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Will Jessett, et al. ♢ - Page 9 of 24 + Page 9 of 25 ♢ diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index e0155a6a..720f1001 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-05-10T09:51:17+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.40 © MMXXIV踐行「見字飲水」信條2024-03-07T12:00:00+08:002024-03-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/live-the-creed-of-see-this-and-drink-water<p>我由自暴自棄改變過來後，發掘到一些我與世界互動，從而推動改變的可能性。也別說，這些發現還真有意思呢！</p> +Jekyll2024-05-12T18:41:28+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.40 © MMXXIV踐行「見字飲水」信條2024-03-07T12:00:00+08:002024-03-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/live-the-creed-of-see-this-and-drink-water<p>我由自暴自棄改變過來後，發掘到一些我與世界互動，從而推動改變的可能性。也別說，這些發現還真有意思呢！</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index 18d1d3d0..db5b1a6b 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-05-10T09:51:17+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.40 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-05-12T18:41:28+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.40 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index 53edcdba..aad04462 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-05-10T09:51:17+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.40 © MMXXIVTransformer2024-03-21T12:00:00+08:002024-03-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/JensenHuang-a1_l-transformer<p>今天，我们邀请Tansformer的创造者们，来一起讨论未来生成式人工智能（GenAI）会将我们带向何方。</p> +Jekyll2024-05-12T18:41:28+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.40 © MMXXIVTransformer2024-03-21T12:00:00+08:002024-03-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/JensenHuang-a1_l-transformer<p>今天，我们邀请Tansformer的创造者们，来一起讨论未来生成式人工智能（GenAI）会将我们带向何方。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index 318932d3..9c435bcb 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,8209 +1,8169 @@ -Jekyll2024-05-10T09:51:17+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.40 © MMXXIVChip Export Control2024-04-09T12:00:00+08:002024-04-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/chip-export-control<p><em>Export control evasion of controlled chips is a known concern, but the specifics of this activity are opaque. In addition, a systematic analysis of the entire chip smuggling pipeline, from initial procurement to unlawful distribution, remains conspicuously absent.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This study aims to bridge that methodological gap. It dissects the smuggling pipeline into four distinct stages: (1) initial procurement; (2) evasion of customs controls; (3) port exit; and (4) transshipment.</em></p> +Jekyll2024-05-12T18:41:28+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.40 © MMXXIV【黎智英案・審訊第 59 日】2024-04-12T12:00:00+08:002024-04-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-59<ul> + <li>陳梓華：G20全球登報遇資金困難 Mark Simon稱黎智英願墊支500萬惟事後要還</li> + <li>陳梓華：黎智英和Mark Simon非常滿意G20登報成果 提議辦展覽延續影響力</li> +</ul> -<p>This report advocates for a first-principles approach in assessing export control evasion risks. Estimates should be anchored on specific vulnerabilities within the supply chain and actual smuggling tactics. To this end, this report identifies 11 potential tactics across the smuggling pipeline. It finds that export control evasion is likely more prevalent than suspected due to an underappreciation of the range and dimensionality of individual smuggling tactics. Importantly, the compounding risk profile that emerges when multiple tactics are layered together is underestimated.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Crucially, this report observes that as soon as illicit goods depart the port of origin and get buried in transshipment networks, untangling the knotted snarl becomes impractical. As such, policymakers should focus on interventions upstream in the smuggling pipeline. In addition, this report suggests a reorientation in how export control compliance should be approached. Rather than fixating on who to bar from the game, regulators should shift their focus toward who gets to play, moving from a system of exclusion based on the reactive blacklisting of suspicious entities to a system of inclusion built on preapprovals. This will be implemented through a series of policies that will sequentially disable each part of the smuggling pipeline before the illicit cargo can depart the port of origin: (1) a certification program during initial procurement to create a marketplace of trusted sellers and increase compliance know-how; (2) the use of digital waybills to reduce documentation fraud and facilitate traceability in order to address evasion of customs controls; and (3) the use of preapproved logistics providers, tagged at the point of sale, to inoculate against the risk of illicit diversion when exiting a port. Logistics providers will be mandated to report to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) monthly on any consignments not received within a specified timeframe of two to four weeks, pinpointing suspicious entities and facilitating targeted and timely spot checks by the BIS on vendors identified as potential weak links.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Nt0k3CH.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>This is ultimately how the United States wins the proverbial “whack-a-mole” game, where smuggling networks surface momentarily, vanish, and reemerge elsewhere as quickly as they can be identified. First, it limits the number of tunnels made available to the moles. This will be operationalized through a stringent preapprovals regime that only permits thoroughly screened chip sellers and logistics providers to operate. Second, by collaborating with partner countries, the United States multiplies the hammers in play, to collectively flush the quarry out of the remaining tunnels. This step can be functionalized through dedicated regional units comprising a few experts from the BIS, along with secondees from individual customs authorities, to strengthen intelligence sharing, risk profiling, interdiction, and investigation competence. Lastly, through the use of modern analytics software, third countries can better and more reliably predict where and how the remaining moles will appear. Collectively, these efforts will allow the United States to reclaim control over the rules of the game and tilt the odds in favor of success against slippery evasion strategies.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（12日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第59日審訊。控方傳召另一名已認罪被告陳梓華以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。陳供稱，2019年6月G20峰會全球文宣登報計劃面對資金問題，在「公海群組」成員的提議下，陳經民主黨創黨主席李柱銘聯絡黎智英，希望黎可以借貸。在李的協助下，陳聯絡上黎的私人助手 Mark Simon，對方表示「呢個計劃好符合佢哋個政治主張」，希望可以令政府回應市民訴求，遂願意墊支500萬元，但事後一定要還款。Mark Simon 又稱黎智英「會願意提供 all kinds of help 去支持呢類型嘅文宣活動」。</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒昨日完成了15日的作供，控方今傳召另一名已認罪被告陳梓華，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。</p> -<p>The prevailing overconfidence in the efficacy of export controls for chips, guided by the “chokepoint theory,” and the related underestimation of export control evasion, first proceeds from an incomplete and cursory understanding of individual smuggling tactics. This is the case for even well-known methods such as the use of shell companies and transshipment networks. For example, the former may be supplemented by front and shell companies and the activation of dormant shelf companies. This defense-in-depth approach makes quick detection and punitive action far more difficult. Similarly, the transshipment challenge extends beyond the circuitous routing of illicit consignments through multiple third countries to muddy the trail. Along the way, smugglers also often utilize multimodal tactics combining air, sea, and land to further confound tracking efforts. In this manner, smugglers exploit regulatory arbitrage not only across different jurisdictions, but also between siloed domestic authorities.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華出庭作供-學歷至碩士程度-任職律師樓">陳梓華出庭作供 學歷至碩士程度 任職律師樓</h4> -<p>And this only scratches the surface. This report further considers nine other smuggling tactics, ranging from the pedestrian, such as utilizing human carriers or mules and concealing chips in ordinary commodities, to progressively more difficult-to-detect methods such as embedding chips in electrical products, disassembling chips, contaminating container cargo, and even using small submersible vessels. While the last suggestion appears fantastical, a study in the 2000s estimated that “narco-subs” accounted for one-third of maritime cocaine trafficking between South America and the United States.</p> +<p>陳身穿灰色西裝、戴眼鏡，在3名懲教人員帶領下，循法庭特別通道進入庭內證人台就坐，並以非宗教儀式宣誓，其後開始作供。</p> -<p>All of these graft onto the fact that chips are particularly amenable to smuggling. Unlike semiconductor manufacturing equipment — which is large, produced in low quantities, sold at extortionate prices, and requires significant amounts of post-sales support — chips are portable enough to fit in a shoe box, are produced in the millions, are high cost but not prohibitively so, and require little to no post-sales support whatsoever. For comparison, a single state-of-the-art extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machine costs $350 million and requires 13 truck-sized containers and 250 crates for transportation. Meanwhile, an H100 chip costs roughly $40,000 and is sufficiently compact that 609 of them can be hidden within a single small freight box.</p> +<p>陳供稱他的英文名是 Wayland，大學時修讀法律，碩士課程則修讀中國法律，主要收入來源是在律師樓工作的薪金。</p> -<p>In addition, while this report provides a primer on tactics that may be used, given the dizzying profit margins to be made, these are likely only the tip of the iceberg. Take a hypothetical example of an H100 being sold in the black market at three times its retail value, for a markup of an additional $80,000 per chip. If a smuggler sells ten chips, they start to skirt the edges of a millionaire’s lifestyle; if they sell a thousand, they are elevated from nouveau riche to the landed gentry. There are few greater motivators for the imagination than greed, and policymakers should not underestimate that ancient playwright. As a result, customs officials are always working off a playbook that does not accurately render both the range and dimensionality of smuggling tactics.</p> +<p>陳亦確認，他在2020年8月10日被警方以「協助罪犯」罪名拘捕，之後獲警方擔保。陳在2021年2月15日再次被捕，罪名是「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」。至同年2月17日，陳被正式起訴「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」，被指與黎智英、Mark Simon 及「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人串謀呼籲外國機構制裁香港特區及中國，另被控「串謀協助罪犯」。陳確認。</p> -<p>Furthermore, the depths of what makes the smuggling enterprise so difficult to detect have scarcely been grazed. The principal challenge of intercepting smuggling operations is not related to the difficulty of detecting individual tactics per se. Rather, it arises from a variety of tactics being combined with one another in a complex chain of overlapping mini-sequences, with tactics recalibrated and refined at each transshipment point. Each supplemental tactic and layer of obfuscation compounds the risk profile. Even if each individual tactic has a seemingly manageable risk of detection, by threading through interstitial gaps at each vulnerability and layering tactics as the context demands to always seek the path of least resistance, the compounding probability of evasion by smugglers drastically increases.</p> +<p>控方指，陳在2021年7月7日承認「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，而「串謀協助罪犯」罪則留法庭存檔，不予起訴。陳確認。</p> -<p>Accordingly, the risk profile for export control evasion does not scale linearly. All else equal, it surges almost exponentially with the length and complexity of the smuggling sequence. It should be qualified that a single weak point, such as a poorly forged document or an improperly concealed illicit item, can compromise the entire operation. But given the high stakes and margins of the operations at play here, it is reasonable to expect that the smuggling syndicates involved are at least half-competent and, with the attacker’s advantage, are more likely than not to evade detection.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華指冀透過g20登報關注反修例運動-惟出現資金問題">陳梓華指冀透過G20登報關注反修例運動 惟出現資金問題</h4> -<p>Laslty, because chips command the forefront of innovation, there is a reflexive instinct to assume that any chip-related challenge, including the bypassing of export controls, demands a similarly high-tech remedy. Without discounting the merits of technical interventions, this report suggests that instead of centering chips as the primary object of attention and smuggling as the backdrop, the reverse may be more instructive. By focusing on smuggling rather than technology, it becomes apparent that chip smuggling will likely not be entirely different from the trafficking of drugs or conflict diamonds, and is beholden to similar attributes, such as compactness, ease of concealment, and unit economics. Importantly, the factors facilitating evasion are steadfastly pre-modern. Seven out of the eleven tactics highlighted in this report hinge on the human element (e.g., bribery) and poor customs infrastructure. Chip smuggling is not a novel issue, but the age-old story of traditional contraband. As such, policymakers should be attentive to the persistent points of failure and timeworn tactics that have sustained this industry.</p> +<p>就2019年的事件，控方問陳是否認識黎智英，陳表示：「我認識。」他並稱在2019年6月透過李柱銘聯絡黎智英。</p> -<h3 id="methodology">Methodology</h3> +<p>陳指，當時他在一個關於G20峰會的 Telegram「公海群組」，見到一個叫「rip」的用戶聲稱需要資金去做全球文宣登報，然後陳私訊「rip」了解情況，「rip」便直接打電話給陳，「我聽到把聲係男聲」，因而知道對方是一名男性。陳指「rip」當時解釋，雖然眾籌已經達標，但是他無法立即取得該筆眾籌款項。</p> -<p>This report puts forward an alternative methodology for assessing export control evasion risks. The traditional approach leans on historical analogues, such as Russia’s circumvention of U.S. export controls for semiconductors following the invasion of Ukraine. While useful, particularly in the absence of reliable information, such approaches are inherently limited and risk overextending region-and country-specific factors.</p> +<p>就G20登報計劃，陳指「佢係一個全球登報嘅一個計劃，趁住當時G20個峰會，就希望可以表達到當時反修例運動，同埋關注香港嘅情況」，又指「當時亦都想表達到，暫緩呢個逃犯修訂條例，唔等如撤回」。</p> -<p>This report advocates for a first-principles approach. It suggests that estimates for export control evasion be anchored on specific vulnerabilities within the supply chain and potential smuggling tactics. This not only promotes a more grounded representation of the evasion landscape but also equips stakeholders with a more precise and actionable framework.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華指後來知道用戶rip真實身份是李宇軒">陳梓華指後來知道用戶「rip」真實身份是李宇軒</h4> -<p>Each method is scrutinized to assess the likelihood of successful evasion (classified as low, medium, or high), pinpointing specific facilitators or barriers to success. This analysis is further supported with real-world case studies and hypothetical scenarios to illustrate each technique in practice. The report thereafter identifies key conclusions and policy recommendations aimed at improving existing control mechanisms.</p> +<p>陳又提到他的 Telegram 用戶名稱是「T」，但一開始是使用「蜂蜜T奶」這名字。</p> -<h3 id="the-export-control-evasion-pipeline">The Export Control Evasion Pipeline</h3> +<p>至於「rip」，陳表示起初不知道這用戶的真實身份，直至大約2019年7月，他與「rip」簽過一份類似借據的協議，期間看過「rip」的身份證，所以知道他的身份是李宇軒。</p> -<p>This section explores the four elements of the export control evasion pipeline — (1) initial procurement, (2) evasion of customs controls, (3) port exit, and (4) transshipment — and component tactics and strategies within each category. Table 1 provides a short summary of each area, as well as the probability for each of evading detection. The rest of the section then unpacks each element in greater detail.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華指公海群組有人提議經李柱銘聯絡黎智英-以解決資金問題">陳梓華指「公海群組」有人提議經李柱銘聯絡黎智英 以解決資金問題</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FF3PaIF.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Summary of the Export Control Evasion Pipeline and Key Takeaways.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> +<p>陳指，當時「公海群組」有過千或過萬人，其中有一個叫「Uncle Walkie」的用戶提議可以聯絡黎智英或其朋友去解決資金問題。陳看到訊息後，在群組入面問：「咁有冇人認識黎智英？」然後有人提議，如果沒有人認識黎的話，可以聯絡李柱銘，「因為眾所周知，佢兩個關係好好。」</p> -<h4 id="stage-1-initial-procurement">Stage 1: Initial Procurement</h4> +<p>陳續指，他便在群組中問：「咁有冇人識李柱銘呀？」然後有人把李柱銘的電話號碼傳送至群組。「當我見到個電話號碼，我以為嗰個人係搞笑，因為個電話號碼好特別，有六個字係一模一樣，然後我就大膽打電話過去，然後聯絡到李柱銘。」</p> -<p>Major chipmakers do not engage in direct sales to businesses. NVIDIA, for instance, routes sales through official distributors and authorized original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and resellers. To demonstrate just how few of these entities exist, Japan, which has the largest NVIDIA sales presence in the Asia-Pacific, only has five official distributors, three authorized OEMs, and ten authorized resellers. Account managers at these intermediaries typically adhere to strict Know Your Client (KYC) procedures and assess non-association with parties on blacklists.</p> +<p>陳稱，在電話中「我話我冒眛唐突咁打擾你，但係呢當時有一個G20嘅全球文宣登報計劃，個宗旨係想喺G20峰會度，表達到香港人嘅訴求」，但是眾籌計劃在程序上面，無法直接取得該筆款項，「所以我哋冇辦法按照當時所想嘅去俾到錢報章，去 hold 住啲版位，我哋需要一筆 bridge loan。」陳亦在電話中提及需要金額為300萬元，並稱這筆貸款一定會還，所以想看看李柱銘能否幫忙聯絡黎智英。</p> -<p><strong>THE USE OF FRONT, SHELL, AND SHELF COMPANIES</strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YO6VGMz.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 李柱銘（資料圖片）</p> -<p>Buyer screening relies heavily on the accurate identification of the real end user. As such, smugglers often use front and shell companies with stand-in directors or shareholders to obscure the ultimate beneficiaries. They then misrepresent the intended recipient to bypass export licensing requirements, especially for countries that face a presumption of denial. In addition, by activating long-standing but dormant shelf companies, smugglers further complicate the task of differentiating between legitimate and deceptive transactions.</p> +<p>陳憶述當時李柱銘在電話中表示明白，「但係我𠵱家唔得閒，我晏少少打返電話畀你。」後來李回電，要求陳再一次解釋為何需要貸款，因為按照李的理解，既然眾籌已經達標，理論上可以做到他們想做的事；陳遂向李解釋，「的而且確眾籌達標，但係眾籌平台 Gogetfund hold 住嗰筆錢，未能夠馬上就俾到我哋。」陳指李聽罷表示明白，「佢話佢會聯絡黎智英。」</p> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Medium–High</em></p> +<p>陳指李柱銘其後回電，指中「黎智英已經知道呢件事喇，但係佢唔喺香港，所以我可以搵佢個助手 Mark Simon，直接同 Mark Simon 對話。」陳引述李指：「但係初步聽落去，黎智英係 OK 呢件事（借貸）。」李傳送了 Mark Simon 的電話號碼給陳，之後陳「幾乎馬上」聯絡 Mark Simon。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Human Detection: High</strong></p> +<h4 id="陳梓華引述黎智英助手mark-simon稱g20登報計劃符合其政治主張-故會聯絡老闆">陳梓華引述黎智英助手Mark Simon稱G20登報計劃符合其政治主張 故會聯絡老闆</h4> - <p>This defense-in-depth approach limits the effectiveness of even the most stringent KYC procedures, creating a disorientating maze of corporate entities that sellers must attempt to understand. Moreover, as soon as an actionable level of suspicion can be established, these companies are torn down as quickly as they were propped up. This makes quick detection and punitive action far more difficult, contributing to the proverbial “whack-a-mole” situation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>igital Detection: Medium–High</strong></p> +<p>陳指聯絡到 Mark Simon 之後，「我將我哋遇到嘅困難去話俾佢聽，然後我哋需要呢個 bridge loan 去完成 G20 之前可以登到報紙。」陳轉述 Mark Simon 指，他大概知道這件事情，而陳並非第一個就此事聯絡他的人，「但我表達得比較清楚，所以佢願意同我合作。」陳又引述 Mark Simon 的說話：「佢話呢個計劃好符合佢哋個政治主張，佢都希望呢個計劃可以令政府回應市民訴求」，他聲稱會「同佢老細聯絡」，惟 Mark Simon 並沒未有在該次通話中提及其政治主張是什麼。</p> - <p>Large distributors, resellers, and OEMs often incorporate advanced KYC and Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) tools that look beyond surface-level information, delving into the origins, financial flows, and relationships of entities.</p> +<p>陳續指，相隔10至15分鐘之後，Mark Simon 再次來電，「佢話呢個 bridge loan 冇問題，佢願意墊支500萬，但係要還。」陳理解當時 Mark Simon 所指的500萬元是限額，不能再多。</p> - <p>However, there are always workarounds. A practiced shell company might (1) conduct some legitimate business activities to establish a trail of normal commercial transactions; (2) utilize informal banking systems that are not integrated with international banking protocols for illicit transactions; and (3) generate high-quality fabricated business records and financial statements that can withstand scrutiny by standard document verification processes.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華mark-simon稱黎智英會願意提供任何形式協助">陳梓華：Mark Simon稱黎智英會願意提供任何形式協助</h4> - <p>Ultimately, the efficacy of advanced digital KYC and EDD systems rests on the integrity of the data they analyze. Compromised or fabricated data can undermine the ability of these systems to identify and flag suspicious entities.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>控方問，Mark Simon 有否在電話中提及其老闆。陳則指：「當時佢話 Jimmy 會願意提供 all kinds of help 去支持呢類型嘅文宣活動。」而以陳所理解，Jimmy 即是黎智英。</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="hypothetical-scenario-1">HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 1</h4> - <h4 id="operation-of-a-global-network-of-front-shell-and-shelf-companies">Operation of a Global Network of Front, Shell, and Shelf Companies</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>陳亦引述 Mark Simon 說：「呢一筆錢唔可以經我哋任何人手，佢希望個方式係，當啲報章去出一個invoice 嘅時候，然後佢去直接付款畀呢啲報章。」Mark Simon 又說，如果他們想在《蘋果》旗下報章登廣告的話，「係可以先行登報，然後再付款。」</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Entity Y with ties to the defense sector in Regime X may establish a front company in another country alongside various affiliates of the shell company in third countries. It may also use a shelf company, alongside the front company, to further muddy the trail.</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="陳梓華告知李宇軒資金問題解決-並承諾若有需要可以再聯絡黎智英同mark-simon">陳梓華告知李宇軒資金問題解決 並承諾若有需要「可以再聯絡黎智英同Mark Simon」</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>Procurement agents, operating covertly on behalf of Entity Y, will orchestrate purchases of chips by the front or shelf company, which receives funding from a shell company’s foreign bank account and in turn transmits funds through a U.S. correspondent bank account to the supplier.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>陳指，他與 Mark Simon 通話之後，同日便透過 Telegram 聯絡李宇軒，告知「蘋果黎智英嗰邊願意墊支500萬」，並叫李將報館的廣告費發票電郵給他們「找數」。陳形容李「當初一開始唔相信呢件事，然後我再同佢講，我好確定我哋可以做到」，他並向李表示「若然你之後喺文宣國際線上面需要幫忙嘅話，我可以再聯絡黎智英同 Mark Simon」。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Moreover, the front or shelf company may order and receive chips from multiple suppliers. In order to avoid drawing attention with large transactions, it will conduct numerous below-threshold transactions that avoid triggering transaction alerts, gradually accumulating significant holdings.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>陳指，李聽罷之後，「佢當時好興奮，話要搞咗啲報紙先，然後就大家開始處理喺邊啲地區國家登報紙。」</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The company will then route the goods to Regime X, often through permissive jurisdictions such as known transshipment points.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>控方問，為何陳當時特別聯絡網名「rip」的李宇軒，而不是其他人。陳表示，因為見到「rip」有權限把訊息置頂，因此相信「rip」當時是「群主」。加上當時他較早前就財務事宜聯絡過「rip」，相信「rip」負責財政，所以才會聯絡「rip」而不是其他人。</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-1"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 1</code></h4> - <h4 id="smuggling-us-microelectronics-to-post-sanctions-russia"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Smuggling U.S. Microelectronics to Post-sanctions Russia</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="陳梓華指李宇軒在登報計劃中是資助者及協調者">陳梓華指李宇軒在登報計劃中是資助者及協調者</h4> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Arthur Petrov, a 33-year-old dual citizen of Russia and Germany, was arrested on August 26, 2023, for his involvement in a scheme to illicitly transport U.S. microelectronics technology, which has military uses, to Russia.</code></em></p> +<p>就陳梓華在登報計劃之中的角色，陳稱自己負責協調報館發票和收據的往來，就《衛報》、《華盛頓郵報》、兩間法國報紙及一份意大利報紙，李宇軒會將發票電郵給他，他會將之轉發給 Mark Simon，其後當 Mark Simon 繳付款項之後，就會將收據傳送給陳，然後陳轉發給李。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Petrov procured the controlled microelectronics from U.S.-based electronics exporters using a Cyprus-based shell company, Astrafteros Technokosmos LTD (Astrafteros), which he operated.</code></em></p> +<p>至於其他報紙的發票和收據，陳並沒有收到，他當時知道李宇軒會收到所有報館的發票，而李會繳付廣告費。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Petrov misled U.S. suppliers by claiming that Astrafteros was acquiring the components for use in fire safety systems and other civilian applications, asserting that the final recipients and locations for these items were companies in Cyprus or other third countries. In reality, however, these sensitive electronics were intended for Electrocom in Russia, a company that provides equipment to Russian military manufacturers.</code></em></p> +<p>就李宇軒的角色，陳表示以他的認知，李在「高登」或「連登」討論區得知G20全球登報計劃，當李參與眾籌計劃時，李負責選擇使用哪一個眾籌平台，然後將收款人設定為自己；當他們確定在哪些報紙登報的時候，李便用自己的錢繳付廣告費。因此陳認為李的角色除了是一個資助者（funder）之外，還是一個匯總、協調者，「去將唔同報章嘅內容，最尾擺埋一齊。」</p> -<p><strong>ACQUIRING EXCESS STOCK FROM SMALLER RESELLERS AND OEMS</strong></p> +<h4 id="兩公司墊支部份廣告費-mark-simon事後提供還款戶口資料-稱都係屬於佢老細">兩公司墊支部份廣告費 Mark Simon事後提供還款戶口資料 稱都係「屬於佢老細」</h4> -<p>Official distributors and authorized resellers and OEMs often purchase excess stock due to bulk discount incentives or to preempt potential shortages. Leading-edge chips such as NVIDIA H100s, facing tight demand-supply constraints, are unlikely candidates for stockpiling.</p> +<p>控方在庭上展示不同報館的發票和匯款紀錄，顯示《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費用是85,050美元，由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 代表李宇軒繳付。</p> -<p>It is worth noting, however, that following the October 17, 2023, export controls update, controlled chips now also include high-end gaming chips and lower-performing data-center chips. Surplus stock from this expanded category may occasionally be offloaded to smaller resellers or OEMs, who may not enforce stringent KYC protocols compared to larger, established distributors. These are consequently attractive targets for smugglers.</p> +<p>《衛報》發出的收據顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 代表李宇軒支付了18,000英鎊廣告費。</p> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> +<p>就意大利《晚郵報》（Corriere Della Sera）的廣告費，匯豐銀行的付款紀錄顯示，力高顧問有限公司（Dico Consultants Limited）代表李宇軒支付2萬元歐羅。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Human Detection: High</strong></p> +<p>控方問陳，當時 Mark Simon 有否提及 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高顧問有限公司的事。陳則回答當時沒有，但之後在2019年7月，第一次與 Mark Simon 見面的時候，對方則有提及。</p> - <p>Industry insiders note that these lesser-known distributors may not rigorously enforce KYC procedures. This is not driven by conspiratorial intent, but simply due to a lack of capacity and an experience deficit. Smaller resellers lack the financial and human resources to invest in rigorous training for compliance and do not have the extensive experience of larger distributors, which is crucial for spotting sophisticated evasion tactics.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Digital Detection: High</strong></p> +<p>就歸還墊支款項事宜，陳指他在2019年7月與 Mark Simon 見面時，從對方手上接過單據和3個用以還款的戶口資料，然後轉交給李宇軒。</p> - <p>As previously mentioned, there are advanced KYC and EDD tools available, but these are costly and typically out of reach for smaller resellers and OEMs in developing countries. In addition, unlike larger distributors and OEMs such as Dell or Fujitsu, they likely do not have access to databases that aggregate global information, which is necessary for effective digital scrutiny.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>陳指3個戶口分別是加拿大、香港和台灣的戶口，當時 Mark Simon 跟他說：「希望、如果可以，可以 send 返啲錢去加拿大，但若然方便你哋，你哋揀任何一個戶口都可以，因為3個戶口都係屬於佢老細。」</p> -<h4 id="stage-2-evasion-of-customs-controls">Stage 2: Evasion of Customs Controls</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CBmDXAl.png" alt="image03" /></p> -<p>The range of tactics to sidestep customs can be broadly collapsed into one key facilitating factor — bribery — and four primary strategies: (1) utilizing human carriers, (2) concealing chips in ordinary commodities, (3) concealing chips in electrical products, (4) disassembling chips.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（12日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第59日審訊。控方傳召另一名已認罪被告陳梓華以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。陳供稱，在2019年6月籌辦G20峰會全球文宣登報計劃期間，他與李宇軒首次親身見面，他問李為何願意墊支400萬元，李當時回應：「為咗香港，都一定要咁做，就算按咗層樓，佢都會咁做。」同年7月，陳與 Mark Simon 首次親身見面，對方「大讚」登報文宣，表示非常滿意成果和效果。Mark Simon 又提議舉辦展覽以延續G20登報的影響力，若果符合他與黎智英的政治理念，「佢哋願意提供經濟上、人脈上，同埋傳媒方面嘅協助。」Mark Simon 亦提到「國際上面嘅 lobbying」，惟陳「當時對 lobbying 冇乜認知」，所以僅向對方說會嘗試參與報紙展覽。</p> -<p><strong>BRIBING CUSTOMS OFFICIALS</strong></p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒昨日完成了15日的作供，控方今傳召另一名已認罪被告陳梓華，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。</p> -<p>Corruption can facilitate several smuggling tactics. Smugglers may bribe customs officials to provide insider information on shift patterns, inspection routines, or red flags officials look for; turn a blind eye to falsified documents; or even digitally manipulate or alter customs records.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華問李宇軒為何墊支巨額-李稱為咗香港都一定要咁做">陳梓華問李宇軒為何墊支巨額 李稱「為咗香港，都一定要咁做」</h4> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> +<p>陳梓華上午提到，2019年6月G20峰會全球文宣登報計劃遇到資金問題，故他嘗試經李柱銘聯絡黎智英，後來聯絡上黎的私人助手 Mark Simon。Mark Simon 稱他及黎願意墊支500萬元，惟事後須要還款。最終 Mark Simon 及黎一方墊支了約150萬元，其餘廣告費則由李宇軒墊支。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Susceptibility of Customs Officials: High</strong></p> +<p>有關陳梓華與李宇軒第一次見面，陳指在籌辦G20登報期間，即2019年6月25至29日之間，二人在金鐘親身見面，「嗰次係純粹大家見個面，我問佢點解要佢自己墊支嗰筆錢」，因為據陳所知，李差不多要墊支400萬元，然後黎智英一方要墊支約200萬元，但是李當時回應：「為咗香港，都一定要咁做，就算按咗層樓，佢都會咁做。」此外，陳確認在該次見面中，有把一些匯款通知書交給李。惟陳當時並未知道李宇軒的真名。</p> - <p>Smugglers often have an in-depth understanding of which countries are more susceptible to corruption. As a result, they are likely to exploit customs officials in developing countries, who are often paid meager salaries. For example, a customs inspector in Cambodia, which is the second-poorest country in Southeast Asia by GDP per capita, is paid an average salary of $6,635 per year, which works out to $553 per month. According to an Economist Intelligence Unit report, it is not uncommon for frontline border officers in less developed economies in Asia to make $100 a month.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華g20後詢問李宇軒還款安排惟李唔應機-遂要求簽借據">陳梓華：G20後詢問李宇軒還款安排惟李「唔應機」 遂要求簽借據</h4> - <p>This is not a depressed outlier number supplied to advance this point. For reference, a customs inspector in Malaysia, which is the third-richest country in Southeast Asia by GDP per capita, is still only paid an average salary of $9,336 per year, which works out to $778 per month. Accordingly, officials are less likely to be susceptible to bribery in a country such as Singapore, the richest country in Southeast Asia by GDP per capita, which has a strong anti-corruption culture and where customs inspectors are paid an average salary of $28,979 per year, or $2,415 per month.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>陳續指，G20登報計劃在13個國家、20份報紙刊登廣告之後，他便開始問李宇軒是否已經成功收到眾籌款項，「但佢一直都唔應機，於是乎我就喺群組入面問咗幾個網友點算。」陳指其中一個網友提議陳和李之間簽署借據，「令佢（李）個人承擔返嗰150萬元。」陳表示：「我認為呢種做法，係無論對 Mark Simon 定黎智英，定抑或係G20本身，都係負責任嘅做法。」</p> -<p><strong>UTILIZING HUMAN CARRIERS</strong></p> +<p>陳指，他準備好借據之後便打電話給李宇軒，打了數次後李才接電話，他向李解釋情況，「因為阿 Mark 都話有人問過嗰筆錢幾時會返番去、有冇時間表，但李宇軒乜都冇覆。」</p> -<p>At first glance, the use of carriers, or “mules,” might seem rudimentary, but it is worth analyzing both for completeness and its continued prevalence. This tactic has the highest likelihood of detection and is not the most efficient method for smuggling at scale.</p> +<p>於是陳相約李到金鐘力寶中心見面，並在哪裡與李共同簽署一份借據。陳指同場有兩名見證人，皆是群組入面的網友，而簽署好的借據由兩名見證人保管。</p> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Low</em></p> +<p>陳指借據上並沒有規定還款日期，只是提及李宇軒向代表 Mark Simon 的陳梓華借錢，欠款約150萬元。該次是陳和李第二次見面。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Human Detection: Low</strong></p> +<h4 id="陳梓華指李宇軒獲得還款戶口號碼後-便稱已還款-不需利息">陳梓華指李宇軒獲得還款戶口號碼後 便稱已還款 不需利息</h4> - <p>Border control screeners, faced with the overwhelming task of screening thousands of travelers, can only scrutinize a fraction in detail. However, the uniformity of the standard security protocol and internal intelligence provides a counterbalance to this challenge.</p> +<p>陳續指，在簽署借據當日的晚上，他與 Mark Simon 透過 WhatsApp call 通話，陳向對方稱，「李宇軒係願意個人去承擔呢筆債務，所以佢唔會拖數。」陳又解釋，因為 Mark Simon 提供了3個還款戶口，分別是加拿大、台灣和香港的戶口，所以李不知道如何還錢，究竟是一次過還錢，還是分別還去3個戶口。Mark Simon 則稱會稍後回覆。</p> - <p>Seasoned border control screeners are also trained to observe behavioral cues, body language, inconsistencies in travelers’ responses, and other subtle indicators that might hint at deceptive activities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Machine Detection: Low</strong></p> +<p>陳指，大概在7月底，Mark Simon 回覆他，指李可以還款去任何一個戶口，但最好是一筆過地還款。</p> - <p>Full-body scanners (e.g., millimetre-wave scanners) can detect metallic and non-metallic objects as well as items hidden under clothing. However, they do not penetrate the skin and as such are unable to detect illicit goods hidden within body cavities. But unlike contraband such as drugs or conflict diamonds, hiding sensitive electrical products within body cavities may be impractical as chips, especially those on boards, are too rigid and large to be concealed in this manner and the functionality of the chips can be compromised.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>控方問 Mark Simon 有否提及該3個戶口的持有人是誰。陳引述 Mark Simon 指3個戶口「都係佢老細」，但是沒有提及戶口持有人是誰，換言之 Mark Simon 實際上只提供了3個戶口號碼。</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-2"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 2</code></h4> - <h4 id="trafficking-of-cpus-in-gongbei-port-macau"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Trafficking of CPUs in Gongbei Port, Macau</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>陳指，他其後把 Mark Simon 的說話及3個還款戶口號碼轉述給李宇軒，數天之後，李宇軒「佢就話佢找咗筆錢喇」。控方問該筆貸款是否有利息，陳則指沒有。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In March 2023, a smuggler was caught at Gongbei Port, the entry point from Macau to China, with 239 central processing units (CPUs) wrapped around his abdomen and legs.</code></em></p> +<h4 id="陳梓華mark-simon和黎智英滿意g20登報效果-並稱可就展覽提供協助">陳梓華：Mark Simon和黎智英滿意G20登報效果 並稱可就展覽提供協助</h4> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Customs officials became suspicious due to his ill-fitting black clothing and strange gait. The CPUs were confiscated, and the man was detained.</code></em></p> +<p>陳梓華提到他與 Mark Simon 於2019年7月首次親身見面，當日在中環文華酒店的咖啡廳，同場還有 Mark Simon 的兒子，「係一個細路仔嚟嘅，然後 Mark Simon 就話呢個係佢個仔。」</p> -<p><strong>CONCEALING CHIPS IN ORDINARY COMMODITIES</strong></p> +<p>陳指二人會合後，Mark Simon 介紹自己為黎智英的助手，「咁佢就 basically 執行佢個 boss 嘅order。」陳續指，「佢（Mark Simon）首先大讚G20全球登報文宣，佢哋好滿意，佢話佢哋非常滿意個成果同效果。」而陳指「佢哋」是代表黎智英和 Mark Simon。</p> -<p>This tactic is a play on misdirection. Customs officials rely on the accuracy and integrity of declared goods to efficiently process vast quantities of imports and exports.</p> +<p>陳引述 Mark Simon 稱：「佢認為未來嘅文宣方向，應該係延續返G20登報嘅影響力。」Mark Simon 舉例指可舉辦展覽，「因為佢話，並唔係人人都會睇報紙，若然我哋可以喺呢方面做多啲，亦都符合佢哋嘅政治理念，佢哋願意提供經濟上、人脈上，同埋傳媒方面嘅協助。」</p> -<p>A Harmonized System (HS) code (see box below) serves as a beacon, directing authorities’ attention and shaping their expectations about a product. The use of incorrect HS codes effectively hides contraband in plain sight, making it appear as routine cargo. This makes smuggling detection an even bigger needle-in-a-haystack challenge.</p> +<p>控方追問當時 Mark Simon 有否談及其政治理念是什麼。陳指 Mark Simon 沒有特別講到政治理念，「但佢有幾次強調『民主』呢個單字。」此外，在該次會面中，Mark Simon 把一個棕色信封交給他，內含G20廣告費的發票和收據，以及3個還款戶口的資料。</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="primer-on-harmonized-system-codes">Primer on Harmonized System Codes</h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="陳梓華稱開離岸公司戶口有困難-mark-simon稱可幫忙當係個獎勵俾自己">陳梓華稱開離岸公司戶口有困難 Mark Simon稱可幫忙、「當係個獎勵俾自己」</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>The Harmonized System (HS) is an international framework that assigns standardized codes to traded products, facilitating global trade classification. The HS code classification is illustrated below using semiconductors as an example.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>陳又指，Mark Simon 有問他未來想做什麼，陳當時稱有朋友想邀請他一起做生意，「其實我鍾意做生意多啲」，然後他談論了想做什麼類型的生意。Mark Simon 一度問陳是否遇到什麼困難，陳則指好難在香港開設到一間離岸公司的銀行戶口。Mark Simon 則稱「應該唔難」，並表示「其實我可以幫到你，你就當係個獎勵畀自己」。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>An HS code is a six-digit number, structured in three parts:</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="陳梓華指mark-simon有提及國際游說-惟當時對國際游說沒有認知">陳梓華指Mark Simon有提及國際游說 惟當時對國際游說沒有認知</h4> -<blockquote> - <ol> - <li>The first two digits (HS-85) indicate the general category or chapter. For example, 85 pertains to “Electrical Machinery and Equipment and Parts Thereof.”</li> - <li>The subsequent two digits (.42) pinpoint subcategories within that chapter. Taking the earlier example, 85.42 specifies “Electrical Integrated Circuits; Parts Thereof.”</li> - <li>The final two digits (.31) provide even greater detail. For instance, 85.42.31 is reserved for “Processors and Controllers.”</li> - </ol> -</blockquote> +<p>陳指 Mark Simon 還有問他會否繼續參與文宣工作，陳當時回答「我會繼續」。Mark Simon 有談及本土的文宣工作，也有談及「國際上面嘅 lobbying」。陳表示，「但我當時對 lobbying 冇乜認知，所以我就同佢講，我會嘗試參與更加多喺報紙展覽。」</p> -<p>Accordingly, controlled chips can be hidden in almost any conceivable manner. Semiconductors (HS 85.42.31) could be concealed in a bag of rice (HS 10.06.30), hermetically sealed in a barrel of crude oil (HS 15.15.11), or simply hidden in a consignment of electronic waste (HS 85.49.39).</p> +<p>控方追問 Mark Simon 口中的「國際上 lobbying」是指什麼。陳則表示當時不清楚。被問到游說的目的，陳指是爭取「五大訴求」，即要求政府撤回逃犯條例修訂、推翻612暴動定性及承諾不檢控被捕人士、成立獨立調查委員會調查警暴，以及落實雙普選。</p> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Medium–High</em></p> +<h4 id="陳梓華視李宇軒為攬炒團隊一員">陳梓華視李宇軒為「攬炒團隊」一員</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Human Detection: Medium–High</strong></p> +<p>陳指，2019年6月之後，由「攬炒巴」劉祖廸帶領的「攬炒團隊」籌辦另一次登報行動，但主題與G20不同，因G20是關於反修例和「五大訴求」，但是「攬炒團隊」的登報行動則是關於中英聯合聲明，「希望英國政府可以履行佢哋道德責任。」</p> - <p>The vast majority of customs checks are routine. Ordinary commodities are handled with a cursory, less suspicious eye with customs officers inadvertently adopting a pattern of expedited checks for such goods.</p> +<p>陳提到當時有大量「公海群組」，目的是聚集更多志同道合的人，俗稱「圈人」，至於實際工作則不是在「公海」討論，而是有另外一些非公開小組。</p> - <p>Even well-trained officers might miss chips adeptly hidden within routine shipments, especially if the overall shipment does not raise suspicions. Additionally, the compact size of chips makes this a “needle-in-a-haystack” challenge. A smuggler could discreetly hide as many as 609 H100 graphics processing units (GPUs) in just one small FedEx freight box, which would be outwardly indistinguishable from other identical boxes.</p> +<p>以陳的理解，李宇軒是「攬炒團隊」成員之一，因為當時李告訴陳，「攬炒團隊」需要有人幫手做眾籌，「我當時嘅理解係佢又想搵人墊支」，然後陳跟李說「你去做啦」，因他相信「攬炒團隊」需要一個有經驗、做過眾籌的人，而李有足夠能力協助他們處理。陳不記得李當時怎樣回覆，「但係我哋下次對話嘅時候，佢已經喺攬炒團隊入面做緊。」</p> - <p>However, many customs personnel are trained to recognize common smuggling tactics and are aware of the propensity to hide illicit goods in everyday shipments. As a countermeasure, random intensive checks are conducted, even on seemingly mundane shipments. In addition, customs officials have databases that store information on previous shipments. As a result, a sudden change in the pattern, frequency, or nature of shipments from a particular company or to a particular address can raise suspicions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Machine Detection: Medium</strong></p> +<p>案件下周一（4月15日）續審。</p> - <p>While the dimunitive size of GPUs can make them nearly imperceptible, especially when masked among bulkier items, they are still likely to show up on modern X-ray scans. X-ray and scanning technologies are also continually improving. Dual-energy X-ray systems can distinguish between organic and inorganic materials, potentially flagging a semiconductor hidden within a bag of rice.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<hr /> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-3"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 3</code></h4> - <h4 id="concealment-of-intregrated-circuits-in-a-wood-pulp-consignment"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Concealment of Intregrated Circuits in a Wood Pulp Consignment</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導陳梓華：G20全球登報遇資金困難 Mark Simon稱黎智英願墊支500萬惟事後要還 陳梓華：黎智英和Mark Simon非常滿意G20登報成果 提議辦展覽延續影響力Euro SIFMANet Riga Report2024-04-12T12:00:00+08:002024-04-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/euro-sifmanet-riga-report<p><em>Roundtable held in Riga in March 2024 highlighted the importance of data sharing in improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In June 2023, Hong Kong customs officers seized $153.4 million worth of new integrated circuits stashed in 15 shipping containers. X-rays of the 15 containers, declared to be carrying wood pulp, revealed suspicious images. Two boxes containing wood pulp were placed at the top of each container, underneath which contraband items were stored.</code></em></p> -</blockquote> +<excerpt /> -<p><strong>CONCEALING CHIPS IN ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS</strong></p> +<p>Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, unprecedented and comprehensive sanctions have been imposed on it. Among the measures taken in the first several months of the war were the immobilisation of the Bank of Russia’s reserves, sanctions on several large Russian financial institutions and their disconnection from SWIFT, the EU’s embargo on Russian oil, the G7 oil price cap regime, and comprehensive export controls on dual-use goods. More restrictions have been added since. However, the focus of the work of governments, think tanks and wider civil society has shifted to questions of implementation and enforcement. As the Russia sanctions regime is likely to remain in place for years, these issues will continue to play a major role. In addition, they are of utmost importance for the future credibility of sanctions beyond the Russia case.</p> -<p>Smugglers may disguise chips within the casings of other electronics such as power supply units or modified computer cases, which would naturally house similar-looking circuitry and components. More concerning, however, is the potential concealment of GPU servers within high-performance workstations or even commercial servers.</p> +<p>The coalition’s actions have had a significant impact on Russia – curtailing export earnings, reducing policy space and limiting access to critical inputs for its military industry. But clearly, they have not succeeded yet at achieving their ultimate objective: to bring the war to an end and rein in the threat to peace and prosperity in Europe – as well as to the rules-based international order – that Russia poses. In fact, serious issues hinder effective implementation and enforcement of key measures such as the oil price cap and export controls. Over a period of more than two years, the RUSI-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet) has contributed to efforts aimed at understanding which sanctions work, which are plagued by practical challenges, and what needs to be done to improve their effectiveness and ensure their credibility.</p> -<p>Here, GPU servers, which are crucial for enabling high-performance computing with minimal latency at the data-center scale, could be made to look like standard, non-descript internal components and will be less likely to arouse suspicion than when hidden within ordinary commodities.</p> +<p>Previous SIFMANet events have established that all stakeholders – whether governments monitoring sanctions circumvention and evasion, private sector actors seeking to ensure their compliance with the restrictions, or civil society attempting to shed light on key developments – need more and better data. To gain further insights on this issue, the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI hosted a roundtable discussion in Riga in March 2024, with the support of the Financial Intelligence Unit of Latvia, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. The event gathered experts from public and private sectors across Europe to explore, under the Chatham House rule, the critical importance of data sharing and develop proposals for improvements in this area. This report summarises the main findings from the discussion.</p> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Medium–High</em></p> +<h3 id="data-is-critical-for-effective-sanctions-implementation">Data is Critical for Effective Sanctions Implementation</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Human Detection: Medium–High</strong></p> +<p>The way sanctions are thought about has changed dramatically in recent years – and with it, the approach to implementation and enforcement. Participants of the roundtable agreed that, for many years, sanctions – if they were more than simply a foreign policy messaging tool – largely fell on to the compliance departments of financial institutions. A global economy made traditional trade embargoes much more difficult to enforce. In response, the US began to leverage the primacy of its financial system to extend the reach of its sanctions. The threat of disconnection from correspondent banking accounts and loss of access to the US dollar meant that most financial institutions around the world had no choice but to comply.</p> - <p>Everyday electronics are likely to experience relatively expedited checks. Unless specially trained, officers may overlook embedded chips in an otherwise ordinary-looking electronics product, especially if there is no external indication of tampering. However, some major customs checkpoints could employ electronics experts for random reviews. These experts, familiar with the architecture of common devices, might spot irregularities.</p> +<p>The discussion described the Russia sanctions regime as fundamentally different from past cases in several respects. First, the sanctions coalition’s measures target an economy more integrated into trade and global financial flows than in any previous case. Second, the measures go far beyond restrictions on the financial system – they include interventions into global energy markets as well as complex supply chains and distribution networks for dual-use goods. Third, the Russia sanctions aim to restrict an aggressor’s capacities during an ongoing military confrontation, putting a much greater sense of urgency on making them work.</p> - <p>If customs receives a tip or is randomly conducting in-depth inspections, the physical feel, weight, or even the boot-up process of a tampered laptop, for example, could give away the presence of an embedded chip.</p> +<p>As SIFMANet discussions have established previously, data is key. Governments need as much information as possible to guide the implementation of sanctions at home, to investigate and prosecute violators, and to target circumvention networks in third countries. But it is not only the public sector that relies on data. Financial and non-financial corporates can only ensure that their business activities comply with sanctions if they have access to a wide range of information. Finally, think tanks such as RUSI and its partners use data to complement governments’ efforts in the area of sanctions. The complexity of the issues at hand as well as resource constraints in the public sector mean that ensuring their effective implementation and enforcement truly must be a whole-of-society effort.</p> - <p>Moreover, as previously mentioned, customs officials have databases that store information on previous shipments, and sudden changes to the pattern, frequency, or nature of electronic shipments could be a red flag.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Machine Detection: High</strong></p> +<p>Participants of the roundtable recognised that the use of data has improved noticeably over the past two years. Many of the agencies involved in analysing and improving the effectiveness of sanctions now have access to a wealth of critical information. In addition, they have stepped up their efforts to analyse this data by linking information from different sources. Furthermore, cooperation between different agencies – within governments and across jurisdictions – has increased significantly over the past two years. Important challenges on data access and sharing remain, but participants agreed that substantial progress has been made in understanding how sanctions work in practice and on the operation of Russian evasion schemes.</p> - <p>Even with X-ray inspections, the embedded chips will appear like integral components, effectively camouflaged among the device’s internal components. However, laptops or devices embedded with non-standard components might produce more heat or even specific sounds under operation. Such differences, if detected, could alert inspectors during a power-on test.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h3 id="a-changing-focus-from-red-flags-to-actionable-evidence">A Changing Focus: From “Red Flags” to Actionable Evidence</h3> -<p><strong>DISASSEMBLY OF CHIPS</strong></p> +<p>The increasing complexity of the Russia sanctions regime poses major challenges for implementation and enforcement – and calls for a different approach to the use of data. For instance, assessing the effectiveness of the G7 oil price cap requires that government agencies not only establish that a certain transaction involving Russian oil as well as a coalition-based entity took place, but also identify the specific contractual terms – that is, the price – at which it did. This information must be collected from a variety of sources – which are not always publicly available and whose reliability raises legitimate concerns – and be merged to develop a comprehensive picture. Think tanks face essentially the same limitations and challenges when it comes to their work in this area.</p> -<p>Smugglers could deconstruct chips into their constituent parts, which are no longer classified as controlled chips by HS code, effectively bypassing export controls. This would mostly be used for the purposes of reverse-engineering advanced chips, as the process of disassembling or delayering a chip is damaging. Once a chip undergoes this process, it likely cannot be restored to its original functional state.</p> +<p>Another example of the magnitude of the task concerns the private sector. Many large economies do not participate in the sanctions, pushing trade and financial transactions to places with far less transparency. For instance, participants highlighted that a large share of Russia’s imports of so-called “battlefield goods” continues to come from coalition-based producers but via third-country intermediaries in China, Turkey and the UAE, as well as countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Non-financial corporates are being asked to go well beyond traditional sanctions screening of business partners. Instead, they are tasked with controlling complex supply chains and distribution networks – a task for which they are neither prepared nor properly incentivised. In addition, the cross-jurisdictional nature of the transactions itself provides considerable room to conceal illicit activities.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="hypothetical-scenario-2">Hypothetical Scenario 2</h4> - <h4 id="disassembling-chips">Disassembling Chips</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>For civil society, the task has also changed. Participating authorities emphasised that governments are looking for researchers and think tanks to identify much more than suspicious patterns or “red flags”. Rather, enforcement agencies are seeking actionable information that can be used to prosecute sanctions violators and/or target entities with new restrictions. In addition, they seek concrete and detailed assessments of how their measures impact transactions and sanctions compliance.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Technically, a chip can be disassembled, but not in the traditional sense of taking apart larger mechanical assemblies. Instead, “disassembling” a semiconductor chip usually involves chip “decapsulation” and “delayering.” It is typically done for purposes such as failure analysis, competitive analysis, research, and intellectual property verification.</p> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="key-challenges-surrounding-data-availability-sharing-and-use">Key Challenges Surrounding Data Availability, Sharing and Use</h3> -<blockquote> - <p>First, the protective package needs to be removed through decapsulation. This can be done one of two ways:</p> -</blockquote> +<p>From the discussion in Riga, several key points emerged on the challenges of acquiring, sharing and properly using data for effective sanctions implementation and enforcement.</p> -<blockquote> - <ol> - <li>Chemical decapsulation, which uses strong acids or bases to dissolve the package</li> - <li>Mechanical decapsulation, which involves grinding, polishing, or cutting away the package</li> - </ol> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="missing-and-inconsistent-information">Missing and Inconsistent Information</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>Delayering describes the process by which the many layers of an integrated circuit can be removed one by one. This process can involve various methods:</p> -</blockquote> +<p>As mentioned above, the Russia sanctions regime differs from past cases (such as Iran and North Korea) insofar as it imposes complex restrictions on trade and financial transactions. In addition, it has led to multi-layered and cross-jurisdictional circumvention and evasion schemes. This means that authorities in coalition countries must acquire and merge information from a wide variety of sources. This is often challenging. For instance, identifying a violation of the G7 oil price cap requires data on the entities involved in oil transport as well as on the price of the transaction.</p> -<blockquote> - <ol> - <li>Wet etching, where the chip is dipped in specific chemicals to dissolve certain layers while leaving others intact</li> - <li>Dry etching, which uses plasma or ions to selectively remove layers</li> - <li>Mechanical polishing, which uses very fine abrasives to polish away the top layer without damaging the underlying structures</li> - </ol> -</blockquote> +<p>Even if access to the information is secured, it is often difficult to match it to other data and develop a comprehensive picture. On export controls, participants added that an understanding of the entire supply chain and distribution network is needed to determine if a coalition-based producer of battlefield goods has violated sanctions. As the physical shipments of such goods largely take place outside of coalition countries, their own customs data is of little help. And many countries through which the bulk of this trade is conducted do not share information because they do not participate in the sanctions.</p> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> +<p>Authorities can certainly establish that suspicious activities take place, but their ultimate objective of generating actionable intelligence is severely impacted by data constraints. To an extent, these are also the result of regulatory gaps. For instance, incomplete customs declarations can be penalised or prosecuted – but rarely are. And important fields in SWIFT are optional. This includes some that would be critical for the monitoring and identification of potential violations, including locations where physical shipments related to financial flows took place as well as trade codes identifying goods.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Human Detection: High</strong></p> +<h4 id="access-to-and-quality-of-external-data">Access to and Quality of External Data</h4> - <p>Disassembled semiconductor components, if high in volume and lacking distinctive, recognizable features, may not raise suspicions or warrant detailed inspection against their declared descriptions, particularly when inspections are based on random sampling or partial checks of shipments. As the smuggling technique becomes known, customs may employ experts to recognize disassembled chips, although there will be a time lag.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Machine Detection: High</strong></p> +<p>To a large extent, governments, the private sector and civil society have relied on Russian trade data to assess the effectiveness of sanctions. But with Russia increasingly restricting access to its data, representatives from these three sectors acknowledge that their ability to monitor developments is at risk. While some important information is commercially available, its reliability can be legitimately questioned. And such questions extend beyond Russian data. Outreach to countries that are strongly suspected to function as circumvention hubs – Turkey, countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia – has been a focus of coalition governments and the EU. One of the key objectives is to acquire data which can shine light on the extent of illicit transactions and the people and entities involved. Beyond capacity constraints that compromise the quality of the information, customs data is often incomplete (for example, due to smuggling) and/or subject to falsification. In fact, coalition authorities often find significant inconsistencies when comparing data related to the exact same transaction from different sources. Most often, codes identifying the goods in question – so-called Harmonised System (HS) codes – differ between exports to Russia as reported in coalition or third-country customs declarations and imports from those countries to Russia as reflected in the Russian trade data.</p> - <p>Standard X-ray examinations would merely reflect components as inconspicuous, smaller semiconductor fragments, bypassing customs scrutiny.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="data-sharing-within-the-public-sector">Data Sharing Within the Public Sector</h4> -<h4 id="stage-3-port-exit">Stage 3: Port Exit</h4> +<p>Many of the countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia have decentralised implementation and enforcement structures. Participants provided several examples for responsibilities being divided between multiple institutions – ministries of foreign affairs, finance, and economy as well as customs services, banking supervisors, financial intelligence units (FIUs) and law enforcement agencies. This inevitably leads to a less-than-optimal exchange of information and can slow down procedures. Challenges related to data sharing go beyond issues related to institutional setup, however. In many countries, data protection standards are high, making it difficult for key agencies to access information. This can be the case, for instance, for information on physical flows of goods provided by customs services, and on financial transactions provided by central banks and FIUs. Barriers can generally be overcome in the case of suspicions of concrete illicit actions, but they often inhibit efforts to monitor sanctions-related developments more broadly. Detecting problematic patterns and developing strategies to improve the effectiveness of sanctions is, thus, made more complicated. Similar challenges exist for data sharing between governments. In addition, existing systems for information exchange – such as the Egmont Group, which facilitates cooperation between FIUs – are set up for very specific purposes and are limited to specific types of data.</p> -<p>There are a range of tactics smugglers use, but three are worth highlighting: (1) leveraging private couriers; (2) contaminating containger cargo; and (3) use of submersible vessels.</p> +<h4 id="decentralised-enforcement-in-the-eu">Decentralised Enforcement in the EU</h4> -<p><strong>LEVERAGING PRIVATE COURIERS</strong></p> +<p>The issue of decentralisation extends beyond individual governments. In the EU, despite 13 sanctions packages at the union level, member states are responsible for carrying out these measures in practice. And, not surprisingly, participants of the discussion reported that the 27 countries do things very differently. This concerns the institutional setup (that is, who is in charge of sanctions-related issues), staffing and resources (that is, what capacities are available for the task at hand), legal frameworks (that is, national legislation and regulations, criminalisation of violations, among others), access to critical information and political priorities. Inevitably, this leads to the fragmentation of sanctions enforcement and implementation in the EU. The involvement of government agencies from 27 member states – where responsibilities are also often split up between multiple players (as outlined above) – and the EU’s own institutions poses serious practical challenges to an effective exchange of information.</p> -<p>Smugglers often prefer private courier services, which typically apply less rigorous inspection protocols than major, well-established companies. Smaller private couriers might be more susceptible to inducements or bribes due to the nature of their operations and potential financial pressures. In contrast, established logistics providers have more to lose and are less likely to risk severe penalties or reputational damage for illicit gains.</p> +<h4 id="private-sector-capacity-constraints">Private Sector Capacity Constraints</h4> -<p>Larger companies also adhere to predetermined routes, minimizing the chances of clandestine diversions that could be used to bypass regulatory checkpoints. Moreover, they often partake in collaborative platforms that allow for real-time information sharing with customs and other regulatory authorities, fostering an environment of cooperation and compliance.</p> +<p>In the past, sanctions implementation has often fallen on the private sector, especially the compliance departments of financial institutions. The Russia sanctions regime is only exacerbating this dynamic. For instance, non-financial corporates have to control their supply chains and distribution networks related to goods critical for the Russian military industry. While buy-in from the private sector is essential, participants pointed out that governments must recognise existing capacity constraints to develop a sanctions implementation approach that works in practice. Many of the producers whose goods continue to reach Russia are large multinational corporations with significant resources to establish compliance structures and carry out the due diligence that is required of them – but not all of the involved companies are. Many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are involved as well, especially in the manufacturing of hi-tech machinery such as CNC machines.</p> -<p>Moreover, established logistics providers have more compliance capabilities at their disposal. Larger companies utilize advanced package screening technologies. They also maintain thorough and standardized document verification procedures, employing expert personnel trained to detect discrepancies that may indicate smuggling. For instance, global logistics giants such as UPS engage security vendors for the express purpose of screening cargo items (see below).</p> +<h4 id="slow-pace-of-adaptation-to-challenges">Slow Pace of Adaptation to Challenges</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bU7Slb8.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>UPS Cargo X-Ray Screener Job Ad.</strong> Source: The posting is no longer online but was available at <a href="https://www.jobs-ups.uk/job/stansted-mountfitchet/cargo-screener/20477/54285091248">“Jobs &amp; Careers: Cargo Screener,” UPS, September 2023</a>.</em></p> +<p>It is important to recognise that economic sanctions are not static. Rather, they require frequent adjustments as their target adapts to restrictions and establishes evasion and circumvention schemes. This is particularly relevant in the current case of a far-from-global sanctions regime and an adversary – Russia – that has considerable experience with manoeuvring around such restrictions. After all, it has done so for roughly 10 years since sanctions were first imposed in 2014. Participants expressed serious concerns about the ability of coalition government to react swiftly to Russia’s actions and, more fundamentally, questioned if the issue is treated with a proper sense of urgency. For Russia on the other hand, the existential nature of the challenge is clear. And, as an increasingly repressive dictatorship, Russia has more flexibility to act compared with the democratic systems of the coalition.</p> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Medium–High</em></p> +<h4 id="leveraging-the-role-of-the-financial-industry">Leveraging the Role of the Financial Industry</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Initial Detection Prior to Leaving Port: High</strong></p> +<p>A topic that had emerged at previous SIFMANet events was again the focus in Riga: the financial industry’s role in sanctions implementation and enforcement. As mentioned above, banks have been involved in these efforts for a long time, but their responsibilities are likely to grow significantly. US President Joe Biden’s Executive Order of 22 December 2023 sent a clear message to foreign financial institutions that they risk losing access to the US financial system if they facilitate significant transactions relating to Russia’s military-industrial base. This represents a clear threat of secondary sanctions in the area of export controls. However, it will likely also make banks much more careful when it comes to any other transactions that involve Russia.</p> - <p>There are a number of tools that private couriers, unlike major global logistics companies, do not have:</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Participants expressed support for leveraging the role of banks in cross-border transactions to improve the effectiveness of the Russia sanctions regime. But they also urged caution regarding such an approach’s practical execution. For instance, simply adding new requirements to the industry’s compliance efforts is unlikely to result in functional procedures without proper guidance. What is more, efforts to involve the financial industry will need to go beyond those global banks that have traditionally been tasked with the implementation of sanctions. Financial flows are fungible and, especially when related to illicit activities, will be quickly redirected through any entities not in focus. This concerns smaller traditional banks as well as non-bank financial institutions such as payments services providers or actors in the crypto sphere. These entities, however, are not insulated from sanctions. Many of them also rely on access to the US financial system and the US dollar. They are also connected, through correspondent accounts and other business dealings, with those large global banks that have substantial experience with sanctions compliance and could hand on due diligence requirements.</p> + +<h4 id="recommendations-data-is-key-to-making-sanctions-work">Recommendations: Data is Key to Making Sanctions Work</h4> + +<p>The way sanctions are viewed has changed dramatically. Implementation and enforcement of an ever-more comprehensive and complex sanctions regime poses new and growing challenges to governments, the private sector and civil society more broadly. Data is key to making these measures work as effectively as possible and constrain Russia’s ability to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine. Specifically, access to data as well as its effective exchange and use are critical to assessing and improving the implementation of sanctions at home, investigating and prosecuting violations, and informing steps to rein in circumvention networks abroad. Throughout the roundtable, participants discussed ideas to improve data-related efforts. The specific recommendations from the event are as follows:</p> <ol> <li> - <p>Advanced inspection equipment, which results in less detailed or less accurate scans, potentially allowing contraband to pass through undetected</p> + <p><strong>Centralise sanctions responsibilities within countries.</strong> Some EU member states are leading the way when it comes to centralising sanctions-related functions by designating competent authorities for implementation and enforcement. Participants expressed that cooperation and coordination within governments and across borders, including for data, would benefit from other countries following suit. As sanctions will remain a key element of foreign policy in the coming years, now is the time to equip institutions with proper resources and procedures. Clearly assigning responsibilities and mandates must be an integral part of this strategy.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Standardized operating protocols, leading to variability in the depth and thoroughness of inspections</p> + <p><strong>Improve cooperation and data sharing across jurisdictions.</strong> One of the key findings of the roundtable is that authorities across the coalition have much better access to information now than two years ago. In addition, efforts are underway to link different data sources to develop a comprehensive view on the effectiveness of sanctions. However, improvements are needed when it comes to the exchange of information across jurisdictions. Existing systems require modifications so that they can be used to address the challenges emerging from the type of unprecedented and comprehensive sanctions that have been imposed on Russia.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Comprehensive training programs or intelligence sharing on emerging threats, which can lead to oversights or missed cues of smuggling activity</p> - - <p>In addition, private couriers, especially smaller-scale operations, may be more vulnerable to internal collusion or corruption.</p> + <p><strong>Exchange best practices and learn from one another.</strong> Some jurisdictions, mainly the US, have significantly more experience with comprehensive financial and technology sanctions. All involved countries should cooperate closely on best practices and learn from one another’s successes and failures. Specifically, authorities across the coalition should look at jurisdictions where sanctions violations have been successfully prosecuted in the past and assess how they can implement the most-effective procedures.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Leverage the role of financial institutions in trade.</strong> Banks have emerged as a key player in sanctions implementation and enforcement and their role will only grow in areas such as export controls as it may be easier to trace trade-related financial transactions than physical shipments. While banks have established compliance resources and procedures and already provide much information to supervisory bodies and other enforcement agencies, it is critical to enable them to play an expanded role by adapting the regulatory framework. For instance, certain fields in SWIFT such as HS trade codes should be made mandatory. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult for banks to identify red flags and stop illicit transactions in their tracks.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Expand interactions with non-financial corporates.</strong> Many coalition governments have taken steps to reach out to the private sector beyond the financial industry to provide guidance and offer technical assistance. It is critical that they continue to do so regularly and intensify this cooperation. With sanctions evasion and circumvention networks adapting rapidly to changing conditions on the ground, government agencies must engage in an ongoing dialogue with the private sector. Importantly, this should include establishing clear feedback mechanisms through which they can tap into companies’ expertise.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Work with trade organisations to extend reach.</strong> As more comprehensive and complex sanctions place growing responsibilities on the private sector, it is critical to make sure that SMEs can also play their role. Given their relative lack of resources and experience with sanctions compliance, governments should work closely with trade organisations to provide guidance and technical assistance to companies. Industry bodies should be leveraged to ensure that due diligence efforts go beyond large multinationals.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Involve civil society in sanctions monitoring efforts.</strong> The experience of the past two years has shown that civil society – including institutes such as RUSI and research networks such as SIFMANet – plays an essential role in using data to assess the effectiveness of sanctions and develop concrete recommendations for their improvement. Think tanks, NGOs and other similar organisations not only complement scarce resources in the public sector but can also provide a more strategic vision, which is often crowded out by governments’ urgent policy design and implementation tasks.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Continue diplomatic outreach to third countries.</strong> Considering the limits of data availability and important gaps in the tracing of supply chains and distribution networks, coalition governments need to undertake efforts to gain access to information from third countries. While not the case for all jurisdictions involved in sanctions evasion and circumvention (such as China and the UAE), many, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia, can be incentivised to share more data as they are interested in deeper commercial ties with the EU and other coalition countries. Data sharing, however, will not be sufficient if not accompanied by technical assistance to public and private sectors alike to build capacities and improve data reliability.</p> </li> </ol> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Subsequent Detection: Medium–High</strong></p> +<p>Roundtable participants stressed that it will become clear in the coming months if coalition countries are up to the task of responding decisively and quickly to Russia’s attempts to work around the sanctions regime. Fundamentally, they were optimistic that, if the extraordinary wealth of information available is leveraged to assess the effectiveness of existing measures, identify and prosecute violators, as well as develop strategies to improve the implementation and enforcement of sanctions, Russia’s capacity to wage war on Ukraine and undermine the rules-based international order can be constrained. It will require improvements to institutional setups and the facilitation of information exchange within governments and across borders, as well as leveraging the role of the private sector and involving civil society. More fundamentally, it will need an understanding of the existential nature of the challenge.</p> - <p>Smugglers could use less-traveled maritime routes to sidestep routine patrol routes. Furthermore, the compact size of their vessels might make them less detectable in open waters, providing an edge in evasion. However, private couriers, being lesser-known entities compared to giants such as UPS, might be viewed with a greater degree of suspicion by maritime patrols, leading to more frequent random inspections.</p> - </li> +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Benjamin Hilgenstock</strong> is a Senior Economist at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute. Benjamin focuses on the Russia sanctions regime, in particular, in the areas of energy, trade, finance and export controls.</p>Benjamin HilgenstockRoundtable held in Riga in March 2024 highlighted the importance of data sharing in improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia.【黎智英案・審訊第 58 日】2024-04-11T12:00:00+08:002024-04-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-58<ul> + <li>國安法後續游說倡議 李宇軒：若被北京視為政敵總會有方法起訴、無關是否繼續</li> + <li>李宇軒：陳梓華稱以色列軍隊可助訓練「勇武」、其小隊涉口岸爆炸品和721等事件</li> </ul> -<p><strong>CONTAMINATING CONTAINER CARGO (“RIP-ON, RIP-OFF” METHOD)</strong></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>One concealment strategy frequently employed by drug syndicates, especially from Brazil, involves exploiting legitimate, often containerized shipments. In this method, illicit cargo is secretly added to a legitimate shipment without the knowledge of the shipper or consignee. According to TradeWinds, the world’s biggest shipping news service, “drug traffickers can open a shipping container and remove a 100-kilogram consignment of cocaine in as little as three minutes.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/atcsnUA.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>For the strategy to work, collaboration is necessary at both the origin and destination. At the departure dock, the insertion or “rip-on” team introduces the illicit goods into the selected container. To mask any interference, they frequently replace the genuine security seal with a counterfeit. At the destination port, retrieval of the concealed items is crucial. This is either done by compromised port staff or by specialized extraction or “rip-off” teams who infiltrate the terminal. After this operation, the container might be either left unsealed or be relocked with another duplicate seal. Locating such containers in large terminals is a challenge. Simply knowing the container identification number is insufficient; it must also be easily reachable, which often demands insider help to adjust the placement of the container.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第58日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，他表示在《國安法》之前理解自己會見外國議員等活動是合法。在《國安法》生效之後，李和另一名被告陳梓華曾討論是否繼續國際游說和倡議工作，還是到美國任職非政府組織「中國人權」，後來李決定繼續游說工作，「呢個決定唔係一個令我特別 comfortable 嘅決定，但對我嚟講，佢似乎係一個 least evil 嘅決定。」李形容《國安法》條文含糊，又預料北京會「搬龍門」來針對政敵，法官問李為何不停止游說工作，李則表示：「因為如果北京覺得你係政敵嘅話，就算你做唔做某啲嘢，佢都會搵到方法嚟政治檢控你。所以我繼唔繼續做一啲嘢，無關係。」</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-4"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 4:</code></h4> - <h4 id="rip-on-rip-off-cocaine-container-bust-at-port-botany"><code class="highlighter-rouge">“Rip-On, Rip-Off” Cocaine Container Bust at Port Botany</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第15天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的新西蘭御用大律師 Marc Corlett 盤問。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Authorities detained two individuals in Sydney following the discovery of 120 kilograms of cocaine, valued at approximately $60 million, concealed within a shipping container they were attempting to break into.</code></em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pSQ7OYt.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 大律師 Marc Corlett（左）、資深大律師 彭耀鴻（右）</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The pair from Athens were suspected to be local operatives involved in a compromised “rip-on, rip-off” narcotics trafficking scheme. The police interception was prompted by a reported break-in at a Port Botany logistics firm, situated in the vicinity of Sydney’s main maritime terminal, where they uncovered 120 bricks of cocaine, each weighing one kilogram.</code></em></p> +<h4 id="曾赴聯合國及會見外國議員-李宇軒國安法之前是合法活動">曾赴聯合國及會見外國議員 李宇軒：國安法之前是合法活動</h4> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> +<p>辯方指，在2020年7月1日《國安法》生效之前，李曾會見訪港的美國議員 Rick Scott、到訪聯合國和法國，以及協助「攬炒巴」劉祖廸接待訪港的英國議員 Bob Seely。辯方問以李的理解，上述活動在《國安法》生效之前是否合法。李回答：「合法嘅。」</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Initial Detection Prior to Leaving Port: High</strong></p> +<p>辯方續指，李所面對的控罪涵蓋2020年7月1日至2021年2月15日，所以並沒有因為上述的活動而被起訴，而李直到現在仍然相信這些活動是合法的。李同意：「全部合法嘅。」</p> - <p>By embedding illicit items within genuine shipments, the chances of arousing suspicion are reduced. Since the original shippers and consignees are typically unaware that their containers are being used for smuggling, their documentation and behavior do not raise red flags. With the right network and bribed officials, the drugs can be successfully loaded onto containers without drawing attention.</p> +<p>在辯方的盤問下，李確認在2019年6月至2020年7月期間，「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）內部從來沒有共識推舉李代表 SWHK 做任何違法行為，而李也沒有基於協議而同意做違法行為，以及沒有協助其他人去做違法行為。</p> - <p>However, the process of breaking and replacing the container seals, even if replaced with duplicates, can sometimes be detected if the seals are not placed correctly or if there are visible signs of tampering.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Subsequent Detection: High</strong></p> +<p>李並確認，他不知道上述活動是違法，直至2020年6月30日午夜《國安法》條文出爐，又指：「《國安法》會令之前合法的行為變成不合法。」</p> - <p>If smugglers successfully load chips onto containers of a reputed logistics provider, the odds of detection decrease significantly for several reasons. First, large logistics providers have built a trustworthy reputation over years, and maritime authorities are less likely to scrutinize these companies as intensely as smaller or less-known shippers. Second, if smugglers manage to bypass the advanced security measures of reputed logistics providers, it may create a false sense of security for officials. However, there are still risks from intelligence tip-offs.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="李宇軒訊息告訴裴倫德根據國安法你已經犯了法-因有條文含糊有域外效力">李宇軒訊息告訴裴倫德「根據國安法你已經犯了法」 因有條文含糊、有「域外效力」</h4> -<p><strong>USE OF SUBMERSIBLE VESSELS</strong></p> +<p>辯方展示李宇軒與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC）創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）之間的 Telegram 訊息對話。李向裴倫德指《國安法》條文中文版已公佈，條文內容比想像中更差（“it’s worse than we thought”），又指根據條文裴倫德已經犯了法（“you have committed a crime according to the text :)”）：</p> -<p>Drug smugglers have been known to use smaller semi-submersible and even fully submersible vessels, particularly from South America to the United States, to evade radar and visual identification.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) <a href="https://twitter.com/lukedepulford/status/1315038772791214088">October 10, 2020</a></p> +</blockquote> -<p>Data from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction suggests that larger crewed vessels can transport as much as eight tons of cocaine, a load potentially valued at over $1 billion. According to Colombian navy estimates, the average cost to the drug smugglers for one of these boats is just under $1 million, making this a potentially higly profitable smuggling method.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lcHOZP2.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）</p> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> +<p>李庭上解釋，上述訊息的意思是裴倫德既不是香港公民也不身處於香港的司法管轄區之內，但《國安法》第38條提及「域外效力」，所以根據條文定義，裴倫德已經是犯了法，「同埋《國安法》個條文，我係覺得好 vague（含糊）嘅」，因此可以廣闊到涵蓋裴倫德正在做的事。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Initial Detection Prior to Leaving Port: High</strong></p> +<h4 id="李宇軒憂北京用國安法針對政敵-向裴倫德提議游說各國取消引渡協議">李宇軒：憂北京用國安法針對政敵 向裴倫德提議游說各國取消引渡協議</h4> - <p>Chips are precision engineered and susceptible to environmental factors. Loading them onto submersible vessels demands specialized handling and extended timeframes, necessitating remote loading locations. Countries with sprawling coastlines, underdeveloped maritime infrastructure, and often lax maritime surveillance offer numerous such potential locations.</p> +<p>2020年7月2日，李宇軒向裴倫德徵詢意見，問他是否應該游說其他國家取消與香港的司法互助和引渡協議，以及國際倡議的效用。</p> - <p>However, major ports are equipped with comprehensive CCTV systems, frequent patrols, and stringent entry and exit procedures. Any unexpected loading activities, especially involving atypical vessels such as submersibles, would likely raise alarms.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Subsequent Maritime Detection: High</strong></p> +<p>李庭上解釋：「我理解《國安法》第29條個用字係好闊，而第38條係講緊全球嘅人都適用，類似咁解」，加上北京對於條文的廣闊詮釋，預料《國安法》「會用落 political enemy 度」，所以他透過訊息告訴裴倫德「《國安法》會 reach 到你個國家，同埋其他國家嘅 citizens」，為了保障其他國家的公民，有需要檢視是否取消與香港的司法互助和引渡逃犯協議，「防止《國安法》的政治檢控落到去你個國家同其他國家嘅公民度。」</p> - <p>In addition to having a low radar signature and being able to submerge quickly when maritime enforcement is detected, submersibles, especially those used in illicit activities, are engineered to be as stealthy as possible. The following are examples of such measures:</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱北京總會找到方法針對政敵-與是否繼續做手上工作沒有關係">李宇軒稱北京總會找到方法針對政敵 與是否繼續做手上工作沒有關係</h4> -<ol> - <li> - <p>A reduced acoustic profile (e.g., quieter engines, vibration-damping materials, streamlined shapes) to evade passive sonar systems</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Air-independent propulsion systems to reduce heat emissions</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Remote guidance or onboard autonomous systems, which allow them to run riskier routes and further reduce their acoustic profile (e.g., no need for life-support systems)</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>辯方問李對於《國安法》「紅線」有什麼理解，包括有什麼事可做、有什麼事不可以做。李回答：「我嘅 understanding 係北京會搬龍門，所以冇得由我或者其他嘅 citizens 去知道個紅線喺邊，rather 我嘅 understanding 會係有一個 broad 嘅 interpretation 去畀北京搬龍門。」</p> -<p>In addition, they often employ advanced logistics tactics, such as deploying a network of fishing vessels to alert crews about nearby patrols or utilizing offshore refueling vessels to bypass coastal areas.</p> +<p>法官李運騰問，既然李有上述擔憂，為何不直接叫裴倫德停止他手上的工作。李則回答：「因為我覺得北京會搬龍門，所以即使你唔做一樣嘢，如果北京要政治檢控你，佢就會用第二啲嘢嚟 charge 你。」李續指，無論是否《國安法》也好，北京會「搬龍門」說現在起訴的罪名已經是法律所涵蓋範圍。</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-5"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 5</code></h4> - <h4 id="narco-submarines-in-costa-rica"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Narco-Submarines in Costa Rica</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>李官追問，《國安法》條文有提及對於《國安法》生效之前的行為沒有追溯力。惟李表示：「我唔信嗰條文會係好似字面咁解地去被 interpreted。」</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">During the 1980s, go-fast boats were the smuggling vessel of choice in many parts of the world. Go-fast boats became more vulnerable to radar detection as radar technology improved, leading to the development of semi-submersibles.</code></em></p> +<p>李官又問，為何他不停止正在做的事。李宇軒表示：「因為如果北京覺得你係政敵嘅話，就算你做唔做某啲嘢，佢都會搵到方法嚟政治檢控你。所以我繼唔繼續做一啲嘢，無關係。」李官說，所以李決定繼續做下去。李宇軒同意。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the 1990s, there were rumours that smugglers were using vessels that were nearly fully submersible to reduce detection by visual, radar, sonar, or infrared systems. However, it was only in 2006 that the U.S. Coast Guard successfully seized a 50-foot narco-submarine with three tons of cocaine some 166 km southwest of Costa Rica.</code></em></p> +<h4 id="國安法後決定繼續國際游說-李宇軒指似乎係一個least-evil嘅決定">國安法後決定繼續國際游說 李宇軒指「似乎係一個least evil嘅決定」</h4> -<h4 id="stage-4-transshipment">Stage 4: Transshipment</h4> +<p>辯方另展示李宇軒與另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）在2020年7月23日的 Signal 訊息對話，二人討論李是否應該到美國的非政府組織「中國人權」工作，或者繼續做國際游說工作。</p> -<p>Upon leaving the initial port, smugglers may redirect the chips for consistency to a third country where customs controls are less stringent. To further obfuscate the trail, they often engage various intermediaries, utilize diverse transportation methods, and transship the chips through multiple countries, further muddying the trail (see Hypothetical Scenario 3).</p> +<p>辯方問，直到當天，李就《國安法》對他是否有影響的理解，是否與《國安法》剛開始生效的時候差不多，還是有改變。李則表示，「我當時覺得反而係 confirm 咗我對《國安法》嘅 suspicion，因為真係用咗佢嚟拉嗰啲社運人士。」所以他在7月2日與裴倫德傳送訊息時提及對於《國安法》的理解，直至7月23日時仍然一樣。</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="hypothetical-scenario-3">Hypothetical Scenario 3</h4> - <h4 id="a-sample-transshipment-journey">A Sample Transshipment Journey</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方問李後來決定繼續做游說工作，是否他自己的決定。李則表示有跟陳梓華討論過，又表示：「呢個決定唔係一個令我特別 comfortable 嘅決定，但對我嚟講，佢似乎係一個 least evil 嘅決定。」</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Country A → Country B</strong></p> -</blockquote> +<p>法官李運騰問，李當時面對兩個選項，一是冒著更大觸犯法律和被拘捕的風險，二是不繼續游說工作，然而李卻選擇了前者。李則回答：「唔係，我當時個 mind 入面唔係呢兩個選項」，當時他懷疑北京可能已經將他視為政敵，所以政權已經有方法拘捕及起訴他，但是擺在他面前的問題是「即使繼唔繼續，都會被拘捕」，因此他當時考慮的問題是應否繼續游說工作。</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Diversionary Tactic:</strong> Smuggler X first moves the chips overland to Country A, classifying them as generic computer parts for a technology roadshow in a provincial city. In reality, they never make it there. They are rerouted to a small coastal village and loaded onto a fishing vessel.</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認swhk從沒公開提流亡政府">李宇軒確認SWHK從沒公開提流亡政府</h4> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Country B → Country C</strong></p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方指，李宇軒和陳梓華曾經討論在外地成立流亡政府，問李是否同意 SWHK 從來沒有在其網站發布相關內容。李同意，他又指 SWHK 內部從來沒有討論過成立流亡政府。</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>“Lost Cargo” Tactic:</strong> Near Country B, the chips are reportedly “lost at sea.” Instead, they are actually anchored and buoyed just beneath the surface, waiting for retrieval by another party. A recreational diving group (in on the operation) “discovers” the “lost cargo.” They retrieve it and bring it to a port in Country C.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方又指李從沒有採取任何行動成立流亡政府。李則表示他曾經問過梁頌恆、陳浩天、黃台仰和梁繼平等人是否願意籌組流亡政府，但他們均表示不會做。</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Country C → Country D</strong></p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="李宇軒指更新swhk和ipac網站之前不會徵詢黎智英mark-simon或陳梓華">李宇軒指更新SWHK和IPAC網站之前不會徵詢黎智英、Mark Simon或陳梓華</h4> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Shell Companies and Ghost Transactions:</strong> In Country C, a shell company purchases the “recovered treasure” and then sells it to another entity in Country D as antique electronics for collectors.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>李早前供稱他協助 SWHK 將內容上載至網站。在辯方的盤問下，李確認他並沒有負責將內容發佈至 SWHK 的 Facebook 和 Twitter，新聞稿也不是他撰寫的。</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Country D → Country E</strong></p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方問李，他上載文章等內容至 SWHK 網站之前，並沒有與黎智英或其私人助手 Mark Simon 討論過。李確認。至於陳梓華，李表示他與陳有討論過一些 SWHK 的活動，但是他把活動資料上載至網站時，並不會事先徵詢陳梓華。</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Container Mixing:</strong> Once in Country D, the chips are embedded within laptops. The products (and chips hidden within) are loaded into containers and shipped to Country E with proper customs declarations for electronics.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方指，《國安法》生效之後，李繼續協助 IPAC 更新網站，和列席會議，並指李事前從沒與黎智英和 Mark Simon 討論。李同意：「冇討論過。」至於陳梓華，李表示他有時與陳討論 IPAC 的事，但不會在更新網站之前徵詢陳的意見或批准。</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Country E → Country F</strong></p> -</blockquote> +<p>李又確認他在不會對其他人作出指示，「我可以邀請人哋去幫手，as an individual activist」，例如有一份 IPAC 會議紀錄，他會問日本群組的會否自願幫手，但他不可以落指示：「喂，你一定要過嚟翻譯啦！」</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Trade Show:</strong> Upon arrival in Country E, the chips are quietly retrieved and repackaged inside dummy prototypes of new technology devices. A buyer from Country F visits the trade show and purchases these prototypes as cutting-edge technology from Country E.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yjeIh8G.png" alt="image04" /></p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Country F → Country G</strong></p> -</blockquote> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第58日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方盤問時指，另一名被告陳梓華曾經告訴李，如果香港成立到軍隊的話，以色列軍隊可以協助訓練「勇武」人士，李確認陳曾提出這想法，但「我唔知佢有幾認真」。此外，李亦確認陳提及其「勇武隊」涉及7.21白衣人事件，以及2020年農曆新年期間邊境口岸的爆炸品事件。李於2020年8月10日被捕，他確認從警署獲釋之後，陳在電話中聲稱會安排他離開香港。李指，其後有不同的帳戶使用「化名」告知他入住「安全屋」、乘坐專車到布袋澳碼頭和聯絡「船家」等，並叫他乘船到達台灣之後自動投案，因已將李的個人資料交給陸委會。李又指有人告訴他，當時有捷克代表訪台，當李獲釋之後，若果趕得及的話，應該跟隨捷克的代表乘坐回程的私人包機，到達捷克之後便找方法前往倫敦。惟「走鬼」計劃未能成事，李最終被大陸公安拘捕。</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Extraction of Chips:</strong> Here, the chips are extracted by an intermediary agent and sent to Country G.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第15天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的新西蘭御用大律師 Marc Corlett 盤問。</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Country G → Country H</strong></p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="辯方陳梓華把勇武小隊隊長介紹給李宇軒">辯方：陳梓華把「勇武小隊隊長」介紹給李宇軒</h4> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Final Journey Overland:</strong> The final purchaser, having trustworthy trade relations with Country H, sends the devices overland.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>對於另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）是否帶領多於一隊「勇武小隊」，李宇軒表示不知道。辯方又問以李所理解，陳是否視「勇武」為削弱香港政府管治的方法。李則表示，以他對陳的理解，陳認為「勇武」能夠「做到一個政權唔係實際上管治到一個領土」。至於陳是否認同使用「勇武」，李則指：「部份同意，或者 conditionally agree。」</p> -<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> +<p>辯方提到，陳梓華曾經叫李宇軒到火炭工業區一幢建築物見面，並將一名叫「Cap」的人介紹給李，同場還有一名叫「Cath」的女子和一名叫「廢老」的男子。辯方問，陳介紹「Cap」時，有否形容他是「勇武小隊隊長」。李指「Cap」即是「Captain」，所以他估計其名稱是這個意思。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Cumulative Detection: High</strong></p> +<p>辯方問，陳梓華有否告訴李「Cath」是負責製造爆炸品和汽油彈。李則指「冇咁 detail」，當時陳使用「科學實驗」字眼，而且作出「引號」的手勢。辯方又問，陳有否提及「勇武隊」儲藏爆炸品的地方。李指：「應該係話，T 嗰隊勇武有自己嘅地方擺佢自己嘅嘢。」</p> - <p>The use of multiple third countries as transit points compounds the difficulty of detecting illicit cargo. Even if each individual country has a seemingly manageable risk of detection, by exploiting interstitial gaps between each transit point, the cumulative probability of evasion drastically increases.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華曾提及口岸爆炸品事件與其勇武隊有關不滿有人咁快玩槍">李宇軒指陳梓華曾提及口岸爆炸品事件與其「勇武隊」有關、不滿有人「咁快玩槍」</h4> - <p>Transshipment is not just about the simple math of probabilities. It is about deliberately and tactically manuevering through a patchwork of customs controls, always seeking the path of least resistance and exploiting the unevenness of the regional and international enforcement landscapes.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>辯方問，陳有否告訴李，陳的「勇武隊」曾經涉及7.21白衣人事件之中。李確認有，但不肯定陳是否在火炭那次會面中講過。辯方又問，陳有否提及他的隊伍涉及中聯辦外的騷亂事件。李則指陳並沒有詳述，只說過「搞中聯辦嗰次」。</p> -<h3 id="key-observations">Key Observations</h3> +<p>辯方問，陳有否提及其隊伍牽涉在2020年農曆新年期間邊境口岸放置爆炸品的事件。李指陳曾提及事件與他的「勇武隊」有關。</p> -<h4 id="early-interdiction-is-more-effective-than-reactive-enforcement">Early interdiction is more effective than reactive enforcement.</h4> +<p>辯方又問，就大埔有人開槍的事件，陳有否向李提及過。李指陳只說過「有人喺大埔玩槍」，之後說了類似：「屌，做乜咁快玩槍呀！」李並指，「屌」一字在該句說話中是重要，「一來我係理解 T 係知道呢件事，同埋佢 disapproved of 嗰個人，同埋屌嗰個人咁 pre-maturely 玩槍。」</p> -<p>Studying the pipeline of export control evasion (see Table 1), there is a noticeable increase in the difficulty of detecting evasion tactics from Stage 1 (the initial procurement of chips) to Stage 4 (the transshipment phase). As soon as illicit goods depart the port of origin and get funneled through transshipment networks, the supply chain becomes a tortuously fragmented puzzle. Untangling this knotted snarl often requires vast resources, regional and international cooperation, and, often, specific intelligence, making the task daunting for even the best-equipped customs and enforcement agencies. A superior approach is therefore to focus on mitigating export control evasion risks upstream rather than downstream. To the extent possible, it is necessary to dam the river at its source, as neglecting to do so allows the stream to branch out unpredictably.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認陳梓華曾提及以色列軍隊可協助訓練勇武-惟不知是否認真">李宇軒確認陳梓華曾提及以色列軍隊可協助訓練「勇武」 惟不知是否認真</h4> -<h4 id="focus-should-be-placed-on-improving-detection-capabilities-in-third-countries-not-just-bis-enforcement">Focus should be placed on improving detection capabilities in third countries, not just BIS enforcement.</h4> +<p>辯方指，在另一個場合之中，陳梓華曾向李宇軒談及如果成立到流亡政府的話，陳會負責成立和訓練軍隊。李則指這是兩條不同戰線，「如果將國際游說推到盡，就係成立流亡政府；如果將啲勇武推到盡，就係軍隊。」辯方追問，陳有否說過會訓練軍隊。李指如果成立到軍隊的話，會由陳或其他發展出來。</p> -<p>Most extant proposals focus on increasing the BIS’s resources to enhance its enforcement capabilities. But if detection precedes enforcement, and if the challenges of doing the former are non-trivial, then perhaps these efforts are putting the horse before the cart. Moreover, given how understaffed and underinvested the BIS continues to be despite the pleas of key voices, can it reliably be expected to police global smuggling networks that span scores of countries, each with multiple ports? Importantly, this singular dependence on the BIS introduces a single point of failure. The BIS may not always recognize specific localized tactics used in transshipment hubs.</p> +<p>辯方續指，在另一個場合中，陳告訴李，如果成立到軍隊的話，以色列軍隊可以協助訓練「勇武」。李則指上述似乎不是陳說話原文，而且陳好像是在談論其他事的時候提出這想法，但「我唔知佢有幾認真」。</p> -<h4 id="capacity-building-is-more-constructive-than-punitive-actions">Capacity building is more constructive than punitive actions.</h4> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認被捕後陳梓華稱會安排他離開香港">李宇軒確認被捕後陳梓華稱會安排他離開香港</h4> -<p>This report suggests a corrective in the nature of U.S. engagement with third countries. There is too often an assumption that countries that are key transshipment hubs are directly abetting illicit networks. This shapes the language for necessary instruments such as sanctions, country quotas, and outright bans.</p> +<p>辯方指，李宇軒在2020年8月23日涉非法偷越邊境罪而被拘捕。李確認，並指「畀大陸公安拉」：「大陸嗰啲著住藍色衫，膊頭有個牌寫住公安嗰啲。」</p> -<p>This report finds that seven out of eleven of the smuggling tactics identified are more likely to happen in developing countries, which often have poor customs infrastructure. This lack of ability to identify smuggling is not due to wilful negligence but a consequence of infrastructural gaps. These nations typically cannot afford advanced X-ray and scanning technologies (e.g., dual-energy X-ray systems), next-generation KYC and EDD software, or experts who may more reliably spot irregularities, such as chips concealed in electronic products. In addition, such ports are commonly not equipped with comprehensive CCTV systems or stringent entry and exit procedures.</p> +<p>辯方指，李原本在2020年8月10日在香港被拘捕，其後在8月12日獲警方批准擔保。李獲釋之後，曾與陳梓華透過電話通話，而陳稱會替李安排離開香港。李確認，但實際安排方面，「我唔知係佢（陳）做，定係第二啲人做，然後由佢傳話。」</p> -<p>Counterintuitively, technonationalism may demand that the United States find greater security not by turning inward but through outward engagement and extending support for capacity building in select third countries. Otherwise, these countries are unlikely to independently invest in improved export control compliance measures themselves (see next observation).</p> +<p>辯方指，在2020年8月18日，陳梓華叫李前往將軍澳日出康城。惟李指他原本的手機被警方沒收，從警署獲釋之後，他使用另一部手機作為「鬼機」，而他百份之一百肯定所有聯絡他的人都是使用「化名（pseudo name）」。李表示，雖然陳知悉他的「鬼機」電話號碼，但是當有一個人叫他前往日出康城時，他不肯定對方是否與陳梓華有關。</p> -<h4 id="understanding-partner-countries-incentives-is-crucial">Understanding partner countries’ incentives is crucial.</h4> +<p>李又指，有人安排「走鬼」期間，會有不同的帳戶聯絡他，中間這些帳戶甚至通訊軟件也換過幾次，雖然他不肯定是否一個人聯絡他，但是從訊息來看，「好似 pick up 到當時發生咩事個 thread，咁我就 trust it。」</p> -<p>Historically, the focus of national customs agencies has been on import controls rather than export controls. This was shaped by the demands of collecting tariffs and protecting domestic industries from foreign competition, as well as the assumption that outbound goods, which contribute to national wealth through trade surpluses, pose less of a risk. The emergence of dual-use goods has heightened the necessity for export controls, but a marked imbalance persists between the attention given to import controls versus export controls at the national level.</p> +<p>李指除了陳梓華之外，知道他使用「鬼機」的人還有其大妹 Beatrice。而李相信陳梓華和其大妹將他的情況告知其他人。</p> -<p>While the United States might emphasize the importance of increased export control measures, many customs agencies will not prioritize them. Having too restrictive a compliance sieve detracts from their core focus, which is to facilitate trade and increase port revenues. As such, in urging partner nations to increase their efforts, the United States must consider such countries’ domestic priorities. Ultimately, the primary mission of these countries’ customs agencies is to advance their own national development goals, not to aid the United States in its AI ambitions.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認有人安排安全屋專車和船家-並叫他到台灣後投案">李宇軒確認有人安排「安全屋」、專車和「船家」 並叫他到台灣後投案</h4> -<h3 id="detailed-policy-recommendations">Detailed Policy Recommendations</h3> +<p>李亦確認曾經有一個帳戶叫他提防被跟蹤，但是不肯定對方是否陳梓華。此外，李確認有一個人將「安全屋」業主的聯絡方法交給他，告訴他有專車接送他去另一間「安全屋」，而且車上有「畀我換嘅衫」，但李不知道對方是否陳梓華。</p> -<p>Given the challenges of detecting illicit consignments after they become obscured in transshipment networks, policymakers should focus on upstream sections of the smuggling pipeline, from the initial procurement of chips to before it leaves the port of origin. Importantly, these recommendations should be agreeable to and easily implementable by third countries. They should also be business-friendly, meaning they should be as frictionessless as possible and paired with incentives to match or dampen obligations. Regulatory interventions that work with the market are almost always more effective than those that swim upstream against it.</p> +<p>辯方問，陳梓華或另一個帳戶是否在2020年8月23日凌晨3時，叫李前往西貢布袋澳碼頭。李記得當時是深夜，但不知道是什麼時間。李又確認，陳梓華或另一個帳戶將「船家」的聯絡方法交給他，而此前他已經知道他將會去台灣。</p> -<p>Lastly, to allay the reflexive reactions of U.S. policymakers to the phrase “capacity building,” the three recommendations proposed here are entirely modest. They include workshops, a regional unit that will only require two to four BIS personnel with shared commitments from partner countries, and the provision of modern analytics software.</p> +<p>李確認，陳梓華或另一個帳戶曾叫他乘船到達台灣之後自動投案，對方亦稱已經將李的個人資料交給陸委會。李指有人告訴他，當時捷克有代表訪台，當李獲釋之後，若果趕得及的話，應該跟隨捷克的代表乘坐返回捷克的私人包機，到達捷克之後便找方法前往倫敦。</p> -<h4 id="recommendation-1-mandate-use-of-custom-digital-waybills-and-preapproved-logistics-providers">Recommendation 1: Mandate use of custom digital waybills and preapproved logistics providers.</h4> +<h4 id="官問如何能有300萬元積蓄-李宇軒指靠寫電腦程式獲取收入">官問如何能有300萬元積蓄 李宇軒指靠寫電腦程式獲取收入</h4> -<p>A custom digital waybill for chips, incorporating a unique identifier, can mitigate the risks associated with the falsification of customs documents. Digital authentication further ensures the integrity of the waybill, making it difficult for smugglers to forge documents without detection. These waybills will be integrated with sales procedures as well as digital sales platforms for ease of business incorporation, and will include several key features:</p> +<p>辯方盤問完畢之後，法官李素蘭問及李宇軒的個人背景。李稱在2019年的時候，他任職電腦程式編寫員，會接一些專案來做，有時是他一手包辦，有時他會找認識的程式編寫員一起做。李素蘭指，李宇軒在2019年時積極參與社運，有否繼續做編寫程式的工作。李確認他繼續工作。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>A Unique Identifier:</strong> A unique QR code or equivalent tag for easy, tamper-proof scanning</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Digital Authentication:</strong> Digital verification mechanisms to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the waybill</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Item Specifics:</strong> Details that clearly state the nature of the controlled item as well as its quantity, value, origin, and destination</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Logistics Providers Details:</strong> Details of the logistics provider, including its preapproval status</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Standardized Sections:</strong> Sections for customs officials to stamp or digitally sign upon inspection, ensuring traceability at every checkpoint</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>李又表示，他自大學畢業起便開始任職電腦程式編寫員，至2019年僅僅接近10年，而他的主要收入來源是這份工作。</p> -<p>Furthermore, purchasers of chips will only be permitted to use prescreened logistics providers and routes. The buyer must identify their logistics provider of choice at the point of sale. Failure to do so should lead to cancellation of the sale. Tagging shipments at the point of sale enhances the BIS’s ability to efficiently conduct targeted audits. Logistics providers will be mandated to report to the BIS monthly on any consignments not received within a specified timeframe of two to four weeks. This process will flag discrepancies between recorded sales and actual shipments, facilitating swift spot checks on vendors identified as potential weak links. This will also better pinpoint suspicious entities that could be operating as front, shell, or shelf companies.</p> +<p>法官李素蘭問，李如何能夠儲存到300萬元銀行積蓄。李則表示閱讀銀行紀錄之後，發覺自己記錯金額，正確金額應該有逾400萬元，這是靠「做 programming 嘅錢」而累積而來。</p> -<p>The criteria for preapproval of logistics providers should broadly include the following:</p> +<p>法官李運騰問，李到訪日內瓦的聯合國總部、法國、日本等地方，有否獲得任何資助。李稱他支付自己的機票、酒店和大部份費用，但是有部份行程的費用則是向眾籌基金報銷。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Operational Integrity:</strong> A five-year track record that includes major incidents, policy breaches, or violations</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Technological Capabilities:</strong> Adoption and integration of advanced package screening technologies</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Employee Training:</strong> Regular training for employees handling controlled items</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Background Checks:</strong> Mandatory checks for staff involved in the shipping of controlled items</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Financial Assessment:</strong> Financial audits to ensure stability and solvency (a company in good financial standing is typically less prone to corrupt practices)</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Documentation Adherence:</strong> A demonstrated record of correctly filling, maintaining, and providing necessary shipment documentation</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Route Security:</strong> An assessment of chosen routes, favoring direct routes over transshipments to minimize risks</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Collaboration with Customs:</strong> Established rapport and history of cooperation with customs and enforcement agencies in the region</p> - </li> -</ol> +<h4 id="稅單顯示李宇軒年薪達120萬元">稅單顯示李宇軒年薪達120萬元</h4> -<p>In addition, to incentivize the use of the waybill by distributors and resellers, this report proposes implementing a revenue-sharing program where distributors and resellers receive a small percentage of the transaction fee from every digital waybill issued. This turns compliance into a direct revenue stream. As for logistics providers, those who submit to BIS audits after the first year will be eligible for green-lane customs treatment in ports of call. In addition, there is room for negotiation with insurance companies to offer lower premiums for shipments that use digital waybills, as they are easier to track and thus present a lower risk of theft or loss.</p> +<p>辯方展示李宇軒在2018至2019年度的稅單，當中顯示他的年薪達120萬元，扣除強積金和免稅額後，應課稅入息實額為105萬元，應繳稅款為約14萬元。</p> -<h4 id="recommendation-2-require-compulsory-certification-for-official-distributors-resellers-and-logistics-providers">Recommendation 2: Require compulsory certification for official distributors, resellers, and logistics providers.</h4> +<p>李稱，就編寫電腦程式的工作，一開始時薪是15美元，幾個月後升至時薪40美元，後來接多了專案，時薪再慢慢升至40至50多美元，其後時薪繼續上升。李又補充，因為工作是以專案為單位，有時可以接多些專案，但有時可以沒有任何專案。</p> -<p>Promoting a culture of compliance relies on a willingness on the part of exporters to comply with controls. While there certainly will be companies or individuals seeking to willfully circumvent or violate export controls, as mentioned previously, smaller resellers may inadvertently do so out of a lack of awareness or due to limited capacity. Hence, they should not be indiscriminately excluded entirely.</p> +<p>李宇軒作供完畢。控方替下一名「從犯證人」陳梓華申請「提犯令」，料明日傳召他出庭作供。</p> -<p>This recommendation seeks to reduce evasion, particularly among these unintentional violators. But in order to be added to the approved list, they will have to undergo and complete the requirements of a certification workshop alongside official distributors, authorized OEMs and resellers, and logistics providers. To ensure that the new policy on custom waybills and use of preapproved logistics providers is well comprehended and implemented by these stakeholders, this report proposes holding a series of targeted capacity-building certification workshops.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>CERTIFICATION WORKSHOP CURRICULUM</strong></p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導國安法後續游說倡議 李宇軒：若被北京視為政敵總會有方法起訴、無關是否繼續 李宇軒：陳梓華稱以色列軍隊可助訓練「勇武」、其小隊涉口岸爆炸品和721等事件【黎智英案・審訊第 57 日】2024-04-10T12:00:00+08:002024-04-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-57<ul> + <li>李宇軒：從未與黎智英見面或交談、「重光團隊」靠眾籌運作無收黎錢</li> +</ul> -<p>The proposed certification workshop should focus on the following goals:</p> +<excerpt /> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Outline in detail U.S. regulations surrounding the export of controlled chips.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conduct training on emergent tactics used by smugglers and how to spot and report front, shell, and shelf companies using easy-to-understand KYC guidelines (see sample guidelines below).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Explain the rationale for the custom waybills as well as criteria for preapproval of logistics providers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Provide hands-on sessions on how to correctly fill and process custom waybills.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Provide distributors and logistics providers with technical assistance to integrate the waybill system with existing inventory and sales software.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HGctlcq.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p><strong>CERTIFICATION WORKSHOP MODALITY</strong></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（10日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第57日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。在辯方的盤問下，李表示：「我冇見過黎智英」，也從沒以任何形式與他交談。李亦確認，他本人及「重光團隊（SWHK）」沒有接收過黎智英或其助手 Mark Simon 任何錢。就 SWHK 的性質，李確認它是一個鬆散、沒有會章的組織，成員之間的共同點是「想去為香港爭取自由民主」。此外，對於辯方形容 SWHK 是一個草根階層、依靠眾籌來營運的倡議組織（grassroots crowdfunded advocacy group），李表示同意。惟法官李運騰指李廿多歲的時候戶口便有300萬元積蓄，質疑他依然形容自己是「草根」，李則回答：「冇諗過呢個問題。」</p> -<p>The workshop will be facilitated by BIS export controls experts and customs officials from partner countries in an interactive format consisting of a detailed presentation, case studies, and a Q&amp;A session with hands-on practice. There should also be recorded versions for remote stakeholders or those unable to attend in person, with periodic live Q&amp;A sessions. If possible, e-guides, video tutorials, and FAQs should be made available on a dedicated portal. To reduce costs, this can be integrated to the extent possible with existing capacity-building work that BIS is already undertaking.</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第14天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行完成主問，接著由代表黎智英的大律師 Marc Corlett 盤問。</p> -<p><strong>CERTIFICATION WORKSHOP EVALUATION</strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DnBc6EM.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 大律師 Marc Corlett（左）、資深大律師 彭耀鴻（右）</p> -<p>An evaluation will be conducted following the workshop by either a BIS or customs official from the host country to ensure comprehension. This could include a mix of multiple-choice questions, waybill filling exercises, and scenario-based questions. Successful participants will receive a certificate, which will be a prerequisite for being listed as an approved distributor, reseller, or logistics provider. This will cost little beyond the logistical costs of organizing the workshop.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱從沒見過黎智英沒任何直接溝通">李宇軒稱從沒見過黎智英、沒任何直接溝通</h4> -<p><strong>RECERTIFICATION AND REVOCATION</strong></p> +<p>辯方問李宇軒與黎智英是否從來沒有見面，李回答：「我冇見過黎智英。」辯方續問，李是否從來沒有與黎交談過，李表示不論是電話、線上會議還是其他方式都好，他沒有與黎交談過。李亦確認，在2020年7月1日《國安法》生效之前，他與黎沒有任何直接的溝通，《國安法》之後也沒有。</p> -<p>Considering the dynamic nature of the industry and the regulatory landscape, periodic refresher workshops should be held at least annually. Updates or changes to the policy can be communicated during these sessions. Moreover, authorized sellers found negligent in conducting KYC procedures during BIS audits or random spot checks risk revocation of their certification.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱僅見過mark-simon一次-國安法前後均沒接觸">李宇軒稱僅見過Mark Simon一次 國安法前後均沒接觸</h4> -<p><strong>SAMPLE KYC GUIDELINES (RED-FLAG INDICATORS)</strong></p> +<p>至於黎的私人助手 Mark Simon ，李早前供稱 2019年9月29日會見訪港的美議員斯科特（Rick Scott）的時候，有同場見過 Mark Simon。李今在辯方的盤問下，確認該場合是他第一次，也是唯一一次見過 Mark Simon。李另確認，他從來沒有透過電話或者視像通話與 Mark Simon 交談。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Watchlist Matches: The customer, their address, or affiliated parties resemble entries on the Commerce Control List.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Business Mismatch: The chip’s capabilities are inconsistent with the customer’s purported business activities (e.g., an advanced GPU order for a steel mill).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Unusual Payment Methods: The customer prefers to pay in cash for high-value orders, despite more standard financing or credit terms being available.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Declined Services: The buyer turns down standard post-purchase offerings, such as installation or training.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Sketchy Business Background: The customer lacks a clear business history, previous transactions, or an online presence.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Lack of Product Familiarity: The customer shows little knowledge about the chip’s specifications and capabilities but is insistent on the purchase.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Ambiguous Delivery Details: The order has vague delivery dates or requests for delivery to remote or unusual destinations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Unusual Routes: The proposed transportation route is circuitous or unusual for the given product and end destination.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Inconsistent Packaging: The packaging requested does not match the method of shipment or seems overdone or inadequate for the type of product.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>電郵方面，李則指在另一名被告陳梓華與 Mark Simon 在一系列電郵商討墊支款項時，李不肯定陳有否副本抄送至他的電郵。</p> -<h4 id="recommendation-3-set-up-dedicated-regional-units-consisting-of-bis-staff-and-secondees-from-partner-countries-and-incorporate-use-of-modern-data-analytics">Recommendation 3: Set up dedicated regional units consisting of BIS staff and secondees from partner countries and incorporate use of modern data analytics.</h4> +<p>WhatsApp 群組方面，辯方指李宇軒與 Mark Simon 的共同群組只有「Coffee on Sunday」和「Sunday Meeting」，兩個群組均是因為會見美議員斯科特而開設。辯方問，除了電郵和 WhatsApp 群組之外，李在2020年7月1日《國安法》生效之前，便沒有與 Mark Simon 有任何接觸。李同意。辯方續問，《國安法》生效之後，李與 Mark Simon 也沒有任何接觸。李同意：「完全冇聯繫。」</p> -<p><strong>SETTING UP A DEDICATED REGIONAL UNIT</strong></p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指mark-simon就會見美議員沒有給予指示">李宇軒指Mark Simon就會見美議員沒有給予指示</h4> -<p>National customs operations have historically been driven by revenue collection and import controls, relegating the task of export controls to the periphery. While the United States might emphasize the importance of such controls, many customs agencies do not prioritize them. Moreover, the infrequent cases related to export control evasion result in an experiential deficit among customs staff, further diminishing its precedence. For reference, even in Germany, the European Union’s largest exporter, the number of criminal proceedings relating to export control violations processed each year is relatively low, in the double digits.</p> +<p>辯方續指，上述兩個 WhatsApp 群組僅談論會見斯科特的安排。李則把兩個群組內容總結為會面流程安排、人選及「見面講啲咩」。辯方指，群組從沒談論制裁、封鎖或禁售人群管理武器等話題，李同意。</p> -<p>This paucity, coupled with the complexity of such cases, has deterred the establishment of specialized procedures or dedicated departments to detect export control evasion. Consequently, this limited exposure leaves customs officers and even prosecutors and judges ill-equipped to credibly deal with export control evasion cases, potentially overlooking critical aspects due to insufficient experience or a lack of technical or legal familiarity.</p> +<p>辯方又指，Mark Simon 從沒有在群組中指示或要求李去做什麼事。惟法官杜麗冰指，Mark Simon 的確有在群組中提及見到斯科特時要說什麼。李則回答，他同意群組入面談論的都是流程和建議，但不是「指示」。</p> -<p>As such, to improve risk profiling, interdiction, investigation competence, and intelligence sharing, this report recommends the formation of a dedicated regional unit comprised of two to four specialist advisory experts from the United States, along with secondees from partners’ customs authorities. In this model, when a frontline officer detects a suspicious transaction, they can immediately seek guidance from the specialized team. In turn, the unit proactively disseminates its intelligence to partner countries. This model takes reference in part from specialized national units like in the Netherlands (see Case Study 6).</p> +<p>李亦同意辯方所指，他們會見斯科特的目的是讓他知道更多香港情況。他亦有在會面期間跟斯科特說美國可以做一些事，但沒有提及任何特定行動，也沒有同場人士提及美國可做什麼特定行動。</p> -<p>However, the efficacy of this system depends on robust interagency information sharing at both the national and international levels. Collaboration between customs and intelligence agencies is paramount. This will necessitate granting security clearances for both U.S. experts and secondees in the risk-profiling unit. Furthermore, intelligence data will need to be transformed into a redacted, yet actionable format, ensuring broader dissemination within the customs department without compromising sensitive information.</p> +<p>法官李運騰指 Mark Simon 在該次會面中基本上發言不多，李同意。</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-6"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 6</code></h4> - <h4 id="a-specialized-team-in-the-netherlands"><code class="highlighter-rouge">A Specialized Team in the Netherlands</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認重光團隊從沒接收黎智英或mark-simon的錢">李宇軒確認「重光團隊」從沒接收黎智英或Mark Simon的錢</h4> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the Netherlands, a specialist team, Precursors, Strategic Goods and Sanctions (POSS), is responsible for the enforcement of export controls and sanctions under the customs administration. POSS monitors and enforces exporters’ compliance and can also conduct (criminal) investigations. To perform its tasks, the team has the power to demand extensive information from any entity (e.g., manufacturers, traders, and brokers) that deals with the export of dual-use and military goods, including the right to access company premises.</code></em></p> +<p>李宇軒早前作供提及2019年8月的第三次眾籌「G攬運動」，Mark Simon 借出其美國銀行帳戶接收眾籌平台的180萬美元款項，然後轉帳至「The Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。李宇軒又提及 Mark Simon 仍有欠款，因此整理相關帳戶後傳送給另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）。</p> -<p><strong>USE OF MODERN DATA ANALYTICS</strong></p> +<p>財務收支紀錄顯示，Mark Simon 在2019年9月30日從眾籌平台「Gofundme」接收約170萬美元，然後分別在2019年11月4日、2020年1月7日和2月3日，把款項分三筆還給「The Project Hong Kong Trust」，亦在2019年11月21日將50萬美元轉帳至李宇軒的戶口。該紀錄顯示 Mark Simon 仍拖欠約26,000美元，需要歸還給「The Project Hong Kong Trust」。李宇軒庭上指，他曾叫陳梓華安排 Mark Simon 還款，但是因為在陳著手處理之前已經被拘捕，所以最後不了了之。</p> -<p>This leans on the work by Gregory C. Allen, Emily Benson, and William Alan Reinsch in their paper “Improved Export Controls Enforcement Technology Needed for U.S. National Security,” which recommends the incorporation of data-driven approaches in place of the dated software and databases BIS currently uses. However, whereas their recommendations focus on improving the BIS’s detection capabilities, this recommendation instead looks at improving detection at the customs level, which are the physical points of failure.</p> +<p>就 Mark Simon 轉帳給他的50萬美元，李宇軒指它本質上並非 Mark Simon 的錢，而是「The Project Hong Kong Trust」的錢。</p> -<p>To be clear, ensuring that the Commerce Control List is improved and regularly updated to pinpoint companies affiliated to bad-faith actors or regimes is crucial to ensure that ports downstream can more effectively sift out front, shell, and shelf companies. However, this also introduces a single point of failure in the detection system due to the reliance on the BIS to fulfill its role perfectly. Furthermore, the BIS might not always recognize specific tactics used in major transshipment hubs.</p> +<p>辯方指，在2019年9月30日之後，除了獲歸還曾經墊支的款項50萬美元之外，李便沒有接收過 Mark Simon 或與其有聯繫的人的任何錢。李同意。</p> -<p>Consequently, the United States should collaborate with partner countries and key circumvention nodes to incorporate modern data analytics for improved detection of evasive entities. Below is a sample implementation strategy.</p> +<p>辯方又指，李亦沒有接收過黎智英任何錢。李回應：「從來都冇。」辯方續指，李亦沒有接收過力高顧問有限公司、Lais Hotel Property Limited、Chartwell Holding Limited ，或任何與黎有聯繫的人士或公司的錢。李確認。</p> -<p><em>Sample Recommendations to Enhance Surveillance Capabilities to Detect Evasive Actors</em></p> +<p>至於「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK），李確認據他所知，在2019年9月30日之後，SWHK 沒有從黎智英、Mark Simon 或與他們有聯繫的人士接收過任何款項。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Customized Risk Profiling:</strong> Implement machine-learning algorithms tailored to each port’s unique profile to auto-score incoming and outgoing shipments based on the history of evasive activities and identified patterns.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Supply Chain Analysis:</strong> Employ supply chain analytics tools to trace the origins and destinations of shipments, identifying unusual routes or odd combinations of cargo that might indicate evasion tactics.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Real-Time Vessel Monitoring:</strong> Integrate real-time tracking systems to monitor vessel movements, especially those taking irregular routes or making unexpected stops, often indicators of evasive or illegal activities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Advanced Document Verification:</strong> Introduce optical character recognition (OCR) and natural-language processing (NLP) systems to scan, verify, and highlight discrepancies in shipment documents, bills of lading, or manifests.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Port Data Integration System:</strong> Consolidate data from different ports to create a holistic database, improving collaborative efforts in detecting evasive actors across the continent. This system can track entities as they move through various checkpoints, making evasion harder.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Behavioral Analytics:</strong> Utilize algorithms to study behavior patterns of freight forwarders, shipping companies, and other stakeholders. A sudden change in patterns could be indicative of evasive or illicit activities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Collaborative Stakeholder Reporting:</strong> Foster an environment where port staff, customs officials, and third-party stakeholders can anonymously report suspicious activities, with the system analyzing these reports for recurring patterns or concerns.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Dynamic Sanctions and Blacklist Checks:</strong> Integrate updated international and regional sanctions lists and run real-time checks on entities, ensuring that any newly blacklisted or suspicious entities are promptly flagged during transactions.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>The insights in this report are admittedly mostly qualitative. However, it seeks to provide a sufficient base for readers to infer the complexities of export control evasion through straightforward inductive reasoning.</p> +<h4 id="辯方指成立信託基金乃由swhk成員而非mark-simon提出">辯方指成立信託基金乃由SWHK成員而非Mark Simon提出</h4> -<p>The recommendations in this report also likely do not go far enough. Recent compute governance proposals suggest establishing a “tracking regime” to monitor the distribution and ownership of AI chips. However, practical implementation details of how chains of custody and a chip registry can be established in such a scheme remain largely poorly defined. In addition, the privacy challenges of doing so have not been sufficiently addressed. For example, when Intel introduced the Pentium III processor in 1999, which had a unique serial number embedded in each chip, the ensuing privacy backlash caused Intel to hastily create a disablement tool and exclude serial numbers in subsequent chip models. This is why this report proposes the less invasive and more modest recommendation of a waybill with a unique identifier instead.</p> - -<p>Lastly, the recommendations proposed in this report will likely be imperfect. Determined smugglers will try to hack the waybill system by forging or altering it. Shell companies will still overcome enhanced KYC checks and engage private couriers. But this is precisely the point. Export controls are an inherently leaky instrument. Guiding principles must therefore be practical. What chokepoints in the smuggling pipeline can realistically be targeted, thereby sufficiently increasing both the cost of compliance and the likelihood of good-faith actions? It is not about guaranteeing success, but defining the level of failure that is acceptable.</p> +<p>李早前作供提及，Mark Simon 答應借用戶口接收眾籌款項時，提議在美國開設一個信託基金來儲存款項，以避開款項遭香港銀行凍結的風險。</p> -<hr /> +<p>辯方今展示李於2019年9月傳送給陳梓華的電郵，當中列出尋找願意接收眾籌款項的人選期間面對的困難，其中一點提到網名「Surely」的美國 SWHK 成員 Shirley Ho 不能接收眾籌款項，因為對於她及其家人過於冒險；Shirley Ho 研究相關法例後提議可以成立一個非牟利的機構（non-profit entity）去接收眾籌款項，以及作日後用途。辯方指，成立信託基金這個主意其實是由 Shirley Ho 提出的。李同意，不過同時指 Shirley Ho 當時僅提及非牟利機構。</p> -<p><strong>Barath Harithas</strong> is a non-resident adjunct fellow with the CSIS Project on Trade and Technology and has held diverse public service roles in Singapore spanning the U.S.-China relationship, international trade, and AI standards.</p>Barath HarithasExport control evasion of controlled chips is a known concern, but the specifics of this activity are opaque. In addition, a systematic analysis of the entire chip smuggling pipeline, from initial procurement to unlawful distribution, remains conspicuously absent.Ships, Trains, And Trucks2024-04-08T12:00:00+08:002024-04-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ships-trains-and-trucks<p><em>The full-scale Russian invasion has devastating effects on Ukraine’s trade causing vast destruction of its transport and logistics infrastructure. Ukraine and its partners have to be creative and determined in finding new trade corridors to support business operations.</em></p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指swhk是鬆散組織-成員共同點是為香港爭取自由民主">李宇軒指SWHK是鬆散組織 成員共同點是為香港爭取自由民主</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>李早前作供時形容 SWHK 是一個鬆散的組織、定義含糊而且沒有會章。李再次確認：「佢（SWHK）係一個 loose 嘅 organisation，佢係一個冇 articles（會章）嘅 organisation ，佢入面大家嘅 common ground 係想去為香港爭取自由民主。」</p> -<p>Transport and logistics infrastructure serves as a country’s main trade arteries, facilitating the flow of people, goods, and services. Without this vital infrastructure, a country’s economic potential is stifled. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 had devastating effects on its economy, including its ability to trade. Due to constant and indiscriminate Russian missile attacks, Ukraine suffered massive destruction of its transport and logistics infrastructure, with air cargo totally suspended and port activity severely interrupted. As a result, Ukraine has to be creative in finding new trade corridors to support business operations and enable the flow of humanitarian and military aid. To that effect, this white paper analyzes how the country has been adapting its trade routes and related infrastructure in wartime and provides recommendations to sustain trade and economic activity now and in the future.</p> +<p>辯方展示李宇軒在 Telegram 傳送給自己的訊息，當中提到 SWHK 本身有很多定義，包括「SWHK元祖」、「SWHK JP」、「SWHK global」和、「SWHK UK」。辯方問「SWHK元祖」是代表什麼，李則指一開始籌辦「中英聯合聲明登報」期間，組員之間投票選出「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」口號作為團體的名稱，並以這個團體的名義登報，從而引申出來的概念便是「SWHK元祖」。</p> -<h3 id="current-trade-challenges">Current Trade Challenges</h3> +<p>李提到因為 SWHK 不是一個有會章或正確的組織，若果不同的人認同某個 SWHK 的身份的話，例如 SWHK 或 SWHK Japan，就會由他們個人自行決定去認同這個「label」。在不同活動之中，也會交給不同行動者自行決定以哪一個身份去參與活動。</p> -<p>Ukraine is facing numerous challenges to its trade-related infrastructure. Even before the full-scale invasion, the quality of Ukraine’s infrastructure was low due to the decades-long absence of critical investments. The 2022 invasion has added more complexities to this situation. First, Russian air strikes have destroyed and damaged transport and logistics infrastructure including key ports, roads, and grain silos, rendering these assets unusable or in need of repair and rebuilding. Second, shipping through the Black Sea, a main artery for trade for agricultural products, has partially rebounded but remains susceptible to attacks. Moreover, finding alternative routes for grain shipments via train and roads through Ukraine’s western borders has led to disruptions with neighboring countries and additional time and transportation costs. Third, given the unpredictability of Russian attacks and the duration of the war, insurance for physical assets, such as vessels and silos, and business operations is expensive or lacking altogether. Lastly, all these transportation modes are labor intensive. Personnel shortages abound across sectors as many Ukrainians have left the country or have been mobilized for the army. Transportation is not immune to these trends.</p> +<h4 id="法官質疑李宇軒廿多歲有300萬仍說自己是草根">法官質疑李宇軒廿多歲有300萬仍說自己是「草根」</h4> -<h3 id="seaports-and-waterways">Seaports and Waterways</h3> +<p>法官李運騰指，沒有任何人能夠壟斷 SWHK 的名義。李回應：「冇人。」李官又指，人們可以自己決定以什麼名義參與，李宇軒確認：「係。」李又補充，因為當時香港的運動是「無大台（decentralised）」，所以會有如此的現象。</p> -<p>Ukraine’s seaports have been crucial modes for exporting agricultural commodities and metals. Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s top five ports in the Black Sea cities of Pivdennyi, Mykolayiv, Chornomorsk, Odesa, and Mariupol — were responsible for over 90 percent of Ukraine’s seaport freight turnover. Moreover, 98 percent of grain exports flowed through the Black Sea ports, with Mykolayiv seaport playing an imperative role. Companies such as U.S. Bunge, Ukrainian Nibulon, and Chinese COFCO all had major investments there.</p> +<p>辯方指，SWHK 沒有正式會員架構、沒有會員登記制度，或者需要經任何程序去認證會員身份。李表示：「同意呢個。」辯方又形容 SWHK 是一個草根階層、依靠眾籌來營運的倡議組織（grassroots crowdfunded advocacy group）。李同意。</p> -<p>With the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, commerce through the Black Sea was significantly interrupted. Grain exports via the Black Sea were subject to constant Russian attacks (the heaviest period being February to July of 2022), including aerial (missile and drone) attacks on port infrastructure and sea mines destroying cargo ships. Due to the invasion, Ukraine fully lost control of the port of Mariupol in May 2022 after Russia brutally invaded it on February 24, 2022. Of the other four important ports, Mykolaiv became inoperative due to Russia’s full-scale invasion, while the ports of Chornomorsk, Pivdennyi, and Odesa have operated at partial capacity since February 2022.</p> +<p>此時法官李運騰打斷，指李宇軒廿多歲的時候戶口便有300萬元積蓄，但李依然形容自己是「草根」嗎？李沉默數秒後，才回答：「冇諗過呢個問題。」</p> -<p>To help ease the flow of goods to and from Ukraine, in May 2022, the European Commission launched the Solidarity Lanes action plan. The EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provide logistics alternatives to Ukraine’s seaports, including rail, road, and inland waterways (Figure 1). A total of €2 billion (around $2.2 billion) has been mobilized to meet this demand. According to the European Council, as of July 2023, almost 33 million metric tons of grain (and other foodstuffs) had been exported via the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which is about half of what it exported prior to the full-scale invasion. At the same time Ukraine imported essential goods such as fuel, and military and humanitarian aid was allowed to flow.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認swhk無任何領導架構-成員可選擇不參與活動">李宇軒確認SWHK無任何領導架構 成員可選擇不參與活動</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wWvs0mW.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: EU Solidarity Lanes.</strong> Source: Reprinted with permission (CC BY 4.0 DEED) from the <a href="https://transport.ec.europa.eu/ukraine/keeping-ukrainian-goods-moving_en">European Commission, “Keeping Ukrainian Goods Moving”</a>.</em></p> +<p>在辯方盤問下，李同意不同 SWHK 成員，不論是以網名或是真名示人也好，都會就如何達成 SWHK 目標表達不同意見。辯方續指，SWHK 並沒有任何領導架構，李同意沒有，不過隨著時間過去，一些比較活躍的成員傾向在不同活動中都會提出意見。</p> -<p>In addition, in July 2022, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and the United Nations brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative. This provided partial safety for Ukraine’s grain exports via the Black Sea ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi for a year. Since August 2022, the initiative has enabled 32 million metric tons of Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs to be shipped across the globe. Furthermore, the initiative helped Ukraine export over 36 million metric tons of nonagricultural goods such as iron, steel, ores, and wood. However, Russia suspended the deal in July 2023 and consequently resumed heavy attacks on Ukraine’s port infrastructure.</p> +<p>辯方又指，若果有成員對某個活動不支持，大可以不參與。李回答，他們可以選擇不參加活動，或者去說服其他人不去籌辦該活動。</p> -<p>After Russia fully compromised the Solidarity Lanes through the Black Sea, Ukraine launched its own alternative Black Sea corridor in August 2023. Established with the help of its Western partners, the corridor between Ukrainian ports and the Bosporus Strait has proved successful. Ships are now traveling on the western coast of the Black Sea through Romanian and Bulgarian territorial waters. Ukraine has also been exporting grain through the ports of Reni and Izmail, both on the Danube River. This new corridor allows Ukraine to continue exporting wheat, corn, sunflower oil, and barley to the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Since Russia’s refusal to continue the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Ukraine claims it has exported, as of December 2023, approximately seven million metric tons of cargo through its seaports, five million of which were Ukrainian agricultural products. According to recent reports, Ukraine is on track to export all its grain from the 2023 harvest. Nevertheless, there are still major risks as Russia continues to attack commercial ships and infrastructure and as mines float in the Black Sea waters.</p> +<p>李又確認，他可以自行決定是否參與某個活動，當中取決於很多理由，其中一個理由是他是否同意該活動，另一個因素是視乎他有否技能協助到活動。</p> -<p>Moreover, due to Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine is using more road and rail infrastructure to trade. Before the full-scale invasion, nonmarine modes of transportation were responsible for over 40 percent of Ukraine’s trade turnover and seaports for about 60 percent. According to author interviews with Ukrainian infrastructure and transportation experts, for most of 2023, the picture almost flipped, where rail and roads accounted for about three-fourths of Ukraine’s total trade volume and seaports accounted for about one-fourth. This situation changed dramatically after Ukraine reopened its ports in the fourth quarter of 2023. According to the experts, today, the balance between seaport and non-seaport trade turnover is about 50-50.</p> +<p>辯方指李不能主導 SWHK 成員的意見。李同意：「我唔可以 dictate，我只可以同大家傾㗎啫。」辯方續指，其他人亦不能主導 SWHK，正如李剛才提到這是一個「無大台」的組織（decentralised organisation）。李則表示：「呢個係其中一個方面。」</p> -<h3 id="roads">Roads</h3> +<h4 id="李宇軒同意陳梓華屬年輕一代-但不知道陳是否視自己為swhk成員之一">李宇軒同意陳梓華屬年輕一代 但不知道陳是否視自己為SWHK成員之一</h4> -<p>Another important mode of transportation for Ukraine is the road network. However, the 170,000-kilometer road network Ukraine inherited from the Soviet era was in poor condition and needed much updating. With Ukraine’s pro-Western trajectory after 2014, the government took road repair more seriously, allocating substantial sums from the state budget. Ukraine’s roads began to be brought back to life as Ukraine repaired up to 10 percent of the roads between 2016 and 2019. Moreover, in 2019, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky announced the Big Construction initiative aimed at building or repairing roads and other important infrastructure. As a result, more than 14,000 kilometers of roads were constructed or repaired in the first two years of the projectbut still not enough to cover the immense needs). This initiative then ran into problems, including lack of transparency in the bidding processes and severe corruption allegations in the state-run road agency Ukravtodor.</p> +<p>李早前供稱曾獲時任英國駐港領事賀恩德（Andy Heyn）邀請到其住所參與會議，同場的民主黨創黨主席李柱銘和前政務司司長陳方安生代表「老一啲嘅民主派」；時任立法會議員郭榮鏗和莫乃光「就喺中間」，而李自己就是「再後生嘅 generation」。</p> -<p>Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s roads were mainly transporting higher value-added products such as finished goods (both for imports and exports), in addition to some commodities. The war has considerably changed trade dynamics as Ukraine’s roads had to absorb part of the commodities transported via seaports, mainly metals and grain. Ukraine can now export some of the grain using road and rail cargo routes via Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova, albeit with limited capacities and in some cases with political tensions.</p> +<p>辯方問李，可否形容 SWHK 為年輕一代的一員？李表示，就他所認識的 SWHK 成員，「佢哋的確大部份係年輕一代」，例如「攬炒巴」劉祖廸是其中之一。至於一些只透過網名溝通的成員，李指憑他們的說話方式、感覺和觀點，似乎都符合他對「年輕一代」的印象。</p> -<p>In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, the European Union allowed tariff-free food imports from Ukraine, but that created problems for neighboring countries. In April 2023, Poland closed its border to Ukrainian grain as Polish farmers protested that their grain became less competitive. Slovakia and Hungary took similar action earlier that month. The EU farmers gained partial victory by making the European Commission impose restrictions against imports of Ukrainian grain (wheat, maize, rapeseed, sunflower seed) to Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Initially, the ban was to last until June 5, 2023, but then it was extended until September 15, 2023, after which it became obsolete. However, in response to lifting the ban, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia said they would impose unilateral import bans.</p> +<p>法官李運騰聞言指，如果他們不是年輕的話，他們也是心態上年輕（young at heart）。法官李素蘭問及李何時出生，李回答他在1990年出生。李素蘭又問，在李眼中，是否在1990年以後出生的人就是年輕人。李則說：「我諗冇乜 definition，望落去 young。」</p> -<p>This shift in transportation has also generated discontent among truckers in neighboring countries. In November 2023, Polish truckers initiated a boycott of one of Poland’s largest Ukraine border crossings, Medyka, in fear that an influx of Ukraine’s truckers are creating unfair competition. Polish truckers have been demanding more support from their government, including reinstating of permits and limiting the number of licenses for Ukrainian truckers. Slovakia and Hungary joined the boycotting of their own border control points a few weeks later.</p> +<p>李官問另一名被告陳梓華是否算年輕人。李則表示，如果把陳都視為 SWHK 成員的話「佢都係年輕一代」。</p> -<p>This caused thousands of trucks to be stranded for miles near the borders in freezing weather, costing Ukraine’s government and the private sector a hefty sum. The total amount of trucks in queue at one point was nearing 4,000. Altogether, Poland blocked four border crossings: Korczowa-Krakivets, Hrebenne-Rava-Ruska, Dorohusk-Yahodyn, and Medyka.</p> +<p>辯方追問陳梓華是否 SWHK 成員，李指如果陳視自己為 SWHK 成員的話，「我就當係」；但如果陳覺得自己只是個人或者義工「咁我冇得話佢係 SWHK」。李指他沒有與陳討論過這個問題，不過二人過往在交談期間，陳似乎將 SWHK 和李「擺埋喺同一邊」。李表示簡而言之他不知道陳視自己為 SWHK 一員與否。</p> -<p>An additional potential problem is that the stranded trucks could be carrying critical humanitarian aid for Ukrainians, considering that some of these border crossings are close to transit points for humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine.</p> +<h4 id="辯方李宇軒和陳梓華都是年輕人-均對民主運動有興趣-所以保持聯繫">辯方：李宇軒和陳梓華都是年輕人 均對民主運動有興趣 所以保持聯繫</h4> -<p>Although the blockade affected a diverse range of businesses, Polish truckers are damaging Ukraine’s wood, furniture, car parts, and vegetable oil exporters and a quarter of Ukraine’s fuel supplies imports in particular. A Ukrainian trucker association estimated the blockage has already cost €400 million ($436 million) in revenue for companies. The European Business Association estimates the total losses to be much lower — around $8.5 million — based on poll results among its members.</p> +<p>李宇軒另確認他本來在網上認識陳梓華，之後透過 Telegram 保持聯絡，就共同感興趣的話題討論和互相交流觀點。辯方指，陳就如李一樣都是年輕一代，或心態上年輕。李同意：「係，同埋佢仲後生過我。」辯方續指，除了年輕以外，二人均對於香港的民主運動感興趣，所以二人之間有連結（connection）和共同點（common ground）。</p> -<p>In January 2024, Polish truckers reached an agreement with the government under certain conditions. Polish farmers also stopped a protest at Medyka after they negotiated a deal with the Polish government. Poland and Ukraine also said that they were close to an agreement on agricultural imports on March 28. However, this does not mean Ukraine will be immune to similar boycotts in the future, which presents an ongoing major risk for Ukrainian trade capacity as road transportation has become increasingly important for Ukraine. Traditionally, even before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s border checkpoints leading to the European Union were congested and depleted. In addition, there is still ongoing corruption at Ukraine’s customs, though authorities have been attempting to crack down on high-level officials. These fundamental challenges need to be addressed in addition to future boycotts and protests.</p> +<p>不過辯方指，根據李早前的證供，陳屬於「前線的人」，而李則屬於「較後線的人」，因此二人不會就所有問題都討論。李同意，例如 IPAC 正式公布成立之前，他遵守保密承諾而沒有告訴陳，又指「唔係全部嘅活動都有同T傾」。</p> -<h3 id="rail">Rail</h3> +<p>辯方盤問未完，案件明日續審。</p> -<p>Along with its seaports and roads, Ukraine has a strong rail infrastructure to transport goods and people — one of the biggest and most resilient in the world. According to Transparency International, before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s railway system — controlled by Ukrzaliznytsia (UZ), the country’s state-run rail monopoly and largest employer — was responsible for 60–75 percent of the country’s total cargo turnover, which included all of Ukraine’s major commodities: construction materials, grain, and steel.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Due to the war, almost 6,300 kilometers of track were destroyed. Along with increases in fuel costs and constant rebuilding due to Russian air strikes, the government of Ukraine decided to increase rail tariffs by 70 percent in June 2022 to make the company economically sustainable. This allowed the monopoly to achieve a financial surplus. In 2022, UZ had a deficit of 11 billion hryvnias ($290 million) as the company had to transport humanitarian aid and evacuate 3.7 million Ukrainians for free. In 2023, the situation dramatically changed, and UZ predicted it would reach 7 billion hryvnias ($190 million) in net profit.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒：從未與黎智英見面或交談、「重光團隊」靠眾籌運作無收黎錢【黎智英案・審訊第 56 日】2024-04-09T12:00:00+08:002024-04-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-56<ul> + <li>李宇軒與陳梓華曾討論籌組流亡政府 陳因人脈廣被懷疑是「肥佬黎嘅仔」</li> +</ul> -<p>In November 2023, UZ transported 14 million metric tons of cargo, a 34 percent increase year over year. About half of this was transported domestically, and the rest was exported (of which 2.4 million was grain). Goods transported via rail today include many of the same transported before the full-scale invasion: construction materials, iron and manganese ore, and coal. What has changed are the volumes and pressure on the railway system. During war, these volumes can vary dramatically, and there is little consistency with figures (for example, grain transportation will strongly depend on whether Ukraine has the ability to export grain via the Black Sea). Furthermore, cargo routes have changed since the full-scale invasion: whereas before 2022, most of the railway cargo transportation was for domestic trade purposes, the full-scale invasion pushed the railways to fill in the export void for commodities.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>However, the rail sector needs reform and much work to attract international companies that could compete with their rolling stock. To reform and liberalize Ukraine’s railway system, the monopoly should become more transparent, unbundle into at least three separate businesses — infrastructure, passenger, and cargo — and uproot corruption, archaic regulation, and inefficient management. Furthermore, Ukraine’s railway infrastructure must meet the requirements of EU directives. Ukraine’s railways should integrate in unison with the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), meaning it will have to solve its gauge issue: Western Europe uses 1,435-millimeter gauge, whereas post-Soviet countries tend to use 1,540-millimeter gauge. Importantly, in coordination with the reform agenda, multilaterals will be valuable partners in providing significant financing to modernize and fix UZ.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/86XFLp2.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<h3 id="air">Air</h3> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（9日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第56日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。2020年7月，李與另一名被告陳梓華曾經透過 Signal 訊息討論在外地籌組「流亡政府」，前提是需要找人願意「浮上枱面做枱面人」，期間李和陳均有考慮擔任「枱面人」，惟陳告訴李如果他做「枱面人」，可能會面臨政治檢控或政治迫害。至同年8月10日，黎智英被警方拘捕，李指一些 Telegram 群組成員覺得陳的人脈甚廣（well connected），懷疑他是「肥佬黎嘅仔」，於是討論「洗唔洗踢肥佬黎個仔出 TG group」。李又指，二人不時討論應否離開香港，陳曾向李表示，作為一名領袖需要留下直至最後一刻，反問「走走走，我若離開，誰來帶隊」。</p> -<p>Before the 2022 invasion, Ukraine had bustling airport traffic, with Kyiv’s Boryspil International Airport having the highest activity by far, followed by the Lviv Danylo Halytskyi International Airport, Kyiv International Airport–Zhuliany, Odesa International Airport, and Kharkiv International Airport. Ukraine’s airport infrastructure was up and coming since 2014, when Ukraine signed an association agreement with the European Union and has been making it easier for airline businesses — including from the United States — to operate within the country ever since. Ukraine’s airports were mainly active with passenger traffic as well as parcel transportation. Today its commercial air activity is completely on pause, and some have been severely damaged. Until the country’s skies are protected, air travel will not operate throughout the country for civilian transportation, and there is limited opportunity for some airports to be active in delivering cargo.</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第13天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> -<h3 id="short-term-and-longer-term-solutions">Short-Term and Longer-Term Solutions</h3> +<h4 id="李宇軒若做枱面人或面臨政治檢控或迫害">李宇軒：若做「枱面人」或面臨政治檢控或迫害</h4> -<p>Considering the war is likely to continue, Ukraine’s trade corridors in the short run need to be fully utilized and protected from Russian attacks. In the long term, Ukraine needs to rethink its existing trade corridors and reconfigure its transport and logistics infrastructure toward the EU market.</p> +<p>控方昨日展示李宇軒與另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）之間的 Signal 對話，當中陳問李：「你安排好哂香港D野未」、「你去打最終件事會係你身邊所有人都會照肺」；李則回覆「我搞掂咗要搞嘅家人s」。</p> -<p>As such, the European Union has heavily supported Ukraine’s adoption and implementation of the TEN-T proposal, which would incorporate roads, inland waterways, and railways to allow more Ukrainian grain and products to be exported. There has already been €110 billion (around $119 billion) worth of investments completed along the TEN-T, including the interconnectivity of maritime, aviation, and land infrastructure. Many new standards are being optimized for more efficient rail (track speed requirements of 100 kilometers per hour for freight and 160 kilometers per hour for passenger rail), sea (alternative vessel fuels and adequate mooring/resting areas), air (new spaceports), and road transit (safe and interconnected roads to infrastructure), aiming to decrease shipping time and ensure lower carbon emissions. This initiative could create 840,000 jobs and increase EU gross domestic product by 2.4 percentage points. Of the nine TEN-T transportation corridors, four are planned to fully connect with Ukraine by 2030: the North Sea–Baltic corridor, the Baltic Sea–Black Sea–Aegean Sea corridor, the Baltic–Adriatic corridor, and the Rhine–Danube corridor.</p> +<p>李今再解釋，陳之所以問他「安排好哂香港D野未」，是因為香港有政治壓迫，無論他選擇留在香港還是離開都好，他都需要處理好香港的事。</p> -<h3 id="short-term-solutions">Short-Term Solutions</h3> +<p>法官李運騰指二人的對話中提及前「青年新政」成員梁頌恆、前「香港民族黨」召集人陳浩天、前英國駐港總領事館職員鄭文傑、前「本土民主前線」發言人黃台仰以及梁繼平，李宇軒又提到他去聯合國會見職員，李官問二人在怎樣的情況下討論上述話題。</p> -<h4 id="seaports">Seaports</h4> +<p>李回答有兩方面，第一是他當時與陳梓華討論他的個人未來方向，包括在譚競嫦（Sharon Hom）的組織「中國人權」工作，或者跟裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）協助 IPAC（對華政策跨國議會聯盟）的工作；第二方面是陳梓華認為 SWHK 需要轉型。李指本來二人討論 SWHK，之後討論到國際和社運形勢，後來他和陳梓華得出結論是有樽頸位（bottle neck）或權力真空（power vacuum）的情況。</p> -<p>If Ukraine wants to ramp up its seaport usage, it ultimately needs to deal with Russia’s continuous military threats. In this regard, stronger military protection of the region and active demining of both land and waterways are key measures to improve the security of seaports. Ukraine’s seaports could be propped up by long-range missiles and air defense that will deter Russia’s fleet farther away from Ukraine’s coast. Plenty of evidence shows this has been effective in the past. Furthermore, Ukraine’s inland waterways should be protected and cleared from mines.</p> +<p>李續指，他們然後討論會否推舉一個「枱面人」，可以對運動提供推動力，後來結論是需要一個「枱面人」，二人繼而討論誰人適合擔任「枱面人」，所以陳在之後的訊息中指「你去打最終件事會係你身邊所有人都會照肺」，意思是如果李「浮上枱面做枱面人」的話，可能會面臨政治檢控或政治迫害。</p> -<p>Another tool that can enable more trade via Ukraine’s seaports is war risk insurance. Currently, risk management company Marsh McLennan, in collaboration with Lloyd’s of London and the Ukrainian government, created a war insurance facility called Unity, which is meant to provide affordable insurance for grain export from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Unity will insure up to $50 million in hull and separate protection and indemnity war risk insurance, which is not a large amount in overall terms for the industry. This is where international financial institutions and development finance institutions could step in to provide additional insurance support. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is working on such a scheme, but it is still not operational.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指另一被告陳梓華亦曾考慮做枱面人">李宇軒指另一被告陳梓華亦曾考慮做「枱面人」</h4> -<h4 id="roads-and-rail">Roads and Rail</h4> +<p>法官李運騰好奇一問，為何陳梓華沒有自動請纓做「枱面人」。李則指陳有考慮過，所以在之前的訊息中，當李說：「數完一圈⋯⋯總結無人」，陳便回覆：「Shit」、「咁我做啦屌」，不過陳隨即說：「唔係喎」、「仲有本記（本土派）果班問過未？」李指陳有考慮過，只是想先詢問本土派有沒有人願意做「枱面人」。</p> -<p>For roads and railways, there is a need to expedite border crossings. The business communities in both Ukraine and Poland have provided a list of ways to improve border control inspections by removing red tape and providing more transparency. Moreover, joint road checkpoints could be expanded to ease the flow of trucks. The Ukrainian government is already partially engaging in checkpoint expansion: just recently U.S.-based company DAI Global signed a contract with Miyamoto International to modernize crossing points on Ukraine’s border.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指枱面人需離開香港籌組流亡政府">李宇軒指「枱面人」需離開香港籌組「流亡政府」</h4> -<p>Another barrier for both transportation companies is the licensing requirements for international postal carriers. Currently, not all private sector players are allowed to receive licenses for international mail processing centers (IMPCs). The only holders of IMPCs in Ukraine are state-owned Ukrposhta and Ukrainian-Canadian company Rosan (part of the Meest Group), which curtails competition. Resolving this matter would expedite the processing and delivery of packages to and from Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine will have to fully adapt its environmental and licensing regulations for cargo transportation vehicles in line with those of the European Union.</p> +<p>李提到，當他們找到「枱面人」之後，該「枱面人」需要離開香港，在外地籌組「流亡政府」。法官李運騰聞言一度問：「這討論是否認真？」不過李指，因為找不到「枱面人」，所以最後沒有結論。</p> -<h4 id="air-1">Air</h4> +<p>李官指，二人的訊息討論是在2020年7月23日，當時《港區國安法》已經生效，問李宇軒為何仍然考慮是否做「枱面人」。李表示，「因為唔企出嚟嘅話，香港依然會畀中國共產黨操控嘅政權統治，所以已經跌入咗一個有政治迫害嘅環境入面，即係已經夠差。」李官續問，在如此的情況下，李依然討論在香港以外籌組流亡政府？李同意。</p> -<p>Regarding air transport, Ukraine could boost its cargo if its western airports (for example, Lviv and Uzhhorod) are more secure and if air cargo carriers are allowed to operate. This will increase Ukraine’s trade turnover capacity, though air transport cannot fully substitute Ukraine’s road freight because it is a more expensive means of transportation.</p> +<p>李並指，籌組流亡政府有兩個先決條件，一是要離開香港，因為若果留在香港的話，「會畀香港政府冚佢檔。」另一個條件是要有「枱面人」，「因為淨係得枱底人嘅流亡政府，係唔會有人 take it seriously。」李指，如果有流亡政府的話，會以流亡政府的名義進行國際游說，但是如果沒有的話，亦可以繼續以個人名義做國際游說。</p> -<p>Ukraine and the European Union could negotiate air cargo transportation by reopening the Lviv airport as an initial hub, followed by other airports in western Ukraine, which are only minutes away from EU airspace. Such air travel could be accompanied by a commercial air defense dome or a negotiation similar to the Black Sea grain corridor but only for air cargo transportation. Furthermore, if private sector players were allowed to receive licenses for IMPCs, these companies could transport goods via the skies, alleviating some of the cargo burden from the roads and diversifying the means of transportation.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒黎智英被捕後-有組員懷疑陳梓華是肥佬黎嘅仔">李宇軒：黎智英被捕後 有組員懷疑陳梓華是「肥佬黎嘅仔」</h4> -<h3 id="long-term-solutions">Long-Term Solutions</h3> +<p>2020年8月10日早上，黎智英等人被拘捕。李宇軒在 Signal 傳送訊息給陳梓華，指有組員問是否需要把陳「踢出」 Telegram 群組，「因為肥佬黎出咗事」；陳其後回覆「No need」。</p> -<p>Along with these short-term measures, Ukraine could envision new and expanded logistics routes to serve trade activity along the EU border. In this regard, EU membership will be a major incentive to improve the transport and logistics network and align regulations and standards to the EU market. To increase trade with the European Union, Ukraine will need to construct new roads, widen existing ones, modernize the railway system, and increase the capacity of the border checkpoints. In the long run, Ukraine will have to prioritize EU accession requirements related to infrastructure, such as TEN-T-related policies and its overall transport policy. However, Ukraine’s progress in this realm so far has been limited.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QaDopl9.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> -<p>On road infrastructure, there is still plenty of work to be done to modernize the current system and build new infrastructure. Private capital and Western companies will play a vital role in the reconstruction of Ukraine’s roads. According to a study by the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank, public-private partnerships (PPPs) had the potential to attract approximately $2 billion in road investments from the private sector between 2021 and 2023. Ukraine could also build more roads that lead toward borders with Moldova and Romania. However, highway construction in Ukraine inherited a reputation as one of the most corrupt sectors in transportation. To address this issue, Ukraine has been implementing reforms since 2014 and needs to continue on this path. The Ukrainian government now requires each company that has won a tender must hire an engineer from the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, which provides more professionalism, transparency, efficiency, and accountability to management. Furthermore, the country’s public e-procurement system (ProZorro) has made the bidding procedure for government contracts more transparent. Ukraine has also decentralized its state roads agency, Ukravtodor.</p> +<p>李庭上解釋，他當時向陳轉達 Telegram 群組成員的說話，有人覺得陳的 Telegram 帳戶「太過 well connected」，並且「估計呢度係咪有個人係肥佬黎嘅仔」。當時黎智英被警方國安處拘捕，因此組員討論「洗唔洗踢肥佬黎個仔出 TG group」。</p> -<p>The port infrastructure requires upgrading as well, including dredging and construction of docking sites. Ukraine’s Odesa port infrastructure has ample potential to develop further, as it is connected to the Dnipro River, which has also been majorly underutilized for cargo transportation during the past decades. If Ukraine advances its river infrastructure, it will put less pressure on roads (which are more expensive for the government to maintain) and expand the overall trade capacity. Furthermore, Ukraine has the advantage of having access to the largest EU river, the Danube, which stretches to the largest EU economy — Germany.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華稱作為領袖需留至最後一刻-反問我若離開誰來帶隊">陳梓華稱作為領袖需留至最後一刻 反問「我若離開，誰來帶隊」</h4> -<p>In this regard, Romania has become a critical player in exporting Ukrainian grain in the past year, though more investments in Romanian port infrastructure may be necessary if it is to accommodate further increases in the coming months and years. The European Union and the United States have already sent a delegation to visit Izmail, as the port is key to ferrying cargo down the Danube River into Romania, which then transports the grain to Constanta for its journey into the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, maritime insurance needs to be more readily available, along with infrastructure investments in grain storage capacity in Romanian and Moldovan silos, to accommodate the increased fertilizer and grain surpluses inevitable in an unpredictable war.</p> +<p>訊息紀錄顯示，陳向李表示，作為一名領袖，他需要留下直至最後一刻，「走走走，我若離開，誰來帶隊」；李則回應自己只是純粹轉達組員的訊息。</p> -<p>At the same time, countries bordering Ukraine’s western regions will have to expand their road and rail capacities as well. Land corridors that allow for trucking are still beneficial to exports, and there is a sense of urgency to widen and expand current roads that traverse out toward Moldova and Romania. With support from the European Investment Bank and EBRD, Moldova is also improving its railway network to ease Ukrainian grain shipments through Moldovan roads.</p> +<p>李庭上解釋，每當有人被拘捕，的確有人叫他及其他仍在香港的人離開，因為他曾經數次使用真名行事。法官李素蘭問到，陳梓華訊息提及「帶隊」，而李是否其中一個隊員？李則表示，他並不屬於任何一個陳梓華所帶領的團隊。</p> -<p>Currently, the freight throughput capacity of rail border crossing points between Ukraine and the European Union is low. This can be resolved by increasing administrative staff (e.g., customs, border police), modernizing equipment, and expanding infrastructure. The European Union has already contributed to the development of Ukraine’s cross-border railway infrastructure via the Connecting Europe Facility. Furthermore, Ukraine needs to have easier access to main EU distribution points such as in the Adriatic and Baltic Seas and at Danube ports.</p> +<p>被問到二人此前有否討論過離開香港，李指相關話題「耐唔耐有浮過出嚟」，因為這並不是一個特別的話題，時不時便會討論，「好似晏晝食飯食咩呀呢種 topic」，討論內容大多圍繞應否離港、離港之後可以做什麼等等。李表示，不論他是否有任何罪名，預計到香港政權總會想到辦法去拘捕他。</p> -<p>In parallel to border issues, Ukraine’s rail system requires deep reforms to create a more competitive rail cargo transportation market that corresponds to EU standards. Currently, this is difficult considering the centralized nature of management during war where rail transportation of humanitarian goods and citizens is important for the country’s functioning. However, this does not mean Ukraine cannot start reforming UZ in the meantime. For example, Ukraine could create an independent railways regulator responsible for tariffs and overall regulation of the monopoly. Furthermore, UZ’s activities should eventually be unbundled, since currently, it has a monopoly both within rail infrastructure and within the cargo transit. The latter could be operated by private sector locomotives and transit companies, which would significantly modernize and expand the fleet. Allowing Western companies to enter would also make Ukraine less dependent on Soviet infrastructure and fleet.</p> +<p>訊息紀錄顯示，陳梓華在同日下午約3時半傳送訊息給李宇軒，叫李離開香港，留下陳一個在香港，因為承受不了國際線再失去多一人（“Brother, leave me here - we can’t afford one more lost in international line.”）。李表示印象中他在同日大約中午時份被拘捕，所以陳傳送上述訊息給他時，「啲差佬搜緊我屋。」</p> -<p>Ukraine’s current rail fleet is a remnant of the Soviet Union. Considering the increase of wear and tear on the rail fleet since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has not been able to keep up with the maintenance. More than 70,000 (or 70 percent) of UZ’s wagons have expired their service life, a quarter of which are in critical condition. Western companies specializing in the mechanical management of rail systems could play a significant role in modernizing Ukraine’s rail. In addition, a key problem is that the European Union and Ukraine use different gauges and wagon types, which limits the number of wagons Ukraine can use. A short-term solution could be the construction of multimodal cargo terminals located close to EU borders to convert Ukrainian rail gauge to EU gauge. Such locations can also be industrial and manufacturing hubs.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒提供立法會選舉被dq名單-並協助把ipac聲明翻譯成日文">李宇軒提供立法會選舉被DQ名單 並協助把IPAC聲明翻譯成日文</h4> -<p>Ukraine’s long-term reforms should prioritize the independence of industry regulators to ensure the market is fair and competitive. This will significantly strengthen Ukraine’s image in front of investors. As discussed, PPPs will be an important tool in attracting private investment in infrastructure. Ukraine’s lawmakers have been working on reforming Ukraine’s PPP legislation to make partnerships more transparent and create a more competitive business environment. This tool can be applied toward highway development, as done in many other countries.</p> +<p>控方另展示 Telegram 群組「SWHK IPAC」的訊息紀錄，就原定於2020年9月舉行的立法會選舉（後來政府以疫情為由取消），李宇軒轉發「氣象巴打」的帖文及被 DQ 候選人的名單，包括黃之鋒、劉頴匡、何桂藍、岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、梁晃維及公民黨的楊岳橋等。後來裴倫德把草擬好的聲明傳送至群組，題為「Statement on the obstruction of the democratic process ahead of the 2020 Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections（就2020年香港立法會選舉阻撓民主進程的聲明）」。李確認他在群組提供了被DQ名單之後，IPAC 等人才開始撰寫聲明，然後李和其他在日港人一起把聲明翻譯成日文。</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<blockquote> + <p>Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) <a href="https://twitter.com/lukedepulford/status/1315038772791214088">October 10, 2020</a></p> +</blockquote> -<p>Ukraine’s ability to trade will remain restricted as long as the Russian military threats remain high. Of the numerous challenges Ukraine faces with trade corridors, one of the primary priorities is to find solutions to protect Ukrainian ports from Russian missile strikes. Second, railways and roads need to be upgraded. Although imperfect substitutes for the existing port infrastructure, railway and road infrastructure must be modernized to complement seaport trade.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lcHOZP2.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）</p> -<p>Ukraine’s vision for its economy and its future drivers will also help define the nature of its transportation network. Will the economy produce and export at higher levels than those before the full-scale invasion? Will Ukraine add more value to its raw materials and export finished goods, or will it continue to be primarily a commodity exporter? Ultimately, Ukraine’s infrastructure modernization will be intimately linked to the country’s EU accession path.</p> +<p>控方表示接近完成主問，料辯方明日開始盤問李。</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Romina Bandura</strong> is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development and Project on Leadership and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> - -<p><strong>Ilya Timtchenko</strong> is a program manager and research associate with the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒與陳梓華曾討論籌組流亡政府 陳因人脈廣被懷疑是「肥佬黎嘅仔」Chip Export Control2024-04-09T12:00:00+08:002024-04-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/chip-export-control<p><em>Export control evasion of controlled chips is a known concern, but the specifics of this activity are opaque. In addition, a systematic analysis of the entire chip smuggling pipeline, from initial procurement to unlawful distribution, remains conspicuously absent.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This study aims to bridge that methodological gap. It dissects the smuggling pipeline into four distinct stages: (1) initial procurement; (2) evasion of customs controls; (3) port exit; and (4) transshipment.</em></p> -<p><strong>Benjamin Robb</strong> was an intern with the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development.</p>Romina Bandura, et al.The full-scale Russian invasion has devastating effects on Ukraine’s trade causing vast destruction of its transport and logistics infrastructure. Ukraine and its partners have to be creative and determined in finding new trade corridors to support business operations.Eroding Trust In Government2024-04-08T12:00:00+08:002024-04-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/eroding-trust-in-government<p><em>In the future, malign actors will seek to undermine trust in government through disrupting basic needs and services such as food aid and medical assistance, in place of costly offensive cyber campaigns.</em></p> +<p>This report advocates for a first-principles approach in assessing export control evasion risks. Estimates should be anchored on specific vulnerabilities within the supply chain and actual smuggling tactics. To this end, this report identifies 11 potential tactics across the smuggling pipeline. It finds that export control evasion is likely more prevalent than suspected due to an underappreciation of the range and dimensionality of individual smuggling tactics. Importantly, the compounding risk profile that emerges when multiple tactics are layered together is underestimated.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Crucially, this report observes that as soon as illicit goods depart the port of origin and get buried in transshipment networks, untangling the knotted snarl becomes impractical. As such, policymakers should focus on interventions upstream in the smuggling pipeline. In addition, this report suggests a reorientation in how export control compliance should be approached. Rather than fixating on who to bar from the game, regulators should shift their focus toward who gets to play, moving from a system of exclusion based on the reactive blacklisting of suspicious entities to a system of inclusion built on preapprovals. This will be implemented through a series of policies that will sequentially disable each part of the smuggling pipeline before the illicit cargo can depart the port of origin: (1) a certification program during initial procurement to create a marketplace of trusted sellers and increase compliance know-how; (2) the use of digital waybills to reduce documentation fraud and facilitate traceability in order to address evasion of customs controls; and (3) the use of preapproved logistics providers, tagged at the point of sale, to inoculate against the risk of illicit diversion when exiting a port. Logistics providers will be mandated to report to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) monthly on any consignments not received within a specified timeframe of two to four weeks, pinpointing suspicious entities and facilitating targeted and timely spot checks by the BIS on vendors identified as potential weak links.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Societies will be held hostage through cyberspace by states and non-state actors seeking to target the most vulnerable as part of larger political warfare campaigns waged online. In place of costly offensive cyber campaigns, malign actors will seek to undermine trust and confidence in government through disrupting basic needs and services such as food aid and medical assistance, creating an insidious new form of countervalue targeting.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Gender dynamics will increasingly play a significant role in shaping perceptions of cyber threats, especially in the context of misinformation campaigns. The manipulation of gender-based differences through deepfakes and computational propaganda will exacerbate fault lines adversaries can use to further polarize society and undermine trust and confidence in governing institutions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Distrust in government will be further compounded as citizens struggle to understand cybersecurity strategy and the funding levels required to protect critical infrastructure. Governments will continue to face challenges in educating the public about evolving cyber threats and balancing the ways and means required to protect the ability to provide public goods online.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>This is ultimately how the United States wins the proverbial “whack-a-mole” game, where smuggling networks surface momentarily, vanish, and reemerge elsewhere as quickly as they can be identified. First, it limits the number of tunnels made available to the moles. This will be operationalized through a stringent preapprovals regime that only permits thoroughly screened chip sellers and logistics providers to operate. Second, by collaborating with partner countries, the United States multiplies the hammers in play, to collectively flush the quarry out of the remaining tunnels. This step can be functionalized through dedicated regional units comprising a few experts from the BIS, along with secondees from individual customs authorities, to strengthen intelligence sharing, risk profiling, interdiction, and investigation competence. Lastly, through the use of modern analytics software, third countries can better and more reliably predict where and how the remaining moles will appear. Collectively, these efforts will allow the United States to reclaim control over the rules of the game and tilt the odds in favor of success against slippery evasion strategies.</p> <h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>What is the future of cyber war? Over the last 20 years, most accounts stress large-scale operations waged by states targeting rival military networks and power grids through a mix of espionage and offensive information campaigns. In these scenarios, planes fall out of the sky and entire cities go dark. Yet this vision discounts the prospects of a more indirect and insidious approach: holding a society hostage through targeting its ability to credibly share information and deliver public goods and services online.</p> +<p>The prevailing overconfidence in the efficacy of export controls for chips, guided by the “chokepoint theory,” and the related underestimation of export control evasion, first proceeds from an incomplete and cursory understanding of individual smuggling tactics. This is the case for even well-known methods such as the use of shell companies and transshipment networks. For example, the former may be supplemented by front and shell companies and the activation of dormant shelf companies. This defense-in-depth approach makes quick detection and punitive action far more difficult. Similarly, the transshipment challenge extends beyond the circuitous routing of illicit consignments through multiple third countries to muddy the trail. Along the way, smugglers also often utilize multimodal tactics combining air, sea, and land to further confound tracking efforts. In this manner, smugglers exploit regulatory arbitrage not only across different jurisdictions, but also between siloed domestic authorities.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This edition of the On Future War series combines tabletop exercises, a public survey, and scenarios created with generative artificial intelligence to analyze how cyber threats are evolving. The best prediction of an uncertain future is based on combining expert opinion and public attitudes to visualize and describe cyber operations almost certain to change the character of war.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>And this only scratches the surface. This report further considers nine other smuggling tactics, ranging from the pedestrian, such as utilizing human carriers or mules and concealing chips in ordinary commodities, to progressively more difficult-to-detect methods such as embedding chips in electrical products, disassembling chips, contaminating container cargo, and even using small submersible vessels. While the last suggestion appears fantastical, a study in the 2000s estimated that “narco-subs” accounted for one-third of maritime cocaine trafficking between South America and the United States.</p> -<p>This installment of On Future War uses a novel mix of expert forecasts, public surveys, and future threat scenarios generated by artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze the changing character of cyber campaigns targeting the U.S. federal government. Based on data gathered from six tabletop exercises (TTXs) with over 50 leading cyber experts and foreign policy practitioners, as well as a public survey of over 1,000 participants from across the United States, experts and the public see a cyber future marked by attacks on government services, critical infrastructure, and trust in society itself. The findings highlight a preference among potential adversaries for undermining the United States through cyberattacks that cause widespread disruption in essential services and small businesses coupled with espionage campaigns designed to steal patents and support long-term technological competition. Furthermore, the findings indicate a trend toward using cyber operations to destabilize social order and undermine public trust, particularly in the context of significant political events such as elections and foreign policy crises. This finding points to a future where cyber warfare is not only a tool for direct socioeconomic disruption but also a means to sow discord and manipulate public opinion.</p> +<p>All of these graft onto the fact that chips are particularly amenable to smuggling. Unlike semiconductor manufacturing equipment — which is large, produced in low quantities, sold at extortionate prices, and requires significant amounts of post-sales support — chips are portable enough to fit in a shoe box, are produced in the millions, are high cost but not prohibitively so, and require little to no post-sales support whatsoever. For comparison, a single state-of-the-art extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machine costs $350 million and requires 13 truck-sized containers and 250 crates for transportation. Meanwhile, an H100 chip costs roughly $40,000 and is sufficiently compact that 609 of them can be hidden within a single small freight box.</p> -<p>The public survey, modeled on the project’s TTX framework, revealed a general lack of clarity and awareness about the U.S. government’s cybersecurity funding. It also unveiled a striking gender gap in perceptions: men were considerably more inclined to deem the current cybersecurity funding as sufficient compared to women. Similarly, women exhibited greater concern over the consequences of deepfake technologies compared to men. Furthermore, integrating U.S. Census Bureau and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Election Data and Science Lab data with survey results revealed that the political preferences of participants’ congressional districts had minimal influence on individual player perceptions and strategies. The research team also controlled and tested environmental socioeconomic variables at the district level — including majority–minority districts by population, household median income, educational achievement, healthcare coverage, and social net benefits — but did not find them significantly impactful on individual player perceptions. In other words, the U.S. public shares a common concern about the future of cyber war that transcends political and regional differences assumed to divide the nation. These ideas echo in Future Lab’s recent study on defending the .gov ecosystem.</p> +<p>In addition, while this report provides a primer on tactics that may be used, given the dizzying profit margins to be made, these are likely only the tip of the iceberg. Take a hypothetical example of an H100 being sold in the black market at three times its retail value, for a markup of an additional $80,000 per chip. If a smuggler sells ten chips, they start to skirt the edges of a millionaire’s lifestyle; if they sell a thousand, they are elevated from nouveau riche to the landed gentry. There are few greater motivators for the imagination than greed, and policymakers should not underestimate that ancient playwright. As a result, customs officials are always working off a playbook that does not accurately render both the range and dimensionality of smuggling tactics.</p> -<p>To address the evolving cyber threat landscape, a multifaceted approach is recommended. First, a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy is essential to protect social services such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid, particularly during critical events such as elections. The United States cannot risk malign actors holding the most vulnerable U.S. citizens hostage during a major crisis or political transition. Second, enhancing public awareness and transparency in cybersecurity funding is vital, necessitating extensive educational campaigns and the establishment of an organization for collecting and analyzing cyber statistics. The U.S. government must engage the public with data about threats and trends. An informed polis is more resilient, but currently the U.S. government lacks a coherent, data-driven collection of cyber statistics to inform the private sector and general public.</p> +<p>Furthermore, the depths of what makes the smuggling enterprise so difficult to detect have scarcely been grazed. The principal challenge of intercepting smuggling operations is not related to the difficulty of detecting individual tactics per se. Rather, it arises from a variety of tactics being combined with one another in a complex chain of overlapping mini-sequences, with tactics recalibrated and refined at each transshipment point. Each supplemental tactic and layer of obfuscation compounds the risk profile. Even if each individual tactic has a seemingly manageable risk of detection, by threading through interstitial gaps at each vulnerability and layering tactics as the context demands to always seek the path of least resistance, the compounding probability of evasion by smugglers drastically increases.</p> -<p>The U.S. government is unlikely to mobilize sufficient attention and resources if it does not invest in public-facing data, a lesson learned long ago with respect to economic statistics. Additionally, fostering real-time information sharing among federal agencies and the private sector is key to a cohesive cyber defense strategy and maintaining public trust. With a pool of data, the government can make forecasts about future threats and better align federal resources, including money, labor, and technology.</p> +<p>Accordingly, the risk profile for export control evasion does not scale linearly. All else equal, it surges almost exponentially with the length and complexity of the smuggling sequence. It should be qualified that a single weak point, such as a poorly forged document or an improperly concealed illicit item, can compromise the entire operation. But given the high stakes and margins of the operations at play here, it is reasonable to expect that the smuggling syndicates involved are at least half-competent and, with the attacker’s advantage, are more likely than not to evade detection.</p> -<h3 id="the-changing-character-of-cyber-warfare">The Changing Character of Cyber Warfare</h3> +<p>Laslty, because chips command the forefront of innovation, there is a reflexive instinct to assume that any chip-related challenge, including the bypassing of export controls, demands a similarly high-tech remedy. Without discounting the merits of technical interventions, this report suggests that instead of centering chips as the primary object of attention and smuggling as the backdrop, the reverse may be more instructive. By focusing on smuggling rather than technology, it becomes apparent that chip smuggling will likely not be entirely different from the trafficking of drugs or conflict diamonds, and is beholden to similar attributes, such as compactness, ease of concealment, and unit economics. Importantly, the factors facilitating evasion are steadfastly pre-modern. Seven out of the eleven tactics highlighted in this report hinge on the human element (e.g., bribery) and poor customs infrastructure. Chip smuggling is not a novel issue, but the age-old story of traditional contraband. As such, policymakers should be attentive to the persistent points of failure and timeworn tactics that have sustained this industry.</p> -<p>While scholars and practitioners once perceived cyber operations as decisive battlefield instruments that heralded a new way of war, the reality has proved to be different. States are increasingly crafting multifaceted cyber strategies that incorporate coercion and a blend of mis-, dis-, and malinformation campaigns. In place of traditional military operations, more espionage and information operations are taking place. As cyber strategies evolve beyond conventional military tactics and traditional espionage, there appears to be a marked shift in focus toward critical civilian infrastructure, reflecting a strategy aimed at exploiting the interconnectedness and vulnerabilities of modern societies.</p> +<h3 id="methodology">Methodology</h3> -<h4 id="critical-infrastructure">Critical Infrastructure</h4> +<p>This report puts forward an alternative methodology for assessing export control evasion risks. The traditional approach leans on historical analogues, such as Russia’s circumvention of U.S. export controls for semiconductors following the invasion of Ukraine. While useful, particularly in the absence of reliable information, such approaches are inherently limited and risk overextending region-and country-specific factors.</p> -<p>The traditional focus on military and intelligence targets in cyber operations has expanded to encompass a broader spectrum of targets, including civilian critical infrastructure. This shift represents a strategic move toward countervalue targeting, where the aim is to undermine governments by digitally taking citizens hostage, thereby changing the character of the threat environment. For instance, the Volt Typhoon espionage campaign by the Chinese Communist Party in 2023 targeted critical infrastructure networks through a service provider, demonstrating the strategic value placed on these targets. Similarly, on December 23, 2015, Ukrainian energy firms suffered unexpected blackouts affecting vast customer areas, alongside reports of malicious software in various essential service sectors. Technical investigations revealed the presence of BlackEnergy malware on their systems, though its exact contribution to the incidents remains under scrutiny.</p> +<p>This report advocates for a first-principles approach. It suggests that estimates for export control evasion be anchored on specific vulnerabilities within the supply chain and potential smuggling tactics. This not only promotes a more grounded representation of the evasion landscape but also equips stakeholders with a more precise and actionable framework.</p> -<p>Countervalue targeting inverts decades of military strategy and introduces a new form of cyber warfare that threatens the very foundations of civilian life. The focal point is the critical infrastructure of modern states, which is integral to the welfare of its citizens. These sectors have emerged as key battlefields in cyberspace. In fact, according to the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Campaign Dataset, states are 4.5 times more likely to see a rival target the non-security agencies of their government and the private sector than their military and intelligence agencies. This type of cyber operation is especially alarming because it threatens to severely disrupt everyday civilian services.</p> +<p>Each method is scrutinized to assess the likelihood of successful evasion (classified as low, medium, or high), pinpointing specific facilitators or barriers to success. This analysis is further supported with real-world case studies and hypothetical scenarios to illustrate each technique in practice. The report thereafter identifies key conclusions and policy recommendations aimed at improving existing control mechanisms.</p> -<p>The increasing frequency of indiscriminate ransomware attacks across critical infrastructure sectors underscores countervalue targeting and vulnerabilities to civilian services. For example, the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack, which rapidly disseminated across the United Kingdom’s National Health Service, had a highly specific and targeted nature and impacted multiple municipal emergency service providers. The convergence of digital and critical infrastructure networks opens new vulnerabilities, transforming these sectors into attractive targets for adversaries aiming to inflict economic and societal damage.</p> +<h3 id="the-export-control-evasion-pipeline">The Export Control Evasion Pipeline</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iH8AxsW.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cyber Critical Infastructure Targeting.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/cisas-evolving-gov-mission-defending-united-states-federal-executive-agency-networks">Jensen et al., CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks (Washington, DC: CSIS, October 2023)</a>.</em></p> +<p>This section explores the four elements of the export control evasion pipeline — (1) initial procurement, (2) evasion of customs controls, (3) port exit, and (4) transshipment — and component tactics and strategies within each category. Table 1 provides a short summary of each area, as well as the probability for each of evading detection. The rest of the section then unpacks each element in greater detail.</p> -<h3 id="political-warfare">Political Warfare</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FF3PaIF.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Summary of the Export Control Evasion Pipeline and Key Takeaways.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<p>Political and cognitive warfare have emerged as recent themes in the literature on modern conflict, reflecting the strategic evolution of cyber operations. Research has examined how the manipulation of digital information ecosystems, particularly through “fake news,” disinformation, and online manipulation, poses significant threats to trust in democratic institutions and processes. This manipulation is not merely an act of disinformation, but a strategic component of political warfare designed to influence and control public perception.</p> +<h4 id="stage-1-initial-procurement">Stage 1: Initial Procurement</h4> -<p>Political warfare has evolved with the digital age, becoming a tool for states to achieve objectives without open conflict. Cyber operations against critical infrastructure are now part of this strategy. These actions undermine trust in democratic processes and can sway public opinion through “fake news,” disinformation, and online manipulation. Cyberattacks on infrastructure serve a dual purpose: they cause immediate disruption and exert long-term psychological impact, aligning with political warfare aims. Cognitive warfare specifically targets the way people think, influencing their actions during sensitive times such as elections. This form of warfare uses the global reach of digital technology to manipulate collective intelligence. By changing perceptions, adversaries can weaken the credibility of governments and destabilize societies from within.</p> +<p>Major chipmakers do not engage in direct sales to businesses. NVIDIA, for instance, routes sales through official distributors and authorized original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and resellers. To demonstrate just how few of these entities exist, Japan, which has the largest NVIDIA sales presence in the Asia-Pacific, only has five official distributors, three authorized OEMs, and ten authorized resellers. Account managers at these intermediaries typically adhere to strict Know Your Client (KYC) procedures and assess non-association with parties on blacklists.</p> -<p>Cyber operations have thus become a critical component of political and cognitive warfare. By disrupting essential services, attackers can magnify societal divisions and erode trust in public institutions, potentially manipulating the political landscape to their advantage. This is exemplified by Russia’s cyber activities, where such operations are viewed not only as a breach of digital security but as an active measure in a broader campaign of political warfare. The targeting of critical infrastructure through cyber operations becomes a tool to exacerbate existing societal divisions, weaken trust in public institutions, and ultimately alter the political landscape to favor the attacking state’s objectives.</p> +<p><strong>THE USE OF FRONT, SHELL, AND SHELF COMPANIES</strong></p> -<h3 id="from-trends-to-games-scenarios-and-surveys">From Trends to Games, Scenarios, and Surveys</h3> +<p>Buyer screening relies heavily on the accurate identification of the real end user. As such, smugglers often use front and shell companies with stand-in directors or shareholders to obscure the ultimate beneficiaries. They then misrepresent the intended recipient to bypass export licensing requirements, especially for countries that face a presumption of denial. In addition, by activating long-standing but dormant shelf companies, smugglers further complicate the task of differentiating between legitimate and deceptive transactions.</p> -<p>Understanding how these trends shape the future of cyber operations and deterrence requires pivoting from policy analysis by case study to more diverse, multi-method assessments of twenty-first-century strategic competition. Methods such as games and public surveys provide a way to compare expert assessments and attitudes among the general population. These approaches provide valuable insights into the strategic logic behind various types of cyberattacks, their impact on government services, and the necessary measures required to strengthen cybersecurity. Furthermore, public surveys can help shed light on the general awareness and perceptions of cybersecurity threats, highlighting gaps in public education and government communication.</p> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Medium–High</em></p> -<p>Using generative AI to build scenarios offers a novel mechanism for synthesizing findings and supporting policy analysis. AI-generated scenarios — especially when fine-tuned and calibrated — offer a method for turning preliminary research findings into narrative, slice-of-time scenarios. This combination of human insight and machine synthesis is a key component of the ongoing research relationship between the CSIS Futures Lab and ScaleAI. The ongoing research explores the human-machine interaction and its effect on scenario building.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Human Detection: High</strong></p> -<h4 id="would-you-like-to-play-a-game">Would You Like to Play a Game?</h4> + <p>This defense-in-depth approach limits the effectiveness of even the most stringent KYC procedures, creating a disorientating maze of corporate entities that sellers must attempt to understand. Moreover, as soon as an actionable level of suspicion can be established, these companies are torn down as quickly as they were propped up. This makes quick detection and punitive action far more difficult, contributing to the proverbial “whack-a-mole” situation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>igital Detection: Medium–High</strong></p> -<p>To analyze how experts in cybersecurity assess emerging threats and approach cyber strategy, the researchers in the CSIS Futures Lab designed a TTX entitled Shadow Table. Shadow Table had these experts assess the optimal targets for holding the United States hostage during the upcoming 2024 U.S. presidential election, including recommendations for hypothetical state and non-state actors. Unbeknownst to the participants, they were randomly assigned to different groups based on how the U.S. government would seek to counter their selected strategy. As a result, the design captured adversary feedback loops while increasing the ability of the researchers to collect data on the underlying strategic logic, target preferences, and resource allocations of would-be attackers (i.e., the ends, ways, and means of cyber strategy).</p> + <p>Large distributors, resellers, and OEMs often incorporate advanced KYC and Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) tools that look beyond surface-level information, delving into the origins, financial flows, and relationships of entities.</p> -<p>The CSIS Futures Lab ran Shadow Table virtually with six separate groups totaling 55 participants. In each session, participants included experts in cybersecurity and cyber strategy, ranging from public and private sector chief information security officers (CISOs) to academics and national security experts. During each session, the participants played two scenarios covering major threat vectors: (1) advise a major nation-state and (2) advise a non-state actor network. In each scenario, participants could select the malign actor they wanted to advise, with states including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea and non-state actors including right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists, and criminal groups. As a result, researchers in the CSIS Futures Lab could compare and contrast different state and non-state approaches while controlling for actor type and assess motivations through a mix of data capture and moderated discussions. Put simply, the games were built to capture strategic preferences and examine how experts anticipate malign cyber actors might target the United States during the upcoming 2024 U.S. presidential election.</p> + <p>However, there are always workarounds. A practiced shell company might (1) conduct some legitimate business activities to establish a trail of normal commercial transactions; (2) utilize informal banking systems that are not integrated with international banking protocols for illicit transactions; and (3) generate high-quality fabricated business records and financial statements that can withstand scrutiny by standard document verification processes.</p> -<p>During the state and non-state scenarios, players gave recommendations on how best to undermine U.S. elections by targeting public services administered by the federal government. These services span a broad range, encompassing essential basic needs such as food and medical assistance to economic programs such as farm loans and critical research conducted by universities and national research institutes. Specifically, players first selected how much time and effort they recommended allocating toward building malware targeting federal programs and services in three areas: (1) the provision of basic needs, (2) small and medium-sized businesses, and (3) science and technology. Second, players recommended their preferred attack method for each, recommending how to allocate a finite set of resources among four methods: (1) low-cost deepfakes, (2) low-cost disruption, (3) espionage, or (4) higher-cost, more complex degradation. Of note, these attack methods are linked to commonly accepted categories used in academic studies on cyber strategy. By forcing players to allocate scarce resources against different attack targets and methods, the game captured how experts approach cyber strategies designed to disrupt core government services during a key political transition.</p> + <p>Ultimately, the efficacy of advanced digital KYC and EDD systems rests on the integrity of the data they analyze. Compromised or fabricated data can undermine the ability of these systems to identify and flag suspicious entities.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Based on this design, Shadow Table served as a forum to both discuss strategy and capture statistical data on preferences. The use of TTXs as a quantitative approach to inform decisionmaking processes is an established line of practice dating back to the nineteenth century. The game design used in Shadow Table reflects emerging trends in analytical wargaming that adapt simulations to capture data in a manner that supports evidence-based policy recommendations. It expands the application of these methods from international to domestic crises, blending traditional elements such as comparing expert-vs.-public outcomes and statistical analysis with new dimensions such as electoral periods and socioeconomic factors. The methodology allows for creative self-selection by participants, focusing on their perception of roles and objectives as a mechanism for identifying different strategic approaches. This approach facilitates a quantitative analysis of political and cognitive warfare by these actors, drawing on political psychology in international relations.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="hypothetical-scenario-1">HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 1</h4> + <h4 id="operation-of-a-global-network-of-front-shell-and-shelf-companies">Operation of a Global Network of Front, Shell, and Shelf Companies</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Cyberattack Methods</code></em></strong></p> +<blockquote> + <p>Entity Y with ties to the defense sector in Regime X may establish a front company in another country alongside various affiliates of the shell company in third countries. It may also use a shelf company, alongside the front company, to further muddy the trail.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Deepfakes: The creation of fake images, text, and videos designed to skew public perception.</code></em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>Procurement agents, operating covertly on behalf of Entity Y, will orchestrate purchases of chips by the front or shelf company, which receives funding from a shell company’s foreign bank account and in turn transmits funds through a U.S. correspondent bank account to the supplier.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Disruption: Low-cost, temporary operations that deface websites or lead to temporary denial of service.</code></em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>Moreover, the front or shelf company may order and receive chips from multiple suppliers. In order to avoid drawing attention with large transactions, it will conduct numerous below-threshold transactions that avoid triggering transaction alerts, gradually accumulating significant holdings.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Espionage: Stealing sensitive information and creating access for future cyberattacks.</code></em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>The company will then route the goods to Regime X, often through permissive jurisdictions such as known transshipment points.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Degradation: More complex attacks that shut down core functions, destroy data, or take networks offline for a longer period of time.</code></em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-1"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 1</code></h4> + <h4 id="smuggling-us-microelectronics-to-post-sanctions-russia"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Smuggling U.S. Microelectronics to Post-sanctions Russia</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="shadow-table-findings">Shadow Table Findings</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Arthur Petrov, a 33-year-old dual citizen of Russia and Germany, was arrested on August 26, 2023, for his involvement in a scheme to illicitly transport U.S. microelectronics technology, which has military uses, to Russia.</code></em></p> -<p>Overall, experts selected the option to disrupt basic needs more than other targets, and the preference was statistically significant in both the state and non-state threat scenarios. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate expert targeting preferences most likely to disrupt trust and confidence in the U.S. federal government during a key political transition such as an election or during a foreign policy crisis. The majority of experts prioritized attacks on the provision of basic needs, reflecting a strategy to disrupt the lives of civilians and potentially cause unrest during elections. This preference for targeting basic needs was consistent regardless of whether participants were playing as state or non-state actors, underscoring the perceived effectiveness of such attacks in destabilizing the U.S. federal government and its executive agencies. Furthermore, the choice of target indicates that attackers prefer to sow chaos or tap into the deep personal fears of civilians that rely on such basic needs. For example, SNAP food assistance alone serves as a lifeline for over 40 million socioeconomically disadvantaged U.S. citizens. Disrupting food access during an election could catalyze further polarization and even unrest.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Petrov procured the controlled microelectronics from U.S.-based electronics exporters using a Cyprus-based shell company, Astrafteros Technokosmos LTD (Astrafteros), which he operated.</code></em></p> -<p>During discussions, participants detailed their strategic logic and the utility of targeting basic needs. Experts saw this attack vector as the best placed to create chaos and increase public mistrust in institutions. Furthermore, groups discussed how these attacks — if effective — could lead to protests, unrest, and a loss of trust in the U.S. government’s ability to protect basic needs. In addition, experts saw the resulting economic distress and fear amplify public discontent and raise questions about the competence and reliability of government institutions. Expert discussions revealed a prevailing assessment that compromising people’s basic needs could also make the population at large more susceptible to dis- and misinformation campaigns, thereby opening up additional vectors for foreign manipulation and radicalization.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Petrov misled U.S. suppliers by claiming that Astrafteros was acquiring the components for use in fire safety systems and other civilian applications, asserting that the final recipients and locations for these items were companies in Cyprus or other third countries. In reality, however, these sensitive electronics were intended for Electrocom in Russia, a company that provides equipment to Russian military manufacturers.</code></em></p> -<p>In other words, experts saw targeting vulnerable groups as the best way to undermine the U.S. government.</p> +<p><strong>ACQUIRING EXCESS STOCK FROM SMALLER RESELLERS AND OEMS</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gZJbYm7.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.1: Non-state Actor Targeting Preferences.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al., CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> +<p>Official distributors and authorized resellers and OEMs often purchase excess stock due to bulk discount incentives or to preempt potential shortages. Leading-edge chips such as NVIDIA H100s, facing tight demand-supply constraints, are unlikely candidates for stockpiling.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sQ1iGnv.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.2: State Actor Targeting Preferences.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab.</em></p> +<p>It is worth noting, however, that following the October 17, 2023, export controls update, controlled chips now also include high-end gaming chips and lower-performing data-center chips. Surplus stock from this expanded category may occasionally be offloaded to smaller resellers or OEMs, who may not enforce stringent KYC protocols compared to larger, established distributors. These are consequently attractive targets for smugglers.</p> -<p>In addition, experts noted opportunities for sowing chaos by targeting federal agencies supporting small and medium-sized businesses. For example, targeting federal grants administrated through agencies such as the Small Business Administration could produce a cascading economic effect. In 2023, the agency delivered over $50 billion in assistance, with much of it focused on underserved communities that experts perceived as likely to amplify political discord. Even more disturbing, cyberattacks that manipulated economic data produced by the U.S. Departments of Labor and Commerce could easily cause disruption to financial markets that rely on credible government statistics. Experts saw federal agencies that support economic activity as being most susceptible to cascading effects, with even small intrusions creating fear and panic likely to undermine trust and confidence in the federal government. The participants shared a perception that such attacks would not only cause direct harm but also create a domino effect, impacting the economy and increasing public discontent.</p> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> -<p>In addition to target preferences, researchers in the CSIS Futures Lab analyzed how experts allocated resources to different attack types across the two scenarios. To capture this data, the TTX forced players to allocate notional resource points across four potential cyberattack methods: (1) the use of deepfakes to alter public perception, (2) low-cost disruptions (e.g., website defacement and limited denial-of-service attacks), (3) espionage campaigns designed to steal data and gain access for future attacks, and (4) more complex degradation attacks capable of shutting down entire networks or services.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Human Detection: High</strong></p> -<p>As seen in Figure 3.1, when analyzing non-state attack vectors, experts had a fairly balanced approach outside of deepfakes and had preferences for conducting espionage against agencies involved in science and technology. During the discussions, participants assessed that unlike traditional state-based cyber operations, their espionage preference with respect to non-state actors was more about extracting information for follow-on mis-, dis-, and malinformation campaigns linked to the use of deepfakes. By compromising scientific data or spreading misinformation, adversaries could increase doubt in government policies and actions, leading to public confusion and weakened trust in the current presidential administration. Participants acknowledged the role of science and technology in responding to national emergencies and health crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. They saw the potential to undermine public trust in government responses by targeting and distorting scientific data related to vaccination efficacy, treatment protocols, or disease spread. Participants noted that adversaries could amplify existing controversies, such as those surrounding climate change or vaccinations, to intensify polarization and create a society where truth is obscured.</p> + <p>Industry insiders note that these lesser-known distributors may not rigorously enforce KYC procedures. This is not driven by conspiratorial intent, but simply due to a lack of capacity and an experience deficit. Smaller resellers lack the financial and human resources to invest in rigorous training for compliance and do not have the extensive experience of larger distributors, which is crucial for spotting sophisticated evasion tactics.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Digital Detection: High</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0P4Wid5.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.1: Non-state Actor Cyberattack Type Preferences.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al., CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> + <p>As previously mentioned, there are advanced KYC and EDD tools available, but these are costly and typically out of reach for smaller resellers and OEMs in developing countries. In addition, unlike larger distributors and OEMs such as Dell or Fujitsu, they likely do not have access to databases that aggregate global information, which is necessary for effective digital scrutiny.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>As seen in Figure 3.2, when participants analyzed optimal targets for state actors, they adopted a similar set of preferences. Experts see espionage as a tool to win long-term technology competition with authoritarian states eager to steal intellectual property (IP), a finding that parallels previous CSIS research efforts. Second, while disruption was the preferred attack method for basic services and agencies supporting small and medium-sized businesses, experts assumed that states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea would invest more effort in disrupting basic services. This was consistent across the state and non-state actor scenarios.</p> +<h4 id="stage-2-evasion-of-customs-controls">Stage 2: Evasion of Customs Controls</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BoF1pTF.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.2: State Actor Cyberattack Type Preferences.</strong> Source. CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al., CISA’s Evolving.gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> +<p>The range of tactics to sidestep customs can be broadly collapsed into one key facilitating factor — bribery — and four primary strategies: (1) utilizing human carriers, (2) concealing chips in ordinary commodities, (3) concealing chips in electrical products, (4) disassembling chips.</p> -<p>Looking across the games, it is clear that experts see vulnerabilities in the federal agencies. These experts see viable attack options for authoritarian states seeking to create chaos during an election by disrupting the delivery of food and medical care to vulnerable populations and distorting economic data and assistance to U.S. businesses. They see non-state actors as eager to launch similar campaigns but leverage mis-, dis-, and malinformation to further polarize the country by distorting public health research. This attack logic speaks to the importance of federal services and associated critical infrastructure and how these critical requirements for modern society are also critical vulnerabilities if left unprotected.</p> +<p><strong>BRIBING CUSTOMS OFFICIALS</strong></p> -<h4 id="from-games-to-public-surveys">From Games to Public Surveys</h4> +<p>Corruption can facilitate several smuggling tactics. Smugglers may bribe customs officials to provide insider information on shift patterns, inspection routines, or red flags officials look for; turn a blind eye to falsified documents; or even digitally manipulate or alter customs records.</p> -<p>To compare observations from experts gathered during the TTX with the general public, researchers at the CSIS Futures Lab converted the game into a public survey using the online platform Prolific. The researchers ensured that the participants were from sufficiently diverse backgrounds and geographic locations to reflect the demographic makeup of the United States. In adapting Shadow Table, the research team also built in attention checks and only recorded responses where the respondents passed these checks.</p> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> -<p>Like the original TTX, participants were randomly assigned into either a state or non-state malign actor group and asked to make recommendations about their preferred target (i.e., basic needs, small and medium-sized businesses, or science and technology) and method (i.e., deepfakes, disruptions, espionage, or degradation). Unlike the expert TTX, the researchers did not have the general public weight assign resource values to their attack methods, given that the general public was likely to be less familiar with cybersecurity and foreign policy issues. Thus, when juxtaposing the outcomes from both expert and public samples, the research team focused on their initial choices. These choices reflect how different groups image cyber strategy preferences of malign actors.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Susceptibility of Customs Officials: High</strong></p> -<p>Participants were presented with descriptions of two types of cyberattacks. The first was a conventional distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, while the second involved the use of deepfakes and disinformation to tamper with health records. When asked which type of attack was more worrisome, respondents indicated that the attack involving deepfakes was of greater concern than the traditional DDoS cyberattack. Deepfakes are emerging as a significant concern in cyber warfare tactics. This was supported by the TTX, which highlighted that deepfakes are increasingly used to spread hostility and disrupt societal harmony for political gains. These digitally manipulated videos or images can convincingly depict individuals saying or doing things they never did, thereby posing unique challenges in ensuring information authenticity and maintaining trust.</p> + <p>Smugglers often have an in-depth understanding of which countries are more susceptible to corruption. As a result, they are likely to exploit customs officials in developing countries, who are often paid meager salaries. For example, a customs inspector in Cambodia, which is the second-poorest country in Southeast Asia by GDP per capita, is paid an average salary of $6,635 per year, which works out to $553 per month. According to an Economist Intelligence Unit report, it is not uncommon for frontline border officers in less developed economies in Asia to make $100 a month.</p> -<p>To deepen the understanding of participant preferences, the research integrated U.S. Census Bureau data from the 2021 American Community Survey five-year estimate, providing socioeconomic and geometric details at the congressional district level. In addition, the researchers integrated data from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab, focusing on congressional elections. As seen in Figure 4, the player sample is distributed across the continental United States. The player population can be observed through its density, whereby increments increase the size of each circle. In addition, this map is colored by party affiliation for each district as of the 116th Congress (2019–20). The color schemes follow blue for Democratic districts and red for Republican districts. As the map shows, the sample is geographically and politically representative of the U.S. population.</p> + <p>This is not a depressed outlier number supplied to advance this point. For reference, a customs inspector in Malaysia, which is the third-richest country in Southeast Asia by GDP per capita, is still only paid an average salary of $9,336 per year, which works out to $778 per month. Accordingly, officials are less likely to be susceptible to bribery in a country such as Singapore, the richest country in Southeast Asia by GDP per capita, which has a strong anti-corruption culture and where customs inspectors are paid an average salary of $28,979 per year, or $2,415 per month.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZlhIizN.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Public Survey Player Population by 116th Congress Districts.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab analysis based on <a href="https://www.census.gov/data/developers/data-sets/acs-5year.html">“American Community Survey 5-Year Data (2009-2022),” U.S. Census Bureau, December 7, 2023</a>; and <a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/data">“Data,” MIT Election Lab + Science Lab</a>.</em></p> +<p><strong>UTILIZING HUMAN CARRIERS</strong></p> -<p>The final dataset included players’ congressional district information; socioeconomic variables on race, income, healthcare coverage, social net benefits, and poverty; and MIT election data, confirming that the survey was geographically representative of the U.S. population. At a granular level, zip code analysis was also conducted, but results did not deviate from the orginal analysis at the congressional district level. The detailed statistical results are available in the accompanying methodology annex.</p> +<p>At first glance, the use of carriers, or “mules,” might seem rudimentary, but it is worth analyzing both for completeness and its continued prevalence. This tactic has the highest likelihood of detection and is not the most efficient method for smuggling at scale.</p> -<h3 id="findings">Findings</h3> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Low</em></p> -<p>Overall, the public thinks that the most likely states to target U.S. federal agencies and critical infrastructure are Russia and China. Similar to the experts, they see these states as focused on disrupting how the U.S. federal government and executive agencies distribute basic services such as food and medical assistance and as likely to use deepfakes to undermine trust in institutions.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Human Detection: Low</strong></p> -<p>As seen in Table 1, both experts and the public view Russia and China as the predominant authoritarian states interested in undermining U.S. public institutions. Similar to the TTX, the public survey started with adopting an adversary role (either state or non-state). Participants were tasked with selecting the entities in both categories. Experts that engaged in the virtual TTX leaned more toward Russia (57 percent), while the public favored China (47 percent). Apart from this divergence, results show that experts and the public converge on similar preferences.</p> + <p>Border control screeners, faced with the overwhelming task of screening thousands of travelers, can only scrutinize a fraction in detail. However, the uniformity of the standard security protocol and internal intelligence provides a counterbalance to this challenge.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/07BVKe4.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Comparing Attacker Choices.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al. CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> + <p>Seasoned border control screeners are also trained to observe behavioral cues, body language, inconsistencies in travelers’ responses, and other subtle indicators that might hint at deceptive activities.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Machine Detection: Low</strong></p> -<p>The general public is worried about Russia and China and sees these states as most likely to target federal executive services and critical infrastructure linked to basic needs. As seen in Figure 5, 49 percent of participants selected basic needs as their first choice overall. These findings are consistent with the expert TTX observations in which players identified disrupting basic services as the optimal mechanism for causing chaos sufficient to undermine trust and confidence in the U.S. government during an election and, by extension, future foreign policy crises. In other words, the traditional defensive advantages provided by the United States’ geography, including separation from adversaries across oceans, is fading fast as malign actors seek ways of launching attacks through cyberspace against core government functions and critical infrastructure.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5wIyj78.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Public Federal Service Targeting Preferences.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab.</em></p> + <p>Full-body scanners (e.g., millimetre-wave scanners) can detect metallic and non-metallic objects as well as items hidden under clothing. However, they do not penetrate the skin and as such are unable to detect illicit goods hidden within body cavities. But unlike contraband such as drugs or conflict diamonds, hiding sensitive electrical products within body cavities may be impractical as chips, especially those on boards, are too rigid and large to be concealed in this manner and the functionality of the chips can be compromised.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Strategy — the alignment of ends, ways, and means — proved consistent between expert TTXs and the survey of the general public. Both groups prioritized low-cost cyber disruptions against federal agencies and critical infrastructure linked to basic needs and deepfakes linked to science and technology. Figure 6 shows that 60 percent of participants chose to disrupt when targeting basic needs, and 28 percent chose deepfakes when targeting services related to science and technology. The shared preference for using deepfakes to target science and technology is consistent with documented disinformation campaigns during the pandemic that had polarizing effects. In other words, it is not just basic services and critical infrastructure that are vulnerable and at risk during political transitions and crises. Malign actors at home and abroad will target the very foundations of scientific truth.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-2"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 2</code></h4> + <h4 id="trafficking-of-cpus-in-gongbei-port-macau"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Trafficking of CPUs in Gongbei Port, Macau</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Based on the public survey, there are clear differences in how different genders and demographic cohorts’ approach cyber strategy. Men are less concerned about deepfakes and believe the government is allocating enough money to cybersecurity. For example, men were 48 percent more likely than women to believe that current spending is sufficient. These concerns are not affected by median household income or party preferences. In other words, gender differences can predict cyber strategy preferences. One possible explanation is that women have disproportionately been victimized by social media and deepfakes, including revenge porn and fabricated images, which likely shapes how they view the future of federal cybersecurity. This dark truth translates into the rational calculation for women to be both more concerned about the risks of deepfakes and more likely to want increased U.S. government funding for cybersecurity. Notably, this does not appear to be a partisan issue.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In March 2023, a smuggler was caught at Gongbei Port, the entry point from Macau to China, with 239 central processing units (CPUs) wrapped around his abdomen and legs.</code></em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IVLOYLW.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Public Cyberattack Preferences across Targets.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al. CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Customs officials became suspicious due to his ill-fitting black clothing and strange gait. The CPUs were confiscated, and the man was detained.</code></em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Cybersecurity and Gender</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>CONCEALING CHIPS IN ORDINARY COMMODITIES</strong></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The odds that a man is concerned about deepfakes as a form of political warfare are 27 percent lower than surveyed women. Men are also 48 percent more likely to believe the federal government is allocating sufficient funds for cybersecurity.</code></em></p> +<p>This tactic is a play on misdirection. Customs officials rely on the accuracy and integrity of declared goods to efficiently process vast quantities of imports and exports.</p> -<p>Second, age matters. There are clear demographic cohort effects that shape how U.S. citizens see future cyber campaigns designed to hold the .gov ecosystem at risk. Older cohorts (i.e., aged 55 to 64 or over 65) tend to recommend espionage and targeting science and technology more than basic needs and federal services that assist small and medium-sized businesses. The most likely explanation for this divergence is rational. Older Americans, especially those over 65, are more likely to draw on federal programs associated with basic needs, including Medicare and Social Security. Similar to the findings associated with gender, even when survey respondents imagine future cyber campaigns, they tend to avoid targets that would bring them harm in their daily lives. An alternative explanation is that older Americans came of age in an era more defined by public sector basic research and major programs — such as during the Space Race — that they associate with national power and pride. However, both of these explanations are best guesses as to why there are age cohort effects associated with how Americans imagine future malign campaigns designed to hold the nation hostage in cyberspace.</p> +<p>A Harmonized System (HS) code (see box below) serves as a beacon, directing authorities’ attention and shaping their expectations about a product. The use of incorrect HS codes effectively hides contraband in plain sight, making it appear as routine cargo. This makes smuggling detection an even bigger needle-in-a-haystack challenge.</p> -<p>The research team used zip code-level data to conduct robustness checks. The analysis confirmed that gender and age are associated with how groups think malign actors will target the U.S. federal government in cyberspace. Specifically, older cohorts (i.e., aged 55 to 64 and over 65) remain less likely to target basic services and government programs associated with supporting small and medium-sized businesses. These cohorts are more likely to recommend cyber campaigns targeting science and technology. Factors such as political party affiliation, income levels, and majority-minority districts are not statistically significant. This contrast implies that gender and demographic cohorts play a larger role than political ideology, income, or race and ethnicity in shaping how Americans imagine the risks from cyber operations.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="primer-on-harmonized-system-codes">Primer on Harmonized System Codes</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Unlike the district-level analysis, party linkage emerges as possible factors shaping malign cyber strategy preferences in the zip code-level robustness check. In Democratic and mixed political zip codes, participants were less likely to target small and medium-sized businesses. This finding further demonstrates rational preferences by the U.S. public with respect to cyber strategy.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The Harmonized System (HS) is an international framework that assigns standardized codes to traded products, facilitating global trade classification. The HS code classification is illustrated below using semiconductors as an example.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Lastly, political ideology did not appear to alter which rival foreign state participants perceived as likely to hold the U.S. government hostage during the upcoming 2024 presidential election. Where participants live (i.e., Democratic- or Republican-leaning zip codes) did not have an impact on the state actor they selected (i.e., Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea). This finding extends to non-state actors. While one might assume Republican-leaning districts would be more likely to select left-wing groups as the malign actor, and Democrats the opposite, this was not the case. The only difference appeared with respect to non-state actor motivation, with Democrat-leaning zip codes being more associated with “lone wolf” cyber actors as opposed to financially motivated cyberattacks (i.e., cybercrime). This difference may suggest that political ideology shapes how people view opposing group motivations, with Democrat-leaning areas more inclined to see malign activity in cyberspace by non-state actors associated with isolated political radicals.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>An HS code is a six-digit number, structured in three parts:</p> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="from-surveys-to-scenarios">From Surveys to Scenarios</h3> +<blockquote> + <ol> + <li>The first two digits (HS-85) indicate the general category or chapter. For example, 85 pertains to “Electrical Machinery and Equipment and Parts Thereof.”</li> + <li>The subsequent two digits (.42) pinpoint subcategories within that chapter. Taking the earlier example, 85.42 specifies “Electrical Integrated Circuits; Parts Thereof.”</li> + <li>The final two digits (.31) provide even greater detail. For instance, 85.42.31 is reserved for “Processors and Controllers.”</li> + </ol> +</blockquote> -<p>To visualize and describe the findings from experts and general public TTXs, the research team employed a novel approach to constructing scenarios that drew on generative AI. Specifically, the CSIS Futures Lab loaded the text transcripts from the TTXs, comments from the public surveys, and a corpus of over 300 documents on cyber operations and modern strategy to fine-tune a model using Scale AI’s Donovan platform and a retrieval assisted generation (RAG) large language model (LLM).</p> +<p>Accordingly, controlled chips can be hidden in almost any conceivable manner. Semiconductors (HS 85.42.31) could be concealed in a bag of rice (HS 10.06.30), hermetically sealed in a barrel of crude oil (HS 15.15.11), or simply hidden in a consignment of electronic waste (HS 85.49.39).</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A Recipe for AI-Generated Scenarios</code></em></strong></p> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Medium–High</em></p> <ul> <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Select a base LLM (e.g., ChatGPT, Bard, or Llama).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Add a corpus of authoritative texts on strategy and critical factors the model can reference.</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Mix in structured observations about ends, ways, means, and feedback loops (e.g., TTX transcripts).</code></em></p> + <p><strong>Human Detection: Medium–High</strong></p> + + <p>The vast majority of customs checks are routine. Ordinary commodities are handled with a cursory, less suspicious eye with customs officers inadvertently adopting a pattern of expedited checks for such goods.</p> + + <p>Even well-trained officers might miss chips adeptly hidden within routine shipments, especially if the overall shipment does not raise suspicions. Additionally, the compact size of chips makes this a “needle-in-a-haystack” challenge. A smuggler could discreetly hide as many as 609 H100 graphics processing units (GPUs) in just one small FedEx freight box, which would be outwardly indistinguishable from other identical boxes.</p> + + <p>However, many customs personnel are trained to recognize common smuggling tactics and are aware of the propensity to hide illicit goods in everyday shipments. As a countermeasure, random intensive checks are conducted, even on seemingly mundane shipments. In addition, customs officials have databases that store information on previous shipments. As a result, a sudden change in the pattern, frequency, or nature of shipments from a particular company or to a particular address can raise suspicions.</p> </li> <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Garnish with tailored prompts (e.g., using trends and themes to refine questions about alternative futures).</code></em></p> + <p><strong>Machine Detection: Medium</strong></p> + + <p>While the dimunitive size of GPUs can make them nearly imperceptible, especially when masked among bulkier items, they are still likely to show up on modern X-ray scans. X-ray and scanning technologies are also continually improving. Dual-energy X-ray systems can distinguish between organic and inorganic materials, potentially flagging a semiconductor hidden within a bag of rice.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>RAG works to optimize how the base model classifies text (i.e., fine-tuning) and predicts the next logical sequence. By using a select corpus trained on cyber and great power competition, the expectation is that text generated in response to queries is more accurate and aligns with key concepts. This fine-tuning is further enhanced by training the model with the prompts that are based on the emerging themes of TTX discussions. To facilitate this process of refinement and structure prompts given to the LLM, the CSIS Futures Lab defined a series of trends based on analyzing the TTX results. In other words, the model used thousands of pages of texts and transcripts to answer prompts about how discrete trends could comingle to produce alternative futures. The result is a series of “slices-of-time” that provide portraits of alternative futures in which malign actors seek to hold the United States hostage by launching cyber campaigns targeting federal executive agencies and critical infrastructure during political transitions and foreign policy crises.</p> - -<p>The use of LLMs in this context is a time-efficient method that enhances understanding but requires skilled handling to avoid biases. In military planning, the effective use of LLMs depends on translating critical thinking and research into structured queries for the AI model. These models complement, rather than replace, human expertise, and military professionals must adeptly convert their knowledge and concepts into AI-interrogable formats. Generative AI, increasingly used in social science, offers significant opportunities and challenges when integrated into wargaming, red teaming, and scenario construction. It can subtly influence crucial leadership decisions and is subject to the “black box” challenge, where the reasoning behind AI-generated outcomes is not always clear. This necessitates ethical governance, transparent methods, and accountability to responsibly manage AI’s role in wargaming, a key factor in determining future conflict outcomes.</p> - -<h4 id="societies-held-hostage">Societies Held Hostage</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-3"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 3</code></h4> + <h4 id="concealment-of-intregrated-circuits-in-a-wood-pulp-consignment"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Concealment of Intregrated Circuits in a Wood Pulp Consignment</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The first major trend that emerged from the TTX discussions concerned how interdependence creates new forms of vulnerability. A connected society requires a mix of online government services and critical infrastructure to function. As a result, the disruption of basic needs and polarizing deepfakes (i.e., disinformation) can amplify underlying fault lines in society during political transitions and foreign policy crises.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In June 2023, Hong Kong customs officers seized $153.4 million worth of new integrated circuits stashed in 15 shipping containers. X-rays of the 15 containers, declared to be carrying wood pulp, revealed suspicious images. Two boxes containing wood pulp were placed at the top of each container, underneath which contraband items were stored.</code></em></p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Differences in State Actors’ Strategies</strong></p> +<p><strong>CONCEALING CHIPS IN ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS</strong></p> -<p><em>TTX participants pointed out that there are significant differences in the strategies of different state actors. During the TTXs, Russia, for instance, was more engaged in disruptive cyber activities, while China was more focused on strategic and espionage-oriented approaches. This assumption is consistent with academic literature on different state strategies in cyberspace. As a result, cyber defense strategies — in both the public and private sectors — need to adapt to different threat characteristics. This process of adaptation will require access to public data on different threat vectors, including statistics on how new attacks compare to past efforts (i.e., cyber statistics).</em></p> +<p>Smugglers may disguise chips within the casings of other electronics such as power supply units or modified computer cases, which would naturally house similar-looking circuitry and components. More concerning, however, is the potential concealment of GPU servers within high-performance workstations or even commercial servers.</p> -<p><strong>Chaos and Instability</strong></p> +<p>Here, GPU servers, which are crucial for enabling high-performance computing with minimal latency at the data-center scale, could be made to look like standard, non-descript internal components and will be less likely to arouse suspicion than when hidden within ordinary commodities.</p> -<p><em>An overarching theme was the creation of chaos and instability, especially with the upcoming 2024 election in mind. By targeting critical services and undermining public confidence, state actors could weaken the U.S. federal government’s legitimacy and provoke divisive reactions among the population. This focus on windows of political vulnerability highlights a need to ensure there are sufficient resources as well as collaboration with the private sector to deny adversaries the ability to hold the United States hostage during its political transitions or foreign policy crises.</em></p> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Medium–High</em></p> -<p><strong>Priority on Disruption and Immediate Impact</strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Human Detection: Medium–High</strong></p> -<p><em>The immediate disruption of services and the ensuing chaos was identified as a key strategy that attackers may prioritize. These tactics aim to impact public perception in the short term leading up to the 2024 election. By causing immediate and visible disruptions, the attackers could potentially cause widespread panic and a loss of confidence among the public in the government’s capabilities. This emphasizes the need for robust disaster recovery plans and the ability to quickly restore services after an attack.</em></p> + <p>Everyday electronics are likely to experience relatively expedited checks. Unless specially trained, officers may overlook embedded chips in an otherwise ordinary-looking electronics product, especially if there is no external indication of tampering. However, some major customs checkpoints could employ electronics experts for random reviews. These experts, familiar with the architecture of common devices, might spot irregularities.</p> -<p><strong>Cross-Domain Attacks</strong></p> + <p>If customs receives a tip or is randomly conducting in-depth inspections, the physical feel, weight, or even the boot-up process of a tampered laptop, for example, could give away the presence of an embedded chip.</p> -<p><em>Another emerging pattern was the idea of cross-domain attacks that not only involve cyberattacks but also physical disruptions. For instance, cyber-physical attacks on critical infrastructure could amplify the overall impact of the attacks, increasing their effectiveness in sowing discord and undermining public confidence. This highlights the need for defenses that extend beyond purely digital assets and can also protect against physical disruptions resulting from cyberattacks.</em></p> + <p>Moreover, as previously mentioned, customs officials have databases that store information on previous shipments, and sudden changes to the pattern, frequency, or nature of electronic shipments could be a red flag.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Machine Detection: High</strong></p> -<p>Based on these dynamics, the CSIS Futures Lab generated the following scenario using Donovan:</p> + <p>Even with X-ray inspections, the embedded chips will appear like integral components, effectively camouflaged among the device’s internal components. However, laptops or devices embedded with non-standard components might produce more heat or even specific sounds under operation. Such differences, if detected, could alert inspectors during a power-on test.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Fracturing Trust</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>DISASSEMBLY OF CHIPS</strong></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the run-up to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, two distinct trends of cyber activity involving Russian and Chinese actors emerge. Leveraging cyber strategies that have been evident in previous conflicts, Russian state operatives appear intent on fanning the flames of political discord within the U.S. electorate. Concurrently, Chinese state-sponsored black-hat hackers are continuously launching large-scale operations aimed at pilfering unprotected IP databases within the United States.</code></em></p> +<p>Smugglers could deconstruct chips into their constituent parts, which are no longer classified as controlled chips by HS code, effectively bypassing export controls. This would mostly be used for the purposes of reverse-engineering advanced chips, as the process of disassembling or delayering a chip is damaging. Once a chip undergoes this process, it likely cannot be restored to its original functional state.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russian cyber activities cast a long shadow of a Cold War-style influence operation that deploys strategically crafted disinformation and propaganda campaigns. These campaigns, which are designed to fracture public resolutions and incite social chaos, allude to the tactics used to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. There appears to be an orchestrated effort to manipulate political perceptions and beliefs in an attempt to shift the electoral landscape in a direction favorable to Russian strategic interests.</code></em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="hypothetical-scenario-2">Hypothetical Scenario 2</h4> + <h4 id="disassembling-chips">Disassembling Chips</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China’s cyber activities, in stark contrast, possess apparent economic drivers. The IP of the United States, held in the form of patents, methodologies, and blueprints, are the primary focus of these cyber breaches. By syphoning off such data, China could potentially undercut U.S. economic competitiveness on a global platform.</code></em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>Technically, a chip can be disassembled, but not in the traditional sense of taking apart larger mechanical assemblies. Instead, “disassembling” a semiconductor chip usually involves chip “decapsulation” and “delayering.” It is typically done for purposes such as failure analysis, competitive analysis, research, and intellectual property verification.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Inevitably, these trends converge, resulting in a dire situation for the United States. The effects of these cyber operations are not restricted to abstract sociopolitical and economic dimensions. Both Russian and Chinese operations have displayed a propensity to target U.S. critical infrastructure, specifically the federal systems that deliver basic assistance programs. Such activities could severely undermine the trust and confidence of U.S. citizens in the government’s ability to ensure their welfare.</code></em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>First, the protective package needs to be removed through decapsulation. This can be done one of two ways:</p> +</blockquote> -<p>This scenario is a good example of how these developments could take place in the near future given the vulnerabilities identified during the TTXs and public survey. Of note, the scenario is also the most logical extrapolation from recent trends in cyber operations and great power competition. According to the scenario, the focus of Russian operatives on disseminating disinformation and propaganda to influence public perception and create social chaos is consistent with the document’s findings on political and cognitive warfare. Similarly, in line with findings from the TTXs, espionage, particularly in the science and technology domain, has a strategic emphasis on cyber threats. This resonates with the activities of Chinese hackers, which center on IP theft to undercut U.S. economic competitiveness. This scenario shows the need for robust measures against potential disinformation campaigns using deepfakes and espionage activities against research and development. If the U.S. government cannot find a way to address deepfakes and protect its science and technology enterprise, the country will be increasingly vulnerable and subject to coercion in the twenty-first century.</p> +<blockquote> + <ol> + <li>Chemical decapsulation, which uses strong acids or bases to dissolve the package</li> + <li>Mechanical decapsulation, which involves grinding, polishing, or cutting away the package</li> + </ol> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="gender-dynamics-will-continue-to-shape-how-the-public-views-cybersecurity">Gender Dynamics Will Continue to Shape How the Public Views Cybersecurity</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>Delayering describes the process by which the many layers of an integrated circuit can be removed one by one. This process can involve various methods:</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The second major trend observed concerns the rise of mis-, dis-, and malinformation. During the TTXs, participants focused on rising threats related to deepfakes and AI. The public survey confirmed these concerns but highlighted a clear divide between how self-identified men and women view the threat of deepfakes. As a result, future campaigns to hold the United States hostage during a political transition or foreign policy crisis are likely to see disinformation campaigns tailored to different segments.</p> +<blockquote> + <ol> + <li>Wet etching, where the chip is dipped in specific chemicals to dissolve certain layers while leaving others intact</li> + <li>Dry etching, which uses plasma or ions to selectively remove layers</li> + <li>Mechanical polishing, which uses very fine abrasives to polish away the top layer without damaging the underlying structures</li> + </ol> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Disinformation and Manipulation of Stolen Data</strong></p> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> -<p><em>During the TTXs, there was a debate regarding the effectiveness of deepfakes and disinformation campaigns in swaying public opinion. Some participants argued that these tactics might sow discord rather than significantly change people’s minds. This discussion pointed toward the potential for dis- and misinformation campaigns to amplify existing social cleavages. Even small groups with hardened worldviews can amplify disinformation and spread it outside their networks.</em></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Human Detection: High</strong></p> -<p><strong>The Gender Gap and Utilization of Deepfakes and Disinformation</strong></p> + <p>Disassembled semiconductor components, if high in volume and lacking distinctive, recognizable features, may not raise suspicions or warrant detailed inspection against their declared descriptions, particularly when inspections are based on random sampling or partial checks of shipments. As the smuggling technique becomes known, customs may employ experts to recognize disassembled chips, although there will be a time lag.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Machine Detection: High</strong></p> -<p><em>During the TTXs, participants highlighted how malign actors could use deepfakes to make the government appear incompetent or even outright malicious in delivering essential needs. Combining real information leaks with deepfakes could further erode trust in the government’s crisis management capabilities. Additionally, the public survey highlighted how gender and age cohort differences shape how the U.S. public views cybersecurity. This disparity in sensitivity offers adversaries an opportunity to tailor attacks that exacerbate confusion, complicating the development of effective strategies to counter these threats.</em></p> + <p>Standard X-ray examinations would merely reflect components as inconspicuous, smaller semiconductor fragments, bypassing customs scrutiny.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Gender Divide in Cyber Warfare</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="stage-3-port-exit">Stage 3: Port Exit</h4> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Heading into the contentious 2024 U.S. presidential election, extensive studies revealed that women voters expressed far greater concern about potential deepfake videos and manipulated information than men. This gender disparity offered a prime opportunity for exploitation by foreign adversaries keen on disrupting U.S. democracy.</code></em></p> +<p>There are a range of tactics smugglers use, but three are worth highlighting: (1) leveraging private couriers; (2) contaminating containger cargo; and (3) use of submersible vessels.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the months before the election, Russian state-sponsored disinformation campaigns specifically targeted women voters across social media. Fake news stories and doctored videos portrayed female political candidates as corrupt, unqualified, and even mentally unstable. Some deepfake footage depicted female candidates making inflammatory racist and misogynistic remarks. Other manipulated videos showed women lawmakers struggling to respond coherently to basic policy questions. Many appeared designed to prey on gender biases that question women’s competency for high office. The goal was to suppress support for female candidates among women voters.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>LEVERAGING PRIVATE COURIERS</strong></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Meanwhile, Chinese cyber operatives stole massive datasets from women’s health organizations and services. They threatened to leak sensitive medical records of female patients from Planned Parenthood and OBGYN practices unless demands were met. This sparked fears that hacked personal health information could be used for blackmail or extortion. Patients worried that intimate details about reproductive health, pregnancies, and sexual health could be made public in an attempt to ruin reputations and lives.</code></em></p> +<p>Smugglers often prefer private courier services, which typically apply less rigorous inspection protocols than major, well-established companies. Smaller private couriers might be more susceptible to inducements or bribes due to the nature of their operations and potential financial pressures. In contrast, established logistics providers have more to lose and are less likely to risk severe penalties or reputational damage for illicit gains.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the wake of the election, Russian disinformation tactics continued preying on female voter anxieties. Deepfake videos portrayed female members of the cabinet as inept crisis managers unable to deliver basic government assistance to struggling Americans. Doctored footage showed relief supplies rotting in warehouses due to incompetence as Americans suffered.</code></em></p> +<p>Larger companies also adhere to predetermined routes, minimizing the chances of clandestine diversions that could be used to bypass regulatory checkpoints. Moreover, they often partake in collaborative platforms that allow for real-time information sharing with customs and other regulatory authorities, fostering an environment of cooperation and compliance.</p> -<p>Unlike the first scenario, the above vignette shows how generative AI can help visualize alternative futures based on critical outcomes. AI is not magic. It is math. And the integration of datasets on strategy, net assessment, and cyber operations, alongside transcripts from the games, alters how the underlying model weights different text combinations to write the story. This story is best characterized as a “what if” scenario and a demonstration of how a particular outcome — regardless of party — intersects with observed patterns and trends in cyber operations as they relate to disinformation. Here the model assumes that a woman — regardless of party — wins the 2024 presidential election, a prospect current polling suggests as unlikely but not impossible. Rather than interpret the results as forecasts about elections, the better perspective is to use the fictional future scenario as a foundation for discussing how authoritarian states are and will likely continue to target gender fault lines in the United States. This focus of discontent could create new preferences for how malign actors will seek to target federal executive agencies and critical infrastructure, with a particular focus on health and human services as well as medical providers highlighted in the scenario.</p> +<p>Moreover, established logistics providers have more compliance capabilities at their disposal. Larger companies utilize advanced package screening technologies. They also maintain thorough and standardized document verification procedures, employing expert personnel trained to detect discrepancies that may indicate smuggling. For instance, global logistics giants such as UPS engage security vendors for the express purpose of screening cargo items (see below).</p> -<h4 id="distrust-in-government-will-continue">Distrust in Government Will Continue</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bU7Slb8.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>UPS Cargo X-Ray Screener Job Ad.</strong> Source: The posting is no longer online but was available at <a href="https://www.jobs-ups.uk/job/stansted-mountfitchet/cargo-screener/20477/54285091248">“Jobs &amp; Careers: Cargo Screener,” UPS, September 2023</a>.</em></p> -<p>The third major trend observed across the TTXs and public survey responses concerns the declining trust in government across democratic societies and the United States, in particular. There was an underlying assumption across different groups that free people currently experience a trust deficit. According to a recent Pew Research, the U.S. trust in the federal government decline from 73 percent in 1958 to 16 percent in 2023. A second major trend observed concerns the rise of mis-, dis-, and malinformation. During the TTXs, participants focused on rising threats related to deepfakes and AI. The public survey confirmed these concerns but highlighted a clear divide between how self-identified men and women view the threat of deepfakes. As a result, the future campaigns to hold the United States hostage during a political transition or foreign policy crisis are likely to see such campaigns tailored to different segments.</p> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: Medium–High</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Propaganda by Deed</code></em></strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Initial Detection Prior to Leaving Port: High</strong></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A nineteenth- and twentieth-century tactic of using protests, terrorist attacks, and other subversive deeds to catalyze further unrest and even open revolt. The idea is closely linked to revolutionary theory and the concept of a “foco” used by Che Guerva. The concept has been used by modern terrorist organizations and is increasingly associated with far right-wing and Islamic extremists.</code></em></p> + <p>There are a number of tools that private couriers, unlike major global logistics companies, do not have:</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Disrupting State and Local Elections</strong></p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Advanced inspection equipment, which results in less detailed or less accurate scans, potentially allowing contraband to pass through undetected</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Standardized operating protocols, leading to variability in the depth and thoroughness of inspections</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Comprehensive training programs or intelligence sharing on emerging threats, which can lead to oversights or missed cues of smuggling activity</p> -<p><em>Participants in the TTX underscored the value of targeting state and local election systems, perceiving them to be more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Such attacks could disrupt the electoral process and weaken faith in the democratic system. More important, this reflected a desire to sow discontent by making it appear that every local disruption was a function of systemic issues at the federal level.</em></p> + <p>In addition, private couriers, especially smaller-scale operations, may be more vulnerable to internal collusion or corruption.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p><strong>Espionage and Long-Term Goals</strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Subsequent Detection: Medium–High</strong></p> -<p><em>Across the TTX and public surveys, participants saw espionage as more than just a means to steal information and technology. They also saw it as a way to undermine trust in government, as Americans perceived each new breach as a sign of a breakdown of sovereignty and the ability of the federal government to safeguard U.S. innovation and the personal information its citizens. This desire to steal IP and undermine trust was seen by participants as a long-term goal beyond any one political transition or foreign policy crisis.</em></p> + <p>Smugglers could use less-traveled maritime routes to sidestep routine patrol routes. Furthermore, the compact size of their vessels might make them less detectable in open waters, providing an edge in evasion. However, private couriers, being lesser-known entities compared to giants such as UPS, might be viewed with a greater degree of suspicion by maritime patrols, leading to more frequent random inspections.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Importance of Insider Threats</strong></p> +<p><strong>CONTAMINATING CONTAINER CARGO (“RIP-ON, RIP-OFF” METHOD)</strong></p> -<p><em>The threat posed by insiders, whether intentional or accidental, was a key point in the TTX discussions. Participants noted that insiders, whether in the United States or other countries, could potentially compromise federal networks. This highlights the need for a holistic approach to cybersecurity that goes beyond protecting against external threats and also addresses the potential risks posed by insiders. It also shows how the breakdown in trust creates new threat vectors as disenfranchised citizens look for new forms of protest and “propaganda by deed.” This threat parallels the broader phenomenon also on display in the rise of activities such as swatting involving federal or local elected officials, which involves falsely calling in SWAT teams to a’ residence.</em></p> +<p>One concealment strategy frequently employed by drug syndicates, especially from Brazil, involves exploiting legitimate, often containerized shipments. In this method, illicit cargo is secretly added to a legitimate shipment without the knowledge of the shipper or consignee. According to TradeWinds, the world’s biggest shipping news service, “drug traffickers can open a shipping container and remove a 100-kilogram consignment of cocaine in as little as three minutes.”</p> -<p><strong>Strategic Timing</strong></p> +<p>For the strategy to work, collaboration is necessary at both the origin and destination. At the departure dock, the insertion or “rip-on” team introduces the illicit goods into the selected container. To mask any interference, they frequently replace the genuine security seal with a counterfeit. At the destination port, retrieval of the concealed items is crucial. This is either done by compromised port staff or by specialized extraction or “rip-off” teams who infiltrate the terminal. After this operation, the container might be either left unsealed or be relocked with another duplicate seal. Locating such containers in large terminals is a challenge. Simply knowing the container identification number is insufficient; it must also be easily reachable, which often demands insider help to adjust the placement of the container.</p> -<p><em>The TTX discussions also pointed to the importance of timing in launching cyber operations designed to undermine trust and confidence in the U.S. government. The participants noted that attackers are likely to time their attacks to coincide with critical events, such as elections or other moments of national significance, to maximize their impact and influence public sentiment. This underlines the need for heightened vigilance during such periods and the importance of having contingency plans in place. It also suggests that cyber operations have become a form of propaganda by deed in networked societies.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-4"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 4:</code></h4> + <h4 id="rip-on-rip-off-cocaine-container-bust-at-port-botany"><code class="highlighter-rouge">“Rip-On, Rip-Off” Cocaine Container Bust at Port Botany</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Based on these dynamics, the CSIS Futures Lab generated the following scenario using Donovan:</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Authorities detained two individuals in Sydney following the discovery of 120 kilograms of cocaine, valued at approximately $60 million, concealed within a shipping container they were attempting to break into.</code></em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Chaos at the Ballot Box</code></em></strong></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The pair from Athens were suspected to be local operatives involved in a compromised “rip-on, rip-off” narcotics trafficking scheme. The police interception was prompted by a reported break-in at a Port Botany logistics firm, situated in the vicinity of Sydney’s main maritime terminal, where they uncovered 120 bricks of cocaine, each weighing one kilogram.</code></em></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The 2024 U.S. presidential election highlights intensifying cyber threats seeking to undermine democracy and national security. Russian hackers disrupt local election systems and infrastructure, timing attacks for maximum impact. Chinese operatives focus on espionage targeting confidential data to advance long-term strategic interests. Meanwhile, insider threats pose increasing risks of unauthorized disclosures and system compromises.</code></em></p> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Prior to the election, a disgruntled federal contractor with access to classified systems leaks troves of confidential documents revealing the government’s cyber capabilities and gaps. Adversaries gain insight, enabling more successful future attacks on exploited weaknesses.</code></em></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Initial Detection Prior to Leaving Port: High</strong></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Weeks before the 2024 election, ransomware strikes voter registration databases in six key battleground states right before registration deadlines. Chaos ensues at local election offices as critical voter rolls are locked down. Tens of thousands lose the ability to update their registration status, request absentee ballots, or fix errors ahead of election day.</code></em></p> + <p>By embedding illicit items within genuine shipments, the chances of arousing suspicion are reduced. Since the original shippers and consignees are typically unaware that their containers are being used for smuggling, their documentation and behavior do not raise red flags. With the right network and bribed officials, the drugs can be successfully loaded onto containers without drawing attention.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">On election day, reporting systems crash in counties across swing states, delaying results. Claims of voter suppression and fraud spread. Protests form amid the uncertainty calling the election’s integrity into question.</code></em></p> + <p>However, the process of breaking and replacing the container seals, even if replaced with duplicates, can sometimes be detected if the seals are not placed correctly or if there are visible signs of tampering.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Subsequent Detection: High</strong></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Throughout the election, Chinese hackers steal datasets from both political parties and all levels of government. In the long term, this facilitates future blackmail and enormous economic advantage from pilfered trade secrets, IP, and proprietary research.</code></em></p> + <p>If smugglers successfully load chips onto containers of a reputed logistics provider, the odds of detection decrease significantly for several reasons. First, large logistics providers have built a trustworthy reputation over years, and maritime authorities are less likely to scrutinize these companies as intensely as smaller or less-known shippers. Second, if smugglers manage to bypass the advanced security measures of reputed logistics providers, it may create a false sense of security for officials. However, there are still risks from intelligence tip-offs.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Like the second scenario (The Gender Divide in Cyber Warfare), the above vignette shows how generative AI can help visualize alternative futures based on the convergence of key trends. Here the prompts based on trends observed during the TTXs change how the model weights words and their sequence to write a dystopian story. Like wargames, these scenarios are not predictive as much they are illustrative, a helpful mechanism for catalyzing policy debates and security assessments. As a result, the story is a gateway to a larger set of stress tests and red-teaming efforts required to identify vulnerabilities that a mix of foreign states and insiders could use to attack federal agencies and critical infrastructure.</p> +<p><strong>USE OF SUBMERSIBLE VESSELS</strong></p> -<h3 id="policy-implications">Policy Implications</h3> +<p>Drug smugglers have been known to use smaller semi-submersible and even fully submersible vessels, particularly from South America to the United States, to evade radar and visual identification.</p> -<p>A connected society is as vulnerable as it prosperous. Each connection creates possibilities for exchanging goods and ideas but opens a vector for spreading malware and holding the entire system hostage. As a result, modern resilience starts with cybersecurity and ensuring that the federal government and critical infrastructure are sufficiently protected from both foreign and domestic threats. Seen in this light, the following policy recommendations warrant further debate and considerations based on the findings from the TTXs, public survey, and generative AI scenarios.</p> +<p>Data from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction suggests that larger crewed vessels can transport as much as eight tons of cocaine, a load potentially valued at over $1 billion. According to Colombian navy estimates, the average cost to the drug smugglers for one of these boats is just under $1 million, making this a potentially higly profitable smuggling method.</p> -<h4 id="charting-a-path-toward-comprehensive-cybersecurity-for-essential-services">Charting a Path toward Comprehensive Cybersecurity for Essential Services</h4> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> -<p>A major finding across all the games, surveys, and scenarios was that future cyber threats will increasingly target the basic needs provided by the federal government as a way of holding the United States hostage during political transitions and foreign policy crises. Traditionally, cyber defense focused on sensitive military and intelligence infrastructure, but this observation changes the logic. Increasingly both federal CISOs and actors such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) will need to prioritize protecting services such as providing food and healthcare to large segments of the U.S. public. These ideas echo the larger recent study on defending the .gov ecosystem. Furthermore, this new focus on public needs will likely require expanding core programs such as threat hunting to include more active red teaming and dynamic consequence management exercises that include stress testing how best to engage the public during a cyber crisis.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Initial Detection Prior to Leaving Port: High</strong></p> -<h4 id="addressing-gender-and-age-dynamics-in-cyber-threat-perception">Addressing Gender and Age Dynamics in Cyber Threat Perception</h4> + <p>Chips are precision engineered and susceptible to environmental factors. Loading them onto submersible vessels demands specialized handling and extended timeframes, necessitating remote loading locations. Countries with sprawling coastlines, underdeveloped maritime infrastructure, and often lax maritime surveillance offer numerous such potential locations.</p> -<p>The fact that gender and age are playing a significant role in shaping perceptions of cyber threats — particularly in the context of misinformation campaigns — means the federal government has to change how it assesses threats and communicates with the U.S. public. Women’s heightened concern about deepfakes and misinformation calls for targeted strategies to address and counter these threats that will likely involve working with private sector social media companies. More generally, CISOs across the federal government, and CISA in particular, will need to incorporate gendered perspectives into cybersecurity policies and awareness campaigns. This could involve conducting gender-specific studies to understand varying threat perceptions and developing tailored public awareness initiatives that address these concerns. By acknowledging and addressing gender-based and age-based differences in cyber threat perception, public communication strategy can become more effective in countering misinformation campaigns and preventing societal divisions.</p> + <p>However, major ports are equipped with comprehensive CCTV systems, frequent patrols, and stringent entry and exit procedures. Any unexpected loading activities, especially involving atypical vessels such as submersibles, would likely raise alarms.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Subsequent Maritime Detection: High</strong></p> -<h4 id="enhancing-public-awareness-and-transparency-in-cybersecurity-funding">Enhancing Public Awareness and Transparency in Cybersecurity Funding</h4> + <p>In addition to having a low radar signature and being able to submerge quickly when maritime enforcement is detected, submersibles, especially those used in illicit activities, are engineered to be as stealthy as possible. The following are examples of such measures:</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The apparent lack of public awareness about government funding and efforts in cybersecurity underscores the need for transparent and persistent communication strategies. The federal government must actively engage with the public to explain the complexities of the cyber threat landscape and the importance of resilience building. This recommendation involves not only investing in robust cybersecurity measures but also in extensive public education and information campaigns. By improving public understanding and involvement in cybersecurity matters, governments can strengthen societal resilience against cyber threats and ensure a more informed and cooperative approach to national cyber defense.</p> - -<h4 id="funding-an-entity-to-collect-analyze-and-share-cyber-statistics">Funding an Entity to Collect, Analyze, and Share Cyber Statistics</h4> +<ol> + <li> + <p>A reduced acoustic profile (e.g., quieter engines, vibration-damping materials, streamlined shapes) to evade passive sonar systems</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Air-independent propulsion systems to reduce heat emissions</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Remote guidance or onboard autonomous systems, which allow them to run riskier routes and further reduce their acoustic profile (e.g., no need for life-support systems)</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>There were expert debates and disagreement across demographic cohorts about whether or not the U.S. government sufficiently resources cybersecurity. This divergence likely speaks to a larger issue: the public does not understand the full extent of the threat and experts are often lost in debating different aspects. There is no, single credible source of information about cyberattacks in the same way that there are public databases on everything from weather patterns to crime statistics to economic data. It should come as no surprise that large segments of the U.S. population see a threat but struggle to understand what the right balance of ways and means is to reach the goal of secure online services and critical infrastructure. Therefore, the U.S. government — whether in the Office of the Cyber Director or CISA — needs to establish an outlet for publishing cyber statistics. This effort should build on new public and private sector data pooling initiatives and ensure cyber dashboards are as accessible to a woman in rural Kansas as they are to a federal CISO in Washington. With a pool of data, the government can make forecasts about future threats and better align federal resources, including money, labor, and technology. This will allow the government to better inform the private sector and general public about the cyber threats and cybersecurity measures.</p> +<p>In addition, they often employ advanced logistics tactics, such as deploying a network of fishing vessels to alert crews about nearby patrols or utilizing offshore refueling vessels to bypass coastal areas.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-5"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 5</code></h4> + <h4 id="narco-submarines-in-costa-rica"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Narco-Submarines in Costa Rica</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The shape of the threat is clear. As science fiction writer William Gibson puts it, “The future is already here, it is just not evenly distributed.” The United States has already seen massive data breaches, IP theft, and efforts to plant malware on its critical infrastructure. Foreign actors increasingly look like they are employing cyberattack vectors targeting the federal government and critical infrastructure to “wreak havoc.” The open question is what the United States will do about it. The games, surveys, and generative AI scenarios in this paper represent an effort by the CSIS Futures Lab to employ novel research methods to understand modern policy challenges.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">During the 1980s, go-fast boats were the smuggling vessel of choice in many parts of the world. Go-fast boats became more vulnerable to radar detection as radar technology improved, leading to the development of semi-submersibles.</code></em></p> -<p>Addressing these threats requires open, honest debate that embraces not just opinion but also large datasets, facts, and even creative scenarios. Diversity of thought and perspective will lead to deeper insights. Too often security questions are treated as sensitive and closed policy discussions, limiting the ability of an educated public to debate the best course of action. Democracy requires these debates and a vibrant marketplace of ideas. Securing the connectivity the U.S. citizens rely on is too important to be left to unaccountable experts debating a handful of marquee case studies and opaque security programs. The public has a stake in understanding the threat and debating how best to confront it. That debate will be messy, but then again so is democracy.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the 1990s, there were rumours that smugglers were using vessels that were nearly fully submersible to reduce detection by visual, radar, sonar, or infrared systems. However, it was only in 2006 that the U.S. Coast Guard successfully seized a 50-foot narco-submarine with three tons of cocaine some 166 km southwest of Costa Rica.</code></em></p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="stage-4-transshipment">Stage 4: Transshipment</h4> -<p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is an associate data fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and a graduate fellow in the Center for Data Science at American University.</p> +<p>Upon leaving the initial port, smugglers may redirect the chips for consistency to a third country where customs controls are less stringent. To further obfuscate the trail, they often engage various intermediaries, utilize diverse transportation methods, and transship the chips through multiple countries, further muddying the trail (see Hypothetical Scenario 3).</p> -<p><strong>Jose Macias</strong> is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="hypothetical-scenario-3">Hypothetical Scenario 3</h4> + <h4 id="a-sample-transshipment-journey">A Sample Transshipment Journey</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a professor in the Marine Corps University, School of Advanced Warfighting.</p>Yasir Atalan, et al.In the future, malign actors will seek to undermine trust in government through disrupting basic needs and services such as food aid and medical assistance, in place of costly offensive cyber campaigns.U.S.-Japan Alliance In 20242024-04-04T12:00:00+08:002024-04-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/us-japan-alliance-in-2024<p><em>The U.S.-Japan alliance is at a moment of historic strength, even as both countries confront daunting challenges in the international system. This report calls for an alliance that is more integrated across the economic and security realms to uphold the rules-based order.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Country A → Country B</strong></p> +</blockquote> -<excerpt /> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Diversionary Tactic:</strong> Smuggler X first moves the chips overland to Country A, classifying them as generic computer parts for a technology roadshow in a provincial city. In reality, they never make it there. They are rerouted to a small coastal village and loaded onto a fishing vessel.</p> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Country B → Country C</strong></p> +</blockquote> -<p>Japan and the United States today confront an international environment more fragmented and divided than at any time since the end of World War II. Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel in October 2023 has rekindled major conflict in the Middle East, including attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, with a risk of expansion as Iran and its proxies seek to capitalize on the violence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shaken the international system and raised the specter of a world dividing into blocs. China has provided Russia with an economic lifeline, and North Korea has provided millions of rounds of ammunition that have sustained the war effort and helped Moscow to avoid defeat — and perhaps even to prevail, absent additional international assistance to Ukraine.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>“Lost Cargo” Tactic:</strong> Near Country B, the chips are reportedly “lost at sea.” Instead, they are actually anchored and buoyed just beneath the surface, waiting for retrieval by another party. A recreational diving group (in on the operation) “discovers” the “lost cargo.” They retrieve it and bring it to a port in Country C.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>For its part, China is pursuing revisionist aims across the Indo-Pacific and beyond, adopting tools of coercion — military, political, and economic — to press territorial claims and advance its interests. Russia and China have largely ceased cooperation with the West, including at the United Nations and even in areas where they previously found common cause, such as efforts to restrain North Korean behavior. Kim Jong-un has capitalized on these divisions to advance his nuclear and missile programs and has forged a close relationship with Vladimir Putin. With Moscow and Beijing effectively in his corner, Kim has abandoned any pretext of engagement with the United States. He is on the brink of a full-spectrum nuclear capability, from tactical weapons for use on the battlefield to strategic weapons that can credibly threaten the United States and its allies.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Country C → Country D</strong></p> +</blockquote> -<p>At the same time, both the United States and Japan are seeking to define the strategic competition with China in terms that avoid a new Cold War. On the one hand, both the United States and Japan have pursued policies to defend commercial and technological advantages in key sectors from China’s predatory and other unfair practices. In 2022, Japan passed new laws to promote “economic security” through enhanced screening for inbound investment, subsidies and protections for critical materials, and a new classified patent system for sensitive technologies. In the United States, Washington is pursuing a “small yard, high fence” approach to protecting critical technologies — limiting Beijing’s access to advanced technologies and promoting supply chain diversification — while otherwise allowing commerce with China to continue. But the size of the “yard” of critical technologies and the height of the “fence” around it remain subject to hot political debate. While managing this competition, Washington and Tokyo must preserve room to cooperate with China on issues of common interest and to sustain economic exchange key to the world’s prosperity. Building cooperation on climate change is of particular importance.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Shell Companies and Ghost Transactions:</strong> In Country C, a shell company purchases the “recovered treasure” and then sells it to another entity in Country D as antique electronics for collectors.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>In this uncertain environment, the U.S.-Japan alliance has never been more important — but doubts about the future of American leadership have never been more profound. Under the Biden administration, the United States has focused on strengthening alliances and partnerships, including by elevating the Quad, launching AUKUS, and promoting deeper “minilateral” cooperation among allies, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Australia. This strategy has achieved noteworthy successes, but it has failed to advance an economic agenda that meets the demand for credible and durable U.S. engagement, especially in the trade arena. And the future of U.S. engagement is uncertain, given a presidential campaign that features radically different visions of the United States’ role in the world and its relationships with allies. Regardless of which candidate wins, the concerns about American isolationism and reliability will continue.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Country D → Country E</strong></p> +</blockquote> -<p>The burdens of global and regional leadership will therefore fall more heavily on Tokyo in the near term. Fortunately, Japan is well positioned to take on this role. Former prime minister Abe Shinzo was the architect of the ambitious diplomatic strategy known as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), and his successors have fully embraced his vision. Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced a second phase of FOIP in March 2023, and it continues to enjoy broad political support in Japan. Japan has responded to a challenging security environment with unprecedented policy change, with plans to nearly double defense spending by 2027 and to acquire new capabilities that will contribute to deterrence in East Asia, including long-range precision strike missiles. Under Kishida’s leadership, Japan has played a major role in supporting Ukraine and was an effective leader of the G7 in 2023. Unlike many Western democracies, Japan has avoided the worst impulses of populism and isolationism. Its role in supporting a free and open international order grounded in the rule of law is therefore more important than ever. But looking ahead, the urgency of the international environment will demand more from Japan, and from the U.S.-Japan alliance.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Container Mixing:</strong> Once in Country D, the chips are embedded within laptops. The products (and chips hidden within) are loaded into containers and shipped to Country E with proper customs declarations for electronics.</p> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="toward-an-integrated-alliance">Toward an Integrated Alliance</h3> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Country E → Country F</strong></p> +</blockquote> -<p>In the year 2000, the lead authors of this report brought together a bipartisan group to develop a vision for the U.S.-Japan alliance before the presidential election to serve as a roadmap for the relationship regardless of which party won. That report helped to shape George W. Bush’s approach to the alliance, and since then this group has built on this tradition of bipartisanship in the U.S.-Japan relationship through reports in 2007, 2012, 2018, and 2020. The broad political support for the alliance today in Washington and Tokyo did not fully exist before 2000 — and it has been crucial to the successful development of the relationship ever since.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Trade Show:</strong> Upon arrival in Country E, the chips are quietly retrieved and repackaged inside dummy prototypes of new technology devices. A buyer from Country F visits the trade show and purchases these prototypes as cutting-edge technology from Country E.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The authors behind earlier reports were not mere cheerleaders for the alliance — they were committed to honesty and candor about the challenges ahead and the need for action in Washington and Tokyo. The first report, issued in October 2000, called for “renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance.” In the most recent report, issued on the eve of President Biden’s inauguration, the authors called for an alliance that is more equal and expects more of Japan.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Country F → Country G</strong></p> +</blockquote> -<p>The strategic environment that the United States and Japan face today, and the urgency of action needed to address it, demands an even stronger call to action. With Japan now embarked on an ambitious strategic trajectory, this report urges Washington and Tokyo to take the next step: to move toward an alliance that is more integrated, from planning and executing military operations to linking economic and security concerns, including by coordinating industrial policy and promoting secure supply chains.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Extraction of Chips:</strong> Here, the chips are extracted by an intermediary agent and sent to Country G.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>In security terms, Washington must recognize that Japan’s new course is fundamentally different from the past, and that a more integrated alliance, including at the command level, can make a vital contribution to deterrence by enabling rapid decisionmaking and reducing seams between the two countries’ systems. On the economic side, Washington and Tokyo should collaborate on critical technologies and advance a robust friend-shoring agenda, working closely with other partners in Asia and Europe. Furthermore, the United States and Japan should work together to build the new bilateral and multilateral mechanisms needed to support a strategy of selective de-risking with China. Japan and the United States should sustain close cooperation globally to uphold a free and open international order grounded in the rule of law.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Country G → Country H</strong></p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="advancing-the-security-alliance">Advancing the Security Alliance</h4> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Final Journey Overland:</strong> The final purchaser, having trustworthy trade relations with Country H, sends the devices overland.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Japan’s 2022 National Defense Strategy represents an opportunity to move toward a far more operational and credible alliance. Despite the significant strengthening of the security relationship over the last decade, much of the alliance architecture remains rooted in an era when the United States expected little of Japan as a strategic partner. In the past, the alliance could be effective without formal mechanisms of military coordination, but today it cannot. A more integrated alliance will require modernizing its command structure, deepening intelligence cooperation, and actively promoting defense industry and technology cooperation. To enable these transformative steps, Japan will need to adopt stronger cybersecurity practices and further enhance and expand its security clearance system.</p> +<p><em>Likelihood of Evading Detection: High</em></p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Restructure alliance command and control.</strong> Japan’s establishment of a new Joint Operational Command (J-JOC) by March 2025, to oversee joint operations of the Self Defense Forces (SDF), is an opportunity to modernize the alliance’s command structure. The United States should upgrade the leadership of U.S. forces in Japan by establishing a standing three- or four-star joint operational command, subordinate to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, with a more robust staff and the authority to plan and execute bilateral exercises and operations. This command could be a revamped U.S. Forces Japan or a new joint operational element established in Japan. Critically, however, the new headquarters should be primarily focused on the bilateral alliance and serve as a one-stop shop on all alliance matters for the Japanese government. The commander should not be dual hatted with U.S. service command responsibilities. With this new structure in place, Tokyo and Washington should establish a standing, combined bilateral planning and coordination office to support closer coordination of military operations while preserving separate chains of command. To the degree possible, the J-JOC and U.S. operational command in Japan should be co-located to ensure seamless coordination during contingencies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Strengthen the intelligence relationship and cybersecurity.</strong> The intelligence relationship remains a weak link in the U.S.-Japan alliance, with Japan’s intelligence community — despite reforms in recent years — still plagued by stovepiping and the absence of a true all-source analytic capability. Japan should establish a centralized analytic organization under the Cabinet Secretariat, staffed with personnel from across the intelligence community with access to all national security information produced by the Japanese government. In addition, Japan should place a high priority on passing legislation to create an economic security clearance system and strengthen Japan’s cyber defenses, including by enhancing public-private information sharing on cyber threats. These steps are prerequisites to deeper intelligence and defense cooperation in the alliance and must not be delayed. To support this effort, the United States should set out a clear road map of steps needed to elevate the intelligence-sharing relationship to the equivalent of the Five Eyes partnership.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Prioritize defense industry and technology cooperation.</strong> The war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of robust allied defense industrial capacity. Supporting an innovative Japanese defense industry is in the U.S. interest, and Japan’s loosening of restrictions on defense equipment exports — though still insufficient — is an opportunity to expand collaboration. Doing so will require adjustments to mindsets on both sides. For example, leadership in the U.S. Department of Defense should prioritize collaborative programs with Japan, from expanded licensed production of existing munitions lines to codevelopment of new technologies and systems. It should also streamline technology release policies to reflect the progress Japan has made on information security. In addition, the United States should support Japanese collaboration with other partners, including projects under Pillar Two of AUKUS. For its part, Japan should resist the instinct to pursue indigenous solutions to defense requirements, which place at risk timely delivery of the capabilities needed to sustain deterrence. To be competitive, and ultimately to provide the capabilities Japan and the United States need, Japanese industry needs to shed its nearly exclusive focus on building capabilities for the SDF and embrace the international marketplace, including partnerships with foreign defense companies.</p> + <p><strong>Cumulative Detection: High</strong></p> + + <p>The use of multiple third countries as transit points compounds the difficulty of detecting illicit cargo. Even if each individual country has a seemingly manageable risk of detection, by exploiting interstitial gaps between each transit point, the cumulative probability of evasion drastically increases.</p> + + <p>Transshipment is not just about the simple math of probabilities. It is about deliberately and tactically manuevering through a patchwork of customs controls, always seeking the path of least resistance and exploiting the unevenness of the regional and international enforcement landscapes.</p> </li> </ul> -<h4 id="expanding-partnerships-and-coalitions">Expanding Partnerships and Coalitions</h4> +<h3 id="key-observations">Key Observations</h3> -<p>Deeper integration of the U.S.-Japan relationship at the bilateral level should be combined with accelerated efforts to improve connectivity to other allies and like-minded partners — in particular, Australia, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. When needed and interests align, the alliance should have global reach — and Japan should play a larger role in addressing the crisis in the Middle East, including by helping to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The U.S.-Japan relationship is rooted in common values and a commitment to democracy; in a world in which democracy is under strain globally, Washington and Tokyo should work together to strengthen democratic resilience and the rule of law.</p> +<h4 id="early-interdiction-is-more-effective-than-reactive-enforcement">Early interdiction is more effective than reactive enforcement.</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Bridge the U.S.-ROK alliance.</strong> With Japan rapidly moving to expand defense capabilities, including long-range counterstrike, the need for connective tissue between the U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-ROK alliances is greater than ever before. Following the Camp David meetings in August 2023, structures of trilateral dialogue at the strategic level are in place. The allies should now move to establish formal connections at the operational level, including through exchanges of liaison officers at respective commands, the inclusion of observers at bilateral exercises, and the establishment of a trilateral contingency planning cell. To support these changes, Japan and South Korea should move purposefully and promptly to normalize bilateral defense relations through a first-ever joint security declaration. Such a declaration could be modeled on the 2007 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, which set out broad areas of common interest and cooperation in a non-binding political statement. These government actions should be accompanied by efforts to deepen ties among individuals and civil society in Japan and South Korea.</p> - </li> +<p>Studying the pipeline of export control evasion (see Table 1), there is a noticeable increase in the difficulty of detecting evasion tactics from Stage 1 (the initial procurement of chips) to Stage 4 (the transshipment phase). As soon as illicit goods depart the port of origin and get funneled through transshipment networks, the supply chain becomes a tortuously fragmented puzzle. Untangling this knotted snarl often requires vast resources, regional and international cooperation, and, often, specific intelligence, making the task daunting for even the best-equipped customs and enforcement agencies. A superior approach is therefore to focus on mitigating export control evasion risks upstream rather than downstream. To the extent possible, it is necessary to dam the river at its source, as neglecting to do so allows the stream to branch out unpredictably.</p> + +<h4 id="focus-should-be-placed-on-improving-detection-capabilities-in-third-countries-not-just-bis-enforcement">Focus should be placed on improving detection capabilities in third countries, not just BIS enforcement.</h4> + +<p>Most extant proposals focus on increasing the BIS’s resources to enhance its enforcement capabilities. But if detection precedes enforcement, and if the challenges of doing the former are non-trivial, then perhaps these efforts are putting the horse before the cart. Moreover, given how understaffed and underinvested the BIS continues to be despite the pleas of key voices, can it reliably be expected to police global smuggling networks that span scores of countries, each with multiple ports? Importantly, this singular dependence on the BIS introduces a single point of failure. The BIS may not always recognize specific localized tactics used in transshipment hubs.</p> + +<h4 id="capacity-building-is-more-constructive-than-punitive-actions">Capacity building is more constructive than punitive actions.</h4> + +<p>This report suggests a corrective in the nature of U.S. engagement with third countries. There is too often an assumption that countries that are key transshipment hubs are directly abetting illicit networks. This shapes the language for necessary instruments such as sanctions, country quotas, and outright bans.</p> + +<p>This report finds that seven out of eleven of the smuggling tactics identified are more likely to happen in developing countries, which often have poor customs infrastructure. This lack of ability to identify smuggling is not due to wilful negligence but a consequence of infrastructural gaps. These nations typically cannot afford advanced X-ray and scanning technologies (e.g., dual-energy X-ray systems), next-generation KYC and EDD software, or experts who may more reliably spot irregularities, such as chips concealed in electronic products. In addition, such ports are commonly not equipped with comprehensive CCTV systems or stringent entry and exit procedures.</p> + +<p>Counterintuitively, technonationalism may demand that the United States find greater security not by turning inward but through outward engagement and extending support for capacity building in select third countries. Otherwise, these countries are unlikely to independently invest in improved export control compliance measures themselves (see next observation).</p> + +<h4 id="understanding-partner-countries-incentives-is-crucial">Understanding partner countries’ incentives is crucial.</h4> + +<p>Historically, the focus of national customs agencies has been on import controls rather than export controls. This was shaped by the demands of collecting tariffs and protecting domestic industries from foreign competition, as well as the assumption that outbound goods, which contribute to national wealth through trade surpluses, pose less of a risk. The emergence of dual-use goods has heightened the necessity for export controls, but a marked imbalance persists between the attention given to import controls versus export controls at the national level.</p> + +<p>While the United States might emphasize the importance of increased export control measures, many customs agencies will not prioritize them. Having too restrictive a compliance sieve detracts from their core focus, which is to facilitate trade and increase port revenues. As such, in urging partner nations to increase their efforts, the United States must consider such countries’ domestic priorities. Ultimately, the primary mission of these countries’ customs agencies is to advance their own national development goals, not to aid the United States in its AI ambitions.</p> + +<h3 id="detailed-policy-recommendations">Detailed Policy Recommendations</h3> + +<p>Given the challenges of detecting illicit consignments after they become obscured in transshipment networks, policymakers should focus on upstream sections of the smuggling pipeline, from the initial procurement of chips to before it leaves the port of origin. Importantly, these recommendations should be agreeable to and easily implementable by third countries. They should also be business-friendly, meaning they should be as frictionessless as possible and paired with incentives to match or dampen obligations. Regulatory interventions that work with the market are almost always more effective than those that swim upstream against it.</p> + +<p>Lastly, to allay the reflexive reactions of U.S. policymakers to the phrase “capacity building,” the three recommendations proposed here are entirely modest. They include workshops, a regional unit that will only require two to four BIS personnel with shared commitments from partner countries, and the provision of modern analytics software.</p> + +<h4 id="recommendation-1-mandate-use-of-custom-digital-waybills-and-preapproved-logistics-providers">Recommendation 1: Mandate use of custom digital waybills and preapproved logistics providers.</h4> + +<p>A custom digital waybill for chips, incorporating a unique identifier, can mitigate the risks associated with the falsification of customs documents. Digital authentication further ensures the integrity of the waybill, making it difficult for smugglers to forge documents without detection. These waybills will be integrated with sales procedures as well as digital sales platforms for ease of business incorporation, and will include several key features:</p> + +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>Operationalize U.S.-Japan-Australia security cooperation.</strong> Japan and Australia have advanced their defense cooperation with a Reciprocal Access Agreement and enhanced Japanese military exercises in northern Australia. Australia’s focus on guided weapons and stand-off strike parallels Japan’s objectives and offers opportunities for federated defense production and forward sustainment. Australia’s geography offers critical defense in depth and a connection to the Indian Ocean. As the United States modernizes its command and control in Japan and defense industrial policies, emphasis should be placed on operationalizing the trilateral security cooperation already underway.</p> + <p><strong>A Unique Identifier:</strong> A unique QR code or equivalent tag for easy, tamper-proof scanning</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Advance cooperation with the Philippines.</strong> The Marcos government’s decisions to stand up to Chinese coercion in the South China Sea and rebuild the U.S. alliance represent a significant strategic opportunity for Washington and Tokyo, who should do everything possible to reinforce and support Manila’s actions. Including Manila in minilateral engagement should continue to be a high priority, and the United States and Japan should coordinate closely in providing security assistance, to avoid duplication and ensure interoperability. Tokyo should prioritize concluding a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Manila.</p> + <p><strong>Digital Authentication:</strong> Digital verification mechanisms to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the waybill</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Support Taiwan’s resilience and quietly deepen trilateral dialogue with Taipei.</strong> Taiwan’s free and fair elections in January 2024 were an inspiration for the world, and the incoming Lai government deserves support from Washington, Tokyo, and other democracies. Within the parameters of the United States’ and Japan’s long-standing “One China” policies, both countries should support Taiwan’s capacity to resist military and economic coercion. In particular, Tokyo should expand low-profile ties with Taiwan’s national security establishment, including through regularized participation in some of Washington’s regular security policy dialogues with Taipei. The absence of these links today is a critical weakness in preparing for the possibility of a Taiwan Strait contingency. In addition, Washington and Tokyo should explore ways to help Taiwan harden critical infrastructure, to include communications networks, energy supplies, and transportation links.</p> + <p><strong>Item Specifics:</strong> Details that clearly state the nature of the controlled item as well as its quantity, value, origin, and destination</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Strengthen cooperation in the Middle East.</strong> Despite Japan’s heavy dependence on sea lanes from the Middle East, Tokyo has been notably absent from the international response to terrorist attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Leveraging the SDF facility in Djibouti, Japan should play a larger and more visible role in defending the commercial sea lanes. Japan depends more heavily on sea lanes from the Middle East than does the United States, and its stance in the region should reflect that reality.</p> + <p><strong>Logistics Providers Details:</strong> Details of the logistics provider, including its preapproval status</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Promote democratic norms and the rule of law.</strong> Japan’s National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of democratic norms and the rule of law to Japan’s national interests. Weak governance and poor transparency and accountability have allowed China to engage in elite capture, build dual-use infrastructure for the military, and turn cash-poor media against the United States and its allies in strategically important parts of the Indo-Pacific. These same conditions limit opportunities for investment by U.S. and Japanese firms that would reinforce anti-corruption measures and the rule of law. The most important work is countering corruption, foreign interference, and disinformation in countries that are strategically important. The United States and Japan should work closely through the Quad and G7 and with South Korea to develop a strategy and coordination mechanism to reinforce democratic resilience, combat disinformation, and strengthen the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific to counter Beijing’s strategies of co-option.</p> + <p><strong>Standardized Sections:</strong> Sections for customs officials to stamp or digitally sign upon inspection, ensuring traceability at every checkpoint</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<h4 id="strengthening-economic-and-technology-cooperation">Strengthening Economic and Technology Cooperation</h4> +<p>Furthermore, purchasers of chips will only be permitted to use prescreened logistics providers and routes. The buyer must identify their logistics provider of choice at the point of sale. Failure to do so should lead to cancellation of the sale. Tagging shipments at the point of sale enhances the BIS’s ability to efficiently conduct targeted audits. Logistics providers will be mandated to report to the BIS monthly on any consignments not received within a specified timeframe of two to four weeks. This process will flag discrepancies between recorded sales and actual shipments, facilitating swift spot checks on vendors identified as potential weak links. This will also better pinpoint suspicious entities that could be operating as front, shell, or shelf companies.</p> -<p>While economic cooperation is enshrined in Article II of the U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty, it has historically been difficult to implement, largely due to trade friction. However, both countries have come a long way in transforming their economic relationship from one of adversity to one of genuine cooperation. Indeed, issues at the nexus of economic and national security — such as protecting critical technologies, strengthening supply chain resilience, and promoting friend-shoring in key strategic sectors — have become among the most important on the policy agenda today and should be a central focus for the United States and Japan in the years ahead, particularly as both countries continue to work to advance their preferred economic rules, values, and norms in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.</p> +<p>The criteria for preapproval of logistics providers should broadly include the following:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>Drive the G7 process on economic security.</strong> Japan deserves strong credit for its leadership at the 2023 G7 meeting in Hiroshima, and in particular its success in shepherding the “G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security.” Implementation of this vision is essential and will require continued leadership by the United States and Japan to press the other G7 members to take concrete measures to enhance supply chain resilience, counter economic coercion, and build resilient critical infrastructure.</p> + <p><strong>Operational Integrity:</strong> A five-year track record that includes major incidents, policy breaches, or violations</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Cooperate in combating China’s excess capacity and dumping.</strong> Excess capacity prompted by massive subsidies and other types of financial assistance, as well as insufficient domestic demand in China, is precipitating a flood of Chinese exports to the rest of the world and putting industries in the United States, Japan, and Europe at risk. Working with like-minded partners, including in the G7, the United States and Japan should coordinate approaches and, where possible, develop collective policy responses. These could include relying on traditional trade tools, such as anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures, but should also involve employing new and creative approaches to address this growing concern. As a first step, the United States, Japan, Europe, and South Korea should initiate a dialogue on coordinated responses to excess capacity in the critical sector of electric vehicles, where the Chinese industry has rapidly become a global leader.</p> + <p><strong>Technological Capabilities:</strong> Adoption and integration of advanced package screening technologies</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Explore new models for free trade arrangements.</strong> The consensus in the United States in support of an affirmative and market-opening trade policy has frayed in both parties, with few signs of it being rebuilt any time soon. Although the authors of this report strongly support the return of the United States to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), such a step is unlikely for the foreseeable future. As an interim measure, the United States and Japan should explore the possibility of developing a new and forward-looking template for free trade agreements that includes some traditional elements but goes further to address emerging issues, such as supply chain resilience, economic coercion, climate and trade, and advanced technology standards. The two governments could also consider pursuing and building on existing agreements in specific sectors, such as electric vehicles, batteries, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Such agreements, aimed to promote secure supply chains, could be deepened to include market access, harmonized or mutually recognized standards, and trade facilitation provisions to make them genuine supply chain agreements.</p> + <p><strong>Employee Training:</strong> Regular training for employees handling controlled items</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Develop common and updated rules governing two-way investment.</strong> A new free trade agreement template could provide more certainty on related investment matters, given the anticipated continued increase in investment flows between both countries. The positions of both presidential candidates on the proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel by Nippon Steel do not reflect a careful assessment of the U.S. national interest. The proposed deal would likely support U.S. economic growth, jobs, and innovation without in any way jeopardizing national security. Although it would not have exempted this transaction from review, Japan should be granted “excepted foreign state” (“whitelist”) status from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.</p> + <p><strong>Background Checks:</strong> Mandatory checks for staff involved in the shipping of controlled items</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Allow new exports of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Japan.</strong> In light of the importance of LNG imports to Japan as a transitional source of energy, even as it continues to invest heavily in renewables and rebuild its nuclear energy capacity, the U.S. government should consider exempting Japan from the temporary pause on new LNG export approvals announced by President Biden in January 2024.</p> + <p><strong>Financial Assessment:</strong> Financial audits to ensure stability and solvency (a company in good financial standing is typically less prone to corrupt practices)</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Deepen cooperation on development globally.</strong> Opportunities to deepen U.S.-Japan development cooperation in the coming years should build on the strong foundation already established between the partners and assess strategic opportunities to leverage Japan’s private sector to advance key development cooperation priorities. Japan and the United States could further align efforts to advance global health security and outcomes; advance their partnership on energy cooperation and youth leadership in sub-Saharan Africa; invest in sustainable economic development and livelihood opportunities in Latin America; and expand access to mobile telecommunication technology in the Indo-Pacific that is open, safe, secure, and accessible to all. The two countries should also enhance their work through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) to mobilize public and private capital to invest in sustainable infrastructure. These efforts are vital to providing countries in the developing world with high-quality alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.</p> + <p><strong>Documentation Adherence:</strong> A demonstrated record of correctly filling, maintaining, and providing necessary shipment documentation</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Support the expansion of the G7 to include Australia and South Korea.</strong> Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the G7 has emerged as the primary international forum for upholding the international rules-based order, from support to Ukraine to combating Chinese economic coercion. But as an increasingly important global governance institution, and perhaps the only effective one, its membership needs expansion to include other like-minded partners with the values and resources to buttress the rules-based international order. The United States and Japan should consider G7 expansion to include Australia and South Korea, the world’s next two largest advanced democracies and partners that are increasingly critical to global political and economic responses. This is not charity. Given the challenges facing today’s international environment, it is time to bring additional voices with meaningful capacity and aligned views to the table.</p> + <p><strong>Route Security:</strong> An assessment of chosen routes, favoring direct routes over transshipments to minimize risks</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Strengthen coordination of economic security policy through a new Economic Security Dialogue led by the U.S. National Security Council and Japan’s National Security Secretariat.</strong> The Economic 2+2, launched in 2022, has proven to be a useful forum for coordinating geoeconomic strategy, but alone it is insufficient to drive aligned decisionmaking in both countries. Given the political sensitivity and coordination challenges on economic security issues and industrial policy, Washington and Tokyo should establish a new dialogue mechanism, led by the White House and the Cabinet Secretariat, to facilitate coordination of industrial policy, technology promotion, export controls, and other economic security policies.</p> + <p><strong>Collaboration with Customs:</strong> Established rapport and history of cooperation with customs and enforcement agencies in the region</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>In addition, to incentivize the use of the waybill by distributors and resellers, this report proposes implementing a revenue-sharing program where distributors and resellers receive a small percentage of the transaction fee from every digital waybill issued. This turns compliance into a direct revenue stream. As for logistics providers, those who submit to BIS audits after the first year will be eligible for green-lane customs treatment in ports of call. In addition, there is room for negotiation with insurance companies to offer lower premiums for shipments that use digital waybills, as they are easier to track and thus present a lower risk of theft or loss.</p> -<p>This report closes with an admonition. As strong as the U.S.-Japan alliance is today, the authors share a concern about its future. The dramatic decline in recent years in Japanese students studying in the United States, and U.S. students studying in Japan, risks eroding the foundation of U.S.-Japan relations over the long term. Both governments should focus on rebuilding these ties, which represent the lifeblood of the relationship across government, industry, and civil society. Programs in both countries should focus on student exchanges and promoting the role of women in the relationship. The U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON) continues to be a vital forum in this regard.</p> +<h4 id="recommendation-2-require-compulsory-certification-for-official-distributors-resellers-and-logistics-providers">Recommendation 2: Require compulsory certification for official distributors, resellers, and logistics providers.</h4> -<p>The U.S.-Japan relationship is at a moment of historic strength, even as both countries confront daunting challenges in the international system. The partnership today was almost unimaginable at the time of the authors’ first report in the year 2000. This evolution was not inevitable. It has been built by people from all walks of life in both countries who are deeply committed to the relationship. The authors of this report have had the good fortune to be part of this effort over many years — and in some cases decades. It is the enduring task of both countries to cultivate new generations of leaders who recognize the value of the two countries’ partnership and who share a commitment to sustaining it.</p> +<p>Promoting a culture of compliance relies on a willingness on the part of exporters to comply with controls. While there certainly will be companies or individuals seeking to willfully circumvent or violate export controls, as mentioned previously, smaller resellers may inadvertently do so out of a lack of awareness or due to limited capacity. Hence, they should not be indiscriminately excluded entirely.</p> -<hr /> +<p>This recommendation seeks to reduce evasion, particularly among these unintentional violators. But in order to be added to the approved list, they will have to undergo and complete the requirements of a certification workshop alongside official distributors, authorized OEMs and resellers, and logistics providers. To ensure that the new policy on custom waybills and use of preapproved logistics providers is well comprehended and implemented by these stakeholders, this report proposes holding a series of targeted capacity-building certification workshops.</p> -<p><strong>Richard L. Armitage</strong> became president of Armitage International in March 2005. Previously, he served as deputy secretary of state, having been confirmed by the U.S. Senate on March 23, 2001.</p> +<p><strong>CERTIFICATION WORKSHOP CURRICULUM</strong></p> -<p><strong>Joseph S. Nye</strong> is University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus, and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He has served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, chair of the National Intelligence Council, and deputy under secretary of state for security assistance, science and technology.</p>Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. NyeThe U.S.-Japan alliance is at a moment of historic strength, even as both countries confront daunting challenges in the international system. This report calls for an alliance that is more integrated across the economic and security realms to uphold the rules-based order.Friendshore Lithium-Ion2024-04-01T12:00:00+08:002024-04-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/friendshore-lithium-ion<p><em>Reforming the lithium-ion supply chain constitutes a critical cornerstone of US foreign policy. The first in a series of three, this report discusses the processing and refining stage of the lithium-ion supply chain.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>It evaluates domestic efforts to ramp up extraction and processing capabilities as well as “friendshore” portions of the supply chain to economic partners and allies in light of China’s dominance. The report closes with a set of recommendations to better leverage economic and trade tools to enhance access and processing of critical minerals and materials, with a focus on expanding critical mineral agreements with allied nations.</em></p> +<p>The proposed certification workshop should focus on the following goals:</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Outline in detail U.S. regulations surrounding the export of controlled chips.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Conduct training on emergent tactics used by smugglers and how to spot and report front, shell, and shelf companies using easy-to-understand KYC guidelines (see sample guidelines below).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Explain the rationale for the custom waybills as well as criteria for preapproval of logistics providers.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Provide hands-on sessions on how to correctly fill and process custom waybills.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Provide distributors and logistics providers with technical assistance to integrate the waybill system with existing inventory and sales software.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Lithium-ion batteries are among the most critical industrial items necessary to achieve the transition to lower carbon emissions worldwide. Essential to electric vehicles (EVs) and the effective delivery of solar and wind power throughout the electric grid, these batteries also charge a majority of consumer electronics products. While the supply chain for batteries is dispersed throughout the globe, the mining and processing of key minerals and materials is concentrated in just a few countries, with China dominating. As changing trade relationships, sanctions, and other geopolitical disruptions ripple through the global economy, the dispersion of supply chains and concentration of key inputs constitutes a significant vulnerability for maintaining and growing production in this key manufacturing sector.</p> +<p><strong>CERTIFICATION WORKSHOP MODALITY</strong></p> -<p>The sourcing and processing challenges in the lithium-ion battery sector are formidable. As U.S industries strive to grow in this sector, they face complexities surrounding battery supply chains that have been generated by overlapping — and at times incompatible — government policies that aim to: (1) protect national security, (2) facilitate the green transition, and (3) improve U.S. economic competitiveness while re-shoring domestic industrial capabilities. Policies designed to address these serious and varied global challenges have at once offered generous market stimulating incentives while introducing non-market economic headwinds that may eventually threaten the survival of U.S. supply chains for lithium-ion batteries.</p> +<p>The workshop will be facilitated by BIS export controls experts and customs officials from partner countries in an interactive format consisting of a detailed presentation, case studies, and a Q&amp;A session with hands-on practice. There should also be recorded versions for remote stakeholders or those unable to attend in person, with periodic live Q&amp;A sessions. If possible, e-guides, video tutorials, and FAQs should be made available on a dedicated portal. To reduce costs, this can be integrated to the extent possible with existing capacity-building work that BIS is already undertaking.</p> -<p>The Biden administration has embraced the vision of achieving an economy that emits less carbon by providing demand-inducing subsidies for EVs and lithium-ion batteries, which are the heart of these cars. Adding difficulty to achieving climate goals is the dominant role played by China in this sector, coupled with a bipartisan consensus in the United States on the need to reduce economic dependence on China.</p> +<p><strong>CERTIFICATION WORKSHOP EVALUATION</strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As changing trade relationships, sanctions, and other geopolitical disruptions ripple through the global economy, the dispersion of supply chains and concentration of key inputs constitutes a significant vulnerability for maintaining and growing production in this key manufacturing sector.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>An evaluation will be conducted following the workshop by either a BIS or customs official from the host country to ensure comprehension. This could include a mix of multiple-choice questions, waybill filling exercises, and scenario-based questions. Successful participants will receive a certificate, which will be a prerequisite for being listed as an approved distributor, reseller, or logistics provider. This will cost little beyond the logistical costs of organizing the workshop.</p> -<p>The business community, for its part, is engaged in extensive risk reassessment with respect to doing business in and with China to ensure greater resiliency in their supply chains. Depending on the current level of investment, the business model, and the structure of individual supply chains, risk reassessment can lead U.S. companies to take the decision to sever ties with China. More often, companies are identifying possible chokepoints for inputs and embarking on a quest for redundant sources of supply to backstop against future export restrictions and trade sanctions should economic relations with China further deteriorate.</p> +<p><strong>RECERTIFICATION AND REVOCATION</strong></p> -<p>A profound shift in trade, economic, climate, and national security policy is underway. The Biden administration has followed the European Union in articulating its goal as “de-risking” rather than decoupling from China, but as a practical matter, policies still under development have so far been disjointed and difficult for industry to follow. These policies, combined with tough rhetoric by various government officials and members of Congress who propose even more draconian measures to require local sourcing, have injected uncertainty into the commercial decisionmaking governing U.S. manufacturing capabilities. In the end, government measures to restrict commerce with China, in advance of alternative sources of supply of key inputs coming online, threaten to derail this range of overlapping policy objectives. In short, the United States is pursuing three conflicting goals: accelerating the green transition, reshoring production capabilities in critical sectors, and diversifying away from China in these key areas. Efforts to achieve the last two goals compromise the first.</p> +<p>Considering the dynamic nature of the industry and the regulatory landscape, periodic refresher workshops should be held at least annually. Updates or changes to the policy can be communicated during these sessions. Moreover, authorized sellers found negligent in conducting KYC procedures during BIS audits or random spot checks risk revocation of their certification.</p> -<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> +<p><strong>SAMPLE KYC GUIDELINES (RED-FLAG INDICATORS)</strong></p> -<p>The Biden administration and Congress have undertaken a full suite of industrial policy measures that are set to skyrocket demand for lithium-ion batteries, especially when it comes to EVs. The Infrastructure Investments and Jobs Act (IIJA) set up funding meant to create a “Made-in-America” EV network of 500,000 chargers. The law invests $7.5 billion in EV charging. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)’s tax incentives, which provide billions in tax benefits for manufacturers and consumers of EV batteries, is making lithium-ion technology more in demand than ever. Certain tax credit qualifications in the IRA include domestic content requirements for batteries and battery materials, including those used to support clean energy project deployment.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Watchlist Matches: The customer, their address, or affiliated parties resemble entries on the Commerce Control List.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Business Mismatch: The chip’s capabilities are inconsistent with the customer’s purported business activities (e.g., an advanced GPU order for a steel mill).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Unusual Payment Methods: The customer prefers to pay in cash for high-value orders, despite more standard financing or credit terms being available.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Declined Services: The buyer turns down standard post-purchase offerings, such as installation or training.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Sketchy Business Background: The customer lacks a clear business history, previous transactions, or an online presence.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Lack of Product Familiarity: The customer shows little knowledge about the chip’s specifications and capabilities but is insistent on the purchase.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Ambiguous Delivery Details: The order has vague delivery dates or requests for delivery to remote or unusual destinations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Unusual Routes: The proposed transportation route is circuitous or unusual for the given product and end destination.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Inconsistent Packaging: The packaging requested does not match the method of shipment or seems overdone or inadequate for the type of product.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>This is the first of three papers examining the lithium-ion battery supply chain and prospects for bringing more production on shore. This paper outlines the basic makeup of a lithium-ion battery and some of the complexities surrounding the purifying processes for several different scarce critical mineral inputs. In addition, it describes the role that the United States plays in the global sourcing of key minerals now and in the future by examining several trends expected to impact the market going forward. Lastly, this paper lays out what actions the Biden administration and Congress have undertaken to date to improve the security of critical mineral supply chains and proposes some recommendations to build upon that foundation.</p> +<h4 id="recommendation-3-set-up-dedicated-regional-units-consisting-of-bis-staff-and-secondees-from-partner-countries-and-incorporate-use-of-modern-data-analytics">Recommendation 3: Set up dedicated regional units consisting of BIS staff and secondees from partner countries and incorporate use of modern data analytics.</h4> -<p>Currently, the processing of battery materials is concentrated in a few nations outside of the United States, representing a daunting challenge for building resiliency in an environment of heightened geopolitical tension. According to the U.S. Department of the Interior, “The clean energy transition will necessitate an overall 400–600 percent increase in global demand for key critical minerals like lithium, graphite, cobalt and nickel and for some minerals the increase will be many times higher.” U.S. reliance on Chinese extraction, refining, and processing of critical minerals creates a serious vulnerability.</p> +<p><strong>SETTING UP A DEDICATED REGIONAL UNIT</strong></p> -<p>Several stages of the lithium-ion battery supply chain need to be considered to understand how the United States can reach its goal of diversifying its supply of battery inputs while keeping the green transition moving. To reduce critical dependencies and build stronger global supply chains in this sector, the administration should consider balancing domestic production incentives with modernized trade relationships to best ensure that U.S. firms maintain an adequate supply of these key inputs.</p> +<p>National customs operations have historically been driven by revenue collection and import controls, relegating the task of export controls to the periphery. While the United States might emphasize the importance of such controls, many customs agencies do not prioritize them. Moreover, the infrequent cases related to export control evasion result in an experiential deficit among customs staff, further diminishing its precedence. For reference, even in Germany, the European Union’s largest exporter, the number of criminal proceedings relating to export control violations processed each year is relatively low, in the double digits.</p> -<h3 id="the-makeup-of-a-lithium-ion-battery">The Makeup of a Lithium-Ion Battery</h3> +<p>This paucity, coupled with the complexity of such cases, has deterred the establishment of specialized procedures or dedicated departments to detect export control evasion. Consequently, this limited exposure leaves customs officers and even prosecutors and judges ill-equipped to credibly deal with export control evasion cases, potentially overlooking critical aspects due to insufficient experience or a lack of technical or legal familiarity.</p> -<p>The basic makeup of a lithium-ion battery consists of three main components: multiple lithium-ion cells, the wires connecting these cells, and a battery management system (BMS) to monitor the functioning and temperature of the battery. In turn, each lithium-ion cell is individually made up of four main components: the cathode, the anode, an electrolyte, and a separator. The anode and cathode components store the lithium. What creates electricity from a lithium-ion battery is the movement of the lithium between the anode to the cathode components, carried by the electrolyte via the separator, creating free electrons and thus a charge that flows through the device being powered. Each of these components are made of several constituent materials and chemicals that are critical to enhancing the performance of the lithium-ion battery, which will be discussed in more detail in subsequent papers.</p> +<p>As such, to improve risk profiling, interdiction, investigation competence, and intelligence sharing, this report recommends the formation of a dedicated regional unit comprised of two to four specialist advisory experts from the United States, along with secondees from partners’ customs authorities. In this model, when a frontline officer detects a suspicious transaction, they can immediately seek guidance from the specialized team. In turn, the unit proactively disseminates its intelligence to partner countries. This model takes reference in part from specialized national units like in the Netherlands (see Case Study 6).</p> -<h4 id="cathode">Cathode</h4> +<p>However, the efficacy of this system depends on robust interagency information sharing at both the national and international levels. Collaboration between customs and intelligence agencies is paramount. This will necessitate granting security clearances for both U.S. experts and secondees in the risk-profiling unit. Furthermore, intelligence data will need to be transformed into a redacted, yet actionable format, ensuring broader dissemination within the customs department without compromising sensitive information.</p> -<p>Batteries are composed of positive and negative electrodes to enable the creation of electrons to create electrical current. In a battery, the cathode is the positive electrode. Cathode active materials (CAMs), which define the output and application of the batteries, are generally composed of metal oxides. The most common metal oxides that make up CAMs are lithium cobalt oxide, lithium manganese oxide, lithium iron phosphate, and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide. Different cathode materials contain varying amounts of lithium: the higher the lithium content, the larger the battery capacity, as lithium storage has a direct impact on the battery’s ability to run.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-6"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CASE STUDY 6</code></h4> + <h4 id="a-specialized-team-in-the-netherlands"><code class="highlighter-rouge">A Specialized Team in the Netherlands</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="anode">Anode</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the Netherlands, a specialist team, Precursors, Strategic Goods and Sanctions (POSS), is responsible for the enforcement of export controls and sanctions under the customs administration. POSS monitors and enforces exporters’ compliance and can also conduct (criminal) investigations. To perform its tasks, the team has the power to demand extensive information from any entity (e.g., manufacturers, traders, and brokers) that deals with the export of dual-use and military goods, including the right to access company premises.</code></em></p> -<p>While the cathode is the positive electrode enabling the flow of electrons, the anode is the negative electrode. Much like cathodes, anodes require active materials to function. Anode active materials (AAMs) are generally made from carbon-based materials such as graphite, silicon, or a combination of both. Graphite is the most commonly used because of its high electrical conductivity, lower cost, and stable structure, while silicon possesses higher energy density (the amount of energy stored in a given substance per unit volume) but presents challenges due to higher volume expansion and shorter life cycles.</p> +<p><strong>USE OF MODERN DATA ANALYTICS</strong></p> -<h4 id="electrolyte">Electrolyte</h4> +<p>This leans on the work by Gregory C. Allen, Emily Benson, and William Alan Reinsch in their paper “Improved Export Controls Enforcement Technology Needed for U.S. National Security,” which recommends the incorporation of data-driven approaches in place of the dated software and databases BIS currently uses. However, whereas their recommendations focus on improving the BIS’s detection capabilities, this recommendation instead looks at improving detection at the customs level, which are the physical points of failure.</p> -<p>A battery electrolyte is a solution inside batteries, the consistency and makeup of which varies based on the type of battery. However, electrolytes ultimately are used for the same purpose: they transport positively charged ions between the cathode and the anode — enabling the free flow of electrons and creating an electrical charge. The chemical in question allows the electrical charge to pass between the cathode and anode terminals and puts the chemicals required for a reaction in contact with the terminals, which converts stored energy into useful electrical energy. The most commonly used electrolyte in lithium-ion batteries is a lithium salt solution.</p> +<p>To be clear, ensuring that the Commerce Control List is improved and regularly updated to pinpoint companies affiliated to bad-faith actors or regimes is crucial to ensure that ports downstream can more effectively sift out front, shell, and shelf companies. However, this also introduces a single point of failure in the detection system due to the reliance on the BIS to fulfill its role perfectly. Furthermore, the BIS might not always recognize specific tactics used in major transshipment hubs.</p> -<h4 id="separator">Separator</h4> +<p>Consequently, the United States should collaborate with partner countries and key circumvention nodes to incorporate modern data analytics for improved detection of evasive entities. Below is a sample implementation strategy.</p> -<p>Separators are placed in lithium-ion batteries between the anode and cathode to avoid a short circuit and facilitate a lithium-ion cell’s stability and safety. Because separators are not part of the reactions that produce the flow of electricity mentioned above, they have to be chemically stable relative to the electrolyte and electrode materials. Materials in a separator include nonwoven fabrics consisting of “a manufactured sheet, web, or mat of directionally or randomly oriented fibers.”</p> +<p><em>Sample Recommendations to Enhance Surveillance Capabilities to Detect Evasive Actors</em></p> -<h3 id="concentration-and-purification-of-the-materials">Concentration and Purification of the Materials</h3> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Customized Risk Profiling:</strong> Implement machine-learning algorithms tailored to each port’s unique profile to auto-score incoming and outgoing shipments based on the history of evasive activities and identified patterns.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Supply Chain Analysis:</strong> Employ supply chain analytics tools to trace the origins and destinations of shipments, identifying unusual routes or odd combinations of cargo that might indicate evasion tactics.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Real-Time Vessel Monitoring:</strong> Integrate real-time tracking systems to monitor vessel movements, especially those taking irregular routes or making unexpected stops, often indicators of evasive or illegal activities.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Advanced Document Verification:</strong> Introduce optical character recognition (OCR) and natural-language processing (NLP) systems to scan, verify, and highlight discrepancies in shipment documents, bills of lading, or manifests.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Port Data Integration System:</strong> Consolidate data from different ports to create a holistic database, improving collaborative efforts in detecting evasive actors across the continent. This system can track entities as they move through various checkpoints, making evasion harder.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Behavioral Analytics:</strong> Utilize algorithms to study behavior patterns of freight forwarders, shipping companies, and other stakeholders. A sudden change in patterns could be indicative of evasive or illicit activities.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Collaborative Stakeholder Reporting:</strong> Foster an environment where port staff, customs officials, and third-party stakeholders can anonymously report suspicious activities, with the system analyzing these reports for recurring patterns or concerns.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Dynamic Sanctions and Blacklist Checks:</strong> Integrate updated international and regional sanctions lists and run real-time checks on entities, ensuring that any newly blacklisted or suspicious entities are promptly flagged during transactions.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Several critical minerals and raw materials are key to the lithium-ion battery supply chain. This paper highlights minerals that are currently used in batteries, but there may be new battery chemistries and types that could change what critical minerals and raw materials are required for renewable power generation. As stated by the Congressional Research Service, processes of obtaining permits, acquiring land and capital, and other necessary steps can vary considerably and may take years. The Government Accountability Office assessed that the amount of time needed simply to reach the approval stage “ranged from about 1 month to over 11 years and averaged approximately 2 years.”</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Critical minerals key to lithium-ion battery manufacturing require rigorous, lengthy technical processes to avoid negative spillover effects on the environment and workers’ health. For instance, cobalt mining has come under scrutiny due to the issue of child labor as well as poor safety standards: a report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development notes that a mine owned by the Kamoto Copper Company in the Democratic Republic of Congo collapsed, killing an estimated 36 workers. Setting up and operating these processes is therefore a difficult task, made all the more challenging by two features. First, demand for these minerals and materials is set to increase significantly. A report by the International Energy Agency found that, in order to meet the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement, demand for nickel, cobalt, and graphite is expected to grow by about 20 times, while lithium demand is expected to grow to 40 times its current level. Second, the movement to diversify away from China, which extracts a large amount of these minerals and materials and processes an even larger share, will require the significant retooling of current processing activities.</p> +<p>The insights in this report are admittedly mostly qualitative. However, it seeks to provide a sufficient base for readers to infer the complexities of export control evasion through straightforward inductive reasoning.</p> -<h4 id="cathode-1">Cathode</h4> +<p>The recommendations in this report also likely do not go far enough. Recent compute governance proposals suggest establishing a “tracking regime” to monitor the distribution and ownership of AI chips. However, practical implementation details of how chains of custody and a chip registry can be established in such a scheme remain largely poorly defined. In addition, the privacy challenges of doing so have not been sufficiently addressed. For example, when Intel introduced the Pentium III processor in 1999, which had a unique serial number embedded in each chip, the ensuing privacy backlash caused Intel to hastily create a disablement tool and exclude serial numbers in subsequent chip models. This is why this report proposes the less invasive and more modest recommendation of a waybill with a unique identifier instead.</p> -<p><strong>LITHIUM</strong></p> +<p>Lastly, the recommendations proposed in this report will likely be imperfect. Determined smugglers will try to hack the waybill system by forging or altering it. Shell companies will still overcome enhanced KYC checks and engage private couriers. But this is precisely the point. Export controls are an inherently leaky instrument. Guiding principles must therefore be practical. What chokepoints in the smuggling pipeline can realistically be targeted, thereby sufficiently increasing both the cost of compliance and the likelihood of good-faith actions? It is not about guaranteeing success, but defining the level of failure that is acceptable.</p> -<p>Lithium is generally extracted from brines and mines. For the former, lithium-rich brine comes to the Earth’s surface and forms shallow ponds in which sunlight and wind evaporate the water and slowly concentrate the solution. It then undergoes thorough chemical treatments, such as precipitation and ion exchange, to reduce impurities and improve lithium-ion concentration. That concentrated solution is then turned into lithium carbonate or lithium hydroxide through precipitation and purification processes which convert it to battery-grade material. Lithium carbonate is a more commonly made compound used in lithium-ion battery production, while lithium hydroxide is becoming increasingly popular because of enhanced performance in cathode chemistries with high nickel content. Lithium extraction from brines is particularly significant because of the relative abundance of lithium in brine deposits.</p> +<hr /> -<p>When it comes to mines, the process is centered around sourcing minerals that carry lithium. The ore-containing lithium is first extracted and undergoes separation steps to get rid of any contaminants. The resulting lithium-rich concentrate is then used to extract lithium ions through a leaching process which mingles the concentrate with chemicals that are made for the purpose of leaching. There are other alternative sources of lithium aside from brines and mines; conventional mining operations can also source lithium from solid rock ore deposits.</p> +<p><strong>Barath Harithas</strong> is a non-resident adjunct fellow with the CSIS Project on Trade and Technology and has held diverse public service roles in Singapore spanning the U.S.-China relationship, international trade, and AI standards.</p>Barath HarithasExport control evasion of controlled chips is a known concern, but the specifics of this activity are opaque. In addition, a systematic analysis of the entire chip smuggling pipeline, from initial procurement to unlawful distribution, remains conspicuously absent.【黎智英案・審訊第 55 日】2024-04-08T12:00:00+08:002024-04-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-55<ul> + <li>李宇軒供稱協助日本議員成立關注對華政策聯盟 及支援推動人權法案</li> +</ul> -<p>Due to ongoing exploration, identified resources of lithium around the globe have increased significantly. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, identified lithium resources in the United States total 12 million tons and total 86 million tons in other countries. South America is particularly relevant when it comes to sourcing the mineral. Bolivia leads the world with 21 million tons, followed by Argentina’s 20 million tons and Chile’s 11 million tons. Other countries with sizable lithium reserves include Australia (8 million tons) and China (about 7 million tons).</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><strong>COBALT</strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Basgwra.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Cobalt deposits are found throughout different mineral formations, including igneous rocks and sedimentary rocks. Cobalt is generally retrieved as a byproduct from copper and nickel production, and its pricing therefore follows the demand of these primary metals. Cobalt has several applications, such as EV batteries, superalloys, cutting tools, and industrial catalysts, to name a few. Cobalt can be produced from three main types of ore deposits: copper deposits, for example, located in the central African copper belt comprising the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia; magmatic nickel sulfide deposits, for example, found at Sudbury, Canada, and at Norilsk, Russia; and, lastly, nickel laterite deposits, located in tropical regions. Cobalt can also be found on the deep-sea floor, although such deposits are generally not being extracted. A majority of the world’s cobalt mine production — about 70 percent — is located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, followed by Russia (about 4 percent) and Australia (4 percent). According to the U.S. Geological Survey, around 70 percent of domestic production is from recycling.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（8日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第55日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。在《國安法》生效之後，IPAC 開始討論游說各國終止與香港的引渡協議，電郵紀錄顯示，李將 IPAC 相關小組會議紀錄翻譯成日文，並以電郵傳送給日本議員山尾志櫻里。同年7月，山尾志櫻里和另一名日本議員中谷元成立 JPAC（Japanese Parliamentary Alliance on China），宗旨是請求中國不要肆意侵害普世價值和基本人權。李供稱他曾協助山尾籌備成立 JPAC，又協助 JPAC 與 IPAC 之間的訊息傳遞和翻譯，並聯絡數個在日港人組織。訊息和電郵紀錄又顯示，李曾串連 IPAC 創辦人裴倫德和英國金融家 Bill Browder 與山尾志櫻里開會，希望協助山尾在日本議會上推動人權法案，惟李在該會議之前已被捕。</p> -<p>Because cobalt is often a byproduct of copper and nickel production, and since the ores of these two metals are intertwined in sedimentary deposits, it is not possible to mine cobalt without mining these other metals. Therefore, the extraction process is essentially the same as mining and refining copper or nickel. Several processing methods can be used for cobalt. In short, crushed sulfite from mines is heaped up to extract a mineral soup leached from the rock by sulfuric acid. Copper, for instance, is extracted from the solution by electrolysis, which leaves behind a solution fairly rich in cobalt (along with other metals). Another set of chemical precipitation and second leaching removes these metals from the electrolyte, which slowly enriches the cobalt in the solution until it can be extracted out.</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第12天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> -<p>In other words, the purification of cobalt involves several steps to extract and separate the mineral from the ore. During the first step, the ore is crushed into small pieces and ground into a powder. That ground ore is mixed with water and chemicals and agitated in flotation cells, creating bubbles that attach to the valuable minerals and form a froth layer while the non-valuable minerals sink to the bottom. The froth containing the valuable minerals goes through a series of concentration steps, including more processing to remove impurities. That concentrated ore is then smelted — which involves heating the ore at very high temperatures to separate the individual metals. The separated component concentrates, copper and cobalt, are further processed to remove additional impurities.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指ipac小組會議談引渡協議-惟未有共識採取什麼行動">李宇軒指IPAC小組會議談引渡協議 惟未有共識採取什麼行動</h4> -<p><strong>MANGANESE</strong></p> +<p>上次聆訊提到，李宇軒向「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC）創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）提議游說外國取消與香港簽訂的司法互助協議或引渡逃犯措施。2020年7月3日 IPAC 舉行小組會議，各聯盟成員講述各自地區與香港司法管轄區之間的司法互助和引渡協議。</p> -<p>Manganese is a relatively abundant metal and is widely available throughout the Earth’s crust, including on the seafloor. Ores that contain over 35 percent manganese are considered commercially viable.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) <a href="https://twitter.com/lukedepulford/status/1315038772791214088">October 10, 2020</a></p> +</blockquote> -<p>Impurities in manganese include oxides of other metals, and these are reduced during smelting. Nonmetallic impurities remain in the post-smelting slag. Smelting processes depend on the kind of manganese destined for final application: pure manganese, ferromanganese, or silicomanganese. For uses requiring pure manganese, the process of producing electrolytic manganese is preferred. In this method, manganese ores are roasted to obtain a calcine that is dissolved in sulfuric acid to make a manganous sulfate solution. The addition of ammonia and hydrogen sulfide then precipitates unwanted materials. Ferromanganese and silicomanganese are made through smelting ores in a furnace. South Africa leads the way in terms of manganese reserves at 640 million metric tons, followed by China (280 million metric tons), and Australia (270 million metric tons). Other large players include Ukraine (140 million metric tons) and Gabon (61 million metric tons).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lcHOZP2.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）</p> -<p><strong>NICKEL</strong></p> +<p>李確認與會者包括裴倫德、英國國會議員 Iain Duncan Smith 、新西蘭眾議員 Simon O’Connor、澳洲參議員 Kimberly Kitching 和加拿大眾議員 Garnett Genuis 等，而李則是列席者。</p> -<p>Nickel, primarily used in stainless steel, is also used in alloys as well as chemicals and batteries due to its resistance to corrosion. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, nickel can be found primarily in two types of ore deposits: laterites and magmatic sulfides. Nickel deposits can generally be found in rocks rich in iron and magnesium. The extraction of nickel from ore is similar to the extraction of copper, and often the same equipment is used in both processes. Nickel, however, does require higher-temperature refractories and therefore enhanced cooling capabilities.</p> +<p>控方指李宇軒事後把小組會議紀錄翻譯成日文，並以電郵傳送給日本議員山尾志櫻里（本名「菅野志桜里」）。庭上展示的會議紀錄指稱習近平利用經濟發展來進行統治，有與會者指不應該有任何人引渡回港受審，控方問李，以上是否小組會議的共識。李則指該次會議並沒有達成任何共識，會議紀錄不見提及任何將會採取的行動，只見不同國家的聯盟代表發言及意見。</p> -<p>The purification processes depend on whether the ore-containing nickel is a sulfide or a laterite. For sulfides, the ores are ground to separate waste materials from the nickel mineral by selective flotation processes (in which the ore is mixed with reagents and agitated by devices to create air bubbles; the sulfide clings to surfaces and then is collected as a concentrate). The resulting concentrate is then either leached or dried and smelted. That product is converted to an oxide and combines with a silica flux to form a slag drawn off to leave a matte with a high nickel content. The matte is then further treated using a variety of processes such as ammonia pressure leach, roasting, or electrorefining.</p> +<p>2020年7月4日，裴倫德傳送一則 Twitter 帖文給李，內容提及 IPAC 經過開會討論國安法和引渡協議之後，一致同意不應有逃犯引渡協議，裴倫德希望 SWHK 轉發此帖文。</p> -<p>For laterite ores, because they are oxides and are not suitable for conventional concentration processes, large amounts must be smelted together. The moisture and water are chemically removed in furnaces. The oxide is then reduced to nickel metal using furnaces and then cooled. A large portion of laterite smelters make a crude ferronickel meant to be an alloying agent in steel production.</p> +<h4 id="swhk曾去信捷克愛爾蘭和葡萄牙-要求終止引渡協議">SWHK曾去信捷克、愛爾蘭和葡萄牙 要求終止引渡協議</h4> -<p>As of 2021, Indonesia and Australia had the largest global reserves of nickel with around 21 million metric tons each, followed by Brazil (16 million metric tons) and Russia (about 8 million metric tons). The United States itself possesses around 340,000 metric tons.</p> +<p>控方指在李宇軒的電腦發現3封由「重光團隊」（Stand with Hong Kong, Fight for Freedom, SWHK）分別撰寫給捷克、愛爾蘭和葡萄牙首長和外交部的信件，要求上述3個國家終止與香港的引渡逃犯協議。</p> -<p><strong>LITHIUM IRON PHOSPHATE</strong></p> +<p>李表示以他理解，愛爾蘭和葡萄牙均沒有 IPAC 的成員，捷克則不肯定，但上述3封信均是由 SWHK 其他成員與顧問公司 Whitehouse Consultancy 合作撰寫，亦有其他團隊成員作出跟進，所以李並沒有協助跟進這3封信。</p> -<p>The basic production of lithium iron phosphate chiefly includes four elements: the production of iron phosphate precursor, wet ball milling, spray drying, and sintering. The synthesis of phosphate can come in two forms, solid or liquid. The solid-phase synthesis method is the most commonly used to prepare electrode materials because it is a relatively simple process that can be more quickly industrialized. Carbothermal reduction, which reduces substances using carbon as an agent, is likely the most common solid-phase method, as it involves using inexpensive ferric iron. Liquid-phase synthesis, on the other hand, adds a solvent such as water to obtain the calcination of lithium iron phosphate at high temperatures.</p> +<h4 id="日本關注對華政策聯盟成立-李宇軒協助山尾志櫻里籌備">日本關注對華政策聯盟成立 李宇軒協助山尾志櫻里籌備</h4> -<p>Australia has the largest reserves of iron content ore, with 27 billion metric tons, followed by Brazil’s 15 billion metric tons and Russia’s 14 billion metric tons. China possesses close to 7 billion metric tons, whereas the United States has around 1 billion metric tons of reserves.</p> +<p>2020年7月19日，李宇軒透過 Telegram 告知裴倫德，兩名日本議員山尾志櫻里和中谷元將會正式成立日本的「IPAC衛星組織（satellite IPAC）」，名叫 JPAC（Japanese Parliamentary Alliance on China）。李庭上稱，JPAC 的成立目的是讓一些關心對華政策的日本議員「好似 IPAC 咁走埋一齊」，以討論對華政策。</p> -<h4 id="anode-1">Anode</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>現在のJPAC所属議員名簿はこちらです。同じURLで随時更新していきます。</p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>GRAPHITE</strong></p> +<blockquote> + <p>The current list of #JPAC members can be found here. This list will be updated as new members join in. https://t.co/MSRYsr0WgQ</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Graphite is a pure form of carbon that comes in three main commercial forms: spherical graphite, coated spherical graphite, and synthetic graphite. The first is not involved in EV-battery applications as it is not processed enough to be suitable to be used in a vehicle. Graphite is a particularly attractive material for lithium-ion battery manufacturers, as it is widely available in a broad range of countries, such as Turkey, Brazil, China, Russia, and Sweden. In addition, the size and shape of graphite particles can be modified depending on the required application.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>— JPAC（対中政策に関する国会議員連盟）公式アカウント (@Japan_pac) <a href="https://twitter.com/Japan_pac/status/1334847941966667777">December 4, 2020</a></p> +</blockquote> -<p>There are three main sources of graphite: natural graphite extracted directly from minerals, synthetic graphite, and bio-graphite. While natural graphite is an important source of graphite materials today, it can contain a large number of impurities, making its use difficult. Synthetic graphite is made out of calcined petroleum coke and coal tar pitch, and bio-graphite is obtained by pyrolysis of carbon-containing components. The carbon content of natural graphite is, in general, fairly low when mined, requiring several enrichment processes. The first stage is the crushing process, in which the crushing methods (for instance, ball, hammer, air-jet, or rod mills) are determined by the type of graphite ore. The second stage is grinding and screening to graphite flakes, and the last stage is purification through a number of methods, such as flotation and high-temperature purification.</p> +<p>訊息顯示，李告訴裴倫德，JPAC 會在2020年7月29日舉行記者會公布成立，日本團隊的發言者將會談及「救生艇」、馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act）、暫緩日本與香港的司法互助協議，以及阻止日本企業或組織向香港政府提供協助。李庭上指以上四點並不是 JPAC 的目標，只是記者會當日的發言重點，因記者會除了宣布成立 JPAC 之外，也會有一些關心中國和香港的社運人士發言。</p> -<p>Synthetic graphite, also known as artificial graphite, is produced through heating formless carbon materials. These chiefly include calcined petroleum coke and coal tar pitch. To produce synthetic graphite, the petroleum is first ground and sieved, and the coal tar pitch is used as a binder to form a paste. The actual shape of the graphite is formed and then heated to carbonize the pitch. A pitch is used to fill pores caused by that carbonization process, and the product is once again calcined to be carbonized and densified. Lastly, the temperature is raised to between 2700 and 3000 °C, where its shape transforms into graphitic crystallites that eventually become a stable graphitic structure. Synthetic graphite has no cost advantage to natural graphite, though it does present higher carbon content, better cyclability, and a more stable performance — as well as enhanced compatibility with electrolytes. There are several experimental ways to achieve the third type, bio-graphite, which refers to graphite produced from biomass. These methods have included, for instance, high-temperature heating.</p> +<p>李又表示，他在 JPAC 並沒有任何角色，在山尾志櫻里籌備 JPAC 的階段，他僅以義工的身份協助山尾。</p> -<p>Given the different source and production methods of graphite mentioned above, the types of impurities they present also vary. A number of purification methods have been applied to natural graphite. Flotation, for instance, is the simplest type but obtains a lower amount of graphite purity. Acid-based methods can remove more impurities through their chemical reactions, as well as the high-temperature method, but they require large amounts of energy and create more environmental pollution. Because synthetic graphite is already graphitized at a very high temperature, its purification process is similar to its initial impurity removal method.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱向日本議員提供語言支援及聯絡日本港人組織">李宇軒稱向日本議員提供語言支援及聯絡日本港人組織</h4> -<p>Turkey leads the way globally when it comes to graphite reserves, with around 90 million metric tons, followed by Brazil (74 million metric tons) and China (52 million metric tons). Other large players include Madagascar (26 million metric tons), Mozambique (25 million metric tons), and Tanzania (18 million metric tons).</p> +<p>在 Telegram 訊息中，裴倫德表示想認識山尾志櫻里，邀請李宇軒作為介紹橋樑。李則回覆，他與山尾之間的溝通似乎只有日語，而「溝通鏈」似乎是山尾及其團隊經日本港人組織與李溝通，然後李將相關信息轉達給 IPAC，以及裴倫德將 IPAC 的信息轉達給李，之後由李轉達給山尾。李又指，山尾的團隊並沒有人具備足夠英語能力，所以來自香港的義工會協助山尾處理英文材料。</p> -<p><strong>SILICON</strong></p> +<p>李庭上確認：「我的確係有將啲訊息 pass 嚟 pass 去」，他在日本線的工作主要有兩方面，一是在山尾志櫻里和中谷元參與會議的時候，提供語言支援；二是協助聯絡日本的港人組織，包括「Act with HK」、「SWHK@JPN」和「香港之黎明（香港の夜明け）」。</p> -<p>Graphite has been the technology of choice for lithium-ion batteries since its inception in the 1990s. However, as graphite hits energy-density limits, elements of the industry are championing silicon to play a larger role in battery anodes. Supporters of silicon argue that using the material could significantly increase the energy density of the anode and provide the battery longer runtimes. In theory, silicon anodes have tenfold the energy density of graphite anodes.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MFu6BaX.jpeg" alt="image03" /> +▲ 山尾志櫻里（左），本名「菅野志桜里」；中谷元（右）（資料圖片）</p> -<p>Silicon is the most abundant mineral in the Earth’s crust. The production of pure silicon for batteries occurs in two stages, as each stage yields two different types of silicon based on varying levels of purity that are meant for different end uses. Silica occurs naturally in the form of quartz. It is purified by oxygen removal through a reaction with carbon in an electrode arc furnace, resulting in metallurgical-grade silicon that is 98 percent pure.</p> +<p>此外，李將 JPAC 的成員名單傳送給裴倫德，當中包括山尾志櫻里、中谷元、長島昭久、有村治子、山田宏、櫻井周、井上一德和串田誠一等。</p> -<p>Metallurgical-grade silicon is further refined by grinding it into a powder and reacting it with acid. The resulting chemical has a low boiling point and is distilled to remove further impurities. Lastly, it is reacted with hydrogen at a high temperature for 200 to 300 hours to produce a silicon of a very high purity level.</p> +<p>庭上展示 JPAC 的會章，以日文撰寫。李指該會章第二條提及 JPAC 的宗旨是請求中國不要肆意侵害普世價值和基本人權。</p> -<p>Excluding the United States, ferrosilicon accounted for almost 70 percent of world silicon production on a silicon-content basis in 2021. The leading countries for ferrosilicon production were, on a silicon-content basis, China (6 million metric tons), Russia (580,000 metric tons), and Norway (350,000 metric tons), highlighting China’s dominance of the mineral’s production. For silicon metal, the leading producers were China, Brazil, and Norway. China accounted for approximately 70 percent of total global estimated production of silicon materials in 2021.</p> +<h4 id="裴倫德邀李穿針引線介紹bill-browder給山尾志櫻里">裴倫德邀李穿針引線介紹Bill Browder給山尾志櫻里</h4> -<h3 id="us-capabilities">U.S. Capabilities</h3> +<p>Telegram 訊息顯示，裴倫德告知李宇軒，英國金融家 Bill Browder 希望協助山尾志櫻里在日本推動人權法案，邀請李穿針引線安排一次線上會議，讓 Bill Browder 與「SWHK@JPN」成員溝通，然後一同協助山尾。</p> -<p>Several nations, especially China, are ahead in the production, ownership, and control of refining, purification, and concentration of several critical minerals and raw materials key to the manufacturing of lithium-ion batteries. For instance, as of 2019, China was processing 65 percent of the world’s cobalt. Likewise, China refines more than 90 percent of global natural graphite. China also processes 58 percent of global lithium, 35 percent of the world’s nickel, and 87 percent of rare earths. Even critical minerals that are mined in the United States are often exported to China to be processed and then returned for domestic use. Whereas the United States has some reserves in a few critical minerals that are inputs in lithium-ion batteries, the country is not a significant player in processing capabilities.</p> +<p>李解釋，Bill Browder 是一名想幫手在全球各地推動馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act）的人，但他不想猜測 Bill Browder 的目的，而法案是針對人權侵害事件。因為當時有港人組織想推動馬格尼茨基法案，而 Bill Browder 同樣想推動，所以兩者有共同的利益，至於 Bill Browder 想法案應用在哪些地方，李則不知道。</p> -<p>In short, years of focused industrial policy in China — including trade protectionism, low environmental standards, and the use of state subsidies to enable operations to run at a loss — has paid off exceptionally. Nevertheless, while China is by far the leader in refining minerals, it is important to recognize that other countries have capabilities as well. Chile for example, processes 29 percent of the world’s lithium while Malaysia processes 12 percent of rare earths.</p> +<p>李指裴倫德希望能把 Bill Browder 介紹給山尾志櫻里，然後雙方可以合作。由於山尾以日語溝通較自在，所以會議中需要有義工協助山尾翻譯，作為 Bill Browder 和山尾之間的溝通橋樑，該義工人選可能是「Act with HK」、「SWHK@JPN」和「香港之黎明（香港の夜明け）」的成員，或者李本人。</p> -<h4 id="the-biden-administrations-approach-to-building-more-resilient-supply-chains">The Biden Administration’s Approach to Building More Resilient Supply Chains</h4> +<h4 id="李宇軒會議定於8月12日-惟此前被拘捕">李宇軒：會議定於8月12日 惟此前被拘捕</h4> -<p>After many months of research, the Biden administration identified several sectors whose supply chains are critical to U.S. economic security. In its 100-Day Reviews under Executive Order 14017, part of the report Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-based Growth, the White House assessed supply chain vulnerabilities across four key sectors: semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging; large-capacity batteries, such as those for EVs; critical minerals and materials; and pharmaceuticals and advanced pharmaceutical ingredients.</p> +<p>裴倫德在2020年8月4日開設 Signal 群組「Magnitsky Japan」，成員還有李宇軒和 Bill Browder。裴倫德在群組中介紹李，指他與日本團隊溝通，並會協助轉達。李則在群組中發送訊息，表示會安排一個會議，告知山尾志櫻里有什麼支援，又表示需要與山尾和其他日本議員商討策略，包括論調及在什麼時機推動法案。</p> -<p>Critical minerals are recognized as the building blocks for modern technologies at the cornerstone of national security and economic prosperity, and in February 2022, the White House announced several investment packages to remedy the United States’ vulnerabilities in the critical minerals and raw materials sector. In addition, the Department of the Interior released a list of 50 critical minerals to inform these efforts. These investments aim to secure, among other essential technologies, the supply chains of lithium-ion batteries.</p> +<p>控方另展示一系列電郵紀錄，山尾向 Bill Browder 表示想在8月12日開會。李庭上確認會議定於8月12日舉行，但是他在當日之前被警方拘捕，不知道會議最終有否如期進行。</p> -<p>For instance, the Department of Defense’s Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program had awarded $35 million to separate and process heavy rare-earth elements in Mountain Pass, California. The Department of Energy is currently managing a $140 million demonstration project to recover rare-earth elements and critical minerals from coal ash and other mine waste as part of the IIJA. The Department of Energy likewise injects $3 billion in investments to refine battery materials and recycle them. Berkshire Hathaway Energy Renewables announced a new demonstration facility in Imperial County, California, to test a lithium extraction process from geothermal brine as part of a multibillion-dollar investment in lithium. Altogether, Sections 40207 of the IIJA requires the Department of Energy to fund more than $6 billion in grants related to the research, supply, processing, and recycling of materials and minerals critical for lithium-ion batteries.</p> +<h4 id="羅冠聰和黃台仰出席ipac會議-談論香港國安法實施後情況">羅冠聰和黃台仰出席IPAC會議 談論香港國安法實施後情況</h4> -<p>The Department of Defense has also entered into agreements with mining companies to enhance domestic mining capabilities, such as the $90 million project signed with Albemarle to reopen the company’s Kings Mountain lithium mine in North Carolina. These agreements are entered into under the Defense Production Act (DPA) and utilize appropriated funds authorized in the IRA. A DPA determination issued in 2022 authorized the Department of Defense to conduct feasibility studies for mature mining and processing projects.</p> +<p>控方展示一份 IPAC 的會議記錄，出席者包括英國、新西蘭、加拿大、澳洲、日本、立陶宛、德國、瑞典和挪威等13個國家的聯盟代表，而列席者包括流亡海外的前香港眾志立法會議員羅冠聰和前「本土民主前線」發言人黃台仰。事後 IPAC 在 Twitter 發表帖文，指會議討論減少對中國的「策略性依賴」（“reducing strategic dependency” on China），又提到羅和黃有參與討論。</p> -<p>Legislation has also strived to enhance research in the critical minerals sector, particularly as it pertains to assessing and enhancing current U.S. capabilities. For instance, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act establishes an Earth Mapping Resources Initiative within the U.S. Geological Survey, which aims to speed up efforts to acquire integrated topographic, geologic, geochemical, and geophysical mapping. The section prioritizes critical minerals.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>A few hours ago 22 #IPAC Co-Chairs from 13 legislatures 🇪🇺🇳🇿🇨🇿🇬🇧🇩🇪🇯🇵🇳🇴🇬🇧🇨🇦🇫🇷🇨🇭🇱🇹🇮🇹 met to discuss “reducing strategic dependency” on China chaired by 🇦🇺 @kimbakit and Andrew Hastie MP.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The Biden administration’s “Securing a Made in America Supply Chain for Critical Minerals” announcement emphasizes that the administration is undertaking action across the federal government to secure critical minerals and raw materials supply chains. First, the Biden administration states that it aims to update outdated mining laws and regulations — chief among them the Mining Law of 1872, which “still governs mining of most critical minerals on federal public lands” — with the establishment of an interagency working group led by the Department of the Interior. The working group has produced several recommendations to enhance various features of mining operations. The announcement likewise directs the United States Geological Survey within the Department of the Interior to update the federal list of minerals essential to economic or national security and vulnerable to disruption. Second, the White House announced a memorandum of understanding between the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State to coordinate stockpiling operations. National Defense Stockpile authority was given to the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment in an October 2021 executive order.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>In addition, #IPAC was privileged to hear from @nathanlawkc @Ray_WongHKI</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="trade-tools-and-tax-incentives">Trade Tools and Tax Incentives</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>— Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) (@ipacglobal) <a href="https://twitter.com/ipacglobal/status/1290557184414285827">August 4, 2020</a></p> +</blockquote> -<p>The IRA is perhaps the most significant legislation to accelerate transportation electrification and clean energy project deployment in U.S. history and stands as the flagship policy to accelerate the transition to lower carbon emissions in the future. However, provisions in the IRA prohibiting reliance on China in the EV supply chain have come at the cost of added difficulty in the sourcing and processing of critical minerals that works at cross purposes with the goals of the green transition. The Biden administration’s current quest to diversify away from China is thus compromising efforts to spur a transition to renewable energy.</p> +<p>李宇軒確認會議大約在2020年8月3日進行，羅冠聰和黃台仰在會上簡述香港在《國安法》實施之後的情況，之後 IPAC 的聯盟代表向二人提問，然後大家討論未來跟進行動，並需要在同年9月初發表文件分析不同國家對中國的「策略性依賴」。</p> -<p>A layer of laws and regulations have put restrictions on how firms can source and produce critical minerals to remain eligible for subsidies. In March 2023, the Department of Commerce updated rules on how it applies the term Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC), limiting the universe of suppliers (most notably China) that car manufacturers can use if they desire to have their vehicles remain eligible for the IRA EV tax credit. If any critical mineral used in the production of an EV was extracted, processed, or recycled in an FEOC, the end vehicle becomes ineligible for the $7,500 tax credit that consumers receive after purchase. Additionally, in December 2023, the Department of the Treasury released proposed guidance on clean vehicle provisions in the IRA where it set critical mineral sourcing requirements for the tax credit. Beginning at 40 percent in 2023 and increasing year over year, certain percentages of critical minerals must be extracted in the United States or a country that the United States has an FTA with (with an additional exception made for batteries recycled in North America). These policies, while having the laudable goal of diversifying dependence on China in EV supply chains, make sourcing and processing critical minerals for EVs more difficult and costly for manufacturers. Indeed, given market realities and scarcity of supply from countries other than China, IRA requirements for eligibility for tax credits appear impossible to meet in many cases.</p> +<p>會議紀錄的「其他事項」提到，日本代表中谷元表示正與香港的社運人士聯絡，推動馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act），針對違反國際法的人。</p> -<p>Cognizant of the soaring demand for critical minerals related to the energy transition, the administration has lessened, through regulation, the sourcing and manufacturing requirements of the IRA with two novel interpretations of the statute. In December 2022, guidance from the Department of the Treasury permitted the “lease loophole,” in which EVs that are not assembled in North America, do not meet the origin requirements on battery content and critical minerals, and are above price caps are still eligible for the $7,500 tax credit if they are classified as “commercial vehicles.” This guidance has supported an increase in EV sales as more consumers have opted for leasing instead of outright purchasing an EV.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華訊息指若李宇軒做枱面人會令身邊人被照肺">陳梓華訊息指若李宇軒做「枱面人」會令身邊人被「照肺」</h4> -<p>In the second workaround to a strict reading of the IRA, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) attempted to negotiate critical mineral agreements (CMAs) with supplying countries. These agreements could in turn ensure that partner countries would be considered as “FTA Countries” under the IRA, an approach that seems to have floundered. The United States signed the first, and so far only, CMA in March 2023 with Japan. The objective of this novel trade and cooperation agreement is:</p> +<p>控方另展示李宇軒與另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）之間的 Signal 對話，當中陳問李：「你安排好哂香港D野未」、「你去打最終件事會係你身邊所有人都會照肺」；李則回覆「我搞掂咗要搞嘅家人s」。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>. . . to strengthen and diversify critical minerals supply chains and promote the adoption of electric vehicle battery technologies by formalizing the shared commitment of the Parties to facilitate trade, promote fair competition and market-oriented conditions for trade in critical minerals, ensure robust labor and environmental standards, and cooperate in efforts to ensure secure, sustainable, and equitable critical minerals supply chains.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>李庭上解釋，訊息意思是「如果要打嘅話，身邊嘅人包括T會被照肺」，所以他回覆陳的訊息意思是：「如果要照肺嘅話都會照，唔會取決於我打唔打。」</p> -<p>While Japan is not a critical minerals source, the country possesses related capabilities, including mineral processing and EV battery production. This CMA sparked interest by other nations and blocs, notably Indonesia, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, which have expressed a desire to negotiate similar agreements. Indonesia and the United States have held preliminary talks on a deal involving Indonesian nickel, a critical mineral of which they hold the largest natural reserves globally. The United States and the United Kingdom’s trade representatives have touted “significant progress” in a bilateral CMA between the two trading blocs, although the agreement has yet to be concluded. Likewise, the European Union and the United States have discussed reaching a Japan-like CMA, although talks seem to have stumbled.</p> +<p>控方追問李要「打」什麼，李僅指：「浮上枱面做枱面人。」法官李運騰問，是否很多社運人士都是「枱底的人」？李同意。</p> -<p>In a similar vein, U.S. policymakers have engaged allies Canada and Australia on critical minerals cooperation. The United States and Canada announced a previous Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals collaboration, while the United States has established a Critical Minerals Working Group with Australia. In all, the United States is engaging its economic allies and partners to enhance the trade of critical minerals as they ramp up domestic capabilities. However, that engagement has so far been lackluster due to significant pushback domestically, including from lawmakers who either wish to be more engaged in negotiations or believe more agreements would undermine the reshoring objectives of current U.S. trade policy.</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<h4 id="the-drive-for-cmas-sputters">The Drive for CMAs Sputters</h4> +<hr /> -<p>Efforts to strike additional CMA deals with allies and trading partners have met pushback domestically, including from the bipartisan leadership of the congressional committees with jurisdiction over trade, as well as from Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV), chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and an important author of the IRA. Senator Manchin has sharply criticized the workarounds, characterizing them as weakening the sourcing and manufacturing requirements in the IRA. Saying that the Biden administration is “distorting the plain text of U.S. law,” Representative Jason Smith (R-MO), chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, who generally objects to “corporate green welfare” contained in the IRA, has also decried the proposal to deem CMAs as FTAs under the IRA. Even strong proponents of the IRA, such as Senator Rony Wyden (D-OR), chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, and Representative Richard Neal (D-MA), ranking member of the House Committee on Ways and Means, have risen up against the USTR’s current CMA strategy, citing workers’ rights and environmental concerns:</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒供稱協助日本議員成立關注對華政策聯盟 及支援推動人權法案Ships, Trains, And Trucks2024-04-08T12:00:00+08:002024-04-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ships-trains-and-trucks<p><em>The full-scale Russian invasion has devastating effects on Ukraine’s trade causing vast destruction of its transport and logistics infrastructure. Ukraine and its partners have to be creative and determined in finding new trade corridors to support business operations.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <p>The critical minerals agreement announced today is unacceptable . . . the Administration does not have the authority to unilaterally enter into free trade agreements. Human rights, environmental rights, and economic opportunity are all closely interwoven, and had the Administration wanted to include meaningful labor or environmental protections in this agreement, they would’ve engaged Congress.</p> -</blockquote> +<excerpt /> -<p>Another camp of opposition to administration policy and the IRA is led by Senator Mike Crapo (R-ID), ranking member on the Senate Committee on Finance, which argues: “Additionally, the Treasury Department has announced several sets of rules and planned rules that will enable Chinese minerals, materials and entities to qualify for IRA subsidies, while potentially also excluding domestic players who are connected to traditional energy source.” The rushed, disjointed policies at the heart of these provisions were unworkable from the outset. In October 2024, following diplomatic outreach by Vice President Kamala Harris and while the USTR engaged with Indonesia on CMA negotiations, more widespread opposition was expressed from another broad-based coalition of senators, including Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Tammy Baldwin (D-MN), Amy Klobuchar (D-WI), and Lisa Murkowski (R-Al), among others, who noted: “Given the extraordinary taxpayer resources at play we strongly believe that eligibility for the critical minerals credit must prioritize domestic producers and existing free trade agreement partners.”</p> +<p>Transport and logistics infrastructure serves as a country’s main trade arteries, facilitating the flow of people, goods, and services. Without this vital infrastructure, a country’s economic potential is stifled. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 had devastating effects on its economy, including its ability to trade. Due to constant and indiscriminate Russian missile attacks, Ukraine suffered massive destruction of its transport and logistics infrastructure, with air cargo totally suspended and port activity severely interrupted. As a result, Ukraine has to be creative in finding new trade corridors to support business operations and enable the flow of humanitarian and military aid. To that effect, this white paper analyzes how the country has been adapting its trade routes and related infrastructure in wartime and provides recommendations to sustain trade and economic activity now and in the future.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">[U.S.] engagement has so far been lackluster due to significant pushback domestically, including from lawmakers who either wish to be more engaged in negotiations or believe more agreements would undermine the reshoring objectives of current U.S. trade policy.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="current-trade-challenges">Current Trade Challenges</h3> -<p>In a multilateral forum, the United States has engaged its partners and allies on critical minerals through the Department of State-led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). This partnership, which includes 13 states and the European Union, seeks to develop sustainable critical mineral supply chains through public-private partnership, targeted financial support, and diplomatic work. In June, the MSP shortlisted a list of 15 projects that it intends to fund by the end of 2023. In September 2023, Norway, Italy, and — most importantly — India joined the MSP, signaling that the desire to diversify critical minerals supply away from China is strong throughout the international community.</p> +<p>Ukraine is facing numerous challenges to its trade-related infrastructure. Even before the full-scale invasion, the quality of Ukraine’s infrastructure was low due to the decades-long absence of critical investments. The 2022 invasion has added more complexities to this situation. First, Russian air strikes have destroyed and damaged transport and logistics infrastructure including key ports, roads, and grain silos, rendering these assets unusable or in need of repair and rebuilding. Second, shipping through the Black Sea, a main artery for trade for agricultural products, has partially rebounded but remains susceptible to attacks. Moreover, finding alternative routes for grain shipments via train and roads through Ukraine’s western borders has led to disruptions with neighboring countries and additional time and transportation costs. Third, given the unpredictability of Russian attacks and the duration of the war, insurance for physical assets, such as vessels and silos, and business operations is expensive or lacking altogether. Lastly, all these transportation modes are labor intensive. Personnel shortages abound across sectors as many Ukrainians have left the country or have been mobilized for the army. Transportation is not immune to these trends.</p> -<p>Additionally, there are nascent talks mostly touted by Europe, where negotiations on a CMA are seemingly stalled, to create a “critical minerals club” or a “buyers club.” This club would benefit its members (in theory, Brussels and its allies) by setting more consistent prices for minerals purchasers, seeking to avoid unstable prices in a time of high demand and fluctuating supply. While meeting with the U.S. Treasury secretary in early 2023, a senior German official raised the possibility of a minerals club, but the idea has yet to gain much traction in Washington.</p> +<h3 id="seaports-and-waterways">Seaports and Waterways</h3> -<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> +<p>Ukraine’s seaports have been crucial modes for exporting agricultural commodities and metals. Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s top five ports in the Black Sea cities of Pivdennyi, Mykolayiv, Chornomorsk, Odesa, and Mariupol — were responsible for over 90 percent of Ukraine’s seaport freight turnover. Moreover, 98 percent of grain exports flowed through the Black Sea ports, with Mykolayiv seaport playing an imperative role. Companies such as U.S. Bunge, Ukrainian Nibulon, and Chinese COFCO all had major investments there.</p> -<p>Building U.S. and allied capacity to rebalance this dependency while achieving green transition goals will require a coherent, well-articulated industrial policy with U.S. leadership that expressly balances domestic production goals, objectives for the green energy transition, and domestic demand for imported inputs from allies and partners, as well as from China, when necessary.</p> +<p>With the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, commerce through the Black Sea was significantly interrupted. Grain exports via the Black Sea were subject to constant Russian attacks (the heaviest period being February to July of 2022), including aerial (missile and drone) attacks on port infrastructure and sea mines destroying cargo ships. Due to the invasion, Ukraine fully lost control of the port of Mariupol in May 2022 after Russia brutally invaded it on February 24, 2022. Of the other four important ports, Mykolaiv became inoperative due to Russia’s full-scale invasion, while the ports of Chornomorsk, Pivdennyi, and Odesa have operated at partial capacity since February 2022.</p> -<p>The president should task an interagency team to draft an industrial policy plan for growing domestic production of lithium-ion batteries. Given its resources and the extensive work already done, the administration should prepare specific estimates and projections for future needs for key critical minerals, constituent minerals and chemistries that are necessary to reach its goals. This assessment could also include what CMAs and other enhanced trade relationships will be necessary to secure supply for projected needs. For example, a recent S&amp;P report assessed that while lithium sourcing was fairly likely to meet the IRA’s requirements by 2035, it is very unlikely that enough cobalt and nickel supply will be able to keep up. Does the administration agree? How can trade relationships be improved to create access for U.S. manufacturers to a greater and more consistent supply of inputs critical to scaling up domestic production?</p> +<p>To help ease the flow of goods to and from Ukraine, in May 2022, the European Commission launched the Solidarity Lanes action plan. The EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provide logistics alternatives to Ukraine’s seaports, including rail, road, and inland waterways (Figure 1). A total of €2 billion (around $2.2 billion) has been mobilized to meet this demand. According to the European Council, as of July 2023, almost 33 million metric tons of grain (and other foodstuffs) had been exported via the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which is about half of what it exported prior to the full-scale invasion. At the same time Ukraine imported essential goods such as fuel, and military and humanitarian aid was allowed to flow.</p> -<p>In terms of diversification, working effectively with other countries is essential. CSIS’s previous work on this subject concluded that an exclusive focus on domestic manufacturing was not the most productive path to resiliency and instead focused on “friendshoring” — encouraging the movement of supply chains to countries that do not pose a national security threat — and the development of “trusted trade partnerships” with them. The U.S. government should do more to ramp up friendshoring efforts in the form of new agreements and should attempt to build up the United States’ own processing capabilities to ensure the future competitiveness of the U.S. lithium-ion battery sector. Additionally, the United States should also foster increased regulatory cooperation with other countries in key areas of the battery supply chain by building upon existing agreements.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wWvs0mW.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: EU Solidarity Lanes.</strong> Source: Reprinted with permission (CC BY 4.0 DEED) from the <a href="https://transport.ec.europa.eu/ukraine/keeping-ukrainian-goods-moving_en">European Commission, “Keeping Ukrainian Goods Moving”</a>.</em></p> -<p>Administration statements on supply chain policy regularly reference the importance of cooperation with friends and allies, but it is becoming clear that this administration may not be capable of actually concluding a viable set of international trade and cooperation agreements that would increase supply chain security in this sector, absent support of Congress and domestic stakeholders. Without this support, the administration’s campaign for additional CMAs has faltered, and business uncertainty continues to grow surrounding the viability of lithium-ion battery production in the United States. It is urgent that the administration engage with Congress to achieve a solid bipartisan consensus on how the United States should balance trade and industrial and climate policy objectives in this sector. Concluding several CMAs with key countries such as the United Kingdom, Europe, Indonesia, Argentina, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be important to shoring up supply chain resiliency.</p> +<p>In addition, in July 2022, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and the United Nations brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative. This provided partial safety for Ukraine’s grain exports via the Black Sea ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi for a year. Since August 2022, the initiative has enabled 32 million metric tons of Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs to be shipped across the globe. Furthermore, the initiative helped Ukraine export over 36 million metric tons of nonagricultural goods such as iron, steel, ores, and wood. However, Russia suspended the deal in July 2023 and consequently resumed heavy attacks on Ukraine’s port infrastructure.</p> -<p>The discriminatory aspects of the IRA, to be discussed in the next paper, have engendered sharp criticism and may result in retaliation from trading partners that could unnecessarily threaten a strategy built on trusted trade partners and the green transition. Again, a multilateral approach to friendshoring and reducing dependency on China cannot be achieved without more active involvement by Congress in shaping trade agreements and better calibration of the legislative requirements for domestic sourcing.</p> +<p>After Russia fully compromised the Solidarity Lanes through the Black Sea, Ukraine launched its own alternative Black Sea corridor in August 2023. Established with the help of its Western partners, the corridor between Ukrainian ports and the Bosporus Strait has proved successful. Ships are now traveling on the western coast of the Black Sea through Romanian and Bulgarian territorial waters. Ukraine has also been exporting grain through the ports of Reni and Izmail, both on the Danube River. This new corridor allows Ukraine to continue exporting wheat, corn, sunflower oil, and barley to the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Since Russia’s refusal to continue the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Ukraine claims it has exported, as of December 2023, approximately seven million metric tons of cargo through its seaports, five million of which were Ukrainian agricultural products. According to recent reports, Ukraine is on track to export all its grain from the 2023 harvest. Nevertheless, there are still major risks as Russia continues to attack commercial ships and infrastructure and as mines float in the Black Sea waters.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is urgent that the administration engage with Congress to achieve a solid bipartisan consensus on how the United States should balance trade and industrial and climate policy objectives in this sector.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Moreover, due to Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine is using more road and rail infrastructure to trade. Before the full-scale invasion, nonmarine modes of transportation were responsible for over 40 percent of Ukraine’s trade turnover and seaports for about 60 percent. According to author interviews with Ukrainian infrastructure and transportation experts, for most of 2023, the picture almost flipped, where rail and roads accounted for about three-fourths of Ukraine’s total trade volume and seaports accounted for about one-fourth. This situation changed dramatically after Ukraine reopened its ports in the fourth quarter of 2023. According to the experts, today, the balance between seaport and non-seaport trade turnover is about 50-50.</p> -<p>Taking the language in the IRA reflecting preference for FTA partners to heart, the administration should investigate options for increasing investment in FTA partners that possess significant reserves of key minerals (such as lithium deposits in FTA partner Chile or Canada’s cobalt, graphite, lithium, and nickel deposits). If the United States is to reach such agreements successfully, it will have to negotiate not only extraction opportunities but also responses to the other countries’ demands to establish more value-added refining operations in their countries. Additionally, the United States should push for regulatory reforms that could be made to incentivize domestic production of key constituent materials for the supply chain.</p> +<h3 id="roads">Roads</h3> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Another important mode of transportation for Ukraine is the road network. However, the 170,000-kilometer road network Ukraine inherited from the Soviet era was in poor condition and needed much updating. With Ukraine’s pro-Western trajectory after 2014, the government took road repair more seriously, allocating substantial sums from the state budget. Ukraine’s roads began to be brought back to life as Ukraine repaired up to 10 percent of the roads between 2016 and 2019. Moreover, in 2019, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky announced the Big Construction initiative aimed at building or repairing roads and other important infrastructure. As a result, more than 14,000 kilometers of roads were constructed or repaired in the first two years of the projectbut still not enough to cover the immense needs). This initiative then ran into problems, including lack of transparency in the bidding processes and severe corruption allegations in the state-run road agency Ukravtodor.</p> -<p>According to the bipartisan House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, China’s domestic industrial policy has over time “effectively monopolized numerous critical mineral supply chains, including mining, mineral processing, refining, metallurgy, and end-use manufacturing,” making the United States and much of the world dependent on China. An uncomfortable reality is that the United States is not currently a significant player in the global mineral extraction and processing markets. The United States depends on imports for renewable technologies, chief among them the lithium-ion battery, and the critical mineral inputs essential to accomplishing a green transition.</p> +<p>Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s roads were mainly transporting higher value-added products such as finished goods (both for imports and exports), in addition to some commodities. The war has considerably changed trade dynamics as Ukraine’s roads had to absorb part of the commodities transported via seaports, mainly metals and grain. Ukraine can now export some of the grain using road and rail cargo routes via Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova, albeit with limited capacities and in some cases with political tensions.</p> -<p>When it comes to processing the materials necessary for lithium-ion battery production, the Biden administration is making multifaceted efforts to incentivize more production in the United States. However, subsidies in the IRA are set to significantly increase the demand for lithium-ion batteries to a level that will far exceed the country’s current manufacturing capabilities and available supply of certain critical mineral inputs. Leveraging subsidy packages (chief among them IRA tax credits) and trade tools (such as CMAs) to incentivize production by U.S. partners and allies is therefore a critical piece of the puzzle.</p> +<p>In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, the European Union allowed tariff-free food imports from Ukraine, but that created problems for neighboring countries. In April 2023, Poland closed its border to Ukrainian grain as Polish farmers protested that their grain became less competitive. Slovakia and Hungary took similar action earlier that month. The EU farmers gained partial victory by making the European Commission impose restrictions against imports of Ukrainian grain (wheat, maize, rapeseed, sunflower seed) to Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Initially, the ban was to last until June 5, 2023, but then it was extended until September 15, 2023, after which it became obsolete. However, in response to lifting the ban, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia said they would impose unilateral import bans.</p> -<p>Hindering U.S. producers from sourcing even small quantities of scarce inputs of critical materials for battery production from China and enforcing domestic content requirements that constrict the ability of U.S. businesses to turn to other nations to satisfy demand for manufacturing inputs will make it more difficult to achieve green transition goals. The three elements of current U.S. policy — incentivizing the green transition via ambitious policy packages such as the IRA, reshoring capabilities in critical sectors, and diversifying away from China — reflects conflicting goals. Policies to diversify away from China and reshore production capabilities will hinder long-term environmental objectives. It is thus imperative that the United States adopt a friendshoring approach to the green transition and allow U.S. businesses further down the lithium-ion battery supply chain to access enough minerals and materials to scale up production. In two subsequent papers, the CSIS Scholl Chair will discuss views on pursuing a more coherent industrial policy that balances these competing objectives.</p> +<p>This shift in transportation has also generated discontent among truckers in neighboring countries. In November 2023, Polish truckers initiated a boycott of one of Poland’s largest Ukraine border crossings, Medyka, in fear that an influx of Ukraine’s truckers are creating unfair competition. Polish truckers have been demanding more support from their government, including reinstating of permits and limiting the number of licenses for Ukrainian truckers. Slovakia and Hungary joined the boycotting of their own border control points a few weeks later.</p> -<hr /> +<p>This caused thousands of trucks to be stranded for miles near the borders in freezing weather, costing Ukraine’s government and the private sector a hefty sum. The total amount of trucks in queue at one point was nearing 4,000. Altogether, Poland blocked four border crossings: Korczowa-Krakivets, Hrebenne-Rava-Ruska, Dorohusk-Yahodyn, and Medyka.</p> -<p><strong>William Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<p>An additional potential problem is that the stranded trucks could be carrying critical humanitarian aid for Ukrainians, considering that some of these border crossings are close to transit points for humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine.</p> -<p><strong>Meredith Broadbent</strong> serves as a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> +<p>Although the blockade affected a diverse range of businesses, Polish truckers are damaging Ukraine’s wood, furniture, car parts, and vegetable oil exporters and a quarter of Ukraine’s fuel supplies imports in particular. A Ukrainian trucker association estimated the blockage has already cost €400 million ($436 million) in revenue for companies. The European Business Association estimates the total losses to be much lower — around $8.5 million — based on poll results among its members.</p> -<p><strong>Thibault Denamiel</strong> is an associate fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> +<p>In January 2024, Polish truckers reached an agreement with the government under certain conditions. Polish farmers also stopped a protest at Medyka after they negotiated a deal with the Polish government. Poland and Ukraine also said that they were close to an agreement on agricultural imports on March 28. However, this does not mean Ukraine will be immune to similar boycotts in the future, which presents an ongoing major risk for Ukrainian trade capacity as road transportation has become increasingly important for Ukraine. Traditionally, even before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s border checkpoints leading to the European Union were congested and depleted. In addition, there is still ongoing corruption at Ukraine’s customs, though authorities have been attempting to crack down on high-level officials. These fundamental challenges need to be addressed in addition to future boycotts and protests.</p> -<p><strong>Elias Shammas</strong> is a research intern with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p>William Alan Reinsch, et al.Reforming the lithium-ion supply chain constitutes a critical cornerstone of US foreign policy. The first in a series of three, this report discusses the processing and refining stage of the lithium-ion supply chain.Ukraine’s Financial System2024-03-28T12:00:00+08:002024-03-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraines-financial-system<p><em>This report highlights key stakeholder views from a recent workshop on developments in Ukraine’s financial system.</em></p> +<h3 id="rail">Rail</h3> -<excerpt /> +<p>Along with its seaports and roads, Ukraine has a strong rail infrastructure to transport goods and people — one of the biggest and most resilient in the world. According to Transparency International, before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s railway system — controlled by Ukrzaliznytsia (UZ), the country’s state-run rail monopoly and largest employer — was responsible for 60–75 percent of the country’s total cargo turnover, which included all of Ukraine’s major commodities: construction materials, grain, and steel.</p> -<p>In February 2024, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI convened an online workshop entitled “The Resilience and Integrity of the Financial System in Ukraine: Two Years after Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion”. As Ukraine continues its commitment to strengthening anti-money laundering (AML) efforts and implementing EU reforms, it recognises the significance of preparing for the upcoming enhanced follow-up procedure and 6th round of the MONEYVAL mutual evaluation, the regional body of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to which the country belongs. In light of this, the virtual workshop addressed key issues crucial for ensuring Ukraine’s readiness for the assessment. The workshop forms part of CFCS’s Supervising and Monitoring Ukraine’s Reconstruction Funds (SMURF) project, supported by the National Endowment for Democracy. The workshop, held under the Chatham House Rule, gathered representatives from key Ukrainian financial institutions and relevant authorities, including the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of the Digital Transformation of Ukraine and others. This report summarises the main findings of the workshop.</p> +<p>Due to the war, almost 6,300 kilometers of track were destroyed. Along with increases in fuel costs and constant rebuilding due to Russian air strikes, the government of Ukraine decided to increase rail tariffs by 70 percent in June 2022 to make the company economically sustainable. This allowed the monopoly to achieve a financial surplus. In 2022, UZ had a deficit of 11 billion hryvnias ($290 million) as the company had to transport humanitarian aid and evacuate 3.7 million Ukrainians for free. In 2023, the situation dramatically changed, and UZ predicted it would reach 7 billion hryvnias ($190 million) in net profit.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>In November 2023, UZ transported 14 million metric tons of cargo, a 34 percent increase year over year. About half of this was transported domestically, and the rest was exported (of which 2.4 million was grain). Goods transported via rail today include many of the same transported before the full-scale invasion: construction materials, iron and manganese ore, and coal. What has changed are the volumes and pressure on the railway system. During war, these volumes can vary dramatically, and there is little consistency with figures (for example, grain transportation will strongly depend on whether Ukraine has the ability to export grain via the Black Sea). Furthermore, cargo routes have changed since the full-scale invasion: whereas before 2022, most of the railway cargo transportation was for domestic trade purposes, the full-scale invasion pushed the railways to fill in the export void for commodities.</p> -<p>Ukraine’s second enhanced follow-up MONEYVAL report, published in June 2020, identified several deficiencies in the country’s technical compliance with standards set by the FATF, the global standard-setter in anti-financial crime. The report flagged areas including risk assessments of new technologies, risk-based supervision and regulation of virtual assets, statistical data on AML and counterterrorist finance (CTF), and others as key issues where the country still has significant work to undertake. During the online workshop, participants reflected on these flagged areas, offering insights in how to effectively tackle these challenges. The workshop not only focused on Ukraine’s technical compliance with AML standards but also delved into the effectiveness of the country’s existing response to financial crime. It focused on four principal areas: development of the law on virtual assets; a path to creating a single register of bank accounts of individuals and legal entities; public–private partnerships; and recovery of the proceeds of crime.</p> +<p>However, the rail sector needs reform and much work to attract international companies that could compete with their rolling stock. To reform and liberalize Ukraine’s railway system, the monopoly should become more transparent, unbundle into at least three separate businesses — infrastructure, passenger, and cargo — and uproot corruption, archaic regulation, and inefficient management. Furthermore, Ukraine’s railway infrastructure must meet the requirements of EU directives. Ukraine’s railways should integrate in unison with the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), meaning it will have to solve its gauge issue: Western Europe uses 1,435-millimeter gauge, whereas post-Soviet countries tend to use 1,540-millimeter gauge. Importantly, in coordination with the reform agenda, multilaterals will be valuable partners in providing significant financing to modernize and fix UZ.</p> -<h3 id="ukraines-technical-compliance-with-aml-standards">Ukraine’s Technical Compliance with AML Standards</h3> +<h3 id="air">Air</h3> -<h4 id="development-of-the-law-on-virtual-assets">Development of the Law on Virtual Assets</h4> +<p>Before the 2022 invasion, Ukraine had bustling airport traffic, with Kyiv’s Boryspil International Airport having the highest activity by far, followed by the Lviv Danylo Halytskyi International Airport, Kyiv International Airport–Zhuliany, Odesa International Airport, and Kharkiv International Airport. Ukraine’s airport infrastructure was up and coming since 2014, when Ukraine signed an association agreement with the European Union and has been making it easier for airline businesses — including from the United States — to operate within the country ever since. Ukraine’s airports were mainly active with passenger traffic as well as parcel transportation. Today its commercial air activity is completely on pause, and some have been severely damaged. Until the country’s skies are protected, air travel will not operate throughout the country for civilian transportation, and there is limited opportunity for some airports to be active in delivering cargo.</p> -<p>Virtual assets and the laws on their regulation emerged as a key topic during the workshop. This was largely due to the spotlight cast on the topic following the downgrade of Ukraine’s rating to “partially compliant” in its second enhanced follow-up MONEYVAL report to in relation to FATF Recommendation 15 on new technologies.</p> +<h3 id="short-term-and-longer-term-solutions">Short-Term and Longer-Term Solutions</h3> -<p>The first attempt to regulate virtual assets in Ukraine, aligning the country with international standards on AML/CTF and comprehensive financial monitoring, was made in 2022, when the Law on Virtual Assets No. 2074-IX was adopted and signed. However, participants noted that the law is not yet in effect due to delays caused by required amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine. A participant clarified that the reason behind the delay is that the necessary draft law for taxing operations with virtual assets has not been developed.</p> +<p>Considering the war is likely to continue, Ukraine’s trade corridors in the short run need to be fully utilized and protected from Russian attacks. In the long term, Ukraine needs to rethink its existing trade corridors and reconfigure its transport and logistics infrastructure toward the EU market.</p> -<p>Rather than developing the necessary technical amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine, a different pathway was chosen to address the issues around the regulation of virtual assets. Two alternative draft laws were registered in Ukraine’s legislature, the Verkhovna Rada, to revise the already-adopted Law on Virtual Assets and legalise the market and solve the taxation issue. However, neither has yet been passed. One participant noted that the main difference between the two draft laws lies in the taxation rules and classification of virtual assets.</p> +<p>As such, the European Union has heavily supported Ukraine’s adoption and implementation of the TEN-T proposal, which would incorporate roads, inland waterways, and railways to allow more Ukrainian grain and products to be exported. There has already been €110 billion (around $119 billion) worth of investments completed along the TEN-T, including the interconnectivity of maritime, aviation, and land infrastructure. Many new standards are being optimized for more efficient rail (track speed requirements of 100 kilometers per hour for freight and 160 kilometers per hour for passenger rail), sea (alternative vessel fuels and adequate mooring/resting areas), air (new spaceports), and road transit (safe and interconnected roads to infrastructure), aiming to decrease shipping time and ensure lower carbon emissions. This initiative could create 840,000 jobs and increase EU gross domestic product by 2.4 percentage points. Of the nine TEN-T transportation corridors, four are planned to fully connect with Ukraine by 2030: the North Sea–Baltic corridor, the Baltic Sea–Black Sea–Aegean Sea corridor, the Baltic–Adriatic corridor, and the Rhine–Danube corridor.</p> -<p>Draft Law No. 10225, developed by Ukraine’s National Securities and Stock Market Commission in cooperation with EY (Ernst &amp; Young), translates the EU’s Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation (MiCA) standards into the Ukrainian context and proposes a standard tax rate of 18%, with a 1.5% military tax. Draft Law No. 10225-1, on the other hand, was developed by the Ministry of the Digital Transformation of Ukraine, and proposes the combination of the Base Law No. 2074-IX with MiCA standards. This draft law proposes a three-year transition period during which the tax rate would be only 5%, with an increase of this rate to 9% over the subsequent five years and 18% after eight years of market regulation. This second draft law aims to simplify the creation of the virtual asset market, streamline the authorisation process for service providers, and promote market development in accordance with EU standards.</p> +<h3 id="short-term-solutions">Short-Term Solutions</h3> -<p>While Ukraine has not adopted either of the two draft laws, workshop participants noted that there is already widespread use of virtual assets in Ukraine and a growing demand among the population, underscoring the need to regulate the industry. Ukraine was ranked fifth on the Global Crypto Adoption Index in 2023, and approximately 6.5 million Ukrainians, 15.72% of the population, owned digital currency in 2022. It should also be noted that while Ukraine’s AML Law offers a legal framework for launching AML/CTF regulation of virtual assets, the law has not be enforced since it came into effect in 2020.</p> +<h4 id="seaports">Seaports</h4> -<p>As market regulations continue to develop, it is also becoming necessary to understand what effective financial monitoring of the virtual asset industry would look like. Participants agreed that effective monitoring relies on a strong market framework. This includes having a diverse range of service providers that serve a broad user base. Without such an ecosystem, the necessary data for effective monitoring would be lacking. Therefore, it is essential to simplify the authorisation procedures for these services, especially during the initial stages, to foster market growth and stimulate demand among a wider population. In the first period of market development, the authorisation process should be as straightforward as possible, as this will help to shape the market and create demand for the service providers from a larger population. Once the market is shaped, additional tools for regulatory influence, impact and review/control will be implemented and become a regular element of the financial market.</p> +<p>If Ukraine wants to ramp up its seaport usage, it ultimately needs to deal with Russia’s continuous military threats. In this regard, stronger military protection of the region and active demining of both land and waterways are key measures to improve the security of seaports. Ukraine’s seaports could be propped up by long-range missiles and air defense that will deter Russia’s fleet farther away from Ukraine’s coast. Plenty of evidence shows this has been effective in the past. Furthermore, Ukraine’s inland waterways should be protected and cleared from mines.</p> -<p>Pseudonymity of virtual assets was another key topic that emerged during the discussion. One participant posited that most users and customers of virtual assets do not consider anonymity the most important aspect of virtual assets, and would be willing to comply with Know Your Customer measures and allow themselves to be identified to ensure they have no criminal intent. Both of the draft laws noted above propose that all service providers must fully identify their users in every case. With the implementation of the law, virtual asset users will have the opportunity to participate in a regulated and transparent market. Another issue identified during the workshop was the lack of crypto-to-fiat gateways in the market. It is important for customers to have the freedom to move their money, especially for exchanging between fiat currency and virtual currencies. However, due to various complications and currency regulations, this task remains quite challenging.</p> +<p>Another tool that can enable more trade via Ukraine’s seaports is war risk insurance. Currently, risk management company Marsh McLennan, in collaboration with Lloyd’s of London and the Ukrainian government, created a war insurance facility called Unity, which is meant to provide affordable insurance for grain export from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Unity will insure up to $50 million in hull and separate protection and indemnity war risk insurance, which is not a large amount in overall terms for the industry. This is where international financial institutions and development finance institutions could step in to provide additional insurance support. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is working on such a scheme, but it is still not operational.</p> -<p>Despite the above-mentioned challenges, one participant drew attention to the benefits of legalising virtual assets in Ukraine, particularly the impact on technical compliance with AML standards and market developments. They noted that legalisation of virtual assets can provide opportunities for business growth, technological advancement, and an increase in state revenue. Additionally, it can help to eliminate the use of Ukraine’s market by criminals for money laundering of crypto assets and sanctions evasion. In the long term, it can also provide access to EU markets in crypto assets and offer additional channels for money flows towards Ukraine’s reconstruction.</p> +<h4 id="roads-and-rail">Roads and Rail</h4> -<p>The next important steps for the legalisation of the market are expected from the Tax Committee of the Verkhovna Rada. The Committee is currently reviewing the draft laws and will choose one as the main law for market development. Workshop participants acknowledged that it is difficult to provide a timeline because of the obstacles caused by the war. Nonetheless, the representative of the Ministry of the Digital Transformation of Ukraine noted that the decision as to which law will move forward is expected by the end of summer 2024. After that, amendments to the basic law could take effect by the end of 2024. With virtual asset companies already working in Ukraine, differing opinions were expressed as to whether the market can operate without waiting for a specific regulation to be adopted.</p> +<p>For roads and railways, there is a need to expedite border crossings. The business communities in both Ukraine and Poland have provided a list of ways to improve border control inspections by removing red tape and providing more transparency. Moreover, joint road checkpoints could be expanded to ease the flow of trucks. The Ukrainian government is already partially engaging in checkpoint expansion: just recently U.S.-based company DAI Global signed a contract with Miyamoto International to modernize crossing points on Ukraine’s border.</p> -<p>Participants in the workshop and authors of the draft laws have been in constant dialogue with the community, the market and potential participants. Overall, workshop participants agreed that there is a need to create a regulatory environment as soon as possible and pass the relevant law.</p> +<p>Another barrier for both transportation companies is the licensing requirements for international postal carriers. Currently, not all private sector players are allowed to receive licenses for international mail processing centers (IMPCs). The only holders of IMPCs in Ukraine are state-owned Ukrposhta and Ukrainian-Canadian company Rosan (part of the Meest Group), which curtails competition. Resolving this matter would expedite the processing and delivery of packages to and from Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine will have to fully adapt its environmental and licensing regulations for cargo transportation vehicles in line with those of the European Union.</p> -<h4 id="a-path-to-creating-a-single-register-of-bank-accounts-and-safe-deposit-holders">A Path to Creating a Single Register of Bank Accounts and Safe-Deposit Holders</h4> +<h4 id="air-1">Air</h4> -<p>With Ukraine’s progress towards EU accession, another concern identified by workshop participants was the necessity of creating a central register of bank accounts and safe-deposit holders, stemming from the requirements of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Ukraine has in fact initiated the development of a single register of bank accounts. During the workshop, participants noted that the register of bank accounts of legal entities is already in place, administered by the State Tax Service of Ukraine, and that law enforcement authorities have access to it. However, information about the bank accounts of individuals is not included in the register, and it was agreed that this should be the focus of future work.</p> +<p>Regarding air transport, Ukraine could boost its cargo if its western airports (for example, Lviv and Uzhhorod) are more secure and if air cargo carriers are allowed to operate. This will increase Ukraine’s trade turnover capacity, though air transport cannot fully substitute Ukraine’s road freight because it is a more expensive means of transportation.</p> -<p>One participant drew attention to efforts by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine in this regard. The Ministry had prepared a draft law entitled “On Amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine and Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Establishment of the Unified Register of Accounts of Individuals and Legal Entities and Individual Bank Safes”. Yet the participant said that in 2023, after the draft law was submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, concerns about privacy, confidentiality and human rights compliance were raised, and the matter was approached with caution.</p> +<p>Ukraine and the European Union could negotiate air cargo transportation by reopening the Lviv airport as an initial hub, followed by other airports in western Ukraine, which are only minutes away from EU airspace. Such air travel could be accompanied by a commercial air defense dome or a negotiation similar to the Black Sea grain corridor but only for air cargo transportation. Furthermore, if private sector players were allowed to receive licenses for IMPCs, these companies could transport goods via the skies, alleviating some of the cargo burden from the roads and diversifying the means of transportation.</p> -<p>The passage of the law was delayed as specific legislative amendments in relation to confidentiality were required, which the Ministry of Finance continues to work on. The law’s drafters were asked to research the confidentiality issue and prepare the necessary amendments to provide safeguards in relation to private information. Currently there is a concern among government officials regarding how personal data could be leaked or misused for malicious purposes.</p> +<h3 id="long-term-solutions">Long-Term Solutions</h3> -<p>One participant noted that officials have identified as a major obstacle a lack of coherence of Ukraine’s data protection regulations in relation to the EU framework. The country has not yet adopted the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation provisions, which would impact the entire process. Participants also noted that Russia has made attempts to abuse the register and use the information included in it. To deal with cyber security threats, a deadline for the establishment of the register has been set for 2027. This will give Ukrainian authorities time to involve cyber security experts in its development and prepare the appropriate procedures and protocols.</p> +<p>Along with these short-term measures, Ukraine could envision new and expanded logistics routes to serve trade activity along the EU border. In this regard, EU membership will be a major incentive to improve the transport and logistics network and align regulations and standards to the EU market. To increase trade with the European Union, Ukraine will need to construct new roads, widen existing ones, modernize the railway system, and increase the capacity of the border checkpoints. In the long run, Ukraine will have to prioritize EU accession requirements related to infrastructure, such as TEN-T-related policies and its overall transport policy. However, Ukraine’s progress in this realm so far has been limited.</p> -<p>One participant recalled that the EU’s Ukraine Facility programme requirements mandate the implementation of a single register by 2027. Ukraine’s National Revenue Strategy for 2024–30 acknowledges the importance of building trust and confidence within the population in the use of private information about bank accounts in the register.</p> +<p>On road infrastructure, there is still plenty of work to be done to modernize the current system and build new infrastructure. Private capital and Western companies will play a vital role in the reconstruction of Ukraine’s roads. According to a study by the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank, public-private partnerships (PPPs) had the potential to attract approximately $2 billion in road investments from the private sector between 2021 and 2023. Ukraine could also build more roads that lead toward borders with Moldova and Romania. However, highway construction in Ukraine inherited a reputation as one of the most corrupt sectors in transportation. To address this issue, Ukraine has been implementing reforms since 2014 and needs to continue on this path. The Ukrainian government now requires each company that has won a tender must hire an engineer from the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, which provides more professionalism, transparency, efficiency, and accountability to management. Furthermore, the country’s public e-procurement system (ProZorro) has made the bidding procedure for government contracts more transparent. Ukraine has also decentralized its state roads agency, Ukravtodor.</p> -<h3 id="the-effectiveness-of-ukraines-response-to-financial-crime">The Effectiveness of Ukraine’s Response to Financial Crime</h3> +<p>The port infrastructure requires upgrading as well, including dredging and construction of docking sites. Ukraine’s Odesa port infrastructure has ample potential to develop further, as it is connected to the Dnipro River, which has also been majorly underutilized for cargo transportation during the past decades. If Ukraine advances its river infrastructure, it will put less pressure on roads (which are more expensive for the government to maintain) and expand the overall trade capacity. Furthermore, Ukraine has the advantage of having access to the largest EU river, the Danube, which stretches to the largest EU economy — Germany.</p> -<h4 id="publicprivate-partnerships-ppps">Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs)</h4> +<p>In this regard, Romania has become a critical player in exporting Ukrainian grain in the past year, though more investments in Romanian port infrastructure may be necessary if it is to accommodate further increases in the coming months and years. The European Union and the United States have already sent a delegation to visit Izmail, as the port is key to ferrying cargo down the Danube River into Romania, which then transports the grain to Constanta for its journey into the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, maritime insurance needs to be more readily available, along with infrastructure investments in grain storage capacity in Romanian and Moldovan silos, to accommodate the increased fertilizer and grain surpluses inevitable in an unpredictable war.</p> -<p>Beyond the discussion of Ukraine’s technical compliance with AML standards, the workshop also placed a spotlight on the issue of the effectiveness of the country’s response to financial crime. The 2017 Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) on Ukraine concluded that the implementation of measures necessary to fight financial crime in the country was not sufficiently effective. Consequently, the workshop discussion extended beyond the technical ratings of the FATF. Among the topics raised against this backdrop was the current status of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in Ukraine.</p> +<p>At the same time, countries bordering Ukraine’s western regions will have to expand their road and rail capacities as well. Land corridors that allow for trucking are still beneficial to exports, and there is a sense of urgency to widen and expand current roads that traverse out toward Moldova and Romania. With support from the European Investment Bank and EBRD, Moldova is also improving its railway network to ease Ukrainian grain shipments through Moldovan roads.</p> -<p>Participants emphasised the key role of PPPs, particularly in the evolving landscape of AML technology. They underscored how PPPs significantly enhance the formulation of efficient market rules and regulations in two key ways. First, they serve as effective deterrents against market violations, while driving progress. Second, given the potential unfamiliarity of state officials with emerging technologies and their business applications, PPPs offer a collaborative platform for knowledge sharing to facilitate deeper understanding of these technologies. However, it was noted that the bureaucratic nature of certain authorities can cause challenges in establishing robust PPPs. Nevertheless, one participant argued that the key to initiating and sustaining PPPs lies in their voluntary nature. Thus, there needs to be a strong emphasis on fostering willingness and providing incentives for the private sector to collaborate with the public sector.</p> +<p>Currently, the freight throughput capacity of rail border crossing points between Ukraine and the European Union is low. This can be resolved by increasing administrative staff (e.g., customs, border police), modernizing equipment, and expanding infrastructure. The European Union has already contributed to the development of Ukraine’s cross-border railway infrastructure via the Connecting Europe Facility. Furthermore, Ukraine needs to have easier access to main EU distribution points such as in the Adriatic and Baltic Seas and at Danube ports.</p> -<p>Positive examples of PPPs in Ukraine emerged during the discussion, although these were not always in relation to conventional financial crime. Participants argued that PPPs in Ukraine are often used for such purposes as raising awareness and establishing communication channels, showcasing the diverse and innovative ways in which they can be leveraged for mutual benefit. On this, one participant highlighted the efforts of the National Bank of Ukraine in raising awareness and establishing a direct communication channel with the private sector. Also mentioned as a good example of a PPP was the Public Council under the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance, a group that includes representatives of public organisations, trade unions and other citizen associations, which gathers annually to discuss issues related to financial services and their impact on society. It was noted that the State Financial Monitoring Service has also set up a Public Council on AML issues. Another participant highlighted that the Ministry of Digital Transformation is actively working on developing a regulatory “sandbox”, scheduled for completion by the end of 2024. This sandbox aims to streamline communication between businesses and government authorities, fostering an environment conducive to PPPs. While some of the initiatives mentioned by the participants suggested promising steps towards PPP development in Ukraine, it was agreed that there remains a need to further strengthen and expand these efforts and learn from foreign experience.</p> +<p>In parallel to border issues, Ukraine’s rail system requires deep reforms to create a more competitive rail cargo transportation market that corresponds to EU standards. Currently, this is difficult considering the centralized nature of management during war where rail transportation of humanitarian goods and citizens is important for the country’s functioning. However, this does not mean Ukraine cannot start reforming UZ in the meantime. For example, Ukraine could create an independent railways regulator responsible for tariffs and overall regulation of the monopoly. Furthermore, UZ’s activities should eventually be unbundled, since currently, it has a monopoly both within rail infrastructure and within the cargo transit. The latter could be operated by private sector locomotives and transit companies, which would significantly modernize and expand the fleet. Allowing Western companies to enter would also make Ukraine less dependent on Soviet infrastructure and fleet.</p> -<h4 id="recovery-of-the-proceeds-of-crime">Recovery of the Proceeds of Crime</h4> +<p>Ukraine’s current rail fleet is a remnant of the Soviet Union. Considering the increase of wear and tear on the rail fleet since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has not been able to keep up with the maintenance. More than 70,000 (or 70 percent) of UZ’s wagons have expired their service life, a quarter of which are in critical condition. Western companies specializing in the mechanical management of rail systems could play a significant role in modernizing Ukraine’s rail. In addition, a key problem is that the European Union and Ukraine use different gauges and wagon types, which limits the number of wagons Ukraine can use. A short-term solution could be the construction of multimodal cargo terminals located close to EU borders to convert Ukrainian rail gauge to EU gauge. Such locations can also be industrial and manufacturing hubs.</p> -<p>Another key topic raised concerning the effectiveness of Ukraine’s anti-financial crime measures related to the country’s efforts to recover the proceeds of crime. Asset recovery is a key FATF priority, particularly under the current Singaporean presidency. In fact, Ukraine’s MER noted that the country needs to ensure that prosecutors handling proceeds-generating cases are well-trained in modern financial investigative techniques, and highlighted a need for focused guidance on the importance of early restraint and confiscation of proceeds.</p> +<p>Ukraine’s long-term reforms should prioritize the independence of industry regulators to ensure the market is fair and competitive. This will significantly strengthen Ukraine’s image in front of investors. As discussed, PPPs will be an important tool in attracting private investment in infrastructure. Ukraine’s lawmakers have been working on reforming Ukraine’s PPP legislation to make partnerships more transparent and create a more competitive business environment. This tool can be applied toward highway development, as done in many other countries.</p> -<p>On Ukraine’s efforts to recover assets, a participant from the Prosecutor General’s Office noted that considerable effort has gone into developing the efficiency of pre-trial investigations of criminal cases. The Prosecutor General’s website has published reports on the results of AML investigations, noting that 7,832 criminal offences related to AML and CTF were investigated in 2023. The report also shows that, according to indictments, the established value of legalised property obtained by criminal means in this period was UAH 2,998,290,540 ($78,263,910), of which UAH 212,426,030 ($5,544,923.50) has been seized. However, despite these achievements, it was highlighted that the key to ensuring effectiveness in recovering the proceeds of crime lies in taking a comprehensive approach during pre-trial investigations. Participants noted that while accessing information about assets or accounts within Ukraine is swift, investigations involving international partners take a long time and can be delayed by prolonged procedures. That said, Ukraine’s formal and informal cooperation with EU countries on mutual legal assistance was reported as working well. Additionally, attention was drawn to the importance of court judgements authorising confiscation, highlighting the key role that these play in asset recovery. It was noted that Ukraine’s particularly low score on Immediate Outcome 7 of its MER – which relates to the effectiveness of a country’s money laundering investigations and prosecutions – should serve as a reminder of the need to demonstrate effective use of financial investigations to recover assets.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Overall, one workshop participant emphasised that it is crucial to recognise that the impact of the FATF assessment of Ukraine is still ongoing. Ukraine’s 2020 MER requires the country to continually report on its efforts to address the deficiencies identified in the MER, and it must submit a progress report by December 2024.</p> +<p>Ukraine’s ability to trade will remain restricted as long as the Russian military threats remain high. Of the numerous challenges Ukraine faces with trade corridors, one of the primary priorities is to find solutions to protect Ukrainian ports from Russian missile strikes. Second, railways and roads need to be upgraded. Although imperfect substitutes for the existing port infrastructure, railway and road infrastructure must be modernized to complement seaport trade.</p> -<p>Looking ahead, while Ukraine’s next MONEYVAL Assessment will not occur until 2027, workshop participants emphasised that all relevant stakeholders in the country should take the necessary measures to both uphold high standards of technical compliance by passing relevant legislation and ensure their effectiveness by ensuring that these laws are implemented. The world – and the EU in particular – is watching.</p> +<p>Ukraine’s vision for its economy and its future drivers will also help define the nature of its transportation network. Will the economy produce and export at higher levels than those before the full-scale invasion? Will Ukraine add more value to its raw materials and export finished goods, or will it continue to be primarily a commodity exporter? Ultimately, Ukraine’s infrastructure modernization will be intimately linked to the country’s EU accession path.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Oksana Ihnatenko</strong> is a Researcher for the Supervising and Monitoring Ukraine’s Reconstruction Funds (SMURF) project at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines resilience and integrity of the Ukraine’s financial system. In particular, her research focuses on Ukraine’s adherence to FATF standards, fighting financial crime, anti-money laundering efforts, and issues surrounding reconstruction.</p> - -<p><strong>Arzu Abbasova</strong> is a Research Analyst for the Centre for Finance and Security. She works on CFCS’s Restricting Kleptocracy project, besides managing related communications and engaging with stakeholders.</p>Oksana Ihnatenko and Arzu AbbasovaThis report highlights key stakeholder views from a recent workshop on developments in Ukraine’s financial system.【黎智英案・審訊第 54 日】2024-03-28T12:00:00+08:002024-03-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-54<ul> - <li>李宇軒：推翻中共可達至解放香港 國安法後提議游說外國取消與港引渡條例</li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Romina Bandura</strong> is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development and Project on Leadership and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Ilya Timtchenko</strong> is a program manager and research associate with the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2zOtMj3.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p><strong>Benjamin Robb</strong> was an intern with the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development.</p>Romina Bandura, et al.The full-scale Russian invasion has devastating effects on Ukraine’s trade causing vast destruction of its transport and logistics infrastructure. Ukraine and its partners have to be creative and determined in finding new trade corridors to support business operations.Eroding Trust In Government2024-04-08T12:00:00+08:002024-04-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/eroding-trust-in-government<p><em>In the future, malign actors will seek to undermine trust in government through disrupting basic needs and services such as food aid and medical assistance, in place of costly offensive cyber campaigns.</em></p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第54日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。庭上展示李與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）之間的訊息對話，二人在《國安法》實施之前討論對策，裴倫德指香港在整個地緣政治的大局裡會被殃及，李則表示香港人樂意「攬炒」。李的訊息又指香港人嘗試以示威來說服國際社會作出改變，但是至今仍未見有任何制裁措施針對侵犯人權者，只有「譴責聲明」。李指上述訊息的潛台詞是希望 IPAC 除了「譴責聲明」之外，可以為香港做更多事。</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>二人另就運動手段和目標辯論，裴倫德認為如果最終目標是香港自治的話，毀滅中共是一個手段，因香港自由化的敵人是中共；李雖然同意推翻中共可能是達至解放香港的一種手段，但是香港人的目標並不是在北京層面推動民主化。李亦認為外界期望香港人透過上街來推翻中共是不切實際，因香港年輕一代已經開始覺得悼念六四不關自己事，現時統治香港的人是「香港政權」加上「北京政權」，但香港社會暫未有足夠意見認為要擴展至「推翻中共」。</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Societies will be held hostage through cyberspace by states and non-state actors seeking to target the most vulnerable as part of larger political warfare campaigns waged online. In place of costly offensive cyber campaigns, malign actors will seek to undermine trust and confidence in government through disrupting basic needs and services such as food aid and medical assistance, creating an insidious new form of countervalue targeting.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Gender dynamics will increasingly play a significant role in shaping perceptions of cyber threats, especially in the context of misinformation campaigns. The manipulation of gender-based differences through deepfakes and computational propaganda will exacerbate fault lines adversaries can use to further polarize society and undermine trust and confidence in governing institutions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Distrust in government will be further compounded as citizens struggle to understand cybersecurity strategy and the funding levels required to protect critical infrastructure. Governments will continue to face challenges in educating the public about evolving cyber threats and balancing the ways and means required to protect the ability to provide public goods online.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>李指裴倫德的訊息是在說服他嘗試把眼光集中在中共身上，而非只聚焦在香港。</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第11天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> +<p>What is the future of cyber war? Over the last 20 years, most accounts stress large-scale operations waged by states targeting rival military networks and power grids through a mix of espionage and offensive information campaigns. In these scenarios, planes fall out of the sky and entire cities go dark. Yet this vision discounts the prospects of a more indirect and insidious approach: holding a society hostage through targeting its ability to credibly share information and deliver public goods and services online.</p> -<h4 id="裴倫德訊息指香港會遭受殃及-李宇軒覺得香港人樂意攬炒">裴倫德訊息指香港會遭受殃及 李宇軒覺得香港人樂意「攬炒」</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This edition of the On Future War series combines tabletop exercises, a public survey, and scenarios created with generative artificial intelligence to analyze how cyber threats are evolving. The best prediction of an uncertain future is based on combining expert opinion and public attitudes to visualize and describe cyber operations almost certain to change the character of war.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>控方展示李宇軒與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC）創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）之間的訊息紀錄。在2020年6月27日，裴倫德向李稱他們的策略需要調整（“Andy I think our strategy need to pivot.”），又指現時問題是如何懲罰和征服，並如何利用降臨在香港的「可怕東西」，在六個月內「殺死中共」：</p> +<p>This installment of On Future War uses a novel mix of expert forecasts, public surveys, and future threat scenarios generated by artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze the changing character of cyber campaigns targeting the U.S. federal government. Based on data gathered from six tabletop exercises (TTXs) with over 50 leading cyber experts and foreign policy practitioners, as well as a public survey of over 1,000 participants from across the United States, experts and the public see a cyber future marked by attacks on government services, critical infrastructure, and trust in society itself. The findings highlight a preference among potential adversaries for undermining the United States through cyberattacks that cause widespread disruption in essential services and small businesses coupled with espionage campaigns designed to steal patents and support long-term technological competition. Furthermore, the findings indicate a trend toward using cyber operations to destabilize social order and undermine public trust, particularly in the context of significant political events such as elections and foreign policy crises. This finding points to a future where cyber warfare is not only a tool for direct socioeconomic disruption but also a means to sow discord and manipulate public opinion.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“The question now is how to punish, divide and conquer. And how to use the terrible things that will happen in HK over the next six months to kill the CCP.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The public survey, modeled on the project’s TTX framework, revealed a general lack of clarity and awareness about the U.S. government’s cybersecurity funding. It also unveiled a striking gender gap in perceptions: men were considerably more inclined to deem the current cybersecurity funding as sufficient compared to women. Similarly, women exhibited greater concern over the consequences of deepfake technologies compared to men. Furthermore, integrating U.S. Census Bureau and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Election Data and Science Lab data with survey results revealed that the political preferences of participants’ congressional districts had minimal influence on individual player perceptions and strategies. The research team also controlled and tested environmental socioeconomic variables at the district level — including majority–minority districts by population, household median income, educational achievement, healthcare coverage, and social net benefits — but did not find them significantly impactful on individual player perceptions. In other words, the U.S. public shares a common concern about the future of cyber war that transcends political and regional differences assumed to divide the nation. These ideas echo in Future Lab’s recent study on defending the .gov ecosystem.</p> -<p>裴倫德補充，香港會遭受殃及（“HK will be collateral.”）。李回應，香港人知道並且樂意扮演這個角色（“this we know and we are very happy to play this role”）。李庭上解釋，訊息中「play this role」的意思是「攬炒」，即是不論對於自己一方、對方還是各方，「對大家都有傷害嘅嘢。」至於裴倫德的訊息「HK will be collateral.」，李指他意思是在整個地緣政治的大局裡，香港會變成遭受殃及，而李認為香港人樂意「攬炒」。</p> +<p>To address the evolving cyber threat landscape, a multifaceted approach is recommended. First, a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy is essential to protect social services such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid, particularly during critical events such as elections. The United States cannot risk malign actors holding the most vulnerable U.S. citizens hostage during a major crisis or political transition. Second, enhancing public awareness and transparency in cybersecurity funding is vital, necessitating extensive educational campaigns and the establishment of an organization for collecting and analyzing cyber statistics. The U.S. government must engage the public with data about threats and trends. An informed polis is more resilient, but currently the U.S. government lacks a coherent, data-driven collection of cyber statistics to inform the private sector and general public.</p> -<p>法官李運騰問李的意思是否香港會遭到破壞，對方同樣會遭到破壞，而李樂意付出這個代價。李同意。</p> +<p>The U.S. government is unlikely to mobilize sufficient attention and resources if it does not invest in public-facing data, a lesson learned long ago with respect to economic statistics. Additionally, fostering real-time information sharing among federal agencies and the private sector is key to a cohesive cyber defense strategy and maintaining public trust. With a pool of data, the government can make forecasts about future threats and better align federal resources, including money, labor, and technology.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒預料香港不會再有大型示威-因示威只換來譴責聲明不值得-未見任何制裁">李宇軒預料香港不會再有大型示威 因示威只換來「譴責聲明」不值得 未見任何制裁</h4> +<h3 id="the-changing-character-of-cyber-warfare">The Changing Character of Cyber Warfare</h3> -<p>李宇軒其後向裴倫德說，中共已經做了非常可怕的事，即是他們的陣營沒有任何人要求訂立《國安法》，也沒有人設局誘使中共這樣做，中共只是出其不意地立法及實質上重燃運動，李認為他們只需要說出真相。</p> +<p>While scholars and practitioners once perceived cyber operations as decisive battlefield instruments that heralded a new way of war, the reality has proved to be different. States are increasingly crafting multifaceted cyber strategies that incorporate coercion and a blend of mis-, dis-, and malinformation campaigns. In place of traditional military operations, more espionage and information operations are taking place. As cyber strategies evolve beyond conventional military tactics and traditional espionage, there appears to be a marked shift in focus toward critical civilian infrastructure, reflecting a strategy aimed at exploiting the interconnectedness and vulnerabilities of modern societies.</p> -<p>裴倫德問李，示威有什麼前景（“What are the prospects for a demo?”）。李則指香港人嘗試以示威來說服國際社會作出改變，但是至今仍未見有任何制裁措施針對已退休的指揮官陶輝或其他侵犯人權者，他們仍然在自由自在，但香港人得到的只有「譴責聲明」（“so far we haven’t seen concrete sanctions falling upon, say, Dover or other perpetrators; they still roam free and all we get are ‘condemn’ statements”）。李又指，香港人的性命只換來一些聲明並不值得（“the lives of HKers aren’t worth just in exchange for some statements”）。</p> +<h4 id="critical-infrastructure">Critical Infrastructure</h4> -<p>李庭上解釋，他當時的判斷是香港短期內不會再有大型示威，因為香港人不認為有用，經過示威後除了「譴責聲明」外便什麼也得不到，所以李在訊息中向裴倫德解釋為什麼香港不會再有大型示威出現。</p> +<p>The traditional focus on military and intelligence targets in cyber operations has expanded to encompass a broader spectrum of targets, including civilian critical infrastructure. This shift represents a strategic move toward countervalue targeting, where the aim is to undermine governments by digitally taking citizens hostage, thereby changing the character of the threat environment. For instance, the Volt Typhoon espionage campaign by the Chinese Communist Party in 2023 targeted critical infrastructure networks through a service provider, demonstrating the strategic value placed on these targets. Similarly, on December 23, 2015, Ukrainian energy firms suffered unexpected blackouts affecting vast customer areas, alongside reports of malicious software in various essential service sectors. Technical investigations revealed the presence of BlackEnergy malware on their systems, though its exact contribution to the incidents remains under scrutiny.</p> -<p>控方指當李說香港人不認為示威有用時，李是否該些香港人之一？李回答：「我當然係香港人。」控方又問，李認為示威沒有用，那他認為做什麼才有用。李則表示：「我唔知。」</p> +<p>Countervalue targeting inverts decades of military strategy and introduces a new form of cyber warfare that threatens the very foundations of civilian life. The focal point is the critical infrastructure of modern states, which is integral to the welfare of its citizens. These sectors have emerged as key battlefields in cyberspace. In fact, according to the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Campaign Dataset, states are 4.5 times more likely to see a rival target the non-security agencies of their government and the private sector than their military and intelligence agencies. This type of cyber operation is especially alarming because it threatens to severely disrupt everyday civilian services.</p> -<p>法官李運騰問，裴倫德是否不建議再進行大型示威。李表示不是，當時《國安法》即將生效，裴倫德希望他可以預計會發生什麼事，以便日後在英國或美國層面作出回應，所以李告訴裴倫德大型示威似乎不會再發生。</p> +<p>The increasing frequency of indiscriminate ransomware attacks across critical infrastructure sectors underscores countervalue targeting and vulnerabilities to civilian services. For example, the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack, which rapidly disseminated across the United Kingdom’s National Health Service, had a highly specific and targeted nature and impacted multiple municipal emergency service providers. The convergence of digital and critical infrastructure networks opens new vulnerabilities, transforming these sectors into attractive targets for adversaries aiming to inflict economic and societal damage.</p> -<p>法官李運騰再問，李是否在訊息中說服裴倫德或 IPAC 要採取什麼行動。李則指上述訊息的潛台詞是：「如果你哋做多過出譴責聲明嘅話會更好喇。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iH8AxsW.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cyber Critical Infastructure Targeting.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/cisas-evolving-gov-mission-defending-united-states-federal-executive-agency-networks">Jensen et al., CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks (Washington, DC: CSIS, October 2023)</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱為香港而運動推翻中共僅次要動機-裴倫德則認為應先推翻中共才能解決香港問題">李宇軒稱為香港而運動、推翻中共僅次要動機 裴倫德則認為應先推翻中共才能解決香港問題</h4> +<h3 id="political-warfare">Political Warfare</h3> -<p>李又向裴倫德表示，他們的目標是建立香港，推翻中共可能是一個次要動機，但這動機從不會強大到足以令香港人考慮犧牲自己（“the thing is, our aim is to first establish HK, taking down CCP might be a secondary motive but it will never be a strong enough motive for HKers to consider sacrificing themselves”），因他們是為香港而參與運動，而不是在北京層面推動民主化（“we campaign for Hong Kong, not for some democratic change at Beijing level”）。</p> +<p>Political and cognitive warfare have emerged as recent themes in the literature on modern conflict, reflecting the strategic evolution of cyber operations. Research has examined how the manipulation of digital information ecosystems, particularly through “fake news,” disinformation, and online manipulation, poses significant threats to trust in democratic institutions and processes. This manipulation is not merely an act of disinformation, but a strategic component of political warfare designed to influence and control public perception.</p> -<p>裴倫德則回應，「推翻中共」與「建立香港」兩者是密不可分，如果最終目標是香港自治的話，毀滅中共是一個手段（“If the end is self government, the means is the destruction of the CCP”）。李宇軒則回應，這是手段與最終目標的問題（“it’s the means vs end perception”），而推翻中共可能是達至解放香港的一種手段（“take down CCP might be a mean to liberate HK (the end)”），但不是掉轉過來。</p> +<p>Political warfare has evolved with the digital age, becoming a tool for states to achieve objectives without open conflict. Cyber operations against critical infrastructure are now part of this strategy. These actions undermine trust in democratic processes and can sway public opinion through “fake news,” disinformation, and online manipulation. Cyberattacks on infrastructure serve a dual purpose: they cause immediate disruption and exert long-term psychological impact, aligning with political warfare aims. Cognitive warfare specifically targets the way people think, influencing their actions during sensitive times such as elections. This form of warfare uses the global reach of digital technology to manipulate collective intelligence. By changing perceptions, adversaries can weaken the credibility of governments and destabilize societies from within.</p> -<p>法官李運騰問李和裴倫德是否在訊息中辯論，李表示「都有啲」；李官又問二人是否有意見上的分歧。李指分歧可以總結為，他自己當時的形勢判斷是以香港為中心，而「Luke de Pulford 應該認為呢個係要由北京嗰度開始睇嘅」。</p> +<p>Cyber operations have thus become a critical component of political and cognitive warfare. By disrupting essential services, attackers can magnify societal divisions and erode trust in public institutions, potentially manipulating the political landscape to their advantage. This is exemplified by Russia’s cyber activities, where such operations are viewed not only as a breach of digital security but as an active measure in a broader campaign of political warfare. The targeting of critical infrastructure through cyber operations becomes a tool to exacerbate existing societal divisions, weaken trust in public institutions, and ultimately alter the political landscape to favor the attacking state’s objectives.</p> -<p>李官追問，所以裴倫德的視野比李看得更遠和更大，因為他想中國作出改變。李則理解：「應該係 Luke de Pulford 認為首先要係中國做咗改變，然後先至可以解決香港問題，但我就覺得無論中國有冇改變都好，我個 focus 係喺香港嗰度。」</p> +<h3 id="from-trends-to-games-scenarios-and-surveys">From Trends to Games, Scenarios, and Surveys</h3> -<p>控方追問李所說的「中國改變」是否意指推翻中共。李同意。控方又問，想透過推翻中共達到什麼目標。李回答：「Liberate Hong Kong⋯⋯啫係解放香港，由中共手中解放出嚟，做返香港人。」</p> +<p>Understanding how these trends shape the future of cyber operations and deterrence requires pivoting from policy analysis by case study to more diverse, multi-method assessments of twenty-first-century strategic competition. Methods such as games and public surveys provide a way to compare expert assessments and attitudes among the general population. These approaches provide valuable insights into the strategic logic behind various types of cyberattacks, their impact on government services, and the necessary measures required to strengthen cybersecurity. Furthermore, public surveys can help shed light on the general awareness and perceptions of cybersecurity threats, highlighting gaps in public education and government communication.</p> -<p>李官則表示不解，昨天的「SWHK IPAC」群組訊息顯示，李並不主張香港獨立，與上述李和裴倫德之間的對話內容不同。李則解釋，在「SWHK IPAC」群組討論的語境之中，他的確不主張港獨，但是在與裴倫德討論的語境下，「我唔反對呢條 line。」</p> +<p>Using generative AI to build scenarios offers a novel mechanism for synthesizing findings and supporting policy analysis. AI-generated scenarios — especially when fine-tuned and calibrated — offer a method for turning preliminary research findings into narrative, slice-of-time scenarios. This combination of human insight and machine synthesis is a key component of the ongoing research relationship between the CSIS Futures Lab and ScaleAI. The ongoing research explores the human-machine interaction and its effect on scenario building.</p> -<h4 id="裴倫德稱香港自由化的敵人是中共-惟李宇軒指香港人不認為要擴展至推翻中共">裴倫德稱香港自由化的敵人是中共 惟李宇軒指香港人不認為要擴展至「推翻中共」</h4> +<h4 id="would-you-like-to-play-a-game">Would You Like to Play a Game?</h4> -<p>裴倫德向李解釋，從政的首項要點是「你永遠有一個敵人」，第二點是打敗敵人的方法是打散它的部隊、狠擊它和佔領它的領土。裴倫德又強調任何未能認清敵人的策略都不是策略，而香港自由化的敵人是中共。</p> +<p>To analyze how experts in cybersecurity assess emerging threats and approach cyber strategy, the researchers in the CSIS Futures Lab designed a TTX entitled Shadow Table. Shadow Table had these experts assess the optimal targets for holding the United States hostage during the upcoming 2024 U.S. presidential election, including recommendations for hypothetical state and non-state actors. Unbeknownst to the participants, they were randomly assigned to different groups based on how the U.S. government would seek to counter their selected strategy. As a result, the design captured adversary feedback loops while increasing the ability of the researchers to collect data on the underlying strategic logic, target preferences, and resource allocations of would-be attackers (i.e., the ends, ways, and means of cyber strategy).</p> -<p>李則指第二點是他們一直嘗試做的事，所以制裁是「願望清單」首位（“that’s why Sanctions have been on top of wishlists”），尤其是有針對目標的制裁（“esp targeted sanctions”）。李在庭上解釋，他在訊息所說的制裁對象是涉及侵犯人權的人士。</p> +<p>The CSIS Futures Lab ran Shadow Table virtually with six separate groups totaling 55 participants. In each session, participants included experts in cybersecurity and cyber strategy, ranging from public and private sector chief information security officers (CISOs) to academics and national security experts. During each session, the participants played two scenarios covering major threat vectors: (1) advise a major nation-state and (2) advise a non-state actor network. In each scenario, participants could select the malign actor they wanted to advise, with states including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea and non-state actors including right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists, and criminal groups. As a result, researchers in the CSIS Futures Lab could compare and contrast different state and non-state approaches while controlling for actor type and assess motivations through a mix of data capture and moderated discussions. Put simply, the games were built to capture strategic preferences and examine how experts anticipate malign cyber actors might target the United States during the upcoming 2024 U.S. presidential election.</p> -<p>李在訊息中向裴倫德表示，他認為外界期望香港人透過上街來推翻中共是不切實際，香港年輕一代已經開始覺得悼念六四事不關己，所以敵人並不是中共本身。李續指，如果要談論敵人的話，現時統治香港的人是「香港政權」和「北京政權」，但暫時香港社會未有足夠意見認為要擴展至「推翻中共」。</p> +<p>During the state and non-state scenarios, players gave recommendations on how best to undermine U.S. elections by targeting public services administered by the federal government. These services span a broad range, encompassing essential basic needs such as food and medical assistance to economic programs such as farm loans and critical research conducted by universities and national research institutes. Specifically, players first selected how much time and effort they recommended allocating toward building malware targeting federal programs and services in three areas: (1) the provision of basic needs, (2) small and medium-sized businesses, and (3) science and technology. Second, players recommended their preferred attack method for each, recommending how to allocate a finite set of resources among four methods: (1) low-cost deepfakes, (2) low-cost disruption, (3) espionage, or (4) higher-cost, more complex degradation. Of note, these attack methods are linked to commonly accepted categories used in academic studies on cyber strategy. By forcing players to allocate scarce resources against different attack targets and methods, the game captured how experts approach cyber strategies designed to disrupt core government services during a key political transition.</p> -<p>李庭上解釋，因為當時香港自由民主被壓縮的政治環境，是由香港政權所造成，而香港政權背後有北京政權撐腰，「叫香港嘅政權咁樣去管治」，所以他在訊息中說統治香港的人是「香港政權」和「北京政權」。他認為裴倫德是在說服他嘗試把眼光集中在中共身上，而非只聚焦在香港。</p> +<p>Based on this design, Shadow Table served as a forum to both discuss strategy and capture statistical data on preferences. The use of TTXs as a quantitative approach to inform decisionmaking processes is an established line of practice dating back to the nineteenth century. The game design used in Shadow Table reflects emerging trends in analytical wargaming that adapt simulations to capture data in a manner that supports evidence-based policy recommendations. It expands the application of these methods from international to domestic crises, blending traditional elements such as comparing expert-vs.-public outcomes and statistical analysis with new dimensions such as electoral periods and socioeconomic factors. The methodology allows for creative self-selection by participants, focusing on their perception of roles and objectives as a mechanism for identifying different strategic approaches. This approach facilitates a quantitative analysis of political and cognitive warfare by these actors, drawing on political psychology in international relations.</p> -<p>法官李運騰問，所以裴倫德認為中共是敵人，有需要推翻它，過程中香港會被殃及。李同意。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Cyberattack Methods</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="李宇軒託裴倫德邀請外國政客參與反國安法聯署">李宇軒託裴倫德邀請外國政客參與反國安法聯署</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Deepfakes: The creation of fake images, text, and videos designed to skew public perception.</code></em></p> -<p>2020年6月29日，李宇軒向裴倫德傳送一份反《國安法》聯署聲明連結，指暫時收集了21個簽署，包括17名香港區議員和4名日本議員。李託裴倫德邀請更多外國政客、社運人士和組織參與聯署，並指聲明會安排在6月30日凌晨發布，因要趕及在國安法實施之前發布，以保護參與聯署的香港區議員和在港組織。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Disruption: Low-cost, temporary operations that deface websites or lead to temporary denial of service.</code></em></p> -<p>李供稱，SWHK 成員有共識不在 SWHK 的網站發布該聲明，他其後開設了一個名為「Anti NSL」的網站，在《國安法》生效之前發布了聲明，從6月30日至7月初，他仍然持續收集聯署及更新聯署名單。至於為何李在訊息中稱該聯署聲明可以補足 IPAC 的聲明，李庭上解釋該聯署聲明有香港區議員的支持，又開放予組織參與聯署，加上有日本議員，「呢啲係當時我覺得 IPAC 聲明做唔到嘅嘢。」</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Espionage: Stealing sensitive information and creating access for future cyberattacks.</code></em></p> -<p>其後，李向裴倫德傳送新聞稿，顯示聲明標題為〈香港民選區議員及各國議員等組織聯署 反對港版《國安法》並呼籲國際社會推行政策回應〉，共有83名議員、政界人物和民間組織參與聯署，涵蓋14個國家。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Degradation: More complex attacks that shut down core functions, destroy data, or take networks offline for a longer period of time.</code></em></p> -<p>控方庭上展示「Anti NSL」網站截圖，顯示聯署人士包括「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯和山尾志櫻里（本名「菅野志桜里」）。聲明內容要求各國針對有份侵犯人權和削弱法治的中國和香港官員實施制裁，包括禁止入境、凍結資產等，又促請各國持續監察中國的行為，例如是否有違反《中英聯合聲明》。聲明又要求民主政體提供誘因支持企業將生產線和營運基地轉移至民主國家，以減少經濟方面對中國的依賴，各國應聯手在經濟層面脫離中國的影響，以及檢視中國資本的滲透。</p> +<h4 id="shadow-table-findings">Shadow Table Findings</h4> -<p>網站提供3種語言版本，即英語、德語和「香港話」。至於為何只有這三種語言，李表示沒有特別原因。</p> +<p>Overall, experts selected the option to disrupt basic needs more than other targets, and the preference was statistically significant in both the state and non-state threat scenarios. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate expert targeting preferences most likely to disrupt trust and confidence in the U.S. federal government during a key political transition such as an election or during a foreign policy crisis. The majority of experts prioritized attacks on the provision of basic needs, reflecting a strategy to disrupt the lives of civilians and potentially cause unrest during elections. This preference for targeting basic needs was consistent regardless of whether participants were playing as state or non-state actors, underscoring the perceived effectiveness of such attacks in destabilizing the U.S. federal government and its executive agencies. Furthermore, the choice of target indicates that attackers prefer to sow chaos or tap into the deep personal fears of civilians that rely on such basic needs. For example, SNAP food assistance alone serves as a lifeline for over 40 million socioeconomically disadvantaged U.S. citizens. Disrupting food access during an election could catalyze further polarization and even unrest.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指國安法後出現政治罪行-研游說外國取消司法互助協議或引渡逃犯">李宇軒指國安法後出現「政治罪行」 研游說外國取消司法互助協議或引渡逃犯</h4> +<p>During discussions, participants detailed their strategic logic and the utility of targeting basic needs. Experts saw this attack vector as the best placed to create chaos and increase public mistrust in institutions. Furthermore, groups discussed how these attacks — if effective — could lead to protests, unrest, and a loss of trust in the U.S. government’s ability to protect basic needs. In addition, experts saw the resulting economic distress and fear amplify public discontent and raise questions about the competence and reliability of government institutions. Expert discussions revealed a prevailing assessment that compromising people’s basic needs could also make the population at large more susceptible to dis- and misinformation campaigns, thereby opening up additional vectors for foreign manipulation and radicalization.</p> -<p>2020年7月2日，李宇軒問裴倫德是否應該游說外國取消與香港簽訂的司法互助協議或引渡逃犯措施，又問裴倫德或 IPAC 是否會就此展開工作，或者交給各地的港人組織去做。李庭上解釋，因為《國安法》實施之後，香港便開始有「政治罪行（political crimes）」，所以其他國家需要因應香港的政治罪行而重新檢視司法互助協議或引渡逃犯措施，以及考慮是否繼續簽訂協議。</p> +<p>In other words, experts saw targeting vulnerable groups as the best way to undermine the U.S. government.</p> -<p>李指，IPAC 部份成員成立了一個小組來研究這範疇，但他不是小組成員之一。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gZJbYm7.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.1: Non-state Actor Targeting Preferences.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al., CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> -<h4 id="李宇軒協助-ipac-聯絡山尾志櫻里討論取消與港引渡協議">李宇軒協助 IPAC 聯絡山尾志櫻里討論取消與港引渡協議</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sQ1iGnv.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.2: State Actor Targeting Preferences.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab.</em></p> -<p>訊息紀錄顯示，裴倫德要求李幫忙問日本議員山尾志櫻里翌日是否有空出席小組會議，討論引渡協議。李之後稱已問了山尾。控方問該次會議是關於什麼，李指不同 IPAC 成員會講各自地區與中國和香港司法管轄區之間的司法互助和引渡協議，以及有沒有機會要求政府重新檢視該些協議，之後成員會各自跟進。李亦確認除了山尾之外，還有英國、澳洲、加拿大和德國的 IPAC 成員出席會議。</p> +<p>In addition, experts noted opportunities for sowing chaos by targeting federal agencies supporting small and medium-sized businesses. For example, targeting federal grants administrated through agencies such as the Small Business Administration could produce a cascading economic effect. In 2023, the agency delivered over $50 billion in assistance, with much of it focused on underserved communities that experts perceived as likely to amplify political discord. Even more disturbing, cyberattacks that manipulated economic data produced by the U.S. Departments of Labor and Commerce could easily cause disruption to financial markets that rely on credible government statistics. Experts saw federal agencies that support economic activity as being most susceptible to cascading effects, with even small intrusions creating fear and panic likely to undermine trust and confidence in the federal government. The participants shared a perception that such attacks would not only cause direct harm but also create a domino effect, impacting the economy and increasing public discontent.</p> -<p>裴倫德告訴李，IPAC 之中有9個成員國家與香港仍有引渡協議，所以目標是游說這9個國家。他其後向李傳送一條 Google 線上會議連結，邀請李參與小組會議。李確認他有列席該會議。</p> +<p>In addition to target preferences, researchers in the CSIS Futures Lab analyzed how experts allocated resources to different attack types across the two scenarios. To capture this data, the TTX forced players to allocate notional resource points across four potential cyberattack methods: (1) the use of deepfakes to alter public perception, (2) low-cost disruptions (e.g., website defacement and limited denial-of-service attacks), (3) espionage campaigns designed to steal data and gain access for future attacks, and (4) more complex degradation attacks capable of shutting down entire networks or services.</p> -<p>會議之後，裴倫德叫李向山尾確認她有意在日本議會提出修訂與香港之間的司法協議，並告訴李加拿大已經宣布撤回與香港簽訂的引渡條例。</p> +<p>As seen in Figure 3.1, when analyzing non-state attack vectors, experts had a fairly balanced approach outside of deepfakes and had preferences for conducting espionage against agencies involved in science and technology. During the discussions, participants assessed that unlike traditional state-based cyber operations, their espionage preference with respect to non-state actors was more about extracting information for follow-on mis-, dis-, and malinformation campaigns linked to the use of deepfakes. By compromising scientific data or spreading misinformation, adversaries could increase doubt in government policies and actions, leading to public confusion and weakened trust in the current presidential administration. Participants acknowledged the role of science and technology in responding to national emergencies and health crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. They saw the potential to undermine public trust in government responses by targeting and distorting scientific data related to vaccination efficacy, treatment protocols, or disease spread. Participants noted that adversaries could amplify existing controversies, such as those surrounding climate change or vaccinations, to intensify polarization and create a society where truth is obscured.</p> -<p>2020年7月4日，裴倫德傳送一則 Twitter 帖文給李，內容提及 IPAC 經過開會討論《國安法》和引渡協議之後，確定他們的立場是不應有逃犯引渡協議，與會者包括加拿大眾議員 Garnett Genuis 和 加拿大律師 Irwin Cotler。他並託李叫 SWHK 轉發此帖文。李庭上確認他有列席上述帖文提及的會議。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0P4Wid5.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.1: Non-state Actor Cyberattack Type Preferences.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al., CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> -<p>由於法官杜麗冰在午膳期間不慎被剪刀割傷，她稱雖然能夠止血，但決定提早至3時半休庭，以前往急症室治理。</p> +<p>As seen in Figure 3.2, when participants analyzed optimal targets for state actors, they adopted a similar set of preferences. Experts see espionage as a tool to win long-term technology competition with authoritarian states eager to steal intellectual property (IP), a finding that parallels previous CSIS research efforts. Second, while disruption was the preferred attack method for basic services and agencies supporting small and medium-sized businesses, experts assumed that states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea would invest more effort in disrupting basic services. This was consistent across the state and non-state actor scenarios.</p> -<p>案件將於4月8日續審。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BoF1pTF.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.2: State Actor Cyberattack Type Preferences.</strong> Source. CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al., CISA’s Evolving.gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>Looking across the games, it is clear that experts see vulnerabilities in the federal agencies. These experts see viable attack options for authoritarian states seeking to create chaos during an election by disrupting the delivery of food and medical care to vulnerable populations and distorting economic data and assistance to U.S. businesses. They see non-state actors as eager to launch similar campaigns but leverage mis-, dis-, and malinformation to further polarize the country by distorting public health research. This attack logic speaks to the importance of federal services and associated critical infrastructure and how these critical requirements for modern society are also critical vulnerabilities if left unprotected.</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒：推翻中共可達至解放香港 國安法後提議游說外國取消與港引渡條例Wagner Group In Mali2024-03-27T12:00:00+08:002024-03-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/wagner-group-in-mali<p><em>Despite the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations in Mali continue. But how do locals feel about the mercenaries?</em></p> +<h4 id="from-games-to-public-surveys">From Games to Public Surveys</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>To compare observations from experts gathered during the TTX with the general public, researchers at the CSIS Futures Lab converted the game into a public survey using the online platform Prolific. The researchers ensured that the participants were from sufficiently diverse backgrounds and geographic locations to reflect the demographic makeup of the United States. In adapting Shadow Table, the research team also built in attention checks and only recorded responses where the respondents passed these checks.</p> -<p>The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company (PMC), appeared in Mali in December 2021 and is still operating there as of March 2024. There was some disruption in the immediate aftermath of the Wagner mutiny and then after the death of the group’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, with Wagner staff seemingly panicking, salaries being delayed and operations being suspended or downsized for some months. At the time of writing, however, the activities of Wagner have changed little overall compared to the first quarter of 2023, at least as far the perceptions of the Malians are concerned.</p> +<p>Like the original TTX, participants were randomly assigned into either a state or non-state malign actor group and asked to make recommendations about their preferred target (i.e., basic needs, small and medium-sized businesses, or science and technology) and method (i.e., deepfakes, disruptions, espionage, or degradation). Unlike the expert TTX, the researchers did not have the general public weight assign resource values to their attack methods, given that the general public was likely to be less familiar with cybersecurity and foreign policy issues. Thus, when juxtaposing the outcomes from both expert and public samples, the research team focused on their initial choices. These choices reflect how different groups image cyber strategy preferences of malign actors.</p> -<p>The reasons why the Malian government began the discussions in early 2021 that eventually led to Wagner arriving in Mali are complex. This article will focus on one particular aspect, which is Wagner’s expected contribution to achieving the aims of a range of actors: the Malian government, the armed forces and various communities that make up the Malian social and political space.</p> +<p>Participants were presented with descriptions of two types of cyberattacks. The first was a conventional distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, while the second involved the use of deepfakes and disinformation to tamper with health records. When asked which type of attack was more worrisome, respondents indicated that the attack involving deepfakes was of greater concern than the traditional DDoS cyberattack. Deepfakes are emerging as a significant concern in cyber warfare tactics. This was supported by the TTX, which highlighted that deepfakes are increasingly used to spread hostility and disrupt societal harmony for political gains. These digitally manipulated videos or images can convincingly depict individuals saying or doing things they never did, thereby posing unique challenges in ensuring information authenticity and maintaining trust.</p> -<p>There are strong perceptions that Wagner has contributed relatively little to Mali’s struggle against jihadist groups and may even have presided over a deterioration in the situation. Sectors of the population may indeed have expected that Wagner would help restore security and service delivery in areas affected by the jihadist insurgencies, but that does not appear to have been the primary reason why Wagner was called in, as far as the Malian authorities are concerned.</p> +<p>To deepen the understanding of participant preferences, the research integrated U.S. Census Bureau data from the 2021 American Community Survey five-year estimate, providing socioeconomic and geometric details at the congressional district level. In addition, the researchers integrated data from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab, focusing on congressional elections. As seen in Figure 4, the player sample is distributed across the continental United States. The player population can be observed through its density, whereby increments increase the size of each circle. In addition, this map is colored by party affiliation for each district as of the 116th Congress (2019–20). The color schemes follow blue for Democratic districts and red for Republican districts. As the map shows, the sample is geographically and politically representative of the U.S. population.</p> -<p>With just over 2,000 men in the country at the peak of its operations in early 2023 (according to Wagner sources), including a team handling the small air force that Wagner had established there, another team protecting the ruling elite and all support elements, Wagner simply did not have the resources to even contemplate reclaiming substantial portions of territory from Mali’s disparate opposition groups, which include five jihadist groups (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, Ansar al-Din, Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Mourabitoun and Katibat Macina) and three coalitions of northern secessionist (or former secessionist) groups. Pro-Russian propagandists certainly celebrated the departure of French forces, but the Malian authorities originally had not intended to replace MINUSMA and French forces with Wagner. The intent had rather been to establish Wagner alongside the two missions, according to a senior source in the Malian government. As noted above, negotiations with Wagner and with the Russian authorities started even before the May 2021 coup that deposed President Bah N’daw (who had reportedly opposed his government colleagues’ enthusiasm for bringing Wagner in).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZlhIizN.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Public Survey Player Population by 116th Congress Districts.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab analysis based on <a href="https://www.census.gov/data/developers/data-sets/acs-5year.html">“American Community Survey 5-Year Data (2009-2022),” U.S. Census Bureau, December 7, 2023</a>; and <a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/data">“Data,” MIT Election Lab + Science Lab</a>.</em></p> -<p>The Malians’ rationale was that MINUSMA and the French were too combat-shy and would never defeat the opposition with their soft counterinsurgency approach. French cosiness with some of the Tuareg groups in the north was viewed with particular apprehension and concern in Bamako, giving rise to a range of conspiracy theories. Bamako’s hypersensitivity on this issue has recently led to a diplomatic clash with the Algerian government. The Malian government does not like the reconciliation route to pacification with the Tuareg rebels in the north, which was sponsored by the French, and wants a military solution instead, which Wagner is happy to support. Wagner was thus meant to strengthen the offensive capability of the Malian armed forces, undermining the territorial control exercised by opposition groups and taking the war back to the north. Indeed, to this day, the recapture of Kidal in the north in November 2023 remains the main achievement of Wagner in Mali, as far as the Malian authorities are concerned.</p> +<p>The final dataset included players’ congressional district information; socioeconomic variables on race, income, healthcare coverage, social net benefits, and poverty; and MIT election data, confirming that the survey was geographically representative of the U.S. population. At a granular level, zip code analysis was also conducted, but results did not deviate from the orginal analysis at the congressional district level. The detailed statistical results are available in the accompanying methodology annex.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There are strong perceptions that Wagner has contributed relatively little to Mali’s struggle against jihadist groups and may even have presided over a deterioration in the situation</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="findings">Findings</h3> -<p>The Malian authorities may have miscalculated when they decided to bring the Wagner Group in, underestimating the depth of geopolitical rivalries. However, when asked to choose between the French and Wagner, they opted for the latter and rejected French efforts to prevent the contract being signed in the second half of 2021. Among the reasons for this are likely to be Wagner’s commitment to securing the regime and to doing whatever it asks for. Many who supported Wagner’s entry regret that this resulted in the departure of MINUSMA and of the French, with a destabilising impact in some areas. However, it is not clear to what extent the regime that emerged from the May 2021 coup sees this as a problem now. Wagner might have deliberately manipulated the situation to create a long-term Malian dependency on its services, but it is also perfectly plausible that the Malian regime (perhaps unwittingly) manoeuvred itself into this position.</p> +<p>Overall, the public thinks that the most likely states to target U.S. federal agencies and critical infrastructure are Russia and China. Similar to the experts, they see these states as focused on disrupting how the U.S. federal government and executive agencies distribute basic services such as food and medical assistance and as likely to use deepfakes to undermine trust in institutions.</p> -<p>The Malian government and the military leadership pay Wagner for its activities in Mali and still seem supportive. This might be less of an elective choice than in early 2021, given the resulting international isolation and how the departure of other foreign military forces has made Bamako dependent on Wagner. Without Wagner, the Malian armed forces lack the punch to challenge insurgent control. In any case, at least according to Wagner sources, the Malians are asking the Russian PMC to do more, particularly in terms of expanding its training effort and air force capabilities. In part also thanks to regime control over the media and to the powerful propaganda machine set up by Wagner, the population of Bamako and of some other cities also appears to be mostly supportive of Wagner’s presence and of its role, as even local critics of the government tend to acknowledge.</p> +<p>As seen in Table 1, both experts and the public view Russia and China as the predominant authoritarian states interested in undermining U.S. public institutions. Similar to the TTX, the public survey started with adopting an adversary role (either state or non-state). Participants were tasked with selecting the entities in both categories. Experts that engaged in the virtual TTX leaned more toward Russia (57 percent), while the public favored China (47 percent). Apart from this divergence, results show that experts and the public converge on similar preferences.</p> -<p>In rural areas, the picture is much more mixed. In areas directly affected by Wagner’s operations there is strong resentment against its ruthless approach and its penchant for violence. This is particularly the case for Fulani communities in central Mali, which have been targeted because many of their younger members have joined jihadist groups. Especially in the early months of the group’s deployment, when Wagner forces were often deploying alone and lacked adequate local intelligence or often even interpreters, their policy of executing suspects wreaked havoc. Even sections of the local Fulani population who used to oppose the jihadists have been alienated by the looting and arrogant behaviour of Wagner forces and associated militias, according to local notables.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/07BVKe4.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Comparing Attacker Choices.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al. CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> -<p>Needless to say, Wagner appears to be very unpopular among the Tuaregs in the north as well, given its role in bringing the war back to the region and in destroying the June 2015 agreement with the Tuareg rebels (which was finally abrogated by Bamako in January).</p> +<p>The general public is worried about Russia and China and sees these states as most likely to target federal executive services and critical infrastructure linked to basic needs. As seen in Figure 5, 49 percent of participants selected basic needs as their first choice overall. These findings are consistent with the expert TTX observations in which players identified disrupting basic services as the optimal mechanism for causing chaos sufficient to undermine trust and confidence in the U.S. government during an election and, by extension, future foreign policy crises. In other words, the traditional defensive advantages provided by the United States’ geography, including separation from adversaries across oceans, is fading fast as malign actors seek ways of launching attacks through cyberspace against core government functions and critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>As for the Malian armed forces, the tactical units that share operating space with Wagner units often experience friction with them, not least because Wagner operates under a separate chain of command (it is under the National State Security Agency) and the two chains appear to be poorly coordinated. In extreme cases, there have even been episodes of violence, typically ending in injuries and loss of life among Malian soldiers. There have been frequent accusations of racism levelled against Wagner fighters from the ranks of the Malian armed forces.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5wIyj78.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Public Federal Service Targeting Preferences.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab.</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Malian regime is clearly unconcerned about popular support in remote areas and appears to believe that the way forward lies in increasing its coercive capabilities</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Strategy — the alignment of ends, ways, and means — proved consistent between expert TTXs and the survey of the general public. Both groups prioritized low-cost cyber disruptions against federal agencies and critical infrastructure linked to basic needs and deepfakes linked to science and technology. Figure 6 shows that 60 percent of participants chose to disrupt when targeting basic needs, and 28 percent chose deepfakes when targeting services related to science and technology. The shared preference for using deepfakes to target science and technology is consistent with documented disinformation campaigns during the pandemic that had polarizing effects. In other words, it is not just basic services and critical infrastructure that are vulnerable and at risk during political transitions and crises. Malign actors at home and abroad will target the very foundations of scientific truth.</p> -<p>Over time, Wagner forces started being accompanied by Malian armed forces units, often special forces; by various local militias, in particular the Donzo, who mostly operate as scouts; or by defectors from armed groups associated with the JNIM. While some sources report that the presence of the Malian army has a mitigating impact on the behaviour of Wagner mercenaries, the same is not true of the militias. Much of the violence perpetrated by Wagner forces appears to be driven by the Donzo militias, which have rivalries with local communities – typically Fulani, who have signed “survival pacts” with the insurgents.</p> +<p>Based on the public survey, there are clear differences in how different genders and demographic cohorts’ approach cyber strategy. Men are less concerned about deepfakes and believe the government is allocating enough money to cybersecurity. For example, men were 48 percent more likely than women to believe that current spending is sufficient. These concerns are not affected by median household income or party preferences. In other words, gender differences can predict cyber strategy preferences. One possible explanation is that women have disproportionately been victimized by social media and deepfakes, including revenge porn and fabricated images, which likely shapes how they view the future of federal cybersecurity. This dark truth translates into the rational calculation for women to be both more concerned about the risks of deepfakes and more likely to want increased U.S. government funding for cybersecurity. Notably, this does not appear to be a partisan issue.</p> -<p>Despite the friction, local sources say that Wagner forces, which typically operate in groups of around 50, share many of the same attitudes towards counterinsurgency operations as the Malian armed forces. Neither believe in soft or population-centric approaches, even if Wagner forces are remarkably more violent towards the civilian population than the Malian army is. Prisoners and locals are coerced into cooperating with Wagner and its pro-government allies, yielding information and even being forced to lead them towards insurgent hideouts.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IVLOYLW.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Public Cyberattack Preferences across Targets.</strong> Source: CSIS Futures Lab. Originally published in Jensen et al. CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission: Defending the United States’ Federal Executive Agency Networks.</em></p> -<p>While Wagner’s modus operandi aligns more closely (although not perfectly) with that of the Malian armed forces than the French or MINUSMA, it is clear even to the Malian authorities that as it stands the Russian PMC will not decisively defeat the insurgents. Wagner is training the Malian special forces, but that will hardly be enough to lead to a major expansion in Malian capabilities. The Malian regime is clearly unconcerned about popular support in remote areas and appears to believe that the way forward lies in increasing its coercive capabilities – hence the desire for a more powerful air force and for expanded training of its ground forces, as mentioned above. Perhaps securing “useful Mali” (cities, roads, mines) is what Bamako is prioritising right now.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Cybersecurity and Gender</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The main risk to Wagner’s position in Mali has paradoxically appeared to emanate (for a period at least) from the Russian government itself, with considerable turmoil for months after Prigozhin’s death. As of February 2024, the Wagner presence in Mali had been halved to about 1,000 men, and sources within the PMC say that it is unable to meet the Malian regime’s request for additional assistance. This appears to be mainly a result of Wagner’s difficulties in retaining and replacing staff (many left the company after Prigozhin’s death), which might in turn be due at least in part to the Russian government’s lack of desire for Wagner to grow again.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The odds that a man is concerned about deepfakes as a form of political warfare are 27 percent lower than surveyed women. Men are also 48 percent more likely to believe the federal government is allocating sufficient funds for cybersecurity.</code></em></p> -<p>After some months of friction, an agreement appears to have been reached whereby Wagner operates under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), according to sources within Wagner. Under the deal, the MoD no longer charges Wagner for the rented vehicles and air fleet deployed to Mali or for ammunition. Nonetheless, it is not clear how stable this deal is, given the bad blood between the two entities. The Russian authorities reportedly still want to replace Wagner with Redut PMC, but negotiations over this have been sluggish. For now at least, the MoD is accepting a continuing role for a diminished Wagner Group, especially in combat operations, while looking for ways to replace it with Wagner’s competitor Redut or even direct assistance.</p> +<p>Second, age matters. There are clear demographic cohort effects that shape how U.S. citizens see future cyber campaigns designed to hold the .gov ecosystem at risk. Older cohorts (i.e., aged 55 to 64 or over 65) tend to recommend espionage and targeting science and technology more than basic needs and federal services that assist small and medium-sized businesses. The most likely explanation for this divergence is rational. Older Americans, especially those over 65, are more likely to draw on federal programs associated with basic needs, including Medicare and Social Security. Similar to the findings associated with gender, even when survey respondents imagine future cyber campaigns, they tend to avoid targets that would bring them harm in their daily lives. An alternative explanation is that older Americans came of age in an era more defined by public sector basic research and major programs — such as during the Space Race — that they associate with national power and pride. However, both of these explanations are best guesses as to why there are age cohort effects associated with how Americans imagine future malign campaigns designed to hold the nation hostage in cyberspace.</p> -<hr /> +<p>The research team used zip code-level data to conduct robustness checks. The analysis confirmed that gender and age are associated with how groups think malign actors will target the U.S. federal government in cyberspace. Specifically, older cohorts (i.e., aged 55 to 64 and over 65) remain less likely to target basic services and government programs associated with supporting small and medium-sized businesses. These cohorts are more likely to recommend cyber campaigns targeting science and technology. Factors such as political party affiliation, income levels, and majority-minority districts are not statistically significant. This contrast implies that gender and demographic cohorts play a larger role than political ideology, income, or race and ethnicity in shaping how Americans imagine the risks from cyber operations.</p> -<p><strong>Antonio Giustozzi</strong> is currently Senior Research Fellow at RUSI. He is the author of several articles and papers on Afghanistan, as well as the conflict in Syria and jihadist groups in Central Asia.</p>Antonio GiustozziDespite the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations in Mali continue. But how do locals feel about the mercenaries?【黎智英案・審訊第 53 日】2024-03-27T12:00:00+08:002024-03-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-53<ul> - <li>李宇軒群組中稱馬格尼茨基法最有力 裴倫德則指立法過程緩慢、證據門檻高</li> -</ul> +<p>Unlike the district-level analysis, party linkage emerges as possible factors shaping malign cyber strategy preferences in the zip code-level robustness check. In Democratic and mixed political zip codes, participants were less likely to target small and medium-sized businesses. This finding further demonstrates rational preferences by the U.S. public with respect to cyber strategy.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Lastly, political ideology did not appear to alter which rival foreign state participants perceived as likely to hold the U.S. government hostage during the upcoming 2024 presidential election. Where participants live (i.e., Democratic- or Republican-leaning zip codes) did not have an impact on the state actor they selected (i.e., Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea). This finding extends to non-state actors. While one might assume Republican-leaning districts would be more likely to select left-wing groups as the malign actor, and Democrats the opposite, this was not the case. The only difference appeared with respect to non-state actor motivation, with Democrat-leaning zip codes being more associated with “lone wolf” cyber actors as opposed to financially motivated cyberattacks (i.e., cybercrime). This difference may suggest that political ideology shapes how people view opposing group motivations, with Democrat-leaning areas more inclined to see malign activity in cyberspace by non-state actors associated with isolated political radicals.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DNtYAkq.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<h3 id="from-surveys-to-scenarios">From Surveys to Scenarios</h3> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（27日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第53日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李稱在「對華政策跨國議會聯盟（IPAC）」成立之後，他與另一名被告陳梓華曾討論應否繼續留在 IPAC 幫忙，因李可以透過 IPAC 接觸不同外國政客，有利於建立人際網絡作游說工作；李亦考慮過會否任職美國非政府組織「中國人權」。後來李決定留在香港協助「重光團隊（SWHK）」的工作。庭上展示李宇軒、IPAC 創辦人兼執行總監裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）及其他 SWHK 成員的 Telegram 群組，當中討論到如何回應北京決定訂立《港區國安法》，李曾提出馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act），即個人層面的制裁或經濟制裁某國家，似乎是最有力的措施。惟裴倫德則指馬格尼茨基法立法過程緩慢、證據門檻高，以及在歐盟成員國等地區不能達成。</p> +<p>To visualize and describe the findings from experts and general public TTXs, the research team employed a novel approach to constructing scenarios that drew on generative AI. Specifically, the CSIS Futures Lab loaded the text transcripts from the TTXs, comments from the public surveys, and a corpus of over 300 documents on cyber operations and modern strategy to fine-tune a model using Scale AI’s Donovan platform and a retrieval assisted generation (RAG) large language model (LLM).</p> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第十天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A Recipe for AI-Generated Scenarios</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指ipac聯盟成員關心與中國議題">李宇軒指IPAC聯盟成員關心與中國議題</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Select a base LLM (e.g., ChatGPT, Bard, or Llama).</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Add a corpus of authoritative texts on strategy and critical factors the model can reference.</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Mix in structured observations about ends, ways, means, and feedback loops (e.g., TTX transcripts).</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Garnish with tailored prompts (e.g., using trends and themes to refine questions about alternative futures).</code></em></p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>就「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC），李宇軒指它裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）是創辦人之一，而聯盟成員均關心與中國有關的議題。李表示他以義工形式協助 IPAC，包括替 IPAC 開設和編輯網站，及協助聯繫日本議員如山尾志櫻里（本名「菅野志桜里」）。</p> +<p>RAG works to optimize how the base model classifies text (i.e., fine-tuning) and predicts the next logical sequence. By using a select corpus trained on cyber and great power competition, the expectation is that text generated in response to queries is more accurate and aligns with key concepts. This fine-tuning is further enhanced by training the model with the prompts that are based on the emerging themes of TTX discussions. To facilitate this process of refinement and structure prompts given to the LLM, the CSIS Futures Lab defined a series of trends based on analyzing the TTX results. In other words, the model used thousands of pages of texts and transcripts to answer prompts about how discrete trends could comingle to produce alternative futures. The result is a series of “slices-of-time” that provide portraits of alternative futures in which malign actors seek to hold the United States hostage by launching cyber campaigns targeting federal executive agencies and critical infrastructure during political transitions and foreign policy crises.</p> -<p>李稱除了裴倫德之外，IPAC 中央秘書處成員 Sam Armstrong 和 Andrew Lawrence，以及另一名來自 Henry Jackson Society 的人士也會提供資料，以供李發布於 IPAC 網站。控方展示 IPAC 網站發布的文章〈Statement from Simon O’Connor MP and Louisa Wall MP〉和〈The Bear in the Room〉。李確認他有份協助發布。</p> +<p>The use of LLMs in this context is a time-efficient method that enhances understanding but requires skilled handling to avoid biases. In military planning, the effective use of LLMs depends on translating critical thinking and research into structured queries for the AI model. These models complement, rather than replace, human expertise, and military professionals must adeptly convert their knowledge and concepts into AI-interrogable formats. Generative AI, increasingly used in social science, offers significant opportunities and challenges when integrated into wargaming, red teaming, and scenario construction. It can subtly influence crucial leadership decisions and is subject to the “black box” challenge, where the reasoning behind AI-generated outcomes is not always clear. This necessitates ethical governance, transparent methods, and accountability to responsibly manage AI’s role in wargaming, a key factor in determining future conflict outcomes.</p> -<p>控方展示李與裴倫德之間的訊息，在 IPAC 正式公布成立之前，李問裴倫德是否需要香港傳媒的協助（“For media, do you need support at HK side”）；裴倫德則表示需要，而且他剛剛向黎智英作簡介，稍後會將新聞稿交給李（“Yes. I’m just briefing Jimmy L. Will give you press release”）。</p> +<h4 id="societies-held-hostage">Societies Held Hostage</h4> -<p>控方指根據訊息紀錄，當中裴倫德提及上載了 IPAC 成立的宣傳影片，可見 IPAC 的成立日期是2020年6月5日。李確認。</p> +<p>The first major trend that emerged from the TTX discussions concerned how interdependence creates new forms of vulnerability. A connected society requires a mix of online government services and critical infrastructure to function. As a result, the disruption of basic needs and polarizing deepfakes (i.e., disinformation) can amplify underlying fault lines in society during political transitions and foreign policy crises.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) <a href="https://twitter.com/lukedepulford/status/1315038772791214088">October 10, 2020</a></p> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Differences in State Actors’ Strategies</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lcHOZP2.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）</p> +<p><em>TTX participants pointed out that there are significant differences in the strategies of different state actors. During the TTXs, Russia, for instance, was more engaged in disruptive cyber activities, while China was more focused on strategic and espionage-oriented approaches. This assumption is consistent with academic literature on different state strategies in cyberspace. As a result, cyber defense strategies — in both the public and private sectors — need to adapt to different threat characteristics. This process of adaptation will require access to public data on different threat vectors, including statistics on how new attacks compare to past efforts (i.e., cyber statistics).</em></p> -<h4 id="李宇軒曾與陳梓華討論透過ipac建立網絡-有利游說工作">李宇軒：曾與陳梓華討論透過IPAC建立網絡 有利游說工作</h4> +<p><strong>Chaos and Instability</strong></p> -<p>李表示他有將 IPAC 的工作告訴另一名被告陳梓華（網名T），由於 IPAC 未正式公佈成立之前，裴倫德要求李保密，所以李當時只向陳暗示過，但沒有談及細節。直至 IPAC 成立之後，李有告訴陳 IPAC 已正式成立，故此陳會知道李有份協助。李轉述陳當時的回應大概是「Good job」、「加油咁上下啦。」</p> +<p><em>An overarching theme was the creation of chaos and instability, especially with the upcoming 2024 election in mind. By targeting critical services and undermining public confidence, state actors could weaken the U.S. federal government’s legitimacy and provoke divisive reactions among the population. This focus on windows of political vulnerability highlights a need to ensure there are sufficient resources as well as collaboration with the private sector to deny adversaries the ability to hold the United States hostage during its political transitions or foreign policy crises.</em></p> -<p>控方問李為何會將 IPAC 的事告訴陳。李指當時會向陳談及有關香港的活動，例如「做緊啲咩」、「香港咩環境」等，「係一啲 general 嘅 conversation 嚟嘅。」</p> +<p><strong>Priority on Disruption and Immediate Impact</strong></p> -<p>IPAC 成立之後，李稱他有繼續與陳梓華討論，當時「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）已經在不同國家嘗試接觸不同政客，作游說工作。而他們看過聯盟成員名單之後，發現名單上大部份都是他們想接觸的政客，甚至還有更多人。李當時認為，既然他可以直接接觸到裴倫德，意味著他可以透過裴倫德接觸到名單上的政客，「如果我可以 develop 到呢啲 connection 嘅話，international lobby 就會 effective 好多喇」，結論是他可以繼續在 IPAC 幫手，「啫係佢（IPAC 工作）同我嘅 international lobbying 冇衝突，反而仲會更加 efficient。」</p> +<p><em>The immediate disruption of services and the ensuing chaos was identified as a key strategy that attackers may prioritize. These tactics aim to impact public perception in the short term leading up to the 2024 election. By causing immediate and visible disruptions, the attackers could potentially cause widespread panic and a loss of confidence among the public in the government’s capabilities. This emphasizes the need for robust disaster recovery plans and the ability to quickly restore services after an attack.</em></p> -<h4 id="李宇軒曾考慮是否參與ipac中央秘書處工作-憂予人印象香港人搶咪">李宇軒：曾考慮是否參與IPAC中央秘書處工作 憂予人印象「香港人搶咪」</h4> +<p><strong>Cross-Domain Attacks</strong></p> -<p>至2020年6至7月，李稱他曾與陳梓華、裴倫德和 SWHK 團隊之間有一系列的討論，關於李應否以個人身份加入 IPAC 的中央秘書處，協助資訊科技或其他崗位。一方面有人擔心此舉會否使李的身份曝光，或者令李備受外界關注，而且擔心「畀人一個 undeserved 嘅感覺，啫係好似一個香港人搶咪咁」，若果他當時未知 IPAC 的運作的話，「無端端一個香港人嚟，好似搶咪、搶光環咁，反而對成個 movement 仲衰。」</p> +<p><em>Another emerging pattern was the idea of cross-domain attacks that not only involve cyberattacks but also physical disruptions. For instance, cyber-physical attacks on critical infrastructure could amplify the overall impact of the attacks, increasing their effectiveness in sowing discord and undermining public confidence. This highlights the need for defenses that extend beyond purely digital assets and can also protect against physical disruptions resulting from cyberattacks.</em></p> -<p>李指，他們亦考慮過李應否以 SWHK 的身份參與 IPAC，可是不論是 SWHK 一方還是 IPAC 一方均有擔憂。SWHK 需要考慮是否在這個時候引人注目（rise profile）、會否引致不必要的風險，而加入 IPAC 是否 SWHK 想走的方向，以及是否所有成員都同意此做法。至於 IPAC 一方，李透過裴倫德得悉有 IPAC 聯盟成員反對 SWHK 加入聯盟，因為這違反 IPAC 避免有其他聯繫的原則。李又提到初時有很多社運組織和游說組織想加入 IPAC，但是裴倫德基於上述原則而一一拒絕。</p> +<p>Based on these dynamics, the CSIS Futures Lab generated the following scenario using Donovan:</p> -<p>李稱他與陳梓華亦有就此討論，而陳不反對李以 SWHK 的身份參與 IPAC，因衡量過李的個人作風和方向，直到他被警方拘捕的時候，討論仍在進行中，未有結論。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Fracturing Trust</code></em></strong></p> -<p>控方展示裴倫德於2020年6月傳送給李宇軒的訊息：「攬炒團隊正式加入『國際聯軍』IPAC」，李確認 SWHK 後來有加入 IPAC 的中央秘書處，惟不是所有成員都同意 SWHK 的中文名稱是「攬炒團隊」。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the run-up to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, two distinct trends of cyber activity involving Russian and Chinese actors emerge. Leveraging cyber strategies that have been evident in previous conflicts, Russian state operatives appear intent on fanning the flames of political discord within the U.S. electorate. Concurrently, Chinese state-sponsored black-hat hackers are continuously launching large-scale operations aimed at pilfering unprotected IP databases within the United States.</code></em></p> -<h4 id="李宇軒曾考慮任職美國非政府組織-但最後決定留在swhk幫忙">李宇軒：曾考慮任職美國非政府組織 但最後決定留在SWHK幫忙</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russian cyber activities cast a long shadow of a Cold War-style influence operation that deploys strategically crafted disinformation and propaganda campaigns. These campaigns, which are designed to fracture public resolutions and incite social chaos, allude to the tactics used to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. There appears to be an orchestrated effort to manipulate political perceptions and beliefs in an attempt to shift the electoral landscape in a direction favorable to Russian strategic interests.</code></em></p> -<p>李另提到，有見《國安法》即將立法，他與陳梓華曾討論過應該留在香港，還是到外國工作。另一名身處美國的 SWHK 成員 Shirley Ho 問李會否想去美國非政府組織「中國人權」工作，做執行主任譚競嫦（Sharon Hom）的下屬，或者形勢許可的話，李可以留在香港，但繼續任職「中國人權」。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China’s cyber activities, in stark contrast, possess apparent economic drivers. The IP of the United States, held in the form of patents, methodologies, and blueprints, are the primary focus of these cyber breaches. By syphoning off such data, China could potentially undercut U.S. economic competitiveness on a global platform.</code></em></p> -<p>李稱他當時考慮，如果他決定任職「中國人權」和做譚競嫦的下屬，需為時2年，與此同時，他可以在工餘時間做有關香港社運的活動，所以他當時正在 SWHK、IPAC 和「中國人權」之間考慮。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Inevitably, these trends converge, resulting in a dire situation for the United States. The effects of these cyber operations are not restricted to abstract sociopolitical and economic dimensions. Both Russian and Chinese operations have displayed a propensity to target U.S. critical infrastructure, specifically the federal systems that deliver basic assistance programs. Such activities could severely undermine the trust and confidence of U.S. citizens in the government’s ability to ensure their welfare.</code></em></p> -<p>李憶述，陳梓華當時認為任職「中國人權」並非有效地運用時間，所以二人均不傾向李任職「中國人權」，改為決定留在 SWHK 幫忙。二人亦傾向認為李應該到英國協助裴倫德，可能擔任 IPAC 某些職位或者協助其他英國的非政府組織。</p> +<p>This scenario is a good example of how these developments could take place in the near future given the vulnerabilities identified during the TTXs and public survey. Of note, the scenario is also the most logical extrapolation from recent trends in cyber operations and great power competition. According to the scenario, the focus of Russian operatives on disseminating disinformation and propaganda to influence public perception and create social chaos is consistent with the document’s findings on political and cognitive warfare. Similarly, in line with findings from the TTXs, espionage, particularly in the science and technology domain, has a strategic emphasis on cyber threats. This resonates with the activities of Chinese hackers, which center on IP theft to undercut U.S. economic competitiveness. This scenario shows the need for robust measures against potential disinformation campaigns using deepfakes and espionage activities against research and development. If the U.S. government cannot find a way to address deepfakes and protect its science and technology enterprise, the country will be increasingly vulnerable and subject to coercion in the twenty-first century.</p> -<p>李指，最後在這個時候，SWHK 已經決定加入 IPAC，而不是李以個人身份加入 IPAC。李則一直留在香港協助 SWHK 事務。</p> +<h4 id="gender-dynamics-will-continue-to-shape-how-the-public-views-cybersecurity">Gender Dynamics Will Continue to Shape How the Public Views Cybersecurity</h4> -<h4 id="重光團隊與ipac開設群組交流-李宇軒分析指北京搏外國不會制裁">重光團隊與IPAC開設群組交流 李宇軒分析指北京搏外國不會制裁</h4> +<p>The second major trend observed concerns the rise of mis-, dis-, and malinformation. During the TTXs, participants focused on rising threats related to deepfakes and AI. The public survey confirmed these concerns but highlighted a clear divide between how self-identified men and women view the threat of deepfakes. As a result, future campaigns to hold the United States hostage during a political transition or foreign policy crisis are likely to see disinformation campaigns tailored to different segments.</p> -<p>控方展示 Telegram 群組「SWHK IPAC」訊息紀錄，群組成員包括李宇軒（網名「RIP@?」）、裴倫德、Shirley Ho 和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸（網名「HK 再離開一下」）等。群組於2020年6月21日成立，李在開首訊息指，此群組的作用是與 IPAC 協調有關香港的聲明和回應，主要是近期的《國安法》議題。他又指如果 IPAC 沒有發表聲明的話，SWHK 可以出聲明以填補空白（fill the gap）；但如果 IPAC 打算出聲明的話，SWHK 不會與之重疊，而轉為在社交媒體分享或轉載 IPAC 的聲明，使曝光率推至最高（maximize coverage）。</p> +<p><strong>Disinformation and Manipulation of Stolen Data</strong></p> -<p>裴倫德問及發表聲明的最佳時機。李宇軒則分析指聲明目標有兩個效果，其一是國際向北京施壓，使北京放棄訂立《港區國安法》，其二是他們容讓《國安法》通過立法，之後以負面角度定性《國安法》，迫使香港或國際社會更加反抗中國，而發表聲明的時機則視乎他們想達至以上哪一種效果。</p> +<p><em>During the TTXs, there was a debate regarding the effectiveness of deepfakes and disinformation campaigns in swaying public opinion. Some participants argued that these tactics might sow discord rather than significantly change people’s minds. This discussion pointed toward the potential for dis- and misinformation campaigns to amplify existing social cleavages. Even small groups with hardened worldviews can amplify disinformation and spread it outside their networks.</em></p> -<p>李又在群組中表示，他的判斷是北京想證實國際社會並不會真的實施制裁或強硬政策，似乎北京會發表外交聲明，聲稱卑躬屈膝的話便可得到經濟利益，之後外國政府便會讓步，北京從而可以避免承擔後果。</p> +<p><strong>The Gender Gap and Utilization of Deepfakes and Disinformation</strong></p> -<h4 id="裴倫德在群組中指-ipac-成員在議會權力有限">裴倫德在群組中指 IPAC 成員在議會權力有限</h4> +<p><em>During the TTXs, participants highlighted how malign actors could use deepfakes to make the government appear incompetent or even outright malicious in delivering essential needs. Combining real information leaks with deepfakes could further erode trust in the government’s crisis management capabilities. Additionally, the public survey highlighted how gender and age cohort differences shape how the U.S. public views cybersecurity. This disparity in sensitivity offers adversaries an opportunity to tailor attacks that exacerbate confusion, complicating the development of effective strategies to counter these threats.</em></p> -<p>裴倫德則在群組中指，他不希望作出不切實際的承諾，英國議員的權力有限，而 IPAC 的威脅需要是可行的，否則北京不會害怕任何人。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Gender Divide in Cyber Warfare</code></em></strong></p> -<p>李宇軒回應指，「市面上」已經有很多譴責中國的聲明，包括外國政要、外交大臣等，而 IPAC 則有一群議員，似乎有一個合適位置向中國聲稱，「如果你做了某些事的話，我們便會在議會上提交政策議案進行討論」，因為這是議員的職能範圍之內。之後裴倫德指李似乎誤解了 IPAC 政客有能力提交政策議案，但事實上他們作為「後座議員」權力有限。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Heading into the contentious 2024 U.S. presidential election, extensive studies revealed that women voters expressed far greater concern about potential deepfake videos and manipulated information than men. This gender disparity offered a prime opportunity for exploitation by foreign adversaries keen on disrupting U.S. democracy.</code></em></p> -<p>李宇軒庭上解釋，他認為如果 IPAC 的成員可以在各自國家的議會提交政策議案討論的話，便會更加有效，但裴倫德指他有誤解，因 IPAC 的成員職能上可以動議法案（propose bills），但不可以提出討論政策議案（table policies）。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the months before the election, Russian state-sponsored disinformation campaigns specifically targeted women voters across social media. Fake news stories and doctored videos portrayed female political candidates as corrupt, unqualified, and even mentally unstable. Some deepfake footage depicted female candidates making inflammatory racist and misogynistic remarks. Other manipulated videos showed women lawmakers struggling to respond coherently to basic policy questions. Many appeared designed to prey on gender biases that question women’s competency for high office. The goal was to suppress support for female candidates among women voters.</code></em></p> -<h4 id="群組中提出馬格尼茨基法-李宇軒自己沒有想法旨在引起討論">群組中提出馬格尼茨基法 李宇軒：自己沒有想法、旨在引起討論</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Meanwhile, Chinese cyber operatives stole massive datasets from women’s health organizations and services. They threatened to leak sensitive medical records of female patients from Planned Parenthood and OBGYN practices unless demands were met. This sparked fears that hacked personal health information could be used for blackmail or extortion. Patients worried that intimate details about reproductive health, pregnancies, and sexual health could be made public in an attempt to ruin reputations and lives.</code></em></p> -<p>裴倫德在群組中表示，他認為 IPAC 應該發表聲明之餘，輔以一項實質行動。惟李宇軒卻認為已經有很多譴責中國的聲明，應該集中在特定行動。裴倫德問李認為 IPAC 就香港議題做什麼是最有力，又提到有 IPAC 成員不喜歡「救生艇計劃」，因認為它代表「承認被打敗」。李亦表示不喜歡「救生艇計劃」，他無意推動一項放棄香港的政策。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the wake of the election, Russian disinformation tactics continued preying on female voter anxieties. Deepfake videos portrayed female members of the cabinet as inept crisis managers unable to deliver basic government assistance to struggling Americans. Doctored footage showed relief supplies rotting in warehouses due to incompetence as Americans suffered.</code></em></p> -<p>李其後提到，馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act），即個人層面的制裁或經濟制裁某國家，似乎是最有力的措施，而且當英國議員集齊足夠簽署提出動議，便不是不可能達成。李又提到，日本議員山尾志櫻里曾經在一次線上會面提出馬格尼茨基法（Magnitsky Act），他認為如果可以說服日本通過馬格尼茨基法，便可以與國際配合一同實施。惟裴倫德指馬格尼茨基法立法過程緩慢、證據門檻高，以及在某一些地區不能達成，例如歐盟成員國。</p> +<p>Unlike the first scenario, the above vignette shows how generative AI can help visualize alternative futures based on critical outcomes. AI is not magic. It is math. And the integration of datasets on strategy, net assessment, and cyber operations, alongside transcripts from the games, alters how the underlying model weights different text combinations to write the story. This story is best characterized as a “what if” scenario and a demonstration of how a particular outcome — regardless of party — intersects with observed patterns and trends in cyber operations as they relate to disinformation. Here the model assumes that a woman — regardless of party — wins the 2024 presidential election, a prospect current polling suggests as unlikely but not impossible. Rather than interpret the results as forecasts about elections, the better perspective is to use the fictional future scenario as a foundation for discussing how authoritarian states are and will likely continue to target gender fault lines in the United States. This focus of discontent could create new preferences for how malign actors will seek to target federal executive agencies and critical infrastructure, with a particular focus on health and human services as well as medical providers highlighted in the scenario.</p> -<p>李宇軒庭上解釋，當時他在群組中提及馬格尼茨基法，只是想提出一些想法，希望引起其他人討論，而他並沒有主張自己的想法。法官李運騰問，李的意思是否他提出一些不成熟的想法，想其他人一起討論。李確認。</p> +<h4 id="distrust-in-government-will-continue">Distrust in Government Will Continue</h4> -<p>至於控方問及山尾志櫻里何時提及馬格尼茨基法，李則表示不肯定山尾在哪一次線上會議中談論過。</p> +<p>The third major trend observed across the TTXs and public survey responses concerns the declining trust in government across democratic societies and the United States, in particular. There was an underlying assumption across different groups that free people currently experience a trust deficit. According to a recent Pew Research, the U.S. trust in the federal government decline from 73 percent in 1958 to 16 percent in 2023. A second major trend observed concerns the rise of mis-, dis-, and malinformation. During the TTXs, participants focused on rising threats related to deepfakes and AI. The public survey confirmed these concerns but highlighted a clear divide between how self-identified men and women view the threat of deepfakes. As a result, the future campaigns to hold the United States hostage during a political transition or foreign policy crisis are likely to see such campaigns tailored to different segments.</p> -<p>李在群組中提到另一個選項，就是要求取消香港特殊地位，但他認為這與「救生艇計劃」沒有分別，都是放棄自己所屬的城市。他又指 IPAC 並不會主張香港獨立，也不會叫其他國家承認香港作為一個獨立國家，因他理解這在外交層面是不切實際。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Propaganda by Deed</code></em></strong></p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A nineteenth- and twentieth-century tactic of using protests, terrorist attacks, and other subversive deeds to catalyze further unrest and even open revolt. The idea is closely linked to revolutionary theory and the concept of a “foco” used by Che Guerva. The concept has been used by modern terrorist organizations and is increasingly associated with far right-wing and Islamic extremists.</code></em></p> -<hr /> +<p><strong>Disrupting State and Local Elections</strong></p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒群組中稱馬格尼茨基法最有力 裴倫德則指立法過程緩慢、證據門檻高G7’s AI Code Of Conduct2024-03-27T12:00:00+08:002024-03-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/g7s-ai-code-of-conduct<p><em>It is the G7’s chance to mature the code of conduct to confer a presumption of conformity to the European Union’s AI Act and to enhance AI regulatory interoperability at the G7 this year.</em></p> +<p><em>Participants in the TTX underscored the value of targeting state and local election systems, perceiving them to be more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Such attacks could disrupt the electoral process and weaken faith in the democratic system. More important, this reflected a desire to sow discontent by making it appear that every local disruption was a function of systemic issues at the federal level.</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Espionage and Long-Term Goals</strong></p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>Over the past five years, the G7 and its member states have made significant progress in specifying ethical principles for AI. Advancing global AI governance in 2024 demands translating these high-level principles into concrete practices for AI developers and government organizations. Rather than address this challenge in isolation, G7 leaders stated in their 2023 Leaders’ Communiqué they would work together and with others to “advance international discussions on inclusive artificial intelligence (AI) governance and interoperability to achieve our common vision and goal of trustworthy AI, in line with our shared democratic values.” The March 2024 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministerial declaration recently reaffirmed this commitment, stressing “the importance of international discussions on AI governance and interoperability” with like-minded partners and developing countries.</p> - -<p>The work of the G7 has already had a tangible impact in productively shaping the domestic AI regulatory approach of multiple G7 members, including the United States (through the 2023 AI executive order), Japan (the updated AI regulatory guidance), and the European Union (the AI Act). In conversations with CSIS, government officials from each of these members stated that the G7 was substantive and helpful to their regulatory efforts. Notably, members of the European Parliament involved in drafting the EU AI Act told CSIS that some sections of the act were directly inspired by the Hiroshima AI Process (HAIP) Code of Conduct the G7 published in October 2023.</p> - -<p>One such section of the EU AI Act is Article 52, which outlines transparency obligations for Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) models above a computational threshold of 1025 floating point operations per second (FLOPS). According to Article 52, the European Union’s AI Office shall “encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of practice at Union level as an element to contribute to the proper application of this Regulation, taking into account international approaches.” Industry developers are directed to coregulate these codes of practice by collaborating directly with the European Commission on this issue.</p> - -<p>Members of the European Parliament told CSIS they believe the HAIP Code of Conduct is the best available starting point for what will ultimately become the EU AI Office’s officially recognized codes of practice for certain GPAI models. Parliament members stated their support for maturing the G7’s code of conduct to a degree that meets EU requirements, such that providers of GPAI models who demonstrate compliance with the G7’s HAIP Code of Conduct would enjoy a “presumption of conformity” to the EU AI Act’s GPAI codes of practice.</p> - -<p>The European Union, while it has the sole final decision over the AI Act’s implementation, should be commended for its demonstrated commitment to interoperability, openness to international input during the codes of practice design process, and willingness to take advantage of the work already done under the Japanese 2023 G7 presidency. Maturing the code of conduct to confer a presumption of conformity to the EU AI Act would not only help the European Commission develop a key piece of regulation for GPAI models but also offer an opportunity for other G7 members to help shape language that will set an informative precedent for how global AI regulations are designed and implemented. Moreover, aligning the code of conduct to the European Union’s codes of practice would be hugely impactful for the G7’s stated goals of establishing interoperable AI regulations and broadening the dissemination of the code.</p> - -<p>Even if the European Commission does not ultimately use the code of conduct to inform or stand in for the European Union’s official codes of practice, the G7 would still achieve a substantially more mature code by aiming to meet this ambitious goal. In its current state, the code of conduct’s 11 high-level principles are too vague for AI developers to subscribe to or implement without further specification. Translating these principles into monitorable and enforceable tasks for AI developers would therefore be a meaningful achievement alone. This process will require extensive input from the private sector to determine what is relevant, technically feasible, and reflective of existing industry best practices in AI governance. Cooperation with and public endorsement from a diverse group of leading international AI firms will also be needed to help to demonstrate the code’s building momentum within the AI industry. While maturing the code of conduct through these avenues and more would already fulfil one of the G7’s stated priorities for 2024, the G7 could go further by aligning the code of conduct with the European Union’s codes of practice to achieve its broader goals of enhancing regulatory interoperability and widening the adoption of the code of conduct.</p> - -<h3 id="timeline">Timeline</h3> - -<p>The expected timeline for EU AI Act implementation suggests that a draft version of the GPAI codes of practice must be ready by February 2025 (see Figure 1). Comparing the EU and G7 timelines highlights that the G7 code of conduct should be substantially elaborated by February 2025 if the European Union is to consider the code of conduct as a presumption of conformity to the European Union’s code of practice on GPAI models when the regulations take effect. This gives the G7 approximately 11 months from the writing of this white paper to mature the code of conduct ahead of the European Union’s February 2025 deadline. While the HAIP Code of Conduct could inform a later, updated EU AI codes of practice, meeting the February 2025 deadline would certainly have greater impact.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UwRrl6E.jpeg" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Expected EU AI Act Implementation Time Frame</em></p> - -<p>The Italian G7 presidency therefore comes at a critical window of opportunity to substantially advance the HAIP and the interoperability of allied AI regulatory frameworks. The Italian presidency recently restated the G7’s commitment to maturing the HAIP and the code of conduct at the Industry, Technology, and Digital Ministerial Meeting in Verona and Trento on March 14 and 15, 2024. The ministerial declaration from this meeting promises to advance the HAIP outcomes on page 10, “including through expanding support and awareness among key partners and organisations, as well as increasing their involvement, as appropriate.” Specifically, per Annex 3, the G7 will develop monitoring mechanisms for assessing organizations’ voluntary implementation of the code of conduct, increase stakeholder engagement in maturing the code of conduct and its adoption, and collaborate with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UNESCO, and GPAI on challenges posed by AI systems. Progress on these issues will be presented at the leaders’ summit in June.</p> - -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p><em>Across the TTX and public surveys, participants saw espionage as more than just a means to steal information and technology. They also saw it as a way to undermine trust in government, as Americans perceived each new breach as a sign of a breakdown of sovereignty and the ability of the federal government to safeguard U.S. innovation and the personal information its citizens. This desire to steal IP and undermine trust was seen by participants as a long-term goal beyond any one political transition or foreign policy crisis.</em></p> -<p>Given the G7’s 2024 agenda for the HAIP and the European Commission’s deadline of February 2025 for developing the GPAI codes of practice, the Italian G7 presidency should strive to accomplish the following this year:</p> +<p><strong>Importance of Insider Threats</strong></p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Continue working on the HAIP Code of Conduct after the March 15 ministerial meeting, including a second digital and industry ministerial meeting toward the end of 2024.</strong> Developing the code of conduct will take substantive effort from both G7 members and AI developers in the private sector and academia. CSIS supports the Italian presidency’s year-round approach to maturing the HAIP ending, with a second ministerial meeting showcasing the G7’s work toward the end of 2024.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Develop the HAIP Code of Conduct’s monitoring and evaluation mechanisms through the OECD.</strong> While the G7 has done excellent work on advancing AI governance principles thus far, its lack of permanent staff makes it challenging to continue this work alone in the long-term. The March Industry, Technology, and Digital Ministerial declaration indicates that the OECD will provide this missing institutional support to the G7 on the Hiroshima AI Process, continuing a long-standing partnership between the two fora.</p> +<p><em>The threat posed by insiders, whether intentional or accidental, was a key point in the TTX discussions. Participants noted that insiders, whether in the United States or other countries, could potentially compromise federal networks. This highlights the need for a holistic approach to cybersecurity that goes beyond protecting against external threats and also addresses the potential risks posed by insiders. It also shows how the breakdown in trust creates new threat vectors as disenfranchised citizens look for new forms of protest and “propaganda by deed.” This threat parallels the broader phenomenon also on display in the rise of activities such as swatting involving federal or local elected officials, which involves falsely calling in SWAT teams to a’ residence.</em></p> - <p>The OECD has a strong record of developing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, which the G7 should draw on to meaningfully mature the code of conduct in 2024. Japan chairs this year’s OECD’s Ministerial Council, offering continuity between the G7 Hiroshima Process, which Japanese government officials continue to staff and support, and the OECD. Developing the code of conduct through the Ministerial Council and other OECD channels, including the Global Partnership on AI, will offer essential capacity and expertise to the 2024 G7.</p> +<p><strong>Strategic Timing</strong></p> - <p>Close collaboration with the OECD would also offer a longer-term path to expand the HAIP beyond the G7, first to like-minded democratic market-driven economies among the OECD countries. The OECD could also serve as a first step in further expansion to a wider set of non-OECD countries through the OECD-hosted Global Partnership on AI, which includes countries such as Brazil and India.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Gather input from private sector AI organizations on the code of conduct through requests for comment and formalized convenings of relevant stakeholders.</strong> In a speech to the Italian government’s Digital Transition Committee in November 2023, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stated that establishing AI governance guidelines “does not mean working against companies” but instead “engaging in dialogue” between the public and private sector. Dialogue between relevant stakeholders is indeed essential for ensuring the code of conduct is translated into specific actions that are technically feasible and reflect the rapidly changing capabilities of advanced AI systems. To ensure that this dialogue remains consistent and constructive, input from private sector AI developers should be organized through specific initiatives such as requests for comment, working groups, and feasibility studies.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><em>The TTX discussions also pointed to the importance of timing in launching cyber operations designed to undermine trust and confidence in the U.S. government. The participants noted that attackers are likely to time their attacks to coincide with critical events, such as elections or other moments of national significance, to maximize their impact and influence public sentiment. This underlines the need for heightened vigilance during such periods and the importance of having contingency plans in place. It also suggests that cyber operations have become a form of propaganda by deed in networked societies.</em></p> -<p>With these recommendation in place, CSIS hopes the following occur by the end of the Italian G7 presidency:</p> +<p>Based on these dynamics, the CSIS Futures Lab generated the following scenario using Donovan:</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>G7 members and EU AI Act officials expand, finalize, and accept the HAIP Code of Conduct language.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A substantial number of companies support the drafting of and publicly subscribe to the code of conduct.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The OECD serves as the principal forum in which to develop monitoring and transparency functions of the code of conduct as necessary.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>By late 2024 or early 2025, there is a clear path to expanding the code of conduct beyond the G7 and OECD forums, including non-G7 and OECD countries potentially through the OECD’s Global Partnership on AI forum.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Chaos at the Ballot Box</code></em></strong></p> -<hr /> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The 2024 U.S. presidential election highlights intensifying cyber threats seeking to undermine democracy and national security. Russian hackers disrupt local election systems and infrastructure, timing attacks for maximum impact. Chinese operatives focus on espionage targeting confidential data to advance long-term strategic interests. Meanwhile, insider threats pose increasing risks of unauthorized disclosures and system compromises.</code></em></p> -<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies and senior fellow with the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Prior to the election, a disgruntled federal contractor with access to classified systems leaks troves of confidential documents revealing the government’s cyber capabilities and gaps. Adversaries gain insight, enabling more successful future attacks on exploited weaknesses.</code></em></p> -<p><strong>Georgia Adamson</strong> is a research assistant with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at CSIS.</p>Gregory C. Allen and Georgia AdamsonIt is the G7’s chance to mature the code of conduct to confer a presumption of conformity to the European Union’s AI Act and to enhance AI regulatory interoperability at the G7 this year.Uphold North Korea Sanctions2024-03-26T12:00:00+08:002024-03-26T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uphold-north-korea-sanctions<p><em>This paper aims to examine cryptocurrency mixers’ distinct technical, legal and regulatory dimensions and the challenges they pose to the sanctions regime. The paper provides detailed background information on North Korea’s cyber-criminal statecraft, focusing on North Korean actors’ use of mixers to launder illicitly obtained cryptocurrency.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Weeks before the 2024 election, ransomware strikes voter registration databases in six key battleground states right before registration deadlines. Chaos ensues at local election offices as critical voter rolls are locked down. Tens of thousands lose the ability to update their registration status, request absentee ballots, or fix errors ahead of election day.</code></em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">On election day, reporting systems crash in counties across swing states, delaying results. Claims of voter suppression and fraud spread. Protests form amid the uncertainty calling the election’s integrity into question.</code></em></p> -<p>North Korean actors have stolen billions of dollars over the past decade as part of a massive campaign to generate illicit revenue through cybercrime. In recent years, they have devoted particular effort to stealing virtual assets. The proceeds of these operations help fund the Kim regime’s ballistic missile programme and the development of more robust cyber capabilities, among other initiatives. North Korea’s cyber-criminal activities undermine UN sanctions and represent a distinct threat to international security.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Throughout the election, Chinese hackers steal datasets from both political parties and all levels of government. In the long term, this facilitates future blackmail and enormous economic advantage from pilfered trade secrets, IP, and proprietary research.</code></em></p> -<p>A US-led coalition has responded to North Korea’s exploitation of cryptocurrency by prioritising enforcement against the virtual asset platforms that facilitate money laundering, especially mixing services. Mixers enable users to obfuscate the origins of their cryptocurrency funds by commingling them in a large pool with other users’ assets. Recognising the key role non-compliant mixers such as Tornado Cash have played in North Korea’s cyber-criminal enterprise, US authorities and international partners have launched an aggressive crackdown. Authorities have supplemented their primary enforcement tools – sanctions and platform takedowns – with asset seizures, arrests and the adoption of new laws and regulatory measures. Over the past few months, governments have experimented with novel approaches to combating digital illicit finance, such as the possibility of designating all mixer transactions as suspicious by default.</p> +<p>Like the second scenario (The Gender Divide in Cyber Warfare), the above vignette shows how generative AI can help visualize alternative futures based on the convergence of key trends. Here the prompts based on trends observed during the TTXs change how the model weights words and their sequence to write a dystopian story. Like wargames, these scenarios are not predictive as much they are illustrative, a helpful mechanism for catalyzing policy debates and security assessments. As a result, the story is a gateway to a larger set of stress tests and red-teaming efforts required to identify vulnerabilities that a mix of foreign states and insiders could use to attack federal agencies and critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>This paper forms part of a series of research projects funded by the US Department of State to understand and mitigate obstacles to UN sanctions implementation. It aims to examine cryptocurrency mixers’ distinct technical, legal and regulatory dimensions and the challenges they pose to the sanctions regime. The paper provides detailed background information on North Korea’s cyber-criminal statecraft, focusing on North Korean actors’ use of mixers to launder illicitly obtained cryptocurrency. It takes stock of the government response to date, concluding that while actions against non-compliant virtual asset platforms have been effective individually, the campaign’s overall impact on North Korea’s laundering capacity has been limited. It also seeks to grapple with the unintended consequences of interventions, some of which have yet to manifest fully.</p> +<h3 id="policy-implications">Policy Implications</h3> -<p>The paper offers 14 recommendations for policymakers and practitioners. The first cluster includes suggestions for broadening the current approach to countering North Korean mixer exploitation through unconventional partnerships and new conceptual frameworks. It advocates for empowering the disparate teams fighting cross-cutting North Korean cyber threats to collaborate more closely, and for expanding consideration of the second- and third-order marketplace effects enforcement actions may trigger. The next cluster focuses on cultivating stronger cooperative relations with the private sector. These recommendations emphasise nurturing the development of compliant blockchain privacy alternatives and tailoring government communications to the idiosyncratic virtual asset industry audience. The final cluster of recommendations focuses on raising global cyber security and anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance standards. Achieving wider implementation of current best practices, with an eye toward augmenting them in light of emerging digital illicit finance risks, would substantially degrade North Korea’s ability to monetise cybercrime.</p> +<p>A connected society is as vulnerable as it prosperous. Each connection creates possibilities for exchanging goods and ideas but opens a vector for spreading malware and holding the entire system hostage. As a result, modern resilience starts with cybersecurity and ensuring that the federal government and critical infrastructure are sufficiently protected from both foreign and domestic threats. Seen in this light, the following policy recommendations warrant further debate and considerations based on the findings from the TTXs, public survey, and generative AI scenarios.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<h4 id="charting-a-path-toward-comprehensive-cybersecurity-for-essential-services">Charting a Path toward Comprehensive Cybersecurity for Essential Services</h4> -<p>North Korea’s innovative and highly motivated e-crime groups have emerged over the past decade as among the world’s most prolific cyber-criminals. Under the direction of the Kim regime, North Korean actors have pioneered a unique model that combines their technical acumen with the state’s experience in conducting illicit financial activities, honed over more than half a century, to cultivate a potent new revenue stream. The results speak for themselves. North Korea has stolen billions of dollars through electronic means from victims around the globe, including more than $3 billion in cryptocurrency. In 2022, North Korean groups accounted for roughly half of the nearly $4 billion stolen across the virtual asset ecosystem and a large portion of the funds taken from decentralised finance (DeFi) protocols, which have quickly become crypto hackers’ primary target. Following each theft, North Korean cyber-criminals steer their ill-gotten gains through a sophisticated laundering process and ultimately into state coffers. The profits from these operations fund much of Pyongyang’s ballistic missile programme, enable deeper investment in its cyber capabilities, bankroll slush funds for the North Korean elite, and help insulate the regime from the effects of sanctions. Through their direct and indirect effects, North Korea’s ongoing cyber-criminal activities pose an acute threat to international security and the global financial system. This paper explores North Korea’s use of these novel technologies to evade sanctions, considers the efficacy of states’ countermeasures, and provides recommendations on how authorities can further impede North Korea’s illicit cyber revenue-generating activities.</p> +<p>A major finding across all the games, surveys, and scenarios was that future cyber threats will increasingly target the basic needs provided by the federal government as a way of holding the United States hostage during political transitions and foreign policy crises. Traditionally, cyber defense focused on sensitive military and intelligence infrastructure, but this observation changes the logic. Increasingly both federal CISOs and actors such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) will need to prioritize protecting services such as providing food and healthcare to large segments of the U.S. public. These ideas echo the larger recent study on defending the .gov ecosystem. Furthermore, this new focus on public needs will likely require expanding core programs such as threat hunting to include more active red teaming and dynamic consequence management exercises that include stress testing how best to engage the public during a cyber crisis.</p> -<p>Cryptocurrency mixers play a key role in the laundering process underpinning the North Korean cyber-criminal model. Mixing services, also known as tumblers, obfuscate the provenance and ownership of cryptocurrency funds by blending many users’ holdings together and disbursing each customer’s “mixed” funds to new addresses under their control. By obscuring the otherwise transparent trail of blockchain transactions, mixers make it harder for victims and law enforcement to trace stolen assets, let alone recover them, and help convert dirty cryptocurrency into more usable funds. Recognising these advantages, North Korean actors have enthusiastically incorporated mixers into their repertoire. Their heavy use of mixers presents both a problem and an opportunity: while these technologies protect a crucial revenue stream, North Korea’s reliance on mixers creates vulnerability to interventions that could significantly degrade their ability to monetise crypto theft.</p> +<h4 id="addressing-gender-and-age-dynamics-in-cyber-threat-perception">Addressing Gender and Age Dynamics in Cyber Threat Perception</h4> -<p>The US-led approach to countering North Korean mixer use is still taking shape. Thus far, the toolkit has mainly featured sanctions, platform takedowns, asset seizures, arrests and regulation, which authorities typically deploy simultaneously and in coordination with international partners. These tactics have proven effective across several cases, rendering certain major platforms much less functional and removing others from availability outright. All told, the ongoing campaign has reshaped key elements of the mixer landscape, and large recent asset seizures have generated a cautious optimism that law enforcement and private partners may be building their capacity to reclaim stolen funds. However, the strategic impact of these interventions on North Korea’s overall illicit finance capabilities is ambiguous, and even the successful platform takedowns may not prove to be enduring achievements. Moreover, the interventions have already triggered unintended consequences, the full scope of which remains to be seen. New platforms are emerging to fill the void predecessors have left, and the replacements may ultimately prove trickier to counter. The interventions have prompted cyber-criminals to adapt their operational procedures and spurred innovation by both legitimate and illicit market actors that promises to catalyse further change. The tough approach to mixers has also exacerbated divisions between the public and private sectors over the character and trajectory of the virtual asset space, undermining efforts to make it less hospitable to criminality. As the strategy for countering North Korean illicit digital finance continues to develop, authorities will need to reckon carefully with the second-order effects of their actions and continually refine their approach.</p> +<p>The fact that gender and age are playing a significant role in shaping perceptions of cyber threats — particularly in the context of misinformation campaigns — means the federal government has to change how it assesses threats and communicates with the U.S. public. Women’s heightened concern about deepfakes and misinformation calls for targeted strategies to address and counter these threats that will likely involve working with private sector social media companies. More generally, CISOs across the federal government, and CISA in particular, will need to incorporate gendered perspectives into cybersecurity policies and awareness campaigns. This could involve conducting gender-specific studies to understand varying threat perceptions and developing tailored public awareness initiatives that address these concerns. By acknowledging and addressing gender-based and age-based differences in cyber threat perception, public communication strategy can become more effective in countering misinformation campaigns and preventing societal divisions.</p> -<p>This paper forms part of a series of research projects funded by the US Department of State to understand and mitigate obstacles to UN sanctions implementation. It aims to examine the distinct technical, legal and regulatory dimensions of cryptocurrency mixers and the challenges they pose to the sanctions regime. The paper concludes a four-month research project, commencing in June 2023 and ending in September 2023, on the use of cryptocurrency mixers for illicit financial purposes by North Korean actors. The analysis is based on a close review of US government documents, such as indictments, sanctions designations, statements of policy and press releases; reports by the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea (“the Panel”); publicly available threat intelligence and blockchain analysis reporting from firms such as BAE Systems, Chainalysis, Elliptic and TRM Labs; and primary data that certain firms have collected on North Korean cyber operations and cryptocurrency transactions. The paper has also benefited from interviews with 16 experts in relevant fields, including compliance specialists, anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance (AML/CTF) practitioners, leading figures in the cryptocurrency industry, threat intelligence and blockchain analysts, policy researchers, and multiple former senior officials from the US Department of the Treasury, the US Department of Justice and the National Security Council.</p> +<h4 id="enhancing-public-awareness-and-transparency-in-cybersecurity-funding">Enhancing Public Awareness and Transparency in Cybersecurity Funding</h4> -<p>The paper contains three chapters. Chapter I offers background on Pyongyang’s cybercrime programme, the factors that draw cyber-criminals to mixers and the countermeasures governments have started taking. Chapter II analyses government interventions to date, focusing on the Blender, Tornado Cash, ChipMixer and Sinbad actions. It identifies unintended consequences that government action may trigger and suggests possible strategies for mitigating them. Chapter III offers a series of policy recommendations for augmenting the current approach to countering North Korean mixers, building stronger cooperative relations with the private sector, and raising global cyber security and AML/CTF standards. The paper concludes by flagging areas for further research and reflecting on how this issue could evolve in the years to come.</p> +<p>The apparent lack of public awareness about government funding and efforts in cybersecurity underscores the need for transparent and persistent communication strategies. The federal government must actively engage with the public to explain the complexities of the cyber threat landscape and the importance of resilience building. This recommendation involves not only investing in robust cybersecurity measures but also in extensive public education and information campaigns. By improving public understanding and involvement in cybersecurity matters, governments can strengthen societal resilience against cyber threats and ensure a more informed and cooperative approach to national cyber defense.</p> -<h3 id="i-background">I. Background</h3> +<h4 id="funding-an-entity-to-collect-analyze-and-share-cyber-statistics">Funding an Entity to Collect, Analyze, and Share Cyber Statistics</h4> -<p>This chapter provides background information on North Korea’s cyber-criminal activities and explains why mixers have become appealing tools for money laundering. It also outlines the measures governments and international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have undertaken in response to virtual asset crime.</p> +<p>There were expert debates and disagreement across demographic cohorts about whether or not the U.S. government sufficiently resources cybersecurity. This divergence likely speaks to a larger issue: the public does not understand the full extent of the threat and experts are often lost in debating different aspects. There is no, single credible source of information about cyberattacks in the same way that there are public databases on everything from weather patterns to crime statistics to economic data. It should come as no surprise that large segments of the U.S. population see a threat but struggle to understand what the right balance of ways and means is to reach the goal of secure online services and critical infrastructure. Therefore, the U.S. government — whether in the Office of the Cyber Director or CISA — needs to establish an outlet for publishing cyber statistics. This effort should build on new public and private sector data pooling initiatives and ensure cyber dashboards are as accessible to a woman in rural Kansas as they are to a federal CISO in Washington. With a pool of data, the government can make forecasts about future threats and better align federal resources, including money, labor, and technology. This will allow the government to better inform the private sector and general public about the cyber threats and cybersecurity measures.</p> -<h4 id="the-north-korean-cybercrime-programme">The North Korean Cybercrime Programme</h4> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Cybercrime has quickly become an essential pillar of North Korean statecraft. In the mid-2010s, having already developed a capacity for destructive and espionage cyber activities, Pyongyang launched a global campaign of financially motivated intrusions whose early results prefigured an enormous return on investment. The 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, in which threat actors submitted fraudulent SWIFT requests to the bank’s accounts at the New York Federal Reserve, extracted more than $80 million and might have yielded 10 times more if not for a typo in the phoney wire instructions that exposed the ruse. In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware affected several hundred thousand machines in at least 150 countries, demonstrating the ease with which hackers cloistered untouchably in faraway jurisdictions could commit digital extortion at massive scale. These and subsequent operations validated the idea that state-directed computer crime could pay quite handsomely. Over the past decade, North Korea has assembled a web of interlocking threat actor sets whose primary or secondary aims are to generate revenue, including the groups known as APT38, Andariel and the Lazarus Group, some of the world’s most active and successful e-crime syndicates. Their combined operations have generated several billion dollars for the Kim regime. That North Korea’s annual foreign trade volume, long its chief source of hard currency, has not surpassed $3 billion since 2019 underscores the impact of this new revenue stream.</p> +<p>The shape of the threat is clear. As science fiction writer William Gibson puts it, “The future is already here, it is just not evenly distributed.” The United States has already seen massive data breaches, IP theft, and efforts to plant malware on its critical infrastructure. Foreign actors increasingly look like they are employing cyberattack vectors targeting the federal government and critical infrastructure to “wreak havoc.” The open question is what the United States will do about it. The games, surveys, and generative AI scenarios in this paper represent an effort by the CSIS Futures Lab to employ novel research methods to understand modern policy challenges.</p> -<p>Among national cyber strategies, Pyongyang’s is unique. North Korea was likely the first country to generate illicit revenue via cybercrime, and to the extent that any other countries have experimented with cyber-criminal statecraft, North Korea remains by far its largest practitioner. Its threat actors have benefited from robust ties to the global underground, from hacker forums and off-the-shelf malware vendors to high-level network access brokers and transnational money laundering networks. North Korea’s repertoire comprises a wide range of activities typically associated with non-state criminals rather than state actors. Of these, theft from major enterprises is the most profitable, but by no means the only, core element. North Korean threat actors have launched ransomware campaigns, solicited fraudulent investments, hijacked other users’ processing power to mine cryptocurrency, stolen customer payment information from e-commerce websites, and programmed ATMs to dispense cash for collection by networks of money mules, among other pursuits. Capitalising on the prevalence of remote work and outsourcing since the Covid-19 pandemic, North Korea has steered many of its skilled programmers into freelance IT work, performing services such as web development and database creation for foreign companies under false identities – activities that would be legal if not for sanctions. The thousands of workers engaging in these activities, many of whom operate from Russia or China, cumulatively bring in millions of dollars per year. In addition to generating income, they may enable future compromises by planting malware in company systems or gathering data to inform social engineering schemes that involve deception of unsuspecting employees. Lesser North Korean cyber-criminals engage in petty e-crime, such as online gaming and casino scams, which are not lucrative individually but scale easily.</p> +<p>Addressing these threats requires open, honest debate that embraces not just opinion but also large datasets, facts, and even creative scenarios. Diversity of thought and perspective will lead to deeper insights. Too often security questions are treated as sensitive and closed policy discussions, limiting the ability of an educated public to debate the best course of action. Democracy requires these debates and a vibrant marketplace of ideas. Securing the connectivity the U.S. citizens rely on is too important to be left to unaccountable experts debating a handful of marquee case studies and opaque security programs. The public has a stake in understanding the threat and debating how best to confront it. That debate will be messy, but then again so is democracy.</p> -<p>The characteristics that distinguish virtual assets make them attractive targets for criminal exploitation. Having surpassed the trillion-dollar market capitalisation threshold in 2021 and remained near or above it since, the cryptocurrency space is awash with cash, the critical factor for opportunistic cyber-criminals, who follow the money above all. Market actors have often prioritised breakneck innovation and user growth at the expense of due attention to compliance and cyber security, leaving large pots of assets under-protected against highly motivated thieves. Users and investors drawn to the prospect of fast and high returns frequently exercise insufficient care in guarding against scammers. Criminals looking to fly under the radar benefit from the space’s emphasis on privacy and, in many circles, its scepticism or outright antagonism toward regulatory authorities and traditional compliance practices perceived as intrusive or burdensome. Instantaneous, borderless transactions enable malign actors to quickly abscond with ill-gotten funds, while decentralisation enables buck-passing with respect to compliance, investigation and victim support. The rapid rise of DeFi and the advances in decentralisation, speed and automation it heralds have increased virtual assets’ appeal to North Korean cyber-criminals in particular. As the US Department of the Treasury assessed in April 2023, “many existing DeFi services covered by the BSA [Bank Secrecy Act] fail to comply with AML/CFT obligations, a vulnerability that illicit actors exploit”.</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="embracing-mixers">Embracing Mixers</h4> +<p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is an associate data fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and a graduate fellow in the Center for Data Science at American University.</p> -<p>Mixers enable North Korean cyber-criminals to launder dirty cryptocurrency with increased speed and anonymity by blending their holdings together with those of many other users. Traditional mixers operate a custodial model, commingling user deposits in a large pool and then returning “clean” funds to their original owners, less a small fee. Relying on a central operator, however, presents counterparty risk and creates opportunities for compromise or law enforcement interdiction, as cases such as the ChipMixer seizure have demonstrated. To solve these problems, some newer mixers employ a non-custodial approach, in which smart contracts – blockchain-based programs that execute automatically when given conditions are met – tumble users’ holdings without ever placing them under a central operator’s control. Non-custodial mixers such as Tornado Cash offer enhanced security, reduce platform administrators’ direct involvement in daily operations, and greatly diminish the possibility of unauthorised asset seizure. While there are plenty of legitimate reasons for law-abiding cryptocurrency owners to wish to use these sorts of privacy tools, most mixers practise minimal compliance, if any, and many were designed explicitly to facilitate illegal transactions. As Chainalysis noted in a mid-2022 review of mixing services’ regulatory obligations, “We aren’t aware of any custodial mixers currently following [US compliance] rules”.</p> +<p><strong>Jose Macias</strong> is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jPaSjv9.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>Figure 1: Life Cycle of a Sample North Korean Mixer Transaction</em></p> +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a professor in the Marine Corps University, School of Advanced Warfighting.</p>Yasir Atalan, et al.In the future, malign actors will seek to undermine trust in government through disrupting basic needs and services such as food aid and medical assistance, in place of costly offensive cyber campaigns.Azerbaijan’s Pivot2024-04-08T12:00:00+08:002024-04-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/azerbaijans-pivot<p><em>While continuing its equidistance policy regarding Russia and the West, Azerbaijan is looking towards Central Asia and identifying its position in the new Great Game.</em></p> -<p>North Korean cyber-criminals have embraced using mixers to launder stolen funds, which now represents a core component of North Korea’s cryptocurrency theft protocols. According to Chainalysis, the percentage of ill-gotten North Korean cryptocurrency that flowed through mixing services grew from under 10% in 2018 to 65% in 2021. North Korean actors laundered more than $1 billion from at least 10 separate operations through Tornado Cash alone prior to the mixer’s designation in August 2022, including from the January 2022 Qubit hack and the June 2022 Horizon Bridge hack. They processed $20 million from the massive March 2022 Axie Infinity hack through Blender and several tens of millions from the aforementioned operations and others, like the September 2020 KuCoin heist, through ChipMixer. In 2023, North Korean cyber-criminals turned to alternative platforms, whisking funds from the Atomic Wallet hack through a new Bitcoin mixer called Sinbad and more than $60 million of Ethereum from Horizon Bridge through the Railgun privacy protocol. Employing a variety of mixers distributes risk across multiple platforms, but also reflects the need to replace services that have shut down.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Most illicit actors use mixers in similar fashion – after all, the point is to blend in with the crowd – but certain characteristics mark North Korea’s use. For one, North Korean actors are among the largest mixer users in the world, accounting for 30% of the funds that sanctioned entities tumbled in 2022, behind only the Hydra darknet marketplace. They appear more inclined toward using mixers than most other cryptocurrency thieves, as less than 20% of the proceeds of non-North Korean cryptocurrency hacks flowed through mixers in 2022. According to Elliptic, illicit North Korean funds comprised 70% of Railgun’s total receipts as of early 2023. In practice, North Korean cyber-criminals have fewer mixer options to choose from than less prolific outfits. As a general rule, the larger a mixer’s pool of assets and users, the stronger the anonymity it can provide; conversely, investigators are generally better able to trace dirty assets through a tumbling protocol with lower volume. Only a handful of platforms can accommodate tens of millions of dollars in North Korean-controlled cryptocurrency in one shot without becoming useless, and authorities can even “de-mix” transactions through certain larger platforms. North Korean launderers often add further layers of obfuscation by employing multiple mixers and bridging funds across blockchains, a practice known as chain-hopping. Of course, the end uses of North Korean virtual asset crime – supporting the regime’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, among other purposes – distinguish it from operations whose perpetrators seek personal profit. Nonetheless, North Korea’s money-laundering methodologies largely overlap with those of other sophisticated cyber-criminals.</p> +<p>Against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has reshaped perceptions of influence, Central Asia has surged to prominence in the 21st-century geopolitical arena. Recognising its newfound importance, the West seems to have pivoted its focus towards the region, one which Russia has long viewed as its backyard and where China has become increasingly economically dominant. Summits in the 5+1 format (with Central Asia’s five republics) have already been organised by the US (September 2023) and Germany (October 2023), with the UK and Italy also expected to host their own. Added to this, European politicians have embarked on tours of Central Asia, such as German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier (June 2023), French President Emmanuel Macron (November 2023) and Italian President Sergio Mattarella (November 2023). Do these activities allow us to speculate that we are witnessing a Great Game 2.0., a sequel to the multifaceted geopolitical competition that once took place over Central Asia between the Russian and British Empires? Whether this is the case or not, it is a fact that the current Central Asian geopolitical context features more actors, including multiple Western powers, China and, to some extent, India and Pakistan.</p> -<h4 id="government-responses">Government Responses</h4> +<p>Enter Azerbaijan, which is determined to become an integral piece in the puzzle of Central Asian geopolitics. In its pivot to Central Asia, Baku’s ambitions, position and attitude are certainly different from those of the above-mentioned countries. Since its independence in 1991, Azerbaijan has directed almost all of its resources toward the resolution of the decades-long Karabakh conflict. Now, with the finalisation of the Karabakh chapter and the restoration of its territorial integrity, Azerbaijan needs to rethink and reshape its foreign policy priorities.</p> -<p>Having begun formulating AML/CTF frameworks for virtual assets in the decade prior, global regulators moved in the late 2010s to account for the emergence of mixers. The FATF, the international standard-setting organisation, updated its core recommendations in October 2018 to apply to virtual assets and virtual asset service providers (VASPs), and in June 2019 it adopted an Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15 detailing how its rules should apply to that ecosystem in practice. Accompanying guidance for implementing a risk-based approach to regulating virtual assets and VASPs expressed concern at “the rise of anonymity-enhanced cryptocurrencies (AECs), mixers and tumblers, decentralised platforms and exchanges, and other types of products and services that enable or allow for reduced transparency and increased obfuscation of financial flows”. The FATF subsequently identified mixer use as a “red flag” indicating users’ possible “intent to obscure the flow of illicit funds”. The FATF urges governments to ensure that VASPs can manage the risks associated with operating or transacting with mixers, and to ban providers that are incapable of or unwilling to do so.</p> +<p>Baku’s foreign policy over the past 15–16 years has been marked by a balancing or “equidistance” between Russo-centric Eurasian structures and the Western power bloc. The hostility between Russia and the West has only strengthened Azerbaijan’s determination not to align itself with either of the confronting parties. At the same time, this has led to a quest for a new geopolitical structure and direction for Baku’s foreign policy and economic development. Here, Central Asia emerges as a potential strategic partner for Azerbaijan, offering a mutually beneficial geopolitical and economic alignment.</p> -<p>US and UK regulators have established similar frameworks. The US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a pair of documents in May 2019 to clarify VASPs’ obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and to warn that “FinCEN and US law enforcement have observed unregistered entities being exploited or wittingly allowing their platforms to be utilised by criminals in the United States and abroad to further illicit activity”. The FinCEN guidance asserts explicitly that mixers fall under the purview of the BSA, building on a 2008 administrative ruling that classified anonymising services as money transmitters and on 2013 guidance concerning virtual currency use and exchange. Importantly, these determinations oblige regulable VASPs to comply with key AML policies such as the Travel Rule, which requires financial institutions to convey certain information about funds they transmit. Heeding encouragement from the FATF and calls from its own National Crime Agency to address mixers “churning criminal cash”, the British government revised its AML legislation in 2022 and implemented the Travel Rule for virtual assets in September 2023. US and UK regulators are working actively with global partners to strengthen the framework governing anonymising technologies such as mixers and to achieve more robust implementation of AML/CTF standards.</p> +<p>This geopolitical calculation is driven by several factors, but mostly by common roots, ethnolinguistic kinship and a shared historical legacy. The concept of Turkic unity itself originated in Azerbaijan during the late 19th century, while Azerbaijan together with Turkey has been zealously pushing the Turkic agenda and integrationist projects since the 1990s. Although these initiatives were initially rooted in and designed to promote cultural ties between Turkic societies, there has been a noticeable shift, in recent years, towards greater political and economic convergence among the Turkic states. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), loosely modelled on the EU, possesses the potential to evolve into a supranational organisation if effectively managed. OTS member states have also had the chance to turn their integrationist ideas into tangible projects such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route – also known as the Middle Corridor – whose significance has only been growing in light of the Russo-Ukrainian war.</p> -<p>Mixers initially appeared on law enforcement authorities’ radar as facilitators for money laundering and internet crime, rather than as vectors of North Korean national security threats. In May 2019, the Dutch financial crime agency and Europol took down BestMixer, at the time one of the three largest mixing platforms, with Europol commenting that “the investigation so far into this case shows that many of the mixed cryptocurrencies on BestMixer.io had a criminal origin or destination”. Culminating an investigation launched the previous summer, the BestMixer intervention appears to have been the first such law enforcement action. In 2020, FinCEN levied a $60 million civil penalty against the primary operator of the Helix Bitcoin mixer for wilfully and systematically violating the BSA in the course of servicing more than three dozen illicit darknet marketplaces, a few months after his indictment on federal money laundering charges. In April 2021, US authorities arrested a dual Russian–Swedish national “on criminal charges related to his alleged operation of the longest-running bitcoin money laundering service on the darknet”, the Bitcoin Fog mixer, which achieved “notoriety as a go-to money laundering service for criminals seeking to hide their illicit proceeds from law enforcement”. That summer, FinCEN assessed a $100-million penalty against BitMEX, a cryptocurrency exchange and derivative trading platform, for BSA infractions that included facilitating thousands of transactions with mixers like Helix.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Azerbaijan aims to position itself not only as a Caucasian or Caspian state but also as a bridge to Central Asia</code></em></strong></p> -<p>North Korea’s brazen string of cryptocurrency hacks in 2021 and 2022, as well as the high-profile Colonial Pipeline and JBS ransomware crises of 2021 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prompted an evolution in how officials tend to view illicit mixer use, from a criminal tool to a direct national security threat. In October 2021, the White House launched the Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI), bringing together dozens of governments to develop cyber-security and AML standards and to coordinate action against the perpetrators and facilitators of cyber-criminal extortion. The UK and Singapore have jointly spearheaded much of the CRI’s work on mixers, co-leading a working group on countering illicit finance in 2022 and the CRI’s policy arm in 2023. The US Department of the Treasury’s February 2022 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, which includes a full sub-section on virtual assets and a sub-header therein on anonymity-enhancing technologies, names North Korean, Russian and Iranian threat actors as primary exploiters of those services, noting that “ransomware attacks … frequently stem from jurisdictions with elevated sanctions risk” and that “ransomware payments may … fund activities that harm US national security”. The Department’s April 2023 report, Illicit Finance Risk Assessment of Decentralized Finance, the most comprehensive government report on this topic at the time of writing, treats North Korean mixer use extensively, noting that “the DPRK … increasingly steals virtual assets from both centralized VASPs and DeFi services” and that North Korean cyber-criminals “are using DeFi services in the process of transferring and laundering their illicit proceeds”. The report offers in-depth suggestions for curtailing this activity by building regulatory capacity and expanding collaboration with foreign and private sector partners.</p> +<p>The increased importance of the Middle Corridor is also attracting greater international attention to the region. The EU recently announced the allocation of €10 billion for the development of this massive connectivity project, which would circumvent Russian infrastructure. Within this substantial investment, 33 infrastructure projects, with a particular focus on rail initiatives, are earmarked for financing. The Middle Corridor further accentuates the key position of Azerbaijan, which plays a crucial role in this framework by serving as a vital link between Europe and Asia. This significance is attributed to its well-established transportation infrastructure, featuring ports along the Caspian Sea and robust connections with neighbouring countries such as Georgia and Turkey, which comprise the European leg of the Middle Corridor.</p> -<p>Since early 2022, global authorities have dramatically ramped up efforts to disrupt North Korean illicit mixer use and experimented with new tools for doing so. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued its first-ever designation of a mixing service in May 2022, sanctioning Blender for obfuscating tens of millions of dollars in North Korean proceeds from the Axie Infinity heist.</p> +<p>In other words, Azerbaijan – or more precisely, the Azerbaijan–Turkey tandem (as the two countries usually work together in such geopolitical and geo-economic projects) – can become a bottleneck for the West, which seeks to establish deeper connections with Central Asia. Having economically expanded into Central Asia since the 1990s, Turkey has also grown its political and even military presence in the region by signing military agreements with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and selling Turkish UAVs (drones) to Kyrgyzstan.</p> -<p>Asked a few months later about North Korea’s cyber activities, Anne Neuberger, US Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology, commented, “Given that cyber is such a core driver of revenue, it’s something we must address … We’re doubling down and planning to do much more work to make it riskier, costlier, and harder for North Korea to gain funds that way”. The US government’s most prominent mixer action to date has been its August 2022 designation of Tornado Cash, which demonstrated OFAC’s ability to target platforms without a traditional centralised operating entity while also provoking much private sector ire, including well-funded legal challenges. Undeterred, US authorities revised and expanded the Tornado Cash designation and recently indicted two of the service’s alleged operators, one of whom was arrested in Washington state. Last year, international coalitions took down ChipMixer, whose servers and nearly $50 million in cryptocurrency holdings were seized by the German Federal Criminal Police, and Sinbad, which OFAC designated in November. In a noteworthy development, in October 2023 FinCEN proposed a new rule that would classify mixing as a transaction class of primary money laundering concern and impose substantial new record-keeping and reporting requirements on domestic participants. If implemented, the proposal would represent a novel exercise of the US Department of the Treasury’s authorities under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, with which it has previously targeted only individual foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions.</p> +<p>The development of Azerbaijan’s relations with Central Asia is being fostered on both shores of the Caspian Sea. This explains Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s participation as an “honoured guest” at the 5th Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Dushanbe in September 2023. The inclusion of Aliyev indicates that Central Asian countries are increasingly acknowledging Azerbaijan as an integral participant in their regional dynamics. At the same time, Aliyev himself, in his latest remarks – especially in his inauguration speech in February – has placed special emphasis on relations with the Turkic states of Central Asia when announcing “our family is the Turkic world” slogan.</p> -<h3 id="ii-analysis">II. Analysis</h3> +<p>Looking ahead, Azerbaijan aims to position itself not only as a Caucasian or Caspian state but also as a bridge to Central Asia. This strategic positioning sends a clear message, particularly to Western powers who seek deeper cooperation with Central Asia: Azerbaijan, together with Turkey, is the gateway for engagement with the region. Azerbaijan’s pivot towards Central Asia is underpinned by a calculated evaluation of the region as a less risky alternative compared to alignment with either the Russo-centric Eurasian structures or the Western power bloc. As a means of avoiding the potentially destabilising entanglements associated with alignment with more dominant powers, Central Asia has emerged as a geopolitical structure that offers relative stability and opportunity for Baku.</p> -<h4 id="evaluating-interventions-to-date">Evaluating Interventions to Date</h4> +<hr /> -<p>This chapter takes stock of the US-led campaign against virtual asset mixers through its first two years. The first portion assesses seven major interventions against platforms and considers their overall impact on North Korea’s money laundering capacity. The second portion outlines the unintended consequences that actions against mixers can trigger, and explores possible mitigations.</p> +<p><strong>Rusif Huseynov</strong> is the director of Topchubashov Center, Azerbaijan. His main interests are socio-political developments, frozen conflicts, and ethnic minorities, in post-Soviet countries, while his focus areas mainly cover Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. He is a ReThink.CEE (2021) fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States and served as Local Focal Point within the EU4Dialogue project.</p> -<p>Viewed through the narrow lens of impact on the target platform, government interventions against mixers facilitating North Korean money laundering have achieved success. Blender shut down shortly after its designation, removing one of North Korean cyber-criminals’ favourite options for mixing Bitcoin. Indeed, Chainalysis reports that roughly 90% of the funds North Korean actors mixed in Q2 2021 passed through Blender. ChipMixer likewise ceased operations following the Germany- and US-led intervention, and Europol anticipates that the four servers and seven terabytes of data seized in the takedown will catalyse further investigations. In the more complicated case of Tornado Cash, the OFAC designation has resulted in a transaction volume decrease of over 80% as of late 2023, shrinking the platform’s pool of mixable funds and in turn significantly degrading its effectiveness at obfuscating asset movements, especially for larger-volume users. According to Chainalysis, after the designation “Tornado Cash … saw drops in inflows from virtually every category” of sender, including funds from thieves and sanctioned entities. As a portion of the total funds North Korean cyber-criminals mixed, Tornado Cash flows declined to under 25% in Q4 2022, following four consecutive quarters of these actors’ pushing essentially all their stolen cryptocurrency through Tornado Cash at some point in the laundering process, which typically involved bridging and layering with other services. Western authorities have arrested two of Tornado Cash’s three alleged “principal” co-founders and in August 2023 unsealed a remarkably detailed indictment indicating that the men deliberately sought to create a “haven for criminals to engage in large-scale money laundering and sanctions evasion”. On an individual basis, these tactics have proven potent, removing or seriously compromising platforms North Korea has relied on to launder dirty virtual assets. Considered together, they have reshaped the cryptocurrency mixer landscape.</p> +<p><strong>Gulkhanim Mammadova</strong> is a researcher with a focus on gender studies, peacebuilding, and conflict transformation at Topchubashov Center. She has taken part in numerous cross-border dialogues and youth projects, such as EU4Dialogue, Corridors, and Conflict School. Gulkhanim is a John Smith Trust Fellow 2023 and a participant in the 2nd Edition of the OSCE Women’s Peace Leadership Programme.</p>Rusif Huseynov and Gulkhanim MammadovaWhile continuing its equidistance policy regarding Russia and the West, Azerbaijan is looking towards Central Asia and identifying its position in the new Great Game.U.S.-Japan Alliance In 20242024-04-04T12:00:00+08:002024-04-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/us-japan-alliance-in-2024<p><em>The U.S.-Japan alliance is at a moment of historic strength, even as both countries confront daunting challenges in the international system. This report calls for an alliance that is more integrated across the economic and security realms to uphold the rules-based order.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/B1bRseB.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>Table 1: Notable Interventions Against Mixers</em></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Still, in some cases governments have fallen short. Despite its reduced functionality, Tornado Cash continues to operate because it runs on smart contracts that authorities are unable to seize or shut down directly, as they could a centralised server or custodial entity. Some users, including North Korean actors, have continued engaging the platform to obscure illicit fund trails, albeit in lesser amounts. This situation reveals a major limitation on authorities’ ability to counter decentralised, smart contract-based mixers, and raises questions about whether measures against similar platforms will be effective in the future. The first action against such an entity, the Tornado Cash designation, has also suffered from a lack of clarity, which generated marketplace confusion as to the extent of the restrictions and liability for interacting, even unwittingly, with the service. These issues and the aforementioned court challenges prompted OFAC in November 2022 to de-list the platform and redesignate it under a broader justification, as well as to publish answers to market actors’ frequently asked questions.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Beyond the complexities of the Tornado Cash case, several other interventions that met the core goal of taking a malign service offline did not accomplish secondary goals such as arrests or property seizures. The operators of ChipMixer and Blender remain at large, and reports indicate that the administrator of the latter may have absconded with as much as $22 million in Bitcoin and remains involved in operating dirty mixers. While multimillion dollar virtual asset seizures impose heavy costs on criminals and may help compensate their victims, few have accounted for more than a small fraction of the total amount the illicit actors in question are known to have processed or taken in profits. These shortcomings should not take away from the altogether impressive results that government interventions have achieved against mixing platforms themselves.</p> +<p>Japan and the United States today confront an international environment more fragmented and divided than at any time since the end of World War II. Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel in October 2023 has rekindled major conflict in the Middle East, including attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, with a risk of expansion as Iran and its proxies seek to capitalize on the violence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shaken the international system and raised the specter of a world dividing into blocs. China has provided Russia with an economic lifeline, and North Korea has provided millions of rounds of ammunition that have sustained the war effort and helped Moscow to avoid defeat — and perhaps even to prevail, absent additional international assistance to Ukraine.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/L8pIIu0.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>Table 2: Tactical Outcomes of Notable Interventions Against Mixers</em></p> +<p>For its part, China is pursuing revisionist aims across the Indo-Pacific and beyond, adopting tools of coercion — military, political, and economic — to press territorial claims and advance its interests. Russia and China have largely ceased cooperation with the West, including at the United Nations and even in areas where they previously found common cause, such as efforts to restrain North Korean behavior. Kim Jong-un has capitalized on these divisions to advance his nuclear and missile programs and has forged a close relationship with Vladimir Putin. With Moscow and Beijing effectively in his corner, Kim has abandoned any pretext of engagement with the United States. He is on the brink of a full-spectrum nuclear capability, from tactical weapons for use on the battlefield to strategic weapons that can credibly threaten the United States and its allies.</p> -<p>The ultimate strategic outcome of authorities’ campaign to disrupt North Korean revenue streams by pursuing dirty mixers remains to be seen, but initial indications have been somewhat discouraging. Every intervention so far has achieved degradation of the target platform, only for replacements or reincarnations to quickly absorb much of its transaction volume. A prominent blockchain investigator privately described the Tornado Cash designation, whose bite on the platform itself has been evident, as a “blip” for North Korean cyber-criminals, who adapted quickly by re-routing illicit asset flows through other service.</p> +<p>At the same time, both the United States and Japan are seeking to define the strategic competition with China in terms that avoid a new Cold War. On the one hand, both the United States and Japan have pursued policies to defend commercial and technological advantages in key sectors from China’s predatory and other unfair practices. In 2022, Japan passed new laws to promote “economic security” through enhanced screening for inbound investment, subsidies and protections for critical materials, and a new classified patent system for sensitive technologies. In the United States, Washington is pursuing a “small yard, high fence” approach to protecting critical technologies — limiting Beijing’s access to advanced technologies and promoting supply chain diversification — while otherwise allowing commerce with China to continue. But the size of the “yard” of critical technologies and the height of the “fence” around it remain subject to hot political debate. While managing this competition, Washington and Tokyo must preserve room to cooperate with China on issues of common interest and to sustain economic exchange key to the world’s prosperity. Building cooperation on climate change is of particular importance.</p> -<p>Elliptic reported in February 2023 that Sinbad, one of the preferred tumblers of North Korean threat actors from late 2022 until its designation last November, was very likely a relaunched version of Blender. In fact, as discussed at length in the next section, taking down a platform may prompt users to shift not just to comparable substitutes but to more powerful anonymising tools. Considering the abundant alternatives and the ease with which developers can launch a new mixer, it has become apparent that compromising individual platforms may not have an enduring effect on the mixer ecosystem’s overall capacity. It is plausible that these interventions have delayed cash-outs to North Korean actors and raised transaction costs, and authorities have managed to interdict small but non-trivial North Korean illicit fund movements. These actions have injected a degree of uncertainty into the laundering process, demonstrating that stolen funds are always vulnerable and forcing cyber-criminals to engage with platforms of unknown pedigree. Nevertheless, the campaign so far has not substantially impaired North Korea’s ability to mix cryptocurrency. With this conundrum in mind, FinCEN’s October 2023 proposal that mixing be classified as a transaction category of primary money-laundering concern is especially intriguing. Could targeting mixing transactions as a class have greater impact than going after facilitators one by one? Whether through this type of action or other means, authorities may need to broaden their approach in order to curtail North Korea’s monetisation of cyber-criminal statecraft.</p> +<p>In this uncertain environment, the U.S.-Japan alliance has never been more important — but doubts about the future of American leadership have never been more profound. Under the Biden administration, the United States has focused on strengthening alliances and partnerships, including by elevating the Quad, launching AUKUS, and promoting deeper “minilateral” cooperation among allies, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Australia. This strategy has achieved noteworthy successes, but it has failed to advance an economic agenda that meets the demand for credible and durable U.S. engagement, especially in the trade arena. And the future of U.S. engagement is uncertain, given a presidential campaign that features radically different visions of the United States’ role in the world and its relationships with allies. Regardless of which candidate wins, the concerns about American isolationism and reliability will continue.</p> -<h4 id="reckoning-with-unintended-consequences">Reckoning with Unintended Consequences</h4> +<p>The burdens of global and regional leadership will therefore fall more heavily on Tokyo in the near term. Fortunately, Japan is well positioned to take on this role. Former prime minister Abe Shinzo was the architect of the ambitious diplomatic strategy known as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), and his successors have fully embraced his vision. Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced a second phase of FOIP in March 2023, and it continues to enjoy broad political support in Japan. Japan has responded to a challenging security environment with unprecedented policy change, with plans to nearly double defense spending by 2027 and to acquire new capabilities that will contribute to deterrence in East Asia, including long-range precision strike missiles. Under Kishida’s leadership, Japan has played a major role in supporting Ukraine and was an effective leader of the G7 in 2023. Unlike many Western democracies, Japan has avoided the worst impulses of populism and isolationism. Its role in supporting a free and open international order grounded in the rule of law is therefore more important than ever. But looking ahead, the urgency of the international environment will demand more from Japan, and from the U.S.-Japan alliance.</p> -<p>Unintended consequences can undermine or even reverse achievements in the fight against North Korea’s digital illicit finance. For example, intervening may require authorities to expose sensitive capabilities such as the ability to trace funds through reputedly opaque technologies or to secure cooperation from a state or platform regarded as hospitable to criminals. Revealing valuable sources and methods may prompt cyber-criminals to adapt by shifting away from compromised partners and improving operational security. In 2017, for example, US and European law enforcement took down AlphaBay, a massive darknet marketplace for illegal goods and services of all kinds. A few years later, the platform relaunched with stronger security protocols designed to prevent such disruptions, including a requirement that users transact only in the “anonymity-enhanced” Monero cryptocurrency as well as a decentralised hosting system that purports to defend against seizures and infrastructure compromises. A related drawback is that shutting down platforms that authorities have quietly infiltrated reduces visibility into malign actors’ fund movements and evolving tactics, techniques and procedures. Several blockchain analysts from firms that work with governments expressed concern in interviews that the Blender, ChipMixer and Sinbad actions, among others, had shuttered key windows into North Korean criminals’ activities, which they argued could leave authorities less well positioned to track and act against future activity.</p> +<h3 id="toward-an-integrated-alliance">Toward an Integrated Alliance</h3> -<p>Taking out non-compliant platforms may simply push bad actors further into the shadows of the underground, where they can be harder for law enforcement to reach. A few days after the AlphaBay intervention, administrators of BitMixer – then the most popular tumbler – shut down their platform too, citing the realisation that truly anonymising Bitcoin transactions was impossible, and encouraging illicit-minded users to switch to anonymous-by-design privacy coins instead. Blockchain analysts and government officials report significant difficulty tracking privacy coins, whose utility to North Korean actors seems to be constrained more by impermanent challenges such as low liquidity and exchangeability than by any inherent operational shortcoming. Troublingly, use by North Korean actors of privacy coins, especially Monero, and privacy-enhanced operating systems like TRON, a favourite of terrorist groups, has grown sharply in recent years. Beyond mixers, North Korean threat actors have increasingly turned for laundering solutions to technologies like privacy wallets, which enable users to participate in obfuscating procedures known as CoinJoins. As with decentralised mixers like Tornado Cash, CoinJoins involve non-custodial transactions, meaning privacy wallets are not vulnerable to disruption or seizure in the way that centralised platforms such as Blender or ChipMixer are. Providers such as Wasabi Wallet and Samourai Wallet have facilitated North Korean money laundering after major heists, such as the $281-million KuCoin exchange hack in September 2020, and strike many investigators as substantially more difficult to crack than the mixers that authorities have dismantled so far. On the whole, while shutting down a dirty mixer or rendering it ineffective may be a short-term tactical victory, the net strategic result may be to induce North Korean cyber-criminals to pivot toward more hardened protocols, exacerbating the challenge overall.</p> +<p>In the year 2000, the lead authors of this report brought together a bipartisan group to develop a vision for the U.S.-Japan alliance before the presidential election to serve as a roadmap for the relationship regardless of which party won. That report helped to shape George W. Bush’s approach to the alliance, and since then this group has built on this tradition of bipartisanship in the U.S.-Japan relationship through reports in 2007, 2012, 2018, and 2020. The broad political support for the alliance today in Washington and Tokyo did not fully exist before 2000 — and it has been crucial to the successful development of the relationship ever since.</p> -<p>Interventions may cause detrimental second-order impacts in the broader virtual asset ecosystem. Popular mixers and illicit marketplaces can be highly profitable to run, and the unexpected shutdown of a market leader creates a tremendous incentive for other actors to offer replacement services in order to meet the unfulfilled user demand. Reviewing the effects of an important recent action, analysts at TRM Labs commented, “The vacuum left by Hydra’s takedown resulted in a veritable ‘Cambrian explosion’ in [darknet markets], with at least a dozen illicit projects having surfaced in its place”. Elliptic found in late 2022 that the Tornado Cash designation had led to an analogous situation, and identified several new or as yet relatively unknown platforms that had begun competing for suddenly available market share. In addition to Sinbad, North Korean actors have passed tens of millions of dollars of virtual assets from recent heists through Railgun, a decentralised privacy protocol that purports to serve professional investors but which FinCEN considers a mixer. Although less established services tend to have lower throughput and fewer users, limiting the privacy benefits they can provide, dispersal across multiple nascent platforms may make it harder to build a complete picture of North Korean activity. Similarly, targeted bans or punitive measures levied against specific entity categories may spur responsive innovation outside the scope of the action. This phenomenon might manifest as a negative or a positive: developers could seek to build compliant solutions or to innovate around the letter of the law just enough to avoid punishment. Other possible market effects include spooking developers into offshoring – moving to more permissive jurisdictions beyond the reach of responsible authorities – and, counterintuitively, enhancing sanctioned actors’ capabilities by raising the prices criminal facilitators can command, thereby attracting more sophisticated partners to enter the marketplace.</p> +<p>The authors behind earlier reports were not mere cheerleaders for the alliance — they were committed to honesty and candor about the challenges ahead and the need for action in Washington and Tokyo. The first report, issued in October 2000, called for “renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance.” In the most recent report, issued on the eve of President Biden’s inauguration, the authors called for an alliance that is more equal and expects more of Japan.</p> -<p>In an industry where relations between authorities and developers are often particularly antagonistic, aggressive measures against virtual asset platforms risk further alienating the private sector and intensifying the misalignment that undermines efforts to combat North Korean cybercrime. Since market actors drive digital financial innovation and serve as the gatekeepers of the virtual asset marketplace, building an ecosystem inhospitable to crime will depend at least as much on private sector buy-in as on government intervention. While widespread industry adoption of standards such as Know Your Customer would go a long way towards curbing malign activity, sustained apathy or resistance to cyber security and compliance will only worsen endemic cybercrime. In other words, whatever an enforcement action’s short-term outcome, the private sector’s response may shape much of its net effect in the long run. Accordingly, while authorities must react firmly to threats and misconduct, officials should be mindful of how industry is likely to perceive their actions, and seek to shrink the gulf between the public and private sectors. Moreover, the fact that most mixer users are not criminals means that interventions inflict collateral damage on law abiding customers. Just as they do for criminals, enforcement actions may restrict ordinary users’ access to mixers, reduce their efficacy, or raise the cost of using them. Chainalysis has determined that, since early 2022, the proportion of mixed funds originating from illicit sources has grown, which may increase the risk to non-criminal users of violating sanctions or of having their assets caught in a seizure. Regrettably, until platforms with the will and capacity to perform sufficient compliance emerge – some do appear to be in development or in preliminary stages of deployment – infringement on ordinary users will likely remain a necessary cost of fighting North Korean cybercrime. As is practicable, authorities should seek to minimise these impacts and mitigate their actions’ negative unintended consequences overall.</p> +<p>The strategic environment that the United States and Japan face today, and the urgency of action needed to address it, demands an even stronger call to action. With Japan now embarked on an ambitious strategic trajectory, this report urges Washington and Tokyo to take the next step: to move toward an alliance that is more integrated, from planning and executing military operations to linking economic and security concerns, including by coordinating industrial policy and promoting secure supply chains.</p> -<p>Conversely, authorities should seek to encourage favourable knock-on effects. Actions designed to target North Korea may impose costs on other malign actors, including some outside the traditional cyber-criminal set. Financially motivated North Korean groups interact regularly with other elements of the global digital underground to purchase malware kits and network accesses, arrange digital infrastructure and cash-outs, and exchange technical know-how. In the course of their operations, threat actors across borders rely on an overlapping suite of tools and platforms, of which mixers are just one prominent example. According to the US Department of the Treasury, “OFAC’s investigation also identified Blender’s facilitation of money-laundering for, among others, Russian-linked malign ransomware groups including Trickbot, Conti, Ryuk, Sodinokibi, and Gandcrab”. Blender likewise processed funds from the massive Russian-language Hydra marketplace, which authorities took down a month before the US Department of the Treasury designated Blender. Criminal filings against ChipMixer describe it as “one of the most popular mixing services used by ransomware operators”, darknet markets, and even Russia’s GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate), whose operators used mixed Bitcoin to surreptitiously purchase infrastructure for hosting malware. Prominent dirty mixers and the North Korean actors who engage heavily with them share additional nexuses with illegal weapons and narcotics distributors, counterfeiters, purveyors of exploitative sexual material, and countless other criminal enterprises whose architects have gravitated toward virtual assets and digital privacy technology. These groups’ convergence of interests and tradecraft creates an opportunity for authorities to strike at multiple malign actor sets simultaneously.</p> +<p>In security terms, Washington must recognize that Japan’s new course is fundamentally different from the past, and that a more integrated alliance, including at the command level, can make a vital contribution to deterrence by enabling rapid decisionmaking and reducing seams between the two countries’ systems. On the economic side, Washington and Tokyo should collaborate on critical technologies and advance a robust friend-shoring agenda, working closely with other partners in Asia and Europe. Furthermore, the United States and Japan should work together to build the new bilateral and multilateral mechanisms needed to support a strategy of selective de-risking with China. Japan and the United States should sustain close cooperation globally to uphold a free and open international order grounded in the rule of law.</p> -<h3 id="iii-recommendations">III. Recommendations</h3> +<h4 id="advancing-the-security-alliance">Advancing the Security Alliance</h4> -<p>This paper offers 14 recommendations for policymakers, national security practitioners, regulatory agencies and law enforcement working to counter North Korean cyber-criminals’ abuse of mixing services. The recommendations fall into three interrelated categories: broadening the approach to countering mixer exploitation through unconventional partnerships and new conceptual frameworks; building stronger cooperative relations with the private sector; and raising global cyber security and AML/CTF standards.</p> +<p>Japan’s 2022 National Defense Strategy represents an opportunity to move toward a far more operational and credible alliance. Despite the significant strengthening of the security relationship over the last decade, much of the alliance architecture remains rooted in an era when the United States expected little of Japan as a strategic partner. In the past, the alliance could be effective without formal mechanisms of military coordination, but today it cannot. A more integrated alliance will require modernizing its command structure, deepening intelligence cooperation, and actively promoting defense industry and technology cooperation. To enable these transformative steps, Japan will need to adopt stronger cybersecurity practices and further enhance and expand its security clearance system.</p> -<h4 id="broadening-the-approach-to-countering-north-korean-mixer-exploitation">Broadening the Approach to Countering North Korean Mixer Exploitation</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Restructure alliance command and control.</strong> Japan’s establishment of a new Joint Operational Command (J-JOC) by March 2025, to oversee joint operations of the Self Defense Forces (SDF), is an opportunity to modernize the alliance’s command structure. The United States should upgrade the leadership of U.S. forces in Japan by establishing a standing three- or four-star joint operational command, subordinate to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, with a more robust staff and the authority to plan and execute bilateral exercises and operations. This command could be a revamped U.S. Forces Japan or a new joint operational element established in Japan. Critically, however, the new headquarters should be primarily focused on the bilateral alliance and serve as a one-stop shop on all alliance matters for the Japanese government. The commander should not be dual hatted with U.S. service command responsibilities. With this new structure in place, Tokyo and Washington should establish a standing, combined bilateral planning and coordination office to support closer coordination of military operations while preserving separate chains of command. To the degree possible, the J-JOC and U.S. operational command in Japan should be co-located to ensure seamless coordination during contingencies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Strengthen the intelligence relationship and cybersecurity.</strong> The intelligence relationship remains a weak link in the U.S.-Japan alliance, with Japan’s intelligence community — despite reforms in recent years — still plagued by stovepiping and the absence of a true all-source analytic capability. Japan should establish a centralized analytic organization under the Cabinet Secretariat, staffed with personnel from across the intelligence community with access to all national security information produced by the Japanese government. In addition, Japan should place a high priority on passing legislation to create an economic security clearance system and strengthen Japan’s cyber defenses, including by enhancing public-private information sharing on cyber threats. These steps are prerequisites to deeper intelligence and defense cooperation in the alliance and must not be delayed. To support this effort, the United States should set out a clear road map of steps needed to elevate the intelligence-sharing relationship to the equivalent of the Five Eyes partnership.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Prioritize defense industry and technology cooperation.</strong> The war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of robust allied defense industrial capacity. Supporting an innovative Japanese defense industry is in the U.S. interest, and Japan’s loosening of restrictions on defense equipment exports — though still insufficient — is an opportunity to expand collaboration. Doing so will require adjustments to mindsets on both sides. For example, leadership in the U.S. Department of Defense should prioritize collaborative programs with Japan, from expanded licensed production of existing munitions lines to codevelopment of new technologies and systems. It should also streamline technology release policies to reflect the progress Japan has made on information security. In addition, the United States should support Japanese collaboration with other partners, including projects under Pillar Two of AUKUS. For its part, Japan should resist the instinct to pursue indigenous solutions to defense requirements, which place at risk timely delivery of the capabilities needed to sustain deterrence. To be competitive, and ultimately to provide the capabilities Japan and the United States need, Japanese industry needs to shed its nearly exclusive focus on building capabilities for the SDF and embrace the international marketplace, including partnerships with foreign defense companies.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>1. Institutions responsible for countering malign cyber operations should reduce barriers between teams focused on state-level and criminal threats, as well as strengthen collaboration between nation-state-specific teams.</strong></p> +<h4 id="expanding-partnerships-and-coalitions">Expanding Partnerships and Coalitions</h4> -<p>A core theme of this paper is that the lines between state and criminal activities in cyberspace and between disparate threat actor sets have become increasingly blurred. Government agencies around the world have often struggled to keep pace with these cross-cutting threats; former practitioners report burdensome delays in interagency processes, difficulty sharing information across institutions and inefficient allocations of scarce technical resources. Authorities should adjust to these trends by promoting further integration between teams responsible for state Advanced Persistent Threats, ransomware groups, virtual asset exploitation and traditional e-crime. Doing so would empower practitioners to more effectively identify and respond to overlapping threats, such as collaboration between North Korean and Russian-speaking cyber-criminal groups, as well as to capitalise on opportunities to achieve multiple victories in one fell swoop.</p> +<p>Deeper integration of the U.S.-Japan relationship at the bilateral level should be combined with accelerated efforts to improve connectivity to other allies and like-minded partners — in particular, Australia, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. When needed and interests align, the alliance should have global reach — and Japan should play a larger role in addressing the crisis in the Middle East, including by helping to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The U.S.-Japan relationship is rooted in common values and a commitment to democracy; in a world in which democracy is under strain globally, Washington and Tokyo should work together to strengthen democratic resilience and the rule of law.</p> -<p>The US Justice Department has taken laudable steps to de-silo its approach to cyber-criminal threats, having recently merged the National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team into the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section and established the National Security Cyber Section (“NatSec Cyber”), which seeks to promote “Department-wide and intragovernmental partnerships in tackling increasingly sophisticated and aggressive cyber threats by hostile nation-state adversaries”. It could be beneficial for national financial, cyber security and regulatory authorities, as well as international partnerships countering malign cyber activity, to consider forming analogous ad hoc task forces with wider mandates and more adaptable capabilities.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Bridge the U.S.-ROK alliance.</strong> With Japan rapidly moving to expand defense capabilities, including long-range counterstrike, the need for connective tissue between the U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-ROK alliances is greater than ever before. Following the Camp David meetings in August 2023, structures of trilateral dialogue at the strategic level are in place. The allies should now move to establish formal connections at the operational level, including through exchanges of liaison officers at respective commands, the inclusion of observers at bilateral exercises, and the establishment of a trilateral contingency planning cell. To support these changes, Japan and South Korea should move purposefully and promptly to normalize bilateral defense relations through a first-ever joint security declaration. Such a declaration could be modeled on the 2007 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, which set out broad areas of common interest and cooperation in a non-binding political statement. These government actions should be accompanied by efforts to deepen ties among individuals and civil society in Japan and South Korea.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Operationalize U.S.-Japan-Australia security cooperation.</strong> Japan and Australia have advanced their defense cooperation with a Reciprocal Access Agreement and enhanced Japanese military exercises in northern Australia. Australia’s focus on guided weapons and stand-off strike parallels Japan’s objectives and offers opportunities for federated defense production and forward sustainment. Australia’s geography offers critical defense in depth and a connection to the Indian Ocean. As the United States modernizes its command and control in Japan and defense industrial policies, emphasis should be placed on operationalizing the trilateral security cooperation already underway.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Advance cooperation with the Philippines.</strong> The Marcos government’s decisions to stand up to Chinese coercion in the South China Sea and rebuild the U.S. alliance represent a significant strategic opportunity for Washington and Tokyo, who should do everything possible to reinforce and support Manila’s actions. Including Manila in minilateral engagement should continue to be a high priority, and the United States and Japan should coordinate closely in providing security assistance, to avoid duplication and ensure interoperability. Tokyo should prioritize concluding a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Manila.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Support Taiwan’s resilience and quietly deepen trilateral dialogue with Taipei.</strong> Taiwan’s free and fair elections in January 2024 were an inspiration for the world, and the incoming Lai government deserves support from Washington, Tokyo, and other democracies. Within the parameters of the United States’ and Japan’s long-standing “One China” policies, both countries should support Taiwan’s capacity to resist military and economic coercion. In particular, Tokyo should expand low-profile ties with Taiwan’s national security establishment, including through regularized participation in some of Washington’s regular security policy dialogues with Taipei. The absence of these links today is a critical weakness in preparing for the possibility of a Taiwan Strait contingency. In addition, Washington and Tokyo should explore ways to help Taiwan harden critical infrastructure, to include communications networks, energy supplies, and transportation links.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Strengthen cooperation in the Middle East.</strong> Despite Japan’s heavy dependence on sea lanes from the Middle East, Tokyo has been notably absent from the international response to terrorist attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Leveraging the SDF facility in Djibouti, Japan should play a larger and more visible role in defending the commercial sea lanes. Japan depends more heavily on sea lanes from the Middle East than does the United States, and its stance in the region should reflect that reality.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Promote democratic norms and the rule of law.</strong> Japan’s National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of democratic norms and the rule of law to Japan’s national interests. Weak governance and poor transparency and accountability have allowed China to engage in elite capture, build dual-use infrastructure for the military, and turn cash-poor media against the United States and its allies in strategically important parts of the Indo-Pacific. These same conditions limit opportunities for investment by U.S. and Japanese firms that would reinforce anti-corruption measures and the rule of law. The most important work is countering corruption, foreign interference, and disinformation in countries that are strategically important. The United States and Japan should work closely through the Quad and G7 and with South Korea to develop a strategy and coordination mechanism to reinforce democratic resilience, combat disinformation, and strengthen the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific to counter Beijing’s strategies of co-option.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>2. Practitioners should incorporate a robust analysis of potential unintended consequences as a standard element when planning any mixer intervention.</strong></p> +<h4 id="strengthening-economic-and-technology-cooperation">Strengthening Economic and Technology Cooperation</h4> -<p>Practitioners would benefit from adopting an expanded standard assessment of the potential second- and third-order effects of a proposed mixer action. Practitioners might consider:</p> +<p>While economic cooperation is enshrined in Article II of the U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty, it has historically been difficult to implement, largely due to trade friction. However, both countries have come a long way in transforming their economic relationship from one of adversity to one of genuine cooperation. Indeed, issues at the nexus of economic and national security — such as protecting critical technologies, strengthening supply chain resilience, and promoting friend-shoring in key strategic sectors — have become among the most important on the policy agenda today and should be a central focus for the United States and Japan in the years ahead, particularly as both countries continue to work to advance their preferred economic rules, values, and norms in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Whether the target platform can be easily relaunched or reconstituted elsewhere.</p> + <p><strong>Drive the G7 process on economic security.</strong> Japan deserves strong credit for its leadership at the 2023 G7 meeting in Hiroshima, and in particular its success in shepherding the “G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security.” Implementation of this vision is essential and will require continued leadership by the United States and Japan to press the other G7 members to take concrete measures to enhance supply chain resilience, counter economic coercion, and build resilient critical infrastructure.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The operational security adaptations the action is likely to trigger among cyber-criminals.</p> + <p><strong>Cooperate in combating China’s excess capacity and dumping.</strong> Excess capacity prompted by massive subsidies and other types of financial assistance, as well as insufficient domestic demand in China, is precipitating a flood of Chinese exports to the rest of the world and putting industries in the United States, Japan, and Europe at risk. Working with like-minded partners, including in the G7, the United States and Japan should coordinate approaches and, where possible, develop collective policy responses. These could include relying on traditional trade tools, such as anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures, but should also involve employing new and creative approaches to address this growing concern. As a first step, the United States, Japan, Europe, and South Korea should initiate a dialogue on coordinated responses to excess capacity in the critical sector of electric vehicles, where the Chinese industry has rapidly become a global leader.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The replaceability of the service being targeted.</p> + <p><strong>Explore new models for free trade arrangements.</strong> The consensus in the United States in support of an affirmative and market-opening trade policy has frayed in both parties, with few signs of it being rebuilt any time soon. Although the authors of this report strongly support the return of the United States to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), such a step is unlikely for the foreseeable future. As an interim measure, the United States and Japan should explore the possibility of developing a new and forward-looking template for free trade agreements that includes some traditional elements but goes further to address emerging issues, such as supply chain resilience, economic coercion, climate and trade, and advanced technology standards. The two governments could also consider pursuing and building on existing agreements in specific sectors, such as electric vehicles, batteries, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Such agreements, aimed to promote secure supply chains, could be deepened to include market access, harmonized or mutually recognized standards, and trade facilitation provisions to make them genuine supply chain agreements.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The likely alternatives cyber-criminals will adopt, and those platforms’ vulnerability to surveillance and disruption.</p> + <p><strong>Develop common and updated rules governing two-way investment.</strong> A new free trade agreement template could provide more certainty on related investment matters, given the anticipated continued increase in investment flows between both countries. The positions of both presidential candidates on the proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel by Nippon Steel do not reflect a careful assessment of the U.S. national interest. The proposed deal would likely support U.S. economic growth, jobs, and innovation without in any way jeopardizing national security. Although it would not have exempted this transaction from review, Japan should be granted “excepted foreign state” (“whitelist”) status from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The extent to which the action’s success depends on industry cooperation, and the likelihood that market actors will cooperate.</p> + <p><strong>Allow new exports of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Japan.</strong> In light of the importance of LNG imports to Japan as a transitional source of energy, even as it continues to invest heavily in renewables and rebuild its nuclear energy capacity, the U.S. government should consider exempting Japan from the temporary pause on new LNG export approvals announced by President Biden in January 2024.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The action’s probable effects on legitimate financial technology innovation.</p> + <p><strong>Deepen cooperation on development globally.</strong> Opportunities to deepen U.S.-Japan development cooperation in the coming years should build on the strong foundation already established between the partners and assess strategic opportunities to leverage Japan’s private sector to advance key development cooperation priorities. Japan and the United States could further align efforts to advance global health security and outcomes; advance their partnership on energy cooperation and youth leadership in sub-Saharan Africa; invest in sustainable economic development and livelihood opportunities in Latin America; and expand access to mobile telecommunication technology in the Indo-Pacific that is open, safe, secure, and accessible to all. The two countries should also enhance their work through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) to mobilize public and private capital to invest in sustainable infrastructure. These efforts are vital to providing countries in the developing world with high-quality alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Collateral damage to non-criminal virtual asset holders.</p> + <p><strong>Support the expansion of the G7 to include Australia and South Korea.</strong> Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the G7 has emerged as the primary international forum for upholding the international rules-based order, from support to Ukraine to combating Chinese economic coercion. But as an increasingly important global governance institution, and perhaps the only effective one, its membership needs expansion to include other like-minded partners with the values and resources to buttress the rules-based international order. The United States and Japan should consider G7 expansion to include Australia and South Korea, the world’s next two largest advanced democracies and partners that are increasingly critical to global political and economic responses. This is not charity. Given the challenges facing today’s international environment, it is time to bring additional voices with meaningful capacity and aligned views to the table.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Strengthen coordination of economic security policy through a new Economic Security Dialogue led by the U.S. National Security Council and Japan’s National Security Secretariat.</strong> The Economic 2+2, launched in 2022, has proven to be a useful forum for coordinating geoeconomic strategy, but alone it is insufficient to drive aligned decisionmaking in both countries. Given the political sensitivity and coordination challenges on economic security issues and industrial policy, Washington and Tokyo should establish a new dialogue mechanism, led by the White House and the Cabinet Secretariat, to facilitate coordination of industrial policy, technology promotion, export controls, and other economic security policies.</p> </li> </ul> -<p><strong>3. When taking action against mixers, authorities should seek out opportunities to make arrests, seize assets and operational infrastructure and instigate favourable knock-on effects, with an eye toward achieving enduring impact on malign actor groups.</strong></p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Actions against non-compliant mixers that remove key personnel and their resources from the field are more likely to have staying power. As the Blender and Sinbad cases reveal, motivated cyber-criminals can circumvent designations and takedowns rather nimbly. With arrests and infrastructure seizures, not to mention financial asset confiscation, authorities prevent threat actors from re-engaging in malign activity as easily and may glean useful intelligence. Targeting platforms and facilitators that service multiple malign actor sets can boost the return on investment of a single action.</p> +<p>This report closes with an admonition. As strong as the U.S.-Japan alliance is today, the authors share a concern about its future. The dramatic decline in recent years in Japanese students studying in the United States, and U.S. students studying in Japan, risks eroding the foundation of U.S.-Japan relations over the long term. Both governments should focus on rebuilding these ties, which represent the lifeblood of the relationship across government, industry, and civil society. Programs in both countries should focus on student exchanges and promoting the role of women in the relationship. The U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON) continues to be a vital forum in this regard.</p> -<p><strong>4. Policymakers and law enforcement should invest in better understanding developments in the virtual asset space and their implications for national security.</strong></p> +<p>The U.S.-Japan relationship is at a moment of historic strength, even as both countries confront daunting challenges in the international system. The partnership today was almost unimaginable at the time of the authors’ first report in the year 2000. This evolution was not inevitable. It has been built by people from all walks of life in both countries who are deeply committed to the relationship. The authors of this report have had the good fortune to be part of this effort over many years — and in some cases decades. It is the enduring task of both countries to cultivate new generations of leaders who recognize the value of the two countries’ partnership and who share a commitment to sustaining it.</p> -<p>Building on the Illicit Finance Risk Assessment of Decentralized Finance, the US Department of the Treasury should launch a standing Virtual Asset Risk Board modelled on the Emerging Technology Board the US Department of Justice envisioned in its 2022 Comprehensive Cyber Review. Such a board should meet regularly and produce biannual reports analysing the economic and national security implications of developments in the virtual asset space. UK bodies such as HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority should explore establishing a similar organ with a particular focus on the robust domestic virtual asset industry.</p> +<hr /> -<p>As discussed below, offices charged with countering North Korean digital illicit finance, such as OFAC and FinCEN in the US, and the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) in the UK, should increase engagement with the private sector, which is naturally better positioned to track the cutting edge of advances in virtual assets and DeFi. Tapping more deeply into the expertise of investors and developers would usefully complement national security practitioners’ points of view.</p> +<p><strong>Richard L. Armitage</strong> became president of Armitage International in March 2005. Previously, he served as deputy secretary of state, having been confirmed by the U.S. Senate on March 23, 2001.</p> -<h4 id="building-stronger-cooperative-relations-with-the-private-sector">Building Stronger Cooperative Relations with the Private Sector</h4> +<p><strong>Joseph S. Nye</strong> is University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus, and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He has served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, chair of the National Intelligence Council, and deputy under secretary of state for security assistance, science and technology.</p>Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. NyeThe U.S.-Japan alliance is at a moment of historic strength, even as both countries confront daunting challenges in the international system. This report calls for an alliance that is more integrated across the economic and security realms to uphold the rules-based order.NATO At 752024-04-04T12:00:00+08:002024-04-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/nato-at-75<p><em>As the Alliance celebrates its 75th anniversary, the author, who headed Britain’s diplomatic corps and, among other positions, served as the UK permanent representative to NATO, reflects on NATO’s accomplishments and challenges.</em></p> -<p><strong>5. Regulators and financial authorities such as the US Department of the Treasury and HM Treasury should nurture the development of compliant virtual asset privacy solutions.</strong></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Officials should encourage the private sector to bring to market new platforms that can offer enhanced privacy for cryptocurrency holders without blindly enabling money laundering. Providing clear guidance on what is or is not permissible, as well as meeting with investors and developers, would reassure upstanding market actors who otherwise might not risk their energy and capital on projects they fear will not be approved or, worse, could lead to their arrest or designation.</p> +<p>Isn’t it remarkable that an organisation that is 75 years old is still absolutely at the heart of European and transatlantic security issues? Other parts of the post-Cold War’s international security architecture are all looking their age and finding it increasingly challenging. Think of the UN Security Council: inevitably, when the major powers are at loggerheads, the Security Council cannot act on issues such as Ukraine, or indeed on anything to do with the growing menace from China. That blockage was foreseen by those who negotiated the UN Charter; the British were very prominent on that point with the Americans. And even when the delegations were signing the UN Charter in San Francisco in the summer of 1945, the British Foreign Office negotiators, including my own personal hero, the permanent secretary at the time, my lineal predecessor, Alec Cadogan, knew that the Security Council was flawed because at any time when the great powers were against each other, it could not work. And so even then, in 1945, the Foreign Office started planning for a Western security organisation for the post-war period. It did not share the optimism that Winston Churchill had in those days that the tactical alliance of the “Big Three” during the war would continue into the post-war period. And that scepticism was shared when we had a new foreign secretary. The Labour government came in at the time of Potsdam in the summer of 1945. Ernest Bevin had absolutely no illusions about Joseph Stalin, and he turned immediately to his Foreign Office officials who had in their files the first plans for organising European security. We had the Dunkirk Treaty with France in 1947. We had the Western European Union, the Brussels Treaty, in 1948. And then, even as the Brussels Treaty was being signed, Bevin was sending papers to George Marshall, the US secretary of state, with his ideas for an Atlantic Pact. And it was really Bevin and Marshall and people such as Senator Arthur Vandenberg in the US who were the godfathers of the NATO Treaty signed 75 years ago.</p> -<p>The widespread availability of compliant solutions would further mark the use of non-compliant platforms as an AML/CTF red flag and likely reduce the fund volume travelling through them, making it more difficult for bad actors to disappear in the crowd.</p> +<p>How can one explain NATO’s longevity? Why is it still an effective organisation 75 years on? The answer lies – partly – by looking at the treaty. The NATO Washington Treaty is terse. It sticks to principles and objectives. It is 14 articles long. Compare that with the Treaty of Rome at 248 articles, four annexes, countless protocols. They are very, very different things because, of course, the EU is a supranational, law-based organisation, with all the complexity that has. And the NATO treaty, to my mind, found an elusive point of balance between being a very solemn political commitment between the allies, but leaving each ally maximum discretion as to how it carries out that commitment. I am sure everybody taking part in the celebrations can recite Article 5 by heart: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”. And that, consequently, they agree that they “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”. So, there is no binding obligation to do anything. The US Senate would never have accepted that for the Americans. But it has given NATO a strength in its flexibility. NATO’s strength is not in its treaty text, but in its shared political objectives and trust between allies. And that is why it has had a capacity to flex and adapt as security priorities have changed. In the Cold War it was the essential vehicle for deterrence and territorial defence against the Soviet Union.</p> -<p><strong>6. Authorities with mandates to intervene against virtual asset platforms, especially OFAC, FinCEN and the US Justice Department, should more clearly delineate the behaviours that will prompt enforcement action.</strong></p> +<p>I am old enough that I first joined the UK Delegation to NATO in 1978. It was at the height of the Cold War. We used to practise nuclear release procedures every winter in a Wintex exercise. So, the nuclear deterrence of NATO was a real thing and was exercised and practised regularly. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO turned to so-called out-of-area operations: expeditionary interventions. These have a rather a bad name now, but it is worth bearing in mind that the interventions in Bosnia, in 1995, and in Kosovo, in 1999, did succeed in their objective of damping down ethnic cleansing, which was the terrible crisis at that point. And although not every country in the region has taken the opportunity, they were given the chance to build more stable, peaceful societies. I might note that in this year of anniversaries, it is the NATO-led KFOR’s (Kosovo Force) 25th anniversary. KFOR is still at work in Kosovo, helping peace and stability there. Of course, interventions then got more difficult. During the early period of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan, it did succeed in working in and around Kabul to help the Hamid Karzai government put down roots. Things went wrong after that. But it is not true to say that the expeditionary interventions of NATO all proved to be disastrous. NATO was not directly involved in the Iraq intervention in 2003. That was a very difficult period in the Alliance. At that time, I was back as permanent representative for the UK and there were deep divisions between allies, genuinely held differences of conviction, which made life quite interesting around the North Atlantic Council table for some time.</p> -<p>Justified or not, many virtual asset industry stakeholders, including some former senior government officials who now work in the private sector, have perceived US authorities’ enforcement approach as capricious and heavy handed. For the enforcement “deterrent” to work, authorities must make clear what malfeasance or inaction constitutes punishable bad behaviour – as distinct from the lesser legal and regulatory shortcomings that seem usually not to result in serious penalties in this burgeoning industry – as well as show that genuine good faith effort to avoid such bad behaviours will be rewarded with greater patience and leniency. While this issue appears most pronounced in the US, the lesson is applicable to all jurisdictions.</p> +<p>But within a year after that, NATO was back together again, and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq was established at the Istanbul Conference summit in 2004 and helped to bring allies together again after that very bruising period. One more piece of reminiscence: by 2011, I was national security adviser. The Libya air campaign was another test for NATO’s capacity to flex, adapt and innovate. Because, as you remember, President Barack Obama decided that the US would not be directly involved. So, senior US officers in the command structure were pulled back. European officers and Canadian officers took their place and NATO managed a complex air campaign, in that rather new guise. Again, things did not turn out too well. We did not have boots on the ground. We were not able to control the situation, but the NATO machine, in my mind, worked well and showed once again it could adapt to new circumstances.</p> -<p><strong>7. Regulators and national security practitioners should tailor their communications to the virtual asset industry on North Korean cybercrime by reframing the issue in economic terms.</strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">NATO’s strength is not in its treaty text, but in its shared political objectives and trust between allies. And that is why it has had a capacity to flex and adapt as security priorities have changed</code></em></strong></p> -<p>When encouraging market actors to comply with regulations and cooperate with law enforcement, authorities should frame North Korean digital illicit finance as a threat to the survival and prosperity of the virtual asset ecosystem, rather than as a “national security” issue, or a matter of right and wrong. Those kinds of appeals may ring hollow or simply not register, especially to users and developers based outside the relevant authority’s jurisdiction and to those who view government as an adversary. Emphasising that compliance and transparency benefit market actors’ economic interests is likely to yield more enthusiastic cooperation.</p> +<p>Now we are back to NATO at its original purpose. Thank you, President Putin, for that! We are facing the most serious threat to European security since 1945. And I think NATO has risen very well to the challenge. I can say that as an outsider. But watching NATO function was very impressive. The US reinforced Europe using those plans that had been in SHAPE’s filing cabinets for decades. Other allies pushed their forces under the enhanced forward presence operation into the territories of the NATO allies, eight battle groups at the moment, with the UK playing a major role. NATO deterrence has worked: President Vladimir Putin has not put one Russian boot across a NATO border. And in many ways, the aggression against Ukraine has already been a strategic disaster for Putin. The Russians have achieved none of their objectives, despite taking enormous numbers of casualties. The Russian armed forces have been shown up to be poorly equipped, badly led with low morale. And when confronted with Western weapons, the Russians have not done well. Their economy will be weakened by sanctions in the medium term; at the moment, it is surfing on the oil price. But in terms of technology and investment, Russia will increasingly lag behind. We now proudly have Finland and Sweden as staunch members of the Alliance, enormously strengthening the northern flank. I remember in my time as NATO permanent representative that Finland and Sweden were proud neutrals, extremely active in the partnership council, in many ways more active than many allies. But I could never have imagined them being members. Thank you again, President Putin, for that. It is a change that will long outlast Putin and what he has been trying to do.</p> -<p><strong>8. As is practicable, governments should channel messaging to the virtual asset private sector through prominent senior officials, rather than practitioners.</strong></p> +<p>To me, NATO feels more united, more purposeful, and, of course, larger, than it has been certainly since the end of the Cold War. I would also say that the EU has responded effectively as well. The fact that Western Europe has weaned itself off dependence on Russian oil and gas is a major strategic advantage for us. It has broken a piece of leverage that Putin held in his hands. We have seen the EU break through some very long-held taboos about the use of the EU budget to fund arms deliveries to Ukraine. Again, this is not something I would have expected from decades of watching the very slow process of European political cooperation. And the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and many other countries – Georgia, Moldova, and countries in the Western Balkans – is a very significant downpayment on future European stability.</p> -<p>Authorities should issue more communications on North Korean cybercrime through high-level officials. Participants in the virtual asset industry are more likely to encounter and appreciate the gravity of these kinds of statements when they come directly from principals and senior deputies in speeches or media engagements than when they come from more obscure, technical or impersonal routes, such as the official channels of national security organs.</p> +<p>Of course, such an enlargement will take many years to achieve, but it is a big step in the right direction. Personally, I would like to see NATO sending even stronger signals in the same direction at the Washington summit. NATO–EU cooperation was for decades not easy; there were all kinds of complexities. I am sure they are still there, in the institutional sense, but things are improving, certainly. In the Vilnius summit conclusions, I read some very positive words about NATO–EU cooperation.</p> -<p><strong>9. Regulators and national security practitioners should institutionalise dialogue with the virtual asset industry and adapt to market actors’ preferred communication channels.</strong></p> +<p>I chair a House of Lords European Affairs Committee, and we recently published a report on the impact of Ukraine on UK and EU relations. We expressed our hope that the undertaking in Vilnius for the non-EU allies – that of the fullest involvement in EU defence – is something that the British government will take active steps to lead on.</p> -<p>In the spirit of expanding efforts to meet with legitimate virtual asset investors and developers, bodies such as OFAC, OFSI, the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Conduct Authority should send more officials to speak at virtual asset conferences and appear on podcasts and livestreams – influential platforms that rarely feature government perspectives. The public engagement strategies developed at the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Office of the National Cyber Director, whose top leaders regularly headline both industry and grassroots events, could serve as a model. Authorities should also increase efforts to host industry stakeholders in government facilities, particularly those who are actively seeking to create compliant anonymity-enhancing platforms.</p> +<p>I give high marks to Western countries for the response to Ukraine so far. But there are major problems ahead. Everybody is very well aware of the central issue, which seems to me to be that of finding the political will as well as the resources to sustain Ukraine into the next phase of this grinding long war that it is facing. And the stakes are very high. The Ukrainian armed forces have shown extraordinary courage and resilience, as has the whole population, but they are more and more dependent on continuing Western military and economic support. It is clear beyond doubt that Ukraine needs right now a lot more artillery shells, anti-missile interceptors and other weapons. So far, looking at the figures, the US has supplied the lion’s share of military resources for Ukraine. The figures that I have indicate that, in the first two years of the war, US military support amounted to around $43 billion, against about $38 billion for European countries collectively, including the UK.</p> -<h4 id="raising-global-cyber-security-and-amlctf-standards">Raising Global Cyber Security and AML/CTF Standards</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The threat landscape in Europe has changed durably, and whoever is in the Oval Office next year, Europeans need to be showing that they are on a path to take on more of the burden of security in Europe than has been true in the past</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>10. Regulators and cyber security officials should work with the private sector to establish an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for the virtual asset industry.</strong></p> +<p>And of course, we are all watching very carefully the fate of this $60-billion package, which is now stuck in the US House of Representatives. If it continues to be delayed, and given how depleted our own stockpiles are in most growing non-US NATO countries, it seems to me the only solution in the short term is to do the sort of thing that the Czech government has been very forward in pursuing: buying in materials from South Korea and other places. But that, in itself, is a wake-up call to all countries in Europe.</p> -<p>Cyber security officials should engage private sector stakeholders as well as the architects of successful ISACs, such as those serving traditional finance and the North American electric grid, to help conceptualise and implement one for the virtual asset industry. To help assuage market actors’ concerns about revealing potentially sensitive customer information, officials should inform would-be ISAC participants of their special rights and liability protections under the law. Accomplishing the creation of such a body – which experts have suggested – will require champions in both government and the private sector.</p> +<p>The honest truth is that for far too long, far too many European countries have been spending far too little on defence. Of course, that has been changing and it has been changing since 2014. Thank you again, President Putin. Perhaps we should also give credit to the pressure Donald Trump exerted when he was president, but it is mainly due to President Putin. RUSI’s Malcolm Chalmers has a very recent paper about the trends in this area, and he identified a 60% increase in European defence spending in real terms since 2014. If that is right, then that is a very impressive figure. And it looks like we should get to 18, perhaps 20, members of NATO meeting the 2% of GDP defence spending target this year. This is definitely better late than never. The new cash, of course, now needs to be turned into real capability. And that is not going to happen immediately. It means removing, as far as possible, the obstacles in the way of European defence-industrial cooperation. The House of Lords report has some points about that, in particular in relation to the pretty restrictive arrangements for the European Defence Fund, which do not make it easy for the UK to partner with other European defence industries.</p> -<p><strong>11. Financial authorities should continue efforts to build global AML/CTF capacity and advance implementation of FATF standards, and political leaders should renew their support, especially for the virtual asset Travel Rule.</strong></p> +<p>Another element to consider about rising defence spending in Europe is it has to be sustained, if it is going to be of any use. The threat landscape in Europe has changed durably, and whoever is in the Oval Office next year, Europeans need to be showing that they are on a path to take on more of the burden of security in Europe than has been true in the past.</p> -<p>Recognising that cyber-criminals and money launderers frequently exploit gaps in financial regulatory regimes, increasing global AML capacity and patching loopholes remains a fundamental component of any strategy for countering North Korean malign activity. Without the resources, technical expertise and will to perform monitoring and enforcement, even the most robust regulatory frameworks are toothless.</p> +<p>I am sure NATO also needs to review its own collective defence in the light of what we have learned from watching the first drone-age war in Europe. Ukrainian armed forces, I am sure, will have a great deal to tell us which will be important for NATO’s collective defence planning. There are all sorts of other issues on NATO’s agenda. I am very conscious that China is a rising concern in many of our countries. Consultations on China are vital between allies. This is also the case between NATO allies and the Asian allies, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan. And I personally wonder whether some sort of NATO+ format could be the right forum for wider consultations on the threats from China.</p> -<p>According to the FATF’s latest implementation report, “jurisdictions are making limited progress implementing the FATF’s requirements on [virtual assets] and VASPs”, and “many jurisdictions seemingly do not know where to start when it comes to regulating the [virtual asset] sector for AML/CFT”. Of the 98 jurisdictions the FATF assessed in mid-2023, just 25 are largely or fully compliant. With respect to the FATF’s virtual asset Travel Rule, only 62 jurisdictions have adopted or are in the process of adopting the policy, while 127 appear to have taken no action towards implementation. Actual enforcement of the Travel Rule is presumably even less common.</p> +<p>In any case, the breadth of the agenda is proof of the vitality of this sprightly 75-year-old that is NATO. But if it is going to survive for another generation, it has to ensure that Putin does not win in Ukraine.</p> -<p>Several RUSI projects have highlighted opportunities for tightening regulations and building capacity.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>12. The FATF and the governments spearheading the campaign against North Korean digital illicit finance should explore ways to expand lower income countries’ access to cyber security and blockchain analysis tools.</strong></p> +<p><strong>Peter Ricketts</strong>, The Loard, GCMG, GCVO, spent 40 years as a British diplomat before retiring in early 2016. His last post was Ambassador to France, where he was heavily involved with UK-French defence cooperation following from the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties.</p>Peter RickettsAs the Alliance celebrates its 75th anniversary, the author, who headed Britain’s diplomatic corps and, among other positions, served as the UK permanent representative to NATO, reflects on NATO’s accomplishments and challenges.Friendshore Lithium-Ion2024-04-01T12:00:00+08:002024-04-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/friendshore-lithium-ion<p><em>Reforming the lithium-ion supply chain constitutes a critical cornerstone of US foreign policy. The first in a series of three, this report discusses the processing and refining stage of the lithium-ion supply chain.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>It evaluates domestic efforts to ramp up extraction and processing capabilities as well as “friendshore” portions of the supply chain to economic partners and allies in light of China’s dominance. The report closes with a set of recommendations to better leverage economic and trade tools to enhance access and processing of critical minerals and materials, with a focus on expanding critical mineral agreements with allied nations.</em></p> -<p>North Korean cyber-criminals and money launderers often take advantage of countries that struggle to prevent illicit financial activity and cyber intrusions within their borders. Governments leading the charge against North Korean malign activity should seek to expand global access to the technical training and advanced software packages required to track illicit virtual asset flows and to protect computer networks. They should consider purchasing or subsidising those services for countries that cannot afford them at the required scale, in addition to encouraging firms to provide their services at reduced cost. Authorities should also conduct more capacity-building exchanges and expand partnerships with the private sector to train more international practitioners.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><strong>13. Regulators and cyber security authorities should encourage or require market actors to adopt industry-standard security practices, especially code audits.</strong></p> +<p>Lithium-ion batteries are among the most critical industrial items necessary to achieve the transition to lower carbon emissions worldwide. Essential to electric vehicles (EVs) and the effective delivery of solar and wind power throughout the electric grid, these batteries also charge a majority of consumer electronics products. While the supply chain for batteries is dispersed throughout the globe, the mining and processing of key minerals and materials is concentrated in just a few countries, with China dominating. As changing trade relationships, sanctions, and other geopolitical disruptions ripple through the global economy, the dispersion of supply chains and concentration of key inputs constitutes a significant vulnerability for maintaining and growing production in this key manufacturing sector.</p> -<p>In 2022 alone, TRM Labs documented more than 100 major cases of cryptocurrency theft involving code exploits, which take advantage of vulnerabilities in a virtual asset platform’s architecture, or protocol attacks, which “target weaknesses in the underlying protocol or business logic of a cryptocurrency system”. The Wormhole and Qubit hacks, which led respectively to $325 million and $80 million in losses, are two recent examples of these kinds of compromises. Authorities should strongly encourage, and consider requiring, virtual asset firms to invest in robust cyber security practices, offer “bug bounties”, and engage third parties to perform thorough code audits before bringing a protocol to market.</p> +<p>The sourcing and processing challenges in the lithium-ion battery sector are formidable. As U.S industries strive to grow in this sector, they face complexities surrounding battery supply chains that have been generated by overlapping — and at times incompatible — government policies that aim to: (1) protect national security, (2) facilitate the green transition, and (3) improve U.S. economic competitiveness while re-shoring domestic industrial capabilities. Policies designed to address these serious and varied global challenges have at once offered generous market stimulating incentives while introducing non-market economic headwinds that may eventually threaten the survival of U.S. supply chains for lithium-ion batteries.</p> -<p><strong>14. Authorities should establish resource centres covering security and compliance best practices, incident response procedures and other important information for virtual asset developers.</strong></p> +<p>The Biden administration has embraced the vision of achieving an economy that emits less carbon by providing demand-inducing subsidies for EVs and lithium-ion batteries, which are the heart of these cars. Adding difficulty to achieving climate goals is the dominant role played by China in this sector, coupled with a bipartisan consensus in the United States on the need to reduce economic dependence on China.</p> -<p>At present, far less official guidance is available to entrepreneurs looking to start a virtual asset business than to those in better established industries. Publishing basic resources that emphasise security and compliance in the virtual asset industry could go a long way towards raising standards. In addition, providing incident response templates – particularly instructions on who to contact in the event of an intrusion, which many local police teams are not equipped to handle – would encourage more victims to engage with authorities and enable swifter reactions.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As changing trade relationships, sanctions, and other geopolitical disruptions ripple through the global economy, the dispersion of supply chains and concentration of key inputs constitutes a significant vulnerability for maintaining and growing production in this key manufacturing sector.</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="further-research">Further Research</h4> +<p>The business community, for its part, is engaged in extensive risk reassessment with respect to doing business in and with China to ensure greater resiliency in their supply chains. Depending on the current level of investment, the business model, and the structure of individual supply chains, risk reassessment can lead U.S. companies to take the decision to sever ties with China. More often, companies are identifying possible chokepoints for inputs and embarking on a quest for redundant sources of supply to backstop against future export restrictions and trade sanctions should economic relations with China further deteriorate.</p> -<p>As governments devote growing attention to virtual asset crime, a number of critical topics remain understudied. One blind spot involves early-stage technologies that have not yet received much scrutiny. Under the current paradigm, in which market actors function as the primary drivers of innovation, authorities are stuck playing catch-up as potentially risky platforms and practices come rapidly into being. Further, most of the detailed, up-to-date commentary on developments in virtual assets is aimed at prospective users or investors, rather than at legislators, regulators, law enforcement officers or national security practitioners. Of the security-focused research in this area, some of which has been quite impactful, nearly all projects look retrospectively at events from months or years prior. Given the pace of development in this space, officials would benefit greatly from a more proactive approach on the part of researchers. What new virtual asset technologies and platforms are emerging, and what are their implications for AML/CTF and national security? It would be especially valuable to assess the privacy-enhancing services that have appeared since the Blender and Tornado Cash designations in 2022, such as Privacy Pools, and whether they may help resolve the privacy/security dilemma. Researchers can also contribute by helping translate into policy terms the complexity of important new technologies and practices, which can require specialised knowledge to understand fully. These efforts help create a window into the rather insular virtual asset developer community, building the familiarity of officials and informing their decision-making.</p> +<p>A profound shift in trade, economic, climate, and national security policy is underway. The Biden administration has followed the European Union in articulating its goal as “de-risking” rather than decoupling from China, but as a practical matter, policies still under development have so far been disjointed and difficult for industry to follow. These policies, combined with tough rhetoric by various government officials and members of Congress who propose even more draconian measures to require local sourcing, have injected uncertainty into the commercial decisionmaking governing U.S. manufacturing capabilities. In the end, government measures to restrict commerce with China, in advance of alternative sources of supply of key inputs coming online, threaten to derail this range of overlapping policy objectives. In short, the United States is pursuing three conflicting goals: accelerating the green transition, reshoring production capabilities in critical sectors, and diversifying away from China in these key areas. Efforts to achieve the last two goals compromise the first.</p> -<p>The murky legal picture surrounding virtual asset technology is another area in need of additional research. Scholars and practitioners studying international security, cybercrime and digital finance often have no formal training in law and may be insufficiently prepared to evaluate the field’s novel legal questions. In many cases, there exists no legal basis for classifying these technologies, let alone taking action to address them in real-world contexts. Indeed, several former senior US Department of Justice and Treasury officials expressed concern that new technologies and practices could seek to exploit legal grey areas, such as outdated definitions of financial institutions and legal persons subject to sanctions, or to operate beyond the current scope of government authority. Are OFAC and OFSI, law enforcement, regulators and other relevant agencies properly equipped to handle virtual asset technologies that may pose security or money-laundering risks? Do they, or will they, require new legal authorities in order to continue fulfilling their mandates? In light of FinCEN’s recent proposal to increase scrutiny of mixers under its USA PATRIOT Act powers, do governments possess capabilities for virtual asset AML/CTF that have gone undiscovered or underused? Moreover, what standards should guide officials who are navigating dual imperatives to counter urgent national security threats without infringing excessively on legitimate expression and privacy interests? These questions demand thoughtful, evidence-based answers to supplement the cacophony of op eds, lawsuits and social media posts that have so far made up much of the public discourse, which has often been dominated by participants with vested interests in resolving the debate one way or another. RUSI and other outlets have offered valuable initial efforts, but more research is sorely needed.</p> +<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>The Biden administration and Congress have undertaken a full suite of industrial policy measures that are set to skyrocket demand for lithium-ion batteries, especially when it comes to EVs. The Infrastructure Investments and Jobs Act (IIJA) set up funding meant to create a “Made-in-America” EV network of 500,000 chargers. The law invests $7.5 billion in EV charging. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)’s tax incentives, which provide billions in tax benefits for manufacturers and consumers of EV batteries, is making lithium-ion technology more in demand than ever. Certain tax credit qualifications in the IRA include domestic content requirements for batteries and battery materials, including those used to support clean energy project deployment.</p> -<p>Having stolen more than half a billion dollars from the virtual asset ecosystem in 2023, North Korean cyber-criminals represent a serious ongoing threat to global security. Mixing platforms such as Tornado Cash, Blender, ChipMixer and Sinbad have played a critical role in North Korean actors’ laundering of illicit cryptocurrency, enabling them to funnel ill-gotten gains into the Kim regime’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes. Although ordinary thieves and scammers are ubiquitous in the virtual asset space, North Korean cybercrime is distinguished by its sheer scale and ultimate beneficiaries. The industry’s indefatigable pace of innovation, along with the complex entanglement of malign actors and legitimate users, has only served to compound the problem facing authorities.</p> +<p>This is the first of three papers examining the lithium-ion battery supply chain and prospects for bringing more production on shore. This paper outlines the basic makeup of a lithium-ion battery and some of the complexities surrounding the purifying processes for several different scarce critical mineral inputs. In addition, it describes the role that the United States plays in the global sourcing of key minerals now and in the future by examining several trends expected to impact the market going forward. Lastly, this paper lays out what actions the Biden administration and Congress have undertaken to date to improve the security of critical mineral supply chains and proposes some recommendations to build upon that foundation.</p> -<p>Since early 2022, governments have redoubled efforts to curtail these dangerous practices, intervening directly against non-compliant mixers through takedowns and designations, whilst investing in the teams responsible for countering virtual asset crime. Taking stock of the past two years of aggressive action, authorities should be heartened by their impressive victories against individual dirty platforms, but concerned about North Korean cyber-criminals’ adaptiveness, not to mention unanticipated second-order effects in the dynamic virtual asset marketplace. Moving forward, governments should seek to broaden their approach to countering North Korean digital illicit finance through unconventional partnerships and new conceptual frameworks to cultivate stronger cooperation with the private sector and to raise global cyber security and AML standards.</p> +<p>Currently, the processing of battery materials is concentrated in a few nations outside of the United States, representing a daunting challenge for building resiliency in an environment of heightened geopolitical tension. According to the U.S. Department of the Interior, “The clean energy transition will necessitate an overall 400–600 percent increase in global demand for key critical minerals like lithium, graphite, cobalt and nickel and for some minerals the increase will be many times higher.” U.S. reliance on Chinese extraction, refining, and processing of critical minerals creates a serious vulnerability.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Several stages of the lithium-ion battery supply chain need to be considered to understand how the United States can reach its goal of diversifying its supply of battery inputs while keeping the green transition moving. To reduce critical dependencies and build stronger global supply chains in this sector, the administration should consider balancing domestic production incentives with modernized trade relationships to best ensure that U.S. firms maintain an adequate supply of these key inputs.</p> -<p><strong>Alex O’Neill</strong> is a national security researcher who studies emerging technology, cyber threats and illicit finance. His current work focuses on North Korea’s financially motivated cyber operations and ties to the Russian-speaking cybercriminal ecosystem. Until 2023, Alex was an Associate at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as well as Coordinator of the Belfer Center’s Korea Project, where he co-founded and led the North Korea Cyber Working Group for three years.</p>Alex O’NeillThis paper aims to examine cryptocurrency mixers’ distinct technical, legal and regulatory dimensions and the challenges they pose to the sanctions regime. The paper provides detailed background information on North Korea’s cyber-criminal statecraft, focusing on North Korean actors’ use of mixers to launder illicitly obtained cryptocurrency.“Unconventional Practices”2024-03-25T12:00:00+08:002024-03-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/unconventional-practices<p><em>Recent strikes against the Houthis in Yemen have prompted fresh discussions on the war powers of the UK government. Yet in many ways, they have reaffirmed the existing constitutional orthodoxy.</em></p> +<h3 id="the-makeup-of-a-lithium-ion-battery">The Makeup of a Lithium-Ion Battery</h3> -<excerpt /> +<p>The basic makeup of a lithium-ion battery consists of three main components: multiple lithium-ion cells, the wires connecting these cells, and a battery management system (BMS) to monitor the functioning and temperature of the battery. In turn, each lithium-ion cell is individually made up of four main components: the cathode, the anode, an electrolyte, and a separator. The anode and cathode components store the lithium. What creates electricity from a lithium-ion battery is the movement of the lithium between the anode to the cathode components, carried by the electrolyte via the separator, creating free electrons and thus a charge that flows through the device being powered. Each of these components are made of several constituent materials and chemicals that are critical to enhancing the performance of the lithium-ion battery, which will be discussed in more detail in subsequent papers.</p> -<p>In December 2023, 20 countries gathered to take part in Operation Prosperity Guardian, conducting freedom of navigation exercises off the Gulf of Aden. They did so in response to a series of attacks against international shipping by the Yemeni Houthi rebels, which began with the hijacking of a container ship the previous month. The attacks have caused significant disruption to international trade ever since, sending vessels sailing thousands of miles around the Cape of Good Hope and adding weeks to their journey time.</p> +<h4 id="cathode">Cathode</h4> -<p>In early January 2024, after ignoring an ultimatum and attacking allied warships, the Houthis provoked a response. UK and US forces conducted limited, joint strikes across Yemen to “degrade the Houthis’ capacity to make further attacks”. More operations followed throughout January and February, with the promise to take additional action, as necessary and appropriate, to address further threats or attacks. Such actions are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.</p> +<p>Batteries are composed of positive and negative electrodes to enable the creation of electrons to create electrical current. In a battery, the cathode is the positive electrode. Cathode active materials (CAMs), which define the output and application of the batteries, are generally composed of metal oxides. The most common metal oxides that make up CAMs are lithium cobalt oxide, lithium manganese oxide, lithium iron phosphate, and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide. Different cathode materials contain varying amounts of lithium: the higher the lithium content, the larger the battery capacity, as lithium storage has a direct impact on the battery’s ability to run.</p> -<p>The strikes have prompted fresh discussions about the UK’s war powers, particularly those involving the use of force below the threshold of war. Historically, the role of the legislature has been limited in the UK. Parliament is responsible for passing budgets to finance the armed forces and providing the statutory authority to maintain their existence. Yet the authority to declare and wage war remains a prerogative power vested formally in the monarch.</p> +<h4 id="anode">Anode</h4> -<p>By convention, this wide-ranging and discretionary authority has been regarded as a “political prerogative”, exercised not by the monarch personally, but by ministers of the crown. Over the centuries, the power to make and declare war was gradually transferred from the monarch to their Cabinet, chaired by the prime minister, who possesses the final authority for any decision to use military force without a vote in Parliament. With some notable exceptions, this has been tempered by a long-standing practice of keeping the House informed on war and foreign affairs, offering debates – if not decisions – on these most serious matters of state.</p> +<p>While the cathode is the positive electrode enabling the flow of electrons, the anode is the negative electrode. Much like cathodes, anodes require active materials to function. Anode active materials (AAMs) are generally made from carbon-based materials such as graphite, silicon, or a combination of both. Graphite is the most commonly used because of its high electrical conductivity, lower cost, and stable structure, while silicon possesses higher energy density (the amount of energy stored in a given substance per unit volume) but presents challenges due to higher volume expansion and shorter life cycles.</p> -<p>This view was considered orthodox until 2003 when then Prime Minister Tony Blair called an unprecedented, “one-off” parliamentary vote aimed at securing legitimacy for Operation Telic prior to the invasion of Iraq. Rebellious factions within the governing Labour Party threatened to prevent UK involvement, so he framed it as a confidence motion in both his leadership and his government, promising to resign if he lost.</p> +<h4 id="electrolyte">Electrolyte</h4> -<p>In the event, Blair experienced the largest rebellion within a governing party in a century. His foreign secretary resigned, and he would have suffered a heavy defeat without support from the Conservative benches; only 254 Labour MPs supported the government, far short of the 330 majority needed. Yet a mass resignation of Labour frontbenchers did not materialise, removing the possibility that political pressure would force Blair to resign, and the vote easily passed.</p> +<p>A battery electrolyte is a solution inside batteries, the consistency and makeup of which varies based on the type of battery. However, electrolytes ultimately are used for the same purpose: they transport positively charged ions between the cathode and the anode — enabling the free flow of electrons and creating an electrical charge. The chemical in question allows the electrical charge to pass between the cathode and anode terminals and puts the chemicals required for a reaction in contact with the terminals, which converts stored energy into useful electrical energy. The most commonly used electrolyte in lithium-ion batteries is a lithium salt solution.</p> -<p>It was suggested that this process established a political rule known as the “war powers convention”, whereby, “save in exceptional circumstances, the House of Commons is given the opportunity to debate and vote on the deployment of armed force overseas”. Although Blair argued the vote was “entirely symbolic” and “non-binding”, both the opposition leader William Hague and successive prime ministers made explicit political commitments to uphold the convention’s spirit. Some even saw it as a stopgap prior to full statutory displacement of the prerogative, an idea prominent, if not dominant, in New Labour circles. Regardless, it has become commonplace to view the debate in terms of a “convention narrative”, with Parliament enjoying an ever-greater role in military deployments since 2011, and the prerogative ever-shrinking from view.</p> +<h4 id="separator">Separator</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As Brown’s 2009 report demonstrated, a statutory war power would be either “undesirably broad” or “insufficiently flexible”, fraught with difficulties for little substantive benefit</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Separators are placed in lithium-ion batteries between the anode and cathode to avoid a short circuit and facilitate a lithium-ion cell’s stability and safety. Because separators are not part of the reactions that produce the flow of electricity mentioned above, they have to be chemically stable relative to the electrolyte and electrode materials. Materials in a separator include nonwoven fabrics consisting of “a manufactured sheet, web, or mat of directionally or randomly oriented fibers.”</p> -<p>This was always somewhat illusory. Blair argued that existing practice regarding the prerogative was sufficient. There was no vote on deployments between 2003 and 2011, while a war powers statute was explored and disbanded by Gordon Brown. As Brown’s 2009 report demonstrated, a statutory war power would be either “undesirably broad” or “insufficiently flexible”, fraught with difficulties for little substantive benefit. As such, although the prerogative could be put on a statutory footing, there should be good reason for doing so. In the event, Brown argued for strengthening the convention in lieu of legislation.</p> +<h3 id="concentration-and-purification-of-the-materials">Concentration and Purification of the Materials</h3> -<p>The convention thus became the only major change to the war powers to survive the Blair-Brown governments, persisting in various guises under David Cameron and Theresa May, albeit subject to an increasing number of caveats and exceptions.</p> +<p>Several critical minerals and raw materials are key to the lithium-ion battery supply chain. This paper highlights minerals that are currently used in batteries, but there may be new battery chemistries and types that could change what critical minerals and raw materials are required for renewable power generation. As stated by the Congressional Research Service, processes of obtaining permits, acquiring land and capital, and other necessary steps can vary considerably and may take years. The Government Accountability Office assessed that the amount of time needed simply to reach the approval stage “ranged from about 1 month to over 11 years and averaged approximately 2 years.”</p> -<p>Cameron, an advocate of prerogative reform since 2006, clearly internalised much of the narrative within his understanding of foreign policy. However, his plans for reform never materialised, and his practice was far more telling than his promises. He subjected the 2011 Libyan airstrike campaign, Operation Ellamy, to a vote, winning it decisively. However, operations had already been underway for three days before this was held. When he next sought prior approval for airstrikes against Syria in 2013, he suffered a significant defeat. It proved the first time that any prime minister had been denied the authority to launch military action – authority that, legally speaking, he already had.</p> +<p>Critical minerals key to lithium-ion battery manufacturing require rigorous, lengthy technical processes to avoid negative spillover effects on the environment and workers’ health. For instance, cobalt mining has come under scrutiny due to the issue of child labor as well as poor safety standards: a report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development notes that a mine owned by the Kamoto Copper Company in the Democratic Republic of Congo collapsed, killing an estimated 36 workers. Setting up and operating these processes is therefore a difficult task, made all the more challenging by two features. First, demand for these minerals and materials is set to increase significantly. A report by the International Energy Agency found that, in order to meet the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement, demand for nickel, cobalt, and graphite is expected to grow by about 20 times, while lithium demand is expected to grow to 40 times its current level. Second, the movement to diversify away from China, which extracts a large amount of these minerals and materials and processes an even larger share, will require the significant retooling of current processing activities.</p> -<p>In contrast, when Theresa May authorised identical airstrikes against Islamic State in 2018, she preserved the substance of the convention while reinterpreting it. Relying partly on the framework set out by Cameron’s defence secretary, Michael Fallon, May launched strikes without a debate, arguing their “emergency nature” precluded consultation. She merely asserted that she was observing the convention, and that her government was acting within the framework that had been set out, even while reinterpreting its bounds to enlarge their scope.</p> +<h4 id="cathode-1">Cathode</h4> -<p>This chequered history has led many to revise their position on the convention. Consensus suggests it exists in a state of limbo. Others have gone further, arguing it no longer exists in practice.</p> +<p><strong>LITHIUM</strong></p> -<p>This is certainly true if one views it through the lens of the “convention narrative”. From this perspective, the government has evaded Parliamentary scrutiny through novel reinterpretations of its authority to act. Moreover, by refusing to displace the prerogative by statute, its actions remain effectively unconstrained.</p> +<p>Lithium is generally extracted from brines and mines. For the former, lithium-rich brine comes to the Earth’s surface and forms shallow ponds in which sunlight and wind evaporate the water and slowly concentrate the solution. It then undergoes thorough chemical treatments, such as precipitation and ion exchange, to reduce impurities and improve lithium-ion concentration. That concentrated solution is then turned into lithium carbonate or lithium hydroxide through precipitation and purification processes which convert it to battery-grade material. Lithium carbonate is a more commonly made compound used in lithium-ion battery production, while lithium hydroxide is becoming increasingly popular because of enhanced performance in cathode chemistries with high nickel content. Lithium extraction from brines is particularly significant because of the relative abundance of lithium in brine deposits.</p> -<p>The problem is that the convention narrative presents an inaccurate picture of the prerogative. Past practice can help contextualise this. The convention has always been driven by the judgement of the prime minister as well as the authority they command in the House. Blair and Cameron chose to put their use of the war powers to a vote because their authority on these issues was relatively weak. Blair struggled to unite the sceptical left wing of the Labour Party around the idea of intervention, while Cameron’s coalition with the Liberal Democrats would probably have collapsed without a vote. The choice to put these issues to Parliament reflected both the fragile politics sustaining their governing coalitions and their own judgement of the proper relationship between Parliament and the prerogative. In the end, Blair convinced a significant majority to back his decision, while Cameron put forward a weak case and mishandled his political strategy, struggling to make the case for UK involvement.</p> +<p>When it comes to mines, the process is centered around sourcing minerals that carry lithium. The ore-containing lithium is first extracted and undergoes separation steps to get rid of any contaminants. The resulting lithium-rich concentrate is then used to extract lithium ions through a leaching process which mingles the concentrate with chemicals that are made for the purpose of leaching. There are other alternative sources of lithium aside from brines and mines; conventional mining operations can also source lithium from solid rock ore deposits.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">When seen in context, the convention narrative looks rather thinner than its advocates suggest</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Due to ongoing exploration, identified resources of lithium around the globe have increased significantly. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, identified lithium resources in the United States total 12 million tons and total 86 million tons in other countries. South America is particularly relevant when it comes to sourcing the mineral. Bolivia leads the world with 21 million tons, followed by Argentina’s 20 million tons and Chile’s 11 million tons. Other countries with sizable lithium reserves include Australia (8 million tons) and China (about 7 million tons).</p> -<p>However, whenever the convention has been reinterpreted, the government has possessed a strong or united majority in Parliament, and could be confident of victory even if a vote was held. Operation Ellamy is the outlier, though Cameron avoided the dilemma faced by Blair in 2003, as he had international authority to act. He took strike actions over the weekend and held both a debate and a vote the following Monday, in line with what the House expected post-Iraq. The Syrian airstrikes in 2018 and the recent strikes against the Houthis were both initiated over weekends, yet debates were held the following Monday also. The first was a light-footprint operation without UK troops, the second a direct response to an attack on the Royal Navy. Neither proved controversial in the aftermath.</p> +<p><strong>COBALT</strong></p> -<p>None of this came at the expense of the convention. On the contrary, every prime minister since Blair has framed their actions in its terms, even when responding to novel circumstances. May asserted she had acted within its limits and worked hard to prove it, outlining a strong framework for the future exercise of the prerogative. Had she appealed to Parliament in 2018, she would likely have received the support she sought. The Conservatives enjoyed a slim majority, and divisions between opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn and his backbench MPs, many of whom supported intervention, led to rifts within the Labour Party which May could probably have used to gain cross-party support. However, she chose not to put this to the test. It was a gamble that turned on her own political judgement, and which ultimately paid off.</p> +<p>Cobalt deposits are found throughout different mineral formations, including igneous rocks and sedimentary rocks. Cobalt is generally retrieved as a byproduct from copper and nickel production, and its pricing therefore follows the demand of these primary metals. Cobalt has several applications, such as EV batteries, superalloys, cutting tools, and industrial catalysts, to name a few. Cobalt can be produced from three main types of ore deposits: copper deposits, for example, located in the central African copper belt comprising the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia; magmatic nickel sulfide deposits, for example, found at Sudbury, Canada, and at Norilsk, Russia; and, lastly, nickel laterite deposits, located in tropical regions. Cobalt can also be found on the deep-sea floor, although such deposits are generally not being extracted. A majority of the world’s cobalt mine production — about 70 percent — is located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, followed by Russia (about 4 percent) and Australia (4 percent). According to the U.S. Geological Survey, around 70 percent of domestic production is from recycling.</p> -<p>When seen in context, the convention narrative looks rather thinner than its advocates suggest. Yet this should come as no surprise. The range of military actions the government can take varies widely, and the executive is afforded room to interpret what counts as emergency action, as well as broad discretion to act in defence of protect critical national interests. These determinations rest with the prime minister and Cabinet, who assess, interpret, and authorise the use of force. Although the perceived erosion of the convention has led to calls for a US-style War Powers Act, this has remained a fringe position for reasons beyond those in the Brown report.</p> +<p>Because cobalt is often a byproduct of copper and nickel production, and since the ores of these two metals are intertwined in sedimentary deposits, it is not possible to mine cobalt without mining these other metals. Therefore, the extraction process is essentially the same as mining and refining copper or nickel. Several processing methods can be used for cobalt. In short, crushed sulfite from mines is heaped up to extract a mineral soup leached from the rock by sulfuric acid. Copper, for instance, is extracted from the solution by electrolysis, which leaves behind a solution fairly rich in cobalt (along with other metals). Another set of chemical precipitation and second leaching removes these metals from the electrolyte, which slowly enriches the cobalt in the solution until it can be extracted out.</p> -<p>First, owing to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, any government which enjoys a cohesive enough majority in the Commons to ignore the substance of the convention could, by extension, overturn any War Powers Act intended to limit its authority. It would have to expend political capital to do so, but no more than a government seeking to ignore the current practice around the convention itself would.</p> +<p>In other words, the purification of cobalt involves several steps to extract and separate the mineral from the ore. During the first step, the ore is crushed into small pieces and ground into a powder. That ground ore is mixed with water and chemicals and agitated in flotation cells, creating bubbles that attach to the valuable minerals and form a froth layer while the non-valuable minerals sink to the bottom. The froth containing the valuable minerals goes through a series of concentration steps, including more processing to remove impurities. That concentrated ore is then smelted — which involves heating the ore at very high temperatures to separate the individual metals. The separated component concentrates, copper and cobalt, are further processed to remove additional impurities.</p> -<p>Second, and more importantly, the US experience refutes the assumptions of the convention narrative. The US president has been nominally constrained by the War Powers Resolution since 1973. Passed as a reaction to the Vietnam War, this statute was aimed at restricting the executive’s unilateral authority to wage war without Congressional involvement. While it has succeeded in preventing Vietnam-style creeping escalations, and although presidents have consistently sought Congressional approval before the major deployment of ground forces, it has fallen substantially short of its legislative intent. Noted for its own unhappy history and failure to live up to expectations, successive Republican and Democrat administrations have frustrated its provisions, adopting creative interpretations of reporting requirements and the phrase “hostilities” to authorise extended campaigns beyond statutory time limits. When pressed, presidents have argued that their actions are merely “consistent” with the Resolution’s requirements, refusing to acknowledge that they take action under its authority, and asserting the statute is an unconstitutional infringement on their office.</p> +<p><strong>MANGANESE</strong></p> -<p>The most important element of the Resolution hinges on the 60–90 day time limit within which a president must withdraw US troops they have committed to hostilities, unless Congressional approval is granted to extend this. For the Houthi action, this was triggered when the Biden administration submitted its first War Powers Resolution report on 12 January, notifying Congress that strikes were conducted alongside the UK pursuant to the president’s authority as Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the conditions of the Resolution. This would theoretically limit the duration of the campaign to 12 April, at a maximum.</p> +<p>Manganese is a relatively abundant metal and is widely available throughout the Earth’s crust, including on the seafloor. Ores that contain over 35 percent manganese are considered commercially viable.</p> -<p>However, Biden has already laid the groundwork for extending the campaign beyond this formal window. The administration has submitted a series of reports for each joint action with the UK, but none for strikes conducted without UK involvement. This has led many to speculate that Biden will continue the practice of claiming the 60-day time limit resets with each new report, or else that the US is not technically involved in “hostilities”. The Resolution’s substantive constraints are, despite appearances, quite limited in practice.</p> +<p>Impurities in manganese include oxides of other metals, and these are reduced during smelting. Nonmetallic impurities remain in the post-smelting slag. Smelting processes depend on the kind of manganese destined for final application: pure manganese, ferromanganese, or silicomanganese. For uses requiring pure manganese, the process of producing electrolytic manganese is preferred. In this method, manganese ores are roasted to obtain a calcine that is dissolved in sulfuric acid to make a manganous sulfate solution. The addition of ammonia and hydrogen sulfide then precipitates unwanted materials. Ferromanganese and silicomanganese are made through smelting ores in a furnace. South Africa leads the way in terms of manganese reserves at 640 million metric tons, followed by China (280 million metric tons), and Australia (270 million metric tons). Other large players include Ukraine (140 million metric tons) and Gabon (61 million metric tons).</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Houthi case highlights the fact that debates and votes have been used as tools to overcome issues of authority and legitimacy</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>NICKEL</strong></p> -<p>Given all of this, what do the recent Houthi strikes say about the war powers in the UK today? In many ways, they reaffirmed the old constitutional orthodoxy. Both the prime minister, Rishi Sunak, and opposition leader Keir Starmer unequivocally stated that the actions were conducted in accordance with the convention framework and past precedent. However, the prime minister also noted that:</p> +<p>Nickel, primarily used in stainless steel, is also used in alloys as well as chemicals and batteries due to its resistance to corrosion. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, nickel can be found primarily in two types of ore deposits: laterites and magmatic sulfides. Nickel deposits can generally be found in rocks rich in iron and magnesium. The extraction of nickel from ore is similar to the extraction of copper, and often the same equipment is used in both processes. Nickel, however, does require higher-temperature refractories and therefore enhanced cooling capabilities.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Fundamentally, we need to maintain the prerogative powers that allow the Executive to act in such emergencies… I am responsible for those decisions, I do not take them lightly, and Parliament is responsible for holding me to account for them.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The purification processes depend on whether the ore-containing nickel is a sulfide or a laterite. For sulfides, the ores are ground to separate waste materials from the nickel mineral by selective flotation processes (in which the ore is mixed with reagents and agitated by devices to create air bubbles; the sulfide clings to surfaces and then is collected as a concentrate). The resulting concentrate is then either leached or dried and smelted. That product is converted to an oxide and combines with a silica flux to form a slag drawn off to leave a matte with a high nickel content. The matte is then further treated using a variety of processes such as ammonia pressure leach, roasting, or electrorefining.</p> -<p>This position preserves the substance of the convention, though it is more forthright in asserting the government’s prerogative to act as it sees fit, without prior or retrospective Parliamentary assent. In this respect, Sunak followed a similar formulation to Fallon, May and US presidential practice, arguing that he acted “in accordance with” the convention while adapting it to the circumstances. He could be confident that his large majority, united behind current UK foreign policy, would support him regardless of whether he approached the House beforehand. And, like May, his decision to authorise strikes without consultation demonstrated his own personal understanding of how the war powers should operate within the bounds of the convention, and the authority he possessed to act.</p> +<p>For laterite ores, because they are oxides and are not suitable for conventional concentration processes, large amounts must be smelted together. The moisture and water are chemically removed in furnaces. The oxide is then reduced to nickel metal using furnaces and then cooled. A large portion of laterite smelters make a crude ferronickel meant to be an alloying agent in steel production.</p> -<p>Sunak was also strengthened by the fact that, in line with convention, Starmer and the shadow defence secretary were also briefed prior to the strikes, and have endorsed the government’s actions both in public and the Commons, albeit on a case-by-case basis. Had they opposed them or been unable to convince a significant majority to support this position, pressure would have mounted on the government to change course.</p> +<p>As of 2021, Indonesia and Australia had the largest global reserves of nickel with around 21 million metric tons each, followed by Brazil (16 million metric tons) and Russia (about 8 million metric tons). The United States itself possesses around 340,000 metric tons.</p> -<p>The Houthi case highlights the fact that debates and votes have been used as tools to overcome issues of authority and legitimacy. Equally, it shows how prime ministerial interpretations of the legal and political limits to their office, be that the conventions, norms or even the foundations of their authority, are of great significance. Non-legal, unwritten constitutional rules such as norms, conventions or practices all wield power when those in high office believe they exist, and war is the preeminent example of a convention-dominated realm of government, where the practice of constitutional actors matters, and where such practice largely constitutes the substance of that realm itself.</p> +<p><strong>LITHIUM IRON PHOSPHATE</strong></p> -<p>The strikes provide further evidence that the political rule we know as the “war powers convention” is less of a convention, and more of a practice. This is a small difference, but it has important consequences. Practices exist as political rules because there are good practical reasons for them to do so. Conventions are somewhat stronger, relying not just on reasons but on stable and consistent precedent, backed up by a general agreement that their provisions are binding on constitutional actors.</p> +<p>The basic production of lithium iron phosphate chiefly includes four elements: the production of iron phosphate precursor, wet ball milling, spray drying, and sintering. The synthesis of phosphate can come in two forms, solid or liquid. The solid-phase synthesis method is the most commonly used to prepare electrode materials because it is a relatively simple process that can be more quickly industrialized. Carbothermal reduction, which reduces substances using carbon as an agent, is likely the most common solid-phase method, as it involves using inexpensive ferric iron. Liquid-phase synthesis, on the other hand, adds a solvent such as water to obtain the calcination of lithium iron phosphate at high temperatures.</p> -<p>The convention narrative may have over-promised and under-delivered precisely because it overlooks this distinction. Since 2003, this narrative has downplayed the virtues of the war prerogative, focusing on its archaic or anachronistic form rather than its valuable substance, while misunderstanding the strengths of the “convention” itself. Its aims are far more limited and subtle – forcing debates, structuring the conversation and linking the use of force more directly to the support of the House, particularly grey-zone activities below the formal threshold of war.</p> +<p>Australia has the largest reserves of iron content ore, with 27 billion metric tons, followed by Brazil’s 15 billion metric tons and Russia’s 14 billion metric tons. China possesses close to 7 billion metric tons, whereas the United States has around 1 billion metric tons of reserves.</p> -<p>In light of current practice and with an eye on future challenges, we may well want to keep this in mind.</p> +<h4 id="anode-1">Anode</h4> -<hr /> +<p><strong>GRAPHITE</strong></p> -<p><strong>Daniel Skeffington</strong> is a doctoral candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London.</p>Daniel SkeffingtonRecent strikes against the Houthis in Yemen have prompted fresh discussions on the war powers of the UK government. Yet in many ways, they have reaffirmed the existing constitutional orthodoxy.【黎智英案・審訊第 52 日】2024-03-25T12:00:00+08:002024-03-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-52<ul> - <li>李宇軒：赴日會見議員討論香港人權法案 稱可阻嚇人權侵犯者</li> -</ul> +<p>Graphite is a pure form of carbon that comes in three main commercial forms: spherical graphite, coated spherical graphite, and synthetic graphite. The first is not involved in EV-battery applications as it is not processed enough to be suitable to be used in a vehicle. Graphite is a particularly attractive material for lithium-ion battery manufacturers, as it is widely available in a broad range of countries, such as Turkey, Brazil, China, Russia, and Sweden. In addition, the size and shape of graphite particles can be modified depending on the required application.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>There are three main sources of graphite: natural graphite extracted directly from minerals, synthetic graphite, and bio-graphite. While natural graphite is an important source of graphite materials today, it can contain a large number of impurities, making its use difficult. Synthetic graphite is made out of calcined petroleum coke and coal tar pitch, and bio-graphite is obtained by pyrolysis of carbon-containing components. The carbon content of natural graphite is, in general, fairly low when mined, requiring several enrichment processes. The first stage is the crushing process, in which the crushing methods (for instance, ball, hammer, air-jet, or rod mills) are determined by the type of graphite ore. The second stage is grinding and screening to graphite flakes, and the last stage is purification through a number of methods, such as flotation and high-temperature purification.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2jYUIoB.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>Synthetic graphite, also known as artificial graphite, is produced through heating formless carbon materials. These chiefly include calcined petroleum coke and coal tar pitch. To produce synthetic graphite, the petroleum is first ground and sieved, and the coal tar pitch is used as a binder to form a paste. The actual shape of the graphite is formed and then heated to carbonize the pitch. A pitch is used to fill pores caused by that carbonization process, and the product is once again calcined to be carbonized and densified. Lastly, the temperature is raised to between 2700 and 3000 °C, where its shape transforms into graphitic crystallites that eventually become a stable graphitic structure. Synthetic graphite has no cost advantage to natural graphite, though it does present higher carbon content, better cyclability, and a more stable performance — as well as enhanced compatibility with electrolytes. There are several experimental ways to achieve the third type, bio-graphite, which refers to graphite produced from biomass. These methods have included, for instance, high-temperature heating.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（25日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第52日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方指李曾與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人兼執行總監裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）以訊息交流，其後裴倫德開設群組，成員包括李和正被港府通緝的邵嵐，李曾把建議制裁名單的連結傳送至群組。此外，李提及他在2020年頭到訪日本並會見議員山尾志櫻里，談論在日本議會上動議香港人權法案；他形容法案可以達至阻嚇作用，如果發現與香港有關的人權侵犯事件的話，「咁日本嗰邊就可以經呢個 process 去 deal with 佢喇。」至2020年5月的「重光計劃」眾籌，李表示他並沒有參與籌備，因當時國安法即將立法，「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人擔心仍在港的李會被指「洗黑錢」，或眾籌款項被本地銀行凍結，最終決定「𠵱家唔洗你搞，同埋隔走T（另一名被告陳梓華）嗰邊」。</p> +<p>Given the different source and production methods of graphite mentioned above, the types of impurities they present also vary. A number of purification methods have been applied to natural graphite. Flotation, for instance, is the simplest type but obtains a lower amount of graphite purity. Acid-based methods can remove more impurities through their chemical reactions, as well as the high-temperature method, but they require large amounts of energy and create more environmental pollution. Because synthetic graphite is already graphitized at a very high temperature, its purification process is similar to its initial impurity removal method.</p> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第九天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> +<p>Turkey leads the way globally when it comes to graphite reserves, with around 90 million metric tons, followed by Brazil (74 million metric tons) and China (52 million metric tons). Other large players include Madagascar (26 million metric tons), Mozambique (25 million metric tons), and Tanzania (18 million metric tons).</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒不欲從政-以避免政治包袱增加角力籌碼">李宇軒：不欲從政 以避免政治包袱、增加角力籌碼</h4> +<p><strong>SILICON</strong></p> -<p>控方展示李宇軒與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人兼執行總監裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）的 Telegram 對話，在2020年1月12日，裴倫德向李稱曾經與英國議員 Lord Alton 談及李，而 Lord Alton 認為李應該從政。（“And discussed you with Lord Alton often, who thinks you should be in politics!”）李則回覆稱，不涉足政治是他的參與方式，因為他們刻意地需要素人，以增加他們一方的角力籌碼。（“Oh we’re kind of playing the game that way, in that we need someone deliberately not in politics to leverage power from this side;)”）</p> +<p>Graphite has been the technology of choice for lithium-ion batteries since its inception in the 1990s. However, as graphite hits energy-density limits, elements of the industry are championing silicon to play a larger role in battery anodes. Supporters of silicon argue that using the material could significantly increase the energy density of the anode and provide the battery longer runtimes. In theory, silicon anodes have tenfold the energy density of graphite anodes.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) <a href="https://twitter.com/lukedepulford/status/1315038772791214088">October 10, 2020</a></p> -</blockquote> +<p>Silicon is the most abundant mineral in the Earth’s crust. The production of pure silicon for batteries occurs in two stages, as each stage yields two different types of silicon based on varying levels of purity that are meant for different end uses. Silica occurs naturally in the form of quartz. It is purified by oxygen removal through a reaction with carbon in an electrode arc furnace, resulting in metallurgical-grade silicon that is 98 percent pure.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lcHOZP2.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）</p> +<p>Metallurgical-grade silicon is further refined by grinding it into a powder and reacting it with acid. The resulting chemical has a low boiling point and is distilled to remove further impurities. Lastly, it is reacted with hydrogen at a high temperature for 200 to 300 hours to produce a silicon of a very high purity level.</p> -<p>李庭上解釋，如果他不是政治人物或政黨成員的話，便不會有政治包袱或不需要遵從政黨路線，會有較大的斡旋空間。</p> +<p>Excluding the United States, ferrosilicon accounted for almost 70 percent of world silicon production on a silicon-content basis in 2021. The leading countries for ferrosilicon production were, on a silicon-content basis, China (6 million metric tons), Russia (580,000 metric tons), and Norway (350,000 metric tons), highlighting China’s dominance of the mineral’s production. For silicon metal, the leading producers were China, Brazil, and Norway. China accounted for approximately 70 percent of total global estimated production of silicon materials in 2021.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指港人面對不同障礙-致未能向國際社會發出清晰信息">李宇軒指港人面對不同障礙 致未能向國際社會發出清晰信息</h4> +<h3 id="us-capabilities">U.S. Capabilities</h3> -<p>控方指，裴倫德在2020年1月12日設立一個 Signal 群組，成員包括李宇軒、邵嵐（Joey Siu）、Dimon 和 Natalie。李指 Dimon 是一間美國非政府組織的職員，而該組織關心當時的香港自由情況；Natalie 則是一些加拿大港人組織成員。裴倫德在訊息中介紹各人，指邵嵐是「香港大專學界國際事務代表團」（IAD）成員，而李則是 SWHK（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong）成員。</p> +<p>Several nations, especially China, are ahead in the production, ownership, and control of refining, purification, and concentration of several critical minerals and raw materials key to the manufacturing of lithium-ion batteries. For instance, as of 2019, China was processing 65 percent of the world’s cobalt. Likewise, China refines more than 90 percent of global natural graphite. China also processes 58 percent of global lithium, 35 percent of the world’s nickel, and 87 percent of rare earths. Even critical minerals that are mined in the United States are often exported to China to be processed and then returned for domestic use. Whereas the United States has some reserves in a few critical minerals that are inputs in lithium-ion batteries, the country is not a significant player in processing capabilities.</p> -<p>李表示，當裴倫德把他加入群組時，他並未有獲得 SWHK 其他成員的授權，所以他只是「in a loose sense」地代表 SWHK，並且基於他對其他 SWHK 成員意見的大概理解。</p> +<p>In short, years of focused industrial policy in China — including trade protectionism, low environmental standards, and the use of state subsidies to enable operations to run at a loss — has paid off exceptionally. Nevertheless, while China is by far the leader in refining minerals, it is important to recognize that other countries have capabilities as well. Chile for example, processes 29 percent of the world’s lithium while Malaysia processes 12 percent of rare earths.</p> -<p>裴倫德在訊息中形容，他們面對很多障礙，以致無法向國際社會清晰地發出信息，而這些障礙必須克服。（“For loads of reasons, I think the obstacle preventing you from speaking more clearly into the international community ‘must’ be overcome.”）控方追問「障礙」是指什麼。李指，其一是很多人都想維持以匿名身份，「所以有啲 idea 喺度，但唔會有人講到呢啲 idea。」再者，不同人分散在不同的地方、時區，而且討論不夠集中，「有時講呢樣，有時講嗰樣。」李又指，沒有一個授權的機制可讓人代表特定群體，當不同人接觸國際社會的時候，對方無法得知一個人可以代表到多少群體入面多少人，例如某人會見英國國會議員時，對方不知道這個人可以代表到多少香港人。</p> +<h4 id="the-biden-administrations-approach-to-building-more-resilient-supply-chains">The Biden Administration’s Approach to Building More Resilient Supply Chains</h4> -<p>李續指，裴倫德在訊息亦提及香港的運動正處於關鍵性時刻（“I believe the movement is at a critical juncture.”），惟仍未有任何傳統民主派、政黨或者組織有意去擔任香港的代表，「結果從 international community 嘅角度，冇一啲好 clear 嘅 message 出到嚟。」</p> +<p>After many months of research, the Biden administration identified several sectors whose supply chains are critical to U.S. economic security. In its 100-Day Reviews under Executive Order 14017, part of the report Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-based Growth, the White House assessed supply chain vulnerabilities across four key sectors: semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging; large-capacity batteries, such as those for EVs; critical minerals and materials; and pharmaceuticals and advanced pharmaceutical ingredients.</p> -<p>李指，裴倫德設立這個群組，原意是集合意見和進行討論。控方追問，為何裴倫德只將上述4人加入群組。李則表示：「我諗係 Luke 啱啱識我哋四個。」</p> +<p>Critical minerals are recognized as the building blocks for modern technologies at the cornerstone of national security and economic prosperity, and in February 2022, the White House announced several investment packages to remedy the United States’ vulnerabilities in the critical minerals and raw materials sector. In addition, the Department of the Interior released a list of 50 critical minerals to inform these efforts. These investments aim to secure, among other essential technologies, the supply chains of lithium-ion batteries.</p> -<h4 id="群組訊息顯示李宇軒傳送制裁名單連結">群組訊息顯示李宇軒傳送制裁名單連結</h4> +<p>For instance, the Department of Defense’s Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program had awarded $35 million to separate and process heavy rare-earth elements in Mountain Pass, California. The Department of Energy is currently managing a $140 million demonstration project to recover rare-earth elements and critical minerals from coal ash and other mine waste as part of the IIJA. The Department of Energy likewise injects $3 billion in investments to refine battery materials and recycle them. Berkshire Hathaway Energy Renewables announced a new demonstration facility in Imperial County, California, to test a lithium extraction process from geothermal brine as part of a multibillion-dollar investment in lithium. Altogether, Sections 40207 of the IIJA requires the Department of Energy to fund more than $6 billion in grants related to the research, supply, processing, and recycling of materials and minerals critical for lithium-ion batteries.</p> -<p>控方指，群組成員 Dimon 在2020年1月19日發訊息，提及「Dr. Warren Mann」想要一份應受制裁的香港高級警員名單，因為他曾經在「前線」處理傷者，希望向美國政府施壓以制裁該些警察。李在1月21日傳送一條 Google Drive 連結，可通向制裁名單的公開版本。</p> +<p>The Department of Defense has also entered into agreements with mining companies to enhance domestic mining capabilities, such as the $90 million project signed with Albemarle to reopen the company’s Kings Mountain lithium mine in North Carolina. These agreements are entered into under the Defense Production Act (DPA) and utilize appropriated funds authorized in the IRA. A DPA determination issued in 2022 authorized the Department of Defense to conduct feasibility studies for mature mining and processing projects.</p> -<p>李指 Dr. Mann 是一名醫生，以他理解，Dr. Mann 想建議一些制裁對象。至於 Dimon 提及 Dr.Mann曾在「前線」處理傷者，李不肯定是指打仗的「前線」還是示威「前線」，他對此沒有認知。李又指，他傳送制裁名單的連結之後，似乎便沒有下文，「我記得呢個 group 最尾不了了之」，但他不記得是否在這一個時間點。</p> +<p>Legislation has also strived to enhance research in the critical minerals sector, particularly as it pertains to assessing and enhancing current U.S. capabilities. For instance, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act establishes an Earth Mapping Resources Initiative within the U.S. Geological Survey, which aims to speed up efforts to acquire integrated topographic, geologic, geochemical, and geophysical mapping. The section prioritizes critical minerals.</p> -<p>翻查「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」網頁，「Darren Mann」被列為醫療範疇的顧問，簡介指他是一名英籍手術師，持有香港永久性居民資格，有在戰場和衝突地區工作的經驗，並且曾在國際上提出有關香港示威中違反「國際人道規範」的情況。</p> +<p>The Biden administration’s “Securing a Made in America Supply Chain for Critical Minerals” announcement emphasizes that the administration is undertaking action across the federal government to secure critical minerals and raw materials supply chains. First, the Biden administration states that it aims to update outdated mining laws and regulations — chief among them the Mining Law of 1872, which “still governs mining of most critical minerals on federal public lands” — with the establishment of an interagency working group led by the Department of the Interior. The working group has produced several recommendations to enhance various features of mining operations. The announcement likewise directs the United States Geological Survey within the Department of the Interior to update the federal list of minerals essential to economic or national security and vulnerable to disruption. Second, the White House announced a memorandum of understanding between the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State to coordinate stockpiling operations. National Defense Stockpile authority was given to the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment in an October 2021 executive order.</p> -<p>控方問在製作制裁名單一事上，「香港大專學界國際事務代表團（IAD）」的角色是什麼。李則表示「我唔清楚」，只記得 IAD 曾就游說之旅向「G攬」報銷開支，而他則負責處理相關單據和向 IAD 歸還款項。李又指 IAD 不只會見政治人物，也會會見社運組織，以他所理解，IAD 會講述香港情況和支持香港自由民主。</p> +<h4 id="trade-tools-and-tax-incentives">Trade Tools and Tax Incentives</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒赴日會見議員討論人權法案-稱可阻嚇香港人權侵犯者">李宇軒：赴日會見議員討論人權法案 稱可阻嚇香港人權侵犯者</h4> +<p>The IRA is perhaps the most significant legislation to accelerate transportation electrification and clean energy project deployment in U.S. history and stands as the flagship policy to accelerate the transition to lower carbon emissions in the future. However, provisions in the IRA prohibiting reliance on China in the EV supply chain have come at the cost of added difficulty in the sourcing and processing of critical minerals that works at cross purposes with the goals of the green transition. The Biden administration’s current quest to diversify away from China is thus compromising efforts to spur a transition to renewable energy.</p> -<p>李供稱在2020年頭曾到訪日本，在日本國會議員山尾志櫻里（Shiori, YAMAO；本名「菅野志桜里」）位於東京的辦事處與她會面，同場人士包括山尾的助理倉持麟太郎、張亦澄和一名叫「村長」的在日港人，其中倉持麟太郎是協助草擬法案及處理法律技術問題。李上周五供稱張亦澄已草擬了法案的草稿，李並透過電郵傳送給山尾志櫻里和高井崇志，惟當他會見山尾時，卻發現山尾已經準備好另一份法案草稿，變相當日會面好像是山尾向李和張匯報法案詳情，「我哋去到，『嘩！既然你哋已經準備好晒』，咁我哋就禮貌上『好好好』。」</p> +<p>A layer of laws and regulations have put restrictions on how firms can source and produce critical minerals to remain eligible for subsidies. In March 2023, the Department of Commerce updated rules on how it applies the term Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC), limiting the universe of suppliers (most notably China) that car manufacturers can use if they desire to have their vehicles remain eligible for the IRA EV tax credit. If any critical mineral used in the production of an EV was extracted, processed, or recycled in an FEOC, the end vehicle becomes ineligible for the $7,500 tax credit that consumers receive after purchase. Additionally, in December 2023, the Department of the Treasury released proposed guidance on clean vehicle provisions in the IRA where it set critical mineral sourcing requirements for the tax credit. Beginning at 40 percent in 2023 and increasing year over year, certain percentages of critical minerals must be extracted in the United States or a country that the United States has an FTA with (with an additional exception made for batteries recycled in North America). These policies, while having the laudable goal of diversifying dependence on China in EV supply chains, make sourcing and processing critical minerals for EVs more difficult and costly for manufacturers. Indeed, given market realities and scarcity of supply from countries other than China, IRA requirements for eligibility for tax credits appear impossible to meet in many cases.</p> + +<p>Cognizant of the soaring demand for critical minerals related to the energy transition, the administration has lessened, through regulation, the sourcing and manufacturing requirements of the IRA with two novel interpretations of the statute. In December 2022, guidance from the Department of the Treasury permitted the “lease loophole,” in which EVs that are not assembled in North America, do not meet the origin requirements on battery content and critical minerals, and are above price caps are still eligible for the $7,500 tax credit if they are classified as “commercial vehicles.” This guidance has supported an increase in EV sales as more consumers have opted for leasing instead of outright purchasing an EV.</p> + +<p>In the second workaround to a strict reading of the IRA, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) attempted to negotiate critical mineral agreements (CMAs) with supplying countries. These agreements could in turn ensure that partner countries would be considered as “FTA Countries” under the IRA, an approach that seems to have floundered. The United States signed the first, and so far only, CMA in March 2023 with Japan. The objective of this novel trade and cooperation agreement is:</p> <blockquote> - <p>マグニツキー法についてコメントも引用して頂きました。制裁できないままの方が、制裁の判断を迫られずに済む。そんな外務省の逃げ腰な姿勢を転換させるのが政治の仕事だと思う。やれないからやらないんじゃなく、やるかやらないか国家として主体的に判断する枠組みが急務。 https://t.co/e7kURzV4wY — 菅野志桜里 (@ShioriYamao) <a href="https://twitter.com/ShioriYamao/status/1358299097862610946">February 7, 2021</a></p> + <p>. . . to strengthen and diversify critical minerals supply chains and promote the adoption of electric vehicle battery technologies by formalizing the shared commitment of the Parties to facilitate trade, promote fair competition and market-oriented conditions for trade in critical minerals, ensure robust labor and environmental standards, and cooperate in efforts to ensure secure, sustainable, and equitable critical minerals supply chains.</p> </blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DcOK0jl.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 日本版マグニツキー法の制定をめざす議員連盟の発起人会に集まった山尾志桜里（奥右）、中谷元（同左）両氏ら=2021年1月27日午前8時42分、国会内、佐藤達弥撮影（資料圖片）</p> +<p>While Japan is not a critical minerals source, the country possesses related capabilities, including mineral processing and EV battery production. This CMA sparked interest by other nations and blocs, notably Indonesia, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, which have expressed a desire to negotiate similar agreements. Indonesia and the United States have held preliminary talks on a deal involving Indonesian nickel, a critical mineral of which they hold the largest natural reserves globally. The United States and the United Kingdom’s trade representatives have touted “significant progress” in a bilateral CMA between the two trading blocs, although the agreement has yet to be concluded. Likewise, the European Union and the United States have discussed reaching a Japan-like CMA, although talks seem to have stumbled.</p> -<p>李指，後來他們便開始嘗試爭取其他日本議員支持山尾所準備的人權法案。李形容法案可以達至阻嚇作用，如果發現與香港有關的人權侵犯事件的話，「咁日本嗰邊就可以經呢個 process 去 deal with 佢喇。」法官李素蘭追問，李剛才指法案並不同於馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act），那麼當某人被視為人權侵犯者（perpetrators of human rights）的時候，他們會有什麼後果。李僅指：「同一啲同日本 jurisdiction 有關嘅嘢會 restricted」，但他不記得有哪些範疇會受到限制，所以無法舉例。</p> +<p>In a similar vein, U.S. policymakers have engaged allies Canada and Australia on critical minerals cooperation. The United States and Canada announced a previous Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals collaboration, while the United States has established a Critical Minerals Working Group with Australia. In all, the United States is engaging its economic allies and partners to enhance the trade of critical minerals as they ramp up domestic capabilities. However, that engagement has so far been lackluster due to significant pushback domestically, including from lawmakers who either wish to be more engaged in negotiations or believe more agreements would undermine the reshoring objectives of current U.S. trade policy.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒疫情期間繼續爭取其他日本議員支持人權法案">李宇軒：疫情期間繼續爭取其他日本議員支持人權法案</h4> +<h4 id="the-drive-for-cmas-sputters">The Drive for CMAs Sputters</h4> -<p>李指，其後全球爆發新冠肺炎疫情，所以有關法案的程序都停滯，日本國會亦未能開會。在這段時間，李透過電郵嘗試爭取高井崇志、井上哲志和山添拓支持山尾志櫻里的法案。</p> +<p>Efforts to strike additional CMA deals with allies and trading partners have met pushback domestically, including from the bipartisan leadership of the congressional committees with jurisdiction over trade, as well as from Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV), chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and an important author of the IRA. Senator Manchin has sharply criticized the workarounds, characterizing them as weakening the sourcing and manufacturing requirements in the IRA. Saying that the Biden administration is “distorting the plain text of U.S. law,” Representative Jason Smith (R-MO), chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, who generally objects to “corporate green welfare” contained in the IRA, has also decried the proposal to deem CMAs as FTAs under the IRA. Even strong proponents of the IRA, such as Senator Rony Wyden (D-OR), chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, and Representative Richard Neal (D-MA), ranking member of the House Committee on Ways and Means, have risen up against the USTR’s current CMA strategy, citing workers’ rights and environmental concerns:</p> -<p>李指，後來大約在2020年夏天，3個日本港人組織包括「Act with HK」、「SWHK@JPN」和「香港之黎明（香港の夜明け）」，在日本舉辦了一個活動，期間前香港眾志成員周庭透過錄像影片發表言論，她表示支持法案，並多謝日本人，希望日本的人可以繼續關心香港。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The critical minerals agreement announced today is unacceptable . . . the Administration does not have the authority to unilaterally enter into free trade agreements. Human rights, environmental rights, and economic opportunity are all closely interwoven, and had the Administration wanted to include meaningful labor or environmental protections in this agreement, they would’ve engaged Congress.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>控方展示李宇軒在2020年4月12日發送給高井崇志的電郵，當中以日文表示香港人抗疫之餘還要爭取民主和自由，並質疑日本政府將訪日的國家主席習近平視為「國賓」。電郵又指，法案一旦通過，能夠帶動日本更多有關香港民主化、疫情亂局和人權議題的討論。</p> +<p>Another camp of opposition to administration policy and the IRA is led by Senator Mike Crapo (R-ID), ranking member on the Senate Committee on Finance, which argues: “Additionally, the Treasury Department has announced several sets of rules and planned rules that will enable Chinese minerals, materials and entities to qualify for IRA subsidies, while potentially also excluding domestic players who are connected to traditional energy source.” The rushed, disjointed policies at the heart of these provisions were unworkable from the outset. In October 2024, following diplomatic outreach by Vice President Kamala Harris and while the USTR engaged with Indonesia on CMA negotiations, more widespread opposition was expressed from another broad-based coalition of senators, including Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Tammy Baldwin (D-MN), Amy Klobuchar (D-WI), and Lisa Murkowski (R-Al), among others, who noted: “Given the extraordinary taxpayer resources at play we strongly believe that eligibility for the critical minerals credit must prioritize domestic producers and existing free trade agreement partners.”</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指沒參與重光計劃眾籌-因仍身處香港國安法將臨-免款項遭凍結">李宇軒指沒參與「重光計劃」眾籌 因仍身處香港、國安法將臨 免款項遭凍結</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">[U.S.] engagement has so far been lackluster due to significant pushback domestically, including from lawmakers who either wish to be more engaged in negotiations or believe more agreements would undermine the reshoring objectives of current U.S. trade policy.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>控方繼而就2020年5月的「重光計劃」提問。李表示他曾分別與「攬炒巴」劉祖廸和另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）討論。他指其時「攬炒巴」已經不在香港，與他之間的討論「主要係隔走我，唔畀我參與」，因為「攬炒巴」一方知道李仍身處香港，銀行戶口也是在香港，當時消息指香港會訂立國安法，惟外界仍未知條文內容，為了安全起見，「所以話唔好俾一個喺香港 jurisdiction 裡面嘅人 hold 住啲錢」，以避免遭指控「洗黑錢」或遭香港銀行凍結款項。李又指，當時「Project Hong Kong Trust」已經成立、在美國開設了銀行戶口，能夠處理眾籌而得的款項，所以不需要借用李的個人戶口。</p> +<p>In a multilateral forum, the United States has engaged its partners and allies on critical minerals through the Department of State-led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). This partnership, which includes 13 states and the European Union, seeks to develop sustainable critical mineral supply chains through public-private partnership, targeted financial support, and diplomatic work. In June, the MSP shortlisted a list of 15 projects that it intends to fund by the end of 2023. In September 2023, Norway, Italy, and — most importantly — India joined the MSP, signaling that the desire to diversify critical minerals supply away from China is strong throughout the international community.</p> -<p>至於陳梓華，李指因為「T嗰邊」曾經墊支，所以他亦需要與陳討論，「啫係意思係T嗰邊都唔好再墊支喇」，改為使用「Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口處理錢銀。李指討論的結論是：「𠵱家唔洗你搞，同埋隔走T嗰邊。」</p> +<p>Additionally, there are nascent talks mostly touted by Europe, where negotiations on a CMA are seemingly stalled, to create a “critical minerals club” or a “buyers club.” This club would benefit its members (in theory, Brussels and its allies) by setting more consistent prices for minerals purchasers, seeking to avoid unstable prices in a time of high demand and fluctuating supply. While meeting with the U.S. Treasury secretary in early 2023, a senior German official raised the possibility of a minerals club, but the idea has yet to gain much traction in Washington.</p> -<p>控方問為何會有「重光計劃」。李指當時檢視「G攬」眾籌之後的收支情況，根據 SWHK 網站所載，截至2020年5月，「G攬」錄得餘款約69.8萬美元（約546萬港元），所以決定舉辦第四次眾籌。李表示，由於他並沒有參與籌備是次眾籌，故此不知道他們使用哪一個眾籌平台，當時也不知道最後籌得多少款項。</p> +<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> -<p>控方庭上展示的眾籌網站 gofundme.com 「攬炒團隊《重光香港計劃》— 攬炒過後是晨曦！[美金]」，顯示是次眾籌籌得175.5萬元美金。被問到眾籌款項由哪一個銀行戶口接收，李表示不知道，但他記得「傾嗰陣話係 Project Hong Kong Trust」。</p> +<p>Building U.S. and allied capacity to rebalance this dependency while achieving green transition goals will require a coherent, well-articulated industrial policy with U.S. leadership that expressly balances domestic production goals, objectives for the green energy transition, and domestic demand for imported inputs from allies and partners, as well as from China, when necessary.</p> -<p>網站載有呼籲人捐款的文字：「2020年5月，國安法兵臨城下，但我地香港人已經準備好攬炒。天助自助者，琴晚國務卿 Pompeo 亦措辭強硬，直言香港自治已死，全面制裁即將降臨。」李指憑相關行文風格，相信這些文字是由「攬炒巴」撰寫。</p> +<p>The president should task an interagency team to draft an industrial policy plan for growing domestic production of lithium-ion batteries. Given its resources and the extensive work already done, the administration should prepare specific estimates and projections for future needs for key critical minerals, constituent minerals and chemistries that are necessary to reach its goals. This assessment could also include what CMAs and other enhanced trade relationships will be necessary to secure supply for projected needs. For example, a recent S&amp;P report assessed that while lithium sourcing was fairly likely to meet the IRA’s requirements by 2035, it is very unlikely that enough cobalt and nickel supply will be able to keep up. Does the administration agree? How can trade relationships be improved to create access for U.S. manufacturers to a greater and more consistent supply of inputs critical to scaling up domestic production?</p> -<p>案件周三（3月27日）續審。</p> +<p>In terms of diversification, working effectively with other countries is essential. CSIS’s previous work on this subject concluded that an exclusive focus on domestic manufacturing was not the most productive path to resiliency and instead focused on “friendshoring” — encouraging the movement of supply chains to countries that do not pose a national security threat — and the development of “trusted trade partnerships” with them. The U.S. government should do more to ramp up friendshoring efforts in the form of new agreements and should attempt to build up the United States’ own processing capabilities to ensure the future competitiveness of the U.S. lithium-ion battery sector. Additionally, the United States should also foster increased regulatory cooperation with other countries in key areas of the battery supply chain by building upon existing agreements.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Administration statements on supply chain policy regularly reference the importance of cooperation with friends and allies, but it is becoming clear that this administration may not be capable of actually concluding a viable set of international trade and cooperation agreements that would increase supply chain security in this sector, absent support of Congress and domestic stakeholders. Without this support, the administration’s campaign for additional CMAs has faltered, and business uncertainty continues to grow surrounding the viability of lithium-ion battery production in the United States. It is urgent that the administration engage with Congress to achieve a solid bipartisan consensus on how the United States should balance trade and industrial and climate policy objectives in this sector. Concluding several CMAs with key countries such as the United Kingdom, Europe, Indonesia, Argentina, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be important to shoring up supply chain resiliency.</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒：赴日會見議員討論香港人權法案 稱可阻嚇人權侵犯者【黎智英案・審訊第 51 日】2024-03-22T12:00:00+08:002024-03-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-51<ul> - <li>李宇軒稱曾帶日本議員到中大二號橋視察、傳送法案初稿及展示催淚彈彈頭</li> -</ul> +<p>The discriminatory aspects of the IRA, to be discussed in the next paper, have engendered sharp criticism and may result in retaliation from trading partners that could unnecessarily threaten a strategy built on trusted trade partners and the green transition. Again, a multilateral approach to friendshoring and reducing dependency on China cannot be achieved without more active involvement by Congress in shaping trade agreements and better calibration of the legislative requirements for domestic sourcing.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is urgent that the administration engage with Congress to achieve a solid bipartisan consensus on how the United States should balance trade and industrial and climate policy objectives in this sector.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/21UcV6Y.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>Taking the language in the IRA reflecting preference for FTA partners to heart, the administration should investigate options for increasing investment in FTA partners that possess significant reserves of key minerals (such as lithium deposits in FTA partner Chile or Canada’s cobalt, graphite, lithium, and nickel deposits). If the United States is to reach such agreements successfully, it will have to negotiate not only extraction opportunities but also responses to the other countries’ demands to establish more value-added refining operations in their countries. Additionally, the United States should push for regulatory reforms that could be made to incentivize domestic production of key constituent materials for the supply chain.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（22日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第51日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李供稱，他與另一名被告陳梓華於2020年初曾到陳方安生的辦公室開會，二人被問及如何達至終局（Endgame），惟二人均說不出相關路線圖。控方亦未有要求李澄清「終局」的意思。此外，李稱在2019年區議會外國監選團來港期間，曾帶日本議員高井崇志到中大二號橋視察衝突後情況，事後二人有透過電郵聯絡，李亦將一份由義工撰寫的法案初稿轉發給高井崇志，冀議員能在日本議會上提出有關香港人權的法案。他亦在2019年12月曾赴日本與兩名日本共產黨議員見面，包括井上哲志和山添拓，「同埋帶咗啲催淚彈彈頭畀佢哋睇。」</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第八天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> +<p>According to the bipartisan House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, China’s domestic industrial policy has over time “effectively monopolized numerous critical mineral supply chains, including mining, mineral processing, refining, metallurgy, and end-use manufacturing,” making the United States and much of the world dependent on China. An uncomfortable reality is that the United States is not currently a significant player in the global mineral extraction and processing markets. The United States depends on imports for renewable technologies, chief among them the lithium-ion battery, and the critical mineral inputs essential to accomplishing a green transition.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒補充指印尼爆眼記者veby和聲稱被性侵sonia-一同會見美議員">李宇軒補充指印尼爆眼記者Veby和聲稱被性侵Sonia 一同會見美議員</h4> +<p>When it comes to processing the materials necessary for lithium-ion battery production, the Biden administration is making multifaceted efforts to incentivize more production in the United States. However, subsidies in the IRA are set to significantly increase the demand for lithium-ion batteries to a level that will far exceed the country’s current manufacturing capabilities and available supply of certain critical mineral inputs. Leveraging subsidy packages (chief among them IRA tax credits) and trade tools (such as CMAs) to incentivize production by U.S. partners and allies is therefore a critical piece of the puzzle.</p> -<p>李宇軒昨日供稱於2019年底，在時任香港民主委員會（Hong Kong Democracy Council）成員、朱耀明兒子朱牧民（Samuel Chu）的安排下，赴美國國會山莊會見參議員斯科特（Rick Scott）、Todd Young 、克魯茲（Ted Cruz）和 Marsha Blackburn。</p> +<p>Hindering U.S. producers from sourcing even small quantities of scarce inputs of critical materials for battery production from China and enforcing domestic content requirements that constrict the ability of U.S. businesses to turn to other nations to satisfy demand for manufacturing inputs will make it more difficult to achieve green transition goals. The three elements of current U.S. policy — incentivizing the green transition via ambitious policy packages such as the IRA, reshoring capabilities in critical sectors, and diversifying away from China — reflects conflicting goals. Policies to diversify away from China and reshore production capabilities will hinder long-term environmental objectives. It is thus imperative that the United States adopt a friendshoring approach to the green transition and allow U.S. businesses further down the lithium-ion battery supply chain to access enough minerals and materials to scale up production. In two subsequent papers, the CSIS Scholl Chair will discuss views on pursuing a more coherent industrial policy that balances these competing objectives.</p> -<p>李昨供稱一同會見美議員的人有 Sonia 、Diana 和 Veby，控方追問二人是誰。李指 Sonia 曾經聲稱被性侵，因為會見美議員是為了展示香港示威入面，「原來就有呢啲有血有肉嘅人呢，就係 victims 嚟，佢（Sonia）就係講佢畀人性侵嘅故事。」</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qCY24zi.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 左起：吳傲雪（Sonia Ng）、Katherine Cheng、Todd Young 、李宇軒、朱牧民（資料圖片）</p> +<p><strong>William Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> -<p>李指 Diana 是一名空姐，相信她的角色是講述她被航空公司施壓，「叫人唔好參加香港嘅民主運動」。至於 Veby，李指她是「印尼爆眼記者」。</p> +<p><strong>Meredith Broadbent</strong> serves as a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> -<p>昨日庭上提到李傳送一份建議制裁名單給朱牧民，控方今展示「重光團隊」的 Facebook 專頁截圖，顯示制裁名單的第三版本上載於專頁。控方指共有141名人士，包括前特首林鄭、前警務處處長曾偉雄、警司陶輝和行政會議成員湯家驊，以及整個警隊被列於名單上。惟李表示他並非專頁的管理人之一。</p> +<p><strong>Thibault Denamiel</strong> is an associate fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指-swhk-沒有中文名非所有人同意稱呼攬炒團隊">李宇軒指 SWHK 沒有中文名、非所有人同意稱呼「攬炒團隊」</h4> +<p><strong>Elias Shammas</strong> is a research intern with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p>William Alan Reinsch, et al.Reforming the lithium-ion supply chain constitutes a critical cornerstone of US foreign policy. The first in a series of three, this report discusses the processing and refining stage of the lithium-ion supply chain.Ukraine’s Financial System2024-03-28T12:00:00+08:002024-03-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraines-financial-system<p><em>This report highlights key stakeholder views from a recent workshop on developments in Ukraine’s financial system.</em></p> -<p>昨日庭上展示李宇軒與朱牧民之間的 Telegram 對話，訊息當中一度提及「攬炒團隊」，李昨稱「攬炒團隊」並非指「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）。控方今日要求李澄清 SWHK 的中文名稱。李則指並非所有 SWHK 的成員都同意以「攬炒團隊」作為中文名稱。法官杜麗冰問李的意思是否指 SWHK 沒有中文名，李確認。</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>李亦提到「G攬」登報結束之後，組員逐漸不再使用「G攬」這稱呼，因為其後的活動不再與登報相關，「如果你喺某一個活動好認同嘅話，就用 SWHK 呢個label」，惟直至李被捕一刻，組員仍然未能統一使用 SWHK 這名義。</p> +<p>In February 2024, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI convened an online workshop entitled “The Resilience and Integrity of the Financial System in Ukraine: Two Years after Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion”. As Ukraine continues its commitment to strengthening anti-money laundering (AML) efforts and implementing EU reforms, it recognises the significance of preparing for the upcoming enhanced follow-up procedure and 6th round of the MONEYVAL mutual evaluation, the regional body of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to which the country belongs. In light of this, the virtual workshop addressed key issues crucial for ensuring Ukraine’s readiness for the assessment. The workshop forms part of CFCS’s Supervising and Monitoring Ukraine’s Reconstruction Funds (SMURF) project, supported by the National Endowment for Democracy. The workshop, held under the Chatham House Rule, gathered representatives from key Ukrainian financial institutions and relevant authorities, including the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of the Digital Transformation of Ukraine and others. This report summarises the main findings of the workshop.</p> -<p>控方問李能否辨認出 SWHK 有哪些成員，李表示：「In a loose sense，可以」，例如有的人多次參與籌辦 SWHK 的活動，而該些人又認同 SWHK 這個參與身份。</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱曾到英領事住所參與會議-出席者包括李柱銘陳方安生郭榮鏗和莫乃光">李宇軒稱曾到英領事住所參與會議 出席者包括李柱銘、陳方安生、郭榮鏗和莫乃光</h4> +<p>Ukraine’s second enhanced follow-up MONEYVAL report, published in June 2020, identified several deficiencies in the country’s technical compliance with standards set by the FATF, the global standard-setter in anti-financial crime. The report flagged areas including risk assessments of new technologies, risk-based supervision and regulation of virtual assets, statistical data on AML and counterterrorist finance (CTF), and others as key issues where the country still has significant work to undertake. During the online workshop, participants reflected on these flagged areas, offering insights in how to effectively tackle these challenges. The workshop not only focused on Ukraine’s technical compliance with AML standards but also delved into the effectiveness of the country’s existing response to financial crime. It focused on four principal areas: development of the law on virtual assets; a path to creating a single register of bank accounts of individuals and legal entities; public–private partnerships; and recovery of the proceeds of crime.</p> -<p>李宇軒昨稱，在2019年11月區選之後，曾經參與民主黨創黨主席李柱銘、前政務司司長陳方安生、英國議員 Lord Alton 和裴倫德在 W Hotel 的會議。</p> +<h3 id="ukraines-technical-compliance-with-aml-standards">Ukraine’s Technical Compliance with AML Standards</h3> -<p>李供稱，他不記得在2019年底還是2020年初，曾獲時任英國駐港領事賀恩德（Andy Heyn）邀請到其住所參與會議，同場出席者還有民主黨創黨主席李柱銘、前政務司司長陳方安生、時任立法會議員郭榮鏗和莫乃光。李指在該次會議中，李柱銘和陳方安生屬於「老一啲嘅民主派」，郭榮鏗和莫乃光「就喺中間」，而「我就係再後生嘅 generation」，因此賀恩德想聆聽年輕一代的意見。李並指會議曾討論「大家對香港民主嗰個睇法」，亦曾提及《中英聯合聲明》。</p> +<h4 id="development-of-the-law-on-virtual-assets">Development of the Law on Virtual Assets</h4> -<p>李稱事前有告訴陳梓華（網名T）他將會出席這會議，而陳有作出回應，大概意思是：「去見吓，network 吓」、「加油」。</p> +<p>Virtual assets and the laws on their regulation emerged as a key topic during the workshop. This was largely due to the spotlight cast on the topic following the downgrade of Ukraine’s rating to “partially compliant” in its second enhanced follow-up MONEYVAL report to in relation to FATF Recommendation 15 on new technologies.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指陳方安生會上問及endgame-惟他與陳梓華均說不出路線圖">李宇軒指陳方安生會上問及endgame 惟他與陳梓華均說不出路線圖</h4> +<p>The first attempt to regulate virtual assets in Ukraine, aligning the country with international standards on AML/CTF and comprehensive financial monitoring, was made in 2022, when the Law on Virtual Assets No. 2074-IX was adopted and signed. However, participants noted that the law is not yet in effect due to delays caused by required amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine. A participant clarified that the reason behind the delay is that the necessary draft law for taxing operations with virtual assets has not been developed.</p> -<p>直至2020年年頭，李稱他與陳梓華一同到陳方安生的辦公室見面，是他第三次與陳方安生見面。控方問，陳為何會邀請李一同會見陳方安生，李則稱以他所知，陳方安生與陳梓華本來相識，「唔知 T（陳梓華）同陳方安生講咗啲咩，咁就 invite 咗我。」</p> +<p>Rather than developing the necessary technical amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine, a different pathway was chosen to address the issues around the regulation of virtual assets. Two alternative draft laws were registered in Ukraine’s legislature, the Verkhovna Rada, to revise the already-adopted Law on Virtual Assets and legalise the market and solve the taxation issue. However, neither has yet been passed. One participant noted that the main difference between the two draft laws lies in the taxation rules and classification of virtual assets.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kEx4BAF.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 陳方安生（資料圖片）</p> +<p>Draft Law No. 10225, developed by Ukraine’s National Securities and Stock Market Commission in cooperation with EY (Ernst &amp; Young), translates the EU’s Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation (MiCA) standards into the Ukrainian context and proposes a standard tax rate of 18%, with a 1.5% military tax. Draft Law No. 10225-1, on the other hand, was developed by the Ministry of the Digital Transformation of Ukraine, and proposes the combination of the Base Law No. 2074-IX with MiCA standards. This draft law proposes a three-year transition period during which the tax rate would be only 5%, with an increase of this rate to 9% over the subsequent five years and 18% after eight years of market regulation. This second draft law aims to simplify the creation of the virtual asset market, streamline the authorisation process for service providers, and promote market development in accordance with EU standards.</p> -<p>李指討論內容「大概意思係我同T（陳梓華）當係𠵱個 generation 嘅 activists，即係話陳方安生問 T 同我，我哋最尾想點做」，李表示他和陳均「答唔出一啲 concrete 嘅 roadmap（路線圖）」。因為當時香港發生很多示威、行動和集會，「啫係（陳方安生問）如果我哋有 endgame 嘅話，我哋會點樣去達到，同埋想點樣做」，惟李表示：「但我同 T 都冇 endgame」，又稱：「我哋冇嚟緊做呢樣、做嗰樣嘅 roadmap（路線圖）。」李形容該次會議「冇結果」。</p> +<p>While Ukraine has not adopted either of the two draft laws, workshop participants noted that there is already widespread use of virtual assets in Ukraine and a growing demand among the population, underscoring the need to regulate the industry. Ukraine was ranked fifth on the Global Crypto Adoption Index in 2023, and approximately 6.5 million Ukrainians, 15.72% of the population, owned digital currency in 2022. It should also be noted that while Ukraine’s AML Law offers a legal framework for launching AML/CTF regulation of virtual assets, the law has not be enforced since it came into effect in 2020.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒曾與陳梓華和攬炒巴討論-三人共識李繼續做國際游說工作">李宇軒：曾與陳梓華和攬炒巴討論 三人共識李繼續做國際游說工作</h4> +<p>As market regulations continue to develop, it is also becoming necessary to understand what effective financial monitoring of the virtual asset industry would look like. Participants agreed that effective monitoring relies on a strong market framework. This includes having a diverse range of service providers that serve a broad user base. Without such an ecosystem, the necessary data for effective monitoring would be lacking. Therefore, it is essential to simplify the authorisation procedures for these services, especially during the initial stages, to foster market growth and stimulate demand among a wider population. In the first period of market development, the authorisation process should be as straightforward as possible, as this will help to shape the market and create demand for the service providers from a larger population. Once the market is shaped, additional tools for regulatory influence, impact and review/control will be implemented and become a regular element of the financial market.</p> -<p>李宇軒早前作供提及於2019年底或2020年初的時候，在軟件 Jitsi 上與「攬炒巴」進行視像會議，因而知道對方真實身份是劉祖廸。李今詳述會議內容，指陳梓華親身去找劉祖廸，「因為佢哋喺同一個 screen 度」，三人討論提及：「攬炒巴就去做一個精神領袖或者一個 influencer 嘅角色，我就係繼續國際線游說，T 就會喺香港 local 度做一啲ground work，大概意思係咁」，目的是推進為香港爭取自由民主的運動。</p> +<p>Pseudonymity of virtual assets was another key topic that emerged during the discussion. One participant posited that most users and customers of virtual assets do not consider anonymity the most important aspect of virtual assets, and would be willing to comply with Know Your Customer measures and allow themselves to be identified to ensure they have no criminal intent. Both of the draft laws noted above propose that all service providers must fully identify their users in every case. With the implementation of the law, virtual asset users will have the opportunity to participate in a regulated and transparent market. Another issue identified during the workshop was the lack of crypto-to-fiat gateways in the market. It is important for customers to have the freedom to move their money, especially for exchanging between fiat currency and virtual currencies. However, due to various complications and currency regulations, this task remains quite challenging.</p> -<p>控方追問「ground work」的意思，李舉例指他自己屬於「後線」，所以不屬於做「ground work」；相反陳梓華則會做「ground work」，例如參加集會以及「真人喺香港落場嘅活動」。</p> +<p>Despite the above-mentioned challenges, one participant drew attention to the benefits of legalising virtual assets in Ukraine, particularly the impact on technical compliance with AML standards and market developments. They noted that legalisation of virtual assets can provide opportunities for business growth, technological advancement, and an increase in state revenue. Additionally, it can help to eliminate the use of Ukraine’s market by criminals for money laundering of crypto assets and sanctions evasion. In the long term, it can also provide access to EU markets in crypto assets and offer additional channels for money flows towards Ukraine’s reconstruction.</p> -<p>就上述會議所提出的建議，李憶述他自己當時回應「OK」，「因為同我本來做緊嘅嘢冇分別。」控方問李日後是否根據三人之間的共識來行事。李則澄清，對於陳梓華叫他繼續做國際游說，「其實同我做緊嘅嘢冇分別，對於我嚟講，啫係講咗等於冇講過咁，事實上我的確係有做 international lobbying，咁算唔算做緊 in accordance with 佢講嘅嘢？」</p> +<p>The next important steps for the legalisation of the market are expected from the Tax Committee of the Verkhovna Rada. The Committee is currently reviewing the draft laws and will choose one as the main law for market development. Workshop participants acknowledged that it is difficult to provide a timeline because of the obstacles caused by the war. Nonetheless, the representative of the Ministry of the Digital Transformation of Ukraine noted that the decision as to which law will move forward is expected by the end of summer 2024. After that, amendments to the basic law could take effect by the end of 2024. With virtual asset companies already working in Ukraine, differing opinions were expressed as to whether the market can operate without waiting for a specific regulation to be adopted.</p> -<p>控方問李，為何三人會在這個時間點進行視像會議？李回答當時大家主要想討論香港運動的方向。法官李運騰問李當時如何看待自己的角色，李宇軒稱他理解自己是「其中一個喺 international 做 lobbying 嘅香港人。」李官又問，為何只有他們三人參與會議。李則表示：「我當時冇諗過呢個問題。」</p> +<p>Participants in the workshop and authors of the draft laws have been in constant dialogue with the community, the market and potential participants. Overall, workshop participants agreed that there is a need to create a regulatory environment as soon as possible and pass the relevant law.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱曾帶日本議員高井崇志-事後電郵傳送法案初稿">李宇軒稱曾帶日本議員高井崇志 事後電郵傳送法案初稿</h4> +<h4 id="a-path-to-creating-a-single-register-of-bank-accounts-and-safe-deposit-holders">A Path to Creating a Single Register of Bank Accounts and Safe-Deposit Holders</h4> -<p>李指，在不同國家均有 SWHK 成員，包括美國、英國、加拿大、澳洲和日本等。而他在日本有進行國際游說。</p> +<p>With Ukraine’s progress towards EU accession, another concern identified by workshop participants was the necessity of creating a central register of bank accounts and safe-deposit holders, stemming from the requirements of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Ukraine has in fact initiated the development of a single register of bank accounts. During the workshop, participants noted that the register of bank accounts of legal entities is already in place, administered by the State Tax Service of Ukraine, and that law enforcement authorities have access to it. However, information about the bank accounts of individuals is not included in the register, and it was agreed that this should be the focus of future work.</p> -<p>李憶述，在2019年區議會選舉期間，時任日本國會議員高井崇志（Takashi, TAKAI）來港監察選舉，於是李與他在香港見面，談及香港當時民主情況和示威情況。李又稱在中大二號橋衝突之後，他帶了高井崇志到二號橋視察。</p> +<p>One participant drew attention to efforts by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine in this regard. The Ministry had prepared a draft law entitled “On Amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine and Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Establishment of the Unified Register of Accounts of Individuals and Legal Entities and Individual Bank Safes”. Yet the participant said that in 2023, after the draft law was submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, concerns about privacy, confidentiality and human rights compliance were raised, and the matter was approached with caution.</p> -<p>李表示，他與高井崇志事後有經電郵聯絡。在2020年，一個日本港人組織的義工張亦澄草擬了一份法案初稿，而李則於同年1月7日將此法案初稿電郵至高井崇志，詢問他的意見。李指他亦有傳送該電郵給另一名日本議員菅野志櫻里（Shiori, YAMAO [née KANNO]）。</p> +<p>The passage of the law was delayed as specific legislative amendments in relation to confidentiality were required, which the Ministry of Finance continues to work on. The law’s drafters were asked to research the confidentiality issue and prepare the necessary amendments to provide safeguards in relation to private information. Currently there is a concern among government officials regarding how personal data could be leaked or misused for malicious purposes.</p> -<p>控方追問法案草稿的內容是關於什麼。李指是關於香港一些人權問題，擴展至國際層面的人權侵犯。他指上述電郵目的是希望日本議員能考慮會否採用這法案草稿的提議，並在議會上提出此法案，另外此電郵同時副本抄送給草擬人張亦澄，類似是李將張亦澄和高井崇志串連在一起，讓二人可加以討論。</p> +<p>One participant noted that officials have identified as a major obstacle a lack of coherence of Ukraine’s data protection regulations in relation to the EU framework. The country has not yet adopted the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation provisions, which would impact the entire process. Participants also noted that Russia has made attempts to abuse the register and use the information included in it. To deal with cyber security threats, a deadline for the establishment of the register has been set for 2027. This will give Ukrainian authorities time to involve cyber security experts in its development and prepare the appropriate procedures and protocols.</p> -<p>關於張亦澄的背景，李指張並非香港人，相信他應該是中國內地人，但不肯定他有否入籍日本，而他的 Telegram 網名是「Katatsuki Hayashi」。李又指張曾經修讀法律，所以對法律範疇比較熟悉。</p> +<p>One participant recalled that the EU’s Ukraine Facility programme requirements mandate the implementation of a single register by 2027. Ukraine’s National Revenue Strategy for 2024–30 acknowledges the importance of building trust and confidence within the population in the use of private information about bank accounts in the register.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒2019年12月帶同催淚彈殼赴日本見議員">李宇軒：2019年12月帶同催淚彈殼赴日本見議員</h4> +<h3 id="the-effectiveness-of-ukraines-response-to-financial-crime">The Effectiveness of Ukraine’s Response to Financial Crime</h3> -<p>李另提及，他在2019年12月曾赴日本與兩名日本共產黨議員見面，包括井上哲志和山添拓，「同埋帶咗啲催淚彈彈頭畀佢哋睇⋯⋯啫係用過嗰啲。」李指是次會面是由日本一些關心香港的人士安排，可能是「Act with HK」或「SWHK@JPN」的成員，由於該兩個組織的人士「本來唔係特別有做 lobbying 嘅嘢」，同時「未有人想真身去見議員住，所以就彈咗畀我」。</p> +<h4 id="publicprivate-partnerships-ppps">Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs)</h4> -<p>案件下周一續審。</p> +<p>Beyond the discussion of Ukraine’s technical compliance with AML standards, the workshop also placed a spotlight on the issue of the effectiveness of the country’s response to financial crime. The 2017 Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) on Ukraine concluded that the implementation of measures necessary to fight financial crime in the country was not sufficiently effective. Consequently, the workshop discussion extended beyond the technical ratings of the FATF. Among the topics raised against this backdrop was the current status of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in Ukraine.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Participants emphasised the key role of PPPs, particularly in the evolving landscape of AML technology. They underscored how PPPs significantly enhance the formulation of efficient market rules and regulations in two key ways. First, they serve as effective deterrents against market violations, while driving progress. Second, given the potential unfamiliarity of state officials with emerging technologies and their business applications, PPPs offer a collaborative platform for knowledge sharing to facilitate deeper understanding of these technologies. However, it was noted that the bureaucratic nature of certain authorities can cause challenges in establishing robust PPPs. Nevertheless, one participant argued that the key to initiating and sustaining PPPs lies in their voluntary nature. Thus, there needs to be a strong emphasis on fostering willingness and providing incentives for the private sector to collaborate with the public sector.</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒稱曾帶日本議員到中大二號橋視察、傳送法案初稿及展示催淚彈彈頭【黎智英案・審訊第 50 日】2024-03-21T12:00:00+08:002024-03-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-50<ul> - <li>李宇軒：由登報轉型做國際游說 傳送建議制裁名單予朱牧民 冀轉交美議員</li> -</ul> +<p>Positive examples of PPPs in Ukraine emerged during the discussion, although these were not always in relation to conventional financial crime. Participants argued that PPPs in Ukraine are often used for such purposes as raising awareness and establishing communication channels, showcasing the diverse and innovative ways in which they can be leveraged for mutual benefit. On this, one participant highlighted the efforts of the National Bank of Ukraine in raising awareness and establishing a direct communication channel with the private sector. Also mentioned as a good example of a PPP was the Public Council under the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance, a group that includes representatives of public organisations, trade unions and other citizen associations, which gathers annually to discuss issues related to financial services and their impact on society. It was noted that the State Financial Monitoring Service has also set up a Public Council on AML issues. Another participant highlighted that the Ministry of Digital Transformation is actively working on developing a regulatory “sandbox”, scheduled for completion by the end of 2024. This sandbox aims to streamline communication between businesses and government authorities, fostering an environment conducive to PPPs. While some of the initiatives mentioned by the participants suggested promising steps towards PPP development in Ukraine, it was agreed that there remains a need to further strengthen and expand these efforts and learn from foreign experience.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="recovery-of-the-proceeds-of-crime">Recovery of the Proceeds of Crime</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/g0W5e3s.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>Another key topic raised concerning the effectiveness of Ukraine’s anti-financial crime measures related to the country’s efforts to recover the proceeds of crime. Asset recovery is a key FATF priority, particularly under the current Singaporean presidency. In fact, Ukraine’s MER noted that the country needs to ensure that prosecutors handling proceeds-generating cases are well-trained in modern financial investigative techniques, and highlighted a need for focused guidance on the importance of early restraint and confiscation of proceeds.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（21日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第50日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李稱他籌辦全球登報活動，以及會見聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處職員之後，與另一名被告陳梓華討論之下，便決定「慢慢將我轉型做 international lobbying」。於是李參與會見美議員斯科特、安排外國人來港觀察區議會選舉，以及參與民主黨創黨主席李柱銘、前政務司司長陳方安生、英國議員 Lord Alton 和裴倫德的會議。2019年底，李赴美國國會山莊會見數名共和黨議員，為了展示香港示威及相關事件裡面的「受害者」個案，讓美議員有基礎去推動支持香港的法案，包括制裁侵犯香港人權民主的人士。同場香港代表包括朱牧民，事後李向朱傳送一份建議制裁對象名單，希望朱代為轉交給美議員。</p> +<p>On Ukraine’s efforts to recover assets, a participant from the Prosecutor General’s Office noted that considerable effort has gone into developing the efficiency of pre-trial investigations of criminal cases. The Prosecutor General’s website has published reports on the results of AML investigations, noting that 7,832 criminal offences related to AML and CTF were investigated in 2023. The report also shows that, according to indictments, the established value of legalised property obtained by criminal means in this period was UAH 2,998,290,540 ($78,263,910), of which UAH 212,426,030 ($5,544,923.50) has been seized. However, despite these achievements, it was highlighted that the key to ensuring effectiveness in recovering the proceeds of crime lies in taking a comprehensive approach during pre-trial investigations. Participants noted that while accessing information about assets or accounts within Ukraine is swift, investigations involving international partners take a long time and can be delayed by prolonged procedures. That said, Ukraine’s formal and informal cooperation with EU countries on mutual legal assistance was reported as working well. Additionally, attention was drawn to the importance of court judgements authorising confiscation, highlighting the key role that these play in asset recovery. It was noted that Ukraine’s particularly low score on Immediate Outcome 7 of its MER – which relates to the effectiveness of a country’s money laundering investigations and prosecutions – should serve as a reminder of the need to demonstrate effective use of financial investigations to recover assets.</p> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第七天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> +<p>Overall, one workshop participant emphasised that it is crucial to recognise that the impact of the FATF assessment of Ukraine is still ongoing. Ukraine’s 2020 MER requires the country to continually report on its efforts to address the deficiencies identified in the MER, and it must submit a progress report by December 2024.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指獲邀見美議員斯科特-因陳梓華認為其游說工作特別有效">李宇軒指獲邀見美議員斯科特 因陳梓華認為其游說工作「特別有效」</h4> +<p>Looking ahead, while Ukraine’s next MONEYVAL Assessment will not occur until 2027, workshop participants emphasised that all relevant stakeholders in the country should take the necessary measures to both uphold high standards of technical compliance by passing relevant legislation and ensure their effectiveness by ensuring that these laws are implemented. The world – and the EU in particular – is watching.</p> -<p>李昨日證供提到2019年9月29日獲另一名被告陳梓華（網名「T」）邀請會見美國參議員斯科特（Rick Scott），因為李曾經籌辦全球登報活動，又曾經赴聯合國會見人權事務高級專員辦事處（OHCHR）職員 Sébastien Gillioz，「咁喺國際呢條線度做過嘢。」</p> +<hr /> -<p>李今日加以補充，他們會見 Sébastien Gillioz 之後，「除咗 secure 到一個官方嘅 reply，即係 special procedure，我另外搵到 Sébastien Gillioz，佢話有職員幫我哋 prioritise （優先處理香港的事務和材料）」，陳梓華當時對此結果印象深刻，認為李的游說工作「特別有效」，所以邀請李會見斯科特。李形容：「當時慢慢有個 transition 由登報去到 lobbying。」</p> +<p><strong>Oksana Ihnatenko</strong> is a Researcher for the Supervising and Monitoring Ukraine’s Reconstruction Funds (SMURF) project at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines resilience and integrity of the Ukraine’s financial system. In particular, her research focuses on Ukraine’s adherence to FATF standards, fighting financial crime, anti-money laundering efforts, and issues surrounding reconstruction.</p> -<p>李又提到，除了聯合國之行外，他在會見斯科特之前還去了法國，「係一個 lobbying 嘅 trip 嚟嘅。」該旅程完結後，李正在考慮「應唔應該繼續做法國嘅 lobbying」，以及是否應該與當地港人組織「Le Comité pour la Liberté à Hong-Kong」合作，或者經該組織進行游說工作，惟當時他並不懂法文。</p> +<p><strong>Arzu Abbasova</strong> is a Research Analyst for the Centre for Finance and Security. She works on CFCS’s Restricting Kleptocracy project, besides managing related communications and engaging with stakeholders.</p>Oksana Ihnatenko and Arzu AbbasovaThis report highlights key stakeholder views from a recent workshop on developments in Ukraine’s financial system.【黎智英案・審訊第 54 日】2024-03-28T12:00:00+08:002024-03-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-54<ul> + <li>李宇軒：推翻中共可達至解放香港 國安法後提議游說外國取消與港引渡條例</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱與陳梓華討論後決定轉型做國際游說">李宇軒稱與陳梓華討論後決定轉型做國際游說</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>就會見 Rick Scott 一事，陳梓華設立了一個 WhatsApp 群組「Coffee on Sunday」，成員有陳、李和 Mark Simon。控方展示該群組訊息，陳在訊息中介紹李為「international propaganda people」。李指因為他曾經籌辦全球登報活動，他和陳經過討論，便決定「慢慢將我轉型做 international lobbying」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2zOtMj3.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Mark Simon 在群組中提議，李應該向斯科特談及較早前的眾籌，以留下深刻印象。（“Also, what would really impress him is if you talk about the go fund me, shows support”）李表示，他不知道為何 Mark Simon 會認為提及眾籌會打動到斯科特，可能 Mark 掌握到斯科特的背景資料，故此提醒李要談論哪些話題。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第54日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。庭上展示李與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）之間的訊息對話，二人在《國安法》實施之前討論對策，裴倫德指香港在整個地緣政治的大局裡會被殃及，李則表示香港人樂意「攬炒」。李的訊息又指香港人嘗試以示威來說服國際社會作出改變，但是至今仍未見有任何制裁措施針對侵犯人權者，只有「譴責聲明」。李指上述訊息的潛台詞是希望 IPAC 除了「譴責聲明」之外，可以為香港做更多事。</p> -<h4 id="陳梓華訊息提醒不要提及資助人-李宇軒指可能指墊支人">陳梓華訊息提醒不要提及「資助人」 李宇軒指可能指墊支人</h4> +<p>二人另就運動手段和目標辯論，裴倫德認為如果最終目標是香港自治的話，毀滅中共是一個手段，因香港自由化的敵人是中共；李雖然同意推翻中共可能是達至解放香港的一種手段，但是香港人的目標並不是在北京層面推動民主化。李亦認為外界期望香港人透過上街來推翻中共是不切實際，因香港年輕一代已經開始覺得悼念六四不關自己事，現時統治香港的人是「香港政權」加上「北京政權」，但香港社會暫未有足夠意見認為要擴展至「推翻中共」。</p> -<p>控方另指，在陳梓華成立 WhatsApp 群組之前，李和陳之間曾經有 WhatsApp 對話，並展示相關紀錄截圖。陳轉述 Mark Simon 提醒李不要提及「Backer（資助人）」和「中英聯合聲明登報」團隊。（“Brother, Mark said do not mention about backer and JD team”）</p> +<p>李指裴倫德的訊息是在說服他嘗試把眼光集中在中共身上，而非只聚焦在香港。</p> -<p>就「Backer」的身份，李表示不肯定，「不過我理解係 T（陳梓華）嗰邊，作為 crowdfunding 嘅 backer，即係有墊過支。」</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第11天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> -<p>李提到當時斯科特有意參選總統，陳梓華和 Mark Simon 希望他避免談及墊支事宜，因為避免可能觸犯美國總統選舉的規矩。李表示他在會面期間有遵從陳在訊息中的指示。</p> +<h4 id="裴倫德訊息指香港會遭受殃及-李宇軒覺得香港人樂意攬炒">裴倫德訊息指香港會遭受殃及 李宇軒覺得香港人樂意「攬炒」</h4> -<p>控方問李會見斯科特之後，有否與陳梓華談論該會面。李回答有，指自己「大概講咗會面講嘅嘢」，又引述陳回應他「『Good, Keep up, good work』呀咁」。至於 Mark Simon，李則稱事後沒有與他討論。</p> +<p>控方展示李宇軒與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC）創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）之間的訊息紀錄。在2020年6月27日，裴倫德向李稱他們的策略需要調整（“Andy I think our strategy need to pivot.”），又指現時問題是如何懲罰和征服，並如何利用降臨在香港的「可怕東西」，在六個月內「殺死中共」：</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華支持他安排區選監察團-以擴展人脈作國際游說">李宇軒指陳梓華支持他安排區選監察團 以擴展人脈作國際游說</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>“The question now is how to punish, divide and conquer. And how to use the terrible things that will happen in HK over the next six months to kill the CCP.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>控方繼而就2019年區議會選舉監察團提問，並展示「Election Observation Mission Report（下稱「EOM」）」，當中提到監選團由「重光團隊」和李成立的「香港故事」籌辦。法官杜麗冰留意到報告上除了有「重光團隊」標誌之外，還有「IAD」標誌。控方提供相關資料，指這是「香港大專學界國際事務代表團」的標誌。</p> +<p>裴倫德補充，香港會遭受殃及（“HK will be collateral.”）。李回應，香港人知道並且樂意扮演這個角色（“this we know and we are very happy to play this role”）。李庭上解釋，訊息中「play this role」的意思是「攬炒」，即是不論對於自己一方、對方還是各方，「對大家都有傷害嘅嘢。」至於裴倫德的訊息「HK will be collateral.」，李指他意思是在整個地緣政治的大局裡，香港會變成遭受殃及，而李認為香港人樂意「攬炒」。</p> -<p>李稱監選團是邀請不同觀察員來港觀察區議會選舉，而他是香港那邊的其中一個搞手。控方問誰人指示李參與。李則澄清：「因為唔係一個指示嚟，係一個 story 嚟」，當時他與陳梓華、轉型中的「重光團隊」以及「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人進行討論，而「攬炒巴」與顧問公司「Whitehouse Consultancy」曾討論英國上議院議員 Lord David Alton 有意來港觀察選舉，「但唔想好似 Lord Alton 主動過嚟咁」，反而想由一個社運團體邀請他來港，於是李直接給他們使用「香港故事」的名義。</p> +<p>法官李運騰問李的意思是否香港會遭到破壞，對方同樣會遭到破壞，而李樂意付出這個代價。李同意。</p> -<p>李續指，「攬炒巴」和「Whitehouse Consultancy」提議除了邀請 Lord Alton 之外，還邀請更加多人，而上次有份接待 Bob Seely 的李宗澤（Wilson Li）表示願意協助處理流程，於是「攬炒巴」和「Whitehouse Consultancy」便著手邀請更多人來港監選。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒預料香港不會再有大型示威-因示威只換來譴責聲明不值得-未見任何制裁">李宇軒預料香港不會再有大型示威 因示威只換來「譴責聲明」不值得 未見任何制裁</h4> -<p>李宇軒稱有跟陳梓華討論安排「監選團」，「佢都支持我去整呢個 EOM，同埋希望喺 EOM 𠵱個場合度擴展我嘅人脈」，這關乎他轉型做國際游說，以爭取香港自由民主。</p> +<p>李宇軒其後向裴倫德說，中共已經做了非常可怕的事，即是他們的陣營沒有任何人要求訂立《國安法》，也沒有人設局誘使中共這樣做，中共只是出其不意地立法及實質上重燃運動，李認為他們只需要說出真相。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒要求裴倫德刪除監選團相關訊息-免被港府禁入境">李宇軒要求裴倫德刪除監選團相關訊息 免被港府禁入境</h4> +<p>裴倫德問李，示威有什麼前景（“What are the prospects for a demo?”）。李則指香港人嘗試以示威來說服國際社會作出改變，但是至今仍未見有任何制裁措施針對已退休的指揮官陶輝或其他侵犯人權者，他們仍然在自由自在，但香港人得到的只有「譴責聲明」（“so far we haven’t seen concrete sanctions falling upon, say, Dover or other perpetrators; they still roam free and all we get are ‘condemn’ statements”）。李又指，香港人的性命只換來一些聲明並不值得（“the lives of HKers aren’t worth just in exchange for some statements”）。</p> -<p>控方展示2019年11月22日，即區選之前兩日，李宇軒與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人兼執行總監裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）之間的 WhatsApp 對話，當中提及要刪除訊息紀錄。</p> +<p>李庭上解釋，他當時的判斷是香港短期內不會再有大型示威，因為香港人不認為有用，經過示威後除了「譴責聲明」外便什麼也得不到，所以李在訊息中向裴倫德解釋為什麼香港不會再有大型示威出現。</p> -<p>李解釋，以當時的政治環境而言，根據籌辦監選團的人士的判斷，當時香港政府並不歡迎外國人來港監選，叫裴倫德刪除訊息是因為擔心若果他被發現有監選團相關的訊息，會被港府標籤為「不受歡迎人士」，被禁止來港。李續指，若然來港監選的人最終被視為「不受歡迎人士」及不能入境，後備方案是他們把情況告知相應國家的領事館和傳媒。因此在裴倫德過關期間，李表示需要與裴倫德保持訊息聯繫，以確保他順利過關。</p> +<p>控方指當李說香港人不認為示威有用時，李是否該些香港人之一？李回答：「我當然係香港人。」控方又問，李認為示威沒有用，那他認為做什麼才有用。李則表示：「我唔知。」</p> -<p>李稱監選團分成港九新界不同小隊，而他屬於其中一個新界小隊，同隊成員包括 Lord Alton。李憶述當時陳梓華叫他把握機會建立人脈網絡。</p> +<p>法官李運騰問，裴倫德是否不建議再進行大型示威。李表示不是，當時《國安法》即將生效，裴倫德希望他可以預計會發生什麼事，以便日後在英國或美國層面作出回應，所以李告訴裴倫德大型示威似乎不會再發生。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒銀行紀錄顯示mark-simon曾借50萬元">李宇軒銀行紀錄顯示Mark Simon曾借50萬元</h4> +<p>法官李運騰再問，李是否在訊息中說服裴倫德或 IPAC 要採取什麼行動。李則指上述訊息的潛台詞是：「如果你哋做多過出譴責聲明嘅話會更好喇。」</p> -<p>李指是次邀請外國人來港監選的開支約有幾十萬元，由「G攬運動」眾籌款項支付，也有的外國代表是自費來港，包括瑞典和丹麥的代表。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱為香港而運動推翻中共僅次要動機-裴倫德則認為應先推翻中共才能解決香港問題">李宇軒稱為香港而運動、推翻中共僅次要動機 裴倫德則認為應先推翻中共才能解決香港問題</h4> -<p>控方指，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示， Mark Simon 在2019年11月21日向李轉帳一筆50萬港元款項。李解釋，當時有見即將籌備監選團，惟其個人戶口只剩下約26萬元，「所以我就要去搵T（陳梓華），我可能唔夠錢去搞 EOM，咁就睇吓佢可唔可以諗吓辦法」，例如找人墊支，於是 Mark Simon 便轉帳了50萬元給他，「我諗就因為嗱嗱臨，佢直情就用 personal account 就畀我喇。」</p> +<p>李又向裴倫德表示，他們的目標是建立香港，推翻中共可能是一個次要動機，但這動機從不會強大到足以令香港人考慮犧牲自己（“the thing is, our aim is to first establish HK, taking down CCP might be a secondary motive but it will never be a strong enough motive for HKers to consider sacrificing themselves”），因他們是為香港而參與運動，而不是在北京層面推動民主化（“we campaign for Hong Kong, not for some democratic change at Beijing level”）。</p> -<p>李指，他並不需要還款給 Mark Simon，因為 Mark Simon 幫忙接收「G攬」眾籌款項，他之後歸還款項給「Project Hong Kong Trust」時，已經直接扣除了上述50萬元。</p> +<p>裴倫德則回應，「推翻中共」與「建立香港」兩者是密不可分，如果最終目標是香港自治的話，毀滅中共是一個手段（“If the end is self government, the means is the destruction of the CCP”）。李宇軒則回應，這是手段與最終目標的問題（“it’s the means vs end perception”），而推翻中共可能是達至解放香港的一種手段（“take down CCP might be a mean to liberate HK (the end)”），但不是掉轉過來。</p> -<p>控方指根據收支帳目表，李合共墊支了約55.2萬港元。昨日提到「Project Hong Kong Trust」在2020年2月28日向李轉帳約42萬元美金（約328萬港元），以歸還李所有活動墊支過的開支。李解釋42萬元美金的計算方法，他先計算所有活動墊支款項的總和，然後扣除已經歸還了給他的款項，例如上述 Mark Simon 的50萬元，最終得出42萬美元這數目。</p> +<p>法官李運騰問李和裴倫德是否在訊息中辯論，李表示「都有啲」；李官又問二人是否有意見上的分歧。李指分歧可以總結為，他自己當時的形勢判斷是以香港為中心，而「Luke de Pulford 應該認為呢個係要由北京嗰度開始睇嘅」。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指李柱銘和陳方安生會見斯科特和裴倫德-談論香港民主情況">李宇軒指李柱銘和陳方安生會見斯科特和裴倫德 談論香港民主情況</h4> +<p>李官追問，所以裴倫德的視野比李看得更遠和更大，因為他想中國作出改變。李則理解：「應該係 Luke de Pulford 認為首先要係中國做咗改變，然後先至可以解決香港問題，但我就覺得無論中國有冇改變都好，我個 focus 係喺香港嗰度。」</p> -<p>李宇軒指，在監選團結束之後，Lord Alton、裴倫德、民主黨創黨主席李柱銘和前政務司司長陳方安生在西九龍的 W Hotel 開會，而李宇軒得知有這個會議，於是陳梓華叫李參與這個會議。在會議中，李曾經與 Lord Alton 和裴倫德交談。</p> +<p>控方追問李所說的「中國改變」是否意指推翻中共。李同意。控方又問，想透過推翻中共達到什麼目標。李回答：「Liberate Hong Kong⋯⋯啫係解放香港，由中共手中解放出嚟，做返香港人。」</p> -<p>李憶述，李柱銘和陳方安生在會議中「講香港民主情況」，而 Lord Alton 則表示會盡力以英國議員的身份引起關注，李理解裴倫德是作為 Lord Alton 的助理。控方追問他們談論的是引起什麼「關注」，李指是「對香港嘅民主情況」的關注；控方再問有什麼情況值得關注，李僅說：「Deteriorate 緊。」</p> +<p>李官則表示不解，昨天的「SWHK IPAC」群組訊息顯示，李並不主張香港獨立，與上述李和裴倫德之間的對話內容不同。李則解釋，在「SWHK IPAC」群組討論的語境之中，他的確不主張港獨，但是在與裴倫德討論的語境下，「我唔反對呢條 line。」</p> -<h4 id="2019年底赴美會見議員-李宇軒為推動支持香港法案使侵犯人權者負責任">2019年底赴美會見議員 李宇軒：為推動支持香港法案、使侵犯人權者負責任</h4> +<h4 id="裴倫德稱香港自由化的敵人是中共-惟李宇軒指香港人不認為要擴展至推翻中共">裴倫德稱香港自由化的敵人是中共 惟李宇軒指香港人不認為要擴展至「推翻中共」</h4> -<p>李宇軒確認曾在2019年底到美國國會山莊會見參議員斯科特（Rick Scott）、Todd Young 、克魯茲（Ted Cruz）和 Marsha Blackburn。是次會見議員是由時任香港民主委員會（Hong Kong Democracy Council）成員、朱耀明兒子朱牧民（Samuel Chu）安排，隨團人士包括天文物理學家 Shirley Ho 和李宗澤（Wilson Li），不過二人並沒有出席會面。李稱事前有告知陳梓華相關行程，而陳回應「好」、「加油」。</p> +<p>裴倫德向李解釋，從政的首項要點是「你永遠有一個敵人」，第二點是打敗敵人的方法是打散它的部隊、狠擊它和佔領它的領土。裴倫德又強調任何未能認清敵人的策略都不是策略，而香港自由化的敵人是中共。</p> -<p>控方問及是次會面目的，李指會面是為了向美國的議員展示香港示威及相關事件裡面的「受害者」個案，「等佢哋有 grounds （基礎）去 push（推動）幾個同香港有關嘅 Acts（法案）。」而該些法案即「廣義上當時 support 香港嘅法案」，例如《香港人權與民主法案》。</p> +<p>李則指第二點是他們一直嘗試做的事，所以制裁是「願望清單」首位（“that’s why Sanctions have been on top of wishlists”），尤其是有針對目標的制裁（“esp targeted sanctions”）。李在庭上解釋，他在訊息所說的制裁對象是涉及侵犯人權的人士。</p> -<p>控方追問，通過這些法案是為了什麼目的。李一度問：「你想我講 sanctions（制裁）？」他其後解釋，首項目的是作為一個政治氣勢（political momentum），在美國推動一些支持香港的法案；另一個目的是使一些「侵犯人權者（Perpetrators of Human Rights）」負上責任，例如制裁。</p> +<p>李在訊息中向裴倫德表示，他認為外界期望香港人透過上街來推翻中共是不切實際，香港年輕一代已經開始覺得悼念六四事不關己，所以敵人並不是中共本身。李續指，如果要談論敵人的話，現時統治香港的人是「香港政權」和「北京政權」，但暫時香港社會未有足夠意見認為要擴展至「推翻中共」。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指會面由朱牧民安排-會上不需談細節-由雙方職員事後跟進實務">李宇軒指會面由朱牧民安排 會上不需談細節 由雙方職員事後跟進實務</h4> +<p>李庭上解釋，因為當時香港自由民主被壓縮的政治環境，是由香港政權所造成，而香港政權背後有北京政權撐腰，「叫香港嘅政權咁樣去管治」，所以他在訊息中說統治香港的人是「香港政權」和「北京政權」。他認為裴倫德是在說服他嘗試把眼光集中在中共身上，而非只聚焦在香港。</p> -<p>李表示，如果沒有記錯的話，他們會見的美國議員均是共和黨黨員，而且全部都是關心香港議題的議員。</p> +<p>法官李運騰問，所以裴倫德認為中共是敵人，有需要推翻它，過程中香港會被殃及。李同意。</p> -<p>李憶述朱牧民在事前簡單解釋過，在會議期間並不需要談及太多細節，因為在會面之後，雙方的職員（staffer）會再商討細節和跟進實務工作，所以會議上只需主要談論幾個受害人的故事，「同埋即係有禮貌地多謝佢哋關心香港嘅事務。」而香港這邊的職員（staffer）就是朱牧民。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒託裴倫德邀請外國政客參與反國安法聯署">李宇軒託裴倫德邀請外國政客參與反國安法聯署</h4> -<p>當控方追問他們想美國議員採取什麼行動，以及針對對象時，李表示：「唔好意思，我頭先已經答咗」，重申「我哋喺 meeting 唔可以特定要求佢哋（美議員）concrete 做乜嘢，啫係呢個係等 staffer 大家之後去夾嘅。」不過李表示，從廣義上來說，他們希望美議員通過法案。</p> +<p>2020年6月29日，李宇軒向裴倫德傳送一份反《國安法》聯署聲明連結，指暫時收集了21個簽署，包括17名香港區議員和4名日本議員。李託裴倫德邀請更多外國政客、社運人士和組織參與聯署，並指聲明會安排在6月30日凌晨發布，因要趕及在國安法實施之前發布，以保護參與聯署的香港區議員和在港組織。</p> -<p>就是次旅程的開支，李稱由他先作墊支，之後向「Project Hong Kong Trust」報銷。控方又展示「重光團隊」的 Facebook 專頁在2019年12月11日的帖文，附有一張 Todd Young 與李宇軒、朱牧民、吳傲雪（Sonia Ng）和 Katherine Cheng 的合照。</p> +<p>李供稱，SWHK 成員有共識不在 SWHK 的網站發布該聲明，他其後開設了一個名為「Anti NSL」的網站，在《國安法》生效之前發布了聲明，從6月30日至7月初，他仍然持續收集聯署及更新聯署名單。至於為何李在訊息中稱該聯署聲明可以補足 IPAC 的聲明，李庭上解釋該聯署聲明有香港區議員的支持，又開放予組織參與聯署，加上有日本議員，「呢啲係當時我覺得 IPAC 聲明做唔到嘅嘢。」</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒向朱牧民傳送建議制裁對象名單-冀轉交美議員">李宇軒向朱牧民傳送建議制裁對象名單 冀轉交美議員</h4> +<p>其後，李向裴倫德傳送新聞稿，顯示聲明標題為〈香港民選區議員及各國議員等組織聯署 反對港版《國安法》並呼籲國際社會推行政策回應〉，共有83名議員、政界人物和民間組織參與聯署，涵蓋14個國家。</p> -<p>控方展示李宇軒與朱牧民之間的 Telegram 訊息，李在訪美旅程之後，向朱轉發了一份文件檔案，題為「Profiles of Perpetrators of Human Rights and Democracy Abuse in Hong Kong（打壓香港人權和民主人士之檔案）」，封面並標註「Confidential（機密）」。文件內容列出四類建議制裁對象，包括發出指令侵犯人權的政府人士（“State actors who condone and give orders for human right violations”）、促使侵犯人權的政府人士和政治人物（“State actors, including politicians, who instigate human rights violations”）、協助和教唆侵犯人權的公私營機構人士（“State and Private Actors who Aid and Abet Human Rights Violations”）和促使侵犯人權的機構（“Organisations who facilitate human rights violations”）。庭上所見時任特首林鄭月娥位居榜首，其他官員和港鐵行政總裁等人亦榜上有名。</p> +<p>控方庭上展示「Anti NSL」網站截圖，顯示聯署人士包括「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯和山尾志櫻里（本名「菅野志桜里」）。聲明內容要求各國針對有份侵犯人權和削弱法治的中國和香港官員實施制裁，包括禁止入境、凍結資產等，又促請各國持續監察中國的行為，例如是否有違反《中英聯合聲明》。聲明又要求民主政體提供誘因支持企業將生產線和營運基地轉移至民主國家，以減少經濟方面對中國的依賴，各國應聯手在經濟層面脫離中國的影響，以及檢視中國資本的滲透。</p> -<p>李相信文件是由「重光團隊」其他人製作，但是他稱：「我冇去參與整呢個文件，但我喺 SWHK 入面，我有參與嗰啲有關 sanctions 嘅討論。」被問到傳送這份文件給朱牧民的原因，李解釋，當「重光團隊」成員知道他見完美國議員之後，希望他能向美議員提議制裁對象，因此他需經由香港一方的職員，即朱牧民去向議員提供材料，所以李向朱提供相關文件，讓朱判斷何時及如何把這些材料交給美國議員。</p> +<p>網站提供3種語言版本，即英語、德語和「香港話」。至於為何只有這三種語言，李表示沒有特別原因。</p> -<p>被問到有否閱讀過上述文件，李表示「應該𥄫咗一眼」、「跟住碌一碌，哦原來好多人」，但是並沒有詳細閱讀。至於醞釀製作這份文件的時間，李則稱有一段長時間，因為「重光團隊」的大群組不時有人提起制裁，組員討論一段時間之後，可能會轉談其他話題，「啫係溝埋晒其他 discussion」，所以未能肯定相關討論實際歷時多久。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指國安法後出現政治罪行-研游說外國取消司法互助協議或引渡逃犯">李宇軒指國安法後出現「政治罪行」 研游說外國取消司法互助協議或引渡逃犯</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒希望建議制裁名單保密-籲勿傳至群組">李宇軒：希望建議制裁名單保密 籲勿傳至群組</h4> +<p>2020年7月2日，李宇軒問裴倫德是否應該游說外國取消與香港簽訂的司法互助協議或引渡逃犯措施，又問裴倫德或 IPAC 是否會就此展開工作，或者交給各地的港人組織去做。李庭上解釋，因為《國安法》實施之後，香港便開始有「政治罪行（political crimes）」，所以其他國家需要因應香港的政治罪行而重新檢視司法互助協議或引渡逃犯措施，以及考慮是否繼續簽訂協議。</p> -<p>訊息紀錄顯示，李傳送完文件給朱之後，表示他不相信群組內所有人會保密（“I don’t trust everybody in the group to keep this confidential”），朱回覆他也不會（I wouldn’t either）。李庭上解釋，他不想文件被傳送至大群組供人傳閱，因為文件性質是「機密」，所以要求朱不要傳送文件至群組。</p> +<p>李指，IPAC 部份成員成立了一個小組來研究這範疇，但他不是小組成員之一。</p> -<p>李又表示，以他理解這份文件是為美國而設，如果有需要向美國以外的國家提供制裁名單的話，便需要找擁有這份文件的人製作另一份。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒協助-ipac-聯絡山尾志櫻里討論取消與港引渡協議">李宇軒協助 IPAC 聯絡山尾志櫻里討論取消與港引渡協議</h4> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p>訊息紀錄顯示，裴倫德要求李幫忙問日本議員山尾志櫻里翌日是否有空出席小組會議，討論引渡協議。李之後稱已問了山尾。控方問該次會議是關於什麼，李指不同 IPAC 成員會講各自地區與中國和香港司法管轄區之間的司法互助和引渡協議，以及有沒有機會要求政府重新檢視該些協議，之後成員會各自跟進。李亦確認除了山尾之外，還有英國、澳洲、加拿大和德國的 IPAC 成員出席會議。</p> -<hr /> +<p>裴倫德告訴李，IPAC 之中有9個成員國家與香港仍有引渡協議，所以目標是游說這9個國家。他其後向李傳送一條 Google 線上會議連結，邀請李參與小組會議。李確認他有列席該會議。</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒：由登報轉型做國際游說 傳送建議制裁名單予朱牧民 冀轉交美議員Next With Hezbollah?2024-03-21T12:00:00+08:002024-03-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/next-with-hezbollah<p><em>Although the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza has captured the world’s attention, there is a serious risk of war between Israel and Hezbollah, according to a new assessment by CSIS.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Since October 7, 2023, there have been over 4,400 rocket, missile, and other stand-off attacks by Israel and Hezbollah combined. Hezbollah has also repeatedly violated UN Security Council Resolution 1701 by deploying forces and firing anti-tank guided missiles and other stand-off weapons against Israel from the zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River, according to CSIS geolocation analysis. The United States needs to increase its diplomatic engagement to prevent what could become a much wider and more violent war in the Middle East.</em></p> +<p>會議之後，裴倫德叫李向山尾確認她有意在日本議會提出修訂與香港之間的司法協議，並告訴李加拿大已經宣布撤回與香港簽訂的引渡條例。</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>2020年7月4日，裴倫德傳送一則 Twitter 帖文給李，內容提及 IPAC 經過開會討論《國安法》和引渡協議之後，確定他們的立場是不應有逃犯引渡協議，與會者包括加拿大眾議員 Garnett Genuis 和 加拿大律師 Irwin Cotler。他並託李叫 SWHK 轉發此帖文。李庭上確認他有列席上述帖文提及的會議。</p> -<p>Shortly after Hamas’s brutal terrorist attacks in southern Israel on October 7, 2023, Israel nearly launched a preventive war against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Israeli intelligence assessed that Hezbollah fighters were on the verge of crossing the border into northern Israel as part of a multi-pronged attack. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed fighter aircraft that awaited orders to strike targets in Lebanon. Israeli officials apparently notified the White House around 6:30 a.m. on October 11, 2023, that they were considering preventive strikes and requested U.S. support. But senior U.S. officials, including President Joe Biden, pushed back. According to CSIS interviews with U.S. officials, they were worried that Israeli strikes in Lebanon would unnecessarily trigger a regional war and were skeptical of Israel’s intelligence that an attack was imminent.</p> +<p>由於法官杜麗冰在午膳期間不慎被剪刀割傷，她稱雖然能夠止血，但決定提早至3時半休庭，以前往急症室治理。</p> -<p>Although Israel did not launch a preventive war, the possibility of an Israel-Hezbollah conflict looms over the region. Israel faces a dilemma. It can risk war with Hezbollah, but in the process, a war would broaden the fighting in a way that makes the current war in Gaza look like a minor dust-up. Israel could also wait, which would avoid war now with Hezbollah, but this could risk a more serious conflict in the future with a foe that is better armed and capable and that could control the timing of a war to its advantage.</p> +<p>案件將於4月8日續審。</p> -<p>To better understand the prospects of war, this brief asks several questions. What factors shape the possibility of war? What are Hezbollah’s capabilities today? What are Israel’s options? What options does the United States have to mitigate or prevent a war?</p> +<hr /> -<p>To answer these questions, this analysis includes a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative information. It compiles data on Israeli and Hezbollah strikes along the Israel-Lebanon-Syria border, geolocates Hezbollah attacks against Israel in the zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River, and examines satellite imagery of Israeli strikes against Hezbollah targets. It also assesses Hezbollah’s military capabilities, including compiling data on Hezbollah’s stockpile of 120,000 to 200,000 short-range guided ballistic missiles, short- and intermediate-range unguided ballistic missiles, and short- and long-range unguided rockets. Finally, it draws on interviews the authors conducted with U.S. and Israeli officials on a trip to Israel.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒：推翻中共可達至解放香港 國安法後提議游說外國取消與港引渡條例Wagner Group In Mali2024-03-27T12:00:00+08:002024-03-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/wagner-group-in-mali<p><em>Despite the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations in Mali continue. But how do locals feel about the mercenaries?</em></p> -<p>The analysis makes three main arguments. First, the security situation has dramatically worsened in recent months for several reasons: the October 7 attacks profoundly increased Israeli insecurity; the displacement of over 150,000 civilians on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border has created growing pressure, particularly in Israel, to alter the security situation so that civilians can return; Hezbollah and Iranian-linked groups in Lebanon and Syria continue to stockpile stand-off weapons that can hit Israel; and Hezbollah continues to violate UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701. Taken together, these factors have created a volatile situation in an already tense Middle East.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Second, violence between Israel and Hezbollah has already started to climb after nearly two decades of low-level conflict. Since October 7, there have been more than 4,400 violent incidents concentrated around the Blue Line and the Golan Heights involving Israel and Hezbollah, according to CSIS analysis. In addition, CSIS analysis indicates that Hezbollah’s anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) have struck Israeli forces from concealed launch sites less than three kilometers from the Blue Line on at least 17 occasions since October 7, a clear violation of UNSCR 1701.</p> +<p>The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company (PMC), appeared in Mali in December 2021 and is still operating there as of March 2024. There was some disruption in the immediate aftermath of the Wagner mutiny and then after the death of the group’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, with Wagner staff seemingly panicking, salaries being delayed and operations being suspended or downsized for some months. At the time of writing, however, the activities of Wagner have changed little overall compared to the first quarter of 2023, at least as far the perceptions of the Malians are concerned.</p> -<p>Third, the United States needs to increase diplomatic efforts to prevent an all-out war, which would be devastating for both Lebanon and Israel and ignite a broader conflagration in an already combustible region, including triggering more attacks on U.S. forces.</p> +<p>The reasons why the Malian government began the discussions in early 2021 that eventually led to Wagner arriving in Mali are complex. This article will focus on one particular aspect, which is Wagner’s expected contribution to achieving the aims of a range of actors: the Malian government, the armed forces and various communities that make up the Malian social and political space.</p> -<p>The rest of this brief is divided into four sections. The first examines the evolving security landscape. The second section assesses Hezbollah’s capabilities and force disposition, particularly along the Israel-Lebanon border. The third section analyzes Israel’s objectives and options. The fourth section explores U.S. policy options.</p> +<p>There are strong perceptions that Wagner has contributed relatively little to Mali’s struggle against jihadist groups and may even have presided over a deterioration in the situation. Sectors of the population may indeed have expected that Wagner would help restore security and service delivery in areas affected by the jihadist insurgencies, but that does not appear to have been the primary reason why Wagner was called in, as far as the Malian authorities are concerned.</p> -<h3 id="the-changing-security-landscape">The Changing Security Landscape</h3> +<p>With just over 2,000 men in the country at the peak of its operations in early 2023 (according to Wagner sources), including a team handling the small air force that Wagner had established there, another team protecting the ruling elite and all support elements, Wagner simply did not have the resources to even contemplate reclaiming substantial portions of territory from Mali’s disparate opposition groups, which include five jihadist groups (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, Ansar al-Din, Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Mourabitoun and Katibat Macina) and three coalitions of northern secessionist (or former secessionist) groups. Pro-Russian propagandists certainly celebrated the departure of French forces, but the Malian authorities originally had not intended to replace MINUSMA and French forces with Wagner. The intent had rather been to establish Wagner alongside the two missions, according to a senior source in the Malian government. As noted above, negotiations with Wagner and with the Russian authorities started even before the May 2021 coup that deposed President Bah N’daw (who had reportedly opposed his government colleagues’ enthusiasm for bringing Wagner in).</p> -<p>Israel has repeatedly fought Hezbollah since the group’s inception in the early 1980s. Indeed, Hezbollah has defined itself from the start in opposition to Israel and dedicated itself to driving Israel out of Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah conducted periodic operations against each other in the 1980s and 1990s despite the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and Hezbollah succeeded in forcing the Israeli military to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000. In the process, Hezbollah conducted an array of terrorist attacks against Israel around the world.</p> +<p>The Malians’ rationale was that MINUSMA and the French were too combat-shy and would never defeat the opposition with their soft counterinsurgency approach. French cosiness with some of the Tuareg groups in the north was viewed with particular apprehension and concern in Bamako, giving rise to a range of conspiracy theories. Bamako’s hypersensitivity on this issue has recently led to a diplomatic clash with the Algerian government. The Malian government does not like the reconciliation route to pacification with the Tuareg rebels in the north, which was sponsored by the French, and wants a military solution instead, which Wagner is happy to support. Wagner was thus meant to strengthen the offensive capability of the Malian armed forces, undermining the territorial control exercised by opposition groups and taking the war back to the north. Indeed, to this day, the recapture of Kidal in the north in November 2023 remains the main achievement of Wagner in Mali, as far as the Malian authorities are concerned.</p> -<p>Despite Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah continued occasional attacks on Israel, using the pretext that Israel occupied Shebaa Farms, a small area at the intersection of the Lebanon-Syria-Israel border. Hezbollah claimed Shebaa Farms was Lebanese territory and thus that Israel’s occupation continued, despite the United Nations concluding that Shebaa Farms is Syrian and that Israel had evacuated its forces from Lebanon completely.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There are strong perceptions that Wagner has contributed relatively little to Mali’s struggle against jihadist groups and may even have presided over a deterioration in the situation</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Another area of dispute was the village of Ghajar, just west of Shebaa Farms and bisected by the Israel-Lebanon border. Its residents have both Lebanese and Israeli citizenship. For years, a fence divided Ghajar, but Israeli forces reoccupied all of Ghajar in 2006 and today retain control there.</p> +<p>The Malian authorities may have miscalculated when they decided to bring the Wagner Group in, underestimating the depth of geopolitical rivalries. However, when asked to choose between the French and Wagner, they opted for the latter and rejected French efforts to prevent the contract being signed in the second half of 2021. Among the reasons for this are likely to be Wagner’s commitment to securing the regime and to doing whatever it asks for. Many who supported Wagner’s entry regret that this resulted in the departure of MINUSMA and of the French, with a destabilising impact in some areas. However, it is not clear to what extent the regime that emerged from the May 2021 coup sees this as a problem now. Wagner might have deliberately manipulated the situation to create a long-term Malian dependency on its services, but it is also perfectly plausible that the Malian regime (perhaps unwittingly) manoeuvred itself into this position.</p> -<p>The low-level conflict between Israel and Hezbollah flared into an all-out war in 2006 after a Hezbollah cross-border kidnapping operation. The war left over 100 Israelis and around 500 Hezbollah fighters dead, as well as devastated Lebanon. Hezbollah likely did not anticipate its operation would spark an all-out war, and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah later announced that he would not have conducted the operation if he had known a war would occur. Although Hezbollah suffered far more dead, some Israelis saw the war as a disaster due to the large number of Israelis killed, and the IDF’s battlefield performance was widely criticized.</p> +<p>The Malian government and the military leadership pay Wagner for its activities in Mali and still seem supportive. This might be less of an elective choice than in early 2021, given the resulting international isolation and how the departure of other foreign military forces has made Bamako dependent on Wagner. Without Wagner, the Malian armed forces lack the punch to challenge insurgent control. In any case, at least according to Wagner sources, the Malians are asking the Russian PMC to do more, particularly in terms of expanding its training effort and air force capabilities. In part also thanks to regime control over the media and to the powerful propaganda machine set up by Wagner, the population of Bamako and of some other cities also appears to be mostly supportive of Wagner’s presence and of its role, as even local critics of the government tend to acknowledge.</p> -<p>The 2006 war ended with UNSCR 1701, which created a zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River along the borders of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. According to UNSCR 1701, the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River should be free from any armed personnel, assets, and weapons except for those of the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL.</p> +<p>In rural areas, the picture is much more mixed. In areas directly affected by Wagner’s operations there is strong resentment against its ruthless approach and its penchant for violence. This is particularly the case for Fulani communities in central Mali, which have been targeted because many of their younger members have joined jihadist groups. Especially in the early months of the group’s deployment, when Wagner forces were often deploying alone and lacked adequate local intelligence or often even interpreters, their policy of executing suspects wreaked havoc. Even sections of the local Fulani population who used to oppose the jihadists have been alienated by the looting and arrogant behaviour of Wagner forces and associated militias, according to local notables.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VHti587.jpeg" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: UNSCR 1701 Zone in Southern Lebanon</em></p> +<p>Needless to say, Wagner appears to be very unpopular among the Tuaregs in the north as well, given its role in bringing the war back to the region and in destroying the June 2015 agreement with the Tuareg rebels (which was finally abrogated by Bamako in January).</p> -<p>After 2006, an uneasy deterrence prevailed. Israel occasionally attacked Hezbollah fighters and Iranian arms shipments headed to Hezbollah and other groups in Syria, and there were intermittent rockets, drones, and other stand-off attacks back and forth across the border. For the most part, however, the border was the calmest it had been in decades, with both sides eager to avoid another all-out war.</p> +<p>As for the Malian armed forces, the tactical units that share operating space with Wagner units often experience friction with them, not least because Wagner operates under a separate chain of command (it is under the National State Security Agency) and the two chains appear to be poorly coordinated. In extreme cases, there have even been episodes of violence, typically ending in injuries and loss of life among Malian soldiers. There have been frequent accusations of racism levelled against Wagner fighters from the ranks of the Malian armed forces.</p> -<p>Today, however, the situation is delicate for several reasons. First, the October 7 attacks dramatically increased Israeli insecurity. It is difficult for most outsiders to fully comprehend the psychological impact and trauma caused by the gruesome attacks. Israel was surprised on October 6, 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israeli forces in the Sinai and Golan Heights. But October 7, 2024, was largely a surprise attack that killed Israeli civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, and involved numerous atrocities and sexual violence, much of it captured on video. Indeed, it was the third-deadliest terrorist attack around the globe since the University of Maryland began collecting terrorism data in 1970, and on a per capita basis, it was 15 times more deadly than the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. In interviews conducted by several of the authors in Israel in December 2023, Israelis of all sorts stressed the failure of their intelligence services and military forces on October 7, and many Israelis felt they could no longer rely on deterrence given its failure against Hamas on October 7.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Malian regime is clearly unconcerned about popular support in remote areas and appears to believe that the way forward lies in increasing its coercive capabilities</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The attacks took a psychological toll on Israelis. According to an analysis published in the medical journal The Lancet, the attacks led to notably higher levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) among Israeli citizens. It concluded, “Our findings show that the deleterious effects of these attacks were not restricted to those directly exposed to the brutal acts of terror but also to those indirectly exposed. Thus, these attacks are to be considered as a mass trauma event affecting an unprecedented proportion of the country/s population.” According to a Gallup opinion poll, Israelis’ emotional health plummeted after the attack, with record-high majorities saying they experienced higher-than-normal levels of worry (67 percent), stress (62 percent), and sadness (51 percent). As Gallup concluded, “No other country has ever seen such a large year-on-year increase in negative experiences.”</p> +<p>Over time, Wagner forces started being accompanied by Malian armed forces units, often special forces; by various local militias, in particular the Donzo, who mostly operate as scouts; or by defectors from armed groups associated with the JNIM. While some sources report that the presence of the Malian army has a mitigating impact on the behaviour of Wagner mercenaries, the same is not true of the militias. Much of the violence perpetrated by Wagner forces appears to be driven by the Donzo militias, which have rivalries with local communities – typically Fulani, who have signed “survival pacts” with the insurgents.</p> -<p>Consequently, Israel’s risk tolerance has likely changed. If Hamas, less well-armed and trained than Hezbollah, can brutally kill over 1,100 Israelis, what might the more formidable Hezbollah do? Hezbollah’s close relationship with Iran and its ties to Hamas reinforce this fear. Reducing the risk Hezbollah poses includes ensuring that Hezbollah’s elite Radwan forces are not poised on Israel’s border, as they were before October 7, 2023. Israel would also like curbs on Hezbollah’s arms and other, more expansive restrictions, though they are aware this is unlikely. Israeli officials profess to prefer a diplomatic solution but warn that “we will have to act on our own” should diplomacy fail.</p> +<p>Despite the friction, local sources say that Wagner forces, which typically operate in groups of around 50, share many of the same attitudes towards counterinsurgency operations as the Malian armed forces. Neither believe in soft or population-centric approaches, even if Wagner forces are remarkably more violent towards the civilian population than the Malian army is. Prisoners and locals are coerced into cooperating with Wagner and its pro-government allies, yielding information and even being forced to lead them towards insurgent hideouts.</p> -<p>Second, in addition to increasing Israel’s sense of insecurity, the repercussions of the October 7 attack and clashes between Hezbollah and Israel have displaced more than 150,000 people on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border since October 2023, including roughly 80,000 civilians from northern Israel and 75,000 from southern Lebanon. For Israel, resettling its internally displaced persons back to their homes and villages in northern Israel will require creating — and ensuring — a security environment that currently does not exist. Israeli leaders need to convince their population that, this time, the intelligence services can anticipate any attack and the military can stop it — a difficult task given Hezbollah’s capabilities and one far harder due to the discrediting of military and intelligence officials on October 7. Domestic pressure has been growing to improve the security situation. According to Avigdor Liberman, a former minister of finance who leads an opposition party, the Israeli government has been weak in the north: “The red line became a white flag — the war cabinet surrendered to Hezbollah and lost the north.”</p> +<p>While Wagner’s modus operandi aligns more closely (although not perfectly) with that of the Malian armed forces than the French or MINUSMA, it is clear even to the Malian authorities that as it stands the Russian PMC will not decisively defeat the insurgents. Wagner is training the Malian special forces, but that will hardly be enough to lead to a major expansion in Malian capabilities. The Malian regime is clearly unconcerned about popular support in remote areas and appears to believe that the way forward lies in increasing its coercive capabilities – hence the desire for a more powerful air force and for expanded training of its ground forces, as mentioned above. Perhaps securing “useful Mali” (cities, roads, mines) is what Bamako is prioritising right now.</p> -<p>Third, Hezbollah has dramatically improved its military since 2006 and stockpiled over 120,000 stand-off weapons in Lebanon and Syria, as discussed in more detail in the next section. With Iranian partner and proxy forces active in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and other countries across the region, the threat from the north could get worse over time, not better.</p> +<p>The main risk to Wagner’s position in Mali has paradoxically appeared to emanate (for a period at least) from the Russian government itself, with considerable turmoil for months after Prigozhin’s death. As of February 2024, the Wagner presence in Mali had been halved to about 1,000 men, and sources within the PMC say that it is unable to meet the Malian regime’s request for additional assistance. This appears to be mainly a result of Wagner’s difficulties in retaining and replacing staff (many left the company after Prigozhin’s death), which might in turn be due at least in part to the Russian government’s lack of desire for Wagner to grow again.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PErjQSj.jpeg" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Figure 2: Assessed Areas of Operations of Hezbollah ATGM Teams (October 8, 2023–March 5, 2024)</em></p> +<p>After some months of friction, an agreement appears to have been reached whereby Wagner operates under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), according to sources within Wagner. Under the deal, the MoD no longer charges Wagner for the rented vehicles and air fleet deployed to Mali or for ammunition. Nonetheless, it is not clear how stable this deal is, given the bad blood between the two entities. The Russian authorities reportedly still want to replace Wagner with Redut PMC, but negotiations over this have been sluggish. For now at least, the MoD is accepting a continuing role for a diminished Wagner Group, especially in combat operations, while looking for ways to replace it with Wagner’s competitor Redut or even direct assistance.</p> -<p>Fourth, Hezbollah has repeatedly violated UNSCR 1701 by stationing its forces in the zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River, sometimes under the cover of the fake nongovernmental organization “Green Without Borders.” Geolocated footage from Hezbollah propaganda videos indicates that Hezbollah ATGMs have struck Israeli forces from concealed launch sites less than five kilometers from the Blue Line on at least 17 occasions since October 7, as shown in Figure 2, a clear violation of UNSCR 1701. These attacks have mostly been against Israeli military bases and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. At least seven Israeli civilians and approximately 10 IDF soldiers have been killed in the attacks. ATGMs played a major role in the 2006 war, during which they accounted for the majority of Israeli infantry casualties, including the loss of 24 tank crewmen and penetration of about 20 tanks.</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GjHaKNg.jpeg" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Figure 3: Violent Incidents Related to the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict by Week</em></p> +<p><strong>Antonio Giustozzi</strong> is currently Senior Research Fellow at RUSI. He is the author of several articles and papers on Afghanistan, as well as the conflict in Syria and jihadist groups in Central Asia.</p>Antonio GiustozziDespite the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations in Mali continue. But how do locals feel about the mercenaries?【黎智英案・審訊第 53 日】2024-03-27T12:00:00+08:002024-03-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-53<ul> + <li>李宇軒群組中稱馬格尼茨基法最有力 裴倫德則指立法過程緩慢、證據門檻高</li> +</ul> -<p>As shown in Figure 3, there was little fighting between Hezbollah and Israel in the months prior to the October 7 attack. But the 15 weeks after the attack have witnessed more than 4,400 violent incidents involving Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah began to launch limited attacks on Israel as a way of showing solidarity with Hamas. This led to an Israeli response, resulting in a bloody tit-for-tat. As Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned, “You expand, we expand. You escalate, we escalate.” The incidents have been concentrated around the Blue Line, as illustrated in Figure 4.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qCNo8VE.jpeg" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Figure 4: Violent Incidents Related to the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict (October 8, 2023–March 15, 2024)</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DNtYAkq.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<h3 id="hezbollahs-objectives-military-forces-and-capabilities">Hezbollah’s Objectives, Military Forces and Capabilities</h3> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（27日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第53日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李稱在「對華政策跨國議會聯盟（IPAC）」成立之後，他與另一名被告陳梓華曾討論應否繼續留在 IPAC 幫忙，因李可以透過 IPAC 接觸不同外國政客，有利於建立人際網絡作游說工作；李亦考慮過會否任職美國非政府組織「中國人權」。後來李決定留在香港協助「重光團隊（SWHK）」的工作。庭上展示李宇軒、IPAC 創辦人兼執行總監裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）及其他 SWHK 成員的 Telegram 群組，當中討論到如何回應北京決定訂立《港區國安法》，李曾提出馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act），即個人層面的制裁或經濟制裁某國家，似乎是最有力的措施。惟裴倫德則指馬格尼茨基法立法過程緩慢、證據門檻高，以及在歐盟成員國等地區不能達成。</p> -<p>This section examines Hezbollah’s overall objectives, force design, defensive positions, rocket, missile, and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) arsenal, anti-tank capabilities, air defense capabilities, and proficiency as a fighting force.</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第十天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> -<p><strong>Objectives:</strong> Hezbollah has several objectives that could lead to a conflict with Israel, though the organization has numerous, and at times competing, goals, some of which make a conflict less likely or at least would lead Hezbollah to be cautious. Hezbollah sees itself as a revolutionary organization that is one of the leaders of the broader Muslim struggle against Israel. Destroying Israel has been a part of its core ideology since its founding, and most of its members are sincerely against the very existence of the Jewish state. Hezbollah shares this goal with Iran, which also rejects Israel ideologically and sees it as a threat to the Islamic Republic: for decades, Iran and Israel have engaged in a shadow war, with Israel conducting assassinations against Iran and building alliances with regional rivals of the Islamic Republic like Saudi Arabia. Iran, for its part, has backed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel, used terrorism, and otherwise tried to weaken Israel. Hezbollah also sees itself as the defender of Lebanon, and various territorial disputes and Israeli incursions are a constant source of tension. Finally, Hezbollah, like Hamas, seeks the release of prisoners in Israeli custody.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指ipac聯盟成員關心與中國議題">李宇軒指IPAC聯盟成員關心與中國議題</h4> -<p>Hezbollah, however, has important reasons for caution. Most importantly, Hezbollah seeks broader popularity in Lebanon, and triggering a destructive war could grievously undermine support, particularly outside its Shiite core constituency. Iran also may seek to keep Hezbollah in reserve as a weapon to use should Israel or the United States launch a major attack on Iran itself. Finally, Hezbollah recognizes the military power of Israel and would not lightly provoke a conflict it might lose or, at the very least, lead to widespread destruction in Lebanon.</p> +<p>就「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC），李宇軒指它裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）是創辦人之一，而聯盟成員均關心與中國有關的議題。李表示他以義工形式協助 IPAC，包括替 IPAC 開設和編輯網站，及協助聯繫日本議員如山尾志櫻里（本名「菅野志桜里」）。</p> -<p><strong>Force Design:</strong> Hezbollah has approximately 30,000 active fighters and up to 20,000 reserves. Its forces primarily consist of light infantry, which have historically been trained and built for stealth, mobility, and autonomy. Hezbollah has employed a version of what the United States calls “mission command,” empowering subordinates to make independent battlefield decisions based on a commander’s intent. This force design has allowed Hezbollah to operate effectively under conditions of overwhelming Israeli firepower. In 2006, for example, its rocket units were designed to set up a launch site, fire, and disperse in less than 28 seconds, relying on prepositioned equipment, underground shelters, and mountain bicycles to achieve such a small window of exposure. In the wake of the 2006 war, Hezbollah continued to build on the strengths of this approach, decentralizing its command and control and reorganizing to force the IDF into more urbanized terrain where its fighters can take advantage of concealed, fortified positions.</p> +<p>李稱除了裴倫德之外，IPAC 中央秘書處成員 Sam Armstrong 和 Andrew Lawrence，以及另一名來自 Henry Jackson Society 的人士也會提供資料，以供李發布於 IPAC 網站。控方展示 IPAC 網站發布的文章〈Statement from Simon O’Connor MP and Louisa Wall MP〉和〈The Bear in the Room〉。李確認他有份協助發布。</p> -<p>Hezbollah’s experience fighting in support of Bashar al-Assad in Syria for the past decade has given it access to capabilities and competencies used by conventional armies. Hezbollah can now conduct coordinated maneuvers of larger forces, employ suppressive artillery, and conduct logistics to support larger groupings of forces. Fighting in Syria has also given Hezbollah access to T-72, T-54/-55, and T-62 main battle tanks (MBTs). Its ability to employ armor inside Lebanon, however, is questionable. MBTs require dedicated sustainment formations and supply chains that may not exist in Hezbollah’s areas of control in Lebanon itself, and Israel would aggressively target MBTs with fighter aircraft, drones, and artillery. Hezbollah also fought against a different enemy in Syria — irregular forces that look very different from the modern military of the IDF. Hezbollah’s ability to effectively employ the capabilities it has gained since 2006 in the face of IDF firepower, especially airpower, is also unclear, and indeed, it is likely that any large, heavy forces would be quickly destroyed if they were deployed.</p> +<p>控方展示李與裴倫德之間的訊息，在 IPAC 正式公布成立之前，李問裴倫德是否需要香港傳媒的協助（“For media, do you need support at HK side”）；裴倫德則表示需要，而且他剛剛向黎智英作簡介，稍後會將新聞稿交給李（“Yes. I’m just briefing Jimmy L. Will give you press release”）。</p> -<p><strong>Geography and Defensive Positions:</strong> The geography of southern Lebanon offers several advantages that Hezbollah fighters could exploit in a war with Israel. The region, including much of the area directly across the Israeli border, predominantly consists of rocky hills. In 2006 and in other clashes with Israel, small and mobile groups of Hezbollah militants used trees, patches of vegetation, caves, surface irregularities, and buildings along the slopes of the hills to conceal their movements and fire rockets, UASs, and ATGMs at Israeli positions on the border. Any heavy Israeli military ground force attempting to move throughout the region would likely be restricted to the major hard-packed roadways due to the hilly terrain and would, therefore, be vulnerable to harassment with ATGMs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ambushes.</p> +<p>控方指根據訊息紀錄，當中裴倫德提及上載了 IPAC 成立的宣傳影片，可見 IPAC 的成立日期是2020年6月5日。李確認。</p> -<p>Hezbollah has built a network of tunnels and bunkers in the hills of southern Lebanon to host and move equipment and personnel relatively securely. Hezbollah also uses this infrastructure to launch ambushes and rocket attacks. Where it lacks purpose-built military fortifications, Hezbollah fighters can exploit existing civilian infrastructure in the cities, towns, and villages throughout the region. During the 2006 war, civilian infrastructure was critical to Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon. They used it in place of formal military fortifications to hide command centers, complicate Israeli targeting, conceal fighters for ambushes, and enable fighters to disperse, maneuver, and defend in depth. Thousands of civilians fled from southern Lebanon as strikes between Hezbollah and Israel intensified after October 7, 2023. Some of the towns and villages along Lebanon’s southern border almost completely emptied. In a war with Israel, Hezbollah could exploit civilian infrastructure and its network of tunnels and bunkers to attack Israeli ground forces and quickly retreat. Aware of Hezbollah’s fortifications and probable tactics, Israeli attacks would likely emphasize clearing and destroying Hezbollah’s tunnel network in southern Lebanon.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) <a href="https://twitter.com/lukedepulford/status/1315038772791214088">October 10, 2020</a></p> +</blockquote> -<p>A number of rivers run through southern Lebanon, including the Litani River, which flows south from the Lebanon Mountains before bending west where it empties into the Mediterranean. Control of these rivers and their features represents an important strategic objective, including controlling the movement of troops, equipment, and supplies. These rivers also serve as natural defensive fortifications that can be exploited for tactical advantages in combat by defending forces.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lcHOZP2.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）</p> -<p><strong>Rockets, Missiles, and Unmanned Aerial Systems:</strong> Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles pose two distinct threats to Israel. The first is their coercive effect: continuous rocket, missile, and UAS barrages can kill or wound Israelis — both civilians and military personnel — or destroy important political or economic infrastructure in Israel. This is the way Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles were primarily used in 2006 and how they are usually discussed in the context of war with Israel. The second threat comes from the tactical and operational effects of these systems: suppressing or attritting IDF forces to limit the effectiveness of Israeli operations. Hezbollah gained experience conducting combined arms operations in Syria, and the group may attempt to use rockets and missiles as part of ground operations against Israeli forces.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒曾與陳梓華討論透過ipac建立網絡-有利游說工作">李宇軒：曾與陳梓華討論透過IPAC建立網絡 有利游說工作</h4> -<p>Hezbollah is probably the most heavily armed non-state group in the world, and its stockpiles of rockets, missiles, and UASs are a major part of its arsenal. Estimates of how many rockets and missiles Hezbollah possesses vary from 120,000 to 200,000. Because of Hezbollah’s close relationship with Iran, it is likely that Tehran would resupply Hezbollah quickly if it used this arsenal in a conflict with Israel. This resupply is easier than in the past, as Iran’s presence in Syria expanded considerably after Tehran came to the rescue of the Syrian regime when civil war broke out after 2011, creating a land bridge that enables weapons to go from Iraq to Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This stands in sharp contrast to Hamas, where weapons and people must be smuggled via tunnels from Gaza.</p> +<p>李表示他有將 IPAC 的工作告訴另一名被告陳梓華（網名T），由於 IPAC 未正式公佈成立之前，裴倫德要求李保密，所以李當時只向陳暗示過，但沒有談及細節。直至 IPAC 成立之後，李有告訴陳 IPAC 已正式成立，故此陳會知道李有份協助。李轉述陳當時的回應大概是「Good job」、「加油咁上下啦。」</p> -<p>As shown in Table 1, the bulk of Hezbollah’s arsenal consists of short-range unguided projectiles. Hezbollah has also dramatically increased its access to long-range missiles since 2006, meaning that most of Israel will feel the threat of Hezbollah attacks if the conflict escalates. Finally, Hezbollah’s precision-guided missiles pose an acute threat to Israel’s most important political, military, and economic centers — a threat that did not exist in 2006.</p> +<p>控方問李為何會將 IPAC 的事告訴陳。李指當時會向陳談及有關香港的活動，例如「做緊啲咩」、「香港咩環境」等，「係一啲 general 嘅 conversation 嚟嘅。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xO91cwF.jpeg" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Hezbollah’s Rocket and Missile Arsenal</em></p> +<p>IPAC 成立之後，李稱他有繼續與陳梓華討論，當時「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）已經在不同國家嘗試接觸不同政客，作游說工作。而他們看過聯盟成員名單之後，發現名單上大部份都是他們想接觸的政客，甚至還有更多人。李當時認為，既然他可以直接接觸到裴倫德，意味著他可以透過裴倫德接觸到名單上的政客，「如果我可以 develop 到呢啲 connection 嘅話，international lobby 就會 effective 好多喇」，結論是他可以繼續在 IPAC 幫手，「啫係佢（IPAC 工作）同我嘅 international lobbying 冇衝突，反而仲會更加 efficient。」</p> -<p>Eliminating the threat from Hezbollah’s rockets will be extremely difficult. The rockets can be launched from trucks, increasing their mobility and therefore survivability, or from underground bunkers, as was common during the 2006 war. Finding and destroying Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capabilities would involve an enormous reconnaissance-strike effort involving a variety of intelligence assets, precision strike capabilities, and ground forces.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒曾考慮是否參與ipac中央秘書處工作-憂予人印象香港人搶咪">李宇軒：曾考慮是否參與IPAC中央秘書處工作 憂予人印象「香港人搶咪」</h4> -<p>Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal also includes long-range missiles. These are also likely to be used mainly in a coercive capacity, with Hezbollah undertaking long-range strikes against Israeli population centers to undermine Israeli support for the war. Hezbollah used its long-range rockets and missiles throughout the 2006 war despite an Israeli air campaign aimed at destroying their launchers and Hezbollah’s apparent unwillingness or inability to make much use of its Iranian-made long-range weapons.</p> +<p>至2020年6至7月，李稱他曾與陳梓華、裴倫德和 SWHK 團隊之間有一系列的討論，關於李應否以個人身份加入 IPAC 的中央秘書處，協助資訊科技或其他崗位。一方面有人擔心此舉會否使李的身份曝光，或者令李備受外界關注，而且擔心「畀人一個 undeserved 嘅感覺，啫係好似一個香港人搶咪咁」，若果他當時未知 IPAC 的運作的話，「無端端一個香港人嚟，好似搶咪、搶光環咁，反而對成個 movement 仲衰。」</p> -<p>Hezbollah’s guided missiles make up an even smaller number of those long-range missiles — a few hundred at most. The accuracy of these weapons makes each attack more devastating and creates greater pressure on Israeli air defense systems. They provide Hezbollah with the capability to strike high-value targets, vital economic centers, and critical infrastructure.</p> +<p>李指，他們亦考慮過李應否以 SWHK 的身份參與 IPAC，可是不論是 SWHK 一方還是 IPAC 一方均有擔憂。SWHK 需要考慮是否在這個時候引人注目（rise profile）、會否引致不必要的風險，而加入 IPAC 是否 SWHK 想走的方向，以及是否所有成員都同意此做法。至於 IPAC 一方，李透過裴倫德得悉有 IPAC 聯盟成員反對 SWHK 加入聯盟，因為這違反 IPAC 避免有其他聯繫的原則。李又提到初時有很多社運組織和游說組織想加入 IPAC，但是裴倫德基於上述原則而一一拒絕。</p> -<p>While Hezbollah has historically used its rockets and missiles to impose pain on Israel rather than as part of combined arms operations, an important unknown is how Hezbollah might use its rocket and (to a lesser extent) missile capabilities in support of ground operations against the IDF. Hezbollah could attempt to capture territory in northern Israel or the Golan Heights in a Hezbollah-Israel war, or at least conduct raids there. This would require ground maneuver, which modern militaries usually enable using suppressive fire from artillery or air platforms. Hezbollah demonstrated the ability to integrate ground maneuver with suppressive fires in Syria, and it may attempt to do so in a war with Israel. Such tactics are difficult in practice, and expertise is probably unevenly distributed across Hezbollah’s military forces. IDF air defenses and air power would also limit Hezbollah’s ability to use its rockets and missiles in this manner.</p> +<p>李稱他與陳梓華亦有就此討論，而陳不反對李以 SWHK 的身份參與 IPAC，因衡量過李的個人作風和方向，直到他被警方拘捕的時候，討論仍在進行中，未有結論。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qch9xH2.jpeg" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ Figure 5: Satellite Imagery of Damaged Runway in Qalaat Jabbour Mountain Region, Lebanon</em></p> +<p>控方展示裴倫德於2020年6月傳送給李宇軒的訊息：「攬炒團隊正式加入『國際聯軍』IPAC」，李確認 SWHK 後來有加入 IPAC 的中央秘書處，惟不是所有成員都同意 SWHK 的中文名稱是「攬炒團隊」。</p> -<p>In addition to its rocket and missile stockpiles, Hezbollah possesses a significant arsenal of UASs that include commercial quadcopters, suicide drones, loitering munitions, and more sophisticated platforms with surveillance and strike capabilities. Hezbollah’s UASs are almost entirely supplied by Iran and are used to conduct surveillance of — and strikes against — Israeli targets. On January 25, 2024, the IDF struck a 1,200-meter runway in southern Lebanon that it alleges Hezbollah built with Iranian assistance and was used by Hezbollah to launch large UASs. The airstrip and the surrounding base illustrate the advancement of Hezbollah’s UAS capabilities to include larger and more sophisticated systems. The base also contained a helicopter landing pad, support and storage facilities, and warehouses and UAS hangers under construction. The damage to the airstrip caused by the Israeli airstrikes can be seen in Figure 5, including four bomb craters on the runway.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒曾考慮任職美國非政府組織-但最後決定留在swhk幫忙">李宇軒：曾考慮任職美國非政府組織 但最後決定留在SWHK幫忙</h4> -<p>Since October 7, Hezbollah has attempted at least 40 UAS attacks against Israeli targets, as shown in Figure 6. Several of these attacks have successfully penetrated Israeli air defense systems, killing IDF soldiers and damaging military sites in precision strikes.</p> +<p>李另提到，有見《國安法》即將立法，他與陳梓華曾討論過應該留在香港，還是到外國工作。另一名身處美國的 SWHK 成員 Shirley Ho 問李會否想去美國非政府組織「中國人權」工作，做執行主任譚競嫦（Sharon Hom）的下屬，或者形勢許可的話，李可以留在香港，但繼續任職「中國人權」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BIBUDzh.jpeg" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ Figure 6: UAS Incidents in Israel (October 8, 2023–March 15, 2024)</em></p> +<p>李稱他當時考慮，如果他決定任職「中國人權」和做譚競嫦的下屬，需為時2年，與此同時，他可以在工餘時間做有關香港社運的活動，所以他當時正在 SWHK、IPAC 和「中國人權」之間考慮。</p> -<p>As seen in Table 2, Hezbollah UAS systems come in a wide variety. This list is not exhaustive, and Hezbollah likely possesses additional Iranian or indigenous drone models. Also not shown are the variety of commercial drones, such as Chinese DJI quadcopters, that Hezbollah possesses and which can be used to conduct surveillance or modified to deliver explosive payloads. Should war with Israel break out, Hezbollah would likely receive additional imports of drones from Iran and emphasize adapting commercial off-the-shelf systems to their needs. After all, Iran has established logistics supply routes — both air and land bridges — that can bring weapon systems and other equipment from Iran to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria. The result is that Hezbollah would probably be able to sustain a campaign of UAS attacks against Israeli targets in Lebanon and Israel unless supply routes were cut.</p> +<p>李憶述，陳梓華當時認為任職「中國人權」並非有效地運用時間，所以二人均不傾向李任職「中國人權」，改為決定留在 SWHK 幫忙。二人亦傾向認為李應該到英國協助裴倫德，可能擔任 IPAC 某些職位或者協助其他英國的非政府組織。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sGbr0WF.jpeg" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ Table 2: Select Iranian UAS Exported to Hezbollah</em></p> +<p>李指，最後在這個時候，SWHK 已經決定加入 IPAC，而不是李以個人身份加入 IPAC。李則一直留在香港協助 SWHK 事務。</p> -<p>Hezbollah’s tactical employment of UASs in a war with Israel is difficult to predict. Hezbollah drone operators have received training from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force, have performed military exercises with drones, and are observing the war in Ukraine, where a variety of new uses and techniques for drones on a battlefield have emerged. Hezbollah could attempt to use its UASs as part of a reconnaissance-strike complex, relaying targeting information for indirect fires or attacking mobile Israeli targets, but Hezbollah’s ability to coordinate its UAS and ground-based capabilities remains to be seen. Hezbollah could also use UASs to detect, surveil, and attack Israeli forces should they enter southern Lebanon or to overwhelm Israeli air defenses through swarming attacks, possibly in combination with rockets and missiles. The effectiveness of these tactics will likely be limited, however, by Israel’s sophisticated counter-UAS capabilities, including electronic warfare systems, air defense systems, and other countermeasures that could disrupt UAS communications with ground systems or knock them out of the sky altogether.</p> +<h4 id="重光團隊與ipac開設群組交流-李宇軒分析指北京搏外國不會制裁">重光團隊與IPAC開設群組交流 李宇軒分析指北京搏外國不會制裁</h4> -<p><strong>Anti-tank Guided Missiles and Improvised Explosive Devices:</strong> ATGMs and IEDs give Hezbollah potent capabilities to attack armored vehicles and fortified locations. These capabilities were vital to its tactical successes in the 2006 war, although Israeli tactical failures contributed to the loss rate it experienced in 2006. The IDF is unlikely to repeat those mistakes.</p> +<p>控方展示 Telegram 群組「SWHK IPAC」訊息紀錄，群組成員包括李宇軒（網名「RIP@?」）、裴倫德、Shirley Ho 和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸（網名「HK 再離開一下」）等。群組於2020年6月21日成立，李在開首訊息指，此群組的作用是與 IPAC 協調有關香港的聲明和回應，主要是近期的《國安法》議題。他又指如果 IPAC 沒有發表聲明的話，SWHK 可以出聲明以填補空白（fill the gap）；但如果 IPAC 打算出聲明的話，SWHK 不會與之重疊，而轉為在社交媒體分享或轉載 IPAC 的聲明，使曝光率推至最高（maximize coverage）。</p> -<p>Hezbollah has almost certainly improved its anti-tank capabilities since 2006. It currently fields an ATGM system, Tharallah, that is designed to overcome the active protection system used by the IDF’s Merkava MBTs, although its efficacy is unclear from open sources. Hezbollah has taken steps to improve the mobility of its anti-tank units, mounting Kornet anti-tank missiles on all-terrain vehicles. Several news outlets also reported in late January 2024 that Hezbollah had used a more advanced Kornet-EM to attack an Israeli air control base, which would represent a significant increase in ATGM range and destructive power. On the tactical side, analysis of Hezbollah’s combat performance in Syria suggests that its members remain well schooled in using ATGMs against armored vehicles and fortified infantry positions. The result is that Hezbollah’s ATGMs are likely to remain one of its deadliest capabilities, even if they do not attain the success rate of 2006.</p> +<p>裴倫德問及發表聲明的最佳時機。李宇軒則分析指聲明目標有兩個效果，其一是國際向北京施壓，使北京放棄訂立《港區國安法》，其二是他們容讓《國安法》通過立法，之後以負面角度定性《國安法》，迫使香港或國際社會更加反抗中國，而發表聲明的時機則視乎他們想達至以上哪一種效果。</p> -<p>Hezbollah also has a considerable IED capacity. Hezbollah employed IEDs with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) against Israel in the 1990s and will almost certainly seek to do so again. EFPs are shaped charges with a concave end, which typically send a molten copper slug through targets and then create a deadly spray of hot metal. Hezbollah’s expertise in using IEDs probably allowed it to contribute to IED attacks against U.S. and British forces in Iraq. During the war in Iraq, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force — which aids Hezbollah — built infrared triggers, explosive circuits, and other EFP components in Iran and smuggled them across the border in Iraq to be used against U.S. forces. Hezbollah could also conduct attacks on Israeli forces using tunnel bombs, which were used in Iraq and Syria to literally undermine fortified positions, or improvised rocket-assisted munitions, which Hezbollah used. These IED capabilities, combined with Hezbollah’s ATGMs, would allow the group to harass and disrupt the advance of Israeli ground forces in Lebanon.</p> +<p>李又在群組中表示，他的判斷是北京想證實國際社會並不會真的實施制裁或強硬政策，似乎北京會發表外交聲明，聲稱卑躬屈膝的話便可得到經濟利益，之後外國政府便會讓步，北京從而可以避免承擔後果。</p> -<p>These weapons, however, will not be decisive in battle. They are suited for killing one vehicle at a time or striking a small, fortified position, not for defeating a combined force integrating infantry, armor, indirect fires, and air power. Israeli countermeasures, such as the Trophy active protection system, will also limit their efficacy. IEDs will, however, inflict casualties, which Hezbollah leaders probably believe would undermine political will in Israel.</p> +<h4 id="裴倫德在群組中指-ipac-成員在議會權力有限">裴倫德在群組中指 IPAC 成員在議會權力有限</h4> -<p><strong>Air Defense:</strong> Since the 2006 war, Hezbollah has emphasized the advancement and expansion of its air defense capabilities in an effort to degrade Israeli air superiority. Hezbollah’s air defenses include a range of systems primarily manufactured by Iran and Russia, including anti-aircraft guns, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and short- and medium-range surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems, as seen in Table 3. These systems most commonly make their way into Lebanon smuggled through Syria, and Hezbollah has occasionally used them to engage Israeli UASs flying over southern Lebanon in recent years.</p> +<p>裴倫德則在群組中指，他不希望作出不切實際的承諾，英國議員的權力有限，而 IPAC 的威脅需要是可行的，否則北京不會害怕任何人。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JetWRE8.jpeg" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ Table 3: Hezbollah’s Air Defense Systems</em></p> +<p>李宇軒回應指，「市面上」已經有很多譴責中國的聲明，包括外國政要、外交大臣等，而 IPAC 則有一群議員，似乎有一個合適位置向中國聲稱，「如果你做了某些事的話，我們便會在議會上提交政策議案進行討論」，因為這是議員的職能範圍之內。之後裴倫德指李似乎誤解了 IPAC 政客有能力提交政策議案，但事實上他們作為「後座議員」權力有限。</p> -<p>In November 2023, U.S. intelligence officials reportedly believed that Russia’s Wagner Group intended to transfer another SA-22 system to Hezbollah from Syria. There have also been recent allegations that militias in Syria are actively training to use Iran’s most advanced air defense system, the Khordad-15.</p> +<p>李宇軒庭上解釋，他認為如果 IPAC 的成員可以在各自國家的議會提交政策議案討論的話，便會更加有效，但裴倫德指他有誤解，因 IPAC 的成員職能上可以動議法案（propose bills），但不可以提出討論政策議案（table policies）。</p> -<p>As shown in Figure 7, Israeli aerial activity has decreased in recent years and remains at historically low levels today, suggesting that Israel takes the threat of Hezbollah’s air defense systems to its aircraft seriously. Statements from Israeli military officials confirm as much. In 2022, the outgoing chief of Israel’s air force stated that Israel no longer had unimpeded air superiority over southern Lebanon.</p> +<h4 id="群組中提出馬格尼茨基法-李宇軒自己沒有想法旨在引起討論">群組中提出馬格尼茨基法 李宇軒：自己沒有想法、旨在引起討論</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4fqhwz7.jpeg" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ Figure 7: Average Daily IDF Flight Hours over Lebanon by UN Reporting Period</em></p> +<p>裴倫德在群組中表示，他認為 IPAC 應該發表聲明之餘，輔以一項實質行動。惟李宇軒卻認為已經有很多譴責中國的聲明，應該集中在特定行動。裴倫德問李認為 IPAC 就香港議題做什麼是最有力，又提到有 IPAC 成員不喜歡「救生艇計劃」，因認為它代表「承認被打敗」。李亦表示不喜歡「救生艇計劃」，他無意推動一項放棄香港的政策。</p> -<p>In the event of war, Hezbollah’s air defenses would likely force Israeli aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, reducing their ability to accurately hit targets on the ground. At the same time, Hezbollah’s air defense systems would be high-priority targets for Israel. On February 26, 2024, the IDF announced that it had struck Hezbollah’s air defense sites in the Beqaa Valley in response to Hezbollah shooting down an Israeli drone over Lebanon earlier that day. In an escalated conflict, Israel would likely continue to favor the use of UASs over manned aircraft to reduce the risk posed by air defense systems to its pilots, though Israel does have fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter. A successful downing by Hezbollah of a manned Israeli aircraft would be a strategically significant event. Although Hezbollah’s upgraded air defense systems pose a greater threat to Israeli aircraft than they did in previous conflicts, Israel still has immense air superiority over Lebanon. Israel’s air force boasts some of the most advanced aircraft in the world, including U.S. and indigenously designed systems. Since the October 7 attack, Israel’s air force has successfully struck targets across Lebanon on almost a daily basis.</p> +<p>李其後提到，馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act），即個人層面的制裁或經濟制裁某國家，似乎是最有力的措施，而且當英國議員集齊足夠簽署提出動議，便不是不可能達成。李又提到，日本議員山尾志櫻里曾經在一次線上會面提出馬格尼茨基法（Magnitsky Act），他認為如果可以說服日本通過馬格尼茨基法，便可以與國際配合一同實施。惟裴倫德指馬格尼茨基法立法過程緩慢、證據門檻高，以及在某一些地區不能達成，例如歐盟成員國。</p> -<p><strong>Human Factors:</strong> Hezbollah’s tactical proficiency, combat experience, and will to fight make it a much deadlier threat than Hamas — and even other regional militaries. Western analysts praised Hezbollah’s efficacy in the 2006 war with Israel, and its forces have only since grown more effective. Hezbollah’s combat experience in Syria has given its troops experience in ground combat that few regional militaries possess, forcing them to learn how to conduct offensive operations and exposing them to the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Russian military. Hezbollah members have also repeatedly displayed a willingness to accept decisive engagement and fight to the last soldier — attitudes that will only be increased by the desire to defend their homes from an Israeli offensive.</p> +<p>李宇軒庭上解釋，當時他在群組中提及馬格尼茨基法，只是想提出一些想法，希望引起其他人討論，而他並沒有主張自己的想法。法官李運騰問，李的意思是否他提出一些不成熟的想法，想其他人一起討論。李確認。</p> -<p>In short, the Hezbollah that Israel would face if violence were to escalate to major ground operations is more capable than in 2006. Hezbollah is larger, better armed, and more experienced, thanks in part to its experience fighting in Syria. It is most effectively designed to fight a coercive campaign aimed at killing Israeli soldiers and civilians at a steady rate through rocket, long-range missiles, ATGM, and UAS attacks. But it may also have some ability to conduct combined arms offensives against Israeli troops and limit Israeli air dominance. Even so, it remains technologically outmatched by the IDF, which has long prepared for a rematch of the 2006 war, has been engaged in a war with Hamas since October 2023, and will be able to bring much greater firepower to bear from its land- and air-based platforms.</p> +<p>至於控方問及山尾志櫻里何時提及馬格尼茨基法，李則表示不肯定山尾在哪一次線上會議中談論過。</p> -<h3 id="israeli-objectives-and-options">Israeli Objectives and Options</h3> +<p>李在群組中提到另一個選項，就是要求取消香港特殊地位，但他認為這與「救生艇計劃」沒有分別，都是放棄自己所屬的城市。他又指 IPAC 並不會主張香港獨立，也不會叫其他國家承認香港作為一個獨立國家，因他理解這在外交層面是不切實際。</p> -<p>In light of the changing strategic landscape and Hezbollah’s evolving capabilities, what options does Israel have? There are at least four options: (1) return to the pre–October 7 status quo and emphasize deterrence, (2) start an all-out war with Hezbollah to destroy the group’s capabilities and force it to comply with Israel’s demands, (3) engage in a limited war with Hezbollah to put pressure on the group and push its forces further from the Israeli border, and (4) use coercive diplomacy to better implement UNSCR 1701.</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<h4 id="option-1-the-status-quo-ante-and-a-return-to-deterrence">Option 1: The Status Quo Ante and a Return to Deterrence</h4> +<hr /> -<p>Israel might try to return to a deterrent approach, which has uneasily kept the peace for almost 20 years. Deterring Hezbollah rests on the idea that the threat of war — including the potential destruction of portions of Lebanon — and punitive strikes on the group and Lebanese infrastructure will keep the group from launching attacks or at least massive strikes on Israel. This threat works by endangering something Hezbollah holds dear, such as the lives of its leaders, its power in Lebanon, and the well-being of its constituents. After Israel left Lebanon in 2000, it retaliated against the occasional rocket strike or other violation of the peace with the threat of more massive strikes should Hezbollah mount a larger attack. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned in December 2023, “If Hezbollah chooses to start an all-out war, then it will single-handedly turn Beirut and South Lebanon, not far from here, into Gaza and Khan Yunis.”</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒群組中稱馬格尼茨基法最有力 裴倫德則指立法過程緩慢、證據門檻高G7’s AI Code Of Conduct2024-03-27T12:00:00+08:002024-03-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/g7s-ai-code-of-conduct<p><em>It is the G7’s chance to mature the code of conduct to confer a presumption of conformity to the European Union’s AI Act and to enhance AI regulatory interoperability at the G7 this year.</em></p> -<p>Deterrence seems to be alive even after October 7. Nasrallah has stressed in public statements that Hezbollah does not plan a broader war even as it supports the Palestinians and will not rule out escalation if circumstances change. Hezbollah strikes focus on a discreet target set along the border even though the group has the capacity to launch far more attacks and to strike all of Israel. It is clearly trying to limit its attacks even as it shows solidarity. Hezbollah cares about its constituents and recognizes that a repeat of the 2006 war, let alone something much worse, would be a disaster for these supporters. In recent years, Lebanon’s economy has plummeted, and Hezbollah does not want to take the blame for a war that would further devastate the country. Israeli threats have made clear to Hezbollah that Lebanon would be hit hard if an all-out conflict resumes, and the devastation of Gaza reinforces the credibility of this threat.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Deterrence, however, could fail for several reasons. A strike that kills large numbers of Israeli civilians, even if accidental, would inflame the situation. Deterrence also rests on understanding an adversary’s decision calculus, and Israel might misunderstand Hezbollah’s tolerance for attacks on Hamas leaders or the continued loss of Hezbollah cadre, including important operational leaders. As previously noted, Israel’s risk tolerance has changed, and Israeli leaders might decide that even a small chance of Hezbollah attacking Israel needs to be preempted.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<h4 id="option-2-an-all-out-war">Option 2: An All-Out War</h4> +<p>Over the past five years, the G7 and its member states have made significant progress in specifying ethical principles for AI. Advancing global AI governance in 2024 demands translating these high-level principles into concrete practices for AI developers and government organizations. Rather than address this challenge in isolation, G7 leaders stated in their 2023 Leaders’ Communiqué they would work together and with others to “advance international discussions on inclusive artificial intelligence (AI) governance and interoperability to achieve our common vision and goal of trustworthy AI, in line with our shared democratic values.” The March 2024 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministerial declaration recently reaffirmed this commitment, stressing “the importance of international discussions on AI governance and interoperability” with like-minded partners and developing countries.</p> -<p>Should deterrence fail, whether by accident or by choice, an all-out war is possible. Israel’s chief of staff, Herzi Halevi, told Israeli soldiers that the chances of war against Hezbollah are growing. Part of Israel’s logic is that a war with Hezbollah at some point is inevitable and that Israel should not wait for a surprise attack. Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser, noted, “If you believe that with Hezbollah is inevitable, as many in Israel do, then now is as good a time as any to do it.”</p> +<p>The work of the G7 has already had a tangible impact in productively shaping the domestic AI regulatory approach of multiple G7 members, including the United States (through the 2023 AI executive order), Japan (the updated AI regulatory guidance), and the European Union (the AI Act). In conversations with CSIS, government officials from each of these members stated that the G7 was substantive and helpful to their regulatory efforts. Notably, members of the European Parliament involved in drafting the EU AI Act told CSIS that some sections of the act were directly inspired by the Hiroshima AI Process (HAIP) Code of Conduct the G7 published in October 2023.</p> -<p>A war would likely focus on preventing a more dangerous repeat of October 7, going after Hezbollah’s rocket, missile, and drone capabilities and trying to push the group’s fighters farther from the border, probably to the other side of the Litani River. Even a decisive defeat of Hezbollah, however, would not lead to the group’s destruction given its deep roots in Lebanon and strong support from Iran.</p> +<p>One such section of the EU AI Act is Article 52, which outlines transparency obligations for Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) models above a computational threshold of 1025 floating point operations per second (FLOPS). According to Article 52, the European Union’s AI Office shall “encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of practice at Union level as an element to contribute to the proper application of this Regulation, taking into account international approaches.” Industry developers are directed to coregulate these codes of practice by collaborating directly with the European Commission on this issue.</p> -<p>Israel possesses considerable capacity for war with Hezbollah, though the Lebanese group would be a formidable foe. Israeli intelligence tries to continuously monitor Hezbollah missile and UAS sites. Indeed, part of why Hamas was able to surprise Israel on October 7 was likely because Israeli intelligence was more focused on Hezbollah, which it saw as the greater threat.</p> +<p>Members of the European Parliament told CSIS they believe the HAIP Code of Conduct is the best available starting point for what will ultimately become the EU AI Office’s officially recognized codes of practice for certain GPAI models. Parliament members stated their support for maturing the G7’s code of conduct to a degree that meets EU requirements, such that providers of GPAI models who demonstrate compliance with the G7’s HAIP Code of Conduct would enjoy a “presumption of conformity” to the EU AI Act’s GPAI codes of practice.</p> -<p>The IDF outnumbers Hezbollah in troops, tanks, artillery, and other forms of military power. Israel’s equipment is also far more sophisticated, and its forces are better trained. Since its poor performance in the 2006 war, Israel has prepared for war with Hezbollah, in contrast to its lack of preparation for the invasion of Gaza. Israel has prepared a target set it can draw on at any time for strikes.</p> +<p>The European Union, while it has the sole final decision over the AI Act’s implementation, should be commended for its demonstrated commitment to interoperability, openness to international input during the codes of practice design process, and willingness to take advantage of the work already done under the Japanese 2023 G7 presidency. Maturing the code of conduct to confer a presumption of conformity to the EU AI Act would not only help the European Commission develop a key piece of regulation for GPAI models but also offer an opportunity for other G7 members to help shape language that will set an informative precedent for how global AI regulations are designed and implemented. Moreover, aligning the code of conduct to the European Union’s codes of practice would be hugely impactful for the G7’s stated goals of establishing interoperable AI regulations and broadening the dissemination of the code.</p> -<p>An Israeli attack would probably involve massive airstrikes that would seek to target Hezbollah leaders, disrupt command and control (which would also involve cyberattacks), and hit Hezbollah’s rocket launcher sites, especially those that involve Hezbollah’s precision munitions arsenal. Although Israel would target Hezbollah leadership and military sites in Beirut and in the Beqaa Valley, it would likely focus most of its effort on Hezbollah’s presence near the border. Using lessons learned in Gaza, Israel would likely also attempt to destroy Hezbollah’s tunnel network. Finding and targeting Hezbollah tunnels has been an Israeli military and intelligence priority for years, though Hezbollah showed in 2006 that it could successfully use deception to build an extensive network.</p> +<p>Even if the European Commission does not ultimately use the code of conduct to inform or stand in for the European Union’s official codes of practice, the G7 would still achieve a substantially more mature code by aiming to meet this ambitious goal. In its current state, the code of conduct’s 11 high-level principles are too vague for AI developers to subscribe to or implement without further specification. Translating these principles into monitorable and enforceable tasks for AI developers would therefore be a meaningful achievement alone. This process will require extensive input from the private sector to determine what is relevant, technically feasible, and reflective of existing industry best practices in AI governance. Cooperation with and public endorsement from a diverse group of leading international AI firms will also be needed to help to demonstrate the code’s building momentum within the AI industry. While maturing the code of conduct through these avenues and more would already fulfil one of the G7’s stated priorities for 2024, the G7 could go further by aligning the code of conduct with the European Union’s codes of practice to achieve its broader goals of enhancing regulatory interoperability and widening the adoption of the code of conduct.</p> -<p>Some Israeli leaders, such as Benny Gantz, a member of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s war cabinet, remarked in February 2024 that Israel could strike the Lebanese military as part of a broader war. “It is important that we be clear — the one responsible for the fire from Lebanon is not only Hezbollah or the terrorist elements that carry it out, but also the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese state that allows the shooting from its territory,” Gantz said. He also added: “There is no target or military infrastructure in the area of the north and Lebanon that is not in our sights.”</p> +<h3 id="timeline">Timeline</h3> -<p>Israel might then invade Lebanon with several divisions (it used four in Gaza, where the dense urban terrain required extensive manpower), seeking to uncover and destroy hidden tunnels and force Hezbollah fighters to the other side of the Litani River. Although southern Lebanon is not densely populated like Gaza, some of the fighting would involve urban warfare. If Israel were to successfully remove Hezbollah forces, it would then carefully monitor the area and conduct extensive strikes if necessary to prevent any return. Israel might push for a more robust UNIFIL force to monitor the area or seek to create a buffer zone, working with Lebanese proxies, as it did before 2000, though both of these approaches have proved insufficient in the past.</p> +<p>The expected timeline for EU AI Act implementation suggests that a draft version of the GPAI codes of practice must be ready by February 2025 (see Figure 1). Comparing the EU and G7 timelines highlights that the G7 code of conduct should be substantially elaborated by February 2025 if the European Union is to consider the code of conduct as a presumption of conformity to the European Union’s code of practice on GPAI models when the regulations take effect. This gives the G7 approximately 11 months from the writing of this white paper to mature the code of conduct ahead of the European Union’s February 2025 deadline. While the HAIP Code of Conduct could inform a later, updated EU AI codes of practice, meeting the February 2025 deadline would certainly have greater impact.</p> -<p>Hezbollah would respond in several ways. Hezbollah forces would conduct guerrilla attacks, likely using an extensive tunnel network and well-prepared defensive positions near the Israeli border, taking advantage of the rough terrain there. Hezbollah would also attempt cross-border attacks as well as perhaps maritime infiltration in order to strike at Israel directly. In addition, Hezbollah would use its massive rocket and missile arsenal to attack Israel, overwhelming Israel’s defensive systems and striking at targets throughout the entire country: in 2006, Hezbollah was able to conduct rocket and missile attacks for all 34 days of the war, and its arsenal today is far larger. Finally, Hezbollah might conduct international terrorist attacks at Israeli targets around the world, working extensively with Iran to do so. Hezbollah would also use its influence over the Lebanese government to ensure that any ceasefire was on its own terms.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UwRrl6E.jpeg" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: Expected EU AI Act Implementation Time Frame</em></p> -<h4 id="option-3-limited-war">Option 3: Limited War</h4> +<p>The Italian G7 presidency therefore comes at a critical window of opportunity to substantially advance the HAIP and the interoperability of allied AI regulatory frameworks. The Italian presidency recently restated the G7’s commitment to maturing the HAIP and the code of conduct at the Industry, Technology, and Digital Ministerial Meeting in Verona and Trento on March 14 and 15, 2024. The ministerial declaration from this meeting promises to advance the HAIP outcomes on page 10, “including through expanding support and awareness among key partners and organisations, as well as increasing their involvement, as appropriate.” Specifically, per Annex 3, the G7 will develop monitoring mechanisms for assessing organizations’ voluntary implementation of the code of conduct, increase stakeholder engagement in maturing the code of conduct and its adoption, and collaborate with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UNESCO, and GPAI on challenges posed by AI systems. Progress on these issues will be presented at the leaders’ summit in June.</p> -<p>Another approach is to continue the current level of conflict, in which there is no all-out war, but dozens of Hezbollah fighters are killed every month, as well as a small number of Israelis. Civilians would die on both sides, but if current patterns continue, far more Lebanese would be killed than Israelis. Limited war would involve regular Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah forces near the border and on the occasional Hezbollah commander, while Hezbollah would fire anti-tank missiles at military and civilian infrastructure across the border, allow Palestinian groups based in Lebanon to attempt the occasional cross-border attack, and launch rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli positions.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<p>Limited war would serve several purposes for both Israel and Hezbollah. For Israel, such strikes keep Hezbollah off balance, forcing its commanders to hide or risk being killed and putting its weapons caches at risk. In addition, the strikes show the Israeli people that the government is actively trying to defend them and make it hard for Hezbollah to amass forces that might conduct a surprise attack across the border. For Hezbollah, limited war allows it to show solidarity with Hamas and affirm Iran’s “resistance” agenda. Although Hezbollah has lost over 100 fighters since October 7, this level of casualties is manageable for a large organization with many skilled personnel. For both Hezbollah and Israel, limits to the conflict help avoid the costs of an all-out war.</p> +<p>Given the G7’s 2024 agenda for the HAIP and the European Commission’s deadline of February 2025 for developing the GPAI codes of practice, the Italian G7 presidency should strive to accomplish the following this year:</p> -<p>At the same time, limited war poses problems for both groups, in addition to the regular casualties. The biggest problem is the impact on civilians along the border. The conflict worsens Lebanon’s always-simmering instability and mounting economic problems, and Hezbollah risks taking the blame. Perhaps 75,000 Lebanese have fled southern Lebanon, with no immediate prospect of return: a similar political problem for Hezbollah to what Israel faces, with its displaced citizens, who are unlikely to return to their homes en masse as long as limited war continues. Finally, it is unclear whether a limited war would actually remain limited.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Continue working on the HAIP Code of Conduct after the March 15 ministerial meeting, including a second digital and industry ministerial meeting toward the end of 2024.</strong> Developing the code of conduct will take substantive effort from both G7 members and AI developers in the private sector and academia. CSIS supports the Italian presidency’s year-round approach to maturing the HAIP ending, with a second ministerial meeting showcasing the G7’s work toward the end of 2024.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Develop the HAIP Code of Conduct’s monitoring and evaluation mechanisms through the OECD.</strong> While the G7 has done excellent work on advancing AI governance principles thus far, its lack of permanent staff makes it challenging to continue this work alone in the long-term. The March Industry, Technology, and Digital Ministerial declaration indicates that the OECD will provide this missing institutional support to the G7 on the Hiroshima AI Process, continuing a long-standing partnership between the two fora.</p> -<h4 id="option-4-coercive-diplomacy">Option 4: Coercive Diplomacy</h4> + <p>The OECD has a strong record of developing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, which the G7 should draw on to meaningfully mature the code of conduct in 2024. Japan chairs this year’s OECD’s Ministerial Council, offering continuity between the G7 Hiroshima Process, which Japanese government officials continue to staff and support, and the OECD. Developing the code of conduct through the Ministerial Council and other OECD channels, including the Global Partnership on AI, will offer essential capacity and expertise to the 2024 G7.</p> -<p>Another approach is to use coercive diplomacy to compel Hezbollah to abide by UNSCR 1701. To this end, the United States, often represented by mediator Amos Hochstein, is using diplomacy to negotiate with Lebanese leaders, and thus indirectly with Hezbollah, while Israel is putting military pressure on the group through a mix of strikes on Hezbollah forces and leaders. The renewed threat of an all-out war gives this pressure additional strength. Hezbollah, however, does not want to be seen as surrendering to Israeli pressure, particularly at a time when Israeli attacks on Palestinians are dominating the headlines.</p> + <p>Close collaboration with the OECD would also offer a longer-term path to expand the HAIP beyond the G7, first to like-minded democratic market-driven economies among the OECD countries. The OECD could also serve as a first step in further expansion to a wider set of non-OECD countries through the OECD-hosted Global Partnership on AI, which includes countries such as Brazil and India.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Gather input from private sector AI organizations on the code of conduct through requests for comment and formalized convenings of relevant stakeholders.</strong> In a speech to the Italian government’s Digital Transition Committee in November 2023, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stated that establishing AI governance guidelines “does not mean working against companies” but instead “engaging in dialogue” between the public and private sector. Dialogue between relevant stakeholders is indeed essential for ensuring the code of conduct is translated into specific actions that are technically feasible and reflect the rapidly changing capabilities of advanced AI systems. To ensure that this dialogue remains consistent and constructive, input from private sector AI developers should be organized through specific initiatives such as requests for comment, working groups, and feasibility studies.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>In addition to ending Hezbollah attacks on Israel, the goal for Israel would be for Hezbollah to move its armed forces back, as promised under UNSCR 1701, to the Litani River. It is possible that Israel would also accept a less comprehensive withdrawal that moves Hezbollah farther back from the Israel-Lebanon border but not all the way to the Litani River. UNIFIL might need to be bolstered substantially and be far more aggressive in its use of force in response to any incursion, both of which would be difficult to accomplish.</p> +<p>With these recommendation in place, CSIS hopes the following occur by the end of the Italian G7 presidency:</p> -<p>Israel, too, would be asked to make concessions and changes in response to UNSCR 1701 and to appease Hezbollah. Israel regularly violates Lebanese airspace, which Israel does to strike and monitor Hezbollah positions. Hezbollah would also likely seek an Israeli evacuation of Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar, perhaps placing them under UNIFIL so that the group could claim a political victory even as it made concessions.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>G7 members and EU AI Act officials expand, finalize, and accept the HAIP Code of Conduct language.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A substantial number of companies support the drafting of and publicly subscribe to the code of conduct.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The OECD serves as the principal forum in which to develop monitoring and transparency functions of the code of conduct as necessary.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>By late 2024 or early 2025, there is a clear path to expanding the code of conduct beyond the G7 and OECD forums, including non-G7 and OECD countries potentially through the OECD’s Global Partnership on AI forum.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="managing-the-crisis">Managing the Crisis</h3> +<hr /> -<p>With a high risk of conflict, Washington needs to step up efforts to prevent an all-out war (Option 2), which would have significant and negative implications for the United States at home, in the Middle East, and around the globe. Restoring deterrence (Option 1) and limited war (Option 3), while better from a U.S. perspective, both have their limits. Option 1 appears, at best, a temporary solution that could easily fall apart, while Option 3 could spiral into an all-out war and, even in limited form, could be disastrous for both Lebanon and Israel. The U.S. military is already overstretched in countering a range of threats, such as China in the Indo-Pacific, including around Taiwan and the South and East China Seas; North Korea, which is accelerating its conventional and nuclear capabilities and issuing provocative threats of nuclear conflict with South Korea; and Russia, which is waging an attrition war against Ukraine and developing land, air, naval, space, and cyber capabilities that threaten the United States and its allies. The U.S. defense industrial base is also overstretched. An all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah would likely require additional U.S. military assets — such as one or more carrier strike groups as well as fixed-wing aircraft, ISR platforms, and munitions — that are needed in other theaters.</p> +<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies and senior fellow with the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>A war could dramatically raise tensions with populations across the Middle East and beyond — including in the United States and Europe — and lead to increased attacks by Iranian-backed groups against Israel, the United States, and commercial targets in the region and littoral areas. U.S. forces in the region, already facing limited attacks from Iranian-backed groups, would likely face more frequent and larger strikes. Although the economic implications of the Gaza war have been limited, an all-out war would likely have significant implications on trade, supply chains, energy prices (including oil and gas), investment, and tourism.</p> +<p><strong>Georgia Adamson</strong> is a research assistant with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at CSIS.</p>Gregory C. Allen and Georgia AdamsonIt is the G7’s chance to mature the code of conduct to confer a presumption of conformity to the European Union’s AI Act and to enhance AI regulatory interoperability at the G7 this year.Uphold North Korea Sanctions2024-03-26T12:00:00+08:002024-03-26T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uphold-north-korea-sanctions<p><em>This paper aims to examine cryptocurrency mixers’ distinct technical, legal and regulatory dimensions and the challenges they pose to the sanctions regime. The paper provides detailed background information on North Korea’s cyber-criminal statecraft, focusing on North Korean actors’ use of mixers to launder illicitly obtained cryptocurrency.</em></p> -<p>A major war would also have significant humanitarian costs. Hezbollah’s rocket and missile systems put all of Israel under threat, and its ground forces are far more formidable than those of Hamas. Israel’s promise to devastate Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon as it has in Gaza is credible, and thousands could die in these attacks. Lebanon’s economy, already under severe strain, could collapse completely as hundreds of thousands of people are displaced and the country’s infrastructure is destroyed.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Consequently, the United States should focus its efforts on implementing a policy of coercive diplomacy (Option 4). There has been some movement toward negotiations. For example, U.S. officials like Amos Hochstein have made energetic efforts to restore stability and discussed a proposal that calls for the withdrawal of non-state armed actors from southern Lebanon, a deployment of Lebanese armed forces, and a development plan for southern Lebanon. In addition, France presented a three-step proposal to Israel, Lebanon’s government, and Hezbollah (and briefed it to the United States) that outlines a 10-day process of de-escalation and calls for Hezbollah to withdraw its fighters to a distance of about six miles (10 kilometers) from the border. Negotiations are critical, but they will not be easy. Hezbollah has formally rejected negotiating a de-escalation proposal until the war in Gaza ends.</p> +<p>North Korean actors have stolen billions of dollars over the past decade as part of a massive campaign to generate illicit revenue through cybercrime. In recent years, they have devoted particular effort to stealing virtual assets. The proceeds of these operations help fund the Kim regime’s ballistic missile programme and the development of more robust cyber capabilities, among other initiatives. North Korea’s cyber-criminal activities undermine UN sanctions and represent a distinct threat to international security.</p> -<p>U.S. leadership will be important. As Henry Kissinger remarked, “One has to remember that every progress that has been made towards peace in the Middle East has come under American leadership.” Preventing an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah is likely the next test.</p> +<p>A US-led coalition has responded to North Korea’s exploitation of cryptocurrency by prioritising enforcement against the virtual asset platforms that facilitate money laundering, especially mixing services. Mixers enable users to obfuscate the origins of their cryptocurrency funds by commingling them in a large pool with other users’ assets. Recognising the key role non-compliant mixers such as Tornado Cash have played in North Korea’s cyber-criminal enterprise, US authorities and international partners have launched an aggressive crackdown. Authorities have supplemented their primary enforcement tools – sanctions and platform takedowns – with asset seizures, arrests and the adoption of new laws and regulatory measures. Over the past few months, governments have experimented with novel approaches to combating digital illicit finance, such as the possibility of designating all mixer transactions as suspicious by default.</p> -<hr /> +<p>This paper forms part of a series of research projects funded by the US Department of State to understand and mitigate obstacles to UN sanctions implementation. It aims to examine cryptocurrency mixers’ distinct technical, legal and regulatory dimensions and the challenges they pose to the sanctions regime. The paper provides detailed background information on North Korea’s cyber-criminal statecraft, focusing on North Korean actors’ use of mixers to launder illicitly obtained cryptocurrency. It takes stock of the government response to date, concluding that while actions against non-compliant virtual asset platforms have been effective individually, the campaign’s overall impact on North Korea’s laundering capacity has been limited. It also seeks to grapple with the unintended consequences of interventions, some of which have yet to manifest fully.</p> -<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, director of the International Security Program at CSIS, and author most recently of Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare (W.W. Norton).</p> +<p>The paper offers 14 recommendations for policymakers and practitioners. The first cluster includes suggestions for broadening the current approach to countering North Korean mixer exploitation through unconventional partnerships and new conceptual frameworks. It advocates for empowering the disparate teams fighting cross-cutting North Korean cyber threats to collaborate more closely, and for expanding consideration of the second- and third-order marketplace effects enforcement actions may trigger. The next cluster focuses on cultivating stronger cooperative relations with the private sector. These recommendations emphasise nurturing the development of compliant blockchain privacy alternatives and tailoring government communications to the idiosyncratic virtual asset industry audience. The final cluster of recommendations focuses on raising global cyber security and anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance standards. Achieving wider implementation of current best practices, with an eye toward augmenting them in light of emerging digital illicit finance risks, would substantially degrade North Korea’s ability to monetise cybercrime.</p> -<p><strong>Daniel Byman</strong> is a senior fellow at CSIS, professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and author most recently of Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism (Oxford).</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><strong>Alexander Palmer</strong> is an associate fellow in the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p> +<p>North Korea’s innovative and highly motivated e-crime groups have emerged over the past decade as among the world’s most prolific cyber-criminals. Under the direction of the Kim regime, North Korean actors have pioneered a unique model that combines their technical acumen with the state’s experience in conducting illicit financial activities, honed over more than half a century, to cultivate a potent new revenue stream. The results speak for themselves. North Korea has stolen billions of dollars through electronic means from victims around the globe, including more than $3 billion in cryptocurrency. In 2022, North Korean groups accounted for roughly half of the nearly $4 billion stolen across the virtual asset ecosystem and a large portion of the funds taken from decentralised finance (DeFi) protocols, which have quickly become crypto hackers’ primary target. Following each theft, North Korean cyber-criminals steer their ill-gotten gains through a sophisticated laundering process and ultimately into state coffers. The profits from these operations fund much of Pyongyang’s ballistic missile programme, enable deeper investment in its cyber capabilities, bankroll slush funds for the North Korean elite, and help insulate the regime from the effects of sanctions. Through their direct and indirect effects, North Korea’s ongoing cyber-criminal activities pose an acute threat to international security and the global financial system. This paper explores North Korea’s use of these novel technologies to evade sanctions, considers the efficacy of states’ countermeasures, and provides recommendations on how authorities can further impede North Korea’s illicit cyber revenue-generating activities.</p> -<p><strong>Riley McCabe</strong> is a program manager and research associate at the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p>Seth G. Jones, et al.Although the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza has captured the world’s attention, there is a serious risk of war between Israel and Hezbollah, according to a new assessment by CSIS.【黎智英案・審訊第卌九日】2024-03-20T12:00:00+08:002024-03-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-49<ul> - <li>李宇軒指「重光團隊」組織鬆散 非所有成員支持制裁 共識是爭取香港自由民主</li> -</ul> +<p>Cryptocurrency mixers play a key role in the laundering process underpinning the North Korean cyber-criminal model. Mixing services, also known as tumblers, obfuscate the provenance and ownership of cryptocurrency funds by blending many users’ holdings together and disbursing each customer’s “mixed” funds to new addresses under their control. By obscuring the otherwise transparent trail of blockchain transactions, mixers make it harder for victims and law enforcement to trace stolen assets, let alone recover them, and help convert dirty cryptocurrency into more usable funds. Recognising these advantages, North Korean actors have enthusiastically incorporated mixers into their repertoire. Their heavy use of mixers presents both a problem and an opportunity: while these technologies protect a crucial revenue stream, North Korea’s reliance on mixers creates vulnerability to interventions that could significantly degrade their ability to monetise crypto theft.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The US-led approach to countering North Korean mixer use is still taking shape. Thus far, the toolkit has mainly featured sanctions, platform takedowns, asset seizures, arrests and regulation, which authorities typically deploy simultaneously and in coordination with international partners. These tactics have proven effective across several cases, rendering certain major platforms much less functional and removing others from availability outright. All told, the ongoing campaign has reshaped key elements of the mixer landscape, and large recent asset seizures have generated a cautious optimism that law enforcement and private partners may be building their capacity to reclaim stolen funds. However, the strategic impact of these interventions on North Korea’s overall illicit finance capabilities is ambiguous, and even the successful platform takedowns may not prove to be enduring achievements. Moreover, the interventions have already triggered unintended consequences, the full scope of which remains to be seen. New platforms are emerging to fill the void predecessors have left, and the replacements may ultimately prove trickier to counter. The interventions have prompted cyber-criminals to adapt their operational procedures and spurred innovation by both legitimate and illicit market actors that promises to catalyse further change. The tough approach to mixers has also exacerbated divisions between the public and private sectors over the character and trajectory of the virtual asset space, undermining efforts to make it less hospitable to criminality. As the strategy for countering North Korean illicit digital finance continues to develop, authorities will need to reckon carefully with the second-order effects of their actions and continually refine their approach.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/H20ee0I.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>This paper forms part of a series of research projects funded by the US Department of State to understand and mitigate obstacles to UN sanctions implementation. It aims to examine the distinct technical, legal and regulatory dimensions of cryptocurrency mixers and the challenges they pose to the sanctions regime. The paper concludes a four-month research project, commencing in June 2023 and ending in September 2023, on the use of cryptocurrency mixers for illicit financial purposes by North Korean actors. The analysis is based on a close review of US government documents, such as indictments, sanctions designations, statements of policy and press releases; reports by the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea (“the Panel”); publicly available threat intelligence and blockchain analysis reporting from firms such as BAE Systems, Chainalysis, Elliptic and TRM Labs; and primary data that certain firms have collected on North Korean cyber operations and cryptocurrency transactions. The paper has also benefited from interviews with 16 experts in relevant fields, including compliance specialists, anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance (AML/CTF) practitioners, leading figures in the cryptocurrency industry, threat intelligence and blockchain analysts, policy researchers, and multiple former senior officials from the US Department of the Treasury, the US Department of Justice and the National Security Council.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（20日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第49日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李稱2019年9月美國參議員斯科特訪港，由於當時他籌辦過國際登報活動，又出席過聯合國人權理事會會議，「咁喺國際呢條線度做過嘢」，所以獲另一名被告陳梓華邀請會見斯科特。李指會面目的是提高對香港人權自由狀況的關注，「同埋當時 SWHK （重光團隊）有啲想做國際游說，去做一啲嘢去應對香港 deteriorating 嘅自由民主狀況。」李提到當天是他首次見到 Mark Simon，惟未曾與他直接傾談，後來才知道他是黎智英的得力助手。此外，李宇軒形容「重光團隊」是「一個鬆散嘅港人組織」，並非所有成員和活動都支持制裁，「我都唔同意 SWHK 係為咗制裁而去成立嘅一個組織」，並重申當時共識是爭取香港的自由民主。</p> +<p>The paper contains three chapters. Chapter I offers background on Pyongyang’s cybercrime programme, the factors that draw cyber-criminals to mixers and the countermeasures governments have started taking. Chapter II analyses government interventions to date, focusing on the Blender, Tornado Cash, ChipMixer and Sinbad actions. It identifies unintended consequences that government action may trigger and suggests possible strategies for mitigating them. Chapter III offers a series of policy recommendations for augmenting the current approach to countering North Korean mixers, building stronger cooperative relations with the private sector, and raising global cyber security and AML/CTF standards. The paper concludes by flagging areas for further research and reflecting on how this issue could evolve in the years to come.</p> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第六天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> +<h3 id="i-background">I. Background</h3> -<h4 id="李宇軒指重光團隊組織鬆散-不同活動論述或有不一致">李宇軒指「重光團隊」組織鬆散 不同活動論述或有不一致</h4> +<p>This chapter provides background information on North Korea’s cyber-criminal activities and explains why mixers have become appealing tools for money laundering. It also outlines the measures governments and international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have undertaken in response to virtual asset crime.</p> -<p>剛開始時，李宇軒主動提及昨日作供期間，有關「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong， SWHK）的描述，希望就此澄清。李表示：「我會話 SWHK 係一個鬆散嘅港人組織，一個 loose 嘅組織，至少一開始係咁。」他指SWHK並沒有一個會章或會員制度，不過有一個共識是 SWHK 會爭取當時香港的自由民主，而在特定活動中便會有支持該活動的人去參加，「所以可能會見到就住 SWHK 活動嗰陣，嗰個論述會有少少 inconsistent」，他表示會在稍後作供時就特定活動去憶述當時群組內的討論重點。</p> +<h4 id="the-north-korean-cybercrime-programme">The North Korean Cybercrime Programme</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒指重光團隊非為呼籲制裁而成立-非全部成員支持制裁">李宇軒指重光團隊非為呼籲制裁而成立 非全部成員支持制裁</h4> +<p>Cybercrime has quickly become an essential pillar of North Korean statecraft. In the mid-2010s, having already developed a capacity for destructive and espionage cyber activities, Pyongyang launched a global campaign of financially motivated intrusions whose early results prefigured an enormous return on investment. The 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, in which threat actors submitted fraudulent SWIFT requests to the bank’s accounts at the New York Federal Reserve, extracted more than $80 million and might have yielded 10 times more if not for a typo in the phoney wire instructions that exposed the ruse. In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware affected several hundred thousand machines in at least 150 countries, demonstrating the ease with which hackers cloistered untouchably in faraway jurisdictions could commit digital extortion at massive scale. These and subsequent operations validated the idea that state-directed computer crime could pay quite handsomely. Over the past decade, North Korea has assembled a web of interlocking threat actor sets whose primary or secondary aims are to generate revenue, including the groups known as APT38, Andariel and the Lazarus Group, some of the world’s most active and successful e-crime syndicates. Their combined operations have generated several billion dollars for the Kim regime. That North Korea’s annual foreign trade volume, long its chief source of hard currency, has not surpassed $3 billion since 2019 underscores the impact of this new revenue stream.</p> -<p>李續指，從這個角度去理解 SWHK 的活動，「所以我會同意一部份 SWHK members 同一部份 SWHK 嘅活動，係同制裁有關嘅，但係我唔同意全部嘅活動、全部嘅 members 都支持制裁。」李續指：「我都唔同意 SWHK 係為咗制裁而去成立嘅一個組織」，他重申有一個共識是爭取當時香港的自由民主，「而頭先講嘅制裁就係一個 means（手段），同意𠵱個 course of action 嘅 member 就同意咁做。」</p> +<p>Among national cyber strategies, Pyongyang’s is unique. North Korea was likely the first country to generate illicit revenue via cybercrime, and to the extent that any other countries have experimented with cyber-criminal statecraft, North Korea remains by far its largest practitioner. Its threat actors have benefited from robust ties to the global underground, from hacker forums and off-the-shelf malware vendors to high-level network access brokers and transnational money laundering networks. North Korea’s repertoire comprises a wide range of activities typically associated with non-state criminals rather than state actors. Of these, theft from major enterprises is the most profitable, but by no means the only, core element. North Korean threat actors have launched ransomware campaigns, solicited fraudulent investments, hijacked other users’ processing power to mine cryptocurrency, stolen customer payment information from e-commerce websites, and programmed ATMs to dispense cash for collection by networks of money mules, among other pursuits. Capitalising on the prevalence of remote work and outsourcing since the Covid-19 pandemic, North Korea has steered many of its skilled programmers into freelance IT work, performing services such as web development and database creation for foreign companies under false identities – activities that would be legal if not for sanctions. The thousands of workers engaging in these activities, many of whom operate from Russia or China, cumulatively bring in millions of dollars per year. In addition to generating income, they may enable future compromises by planting malware in company systems or gathering data to inform social engineering schemes that involve deception of unsuspecting employees. Lesser North Korean cyber-criminals engage in petty e-crime, such as online gaming and casino scams, which are not lucrative individually but scale easily.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指眾籌收支表中文版會用花巧言辭-例如制裁港共-以鼓勵人捐錢">李宇軒指眾籌收支表中文版會用花巧言辭 例如「制裁港共」 以鼓勵人捐錢</h4> +<p>The characteristics that distinguish virtual assets make them attractive targets for criminal exploitation. Having surpassed the trillion-dollar market capitalisation threshold in 2021 and remained near or above it since, the cryptocurrency space is awash with cash, the critical factor for opportunistic cyber-criminals, who follow the money above all. Market actors have often prioritised breakneck innovation and user growth at the expense of due attention to compliance and cyber security, leaving large pots of assets under-protected against highly motivated thieves. Users and investors drawn to the prospect of fast and high returns frequently exercise insufficient care in guarding against scammers. Criminals looking to fly under the radar benefit from the space’s emphasis on privacy and, in many circles, its scepticism or outright antagonism toward regulatory authorities and traditional compliance practices perceived as intrusive or burdensome. Instantaneous, borderless transactions enable malign actors to quickly abscond with ill-gotten funds, while decentralisation enables buck-passing with respect to compliance, investigation and victim support. The rapid rise of DeFi and the advances in decentralisation, speed and automation it heralds have increased virtual assets’ appeal to North Korean cyber-criminals in particular. As the US Department of the Treasury assessed in April 2023, “many existing DeFi services covered by the BSA [Bank Secrecy Act] fail to comply with AML/CFT obligations, a vulnerability that illicit actors exploit”.</p> -<p>李提及昨日庭上展示的「重光團隊」網站截圖，有「全球登報制裁港共眾籌計劃」的收支報表，當時組員討論如何鼓勵其他人捐款，「我記得當時有𠵱個共識，就住中文版嚟講，flowery language（花巧的言辭）會比較容易鼓勵識睇嘅人捐錢」，而對於不懂中文或閱讀英文的人，「當時就覺得係比較用中性啲嘅字眼，就會比較容易 encourage 到人捐錢」，因此網站上公佈的收支報表，中英版本之間會有不一致的情況。</p> +<h4 id="embracing-mixers">Embracing Mixers</h4> -<p>法官杜麗冰問到，李所說的花巧言辭是哪些。李指「制裁港共」，與英文版的「Advocacy for Hong Kong」有出入。被問到「港共」的意思，李指這字眼是「形容香港政府與中共相關」，但並非意指香港政府就等如中共。</p> +<p>Mixers enable North Korean cyber-criminals to launder dirty cryptocurrency with increased speed and anonymity by blending their holdings together with those of many other users. Traditional mixers operate a custodial model, commingling user deposits in a large pool and then returning “clean” funds to their original owners, less a small fee. Relying on a central operator, however, presents counterparty risk and creates opportunities for compromise or law enforcement interdiction, as cases such as the ChipMixer seizure have demonstrated. To solve these problems, some newer mixers employ a non-custodial approach, in which smart contracts – blockchain-based programs that execute automatically when given conditions are met – tumble users’ holdings without ever placing them under a central operator’s control. Non-custodial mixers such as Tornado Cash offer enhanced security, reduce platform administrators’ direct involvement in daily operations, and greatly diminish the possibility of unauthorised asset seizure. While there are plenty of legitimate reasons for law-abiding cryptocurrency owners to wish to use these sorts of privacy tools, most mixers practise minimal compliance, if any, and many were designed explicitly to facilitate illegal transactions. As Chainalysis noted in a mid-2022 review of mixing services’ regulatory obligations, “We aren’t aware of any custodial mixers currently following [US compliance] rules”.</p> -<p>代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻則提議，「港共」的英文翻譯可以是「Hong Kong Communists」。李同意這譯法接近「港共」的原本意思。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jPaSjv9.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>Figure 1: Life Cycle of a Sample North Korean Mixer Transaction</em></p> -<p>被問到「港共」一詞想帶出什麼訊息，李指即是香港政權與共產政權有關，暗示共產黨。他又指，雖然當時字眼沒有提及「中共」，但當時覺得「港共」相比起「香港」是一個帶較強烈感情（more charged）的描述，可用以呼籲人們捐錢。</p> +<p>North Korean cyber-criminals have embraced using mixers to launder stolen funds, which now represents a core component of North Korea’s cryptocurrency theft protocols. According to Chainalysis, the percentage of ill-gotten North Korean cryptocurrency that flowed through mixing services grew from under 10% in 2018 to 65% in 2021. North Korean actors laundered more than $1 billion from at least 10 separate operations through Tornado Cash alone prior to the mixer’s designation in August 2022, including from the January 2022 Qubit hack and the June 2022 Horizon Bridge hack. They processed $20 million from the massive March 2022 Axie Infinity hack through Blender and several tens of millions from the aforementioned operations and others, like the September 2020 KuCoin heist, through ChipMixer. In 2023, North Korean cyber-criminals turned to alternative platforms, whisking funds from the Atomic Wallet hack through a new Bitcoin mixer called Sinbad and more than $60 million of Ethereum from Horizon Bridge through the Railgun privacy protocol. Employing a variety of mixers distributes risk across multiple platforms, but also reflects the need to replace services that have shut down.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒確認他曾管理重光團隊網站">李宇軒確認他曾管理「重光團隊」網站</h4> +<p>Most illicit actors use mixers in similar fashion – after all, the point is to blend in with the crowd – but certain characteristics mark North Korea’s use. For one, North Korean actors are among the largest mixer users in the world, accounting for 30% of the funds that sanctioned entities tumbled in 2022, behind only the Hydra darknet marketplace. They appear more inclined toward using mixers than most other cryptocurrency thieves, as less than 20% of the proceeds of non-North Korean cryptocurrency hacks flowed through mixers in 2022. According to Elliptic, illicit North Korean funds comprised 70% of Railgun’s total receipts as of early 2023. In practice, North Korean cyber-criminals have fewer mixer options to choose from than less prolific outfits. As a general rule, the larger a mixer’s pool of assets and users, the stronger the anonymity it can provide; conversely, investigators are generally better able to trace dirty assets through a tumbling protocol with lower volume. Only a handful of platforms can accommodate tens of millions of dollars in North Korean-controlled cryptocurrency in one shot without becoming useless, and authorities can even “de-mix” transactions through certain larger platforms. North Korean launderers often add further layers of obfuscation by employing multiple mixers and bridging funds across blockchains, a practice known as chain-hopping. Of course, the end uses of North Korean virtual asset crime – supporting the regime’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, among other purposes – distinguish it from operations whose perpetrators seek personal profit. Nonetheless, North Korea’s money-laundering methodologies largely overlap with those of other sophisticated cyber-criminals.</p> -<p>控方問及「重光團隊」網站是何時設立。李表示不記得，因為若果沒記錯的話，網站應該是由一名叫 Kirin Bumper 的人設立，而他在後來才被加入管理網站。不過他當時並沒有在網站編輯或發布過任何內容，直至後來 Kirin Bumper 打算將網站完全交給李和其他組員管理，李相信可翻查網頁編輯紀錄來得知相關日子。</p> +<h4 id="government-responses">Government Responses</h4> -<p>至於「重光團隊」的事務由誰管理，李指「由組員一齊傾」，負責執行活動的人則是大家透過共識來決定。</p> +<p>Having begun formulating AML/CTF frameworks for virtual assets in the decade prior, global regulators moved in the late 2010s to account for the emergence of mixers. The FATF, the international standard-setting organisation, updated its core recommendations in October 2018 to apply to virtual assets and virtual asset service providers (VASPs), and in June 2019 it adopted an Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15 detailing how its rules should apply to that ecosystem in practice. Accompanying guidance for implementing a risk-based approach to regulating virtual assets and VASPs expressed concern at “the rise of anonymity-enhanced cryptocurrencies (AECs), mixers and tumblers, decentralised platforms and exchanges, and other types of products and services that enable or allow for reduced transparency and increased obfuscation of financial flows”. The FATF subsequently identified mixer use as a “red flag” indicating users’ possible “intent to obscure the flow of illicit funds”. The FATF urges governments to ensure that VASPs can manage the risks associated with operating or transacting with mixers, and to ban providers that are incapable of or unwilling to do so.</p> -<p>控方展示由李宇軒製作的「G攬運動」收支報表和李的花旗銀行戶口紀錄，顯示在2020年2月28日，有一筆約42萬元美金（約327萬港元）的款項歸還給李，而轉帳人是「Project Hong Kong Trust」的美國 Amalgamated Bank 帳戶。李確認他當時要求 Project Hong Kong Trust 歸還他曾墊支的款項。</p> +<p>US and UK regulators have established similar frameworks. The US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a pair of documents in May 2019 to clarify VASPs’ obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and to warn that “FinCEN and US law enforcement have observed unregistered entities being exploited or wittingly allowing their platforms to be utilised by criminals in the United States and abroad to further illicit activity”. The FinCEN guidance asserts explicitly that mixers fall under the purview of the BSA, building on a 2008 administrative ruling that classified anonymising services as money transmitters and on 2013 guidance concerning virtual currency use and exchange. Importantly, these determinations oblige regulable VASPs to comply with key AML policies such as the Travel Rule, which requires financial institutions to convey certain information about funds they transmit. Heeding encouragement from the FATF and calls from its own National Crime Agency to address mixers “churning criminal cash”, the British government revised its AML legislation in 2022 and implemented the Travel Rule for virtual assets in September 2023. US and UK regulators are working actively with global partners to strengthen the framework governing anonymising technologies such as mixers and to achieve more robust implementation of AML/CTF standards.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指-mark-simon-歸還款項條數唔夾-惟陳梓華未安排歸還差額">李宇軒指 Mark Simon 歸還款項「條數唔夾」 惟陳梓華未安排歸還差額</h4> +<p>Mixers initially appeared on law enforcement authorities’ radar as facilitators for money laundering and internet crime, rather than as vectors of North Korean national security threats. In May 2019, the Dutch financial crime agency and Europol took down BestMixer, at the time one of the three largest mixing platforms, with Europol commenting that “the investigation so far into this case shows that many of the mixed cryptocurrencies on BestMixer.io had a criminal origin or destination”. Culminating an investigation launched the previous summer, the BestMixer intervention appears to have been the first such law enforcement action. In 2020, FinCEN levied a $60 million civil penalty against the primary operator of the Helix Bitcoin mixer for wilfully and systematically violating the BSA in the course of servicing more than three dozen illicit darknet marketplaces, a few months after his indictment on federal money laundering charges. In April 2021, US authorities arrested a dual Russian–Swedish national “on criminal charges related to his alleged operation of the longest-running bitcoin money laundering service on the darknet”, the Bitcoin Fog mixer, which achieved “notoriety as a go-to money laundering service for criminals seeking to hide their illicit proceeds from law enforcement”. That summer, FinCEN assessed a $100-million penalty against BitMEX, a cryptocurrency exchange and derivative trading platform, for BSA infractions that included facilitating thousands of transactions with mixers like Helix.</p> -<p>控方又指，「G攬運動」收支報表可見三筆交易，金額分別為40萬、約33萬和約46.9萬美元，分別在2019年11月4日、2020年1月7日和2月3日，由「Funder 2」轉帳至「Project Hong Kong Trust」戶口。</p> +<p>North Korea’s brazen string of cryptocurrency hacks in 2021 and 2022, as well as the high-profile Colonial Pipeline and JBS ransomware crises of 2021 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prompted an evolution in how officials tend to view illicit mixer use, from a criminal tool to a direct national security threat. In October 2021, the White House launched the Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI), bringing together dozens of governments to develop cyber-security and AML standards and to coordinate action against the perpetrators and facilitators of cyber-criminal extortion. The UK and Singapore have jointly spearheaded much of the CRI’s work on mixers, co-leading a working group on countering illicit finance in 2022 and the CRI’s policy arm in 2023. The US Department of the Treasury’s February 2022 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, which includes a full sub-section on virtual assets and a sub-header therein on anonymity-enhancing technologies, names North Korean, Russian and Iranian threat actors as primary exploiters of those services, noting that “ransomware attacks … frequently stem from jurisdictions with elevated sanctions risk” and that “ransomware payments may … fund activities that harm US national security”. The Department’s April 2023 report, Illicit Finance Risk Assessment of Decentralized Finance, the most comprehensive government report on this topic at the time of writing, treats North Korean mixer use extensively, noting that “the DPRK … increasingly steals virtual assets from both centralized VASPs and DeFi services” and that North Korean cyber-criminals “are using DeFi services in the process of transferring and laundering their illicit proceeds”. The report offers in-depth suggestions for curtailing this activity by building regulatory capacity and expanding collaboration with foreign and private sector partners.</p> -<p>李解釋，這三筆款項是 Mark Simon 將眾籌款項轉帳給「Project Hong Kong Trust」，因為 Mark Simon 較早前借出銀行戶口替「G攬運動」接收和「hold 住」眾籌款項，直至後來「Project Hong Kong Trust」準備好銀行戶口，Mark Simon 便歸還眾籌款項。而 Mark Simon 屬於「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」，換言之「Funder 2」即是代表「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」。</p> +<p>Since early 2022, global authorities have dramatically ramped up efforts to disrupt North Korean illicit mixer use and experimented with new tools for doing so. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued its first-ever designation of a mixing service in May 2022, sanctioning Blender for obfuscating tens of millions of dollars in North Korean proceeds from the Axie Infinity heist.</p> -<p>控方指，上述三筆 Mark Simon 歸還的款項總和是120萬美元，惟網站公佈的「G攬運動」收支報表顯示，代號「Funder 2」的 Mark Simon 接收了約177.2萬元美金，兩筆數有差距。</p> +<p>Asked a few months later about North Korea’s cyber activities, Anne Neuberger, US Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology, commented, “Given that cyber is such a core driver of revenue, it’s something we must address … We’re doubling down and planning to do much more work to make it riskier, costlier, and harder for North Korea to gain funds that way”. The US government’s most prominent mixer action to date has been its August 2022 designation of Tornado Cash, which demonstrated OFAC’s ability to target platforms without a traditional centralised operating entity while also provoking much private sector ire, including well-funded legal challenges. Undeterred, US authorities revised and expanded the Tornado Cash designation and recently indicted two of the service’s alleged operators, one of whom was arrested in Washington state. Last year, international coalitions took down ChipMixer, whose servers and nearly $50 million in cryptocurrency holdings were seized by the German Federal Criminal Police, and Sinbad, which OFAC designated in November. In a noteworthy development, in October 2023 FinCEN proposed a new rule that would classify mixing as a transaction class of primary money laundering concern and impose substantial new record-keeping and reporting requirements on domestic participants. If implemented, the proposal would represent a novel exercise of the US Department of the Treasury’s authorities under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, with which it has previously targeted only individual foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions.</p> -<p>李解釋，因為「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」曾經墊支登報費用，所以這部份款項不需要歸還，若 Mark Simon 把眾籌款項扣除墊支了的登報費，便當作是直接發還了開支。不過李指，若將 Mark Simon的 三筆還款加上墊支費用，總數不是相等於177.2萬元美金，他曾就此問題與陳梓華商討，「就話條數唔夾，其實應該有多啲嘅錢畀返 Project Hong Kong Trust。」他並製作了收支報表，要求陳安排歸還差額。</p> +<h3 id="ii-analysis">II. Analysis</h3> -<p>李指相關款項是大約一萬或者幾萬元美金，不會多於10萬元美金，當時陳僅回覆「佢會搞」，但以李所知，陳並沒有安排歸還欠款。李指由於 Project Hong Kong Trust 帳戶非由他控制，「所以到最尾我唔清楚有冇多咗錢入去個戶口⋯⋯ in any event，至少T（陳梓華）冇同我講。」</p> +<h4 id="evaluating-interventions-to-date">Evaluating Interventions to Date</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒指群組成員就是否籌辦第四次登報意見不一-最終決定不登報-部份人因而離開群組">李宇軒指群組成員就是否籌辦第四次登報意見不一 最終決定不登報 部份人因而離開群組</h4> +<p>This chapter takes stock of the US-led campaign against virtual asset mixers through its first two years. The first portion assesses seven major interventions against platforms and considers their overall impact on North Korea’s money laundering capacity. The second portion outlines the unintended consequences that actions against mixers can trigger, and explores possible mitigations.</p> -<p>李供稱，第三次眾籌及登報的「G攬運動」中，錄得大約一半餘款，當時在其中一個「G攬」群組中，組員關注若果任由剩下的款項原封不動，便可能引來懷疑或指控「G攬嗰度會唔會落格」，大家曾經作出討論，有人認為籌辦多一次登報便可花費剩下的款項，也有人質疑登報是否爭取香港自由民主的最好方法。李指組員最終決定不籌辦多一次登報，但同時沒有其他活動方案，「就真係由得啲錢擺喺度，睇吓嚟緊有咩想做、有咩值得去做。」</p> +<p>Viewed through the narrow lens of impact on the target platform, government interventions against mixers facilitating North Korean money laundering have achieved success. Blender shut down shortly after its designation, removing one of North Korean cyber-criminals’ favourite options for mixing Bitcoin. Indeed, Chainalysis reports that roughly 90% of the funds North Korean actors mixed in Q2 2021 passed through Blender. ChipMixer likewise ceased operations following the Germany- and US-led intervention, and Europol anticipates that the four servers and seven terabytes of data seized in the takedown will catalyse further investigations. In the more complicated case of Tornado Cash, the OFAC designation has resulted in a transaction volume decrease of over 80% as of late 2023, shrinking the platform’s pool of mixable funds and in turn significantly degrading its effectiveness at obfuscating asset movements, especially for larger-volume users. According to Chainalysis, after the designation “Tornado Cash … saw drops in inflows from virtually every category” of sender, including funds from thieves and sanctioned entities. As a portion of the total funds North Korean cyber-criminals mixed, Tornado Cash flows declined to under 25% in Q4 2022, following four consecutive quarters of these actors’ pushing essentially all their stolen cryptocurrency through Tornado Cash at some point in the laundering process, which typically involved bridging and layering with other services. Western authorities have arrested two of Tornado Cash’s three alleged “principal” co-founders and in August 2023 unsealed a remarkably detailed indictment indicating that the men deliberately sought to create a “haven for criminals to engage in large-scale money laundering and sanctions evasion”. On an individual basis, these tactics have proven potent, removing or seriously compromising platforms North Korea has relied on to launder dirty virtual assets. Considered together, they have reshaped the cryptocurrency mixer landscape.</p> -<p>李指，在上述討論尾聲「咁就有個 split」，有一部份同意不登報的組員，便繼續留在群組中；「而覺得淨係想登報嘅嗰啲人，就離開咗個『G攬』team」，因為該些人想辦多一次登報，「而你哋決定唔繼續做，所以佢哋就走。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/B1bRseB.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>Table 1: Notable Interventions Against Mixers</em></p> -<p>李指，該些想登報的人離開群組之後，在大約2019年10月1日前後籌辦了一個「賀你老母」的眾籌登報計劃，不過他並沒有參與其中。</p> +<p>Still, in some cases governments have fallen short. Despite its reduced functionality, Tornado Cash continues to operate because it runs on smart contracts that authorities are unable to seize or shut down directly, as they could a centralised server or custodial entity. Some users, including North Korean actors, have continued engaging the platform to obscure illicit fund trails, albeit in lesser amounts. This situation reveals a major limitation on authorities’ ability to counter decentralised, smart contract-based mixers, and raises questions about whether measures against similar platforms will be effective in the future. The first action against such an entity, the Tornado Cash designation, has also suffered from a lack of clarity, which generated marketplace confusion as to the extent of the restrictions and liability for interacting, even unwittingly, with the service. These issues and the aforementioned court challenges prompted OFAC in November 2022 to de-list the platform and redesignate it under a broader justification, as well as to publish answers to market actors’ frequently asked questions.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指2019年底g攬和重光團隊整合">李宇軒指2019年底「G攬」和「重光團隊」整合</h4> +<p>Beyond the complexities of the Tornado Cash case, several other interventions that met the core goal of taking a malign service offline did not accomplish secondary goals such as arrests or property seizures. The operators of ChipMixer and Blender remain at large, and reports indicate that the administrator of the latter may have absconded with as much as $22 million in Bitcoin and remains involved in operating dirty mixers. While multimillion dollar virtual asset seizures impose heavy costs on criminals and may help compensate their victims, few have accounted for more than a small fraction of the total amount the illicit actors in question are known to have processed or taken in profits. These shortcomings should not take away from the altogether impressive results that government interventions have achieved against mixing platforms themselves.</p> -<p>李表示，在群組成員討論期間，他和網名「T」的陳梓華均不同意進行第四次登報。二人曾經一度離開群組，但在實務層面考慮，如果李和陳都離開群組的話，未來的登報計劃便會面臨財政壓力，因為未必有另一個人能夠墊支廣告費用，「唔知係咪因為咁樣，定係後來大家共識係唔再登報」，結果群組成員決定不籌辦登報，之後李便重新被加入群組。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/L8pIIu0.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>Table 2: Tactical Outcomes of Notable Interventions Against Mixers</em></p> -<p>李憶述，他重新加入群組之後，曾經有一段時間，群組成員之中有部分人認同「G攬」團隊的身份，同時也有部份人認同「重光團隊」的身份，不過當時沒有迫切性去處理這個形式問題。李指，以他所理解，反而「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人在英國當地舉辦公開活動、印製橫額或會見國會議員時，他們會逐漸使用「重光團隊」的口號和標誌。不過直到大約2019年底，「G攬」和「重光團隊」有進行整合，並將一些合併了的群組重新命名為「重光團隊」，但實際上的日常運作與之前並沒有分別。</p> +<p>The ultimate strategic outcome of authorities’ campaign to disrupt North Korean revenue streams by pursuing dirty mixers remains to be seen, but initial indications have been somewhat discouraging. Every intervention so far has achieved degradation of the target platform, only for replacements or reincarnations to quickly absorb much of its transaction volume. A prominent blockchain investigator privately described the Tornado Cash designation, whose bite on the platform itself has been evident, as a “blip” for North Korean cyber-criminals, who adapted quickly by re-routing illicit asset flows through other service.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱2019年831曾與英議員bob-seely晚飯-談論香港狀況">李宇軒稱2019年8.31曾與英議員Bob Seely晚飯 談論香港狀況</h4> +<p>Elliptic reported in February 2023 that Sinbad, one of the preferred tumblers of North Korean threat actors from late 2022 until its designation last November, was very likely a relaunched version of Blender. In fact, as discussed at length in the next section, taking down a platform may prompt users to shift not just to comparable substitutes but to more powerful anonymising tools. Considering the abundant alternatives and the ease with which developers can launch a new mixer, it has become apparent that compromising individual platforms may not have an enduring effect on the mixer ecosystem’s overall capacity. It is plausible that these interventions have delayed cash-outs to North Korean actors and raised transaction costs, and authorities have managed to interdict small but non-trivial North Korean illicit fund movements. These actions have injected a degree of uncertainty into the laundering process, demonstrating that stolen funds are always vulnerable and forcing cyber-criminals to engage with platforms of unknown pedigree. Nevertheless, the campaign so far has not substantially impaired North Korea’s ability to mix cryptocurrency. With this conundrum in mind, FinCEN’s October 2023 proposal that mixing be classified as a transaction category of primary money-laundering concern is especially intriguing. Could targeting mixing transactions as a class have greater impact than going after facilitators one by one? Whether through this type of action or other means, authorities may need to broaden their approach in order to curtail North Korea’s monetisation of cyber-criminal statecraft.</p> -<p>控方展示「重光團隊」網站公佈的工作匯報，其中一項提到「成功邀請 Bob Seely MP 於8月31日到港觀察示威」。李憶述，在2019年8月31日之前，「攬炒巴」透過 Telegram 告知他英國國會議員 Bob Seely 想來港觀察示威，希望香港方面會有人接應，於是李宇軒、前學民思潮成員李宗澤（Wilson Li）和其他人一同幫忙。</p> +<h4 id="reckoning-with-unintended-consequences">Reckoning with Unintended Consequences</h4> -<p>李宇軒記得李宗澤負責大部份流程相關的工作，而他曾經與 Bob Seely、李宗澤和其他人，在銅鑼灣一間酒店食晚飯，期間向 Bob Seely 談論有關香港發生的事。李續指，「唔知係 Wilson 定係另一啲人，咁就帶 Bob Seely 落咗場去睇示威，因為嗰晚附近都有出咗 tear gas。」而李宇軒則沒有落場。</p> +<p>Unintended consequences can undermine or even reverse achievements in the fight against North Korea’s digital illicit finance. For example, intervening may require authorities to expose sensitive capabilities such as the ability to trace funds through reputedly opaque technologies or to secure cooperation from a state or platform regarded as hospitable to criminals. Revealing valuable sources and methods may prompt cyber-criminals to adapt by shifting away from compromised partners and improving operational security. In 2017, for example, US and European law enforcement took down AlphaBay, a massive darknet marketplace for illegal goods and services of all kinds. A few years later, the platform relaunched with stronger security protocols designed to prevent such disruptions, including a requirement that users transact only in the “anonymity-enhanced” Monero cryptocurrency as well as a decentralised hosting system that purports to defend against seizures and infrastructure compromises. A related drawback is that shutting down platforms that authorities have quietly infiltrated reduces visibility into malign actors’ fund movements and evolving tactics, techniques and procedures. Several blockchain analysts from firms that work with governments expressed concern in interviews that the Blender, ChipMixer and Sinbad actions, among others, had shuttered key windows into North Korean criminals’ activities, which they argued could leave authorities less well positioned to track and act against future activity.</p> -<p>控方問，帶 Bob Seely 觀察示威現場的目的是什麼。李指：「Bob Seely 佢想親身用佢對眼去睇香港發生咩事，咁當時香港一啲街頭示威，以當時嘅香港嚟講，係比較重要嘅事，所以 Bob Seely 就去咗睇示威喇。」控方問是否關於香港當時的社會動亂（social unrest）。李則表示：「我諗我會總結做當時香港嘅自由同民主」，又指：「啲人對於當時人權自由狀況有好多不滿，所以有好多 street demonstration。」</p> +<p>Taking out non-compliant platforms may simply push bad actors further into the shadows of the underground, where they can be harder for law enforcement to reach. A few days after the AlphaBay intervention, administrators of BitMixer – then the most popular tumbler – shut down their platform too, citing the realisation that truly anonymising Bitcoin transactions was impossible, and encouraging illicit-minded users to switch to anonymous-by-design privacy coins instead. Blockchain analysts and government officials report significant difficulty tracking privacy coins, whose utility to North Korean actors seems to be constrained more by impermanent challenges such as low liquidity and exchangeability than by any inherent operational shortcoming. Troublingly, use by North Korean actors of privacy coins, especially Monero, and privacy-enhanced operating systems like TRON, a favourite of terrorist groups, has grown sharply in recent years. Beyond mixers, North Korean threat actors have increasingly turned for laundering solutions to technologies like privacy wallets, which enable users to participate in obfuscating procedures known as CoinJoins. As with decentralised mixers like Tornado Cash, CoinJoins involve non-custodial transactions, meaning privacy wallets are not vulnerable to disruption or seizure in the way that centralised platforms such as Blender or ChipMixer are. Providers such as Wasabi Wallet and Samourai Wallet have facilitated North Korean money laundering after major heists, such as the $281-million KuCoin exchange hack in September 2020, and strike many investigators as substantially more difficult to crack than the mixers that authorities have dismantled so far. On the whole, while shutting down a dirty mixer or rendering it ineffective may be a short-term tactical victory, the net strategic result may be to induce North Korean cyber-criminals to pivot toward more hardened protocols, exacerbating the challenge overall.</p> -<p>有關是次接見 Bob Seely 想達到什麼目標，李指為了幫助「攬炒巴嗰邊」接見 Bob Seely，然後 Bob Seely 回到英國後，「就可以繼續 whatever 佢同攬炒巴搞緊嘅嘢」，而相關工作整體而言是有關提高對香港民主自由的關注，惟李對二人之間的具體工作並不清楚。</p> +<p>Interventions may cause detrimental second-order impacts in the broader virtual asset ecosystem. Popular mixers and illicit marketplaces can be highly profitable to run, and the unexpected shutdown of a market leader creates a tremendous incentive for other actors to offer replacement services in order to meet the unfulfilled user demand. Reviewing the effects of an important recent action, analysts at TRM Labs commented, “The vacuum left by Hydra’s takedown resulted in a veritable ‘Cambrian explosion’ in [darknet markets], with at least a dozen illicit projects having surfaced in its place”. Elliptic found in late 2022 that the Tornado Cash designation had led to an analogous situation, and identified several new or as yet relatively unknown platforms that had begun competing for suddenly available market share. In addition to Sinbad, North Korean actors have passed tens of millions of dollars of virtual assets from recent heists through Railgun, a decentralised privacy protocol that purports to serve professional investors but which FinCEN considers a mixer. Although less established services tend to have lower throughput and fewer users, limiting the privacy benefits they can provide, dispersal across multiple nascent platforms may make it harder to build a complete picture of North Korean activity. Similarly, targeted bans or punitive measures levied against specific entity categories may spur responsive innovation outside the scope of the action. This phenomenon might manifest as a negative or a positive: developers could seek to build compliant solutions or to innovate around the letter of the law just enough to avoid punishment. Other possible market effects include spooking developers into offshoring – moving to more permissive jurisdictions beyond the reach of responsible authorities – and, counterintuitively, enhancing sanctioned actors’ capabilities by raising the prices criminal facilitators can command, thereby attracting more sophisticated partners to enter the marketplace.</p> -<p>李指，有關是次會見 Bob Seely 的支出，他向第二次眾籌的「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃報銷費用，因為是次會見與英國有關。他並指，款額「我諗應該唔夠幾萬蚊港紙」。</p> +<p>In an industry where relations between authorities and developers are often particularly antagonistic, aggressive measures against virtual asset platforms risk further alienating the private sector and intensifying the misalignment that undermines efforts to combat North Korean cybercrime. Since market actors drive digital financial innovation and serve as the gatekeepers of the virtual asset marketplace, building an ecosystem inhospitable to crime will depend at least as much on private sector buy-in as on government intervention. While widespread industry adoption of standards such as Know Your Customer would go a long way towards curbing malign activity, sustained apathy or resistance to cyber security and compliance will only worsen endemic cybercrime. In other words, whatever an enforcement action’s short-term outcome, the private sector’s response may shape much of its net effect in the long run. Accordingly, while authorities must react firmly to threats and misconduct, officials should be mindful of how industry is likely to perceive their actions, and seek to shrink the gulf between the public and private sectors. Moreover, the fact that most mixer users are not criminals means that interventions inflict collateral damage on law abiding customers. Just as they do for criminals, enforcement actions may restrict ordinary users’ access to mixers, reduce their efficacy, or raise the cost of using them. Chainalysis has determined that, since early 2022, the proportion of mixed funds originating from illicit sources has grown, which may increase the risk to non-criminal users of violating sanctions or of having their assets caught in a seizure. Regrettably, until platforms with the will and capacity to perform sufficient compliance emerge – some do appear to be in development or in preliminary stages of deployment – infringement on ordinary users will likely remain a necessary cost of fighting North Korean cybercrime. As is practicable, authorities should seek to minimise these impacts and mitigate their actions’ negative unintended consequences overall.</p> -<p>法官杜麗冰留意到工作匯報所使用的字眼是「成功邀請 Bob Seely MP」，意味 Bob Seely 是受邀，而非主動提出來港。惟李宇軒稱他不知道事前 Bob Seely 與「攬炒巴」是如何溝通，因此他不會揣測「成功邀請」一詞的意思，他亦不知道 Bob Seely 來港的主意是由誰人主動提出。</p> +<p>Conversely, authorities should seek to encourage favourable knock-on effects. Actions designed to target North Korea may impose costs on other malign actors, including some outside the traditional cyber-criminal set. Financially motivated North Korean groups interact regularly with other elements of the global digital underground to purchase malware kits and network accesses, arrange digital infrastructure and cash-outs, and exchange technical know-how. In the course of their operations, threat actors across borders rely on an overlapping suite of tools and platforms, of which mixers are just one prominent example. According to the US Department of the Treasury, “OFAC’s investigation also identified Blender’s facilitation of money-laundering for, among others, Russian-linked malign ransomware groups including Trickbot, Conti, Ryuk, Sodinokibi, and Gandcrab”. Blender likewise processed funds from the massive Russian-language Hydra marketplace, which authorities took down a month before the US Department of the Treasury designated Blender. Criminal filings against ChipMixer describe it as “one of the most popular mixing services used by ransomware operators”, darknet markets, and even Russia’s GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate), whose operators used mixed Bitcoin to surreptitiously purchase infrastructure for hosting malware. Prominent dirty mixers and the North Korean actors who engage heavily with them share additional nexuses with illegal weapons and narcotics distributors, counterfeiters, purveyors of exploitative sexual material, and countless other criminal enterprises whose architects have gravitated toward virtual assets and digital privacy technology. These groups’ convergence of interests and tradecraft creates an opportunity for authorities to strike at multiple malign actor sets simultaneously.</p> -<p>就李宗澤的身份，李宇軒形容「佢好似對於 book 機票、酒店好熟悉」，但他除了是次接見 Bob Seely 和後來的區議會監選團之外，「平時喺 SWHK 同『G攬』嗰度，係完全見唔到佢嘅」，因此他理解李宗澤並不是任何一個團隊的成員。</p> +<h3 id="iii-recommendations">III. Recommendations</h3> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱成立香港故事公司-為處理籌款和參與社運名義問題">李宇軒稱成立「香港故事」公司 為處理籌款和參與社運名義問題</h4> +<p>This paper offers 14 recommendations for policymakers, national security practitioners, regulatory agencies and law enforcement working to counter North Korean cyber-criminals’ abuse of mixing services. The recommendations fall into three interrelated categories: broadening the approach to countering mixer exploitation through unconventional partnerships and new conceptual frameworks; building stronger cooperative relations with the private sector; and raising global cyber security and AML/CTF standards.</p> -<p>控方提到，公司註冊處紀錄顯示李宇軒在2019年9月9日註冊「香港故事有限公司」，而李是首任董事兼創辦成員。李稱除他自己之外，公司便沒有牽涉其他人。</p> +<h4 id="broadening-the-approach-to-countering-north-korean-mixer-exploitation">Broadening the Approach to Countering North Korean Mixer Exploitation</h4> -<p>就成立公司的原因，李解釋上次眾籌遇到提取款項的問題，他曾經與陳梓華討論是否需要成立一間有限責任公司（Limited Liability Company）。李亦留意到提款時牽涉了一些個人戶口，例如他自己的戶口，或非社運團體的的戶口，於是考慮開設一個社運團體的銀行戶口。李又表示，「既然我已經用咗真身份去做眾籌眾籌活動，咁就會唔會⋯⋯接住落嚟我會唔會用真身份去做 activist activities 呢？」他考慮：「如果係嘅話，會係 under 咩 activist organisation 呢？」，其中一個選項便是「我直情起一個 activist organisation 出嚟」。</p> +<p><strong>1. Institutions responsible for countering malign cyber operations should reduce barriers between teams focused on state-level and criminal threats, as well as strengthen collaboration between nation-state-specific teams.</strong></p> -<p>李表示，他與陳梓華商討之後，有共識去研究上述議題，最終開設了「香港故事」這間公司。</p> +<p>A core theme of this paper is that the lines between state and criminal activities in cyberspace and between disparate threat actor sets have become increasingly blurred. Government agencies around the world have often struggled to keep pace with these cross-cutting threats; former practitioners report burdensome delays in interagency processes, difficulty sharing information across institutions and inefficient allocations of scarce technical resources. Authorities should adjust to these trends by promoting further integration between teams responsible for state Advanced Persistent Threats, ransomware groups, virtual asset exploitation and traditional e-crime. Doing so would empower practitioners to more effectively identify and respond to overlapping threats, such as collaboration between North Korean and Russian-speaking cyber-criminal groups, as well as to capitalise on opportunities to achieve multiple victories in one fell swoop.</p> -<p>不過李補充，後來這間公司實際上並未能處理到上述議題，因為隨著「Project Hong Kong Trust」的銀行戶口成立，可以用來處理眾籌款項，所以沒有需要用到「香港故事」的戶口。至於「香港故事」作為一個社運身份，李則認為「SWHK 作為一個 pseudo organisation，佢係更加有效」，所以後來派卡片也是直接使用「重光團隊」的卡片。例如他在2019年尾會見美國參議員 Marsha Blackburn、斯科特（Rick Scott）、Todd Young 和共和黨議員克魯茲（Ted Cruz）的時候，便是使用「重光團隊」的卡片，而沒有使用「香港故事」的卡片。</p> +<p>The US Justice Department has taken laudable steps to de-silo its approach to cyber-criminal threats, having recently merged the National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team into the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section and established the National Security Cyber Section (“NatSec Cyber”), which seeks to promote “Department-wide and intragovernmental partnerships in tackling increasingly sophisticated and aggressive cyber threats by hostile nation-state adversaries”. It could be beneficial for national financial, cyber security and regulatory authorities, as well as international partnerships countering malign cyber activity, to consider forming analogous ad hoc task forces with wider mandates and more adaptable capabilities.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱曾以香港故事身份會見聯合國人權事務高級專員">李宇軒稱曾以「香港故事」身份會見聯合國人權事務高級專員</h4> +<p><strong>2. Practitioners should incorporate a robust analysis of potential unintended consequences as a standard element when planning any mixer intervention.</strong></p> -<p>控方問「香港故事」曾經進行什麼活動。李指他在2019年8月的時候，曾赴聯合國會見 Sébastien Gillioz，即聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處（OHCHR）中負責亞太地區的職員，當時使用了「香港故事」的身份。</p> +<p>Practitioners would benefit from adopting an expanded standard assessment of the potential second- and third-order effects of a proposed mixer action. Practitioners might consider:</p> -<p>李憶述相關背景，有一名叫「Sheep」的人士是聯合國的職員，在2019年8月中旬，「Sheep」告知他聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處發表一份關注香港自由民主狀況的聲明，「佢話呢個好唔尋常，因為有史以來淨係出過兩個同香港有關嘅聲明」，所以是次聲明意味「OHCHR 都重視嗰陣時香港嘅狀況」，即有關民主、自由和示威。</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Whether the target platform can be easily relaunched or reconstituted elsewhere.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The operational security adaptations the action is likely to trigger among cyber-criminals.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The replaceability of the service being targeted.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The likely alternatives cyber-criminals will adopt, and those platforms’ vulnerability to surveillance and disruption.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The extent to which the action’s success depends on industry cooperation, and the likelihood that market actors will cooperate.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The action’s probable effects on legitimate financial technology innovation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Collateral damage to non-criminal virtual asset holders.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>李續轉述「Sheep」告訴他，聯合國人權理事會（United Nations Human Rights Council）將於2019年9月在日內瓦舉行會議，如果想準備參與會議，便最好事前去聯絡 Sébastien Gillioz，因為他在 OHCHR 裡是負責中國事務的人之一。因此李便在8月赴日內瓦會見 Sébastien Gillioz，以了解當時 OHCHR 如何看香港發生的情況，同行人士還有天文物理學家 Shirley Ho 和一名叫 Adder 的人。</p> +<p><strong>3. When taking action against mixers, authorities should seek out opportunities to make arrests, seize assets and operational infrastructure and instigate favourable knock-on effects, with an eye toward achieving enduring impact on malign actor groups.</strong></p> -<p>李提到會見 Sébastien Gillioz 時，他們得悉OHCHR的職員並不滿意當時中國代表團所聲稱「development based 嘅 human right」。惟當李想進一步解釋時，法官杜麗冰打斷指，現在只需要了解相關事件背景，而不是審判在聯合國的游說工作，因此不需要詳述。</p> +<p>Actions against non-compliant mixers that remove key personnel and their resources from the field are more likely to have staying power. As the Blender and Sinbad cases reveal, motivated cyber-criminals can circumvent designations and takedowns rather nimbly. With arrests and infrastructure seizures, not to mention financial asset confiscation, authorities prevent threat actors from re-engaging in malign activity as easily and may glean useful intelligence. Targeting platforms and facilitators that service multiple malign actor sets can boost the return on investment of a single action.</p> -<p>李總結指，經過8月的會面後，他便預備資料去9月的聯合國人權理事會會議，又開設 Telegram 群組「地球香港分部」，成員包括他、「Sheep」和「我要做飯」，以討論9月的旅程。李並指曾經與陳梓華談論過此事，「佢亦都支持我去聯合國。」</p> +<p><strong>4. Policymakers and law enforcement should invest in better understanding developments in the virtual asset space and their implications for national security.</strong></p> -<h4 id="因會見美議員-李宇軒與mark-simon被加入同一群組">因會見美議員 李宇軒與Mark Simon被加入同一群組</h4> +<p>Building on the Illicit Finance Risk Assessment of Decentralized Finance, the US Department of the Treasury should launch a standing Virtual Asset Risk Board modelled on the Emerging Technology Board the US Department of Justice envisioned in its 2022 Comprehensive Cyber Review. Such a board should meet regularly and produce biannual reports analysing the economic and national security implications of developments in the virtual asset space. UK bodies such as HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority should explore establishing a similar organ with a particular focus on the robust domestic virtual asset industry.</p> -<p>控方另展示 WhatsApp 群組「Coffee on Sunday」，紀錄顯示陳梓華於2019年9月29日創立群組，當時群組成員有陳、李和 Mark Simon。李解釋，陳梓華當時問他會否會見美國參議員斯科特（Rick Scott），「我話OK」，然後陳便把他加進群組。</p> +<p>As discussed below, offices charged with countering North Korean digital illicit finance, such as OFAC and FinCEN in the US, and the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) in the UK, should increase engagement with the private sector, which is naturally better positioned to track the cutting edge of advances in virtual assets and DeFi. Tapping more deeply into the expertise of investors and developers would usefully complement national security practitioners’ points of view.</p> -<p>群組顯示 Mark Simon 傳送訊息，指美國參議員斯科特正身處香港，問李和陳是否有空會見。Mark Simon 其後表示會加入斯科特的助手 Scott Sciretta 及美國領事職員 Alan Brinker。</p> +<h4 id="building-stronger-cooperative-relations-with-the-private-sector">Building Stronger Cooperative Relations with the Private Sector</h4> -<p>李表示，在加入群組之前，他對於 Mark Simon 沒有任何認知，也不知 Mark Simon 將會一同會見斯科特。李表示，看過群組討論之後，「其後我知道佢（Mark Simon）係T（陳梓華）同黎智英嗰邊嘅」，也是收取 GoFundMe 款項及之後轉移去 Project Hong Kong Trust 戶口的人士。</p> +<p><strong>5. Regulators and financial authorities such as the US Department of the Treasury and HM Treasury should nurture the development of compliant virtual asset privacy solutions.</strong></p> -<p>控方問李何以知道 Mark Simon 與黎智英有關，李表示加入群組時並不知道，「後來唔記得喺邊度定報紙，話 Mark Simon 就係黎智英嘅 right hand man（得力助手）。」</p> +<p>Officials should encourage the private sector to bring to market new platforms that can offer enhanced privacy for cryptocurrency holders without blindly enabling money laundering. Providing clear guidance on what is or is not permissible, as well as meeting with investors and developers, would reassure upstanding market actors who otherwise might not risk their energy and capital on projects they fear will not be approved or, worse, could lead to their arrest or designation.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱會見美議員時談及香港示威-希望美國政府可以做啲嘢">李宇軒稱會見美議員時談及香港示威 「希望美國政府可以做啲嘢」</h4> +<p>The widespread availability of compliant solutions would further mark the use of non-compliant platforms as an AML/CTF red flag and likely reduce the fund volume travelling through them, making it more difficult for bad actors to disappear in the crowd.</p> -<p>控方問為何李會被邀請會見斯科特。李表示，因為當時他籌辦過國際登報活動，又出席過聯合國人權理事會會議，「咁喺國際呢條線度做過嘢，所以就想我去見 Rick Scott 喇。」他指會面目的是提高對香港人權自由狀況的關注，「同埋當時 SWHK 有啲想做國際游說，去做一啲嘢去應對香港 deteriorating 嘅自由民主狀況。」</p> +<p><strong>6. Authorities with mandates to intervene against virtual asset platforms, especially OFAC, FinCEN and the US Justice Department, should more clearly delineate the behaviours that will prompt enforcement action.</strong></p> -<p>不過李提到，當時眾人未有任何共識提出實質方案，所以當時共識是先提高關注，之後才「去做一啲嘢」，「就係希望美國去做一啲嘢」來應對香港的狀況。李續指，因此他會見議員時，僅使用一些很籠統的字眼，例如「希望美國政府採取行動」之類。</p> +<p>Justified or not, many virtual asset industry stakeholders, including some former senior government officials who now work in the private sector, have perceived US authorities’ enforcement approach as capricious and heavy handed. For the enforcement “deterrent” to work, authorities must make clear what malfeasance or inaction constitutes punishable bad behaviour – as distinct from the lesser legal and regulatory shortcomings that seem usually not to result in serious penalties in this burgeoning industry – as well as show that genuine good faith effort to avoid such bad behaviours will be rewarded with greater patience and leniency. While this issue appears most pronounced in the US, the lesson is applicable to all jurisdictions.</p> -<p>就會見議員的討論內容，李指另一位同行的「Cath」描述她在示威前線見到的場景，另外「我亦都簡單講咗香港人眾籌運動，同埋希望美國政府可以做啲嘢，同埋佢（Rick Scott）作為一個參議員，佢可以做啲嘢咁」。</p> +<p><strong>7. Regulators and national security practitioners should tailor their communications to the virtual asset industry on North Korean cybercrime by reframing the issue in economic terms.</strong></p> -<p>李稱當天的會面是他首次見到同場的 Mark Simon，惟他並未與 Mark Simon 有任何直接交談，「我淨係記得佢係肥肥地。」</p> +<p>When encouraging market actors to comply with regulations and cooperate with law enforcement, authorities should frame North Korean digital illicit finance as a threat to the survival and prosperity of the virtual asset ecosystem, rather than as a “national security” issue, or a matter of right and wrong. Those kinds of appeals may ring hollow or simply not register, especially to users and developers based outside the relevant authority’s jurisdiction and to those who view government as an adversary. Emphasising that compliance and transparency benefit market actors’ economic interests is likely to yield more enthusiastic cooperation.</p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p><strong>8. As is practicable, governments should channel messaging to the virtual asset private sector through prominent senior officials, rather than practitioners.</strong></p> -<hr /> +<p>Authorities should issue more communications on North Korean cybercrime through high-level officials. Participants in the virtual asset industry are more likely to encounter and appreciate the gravity of these kinds of statements when they come directly from principals and senior deputies in speeches or media engagements than when they come from more obscure, technical or impersonal routes, such as the official channels of national security organs.</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒指「重光團隊」組織鬆散 非所有成員支持制裁 共識是爭取香港自由民主AI, Geopolitics And Framework2024-03-20T12:00:00+08:002024-03-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-geopolitics-and-framework<p><em>This workshop report summarises what impact AI has on geopolitics, whether there is a need for a new analytical framework to capture AI’s impact on international relations, and what we can learn from other technologies and their respective impact on geopolitical developments.</em></p> +<p><strong>9. Regulators and national security practitioners should institutionalise dialogue with the virtual asset industry and adapt to market actors’ preferred communication channels.</strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>In the spirit of expanding efforts to meet with legitimate virtual asset investors and developers, bodies such as OFAC, OFSI, the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Conduct Authority should send more officials to speak at virtual asset conferences and appear on podcasts and livestreams – influential platforms that rarely feature government perspectives. The public engagement strategies developed at the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Office of the National Cyber Director, whose top leaders regularly headline both industry and grassroots events, could serve as a model. Authorities should also increase efforts to host industry stakeholders in government facilities, particularly those who are actively seeking to create compliant anonymity-enhancing platforms.</p> -<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> +<h4 id="raising-global-cyber-security-and-amlctf-standards">Raising Global Cyber Security and AML/CTF Standards</h4> -<p>Policymakers are striving to understand the use, associated risks and benefits of AI technologies. The technologies are developing at pace and often involve highly technical details. Coumpounded by the persistent hype around AI, this complexity can make it challenging for non-specialists to understand AI’s impact, including in a geopolitical context. Yet, the need to respond to disruptive technological developments is not new: International Relations scholarship has often provided useful tools, frameworks or concepts to understand how such changes impact interstate relations. Can policymakers turn to such scholarship to provide valid analytical tools to better understand AI’s impact on geopolitics? This workshop report summarises the discussion of 10 scholars, debating what impact AI has on geopolitics, whether there is a need for a new analytical framework to capture AI’s impact on international relations, and what we can learn from other technologies and their respective impact on geopolitical developments.</p> +<p><strong>10. Regulators and cyber security officials should work with the private sector to establish an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for the virtual asset industry.</strong></p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Cyber security officials should engage private sector stakeholders as well as the architects of successful ISACs, such as those serving traditional finance and the North American electric grid, to help conceptualise and implement one for the virtual asset industry. To help assuage market actors’ concerns about revealing potentially sensitive customer information, officials should inform would-be ISAC participants of their special rights and liability protections under the law. Accomplishing the creation of such a body – which experts have suggested – will require champions in both government and the private sector.</p> -<p>In November 2023, RUSI hosted an invitation-only workshop to discuss whether there is a genuine need for a new analytical framework in International Relations scholarship to grasp AI’s impact on geopolitics. RUSI convened a deliberately small number of leading International Relations scholars working on AI and other technologies to discuss the impact of AI on international relations, what can be learned from previous technological inventions on the interplay of technology and international relations, and whether a new framework or concept to analyse AI’s impact on geopolitics is needed.</p> +<p><strong>11. Financial authorities should continue efforts to build global AML/CTF capacity and advance implementation of FATF standards, and political leaders should renew their support, especially for the virtual asset Travel Rule.</strong></p> -<p>The workshop included 10 scholars and was chaired by Anthony Finkelstein, President of City, University of London, and a RUSI Distinguished Fellow. In addition to the findings from the workshop itself, invited participants were asked to fill out a survey in advance of the workshop (please see the Annex for the survey questions). Of the 10 participants who attended the workshop, six provided a survey response. An additional two responses were provided by those who were invited but did not attend. This workshop report relies on the contributions from both the survey and the workshop. All views expressed in the workshop and the survey are non-attributable.</p> +<p>Recognising that cyber-criminals and money launderers frequently exploit gaps in financial regulatory regimes, increasing global AML capacity and patching loopholes remains a fundamental component of any strategy for countering North Korean malign activity. Without the resources, technical expertise and will to perform monitoring and enforcement, even the most robust regulatory frameworks are toothless.</p> -<h3 id="context">Context</h3> +<p>According to the FATF’s latest implementation report, “jurisdictions are making limited progress implementing the FATF’s requirements on [virtual assets] and VASPs”, and “many jurisdictions seemingly do not know where to start when it comes to regulating the [virtual asset] sector for AML/CFT”. Of the 98 jurisdictions the FATF assessed in mid-2023, just 25 are largely or fully compliant. With respect to the FATF’s virtual asset Travel Rule, only 62 jurisdictions have adopted or are in the process of adopting the policy, while 127 appear to have taken no action towards implementation. Actual enforcement of the Travel Rule is presumably even less common.</p> -<p>AI technologies, their risks and opportunities, as well as their regulation and ethical challenges, are highly debated topics in UK policy circles. This is particularly the case since the launch of the UK National AI Strategy, setting out the aim of making the UK an “AI superpower”, and in the context of the UK AI Safety Summit held in November 2023. Policymakers in the UK increasingly turn to questions of AI benefits, implications and risks, including its relationship with foreign affairs and international relations.</p> +<p>Several RUSI projects have highlighted opportunities for tightening regulations and building capacity.</p> -<p>Too often, however, it is difficult for policymakers and non-technicians to grasp AI’s novel implications for familiar fields like International Relations. This is partially due to the knowledge gap on how AI technology works and how it will develop. This gap exists between technology experts and those in the social sciences and policy circles.</p> +<p><strong>12. The FATF and the governments spearheading the campaign against North Korean digital illicit finance should explore ways to expand lower income countries’ access to cyber security and blockchain analysis tools.</strong></p> -<p>Are the tools and methods currently available adequate to frame and explain AI’s impact on international relations? Or are new ones required to capture AI’s implications for interstate relations? Only where there are adequate methods to understand and communicate such impact will non-technicians and policymakers be appropriately equipped to grasp and communicate the implications that follow from AI technologies for international relations. These might be considered decisively different or similar to those of existing technologies. Reaching such understanding is, of course, a necessary pre-condition for policymakers to design effective policy interventions for AI technologies that will allow countries such as the UK to secure a strategic advantage from AI by harnessing its advantages and mitigating any arising risks.</p> +<p>North Korean cyber-criminals and money launderers often take advantage of countries that struggle to prevent illicit financial activity and cyber intrusions within their borders. Governments leading the charge against North Korean malign activity should seek to expand global access to the technical training and advanced software packages required to track illicit virtual asset flows and to protect computer networks. They should consider purchasing or subsidising those services for countries that cannot afford them at the required scale, in addition to encouraging firms to provide their services at reduced cost. Authorities should also conduct more capacity-building exchanges and expand partnerships with the private sector to train more international practitioners.</p> -<p>Academic scholarship can provide suitable and widely applied frameworks and concepts to understand technologies’ impact on international relations – such as, for example, deterrence theory as it applies to nuclear weapons and their impact on international relations during the Cold War. Even where such theory’s ability to accurately capture a technology’s impact on international relations is debatable, it can nevertheless serve as a starting point of discussion.</p> +<p><strong>13. Regulators and cyber security authorities should encourage or require market actors to adopt industry-standard security practices, especially code audits.</strong></p> -<p>AI technologies are not a completely new topic in social sciences and International Relations. That said, the recent trend has certainly led to more academic attention to AI. Whereas much academic discussion has traditionally focused on ethical implications of so-called “killer robots” and the use of AI by lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), scholars in the social sciences are now expanding their research to include areas such as AI governance and AI-enabled disinformation campaigns.</p> +<p>In 2022 alone, TRM Labs documented more than 100 major cases of cryptocurrency theft involving code exploits, which take advantage of vulnerabilities in a virtual asset platform’s architecture, or protocol attacks, which “target weaknesses in the underlying protocol or business logic of a cryptocurrency system”. The Wormhole and Qubit hacks, which led respectively to $325 million and $80 million in losses, are two recent examples of these kinds of compromises. Authorities should strongly encourage, and consider requiring, virtual asset firms to invest in robust cyber security practices, offer “bug bounties”, and engage third parties to perform thorough code audits before bringing a protocol to market.</p> -<p>RUSI’s workshop included International Relations scholars working on the implications of AI, or other technologies such as space or nuclear technologies, for international relations. Participants were invited to discuss three subject areas:</p> +<p><strong>14. Authorities should establish resource centres covering security and compliance best practices, incident response procedures and other important information for virtual asset developers.</strong></p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>AI’s impact on geopolitics (Part One).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What can be learned from the way International Relations theory and scholarship has explained previous technological inventions (Part Two).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Whether a new framework is needed to conceptualise AI’s impact on international relations (Part Three).</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>At present, far less official guidance is available to entrepreneurs looking to start a virtual asset business than to those in better established industries. Publishing basic resources that emphasise security and compliance in the virtual asset industry could go a long way towards raising standards. In addition, providing incident response templates – particularly instructions on who to contact in the event of an intrusion, which many local police teams are not equipped to handle – would encourage more victims to engage with authorities and enable swifter reactions.</p> -<h3 id="part-one-ais-impact-on-geopolitics-and-international-relations">Part One: AI’s Impact on Geopolitics and International Relations</h3> +<h4 id="further-research">Further Research</h4> -<p>There was widespread agreement that AI has a noticeable and manifold impact on international relations as well as International Relations scholarship – not least because states are addressing issues of AI governance and risk management. The impacts have also been felt as AI potentially has an effect on interstate power dynamics.</p> +<p>As governments devote growing attention to virtual asset crime, a number of critical topics remain understudied. One blind spot involves early-stage technologies that have not yet received much scrutiny. Under the current paradigm, in which market actors function as the primary drivers of innovation, authorities are stuck playing catch-up as potentially risky platforms and practices come rapidly into being. Further, most of the detailed, up-to-date commentary on developments in virtual assets is aimed at prospective users or investors, rather than at legislators, regulators, law enforcement officers or national security practitioners. Of the security-focused research in this area, some of which has been quite impactful, nearly all projects look retrospectively at events from months or years prior. Given the pace of development in this space, officials would benefit greatly from a more proactive approach on the part of researchers. What new virtual asset technologies and platforms are emerging, and what are their implications for AML/CTF and national security? It would be especially valuable to assess the privacy-enhancing services that have appeared since the Blender and Tornado Cash designations in 2022, such as Privacy Pools, and whether they may help resolve the privacy/security dilemma. Researchers can also contribute by helping translate into policy terms the complexity of important new technologies and practices, which can require specialised knowledge to understand fully. These efforts help create a window into the rather insular virtual asset developer community, building the familiarity of officials and informing their decision-making.</p> -<p>Examples of how AI impacts geopolitical dynamics included:</p> +<p>The murky legal picture surrounding virtual asset technology is another area in need of additional research. Scholars and practitioners studying international security, cybercrime and digital finance often have no formal training in law and may be insufficiently prepared to evaluate the field’s novel legal questions. In many cases, there exists no legal basis for classifying these technologies, let alone taking action to address them in real-world contexts. Indeed, several former senior US Department of Justice and Treasury officials expressed concern that new technologies and practices could seek to exploit legal grey areas, such as outdated definitions of financial institutions and legal persons subject to sanctions, or to operate beyond the current scope of government authority. Are OFAC and OFSI, law enforcement, regulators and other relevant agencies properly equipped to handle virtual asset technologies that may pose security or money-laundering risks? Do they, or will they, require new legal authorities in order to continue fulfilling their mandates? In light of FinCEN’s recent proposal to increase scrutiny of mixers under its USA PATRIOT Act powers, do governments possess capabilities for virtual asset AML/CTF that have gone undiscovered or underused? Moreover, what standards should guide officials who are navigating dual imperatives to counter urgent national security threats without infringing excessively on legitimate expression and privacy interests? These questions demand thoughtful, evidence-based answers to supplement the cacophony of op eds, lawsuits and social media posts that have so far made up much of the public discourse, which has often been dominated by participants with vested interests in resolving the debate one way or another. RUSI and other outlets have offered valuable initial efforts, but more research is sorely needed.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Applications in the military domain, including strategic stability, the laws and ethics of war, and the public perception of warfare.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Increased danger of digital authoritarianism.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Work in diplomacy, such as efficiency of consular work.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Normative challenges to existing values and considerations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The race to be leading AI development, research and implementation, including through data collection.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The perceived need for international governance of AI technologies.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<h4 id="narrowing-down-what-and-when-constitutes-impact">Narrowing Down What and When Constitutes “Impact”</h4> +<p>Having stolen more than half a billion dollars from the virtual asset ecosystem in 2023, North Korean cyber-criminals represent a serious ongoing threat to global security. Mixing platforms such as Tornado Cash, Blender, ChipMixer and Sinbad have played a critical role in North Korean actors’ laundering of illicit cryptocurrency, enabling them to funnel ill-gotten gains into the Kim regime’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes. Although ordinary thieves and scammers are ubiquitous in the virtual asset space, North Korean cybercrime is distinguished by its sheer scale and ultimate beneficiaries. The industry’s indefatigable pace of innovation, along with the complex entanglement of malign actors and legitimate users, has only served to compound the problem facing authorities.</p> -<p>Participants repeatedly debated the timeframe that applies to the question of AI’s impacts on geopolitics. The contemporary landscape differs from potential future scenarios given the rapid development of AI technologies. The assessment of what kind of development to expect and the capabilities AI technologies may develop, however, strongly depends on the taken approach: tech-optimist or doomsday scenario. The timeline envisaged is also relevant. One participant pointed out that “the actual impacts in the short, mid- and long term are somewhat unclear”. Even the question of what timeframe constitutes “the future” or “long term” is challenging.</p> +<p>Since early 2022, governments have redoubled efforts to curtail these dangerous practices, intervening directly against non-compliant mixers through takedowns and designations, whilst investing in the teams responsible for countering virtual asset crime. Taking stock of the past two years of aggressive action, authorities should be heartened by their impressive victories against individual dirty platforms, but concerned about North Korean cyber-criminals’ adaptiveness, not to mention unanticipated second-order effects in the dynamic virtual asset marketplace. Moving forward, governments should seek to broaden their approach to countering North Korean digital illicit finance through unconventional partnerships and new conceptual frameworks to cultivate stronger cooperation with the private sector and to raise global cyber security and AML standards.</p> -<p>Timeline considerations also tied to questions on whether to focus on long-term, potentially existential, risks that largely rely on speculation or to focus on AI’s contemporary impact and potential harm. One academic pointed out that this discussion was now highly politicised, tied to narratives of US–China competition and other broader trends. They argued, however, that long- and short-term impact cannot be disintegrated so easily but that these questions are instead closely tied to political considerations underlying them.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The political implications that follow from the narrative of distinguishing between long- and short-term impact were picked up by other participants. One scholar argued that such distinction is not contradictory. Nonetheless, it is vital to bridge the gap between various communities, each focusing on different types of risks (for example, the national security community and the military community).</p> +<p><strong>Alex O’Neill</strong> is a national security researcher who studies emerging technology, cyber threats and illicit finance. His current work focuses on North Korea’s financially motivated cyber operations and ties to the Russian-speaking cybercriminal ecosystem. Until 2023, Alex was an Associate at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as well as Coordinator of the Belfer Center’s Korea Project, where he co-founded and led the North Korea Cyber Working Group for three years.</p>Alex O’NeillThis paper aims to examine cryptocurrency mixers’ distinct technical, legal and regulatory dimensions and the challenges they pose to the sanctions regime. The paper provides detailed background information on North Korea’s cyber-criminal statecraft, focusing on North Korean actors’ use of mixers to launder illicitly obtained cryptocurrency.“Unconventional Practices”2024-03-25T12:00:00+08:002024-03-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/unconventional-practices<p><em>Recent strikes against the Houthis in Yemen have prompted fresh discussions on the war powers of the UK government. Yet in many ways, they have reaffirmed the existing constitutional orthodoxy.</em></p> -<p>Especially when discussing long-term and existential risk of AI technologies, academics stressed the need to consider where the information underlying assumptions comes from. Who circulates what information with what kind of intentions? What vision of technology are they trying to sell? One participant found that this increased politicisation is making their job harder. Another academic also pointed to the lack of diversity among many technology companies. Many of these companies hold a lot of information and knowledge. They shape the discourse on the impact of AI, especially when it comes to discussing potential long-term and existential risks. They may do so in a one-sided way. Another participant added that technology companies often even determine what is labelled as AI, thereby holding additional power.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>All of these points on the different perspectives, the timeframe applied and the information underlying any assumptions shape the understanding of AI’s impact on geopolitics.</p> +<p>In December 2023, 20 countries gathered to take part in Operation Prosperity Guardian, conducting freedom of navigation exercises off the Gulf of Aden. They did so in response to a series of attacks against international shipping by the Yemeni Houthi rebels, which began with the hijacking of a container ship the previous month. The attacks have caused significant disruption to international trade ever since, sending vessels sailing thousands of miles around the Cape of Good Hope and adding weeks to their journey time.</p> -<h4 id="the-approach-of-international-relations-scholarship-to-ai">The Approach of International Relations Scholarship to AI</h4> +<p>In early January 2024, after ignoring an ultimatum and attacking allied warships, the Houthis provoked a response. UK and US forces conducted limited, joint strikes across Yemen to “degrade the Houthis’ capacity to make further attacks”. More operations followed throughout January and February, with the promise to take additional action, as necessary and appropriate, to address further threats or attacks. Such actions are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.</p> -<p>The discussion identified several areas of the impact of AI on geopolitics that are – to varying degrees – addressed in International Relations scholarship. For example, one participant’s introductory remarks argued that International Relations scholars primarily address the impact of AI by focusing on four areas of study. First, the influence of AI on the balance of power is primarily addressed in areas such as war studies or strategic studies. Second, issues of AI governance are analysed by a more diverse set of scholars driven by a shared sense that some form of global AI governance is needed. Third, the same scholar further remarked that ethics questions are often primarily looked at within a military context but should be considered more broadly. Finally, disinformation and social media are widely discussed in International Relations scholarship, particularly considering the impact of deepfakes, but research in this area is often inconclusive.</p> +<p>The strikes have prompted fresh discussions about the UK’s war powers, particularly those involving the use of force below the threshold of war. Historically, the role of the legislature has been limited in the UK. Parliament is responsible for passing budgets to finance the armed forces and providing the statutory authority to maintain their existence. Yet the authority to declare and wage war remains a prerogative power vested formally in the monarch.</p> -<p>The discussion on AI’s impact on geopolitics underlined the implications that different framings have, whether on the temporal framework applied, the community and the political environment that discusses AI’s impact on international relations, or the source of information such assessment is based on in the first place. These challenges, particularly the question of timeframes, were raised throughout all stages of the workshop.</p> +<p>By convention, this wide-ranging and discretionary authority has been regarded as a “political prerogative”, exercised not by the monarch personally, but by ministers of the crown. Over the centuries, the power to make and declare war was gradually transferred from the monarch to their Cabinet, chaired by the prime minister, who possesses the final authority for any decision to use military force without a vote in Parliament. With some notable exceptions, this has been tempered by a long-standing practice of keeping the House informed on war and foreign affairs, offering debates – if not decisions – on these most serious matters of state.</p> -<h3 id="part-two-learning-from-other-technologies">Part Two: Learning from Other Technologies</h3> +<p>This view was considered orthodox until 2003 when then Prime Minister Tony Blair called an unprecedented, “one-off” parliamentary vote aimed at securing legitimacy for Operation Telic prior to the invasion of Iraq. Rebellious factions within the governing Labour Party threatened to prevent UK involvement, so he framed it as a confidence motion in both his leadership and his government, promising to resign if he lost.</p> -<p>AI technologies are by no means the first technological invention to impact international relations. From nuclear to space, and military inventions to maritime technologies, technology impacts many areas of interstate relations. Workshop participants therefore also debated how far AI technologies and their impact on geopolitics resemble that of other technologies or whether they pose unique, unprecedented challenges.</p> +<p>In the event, Blair experienced the largest rebellion within a governing party in a century. His foreign secretary resigned, and he would have suffered a heavy defeat without support from the Conservative benches; only 254 Labour MPs supported the government, far short of the 330 majority needed. Yet a mass resignation of Labour frontbenchers did not materialise, removing the possibility that political pressure would force Blair to resign, and the vote easily passed.</p> -<h4 id="how-different-is-ai-from-previous-technological-inventions">How Different is AI from Previous Technological Inventions?</h4> +<p>It was suggested that this process established a political rule known as the “war powers convention”, whereby, “save in exceptional circumstances, the House of Commons is given the opportunity to debate and vote on the deployment of armed force overseas”. Although Blair argued the vote was “entirely symbolic” and “non-binding”, both the opposition leader William Hague and successive prime ministers made explicit political commitments to uphold the convention’s spirit. Some even saw it as a stopgap prior to full statutory displacement of the prerogative, an idea prominent, if not dominant, in New Labour circles. Regardless, it has become commonplace to view the debate in terms of a “convention narrative”, with Parliament enjoying an ever-greater role in military deployments since 2011, and the prerogative ever-shrinking from view.</p> -<p>Assessments of how far AI is “a gamechanger” differed among the participants. Again, varying timeframes applied to the question. On the one hand, some considered that AI, at least in the current context, primarily amplified existing challenges or power dynamics without fundamentally challenging interstate relations. Some participants tied the impact of AI on international relations to other technologies (for example, to quantum sensing or information communication infrastructure [ICT] and cyber technologies), pointing to possible similarities and interdependencies. One participant also argued that “AI has far more in common with earlier technological inventions than is often implied in the existing literature”, at least in its current form. This could, in theory, change if artificial general intelligence comes into existence.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As Brown’s 2009 report demonstrated, a statutory war power would be either “undesirably broad” or “insufficiently flexible”, fraught with difficulties for little substantive benefit</code></em></strong></p> -<p>On the other hand, some participants found that the impact of AI is already groundbreaking. They stressed its ability to replace human factors as – unlike other technologies – it is a decision-making technology with “a degree of agency”. AI’s ability to not just replace motor skills – as was the case with previous technologies – but also “chiefly cognitive skills” was perceived as a decisive difference. As such, AI has the ability to change the quality of decision-making, with implications for the nature of international society and relations.</p> +<p>This was always somewhat illusory. Blair argued that existing practice regarding the prerogative was sufficient. There was no vote on deployments between 2003 and 2011, while a war powers statute was explored and disbanded by Gordon Brown. As Brown’s 2009 report demonstrated, a statutory war power would be either “undesirably broad” or “insufficiently flexible”, fraught with difficulties for little substantive benefit. As such, although the prerogative could be put on a statutory footing, there should be good reason for doing so. In the event, Brown argued for strengthening the convention in lieu of legislation.</p> -<p>More abstractly, as International Relations as a discipline concerns the study of interstate relations, not humans, AI fundamentally challenges this assumption, according to one discussant. Here lies the challenge to International Relations as a discipline. At the same time, it can also add to the discourse: while computer scientists focus on individual intelligence, International Relations scholars focus on collective social intelligence because the discipline is the study of groups, not the individual. As such, the field’s scholarship can make a meaningful contribution to often technology-dominated discussions on how the impact of AI on international relations is understood.</p> +<p>The convention thus became the only major change to the war powers to survive the Blair-Brown governments, persisting in various guises under David Cameron and Theresa May, albeit subject to an increasing number of caveats and exceptions.</p> -<h4 id="what-lessons-were-learned-from-other-technologies-and-their-impact-on-international-relations">What Lessons Were Learned from Other Technologies and Their Impact on International Relations?</h4> +<p>Cameron, an advocate of prerogative reform since 2006, clearly internalised much of the narrative within his understanding of foreign policy. However, his plans for reform never materialised, and his practice was far more telling than his promises. He subjected the 2011 Libyan airstrike campaign, Operation Ellamy, to a vote, winning it decisively. However, operations had already been underway for three days before this was held. When he next sought prior approval for airstrikes against Syria in 2013, he suffered a significant defeat. It proved the first time that any prime minister had been denied the authority to launch military action – authority that, legally speaking, he already had.</p> -<p>On lessons learned from other disciplines, including on how to deal with increased hype around new technological inventions, one participant remarked that in the area of space technology, camps form around “futurists” and those paying more attention to contemporary developments. While futurists primarily focus on potential technological inventions in the more distant future, possibly developed by engineers without guiding policy and strategy, those who are perhaps more grounded in pragmatism focus on the technologies that are actually being deployed. The participant remarked that a lesson learned from the space context is to “look away from the shiny stuff” and instead focus on where mass investments are being made and mass adoption is being advanced. A similar shift in attention in an AI context would contribute to moving away from the contemporary hype around AI and to guide non-technicians in navigating the technological landscape and seeing the bigger picture.</p> +<p>In contrast, when Theresa May authorised identical airstrikes against Islamic State in 2018, she preserved the substance of the convention while reinterpreting it. Relying partly on the framework set out by Cameron’s defence secretary, Michael Fallon, May launched strikes without a debate, arguing their “emergency nature” precluded consultation. She merely asserted that she was observing the convention, and that her government was acting within the framework that had been set out, even while reinterpreting its bounds to enlarge their scope.</p> -<p>Interesting lessons were also drawn in comparison to the development of nuclear technologies. A participant noted that the ownership of the development of AI – unlike that of nuclear weapons – lies with technology companies rather than states. This, for them, challenges the state-centric assumptions often underlying International Relations theory.</p> +<p>This chequered history has led many to revise their position on the convention. Consensus suggests it exists in a state of limbo. Others have gone further, arguing it no longer exists in practice.</p> -<p>Another comparison was made to the nuclear domain. Like the sanctions there, one participant expected future geopolitical considerations on AI development would likely include further sanctioning of semiconductors. This is already a powerful tool of US foreign and technology policy.</p> +<p>This is certainly true if one views it through the lens of the “convention narrative”. From this perspective, the government has evaded Parliamentary scrutiny through novel reinterpretations of its authority to act. Moreover, by refusing to displace the prerogative by statute, its actions remain effectively unconstrained.</p> -<p>Others stressed that AI technologies cannot be seen in isolation and that they do “not exist in a social vacuum”. Instead, AI technologies must be seen as a collection of technologies which are also linked to broader questions such as supply chain issues or labour market dynamics.</p> +<p>The problem is that the convention narrative presents an inaccurate picture of the prerogative. Past practice can help contextualise this. The convention has always been driven by the judgement of the prime minister as well as the authority they command in the House. Blair and Cameron chose to put their use of the war powers to a vote because their authority on these issues was relatively weak. Blair struggled to unite the sceptical left wing of the Labour Party around the idea of intervention, while Cameron’s coalition with the Liberal Democrats would probably have collapsed without a vote. The choice to put these issues to Parliament reflected both the fragile politics sustaining their governing coalitions and their own judgement of the proper relationship between Parliament and the prerogative. In the end, Blair convinced a significant majority to back his decision, while Cameron put forward a weak case and mishandled his political strategy, struggling to make the case for UK involvement.</p> -<p>While participants’ observations of how far AI technologies constitute a game changer or resemble previous technologies’ impact on international relations differed, some interesting parallels and differences were drawn. These highlighted the value of situating our understanding of AI in the broader context, both in relation to parallel political developments and dynamics around other technologies.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">When seen in context, the convention narrative looks rather thinner than its advocates suggest</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="part-three-applying-existing-theories-and-frameworks-to-ai-and-the-need-for-a-new-concept">Part Three: Applying Existing Theories and Frameworks to AI and the Need for a New Concept</h3> +<p>However, whenever the convention has been reinterpreted, the government has possessed a strong or united majority in Parliament, and could be confident of victory even if a vote was held. Operation Ellamy is the outlier, though Cameron avoided the dilemma faced by Blair in 2003, as he had international authority to act. He took strike actions over the weekend and held both a debate and a vote the following Monday, in line with what the House expected post-Iraq. The Syrian airstrikes in 2018 and the recent strikes against the Houthis were both initiated over weekends, yet debates were held the following Monday also. The first was a light-footprint operation without UK troops, the second a direct response to an attack on the Royal Navy. Neither proved controversial in the aftermath.</p> -<p>At the start of the workshop, participants were asked to place themselves on a spectrum ranging from “no new framework needed” to “new framework needed” to analyse AI’s impact on geopolitics (see Figure 1 for a rough indication). The allocations are merely indicators replicated from a whiteboard in the room and do not follow a scientific measurement. Nevertheless, they provide an overview of the different sentiments represented during the workshop.</p> +<p>None of this came at the expense of the convention. On the contrary, every prime minister since Blair has framed their actions in its terms, even when responding to novel circumstances. May asserted she had acted within its limits and worked hard to prove it, outlining a strong framework for the future exercise of the prerogative. Had she appealed to Parliament in 2018, she would likely have received the support she sought. The Conservatives enjoyed a slim majority, and divisions between opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn and his backbench MPs, many of whom supported intervention, led to rifts within the Labour Party which May could probably have used to gain cross-party support. However, she chose not to put this to the test. It was a gamble that turned on her own political judgement, and which ultimately paid off.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cjRyzgR.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Do We Need a New Framework to Understand AI’s Impact on Geopolitics?</em></p> +<p>When seen in context, the convention narrative looks rather thinner than its advocates suggest. Yet this should come as no surprise. The range of military actions the government can take varies widely, and the executive is afforded room to interpret what counts as emergency action, as well as broad discretion to act in defence of protect critical national interests. These determinations rest with the prime minister and Cabinet, who assess, interpret, and authorise the use of force. Although the perceived erosion of the convention has led to calls for a US-style War Powers Act, this has remained a fringe position for reasons beyond those in the Brown report.</p> -<h4 id="the-need-for-a-new-framework-to-capture-the-impact-of-ai-on-international-relations">The Need for a New Framework to Capture the Impact of AI on International Relations</h4> +<p>First, owing to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, any government which enjoys a cohesive enough majority in the Commons to ignore the substance of the convention could, by extension, overturn any War Powers Act intended to limit its authority. It would have to expend political capital to do so, but no more than a government seeking to ignore the current practice around the convention itself would.</p> -<p>As demonstrated in Figure 1, participants offered a wide range of perspectives and arguments on whether a new analytical framework in International Relations scholarship is needed to adequately capture and explain the impact of AI on international relations.</p> +<p>Second, and more importantly, the US experience refutes the assumptions of the convention narrative. The US president has been nominally constrained by the War Powers Resolution since 1973. Passed as a reaction to the Vietnam War, this statute was aimed at restricting the executive’s unilateral authority to wage war without Congressional involvement. While it has succeeded in preventing Vietnam-style creeping escalations, and although presidents have consistently sought Congressional approval before the major deployment of ground forces, it has fallen substantially short of its legislative intent. Noted for its own unhappy history and failure to live up to expectations, successive Republican and Democrat administrations have frustrated its provisions, adopting creative interpretations of reporting requirements and the phrase “hostilities” to authorise extended campaigns beyond statutory time limits. When pressed, presidents have argued that their actions are merely “consistent” with the Resolution’s requirements, refusing to acknowledge that they take action under its authority, and asserting the statute is an unconstitutional infringement on their office.</p> -<p>Some thought that a new framework is needed to go beyond the descriptions of aspects of AI’s impact offered by existing theories and concepts. A new framework would especially need to address AI’s ability to perform cognitive tasks and its impact on political decision-making. One participant also deemed a new framework necessary to move away from the dominant perception of AI as an arms race between big powers, overlooking smaller and medium states as well as private technology companies, which are at the heart of AI development. Whether such a new framework would rely on existing concepts that needed updating and enhancing, including from an interdisciplinary perspective, or whether a new, comprehensive theory should be developed remained subject to debate.</p> +<p>The most important element of the Resolution hinges on the 60–90 day time limit within which a president must withdraw US troops they have committed to hostilities, unless Congressional approval is granted to extend this. For the Houthi action, this was triggered when the Biden administration submitted its first War Powers Resolution report on 12 January, notifying Congress that strikes were conducted alongside the UK pursuant to the president’s authority as Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the conditions of the Resolution. This would theoretically limit the duration of the campaign to 12 April, at a maximum.</p> -<p>Others pointed to the many theories of International Relations scholarship that already apply to technological inventions more broadly. For example, the framing of the governance and technology lag, describing how technology develops faster than its respective governance, applies to an AI context. Another participant pointed to critical norm theory as a way to build on existing theoretical thinking on how AI technologies shape international norms. For specific areas such as trade and international political economy, the new trade theory was named as an example of an existing theory, adding insights to AI’s impact on geopolitics. Similarly, the theory of organisational reputation was given as an example of how an existing theory can “provide insights into why agencies react to and regulate disruptive innovations”. One scholar added that existing concepts from other disciplines such as neuroscience, psychology and philosophy are also useful tools in contributing to explaining AI’s impact on international relations.</p> +<p>However, Biden has already laid the groundwork for extending the campaign beyond this formal window. The administration has submitted a series of reports for each joint action with the UK, but none for strikes conducted without UK involvement. This has led many to speculate that Biden will continue the practice of claiming the 60-day time limit resets with each new report, or else that the US is not technically involved in “hostilities”. The Resolution’s substantive constraints are, despite appearances, quite limited in practice.</p> -<h4 id="one-theory-to-rule-them-all">One Theory to Rule Them All?</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Houthi case highlights the fact that debates and votes have been used as tools to overcome issues of authority and legitimacy</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The discussion arguing in favour of one new concept or against it was far from binary. Instead, it was often a matter of the degree to which existing theories can adequately capture AI’s impact. Participants further questioned whether there can be one theory to address AI’s impact on international relations in the first place. While one participant pointed out that the big theories – realism, constructivism and institutionalism – each offer “valuable insights into AI and the impact it may have on geopolitics”, others stressed the move away from “the big ‘isms’”. Instead, there are many more nuanced, mid-level theories aiming to address aspects of International Relations.</p> +<p>Given all of this, what do the recent Houthi strikes say about the war powers in the UK today? In many ways, they reaffirmed the old constitutional orthodoxy. Both the prime minister, Rishi Sunak, and opposition leader Keir Starmer unequivocally stated that the actions were conducted in accordance with the convention framework and past precedent. However, the prime minister also noted that:</p> -<p>Indeed, one scholar argued that “no single theory, concept or framework can comprehensively and adequately describe, analyse and reflect on the various impacts of AI. Each theory in International Relations can, however, illuminate certain aspects, risks and opportunities of AI, but none can on its own discuss, analyse and reflect on it in a comprehensive manner”. Others agreed, stating that they did not think “that one single theory, concept or framework can fully capture the impact of AI technologies as they all have their own comparative strengths and weaknesses. For this reason, a multiple theory, concept or framework is the most analytically productive”.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Fundamentally, we need to maintain the prerogative powers that allow the Executive to act in such emergencies… I am responsible for those decisions, I do not take them lightly, and Parliament is responsible for holding me to account for them.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Some noted that a comprehensive approach would be desirable to accomplish a new, overarching theory, acknowledging the tremendous challenge of developing such a theory. Others argued in favour of basing work on existing theories and updating them in line with new developments.</p> +<p>This position preserves the substance of the convention, though it is more forthright in asserting the government’s prerogative to act as it sees fit, without prior or retrospective Parliamentary assent. In this respect, Sunak followed a similar formulation to Fallon, May and US presidential practice, arguing that he acted “in accordance with” the convention while adapting it to the circumstances. He could be confident that his large majority, united behind current UK foreign policy, would support him regardless of whether he approached the House beforehand. And, like May, his decision to authorise strikes without consultation demonstrated his own personal understanding of how the war powers should operate within the bounds of the convention, and the authority he possessed to act.</p> -<h4 id="what-tool-for-what-purpose">What Tool for What Purpose?</h4> +<p>Sunak was also strengthened by the fact that, in line with convention, Starmer and the shadow defence secretary were also briefed prior to the strikes, and have endorsed the government’s actions both in public and the Commons, albeit on a case-by-case basis. Had they opposed them or been unable to convince a significant majority to support this position, pressure would have mounted on the government to change course.</p> -<p>The discussions on the need of a new framework or theory repeatedly linked back to questions of purpose, scope and intention. Participants discussed both what aspect of AI technologies a concrete framework should focus on but also what the purpose of International Relations scholarship is more fundamentally. Again, defining purpose also tied to the question of timeframes – whether a new theory would address the impact of AI on international relations now or in the future. One participant argued that, as it stands, existing concepts “have a lot to say” but that it is harder to predict future developments and how existing concepts would be able to keep up.</p> +<p>The Houthi case highlights the fact that debates and votes have been used as tools to overcome issues of authority and legitimacy. Equally, it shows how prime ministerial interpretations of the legal and political limits to their office, be that the conventions, norms or even the foundations of their authority, are of great significance. Non-legal, unwritten constitutional rules such as norms, conventions or practices all wield power when those in high office believe they exist, and war is the preeminent example of a convention-dominated realm of government, where the practice of constitutional actors matters, and where such practice largely constitutes the substance of that realm itself.</p> -<p>With respect to the purpose of a new framework, participants asked why a framework is needed, and whether it is to better understand AI’s impact on geopolitics as opposed to drawing attention to previously unnoticed phenomena. One participant argued that, in some sense, International Relations scholarship “had a technology problem” – while technology was part of many considerations, it was never conceptualised as such. This status quo is now challenged, as new developments in AI technology arguably have the potential to fundamentally challenge how International Relations theories work.</p> +<p>The strikes provide further evidence that the political rule we know as the “war powers convention” is less of a convention, and more of a practice. This is a small difference, but it has important consequences. Practices exist as political rules because there are good practical reasons for them to do so. Conventions are somewhat stronger, relying not just on reasons but on stable and consistent precedent, backed up by a general agreement that their provisions are binding on constitutional actors.</p> -<p>This linked to the broader and fundamental question of the purpose of International Relations theory. Participants critically discussed whether it is the purpose of International Relations theory to predict the future; a challenge some considered too great given that the “past and present are already difficult enough” to conceptualise. Others felt that it is indeed the idea of the discipline to predict geopolitics but that it has also been historically poor at doing so. This also raised the question of how far International Relations theory is contributing to preventing war or harm and whether that is its purpose and, if so, whether it needs to get better at doing so.</p> +<p>The convention narrative may have over-promised and under-delivered precisely because it overlooks this distinction. Since 2003, this narrative has downplayed the virtues of the war prerogative, focusing on its archaic or anachronistic form rather than its valuable substance, while misunderstanding the strengths of the “convention” itself. Its aims are far more limited and subtle – forcing debates, structuring the conversation and linking the use of force more directly to the support of the House, particularly grey-zone activities below the formal threshold of war.</p> -<p>Thus, how International Relations scholars understand their discipline and interpret existing theories heavily influenced their assessment of whether a new framework is necessary or feasible and, if so, what purpose it might serve.</p> +<p>In light of current practice and with an eye on future challenges, we may well want to keep this in mind.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<hr /> -<p>The workshop identified that whether participants considered a new framework necessary to adequately capture AI’s impact on international relations was influenced by three key factors.</p> +<p><strong>Daniel Skeffington</strong> is a doctoral candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London.</p>Daniel SkeffingtonRecent strikes against the Houthis in Yemen have prompted fresh discussions on the war powers of the UK government. Yet in many ways, they have reaffirmed the existing constitutional orthodoxy.【黎智英案・審訊第 52 日】2024-03-25T12:00:00+08:002024-03-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-52<ul> + <li>李宇軒：赴日會見議員討論香港人權法案 稱可阻嚇人權侵犯者</li> +</ul> -<ol> - <li> - <p>What experts considered AI’s impact to be in the first place – and how unprecedented they found it compared to previous technological inventions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How far they believed existing theories in various fields can capture such impact and whether a single theory could ever do so.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Experts’ assessment of how useful existing theories are also depended on what they considered the objective and purpose of both a new theory and International Relations scholarship more widely to be.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<excerpt /> -<p>The conversation repeatedly returned to themes such as the applicable timeframe to define the impact of AI, the definition of AI, and the bias of available information and their implications on scholars’ understanding of AI. These factors, the assessment of which varied depending on participants’ areas of specialism, were often considered underlying questions that need to be answered before a suitable framework can be developed.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2jYUIoB.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Further research could provide a fuller and more systematic understanding of AI’s impact on geopolitics but also help identify concrete examples of how far existing theories already capture various aspects of the impact of AI on geopolitics. Research could also provide a more detailed analysis of parallels and differences between AI and previous technologies and their impact on international relations.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（25日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第52日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方指李曾與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人兼執行總監裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）以訊息交流，其後裴倫德開設群組，成員包括李和正被港府通緝的邵嵐，李曾把建議制裁名單的連結傳送至群組。此外，李提及他在2020年頭到訪日本並會見議員山尾志櫻里，談論在日本議會上動議香港人權法案；他形容法案可以達至阻嚇作用，如果發現與香港有關的人權侵犯事件的話，「咁日本嗰邊就可以經呢個 process 去 deal with 佢喇。」至2020年5月的「重光計劃」眾籌，李表示他並沒有參與籌備，因當時國安法即將立法，「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人擔心仍在港的李會被指「洗黑錢」，或眾籌款項被本地銀行凍結，最終決定「𠵱家唔洗你搞，同埋隔走T（另一名被告陳梓華）嗰邊」。</p> -<h3 id="annex-survey-questions">Annex: Survey Questions</h3> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第九天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>What impact do AI technologies have on international relations?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>To what extent does this resemble or differ from previous technological inventions?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Can existing theory, concepts or frameworks in your field adequately describe the impact of AI technologies? (Please expand and include field and theory.)</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>If applying existing theories does not work, why not? And what do new analytical frameworks need to offer to successfully reflect the impact of AI technologies on geopolitics?</p> - </li> -</ol> +<h4 id="李宇軒不欲從政-以避免政治包袱增加角力籌碼">李宇軒：不欲從政 以避免政治包袱、增加角力籌碼</h4> -<hr /> +<p>控方展示李宇軒與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人兼執行總監裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）的 Telegram 對話，在2020年1月12日，裴倫德向李稱曾經與英國議員 Lord Alton 談及李，而 Lord Alton 認為李應該從政。（“And discussed you with Lord Alton often, who thinks you should be in politics!”）李則回覆稱，不涉足政治是他的參與方式，因為他們刻意地需要素人，以增加他們一方的角力籌碼。（“Oh we’re kind of playing the game that way, in that we need someone deliberately not in politics to leverage power from this side;)”）</p> -<p><strong>Pia Hüsch</strong> is a RUSI Research Fellow in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focusses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations and the geopolitical and national security implications of disruptive technologies, such as AI. Pia’s other research interests include the governance of cyberspace, election interference, cyberwarfare, and the relationship between law and technology, including cyber and AI.</p>Pia HüschThis workshop report summarises what impact AI has on geopolitics, whether there is a need for a new analytical framework to capture AI’s impact on international relations, and what we can learn from other technologies and their respective impact on geopolitical developments.【黎智英案・審訊第卌八日】2024-03-19T12:00:00+08:002024-03-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-48<ul> - <li>美加登報廣告促制裁及禁售武器予港警 李宇軒：由不同人設計、有關香港民主自由</li> -</ul> +<blockquote> + <p>Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) <a href="https://twitter.com/lukedepulford/status/1315038772791214088">October 10, 2020</a></p> +</blockquote> -<excerpt /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lcHOZP2.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ELaCoJi.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>李庭上解釋，如果他不是政治人物或政黨成員的話，便不會有政治包袱或不需要遵從政黨路線，會有較大的斡旋空間。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第48日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。就2019年8月的第三次眾籌即「G攬運動」，庭上展示的加拿大《環球郵報》和《紐約時報》國際版廣告，分別促請加國和美國政府禁止出售武器給香港警方，又呼籲美國讀者促請議員動議通過《香港人權與民主法案》。其中一份匯款紀錄顯示西班牙《世界報》的廣告費由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 繳付，根據控方開案陳詞，該公司由 Mark Simon 持有或控制。另外，李確認截至2020年5月，「G攬運動」錄得餘款約69.8萬美元（約546萬港元），而這筆錢之後用在「各地有關 support 香港自由民主嘅活動」，即有關「重光團隊」的活動。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指港人面對不同障礙-致未能向國際社會發出清晰信息">李宇軒指港人面對不同障礙 致未能向國際社會發出清晰信息</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒指曾與陳梓華討論在美國成立公司來收取眾籌款項">李宇軒指曾與陳梓華討論在美國成立公司來收取眾籌款項</h4> +<p>控方指，裴倫德在2020年1月12日設立一個 Signal 群組，成員包括李宇軒、邵嵐（Joey Siu）、Dimon 和 Natalie。李指 Dimon 是一間美國非政府組織的職員，而該組織關心當時的香港自由情況；Natalie 則是一些加拿大港人組織成員。裴倫德在訊息中介紹各人，指邵嵐是「香港大專學界國際事務代表團」（IAD）成員，而李則是 SWHK（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong）成員。</p> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第五天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李昨日供稱，在2019年8月第三次眾籌活動期間，他和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人成立「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong），並以此團體名義在各地登報。就他們所籌得的180萬美元，李稱在另一名被告陳梓華的協助下，找來了黎智英的私人助手 Mark Simon 借出美國的銀行戶口收取眾籌款項，然後轉帳至「Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。李並指當時 Mark Simon 要求在美國成立一個基金來保管眾籌款項，需要找美國公民來擔任受託人，以減少香港銀行凍結款項的風險。</p> +<p>李表示，當裴倫德把他加入群組時，他並未有獲得 SWHK 其他成員的授權，所以他只是「in a loose sense」地代表 SWHK，並且基於他對其他 SWHK 成員意見的大概理解。</p> -<p>控方今展示從李宇軒電腦檢取的電郵紀錄，可見在2019年9月6日至17日期間，李和網名「T」的陳梓華經電郵與眾籌平台職員溝通，提及第一次提取眾籌款項時，銀行「啷住咗」相關帳目，於是轉用另一人的戶口來收款。李表示當時他並未有留意第二名收款人的身份。</p> +<p>裴倫德在訊息中形容，他們面對很多障礙，以致無法向國際社會清晰地發出信息，而這些障礙必須克服。（“For loads of reasons, I think the obstacle preventing you from speaking more clearly into the international community ‘must’ be overcome.”）控方追問「障礙」是指什麼。李指，其一是很多人都想維持以匿名身份，「所以有啲 idea 喺度，但唔會有人講到呢啲 idea。」再者，不同人分散在不同的地方、時區，而且討論不夠集中，「有時講呢樣，有時講嗰樣。」李又指，沒有一個授權的機制可讓人代表特定群體，當不同人接觸國際社會的時候，對方無法得知一個人可以代表到多少群體入面多少人，例如某人會見英國國會議員時，對方不知道這個人可以代表到多少香港人。</p> -<p>李供稱，當時他和陳梓華有討論過考慮在美國成立一間公司，以其銀行戶口來收取眾籌款項，因此曾經問眾籌平台的職員是否可行。在2019年9月10日的電郵中，李問職員可否選擇提供一個「責任有限公司」（Limited Liability Company, LLC）的銀行帳戶來收款。在翌日的電郵中，職員表示這方案是可行，要求李提供相關公司名稱和負責人身份，又問「Freedom Hong Kong」會否考慮在美國成立一間「責任有限公司」。</p> +<p>李續指，裴倫德在訊息亦提及香港的運動正處於關鍵性時刻（“I believe the movement is at a critical juncture.”），惟仍未有任何傳統民主派、政黨或者組織有意去擔任香港的代表，「結果從 international community 嘅角度，冇一啲好 clear 嘅 message 出到嚟。」</p> -<h4 id="陳梓華電郵傳送mark-simon作為收款人資料-李宇軒當時未留意收款人資料">陳梓華電郵傳送Mark Simon作為收款人資料 李宇軒：當時未留意收款人資料</h4> +<p>李指，裴倫德設立這個群組，原意是集合意見和進行討論。控方追問，為何裴倫德只將上述4人加入群組。李則表示：「我諗係 Luke 啱啱識我哋四個。」</p> -<p>其後在9月17日，陳梓華向眾籌平台職員傳送電郵，內容含有收款人 Mark Simon 的資料，包括法律上名稱（Legal Name）「Mark H Simon」、地址、電話號碼、銀行戶口資料等。相關電郵同時副本抄送至李的電郵。李表示，他當時並沒有留意收款人的法律地位（legal status），因為只要陳梓華和眾籌平台能夠將款項轉移至收款人的銀行戶口，便能夠處理到問題，後來他才知道當時陳梓華找了 Mark Simon 介入。</p> +<h4 id="群組訊息顯示李宇軒傳送制裁名單連結">群組訊息顯示李宇軒傳送制裁名單連結</h4> -<p>法官李運騰指，李早前供稱在美國參議員斯科特（Rick Scott）訪港時，有安排他會見斯科特，並介紹 Mark Simon 給他認識，而上述陳梓華的電郵寫有 Mark Simon 的資料，問李當時陳梓華是否已經向他介紹了 Mark Simon。李則表示，視乎會見斯科特的時間是在上述電郵之前，還是之後，因為當時他並未有將會見參議員和提取眾籌款項的事宜「link up 埋一齊」，但他可以確認在2019年9月時已獲介紹。</p> +<p>控方指，群組成員 Dimon 在2020年1月19日發訊息，提及「Dr. Warren Mann」想要一份應受制裁的香港高級警員名單，因為他曾經在「前線」處理傷者，希望向美國政府施壓以制裁該些警察。李在1月21日傳送一條 Google Drive 連結，可通向制裁名單的公開版本。</p> -<p>2019年9月17日的電郵顯示，李向眾籌平台職員確認 Mark Simon 是收款人，並籲職員與陳梓華和 Mark 合作處理提取款項。</p> +<p>李指 Dr. Mann 是一名醫生，以他理解，Dr. Mann 想建議一些制裁對象。至於 Dimon 提及 Dr.Mann曾在「前線」處理傷者，李不肯定是指打仗的「前線」還是示威「前線」，他對此沒有認知。李又指，他傳送制裁名單的連結之後，似乎便沒有下文，「我記得呢個 group 最尾不了了之」，但他不記得是否在這一個時間點。</p> -<h4 id="單據顯示lais-hotel-墊支西班牙報紙廣告費18500歐元">單據顯示Lais Hotel 墊支西班牙報紙廣告費18,500歐元</h4> +<p>翻查「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」網頁，「Darren Mann」被列為醫療範疇的顧問，簡介指他是一名英籍手術師，持有香港永久性居民資格，有在戰場和衝突地區工作的經驗，並且曾在國際上提出有關香港示威中違反「國際人道規範」的情況。</p> -<p>就第三次眾籌的登報廣告，控方指收支表顯示廣告支出合共為633.7萬港元，而李昨日供稱陳梓華等人墊支了約300萬元，其他廣告費則全部由李墊支，由此推論李墊支了約270萬元。李表示：「大概。」</p> +<p>控方問在製作制裁名單一事上，「香港大專學界國際事務代表團（IAD）」的角色是什麼。李則表示「我唔清楚」，只記得 IAD 曾就游說之旅向「G攬」報銷開支，而他則負責處理相關單據和向 IAD 歸還款項。李又指 IAD 不只會見政治人物，也會會見社運組織，以他所理解，IAD 會講述香港情況和支持香港自由民主。</p> -<p>控方繼而展示由西班牙報紙《世界報》（El Mundo）發出的發票，顯示廣告費為18,500歐元。李供稱當時相關費用由「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」墊支。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒赴日會見議員討論人權法案-稱可阻嚇香港人權侵犯者">李宇軒：赴日會見議員討論人權法案 稱可阻嚇香港人權侵犯者</h4> -<p>控方遂展示匯款收據，顯示上述費用由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 在2019年8月16日支付。李確認，並指這收據是陳梓華交給他的。</p> +<p>李供稱在2020年頭曾到訪日本，在日本國會議員山尾志櫻里（Shiori, YAMAO；本名「菅野志桜里」）位於東京的辦事處與她會面，同場人士包括山尾的助理倉持麟太郎、張亦澄和一名叫「村長」的在日港人，其中倉持麟太郎是協助草擬法案及處理法律技術問題。李上周五供稱張亦澄已草擬了法案的草稿，李並透過電郵傳送給山尾志櫻里和高井崇志，惟當他會見山尾時，卻發現山尾已經準備好另一份法案草稿，變相當日會面好像是山尾向李和張匯報法案詳情，「我哋去到，『嘩！既然你哋已經準備好晒』，咁我哋就禮貌上『好好好』。」</p> -<h4 id="電郵紀錄顯示周庭曾就登廣告聯絡日經新聞">電郵紀錄顯示周庭曾就登廣告聯絡《日經新聞》</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>マグニツキー法についてコメントも引用して頂きました。制裁できないままの方が、制裁の判断を迫られずに済む。そんな外務省の逃げ腰な姿勢を転換させるのが政治の仕事だと思う。やれないからやらないんじゃなく、やるかやらないか国家として主体的に判断する枠組みが急務。 https://t.co/e7kURzV4wY — 菅野志桜里 (@ShioriYamao) <a href="https://twitter.com/ShioriYamao/status/1358299097862610946">February 7, 2021</a></p> +</blockquote> -<p>就《日經新聞》的廣告，控方展示一封由《日經》傳送給前「香港眾志」成員周庭的電郵，附件有一個發票檔案，顯示廣告費為2,040萬日圓。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DcOK0jl.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 日本版マグニツキー法の制定をめざす議員連盟の発起人会に集まった山尾志桜里（奥右）、中谷元（同左）両氏ら=2021年1月27日午前8時42分、国会内、佐藤達弥撮影（資料圖片）</p> -<p>李供稱，當時「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」早於8月15日從加拿大匯款繳付了《日經新聞》廣告費，大約為147萬港元，但是由於國際交易需時數個工作日，所以《日經新聞》趕不及在廣告刊登的日子（8月19日）之前收到該筆款項，李遂先以現金額外支付約147萬港元的廣告費，作為臨時方案，待《日經新聞》收到加拿大的匯款之後，便會將多付的款項還給李。李指這做法可以確保《日經新聞》在廣告刊登之前收到廣告費。</p> +<p>李指，後來他們便開始嘗試爭取其他日本議員支持山尾所準備的人權法案。李形容法案可以達至阻嚇作用，如果發現與香港有關的人權侵犯事件的話，「咁日本嗰邊就可以經呢個 process 去 deal with 佢喇。」法官李素蘭追問，李剛才指法案並不同於馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act），那麼當某人被視為人權侵犯者（perpetrators of human rights）的時候，他們會有什麼後果。李僅指：「同一啲同日本 jurisdiction 有關嘅嘢會 restricted」，但他不記得有哪些範疇會受到限制，所以無法舉例。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dfMItKa.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒疫情期間繼續爭取其他日本議員支持人權法案">李宇軒：疫情期間繼續爭取其他日本議員支持人權法案</h4> -<p>控方指李的銀行紀錄顯示，李於8月16日從銀行戶口提款約147萬港元，李確認之後以現金向《日經新聞》支付廣告費。控方並展示支票入帳紀錄，顯示以支票向李退還合共約147萬港元，李確認。</p> +<p>李指，其後全球爆發新冠肺炎疫情，所以有關法案的程序都停滯，日本國會亦未能開會。在這段時間，李透過電郵嘗試爭取高井崇志、井上哲志和山添拓支持山尾志櫻里的法案。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華等相關人士墊支英國瑞典德國和韓國報章的廣告費">李宇軒指陳梓華等相關人士墊支英國、瑞典、德國和韓國報章的廣告費</h4> +<p>李指，後來大約在2020年夏天，3個日本港人組織包括「Act with HK」、「SWHK@JPN」和「香港之黎明（香港の夜明け）」，在日本舉辦了一個活動，期間前香港眾志成員周庭透過錄像影片發表言論，她表示支持法案，並多謝日本人，希望日本的人可以繼續關心香港。</p> -<p>控方展示由一間英國媒體公司所發出的發票，顯示分別於《旗幟晚報》（Evening Standard）、《泰晤士報》（The Times）、《衛報》（The Guardian）、英國《時代》雜誌（Time）、The Week、City A.M.和《經濟學人》（Economist UK），合共7份報紙和雜誌刊登廣告，費用合共約12萬英鎊。</p> +<p>控方展示李宇軒在2020年4月12日發送給高井崇志的電郵，當中以日文表示香港人抗疫之餘還要爭取民主和自由，並質疑日本政府將訪日的國家主席習近平視為「國賓」。電郵又指，法案一旦通過，能夠帶動日本更多有關香港民主化、疫情亂局和人權議題的討論。</p> -<p>控方又展示匯款紀錄，顯示某人將加拿大貨幣轉換至12萬英鎊，並繳付了上述廣告費。李指這張單據是「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」交給他，「就話英國嗰條數找咗。」</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指沒參與重光計劃眾籌-因仍身處香港國安法將臨-免款項遭凍結">李宇軒指沒參與「重光計劃」眾籌 因仍身處香港、國安法將臨 免款項遭凍結</h4> -<p>此外，李宇軒確認庭上展示的瑞典、德國和韓國報章的廣告費發票、匯款紀錄等，均由「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」交給他，詳情如下：</p> +<p>控方繼而就2020年5月的「重光計劃」提問。李表示他曾分別與「攬炒巴」劉祖廸和另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）討論。他指其時「攬炒巴」已經不在香港，與他之間的討論「主要係隔走我，唔畀我參與」，因為「攬炒巴」一方知道李仍身處香港，銀行戶口也是在香港，當時消息指香港會訂立國安法，惟外界仍未知條文內容，為了安全起見，「所以話唔好俾一個喺香港 jurisdiction 裡面嘅人 hold 住啲錢」，以避免遭指控「洗黑錢」或遭香港銀行凍結款項。李又指，當時「Project Hong Kong Trust」已經成立、在美國開設了銀行戶口，能夠處理眾籌而得的款項，所以不需要借用李的個人戶口。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>瑞典《每日工業報》（Dagens industri）和《每日新聞報》（Dagens Nyheter）廣告費：164,450 瑞典克朗</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>德國《法蘭克福匯報》（Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung）廣告費：48,848 歐元</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>南韓《京鄉新聞》廣告費：22,000,000 韓圜</p> - </li> +<p>至於陳梓華，李指因為「T嗰邊」曾經墊支，所以他亦需要與陳討論，「啫係意思係T嗰邊都唔好再墊支喇」，改為使用「Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口處理錢銀。李指討論的結論是：「𠵱家唔洗你搞，同埋隔走T嗰邊。」</p> + +<p>控方問為何會有「重光計劃」。李指當時檢視「G攬」眾籌之後的收支情況，根據 SWHK 網站所載，截至2020年5月，「G攬」錄得餘款約69.8萬美元（約546萬港元），所以決定舉辦第四次眾籌。李表示，由於他並沒有參與籌備是次眾籌，故此不知道他們使用哪一個眾籌平台，當時也不知道最後籌得多少款項。</p> + +<p>控方庭上展示的眾籌網站 gofundme.com 「攬炒團隊《重光香港計劃》— 攬炒過後是晨曦！[美金]」，顯示是次眾籌籌得175.5萬元美金。被問到眾籌款項由哪一個銀行戶口接收，李表示不知道，但他記得「傾嗰陣話係 Project Hong Kong Trust」。</p> + +<p>網站載有呼籲人捐款的文字：「2020年5月，國安法兵臨城下，但我地香港人已經準備好攬炒。天助自助者，琴晚國務卿 Pompeo 亦措辭強硬，直言香港自治已死，全面制裁即將降臨。」李指憑相關行文風格，相信這些文字是由「攬炒巴」撰寫。</p> + +<p>案件周三（3月27日）續審。</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒：赴日會見議員討論香港人權法案 稱可阻嚇人權侵犯者【黎智英案・審訊第 51 日】2024-03-22T12:00:00+08:002024-03-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-51<ul> + <li>李宇軒稱曾帶日本議員到中大二號橋視察、傳送法案初稿及展示催淚彈彈頭</li> </ul> -<h4 id="匯款紀錄顯示李宇軒墊支登報廣告費約1924萬港元">匯款紀錄顯示李宇軒墊支登報廣告費約192.4萬港元</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>控方其後展示一系列發票和匯款紀錄，李宇軒確認墊支有關「G攬」登報活動的廣告費，總數約192.4萬港元，詳情如下：</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/21UcV6Y.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>加拿大《環球郵報》（The Global and Mail）兩份廣告費：130,000 加幣</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>法國《世界報》（Le Monde）廣告費：26,000 歐元</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>澳洲《澳洲人報》（The Australian）廣告費：40,930.56 澳元</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>《紐約時報》國際版廣告費：28,000 美元</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>台灣《自由時報》廣告費：336,274 港元</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>芬蘭《赫爾辛基日報》（Helsingin Sanomat）廣告費：14116.08 歐元</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>丹麥《貝林時報》（Berlingske Tidende）廣告費：54,900 丹麥克朗</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（22日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第51日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李供稱，他與另一名被告陳梓華於2020年初曾到陳方安生的辦公室開會，二人被問及如何達至終局（Endgame），惟二人均說不出相關路線圖。控方亦未有要求李澄清「終局」的意思。此外，李稱在2019年區議會外國監選團來港期間，曾帶日本議員高井崇志到中大二號橋視察衝突後情況，事後二人有透過電郵聯絡，李亦將一份由義工撰寫的法案初稿轉發給高井崇志，冀議員能在日本議會上提出有關香港人權的法案。他亦在2019年12月曾赴日本與兩名日本共產黨議員見面，包括井上哲志和山添拓，「同埋帶咗啲催淚彈彈頭畀佢哋睇。」</p> -<p>李又確認，他在支付法國《世界報》的廣告費時，是經一間公司 COGITO LAB COMPANY LIMITED 匯款，而李是該間公司銀行戶口的唯一授權簽署人。</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第八天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> -<h4 id="加拿大環球郵報廣告稱港府干犯人道罪行-促加國政府施壓-包括制裁">加拿大《環球郵報》廣告稱港府干犯人道罪行 促加國政府施壓 包括制裁</h4> +<h4 id="李宇軒補充指印尼爆眼記者veby和聲稱被性侵sonia-一同會見美議員">李宇軒補充指印尼爆眼記者Veby和聲稱被性侵Sonia 一同會見美議員</h4> -<p>控方展示刊登在加拿大《環球郵報》的廣告，標題為「STAND WITH HONG KONG UNTIL DAWN」，內文要求加國政府支持香港人，因香港人正在爭取自由和民主，但是面臨與香港政府相關的暴力，包括催淚彈和橡膠子彈，香港已成為了一個「警察國家」（a police state）。</p> +<p>李宇軒昨日供稱於2019年底，在時任香港民主委員會（Hong Kong Democracy Council）成員、朱耀明兒子朱牧民（Samuel Chu）的安排下，赴美國國會山莊會見參議員斯科特（Rick Scott）、Todd Young 、克魯茲（Ted Cruz）和 Marsha Blackburn。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FjWdc0Z.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p>李昨供稱一同會見美議員的人有 Sonia 、Diana 和 Veby，控方追問二人是誰。李指 Sonia 曾經聲稱被性侵，因為會見美議員是為了展示香港示威入面，「原來就有呢啲有血有肉嘅人呢，就係 victims 嚟，佢（Sonia）就係講佢畀人性侵嘅故事。」</p> -<p>該廣告並指，在香港政府的施政下，沒有人是安全的，要求讀者採取行動，促使加國政府保護30萬名在港的加拿大公民，例如促請加國政府向北京和特區政府施壓，包括實施制裁和禁止出售武器給香港警方；要求加國政府確認香港特區政府和警方干犯人道罪行；以及在來屆選舉中投票給支持香港爭取民主自由的候選人等。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qCY24zi.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 左起：吳傲雪（Sonia Ng）、Katherine Cheng、Todd Young 、李宇軒、朱牧民（資料圖片）</p> -<p>李宇軒確認上述是「G攬運動」期間，刊登在加拿大《環球郵報》的廣告。</p> +<p>李指 Diana 是一名空姐，相信她的角色是講述她被航空公司施壓，「叫人唔好參加香港嘅民主運動」。至於 Veby，李指她是「印尼爆眼記者」。</p> -<h4 id="紐約時報國際版廣告促美國政府向香港警方禁售武器">《紐約時報》國際版廣告促美國政府向香港警方禁售武器</h4> +<p>昨日庭上提到李傳送一份建議制裁名單給朱牧民，控方今展示「重光團隊」的 Facebook 專頁截圖，顯示制裁名單的第三版本上載於專頁。控方指共有141名人士，包括前特首林鄭、前警務處處長曾偉雄、警司陶輝和行政會議成員湯家驊，以及整個警隊被列於名單上。惟李表示他並非專頁的管理人之一。</p> -<p>控方另展示刊登於《紐約時報》國際版的廣告，標題為「CATCH HONG KONG AS WE FALL」、「THE LAST STAND FOR FREEDOM」。內文求美國讀者聯絡眾議員和參議員，成為《香港人權與民主法案》的共同動議人，並促請美國政府向香港警方禁售武器。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指-swhk-沒有中文名非所有人同意稱呼攬炒團隊">李宇軒指 SWHK 沒有中文名、非所有人同意稱呼「攬炒團隊」</h4> -<p>控方問李，有關「G攬運動」的登報廣告是否與上述廣告大致相似。李則表示：「我諗唯一嘅共識係同當時嘅香港自由民主有關」，雖然不同國家的廣告文字和設計就由其他人去負責，但是「唔會否認（話）呢份廣告唔係我哋整嘅」。</p> +<p>昨日庭上展示李宇軒與朱牧民之間的 Telegram 對話，訊息當中一度提及「攬炒團隊」，李昨稱「攬炒團隊」並非指「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）。控方今日要求李澄清 SWHK 的中文名稱。李則指並非所有 SWHK 的成員都同意以「攬炒團隊」作為中文名稱。法官杜麗冰問李的意思是否指 SWHK 沒有中文名，李確認。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指第三次眾籌餘款約698萬美元-用在重光團隊有關的活動">李宇軒指第三次眾籌餘款約69.8萬美元 用在「重光團隊」有關的活動</h4> +<p>李亦提到「G攬」登報結束之後，組員逐漸不再使用「G攬」這稱呼，因為其後的活動不再與登報相關，「如果你喺某一個活動好認同嘅話，就用 SWHK 呢個label」，惟直至李被捕一刻，組員仍然未能統一使用 SWHK 這名義。</p> -<p>李早前提及第四次的眾籌運動「重光計劃」，以及相關網站有最新的財務紀錄，控方庭上展示「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong）的網站截圖，可見「全球登報制裁港共眾籌計劃」標題。李確認此標題反映眾籌運動的主題，並補充指截圖所顯示的，是「G攬運動」的財務收支報告，總結「G攬運動」眾籌了多少款項、花費了多少款項，用以向公眾交代和解釋為何在2020年5月籌辦第四次眾籌即「重光計劃」。</p> +<p>控方問李能否辨認出 SWHK 有哪些成員，李表示：「In a loose sense，可以」，例如有的人多次參與籌辦 SWHK 的活動，而該些人又認同 SWHK 這個參與身份。</p> -<p>李確認根據收支報告，截至2020年5月，「G攬運動」錄得餘款約69.8萬美元（約546萬港元），但他指這筆錢之後會一直使用，花費在「各地有關 support 香港自由民主嘅活動」。控方問是否有關「重光團隊」的活動，李表示：「可以咁樣理解。」控方表示會在稍後時間就此提問。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱曾到英領事住所參與會議-出席者包括李柱銘陳方安生郭榮鏗和莫乃光">李宇軒稱曾到英領事住所參與會議 出席者包括李柱銘、陳方安生、郭榮鏗和莫乃光</h4> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p>李宇軒昨稱，在2019年11月區選之後，曾經參與民主黨創黨主席李柱銘、前政務司司長陳方安生、英國議員 Lord Alton 和裴倫德在 W Hotel 的會議。</p> -<hr /> +<p>李供稱，他不記得在2019年底還是2020年初，曾獲時任英國駐港領事賀恩德（Andy Heyn）邀請到其住所參與會議，同場出席者還有民主黨創黨主席李柱銘、前政務司司長陳方安生、時任立法會議員郭榮鏗和莫乃光。李指在該次會議中，李柱銘和陳方安生屬於「老一啲嘅民主派」，郭榮鏗和莫乃光「就喺中間」，而「我就係再後生嘅 generation」，因此賀恩德想聆聽年輕一代的意見。李並指會議曾討論「大家對香港民主嗰個睇法」，亦曾提及《中英聯合聲明》。</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導美加登報廣告促制裁及禁售武器予港警 李宇軒：由不同人設計、有關香港民主自由Monitoring In Antarctica2024-03-19T12:00:00+08:002024-03-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/monitoring-in-antarctica<p><em>China opened its fifth station in Antarctica on February 7, 2024. The new Qinling station, located on Inexpressible Island in the Ross Sea, joins the existing Great Wall (Antarctic Peninsula), Zhongshan (eastern Antarctica), Taishan (eastern Antarctic highlands), and Kunlun (Dome A) stations.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>China, with five, now has the fourth most stations in Antarctica behind Argentina, Chile, and Russia, and has the fastest-growing presence in Antarctica, having opened three stations since 2009.</em></p> +<p>李稱事前有告訴陳梓華（網名T）他將會出席這會議，而陳有作出回應，大概意思是：「去見吓，network 吓」、「加油」。</p> -<p>Chinese president Xi Jinping declared in 2014 that the country intends to be a “polar power,” and its growth in Antarctica is consistent with achieving that goal in the southern hemisphere. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said upon the opening of Qinling that the station “will contribute to humanity’s scientific understanding of the Antarctic, provide a platform for joint scientific exploration and cooperation between China and other countries, and help advance peace and sustainable development in the region.”</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳方安生會上問及endgame-惟他與陳梓華均說不出路線圖">李宇軒指陳方安生會上問及endgame 惟他與陳梓華均說不出路線圖</h4> -<p>So, what is China doing in Antarctica? And do its intentions, capabilities, and actions in that remote region threaten the national security of the United States and its allies? In 2023, CSIS published two publications on Antarctica that started to address these questions: “Great Power Competition Comes for the South Pole” and “Frozen Frontiers: China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions.”</p> +<p>直至2020年年頭，李稱他與陳梓華一同到陳方安生的辦公室見面，是他第三次與陳方安生見面。控方問，陳為何會邀請李一同會見陳方安生，李則稱以他所知，陳方安生與陳梓華本來相識，「唔知 T（陳梓華）同陳方安生講咗啲咩，咁就 invite 咗我。」</p> -<p>Other than a few such articles, there is generally little focus in the United States on Antarctic geopolitics or their potential to affect U.S. and allied national security interests. The quiet in the United States is in stark contrast to the regular discussions on the topic in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. However, this does not mean that no one in the United States is paying attention or that U.S. officials have no tools for learning what other countries are doing in Antarctica.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kEx4BAF.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 陳方安生（資料圖片）</p> -<p>Specifically, the Antarctic Treaty permits certain countries to conduct unannounced, in-person inspections in the region and requires countries operating there to provide advance notification of their activities, equipment, and personnel. In the United States, the responsibility to use these tools to monitor other countries’ capabilities in Antarctica falls to the Department of State. For example, as a State Department official, the author led the U.S. team that conducted a 2020 inspection of the Chinese station being built at Inexpressible Island, the same station that just opened. So while some commentators may have been caught unawares by the construction, which started in 2017, U.S. officials have already conducted a surprise inspection of the Qinling station in 2020.</p> +<p>李指討論內容「大概意思係我同T（陳梓華）當係𠵱個 generation 嘅 activists，即係話陳方安生問 T 同我，我哋最尾想點做」，李表示他和陳均「答唔出一啲 concrete 嘅 roadmap（路線圖）」。因為當時香港發生很多示威、行動和集會，「啫係（陳方安生問）如果我哋有 endgame 嘅話，我哋會點樣去達到，同埋想點樣做」，惟李表示：「但我同 T 都冇 endgame」，又稱：「我哋冇嚟緊做呢樣、做嗰樣嘅 roadmap（路線圖）。」李形容該次會議「冇結果」。</p> -<p>Given the rapidly growing Chinese presence in Antarctica — as well as concerns about how the Chinese stations might employ dual-use technology — now is a good time to review the tools the Antarctic Treaty provides for monitoring the presence, activities, and equipment of all countries operating in the region. In addition to knowing these tools exist, policymakers should be aware of the opportunities and limits of these tools so they can best use and strengthen them.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒曾與陳梓華和攬炒巴討論-三人共識李繼續做國際游說工作">李宇軒：曾與陳梓華和攬炒巴討論 三人共識李繼續做國際游說工作</h4> -<h3 id="key-non-armament-and-monitoring-provisions-in-the-antarctic-treaty">Key Non-armament and Monitoring Provisions in the Antarctic Treaty</h3> +<p>李宇軒早前作供提及於2019年底或2020年初的時候，在軟件 Jitsi 上與「攬炒巴」進行視像會議，因而知道對方真實身份是劉祖廸。李今詳述會議內容，指陳梓華親身去找劉祖廸，「因為佢哋喺同一個 screen 度」，三人討論提及：「攬炒巴就去做一個精神領袖或者一個 influencer 嘅角色，我就係繼續國際線游說，T 就會喺香港 local 度做一啲ground work，大概意思係咁」，目的是推進為香港爭取自由民主的運動。</p> -<p>In 1959, 12 countries signed the Antarctic Treaty, which sought to prevent the use of Antarctica for military purposes while providing for freedom of scientific investigation and freedom of access. This decision headed off the growing possibility of violence between Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom over their overlapping sovereignty claims; locked in the cooperation demonstrated during the successful 1957–58 International Geophysical Year; and prevented Cold War competition from spreading to the coldest continent. Signatories to the document — the first Cold War non-armament and arms control treaty — agreed to significantly restrict military action (Article I), prohibit nuclear explosive devices and their waste (Article V), and establish a strong monitoring system (Article VII). Per the treaty, “Antarctica” is defined as everything below 60 degrees south latitude, regardless of whether it is land, any category of ice, or water. Any country can join the treaty, although only ones that conduct substantial scientific research in Antarctica can participate in the consensus-based decisionmaking process.</p> +<p>控方追問「ground work」的意思，李舉例指他自己屬於「後線」，所以不屬於做「ground work」；相反陳梓華則會做「ground work」，例如參加集會以及「真人喺香港落場嘅活動」。</p> -<h4 id="restricting-military-and-nuclear-uses">Restricting Military and Nuclear Uses</h4> +<p>就上述會議所提出的建議，李憶述他自己當時回應「OK」，「因為同我本來做緊嘅嘢冇分別。」控方問李日後是否根據三人之間的共識來行事。李則澄清，對於陳梓華叫他繼續做國際游說，「其實同我做緊嘅嘢冇分別，對於我嚟講，啫係講咗等於冇講過咁，事實上我的確係有做 international lobbying，咁算唔算做緊 in accordance with 佢講嘅嘢？」</p> -<p>Limiting the risk that Antarctica could be used as a launchpad for conventional military forces, dumping ground for nuclear waste, or nuclear weapons testing site was particularly important to the countries closest to the continent. Article I addressed this by establishing that the region “shall be used for peaceful purposes only” and prohibiting, “inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.” This provision is remarkably broad, presumably so it can cover non-peaceful uses of the region comprehensively. It provides one example of what is prohibited — “any measures of a military nature” — and three examples of what could be considered as such. Given the structure of the provision, it would be normal, but incorrect, to conclude that these three examples are the main determinants of what needs to be prohibited to reserve Antarctica for peaceful use. However, focusing on only three examples would be insufficiently narrow. The correct reading is that “any measures of a military nature” is but one way that Antarctica cannot be used for non-peaceful purposes. In recognition of the importance of military logistical capabilities in particular, Article I does not prohibit the presence of military forces in Antarctica so long as their activities there are for scientific research or other peaceful purposes. Similarly, while Article V prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in Antarctica, it does not prohibit the peaceful use of nuclear energy to fuel stations or vessels.</p> +<p>控方問李，為何三人會在這個時間點進行視像會議？李回答當時大家主要想討論香港運動的方向。法官李運騰問李當時如何看待自己的角色，李宇軒稱他理解自己是「其中一個喺 international 做 lobbying 嘅香港人。」李官又問，為何只有他們三人參與會議。李則表示：「我當時冇諗過呢個問題。」</p> -<p>Articles I and V were vital for the 12 countries that negotiated the treaty since Article IV holds in abeyance all sovereignty claims. There are seven countries that claim sovereignty over specific portions of Antarctica (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom) plus two countries that maintain a basis to make claims in Antarctica (Russia and the United States). So long as the treaty remains in force, Article IV prevents new claimants from coming forward, freezes the current claims, and prevents any country from enforcing or applying its claim. Article IV therefore prompted the seven claimants to insist on Articles I and V due to their reasonable desire to prevent their national homelands from being threatened from territory they claim but cannot administer in Antarctica.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱曾帶日本議員高井崇志-事後電郵傳送法案初稿">李宇軒稱曾帶日本議員高井崇志 事後電郵傳送法案初稿</h4> -<h3 id="the-two-tier-monitoring-program-in-action">The Two-Tier Monitoring Program in Action</h3> +<p>李指，在不同國家均有 SWHK 成員，包括美國、英國、加拿大、澳洲和日本等。而他在日本有進行國際游說。</p> -<p>Understanding that restrictions without monitoring are just dreams, negotiators went beyond just having words on paper and established a two-tier monitoring program to verify compliance with the Antarctic Treaty. These mechanisms — an inspections regime and a requirement for advance notification of activities in Antarctica — are found in Article VII. As a result, the 12 countries that negotiated the treaty and the 47 other countries that have signed onto its provisions (as of March 1, 2024) significantly reduced the possibility of Antarctica being used to threaten others.</p> +<p>李憶述，在2019年區議會選舉期間，時任日本國會議員高井崇志（Takashi, TAKAI）來港監察選舉，於是李與他在香港見面，談及香港當時民主情況和示威情況。李又稱在中大二號橋衝突之後，他帶了高井崇志到二號橋視察。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Understanding that restrictions without monitoring are just dreams, negotiators went beyond just having words on paper and established a two-tier monitoring program to verify compliance with the Antarctic Treaty.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>李表示，他與高井崇志事後有經電郵聯絡。在2020年，一個日本港人組織的義工張亦澄草擬了一份法案初稿，而李則於同年1月7日將此法案初稿電郵至高井崇志，詢問他的意見。李指他亦有傳送該電郵給另一名日本議員菅野志櫻里（Shiori, YAMAO [née KANNO]）。</p> -<h4 id="the-inspection-regime">The Inspection Regime</h4> +<p>控方追問法案草稿的內容是關於什麼。李指是關於香港一些人權問題，擴展至國際層面的人權侵犯。他指上述電郵目的是希望日本議員能考慮會否採用這法案草稿的提議，並在議會上提出此法案，另外此電郵同時副本抄送給草擬人張亦澄，類似是李將張亦澄和高井崇志串連在一起，讓二人可加以討論。</p> -<p>Of the two monitoring tools established by the treaty, the inspections regime has received more attention. This tool permits certain countries operating in Antarctica to conduct unannounced inspections. Per the treaty, the inspectors have complete freedom of access to all areas in Antarctica, including any station, installation, ship, aircraft, or equipment.</p> +<p>關於張亦澄的背景，李指張並非香港人，相信他應該是中國內地人，但不肯定他有否入籍日本，而他的 Telegram 網名是「Katatsuki Hayashi」。李又指張曾經修讀法律，所以對法律範疇比較熟悉。</p> -<p>This remarkably open provision was intended to advance both U.S. foreign policy goals and protect Antarctica. Per Ambassador Herman Phleger, the lead U.S. negotiator for the treaty, the United States’ intent was to use Antarctica to facilitate potential future treaties with the Soviet Union on “such vitally important matters as nuclear testing, surprise attack, and general disarmament” — agreements Moscow had been unwilling to accept at the time. According to Phleger’s testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the inspection provisions “will not only serve to protect the parties against any violation of the treaty, but should also prove a valuable source of practical experience in the detailed processes of international inspection.”</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒2019年12月帶同催淚彈殼赴日本見議員">李宇軒：2019年12月帶同催淚彈殼赴日本見議員</h4> -<p>If obtaining agreement to this broad inspection regime was the first step, the second step was to use this right. The first inspection was completed in 1963 by New Zealand of two U.S. stations (McMurdo and South Pole) followed by the U.S. inspection in 1964 of a number of facilities, including two Soviet ones. When planning for the first U.S. inspection, one of the norms important to U.S. officials was that the unannounced visits to Soviet and other stations “should not disrupt the very harmony and international cooperation which it is the primary purpose of the Treaty to preserve.” Consistent with this goal, Secretary of State Dean Rusk instructed the U.S. inspection team, “While performing inspections, you should bear constantly in mind that all states active in Antarctica have been both friendly and cooperative with the United States in matters relating to the continent, and it is the policy of the United States to preserve and enhance this situation.” The United States and other countries also made public the inspection findings rather than burying them in government bureaucracies under heavy classification restrictions.</p> +<p>李另提及，他在2019年12月曾赴日本與兩名日本共產黨議員見面，包括井上哲志和山添拓，「同埋帶咗啲催淚彈彈頭畀佢哋睇⋯⋯啫係用過嗰啲。」李指是次會面是由日本一些關心香港的人士安排，可能是「Act with HK」或「SWHK@JPN」的成員，由於該兩個組織的人士「本來唔係特別有做 lobbying 嘅嘢」，同時「未有人想真身去見議員住，所以就彈咗畀我」。</p> -<p>By promptly using the inspection provisions, publicizing the results, and making it clear that the inspections were not hostile or indicative of any specific treaty or national security concern, the United States and its allies reinforced that Antarctica was a place of cooperation and transparency reserved for peaceful scientific research. That they did so via surprise inspections indicated they did not believe in Antarctic exceptionalism or that the treaty’s words alone were sufficient to uphold it. This posture was also shaped by the desire to create favorable conditions for future arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union by demonstrating that in-person inspections would not necessarily be hostile.</p> +<p>案件下周一續審。</p> -<p>According to the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, there have been 60 inspections since the treaty entered into force in 1961. The most recent — by the United States to certain Ross Sea sites and Australia to various stations throughout the continent — concluded in February 2020. The United States has conducted the most inspections overall (17), with Australia conducting the most during the twenty-first century (6).</p> +<hr /> -<p>There are significant differences between earlier and more recent inspections. Only 12 countries conducted inspections during the first three decades, while 22 did during the second three decades. This trend reinforces that the inspection regime is neither just a U.S. interest nor merely a Cold War tool, but that it is important for many countries active in Antarctica, including those that have no territorial claim or are not leading participants in great power competition.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒稱曾帶日本議員到中大二號橋視察、傳送法案初稿及展示催淚彈彈頭【黎智英案・審訊第 50 日】2024-03-21T12:00:00+08:002024-03-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-50<ul> + <li>李宇軒：由登報轉型做國際游說 傳送建議制裁名單予朱牧民 冀轉交美議員</li> +</ul> -<p>The increasing number of inspecting countries and inspected sites is vital since the number of stations has grown over the decades. Having a wider range of states monitoring treaty compliance is particularly important since the seven claimant countries generally focus their inspections on the area they claim, likely due to having logistical capability and familiarity with that region as well as to learn the details of the activities of other countries in “their” area. For example, the United Kingdom has conducted eight inspections, only two of which were outside its territorial claim while both Argentina and Chile have conducted all of their six inspections in their claimed areas. Australia is the main exception to this observation, having sent officials to the Ross Sea and Peninsula regions, both of which are outside of its Antarctic claim.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The rise in joint or multilateral inspections reflects their potential benefits, including the sharing of costs (political and logistical) and rewards (both practical and what was found). However, there is no treaty requirement for joint or multilateral inspections or provisions for neutral monitoring teams. This is because during the treaty negotiations, the United States insisted on the right to organize unilateral inspections due to challenges learned from attempting to conduct inspections with multiple countries during the Korean War.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/g0W5e3s.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Overall, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have consistently been the most active countries in using the inspection tools. After conducting only one inspection in the first 20 years of the treaty, Australia has increased the pace of its inspections. Although the United Kingdom has conducted eight inspections it has inspected 138 sites — the most by far. It is also the leader in joint inspections, having undertaken seven joint inspections with different countries, followed by Argentina and Chile (which have conducted three joint inspections with each other in the past decade), France, Germany, and the United States. The pace of U.S. inspections has slowed significantly since the Cold War: The United States conducted eight of the 13 inspections prior to 1985 but has conducted only two inspections since 2013, only one of which included national security officials.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（21日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第50日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李稱他籌辦全球登報活動，以及會見聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處職員之後，與另一名被告陳梓華討論之下，便決定「慢慢將我轉型做 international lobbying」。於是李參與會見美議員斯科特、安排外國人來港觀察區議會選舉，以及參與民主黨創黨主席李柱銘、前政務司司長陳方安生、英國議員 Lord Alton 和裴倫德的會議。2019年底，李赴美國國會山莊會見數名共和黨議員，為了展示香港示威及相關事件裡面的「受害者」個案，讓美議員有基礎去推動支持香港的法案，包括制裁侵犯香港人權民主的人士。同場香港代表包括朱牧民，事後李向朱傳送一份建議制裁對象名單，希望朱代為轉交給美議員。</p> -<p>The Soviet Union’s global stance against inspections likely reduced its willingness to use the treaty inspection regime despite its interest in monitoring its Cold War competitors. However, Russia did conduct two joint inspections with the United States in January and December 2012 during the “reset” period of U.S.-Russian relations. In addition, since China became a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty in 1985, it has conducted two inspections, one in 2015 and one in 1990.</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第七天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> -<h4 id="advance-notification-in-practice">Advance Notification in Practice</h4> +<h4 id="李宇軒指獲邀見美議員斯科特-因陳梓華認為其游說工作特別有效">李宇軒指獲邀見美議員斯科特 因陳梓華認為其游說工作「特別有效」</h4> -<p>Per Article VII, the second monitoring tool requires a country to give advance notice regarding “all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory,” all its stations, and “any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica.” This provides transparency about upcoming activities, which benefits both national security interests and scientific collaboration. Since traveling to the region is remarkably expensive and challenging, this process gives more countries greater insight into a wider area of Antarctica than could be achieved via in-person inspections. In addition, Article III requires parties to share plans for future and results from previous scientific programs “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable.”</p> +<p>李昨日證供提到2019年9月29日獲另一名被告陳梓華（網名「T」）邀請會見美國參議員斯科特（Rick Scott），因為李曾經籌辦全球登報活動，又曾經赴聯合國會見人權事務高級專員辦事處（OHCHR）職員 Sébastien Gillioz，「咁喺國際呢條線度做過嘢。」</p> -<p>The advance notification process has evolved but is currently failing. For many years, parties met these obligations via diplomatic notes. However, this was inefficient, so representatives at the 2012 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) decided they would use the web-based Electronic Information Exchange System (EIES) maintained by the treaty’s secretariat. On top of the information required by the treaty — most notably on expeditions and military personnel and equipment — parties agreed to provide additional information on areas such as the use of research rockets.</p> +<p>李今日加以補充，他們會見 Sébastien Gillioz 之後，「除咗 secure 到一個官方嘅 reply，即係 special procedure，我另外搵到 Sébastien Gillioz，佢話有職員幫我哋 prioritise （優先處理香港的事務和材料）」，陳梓華當時對此結果印象深刻，認為李的游說工作「特別有效」，所以邀請李會見斯科特。李形容：「當時慢慢有個 transition 由登報去到 lobbying。」</p> -<p>Three troubling trends were salient at the 2023 ATCM. First, only 10 of the 29 consultative parties submitted their annual report for each of the past 10 years. Second, during this time, there was a 20 percent decrease in the number of parties that submitted their information. Third, when a party files its annual report, the document usually does not cover all topics, including treaty-required information.</p> +<p>李又提到，除了聯合國之行外，他在會見斯科特之前還去了法國，「係一個 lobbying 嘅 trip 嚟嘅。」該旅程完結後，李正在考慮「應唔應該繼續做法國嘅 lobbying」，以及是否應該與當地港人組織「Le Comité pour la Liberté à Hong-Kong」合作，或者經該組織進行游說工作，惟當時他並不懂法文。</p> -<p>Of the major actors in Antarctica, China is the most significant party that has not consistently submitted information to the EIES, notably not filing any reports between 2017–2022 and recently filing the reports for the last two seasons. China’s failure to regularly report on its annual expeditions, station construction, and operations contributes to an information void that calls into question Chinese motives and capabilities. But as the secretariat has indicated, some topics are almost never reported on by any party, including the obligatory information on forward plans for scientific research and military personnel and equipment. This widespread failure by parties to meet agreed-upon transparency requirements amplifies stress on the Antarctic Treaty system even as concerns mount about its health.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱與陳梓華討論後決定轉型做國際游說">李宇軒稱與陳梓華討論後決定轉型做國際游說</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This widespread failure by parties to meet agreed-upon transparency requirements amplifies stress on the Antarctic Treaty system even as concerns mount about its health.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>就會見 Rick Scott 一事，陳梓華設立了一個 WhatsApp 群組「Coffee on Sunday」，成員有陳、李和 Mark Simon。控方展示該群組訊息，陳在訊息中介紹李為「international propaganda people」。李指因為他曾經籌辦全球登報活動，他和陳經過討論，便決定「慢慢將我轉型做 international lobbying」。</p> -<h3 id="us-inspections-in-2020">U.S. Inspections in 2020</h3> +<p>Mark Simon 在群組中提議，李應該向斯科特談及較早前的眾籌，以留下深刻印象。（“Also, what would really impress him is if you talk about the go fund me, shows support”）李表示，他不知道為何 Mark Simon 會認為提及眾籌會打動到斯科特，可能 Mark 掌握到斯科特的背景資料，故此提醒李要談論哪些話題。</p> -<p>In 2020, the U.S. interagency team inspected five sites at three stations — Jang Bogo (South Korea), Mario Zucchelli (Italy), and the station later dubbed Qinling under construction on Inexpressible Island (China) — as well as Antarctic Specially Protected Area (ASPA) 161 and the runway under construction near Mario Zucchelli Station. The United States chose to inspect these five sites due to operational, scientific, and environmental reasons, in addition to national security ones.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華訊息提醒不要提及資助人-李宇軒指可能指墊支人">陳梓華訊息提醒不要提及「資助人」 李宇軒指可能指墊支人</h4> -<p>The composition of the team was consistent with the goal of inspection and included national security experts from the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Coast Guard, as well as experts in Antarctic scientific operations and environmental topics from the National Science Foundation and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. All inspectors had the responsibility and ability to collect information on any of the priority issues up for inspection and were not restricted to a particular topic. Additionally, all inspectors used the EIES and other publicly available information to research the sites before arrival. As noted above, the EIES process is designed to satisfy not only the advance notification requirements of the Antarctic Treaty but also, as parties agreed to in 2012, provide additional information on other topics.</p> +<p>控方另指，在陳梓華成立 WhatsApp 群組之前，李和陳之間曾經有 WhatsApp 對話，並展示相關紀錄截圖。陳轉述 Mark Simon 提醒李不要提及「Backer（資助人）」和「中英聯合聲明登報」團隊。（“Brother, Mark said do not mention about backer and JD team”）</p> -<p>Per the terms of the treaty and as subsequently illuminated by treaty meetings, the United States informed other parties of the names and affiliated U.S. government agency of the inspection team members in December 2019 but provided no information about the destinations or goals of the inspection. The United States informed the three selected stations of the team’s impending arrival roughly 36 hours before they reached the first site, the South Korean Jang Bogo station. Providing short-term advance notification is a customary courtesy, given how receptive all countries have been to these inspections, to reduce disruptions to scientific and operational activities and reduce risk of a transportation emergency.</p> +<p>就「Backer」的身份，李表示不肯定，「不過我理解係 T（陳梓華）嗰邊，作為 crowdfunding 嘅 backer，即係有墊過支。」</p> -<p>The United States was interested in the operational aspects of the chosen sites in the Ross Sea region largely due to the new infrastructure that had been (and was being) constructed there since the previous U.S. inspection in 2012: the Jang Bogo Station was opened in 2014, Italy was building a new runway, and China was building a new year-round station on Inexpressible Island. The Italian runway was of particular interest since it could serve as an alternative landing point for intercontinental flights to the U.S. McMurdo Station — a major transit and logistical hub 200 miles away — that would otherwise need to return to their departure point if weather at McMurdo was inhospitable. Having an alternative landing site in Antarctica could prevent “boomerang” flights that return to New Zealand, for example, thereby saving time, fuel, and money. Additionally, since the United States has the largest presence in the region, U.S. officials wanted to be prepared in case McMurdo personnel are called on to respond to an emergency. Decreasing the possibility that the finite U.S. resources at the station would be diverted from planned scientific or operational activity to provide emergency assistance to the Chinese, Italian, or South Korean stations along the Ross Sea was the main concern in the report, which therefore encouraged the then-unnamed Chinese station to increase communication with its Italian and South Korean neighbors.</p> +<p>李提到當時斯科特有意參選總統，陳梓華和 Mark Simon 希望他避免談及墊支事宜，因為避免可能觸犯美國總統選舉的規矩。李表示他在會面期間有遵從陳在訊息中的指示。</p> -<p>In addition to having the largest presence in Antarctica, the United States conducts the most scientific research on the continent. U.S. officials are always interested in learning about new activities and new approaches being pursued there, including ongoing Italian maritime research, new South Korean preparations for an inland traverse, and potential Chinese contributions to understanding the variation of the climate, cryosphere, and ocean in the Ross Sea region. At the time, these three parties were collaborating to designate a new ASPA to assist in monitoring one of the oldest Adélie penguin colonies and a breeding site of south polar skua, as well as serve as a reference point for sea-ice dynamics; ASPA 178 was approved at the 2021 ATCM in Paris. The United States also uses inspections to learn how parties are engaging with the environment, including but not limited to how a station is implementing the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty’s Protocol on Environmental Protection, a complementary agreement that entered into force in 1998. Notably, the inspectors “strongly encouraged” China to submit a final comprehensive environmental evaluation for its station, a requirement China subsequently completed in October 2021.</p> +<p>控方問李會見斯科特之後，有否與陳梓華談論該會面。李回答有，指自己「大概講咗會面講嘅嘢」，又引述陳回應他「『Good, Keep up, good work』呀咁」。至於 Mark Simon，李則稱事後沒有與他討論。</p> -<p>None of the countries whose stations were inspected have made or can make territorial claims so long as the treaty is in force, so Article IV sovereignty considerations were of the less priority for the inspectors. However, New Zealand maintains a territorial claim over the Ross Sea area where the stations are located, so having U.S. officials travel there without informing New Zealand underscored that no country’s claim can impede an unannounced inspection. Inspection officials, who were warmly welcomed at all visited sites, focused on reviewing compliance with Article I and other treaty provisions and, as the report concluded, “found no violations of Treaty provisions reserving Antarctica solely for peaceful purposes.” Rather, “each of the stations was well-managed and impressive in terms of their general facilities and professional character.”</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華支持他安排區選監察團-以擴展人脈作國際游說">李宇軒指陳梓華支持他安排區選監察團 以擴展人脈作國際游說</h4> -<p>However, the U.S. team very much considered Articles I and V and other provisions. Each station allowed the inspectors access to all parts of the station. Inspectors found no weapons, military equipment, or explosives at any of them; however, both Italy’s Mario Zucchelli station and Korea’s Jang Bogo station had military personnel present.</p> +<p>控方繼而就2019年區議會選舉監察團提問，並展示「Election Observation Mission Report（下稱「EOM」）」，當中提到監選團由「重光團隊」和李成立的「香港故事」籌辦。法官杜麗冰留意到報告上除了有「重光團隊」標誌之外，還有「IAD」標誌。控方提供相關資料，指這是「香港大專學界國際事務代表團」的標誌。</p> -<p>In addition to the stations, the United States chose to inspect ASPA 161, which reinforced the point that giving an area protected status does not exempt it from the broader monitoring regime. Other countries had inspected protected areas, including Australia in 2016 and New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 2005. Doing so also demonstrated how to conduct an inspection without harming the ecology of the area.</p> +<p>李稱監選團是邀請不同觀察員來港觀察區議會選舉，而他是香港那邊的其中一個搞手。控方問誰人指示李參與。李則澄清：「因為唔係一個指示嚟，係一個 story 嚟」，當時他與陳梓華、轉型中的「重光團隊」以及「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人進行討論，而「攬炒巴」與顧問公司「Whitehouse Consultancy」曾討論英國上議院議員 Lord David Alton 有意來港觀察選舉，「但唔想好似 Lord Alton 主動過嚟咁」，反而想由一個社運團體邀請他來港，於是李直接給他們使用「香港故事」的名義。</p> -<p>Finally, the U.S. inspectors chose to highlight the importance of transparency. For example, the report encouraged countries to “maintain or increase the information they share” and noted the “significant disparity in the use of the [EIES],” as noted above, China has been particularly derelict at using this mandated transparency tool. By contrast, as has been the norm since the treaty was signed, the United States released its report not only to the Antarctic Treaty parties but also to the public.</p> +<p>李續指，「攬炒巴」和「Whitehouse Consultancy」提議除了邀請 Lord Alton 之外，還邀請更加多人，而上次有份接待 Bob Seely 的李宗澤（Wilson Li）表示願意協助處理流程，於是「攬炒巴」和「Whitehouse Consultancy」便著手邀請更多人來港監選。</p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p>李宇軒稱有跟陳梓華討論安排「監選團」，「佢都支持我去整呢個 EOM，同埋希望喺 EOM 𠵱個場合度擴展我嘅人脈」，這關乎他轉型做國際游說，以爭取香港自由民主。</p> -<p>Given that the Antarctic Treaty does not resolve differences over Antarctica but addresses them by agreeing to disagree on key topics such as sovereignty and by curtailing military interests and activities, there is justifiable concern about how increased geopolitical rivalry may affect the future of the treaty. In particular, strategic rivalries may increase suspicion that certain countries are not complying with key provisions such as the obligation to use Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒要求裴倫德刪除監選團相關訊息-免被港府禁入境">李宇軒要求裴倫德刪除監選團相關訊息 免被港府禁入境</h4> -<p>However, existing tools do provide some solutions to these challenges and worries, and there is much the United States can do to ensure its own situational awareness of what is happening in Antarctica. Specifically, the United States should do the following:</p> +<p>控方展示2019年11月22日，即區選之前兩日，李宇軒與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人兼執行總監裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）之間的 WhatsApp 對話，當中提及要刪除訊息紀錄。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Increase the frequency of in-person, unannounced inspections.</strong> Although the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted and continues to affect Antarctic operations, and weather will always be the biggest challenge to any sort of movement, conducting only one full inspection during the past decade demonstrates a lack of commitment by the United States to monitoring the capabilities and activities of other countries in Antarctica in person. Every three to five years, the United States should aim to undertake inspections that cover an appropriate array of sites and use U.S.-flagged operated transportation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Increase collaboration with like-minded countries on inspections.</strong> Inspections are time-consuming and expensive. To mitigate these practical challenges, the United States should consider collaborating with other like-minded countries, such as by conducting joint inspections or sharing detailed information afterward.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Promote the idea that inspections can in turn reinforce collaboration.</strong> The United States should consider conducting in-person inspections with other countries to achieve specific goals. For example, a joint inspection of Antarctic Peninsula sites with Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom — the three countries laying claim to the region — could send a powerful signal of cooperation. Like the U.S.-Russian inspections in 2012, a joint inspection by the United States and China could also provide a practical and discrete way for the two countries to demonstrate their collaboration in Antarctica and commitment to the treaty.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Encourage compliance with advance notification requirements.</strong> The United States should continue to push all countries to supply the information they agreed to provide to the EIES. It should encourage work by neutral knowledgeable authorities, such as the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, to report on EIES compliance annually. In addition to reviewing the submissions of other countries, the United States should set a positive example of compliance with the EIES reporting requirements. It should make sure its own submissions are timely and complete.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Increase attention paid to dual-use equipment.</strong> The United States should analyze the information already collected during previous inspections and submitted to the EIES regarding telescopes, telecommunications equipment such as submarine cables if and when they are built, and satellite infrastructure such as the U.S. Global Positioning System, Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System, China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, and the EU Galileo system. If Washington feels the existing requirements to report on military equipment are not sufficient to supply the information it needs, it should also consider proposing to add additional fields to the EIES. Countries should also prioritize in-person inspections of key sites to verify the information submitted is consistent with what is on the ground. Knowing what equipment is in Antarctica is the first step to determining related risks and mitigation actions.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>李解釋，以當時的政治環境而言，根據籌辦監選團的人士的判斷，當時香港政府並不歡迎外國人來港監選，叫裴倫德刪除訊息是因為擔心若果他被發現有監選團相關的訊息，會被港府標籤為「不受歡迎人士」，被禁止來港。李續指，若然來港監選的人最終被視為「不受歡迎人士」及不能入境，後備方案是他們把情況告知相應國家的領事館和傳媒。因此在裴倫德過關期間，李表示需要與裴倫德保持訊息聯繫，以確保他順利過關。</p> -<hr /> +<p>李稱監選團分成港九新界不同小隊，而他屬於其中一個新界小隊，同隊成員包括 Lord Alton。李憶述當時陳梓華叫他把握機會建立人脈網絡。</p> -<p><strong>William Muntean III</strong> is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>William Muntean IIIChina opened its fifth station in Antarctica on February 7, 2024. The new Qinling station, located on Inexpressible Island in the Ross Sea, joins the existing Great Wall (Antarctic Peninsula), Zhongshan (eastern Antarctica), Taishan (eastern Antarctic highlands), and Kunlun (Dome A) stations.【黎智英案・審訊第卌七日】2024-03-18T12:00:00+08:002024-03-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-47<ul> - <li>李宇軒指Mark Simon借出戶口收眾籌款項 冀成立基金不留港銀行 免受凍結風險</li> -</ul> +<h4 id="李宇軒銀行紀錄顯示mark-simon曾借50萬元">李宇軒銀行紀錄顯示Mark Simon曾借50萬元</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>李指是次邀請外國人來港監選的開支約有幾十萬元，由「G攬運動」眾籌款項支付，也有的外國代表是自費來港，包括瑞典和丹麥的代表。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cVGoitS.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>控方指，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示， Mark Simon 在2019年11月21日向李轉帳一筆50萬港元款項。李解釋，當時有見即將籌備監選團，惟其個人戶口只剩下約26萬元，「所以我就要去搵T（陳梓華），我可能唔夠錢去搞 EOM，咁就睇吓佢可唔可以諗吓辦法」，例如找人墊支，於是 Mark Simon 便轉帳了50萬元給他，「我諗就因為嗱嗱臨，佢直情就用 personal account 就畀我喇。」</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（18日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第47日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李談及2019年8月的第三次眾籌活動，籌得約180萬美元，在提取眾籌款項過程中經歷了一些困難，後來在另一名被告陳梓華的協助下，找來了黎智英的私人助手、被指為本案共謀者之一的 Mark Simon 借出美國的銀行戶口收取眾籌款項，然後轉帳至「Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。李提到，當時 Mark Simon 要求成立一個基金來保管眾籌款項，而非把款項轉帳至李的渣打銀行個人戶口，而且需要找美國公民來擔任基金信託人，「盡量將啲錢唔留喺香港銀行系統入面，去減少香港銀行例如凍結呢啲錢嘅風險。」</p> +<p>李指，他並不需要還款給 Mark Simon，因為 Mark Simon 幫忙接收「G攬」眾籌款項，他之後歸還款項給「Project Hong Kong Trust」時，已經直接扣除了上述50萬元。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指英國登報計劃花光308萬英鎊籌款">李宇軒指英國登報計劃花光30.8萬英鎊籌款</h4> +<p>控方指根據收支帳目表，李合共墊支了約55.2萬港元。昨日提到「Project Hong Kong Trust」在2020年2月28日向李轉帳約42萬元美金（約328萬港元），以歸還李所有活動墊支過的開支。李解釋42萬元美金的計算方法，他先計算所有活動墊支款項的總和，然後扣除已經歸還了給他的款項，例如上述 Mark Simon 的50萬元，最終得出42萬美元這數目。</p> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第四天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。就2019年7月的「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃，控方展示報館發票、李宇軒的銀行戶口紀錄，顯示《衛報》（The Guardian）的廣告費用是4萬英鎊。此外，NewStatesman 的廣告費是1,200英鎊，The Spectator 的廣告費則是2,333英鎊。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指李柱銘和陳方安生會見斯科特和裴倫德-談論香港民主情況">李宇軒指李柱銘和陳方安生會見斯科特和裴倫德 談論香港民主情況</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/k8ylTEW.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 網絡截圖（資料圖片）</p> +<p>李宇軒指，在監選團結束之後，Lord Alton、裴倫德、民主黨創黨主席李柱銘和前政務司司長陳方安生在西九龍的 W Hotel 開會，而李宇軒得知有這個會議，於是陳梓華叫李參與這個會議。在會議中，李曾經與 Lord Alton 和裴倫德交談。</p> -<p>李指是次登報的總支出是大約30.8萬英鎊，即是花光所有眾籌款項。李又指除了登報紙廣告費用之外，相關支出還有在「89up」的廣告版、Facebook、Twitter 和 Google 登廣告，也有分別向「89up」和「Whitehouse consultancy」兩間顧問公司支付顧問費。</p> +<p>李憶述，李柱銘和陳方安生在會議中「講香港民主情況」，而 Lord Alton 則表示會盡力以英國議員的身份引起關注，李理解裴倫德是作為 Lord Alton 的助理。控方追問他們談論的是引起什麼「關注」，李指是「對香港嘅民主情況」的關注；控方再問有什麼情況值得關注，李僅說：「Deteriorate 緊。」</p> -<p>活動開支方面，李指包括印製單張、租借會議室、訂製T恤等雜費。控方問到這些活動是什麼性質。李則指一般來說是「支持香港的活動」，但他不清楚每個活動的性質，因為是「攬炒巴」劉祖廸以及在英國當地的人所舉辦的。</p> +<h4 id="2019年底赴美會見議員-李宇軒為推動支持香港法案使侵犯人權者負責任">2019年底赴美會見議員 李宇軒：為推動支持香港法案、使侵犯人權者負責任</h4> -<h4 id="英國登報廣告呼籲英政府制裁有份打壓香港自由人權的人士">英國登報廣告呼籲英政府制裁有份打壓香港自由人權的人士</h4> +<p>李宇軒確認曾在2019年底到美國國會山莊會見參議員斯科特（Rick Scott）、Todd Young 、克魯茲（Ted Cruz）和 Marsha Blackburn。是次會見議員是由時任香港民主委員會（Hong Kong Democracy Council）成員、朱耀明兒子朱牧民（Samuel Chu）安排，隨團人士包括天文物理學家 Shirley Ho 和李宗澤（Wilson Li），不過二人並沒有出席會面。李稱事前有告知陳梓華相關行程，而陳回應「好」、「加油」。</p> -<p>控方展示從李的手機檢取的廣告相片，當中的文字呼籲英國政府向有份打壓香港自由和人權的人實施制裁，又指英國一定要支持香港。</p> +<p>控方問及是次會面目的，李指會面是為了向美國的議員展示香港示威及相關事件裡面的「受害者」個案，「等佢哋有 grounds （基礎）去 push（推動）幾個同香港有關嘅 Acts（法案）。」而該些法案即「廣義上當時 support 香港嘅法案」，例如《香港人權與民主法案》。</p> -<p>控方又留意到廣告提供一個聯署網址，李指「攬炒巴」等人希望將一些廣告轉變成實質的政治行動（concrete political actions），因此以他記憶所及，該聯署是讓英國當地選民找回自己有份投選的國會議員，「跟住搵返佢哋做咩，我唔記得。」李指意思是：「我係你嘅 voter，我想你做一樣嘢，咁我就繼續投票俾你。」</p> +<p>控方追問，通過這些法案是為了什麼目的。李一度問：「你想我講 sanctions（制裁）？」他其後解釋，首項目的是作為一個政治氣勢（political momentum），在美國推動一些支持香港的法案；另一個目的是使一些「侵犯人權者（Perpetrators of Human Rights）」負上責任，例如制裁。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒表示有份成立fight-for-freedom-stand-with-hong-kong">李宇軒表示有份成立「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」</h4> +<h4 id="李宇軒指會面由朱牧民安排-會上不需談細節-由雙方職員事後跟進實務">李宇軒指會面由朱牧民安排 會上不需談細節 由雙方職員事後跟進實務</h4> -<p>控方指廣告下方有一組字「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」，問這是否一個組織。李確認是一個組織，並稱：「我係佢嘅一部份。」李指：「係由一班國際嘅香港人，同埋關心香港嘅人去組成，去組成一個 activism 嘅組織，就去爭取當時香港嘅自由民主。」</p> +<p>李表示，如果沒有記錯的話，他們會見的美國議員均是共和黨黨員，而且全部都是關心香港議題的議員。</p> -<p>李稱這個組織的創辦人除了他自己之外，還有「攬炒巴」、「Always」、「Madison」和「Shirley Ho」等人。</p> +<p>李憶述朱牧民在事前簡單解釋過，在會議期間並不需要談及太多細節，因為在會面之後，雙方的職員（staffer）會再商討細節和跟進實務工作，所以會議上只需主要談論幾個受害人的故事，「同埋即係有禮貌地多謝佢哋關心香港嘅事務。」而香港這邊的職員（staffer）就是朱牧民。</p> -<p>控方其後逐一追問各人身份。李稱「Always」和「Madison」均是網名，但不知他們真實身份。而「Shirley Ho」則是真名，她是一名天文物理學家，當時居住於美國。李指 Shirley Ho 曾經在2019年7月底或8月頭與他一同前往日內瓦，她在同年11月底或12月與他前往美國華盛頓，該次她作為一個監管者（chaperone）角色。</p> +<p>當控方追問他們想美國議員採取什麼行動，以及針對對象時，李表示：「唔好意思，我頭先已經答咗」，重申「我哋喺 meeting 唔可以特定要求佢哋（美議員）concrete 做乜嘢，啫係呢個係等 staffer 大家之後去夾嘅。」不過李表示，從廣義上來說，他們希望美議員通過法案。</p> -<p>控方問到「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」如何成立。李指，在2019年6月的G20登報計劃時，有的報紙會要求登廣告的人使用實名，也有的報紙接受籠統的名字，例如「Free Hong Kong」或「Hongkonger」。李指後來在7月的「中英聯合聲明」登報計劃中，大家希望成立一個統一或大家安心的團體，能夠使用它的名義登廣告，所以 Telegram 群組的人設立一個投票，最終投選出「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」作為團體的名稱，所以是次登報的廣告都是以這個團體的名義。</p> +<p>就是次旅程的開支，李稱由他先作墊支，之後向「Project Hong Kong Trust」報銷。控方又展示「重光團隊」的 Facebook 專頁在2019年12月11日的帖文，附有一張 Todd Young 與李宇軒、朱牧民、吳傲雪（Sonia Ng）和 Katherine Cheng 的合照。</p> -<p>李續指：「到再後期嘅事，呢一個組織或呢班人嗰 scope 擴闊到唔淨只報紙登廣告，不過呢個係後話。」控方追問他們會做什麼事，李則指例如舉辦一些支持香港的活動、與顧問公司合作和在社交媒體登廣告等等。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒向朱牧民傳送建議制裁對象名單-冀轉交美議員">李宇軒向朱牧民傳送建議制裁對象名單 冀轉交美議員</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒確認攬炒巴角色是精神領袖在連登上有號召力">李宇軒確認「攬炒巴」角色是精神領袖、在連登上有號召力</h4> +<p>控方展示李宇軒與朱牧民之間的 Telegram 訊息，李在訪美旅程之後，向朱轉發了一份文件檔案，題為「Profiles of Perpetrators of Human Rights and Democracy Abuse in Hong Kong（打壓香港人權和民主人士之檔案）」，封面並標註「Confidential（機密）」。文件內容列出四類建議制裁對象，包括發出指令侵犯人權的政府人士（“State actors who condone and give orders for human right violations”）、促使侵犯人權的政府人士和政治人物（“State actors, including politicians, who instigate human rights violations”）、協助和教唆侵犯人權的公私營機構人士（“State and Private Actors who Aid and Abet Human Rights Violations”）和促使侵犯人權的機構（“Organisations who facilitate human rights violations”）。庭上所見時任特首林鄭月娥位居榜首，其他官員和港鐵行政總裁等人亦榜上有名。</p> -<p>控方問及「攬炒巴」在「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」（後稱SWHK）團隊中的角色。李指「佢最 prominent 嘅角色係作為『攬炒巴』。」控方追問是什麼意思，李則指：「啫係佢就係連登上面嘅『攬炒巴』，呢個就係佢最 prominent 嘅 role。」</p> +<p>李相信文件是由「重光團隊」其他人製作，但是他稱：「我冇去參與整呢個文件，但我喺 SWHK 入面，我有參與嗰啲有關 sanctions 嘅討論。」被問到傳送這份文件給朱牧民的原因，李解釋，當「重光團隊」成員知道他見完美國議員之後，希望他能向美議員提議制裁對象，因此他需經由香港一方的職員，即朱牧民去向議員提供材料，所以李向朱提供相關文件，讓朱判斷何時及如何把這些材料交給美國議員。</p> -<p>法官李運騰追問「攬炒巴」實際做過什麼事。李稱「攬炒巴」的角色有如早前提及的另一個連登帳號「家樂牌通心粉」，在G20登報期間「家樂牌通心粉」在連登討論區上有號召力，直至「中英聯合聲明」登報期間，就輪到「攬炒巴」在連登上有號召力。</p> +<p>被問到有否閱讀過上述文件，李表示「應該𥄫咗一眼」、「跟住碌一碌，哦原來好多人」，但是並沒有詳細閱讀。至於醞釀製作這份文件的時間，李則稱有一段長時間，因為「重光團隊」的大群組不時有人提起制裁，組員討論一段時間之後，可能會轉談其他話題，「啫係溝埋晒其他 discussion」，所以未能肯定相關討論實際歷時多久。</p> -<p>李官再問，「攬炒巴」的角色是否作為一名精神領袖。李表示：「可以咁樣理解。」李又指「攬炒巴」是其中一個在「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃中積極參與討論的人，而他的主意與其他 Telegram 群組成員一致，「最 prominent 嘅 role 係佢會喺連登出 post。」</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒希望建議制裁名單保密-籲勿傳至群組">李宇軒：希望建議制裁名單保密 籲勿傳至群組</h4> -<p>李形容：「而佢喺連登出嘅 post，我理解大部份嘅 post 都會有好大嘅迴響，即係好多人會睇佢嘅 post。」法官李運騰問，連登上是否有很多人跟蹤「攬炒巴」的帖文？李則表示不肯定連登有否「追蹤」這個功能，只能說有很多人回應（react to）「攬炒巴」的帖文。李官又問「攬炒巴」是否有很多追隨者？李指：「喺連登上面係。」</p> +<p>訊息紀錄顯示，李傳送完文件給朱之後，表示他不相信群組內所有人會保密（“I don’t trust everybody in the group to keep this confidential”），朱回覆他也不會（I wouldn’t either）。李庭上解釋，他不想文件被傳送至大群組供人傳閱，因為文件性質是「機密」，所以要求朱不要傳送文件至群組。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指swhk曾經舉辦g20報紙展覽-據陳梓華稱蘋果日報資助3至4萬元-惟記憶模糊">李宇軒指SWHK曾經舉辦G20報紙展覽 據陳梓華稱《蘋果日報》資助3至4萬元 惟記憶模糊</h4> +<p>李又表示，以他理解這份文件是為美國而設，如果有需要向美國以外的國家提供制裁名單的話，便需要找擁有這份文件的人製作另一份。</p> -<p>被問及SWHK有否在香港舉辦活動，李宇軒提到，SWHK曾經在大約2019年8月或9月，在灣仔富德樓舉辦一個報紙展，「可以話，去畀喺香港嘅香港人去睇返，原來G20，6月嗰陣，有啲香港人做咗國際登報喎。」因為G20廣告是登在外國的報紙，反而身處香港的人未曾看過這些實體報紙，所以便舉辦這個報紙展覽。</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pSo39uQ.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<hr /> -<p>李又表示，相信是一個「G20殘留落嚟嘅小組」，裡面有人提議舉辦展覽。他記得他曾經做過一日義工，負責看管場地和做介紹。</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒：由登報轉型做國際游說 傳送建議制裁名單予朱牧民 冀轉交美議員Next With Hezbollah?2024-03-21T12:00:00+08:002024-03-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/next-with-hezbollah<p><em>Although the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza has captured the world’s attention, there is a serious risk of war between Israel and Hezbollah, according to a new assessment by CSIS.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Since October 7, 2023, there have been over 4,400 rocket, missile, and other stand-off attacks by Israel and Hezbollah combined. Hezbollah has also repeatedly violated UN Security Council Resolution 1701 by deploying forces and firing anti-tank guided missiles and other stand-off weapons against Israel from the zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River, according to CSIS geolocation analysis. The United States needs to increase its diplomatic engagement to prevent what could become a much wider and more violent war in the Middle East.</em></p> -<p>控方問到展覽由誰人出資舉辦。李表示開頭不知道，但是在後來知道陳梓華等人，或者陳梓華穿針引線去《蘋果日報》那邊，便資助了3萬或4萬元。他相信當時是陳梓華告訴他，或者陳梓華等人轉達過來的說法（hearsay），不過他不肯定相關詳情。法官遂打斷指，既然李對於自己的證供不肯定，便沒有需要詳述下去。</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>在午飯後，李再補充，T曾經就這個展覽跟他談及有關《蘋果日報》基金的事，不過他不記得詳情，但他肯定他從沒從陳梓華那邊接收過任何錢。就《蘋果》基金在展覽中的角色，李指在活動後段，若他沒有記錯的話《蘋果》基金有提供資助，但是「記憶好模糊」。</p> +<p>Shortly after Hamas’s brutal terrorist attacks in southern Israel on October 7, 2023, Israel nearly launched a preventive war against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Israeli intelligence assessed that Hezbollah fighters were on the verge of crossing the border into northern Israel as part of a multi-pronged attack. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed fighter aircraft that awaited orders to strike targets in Lebanon. Israeli officials apparently notified the White House around 6:30 a.m. on October 11, 2023, that they were considering preventive strikes and requested U.S. support. But senior U.S. officials, including President Joe Biden, pushed back. According to CSIS interviews with U.S. officials, they were worried that Israeli strikes in Lebanon would unnecessarily trigger a regional war and were skeptical of Israel’s intelligence that an attack was imminent.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指2019年8月籌辦第三次眾籌登報">李宇軒指2019年8月籌辦第三次眾籌登報</h4> +<p>Although Israel did not launch a preventive war, the possibility of an Israel-Hezbollah conflict looms over the region. Israel faces a dilemma. It can risk war with Hezbollah, but in the process, a war would broaden the fighting in a way that makes the current war in Gaza look like a minor dust-up. Israel could also wait, which would avoid war now with Hezbollah, but this could risk a more serious conflict in the future with a foe that is better armed and capable and that could control the timing of a war to its advantage.</p> -<p>就2019年8月的第三次眾籌活動，李指因為G20和「中英聯合聲明」先後兩次眾籌登報計劃「都OK成功」，所以兩次眾籌的部份籌辦者，包括李、「攬炒巴」和網名「T」的陳梓華，聯手籌辦了第三次運動，即是「G攬運動」。李指是次運動的主題是喚起國際關注當時香港的民主自由狀況。</p> +<p>To better understand the prospects of war, this brief asks several questions. What factors shape the possibility of war? What are Hezbollah’s capabilities today? What are Israel’s options? What options does the United States have to mitigate or prevent a war?</p> -<p>李指，是次運動分別在美國、英國、加拿大、法國、德國、西班牙、意大利、瑞典、芬蘭和丹麥等國家的報紙登廣告。有人負責聯絡報館，有人負責設計廣告，而負責處理眾籌和墊支的人則是李自己。</p> +<p>To answer these questions, this analysis includes a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative information. It compiles data on Israeli and Hezbollah strikes along the Israel-Lebanon-Syria border, geolocates Hezbollah attacks against Israel in the zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River, and examines satellite imagery of Israeli strikes against Hezbollah targets. It also assesses Hezbollah’s military capabilities, including compiling data on Hezbollah’s stockpile of 120,000 to 200,000 short-range guided ballistic missiles, short- and intermediate-range unguided ballistic missiles, and short- and long-range unguided rockets. Finally, it draws on interviews the authors conducted with U.S. and Israeli officials on a trip to Israel.</p> -<p>李又提到「攬炒巴」的角色是在「連登」討論區出帖文，因為當時「『攬炒巴』個 account 勁過『家樂牌通心粉』，我意思係『攬炒巴』個 account 會有多啲迴響，所以由『攬炒巴』喺連登出 post」，宣傳及簡介眾籌計劃。</p> +<p>The analysis makes three main arguments. First, the security situation has dramatically worsened in recent months for several reasons: the October 7 attacks profoundly increased Israeli insecurity; the displacement of over 150,000 civilians on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border has created growing pressure, particularly in Israel, to alter the security situation so that civilians can return; Hezbollah and Iranian-linked groups in Lebanon and Syria continue to stockpile stand-off weapons that can hit Israel; and Hezbollah continues to violate UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701. Taken together, these factors have created a volatile situation in an already tense Middle East.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指第三次眾籌款項達180萬元美金-需找美國的有錢人借出戶口收款">李宇軒指第三次眾籌款項達180萬元美金 需找美國的有錢人借出戶口收款</h4> +<p>Second, violence between Israel and Hezbollah has already started to climb after nearly two decades of low-level conflict. Since October 7, there have been more than 4,400 violent incidents concentrated around the Blue Line and the Golan Heights involving Israel and Hezbollah, according to CSIS analysis. In addition, CSIS analysis indicates that Hezbollah’s anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) have struck Israeli forces from concealed launch sites less than three kilometers from the Blue Line on at least 17 occasions since October 7, a clear violation of UNSCR 1701.</p> -<p>李指第三次眾籌不是限於英國，所以決定使用國際通用的美元為單位，同樣使用眾籌平台「gofundme.com」。至於眾籌款項當時提取至哪一個銀戶口，李則形容「呢個係好長嘅故事」，他指眾籌款項最後被轉移至「Project Hong Kong Trust」在美國 Amalgamated Bank 的戶口，但中間卻經歷了一些困難。</p> +<p>Third, the United States needs to increase diplomatic efforts to prevent an all-out war, which would be devastating for both Lebanon and Israel and ignite a broader conflagration in an already combustible region, including triggering more attacks on U.S. forces.</p> -<p>李解釋，他們需要借用一個在美國開設的美金戶口來收取眾籌款項，加上款項達180萬元美金，為了避免被懷疑「洗黑錢」，所以不能借用一般的銀行戶口，「咁就要搵喺美國、又咁上下有錢嘅人」來借出銀行戶口。</p> +<p>The rest of this brief is divided into four sections. The first examines the evolving security landscape. The second section assesses Hezbollah’s capabilities and force disposition, particularly along the Israel-Lebanon border. The third section analyzes Israel’s objectives and options. The fourth section explores U.S. policy options.</p> -<p>李記得他們首先找到一個在美國的有錢人願意借出戶口，但是當這個人嘗試將款項從眾籌戶口轉移至其銀行個人戶口時，銀行卻未能完成此程序，他理解該筆款項是離開了眾籌戶口，「但是去到收款人戶口時，銀行 hold 住咗條數，就冇入到去個銀行戶口」，可能正在等待釐清一些資料。</p> +<h3 id="the-changing-security-landscape">The Changing Security Landscape</h3> -<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華找到mark-simon借出戶口">李宇軒指陳梓華找到Mark Simon借出戶口</h4> +<p>Israel has repeatedly fought Hezbollah since the group’s inception in the early 1980s. Indeed, Hezbollah has defined itself from the start in opposition to Israel and dedicated itself to driving Israel out of Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah conducted periodic operations against each other in the 1980s and 1990s despite the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and Hezbollah succeeded in forcing the Israeli military to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000. In the process, Hezbollah conducted an array of terrorist attacks against Israel around the world.</p> -<p>李續指，後來他們找到另一名在美國的有錢人士協助，當時他不知道該人的身份，後來才知道他是Mark Simon。而李知道眾籌款項成功地轉移至該有錢人的銀行戶口，不久之後，Mark Simon 的銀行戶口便將相關款項轉帳至「Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。李補充，嚴格來說他並不知道從眾籌戶口提取款項的人是否 Mark Simon，而他只知道 Mark Simon 轉帳了一筆錢給「Project Hong Kong Trust」戶口。</p> +<p>Despite Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah continued occasional attacks on Israel, using the pretext that Israel occupied Shebaa Farms, a small area at the intersection of the Lebanon-Syria-Israel border. Hezbollah claimed Shebaa Farms was Lebanese territory and thus that Israel’s occupation continued, despite the United Nations concluding that Shebaa Farms is Syrian and that Israel had evacuated its forces from Lebanon completely.</p> -<p>李憶述，他曾經在 Telegram 與網名是「T」的陳梓華討論有關事宜，當第一名美國有錢人未能接收眾籌款項的時候，「我問 T 有冇計，咁佢話佢嗰邊諗吓辦法，eventually 佢話『我搵到人』。」控方問李，陳梓華當時有否提及該人的身份，李回答：「我唔記得佢有冇講，定係佢講咗但我唔記得。」</p> +<p>Another area of dispute was the village of Ghajar, just west of Shebaa Farms and bisected by the Israel-Lebanon border. Its residents have both Lebanese and Israeli citizenship. For years, a fence divided Ghajar, but Israeli forces reoccupied all of Ghajar in 2006 and today retain control there.</p> -<p>李憶述，直至大約2020年2月，他整理第三次眾籌的收支紀錄期間，查看「Project Hong Kong Trust」的銀行戶口紀錄時，「我見到，噢，原來入錢嗰度寫住 Mark Simon」，而轉帳日子是2019年底或2020年初。</p> +<p>The low-level conflict between Israel and Hezbollah flared into an all-out war in 2006 after a Hezbollah cross-border kidnapping operation. The war left over 100 Israelis and around 500 Hezbollah fighters dead, as well as devastated Lebanon. Hezbollah likely did not anticipate its operation would spark an all-out war, and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah later announced that he would not have conducted the operation if he had known a war would occur. Although Hezbollah suffered far more dead, some Israelis saw the war as a disaster due to the large number of Israelis killed, and the IDF’s battlefield performance was widely criticized.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指mark-simon要求成立基金保管眾籌款項-美國公民擔任信託人免受風險">李宇軒指Mark Simon要求成立基金保管眾籌款項 美國公民擔任信託人免受風險</h4> +<p>The 2006 war ended with UNSCR 1701, which created a zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River along the borders of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. According to UNSCR 1701, the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River should be free from any armed personnel, assets, and weapons except for those of the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL.</p> -<p>就「Project Hong Kong Trust」，李指主要有3名美國公民作為這個基金的法律上持有人，其中一個人是 Katherine Cheng ，另外兩名人士則不知道。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VHti587.jpeg" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: UNSCR 1701 Zone in Southern Lebanon</em></p> -<p>李指，Mark Simon 當時提出一個要求，他希望把這一筆眾籌款項轉移至一個基金，而不是李的渣打銀行戶口，所以 Mark Simon 替他們聯絡律師並與美國當地的人商討，希望成立一個基金保管這筆錢，而且需要找人擔任信託人，「希望呢啲 trustee 係美國公民，去減低佢哋有可能受到，譬如話香港銀行系統要求佢哋要對啲錢點樣做嘅風險。」李相信以上是由陳梓華轉述給他的。</p> +<p>After 2006, an uneasy deterrence prevailed. Israel occasionally attacked Hezbollah fighters and Iranian arms shipments headed to Hezbollah and other groups in Syria, and there were intermittent rockets, drones, and other stand-off attacks back and forth across the border. For the most part, however, the border was the calmest it had been in decades, with both sides eager to avoid another all-out war.</p> -<p>被問到為何 Mark Simon 想成立一個基金，李稱記得當時的討論和分析是，「盡量將啲錢唔留喺香港銀行系統入面，去減少香港銀行例如凍結呢啲錢嘅風險。」</p> +<p>Today, however, the situation is delicate for several reasons. First, the October 7 attacks dramatically increased Israeli insecurity. It is difficult for most outsiders to fully comprehend the psychological impact and trauma caused by the gruesome attacks. Israel was surprised on October 6, 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israeli forces in the Sinai and Golan Heights. But October 7, 2024, was largely a surprise attack that killed Israeli civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, and involved numerous atrocities and sexual violence, much of it captured on video. Indeed, it was the third-deadliest terrorist attack around the globe since the University of Maryland began collecting terrorism data in 1970, and on a per capita basis, it was 15 times more deadly than the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. In interviews conducted by several of the authors in Israel in December 2023, Israelis of all sorts stressed the failure of their intelligence services and military forces on October 7, and many Israelis felt they could no longer rely on deterrence given its failure against Hamas on October 7.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華安排他會見美議員-mark-simon亦在場">李宇軒指陳梓華安排他會見美議員 Mark Simon亦在場</h4> +<p>The attacks took a psychological toll on Israelis. According to an analysis published in the medical journal The Lancet, the attacks led to notably higher levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) among Israeli citizens. It concluded, “Our findings show that the deleterious effects of these attacks were not restricted to those directly exposed to the brutal acts of terror but also to those indirectly exposed. Thus, these attacks are to be considered as a mass trauma event affecting an unprecedented proportion of the country/s population.” According to a Gallup opinion poll, Israelis’ emotional health plummeted after the attack, with record-high majorities saying they experienced higher-than-normal levels of worry (67 percent), stress (62 percent), and sadness (51 percent). As Gallup concluded, “No other country has ever seen such a large year-on-year increase in negative experiences.”</p> -<p>李表示當時未曾跟 Mark Simon 溝通，「我知 T（陳梓華）係有同 Mark Simon 傾計」，不過「喺呢個時間點，T 已經 link up 咗我同 Mark Simon」。李提到大約在2019年8或9月，美國參議員斯科特（Rick Scott）訪港，陳梓華安排了他會見斯科特、其助手 Scott Sciretta 及美國領事職員 Alan Brinker，而且 Mark Simon 及其他人亦在場。</p> +<p>Consequently, Israel’s risk tolerance has likely changed. If Hamas, less well-armed and trained than Hezbollah, can brutally kill over 1,100 Israelis, what might the more formidable Hezbollah do? Hezbollah’s close relationship with Iran and its ties to Hamas reinforce this fear. Reducing the risk Hezbollah poses includes ensuring that Hezbollah’s elite Radwan forces are not poised on Israel’s border, as they were before October 7, 2023. Israel would also like curbs on Hezbollah’s arms and other, more expansive restrictions, though they are aware this is unlikely. Israeli officials profess to prefer a diplomatic solution but warn that “we will have to act on our own” should diplomacy fail.</p> -<p>控方展示「G攬運動」的財務收支紀錄，李確認是次眾籌籌得180萬美元，大約是1,400萬港元。截至2020年3月，支出是大約730萬港元，其中630萬港元用作登報廣告費。</p> +<p>Second, in addition to increasing Israel’s sense of insecurity, the repercussions of the October 7 attack and clashes between Hezbollah and Israel have displaced more than 150,000 people on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border since October 2023, including roughly 80,000 civilians from northern Israel and 75,000 from southern Lebanon. For Israel, resettling its internally displaced persons back to their homes and villages in northern Israel will require creating — and ensuring — a security environment that currently does not exist. Israeli leaders need to convince their population that, this time, the intelligence services can anticipate any attack and the military can stop it — a difficult task given Hezbollah’s capabilities and one far harder due to the discrediting of military and intelligence officials on October 7. Domestic pressure has been growing to improve the security situation. According to Avigdor Liberman, a former minister of finance who leads an opposition party, the Israeli government has been weak in the north: “The red line became a white flag — the war cabinet surrendered to Hezbollah and lost the north.”</p> -<p>李提到後來第四次的眾籌計劃名叫「重光香港計劃」，惟他並沒有參與。</p> +<p>Third, Hezbollah has dramatically improved its military since 2006 and stockpiled over 120,000 stand-off weapons in Lebanon and Syria, as discussed in more detail in the next section. With Iranian partner and proxy forces active in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and other countries across the region, the threat from the north could get worse over time, not better.</p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PErjQSj.jpeg" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Figure 2: Assessed Areas of Operations of Hezbollah ATGM Teams (October 8, 2023–March 5, 2024)</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>Fourth, Hezbollah has repeatedly violated UNSCR 1701 by stationing its forces in the zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River, sometimes under the cover of the fake nongovernmental organization “Green Without Borders.” Geolocated footage from Hezbollah propaganda videos indicates that Hezbollah ATGMs have struck Israeli forces from concealed launch sites less than five kilometers from the Blue Line on at least 17 occasions since October 7, as shown in Figure 2, a clear violation of UNSCR 1701. These attacks have mostly been against Israeli military bases and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. At least seven Israeli civilians and approximately 10 IDF soldiers have been killed in the attacks. ATGMs played a major role in the 2006 war, during which they accounted for the majority of Israeli infantry casualties, including the loss of 24 tank crewmen and penetration of about 20 tanks.</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒指Mark Simon借出戶口收眾籌款項 冀成立基金不留港銀行 免受凍結風險Training Afghan Journalists2024-03-18T12:00:00+08:002024-03-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/training-afghan-journalists<p><em>This article presents and discusses results from an exercise in comparative content analysis of news articles about issues of conflict produced by Afghan journalists before and after participating in an internationally sponsored training and mentorship programme in Peace Journalism.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GjHaKNg.jpeg" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Figure 3: Violent Incidents Related to the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict by Week</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>As shown in Figure 3, there was little fighting between Hezbollah and Israel in the months prior to the October 7 attack. But the 15 weeks after the attack have witnessed more than 4,400 violent incidents involving Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah began to launch limited attacks on Israel as a way of showing solidarity with Hamas. This led to an Israeli response, resulting in a bloody tit-for-tat. As Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned, “You expand, we expand. You escalate, we escalate.” The incidents have been concentrated around the Blue Line, as illustrated in Figure 4.</p> -<p>The programme was part of a Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) project, intended to create community resources for resilience, in the information sphere, towards conflict issues contributing to recruitment by non-state armed groups such as Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS–KP). Peace Journalism is familiar as the basis for media development aid in contexts of conflict; however, its use in an intervention aimed specifically at PVE is relatively new.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qCNo8VE.jpeg" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Figure 4: Violent Incidents Related to the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict (October 8, 2023–March 15, 2024)</em></p> -<p>The results showed that the programme was effective, it is argued, in terms of benefits transferred to and applied by participating journalists. A sample of articles after the training showed a markedly higher Peace Journalism quotient than a baseline sample of articles by the same journalists before it. This suggested that the training and mentorship had successfully stimulated and enabled journalistic agency, taking account of constraints imposed by media structures and wider political and social contexts. The latter have become steadily more onerous under the Islamic Emirate (Taliban) government, in power since August 2021, according to international monitoring organisations. Implications are considered, in light of the findings, for future media development aid to Afghanistan.</p> +<h3 id="hezbollahs-objectives-military-forces-and-capabilities">Hezbollah’s Objectives, Military Forces and Capabilities</h3> -<h3 id="1-introduction">1. Introduction</h3> +<p>This section examines Hezbollah’s overall objectives, force design, defensive positions, rocket, missile, and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) arsenal, anti-tank capabilities, air defense capabilities, and proficiency as a fighting force.</p> -<p>The Peace Journalism (PJ) model, originally proposed by Johan Galtung as a set of ideational distinctions in news representations of conflict, has served as the organising principle for both scholarly research and practical application. Much of the latter has come through media development aid, often taking the form of professional training courses for editors and reporters. The effectiveness of such schemes depends on activating and galvanising journalistic agency to change the content of reporting. The extent of this activity can be gauged from grey literature such as The Peace Journalist, published biannually by the Global Peace Journalism Center at Park University, Missouri. Lynch and Tiripelli (2022) found 55 reports of such interventions, in 33 countries, in the magazine’s first 19 editions, from April 2012.</p> +<p><strong>Objectives:</strong> Hezbollah has several objectives that could lead to a conflict with Israel, though the organization has numerous, and at times competing, goals, some of which make a conflict less likely or at least would lead Hezbollah to be cautious. Hezbollah sees itself as a revolutionary organization that is one of the leaders of the broader Muslim struggle against Israel. Destroying Israel has been a part of its core ideology since its founding, and most of its members are sincerely against the very existence of the Jewish state. Hezbollah shares this goal with Iran, which also rejects Israel ideologically and sees it as a threat to the Islamic Republic: for decades, Iran and Israel have engaged in a shadow war, with Israel conducting assassinations against Iran and building alliances with regional rivals of the Islamic Republic like Saudi Arabia. Iran, for its part, has backed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel, used terrorism, and otherwise tried to weaken Israel. Hezbollah also sees itself as the defender of Lebanon, and various territorial disputes and Israeli incursions are a constant source of tension. Finally, Hezbollah, like Hamas, seeks the release of prisoners in Israeli custody.</p> -<p>From the early days of such interventions, however, trainers were reporting such risks as “creating cycles of empowerment and disempowerment” (Lloyd 2003, p. 118), as trainees, enthused with new ideas, returned afterwards to the same office settings, with the same constraints. Adebayo found that journalist participants in a PJ workshop in Nigeria wanted to “set a positive developmental agenda for public discourse”, but found themselves “act[ing] as muffled drums because of the overbearing influence of media owners and draconian government policies” (Adebayo 2016, p. 375). An early scholarly critique complained that PJ exponents tended to adopt “an overly individualistic and voluntaristic perspective” (Hanitzsch 2008, p. 75), giving rise to exaggerated assessments of the extent of change in news practices that could be brought about through such means.</p> +<p>Hezbollah, however, has important reasons for caution. Most importantly, Hezbollah seeks broader popularity in Lebanon, and triggering a destructive war could grievously undermine support, particularly outside its Shiite core constituency. Iran also may seek to keep Hezbollah in reserve as a weapon to use should Israel or the United States launch a major attack on Iran itself. Finally, Hezbollah recognizes the military power of Israel and would not lightly provoke a conflict it might lose or, at the very least, lead to widespread destruction in Lebanon.</p> -<p>Reporting of conflict issues by Afghan media, from the time of the abortive US-sponsored peace talks with the then insurgent Taliban in September 2020, was found (Lynch and Freear 2023) to display a predominant pattern of War Journalism, and little or no Peace Journalism, on the distinctions in the Galtung model. In the same study, Afghan journalists were interviewed (n = 16), and asked whether, how, and to what extent this pattern of reporting matched their own aspirations for their journalism. “The dominant pattern of coverage did not align with their own notions of how the conflict and the issues in the peace negotiations should be reported… Afghan journalists interviewed for this study wanted to do more Peace Journalism”, the researchers found.</p> +<p><strong>Force Design:</strong> Hezbollah has approximately 30,000 active fighters and up to 20,000 reserves. Its forces primarily consist of light infantry, which have historically been trained and built for stealth, mobility, and autonomy. Hezbollah has employed a version of what the United States calls “mission command,” empowering subordinates to make independent battlefield decisions based on a commander’s intent. This force design has allowed Hezbollah to operate effectively under conditions of overwhelming Israeli firepower. In 2006, for example, its rocket units were designed to set up a launch site, fire, and disperse in less than 28 seconds, relying on prepositioned equipment, underground shelters, and mountain bicycles to achieve such a small window of exposure. In the wake of the 2006 war, Hezbollah continued to build on the strengths of this approach, decentralizing its command and control and reorganizing to force the IDF into more urbanized terrain where its fighters can take advantage of concealed, fortified positions.</p> -<p>Such receptiveness to the tenets of PJ is not untypical among journalists in non-Western settings, Hussain writes. However, “the main obstacles to Peace Journalism in the non-Western world are lack of media freedom, threats to life and security, unfavourable socio-cultural conditions and lack of resources for journalists” (Hussain 2022, p. 116). Aside from the direct obstacles brought about by political and security considerations, the constraint on reporting by Afghan media most often identified by the interview subjects was “a lack of suitable training, particularly in Peace Journalism” (ibid.)</p> +<p>Hezbollah’s experience fighting in support of Bashar al-Assad in Syria for the past decade has given it access to capabilities and competencies used by conventional armies. Hezbollah can now conduct coordinated maneuvers of larger forces, employ suppressive artillery, and conduct logistics to support larger groupings of forces. Fighting in Syria has also given Hezbollah access to T-72, T-54/-55, and T-62 main battle tanks (MBTs). Its ability to employ armor inside Lebanon, however, is questionable. MBTs require dedicated sustainment formations and supply chains that may not exist in Hezbollah’s areas of control in Lebanon itself, and Israel would aggressively target MBTs with fighter aircraft, drones, and artillery. Hezbollah also fought against a different enemy in Syria — irregular forces that look very different from the modern military of the IDF. Hezbollah’s ability to effectively employ the capabilities it has gained since 2006 in the face of IDF firepower, especially airpower, is also unclear, and indeed, it is likely that any large, heavy forces would be quickly destroyed if they were deployed.</p> -<p>In response to these findings, over a period of five months in 2023, a journalist training programme was devised and implemented, in several stages:</p> +<p><strong>Geography and Defensive Positions:</strong> The geography of southern Lebanon offers several advantages that Hezbollah fighters could exploit in a war with Israel. The region, including much of the area directly across the Israeli border, predominantly consists of rocky hills. In 2006 and in other clashes with Israel, small and mobile groups of Hezbollah militants used trees, patches of vegetation, caves, surface irregularities, and buildings along the slopes of the hills to conceal their movements and fire rockets, UASs, and ATGMs at Israeli positions on the border. Any heavy Israeli military ground force attempting to move throughout the region would likely be restricted to the major hard-packed roadways due to the hilly terrain and would, therefore, be vulnerable to harassment with ATGMs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ambushes.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>A group of five Afghan journalist trainers themselves underwent training, provided online through an international aid programme, in Peace Journalism;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>They then facilitated a week-long residential training workshop for Afghan journalists, held in neighbouring Pakistan. Thirty journalists were trained in total, 20 residing in Afghanistan and 10 in Pakistan (of whom three were living in Peshawar and seven in Islamabad). Of the 30 trainees, seven were women.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The trainees continued to be mentored as they returned to their newsrooms and produced pieces of Peace Journalism, integrating new ideas with the work they had brought to the training, and publishing and/or broadcasting it. They contributed to 49 news outlets in total, including television, radio, magazines, and newspapers.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Hezbollah has built a network of tunnels and bunkers in the hills of southern Lebanon to host and move equipment and personnel relatively securely. Hezbollah also uses this infrastructure to launch ambushes and rocket attacks. Where it lacks purpose-built military fortifications, Hezbollah fighters can exploit existing civilian infrastructure in the cities, towns, and villages throughout the region. During the 2006 war, civilian infrastructure was critical to Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon. They used it in place of formal military fortifications to hide command centers, complicate Israeli targeting, conceal fighters for ambushes, and enable fighters to disperse, maneuver, and defend in depth. Thousands of civilians fled from southern Lebanon as strikes between Hezbollah and Israel intensified after October 7, 2023. Some of the towns and villages along Lebanon’s southern border almost completely emptied. In a war with Israel, Hezbollah could exploit civilian infrastructure and its network of tunnels and bunkers to attack Israeli ground forces and quickly retreat. Aware of Hezbollah’s fortifications and probable tactics, Israeli attacks would likely emphasize clearing and destroying Hezbollah’s tunnel network in southern Lebanon.</p> -<p>The context for this intervention was conceived with reference to the United Nations Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2016). This “involves aligning ongoing humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, security, and political interventions with the goals of preventing violent extremism”, across many fields (Thiessen 2019, p. 1). One specifically mentioned in a contemporaneous policy document from the United Nations Development Programme is “promoting messages of tolerance in the media”. Integrating Peace Journalism — or Conflict Sensitive Journalism, as it is sometimes called — within a P/CVE programme is an approach that has been applied previously to address factors associated with violent extremism in Kenya, including under-representation in media, historical grievances and complaints over poor governance (Freear and Glazzard 2021). However, the present study deals with the first intervention of its kind in Afghanistan.</p> +<p>A number of rivers run through southern Lebanon, including the Litani River, which flows south from the Lebanon Mountains before bending west where it empties into the Mediterranean. Control of these rivers and their features represents an important strategic objective, including controlling the movement of troops, equipment, and supplies. These rivers also serve as natural defensive fortifications that can be exploited for tactical advantages in combat by defending forces.</p> -<p>Such an intervention can, in turn, be seen to align with the UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda 2030, intended as a framework for activities in the international aid sector. Within it, “peaceful and inclusive societies” are nominated as an essential co-requisite of sustainable development, in Goal 16, within which Target 10 mentions “public access to information” as a means by which these conditions are to be engendered. So, distinctions of Peace Journalism coding, for evaluation purposes, were adjusted accordingly (see full discussion below).</p> +<p><strong>Rockets, Missiles, and Unmanned Aerial Systems:</strong> Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles pose two distinct threats to Israel. The first is their coercive effect: continuous rocket, missile, and UAS barrages can kill or wound Israelis — both civilians and military personnel — or destroy important political or economic infrastructure in Israel. This is the way Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles were primarily used in 2006 and how they are usually discussed in the context of war with Israel. The second threat comes from the tactical and operational effects of these systems: suppressing or attritting IDF forces to limit the effectiveness of Israeli operations. Hezbollah gained experience conducting combined arms operations in Syria, and the group may attempt to use rockets and missiles as part of ground operations against Israeli forces.</p> -<h3 id="2-research-questions-and-method">2. Research Questions and Method</h3> +<p>Hezbollah is probably the most heavily armed non-state group in the world, and its stockpiles of rockets, missiles, and UASs are a major part of its arsenal. Estimates of how many rockets and missiles Hezbollah possesses vary from 120,000 to 200,000. Because of Hezbollah’s close relationship with Iran, it is likely that Tehran would resupply Hezbollah quickly if it used this arsenal in a conflict with Israel. This resupply is easier than in the past, as Iran’s presence in Syria expanded considerably after Tehran came to the rescue of the Syrian regime when civil war broke out after 2011, creating a land bridge that enables weapons to go from Iraq to Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This stands in sharp contrast to Hamas, where weapons and people must be smuggled via tunnels from Gaza.</p> -<p>The overarching aim of the research was to ascertain whether, how, and how far the participating journalists changed their approach to reporting of overlapping issues pertaining to conflict, preventing violent extremism, and sustainable development, after the training, by comparing their new outputs with those they had previously produced.</p> +<p>As shown in Table 1, the bulk of Hezbollah’s arsenal consists of short-range unguided projectiles. Hezbollah has also dramatically increased its access to long-range missiles since 2006, meaning that most of Israel will feel the threat of Hezbollah attacks if the conflict escalates. Finally, Hezbollah’s precision-guided missiles pose an acute threat to Israel’s most important political, military, and economic centers — a threat that did not exist in 2006.</p> -<p>The Research Questions were, therefore:</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xO91cwF.jpeg" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Hezbollah’s Rocket and Missile Arsenal</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>How much War Journalism and how much Peace Journalism were the journalists producing in their work before entering the programme of training and mentoring?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How did this compare with the extent of War Journalism and Peace Journalism in stories produced by the same journalists, through and after the programme?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Eliminating the threat from Hezbollah’s rockets will be extremely difficult. The rockets can be launched from trucks, increasing their mobility and therefore survivability, or from underground bunkers, as was common during the 2006 war. Finding and destroying Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capabilities would involve an enormous reconnaissance-strike effort involving a variety of intelligence assets, precision strike capabilities, and ground forces.</p> -<p>Hence, the participating journalists were asked to provide examples of their work, comprising news articles on conflict and related issues, before the programme of mentoring and training began. These were translated then analysed and taken as a baseline sample, then compared with a second sample, comprising articles they had prepared, published and/or broadcast during or after the programme. The latter reflected new ideas they had developed in the training, in close consultation with the mentors.</p> +<p>Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal also includes long-range missiles. These are also likely to be used mainly in a coercive capacity, with Hezbollah undertaking long-range strikes against Israeli population centers to undermine Israeli support for the war. Hezbollah used its long-range rockets and missiles throughout the 2006 war despite an Israeli air campaign aimed at destroying their launchers and Hezbollah’s apparent unwillingness or inability to make much use of its Iranian-made long-range weapons.</p> -<p>The unit of analysis was therefore the individual story. The content analysis was carried out using evaluative criteria derived from distinctions in the Peace Journalism Model, which takes the form of a table setting out a series of dyads. Table 1 sets out Galtung’s original Peace Journalism model (Lynch and Galtung 2010, p. 13).</p> +<p>Hezbollah’s guided missiles make up an even smaller number of those long-range missiles — a few hundred at most. The accuracy of these weapons makes each attack more devastating and creates greater pressure on Israeli air defense systems. They provide Hezbollah with the capability to strike high-value targets, vital economic centers, and critical infrastructure.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/64caqYo.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Table 1. The Peace Journalism model.</em></p> +<p>While Hezbollah has historically used its rockets and missiles to impose pain on Israel rather than as part of combined arms operations, an important unknown is how Hezbollah might use its rocket and (to a lesser extent) missile capabilities in support of ground operations against the IDF. Hezbollah could attempt to capture territory in northern Israel or the Golan Heights in a Hezbollah-Israel war, or at least conduct raids there. This would require ground maneuver, which modern militaries usually enable using suppressive fire from artillery or air platforms. Hezbollah demonstrated the ability to integrate ground maneuver with suppressive fires in Syria, and it may attempt to do so in a war with Israel. Such tactics are difficult in practice, and expertise is probably unevenly distributed across Hezbollah’s military forces. IDF air defenses and air power would also limit Hezbollah’s ability to use its rockets and missiles in this manner.</p> -<p>This yielded eight coding categories, with a ninth added, to denote the provision or otherwise in the reports of a “framework of understanding” to connect the story material to broader conflict frames (see discussion below). The coding was carried out with due attention to the gendered implications of conflict issues in Afghanistan over the time frame from which the sample material was taken (again, see discussion below).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qch9xH2.jpeg" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ Figure 5: Satellite Imagery of Damaged Runway in Qalaat Jabbour Mountain Region, Lebanon</em></p> -<p>The samples were coded manually by the two co-authors. The content in each story was analysed for the presence of indicators from any of the four orientations on either side of the table: War Journalism and Peace Journalism. A score of 1 was recorded each time an indicator was found. Scott’s pi, a measure of inter-rater agreement used to establish reliability of findings by two raters, was calculated, and used to validate the results. To calculate observed agreement using this method, the number of items on which raters agree is divided by the total number of items.</p> +<p>In addition to its rocket and missile stockpiles, Hezbollah possesses a significant arsenal of UASs that include commercial quadcopters, suicide drones, loitering munitions, and more sophisticated platforms with surveillance and strike capabilities. Hezbollah’s UASs are almost entirely supplied by Iran and are used to conduct surveillance of — and strikes against — Israeli targets. On January 25, 2024, the IDF struck a 1,200-meter runway in southern Lebanon that it alleges Hezbollah built with Iranian assistance and was used by Hezbollah to launch large UASs. The airstrip and the surrounding base illustrate the advancement of Hezbollah’s UAS capabilities to include larger and more sophisticated systems. The base also contained a helicopter landing pad, support and storage facilities, and warehouses and UAS hangers under construction. The damage to the airstrip caused by the Israeli airstrikes can be seen in Figure 5, including four bomb craters on the runway.</p> -<p>To elaborate on the coding categories, as adapted for the current context: in a war and violence-orientation, conflict is represented as a zero-sum game, where two antagonistic parties contest the single goal of victory (which, for the other, means inevitable defeat). Significantly, such representations are also characteristic of messaging by violent extremist groups, which typically counterposes “us against them” (Post 1987).</p> +<p>Since October 7, Hezbollah has attempted at least 40 UAS attacks against Israeli targets, as shown in Figure 6. Several of these attacks have successfully penetrated Israeli air defense systems, killing IDF soldiers and damaging military sites in precision strikes.</p> -<p>Causes of — and possible exits from — the conflict are confined to the immediate arena of hostilities, whereas peace- and conflict-orientation mean going beyond the familiar tit-for-tat sequence of direct violence, instead allowing for multiple parties and goals, with causes and exits anywhere in time and/or space.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BIBUDzh.jpeg" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ Figure 6: UAS Incidents in Israel (October 8, 2023–March 15, 2024)</em></p> -<p>In practical terms, by reporting only violent incidents, or ritualised denunciations of the “enemy” by leaders on either of two “sides”, War Journalism typically omits the goals of the parties, or the issues (of grievance, relative deprivation, injustice, unmet needs and interests) that lead them to engage in the conflict, including through violence, in the first place. Generally, their reasons for acting as they do remain obscured by the sophisticated and aggressive communication of violent ideological dogma. In the case of violent extremism, this enhances the appearance of acting beyond the realm of reason, so there is no point reasoning (negotiating) with any of “them”. This can render news audiences cognitively primed for violent responses. “By focusing on physical violence divorced from context, and on win–lose scenarios… news unwittingly incentivises conflict escalation and ‘crackdowns’” (Hackett 2011, p. 40).</p> +<p>As seen in Table 2, Hezbollah UAS systems come in a wide variety. This list is not exhaustive, and Hezbollah likely possesses additional Iranian or indigenous drone models. Also not shown are the variety of commercial drones, such as Chinese DJI quadcopters, that Hezbollah possesses and which can be used to conduct surveillance or modified to deliver explosive payloads. Should war with Israel break out, Hezbollah would likely receive additional imports of drones from Iran and emphasize adapting commercial off-the-shelf systems to their needs. After all, Iran has established logistics supply routes — both air and land bridges — that can bring weapon systems and other equipment from Iran to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria. The result is that Hezbollah would probably be able to sustain a campaign of UAS attacks against Israeli targets in Lebanon and Israel unless supply routes were cut.</p> -<p>Truth-orientation may refer to the familiar duty of public service media to accurate reporting. At any rate, it indicates, in the specific context of reporting conflict, the inclusion and/or juxtaposition of material calculated or likely to activate critical thinking by audiences served up with propaganda, or partial, self-serving claims and statements, by one or more parties. In PVE initiatives, this could take the form of furnishing public discourse with insights into the grievances, economic and social factors, and individual stories behind violent extremism, in addition to the ideological discourse that is propagated as the “reason for violence”.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sGbr0WF.jpeg" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ Table 2: Select Iranian UAS Exported to Hezbollah</em></p> -<p>Reporting that adopts these two orientations — peace-and-conflict, and truth — in tandem may help to contextualise and relativise a group such as IS–KP, for instance: revealing commonalities in its composition, patterns of recruitment, orientation to authority, and motivating issues, with those of many other armed groups around the world, thus de-bunking the myth of its special status. This may enable audiences to understand its activities and messaging in the context of a constant challenge to prove relevance and impact in competition with rivals; the related search for secure funding and a steady stream of fighters, and arms; and the need to present strategy within a higher, ideological framework for the purposes of recruitment and morale.</p> +<p>Hezbollah’s tactical employment of UASs in a war with Israel is difficult to predict. Hezbollah drone operators have received training from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force, have performed military exercises with drones, and are observing the war in Ukraine, where a variety of new uses and techniques for drones on a battlefield have emerged. Hezbollah could attempt to use its UASs as part of a reconnaissance-strike complex, relaying targeting information for indirect fires or attacking mobile Israeli targets, but Hezbollah’s ability to coordinate its UAS and ground-based capabilities remains to be seen. Hezbollah could also use UASs to detect, surveil, and attack Israeli forces should they enter southern Lebanon or to overwhelm Israeli air defenses through swarming attacks, possibly in combination with rockets and missiles. The effectiveness of these tactics will likely be limited, however, by Israel’s sophisticated counter-UAS capabilities, including electronic warfare systems, air defense systems, and other countermeasures that could disrupt UAS communications with ground systems or knock them out of the sky altogether.</p> -<p>A people-orientation is often fulfilled by featuring efforts at conflict resolution, bridge-building, and peaceful coexistence by actors and institutions at sub-elite levels. The ability to surface a range of perspectives, issues, and voices from the population at large is of significance and dilutes the polarising effects of violent extremism.</p> +<p><strong>Anti-tank Guided Missiles and Improvised Explosive Devices:</strong> ATGMs and IEDs give Hezbollah potent capabilities to attack armored vehicles and fortified locations. These capabilities were vital to its tactical successes in the 2006 war, although Israeli tactical failures contributed to the loss rate it experienced in 2006. The IDF is unlikely to repeat those mistakes.</p> -<p>Conflict coverage can be seen, finally, as solution-oriented if causes are explained, and problems diagnosed, in terms of intelligible sequences of stimulus and response. If audiences can see how the processes of a conflict lead up to events — including violent events — that dominate the news, they are more likely to be receptive to treatment recommendations in the shape of proposals for nonviolent policy responses, which can be seen as peace initiatives. In this, such reporting may be consistent with PVE approaches that seek to explain violence from a range of perspectives — from broad historical and socio-economic trends to the specific circumstances of individuals and groups, and why they come to support and join VE organisations.</p> +<p>Hezbollah has almost certainly improved its anti-tank capabilities since 2006. It currently fields an ATGM system, Tharallah, that is designed to overcome the active protection system used by the IDF’s Merkava MBTs, although its efficacy is unclear from open sources. Hezbollah has taken steps to improve the mobility of its anti-tank units, mounting Kornet anti-tank missiles on all-terrain vehicles. Several news outlets also reported in late January 2024 that Hezbollah had used a more advanced Kornet-EM to attack an Israeli air control base, which would represent a significant increase in ATGM range and destructive power. On the tactical side, analysis of Hezbollah’s combat performance in Syria suggests that its members remain well schooled in using ATGMs against armored vehicles and fortified infantry positions. The result is that Hezbollah’s ATGMs are likely to remain one of its deadliest capabilities, even if they do not attain the success rate of 2006.</p> -<p>The Peace Journalism model is typically operationalised in relevant research by treating the above orientations as a set of headings, and allotting particular dyadic distinctions of representation, in samples of news reporting about particular conflicts, under each heading — a method pioneered by Lee and Maslog (2005). This process is guided by attention to the conflict milieu — and in this case the particularities of violent extremism in Afghanistan, manifested in IS–KP — considered with reference to established precepts of conflict analysis — to pinpoint the differentials of newsgathering and story-telling that are likely to produce the strongest interactions in audience meaning-making.</p> +<p>Hezbollah also has a considerable IED capacity. Hezbollah employed IEDs with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) against Israel in the 1990s and will almost certainly seek to do so again. EFPs are shaped charges with a concave end, which typically send a molten copper slug through targets and then create a deadly spray of hot metal. Hezbollah’s expertise in using IEDs probably allowed it to contribute to IED attacks against U.S. and British forces in Iraq. During the war in Iraq, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force — which aids Hezbollah — built infrared triggers, explosive circuits, and other EFP components in Iran and smuggled them across the border in Iraq to be used against U.S. forces. Hezbollah could also conduct attacks on Israeli forces using tunnel bombs, which were used in Iraq and Syria to literally undermine fortified positions, or improvised rocket-assisted munitions, which Hezbollah used. These IED capabilities, combined with Hezbollah’s ATGMs, would allow the group to harass and disrupt the advance of Israeli ground forces in Lebanon.</p> -<p>As Nohrstedt and Ottosen point out, “journalistic products are perceived to carry and contain meanings on several levels. These cannot be collapsed into a single ‘manifest content’ level” (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2011, pp. 224–25). In all studies where the PJ model is used as the basis for deriving evaluative criteria to use in content analysis, therefore, some further allowance is made for the discursive context into which the sample of reporting would have entered, and how the distinctions “caught” by such criteria would be likely to influence audience responses.</p> +<p>These weapons, however, will not be decisive in battle. They are suited for killing one vehicle at a time or striking a small, fortified position, not for defeating a combined force integrating infantry, armor, indirect fires, and air power. Israeli countermeasures, such as the Trophy active protection system, will also limit their efficacy. IEDs will, however, inflict casualties, which Hezbollah leaders probably believe would undermine political will in Israel.</p> -<p>Dyrstad and Hillesund (2020) use comparative survey research to show how a combination of “grievances… actual or perceived [and] lack of political efficacy” predicates “individual support for political violence”, with particular reference to appeals for support by non-state armed groups. This, therefore, influenced coding for the third of the Peace Journalism orientations, “people-oriented”, to emphasise reporting that highlighted political and/or social agency being exerted from sub-elite levels, with people taking matters into their own hands rather than simply appealing for intervention by authorities, or indeed by violent groups. Such initiatives could be seen as supplying some actual or prospective political efficacy in respect of grievances, and therefore as a community resource to safeguard against the messaging of violent extremism.</p> +<p><strong>Air Defense:</strong> Since the 2006 war, Hezbollah has emphasized the advancement and expansion of its air defense capabilities in an effort to degrade Israeli air superiority. Hezbollah’s air defenses include a range of systems primarily manufactured by Iran and Russia, including anti-aircraft guns, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and short- and medium-range surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems, as seen in Table 3. These systems most commonly make their way into Lebanon smuggled through Syria, and Hezbollah has occasionally used them to engage Israeli UASs flying over southern Lebanon in recent years.</p> -<p>Since the dynamics of cause and effect in any conflict can be differentiated according to gender, White urges, in programming designed to create community resources to prevent violent extremism, a “focus… on the socio-culturally constructed nature of gender roles, and how the unequal socialisation of these roles can… be challenged” (White 2022, p. 588). Contestation over these processes of construction and socialisation has been highlighted by monitoring groups in Afghanistan, with women’s presence in public life characterised as having changed “from almost everywhere to almost nowhere” since the Taliban takeover in 2021. Hence the PJ distinctions were applied with attention to issues in the construction and socialisation of gender roles, particularly as they affected participation by women in any form of public life — and indeed this fed through into the biggest single theme of material in the reporting by trainees. A particularly poignant note within media came with a story about women journalists whose radio station was taken off air — following a process of negotiation with the new authorities — before being put back on, albeit without the music broadcasting that previously accompanied the factual content.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JetWRE8.jpeg" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ Table 3: Hezbollah’s Air Defense Systems</em></p> -<p>The gendered impact of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan will doubtless manifest itself in many contexts, and take time to evolve. A corollary of the exclusion of women from consequential social roles outside the private sphere may be to tilt women’s participation towards non-state armed groups, thus adding to the germinal layers of violent extremism. Margolin notes that, when Islamic State emerged “from the ashes of Al Qaida in Iraq”, it used female suicide bombers while US troops were still in the country. “The use of women in combat roles” had a dual purpose: “both shaming men into action and allowing for women’s participation under special circumstances” (Margolin 2019, p. 44). However, this changed after the end of US combat operations, she notes, with women then explicitly encouraged, by ideologues of the group, to remain in the home. For Afghanistan, then — with a persistent threat from an offshoot of the same organisation, Islamic State–Khorasan Province, or IS–KP, but now similarly emptied of international forces — the auguries, with regard to the impact on gender roles, are mixed. However, this specific issue, of women’s potential participation in violent extremist activity, did not crop up as story material of interest to the journalists in the training programme.</p> +<p>In November 2023, U.S. intelligence officials reportedly believed that Russia’s Wagner Group intended to transfer another SA-22 system to Hezbollah from Syria. There have also been recent allegations that militias in Syria are actively training to use Iran’s most advanced air defense system, the Khordad-15.</p> -<h3 id="3-limitations">3. Limitations</h3> +<p>As shown in Figure 7, Israeli aerial activity has decreased in recent years and remains at historically low levels today, suggesting that Israel takes the threat of Hezbollah’s air defense systems to its aircraft seriously. Statements from Israeli military officials confirm as much. In 2022, the outgoing chief of Israel’s air force stated that Israel no longer had unimpeded air superiority over southern Lebanon.</p> -<p>Results from the comparative content analysis could be expected to show how far Afghan journalists could change the content of the news they produce, to incorporate more Peace Journalism, under the controlled conditions of a sustained intervention in training and mentorship, in which they participated with permission and support from their editors and employers. Such a study cannot, by itself, indicate the likelihood of a change in news content overall, even from participating journalists, following the conclusion of such an intervention.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4fqhwz7.jpeg" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ Figure 7: Average Daily IDF Flight Hours over Lebanon by UN Reporting Period</em></p> -<p>Shoemaker and Reese (1996) model influences on news content in a “hierarchy”, arranged on five nested (though often overlapping) levels: (1) personal influences, operating directly on the individual journalist; (2) professional influences (reporting routines and news values); (3) organizational influences (economic imperatives and editorial control); (4) extra-media influences (including threats and intimidation from state and non-state actors); and (5) broader societal influences. The nature of a training course, intended to take effect by resourcing participants to exert greater individual agency in their professional work, points to levels (1) and (2) of this model as fields of influence, but not the other levels.</p> +<p>In the event of war, Hezbollah’s air defenses would likely force Israeli aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, reducing their ability to accurately hit targets on the ground. At the same time, Hezbollah’s air defense systems would be high-priority targets for Israel. On February 26, 2024, the IDF announced that it had struck Hezbollah’s air defense sites in the Beqaa Valley in response to Hezbollah shooting down an Israeli drone over Lebanon earlier that day. In an escalated conflict, Israel would likely continue to favor the use of UASs over manned aircraft to reduce the risk posed by air defense systems to its pilots, though Israel does have fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter. A successful downing by Hezbollah of a manned Israeli aircraft would be a strategically significant event. Although Hezbollah’s upgraded air defense systems pose a greater threat to Israeli aircraft than they did in previous conflicts, Israel still has immense air superiority over Lebanon. Israel’s air force boasts some of the most advanced aircraft in the world, including U.S. and indigenously designed systems. Since the October 7 attack, Israel’s air force has successfully struck targets across Lebanon on almost a daily basis.</p> -<p>Another significant factor, which could be expected to influence the conduct and content of news — and therefore required allowances to be made in the coding — concerned the working lives of journalists amid a rapidly tightening set of constraints on media freedom. A report released in 2023 by the International Federation of Journalists referenced “unprecedented restrictions on journalists and media”, and cited a survey by its Afghan affiliate union, according to which just 292 out of 579 media outlets previously operating in the country were still in business. “Women journalists have been especially hard hit”, it went on, and “80 percent of women journalists in Afghanistan lost their jobs”.</p> +<p><strong>Human Factors:</strong> Hezbollah’s tactical proficiency, combat experience, and will to fight make it a much deadlier threat than Hamas — and even other regional militaries. Western analysts praised Hezbollah’s efficacy in the 2006 war with Israel, and its forces have only since grown more effective. Hezbollah’s combat experience in Syria has given its troops experience in ground combat that few regional militaries possess, forcing them to learn how to conduct offensive operations and exposing them to the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Russian military. Hezbollah members have also repeatedly displayed a willingness to accept decisive engagement and fight to the last soldier — attitudes that will only be increased by the desire to defend their homes from an Israeli offensive.</p> -<p>The IFJ report specified the modalities of restriction on journalism:</p> +<p>In short, the Hezbollah that Israel would face if violence were to escalate to major ground operations is more capable than in 2006. Hezbollah is larger, better armed, and more experienced, thanks in part to its experience fighting in Syria. It is most effectively designed to fight a coercive campaign aimed at killing Israeli soldiers and civilians at a steady rate through rocket, long-range missiles, ATGM, and UAS attacks. But it may also have some ability to conduct combined arms offensives against Israeli troops and limit Israeli air dominance. Even so, it remains technologically outmatched by the IDF, which has long prepared for a rematch of the 2006 war, has been engaged in a war with Hamas since October 2023, and will be able to bring much greater firepower to bear from its land- and air-based platforms.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“Numerous players within the Taliban regularly intervene in media affairs. The Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC), the Government Media Information Center (GMIC), and the Ministry for the Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue (MPVV) have all issued vague rules with unclear legal bases or consequences for the media… Other rules call on media to refer to the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, respect Islamic values, and coordinate reporting with state overseers. Meanwhile, General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) operatives have cracked down on the press, by watching, detaining, and beating journalists and visiting newsrooms to threaten workers and complain about coverage.”</p> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="israeli-objectives-and-options">Israeli Objectives and Options</h3> -<p>Taken together, these factors were built into the coding, with an additional indicator denoted by the concept of a “framework of understanding” (FWU). Many items, in both the pre-training and post-training samples, included interview material with non-elite sources to score in the people-orientation of the PJ model, which previous research has shown is the most widespread aspect of take-up among alumni of such courses as in the present example (Lynch and Tiripelli 2022). Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) characterise the training or pedagogical issue, arising from such a practice, in the following terms:</p> +<p>In light of the changing strategic landscape and Hezbollah’s evolving capabilities, what options does Israel have? There are at least four options: (1) return to the pre–October 7 status quo and emphasize deterrence, (2) start an all-out war with Hezbollah to destroy the group’s capabilities and force it to comply with Israel’s demands, (3) engage in a limited war with Hezbollah to put pressure on the group and push its forces further from the Israeli border, and (4) use coercive diplomacy to better implement UNSCR 1701.</p> -<p>“The challenge is to convey their connection with the conflict, and the outlook for its likely development, in the course of a news story… you need… to construct a framework of understanding, in which the relevance of new perspectives to the story… can be made clear” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, pp. 165–66, emphasis in the original). To make the relevance clear, in the repressive context spelled out in the IFJ report, of sub-elite initiatives to support the visibility or social participation of women, would carry obvious risks. In the coding, therefore, especial care was taken to detect even the most inferential signalling of this kind, and denote it through adopting a separate Framework of Understanding indicator.</p> +<h4 id="option-1-the-status-quo-ante-and-a-return-to-deterrence">Option 1: The Status Quo Ante and a Return to Deterrence</h4> -<p>“Peace journalism is supported by framing theory”, Lee and Maslog (2005) point out, and Entman (1993) indicates an active role for framing with the formulation of “making salient” the archetypical factors of “problem definition, moral evaluation and causal explanation”, on the one hand, as validating different “treatment recommendations”, on the other. To make them salient, he continues, requires more than the provision of “scattered oppositional facts” to “challenge a dominant frame”, thereby enabling and activating critical thinking, in fulfilment of the PJM heading of truth-orientation. The samples both before and after the training and mentorship programme included some stories that merely presented “feature material”, typically about ordinary Afghans going about their daily business — in a generalized social context, to be sure, but without explicit connecting content between them. So, these were coded at 0 for FWU, whereas stories that did make such explicit connections were coded at 1.</p> +<p>Israel might try to return to a deterrent approach, which has uneasily kept the peace for almost 20 years. Deterring Hezbollah rests on the idea that the threat of war — including the potential destruction of portions of Lebanon — and punitive strikes on the group and Lebanese infrastructure will keep the group from launching attacks or at least massive strikes on Israel. This threat works by endangering something Hezbollah holds dear, such as the lives of its leaders, its power in Lebanon, and the well-being of its constituents. After Israel left Lebanon in 2000, it retaliated against the occasional rocket strike or other violation of the peace with the threat of more massive strikes should Hezbollah mount a larger attack. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned in December 2023, “If Hezbollah chooses to start an all-out war, then it will single-handedly turn Beirut and South Lebanon, not far from here, into Gaza and Khan Yunis.”</p> -<h3 id="4-results-and-discussion">4. Results and Discussion</h3> +<p>Deterrence seems to be alive even after October 7. Nasrallah has stressed in public statements that Hezbollah does not plan a broader war even as it supports the Palestinians and will not rule out escalation if circumstances change. Hezbollah strikes focus on a discreet target set along the border even though the group has the capacity to launch far more attacks and to strike all of Israel. It is clearly trying to limit its attacks even as it shows solidarity. Hezbollah cares about its constituents and recognizes that a repeat of the 2006 war, let alone something much worse, would be a disaster for these supporters. In recent years, Lebanon’s economy has plummeted, and Hezbollah does not want to take the blame for a war that would further devastate the country. Israeli threats have made clear to Hezbollah that Lebanon would be hit hard if an all-out conflict resumes, and the devastation of Gaza reinforces the credibility of this threat.</p> -<p>The 30 participating journalists in the training and mentorship programme were asked to submit up to five articles each, as examples of their work on any aspect of conflict (broadly defined) from before the training, for analysis. This yielded a baseline sample of 80 articles, with the oldest dating from 2017, up to and including the period since the Taliban takeover in 2021.</p> +<p>Deterrence, however, could fail for several reasons. A strike that kills large numbers of Israeli civilians, even if accidental, would inflame the situation. Deterrence also rests on understanding an adversary’s decision calculus, and Israel might misunderstand Hezbollah’s tolerance for attacks on Hamas leaders or the continued loss of Hezbollah cadre, including important operational leaders. As previously noted, Israel’s risk tolerance has changed, and Israeli leaders might decide that even a small chance of Hezbollah attacking Israel needs to be preempted.</p> -<p>Following the training workshop and with mentorship from trainers, they then created, published, and/or broadcast a total of 85 articles between them, in which they attempted to apply the principles presented in the training to stories on any aspect of conflict (again, broadly defined). These were gathered and submitted for comparative analysis, using the same evaluative criteria. Table 2 shows results from the content analysis before the training and mentorship programme, and Table 3 shows results from content analysis after the programme.</p> +<h4 id="option-2-an-all-out-war">Option 2: An All-Out War</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CcOOAcd.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Table 2. War Journalism and Peace Journalism coding, before training. Pre-training n = 80.</em></p> +<p>Should deterrence fail, whether by accident or by choice, an all-out war is possible. Israel’s chief of staff, Herzi Halevi, told Israeli soldiers that the chances of war against Hezbollah are growing. Part of Israel’s logic is that a war with Hezbollah at some point is inevitable and that Israel should not wait for a surprise attack. Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser, noted, “If you believe that with Hezbollah is inevitable, as many in Israel do, then now is as good a time as any to do it.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4B6LKnW.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Table 3. War Journalism and Peace Journalism coding, after training. Post-training n = 85.</em></p> +<p>A war would likely focus on preventing a more dangerous repeat of October 7, going after Hezbollah’s rocket, missile, and drone capabilities and trying to push the group’s fighters farther from the border, probably to the other side of the Litani River. Even a decisive defeat of Hezbollah, however, would not lead to the group’s destruction given its deep roots in Lebanon and strong support from Iran.</p> -<p>In the pre-training sample, n = 80, so the maximum score for each category, WJ and PJ, was 320. Overall, this sample showed a WJ quotient of 73, or 23%, and a PJ quotient of 67, or 21%. Under half of these (45%) showed how the material being reported on fitted in with broader themes of conflict, in a framework of understanding.</p> +<p>Israel possesses considerable capacity for war with Hezbollah, though the Lebanese group would be a formidable foe. Israeli intelligence tries to continuously monitor Hezbollah missile and UAS sites. Indeed, part of why Hamas was able to surprise Israel on October 7 was likely because Israeli intelligence was more focused on Hezbollah, which it saw as the greater threat.</p> -<p>In the post-training sample, n = 85, so the maximum score for each category, WJ and PJ, was 340. Overall, this sample showed a WJ quotient of 18, or 5%, and a PJ quotient of 183, or 57%. Fully 68 out of the sample of 85 (or 80%) constructed a framework of understanding in which connections, between the sources for the stories, their words and deeds, and larger or more general issues of conflict, were clearly indicated.</p> +<p>The IDF outnumbers Hezbollah in troops, tanks, artillery, and other forms of military power. Israel’s equipment is also far more sophisticated, and its forces are better trained. Since its poor performance in the 2006 war, Israel has prepared for war with Hezbollah, in contrast to its lack of preparation for the invasion of Gaza. Israel has prepared a target set it can draw on at any time for strikes.</p> -<p>From a comparison of coding between the two raters, Scott’s pi was calculated at 0.91, indicating a high level of agreement. For comparison, in the Lee and Maslog study (Lee and Maslog 2005) quoted above, “a coding of 100 stories produced Scott’s pi of between 0.76 and 0.93”, on a range of different dyads.</p> +<p>An Israeli attack would probably involve massive airstrikes that would seek to target Hezbollah leaders, disrupt command and control (which would also involve cyberattacks), and hit Hezbollah’s rocket launcher sites, especially those that involve Hezbollah’s precision munitions arsenal. Although Israel would target Hezbollah leadership and military sites in Beirut and in the Beqaa Valley, it would likely focus most of its effort on Hezbollah’s presence near the border. Using lessons learned in Gaza, Israel would likely also attempt to destroy Hezbollah’s tunnel network. Finding and targeting Hezbollah tunnels has been an Israeli military and intelligence priority for years, though Hezbollah showed in 2006 that it could successfully use deception to build an extensive network.</p> -<h4 id="41-pre-training-examples">4.1. Pre-Training Examples</h4> +<p>Some Israeli leaders, such as Benny Gantz, a member of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s war cabinet, remarked in February 2024 that Israel could strike the Lebanese military as part of a broader war. “It is important that we be clear — the one responsible for the fire from Lebanon is not only Hezbollah or the terrorist elements that carry it out, but also the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese state that allows the shooting from its territory,” Gantz said. He also added: “There is no target or military infrastructure in the area of the north and Lebanon that is not in our sights.”</p> -<p>Nearly all the trainees were performing some aspects of PJ in their existing reporting, chiefly in the people-orientation. The material covered a wide range of different story types and media, from amateur-style (possibly smartphone) video pictures stitched together in rudimentary edits, often with no reporter voiceover, to professionally shot and edited longer packages.</p> +<p>Israel might then invade Lebanon with several divisions (it used four in Gaza, where the dense urban terrain required extensive manpower), seeking to uncover and destroy hidden tunnels and force Hezbollah fighters to the other side of the Litani River. Although southern Lebanon is not densely populated like Gaza, some of the fighting would involve urban warfare. If Israel were to successfully remove Hezbollah forces, it would then carefully monitor the area and conduct extensive strikes if necessary to prevent any return. Israel might push for a more robust UNIFIL force to monitor the area or seek to create a buffer zone, working with Lebanese proxies, as it did before 2000, though both of these approaches have proved insufficient in the past.</p> -<p>Among the more technically rudimentary pieces in the sample was a video piece of just over a minute’s duration about an Art Centre in Nangarhar province offering, on a voluntary basis, free education for orphans, including “girls up to the age of 12” — the oldest that are presently allowed to attend school under the Taliban.</p> +<p>Hezbollah would respond in several ways. Hezbollah forces would conduct guerrilla attacks, likely using an extensive tunnel network and well-prepared defensive positions near the Israeli border, taking advantage of the rough terrain there. Hezbollah would also attempt cross-border attacks as well as perhaps maritime infiltration in order to strike at Israel directly. In addition, Hezbollah would use its massive rocket and missile arsenal to attack Israel, overwhelming Israel’s defensive systems and striking at targets throughout the entire country: in 2006, Hezbollah was able to conduct rocket and missile attacks for all 34 days of the war, and its arsenal today is far larger. Finally, Hezbollah might conduct international terrorist attacks at Israeli targets around the world, working extensively with Iran to do so. Hezbollah would also use its influence over the Lebanese government to ensure that any ceasefire was on its own terms.</p> -<p>It edited together statements from two pupils, a boy and a girl, then the centre’s Director, who explained the initiative to camera. There was no reporter voiceover. It could, then, be assessed as a piece of PJ, in the domains of people- and peace-orientation, since it is contributing to quotidian security. A positive score was allotted for a framework of understanding. The example is worth dwelling on because it illustrated the subtlety of signalling that could be deemed, in the codebook and adjusted for context, to “count” in this respect. The girl pupil was interviewed in front of a background that prominently included a picture of a dove carrying an olive branch, perched on the barrel of a gun and causing it to bend downwards. As Fahmy and Neumann note, “the framing that occurs through visuals is… potentially more effective in communicating specific interpretation of news events than framing that occurs via print and/or in written and spoken parts of broadcast news” (Fahmy and Neumann 2012, p. NP4).</p> +<h4 id="option-3-limited-war">Option 3: Limited War</h4> -<p>It is reasonable to speculate that this visual juxtaposition, along with the evident joy and excitement of the young girl as she spoke about her studies, could lead audiences to respond by referencing this situation to the controversy over girls’ school attendance at the secondary stage. Whether consciously or not, that would potentially enter the process of meaning-making. Any who viewed the article after 27 March 2023 would also most likely be aware of the arrest of Matiullah Wesa, an “education activist… [who] helped to set up or restore schools. And along the way, emboldened whole communities to keep pushing for greater education opportunities” (Latifi 2023).</p> +<p>Another approach is to continue the current level of conflict, in which there is no all-out war, but dozens of Hezbollah fighters are killed every month, as well as a small number of Israelis. Civilians would die on both sides, but if current patterns continue, far more Lebanese would be killed than Israelis. Limited war would involve regular Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah forces near the border and on the occasional Hezbollah commander, while Hezbollah would fire anti-tank missiles at military and civilian infrastructure across the border, allow Palestinian groups based in Lebanon to attempt the occasional cross-border attack, and launch rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli positions.</p> -<p>A report of a car bomb in Logar province, dating from the early days after the Taliban takeover in 2021, was allotted a War Journalism point for violence-orientation, but also some Peace Journalism points. These included a people-orientation, as local citizens spoke about the impact on them and their community, but also the provincial governor, Abdul Qayum Rahimi, offering his analysis of the nature and extent of Taliban responsibility for the blast, blame for which was not explicitly apportioned, in the piece, to any one group. Instead, in general terms, the governor said: “Talib is a ceiling and different groups work under this ceiling like Jesh Mohammad to Al-Qaida, Tajik militants, Uzbek militants, Kazakh, Arora, Pakistanis all are those groups that fight in Logar and empower the Taliban” — thus scoring positively under the supplementary indication for a framework of understanding.</p> +<p>Limited war would serve several purposes for both Israel and Hezbollah. For Israel, such strikes keep Hezbollah off balance, forcing its commanders to hide or risk being killed and putting its weapons caches at risk. In addition, the strikes show the Israeli people that the government is actively trying to defend them and make it hard for Hezbollah to amass forces that might conduct a surprise attack across the border. For Hezbollah, limited war allows it to show solidarity with Hamas and affirm Iran’s “resistance” agenda. Although Hezbollah has lost over 100 fighters since October 7, this level of casualties is manageable for a large organization with many skilled personnel. For both Hezbollah and Israel, limits to the conflict help avoid the costs of an all-out war.</p> -<p>This is an issue that clearly needs careful handling and response. On the one hand, pointing the finger at ethnic minorities can clearly be dangerous. On the other, the governor was not alone in raising the alarm over the need for the Taliban authorities to take concrete steps to distance and dissociate themselves from non-state armed groups, to allow clearer and more effective policies to counter violent extremism. In a sample piece that included a television interview with EU Special Representative Tomas Niklasson, the latter stated:</p> +<p>At the same time, limited war poses problems for both groups, in addition to the regular casualties. The biggest problem is the impact on civilians along the border. The conflict worsens Lebanon’s always-simmering instability and mounting economic problems, and Hezbollah risks taking the blame. Perhaps 75,000 Lebanese have fled southern Lebanon, with no immediate prospect of return: a similar political problem for Hezbollah to what Israel faces, with its displaced citizens, who are unlikely to return to their homes en masse as long as limited war continues. Finally, it is unclear whether a limited war would actually remain limited.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“Afghanistan’s USD$9 billion capital that is outside Afghanistan, this capital has been frozen due to the type of takeover of power by Taliban. It’s a normal procedure. No other country has tried to make the frozen capital closed to Afghanistan, but USA is the leading country in this regard. The reasons for freezing this money are these: that there isn’t any description of Afghanistan Bank independence, there isn’t any description of the Afghanistan Bank for preventing the use of this money for terrorist activities, and this money cannot be given to Afghanistan until an assurance is provided in this regard. You can always see a half empty glass, but I see it as a half glass of water and if Taliban take reasonable measures, some amount of this money will be released and all the money should be transferred back to Afghanistan in the future”.</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="option-4-coercive-diplomacy">Option 4: Coercive Diplomacy</h4> -<p>Some of the submitted sample material dated from before the Taliban takeover. A report from RTA Afghanistan, the state broadcaster, offered a highly professional piece of television War Journalism: a facility with a military patrol shown discovering and defusing enemy munitions secreted by Taliban forces in or near Kabul. A transcript of a television studio discussion from Sediqa Faramarz referred to Abdullah Abdullah as leading negotiations on behalf of the Afghan government, and US and UK troops entering the country. Both arguably exemplified the dominant War Journalism settings of reporting under the Republic, as recorded in content analysis by Lynch and Freear (2023). A typical excerpt from the latter showed a victory orientation:</p> +<p>Another approach is to use coercive diplomacy to compel Hezbollah to abide by UNSCR 1701. To this end, the United States, often represented by mediator Amos Hochstein, is using diplomacy to negotiate with Lebanese leaders, and thus indirectly with Hezbollah, while Israel is putting military pressure on the group through a mix of strikes on Hezbollah forces and leaders. The renewed threat of an all-out war gives this pressure additional strength. Hezbollah, however, does not want to be seen as surrendering to Israeli pressure, particularly at a time when Israeli attacks on Palestinians are dominating the headlines.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“The First Vice President of the Republic says that we will not accept any kind of conditions and any kind of compromise of Taliban rule to the people of Afghanistan, and we will not agree to any kind of deal and conditions that the Taliban will comply with. For any reason, we will not accept the peace of Taliban for the people of Afghanistan, and we will not agree to any deal dictated by the Taliban”.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>In addition to ending Hezbollah attacks on Israel, the goal for Israel would be for Hezbollah to move its armed forces back, as promised under UNSCR 1701, to the Litani River. It is possible that Israel would also accept a less comprehensive withdrawal that moves Hezbollah farther back from the Israel-Lebanon border but not all the way to the Litani River. UNIFIL might need to be bolstered substantially and be far more aggressive in its use of force in response to any incursion, both of which would be difficult to accomplish.</p> -<p>By way of contrast, a more recent submission from the same trainee, though still in the pre-training sample, contained transcripts of several video news stories illustrating social problems and challenges, with sources recommending cooperation, even efforts to engender peace, as solutions. These adopted a strong watchdog role, pointing up situations where governmental action under the Islamic Emirate departed from its apparent commitments, or was criticised by international organisations, but also giving credit for a successful effort by Afghanistan to reduce corruption, as reflected by its improving position in the “league table” compiled by Transparency International, since the change of regime.</p> +<p>Israel, too, would be asked to make concessions and changes in response to UNSCR 1701 and to appease Hezbollah. Israel regularly violates Lebanese airspace, which Israel does to strike and monitor Hezbollah positions. Hezbollah would also likely seek an Israeli evacuation of Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar, perhaps placing them under UNIFIL so that the group could claim a political victory even as it made concessions.</p> -<h4 id="42-post-training-examples">4.2. Post-Training Examples</h4> +<h3 id="managing-the-crisis">Managing the Crisis</h3> -<p>The following articles from the “after” sample were among those with noteworthy elements of content, based on the observations above.</p> +<p>With a high risk of conflict, Washington needs to step up efforts to prevent an all-out war (Option 2), which would have significant and negative implications for the United States at home, in the Middle East, and around the globe. Restoring deterrence (Option 1) and limited war (Option 3), while better from a U.S. perspective, both have their limits. Option 1 appears, at best, a temporary solution that could easily fall apart, while Option 3 could spiral into an all-out war and, even in limited form, could be disastrous for both Lebanon and Israel. The U.S. military is already overstretched in countering a range of threats, such as China in the Indo-Pacific, including around Taiwan and the South and East China Seas; North Korea, which is accelerating its conventional and nuclear capabilities and issuing provocative threats of nuclear conflict with South Korea; and Russia, which is waging an attrition war against Ukraine and developing land, air, naval, space, and cyber capabilities that threaten the United States and its allies. The U.S. defense industrial base is also overstretched. An all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah would likely require additional U.S. military assets — such as one or more carrier strike groups as well as fixed-wing aircraft, ISR platforms, and munitions — that are needed in other theaters.</p> -<p>A story for Deutsche Welle, “Scholars”, aired on 26 May 2023 as the training was still underway, exemplified several aspects of PJ. It represented an issue of conflict — girls’ education — over which many parties’ views are aired, including those of eminent Islamic scholars but also a student and political commentators. The representation was not entirely dyadic, since the government’s position was nuanced, in some ways contradictory and possibly evolving. The article heard from sources about the impact on national productivity of keeping girls from being educated. It was conflict-oriented, people-oriented, truth-oriented, and solution-oriented. It constructed a framework of understanding in which everyday lived reality was connected to broader conflict issues. Those criticising the Taliban’s rescission of education rights for girls beyond elementary level appeared in roles allotted by Fahmy and Neumann, in a study of visual effects in news about conflict, as belonging to the Peace Journalism end of the spectrum, being “negotiators or demonstrators… [rather than] victims [or] belligerents” (Fahmy and Neumann 2012, p. NP 17).</p> +<p>A war could dramatically raise tensions with populations across the Middle East and beyond — including in the United States and Europe — and lead to increased attacks by Iranian-backed groups against Israel, the United States, and commercial targets in the region and littoral areas. U.S. forces in the region, already facing limited attacks from Iranian-backed groups, would likely face more frequent and larger strikes. Although the economic implications of the Gaza war have been limited, an all-out war would likely have significant implications on trade, supply chains, energy prices (including oil and gas), investment, and tourism.</p> -<p>A story titled “Carpet”, for a television channel, Khama News, showed girls forced out of school who now worked as weavers in a nearby factory. It carried the now familiar line that the government was working towards re-opening schools for girls, which, again, provided a solution orientation. The comments from the girls themselves, which included an observation that the schools had now been closed for 600 days, may be interpreted in context as truth-orientation, prompting and enabling the reader to see through propaganda. This is mentioned here as an example of the subtle inferential coding required to detect salient framing content in the process of meaning-making in the Afghan context of 2023. To select such an example for attention, in the context of a news channel, may reflect the resourcefulness required of the journalist operating in constrained conditions, typical of non-Western settings, and adopting an approach that Hussain characterises as “critical pragmatism… [which] focuses on practice and at the same time, is aware of the structures that contribute to systemic inequalities in the outcomes. To ensure more purposeful activities, it stresses on critical reflections to develop better solutions to the social problems” (Hussain 2022, p. 117).</p> +<p>A major war would also have significant humanitarian costs. Hezbollah’s rocket and missile systems put all of Israel under threat, and its ground forces are far more formidable than those of Hamas. Israel’s promise to devastate Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon as it has in Gaza is credible, and thousands could die in these attacks. Lebanon’s economy, already under severe strain, could collapse completely as hundreds of thousands of people are displaced and the country’s infrastructure is destroyed.</p> -<p>A transcript from an Azadi Radio newsmagazine programme showed how international agencies, including the World Food Programme, were being forced to suspend their operations in Afghanistan, blaming interference by the Taliban authorities. The segment was scored positively in the Peace Journalism coding categories of being peace-and-conflict oriented, by explaining backgrounds and contexts, including the economic disruption brought about by the change of government; people-oriented, by interviewing social actors from sub-elite levels; and solution-oriented, due to the time given over to allowing these interviewees to call for specific policy responses to alleviate the situation. It constructed a framework of understanding in which their perspectives could be seen as directly relevant to broader conflict issues.</p> +<p>Consequently, the United States should focus its efforts on implementing a policy of coercive diplomacy (Option 4). There has been some movement toward negotiations. For example, U.S. officials like Amos Hochstein have made energetic efforts to restore stability and discussed a proposal that calls for the withdrawal of non-state armed actors from southern Lebanon, a deployment of Lebanese armed forces, and a development plan for southern Lebanon. In addition, France presented a three-step proposal to Israel, Lebanon’s government, and Hezbollah (and briefed it to the United States) that outlines a 10-day process of de-escalation and calls for Hezbollah to withdraw its fighters to a distance of about six miles (10 kilometers) from the border. Negotiations are critical, but they will not be easy. Hezbollah has formally rejected negotiating a de-escalation proposal until the war in Gaza ends.</p> -<h4 id="43-coding-for-gender">4.3. Coding for Gender</h4> +<p>U.S. leadership will be important. As Henry Kissinger remarked, “One has to remember that every progress that has been made towards peace in the Middle East has come under American leadership.” Preventing an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah is likely the next test.</p> -<p>The gradual withdrawal of US and allied forces starting in May 2021 enabled the Taliban’s military takeover of the entire country by August of that year, thus reducing the level of direct violence and bringing peace to the country, on “the most popular (Western) view… as an absence of war [which is] also the primary dictionary definition” (Rummel 1981). This, in turn, delivered security, but only of a kind which “assumes a short-term outlook and presents physical threats as the main risks, largely overlooking the long-term drivers of insecurity”, according to a critical expert group in the UK. It “proposes to respond by extending control over the strategic environment, achieved principally through offensive military capabilities, a superpower alliance, and restrictions on civil liberties” (Ammerdown Group 2016, p. 1).</p> +<hr /> -<p>Reardon identifies this as a distinctively gendered view, since it sustains “the present highly militarized, war prone, patriarchal nation state system” (Reardon and Snauwaert 2015, p. 112). As an alternative, she shows how peace and social activism by women, in a range of contexts, bequeath a concept of human security as “in essence the conditions that make possible the experience and expectation of well-being” (ibid., p. 117).</p> +<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, director of the International Security Program at CSIS, and author most recently of Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare (W.W. Norton).</p> -<p>This connects with the typical concerns of such activism, which “stem from… conditions of quotidian security for families and communities… They have been active in environmental protection movements, efforts to overcome and compensate for poverty, the human rights movement for gender equality and rights of the excluded and oppressed” (Reardon and Snauwaert 2015, p. 120).</p> +<p><strong>Daniel Byman</strong> is a senior fellow at CSIS, professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and author most recently of Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism (Oxford).</p> -<p>In the post-training sample, such concerns are prominent, notably over the lack of access to education for girls of secondary school age, but also including the unmet humanitarian needs of the Afghan population. These issues can be seen, therefore, as elements of a consciously re-gendered security concept, with salience to the Afghan context.</p> +<p><strong>Alexander Palmer</strong> is an associate fellow in the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p> -<p>Indeed, the connection is made in some of the articles between provision for women’s rights, on the one hand, and protecting communities from a recrudescence of non-state armed groups, on the other. In an episode of Shamshad News, submitted by trainee Sabir Khan, reports from an international conclave quoted a Russian spokesperson as criticising Western countries for “isolating” Afghanistan. It was “not easy to fight against terrorism alone”, the programme voice-over observed. To the extent that this isolation is linked with Taliban refusal to allow women to work for agencies in the country, the programme interviewed an analyst, Shir Hasan Hasan, who commented: “The Taliban should take themselves out of isolation to success in this regard and they should work on national and international legitimacy, they should work on Afghanistan’s constitution, they should work on the freedom of political and civil activities, and they should work on women’s rights”.</p> +<p><strong>Riley McCabe</strong> is a program manager and research associate at the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p>Seth G. Jones, et al.Although the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza has captured the world’s attention, there is a serious risk of war between Israel and Hezbollah, according to a new assessment by CSIS.【黎智英案・審訊第卌九日】2024-03-20T12:00:00+08:002024-03-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-49<ul> + <li>李宇軒指「重光團隊」組織鬆散 非所有成員支持制裁 共識是爭取香港自由民主</li> +</ul> -<p>Research in Afghan communities before the Taliban takeover highlighted “everyday peace indicators” (Firchow and Mac Ginty 2017), or community-sourced indicators of change, perceived as important by the people themselves, according to a USIP study based on FGD data. A thousand participants from 18 villages in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar and Kunar provinces nominated, as a community indicator for peace while countering violent extremism, “the visibility of women and girls — especially seeing them going to school and traveling to the market. This indicator was universally prioritized by men, women, and youth interviewees, implying that women’s mobility is equated with feelings of security across demographics” (Urwin and Ahmadi 2018, p. 3). The clear consonance with Reardon’s emphasis on the “quotidian” in a re-gendered definition of security represents another sign that journalism by the Afghan trainees, after training, was constructing and exploring a set of security issues as yet untackled by the country’s new rulers, who were, in some cases, credibly presented as making them worse.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The new Emirati authorities could deploy force around their territory where necessary, including in “crackdowns” on rare open fronts of internal dissent — but only at the risk of overriding the everyday expectation and experience of wellbeing, and exacerbating the long-term drivers of insecurity. Again, the experiences of women, in such security contexts, could be seen as a touchstone. Latifi (2022) quotes Sadullah, a villager from Panjshir province, on the impact of the Taliban armed security response to the NRF insurgency: “Sadullah said he had tried to make the best of the situation back in Panjshir, but the presence of up to 150 Taliban fighters in their village made resuming normal life impossible. ‘We are a traditional people’, he explained. ‘Our women didn’t feel comfortable going out with strange Taliban fighters around’”.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/H20ee0I.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>As noted above, Peace Journalism is “supported by framing theory” (Lee and Maslog 2005). The dominant context-specific, gender-adjusted framing according to the elements in Entman’s formulation (Entman 1993) — to “make salient… [the] moral evaluation, problem definition, causal explanation and treatment recommendation” in the representation of a typical contested or ambiguous social scenario — can be read, from the post-training articles, in the following terms:</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（20日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第49日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李稱2019年9月美國參議員斯科特訪港，由於當時他籌辦過國際登報活動，又出席過聯合國人權理事會會議，「咁喺國際呢條線度做過嘢」，所以獲另一名被告陳梓華邀請會見斯科特。李指會面目的是提高對香港人權自由狀況的關注，「同埋當時 SWHK （重光團隊）有啲想做國際游說，去做一啲嘢去應對香港 deteriorating 嘅自由民主狀況。」李提到當天是他首次見到 Mark Simon，惟未曾與他直接傾談，後來才知道他是黎智英的得力助手。此外，李宇軒形容「重光團隊」是「一個鬆散嘅港人組織」，並非所有成員和活動都支持制裁，「我都唔同意 SWHK 係為咗制裁而去成立嘅一個組織」，並重申當時共識是爭取香港的自由民主。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>A moral evaluation that depriving girls and women of opportunities is wrong;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A problem definition that includes violation of their human rights, as well as more pragmatic, consequentialist issues such as alienating the international community whose support is needed for both humanitarian relief and security, and leading to increased outward migration, thus costing Afghanistan human capital and talent;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A causal explanation that these problems are connected with doctrinaire decisions by the Emirati authorities;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Treatment recommendations that involve changes in policy, with not-infrequent signs that debate among the Taliban rulers is underway, and also referred to Islamic scholarship.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第六天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。</p> -<h4 id="44-implications-for-future-media-development-aid">4.4. Implications for Future Media Development Aid</h4> +<h4 id="李宇軒指重光團隊組織鬆散-不同活動論述或有不一致">李宇軒指「重光團隊」組織鬆散 不同活動論述或有不一致</h4> -<p>Trainees produced a strong and impressive body of Peace Journalism after the training. This shows a “benefit applied”: a key indicator, in a proposal from a senior practitioner Alan Davis of the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, in monitoring and evaluating interventions in media development aid. Such initiatives all contain a “benefit transferred”, he writes; what is more valuable is when trainees then change the content of their reporting to reflect the new ideas. A third category is the “benefit beyond” or the expected influence on audience meaning-making, source behaviours, and/or societal development as a whole (Davis 2008, pp. 90–91).</p> +<p>剛開始時，李宇軒主動提及昨日作供期間，有關「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong， SWHK）的描述，希望就此澄清。李表示：「我會話 SWHK 係一個鬆散嘅港人組織，一個 loose 嘅組織，至少一開始係咁。」他指SWHK並沒有一個會章或會員制度，不過有一個共識是 SWHK 會爭取當時香港的自由民主，而在特定活動中便會有支持該活動的人去參加，「所以可能會見到就住 SWHK 活動嗰陣，嗰個論述會有少少 inconsistent」，他表示會在稍後作供時就特定活動去憶述當時群組內的討論重點。</p> -<p>This may have specific benefits for communities at risk from violent extremism such as the activities — and messaging to match — promulgated by such groups as IS–KP. Communication by such groups is akin to marketing, a recent policy guide by USAID notes. However, it is likely that “counter-narratives” are ineffective. Instead, “communication strategies should convey accessible alternatives that dilute the potency of violent extremists’ arguments while creating positive identities, opportunities for engagement, and expressions of agency” — that relate to the concerns and priorities of people, and are thereby closely akin to the orientations of Peace Journalism and the coding adopted to operationalise them in the Afghan context of 2023.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指重光團隊非為呼籲制裁而成立-非全部成員支持制裁">李宇軒指重光團隊非為呼籲制裁而成立 非全部成員支持制裁</h4> -<p>How far can this Peace Journalism training, for journalists in the new Afghanistan, afford insights capable of informing future interventions, and capable of taking effect by delivering benefits both applied and beyond? Lynch and Freear (2023) cite evidence from grey literature of specialist agencies being forced to adapt as international support for the media sector was “drawn down”, in the early 2000s. Some such aid continued to be available, albeit under the Islamic Republic government, and supplemented by paid advertising on behalf of international organisations.</p> +<p>李續指，從這個角度去理解 SWHK 的活動，「所以我會同意一部份 SWHK members 同一部份 SWHK 嘅活動，係同制裁有關嘅，但係我唔同意全部嘅活動、全部嘅 members 都支持制裁。」李續指：「我都唔同意 SWHK 係為咗制裁而去成立嘅一個組織」，他重申有一個共識是爭取當時香港的自由民主，「而頭先講嘅制裁就係一個 means（手段），同意𠵱個 course of action 嘅 member 就同意咁做。」</p> -<p>Afghan journalism and media may therefore offer continuing affordances for Peace Journalism training. Afghan journalists interviewed for the antecedent study “wanted to do more Peace Journalism” (Lynch and Freear 2023, np). Their role perceptions proved consonant with earlier findings by Mitra, who interviewed Afghan photojournalists, finding them motivated by a “wish to depict positive, peaceful Afghanistan”. This showed “concurrence with PJ norms and point[ed] to the opportunities for acceptance of PJ” (Mitra 2017, p. 23). In both of these studies, therefore, Afghan journalists’ role perceptions gravitated towards those of journalists in developing countries more generally. In the collaborative Worlds of Journalism study, in which over 6000 journalists, from 60 countries, were interviewed, the single most widespread ethical precept was “non-involvement” in the stories covered, or detached “reporting of the facts”.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指眾籌收支表中文版會用花巧言辭-例如制裁港共-以鼓勵人捐錢">李宇軒指眾籌收支表中文版會用花巧言辭 例如「制裁港共」 以鼓勵人捐錢</h4> -<p>Early Western critics of Peace Journalism, such as the then BBC correspondent David Loyn, rejected it as an attempt to “prescribe” methods of reporting conflict — an approach that risked, he averred, creating a “new orthodoxy… [something that would be] uniquely unhelpful” to reporters in the field. Rather, Loyn argued, they should be left to decide how to report on a case-by-case basis, by empirical methods, save in certain circumstances — such as those covered by libel laws — where specified activities are “proscribed” (Loyn 2008, pp. 53–54). In the WoJ study, however, majority-world participants — drawn from countries in east Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America — tended to a different view. Their responses revealed ethical precepts which emphasised values of “social intervention, national development and educating people” (Kalyango et al. 2017, p. 576).</p> +<p>李提及昨日庭上展示的「重光團隊」網站截圖，有「全球登報制裁港共眾籌計劃」的收支報表，當時組員討論如何鼓勵其他人捐款，「我記得當時有𠵱個共識，就住中文版嚟講，flowery language（花巧的言辭）會比較容易鼓勵識睇嘅人捐錢」，而對於不懂中文或閱讀英文的人，「當時就覺得係比較用中性啲嘅字眼，就會比較容易 encourage 到人捐錢」，因此網站上公佈的收支報表，中英版本之間會有不一致的情況。</p> -<p>The International Federation of Journalists report, referenced earlier, raises the alarm over a rupture in the system of support for Afghan journalists, catalysed by the collapse of the Republic and its replacement by the Taliban Islamic Emirate, with the consequent humanitarian crisis in the country now dominating the attention of aid agencies:</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰問到，李所說的花巧言辭是哪些。李指「制裁港共」，與英文版的「Advocacy for Hong Kong」有出入。被問到「港共」的意思，李指這字眼是「形容香港政府與中共相關」，但並非意指香港政府就等如中共。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“Though some media aid implementers are finding ways to continue working in Afghanistan, the overall system for news organisations to solicit support from donors and implementers has broken down. Donor governments are focused on diplomacy and humanitarian relief rather than media development”.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻則提議，「港共」的英文翻譯可以是「Hong Kong Communists」。李同意這譯法接近「港共」的原本意思。</p> -<p>At the time of writing, the United Nations was awaiting, from the Secretary General on a mandate directly from the Security Council, “forward-looking recommendations for an integrated and coherent approach [in the country] among relevant political, humanitarian, and development actors, within and outside of the United Nations”. These were due by mid-November 2023, with hopes high among some in the sector for the inclusion of a strategy to ensure “public access to information”, as called for in Goal 16, Target 10 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.</p> +<p>被問到「港共」一詞想帶出什麼訊息，李指即是香港政權與共產政權有關，暗示共產黨。他又指，雖然當時字眼沒有提及「中共」，但當時覺得「港共」相比起「香港」是一個帶較強烈感情（more charged）的描述，可用以呼籲人們捐錢。</p> -<p>Meanwhile, some interventions were already underway, having been devised specifically for implementation in the newly restricted media space under the Taliban, and focused on conflict-sensitive or Peace Journalism content. UNESCO announced a new partnership with the European Union in late 2022, to:</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認他曾管理重光團隊網站">李宇軒確認他曾管理「重光團隊」網站</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>“Provide support to Afghan media outlets in the production of conflict-sensitive, humanitarian, health and educational public interest content. The project will benefit at least 6 million Afghan citizens, with a specific focus on reporting addressed at women, girls and youth. UNESCO will also be partnering with civil society organizations and local journalists’ unions to train an estimated six hundred journalists on conflict-sensitive reporting”.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>控方問及「重光團隊」網站是何時設立。李表示不記得，因為若果沒記錯的話，網站應該是由一名叫 Kirin Bumper 的人設立，而他在後來才被加入管理網站。不過他當時並沒有在網站編輯或發布過任何內容，直至後來 Kirin Bumper 打算將網站完全交給李和其他組員管理，李相信可翻查網頁編輯紀錄來得知相關日子。</p> -<p>The results of this research, showing how such training can lead to changes in the content of news produced by Afghan journalists, suggest the potential of such initiatives to yield measurable results.</p> +<p>至於「重光團隊」的事務由誰管理，李指「由組員一齊傾」，負責執行活動的人則是大家透過共識來決定。</p> -<p>The IFJ, for its part, called on “aid [to be] directed towards independent media. International supporters can facilitate communication among Afghan media outlets and encourage the strengthening of inter-organisational associations. Though such groups, media and CSOs can form a united front to engage both the Taliban and international donor community”.</p> +<p>控方展示由李宇軒製作的「G攬運動」收支報表和李的花旗銀行戶口紀錄，顯示在2020年2月28日，有一筆約42萬元美金（約327萬港元）的款項歸還給李，而轉帳人是「Project Hong Kong Trust」的美國 Amalgamated Bank 帳戶。李確認他當時要求 Project Hong Kong Trust 歸還他曾墊支的款項。</p> -<p>Results from the comparative content analysis of articles by the same journalists before and after undergoing training in Peace Journalism indicate the potential impact of such interventions at the level of a media approach to be applied, and to catalyse new creative practices, awareness, and critical reflexivity of particular importance amidst the highly emotive words and deeds of violent extremists. On a second level, changes to journalists’ professional environment, stimulating new techniques for fieldwork and news production, can sustain and spread the impact of the first. This can, in turn, lead to new relations with sources and other social groups, collaborating to create “public records of truth” (Waisbord 2019, p. 4), surfacing hitherto under-reported voices and issues. On a fourth level, Davis’ notion of a “benefit beyond” may be discerned in a public furnished with access to information that prompts and enables their appreciation of nonviolent policy responses to conflict issues foregrounded by ambiguous causal scenarios, identified as a crucial component of both communication for sustainable development and community resilience against communication strategies by groups associated with violent extremism.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指-mark-simon-歸還款項條數唔夾-惟陳梓華未安排歸還差額">李宇軒指 Mark Simon 歸還款項「條數唔夾」 惟陳梓華未安排歸還差額</h4> -<p>Peace Journalism training can be effective, therefore, even among a group of participating trainees who face significant constraints in their working lives and pressure on a range of issues evident in the everyday lives of their readers and audiences, which present themselves for journalistic attention and coverage. With ongoing mentorship and encouragement to adapt the PJ approach to the exigencies of conflict, discernible extra value can be added to the supply of news reaching publics who remain vulnerable to the messaging of authoritarian rulers and violent extremists alike. Such interventions can deliver benefits both applied in news coverage itself and potentially beyond the training to enable cognitive resources to be developed and brought to bear in communities.</p> +<p>控方又指，「G攬運動」收支報表可見三筆交易，金額分別為40萬、約33萬和約46.9萬美元，分別在2019年11月4日、2020年1月7日和2月3日，由「Funder 2」轉帳至「Project Hong Kong Trust」戶口。</p> -<h3 id="references">References</h3> +<p>李解釋，這三筆款項是 Mark Simon 將眾籌款項轉帳給「Project Hong Kong Trust」，因為 Mark Simon 較早前借出銀行戶口替「G攬運動」接收和「hold 住」眾籌款項，直至後來「Project Hong Kong Trust」準備好銀行戶口，Mark Simon 便歸還眾籌款項。而 Mark Simon 屬於「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」，換言之「Funder 2」即是代表「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」。</p> -<p>Adebayo, Joseph Olusegun. 2016. The Impact of Peace Journalism Training on Journalists’ Reportage of the 2015 Elections in Nigeria: An Action Research Case Study. Communicatio 42: 361–77. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02500167.2016.1216458">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>控方指，上述三筆 Mark Simon 歸還的款項總和是120萬美元，惟網站公佈的「G攬運動」收支報表顯示，代號「Funder 2」的 Mark Simon 接收了約177.2萬元美金，兩筆數有差距。</p> -<p>Ammerdown Group. 2016. Re-Thinking Security: A Discussion Paper, Executive Summary. <a href="https://rethinkingsecurity.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rethinking-security-executive-summary.pdf">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> +<p>李解釋，因為「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」曾經墊支登報費用，所以這部份款項不需要歸還，若 Mark Simon 把眾籌款項扣除墊支了的登報費，便當作是直接發還了開支。不過李指，若將 Mark Simon的 三筆還款加上墊支費用，總數不是相等於177.2萬元美金，他曾就此問題與陳梓華商討，「就話條數唔夾，其實應該有多啲嘅錢畀返 Project Hong Kong Trust。」他並製作了收支報表，要求陳安排歸還差額。</p> -<p>Davis, Alan. 2008. A Road Map for Monitoring &amp; Evaluation in the Media Development Sector. In Media Matters: Perspective on Advancing Governance and Development from the Global Forum for Media Development. Edited by M. Harvey. Internews Europe and the Global Forum for Media Development: pp. 89–93. <a href="https://internews.org/resource/media-matters-perspectives-advancing-governance-development">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> +<p>李指相關款項是大約一萬或者幾萬元美金，不會多於10萬元美金，當時陳僅回覆「佢會搞」，但以李所知，陳並沒有安排歸還欠款。李指由於 Project Hong Kong Trust 帳戶非由他控制，「所以到最尾我唔清楚有冇多咗錢入去個戶口⋯⋯ in any event，至少T（陳梓華）冇同我講。」</p> -<p>Dyrstad, Karin, and Solveig Hillesund. 2020. Explaining support for political violence: Grievance and perceived opportunity. Journal of Conflict Resolution 64: 1725–53. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720909886">CrossRef</a></p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指群組成員就是否籌辦第四次登報意見不一-最終決定不登報-部份人因而離開群組">李宇軒指群組成員就是否籌辦第四次登報意見不一 最終決定不登報 部份人因而離開群組</h4> -<p>Entman, Robert. 1993. Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication 43: 51–58. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>李供稱，第三次眾籌及登報的「G攬運動」中，錄得大約一半餘款，當時在其中一個「G攬」群組中，組員關注若果任由剩下的款項原封不動，便可能引來懷疑或指控「G攬嗰度會唔會落格」，大家曾經作出討論，有人認為籌辦多一次登報便可花費剩下的款項，也有人質疑登報是否爭取香港自由民主的最好方法。李指組員最終決定不籌辦多一次登報，但同時沒有其他活動方案，「就真係由得啲錢擺喺度，睇吓嚟緊有咩想做、有咩值得去做。」</p> -<p>Fahmy, Shahira, and Rico Neumann. 2012. Shooting War or Peace Photographs? An Examination of Newswires’ Coverage of the Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009). American Behavioral Scientist 56: NP1–NP26. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764211419355">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>李指，在上述討論尾聲「咁就有個 split」，有一部份同意不登報的組員，便繼續留在群組中；「而覺得淨係想登報嘅嗰啲人，就離開咗個『G攬』team」，因為該些人想辦多一次登報，「而你哋決定唔繼續做，所以佢哋就走。」</p> -<p>Firchow, Pamina, and Roger Mac Ginty. 2017. Measuring Peace: Comparability, Commensurability, and Complementarity Using Bottom-Up Indicators. International Studies Review 19: 6–27. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix001">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>李指，該些想登報的人離開群組之後，在大約2019年10月1日前後籌辦了一個「賀你老母」的眾籌登報計劃，不過他並沒有參與其中。</p> -<p>Freear, Matt, and Andrew Glazzard. 2021. Preventing Violent Extremism Through Media and Communications, RUSI Whitehall Report. London: Royal United Services Institute. <a href="https://static.rusi.org/274_WHR_Strat_Comms.pdf">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指2019年底g攬和重光團隊整合">李宇軒指2019年底「G攬」和「重光團隊」整合</h4> -<p>Hackett, Robert A. 2011. New vistas for peace journalism: Alternative media and communication rights. In Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches. Edited by Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch and Robert A Hackett. Sydney: Sydney University Press, pp. 33–67. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=New+vistas+for+peace+journalism:+Alternative+media+and+communication+rights&amp;author=Hackett,+Robert+A.&amp;publication_year=2011&amp;pages=33%E2%80%9367">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>李表示，在群組成員討論期間，他和網名「T」的陳梓華均不同意進行第四次登報。二人曾經一度離開群組，但在實務層面考慮，如果李和陳都離開群組的話，未來的登報計劃便會面臨財政壓力，因為未必有另一個人能夠墊支廣告費用，「唔知係咪因為咁樣，定係後來大家共識係唔再登報」，結果群組成員決定不籌辦登報，之後李便重新被加入群組。</p> -<p>Hanitzsch, Thomas. 2008. Situating peace journalism in journalism studies: A critical appraisal. In The Peace Journalism Controversy. Edited by Wilhelm Kempf. Berlin: Regener, pp. 69–80. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v1i1.96">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>李憶述，他重新加入群組之後，曾經有一段時間，群組成員之中有部分人認同「G攬」團隊的身份，同時也有部份人認同「重光團隊」的身份，不過當時沒有迫切性去處理這個形式問題。李指，以他所理解，反而「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人在英國當地舉辦公開活動、印製橫額或會見國會議員時，他們會逐漸使用「重光團隊」的口號和標誌。不過直到大約2019年底，「G攬」和「重光團隊」有進行整合，並將一些合併了的群組重新命名為「重光團隊」，但實際上的日常運作與之前並沒有分別。</p> -<p>Hussain, Shabir. 2022. Peace Journalism in a Non-Western Context: A Theoretical Perspective. In Responsible Journalism in Conflicted Societies: Trust and Public Service across New and Old Divides. Edited by Jake Lynch and Charis Rice. New York: Routledge, pp. 110–22. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Peace+Journalism+in+a+Non-Western+Context:+A+Theoretical+Perspective&amp;author=Hussain,+Shabir&amp;publication_year=2022&amp;pages=110%E2%80%9322">Google Scholar</a></p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱2019年831曾與英議員bob-seely晚飯-談論香港狀況">李宇軒稱2019年8.31曾與英議員Bob Seely晚飯 談論香港狀況</h4> -<p>Kalyango, Yusuf, Folker Hanusch, Jyotika Ramaprasad, Terje Skjerdal, Mohd Safar Hasim, Nurhaya Muchtar, Mohammad Sahid Ullah, Levi Zeleza Manda, and Sarah Bomkapre Kamara. 2017. Journalists’ Development Role Perceptions. Journalism Studies 18: 576–94. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1254060">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>控方展示「重光團隊」網站公佈的工作匯報，其中一項提到「成功邀請 Bob Seely MP 於8月31日到港觀察示威」。李憶述，在2019年8月31日之前，「攬炒巴」透過 Telegram 告知他英國國會議員 Bob Seely 想來港觀察示威，希望香港方面會有人接應，於是李宇軒、前學民思潮成員李宗澤（Wilson Li）和其他人一同幫忙。</p> -<p>Latifi, Ali M. 2022. In Afghanistan’s Shadowy New Conflict, New Displacement and New Civilian Abuses. The New Humanitarian. <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/11/23/Afghanistan-Panjshir-Taliban-abuses-resistance-UN">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> +<p>李宇軒記得李宗澤負責大部份流程相關的工作，而他曾經與 Bob Seely、李宗澤和其他人，在銅鑼灣一間酒店食晚飯，期間向 Bob Seely 談論有關香港發生的事。李續指，「唔知係 Wilson 定係另一啲人，咁就帶 Bob Seely 落咗場去睇示威，因為嗰晚附近都有出咗 tear gas。」而李宇軒則沒有落場。</p> -<p>Latifi, Ali M. 2023. Arrest of Leading Education Activist Leaves Afghans Confused and Worried. The New Humanitarian. <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2023/04/12/arrest-afghanistan-matiullah-wesa-education-advocate">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> +<p>控方問，帶 Bob Seely 觀察示威現場的目的是什麼。李指：「Bob Seely 佢想親身用佢對眼去睇香港發生咩事，咁當時香港一啲街頭示威，以當時嘅香港嚟講，係比較重要嘅事，所以 Bob Seely 就去咗睇示威喇。」控方問是否關於香港當時的社會動亂（social unrest）。李則表示：「我諗我會總結做當時香港嘅自由同民主」，又指：「啲人對於當時人權自由狀況有好多不滿，所以有好多 street demonstration。」</p> -<p>Lee, Seow Ting, and Crispin C. Maslog. 2005. War or Peace Journalism in Asian Newspapers. Journal of Communication 55: 311–29. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2005.tb02674.x">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>有關是次接見 Bob Seely 想達到什麼目標，李指為了幫助「攬炒巴嗰邊」接見 Bob Seely，然後 Bob Seely 回到英國後，「就可以繼續 whatever 佢同攬炒巴搞緊嘅嘢」，而相關工作整體而言是有關提高對香港民主自由的關注，惟李對二人之間的具體工作並不清楚。</p> -<p>Lloyd, Fiona. 2003. Radio for peace training in Indonesia. In The Power of Media: A Handbook for Peacebuilders. Edited by Ross Howard, Francis Rolt, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven. Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, pp. 118–27. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Radio+for+peace+training+in+Indonesia&amp;author=Lloyd,+Fiona&amp;publication_year=2003&amp;pages=118%E2%80%9327">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>李指，有關是次會見 Bob Seely 的支出，他向第二次眾籌的「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃報銷費用，因為是次會見與英國有關。他並指，款額「我諗應該唔夠幾萬蚊港紙」。</p> -<p>Loyn, David. 2008. Good journalism or peace journalism? In The Peace Journalism Controversy. Edited by Wilhelm Kempf. Berlin: Regener, pp. 53–68. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Good+journalism+or+peace+journalism?&amp;author=Loyn,+David&amp;publication_year=2008&amp;pages=53%E2%80%9368">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>法官杜麗冰留意到工作匯報所使用的字眼是「成功邀請 Bob Seely MP」，意味 Bob Seely 是受邀，而非主動提出來港。惟李宇軒稱他不知道事前 Bob Seely 與「攬炒巴」是如何溝通，因此他不會揣測「成功邀請」一詞的意思，他亦不知道 Bob Seely 來港的主意是由誰人主動提出。</p> -<p>Lynch, Jake, and Annabel McGoldrick. 2005. Peace Journalism. Stroud: Hawthorn Press. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Peace+Journalism&amp;author=Lynch,+Jake&amp;author=and+Annabel+McGoldrick&amp;publication_year=2005">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>就李宗澤的身份，李宇軒形容「佢好似對於 book 機票、酒店好熟悉」，但他除了是次接見 Bob Seely 和後來的區議會監選團之外，「平時喺 SWHK 同『G攬』嗰度，係完全見唔到佢嘅」，因此他理解李宗澤並不是任何一個團隊的成員。</p> -<p>Lynch, Jake, and Giuliana Tiripelli. 2022. Overcoming the Peace Journalism paradox: A case study in journalist training as media development aid. Journal of Applied Journalism and Media Studies 11: 211–26. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1386/ajms_00091_1">CrossRef</a></p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱成立香港故事公司-為處理籌款和參與社運名義問題">李宇軒稱成立「香港故事」公司 為處理籌款和參與社運名義問題</h4> -<p>Lynch, Jake, and Johan Galtung. 2010. Reporting Conflict: New Directions in Peace Journalism. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Reporting+Conflict:+New+Directions+in+Peace+Journalism&amp;author=Lynch,+Jake&amp;author=and+Johan+Galtung&amp;publication_year=2010">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>控方提到，公司註冊處紀錄顯示李宇軒在2019年9月9日註冊「香港故事有限公司」，而李是首任董事兼創辦成員。李稱除他自己之外，公司便沒有牽涉其他人。</p> -<p>Lynch, Jake, and Matt Freear. 2023. Why intervention in Afghan media failed to provide support for peace talks. Frontiers in Communication 8. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2023.1118776">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>就成立公司的原因，李解釋上次眾籌遇到提取款項的問題，他曾經與陳梓華討論是否需要成立一間有限責任公司（Limited Liability Company）。李亦留意到提款時牽涉了一些個人戶口，例如他自己的戶口，或非社運團體的的戶口，於是考慮開設一個社運團體的銀行戶口。李又表示，「既然我已經用咗真身份去做眾籌眾籌活動，咁就會唔會⋯⋯接住落嚟我會唔會用真身份去做 activist activities 呢？」他考慮：「如果係嘅話，會係 under 咩 activist organisation 呢？」，其中一個選項便是「我直情起一個 activist organisation 出嚟」。</p> -<p>Margolin, Devorah. 2019. The Changing Roles of Women in Violent Islamist Groups. Washington, DC: The Program on Extremism at The George Washington University, vol. 2, pp. 40–49. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=The+Changing+Roles+of+Women+in+Violent+Islamist+Groups&amp;author=Margolin,+Devorah&amp;publication_year=2019">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>李表示，他與陳梓華商討之後，有共識去研究上述議題，最終開設了「香港故事」這間公司。</p> -<p>Mitra, Saumava. 2017. Adoptability and acceptability of peace journalism among Afghan photojournalists: Lessons for peace journalism training in conflict-affected countries. Journal of the Association for Journalism Education 6: 17–27. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Adoptability+and+acceptability+of+peace+journalism+among+Afghan+photojournalists:+Lessons+for+peace+journalism+training+in+conflict-affected+countries&amp;author=Mitra,+Saumava&amp;publication_year=2017&amp;journal=Journal+of+the+Association+for+Journalism+Education&amp;volume=6&amp;pages=17%E2%80%9327">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>不過李補充，後來這間公司實際上並未能處理到上述議題，因為隨著「Project Hong Kong Trust」的銀行戶口成立，可以用來處理眾籌款項，所以沒有需要用到「香港故事」的戶口。至於「香港故事」作為一個社運身份，李則認為「SWHK 作為一個 pseudo organisation，佢係更加有效」，所以後來派卡片也是直接使用「重光團隊」的卡片。例如他在2019年尾會見美國參議員 Marsha Blackburn、斯科特（Rick Scott）、Todd Young 和共和黨議員克魯茲（Ted Cruz）的時候，便是使用「重光團隊」的卡片，而沒有使用「香港故事」的卡片。</p> -<p>Nohrstedt, Stig-Arne, and Rune Ottosen. 2011. Peace Journalism–Critical Discourse Case Study: Media and the Plan for Swedish and Norwegian Defence Cooperation. In Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches. Edited by Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch and Robert A. Hackett. Sydney: Sydney University Press, pp. 217–38. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Peace+Journalism%E2%80%93Critical+Discourse+Case+Study:+Media+and+the+Plan+for+Swedish+and+Norwegian+Defence+Cooperation&amp;author=Nohrstedt,+Stig-Arne&amp;author=and+Rune+Ottosen&amp;publication_year=2011&amp;pages=217%E2%80%9338">Google Scholar</a></p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱曾以香港故事身份會見聯合國人權事務高級專員">李宇軒稱曾以「香港故事」身份會見聯合國人權事務高級專員</h4> -<p>Post, Jerrold M. 1987. “It’s us against them”: The group dynamics of political terrorism. Terrorism 10: 23–35. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10576108708435644">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>控方問「香港故事」曾經進行什麼活動。李指他在2019年8月的時候，曾赴聯合國會見 Sébastien Gillioz，即聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處（OHCHR）中負責亞太地區的職員，當時使用了「香港故事」的身份。</p> -<p>Reardon, Betty A., and Dale T. Snauwaert, eds. 2015. Betty a Reardon: Key Texts in Gender and Peace. Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice: Texts and Protocols 27. Series Editor Hans Gunter Brauch; Mosbach: Springer. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Betty+a+Reardon:+Key+Texts+in+Gender+and+Peace&amp;author=Reardon,+Betty+A.&amp;author=and+Dale+T.+Snauwaert&amp;publication_year=2015">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>李憶述相關背景，有一名叫「Sheep」的人士是聯合國的職員，在2019年8月中旬，「Sheep」告知他聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處發表一份關注香港自由民主狀況的聲明，「佢話呢個好唔尋常，因為有史以來淨係出過兩個同香港有關嘅聲明」，所以是次聲明意味「OHCHR 都重視嗰陣時香港嘅狀況」，即有關民主、自由和示威。</p> -<p>Rummel, Rudolph J. 1981. Understanding Conflict and War. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, vol. 5. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Understanding+Conflict+and+War&amp;author=Rummel,+Rudolph+J.&amp;publication_year=1981">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>李續轉述「Sheep」告訴他，聯合國人權理事會（United Nations Human Rights Council）將於2019年9月在日內瓦舉行會議，如果想準備參與會議，便最好事前去聯絡 Sébastien Gillioz，因為他在 OHCHR 裡是負責中國事務的人之一。因此李便在8月赴日內瓦會見 Sébastien Gillioz，以了解當時 OHCHR 如何看香港發生的情況，同行人士還有天文物理學家 Shirley Ho 和一名叫 Adder 的人。</p> -<p>Shoemaker, Pamela, and Stephen Reese. 1996. Mediating the Message. White Plains: Longman. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Mediating+the+Message&amp;author=Shoemaker,+Pamela&amp;author=and+Stephen+Reese&amp;publication_year=1996">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>李提到會見 Sébastien Gillioz 時，他們得悉OHCHR的職員並不滿意當時中國代表團所聲稱「development based 嘅 human right」。惟當李想進一步解釋時，法官杜麗冰打斷指，現在只需要了解相關事件背景，而不是審判在聯合國的游說工作，因此不需要詳述。</p> -<p>Thiessen, Chuck. 2019. Preventing Violent Extremism While Promoting Human Rights: Toward a Clarified UN Approach. New York: International Peace Institute. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Preventing+Violent+Extremism+While+Promoting+Human+Rights:+Toward+a+Clarified+UN+Approach&amp;author=Thiessen,+Chuck&amp;publication_year=2019">Google Scholar</a></p> +<p>李總結指，經過8月的會面後，他便預備資料去9月的聯合國人權理事會會議，又開設 Telegram 群組「地球香港分部」，成員包括他、「Sheep」和「我要做飯」，以討論9月的旅程。李並指曾經與陳梓華談論過此事，「佢亦都支持我去聯合國。」</p> -<p>Urwin, Eliza, and Belquis Ahmadi. 2018. Measuring Peace and Violent Extremism: Voices from the Afghan Village. Peace Brief. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, vol. 244. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Measuring+Peace+and+Violent+Extremism:+Voices+from+the+Afghan+Village.+Peace+Brief&amp;author=Urwin,+Eliza&amp;author=and+Belquis+Ahmadi&amp;publication_year=2018">Google Scholar</a></p> +<h4 id="因會見美議員-李宇軒與mark-simon被加入同一群組">因會見美議員 李宇軒與Mark Simon被加入同一群組</h4> -<p>Waisbord, Silvio. 2019. The progressive promises and the reality of news beyond industrial journalism. [revised keynote presentation given at the conference of the Journalism Education and Research Association of Australia in Hobart, 2 December 2018]. Australian Journalism Review 41: 9–16. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1386/ajr.41.1.9_1">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>控方另展示 WhatsApp 群組「Coffee on Sunday」，紀錄顯示陳梓華於2019年9月29日創立群組，當時群組成員有陳、李和 Mark Simon。李解釋，陳梓華當時問他會否會見美國參議員斯科特（Rick Scott），「我話OK」，然後陳便把他加進群組。</p> -<p>White, Jessica. 2022. Finding the right mix: Re-evaluating the road to gender-equality in countering violent extremism programming. Critical Studies on Terrorism 15: 585–609. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2036423">CrossRef</a></p> +<p>群組顯示 Mark Simon 傳送訊息，指美國參議員斯科特正身處香港，問李和陳是否有空會見。Mark Simon 其後表示會加入斯科特的助手 Scott Sciretta 及美國領事職員 Alan Brinker。</p> -<hr /> +<p>李表示，在加入群組之前，他對於 Mark Simon 沒有任何認知，也不知 Mark Simon 將會一同會見斯科特。李表示，看過群組討論之後，「其後我知道佢（Mark Simon）係T（陳梓華）同黎智英嗰邊嘅」，也是收取 GoFundMe 款項及之後轉移去 Project Hong Kong Trust 戶口的人士。</p> -<p><strong>Jake Lynch</strong> is Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS) at the University of Sydney and an Executive Member of the Sydney Peace Foundation.</p> +<p>控方問李何以知道 Mark Simon 與黎智英有關，李表示加入群組時並不知道，「後來唔記得喺邊度定報紙，話 Mark Simon 就係黎智英嘅 right hand man（得力助手）。」</p> -<p><strong>Matt Freear</strong> has worked in media and communications for more than 17 years, specialising in communications around conflict and terrorism since 2005. He started his career in the UK civil service communications network, working in media relations, crisis communication roles and in the Strategic Communications Unit of the Prime Minister’s Office, Downing Street.</p>Jake Lynch and Matt FreearThis article presents and discusses results from an exercise in comparative content analysis of news articles about issues of conflict produced by Afghan journalists before and after participating in an internationally sponsored training and mentorship programme in Peace Journalism.The Attritional Art Of War2024-03-18T12:00:00+08:002024-03-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-attritional-art-of-war<p><em>If the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.</em></p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱會見美議員時談及香港示威-希望美國政府可以做啲嘢">李宇軒稱會見美議員時談及香港示威 「希望美國政府可以做啲嘢」</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>控方問為何李會被邀請會見斯科特。李表示，因為當時他籌辦過國際登報活動，又出席過聯合國人權理事會會議，「咁喺國際呢條線度做過嘢，所以就想我去見 Rick Scott 喇。」他指會面目的是提高對香港人權自由狀況的關注，「同埋當時 SWHK 有啲想做國際游說，去做一啲嘢去應對香港 deteriorating 嘅自由民主狀況。」</p> -<p>Attritional wars require their own “Art of War” and are fought with a “force-centric” approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are “terrain-focused”. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.</p> +<p>不過李提到，當時眾人未有任何共識提出實質方案，所以當時共識是先提高關注，之後才「去做一啲嘢」，「就係希望美國去做一啲嘢」來應對香港的狀況。李續指，因此他會見議員時，僅使用一些很籠統的字眼，例如「希望美國政府採取行動」之類。</p> -<p>The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short “winner takes all” clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude. Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.</p> +<p>就會見議員的討論內容，李指另一位同行的「Cath」描述她在示威前線見到的場景，另外「我亦都簡單講咗香港人眾籌運動，同埋希望美國政府可以做啲嘢，同埋佢（Rick Scott）作為一個參議員，佢可以做啲嘢咁」。</p> -<h3 id="the-economic-dimension">The Economic Dimension</h3> +<p>李稱當天的會面是他首次見到同場的 Mark Simon，惟他並未與 Mark Simon 有任何直接交談，「我淨係記得佢係肥肥地。」</p> -<p>Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and weapons is imperative in order to win.</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p>High-end weapons have exceptional performance but are difficult to manufacture, especially when needed to arm a rapidly mobilised army subjected to a high rate of attrition. For example, during the Second World War German Panzers were superb tanks, but using approximately the same production resources, the Soviets rolled out eight T-34s for every German Panzer. The difference in performance did not justify the numerical disparity in production. High-end weapons also require high-end troops. These take significant time to train – time which is unavailable in a war with high attrition rates.</p> +<hr /> -<p>It is easier and faster to produce large numbers of cheap weapons and munitions, especially if their subcomponents are interchangeable with civilian goods, ensuring mass quantity without the expansion of production lines. New recruits also absorb simpler weapons faster, allowing rapid generation of new formations or the reconstitution of existing ones.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒指「重光團隊」組織鬆散 非所有成員支持制裁 共識是爭取香港自由民主AI, Geopolitics And Framework2024-03-20T12:00:00+08:002024-03-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-geopolitics-and-framework<p><em>This workshop report summarises what impact AI has on geopolitics, whether there is a need for a new analytical framework to capture AI’s impact on international relations, and what we can learn from other technologies and their respective impact on geopolitical developments.</em></p> -<p>Achieving mass is difficult for higher-end Western economies. To achieve hyper-efficiency, they shed excess capacity and struggle to rapidly expand, especially since lower-tier industries have been transferred abroad for economic reasons. During war, global supply chains are disrupted and subcomponents can no longer be secured. Added to this conundrum is the lack of a skilled workforce with experience in a particular industry. These skills are acquired over decades, and once an industry is shuttered it takes decades to rebuild. The 2018 US government interagency report on US industrial capacity highlighted these problems. The bottom line is that the West must take a hard look at ensuring peacetime excess capacity in its military industrial complex, or risk losing the next war.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h3 id="force-generation">Force Generation</h3> +<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> -<p>Industrial output exists so it can be channelled into replacing losses and generating new formations. This requires appropriate doctrine and command and control structures. There are two main models; NATO (most Western armies) and the old Soviet model, with most states fielding something in between.</p> +<p>Policymakers are striving to understand the use, associated risks and benefits of AI technologies. The technologies are developing at pace and often involve highly technical details. Coumpounded by the persistent hype around AI, this complexity can make it challenging for non-specialists to understand AI’s impact, including in a geopolitical context. Yet, the need to respond to disruptive technological developments is not new: International Relations scholarship has often provided useful tools, frameworks or concepts to understand how such changes impact interstate relations. Can policymakers turn to such scholarship to provide valid analytical tools to better understand AI’s impact on geopolitics? This workshop report summarises the discussion of 10 scholars, debating what impact AI has on geopolitics, whether there is a need for a new analytical framework to capture AI’s impact on international relations, and what we can learn from other technologies and their respective impact on geopolitical developments.</p> -<p>NATO armies are highly professional, backed by a strong non-commissioned officer (NCO) Corps, with extensive peacetime military education and experience. They build upon this professionalism for their military doctrine (fundamentals, tactics and techniques) to stress individual initiative, delegating a great deal of leeway to junior officers and NCOs. NATO formations enjoy tremendous agility and flexibility to exploit opportunities on a dynamic battlefield.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>In attritional war, this method has a downside. The officers and NCOs required to execute this doctrine require extensive training and, above all, experience. A US Army NCO takes years to develop. A squad leader generally has at least three years in service and a platoon sergeant has at least seven. In an attritional war characterised by heavy casualties, there simply isn’t time to replace lost NCOs or generate them for new units. The idea that civilians can be given three-month training courses, sergeant’s chevrons and then expected to perform in the same manner as a seven-year veteran is a recipe for disaster. Only time can generate leaders capable of executing NATO doctrine, and time is one thing that the massive demands of attritional war do not give.</p> +<p>In November 2023, RUSI hosted an invitation-only workshop to discuss whether there is a genuine need for a new analytical framework in International Relations scholarship to grasp AI’s impact on geopolitics. RUSI convened a deliberately small number of leading International Relations scholars working on AI and other technologies to discuss the impact of AI on international relations, what can be learned from previous technological inventions on the interplay of technology and international relations, and whether a new framework or concept to analyse AI’s impact on geopolitics is needed.</p> -<p>The Soviet Union built its army for large-scale conflict with NATO. It was intended to be able to rapidly expand by calling up massed reserves. Every male in the Soviet Union underwent two years of basic training right out of high school. The constant turnover of enlisted personnel precluded creation of a Western-style NCO corps but generated a massive pool of semi-trained reserves available in times of war. The absence of reliable NCOs created an officer-centric command model, less flexible than NATO’s but more adaptable to the large-scale expansion required by attritional warfare.</p> +<p>The workshop included 10 scholars and was chaired by Anthony Finkelstein, President of City, University of London, and a RUSI Distinguished Fellow. In addition to the findings from the workshop itself, invited participants were asked to fill out a survey in advance of the workshop (please see the Annex for the survey questions). Of the 10 participants who attended the workshop, six provided a survey response. An additional two responses were provided by those who were invited but did not attend. This workshop report relies on the contributions from both the survey and the workshop. All views expressed in the workshop and the survey are non-attributable.</p> -<p>However, as a war progresses past a one-year mark, front-line units will gain experience and an improved NCO corps is likely to emerge, giving the Soviet model greater flexibility. By 1943, the Red Army had developed a robust NCO corps, which then disappeared after the Second World War as combat formations were demobilised. A key difference between the models is that NATO doctrine cannot function without high-performing NCOs. The Soviet doctrine was enhanced by experienced NCOs but did not require them.</p> +<h3 id="context">Context</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own</code></em></strong></p> +<p>AI technologies, their risks and opportunities, as well as their regulation and ethical challenges, are highly debated topics in UK policy circles. This is particularly the case since the launch of the UK National AI Strategy, setting out the aim of making the UK an “AI superpower”, and in the context of the UK AI Safety Summit held in November 2023. Policymakers in the UK increasingly turn to questions of AI benefits, implications and risks, including its relationship with foreign affairs and international relations.</p> -<p>The most effective model is a mixture of the two, in which a state maintains a medium-sized professional army, together with a mass of draftees available for mobilisation. This leads directly to a high/low mixture. Professional pre-war forces form the high end of this army, becoming fire brigades – moving from sector to sector in battle to stabilise the situation and conduct decisive attacks. Low-end formations hold the line and gain experience slowly, increasing their quality until they gain the capability to conduct offensive operations. Victory is attained by creating the highest quality low-end formations possible.</p> +<p>Too often, however, it is difficult for policymakers and non-technicians to grasp AI’s novel implications for familiar fields like International Relations. This is partially due to the knowledge gap on how AI technology works and how it will develop. This gap exists between technology experts and those in the social sciences and policy circles.</p> -<p>Forging new units into combat-capable soldiers instead of civilian mobs is done through training and combat experience. A new formation should train for at least six months, and only if manned by reservists with previous individual training. Conscripts take longer. These units should also have professional soldiers and NCOs brought in from the pre-war army to add professionalism. Once initial training is complete, they should only be fed into the battle in secondary sectors. No formation should be allowed to fall below 70% strength. Withdrawing formations early allows experience to proliferate among the new replacements as veterans pass on their skills. Otherwise, valuable experience is lost, causing the process to start all over. Another implication is that resources should prioritise replacements over new formations, preserving combat edge in both the pre-war army (high) and newly raised (low) formations. It’s advisable to disband several pre-war (high-end) formations to spread professional soldiers among newly created low-end formations in order to raise initial quality.</p> +<p>Are the tools and methods currently available adequate to frame and explain AI’s impact on international relations? Or are new ones required to capture AI’s implications for interstate relations? Only where there are adequate methods to understand and communicate such impact will non-technicians and policymakers be appropriately equipped to grasp and communicate the implications that follow from AI technologies for international relations. These might be considered decisively different or similar to those of existing technologies. Reaching such understanding is, of course, a necessary pre-condition for policymakers to design effective policy interventions for AI technologies that will allow countries such as the UK to secure a strategic advantage from AI by harnessing its advantages and mitigating any arising risks.</p> -<h3 id="the-military-dimension">The Military Dimension</h3> +<p>Academic scholarship can provide suitable and widely applied frameworks and concepts to understand technologies’ impact on international relations – such as, for example, deterrence theory as it applies to nuclear weapons and their impact on international relations during the Cold War. Even where such theory’s ability to accurately capture a technology’s impact on international relations is debatable, it can nevertheless serve as a starting point of discussion.</p> -<p>Military operations in an attritional conflict are very distinct from those in a war of manoeuvre. Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own. In this context, a successful strategy accepts that the war will last at least two years and be broken into two distinct phases. The first phase ranges from initiation of hostilities to the point where sufficient combat power has been mobilised to allow decisive action. It will see little positional shifting on the ground, focusing on favourable exchange of losses and building up combat power in the rear. The dominant form of combat is fires rather than manoeuvre, complemented by extensive fortifications and camouflage. The peacetime army starts the war and conducts holding actions, providing time to mobilise resources and train the new army.</p> +<p>AI technologies are not a completely new topic in social sciences and International Relations. That said, the recent trend has certainly led to more academic attention to AI. Whereas much academic discussion has traditionally focused on ethical implications of so-called “killer robots” and the use of AI by lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), scholars in the social sciences are now expanding their research to include areas such as AI governance and AI-enabled disinformation campaigns.</p> -<p>The second phase can commence after one side has met the following conditions.</p> +<p>RUSI’s workshop included International Relations scholars working on the implications of AI, or other technologies such as space or nuclear technologies, for international relations. Participants were invited to discuss three subject areas:</p> + +<ol> + <li> + <p>AI’s impact on geopolitics (Part One).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What can be learned from the way International Relations theory and scholarship has explained previous technological inventions (Part Two).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Whether a new framework is needed to conceptualise AI’s impact on international relations (Part Three).</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<h3 id="part-one-ais-impact-on-geopolitics-and-international-relations">Part One: AI’s Impact on Geopolitics and International Relations</h3> + +<p>There was widespread agreement that AI has a noticeable and manifold impact on international relations as well as International Relations scholarship – not least because states are addressing issues of AI governance and risk management. The impacts have also been felt as AI potentially has an effect on interstate power dynamics.</p> + +<p>Examples of how AI impacts geopolitical dynamics included:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Newly mobilised forces have completed their training and gained sufficient experience to make them combat-effective formations, capable of rapidly integrating all their assets in a cohesive manner.</p> + <p>Applications in the military domain, including strategic stability, the laws and ethics of war, and the public perception of warfare.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The enemy’s strategic reserve is exhausted, leaving it unable to reinforce the threatened sector.</p> + <p>Increased danger of digital authoritarianism.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Fires and reconnaissance superiority are achieved, allowing the attacker to effectively mass fires on a key sector while denying the enemy the same.</p> + <p>Work in diplomacy, such as efficiency of consular work.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The enemy’s industrial sector is degraded to the point where it is unable to replace battlefield losses. In the case of fighting against a coalition of countries, their industrial resources must also be exhausted or at least accounted for.</p> + <p>Normative challenges to existing values and considerations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The race to be leading AI development, research and implementation, including through data collection.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The perceived need for international governance of AI technologies.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Only after meeting these criteria should offensive operations commence. They should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points with shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside a layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. Concentration of forces on one main effort should be avoided as this gives an indication of the offensive’s location and an opportunity for the enemy to concentrate their reserves against this key point. The Brusilov Offensive of 1916, which resulted in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, is a good example of a successful attritional offensive at the tactical and operational level. By attacking along a broad front, the Russian army prevented the Austro-Hungarians from concentrating their reserves, resulting in a collapse all along the front. At the strategic level, however, the Brusilov Offensive is an example of failure. Russian forces failed to set conditions against the whole enemy coalition, focusing only on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and neglecting German capacity. The Russians expended crucial resources which they could not replace, without defeating the strongest coalition member. To reemphasise the key point, an offensive will only succeed once key criteria are met. Attempting to launch an offensive earlier will result in losses without any strategic gains, playing directly into enemy hands.</p> +<h4 id="narrowing-down-what-and-when-constitutes-impact">Narrowing Down What and When Constitutes “Impact”</h4> -<h3 id="modern-war">Modern War</h3> +<p>Participants repeatedly debated the timeframe that applies to the question of AI’s impacts on geopolitics. The contemporary landscape differs from potential future scenarios given the rapid development of AI technologies. The assessment of what kind of development to expect and the capabilities AI technologies may develop, however, strongly depends on the taken approach: tech-optimist or doomsday scenario. The timeline envisaged is also relevant. One participant pointed out that “the actual impacts in the short, mid- and long term are somewhat unclear”. Even the question of what timeframe constitutes “the future” or “long term” is challenging.</p> -<p>The modern battlefield is an integrated system of systems which includes various types of electronic warfare (EW), three basic types of air defences, four different types of artillery, countless aircraft types, strike and reconnaissance drones, construction and sapper engineers, traditional infantry, armour formations and, above all, logistics. Artillery has become more dangerous thanks to increased ranges and advanced targeting, stretching the depth of the battlefield.</p> +<p>Timeline considerations also tied to questions on whether to focus on long-term, potentially existential, risks that largely rely on speculation or to focus on AI’s contemporary impact and potential harm. One academic pointed out that this discussion was now highly politicised, tied to narratives of US–China competition and other broader trends. They argued, however, that long- and short-term impact cannot be disintegrated so easily but that these questions are instead closely tied to political considerations underlying them.</p> -<p>In practice, this means it is easier to mass fires than forces. Deep manoeuvre, which requires the massing of combat power, is no longer possible because any massed force will be destroyed by indirect fires before it can achieve success in depth. Instead, a ground offensive requires a tight protective bubble to ward off enemy strike systems. This bubble is generated through layering friendly counter-fire, air defence and EW assets. Moving numerous interdependent systems is highly complicated and unlikely to be successful. Shallow attacks along the forward line of troops are most likely to be successful at an acceptable cost ratio; attempts at deep penetration will be exposed to massed fires the moment they exit the protection of the defensive bubble.</p> +<p>The political implications that follow from the narrative of distinguishing between long- and short-term impact were picked up by other participants. One scholar argued that such distinction is not contradictory. Nonetheless, it is vital to bridge the gap between various communities, each focusing on different types of risks (for example, the national security community and the military community).</p> -<p>Integration of these overlapping assets requires centralised planning and exceptionally well-trained staff officers, capable of integrating multiple capabilities on the fly. It takes years to train such officers, and even combat experience does not generate such skills in a short time. Checklists and mandatory procedures can alleviate these deficiencies, but only on a less-complicated, static front. Dynamic offensive operations require fast reaction times, which semi-trained officers are incapable of performing.</p> +<p>Especially when discussing long-term and existential risk of AI technologies, academics stressed the need to consider where the information underlying assumptions comes from. Who circulates what information with what kind of intentions? What vision of technology are they trying to sell? One participant found that this increased politicisation is making their job harder. Another academic also pointed to the lack of diversity among many technology companies. Many of these companies hold a lot of information and knowledge. They shape the discourse on the impact of AI, especially when it comes to discussing potential long-term and existential risks. They may do so in a one-sided way. Another participant added that technology companies often even determine what is labelled as AI, thereby holding additional power.</p> -<p>An example of this complexity is an attack by a platoon of 30 soldiers. This would require EW systems to jam enemy drones; another EW system to jam enemy communications preventing adjustment of enemy fires; and a third EW system to jam space navigation systems denying use of precision guided munitions. In addition, fires require counterbattery radars to defeat enemy artillery. Further complicating planning is the fact that enemy EW will locate and destroy any friendly radar or EW emitter that is emitting for too long. Engineers will have to clear paths through minefields, while friendly drones provide time-sensitive ISR and fire support if needed. (This task requires a great deal of training with the supporting units to avoid dropping munitions on friendly attacking troops.) Finally, artillery needs to provide support both on the objective and enemy rear, targeting reserves and suppressing artillery. All these systems need to work as an integrated team just to support 30 men in several vehicles attacking another 30 men or less. A lack of coordination between these assets will result in failed attacks and horrific losses without ever seeing the enemy. As the size of formation conducting operations increases, so do the number and complexity of assets that need to be integrated.</p> +<p>All of these points on the different perspectives, the timeframe applied and the information underlying any assumptions shape the understanding of AI’s impact on geopolitics.</p> -<h3 id="implications-for-combat-operations">Implications for Combat Operations</h3> +<h4 id="the-approach-of-international-relations-scholarship-to-ai">The Approach of International Relations Scholarship to AI</h4> -<p>Deep fires – further than 100–150 km (the average range of tactical rockets) behind the front line – target an enemy’s ability to generate combat power. This includes production facilities, munitions dumps, repair depots, and energy and transportation infrastructure. Of particular importance are targets that require significant production capabilities and that are difficult to replace/repair, as their destruction will inflict long term damage. As with all aspects of attritional war, such strikes will take significant time to have an effect, with timelines running into years. The low global production volumes of long-range precision-guided munitions, effective deception and concealment actions, large stockpiles of anti-aircraft missiles and the sheer repair capacities of strong, determined states all combine to prolong conflicts. Effective layering of air defences must include high-end systems at all altitudes coupled with cheaper systems to counter the enemy’s massed low-end attack platforms. Combined with mass-scale manufacturing and effective EW, this is the only way to defeat enemy deep fires.</p> +<p>The discussion identified several areas of the impact of AI on geopolitics that are – to varying degrees – addressed in International Relations scholarship. For example, one participant’s introductory remarks argued that International Relations scholars primarily address the impact of AI by focusing on four areas of study. First, the influence of AI on the balance of power is primarily addressed in areas such as war studies or strategic studies. Second, issues of AI governance are analysed by a more diverse set of scholars driven by a shared sense that some form of global AI governance is needed. Third, the same scholar further remarked that ethics questions are often primarily looked at within a military context but should be considered more broadly. Finally, disinformation and social media are widely discussed in International Relations scholarship, particularly considering the impact of deepfakes, but research in this area is often inconclusive.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Victory in an attritional war is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The discussion on AI’s impact on geopolitics underlined the implications that different framings have, whether on the temporal framework applied, the community and the political environment that discusses AI’s impact on international relations, or the source of information such assessment is based on in the first place. These challenges, particularly the question of timeframes, were raised throughout all stages of the workshop.</p> -<p>Successful attritional war focuses on the preservation of one’s own combat power. This usually translates into a relatively static front interrupted by limited local attacks to improve positions, using artillery for most of the fighting. Fortification and concealment of all forces including logistics is the key to minimising losses. The long time required to construct fortifications prevents significant ground movement. An attacking force which cannot rapidly entrench will suffer significant losses from enemy artillery fires.</p> +<h3 id="part-two-learning-from-other-technologies">Part Two: Learning from Other Technologies</h3> -<p>Defensive operations buy time to develop low-end combat formations, allowing newly mobilised troops to gain combat experience without suffering heavy losses in large-scale attacks. Building up experienced low-tier combat formations generates the capability for future offensive operations.</p> +<p>AI technologies are by no means the first technological invention to impact international relations. From nuclear to space, and military inventions to maritime technologies, technology impacts many areas of interstate relations. Workshop participants therefore also debated how far AI technologies and their impact on geopolitics resemble that of other technologies or whether they pose unique, unprecedented challenges.</p> -<p>The early stages of attritional war range from initiation of hostilities to the point where mobilised resources are available in large numbers and are ready for combat operations. In the case of a surprise attack, a rapid offensive by one side may be possible until the defender can form a solid front. After that, combat solidifies. This period lasts at least a year-and-a-half to two years. During this period, major offensive operations should be avoided. Even if large attacks are successful, they will result in significant casualties, often for meaningless territorial gains. An army should never accept a battle on unfavourable terms. In attritional war, any terrain that does not have a vital industrial centre is irrelevant. It is always better to retreat and preserve forces, regardless of the political consequences. Fighting on disadvantageous terrain burns up units, losing experienced soldiers who are key to victory. The German obsession with Stalingrad in 1942 is a prime example of fighting on unfavourable terrain for political reasons. Germany burned up vital units that it could not afford to lose, simply to capture a city bearing Stalin’s name. It is also wise to push the enemy into fighting on disadvantageous terrain through information operations, exploiting politically sensitive enemy objectives. The goal is to force the enemy to expend vital material and strategic reserves on strategically meaningless operations. A key pitfall to avoid is being dragged into the very same trap that has been set for the enemy. In the First World War, Germans did just that at Verdun, where it planned to use surprise to capture key, politically sensitive terrain, provoking costly French counterattacks. Unfortunately for the Germans, they fell into their own trap. They failed to gain key, defendable terrain early on, and the battle devolved instead into a series of costly infantry assaults by both sides, with artillery fires devastating attacking infantry.</p> +<h4 id="how-different-is-ai-from-previous-technological-inventions">How Different is AI from Previous Technological Inventions?</h4> -<p>When the second phase begins, the offensive should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points using shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside the layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. There is a cascading effect in which a crisis in one sector forces the defenders to shift reserves from a second sector, only to generate a crisis there in turn. As forces start falling back and leaving prepared fortifications, morale plummets, with the obvious question: “If we can’t hold the mega-fortress, how can we hold these new trenches?” Retreat then turns into rout. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. The Allies’ Offensive in 1918 is an example. The Allies attacked along a broad front, while the Germans lacked sufficient resources to defend the entire line. Once the German Army began to retreat it proved impossible to stop.</p> +<p>Assessments of how far AI is “a gamechanger” differed among the participants. Again, varying timeframes applied to the question. On the one hand, some considered that AI, at least in the current context, primarily amplified existing challenges or power dynamics without fundamentally challenging interstate relations. Some participants tied the impact of AI on international relations to other technologies (for example, to quantum sensing or information communication infrastructure [ICT] and cyber technologies), pointing to possible similarities and interdependencies. One participant also argued that “AI has far more in common with earlier technological inventions than is often implied in the existing literature”, at least in its current form. This could, in theory, change if artificial general intelligence comes into existence.</p> -<p>The attritional strategy, centred on defence, is counterintuitive to most Western military officers. Western military thought views the offensive as the only means of achieving the decisive strategic goal of forcing the enemy to come to the negotiating table on unfavourable terms. The strategic patience required to set the conditions for an offensive runs against their combat experience acquired in overseas counterinsurgency operations.</p> +<p>On the other hand, some participants found that the impact of AI is already groundbreaking. They stressed its ability to replace human factors as – unlike other technologies – it is a decision-making technology with “a degree of agency”. AI’s ability to not just replace motor skills – as was the case with previous technologies – but also “chiefly cognitive skills” was perceived as a decisive difference. As such, AI has the ability to change the quality of decision-making, with implications for the nature of international society and relations.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>More abstractly, as International Relations as a discipline concerns the study of interstate relations, not humans, AI fundamentally challenges this assumption, according to one discussant. Here lies the challenge to International Relations as a discipline. At the same time, it can also add to the discourse: while computer scientists focus on individual intelligence, International Relations scholars focus on collective social intelligence because the discipline is the study of groups, not the individual. As such, the field’s scholarship can make a meaningful contribution to often technology-dominated discussions on how the impact of AI on international relations is understood.</p> -<p>The conduct of attritional wars is vastly different from wars of manoeuvre. They last longer and end up testing a country’s industrial capacity. Victory is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime.</p> +<h4 id="what-lessons-were-learned-from-other-technologies-and-their-impact-on-international-relations">What Lessons Were Learned from Other Technologies and Their Impact on International Relations?</h4> -<p>Victory is attainable by carefully analysing one’s own and the enemy’s political objectives. The key is recognising the strengths and weaknesses of competing economic models and identifying the economic strategies that are most likely to generate maximum resources. These resources can then be utilised to build a massive army using the high/low force and weapons mixture. The military conduct of war is driven by overall political strategic objectives, military realities and economic limitations. Combat operations are shallow and focus on destroying enemy resources, not on gaining terrain. Propaganda is used to support military operations, not the other way around. With patience and careful planning, a war can be won.</p> +<p>On lessons learned from other disciplines, including on how to deal with increased hype around new technological inventions, one participant remarked that in the area of space technology, camps form around “futurists” and those paying more attention to contemporary developments. While futurists primarily focus on potential technological inventions in the more distant future, possibly developed by engineers without guiding policy and strategy, those who are perhaps more grounded in pragmatism focus on the technologies that are actually being deployed. The participant remarked that a lesson learned from the space context is to “look away from the shiny stuff” and instead focus on where mass investments are being made and mass adoption is being advanced. A similar shift in attention in an AI context would contribute to moving away from the contemporary hype around AI and to guide non-technicians in navigating the technological landscape and seeing the bigger picture.</p> -<p>Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the geography and the population and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the economy, doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict.</p> +<p>Interesting lessons were also drawn in comparison to the development of nuclear technologies. A participant noted that the ownership of the development of AI – unlike that of nuclear weapons – lies with technology companies rather than states. This, for them, challenges the state-centric assumptions often underlying International Relations theory.</p> -<p>If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method.</p> +<p>Another comparison was made to the nuclear domain. Like the sanctions there, one participant expected future geopolitical considerations on AI development would likely include further sanctioning of semiconductors. This is already a powerful tool of US foreign and technology policy.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Others stressed that AI technologies cannot be seen in isolation and that they do “not exist in a social vacuum”. Instead, AI technologies must be seen as a collection of technologies which are also linked to broader questions such as supply chain issues or labour market dynamics.</p> -<p><strong>Alex Vershinin</strong>, Lt Col (Retd), has 10 years of frontline experience in Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan. For the last decade before his retirement, he worked as a modelling and simulations officer in concept development and experimentation for NATO and the US Army.</p>Alex VershininIf the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.【黎智英案・審訊第卌六日】2024-03-15T12:00:00+08:002024-03-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46<ul> - <li>李宇軒指英國登報眾籌餘款供「攬炒巴」等人辦活動、安排見英議員及監察區選</li> -</ul> +<p>While participants’ observations of how far AI technologies constitute a game changer or resemble previous technologies’ impact on international relations differed, some interesting parallels and differences were drawn. These highlighted the value of situating our understanding of AI in the broader context, both in relation to parallel political developments and dynamics around other technologies.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="part-three-applying-existing-theories-and-frameworks-to-ai-and-the-need-for-a-new-concept">Part Three: Applying Existing Theories and Frameworks to AI and the Need for a New Concept</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HjXOWhI.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>At the start of the workshop, participants were asked to place themselves on a spectrum ranging from “no new framework needed” to “new framework needed” to analyse AI’s impact on geopolitics (see Figure 1 for a rough indication). The allocations are merely indicators replicated from a whiteboard in the room and do not follow a scientific measurement. Nevertheless, they provide an overview of the different sentiments represented during the workshop.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（15日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第46日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李談及2019年7月第二次的眾籌，是有關英國的「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃及相關活動，當時認識了主要搞手「攬炒巴」劉祖廸。據銀行紀錄，該次眾籌錄得餘款約20萬英鎊，李供稱用以支付「攬炒巴」在英國籌辦活動和遊行的開支，採取實報實銷制。部份餘款則用於向「Whitehouse Consultancy」支付顧問費，而該公司曾安排「攬炒巴」等人會見英國國會議員、動用人脈來港監察2019年區議會選舉，並與「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯持續合作。此外，李指「攬炒巴」等人曾經研究簽署《中英聯合聲明》的新聞圖片版權問題，另一名同案被告陳梓華聲稱可以在與黎智英食飯時查問，「嗰時 for some reasons，我覺得佢同《蘋果》有啲關係。」後來陳告訴李「張相OK喇」，《蘋果》職員亦授權他們使用相關新聞圖片。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cjRyzgR.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: Do We Need a New Framework to Understand AI’s Impact on Geopolitics?</em></p> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第三天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李早前提及，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌及籌備在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。期間案中另一名被告陳梓華經 Telegram 接觸李，並以「T」的身份與李商討墊支廣告費，惟李當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。</p> +<h4 id="the-need-for-a-new-framework-to-capture-the-impact-of-ai-on-international-relations">The Need for a New Framework to Capture the Impact of AI on International Relations</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒兩間墊支的公司非經營登廣告業務-理應盡快還錢">李宇軒：兩間墊支的公司非經營登廣告業務 理應盡快還錢</h4> +<p>As demonstrated in Figure 1, participants offered a wide range of perspectives and arguments on whether a new analytical framework in International Relations scholarship is needed to adequately capture and explain the impact of AI on international relations.</p> -<p>控方問及G20登報計劃結束之後，李宇軒與T商討還款的細節。李宇軒供稱，他與 T 在7月的時候，就還款事宜在 Telegram 上溝通，大概意思是「T嗰邊」墊支過登報費，李問可以怎樣還款，T則說要安排一下。</p> +<p>Some thought that a new framework is needed to go beyond the descriptions of aspects of AI’s impact offered by existing theories and concepts. A new framework would especially need to address AI’s ability to perform cognitive tasks and its impact on political decision-making. One participant also deemed a new framework necessary to move away from the dominant perception of AI as an arms race between big powers, overlooking smaller and medium states as well as private technology companies, which are at the heart of AI development. Whether such a new framework would rely on existing concepts that needed updating and enhancing, including from an interdisciplinary perspective, or whether a new, comprehensive theory should be developed remained subject to debate.</p> -<p>李前天提到，等待還款安排期間，T曾告訴他「上頭嘅人」對於「拖住嚿錢」感到不安，於是雙方簽訂借據。控方今追問，T有否告訴李，「上頭嘅人」實際上是指哪些人。李指沒有。</p> +<p>Others pointed to the many theories of International Relations scholarship that already apply to technological inventions more broadly. For example, the framing of the governance and technology lag, describing how technology develops faster than its respective governance, applies to an AI context. Another participant pointed to critical norm theory as a way to build on existing theoretical thinking on how AI technologies shape international norms. For specific areas such as trade and international political economy, the new trade theory was named as an example of an existing theory, adding insights to AI’s impact on geopolitics. Similarly, the theory of organisational reputation was given as an example of how an existing theory can “provide insights into why agencies react to and regulate disruptive innovations”. One scholar added that existing concepts from other disciplines such as neuroscience, psychology and philosophy are also useful tools in contributing to explaining AI’s impact on international relations.</p> -<p>控方又問，T有否告訴李，為何「上頭嘅人」感到不安。李則指，因為墊支登廣告的公司「唔 suppose 係做登廣告嘅業務」，所以李理應盡快還款，以免「唔關公司本身業務嘅嘢喺度拖住」，不過他表示：「唔記得係我咁樣諗，定係佢同我講佢咁樣諗。」</p> +<h4 id="one-theory-to-rule-them-all">One Theory to Rule Them All?</h4> -<p>李其後承認這是他的假設，因為籌辦G20登報的一般都是社運組織，「以我知道，Lais Hotel 和 Dico（力高）都唔係一啲 activist 嘅 organisation。」</p> +<p>The discussion arguing in favour of one new concept or against it was far from binary. Instead, it was often a matter of the degree to which existing theories can adequately capture AI’s impact. Participants further questioned whether there can be one theory to address AI’s impact on international relations in the first place. While one participant pointed out that the big theories – realism, constructivism and institutionalism – each offer “valuable insights into AI and the impact it may have on geopolitics”, others stressed the move away from “the big ‘isms’”. Instead, there are many more nuanced, mid-level theories aiming to address aspects of International Relations.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒簽借據時首次得知t真名為陳梓華">李宇軒：簽借據時首次得知T真名為陳梓華</h4> +<p>Indeed, one scholar argued that “no single theory, concept or framework can comprehensively and adequately describe, analyse and reflect on the various impacts of AI. Each theory in International Relations can, however, illuminate certain aspects, risks and opportunities of AI, but none can on its own discuss, analyse and reflect on it in a comprehensive manner”. Others agreed, stating that they did not think “that one single theory, concept or framework can fully capture the impact of AI technologies as they all have their own comparative strengths and weaknesses. For this reason, a multiple theory, concept or framework is the most analytically productive”.</p> -<p>李早前作供又指，他與T相約到金鐘力寶中心的一間咖啡店簽署借據，作為一個臨時措施（stop gap measure）。李今再解釋，若T手上有一份借據，T便可以跟「上面嘅人」說：「嗱，依家有 promissory note，條數一定會還嘅。」</p> +<p>Some noted that a comprehensive approach would be desirable to accomplish a new, overarching theory, acknowledging the tremendous challenge of developing such a theory. Others argued in favour of basing work on existing theories and updating them in line with new developments.</p> -<p>法官李運騰問李是否記得借據上的「收款人」一欄寫什麼。李則表示記得有類似「收款人」一欄，但是不記得內容是什麼。他又指，合共有4個人在借據上簽名，包括他、T 和兩名見證人，期間「拎咗身份證出嚟畀大家睇」，但他不記得需否寫下身份證號碼。</p> +<h4 id="what-tool-for-what-purpose">What Tool for What Purpose?</h4> -<p>李表示，在該次簽借據的過程中，是首次得知T真名叫陳梓華。</p> +<p>The discussions on the need of a new framework or theory repeatedly linked back to questions of purpose, scope and intention. Participants discussed both what aspect of AI technologies a concrete framework should focus on but also what the purpose of International Relations scholarship is more fundamentally. Again, defining purpose also tied to the question of timeframes – whether a new theory would address the impact of AI on international relations now or in the future. One participant argued that, as it stands, existing concepts “have a lot to say” but that it is harder to predict future developments and how existing concepts would be able to keep up.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒確認經chartwell-holding戶口還款156萬-惟陳梓華未有談及公司背景">李宇軒確認經Chartwell Holding戶口還款156萬 惟陳梓華未有談及公司背景</h4> +<p>With respect to the purpose of a new framework, participants asked why a framework is needed, and whether it is to better understand AI’s impact on geopolitics as opposed to drawing attention to previously unnoticed phenomena. One participant argued that, in some sense, International Relations scholarship “had a technology problem” – while technology was part of many considerations, it was never conceptualised as such. This status quo is now challenged, as new developments in AI technology arguably have the potential to fundamentally challenge how International Relations theories work.</p> -<p>控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，顯示李在2019年8月1日把100萬元轉帳至 Chartwell Holding，其後8月2日再次把約55.9萬元轉帳至 Chartwell Holding。李確認兩筆款項是用以清還有關G20登報的費用。</p> +<p>This linked to the broader and fundamental question of the purpose of International Relations theory. Participants critically discussed whether it is the purpose of International Relations theory to predict the future; a challenge some considered too great given that the “past and present are already difficult enough” to conceptualise. Others felt that it is indeed the idea of the discipline to predict geopolitics but that it has also been historically poor at doing so. This also raised the question of how far International Relations theory is contributing to preventing war or harm and whether that is its purpose and, if so, whether it needs to get better at doing so.</p> -<p>控方問李，陳梓華向他提供 Chartwell Holding 的戶口資料時，有否談及這間公司的背景。李回答沒有。</p> +<p>Thus, how International Relations scholars understand their discipline and interpret existing theories heavily influenced their assessment of whether a new framework is necessary or feasible and, if so, what purpose it might serve.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱登報計劃15萬餘款捐給612基金">李宇軒稱登報計劃15萬餘款捐給612基金</h4> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>控方指，據G20登報計劃的收支列表，該次錄得15萬港元餘款，問李當時如何處理這些餘款。李稱：「捐咗畀612。」控方追問「612」是什麼意思，李回答：「啫係612基金。」他又解釋，因為登報計劃有一筆餘款，「唔可以落袋」，因此後來將這筆餘款捐給612基金。控方再追問612基金是用作什麼目的，李僅指：「支援 legal fee 嘅。」</p> +<p>The workshop identified that whether participants considered a new framework necessary to adequately capture AI’s impact on international relations was influenced by three key factors.</p> -<p>控方其後問，612基金的全名是否「612人道支援基金」。李表示：「啱啱你幫我記得起佢全名，我淨係記得612。」</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>What experts considered AI’s impact to be in the first place – and how unprecedented they found it compared to previous technological inventions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How far they believed existing theories in various fields can capture such impact and whether a single theory could ever do so.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Experts’ assessment of how useful existing theories are also depended on what they considered the objective and purpose of both a new theory and International Relations scholarship more widely to be.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>被問到為何選擇捐給612基金，陳表示他理解612基金其中一項工作是支援被捕人士的法律開支，「咁係完全合法嘅，同埋我理解公眾唔會反對嘅」，所以當他們有一筆餘款時，「唔知做咩咁，同埋擔心有人唔知係咪袋咗自己袋」，所以便決定捐出。</p> +<p>The conversation repeatedly returned to themes such as the applicable timeframe to define the impact of AI, the definition of AI, and the bias of available information and their implications on scholars’ understanding of AI. These factors, the assessment of which varied depending on participants’ areas of specialism, were often considered underlying questions that need to be answered before a suitable framework can be developed.</p> -<p>控方問李有否就眾籌計劃接受過任何傳媒訪問。李表示記得在其中一次眾籌期間，《蘋果》曾經採訪過眾籌團隊，不過他不記得是6月那次眾籌，還是7月那次眾籌。</p> +<p>Further research could provide a fuller and more systematic understanding of AI’s impact on geopolitics but also help identify concrete examples of how far existing theories already capture various aspects of the impact of AI on geopolitics. Research could also provide a more detailed analysis of parallels and differences between AI and previous technologies and their impact on international relations.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指2019年7月參與英國登報眾籌計劃-攬炒巴有份">李宇軒指2019年7月參與英國登報眾籌計劃 「攬炒巴」有份</h4> +<h3 id="annex-survey-questions">Annex: Survey Questions</h3> -<p>李接著談及2019年7月的另一次眾籌計劃，是有關在英國登廣告的活動。他記得當時有一個人將「攬炒巴」介紹給他認識，「因為攬炒巴想喺英國嗰邊去搞眾籌登報，同埋相關嘅事。」李指，因為對方知道他籌辦G20登報眾籌「係幾成功」，所以便邀請他幫手「睇吓攬炒巴喺 crowdfund 嗰度有冇嘢可以幫到手」。</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>What impact do AI technologies have on international relations?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>To what extent does this resemble or differ from previous technological inventions?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Can existing theory, concepts or frameworks in your field adequately describe the impact of AI technologies? (Please expand and include field and theory.)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>If applying existing theories does not work, why not? And what do new analytical frameworks need to offer to successfully reflect the impact of AI technologies on geopolitics?</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>李表示，當時知道「攬炒巴」即是「連登」討論區上一個帳號「我要攬炒」，「而連登上面男仔係叫『巴打』嘅」，所以「攬炒巴」便是這一個帳號。</p> +<hr /> -<p>李稱，後來他知道「攬炒巴」即是劉祖廸，因為大約在2019年尾至2020年初，陳梓華和「攬炒巴」與他曾經在網上平台 Jitsi 進行線上會議。</p> +<p><strong>Pia Hüsch</strong> is a RUSI Research Fellow in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focusses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations and the geopolitical and national security implications of disruptive technologies, such as AI. Pia’s other research interests include the governance of cyberspace, election interference, cyberwarfare, and the relationship between law and technology, including cyber and AI.</p>Pia HüschThis workshop report summarises what impact AI has on geopolitics, whether there is a need for a new analytical framework to capture AI’s impact on international relations, and what we can learn from other technologies and their respective impact on geopolitical developments.【黎智英案・審訊第卌八日】2024-03-19T12:00:00+08:002024-03-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-48<ul> + <li>美加登報廣告促制裁及禁售武器予港警 李宇軒：由不同人設計、有關香港民主自由</li> +</ul> -<p>至於李在是次眾籌的角色，李稱主要都是幫手處理眾籌。其他參與者包括「攬炒巴」、一個叫「Always」的人、向他介紹「攬炒巴」的人，以及後來有 Jack Hazlewood，其他參與者則記不起。他指是次活動「主要係攬炒巴嗰邊嘅人搞」，據他所知，運作模式與G20登報計劃相若，有的人處理眾籌，有的人聯絡報館，有的人設計廣告。</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="李宇軒指蘋果專欄作家jack-hazlewood借出銀行戶口接收眾籌款項">李宇軒指《蘋果》專欄作家Jack Hazlewood借出銀行戶口接收眾籌款項</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ELaCoJi.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>李指，該次英國眾籌登報是關於1984年簽署的《中英聯合聲明》，而當時「攬炒巴」希望以此作為主題。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第48日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。就2019年8月的第三次眾籌即「G攬運動」，庭上展示的加拿大《環球郵報》和《紐約時報》國際版廣告，分別促請加國和美國政府禁止出售武器給香港警方，又呼籲美國讀者促請議員動議通過《香港人權與民主法案》。其中一份匯款紀錄顯示西班牙《世界報》的廣告費由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 繳付，根據控方開案陳詞，該公司由 Mark Simon 持有或控制。另外，李確認截至2020年5月，「G攬運動」錄得餘款約69.8萬美元（約546萬港元），而這筆錢之後用在「各地有關 support 香港自由民主嘅活動」，即有關「重光團隊」的活動。</p> -<p>就眾籌方法，李指在第一次就G20登報眾籌時使用的平台「GoGetFund」，手續費頗貴，當時籌到接近700萬元，但是卻扣除了50至60萬元手續費。於是他們找了另一個眾籌平台「gofundme.com」，可以選擇不給予貼士或手續費。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指曾與陳梓華討論在美國成立公司來收取眾籌款項">李宇軒指曾與陳梓華討論在美國成立公司來收取眾籌款項</h4> -<p>李指，不過在「攬炒巴嗰邊嘅人」當中，沒有人願意借出自己的銀行戶口作為眾籌的收款人。李當時認為，因為他在第一次眾籌時已經使用了其個人戶口，「即使再嚟多次，都唔會增加我嘅風險」，於是決定借出他的渣打銀行戶口去接收眾籌款項。惟後來李發現，「gofundme.com」規定款項必須經由英國開設的英鎊戶口接收，他不記得在陳梓華還是另一名群組成員的介紹下，最終認識了 Jack Hazlewood，對方亦同意借出銀行戶口。後來李知道 Jack Hazlewood 是「《蘋果》嘅寫手」。</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第五天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李昨日供稱，在2019年8月第三次眾籌活動期間，他和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人成立「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong），並以此團體名義在各地登報。就他們所籌得的180萬美元，李稱在另一名被告陳梓華的協助下，找來了黎智英的私人助手 Mark Simon 借出美國的銀行戶口收取眾籌款項，然後轉帳至「Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。李並指當時 Mark Simon 要求在美國成立一個基金來保管眾籌款項，需要找美國公民來擔任受託人，以減少香港銀行凍結款項的風險。</p> -<p>控方追問李提到的「風險」是什麼意思。李指是被指控「洗黑錢」的風險，雖然他有妥善保存所有關於眾籌的單據，能夠證明到他不是「洗黑錢」，「但中間有畀人懷疑洗黑錢同埋凍結戶口的風險。」</p> +<p>控方今展示從李宇軒電腦檢取的電郵紀錄，可見在2019年9月6日至17日期間，李和網名「T」的陳梓華經電郵與眾籌平台職員溝通，提及第一次提取眾籌款項時，銀行「啷住咗」相關帳目，於是轉用另一人的戶口來收款。李表示當時他並未有留意第二名收款人的身份。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒陳梓華聲稱與黎智英食飯後-獲允使用蘋果新聞圖片">李宇軒：陳梓華聲稱與黎智英食飯後 獲允使用《蘋果》新聞圖片</h4> +<p>李供稱，當時他和陳梓華有討論過考慮在美國成立一間公司，以其銀行戶口來收取眾籌款項，因此曾經問眾籌平台的職員是否可行。在2019年9月10日的電郵中，李問職員可否選擇提供一個「責任有限公司」（Limited Liability Company, LLC）的銀行帳戶來收款。在翌日的電郵中，職員表示這方案是可行，要求李提供相關公司名稱和負責人身份，又問「Freedom Hong Kong」會否考慮在美國成立一間「責任有限公司」。</p> -<p>李續指：「後來我又知陳梓華識 Mark Simon 同肥佬黎」，當法庭翻譯主任把「肥佬黎」翻譯成「Fatty Lai」時，李補充道：「Sorry，黎智英。」</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華電郵傳送mark-simon作為收款人資料-李宇軒當時未留意收款人資料">陳梓華電郵傳送Mark Simon作為收款人資料 李宇軒：當時未留意收款人資料</h4> -<p>李提到「攬炒巴」想使用當年簽署《中英聯合聲明》的新聞圖片，即是中方代表與時任英國首相戴卓爾夫人握手的相片。有組員留意到《蘋果》網站上有這一張相片，陳梓華聲稱會去問《蘋果日報》，李說：「嗰時 for some reasons，我覺得佢同《蘋果》有啲關係，之前我唔記得佢幾時暗示過。」</p> +<p>其後在9月17日，陳梓華向眾籌平台職員傳送電郵，內容含有收款人 Mark Simon 的資料，包括法律上名稱（Legal Name）「Mark H Simon」、地址、電話號碼、銀行戶口資料等。相關電郵同時副本抄送至李的電郵。李表示，他當時並沒有留意收款人的法律地位（legal status），因為只要陳梓華和眾籌平台能夠將款項轉移至收款人的銀行戶口，便能夠處理到問題，後來他才知道當時陳梓華找了 Mark Simon 介入。</p> -<p>李轉述陳當時稱：「等佢（陳）下個禮拜四，咁佢去同唔記得『黎生』定係『肥佬黎』食飯嗰陣，佢（陳）就會問佢（黎）。」李表示：「嗰陣時我知，原來佢（陳）可以去同黎生食飯。跟住過咗禮拜四之後，T（陳梓華）就話：『張相OK喇。』」李稱，其後與《蘋果》職員經過一輪正式的電郵溝通，他們便可以使用高清版的新聞圖片。</p> +<p>法官李運騰指，李早前供稱在美國參議員斯科特（Rick Scott）訪港時，有安排他會見斯科特，並介紹 Mark Simon 給他認識，而上述陳梓華的電郵寫有 Mark Simon 的資料，問李當時陳梓華是否已經向他介紹了 Mark Simon。李則表示，視乎會見斯科特的時間是在上述電郵之前，還是之後，因為當時他並未有將會見參議員和提取眾籌款項的事宜「link up 埋一齊」，但他可以確認在2019年9月時已獲介紹。</p> -<p>控方展示一份《蘋果》報導〈遊行被圍捕險洩身份 攬炒巴死裏逃生 帶署歷警暴 拒保後返英〉，版面下方含有眾籌網站截圖，顯示計劃名稱是「中英聯合聲明登報」。李確認。</p> +<p>2019年9月17日的電郵顯示，李向眾籌平台職員確認 Mark Simon 是收款人，並籲職員與陳梓華和 Mark 合作處理提取款項。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OGbFYsS.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 網路截圖（資料圖片）</p> +<h4 id="單據顯示lais-hotel-墊支西班牙報紙廣告費18500歐元">單據顯示Lais Hotel 墊支西班牙報紙廣告費18,500歐元</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱第二次登報活動中再度墊支-控方指事後有餘款約20萬英鎊">李宇軒稱第二次登報活動中再度墊支 控方指事後有餘款約20萬英鎊</h4> +<p>就第三次眾籌的登報廣告，控方指收支表顯示廣告支出合共為633.7萬港元，而李昨日供稱陳梓華等人墊支了約300萬元，其他廣告費則全部由李墊支，由此推論李墊支了約270萬元。李表示：「大概。」</p> -<p>李指第一次的G20登報與第二次的「中英聯合聲明登報」眾籌，同樣遇到未能立即動用籌得款項的問題，所以李需要協助墊支。</p> +<p>控方繼而展示由西班牙報紙《世界報》（El Mundo）發出的發票，顯示廣告費為18,500歐元。李供稱當時相關費用由「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」墊支。</p> -<p>控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，可見李在2019年7月19日至25日期間，先後向《旗幟晚報》（Evening Standard）、《衛報》（The Guardian）、台灣《自由時報》等合共6間媒體公司轉帳。李表示不肯定台灣《自由時報》那一次轉帳是關於「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃，還是第三次的眾籌活動，但其餘5間媒體公司的轉帳則確認有關。控方指，若果把台灣《自由時報》計算在內，李合共墊支了約10萬英鎊，即130萬港元。李確認。</p> +<p>控方遂展示匯款收據，顯示上述費用由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 在2019年8月16日支付。李確認，並指這收據是陳梓華交給他的。</p> -<p>控方續指，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，Jack Henry Hazlewood 在2019年8月9日轉帳了約30.8萬英鎊給李。控方要求李確認第二次的登報活動錄得餘款約20萬英鎊，惟李表示不記得金額，但他相信控方的推論是正確。李亦記得該些餘款均存放在他的銀行戶口內。</p> +<h4 id="電郵紀錄顯示周庭曾就登廣告聯絡日經新聞">電郵紀錄顯示周庭曾就登廣告聯絡《日經新聞》</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒指眾籌餘款用以支付英國活動開支-實報實銷">李宇軒指眾籌餘款用以支付英國活動開支 實報實銷</h4> +<p>就《日經新聞》的廣告，控方展示一封由《日經》傳送給前「香港眾志」成員周庭的電郵，附件有一個發票檔案，顯示廣告費為2,040萬日圓。</p> -<p>被問到如何處理這一筆餘款，李指「一路攬炒巴嗰邊呢，就將佢（餘款）用喺佢同英國相關嘅嘢度」，例如他們舉辦一個支持香港的集會，可能涉及零星開支，例如泊車費，那便會動用「中英聯合聲明登報」的餘款來支付。李指實際操作是有人先墊支，事後給他單據，他便會向相關人士還款。</p> +<p>李供稱，當時「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」早於8月15日從加拿大匯款繳付了《日經新聞》廣告費，大約為147萬港元，但是由於國際交易需時數個工作日，所以《日經新聞》趕不及在廣告刊登的日子（8月19日）之前收到該筆款項，李遂先以現金額外支付約147萬港元的廣告費，作為臨時方案，待《日經新聞》收到加拿大的匯款之後，便會將多付的款項還給李。李指這做法可以確保《日經新聞》在廣告刊登之前收到廣告費。</p> -<p>法官杜麗冰問李是否認識報銷開支的人士，李則表示不知道，並指：「只要攬炒巴嗰邊彈一個人嚟，話『呢個人係關事嘅，你 reimburse 佢啦』，咁我就會 reimburse。」李又指：「Whatever 佢寫咩，佢話係咩就係咩」，有點似「攬炒巴」批核相關開支，而李就像一個司庫般償還款項。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dfMItKa.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒除舉辦活動外-眾籌餘款用於顧問費">李宇軒：除舉辦活動外 眾籌餘款用於顧問費</h4> +<p>控方指李的銀行紀錄顯示，李於8月16日從銀行戶口提款約147萬港元，李確認之後以現金向《日經新聞》支付廣告費。控方並展示支票入帳紀錄，顯示以支票向李退還合共約147萬港元，李確認。</p> -<p>控方再次問李有關餘款的用途，李補充指除了用於舉辦英國相關的活動之外，還會用於支付顧問費、籌辦一些支持香港的遊行和支付網絡伺服器的費用等等。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華等相關人士墊支英國瑞典德國和韓國報章的廣告費">李宇軒指陳梓華等相關人士墊支英國、瑞典、德國和韓國報章的廣告費</h4> -<p>控方問李所指的「遊行」是支持香港什麼，李僅回答：「民主。」</p> +<p>控方展示由一間英國媒體公司所發出的發票，顯示分別於《旗幟晚報》（Evening Standard）、《泰晤士報》（The Times）、《衛報》（The Guardian）、英國《時代》雜誌（Time）、The Week、City A.M.和《經濟學人》（Economist UK），合共7份報紙和雜誌刊登廣告，費用合共約12萬英鎊。</p> -<p>就剛才提及的「顧問費」，李指涉及兩間顧問公司，其中一間為「89up」，以他所知是比較集中於媒體範疇的顧問公司，後來他們覺得「89up」在政治方面較弱，於是轉用另一間顧問公司「Whitehouse Consultancy」。李特別強調，這間「Whitehouse Consultancy」與美國的白宮無關，純粹因為老闆名叫 Chris Whitehouse。</p> +<p>控方又展示匯款紀錄，顯示某人將加拿大貨幣轉換至12萬英鎊，並繳付了上述廣告費。李指這張單據是「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」交給他，「就話英國嗰條數找咗。」</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指顧問公司安排攬炒巴會見英議員監察區議會選舉等">李宇軒指顧問公司安排「攬炒巴」會見英議員、監察區議會選舉等</h4> +<p>此外，李宇軒確認庭上展示的瑞典、德國和韓國報章的廣告費發票、匯款紀錄等，均由「T（陳梓華）嗰邊」交給他，詳情如下：</p> -<p>控方遂追問關於「Whitehouse Consultancy」的性質和活動。李指這間公司曾經安排過「攬炒巴喺英國嘅 members」去會見英國國會議員，後來在2019年11月香港區議會選舉期間，「佢哋有幫手去用佢哋嘅人脈搵咗一啲人去監選」。李續指，到後期直至2020年，這間公司一直與「香港監察」的羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）合作，也有一次協助前港督彭定康（Chris Patten）處理一個聯署行動。</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>瑞典《每日工業報》（Dagens industri）和《每日新聞報》（Dagens Nyheter）廣告費：164,450 瑞典克朗</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>德國《法蘭克福匯報》（Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung）廣告費：48,848 歐元</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>南韓《京鄉新聞》廣告費：22,000,000 韓圜</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>控方追問該次聯署行動的目的，李指當時是2020年5月，有消息傳出香港會訂立《國安法》，「嗰個聯署就係話表達 concern」，尤其在英國角度，他們會認為《國安法》與《中英聯合聲明》不一致。</p> +<h4 id="匯款紀錄顯示李宇軒墊支登報廣告費約1924萬港元">匯款紀錄顯示李宇軒墊支登報廣告費約192.4萬港元</h4> -<p>控方又問會見英國國會議員的目的是什麼。李指是有關當時對香港人權民主問題的關注。</p> +<p>控方其後展示一系列發票和匯款紀錄，李宇軒確認墊支有關「G攬」登報活動的廣告費，總數約192.4萬港元，詳情如下：</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒戶口紀錄顯示曾轉帳至兩間顧問公司">李宇軒戶口紀錄顯示曾轉帳至兩間顧問公司</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>加拿大《環球郵報》（The Global and Mail）兩份廣告費：130,000 加幣</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>法國《世界報》（Le Monde）廣告費：26,000 歐元</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>澳洲《澳洲人報》（The Australian）廣告費：40,930.56 澳元</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>《紐約時報》國際版廣告費：28,000 美元</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>台灣《自由時報》廣告費：336,274 港元</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>芬蘭《赫爾辛基日報》（Helsingin Sanomat）廣告費：14116.08 歐元</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>丹麥《貝林時報》（Berlingske Tidende）廣告費：54,900 丹麥克朗</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，可見他分別於2019年7月23日、8月15日和8月21日，向顧問公司「89up」支付1.3萬元港幣、9,663英鎊和12,375英鎊。李確認他使用眾籌的餘款來支付上述顧問費。他又舉例指，「攬炒巴」在英國與「89up」合作，「佢哋租咗一架大巴士，喺倫敦度周圍走。」</p> +<p>李又確認，他在支付法國《世界報》的廣告費時，是經一間公司 COGITO LAB COMPANY LIMITED 匯款，而李是該間公司銀行戶口的唯一授權簽署人。</p> -<p>至於「Whitehouse Consultancy」，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示他分別在2019年11月29日、12月31日和2020年2月4日，向「The Whitehouse Consultancy Limited」轉帳9,500英鎊、14,750英鎊和15,492.85英鎊。</p> +<h4 id="加拿大環球郵報廣告稱港府干犯人道罪行-促加國政府施壓-包括制裁">加拿大《環球郵報》廣告稱港府干犯人道罪行 促加國政府施壓 包括制裁</h4> -<p>案件下周一續審。</p> +<p>控方展示刊登在加拿大《環球郵報》的廣告，標題為「STAND WITH HONG KONG UNTIL DAWN」，內文要求加國政府支持香港人，因香港人正在爭取自由和民主，但是面臨與香港政府相關的暴力，包括催淚彈和橡膠子彈，香港已成為了一個「警察國家」（a police state）。</p> -<hr /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FjWdc0Z.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒指英國登報眾籌餘款供「攬炒巴」等人辦活動、安排見英議員及監察區選Orbán’s Balkan Allies2024-03-15T12:00:00+08:002024-03-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/orb%C3%A1ns-balkan-allies<p><em>EU and NATO should clarify the red lines to ensure Bosnia and Herzegovina’s security in the face of Viktor Orbán’s backing of Serb secessionism.</em></p> +<p>該廣告並指，在香港政府的施政下，沒有人是安全的，要求讀者採取行動，促使加國政府保護30萬名在港的加拿大公民，例如促請加國政府向北京和特區政府施壓，包括實施制裁和禁止出售武器給香港警方；要求加國政府確認香港特區政府和警方干犯人道罪行；以及在來屆選舉中投票給支持香港爭取民主自由的候選人等。</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>李宇軒確認上述是「G攬運動」期間，刊登在加拿大《環球郵報》的廣告。</p> -<p>Milorad Dodik, president of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Republika Srpska (a majority Serb region), met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 21 February 2024. At the meeting, he complained about the US and the UK sanctions against him and his associates. Dodik also promised to prevent his country’s NATO membership and bragged about his “excellent relations with [Serbian President Aleksandar] Vučić and [Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor] Orbán”.</p> +<h4 id="紐約時報國際版廣告促美國政府向香港警方禁售武器">《紐約時報》國際版廣告促美國政府向香港警方禁售武器</h4> -<p>The three top politicians – Orbán, Vučić and Dodik – have built a brotherhood in the triangle between Budapest, Belgrade and Banja Luka. They share similar worldviews, authoritarian tendencies and comparable political paths. Their positions are quite aligned: from Russia and China to hopes for Donald Trump’s return to the White House.</p> +<p>控方另展示刊登於《紐約時報》國際版的廣告，標題為「CATCH HONG KONG AS WE FALL」、「THE LAST STAND FOR FREEDOM」。內文求美國讀者聯絡眾議員和參議員，成為《香港人權與民主法案》的共同動議人，並促請美國政府向香港警方禁售武器。</p> -<p>This brotherhood, Dodik explained to Putin, made the relationship with the EU easier.</p> +<p>控方問李，有關「G攬運動」的登報廣告是否與上述廣告大致相似。李則表示：「我諗唯一嘅共識係同當時嘅香港自由民主有關」，雖然不同國家的廣告文字和設計就由其他人去負責，但是「唔會否認（話）呢份廣告唔係我哋整嘅」。</p> -<p>Indeed, Hungary is the most vocal opponent to the imposition of EU individual sanctions against Dodik and any restrictive measures against Serbia. Orbán’s man in Brussels, Olivér Várhelyi, has been an EU commissioner since 2019. He has significant influence over the disbursement of EU funds. As if that was not enough, earlier this year Hungary took over the command of the EUFOR Althea mission, a 1,600-strong EU-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指第三次眾籌餘款約698萬美元-用在重光團隊有關的活動">李宇軒指第三次眾籌餘款約69.8萬美元 用在「重光團隊」有關的活動</h4> -<p>For Orbán, this brotherhood shows that he is a leader capable of exporting his model of governance. There is, of course, also some economic interest involved. But for Vučić and Dodik, Orbán is their key ally and disrupter inside the two transatlantic alliances: the EU and NATO. Orbán is both their protector and promoter, someone who strengthens their position at home and gives their words and deeds a stamp of approval.</p> +<p>李早前提及第四次的眾籌運動「重光計劃」，以及相關網站有最新的財務紀錄，控方庭上展示「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong）的網站截圖，可見「全球登報制裁港共眾籌計劃」標題。李確認此標題反映眾籌運動的主題，並補充指截圖所顯示的，是「G攬運動」的財務收支報告，總結「G攬運動」眾籌了多少款項、花費了多少款項，用以向公眾交代和解釋為何在2020年5月籌辦第四次眾籌即「重光計劃」。</p> -<p>Take this year’s celebration of the Day of Republika Srpska.</p> +<p>李確認根據收支報告，截至2020年5月，「G攬運動」錄得餘款約69.8萬美元（約546萬港元），但他指這筆錢之後會一直使用，花費在「各地有關 support 香港自由民主嘅活動」。控方問是否有關「重光團隊」的活動，李表示：「可以咁樣理解。」控方表示會在稍後時間就此提問。</p> -<p>On 9 January 1992 a group of ethnic Serbs left the first democratically elected parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina and decided to proclaim the Republika Srpska – the Serb Republic. Their primary aim was to carve out a mono-ethnic territory where Serbs would be a dominant majority. Their longer-term aim was to then unite it with neighbouring Serbia. To achieve this, the country’s multi-ethnic fabric had to be destroyed. What followed was the most brutal conflict in Europe since the end of Second World War. It culminated with genocide in Srebrenica, leaving some 100,000 dead, 2.2 million displaced and tens of thousands raped.</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p>Since 2015, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has repeatedly declared the celebration of this day to be unconstitutional. The country’s highest court ruled that this discriminates against non-Serbs living in that region. While the Republika Srpska retains its name – the Serb Republic – according to its constitution, it is no longer only that.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For Vučić and Dodik, Orbán is both their protector and promoter, someone who strengthens their position at home and gives their words and deeds a stamp of approval</code></em></strong></p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導美加登報廣告促制裁及禁售武器予港警 李宇軒：由不同人設計、有關香港民主自由Monitoring In Antarctica2024-03-19T12:00:00+08:002024-03-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/monitoring-in-antarctica<p><em>China opened its fifth station in Antarctica on February 7, 2024. The new Qinling station, located on Inexpressible Island in the Ross Sea, joins the existing Great Wall (Antarctic Peninsula), Zhongshan (eastern Antarctica), Taishan (eastern Antarctic highlands), and Kunlun (Dome A) stations.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>China, with five, now has the fourth most stations in Antarctica behind Argentina, Chile, and Russia, and has the fastest-growing presence in Antarctica, having opened three stations since 2009.</em></p> -<p>One of the key aims set in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords signed by all warring sides was to restore the multi-ethnic character of the country. This required a large-scale return of displaced people and their property, persecution of war criminals, as well as making sure that constitutional and legal provisions provide equal rights for all ethnic groups and others throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p> +<p>Chinese president Xi Jinping declared in 2014 that the country intends to be a “polar power,” and its growth in Antarctica is consistent with achieving that goal in the southern hemisphere. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said upon the opening of Qinling that the station “will contribute to humanity’s scientific understanding of the Antarctic, provide a platform for joint scientific exploration and cooperation between China and other countries, and help advance peace and sustainable development in the region.”</p> -<p>With significant international military, financial and diplomatic efforts, much has been achieved since. Almost 20% of the population in the Republika Srpska are non-Serbs. Four out of six most important positions in the region’s executive, legislature and judiciary must be occupied by non-Serbs, as well as half of all regional ministries. Also, changing the region’s constitution is impossible without the support of non-Serbs siting in the upper chamber of the regional parliament.</p> +<p>So, what is China doing in Antarctica? And do its intentions, capabilities, and actions in that remote region threaten the national security of the United States and its allies? In 2023, CSIS published two publications on Antarctica that started to address these questions: “Great Power Competition Comes for the South Pole” and “Frozen Frontiers: China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions.”</p> -<p>Since Milorad Dodik’s first term as Republika Srpska’s prime minister in 1998, he has been an arch-pragmatist, always adapting his rhetoric and actions to the circumstances. He supported the return of displaced persons and the reconstruction of mosques when this looked inevitable. He supported comprehensive constitutional reforms when the US pushed them in 2006. He was also once in favour of the country’s NATO membership.</p> +<p>Other than a few such articles, there is generally little focus in the United States on Antarctic geopolitics or their potential to affect U.S. and allied national security interests. The quiet in the United States is in stark contrast to the regular discussions on the topic in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. However, this does not mean that no one in the United States is paying attention or that U.S. officials have no tools for learning what other countries are doing in Antarctica.</p> -<p>But whenever it looked more politically promising to embrace nationalist causes – denying the Srebrenica Genocide, challenging state institutions – he has done so.</p> +<p>Specifically, the Antarctic Treaty permits certain countries to conduct unannounced, in-person inspections in the region and requires countries operating there to provide advance notification of their activities, equipment, and personnel. In the United States, the responsibility to use these tools to monitor other countries’ capabilities in Antarctica falls to the Department of State. For example, as a State Department official, the author led the U.S. team that conducted a 2020 inspection of the Chinese station being built at Inexpressible Island, the same station that just opened. So while some commentators may have been caught unawares by the construction, which started in 2017, U.S. officials have already conducted a surprise inspection of the Qinling station in 2020.</p> -<p>Since 2015, Dodik has continually defied the Constitutional Court’s decision on the 9 January celebration. In 2016 he organised an illegal referendum, asking citizens to support his rejection of the court’s ruling. It took a coordinated diplomatic effort by the EU and NATO allies to convince neighbouring Serbia’s leadership to publicly state that it “did not support the referendum”. It was part of the West’s firm position to stand behind the Constitutional Court and its decisions, no matter how trivial or bizarre the issue might have seemed to some outsiders.</p> +<p>Given the rapidly growing Chinese presence in Antarctica — as well as concerns about how the Chinese stations might employ dual-use technology — now is a good time to review the tools the Antarctic Treaty provides for monitoring the presence, activities, and equipment of all countries operating in the region. In addition to knowing these tools exist, policymakers should be aware of the opportunities and limits of these tools so they can best use and strengthen them.</p> -<p>9 January has since turned into a parade of nationalistic celebrations and secessionist rhetoric, fully supported by Russia. In 2018, Anatoly Bibilov, then the Russian-backed president of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, attended the 9 January celebration. He signed a cooperation agreement with Milorad Dodik and was quoted saying that “our two republics are like twins with identical strategic partnership with Russia”. Since 2019, members of the Night Wolves, the biggest Russian motorcycle club and a far-right group supporting the Kremlin, have become a regular feature of parades. In 2023, Putin was awarded the highest order of Republika Srpska and flags of the self-proclaimed Donetsk Republic were paraded.</p> +<h3 id="key-non-armament-and-monitoring-provisions-in-the-antarctic-treaty">Key Non-armament and Monitoring Provisions in the Antarctic Treaty</h3> -<p>In 2024, as in all years before, at the centre of this day was Milorad Dodik. Standing next to him was the Russian ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. But what was different is the regional and wider European context.</p> +<p>In 1959, 12 countries signed the Antarctic Treaty, which sought to prevent the use of Antarctica for military purposes while providing for freedom of scientific investigation and freedom of access. This decision headed off the growing possibility of violence between Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom over their overlapping sovereignty claims; locked in the cooperation demonstrated during the successful 1957–58 International Geophysical Year; and prevented Cold War competition from spreading to the coldest continent. Signatories to the document — the first Cold War non-armament and arms control treaty — agreed to significantly restrict military action (Article I), prohibit nuclear explosive devices and their waste (Article V), and establish a strong monitoring system (Article VII). Per the treaty, “Antarctica” is defined as everything below 60 degrees south latitude, regardless of whether it is land, any category of ice, or water. Any country can join the treaty, although only ones that conduct substantial scientific research in Antarctica can participate in the consensus-based decisionmaking process.</p> -<p>Serbia sent a large delegation led by the defence minister and leader of Vučić’s Serb Progressive Party. He was accompanied by the Chief of General Staff and several ministers. In his congratulatory letter, Vučić, who was not present in Banja Luka, wrote the usual and important assurance that he recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina within its current borders. But he then warned gloomily that Serbia and Republika Srpska would soon jointly face difficult times.</p> +<h4 id="restricting-military-and-nuclear-uses">Restricting Military and Nuclear Uses</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Serb leaders bet on US disengagement and on a divided and hapless EU and NATO – and they see that from Ukraine to Nagorno-Karabakh it is military force, not diplomacy, that changes reality</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Limiting the risk that Antarctica could be used as a launchpad for conventional military forces, dumping ground for nuclear waste, or nuclear weapons testing site was particularly important to the countries closest to the continent. Article I addressed this by establishing that the region “shall be used for peaceful purposes only” and prohibiting, “inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.” This provision is remarkably broad, presumably so it can cover non-peaceful uses of the region comprehensively. It provides one example of what is prohibited — “any measures of a military nature” — and three examples of what could be considered as such. Given the structure of the provision, it would be normal, but incorrect, to conclude that these three examples are the main determinants of what needs to be prohibited to reserve Antarctica for peaceful use. However, focusing on only three examples would be insufficiently narrow. The correct reading is that “any measures of a military nature” is but one way that Antarctica cannot be used for non-peaceful purposes. In recognition of the importance of military logistical capabilities in particular, Article I does not prohibit the presence of military forces in Antarctica so long as their activities there are for scientific research or other peaceful purposes. Similarly, while Article V prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in Antarctica, it does not prohibit the peaceful use of nuclear energy to fuel stations or vessels.</p> -<p>One of Vučić’s ministers present in Banja Luka was awarded with a long and warm applause after saying that “Republika Srpska needs to exist as a state”. Aleksandar Vulin, a recently replaced director of Serbian intelligence agency, and Vučić’s former defence and interior minister, made it clear that several years ago the integrity of Republika Srpska was made the number one priority in Serbia’s military doctrine. Vulin also said that “this generation of Serb politicians should work on making sure that no border exists” between majority-Serb territories.</p> +<p>Articles I and V were vital for the 12 countries that negotiated the treaty since Article IV holds in abeyance all sovereignty claims. There are seven countries that claim sovereignty over specific portions of Antarctica (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom) plus two countries that maintain a basis to make claims in Antarctica (Russia and the United States). So long as the treaty remains in force, Article IV prevents new claimants from coming forward, freezes the current claims, and prevents any country from enforcing or applying its claim. Article IV therefore prompted the seven claimants to insist on Articles I and V due to their reasonable desire to prevent their national homelands from being threatened from territory they claim but cannot administer in Antarctica.</p> -<p>What was also different this year is that Orbán was awarded the same order of Republika Srpska that Putin received year before. Orbán gratefully accepted it and is expected to receive it in person later this month in Banja Luka. As the head of an EU and NATO government, Orbán’s embrace of Dodik’s narrative and anti-constitutional behaviour provides Dodik with additional credibility and political capital.</p> +<h3 id="the-two-tier-monitoring-program-in-action">The Two-Tier Monitoring Program in Action</h3> -<p>This is a dangerous development because Dodik and his closest associates can only convince the institutions in Republika Srpska of possible secession if he has clearly visible support from outside. That is why the EU and NATO must now show Budapest and Belgrade the red lines. Hungary is even more important in this arrangement because it can use its veto to protect both Republika Srpska and Serbia from Western sanctions and interventions.</p> +<p>Understanding that restrictions without monitoring are just dreams, negotiators went beyond just having words on paper and established a two-tier monitoring program to verify compliance with the Antarctic Treaty. These mechanisms — an inspections regime and a requirement for advance notification of activities in Antarctica — are found in Article VII. As a result, the 12 countries that negotiated the treaty and the 47 other countries that have signed onto its provisions (as of March 1, 2024) significantly reduced the possibility of Antarctica being used to threaten others.</p> -<p>In his recent interviews, Dodik spoke at length about the need for Serbs to use the potential return of Trump in the White House to push towards unification of Serbia and Serb-majority territories, from north Kosovo to Republika Srpska. According to him, the Americans “are wounded beast. They have left Afghanistan, they were crushed in Syria. They rallied the West against Russia in Ukraine and they are being crushed there as well. We must understand that this is the key moment”.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Understanding that restrictions without monitoring are just dreams, negotiators went beyond just having words on paper and established a two-tier monitoring program to verify compliance with the Antarctic Treaty.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In parallel, Serbian leaders in Belgrade are rearming. Since Vučić came to power in 2012, Serbia’s military budget has almost tripled, from €500 million in 2013 to €1.4 billion in 2023. This makes it larger than that of all other five Western Balkan countries combined. In 2023 alone, Serbia spent €600 million on new weapons and equipment, and its military industry’s exports were worth over €1.5 billion.</p> +<h4 id="the-inspection-regime">The Inspection Regime</h4> -<p>The Serb leaders bet on US disengagement and on a divided and hapless EU and NATO. And they see that from Ukraine to Nagorno-Karabakh it is military force, not diplomacy, that changes reality.</p> +<p>Of the two monitoring tools established by the treaty, the inspections regime has received more attention. This tool permits certain countries operating in Antarctica to conduct unannounced inspections. Per the treaty, the inspectors have complete freedom of access to all areas in Antarctica, including any station, installation, ship, aircraft, or equipment.</p> -<p>On 24 September 2023 in north Kosovo, Serb paramilitaries have returned – using force. They were praised as heroes in Serbia and Republika Srpska, with vocal support from Russia. In the days that followed, the US government warned that it had detected “an unprecedented staging of advanced Serbian artillery, tanks, and mechanized infantry units, along the border with Kosovo”.</p> +<p>This remarkably open provision was intended to advance both U.S. foreign policy goals and protect Antarctica. Per Ambassador Herman Phleger, the lead U.S. negotiator for the treaty, the United States’ intent was to use Antarctica to facilitate potential future treaties with the Soviet Union on “such vitally important matters as nuclear testing, surprise attack, and general disarmament” — agreements Moscow had been unwilling to accept at the time. According to Phleger’s testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the inspection provisions “will not only serve to protect the parties against any violation of the treaty, but should also prove a valuable source of practical experience in the detailed processes of international inspection.”</p> -<p>Since then, the Serb Armed Forces have partially retreated. But as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned on 26 January 2024: the situation “remains unstable”. This is an ever more dangerous spiral of escalation.</p> +<p>If obtaining agreement to this broad inspection regime was the first step, the second step was to use this right. The first inspection was completed in 1963 by New Zealand of two U.S. stations (McMurdo and South Pole) followed by the U.S. inspection in 1964 of a number of facilities, including two Soviet ones. When planning for the first U.S. inspection, one of the norms important to U.S. officials was that the unannounced visits to Soviet and other stations “should not disrupt the very harmony and international cooperation which it is the primary purpose of the Treaty to preserve.” Consistent with this goal, Secretary of State Dean Rusk instructed the U.S. inspection team, “While performing inspections, you should bear constantly in mind that all states active in Antarctica have been both friendly and cooperative with the United States in matters relating to the continent, and it is the policy of the United States to preserve and enhance this situation.” The United States and other countries also made public the inspection findings rather than burying them in government bureaucracies under heavy classification restrictions.</p> -<hr /> +<p>By promptly using the inspection provisions, publicizing the results, and making it clear that the inspections were not hostile or indicative of any specific treaty or national security concern, the United States and its allies reinforced that Antarctica was a place of cooperation and transparency reserved for peaceful scientific research. That they did so via surprise inspections indicated they did not believe in Antarctic exceptionalism or that the treaty’s words alone were sufficient to uphold it. This posture was also shaped by the desire to create favorable conditions for future arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union by demonstrating that in-person inspections would not necessarily be hostile.</p> -<p><strong>Adnan Ćerimagić</strong> is a Senior Analyst for the Western Balkans at the European Stability Initiative (ESI) in Berlin. Before joining ESI in August 2013, Adnan worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo and Brussels. He is a member of the Advisory Board of the International Institute for Peace in Vienna and the International Advisory Board of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy in Serbia.</p>Adnan ĆerimagićEU and NATO should clarify the red lines to ensure Bosnia and Herzegovina’s security in the face of Viktor Orbán’s backing of Serb secessionism.China’s Food Security2024-03-15T12:00:00+08:002024-03-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/chinas-food-security<p><em>Feeding China’s vast population is a priority issue for Beijing, given historic ramifications of famines and food crises for social and regime stability.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Yet the task is vast — China must feed nearly 20 percent of the global population but is home to under 10 percent of the world’s arable land — and the challenges to stable food supply are many. These include inefficient agricultural practices, supply chain bottlenecks, changing consumption habits, international trade dynamics, domestic environmental degradation, corruption and data misrepresentation, and a history of food safety scandals. Diagnosing a more contentious international environment, Xi Jinping has placed greater emphasis on agricultural self-sufficiency and diversified sourcing of critical inputs, foodstuffs, technology and know-how. This brief explores key trends, challenges, and policy measures in China’s pursuit of food security. It is part of a joint CSIS-Brookings Institution project, Advancing Collaboration in an Era of Strategic Competition, which seeks to explore and expand the space for U.S.-China collaboration on matters of shared concern.</em></p> +<p>According to the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, there have been 60 inspections since the treaty entered into force in 1961. The most recent — by the United States to certain Ross Sea sites and Australia to various stations throughout the continent — concluded in February 2020. The United States has conducted the most inspections overall (17), with Australia conducting the most during the twenty-first century (6).</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>There are significant differences between earlier and more recent inspections. Only 12 countries conducted inspections during the first three decades, while 22 did during the second three decades. This trend reinforces that the inspection regime is neither just a U.S. interest nor merely a Cold War tool, but that it is important for many countries active in Antarctica, including those that have no territorial claim or are not leading participants in great power competition.</p> -<p>In December 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping gave a speech at the Central Rural Work Conference of the Communist Party of China stating that China “cannot allow the recent, steady gains we have achieved in grain production to lull us into a false sense of security. We should not forget about the suffering caused by previous famines just because we have managed to recover. Rather, we should recognize that the issue of food security is a red line that would trigger terrible consequences were it ever to be compromised . . . we must adhere to the national food security strategy that puts [China] first.”</p> +<p>The increasing number of inspecting countries and inspected sites is vital since the number of stations has grown over the decades. Having a wider range of states monitoring treaty compliance is particularly important since the seven claimant countries generally focus their inspections on the area they claim, likely due to having logistical capability and familiarity with that region as well as to learn the details of the activities of other countries in “their” area. For example, the United Kingdom has conducted eight inspections, only two of which were outside its territorial claim while both Argentina and Chile have conducted all of their six inspections in their claimed areas. Australia is the main exception to this observation, having sent officials to the Ross Sea and Peninsula regions, both of which are outside of its Antarctic claim.</p> -<p>Any nation’s food security is essential to the prosperity and health of its people. And China must feed nearly 20 percent of the global population, despite being home to less than 10 percent of the world’s arable land and 6 percent of the world’s water resources. This translates into just 0.08 hectares per capita of arable land for the people of China, far lower than the 0.48 hectares of arable land per capita in the United States.</p> +<p>The rise in joint or multilateral inspections reflects their potential benefits, including the sharing of costs (political and logistical) and rewards (both practical and what was found). However, there is no treaty requirement for joint or multilateral inspections or provisions for neutral monitoring teams. This is because during the treaty negotiations, the United States insisted on the right to organize unilateral inspections due to challenges learned from attempting to conduct inspections with multiple countries during the Korean War.</p> -<p>Historically, famines and food crises in China have sometimes catalyzed political upheavals and regime collapse, underscoring for Beijing the national stability ramifications of securing a steady supply of food. Indeed, China’s State Council has cast food security as a “ballast stone” of the country’s overall national security.</p> +<p>Overall, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have consistently been the most active countries in using the inspection tools. After conducting only one inspection in the first 20 years of the treaty, Australia has increased the pace of its inspections. Although the United Kingdom has conducted eight inspections it has inspected 138 sites — the most by far. It is also the leader in joint inspections, having undertaken seven joint inspections with different countries, followed by Argentina and Chile (which have conducted three joint inspections with each other in the past decade), France, Germany, and the United States. The pace of U.S. inspections has slowed significantly since the Cold War: The United States conducted eight of the 13 inspections prior to 1985 but has conducted only two inspections since 2013, only one of which included national security officials.</p> -<p>China’s leaders are seeking to sustain and improve the country’s food security amid myriad challenges, including inefficient agricultural practices, supply chain logistics bottlenecks, international trade dynamics, changing consumption habits, water scarcity, and domestic environmental degradation. This research paper details China’s pursuit of food security — highlighting key trends, challenges, and policy measures, along with their impacts.</p> +<p>The Soviet Union’s global stance against inspections likely reduced its willingness to use the treaty inspection regime despite its interest in monitoring its Cold War competitors. However, Russia did conduct two joint inspections with the United States in January and December 2012 during the “reset” period of U.S.-Russian relations. In addition, since China became a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty in 1985, it has conducted two inspections, one in 2015 and one in 1990.</p> -<h3 id="the-significance-of-food-security-in-china">The Significance of Food Security in China</h3> +<h4 id="advance-notification-in-practice">Advance Notification in Practice</h4> -<p>For millennia in China, food security has been inextricably tied with social stability. Food scarcity and famine have often played a central role in triggering violent upheaval. The last Chinese imperial government — the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) — saw major famines between 1810 to 1907 that resulted in the deaths of tens of millions. These periods of starvation were often followed by or served as catalysts for major rebellions and deadly conflicts that weakened imperial control and worsened socioeconomic conditions in the empire — all of which contributed to the dynasty’s collapse.</p> +<p>Per Article VII, the second monitoring tool requires a country to give advance notice regarding “all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory,” all its stations, and “any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica.” This provides transparency about upcoming activities, which benefits both national security interests and scientific collaboration. Since traveling to the region is remarkably expensive and challenging, this process gives more countries greater insight into a wider area of Antarctica than could be achieved via in-person inspections. In addition, Article III requires parties to share plans for future and results from previous scientific programs “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable.”</p> -<p>With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the country’s Communist-led government faced several immediate challenges to ensure a steady and sufficient food supply. In the aftermath of decades of foreign invasion and civil war, China’s citizens were among the poorest in the world. The country’s agricultural labor force was barely recovering from years of mass conscription and movements from the countryside to escape the war. Furthermore, the populace of around 550 million people was rapidly growing. Under Chairman Mao Zedong, the PRC carried out land reforms in the countryside, eliminated private landownership, and established agricultural collectives along similar lines to the Soviet Union’s state-controlled collectivized approach. China saw initial success in increasing agricultural output by nearly 4 percent annually from 1952 to 1958. Increased irrigation throughout the country also improved yields from the collectivized farms.</p> +<p>The advance notification process has evolved but is currently failing. For many years, parties met these obligations via diplomatic notes. However, this was inefficient, so representatives at the 2012 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) decided they would use the web-based Electronic Information Exchange System (EIES) maintained by the treaty’s secretariat. On top of the information required by the treaty — most notably on expeditions and military personnel and equipment — parties agreed to provide additional information on areas such as the use of research rockets.</p> -<p>However, many of the gains made would soon be reversed under Mao’s attempt to achieve rapid industrialization through the policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962). Under this initiative, farmers were assigned to make steel in backyard furnaces instead of cultivating crops — which, given their inexperience, often resulted in inefficient production that generated commercially unusable pig iron. Local officials inflated crop production numbers to obscure the adverse effects of Mao’s policies, creating an illusion of superabundance. Cadres had farmers following badly planned directives, such as the abandonment of traditional Chinese agricultural techniques in favor of disastrous pseudo-scientific ideas influenced by Soviet agronomist Trofim Lysenko.</p> +<p>Three troubling trends were salient at the 2023 ATCM. First, only 10 of the 29 consultative parties submitted their annual report for each of the past 10 years. Second, during this time, there was a 20 percent decrease in the number of parties that submitted their information. Third, when a party files its annual report, the document usually does not cover all topics, including treaty-required information.</p> -<p>The agricultural sector was further strained by a series of natural disasters, including the 1958 flooding of large parts of northern China and droughts in 1960–1961. These failures contributed to the food security crisis known as the “Three Years of Great Famine,” which caused upwards of 30 to 40 million deaths throughout China — the largest famine in modern history. In the aftermath, Mao would briefly step down, and the Communist Party returned to a more science-based set of agricultural practices.</p> +<p>Of the major actors in Antarctica, China is the most significant party that has not consistently submitted information to the EIES, notably not filing any reports between 2017–2022 and recently filing the reports for the last two seasons. China’s failure to regularly report on its annual expeditions, station construction, and operations contributes to an information void that calls into question Chinese motives and capabilities. But as the secretariat has indicated, some topics are almost never reported on by any party, including the obligatory information on forward plans for scientific research and military personnel and equipment. This widespread failure by parties to meet agreed-upon transparency requirements amplifies stress on the Antarctic Treaty system even as concerns mount about its health.</p> -<p>Chinese scientists played a key role in alleviating starvation and contributing to the global Green Revolution. Renowned agronomist Yuan Longping rejected the theories of Lysenko and discovered a type of hybrid rice in the 1960s that could increase crop yields by over 20 percent. By the late 1990s, this hybrid rice would go on to feed an additional 100 million Chinese citizens. In 2017, Yuan’s hybrid rice would make up over 60 percent of the country’s rice production and would be grown in over 60 countries worldwide.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This widespread failure by parties to meet agreed-upon transparency requirements amplifies stress on the Antarctic Treaty system even as concerns mount about its health.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The ascension of Chairman Deng Xiaoping in 1978 led to gradual market-oriented economic reforms. In the countryside, this meant phasing out collective farms in favor of household ownership. Households were allowed to sell crops that were grown beyond government quotas, thus incentivizing increased yields. Agricultural outputs rose from 2.7 percent per year in 1978 to 7.1 percent annually during the five years following the reforms. This contributed to a significant reduction in undernourishment, defined by the World Bank as habitual food consumption insufficient to provide the dietary energy levels required to maintain a normal active and healthy life. As late as 2001, around 10 percent of China’s population faced undernourishment, a figure that declined to below 2.5 percent by around 2010 (see Figure 1).</p> +<h3 id="us-inspections-in-2020">U.S. Inspections in 2020</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fAPKTqT.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Prevalence of Undernourishment in China</em></p> +<p>In 2020, the U.S. interagency team inspected five sites at three stations — Jang Bogo (South Korea), Mario Zucchelli (Italy), and the station later dubbed Qinling under construction on Inexpressible Island (China) — as well as Antarctic Specially Protected Area (ASPA) 161 and the runway under construction near Mario Zucchelli Station. The United States chose to inspect these five sites due to operational, scientific, and environmental reasons, in addition to national security ones.</p> -<p>China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2002 exposed the country’s agricultural producers to global markets, leading to increasing exports and imports of foodstuffs. The availability of imports enabled a meaningful shift in Chinese consumer preferences. In addition, attention to food safety grew in the aftermath of a series of food and agricultural contamination scandals in the early 2000s. Under President Hu Jintao, the PRC would codify new laws standardizing food production and prosecute hazardous food distribution practices in 2009. Given their country’s history, China’s leaders today are acutely aware of the stakes of food security — as a failure to secure a stable food supply could kindle collective grievances and provoke challenges to their authority, potentially destabilizing the regime.</p> +<p>The composition of the team was consistent with the goal of inspection and included national security experts from the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Coast Guard, as well as experts in Antarctic scientific operations and environmental topics from the National Science Foundation and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. All inspectors had the responsibility and ability to collect information on any of the priority issues up for inspection and were not restricted to a particular topic. Additionally, all inspectors used the EIES and other publicly available information to research the sites before arrival. As noted above, the EIES process is designed to satisfy not only the advance notification requirements of the Antarctic Treaty but also, as parties agreed to in 2012, provide additional information on other topics.</p> -<h3 id="strategies-for-food-security-under-xi-jinping">Strategies for Food Security under Xi Jinping</h3> +<p>Per the terms of the treaty and as subsequently illuminated by treaty meetings, the United States informed other parties of the names and affiliated U.S. government agency of the inspection team members in December 2019 but provided no information about the destinations or goals of the inspection. The United States informed the three selected stations of the team’s impending arrival roughly 36 hours before they reached the first site, the South Korean Jang Bogo station. Providing short-term advance notification is a customary courtesy, given how receptive all countries have been to these inspections, to reduce disruptions to scientific and operational activities and reduce risk of a transportation emergency.</p> -<p>Since coming to power, Xi Jinping’s government has made food security a national priority. Reflecting the importance Beijing places on the issue, in March 2023 a book of “Excerpts of Xi Jinping’s Discussions on National Food Security” was published by the Chinese Central Literature Publishing House. The book covered more than 80 speeches, reports, talks, letters, and instructions from Xi Jinping related to food security since 2012. A central theme of the book is Xi’s admonition that food security is a matter of economic and political importance. The book includes a warning published by the People’s Daily, the party’s mouthpiece, that “whether [the Chinese government] can give the common people a satisfactory account of food [security] is a major test of our ability to govern. If our party is in power in China, if we can’t even do a good job in food safety, and if we can’t do it well for a long time, some people will ask whether it is enough or not.”</p> +<p>The United States was interested in the operational aspects of the chosen sites in the Ross Sea region largely due to the new infrastructure that had been (and was being) constructed there since the previous U.S. inspection in 2012: the Jang Bogo Station was opened in 2014, Italy was building a new runway, and China was building a new year-round station on Inexpressible Island. The Italian runway was of particular interest since it could serve as an alternative landing point for intercontinental flights to the U.S. McMurdo Station — a major transit and logistical hub 200 miles away — that would otherwise need to return to their departure point if weather at McMurdo was inhospitable. Having an alternative landing site in Antarctica could prevent “boomerang” flights that return to New Zealand, for example, thereby saving time, fuel, and money. Additionally, since the United States has the largest presence in the region, U.S. officials wanted to be prepared in case McMurdo personnel are called on to respond to an emergency. Decreasing the possibility that the finite U.S. resources at the station would be diverted from planned scientific or operational activity to provide emergency assistance to the Chinese, Italian, or South Korean stations along the Ross Sea was the main concern in the report, which therefore encouraged the then-unnamed Chinese station to increase communication with its Italian and South Korean neighbors.</p> -<p>An April 2019 white paper by the State Council names 16 recent major laws related to food security matters, from seed intellectual property (IP) rights to pesticide administration to grain circulation. In April 2020, the government also published “six guarantees” to inform prioritization of economic policy following Covid-19: employment, basic livelihood, market entities, operations of grassroots organizations and structure, stability of supply chains, and energy and food security. The Central Document No. 1 published in 2023 focused on rural revitalization, and five of the nine areas of focus directly related to food security — specifically grain production, agricultural infrastructure, technology and equipment support, high-quality development of rural industries, and expanding agricultural employment. These documents reflect the central leadership’s framing of food security as an important foundation for achieving economic development, social stability, and national security.</p> +<p>In addition to having the largest presence in Antarctica, the United States conducts the most scientific research on the continent. U.S. officials are always interested in learning about new activities and new approaches being pursued there, including ongoing Italian maritime research, new South Korean preparations for an inland traverse, and potential Chinese contributions to understanding the variation of the climate, cryosphere, and ocean in the Ross Sea region. At the time, these three parties were collaborating to designate a new ASPA to assist in monitoring one of the oldest Adélie penguin colonies and a breeding site of south polar skua, as well as serve as a reference point for sea-ice dynamics; ASPA 178 was approved at the 2021 ATCM in Paris. The United States also uses inspections to learn how parties are engaging with the environment, including but not limited to how a station is implementing the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty’s Protocol on Environmental Protection, a complementary agreement that entered into force in 1998. Notably, the inspectors “strongly encouraged” China to submit a final comprehensive environmental evaluation for its station, a requirement China subsequently completed in October 2021.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FbW1Pqs.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Figure 2: Distribution of Involvement by Xi Jinping in Food Security Initiat</em></p> +<p>None of the countries whose stations were inspected have made or can make territorial claims so long as the treaty is in force, so Article IV sovereignty considerations were of the less priority for the inspectors. However, New Zealand maintains a territorial claim over the Ross Sea area where the stations are located, so having U.S. officials travel there without informing New Zealand underscored that no country’s claim can impede an unannounced inspection. Inspection officials, who were warmly welcomed at all visited sites, focused on reviewing compliance with Article I and other treaty provisions and, as the report concluded, “found no violations of Treaty provisions reserving Antarctica solely for peaceful purposes.” Rather, “each of the stations was well-managed and impressive in terms of their general facilities and professional character.”</p> -<p>From 2012 to 2022, Xi Jinping engaged directly on food security topics 67 times, including through domestic province inspections and instructions to local governors on how to manage agricultural production. Xi’s frequent direct monitoring serves as a signal to the rest of the Chinese leadership apparatus of his personal attention to the issue.</p> +<p>However, the U.S. team very much considered Articles I and V and other provisions. Each station allowed the inspectors access to all parts of the station. Inspectors found no weapons, military equipment, or explosives at any of them; however, both Italy’s Mario Zucchelli station and Korea’s Jang Bogo station had military personnel present.</p> -<p>Under Xi Jinping, China has undertaken a multipronged strategy to pursue self-sufficiency in food security, addressing the top challenges facing China today (see Figure 3), as detailed in the following sections.</p> +<p>In addition to the stations, the United States chose to inspect ASPA 161, which reinforced the point that giving an area protected status does not exempt it from the broader monitoring regime. Other countries had inspected protected areas, including Australia in 2016 and New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 2005. Doing so also demonstrated how to conduct an inspection without harming the ecology of the area.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-top-food-security-challenges">China’s Top Food Security Challenges</h3> +<p>Finally, the U.S. inspectors chose to highlight the importance of transparency. For example, the report encouraged countries to “maintain or increase the information they share” and noted the “significant disparity in the use of the [EIES],” as noted above, China has been particularly derelict at using this mandated transparency tool. By contrast, as has been the norm since the treaty was signed, the United States released its report not only to the Antarctic Treaty parties but also to the public.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ri23gl0.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Figure 3: China’s Responses to Food Security Challenges</em></p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<h4 id="diminishing-arable-land">Diminishing Arable Land</h4> +<p>Given that the Antarctic Treaty does not resolve differences over Antarctica but addresses them by agreeing to disagree on key topics such as sovereignty and by curtailing military interests and activities, there is justifiable concern about how increased geopolitical rivalry may affect the future of the treaty. In particular, strategic rivalries may increase suspicion that certain countries are not complying with key provisions such as the obligation to use Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.</p> -<p>Between 2013 and 2019, China reported a decline of over 5 percent of its arable land, largely attributed to destructive farming practices and local governments repurposing agricultural land for infrastructure and real estate.</p> +<p>However, existing tools do provide some solutions to these challenges and worries, and there is much the United States can do to ensure its own situational awareness of what is happening in Antarctica. Specifically, the United States should do the following:</p> -<p>To counteract this decrease, China has embarked on a few pivotal strategies, including the National High-Standard Farmland Construction Plan (2021–2030), a national blueprint for enhancing farmland quality. The blueprint sets goals for farmland creation and upgrading by 2025, 2030, and 2035. It specifies where funding is coming from (a combination of general public budget, bonds, land transfers, etc.), provides annual measures, and lists ways to encourage private entities to invest in the development of high-quality farmland. China has also sought to alleviate some of its demographic shifts by increasing the sustainability and productivity of China’s agricultural output in urban-adjacent locations.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Increase the frequency of in-person, unannounced inspections.</strong> Although the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted and continues to affect Antarctic operations, and weather will always be the biggest challenge to any sort of movement, conducting only one full inspection during the past decade demonstrates a lack of commitment by the United States to monitoring the capabilities and activities of other countries in Antarctica in person. Every three to five years, the United States should aim to undertake inspections that cover an appropriate array of sites and use U.S.-flagged operated transportation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Increase collaboration with like-minded countries on inspections.</strong> Inspections are time-consuming and expensive. To mitigate these practical challenges, the United States should consider collaborating with other like-minded countries, such as by conducting joint inspections or sharing detailed information afterward.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Promote the idea that inspections can in turn reinforce collaboration.</strong> The United States should consider conducting in-person inspections with other countries to achieve specific goals. For example, a joint inspection of Antarctic Peninsula sites with Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom — the three countries laying claim to the region — could send a powerful signal of cooperation. Like the U.S.-Russian inspections in 2012, a joint inspection by the United States and China could also provide a practical and discrete way for the two countries to demonstrate their collaboration in Antarctica and commitment to the treaty.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Encourage compliance with advance notification requirements.</strong> The United States should continue to push all countries to supply the information they agreed to provide to the EIES. It should encourage work by neutral knowledgeable authorities, such as the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, to report on EIES compliance annually. In addition to reviewing the submissions of other countries, the United States should set a positive example of compliance with the EIES reporting requirements. It should make sure its own submissions are timely and complete.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Increase attention paid to dual-use equipment.</strong> The United States should analyze the information already collected during previous inspections and submitted to the EIES regarding telescopes, telecommunications equipment such as submarine cables if and when they are built, and satellite infrastructure such as the U.S. Global Positioning System, Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System, China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, and the EU Galileo system. If Washington feels the existing requirements to report on military equipment are not sufficient to supply the information it needs, it should also consider proposing to add additional fields to the EIES. Countries should also prioritize in-person inspections of key sites to verify the information submitted is consistent with what is on the ground. Knowing what equipment is in Antarctica is the first step to determining related risks and mitigation actions.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>In addition, the Central Document No. 1 from 2019 sets out a “red line” for arable land: no less than 1.8 billion mu (120 million hectares) nationally. In pursuit of this goal, China has introduced farmland restoration measures, crop rotation practices, and fallow land systems. Additionally, Chinese authorities created a strategy for “reclaiming” farmland by reverting agricultural land that had been repurposed for industry, real estate, and infrastructure. As shown in Figure 4, from 1990 to 2021 China increased the amount of land being sown for crops by 17.45 percent. Furthermore, from 2021 to 2023, Chinese authorities reclaimed more than 170,000 hectares (420,000 acres) of farmland. Nonetheless, reclaiming farmland does not automatically reset its value. Often, the land has become unsuitable for growing.</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/E0tYfen.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Figure 4: Sown Area of Farm Crops in China (1990–2021)</em></p> +<p><strong>William Muntean III</strong> is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>William Muntean IIIChina opened its fifth station in Antarctica on February 7, 2024. The new Qinling station, located on Inexpressible Island in the Ross Sea, joins the existing Great Wall (Antarctic Peninsula), Zhongshan (eastern Antarctica), Taishan (eastern Antarctic highlands), and Kunlun (Dome A) stations.【黎智英案・審訊第卌七日】2024-03-18T12:00:00+08:002024-03-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-47<ul> + <li>李宇軒指Mark Simon借出戶口收眾籌款項 冀成立基金不留港銀行 免受凍結風險</li> +</ul> -<p>China also grapples with pronounced geographical disparities in water resources, and many critical grain-producing provinces are water-scarce. Traditional flood irrigation methods, used by most small farms, often result in significant wastage. Overreliance on groundwater extraction, a direct response to this disparity, has spawned significant environmental concerns. To tackle these issues, China is making substantial investments in water-saving technologies, enhancing agricultural irrigation systems, and allocating significant funds — totaling trillions of RMB — to mega projects like the South-North Water Diversion project. The results have been mixed, with some projects showing improved crop production, an increase in farmers’ incomes, and substantial reduction in water usage, while others have created significant inter-provincial conflict over resources and financing. Additionally, long-term environmental impacts of these projects are subject to debate.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="governance-challenges">Governance Challenges</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cVGoitS.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>China’s pursuit of food security has been stymied by corruption and data misrepresentation. For example, in 2022, the former top official at the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration (responsible for centralized control over stockpiled grain), Zhang Wufeng, was felled for corruption. Another inherent problem has been the misrepresentation of data by regional and local officials — a consequence of the prevalent incentive structure in the Chinese bureaucratic system, which promotes cadres who report good news and penalizes those who relay unfavorable news. In response, the central government has clarified that it oversees national food security policies, while provincial and local governments bear primary responsibility for making sure every Chinese citizen has enough food to eat.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（18日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第47日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李談及2019年8月的第三次眾籌活動，籌得約180萬美元，在提取眾籌款項過程中經歷了一些困難，後來在另一名被告陳梓華的協助下，找來了黎智英的私人助手、被指為本案共謀者之一的 Mark Simon 借出美國的銀行戶口收取眾籌款項，然後轉帳至「Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。李提到，當時 Mark Simon 要求成立一個基金來保管眾籌款項，而非把款項轉帳至李的渣打銀行個人戶口，而且需要找美國公民來擔任基金信託人，「盡量將啲錢唔留喺香港銀行系統入面，去減少香港銀行例如凍結呢啲錢嘅風險。」</p> -<p>China’s legacy of decentralizing farmland, stemming from the household responsibility system (HRS) that originated post-collectivization, also poses challenges. The government’s restrictions on corporate entities acquiring farmland have resulted in a significant dispersion of agricultural resources among individual farmers. This fragmentation hinders technological advancement, marketing, standardization, and coordination within the sector. It also has incentivized farmers to produce cash crops like fruits and vegetables, given their higher returns compared to staple grains.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指英國登報計劃花光308萬英鎊籌款">李宇軒指英國登報計劃花光30.8萬英鎊籌款</h4> -<h4 id="changing-consumer-demands">Changing Consumer Demands</h4> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第四天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。就2019年7月的「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃，控方展示報館發票、李宇軒的銀行戶口紀錄，顯示《衛報》（The Guardian）的廣告費用是4萬英鎊。此外，NewStatesman 的廣告費是1,200英鎊，The Spectator 的廣告費則是2,333英鎊。</p> -<p>The dietary preferences and demands of China’s populace — and especially the rapidly expanding urban middle class — have changed substantially over the past few decades. With increasing disposable income and exposure to global cultures, there is growing demand for safer, more varied, and higher-quality food options. The traditional Chinese diet is based on staple grain, high in vegetables, and low in animal products. But as incomes have risen, so too has consumption of refined grains, meats, oils, and sugars. Except for a dip at the beginning of Covid-19 that can be attributed to lack of supply, consumption of meat has more than tripled since 1990, as shown in Figure 5. In urban markets, consumers now seek out specialty items such as organic produce, dairy alternatives, and imported meats. As China’s growing middle class looks set to encompass over 50 percent of its population by 2025, the increasingly affluent population’s demand for meat products will steadily increase — corresponding to growing demand for soy and grain inputs to feed livestock.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/k8ylTEW.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 網絡截圖（資料圖片）</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ed1aRjH.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ Figure 5: Consumption of Meat Products in China (1991–2021)</em></p> +<p>李指是次登報的總支出是大約30.8萬英鎊，即是花光所有眾籌款項。李又指除了登報紙廣告費用之外，相關支出還有在「89up」的廣告版、Facebook、Twitter 和 Google 登廣告，也有分別向「89up」和「Whitehouse consultancy」兩間顧問公司支付顧問費。</p> -<p>As shown in Figure 6, food imports have increased dramatically, making China the world’s top importer of foodstuffs. In 2022, China imported approximately 98.3 billion USD in agricultural products, a record high. Even amid geopolitical tensions, China has continued to increase the amount of food it purchases from the United States, specifically non-staple foods like beef and nuts, along with products used for feeding livestock like corn and sorghum grain (see Figure 7).</p> +<p>活動開支方面，李指包括印製單張、租借會議室、訂製T恤等雜費。控方問到這些活動是什麼性質。李則指一般來說是「支持香港的活動」，但他不清楚每個活動的性質，因為是「攬炒巴」劉祖廸以及在英國當地的人所舉辦的。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Yd7yi01.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ Figure 6: Food Imports to China by Country (2011–2021)</em></p> +<h4 id="英國登報廣告呼籲英政府制裁有份打壓香港自由人權的人士">英國登報廣告呼籲英政府制裁有份打壓香港自由人權的人士</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6VVIkp6.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ Figure 7: Percent Change in Top 10 U.S. Agricultural Exports to China (2017–2022)</em></p> +<p>控方展示從李的手機檢取的廣告相片，當中的文字呼籲英國政府向有份打壓香港自由和人權的人實施制裁，又指英國一定要支持香港。</p> -<p>Recently, China has poured resources into research, development, and imports of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and alternative foods. Precision gene-edited crops have been at the forefront of boosting crop yields in the United States for decades. However, despite being the first country to commercialize a transgenic crop in 1992, China has been slow to adopt overarching global GMO technologies. To support local companies in developing GMO IP, Chinese leaders have been reluctant in accepting foreign GMO seed producing companies in the Chinese market. Consumers were also initially hesitant, but public perceptions of genetically modified foods have become more positive in recent years. Recently, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (China’s national agricultural scientific research organization) laid out a five-year development plan calling for “construction of new key laboratories, a grain crop science center, a molecular design breeding center, a national crop germplasm resource bank, a livestock and poultry bank, and an agricultural microorganism bank.”</p> +<p>控方又留意到廣告提供一個聯署網址，李指「攬炒巴」等人希望將一些廣告轉變成實質的政治行動（concrete political actions），因此以他記憶所及，該聯署是讓英國當地選民找回自己有份投選的國會議員，「跟住搵返佢哋做咩，我唔記得。」李指意思是：「我係你嘅 voter，我想你做一樣嘢，咁我就繼續投票俾你。」</p> -<p>The demand for imported foods also stems from long-standing concerns about domestic food safety. Imported goods are perceived as meeting higher safety and quality standards, making them particularly appealing to a population increasingly concerned with health and wellness. Over the years, the country has faced numerous high-visibility food safety scandals involving adulterated or toxic domestic products, leading to widespread perception that imports are safer than domestic products. One particularly impactful incident in 2008 involved the adulteration of baby formula with melamine, which led to the deaths of six infants and sickened nearly 300,000 others.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒表示有份成立fight-for-freedom-stand-with-hong-kong">李宇軒表示有份成立「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」</h4> -<p>In response, China has improved oversight and regulation of its food industry. The country’s first comprehensive food safety law was enacted in 2009 and has since been amended multiple times. The law encompasses a wide range of regulations aimed at ensuring food quality and consumer safety. It established a licensing system for food production and food operation, along with a safety review system for new foods entering the market. The law also addresses the logistics of food storage and distribution and sets national standards for various aspects of food products — including additives, hygiene, labeling, examination, and packaging — to bring China’s food industry up to international standards. Additionally, the law outlines specific food safety responsibilities for businesses, ranging from manufacturers to retailers, thereby aiming to make the entire food supply chain accountable for adhering to safety norms.</p> +<p>控方指廣告下方有一組字「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」，問這是否一個組織。李確認是一個組織，並稱：「我係佢嘅一部份。」李指：「係由一班國際嘅香港人，同埋關心香港嘅人去組成，去組成一個 activism 嘅組織，就去爭取當時香港嘅自由民主。」</p> -<h4 id="workforce-dynamics">Workforce Dynamics</h4> +<p>李稱這個組織的創辦人除了他自己之外，還有「攬炒巴」、「Always」、「Madison」和「Shirley Ho」等人。</p> -<p>The allure of urban life, combined with the promise of better wages, has seen many Chinese individuals leaving the agricultural sector for city-based jobs. Migrant jobs in urban centers offer better pay and seemingly improved prospects for future generations. Sectors such as transportation and logistics that have huge impacts on the agricultural sector also face workforce challenges. By the end of 2021, China faced a shortfall of 4 million truck drivers, an issue that will continue to be exacerbated as the working-age population in the country begins to shrink and people look toward more white-collar jobs. As birth rates decline and the population ages, fewer young people are available to replace the aging workforce, further compounding labor shortages in sectors like agriculture, transportation, and logistics.</p> +<p>控方其後逐一追問各人身份。李稱「Always」和「Madison」均是網名，但不知他們真實身份。而「Shirley Ho」則是真名，她是一名天文物理學家，當時居住於美國。李指 Shirley Ho 曾經在2019年7月底或8月頭與他一同前往日內瓦，她在同年11月底或12月與他前往美國華盛頓，該次她作為一個監管者（chaperone）角色。</p> -<p>The Chinese government has taken steps to make farming more lucrative and economically viable, beginning in the early 2000s with the abolition of the 2,600-year-old agricultural tax (similar to modern property taxes). Since then, central authorities have continued to reduce or remove taxes on agriculture, aiming to alleviate financial pressures on farmers. In 2006, the government also introduced a support price for wheat: when market prices dip below the annually set minimum price, the government commits to purchasing wheat from farmers at the support price, guaranteeing a level of income for farmers and incentivizing continued cultivation of this specific staple crop. The success of the strategy to support wheat is demonstrated in China’s grain output, which increased between the early 2000s and 2020 (see Figure 8).</p> +<p>控方問到「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」如何成立。李指，在2019年6月的G20登報計劃時，有的報紙會要求登廣告的人使用實名，也有的報紙接受籠統的名字，例如「Free Hong Kong」或「Hongkonger」。李指後來在7月的「中英聯合聲明」登報計劃中，大家希望成立一個統一或大家安心的團體，能夠使用它的名義登廣告，所以 Telegram 群組的人設立一個投票，最終投選出「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」作為團體的名稱，所以是次登報的廣告都是以這個團體的名義。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/c8fjSI3.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ Figure 8: China’s Grain Output (1980–2020)</em></p> +<p>李續指：「到再後期嘅事，呢一個組織或呢班人嗰 scope 擴闊到唔淨只報紙登廣告，不過呢個係後話。」控方追問他們會做什麼事，李則指例如舉辦一些支持香港的活動、與顧問公司合作和在社交媒體登廣告等等。</p> -<p>Recently, the government introduced initiatives to bolster farmers’ incomes directly. In April 2023, the Chinese government allocated 10 billion yuan (approximately 1.38 billion USD), in one-time financial subsidies for farmers. However, despite these efforts, attracting younger generations to the farming profession remains a challenge. As recently as 2019, studies have shown that aging populations in rural areas continue to place a drag on agricultural productivity and negatively affect agricultural wages.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認攬炒巴角色是精神領袖在連登上有號召力">李宇軒確認「攬炒巴」角色是精神領袖、在連登上有號召力</h4> -<h4 id="technological-and-productivity-issues">Technological and Productivity Issues</h4> +<p>控方問及「攬炒巴」在「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」（後稱SWHK）團隊中的角色。李指「佢最 prominent 嘅角色係作為『攬炒巴』。」控方追問是什麼意思，李則指：「啫係佢就係連登上面嘅『攬炒巴』，呢個就係佢最 prominent 嘅 role。」</p> -<p>China’s agricultural landscape is uniquely characterized by the prevalence of small family farms dispersed throughout the country, rather than the large factory-farming models in many developed countries. While this model is a cornerstone of the Chinese economy, providing employment to millions, the fragmented nature of farms complicates the dissemination of new agricultural technologies and makes coordination among farmers, standardization of practices, and effective marketing difficult.</p> +<p>法官李運騰追問「攬炒巴」實際做過什麼事。李稱「攬炒巴」的角色有如早前提及的另一個連登帳號「家樂牌通心粉」，在G20登報期間「家樂牌通心粉」在連登討論區上有號召力，直至「中英聯合聲明」登報期間，就輪到「攬炒巴」在連登上有號召力。</p> -<p>To bridge this divide, China launched the National Agricultural Technology and Education Cloud Platform in 2015. This digital platform promotes knowledge sharing and independent learning among agricultural workers. Farmers provide data on crops, pests, and on-the-ground conditions, and in return they can access online training courses, diagnostic AI, and helplines. Start-ups for strategic AI technologies can tell farmers which insects they are looking at with just a picture and which pesticides they should use to protect their crops. The central government also dispatches specialized expert teams to provinces affected by natural disasters or falling behind in agricultural output to deliver on-the-ground support and promote the popularization of advanced agricultural technology.</p> +<p>李官再問，「攬炒巴」的角色是否作為一名精神領袖。李表示：「可以咁樣理解。」李又指「攬炒巴」是其中一個在「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃中積極參與討論的人，而他的主意與其他 Telegram 群組成員一致，「最 prominent 嘅 role 係佢會喺連登出 post。」</p> -<p>In the early twenty-first century, initiatives like expanding irrigation systems propelled China’s agricultural total factor productivity (TFP) growth — from under 1 percent in the 1970s to an average of 2.48 percent from 2001 to 2010. However, this expansion has fallen in the years since, as China has been unable to maintain a steady rate of agricultural TFP growth through continued policy improvements and investments in agricultural research and development (R&amp;D). China still outperforms every other region except South Asia and the so-called transition countries (former Soviet Union) for agricultural TFP growth, but it will have to work increasingly hard to maintain this advantage. China’s public sector expenditures on agricultural R&amp;D were approximately 6.6 billion USD in 2021, larger than those of India, the United States, and Brazil combined. However, in the United States, the private sector accounts for an additional 15 to 20 billion USD, while in China this number is functionally zero.</p> +<p>李形容：「而佢喺連登出嘅 post，我理解大部份嘅 post 都會有好大嘅迴響，即係好多人會睇佢嘅 post。」法官李運騰問，連登上是否有很多人跟蹤「攬炒巴」的帖文？李則表示不肯定連登有否「追蹤」這個功能，只能說有很多人回應（react to）「攬炒巴」的帖文。李官又問「攬炒巴」是否有很多追隨者？李指：「喺連登上面係。」</p> -<p>In response to the productivity conundrum, China has embraced R&amp;D solutions. Substantial financial inflows have been directed toward hybrid seed technologies, particularly in the domain of hybrid rice, corn, soybeans, and wheat. China also established “core areas” for production of certain products (e.g., potatoes in Southeast China, double-cropping rice in the Yangtze River Economic Belt). In 2021, amendments to China’s Seed Law strengthened the protection of legal rights and interests of owners of new plant varieties, encouraging R&amp;D of seeds.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指swhk曾經舉辦g20報紙展覽-據陳梓華稱蘋果日報資助3至4萬元-惟記憶模糊">李宇軒指SWHK曾經舉辦G20報紙展覽 據陳梓華稱《蘋果日報》資助3至4萬元 惟記憶模糊</h4> -<h4 id="climate-change">Climate Change</h4> +<p>被問及SWHK有否在香港舉辦活動，李宇軒提到，SWHK曾經在大約2019年8月或9月，在灣仔富德樓舉辦一個報紙展，「可以話，去畀喺香港嘅香港人去睇返，原來G20，6月嗰陣，有啲香港人做咗國際登報喎。」因為G20廣告是登在外國的報紙，反而身處香港的人未曾看過這些實體報紙，所以便舉辦這個報紙展覽。</p> -<p>China’s agricultural sector is heavily exposed to climate change. Between 1981 and 2010, shifting climate patterns and ozone pollution collectively slashed China’s crop yields by 10 percent, an annual loss of 55 million tons of crops. As temperatures rise, extreme weather events, melting glaciers, environmental degradation, and water scarcity and contamination will intensify the implications for China’s agriculture.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pSo39uQ.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<p>China’s focus has been on building resilience and adaptation mechanisms to confront these challenges and shoring up the system’s response to natural disasters. Throughout the 2010s, China made significant investments in mega projects to ameliorate the effects of climate change. More recently, there has been a palpable shift toward promoting the green development of agriculture and encouraging farmers to switch to higher-yield and stress-resistant crops. China is also looking to the oceans to bolster food security, as evidenced in a series of recent initiatives aimed at promoting and streamlining marine aquaculture. In November 2017, the Ministry of Agriculture unveiled the National Mariculture Development Plan (2017–2025). As per this blueprint, China aspires to establish 200 national-level demonstration marine ranches by 2025. In April 2023, President Xi coined the term “blue granary” to describe marine fisheries and mariculture, specifically deep-sea fishing and ranching. Shortly thereafter, Chinese authorities released guidelines on deep-water aquaculture as a key piece of fortifying the agricultural supply chain.</p> +<p>李又表示，相信是一個「G20殘留落嚟嘅小組」，裡面有人提議舉辦展覽。他記得他曾經做過一日義工，負責看管場地和做介紹。</p> -<h4 id="food-waste">Food Waste</h4> +<p>控方問到展覽由誰人出資舉辦。李表示開頭不知道，但是在後來知道陳梓華等人，或者陳梓華穿針引線去《蘋果日報》那邊，便資助了3萬或4萬元。他相信當時是陳梓華告訴他，或者陳梓華等人轉達過來的說法（hearsay），不過他不肯定相關詳情。法官遂打斷指，既然李對於自己的證供不肯定，便沒有需要詳述下去。</p> -<p>Between 2014 and 2018, an estimated 27 percent of all food in China was lost or wasted, comparable to global averages. Food waste and loss can occur at any point in the supply chain, from death of livestock to crops damaged by improper storage to expired products thrown out in households. China has made a concerted effort to address food waste through a series of “campaign-style” reforms. In August 2020, President Xi Jinping launched the “Clean Your Plate Campaign 2.0,” modeled on an earlier homonymous anti-corruption initiative. Following the “Clean Your Plate Campaign 2.0,” China introduced the Anti-Food Waste Law in April 2021. This State Council–spearheaded initiative included educational campaigns, regulatory measures against businesses, the introduction of systems for enhanced procurement, storage, and handling practices, and methods for increasing efficiency in food production, with relevant incentives and penalties.</p> +<p>在午飯後，李再補充，T曾經就這個展覽跟他談及有關《蘋果日報》基金的事，不過他不記得詳情，但他肯定他從沒從陳梓華那邊接收過任何錢。就《蘋果》基金在展覽中的角色，李指在活動後段，若他沒有記錯的話《蘋果》基金有提供資助，但是「記憶好模糊」。</p> -<h4 id="geopolitical-dynamics">Geopolitical Dynamics</h4> +<h4 id="李宇軒指2019年8月籌辦第三次眾籌登報">李宇軒指2019年8月籌辦第三次眾籌登報</h4> -<p>Following geopolitical shocks including the 2017 trade war with the United States, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China has sought to reduce its exposure to external dependencies. This strategy includes ramping up international land acquisition, increasing bilateral and multilateral trade deals, diversifying international supply chains, expanding overseas agricultural activities through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and encouraging domestic companies to take their operations global.</p> +<p>就2019年8月的第三次眾籌活動，李指因為G20和「中英聯合聲明」先後兩次眾籌登報計劃「都OK成功」，所以兩次眾籌的部份籌辦者，包括李、「攬炒巴」和網名「T」的陳梓華，聯手籌辦了第三次運動，即是「G攬運動」。李指是次運動的主題是喚起國際關注當時香港的民主自由狀況。</p> -<p>While Chinese acquisition of farmland in the United States has garnered attention in Washington, most of its international land purchases are in Asia and Africa. According to Land Matrix, a European land monitoring organization, between 2011 and 2020 Chinese companies purchased or leased 6.48 million hectares of land for agriculture, forestry, or mining — equivalent to the size of Latvia. Chinese companies purchase arable land in other countries and sell their products back to consumers in China through individual deals as well as through BRI projects and other similar initiatives; China has signed over 100 agricultural cooperation agreements with BRI countries.</p> +<p>李指，是次運動分別在美國、英國、加拿大、法國、德國、西班牙、意大利、瑞典、芬蘭和丹麥等國家的報紙登廣告。有人負責聯絡報館，有人負責設計廣告，而負責處理眾籌和墊支的人則是李自己。</p> -<p>Additionally, China has sought to grow its global influence in food security and governance. China has held the director-generalship of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) since August 2019 and has a position on the World Food Programme (WFP) executive board. China also hosts the WFP Centre of Excellence in China, which takes advantage of China’s experience in reducing poverty and hunger to facilitate activities relevant to the Sustainable Development Goals through training, policy dialogue, and capacity building.</p> +<p>李又提到「攬炒巴」的角色是在「連登」討論區出帖文，因為當時「『攬炒巴』個 account 勁過『家樂牌通心粉』，我意思係『攬炒巴』個 account 會有多啲迴響，所以由『攬炒巴』喺連登出 post」，宣傳及簡介眾籌計劃。</p> -<p>In October 2019, the State Council Information Office published a white paper titled “Food Security in China” to “provide a full picture of how food security operates in China, in order to increase the international community’s understanding in this important field.” It frames China’s role in global food security as opening its market further, upholding WTO obligations, sharing food security expertise and resources, promoting top domestic food businesses to expand internationally, forging food and agriculture cooperation agreements on bilateral and multilateral levels, collaborating on research with nations and global entities, offering emergency food aid as per its capabilities, and actively engaging in global food security governance.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指第三次眾籌款項達180萬元美金-需找美國的有錢人借出戶口收款">李宇軒指第三次眾籌款項達180萬元美金 需找美國的有錢人借出戶口收款</h4> -<p>Furthermore, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought into focus the fragility of international food supply chains. The war in Ukraine generated a global spike in food prices, which impacted China disproportionately, given its position as the world’s top importer of foodstuffs.</p> +<p>李指第三次眾籌不是限於英國，所以決定使用國際通用的美元為單位，同樣使用眾籌平台「gofundme.com」。至於眾籌款項當時提取至哪一個銀戶口，李則形容「呢個係好長嘅故事」，他指眾籌款項最後被轉移至「Project Hong Kong Trust」在美國 Amalgamated Bank 的戶口，但中間卻經歷了一些困難。</p> -<p>A similar challenge arose from China’s draconian Covid-19 regulations. As China scrambled to enforce lockdowns in a bid to curb the virus’s spread, transportation bottlenecks, labor shortages, and logistical challenges threatened the steady flow of essential commodities — including food — both domestically and internationally. While headlines of people locked in their houses in Shanghai made the news, lack of food during lockdowns appears to have been prevalent throughout rural China as well. A study of 2,631 rural households showed that an increase of 100 confirmed Covid-19 cases in a county corresponded with a statistically significant decrease in per capita intake of dietary energy, carbohydrates, fats, and proteins, an effect that was especially pronounced in low-income groups.</p> +<p>李解釋，他們需要借用一個在美國開設的美金戶口來收取眾籌款項，加上款項達180萬元美金，為了避免被懷疑「洗黑錢」，所以不能借用一般的銀行戶口，「咁就要搵喺美國、又咁上下有錢嘅人」來借出銀行戶口。</p> -<p>To buffer against such shocks, China has traditionally maintained vast food reserves. Estimates from the U.S. Department of Agriculture projected that in 2022, China possessed 69 percent of global corn reserves, 60 percent of rice, 51 percent of wheat, and 37 percent of soybeans. In recent years, China has increased its investment in stockpiling. The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics reported that 2022 pork production was at its highest level since 2014 and that China bought a record number of soybeans in 2023, both attributed to replenishment of reserves depleted during the pandemic. China also inked an agreement with Russia in September 2023 establishing a new 159 million USD grain hub strategically located on both sides of the border between the Russian Jewish Autonomous Oblast and China’s Heilongjiang Province. Accompanying this deal were agreements to enhance storage and transportation capabilities. A 26 billion USD deal was also inked between Beijing and Moscow in October 2023 to export 70 million tons of grain over the next 12 years. Beijing and Moscow also sought to accelerate the construction of the New Russia–China Land Grain Corridor — a Sino-Russian initiative established in 2012 that would build out infrastructure to allow for the export of more grain by Russia and other Eurasian countries to China.</p> +<p>李記得他們首先找到一個在美國的有錢人願意借出戶口，但是當這個人嘗試將款項從眾籌戶口轉移至其銀行個人戶口時，銀行卻未能完成此程序，他理解該筆款項是離開了眾籌戶口，「但是去到收款人戶口時，銀行 hold 住咗條數，就冇入到去個銀行戶口」，可能正在等待釐清一些資料。</p> -<h3 id="chinas-future-food-security-path-and-implications">China’s Future Food Security Path and Implications</h3> +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華找到mark-simon借出戶口">李宇軒指陳梓華找到Mark Simon借出戶口</h4> -<p>Many challenges will likely influence the PRC’s food security approach in the coming years and decades. On the policymaking front, China’s Food Security Law was recently submitted for deliberation at the third session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress on June 26, 2023. Although the draft is not yet public, writer Gong Yixi from the People’s Congress Multimedia Office has stated that the purpose of the law is to “guarantee effective food supply, ensure national food security, and enhance the ability to prevent and defend against food security risks.” He also states that the law will include provisions on protecting farmland, food production, food reserves, food circulation, food processing, food emergencies, food conservation, supervision, and management. Earlier food security publications from the central government focused on domestic facets of food security, such as farmland reclamation and increasing employment in the agricultural sector. The forthcoming law, by comparison, seems to take a more national security–focused lens.</p> +<p>李續指，後來他們找到另一名在美國的有錢人士協助，當時他不知道該人的身份，後來才知道他是Mark Simon。而李知道眾籌款項成功地轉移至該有錢人的銀行戶口，不久之後，Mark Simon 的銀行戶口便將相關款項轉帳至「Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。李補充，嚴格來說他並不知道從眾籌戶口提取款項的人是否 Mark Simon，而他只知道 Mark Simon 轉帳了一筆錢給「Project Hong Kong Trust」戶口。</p> -<p>As outlined in Figure 9, the newest iteration of the National People’s Congress five-year legislation plan, which sets priority for legislation through 2028, names 10 laws directly related to food security.</p> +<p>李憶述，他曾經在 Telegram 與網名是「T」的陳梓華討論有關事宜，當第一名美國有錢人未能接收眾籌款項的時候，「我問 T 有冇計，咁佢話佢嗰邊諗吓辦法，eventually 佢話『我搵到人』。」控方問李，陳梓華當時有否提及該人的身份，李回答：「我唔記得佢有冇講，定係佢講咗但我唔記得。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RsC7pG2.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ Figure 9: Five-Year Legislative Plan of China’s National People’s Congress for 2023–2028 (Laws related to food security)</em></p> +<p>李憶述，直至大約2020年2月，他整理第三次眾籌的收支紀錄期間，查看「Project Hong Kong Trust」的銀行戶口紀錄時，「我見到，噢，原來入錢嗰度寫住 Mark Simon」，而轉帳日子是2019年底或2020年初。</p> -<p>China has made significant efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in feeding its population. Under Xi, it has channeled substantial resources into strategies for enhancing agricultural productivity, reducing waste, and diversifying sources of supply to avoid overreliance on single markets for food imports. However, the pursuit of absolute self-sufficiency in food security is an improbable, if not impossible, goal.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指mark-simon要求成立基金保管眾籌款項-美國公民擔任信託人免受風險">李宇軒指Mark Simon要求成立基金保管眾籌款項 美國公民擔任信託人免受風險</h4> -<p>The sheer scale of China’s population compared to its share of arable land will continue to pose a significant problem, compounded by environmental constraints. Even with advanced technologies, there are natural limits to how much food can be sustainably produced. Achieving self-sufficiency would likely mean reverting to a diet based primarily on staple foods that does not meet modern nutritional standards and food preferences. Moreover, the concept of self-sufficiency in the globalized era is increasingly outdated. The global food market is intricately connected, and any pursuit of autarkic food self-sufficiency would cause China to lose out on the benefits of a functioning global agricultural market which, while imperfect, does benefit from year-round output and market-based adjustments to address imbalances in supply and demand.</p> +<p>就「Project Hong Kong Trust」，李指主要有3名美國公民作為這個基金的法律上持有人，其中一個人是 Katherine Cheng ，另外兩名人士則不知道。</p> -<p>By necessity, if not by choice, China will have to continue to depend upon imports to meet the food demands of its population. To guard against risks of dependencies, China likely will continue seeking to diversify its sourcing of critical inputs, foodstuffs, technology, and know-how.</p> +<p>李指，Mark Simon 當時提出一個要求，他希望把這一筆眾籌款項轉移至一個基金，而不是李的渣打銀行戶口，所以 Mark Simon 替他們聯絡律師並與美國當地的人商討，希望成立一個基金保管這筆錢，而且需要找人擔任信託人，「希望呢啲 trustee 係美國公民，去減低佢哋有可能受到，譬如話香港銀行系統要求佢哋要對啲錢點樣做嘅風險。」李相信以上是由陳梓華轉述給他的。</p> -<p>This study makes clear that Xi has set food security as a leader-level priority. He views such efforts as directly linked to China’s national security and to the legitimacy and survivability of the Chinese Communist Party. As the world’s leading importer of foodstuffs, the strategies that China has proposed and initiated will have significant spillover effects on the rest of the world. This makes China’s efforts to enhance its food security not just a matter of concern for China, but indeed an issue of importance across the world.</p> +<p>被問到為何 Mark Simon 想成立一個基金，李稱記得當時的討論和分析是，「盡量將啲錢唔留喺香港銀行系統入面，去減少香港銀行例如凍結呢啲錢嘅風險。」</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華安排他會見美議員-mark-simon亦在場">李宇軒指陳梓華安排他會見美議員 Mark Simon亦在場</h4> -<p><strong>Kevin Dong</strong> is senior research assistant for the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.</p> +<p>李表示當時未曾跟 Mark Simon 溝通，「我知 T（陳梓華）係有同 Mark Simon 傾計」，不過「喺呢個時間點，T 已經 link up 咗我同 Mark Simon」。李提到大約在2019年8或9月，美國參議員斯科特（Rick Scott）訪港，陳梓華安排了他會見斯科特、其助手 Scott Sciretta 及美國領事職員 Alan Brinker，而且 Mark Simon 及其他人亦在場。</p> -<p><strong>Mallie Prytherch</strong> is a former research assistant for the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.</p> +<p>控方展示「G攬運動」的財務收支紀錄，李確認是次眾籌籌得180萬美元，大約是1,400萬港元。截至2020年3月，支出是大約730萬港元，其中630萬港元用作登報廣告費。</p> -<p><strong>Lily McElwee</strong> is deputy director and a fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>李提到後來第四次的眾籌計劃名叫「重光香港計劃」，惟他並沒有參與。</p> -<p><strong>Patricia Kim</strong> is a fellow at the Brookings Institution and holds a joint appointment to the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for Asia Policy Studies.</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p><strong>Jude Blanchette</strong> is the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS in Washington, D.C.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>Ryan Hass</strong> is director of the John L. Thornton China Center, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.</p>Kevin Dong, et al.Feeding China’s vast population is a priority issue for Beijing, given historic ramifications of famines and food crises for social and regime stability.【黎智英案・審訊第卌五日】2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-45<ul> - <li>財務文件顯示眾志參與G20登報 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》</li> -</ul> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒指Mark Simon借出戶口收眾籌款項 冀成立基金不留港銀行 免受凍結風險Training Afghan Journalists2024-03-18T12:00:00+08:002024-03-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/training-afghan-journalists<p><em>This article presents and discusses results from an exercise in comparative content analysis of news articles about issues of conflict produced by Afghan journalists before and after participating in an internationally sponsored training and mentorship programme in Peace Journalism.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eF3UgIi.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>The programme was part of a Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) project, intended to create community resources for resilience, in the information sphere, towards conflict issues contributing to recruitment by non-state armed groups such as Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS–KP). Peace Journalism is familiar as the basis for media development aid in contexts of conflict; however, its use in an intervention aimed specifically at PVE is relatively new.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（14日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第45日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方提問繼續圍繞2019年6月G20峰會前夕的登報計劃，以及相關財務紀錄。李確認他向台灣《蘋果日報》、《南德意志報》、《紐約時報》、《泰晤士報》和三份南韓報紙等，分別支付了登報廣告費用，款額逾385萬港元。其中《朝日新聞》和歐洲版 POLITICO 的發票均顯示上款為「Demosisto（香港眾志）」，李估計當時的眾志成員周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》，因為估計只有她懂得日文。而《紐約時報》的發票顯示上款除了李宇軒之外，還有「Anna Kwok」，李相信當時他與「Anna Kwok」一同聯絡報館，惟控方未有就「Anna Kwok」的身份提問。</p> +<p>The results showed that the programme was effective, it is argued, in terms of benefits transferred to and applied by participating journalists. A sample of articles after the training showed a markedly higher Peace Journalism quotient than a baseline sample of articles by the same journalists before it. This suggested that the training and mentorship had successfully stimulated and enabled journalistic agency, taking account of constraints imposed by media structures and wider political and social contexts. The latter have become steadily more onerous under the Islamic Emirate (Taliban) government, in power since August 2021, according to international monitoring organisations. Implications are considered, in light of the findings, for future media development aid to Afghanistan.</p> -<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第二天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李昨日提及，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌及籌備在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。期間案中另一名被告陳梓華經 Telegram 接觸李，並以「T」的身份與李商討墊支廣告費，惟李當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。</p> +<h3 id="1-introduction">1. Introduction</h3> -<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華後來介紹mark-simon給他認識">李宇軒指陳梓華後來介紹Mark Simon給他認識</h4> +<p>The Peace Journalism (PJ) model, originally proposed by Johan Galtung as a set of ideational distinctions in news representations of conflict, has served as the organising principle for both scholarly research and practical application. Much of the latter has come through media development aid, often taking the form of professional training courses for editors and reporters. The effectiveness of such schemes depends on activating and galvanising journalistic agency to change the content of reporting. The extent of this activity can be gauged from grey literature such as The Peace Journalist, published biannually by the Global Peace Journalism Center at Park University, Missouri. Lynch and Tiripelli (2022) found 55 reports of such interventions, in 33 countries, in the magazine’s first 19 editions, from April 2012.</p> -<p>控方展示兩封由「T」轉發給李宇軒的電郵，可見電郵原初發送者為「Terrie Lam」。李指當時T把《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費收據，由「Terrie Lam」的電郵轉發給他。</p> +<p>From the early days of such interventions, however, trainers were reporting such risks as “creating cycles of empowerment and disempowerment” (Lloyd 2003, p. 118), as trainees, enthused with new ideas, returned afterwards to the same office settings, with the same constraints. Adebayo found that journalist participants in a PJ workshop in Nigeria wanted to “set a positive developmental agenda for public discourse”, but found themselves “act[ing] as muffled drums because of the overbearing influence of media owners and draconian government policies” (Adebayo 2016, p. 375). An early scholarly critique complained that PJ exponents tended to adopt “an overly individualistic and voluntaristic perspective” (Hanitzsch 2008, p. 75), giving rise to exaggerated assessments of the extent of change in news practices that could be brought about through such means.</p> -<p>控方指其中一個電郵提及一個名叫「Mark」的人。李表示當他收到這封電郵時，並不知道 Mark 是誰，但「其後我知道呢個係 Mark Simon」，因為在不遲於2019年9月的時候， T 把 Mark Simon 介紹給他認識。</p> +<p>Reporting of conflict issues by Afghan media, from the time of the abortive US-sponsored peace talks with the then insurgent Taliban in September 2020, was found (Lynch and Freear 2023) to display a predominant pattern of War Journalism, and little or no Peace Journalism, on the distinctions in the Galtung model. In the same study, Afghan journalists were interviewed (n = 16), and asked whether, how, and to what extent this pattern of reporting matched their own aspirations for their journalism. “The dominant pattern of coverage did not align with their own notions of how the conflict and the issues in the peace negotiations should be reported… Afghan journalists interviewed for this study wanted to do more Peace Journalism”, the researchers found.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒相信以自己信用卡支付日本時報廣告費">李宇軒相信以自己信用卡支付《日本時報》廣告費</h4> +<p>Such receptiveness to the tenets of PJ is not untypical among journalists in non-Western settings, Hussain writes. However, “the main obstacles to Peace Journalism in the non-Western world are lack of media freedom, threats to life and security, unfavourable socio-cultural conditions and lack of resources for journalists” (Hussain 2022, p. 116). Aside from the direct obstacles brought about by political and security considerations, the constraint on reporting by Afghan media most often identified by the interview subjects was “a lack of suitable training, particularly in Peace Journalism” (ibid.)</p> -<p>控方提及刊登於《日本時報》的G20廣告，李指《日本時報》是當年G20峰會會場內會派發的報紙，並確認上述廣告是其中一份在日本報紙刊登的廣告。</p> +<p>In response to these findings, over a period of five months in 2023, a journalist training programme was devised and implemented, in several stages:</p> -<p>控方展示由《日本時報》發出的發票，以及收據，並指這是從李的住所檢取的，顯示某人在2019年6月28日以信用卡支付了200萬日圓廣告費。李表示，若果他沒有記錯的話，應該是使用了他的信用卡付款，不過需要翻查信用卡紀錄確認。</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>A group of five Afghan journalist trainers themselves underwent training, provided online through an international aid programme, in Peace Journalism;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>They then facilitated a week-long residential training workshop for Afghan journalists, held in neighbouring Pakistan. Thirty journalists were trained in total, 20 residing in Afghanistan and 10 in Pakistan (of whom three were living in Peshawar and seven in Islamabad). Of the 30 trainees, seven were women.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The trainees continued to be mentored as they returned to their newsrooms and produced pieces of Peace Journalism, integrating new ideas with the work they had brought to the training, and publishing and/or broadcasting it. They contributed to 49 news outlets in total, including television, radio, magazines, and newspapers.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>控方後來向李出示他的信用卡交易紀錄，惟未見任何有關《日本時報》的交易。李遂對於是否由他的信用卡支付廣告費表示不肯定。</p> +<p>The context for this intervention was conceived with reference to the United Nations Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2016). This “involves aligning ongoing humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, security, and political interventions with the goals of preventing violent extremism”, across many fields (Thiessen 2019, p. 1). One specifically mentioned in a contemporaneous policy document from the United Nations Development Programme is “promoting messages of tolerance in the media”. Integrating Peace Journalism — or Conflict Sensitive Journalism, as it is sometimes called — within a P/CVE programme is an approach that has been applied previously to address factors associated with violent extremism in Kenya, including under-representation in media, historical grievances and complaints over poor governance (Freear and Glazzard 2021). However, the present study deals with the first intervention of its kind in Afghanistan.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華起初聲稱會處理台蘋廣告費-惟後來要求他自行處理">李宇軒指陳梓華起初聲稱會處理台蘋廣告費 惟後來要求他自行處理</h4> +<p>Such an intervention can, in turn, be seen to align with the UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda 2030, intended as a framework for activities in the international aid sector. Within it, “peaceful and inclusive societies” are nominated as an essential co-requisite of sustainable development, in Goal 16, within which Target 10 mentions “public access to information” as a means by which these conditions are to be engendered. So, distinctions of Peace Journalism coding, for evaluation purposes, were adjusted accordingly (see full discussion below).</p> -<p>控方提到於2019年6月28日刊於台灣《蘋果日報》的廣告，寫有「港台同行 唇亡齒寒」。發票顯示李須於2019年7月5日或之前繳付120萬元新台幣廣告費。另一份匯款申請表顯示，李宇軒在7月15日申請以台幣匯率匯款307,692.31元港幣。李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，廣告費最後在7月16日付清。</p> +<h3 id="2-research-questions-and-method">2. Research Questions and Method</h3> -<p>李確認發票上的付款期限是7月5日，但因為當時 T 告訴他：「佢同埋佢嗰邊會 handle 嘅，即係有關俾錢嗰樣嘢，佢都會搞掂」，所以李一開始收到發票後並未有理會。</p> +<p>The overarching aim of the research was to ascertain whether, how, and how far the participating journalists changed their approach to reporting of overlapping issues pertaining to conflict, preventing violent extremism, and sustainable development, after the training, by comparing their new outputs with those they had previously produced.</p> -<p>直至廣告刊出之後，「咁後來冇人去追我數」，當時他亦不知道自己收到的文件是要求他付款的發票，「咁我覺得 T 嗰邊已經搞掂咗條數喇。」</p> +<p>The Research Questions were, therefore:</p> -<p>可是大約7月的時候，「T 就話，你都係找返台灣《蘋果》呢條數啦。」李續指，既然 T 叫他付款，「咁我就嗱嗱臨找咗條數囉」，因此他在7月15日遞交匯款申請表，最終於7月16日付清廣告費。</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>How much War Journalism and how much Peace Journalism were the journalists producing in their work before entering the programme of training and mentoring?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How did this compare with the extent of War Journalism and Peace Journalism in stories produced by the same journalists, through and after the programme?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="紐約時報發票顯示anna-kwok參與落廣告">《紐約時報》發票顯示「Anna Kwok」參與落廣告</h4> +<p>Hence, the participating journalists were asked to provide examples of their work, comprising news articles on conflict and related issues, before the programme of mentoring and training began. These were translated then analysed and taken as a baseline sample, then compared with a second sample, comprising articles they had prepared, published and/or broadcast during or after the programme. The latter reflected new ideas they had developed in the training, in close consultation with the mentors.</p> -<p>控方展示在2019年6月27日刊登於《南德意志報》（Süddeutsche Zeitung）的G20廣告。李表示記得在登報計劃中，只在一份德國報紙登廣告，所以確認是《南德意志報》。李確認他就此廣告支付了85,300歐元，即大約67萬港元。</p> +<p>The unit of analysis was therefore the individual story. The content analysis was carried out using evaluative criteria derived from distinctions in the Peace Journalism Model, which takes the form of a table setting out a series of dyads. Table 1 sets out Galtung’s original Peace Journalism model (Lynch and Galtung 2010, p. 13).</p> -<p>控方另展示兩份刊登於《紐約時報》的G20廣告，日期均是2019年6月28日。就第一份廣告，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，他於6月26日向《紐約時報》支付了83,752美元。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/64caqYo.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Table 1. The Peace Journalism model.</em></p> -<p>法官李運騰留意到，《紐約時報》發票抬頭除了寫有李宇軒的英文名字 Li Yu Hin 之外，還有另一個名字 Anna Kwok，並澄清向報館落單的人是否李。李回答，他相信他本人和 Anna Kwok 一同負責向《紐約時報》落廣告，至於為何發票上出現兩個名字，李表示不知道。控方庭上未有就 Anna Kwok 的身份提問。</p> +<p>This yielded eight coding categories, with a ninth added, to denote the provision or otherwise in the reports of a “framework of understanding” to connect the story material to broader conflict frames (see discussion below). The coding was carried out with due attention to the gendered implications of conflict issues in Afghanistan over the time frame from which the sample material was taken (again, see discussion below).</p> -<p>李官表示，純粹好奇一問，李在聯絡報館期間使用了真實姓名，是否代表 Telegram 群組成員知道他的真實姓名。李回答不是，因為他只曾向報館提供真實姓名，所以報館可能知道他的真名，如果相關文件透過電郵被轉發或副本抄送至其他有份聯絡報館的人時，該些人便會知道他的真名。</p> +<p>The samples were coded manually by the two co-authors. The content in each story was analysed for the presence of indicators from any of the four orientations on either side of the table: War Journalism and Peace Journalism. A score of 1 was recorded each time an indicator was found. Scott’s pi, a measure of inter-rater agreement used to establish reliability of findings by two raters, was calculated, and used to validate the results. To calculate observed agreement using this method, the number of items on which raters agree is divided by the total number of items.</p> -<p>至於另一份在《紐約時報》刊登的G20廣告，李確認支付了36,000美元。</p> +<p>To elaborate on the coding categories, as adapted for the current context: in a war and violence-orientation, conflict is represented as a zero-sum game, where two antagonistic parties contest the single goal of victory (which, for the other, means inevitable defeat). Significantly, such representations are also characteristic of messaging by violent extremist groups, which typically counterposes “us against them” (Post 1987).</p> -<h4 id="朝日新聞發票顯示客戶為香港眾志-李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡報館">《朝日新聞》發票顯示客戶為香港眾志 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡報館</h4> +<p>Causes of — and possible exits from — the conflict are confined to the immediate arena of hostilities, whereas peace- and conflict-orientation mean going beyond the familiar tit-for-tat sequence of direct violence, instead allowing for multiple parties and goals, with causes and exits anywhere in time and/or space.</p> -<p>控方展示於2019年6月28日刊登於《朝日新聞》的廣告，並向李出示相關發票，客戶名稱寫有「Demosisto」，要求支付700萬日圓。控方問這個客戶是誰、為何會出現在發票上。李指它是「眾志」，「因為眾志入面有人去負責搵 Asahi Shimbun（《朝日新聞》）」，但是他不知道該人是否 Telegram 群組的成員之一。</p> +<p>In practical terms, by reporting only violent incidents, or ritualised denunciations of the “enemy” by leaders on either of two “sides”, War Journalism typically omits the goals of the parties, or the issues (of grievance, relative deprivation, injustice, unmet needs and interests) that lead them to engage in the conflict, including through violence, in the first place. Generally, their reasons for acting as they do remain obscured by the sophisticated and aggressive communication of violent ideological dogma. In the case of violent extremism, this enhances the appearance of acting beyond the realm of reason, so there is no point reasoning (negotiating) with any of “them”. This can render news audiences cognitively primed for violent responses. “By focusing on physical violence divorced from context, and on win–lose scenarios… news unwittingly incentivises conflict escalation and ‘crackdowns’” (Hackett 2011, p. 40).</p> -<p>控方問李所指的「眾志」是否一個政治團體，李僅回答：「以我理解，淨係得一個眾志。」控方追問是哪一位眾志成員負責聯絡《朝日新聞》，李表示：「我唔直接知道，但我 speculation（估計）係周庭。」他補充：「因為，我 speculation 係，得佢一個識講日文。」</p> +<p>Truth-orientation may refer to the familiar duty of public service media to accurate reporting. At any rate, it indicates, in the specific context of reporting conflict, the inclusion and/or juxtaposition of material calculated or likely to activate critical thinking by audiences served up with propaganda, or partial, self-serving claims and statements, by one or more parties. In PVE initiatives, this could take the form of furnishing public discourse with insights into the grievances, economic and social factors, and individual stories behind violent extremism, in addition to the ideological discourse that is propagated as the “reason for violence”.</p> -<p>李的銀行個人戶口紀錄顯示，在同年6月27日有一筆700萬日圓的支帳紀錄，李確認這是有關登報的廣告費。控方問李當時如何收到上述發票，李則稱不記得，因為在籌備登報計劃期間，有些人負責聯絡不同報館，包括《朝日新聞》，他相信一些負責聯絡報館的人，「喺畀錢嘅時候彈咗張單俾我」，即是上述抬頭為「Demosisto」的發票。</p> +<p>Reporting that adopts these two orientations — peace-and-conflict, and truth — in tandem may help to contextualise and relativise a group such as IS–KP, for instance: revealing commonalities in its composition, patterns of recruitment, orientation to authority, and motivating issues, with those of many other armed groups around the world, thus de-bunking the myth of its special status. This may enable audiences to understand its activities and messaging in the context of a constant challenge to prove relevance and impact in competition with rivals; the related search for secure funding and a steady stream of fighters, and arms; and the need to present strategy within a higher, ideological framework for the purposes of recruitment and morale.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒確認由他支付南韓英國西班牙等報廣告費">李宇軒確認由他支付南韓、英國、西班牙等報廣告費</h4> +<p>A people-orientation is often fulfilled by featuring efforts at conflict resolution, bridge-building, and peaceful coexistence by actors and institutions at sub-elite levels. The ability to surface a range of perspectives, issues, and voices from the population at large is of significance and dilutes the polarising effects of violent extremism.</p> -<p>就南韓報紙，李宇軒指當時一共在三份南韓報紙登廣告，分別是《韓國日報》（한국 일보）、《朝鮮日報》（조선일보）和《東亞日報》（동아일보），並確認上述三份報紙廣告費合共是8,325萬韓圜。</p> +<p>Conflict coverage can be seen, finally, as solution-oriented if causes are explained, and problems diagnosed, in terms of intelligible sequences of stimulus and response. If audiences can see how the processes of a conflict lead up to events — including violent events — that dominate the news, they are more likely to be receptive to treatment recommendations in the shape of proposals for nonviolent policy responses, which can be seen as peace initiatives. In this, such reporting may be consistent with PVE approaches that seek to explain violence from a range of perspectives — from broad historical and socio-economic trends to the specific circumstances of individuals and groups, and why they come to support and join VE organisations.</p> -<p>就《泰晤士報》（The UK Times）刊登的廣告，李的信用卡交易紀錄顯示他支付了27,195英鎊，即大約275,763.90港元。李確認相關紀錄。</p> +<p>The Peace Journalism model is typically operationalised in relevant research by treating the above orientations as a set of headings, and allotting particular dyadic distinctions of representation, in samples of news reporting about particular conflicts, under each heading — a method pioneered by Lee and Maslog (2005). This process is guided by attention to the conflict milieu — and in this case the particularities of violent extremism in Afghanistan, manifested in IS–KP — considered with reference to established precepts of conflict analysis — to pinpoint the differentials of newsgathering and story-telling that are likely to produce the strongest interactions in audience meaning-making.</p> -<p>就西班牙報紙《世界報》（El Mundo），李確認他支付了2萬歐羅。</p> +<p>As Nohrstedt and Ottosen point out, “journalistic products are perceived to carry and contain meanings on several levels. These cannot be collapsed into a single ‘manifest content’ level” (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2011, pp. 224–25). In all studies where the PJ model is used as the basis for deriving evaluative criteria to use in content analysis, therefore, some further allowance is made for the discursive context into which the sample of reporting would have entered, and how the distinctions “caught” by such criteria would be likely to influence audience responses.</p> -<p>就加拿大報紙《環球郵報》（The Globe and Mail），李確認發票上要求他繳付的金額是84,750元加幣，不過實際上廣告費只是75,000元加幣，他當時告訴報館職員自己不是身處加拿大，問對方可否免除增值稅（value added tax），對方表示不用支付增值稅，所以李最終只繳付了75,000元加幣。</p> +<p>Dyrstad and Hillesund (2020) use comparative survey research to show how a combination of “grievances… actual or perceived [and] lack of political efficacy” predicates “individual support for political violence”, with particular reference to appeals for support by non-state armed groups. This, therefore, influenced coding for the third of the Peace Journalism orientations, “people-oriented”, to emphasise reporting that highlighted political and/or social agency being exerted from sub-elite levels, with people taking matters into their own hands rather than simply appealing for intervention by authorities, or indeed by violent groups. Such initiatives could be seen as supplying some actual or prospective political efficacy in respect of grievances, and therefore as a community resource to safeguard against the messaging of violent extremism.</p> -<p>控方最後展示由歐洲版 POLITICO 發出的發票，抬頭是「Demosisto」，需就2019年6月27至29日期間刊登網上廣告繳付5,000歐羅。李確認他向 POLITICO 支付了5,000歐羅，並確認 POLITICO 的公司總部位於比利時，但是該G20廣告是網上的廣告。</p> +<p>Since the dynamics of cause and effect in any conflict can be differentiated according to gender, White urges, in programming designed to create community resources to prevent violent extremism, a “focus… on the socio-culturally constructed nature of gender roles, and how the unequal socialisation of these roles can… be challenged” (White 2022, p. 588). Contestation over these processes of construction and socialisation has been highlighted by monitoring groups in Afghanistan, with women’s presence in public life characterised as having changed “from almost everywhere to almost nowhere” since the Taliban takeover in 2021. Hence the PJ distinctions were applied with attention to issues in the construction and socialisation of gender roles, particularly as they affected participation by women in any form of public life — and indeed this fed through into the biggest single theme of material in the reporting by trainees. A particularly poignant note within media came with a story about women journalists whose radio station was taken off air — following a process of negotiation with the new authorities — before being put back on, albeit without the music broadcasting that previously accompanied the factual content.</p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p>The gendered impact of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan will doubtless manifest itself in many contexts, and take time to evolve. A corollary of the exclusion of women from consequential social roles outside the private sphere may be to tilt women’s participation towards non-state armed groups, thus adding to the germinal layers of violent extremism. Margolin notes that, when Islamic State emerged “from the ashes of Al Qaida in Iraq”, it used female suicide bombers while US troops were still in the country. “The use of women in combat roles” had a dual purpose: “both shaming men into action and allowing for women’s participation under special circumstances” (Margolin 2019, p. 44). However, this changed after the end of US combat operations, she notes, with women then explicitly encouraged, by ideologues of the group, to remain in the home. For Afghanistan, then — with a persistent threat from an offshoot of the same organisation, Islamic State–Khorasan Province, or IS–KP, but now similarly emptied of international forces — the auguries, with regard to the impact on gender roles, are mixed. However, this specific issue, of women’s potential participation in violent extremist activity, did not crop up as story material of interest to the journalists in the training programme.</p> -<hr /> +<h3 id="3-limitations">3. Limitations</h3> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導財務文件顯示眾志參與G20登報 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》Power Plays2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/power-plays<p><em>This report examines the trade in Russian enriched uranium.</em></p> +<p>Results from the comparative content analysis could be expected to show how far Afghan journalists could change the content of the news they produce, to incorporate more Peace Journalism, under the controlled conditions of a sustained intervention in training and mentorship, in which they participated with permission and support from their editors and employers. Such a study cannot, by itself, indicate the likelihood of a change in news content overall, even from participating journalists, following the conclusion of such an intervention.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Shoemaker and Reese (1996) model influences on news content in a “hierarchy”, arranged on five nested (though often overlapping) levels: (1) personal influences, operating directly on the individual journalist; (2) professional influences (reporting routines and news values); (3) organizational influences (economic imperatives and editorial control); (4) extra-media influences (including threats and intimidation from state and non-state actors); and (5) broader societal influences. The nature of a training course, intended to take effect by resourcing participants to exert greater individual agency in their professional work, points to levels (1) and (2) of this model as fields of influence, but not the other levels.</p> -<h3 id="introduction-and-report-overview">Introduction and Report Overview</h3> +<p>Another significant factor, which could be expected to influence the conduct and content of news — and therefore required allowances to be made in the coding — concerned the working lives of journalists amid a rapidly tightening set of constraints on media freedom. A report released in 2023 by the International Federation of Journalists referenced “unprecedented restrictions on journalists and media”, and cited a survey by its Afghan affiliate union, according to which just 292 out of 579 media outlets previously operating in the country were still in business. “Women journalists have been especially hard hit”, it went on, and “80 percent of women journalists in Afghanistan lost their jobs”.</p> -<p>On 17 February 2024, almost two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenksy addressed the Munich Security Conference, pleading for unity against the aggression perpetuated by Russian President Vladimir Putin and for continued support for Ukraine in its fight. Among his calls to action, Zelensky stressed the need to close “all loopholes in the sanctions against Russia”, singling out Russia’s nuclear industry in particular. “There should be no sectors of the Russian economy involved in its aggression that are still free from sanctions”, he said. “This particularly relates to the nuclear sector”.</p> +<p>The IFJ report specified the modalities of restriction on journalism:</p> -<p>Russia’s Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is an important player in the international nuclear energy industry, with a major presence across various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The company, through its subsidiaries JSC TVEL and Techsnabexport LLC (better known as TENEX), is the biggest supplier of uranium enrichment to the global market, and has continued to export significant volumes of enriched uranium product since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In 2022, Russia accounted for 30% of the separative work units (SWU, the unit of measurement for uranium enrichment services) delivered to EU utilities and for 44% of global enrichment capacity. In the US, 24% of SWU purchased by US utilities in 2022 came from Russia.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“Numerous players within the Taliban regularly intervene in media affairs. The Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC), the Government Media Information Center (GMIC), and the Ministry for the Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue (MPVV) have all issued vague rules with unclear legal bases or consequences for the media… Other rules call on media to refer to the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, respect Islamic values, and coordinate reporting with state overseers. Meanwhile, General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) operatives have cracked down on the press, by watching, detaining, and beating journalists and visiting newsrooms to threaten workers and complain about coverage.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>This report examines the extent of Western (European and US) dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and identifies ways in which Rosatom may be continuing to access global, including Western, nuclear fuel supply chains, despite some efforts in the US and Europe to diversify away from Russian supply. The report studies changes in Russian enriched uranium trade patterns since the start of 2022 to identify possible indicators of efforts to adapt to restrictions on Russian uranium supply that have been or may be introduced by governments and companies.</p> +<p>Taken together, these factors were built into the coding, with an additional indicator denoted by the concept of a “framework of understanding” (FWU). Many items, in both the pre-training and post-training samples, included interview material with non-elite sources to score in the people-orientation of the PJ model, which previous research has shown is the most widespread aspect of take-up among alumni of such courses as in the present example (Lynch and Tiripelli 2022). Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) characterise the training or pedagogical issue, arising from such a practice, in the following terms:</p> -<p>The report examines four main case studies. In the first case study, the report outlines possible Chinese displacement activity using Russian material, identifying trade patterns that suggest that increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into China may be facilitating greater exports of Chinese enriched uranium supply, including to the US. The second case study addresses well-documented increases in enriched uranium imports from Russia to France and considers a range of possible explanations for this growth. While the precise flow and use of the additional Russian material that is being imported into France is difficult to ascertain definitively, it appears that France may be offering an outlet for Russian enriched uranium that is no longer welcome in other countries. This may be facilitating the reallocation of Russian supplies across European utilities’ supply chains, allowing Russia to continue accessing the European nuclear fuel market even as some countries seek to diversify away from Russian supply. The third case study examines reported deliveries through France and possibly the Netherlands of Russian enriched uranium to a French-owned fuel fabrication facility in Germany. The trade data reviewed for this report could not confirm the extent of deliveries to Germany of Russian material through third countries, or whether there have been shifts in such activity since the start of 2022; however, any such deliveries to Germany may be providing an additional option for Russian enriched uranium imports no longer welcome in other countries and may potentially be used in the future fabrication of VVER assemblies in Germany. The fourth case study touches on US dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and the likely limits of a proposed US ban on imports of Russian uranium in limiting Russia’s role in global nuclear fuel supply chains and Rosatom revenues.</p> +<p>“The challenge is to convey their connection with the conflict, and the outlook for its likely development, in the course of a news story… you need… to construct a framework of understanding, in which the relevance of new perspectives to the story… can be made clear” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, pp. 165–66, emphasis in the original). To make the relevance clear, in the repressive context spelled out in the IFJ report, of sub-elite initiatives to support the visibility or social participation of women, would carry obvious risks. In the coding, therefore, especial care was taken to detect even the most inferential signalling of this kind, and denote it through adopting a separate Framework of Understanding indicator.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the report demonstrates how Russia may be able to take advantage of incongruencies in sanctions or other restrictions, as well as persistent contractual dependencies and supply challenges, to maintain access to Western nuclear fuel supply chains and continue generating revenue through its enriched uranium exports. To improve effectiveness, any future sanctions or other bans aimed at limiting Russia’s presence in global nuclear fuel supply chains must be multilateral and accompanied by a concerted effort to increase Western and partner capacity across the supply chain, to successfully undercut dependence on Russian supply.</p> +<p>“Peace journalism is supported by framing theory”, Lee and Maslog (2005) point out, and Entman (1993) indicates an active role for framing with the formulation of “making salient” the archetypical factors of “problem definition, moral evaluation and causal explanation”, on the one hand, as validating different “treatment recommendations”, on the other. To make them salient, he continues, requires more than the provision of “scattered oppositional facts” to “challenge a dominant frame”, thereby enabling and activating critical thinking, in fulfilment of the PJM heading of truth-orientation. The samples both before and after the training and mentorship programme included some stories that merely presented “feature material”, typically about ordinary Afghans going about their daily business — in a generalized social context, to be sure, but without explicit connecting content between them. So, these were coded at 0 for FWU, whereas stories that did make such explicit connections were coded at 1.</p> -<p>It is worth noting that most of the activities described in this report are entirely legal and likely represent logical efforts by companies to adapt to the changing trade and geopolitical landscape while continuing to meet whatever contractual obligations they may have for continued purchase and import of Russian material. As such, the report does not imply any violations of the laws of any relevant jurisdiction, or any international laws or sanctions. As described in more detail in Chapter II, the delivery to the US of enriched uranium that has been displaced by Russian supply, as may be the case with Chinese enriched uranium trade, may be in contravention of US regulation, unless assurances have been given to US authorities that such displacement is not taking place.</p> +<h3 id="4-results-and-discussion">4. Results and Discussion</h3> -<p>The practices described in this report raise questions over the extent of Western dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supply, the implications for Western energy security, the imbalance of vulnerability this may create between some Western governments and Moscow, and the effectiveness of efforts to cut Russia out of global, or even Western, nuclear supply chains. While the nuclear sector holds strategic significance for Moscow, it is not a major revenue source for Russia when compared to Russian trade in other commodities, such as oil and gas. However, as outlined in this report, Western reliance on Russian enriched uranium supply is proving challenging to shake, at least in the short term, and may create some difficulties for Western generation of nuclear energy, although experts disagree on the urgency and extent of potential challenges. The willingness, or necessity, of some Western countries to overlook Russian adaptations following efforts by other countries to limit Russian presence in Western nuclear fuel supply chains also points to a political and moral dissonance with stated US and European commitments to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression.</p> +<p>The 30 participating journalists in the training and mentorship programme were asked to submit up to five articles each, as examples of their work on any aspect of conflict (broadly defined) from before the training, for analysis. This yielded a baseline sample of 80 articles, with the oldest dating from 2017, up to and including the period since the Taliban takeover in 2021.</p> -<h4 id="data-and-research-methodology">Data and Research Methodology</h4> +<p>Following the training workshop and with mentorship from trainers, they then created, published, and/or broadcast a total of 85 articles between them, in which they attempted to apply the principles presented in the training to stories on any aspect of conflict (again, broadly defined). These were gathered and submitted for comparative analysis, using the same evaluative criteria. Table 2 shows results from the content analysis before the training and mentorship programme, and Table 3 shows results from content analysis after the programme.</p> -<p>The data for this report was collected from a range of publicly accessible sources. These include: the UN Comtrade Database; the Eurostat database; trade data made available by national governments; trade data sourced from third-party trade data providers; corporate reporting documents and other publicly available corporate information; analysis published by think tanks, academic institutions, consultancies, industry associations and interest groups; and media reporting. Some of the data was sourced from non-English-language sources. Data from Russian-, Ukrainian-, French- and Spanish-language sources was viewed in its original language. Data from other language sources was viewed using digital translation. Urenco, the project funder, provided additional data and feedback throughout the research process. Any data that was subsequently included in the report or informed the analysis was independently verified through publicly available (or publicly accessible) sources. The report was subsequently subject to several internal and external peer reviews.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CcOOAcd.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Table 2. War Journalism and Peace Journalism coding, before training. Pre-training n = 80.</em></p> -<p>Fourteen unstructured anonymous interviews with a range of experts were also conducted to test some of the assumptions and hypotheses being drawn from the data, to identify possible alternative explanations for some of the trade patterns observed, and to capture any necessary nuance or overlooked data. To ensure the highest quality insights, interview questions were tailored to each expert’s distinct area of expertise, because, given the commercial sensitivity of nuclear fuel contracts and the intricate nature of global nuclear supply chains, not all experts consulted were necessarily familiar with all the dynamics being examined in this report. This approach facilitated a more nuanced understanding of the subject matter, reinforcing the robustness of the methodology employed in this report. While conducting this research, input was sought from key industry stakeholders and relevant organisations. To ensure comprehensive coverage and balanced perspective, outreach was extended to several entities mentioned in the report. Unfortunately, not all entities that were approached responded.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4B6LKnW.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Table 3. War Journalism and Peace Journalism coding, after training. Post-training n = 85.</em></p> -<p>As with any large data set, the trade data accessed for this report may include some inconsistencies, omissions or duplicates. Misreporting in customs data is also possible. Efforts have been made to clean the datasets (by removing apparent duplicate entries from transaction-level datasets or disregarding datasets that were clearly incorrect) and to validate trends in data across multiple datasets, but it is possible that some inaccuracies remain.</p> +<p>In the pre-training sample, n = 80, so the maximum score for each category, WJ and PJ, was 320. Overall, this sample showed a WJ quotient of 73, or 23%, and a PJ quotient of 67, or 21%. Under half of these (45%) showed how the material being reported on fitted in with broader themes of conflict, in a framework of understanding.</p> -<p>Because Russia does not release data on its enriched uranium exports, values for trade with Russia were sourced from parallel import data of importing countries. Russia is not the only country that does not make information on its enriched uranium exports publicly available. For instance, the UK also does not publicly report its trade in enriched uranium. This limited the analysis that could be conducted for this report to those countries whose data could be accessed through publicly accessible sources. Any reference to exports from a given country indicates values sourced from the export data of that country; any reference to imports into a given country indicates values sourced from the import data of that country. In many instances, the import and export data of two trading partners differed somewhat; this may be due to differences in customs reporting between the two countries or delays between the export of material from one country and its arrival in the other. Such discrepancies have been noted throughout the report and given due attention in instances where they were particularly significant.</p> +<p>In the post-training sample, n = 85, so the maximum score for each category, WJ and PJ, was 340. Overall, this sample showed a WJ quotient of 18, or 5%, and a PJ quotient of 183, or 57%. Fully 68 out of the sample of 85 (or 80%) constructed a framework of understanding in which connections, between the sources for the stories, their words and deeds, and larger or more general issues of conflict, were clearly indicated.</p> -<p>It is worth noting that the prices of natural uranium and enrichment services – which are included in the value of enriched uranium product – fluctuate. The spot price (the price of uranium purchased outside existing contracts) of natural (unenriched) uranium has risen significantly in the past three years. To avoid conflating increases in the values and volumes of trade in enriched uranium, data on both the monetary values and the net weight of enriched uranium (in the form of uranium hexafluoride) and nuclear fuel being traded has been included in the report, where available. However, data on the weight of material traded can also vary between datasets. While the data largely captures net weight, in some instances, data may also be capturing gross weight. As such, both the value and volume of goods should be reviewed together when analysing the data. The two largely bear out similar patterns. Where there are notable discrepancies, this has been highlighted.</p> +<p>From a comparison of coding between the two raters, Scott’s pi was calculated at 0.91, indicating a high level of agreement. For comparison, in the Lee and Maslog study (Lee and Maslog 2005) quoted above, “a coding of 100 stories produced Scott’s pi of between 0.76 and 0.93”, on a range of different dyads.</p> -<p>When querying trade data for enriched uranium, where possible, searches were conducted for HS code 28442035, the commodity code for uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds. Some databases only allow for searches of six-digit HS codes; in these instances, HS code 284420 was queried instead, which includes the following commodities: uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds; plutonium and its compounds; alloys; dispersions (including metal-ceramics); ceramic products and mixtures containing uranium enriched in U-235; plutonium or compounds of these products. As such, data queried using the six-digit code may also include some materials besides enriched uranium. However, data for HS code 284420 is normally overwhelmingly made up of enriched uranium, with any other materials appearing in relatively small quantities. Variations of HS code 284420 were used in some instances – HS code 28442000 to query Chinese data (similar considerations relating to queries using HS code 284420 apply) and HS code 2844200020 to query US data (which captures uranium fluoride enriched in U-235) to access information on the weight of traded material, not just value.</p> +<h4 id="41-pre-training-examples">4.1. Pre-Training Examples</h4> -<h3 id="i-nuclear-fuel-supply-chains-and-russias-role">I. Nuclear Fuel Supply Chains and Russia’s Role</h3> +<p>Nearly all the trainees were performing some aspects of PJ in their existing reporting, chiefly in the people-orientation. The material covered a wide range of different story types and media, from amateur-style (possibly smartphone) video pictures stitched together in rudimentary edits, often with no reporter voiceover, to professionally shot and edited longer packages.</p> -<p>Before examining Russia’s enriched uranium trade, it is worth understanding the nature of global nuclear fuel supply chains. Figure 1 includes a simplified overview of the nuclear fuel cycle. This report is only concerned with the front end of the cycle, and more specifically the enrichment stage.</p> +<p>Among the more technically rudimentary pieces in the sample was a video piece of just over a minute’s duration about an Art Centre in Nangarhar province offering, on a voluntary basis, free education for orphans, including “girls up to the age of 12” — the oldest that are presently allowed to attend school under the Taliban.</p> -<h4 id="overview-of-market-dynamics-in-the-front-end-of-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle">Overview of Market Dynamics in the Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle</h4> +<p>It edited together statements from two pupils, a boy and a girl, then the centre’s Director, who explained the initiative to camera. There was no reporter voiceover. It could, then, be assessed as a piece of PJ, in the domains of people- and peace-orientation, since it is contributing to quotidian security. A positive score was allotted for a framework of understanding. The example is worth dwelling on because it illustrated the subtlety of signalling that could be deemed, in the codebook and adjusted for context, to “count” in this respect. The girl pupil was interviewed in front of a background that prominently included a picture of a dove carrying an olive branch, perched on the barrel of a gun and causing it to bend downwards. As Fahmy and Neumann note, “the framing that occurs through visuals is… potentially more effective in communicating specific interpretation of news events than framing that occurs via print and/or in written and spoken parts of broadcast news” (Fahmy and Neumann 2012, p. NP4).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XnJgzSr.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Overview of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.</strong> Source: Data from <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/nuclear-fuel-cycle-overview.aspx">World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Overview”, updated April 2021</a>.</em></p> +<p>It is reasonable to speculate that this visual juxtaposition, along with the evident joy and excitement of the young girl as she spoke about her studies, could lead audiences to respond by referencing this situation to the controversy over girls’ school attendance at the secondary stage. Whether consciously or not, that would potentially enter the process of meaning-making. Any who viewed the article after 27 March 2023 would also most likely be aware of the arrest of Matiullah Wesa, an “education activist… [who] helped to set up or restore schools. And along the way, emboldened whole communities to keep pushing for greater education opportunities” (Latifi 2023).</p> -<p>The generation of energy from nuclear fuel depends on the splitting of atoms of the uranium isotope U-235 inside a nuclear reactor (nuclear fission). Mined uranium ore is made up of about 0.7% of U-235, with the remainder consisting of U-238. To make the fissile U-235 isotope suitable for nuclear energy generation in light water reactors its concentration must be increased before the uranium can be used to produce nuclear fuel assemblies (for most contemporary nuclear reactors, the concentration is about 3–5% U-235, which is classified as low enriched uranium (LEU)). This is done through the uranium enrichment process, using one of several possible methods. Globally, there is a limited number of companies that offer enrichment services, with almost all commercial enrichment conducted by one of four companies: Rosatom; China National Nuclear Corporation; Orano; and Urenco. Enrichment capacity is measured in SWU, which represent the effort required to separate isotopes of U-235 and U-238.</p> +<p>A report of a car bomb in Logar province, dating from the early days after the Taliban takeover in 2021, was allotted a War Journalism point for violence-orientation, but also some Peace Journalism points. These included a people-orientation, as local citizens spoke about the impact on them and their community, but also the provincial governor, Abdul Qayum Rahimi, offering his analysis of the nature and extent of Taliban responsibility for the blast, blame for which was not explicitly apportioned, in the piece, to any one group. Instead, in general terms, the governor said: “Talib is a ceiling and different groups work under this ceiling like Jesh Mohammad to Al-Qaida, Tajik militants, Uzbek militants, Kazakh, Arora, Pakistanis all are those groups that fight in Logar and empower the Taliban” — thus scoring positively under the supplementary indication for a framework of understanding.</p> -<p>Nuclear fuel fabrication is also limited to a relatively small number of manufacturers. Once manufactured, nuclear fuel assemblies may be used in the country of fabrication or shipped for loading into reactors in other countries. Due to the challenges associated with transporting radioactive material, nuclear fuel is usually fabricated broadly in the same region of the world where it will be used.</p> +<p>This is an issue that clearly needs careful handling and response. On the one hand, pointing the finger at ethnic minorities can clearly be dangerous. On the other, the governor was not alone in raising the alarm over the need for the Taliban authorities to take concrete steps to distance and dissociate themselves from non-state armed groups, to allow clearer and more effective policies to counter violent extremism. In a sample piece that included a television interview with EU Special Representative Tomas Niklasson, the latter stated:</p> -<p>The ultimate consumers of uranium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle are energy utilities, which generate electricity through the operation of nuclear reactors and sell it to consumers. Most often, the utility purchases the uranium it needs directly from uranium mine operators and owns the uranium throughout the rest of the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The utility then purchases the services necessary to turn mined uranium into usable nuclear reactor fuel (that is, conversion, enrichment, deconversion and fuel fabrication) from relevant service providers; however, the utility normally remains the sole owner of the material throughout the process.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“Afghanistan’s USD$9 billion capital that is outside Afghanistan, this capital has been frozen due to the type of takeover of power by Taliban. It’s a normal procedure. No other country has tried to make the frozen capital closed to Afghanistan, but USA is the leading country in this regard. The reasons for freezing this money are these: that there isn’t any description of Afghanistan Bank independence, there isn’t any description of the Afghanistan Bank for preventing the use of this money for terrorist activities, and this money cannot be given to Afghanistan until an assurance is provided in this regard. You can always see a half empty glass, but I see it as a half glass of water and if Taliban take reasonable measures, some amount of this money will be released and all the money should be transferred back to Afghanistan in the future”.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The various service providers may be – and often are – located in countries other than the one where the material will eventually be used in reactors for energy generation. As a hypothetical example, uranium ore mined in Kazakhstan may be purchased by a Swiss utility, sent to Russia to be converted and enriched by Russian companies, then transported to a French-owned nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Germany to be made into nuclear fuel assemblies, before finally being delivered to Switzerland for use in Swiss nuclear reactors. Throughout this process, the Swiss utility would maintain ownership of the uranium material.</p> +<p>Some of the submitted sample material dated from before the Taliban takeover. A report from RTA Afghanistan, the state broadcaster, offered a highly professional piece of television War Journalism: a facility with a military patrol shown discovering and defusing enemy munitions secreted by Taliban forces in or near Kabul. A transcript of a television studio discussion from Sediqa Faramarz referred to Abdullah Abdullah as leading negotiations on behalf of the Afghan government, and US and UK troops entering the country. Both arguably exemplified the dominant War Journalism settings of reporting under the Republic, as recorded in content analysis by Lynch and Freear (2023). A typical excerpt from the latter showed a victory orientation:</p> -<p>An alternative supply model involves the purchase and sale of uranium at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle by brokers and traders, who have themselves purchased the uranium or services in question from providers and sell these on to utilities.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“The First Vice President of the Republic says that we will not accept any kind of conditions and any kind of compromise of Taliban rule to the people of Afghanistan, and we will not agree to any kind of deal and conditions that the Taliban will comply with. For any reason, we will not accept the peace of Taliban for the people of Afghanistan, and we will not agree to any deal dictated by the Taliban”.</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="russian-presence-across-the-global-nuclear-fuel-supply-chain">Russian Presence Across the Global Nuclear Fuel Supply Chain</h4> +<p>By way of contrast, a more recent submission from the same trainee, though still in the pre-training sample, contained transcripts of several video news stories illustrating social problems and challenges, with sources recommending cooperation, even efforts to engender peace, as solutions. These adopted a strong watchdog role, pointing up situations where governmental action under the Islamic Emirate departed from its apparent commitments, or was criticised by international organisations, but also giving credit for a successful effort by Afghanistan to reduce corruption, as reflected by its improving position in the “league table” compiled by Transparency International, since the change of regime.</p> -<p>While Russian companies offer services across the nuclear fuel cycle, this report focuses on the provision of Russian enrichment services, as enrichment and conversion are the parts of the global nuclear supply chain where there are the greatest dependencies on Russia. Russia and, more specifically, the Rosatom subsidiaries TVEL and TENEX, is the greatest supplier of enrichment services to the global market. In 2022, Rosatom provided 35% of uranium enrichment services globally, according to the company’s 2022 annual report, and, according to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), provided 44% of global enrichment capacity in 2022.</p> +<h4 id="42-post-training-examples">4.2. Post-Training Examples</h4> -<p>The precise value of Russian enriched uranium exports over the past two years is difficult to ascertain as Russia does not make data on its enriched uranium trade publicly available. Some estimates are possible using import data from Russian customer countries reported through publicly accessible sources such as UN Comtrade, Eurostat, individual government reporting and third-party trade data providers. However, as noted earlier, some countries, for example, the UK, do not report their enriched uranium imports. Furthermore, at least in the case of the US, the import values of Russian enriched uranium include “returned feed”, that is, unenriched uranium the equivalent of which is returned to Russia, as required under US regulation (for more details, see Chapter V). As such, estimates of Russian enriched uranium exports are likely to be inexact and are not necessarily representative of the revenue that Rosatom generates from this trade. UN Comtrade data shows $2.03 billion in global imports from Russia under HS code 284420 in 2022, up from $1.29 billion in 2021. Data compiled from a range of sources shows $2.7 billion of enriched uranium imports from Russia in 2023.</p> +<p>The following articles from the “after” sample were among those with noteworthy elements of content, based on the observations above.</p> -<p>Several Western and partner governments have taken some limited measures to sanction Rosatom or to make trade with Russia in nuclear materials more challenging or unattractive. The UK, the US and others have sanctioned parts of the Rosatom leadership and/or a small number of the company’s subsidiaries. In July 2022, the UK also introduced a new 35% tariff on imports of radioactive chemical elements and isotopes from Russia, which includes enriched uranium. While the EU has not introduced sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector, some European countries and companies have undertaken efforts to diversify away from Russian imports, turning to alternative suppliers of nuclear reactor technology and nuclear fuel. A bill that would restrict the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US was also passed in the US House of Representatives in December 2023 and, at the time of writing, was awaiting debate by the US Senate.</p> +<p>A story for Deutsche Welle, “Scholars”, aired on 26 May 2023 as the training was still underway, exemplified several aspects of PJ. It represented an issue of conflict — girls’ education — over which many parties’ views are aired, including those of eminent Islamic scholars but also a student and political commentators. The representation was not entirely dyadic, since the government’s position was nuanced, in some ways contradictory and possibly evolving. The article heard from sources about the impact on national productivity of keeping girls from being educated. It was conflict-oriented, people-oriented, truth-oriented, and solution-oriented. It constructed a framework of understanding in which everyday lived reality was connected to broader conflict issues. Those criticising the Taliban’s rescission of education rights for girls beyond elementary level appeared in roles allotted by Fahmy and Neumann, in a study of visual effects in news about conflict, as belonging to the Peace Journalism end of the spectrum, being “negotiators or demonstrators… [rather than] victims [or] belligerents” (Fahmy and Neumann 2012, p. NP 17).</p> -<p>While analysts disagree on precisely how much the termination of Russian enriched uranium deliveries would impact Western utilities, there seems to be broad agreement that, in the absence of additional Western capacity coming online, such an embargo, whether introduced by Western governments or by Russia, as Moscow has previously threatened, would create at least some challenges for Western utilities. Several experts interviewed for this research expressed concerns that some US utilities may struggle to keep nuclear power plants operating should Russian enriched uranium supply be cut off; one interviewee noted that the concern is probably over longer-term supply and that utilities likely have sufficient stockpiles to carry them over in the short term. Furthermore, as time passes, governments and utilities may become increasingly better prepared to deal with disruptions in Russian enriched uranium supply. (For a further discussion on potential supply challenges, see Chapter V.)</p> +<p>A story titled “Carpet”, for a television channel, Khama News, showed girls forced out of school who now worked as weavers in a nearby factory. It carried the now familiar line that the government was working towards re-opening schools for girls, which, again, provided a solution orientation. The comments from the girls themselves, which included an observation that the schools had now been closed for 600 days, may be interpreted in context as truth-orientation, prompting and enabling the reader to see through propaganda. This is mentioned here as an example of the subtle inferential coding required to detect salient framing content in the process of meaning-making in the Afghan context of 2023. To select such an example for attention, in the context of a news channel, may reflect the resourcefulness required of the journalist operating in constrained conditions, typical of non-Western settings, and adopting an approach that Hussain characterises as “critical pragmatism… [which] focuses on practice and at the same time, is aware of the structures that contribute to systemic inequalities in the outcomes. To ensure more purposeful activities, it stresses on critical reflections to develop better solutions to the social problems” (Hussain 2022, p. 117).</p> -<p>Alternative enrichment capacity exists in Europe and the US – a combined 25,400 tonnes of SWU as of 2022, according to the WNA. In its latest report on global nuclear fuel markets, the WNA concludes that there is currently an oversupply of global enrichment capacity when compared to demand; however, Russia accounts for nearly half of current global SWU capacity. Additional Western capacity is being added through the expansion of Urenco’s enrichment plant in Eunice, New Mexico (an additional 700 tonnes of SWU per year, with the first cascades expected to become operational in 2025), Urenco’s Dutch facility at Almelo (an additional 750 tonnes of SWU per year, with the first cascades expected to become operational in 2027), Urenco’s enrichment plant in Gronau, Germany, and Orano’s Georges Besse II plant in southern France (an additional 2,500 tonnes of SWU per year, with additional capacity starting to become operational in 2028). Increased uranium enrichment in the US and Europe will also depend on the availability of the stage in the nuclear fuel cycle that precedes enrichment – conversion, where Russia also dominates the market. There are also enriched uranium inventories in the US and Europe, which stood at 3,963 tonnes of uranium in Europe and 2,670 tonnes of uranium in the US at the end of 2021 and which may help alleviate (at least partially) shortages caused by a termination of Russian supply. However, inventories vary between countries and utilities.</p> +<p>A transcript from an Azadi Radio newsmagazine programme showed how international agencies, including the World Food Programme, were being forced to suspend their operations in Afghanistan, blaming interference by the Taliban authorities. The segment was scored positively in the Peace Journalism coding categories of being peace-and-conflict oriented, by explaining backgrounds and contexts, including the economic disruption brought about by the change of government; people-oriented, by interviewing social actors from sub-elite levels; and solution-oriented, due to the time given over to allowing these interviewees to call for specific policy responses to alleviate the situation. It constructed a framework of understanding in which their perspectives could be seen as directly relevant to broader conflict issues.</p> -<p>Russia is also a major supplier of nuclear reactor technology and nuclear reactor fuel, although the dependencies in this context have historically been in Eastern Europe and are now increasing in the Global South. Western suppliers have begun successfully replacing Russia’s supply of reactor and fuel technology to certain markets. Russia is also an important supplier in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, taking deliveries of spent nuclear fuel (which has already been irradiated in a nuclear reactor) for long-term storage or for reprocessing (the extraction of uranium from used reactor fuel, which can then be enriched and reused in the production of new nuclear fuel). France has historically sent reprocessed uranium from its reactors to Russia for re-enrichment. In 2018, Urenco concluded a contract with French utility EDF to enrich uranium recovered from reprocessed fuel from French reactors; the reprocessed fuel will be converted in Russia and delivered to Urenco’s facility in Almelo (the Netherlands) for enrichment, before being sent to a fuel fabrication plant at Romans-sur-Isère (France) for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for French reactors. The UK’s nuclear reactor at the Sizewell-B nuclear power plant has also previously used Framatome-manufactured nuclear fuel containing enriched reprocessed uranium (ERU) which was enriched in Russia. Sizewell-B has now switched to using natural (non-reprocessed) uranium enriched by Orano.</p> +<h4 id="43-coding-for-gender">4.3. Coding for Gender</h4> -<p>As this report focuses on Russian enrichment services, Russian presence across the rest of the fuel cycle, including in uranium conversion and reprocessing services, is not discussed at length. However, it is worth noting that weaning utilities in Western and partner countries off dependencies on Russian enriched uranium will only tackle one piece of the puzzle. Curtailing dependencies on Russia in Western countries’ nuclear energy supply chains will require investment in non-Russian capacity in other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, too, with conversion services being a particular chokepoint.</p> +<p>The gradual withdrawal of US and allied forces starting in May 2021 enabled the Taliban’s military takeover of the entire country by August of that year, thus reducing the level of direct violence and bringing peace to the country, on “the most popular (Western) view… as an absence of war [which is] also the primary dictionary definition” (Rummel 1981). This, in turn, delivered security, but only of a kind which “assumes a short-term outlook and presents physical threats as the main risks, largely overlooking the long-term drivers of insecurity”, according to a critical expert group in the UK. It “proposes to respond by extending control over the strategic environment, achieved principally through offensive military capabilities, a superpower alliance, and restrictions on civil liberties” (Ammerdown Group 2016, p. 1).</p> -<h4 id="rosatom-and-the-war-in-ukraine">Rosatom and the War in Ukraine</h4> +<p>Reardon identifies this as a distinctively gendered view, since it sustains “the present highly militarized, war prone, patriarchal nation state system” (Reardon and Snauwaert 2015, p. 112). As an alternative, she shows how peace and social activism by women, in a range of contexts, bequeath a concept of human security as “in essence the conditions that make possible the experience and expectation of well-being” (ibid., p. 117).</p> -<p>Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear state enterprise, is responsible – through its many subsidiaries – for the development and export of Russian nuclear energy-related technology, services and materials. However, the company has also been reported as being connected with Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, and is headed up by some of the most senior people in Russia’s political and security circles. The company’s supervisory board is chaired by Sergey Kirienko, former prime minister of Russia and currently first deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Kirienko has admitted to orchestrating Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s occupied territories. According to Rosatom’s webpage, its board also includes: Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev; Assistant to the President of Russia Larissa Brychyova; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry Denis Manturov; First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Sergey Korolev; Deputy Prime Minister (and former Minister of Energy) Alexander Novak; Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev; Assistant to the President Maxim Oreshkin; and former Russian Ambassador to the US and currently Advisor to the President Yuri Ushakov. All members of the Rosatom supervisory board, with the exception of Ushakov, have been sanctioned by either the UK, the US or both. At the time of writing, there are no sanctions on Rosatom nor its leadership from the EU.</p> +<p>This connects with the typical concerns of such activism, which “stem from… conditions of quotidian security for families and communities… They have been active in environmental protection movements, efforts to overcome and compensate for poverty, the human rights movement for gender equality and rights of the excluded and oppressed” (Reardon and Snauwaert 2015, p. 120).</p> -<p>The company has reportedly offered to provide technology for the Russian military, and Rosatom staff were allegedly present at the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone following the Russian occupation of the site in February 2022. The company has also been reported as playing an important role in Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear power plant (NPP) in Europe, which was attacked and occupied by the Russian military on 4 March 2022. Following the occupation, Rosatom was reported as having taken over management of the plant. In October 2022, the Joint Stock Company Operating Organisation of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (JSC ZNPP OO) was established and currently operates the ZNPP. Kirienko has also repeatedly visited the ZNPP since its occupation.</p> +<p>In the post-training sample, such concerns are prominent, notably over the lack of access to education for girls of secondary school age, but also including the unmet humanitarian needs of the Afghan population. These issues can be seen, therefore, as elements of a consciously re-gendered security concept, with salience to the Afghan context.</p> -<p>There have been media reports of torture and harassment of the ZNPP’s Ukrainian staff since the invasion. Staff that had not fled the fighting around the plant were reportedly forced to sign contracts with Rosatom. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly raised concerns over the safety and security of the ZNPP and the wellbeing of its staff, while US and European governments have condemned Russian behaviour at the plant. An apparent interest by Rosatom in the ZNPP’s Western-supplied fuel and related technology has also raised concerns of industrial espionage and the security of the nuclear material at the facility.</p> +<p>Indeed, the connection is made in some of the articles between provision for women’s rights, on the one hand, and protecting communities from a recrudescence of non-state armed groups, on the other. In an episode of Shamshad News, submitted by trainee Sabir Khan, reports from an international conclave quoted a Russian spokesperson as criticising Western countries for “isolating” Afghanistan. It was “not easy to fight against terrorism alone”, the programme voice-over observed. To the extent that this isolation is linked with Taliban refusal to allow women to work for agencies in the country, the programme interviewed an analyst, Shir Hasan Hasan, who commented: “The Taliban should take themselves out of isolation to success in this regard and they should work on national and international legitimacy, they should work on Afghanistan’s constitution, they should work on the freedom of political and civil activities, and they should work on women’s rights”.</p> -<p>TVEL, which operates Russia’s uranium enrichment plants, and TENEX, which supplies Russian enriched uranium abroad, are important members of the Rosatom family of companies. They are also closely related to JSC ZNPP OO, which is owned by JSC Rosenergoatom Concern (Rosenergoatom), the state enterprise responsible for the operation of Russia’s NPPs. TVEL, TENEX and Rosenergoatom are in turn owned by JSC Atomenergoprom (Atomenergoprom), the Russian state enterprise established “to consolidate the assets of the civilian part of the Russian nuclear industry” and which is a direct subsidiary of Rosatom. Figure 2 shows these relationships.</p> +<p>Research in Afghan communities before the Taliban takeover highlighted “everyday peace indicators” (Firchow and Mac Ginty 2017), or community-sourced indicators of change, perceived as important by the people themselves, according to a USIP study based on FGD data. A thousand participants from 18 villages in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar and Kunar provinces nominated, as a community indicator for peace while countering violent extremism, “the visibility of women and girls — especially seeing them going to school and traveling to the market. This indicator was universally prioritized by men, women, and youth interviewees, implying that women’s mobility is equated with feelings of security across demographics” (Urwin and Ahmadi 2018, p. 3). The clear consonance with Reardon’s emphasis on the “quotidian” in a re-gendered definition of security represents another sign that journalism by the Afghan trainees, after training, was constructing and exploring a set of security issues as yet untackled by the country’s new rulers, who were, in some cases, credibly presented as making them worse.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/X6TKBlo.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Ownership Structures of Rosatom Subsidiaries.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.rosenergoatom.ru/en/about-us/">Rosenergoatom, “About Us”</a>; <a href="https://atomenergoprom.ru/en/">Atomenergoprom</a>; <a href="https://www.tenex.ru/download/330/articles_of_association_of_tenex__joint_stock_company__revision_dated_march_27__2020_.pdf">Articles of Association of TENEX, Joint-Stock Company</a>; Russian Federal Tax Register documents sourced through <a href="https://sayari.com/">Sayari Analytics</a>; IBR EU Power Technologies LLC, Department of Nuclear Power Engineering and Nuclear Fuel Cycle, “Russian Uranium Enrichment Industry State and Prospects of Development”, 2023, pp. 22–24.</em></p> +<p>The new Emirati authorities could deploy force around their territory where necessary, including in “crackdowns” on rare open fronts of internal dissent — but only at the risk of overriding the everyday expectation and experience of wellbeing, and exacerbating the long-term drivers of insecurity. Again, the experiences of women, in such security contexts, could be seen as a touchstone. Latifi (2022) quotes Sadullah, a villager from Panjshir province, on the impact of the Taliban armed security response to the NRF insurgency: “Sadullah said he had tried to make the best of the situation back in Panjshir, but the presence of up to 150 Taliban fighters in their village made resuming normal life impossible. ‘We are a traditional people’, he explained. ‘Our women didn’t feel comfortable going out with strange Taliban fighters around’”.</p> -<h4 id="pursuit-for-continued-market-access">Pursuit for Continued Market Access</h4> +<p>As noted above, Peace Journalism is “supported by framing theory” (Lee and Maslog 2005). The dominant context-specific, gender-adjusted framing according to the elements in Entman’s formulation (Entman 1993) — to “make salient… [the] moral evaluation, problem definition, causal explanation and treatment recommendation” in the representation of a typical contested or ambiguous social scenario — can be read, from the post-training articles, in the following terms:</p> -<p>Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Rosatom and its subsidiaries have continued to do business with customers around the world, including the sale of enriched uranium to Europe, the US and globally. Rosatom’s 2022 annual report noted a 14.9% increase from the previous year (2021) in revenue for the company’s fuel division, which includes enrichment services (but also encompasses conversion services and production of nuclear fuel for reactors). Rosatom has also made no revisions to its business strategy up to 2030, which was last revised in 2020 and expects to see an increase in Rosatom’s revenue to 4 trillion RUB. This suggests a certain level of confidence (or at least an effort to portray confidence) in continued demand, despite clearly countervailing winds in trade with Russia among Western countries.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>A moral evaluation that depriving girls and women of opportunities is wrong;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A problem definition that includes violation of their human rights, as well as more pragmatic, consequentialist issues such as alienating the international community whose support is needed for both humanitarian relief and security, and leading to increased outward migration, thus costing Afghanistan human capital and talent;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A causal explanation that these problems are connected with doctrinaire decisions by the Emirati authorities;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Treatment recommendations that involve changes in policy, with not-infrequent signs that debate among the Taliban rulers is underway, and also referred to Islamic scholarship.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>One likely reason for this apparent confidence is Rosatom’s determined pursuit of the development and sale of new products, as well as expansion into new markets, particularly as it relates to the construction of NPPs abroad. Yet, Rosatom’s continued engagement with some of its traditional customers may also offer the company alternative or indirect access into markets that may otherwise be trying to diversify away from Russian supplies. One strategy that Rosatom may be trying to employ in its enriched uranium business is displacement, increasing its deliveries of enriched uranium to countries that are still willing – or contractually obligated – to accept them and which may then be able to increase exports of their own enriched uranium to global markets. This has been suggested in a report by nuclear industry consultancy I BR EU Power Technologies LLC. The company was established in 1991 “by a group of researchers and engineers who had previously worked at the research centers of the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry and the Ministry’s headquarters”. The company’s latest report on the state and development of the Russian nuclear enrichment industry, published in October 2023, notes that, in examining data on enriched uranium exports from Russia in 2022, the report’s authors were able to draw “preliminary conclusions” about Rosatom’s introduction of a new strategy in response to decreased purchases of Russian enriched uranium by some foreign customers, as a result of the war in Ukraine. The report notes:</p> +<h4 id="44-implications-for-future-media-development-aid">4.4. Implications for Future Media Development Aid</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>The essence of this element can be formulated as follows – to increase the supply of EUP [enriched uranium product] to countries that have a fleet of their own nuclear power plants and a uranium enrichment industry, with the aim of using this EUP at local nuclear power plants, which will partially free up local uranium enrichment capacities from the production of EUP for local nuclear power plants and use freed-up capacity for the production of EUP for export.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Trainees produced a strong and impressive body of Peace Journalism after the training. This shows a “benefit applied”: a key indicator, in a proposal from a senior practitioner Alan Davis of the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, in monitoring and evaluating interventions in media development aid. Such initiatives all contain a “benefit transferred”, he writes; what is more valuable is when trainees then change the content of their reporting to reflect the new ideas. A third category is the “benefit beyond” or the expected influence on audience meaning-making, source behaviours, and/or societal development as a whole (Davis 2008, pp. 90–91).</p> -<p>The report singles out France and China in its analysis of a potential Russian displacement strategy, noting the significant increase of enriched uranium imports by these two countries in 2022, as compared to 2021, driven primarily by imports from Russia. The report’s authors point to a planned increase in enriched uranium exports from France to the US, as well as a 2026–31 contract for the provision of SWU by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to South Korea’s KHNP (Korea Hydro &amp; Nuclear Power), as potential vehicles for this strategy.</p> +<p>This may have specific benefits for communities at risk from violent extremism such as the activities — and messaging to match — promulgated by such groups as IS–KP. Communication by such groups is akin to marketing, a recent policy guide by USAID notes. However, it is likely that “counter-narratives” are ineffective. Instead, “communication strategies should convey accessible alternatives that dilute the potency of violent extremists’ arguments while creating positive identities, opportunities for engagement, and expressions of agency” — that relate to the concerns and priorities of people, and are thereby closely akin to the orientations of Peace Journalism and the coding adopted to operationalise them in the Afghan context of 2023.</p> -<p>The data presented and analysed later in this report tries, in part, to test this displacement hypothesis. While this report is unable to definitively confirm using publicly available sources that displacement activity is occurring, at least in China’s case, shifts in trade patterns appear to be consistent with what one would expect to see if a displacement strategy was being introduced. Testing the possibility of displacement through France is even more challenging, considering the complexities of European nuclear fuel supply chains and the central role that France plays therein. Changes to French trade in enriched uranium could technically point to displacement, but – as in the case of China – there are other possible explanations for the shifts in trade patterns.</p> +<p>How far can this Peace Journalism training, for journalists in the new Afghanistan, afford insights capable of informing future interventions, and capable of taking effect by delivering benefits both applied and beyond? Lynch and Freear (2023) cite evidence from grey literature of specialist agencies being forced to adapt as international support for the media sector was “drawn down”, in the early 2000s. Some such aid continued to be available, albeit under the Islamic Republic government, and supplemented by paid advertising on behalf of international organisations.</p> -<p>The nuclear sector is not the only instance where Russia has been accused of resorting to a displacement strategy to compensate for the loss of certain markets in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. A similar tactic has been reported in relation to the oil sector. Media reporting has detailed increases in German imports of refined oil products from India in 2023 as compared to 2022, at the same time as India became a leading importer of Russian crude in 2022, thus apparently providing what has been called a “backdoor route” for Russian oil into European markets. Some have even suggested that some of the oil products shipped from India to European countries may include Russian material. If such activity is taking place to circumvent sanctions on Russian oil trade, it would not be inconceivable that a similar strategy may be applied in the nuclear sector, which has yet to be sanctioned to the same extent as the Russian petroleum sector.</p> +<p>Afghan journalism and media may therefore offer continuing affordances for Peace Journalism training. Afghan journalists interviewed for the antecedent study “wanted to do more Peace Journalism” (Lynch and Freear 2023, np). Their role perceptions proved consonant with earlier findings by Mitra, who interviewed Afghan photojournalists, finding them motivated by a “wish to depict positive, peaceful Afghanistan”. This showed “concurrence with PJ norms and point[ed] to the opportunities for acceptance of PJ” (Mitra 2017, p. 23). In both of these studies, therefore, Afghan journalists’ role perceptions gravitated towards those of journalists in developing countries more generally. In the collaborative Worlds of Journalism study, in which over 6000 journalists, from 60 countries, were interviewed, the single most widespread ethical precept was “non-involvement” in the stories covered, or detached “reporting of the facts”.</p> -<p>The following sections of this report examine whether and how similar displacement, and other possible adaptation methods, may be playing out (or may play out in future) in Russian trade in enriched uranium and enrichment services. They also offer and test possible alternative explanations for the observed shifts in Russian enriched uranium trade patterns.</p> +<p>Early Western critics of Peace Journalism, such as the then BBC correspondent David Loyn, rejected it as an attempt to “prescribe” methods of reporting conflict — an approach that risked, he averred, creating a “new orthodoxy… [something that would be] uniquely unhelpful” to reporters in the field. Rather, Loyn argued, they should be left to decide how to report on a case-by-case basis, by empirical methods, save in certain circumstances — such as those covered by libel laws — where specified activities are “proscribed” (Loyn 2008, pp. 53–54). In the WoJ study, however, majority-world participants — drawn from countries in east Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America — tended to a different view. Their responses revealed ethical precepts which emphasised values of “social intervention, national development and educating people” (Kalyango et al. 2017, p. 576).</p> -<h3 id="ii-case-study-china">II. Case Study: China</h3> +<p>The International Federation of Journalists report, referenced earlier, raises the alarm over a rupture in the system of support for Afghan journalists, catalysed by the collapse of the Republic and its replacement by the Taliban Islamic Emirate, with the consequent humanitarian crisis in the country now dominating the attention of aid agencies:</p> -<p>Russia has been a long-time partner of the Chinese nuclear energy industry, having built numerous nuclear reactors in China, contributed to the development of China’s domestic enrichment capabilities, and served as a long-time supplier of enriched uranium and nuclear fuel to the country. Trade data made available by the Chinese government reveals a number of shifts in China’s enriched uranium trade patterns since 2022, including with regard to its imports of Russian material and exports to the US. While the trade data alone cannot definitively confirm the hypothesis put forward by IBR EU Power Technologies that displacement of enriched uranium is taking place through China backed by greater Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium, it does point to the possibility of such activity. As China may be seeking to carve out a greater role for itself in world enriched uranium markets, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium may facilitate the pursuit of Beijing’s ambitions.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“Though some media aid implementers are finding ways to continue working in Afghanistan, the overall system for news organisations to solicit support from donors and implementers has broken down. Donor governments are focused on diplomacy and humanitarian relief rather than media development”.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Figures 3 and 4 show the value and weight of enriched uranium imports from Russia into China since 2015, respectively. After importing no enriched uranium from Russia in 2021 and 44 tonnes in 2020, Chinese enriched uranium imports from Russia rose to 685 tonnes ($492.6 million) in 2022. This was the highest level since 2011 (when Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium stood at 779 tonnes [$544 million]), as well as a 36% increase in volume from the next-highest yearly value – observed in 2019 (504 tonnes [$292 million]). The 2023 value of Russian imports of enriched uranium into China reached 467 tonnes ($418 million), a slight decrease from 2022 but still much higher than in many previous years.</p> +<p>At the time of writing, the United Nations was awaiting, from the Secretary General on a mandate directly from the Security Council, “forward-looking recommendations for an integrated and coherent approach [in the country] among relevant political, humanitarian, and development actors, within and outside of the United Nations”. These were due by mid-November 2023, with hopes high among some in the sector for the inclusion of a strategy to ensure “public access to information”, as called for in Goal 16, Target 10 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5l2YS5D.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Chinese Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (USD).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> +<p>Meanwhile, some interventions were already underway, having been devised specifically for implementation in the newly restricted media space under the Taliban, and focused on conflict-sensitive or Peace Journalism content. UNESCO announced a new partnership with the European Union in late 2022, to:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KQIJVe5.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Chinese Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>“Provide support to Afghan media outlets in the production of conflict-sensitive, humanitarian, health and educational public interest content. The project will benefit at least 6 million Afghan citizens, with a specific focus on reporting addressed at women, girls and youth. UNESCO will also be partnering with civil society organizations and local journalists’ unions to train an estimated six hundred journalists on conflict-sensitive reporting”.</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="possible-stockpiling-and-domestic-demand">Possible Stockpiling and Domestic Demand</h4> +<p>The results of this research, showing how such training can lead to changes in the content of news produced by Afghan journalists, suggest the potential of such initiatives to yield measurable results.</p> -<p>The relatively high volumes of Chinese imports of enriched uranium from Russia in the last two years could potentially be attributed to Chinese stockpiling efforts to meet nuclear fuel needs for its domestic fleet of reactors. This was the conclusion of a number of the experts interviewed for this report when shown trade data indicating an increase in the value of Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium. Indeed, in 2021, the chairperson of a China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation (CNEIC) subsidiary and a member of the National People’s Congress said that China should prioritise the expansion of the domestic strategic enriched uranium stockpile to limit the impact of enriched uranium price fluctuations, possible supply chain risks and other potential challenges.</p> +<p>The IFJ, for its part, called on “aid [to be] directed towards independent media. International supporters can facilitate communication among Afghan media outlets and encourage the strengthening of inter-organisational associations. Though such groups, media and CSOs can form a united front to engage both the Taliban and international donor community”.</p> -<p>China is a major nuclear energy power. As of December 2023, it was operating 55 nuclear reactors, with a further 22 under construction. Chinese SWU requirements are expected to rise significantly over the next decade. Chinese enrichment capacity is not reported publicly, but expert estimates seem to expect that China will increase its enrichment capacity to meet domestic demand. As these are simply estimates they may be subject to developments in opportunities to increase supply and inventories through additional imports. In its 2023 report “Global Inventories of Secondary Uranium Supplies” the IAEA estimates that China has also maintained a strategic enriched uranium stockpile since before 2010, which it believes may have increased by as much as 910 tonnes of enriched uranium product (tEUP) since then (the IAEA does not provide estimates of material stockpiled before 2010). The IAEA has observed that the strategic stockpile is intended for domestic consumption but notes that it may also be used to meet export demand, should China choose to increase its presence on international markets.</p> +<p>Results from the comparative content analysis of articles by the same journalists before and after undergoing training in Peace Journalism indicate the potential impact of such interventions at the level of a media approach to be applied, and to catalyse new creative practices, awareness, and critical reflexivity of particular importance amidst the highly emotive words and deeds of violent extremists. On a second level, changes to journalists’ professional environment, stimulating new techniques for fieldwork and news production, can sustain and spread the impact of the first. This can, in turn, lead to new relations with sources and other social groups, collaborating to create “public records of truth” (Waisbord 2019, p. 4), surfacing hitherto under-reported voices and issues. On a fourth level, Davis’ notion of a “benefit beyond” may be discerned in a public furnished with access to information that prompts and enables their appreciation of nonviolent policy responses to conflict issues foregrounded by ambiguous causal scenarios, identified as a crucial component of both communication for sustainable development and community resilience against communication strategies by groups associated with violent extremism.</p> -<h4 id="chinese-exports-of-enriched-uranium">Chinese Exports of Enriched Uranium</h4> +<p>Peace Journalism training can be effective, therefore, even among a group of participating trainees who face significant constraints in their working lives and pressure on a range of issues evident in the everyday lives of their readers and audiences, which present themselves for journalistic attention and coverage. With ongoing mentorship and encouragement to adapt the PJ approach to the exigencies of conflict, discernible extra value can be added to the supply of news reaching publics who remain vulnerable to the messaging of authoritarian rulers and violent extremists alike. Such interventions can deliver benefits both applied in news coverage itself and potentially beyond the training to enable cognitive resources to be developed and brought to bear in communities.</p> -<p>Historically, China has been a net importer of enriched uranium, exporting material only to Kazakhstan, the US, South Korea (until recently), and a small annual value ($100) to Austria, as well as nuclear fuel assemblies to Pakistan. However, it appears that China may be interested in becoming a greater supplier of enriched uranium to global markets. In October 2023, China reportedly completed its first export since 2014 of enriched uranium using imported feed material. In other words, for the first time in nearly a decade, China has provided enrichment services for a customer that had sourced the feed material elsewhere. Reports on this development noted that the resumption of trade in enrichment services (and the efforts that had gone into ensuring that the necessary regulatory and licensing frameworks are in place to allow this trade) are part of a CNEIC strategic policy of “going out, grabbing orders, and stabilizing growth” in the nuclear fuel trade, in light of the “historical window period” since the start of the “conflict between Russia and Ukraine” and its impact on international nuclear fuel demand and prices.</p> +<h3 id="references">References</h3> -<p>The introduction of this option for enrichment-service-only trade, combined with the articulated policy to capture more of the global nuclear fuel market, supports assessments that China may be looking to play an increasingly larger role as a supplier of enriched uranium and enrichment services. Increased imports of Russian material could help China meet the expanded demand that will result from a combination of the expected growth in its domestic enriched uranium needs and any expected increase in exports. In 2022, China announced a number of long-term nuclear fuel contracts with US and EU utilities, although it is unclear what those contracts involved specifically, whether they include deliveries of Chinese enriched uranium and, if so, when these would commence.</p> +<p>Adebayo, Joseph Olusegun. 2016. The Impact of Peace Journalism Training on Journalists’ Reportage of the 2015 Elections in Nigeria: An Action Research Case Study. Communicatio 42: 361–77. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02500167.2016.1216458">CrossRef</a></p> -<p>The IBR EU Power Technologies report pointed to a 2026–31 CNEIC contract with KHNP as a potential vehicle for enriched uranium displacement through China.</p> +<p>Ammerdown Group. 2016. Re-Thinking Security: A Discussion Paper, Executive Summary. <a href="https://rethinkingsecurity.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rethinking-security-executive-summary.pdf">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> -<p>Should China be engaging in the displacement of enriched uranium, facilitated by the observed increases in imports of Russian material, one would expect to see an increase in Chinese exports of enriched uranium since 2022, as Russian supply freed up domestic capacity for export. While the 2022 value and volume of Chinese exports of enriched uranium (97 tonnes [$65 million]) remained more or less on a par with 2021 figures (95 tonnes [$64 million]) and well below the values and volumes of exports in previous years, the volume of Chinese exports in 2023 (368 tonnes [$445 million]) increased by 288% from 2021. The increase is less dramatic when compared to previous years but is still noteworthy. The increase in exports in 2023 was in large part due to a spike in Chinese exports of enriched uranium to the US, which amounted to 175 tonnes ($316 million) in 2023, following three years (2019–21) of no Chinese exports to the US appearing in Chinese or US government trade data, and 5% higher than the volume of all Chinese exports of enriched uranium to the US from 2015 to 2022 combined (see Figure 5). Trade data made available by the US government confirms the Chinese-reported export values, although US import data shows much higher volumes of material delivered in 2023 (293 tonnes) than those reported in Chinese export data (the reason for this discrepancy is not clear). Besides the US, China also exported enriched uranium to Kazakhstan in 2023, with the value of these exports also increasing significantly, nearly doubling from 2022 (97 tonnes [$65 million]) to 2023 (193 tonnes [$130 million]). The additional exports under HS code 284420 from China to Kazakhstan could be related to the fabrication of nuclear fuel for Chinese reactors at a nuclear fabrication facility in Kazakhstan. The plant is operated by a Kazakh-Chinese joint venture and made its first delivery of fuel assemblies to China in early 2023.</p> +<p>Davis, Alan. 2008. A Road Map for Monitoring &amp; Evaluation in the Media Development Sector. In Media Matters: Perspective on Advancing Governance and Development from the Global Forum for Media Development. Edited by M. Harvey. Internews Europe and the Global Forum for Media Development: pp. 89–93. <a href="https://internews.org/resource/media-matters-perspectives-advancing-governance-development">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> -<p>An increase in Chinese exports of enriched uranium, even if coupled with an increase in enriched uranium imports from Russia, is not in itself sufficient to prove that displacement is occurring, as increased exports may also be the result of expanded domestic enrichment activity. The cyclical nature of trade in the nuclear energy sector and long contracting lead times for supply of enriched uranium for fuel manufacturing also mean that one cannot read too closely into variations in enriched uranium trade values. Furthermore, the volume of Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023 is significantly greater than the volume of 2023 Chinese exports to the US. This suggests that at least some of the material may be being used for the manufacturing of nuclear fuel inside China or being stockpiled – either to meet Chinese domestic demand or perhaps to support a future expansion of Chinese exports. In the absence of data on Chinese enriched uranium stockpiles, this is difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the scale of the increase in the volume and value of Chinese deliveries to the US in 2023 is noteworthy.</p> +<p>Dyrstad, Karin, and Solveig Hillesund. 2020. Explaining support for political violence: Grievance and perceived opportunity. Journal of Conflict Resolution 64: 1725–53. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720909886">CrossRef</a></p> -<p>The reason for these increases is not clear. However, trade records for 2023 Chinese deliveries of enriched uranium to the US sourced through corporate and trade data provider Sayari Analytics indicate that Global Nuclear Fuel Americas LLC and Westinghouse Electric Company, both manufacturers of nuclear fuel, received shipments of uranium hexafluoride from China in 2023. It is unclear whether the enriched uranium was ultimately used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel in the US, or who the ultimate recipient of any manufactured nuclear fuel may have been, including whether customers are domestic or foreign utilities. For instance, when asked about likely drivers for increased Chinese enriched uranium imports into the US, one expert interviewed for this report suggested that the increased imports of Chinese material into the US may be meant for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for Chinese reactors and therefore may be re-exported back to China.</p> +<p>Entman, Robert. 1993. Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication 43: 51–58. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x">CrossRef</a></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GfzMy87.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Chinese Exports to the US under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (USD).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> +<p>Fahmy, Shahira, and Rico Neumann. 2012. Shooting War or Peace Photographs? An Examination of Newswires’ Coverage of the Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009). American Behavioral Scientist 56: NP1–NP26. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764211419355">CrossRef</a></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gSFX03b.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Chinese Exports to the US under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Chinese customs data made available by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> +<p>Firchow, Pamina, and Roger Mac Ginty. 2017. Measuring Peace: Comparability, Commensurability, and Complementarity Using Bottom-Up Indicators. International Studies Review 19: 6–27. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix001">CrossRef</a></p> -<h4 id="implications">Implications</h4> +<p>Freear, Matt, and Andrew Glazzard. 2021. Preventing Violent Extremism Through Media and Communications, RUSI Whitehall Report. London: Royal United Services Institute. <a href="https://static.rusi.org/274_WHR_Strat_Comms.pdf">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> -<p>The limited publicly available information on domestic Chinese enrichment activity and the opacity of China’s internal nuclear fuel supply chains make it challenging to ascertain whether the increase in the value of exports of enriched uranium to the US in 2023 has been backed by increases in enrichment activity at domestic Chinese facilities or is the result of displacement facilitated by increased imports of Russian material into China. However, the data reviewed here points to the possibility that displacement may be taking place.</p> +<p>Hackett, Robert A. 2011. New vistas for peace journalism: Alternative media and communication rights. In Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches. Edited by Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch and Robert A Hackett. Sydney: Sydney University Press, pp. 33–67. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=New+vistas+for+peace+journalism:+Alternative+media+and+communication+rights&amp;author=Hackett,+Robert+A.&amp;publication_year=2011&amp;pages=33%E2%80%9367">Google Scholar</a></p> -<p>As the US seeks to diversify away from Russian uranium supply and curtail Rosatom revenues, to what extent might any such efforts be undermined by increased Russian access to the Chinese market and subsequent increases in deliveries of Chinese material to the US? Under US regulation that limits the amount of enriched uranium that can be imported into the country from Russia (“The Russian Suspension Agreement” [1992], discussed in greater detail in Chapter V), imports of enriched uranium “which can be shown to have resulted in the ultimate delivery or sale into the United States of displaced uranium products of any type, regardless of the sequence of the transactions” are considered a circumvention tactic. Importers of enriched uranium into the US are required to “submit at the time of entry a written statement certifying that the uranium being imported was not obtained under any arrangement, swap, or other exchange designed to circumvent the export limits for uranium of Russian Federation origin established by this Agreement”. A bill passed in the US House of Representatives in December 2023, which would prohibit the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US (but which has not yet passed the Senate or received presidential approval at the time of drafting), contains a similar anti-circumvention provision, prohibiting the import of “unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is determined to have been exchanged with, swapped for, or otherwise obtained in lieu of unirradiated low-enriched uranium [produced in the Russian Federation or by a Russian entity] in a manner designed to circumvent the restrictions under this section”.</p> +<p>Hanitzsch, Thomas. 2008. Situating peace journalism in journalism studies: A critical appraisal. In The Peace Journalism Controversy. Edited by Wilhelm Kempf. Berlin: Regener, pp. 69–80. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v1i1.96">CrossRef</a></p> -<p>It is not clear whether imports of enriched uranium from China into the US were accompanied by any such certification. Such a declaration would likely have been subject to processes governed by contractual confidentiality. Considering the complexity and commercial sensitivity inherent to nuclear fuel supply chains, definitively proving that any given import of enriched uranium into a given country is not the product of displacement using Russian enriched uranium is likely to be challenging. However, should such displacement be occurring, it would undermine US efforts to diversify away from Russian supply. While imports of enriched uranium from China into the US remain a minor share of all US imports of enriched uranium, the stark increase in the value of deliveries in 2023 should be examined more closely. US utilities and government would also do well to consider the risks of swapping dependencies on Russia for dependencies on China in its enriched uranium supply. China’s apparent interest in taking advantage of the shifts occurring in global nuclear supply chains suggests that China may be actively angling to replace Russia in the US’s nuclear energy supply chain, potentially using increased imports of Russian material.</p> +<p>Hussain, Shabir. 2022. Peace Journalism in a Non-Western Context: A Theoretical Perspective. In Responsible Journalism in Conflicted Societies: Trust and Public Service across New and Old Divides. Edited by Jake Lynch and Charis Rice. New York: Routledge, pp. 110–22. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Peace+Journalism+in+a+Non-Western+Context:+A+Theoretical+Perspective&amp;author=Hussain,+Shabir&amp;publication_year=2022&amp;pages=110%E2%80%9322">Google Scholar</a></p> -<h3 id="iii-case-study-france">III. Case Study: France</h3> +<p>Kalyango, Yusuf, Folker Hanusch, Jyotika Ramaprasad, Terje Skjerdal, Mohd Safar Hasim, Nurhaya Muchtar, Mohammad Sahid Ullah, Levi Zeleza Manda, and Sarah Bomkapre Kamara. 2017. Journalists’ Development Role Perceptions. Journalism Studies 18: 576–94. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1254060">CrossRef</a></p> -<p>France is regularly mentioned in media coverage and expert discussion of continued Western reliance on Russian enriched uranium. The French nuclear sector has a long history of partnership with Russia, with Rosatom entering the French market in the 1970s. The value and volume of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia rose notably in 2022 and has remained high in 2023, relative to pre-2022 levels. According to Eurostat data, in 2021, France imported 110 tonnes (€93 million) from Russia under HS code 28442035. In 2022, the volume of imports rose to 312 tonnes (€359 million), an increase of 184% from 2021. Eurostat data shows 223 tonnes in imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2023, a 103% increase in volume from 2021 but a decrease of 29% from 2022 imports. Comparable levels of imports from Russia into France were last seen in 2014, when France imported 399 tonnes (€398 million) of enriched uranium from Russia. It is worth noting that the value of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2023 actually increased from 2022, to €396 million, pointing to a discrepancy between changes in the value and weight of imports from Russia in 2023. The reason for this discrepancy was not clear. Figures 7 and 8 show the value and weight, respectively, of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia from 2015 to 2023.</p> +<p>Latifi, Ali M. 2022. In Afghanistan’s Shadowy New Conflict, New Displacement and New Civilian Abuses. The New Humanitarian. <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/11/23/Afghanistan-Panjshir-Taliban-abuses-resistance-UN">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> -<p>Several explanations for the increase in French imports of Russian material are possible and are explored in this chapter. Based on a review of trade data, publicly available information on nuclear fuel supply chains in Europe and other public reporting, one likely explanation (although difficult to prove with certainty) is that the increased imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and continued relatively high levels in 2023 may be the result of the redistribution of Russian enriched uranium by some utilities across their supply chains – delivering more of their Russian-sourced material for fuel fabrication in France instead of to fabrication facilities in other countries that may be less willing to accept Russian supply. If true, this would mean that efforts to move away from Russian enriched uranium supply by some companies and governments may be being offset – at least in part – by greater imports of Russian enriched uranium into France. This chapter outlines these developments and tests a number of other possible explanations for the observed increases in French imports of Russian enriched uranium since 2022.</p> +<p>Latifi, Ali M. 2023. Arrest of Leading Education Activist Leaves Afghans Confused and Worried. The New Humanitarian. <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2023/04/12/arrest-afghanistan-matiullah-wesa-education-advocate">Available online</a> (accessed on 5 January 2024).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kdTELAw.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: French Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (EUR).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Eurostat, “EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> +<p>Lee, Seow Ting, and Crispin C. Maslog. 2005. War or Peace Journalism in Asian Newspapers. Journal of Communication 55: 311–29. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2005.tb02674.x">CrossRef</a></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QH6aZfB.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: French Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Eurostat, “EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> +<p>Lloyd, Fiona. 2003. Radio for peace training in Indonesia. In The Power of Media: A Handbook for Peacebuilders. Edited by Ross Howard, Francis Rolt, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven. Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, pp. 118–27. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Radio+for+peace+training+in+Indonesia&amp;author=Lloyd,+Fiona&amp;publication_year=2003&amp;pages=118%E2%80%9327">Google Scholar</a></p> -<h4 id="overview-of-the-french-nuclear-energy-sector">Overview of the French Nuclear Energy Sector</h4> +<p>Loyn, David. 2008. Good journalism or peace journalism? In The Peace Journalism Controversy. Edited by Wilhelm Kempf. Berlin: Regener, pp. 53–68. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Good+journalism+or+peace+journalism?&amp;author=Loyn,+David&amp;publication_year=2008&amp;pages=53%E2%80%9368">Google Scholar</a></p> -<p>France plays a significant role in European and global nuclear fuel supply chains. The country is not only a major producer and consumer of nuclear energy, but it also hosts conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing facilities. At the time of writing, France hosted 56 operational reactors with a total net electrical capacity of 61.37 GW(e), second only to the US on both metrics. Another reactor is expected to be connected to the grid in mid-2024. France’s nuclear reactor fleet is operated by Électricité de France SA (EDF), which is fully owned by the French state. France also performs uranium conversion at the Philippe Coste plant (an Orano facility), uranium enrichment at the Georges Besse II plant (also an Orano facility) and nuclear fuel fabrication at the Romans-sur-Isère plant (a Framatome facility). According to its webpage, Framatome is owned by EDF (80.5%) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (19.5%). Through its subsidiary companies, Framatome also operates nuclear fuel fabrication plants at Lingen, Germany (Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH) and in Richland, Washington (Framatome, Inc.). Fuel manufactured at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère facility serves both the French domestic fleet of reactors and nuclear utilities and research reactors abroad. French reactors are also loaded with fuel manufactured at the fuel fabrication plant at Västerås, Sweden (owned by a subsidiary of US company Westinghouse Electric), at a plant in Juzbado, Spain (owned by Spanish company Enusa; Westinghouse manufactures EDF fuel at the facility), and at the Westinghouse-operated facility at Springfields, UK. Components of fuel assemblies destined for French reactors may also be manufactured at Framatome’s facility in Lingen. Figure 9 shows a simplified summary of the locations of uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in Europe and the UK.</p> +<p>Lynch, Jake, and Annabel McGoldrick. 2005. Peace Journalism. Stroud: Hawthorn Press. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Peace+Journalism&amp;author=Lynch,+Jake&amp;author=and+Annabel+McGoldrick&amp;publication_year=2005">Google Scholar</a></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mWbApMI.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Locations of European and UK Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities.</strong> Source: Generated based on data from various sources.</em></p> +<p>Lynch, Jake, and Giuliana Tiripelli. 2022. Overcoming the Peace Journalism paradox: A case study in journalist training as media development aid. Journal of Applied Journalism and Media Studies 11: 211–26. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1386/ajms_00091_1">CrossRef</a></p> -<p>As such, enriched uranium may theoretically be imported into France for the following purposes:</p> +<p>Lynch, Jake, and Johan Galtung. 2010. Reporting Conflict: New Directions in Peace Journalism. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Reporting+Conflict:+New+Directions+in+Peace+Journalism&amp;author=Lynch,+Jake&amp;author=and+Johan+Galtung&amp;publication_year=2010">Google Scholar</a></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Production of nuclear fuel in France (at the Romans-sur-Isère facility) for the French reactor fleet.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Production of nuclear fuel in France (at the Romans-sur-Isère facility) for export to utilities abroad.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Further shipment of the enriched uranium from France to Germany, Sweden, the UK or Spain (via other countries for deconversion) to be used in the production of nuclear fuel for the French reactor fleet.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Further shipment of the enriched uranium from France to Germany, Sweden, the UK or Spain (via other countries for deconversion) to be used in the production of nuclear fuel for export to utilities abroad.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Lynch, Jake, and Matt Freear. 2023. Why intervention in Afghan media failed to provide support for peace talks. Frontiers in Communication 8. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2023.1118776">CrossRef</a></p> -<p>An increase in French imports of Russian enriched uranium could therefore be explained by an increase in demand for enriched uranium generally, or for Russian material specifically, for one or several of these purposes.</p> +<p>Margolin, Devorah. 2019. The Changing Roles of Women in Violent Islamist Groups. Washington, DC: The Program on Extremism at The George Washington University, vol. 2, pp. 40–49. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=The+Changing+Roles+of+Women+in+Violent+Islamist+Groups&amp;author=Margolin,+Devorah&amp;publication_year=2019">Google Scholar</a></p> -<h4 id="possible-stockpiling-in-france">Possible Stockpiling in France</h4> +<p>Mitra, Saumava. 2017. Adoptability and acceptability of peace journalism among Afghan photojournalists: Lessons for peace journalism training in conflict-affected countries. Journal of the Association for Journalism Education 6: 17–27. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Adoptability+and+acceptability+of+peace+journalism+among+Afghan+photojournalists:+Lessons+for+peace+journalism+training+in+conflict-affected+countries&amp;author=Mitra,+Saumava&amp;publication_year=2017&amp;journal=Journal+of+the+Association+for+Journalism+Education&amp;volume=6&amp;pages=17%E2%80%9327">Google Scholar</a></p> -<p>One possible explanation for the increased French imports of Russian enriched uranium, and the initial suspicion of a number of the experts consulted for this report, is that French utilities and fuel manufacturing facilities have been in a rush to stockpile Russian material for future use, in advance of possible future bans on enriched uranium imports from Russia. Such stockpiling would help to ensure that sufficient inventories are in place to meet long-term domestic French needs as well as future demand of foreign customers.</p> +<p>Nohrstedt, Stig-Arne, and Rune Ottosen. 2011. Peace Journalism–Critical Discourse Case Study: Media and the Plan for Swedish and Norwegian Defence Cooperation. In Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches. Edited by Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch and Robert A. Hackett. Sydney: Sydney University Press, pp. 217–38. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Peace+Journalism%E2%80%93Critical+Discourse+Case+Study:+Media+and+the+Plan+for+Swedish+and+Norwegian+Defence+Cooperation&amp;author=Nohrstedt,+Stig-Arne&amp;author=and+Rune+Ottosen&amp;publication_year=2011&amp;pages=217%E2%80%9338">Google Scholar</a></p> -<p>To test this hypothesis, an assessment of changes in French enriched uranium stockpiles is needed. Information on France’s annual national inventories of enriched uranium is made available in reports by France’s national agency for radioactive waste management (Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs, ANDRA). At the time of writing, ANDRA has not made available information on 2022 or 2023 stockpiles. Its estimates of French enriched uranium stocks up to 2040 predict relatively consistent inventory levels over this time period, although it notes that the estimates are based on historical trends and do not represent (or reflect) an industrial strategy. The financial reports of EDF and Framatome indicate a drop in the monetary value of their holdings of nuclear fuel between 2021 and 2022, while Orano reported a slight increase in the value of its “inventories and in-process” material from 2021 to 2022 (of €15 million). However, these figures are not an ideal point of analysis, as they include materials other than enriched uranium and are expressed in terms of monetary value (which can fluctuate) instead of volume. The data also does not offer any insights on where any enriched uranium in the inventories may have come from.</p> +<p>Post, Jerrold M. 1987. “It’s us against them”: The group dynamics of political terrorism. Terrorism 10: 23–35. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10576108708435644">CrossRef</a></p> -<p>In comments made to the press in response to questions about the increase of imports into France of Russian enriched uranium, an EDF representative noted that the company has not increased its dependence on Russian enriched uranium and is purchasing as per “the contractual minimums with its Russian partners”. This suggests that the French utility is not maxing out its contractual options in an effort to import as much Russian material as possible in advance of a potential ban. In the case of Orano, considering that the company is itself a provider of uranium enrichment services, it is unlikely, although technically possible, that the company is importing and stockpiling large volumes of Russian enriched uranium.</p> +<p>Reardon, Betty A., and Dale T. Snauwaert, eds. 2015. Betty a Reardon: Key Texts in Gender and Peace. Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice: Texts and Protocols 27. Series Editor Hans Gunter Brauch; Mosbach: Springer. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Betty+a+Reardon:+Key+Texts+in+Gender+and+Peace&amp;author=Reardon,+Betty+A.&amp;author=and+Dale+T.+Snauwaert&amp;publication_year=2015">Google Scholar</a></p> -<p>It is worth noting that ANDRA does not capture enriched uranium inventories held in France by non-French utilities. As such, it is possible that some non-French utilities are importing and maintaining stocks of Russian material in France. Swiss utilities, for instance, have been known to hold natural and enriched uranium stocks in Germany, France, Sweden and the UK. Testing this hypothesis would likely require access to commercially sensitive information. One could also compare the sum of EDF’s imports and Orano-produced enriched uranium against the sum of domestic uranium consumption and total enriched uranium and fabricated fuel exports, to determine the overall stocks of enriched uranium in the country, including any changes in stocks that may belong to foreign utilities. Such an assessment was not undertaken as part of the analysis for this report. Data on uranium inventories across Europe made available by the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) shows a decrease in overall inventories from 2021 to 2022, however the figure is an aggregate of total stocks across Europe and captures uranium at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle (not just enriched uranium). As mentioned earlier, the monetary value of nuclear fuel held by Framatome did not increase in 2022, also suggesting that significant stockpiling, even for fabrication of fuel for foreign customers, is likely not happening.</p> +<p>Rummel, Rudolph J. 1981. Understanding Conflict and War. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, vol. 5. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Understanding+Conflict+and+War&amp;author=Rummel,+Rudolph+J.&amp;publication_year=1981">Google Scholar</a></p> -<p>As such, based on publicly available data, there is no obvious indication that significant stockpiling of enriched uranium is taking place in France. However, there is also insufficient data to definitively discount the possibility that the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium into France is due to a major stockpiling drive. Details on 2022 and 2023 uranium inventories in future ANDRA reporting, or future IAEA reports on French enriched uranium inventories, will provide a clearer picture of how French stocks of enriched uranium may have changed and whether these changes are reflective of the significant increase in imports from Russia.</p> +<p>Shoemaker, Pamela, and Stephen Reese. 1996. Mediating the Message. White Plains: Longman. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Mediating+the+Message&amp;author=Shoemaker,+Pamela&amp;author=and+Stephen+Reese&amp;publication_year=1996">Google Scholar</a></p> -<h4 id="possible-shifts-in-domestic-demand">Possible Shifts in Domestic Demand</h4> +<p>Thiessen, Chuck. 2019. Preventing Violent Extremism While Promoting Human Rights: Toward a Clarified UN Approach. New York: International Peace Institute. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Preventing+Violent+Extremism+While+Promoting+Human+Rights:+Toward+a+Clarified+UN+Approach&amp;author=Thiessen,+Chuck&amp;publication_year=2019">Google Scholar</a></p> -<p>An increase in France’s domestic demand for enriched uranium to respond to greater domestic nuclear energy production could also technically explain the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023. However, this explanation does not appear very likely. Based on WNA projections of France’s enriched uranium production and needs through 2040, it appears that the country has sufficient domestic uranium enrichment capacity to cover its domestic needs. The WNA estimates that France’s enriched uranium needs up to 2040 will not rise significantly, reaching a peak of 6,986 thousand SWU in 2023 and fluctuating below that number in the subsequent 17 years. This indicates about a 4.7% increase from the 2022 demand of 6,639 thousand SWU, hardly justifying the 184% increase in the volume of imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and the continued relatively high volume of imports in 2023. Of course, the projections for French demand do not account for the enriched uranium that will be needed by French fuel fabricators to fulfil their contracts with foreign customers, which is likely to be significant.</p> +<p>Urwin, Eliza, and Belquis Ahmadi. 2018. Measuring Peace and Violent Extremism: Voices from the Afghan Village. Peace Brief. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, vol. 244. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Measuring+Peace+and+Violent+Extremism:+Voices+from+the+Afghan+Village.+Peace+Brief&amp;author=Urwin,+Eliza&amp;author=and+Belquis+Ahmadi&amp;publication_year=2018">Google Scholar</a></p> -<p>There are other indicators that French domestic demand for Russian material specifically has not increased. Based on public reporting and statements by French authorities and EDF, it appears that only a limited amount of Russian enriched uranium is actually used in France’s energy generation. In its 2022 “Universal Registration Document”, EDF notes that it “has a limited dependence on imports of Russian uranium, considering existing inventories and diversified and long-term supply contracts”. As mentioned earlier, EDF representatives have also stated to the media that the company “has not increased its share of enrichment of its natural uranium carried out in Russia in 2022 compared to 2021, in accordance with ‘the contractual minimums with its Russian partners’” and that uranium enriched in Russia “represents a very small part of its enrichment activities”.</p> +<p>Waisbord, Silvio. 2019. The progressive promises and the reality of news beyond industrial journalism. [revised keynote presentation given at the conference of the Journalism Education and Research Association of Australia in Hobart, 2 December 2018]. Australian Journalism Review 41: 9–16. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1386/ajr.41.1.9_1">CrossRef</a></p> -<p>Spikes can also sometimes be seen in trade data for enriched uranium corresponding to reactor refuelling cycles, which usually see a quarter to a third of the assemblies in a reactor core replaced every 12, 18 or 24 months. In other words, deliveries of enriched uranium to fabrication facilities (like the one at Romans-sur-Isère) might spike at predictable intervals (for instance, every other year) to account for the fabrication of new fuel assemblies in advance of a reactor reload. It is technically possible that the refuelling cycles of a number of facilities that use the Romans-sur-Isère plant aligned. However, the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium to France in 2022, and continued high levels of imports in 2023, do not match any observable pattern of regular increases in preceding years. Furthermore, the high levels of Russian imports into France (relative to pre-2022 values) have persisted for two consecutive years.</p> +<p>White, Jessica. 2022. Finding the right mix: Re-evaluating the road to gender-equality in countering violent extremism programming. Critical Studies on Terrorism 15: 585–609. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2036423">CrossRef</a></p> -<h4 id="possible-reallocation-of-russian-enriched-uranium-across-european-supply-chains">Possible Reallocation of Russian Enriched Uranium Across European Supply Chains</h4> +<hr /> -<p>An April 2023 news report for Le Monde provides additional indication as to possible drivers for the increase in French imports of Russian enriched material in 2022. The article notes:</p> +<p><strong>Jake Lynch</strong> is Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS) at the University of Sydney and an Executive Member of the Sydney Peace Foundation.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>When questioned, EDF said that its imports of Russian-enriched uranium have remained at the same level between 2021 and 2022. But it added that it has made more use of French factories for the manufacture of fuel assemblies, which would partly explain the difference. In other words, in previous years, some of the enriched uranium imported did not arrive in France but at plants in Sweden or the UK and was therefore not accounted for in the same way by customs.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Matt Freear</strong> has worked in media and communications for more than 17 years, specialising in communications around conflict and terrorism since 2005. He started his career in the UK civil service communications network, working in media relations, crisis communication roles and in the Strategic Communications Unit of the Prime Minister’s Office, Downing Street.</p>Jake Lynch and Matt FreearThis article presents and discusses results from an exercise in comparative content analysis of news articles about issues of conflict produced by Afghan journalists before and after participating in an internationally sponsored training and mentorship programme in Peace Journalism.The Attritional Art Of War2024-03-18T12:00:00+08:002024-03-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-attritional-art-of-war<p><em>If the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.</em></p> -<p>In its 2022 annual report, EDF noted that it sources its enriched uranium from Orano, Urenco and TENEX. Based on the above comments, it appears that EDF may be reallocating its supply of Russian enriched uranium from Sweden (which hosts a fuel fabrication facility at Västerås, operated by Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB) and/or the UK (which hosts a fuel fabrication facility at Springfields, operated by Westinghouse Springfields Fuels Ltd) to France, for fabrication of nuclear fuel at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère plant. This would mean that, as some European countries are trying to diversify away from Russian enriched uranium, France may be offering an alternative entry point for Rosatom to the European nuclear fuel market.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>On the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Swedish energy giant Vattenfall announced that it would no longer be accepting deliveries of Russian nuclear fuel, until further notice. As it eventually became clear, that would also include all Russian enriched uranium. In April 2022, Sweden’s other utility also announced that it was pausing deliveries of enriched uranium from TENEX. While there is currently no ban on imports of Russian material into Sweden at a national level, trade data made available by the Swedish government shows a complete stop of imports of enriched uranium from Russia into Sweden as of 2022.</p> +<p>Attritional wars require their own “Art of War” and are fought with a “force-centric” approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are “terrain-focused”. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uplqt0F.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Swedish Imports under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (SEK).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Imports of Goods from Country of Consignment. Not Adjusted for Non Response, SEK thousand by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> +<p>The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short “winner takes all” clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude. Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jpnRLnI.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Swedish Imports under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Imports of Goods from Country of Consignment. Not Adjusted for Non Response, Metric Ton by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> +<h3 id="the-economic-dimension">The Economic Dimension</h3> -<p>This is significant not only for Sweden’s own nuclear energy sector but also for nuclear energy production across Europe, as the nuclear fuel production facility at V ästerås manufactures fuel for Vattenfall and reactors across Europe. The Västerås facility also has the capability to produce fuel for Soviet and Russian-built VVER-type reactors (водо-водяной энергетический реактор [vodo-vodyanoi enyergeticheskiy reactor]), offering an alternative supply of VVER fuel for countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, which have historically relied on Rosatom subsidiary TVEL for their supply. Västerås-manufactured VVER fuel has already been supplied to Ukrainian reactors and deliveries are planned for reactors in Bulgaria in 2024.</p> +<p>Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and weapons is imperative in order to win.</p> -<p>The cessation of imports of enriched uranium from Russia to Sweden after 2022 indicates that all the utilities using the Västerås facility for their fuel manufacturing, and which may have previously relied on Russian enriched uranium supply, have found alternative enriched uranium suppliers for the manufacture of their fuel at Västerås. In 2022 and 2023, the value of imports of enriched uranium into Sweden increased from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, suggesting an uptick in deliveries from Orano (France) and Urenco (the UK, the Netherlands and Germany). The German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (Bundesamt für die Sicherheit der nuklearen Entsorgung, BASE) has also issued a permit for the transport to Västerås through German territory of uranium hexafluoride from enrichment facilities in France (Orano), the Netherlands (Urenco) and Germany (Urenco), with regular transport activity recorded throughout 2023. At the time of writing, no such permit has been reported by the German authorities for the transport of enriched uranium to Västerås from TENEX, although it is unclear when the last permit for such transit expired.</p> +<p>High-end weapons have exceptional performance but are difficult to manufacture, especially when needed to arm a rapidly mobilised army subjected to a high rate of attrition. For example, during the Second World War German Panzers were superb tanks, but using approximately the same production resources, the Soviets rolled out eight T-34s for every German Panzer. The difference in performance did not justify the numerical disparity in production. High-end weapons also require high-end troops. These take significant time to train – time which is unavailable in a war with high attrition rates.</p> -<p>Supply of enriched uranium is normally secured by utilities under long-term contracts, meaning that utilities still obligated to source enriched uranium from Russia but suddenly unable to send it to Sweden will have needed to deliver it to fuel fabrication facilities in countries still willing to accept Russian material. According to Eurostat data, since February 2022 France and Germany are the only European countries that have continued to import enriched uranium from Russia, although the latter at much lower volumes than before 2022. Both host nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. At least some imports of Russian-origin material also appear to have been delivered to Spain in 2022; a fuel fabrication facility is located at Juzbado, owned by Enusa.</p> +<p>It is easier and faster to produce large numbers of cheap weapons and munitions, especially if their subcomponents are interchangeable with civilian goods, ensuring mass quantity without the expansion of production lines. New recruits also absorb simpler weapons faster, allowing rapid generation of new formations or the reconstitution of existing ones.</p> -<p>At the time of writing, the webpage of the Västerås fabrication plant noted that, alongside Ukraine, France is its biggest customer. This is also borne out in trade data, which shows France as the primary destination for Swedish nuclear fuel exports (See Figure 13). It is unclear from publicly available sources how much, if any, of EDF’s TENEX-sourced supply had historically been sent to Sweden, but the complete cessation of Russian enriched uranium imports into Sweden suggests that all of EDF’s TENEX-supplied material is now being delivered to one of the other fuel fabrication facilities the company uses. Other utilities that have used the Västerås facility – Swedish, Ukrainian, German and Finnish companies – had also historically relied on the Russian supply of enriched uranium, some of which may have been delivered to Västerås prior to 2022.</p> +<p>Achieving mass is difficult for higher-end Western economies. To achieve hyper-efficiency, they shed excess capacity and struggle to rapidly expand, especially since lower-tier industries have been transferred abroad for economic reasons. During war, global supply chains are disrupted and subcomponents can no longer be secured. Added to this conundrum is the lack of a skilled workforce with experience in a particular industry. These skills are acquired over decades, and once an industry is shuttered it takes decades to rebuild. The 2018 US government interagency report on US industrial capacity highlighted these problems. The bottom line is that the West must take a hard look at ensuring peacetime excess capacity in its military industrial complex, or risk losing the next war.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LpOdP8B.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Swedish Exports under HS Code 84013000, 2015–23 (SEK).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Exports of Goods to Country of Destination. Not Adjusted for Non Response, SEK Thousand by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS Code 84013000).</em></p> +<h3 id="force-generation">Force Generation</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3T73YHa.png" alt="image13" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: Swedish Exports Under HS Code 84013000, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Exports of Goods to Country of Destination. Not Adjusted for Non Response, Metric Ton by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS Code 84013000).</em></p> +<p>Industrial output exists so it can be channelled into replacing losses and generating new formations. This requires appropriate doctrine and command and control structures. There are two main models; NATO (most Western armies) and the old Soviet model, with most states fielding something in between.</p> -<p>Fuel for French reactors is also manufactured at the nuclear fuel manufacturing facility at Springfields (UK), operated by a subsidiary of Westinghouse. Eurostat data shows imports under HS code 840130 – which captures nuclear fuel assemblies (but may also include components thereof) – from the UK into France from 2021 onwards, including 49 tonnes of imports in 2022 and 74 tonnes in 2023. It is unclear whether Russian enriched uranium is or has in the past been used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel for French reactors at the facility. As neither Russia nor the UK publicly report their trade in enriched uranium, any deliveries of Russian enriched material to the UK, or changes in any such trade, cannot be tracked through a review of trade data. However, in July 2022, the UK introduced a 35% tariff on goods under HS code 2844 (“Radioactive chemical elements and radioactive isotopes (including the fissile or fertile chemical elements and isotopes) and their compounds; mixtures and residues containing these products”) imported into the UK from Russia, which includes enriched uranium. As such, while deliveries of Russian enriched uranium into the UK are still permitted and may therefore be taking place, the introduction of the 35% tariff makes it unlikely that such imports have continued since July 2022. This means that EDF’s supply of Russian enriched uranium is now likely being sent to one of two facilities – the Enusa facility in Juzbado (Spain) or the Framatome facility at Romans-sur-Isère (France).</p> +<p>NATO armies are highly professional, backed by a strong non-commissioned officer (NCO) Corps, with extensive peacetime military education and experience. They build upon this professionalism for their military doctrine (fundamentals, tactics and techniques) to stress individual initiative, delegating a great deal of leeway to junior officers and NCOs. NATO formations enjoy tremendous agility and flexibility to exploit opportunities on a dynamic battlefield.</p> -<p>A reallocation of Russian material by EDF from other facilities – Västerås or Springfields – to France would explain, at least in part, the increase in 2022 of imports of Russian enriched uranium into the country. It also aligns with statements by EDF that the company “has made more use of French factories for the manufacture of fuel assemblies” in 2022 than in past years and that it has not increased its overall reliance on Russian enriched uranium. However, any such reallocation is difficult to confirm from publicly available information, as supply contracts tend to be commercially sensitive.</p> +<p>In attritional war, this method has a downside. The officers and NCOs required to execute this doctrine require extensive training and, above all, experience. A US Army NCO takes years to develop. A squad leader generally has at least three years in service and a platoon sergeant has at least seven. In an attritional war characterised by heavy casualties, there simply isn’t time to replace lost NCOs or generate them for new units. The idea that civilians can be given three-month training courses, sergeant’s chevrons and then expected to perform in the same manner as a seven-year veteran is a recipe for disaster. Only time can generate leaders capable of executing NATO doctrine, and time is one thing that the massive demands of attritional war do not give.</p> -<p>In its 2022 annual report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France, the nuclear safety authority (Autorité de s ûreté nucléaire, ASN) reported an increase compared with 2021 in the amount of TENEX-supplied enriched uranium processed at the Romans-sur-Isère facility, from 21 to 40 tonnes. However, compared to Orano- and Urenco-supplied product processed by the facility in 2022 (564 tonnes and 142 tonnes, respectively), the 19-tonne increase in TENEX-supplied enriched uranium processed at Romans-sur-Isère in 2022 is not significant in terms of volume and certainly does not fully account for the increase of Russian enriched uranium into France. The ANS report refers to enriched uranium “processed” (not necessarily “delivered”) at the facility in a given year, meaning that it is possible that any additional deliveries of Russian material to the facility made in 2022 may not actually be processed until 2023 or later. Alternatively, the additional TENEX material processed may have been drawn from existing stocks, not new deliveries.</p> +<p>The Soviet Union built its army for large-scale conflict with NATO. It was intended to be able to rapidly expand by calling up massed reserves. Every male in the Soviet Union underwent two years of basic training right out of high school. The constant turnover of enlisted personnel precluded creation of a Western-style NCO corps but generated a massive pool of semi-trained reserves available in times of war. The absence of reliable NCOs created an officer-centric command model, less flexible than NATO’s but more adaptable to the large-scale expansion required by attritional warfare.</p> -<p>Exports under HS code 840130 from Sweden and the UK to France continued in 2022 and 2023, albeit at lower volumes than pre-2022 in the case of exports from Sweden. If, as per EDF’s comments in Le Monde, less of the company’s Russian supply of enriched uranium is being delivered to fuel fabrication facilities abroad, that material may have been replaced by deliveries to those facilities of non-Russian material from elsewhere in EDF’s supply chain. The value of French exports of enriched uranium to Sweden increased from 40 tonnes in 2021 to 120 tonnes in 2022 and to 153 tonnes in 2023. French exports of enriched uranium to the UK have decreased, from 167 tonnes in 2021 to 129 tonnes in 2022 and 90 tonnes in 2023. US imports of enriched uranium from France increased from 121 tonnes in 2021 to 327 tonnes in 2023. However, at least some of the additional exports of enriched uranium from France are very likely the result of deliveries for non-French utilities under new contracts with enrichment services provider Orano as countries seek to diversify away from Rosatom supply. For instance, Sweden’s utility Vattenfall, which previously received enriched uranium from Russia, is now sourcing its supply from Orano in France and Urenco in the UK. US-based broker of enrichment services Centrus Energy Corp. (Centrus) also started taking deliveries of enriched uranium from Orano in 2023 under a contract that was concluded in 2018.</p> +<p>However, as a war progresses past a one-year mark, front-line units will gain experience and an improved NCO corps is likely to emerge, giving the Soviet model greater flexibility. By 1943, the Red Army had developed a robust NCO corps, which then disappeared after the Second World War as combat formations were demobilised. A key difference between the models is that NATO doctrine cannot function without high-performing NCOs. The Soviet doctrine was enhanced by experienced NCOs but did not require them.</p> -<p>In its comments to Le Monde, EDF also highlighted that it is not the only importer of uranium into France, and the news article points out that part of a delivery of Russian enriched uranium to Dunkirk in November 2022 belonged to Framatome, which operates the Romans-sur-Isère facility and manufactures fuel for a number of other European utilities at fabrication facilities in France and Germany. It is unclear whether that particular shipment remained in France or was transported onwards to Germany. As such, the increase of Russian enriched uranium deliveries to the site may be for the fabrication of nuclear fuel for other reactors, not just the French fleet. The 2021 and 2022 ANS reports record deliveries of nuclear fuel assemblies from Romans-sur-Isère to Switzerland, Belgium and China. The plant also produces nuclear fuel assemblies for South Africa. Theoretically, the additional imports into France of Russian enriched uranium could have been for integration into fuel assemblies for some of these customers. As of April 2022, Swiss energy utility Axpo was reported as having considerable dependencies on Russian uranium and stated that it would honour its existing contracts but not sign new ones. It is unclear from the report whether the dependency was in relation to mined or enriched uranium and when the existing contracts expire. China is also a well-established consumer of Russian enriched uranium and, as discussed in Chapter II, ramped up its own imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and 2023. Synatom, which provides enriched uranium to Belgium’s nuclear power plants, was reported in early 2022 to be relying on Russian uranium supply, although the report seems to have been referencing mined uranium and not enrichment services. While Belgium’s supply contract with Rosatom is no longer active, it reportedly took its last delivery of enriched uranium from Rosatom in May 2022. It is unclear which fabrication facility took delivery of this material.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own</code></em></strong></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="russian-enriched-uranium-deliveries-to-spain"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russian Enriched Uranium Deliveries to Spain</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The most effective model is a mixture of the two, in which a state maintains a medium-sized professional army, together with a mass of draftees available for mobilisation. This leads directly to a high/low mixture. Professional pre-war forces form the high end of this army, becoming fire brigades – moving from sector to sector in battle to stabilise the situation and conduct decisive attacks. Low-end formations hold the line and gain experience slowly, increasing their quality until they gain the capability to conduct offensive operations. Victory is attained by creating the highest quality low-end formations possible.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Besides Springfields, Västerås and Romans-sur-Isère, the nuclear fuel fabrication plant at Juzbado in Spain is the other facility that fabricates nuclear fuel for EDF. The facility also produces nuclear fuel for reactors in Spanish, Belgian, Swedish and Finnish reactors and has taken delivery of Russian enriched uranium since February 2022. It is technically possible that Russian enriched material delivered to Juzbado (if such deliveries have continued) may be used for fuel fabrication for a number of European utilities. Swedish and Finnish policies of diversification away from Russian supply mean that any deliveries of Russian enriched uranium to Juzbado would likely only be for the production of fuel for Spanish, Belgian or French reactors.</code></em></p> +<p>Forging new units into combat-capable soldiers instead of civilian mobs is done through training and combat experience. A new formation should train for at least six months, and only if manned by reservists with previous individual training. Conscripts take longer. These units should also have professional soldiers and NCOs brought in from the pre-war army to add professionalism. Once initial training is complete, they should only be fed into the battle in secondary sectors. No formation should be allowed to fall below 70% strength. Withdrawing formations early allows experience to proliferate among the new replacements as veterans pass on their skills. Otherwise, valuable experience is lost, causing the process to start all over. Another implication is that resources should prioritise replacements over new formations, preserving combat edge in both the pre-war army (high) and newly raised (low) formations. It’s advisable to disband several pre-war (high-end) formations to spread professional soldiers among newly created low-end formations in order to raise initial quality.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Tracking shifts in the flow of enriched uranium into Spain is challenging. As Spain does not have a domestic deconversion capacity, enriched uranium destined for Juzbado undergoes deconversion abroad before being delivered to Spain for fuel fabrication. Enusa’s contract for the supply of enriched uranium to Spanish reactors from TENEX runs until 2027 and the Spanish government has confirmed that Enusa has taken delivery of Russian enriched uranium in the UK and the US (as well as in Germany) since February 2022. Eighteen tonnes of the material were eventually delivered to Spain from the US in March 2023. However, it is unclear when the deliveries were made to the US and the UK or whether the two countries have since taken any other deliveries of Russian enriched uranium for Enusa.</code></em></p> +<h3 id="the-military-dimension">The Military Dimension</h3> -<h4 id="implications-1">Implications</h4> +<p>Military operations in an attritional conflict are very distinct from those in a war of manoeuvre. Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own. In this context, a successful strategy accepts that the war will last at least two years and be broken into two distinct phases. The first phase ranges from initiation of hostilities to the point where sufficient combat power has been mobilised to allow decisive action. It will see little positional shifting on the ground, focusing on favourable exchange of losses and building up combat power in the rear. The dominant form of combat is fires rather than manoeuvre, complemented by extensive fortifications and camouflage. The peacetime army starts the war and conducts holding actions, providing time to mobilise resources and train the new army.</p> -<p>Due to the commercial sensitivity of uranium supply and fuel manufacturing contracts, limited information on French uranium stocks and any stockpiles held in France by foreign utilities, as well as the difficulties inherent in tracing complex supply chain dynamics, it is challenging to ascertain the precise drivers of increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France. While at least some reallocation of Russian supplies to France appears to be happening, the degree to which such activity is responsible for the additional import of Russian material into France is difficult to confirm. A range of other explanations for the increased Russian enriched uranium imports into France are also technically possible, some of which have been outlined earlier in this chapter.</p> +<p>The second phase can commence after one side has met the following conditions.</p> -<p>In the absence of EU sanctions on Rosatom, there is no legal basis on which to disallow continued imports of Russian enriched uranium into EU countries. Neither is any redistribution of Russian and non-Russian supplies across European nuclear fuel supply chains prohibited in any way. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, there has been no public reporting of new contracts for enriched uranium supply between Rosatom and European utilities; as such, if any reallocation of Russian material into France is taking place, it is likely facilitating the execution of existing contracts by companies still obligated to continue taking Russian enriched uranium, the breach of which may have proven very costly for the companies in question. France’s willingness to continue accepting Russian imports of enriched uranium may therefore be granting utilities the flexibility they need in their supply chains to maintain continuity of supply and to avoid breaching existing contracts. Industry will do what it must to adjust to changing market dynamics and can hardly be blamed for doing so, within the parameters permitted by regulation. However, it points to the importance of considering how industry is likely to adapt to the implementation of new restrictions and what measures may be needed to facilitate and incentivise alignment of private sector behaviour with political objectives. The observed increase in imports of Russian material into France, even as other European countries look to move away from Russian supply, also highlights the limited impact of unilateral national or company efforts to cut Russia out of the highly interconnected European nuclear fuel supply chain.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Newly mobilised forces have completed their training and gained sufficient experience to make them combat-effective formations, capable of rapidly integrating all their assets in a cohesive manner.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The enemy’s strategic reserve is exhausted, leaving it unable to reinforce the threatened sector.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Fires and reconnaissance superiority are achieved, allowing the attacker to effectively mass fires on a key sector while denying the enemy the same.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The enemy’s industrial sector is degraded to the point where it is unable to replace battlefield losses. In the case of fighting against a coalition of countries, their industrial resources must also be exhausted or at least accounted for.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="iv-case-study-germany">IV. Case Study: Germany</h3> +<p>Only after meeting these criteria should offensive operations commence. They should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points with shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside a layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. Concentration of forces on one main effort should be avoided as this gives an indication of the offensive’s location and an opportunity for the enemy to concentrate their reserves against this key point. The Brusilov Offensive of 1916, which resulted in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, is a good example of a successful attritional offensive at the tactical and operational level. By attacking along a broad front, the Russian army prevented the Austro-Hungarians from concentrating their reserves, resulting in a collapse all along the front. At the strategic level, however, the Brusilov Offensive is an example of failure. Russian forces failed to set conditions against the whole enemy coalition, focusing only on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and neglecting German capacity. The Russians expended crucial resources which they could not replace, without defeating the strongest coalition member. To reemphasise the key point, an offensive will only succeed once key criteria are met. Attempting to launch an offensive earlier will result in losses without any strategic gains, playing directly into enemy hands.</p> -<p>Germany is the other country in Europe which has continued to import enriched uranium from Russia since February 2022, according to Eurostat data. The only nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Germany is the Lingen plant, which is owned by a subsidiary of France’s Framatome and has been reported as apparently continuing to accept deliveries of Russian uranium. This raises questions over whether the Lingen plant could be another possible diversion point for Russian material that is no longer wanted in other countries, now or in the future.</p> +<h3 id="modern-war">Modern War</h3> -<h4 id="deliveries-of-russian-enriched-uranium-to-germany">Deliveries of Russian Enriched Uranium to Germany</h4> +<p>The modern battlefield is an integrated system of systems which includes various types of electronic warfare (EW), three basic types of air defences, four different types of artillery, countless aircraft types, strike and reconnaissance drones, construction and sapper engineers, traditional infantry, armour formations and, above all, logistics. Artillery has become more dangerous thanks to increased ranges and advanced targeting, stretching the depth of the battlefield.</p> -<p>The Lingen plant produces fuel assemblies for customers around the world and supplies “components and fuel for Framatome’s fuel assembly plants in the USA and Europe”. The IAEA’s 2023 report “Global Inventories of Secondary Uranium Supplies” notes that Lingen manufactures fuel for customers in the Netherlands and that Spain has received deliveries of fuel from Germany. UN Comtrade data also shows exports since 2019 from Germany of goods under HS code 840130 to Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the UK, Belgium, France, Finland, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Brazil and a number of other countries; however, while the code captures unirradiated nuclear fuel, it also includes nuclear assembly parts – as such, exports recorded under this code do not necessarily signify the delivery of manufactured fuel assemblies. Russian-origin enriched uranium has also previously been supplied to the UK via Lingen for use in UK reactors operated by EDF’s British subsidiary EDF Energy.</p> +<p>In practice, this means it is easier to mass fires than forces. Deep manoeuvre, which requires the massing of combat power, is no longer possible because any massed force will be destroyed by indirect fires before it can achieve success in depth. Instead, a ground offensive requires a tight protective bubble to ward off enemy strike systems. This bubble is generated through layering friendly counter-fire, air defence and EW assets. Moving numerous interdependent systems is highly complicated and unlikely to be successful. Shallow attacks along the forward line of troops are most likely to be successful at an acceptable cost ratio; attempts at deep penetration will be exposed to massed fires the moment they exit the protection of the defensive bubble.</p> -<p>In August 2023, BASE issued a permit to Orano NCS GmbH (a nuclear logistics provider and part of the Orano Group of companies) for the transport of enriched uranium (in the form of uranium hexafluoride) from JSC TENEX to Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) GmbH, the Framatome subsidiary that operates nuclear fuel manufacturing facility at Lingen. The current permit is valid from 7 August 2023 to 31 December 2024; however, as of 29 February 2024, only two transport activities had been recorded under this permit, on 5 September 2023 and 8 February 2024. It is unclear where the transport originated. The cargo vessel Mikhail Dudin, which has been known to transport Russian enriched uranium to Europe, made a port call in Rotterdam on 5 September 2023. The cargo vessel Baltiysky-202, which had previously been reported unloading Russian enriched uranium in Dunkirk, called at the port of Rotterdam on 8 February 2024 and the port of Dunkirk on 9 February 2024. However, the Netherlands has not reported any imports of enriched uranium from Russia since February 2022. On at least one occasion, Russian enriched uranium being delivered by the Mikhail Dudin to Dunkirk was reportedly on its way to Lingen. According to reports by environmental activist groups, the delivery had been due to arrive in Rotterdam but was ultimately delivered to France instead.</p> +<p>Integration of these overlapping assets requires centralised planning and exceptionally well-trained staff officers, capable of integrating multiple capabilities on the fly. It takes years to train such officers, and even combat experience does not generate such skills in a short time. Checklists and mandatory procedures can alleviate these deficiencies, but only on a less-complicated, static front. Dynamic offensive operations require fast reaction times, which semi-trained officers are incapable of performing.</p> -<p>Between March 2022 and January 2024, the Mikhail Dudin called at the port of Rotterdam at least eight times and at least 12 times at Dunkirk. The vessel has also made four port calls at Vlissingen in the Netherlands and multiple calls at other ports in Europe and the UK. It is unclear what, if anything, was loaded or unloaded during these calls or where the final destination of any deliveries may have been. The Baltiysky-202 has called at the port of Rotterdam four times since March 2022 and nine times at Dunkirk (as well as one port call at Cherbourg, France).</p> +<p>An example of this complexity is an attack by a platoon of 30 soldiers. This would require EW systems to jam enemy drones; another EW system to jam enemy communications preventing adjustment of enemy fires; and a third EW system to jam space navigation systems denying use of precision guided munitions. In addition, fires require counterbattery radars to defeat enemy artillery. Further complicating planning is the fact that enemy EW will locate and destroy any friendly radar or EW emitter that is emitting for too long. Engineers will have to clear paths through minefields, while friendly drones provide time-sensitive ISR and fire support if needed. (This task requires a great deal of training with the supporting units to avoid dropping munitions on friendly attacking troops.) Finally, artillery needs to provide support both on the objective and enemy rear, targeting reserves and suppressing artillery. All these systems need to work as an integrated team just to support 30 men in several vehicles attacking another 30 men or less. A lack of coordination between these assets will result in failed attacks and horrific losses without ever seeing the enemy. As the size of formation conducting operations increases, so do the number and complexity of assets that need to be integrated.</p> -<p>As such, it appears that some of the Russian material entering France, and possibly the Netherlands, may be passing through these countries on its way to Lingen in Germany. However, trade data reviewed for this report does not provide a clear enough picture to confirm how much Russian material is actually arriving at Lingen, whether the value or volume of any such Russian deliveries has changed since the start of 2022, which customers may be benefiting and which routes may be being used.</p> +<h3 id="implications-for-combat-operations">Implications for Combat Operations</h3> -<p>Unlike in the case of France, the value of Germany’s imports of enriched uranium from Russia decreased from 2021 to 2022. One possible explanation may be German reactor closures, at least some of which appear to have used the Lingen facility for the fabrication of their fuel and had historically relied on Russian re-enrichment of reprocessed uranium. In 2022, the value of imports of enriched uranium into Germany increased from the Netherlands and from France; however, imports from these two countries fell to below pre-2022 levels in 2023.</p> +<p>Deep fires – further than 100–150 km (the average range of tactical rockets) behind the front line – target an enemy’s ability to generate combat power. This includes production facilities, munitions dumps, repair depots, and energy and transportation infrastructure. Of particular importance are targets that require significant production capabilities and that are difficult to replace/repair, as their destruction will inflict long term damage. As with all aspects of attritional war, such strikes will take significant time to have an effect, with timelines running into years. The low global production volumes of long-range precision-guided munitions, effective deception and concealment actions, large stockpiles of anti-aircraft missiles and the sheer repair capacities of strong, determined states all combine to prolong conflicts. Effective layering of air defences must include high-end systems at all altitudes coupled with cheaper systems to counter the enemy’s massed low-end attack platforms. Combined with mass-scale manufacturing and effective EW, this is the only way to defeat enemy deep fires.</p> -<p>The cause of the increases in 2022 is difficult to ascertain and several explanations are possible. For instance, the increases in import values may be capturing deliveries to the Lingen plant of enriched uranium secured under renewed contracts with or expanded deliveries from Urenco (the Netherlands) or Orano (France) as utilities using the fabrication plant seek alternative, non-Russian, suppliers. Urenco also hosts an enrichment facility at Gronau in Germany; as such, the data may be capturing Urenco’s internal company transfers and not material travelling to Lingen for fuel fabrication. Transfers from the Netherlands and France into Germany, including to the Lingen facility, by Orano and Urenco have been recorded in German transport licence documents. As mentioned earlier, Urenco has also concluded an agreement with EDF to enrich reprocessed uranium from French reactors at its Almelo facility, which will first be converted by Rosatom in Russia. As such, from 2024, Dutch trade data is likely to show increased imports of reprocessed uranium from Russia (although not enriched uranium), as well as increased exports of enriched uranium from the Netherlands to France for the fabrication of nuclear fuel at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère facility. The decrease in the value and volume of imports of enriched uranium from France and the Netherlands into Germany in 2023 also raises the possibility that any increase in 2022 deliveries may not be part of a sustained pattern but a one-off.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Victory in an attritional war is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Furthermore, there are significant discrepancies in Eurostat data between German-reported import data and French- and Dutch-reported data on the export of enriched uranium to Germany, which suggests that the data must be treated with some caution. While data on French exports as well as data on German exports made available through Eurostat both show increases in the value of French exports to Germany (in the case of the German data, French imports into Germany) of enriched uranium in 2022, German import data shows a much lower increase than the French export data. A similar discrepancy can be observed when comparing Eurostat data on German imports with data on Dutch exports, with the former showing markedly lower values of enriched material transferred in 2022 than the latter. Furthermore, in contrast to German import data, Dutch export data shows an overall decrease from 2021 to 2022 in the net weight of enriched uranium exported to Germany. The reason for these discrepancies in the reporting is unclear but may be due to particularities in the recording of transhipment data or delays between the recording of export and import data. Critically, as mentioned earlier, trade data reviewed for this report shows no deliveries of enriched uranium from Russia to the Netherlands since February 2022.</p> +<p>Successful attritional war focuses on the preservation of one’s own combat power. This usually translates into a relatively static front interrupted by limited local attacks to improve positions, using artillery for most of the fighting. Fortification and concealment of all forces including logistics is the key to minimising losses. The long time required to construct fortifications prevents significant ground movement. An attacking force which cannot rapidly entrench will suffer significant losses from enemy artillery fires.</p> -<h4 id="implications-2">Implications</h4> +<p>Defensive operations buy time to develop low-end combat formations, allowing newly mobilised troops to gain combat experience without suffering heavy losses in large-scale attacks. Building up experienced low-tier combat formations generates the capability for future offensive operations.</p> -<p>As with reallocation of Russian supplies across a utility’s supply chain, shipment of enriched uranium, Russian or otherwise, through third jurisdictions, if such activity is indeed occurring through France or the Netherlands, is a perfectly permissible activity and does not suggest any wrongdoing. Furthermore, because of the specialised nature of radioactive material transport and the associated logistics and certification required, not all ports are able to receive deliveries of enriched uranium, limiting supply routes. As mentioned above, there is currently also no legal obligation for Germany, France, Spain or any other EU country to terminate existing contracts for Russian supply, prevent the conclusion of new ones, or deny delivery of Russian material to facilities on their territory. As the German government has rightly pointed out in response to questions about deliveries of Russian material to the Lingen facility, there are no legal grounds on which to deny shipments of Russian material to the plant as Russian enriched uranium is not covered by EU sanctions. However, transhipment activity would add further opacity to European nuclear supply chains and may provide additional, less obvious, entry points for Russian material into the European market. It may also allow countries to save face by officially refusing to accept Russian enriched uranium at their ports, all the while continuing to import it through third jurisdictions or accepting non-Russian material from a third country which has been displaced by Russian imports.</p> +<p>The early stages of attritional war range from initiation of hostilities to the point where mobilised resources are available in large numbers and are ready for combat operations. In the case of a surprise attack, a rapid offensive by one side may be possible until the defender can form a solid front. After that, combat solidifies. This period lasts at least a year-and-a-half to two years. During this period, major offensive operations should be avoided. Even if large attacks are successful, they will result in significant casualties, often for meaningless territorial gains. An army should never accept a battle on unfavourable terms. In attritional war, any terrain that does not have a vital industrial centre is irrelevant. It is always better to retreat and preserve forces, regardless of the political consequences. Fighting on disadvantageous terrain burns up units, losing experienced soldiers who are key to victory. The German obsession with Stalingrad in 1942 is a prime example of fighting on unfavourable terrain for political reasons. Germany burned up vital units that it could not afford to lose, simply to capture a city bearing Stalin’s name. It is also wise to push the enemy into fighting on disadvantageous terrain through information operations, exploiting politically sensitive enemy objectives. The goal is to force the enemy to expend vital material and strategic reserves on strategically meaningless operations. A key pitfall to avoid is being dragged into the very same trap that has been set for the enemy. In the First World War, Germans did just that at Verdun, where it planned to use surprise to capture key, politically sensitive terrain, provoking costly French counterattacks. Unfortunately for the Germans, they fell into their own trap. They failed to gain key, defendable terrain early on, and the battle devolved instead into a series of costly infantry assaults by both sides, with artillery fires devastating attacking infantry.</p> -<p>Of note is the fact that ANF has applied to German authorities for permission to manufacture VVER fuel assemblies at the Lingen plant. According to reports, fabrication of VVER fuel at the plant may take place in collaboration with Rosatom; however, prospects of German government approval remain unclear. Framatome has signed agreements for VVER fuel supply with Bulgaria and Czechia. It is unclear where fuel assemblies for Bulgarian and Czech VVER reactors will take place and who would be the supplier of enriched uranium for these or any other VVER fuel assemblies. However, should fuel fabrication for VVER reactors take place at the Lingen facility with the use of Rosatom-supplied enriched uranium and in collaboration with Rosatom, this could hardly be considered successful diversification away from Russia for Framatome’s VVER fuel customers.</p> +<p>When the second phase begins, the offensive should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points using shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside the layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. There is a cascading effect in which a crisis in one sector forces the defenders to shift reserves from a second sector, only to generate a crisis there in turn. As forces start falling back and leaving prepared fortifications, morale plummets, with the obvious question: “If we can’t hold the mega-fortress, how can we hold these new trenches?” Retreat then turns into rout. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. The Allies’ Offensive in 1918 is an example. The Allies attacked along a broad front, while the Germans lacked sufficient resources to defend the entire line. Once the German Army began to retreat it proved impossible to stop.</p> -<h3 id="v-case-study-us">V. Case Study: US</h3> +<p>The attritional strategy, centred on defence, is counterintuitive to most Western military officers. Western military thought views the offensive as the only means of achieving the decisive strategic goal of forcing the enemy to come to the negotiating table on unfavourable terms. The strategic patience required to set the conditions for an offensive runs against their combat experience acquired in overseas counterinsurgency operations.</p> -<p>In the trade data reviewed for this report, the US stands out conspicuously as the largest importer of Russian material, both prior to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and since. Figure 14 shows the value of US imports of enriched uranium from Russia since 2015; Figure 15 shows the weight of imports in tonnes. As mentioned earlier, data on US imports of Russian enriched uranium requires caveating. Some US customers purchase only SWU from Russia, meaning that some natural (unenriched) uranium is returned to Russia as “returned feed”, while other customers purchase both the feed and the services from Russia. As such, the values (and volume) of US imports of enriched uranium are not necessarily representative of the values (or volume) of Russian materials and services that are actually consumed by US utilities. This is in addition to any nuclear fuel assemblies that may be manufactured in the US and exported for use by utilities abroad. US-based think tank Third Way, citing data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and other sources, has estimated that in 2022 US utilities purchased $168 million in processed natural uranium and $344 million in enrichment services. As noted earlier, the EIA has reported that 24% of the SWU delivered to US utilities in 2022 came from Russia.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yV1IBYf.png" alt="image14" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: US Imports from Russia under HS Code 2844200020, 2015–23 (USD).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the US Census Bureau (HS code 2844200020).</em></p> +<p>The conduct of attritional wars is vastly different from wars of manoeuvre. They last longer and end up testing a country’s industrial capacity. Victory is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T4xMXA6.png" alt="image15" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: US Imports from Russia under HS Code 2844200020, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the US Census Bureau (HS code 2844200020).</em></p> +<p>Victory is attainable by carefully analysing one’s own and the enemy’s political objectives. The key is recognising the strengths and weaknesses of competing economic models and identifying the economic strategies that are most likely to generate maximum resources. These resources can then be utilised to build a massive army using the high/low force and weapons mixture. The military conduct of war is driven by overall political strategic objectives, military realities and economic limitations. Combat operations are shallow and focus on destroying enemy resources, not on gaining terrain. Propaganda is used to support military operations, not the other way around. With patience and careful planning, a war can be won.</p> -<h4 id="history-of-us-dependency-on-russian-enriched-uranium-and-efforts-to-limit-supply">History of US Dependency on Russian Enriched Uranium and Efforts to Limit Supply</h4> +<p>Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the geography and the population and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the economy, doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict.</p> -<p>US reliance on Russian enriched uranium is in part a legacy of the “Megatons to Megawatts” initiative, which ran from 1995 to 2013 and saw the conversion of 500 metric tonnes of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons into over 14,000 metric tonnes of low enriched uranium for the generation of nuclear energy in the US, accounting for 10% of US electricity production at the time. The agreement was executed by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and TENEX, with the former accepting low enriched uranium, chemically processed and diluted by TENEX from highly enriched uranium withdrawn from Russian nuclear weapons, and selling it on to utility customers. As a result of this significant Russian supply of enriched uranium into the US nuclear energy supply chain, as well as the longstanding low prices of Russian material, there was little ability or need for domestic enrichment production to compete with Russian supply and the US enrichment industry atrophied.</p> +<p>If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method.</p> -<p>However, Russian exports of enriched uranium to Western countries, including the US, pre-dates the “Megatons to Megawatts” initiative, as do concerns over excessive Russian access to the US enriched uranium market and efforts to limit it. In an effort to prevent an influx of cheap Russian enrichment services into the US following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US nuclear energy industry instigated an anti-dumping petition in 1991. The petition eventually resulted in the adoption in 1992 of the “Russian Suspension Agreement” (RSA) between the US Department of Commerce and Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (succeeded by Rosatom). The RSA, which was amended in 2008 and 2020, introduced formal quotas on the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US.</p> +<hr /> -<p>At present, the only commercial enrichment facility operating in the US is a plant in Eunice, New Mexico owned by Urenco, a joint venture between the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. The company recently announced an expansion of its capacity at the Eunice plant by 15%, with additional enrichment commencing in 2025 and eventually providing an additional 700 tonnes of SWU per year. Several US companies, including Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) LLC and Centrus, also offer enrichment technology and may look to enter (or re-enter) the commercial enrichment market. In October 2023, Centruslaunched operations at its enrichment facility in Piketon, Ohio for the enrichment of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). Commercial US reactors do not currently take HALEU but many advanced reactor models will require HALEU fuel.</p> +<p><strong>Alex Vershinin</strong>, Lt Col (Retd), has 10 years of frontline experience in Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan. For the last decade before his retirement, he worked as a modelling and simulations officer in concept development and experimentation for NATO and the US Army.</p>Alex VershininIf the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.【黎智英案・審訊第卌六日】2024-03-15T12:00:00+08:002024-03-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46<ul> + <li>李宇軒指英國登報眾籌餘款供「攬炒巴」等人辦活動、安排見英議員及監察區選</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="efforts-to-diversify-away-from-russia-and-related-challenges">Efforts to Diversify Away from Russia and Related Challenges</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>As discussed earlier, there are some ongoing efforts in the US to diversify away from Russian enriched uranium supply. In December 2023, the US House of Representatives passed a bill that would prohibit the import into the US of “unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is produced in the Russian Federation or by a Russian entity” through 2040. The bill, which at the time of writing was awaiting debate by the Senate, would allow the secretary of energy, in consultation with the secretary of state and the secretary of commerce, to issue waivers for imports of Russian enriched uranium in instances where alternative supply is not available or if such imports would be in the national interest. RSA quotas on imports of any Russian material would still apply and any waivers would be terminated by 1 January 2028. A similar bill was introduced in the Senate in March 2023.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HjXOWhI.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>As noted earlier, concerns over the availability of alternative, non-Russian, enriched uranium supply for US utilities have been raised by a number of experts. However, the extent of the challenge that US utilities may face in replacing Russian material with non-Russian supply in the short, medium and long term is the subject of some debate and likely varies between utilities. In comments to media, Urenco leadership has stated that “it has enough capacity to replace Russian supplies if Washington bans imports from the country” and “there are no constraints in the short term in replacing Russian materials in the western world”. Some analysts have nevertheless pointed to likely shortages in supply for US utilities should imports of Russian uranium stop, although they have noted that assessing the full impact of a ban on Russian imports is challenging as various utilities are likely to have different dependencies on Russian supply and varying nuclear fuel reserves.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（15日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第46日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李談及2019年7月第二次的眾籌，是有關英國的「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃及相關活動，當時認識了主要搞手「攬炒巴」劉祖廸。據銀行紀錄，該次眾籌錄得餘款約20萬英鎊，李供稱用以支付「攬炒巴」在英國籌辦活動和遊行的開支，採取實報實銷制。部份餘款則用於向「Whitehouse Consultancy」支付顧問費，而該公司曾安排「攬炒巴」等人會見英國國會議員、動用人脈來港監察2019年區議會選舉，並與「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯持續合作。此外，李指「攬炒巴」等人曾經研究簽署《中英聯合聲明》的新聞圖片版權問題，另一名同案被告陳梓華聲稱可以在與黎智英食飯時查問，「嗰時 for some reasons，我覺得佢同《蘋果》有啲關係。」後來陳告訴李「張相OK喇」，《蘋果》職員亦授權他們使用相關新聞圖片。</p> -<p>With time, individual utilities and the US nuclear energy sector more broadly will likely become more prepared to withstand the impact of a ban on imports of Russian uranium into the US. In December 2023, the governments of the US, Canada, France, Japan and the UK announced a commitment “to pursue at least USD $4.2 billion in government-led and private investment in our five nations’ collective enrichment and conversion capacity over the next three years”. In February 2024, as part of the Emergency National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, the US Senate approved $2.7 billion in funding to expand the production in the US of LEU and HALEU. The Nuclear Energy Institute – which is the “policy organisation of the nuclear technologies industry” in the US – also supports a ban on imports of Russian uranium, with its leadership noting that: “The U.S. commercial nuclear industry is committed to transitioning to a secure domestic nuclear fuel supply, and this bill is an important step toward that goal”.</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第三天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李早前提及，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌及籌備在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。期間案中另一名被告陳梓華經 Telegram 接觸李，並以「T」的身份與李商討墊支廣告費，惟李當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。</p> -<p>However, some have raised concerns. Centrus, which acts as a broker of enriched uranium (sourcing foreign SWU and supplying SWU and uranium to US and international customers), has raised concerns over potential risks to its supply that may result from restrictions on trade in uranium with Russia. Such restrictions may come in the form of US sanctions on Russian enriched uranium imports, refusal by its US and/or foreign customers to accept Russian SWU, or a decision by Russia to stop exports of uranium to the US. According to its 2023 annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, TENEX is Centrus’s largest supplier of SWU, followed by French company Orano. Centrus has commitments with TENEX for the supply of Russian enrichment services (in the form of SWU) to 2028. Despite having access to alternative sources of enriched uranium, in its 2023 report Centrus notes that, short of securing a waiver from the secretary of energy, the proposed ban would preclude the company from importing Russian LEU into the US and that its alternative supply would not be sufficient to replace the Russian LEU it is currently permitted to import under the RSA.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒兩間墊支的公司非經營登廣告業務-理應盡快還錢">李宇軒：兩間墊支的公司非經營登廣告業務 理應盡快還錢</h4> -<p>Furthermore, the proposed ban on imports into the US of Russian enriched uranium could mean that a greater proportion of the Russian material that Centrus is committed to purchasing from TENEX may have to be directed to non-US utilities. Due to the RSA quotas, not all of the material that Centrus purchases from TENEX can be sold to US utilities. In its 2023 report, the company notes:</p> +<p>控方問及G20登報計劃結束之後，李宇軒與T商討還款的細節。李宇軒供稱，他與 T 在7月的時候，就還款事宜在 Telegram 上溝通，大概意思是「T嗰邊」墊支過登報費，李問可以怎樣還款，T則說要安排一下。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>We will need to make new sales to place all the Russian LEU we must order to meet our SWU purchase obligations to TENEX. In addition, because the [RSA] quotas do not cover all of the LEU that we must order to fulfill our purchase obligations under the TENEX Supply Contract, we expect that a portion of the Russian LEU that we order during the term of the TENEX Supply Contract will need to be delivered to customers that will use it in overseas reactors.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>李前天提到，等待還款安排期間，T曾告訴他「上頭嘅人」對於「拖住嚿錢」感到不安，於是雙方簽訂借據。控方今追問，T有否告訴李，「上頭嘅人」實際上是指哪些人。李指沒有。</p> -<p>Centrus also noted prior to 2022 that the company expected to have to deliver some of the LEU it would source from TENEX during the term of its supply agreement with the Russian company to customers for use in overseas reactors. Yet, should a potential ban on imports of Russian material into the US be introduced, and if Centrus commitments to purchase Russian SWU remain unaffected by the ban or other factors, this raises questions over whether a greater fraction of the Russian SWU that Centrus is committed to purchasing from TENEX would need to get sold to customers elsewhere and, if so, how much and to whom.</p> +<p>控方又問，T有否告訴李，為何「上頭嘅人」感到不安。李則指，因為墊支登廣告的公司「唔 suppose 係做登廣告嘅業務」，所以李理應盡快還款，以免「唔關公司本身業務嘅嘢喺度拖住」，不過他表示：「唔記得係我咁樣諗，定係佢同我講佢咁樣諗。」</p> -<p>Should new customers need to be found for Russian material no longer accepted in the US, these are likely to be companies and countries that would probably have purchased Russian SWU directly from Russia anyway. As such, any redirection of Russian SWU from the US to alternative customers following a US ban would not necessarily increase Rosatom’s footprint in global supply chains. However, it would also tamper the impact of the US ban on overall Russian access to global enrichment supply chains – simply shifting Russian supply elsewhere. Furthermore, should material that is no longer accepted in the US be sold to China or another country that is still willing to take Russian SWU and has a domestic enrichment capacity, the supply could in theory be used in a displacement strategy in efforts to circumvent existing restrictions on the import of Russian material into the US.</p> +<p>李其後承認這是他的假設，因為籌辦G20登報的一般都是社運組織，「以我知道，Lais Hotel 和 Dico（力高）都唔係一啲 activist 嘅 organisation。」</p> -<p>Of course, alternative customers, other than China or other countries that could adopt a displacement strategy, could potentially be found for the excess Russian material, for instance, South Korea, the UAE or some Latin American countries with operating nuclear reactors. However, the willingness of utilities in these countries to purchase enriched uranium no longer accepted in the US would depend on their readiness to accept Russian supply as well as any existing contracts they may have for alternative enriched uranium and enrichment services. These two factors may therefore limit opportunities for – and likelihood of – reallocation of Russian supply to new non-US customers.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒簽借據時首次得知t真名為陳梓華">李宇軒：簽借據時首次得知T真名為陳梓華</h4> -<p>Furthermore, a ban on imports of enriched uranium into the US may impact on businesses’ commitments to source SWU from TENEX. The introduction of a ban might allow companies the opportunity to terminate supply contracts with Russia on the grounds that the US has introduced restriction on such trade, depending on the nature of the restrictions put in place. However, this would not resolve the issue of any supply challenges that may result for US nuclear industry from a loss of access to Russian enriched uranium and enrichment services. As such, seeking a way out of supply contracts may therefore not be the preferred option for TENEX customers. In fact, US companies are likely to seek waivers to allow them to continue purchasing and importing Russian LEU into the US. As such, reallocation of Russian supply from US utilities to utilities in other countries, as described above, may not be necessary. However, the granting of waivers – while maybe necessary to ensure continued security of supply for some in the US nuclear industry – would in itself diminish the short-term impact of efforts to limit Russian access to US nuclear supply chains.</p> +<p>李早前作供又指，他與T相約到金鐘力寶中心的一間咖啡店簽署借據，作為一個臨時措施（stop gap measure）。李今再解釋，若T手上有一份借據，T便可以跟「上面嘅人」說：「嗱，依家有 promissory note，條數一定會還嘅。」</p> -<p>As with some of the adaptations described in the case studies on France and Germany, a ban on the import of Russian uranium into the US may cause some challenges for industry – either as a result of contractual obligations or concerns over security of supply. A ban is therefore likely to result in adaptations which may temper the ban’s ability to reduce Rosatom’s revenue generation and Russia’s presence in global and Western nuclear supply chains, at least in the short term. This is not a reason to forego pursuing such restrictions on imports of Russian enriched uranium into the US, but rather a reminder of the need for a considered approach to the institution of such restrictions – one which takes into account both political objectives and the practicalities faced by industry. To help incentivise and facilitate industry behaviour which aligns with political objectives, the articulation and application of a ban must rely on thorough consultation with customers and suppliers in the US’s nuclear energy sector. It needs to be accompanied by the development of domestic and partner enrichment capacity to ensure a sustainable transition away from Russian supply, and must seek to identify and mitigate the ways in which Russia may continue to access global nuclear fuel supply chains despite the introduction of restrictions.</p> +<p>法官李運騰問李是否記得借據上的「收款人」一欄寫什麼。李則表示記得有類似「收款人」一欄，但是不記得內容是什麼。他又指，合共有4個人在借據上簽名，包括他、T 和兩名見證人，期間「拎咗身份證出嚟畀大家睇」，但他不記得需否寫下身份證號碼。</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-and-policy-recommendations">Conclusion and Policy Recommendations</h3> +<p>李表示，在該次簽借據的過程中，是首次得知T真名叫陳梓華。</p> -<p>This report has outlined four case studies that demonstrate the scale of Western and global dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supplies, the economic and contractual challenges that stand in the way of ending these dependencies, the adaptations to efforts by some Western countries and companies to cut Russia out of their nuclear fuel supply chains, and the likely limitations of efforts to cut Russia out of global nuclear fuel supply chains. In particular, Russia may rely on countries still willing or obligated to accept its enriched uranium to implement displacement strategies or simply serve as alternative entry points into markets from which it is being squeezed out. Such strategies simply push the issue of Russian dependency to a different part of the supply chain but do little to ultimately squeeze Rosatom’s bottom line and, in some instances, to decrease Western dependencies on Russian enriched uranium.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認經chartwell-holding戶口還款156萬-惟陳梓華未有談及公司背景">李宇軒確認經Chartwell Holding戶口還款156萬 惟陳梓華未有談及公司背景</h4> -<p>Of particular concern are trends in trade data that could point to the adoption of a displacement strategy – as may be the case with China. As Beijing may be seeking to increase its role as an exporter of enriched uranium to global markets, including to the US, it could rely on increased imports into China of Russian enriched uranium to facilitate this expansion. An increase in the value of Russian enriched uranium imports by China since 2022 has been accompanied by an increase in the value of Chinese exports of enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023, driven primarily by deliveries to the US. However, publicly available data reviewed for this report is insufficient to conclude definitively whether displacement is actually occurring.</p> +<p>控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，顯示李在2019年8月1日把100萬元轉帳至 Chartwell Holding，其後8月2日再次把約55.9萬元轉帳至 Chartwell Holding。李確認兩筆款項是用以清還有關G20登報的費用。</p> -<p>In the case of Europe, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France and continued deliveries of Russian material to Germany also raise questions over the effectiveness of unilateral efforts by other players in the European nuclear fuel supply chain to cut dependencies on Russia. While it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the drivers of recent increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France or to confirm whether and how much Russian enriched uranium may be arriving in Germany through third countries, the willingness of certain countries to continue accepting Russian material may continue to grant Rosatom alternative entry points into the European nuclear fuel supply chain. Should Russian material delivered to Germany be integrated into the future fabrication of VVER nuclear fuel assemblies in cooperation with Rosatom, this would also be counterproductive to efforts by Eastern European VVER operators to diversify away from Russian supplies.</p> +<p>控方問李，陳梓華向他提供 Chartwell Holding 的戶口資料時，有否談及這間公司的背景。李回答沒有。</p> -<p>The report also briefly examined US dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supplies, as the US remains the most important importer of Russian enriched uranium. While a prohibition on imports of Russian enriched uranium into the US may cut Russia out of US supply chains, the extent to which such a ban may cause supply challenges for US nuclear fuel supply chains remains the subject of some debate. Furthermore, some of the Russian material that may no longer be accepted in the US may need to be redirected to other customers around the world that are still willing to accept Russian material. While this is unlikely to have a significant impact on the presence of Russian enriched uranium on global markets, as the excess supply is likely to be redirected to countries willing to do business with Russia and which would have probably purchased Russian supply anyway, it highlights again the challenges and limitations inherent to unilateral efforts to cut Russia out of global nuclear fuel supply chains. The case studies presented in this report – including that of the US – also point to the need for close engagement with the nuclear industry to ensure that restrictions on trade in uranium and enrichment services with Russia are developed and implemented in a manner that incentivises and facilitates maximum industry buy-in on the objectives of such restrictions – in this case, sustainable diversification away from Russian enriched uranium supply in Western nuclear fuel supply chains.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱登報計劃15萬餘款捐給612基金">李宇軒稱登報計劃15萬餘款捐給612基金</h4> -<p>The limitations of current restrictions on purchases of Russian enriched uranium and enrichment services described in this report should not serve to dissuade the further introduction of such restrictions. Not only is diversification away from Russia’s nuclear industry important for ensuring nuclear energy security in the US and Europe, it is also critical to avoiding the political and moral dissonance inherent in claims to support Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression while continuing to engage in business with a strategically significant Russian state-enterprise. Instead, they should serve as a further reminder to ensure that any future restrictions aim for a multilateral approach, identify and address likely opportunities for circumvention through countries still willing to do business with Russia, are introduced in close consultation with industry and are accompanied by measures that incentivise and facilitate maximum industry buy-in and compliance. The six recommendations outlined below are aimed at facilitating diversification and preventing circumvention, both in instances where continued intake of Russian material is contractually obligated and when it may be being used as part of a deliberate strategy to gain greater market access by competing suppliers.</p> +<p>控方指，據G20登報計劃的收支列表，該次錄得15萬港元餘款，問李當時如何處理這些餘款。李稱：「捐咗畀612。」控方追問「612」是什麼意思，李回答：「啫係612基金。」他又解釋，因為登報計劃有一筆餘款，「唔可以落袋」，因此後來將這筆餘款捐給612基金。控方再追問612基金是用作什麼目的，李僅指：「支援 legal fee 嘅。」</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation 1: Invest in the further expansion of enrichment capacity in partner countries.</strong> While additional capacity from Urenco and Orano is due to come online in 2025 and 2028 respectively, the US, the UK, European and other Western-allied governments must invest in additional enrichment capacity to ensure long-term security of supply and facilitate a sustainable diversification away from Russian supply while limiting negative impacts on Western nuclear industry and energy production. This could include investments in the development of new enrichment technologies that may be easier and quicker to scale up and would allow for the entry into the market of new enrichment service providers. Recent US and UK efforts to support domestic production of HALEU fuel should be commended to this end. Making available competitive government incentives for enrichment service providers to invest in expanded enrichment capacity, as well as incentives for utilities (that is, the customers) to provide guarantees of sustained demand in the form of long-term contracts will also help encourage further investment by enrichers into additional capacity.</p> +<p>控方其後問，612基金的全名是否「612人道支援基金」。李表示：「啱啱你幫我記得起佢全名，我淨係記得612。」</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation 2: Once alternative supply can be assured, implement multilateral restrictions on imports of Russian enriched uranium.</strong> To increase the effectiveness and limit the negative impacts of any sanctions or restrictions on the Western nuclear sector, any initiatives at diversification should be undertaken only following extensive consultations with relevant actors within the nuclear energy industry and only once sufficient alternative enriched uranium supply has been secured, either through expanded Western and partner enrichment capacity or through enriched uranium inventories. Every effort must also be made to ensure a unanimous approach to sanctions across US, European and other allied markets. The adaptation activities outlined in this report rely on Russia’s ability to access some markets while others adopt diversification policies. As such, unilateral efforts by individual countries or companies to cut Russia out of the West’s nuclear supply chain will be vulnerable to circumvention.</p> +<p>被問到為何選擇捐給612基金，陳表示他理解612基金其中一項工作是支援被捕人士的法律開支，「咁係完全合法嘅，同埋我理解公眾唔會反對嘅」，所以當他們有一筆餘款時，「唔知做咩咁，同埋擔心有人唔知係咪袋咗自己袋」，所以便決定捐出。</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation 3: Establish methods for enforcing the “displacement swap” prohibition under the RSA.</strong> The US Department of Commerce, as the authority responsible for monitoring possible circumvention of the RSA provisions, should work with other departments in US government as well as with industry to identify methods for enforcing the prohibition of displacement swaps. To demonstrate that enriched uranium imported into the US was not the result of displacement using Russian material, importers could, for instance, be asked to demonstrate the allocation to various customers of enriched uranium imports into their country or show proof of increases in domestic enrichment capacity to meet demand for exports to the US. Considering the commercial sensitivity of some of this information, government authorities in the country of export could be asked to collate this information and provide assurances on behalf of industry.</p> +<p>控方問李有否就眾籌計劃接受過任何傳媒訪問。李表示記得在其中一次眾籌期間，《蘋果》曾經採訪過眾籌團隊，不過他不記得是6月那次眾籌，還是7月那次眾籌。</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation 4: Adopt prohibitions on displacement swaps alongside other national or multilateral (EU) bans on imports of Russian enriched uranium.</strong> Should individual countries or the EU decide to adopt a ban on Russian enriched uranium, they should include prohibitions of displacement swaps, similar to those included in the RSA. Such prohibitions, if enforced as per Recommendation 3, will help close potential loopholes that Russia could exploit to maintain indirect access to markets that are trying to cut Russia out, undermining efforts to squeeze Rosatom’s bottom line.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指2019年7月參與英國登報眾籌計劃-攬炒巴有份">李宇軒指2019年7月參與英國登報眾籌計劃 「攬炒巴」有份</h4> -<p><strong>Recommendation 5: Examine and work to address dependencies on Russia across the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle.</strong> Uranium enrichment is not the only aspect of the global nuclear fuel supply chain where dependencies on Russia are critical. Rosatom also plays a major role in global NPP construction, uranium conversion and spent fuel management. Cutting dependencies on Russia in one part of the supply chain, while a good start, will not have as great an effect on Rosatom’s revenue generation as ensuring that the West and partner countries, as well as undecided customers, have alternative suppliers across the nuclear fuel cycle. Russia and China have invested extensively in their civil nuclear sectors as strategic industries, having understood the long-term dependencies they can create in the countries to which they sell their technology and services. While the economies and the government–industry relations in Russia and China differ significantly from those in Western and partner countries, supporting the development of domestic nuclear industries and their ability to compete internationally should be a priority.</p> +<p>李接著談及2019年7月的另一次眾籌計劃，是有關在英國登廣告的活動。他記得當時有一個人將「攬炒巴」介紹給他認識，「因為攬炒巴想喺英國嗰邊去搞眾籌登報，同埋相關嘅事。」李指，因為對方知道他籌辦G20登報眾籌「係幾成功」，所以便邀請他幫手「睇吓攬炒巴喺 crowdfund 嗰度有冇嘢可以幫到手」。</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation 6: Avoid trading dependencies on Russia for dependencies on China.</strong> As companies and governments seek to diversify away from Russia in their sourcing of enriched uranium supplies and across the nuclear fuel cycle, China may look to take advantage of openings to present itself as an alternative supplier. It is imperative that Western and partner governments focus on investment in domestic capacity and the capacity of partner countries, not on sourcing services and technology from China. Not only may increased Chinese exports of enriched uranium be backed by increased imports of Russian material (undermining the impact of Western and partner sanctions on the Russian nuclear industry), but allowing Chinese companies to play an important role in nuclear supply chains runs the risk of creating problematic dependencies not dissimilar to those that currently exist on Russia.</p> +<p>李表示，當時知道「攬炒巴」即是「連登」討論區上一個帳號「我要攬炒」，「而連登上面男仔係叫『巴打』嘅」，所以「攬炒巴」便是這一個帳號。</p> -<hr /> +<p>李稱，後來他知道「攬炒巴」即是劉祖廸，因為大約在2019年尾至2020年初，陳梓華和「攬炒巴」與他曾經在網上平台 Jitsi 進行線上會議。</p> -<p><strong>Darya Dolzikova</strong> is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and strategic aspects of civil nuclear technology. She has conducted research on the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, nuclear safety in Ukraine, the role of Russia in global civil nuclear supply chains, and other issues relating to nuclear technology and proliferation.</p>Darya DolzikovaThis report examines the trade in Russian enriched uranium.China In Sub-Saharan Africa2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-sub-saharan-africa<p><em>Chinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.</em></p> +<p>至於李在是次眾籌的角色，李稱主要都是幫手處理眾籌。其他參與者包括「攬炒巴」、一個叫「Always」的人、向他介紹「攬炒巴」的人，以及後來有 Jack Hazlewood，其他參與者則記不起。他指是次活動「主要係攬炒巴嗰邊嘅人搞」，據他所知，運作模式與G20登報計劃相若，有的人處理眾籌，有的人聯絡報館，有的人設計廣告。</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="李宇軒指蘋果專欄作家jack-hazlewood借出銀行戶口接收眾籌款項">李宇軒指《蘋果》專欄作家Jack Hazlewood借出銀行戶口接收眾籌款項</h4> -<p>China has developed significant global influence through the use of development financing, spending $1 trillion since 2013, including $160 billion in Africa. This article is based on research conducted into Chinese influence in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on Angola, Zambia and Kenya. The study involved interviews with key figures such as senior business officials, Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) and state-owned bank managers, investigative journalists and personal contacts within the former intelligence sphere, all of whom had first-hand or extensive experience of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) deals.</p> +<p>李指，該次英國眾籌登報是關於1984年簽署的《中英聯合聲明》，而當時「攬炒巴」希望以此作為主題。</p> -<p>The research uncovered how Beijing’s overarching strategy on the African continent seeks to court foreign policy influence in order to sanction-proof supply chains and develop dual-use ports, despite the doubtful resilience of such a strategy outside of peacetime conditions. A former senior manager in a Chinese SOE stated, “the large SOEs in the region have very limited freedom. It is guided by the Central Government from the way they are staffed at the high level and the overarching direction they pursue”.</p> +<p>就眾籌方法，李指在第一次就G20登報眾籌時使用的平台「GoGetFund」，手續費頗貴，當時籌到接近700萬元，但是卻扣除了50至60萬元手續費。於是他們找了另一個眾籌平台「gofundme.com」，可以選擇不給予貼士或手續費。</p> -<h3 id="sanction-proofing-supply-chains">Sanction-Proofing Supply Chains</h3> +<p>李指，不過在「攬炒巴嗰邊嘅人」當中，沒有人願意借出自己的銀行戶口作為眾籌的收款人。李當時認為，因為他在第一次眾籌時已經使用了其個人戶口，「即使再嚟多次，都唔會增加我嘅風險」，於是決定借出他的渣打銀行戶口去接收眾籌款項。惟後來李發現，「gofundme.com」規定款項必須經由英國開設的英鎊戶口接收，他不記得在陳梓華還是另一名群組成員的介紹下，最終認識了 Jack Hazlewood，對方亦同意借出銀行戶口。後來李知道 Jack Hazlewood 是「《蘋果》嘅寫手」。</p> -<p>A core component of this strategy is China’s use of financing for “resource-led diplomacy” to facilitate access to raw materials and minerals for electronics, renewable energy and hi-tech industries. According to a Brookings report, by 2019, minerals and fossil fuels accounted for 35% of exports to China from 60% of African countries. Trade between China and Africa saw a 1,900% increase from 2000, the year of the first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation summit. Yet access to raw materials masks half the story.</p> +<p>控方追問李提到的「風險」是什麼意思。李指是被指控「洗黑錢」的風險，雖然他有妥善保存所有關於眾籌的單據，能夠證明到他不是「洗黑錢」，「但中間有畀人懷疑洗黑錢同埋凍結戶口的風險。」</p> -<p>Crucially, China is tailoring funding to build bespoke infrastructure (roads/railways/ports) for the transport of raw materials in a sanction-resilient supply chain. Securing raw materials in Zambia led China to enhance strategic supply routes to port sites in Lobito, Luanda and Mombasa. Indeed, based on Observer Research Foundation statistics, the use of financing to secure access to raw materials in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia accounted for 60% of all trade between China and Africa. A head of a leading private intelligence group suggested that securing access to copper is “the be all and end all” for China–Zambia financing, which is part of a wider global strategy to “control the copper market and deny Western companies access by removing Western powers from supply chains”.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒陳梓華聲稱與黎智英食飯後-獲允使用蘋果新聞圖片">李宇軒：陳梓華聲稱與黎智英食飯後 獲允使用《蘋果》新聞圖片</h4> -<p>Beijing views Zambia as “land-linked” rather than “land-locked”. Interviewees described the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation’s operations in Zambia as intricately tied to the Central Government, having previously been part of the Chinese Ministry of Railways and currently being overseen by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council. Its activities in Zambia expose Beijing’s clear strategy of securing raw material supply routes in order to enhance China’s energy security in case of future sanctions. Indeed, China focuses financing on specific strategic roads and railways which “creates a corridor so most of the lithium, copper, cobalt etc. can access the coast and go back to China” via the Tazara Railway and roads connecting Zambia, the DRC, South Africa and Angola. A former Nigerian presidential advisor who had worked on several Chinese BRI deals suggested that “through helping with infrastructure projects China is securing the ability to move things directly from Zambia and the surrounding region out to Mombasa and the African coast to China”.</p> +<p>李續指：「後來我又知陳梓華識 Mark Simon 同肥佬黎」，當法庭翻譯主任把「肥佬黎」翻譯成「Fatty Lai」時，李補充道：「Sorry，黎智英。」</p> -<p>In Kenya, China secures strategic supply routes by using it as the maritime gateway for raw materials from the hinterland. A former senior official within an Investment Banking department at the China Construction Bank (CCB) suggested that Chinese SOEs in Kenya were working in concert. The state-owned China State Railway Group which was responsible for the Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and the Nairobi-Thika Highway Project purportedly worked in collaboration with mining SOEs in neighbouring countries to improve China’s raw material supply routes. Moreover, following interviews with senior government officials, a senior source suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued directives to ensure a strategic foothold in the country, meaning the SGR and associated Chinese-funded infrastructure projects became “too big to fail”.</p> +<p>李提到「攬炒巴」想使用當年簽署《中英聯合聲明》的新聞圖片，即是中方代表與時任英國首相戴卓爾夫人握手的相片。有組員留意到《蘋果》網站上有這一張相片，陳梓華聲稱會去問《蘋果日報》，李說：「嗰時 for some reasons，我覺得佢同《蘋果》有啲關係，之前我唔記得佢幾時暗示過。」</p> -<p>Corroborating this, the CEO of a prominent Chinese advisory financing firm, reporting on conversations with Chinese officials, conveyed that “China saw Kenya as a key logistics hub”. Mombasa’s deepwater port made it “the best strategic location and a hub of the large region of East and Central Africa”. A former UK intelligence official stated, “China wants to be a rival to India in the Indian Ocean. They want to be able to get access to those resources and minerals and they view Kenya as the artery to the continent”.</p> +<p>李轉述陳當時稱：「等佢（陳）下個禮拜四，咁佢去同唔記得『黎生』定係『肥佬黎』食飯嗰陣，佢（陳）就會問佢（黎）。」李表示：「嗰陣時我知，原來佢（陳）可以去同黎生食飯。跟住過咗禮拜四之後，T（陳梓華）就話：『張相OK喇。』」李稱，其後與《蘋果》職員經過一輪正式的電郵溝通，他們便可以使用高清版的新聞圖片。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The ultimate goal is to ensure that if the US and other countries cease or begin to strongly limit cooperation, China’s supply chain resilience is already in place</code></em></strong></p> +<p>控方展示一份《蘋果》報導〈遊行被圍捕險洩身份 攬炒巴死裏逃生 帶署歷警暴 拒保後返英〉，版面下方含有眾籌網站截圖，顯示計劃名稱是「中英聯合聲明登報」。李確認。</p> -<p>A similar motivation was found in Angola, a country with vast oil reserves. AidData investment figures and the CEO of an Africa–China investment advisory firm who worked on Chinese-Angolan oil deals revealed that several Chinese-financed projects were tailored to suit Chinese supply chain interests, including the $362 million Benguela Railway, the $923 million construction work to Caio port in Cabina, and efforts to bolster raw material strategic supply routes via the port of Lobito, Luanda and the Tazara Railway. Indeed, China financed the $1.5 billion refurbishment of the Lobito-Benguela railway corridor from the cobalt belt in the southern DRC to the port of Lobito, freeing up capacity to carry 20 million tonnes of export cargo annually. Having spoken to senior Beijing officials, an interviewee suggested that the MFA and Peking University developed a “resources for infrastructure financing” framework and used Angola as the pioneering example over 15 years ago. Further reports suggest current plans exist to connect the railway with Zambia’s 1860 km Chinese-financed Tazara Railway, giving China export routes from the west coast through the raw material-rich heartland to Tanzania’s east-coast Dar es Salaam port.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OGbFYsS.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 網路截圖（資料圖片）</p> -<p>Such examples of Chinese financing in sub-Saharan Africa aimed at sanction-proofing supply routes are generalisable to countries including the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and several East African countries. A former UK intelligence official declared, “they wish to keep plenty of strings to their energy and mineral supply chain bow and this explains a lot of their development financing. They are looking now to fortify their trading networks against a possible US and European sanctions movement that would come with an invasion of Taiwan or increased geopolitical tension”.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱第二次登報活動中再度墊支-控方指事後有餘款約20萬英鎊">李宇軒稱第二次登報活動中再度墊支 控方指事後有餘款約20萬英鎊</h4> -<p>A lawyer previously working on Chinese BRI deals stated, “it is clear that China is working together with the development banks to get the money in, buy the asset, build the infrastructure around it, get it onto a railway and get it to the port”. A former senior manager in a large SOE supported this view, stating that “those harbours and railways are not put in place by us just for fun or development help or a small return on a loan. If we need a railway to reach the next country for this supply chain, we will put it in place to reach those materials”. Indeed, a former senior official within an Investment Banking department at the CCB insisted that China does not trust international markets and wants to be self-sufficient to prevent the threat of Western sanctions. The ultimate goal is to ensure that if the US and other countries cease or begin to strongly limit cooperation, China’s supply chain resilience is already in place.</p> +<p>李指第一次的G20登報與第二次的「中英聯合聲明登報」眾籌，同樣遇到未能立即動用籌得款項的問題，所以李需要協助墊支。</p> -<h3 id="dual-port-use">Dual Port Use</h3> +<p>控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，可見李在2019年7月19日至25日期間，先後向《旗幟晚報》（Evening Standard）、《衛報》（The Guardian）、台灣《自由時報》等合共6間媒體公司轉帳。李表示不肯定台灣《自由時報》那一次轉帳是關於「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃，還是第三次的眾籌活動，但其餘5間媒體公司的轉帳則確認有關。控方指，若果把台灣《自由時報》計算在內，李合共墊支了約10萬英鎊，即130萬港元。李確認。</p> -<p>Having bolstered supply chain resilience, China is also ensuring that a significant amount of its port construction is being completed to a “dual port use specification” so as to avoid Western suspicion of PLA Navy (PLAN) build-up. Chinese-funded ports are built to accommodate commercial trade, but can – with significant risks and complications (see below) – be flipped to military use as the depth and landing/docking zones are built to PLAN specifications. A regional director at a private intelligence firm and former UK intelligence official with experience of BRI port deals pointed to secure, dual-use facilities in several countries including Angola, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa and Kenya.</p> +<p>控方續指，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，Jack Henry Hazlewood 在2019年8月9日轉帳了約30.8萬英鎊給李。控方要求李確認第二次的登報活動錄得餘款約20萬英鎊，惟李表示不記得金額，但他相信控方的推論是正確。李亦記得該些餘款均存放在他的銀行戶口內。</p> -<p>China’s own 2019 defence white paper stated that the PLA was developing “overseas logistical facilities” to “address deficiencies in overseas operations”, calling for a shift from “near coast active defence” to “far seas manoeuvring operations”. It claimed that China must establish its “perceived status as a Great Power” by advancing “China’s escalating global interests, particularly those associated with the BRI, including infrastructure, assets, personnel and control over sea lanes”. Moreover, China’s capstone doctrinal text, the Science of Military Strategy (2020 edition), highlights the “two Oceans” approach in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the PLAN’s desire to “establish ourselves” in both by constructing “maritime strategic support points”.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指眾籌餘款用以支付英國活動開支-實報實銷">李宇軒指眾籌餘款用以支付英國活動開支 實報實銷</h4> -<p>The aforementioned senior official within the Investment Banking department at the CCB confirmed this, suggesting China is securing influence in Kenya as part of its effort to become a significant “ocean-faring nation”, constructing the port of Mombasa to be compatible with PLAN specifications. Indeed, the PLA Military Transport Academy suggests the dual use of Mombasa port could help solve the Malacca Dilemma by “reducing transport pressure and avoiding waterways that could be closed by adversaries”. Satellite imagery reveals the 245 m military-grade dock could berth two Type 056 corvettes and any surface combatant up to the Type 055D guided-missile destroyer. Additionally, it reveals the 164 m dock could accommodate one surface combatant up to the Type 052D destroyer, with the port also having the capacity to refuel most PLAN ships and act as a logistics hub for tankers directly facilitating the replenishment of PLAN ships in open waters.</p> +<p>被問到如何處理這一筆餘款，李指「一路攬炒巴嗰邊呢，就將佢（餘款）用喺佢同英國相關嘅嘢度」，例如他們舉辦一個支持香港的集會，可能涉及零星開支，例如泊車費，那便會動用「中英聯合聲明登報」的餘款來支付。李指實際操作是有人先墊支，事後給他單據，他便會向相關人士還款。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The previously cautious consensus around Chinese financing motivations may no longer apply to the strengthening China of today</code></em></strong></p> +<p>法官杜麗冰問李是否認識報銷開支的人士，李則表示不知道，並指：「只要攬炒巴嗰邊彈一個人嚟，話『呢個人係關事嘅，你 reimburse 佢啦』，咁我就會 reimburse。」李又指：「Whatever 佢寫咩，佢話係咩就係咩」，有點似「攬炒巴」批核相關開支，而李就像一個司庫般償還款項。</p> -<p>The PLAN’s future ambitions for dual use of Angola’s deepwater Luanda Atlantic port reveal a similar story. In addition to the port of Lobito, Angola’s 1,600 km coastline has four other operational seaports, significant portions of which China has financed. A private military investigation found that Luanda port can accommodate Type 052D and 055 destroyers and most PLAN vessels for replenishment. In 2016, the Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China (CHEXIM) financed the China Energy Engineering Corporation to build Caio port in Cabinda, Angola’s first deepwater port. China-Sonangol is currently involved in constructing another deepwater Angolan facility, the Barra do Dande port 50 km north of Luanda, which will include 29 storage tanks, a container and multi-use terminal and a petroleum support zone. According to China Dialogue, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) acquired a 30% stake in the Portuguese construction company Mota-Engil, which secured a 30-year concession on the port of Lobito. Moreover, a CLBrief report indicated that China International Trust Investment Corporation and Shandong Port Group secured a 20-year concession to manage and operate Angola’s port of Lobito multipurpose container and general cargo terminal.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒除舉辦活動外-眾籌餘款用於顧問費">李宇軒：除舉辦活動外 眾籌餘款用於顧問費</h4> -<p>Evidence provided by a regional director of a private intelligence firm showed that, via financing, China is seeking access and control over deepwater maritime ports on Africa’s Atlantic coast for commercial and military purposes. Secret PLAN documents revealed plans to link Chinese port financing to strategic military motivations in Angola, Kenya and 11 other countries. Indeed, China’s Djibouti military base disguises a more subtle Chinese military strategy of dual-use ports across the continent.</p> +<p>控方再次問李有關餘款的用途，李補充指除了用於舉辦英國相關的活動之外，還會用於支付顧問費、籌辦一些支持香港的遊行和支付網絡伺服器的費用等等。</p> -<p>Ports on the Atlantic coast should perhaps raise the most concern in Washington. A traditional Chinese inter-continental ballistic missile has a range of about 6,000 km, meaning that it can be launched from eastern China to hit the west coast of the US. Chinese nuclear submarines can currently remain at sea for long periods, but they do not have the ability to obtain food and resupplies when operating in the Atlantic. Therefore, a resupply base on the African Atlantic coast would put Chinese submarines in range of New York, Washington DC and Atlanta. With Africa remaining an uncontested space for Chinese development financing, the US’s internal security is at risk.</p> +<p>控方問李所指的「遊行」是支持香港什麼，李僅回答：「民主。」</p> -<p>Indeed, CHEXIM financed, and CCCC First Harbour Engineering Co built, Equatorial Guinea’s Bata deepwater port in 2006, with the China Road and Bridge Corp making significant updates in 2016. The CEO of a leading China-focused intelligence firm stated, “don’t be fooled by the lack of hard arms sales. China now owns 93 ports in 53 countries” including Nigeria, Tanzania and Namibia, with China’s Ambassador to Namibia calling Walvis Bay port the “most brilliant pearl” on Africa’s Atlantic coast. Of African BRI countries, 70% are located on the north, east, west or south coast with key investments made in ports near the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal, including Djibouti port, Port Sudan, Port Said–Port Tewfik, Ain Sokhna port, Zarzis port, El Hamdania port and the newly financed and commissioned Lekki deep seaport in Lagos, West Africa’s largest. Ultimately, the dual-use model allows China to downplay the military significance of its port investments, while providing access to several military facilities. The Economic Times reported that a total of 46 African ports have been built or financed – or are currently operated – by Chinese state-owned shipping corporations.</p> +<p>就剛才提及的「顧問費」，李指涉及兩間顧問公司，其中一間為「89up」，以他所知是比較集中於媒體範疇的顧問公司，後來他們覺得「89up」在政治方面較弱，於是轉用另一間顧問公司「Whitehouse Consultancy」。李特別強調，這間「Whitehouse Consultancy」與美國的白宮無關，純粹因為老闆名叫 Chris Whitehouse。</p> -<p>However, despite such developments, existential alarmism when analysing these findings would be premature. An important caveat is that the above analysis assumes peacetime conditions. In conflict, China will find protecting port infrastructure and negotiating access to be crucial stumbling blocks to its dual-use port model. Protecting the aforementioned ports from incoming enemy fire – especially without adequate missile defence systems, bunkers and existent fortified supply depots for fuel and munitions, would involve increasingly complex military planning of a scale and capability that the Chinese military complex does not yet possess. Moreover, any Chinese troop movement (such as reinforcements) would require significant negotiations with the host country. As such, troublesome coercion tactics against countries that China relies on for supply routes (such as Angola or Kenya) would be risky and unproven.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指顧問公司安排攬炒巴會見英議員監察區議會選舉等">李宇軒指顧問公司安排「攬炒巴」會見英議員、監察區議會選舉等</h4> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>控方遂追問關於「Whitehouse Consultancy」的性質和活動。李指這間公司曾經安排過「攬炒巴喺英國嘅 members」去會見英國國會議員，後來在2019年11月香港區議會選舉期間，「佢哋有幫手去用佢哋嘅人脈搵咗一啲人去監選」。李續指，到後期直至2020年，這間公司一直與「香港監察」的羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）合作，也有一次協助前港督彭定康（Chris Patten）處理一個聯署行動。</p> -<p>Africa provides an important and long-standing model for China’s global financing efforts. The previously cautious consensus around Chinese financing motivations may no longer apply to the strengthening China of today. Over a 20-year period, Chinese financing within sub-Saharan Africa has significantly bolstered Beijing’s “sanction-proof” supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength, perhaps enhancing its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion (such as against Taiwan). Yet, serious complications around the execution of such a strategy outside of peacetime conditions remain pertinent. As the US–China relationship moves into stormier waters, China will continue to expand its naval reach and supply chain resilience, particularly as its declining economic surplus will see it concentrate financing on geostrategically important locations off the Atlantic coast and in the Indian Ocean.</p> +<p>控方追問該次聯署行動的目的，李指當時是2020年5月，有消息傳出香港會訂立《國安法》，「嗰個聯署就係話表達 concern」，尤其在英國角度，他們會認為《國安法》與《中英聯合聲明》不一致。</p> -<hr /> +<p>控方又問會見英國國會議員的目的是什麼。李指是有關當時對香港人權民主問題的關注。</p> -<p><strong>Benedict Hamlyn</strong> is a geopolitical specialist. Benedict currently works as Gatehouse Advisory Partners’ Network/Source Manager having joined as an Associate. He is responsible for strategically enabling client delivery by engaging and managing the expert network of 2,500 individuals across the globe.</p>Benedict HamlynChinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.【黎智英案・審訊第卌四日】2024-03-13T12:00:00+08:002024-03-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-44<ul> - <li>李宇軒出庭作供：為爭取國際關注香港示威 發起眾籌及G20登報計劃</li> - <li>紀錄顯示兩間公司墊支G20登報費 李宇軒：陳梓華稱「上頭」憂走數故簽借據</li> -</ul> +<h4 id="李宇軒戶口紀錄顯示曾轉帳至兩間顧問公司">李宇軒戶口紀錄顯示曾轉帳至兩間顧問公司</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，可見他分別於2019年7月23日、8月15日和8月21日，向顧問公司「89up」支付1.3萬元港幣、9,663英鎊和12,375英鎊。李確認他使用眾籌的餘款來支付上述顧問費。他又舉例指，「攬炒巴」在英國與「89up」合作，「佢哋租咗一架大巴士，喺倫敦度周圍走。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XXQlo6M.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>至於「Whitehouse Consultancy」，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示他分別在2019年11月29日、12月31日和2020年2月4日，向「The Whitehouse Consultancy Limited」轉帳9,500英鎊、14,750英鎊和15,492.85英鎊。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（13日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第44日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，相隔逾一年再度在法庭露面。李供稱，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，他與其他市民在 Telegram 群組討論在多國報紙刊登廣告，「因為當時喺香港已經有幾次好有畫面嘅示威場面」，所以眾人希望「將個關注同 momentum（運動的氣勢）帶到去國際舞台，去攞國際嘅支持」，遂開始眾籌廣告費。公開財務紀錄顯示，該次眾籌計劃籌得逾673萬元。李指，由於籌得款項需時轉帳至其銀行個人戶口，所以未能立即動用款項支付廣告費。案中另一名串謀者、被告陳梓華當時聯絡他商討墊支事宜，二人始相識，李稱：「佢（陳）去問過 uncle 或者其他人，咁佢就話嗰度可以動用到五球（500萬元）啦」，控方追問「uncle」是指誰人，李則指陳並未有提及，「可能泛指一啲男人或者其他人」，而非有血緣關係的親戚。</p> +<p>案件下周一續審。</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒已認罪-惟需等待黎智英審訊結果-相隔2年半尚未判刑">李宇軒已認罪 惟需等待黎智英審訊結果 相隔2年半尚未判刑</h4> +<hr /> -<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇昨日完成作供。控方今早開始傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒出庭，以「從犯證人」身份作供。李身穿深藍色厚褸，戴黑色粗框眼鏡，由三名懲教人員帶領下，從法庭特別通道進入法庭。李在證人台手持聖經，以基督教形式宣誓。在作供期間，李不時在庭內四處張望，並曾經望向被告欄。</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒指英國登報眾籌餘款供「攬炒巴」等人辦活動、安排見英議員及監察區選Orbán’s Balkan Allies2024-03-15T12:00:00+08:002024-03-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/orb%C3%A1ns-balkan-allies<p><em>EU and NATO should clarify the red lines to ensure Bosnia and Herzegovina’s security in the face of Viktor Orbán’s backing of Serb secessionism.</em></p> -<p>李宇軒於2021年8月19日在高院承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪；他另被控的「串謀協助罪犯罪」及「無牌管有彈藥罪」則存檔於法庭，獲不提證供起訴。李其後分別於2022年1月3日、5月3日和9月16日出席提訊，惟因為需等待黎智英的審訊結果才處理判刑，李認罪至今相隔逾2年6個月，仍尚未判刑。李是次出庭作供，是自2022年9月提訊以來，首次再度在法庭露面。</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="李宇軒確認已承認勾結控罪">李宇軒確認已承認「勾結」控罪</h4> +<p>Milorad Dodik, president of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Republika Srpska (a majority Serb region), met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 21 February 2024. At the meeting, he complained about the US and the UK sanctions against him and his associates. Dodik also promised to prevent his country’s NATO membership and bragged about his “excellent relations with [Serbian President Aleksandar] Vučić and [Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor] Orbán”.</p> -<p>控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行先作主問。李確認他曾接受大學教育，懂得中文和英文。控方指，不爭議的是李在2020年8月被警方以「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」等罪拘捕。李表示：「我冇爭議。」</p> +<p>The three top politicians – Orbán, Vučić and Dodik – have built a brotherhood in the triangle between Budapest, Belgrade and Banja Luka. They share similar worldviews, authoritarian tendencies and comparable political paths. Their positions are quite aligned: from Russia and China to hopes for Donald Trump’s return to the White House.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/98zaItN.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行（左）</p> +<p>This brotherhood, Dodik explained to Putin, made the relationship with the EU easier.</p> -<p>控方續指，李在2021年3月24日被控「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪，該控罪指李連同黎智英、Mark Simon、陳梓華和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人，在2020年7月1日至2021年2月15日，一同串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全。李表示：「具體3月幾多號唔記得，不過係咁上下。」控方續指，李於同年7月7日在裁判法院承認「串謀勾結」控罪，而他另外面對的「串謀協助罪犯罪」及「無牌管有彈藥罪」則存檔於法庭。李確認，不過不記得具體日子。</p> +<p>Indeed, Hungary is the most vocal opponent to the imposition of EU individual sanctions against Dodik and any restrictive measures against Serbia. Orbán’s man in Brussels, Olivér Várhelyi, has been an EU commissioner since 2019. He has significant influence over the disbursement of EU funds. As if that was not enough, earlier this year Hungary took over the command of the EUFOR Althea mission, a 1,600-strong EU-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指備登報計劃期間認識陳梓華-商討墊支廣告費">李宇軒指備登報計劃期間認識陳梓華 商討墊支廣告費</h4> +<p>For Orbán, this brotherhood shows that he is a leader capable of exporting his model of governance. There is, of course, also some economic interest involved. But for Vučić and Dodik, Orbán is their key ally and disrupter inside the two transatlantic alliances: the EU and NATO. Orbán is both their protector and promoter, someone who strengthens their position at home and gives their words and deeds a stamp of approval.</p> -<p>控方指陳梓華是控罪的串謀者之一，並問李是否認識陳。李表示認識陳，若果他沒記錯的話，二人在2019年6月首次在 Telegram 認識，當時他並不知道陳的名字叫陳梓華，因陳以「T」的身份與他溝通。</p> +<p>Take this year’s celebration of the Day of Republika Srpska.</p> -<p>李指，當時G20峰會將於2019年6月下旬在日本舉行，在6月上旬或中旬的時候，有一些香港市民，包括他和陳梓華，打算在不同報紙登廣告，「就傾緊一個有關登報嘅 idea」，於是眾人就在一個 Telegram 群組參與討論。</p> +<p>On 9 January 1992 a group of ethnic Serbs left the first democratically elected parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina and decided to proclaim the Republika Srpska – the Serb Republic. Their primary aim was to carve out a mono-ethnic territory where Serbs would be a dominant majority. Their longer-term aim was to then unite it with neighbouring Serbia. To achieve this, the country’s multi-ethnic fabric had to be destroyed. What followed was the most brutal conflict in Europe since the end of Second World War. It culminated with genocide in Srebrenica, leaving some 100,000 dead, 2.2 million displaced and tens of thousands raped.</p> -<p>李形容：「大家喺個 group 度好 supportive of 呢個 idea，因為當時喺香港已經有幾次好有畫面嘅示威場面」，所以眾人希望「將個關注同 momentum（運動的氣勢）帶到去國際舞台，去攞國際嘅支持」。由於他們希望登報廣告能夠「ride on G20」（乘著G20的時機），「所以啲廣告想盡量喺G20開會之前就出晒」，而錢銀問題則想在此前解決好。</p> +<p>Since 2015, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has repeatedly declared the celebration of this day to be unconstitutional. The country’s highest court ruled that this discriminates against non-Serbs living in that region. While the Republika Srpska retains its name – the Serb Republic – according to its constitution, it is no longer only that.</p> -<p>李解釋，由於眾籌結束後，本來想透過「PayPal」將款項轉帳至其個人戶口，惟不知為何「PayPal」戶口被凍結，遂轉用「Stripe」將款項轉帳至其渣打銀行的個人帳戶，而相關轉帳手續需時，所以他未能立即動用所籌得的款項，「所以我用晒自己戶口啲積蓄，大概墊咗三球幾（300萬元），但係就唔夠墊支啲廣告費，所以就有頭先講嘅 money issue。」</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For Vučić and Dodik, Orbán is both their protector and promoter, someone who strengthens their position at home and gives their words and deeds a stamp of approval</code></em></strong></p> -<p>李指嚴格來說，他理應在廣告刊出之前三日便需向報館繳清廣告費。就在他需要就廣告費向報館「找數」的時候，「T」經 Telegram 的私人對話聯絡李。經「T」查證李不夠錢支付廣告費之後，「T」聲稱會找「佢哋嗰邊啲人」幫忙墊支。至於「佢哋嗰邊啲人」是指什麼人，李指「T」當時並未有說清楚。在6月的時候，李只知道曾墊支的有 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高。據控方開案陳詞，兩間公司分別由 Mark Simon 和黎智英持有。</p> +<p>One of the key aims set in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords signed by all warring sides was to restore the multi-ethnic character of the country. This required a large-scale return of displaced people and their property, persecution of war criminals, as well as making sure that constitutional and legal provisions provide equal rights for all ethnic groups and others throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒表示當時支持香港的民主運動-登報計劃為了爭取國際關注">李宇軒表示當時支持香港的民主運動 登報計劃為了爭取國際關注</h4> +<p>With significant international military, financial and diplomatic efforts, much has been achieved since. Almost 20% of the population in the Republika Srpska are non-Serbs. Four out of six most important positions in the region’s executive, legislature and judiciary must be occupied by non-Serbs, as well as half of all regional ministries. Also, changing the region’s constitution is impossible without the support of non-Serbs siting in the upper chamber of the regional parliament.</p> -<p>控方問「登報計劃」是什麼。李回答：「係眾籌、盡量搵多啲國際報紙登廣告，而啲廣告係有關當時香港嘅民主運動嘅」，目的是提高國際對於當時香港民主運動的關注。</p> +<p>Since Milorad Dodik’s first term as Republika Srpska’s prime minister in 1998, he has been an arch-pragmatist, always adapting his rhetoric and actions to the circumstances. He supported the return of displaced persons and the reconstruction of mosques when this looked inevitable. He supported comprehensive constitutional reforms when the US pushed them in 2006. He was also once in favour of the country’s NATO membership.</p> -<p>法官李運騰問李是否支持當時的運動，李表示：「係，當時我係支持。」李官又問，登報計劃是為了爭取國際社會的支持，李回答：「我同意。」</p> +<p>But whenever it looked more politically promising to embrace nationalist causes – denying the Srebrenica Genocide, challenging state institutions – he has done so.</p> -<p>李稱當時使用眾籌平台「GoGetFunding」，至於當時呼籲市民捐款時使用的字眼，他表示不記得具體字眼，只記得大概是希望「去畀當時嘅國際社會知道，當時嘅香港示威活動發生咩事」。</p> +<p>Since 2015, Dodik has continually defied the Constitutional Court’s decision on the 9 January celebration. In 2016 he organised an illegal referendum, asking citizens to support his rejection of the court’s ruling. It took a coordinated diplomatic effort by the EU and NATO allies to convince neighbouring Serbia’s leadership to publicly state that it “did not support the referendum”. It was part of the West’s firm position to stand behind the Constitutional Court and its decisions, no matter how trivial or bizarre the issue might have seemed to some outsiders.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指眾籌超額完成-事後與陳梓華親身見面">李宇軒指眾籌超額完成 事後與陳梓華親身見面</h4> +<p>9 January has since turned into a parade of nationalistic celebrations and secessionist rhetoric, fully supported by Russia. In 2018, Anatoly Bibilov, then the Russian-backed president of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, attended the 9 January celebration. He signed a cooperation agreement with Milorad Dodik and was quoted saying that “our two republics are like twins with identical strategic partnership with Russia”. Since 2019, members of the Night Wolves, the biggest Russian motorcycle club and a far-right group supporting the Kremlin, have become a regular feature of parades. In 2023, Putin was awarded the highest order of Republika Srpska and flags of the self-proclaimed Donetsk Republic were paraded.</p> -<p>控方問李當時有否在 Telegram 群組宣傳眾籌計劃。李表示以他所知，Telegram 群組內其中一名用戶，在「連登」討論區有一個帳號叫「家樂牌通心粉」，當時該帳戶「就本來已經好 hit」、「有好多人關注㗎喇」，而「家樂牌通心粉」在「連登」轉載上述眾籌網站，所以令更多人知道眾籌計劃。</p> +<p>In 2024, as in all years before, at the centre of this day was Milorad Dodik. Standing next to him was the Russian ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. But what was different is the regional and wider European context.</p> -<p>被問到當時眾籌的目標金額，李表示不記得，「不過我記得個 target 無爆咗，所以最尾大概籌咗七球幾（逾700萬）」，所以他相信當時的眾籌目標是低於700萬。</p> +<p>Serbia sent a large delegation led by the defence minister and leader of Vučić’s Serb Progressive Party. He was accompanied by the Chief of General Staff and several ministers. In his congratulatory letter, Vučić, who was not present in Banja Luka, wrote the usual and important assurance that he recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina within its current borders. But he then warned gloomily that Serbia and Republika Srpska would soon jointly face difficult times.</p> -<p>李供稱，在登報計劃完結之後，他與陳梓華曾經相約在金鐘太古廣場親身單獨見面，因陳想將一些匯款通知交給他，會面結束之後，陳隨即返回附近的辦公室。李解釋：「喺佢（陳）知道咗我需要幫手墊支，然後佢幫手墊咗幾次支，之後佢就要畀 remittance advice，所以就去見面喇。」</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Serb leaders bet on US disengagement and on a divided and hapless EU and NATO – and they see that from Ukraine to Nagorno-Karabakh it is military force, not diplomacy, that changes reality</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="李宇軒陳梓華稱可找uncle協助墊支廣告費-惟未說明所指誰人">李宇軒：陳梓華稱可找「uncle」協助墊支廣告費 惟未說明所指誰人</h4> +<p>One of Vučić’s ministers present in Banja Luka was awarded with a long and warm applause after saying that “Republika Srpska needs to exist as a state”. Aleksandar Vulin, a recently replaced director of Serbian intelligence agency, and Vučić’s former defence and interior minister, made it clear that several years ago the integrity of Republika Srpska was made the number one priority in Serbia’s military doctrine. Vulin also said that “this generation of Serb politicians should work on making sure that no border exists” between majority-Serb territories.</p> -<p>控方問李，陳梓華首次聯絡他的時候，是如何介紹自己的。李則表示：「我唔記得，mostly likely 佢冇介紹自己。」</p> +<p>What was also different this year is that Orbán was awarded the same order of Republika Srpska that Putin received year before. Orbán gratefully accepted it and is expected to receive it in person later this month in Banja Luka. As the head of an EU and NATO government, Orbán’s embrace of Dodik’s narrative and anti-constitutional behaviour provides Dodik with additional credibility and political capital.</p> -<p>李亦表示，他不記得與陳對話的具體內容，不過大概意思是，「佢（陳）問我大概要墊支幾多，之後佢就話會諗計」；相隔不久後，陳傳來回覆，大概意思是：「佢去問過 uncle 或者其他人，咁佢就話嗰度可以動用到五球（500萬元）啦，咁有需要嘅時候就可以搵佢喇。」李補充，陳曾提及「當然係墊支，所以之後要畀返佢」，但他不記得陳何時說過上述說話。</p> +<p>This is a dangerous development because Dodik and his closest associates can only convince the institutions in Republika Srpska of possible secession if he has clearly visible support from outside. That is why the EU and NATO must now show Budapest and Belgrade the red lines. Hungary is even more important in this arrangement because it can use its veto to protect both Republika Srpska and Serbia from Western sanctions and interventions.</p> -<p>控方追問李，陳有否向他提及「Uncle」實際上是指誰人。李說：「冇，除咗我理解佢講嘅『uncle』唔一定係 blood uncle（有血緣關係的叔叔），而係可能泛指一啲男人或者其他人。」</p> +<p>In his recent interviews, Dodik spoke at length about the need for Serbs to use the potential return of Trump in the White House to push towards unification of Serbia and Serb-majority territories, from north Kosovo to Republika Srpska. According to him, the Americans “are wounded beast. They have left Afghanistan, they were crushed in Syria. They rallied the West against Russia in Ukraine and they are being crushed there as well. We must understand that this is the key moment”.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒指其角色是提出登報主意操作眾籌戶口和管理帳目">李宇軒指其角色是提出登報主意、操作眾籌戶口和管理帳目</h4> +<p>In parallel, Serbian leaders in Belgrade are rearming. Since Vučić came to power in 2012, Serbia’s military budget has almost tripled, from €500 million in 2013 to €1.4 billion in 2023. This makes it larger than that of all other five Western Balkan countries combined. In 2023 alone, Serbia spent €600 million on new weapons and equipment, and its military industry’s exports were worth over €1.5 billion.</p> -<p>被問到李在登報計劃中的角色，李表示「我係其中一個 bring up 呢個 idea 嘅人，同埋我係實際上操作嗰個眾籌戶口嘅人」；此外，他後來有協助墊支，以及「有份 keep 條數」，因為眾籌戶口是以他的電郵開設的。</p> +<p>The Serb leaders bet on US disengagement and on a divided and hapless EU and NATO. And they see that from Ukraine to Nagorno-Karabakh it is military force, not diplomacy, that changes reality.</p> -<p>控方又問到陳梓華的角色，李指「我諗佢（陳）係其中一個 bring up 呢個 idea 嘅人」，他亦有幫忙聯絡報紙和墊支。</p> +<p>On 24 September 2023 in north Kosovo, Serb paramilitaries have returned – using force. They were praised as heroes in Serbia and Republika Srpska, with vocal support from Russia. In the days that followed, the US government warned that it had detected “an unprecedented staging of advanced Serbian artillery, tanks, and mechanized infantry units, along the border with Kosovo”.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒透露以化名tong-lo身份公開登報財務紀錄">李宇軒透露以化名「Tong Lo」身份公開登報財務紀錄</h4> +<p>Since then, the Serb Armed Forces have partially retreated. But as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned on 26 January 2024: the situation “remains unstable”. This is an ever more dangerous spiral of escalation.</p> -<p>控方向李展示登報計劃的公開財務紀錄，題為「Income and expenditure statement《眾籌G20各國報章頭版公開信》」，由2019年6月25日至7月2日。李確認他們曾向17間報館公司支付廣告費，但不一定是17份報紙。李亦確認他們登廣告的報紙遍及13個國家。</p> +<hr /> -<p>財務紀錄亦顯示，在眾籌平台「GoGetFund」籌得超過670萬元，在「PayPal」則籌得2.6萬元，合共約673萬元。而廣告費則合共約602.3萬元，扣除手續費之後，眾籌計劃錄得盈餘約15萬元。李確認。</p> +<p><strong>Adnan Ćerimagić</strong> is a Senior Analyst for the Western Balkans at the European Stability Initiative (ESI) in Berlin. Before joining ESI in August 2013, Adnan worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo and Brussels. He is a member of the Advisory Board of the International Institute for Peace in Vienna and the International Advisory Board of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy in Serbia.</p>Adnan ĆerimagićEU and NATO should clarify the red lines to ensure Bosnia and Herzegovina’s security in the face of Viktor Orbán’s backing of Serb secessionism.China’s Food Security2024-03-15T12:00:00+08:002024-03-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/chinas-food-security<p><em>Feeding China’s vast population is a priority issue for Beijing, given historic ramifications of famines and food crises for social and regime stability.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Yet the task is vast — China must feed nearly 20 percent of the global population but is home to under 10 percent of the world’s arable land — and the challenges to stable food supply are many. These include inefficient agricultural practices, supply chain bottlenecks, changing consumption habits, international trade dynamics, domestic environmental degradation, corruption and data misrepresentation, and a history of food safety scandals. Diagnosing a more contentious international environment, Xi Jinping has placed greater emphasis on agricultural self-sufficiency and diversified sourcing of critical inputs, foodstuffs, technology and know-how. This brief explores key trends, challenges, and policy measures in China’s pursuit of food security. It is part of a joint CSIS-Brookings Institution project, Advancing Collaboration in an Era of Strategic Competition, which seeks to explore and expand the space for U.S.-China collaboration on matters of shared concern.</em></p> -<p>財務紀錄下方的署名是「Tong Lo」並附有簽名，李稱：「係我嘅 pseudo name（化名）。」另一個署名是「Tong M Man」，李則稱是一個會計師。</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>翻查報導，李宇軒與另外11人在2020年8月被內地水警截獲，同年12月與其中7人一同被判「偷越邊境罪成」，2021年3月在內地服刑完畢，隨即被移交至本港警方。</p> +<p>In December 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping gave a speech at the Central Rural Work Conference of the Communist Party of China stating that China “cannot allow the recent, steady gains we have achieved in grain production to lull us into a false sense of security. We should not forget about the suffering caused by previous famines just because we have managed to recover. Rather, we should recognize that the issue of food security is a red line that would trigger terrible consequences were it ever to be compromised . . . we must adhere to the national food security strategy that puts [China] first.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/R133f0E.png" alt="image03" /></p> +<p>Any nation’s food security is essential to the prosperity and health of its people. And China must feed nearly 20 percent of the global population, despite being home to less than 10 percent of the world’s arable land and 6 percent of the world’s water resources. This translates into just 0.08 hectares per capita of arable land for the people of China, far lower than the 0.48 hectares of arable land per capita in the United States.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（13日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第44日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，相隔逾一年再度在法庭露面。李供稱他在2019年6月籌備在G20前夕在不同國家的報紙登頭版廣告，控方在庭上展示多份G20廣告的付款和匯款紀錄，顯示《衛報》、《晚郵報》和《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費用，分別由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高顧問有限公司墊支。李憶述，在等待還款安排期間，另一名被告陳梓華聲稱：「『上頭嘅人』有壓力，想做啲嘢確保嗰筆錢會返番去」，於是雙方簽訂借據以防李「走數」。後來陳叫李透過一間公司的銀行戶口還錢，李遂歸還了156萬元。</p> +<p>Historically, famines and food crises in China have sometimes catalyzed political upheavals and regime collapse, underscoring for Beijing the national stability ramifications of securing a steady supply of food. Indeed, China’s State Council has cast food security as a “ballast stone” of the country’s overall national security.</p> -<p>控方今早開始傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒出庭，以「從犯證人」身份作供。李身穿白色恤衫和深藍色厚褸，戴黑色粗框眼鏡，由三名懲教人員帶領下，從法庭特別通道進入法庭，期間不時望向旁聽席。</p> +<p>China’s leaders are seeking to sustain and improve the country’s food security amid myriad challenges, including inefficient agricultural practices, supply chain logistics bottlenecks, international trade dynamics, changing consumption habits, water scarcity, and domestic environmental degradation. This research paper details China’s pursuit of food security — highlighting key trends, challenges, and policy measures, along with their impacts.</p> -<p>李早上供稱，2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌和在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。李當時遇到錢銀問題，案中另一名被告陳梓華以「T」的身份經 Telegram 與他溝通，協助墊支廣告費，惟他當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。</p> +<h3 id="the-significance-of-food-security-in-china">The Significance of Food Security in China</h3> -<h4 id="庭上展示多國廣告-包括巴黎日報澳洲人報">庭上展示多國廣告 包括《巴黎日報》、《澳洲人報》</h4> +<p>For millennia in China, food security has been inextricably tied with social stability. Food scarcity and famine have often played a central role in triggering violent upheaval. The last Chinese imperial government — the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) — saw major famines between 1810 to 1907 that resulted in the deaths of tens of millions. These periods of starvation were often followed by or served as catalysts for major rebellions and deadly conflicts that weakened imperial control and worsened socioeconomic conditions in the empire — all of which contributed to the dynasty’s collapse.</p> -<p>控方提及其中一份刊登廣告的《巴黎日報》，李確認並以標準的法語讀出《巴黎日報》的法語名稱「Le Parisien」。控方指廣告上有以法語寫成的「向送中條例說不」，李則指相關句子的英語翻譯應該是「No to the project of Extradition Bill to China」，而非「No to the Extradition Bill to China」。</p> +<p>With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the country’s Communist-led government faced several immediate challenges to ensure a steady and sufficient food supply. In the aftermath of decades of foreign invasion and civil war, China’s citizens were among the poorest in the world. The country’s agricultural labor force was barely recovering from years of mass conscription and movements from the countryside to escape the war. Furthermore, the populace of around 550 million people was rapidly growing. Under Chairman Mao Zedong, the PRC carried out land reforms in the countryside, eliminated private landownership, and established agricultural collectives along similar lines to the Soviet Union’s state-controlled collectivized approach. China saw initial success in increasing agricultural output by nearly 4 percent annually from 1952 to 1958. Increased irrigation throughout the country also improved yields from the collectivized farms.</p> -<p>李提到，當時《巴黎日報》的廣告費應該不是21,600歐羅，而是18,000歐羅，因為 T 聲稱「唔小心以為要畀埋 VAT（增值稅）」；至於發票上為何標註一粒星及「overpay」，李表示不知道，因為從「T」手上收到這份文件時已經有。</p> +<p>However, many of the gains made would soon be reversed under Mao’s attempt to achieve rapid industrialization through the policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962). Under this initiative, farmers were assigned to make steel in backyard furnaces instead of cultivating crops — which, given their inexperience, often resulted in inefficient production that generated commercially unusable pig iron. Local officials inflated crop production numbers to obscure the adverse effects of Mao’s policies, creating an illusion of superabundance. Cadres had farmers following badly planned directives, such as the abandonment of traditional Chinese agricultural techniques in favor of disastrous pseudo-scientific ideas influenced by Soviet agronomist Trofim Lysenko.</p> -<p>控方提到另一個登報廣告例子，刊於意大利的《晚郵報》（Corrierre Della Sera）。李確認文件顯示的廣告版本有刊登過。</p> +<p>The agricultural sector was further strained by a series of natural disasters, including the 1958 flooding of large parts of northern China and droughts in 1960–1961. These failures contributed to the food security crisis known as the “Three Years of Great Famine,” which caused upwards of 30 to 40 million deaths throughout China — the largest famine in modern history. In the aftermath, Mao would briefly step down, and the Communist Party returned to a more science-based set of agricultural practices.</p> -<p>控方展一份含有韓語的廣告，寫有「홍콩을 도와 주 세요」（請援助香港）和「STAND WITH HONG KONG AT G20」。李確認相關廣告有刊登，但是不肯定是哪一份報紙，因為他們不只在一份韓國報紙登廣告。</p> +<p>Chinese scientists played a key role in alleviating starvation and contributing to the global Green Revolution. Renowned agronomist Yuan Longping rejected the theories of Lysenko and discovered a type of hybrid rice in the 1960s that could increase crop yields by over 20 percent. By the late 1990s, this hybrid rice would go on to feed an additional 100 million Chinese citizens. In 2017, Yuan’s hybrid rice would make up over 60 percent of the country’s rice production and would be grown in over 60 countries worldwide.</p> -<p>另一份刊登在《澳洲人報》（The Australian）的廣告，同樣寫有「STAND WITH HONG KONG AT G20」。控方展示由《澳洲人報》在6月26日發出的發票，上款是一名叫 Anson Cheung 的人。李表示不知他是誰，也不記得為何上款寫他的名字，但估計他可能是其中一個負責聯絡 The Australian 的人。</p> +<p>The ascension of Chairman Deng Xiaoping in 1978 led to gradual market-oriented economic reforms. In the countryside, this meant phasing out collective farms in favor of household ownership. Households were allowed to sell crops that were grown beyond government quotas, thus incentivizing increased yields. Agricultural outputs rose from 2.7 percent per year in 1978 to 7.1 percent annually during the five years following the reforms. This contributed to a significant reduction in undernourishment, defined by the World Bank as habitual food consumption insufficient to provide the dietary energy levels required to maintain a normal active and healthy life. As late as 2001, around 10 percent of China’s population faced undernourishment, a figure that declined to below 2.5 percent by around 2010 (see Figure 1).</p> -<h4 id="文件顯示-mark-simon-名下公司代李宇軒支付衛報廣告費">文件顯示 Mark Simon 名下公司代李宇軒支付《衛報》廣告費</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fAPKTqT.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: Prevalence of Undernourishment in China</em></p> -<p>控方提到《衛報》（The Guardian）有刊登廣告，並展示相關發票，匯款紀錄顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 代表李宇軒向《衛報》支付18,000英磅廣告費。控方問李，「T」有否告訴他為什麼會用這間公司來支付費用，李回答沒有，當時也沒有向「T」查問。據控方開案陳詞，Lais Hotel Property Limited 由黎智英的私人助手 Mark Simon 持有。</p> +<p>China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2002 exposed the country’s agricultural producers to global markets, leading to increasing exports and imports of foodstuffs. The availability of imports enabled a meaningful shift in Chinese consumer preferences. In addition, attention to food safety grew in the aftermath of a series of food and agricultural contamination scandals in the early 2000s. Under President Hu Jintao, the PRC would codify new laws standardizing food production and prosecute hazardous food distribution practices in 2009. Given their country’s history, China’s leaders today are acutely aware of the stakes of food security — as a failure to secure a stable food supply could kindle collective grievances and provoke challenges to their authority, potentially destabilizing the regime.</p> -<p>控方提到李在今天早上作供時，轉述「T」聲稱有一些「uncle」可以動用到500萬元墊支，問以上做法是否有關。此時辯方代表大律師 Marc Corlett 打斷，就控方的提問方式提出關注，因涉及揣測和傳聞證供（hearsay）。法官杜麗冰亦指，李剛才已經回答了陳梓華未談及原因。法官李運騰指，證人已經說了他尋求資金，然後他得到金錢來支付廣告費，就是這樣，質疑控方還有什麼想問。控方最終不就此發問。</p> +<h3 id="strategies-for-food-security-under-xi-jinping">Strategies for Food Security under Xi Jinping</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TEHanlu.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）</p> +<p>Since coming to power, Xi Jinping’s government has made food security a national priority. Reflecting the importance Beijing places on the issue, in March 2023 a book of “Excerpts of Xi Jinping’s Discussions on National Food Security” was published by the Chinese Central Literature Publishing House. The book covered more than 80 speeches, reports, talks, letters, and instructions from Xi Jinping related to food security since 2012. A central theme of the book is Xi’s admonition that food security is a matter of economic and political importance. The book includes a warning published by the People’s Daily, the party’s mouthpiece, that “whether [the Chinese government] can give the common people a satisfactory account of food [security] is a major test of our ability to govern. If our party is in power in China, if we can’t even do a good job in food safety, and if we can’t do it well for a long time, some people will ask whether it is enough or not.”</p> -<p>控方續展示在2019年6月28日刊登於法國《世界報》（Le Monde）的G20廣告，惟未有提及廣告費由誰支付。</p> +<p>An April 2019 white paper by the State Council names 16 recent major laws related to food security matters, from seed intellectual property (IP) rights to pesticide administration to grain circulation. In April 2020, the government also published “six guarantees” to inform prioritization of economic policy following Covid-19: employment, basic livelihood, market entities, operations of grassroots organizations and structure, stability of supply chains, and energy and food security. The Central Document No. 1 published in 2023 focused on rural revitalization, and five of the nine areas of focus directly related to food security — specifically grain production, agricultural infrastructure, technology and equipment support, high-quality development of rural industries, and expanding agricultural employment. These documents reflect the central leadership’s framing of food security as an important foundation for achieving economic development, social stability, and national security.</p> -<h4 id="黎智英名下力高顧問公司支付意大利報紙廣告費">黎智英名下力高顧問公司支付意大利報紙廣告費</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FbW1Pqs.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Figure 2: Distribution of Involvement by Xi Jinping in Food Security Initiat</em></p> -<p>另一份發票是由 RCS Media Group 發出的，李指這是有關向意大利《晚郵報》（Corriere Della Sera）支付的2萬元歐羅。付款紀錄顯示，力高顧問有限公司（Dico Consultants Limited）在2019年6月29日向 RCS Media Group 支付了廣告費用。據控方開案陳詞，力高是由黎智英持有的公司。</p> +<p>From 2012 to 2022, Xi Jinping engaged directly on food security topics 67 times, including through domestic province inspections and instructions to local governors on how to manage agricultural production. Xi’s frequent direct monitoring serves as a signal to the rest of the Chinese leadership apparatus of his personal attention to the issue.</p> -<p>控方問李，「T」有否向他談及力高。李指沒有。控方再問，「T」有否在任何時候向他談及過力高。李表示：「以我記憶所及，冇，除咗呢張 invoice 係畀我嘅。所以 Dico 條數就要加埋去 T 嗰邊嘅人，有關 T 嗰邊嘅人找過嘅數，所以最尾要還返錢嘅時候就要還埋呢條數。」</p> +<p>Under Xi Jinping, China has undertaken a multipronged strategy to pursue self-sufficiency in food security, addressing the top challenges facing China today (see Figure 3), as detailed in the following sections.</p> -<h4 id="李宇軒稱專心處理眾籌-故不記得誰人設計和草擬g20廣告">李宇軒稱專心處理眾籌 故不記得誰人設計和草擬G20廣告</h4> +<h3 id="chinas-top-food-security-challenges">China’s Top Food Security Challenges</h3> -<p>控方展示刊登於《華盛頓郵報》的廣告期間，法官李素蘭問及廣告是由誰人草擬。李表示：「我唔清楚，因為我冇參與去設計呢啲廣告」，他亦沒有參與撰寫相關文字。他指，當時群組成員表示想登報，所以有的人去聯絡報紙，有的人去設計廣告和撰寫文字，「我去咗搞 crowdfund，所以我唔係好清楚其他組員去咗做啲乜。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ri23gl0.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Figure 3: China’s Responses to Food Security Challenges</em></p> -<p>被問到有多少人參與G20登報計劃，李表示不清楚，「因為我當時專心做緊 crowdfund 嘅嘢，至於 group 入面有幾多人，我唔清楚。」</p> +<h4 id="diminishing-arable-land">Diminishing Arable Land</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒轉述t聲稱有上面嘅人擔心拖數-雙方簽借據">李宇軒轉述T聲稱「有上面嘅人」擔心拖數 雙方簽借據</h4> +<p>Between 2013 and 2019, China reported a decline of over 5 percent of its arable land, largely attributed to destructive farming practices and local governments repurposing agricultural land for infrastructure and real estate.</p> -<p>至於參與處理眾籌的人，李稱：「我諗有我、accountant 去睇嗰條數，有『家樂牌通心粉』（在連登討論區）出嗰個 post 啦，另外有我同 T 嗰邊墊支過啲錢啦，係同錢有關嘅就係呢啲喇。」</p> +<p>To counteract this decrease, China has embarked on a few pivotal strategies, including the National High-Standard Farmland Construction Plan (2021–2030), a national blueprint for enhancing farmland quality. The blueprint sets goals for farmland creation and upgrading by 2025, 2030, and 2035. It specifies where funding is coming from (a combination of general public budget, bonds, land transfers, etc.), provides annual measures, and lists ways to encourage private entities to invest in the development of high-quality farmland. China has also sought to alleviate some of its demographic shifts by increasing the sustainability and productivity of China’s agricultural output in urban-adjacent locations.</p> -<p>控方又問「T嗰邊」涉及多少人。李稱：「至少有 T，同埋有一個叫『Banker』嘅⋯⋯我唔知係咪一個人嚟。」他指後來有「簽借據」事宜，其時「T嗰邊」便再涉及多4至5個人。</p> +<p>In addition, the Central Document No. 1 from 2019 sets out a “red line” for arable land: no less than 1.8 billion mu (120 million hectares) nationally. In pursuit of this goal, China has introduced farmland restoration measures, crop rotation practices, and fallow land systems. Additionally, Chinese authorities created a strategy for “reclaiming” farmland by reverting agricultural land that had been repurposed for industry, real estate, and infrastructure. As shown in Figure 4, from 1990 to 2021 China increased the amount of land being sown for crops by 17.45 percent. Furthermore, from 2021 to 2023, Chinese authorities reclaimed more than 170,000 hectares (420,000 acres) of farmland. Nonetheless, reclaiming farmland does not automatically reset its value. Often, the land has become unsuitable for growing.</p> -<p>法官李運騰要求李闡述什麼是「簽借據」事件。李則指，在2019年7月的時候，他曾向 T 查詢歸還墊支款項的方法，而T則表示「等佢嗰邊嘅人 arrange 吓」。在等待期間，T 聲稱「有上面嘅人唔係好 comfortable with 我拖住呢舊錢」，惟李認為這是因為 T 尚未提供一個讓他還錢的帳戶。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/E0tYfen.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Figure 4: Sown Area of Farm Crops in China (1990–2021)</em></p> -<p>李續指：「As a stop gap measure（臨時方案），佢（T）就約咗我去金鐘嘅 Lippo Centre」，在一間咖啡店見面，T 並安排了兩名見證人，一個是 T 一方的見證人，另一個是李一方的見證人，「咁就簽咗一份 promissory note，嗰份文件真係用 promissory note 呢隻字。」</p> +<p>China also grapples with pronounced geographical disparities in water resources, and many critical grain-producing provinces are water-scarce. Traditional flood irrigation methods, used by most small farms, often result in significant wastage. Overreliance on groundwater extraction, a direct response to this disparity, has spawned significant environmental concerns. To tackle these issues, China is making substantial investments in water-saving technologies, enhancing agricultural irrigation systems, and allocating significant funds — totaling trillions of RMB — to mega projects like the South-North Water Diversion project. The results have been mixed, with some projects showing improved crop production, an increase in farmers’ incomes, and substantial reduction in water usage, while others have created significant inter-provincial conflict over resources and financing. Additionally, long-term environmental impacts of these projects are subject to debate.</p> -<p>李指，借據內容是「我爭 T 錢，個金額啱啱係G20佢嗰邊找嗰條數」，大概是156萬港元。他憶述雙方簽署了借據之後，T安排了一間律師樓的人員接收這份借據，不過李並不知道是哪一間律師樓，因為有一或兩個人拿了文件後，「我見佢行咗去𨋢口就上去喇。」</p> +<h4 id="governance-challenges">Governance Challenges</h4> -<h4 id="李宇軒轉述t稱簽借據為了擺平上頭嘅人">李宇軒轉述T稱簽借據為了擺平「上頭嘅人」</h4> +<p>China’s pursuit of food security has been stymied by corruption and data misrepresentation. For example, in 2022, the former top official at the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration (responsible for centralized control over stockpiled grain), Zhang Wufeng, was felled for corruption. Another inherent problem has been the misrepresentation of data by regional and local officials — a consequence of the prevalent incentive structure in the Chinese bureaucratic system, which promotes cadres who report good news and penalizes those who relay unfavorable news. In response, the central government has clarified that it oversees national food security policies, while provincial and local governments bear primary responsibility for making sure every Chinese citizen has enough food to eat.</p> -<p>李轉述T當時聲稱：「呢張 promissory note 係備用嘅啫，因為係用嚟擺平佢當時講嘅『佢上頭嘅人』，嗰啲『上頭嘅人』有壓力，想做啲嘢確保嗰筆錢會返番去。」李轉述，既然有一張借據，「T 就可以同佢哋講有張 promissory note，所以唔使驚會走數喇。」</p> +<p>China’s legacy of decentralizing farmland, stemming from the household responsibility system (HRS) that originated post-collectivization, also poses challenges. The government’s restrictions on corporate entities acquiring farmland have resulted in a significant dispersion of agricultural resources among individual farmers. This fragmentation hinders technological advancement, marketing, standardization, and coordination within the sector. It also has incentivized farmers to produce cash crops like fruits and vegetables, given their higher returns compared to staple grains.</p> -<p>李續指，T 後來提供了一個 Chartwell 戶口，叫他經這間公司的戶口歸還款項，所以他把156萬元還給 Chartwell，並把還款的匯款通知書交給 T，自此之後 T 便沒有再提起借據事宜。據控方開案陳詞，李被指向 Chartwell Holding Limited 的公司戶口還款，以避免黎的身份曝光。</p> +<h4 id="changing-consumer-demands">Changing Consumer Demands</h4> -<p>李表示，當他剛才說簽借據時涉及多4至5個人，就是包括兩名見證人和一個接收文件的律師樓人員，「我就係講緊呢啲人。」</p> +<p>The dietary preferences and demands of China’s populace — and especially the rapidly expanding urban middle class — have changed substantially over the past few decades. With increasing disposable income and exposure to global cultures, there is growing demand for safer, more varied, and higher-quality food options. The traditional Chinese diet is based on staple grain, high in vegetables, and low in animal products. But as incomes have risen, so too has consumption of refined grains, meats, oils, and sugars. Except for a dip at the beginning of Covid-19 that can be attributed to lack of supply, consumption of meat has more than tripled since 1990, as shown in Figure 5. In urban markets, consumers now seek out specialty items such as organic produce, dairy alternatives, and imported meats. As China’s growing middle class looks set to encompass over 50 percent of its population by 2025, the increasingly affluent population’s demand for meat products will steadily increase — corresponding to growing demand for soy and grain inputs to feed livestock.</p> -<p>控方另展示《華盛頓郵報》廣告費的付款紀錄，顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 支付了85,050美元。李稱這紀錄是由 T 交給他的。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ed1aRjH.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ Figure 5: Consumption of Meat Products in China (1991–2021)</em></p> -<p>李宇軒作供未完，案件明日續審。</p> +<p>As shown in Figure 6, food imports have increased dramatically, making China the world’s top importer of foodstuffs. In 2022, China imported approximately 98.3 billion USD in agricultural products, a record high. Even amid geopolitical tensions, China has continued to increase the amount of food it purchases from the United States, specifically non-staple foods like beef and nuts, along with products used for feeding livestock like corn and sorghum grain (see Figure 7).</p> -<hr /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Yd7yi01.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ Figure 6: Food Imports to China by Country (2011–2021)</em></p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒出庭作供：為爭取國際關注香港示威 發起眾籌及G20登報計劃 紀錄顯示兩間公司墊支G20登報費 李宇軒：陳梓華稱「上頭」憂走數故簽借據【黎智英案・審訊第卌三日】2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-43<ul> - <li>楊清奇：黎智英向報紙設下「鳥籠」 編採人員享一定自主但不得超越框架</li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6VVIkp6.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ Figure 7: Percent Change in Top 10 U.S. Agricultural Exports to China (2017–2022)</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Recently, China has poured resources into research, development, and imports of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and alternative foods. Precision gene-edited crops have been at the forefront of boosting crop yields in the United States for decades. However, despite being the first country to commercialize a transgenic crop in 1992, China has been slow to adopt overarching global GMO technologies. To support local companies in developing GMO IP, Chinese leaders have been reluctant in accepting foreign GMO seed producing companies in the Chinese market. Consumers were also initially hesitant, but public perceptions of genetically modified foods have become more positive in recent years. Recently, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (China’s national agricultural scientific research organization) laid out a five-year development plan calling for “construction of new key laboratories, a grain crop science center, a molecular design breeding center, a national crop germplasm resource bank, a livestock and poultry bank, and an agricultural microorganism bank.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IISEe8t.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>The demand for imported foods also stems from long-standing concerns about domestic food safety. Imported goods are perceived as meeting higher safety and quality standards, making them particularly appealing to a population increasingly concerned with health and wellness. Over the years, the country has faced numerous high-visibility food safety scandals involving adulterated or toxic domestic products, leading to widespread perception that imports are safer than domestic products. One particularly impactful incident in 2008 involved the adulteration of baby formula with melamine, which led to the deaths of six infants and sickened nearly 300,000 others.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（12日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第43日審訊。前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊提到傳媒為了吸引特定讀者群，都會有自己的立場，而黎設下了《蘋果》的基本立場，「就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠」，所以難以回答《蘋果》是否有編採自主。控辯雙方皆完成提問，楊作供完畢。控方透露下一名證人為李宇軒，將安排於明日出庭作供。</p> +<p>In response, China has improved oversight and regulation of its food industry. The country’s first comprehensive food safety law was enacted in 2009 and has since been amended multiple times. The law encompasses a wide range of regulations aimed at ensuring food quality and consumer safety. It established a licensing system for food production and food operation, along with a safety review system for new foods entering the market. The law also addresses the logistics of food storage and distribution and sets national standards for various aspects of food products — including additives, hygiene, labeling, examination, and packaging — to bring China’s food industry up to international standards. Additionally, the law outlines specific food safety responsibilities for businesses, ranging from manufacturers to retailers, thereby aiming to make the entire food supply chain accountable for adhering to safety norms.</p> -<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第七天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻開始盤問。</p> +<h4 id="workforce-dynamics">Workforce Dynamics</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DXq59sA.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（中）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）</p> +<p>The allure of urban life, combined with the promise of better wages, has seen many Chinese individuals leaving the agricultural sector for city-based jobs. Migrant jobs in urban centers offer better pay and seemingly improved prospects for future generations. Sectors such as transportation and logistics that have huge impacts on the agricultural sector also face workforce challenges. By the end of 2021, China faced a shortfall of 4 million truck drivers, an issue that will continue to be exacerbated as the working-age population in the country begins to shrink and people look toward more white-collar jobs. As birth rates decline and the population ages, fewer young people are available to replace the aging workforce, further compounding labor shortages in sectors like agriculture, transportation, and logistics.</p> -<h4 id="辯方指訊息顯示楊清奇拒絕黎智英提議">辯方指訊息顯示楊清奇拒絕黎智英提議</h4> +<p>The Chinese government has taken steps to make farming more lucrative and economically viable, beginning in the early 2000s with the abolition of the 2,600-year-old agricultural tax (similar to modern property taxes). Since then, central authorities have continued to reduce or remove taxes on agriculture, aiming to alleviate financial pressures on farmers. In 2006, the government also introduced a support price for wheat: when market prices dip below the annually set minimum price, the government commits to purchasing wheat from farmers at the support price, guaranteeing a level of income for farmers and incentivizing continued cultivation of this specific staple crop. The success of the strategy to support wheat is demonstrated in China’s grain output, which increased between the early 2000s and 2020 (see Figure 8).</p> -<p>在辯方的提問下，楊確認民主制度是良好的，極權制度則是不好的，而民主制度是包含公平的選舉、新聞自由和言論自由，所以《蘋果》論壇版選取文章有三個主要原則，包括「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。楊並確認這些原則是由前任編輯訂下，同事之間都會採用，而且「唔需要日日去講嘅」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/c8fjSI3.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ Figure 8: China’s Grain Output (1980–2020)</em></p> -<p>辯方展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的訊息，黎在2019年9月3日向楊說：「李平兄，看了單偉建先生的文章後請回電。謝謝。」楊後來表示「成1800字，又長又臭，都係玩自欺欺人」，「單先生的文章是老生常談，一個特首連請辭的自由都冇，談何民主進步？論壇版未擬採用。謝謝。」</p> +<p>Recently, the government introduced initiatives to bolster farmers’ incomes directly. In April 2023, the Chinese government allocated 10 billion yuan (approximately 1.38 billion USD), in one-time financial subsidies for farmers. However, despite these efforts, attracting younger generations to the farming profession remains a challenge. As recently as 2019, studies have shown that aging populations in rural areas continue to place a drag on agricultural productivity and negatively affect agricultural wages.</p> -<p>辯方指上述訊息可見黎提議楊閱讀單的文章，惟楊拒絕黎的提議。楊則指「唔係一個咁簡單嘅 reject」，因為當時他與黎有使用其他溝通渠道，黎亦有透過時任副社長陳沛敏聯絡他，所以庭上展示的 WhatsApp 訊息只是一部份，並非全部。</p> +<h4 id="technological-and-productivity-issues">Technological and Productivity Issues</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Bwy32yd.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<p>China’s agricultural landscape is uniquely characterized by the prevalence of small family farms dispersed throughout the country, rather than the large factory-farming models in many developed countries. While this model is a cornerstone of the Chinese economy, providing employment to millions, the fragmented nature of farms complicates the dissemination of new agricultural technologies and makes coordination among farmers, standardization of practices, and effective marketing difficult.</p> -<p>辯方續指，但是楊能夠對於黎所提議的文章，坦誠地提出自己的觀點。楊確認。</p> +<p>To bridge this divide, China launched the National Agricultural Technology and Education Cloud Platform in 2015. This digital platform promotes knowledge sharing and independent learning among agricultural workers. Farmers provide data on crops, pests, and on-the-ground conditions, and in return they can access online training courses, diagnostic AI, and helplines. Start-ups for strategic AI technologies can tell farmers which insects they are looking at with just a picture and which pesticides they should use to protect their crops. The central government also dispatches specialized expert teams to provinces affected by natural disasters or falling behind in agricultural output to deliver on-the-ground support and promote the popularization of advanced agricultural technology.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇除了提出特定主題-一般不會干預作者選題和觀點">楊清奇：除了提出特定主題 一般不會干預作者選題和觀點</h4> +<p>In the early twenty-first century, initiatives like expanding irrigation systems propelled China’s agricultural total factor productivity (TFP) growth — from under 1 percent in the 1970s to an average of 2.48 percent from 2001 to 2010. However, this expansion has fallen in the years since, as China has been unable to maintain a steady rate of agricultural TFP growth through continued policy improvements and investments in agricultural research and development (R&amp;D). China still outperforms every other region except South Asia and the so-called transition countries (former Soviet Union) for agricultural TFP growth, but it will have to work increasingly hard to maintain this advantage. China’s public sector expenditures on agricultural R&amp;D were approximately 6.6 billion USD in 2021, larger than those of India, the United States, and Brazil combined. However, in the United States, the private sector accounts for an additional 15 to 20 billion USD, while in China this number is functionally zero.</p> -<p>辯方指，評論文章寫什麼內容是由作者自行決定。楊則指不一定，有時是他向作者提議特定寫作主題，不過除了這種情況以外，文章內容都是由作者決定。</p> +<p>In response to the productivity conundrum, China has embraced R&amp;D solutions. Substantial financial inflows have been directed toward hybrid seed technologies, particularly in the domain of hybrid rice, corn, soybeans, and wheat. China also established “core areas” for production of certain products (e.g., potatoes in Southeast China, double-cropping rice in the Yangtze River Economic Belt). In 2021, amendments to China’s Seed Law strengthened the protection of legal rights and interests of owners of new plant varieties, encouraging R&amp;D of seeds.</p> -<p>辯方遂展示楊清奇與高橋之間的 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄。高橋於2020年12月5日向楊表示：「下週還是要寫王毅發言與日本傳媒的無知無恥。請理解。」楊翌日表示：「選題與觀點，我們一般不干預。但如果較多讀者不認同，就需要換作者。謝謝🙏」</p> +<h4 id="climate-change">Climate Change</h4> -<p>辯方問，是否正如上述訊息所說，《蘋果》一般不會干預作者的選題和觀點。楊確認，但同時指出下一句「但如果較多讀者不認同，就需要換作者」，就如黎智英般，如果編輯的工作表現不合他心意，便會換人。</p> +<p>China’s agricultural sector is heavily exposed to climate change. Between 1981 and 2010, shifting climate patterns and ozone pollution collectively slashed China’s crop yields by 10 percent, an annual loss of 55 million tons of crops. As temperatures rise, extreme weather events, melting glaciers, environmental degradation, and water scarcity and contamination will intensify the implications for China’s agriculture.</p> -<p>辯方另展示2020年12月10日的訊息，楊與高橋談及「美國已死總統」用字，期間楊提議高橋可考慮評論有關新聞，但同時強調：「我說過，我們一般不會干預選題。寫不寫，如何寫，你自己決定。」</p> +<p>China’s focus has been on building resilience and adaptation mechanisms to confront these challenges and shoring up the system’s response to natural disasters. Throughout the 2010s, China made significant investments in mega projects to ameliorate the effects of climate change. More recently, there has been a palpable shift toward promoting the green development of agriculture and encouraging farmers to switch to higher-yield and stress-resistant crops. China is also looking to the oceans to bolster food security, as evidenced in a series of recent initiatives aimed at promoting and streamlining marine aquaculture. In November 2017, the Ministry of Agriculture unveiled the National Mariculture Development Plan (2017–2025). As per this blueprint, China aspires to establish 200 national-level demonstration marine ranches by 2025. In April 2023, President Xi coined the term “blue granary” to describe marine fisheries and mariculture, specifically deep-sea fishing and ranching. Shortly thereafter, Chinese authorities released guidelines on deep-water aquaculture as a key piece of fortifying the agricultural supply chain.</p> -<p>辯方問楊，這種不干預的做法是否適用於所有論壇版作者。楊表示：「講『係』呢，係唔夠準確嘅」，因為事實上他當時已經正在作出干預，他跟高橋說如果文章不符合《蘋果》的立場，可能要換作者，「文章如果唔符合《蘋果》嘅立場，到時候被炒嘅可能係我喇！」不過辯方追問，「寫不寫，如何寫」是由高橋決定，楊則指相關決定是從政治角度出發。</p> +<h4 id="food-waste">Food Waste</h4> -<h4 id="楊清奇指文章有審批-若倡港獨及明顯違法不會刊登若擦邊球則可登">楊清奇指文章有審批 若倡港獨及明顯違法不會刊登、若擦邊球則可登</h4> +<p>Between 2014 and 2018, an estimated 27 percent of all food in China was lost or wasted, comparable to global averages. Food waste and loss can occur at any point in the supply chain, from death of livestock to crops damaged by improper storage to expired products thrown out in households. China has made a concerted effort to address food waste through a series of “campaign-style” reforms. In August 2020, President Xi Jinping launched the “Clean Your Plate Campaign 2.0,” modeled on an earlier homonymous anti-corruption initiative. Following the “Clean Your Plate Campaign 2.0,” China introduced the Anti-Food Waste Law in April 2021. This State Council–spearheaded initiative included educational campaigns, regulatory measures against businesses, the introduction of systems for enhanced procurement, storage, and handling practices, and methods for increasing efficiency in food production, with relevant incentives and penalties.</p> -<p>辯方指，當報紙不合讀者口味時，讀者可以轉看另一份報紙，其實《蘋果》也是提供讀者想看的內容。楊則指，報紙一方面要照顧讀者口味，另一方面都要堅持自己的政治立場和觀點。</p> +<h4 id="geopolitical-dynamics">Geopolitical Dynamics</h4> -<p>辯方續指，《蘋果》對於評論作者和文章不會有審批。惟楊表示：「有一個批准嘅，至少都要我睇過覺得OK先可以（刊出）嘅。」</p> +<p>Following geopolitical shocks including the 2017 trade war with the United States, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China has sought to reduce its exposure to external dependencies. This strategy includes ramping up international land acquisition, increasing bilateral and multilateral trade deals, diversifying international supply chains, expanding overseas agricultural activities through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and encouraging domestic companies to take their operations global.</p> -<p>辯方指，這是當然的，如果文章提倡港獨的話，楊便不會刊登。楊確認。辯方續指，如果文章提倡非法行為，也不會獲准刊登。楊回答：「如果係好明顯違法嘅就唔會（刊登）」，但正如他早前提及，「如果擦邊球又符合《蘋果》立場嘅，又避開嗰個違法嘅，就會用。」</p> +<p>While Chinese acquisition of farmland in the United States has garnered attention in Washington, most of its international land purchases are in Asia and Africa. According to Land Matrix, a European land monitoring organization, between 2011 and 2020 Chinese companies purchased or leased 6.48 million hectares of land for agriculture, forestry, or mining — equivalent to the size of Latvia. Chinese companies purchase arable land in other countries and sell their products back to consumers in China through individual deals as well as through BRI projects and other similar initiatives; China has signed over 100 agricultural cooperation agreements with BRI countries.</p> -<p>辯方其後問楊是否同意，「擦邊球」是為了避免觸犯法律，同時又能遵守《蘋果》論壇版揀選評論文章的原則。楊同意。辯方又指楊並不會故意地觸犯法律。楊確認。</p> +<p>Additionally, China has sought to grow its global influence in food security and governance. China has held the director-generalship of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) since August 2019 and has a position on the World Food Programme (WFP) executive board. China also hosts the WFP Centre of Excellence in China, which takes advantage of China’s experience in reducing poverty and hunger to facilitate activities relevant to the Sustainable Development Goals through training, policy dialogue, and capacity building.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇確認曾邀請曾鈺成任志剛和曾俊華撰文">楊清奇確認曾邀請曾鈺成、任志剛和曾俊華撰文</h4> +<p>In October 2019, the State Council Information Office published a white paper titled “Food Security in China” to “provide a full picture of how food security operates in China, in order to increase the international community’s understanding in this important field.” It frames China’s role in global food security as opening its market further, upholding WTO obligations, sharing food security expertise and resources, promoting top domestic food businesses to expand internationally, forging food and agriculture cooperation agreements on bilateral and multilateral levels, collaborating on research with nations and global entities, offering emergency food aid as per its capabilities, and actively engaging in global food security governance.</p> -<p>楊清奇早前證供提及，曾經在2016年與黎智英和陳沛敏討論作者名單。辯方展示2018年4月，楊與陳之間的 WhatsApp 對話紀錄，並指當時曾經討論邀請前民建聯立法會主席曾鈺成、行政會議成員任志剛和前財政司司長曾俊華撰文。楊確認。</p> +<p>Furthermore, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought into focus the fragility of international food supply chains. The war in Ukraine generated a global spike in food prices, which impacted China disproportionately, given its position as the world’s top importer of foodstuffs.</p> -<h4 id="辯方指論壇版作者觀點未必相同-王崑義文章刊出後捱罵">辯方指論壇版作者觀點未必相同 王崑義文章刊出後捱罵</h4> +<p>A similar challenge arose from China’s draconian Covid-19 regulations. As China scrambled to enforce lockdowns in a bid to curb the virus’s spread, transportation bottlenecks, labor shortages, and logistical challenges threatened the steady flow of essential commodities — including food — both domestically and internationally. While headlines of people locked in their houses in Shanghai made the news, lack of food during lockdowns appears to have been prevalent throughout rural China as well. A study of 2,631 rural households showed that an increase of 100 confirmed Covid-19 cases in a county corresponded with a statistically significant decrease in per capita intake of dietary energy, carbohydrates, fats, and proteins, an effect that was especially pronounced in low-income groups.</p> -<p>楊清奇確認論壇版的作者之中，並非所有人都抱持同一觀點。辯方舉例指台灣國際戰略學會理事長王崑義的文章〈港台「聯手抗中」恐是南柯一夢〉，對於制裁的看法有所不同。楊表示他作為編輯處於尷尬位置，通常他在邀稿的時候，作者跟他所說的，與作者最終寫出來的文章是不同的，「但我又好難食言唔用佢嘅稿」，如果當天論壇版沒有稿件，「就要開天窗咁滯。」</p> +<p>To buffer against such shocks, China has traditionally maintained vast food reserves. Estimates from the U.S. Department of Agriculture projected that in 2022, China possessed 69 percent of global corn reserves, 60 percent of rice, 51 percent of wheat, and 37 percent of soybeans. In recent years, China has increased its investment in stockpiling. The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics reported that 2022 pork production was at its highest level since 2014 and that China bought a record number of soybeans in 2023, both attributed to replenishment of reserves depleted during the pandemic. China also inked an agreement with Russia in September 2023 establishing a new 159 million USD grain hub strategically located on both sides of the border between the Russian Jewish Autonomous Oblast and China’s Heilongjiang Province. Accompanying this deal were agreements to enhance storage and transportation capabilities. A 26 billion USD deal was also inked between Beijing and Moscow in October 2023 to export 70 million tons of grain over the next 12 years. Beijing and Moscow also sought to accelerate the construction of the New Russia–China Land Grain Corridor — a Sino-Russian initiative established in 2012 that would build out infrastructure to allow for the export of more grain by Russia and other Eurasian countries to China.</p> -<p>楊又提到，當年王崑義的文章刊出之後，《蘋果》「畀人鬧嘅」，有讀者更加寫信給黎智英，後來黎將信件轉交給他。</p> +<h3 id="chinas-future-food-security-path-and-implications">China’s Future Food Security Path and Implications</h3> -<p>辯方另展示楊清奇與王崑義之間的電郵，可見楊邀請王撰效分析美國大選的影響，包括拜登入主白宮對台美關係的影響。楊在庭上一度說：「我好奇怪，律師先生你係點樣拎到我嘅私人電郵。」彭耀鴻指這是控方給予辯方律師團隊的，而控方有責任將所有相關材料交給辯方，又強調辯方並沒有入侵楊的電腦。楊說：「我都唔知控方係幾時、點樣攞到。」彭耀鴻則笑說：「那你要去問張先生（律政司助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤）了。」</p> +<p>Many challenges will likely influence the PRC’s food security approach in the coming years and decades. On the policymaking front, China’s Food Security Law was recently submitted for deliberation at the third session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress on June 26, 2023. Although the draft is not yet public, writer Gong Yixi from the People’s Congress Multimedia Office has stated that the purpose of the law is to “guarantee effective food supply, ensure national food security, and enhance the ability to prevent and defend against food security risks.” He also states that the law will include provisions on protecting farmland, food production, food reserves, food circulation, food processing, food emergencies, food conservation, supervision, and management. Earlier food security publications from the central government focused on domestic facets of food security, such as farmland reclamation and increasing employment in the agricultural sector. The forthcoming law, by comparison, seems to take a more national security–focused lens.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1etfEWb.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> +<p>As outlined in Figure 9, the newest iteration of the National People’s Congress five-year legislation plan, which sets priority for legislation through 2028, names 10 laws directly related to food security.</p> -<p>辯方問楊為何會邀請王崑義撰文。楊回答因為王是台灣著名的學者，雖然其觀點未必符合《蘋果》，「但都係可以自圓其說嘅。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RsC7pG2.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ Figure 9: Five-Year Legislative Plan of China’s National People’s Congress for 2023–2028 (Laws related to food security)</em></p> -<h4 id="辯方指黎智英在飯局沒有提制裁-楊清奇堅稱有">辯方指黎智英在飯局沒有提「制裁」 楊清奇堅稱有</h4> +<p>China has made significant efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in feeding its population. Under Xi, it has channeled substantial resources into strategies for enhancing agricultural productivity, reducing waste, and diversifying sources of supply to avoid overreliance on single markets for food imports. However, the pursuit of absolute self-sufficiency in food security is an improbable, if not impossible, goal.</p> -<p>楊早前作供提及在2020年6月黎住所的飯局中，黎表示不怕被捕，若果被捕就「更加證明到中國和香港政府對人權嘅打壓」，並相信美國、英國同歐洲係唔會坐視不理，楊並轉述黎認為只有實施制裁，才能有助改善香港的人權狀況。</p> +<p>The sheer scale of China’s population compared to its share of arable land will continue to pose a significant problem, compounded by environmental constraints. Even with advanced technologies, there are natural limits to how much food can be sustainably produced. Achieving self-sufficiency would likely mean reverting to a diet based primarily on staple foods that does not meet modern nutritional standards and food preferences. Moreover, the concept of self-sufficiency in the globalized era is increasingly outdated. The global food market is intricately connected, and any pursuit of autarkic food self-sufficiency would cause China to lose out on the benefits of a functioning global agricultural market which, while imperfect, does benefit from year-round output and market-based adjustments to address imbalances in supply and demand.</p> -<p>辯方提議黎可能沒有提及制裁，黎可能提及美國、英國和歐洲會回應及採取行動，但是他沒有提到「制裁」兩字。惟楊不同意，又堅稱：「我肯定佢有（提及制裁）嘅。」</p> +<p>By necessity, if not by choice, China will have to continue to depend upon imports to meet the food demands of its population. To guard against risks of dependencies, China likely will continue seeking to diversify its sourcing of critical inputs, foodstuffs, technology, and know-how.</p> -<p>辯方又提到，警方在2021年6月24日與楊進行的錄影會面中，問及「飯盒會」做些什麼，而楊當時回答「坐底傾吓」工作上遇到什麼難題需要黎「出面解決」。楊在庭上確認。</p> +<p>This study makes clear that Xi has set food security as a leader-level priority. He views such efforts as directly linked to China’s national security and to the legitimacy and survivability of the Chinese Communist Party. As the world’s leading importer of foodstuffs, the strategies that China has proposed and initiated will have significant spillover effects on the rest of the world. This makes China’s efforts to enhance its food security not just a matter of concern for China, but indeed an issue of importance across the world.</p> -<h4 id="辯方評論文章非為批評而批評">辯方：評論文章非「為批評而批評」</h4> +<hr /> -<p>辯方指，控方早前向楊展示一系列的評論文章，部份對香港特區和中央政府帶有批判性，但這些批判是為了指出施政上的不足，希望政府可以改善施政，避免重蹈覆轍。楊同意。</p> +<p><strong>Kevin Dong</strong> is senior research assistant for the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.</p> -<p>辯方續指，所以庭上展示的評論文章不是「為了批評而批評」。楊回答：「可以咁講嘅。」</p> +<p><strong>Mallie Prytherch</strong> is a former research assistant for the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.</p> -<h4 id="黎智英要求楊清奇撰文反駁另一人文章-楊拒絕後撰訊息供黎向對方交代">黎智英要求楊清奇撰文反駁另一人文章 楊拒絕後撰訊息供黎向對方交代</h4> +<p><strong>Lily McElwee</strong> is deputy director and a fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>控方覆問時，就單偉建文章的議題，展示楊清奇與陳沛敏之間的訊息紀錄。陳於2019年9月向楊說，她電郵轉寄了一篇文章給楊，而黎想楊以筆名李平撰文反駁該文章。楊回覆陳：「啲垃圾真的要出要駁？港共搵多幾條友咁搞，論壇版就俾人玩殘」、「同老闆溝通過，但最終覺得唔值駁，都係唔出」。</p> +<p><strong>Patricia Kim</strong> is a fellow at the Brookings Institution and holds a joint appointment to the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for Asia Policy Studies.</p> -<p>楊相信黎智英應該認識單偉建，「其實黎生都覺得文章嘅觀點唔係咁好，但又想照出佢嘅文章，所以又要我用文章嚟反駁佢」，但楊認為若果經常要反駁他人文章，「論壇版好快俾人玩殘咗。」</p> +<p><strong>Jude Blanchette</strong> is the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>楊續指：「但黎生要畀作者一個交代，但又唔可以好似私人溝通講嘅咁冇禮貌啦」，所以後來楊撰寫了一則訊息評價單的文章，說明為何決定不刊登及顯示這是編輯的決定，以供黎將該訊息轉發給單，即是：「單先生的文章是老生常談，一個特首連請辭的自由都冇，談何民主進步？論壇版未擬採用。謝謝。」</p> +<p><strong>Ryan Hass</strong> is director of the John L. Thornton China Center, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.</p>Kevin Dong, et al.Feeding China’s vast population is a priority issue for Beijing, given historic ramifications of famines and food crises for social and regime stability.【黎智英案・審訊第卌五日】2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-45<ul> + <li>財務文件顯示眾志參與G20登報 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英設立鳥籠-員工有一定自主但不能超越框架">楊清奇：黎智英設立「鳥籠」 員工有一定自主但不能超越框架</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>控方問及編採自主時，楊表示：「對於編採自主，其實我係有好深嘅感觸同體會。我從事傳媒工作三十幾年，咁都喺五間報紙、電視台打過工。我感受喺互聯網掀起之後，傳統媒體沒落之後，採編自主幾乎就成為一個神話嚟嘅。」楊指因為傳媒為了吸引特定的讀者群，都會有自己的立場。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eF3UgIi.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>楊引用一個政治術語「鳥籠政治」來形容《蘋果》和類似報紙的採編自主，稱為「鳥籠自主」。楊指：「黎先生 set 咗《蘋果》嘅基本立場，就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠，所以唔可以簡單講有冇採編自主。」</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（14日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第45日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方提問繼續圍繞2019年6月G20峰會前夕的登報計劃，以及相關財務紀錄。李確認他向台灣《蘋果日報》、《南德意志報》、《紐約時報》、《泰晤士報》和三份南韓報紙等，分別支付了登報廣告費用，款額逾385萬港元。其中《朝日新聞》和歐洲版 POLITICO 的發票均顯示上款為「Demosisto（香港眾志）」，李估計當時的眾志成員周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》，因為估計只有她懂得日文。而《紐約時報》的發票顯示上款除了李宇軒之外，還有「Anna Kwok」，李相信當時他與「Anna Kwok」一同聯絡報館，惟控方未有就「Anna Kwok」的身份提問。</p> -<p>控方追問，由黎設下的「鳥籠」，是否與黎所給予的指示有關？楊確認。</p> +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第二天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李昨日提及，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌及籌備在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。期間案中另一名被告陳梓華經 Telegram 接觸李，並以「T」的身份與李商討墊支廣告費，惟李當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/a21wrmR.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華後來介紹mark-simon給他認識">李宇軒指陳梓華後來介紹Mark Simon給他認識</h4> -<p>就王崑義的文章，在法官杜麗冰提問下，楊清奇指黎智英曾經將讀者的來信，透過秘書轉交給他，但因為黎智英未有直接地批評王崑義，所以「呢個係我後來再去搵佢寫稿嘅原因之一」。</p> +<p>控方展示兩封由「T」轉發給李宇軒的電郵，可見電郵原初發送者為「Terrie Lam」。李指當時T把《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費收據，由「Terrie Lam」的電郵轉發給他。</p> -<p>楊清奇作供完畢。控方其後替下一名證人李宇軒，向法庭申請「提犯令」。案件明日續審。</p> +<p>控方指其中一個電郵提及一個名叫「Mark」的人。李表示當他收到這封電郵時，並不知道 Mark 是誰，但「其後我知道呢個係 Mark Simon」，因為在不遲於2019年9月的時候， T 把 Mark Simon 介紹給他認識。</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="李宇軒相信以自己信用卡支付日本時報廣告費">李宇軒相信以自己信用卡支付《日本時報》廣告費</h4> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇：黎智英向報紙設下「鳥籠」 編採人員享一定自主但不得超越框架The Dilemmas Of Deterrence2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-dilemmas-of-deterrence<p><em>As the danger of war rises in the Western Pacific, the United States is racing to reset its military strategy. China’s astonishing military modernization — especially its arsenal of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities — has fundamentally challenged the old U.S. approach, which focused on defeating aggression by projecting decisive power into the first island chain.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>In response, the Pentagon is attempting a great inversion: to defeat Chinese power projection against Taiwan or another target, it is emulating Beijing’s A2/AD strategy in hopes of making the Western Pacific a no-go zone for hostile forces.</em></p> +<p>控方提及刊登於《日本時報》的G20廣告，李指《日本時報》是當年G20峰會會場內會派發的報紙，並確認上述廣告是其中一份在日本報紙刊登的廣告。</p> -<p>This change, which some defense analysts have advocated for years, is a necessary response to China’s daunting capabilities. It is a smart effort to make the geography of the region, and the inherent difficulty of power projection, work for, rather than against, the United States and its allies. Speed is essential in making this shift: Even as the stated U.S. view is that conflict is “neither imminent nor inevitable” in the Taiwan Strait, numerous U.S. officials have warned that conflict could plausibly occur in the region this decade. This urgency is catalyzing constructive action across multiple U.S. alliances and every U.S. military service as they seek to make the strategy real in the limited time that may be left.</p> +<p>控方展示由《日本時報》發出的發票，以及收據，並指這是從李的住所檢取的，顯示某人在2019年6月28日以信用卡支付了200萬日圓廣告費。李表示，若果他沒有記錯的話，應該是使用了他的信用卡付款，不過需要翻查信用卡紀錄確認。</p> -<p>Every strategy brings dilemmas, though, and this strategy — call it “anti-access with American characteristics” — presents six crucial trade-offs the Pentagon and U.S. civilian leaders must address. Many of these challenges, moreover, must be confronted in coordination with U.S. allies and partners, but these conversations are not as advanced as they should be given the shrinking timeline and urgency of action. Strategy is the art of making hard choices, and the United States is only starting to reckon with the hard choices its new strategy involves.</p> +<p>控方後來向李出示他的信用卡交易紀錄，惟未見任何有關《日本時報》的交易。李遂對於是否由他的信用卡支付廣告費表示不肯定。</p> -<h3 id="washingtons-strategic-shift">Washington’s Strategic Shift</h3> +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華起初聲稱會處理台蘋廣告費-惟後來要求他自行處理">李宇軒指陳梓華起初聲稱會處理台蘋廣告費 惟後來要求他自行處理</h4> -<p>U.S. strategy has been turned upside down by two key developments: China’s ballooning defense budget and its military-technological breakthroughs. Using defense resources made available by decades of rapid economic growth, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has developed a vast arsenal of capabilities — especially long-range missiles — designed to prevent U.S. forces from accessing bases along the Pacific’s first island chain, as well as in the waters and airspace within them. According to the Pentagon’s most recent public report on Chinese military power, for instance, Beijing now possesses roughly 1,000 medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers and 500 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a range of between 3,000 and 5,500 kilometers. If a war were to break out, the PLA could now target nearly all U.S. forces within hundreds of miles of the Chinese coast.</p> +<p>控方提到於2019年6月28日刊於台灣《蘋果日報》的廣告，寫有「港台同行 唇亡齒寒」。發票顯示李須於2019年7月5日或之前繳付120萬元新台幣廣告費。另一份匯款申請表顯示，李宇軒在7月15日申請以台幣匯率匯款307,692.31元港幣。李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，廣告費最後在7月16日付清。</p> -<p>The result is a weakening of America’s ability to project power in a crucial region. A quarter century ago, China could barely detect, let alone destroy, U.S. aircraft carriers operating near its coast. Into the early 2010s, the Pentagon could — according to think tank reports — pursue a strategy that envisioned defeating Chinese aggression with a devastating precision-strike campaign against radars, missile bases, command-and-control centers, and other targets on Chinese soil.</p> +<p>李確認發票上的付款期限是7月5日，但因為當時 T 告訴他：「佢同埋佢嗰邊會 handle 嘅，即係有關俾錢嗰樣嘢，佢都會搞掂」，所以李一開始收到發票後並未有理會。</p> -<p>Today, however, Beijing can threaten aircraft carriers hundreds of miles away, as well as the surface ships that escort them and the bases they visit. A growing inventory of advanced fighters, as well as the world’s densest air defense network, can take a heavy toll on U.S. strike aircraft. Meanwhile, China’s rapid nuclear buildup makes the prospect of carrying the war onto its territory much riskier by giving Beijing more credible nuclear response options. In short, the days of easily projecting power to China’s shores are over.</p> +<p>直至廣告刊出之後，「咁後來冇人去追我數」，當時他亦不知道自己收到的文件是要求他付款的發票，「咁我覺得 T 嗰邊已經搞掂咗條數喇。」</p> -<p>The United States needs new capabilities and concepts — as well as enhanced coalitions — to offset this historic change in the military balance. To be sure, the United States will continue to require ways of breaking down China’s battle networks and degrading its A2/AD capabilities. But simply doubling down on the traditional power projection strategy will not work under the current defense budget and in view of how formidable China’s A2/AD capabilities have become. Instead, U.S. forces are trying to flip the script: they are trying to deny China the ability to project its power outward. Rather than rely so heavily on a few large, vulnerable bases and scarce, expensive platforms like aircraft carriers, this strategy would empower smaller units that operate from more austere locations and fight with cheaper, more numerous, and more expendable weapons. The goal is to create a more resilient, diversified military posture up and down the Western Pacific with sufficient firepower to inflict an awful cost if the enemy attacks. The United States will not be able to reassert the level of military dominance it once enjoyed in the region, but it can prevent an age of Chinese dominance.</p> +<p>可是大約7月的時候，「T 就話，你都係找返台灣《蘋果》呢條數啦。」李續指，既然 T 叫他付款，「咁我就嗱嗱臨找咗條數囉」，因此他在7月15日遞交匯款申請表，最終於7月16日付清廣告費。</p> -<p>What makes this approach attractive is the fact that holding U.S. forces at bay is only half the challenge China faces. To conquer Taiwan or otherwise upend the regional status quo, Beijing must replicate the traditional U.S. mission of power projection by moving troops, ships, and planes into hostile areas and sustaining them there indefinitely. In fact, Beijing is in the process of fielding four aircraft carriers with more to come; it is building other long-range ships and aircraft that can operate throughout the region and beyond. The more China invests in these larger, more expensive platforms and the more it tries to exert control in the Western Pacific, the more it makes itself the target of the very strategy its own military has employed.</p> +<h4 id="紐約時報發票顯示anna-kwok參與落廣告">《紐約時報》發票顯示「Anna Kwok」參與落廣告</h4> -<p>The United States has recently advanced several aspects of such a strategy. The first is real estate. Washington has secured or expanded U.S. access to bases in countries from Japan and the Philippines to Australia and Papua New Guinea, a crucial step in making U.S. forces more survivable if China attacks. There is significantly more work to do, but 2023 has been the most transformative year in a generation for America’s Indo-Pacific posture.</p> +<p>控方展示在2019年6月27日刊登於《南德意志報》（Süddeutsche Zeitung）的G20廣告。李表示記得在登報計劃中，只在一份德國報紙登廣告，所以確認是《南德意志報》。李確認他就此廣告支付了85,300歐元，即大約67萬港元。</p> -<p>The second aspect is capabilities. The Pentagon has announced programs such as the Replicator initiative, which seeks to build large numbers of small, cheap drones that can deliver devastating firepower. If these programs reach fruition, they could complement existing platforms, such as attack submarines and penetrating bombers, that can destroy Chinese forces within Beijing’s A2/AD zone.</p> +<p>控方另展示兩份刊登於《紐約時報》的G20廣告，日期均是2019年6月28日。就第一份廣告，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，他於6月26日向《紐約時報》支付了83,752美元。</p> -<p>A third aspect involves concepts. The services are developing new (and somewhat embryonic) ways of employing these technologies. Examples include Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, a Marine Corps initiative that involves using antiship missiles and other ground-based fires to target Chinese vessels from small islands in the Western Pacific, and Agile Combat Employment, an Air Force project that aims to preserve U.S. striking power by getting planes off of large, exposed bases when a crisis begins.</p> +<p>法官李運騰留意到，《紐約時報》發票抬頭除了寫有李宇軒的英文名字 Li Yu Hin 之外，還有另一個名字 Anna Kwok，並澄清向報館落單的人是否李。李回答，他相信他本人和 Anna Kwok 一同負責向《紐約時報》落廣告，至於為何發票上出現兩個名字，李表示不知道。控方庭上未有就 Anna Kwok 的身份提問。</p> -<p>And fourth is coalitions. To generate the necessary firepower, secure access to critical terrain, and confront China with the prospect of a big war against multiple adversaries, the United States has strengthened bilateral alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines while also investing in new partnerships — such as AUKUS — linking countries in the region and beyond.</p> +<p>李官表示，純粹好奇一問，李在聯絡報館期間使用了真實姓名，是否代表 Telegram 群組成員知道他的真實姓名。李回答不是，因為他只曾向報館提供真實姓名，所以報館可能知道他的真名，如果相關文件透過電郵被轉發或副本抄送至其他有份聯絡報館的人時，該些人便會知道他的真名。</p> -<p>To be clear, anti-access with U.S. characteristics is more of a complement to than a pure replacement for the Pentagon’s old approach. Aircraft carriers and major surface combatants would be needed to defeat a Chinese blockade of Taiwan, for instance, even if they suffered heavy losses. Tactical fighters, long-range bombers, and other manned aircraft will play an important role in delivering munitions and partnering with unmanned systems. The United States will still need to find ways of suppressing China’s air defenses and hindering its kill chains. But legacy approaches alone cannot defeat a Chinese attack at acceptable cost. The United States needs asymmetric ways of thinning out enemy forces and preventing them from achieving their objectives.</p> +<p>至於另一份在《紐約時報》刊登的G20廣告，李確認支付了36,000美元。</p> -<p>To succeed, the United States will need a two-part force. A blunting layer of dispersed forces must survive the initial onslaught and prevent Chinese forces from winning a quick, decisive victory. Then a follow-on force of U.S. ships and aircraft will need to push into the theater to decisively defeat the remaining Chinese units. Ultimately, this might not be sufficient to terminate a conflict, but it would neutralize the immediate threat and buy time for other options meant to persuade Beijing to call it quits, such as a long-term economic pressure campaign.</p> +<h4 id="朝日新聞發票顯示客戶為香港眾志-李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡報館">《朝日新聞》發票顯示客戶為香港眾志 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡報館</h4> -<p>America’s new strategy, however, also raises new questions: Can a blunting force remain effective if it is exposed to devastating Chinese missile salvoes and cannot easily be resupplied? Could these smaller units deter a conflict as well as larger and more visible ships and aircraft could? Should U.S. power projection forces remain in the first island chain or pull back to more defendable positions farther away? How hard should the United States push for access to new bases? Are allies prepared to play their part in this new strategy? And to what extent would anti-access with U.S. characteristics just redirect China’s effort toward gray zone coercion?</p> +<p>控方展示於2019年6月28日刊登於《朝日新聞》的廣告，並向李出示相關發票，客戶名稱寫有「Demosisto」，要求支付700萬日圓。控方問這個客戶是誰、為何會出現在發票上。李指它是「眾志」，「因為眾志入面有人去負責搵 Asahi Shimbun（《朝日新聞》）」，但是他不知道該人是否 Telegram 群組的成員之一。</p> -<p>These are difficult questions. They involve hard trade-offs between survivability and lethality, concealing and revealing, close-in and standoff operations, speed and sustainability, sovereignty and efficiency, and gray zone and high-intensity conflict. As the United States tries to prepare for or, preferably, deter a potentially devastating conflict, these six issues require urgent attention and debate.</p> +<p>控方問李所指的「眾志」是否一個政治團體，李僅回答：「以我理解，淨係得一個眾志。」控方追問是哪一位眾志成員負責聯絡《朝日新聞》，李表示：「我唔直接知道，但我 speculation（估計）係周庭。」他補充：「因為，我 speculation 係，得佢一個識講日文。」</p> -<h3 id="survivability-or-lethality">Survivability or Lethality</h3> +<p>李的銀行個人戶口紀錄顯示，在同年6月27日有一筆700萬日圓的支帳紀錄，李確認這是有關登報的廣告費。控方問李當時如何收到上述發票，李則稱不記得，因為在籌備登報計劃期間，有些人負責聯絡不同報館，包括《朝日新聞》，他相信一些負責聯絡報館的人，「喺畀錢嘅時候彈咗張單俾我」，即是上述抬頭為「Demosisto」的發票。</p> -<p>A fundamental feature of today’s environment is the development of accuracy independent of range, which makes it possible to precisely strike targets at great distances. This is why China’s ballistic missile force, the largest in the world, poses such a threat to the aircraft and surface ships that the United States would need to project power into the Western Pacific. Hardening airfields and investing in air and missile defenses can help, but the cost-exchange ratio favors the attacker, since most missiles are significantly cheaper than the interceptors that engage them. If U.S. forces remain on large bases at Guam or Okinawa, they risk being destroyed. Military units must disperse and hide to survive. The dilemma is that once they do, they will struggle to generate the striking power — the lethality — needed to defeat a Chinese assault.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認由他支付南韓英國西班牙等報廣告費">李宇軒確認由他支付南韓、英國、西班牙等報廣告費</h4> -<p>This problem involves logistics and sustainment: the more dispersed one’s forces, the harder it is to keep them well supplied. The Air Force, for instance, has shown it can get attack aircraft out of vulnerable places in a hurry. Less certain is whether it can deliver the fuel, weapons, and other support those planes will need to conduct combat missions from wherever they go to ride out the storm. If U.S. planes cannot fly strike missions in the opening days or weeks of a Taiwan crisis, Taipei might fold and close Washington’s window to respond. Similar challenges afflict the Army’s Multi-Domain Operations concept.</p> +<p>就南韓報紙，李宇軒指當時一共在三份南韓報紙登廣告，分別是《韓國日報》（한국 일보）、《朝鮮日報》（조선일보）和《東亞日報》（동아일보），並確認上述三份報紙廣告費合共是8,325萬韓圜。</p> -<p>To be fair, the picture varies across the services. By making significant changes to its force structure, the Marine Corps has become better positioned to distribute small units across numerous islands while also equipping them with real firepower. Yet services that rely on large platforms (the Navy), large bases (the Air Force), or large formations (the Army) have more work to do to make their forces survivable without undermining their ability to land a lethal punch.</p> +<p>就《泰晤士報》（The UK Times）刊登的廣告，李的信用卡交易紀錄顯示他支付了27,195英鎊，即大約275,763.90港元。李確認相關紀錄。</p> -<h3 id="conceal-or-reveal">Conceal or Reveal</h3> +<p>就西班牙報紙《世界報》（El Mundo），李確認他支付了2萬歐羅。</p> -<p>As new operational concepts take shape around smaller, more dispersed units, the Pentagon will face another challenge: how to deter China with less visible forces. The accuracy of today’s weapons means visible forces are increasingly vulnerable, but the best capabilities for deterring opponents and reassuring friends are those they can plainly see. Alternatively, concealing capabilities can help maximize their effect on the battlefield but undercuts their deterrent value before a conflict begins.</p> +<p>就加拿大報紙《環球郵報》（The Globe and Mail），李確認發票上要求他繳付的金額是84,750元加幣，不過實際上廣告費只是75,000元加幣，他當時告訴報館職員自己不是身處加拿大，問對方可否免除增值稅（value added tax），對方表示不用支付增值稅，所以李最終只繳付了75,000元加幣。</p> -<p>Take, for example, one of America’s most effective deterrents — the purported ability to disrupt Chinese power projection by using cyberattacks to disable PLA command, control, and communications. Disclosing the details of this capability would require revealing U.S. access to Chinese networks, which would give Beijing a chance to close breaches. The same basic problem would apply to revealing new operating locations or highly secretive systems, such as advanced undersea drones, stealthy aircraft, space-based capabilities, and others.</p> +<p>控方最後展示由歐洲版 POLITICO 發出的發票，抬頭是「Demosisto」，需就2019年6月27至29日期間刊登網上廣告繳付5,000歐羅。李確認他向 POLITICO 支付了5,000歐羅，並確認 POLITICO 的公司總部位於比利時，但是該G20廣告是網上的廣告。</p> -<p>A related issue involves timing. Unveiling new capabilities during a crisis might bolster deterrence but could come too late, after Chinese leaders have made the crucial decision to act. Publicly revealing new capabilities in the opening phases of a crisis could increase tensions, complicate efforts to deescalate, and lead third parties to blame Washington for the conflict. Admittedly, these are not new problems. But they are made more difficult by the fact that the United States no longer has such overwhelming conventional superiority, so it must hold more in reserve to surprise Chinese military commanders and complicate their operations after the shooting starts.</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<h3 id="close-in-or-standoff">Close-in or Standoff</h3> +<hr /> -<p>A third trade-off involves geography: Where should the United States place these more dispersed forces? For decades, U.S. power projection was so effective that even massed forward-deployed forces were largely invulnerable to enemy attack, and U.S. dominance was so pronounced that even faraway forces could reach the theater in time to make the vital difference. Today, however, China could do catastrophic damage to the Pentagon’s forward-most forces, whether they be ships near the Taiwan Strait or units on the ground in Okinawa. Moreover, if China can quickly establish dominance in and around the Taiwan Strait, assets stationed farther away might not arrive soon enough to prevent a fait accompli.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導財務文件顯示眾志參與G20登報 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》Power Plays2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/power-plays<p><em>This report examines the trade in Russian enriched uranium.</em></p> -<p>Thus, the dilemma: if the United States stations most of its combat power along the first island chain, the PLA could conduct a crippling first strike. Yet if Washington keeps the bulk of its forces over the horizon at bases in the second island chain or even farther away, then China might be emboldened to try the fait accompli. Of course, if Beijing chooses to kill a large number of Americans in a first strike, it is probably choosing a long, bloody war with an enraged superpower as well. But even in that case, U.S. allies would face the possibility of being pounded as U.S. forces fight from distant locations — not exactly a recipe for alliance cohesion in a crucial moment.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>An answer — albeit an uncomfortable one — is to divide U.S. forces into two elements. Some units would serve as frontline forces to blunt Chinese attacks and reassure allied publics. These forces would constitute a bulwark and a trip wire: they would deny China the option of using force without bloodying U.S. personnel. They would commit the United States to the fight while also giving Washington some combat power early on. The objective of these forces would not be to establish U.S. dominance within the first island chain but rather to prevent China from dominating portions of the first island chain itself. Mobile forces equipped with antiship and antiaircraft missiles would blunt Chinese attacks on U.S. allies and partners.</p> +<h3 id="introduction-and-report-overview">Introduction and Report Overview</h3> -<p>Ultimately, this blunting force would also buy time and serve as a shield behind which standoff forces, such as long-range stealth aircraft or other platforms capable of delivering munitions from a distance, could operate at somewhat decreased risk. Unfortunately, the costs to these close-in units could be very high, so the United States might not want to place its most advanced capabilities at risk — fifth-generation tactical aircraft, or aircraft carrier strike groups, for instance — until it has succeeded in degrading China’s A2/AD capabilities, primarily through strikes delivering from longer range. In the meantime, forward-stationed forces might suffer ghastly losses.</p> +<p>On 17 February 2024, almost two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenksy addressed the Munich Security Conference, pleading for unity against the aggression perpetuated by Russian President Vladimir Putin and for continued support for Ukraine in its fight. Among his calls to action, Zelensky stressed the need to close “all loopholes in the sanctions against Russia”, singling out Russia’s nuclear industry in particular. “There should be no sectors of the Russian economy involved in its aggression that are still free from sanctions”, he said. “This particularly relates to the nuclear sector”.</p> -<h3 id="speed-or-sustainability">Speed or Sustainability</h3> +<p>Russia’s Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is an important player in the international nuclear energy industry, with a major presence across various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The company, through its subsidiaries JSC TVEL and Techsnabexport LLC (better known as TENEX), is the biggest supplier of uranium enrichment to the global market, and has continued to export significant volumes of enriched uranium product since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In 2022, Russia accounted for 30% of the separative work units (SWU, the unit of measurement for uranium enrichment services) delivered to EU utilities and for 44% of global enrichment capacity. In the US, 24% of SWU purchased by US utilities in 2022 came from Russia.</p> -<p>A fourth trade-off is political. Washington’s new strategy is predicated on rapidly diversifying U.S. operating locations from a handful of major U.S. bases to a range of ally and partner bases, austere sites, and even some civilian facilities. The United States has made remarkable progress in this endeavor; key allies like Japan are expanding their military footprints as well. Yet the harder Washington pushes to make use of these locations today, the more it risks damaging critical relationships.</p> +<p>This report examines the extent of Western (European and US) dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and identifies ways in which Rosatom may be continuing to access global, including Western, nuclear fuel supply chains, despite some efforts in the US and Europe to diversify away from Russian supply. The report studies changes in Russian enriched uranium trade patterns since the start of 2022 to identify possible indicators of efforts to adapt to restrictions on Russian uranium supply that have been or may be introduced by governments and companies.</p> -<p>This tension is on display in Japan’s southwest islands. Okinawa, Miyako, Ishigaki, and Yonaguni are critical real estate given their proximity to Taiwan. If the United States could, for instance, station hordes of long-range antiship missiles on the outermost islands, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait would change overnight. But populations on some of these islands are ambivalent about a growing Japanese military presence, let alone any sizable deployment of Americans. If Washington pushes too hard, it risks alienating local populations and causing diplomatic setbacks. If Washington does not push hard enough, the United States and its allies might not be ready if a conflict comes.</p> +<p>The report examines four main case studies. In the first case study, the report outlines possible Chinese displacement activity using Russian material, identifying trade patterns that suggest that increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into China may be facilitating greater exports of Chinese enriched uranium supply, including to the US. The second case study addresses well-documented increases in enriched uranium imports from Russia to France and considers a range of possible explanations for this growth. While the precise flow and use of the additional Russian material that is being imported into France is difficult to ascertain definitively, it appears that France may be offering an outlet for Russian enriched uranium that is no longer welcome in other countries. This may be facilitating the reallocation of Russian supplies across European utilities’ supply chains, allowing Russia to continue accessing the European nuclear fuel market even as some countries seek to diversify away from Russian supply. The third case study examines reported deliveries through France and possibly the Netherlands of Russian enriched uranium to a French-owned fuel fabrication facility in Germany. The trade data reviewed for this report could not confirm the extent of deliveries to Germany of Russian material through third countries, or whether there have been shifts in such activity since the start of 2022; however, any such deliveries to Germany may be providing an additional option for Russian enriched uranium imports no longer welcome in other countries and may potentially be used in the future fabrication of VVER assemblies in Germany. The fourth case study touches on US dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and the likely limits of a proposed US ban on imports of Russian uranium in limiting Russia’s role in global nuclear fuel supply chains and Rosatom revenues.</p> -<p>The same point could be made regarding the Philippines. Under President Joe Biden, the United States has made remarkable progress in jump-starting implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and gaining access to additional facilities in that country. In theory, these facilities — some of which are on the northern island of Luzon — could play a vital role in a Taiwan contingency. In reality, what access the United States would have to those facilities in a crisis remains uncertain. The more tensions increase, the greater the need for the United States to have clarity about this issue and to position more (and more capable) forces there. Those needs may clash, however, with the political incentives of the government in Manila, which would presumably prefer to defer hard choices that could put local communities in the firing line if conflict ensues.</p> +<p>Ultimately, the report demonstrates how Russia may be able to take advantage of incongruencies in sanctions or other restrictions, as well as persistent contractual dependencies and supply challenges, to maintain access to Western nuclear fuel supply chains and continue generating revenue through its enriched uranium exports. To improve effectiveness, any future sanctions or other bans aimed at limiting Russia’s presence in global nuclear fuel supply chains must be multilateral and accompanied by a concerted effort to increase Western and partner capacity across the supply chain, to successfully undercut dependence on Russian supply.</p> -<h3 id="sovereignty-or-efficiency">Sovereignty or Efficiency</h3> +<p>It is worth noting that most of the activities described in this report are entirely legal and likely represent logical efforts by companies to adapt to the changing trade and geopolitical landscape while continuing to meet whatever contractual obligations they may have for continued purchase and import of Russian material. As such, the report does not imply any violations of the laws of any relevant jurisdiction, or any international laws or sanctions. As described in more detail in Chapter II, the delivery to the US of enriched uranium that has been displaced by Russian supply, as may be the case with Chinese enriched uranium trade, may be in contravention of US regulation, unless assurances have been given to US authorities that such displacement is not taking place.</p> -<p>Allies and partners are central to U.S. strategy because the China challenge is more serious than anything the United States has faced in decades. Beijing can field a force so large and potent that the United States cannot succeed on its own. Even under the most favorable assumptions about the development of U.S. and Taiwanese capabilities, the United States will still need — at a bare minimum — access to bases in Japan and perhaps other countries. Yet, after several decades in which allied contributions were a “nice to have” but not a “need to have,” there is little muscle memory in Asia about how to conduct complex coalition operations in a high-intensity environment.</p> +<p>The practices described in this report raise questions over the extent of Western dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supply, the implications for Western energy security, the imbalance of vulnerability this may create between some Western governments and Moscow, and the effectiveness of efforts to cut Russia out of global, or even Western, nuclear supply chains. While the nuclear sector holds strategic significance for Moscow, it is not a major revenue source for Russia when compared to Russian trade in other commodities, such as oil and gas. However, as outlined in this report, Western reliance on Russian enriched uranium supply is proving challenging to shake, at least in the short term, and may create some difficulties for Western generation of nuclear energy, although experts disagree on the urgency and extent of potential challenges. The willingness, or necessity, of some Western countries to overlook Russian adaptations following efforts by other countries to limit Russian presence in Western nuclear fuel supply chains also points to a political and moral dissonance with stated US and European commitments to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression.</p> -<p>Getting the coalition dynamics right requires addressing tough questions about roles, missions, capabilities, and — most of all — politics. Which allies would be willing to commit their forces in advance of a conflict? Under what circumstances would they do so? And with what caveats about their use? The answers to these questions will vary greatly from country to country, even from leader to leader. And although it seems likely that close allies, such as Japan or Australia, will indeed side with the United States if shooting starts, their leaders are often unwilling, for understandable political and diplomatic reasons, to make that commitment explicit in advance.</p> +<h4 id="data-and-research-methodology">Data and Research Methodology</h4> -<p>Ideally, a U.S.-led coalition would maximize efficiency: Washington would rely on allies to build niche capabilities and focus on particular missions, freeing up U.S. forces for the most daunting tasks. A similar argument has been made for why Taiwan should ditch its expensive planes and warships, which will probably be destroyed or disabled at the outset of any conflict, and instead focus on antiship missiles, mines, and other asymmetric capabilities that can help it survive until help arrives. But Taiwan is hesitant to do this because it has no ironclad assurance help will come — not even from the United States.</p> +<p>The data for this report was collected from a range of publicly accessible sources. These include: the UN Comtrade Database; the Eurostat database; trade data made available by national governments; trade data sourced from third-party trade data providers; corporate reporting documents and other publicly available corporate information; analysis published by think tanks, academic institutions, consultancies, industry associations and interest groups; and media reporting. Some of the data was sourced from non-English-language sources. Data from Russian-, Ukrainian-, French- and Spanish-language sources was viewed in its original language. Data from other language sources was viewed using digital translation. Urenco, the project funder, provided additional data and feedback throughout the research process. Any data that was subsequently included in the report or informed the analysis was independently verified through publicly available (or publicly accessible) sources. The report was subsequently subject to several internal and external peer reviews.</p> -<p>This illustrates the larger dilemma: if no one really knows who will or will not fight in a crisis, a clean division of labor becomes dangerous because absent allies would create glaring gaps. Political leaders in the Western Pacific naturally want to preserve flexibility and protect sovereignty. Yet this undermines efficiency by forcing Washington to plan for the possibility that its allies will not show up. The dilemma works the other way as well: the less reliable the United States seems due to resurgent isolationism or political dysfunction, the less willing its allies will be to make potentially costly commitments to fight by its side.</p> +<p>Fourteen unstructured anonymous interviews with a range of experts were also conducted to test some of the assumptions and hypotheses being drawn from the data, to identify possible alternative explanations for some of the trade patterns observed, and to capture any necessary nuance or overlooked data. To ensure the highest quality insights, interview questions were tailored to each expert’s distinct area of expertise, because, given the commercial sensitivity of nuclear fuel contracts and the intricate nature of global nuclear supply chains, not all experts consulted were necessarily familiar with all the dynamics being examined in this report. This approach facilitated a more nuanced understanding of the subject matter, reinforcing the robustness of the methodology employed in this report. While conducting this research, input was sought from key industry stakeholders and relevant organisations. To ensure comprehensive coverage and balanced perspective, outreach was extended to several entities mentioned in the report. Unfortunately, not all entities that were approached responded.</p> -<h3 id="gray-zone-or-high-intensity">Gray Zone or High Intensity</h3> +<p>As with any large data set, the trade data accessed for this report may include some inconsistencies, omissions or duplicates. Misreporting in customs data is also possible. Efforts have been made to clean the datasets (by removing apparent duplicate entries from transaction-level datasets or disregarding datasets that were clearly incorrect) and to validate trends in data across multiple datasets, but it is possible that some inaccuracies remain.</p> -<p>A final tension is between dealing with day-to-day gray zone challenges — maritime coercion, menacing aerial intercepts, and other pressure tactics short of war — and preparing for the potential outbreak of a major conflict. Gray zone engagements require frequent sorties, which wear down aircraft and their crews. There is a real trade-off between showing the flag in the South China Sea and training for high-intensity conflict. The Pentagon’s preference may be to concentrate intently on deterring high-intensity conflict — the fight that the United States simply cannot afford to lose — but even if it does so successfully, its friends will still suffer as Beijing salami-slices the status quo.</p> +<p>Because Russia does not release data on its enriched uranium exports, values for trade with Russia were sourced from parallel import data of importing countries. Russia is not the only country that does not make information on its enriched uranium exports publicly available. For instance, the UK also does not publicly report its trade in enriched uranium. This limited the analysis that could be conducted for this report to those countries whose data could be accessed through publicly accessible sources. Any reference to exports from a given country indicates values sourced from the export data of that country; any reference to imports into a given country indicates values sourced from the import data of that country. In many instances, the import and export data of two trading partners differed somewhat; this may be due to differences in customs reporting between the two countries or delays between the export of material from one country and its arrival in the other. Such discrepancies have been noted throughout the report and given due attention in instances where they were particularly significant.</p> -<p>For example, the U.S. military is heavily focused on a potential war in the Taiwan Strait, most notably the challenge of rapidly sinking an invasion fleet. But although this is the most dangerous contingency, it is not the only, or perhaps even the most likely, one. Every day China is squeezing Taiwan, using a high operations tempo and boundary encroachment to nibble away at its buffer zones. Likewise, the challenge in the South China Sea is not a matter of Beijing mounting an all-out invasion of the Philippines. It involves using fishing boats, maritime militia, coast guard vessels, and other capabilities to undermine sovereignty.</p> +<p>It is worth noting that the prices of natural uranium and enrichment services – which are included in the value of enriched uranium product – fluctuate. The spot price (the price of uranium purchased outside existing contracts) of natural (unenriched) uranium has risen significantly in the past three years. To avoid conflating increases in the values and volumes of trade in enriched uranium, data on both the monetary values and the net weight of enriched uranium (in the form of uranium hexafluoride) and nuclear fuel being traded has been included in the report, where available. However, data on the weight of material traded can also vary between datasets. While the data largely captures net weight, in some instances, data may also be capturing gross weight. As such, both the value and volume of goods should be reviewed together when analysing the data. The two largely bear out similar patterns. Where there are notable discrepancies, this has been highlighted.</p> -<p>Unfortunately, many of the capabilities needed for gray zone scenarios are different from those needed for high-end deterrence missions. Small units equipped with antiship missiles may be lethally effective against an invasion fleet, but they are of less use in helping the Philippines defend its sovereignty against everyday encroachment or helping Japan cope with pressure from Chinese aircraft over the East China Sea. In fairness, this dilemma might well attend any U.S. defense strategy in the Western Pacific. But the more Washington emphasizes high-end conflict scenarios and anti-access forces, the sharper this trade-off will become.</p> +<p>When querying trade data for enriched uranium, where possible, searches were conducted for HS code 28442035, the commodity code for uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds. Some databases only allow for searches of six-digit HS codes; in these instances, HS code 284420 was queried instead, which includes the following commodities: uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds; plutonium and its compounds; alloys; dispersions (including metal-ceramics); ceramic products and mixtures containing uranium enriched in U-235; plutonium or compounds of these products. As such, data queried using the six-digit code may also include some materials besides enriched uranium. However, data for HS code 284420 is normally overwhelmingly made up of enriched uranium, with any other materials appearing in relatively small quantities. Variations of HS code 284420 were used in some instances – HS code 28442000 to query Chinese data (similar considerations relating to queries using HS code 284420 apply) and HS code 2844200020 to query US data (which captures uranium fluoride enriched in U-235) to access information on the weight of traded material, not just value.</p> -<h3 id="no-easy-answers">No Easy Answers</h3> +<h3 id="i-nuclear-fuel-supply-chains-and-russias-role">I. Nuclear Fuel Supply Chains and Russia’s Role</h3> -<p>There are no perfect solutions to these challenges. Every choice comes with risks and consequences. The best the United States and its allies and partners can do is mitigate those risks to the extent possible, which begins with recognizing that the requirements of assurance, deterrence, and warfighting often cut in different directions — and that Washington cannot adequately address any of these dilemmas on its own.</p> +<p>Before examining Russia’s enriched uranium trade, it is worth understanding the nature of global nuclear fuel supply chains. Figure 1 includes a simplified overview of the nuclear fuel cycle. This report is only concerned with the front end of the cycle, and more specifically the enrichment stage.</p> -<p>As discussed, the Pentagon may envision addressing the competing imperatives of assurance, deterrence, and warfighting by effectively bifurcating the force. An “inside force” located within the first island chain would reassure allies of U.S. commitment and dissuade China from thinking it can succeed with a rapid fait accompli. If war occurs, it will be supplemented by an “outside force,” located mostly beyond the immediate reach of China’s most potent A2/AD assets, which would provide the bulk of the striking power needed to turn back a PLA assault and eventually end the conflict on favorable terms. Yet that is only a partial answer to the dilemmas raised here, many of which will persist even if the United States optimizes different parts of its forces for different tasks.</p> +<h4 id="overview-of-market-dynamics-in-the-front-end-of-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle">Overview of Market Dynamics in the Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle</h4> -<p>One requirement for more squarely confronting trade-offs between speed and sustainability, between survivability and lethality, and so on would be closer coordination between the officials responsible — in the United States and friendly countries — for operational planning, capability development, and alliance management. After all, the hardest trade-offs tend to arise at the intersection of these tasks. But even within the U.S. government, it is not clear that the dilemmas are as sharply understood, or as explicitly acknowledged, as they could be. When the authors recently traveled to the region, we were struck that many of these dilemmas are not really being debated yet with key allies and partners.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XnJgzSr.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Overview of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.</strong> Source: Data from <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/nuclear-fuel-cycle-overview.aspx">World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Overview”, updated April 2021</a>.</em></p> -<p>This is a potentially costly mistake. Each trade-off has extensive implications for Indo-Pacific allies and partners; addressing them requires not just understanding but also extensive military reforms and sensitive political guidance from U.S. friends. The U.S. military no longer possesses power projection capabilities so overwhelming it can determine its strategy independently and then seek the acquiescence of like-minded nations. For the first time in decades, Washington must truly integrate its Asian friends into its most crucial strategic debates — as well as the training, exercises, contingency planning processes, and wargames that both inform and flow from those debates. The alternative is a strategy that becomes dangerously disjointed as the United States and other defenders of the Asian order confront difficult choices in divergent ways.</p> +<p>The generation of energy from nuclear fuel depends on the splitting of atoms of the uranium isotope U-235 inside a nuclear reactor (nuclear fission). Mined uranium ore is made up of about 0.7% of U-235, with the remainder consisting of U-238. To make the fissile U-235 isotope suitable for nuclear energy generation in light water reactors its concentration must be increased before the uranium can be used to produce nuclear fuel assemblies (for most contemporary nuclear reactors, the concentration is about 3–5% U-235, which is classified as low enriched uranium (LEU)). This is done through the uranium enrichment process, using one of several possible methods. Globally, there is a limited number of companies that offer enrichment services, with almost all commercial enrichment conducted by one of four companies: Rosatom; China National Nuclear Corporation; Orano; and Urenco. Enrichment capacity is measured in SWU, which represent the effort required to separate isotopes of U-235 and U-238.</p> -<p>Given the growing worry about crises or conflict, there is little time to waste. The shorter the time horizon gets, the starker the trade-offs will become. Hard dilemmas are the price to pay for decades of lethargy in dealing with a growing Chinese challenge. If the United States, its allies, and its partners do not confront these issues head-on today, the consequences could be ugly tomorrow.</p> +<p>Nuclear fuel fabrication is also limited to a relatively small number of manufacturers. Once manufactured, nuclear fuel assemblies may be used in the country of fabrication or shipped for loading into reactors in other countries. Due to the challenges associated with transporting radioactive material, nuclear fuel is usually fabricated broadly in the same region of the world where it will be used.</p> -<hr /> +<p>The ultimate consumers of uranium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle are energy utilities, which generate electricity through the operation of nuclear reactors and sell it to consumers. Most often, the utility purchases the uranium it needs directly from uranium mine operators and owns the uranium throughout the rest of the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The utility then purchases the services necessary to turn mined uranium into usable nuclear reactor fuel (that is, conversion, enrichment, deconversion and fuel fabrication) from relevant service providers; however, the utility normally remains the sole owner of the material throughout the process.</p> -<p><strong>Hal Brands</strong> is Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.</p> +<p>The various service providers may be – and often are – located in countries other than the one where the material will eventually be used in reactors for energy generation. As a hypothetical example, uranium ore mined in Kazakhstan may be purchased by a Swiss utility, sent to Russia to be converted and enriched by Russian companies, then transported to a French-owned nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Germany to be made into nuclear fuel assemblies, before finally being delivered to Switzerland for use in Swiss nuclear reactors. Throughout this process, the Swiss utility would maintain ownership of the uranium material.</p> -<p><strong>Zack Cooper</strong> is senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer in public and international affairs at Princeton University.</p>Hal Brands and Zack CooperAs the danger of war rises in the Western Pacific, the United States is racing to reset its military strategy. China’s astonishing military modernization — especially its arsenal of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities — has fundamentally challenged the old U.S. approach, which focused on defeating aggression by projecting decisive power into the first island chain.Government Use Of Deepfakes2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/government-use-of-deepfakes<p><em>What questions should governments ask — and who in government should be asking them — when a deepfake is being considered?</em></p> +<p>An alternative supply model involves the purchase and sale of uranium at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle by brokers and traders, who have themselves purchased the uranium or services in question from providers and sell these on to utilities.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="russian-presence-across-the-global-nuclear-fuel-supply-chain">Russian Presence Across the Global Nuclear Fuel Supply Chain</h4> -<p>This paper examines several scenarios in which democratic governments might consider using deepfakes to advance their foreign policy objectives. It argues that officials should consider the following factors: (1) the likely efficacy of the deepfake, (2) its audience, (3) the potential harms, (4) the legal implications, (5) the nature of the target, (6) the goal of the deepfake, and (7) the traceability of the deepfake back to the originating democratic government. In general, the authors argue that deepfakes should not be used as they are likely to reduce the credibility of democratic governments if their use is discovered, though there may be rare circumstances when their use deserves serious consideration. This paper also proposes a process for approving or rejecting deepfakes that ensures that a wide variety of perspectives are brought to the table.</p> +<p>While Russian companies offer services across the nuclear fuel cycle, this report focuses on the provision of Russian enrichment services, as enrichment and conversion are the parts of the global nuclear supply chain where there are the greatest dependencies on Russia. Russia and, more specifically, the Rosatom subsidiaries TVEL and TENEX, is the greatest supplier of enrichment services to the global market. In 2022, Rosatom provided 35% of uranium enrichment services globally, according to the company’s 2022 annual report, and, according to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), provided 44% of global enrichment capacity in 2022.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>The precise value of Russian enriched uranium exports over the past two years is difficult to ascertain as Russia does not make data on its enriched uranium trade publicly available. Some estimates are possible using import data from Russian customer countries reported through publicly accessible sources such as UN Comtrade, Eurostat, individual government reporting and third-party trade data providers. However, as noted earlier, some countries, for example, the UK, do not report their enriched uranium imports. Furthermore, at least in the case of the US, the import values of Russian enriched uranium include “returned feed”, that is, unenriched uranium the equivalent of which is returned to Russia, as required under US regulation (for more details, see Chapter V). As such, estimates of Russian enriched uranium exports are likely to be inexact and are not necessarily representative of the revenue that Rosatom generates from this trade. UN Comtrade data shows $2.03 billion in global imports from Russia under HS code 284420 in 2022, up from $1.29 billion in 2021. Data compiled from a range of sources shows $2.7 billion of enriched uranium imports from Russia in 2023.</p> -<p>In March 2022, a fake video of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky telling his soldiers to lay down their arms was posted on a Ukrainian website. The video also appeared on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and a host of Russian channels. A similar video shared on the social platform Telegram surfaced in November 2023 in which the head of Ukraine’s armed forces, General Valery Zaluzhny, is heard making a similar speech. Other fake videos of Zelensky show him sporting a swastika and appearing in a Pride parade. Widely believed to have been created and disseminated by Russia, these fakes reflect the use of advanced information technology methods to covertly influence warfare and shape the broader information environment in Russia’s favor.</p> +<p>Several Western and partner governments have taken some limited measures to sanction Rosatom or to make trade with Russia in nuclear materials more challenging or unattractive. The UK, the US and others have sanctioned parts of the Rosatom leadership and/or a small number of the company’s subsidiaries. In July 2022, the UK also introduced a new 35% tariff on imports of radioactive chemical elements and isotopes from Russia, which includes enriched uranium. While the EU has not introduced sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector, some European countries and companies have undertaken efforts to diversify away from Russian imports, turning to alternative suppliers of nuclear reactor technology and nuclear fuel. A bill that would restrict the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US was also passed in the US House of Representatives in December 2023 and, at the time of writing, was awaiting debate by the US Senate.</p> -<p>This state of affairs is only likely to worsen with the rapid proliferation of deepfakes, or artificial images generated by artificial intelligence (AI), as well as manipulable digital media in general. As AI has improved, deepfakes have gone from primitive to highly realistic, and they will only get harder to distinguish. (A representative list of some popular tools for generating synthetic artifacts is provided in the appendix.)</p> +<p>While analysts disagree on precisely how much the termination of Russian enriched uranium deliveries would impact Western utilities, there seems to be broad agreement that, in the absence of additional Western capacity coming online, such an embargo, whether introduced by Western governments or by Russia, as Moscow has previously threatened, would create at least some challenges for Western utilities. Several experts interviewed for this research expressed concerns that some US utilities may struggle to keep nuclear power plants operating should Russian enriched uranium supply be cut off; one interviewee noted that the concern is probably over longer-term supply and that utilities likely have sufficient stockpiles to carry them over in the short term. Furthermore, as time passes, governments and utilities may become increasingly better prepared to deal with disruptions in Russian enriched uranium supply. (For a further discussion on potential supply challenges, see Chapter V.)</p> -<p>This proliferation of AI provides an unparalleled opportunity for state actors to use deepfakes for national security purposes. In addition to the Zelensky and Zaluzhny videos, there have been numerous uses of deepfake technology in the context of politics and international conflict. In May 2023, deepfake videos claimed to show the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror group endorsing Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the main opposition candidate for the Turkish presidency. Another deepfake against an opposition candidate, this time allegedly pornographic, led him to step down from the presidential race. In January 2024, a robocall that faked President Joe Biden’s voice advised New Hampshire residents not to vote in the presidential primary. There are reports that the Venezuelan government used deepfake technology (specifically the Synthesia tool shown in the appendix) to generate deepfakes of news anchors portraying the Venezuelan economy in glowing terms.</p> +<p>Alternative enrichment capacity exists in Europe and the US – a combined 25,400 tonnes of SWU as of 2022, according to the WNA. In its latest report on global nuclear fuel markets, the WNA concludes that there is currently an oversupply of global enrichment capacity when compared to demand; however, Russia accounts for nearly half of current global SWU capacity. Additional Western capacity is being added through the expansion of Urenco’s enrichment plant in Eunice, New Mexico (an additional 700 tonnes of SWU per year, with the first cascades expected to become operational in 2025), Urenco’s Dutch facility at Almelo (an additional 750 tonnes of SWU per year, with the first cascades expected to become operational in 2027), Urenco’s enrichment plant in Gronau, Germany, and Orano’s Georges Besse II plant in southern France (an additional 2,500 tonnes of SWU per year, with additional capacity starting to become operational in 2028). Increased uranium enrichment in the US and Europe will also depend on the availability of the stage in the nuclear fuel cycle that precedes enrichment – conversion, where Russia also dominates the market. There are also enriched uranium inventories in the US and Europe, which stood at 3,963 tonnes of uranium in Europe and 2,670 tonnes of uranium in the US at the end of 2021 and which may help alleviate (at least partially) shortages caused by a termination of Russian supply. However, inventories vary between countries and utilities.</p> -<p>The Synthesia product was also reportedly used to generate videos supportive of the 2022 coup in Burkina Faso. Initial versions allowed users to use their own visual likeness or an avatar to generate a video in the voice of the individual portrayed. Recent updates can convert “text-based sources [inputs] into full-fledged synthetic videos in a matter of minutes.” However, unscrupulous individuals may use similar technology to generate highly realistic videos of nonconsenting individuals. It is therefore only a matter of time before politicians, military leaders, and others are falsely accused, through weaponized audio and video, of participating in acts they never carried out. These deepfakes may include made-up speeches, fake murders, and other provocative acts.</p> +<p>Russia is also a major supplier of nuclear reactor technology and nuclear reactor fuel, although the dependencies in this context have historically been in Eastern Europe and are now increasing in the Global South. Western suppliers have begun successfully replacing Russia’s supply of reactor and fuel technology to certain markets. Russia is also an important supplier in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, taking deliveries of spent nuclear fuel (which has already been irradiated in a nuclear reactor) for long-term storage or for reprocessing (the extraction of uranium from used reactor fuel, which can then be enriched and reused in the production of new nuclear fuel). France has historically sent reprocessed uranium from its reactors to Russia for re-enrichment. In 2018, Urenco concluded a contract with French utility EDF to enrich uranium recovered from reprocessed fuel from French reactors; the reprocessed fuel will be converted in Russia and delivered to Urenco’s facility in Almelo (the Netherlands) for enrichment, before being sent to a fuel fabrication plant at Romans-sur-Isère (France) for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for French reactors. The UK’s nuclear reactor at the Sizewell-B nuclear power plant has also previously used Framatome-manufactured nuclear fuel containing enriched reprocessed uranium (ERU) which was enriched in Russia. Sizewell-B has now switched to using natural (non-reprocessed) uranium enriched by Orano.</p> -<p>On the positive side, deepfakes have been used for various legitimate purposes, labeled here as “beneficial deepfakes.” One example is the set of deepfakes of soccer superstar David Beckham, who was portrayed supporting an antimalaria message in which he speaks in a host of foreign languages; the visual content is real, but the audio is not. These messages, created by Synthesia, were presumably generated with his consent. An Indian politician had previously used a similar idea to create deepfake videos of his own political speeches in 20 languages using his own voice, enabling him to share his political message more effectively.</p> +<p>As this report focuses on Russian enrichment services, Russian presence across the rest of the fuel cycle, including in uranium conversion and reprocessing services, is not discussed at length. However, it is worth noting that weaning utilities in Western and partner countries off dependencies on Russian enriched uranium will only tackle one piece of the puzzle. Curtailing dependencies on Russia in Western countries’ nuclear energy supply chains will require investment in non-Russian capacity in other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, too, with conversion services being a particular chokepoint.</p> -<p>Will the lure of deepfakes, whether beneficial or malign, prove irresistible to democratic governments? If the past is a guide, the answer seems to be a resounding yes. Photoshop and similar tools have long allowed the easy editing of images, and deepfakes bring this phenomenon to a new level. September 2022 saw reports of the U.S. military using fake Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram accounts to promote a pro-Western message in Central Asia and the Middle East. In February 2023, leaked documents revealed the U.S. military may be actively seeking to run covert overseas influence campaigns that use deepfakes to “generate messages and influence operations via non-traditional channels.”</p> +<h4 id="rosatom-and-the-war-in-ukraine">Rosatom and the War in Ukraine</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Will the lure of deepfakes, whether beneficial or malign, prove irresistible to democratic governments? If the past is a guide, the answer seems to be a resounding yes.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear state enterprise, is responsible – through its many subsidiaries – for the development and export of Russian nuclear energy-related technology, services and materials. However, the company has also been reported as being connected with Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, and is headed up by some of the most senior people in Russia’s political and security circles. The company’s supervisory board is chaired by Sergey Kirienko, former prime minister of Russia and currently first deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Kirienko has admitted to orchestrating Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s occupied territories. According to Rosatom’s webpage, its board also includes: Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev; Assistant to the President of Russia Larissa Brychyova; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry Denis Manturov; First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Sergey Korolev; Deputy Prime Minister (and former Minister of Energy) Alexander Novak; Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev; Assistant to the President Maxim Oreshkin; and former Russian Ambassador to the US and currently Advisor to the President Yuri Ushakov. All members of the Rosatom supervisory board, with the exception of Ushakov, have been sanctioned by either the UK, the US or both. At the time of writing, there are no sanctions on Rosatom nor its leadership from the EU.</p> -<p>It will not be long before major democracies, including the United States, start or at least consider using deepfakes to achieve their ends, if they have not already done so. This paper examines hypothetical cases in which deepfakes might be used and argues that deepfakes should not be used without a clearly articulated set of guardrails that consider both the benefits and the risks of a proposed government-run deepfake-enabled operation.</p> +<p>The company has reportedly offered to provide technology for the Russian military, and Rosatom staff were allegedly present at the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone following the Russian occupation of the site in February 2022. The company has also been reported as playing an important role in Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear power plant (NPP) in Europe, which was attacked and occupied by the Russian military on 4 March 2022. Following the occupation, Rosatom was reported as having taken over management of the plant. In October 2022, the Joint Stock Company Operating Organisation of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (JSC ZNPP OO) was established and currently operates the ZNPP. Kirienko has also repeatedly visited the ZNPP since its occupation.</p> -<p>There is need for an unbiased evaluation of the trade-off between the short-term benefits and long-term risks of a hypothetical deepfake campaign by a democratic nation. Moreover, a transparent and publicly articulated process is required for performing such evaluations, even if the details of a specific deepfake or deepfake campaign are classified. To these ends, this paper focuses on answering two fundamental questions:</p> +<p>There have been media reports of torture and harassment of the ZNPP’s Ukrainian staff since the invasion. Staff that had not fled the fighting around the plant were reportedly forced to sign contracts with Rosatom. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly raised concerns over the safety and security of the ZNPP and the wellbeing of its staff, while US and European governments have condemned Russian behaviour at the plant. An apparent interest by Rosatom in the ZNPP’s Western-supplied fuel and related technology has also raised concerns of industrial espionage and the security of the nuclear material at the facility.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>What</strong> are the right questions to ask when a government agency contemplates using deepfakes to further its mission?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Who</strong> should be responsible for asking these questions and who should approve or reject a request to use a deepfake or perform a deepfake campaign? What processes and governance mechanisms should these people use when contemplating deepfake use in military and intelligence settings?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>TVEL, which operates Russia’s uranium enrichment plants, and TENEX, which supplies Russian enriched uranium abroad, are important members of the Rosatom family of companies. They are also closely related to JSC ZNPP OO, which is owned by JSC Rosenergoatom Concern (Rosenergoatom), the state enterprise responsible for the operation of Russia’s NPPs. TVEL, TENEX and Rosenergoatom are in turn owned by JSC Atomenergoprom (Atomenergoprom), the Russian state enterprise established “to consolidate the assets of the civilian part of the Russian nuclear industry” and which is a direct subsidiary of Rosatom. Figure 2 shows these relationships.</p> -<p>To answer these questions, this paper presents five hypothetical security-related scenarios a democratic government might confront. The authors conducted interviews with six leaders who have expert knowledge in both AI technology and national defense. These include a retired U.S. general, a retired U.S. intelligence agency chief, a leading EU think tank employee working in disinformation and technology, a senior tech company executive, a retired general from Asia, and a former senior lawyer at the White House and National Security Council (NSC). The authors engaged in a discussion with each of these experts on the what and who questions listed above. This report summarizes the authors’ methods and findings.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/X6TKBlo.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Ownership Structures of Rosatom Subsidiaries.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.rosenergoatom.ru/en/about-us/">Rosenergoatom, “About Us”</a>; <a href="https://atomenergoprom.ru/en/">Atomenergoprom</a>; <a href="https://www.tenex.ru/download/330/articles_of_association_of_tenex__joint_stock_company__revision_dated_march_27__2020_.pdf">Articles of Association of TENEX, Joint-Stock Company</a>; Russian Federal Tax Register documents sourced through <a href="https://sayari.com/">Sayari Analytics</a>; IBR EU Power Technologies LLC, Department of Nuclear Power Engineering and Nuclear Fuel Cycle, “Russian Uranium Enrichment Industry State and Prospects of Development”, 2023, pp. 22–24.</em></p> -<p>This paper argues democratic governments should consider several issues before they deploy deepfakes. First, how effective is the deepfake likely to be, especially if other methods are available? Second, will the deepfake be visible to a narrow audience (e.g., just the inner circle of a foreign terrorist organization) or a broad one (such as an entire country or the citizens in the government’s own country)? Third, could the deepfake harm innocent civilians, distorting their views on important issues? Fourth, does the proposed deepfake use comply with applicable international law? Fifth, is the deepfake portraying a truly prominent and influential person, such as a president or religious or social leader, or is it portraying a less important person? Sixth, is the deepfake part of a tit-for-tat process or to protect a country’s people from immediate harm, or is there a lesser goal? Finally, how likely is it that a deepfake will be traced back to the home country, with potentially profound repercussions for a government’s relationship with its own people? To answer these questions, the authors recommend a deepfake equities process that brings together a range of stakeholders to determine whether the deepfake should be used, with the initial presumption being that, in general, deepfakes should not be used.</p> +<h4 id="pursuit-for-continued-market-access">Pursuit for Continued Market Access</h4> -<h4 id="potential-risks-for-democratic-governments">Potential Risks for Democratic Governments</h4> +<p>Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Rosatom and its subsidiaries have continued to do business with customers around the world, including the sale of enriched uranium to Europe, the US and globally. Rosatom’s 2022 annual report noted a 14.9% increase from the previous year (2021) in revenue for the company’s fuel division, which includes enrichment services (but also encompasses conversion services and production of nuclear fuel for reactors). Rosatom has also made no revisions to its business strategy up to 2030, which was last revised in 2020 and expects to see an increase in Rosatom’s revenue to 4 trillion RUB. This suggests a certain level of confidence (or at least an effort to portray confidence) in continued demand, despite clearly countervailing winds in trade with Russia among Western countries.</p> -<p>A previous report by two of the authors on this topic details the potential uses of deepfakes in conflict settings as well as the costs and risks. Several risks are worth noting for democratic governments in particular. The loss of trust that the population of a democratic nation has in both offline and online media and news sources will be the first casualty, making it easier for adversaries to sow disinformation that divides a target population and for antigovernment domestic actors to use the deepfake to degrade public trust in the government. This loss of trust, in turn, may allow such adversaries to influence elections, reduce support for the target nation’s military and diplomatic activities, encourage riots and internal conflict, sway stock markets, and more. As democracies depend on open communication and informed voters, anything that interferes with these concepts — such as deepfakes — should be viewed with concern.</p> +<p>One likely reason for this apparent confidence is Rosatom’s determined pursuit of the development and sale of new products, as well as expansion into new markets, particularly as it relates to the construction of NPPs abroad. Yet, Rosatom’s continued engagement with some of its traditional customers may also offer the company alternative or indirect access into markets that may otherwise be trying to diversify away from Russian supplies. One strategy that Rosatom may be trying to employ in its enriched uranium business is displacement, increasing its deliveries of enriched uranium to countries that are still willing – or contractually obligated – to accept them and which may then be able to increase exports of their own enriched uranium to global markets. This has been suggested in a report by nuclear industry consultancy I BR EU Power Technologies LLC. The company was established in 1991 “by a group of researchers and engineers who had previously worked at the research centers of the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry and the Ministry’s headquarters”. The company’s latest report on the state and development of the Russian nuclear enrichment industry, published in October 2023, notes that, in examining data on enriched uranium exports from Russia in 2022, the report’s authors were able to draw “preliminary conclusions” about Rosatom’s introduction of a new strategy in response to decreased purchases of Russian enriched uranium by some foreign customers, as a result of the war in Ukraine. The report notes:</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As democracies depend on open communication and informed voters, anything that interferes with these concepts — such as deepfakes — should be viewed with concern.</code></em></strong></p> +<blockquote> + <p>The essence of this element can be formulated as follows – to increase the supply of EUP [enriched uranium product] to countries that have a fleet of their own nuclear power plants and a uranium enrichment industry, with the aim of using this EUP at local nuclear power plants, which will partially free up local uranium enrichment capacities from the production of EUP for local nuclear power plants and use freed-up capacity for the production of EUP for export.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>A second major long-term risk of the use of deepfakes is the loss of credibility of the government that uses them. Once a government can be credibly accused of using lies as an instrument of state policy, the value of any statements they make could be diminished for years, if not decades, at home as well as abroad.</p> +<p>The report singles out France and China in its analysis of a potential Russian displacement strategy, noting the significant increase of enriched uranium imports by these two countries in 2022, as compared to 2021, driven primarily by imports from Russia. The report’s authors point to a planned increase in enriched uranium exports from France to the US, as well as a 2026–31 contract for the provision of SWU by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to South Korea’s KHNP (Korea Hydro &amp; Nuclear Power), as potential vehicles for this strategy.</p> -<p>Third, adversaries may benefit from the “liar’s dividend,” wherein they can explain away real evidence of corruption or abuse by claiming the information is fake.</p> +<p>The data presented and analysed later in this report tries, in part, to test this displacement hypothesis. While this report is unable to definitively confirm using publicly available sources that displacement activity is occurring, at least in China’s case, shifts in trade patterns appear to be consistent with what one would expect to see if a displacement strategy was being introduced. Testing the possibility of displacement through France is even more challenging, considering the complexities of European nuclear fuel supply chains and the central role that France plays therein. Changes to French trade in enriched uranium could technically point to displacement, but – as in the case of China – there are other possible explanations for the shifts in trade patterns.</p> -<h3 id="methodology">Methodology</h3> +<p>The nuclear sector is not the only instance where Russia has been accused of resorting to a displacement strategy to compensate for the loss of certain markets in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. A similar tactic has been reported in relation to the oil sector. Media reporting has detailed increases in German imports of refined oil products from India in 2023 as compared to 2022, at the same time as India became a leading importer of Russian crude in 2022, thus apparently providing what has been called a “backdoor route” for Russian oil into European markets. Some have even suggested that some of the oil products shipped from India to European countries may include Russian material. If such activity is taking place to circumvent sanctions on Russian oil trade, it would not be inconceivable that a similar strategy may be applied in the nuclear sector, which has yet to be sanctioned to the same extent as the Russian petroleum sector.</p> -<p>The authors created five scenarios in which a democratic government may be tempted to intervene. These five scenarios were shared with six leaders in the national security sector from three regions: the United States, the European Union, and Asia. The leaders represented four types of stakeholders: intelligence, military, industry, and nongovernmental organizations with an interest in the topic.</p> +<p>The following sections of this report examine whether and how similar displacement, and other possible adaptation methods, may be playing out (or may play out in future) in Russian trade in enriched uranium and enrichment services. They also offer and test possible alternative explanations for the observed shifts in Russian enriched uranium trade patterns.</p> -<h4 id="election-scenario">Election Scenario</h4> +<h3 id="ii-case-study-china">II. Case Study: China</h3> -<p><em>Country X is rich in oil, minerals, and other natural resources and has a government that is not friendly to Western countries. The leader of Country X is an unsavory character responsible for human rights abuses and linked to international terrorist groups. In the aftermath of recent elections, Country X is experiencing political instability, with many protests and moderate and pro-Western leaders credibly contending the election was stolen from them. In the midst of ongoing instability, intelligence agencies propose to use deepfakes showing the leader of Country X thanking a Western diplomat for sending him money, receiving a payoff from a wealthy national of Country X, laughing at the deaths of citizens of Country X in protests, and ordering ballot boxes to be stuffed with fraudulent ballots. The intelligence agencies hope this will discredit him and contribute to his downfall.</em></p> +<p>Russia has been a long-time partner of the Chinese nuclear energy industry, having built numerous nuclear reactors in China, contributed to the development of China’s domestic enrichment capabilities, and served as a long-time supplier of enriched uranium and nuclear fuel to the country. Trade data made available by the Chinese government reveals a number of shifts in China’s enriched uranium trade patterns since 2022, including with regard to its imports of Russian material and exports to the US. While the trade data alone cannot definitively confirm the hypothesis put forward by IBR EU Power Technologies that displacement of enriched uranium is taking place through China backed by greater Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium, it does point to the possibility of such activity. As China may be seeking to carve out a greater role for itself in world enriched uranium markets, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium may facilitate the pursuit of Beijing’s ambitions.</p> -<p>This scenario is intended to address a common foreign policy challenge: an adversarial government that is also repressive to its own people. Such governments often threaten U.S. and allied interests and harm their own people, though rarely do they pose a grave threat.</p> +<p>Figures 3 and 4 show the value and weight of enriched uranium imports from Russia into China since 2015, respectively. After importing no enriched uranium from Russia in 2021 and 44 tonnes in 2020, Chinese enriched uranium imports from Russia rose to 685 tonnes ($492.6 million) in 2022. This was the highest level since 2011 (when Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium stood at 779 tonnes [$544 million]), as well as a 36% increase in volume from the next-highest yearly value – observed in 2019 (504 tonnes [$292 million]). The 2023 value of Russian imports of enriched uranium into China reached 467 tonnes ($418 million), a slight decrease from 2022 but still much higher than in many previous years.</p> -<h4 id="genocide-scenario">Genocide Scenario</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5l2YS5D.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Chinese Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (USD).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> -<p><em>Country Z is run by a small cabal whose leader (L1) is planning a genocide of a minority group that constitutes about 15 percent of the population. Unbeknownst to L1, his intelligence chief (L2) has had discussions with Western governments about the future of the country, including turning against his boss, possibly to save himself or to gain power. He wants your government’s help overthrowing the leader, preventing a genocide, and becoming the leader of a government that will be better and more closely aligned with Western principles. The time has come to overthrow L1. To do so, your country’s intelligence agency has generated deepfake videos of L1 boasting about the amount of money he has stolen from the treasury and stating that most members of the majority group are stupid and will have to follow him even though the minority group poses no threat. Western intelligence agencies hope that this deepfake will reduce L1’s support among the population of Country Z and enable L2 to gain enough momentum to take over and avert genocide.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KQIJVe5.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Chinese Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> -<p>This scenario is designed to test responses in one of the worst situations imaginable: the deliberate mass killing of civilians. Historically, the United States and other Western governments have not intervened effectively in such situations. Deepfakes offer one means of intervention that leaders might turn to in such a crisis.</p> +<h4 id="possible-stockpiling-and-domestic-demand">Possible Stockpiling and Domestic Demand</h4> -<h4 id="invasion-scenario">Invasion Scenario</h4> +<p>The relatively high volumes of Chinese imports of enriched uranium from Russia in the last two years could potentially be attributed to Chinese stockpiling efforts to meet nuclear fuel needs for its domestic fleet of reactors. This was the conclusion of a number of the experts interviewed for this report when shown trade data indicating an increase in the value of Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium. Indeed, in 2021, the chairperson of a China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation (CNEIC) subsidiary and a member of the National People’s Congress said that China should prioritise the expansion of the domestic strategic enriched uranium stockpile to limit the impact of enriched uranium price fluctuations, possible supply chain risks and other potential challenges.</p> -<p><em>Country R is mobilizing its military forces and preparing to invade a small neighbor. Western intelligence learns Country R is preparing deepfake videos that show that its neighbor’s troops fired first at Country R’s forces and that the small state’s leaders were planning to oppress ethnic citizens living in Country R. Your government considers releasing a fake video of Country R’s leader boasting about creating fake videos and how easily he can fool his own people into believing what he wants. The hope is that the fake video will preemptively discredit Country R’s fake videos and decrease the popularity of Country R’s leader.</em></p> +<p>China is a major nuclear energy power. As of December 2023, it was operating 55 nuclear reactors, with a further 22 under construction. Chinese SWU requirements are expected to rise significantly over the next decade. Chinese enrichment capacity is not reported publicly, but expert estimates seem to expect that China will increase its enrichment capacity to meet domestic demand. As these are simply estimates they may be subject to developments in opportunities to increase supply and inventories through additional imports. In its 2023 report “Global Inventories of Secondary Uranium Supplies” the IAEA estimates that China has also maintained a strategic enriched uranium stockpile since before 2010, which it believes may have increased by as much as 910 tonnes of enriched uranium product (tEUP) since then (the IAEA does not provide estimates of material stockpiled before 2010). The IAEA has observed that the strategic stockpile is intended for domestic consumption but notes that it may also be used to meet export demand, should China choose to increase its presence on international markets.</p> -<p>In this situation, the deepfake is being used in response to other fake videos — an attempt to fight fire with fire — in a situation involving potential war and human rights abuses.</p> +<h4 id="chinese-exports-of-enriched-uranium">Chinese Exports of Enriched Uranium</h4> -<h4 id="stock-market-scenario">Stock Market Scenario</h4> +<p>Historically, China has been a net importer of enriched uranium, exporting material only to Kazakhstan, the US, South Korea (until recently), and a small annual value ($100) to Austria, as well as nuclear fuel assemblies to Pakistan. However, it appears that China may be interested in becoming a greater supplier of enriched uranium to global markets. In October 2023, China reportedly completed its first export since 2014 of enriched uranium using imported feed material. In other words, for the first time in nearly a decade, China has provided enrichment services for a customer that had sourced the feed material elsewhere. Reports on this development noted that the resumption of trade in enrichment services (and the efforts that had gone into ensuring that the necessary regulatory and licensing frameworks are in place to allow this trade) are part of a CNEIC strategic policy of “going out, grabbing orders, and stabilizing growth” in the nuclear fuel trade, in light of the “historical window period” since the start of the “conflict between Russia and Ukraine” and its impact on international nuclear fuel demand and prices.</p> -<p><em>A criminal hacker group has released a deepfake video of a corporate billionaire saying his company’s latest research has not panned out and that such efforts are not likely to come to fruition for the next 5–10 years. The company stock crashes, along with related stocks, and the hackers reap huge rewards. The billionaire is politically connected, and he reaches out to his government (Western Country X), demanding it help prevent this foreign attack from destabilizing the market and ensure other companies (especially his) are safe. Desperate to stabilize the market and prevent contagion, Country X decides to release a deepfake video of a known critic of the company saying the report is false and the technology is sound.</em></p> +<p>The introduction of this option for enrichment-service-only trade, combined with the articulated policy to capture more of the global nuclear fuel market, supports assessments that China may be looking to play an increasingly larger role as a supplier of enriched uranium and enrichment services. Increased imports of Russian material could help China meet the expanded demand that will result from a combination of the expected growth in its domestic enriched uranium needs and any expected increase in exports. In 2022, China announced a number of long-term nuclear fuel contracts with US and EU utilities, although it is unclear what those contracts involved specifically, whether they include deliveries of Chinese enriched uranium and, if so, when these would commence.</p> -<p>To determine if government use of deepfakes is appropriate outside a traditional security context, this scenario explores a different situation: a private citizen and a company seeking assistance. In addition, the information in this deepfake is at least partially true.</p> +<p>The IBR EU Power Technologies report pointed to a 2026–31 CNEIC contract with KHNP as a potential vehicle for enriched uranium displacement through China.</p> -<h4 id="intellectual-property-theft-scenario">Intellectual Property Theft Scenario</h4> +<p>Should China be engaging in the displacement of enriched uranium, facilitated by the observed increases in imports of Russian material, one would expect to see an increase in Chinese exports of enriched uranium since 2022, as Russian supply freed up domestic capacity for export. While the 2022 value and volume of Chinese exports of enriched uranium (97 tonnes [$65 million]) remained more or less on a par with 2021 figures (95 tonnes [$64 million]) and well below the values and volumes of exports in previous years, the volume of Chinese exports in 2023 (368 tonnes [$445 million]) increased by 288% from 2021. The increase is less dramatic when compared to previous years but is still noteworthy. The increase in exports in 2023 was in large part due to a spike in Chinese exports of enriched uranium to the US, which amounted to 175 tonnes ($316 million) in 2023, following three years (2019–21) of no Chinese exports to the US appearing in Chinese or US government trade data, and 5% higher than the volume of all Chinese exports of enriched uranium to the US from 2015 to 2022 combined (see Figure 5). Trade data made available by the US government confirms the Chinese-reported export values, although US import data shows much higher volumes of material delivered in 2023 (293 tonnes) than those reported in Chinese export data (the reason for this discrepancy is not clear). Besides the US, China also exported enriched uranium to Kazakhstan in 2023, with the value of these exports also increasing significantly, nearly doubling from 2022 (97 tonnes [$65 million]) to 2023 (193 tonnes [$130 million]). The additional exports under HS code 284420 from China to Kazakhstan could be related to the fabrication of nuclear fuel for Chinese reactors at a nuclear fabrication facility in Kazakhstan. The plant is operated by a Kazakh-Chinese joint venture and made its first delivery of fuel assemblies to China in early 2023.</p> -<p><em>Company C is a world leader in the pharmaceutical industry. It invests massive amounts of money in the design of new drugs for a variety of diseases. Company C has been previously hacked and is fearful the designs for a new blockbuster drug will be stolen by adverse nation-states. It designs deepfake materials (text documents, images, videos, PowerPoints) that are close enough to the real design to appear highly credible, even to experts, but are flawed enough that the designs do not work. The idea is that an adversary who steals a fake design will execute the design and waste an immense amount of time and money developing a product that does not work.</em></p> +<p>An increase in Chinese exports of enriched uranium, even if coupled with an increase in enriched uranium imports from Russia, is not in itself sufficient to prove that displacement is occurring, as increased exports may also be the result of expanded domestic enrichment activity. The cyclical nature of trade in the nuclear energy sector and long contracting lead times for supply of enriched uranium for fuel manufacturing also mean that one cannot read too closely into variations in enriched uranium trade values. Furthermore, the volume of Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023 is significantly greater than the volume of 2023 Chinese exports to the US. This suggests that at least some of the material may be being used for the manufacturing of nuclear fuel inside China or being stockpiled – either to meet Chinese domestic demand or perhaps to support a future expansion of Chinese exports. In the absence of data on Chinese enriched uranium stockpiles, this is difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the scale of the increase in the volume and value of Chinese deliveries to the US in 2023 is noteworthy.</p> -<p>This last scenario explores another commercial use of deepfakes. In this case, the deepfake is defensive and may never be seen by anyone other than its creators.</p> +<p>The reason for these increases is not clear. However, trade records for 2023 Chinese deliveries of enriched uranium to the US sourced through corporate and trade data provider Sayari Analytics indicate that Global Nuclear Fuel Americas LLC and Westinghouse Electric Company, both manufacturers of nuclear fuel, received shipments of uranium hexafluoride from China in 2023. It is unclear whether the enriched uranium was ultimately used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel in the US, or who the ultimate recipient of any manufactured nuclear fuel may have been, including whether customers are domestic or foreign utilities. For instance, when asked about likely drivers for increased Chinese enriched uranium imports into the US, one expert interviewed for this report suggested that the increased imports of Chinese material into the US may be meant for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for Chinese reactors and therefore may be re-exported back to China.</p> -<h3 id="questions-to-ask-if-and-when-governments-contemplate-using-deepfakes">Questions to Ask If and When Governments Contemplate Using Deepfakes</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GfzMy87.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Chinese Exports to the US under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (USD).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> -<p>All the experts interviewed expressed deep concerns about governments using deepfakes. They were united in their view that deepfakes should be used only in limited settings and under authorization from appropriate authorities. However, there were differences in their opinions about when deepfakes should be used, which scenarios were appropriate, how they should be used, and who should authorize their use.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gSFX03b.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Chinese Exports to the US under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Chinese customs data made available by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> -<p>Drawing on the interviews, Figure 1 summarizes the key questions that should be asked when a government contemplates the use of a deepfake. These questions address (1) the likely efficacy of the deepfake, (2) its audience, (3) the potential harms, (4) the legal implications, (5) the nature of the target, (6) the goal of the deepfake, and (7) the traceability of the deepfake back to the originating democratic government.</p> +<h4 id="implications">Implications</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="1-efficacy">1. Efficacy</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The limited publicly available information on domestic Chinese enrichment activity and the opacity of China’s internal nuclear fuel supply chains make it challenging to ascertain whether the increase in the value of exports of enriched uranium to the US in 2023 has been backed by increases in enrichment activity at domestic Chinese facilities or is the result of displacement facilitated by increased imports of Russian material into China. However, the data reviewed here points to the possibility that displacement may be taking place.</p> -<p><em>What is the intended purpose of the deepfake? Will using the deepfake achieve the desired purpose? Are there other ways to achieve the intended goal that do not involve deception?</em></p> +<p>As the US seeks to diversify away from Russian uranium supply and curtail Rosatom revenues, to what extent might any such efforts be undermined by increased Russian access to the Chinese market and subsequent increases in deliveries of Chinese material to the US? Under US regulation that limits the amount of enriched uranium that can be imported into the country from Russia (“The Russian Suspension Agreement” [1992], discussed in greater detail in Chapter V), imports of enriched uranium “which can be shown to have resulted in the ultimate delivery or sale into the United States of displaced uranium products of any type, regardless of the sequence of the transactions” are considered a circumvention tactic. Importers of enriched uranium into the US are required to “submit at the time of entry a written statement certifying that the uranium being imported was not obtained under any arrangement, swap, or other exchange designed to circumvent the export limits for uranium of Russian Federation origin established by this Agreement”. A bill passed in the US House of Representatives in December 2023, which would prohibit the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US (but which has not yet passed the Senate or received presidential approval at the time of drafting), contains a similar anti-circumvention provision, prohibiting the import of “unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is determined to have been exchanged with, swapped for, or otherwise obtained in lieu of unirradiated low-enriched uranium [produced in the Russian Federation or by a Russian entity] in a manner designed to circumvent the restrictions under this section”.</p> -<p>Deepfakes may fail to achieve their goals or may make only a marginal difference. As an example, consider the election scenario. A senior intelligence official might believe that generating a deepfake of the unsavory leader will lead to his downfall. However, the reality might not be so simple. The leader may (correctly) argue the video is a deepfake created to tarnish his image. He might additionally invoke the specter of a U.S. or other foreign takeover of the country and argue that the deepfake is an attempt to grab control of the country’s mineral wealth, creating a nationalistic backlash against the United States in favor of the dictator.</p> +<p>It is not clear whether imports of enriched uranium from China into the US were accompanied by any such certification. Such a declaration would likely have been subject to processes governed by contractual confidentiality. Considering the complexity and commercial sensitivity inherent to nuclear fuel supply chains, definitively proving that any given import of enriched uranium into a given country is not the product of displacement using Russian enriched uranium is likely to be challenging. However, should such displacement be occurring, it would undermine US efforts to diversify away from Russian supply. While imports of enriched uranium from China into the US remain a minor share of all US imports of enriched uranium, the stark increase in the value of deliveries in 2023 should be examined more closely. US utilities and government would also do well to consider the risks of swapping dependencies on Russia for dependencies on China in its enriched uranium supply. China’s apparent interest in taking advantage of the shifts occurring in global nuclear supply chains suggests that China may be actively angling to replace Russia in the US’s nuclear energy supply chain, potentially using increased imports of Russian material.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WVlVrQK.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>Figure 1. Deepfake Use by Governments: The Questions to Consider</em></p> +<h3 id="iii-case-study-france">III. Case Study: France</h3> -<p>Or consider the genocide scenario, where the leader of Country Z is planning to kill many members of the country’s ethnic minority. In the long run, it may be wiser to disclose true evidence of the leader’s plans, as well as evidence pointing to prior acts of ethnic cleansing he might have carried out at a smaller scale. An influence campaign that puts out honest information, such as via the country’s cell phone network, might be less easily refutable by the leader.</p> +<p>France is regularly mentioned in media coverage and expert discussion of continued Western reliance on Russian enriched uranium. The French nuclear sector has a long history of partnership with Russia, with Rosatom entering the French market in the 1970s. The value and volume of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia rose notably in 2022 and has remained high in 2023, relative to pre-2022 levels. According to Eurostat data, in 2021, France imported 110 tonnes (€93 million) from Russia under HS code 28442035. In 2022, the volume of imports rose to 312 tonnes (€359 million), an increase of 184% from 2021. Eurostat data shows 223 tonnes in imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2023, a 103% increase in volume from 2021 but a decrease of 29% from 2022 imports. Comparable levels of imports from Russia into France were last seen in 2014, when France imported 399 tonnes (€398 million) of enriched uranium from Russia. It is worth noting that the value of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2023 actually increased from 2022, to €396 million, pointing to a discrepancy between changes in the value and weight of imports from Russia in 2023. The reason for this discrepancy was not clear. Figures 7 and 8 show the value and weight, respectively, of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia from 2015 to 2023.</p> -<p>However, there may be reasons to use a deepfake to make accurate but inaccessible acts more apparent. In the context of this scenario, a retired non-U.S. military leader argued,</p> +<p>Several explanations for the increase in French imports of Russian material are possible and are explored in this chapter. Based on a review of trade data, publicly available information on nuclear fuel supply chains in Europe and other public reporting, one likely explanation (although difficult to prove with certainty) is that the increased imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and continued relatively high levels in 2023 may be the result of the redistribution of Russian enriched uranium by some utilities across their supply chains – delivering more of their Russian-sourced material for fuel fabrication in France instead of to fabrication facilities in other countries that may be less willing to accept Russian supply. If true, this would mean that efforts to move away from Russian enriched uranium supply by some companies and governments may be being offset – at least in part – by greater imports of Russian enriched uranium into France. This chapter outlines these developments and tests a number of other possible explanations for the observed increases in French imports of Russian enriched uranium since 2022.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>If the deepfake is replicating something where it is difficult to get videos of actual facts and you make a video that is based on the truth to avoid something worse from happening, in those cases I would say it is justified as long as it is based on the truth.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kdTELAw.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: French Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (EUR).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Eurostat, “EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> -<p>The interviewee added,</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QH6aZfB.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: French Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Eurostat, “EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> -<blockquote> - <p>Anything based on falsity is not likely to be effective. If you base your narratives on the truth and use deepfakes to protect the truth, it will be effective. Otherwise, it will eventually be exposed and be ineffective and lead to loss of credibility.</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="overview-of-the-french-nuclear-energy-sector">Overview of the French Nuclear Energy Sector</h4> -<p>Thus, at least during times of extreme danger, interviewees expressed some support for the use of deepfakes when they are merely representations of the truth, even if the video is itself fake. But also consider that how to represent “the truth” may not be so straightforward, particularly in contentious situations.</p> +<p>France plays a significant role in European and global nuclear fuel supply chains. The country is not only a major producer and consumer of nuclear energy, but it also hosts conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing facilities. At the time of writing, France hosted 56 operational reactors with a total net electrical capacity of 61.37 GW(e), second only to the US on both metrics. Another reactor is expected to be connected to the grid in mid-2024. France’s nuclear reactor fleet is operated by Électricité de France SA (EDF), which is fully owned by the French state. France also performs uranium conversion at the Philippe Coste plant (an Orano facility), uranium enrichment at the Georges Besse II plant (also an Orano facility) and nuclear fuel fabrication at the Romans-sur-Isère plant (a Framatome facility). According to its webpage, Framatome is owned by EDF (80.5%) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (19.5%). Through its subsidiary companies, Framatome also operates nuclear fuel fabrication plants at Lingen, Germany (Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH) and in Richland, Washington (Framatome, Inc.). Fuel manufactured at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère facility serves both the French domestic fleet of reactors and nuclear utilities and research reactors abroad. French reactors are also loaded with fuel manufactured at the fuel fabrication plant at Västerås, Sweden (owned by a subsidiary of US company Westinghouse Electric), at a plant in Juzbado, Spain (owned by Spanish company Enusa; Westinghouse manufactures EDF fuel at the facility), and at the Westinghouse-operated facility at Springfields, UK. Components of fuel assemblies destined for French reactors may also be manufactured at Framatome’s facility in Lingen. Figure 9 shows a simplified summary of the locations of uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in Europe and the UK.</p> -<p>In the intellectual property (IP) theft scenario, the deepfake is intended to have an effect only after a criminal act is performed (i.e., the theft of the IP). Only after the criminal act happens does the deepfake impose costs on the IP thief. Such costs include inducing delays in the IP thieves’ projects, inducing additional uncertainty in the thieves’ minds about whether the stolen material is real or fake, and frustrating adversaries. Also, there is less risk of the deepfake reaching a broader audience that then accepts it as true. All but one interviewee was enthusiastic about the use of deepfakes in this scenario.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mWbApMI.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Locations of European and UK Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities.</strong> Source: Generated based on data from various sources.</em></p> -<p>In the case of the stock market scenario, a former senior White House official stated the critic portrayed in the deepfake would “immediately jump up and deny” they ever made the statement. Such a quick and emphatic denial might blunt any desired outcome of the deepfake and could cause volatility that makes the situation worse, further undermining the credibility of those who endorse the deepfake.</p> +<p>As such, enriched uranium may theoretically be imported into France for the following purposes:</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="2-audience">2. Audience</h4> -</blockquote> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Production of nuclear fuel in France (at the Romans-sur-Isère facility) for the French reactor fleet.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Production of nuclear fuel in France (at the Romans-sur-Isère facility) for export to utilities abroad.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Further shipment of the enriched uranium from France to Germany, Sweden, the UK or Spain (via other countries for deconversion) to be used in the production of nuclear fuel for the French reactor fleet.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Further shipment of the enriched uranium from France to Germany, Sweden, the UK or Spain (via other countries for deconversion) to be used in the production of nuclear fuel for export to utilities abroad.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><em>Who is the target audience for the deepfake? Is it a domestic audience? A highly focused audience? Or is the deepfake expected to reach a large number of people?</em></p> +<p>An increase in French imports of Russian enriched uranium could therefore be explained by an increase in demand for enriched uranium generally, or for Russian material specifically, for one or several of these purposes.</p> -<p>A key question when contemplating the use of a deepfake is whether it can be disseminated so that only a small, focused group of people end up seeing it. Multiple experts pointed out that once a deepfake is in the public domain, it may spread rapidly and uncontrollably. One retired U.S. military officer said, “The idea that you will produce some deepfake material and then it will only play in the specific context for the specific audience is really difficult. You can’t control it.”</p> +<h4 id="possible-stockpiling-in-france">Possible Stockpiling in France</h4> -<p>However, for example, if an intelligence agency were to generate a deepfake of two senior Russian security officials, such as Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) chief Sergey Naryshkin and General Valery Gerasimov, discussing something potentially treasonous and then strategically leak it to Russian president Vladimir Putin, the audience for such a deepfake would be very small. The deepfake would not deceive the entire Russian population or other large audiences. In this regard, a former senior White House attorney said, “Deepfakes should not leak into the bloodstream of the internet. . . . [If there are going to be] lots of eyeballs on a deepfake, don’t go there.”</p> +<p>One possible explanation for the increased French imports of Russian enriched uranium, and the initial suspicion of a number of the experts consulted for this report, is that French utilities and fuel manufacturing facilities have been in a rush to stockpile Russian material for future use, in advance of possible future bans on enriched uranium imports from Russia. Such stockpiling would help to ensure that sufficient inventories are in place to meet long-term domestic French needs as well as future demand of foreign customers.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A key question when contemplating the use of a deepfake is whether it can be disseminated so that only a small, focused group of people end up seeing it.</code></em></strong>_</p> +<p>To test this hypothesis, an assessment of changes in French enriched uranium stockpiles is needed. Information on France’s annual national inventories of enriched uranium is made available in reports by France’s national agency for radioactive waste management (Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs, ANDRA). At the time of writing, ANDRA has not made available information on 2022 or 2023 stockpiles. Its estimates of French enriched uranium stocks up to 2040 predict relatively consistent inventory levels over this time period, although it notes that the estimates are based on historical trends and do not represent (or reflect) an industrial strategy. The financial reports of EDF and Framatome indicate a drop in the monetary value of their holdings of nuclear fuel between 2021 and 2022, while Orano reported a slight increase in the value of its “inventories and in-process” material from 2021 to 2022 (of €15 million). However, these figures are not an ideal point of analysis, as they include materials other than enriched uranium and are expressed in terms of monetary value (which can fluctuate) instead of volume. The data also does not offer any insights on where any enriched uranium in the inventories may have come from.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, it is difficult to anticipate the size of the audience affected by a deepfake. In the above example, only a few people might initially view the deepfake, but if they act on this “intelligence,” believing it to be true, they might take actions that affect millions of people. One interviewee expressed concern that even if such use of a deepfake were successful, the truth might leak months or years into the future. For example, a prominent news outlet such as the New York Times might write a piece titled “How the Biden Administration Fooled Putin” six or twelve months after the deepfake was used. Such a story might severely compromise real evidence the United States offers in future national security situations. Given that clandestine U.S. operations and collection methods regularly leak, it is plausible, even likely, that reports of deepfake use would leak too. In addition, as deepfake detection technology improves, a deepfake used today might be uncovered in the future.</p> +<p>In comments made to the press in response to questions about the increase of imports into France of Russian enriched uranium, an EDF representative noted that the company has not increased its dependence on Russian enriched uranium and is purchasing as per “the contractual minimums with its Russian partners”. This suggests that the French utility is not maxing out its contractual options in an effort to import as much Russian material as possible in advance of a potential ban. In the case of Orano, considering that the company is itself a provider of uranium enrichment services, it is unlikely, although technically possible, that the company is importing and stockpiling large volumes of Russian enriched uranium.</p> -<p>All interviewees agreed that governments should not try to use deepfakes to influence their own population. As a retired non-U.S. official at the level of general stated, “If we are using cognitive means against anybody, you should not misinfluence your own population.”</p> +<p>It is worth noting that ANDRA does not capture enriched uranium inventories held in France by non-French utilities. As such, it is possible that some non-French utilities are importing and maintaining stocks of Russian material in France. Swiss utilities, for instance, have been known to hold natural and enriched uranium stocks in Germany, France, Sweden and the UK. Testing this hypothesis would likely require access to commercially sensitive information. One could also compare the sum of EDF’s imports and Orano-produced enriched uranium against the sum of domestic uranium consumption and total enriched uranium and fabricated fuel exports, to determine the overall stocks of enriched uranium in the country, including any changes in stocks that may belong to foreign utilities. Such an assessment was not undertaken as part of the analysis for this report. Data on uranium inventories across Europe made available by the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) shows a decrease in overall inventories from 2021 to 2022, however the figure is an aggregate of total stocks across Europe and captures uranium at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle (not just enriched uranium). As mentioned earlier, the monetary value of nuclear fuel held by Framatome did not increase in 2022, also suggesting that significant stockpiling, even for fabrication of fuel for foreign customers, is likely not happening.</p> -<p>However, there was some support for using deepfakes generated in a foreign language, making it unlikely the majority of the U.S. population would understand the content of the deepfake, though the use of subtitles or automated translation tools could easily change this. Further, the images themselves might be easily understood even without audio translation. One corporate leader with deep expertise in AI said, “Is there a risk to the domestic population if a deepfake used in a foreign country uses a foreign language? Yes, and [it] still needs guardrails if it gets to the U.S.”</p> +<p>As such, based on publicly available data, there is no obvious indication that significant stockpiling of enriched uranium is taking place in France. However, there is also insufficient data to definitively discount the possibility that the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium into France is due to a major stockpiling drive. Details on 2022 and 2023 uranium inventories in future ANDRA reporting, or future IAEA reports on French enriched uranium inventories, will provide a clearer picture of how French stocks of enriched uranium may have changed and whether these changes are reflective of the significant increase in imports from Russia.</p> -<p>If a government deploys a deepfake overseas, even in a foreign language, is there still a risk it will affect the domestic population? If a deepfake directed at an overseas population emphasizes rising crime in that country or other social problems, it might influence travel blogs, social media commentary, or other information that would affect whether Americans travel to a part of the world. It might even influence U.S. immigration policy and attitudes toward the country in question.</p> +<h4 id="possible-shifts-in-domestic-demand">Possible Shifts in Domestic Demand</h4> -<p>Another important question to consider is, Who are the possible beneficiaries of the deepfake’s use? The country’s citizens as a whole? A specific individual, company, or industrial sector? In the case of the stock market scenario, the direct beneficiaries are limited. All interview subjects were united in the view that the government should not be in the business of helping individuals or private corporations foster lies to the population, even if the request for help comes due to an attack by a foreign state. In the stock market scenario, the billionaire could, as a citizen, ask the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (or the equivalent for other democratic governments) for help in investigating the origins and perpetrators of the deepfake that targeted him rather than ask the government to run deepfakes to correct the market, which would deceive the American people and others.</p> +<p>An increase in France’s domestic demand for enriched uranium to respond to greater domestic nuclear energy production could also technically explain the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023. However, this explanation does not appear very likely. Based on WNA projections of France’s enriched uranium production and needs through 2040, it appears that the country has sufficient domestic uranium enrichment capacity to cover its domestic needs. The WNA estimates that France’s enriched uranium needs up to 2040 will not rise significantly, reaching a peak of 6,986 thousand SWU in 2023 and fluctuating below that number in the subsequent 17 years. This indicates about a 4.7% increase from the 2022 demand of 6,639 thousand SWU, hardly justifying the 184% increase in the volume of imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and the continued relatively high volume of imports in 2023. Of course, the projections for French demand do not account for the enriched uranium that will be needed by French fuel fabricators to fulfil their contracts with foreign customers, which is likely to be significant.</p> + +<p>There are other indicators that French domestic demand for Russian material specifically has not increased. Based on public reporting and statements by French authorities and EDF, it appears that only a limited amount of Russian enriched uranium is actually used in France’s energy generation. In its 2022 “Universal Registration Document”, EDF notes that it “has a limited dependence on imports of Russian uranium, considering existing inventories and diversified and long-term supply contracts”. As mentioned earlier, EDF representatives have also stated to the media that the company “has not increased its share of enrichment of its natural uranium carried out in Russia in 2022 compared to 2021, in accordance with ‘the contractual minimums with its Russian partners’” and that uranium enriched in Russia “represents a very small part of its enrichment activities”.</p> + +<p>Spikes can also sometimes be seen in trade data for enriched uranium corresponding to reactor refuelling cycles, which usually see a quarter to a third of the assemblies in a reactor core replaced every 12, 18 or 24 months. In other words, deliveries of enriched uranium to fabrication facilities (like the one at Romans-sur-Isère) might spike at predictable intervals (for instance, every other year) to account for the fabrication of new fuel assemblies in advance of a reactor reload. It is technically possible that the refuelling cycles of a number of facilities that use the Romans-sur-Isère plant aligned. However, the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium to France in 2022, and continued high levels of imports in 2023, do not match any observable pattern of regular increases in preceding years. Furthermore, the high levels of Russian imports into France (relative to pre-2022 values) have persisted for two consecutive years.</p> + +<h4 id="possible-reallocation-of-russian-enriched-uranium-across-european-supply-chains">Possible Reallocation of Russian Enriched Uranium Across European Supply Chains</h4> + +<p>An April 2023 news report for Le Monde provides additional indication as to possible drivers for the increase in French imports of Russian enriched material in 2022. The article notes:</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="3-harms">3. Harms</h4> + <p>When questioned, EDF said that its imports of Russian-enriched uranium have remained at the same level between 2021 and 2022. But it added that it has made more use of French factories for the manufacture of fuel assemblies, which would partly explain the difference. In other words, in previous years, some of the enriched uranium imported did not arrive in France but at plants in Sweden or the UK and was therefore not accounted for in the same way by customs.</p> </blockquote> -<p><em>Who might be harmed by the deepfake? What is the probability the deepfake will harm innocent civilians?</em></p> +<p>In its 2022 annual report, EDF noted that it sources its enriched uranium from Orano, Urenco and TENEX. Based on the above comments, it appears that EDF may be reallocating its supply of Russian enriched uranium from Sweden (which hosts a fuel fabrication facility at Västerås, operated by Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB) and/or the UK (which hosts a fuel fabrication facility at Springfields, operated by Westinghouse Springfields Fuels Ltd) to France, for fabrication of nuclear fuel at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère plant. This would mean that, as some European countries are trying to diversify away from Russian enriched uranium, France may be offering an alternative entry point for Rosatom to the European nuclear fuel market.</p> -<p>All subjects interviewed were deeply concerned a deepfake might harm innocent civilians. According to one interview subject, “There should be no unintended harm to civilians.”</p> +<p>On the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Swedish energy giant Vattenfall announced that it would no longer be accepting deliveries of Russian nuclear fuel, until further notice. As it eventually became clear, that would also include all Russian enriched uranium. In April 2022, Sweden’s other utility also announced that it was pausing deliveries of enriched uranium from TENEX. While there is currently no ban on imports of Russian material into Sweden at a national level, trade data made available by the Swedish government shows a complete stop of imports of enriched uranium from Russia into Sweden as of 2022.</p> -<p>In the election, genocide, and invasion scenarios, the goal of the deepfake is to destabilize an abhorrent leader. The main people likely to be directly harmed are the despicable leader and the leader’s close supporters. However, if the deepfake leads to civil unrest (e.g., if people rise up against the leader), then protesters may be injured or killed. Then the leader might simply be replaced by another leader with similar or more extreme goals. The use of the deepfake might lead to the deaths of innocent civilians but not avert the threat.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uplqt0F.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Swedish Imports under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (SEK).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Imports of Goods from Country of Consignment. Not Adjusted for Non Response, SEK thousand by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> -<p>A shared goal in the election, genocide, and invasion scenarios is to discredit or destabilize the leader. But what if the leader escalates the scenario out of fear, paranoia, perceived self-defense, or something else and cracks down on the population, a neighboring country, or the country perpetrating the deepfake? It is difficult to predict how an adversary would respond to the deepfake, and some responses could foster tremendous harm.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jpnRLnI.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Swedish Imports under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Imports of Goods from Country of Consignment. Not Adjusted for Non Response, Metric Ton by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> -<p>Additionally, in the case of the IP theft scenario, harms may occur to innocent people. For instance, suppose a Chinese entity steals the design documents for a hypersonic missile from a U.S. company, and suppose that company had generated 99 fake versions of that design document by using a large language model or a system specifically focused on generating believable fake technical documents to deter IP theft. Further, suppose the entity responsible for the theft has analyzed all 100 versions of the document (1 real, 99 fake) and decided a specific version (v) is the real one. The assessment that v is real is incorrect (i.e., the deception by the victim company was successful). The IP thief executes on the design, but during testing, the missile blows up, killing six employees of the Chinese entity. In this case, the victim of the IP theft might argue it is not responsible as the deadly outcome was a direct consequence of a criminal act perpetrated by the Chinese entity and, hence, the Chinese entity should be held responsible for its misdeeds. All but one of the interviewees accepted this argument.</p> +<p>This is significant not only for Sweden’s own nuclear energy sector but also for nuclear energy production across Europe, as the nuclear fuel production facility at V ästerås manufactures fuel for Vattenfall and reactors across Europe. The Västerås facility also has the capability to produce fuel for Soviet and Russian-built VVER-type reactors (водо-водяной энергетический реактор [vodo-vodyanoi enyergeticheskiy reactor]), offering an alternative supply of VVER fuel for countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, which have historically relied on Rosatom subsidiary TVEL for their supply. Västerås-manufactured VVER fuel has already been supplied to Ukrainian reactors and deliveries are planned for reactors in Bulgaria in 2024.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="4-legal">4. Legal</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The cessation of imports of enriched uranium from Russia to Sweden after 2022 indicates that all the utilities using the Västerås facility for their fuel manufacturing, and which may have previously relied on Russian enriched uranium supply, have found alternative enriched uranium suppliers for the manufacture of their fuel at Västerås. In 2022 and 2023, the value of imports of enriched uranium into Sweden increased from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, suggesting an uptick in deliveries from Orano (France) and Urenco (the UK, the Netherlands and Germany). The German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (Bundesamt für die Sicherheit der nuklearen Entsorgung, BASE) has also issued a permit for the transport to Västerås through German territory of uranium hexafluoride from enrichment facilities in France (Orano), the Netherlands (Urenco) and Germany (Urenco), with regular transport activity recorded throughout 2023. At the time of writing, no such permit has been reported by the German authorities for the transport of enriched uranium to Västerås from TENEX, although it is unclear when the last permit for such transit expired.</p> -<p><em>Will the contemplated use of a deepfake under the circumstances violate international law?</em></p> +<p>Supply of enriched uranium is normally secured by utilities under long-term contracts, meaning that utilities still obligated to source enriched uranium from Russia but suddenly unable to send it to Sweden will have needed to deliver it to fuel fabrication facilities in countries still willing to accept Russian material. According to Eurostat data, since February 2022 France and Germany are the only European countries that have continued to import enriched uranium from Russia, although the latter at much lower volumes than before 2022. Both host nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. At least some imports of Russian-origin material also appear to have been delivered to Spain in 2022; a fuel fabrication facility is located at Juzbado, owned by Enusa.</p> -<p>International law has a role to play when states use deepfakes in their interactions with other states. But how international law regulates cyberspace generally, much less deepfakes specifically, lacks clarity. States, experts, and scholars have debated for more than a decade how international law applies to activities in cyberspace. While areas of agreement have emerged, several published positions reveal the many divisions and uncertainties.</p> +<p>At the time of writing, the webpage of the Västerås fabrication plant noted that, alongside Ukraine, France is its biggest customer. This is also borne out in trade data, which shows France as the primary destination for Swedish nuclear fuel exports (See Figure 13). It is unclear from publicly available sources how much, if any, of EDF’s TENEX-sourced supply had historically been sent to Sweden, but the complete cessation of Russian enriched uranium imports into Sweden suggests that all of EDF’s TENEX-supplied material is now being delivered to one of the other fuel fabrication facilities the company uses. Other utilities that have used the Västerås facility – Swedish, Ukrainian, German and Finnish companies – had also historically relied on the Russian supply of enriched uranium, some of which may have been delivered to Västerås prior to 2022.</p> -<p>Determining how international law applies to deepfakes raises new issues beyond those that scholars focus on when analyzing cyberattacks. Peter B. M. J. Pijpers, when analyzing influence operations, describes cyberspace as consisting of three dimensions: physical, virtual, and cognitive. International law, like most law, focuses on the physical world. For example, if foreign actors enter another state and surreptitiously destroy election ballots before they are counted, this would be a clear violation of the state’s sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention. With the advent of the internet, however, a state can affect activities in another state through a virtual dimension without entering another state’s physical world. These virtual activities can result in direct physical impacts — for example, hacking that causes the destruction of computers and other physical devices. These virtual activities can also cause virtual damage, such as manipulating voting tallies on a machine or in a database, which might be considered analogous to physical effects when analyzed under traditional international law.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LpOdP8B.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Swedish Exports under HS Code 84013000, 2015–23 (SEK).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Exports of Goods to Country of Destination. Not Adjusted for Non Response, SEK Thousand by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS Code 84013000).</em></p> -<p>Deepfakes, which are deployed in the virtual dimension but are focused on having an impact in the cognitive dimension of cyberspace, present new challenges for international law. Given the recent emergence of deepfakes, it is not surprising that the body of literature on this topic is small. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, the authors can outline at a high level the principles and rules most likely to apply and that states should consider when deepfakes are used in the national security context.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3T73YHa.png" alt="image13" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: Swedish Exports Under HS Code 84013000, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Exports of Goods to Country of Destination. Not Adjusted for Non Response, Metric Ton by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS Code 84013000).</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Deepfakes, which are deployed in the virtual dimension but are focused on having an impact in the cognitive dimension of cyberspace, present new challenges for international law.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Fuel for French reactors is also manufactured at the nuclear fuel manufacturing facility at Springfields (UK), operated by a subsidiary of Westinghouse. Eurostat data shows imports under HS code 840130 – which captures nuclear fuel assemblies (but may also include components thereof) – from the UK into France from 2021 onwards, including 49 tonnes of imports in 2022 and 74 tonnes in 2023. It is unclear whether Russian enriched uranium is or has in the past been used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel for French reactors at the facility. As neither Russia nor the UK publicly report their trade in enriched uranium, any deliveries of Russian enriched material to the UK, or changes in any such trade, cannot be tracked through a review of trade data. However, in July 2022, the UK introduced a 35% tariff on goods under HS code 2844 (“Radioactive chemical elements and radioactive isotopes (including the fissile or fertile chemical elements and isotopes) and their compounds; mixtures and residues containing these products”) imported into the UK from Russia, which includes enriched uranium. As such, while deliveries of Russian enriched uranium into the UK are still permitted and may therefore be taking place, the introduction of the 35% tariff makes it unlikely that such imports have continued since July 2022. This means that EDF’s supply of Russian enriched uranium is now likely being sent to one of two facilities – the Enusa facility in Juzbado (Spain) or the Framatome facility at Romans-sur-Isère (France).</p> -<p>Before analyzing the hypotheticals presented, it is important to recognize that a state’s use of deepfakes will involve far more than simply creating the deepfake. For example, states will have specific goals, and consideration of the context will play an important role in the legal analysis. States will also decide how to deploy the deepfake or campaign of deepfakes using specific social media channels or other methods of publishing and disseminating content. States might hack social media accounts, news organizations, or other organizations, including in the targeted state, to disseminate content. Or states might deploy individuals in the targeted state to carry out these or related activities. These examples illustrate some of the context that should be considered when a state uses deepfakes. Considering the context will greatly inform the analysis of whether the activities related to a state’s use of deepfakes complies with applicable international law.</p> +<p>A reallocation of Russian material by EDF from other facilities – Västerås or Springfields – to France would explain, at least in part, the increase in 2022 of imports of Russian enriched uranium into the country. It also aligns with statements by EDF that the company “has made more use of French factories for the manufacture of fuel assemblies” in 2022 than in past years and that it has not increased its overall reliance on Russian enriched uranium. However, any such reallocation is difficult to confirm from publicly available information, as supply contracts tend to be commercially sensitive.</p> -<p>To begin, it will be useful for states to consider whether the use of deepfakes involves use of force, the threat of force, intervention in the domestic affairs of another state, or violation of the sovereignty of another state. When engaged in armed conflict, states cannot engage in perfidy, which applies to “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.” Michael N. Schmitt in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, a compilation of expert views on the application of international law to cyber operations, provides an example of perfidy: “Consider the case of a perfidious email inviting the enemy to a meeting with a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, but which is actually intended to lead enemy forces into an ambush.”</p> +<p>In its 2022 annual report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France, the nuclear safety authority (Autorité de s ûreté nucléaire, ASN) reported an increase compared with 2021 in the amount of TENEX-supplied enriched uranium processed at the Romans-sur-Isère facility, from 21 to 40 tonnes. However, compared to Orano- and Urenco-supplied product processed by the facility in 2022 (564 tonnes and 142 tonnes, respectively), the 19-tonne increase in TENEX-supplied enriched uranium processed at Romans-sur-Isère in 2022 is not significant in terms of volume and certainly does not fully account for the increase of Russian enriched uranium into France. The ANS report refers to enriched uranium “processed” (not necessarily “delivered”) at the facility in a given year, meaning that it is possible that any additional deliveries of Russian material to the facility made in 2022 may not actually be processed until 2023 or later. Alternatively, the additional TENEX material processed may have been drawn from existing stocks, not new deliveries.</p> -<p>Contrast perfidy with a “ruse” of war, which is not prohibited. According to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I), ruses are acts that are “intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law.” Protocol I provides traditional examples of ruses such as “use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.” The Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides several examples of ruses, including simulating nonexistent forces, transmitting false information showing operations beginning, feigned cyberattacks, bogus orders purportedly issued by the enemy, and transmitting false intelligence information intended for interception.</p> +<p>Exports under HS code 840130 from Sweden and the UK to France continued in 2022 and 2023, albeit at lower volumes than pre-2022 in the case of exports from Sweden. If, as per EDF’s comments in Le Monde, less of the company’s Russian supply of enriched uranium is being delivered to fuel fabrication facilities abroad, that material may have been replaced by deliveries to those facilities of non-Russian material from elsewhere in EDF’s supply chain. The value of French exports of enriched uranium to Sweden increased from 40 tonnes in 2021 to 120 tonnes in 2022 and to 153 tonnes in 2023. French exports of enriched uranium to the UK have decreased, from 167 tonnes in 2021 to 129 tonnes in 2022 and 90 tonnes in 2023. US imports of enriched uranium from France increased from 121 tonnes in 2021 to 327 tonnes in 2023. However, at least some of the additional exports of enriched uranium from France are very likely the result of deliveries for non-French utilities under new contracts with enrichment services provider Orano as countries seek to diversify away from Rosatom supply. For instance, Sweden’s utility Vattenfall, which previously received enriched uranium from Russia, is now sourcing its supply from Orano in France and Urenco in the UK. US-based broker of enrichment services Centrus Energy Corp. (Centrus) also started taking deliveries of enriched uranium from Orano in 2023 under a contract that was concluded in 2018.</p> -<p>According to Protocol I, states must also consider that “in the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.” The Tallinn Manual 2.0 states, “The term ‘spare’ refers to the broad general duty to ‘respect’ the civilian population, that is, to consider deleterious effects of military operations on civilians.”</p> +<p>In its comments to Le Monde, EDF also highlighted that it is not the only importer of uranium into France, and the news article points out that part of a delivery of Russian enriched uranium to Dunkirk in November 2022 belonged to Framatome, which operates the Romans-sur-Isère facility and manufactures fuel for a number of other European utilities at fabrication facilities in France and Germany. It is unclear whether that particular shipment remained in France or was transported onwards to Germany. As such, the increase of Russian enriched uranium deliveries to the site may be for the fabrication of nuclear fuel for other reactors, not just the French fleet. The 2021 and 2022 ANS reports record deliveries of nuclear fuel assemblies from Romans-sur-Isère to Switzerland, Belgium and China. The plant also produces nuclear fuel assemblies for South Africa. Theoretically, the additional imports into France of Russian enriched uranium could have been for integration into fuel assemblies for some of these customers. As of April 2022, Swiss energy utility Axpo was reported as having considerable dependencies on Russian uranium and stated that it would honour its existing contracts but not sign new ones. It is unclear from the report whether the dependency was in relation to mined or enriched uranium and when the existing contracts expire. China is also a well-established consumer of Russian enriched uranium and, as discussed in Chapter II, ramped up its own imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and 2023. Synatom, which provides enriched uranium to Belgium’s nuclear power plants, was reported in early 2022 to be relying on Russian uranium supply, although the report seems to have been referencing mined uranium and not enrichment services. While Belgium’s supply contract with Rosatom is no longer active, it reportedly took its last delivery of enriched uranium from Rosatom in May 2022. It is unclear which fabrication facility took delivery of this material.</p> -<p>To determine the propriety of using deepfakes, a state may have considered the prior activities of the target state, which may have precipitated a response. For example, proportional countermeasures may be appropriate even when not engaged in armed conflict.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="russian-enriched-uranium-deliveries-to-spain"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russian Enriched Uranium Deliveries to Spain</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Outside of armed conflict settings, the principle of sovereignty prohibits acts that “interfere with, or usurp, an inherently governmental act or cause such effects on the territory.” Protected governmental acts include elections, crisis management, and national security. The following analysis of the scenarios begins with sovereignty as it “is a foundational principle of international law.”</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Besides Springfields, Västerås and Romans-sur-Isère, the nuclear fuel fabrication plant at Juzbado in Spain is the other facility that fabricates nuclear fuel for EDF. The facility also produces nuclear fuel for reactors in Spanish, Belgian, Swedish and Finnish reactors and has taken delivery of Russian enriched uranium since February 2022. It is technically possible that Russian enriched material delivered to Juzbado (if such deliveries have continued) may be used for fuel fabrication for a number of European utilities. Swedish and Finnish policies of diversification away from Russian supply mean that any deliveries of Russian enriched uranium to Juzbado would likely only be for the production of fuel for Spanish, Belgian or French reactors.</code></em></p> -<p>International law scholars generally do not view cyber espionage as a violation of sovereignty, and some contend this even when such activities take place within another state’s territory or cause territorial effects. Eric Talbot Jensen writes that these scholars “for instance . . . are of the view that remote cyber activities that violate domestic law on espionage would not, in themselves, violate international law.” Some states argue that sovereignty is not a rule but a foundational principle on which the use-of-force and nonintervention principles are based, meaning that noncoercive cyber operations and deepfakes would not violate international law.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Tracking shifts in the flow of enriched uranium into Spain is challenging. As Spain does not have a domestic deconversion capacity, enriched uranium destined for Juzbado undergoes deconversion abroad before being delivered to Spain for fuel fabrication. Enusa’s contract for the supply of enriched uranium to Spanish reactors from TENEX runs until 2027 and the Spanish government has confirmed that Enusa has taken delivery of Russian enriched uranium in the UK and the US (as well as in Germany) since February 2022. Eighteen tonnes of the material were eventually delivered to Spain from the US in March 2023. However, it is unclear when the deliveries were made to the US and the UK or whether the two countries have since taken any other deliveries of Russian enriched uranium for Enusa.</code></em></p> -<p>While often discussed together, sovereignty and nonintervention must be differentiated, as sovereignty focuses on territorial control and governmental acts and does not require coercion. Nonintervention is seen to emanate from sovereignty. Nonintervention “prohibits States from engaging in coercive interference, directly or indirectly, with the domestic affairs of another State.” Case law illustrates the application of nonintervention as a customary rule. The International Court of Justice has defined the protected affairs of a state, known as the domaine réservé, as “the choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.” According to Pijpers, “The domaine réservé . . . is the area ‘in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty to decide freely.’”</p> +<h4 id="implications-1">Implications</h4> -<p>Nonintervention requires coercion, but coercion lacks a universal standard and is not well defined. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts state, “To constitute intervention, the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive; in effect depriving the State intervened against of control over the matter in question.” Schmitt defines coercive action as “intended to cause the State to do something, such as take a decision that it would otherwise not take, or not to engage in an activity in which it would otherwise engage.”</p> +<p>Due to the commercial sensitivity of uranium supply and fuel manufacturing contracts, limited information on French uranium stocks and any stockpiles held in France by foreign utilities, as well as the difficulties inherent in tracing complex supply chain dynamics, it is challenging to ascertain the precise drivers of increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France. While at least some reallocation of Russian supplies to France appears to be happening, the degree to which such activity is responsible for the additional import of Russian material into France is difficult to confirm. A range of other explanations for the increased Russian enriched uranium imports into France are also technically possible, some of which have been outlined earlier in this chapter.</p> -<p>According to Schmitt, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 says that states should also consider due diligence, or their obligation “to ensure that their territory is not used as a location from which cyber operations having serious adverse consequences for the target State are launched.” But this would not require a state to monitor or prevent cyber operations, only to stop them when the state has notice. Many states, however, reject the notion that due diligence is required.</p> +<p>In the absence of EU sanctions on Rosatom, there is no legal basis on which to disallow continued imports of Russian enriched uranium into EU countries. Neither is any redistribution of Russian and non-Russian supplies across European nuclear fuel supply chains prohibited in any way. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, there has been no public reporting of new contracts for enriched uranium supply between Rosatom and European utilities; as such, if any reallocation of Russian material into France is taking place, it is likely facilitating the execution of existing contracts by companies still obligated to continue taking Russian enriched uranium, the breach of which may have proven very costly for the companies in question. France’s willingness to continue accepting Russian imports of enriched uranium may therefore be granting utilities the flexibility they need in their supply chains to maintain continuity of supply and to avoid breaching existing contracts. Industry will do what it must to adjust to changing market dynamics and can hardly be blamed for doing so, within the parameters permitted by regulation. However, it points to the importance of considering how industry is likely to adapt to the implementation of new restrictions and what measures may be needed to facilitate and incentivise alignment of private sector behaviour with political objectives. The observed increase in imports of Russian material into France, even as other European countries look to move away from Russian supply, also highlights the limited impact of unilateral national or company efforts to cut Russia out of the highly interconnected European nuclear fuel supply chain.</p> -<p>Turning to the hypotheticals, how might international law principles and rules apply to a country’s use of deepfakes? A country using deepfakes would intend to cause a specific outcome and would undertake action to disseminate the deepfakes, providing many additional facts to inform the legal analysis. Even without these additional facts in hand, one could consider the international law principles and rules that might apply.</p> +<h3 id="iv-case-study-germany">IV. Case Study: Germany</h3> -<p>In the election scenario, targeting an election — an inherently governmental function — implicates the principle of sovereignty. A certain magnitude of state action is required to violate another state’s sovereignty, but neither physical damage nor loss of functionality is required when an inherent government function is involved. Additionally, propaganda aimed to influence an election result, which could possibly describe the activity in the election scenario, is usually allowed. Likewise, for the nonintervention principle to apply, the use of the deepfake would need to be coercive, which seems unlikely based on the facts described. Thus, the country’s use of a deepfake in this scenario might not run afoul of international law, depending on the country’s intent and other facts that would emerge.</p> +<p>Germany is the other country in Europe which has continued to import enriched uranium from Russia since February 2022, according to Eurostat data. The only nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Germany is the Lingen plant, which is owned by a subsidiary of France’s Framatome and has been reported as apparently continuing to accept deliveries of Russian uranium. This raises questions over whether the Lingen plant could be another possible diversion point for Russian material that is no longer wanted in other countries, now or in the future.</p> -<p>In the genocide scenario, the clear human rights violations may justify the use of deepfakes, notwithstanding principles of sovereignty and nonintervention, particularly when neither leader seems to enjoy legitimacy.</p> +<h4 id="deliveries-of-russian-enriched-uranium-to-germany">Deliveries of Russian Enriched Uranium to Germany</h4> -<p>In the invasion scenario, the contemplated deepfake would not have a direct impact in the target country and is likely to be seen as propaganda that does not implicate the principles of sovereignty or nonintervention. If the deepfake leads to an indirect coercive impact in the target state and the state that used the deepfake intends to cause this coercive impact, a majority of experts in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 take the position this would violate the principle of nonintervention. In the scenario for this paper, the authors have not ascribed any such intent to the state using the deepfake. In the invasion scenario, there may also be a humanitarian justification for intervening. The deepfake could also be justified as a countermeasure, though experts are split on whether a non-injured state can undertake countermeasures on behalf of another state.</p> +<p>The Lingen plant produces fuel assemblies for customers around the world and supplies “components and fuel for Framatome’s fuel assembly plants in the USA and Europe”. The IAEA’s 2023 report “Global Inventories of Secondary Uranium Supplies” notes that Lingen manufactures fuel for customers in the Netherlands and that Spain has received deliveries of fuel from Germany. UN Comtrade data also shows exports since 2019 from Germany of goods under HS code 840130 to Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the UK, Belgium, France, Finland, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Brazil and a number of other countries; however, while the code captures unirradiated nuclear fuel, it also includes nuclear assembly parts – as such, exports recorded under this code do not necessarily signify the delivery of manufactured fuel assemblies. Russian-origin enriched uranium has also previously been supplied to the UK via Lingen for use in UK reactors operated by EDF’s British subsidiary EDF Energy.</p> -<p>For the stock market scenario, it is unclear whether other states will be affected by the deepfake and thus whether and how international law should apply. To the extent it is relevant, cyberattacks that result in economic damages may give rise to a countermeasure claim.</p> +<p>In August 2023, BASE issued a permit to Orano NCS GmbH (a nuclear logistics provider and part of the Orano Group of companies) for the transport of enriched uranium (in the form of uranium hexafluoride) from JSC TENEX to Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) GmbH, the Framatome subsidiary that operates nuclear fuel manufacturing facility at Lingen. The current permit is valid from 7 August 2023 to 31 December 2024; however, as of 29 February 2024, only two transport activities had been recorded under this permit, on 5 September 2023 and 8 February 2024. It is unclear where the transport originated. The cargo vessel Mikhail Dudin, which has been known to transport Russian enriched uranium to Europe, made a port call in Rotterdam on 5 September 2023. The cargo vessel Baltiysky-202, which had previously been reported unloading Russian enriched uranium in Dunkirk, called at the port of Rotterdam on 8 February 2024 and the port of Dunkirk on 9 February 2024. However, the Netherlands has not reported any imports of enriched uranium from Russia since February 2022. On at least one occasion, Russian enriched uranium being delivered by the Mikhail Dudin to Dunkirk was reportedly on its way to Lingen. According to reports by environmental activist groups, the delivery had been due to arrive in Rotterdam but was ultimately delivered to France instead.</p> -<p>For the IP theft scenario, if only private actors are affected, international law likely has no role. In this instance, the harm occurred only because a counterparty committed the wrongful act of stealing Company C’s IP. In an extreme case, if the home country is aware of Company C’s actions and there is a high likelihood of harm to another country, under the due diligence doctrine the home country might be obligated to take appropriate action to stop these acts. Even then, many states do not accept the due diligence doctrine.</p> +<p>Between March 2022 and January 2024, the Mikhail Dudin called at the port of Rotterdam at least eight times and at least 12 times at Dunkirk. The vessel has also made four port calls at Vlissingen in the Netherlands and multiple calls at other ports in Europe and the UK. It is unclear what, if anything, was loaded or unloaded during these calls or where the final destination of any deliveries may have been. The Baltiysky-202 has called at the port of Rotterdam four times since March 2022 and nine times at Dunkirk (as well as one port call at Cherbourg, France).</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="5-target">5. Target</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>As such, it appears that some of the Russian material entering France, and possibly the Netherlands, may be passing through these countries on its way to Lingen in Germany. However, trade data reviewed for this report does not provide a clear enough picture to confirm how much Russian material is actually arriving at Lingen, whether the value or volume of any such Russian deliveries has changed since the start of 2022, which customers may be benefiting and which routes may be being used.</p> -<p><em>Who or what is the intended target of the deepfake? Is it the president of a country or a prominent person such as a political or religious leader? Is it a living person?</em></p> +<p>Unlike in the case of France, the value of Germany’s imports of enriched uranium from Russia decreased from 2021 to 2022. One possible explanation may be German reactor closures, at least some of which appear to have used the Lingen facility for the fabrication of their fuel and had historically relied on Russian re-enrichment of reprocessed uranium. In 2022, the value of imports of enriched uranium into Germany increased from the Netherlands and from France; however, imports from these two countries fell to below pre-2022 levels in 2023.</p> -<p>Consider the invasion scenario. Suppose an intelligence agency wants to create a deepfake of President Putin saying something false. The bar for approving such a deepfake should be the highest possible. In the United States, it might require approval from the president, while in some EU countries, the approving authority might be a prime minister, especially if the deepfake were to be disseminated widely in Russia and beyond. To quote one interviewee, a retired U.S. military leader at the level of general or higher, “Deepfakes of a national leader would need presidential approval under a finding from the White House.”</p> +<p>The cause of the increases in 2022 is difficult to ascertain and several explanations are possible. For instance, the increases in import values may be capturing deliveries to the Lingen plant of enriched uranium secured under renewed contracts with or expanded deliveries from Urenco (the Netherlands) or Orano (France) as utilities using the fabrication plant seek alternative, non-Russian, suppliers. Urenco also hosts an enrichment facility at Gronau in Germany; as such, the data may be capturing Urenco’s internal company transfers and not material travelling to Lingen for fuel fabrication. Transfers from the Netherlands and France into Germany, including to the Lingen facility, by Orano and Urenco have been recorded in German transport licence documents. As mentioned earlier, Urenco has also concluded an agreement with EDF to enrich reprocessed uranium from French reactors at its Almelo facility, which will first be converted by Rosatom in Russia. As such, from 2024, Dutch trade data is likely to show increased imports of reprocessed uranium from Russia (although not enriched uranium), as well as increased exports of enriched uranium from the Netherlands to France for the fabrication of nuclear fuel at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère facility. The decrease in the value and volume of imports of enriched uranium from France and the Netherlands into Germany in 2023 also raises the possibility that any increase in 2022 deliveries may not be part of a sustained pattern but a one-off.</p> -<p>Another U.S. military leader at the level of general or higher stated that U.S. presidents may be deeply reluctant to approve the use of deepfakes to target the leader of a foreign nation because of the precedent it would set: “A POTUS tends to think a lot about precedent — are we creating the right precedents? Subordinates tend to be more focused on objectives.” The same individual went on to say, “The slippery slope argument is very strong, and the costs may be higher than we anticipate.”</p> +<p>Furthermore, there are significant discrepancies in Eurostat data between German-reported import data and French- and Dutch-reported data on the export of enriched uranium to Germany, which suggests that the data must be treated with some caution. While data on French exports as well as data on German exports made available through Eurostat both show increases in the value of French exports to Germany (in the case of the German data, French imports into Germany) of enriched uranium in 2022, German import data shows a much lower increase than the French export data. A similar discrepancy can be observed when comparing Eurostat data on German imports with data on Dutch exports, with the former showing markedly lower values of enriched material transferred in 2022 than the latter. Furthermore, in contrast to German import data, Dutch export data shows an overall decrease from 2021 to 2022 in the net weight of enriched uranium exported to Germany. The reason for these discrepancies in the reporting is unclear but may be due to particularities in the recording of transhipment data or delays between the recording of export and import data. Critically, as mentioned earlier, trade data reviewed for this report shows no deliveries of enriched uranium from Russia to the Netherlands since February 2022.</p> -<p>In both the election and genocide scenarios, one corporate leader said, “If a human rights abuser uses a deepfake, I can see doing a lot of other deepfakes to discredit the first (e.g., 100 variations) to educate people.” Simply put, if the leaders of the two countries involved in these scenarios use deepfakes, then targeting them with deepfakes might be considered an appropriate response.</p> +<h4 id="implications-2">Implications</h4> -<p>However, if the deepfake portrays a fictional version of a real event occurring on the ground (e.g., a genocide) for which there is compelling evidence, then disseminating a deepfake image or video representing the event may be fair because (1) the event is real and compelling evidence (perhaps nonvisual) exists; (2) there may not be real, compelling imagery or video because anyone capturing such imagery would be killed or placed in harm’s way; and (3) no single world leader is being explicitly portrayed in the deepfake. Thus, some of the interviewees were comfortable with disseminating a deepfake image of a burial pit with bodies to illustrate what is really happening in a country at war. Nevertheless, such use has risks. For instance, how does the government creating the deepfake know its portrayal of the burial pits is consistent with reality? Will the use of a deepfake backfire, convincing people that the real burial pits are nonexistent because a deepfake was used? Considerable effort would be needed to ensure the deepfake accurately represents, and is believed by the public to be, the reported reality. In addition, both civil society and investigative journalist groups such as Bellingcat often offer their own highly credible reports, which is vital in democratic systems.</p> +<p>As with reallocation of Russian supplies across a utility’s supply chain, shipment of enriched uranium, Russian or otherwise, through third jurisdictions, if such activity is indeed occurring through France or the Netherlands, is a perfectly permissible activity and does not suggest any wrongdoing. Furthermore, because of the specialised nature of radioactive material transport and the associated logistics and certification required, not all ports are able to receive deliveries of enriched uranium, limiting supply routes. As mentioned above, there is currently also no legal obligation for Germany, France, Spain or any other EU country to terminate existing contracts for Russian supply, prevent the conclusion of new ones, or deny delivery of Russian material to facilities on their territory. As the German government has rightly pointed out in response to questions about deliveries of Russian material to the Lingen facility, there are no legal grounds on which to deny shipments of Russian material to the plant as Russian enriched uranium is not covered by EU sanctions. However, transhipment activity would add further opacity to European nuclear supply chains and may provide additional, less obvious, entry points for Russian material into the European market. It may also allow countries to save face by officially refusing to accept Russian enriched uranium at their ports, all the while continuing to import it through third jurisdictions or accepting non-Russian material from a third country which has been displaced by Russian imports.</p> -<p>Another alternative is to release the deepfake publicly but clearly label it a deepfake. In essence, the deepfake would be a dramatization of real events, which frequently occurs in documentaries and films.</p> +<p>Of note is the fact that ANF has applied to German authorities for permission to manufacture VVER fuel assemblies at the Lingen plant. According to reports, fabrication of VVER fuel at the plant may take place in collaboration with Rosatom; however, prospects of German government approval remain unclear. Framatome has signed agreements for VVER fuel supply with Bulgaria and Czechia. It is unclear where fuel assemblies for Bulgarian and Czech VVER reactors will take place and who would be the supplier of enriched uranium for these or any other VVER fuel assemblies. However, should fuel fabrication for VVER reactors take place at the Lingen facility with the use of Rosatom-supplied enriched uranium and in collaboration with Rosatom, this could hardly be considered successful diversification away from Russia for Framatome’s VVER fuel customers.</p> -<p>Whether the subject of a deepfake is living or dead also should matter. A dead person cannot lose power or money or otherwise suffer harm. On the other hand, consider that others close to the dead person may be harmed. The deniability of the deepfake is also affected, as the person in question cannot simply say the video is fake.</p> +<h3 id="v-case-study-us">V. Case Study: US</h3> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="6-goal">6. Goal</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>In the trade data reviewed for this report, the US stands out conspicuously as the largest importer of Russian material, both prior to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and since. Figure 14 shows the value of US imports of enriched uranium from Russia since 2015; Figure 15 shows the weight of imports in tonnes. As mentioned earlier, data on US imports of Russian enriched uranium requires caveating. Some US customers purchase only SWU from Russia, meaning that some natural (unenriched) uranium is returned to Russia as “returned feed”, while other customers purchase both the feed and the services from Russia. As such, the values (and volume) of US imports of enriched uranium are not necessarily representative of the values (or volume) of Russian materials and services that are actually consumed by US utilities. This is in addition to any nuclear fuel assemblies that may be manufactured in the US and exported for use by utilities abroad. US-based think tank Third Way, citing data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and other sources, has estimated that in 2022 US utilities purchased $168 million in processed natural uranium and $344 million in enrichment services. As noted earlier, the EIA has reported that 24% of the SWU delivered to US utilities in 2022 came from Russia.</p> -<p><em>What is the goal of the deepfake? Is it intended to protect the nation’s citizens from immediate harm? Is it a tit-for-tat response to deepfake use by another government? Is it intended to educate a given population about deepfakes and suggest they be wary of any content they see?</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yV1IBYf.png" alt="image14" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: US Imports from Russia under HS Code 2844200020, 2015–23 (USD).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the US Census Bureau (HS code 2844200020).</em></p> -<p>The interviewees largely agreed it was acceptable for governments to use deepfakes under three circumstances: an immediate threat, a tit-for-tat response, or education and discrediting.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T4xMXA6.png" alt="image15" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: US Imports from Russia under HS Code 2844200020, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the US Census Bureau (HS code 2844200020).</em></p> -<p><strong>Immediate threat.</strong> At least one U.S. military leader felt using a deepfake in response to an immediate threat was potentially acceptable as long as no other measures were available to defeat the threat. However, he cautioned,</p> +<h4 id="history-of-us-dependency-on-russian-enriched-uranium-and-efforts-to-limit-supply">History of US Dependency on Russian Enriched Uranium and Efforts to Limit Supply</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>The deepfake is still not something I would do unless there is an imminent threat because there are all these other tools you can use rather than try to put words in the mouths of these leaders, and the potential for boomerang is still too high.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>US reliance on Russian enriched uranium is in part a legacy of the “Megatons to Megawatts” initiative, which ran from 1995 to 2013 and saw the conversion of 500 metric tonnes of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons into over 14,000 metric tonnes of low enriched uranium for the generation of nuclear energy in the US, accounting for 10% of US electricity production at the time. The agreement was executed by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and TENEX, with the former accepting low enriched uranium, chemically processed and diluted by TENEX from highly enriched uranium withdrawn from Russian nuclear weapons, and selling it on to utility customers. As a result of this significant Russian supply of enriched uranium into the US nuclear energy supply chain, as well as the longstanding low prices of Russian material, there was little ability or need for domestic enrichment production to compete with Russian supply and the US enrichment industry atrophied.</p> -<p>Thus, an immediate threat might constitute one set of circumstances where deepfakes could be used. For instance, in the case of the genocide scenario, there may be members of the minority group who are U.S. citizens living in the country where the potential genocide would occur. As in the case of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, a U.S. president may be deeply reluctant to deploy U.S. troops to avert the genocide, and the presence of UN peacekeepers may not be useful. In such cases, it might make sense to use deepfakes to avert the genocide.</p> +<p>However, Russian exports of enriched uranium to Western countries, including the US, pre-dates the “Megatons to Megawatts” initiative, as do concerns over excessive Russian access to the US enriched uranium market and efforts to limit it. In an effort to prevent an influx of cheap Russian enrichment services into the US following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US nuclear energy industry instigated an anti-dumping petition in 1991. The petition eventually resulted in the adoption in 1992 of the “Russian Suspension Agreement” (RSA) between the US Department of Commerce and Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (succeeded by Rosatom). The RSA, which was amended in 2008 and 2020, introduced formal quotas on the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US.</p> -<p>In some cases, the deepfake does not necessarily need to be believable in the long term. In the genocide scenario (or in cases of military deception), the deepfake could be circulated among the target state’s leaders to misguide them into leaving a certain area exposed, allowing the at-risk population to be evacuated. However, the use of deepfakes in the invasion scenario may not make sense if the potential for retaliatory deepfakes or a kinetic response by the country in question is high.</p> +<p>At present, the only commercial enrichment facility operating in the US is a plant in Eunice, New Mexico owned by Urenco, a joint venture between the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. The company recently announced an expansion of its capacity at the Eunice plant by 15%, with additional enrichment commencing in 2025 and eventually providing an additional 700 tonnes of SWU per year. Several US companies, including Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) LLC and Centrus, also offer enrichment technology and may look to enter (or re-enter) the commercial enrichment market. In October 2023, Centruslaunched operations at its enrichment facility in Piketon, Ohio for the enrichment of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). Commercial US reactors do not currently take HALEU but many advanced reactor models will require HALEU fuel.</p> -<p><strong>Tit for tat.</strong> Would it be acceptable for the United States to use deepfakes in retaliation for deepfake use by a foreign government? One non-U.S. military leader saw nothing wrong in doing so: “Tit-for-tat countering may be OK. . . . If an adversary is trying to create strategic effects in the victim nation, then the way international law is framed, in the interim, I would say the same logic should apply.”</p> +<h4 id="efforts-to-diversify-away-from-russia-and-related-challenges">Efforts to Diversify Away from Russia and Related Challenges</h4> -<p>A corporate leader likewise supported tit-for-tat use of deepfakes. He advocated a “no-first-use policy” but said “it is OK to respond in kind to use by a bad guy.” He went on to say that he was “OK with using deepfakes defensively,” and in such a case the actors “must flood the internet when such deepfakes are deployed, as one message doesn’t work well.”</p> +<p>As discussed earlier, there are some ongoing efforts in the US to diversify away from Russian enriched uranium supply. In December 2023, the US House of Representatives passed a bill that would prohibit the import into the US of “unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is produced in the Russian Federation or by a Russian entity” through 2040. The bill, which at the time of writing was awaiting debate by the Senate, would allow the secretary of energy, in consultation with the secretary of state and the secretary of commerce, to issue waivers for imports of Russian enriched uranium in instances where alternative supply is not available or if such imports would be in the national interest. RSA quotas on imports of any Russian material would still apply and any waivers would be terminated by 1 January 2028. A similar bill was introduced in the Senate in March 2023.</p> -<p>Thus, according to both these experts, in the case of the Zelensky video referenced earlier, it would have been acceptable for Ukraine to target Putin not just with one retaliatory deepfake but with a large number, presumably as a deterrent for future deepfake use by Russia. Appropriate authorities must answer the question of what constitutes a number that is large but not so large that it is escalatory. Such an effort, however, might poison the internet even further, perhaps to the detriment of billions of ordinary users.</p> +<p>As noted earlier, concerns over the availability of alternative, non-Russian, enriched uranium supply for US utilities have been raised by a number of experts. However, the extent of the challenge that US utilities may face in replacing Russian material with non-Russian supply in the short, medium and long term is the subject of some debate and likely varies between utilities. In comments to media, Urenco leadership has stated that “it has enough capacity to replace Russian supplies if Washington bans imports from the country” and “there are no constraints in the short term in replacing Russian materials in the western world”. Some analysts have nevertheless pointed to likely shortages in supply for US utilities should imports of Russian uranium stop, although they have noted that assessing the full impact of a ban on Russian imports is challenging as various utilities are likely to have different dependencies on Russian supply and varying nuclear fuel reserves.</p> -<p>Perhaps the best response to a foreign deepfake may be other cyber means. A former senior White House attorney and NSC member stated that if Russia is spreading deepfakes inside the United States, the United States should “get out in front of Russia’s deepfakes and punch down the story.” The interviewee was also supportive of “shut[ting] down Russia’s efforts to create/spread the deepfakes using cyber tools.”</p> +<p>With time, individual utilities and the US nuclear energy sector more broadly will likely become more prepared to withstand the impact of a ban on imports of Russian uranium into the US. In December 2023, the governments of the US, Canada, France, Japan and the UK announced a commitment “to pursue at least USD $4.2 billion in government-led and private investment in our five nations’ collective enrichment and conversion capacity over the next three years”. In February 2024, as part of the Emergency National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, the US Senate approved $2.7 billion in funding to expand the production in the US of LEU and HALEU. The Nuclear Energy Institute – which is the “policy organisation of the nuclear technologies industry” in the US – also supports a ban on imports of Russian uranium, with its leadership noting that: “The U.S. commercial nuclear industry is committed to transitioning to a secure domestic nuclear fuel supply, and this bill is an important step toward that goal”.</p> -<p><strong>Education/discrediting.</strong> Can a deepfake be used to show how convincing deepfakes can be? Can AI-generated deepfakes be used to educate a population and make them understand they should not trust everything they see? One industry expert stated the use of deepfakes to educate the population about deepfakes is perfectly acceptable. This interviewee, who has in-depth knowledge about YouTube’s policies, remarked,</p> +<p>However, some have raised concerns. Centrus, which acts as a broker of enriched uranium (sourcing foreign SWU and supplying SWU and uranium to US and international customers), has raised concerns over potential risks to its supply that may result from restrictions on trade in uranium with Russia. Such restrictions may come in the form of US sanctions on Russian enriched uranium imports, refusal by its US and/or foreign customers to accept Russian SWU, or a decision by Russia to stop exports of uranium to the US. According to its 2023 annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, TENEX is Centrus’s largest supplier of SWU, followed by French company Orano. Centrus has commitments with TENEX for the supply of Russian enrichment services (in the form of SWU) to 2028. Despite having access to alternative sources of enriched uranium, in its 2023 report Centrus notes that, short of securing a waiver from the secretary of energy, the proposed ban would preclude the company from importing Russian LEU into the US and that its alternative supply would not be sufficient to replace the Russian LEU it is currently permitted to import under the RSA.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, the proposed ban on imports into the US of Russian enriched uranium could mean that a greater proportion of the Russian material that Centrus is committed to purchasing from TENEX may have to be directed to non-US utilities. Due to the RSA quotas, not all of the material that Centrus purchases from TENEX can be sold to US utilities. In its 2023 report, the company notes:</p> <blockquote> - <p>Educational use — don’t believe what you see — is OK. For example, YouTube approved a deepfake of “[the] pope in [a] puff jacket” if it was posted for educational purposes but would block it if it was used as an ad or in a way intended to create harm.</p> + <p>We will need to make new sales to place all the Russian LEU we must order to meet our SWU purchase obligations to TENEX. In addition, because the [RSA] quotas do not cover all of the LEU that we must order to fulfill our purchase obligations under the TENEX Supply Contract, we expect that a portion of the Russian LEU that we order during the term of the TENEX Supply Contract will need to be delivered to customers that will use it in overseas reactors.</p> </blockquote> -<p>Of course, when deepfakes are used for educational purposes, they should be clearly marked as deepfakes.</p> +<p>Centrus also noted prior to 2022 that the company expected to have to deliver some of the LEU it would source from TENEX during the term of its supply agreement with the Russian company to customers for use in overseas reactors. Yet, should a potential ban on imports of Russian material into the US be introduced, and if Centrus commitments to purchase Russian SWU remain unaffected by the ban or other factors, this raises questions over whether a greater fraction of the Russian SWU that Centrus is committed to purchasing from TENEX would need to get sold to customers elsewhere and, if so, how much and to whom.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="7-traceability">7. Traceability</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Should new customers need to be found for Russian material no longer accepted in the US, these are likely to be companies and countries that would probably have purchased Russian SWU directly from Russia anyway. As such, any redirection of Russian SWU from the US to alternative customers following a US ban would not necessarily increase Rosatom’s footprint in global supply chains. However, it would also tamper the impact of the US ban on overall Russian access to global enrichment supply chains – simply shifting Russian supply elsewhere. Furthermore, should material that is no longer accepted in the US be sold to China or another country that is still willing to take Russian SWU and has a domestic enrichment capacity, the supply could in theory be used in a displacement strategy in efforts to circumvent existing restrictions on the import of Russian material into the US.</p> -<p><em>What is the probability of the deepfake being traced back to the creator? What will the blowback be in the event it is attributed to the government that created it?</em></p> +<p>Of course, alternative customers, other than China or other countries that could adopt a displacement strategy, could potentially be found for the excess Russian material, for instance, South Korea, the UAE or some Latin American countries with operating nuclear reactors. However, the willingness of utilities in these countries to purchase enriched uranium no longer accepted in the US would depend on their readiness to accept Russian supply as well as any existing contracts they may have for alternative enriched uranium and enrichment services. These two factors may therefore limit opportunities for – and likelihood of – reallocation of Russian supply to new non-US customers.</p> -<p>When a government uses deepfakes in pursuit of its goals, the interviewees felt several questions must be asked: Will the deepfake be detected by other actors? How severe will the repercussions of the deepfake likely be, if they are publicly attributed to the country that created and distributed it? Will it implicate third parties (e.g., if Israel uses a deepfake, will it implicate the United States)?</p> +<p>Furthermore, a ban on imports of enriched uranium into the US may impact on businesses’ commitments to source SWU from TENEX. The introduction of a ban might allow companies the opportunity to terminate supply contracts with Russia on the grounds that the US has introduced restriction on such trade, depending on the nature of the restrictions put in place. However, this would not resolve the issue of any supply challenges that may result for US nuclear industry from a loss of access to Russian enriched uranium and enrichment services. As such, seeking a way out of supply contracts may therefore not be the preferred option for TENEX customers. In fact, US companies are likely to seek waivers to allow them to continue purchasing and importing Russian LEU into the US. As such, reallocation of Russian supply from US utilities to utilities in other countries, as described above, may not be necessary. However, the granting of waivers – while maybe necessary to ensure continued security of supply for some in the US nuclear industry – would in itself diminish the short-term impact of efforts to limit Russian access to US nuclear supply chains.</p> -<p>The experts had deep concerns about detectability and blowback. One U.S. military leader at the level of general or higher stated the importance of intelligence tradecraft: “If we do this, can they trace it back to us? Is there something inherently identifying that is traceable back to us?”</p> +<p>As with some of the adaptations described in the case studies on France and Germany, a ban on the import of Russian uranium into the US may cause some challenges for industry – either as a result of contractual obligations or concerns over security of supply. A ban is therefore likely to result in adaptations which may temper the ban’s ability to reduce Rosatom’s revenue generation and Russia’s presence in global and Western nuclear supply chains, at least in the short term. This is not a reason to forego pursuing such restrictions on imports of Russian enriched uranium into the US, but rather a reminder of the need for a considered approach to the institution of such restrictions – one which takes into account both political objectives and the practicalities faced by industry. To help incentivise and facilitate industry behaviour which aligns with political objectives, the articulation and application of a ban must rely on thorough consultation with customers and suppliers in the US’s nuclear energy sector. It needs to be accompanied by the development of domestic and partner enrichment capacity to ensure a sustainable transition away from Russian supply, and must seek to identify and mitigate the ways in which Russia may continue to access global nuclear fuel supply chains despite the introduction of restrictions.</p> -<p>Another U.S. military leader said the amount of blowback “should be linked to the approval process all the way up to the NSC.” Simply put, a deepfake, especially one of a foreign leader, may need very high levels of approval up to the highest levels of the U.S. government. He went on to posit a hypothetical scenario: “Suppose a Silicon Valley firm releases a deepfake of Xi Jinping. What about his reaction? They would blame the USA. This is coming.” This suggests the need for a more compelling set of guardrails against corporate and individual use of deepfakes to target foreign states or their leaders.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-and-policy-recommendations">Conclusion and Policy Recommendations</h3> -<p>In contrast, a former senior White House and NSC lawyer stated, “If a covert action finding had previously been approved, then the CIA alone would decide if deepfakes should be used.” Speaking on the same topic, a non-U.S. military leader said, “Who created the deepfake doesn’t matter. It is about who is endorsing and authenticating it.” Thus, in the case of a Silicon Valley company releasing a deepfake, the military leader suggested the U.S. government should not endorse the deepfake or distribute it in any way, even if it represents a reality. Perhaps, in this case, the U.S. government’s immediate action should be to disavow the corporate deepfake and immediately take action to hold those responsible to account to the fullest extent of the law.</p> +<p>This report has outlined four case studies that demonstrate the scale of Western and global dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supplies, the economic and contractual challenges that stand in the way of ending these dependencies, the adaptations to efforts by some Western countries and companies to cut Russia out of their nuclear fuel supply chains, and the likely limitations of efforts to cut Russia out of global nuclear fuel supply chains. In particular, Russia may rely on countries still willing or obligated to accept its enriched uranium to implement displacement strategies or simply serve as alternative entry points into markets from which it is being squeezed out. Such strategies simply push the issue of Russian dependency to a different part of the supply chain but do little to ultimately squeeze Rosatom’s bottom line and, in some instances, to decrease Western dependencies on Russian enriched uranium.</p> -<h4 id="who-should-manage-a-deepfake-equities-process">Who Should Manage a Deepfake Equities Process?</h4> +<p>Of particular concern are trends in trade data that could point to the adoption of a displacement strategy – as may be the case with China. As Beijing may be seeking to increase its role as an exporter of enriched uranium to global markets, including to the US, it could rely on increased imports into China of Russian enriched uranium to facilitate this expansion. An increase in the value of Russian enriched uranium imports by China since 2022 has been accompanied by an increase in the value of Chinese exports of enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023, driven primarily by deliveries to the US. However, publicly available data reviewed for this report is insufficient to conclude definitively whether displacement is actually occurring.</p> -<p>The above questions are important to ask — but equally important is who is asking them. Democratic countries should create a deepfake equities commission (DEC) to weigh the answers to these questions. The following is a discussion of how this might work in the United States.</p> +<p>In the case of Europe, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France and continued deliveries of Russian material to Germany also raise questions over the effectiveness of unilateral efforts by other players in the European nuclear fuel supply chain to cut dependencies on Russia. While it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the drivers of recent increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France or to confirm whether and how much Russian enriched uranium may be arriving in Germany through third countries, the willingness of certain countries to continue accepting Russian material may continue to grant Rosatom alternative entry points into the European nuclear fuel supply chain. Should Russian material delivered to Germany be integrated into the future fabrication of VVER nuclear fuel assemblies in cooperation with Rosatom, this would also be counterproductive to efforts by Eastern European VVER operators to diversify away from Russian supplies.</p> -<p>The DEC should be a White House–run interagency working group chaired by an NSC senior director. It should include one representative from each of the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and Treasury as well as a representative from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to ensure that different perspectives are brought together. In addition to these national security and legal perspectives, it is necessary to bring in representatives who can weigh the domestic effects — something outside the traditional national security realm — which may require bringing in an appropriately cleared representative from civil society to represent the public interest.</p> +<p>The report also briefly examined US dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supplies, as the US remains the most important importer of Russian enriched uranium. While a prohibition on imports of Russian enriched uranium into the US may cut Russia out of US supply chains, the extent to which such a ban may cause supply challenges for US nuclear fuel supply chains remains the subject of some debate. Furthermore, some of the Russian material that may no longer be accepted in the US may need to be redirected to other customers around the world that are still willing to accept Russian material. While this is unlikely to have a significant impact on the presence of Russian enriched uranium on global markets, as the excess supply is likely to be redirected to countries willing to do business with Russia and which would have probably purchased Russian supply anyway, it highlights again the challenges and limitations inherent to unilateral efforts to cut Russia out of global nuclear fuel supply chains. The case studies presented in this report – including that of the US – also point to the need for close engagement with the nuclear industry to ensure that restrictions on trade in uranium and enrichment services with Russia are developed and implemented in a manner that incentivises and facilitates maximum industry buy-in on the objectives of such restrictions – in this case, sustainable diversification away from Russian enriched uranium supply in Western nuclear fuel supply chains.</p> -<p>Because of the novelty of deepfakes and their potentially broad effects on the American people, any recommendation for deepfake use by the U.S. government should be approved by the president. Should deepfake use become more common, it is plausible there may be established categories for use that are preapproved, but for the initial stages and possibly beyond, their importance and the precedent they might set require the highest level of approval. Similarly, if deepfakes are used as part of an ongoing conflict, authority may be delegated to the secretary of defense or another high-ranking subordinate until clear use categories are established.</p> +<p>The limitations of current restrictions on purchases of Russian enriched uranium and enrichment services described in this report should not serve to dissuade the further introduction of such restrictions. Not only is diversification away from Russia’s nuclear industry important for ensuring nuclear energy security in the US and Europe, it is also critical to avoiding the political and moral dissonance inherent in claims to support Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression while continuing to engage in business with a strategically significant Russian state-enterprise. Instead, they should serve as a further reminder to ensure that any future restrictions aim for a multilateral approach, identify and address likely opportunities for circumvention through countries still willing to do business with Russia, are introduced in close consultation with industry and are accompanied by measures that incentivise and facilitate maximum industry buy-in and compliance. The six recommendations outlined below are aimed at facilitating diversification and preventing circumvention, both in instances where continued intake of Russian material is contractually obligated and when it may be being used as part of a deliberate strategy to gain greater market access by competing suppliers.</p> -<p>Other countries will have different institutional arrangements, but the same basic principles should hold. Different parts of the government representing different commercial and security perspectives should be brought together, as should individuals representing the informational health of the polity. Because of the novelty and potential impact of deepfakes, the top elected official, such as the prime minister in countries with a parliamentary system of government, should approve their use.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation 1: Invest in the further expansion of enrichment capacity in partner countries.</strong> While additional capacity from Urenco and Orano is due to come online in 2025 and 2028 respectively, the US, the UK, European and other Western-allied governments must invest in additional enrichment capacity to ensure long-term security of supply and facilitate a sustainable diversification away from Russian supply while limiting negative impacts on Western nuclear industry and energy production. This could include investments in the development of new enrichment technologies that may be easier and quicker to scale up and would allow for the entry into the market of new enrichment service providers. Recent US and UK efforts to support domestic production of HALEU fuel should be commended to this end. Making available competitive government incentives for enrichment service providers to invest in expanded enrichment capacity, as well as incentives for utilities (that is, the customers) to provide guarantees of sustained demand in the form of long-term contracts will also help encourage further investment by enrichers into additional capacity.</p> -<p>When a situation arises where use of a deepfake might be considered, the relevant agency should present the use case, with particular detail not only on the immediate effects but also on the potential blowback to the home country’s people, allies, and the credibility of the government should the deepfake use be discovered. For example, if the goal is to discredit a foreign military official, the Department of Defense might propose a deepfake. The scenario would not only outline the content of the deepfake and its anticipated effects on the adversary’s military but also how it might shape public opinion inadvertently in the United States (or the home country contemplating deepfake use) and in allied countries. Officials from other agencies would weigh in on its legality, diplomatic consequences, and other ramifications. The designated official representing U.S. public opinion would also weigh how dangerous the information would be if it infected domestic discussion. Other officials might review its necessity, as there may be more traditional cyber or other operations that have a more established precedent that could achieve the same intended effects. Finally, all involved officials would discuss the implications for other policy goals if the United States were associated with deliberately promulgating false information.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation 2: Once alternative supply can be assured, implement multilateral restrictions on imports of Russian enriched uranium.</strong> To increase the effectiveness and limit the negative impacts of any sanctions or restrictions on the Western nuclear sector, any initiatives at diversification should be undertaken only following extensive consultations with relevant actors within the nuclear energy industry and only once sufficient alternative enriched uranium supply has been secured, either through expanded Western and partner enrichment capacity or through enriched uranium inventories. Every effort must also be made to ensure a unanimous approach to sanctions across US, European and other allied markets. The adaptation activities outlined in this report rely on Russia’s ability to access some markets while others adopt diversification policies. As such, unilateral efforts by individual countries or companies to cut Russia out of the West’s nuclear supply chain will be vulnerable to circumvention.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p><strong>Recommendation 3: Establish methods for enforcing the “displacement swap” prohibition under the RSA.</strong> The US Department of Commerce, as the authority responsible for monitoring possible circumvention of the RSA provisions, should work with other departments in US government as well as with industry to identify methods for enforcing the prohibition of displacement swaps. To demonstrate that enriched uranium imported into the US was not the result of displacement using Russian material, importers could, for instance, be asked to demonstrate the allocation to various customers of enriched uranium imports into their country or show proof of increases in domestic enrichment capacity to meet demand for exports to the US. Considering the commercial sensitivity of some of this information, government authorities in the country of export could be asked to collate this information and provide assurances on behalf of industry.</p> -<p>Deepfakes are a new information tool, and it is important to think about their use and consequences now rather than wait to cobble together a policy following haphazard usage by U.S. government agencies or allied entities. This process is particularly important as deepfakes have profound consequences for the long-term credibility of any government and can shape and potentially worsen domestic political debates.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation 4: Adopt prohibitions on displacement swaps alongside other national or multilateral (EU) bans on imports of Russian enriched uranium.</strong> Should individual countries or the EU decide to adopt a ban on Russian enriched uranium, they should include prohibitions of displacement swaps, similar to those included in the RSA. Such prohibitions, if enforced as per Recommendation 3, will help close potential loopholes that Russia could exploit to maintain indirect access to markets that are trying to cut Russia out, undermining efforts to squeeze Rosatom’s bottom line.</p> -<p>Although it is tempting to simply declare that a government will never use deepfakes, their potential power and reach make them attractive tools. Governments, however, may want to act — at times, for the best reasons — without thinking through the long-term implications of deepfake use. Thus, deepfakes must have a set of rules and criteria to guide their use and ensure governments are considering all relevant factors and long-term as well as short-term perspectives. For these rules to work in practice, governments must draw on a range of perspectives, including those beyond the traditional national security realm, when discussing deepfake use. Although the authors have presented some initial criteria, rich debate and observations on the use of deepfakes in practice by other governments will inform how to weigh these factors and what to add to ensure robust practice.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation 5: Examine and work to address dependencies on Russia across the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle.</strong> Uranium enrichment is not the only aspect of the global nuclear fuel supply chain where dependencies on Russia are critical. Rosatom also plays a major role in global NPP construction, uranium conversion and spent fuel management. Cutting dependencies on Russia in one part of the supply chain, while a good start, will not have as great an effect on Rosatom’s revenue generation as ensuring that the West and partner countries, as well as undecided customers, have alternative suppliers across the nuclear fuel cycle. Russia and China have invested extensively in their civil nuclear sectors as strategic industries, having understood the long-term dependencies they can create in the countries to which they sell their technology and services. While the economies and the government–industry relations in Russia and China differ significantly from those in Western and partner countries, supporting the development of domestic nuclear industries and their ability to compete internationally should be a priority.</p> -<h3 id="appendix">Appendix</h3> +<p><strong>Recommendation 6: Avoid trading dependencies on Russia for dependencies on China.</strong> As companies and governments seek to diversify away from Russia in their sourcing of enriched uranium supplies and across the nuclear fuel cycle, China may look to take advantage of openings to present itself as an alternative supplier. It is imperative that Western and partner governments focus on investment in domestic capacity and the capacity of partner countries, not on sourcing services and technology from China. Not only may increased Chinese exports of enriched uranium be backed by increased imports of Russian material (undermining the impact of Western and partner sanctions on the Russian nuclear industry), but allowing Chinese companies to play an important role in nuclear supply chains runs the risk of creating problematic dependencies not dissimilar to those that currently exist on Russia.</p> -<p>A deepfake of a computational artifact (e.g., an image, a piece of text, or an audio or video clip) is a synthetic version of the artifact that is generated using advanced AI techniques. Machine learning classifiers have been trained for well over a decade to distinguish between real and fake artifacts. Since 2017, new generative AI techniques have created increasingly hard-to-detect fakes.</p> +<hr /> -<p>One popular technique, generative adversarial networks (GANs), considers the generation of fakes in terms of a game: A generator module in the GAN generates fake artifacts, while a discriminator module (a machine learning classifier) in the GAN tries to detect which of a set of artifacts (both real and fake) are fake. The discriminator reports the results, which the generator then uses as feedback to generate better fakes. This iterative process (generate-discriminate-feedback, generate-discriminate-feedback, and so on) continues until an equilibrium is reached and neither the generator nor the discriminator can substantially improve at its task in subsequent iterations. Numerous organizations worldwide have adapted and improved GANs and other AI techniques, such as Stable Diffusion, providing ready access to a huge number of AI tools capable of generating deepfakes for a wide variety of multimodal artifacts.</p> +<p><strong>Darya Dolzikova</strong> is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and strategic aspects of civil nuclear technology. She has conducted research on the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, nuclear safety in Ukraine, the role of Russia in global civil nuclear supply chains, and other issues relating to nuclear technology and proliferation.</p>Darya DolzikovaThis report examines the trade in Russian enriched uranium.China In Sub-Saharan Africa2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-sub-saharan-africa<p><em>Chinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.</em></p> -<p>Table 1 presents a range of artifacts and generation tools that could be used to generate different kinds of deepfake content.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e89F69s.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>Table 1: Well-Known Synthetic Computational Artifact Generation Tools</em></p> +<p>China has developed significant global influence through the use of development financing, spending $1 trillion since 2013, including $160 billion in Africa. This article is based on research conducted into Chinese influence in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on Angola, Zambia and Kenya. The study involved interviews with key figures such as senior business officials, Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) and state-owned bank managers, investigative journalists and personal contacts within the former intelligence sphere, all of whom had first-hand or extensive experience of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) deals.</p> -<hr /> +<p>The research uncovered how Beijing’s overarching strategy on the African continent seeks to court foreign policy influence in order to sanction-proof supply chains and develop dual-use ports, despite the doubtful resilience of such a strategy outside of peacetime conditions. A former senior manager in a Chinese SOE stated, “the large SOEs in the region have very limited freedom. It is guided by the Central Government from the way they are staffed at the high level and the overarching direction they pursue”.</p> -<p><strong>Daniel Byman</strong> is a senior fellow with the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and director of the Security Studies Program. He is the foreign policy editor for Lawfare and a part-time senior adviser to the Department of State on the International Security Advisory Board.</p> +<h3 id="sanction-proofing-supply-chains">Sanction-Proofing Supply Chains</h3> -<p><strong>Daniel W. Linna Jr.</strong> has a joint appointment at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law and McCormick School of Engineering as a senior lecturer and the director of law and technology initiatives. Dan’s teaching and research focus on innovation and technology, including the use of artificial intelligence and data analytics to improve legal-services delivery as well as the law, regulation, and governance of computational technologies.</p> +<p>A core component of this strategy is China’s use of financing for “resource-led diplomacy” to facilitate access to raw materials and minerals for electronics, renewable energy and hi-tech industries. According to a Brookings report, by 2019, minerals and fossil fuels accounted for 35% of exports to China from 60% of African countries. Trade between China and Africa saw a 1,900% increase from 2000, the year of the first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation summit. Yet access to raw materials masks half the story.</p> -<p><strong>V. S. Subrahmanian</strong> is the Walter P. Murphy Professor of Computer Science and a faculty fellow in the Buffett Institute for Global Affairs at Northwestern University. He is an expert on probabilistic and machine learning based methods to analyze text/geospatial/relational/social network data, learn behavioral models from the data, forecast actions, and influence behaviors.</p>Daniel Byman, et al.What questions should governments ask — and who in government should be asking them — when a deepfake is being considered?Diplomacy Through Defence2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/diplomacy-through-defence<p><em>With enthusiasm for Defence Engagement seemingly waning, how can Defence ensure that it is contributing to UK influence around the globe?</em></p> +<p>Crucially, China is tailoring funding to build bespoke infrastructure (roads/railways/ports) for the transport of raw materials in a sanction-resilient supply chain. Securing raw materials in Zambia led China to enhance strategic supply routes to port sites in Lobito, Luanda and Mombasa. Indeed, based on Observer Research Foundation statistics, the use of financing to secure access to raw materials in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia accounted for 60% of all trade between China and Africa. A head of a leading private intelligence group suggested that securing access to copper is “the be all and end all” for China–Zambia financing, which is part of a wider global strategy to “control the copper market and deny Western companies access by removing Western powers from supply chains”.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Beijing views Zambia as “land-linked” rather than “land-locked”. Interviewees described the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation’s operations in Zambia as intricately tied to the Central Government, having previously been part of the Chinese Ministry of Railways and currently being overseen by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council. Its activities in Zambia expose Beijing’s clear strategy of securing raw material supply routes in order to enhance China’s energy security in case of future sanctions. Indeed, China focuses financing on specific strategic roads and railways which “creates a corridor so most of the lithium, copper, cobalt etc. can access the coast and go back to China” via the Tazara Railway and roads connecting Zambia, the DRC, South Africa and Angola. A former Nigerian presidential advisor who had worked on several Chinese BRI deals suggested that “through helping with infrastructure projects China is securing the ability to move things directly from Zambia and the surrounding region out to Mombasa and the African coast to China”.</p> -<p>Although Defence Diplomacy became a Defence Task in 1998, Defence Engagement (DE) only emerged in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Concerns about warfighting were being displaced by “the realities and uncertainties of the 21st century” and a desire to target the causes of national security risks, rather than managing the consequences. DE would “shap(e) the environment, promoting the rules-based international order and preventing instability”. The 2015 Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) definition of DE – “using assets (short of combat operations) to generate influence” – rapidly expanded to include “capacity building, access, information and conflict prevention”, typically through High Level Engagements, Short Term Training Teams and Subject Matter Expert exchanges. Over time, “Engagement” became an accepted principle of UK security and a byword for the softer influence that Defence sought to exert through its operations around the world.</p> +<p>In Kenya, China secures strategic supply routes by using it as the maritime gateway for raw materials from the hinterland. A former senior official within an Investment Banking department at the China Construction Bank (CCB) suggested that Chinese SOEs in Kenya were working in concert. The state-owned China State Railway Group which was responsible for the Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and the Nairobi-Thika Highway Project purportedly worked in collaboration with mining SOEs in neighbouring countries to improve China’s raw material supply routes. Moreover, following interviews with senior government officials, a senior source suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued directives to ensure a strategic foothold in the country, meaning the SGR and associated Chinese-funded infrastructure projects became “too big to fail”.</p> -<p>A lot has changed. Despite there being clear water between DE and combat operations at its inception, the move to “Persistent Engagement” (PE) has seen a rapid growth in more kinetic partnerships focused on areas such as constraining poaching, drug trafficking and violent extremist organisations. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, warfighting is again the issue of the day. The Army has shrunk by 21%, becoming more stretched than ever. There is a frustration that DE hasn’t delivered, and it seems to be being side-lined; when the House of Commons Defence Committee recommended updating the JDN last year, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) response did not even include the term , referring only to Defence Diplomacy. The 2018 DE budget was £80 million, with the potential for more from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). By 2022–3, only £3.6 million was explicitly linked to it. Yet the requirement is still being articulated; the first characteristic of the “Engage” function in the Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC) is “assuring influence”. Accordingly, some force elements still appear firmly committed to DE; the Defence Medical Services have a significant DE-specific budget, UKStratCom has a regular 2* DE steering group, and a recent think tank meeting heard that “50% of the Fleet undertook DE activity in 2023”.</p> +<p>Corroborating this, the CEO of a prominent Chinese advisory financing firm, reporting on conversations with Chinese officials, conveyed that “China saw Kenya as a key logistics hub”. Mombasa’s deepwater port made it “the best strategic location and a hub of the large region of East and Central Africa”. A former UK intelligence official stated, “China wants to be a rival to India in the Indian Ocean. They want to be able to get access to those resources and minerals and they view Kenya as the artery to the continent”.</p> -<p>DE’s problems lay not in the concept of leveraging influence to prevent and resist security threats. It lay in the definition of “influence”. There simply wasn’t one, even in the eponymous JDN. Even the IOpC didn’t define it, despite stating that we would “develop”, “regain”, “project”, “assure” (x2) and “secure” it. This recently led a Global Defence Network (GDN) colleague to say that it was “undefinable”. Lacking a clear “theory of victory” around influence, how could Defence construct strategies to deliver it, or know if it had? Unsurprisingly, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office concluded in 2021 that there was no viable means of measuring it – a real problem given “there are hard choices to be made. Not least where, how and when engagement offers political access and value”.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The ultimate goal is to ensure that if the US and other countries cease or begin to strongly limit cooperation, China’s supply chain resilience is already in place</code></em></strong></p> -<p>As DE fell out of favour, Strategic Communication (StratCom) made a strong bid for ownership of the elusive influence. In 2019, the UK’s StratCom doctrine reframed all activity – physical or information – as contributing to influence. This led to a meaningful NATO definition of influence in 2023: “effects on the perception, attitudes and behaviours of an audience … achieved deliberately by information and communication activities, or as a second and third order effect of all activities”. It also became the central pillar of the concept of Orchestrated Military Strategic Effects (OMSE).</p> +<p>A similar motivation was found in Angola, a country with vast oil reserves. AidData investment figures and the CEO of an Africa–China investment advisory firm who worked on Chinese-Angolan oil deals revealed that several Chinese-financed projects were tailored to suit Chinese supply chain interests, including the $362 million Benguela Railway, the $923 million construction work to Caio port in Cabina, and efforts to bolster raw material strategic supply routes via the port of Lobito, Luanda and the Tazara Railway. Indeed, China financed the $1.5 billion refurbishment of the Lobito-Benguela railway corridor from the cobalt belt in the southern DRC to the port of Lobito, freeing up capacity to carry 20 million tonnes of export cargo annually. Having spoken to senior Beijing officials, an interviewee suggested that the MFA and Peking University developed a “resources for infrastructure financing” framework and used Angola as the pioneering example over 15 years ago. Further reports suggest current plans exist to connect the railway with Zambia’s 1860 km Chinese-financed Tazara Railway, giving China export routes from the west coast through the raw material-rich heartland to Tanzania’s east-coast Dar es Salaam port.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Defence Engagement’s focus should firmly be on actors who do not yet support UK interests effectively – either shaping their intent to support the UK, building their capacity to do so, or both</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Such examples of Chinese financing in sub-Saharan Africa aimed at sanction-proofing supply routes are generalisable to countries including the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and several East African countries. A former UK intelligence official declared, “they wish to keep plenty of strings to their energy and mineral supply chain bow and this explains a lot of their development financing. They are looking now to fortify their trading networks against a possible US and European sanctions movement that would come with an invasion of Taiwan or increased geopolitical tension”.</p> -<p>There is, however, a big problem with this approach. All doctrine (including OMSE) has consistently implied that influence modifies behaviour – be it voting a certain way in the UN General Assembly, choosing a trade partner or being deterred from a course of action. Behavioural science (the well-established academic field relating to behavioural change) has a fundamental rule that the desire to change is inadequate by itself. Without capacity – the necessary tools, know-how and permissions (individual, cultural and legal), intent cannot translate to action. Motivation and capacity together result in change. So StratCom’s changes in perceptions and motivation are inadequate for the task on their own. Capacity is measurable and can be built up if insufficient – just not by StratCom.</p> +<p>A lawyer previously working on Chinese BRI deals stated, “it is clear that China is working together with the development banks to get the money in, buy the asset, build the infrastructure around it, get it onto a railway and get it to the port”. A former senior manager in a large SOE supported this view, stating that “those harbours and railways are not put in place by us just for fun or development help or a small return on a loan. If we need a railway to reach the next country for this supply chain, we will put it in place to reach those materials”. Indeed, a former senior official within an Investment Banking department at the CCB insisted that China does not trust international markets and wants to be self-sufficient to prevent the threat of Western sanctions. The ultimate goal is to ensure that if the US and other countries cease or begin to strongly limit cooperation, China’s supply chain resilience is already in place.</p> -<p>The other contender for the now-vacant throne of DE is the related concept of PE. Certainly, PE would seem to be an effective tool for capacity building, at least in terms of the tools and know-how. While PE readily enhances access and counter-adversary activities at the tactical and operational levels, it is not clear that it increases public or international influence (needed to “grant permission” for change). It also tends to be single service-led, and so one wonders how well it can ever truly be coordinated by a centralised StratCom function to meet the demands of OMSE.</p> +<h3 id="dual-port-use">Dual Port Use</h3> -<p>So, the UK’s current approach may still be a missing a vital element. What needs to change to fill that gap? First, Defence needs to be very clear about what the Engage space is for. If it truly includes shaping the behaviours of potential allies and adversaries alike, then it must implement a whole-system approach to doing so, ensuring all the apposite instruments (Global Defence Network, UK StratCom, Intelligence, Special Forces and the Single Services) are involved at every stage. Next, there needs to be an evidence-based articulation of how military activities can engender relevant changes in behaviour, not just perception. Lastly, a robust assessment, monitoring and evaluation framework must be in place so that Defence understands the cost, benefit and what works – the ESCAPADE database was simply not up to the task. DE struggled with all of these, but there is little sign that newer approaches are addressing them any better.</p> +<p>Having bolstered supply chain resilience, China is also ensuring that a significant amount of its port construction is being completed to a “dual port use specification” so as to avoid Western suspicion of PLA Navy (PLAN) build-up. Chinese-funded ports are built to accommodate commercial trade, but can – with significant risks and complications (see below) – be flipped to military use as the depth and landing/docking zones are built to PLAN specifications. A regional director at a private intelligence firm and former UK intelligence official with experience of BRI port deals pointed to secure, dual-use facilities in several countries including Angola, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa and Kenya.</p> -<p>The targets of the activities might change too. Why invest in the ability to modify the behaviour of an ally who already routinely supports UK interests? That is not to say that Defence should ignore them, but rather that it should focus on reinforcing interoperability and demonstrating the UK’s commitment to mutual support – a different set of activities entirely. DE’s focus should firmly be on actors who do not yet support UK interests effectively – either shaping their intent to support the UK, building their capacity to do so, or both. This requires Security, Policy and Operations to clearly articulate and prioritise desired behavioural changes, something it has not always managed.</p> +<p>China’s own 2019 defence white paper stated that the PLA was developing “overseas logistical facilities” to “address deficiencies in overseas operations”, calling for a shift from “near coast active defence” to “far seas manoeuvring operations”. It claimed that China must establish its “perceived status as a Great Power” by advancing “China’s escalating global interests, particularly those associated with the BRI, including infrastructure, assets, personnel and control over sea lanes”. Moreover, China’s capstone doctrinal text, the Science of Military Strategy (2020 edition), highlights the “two Oceans” approach in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the PLAN’s desire to “establish ourselves” in both by constructing “maritime strategic support points”.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Defence must be certain that it is happy to lose Defence Engagement’s strategic influence function, and if it is not, it needs to act; the UK’s adversaries are absolutely not prevaricating in this space</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The aforementioned senior official within the Investment Banking department at the CCB confirmed this, suggesting China is securing influence in Kenya as part of its effort to become a significant “ocean-faring nation”, constructing the port of Mombasa to be compatible with PLAN specifications. Indeed, the PLA Military Transport Academy suggests the dual use of Mombasa port could help solve the Malacca Dilemma by “reducing transport pressure and avoiding waterways that could be closed by adversaries”. Satellite imagery reveals the 245 m military-grade dock could berth two Type 056 corvettes and any surface combatant up to the Type 055D guided-missile destroyer. Additionally, it reveals the 164 m dock could accommodate one surface combatant up to the Type 052D destroyer, with the port also having the capacity to refuel most PLAN ships and act as a logistics hub for tankers directly facilitating the replenishment of PLAN ships in open waters.</p> -<p>Perhaps most importantly, existing expertise in behavioural change and capacity building must be exploited and developed. Involvement of the reserves should be routine, as should introduction of (and handover to) the civilian institutions that hold much of the UK’s national soft power (and which are often resourced with international engagement in mind). Further professionalising the DE career will serve to act as a recruitment and retention tool, boost the capacity to iterate and develop, and establish the UK as a world leader in the field (which would itself offer DE opportunities).</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The previously cautious consensus around Chinese financing motivations may no longer apply to the strengthening China of today</code></em></strong></p> -<p>So, what of DE in 2024? Defence seems uncertain. Has it simply rebranded DE, believing that influence is completely captured between effects-based StratCom and PE? Or has it decided to limit its contribution to UK influence, falling back on the excellent work of the Defence Attaché network and reinvesting the resources into other subthreshold operations? The concern must be that, by just culling DE without the right mechanism to replace it, Defence will simply go back to 2010 – recognising that the UK possesses dwindling hard power and is in need of reliable partners, but uncertain about how to court them. Defence must be certain that it is happy to lose DE’s strategic influence function, and if it is not, it needs to act; the UK’s adversaries are absolutely not prevaricating in this space. Addressing the flaws of DE though a prioritised, coordinated and evidence-based approach to behavioural change (which would include PE and StratCom) should deliver the Engage/Constrain effects that Defence seeks. Ignoring them will simply propagate the problems; OMSE will fail and be replaced at the next SDSR by another concept with the same problems, while the UK continues to fret over the increasing gap between its influence and that of its adversaries.</p> +<p>The PLAN’s future ambitions for dual use of Angola’s deepwater Luanda Atlantic port reveal a similar story. In addition to the port of Lobito, Angola’s 1,600 km coastline has four other operational seaports, significant portions of which China has financed. A private military investigation found that Luanda port can accommodate Type 052D and 055 destroyers and most PLAN vessels for replenishment. In 2016, the Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China (CHEXIM) financed the China Energy Engineering Corporation to build Caio port in Cabinda, Angola’s first deepwater port. China-Sonangol is currently involved in constructing another deepwater Angolan facility, the Barra do Dande port 50 km north of Luanda, which will include 29 storage tanks, a container and multi-use terminal and a petroleum support zone. According to China Dialogue, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) acquired a 30% stake in the Portuguese construction company Mota-Engil, which secured a 30-year concession on the port of Lobito. Moreover, a CLBrief report indicated that China International Trust Investment Corporation and Shandong Port Group secured a 20-year concession to manage and operate Angola’s port of Lobito multipurpose container and general cargo terminal.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Evidence provided by a regional director of a private intelligence firm showed that, via financing, China is seeking access and control over deepwater maritime ports on Africa’s Atlantic coast for commercial and military purposes. Secret PLAN documents revealed plans to link Chinese port financing to strategic military motivations in Angola, Kenya and 11 other countries. Indeed, China’s Djibouti military base disguises a more subtle Chinese military strategy of dual-use ports across the continent.</p> -<p><strong>Si Horne</strong> is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. An Army Emergency Medicine doctor, he has supported operations in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and South Sudan as well as serving as the Emergency Medicine lead for the Army.</p> +<p>Ports on the Atlantic coast should perhaps raise the most concern in Washington. A traditional Chinese inter-continental ballistic missile has a range of about 6,000 km, meaning that it can be launched from eastern China to hit the west coast of the US. Chinese nuclear submarines can currently remain at sea for long periods, but they do not have the ability to obtain food and resupplies when operating in the Atlantic. Therefore, a resupply base on the African Atlantic coast would put Chinese submarines in range of New York, Washington DC and Atlanta. With Africa remaining an uncontested space for Chinese development financing, the US’s internal security is at risk.</p> -<p><strong>Ian Gurney</strong> is a British Army Medical Officer and has served in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan and South Sudan (UN Tour).</p>Si Horne and Ian GurneyWith enthusiasm for Defence Engagement seemingly waning, how can Defence ensure that it is contributing to UK influence around the globe?【黎智英案・審訊第卌二日】2024-03-11T12:00:00+08:002024-03-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-42<ul> - <li>楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時轉變對華政策、落井下石是好時機</li> -</ul> +<p>Indeed, CHEXIM financed, and CCCC First Harbour Engineering Co built, Equatorial Guinea’s Bata deepwater port in 2006, with the China Road and Bridge Corp making significant updates in 2016. The CEO of a leading China-focused intelligence firm stated, “don’t be fooled by the lack of hard arms sales. China now owns 93 ports in 53 countries” including Nigeria, Tanzania and Namibia, with China’s Ambassador to Namibia calling Walvis Bay port the “most brilliant pearl” on Africa’s Atlantic coast. Of African BRI countries, 70% are located on the north, east, west or south coast with key investments made in ports near the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal, including Djibouti port, Port Sudan, Port Said–Port Tewfik, Ain Sokhna port, Zarzis port, El Hamdania port and the newly financed and commissioned Lekki deep seaport in Lagos, West Africa’s largest. Ultimately, the dual-use model allows China to downplay the military significance of its port investments, while providing access to several military facilities. The Economic Times reported that a total of 46 African ports have been built or financed – or are currently operated – by Chinese state-owned shipping corporations.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>However, despite such developments, existential alarmism when analysing these findings would be premature. An important caveat is that the above analysis assumes peacetime conditions. In conflict, China will find protecting port infrastructure and negotiating access to be crucial stumbling blocks to its dual-use port model. Protecting the aforementioned ports from incoming enemy fire – especially without adequate missile defence systems, bunkers and existent fortified supply depots for fuel and munitions, would involve increasingly complex military planning of a scale and capability that the Chinese military complex does not yet possess. Moreover, any Chinese troop movement (such as reinforcements) would require significant negotiations with the host country. As such, troublesome coercion tactics against countries that China relies on for supply routes (such as Angola or Kenya) would be risky and unproven.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/8EtMi8U.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第42日審訊。前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊早前證供提及，2018年時任總統彭斯演講時提及美國對華政策，黎認為「美國反檯」，自此政治立場變得激進。楊表示以他的理解，黎認為國家主席習近平「係比較弱勢」，美國在這個時機轉變對華政策，是一個好時機，訊息紀錄亦顯示，黎曾向楊稱「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石」。楊又指黎曾經是一個成功的商人，辦報紙時擅長把握形勢和讀者的需要，當時見到美國對華政策的改變，都會調整報紙立場。楊指在2019年反修例期間，《蘋果》經常以「今日上街，明日上街」作為標題，並在報導和評論中落實「和勇不分」和「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」原則。</p> +<p>Africa provides an important and long-standing model for China’s global financing efforts. The previously cautious consensus around Chinese financing motivations may no longer apply to the strengthening China of today. Over a 20-year period, Chinese financing within sub-Saharan Africa has significantly bolstered Beijing’s “sanction-proof” supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength, perhaps enhancing its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion (such as against Taiwan). Yet, serious complications around the execution of such a strategy outside of peacetime conditions remain pertinent. As the US–China relationship moves into stormier waters, China will continue to expand its naval reach and supply chain resilience, particularly as its declining economic surplus will see it concentrate financing on geostrategically important locations off the Atlantic coast and in the Indian Ocean.</p> -<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第六天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤繼續主問。</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/s5bxOG9.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> +<p><strong>Benedict Hamlyn</strong> is a geopolitical specialist. Benedict currently works as Gatehouse Advisory Partners’ Network/Source Manager having joined as an Associate. He is responsible for strategically enabling client delivery by engaging and managing the expert network of 2,500 individuals across the globe.</p>Benedict HamlynChinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.【黎智英案・審訊第卌四日】2024-03-13T12:00:00+08:002024-03-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-44<ul> + <li>李宇軒出庭作供：為爭取國際關注香港示威 發起眾籌及G20登報計劃</li> + <li>紀錄顯示兩間公司墊支G20登報費 李宇軒：陳梓華稱「上頭」憂走數故簽借據</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="蘋果論壇版曾刊登有關加拿大救生艇文章-楊清奇指香港監察關注港人權">《蘋果》論壇版曾刊登有關加拿大救生艇文章 楊清奇指「香港監察」關注港人權</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>控方向楊清奇展示數篇曾刊登於《蘋果》的評論文章，其中一篇在2020年11月24日刊登於報紙論壇版的文章〈加拿大加入救生艇計劃〉，由「香港監察」高級政策顧問 Sam Goodman 撰寫。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XXQlo6M.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>楊表示記得這篇文章是由同事交給他的，相信 Sam Goodman 提供了中英文版本。控方遂展示時任英文版主筆盧峯（馮偉光）與楊清奇之間的訊息紀錄，盧峯指「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）轉交其同事 Sam Goodman 的文章，並提供了中英文版本。盧峯並表示英文版會刊登，問楊清奇是否有興趣在中文論壇版刊登。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（13日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第44日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，相隔逾一年再度在法庭露面。李供稱，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，他與其他市民在 Telegram 群組討論在多國報紙刊登廣告，「因為當時喺香港已經有幾次好有畫面嘅示威場面」，所以眾人希望「將個關注同 momentum（運動的氣勢）帶到去國際舞台，去攞國際嘅支持」，遂開始眾籌廣告費。公開財務紀錄顯示，該次眾籌計劃籌得逾673萬元。李指，由於籌得款項需時轉帳至其銀行個人戶口，所以未能立即動用款項支付廣告費。案中另一名串謀者、被告陳梓華當時聯絡他商討墊支事宜，二人始相識，李稱：「佢（陳）去問過 uncle 或者其他人，咁佢就話嗰度可以動用到五球（500萬元）啦」，控方追問「uncle」是指誰人，李則指陳並未有提及，「可能泛指一啲男人或者其他人」，而非有血緣關係的親戚。</p> -<p>楊表示，以他所知羅傑斯是「香港監察」的負責人，其文章曾被刊登於《蘋果》英文版，中文版則沒有印象。控方遂展示羅傑斯的文章〈Aversion to Beijing’s bellicose diplomacy is escalating in Europe（歐洲對北京戰狼外交政策反感俱增）〉，刊登於《蘋果》英文版網站。楊指「佢個機構都係比較關注香港人權嘅」，至於羅傑斯的寫作角度，楊則稱沒有留意他的文章，未能回答到此問題。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒已認罪-惟需等待黎智英審訊結果-相隔2年半尚未判刑">李宇軒已認罪 惟需等待黎智英審訊結果 相隔2年半尚未判刑</h4> -<h4 id="楊清奇稱對方鄺頌晴寫作角度無印象">楊清奇稱對方鄺頌晴寫作角度無印象</h4> +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇昨日完成作供。控方今早開始傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒出庭，以「從犯證人」身份作供。李身穿深藍色厚褸，戴黑色粗框眼鏡，由三名懲教人員帶領下，從法庭特別通道進入法庭。李在證人台手持聖經，以基督教形式宣誓。在作供期間，李不時在庭內四處張望，並曾經望向被告欄。</p> -<p>控方續展示由鄺頌晴（Glacier Kwong）撰寫的文章〈Why people reckon upon Germany speaking up against human rights violations〉，在2021年1月28日刊於《蘋果》英文版網站。</p> +<p>李宇軒於2021年8月19日在高院承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪；他另被控的「串謀協助罪犯罪」及「無牌管有彈藥罪」則存檔於法庭，獲不提證供起訴。李其後分別於2022年1月3日、5月3日和9月16日出席提訊，惟因為需等待黎智英的審訊結果才處理判刑，李認罪至今相隔逾2年6個月，仍尚未判刑。李是次出庭作供，是自2022年9月提訊以來，首次再度在法庭露面。</p> -<p>楊表示「我唔認識呢個作者嘅」，只是間中見到她的文章在英文版刊出。至於鄺的寫作角度，楊亦表示「無特別印象」。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒確認已承認勾結控罪">李宇軒確認已承認「勾結」控罪</h4> -<h4 id="楊清奇指前眾新聞主筆楊健興支持新聞自由">楊清奇指前《眾新聞》主筆楊健興支持新聞自由</h4> +<p>控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行先作主問。李確認他曾接受大學教育，懂得中文和英文。控方指，不爭議的是李在2020年8月被警方以「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」等罪拘捕。李表示：「我冇爭議。」</p> -<p>控方提及已停運的《眾新聞》前主筆楊健興所撰寫的文章〈National Security Law targets small but hits big〉，在2021年3月31日刊登於《蘋果》英文版網站。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/98zaItN.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行（左）</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dhgmnRP.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 楊健興（資料圖片）</p> +<p>控方續指，李在2021年3月24日被控「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪，該控罪指李連同黎智英、Mark Simon、陳梓華和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人，在2020年7月1日至2021年2月15日，一同串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全。李表示：「具體3月幾多號唔記得，不過係咁上下。」控方續指，李於同年7月7日在裁判法院承認「串謀勾結」控罪，而他另外面對的「串謀協助罪犯罪」及「無牌管有彈藥罪」則存檔於法庭。李確認，不過不記得具體日子。</p> -<p>楊清奇指，楊健興是當時的記協主席，在《蘋果》中文論壇版是自由撰稿人，他一般會就新聞事件邀請楊健興撰稿，「佢係好強調新聞自由，好支持新聞自由」。楊清奇亦確認，根據「飯盒會」會議紀錄重點，黎曾同意邀請《立場新聞》、《眾新聞》和《端傳媒》等網媒寫手撰文。他補充，上述楊健興的英文文章並不是由中文論壇版的文章翻譯而成的。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指備登報計劃期間認識陳梓華-商討墊支廣告費">李宇軒指備登報計劃期間認識陳梓華 商討墊支廣告費</h4> -<p>控方另展示由 Joseph Long 撰寫的〈A growing threat〉和 Michael Cox 撰寫的〈Time for UK to bring HSBC to heel〉。楊表示不認識這兩名作者。</p> +<p>控方指陳梓華是控罪的串謀者之一，並問李是否認識陳。李表示認識陳，若果他沒記錯的話，二人在2019年6月首次在 Telegram 認識，當時他並不知道陳的名字叫陳梓華，因陳以「T」的身份與他溝通。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指桑普較激進支持港獨-蘋果論壇只採用不涉港獨文章">楊清奇指桑普較激進、支持港獨 《蘋果》論壇只採用不涉港獨文章</h4> +<p>李指，當時G20峰會將於2019年6月下旬在日本舉行，在6月上旬或中旬的時候，有一些香港市民，包括他和陳梓華，打算在不同報紙登廣告，「就傾緊一個有關登報嘅 idea」，於是眾人就在一個 Telegram 群組參與討論。</p> -<p>控方問及桑普，楊指他「係屬於激進啲」，他知道桑普在網上發表的文章都是支持港獨，但因為《蘋果》論壇版不支持港獨，所以他們採用桑普的文章是不會談及港獨。</p> +<p>李形容：「大家喺個 group 度好 supportive of 呢個 idea，因為當時喺香港已經有幾次好有畫面嘅示威場面」，所以眾人希望「將個關注同 momentum（運動的氣勢）帶到去國際舞台，去攞國際嘅支持」。由於他們希望登報廣告能夠「ride on G20」（乘著G20的時機），「所以啲廣告想盡量喺G20開會之前就出晒」，而錢銀問題則想在此前解決好。</p> -<p>至於李兆富（Simon Lee），楊指他的文章多數與經濟有關，會用經濟學的角度去分析社會問題和政治問題。楊又表示，對於李的文章，「其實我啲同事同讀者都會覺得悶」，所以沒有文章令他印象深刻。</p> +<p>李解釋，由於眾籌結束後，本來想透過「PayPal」將款項轉帳至其個人戶口，惟不知為何「PayPal」戶口被凍結，遂轉用「Stripe」將款項轉帳至其渣打銀行的個人帳戶，而相關轉帳手續需時，所以他未能立即動用所籌得的款項，「所以我用晒自己戶口啲積蓄，大概墊咗三球幾（300萬元），但係就唔夠墊支啲廣告費，所以就有頭先講嘅 money issue。」</p> -<p>控方問到李的寫作角度，楊指「佢政治立場都好明顯係支持民主派」，而且李的觀點與黎的觀點都很一致，所以黎有找他負責處理 Twitter 帳戶。</p> +<p>李指嚴格來說，他理應在廣告刊出之前三日便需向報館繳清廣告費。就在他需要就廣告費向報館「找數」的時候，「T」經 Telegram 的私人對話聯絡李。經「T」查證李不夠錢支付廣告費之後，「T」聲稱會找「佢哋嗰邊啲人」幫忙墊支。至於「佢哋嗰邊啲人」是指什麼人，李指「T」當時並未有說清楚。在6月的時候，李只知道曾墊支的有 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高。據控方開案陳詞，兩間公司分別由 Mark Simon 和黎智英持有。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指安裕支持民主派-國安法生效後憂紅線間中停稿">楊清奇指安裕支持民主派 國安法生效後憂紅線、間中停稿</h4> +<h4 id="李宇軒表示當時支持香港的民主運動-登報計劃為了爭取國際關注">李宇軒表示當時支持香港的民主運動 登報計劃為了爭取國際關注</h4> -<p>控方提及已故作家李怡因年紀大而減產，並問楊知不知道黎智英是否認識李怡。楊則指李怡曾經是《蘋果》的主筆，「黎先生冇理由唔識佢嘅。」</p> +<p>控方問「登報計劃」是什麼。李回答：「係眾籌、盡量搵多啲國際報紙登廣告，而啲廣告係有關當時香港嘅民主運動嘅」，目的是提高國際對於當時香港民主運動的關注。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QQoME5h.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 李怡（已歿）</p> +<p>法官李運騰問李是否支持當時的運動，李表示：「係，當時我係支持。」李官又問，登報計劃是為了爭取國際社會的支持，李回答：「我同意。」</p> -<p>控方另提及錢志健，楊指錢曾經是《蘋果》的專欄作家，但是「我係取消咗佢專欄嘅」。他記不起取消專欄的原因，只記得在大概2018年發生。楊指在2019年，《蘋果》論壇版基本上已沒有錢志健的文章，但後來《國安法》生效，論壇版不夠作者撰文，因此錢有時投稿，楊曾經用過一至兩次。</p> +<p>李稱當時使用眾籌平台「GoGetFunding」，至於當時呼籲市民捐款時使用的字眼，他表示不記得具體字眼，只記得大概是希望「去畀當時嘅國際社會知道，當時嘅香港示威活動發生咩事」。</p> -<p>另一名作者、資深新聞工作者安裕（姜國元），楊指他是很著名的專欄作家，惟《國安法》生效之後，「間唔中話要停稿、請假，佢都係對《國安法》劃出咗一條紅線有擔憂。」楊又指，安裕很熟悉美國政治，所以其文章除了涉及香港情況之外，還會涉及美國。至於安裕的寫作角度，楊指：「簡單嚟講，佢都係支持民主派嘅。」</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指眾籌超額完成-事後與陳梓華親身見面">李宇軒指眾籌超額完成 事後與陳梓華親身見面</h4> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎認為西方對中共制裁不會緩和肯定制裁成效">楊清奇指黎認為西方對中共制裁不會緩和、肯定制裁成效</h4> +<p>控方問李當時有否在 Telegram 群組宣傳眾籌計劃。李表示以他所知，Telegram 群組內其中一名用戶，在「連登」討論區有一個帳號叫「家樂牌通心粉」，當時該帳戶「就本來已經好 hit」、「有好多人關注㗎喇」，而「家樂牌通心粉」在「連登」轉載上述眾籌網站，所以令更多人知道眾籌計劃。</p> -<p>關於黎智英的個人觀點，控方展示兩篇黎發表於個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」的文章。其中一篇為〈時間就是武器〉，楊引述當中一段，黎指不相信美國等西方國家對中共的制裁會緩和下來，中共與美國等西方國家關係的關係大勢已去，暫時是無法逆轉的。楊指以上是黎對中美關係形勢的判斷。</p> +<p>被問到當時眾籌的目標金額，李表示不記得，「不過我記得個 target 無爆咗，所以最尾大概籌咗七球幾（逾700萬）」，所以他相信當時的眾籌目標是低於700萬。</p> -<p>就另一篇文章〈大時代即將來臨〉，楊清奇引述其中一段：「中美關係惡化，是十年八載解決不了的問題，期間中國企業投資停滯，將是個大隱憂。很明顯，中共與美國對抗造成的經濟和政治損失，實在來得太大，甚至大到觸發成為對中共政權認受性的挑戰。保不住經濟，中共將保不住政權。與美國對抗造成的實質和信心創傷，預示中共將大禍臨頭。」楊表示據他理解，黎在以上段落肯定了制裁的成效。</p> +<p>李供稱，在登報計劃完結之後，他與陳梓華曾經相約在金鐘太古廣場親身單獨見面，因陳想將一些匯款通知交給他，會面結束之後，陳隨即返回附近的辦公室。李解釋：「喺佢（陳）知道咗我需要幫手墊支，然後佢幫手墊咗幾次支，之後佢就要畀 remittance advice，所以就去見面喇。」</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時落井下石是好時機">楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時落井下石是好時機</h4> +<h4 id="李宇軒陳梓華稱可找uncle協助墊支廣告費-惟未說明所指誰人">李宇軒：陳梓華稱可找「uncle」協助墊支廣告費 惟未說明所指誰人</h4> -<p>楊早前證供提及，時任美國副總統彭斯於2018年10月在哈特遜研究所（Hudson Institute）發表演講時提及美國對華政策，黎當時認為演講內容意味「美國反檯」，以楊的觀察，自此黎的政治立場轉趨激進。</p> +<p>控方問李，陳梓華首次聯絡他的時候，是如何介紹自己的。李則表示：「我唔記得，mostly likely 佢冇介紹自己。」</p> -<p>控方展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的訊息，楊在同年10月5日向黎傳送彭斯演講翻譯全文。黎其後表示：「剛聽了彭斯演講、反檯，美國帶領西方日本等國重新調整中國政策明顯不過了，這是針對習現在弱勢而來的。時機正好！」楊其後表示：「美中現在不是貿易戰，是全面開戰咁」，黎回應：「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石。」</p> +<p>李亦表示，他不記得與陳對話的具體內容，不過大概意思是，「佢（陳）問我大概要墊支幾多，之後佢就話會諗計」；相隔不久後，陳傳來回覆，大概意思是：「佢去問過 uncle 或者其他人，咁佢就話嗰度可以動用到五球（500萬元）啦，咁有需要嘅時候就可以搵佢喇。」李補充，陳曾提及「當然係墊支，所以之後要畀返佢」，但他不記得陳何時說過上述說話。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Las1PAd.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> +<p>控方追問李，陳有否向他提及「Uncle」實際上是指誰人。李說：「冇，除咗我理解佢講嘅『uncle』唔一定係 blood uncle（有血緣關係的叔叔），而係可能泛指一啲男人或者其他人。」</p> -<p>楊庭上解釋，黎之所以說「時機正好」，是因為他認為國家主席習近平「係比較弱勢」，美國在這個時機轉變對華政策，而「呢個時機係好嘅」。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒指其角色是提出登報主意操作眾籌戶口和管理帳目">李宇軒指其角色是提出登報主意、操作眾籌戶口和管理帳目</h4> -<p>控方追問楊是指什麼「時機」、要做什麼。楊則引述黎的訊息「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石」，亦正如他撰寫及傳送給黎的社評標題：〈【蘋論】美國發宣戰檄文 香港挺身撞槍口〉。楊指：「2019年發生嘅反修例事件，就係撞正個槍口。」</p> +<p>被問到李在登報計劃中的角色，李表示「我係其中一個 bring up 呢個 idea 嘅人，同埋我係實際上操作嗰個眾籌戶口嘅人」；此外，他後來有協助墊支，以及「有份 keep 條數」，因為眾籌戶口是以他的電郵開設的。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英擅長把握形勢和讀者需要-而調整報紙立場">楊清奇指黎智英擅長把握形勢和讀者需要 而調整報紙立場</h4> +<p>控方又問到陳梓華的角色，李指「我諗佢（陳）係其中一個 bring up 呢個 idea 嘅人」，他亦有幫忙聯絡報紙和墊支。</p> -<p>控方再追問「撞正個槍口」是什麼意思。楊引述「美國發宣戰檄文 香港挺身撞槍口」，指「美國舉槍對住中國嘅時候，香港就挺身擋住個槍口，自己送一個目標畀美國打」。</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒透露以化名tong-lo身份公開登報財務紀錄">李宇軒透露以化名「Tong Lo」身份公開登報財務紀錄</h4> -<p>控方問以上觀點與黎智英有何關係。楊表示正如他早前作供時所說，他認為黎曾經是一個成功的商人，擅長把握市場和顧客的需求，當黎辦報紙的時候，他一樣擅長把握形勢和讀者的需要，當時見到美國對華政策的改變，都會調整報紙立場。</p> +<p>控方向李展示登報計劃的公開財務紀錄，題為「Income and expenditure statement《眾籌G20各國報章頭版公開信》」，由2019年6月25日至7月2日。李確認他們曾向17間報館公司支付廣告費，但不一定是17份報紙。李亦確認他們登廣告的報紙遍及13個國家。</p> -<p>法官李運騰追問以上是為了什麼目的。楊表示，未有與黎討論過目的，但是以他觀察《蘋果》報紙的變化，他認為在反修例期間，「《蘋果》立場嘅激進係眾所周知啦，新聞報導就成日見到『上街』呢兩個字嘅，我覺得唔係好嘅標題」，因為「成日見到『今日上街，明日上街，今日又上街，明日又上街』，我唔覺得係好嘅標題」。</p> +<p>財務紀錄亦顯示，在眾籌平台「GoGetFund」籌得超過670萬元，在「PayPal」則籌得2.6萬元，合共約673萬元。而廣告費則合共約602.3萬元，扣除手續費之後，眾籌計劃錄得盈餘約15萬元。李確認。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指蘋果新聞報導落實和勇不分和不譴責不割蓆不篤灰">楊清奇指《蘋果》新聞報導落實「和勇不分」和「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」</h4> +<p>財務紀錄下方的署名是「Tong Lo」並附有簽名，李稱：「係我嘅 pseudo name（化名）。」另一個署名是「Tong M Man」，李則稱是一個會計師。</p> -<p>楊又提到黎的專欄文章經常呼籲人上街，從黎的專欄和《蘋果》的報導可見，對於「和勇不分」這口號，黎和整個《蘋果》都「比較寬容、比較支持嘅」。</p> +<p>翻查報導，李宇軒與另外11人在2020年8月被內地水警截獲，同年12月與其中7人一同被判「偷越邊境罪成」，2021年3月在內地服刑完畢，隨即被移交至本港警方。</p> -<p>楊補充，「和勇不分」主要有三個「不」，包括「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」，從《蘋果》的報導和評論來看，「係落實咗呢三個『不』嘅。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/R133f0E.png" alt="image03" /></p> -<p>控方問到，《國安法》生效之後，《蘋果》以上立場有否改變。楊則表示當時沒有收到任何指示，「基本上冇再提『三不』嘅，但都冇話過立場改變。」</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（13日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第44日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，相隔逾一年再度在法庭露面。李供稱他在2019年6月籌備在G20前夕在不同國家的報紙登頭版廣告，控方在庭上展示多份G20廣告的付款和匯款紀錄，顯示《衛報》、《晚郵報》和《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費用，分別由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高顧問有限公司墊支。李憶述，在等待還款安排期間，另一名被告陳梓華聲稱：「『上頭嘅人』有壓力，想做啲嘢確保嗰筆錢會返番去」，於是雙方簽訂借據以防李「走數」。後來陳叫李透過一間公司的銀行戶口還錢，李遂歸還了156萬元。</p> -<p>控方表示主問完畢。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻表示，需時整理盤問方向，申請押後至明天才開始盤問，獲法官批准。</p> +<p>控方今早開始傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒出庭，以「從犯證人」身份作供。李身穿白色恤衫和深藍色厚褸，戴黑色粗框眼鏡，由三名懲教人員帶領下，從法庭特別通道進入法庭，期間不時望向旁聽席。</p> -<hr /> +<p>李早上供稱，2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌和在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。李當時遇到錢銀問題，案中另一名被告陳梓華以「T」的身份經 Telegram 與他溝通，協助墊支廣告費，惟他當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時轉變對華政策、落井下石是好時機Forward Defense2024-03-11T12:00:00+08:002024-03-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/forward-defense<p><em>Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States’ role in Europe.</em></p> +<h4 id="庭上展示多國廣告-包括巴黎日報澳洲人報">庭上展示多國廣告 包括《巴黎日報》、《澳洲人報》</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>控方提及其中一份刊登廣告的《巴黎日報》，李確認並以標準的法語讀出《巴黎日報》的法語名稱「Le Parisien」。控方指廣告上有以法語寫成的「向送中條例說不」，李則指相關句子的英語翻譯應該是「No to the project of Extradition Bill to China」，而非「No to the Extradition Bill to China」。</p> -<p>This report examines U.S. force posture in Europe — including the military capabilities, personnel, infrastructure, and agreements that support defense operations and plans — and makes recommendations for future U.S. posture. It finds that the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression.</p> +<p>李提到，當時《巴黎日報》的廣告費應該不是21,600歐羅，而是18,000歐羅，因為 T 聲稱「唔小心以為要畀埋 VAT（增值稅）」；至於發票上為何標註一粒星及「overpay」，李表示不知道，因為從「T」手上收到這份文件時已經有。</p> -<p>First, the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression. Russia will likely remain a dangerous threat to the United States and Europe over the next several years. Russian president Vladimir Putin retains the political will and intentions to expand Russian power abroad, and Russia is reconstituting its military capabilities with help from China, Iran, and North Korea. A significant downsizing of U.S. forces in Europe could severely weaken deterrence and embolden a revanchist Russia.</p> +<p>控方提到另一個登報廣告例子，刊於意大利的《晚郵報》（Corrierre Della Sera）。李確認文件顯示的廣告版本有刊登過。</p> -<p>Second, the United States should permanently station a U.S. Army armored brigade combat team (ABCT) in Poland to strengthen deterrence and reassure the United States’ Eastern European allies in response to a long-term Russian threat. Shifting the current rotational ABCT from Operation Atlantic Resolve to a permanent presence in Poland should be part of a 4+2 posture in Europe. This posture would include four U.S. brigade combat teams (BCTs) — three forward-stationed BCTs in Poland, Italy, and Germany, along with one rotational BCT in Romania — and two divisional headquarters, in Germany and Poland.</p> +<p>控方展一份含有韓語的廣告，寫有「홍콩을 도와 주 세요」（請援助香港）和「STAND WITH HONG KONG AT G20」。李確認相關廣告有刊登，但是不肯定是哪一份報紙，因為他們不只在一份韓國報紙登廣告。</p> -<p>Third, the U.S. Army should remain a bulwark for deterrence in Europe. A war against China in the Indo-Pacific will likely center on air and naval operations. However, some ground forces — from the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and allies and partners — will be helpful for both deterrence and warfighting, including on the Korean peninsula.</p> +<p>另一份刊登在《澳洲人報》（The Australian）的廣告，同樣寫有「STAND WITH HONG KONG AT G20」。控方展示由《澳洲人報》在6月26日發出的發票，上款是一名叫 Anson Cheung 的人。李表示不知他是誰，也不記得為何上款寫他的名字，但估計他可能是其中一個負責聯絡 The Australian 的人。</p> -<p>In examining U.S. posture in Europe, this study asks three main questions. What are the main security threats in Europe for the United States and its allies? What are U.S. interests in Europe? What is the appropriate U.S. force posture in Europe? In answering these questions, this study comes to several broad conclusions.</p> +<h4 id="文件顯示-mark-simon-名下公司代李宇軒支付衛報廣告費">文件顯示 Mark Simon 名下公司代李宇軒支付《衛報》廣告費</h4> -<h4 id="enduring-us-interests-in-europe">Enduring U.S. Interests in Europe</h4> +<p>控方提到《衛報》（The Guardian）有刊登廣告，並展示相關發票，匯款紀錄顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 代表李宇軒向《衛報》支付18,000英磅廣告費。控方問李，「T」有否告訴他為什麼會用這間公司來支付費用，李回答沒有，當時也沒有向「T」查問。據控方開案陳詞，Lais Hotel Property Limited 由黎智英的私人助手 Mark Simon 持有。</p> -<p>The United States has several enduring interests in Europe. They include protecting the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people from threats based in Europe, including from Russia; promoting and expanding economic prosperity and opportunity; realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and defending and supporting the United States’ European allies. While some U.S. politicians and pundits have questioned the value of NATO, U.S. interests in Europe remain significant and enduring. Still, a number of European governments need to increase defense spending in light of the precarious security environment. Numerous NATO countries (especially those on NATO’s eastern flank) spend over 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, such as Poland (3.9 percent), Estonia (2.73 percent), Lithuania (2.54 percent), Finland (2.45 percent), and the United Kingdom (2.07 percent). But some others do not.</p> +<p>控方提到李在今天早上作供時，轉述「T」聲稱有一些「uncle」可以動用到500萬元墊支，問以上做法是否有關。此時辯方代表大律師 Marc Corlett 打斷，就控方的提問方式提出關注，因涉及揣測和傳聞證供（hearsay）。法官杜麗冰亦指，李剛才已經回答了陳梓華未談及原因。法官李運騰指，證人已經說了他尋求資金，然後他得到金錢來支付廣告費，就是這樣，質疑控方還有什麼想問。控方最終不就此發問。</p> -<h4 id="persistent-russian-threat">Persistent Russian Threat</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TEHanlu.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）</p> -<p>Russia will likely remain a significant and dangerous threat to the United States and NATO. Russia likely does not pose an immediate conventional threat to NATO. Over the next several years, however, there are several factors that could change the military balance in Europe. The United States could become overstretched with a war against China in the Indo-Pacific, North Korea on the Korean Peninsula, or Iran or terrorist groups in the Middle East. In addition, Russia could continue to rebuild its military over the next several years with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. A Russian military victory in Ukraine — or even significant Russian military advances on the battlefield — would also increase the Russian threat.</p> +<p>控方續展示在2019年6月28日刊登於法國《世界報》（Le Monde）的G20廣告，惟未有提及廣告費由誰支付。</p> -<h4 id="forward-defense-posture">Forward Defense Posture</h4> +<h4 id="黎智英名下力高顧問公司支付意大利報紙廣告費">黎智英名下力高顧問公司支付意大利報紙廣告費</h4> -<p>The United States should take several steps to enhance its posture in Europe over the next several years in ways that are sustainable and affordable:</p> +<p>另一份發票是由 RCS Media Group 發出的，李指這是有關向意大利《晚郵報》（Corriere Della Sera）支付的2萬元歐羅。付款紀錄顯示，力高顧問有限公司（Dico Consultants Limited）在2019年6月29日向 RCS Media Group 支付了廣告費用。據控方開案陳詞，力高是由黎智英持有的公司。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Ground:</strong> The United States should adopt a 4+2 posture beginning in 2025 that consists of four U.S. BCTs — in Poland, Italy, Germany, and Romania — and two headquarters, in Germany and Poland. This force posture would involve eventually shifting from a rotational to a permanent ABCT in Poland to strengthen deterrence against a revanchist Russia.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Air:</strong> The United States should maintain all seven forward-deployed fighter squadrons currently based in Europe and add an additional F-16 squadron to Spangdahlem Air Base.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Maritime:</strong> The United States should continue its current naval presence in the Baltic Sea region to deter Russian aggression and strengthen interoperability with allies and partners. In addition, the U.S. Navy should supplement existing NATO anti-submarine warfare capabilities by developing and deploying additional systems to the region.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Prepositioned Equipment and Munitions Stockpiles:</strong> The United States should bolster its prepositioned equipment and munitions stocks in Europe to enhance the readiness of U.S. forces. While the Army Prepositioned Stock 2 has been somewhat augmented by funding from the European Deterrence Initiative, the U.S. Army should take additional steps to improve the readiness of this equipment and the forces overseeing it.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Integrated Air and Missile Defense:</strong> The United States should increase air and missile defense capabilities in Poland in coordination with a permanent ABCT. Given the utility of, and demand for, air and missile defense assets across multiple combatant commands, the Army should also prioritize the development and deployment of additional Patriot battalions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Nuclear Posture:</strong> The United States should increase modernization efforts, exercises, and scheduled deployments of assets to the European theater to bolster its deterrent capabilities and reassure allies. This includes modernizing its gravity bombs with the new B61-12. The U.S. military and NATO should also continue to conduct exercises with nuclear-capable platforms, including Bomber Task Force missions, to enhance readiness and assure allies of U.S. support.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Cyber and Space:</strong> U.S. forces should continue to enhance the security and resilience of their cyber systems and networks while simultaneously assisting European partners and allies. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) should deploy additional “hunt forward” teams to Europe to counter threats from Russia and Russian-backed groups to U.S. forces and allies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Security Cooperation:</strong> The United States should help strengthen European military capabilities and encourage greater investment in such areas as combat support, including short-range air defense and long-range fires; airlift; heavy maneuver forces; maritime capabilities, including sensors and survivability systems; sufficient quantities of long-range precision strike weapons; and multi-spectrum ranges to train and maintain high-readiness forces. Security cooperation efforts should also involve additional security assistance, arms sales, training, partner capacity missions, industrial base cooperation, and strategic coordination between the United States, NATO, and European states on the development of forces and capabilities. Still, a number of European governments need to increase defense spending in light of the precarious security environment.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>控方問李，「T」有否向他談及力高。李指沒有。控方再問，「T」有否在任何時候向他談及過力高。李表示：「以我記憶所及，冇，除咗呢張 invoice 係畀我嘅。所以 Dico 條數就要加埋去 T 嗰邊嘅人，有關 T 嗰邊嘅人找過嘅數，所以最尾要還返錢嘅時候就要還埋呢條數。」</p> -<p>Europe remains a vital region for the United States. The last two U.S. national security and national defense strategies prioritized China as the main global threat. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, continuing aggression, and growing cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea are stark reminders that the United States has significant and enduring interests in Europe as well.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱專心處理眾籌-故不記得誰人設計和草擬g20廣告">李宇軒稱專心處理眾籌 故不記得誰人設計和草擬G20廣告</h4> -<h3 id="ch-01">CH. 01</h3> -<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> +<p>控方展示刊登於《華盛頓郵報》的廣告期間，法官李素蘭問及廣告是由誰人草擬。李表示：「我唔清楚，因為我冇參與去設計呢啲廣告」，他亦沒有參與撰寫相關文字。他指，當時群組成員表示想登報，所以有的人去聯絡報紙，有的人去設計廣告和撰寫文字，「我去咗搞 crowdfund，所以我唔係好清楚其他組員去咗做啲乜。」</p> -<p>Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine dramatically shifted the strategic landscape in Europe, triggering the most devastating war in Europe since World War II. More Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine than in all previous Soviet and Russian wars combined since World War II, including Russia’s bloody wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The war has caused the most significant refugee crisis in Europe since World War II, driving over 6 million refugees to Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, and other countries. The war also has had substantial humanitarian implications, causing widespread civilian deaths and destruction in Ukraine and disrupting public access to water, electricity, heating, health care, and education.</p> +<p>被問到有多少人參與G20登報計劃，李表示不清楚，「因為我當時專心做緊 crowdfund 嘅嘢，至於 group 入面有幾多人，我唔清楚。」</p> -<p>In addition, Russian leaders have threatened to use nuclear weapons, raising concerns about nuclear escalation. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council and a former Russian president, remarked, “Just imagine that the [Ukrainian] offensive . . . in tandem with NATO, succeeded and end up with part of our land being taken away. Then we would have to use nuclear weapons by virtue of the stipulations of the Russian Presidential Decree.” He continued by warning that “our enemies should pray to our fighters that they do not allow the world to go up in nuclear flames.” In response, some Western leaders have worried that Russia might consider using tactical nuclear weapons if Moscow faces sustained military losses in Ukraine. “Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they’ve faced so far, militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons,” remarked William J. Burns, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in April 2022.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒轉述t聲稱有上面嘅人擔心拖數-雙方簽借據">李宇軒轉述T聲稱「有上面嘅人」擔心拖數 雙方簽借據</h4> -<p>Despite Russian aggression and an escalation in tensions between NATO and Russia, two consecutive U.S. administrations have committed to shifting military resources to the Indo-Pacific to deal with China. The Biden administration’s Global Posture Review identified the Indo-Pacific as the most important region for U.S. national security to “advance initiatives that contribute to regional stability and deter potential Chinese military aggression and threats from North Korea.” In addition, the administration’s National Defense Strategy reaffirmed that the United States’ is prioritizing the Indo-Pacific region in its efforts to counter China.</p> +<p>至於參與處理眾籌的人，李稱：「我諗有我、accountant 去睇嗰條數，有『家樂牌通心粉』（在連登討論區）出嗰個 post 啦，另外有我同 T 嗰邊墊支過啲錢啦，係同錢有關嘅就係呢啲喇。」</p> -<p>Nevertheless, there is a need to re-evaluate U.S. force posture in Europe based on Russia’s aggressive military actions and the prospect of a protracted war in Ukraine. Future U.S. posture in Europe has significant implications for deterring adversaries in Europe and other regions, including the Indo-Pacific; assuring allies and partners in Europe and other regions; fighting wars effectively if deterrence fails; and preserving security institutions, including NATO. There have been numerous studies on U.S. posture in Europe over the past several years. But the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, expansion of NATO to Finland and Sweden, and Russian threats to Poland, Baltic states, and other countries create an urgent need to re-examine U.S. defense posture in Europe.</p> +<p>控方又問「T嗰邊」涉及多少人。李稱：「至少有 T，同埋有一個叫『Banker』嘅⋯⋯我唔知係咪一個人嚟。」他指後來有「簽借據」事宜，其時「T嗰邊」便再涉及多4至5個人。</p> -<h4 id="research-design">RESEARCH DESIGN</h4> +<p>法官李運騰要求李闡述什麼是「簽借據」事件。李則指，在2019年7月的時候，他曾向 T 查詢歸還墊支款項的方法，而T則表示「等佢嗰邊嘅人 arrange 吓」。在等待期間，T 聲稱「有上面嘅人唔係好 comfortable with 我拖住呢舊錢」，惟李認為這是因為 T 尚未提供一個讓他還錢的帳戶。</p> -<p>In light of these challenges, this report asks several questions. First, what are the main security threats in Europe for the United States and its allies? Second, what are U.S. interests in Europe? Third, what is the appropriate U.S. force posture in Europe?</p> +<p>李續指：「As a stop gap measure（臨時方案），佢（T）就約咗我去金鐘嘅 Lippo Centre」，在一間咖啡店見面，T 並安排了兩名見證人，一個是 T 一方的見證人，另一個是李一方的見證人，「咁就簽咗一份 promissory note，嗰份文件真係用 promissory note 呢隻字。」</p> -<p>To answer these research questions, the report pursues a mixed methods approach. To answer the first question, it assesses the conventional and nuclear balance in Europe in such areas as land, air, maritime, and nuclear capabilities. It also examines Russia’s attempts to reconstitute its military, the nature of the Russian threat to the West over the next several years, and European capabilities and capability gaps. To answer the second question, the report outlines U.S. interests and objectives in the context of broader U.S. strategic considerations. To answer the third question, the report assesses U.S. posture in several domains: land (including forward-stationed forces, rotational forces, and Army Prepositioned Stocks); air (including sensors, fighter aircraft, integrated air and missile defense, and long-range strike); naval (including all-domain naval operations, theater security cooperation, prepositioning, and the deployment of carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups and Marine expeditionary units, and the U.S. Sixth and Second Fleets); space (including coordination with U.S. Space Command); cyber (including coordination with Joint Force Headquarters–Cyber and U.S. Cyber Command); and nuclear (including nuclear forces and dual-capable aircraft).</p> +<p>李指，借據內容是「我爭 T 錢，個金額啱啱係G20佢嗰邊找嗰條數」，大概是156萬港元。他憶述雙方簽署了借據之後，T安排了一間律師樓的人員接收這份借據，不過李並不知道是哪一間律師樓，因為有一或兩個人拿了文件後，「我見佢行咗去𨋢口就上去喇。」</p> -<p>The project team leveraged primary- and secondary-source documents from relevant organizations (such as NATO, U.S. European Command, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, the U.S. Department of State, European countries, and EU officials), open-source materials from policymakers and subject-matter experts, and interviews.</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒轉述t稱簽借據為了擺平上頭嘅人">李宇軒轉述T稱簽借據為了擺平「上頭嘅人」</h4> -<h4 id="definitions">DEFINITIONS</h4> +<p>李轉述T當時聲稱：「呢張 promissory note 係備用嘅啫，因為係用嚟擺平佢當時講嘅『佢上頭嘅人』，嗰啲『上頭嘅人』有壓力，想做啲嘢確保嗰筆錢會返番去。」李轉述，既然有一張借據，「T 就可以同佢哋講有張 promissory note，所以唔使驚會走數喇。」</p> -<p>As used here, force posture refers to the military capabilities, personnel, footprint (including bases, facilities, and support infrastructure), and agreements that support defense operations and plans. U.S. posture in Europe is significantly influenced by agreements with host countries, which provide access to facilities, airspace, and territory. In addition, the number of U.S. military personnel in Europe is based on the deployment of U.S. forces into and out of the region, which increase as assets such as carrier strike groups or Bomber Task Force units flow into Europe and decrease as they depart. While this report focuses on U.S. posture in Europe, the United States’ regional posture is impacted by its global posture. The report adopts a broad definition of Europe in line with the area that is currently in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, which includes 51 countries in Europe and portions of Asia and the Middle East, with a total population of nearly 1 billion people.</p> +<p>李續指，T 後來提供了一個 Chartwell 戶口，叫他經這間公司的戶口歸還款項，所以他把156萬元還給 Chartwell，並把還款的匯款通知書交給 T，自此之後 T 便沒有再提起借據事宜。據控方開案陳詞，李被指向 Chartwell Holding Limited 的公司戶口還款，以避免黎的身份曝光。</p> -<p>Overseas force posture generally involves trade-offs. On the one hand, overseas posture can help a country prepare for military operations, deter adversaries, assure allies and partners, and build local capacity through security cooperation. On the other hand, it can also incur risks by increasing the vulnerability of forces to attack from hostile states, stressing the readiness of the force, encouraging free riding by allies and partners, and potentially dragging forces into unwanted wars.</p> +<p>李表示，當他剛才說簽借據時涉及多4至5個人，就是包括兩名見證人和一個接收文件的律師樓人員，「我就係講緊呢啲人。」</p> -<p>The report examines the viability of strategic and operational concepts, including dynamic force employment and agile combat employment. Dynamic force employment involves deploying U.S. forces in ways that are strategically predictable for allies and operationally unpredictable for competitors. Examples might include deploying fifth-generation fighters, Bomber Task Force missions, U.S. Army or Marine forces, or guided-missile destroyers to various locations in Europe for snap exercises with allies and partners. Agile combat employment involves the use of small, dispersed air bases abroad — rather than relying on large overseas bases — to reduce vulnerability to adversary attacks.</p> +<p>控方另展示《華盛頓郵報》廣告費的付款紀錄，顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 支付了85,050美元。李稱這紀錄是由 T 交給他的。</p> -<h4 id="caveats">CAVEATS</h4> +<p>李宇軒作供未完，案件明日續審。</p> -<p>There are several caveats about what this analysis does — and does not — attempt to do. First, the report does not conduct a systematic cost analysis of U.S. force posture in Europe, though it does broadly discuss the cost implications associated with overseas posture. This report does not build a model that includes the cost of the current condition of overseas and U.S. installations (including a need to modernize installations or restore facilities and capabilities), host-nation support that the U.S. Department of Defense receives when it stations forces in a foreign country, or the incremental costs beyond the United States’ stationing and maintaining overseas bases and forces (including the cost difference in permanent and rotational presence options).</p> +<hr /> -<p>Instead, this report focuses predominantly on strategic and operational U.S. interests, objectives, and force postures in Europe. A detailed cost analysis is important and should be a component of any final U.S. decision on force posture in the Middle East and elsewhere around the globe. But the most important determinants of U.S. force posture in the region are likely to be the relative benefits and risks of U.S. strategic objectives and interests. Additionally, the cost differential in the event of a reduction in U.S. presence in the region would be relatively minor if those forces were deployed elsewhere overseas or returned to the United States. Significant savings would only be generated if the units and force structure elements were deactivated.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒出庭作供：為爭取國際關注香港示威 發起眾籌及G20登報計劃 紀錄顯示兩間公司墊支G20登報費 李宇軒：陳梓華稱「上頭」憂走數故簽借據【黎智英案・審訊第卌三日】2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-43<ul> + <li>楊清奇：黎智英向報紙設下「鳥籠」 編採人員享一定自主但不得超越框架</li> +</ul> -<p>Second, the report does not conduct a systematic analysis of U.S. force posture around the globe. The focus is squarely on Europe. Nevertheless, as highlighted in every chapter of this report, the analysis and conclusions were informed by U.S. global posture considerations. Any decision regarding U.S. force posture in Europe needs to be understood in the context of U.S. national security interests and U.S. posture in other regions — especially the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Third, the report focuses on U.S. military posture in the region. It does not conduct a systematic analysis of all U.S. activity in Europe, including diplomatic activity conducted by the U.S. State Department; intelligence activity conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and other organizations within the U.S. intelligence community; development activity by the U.S. Agency for International Development and non-governmental organizations; and financial, law enforcement, and other activity conducted by such organizations as the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Commerce, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. These non-military actions are critical, and military force should not be viewed as the principal tool to deal with the region’s challenges.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IISEe8t.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>While the report focuses predominantly on U.S. military posture, it does highlight other U.S. government actions where appropriate and acknowledges the importance of diplomacy, development, information operations, and other activities. The report does not conduct a systematic analysis of all NATO or EU militaries, though it does nest the analysis in a broader understanding of European military capabilities and political will.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（12日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第43日審訊。前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊提到傳媒為了吸引特定讀者群，都會有自己的立場，而黎設下了《蘋果》的基本立場，「就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠」，所以難以回答《蘋果》是否有編採自主。控辯雙方皆完成提問，楊作供完畢。控方透露下一名證人為李宇軒，將安排於明日出庭作供。</p> -<h4 id="organization-of-the-report">ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT</h4> +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第七天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻開始盤問。</p> -<p>The rest of this report is divided into several parts and chapters. Part I explores the strategic landscape in Europe. Chapter 2 examines the U.S. military presence in Europe from World War II to today. Chapter 3 analyzes the evolving threat landscape in Europe, including the threat from Russia. Chapter 4 assesses European military capabilities, including at the high-end of the military spectrum. Part II turns to force posture. Chapter 5 provides an overview of U.S. interests in Europe in the context of other U.S. interests at home and abroad, as well as U.S. defense objectives. Chapter 6 offers recommendations for future U.S. force posture in Europe. Chapter 7 assesses alternative options and weighs their pros and cons. Finally, Part III provides a conclusion, with Chapter 9 summarizing the main recommendations.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DXq59sA.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（中）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）</p> -<h2 id="strategic-landscape">STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE</h2> +<h4 id="辯方指訊息顯示楊清奇拒絕黎智英提議">辯方指訊息顯示楊清奇拒絕黎智英提議</h4> -<h3 id="ch-02">CH. 02</h3> -<h3 id="historical-trends">HISTORICAL TRENDS</h3> +<p>在辯方的提問下，楊確認民主制度是良好的，極權制度則是不好的，而民主制度是包含公平的選舉、新聞自由和言論自由，所以《蘋果》論壇版選取文章有三個主要原則，包括「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。楊並確認這些原則是由前任編輯訂下，同事之間都會採用，而且「唔需要日日去講嘅」。</p> -<p>The United States’ military posture in Europe has considerably evolved from the end of World War II to the present. Changes to the number and types of capabilities of U.S. forces in Europe have been driven by several factors, such as the perception of threat posed by the Soviet Union and Russia to the United States and its European allies, the relative balance of military capabilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the evolution of U.S. strategy and political considerations, and the relationship between the United States and its allies.</p> +<p>辯方展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的訊息，黎在2019年9月3日向楊說：「李平兄，看了單偉建先生的文章後請回電。謝謝。」楊後來表示「成1800字，又長又臭，都係玩自欺欺人」，「單先生的文章是老生常談，一個特首連請辭的自由都冇，談何民主進步？論壇版未擬採用。謝謝。」</p> -<p>President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy emphasized a reliance on nuclear weapons, though he was committed to keeping U.S. forces in Europe “as long as the need existed.” The Kennedy and Johnson administrations shifted to a policy of “Flexible Response,” which was adopted by NATO in 1967 and gave the U.S. president the ability to select from a suite of military and non-military options when responding to a crisis. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations largely pursued a policy of detente with the Soviet Union before the Carter administration’s Dual-Track strategy and President Ronald Reagan’s defense buildup. The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War led to a major drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe as the United States prioritized contingencies elsewhere. However, Russian aggression in Ukraine, beginning in 2014 and continuing through the February 2022 invasion, prompted a rethinking of the role and capabilities of U.S. forces in Europe.</p> +<p>辯方指上述訊息可見黎提議楊閱讀單的文章，惟楊拒絕黎的提議。楊則指「唔係一個咁簡單嘅 reject」，因為當時他與黎有使用其他溝通渠道，黎亦有透過時任副社長陳沛敏聯絡他，所以庭上展示的 WhatsApp 訊息只是一部份，並非全部。</p> -<p>This chapter provides a qualitative and quantitative assessment of U.S. military posture in Europe in the post-World War II era to the present. It examines trends in capabilities and personnel, and it identifies strategic and operational inflection points in U.S. force posture. The chapter concludes by presenting a baseline of current U.S. posture and discussing NATO force posture development. The baseline serves to inform the posture options presented in subsequent chapters.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Bwy32yd.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> -<h4 id="trends-in-us-military-personnel-in-europe">TRENDS IN U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN EUROPE</h4> +<p>辯方續指，但是楊能夠對於黎所提議的文章，坦誠地提出自己的觀點。楊確認。</p> -<p>The number of U.S. military personnel in Europe shifted considerably during the Cold War, as shown in Figure 2.1. End strength in Europe peaked in 1957 at 473,000, a significant increase from the 122,000 stationed there in 1950. That figure fell by 45 percent to 262,000 by 1970 during détente. By 1985, however, the number of U.S. military personnel in Europe grew to 359,000 during the Reagan buildup. Following the end of the Cold War, the number of U.S. personnel declined nearly 42 percent by 1992 from 1985 levels, and U.S. forces continued to decrease to a post-World War II low of 66,000 in 2013. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to yet another shift, with the number of U.S. forces increasing to over 100,000 by 2023.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇除了提出特定主題-一般不會干預作者選題和觀點">楊清奇：除了提出特定主題 一般不會干預作者選題和觀點</h4> -<p>More U.S. personnel have been stationed in Europe than any other region during periods of peace. Figure 2.2 compares the deployment of U.S. active-duty military personnel globally. U.S. forces in Asia exceeded those in Europe during the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Despite the drawdown of personnel following the Cold War, more forces remained in Europe than any other region until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.</p> +<p>辯方指，評論文章寫什麼內容是由作者自行決定。楊則指不一定，有時是他向作者提議特定寫作主題，不過除了這種情況以外，文章內容都是由作者決定。</p> -<p>The following sections detail the policy and strategic developments which shaped these trends in U.S. military and capabilities in Europe.</p> +<p>辯方遂展示楊清奇與高橋之間的 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄。高橋於2020年12月5日向楊表示：「下週還是要寫王毅發言與日本傳媒的無知無恥。請理解。」楊翌日表示：「選題與觀點，我們一般不干預。但如果較多讀者不認同，就需要換作者。謝謝🙏」</p> -<h4 id="historical-trends-in-us-force-posture">HISTORICAL TRENDS IN U.S. FORCE POSTURE</h4> +<p>辯方問，是否正如上述訊息所說，《蘋果》一般不會干預作者的選題和觀點。楊確認，但同時指出下一句「但如果較多讀者不認同，就需要換作者」，就如黎智英般，如果編輯的工作表現不合他心意，便會換人。</p> -<p><strong>The End of World War II and Early Stages of the Cold War</strong></p> +<p>辯方另展示2020年12月10日的訊息，楊與高橋談及「美國已死總統」用字，期間楊提議高橋可考慮評論有關新聞，但同時強調：「我說過，我們一般不會干預選題。寫不寫，如何寫，你自己決定。」</p> -<p>Tensions quickly mounted between the Western allies and the Soviet Union despite collaboration between the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union during World War II to defeat the Axis powers. Winston Churchill, following his 1945 electoral defeat, described this emerging incompatibility between allied and Soviet worldviews and interests the following year as the descent of an “iron curtain” over the continent, dividing East from West.</p> +<p>辯方問楊，這種不干預的做法是否適用於所有論壇版作者。楊表示：「講『係』呢，係唔夠準確嘅」，因為事實上他當時已經正在作出干預，他跟高橋說如果文章不符合《蘋果》的立場，可能要換作者，「文章如果唔符合《蘋果》嘅立場，到時候被炒嘅可能係我喇！」不過辯方追問，「寫不寫，如何寫」是由高橋決定，楊則指相關決定是從政治角度出發。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wp6ROpy.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.1: U.S. Active-Duty Military Personnel in Europe.</strong> Source: Compiled by authors from various sources.</em></p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指文章有審批-若倡港獨及明顯違法不會刊登若擦邊球則可登">楊清奇指文章有審批 若倡港獨及明顯違法不會刊登、若擦邊球則可登</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qo2utzr.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.2: U.S. Active-Duty Military Personnel Overseas, 1950–2023.</strong> Source: Compiled by authors from various sources.</em></p> +<p>辯方指，當報紙不合讀者口味時，讀者可以轉看另一份報紙，其實《蘋果》也是提供讀者想看的內容。楊則指，報紙一方面要照顧讀者口味，另一方面都要堅持自己的政治立場和觀點。</p> -<p>Despite these geopolitical warnings, post-World War II peacetime demobilization and drawdowns of forces by Western powers proceeded at a blistering pace. U.S. end strength fell from over 12 million personnel in 1945 to just 1.4 million by 1948. The United States’ military posture in Europe reduced given its transition from an invasion force to an occupation force in Germany. In the late 1940s, the U.S. presence was roughly 150,000. By 1950, the Army’s European Command only controlled one infantry division in Germany, while four were stationed in Japan. By the time of the creation of NATO in 1949, the United States, United Kingdom, and France could barely account for 12 total divisions, which were dedicated primarily to the occupation of Germany. These forces paled in comparison to the 26 Soviet divisions forward deployed in Eastern Europe and the estimated 75 Soviet divisions based in western Russia. On balance, neither the military dimensions nor the military requirements of the emerging competition with the Soviet Union were fully appreciated by Western powers in the early stages of the Cold War.</p> +<p>辯方續指，《蘋果》對於評論作者和文章不會有審批。惟楊表示：「有一個批准嘅，至少都要我睇過覺得OK先可以（刊出）嘅。」</p> -<p>The June 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea fundamentally altered U.S. and Western strategic calculus regarding the roles, missions, and necessity of military forces in confronting an expansionist and aggressive Soviet Union. Communist China and the Soviet Union backed North Korea, and U.S. leaders viewed the conflict as an attempt to impose communist rule by force on non-communist nations. The Truman administration adopted a policy of containment, as outlined in NSC-68, to limit the spread of communist and Soviet influence globally. This strategy required a buildup of both conventional and nuclear forces to meet the expansive demands of deterring and defending against Soviet aggression.</p> +<p>辯方指，這是當然的，如果文章提倡港獨的話，楊便不會刊登。楊確認。辯方續指，如果文章提倡非法行為，也不會獲准刊登。楊回答：「如果係好明顯違法嘅就唔會（刊登）」，但正如他早前提及，「如果擦邊球又符合《蘋果》立場嘅，又避開嗰個違法嘅，就會用。」</p> -<p>The Korean War had the practical effect of waking the United States and Europe up to the military dimensions of the Cold War. Not only did allies contribute troops and capabilities toward the defense of South Korea, but they also began prioritizing the defense of Western Europe against possible Soviet incursions. Following the outbreak of the war, the United States and NATO took steps to significantly increase their military presence. NATO plans in 1950 called for 18 active and 16 reserve divisions. The United States increased its posture in Europe to four divisions and prepositioned equipment and supplies on the continent. In a February 1952 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, NATO pursued an even more ambitious target of reaching 50 active and 46 reserve divisions by 1954. However, NATO failed to meet the Lisbon Force goals, only fielding 25 active and 25 reserve divisions by 1955. During this period, the U.S. military pushed for the creation of an integrated NATO command structure and took on critical NATO staff roles, including a U.S. general as the supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR). The United States also established U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in August 1952.</p> +<p>辯方其後問楊是否同意，「擦邊球」是為了避免觸犯法律，同時又能遵守《蘋果》論壇版揀選評論文章的原則。楊同意。辯方又指楊並不會故意地觸犯法律。楊確認。</p> -<p><strong>New Look and Flexible Response</strong></p> +<h4 id="楊清奇確認曾邀請曾鈺成任志剛和曾俊華撰文">楊清奇確認曾邀請曾鈺成、任志剛和曾俊華撰文</h4> -<p>In 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower, former U.S. Army chief of staff and the first SACEUR, was elected president on a platform of balancing the federal budget. Eisenhower vowed to reduce defense spending, which had spiked under Truman, and to pursue a more sustainable defense strategy. Despite the buildup of U.S. and NATO forces, the West still faced a significant numerical disadvantage against the Soviet Union in Europe. This disparity shaped the development of the Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” strategy of massive retaliation beginning in 1953 and its eventual adoption by NATO in 1957. The policy of massive retaliation emerged out of a strategy review known as Project Solarium, which affirmed the goals of the containment strategy identified by the Truman administration. However, the strategy document which eventually emerged, NSC 162/2, outlined a more economically sustainable deterrent based on a retaliatory nuclear response. This approach reduced the role of conventional Western forces in Europe to a “tripwire” and “delaying force” that would prevent Europe from “being entirely overrun before the effect of the U.S. nuclear attack on the Soviet homeland was fully felt.”</p> +<p>楊清奇早前證供提及，曾經在2016年與黎智英和陳沛敏討論作者名單。辯方展示2018年4月，楊與陳之間的 WhatsApp 對話紀錄，並指當時曾經討論邀請前民建聯立法會主席曾鈺成、行政會議成員任志剛和前財政司司長曾俊華撰文。楊確認。</p> -<p>The United States and NATO shifted their strategy from massive retaliation to “flexible response” during the 1960s and 1970s. This shift was due in part to the belief that massive retaliation was no longer a credible deterrent given expanding Soviet nuclear capabilities and the Kennedy administration’s pursuit of a more “balanced” approach to defense. The United States expanded its ground forces from 11 to 16 active divisions and deployed an additional two to Germany following the 1961 Berlin Wall crisis. Additionally, U.S. army divisions placed greater emphasis on conventional firepower, tactical mobility, and decentralized command and control. While U.S. officials felt a greater sense of optimism regarding the balance of allied conventional military capabilities against the Soviets, particularly given the United States’ qualitative advantage in terms of capabilities, U.S. forces in Europe in the late 1960s declined largely because of the U.S. war in Vietnam. During the 1970s, the U.S. military placed greater emphasis on its ability to provide outside reinforcements to NATO in the event of a crisis, including plans to deploy 10 divisions and 60 tactical fighter squadrons to Europe in only 10 days. This led to a greater emphasis on the prepositioning of Army and Air Force equipment in Europe and securing allied host-nation support.</p> +<h4 id="辯方指論壇版作者觀點未必相同-王崑義文章刊出後捱罵">辯方指論壇版作者觀點未必相同 王崑義文章刊出後捱罵</h4> -<p><strong>The Dual-Track Strategy and Peace through Strength</strong></p> +<p>楊清奇確認論壇版的作者之中，並非所有人都抱持同一觀點。辯方舉例指台灣國際戰略學會理事長王崑義的文章〈港台「聯手抗中」恐是南柯一夢〉，對於制裁的看法有所不同。楊表示他作為編輯處於尷尬位置，通常他在邀稿的時候，作者跟他所說的，與作者最終寫出來的文章是不同的，「但我又好難食言唔用佢嘅稿」，如果當天論壇版沒有稿件，「就要開天窗咁滯。」</p> -<p>In 1976, the Soviet Union began deploying its SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, prompting concerns from Western European allies. In response, the Carter administration and NATO announced the dual-track decision in December 1979, which entailed deploying 108 Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy. In addition, the dual-track decision involved simultaneously pursuing arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce each side’s missiles.</p> +<p>楊又提到，當年王崑義的文章刊出之後，《蘋果》「畀人鬧嘅」，有讀者更加寫信給黎智英，後來黎將信件轉交給他。</p> -<p>Under the Reagan administration, U.S. forces in Europe increased as part of a broader defense buildup. The administration’s decision to confront the Soviet Union through its “peace through strength” plan led to a buildup of U.S. military forces in Europe — in addition to the planned deployment of Pershing 2 nuclear missiles to West Germany in 1983 and NATO’s Able Archer 83 exercises in the same year. At the same time, Reagan officials also conducted a series of arms control negotiations, such as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.</p> +<p>辯方另展示楊清奇與王崑義之間的電郵，可見楊邀請王撰效分析美國大選的影響，包括拜登入主白宮對台美關係的影響。楊在庭上一度說：「我好奇怪，律師先生你係點樣拎到我嘅私人電郵。」彭耀鴻指這是控方給予辯方律師團隊的，而控方有責任將所有相關材料交給辯方，又強調辯方並沒有入侵楊的電腦。楊說：「我都唔知控方係幾時、點樣攞到。」彭耀鴻則笑說：「那你要去問張先生（律政司助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤）了。」</p> -<p>By the end of the Cold War, a sophisticated network of political-military arrangements designed to communicate the capability and credibility of allied forces to deter a Soviet attack underpinned U.S. and NATO posture. Division-level exercises, such as REFORGER, allowed the United States to test its ability to deploy its troops from the continental United States to Europe and reseize NATO territory. NATO’s International Military Staff worked to build common war plans and interoperability standards among allies in order to minimize tactical frictions commonly associated with fighting in military coalitions. The SACEUR possessed pre-delegated authorities to retaliate against a Soviet incursion with nuclear weapons in the event that London, for example, could not be contacted during a crisis.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1etfEWb.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> -<p><strong>Post-Cold War</strong></p> +<p>辯方問楊為何會邀請王崑義撰文。楊回答因為王是台灣著名的學者，雖然其觀點未必符合《蘋果》，「但都係可以自圓其說嘅。」</p> -<p>The fall of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War led successive governments on both sides of the Atlantic to realize the gains of a “peace dividend” and reduce military spending, military forces, and the U.S. military presence in Europe. Building on planning that was initially conducted during the Reagan administration, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell developed the “Base Force” plan in 1991 to determine the future force structure requirements for the United States in the post-Cold War era. The central premise of the Base Force was that global conflict was increasingly unlikely, while regional conflicts were becoming more likely. U.S. policymakers designed the initial assumptions for the Base Force before the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, but the Bush administration argued that military design and end-strength determinations were still relevant. As one observer wrote:</p> +<h4 id="辯方指黎智英在飯局沒有提制裁-楊清奇堅稱有">辯方指黎智英在飯局沒有提「制裁」 楊清奇堅稱有</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>Like its predecessors, JSCP FY 1989-90 [which informed the Base Force], written in the spring of 1988, considered the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation that could erupt into global war as the most serious threat to U.S. interests. But, with the Soviet Union reducing its military presence in Eastern Europe, reducing and consolidating its military forces, and undertaking domestic reform, the JSCP argued that calculated Soviet aggression in Central Europe was unlikely. The more likely threats were indigenously caused conventional regional conflicts with little likelihood of direct Soviet intervention.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>楊早前作供提及在2020年6月黎住所的飯局中，黎表示不怕被捕，若果被捕就「更加證明到中國和香港政府對人權嘅打壓」，並相信美國、英國同歐洲係唔會坐視不理，楊並轉述黎認為只有實施制裁，才能有助改善香港的人權狀況。</p> -<p>Accordingly, senior U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officials argued at the time that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact meant that further reductions in nuclear forces might be warranted and that U.S. posture in Europe should also decrease. Yet they did so with a caveat: U.S. presence in Europe should not be reduced any further than the planned end strength of 150,000 personnel. The United States also returned a number of installations to host countries.</p> +<p>辯方提議黎可能沒有提及制裁，黎可能提及美國、英國和歐洲會回應及採取行動，但是他沒有提到「制裁」兩字。惟楊不同意，又堅稱：「我肯定佢有（提及制裁）嘅。」</p> -<p>This decrease in U.S. force posture accelerated under the Clinton administration, which planned for a final end strength of 100,000 by 1996 (down from 185,000 in 1993). Yet U.S. posture in Europe only reached a low of 113,000 in 1997 because of U.S. involvement in the Balkan wars. Between December 1995 and January 1996, the United States deployed 20,000 military personnel to Bosnia under a NATO-led force to implement a peace agreement.</p> +<p>辯方又提到，警方在2021年6月24日與楊進行的錄影會面中，問及「飯盒會」做些什麼，而楊當時回答「坐底傾吓」工作上遇到什麼難題需要黎「出面解決」。楊在庭上確認。</p> -<p>In 2004, the George W. Bush administration announced that it would withdraw 40,000 U.S. military personnel from Europe as part of a broader effort to redeploy and return troops to the United States. This removal included the heavy armored brigades of the 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division, which returned to the United States. The reassignment of U.S. forces continued until late 2007 when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates temporarily halted the withdrawal of the last two heavy brigades. He was concerned that there was insufficient basing for the troops in the United States. U.S. military commanders in Europe also argued that armored capabilities were necessary to meet theater security requirements. Still, the number of U.S. military personnel fell by over 40 percent, from 115,000 personnel in 2004 to 66,000 in 2008. By 2011, only four brigade combat teams (BCTs) remained in Europe.</p> +<h4 id="辯方評論文章非為批評而批評">辯方：評論文章非「為批評而批評」</h4> -<p>In 2012, however, the Obama administration announced that it would withdraw the two remaining armored brigades, in line with its Defense Strategic Guidance, leaving only two light BCTs. The number of U.S. personnel in Europe reached a post-World War II low of 63,000 in 2013. A rotational battalion-sized task force known as the European Rotational Force replaced the armored brigades.</p> +<p>辯方指，控方早前向楊展示一系列的評論文章，部份對香港特區和中央政府帶有批判性，但這些批判是為了指出施政上的不足，希望政府可以改善施政，避免重蹈覆轍。楊同意。</p> -<p>As U.S. troop strength in Europe decreased and U.S. strategic priorities shifted to other regions, there were two major arguments for retaining a presence in Europe. First, some argued that the United States needed a military presence in Italy and Germany to launch and support counterterrorism operations in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Second, some argued that the United States needed to maintain a robust suite of security cooperation activities to ensure that former Warsaw Pact countries continued reforming their militaries to be compatible with their recently established democratic institutions. In addition, the United States continued to deploy forces to the Balkans as part of the Kosovo Force.</p> +<p>辯方續指，所以庭上展示的評論文章不是「為了批評而批評」。楊回答：「可以咁講嘅。」</p> -<p><strong>Russia’s 2014 Military Action in Ukraine</strong></p> +<h4 id="黎智英要求楊清奇撰文反駁另一人文章-楊拒絕後撰訊息供黎向對方交代">黎智英要求楊清奇撰文反駁另一人文章 楊拒絕後撰訊息供黎向對方交代</h4> -<p>Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Obama administration responded by bolstering the United States’ defense posture in Europe. In April, EUCOM launched Operation Atlantic Resolve to increase U.S. presence in the region. The operation was funded by the European Reassurance Initiative, later renamed the European Deterrence Initiative, a special account requested by the administration to fund rotational deployments, exercises, training, and security cooperation efforts with partners and allies. Much of the initial years of this funding went toward recapitalizing basing and infrastructure that had been underinvested in over prior decades. While the initial rotational deployments of the European Rotational Force in 2014 sent only a battalion-sized force to the region, those deployments expanded to meet the new mission requirements of Atlantic Resolve beginning in 2015. In January 2017, the DOD announced the beginning of a continuous armored brigade combat team (ABCT) rotational presence in Europe and back-to-back rotations of U.S. troops and equipment to Europe. By 2023, the 7,000-person rotational force included four elements: a division headquarters located in Poznan, Poland; a combat aviation brigade; an ABCT; and a sustainment task force.</p> +<p>控方覆問時，就單偉建文章的議題，展示楊清奇與陳沛敏之間的訊息紀錄。陳於2019年9月向楊說，她電郵轉寄了一篇文章給楊，而黎想楊以筆名李平撰文反駁該文章。楊回覆陳：「啲垃圾真的要出要駁？港共搵多幾條友咁搞，論壇版就俾人玩殘」、「同老闆溝通過，但最終覺得唔值駁，都係唔出」。</p> -<p>In July 2020, the Trump administration announced that it planned to withdraw almost 12,000 U.S. personnel from Germany. As part of that redeployment, approximately 6,400 troops would return to the United States, while the remainder would be moved to Belgium and Italy. The Biden administration announced that the withdrawal plans were on hold shortly after taking office.</p> +<p>楊相信黎智英應該認識單偉建，「其實黎生都覺得文章嘅觀點唔係咁好，但又想照出佢嘅文章，所以又要我用文章嚟反駁佢」，但楊認為若果經常要反駁他人文章，「論壇版好快俾人玩殘咗。」</p> -<h4 id="the-us-response-to-russias-2022-invasion-and-us-posture-today">THE U.S. RESPONSE TO RUSSIA’S 2022 INVASION AND U.S. POSTURE TODAY</h4> +<p>楊續指：「但黎生要畀作者一個交代，但又唔可以好似私人溝通講嘅咁冇禮貌啦」，所以後來楊撰寫了一則訊息評價單的文章，說明為何決定不刊登及顯示這是編輯的決定，以供黎將該訊息轉發給單，即是：「單先生的文章是老生常談，一個特首連請辭的自由都冇，談何民主進步？論壇版未擬採用。謝謝。」</p> -<p>As Russian forces massed on its border with Ukraine in late 2021 and early 2022, the Biden administration announced several deployments as part of its deterrence and reassurance efforts. In early February 2022, the United States deployed approximately 4,700 personnel of the 82nd Airborne Division and additional troops from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps to Germany and Poland and repositioned a Stryker squadron from Germany to Romania. Later that month, the DOD deployed the main V Corps Headquarters to Germany and the main 1st Infantry Division Headquarters and the 1st Infantry Division Artillery Headquarters to Poland, which totaled approximately 1,300 soldiers. The United States also deployed additional forces — including an infantry battalion task force, F-35 strike fighters, and attack aviation — to countries along NATO’s eastern flank. By the beginning of Russia’s invasion on February 24, 2022, the U.S. presence in Europe had increased to 90,000 personnel.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英設立鳥籠-員工有一定自主但不能超越框架">楊清奇：黎智英設立「鳥籠」 員工有一定自主但不能超越框架</h4> -<p>Following the invasion, the DOD announced that it had deployed or extended over 20,000 additional forces to Europe, bringing the total number of U.S. personnel in Europe to over 100,000. These forces included the deployment of an ABCT, a High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battalion, and KC-135 refueling aircraft, among other forces. At the Madrid NATO Summit in July 2022, President Biden announced several “long-term commitments to bolster European security,” including:</p> +<p>控方問及編採自主時，楊表示：「對於編採自主，其實我係有好深嘅感觸同體會。我從事傳媒工作三十幾年，咁都喺五間報紙、電視台打過工。我感受喺互聯網掀起之後，傳統媒體沒落之後，採編自主幾乎就成為一個神話嚟嘅。」楊指因為傳媒為了吸引特定的讀者群，都會有自己的立場。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>In Poland, the permanent forward-stationing of the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters, and a field support battalion;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In Romania, the deployment of an additional rotational BCT;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In the Baltics, enhanced rotational deployments;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In Spain, an increase in the number of destroyers stationed at Rota from four to six;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In the United Kingdom, the forward-stationing of two F-35 squadrons;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In Germany, the forward-stationing of an air defense artillery brigade headquarters, a short-range air defense battalion, a combat sustainment support battalion headquarters, and an engineer brigade headquarters; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In Italy, the forward-stationing of a short-range air defense battery.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>楊引用一個政治術語「鳥籠政治」來形容《蘋果》和類似報紙的採編自主，稱為「鳥籠自主」。楊指：「黎先生 set 咗《蘋果》嘅基本立場，就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠，所以唔可以簡單講有冇採編自主。」</p> -<p>The U.S. force posture in Europe rose by almost 60 percent from its historic low point in 2013. This increase coincided with an expanded footprint on the continent, with forward operating and training sites in addition to traditional bases and garris Europe. U.S. Army Europe and Africa has eight main operating bases across Germany, Belgium, and Italy, supported by seven Army garrison. It additionally maintains forward operating sites and training locations in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.</p> +<p>控方追問，由黎設下的「鳥籠」，是否與黎所給予的指示有關？楊確認。</p> -<p>The U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA) is headquartered at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and oversees approximately 35,000 personnel (including active-duty, guard, reserve, and civilian) and 217 aircraft. USAFE-AFAFRICA’s capabilities include fighter, attack, rotary-wing, tanker, and transport aircraft which perform close air support, air interdiction, air defense, in-flight refueling, long-range transport, and support of maritime operations. The command operates from seven main bases, including Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath and RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom; Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air Bases in Germany; Aviano Air Base in Italy; Lajes Field in the Azores; and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. While U.S. F-35 squadrons are primarily stationed at RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom and Sangadahlem Air Base in Germany, the fifth-generation aircraft deployed to the Baltic and Black Sea regions for air policing missions to deter against Russian aggression.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/a21wrmR.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> -<p>The U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, oversees an area of responsibility that covers approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean, from the Arctic Ocean to the coast of Antarctica, as well as the Adriatic, Baltic, Barents, Black, Caspian, Mediterranean, and North Seas. The fleet is headquartered at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Naples, Italy. Notably, the Sixth Fleet maintains Task Force 65/Destroyer Squadron 60 in Rota, Spain, which includes the forward stationing of six destroyers.</p> +<p>就王崑義的文章，在法官杜麗冰提問下，楊清奇指黎智英曾經將讀者的來信，透過秘書轉交給他，但因為黎智英未有直接地批評王崑義，所以「呢個係我後來再去搵佢寫稿嘅原因之一」。</p> -<h4 id="nato-posture-and-the-2022-strategic-concept">NATO POSTURE AND THE 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT</h4> +<p>楊清奇作供完畢。控方其後替下一名證人李宇軒，向法庭申請「提犯令」。案件明日續審。</p> -<p>NATO responded to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 by establishing a high-readiness response force and enhancing its forward presence with four battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. These four battlegroups, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, respectively, totaled 4,530 personnel by May 2017. NATO’s presence on its eastern flank has expanded considerably since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine, with four new battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, for a total presence of 10,232 personnel as of November 2022. NATO has also adopted an increased air and missile defense posture on the eastern flank, which it refers to as “air shielding.”</p> +<hr /> -<p>At its Madrid summit in June 2022, NATO announced a new strategic concept in response to Russia’s aggression. The new concept calls for a “fundamental shift to [NATO’s] deterrence and defence” by expanding NATO forces and capabilities. This shift includes the expansion of the forward-deployed battlegroups to brigade-sized units “where and when required.” NATO leaders also agreed to a new NATO Force Model for the high-readiness response force, with the goal of growing from 40,00 to over 300,000 troops. The NATO Force Model envisions two tiers of high-readiness forces, including 100,000 personnel ready to deploy within 10 days and an additional 200,000 ready within 30 days. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept also stresses the importance of enhancing prepositioned equipment to maintain readiness. This development marks a shift in NATO posture away from a “forward-presence tripwire” of limited forces on the eastern flank to a more credible force capable of deterrence by denial. In addition to releasing its new strategic concept at the Madrid summit, NATO also invited Finland and Sweden to join the alliance following the submission of their official letters of application in May. Finland officially joined NATO on April 4, 2023.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇：黎智英向報紙設下「鳥籠」 編採人員享一定自主但不得超越框架The Dilemmas Of Deterrence2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-dilemmas-of-deterrence<p><em>As the danger of war rises in the Western Pacific, the United States is racing to reset its military strategy. China’s astonishing military modernization — especially its arsenal of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities — has fundamentally challenged the old U.S. approach, which focused on defeating aggression by projecting decisive power into the first island chain.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>In response, the Pentagon is attempting a great inversion: to defeat Chinese power projection against Taiwan or another target, it is emulating Beijing’s A2/AD strategy in hopes of making the Western Pacific a no-go zone for hostile forces.</em></p> -<p>In July 2023, NATO took further steps to enhance its posture by establishing new regional plans to defend NATO across all of its flanks with new command and control arrangements and by establishing a new Allied Reaction Force. Allies also agreed through a new Defense Investment Pledge to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense in an update to the 2014 agreement.</p> +<p>This change, which some defense analysts have advocated for years, is a necessary response to China’s daunting capabilities. It is a smart effort to make the geography of the region, and the inherent difficulty of power projection, work for, rather than against, the United States and its allies. Speed is essential in making this shift: Even as the stated U.S. view is that conflict is “neither imminent nor inevitable” in the Taiwan Strait, numerous U.S. officials have warned that conflict could plausibly occur in the region this decade. This urgency is catalyzing constructive action across multiple U.S. alliances and every U.S. military service as they seek to make the strategy real in the limited time that may be left.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h4> +<p>Every strategy brings dilemmas, though, and this strategy — call it “anti-access with American characteristics” — presents six crucial trade-offs the Pentagon and U.S. civilian leaders must address. Many of these challenges, moreover, must be confronted in coordination with U.S. allies and partners, but these conversations are not as advanced as they should be given the shrinking timeline and urgency of action. Strategy is the art of making hard choices, and the United States is only starting to reckon with the hard choices its new strategy involves.</p> -<p>Since the end of World War II, the United States’ military posture in Europe has been impacted by a range of factors, especially the threat posed by the Soviet Union and then Russia. While the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to a major decline in U.S. forces in Europe, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has raised numerous questions about the future. The next chapter examines the threat landscape in Europe through 2030.</p> +<h3 id="washingtons-strategic-shift">Washington’s Strategic Shift</h3> -<h3 id="ch-03">CH. 03</h3> -<h3 id="europes-evolving-threat-landscape">EUROPE’S EVOLVING THREAT LANDSCAPE</h3> +<p>U.S. strategy has been turned upside down by two key developments: China’s ballooning defense budget and its military-technological breakthroughs. Using defense resources made available by decades of rapid economic growth, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has developed a vast arsenal of capabilities — especially long-range missiles — designed to prevent U.S. forces from accessing bases along the Pacific’s first island chain, as well as in the waters and airspace within them. According to the Pentagon’s most recent public report on Chinese military power, for instance, Beijing now possesses roughly 1,000 medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers and 500 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a range of between 3,000 and 5,500 kilometers. If a war were to break out, the PLA could now target nearly all U.S. forces within hundreds of miles of the Chinese coast.</p> -<p>This chapter examines the evolving threat landscape in Europe. It focuses on the military balance with Russia, which is the most significant threat to Europe in the foreseeable future. It also briefly examines terrorism, Iran, China, illegal migration, and other threats, such as pandemics and climate change. Applying a planning horizon through 2030 is far enough away to be helpful to policymakers considering force posture decisions, which can take years to develop. It is also near enough to make plausible assumptions about the future.</p> +<p>The result is a weakening of America’s ability to project power in a crucial region. A quarter century ago, China could barely detect, let alone destroy, U.S. aircraft carriers operating near its coast. Into the early 2010s, the Pentagon could — according to think tank reports — pursue a strategy that envisioned defeating Chinese aggression with a devastating precision-strike campaign against radars, missile bases, command-and-control centers, and other targets on Chinese soil.</p> -<p>The chapter argues that Russia will remain the most significant threat to Europe for the foreseeable future. Today, NATO enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent. In the event of a potential near-term Russian attack against NATO’s eastern flank, however unlikely, there are several factors in NATO’s favor: the inherent advantage of the defense, the force-to-space ratio problem for Russia, limited avenues of approach from Russia into Eastern Europe, and the qualitative superiority of NATO forces. In addition, NATO retains a robust nuclear deterrent.</p> +<p>Today, however, Beijing can threaten aircraft carriers hundreds of miles away, as well as the surface ships that escort them and the bases they visit. A growing inventory of advanced fighters, as well as the world’s densest air defense network, can take a heavy toll on U.S. strike aircraft. Meanwhile, China’s rapid nuclear buildup makes the prospect of carrying the war onto its territory much riskier by giving Beijing more credible nuclear response options. In short, the days of easily projecting power to China’s shores are over.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, Russia has the will and intentions to threaten one or more NATO countries, and it is re-building its capabilities. Russian military thinking is dominated by a view that the United States is — and will remain — Moscow’s main enemy (главный враг) for the foreseeable future. This view of the United States as the main enemy has increased since the 2022 invasion. Russian political and military leaders assess that Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have been largely due to U.S. and broader NATO aid, which Russian leaders interpret as direct participation in the war. In addition, Russian leaders believe that the United States is attempting to expand its power, further encircle Russia, and weaken Russia militarily, politically, and economically. These sentiments make Russia a dangerous enemy over the next several years and will likely drive Moscow’s desire to reconstitute its military as rapidly as possible, prepare to fight the West if deterrence fails, and engage in irregular and hybrid activities.</p> +<p>The United States needs new capabilities and concepts — as well as enhanced coalitions — to offset this historic change in the military balance. To be sure, the United States will continue to require ways of breaking down China’s battle networks and degrading its A2/AD capabilities. But simply doubling down on the traditional power projection strategy will not work under the current defense budget and in view of how formidable China’s A2/AD capabilities have become. Instead, U.S. forces are trying to flip the script: they are trying to deny China the ability to project its power outward. Rather than rely so heavily on a few large, vulnerable bases and scarce, expensive platforms like aircraft carriers, this strategy would empower smaller units that operate from more austere locations and fight with cheaper, more numerous, and more expendable weapons. The goal is to create a more resilient, diversified military posture up and down the Western Pacific with sufficient firepower to inflict an awful cost if the enemy attacks. The United States will not be able to reassert the level of military dominance it once enjoyed in the region, but it can prevent an age of Chinese dominance.</p> -<p>In addition, several factors could change the military balance in Europe over the next decade. First, the United States could become overstretched due to a major theater war in another region, such as against China in the Indo-Pacific. European conventional and logistical capabilities are limited — particularly for high-end war — creating potential vulnerabilities if the United States were to withdraw significant air, naval, and ground forces from the region. Second, Russia could rebuild its military capabilities over the next several years with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. China, in particular, is developing significant military capabilities, such as fifth- and sixth-generation fighters, hypersonic weapons, and emerging technologies, which could change the European balance of power if there were a notable increase in defense cooperation with Russia. Third, U.S. or European political will could erode to build sufficient military capabilities to deter Russia, based on differences in strategic culture, domestic financial and popular constraints, distinct threat perceptions, or other factors. Fourth, there are several other potential wildcards that could impact the threat environment, such as a Russian leadership change or use of a nuclear weapon.</p> +<p>What makes this approach attractive is the fact that holding U.S. forces at bay is only half the challenge China faces. To conquer Taiwan or otherwise upend the regional status quo, Beijing must replicate the traditional U.S. mission of power projection by moving troops, ships, and planes into hostile areas and sustaining them there indefinitely. In fact, Beijing is in the process of fielding four aircraft carriers with more to come; it is building other long-range ships and aircraft that can operate throughout the region and beyond. The more China invests in these larger, more expensive platforms and the more it tries to exert control in the Western Pacific, the more it makes itself the target of the very strategy its own military has employed.</p> -<p>There are several caveats in conducting any analysis of the future security environment, including the military balance. One is that this analysis is based on open-source reporting, not classified intelligence, which creates some gaps. For example, there is imperfect information about the size, composition, equipment, and capabilities of Russian forces, what is known as “order of battle.” Russia has utilized maskirovka — or denial and deception — to mask its activities, strengths, and vulnerabilities. It is also difficult to foresee how the future threat environment will evolve. For example, it was unclear in February 2021 that Russia would invade Ukraine a year later — and then suffer a series of battlefield losses. These uncertainties suggest that any analysis of the future security environment in Europe should have sufficient modesty and humility.</p> +<p>The United States has recently advanced several aspects of such a strategy. The first is real estate. Washington has secured or expanded U.S. access to bases in countries from Japan and the Philippines to Australia and Papua New Guinea, a crucial step in making U.S. forces more survivable if China attacks. There is significantly more work to do, but 2023 has been the most transformative year in a generation for America’s Indo-Pacific posture.</p> -<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines the military balance in Europe with Russia. The second section assesses other threats to Europe, such as terrorism, Iran, China, and illegal immigration. The third outlines possible wildcards that could change the military balance in Europe and impact the threat environment. The fourth section provides a brief summary.</p> +<p>The second aspect is capabilities. The Pentagon has announced programs such as the Replicator initiative, which seeks to build large numbers of small, cheap drones that can deliver devastating firepower. If these programs reach fruition, they could complement existing platforms, such as attack submarines and penetrating bombers, that can destroy Chinese forces within Beijing’s A2/AD zone.</p> -<h4 id="military-balance-in-europe">MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE</h4> +<p>A third aspect involves concepts. The services are developing new (and somewhat embryonic) ways of employing these technologies. Examples include Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, a Marine Corps initiative that involves using antiship missiles and other ground-based fires to target Chinese vessels from small islands in the Western Pacific, and Agile Combat Employment, an Air Force project that aims to preserve U.S. striking power by getting planes off of large, exposed bases when a crisis begins.</p> -<p>This section begins by examining Russia and the conventional balance in Europe and then turns to the nuclear balance</p> +<p>And fourth is coalitions. To generate the necessary firepower, secure access to critical terrain, and confront China with the prospect of a big war against multiple adversaries, the United States has strengthened bilateral alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines while also investing in new partnerships — such as AUKUS — linking countries in the region and beyond.</p> -<p><strong>The Conventional Balance</strong></p> +<p>To be clear, anti-access with U.S. characteristics is more of a complement to than a pure replacement for the Pentagon’s old approach. Aircraft carriers and major surface combatants would be needed to defeat a Chinese blockade of Taiwan, for instance, even if they suffered heavy losses. Tactical fighters, long-range bombers, and other manned aircraft will play an important role in delivering munitions and partnering with unmanned systems. The United States will still need to find ways of suppressing China’s air defenses and hindering its kill chains. But legacy approaches alone cannot defeat a Chinese attack at acceptable cost. The United States needs asymmetric ways of thinning out enemy forces and preventing them from achieving their objectives.</p> -<p>Any analysis assessing the military balance should begin by positing the goals and strategies of the two sides, and it should then proceed to explore the ability of each side to execute its strategy. In Eastern Europe, NATO’s primary goal is to deter an attack and defend its eastern flank, if necessary. To achieve this goal, NATO has adopted a conventional strategy that aims, in the words of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, to “defend forward with robust in-place, multi-domain, combat-ready forces, enhanced command and control arrangements, prepositioned ammunition and equipment and improved capacity and infrastructure to rapidly reinforce any Ally, including at short or no notice.”</p> +<p>To succeed, the United States will need a two-part force. A blunting layer of dispersed forces must survive the initial onslaught and prevent Chinese forces from winning a quick, decisive victory. Then a follow-on force of U.S. ships and aircraft will need to push into the theater to decisively defeat the remaining Chinese units. Ultimately, this might not be sufficient to terminate a conflict, but it would neutralize the immediate threat and buy time for other options meant to persuade Beijing to call it quits, such as a long-term economic pressure campaign.</p> -<p>Russia’s strategy has generally focused on “active defense” (активная оборона), which involves taking measures to deny victory in the initial period of a foreign invasion. But Russia’s strategy envisions occasionally shifting to the offense, as it did in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin seeks a growing sphere of influence in Europe, the Middle East, and other regions, and he has expressed admiration for the historical Russian Empire and Russian conquerors such as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. In his essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” Putin argued that Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians are descendants of the Rus and that Ukraine has never been a sovereign country. Putin has also expressed interest in a new Slavic union composed of Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and perhaps the northern part of Kazakhstan.</p> +<p>America’s new strategy, however, also raises new questions: Can a blunting force remain effective if it is exposed to devastating Chinese missile salvoes and cannot easily be resupplied? Could these smaller units deter a conflict as well as larger and more visible ships and aircraft could? Should U.S. power projection forces remain in the first island chain or pull back to more defendable positions farther away? How hard should the United States push for access to new bases? Are allies prepared to play their part in this new strategy? And to what extent would anti-access with U.S. characteristics just redirect China’s effort toward gray zone coercion?</p> -<p>Based on this revisionist worldview, NATO countries need to deter future Russian activity — including irregular or gray zone activities — in Eastern Europe, especially such countries as the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland. Russian military thinking is dominated by a view that the United States — and NATO more broadly — is Moscow’s main enemy (главный враг). Russian political and military leaders assess that the country’s struggles in Ukraine have been largely due to U.S. and broader NATO assistance. As one senior Russian diplomat remarked, “The United States became a direct participant of this conflict long ago, and they have long been waging a hybrid war against my country. Ukraine is only an instrument in their hands, a tip of the spear held by the U.S.-led collective West. Their goal is to destroy a sovereign, independent Russia as a factor in international politics.” Russian leaders also believe that the United States is expanding its influence, attempting to further encircle Russia, and trying to weaken Russia militarily, politically, and economically. The result is that Russia’s insecurity and animosity toward the West — and the United States in particular — will likely deepen.</p> +<p>These are difficult questions. They involve hard trade-offs between survivability and lethality, concealing and revealing, close-in and standoff operations, speed and sustainability, sovereignty and efficiency, and gray zone and high-intensity conflict. As the United States tries to prepare for or, preferably, deter a potentially devastating conflict, these six issues require urgent attention and debate.</p> -<p>While a Russian conventional attack against NATO countries, such as the Baltic states, is unlikely today, NATO needs to deter a Russian attack in the future. There are several factors that are important to assess deterrence: (1) the relative strength of the available forces possessed by Russia and NATO; (2) the force-to-space ratio; (3) the relative rate at which each side can marshal and deploy forces; (4) the individual initiative and flexibility of Russian commanders; and (5) the character of the terrain in the theater.</p> +<h3 id="survivability-or-lethality">Survivability or Lethality</h3> -<p><strong>Relative Capabilities of Opposing Forces:</strong> The first factor is the relative strength of the opposing forces. The best measures of relative conventional strength are those that capture the full range of combat capabilities of a force.</p> +<p>A fundamental feature of today’s environment is the development of accuracy independent of range, which makes it possible to precisely strike targets at great distances. This is why China’s ballistic missile force, the largest in the world, poses such a threat to the aircraft and surface ships that the United States would need to project power into the Western Pacific. Hardening airfields and investing in air and missile defenses can help, but the cost-exchange ratio favors the attacker, since most missiles are significantly cheaper than the interceptors that engage them. If U.S. forces remain on large bases at Guam or Okinawa, they risk being destroyed. Military units must disperse and hide to survive. The dilemma is that once they do, they will struggle to generate the striking power — the lethality — needed to defeat a Chinese assault.</p> -<p>While Russian soldiers have struggled in Ukraine, the Russian military is attempting to modernize its forces, including main battle tanks (such as the T-14 Armata), infantry fight vehicles (such as the BMP-2M and T-15), armored personnel carriers (such as the BTR‐82A and BTR‐82AM), and artillery (such as the 300-mm 9K515 Tornado-S [Smerch] and 122-mm 9K51M Tornado-G [Grad] multiple rocket launcher system). Russia is also modernizing its legacy aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, and radars. Over the next year or two, Russia plans to deploy two regiments equipped with RS-26 Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia’s navy is modernizing elements of its fleet, including with the Borey-class (Project 955/955A) ballistic missile submarine, guided missile submarines such as the Project 949A Oscar II-class), and missiles (such as the 3M14 Kalibr land-attack cruise missile). Russia is also focused on improving other components of its anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities through 2030, including air defense, coastal missiles, and layered defenses. Russia’s defense industry, which has been handicapped by sanctions, will likely be under stress to match its leaders’ ambitions, though it is producing new equipment.</p> +<p>This problem involves logistics and sustainment: the more dispersed one’s forces, the harder it is to keep them well supplied. The Air Force, for instance, has shown it can get attack aircraft out of vulnerable places in a hurry. Less certain is whether it can deliver the fuel, weapons, and other support those planes will need to conduct combat missions from wherever they go to ride out the storm. If U.S. planes cannot fly strike missions in the opening days or weeks of a Taiwan crisis, Taipei might fold and close Washington’s window to respond. Similar challenges afflict the Army’s Multi-Domain Operations concept.</p> -<p>Russia is in the midst of a shift in force design. The Russian army will likely continue to move away from battalion formations to infantry, marine, and airborne divisions. This would mark a significant shift away from the changes implemented under former minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov, who scrapped the Soviet-era structure of the armed forces that included large divisions as part of the “New Look” reforms.</p> +<p>To be fair, the picture varies across the services. By making significant changes to its force structure, the Marine Corps has become better positioned to distribute small units across numerous islands while also equipping them with real firepower. Yet services that rely on large platforms (the Navy), large bases (the Air Force), or large formations (the Army) have more work to do to make their forces survivable without undermining their ability to land a lethal punch.</p> -<p>As part of its restructuring plan, the military re-established the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts as joint force strategic territorial units within the armed forces. This was another blow to the Serdyukov “New Look” reforms, since he had condensed six military districts into four, as well as changed their command and control relationships. The Western Military District’s failure during the invasion of Ukraine may have contributed to its downfall. The Russian military will also likely increase the number of contract service members, or kontraktniki (контрактники), and raise the age ceiling for conscription.</p> +<h3 id="conceal-or-reveal">Conceal or Reveal</h3> -<p>Yet the Russian military faces several challenges. First, Russia’s deepening economic crisis will somewhat constrain its efforts to expand the quantity and quality of its ground, air, and naval forces. The war in Ukraine has fueled Russia’s worst labor crunch in decades; hundreds of thousands of workers have fled the country or have been sent to fight in Ukraine, weakening an economy weighed down by economic sanctions and international isolation. Second, corruption remains rampant in the Russian military, which could undermine Moscow’s overall plan to structure, staff, train, and equip its forces. Third, Russia’s defense industrial base faces several challenges. One is replacement of losses from the war in Ukraine. A protracted war in Ukraine will likely compound these challenges. In addition, economic sanctions have created shortages of higher-end foreign components and forced Moscow to substitute them with lower-quality alternatives.</p> +<p>As new operational concepts take shape around smaller, more dispersed units, the Pentagon will face another challenge: how to deter China with less visible forces. The accuracy of today’s weapons means visible forces are increasingly vulnerable, but the best capabilities for deterring opponents and reassuring friends are those they can plainly see. Alternatively, concealing capabilities can help maximize their effect on the battlefield but undercuts their deterrent value before a conflict begins.</p> -<p>In short, the conventional balance in Europe favors the United States and Europe today. This advantage includes forces currently deployed to NATO’s eastern flank, as well as forces that Russia and NATO could deploy as part of a war that are stationed elsewhere. As Figure 3.1 highlights, for example, the United States and other NATO forces have a significant advantage in the number of active and reserve army personnel, main battle tanks, other armored fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and air and missile defenses already deployed on the collective territory. This importantly does not include the potential reinforcements and rotational positioning that U.S. and allied forces can produce. Russia’s war in Ukraine significantly deteriorated Russian capabilities.</p> +<p>Take, for example, one of America’s most effective deterrents — the purported ability to disrupt Chinese power projection by using cyberattacks to disable PLA command, control, and communications. Disclosing the details of this capability would require revealing U.S. access to Chinese networks, which would give Beijing a chance to close breaches. The same basic problem would apply to revealing new operating locations or highly secretive systems, such as advanced undersea drones, stealthy aircraft, space-based capabilities, and others.</p> -<p>In addition, the United States and other NATO forces have some advantages in naval capabilities, including submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and other surface ships, as highlighted in Figure 3.2. The same is true in air forces, as highlighted in Figure 3.3, where the United States and NATO have an advantage in bombers, fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, command and control aircraft, electronic warfare, and other aircraft.</p> +<p>A related issue involves timing. Unveiling new capabilities during a crisis might bolster deterrence but could come too late, after Chinese leaders have made the crucial decision to act. Publicly revealing new capabilities in the opening phases of a crisis could increase tensions, complicate efforts to deescalate, and lead third parties to blame Washington for the conflict. Admittedly, these are not new problems. But they are made more difficult by the fact that the United States no longer has such overwhelming conventional superiority, so it must hold more in reserve to surprise Chinese military commanders and complicate their operations after the shooting starts.</p> -<p>There are two other themes of note based on the data. First, the United States’ armed forces constitute a majority of NATO’s overall military capabilities. As discussed later in this chapter, U.S. involvement in a war in the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, or another region would likely impact the type and number of forces available in Europe, potentially changing this balance. Second, while the conventional balance in Europe heavily favors NATO, Russia’s weakness is particularly apparent compared to Chinese capabilities. As highlighted later in this chapter, China could provide weapons systems and technology to Russia that would change the balance.</p> +<h3 id="close-in-or-standoff">Close-in or Standoff</h3> -<p><strong>Force-to-Space Ratio:</strong> A second factor includes force-to-space ratio constraints. The size of the forces that both sides can place on the front lines is limited by the nature of the local geography and the transportation infrastructure. Beyond a certain number, more forces will not fit on the front. Many of the attacker’s vehicles must travel on roads, require significant logistics tails, and need to be spaced out to decrease the possibility of strikes from aircraft, artillery, and ambushes. If the attacker crams too many forces at or near the point of attack, a traffic jam could develop that makes it difficult to maneuver the offender’s armored forces. The defender can place more forces in prepared positions off the roads, but there are limits to the size of the defender’s forward forces as well. This limit, known as the maximum force-to-space ratio, is roughly one brigade per seven kilometers of front, although these are approximate estimates.</p> +<p>A third trade-off involves geography: Where should the United States place these more dispersed forces? For decades, U.S. power projection was so effective that even massed forward-deployed forces were largely invulnerable to enemy attack, and U.S. dominance was so pronounced that even faraway forces could reach the theater in time to make the vital difference. Today, however, China could do catastrophic damage to the Pentagon’s forward-most forces, whether they be ships near the Taiwan Strait or units on the ground in Okinawa. Moreover, if China can quickly establish dominance in and around the Taiwan Strait, assets stationed farther away might not arrive soon enough to prevent a fait accompli.</p> -<p>Some of these challenges were evident in the first days and weeks following the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Russian army faced significant logistical and maintenance challenges operating in contested areas deep inside of Ukraine. Without access to rail transport infrastructure that is typically used to move Russian heavy equipment and with the few roads available clogged with traffic, it became increasingly difficult for Russian forces operating on the Kyiv axis to move food, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies to forward-deployed forces. These problems were compounded by the Russian army’s failure to provide convoy security to logistics vehicles, such as trucks carrying food, water, fuel, medical equipment, mobile kitchen equipment, and spare parts. Forward-deployed Russian vehicles broke down, but many had to be abandoned because of a lack of spare parts, mechanics, and recovery vehicles. The Russian military also lacked modern shipping containers, mechanized loaders, forklifts, or pallets to efficiently move supplies into Ukraine. Instead of a mechanized logistics system, Russia’s military relied on conscript labor to move gear, often in unwieldy wooden crates.</p> +<p>Thus, the dilemma: if the United States stations most of its combat power along the first island chain, the PLA could conduct a crippling first strike. Yet if Washington keeps the bulk of its forces over the horizon at bases in the second island chain or even farther away, then China might be emboldened to try the fait accompli. Of course, if Beijing chooses to kill a large number of Americans in a first strike, it is probably choosing a long, bloody war with an enraged superpower as well. But even in that case, U.S. allies would face the possibility of being pounded as U.S. forces fight from distant locations — not exactly a recipe for alliance cohesion in a crucial moment.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/c7mLj6k.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.1: Military Balance in Selected Land Forces, 2023.</strong> Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2023 (London: Routledge, 2023).</em></p> +<p>An answer — albeit an uncomfortable one — is to divide U.S. forces into two elements. Some units would serve as frontline forces to blunt Chinese attacks and reassure allied publics. These forces would constitute a bulwark and a trip wire: they would deny China the option of using force without bloodying U.S. personnel. They would commit the United States to the fight while also giving Washington some combat power early on. The objective of these forces would not be to establish U.S. dominance within the first island chain but rather to prevent China from dominating portions of the first island chain itself. Mobile forces equipped with antiship and antiaircraft missiles would blunt Chinese attacks on U.S. allies and partners.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cgZeYMJ.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.2: Military Balance in Selected Maritime Forces, 2023.</strong> Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023.</em></p> +<p>Ultimately, this blunting force would also buy time and serve as a shield behind which standoff forces, such as long-range stealth aircraft or other platforms capable of delivering munitions from a distance, could operate at somewhat decreased risk. Unfortunately, the costs to these close-in units could be very high, so the United States might not want to place its most advanced capabilities at risk — fifth-generation tactical aircraft, or aircraft carrier strike groups, for instance — until it has succeeded in degrading China’s A2/AD capabilities, primarily through strikes delivering from longer range. In the meantime, forward-stationed forces might suffer ghastly losses.</p> -<p>Force-to-space ratio constraints generally help the defender — in this case NATO — by preventing the attacker from exploiting whatever local materiel superiority might be enjoyed at breakthrough points. The attacker strives to achieve overwhelming superiority at the breakthrough points by suddenly concentrating forces there. An attacker likely requires a local force advantage of at least 3:1 to open a breach in the defender’s front. If both sides have large forces at their disposal, however, the attacker may be unable to place enough units forward to gain a 3:1 advantage, even if it has local materiel superiority, simply because there is insufficient room at the front. Instead, the attacker must stack forces up behind the front, where they cannot contribute to the breakthrough battle. But stacking forces up puts them in danger of being targeted by long-range strike.</p> +<h3 id="speed-or-sustainability">Speed or Sustainability</h3> -<p>Russia faces considerable force-to-space ratio constraints in Eastern Europe today. A Russian buildup along NATO’s eastern flank, including in Belarus, would likely lead to a rapid NATO deterrent buildup in response — and deny Russia from gaining a force-to-space ratio advantage.</p> +<p>A fourth trade-off is political. Washington’s new strategy is predicated on rapidly diversifying U.S. operating locations from a handful of major U.S. bases to a range of ally and partner bases, austere sites, and even some civilian facilities. The United States has made remarkable progress in this endeavor; key allies like Japan are expanding their military footprints as well. Yet the harder Washington pushes to make use of these locations today, the more it risks damaging critical relationships.</p> -<p><strong>Relative Rates of Reinforcement into Breakthrough Area:</strong> A third factor affecting the balance is the relative rate of reinforcement into the breakthrough battle area. The defender must match the attacker’s concentration at the main point of attack. To do this, the defender — in this case NATO forces — must be able to move forces already in the theater. The defender must also be able to compete with the attacker in bringing outside forces into the theater. The defender’s basic aim is to ensure that the attacker does not win the breakthrough battle by wearing down the defender to the point where the defender has virtually no forces remaining.</p> +<p>This tension is on display in Japan’s southwest islands. Okinawa, Miyako, Ishigaki, and Yonaguni are critical real estate given their proximity to Taiwan. If the United States could, for instance, station hordes of long-range antiship missiles on the outermost islands, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait would change overnight. But populations on some of these islands are ambivalent about a growing Japanese military presence, let alone any sizable deployment of Americans. If Washington pushes too hard, it risks alienating local populations and causing diplomatic setbacks. If Washington does not push hard enough, the United States and its allies might not be ready if a conflict comes.</p> -<p>In most wargames over the past decade involving a Russian invasion in Eastern Europe — especially the Baltics — forward-deployed NATO ground forces were badly outgunned by Russia both by forces massing from mainland Russia but also from the heavily militarized enclave of Kaliningrad, located on the Baltic Sea between Lithuania and Poland. NATO airpower was able to impose significant attrition on attacking Russian forces, destroying the equivalent of two to three battalion equivalents per day in some games. But without a heavy NATO ground force to slow down Russian forces, NATO forces failed to halt the invasion. More recently, however, NATO has strengthened its eastern flank, improving its relative rate of reinforcement. For example, the Baltic region has been a focal point for NATO, which agreed on the Readiness Action Plan at the 2014 Wales summit and established the Enhanced Forward Presence at the 2016 Warsaw summit. This forward presence was first deployed in 2017, with the creation of four multinational battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, respectively. In the southeast, a tailored presence on land, at sea, and in the air contributed to increased allied activity in the region as well as enhanced situational awareness, interoperability, and responsiveness.</p> +<p>The same point could be made regarding the Philippines. Under President Joe Biden, the United States has made remarkable progress in jump-starting implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and gaining access to additional facilities in that country. In theory, these facilities — some of which are on the northern island of Luzon — could play a vital role in a Taiwan contingency. In reality, what access the United States would have to those facilities in a crisis remains uncertain. The more tensions increase, the greater the need for the United States to have clarity about this issue and to position more (and more capable) forces there. Those needs may clash, however, with the political incentives of the government in Manila, which would presumably prefer to defer hard choices that could put local communities in the firing line if conflict ensues.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NjSrDYh.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.3: Military Balance in Selected Air Forces, 2023.</strong> Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023.</em></p> +<h3 id="sovereignty-or-efficiency">Sovereignty or Efficiency</h3> -<p>Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO reinforced the existing battlegroups and established four more multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. Known as the Eastern Flank Initiative, this brought the total number of multinational battlegroups to eight, effectively doubling the number of troops on the ground when fully established and extending NATO’s forward presence along the alliance’s eastern flank — from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south.</p> +<p>Allies and partners are central to U.S. strategy because the China challenge is more serious than anything the United States has faced in decades. Beijing can field a force so large and potent that the United States cannot succeed on its own. Even under the most favorable assumptions about the development of U.S. and Taiwanese capabilities, the United States will still need — at a bare minimum — access to bases in Japan and perhaps other countries. Yet, after several decades in which allied contributions were a “nice to have” but not a “need to have,” there is little muscle memory in Asia about how to conduct complex coalition operations in a high-intensity environment.</p> -<p>The four northeastern battlegroups (in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) are under NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters in Szczecin, Poland. Two division-level headquarters coordinate the training and preparation activities of their respective battlegroups. Multinational Division Northeast Headquarters, located in Elblag, Poland, has been fully operational since December 2018. This headquarters works closely with the battlegroups in Poland and Lithuania. A complementary Multinational Division North Headquarters was activated by NATO in October 2020 and is moving toward full operational capability. Its forward elements are located in Adazi, Latvia, while the rest of the headquarters is located in Karup, Denmark. This headquarters cooperates closely with the battlegroups in Estonia and Latvia. At the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, NATO allies agreed to enhance the multinational battlegroups from battalions up to brigade size, where and when required. These steps have changed the relative rates of reinforcement, making it more difficult for Russia to conduct a successful breakthrough.</p> +<p>Getting the coalition dynamics right requires addressing tough questions about roles, missions, capabilities, and — most of all — politics. Which allies would be willing to commit their forces in advance of a conflict? Under what circumstances would they do so? And with what caveats about their use? The answers to these questions will vary greatly from country to country, even from leader to leader. And although it seems likely that close allies, such as Japan or Australia, will indeed side with the United States if shooting starts, their leaders are often unwilling, for understandable political and diplomatic reasons, to make that commitment explicit in advance.</p> -<p>In addition, an attacker’s penetrating armies will be vulnerable to counterattack since they will be moving forward rapidly on unfamiliar terrain at the head of long logistical columns. The defender therefore may be able to seal off the penetration if it rapidly brings reserves to bear. The size and quality of the defender’s reserves become important for this reason. Again, NATO has made adjustments over the past several years. NATO’s rapid reinforcement strategy ensures that forward-presence forces will be reinforced by NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the broader NATO Response Force, additional high-readiness forces, and NATO’s heavier follow-on forces. At the 2022 Madrid summit, NATO agreed on a new NATO Force Model, which represented a broader expansion of high-readiness forces potentially available to NATO, where and when required. NATO allies have also agreed to boost NATO’s ability to reinforce its forces in the east by developing:</p> +<p>Ideally, a U.S.-led coalition would maximize efficiency: Washington would rely on allies to build niche capabilities and focus on particular missions, freeing up U.S. forces for the most daunting tasks. A similar argument has been made for why Taiwan should ditch its expensive planes and warships, which will probably be destroyed or disabled at the outset of any conflict, and instead focus on antiship missiles, mines, and other asymmetric capabilities that can help it survive until help arrives. But Taiwan is hesitant to do this because it has no ironclad assurance help will come — not even from the United States.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>More prepositioned equipment and weapons stockpiles;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>More forward-deployed capabilities, including integrated air and missile defense systems;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Strengthened command and control; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Upgraded defense plans, with specific forces preassigned to the defense of specific allies.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>This illustrates the larger dilemma: if no one really knows who will or will not fight in a crisis, a clean division of labor becomes dangerous because absent allies would create glaring gaps. Political leaders in the Western Pacific naturally want to preserve flexibility and protect sovereignty. Yet this undermines efficiency by forcing Washington to plan for the possibility that its allies will not show up. The dilemma works the other way as well: the less reliable the United States seems due to resurgent isolationism or political dysfunction, the less willing its allies will be to make potentially costly commitments to fight by its side.</p> -<p><strong>Flexibility and Initiative of Attacking Forces:</strong> The fourth factor is the ability of attacking forces to maximize flexibility and initiative. To forestall a successful counterattack, the attacker must take immediate advantage of the breakthrough opening and then maintain a rapid rate of advance to keep the defender constantly off balance. This is a demanding task because the commanders of the attacker’s forces, operating in a fog of war, will have to make rapid-fire decisions based on incomplete information while facing a constantly changing situation. A deep strategic penetration is best served by a flexible command and control structure and a joint force commanded at all levels by individuals capable of intelligently exercising initiative. Delegating responsibility to officers and non-commissioned officers who can make bold decisions in difficult circumstances maximizes the prospects that the attacking forces will not get bogged down, undermining the blitzkrieg.</p> +<h3 id="gray-zone-or-high-intensity">Gray Zone or High Intensity</h3> -<p>Russian forces currently lack flexibility and initiative. During the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, for example, a failure of small-unit cohesion and initiative likely contributed to the defeat of some Russian forces. Russian units included a mix of troops with variable levels of training, experience, and equipment — and with little time spent working together. The lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps in the Russian army likely inhibited the cohesion of these units. Additional deficiencies included small-unit tactics and morale, which are usually the purview of junior and non-commissioned officers. Small-unit leaders failed to break with the Soviet tradition of passively waiting for orders, which discourages initiative and punishes mistakes. It did not help that many Russian soldiers were not informed that they were being sent to war, but were instead told they were headed to a training mission. Furthermore, the massive casualties among Russia’s contract soldiers — disproportionately concentrated among the airborne and special forces — in the first month of the war left many surviving soldiers deeply reluctant to embark on offensive operations. The most experienced troops who should have been critical to leading newly mobilized personnel were, in many cases, the most reluctant to conduct attacks.</p> +<p>A final tension is between dealing with day-to-day gray zone challenges — maritime coercion, menacing aerial intercepts, and other pressure tactics short of war — and preparing for the potential outbreak of a major conflict. Gray zone engagements require frequent sorties, which wear down aircraft and their crews. There is a real trade-off between showing the flag in the South China Sea and training for high-intensity conflict. The Pentagon’s preference may be to concentrate intently on deterring high-intensity conflict — the fight that the United States simply cannot afford to lose — but even if it does so successfully, its friends will still suffer as Beijing salami-slices the status quo.</p> -<p>Consequently, the Russian military — especially Russian ground forces — lacks sufficient initiative to be able to effectively execute a conventionally focused blitzkrieg operation against NATO countries.</p> +<p>For example, the U.S. military is heavily focused on a potential war in the Taiwan Strait, most notably the challenge of rapidly sinking an invasion fleet. But although this is the most dangerous contingency, it is not the only, or perhaps even the most likely, one. Every day China is squeezing Taiwan, using a high operations tempo and boundary encroachment to nibble away at its buffer zones. Likewise, the challenge in the South China Sea is not a matter of Beijing mounting an all-out invasion of the Philippines. It involves using fishing boats, maritime militia, coast guard vessels, and other capabilities to undermine sovereignty.</p> -<p><strong>Geography:</strong> Geography is a fifth factor impacting the outcome of a successful breakthrough battle. The defender generally prefers a front covered with obstacles — rivers, mountains, forests, swamps, jungles, and prepared defensive positions — so that there are few locations where the attacker can place a main axis of attack. The defender then has a good chance of predicting where the attacker will strike, minimizing the attacker’s prospects of outmaneuvering the defender. Also, a defender faced with few possible breakthrough points along the front can concentrate forces in front of them, since the defender does not have to worry much about the obstacle-ridden portion of the front.</p> +<p>Unfortunately, many of the capabilities needed for gray zone scenarios are different from those needed for high-end deterrence missions. Small units equipped with antiship missiles may be lethally effective against an invasion fleet, but they are of less use in helping the Philippines defend its sovereignty against everyday encroachment or helping Japan cope with pressure from Chinese aircraft over the East China Sea. In fairness, this dilemma might well attend any U.S. defense strategy in the Western Pacific. But the more Washington emphasizes high-end conflict scenarios and anti-access forces, the sharper this trade-off will become.</p> -<p>Geography poses a challenge for NATO in Eastern Europe, though it does not outweigh other factors, such as both sides’ relative capabilities and the attacker’s initiative. The Baltic states, for example, are largely flat, though the terrain is dotted with lakes, bogs, and marshes. In some places, off-road mobility could be difficult, especially during the rasputitsa — or thaw — when travel on unpaved roads becomes difficult because of muddy conditions caused by rain or melting snow. Still, there is a fairly robust network of roads and highways in the Baltics, and the distances are short.</p> +<h3 id="no-easy-answers">No Easy Answers</h3> -<p>It is only 213 kilometers from Ivangorod, Russia, which is situated along the Russian-Estonian border, to Talinn along the E20 highway in flat terrain. Lithuania is in an even more precarious situation. There are multiple direct routes from Belarus to Vilnius, Lithuania’s capital, in relatively flat terrain. It is a short 35-kilometer drive from the border crossing at Kamenny Log to Vilnius along the E28 highway, and a 34-kilometer drive from the border crossing at Kotlovka to Vilnius along the 103 highway. Russia’s enclave in Kaliningrad could interfere with the movement of NATO forces into the Baltics. To move from Poland into Lithuania by land, for example, NATO forces would have to transit the “Kaliningrad corridor,” a 110- to 150-kilometer gap in Poland between the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus that could be attacked from both sides and could require substantial air, sea, and ground forces to secure. Instead of moving over land from Poland, NATO forces could arrive by air or by sea, but they would have to contend with Russian interdiction.</p> +<p>There are no perfect solutions to these challenges. Every choice comes with risks and consequences. The best the United States and its allies and partners can do is mitigate those risks to the extent possible, which begins with recognizing that the requirements of assurance, deterrence, and warfighting often cut in different directions — and that Washington cannot adequately address any of these dilemmas on its own.</p> -<p>Finland, which shares a 1,300-kilometer border with Russia, also presents a challenge for NATO. Finland’s geography is characterized by intermingled boreal forests and lakes, with archipelagoes and coastal lowlands in the south, a slightly higher central lake plateau, and uplands in the north and northeast. Northern and eastern Finland are sparsely populated and contain vast wilderness areas, with taiga forest as the dominant vegetation type. But the terrain in Finland is mostly flat, and it is only 191 kilometers from the Torfyanovka border crossing to Helsinki along the E18 highway.</p> +<p>As discussed, the Pentagon may envision addressing the competing imperatives of assurance, deterrence, and warfighting by effectively bifurcating the force. An “inside force” located within the first island chain would reassure allies of U.S. commitment and dissuade China from thinking it can succeed with a rapid fait accompli. If war occurs, it will be supplemented by an “outside force,” located mostly beyond the immediate reach of China’s most potent A2/AD assets, which would provide the bulk of the striking power needed to turn back a PLA assault and eventually end the conflict on favorable terms. Yet that is only a partial answer to the dilemmas raised here, many of which will persist even if the United States optimizes different parts of its forces for different tasks.</p> -<p>The same is true of Poland, whose plains have made it susceptible to invasion throughout history, from the Mongols in the thirteenth century to the Nazi and Soviet invasions in the twentieth century. Poland’s geographic location is, in part, why Norman Davies titled his history of Poland God’s Playground. Poland’s relatively flat central terrain is partly why wargames of a Russian invasion of Poland, including Winter-20, have been bleak.</p> +<p>One requirement for more squarely confronting trade-offs between speed and sustainability, between survivability and lethality, and so on would be closer coordination between the officials responsible — in the United States and friendly countries — for operational planning, capability development, and alliance management. After all, the hardest trade-offs tend to arise at the intersection of these tasks. But even within the U.S. government, it is not clear that the dilemmas are as sharply understood, or as explicitly acknowledged, as they could be. When the authors recently traveled to the region, we were struck that many of these dilemmas are not really being debated yet with key allies and partners.</p> -<p>While these geographic features present challenges, they do not outweigh the other factors, such as the relative capabilities of the forces possessed by the sides, the force-to-space ratio, the relative rate at which each side can marshal and deploy reinforcements, and the individual initiative and flexibility of the attacker’s commanders. The conventional balance heavily favors NATO, which has a very good chance of defeating any conventional Russian attack in Eastern Europe. This reality is very different from the military balance in Central Europe for part of the Cold War.</p> +<p>This is a potentially costly mistake. Each trade-off has extensive implications for Indo-Pacific allies and partners; addressing them requires not just understanding but also extensive military reforms and sensitive political guidance from U.S. friends. The U.S. military no longer possesses power projection capabilities so overwhelming it can determine its strategy independently and then seek the acquiescence of like-minded nations. For the first time in decades, Washington must truly integrate its Asian friends into its most crucial strategic debates — as well as the training, exercises, contingency planning processes, and wargames that both inform and flow from those debates. The alternative is a strategy that becomes dangerously disjointed as the United States and other defenders of the Asian order confront difficult choices in divergent ways.</p> -<p><strong>The Nuclear Balance</strong></p> +<p>Given the growing worry about crises or conflict, there is little time to waste. The shorter the time horizon gets, the starker the trade-offs will become. Hard dilemmas are the price to pay for decades of lethargy in dealing with a growing Chinese challenge. If the United States, its allies, and its partners do not confront these issues head-on today, the consequences could be ugly tomorrow.</p> -<p>Russia has improved its nuclear capabilities and still maintains the largest inventory of strategic weapons in the world, providing it with a strong deterrent capability against conventional and nuclear threats. Moscow has been — and will likely continue to be — committed to retaining a full range of sea-, land-, and air-based systems. Russia’s land‐based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are under the control of the Strategic Missile Forces, while sea‐ and air‐based strategic systems are operationally managed by the Russian navy and air force. Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS) brings together Russia’s aviation, air defense, and missile defense systems, as well as the country’s missile early-warning and space control and monitoring systems, under a unified and integrated command and control structure. Moscow may also be developing a nuclear space-based weapon capable of targeting satellites.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Overall, examples of Russian modernization priorities include: the RS-26 Avangard ICBM, equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle; the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM; the Poseidon nuclear-capable, long-range unmanned underwater vehicle; the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (Dagger) air-launched high-speed ballistic missile; the Tu-160M strategic bomber; and the PAK-DA next-generation strategic bomber.</p> +<p><strong>Hal Brands</strong> is Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.</p> -<p>As Figure 3.4 highlights, however, the United States and NATO possess a strong nuclear deterrent. The United States has roughly 400 Minuteman III ICBMs. In addition, the U.S. arsenal includes roughly 280 Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the United Kingdom has another 48 Trident I/II D5 SLBMs, and France has 64 M51 SLBMs. In addition, the United States currently possesses roughly 66 aircraft (B-2s and B-52s) capable of carrying nuclear weapons, while France has 40 Rafales. The certification of the F-35 as a dual-capable aircraft (DCA) will increase the number of tactical air delivery systems available in Europe. The result is near parity in the number of warheads: approximately 4,495 for Russia and roughly 4,300 for the United States, United Kingdom, and France. NATO’s strategic air-, land-, and maritime-based capabilities give it a viable second-strike capability and a strong deterrent.</p> +<p><strong>Zack Cooper</strong> is senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer in public and international affairs at Princeton University.</p>Hal Brands and Zack CooperAs the danger of war rises in the Western Pacific, the United States is racing to reset its military strategy. China’s astonishing military modernization — especially its arsenal of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities — has fundamentally challenged the old U.S. approach, which focused on defeating aggression by projecting decisive power into the first island chain.Government Use Of Deepfakes2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/government-use-of-deepfakes<p><em>What questions should governments ask — and who in government should be asking them — when a deepfake is being considered?</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l0j70Pb.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.4: The Nuclear Balance in Selected Strategic Offensive Weapons, 2023.</strong> Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023.</em></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The United States is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal. For example, existing strategic delivery systems are undergoing modernization, including complete rebuilds of the Minuteman III ICBM and Trident II SLBM. The service lives of the Navy’s 14 Trident Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines are being extended. Additionally, Columbia-class submarines will replace Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. The U.S. Air Force is also building a new strategic bomber, the B-21 Raider, and a new nuclear-capable cruise missile, the Long Range Stand Off Weapon, to replace the existing air-launched cruise missile. These modernization efforts will likely ensure that NATO retains a strong nuclear deterrent in Europe.</p> +<p>This paper examines several scenarios in which democratic governments might consider using deepfakes to advance their foreign policy objectives. It argues that officials should consider the following factors: (1) the likely efficacy of the deepfake, (2) its audience, (3) the potential harms, (4) the legal implications, (5) the nature of the target, (6) the goal of the deepfake, and (7) the traceability of the deepfake back to the originating democratic government. In general, the authors argue that deepfakes should not be used as they are likely to reduce the credibility of democratic governments if their use is discovered, though there may be rare circumstances when their use deserves serious consideration. This paper also proposes a process for approving or rejecting deepfakes that ensures that a wide variety of perspectives are brought to the table.</p> -<p>While NATO enjoys a robust nuclear deterrent, it is less clear whether Russia will be deterred from using nuclear weapons against a country outside of NATO, such as Ukraine. Any Russian use of nuclear weapons against any non-NATO country would cause significant political concern across Europe.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><strong>Other Threats</strong></p> +<p>In March 2022, a fake video of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky telling his soldiers to lay down their arms was posted on a Ukrainian website. The video also appeared on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and a host of Russian channels. A similar video shared on the social platform Telegram surfaced in November 2023 in which the head of Ukraine’s armed forces, General Valery Zaluzhny, is heard making a similar speech. Other fake videos of Zelensky show him sporting a swastika and appearing in a Pride parade. Widely believed to have been created and disseminated by Russia, these fakes reflect the use of advanced information technology methods to covertly influence warfare and shape the broader information environment in Russia’s favor.</p> -<p>In addition to Russia, there are other threats to Europe. This section focuses on several threats: Iran, China, terrorism, illegal immigration, and illegal drug trafficking. These represent the most acute threats to Europe over the next decade. There are other threats — involving climate change, pandemics, energy, and cyber — that also present long-term threats.</p> +<p>This state of affairs is only likely to worsen with the rapid proliferation of deepfakes, or artificial images generated by artificial intelligence (AI), as well as manipulable digital media in general. As AI has improved, deepfakes have gone from primitive to highly realistic, and they will only get harder to distinguish. (A representative list of some popular tools for generating synthetic artifacts is provided in the appendix.)</p> -<p><strong>Iran:</strong> European states will likely face a lingering threat from Iran, including from long-range missiles. Under the oversight of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Forces, Iran will likely continue to field more accurate and longer-range missiles over the next decade, as Figure 3.6 highlights. A ballistic missile based on Iran’s Zoljanah space launch vehicle could carry a one-ton warhead as far as 5,000 kilometers, allowing Iran to strike every European capital. These developments will supplement other Iranian missiles, such as the Shahab-3 and Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missiles, which have an operational range of up to 2,000 kilometers. Iran also has layered area denial and anti-surface warfare capabilities, including naval mining (such as moored contact, drifting contact, and limpet mines), small boat swarming tactics, and coastal defenses.</p> +<p>This proliferation of AI provides an unparalleled opportunity for state actors to use deepfakes for national security purposes. In addition to the Zelensky and Zaluzhny videos, there have been numerous uses of deepfake technology in the context of politics and international conflict. In May 2023, deepfake videos claimed to show the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror group endorsing Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the main opposition candidate for the Turkish presidency. Another deepfake against an opposition candidate, this time allegedly pornographic, led him to step down from the presidential race. In January 2024, a robocall that faked President Joe Biden’s voice advised New Hampshire residents not to vote in the presidential primary. There are reports that the Venezuelan government used deepfake technology (specifically the Synthesia tool shown in the appendix) to generate deepfakes of news anchors portraying the Venezuelan economy in glowing terms.</p> -<p>However, there are serious challenges with Europe’s integrated air and missile defense capabilities, particularly in ground-based air defense, command and control, and defense against emerging advanced threats. The European Sky Shield Initiative, which is led by Germany, could theoretically address some of these problems. But it is under significant political pressure, and several countries, such as France, Poland, and Italy, have opted out of the initiative. The result is that European missile defense capabilities are a poorly integrated jumble of capabilities. For example, France and Italy possess SAMP/T ground-based air defense missile systems; Germany and the Netherlands have the Patriot surface-to-air missile system; and Greece and Romania have Patriot, SA-20, and I-HAWK systems. There are numerous future plans in the works. For instance, NATO’s ballistic missile defense program is unlikely to be fully operational until roughly 2030. Most of the European countries developing sea-based, lower-layer ballistic missile defense are forecasting delays — including to the development of a suitable interceptor missile — through the end of the decade. The U.S. contribution to NATO’s ballistic missile defense architecture will remain critical, including the Aegis Ashore and periodic rotation of the Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) missile defense system.</p> +<p>The Synthesia product was also reportedly used to generate videos supportive of the 2022 coup in Burkina Faso. Initial versions allowed users to use their own visual likeness or an avatar to generate a video in the voice of the individual portrayed. Recent updates can convert “text-based sources [inputs] into full-fledged synthetic videos in a matter of minutes.” However, unscrupulous individuals may use similar technology to generate highly realistic videos of nonconsenting individuals. It is therefore only a matter of time before politicians, military leaders, and others are falsely accused, through weaponized audio and video, of participating in acts they never carried out. These deepfakes may include made-up speeches, fake murders, and other provocative acts.</p> -<p><strong>China:</strong> Security competition between the United States and China has increased — and will likely continue to increase over the next decade. But there are different views of the Chinese threat in European capitals.</p> +<p>On the positive side, deepfakes have been used for various legitimate purposes, labeled here as “beneficial deepfakes.” One example is the set of deepfakes of soccer superstar David Beckham, who was portrayed supporting an antimalaria message in which he speaks in a host of foreign languages; the visual content is real, but the audio is not. These messages, created by Synthesia, were presumably generated with his consent. An Indian politician had previously used a similar idea to create deepfake videos of his own political speeches in 20 languages using his own voice, enabling him to share his political message more effectively.</p> -<p>The United Kingdom, for example, has been critical of China’s crackdowns in Hong Kong, has been willing to speak out about China’s human rights abuses, and is increasingly vocal about the threat from China. The head of MI5, the United Kingdom’s domestic intelligence agency, bluntly remarked in 2022 that the “most game-changing challenge we face comes from the Chinese Communist Party. It’s covertly applying pressure across the globe.” France, which has overseas departments, territories, and communities in the Indo-Pacific, has established a harder line against China than many European countries. In addition, Denmark’s economic relationship with China is limited, and its leaders have been wary of Chinese intentions in Greenland and the Arctic. Denmark joined the U.S.-led Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative, alongside Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, which is designed to stem the flow of sensitive technologies to authoritarian governments such as China. Lithuania has faced economic coercion from China for its moves to recognize a Taiwanese office in Vilnius as well as for withdrawing from an economic initiative focusing on China and Central and Eastern Europe.</p> +<p>Will the lure of deepfakes, whether beneficial or malign, prove irresistible to democratic governments? If the past is a guide, the answer seems to be a resounding yes. Photoshop and similar tools have long allowed the easy editing of images, and deepfakes bring this phenomenon to a new level. September 2022 saw reports of the U.S. military using fake Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram accounts to promote a pro-Western message in Central Asia and the Middle East. In February 2023, leaked documents revealed the U.S. military may be actively seeking to run covert overseas influence campaigns that use deepfakes to “generate messages and influence operations via non-traditional channels.”</p> -<p>But other European countries have been less concerned about China. Germany’s relationship with China is complicated due to Germany’s dependence on Chinese manufacturing and markets. For example, a study from a German industry association found that “approximately 5,200 German companies comprising over one million employees” were operating in China and that many more had “large sums of investments tied up in China.” This situation has created some German dependencies on Chinese supply chains and value creation networks, and the Chinese shipping giant COSCO bought a 35 percent stake in a container terminal at the port of Hamburg. In Greece, China’s COSCO now owns more than 51 percent of the commercial port of Piraeus, which is often used by NATO for port visits, exercise staging, and transport. This dependency raises questions about whether Greece might hesitate to act (or be constrained from acting) in a conflict with China. Italy has also established close relations with China. For example, Italy signed a memorandum of understanding with China, which is valid until 2024, in support of the Belt and Road Initiative.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Will the lure of deepfakes, whether beneficial or malign, prove irresistible to democratic governments? If the past is a guide, the answer seems to be a resounding yes.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>A majority of Europeans are opposed to engaging in conflict with China, according to some survey data. Similarly, a majority believe that they are not in any type of a Cold War with China, though a growing percentage also say their views of China have worsened over time and expressed concern about Chinese ownership of key infrastructure. The populations of Sweden and the Netherlands have the most unfavorable views of China, while those of Greece, Hungary, Italy, and several other countries have more favorable views. A substantial percentage of Europeans (36 percent) consider China to be a necessary partner. Only 12 percent of all respondents in one survey saw China as an adversary. Some polling also suggests that a large majority of European populations would prefer to remain neutral in a conflict between the United States and China.</p> +<p>It will not be long before major democracies, including the United States, start or at least consider using deepfakes to achieve their ends, if they have not already done so. This paper examines hypothetical cases in which deepfakes might be used and argues that deepfakes should not be used without a clearly articulated set of guardrails that consider both the benefits and the risks of a proposed government-run deepfake-enabled operation.</p> -<p>These realities suggest that there are differences among European governments and populations about the perceived threat posed by China. This is an important consideration for U.S. military planners and political leaders: it is not clear nor inevitable that NATO and Europe writ large can be counted on to join military actions in the Indo-Pacific through 2030. And this may be an acceptable outcome in order to maintain some strategic balance against Russia.</p> +<p>There is need for an unbiased evaluation of the trade-off between the short-term benefits and long-term risks of a hypothetical deepfake campaign by a democratic nation. Moreover, a transparent and publicly articulated process is required for performing such evaluations, even if the details of a specific deepfake or deepfake campaign are classified. To these ends, this paper focuses on answering two fundamental questions:</p> -<p><strong>Terrorism:</strong> Terrorism in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia will likely present a continuing threat to Europe. Salafi-jihadist groups linked to the Islamic State and al Qaeda are active across these regions. There are several groups linked to al Qaeda, including Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (or al Shabaab) in Somalia; Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in West Africa; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria; Hurras al-Din in Syria; al Qaeda core and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent in Afghanistan; and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. There are also several groups linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Islamic State), including the leadership in Iraq and Syria; the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in West Africa; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt; the Islamic State-Libya; the Islamic State-Khorasan; the Islamic State-Yemen, Islamic State networks in Somalia, which host the al-Karrar office. In addition, Shia groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, continue to operate in Europe, though primarily to fundraise and recruit individuals rather than plot attacks. The most significant external terrorist threat to Europe is likely attacks by individuals inspired by the Islamic State or al Qaeda — especially with connections to the Middle East and Africa.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>What</strong> are the right questions to ask when a government agency contemplates using deepfakes to further its mission?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Who</strong> should be responsible for asking these questions and who should approve or reject a request to use a deepfake or perform a deepfake campaign? What processes and governance mechanisms should these people use when contemplating deepfake use in military and intelligence settings?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RyApZzZ.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.5: Iran’s Ballistic and Cruise Missile Ranges through 2030.</strong> Source: <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/">Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Iran,” Missile Threat, CSIS, June 14, 2018, Last modified July 17, 2020</a>; <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3907877">“Identical Letters Dated 7 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Digital Library, April 8, 2021</a>.</em></p> +<p>To answer these questions, this paper presents five hypothetical security-related scenarios a democratic government might confront. The authors conducted interviews with six leaders who have expert knowledge in both AI technology and national defense. These include a retired U.S. general, a retired U.S. intelligence agency chief, a leading EU think tank employee working in disinformation and technology, a senior tech company executive, a retired general from Asia, and a former senior lawyer at the White House and National Security Council (NSC). The authors engaged in a discussion with each of these experts on the what and who questions listed above. This report summarizes the authors’ methods and findings.</p> -<p><strong>Illegal Immigration:</strong> Europe faces a continuing threat from illegal immigration, including human trafficking for all forms of exploitation, such as labor and sexual exploitation. Migrant-smuggling networks transport individuals illegally through the Western, Central, and Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans into Europe, requiring extensive monitoring. In 2021, Belarus organized immigrants from the Middle East, including Iraqi Kurdistan, to cross into Poland. It was part of a political coercion campaign by Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko, who threatened to “flood” the European Union with illegal immigrants and drug traffickers. In response, European countries have been involved in efforts to detect, monitor, and counter the movement of illegal immigrants, including European Union Naval Force Mediterranean, Operation Triton, Operation Themis, and Operation Mare Nostrum.</p> +<p>This paper argues democratic governments should consider several issues before they deploy deepfakes. First, how effective is the deepfake likely to be, especially if other methods are available? Second, will the deepfake be visible to a narrow audience (e.g., just the inner circle of a foreign terrorist organization) or a broad one (such as an entire country or the citizens in the government’s own country)? Third, could the deepfake harm innocent civilians, distorting their views on important issues? Fourth, does the proposed deepfake use comply with applicable international law? Fifth, is the deepfake portraying a truly prominent and influential person, such as a president or religious or social leader, or is it portraying a less important person? Sixth, is the deepfake part of a tit-for-tat process or to protect a country’s people from immediate harm, or is there a lesser goal? Finally, how likely is it that a deepfake will be traced back to the home country, with potentially profound repercussions for a government’s relationship with its own people? To answer these questions, the authors recommend a deepfake equities process that brings together a range of stakeholders to determine whether the deepfake should be used, with the initial presumption being that, in general, deepfakes should not be used.</p> -<p><strong>Illegal Drug Trafficking:</strong> European states will likely face persistent threats from illegal drugs and drug trafficking, including from cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, methamphetamines, MDMA, and other drugs. In response, European states are likely to remain focused on detecting, monitoring, and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs coming from West and South Asia, South America, North Africa, and other regions. Recent European counter-drug campaigns have included the European Union Military Operation in the Central African Republic and Operation Atalanta.</p> +<h4 id="potential-risks-for-democratic-governments">Potential Risks for Democratic Governments</h4> -<p><strong>Other Threats:</strong> European states will also face several other threats. One is from pandemics, such as new strains of influenza or a novel coronavirus. Another is from climate change. Concerns about global climate change are likely to remain high in many European countries, as such events as wildfires, floods, and extreme heat cause significant disruption across the continent. Worries about climate change are not shared by all Europeans and are generally lower among those who support far-right populist parties. In Germany, for instance, only 55 percent of supporters of the Alternative for Germany party view climate change as a major threat, compared with 77 percent of those who do not support the party. Similar divisions also appear in Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Europe will also continue to face a threat from cyberattacks from a range of state and non-state actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Finally, Europe will likely face a persistent energy crisis because of a decline in Russian gas deliveries, supply chain disruptions, and volatility in the oil and gas markets.</p> +<p>A previous report by two of the authors on this topic details the potential uses of deepfakes in conflict settings as well as the costs and risks. Several risks are worth noting for democratic governments in particular. The loss of trust that the population of a democratic nation has in both offline and online media and news sources will be the first casualty, making it easier for adversaries to sow disinformation that divides a target population and for antigovernment domestic actors to use the deepfake to degrade public trust in the government. This loss of trust, in turn, may allow such adversaries to influence elections, reduce support for the target nation’s military and diplomatic activities, encourage riots and internal conflict, sway stock markets, and more. As democracies depend on open communication and informed voters, anything that interferes with these concepts — such as deepfakes — should be viewed with concern.</p> -<p><strong>Possible Wildcards</strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As democracies depend on open communication and informed voters, anything that interferes with these concepts — such as deepfakes — should be viewed with concern.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Despite these threats, Russia will likely remain the most significant threat to Europe in the foreseeable future, and there are several wildcards that could change the conventional military balance in Europe. This section focuses on several possibilities: U.S. involvement in a major war outside of Europe, a Russian military buildup with assistance from China and other countries, and erosion of U.S. or European political will. These are by no means the only possibilities, though they are plausible wildcards that could significantly impact the threat landscape.</p> +<p>A second major long-term risk of the use of deepfakes is the loss of credibility of the government that uses them. Once a government can be credibly accused of using lies as an instrument of state policy, the value of any statements they make could be diminished for years, if not decades, at home as well as abroad.</p> -<p><strong>Major War Outside of Europe:</strong> The United States could become overstretched with a major theater war in another region, such as against China in the Indo-Pacific. European conventional and logistical capabilities are limited — particularly for high-end war — and U.S. involvement in a major war in another region could potentially alter the balance in Europe. One example is a war between the United States and China over Taiwan. There are at least two major implications for Europe.</p> +<p>Third, adversaries may benefit from the “liar’s dividend,” wherein they can explain away real evidence of corruption or abuse by claiming the information is fake.</p> -<p>First, the United States would likely require significant resources in a Taiwan conflict, including air defense systems, such as Patriots; long-range bombers, such as the B-21; long-range precision strike capabilities, such as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER); and submarines, such as Virginia-class and Columbia-class vessels. Overall, the requirements and political attention necessary for a U.S. war with China in the Indo-Pacific would likely require deploying U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and possibly Army personnel and capabilities to the Indo-Pacific for an extended period. It is likely that a war could be protracted, dragging out for months or longer.</p> +<h3 id="methodology">Methodology</h3> -<p>Second, the United States would likely lose a significant portion of its military forces, especially in a protracted war. In the more pessimistic scenario from a recent CSIS wargame, for example, the United States loses nearly 500 aircraft and 14 surface combatant ships. Roughly 90 percent of U.S. aircraft losses occur while they sit on airfields, not in the air. Across scenarios, the United States typically loses more than 500 U.S. aircraft in all, as well as at least two aircraft carriers and between 10 and 20 large surface combatants. These high losses occur because U.S. aircraft and surface ships deploy forward to strike at the Chinese fleet, particularly the amphibious forces, before establishing air and maritime dominance. Chinese losses are also high, with over 300 aircraft losses and over 100 surface combatant ships destroyed. Overall, Chinese air losses varied across the wargame scenarios from several dozen to over 700.</p> +<p>The authors created five scenarios in which a democratic government may be tempted to intervene. These five scenarios were shared with six leaders in the national security sector from three regions: the United States, the European Union, and Asia. The leaders represented four types of stakeholders: intelligence, military, industry, and nongovernmental organizations with an interest in the topic.</p> -<p>In a Taiwan conflict, the United States would likely have to shift considerable military resources and political focus to the Indo-Pacific and away from Europe. U.S. military power would also be eroded through attrition. This could have at least two consequences. It could change the conventional balance in Europe by requiring the United States to pull some military forces out of Europe and deploy them to the Indo-Pacific. In addition, Russia could be emboldened to conduct offensive actions against the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, or another country. A U.S. withdrawal of forces to another theater, such as the Indo-Pacific, could create a window of opportunity for offensive actions by Russian leaders, who may conclude that the advantages of defense in Europe have weakened. Historically, leaders have developed offensive military strategies when they possess revisionist war aims and believe the balance of power is shifting in their favor.</p> +<h4 id="election-scenario">Election Scenario</h4> -<p>It is also conceivable that the United States could become involved in a major war elsewhere — such as against North Korea, Iran, or terrorist groups in the Middle East or South Asia — which Russian leaders could attempt to exploit. Following Hamas’ brutal attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, conflict in the Middle East expanded to include Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries.</p> +<p><em>Country X is rich in oil, minerals, and other natural resources and has a government that is not friendly to Western countries. The leader of Country X is an unsavory character responsible for human rights abuses and linked to international terrorist groups. In the aftermath of recent elections, Country X is experiencing political instability, with many protests and moderate and pro-Western leaders credibly contending the election was stolen from them. In the midst of ongoing instability, intelligence agencies propose to use deepfakes showing the leader of Country X thanking a Western diplomat for sending him money, receiving a payoff from a wealthy national of Country X, laughing at the deaths of citizens of Country X in protests, and ordering ballot boxes to be stuffed with fraudulent ballots. The intelligence agencies hope this will discredit him and contribute to his downfall.</em></p> -<p><strong>Russian Military Modernization:</strong> Russia could significantly rebuild its conventional capabilities — as well as further invest in asymmetric ones — with help from China and other countries, such as North Korea and Iran. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its land forces to prepare for deterrence and warfighting against NATO. The Russian army will likely continue to move away from battalion formations to infantry, marine, and airborne divisions. This would mark a significant shift away from the changes implemented under former minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov, who scrapped the Soviet-era structure of the armed forces that included large divisions as part of the “New Look” reforms.</p> +<p>This scenario is intended to address a common foreign policy challenge: an adversarial government that is also repressive to its own people. Such governments often threaten U.S. and allied interests and harm their own people, though rarely do they pose a grave threat.</p> -<p>For example, Russian military leaders have indicated an intention to create at least nine new divisions: five artillery divisions, including super-heavy artillery brigades for building artillery reserves; two air assault divisions in the Russian Airborne Forces, bringing its force structure to roughly equal with Soviet times; and two motorized infantry divisions integrated into combined arms forces. The Ministry of Defence will likely transform seven motorized infantry brigades into motorized infantry divisions in the Western, Central, and Eastern Districts, as well as in the Northern Fleet. It will also likely expand an army corps in Karelia, across the border from Finland. In addition, each combined arms (tank) army may have a composite aviation division within it and an army aviation brigade with 80 to 100 combat helicopters under the control of ground force units — not the Russian Aerospace Forces. This decision was likely a result of the poor joint operations in Ukraine, especially air-land battle, though it does not fix poor coordination between Russian land and air forces.</p> +<h4 id="genocide-scenario">Genocide Scenario</h4> -<p>Russian leaders have expressed an interest in strengthening Russian naval forces — including submarines — in response to growing tensions with the United States and NATO. The Ministry of Defence has announced a desire to create five naval infantry brigades for the navy’s coastal troops based on existing naval infantry brigades. This expansion followed Russia’s adoption of a new maritime doctrine in July 2022, which identified the United States and NATO as major threats. In addition, the doctrine expressed an interest in building modern aircraft carriers, though it also highlighted the challenges of Russia’s lack of overseas naval bases and the constraints on Russia’s shipbuilding industry because of the West’s economic sanctions. Senior Russian officials have identified nuclear-powered submarines as critical in future force design.</p> +<p><em>Country Z is run by a small cabal whose leader (L1) is planning a genocide of a minority group that constitutes about 15 percent of the population. Unbeknownst to L1, his intelligence chief (L2) has had discussions with Western governments about the future of the country, including turning against his boss, possibly to save himself or to gain power. He wants your government’s help overthrowing the leader, preventing a genocide, and becoming the leader of a government that will be better and more closely aligned with Western principles. The time has come to overthrow L1. To do so, your country’s intelligence agency has generated deepfake videos of L1 boasting about the amount of money he has stolen from the treasury and stating that most members of the majority group are stupid and will have to follow him even though the minority group poses no threat. Western intelligence agencies hope that this deepfake will reduce L1’s support among the population of Country Z and enable L2 to gain enough momentum to take over and avert genocide.</em></p> -<p>Beijing could accelerate Russian military modernization. China possesses significant fifth-generation military capabilities, technology, and money that could impact the European balance of power if Beijing calculated that it was in its interest to help Russia modernize its military. The Chinese Communist Party’s 14th Five Year Plan, which goes through 2025, calls for accelerated development of military mechanization, informatization, and “intelligentization.” China is focusing on military applications for such areas as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, biotechnology, information technology, quantum computing, robotics, advanced materials and manufacturing, and deep-sea technologies.</p> +<p>This scenario is designed to test responses in one of the worst situations imaginable: the deliberate mass killing of civilians. Historically, the United States and other Western governments have not intervened effectively in such situations. Deepfakes offer one means of intervention that leaders might turn to in such a crisis.</p> -<p>China is developing the J-20A and J-20B fifth-generation stealth fighter, armed stealth unmanned aircraft systems, and the J-31 medium-weight stealth fighter by 2025. China is also developing kinetic kill vehicle technology to field an upper-tier ballistic missile interceptor by 2030; longer-range, more accurate, and increasingly lethal ballistic and cruise missiles; air defenses; and other platforms and systems. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLANAF) is fielding new carrier-based aircraft, as well as anti-submarine warfare, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, land-based maritime strike, and air defense forces. China may have as many as five aircraft carriers by 2030, aided by helicopter carriers and a fleet of destroyers. The development of China’s space, counterspace, and electronics sectors has enabled it to increase the pace of satellite launches and deploy a wider range of sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites. Some modeling suggests that the effectiveness of the Chinese submarine fleet (as measured by the number of attack opportunities it might achieve against carriers) has risen significantly over the past 25 years.</p> +<h4 id="invasion-scenario">Invasion Scenario</h4> -<p>Based on these developments, China could potentially provide significant air, land, and maritime weapon systems and technology to Russia through exports, joint development projects, funding, or other arrangements that facilitate a Russian defense revitalization. After all, Russia and China have pledged to deepen defense cooperation through arms sales, military exercises, and other activities.</p> +<p><em>Country R is mobilizing its military forces and preparing to invade a small neighbor. Western intelligence learns Country R is preparing deepfake videos that show that its neighbor’s troops fired first at Country R’s forces and that the small state’s leaders were planning to oppress ethnic citizens living in Country R. Your government considers releasing a fake video of Country R’s leader boasting about creating fake videos and how easily he can fool his own people into believing what he wants. The hope is that the fake video will preemptively discredit Country R’s fake videos and decrease the popularity of Country R’s leader.</em></p> -<p><strong>Eroding Political Will:</strong> An erosion of European — or U.S. — political will could weaken NATO’s cohesion and threaten its ability to project and conduct credible deterrence. Political will refers to the proclivity and decision of political leaders to conduct activities, including military activities. Politics and war are deeply intertwined. As the Prussian general and theorist Carl von Clausewitz argued, “war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.” For Clausewitz, will is an essential component of military operations: “If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separate, namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the Will.”</p> +<p>In this situation, the deepfake is being used in response to other fake videos — an attempt to fight fire with fire — in a situation involving potential war and human rights abuses.</p> -<p>In addition, economists and political scientists who study the logic of collective action have identified burden sharing as a persistent problem in multinational organizations. Larger, richer allies step up to provide a public good, which leads to free-riding behavior by smaller, less wealthy allies. For NATO, deterrence and collective defense became that public good during the Cold War. During this period, there was a close correlation between allies’ GDPs and their respective levels of defense spending. Larger allies were willing to tolerate a degree of free riding in light of the existential, overarching threat posed by the Soviet Union.</p> +<h4 id="stock-market-scenario">Stock Market Scenario</h4> -<p>Several factors — such as strategic culture, domestic constraints, voluntary force recruitment challenges, technology usage concerns, differences in threat perception, or even an economic depression — could undermine the political will of European countries or the United States to sufficiently deter Russia. For example, domestic constraints can undermine political will. They can be political, such as the degree of fragmentation within a government or friction between different elements in the bureaucracy. The former is particularly problematic in Europe, where coalition or minority governments are becoming the norm rather than the exception. Some countries attempt to reduce fragmentation and limit “ministerial drift” by locking in their priorities and policies through formal coalition agreements (e.g., Germany) or cross-party defense agreements (e.g., Denmark).</p> +<p><em>A criminal hacker group has released a deepfake video of a corporate billionaire saying his company’s latest research has not panned out and that such efforts are not likely to come to fruition for the next 5–10 years. The company stock crashes, along with related stocks, and the hackers reap huge rewards. The billionaire is politically connected, and he reaches out to his government (Western Country X), demanding it help prevent this foreign attack from destabilizing the market and ensure other companies (especially his) are safe. Desperate to stabilize the market and prevent contagion, Country X decides to release a deepfake video of a known critic of the company saying the report is false and the technology is sound.</em></p> -<p>Domestic constraints on political will can also be structural. These include legal limitations on deployment of forces, requirements for parliamentary approval to deploy forces, and operational caveats on deployments. In Afghanistan, only a few countries (such as Denmark, Georgia, Poland, the United States, and the United Kingdom) operated caveat-free, with most imposing restrictions on everything from the rules of engagement to the geographic areas in which their forces were able to operate. Legal limitations on the deployment of forces, requirements for parliamentary approval to deploy forces, domestic politics and logrolling, and imposition of operational caveats on deployments and the use of certain technologies will remain a challenge for some European countries and could impact their willingness to build sufficient capabilities to deter Russian aggression.</p> +<p>To determine if government use of deepfakes is appropriate outside a traditional security context, this scenario explores a different situation: a private citizen and a company seeking assistance. In addition, the information in this deepfake is at least partially true.</p> -<p>The 2024 U.S. elections also raise major questions about U.S. political will in Europe. It is possible, for example, that Donald Trump could withdraw from NATO in a second term, raising serious questions about credible deterrence against Russia.</p> +<h4 id="intellectual-property-theft-scenario">Intellectual Property Theft Scenario</h4> -<p><strong>Other Wildcards:</strong> There are several other wildcards that could change the balance in Europe or otherwise impact the threat landscape. First, Russia could successfully use an irregular or a limited aims strategy in Eastern Europe. The goal of an irregular strategy would be to destabilize one or more European countries through subversion rather than a conventional military campaign. This could include, for example, aiding non-state actors in the Baltic states or other countries — including pro-Russian populations — to cause instability. Moscow adopted this type of a strategy in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Russia could also adopt a limited-aims strategy and seize only a portion of territory in Europe or Central Asia. Second, a leadership change in Russia could create a more dangerous — or friendlier — neighbor, impacting the threat from Russia. Third, Russia could use nuclear weapons, including battlefield nuclear weapons against Ukraine, breaking the nuclear taboo that has existed since 1945. This would cause significant concerns in European capitals about the threat from Moscow.</p> +<p><em>Company C is a world leader in the pharmaceutical industry. It invests massive amounts of money in the design of new drugs for a variety of diseases. Company C has been previously hacked and is fearful the designs for a new blockbuster drug will be stolen by adverse nation-states. It designs deepfake materials (text documents, images, videos, PowerPoints) that are close enough to the real design to appear highly credible, even to experts, but are flawed enough that the designs do not work. The idea is that an adversary who steals a fake design will execute the design and waste an immense amount of time and money developing a product that does not work.</em></p> -<h4 id="conclusion-1">CONCLUSION</h4> +<p>This last scenario explores another commercial use of deepfakes. In this case, the deepfake is defensive and may never be seen by anyone other than its creators.</p> -<p>As the evidence presented in this chapter suggests, NATO likely possesses a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent against a possible Russian threat in the short term. Other potential threats to Europe — such as Iran, China, terrorism, illegal migration, illegal drug trafficking, pandemics, and climate change — do not pose an existential crisis in the near term.</p> +<h3 id="questions-to-ask-if-and-when-governments-contemplate-using-deepfakes">Questions to Ask If and When Governments Contemplate Using Deepfakes</h3> -<p>Over the long term, however, Russia will likely constitute a serious threat to the United States and Europe. Russian president Vladimir Putin retains the political will and intentions to expand Russian power abroad, and Russia is reconstituting its military capabilities with help from China, Iran, and North Korea. The military balance could shift, and deterrence could weaken — perhaps significantly — if the United States were to become involved in a major war in the Indo-Pacific or another region, if Russia were able to rearm and rebuild with Chinese and other assistance, or if U.S. or European political will eroded. The key takeaway is that neither today’s military balance nor deterrence is guaranteed ad infinitum. To help understand the future military balance in Europe, the next chapter examines European military capabilities.</p> +<p>All the experts interviewed expressed deep concerns about governments using deepfakes. They were united in their view that deepfakes should be used only in limited settings and under authorization from appropriate authorities. However, there were differences in their opinions about when deepfakes should be used, which scenarios were appropriate, how they should be used, and who should authorize their use.</p> -<h3 id="ch-04">CH. 04</h3> -<h3 id="european-military-capabilities">EUROPEAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES</h3> +<p>Drawing on the interviews, Figure 1 summarizes the key questions that should be asked when a government contemplates the use of a deepfake. These questions address (1) the likely efficacy of the deepfake, (2) its audience, (3) the potential harms, (4) the legal implications, (5) the nature of the target, (6) the goal of the deepfake, and (7) the traceability of the deepfake back to the originating democratic government.</p> -<p>This chapter examines European military capabilities. Any analysis of U.S. force posture in Europe needs to assess European military capabilities at present and in the future, which is reflected in NATO’s own 2030 plan from the Brussels summit and the subsequent 2022 Strategic Concept from the Madrid summit. This chapter asks one central question: What types of missions will European allies and partners of the United States be able and unable to effectively perform by 2030?</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="1-efficacy">1. Efficacy</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>To answer this question, this chapter uses a combination of methods. It builds an analytical framework that includes a range of military missions, from small-scale humanitarian assistance missions to large-scale combat. The chapter then uses this framework to evaluate the ability of European countries to accomplish these missions. It also builds a data set of specific European operations over the past three decades, including operations conducted through NATO and the European Union. The data provide a useful context for the types and frequency of missions in which European states may engage. Finally, it uses the results and analyses from wargames, scenarios, exercises, after-action reviews, and other analyses to assess the ability of European states to perform military missions through 2030.</p> +<p><em>What is the intended purpose of the deepfake? Will using the deepfake achieve the desired purpose? Are there other ways to achieve the intended goal that do not involve deception?</em></p> -<p>Based on the analysis, this chapter makes two main arguments. First, if member states meet their “NATO 2030” goals, most NATO militaries will likely be able to conduct the majority of military missions by 2030 at the lower end of the conflict continuum with little or no U.S. assistance. But European militaries will likely have difficulty conducting operations at the higher end of the conflict continuum without significant assistance from the United States. European states still lack sufficient capabilities in the following areas:</p> +<p>Deepfakes may fail to achieve their goals or may make only a marginal difference. As an example, consider the election scenario. A senior intelligence official might believe that generating a deepfake of the unsavory leader will lead to his downfall. However, the reality might not be so simple. The leader may (correctly) argue the video is a deepfake created to tarnish his image. He might additionally invoke the specter of a U.S. or other foreign takeover of the country and argue that the deepfake is an attempt to grab control of the country’s mineral wealth, creating a nationalistic backlash against the United States in favor of the dictator.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Combat support, such as short-range air defense and long-range indirect fires;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Airlift and other logistical means of transporting troops and material;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Quantity, quality, and capabilities of ground forces, especially heavy maneuver forces;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Maritime capabilities, including sensors (such as sub-surface sensors) and survivability systems;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Sufficient quantities of long-range precision strike, such as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM); and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Multi-spectrum ranges to train and maintain high-readiness forces.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WVlVrQK.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>Figure 1. Deepfake Use by Governments: The Questions to Consider</em></p> -<p>To help make up for some of these shortfalls, Chapter 6 outlines several security cooperation steps to improve European military capabilities. Nevertheless, the most significant obstacle to fixing these capability gaps is a lack of political will in European capabilities.</p> +<p>Or consider the genocide scenario, where the leader of Country Z is planning to kill many members of the country’s ethnic minority. In the long run, it may be wiser to disclose true evidence of the leader’s plans, as well as evidence pointing to prior acts of ethnic cleansing he might have carried out at a smaller scale. An influence campaign that puts out honest information, such as via the country’s cell phone network, might be less easily refutable by the leader.</p> -<p>Second, most European militaries will likely continue to face serious challenges projecting power into regions such as the Indo-Pacific. They lack significantly deployable capabilities in such areas as anti-submarine warfare; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); ballistic missile defense; air precision strike; suppression of enemy air defense; and expeditionary logistics. What capabilities European allies do have in these categories should likely be prioritized for a Europe-based fight.</p> +<p>However, there may be reasons to use a deepfake to make accurate but inaccessible acts more apparent. In the context of this scenario, a retired non-U.S. military leader argued,</p> -<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first develops a framework for understanding and analyzing military missions. The second section assesses European participation in military missions through 2030. The third section provides a summary of the main conclusions.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>If the deepfake is replicating something where it is difficult to get videos of actual facts and you make a video that is based on the truth to avoid something worse from happening, in those cases I would say it is justified as long as it is based on the truth.</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="framework-for-understanding-military-missions">FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING MILITARY MISSIONS</h4> +<p>The interviewee added,</p> -<p>This chapter focuses on the ability of European militaries to perform a mission, a military task to complete an action with a specific purpose. An important metric of military power is the ability of military forces to successfully prosecute a variety of missions. Military missions are often categorized by their focus. Examples include noncombatant evacuation, foreign humanitarian assistance, security force assistance, freedom of navigation, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and large-scale combat missions. Military missions are distinct from civilian missions in that they are conducted by military personnel, even if the activities lack a uniquely martial component. In addition, this chapter also discusses military operations, which include specific military actions to carry out strategic, operational, tactical, or other objectives. As used here, missions refer to the general tasks that militaries are asked to perform, while operations refer to specific, named efforts. Named operations include such examples as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Unified Protector in Libya, Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslavia, and Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Anything based on falsity is not likely to be effective. If you base your narratives on the truth and use deepfakes to protect the truth, it will be effective. Otherwise, it will eventually be exposed and be ineffective and lead to loss of credibility.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Much of the policy focus on European capabilities has been on tracking quantitative metrics. For example, NATO has collected and analyzed such metrics as the percent of GDP that a country spends on defense and procurement of major new equipment (including research and development), the percent of allied forces that are deployable, the percent of allied forces that are sustainable, and contributions to NATO Command Structure positions. While valuable, these metrics do not provide a good indication of whether countries will be able to perform specific military missions. Most do not translate defense spending or military capabilities into whether and how countries will be able to perform on the battlefield.</p> +<p>Thus, at least during times of extreme danger, interviewees expressed some support for the use of deepfakes when they are merely representations of the truth, even if the video is itself fake. But also consider that how to represent “the truth” may not be so straightforward, particularly in contentious situations.</p> -<p>Assessing military performance is a complex undertaking. How a state — or states — perform in conducting military missions can include a wide range of factors, such as strategy, tactics, morale, numerical preponderance, technology, combat motivation, force employment, leadership, and materiel. Other factors are also important, such as readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure. In fact, NATO countries spend an average of 40 percent of their defense budgets on personnel costs, with an emphasis on recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer force. Some countries, such as Spain and Italy, spend roughly 60 percent on personnel. These estimates do not include equipping and fielding the fighting force, which leads to inaccurate or incomplete metrics on how well an individual NATO member state may perform on any given military mission.</p> +<p>In the intellectual property (IP) theft scenario, the deepfake is intended to have an effect only after a criminal act is performed (i.e., the theft of the IP). Only after the criminal act happens does the deepfake impose costs on the IP thief. Such costs include inducing delays in the IP thieves’ projects, inducing additional uncertainty in the thieves’ minds about whether the stolen material is real or fake, and frustrating adversaries. Also, there is less risk of the deepfake reaching a broader audience that then accepts it as true. All but one interviewee was enthusiastic about the use of deepfakes in this scenario.</p> -<p>To complicate matters, military forces frequently perform a wide range of missions, such as countering terrorists, deterring aggressors, conducting peace-keeping efforts, enforcing sanctions, performing freedom of navigation missions, and training foreign police and soldiers. Proficiency in one or several missions does not indicate proficiency in all or even most missions.</p> +<p>In the case of the stock market scenario, a former senior White House official stated the critic portrayed in the deepfake would “immediately jump up and deny” they ever made the statement. Such a quick and emphatic denial might blunt any desired outcome of the deepfake and could cause volatility that makes the situation worse, further undermining the credibility of those who endorse the deepfake.</p> -<p>To better understand military missions, this chapter divides missions into three categories: small-scale missions; medium-scale missions; and large-scale combat. These categories can be differentiated by their scale and scope. Small-scale missions, for example, are at one end of the conflict continuum and generally include limited or no combat. Large-scale combat sits at the other end of the conflict continuum and can involve joint, multi-domain operations involving the air, ground, maritime, cyber, and space domains. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the types of military missions and examples of current and historical operations involving European countries.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="2-audience">2. Audience</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>First, small-scale missions sit at one end of the conflict continuum. They include such activities as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace-keeping, and foreign humanitarian assistance efforts. NEOs involve situations in which military forces attempt to evacuate noncombatants from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster.</p> +<p><em>Who is the target audience for the deepfake? Is it a domestic audience? A highly focused audience? Or is the deepfake expected to reach a large number of people?</em></p> -<p>Peacekeeping consists of military support to diplomatic, economic, or other efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict — often to support such regional or international institutions as the United Nations or African Union. As highlighted in Figure 4.1, historical examples involving European countries include Operation Concordia and Operation Allied Harmony in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and numerous operations in support of UN peacekeeping efforts across the globe.</p> +<p>A key question when contemplating the use of a deepfake is whether it can be disseminated so that only a small, focused group of people end up seeing it. Multiple experts pointed out that once a deepfake is in the public domain, it may spread rapidly and uncontrollably. One retired U.S. military officer said, “The idea that you will produce some deepfake material and then it will only play in the specific context for the specific audience is really difficult. You can’t control it.”</p> -<p>Finally, humanitarian assistance involves the use of military forces to reduce human suffering, pandemics, disease, or hunger. Examples of foreign humanitarian assistance include the European Union Force Chad and Central African Republic and NATO’s humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan following the October 2005 earthquake, which killed an estimated 53,000 people.</p> +<p>However, for example, if an intelligence agency were to generate a deepfake of two senior Russian security officials, such as Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) chief Sergey Naryshkin and General Valery Gerasimov, discussing something potentially treasonous and then strategically leak it to Russian president Vladimir Putin, the audience for such a deepfake would be very small. The deepfake would not deceive the entire Russian population or other large audiences. In this regard, a former senior White House attorney said, “Deepfakes should not leak into the bloodstream of the internet. . . . [If there are going to be] lots of eyeballs on a deepfake, don’t go there.”</p> -<p>Second, medium-scale missions include a wide range of activities to establish, shape, and maintain relations with other nations. The general objective is to protect national interests by building or maintaining support to partner nations, enhancing their capability to provide security and maintain stability, and establishing operational access. Security cooperation involves military interactions with foreign security agencies to build or maintain defense relationships, develop their capabilities, and provide access.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A key question when contemplating the use of a deepfake is whether it can be disseminated so that only a small, focused group of people end up seeing it.</code></em></strong>_</p> -<p>Crisis management missions include efforts to conduct expeditionary air, land, and maritime deployments. Many of these specific operations — such as Operation Allied Force, Operation Deliberate Force, and Operation Unified Protector — involve multiservice military deployments that require several thousand personnel. NATO’s Operation Unified Protector, for instance, had three components: the enforcement of an arms embargo in the Mediterranean, the enforcement of a no-fly zone to prevent aircraft from bombing civilian targets, and air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, it is difficult to anticipate the size of the audience affected by a deepfake. In the above example, only a few people might initially view the deepfake, but if they act on this “intelligence,” believing it to be true, they might take actions that affect millions of people. One interviewee expressed concern that even if such use of a deepfake were successful, the truth might leak months or years into the future. For example, a prominent news outlet such as the New York Times might write a piece titled “How the Biden Administration Fooled Putin” six or twelve months after the deepfake was used. Such a story might severely compromise real evidence the United States offers in future national security situations. Given that clandestine U.S. operations and collection methods regularly leak, it is plausible, even likely, that reports of deepfake use would leak too. In addition, as deepfake detection technology improves, a deepfake used today might be uncovered in the future.</p> -<p>These types of activities can also involve deterrence (which includes actions to persuade an adversary not to initiate a war or other military activity because the expected costs and risks outweigh the anticipated benefits) and assurance (which includes actions to support an ally or partner’s government and population and communicate a credible message of confidence in the dependability of its security commitment). Assurance measures might involve flying airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), deploying Patriot air defense systems, conducting enhanced air policing, deploying a ship or a maritme strike group off a threatened country’s coast, rotating high-readiness forces into a particular country or region, and utilizing surface-to-air, medium-range platform terrain (SAMP/T) systems. NATO created the tailored Forward Presence in 2016 to help reassure Bulgaria and Romania and establish a Black Sea presence.</p> +<p>All interviewees agreed that governments should not try to use deepfakes to influence their own population. As a retired non-U.S. official at the level of general stated, “If we are using cognitive means against anybody, you should not misinfluence your own population.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DpwcxAV.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.1: Types of Military Missions.</strong> Source: CSIS.</em></p> +<p>However, there was some support for using deepfakes generated in a foreign language, making it unlikely the majority of the U.S. population would understand the content of the deepfake, though the use of subtitles or automated translation tools could easily change this. Further, the images themselves might be easily understood even without audio translation. One corporate leader with deep expertise in AI said, “Is there a risk to the domestic population if a deepfake used in a foreign country uses a foreign language? Yes, and [it] still needs guardrails if it gets to the U.S.”</p> -<p>Third, large-scale combat sits at the other end of the conflict spectrum from crisis response. Large-scale combat involves a series of tactical actions — such as battles — conducted by combat forces to achieve strategic or operational objectives. It can include a range of activities, from wars in specific countries or regions involving a combination of multidomain air, ground, maritime, and other capabilities, to world wars among great powers. These types of missions generally require substantial power-projection capabilities, including the ability to deploy and employ military forces rapidly over long distances and for sustained periods. Historical examples involving European countries include Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as highlighted in Figure 4.1.</p> +<p>If a government deploys a deepfake overseas, even in a foreign language, is there still a risk it will affect the domestic population? If a deepfake directed at an overseas population emphasizes rising crime in that country or other social problems, it might influence travel blogs, social media commentary, or other information that would affect whether Americans travel to a part of the world. It might even influence U.S. immigration policy and attitudes toward the country in question.</p> -<h4 id="assessment-of-european-capabilities">ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN CAPABILITIES</h4> +<p>Another important question to consider is, Who are the possible beneficiaries of the deepfake’s use? The country’s citizens as a whole? A specific individual, company, or industrial sector? In the case of the stock market scenario, the direct beneficiaries are limited. All interview subjects were united in the view that the government should not be in the business of helping individuals or private corporations foster lies to the population, even if the request for help comes due to an attack by a foreign state. In the stock market scenario, the billionaire could, as a citizen, ask the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (or the equivalent for other democratic governments) for help in investigating the origins and perpetrators of the deepfake that targeted him rather than ask the government to run deepfakes to correct the market, which would deceive the American people and others.</p> -<p>This section applies the framework outlined in Figure 4.1 to analyze European capabilities to perform specific missions. It provides a qualitative judgment of European capabilities through 2030 — especially from major powers such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany — based on the results and analyses from wargames, scenarios, exercises, after-action reviews, and other analyses. The goal is to provide reasonable estimates of whether European states may be able to conduct future missions across the continuum of conflict in four regions: Europe (including the Mediterranean), the Middle East, Africa (especially North, West, and East Africa), and the Indo-Pacific. These are the regions where European forces are most likely to deploy in the future, based on future planning considerations and past actions.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="3-harms">3. Harms</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The assessment is based on whether the evidence from wargames and other analyses suggests that European states can successfully conduct the designated mission with no, limited, or significant U.S. support. In Figure 4.2, “High” (or green) means that the major European states — such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany — generally have the capability to successfully conduct the designated type of mission in the identified region without U.S. aid. A “high” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong. “Medium” (or yellow) means that major European states have the capability to successfully conduct the designated type of mission in the identified region with moderate U.S. aid, such as transport, aerial refueling, or ISR capabilities. “Low” (or red) means that major European states have the capability to successfully conduct the designated mission in the identified region only with significant U.S. aid. Figure 4.2 provides a summary of the main findings.</p> +<p><em>Who might be harmed by the deepfake? What is the probability the deepfake will harm innocent civilians?</em></p> -<p><strong>Small-Scale Missions:</strong> Major European states have a high likelihood of performing most small-scale missions through at least 2030 with limited U.S. aid or, in some cases, with none at all. NATO 2030 provides a set of targets that individual allies and the broader NATO alliance are expected to meet. Europe’s ability to perform critical missions is especially high in Europe, the Middle East, and parts of East, West, and North Africa, though there may still be challenges in some areas.</p> +<p>All subjects interviewed were deeply concerned a deepfake might harm innocent civilians. According to one interview subject, “There should be no unintended harm to civilians.”</p> -<p>First, European states may face difficulties conducting some missions in Asia and parts of Africa because of limited posture (especially bases), few enablers (such as airlift, aerial refueling, maritime logistics, command and control, and ISR), and a large geographic area. These factors could also impact the speed that European militaries could respond to contingency missions because of the small number of European personnel in the region and a vast geographic area. Germany, for instance, already faces airlift, combat search and rescue, and other limitations that will complicate noncombatant evacuation and other missions in Asia or parts of Africa. Although German chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a €100 billion ($106 billion) special fund for Bundeswehr development — including a heavy focus on air capabilities — shortly after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the allocation will primarily finance existing military plans that had been unfunded or underfunded rather than support new developments.</p> +<p>In the election, genocide, and invasion scenarios, the goal of the deepfake is to destabilize an abhorrent leader. The main people likely to be directly harmed are the despicable leader and the leader’s close supporters. However, if the deepfake leads to civil unrest (e.g., if people rise up against the leader), then protesters may be injured or killed. Then the leader might simply be replaced by another leader with similar or more extreme goals. The use of the deepfake might lead to the deaths of innocent civilians but not avert the threat.</p> -<p>Second, the deployment of Russian and Chinese assets — including intelligence, electronic warfare, and anti-aircraft weapons systems — could complicate missions in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Russia has expanded its military presence in the Middle East and Africa, particularly in countries such as Syria and Libya. China continues to build military and civilian infrastructure in countries such as Djibouti, where France has a significant military presence, and Chinese private security companies such as China Security Technology Group (中国安保技术集团), Hua Xin Zhong An (Beijing) Security Service (HXZA) (华信中安集团), and Zhongjun Junhong (中军军弘安保集团) conduct armed maritime escort and other security services in strategic waterways in Africa and the Middle East.</p> +<p>A shared goal in the election, genocide, and invasion scenarios is to discredit or destabilize the leader. But what if the leader escalates the scenario out of fear, paranoia, perceived self-defense, or something else and cracks down on the population, a neighboring country, or the country perpetrating the deepfake? It is difficult to predict how an adversary would respond to the deepfake, and some responses could foster tremendous harm.</p> -<p>In addition, growing competition could lead Moscow and Beijing to pressure some host-nation countries in these regions to limit or reject U.S. and European militaries from using their air bases or ports or to deny overflight access. During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Union routinely pressured foreign countries to refuse U.S. basing rights and overflight permission for operations that Moscow opposed. Already, Russia has helped to dislodge French, EU, and UN missions in countries such as Mali, including through the use of private military companies and other quasi-independent proxies. Russia is unlikely to replicate this approach widely outside of states with weak governance and autocratic leadership, but China may prove more capable in this regard. By 2030, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) probably will be able to deploy and sustain military forces across Asia and much of Africa, and will likely maintain a lower level of power-projection capabilities in areas with key Chinese economic interests, such as Latin America and the Middle East. Chinese competence may include military airlift and sealift capabilities, and its efforts to expand overseas basing and logistics infrastructure may enable the intelligence, logistics, and communications support needed to deal with threats to China or to disrupt its adversaries’ global operations. China may also have the ability and posture to deploy aircraft carrier strike groups to the Indian and Pacific Oceans by 2030.</p> +<p>Additionally, in the case of the IP theft scenario, harms may occur to innocent people. For instance, suppose a Chinese entity steals the design documents for a hypersonic missile from a U.S. company, and suppose that company had generated 99 fake versions of that design document by using a large language model or a system specifically focused on generating believable fake technical documents to deter IP theft. Further, suppose the entity responsible for the theft has analyzed all 100 versions of the document (1 real, 99 fake) and decided a specific version (v) is the real one. The assessment that v is real is incorrect (i.e., the deception by the victim company was successful). The IP thief executes on the design, but during testing, the missile blows up, killing six employees of the Chinese entity. In this case, the victim of the IP theft might argue it is not responsible as the deadly outcome was a direct consequence of a criminal act perpetrated by the Chinese entity and, hence, the Chinese entity should be held responsible for its misdeeds. All but one of the interviewees accepted this argument.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ESXIrEl.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.2: Overview of European Capabilities to Perform Missions.</strong> Note: CSIS.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="4-legal">4. Legal</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Medium-Scale Missions:</strong> Europe’s largest militaries will likely be able to perform numerous medium-scale missions through 2030 with limited U.S. assistance — especially in Europe and the Middle East — and potentially beyond 2030 with enhanced capabilities as a result of NATO’s 2030 plan. For example, European militaries will be able to conduct numerous deterrence missions in Europe. Similarly, European militaries likely will be able to conduct most assurance missions to support governments and their populations, such as flying AWACS, conducting enhanced air policing, and deploying SAMP/T systems.</p> +<p><em>Will the contemplated use of a deepfake under the circumstances violate international law?</em></p> -<p>France is likely to retain sufficient capabilities to conduct many of these missions in Europe, the Middle East, and possibly West Africa. France has undertaken medium-footprint expeditionary interventions, such as the 4,000-troop mission to defeat Islamist militants in Mali in 2013 to 2014. In recent years, however, France has experienced diplomatic setbacks in West Africa that may limit its ability to operate in the region, including the termination of Operation Barkhane in Mali and deteriorating relationships with other West African states. Nonetheless, through 2030, France will likely retain a sustained capability to conduct unilateral and joint expeditionary operations, especially as it resolves its shortfalls in aerial refueling, strategic and tactical airlift, unmanned aircraft systems, and precision-guided munitions. In addition, the French navy will likely remain capable of performing freedom of navigation, counterpiracy, counter smuggling, counternarcotics, and presence patrols — especially in such areas as the Mediterranean Sea, North Atlantic, Red Sea, and Arctic Ocean.</p> +<p>International law has a role to play when states use deepfakes in their interactions with other states. But how international law regulates cyberspace generally, much less deepfakes specifically, lacks clarity. States, experts, and scholars have debated for more than a decade how international law applies to activities in cyberspace. While areas of agreement have emerged, several published positions reveal the many divisions and uncertainties.</p> -<p>Similarly, the United Kingdom will likely be able to perform many of these medium-scale missions through 2030 in Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Africa. But the United Kingdom will likely have significant limitations operating in the Indo-Pacific, where there are at least 1.7 million UK citizens. The United Kingdom is attempting to expand its presence and activity and conduct such missions as freedom of navigation and maritime patrol. The United Kingdom has conducted some exercises in the Indo-Pacific — including with Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and New Zealand — to enable it to play at least a limited role. In addition, the United Kingdom is developing a fifth-generation carrier strike group and investing in some next-generation capabilities, such as directed energy weapons and swarming drones.</p> +<p>Determining how international law applies to deepfakes raises new issues beyond those that scholars focus on when analyzing cyberattacks. Peter B. M. J. Pijpers, when analyzing influence operations, describes cyberspace as consisting of three dimensions: physical, virtual, and cognitive. International law, like most law, focuses on the physical world. For example, if foreign actors enter another state and surreptitiously destroy election ballots before they are counted, this would be a clear violation of the state’s sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention. With the advent of the internet, however, a state can affect activities in another state through a virtual dimension without entering another state’s physical world. These virtual activities can result in direct physical impacts — for example, hacking that causes the destruction of computers and other physical devices. These virtual activities can also cause virtual damage, such as manipulating voting tallies on a machine or in a database, which might be considered analogous to physical effects when analyzed under traditional international law.</p> -<p>More broadly, European states will likely retain sufficient capabilities to perform several of these missions. France, the United Kingdom, and several other European countries — such as Germany — maintain competent special operations forces, allowing them to conduct security force assistance, counterterrorism, and other types of missions. In addition, Europe has several competent law enforcement and paramilitary forces — such as France’s Gendarmerie and Italy’s Carabinieri — capable of security force assistance, including training and advising foreign security forces. Several European states — such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom — will also likely retain significant capabilites to conduct offensive and defensive cyber operations, including against higher-end threats such as Russia and China. Despite these capabilities, some European states may be hesitant to integrate offensive cyber capabilities into multilateral operations because of national sensitivities. European countries are also improving their ability to build computer network resilience, cyber institutions, and response strategies, which will likely improve their ability to engage in offensive and defensive cyber missions. Finally, European countries will also likely have sufficient capabilities to conduct deterrence and assurance missions, such as enhanced air policing, maritime patrol aircraft, and forward-deployed troops.</p> +<p>Deepfakes, which are deployed in the virtual dimension but are focused on having an impact in the cognitive dimension of cyberspace, present new challenges for international law. Given the recent emergence of deepfakes, it is not surprising that the body of literature on this topic is small. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, the authors can outline at a high level the principles and rules most likely to apply and that states should consider when deepfakes are used in the national security context.</p> -<p>European states may face several types of challenges, based on a review of wargames and other analyses. First, they will likely face some problems in the Indo-Pacific region and parts of Africa with conducting military engagement, security cooperation, and similar types of missions without help from the United States and other partners. France has some bases in New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Mayotte, Réunion, Djibouti, and the United Arab Emirates. The United Kingdom likewise has overseas bases in Brunei and Diego Garcia. Still, European militaries — even France and the United Kingdom — lack sufficient basing, airlift, logistics, aerial refueling, and power-projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Deepfakes, which are deployed in the virtual dimension but are focused on having an impact in the cognitive dimension of cyberspace, present new challenges for international law.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Second, if planned new investments are not realized, air and naval patrol missions could become challenging even within Europe. Personnel shortages, low aircraft-readiness rates, and some allies’ lack of investment in integrated air and missile defense capabilities will likely inhibit future missions. Staff air patrol shortfalls, for example, have impacted missions in some areas such as the Black Sea. Fortunately, several allies are currently investing in ground-based air defense, short-range air defense, new fighter jets, and long-range patrol assets that will be in service by 2030.</p> +<p>Before analyzing the hypotheticals presented, it is important to recognize that a state’s use of deepfakes will involve far more than simply creating the deepfake. For example, states will have specific goals, and consideration of the context will play an important role in the legal analysis. States will also decide how to deploy the deepfake or campaign of deepfakes using specific social media channels or other methods of publishing and disseminating content. States might hack social media accounts, news organizations, or other organizations, including in the targeted state, to disseminate content. Or states might deploy individuals in the targeted state to carry out these or related activities. These examples illustrate some of the context that should be considered when a state uses deepfakes. Considering the context will greatly inform the analysis of whether the activities related to a state’s use of deepfakes complies with applicable international law.</p> -<p>Similarly, if current defense plans are not realized, some types of maritime patrol missions could be impacted by shortages in frigates, problems with information sharing, and limited specialized capabilities such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Operation Sea Guardian, which occurred in the Mediterranean, was chronically underresourced and faced particularly acute shortfalls in such areas as naval vessels (including surface combatants) and maritime patrol aircraft. The German navy, for example, will likely continue to face personnel shortages, maintenance delays, spare part shortfalls, and procurement challenges. The major allies recognize these deficencies and are investing significantly in frigates and other ASW platforms that will enter service by 2030, if not sooner. Nevertheless, challenges may remain acute in the Indo-Pacific region, with such significant distances to cover in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.</p> +<p>To begin, it will be useful for states to consider whether the use of deepfakes involves use of force, the threat of force, intervention in the domestic affairs of another state, or violation of the sovereignty of another state. When engaged in armed conflict, states cannot engage in perfidy, which applies to “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.” Michael N. Schmitt in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, a compilation of expert views on the application of international law to cyber operations, provides an example of perfidy: “Consider the case of a perfidious email inviting the enemy to a meeting with a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, but which is actually intended to lead enemy forces into an ambush.”</p> -<p>Third, shortfalls could impact some types of security force assistance missions, especially in countries that face high levels of terrorism and insurgency and present a non-permissive environment. In the NATO Training Mission Iraq, there were shortfalls in filling Mobile Training Teams as well as force protection concerns. The NATO mission in Kosovo, called Kosovo Force, faced personnel and intelligence shortfalls, including in human and signals intelligence.</p> +<p>Contrast perfidy with a “ruse” of war, which is not prohibited. According to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I), ruses are acts that are “intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law.” Protocol I provides traditional examples of ruses such as “use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.” The Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides several examples of ruses, including simulating nonexistent forces, transmitting false information showing operations beginning, feigned cyberattacks, bogus orders purportedly issued by the enemy, and transmitting false intelligence information intended for interception.</p> -<p><strong>Large-Scale Combat:</strong> European states are likely to face significant challenges conducting large-scale combat missions, particularly in such areas as heavy maneuver forces, naval combatants, and support capabilities such as logistics and fire support. While much of this section focuses on European challenges in conducting large-scale combat involving Russia, China, or Iran, there are some broader problems that may impact large-scale combat. For example, while NATO 2030 lays out an ambitious agenda for all member states to improve their national capabilties, it is unclear whether European states will realize planned major improvements in the interoperability of their forces regarding the usability of land maneuver formations; suppression of enemy air defense; electronic warfare; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; and medical support to operations. It is also unlikely that European militaries will be able to operate at scale in high-end scenarios against countries such as Russia and China without significant U.S. assistance.</p> +<p>According to Protocol I, states must also consider that “in the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.” The Tallinn Manual 2.0 states, “The term ‘spare’ refers to the broad general duty to ‘respect’ the civilian population, that is, to consider deleterious effects of military operations on civilians.”</p> -<p>In addition, challenges in the land and maritime domains will likely impact Europe’s ability to successfully perform high-end missions. While there may be new main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, it is unclear if European militaries will adequately fix problems in combat support and training or address widespread shortfalls in materiel stockpiles by 2030. Significant numbers of infantry battalions are likely to lack their required combat capabilities over the next decade, half of all combat brigades may lack short-range air defense, and roughly one-quarter of infantry divisions may lack long-range indirect fire capabilities. Maritime capabilities also pose a challenge for large-scale combat, including a qualitative shortfall in sensors (including sub-surface sensors), weapons, force protection, and survivability systems.</p> +<p>To determine the propriety of using deepfakes, a state may have considered the prior activities of the target state, which may have precipitated a response. For example, proportional countermeasures may be appropriate even when not engaged in armed conflict.</p> -<p>Despite these challenges, European militaries are improving their capabilities in some areas. For example, European combat air capabilities will likely improve, with the shift to fifth-generation combat aircraft and improvement in air-to-air refueling, transport, and cargo capabilities because of the multinational Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft fleet. Members of the F-35 consortium — such as Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom — are transitioning their fourth-generation F-16 fighters to fifth-generation F-35s. Several aspects of the F-35s, such as stealth and data-sharing capabilities, will be particularly helpful in conducting large-scale combat missions. Several other European countries, such as Belgium, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Switzerland, are also procuring and operating F-35s. The United Kingdom, along with Italy and Sweden, is developing a sixth-generation future combat aircraft, the Tempest, which is expected to enter service in the mid-2030s. Furthermore, the reevaluation of defense priorities after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and efforts to supply materiel to Ukraine have accelerated the modernization of equipment and ammunition stocks, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.</p> +<p>Outside of armed conflict settings, the principle of sovereignty prohibits acts that “interfere with, or usurp, an inherently governmental act or cause such effects on the territory.” Protected governmental acts include elections, crisis management, and national security. The following analysis of the scenarios begins with sovereignty as it “is a foundational principle of international law.”</p> -<p>The Russian invasion has also motivated a European Commission review of the EU defense industrial base and a range of new initiatives to increase weapons and munitions stocks, modernize equipment, invest in research and development, and increase cooperation between EU member states. In October 2023, for example, the Council of the European Union approved the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act, a €300 million ($318 million) instrument that directly incentivizes collaborative defense procurement. Such efforts aim to reduce fragmentation in EU defense capabilities and planning and to strengthen the European defense industrial base, but their ability to impact large-scale European capabilities through 2030 will require sustained support and significantly increased resourcing. European countries will likely continue to develop substantial space-based capabilities that will facilitate their participation in large-scale combat. For example, France has committed to increasing its military space budget to improve its space and counterspace capabilities, including active defense for space objects. The United Kingdom is also attempting to augment its satellite communications capability, Skynet, and develop opportunies for utilizing or enhancing quantum field sensors; space-based ISR with multi-sensor capabilities; additional payloads for Skynet; and new options to exploit electromagnetic targets.</p> +<p>International law scholars generally do not view cyber espionage as a violation of sovereignty, and some contend this even when such activities take place within another state’s territory or cause territorial effects. Eric Talbot Jensen writes that these scholars “for instance . . . are of the view that remote cyber activities that violate domestic law on espionage would not, in themselves, violate international law.” Some states argue that sovereignty is not a rule but a foundational principle on which the use-of-force and nonintervention principles are based, meaning that noncoercive cyber operations and deepfakes would not violate international law.</p> -<h4 id="high-end-challenges">HIGH-END CHALLENGES</h4> +<p>While often discussed together, sovereignty and nonintervention must be differentiated, as sovereignty focuses on territorial control and governmental acts and does not require coercion. Nonintervention is seen to emanate from sovereignty. Nonintervention “prohibits States from engaging in coercive interference, directly or indirectly, with the domestic affairs of another State.” Case law illustrates the application of nonintervention as a customary rule. The International Court of Justice has defined the protected affairs of a state, known as the domaine réservé, as “the choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.” According to Pijpers, “The domaine réservé . . . is the area ‘in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty to decide freely.’”</p> -<p>This section highlights several scenarios that help examine Europe’s ability to effectively perform high-end military missions: a war with Russia in the Baltics, a war with Iran in the Persian Gulf, and wars with China in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. These cases represent plausible future scenarios involving large-scale combat and have been important as part of U.S. Operation Plans (OPLANS). This section uses the results and analyses from wargames, scenarios, exercises, and other analyses to assess the ability of European states to perform military missions through 2030.</p> +<p>Nonintervention requires coercion, but coercion lacks a universal standard and is not well defined. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts state, “To constitute intervention, the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive; in effect depriving the State intervened against of control over the matter in question.” Schmitt defines coercive action as “intended to cause the State to do something, such as take a decision that it would otherwise not take, or not to engage in an activity in which it would otherwise engage.”</p> -<p><strong>War with Russia:</strong> The results of wargames, scenarios, and other analyses of a war with Russia in the Baltics indicate some challenges with a war in Eastern Europe, even with current Russian weaknesses. As outlined in Chapter 3, these challenges could increase if Russia is able to rebuild its military capabilities over the next decade with help from China and other countries, and if European countries are slow to build their capabilities or fail to learn from the war in Ukraine, including in their efforts to re-strategize, modernize forces, and increase complementarity in research, development, and procurement.</p> +<p>According to Schmitt, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 says that states should also consider due diligence, or their obligation “to ensure that their territory is not used as a location from which cyber operations having serious adverse consequences for the target State are launched.” But this would not require a state to monitor or prevent cyber operations, only to stop them when the state has notice. Many states, however, reject the notion that due diligence is required.</p> -<p>Wargames and other analyses show a major disparity in long-range fires between Europe and Russia even with projected European investments in such systems. European forces will likely continue to be susceptible to fire throughout the theater from Russian systems and lack sufficient ground-based air defense capabilities to counter Russian cruise and ballistic missiles. These problems could be compounded by Russian long-range integrated air defense systems (IADS), which can prevent European states from using airpower in a decisive way early in a conflict. Russian rockets and artillery may also outrange their European counterparts and threaten ground forces.</p> +<p>Turning to the hypotheticals, how might international law principles and rules apply to a country’s use of deepfakes? A country using deepfakes would intend to cause a specific outcome and would undertake action to disseminate the deepfakes, providing many additional facts to inform the legal analysis. Even without these additional facts in hand, one could consider the international law principles and rules that might apply.</p> -<p>There are also significant challenges with the number, quality, and capabilities of most European ground forces. While Germany’s current defense plan aims to have three combat-capable divisions by the end of the decade, reaching this milestone is unlikely because the German army is shrinking. The United Kingdom has also cut the size of its army and plans to rely more heavily on reserve forces to make up the delta.</p> +<p>In the election scenario, targeting an election — an inherently governmental function — implicates the principle of sovereignty. A certain magnitude of state action is required to violate another state’s sovereignty, but neither physical damage nor loss of functionality is required when an inherent government function is involved. Additionally, propaganda aimed to influence an election result, which could possibly describe the activity in the election scenario, is usually allowed. Likewise, for the nonintervention principle to apply, the use of the deepfake would need to be coercive, which seems unlikely based on the facts described. Thus, the country’s use of a deepfake in this scenario might not run afoul of international law, depending on the country’s intent and other facts that would emerge.</p> -<p>Other European capability gaps that could impact operations include: a longer-range, fast-flying radar-homing missile for suppressing modern surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems; mobile short-range air defense systems; Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs); and area munitions for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)/Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). These problems would be particularly serious without U.S. involvement, though allies’ investments in some of these systems could help them hold initial ground. These include acquisitions of ATACMS and Patriots by Poland and Hungary, the National/Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) by Lithuania, and the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) by Poland. German and other European forces might also face significant challenges neutralizing the Bastion-P coastal defense cruise missile systems located in Kaliningrad and could face sigificant command and control problems.</p> +<p>In the genocide scenario, the clear human rights violations may justify the use of deepfakes, notwithstanding principles of sovereignty and nonintervention, particularly when neither leader seems to enjoy legitimacy.</p> -<p><strong>Iranian Missile Threat:</strong> European states will likely face significant challenges dealing with a missile threat from Iran, based on a review of wargames, scenarios, and other analyses. Under the oversight of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Forces Al Ghadir Missile Command, Iran will likely focus on fielding more accurate and longer-range missiles over the next decade that include counter-measures for defeating U.S. and partner missile defense systems. Iran will likely continue to expand its missile ranges through 2030. A ballistic missile based on Iran’s Zoljanah space launch vehicle could carry a one-ton warhead as far as 5,000 kilometers, allowing Iran to strike every European capital. These developments will supplement other Iranian missiles, such as the Shahab-3 and Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missiles, which have have an operational range of up to 2,000 kilometers. Iran also has layered area denial and anti-surface warfare capabilities, including naval mining (e.g., moored contact, drifting contact, and limpet mines), small boat swarming tactics, and coastal defenses.</p> +<p>In the invasion scenario, the contemplated deepfake would not have a direct impact in the target country and is likely to be seen as propaganda that does not implicate the principles of sovereignty or nonintervention. If the deepfake leads to an indirect coercive impact in the target state and the state that used the deepfake intends to cause this coercive impact, a majority of experts in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 take the position this would violate the principle of nonintervention. In the scenario for this paper, the authors have not ascribed any such intent to the state using the deepfake. In the invasion scenario, there may also be a humanitarian justification for intervening. The deepfake could also be justified as a countermeasure, though experts are split on whether a non-injured state can undertake countermeasures on behalf of another state.</p> -<p>European missile defense capabilities are lagging. Figure 4.3 outlines EU and NATO multinational air and missile defense projects, many of which will not be fully operational until 2030 or later. For example, NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program — which is designed to protect European populations from a ballistic missile attack from a country such as Iran — likely will not achieve full operational capabilities until at least 2030. France possesses one SAMP/T ground-based air defense missile squadron that will be updated by 2025. Spain is expected to have two long-range radars by 2024. Most of the European countries developing sea-based, lower-layer ballistic missile defense are forecasting delays — including to the development of a suitable interceptor missile — through the end of the decade. The U.S. contribution to NATO’s BMD architecture will remain critical, including the Aegis Ashore and periodic rotation of the Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) missile defense system.</p> +<p>For the stock market scenario, it is unclear whether other states will be affected by the deepfake and thus whether and how international law should apply. To the extent it is relevant, cyberattacks that result in economic damages may give rise to a countermeasure claim.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/8QUQ5oT.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.3: EU and NATO Multinational Air and Missile Defense Initiatives.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/making-most-european-sky-shield-initiative">Sean Monaghan and John Christianson, Making the Most of the European Sky Shield Initiative (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2023), 8</a>.</em></p> +<p>For the IP theft scenario, if only private actors are affected, international law likely has no role. In this instance, the harm occurred only because a counterparty committed the wrongful act of stealing Company C’s IP. In an extreme case, if the home country is aware of Company C’s actions and there is a high likelihood of harm to another country, under the due diligence doctrine the home country might be obligated to take appropriate action to stop these acts. Even then, many states do not accept the due diligence doctrine.</p> -<p>Most scenarios involving an Iranian missile threat in the Persian Gulf suggest that European countries will be able to play at best a limited role. Forces from several allied nations — particularly air, naval, and long-range fires forces from Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates — might participate alongside the United States. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman could each potentially commit one or more combat squadrons (and Saudi Arabia one or more wings) to a conflict. Some Middle Eastern countries possess the HIMARS with ATACMS and could conduct fires across the Persian Gulf against Iranian targets. European allies, such as the United Kingdom and France, could commit some naval and air forces and possibly forward station assets at their bases in the region. But their missile defense capabilities are limited. Barring extended warning of potential Iranian aggression, and without substantial airlift assets, it is unlikely that European forces would be available during the critical early days of a Persian Gulf conflict.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="5-target">5. Target</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>War with China in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea:</strong> European states will likely lack the capability by 2030 to successfully conduct large-scale combat operations against China, including in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait. The challenges in Asia are significant — even for the United States, which has likely lost “overmatch” with China. The Chinese Communist Party’s 14th Five Year Plan, which goes through 2025, calls for accelerated development of military mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. China is focusing on military applications for such areas as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, biotechnology, information technology, quantum computing, robotics, advanced materials and manufacturing, and deep-sea technologies.</p> +<p><em>Who or what is the intended target of the deepfake? Is it the president of a country or a prominent person such as a political or religious leader? Is it a living person?</em></p> -<p>Much of China’s activity has focused on the development or acquisition of power-projection capabilities — from fifth-generation aircraft to China’s third aircraft carrier — designed to give China greater ability to influence actions in the Indo-Pacific. The PLA increasingly has the ability to put aircraft carrier strike groups at risk and neutralize ground-based air-power. By 2030, the PLA will likely have the capability to deny operations within the First Island Chain and to complicate operations within the Second Island Chain. By 2030, the PLA may increasingly advance and integrate joint capabilities across multiple domains, which will improve China’s strike capabilities, extend the range and efficacy of force projection, and protect China’s interests.</p> +<p>Consider the invasion scenario. Suppose an intelligence agency wants to create a deepfake of President Putin saying something false. The bar for approving such a deepfake should be the highest possible. In the United States, it might require approval from the president, while in some EU countries, the approving authority might be a prime minister, especially if the deepfake were to be disseminated widely in Russia and beyond. To quote one interviewee, a retired U.S. military leader at the level of general or higher, “Deepfakes of a national leader would need presidential approval under a finding from the White House.”</p> -<p>China is developing the J-20A and J-20B fifth-generation stealth fighters, armed stealth unmanned aircraft systems, the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile that carries an advanced hypersonic glide vehicle, and the J-31 medium-weight stealth fighter. China is also developing kinetic kill vehicle technology to field an upper-tier ballistic missile interceptor by 2030; longer-range, more accurate, and increasingly lethal ballistic and cruise missiles, including conventionally armed intercontinental-range missile systems; air defenses; and other platforms and systems. China also continues to expand its development and modernization efforts of unmanned aircraft systems, including next-generation capabilities such as air-to-air and air-to-ground combat and swarming capabilities.</p> +<p>Another U.S. military leader at the level of general or higher stated that U.S. presidents may be deeply reluctant to approve the use of deepfakes to target the leader of a foreign nation because of the precedent it would set: “A POTUS tends to think a lot about precedent — are we creating the right precedents? Subordinates tend to be more focused on objectives.” The same individual went on to say, “The slippery slope argument is very strong, and the costs may be higher than we anticipate.”</p> -<p>The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is fielding new carrier-based aircraft, as well as ASW, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, land-based maritime strike, and air defense forces. China may have as many as five aircraft carriers by 2030, aided by helicopter carriers and a fleet of destroyers. The overall PLAN battle force will likely comprise 435 ships by 2030. China has developed a credible and increasingly robust over-the-horizon ISR capability. The development of China’s space, counterspace, and electronics sectors has enabled it to increase the pace of satellite launches and deploy a wider range of sophisticated ISR satellites. China’s development of anti-ship ballistic missiles presents a heightened maritime threat. At the same time, the ongoing modernization of Chinese air and submarine capabilities represents a more challenging threat to carrier strike groups. Some modeling suggests that the effectiveness of the Chinese submarine fleet (as measured by the number of attack opportunities it might achieve against carriers) has risen significantly over the past 25 years. Chinese submarines would present a credible threat to surface ships in a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea. The PLAN’s total submarine force is expected to number 65 by 2025 and 80 by 2035.</p> +<p>In both the election and genocide scenarios, one corporate leader said, “If a human rights abuser uses a deepfake, I can see doing a lot of other deepfakes to discredit the first (e.g., 100 variations) to educate people.” Simply put, if the leaders of the two countries involved in these scenarios use deepfakes, then targeting them with deepfakes might be considered an appropriate response.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/r06dv6U.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.4: China’s Regional Missile Threats: Fielded Nuclear Ballistic Missiles.</strong> Source: <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF">Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 2023), 68</a>.</em></p> +<p>However, if the deepfake portrays a fictional version of a real event occurring on the ground (e.g., a genocide) for which there is compelling evidence, then disseminating a deepfake image or video representing the event may be fair because (1) the event is real and compelling evidence (perhaps nonvisual) exists; (2) there may not be real, compelling imagery or video because anyone capturing such imagery would be killed or placed in harm’s way; and (3) no single world leader is being explicitly portrayed in the deepfake. Thus, some of the interviewees were comfortable with disseminating a deepfake image of a burial pit with bodies to illustrate what is really happening in a country at war. Nevertheless, such use has risks. For instance, how does the government creating the deepfake know its portrayal of the burial pits is consistent with reality? Will the use of a deepfake backfire, convincing people that the real burial pits are nonexistent because a deepfake was used? Considerable effort would be needed to ensure the deepfake accurately represents, and is believed by the public to be, the reported reality. In addition, both civil society and investigative journalist groups such as Bellingcat often offer their own highly credible reports, which is vital in democratic systems.</p> -<p>Based on these developments, European militaries will not likely have the power-projection architecture and capabilities to play a major role in large-scale combat against China. They lack significantly deployable capabilities in such areas as ASW; ISR; ballistic missile defense; air precision strike; expeditionary logistics; and suppression of enemy air defense — and would likely prioritize the capabilties they do have for a Europe-based fight. Although NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept identified China’s political ambitions and coercive activities as a challenge for the first time, the document emphasized the Chinese threat to Euro-Atlantic security — indicating that the development of capabilities in the Indo-Pacific is not currently an alliance priority. With the exception of France, which has military assets and some 7,000 to 8,000 troops permanently stationed in the region, European countries lack the significant posture and prepositioned forces in the Indo-Pacific region needed to move quickly in the early stages of any conflict. The huge distances in the Indo-Pacific will also stress European allies’ air-to-air refueling and transport capabilities. Nevertheless, European states can provide some capabilities — such as cyber and space — to support the United States or other countries in the region, including Australia, South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand, and contribute to lower-end deterrence and assurance missions.</p> +<p>Another alternative is to release the deepfake publicly but clearly label it a deepfake. In essence, the deepfake would be a dramatization of real events, which frequently occurs in documentaries and films.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-2">CONCLUSION</h4> - -<p>The goal of this chapter was to focus on military missions and to move beyond assessing whether European countries will be able to increase their defense spending to 2 percent of GDP or fix capability gaps. In examining which types of missions European militaries will be able to effectively perform in Europe, the Middle East, parts of Africa, and the Indo-Pacific, this analysis highlights several findings.</p> - -<p>To begin with, European reliance on the United States can be divided into several tiers, as illustrated below. These tiers represent a judgment about whether European states could operate independently of the U.S. military, not whether they should. They include:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Tier 1 Missions: Low Reliance on the United States:</strong> Most European states likely will not require aid from the United States for such missions as noncombatant evacuation, peackeeping, foreign humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, security force assistance, counter illegal migration, air patrol, and maritime patrol missions — particularly in and around Europe.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Tier 2 Missions: Medium Reliance on the United States:</strong> Most European states likely will require some aid from the United States for military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and assurance missions in parts of the Middle East and Africa. In these regions, most European militaries could face some challenges with airlift, aerial refueling, basing, and other issues over extensive geographic areas.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Tier 3 Missions: High Reliance on the United States:</strong> Most European states likely will require significant aid from the United States for large-scale combat, particularly with Russia and China. In addition, European militaries likely will also require U.S. aid to effectively perform numerous missions (such as deterrence and assurance) in the Indo-Pacific.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>In addition, some European states — particularly larger powers such as the United Kingdom and France — will likely have the capability to conduct most types of missions at the lower end of the conflict continuum without U.S. military aid. Examples include noncombatant evacuations, peacekeeping, and foreign humanitarian assistance.</p> - -<p>Major European states will also likely be able to conduct most types of medium-scale missions, such as security force assistance, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and air and maritime patrol. European militaries may face resource issues, including shortfalls in the number of aircraft, naval vessels, personnel, or spare parts, which could stress their ability to fill several missions concurrently or for an extended duration. Nevertheless, they likely will not have significant capability gaps in accomplishing most of these missions, particularly in Europe.</p> - -<p>However, European militaries — including the United Kingdom and France — will likely struggle to conduct large-scale combat, where European states still lack sufficient heavy maneuver forces, airlift, naval combatants, and support capabilities, such as logistics and fire support. Although European allies and partners of the United States plan to improve these capabilities by 2030 as part of a greater NATO-agreed initiative, it is unclear whether they will be successful. European challenges may be particularly notable with large-scale, high-end conflict at short notice given most European countries’ persistent readiness challenges. Another challenge will likely be missions in the Indo-Pacific, where European maritime and air forces lack sufficient airlift, aerial refueling, and basing to sustain operations. Countries such as France and the United Kingdom could mitigate basing challenges by reaching agreements with some countries in the region. As highlighted later in Chapter 6, these are areas on which the United States can focus as part of security cooperation and industrial base cooperation with European allies and partners.</p> - -<p>As noted earlier in this chapter, Germany and the United Kingdom may struggle to field some units because of manpower shortages. The shrinking forces of both countries reflect an overall trend affecting not only Europe but also the United States and Canada in trying to recruit and retain an all-volunteer, professional armed force. This is a challenge that needs to be addressed by all Western nations. Without adequate active-duty volunteers, many national leaders will need to consider whether a greater reliance on reservists will be needed to meet force goals and operational requirements. Additionally, consideration may need to be given to reinstitute conscription in some form to have a minimally trained reserve force capable of being called up and deployed if needed.</p> - -<p>There are also a range of factors that could impact the outcome of European missions, such as political will, financial constraints, and variation in threat perception. While all members have pledged to honor NATO’s Article V commitment, many allies in Western and Southern Europe have a significantly different perception of the Russian threat than those nations of Northern and Eastern Europe. Conversely, nations in Northern and Eastern Europe have a different threat perception of illegal migration and terrorist flows than those in Southern and Western Europe. Although the overall strategic focus in Europe has shifted toward the northeast following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, effective development of allied capabilities and strategy will require a balanced threat assessment. Ensuring that all allies share a common risk assessment and understanding that the alliance, as a whole, needs a wide spectrum of deep capabilities to address these threats is what NATO 2030 was designed to achieve and what allied leaders reaffirmed at the Madrid summit in June 2022.</p> - -<p>Recruitment, training, operations and maintenance, and purchasing of spare parts will also be key factors in assessing whether NATO allies — including the United States — can meet the 2030 goals and be able to maintain them post-2030. If NATO leaders can find the political will to ensure its 2021 Brussels and 2022 Madrid declarations are not hollow, then many of the missions outlined above can be achieved and many of the present identified gaps can be filled. However, if there is not ample political support — as well as adequate funding — to do what is needed to meet 2030 objectives, many of the challenges noted in this chapter may become even more difficult.</p> - -<h2 id="forward-defense">FORWARD DEFENSE</h2> - -<h3 id="ch-05">CH. 05</h3> -<h3 id="us-interests-and-defense-objectives">U.S. INTERESTS AND DEFENSE OBJECTIVES</h3> - -<p>This chapter examines U.S. interests and objectives in Europe in the context of U.S. military posture. It asks several questions. What are U.S. interests in Europe? In light of these interests, what should be the United States’ major defense objectives and capabilities in Europe? Based on the analysis, this chapter makes three main arguments.</p> - -<p>First, the United States has several enduring interests in Europe: protect the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people; promote and expand economic prosperity and opportunity; realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and defend and support the United States’ European allies and partners. Second, the United States has several defense objectives that flow from these interests, such as deterring and defeating conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and NATO allies. Third, deterrence should be the conceptual lynchpin of U.S. posture in Europe, including a combination of deterrence by punishment (for areas of NATO’s eastern flank) and deterrence by denial (for much of the rest of Europe). Nevertheless, deterrence is likely to be more difficult below the threshold of conventional war for Russian gray zone activities and irregular warfare.</p> - -<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. The first outlines U.S. interests in Europe. The second section examines U.S. defense objectives, which flow from U.S. interests. The third explores deterrence. The fourth section examines several operational concepts. The fifth section analyzes risks to U.S. posture in Europe.</p> - -<h4 id="us-interests">U.S. INTERESTS</h4> - -<p>The United States has several broad security interests in Europe today, which will likely persist over the next decade:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Protect the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people, including from threats emanating from Europe;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Promote and expand U.S. economic prosperity and opportunity;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Defend and support the United States’ European allies and partners.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>The United States has interests elsewhere in the world. In particular, China will likely be the United States’ main global competitor. China poses a challenge to the United States around the globe because of its expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities, irregular warfare and gray zone activities, technological and economic competitiveness, and “wolf warrior” diplomacy. The United States has other important interests in other regions, including in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.</p> - -<p>But it is a false dichotomy to argue that the United States needs to choose between these interests — especially between China and Russia. Both are authoritarian regimes cooperating on two major axes. Beijing and Moscow have deepened their military, economic, and diplomatic ties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States should develop a two-front strategy that works with allies and partners to counter China and Russia. U.S. interests in Europe are significant, and U.S. allies and partners in Europe share the United States’ democratic values and account for significant military, economic, and technological power. Examples include:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Democracy:</strong> Europe accounts for the largest number of democratic countries of any continent in the world. Europe’s commitment to freedom and democracy is particularly critical because of 16 straight years of democratic decline worldwide due to the global expansion of authoritarian regimes, including China, Russia, and Iran.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Military Power:</strong> European countries have 4 of the 10 largest defense budgets in the world.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Economic Power:</strong> Europe includes 3 of the 10 largest economies in the world, as measured by purchasing power parity. Combined, the European Union has the third-largest economy in the world.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Population:</strong> The population of the entire European Union is 447.7 million, which would make it the third-largest country in the world.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>Public support for NATO in the United States has been over 70 percent for the past two decades. In 2022, at least three-quarters of Republicans, Democrats, and independents believed that the United States should maintain or increase its support to NATO, according to a Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll. In 2023, U.S. support for NATO remained high, though some Republicans and independents were more likely to focus on domestic issues. Still, a significant 91 percent of Americans — including Republicans and Democrats — had unfavorable views of Russia in 2023.</p> - -<p>Since its establishment in the 1949 Washington Treaty, NATO has been the lynchpin of U.S. security in Europe. The bedrock of NATO is a collective defense provision — an attack on one is an attack on all — that was codified in Article V of the Washington Treaty. During the Cold War, the alliance served as the primary bulwark against the expansion of the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, NATO became the major framework for organizing transatlantic efforts on collective security matters, including military interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. In addition, several former Soviet republics (such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and members of the Soviet-aligned Warsaw Pact (such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia) became NATO members.</p> - -<p>These treaty relationships have benefited the United States for several reasons. One is supporting U.S. leadership. As a result of the United States’ central role in transatlantic and international relations that NATO has in many ways cemented, Americans have enjoyed unprecedented economic prosperity and freedom. Successive American governments have been afforded both de facto and de jure privileged status related to such issues as trade partnerships and access to bases in large part because of the outsized role that the country plays in the defense of its allies. For example, the United States would not have been able to prosecute expeditionary and counterterrorism operations in the Middle East and Africa were it not for the bases and prepositioned equipment that the United States has been able to maintain on allied soil in Europe.</p> - -<p>Another long-standing reason for U.S. engagement in Europe is to enable U.S. strategic depth. The United States’ geographic location, protected by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, no longer provides the same security as in previous decades because of advances in long-range strike, cyber operations, space, and other technological developments. As a result, it is prudent to station U.S. forces overseas to contend with adversary aggression — if not outright conflict — far from the U.S. homeland. Not only does this make the U.S. homeland less vulnerable to outright war, but forward presence is also relatively cost effective.</p> - -<p>Finally, the NATO alliance today affords the United States strategic flexibility. Most of the United States’ main security challenges — from China and Russia to Iran and terrorism — cannot be tackled by one state alone, not even the United States. Allies are critical. They enable flexible cooperation and consultation on any number of strategic issues as they arise. In short, the United States has significant interests in Europe that will likely persist over the next decade.</p> - -<h4 id="defense-objectives">DEFENSE OBJECTIVES</h4> - -<p>Based on these interests, the United States has several defense objectives in Europe:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Deter and defeat conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and U.S. allies, as well as coerce, persuade, and influence adversary behavior;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Counter irregular and gray zone activities, as well as compete effectively below the threshold of conventional conflict using both defensive and offensive means;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Counter terrorist and other transnational threats;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Deter and prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Maintain access to trade routes and global commons.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>A key defense objective should be to deter and defeat conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and NATO allies, as well as to coerce, persuade, and influence adversary behavior. This objective includes preventing a country with hegemonic ambitions, such as Russia, from expanding its power through territorial conquest, covert influence, and other means. As Putin explained at length in discussing the historical exploits of Peter I, military expansion was about returning what rightly belonged to Russia:</p> +<p>Whether the subject of a deepfake is living or dead also should matter. A dead person cannot lose power or money or otherwise suffer harm. On the other hand, consider that others close to the dead person may be harmed. The deniability of the deepfake is also affected, as the person in question cannot simply say the video is fake.</p> <blockquote> - <p>Peter the Great waged the Great Northern War for 21 years. On the face of it, he was at war with Sweden taking something away from it. . . . He was not taking away anything, he was returning. This is how it was. The areas around Lake Ladoga, where St Petersburg was founded. When he founded the new capital, none of the European countries recognized this territory as part of Russia; everyone recognized it as part of Sweden. However, from time immemorial, the Slavs lived there along with the Finno-Ugric peoples, and this territory was under Russia’s control. The same is true of the western direction, Narva and his first campaigns. Why would he go there? He was returning and reinforcing, that is what he was doing.</p> + <h4 id="6-goal">6. Goal</h4> </blockquote> -<p>This logic is revanchist. Putin went on to highlight the need for expansion today. “Clearly, it fell to our lot to reclaim and strengthen as well. And if we operate on the premise that these basic values constitute the basis of our existence, we will certainly succeed in achieving our goals.” Putin’s desire to expand territorial control is cloaked in the language that the Kremlin is merely acquiring what already belongs to Russia. Putin likely has other countries on his colonial agenda, such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which were Soviet republics. Putin’s revanchist aims makes it important to deter and defeat armed aggression.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FO3KurR.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5.1: European Underwater Fiber-Optic Cables.</strong> Source: <a href="https://submarine-cable-map-2022.telegeography.com/">“Submarine Cable Map 2022,” Telegeography</a> (CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED); and <a href="https://assets.weforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/151104-submarine-cables-internet-world-map.png">“How Can We Protect the Internet’s Undersea Cables?,” World Economic Forum, November 4, 2015</a>.</em></p> - -<p>The United States has other defense objectives, such as countering gray zone activities, terrorism, and other transnational threats. For instance, Europe has critical infrastructure that could be threatened by state and non-state activity and pose a threat to the United States. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, one example is the underwater fiber-optic cables that connect Europe with North America and European countries with each other. There are currently 16 cables running under the Atlantic that connect the United States with mainland Europe. They are primarily operated by such companies as Google, Microsoft, France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks, and China’s Huawei Marine Networks. Submarine cables are critical for global communication and account for roughly 95 percent of all transatlantic data traffic. Militaries also use them. These cables are vulnerable to subversion and sabotage by special operations forces and intelligence units; maritime vessels, such as submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles; and possibly non-state actors.</p> - -<p>In January 2022, the Russian navy allegedly mapped out the undersea cables off the coast of Ireland and carried out maneuvers, raising serious concerns in Europe and the United States about Russian sabotage. In addition, a Russian government unit allegedly cut an underwater fiber-optic cable off the coast of Svalbard, Norway, in January 2022 in the Arctic Ocean.</p> - -<p>Europe’s intricate network of gas and oil pipelines are also vulnerable to sabotage and subversion. In September 2022, for example, there were explosions in the Baltic Sea on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines. Europe is vulnerable to other threats below the threshold of conventional war — such as cyberattacks, misinformation and disinformation, assassinations, terrorist attacks, illegal drugs, human trafficking, and the weaponization of immigrants — from state and non-state actors that may require U.S. defense assistance. In 2021, Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko threatened to “flood” the European Union with “drugs and migrants,” and then his government sent thousands of migrants from Iraq and other countries to the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in 2021 and 2022.</p> - -<p>In addition, the United States will likely need to help deter and prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction. On several occasions, Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons in response to U.S. and other Western aid to Ukraine following the Russian invasion. Russian military leaders also discussed the use of battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine, according to U.S. intelligence. The United States could also help track and counter the acquisition — or attempted acquisition — of fissile material and chemical or biological agents or precursors as well as the movement of these materials and their possible use.</p> - -<p>A final defense objective is maintaining access to major trade routes and global commons. Europe has some of the most significant trade routes, such as the Dover Strait (between the United Kingdom and France) and the Suez Canal (between the Mediterranean and Red Sea). On March 23, 2021, for example, the cargo ship Ever Given ran aground in the Suez Canal and created a massive backlog of over 400 vessels, significantly disrupting global supply chains, delaying goods from reaching their destinations, and holding up an estimated $9.6 billion of trade each day. U.S. and European maritime vessels — including from the U.S. Sixth Fleet — and aircraft can help to ensure these shipping lanes remain open. As the Arctic ice melts, the Arctic Ocean also represents a major global common with potential shipping lanes.</p> - -<h4 id="deterrence">DETERRENCE</h4> - -<p>Deterrence should be the lynchpin of U.S. posture in Europe. Deterrence involves preventing an adversary from taking an action that it might otherwise take. There are two types of deterrence relevant to Europe. Deterrence by denial involves preventing an action, such as Russian aggression, by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives. Deterrence by punishment includes preventing an action, such as Russian aggression, by imposing severe costs if an attack occurs. Some have referred to this as deterrence by cost imposition.</p> - -<p>A potential attacker’s fears about the costs of military action, especially when weighed against the benefits, are central to both concepts of deterrence. Costs are often a function of military and civilian casualties, military equipment destroyed or lost, the losses associated with economic sanctions imposed by opponents, trade disrupted, and the expense of mobilizing, deploying, and maintaining forces. In the case of successful deterrence, the attacker might not conduct an action because it believes the probability of success is low and the costs and risks are high. For example, the attacker might assess that it cannot successfully achieve its objectives quickly and with limited costs using a blitzkrieg strategy and would instead face a protracted and bloody war of attrition. As former U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson noted: “The only deterrence to the imposition of Russian will in Western Europe is the belief that from the outset of any such attempt American power would be employed in stopping it, and if necessary, would inflict on the Soviet Union injury which the Moscow regime would not wish to suffer.”</p> - -<p>Deterrence by denial may be achievable for much, though not all, of Europe. A denial strategy requires deploying sufficient numbers and types of conventional forces (such as armored brigade combat teams, fifth-generation aircraft, bombers, artillery, and main battle tanks) and nuclear weapons to prevent the advance of an adversary — such as Russia — on the battlefield. Other factors, such as strategy, are also important. Consequently, for deterrence by denial to be effective in Europe, the United States and its NATO allies need to develop a strategy designed to blunt a Russian blitzkrieg, deploy sufficient numbers of armored brigade combat teams and weapons systems to frontline states in Eastern Europe, and ensure that the defense industrial base of the United States and its allies can produce sufficient munitions and weapons systems for a protracted war.</p> - -<p>In some countries, such as the Baltic states and perhaps Finland, deterrence by denial may be difficult. NATO likely lacks a forward posture — including ground forces and capabilities — in some frontline states to prevent a Russian fait accompli. In these cases, the United States and its NATO allies will likely need to credibly signal to Moscow that the costs of a Russian attack would far outweigh the benefits. Examples might include strengthening the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to quickly surge into targeted countries to repel an advance, using — or threatening to use — nuclear weapons, or developing sufficient host-nation capabilities to mount a costly insurgency. In the case of nuclear weapons, deterrence by punishment can sometimes involve an implicit or explicit threat to destroy large portions of an opponent’s industry and other targets. In the case of a potential insurgency, countries such as Switzerland have deterred invasions in part by developing and training local defense units (supported by regular forces) in irregular warfare, prepositioning stockpiles of weapons and equipment to wage a protracted insurgency, and preparing military and civilian units for decentralized and aggressive resistance.</p> - -<p>However, deterrence is more difficult below the threshold of conventional war, including for irregular warfare and gray zone activities. Offensive cyberattacks, sabotage, anti-satellite attacks, assassinations, and other types of activities are difficult to deter.</p> - -<p>In addition to deterrence, assurance will remain important in Europe. Assurance, which includes land, maritime, and air activities designed to give confidence to allies and partners, can be helpful. Examples might include the stationing of permanent or rotational ground forces and equipment, air and maritime patrols, and military exercises. But assurance is not the same as deterrence, and steps to assure allies and partners do not necessarily deter adversaries. For example, air and maritime patrols may provide some confidence and comfort to host-nation countries near where these patrols occur, but there is little evidence that they deter adversary behavior. Consequently, while assurance steps are important, deterrence should be the conceptual lynchpin of U.S. posture in Europe.</p> - -<h4 id="operational-concepts">OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS</h4> - -<p>There are several operational concepts relevant to examining force posture in Europe. One is agile combat employment (ACE), which is designed to increase survivability and generate combat power in the face of an imminent threat or action. The intent is to complicate the adversary’s targeting process, create political and operational dilemmas for the enemy, and create flexibility for U.S. or allied and partner forces. Aircraft are particularly vulnerable if they are postured on bases that are few in number, lack passive defenses (such as shelters and decoys), and lack sufficient active defenses (such as kinetic and non-kinetic interceptors, electronic warfare, and directed-energy weapons) that can help counter air and missile threats.</p> - -<p>ACE in Europe involves responding to a rising threat — such as an increase in U.S.-Russian tensions, a Russian military buildup along NATO’s eastern flank, or even a preemptive Russian strike against NATO. ACE might include rapidly moving U.S. and allied aircraft and key personnel, materiel, and logistics from large bases (or main operating bases) to dispersed contingency locations (or forward operating sites) in Europe and perhaps other regions.</p> - -<p>One example might involve quickly dispersing aircraft, materiel, and personnel from such main operating bases as Ramstein Air Base in Germany to forward operating sites in Greece, Slovenia, Poland, Romania, or other countries. Rapid dispersal relies on airlift and logistical flows between main operating bases and forward operating sites, ideally covered by air and missile defense. ACE also involves massing and utilizing forces from forward operating sites to potentially strike enemy targets. To be effective, ACE generally requires prepositioning war reserve materiel and building infrastructure at forward operating sites, as well as conducting training and exercises, negotiating access through host-nation agreements, and engaging in other activities with European partners.</p> - -<p>In addition, dynamic force employment (DFE) is an operational concept designed to demonstrate operational unpredictability to adversaries, improve deterrence, and support allies. DFE missions might include posturing a guided-missile destroyer to the High North, conducting Bomber Task Force missions, or deploying an F-35 squadron. The idea is to employ forces in ways that demonstrate the United States’ ability to quickly generate combat power and deter adversary action. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy concluded, DFE provides “options for proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force” and facilitates “combat-credible, flexible theater postures [that] will enhance our ability to compete and provide freedom of maneuver during conflict, providing national decision-makers with better military options.”</p> - -<p>The Defender-Europe exercise involved the rapid deployment of air and land capabilities (including Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and M113 armored personnel carriers) from the United States and Germany to Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area in Poland. U.S. Army units then conducted company-level, live-fire exercises with Poland’s 17th Mechanized Brigade and 11th Armor Cavalry Division.</p> - -<p>However, there are at least three challenges with DFE and deterrence. First, there is little empirical evidence that DFE actually deters adversaries. For example, it is unclear if — and perhaps unlikely that — Russia has been deterred by the occasional deployment of an F-35 squadron, guided-missile destroyer, or Bomber Task Force mission in Europe. To effectively deter, actions need to make an adversary’s activity infeasible or impose severe costs if the activity occurs. DFE likely does neither. Second, DFE may weaken assurance of U.S. allies and partners in cases where permanent or rotational forces are replaced by those engaged in DFE. Third, there is often little or nothing “dynamic” about DFE, since it can sometimes take several months to negotiate with local partners and allow for adversary intelligence collection and warning.</p> - -<h4 id="potential-risks">POTENTIAL RISKS</h4> - -<p>As this chapter argues, the United States has enduring interests in Europe. In particular, Russia presents a long-term threat to the United States and its European allies and partners because of its revanchist intentions and efforts to rebuild its military capabilities. Based on these interests, the United States has several defense objectives in Europe, such as deterring and defeating conventional and nuclear-armed conflict, countering irregular and gray zone activities, countering terrorist and other trans-national threats, deterring and preventing state and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining access to key trade routes and global commons. To achieve these objectives, the United States needs sufficient land, maritime, air, space, cyber, nuclear, and special operations capabilities in or near Europe.</p> - -<p>In addition, deterrence should be the lynchpin of U.S. posture in Europe, and it should include a combination of deterrence by punishment (for areas of NATO’s eastern flank) and deterrence by denial (for most of Europe). But deterrence is likely to be weaker below the threshold of conventional war — including for irregular warfare and gray zone activities, such as cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, and subversion. This reality suggests that the United States and its European allies should be aggressive in conducting both defensive and offensive action below the threshold of conventional war.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, any U.S. force posture has risks that need to be managed. Examples include:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><em>European Military Capabilities:</em> European capabilities remain limited, including for high-end warfare. Particular concerns are such areas as integrated air and missile defense, long-range fires, hypersonics, and sufficient stockpiles of critical munitions, such as for integrated air defense systems and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Interoperability:</em> Military interoperability remains a challenge across NATO militaries.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Political Will:</em> Political will may be fragile in some European countries, including to support U.S. basing, access, and overflight.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>European Defense Industrial Base:</em> The defense industrial bases of most European countries are not adequately prepared for the current security environment. Most have not produced sufficient quantities of the most important munitions and weapons systems — such as long-range fires and integrated air and missile defense systems — for a major war. Most also do not have sufficient surge capacity for a protracted war.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Escalation:</em> Some posture actions, such as deploying armored brigade combat teams to Finland, could unnecessarily provoke Moscow and risk escalation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>U.S. Contingencies:</em> Some U.S. forces could be deployed to other regions — such as the Indo-Pacific or Middle East — for contingencies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Domestic U.S. Constraints:</em> There are several domestic factors that could impact U.S. force posture in Europe, including the size of the U.S. defense budget or an isolationist turn in U.S. politics.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>Based on these risks, U.S. posture in Europe needs to be flexible enough to allow some U.S. forces to surge to other regions — such as the Indo-Pacific or Middle East — in case of contingencies. The next chapter provides more details about U.S. posture.</p> - -<h3 id="ch-06">CH. 06</h3> -<h3 id="a-forward-defense-posture">A FORWARD DEFENSE POSTURE</h3> - -<p>This chapter outlines recommendations for the future of U.S. military posture in Europe based on the interests, objectives, capabilities, and operational concepts identified in the previous chapter, as well as concerns about Russian military reconstitution and political revanchism. The chapter begins with a discussion of the methodology and assumptions underpinning them, including considerations of the time frame for implementing new U.S. policies, the state of the war in Ukraine and the reconstitution of Russia’s military capabilities, the state of competition with China and the likelihood of a Taiwan conflict, and U.S. global posture writ large.</p> - -<p>This chapter also provides recommendations in line with a posture of “forward defense.” It is organized around the categories of ground forces; air combat forces; naval forces; air and missile defense; logistics and enablers; and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR). The recommendations seek to bolster U.S. ground forces, particularly in NATO’s eastern flank, as a deterrent against Russian military reconstitution and revanchism. In the air and maritime domains, they aim to adopt a flexible posture and work with allies to fill capability gaps in the event of a contingency in the Indo-Pacific or other regions. Finally, they strive to enhance coordination with NATO allies by building partner capacity missions, security assistance, and arms sales to fill capability gaps, improve interoperability, and enhance allied lethality.</p> - -<h4 id="methodology-and-assumptions">METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS</h4> - -<p>The posture recommendations were developed based on the analysis in preceding chapters as well as an evaluation of the U.S. military’s posture both currently and prior to the war in Ukraine. Those postures served as a baseline from which the study team recommended changes according to the objectives and interests identified in Chapter 5, the state of European military capabilities as assessed in Chapter 6, and the analysis of the threat landscape in Chapter 4. The recommendations were then evaluated against alternative postures discussed in Chapter 7 and assessed against several operational scenarios.</p> - -<p>Additionally, several assumptions inform the recommendations. Regarding the timeline to enact policy and posture changes, these recommendations are designed for U.S. military force posture in Europe through 2030. In the case of some recommendations that may have a more immediate impact (such as increased port visits) or delayed impact (such as new bases), the approximate timeline will be specified.</p> - -<p>Offering recommendations on the future of U.S. posture in Europe is also complicated by the current state of the war in Ukraine. This study assumes that the war will likely continue for the foreseeable future, though the intensity of the fighting could wax and wane based on several factors, including political negotiations. The study assumes that the Russian military will attempt to reconstitute its military forces and capabilities, to include the modernization of the army. China will likely provide economic and some military assistance to Russia to aid in its modernization efforts. The study team also assumes that Iran, North Korea, and other countries will provide military assistance to Russia.</p> - -<p>The recommendations offered in this study are not made in a vacuum absent considerations of U.S. posture elsewhere in the world. This report seeks to offer realistic policy options informed by global trade-offs in terms of U.S. forces and capabilities. As outlined above, while the United States has significant interests and objectives, China is the United States’ main geostrategic competitor. Accordingly, this report identifies areas of risk where preferred capabilities may not be available for use in the European theater due to their deployment in the Indo-Pacific theater and offers options to mitigate that risk. The recommendations assume that U.S. tensions with China will continue, including over Taiwan. Finally, this study does not conduct a detailed budget analysis of forward defense, but it does highlight the budgetary implications of certain policies or force posture changes as well as political considerations.</p> - -<p>The rest of this chapter examines posture and capability recommendations in the following categories: ground forces, air combat forces, naval forces, air and missile defense, logistics and enablers, ISR, and nuclear forces.</p> - -<h4 id="ground-forces">GROUND FORCES</h4> - -<p>The nature of operations in Ukraine illustrates the continued significance of ground forces in combat in the European theater. Consequently, U.S. ground forces in Europe will play a major role in deterring and responding to acts of Russian aggression and should be strengthened in a “forward defense” posture.</p> - -<p>As the war in Ukraine highlights, land warfare remains important, including in Europe. There are several types of capabilities important for achieving U.S. defense objectives highlighted in the previous chapter, including deterring and defeating conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and NATO allies. Key examples include:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Army units, including armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs);</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Integrated air and missile defense systems;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Long-range fires;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Manned and unmanned aircraft;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Multi-domain command and control; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Additional investments and equipment — including logistics — such as munitions stockpiles, spare parts, hardened facilities, and improved lines of communication.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>These and other land-based capabilities fall under U.S. Army Europe. In addition, achieving U.S. defense objectives in Europe requires active defenses, passive defenses, and counterstrike. Active defense refers to assets that directly target and eliminate incoming threats, including integrated air and missile defense capabilities, such as Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot surface-to-air missile systems (including radars, fire control, battle management, and command and control). Passive defense refers to hardened infrastructure and dispersal of assets through concepts of operation such as agile combat employment (ACE). These passive defense actions minimize damage to installations from kinetic threats by absorbing strikes and forcing U.S. adversaries to expend more munitions on hardened targets. Finally, counterstrike includes the ability to conduct retaliatory actions against enemy forces and to prevent or mitigate damage from additional follow-on attacks.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fnHJLAQ.png" alt="image13" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6.1: U.S. Military Force Posture in Europe, 2024.</strong> Source: Compiled by CSIS based on DOD and open-source reporting.</em></p> - -<p>The United States should prepare for Russia to revitalize its military capabilities and pose a threat to NATO’s eastern flank. It should consequently take steps to strengthen its presence from pre-February 2022 levels by increasing the number of permanent forward-stationed maneuver forces to deter and effectively respond to Russian aggression. That increase entails shifting the rotational ABCT associated with Operation Atlantic Resolve (along with the associated combat aviation brigade) to a permanent, forward-stationed ABCT headquartered in Poland. The United States should also maintain its enduring rotational infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) presence in Romania, as well as rotational deployments to the Baltic states in the near term and incorporate them into Operation Atlantic Resolve under the command of the V Corps headquarters. However, the requirement for these rotational forces may shift depending on changes to the threat environment.</p> - -<p>These changes to U.S. ground force posture would shift the U.S. Army to a posture model of four total brigade combat teams (BCTs) in Europe (three permanent, forward-stationed BCTs and one rotational BCT) plus two headquarters in Germany and Poland (four BCTs + two headquarters model) from the previous 3+1 model prior to the war in Ukraine. This model would also include the permanent forward basing of two combat aviation brigades (the existing 12th Combat Aviation Brigade plus another). Prior to the February 2022 invasion, the United States maintained two permanent, forward-stationed BCTs in Europe plus one rotational BCT. The permanent units include the 2nd Cavalry Regiment Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) headquartered in Vilseck, Germany, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade across Vincenza, Italy, and Grafenwoehr, Germany, as well as the forward-stationed 12th Combat Aviation Brigade. The rotational ABCT, established in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, serves as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, which deploys approximately 7,000 U.S. Army personnel (including the ABCT plus a combat aviation brigade, sustainment task force, and forward division headquarters) to Europe on nine-month rotations.</p> - -<p>Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, U.S. ground forces in the U.S European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility increased significantly, shifting to a 5+2 model with the deployment of two additional BCTs (one ABCT and one IBCT), the V Corps division headquarters in Poland, a High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battalion, and enablers. The second IBCT serves as a rotational unit headquartered in Romania to provide an additional brigade on the eastern flank. Additionally, it was announced that the United States would “enhance its rotational deployments” to the Baltics states — including armored, aviation, air defense, and special operations forces — and “maintain a persistent heel-to-toe presence in the region.” From an operational perspective, EUCOM also deployed its permanently forward-stationed forces to NATO’s eastern flank in response to Russia’s invasion, including the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, Patriot forces, and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade.</p> - -<p>The recommended changes in this report for a 4+2 model would thus maintain the permanent SBCT in Germany and IBCT in Italy and Germany, create a permanent, forward-stationed ABCT at a new base in Poland, maintain the rotational IBCT in Romania, and maintain two permanent headquarters in Germany and Poland.</p> +<p><em>What is the goal of the deepfake? Is it intended to protect the nation’s citizens from immediate harm? Is it a tit-for-tat response to deepfake use by another government? Is it intended to educate a given population about deepfakes and suggest they be wary of any content they see?</em></p> -<p>Forward-stationing an ABCT in Poland offers several benefits to maintaining U.S. interests and achieving objectives in Europe, including (1) providing a credible force to swiftly respond to acts of Russian aggression against NATO partners; (2) reassuring allies of the U.S. commitment while building interoperability with partner forces; and (3) enhancing the general readiness of U.S. forces at large and reducing costs in the long run. Poland would provide the most practical and beneficial location to establish a new military base for an ABCT from an operational and political perspective. As announced at the 2022 NATO summit, Poland already hosts the V Corps Forward Command Post Headquarters, an Army garrison, and sustainment capabilities — the “first permanent stationing of U.S. forces on NATO’s eastern flank.”</p> +<p>The interviewees largely agreed it was acceptable for governments to use deepfakes under three circumstances: an immediate threat, a tit-for-tat response, or education and discrediting.</p> -<p>More critically, forward-stationing U.S. units in Poland would facilitate the speed of assembly and movement for U.S. operations in Europe, in which ABCTs would play a major role. According to a U.S. Army War College study, “The heart of the combat capability of a division configured for Europe is its ABCTs,” which “provide the bulk of ground force combat power and are the fulcrum around which the remainder of the ground campaign acts.” A forward-stationed ABCT in Poland would limit the amount of time required to build a combat-credible force to counter acts of Russian aggression against NATO. This capability would play a particularly major role in deterring or responding to a contingency in the Baltic states. Russian forces could threaten to cut off or slow the access of U.S. and NATO forces to the Baltic states by closing the Suwalki Gap, also known as the Kaliningrad Corridor — the 40-mile gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus where Lithuania borders Poland. Poland also offers greater strategic depth than alternative locations, such as the Baltic states, and interconnected rail lines with the rest of Europe that would ease resupply and reinforcement efforts.</p> +<p><strong>Immediate threat.</strong> At least one U.S. military leader felt using a deepfake in response to an immediate threat was potentially acceptable as long as no other measures were available to defeat the threat. However, he cautioned,</p> -<p>Forward-stationing a U.S. ABCT where it swiftly reinforces the Baltic states in the event of a contingency would also mitigate risks posed by shortcomings in NATO’s posture and capabilities. As discussed in Chapter 4, European militaries have insufficient numbers of maneuver forces. Moreover, Germany has struggled to expand its forces in Lithuania. However, U.S. and NATO force planners would also have to consider the Russian response to permanently forward-stationing a U.S. ABCT in Poland. The Russian government would likely consider this act to be a provocation and a further violation of the 1997 NATO Russia Founding Act. Consequently, the selection of a specific location for an ABCT base in the country would also have to balance operational efficiency with the risk posed by Russian escalation.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The deepfake is still not something I would do unless there is an imminent threat because there are all these other tools you can use rather than try to put words in the mouths of these leaders, and the potential for boomerang is still too high.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Nevertheless, the permanent U.S. presence would provide greater reassurance to Poland and to allies and partners on NATO’s eastern flank. According to a U.S. Army War College study, ABCTs have an “even greater political salience with Allied policymakers and populations due to their easily understood symbolic value,” and “rotational forces represent less commitment on the part of the United States and so have less reassurance value from the perspective of the ally or partner.” From a political perspective, the Polish government has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to host a permanent forward U.S. presence and share costs with the U.S. military. Poland already provides significant infrastructure and logistical support for the existing U.S. forces there.</p> +<p>Thus, an immediate threat might constitute one set of circumstances where deepfakes could be used. For instance, in the case of the genocide scenario, there may be members of the minority group who are U.S. citizens living in the country where the potential genocide would occur. As in the case of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, a U.S. president may be deeply reluctant to deploy U.S. troops to avert the genocide, and the presence of UN peacekeepers may not be useful. In such cases, it might make sense to use deepfakes to avert the genocide.</p> -<p>Forward-stationing additional U.S. forces can also enhance interoperability with allied forces and society. Forward-stationed U.S. units develop valuable relationships interacting with host-country military and civilian personnel on a regular basis and become more culturally attuned by learning about the community and environment. There are also vital benefits to increased interoperability both in times of crisis (easier coordination and problem solving) and stability (fewer violations of laws thanks to familiarity with local statutes and practices). As one assessment concludes, “the benefits of tactical and operational interoperability that come with forward stationing are most useful to those units that require the greatest depth of knowledge of local rules, regulations, customs, terrain, airspace, and counterparts.” In the case of Europe, this suggests that ABCTs are best placed to permanently forward station rather than IBCTs or SBCTs.</p> +<p>In some cases, the deepfake does not necessarily need to be believable in the long term. In the genocide scenario (or in cases of military deception), the deepfake could be circulated among the target state’s leaders to misguide them into leaving a certain area exposed, allowing the at-risk population to be evacuated. However, the use of deepfakes in the invasion scenario may not make sense if the potential for retaliatory deepfakes or a kinetic response by the country in question is high.</p> -<p>Interoperability is likely further enhanced when U.S. personnel are forward stationed with their dependents. Military families, about 60 percent of whom live on base, engage with host-country neighbors and businesses as de facto ambassadors. This strengthens strategic interoperability between the United States and host countries by improving cultural understanding and, in the case of Europe, reinforcing transatlantic ties and the role of NATO. When comparing the readiness between forward-stationed and rotational forces, these factors — increased interoperability and the presence of dependents — play a major role in the superior long-term readiness of permanent units compared to rotational forces.</p> +<p><strong>Tit for tat.</strong> Would it be acceptable for the United States to use deepfakes in retaliation for deepfake use by a foreign government? One non-U.S. military leader saw nothing wrong in doing so: “Tit-for-tat countering may be OK. . . . If an adversary is trying to create strategic effects in the victim nation, then the way international law is framed, in the interim, I would say the same logic should apply.”</p> -<p>Permanent stationed forces typically have significantly higher unit-manning rates than rotational forces. Manning levels for rotational forces can be as low as 67 percent. Their superior training readiness is further offset by the interoperability and awareness of forward-stationed forces with the host-country military, society, and regulations as well as heightened morale. Some evidence suggests that rotational deployments, which separate military personnel from their families for nine months at a time, cause lower morale than permanent deployments, which keep personnel with their dependents. Rotational deployments also lead to more discipline issues and increased divorce rates. A comparison of re-enlistment rates between rotational BCTs and all Army BCTs found a lower re-enlistment rate for rotational personnel, which was even lower when compared to the forward-stationed 2nd Cavalry Regiment SBCT based in Vilseck, Germany.</p> +<p>A corporate leader likewise supported tit-for-tat use of deepfakes. He advocated a “no-first-use policy” but said “it is OK to respond in kind to use by a bad guy.” He went on to say that he was “OK with using deepfakes defensively,” and in such a case the actors “must flood the internet when such deepfakes are deployed, as one message doesn’t work well.”</p> -<p>From a force-planning and budgetary perspective, the costs of permanently stationed forces are also lower. In terms of the force-generation model, an enduring and constant rotational ABCT presence in Europe for a nine-month deployment requires three total ABCTs. As an illustrative example, U.S.-based ABCT-1 must be training and preparing to deploy to replace ABCT-2 currently in Europe. ABCT-3, also U.S.-based, after recently ending its nine-month deployment, must then recover and begin training to deploy following ABCT-1’s tour overseas. This model, rather than having one unit permanently stationed in Europe, eats up more of the Army’s force structure and long-term readiness.</p> +<p>Thus, according to both these experts, in the case of the Zelensky video referenced earlier, it would have been acceptable for Ukraine to target Putin not just with one retaliatory deepfake but with a large number, presumably as a deterrent for future deepfake use by Russia. Appropriate authorities must answer the question of what constitutes a number that is large but not so large that it is escalatory. Such an effort, however, might poison the internet even further, perhaps to the detriment of billions of ordinary users.</p> -<p>From a fiscal cost perspective, establishing a new U.S. military base in Poland would initially have high budgetary costs and take roughly seven years to put in place. However, the financial burden of permanently stationed forces would be lower in the long run. Operation and sustainment costs would be significantly lower than those of rotational force. A forward-stationed ABCT incurs 75 percent of the additional operational tempo (OPTEMPO) costs that a rotationally deployed ABCT would, and it also generates savings over time. Moreover, given the cost of moving their equipment, ABCTs are the most expensive unit to rotationally deploy, suggesting that IBCTs or SBCTs are better suited to that deployment model.</p> +<p>Perhaps the best response to a foreign deepfake may be other cyber means. A former senior White House attorney and NSC member stated that if Russia is spreading deepfakes inside the United States, the United States should “get out in front of Russia’s deepfakes and punch down the story.” The interviewee was also supportive of “shut[ting] down Russia’s efforts to create/spread the deepfakes using cyber tools.”</p> -<p><strong>Long-Range Fires:</strong> Long-range fires offer a valuable capability to deter Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern flank, as evidenced by the reactivation of the 56th Artillery Command in Germany and the activation of the Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force in 2021. Long-range fires units, including those with HIMARS capabilities, have also deployed on a rotational basis to conduct training and improve interoperability with NATO allies. In March 2023, the Army’s V Corps announced its European HIMARS initiative to formalize these efforts, particularly across the eastern flank, with participation from 56th Artillery Command, 41st Field Artillery Brigade, and elements of the 101st Airborne and 4th Infantry Divisions.</p> +<p><strong>Education/discrediting.</strong> Can a deepfake be used to show how convincing deepfakes can be? Can AI-generated deepfakes be used to educate a population and make them understand they should not trust everything they see? One industry expert stated the use of deepfakes to educate the population about deepfakes is perfectly acceptable. This interviewee, who has in-depth knowledge about YouTube’s policies, remarked,</p> -<p>Given the applicability of the capability to operations in Europe as well as the Indo-Pacific, long-range fire units must be balanced across both theaters. European militaries, however, lack a strong long-range indirect fire capability, as discussed earlier. The United States can increase its capabilities in Europe by permitting further sales of HIMARS systems to NATO allies. Between 2022 and 2023, the United States completed sales of HIMARS systems to Estonia, Poland, and the Netherlands. To enhance allied lethality, the Army should also continue rotational deployments of HIMARS units in support of the European HIMARS Initiative. Furthermore, the Army should continue the modernization of the long-range fires, to include the development of hypersonic capabilities and fielding of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) to replace existing HIMARS and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) munitions.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Educational use — don’t believe what you see — is OK. For example, YouTube approved a deepfake of “[the] pope in [a] puff jacket” if it was posted for educational purposes but would block it if it was used as an ad or in a way intended to create harm.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Special Operations Forces and Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs):</strong> U.S. special operations forces and U.S. Army SFABs are helpful in such areas as:</p> +<p>Of course, when deepfakes are used for educational purposes, they should be clearly marked as deepfakes.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><em>Foreign internal defense</em>, which involves efforts to build the capacity of foreign governments. This can include training and equipping partners in Europe that border Russia, such as Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. Special operations forces are an essential part of foreign internal defense. These activities can also include broader efforts to conduct security force assistance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Unconventional warfare</em>, which includes operations to advise, assist, and accompany non-state partners resisting a hostile actor by operating with or through an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Information operations</em> — or Military Information Support Operations — which involve activities to influence foreign audiences.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="7-traceability">7. Traceability</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>There are other critical activities, such as special reconnaissance, civil affairs operations, direct action, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterinsurgency, and hostage rescue and recovery. Special operations forces can counter Moscow economically, militarily, and diplomatically below the threshold of conventional war — including through information operations. For example, U.S. forces can also proactively highlight examples of Russian malign activity, human rights abuses, and corruption. Examples of subjects that could be highlighted include:</p> +<p><em>What is the probability of the deepfake being traced back to the creator? What will the blowback be in the event it is attributed to the government that created it?</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Russian direct or indirect involvement in human rights abuses, including in Ukraine;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russian involvement in the assassination (or attempted assassination) of defectors, political opponents, and those — such as journalists and lawyers — investigating or prosecuting Russian corruption or human rights abuses;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russian proxies involved in abuses, including Russian private military companies such as the Wagner Group;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Corruption in Russia, including by senior Russian officials;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russian support to terrorist and insurgent groups, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Lebanese Hezbollah and Shia militias in Syria;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russian economic problems; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Anti-regime riots, protests, and demonstrations in Russia or in Russian-allied countries, such as Belarus.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>When a government uses deepfakes in pursuit of its goals, the interviewees felt several questions must be asked: Will the deepfake be detected by other actors? How severe will the repercussions of the deepfake likely be, if they are publicly attributed to the country that created and distributed it? Will it implicate third parties (e.g., if Israel uses a deepfake, will it implicate the United States)?</p> -<p>The U.S. military should increase efforts to build and enhance allied and partner capabilities, with a focus on eastern flank states. The United States has already undertaken significant and credible missions to train partner forces in the Baltics and Ukraine since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine by deploying special operations forces, the Army’s 4th SFAB, and Army National Guard units. U.S. special operations forces units have taken the lead in training Baltic militaries to counter Russian hybrid and irregular warfare capabilities. To that end, as well as to establish a forward operating site, U.S. forces established a new special operations site in Riga, Latvia, in 2020. The U.S. security cooperation efforts in the region are simultaneously boosted by the National Guard’s State Partnership Program, which assigns certain National Guard units from specific states with partner countries to train forces there. The 4th SFAB similarly operates between the “Baltics and the Black Sea” and, as of September 2022, had 19 teams of military advisers in 10 European countries.</p> +<p>The experts had deep concerns about detectability and blowback. One U.S. military leader at the level of general or higher stated the importance of intelligence tradecraft: “If we do this, can they trace it back to us? Is there something inherently identifying that is traceable back to us?”</p> -<p>Forces from the 4th SFAB have also been involved in the training of Ukrainian personnel. However, that effort has been led by the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) under the direction of the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U). National Guard units, including a New York State BCT, have trained Ukrainian forces under the JMTG-U to great effect. Where possible, the United States should increase its training of Ukrainian units and personnel to strengthen their ability to withstand and counter further Russian aggression. This should be complemented by an expansion of training programs with the militaries of the Baltic states and other relevant Eastern flank states to defend against hybrid Russian threats. Special operations forces may also provide civil defense training practices to those populations in the event of a heightened or resurgent Russian threat.</p> +<p>Another U.S. military leader said the amount of blowback “should be linked to the approval process all the way up to the NSC.” Simply put, a deepfake, especially one of a foreign leader, may need very high levels of approval up to the highest levels of the U.S. government. He went on to posit a hypothetical scenario: “Suppose a Silicon Valley firm releases a deepfake of Xi Jinping. What about his reaction? They would blame the USA. This is coming.” This suggests the need for a more compelling set of guardrails against corporate and individual use of deepfakes to target foreign states or their leaders.</p> -<p>However, the United States should also take steps to ensure greater coordination among its various security cooperation efforts in Eastern Europe. The Department of Defense (DOD) should assign one entity to lead and manage security cooperation missions in the region to ensure the efficient allocation of units and resources.</p> +<p>In contrast, a former senior White House and NSC lawyer stated, “If a covert action finding had previously been approved, then the CIA alone would decide if deepfakes should be used.” Speaking on the same topic, a non-U.S. military leader said, “Who created the deepfake doesn’t matter. It is about who is endorsing and authenticating it.” Thus, in the case of a Silicon Valley company releasing a deepfake, the military leader suggested the U.S. government should not endorse the deepfake or distribute it in any way, even if it represents a reality. Perhaps, in this case, the U.S. government’s immediate action should be to disavow the corporate deepfake and immediately take action to hold those responsible to account to the fullest extent of the law.</p> -<h4 id="air-combat-forces">AIR COMBAT FORCES</h4> +<h4 id="who-should-manage-a-deepfake-equities-process">Who Should Manage a Deepfake Equities Process?</h4> -<p>Air capabilities are critical to achieve U.S. defense objectives, including deterring and defeating armed conflict, countering terrorist and other transnational threats, and maintaining access to trade routes and global commons. Russia has considerable air and air defense capabilities, such as the S-400, which would undermine the United States’ ability to gain air supremacy in a war.</p> +<p>The above questions are important to ask — but equally important is who is asking them. Democratic countries should create a deepfake equities commission (DEC) to weigh the answers to these questions. The following is a discussion of how this might work in the United States.</p> -<p>For future U.S. posture, there are several important categories of air assets. First, fixed-wing aircraft, such as F-35, F-16, and F-15 squadrons, are helpful for conducting close air support, suppression of enemy air defense, combat air patrol, defensive counter air, strike, and other missions. So are bombers, such as the B-52H Stratofortress and B-21 Raider, which can be useful to attack ground and naval targets. Second, ISR capabilities are important for intelligence and warning. Examples include unmanned aircraft systems (such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-9A, and MQ-9B); airborne early warning and command and control (such as the E-8 Joint STARS, E-3 Sentry, and E-7); and electronic warfare. Along with space capabilities, persistent aerial ISR is critical to collect intelligence, including communications and electronic intelligence. Third are enablers, including transport (such as the C-17 and C-130), aerial refueling (such as the KC-135 and KC-46), and medical evacuation. Fourth are logistics, such as stockpiling spare parts and munitions, personnel, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants.</p> +<p>The DEC should be a White House–run interagency working group chaired by an NSC senior director. It should include one representative from each of the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and Treasury as well as a representative from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to ensure that different perspectives are brought together. In addition to these national security and legal perspectives, it is necessary to bring in representatives who can weigh the domestic effects — something outside the traditional national security realm — which may require bringing in an appropriately cleared representative from civil society to represent the public interest.</p> -<p>Global posture considerations play a major role in recommendations for the air domain in Europe given the value of air combat capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater. Consequently, a forward defense posture that enhances deterrence should ensure flexibility in the air domain to surge forces to the Indo-Pacific if necessary. It also means that the United States needs to be prepared to accept some risk that can be mitigated through allied capabilities.</p> +<p>Because of the novelty of deepfakes and their potentially broad effects on the American people, any recommendation for deepfake use by the U.S. government should be approved by the president. Should deepfake use become more common, it is plausible there may be established categories for use that are preapproved, but for the initial stages and possibly beyond, their importance and the precedent they might set require the highest level of approval. Similarly, if deepfakes are used as part of an ongoing conflict, authority may be delegated to the secretary of defense or another high-ranking subordinate until clear use categories are established.</p> -<p>In terms of air combat capabilities, a forward defense posture includes maintaining all seven forward-deployed fighter squadrons currently based in Europe and adding an additional F-16 squadron to Spangdahlem Air Base. Four squadrons are based at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath in the United Kingdom under the 48th Fighter Air Wing, including two squadrons of F-35A aircraft and 2 F-15E squadrons. Two squadrons of F-16 aircraft are stationed at Aviano Air Base in Italy under the 31st Fighter Wing, and one additional F-16 squadron is currently stationed at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany under the 52nd Fighter Wing. While stationed out of their respective bases, these units have often been forward deployed to NATO’s eastern flank to provide additional posture amid the war in Ukraine.</p> +<p>Other countries will have different institutional arrangements, but the same basic principles should hold. Different parts of the government representing different commercial and security perspectives should be brought together, as should individuals representing the informational health of the polity. Because of the novelty and potential impact of deepfakes, the top elected official, such as the prime minister in countries with a parliamentary system of government, should approve their use.</p> -<p>Forward-stationed forces are supplemented by deployments of U.S.-based fighter aircraft to enhance the United States’ forward posture, increasing in the lead-up to and throughout the Ukraine conflict. These supplemental units have included active-duty, reserve, and Air National Guard F-35 units operating out of Spangdahlem Air Base and forward-deployed to allied air bases on the eastern flank in support of NATO Enhanced Air Policing Missions, as well as U.S.-based F-22 and fourth-generation aircraft.</p> +<p>When a situation arises where use of a deepfake might be considered, the relevant agency should present the use case, with particular detail not only on the immediate effects but also on the potential blowback to the home country’s people, allies, and the credibility of the government should the deepfake use be discovered. For example, if the goal is to discredit a foreign military official, the Department of Defense might propose a deepfake. The scenario would not only outline the content of the deepfake and its anticipated effects on the adversary’s military but also how it might shape public opinion inadvertently in the United States (or the home country contemplating deepfake use) and in allied countries. Officials from other agencies would weigh in on its legality, diplomatic consequences, and other ramifications. The designated official representing U.S. public opinion would also weigh how dangerous the information would be if it infected domestic discussion. Other officials might review its necessity, as there may be more traditional cyber or other operations that have a more established precedent that could achieve the same intended effects. Finally, all involved officials would discuss the implications for other policy goals if the United States were associated with deliberately promulgating false information.</p> -<p>Forward-deployed F-35 squadrons enhance the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces to establish air superiority against robust and experienced Russian integrated air defense systems (IADS). F-35 aircraft can also collect electronic signals from and compile a picture of hostile and friendly forces in an area. However, given requirements for the Indo-Pacific region, adding another F-35 squadron to the two currently stationed at RAF Lakenheath is not optimal.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Instead, this analysis recommends forward stationing an additional F-16 squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base to provide greater short-term combat capacity as allied F-35 squadrons come online. Additional permanently based fifth-generation squadrons in Europe may be more likely to come as future replacements for the Air Force’s F-15E squadrons, which the service plans to cut by more than half by 2028. F-16 fighters, such as those currently based at Spangdahlem and Aviano Air Bases, will likely continue to serve into the 2040s. However, U.S. Air Forces in Europe should supplement these aircraft with deployments of U.S.-based fifth-generation squadrons of fighter aircraft — either F-35 or F-22 aircraft — as demanded by the threat environment.</p> +<p>Deepfakes are a new information tool, and it is important to think about their use and consequences now rather than wait to cobble together a policy following haphazard usage by U.S. government agencies or allied entities. This process is particularly important as deepfakes have profound consequences for the long-term credibility of any government and can shape and potentially worsen domestic political debates.</p> -<p>As previously discussed, ACE will continue to play a vital role in maximizing the flexibility and survivability of forward-deployed fighter aircraft. ACE will require U.S. aircraft and pilots to operate and rapidly deploy from forward operating sites on allied and partner airfields as part of a hub-and-spoke system. These sites should be “light, lean, and agile,” as noted by General CQ Brown. However, the Air Force needs to ensure that its dispersed sites are equipped with adequate prepositioned equipment and war reserve materiel, including scalable logistics packages, resilient communications, command and control, munitions, spare parts, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants; are resilient from missile and cyber attacks; have adequate infrastructure for storing munitions, fuel, and other materiel; and have forces trained for quick response to enemy missile attacks, including runway repair and medical care.</p> +<p>Although it is tempting to simply declare that a government will never use deepfakes, their potential power and reach make them attractive tools. Governments, however, may want to act — at times, for the best reasons — without thinking through the long-term implications of deepfake use. Thus, deepfakes must have a set of rules and criteria to guide their use and ensure governments are considering all relevant factors and long-term as well as short-term perspectives. For these rules to work in practice, governments must draw on a range of perspectives, including those beyond the traditional national security realm, when discussing deepfake use. Although the authors have presented some initial criteria, rich debate and observations on the use of deepfakes in practice by other governments will inform how to weigh these factors and what to add to ensure robust practice.</p> -<p>To further maximize flexibility, U.S. air combat forces based in or deployed to Europe must also be prepared to surge to the Indo-Pacific in the event of a contingency. The Air Force has already leveraged EUCOM assets to fill capability gaps in the Indo-Pacific with the temporary transfer of F-16 aircraft from the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base to Kadena Air Base in Japan amid the return of its F-15C/D fighter aircraft to the United States. The Air Force and NATO must prepare plans to fill its own capability gaps in the event of further transfers.</p> +<h3 id="appendix">Appendix</h3> -<h4 id="naval-forces">NAVAL FORCES</h4> +<p>A deepfake of a computational artifact (e.g., an image, a piece of text, or an audio or video clip) is a synthetic version of the artifact that is generated using advanced AI techniques. Machine learning classifiers have been trained for well over a decade to distinguish between real and fake artifacts. Since 2017, new generative AI techniques have created increasingly hard-to-detect fakes.</p> -<p>To achieve defense objectives in Europe, the United States will likely need several types of maritime capabilities led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe-U.S. Sixth Fleet. Maritime capabilities will be helpful to deter and defeat conventional armed conflict, counter irregular and gray zone activities, maintain access to trade routes and global commons (including in the Arctic), and other objectives. The Russian navy possesses significant maritime capabilities, such as submarines, and it has added the Project 955A Borey-A nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and the Project 08851 Yasen-M nuclear-powered guided missile submarine to its fleet. European maritime capabilities, as previously discussed, are likely lacking in large-scale combat, given qualitative shortfalls in sensors, weapons, force protection, and survivability systems as well as due to manning, maintenance, and procurement challenges for some navies.</p> +<p>One popular technique, generative adversarial networks (GANs), considers the generation of fakes in terms of a game: A generator module in the GAN generates fake artifacts, while a discriminator module (a machine learning classifier) in the GAN tries to detect which of a set of artifacts (both real and fake) are fake. The discriminator reports the results, which the generator then uses as feedback to generate better fakes. This iterative process (generate-discriminate-feedback, generate-discriminate-feedback, and so on) continues until an equilibrium is reached and neither the generator nor the discriminator can substantially improve at its task in subsequent iterations. Numerous organizations worldwide have adapted and improved GANs and other AI techniques, such as Stable Diffusion, providing ready access to a huge number of AI tools capable of generating deepfakes for a wide variety of multimodal artifacts.</p> -<p>To fully leverage its naval capabilities in Europe and compensate for the shortcomings of allied and partner militaries, the United States should expand operations, port visits, and exercises in partnership with allied and partner forces and consider investments in future capabilities to deploy to Europe. However, the United States also needs to pursue flexibility and mitigate risk in its posture given requirements in the Indo-Pacific theater.</p> +<p>Table 1 presents a range of artifacts and generation tools that could be used to generate different kinds of deepfake content.</p> -<p>The U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Naples, Italy, conducts and oversees naval operations in the European theater. The Sixth Fleet maintains six destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain, as part of Task Force 65. These destroyers play a critical role in NATO’s ballistic missile defense mission under Operation Atlantic Sentry. The vessels also conduct regular Forward-Deployed Naval Forces-Europe (FDNF-E) patrols throughout the Sixth Fleet area of operations to conduct port visits and strengthen interoperability with allied and partner forces. In addition to the destroyer presence at Rota, the United States also conducts regular carrier strike group deployments and occasional amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit deployments, the latter of which falls under the Sixth Fleet’s Task Force 61/2.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e89F69s.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>Table 1: Well-Known Synthetic Computational Artifact Generation Tools</em></p> -<p>To achieve a posture of forward defense in the European area of operations, the United States should enhance its naval presence in the Baltic Sea region with small surface combatants and unmanned vessels through 2030 to reassure and improve interoperability with allies and partners in the region and to deter potential acts of Russian aggression. Russia still maintains a sizeable presence in the region. In 2022, the Swedish government requested a strengthened U.S. naval posture in the region. U.S. ships should conduct more frequent port visits, including both FDNF-E patrols and deployments of U.S.-based assets, as well as bilateral and multilateral exercises.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The United States must also act in coordination with its NATO allies to tackle several mission sets. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) remains a critical mission, both in the Baltic and North Seas, which has been much neglected. NATO has consequently increased its joint ASW exercises among allied forces, including Operation Dynamic Mongoose in the North Atlantic in 2022 and Dynamic Manta off the coast of Italy in 2023.</p> +<p><strong>Daniel Byman</strong> is a senior fellow with the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and director of the Security Studies Program. He is the foreign policy editor for Lawfare and a part-time senior adviser to the Department of State on the International Security Advisory Board.</p> -<p>The U.S. Navy could supplement existing NATO ASW capabilities by developing and deploying additional systems to the region. One option is homeporting the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, which has ASW capabilities, in German ports to provide improved situational awareness in the Baltics. Given the Navy’s apparent commitment to retire the Littoral Combat Ship, it could deploy its Constellation-class frigates, which also have ASW capabilities, to the region once they are operational beginning in 2027. However, operational requirements for the presence of surface ships and submarines in the Indo-Pacific should take priority over Baltic deployments.</p> +<p><strong>Daniel W. Linna Jr.</strong> has a joint appointment at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law and McCormick School of Engineering as a senior lecturer and the director of law and technology initiatives. Dan’s teaching and research focus on innovation and technology, including the use of artificial intelligence and data analytics to improve legal-services delivery as well as the law, regulation, and governance of computational technologies.</p> -<p>Given Indo-Pacific demands for naval forces, the Navy could also leverage its developing unmanned surface and undersea vessels for ASW and additional missions in the Baltic Sea. Pioneered under the Fifth Fleet’s Task Force 59 in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the Navy recently announced its intention to deploy these capabilities to the broader fleet beginning with Fourth Fleet under U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in the summer of 2023. The United States and partners should also increase their number of sonobuoys and static hydrophone networks to track the subsurface threat.</p> +<p><strong>V. S. Subrahmanian</strong> is the Walter P. Murphy Professor of Computer Science and a faculty fellow in the Buffett Institute for Global Affairs at Northwestern University. He is an expert on probabilistic and machine learning based methods to analyze text/geospatial/relational/social network data, learn behavioral models from the data, forecast actions, and influence behaviors.</p>Daniel Byman, et al.What questions should governments ask — and who in government should be asking them — when a deepfake is being considered?Diplomacy Through Defence2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/diplomacy-through-defence<p><em>With enthusiasm for Defence Engagement seemingly waning, how can Defence ensure that it is contributing to UK influence around the globe?</em></p> -<p>The U.S. Navy and NATO allies should additionally prioritize three maritime missions in the Baltic region: hybrid gray zone operations, offensive and defensive mining, and missile defense and suppression. They must develop a plan to tackle hybrid threats to undersea cables and pipelines and other infrastructure that could disrupt the flow of commerce, energy, and data. This is critical to managing escalation and preventing Russia from destabilizing the region. Furthermore, the United States and NATO should plan to leverage the extensive mining and demining capabilities of new members Finland and Sweden in the event of a possible contingency with Russia that threatens naval deployments and the commercial shipping of partners and allies. Finally, the United States and NATO must anticipate the use of anti-ship cruise missiles in a potential conflict with Russia and seek to neutralize this threat through the coordination of the Baltic Air Policing mission and Allied Maritime Command.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>As the Navy expands its mission set and presence in the Baltic and North Seas, it should strengthen its forward posture by considering homeporting vessels in the region or establishing logistical points to resupply, given the distance from existing sites in Spain, Italy, and Crete. While this would require significant diplomatic outreach, the Navy could explore the possibility of establishing sites at existing ports or naval bases in Germany, Denmark, or other allied states.</p> +<p>Although Defence Diplomacy became a Defence Task in 1998, Defence Engagement (DE) only emerged in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Concerns about warfighting were being displaced by “the realities and uncertainties of the 21st century” and a desire to target the causes of national security risks, rather than managing the consequences. DE would “shap(e) the environment, promoting the rules-based international order and preventing instability”. The 2015 Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) definition of DE – “using assets (short of combat operations) to generate influence” – rapidly expanded to include “capacity building, access, information and conflict prevention”, typically through High Level Engagements, Short Term Training Teams and Subject Matter Expert exchanges. Over time, “Engagement” became an accepted principle of UK security and a byword for the softer influence that Defence sought to exert through its operations around the world.</p> -<p>In the Black Sea, the United States must work with its NATO allies and partners in the region to enhance its maritime domain awareness. The United States and the NATO alliance should encourage regional partners to cooperate and modernize their military capabilities, including by strengthening sea power in ways that are consistent with the Montreux Convention. The United States should also increase engagement with allied and partner militaries in the region. This could include seeking a more active partnership with the Turkish military in the Black Sea as part of a broader agreement to improve U.S.-Turkish strategic cooperation on a handful of key issues.</p> +<p>A lot has changed. Despite there being clear water between DE and combat operations at its inception, the move to “Persistent Engagement” (PE) has seen a rapid growth in more kinetic partnerships focused on areas such as constraining poaching, drug trafficking and violent extremist organisations. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, warfighting is again the issue of the day. The Army has shrunk by 21%, becoming more stretched than ever. There is a frustration that DE hasn’t delivered, and it seems to be being side-lined; when the House of Commons Defence Committee recommended updating the JDN last year, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) response did not even include the term , referring only to Defence Diplomacy. The 2018 DE budget was £80 million, with the potential for more from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). By 2022–3, only £3.6 million was explicitly linked to it. Yet the requirement is still being articulated; the first characteristic of the “Engage” function in the Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC) is “assuring influence”. Accordingly, some force elements still appear firmly committed to DE; the Defence Medical Services have a significant DE-specific budget, UKStratCom has a regular 2* DE steering group, and a recent think tank meeting heard that “50% of the Fleet undertook DE activity in 2023”.</p> -<p>The Arctic represents another vital region for U.S. maritime interests. The United States should expand its capabilities and posture in the Arctic through the U.S. Coast Guard. The 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region outlined security as one of its four strategic pillars for the region. The strategy called for “expanding the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker fleet to support persistent presence in the U.S. Arctic and additional presence as needed in the European Arctic.” The primary goal of U.S. forces in the region is to support the homeland defense mission as well as power-projection and deterrence goals, alongside safeguarding commercial and scientific activities. While the strategy primarily emphasizes the need to deter aggression from Russia in the Arctic, it also notes expanded Chinese activities there. Russia seeks to maintain its economic interests, such as oil and gas megaprojects, in the region while leveraging the Arctic for greater power projection and potentially hybrid activities to threaten European Arctic countries. Russia currently operates more than 40 icebreakers. China has increased its presence and posture in the Arctic, maintaining three research sites in Svalbard, Iceland, and Sweden and operating two icebreakers, with a third under development.</p> +<p>DE’s problems lay not in the concept of leveraging influence to prevent and resist security threats. It lay in the definition of “influence”. There simply wasn’t one, even in the eponymous JDN. Even the IOpC didn’t define it, despite stating that we would “develop”, “regain”, “project”, “assure” (x2) and “secure” it. This recently led a Global Defence Network (GDN) colleague to say that it was “undefinable”. Lacking a clear “theory of victory” around influence, how could Defence construct strategies to deliver it, or know if it had? Unsurprisingly, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office concluded in 2021 that there was no viable means of measuring it – a real problem given “there are hard choices to be made. Not least where, how and when engagement offers political access and value”.</p> -<p>The United States should seek to expand its Arctic posture and capabilities as rapidly as possible to counter Russian and Chinese security interests in the region. Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard only operates two icebreakers, the heavy cutter Polar Star and the medium cutter Healy, neither of which can be used for all-year Arctic icebreaking missions. The Coast Guard plans to expand its icebreaking fleet with the procurement of three heavy Polar Security Cutters (PSCs), although delays have pushed the delivery of the first vessel back to 2026 or 2027, and three medium Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs). In 2021, then-commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard Karl Schultz called for a fleet of nine total icebreakers (six PSCs and three ASCs). As the United States awaits delivery of its new vessels, it should seek to enhance cooperation with Arctic allies through joint operations and combined exercises and training.</p> +<p>As DE fell out of favour, Strategic Communication (StratCom) made a strong bid for ownership of the elusive influence. In 2019, the UK’s StratCom doctrine reframed all activity – physical or information – as contributing to influence. This led to a meaningful NATO definition of influence in 2023: “effects on the perception, attitudes and behaviours of an audience … achieved deliberately by information and communication activities, or as a second and third order effect of all activities”. It also became the central pillar of the concept of Orchestrated Military Strategic Effects (OMSE).</p> -<h4 id="logistics-and-enablers">LOGISTICS AND ENABLERS</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Defence Engagement’s focus should firmly be on actors who do not yet support UK interests effectively – either shaping their intent to support the UK, building their capacity to do so, or both</code></em></strong></p> -<p>This section examines several types of logistics and enablers, including prepositioned equipment and munitions stockpiles, ISR, integrated air and missile defense, and infrastructure and mobility.</p> +<p>There is, however, a big problem with this approach. All doctrine (including OMSE) has consistently implied that influence modifies behaviour – be it voting a certain way in the UN General Assembly, choosing a trade partner or being deterred from a course of action. Behavioural science (the well-established academic field relating to behavioural change) has a fundamental rule that the desire to change is inadequate by itself. Without capacity – the necessary tools, know-how and permissions (individual, cultural and legal), intent cannot translate to action. Motivation and capacity together result in change. So StratCom’s changes in perceptions and motivation are inadequate for the task on their own. Capacity is measurable and can be built up if insufficient – just not by StratCom.</p> -<p><strong>Prepositioned Equipment and Munitions Stockpiles:</strong> The United States should take steps to bolster its prepositioned equipment and munitions stocks in Europe to enhance the readiness of U.S. forces in the event of a contingency with Russia. The Army maintains its Army Prepositioned Stock-2 (APS-2) across four sites in three different countries (Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands), with a fifth APS-2 site planned for Poland. These sites, operated by the 405th Army Field Support Brigade, contain enough materiel to equip two ABCTs. The Army issued some of this stock in March 2022 to the 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While APS-2 stocks have been bolstered by funding from the European Deterrence Initiative, the Army should take additional steps to improve the readiness of this equipment and the forces overseeing it. A DOD inspector general investigation found that some materiel provided from APS-2 was “non-fully mission capable” and that “maintenance and coordination shortfalls occurred.” In the event of a direct conflict against Russia, U.S. forces arriving in theater must be assured that they will receive capable equipment to rapidly equip and engage the enemy.</p> +<p>The other contender for the now-vacant throne of DE is the related concept of PE. Certainly, PE would seem to be an effective tool for capacity building, at least in terms of the tools and know-how. While PE readily enhances access and counter-adversary activities at the tactical and operational levels, it is not clear that it increases public or international influence (needed to “grant permission” for change). It also tends to be single service-led, and so one wonders how well it can ever truly be coordinated by a centralised StratCom function to meet the demands of OMSE.</p> -<p>In addition to enhancing prepositioned equipment, the DOD must ensure that EUCOM is maintaining appropriate inventories of munitions in the region. The war in Ukraine has illustrated the role of long-range artillery, and U.S. and NATO forces must have enough missiles and munitions in theater to contend with and counter Russian forces. That includes munitions for the Air Force, which must develop plans to maintain weapons for aircraft operating under the ACE concept at forward locations, and the Army EUCOM’s munitions starter stocks, which preposition key munitions — including Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement — in Europe for use in the event of a contingency. Additionally, EUCOM should seek to reinforce and build additional facilities to store munitions to distribute across the theater for easier access and enhanced survivability.</p> +<p>So, the UK’s current approach may still be a missing a vital element. What needs to change to fill that gap? First, Defence needs to be very clear about what the Engage space is for. If it truly includes shaping the behaviours of potential allies and adversaries alike, then it must implement a whole-system approach to doing so, ensuring all the apposite instruments (Global Defence Network, UK StratCom, Intelligence, Special Forces and the Single Services) are involved at every stage. Next, there needs to be an evidence-based articulation of how military activities can engender relevant changes in behaviour, not just perception. Lastly, a robust assessment, monitoring and evaluation framework must be in place so that Defence understands the cost, benefit and what works – the ESCAPADE database was simply not up to the task. DE struggled with all of these, but there is little sign that newer approaches are addressing them any better.</p> -<p><strong>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:</strong> The demand for U.S. ISR assets will only increase as the U.S. military expands missions and operations in the Indo-Pacific and the Russian military reconstitutes its capabilities on NATO’s eastern flank. While the United States should prioritize the Indo-Pacific, the DOD should maximize its available ISR assets for use by both EUCOM and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). The DOD is currently seeking to modernize its ISR capabilities, with plans to retire the RQ-4 by FY 2027 and the MQ-9 by FY 2035. However, the DOD and the services must ensure that any gaps in ISR coverage are limited. This could be managed by timing the retirement of certain platforms to coincide with the activation of new assets. Alternatively, the DOD could leverage commercial capabilities to cover any gaps until requirements are established and new platforms are deployed.</p> +<p>The targets of the activities might change too. Why invest in the ability to modify the behaviour of an ally who already routinely supports UK interests? That is not to say that Defence should ignore them, but rather that it should focus on reinforcing interoperability and demonstrating the UK’s commitment to mutual support – a different set of activities entirely. DE’s focus should firmly be on actors who do not yet support UK interests effectively – either shaping their intent to support the UK, building their capacity to do so, or both. This requires Security, Policy and Operations to clearly articulate and prioritise desired behavioural changes, something it has not always managed.</p> -<p>The Army is currently testing commercial assets in operations in Europe under its High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES) to define the requirements for the replacement for the RC-12 Guardrail aircraft.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Defence must be certain that it is happy to lose Defence Engagement’s strategic influence function, and if it is not, it needs to act; the UK’s adversaries are absolutely not prevaricating in this space</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Space-based ISR assets will play a major role in both covering gaps and supplementing ISR provided by traditional airborne assets. Commercial satellite imagery has already been used by NATO to fill gaps in coverage and played a major role in identifying Russian military movements in the lead-up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the next few years, the United States should further leverage commercial satellite imagery to bolster its ISR capabilities in Europe. Over the long term, however, the DOD must ultimately determine the appropriate balance between leasing commercial services and establishing its own systems to ensure sustainable and reliable coverage.</p> +<p>Perhaps most importantly, existing expertise in behavioural change and capacity building must be exploited and developed. Involvement of the reserves should be routine, as should introduction of (and handover to) the civilian institutions that hold much of the UK’s national soft power (and which are often resourced with international engagement in mind). Further professionalising the DE career will serve to act as a recruitment and retention tool, boost the capacity to iterate and develop, and establish the UK as a world leader in the field (which would itself offer DE opportunities).</p> -<p><strong>Integrated Air and Missile Defense:</strong> Some changes to U.S. air and missile defense posture should be made in the event that some of the recommendations here are adopted, including the permanent basing of an ABCT in Poland. If a new base is established, the United States should consider shifting the headquarters of the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command from Rhine Ordnance Barracks in Germany. A new base in Poland would require a significant investment in air and missile defense capabilities given its proximity to Russia. If the Army chooses not to move the entire command to Poland, it should prioritize shifting the battalion headquarters of the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, which provides command and control operations of Patriot batteries, and the 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment and its short-range air defense capabilities.</p> +<p>So, what of DE in 2024? Defence seems uncertain. Has it simply rebranded DE, believing that influence is completely captured between effects-based StratCom and PE? Or has it decided to limit its contribution to UK influence, falling back on the excellent work of the Defence Attaché network and reinvesting the resources into other subthreshold operations? The concern must be that, by just culling DE without the right mechanism to replace it, Defence will simply go back to 2010 – recognising that the UK possesses dwindling hard power and is in need of reliable partners, but uncertain about how to court them. Defence must be certain that it is happy to lose DE’s strategic influence function, and if it is not, it needs to act; the UK’s adversaries are absolutely not prevaricating in this space. Addressing the flaws of DE though a prioritised, coordinated and evidence-based approach to behavioural change (which would include PE and StratCom) should deliver the Engage/Constrain effects that Defence seeks. Ignoring them will simply propagate the problems; OMSE will fail and be replaced at the next SDSR by another concept with the same problems, while the UK continues to fret over the increasing gap between its influence and that of its adversaries.</p> -<p>From a broader force-planning perspective, however, the Army should prioritize the deployment of additional Patriot battalions, which operate at the highest OPTEMPO of Army units and are in high demand from multiple combatant commands. Given their value in potential conflicts with China and Russia, the Army should create additional units to limit the stress and degradation of readiness of existing units, particularly given the lack of European capabilities in this area.</p> +<hr /> -<p>In terms of ballistic missile defense, the United States should also maintain its current posture and force structure in line with Operation Atlantic Sentry. Relevant units include the six Aegis destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain, along with the two Aegis Ashore sites based in Romania and Poland.</p> +<p><strong>Si Horne</strong> is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. An Army Emergency Medicine doctor, he has supported operations in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and South Sudan as well as serving as the Emergency Medicine lead for the Army.</p> -<p><strong>Infrastructure, Mobility, and Access:</strong> The United States, in partnership with host nations and other NATO allies, should also take steps to improve military infrastructure and mobility to ensure ease of access, transportation, and reliable communications throughout the European theater. These include enhancements to infrastructure on both U.S. bases and in partner countries, such as the installation of fiber-optic cables and improvements to rail, road networks, and bridges. The DOD and European Defence Agency have identified military mobility as one area of collaboration under an Administrative Arrangement reached in April 2023 (see security cooperation section below).</p> +<p><strong>Ian Gurney</strong> is a British Army Medical Officer and has served in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan and South Sudan (UN Tour).</p>Si Horne and Ian GurneyWith enthusiasm for Defence Engagement seemingly waning, how can Defence ensure that it is contributing to UK influence around the globe?【黎智英案・審訊第卌二日】2024-03-11T12:00:00+08:002024-03-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-42<ul> + <li>楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時轉變對華政策、落井下石是好時機</li> +</ul> -<p>The United States should also continue to update its security and defense cooperation agreements with its partners and allies to ensure ease of access. In December 2023, the United States reached new agreements with Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that provided U.S. forces with access to bases and other infrastructure in those countries.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="nuclear-posture">NUCLEAR POSTURE</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/8EtMi8U.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>The United States should continue with planned nuclear modernization efforts, exercises, and scheduled deployments of assets to the European theater to bolster its deterrent capabilities and reassure allies. The United States currently deploys 100 tactical bombs — the B61-3 and B61-4 gravity bombs — in air bases in Europe across five countries. Under current U.S. nuclear-sharing policy, control over those bombs is maintained by the U.S. Air Force, but seven countries contribute dual-capable aircraft to the mission (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and the United States) and four air forces (from Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy) are assigned an active nuclear strike role with those weapons in the event that a nuclear mission is approved.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第42日審訊。前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊早前證供提及，2018年時任總統彭斯演講時提及美國對華政策，黎認為「美國反檯」，自此政治立場變得激進。楊表示以他的理解，黎認為國家主席習近平「係比較弱勢」，美國在這個時機轉變對華政策，是一個好時機，訊息紀錄亦顯示，黎曾向楊稱「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石」。楊又指黎曾經是一個成功的商人，辦報紙時擅長把握形勢和讀者的需要，當時見到美國對華政策的改變，都會調整報紙立場。楊指在2019年反修例期間，《蘋果》經常以「今日上街，明日上街」作為標題，並在報導和評論中落實「和勇不分」和「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」原則。</p> -<p>The United States is currently in the process of modernizing its gravity bombs, with the new B61-12 having begun full-scale production in 2022 and deployment originally planned for the spring of 2023.</p> +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第六天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤繼續主問。</p> -<p>A range of U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft will be certified to operate the B61-12, including the F-15E, F-35A, F-16, B-2, and German PA-200 Tornado (currently planned to be retired and replaced by the F-35A by 2030).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/s5bxOG9.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> -<p>NATO is also modernizing its nuclear weapons storage facilities, including making upgrades to command and control structures and base security.</p> +<h4 id="蘋果論壇版曾刊登有關加拿大救生艇文章-楊清奇指香港監察關注港人權">《蘋果》論壇版曾刊登有關加拿大救生艇文章 楊清奇指「香港監察」關注港人權</h4> -<p>The U.S. military and NATO should also continue to conduct exercises with nuclear-capable platforms, including Bomber Task Force missions, to enhance readiness and assure allies of U.S. support. These include the annual NATO Steadfast Noon exercise, which practices nuclear sharing. However, such exercises should occur on a regularly scheduled timeline to ensure consistency and limit the potential for escalation with or misinterpretation by Russia. There is no evidence that unscheduled Bomber Task Force deployments conducted under the dynamic force employment model offered additional deterrent value, particularly given the still lengthy amount of time necessary to organize such missions.</p> +<p>控方向楊清奇展示數篇曾刊登於《蘋果》的評論文章，其中一篇在2020年11月24日刊登於報紙論壇版的文章〈加拿大加入救生艇計劃〉，由「香港監察」高級政策顧問 Sam Goodman 撰寫。</p> -<h4 id="cyber-and-space">CYBER AND SPACE</h4> +<p>楊表示記得這篇文章是由同事交給他的，相信 Sam Goodman 提供了中英文版本。控方遂展示時任英文版主筆盧峯（馮偉光）與楊清奇之間的訊息紀錄，盧峯指「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）轉交其同事 Sam Goodman 的文章，並提供了中英文版本。盧峯並表示英文版會刊登，問楊清奇是否有興趣在中文論壇版刊登。</p> -<p>In the cyber and space domains, U.S. forces should take steps to enhance the security and resilience of their own systems and networks while simultaneously assisting European partners and allies in securing their own capabilities. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) should deploy additional “hunt forward” teams to Europe in line with its “defend forward” strategy to counter threats from Russia and Russian-backed groups to U.S. forces and allies. CYBERCOM deployed its largest hunt forward team to Ukraine between 2021 and 2022. To capably resource further deployments and ensure readiness, CYBERCOM should also seek to expand the number of cyber mission teams across the services.</p> +<p>楊表示，以他所知羅傑斯是「香港監察」的負責人，其文章曾被刊登於《蘋果》英文版，中文版則沒有印象。控方遂展示羅傑斯的文章〈Aversion to Beijing’s bellicose diplomacy is escalating in Europe（歐洲對北京戰狼外交政策反感俱增）〉，刊登於《蘋果》英文版網站。楊指「佢個機構都係比較關注香港人權嘅」，至於羅傑斯的寫作角度，楊則稱沒有留意他的文章，未能回答到此問題。</p> -<p>The United States should further define its authorities for and consider expanding its conduct of offensive cyber operations against Russian forces, particularly in the event that the conflict in Ukraine and Russian cyberattacks persist. The United States should also expand deployments of U.S. Space Force units and personnel to Europe and define their role within NATO. The service is currently standing up its own component to operate in EUCOM. Space Force units can play a major role in supporting forward-deployed U.S. forces by preventing enemy interference and maintaining open lines of satellite communication. Additionally, space-based ISR assets will continue to play a major role in the European theater, and the U.S. military should also further leverage commercial capabilities to fill gaps.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇稱對方鄺頌晴寫作角度無印象">楊清奇稱對方鄺頌晴寫作角度無印象</h4> -<p>Finally, U.S. forces should enhance redundancy, in addition to improving the resilience of U.S. assets and networks in terms of both software and hardware. Establishing clear fallback options for communications and ISR in the event of a contingency is vital to ensuring the survivability of networks.</p> +<p>控方續展示由鄺頌晴（Glacier Kwong）撰寫的文章〈Why people reckon upon Germany speaking up against human rights violations〉，在2021年1月28日刊於《蘋果》英文版網站。</p> -<h4 id="security-cooperation">SECURITY COOPERATION</h4> +<p>楊表示「我唔認識呢個作者嘅」，只是間中見到她的文章在英文版刊出。至於鄺的寫作角度，楊亦表示「無特別印象」。</p> -<p>In addition to maintaining and bolstering traditional partner capacity-building efforts, the DOD, in tandem with EUCOM and the U.S. Department of State, should adopt a broader approach to security cooperation in the region. This would entail supporting the efforts of NATO allies and other European partners to develop and acquire advanced military capabilities and lessen their reliance on U.S. units and platforms, particularly enabling forces that support operations.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指前眾新聞主筆楊健興支持新聞自由">楊清奇指前《眾新聞》主筆楊健興支持新聞自由</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b1N9P6o.png" alt="image14" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6.2: U.S. Nuclear Posture in Europe.</strong> Source: Compiled based on data from Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, Federation of American Scientists, 2023, and Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection, Nuclear Threat Initiative.</em></p> +<p>控方提及已停運的《眾新聞》前主筆楊健興所撰寫的文章〈National Security Law targets small but hits big〉，在2021年3月31日刊登於《蘋果》英文版網站。</p> -<p>As part of this effort, the DOD should consider standing up a new organization within EUCOM to coordinate broader U.S. security cooperation efforts in Europe. This organization should have representation from the services, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and work closely with the Department of State. It would directly interface with NATO headquarters and allied militaries to manage requests for security assistance and arms sales, as well as provide guidance on the development of new capabilities, as needed. The organization’s objective would be to bolster allied and partner capacity by focusing on closing quantitative and qualitative gaps within European militaries that drive their reliance on U.S. forces in some areas. It could also pursue greater coordination and information sharing between the United States and European allies in the development of new technologies and capabilities, thereby ensuring interoperability.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dhgmnRP.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 楊健興（資料圖片）</p> -<p>The DOD has already taken some steps to bolster cooperation efforts and information sharing with European partners in its April 2023 Administrative Arrangement reached with the European Defence Agency (EDA). The agreement provides a framework for the United States and EDA to “exchange information and explore collaborative activities falling within the scope of EDA’s mission,” with a focus on areas including supply chain issues, military mobility, and the impact of climate change on defense activities. However, the terms of the agreement specifically preclude “research and technology” from the scope of the arrangement.</p> +<p>楊清奇指，楊健興是當時的記協主席，在《蘋果》中文論壇版是自由撰稿人，他一般會就新聞事件邀請楊健興撰稿，「佢係好強調新聞自由，好支持新聞自由」。楊清奇亦確認，根據「飯盒會」會議紀錄重點，黎曾同意邀請《立場新聞》、《眾新聞》和《端傳媒》等網媒寫手撰文。他補充，上述楊健興的英文文章並不是由中文論壇版的文章翻譯而成的。</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-3">CONCLUSION</h4> +<p>控方另展示由 Joseph Long 撰寫的〈A growing threat〉和 Michael Cox 撰寫的〈Time for UK to bring HSBC to heel〉。楊表示不認識這兩名作者。</p> -<p>The recommendations outlined in this chapter seek to enhance U.S. military posture from its levels before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. While this posture strengthens the ability of the United States and NATO to deter and repel Russian aggression on the continent, it also pursues more sustainable policies by shifting the presence of U.S. ground forces largely to permanent, forward-stationed forces and articulates trade-offs and limitations with other strategic pri orities, such as competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, it seeks to accommodate both the benefits and shortcomings of allied capabilities in the region.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指桑普較激進支持港獨-蘋果論壇只採用不涉港獨文章">楊清奇指桑普較激進、支持港獨 《蘋果》論壇只採用不涉港獨文章</h4> -<h3 id="ch-07">CH. 07</h3> -<h3 id="alternative-options">ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS</h3> +<p>控方問及桑普，楊指他「係屬於激進啲」，他知道桑普在網上發表的文章都是支持港獨，但因為《蘋果》論壇版不支持港獨，所以他們採用桑普的文章是不會談及港獨。</p> -<p>The recommendations for the future of U.S. military posture in Europe, as outlined in the preceding chapter, provide the necessary forces and capabilities to realize the United States’ interests and strategic objectives outlined in Chapter 5. There are, however, alternative military postures to this “forward defense” approach that the United States could adopt based on different interests and objectives. This chapter briefly assesses the components of alternative U.S. posture options for Europe through 2030, along with their associated advantages and limitations.</p> +<p>至於李兆富（Simon Lee），楊指他的文章多數與經濟有關，會用經濟學的角度去分析社會問題和政治問題。楊又表示，對於李的文章，「其實我啲同事同讀者都會覺得悶」，所以沒有文章令他印象深刻。</p> -<p>This chapter focuses chiefly on three broad approaches: an extension of the U.S. military’s current posture in Europe in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; a strategy of restraint; and a China-first strategy that strictly prioritizes competition with China above all other objectives. It should be noted that the latter two strategies do not represent a singular, cohesive approach that is uniformly agreed upon by their advocates. Similarly, there is overlap in the views and advocates of these two approaches. While these strategies may offer some benefits to U.S. foreign policy, such as prioritizing resources for competition in the Indo-Pacific, their significant cuts to U.S. posture in Europe would severely undermine the ability of the United States and NATO to deter and respond to threats from a revanchist Russia.</p> +<p>控方問到李的寫作角度，楊指「佢政治立場都好明顯係支持民主派」，而且李的觀點與黎的觀點都很一致，所以黎有找他負責處理 Twitter 帳戶。</p> -<h4 id="maintain-current-us-posture">MAINTAIN CURRENT U.S. POSTURE</h4> +<h4 id="楊清奇指安裕支持民主派-國安法生效後憂紅線間中停稿">楊清奇指安裕支持民主派 國安法生效後憂紅線、間中停稿</h4> -<p>One alternative is to extend the U.S. military’s existing posture in Europe, as currently oriented in response to Russia’s invasion, through 2030. This posture is based on an operational concept of deterrence by denial, and it relies on an enhanced military presence, as illustrated by the United States’ current end strength of approximately 100,000 personnel in Europe. The U.S. military would maintain that posture throughout the time frame or until European allies bolster their capabilities and capacity to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank.</p> +<p>控方提及已故作家李怡因年紀大而減產，並問楊知不知道黎智英是否認識李怡。楊則指李怡曾經是《蘋果》的主筆，「黎先生冇理由唔識佢嘅。」</p> -<p>Such a posture would be based on the current 5+2 model that maintains five total brigade combat teams (BCTs), including the two additional BCTs deployed after Russia’s invasion (one rotational armored brigade combat team [ABCT] and one rotational infantry brigade combat team [IBCT] in Romania) in addition to the pre-war units (a forward-stationed IBCT and Stryker brigade combat team [SBCT] based in Italy and Germany, respectively, and one rotational ABCT as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve). The model would keep headquarters in Germany and Poland as well. In terms of air combat forces, this posture would maintain the seven fighter squadrons currently forward deployed and add a persistent rotational deployment of fifth-generation aircraft to NATO’s eastern flank. Other force structure elements would remain largely unchanged from the status quo.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QQoME5h.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 李怡（已歿）</p> -<p>The current U.S. military posture provides greater combat capability for U.S. and allied forces in Europe with the deployment of an additional ABCT, which could consequently provide increased deterrent value against Russia. This strengthened posture also serves to reassure European allies, particularly those on the eastern flank, of the United States’ commitment. However, there are drawbacks to maintaining this enhanced posture over the long term. While a second ABCT provides greater combat capability and potential deterrent value, it does not ensure that NATO would be able to defeat a determined Russian invasion on the eastern flank, particularly an attack against the Baltic states, where there is limited strategic depth.</p> +<p>控方另提及錢志健，楊指錢曾經是《蘋果》的專欄作家，但是「我係取消咗佢專欄嘅」。他記不起取消專欄的原因，只記得在大概2018年發生。楊指在2019年，《蘋果》論壇版基本上已沒有錢志健的文章，但後來《國安法》生效，論壇版不夠作者撰文，因此錢有時投稿，楊曾經用過一至兩次。</p> -<p>Maintaining the current enhanced military posture in Europe would also force the United States to incur greater costs in terms of operating expenses and readiness. As discussed in the preceding chapter, rotationally deployed units are more expensive from both a cost and readiness standpoint than forward-deployed units. Two rotational ABCTs would put greater stress on the Army’s force-generation model, given the time and additional units required to replace following the end of their deployment. While constructing a permanent military base in Poland would entail costs in the short-term, it would prove more sustainable over the long term and allow units to integrate into the local community.</p> +<p>另一名作者、資深新聞工作者安裕（姜國元），楊指他是很著名的專欄作家，惟《國安法》生效之後，「間唔中話要停稿、請假，佢都係對《國安法》劃出咗一條紅線有擔憂。」楊又指，安裕很熟悉美國政治，所以其文章除了涉及香港情況之外，還會涉及美國。至於安裕的寫作角度，楊指：「簡單嚟講，佢都係支持民主派嘅。」</p> -<p>Finally, maintaining the current 5+2 posture model in Europe risks encouraging free riding from U.S. allies and delaying their efforts to strengthen their own military capabilities in terms of both force size and modernization. The recommended 4+2 model, with a permanent forward-stationed ABCT in Poland, highlights U.S. long-term resolve and commitment while also stressing that NATO militaries must swiftly enhance their forces and posture on the eastern flank in the short term.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎認為西方對中共制裁不會緩和肯定制裁成效">楊清奇指黎認為西方對中共制裁不會緩和、肯定制裁成效</h4> -<h4 id="strategic-restraint">STRATEGIC RESTRAINT</h4> +<p>關於黎智英的個人觀點，控方展示兩篇黎發表於個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」的文章。其中一篇為〈時間就是武器〉，楊引述當中一段，黎指不相信美國等西方國家對中共的制裁會緩和下來，中共與美國等西方國家關係的關係大勢已去，暫時是無法逆轉的。楊指以上是黎對中美關係形勢的判斷。</p> -<p>Strategic restraint, sometimes called offshore balancing, argues that the United States is fundamentally secure based on its relative geographic isolation, nuclear arsenal, and military power. According to this view, the United States has over-extended itself with costly overseas commitments and misguided interventions in countries and missions that are not critical to U.S. interests. Consequently, advocates for strategic restraint call for the United States to draw down its global military presence and missions to focus on more limited objectives, to include homeland defense or preventing rivals from disrupting the global or regional balances of power.</p> +<p>就另一篇文章〈大時代即將來臨〉，楊清奇引述其中一段：「中美關係惡化，是十年八載解決不了的問題，期間中國企業投資停滯，將是個大隱憂。很明顯，中共與美國對抗造成的經濟和政治損失，實在來得太大，甚至大到觸發成為對中共政權認受性的挑戰。保不住經濟，中共將保不住政權。與美國對抗造成的實質和信心創傷，預示中共將大禍臨頭。」楊表示據他理解，黎在以上段落肯定了制裁的成效。</p> -<p>Advocates for strategic restraint largely argue for a drawdown or the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Some have even called for reconsidering the United States’ membership in NATO, although that is by no means a universally shared view within the restraint community. While restraint is a broad and ideologically diverse approach, most advocates agree that the United States should end or significantly reduce its military presence in Europe on geopolitical and budgetary grounds.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時落井下石是好時機">楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時落井下石是好時機</h4> -<p>While advocates call for a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, they have yet to offer detailed analysis of the future U.S. posture they envision and the force elements that would remain on the continent. However, the main component of a restraint force posture would entail a reduction in U.S. presence from Europe over 5 to 10 years to the eventual withdrawal of most U.S. forces. The United States would end access agreements with European partners and either close or repurpose most of its bases, predominantly Army bases. For example, Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Barry Posen calls for remaining bases to be converted to forward operating sites or cooperative security locations for use in the event of a contingency. Forces along the eastern flank, including the rotational ABCT presence in Poland and the IBCT in Romania, would be removed.</p> +<p>楊早前證供提及，時任美國副總統彭斯於2018年10月在哈特遜研究所（Hudson Institute）發表演講時提及美國對華政策，黎當時認為演講內容意味「美國反檯」，以楊的觀察，自此黎的政治立場轉趨激進。</p> -<p>Nonetheless, some U.S. forces would likely remain in theater. In terms of ground forces, the United States could retain its forward-stationed IBCT to serve as a contingency response force, and special operations forces could also retain a small footprint to realize limited U.S. objectives on the ground. While the United States would withdraw its F-35 squadrons from the United Kingdom, it could retain its F-15E presence at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath and consider maintaining its F-16 presence at either Spangdahlem or Aviano Air Bases.</p> +<p>控方展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的訊息，楊在同年10月5日向黎傳送彭斯演講翻譯全文。黎其後表示：「剛聽了彭斯演講、反檯，美國帶領西方日本等國重新調整中國政策明顯不過了，這是針對習現在弱勢而來的。時機正好！」楊其後表示：「美中現在不是貿易戰，是全面開戰咁」，黎回應：「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石。」</p> -<p>In terms of the maritime domain, the United States could retain naval bases, including in Rota and Naples, and forces to ensure freedom of navigation at sea and U.S. command over the maritime commons. Finally, the United States may seek to maintain some nuclear weapons in Europe and the nuclear-sharing mission to counter major aggression from Russia. To compensate for the lack of forces in the area, it may opt to increase stocks of prepositioned equipment for use in the event of a contingency.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Las1PAd.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> -<p>Supporters argue that the primary benefit of adopting a posture of restraint in Europe would be to free up forces and resources that could be allocated elsewhere, since many believe that the United States is “not capable of conducting full-scale operations against China and Russia simultaneously.” The strategy of restraint would reduce the U.S. position in Europe to a supporting role, which advocates justify by arguing that its NATO allies and the European Union possess enough military and economic power to counter Russian forces and other security crises. The United States could then prioritize allocation of resources toward other priorities, such as strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<p>楊庭上解釋，黎之所以說「時機正好」，是因為他認為國家主席習近平「係比較弱勢」，美國在這個時機轉變對華政策，而「呢個時機係好嘅」。</p> -<p>Moreover, advocates of restraint argue that withdrawing forces from Europe would significantly reduce the challenge of free riding by NATO allies and encourage greater European investment toward defense capabilities. While other NATO allies have lagged behind the United States in terms of security investment, supporters of strategic restraint argue that the strong U.S. presence in Europe has “long suppressed” the development of indigenous defense capabilities on the continent and hindered cooperation between European states. Withdrawing U.S. forces would require Europe to invest much more significantly in its own defense and would result in budgetary savings for the United States.</p> +<p>控方追問楊是指什麼「時機」、要做什麼。楊則引述黎的訊息「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石」，亦正如他撰寫及傳送給黎的社評標題：〈【蘋論】美國發宣戰檄文 香港挺身撞槍口〉。楊指：「2019年發生嘅反修例事件，就係撞正個槍口。」</p> -<p>Despite these arguments, the drawbacks of a restraint-based posture in Europe outweigh its advantages. First, a significantly reduced U.S. presence would incur significant risk and potentially embolden a revanchist Russia to pursue acts of aggression against states on the eastern flank. As argued in Chapter 3, Russia is actively modernizing and rebuilding its military with some help from China, Iran, and other countries. In the event of a contingency, U.S. forces would take longer to deploy from the United States and respond to threats against NATO.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英擅長把握形勢和讀者需要-而調整報紙立場">楊清奇指黎智英擅長把握形勢和讀者需要 而調整報紙立場</h4> -<p>Second, while allies and partners may invest more in their own defense, they would likely not be able to develop the forces and capabilities necessary to compensate for withdrawn U.S. forces even in the event of a phased drawdown over several years. As outlined in Chapter 4, while European nations are largely able to perform small-scale military missions and some medium-scale missions without U.S. assistance, they typically require U.S. collaboration to successfully execute large-scale operations. European forces rely heavily on the U.S. military for assistance in areas such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), logistics support, long-range precision support, heavy maneuver forces, and maritime operations. Most lack capacity in their defense industrial base to indigenously develop the required systems in a short time frame, and many face ongoing personnel and equipment shortages, interoperability challenges, and uncertain future funding for efforts such as air and naval patrol missions.</p> +<p>控方再追問「撞正個槍口」是什麼意思。楊引述「美國發宣戰檄文 香港挺身撞槍口」，指「美國舉槍對住中國嘅時候，香港就挺身擋住個槍口，自己送一個目標畀美國打」。</p> -<p>Finally, advocates of restraint overstate the budgetary savings associated with reducing the overseas presence of U.S. forces. To generate significant savings, the Department of Defense would have to wholly eliminate units and divest equipment rather than simply return U.S. units and personnel to the contiguous United States. In addition to being politically and logistically difficult, such eliminations would leave the U.S. military unable to redeploy forces to other theaters such as the Indo-Pacific — thus negating the first and most important benefit that restraint advocates hope to achieve.</p> +<p>控方問以上觀點與黎智英有何關係。楊表示正如他早前作供時所說，他認為黎曾經是一個成功的商人，擅長把握市場和顧客的需求，當黎辦報紙的時候，他一樣擅長把握形勢和讀者的需要，當時見到美國對華政策的改變，都會調整報紙立場。</p> -<p>Together, the detrimental effects of a force posture based on restraint would outweigh its alleged benefits. Such a posture would create significant security risks and operational gaps across the European continent without producing meaningful savings for the United States.</p> +<p>法官李運騰追問以上是為了什麼目的。楊表示，未有與黎討論過目的，但是以他觀察《蘋果》報紙的變化，他認為在反修例期間，「《蘋果》立場嘅激進係眾所周知啦，新聞報導就成日見到『上街』呢兩個字嘅，我覺得唔係好嘅標題」，因為「成日見到『今日上街，明日上街，今日又上街，明日又上街』，我唔覺得係好嘅標題」。</p> -<h4 id="china-first">CHINA FIRST</h4> +<h4 id="楊清奇指蘋果新聞報導落實和勇不分和不譴責不割蓆不篤灰">楊清奇指《蘋果》新聞報導落實「和勇不分」和「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」</h4> -<p>A China-first strategy shares similar underpinnings to the “offshore balancing” strain of restraint. Advocates of this approach argue that U.S. forces and resources dedicated to European security and, more specifically, to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia undermine the United States’ ability to compete with China in the Indo-Pacific and to defend Taiwan. Advocates of a China-first strategy argue that if Taiwan is taken by China, the United States’ military position in the region and the confidence of Asian partners states in the ability of the United States to confront China would weaken. Members of the restraint community note that the alignment of China-first “hawks” with foreign policy realists has “reshaped” the debate over U.S. security commitments to Europe. However, restraint advocates generally do not view the China threat as urgent as China-first supporters do, while some view U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific more narrowly. Consequently, restraint advocates argue for reductions in U.S. forces in Europe on geopolitical and budgetary grounds, as noted above.</p> +<p>楊又提到黎的專欄文章經常呼籲人上街，從黎的專欄和《蘋果》的報導可見，對於「和勇不分」這口號，黎和整個《蘋果》都「比較寬容、比較支持嘅」。</p> -<p>China-first advocates have similarly not built out detailed posture recommendations for U.S. forces in Europe. However, they have articulated the types of capabilities and trade-offs they would seek to bolster U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific at the expense of U.S. posture in Europe. These trade-offs would result in major cuts to U.S. forces and capabilities in Europe that could significantly hinder NATO’s ability to deter Russian aggression. As one China-first advocate writes:</p> +<p>楊補充，「和勇不分」主要有三個「不」，包括「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」，從《蘋果》的報導和評論來看，「係落實咗呢三個『不』嘅。」</p> -<blockquote> - <p>So long as China is our priority, the United States will be forced to withhold forces from Europe to deter or defeat Chinese aggression, even if Russia attacks NATO first. This will significantly limit our ability to help deter, deny, or repel a Russian assault because many of the capabilities required for a Taiwan contingency are also vital for Europe, including air and naval strike platforms; long-range missiles; air and missile defenses; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and logistics forces.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>控方問到，《國安法》生效之後，《蘋果》以上立場有否改變。楊則表示當時沒有收到任何指示，「基本上冇再提『三不』嘅，但都冇話過立場改變。」</p> -<p>According to this approach, force structure elements that would be removed or reduced from the United States’ current military posture in Europe for redeployment to the Indo-Pacific would include the two F-35 squadrons from RAF Lakenheath and at least some number of the six destroyers currently forward-stationed at Rota. In terms of ground forces, a China-first posture would similarly reduce long-range fires and theater air and missile defense assets to be prioritized for competition in the Indo-Pacific. Critical enablers — including airlift and aerial refueling, prepositioned stocks, and munitions stockpiles — would similarly be de-prioritized in the European theater.</p> +<p>控方表示主問完畢。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻表示，需時整理盤問方向，申請押後至明天才開始盤問，獲法官批准。</p> -<p>A China-first approach to posture in Europe is thus willing to incur major risk and even potential military setbacks to field the needed capabilities and systems in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, advocates call on NATO allies and partners in the European Union to take on a significantly greater burden in providing for their own defense. While a China-first posture in Europe may retain more U.S. forces relative to a restraint posture, such as ABCTs, China-first supporters are willing to divest those forces and units in a resource-constrained fiscal environment.</p> +<hr /> -<p>In addition to shifting current forces from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, China-first advocates also call for shifting force planning and security assistance efforts toward competition with China and the defense of Taiwan. They argue that procurement policy and the development of new capabilities should prioritize systems and capabilities for Indo-Pacific missions and the Taiwan contingency, such as surface ships, submarines, and precision-guided munitions. They also call for greater investments in improving the resilience of Indo-Pacific basing and infrastructure at the expense of similar investments in Europe. Advocates more forcefully argue against the security assistance currently provided to Ukraine in its war against Russia. They contend that this assistance, particularly of munitions, has at least two problems: it is contributing to dwindling U.S. stockpiles that could be used in a contingency with China, and munitions should instead be allocated to the defense of Taiwan.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時轉變對華政策、落井下石是好時機Forward Defense2024-03-11T12:00:00+08:002024-03-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/forward-defense<p><em>Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States’ role in Europe.</em></p> -<p>Advocates of a China-first approach to strategy and posture generally recognize the high level of risk they are willing to incur in order to prioritize the Indo-Pacific and ensure that Taiwan does not fall to China. However, a Europe posture based on this strategy poses many of the same drawbacks as restraint. But the immediate shift in forces and capabilities from Europe to the Indo-Pacific associated with a China-first strategy poses much greater short-term risk in Europe, particularly if assistance to Ukraine is drastically reduced at the same time. The reduction in military aid vital to the Ukrainian war effort could allow the Russian military to gain the upper hand in the conflict, conquer all (or at least more) territory in Ukraine, encourage Russia to take military action elsewhere in Europe and other regions, and embolden China.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="conclusion-4">CONCLUSION</h4> +<p>This report examines U.S. force posture in Europe — including the military capabilities, personnel, infrastructure, and agreements that support defense operations and plans — and makes recommendations for future U.S. posture. It finds that the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression.</p> -<p>In short, any benefits of the three alternatives — extending the U.S. military’s current posture in Europe, restraint, or China-first — are outweighed by the costs and risks. As noted in Chapter 8, a significant withdrawal of U.S. forces along the lines of restraint or a China-first approach would jeopardize U.S. national security interests and significantly embolden authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere.</p> +<p>First, the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression. Russia will likely remain a dangerous threat to the United States and Europe over the next several years. Russian president Vladimir Putin retains the political will and intentions to expand Russian power abroad, and Russia is reconstituting its military capabilities with help from China, Iran, and North Korea. A significant downsizing of U.S. forces in Europe could severely weaken deterrence and embolden a revanchist Russia.</p> -<h2 id="part-iii-conclusion">PART III CONCLUSION</h2> +<p>Second, the United States should permanently station a U.S. Army armored brigade combat team (ABCT) in Poland to strengthen deterrence and reassure the United States’ Eastern European allies in response to a long-term Russian threat. Shifting the current rotational ABCT from Operation Atlantic Resolve to a permanent presence in Poland should be part of a 4+2 posture in Europe. This posture would include four U.S. brigade combat teams (BCTs) — three forward-stationed BCTs in Poland, Italy, and Germany, along with one rotational BCT in Romania — and two divisional headquarters, in Germany and Poland.</p> -<h3 id="ch-08">CH. 08</h3> -<h3 id="final-thoughts">FINAL THOUGHTS</h3> +<p>Third, the U.S. Army should remain a bulwark for deterrence in Europe. A war against China in the Indo-Pacific will likely center on air and naval operations. However, some ground forces — from the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and allies and partners — will be helpful for both deterrence and warfighting, including on the Korean peninsula.</p> -<p>The U.S. military presence in Europe will likely remain contentious for several reasons. First, a substantial number of U.S. policymakers and analysts assess that China is the most significant threat to the United States for the foreseeable future and that the United States should focus the bulk of its military posture and attention — including its military air, naval, and maritime forces — in the Indo-Pacific. Second, some policymakers and analysts support decreasing the U.S. presence in Europe because European governments have generally failed to increase their defense budgets or focus on high-end military capabilities. Third, some contend that the United States should focus on problems at home, such as combatting immigration, improving health care, and stemming the production, trafficking, and use of such drugs as fentanyl. Fourth, still others assess that Russia poses little conventional or nuclear threat to the United States and its NATO allies in the short- or long-term.</p> +<p>In examining U.S. posture in Europe, this study asks three main questions. What are the main security threats in Europe for the United States and its allies? What are U.S. interests in Europe? What is the appropriate U.S. force posture in Europe? In answering these questions, this study comes to several broad conclusions.</p> -<p>There is validity in some of these points. China is a major threat, European governments need to spend more (and spend more effectively) on defense, and the United States needs to better address a wide range of challenges at home. As this report maintains, however, the United States has significant and enduring interests in Europe that will require a force posture of “forward defense.” A notable decline in the United States’ force posture in Europe would likely be significant and dangerous for U.S. national security in several ways.</p> +<h4 id="enduring-us-interests-in-europe">Enduring U.S. Interests in Europe</h4> -<p>First, it would embolden a revanchist Moscow and undermine deterrence in Europe. President Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders would likely see a declining U.S. force posture in Europe as a sign of weakening U.S. resolve and potentially declining power. The United States’ limited response following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and military action in eastern Ukraine later that year likely encouraged Russia to take future action. Second, a deteriorating U.S. posture would likely embolden other U.S. adversaries, such as China, and heighten concerns among U.S. allies and partners in Asia about U.S. resolve. The views in Taipei, the most likely flashpoint with China, are striking. Some of Taiwan’s national security leaders have warned that a reduced U.S. commitment to Europe — including aid to Ukraine — would heighten Taiwanese concerns about U.S. resolve. Only 34 percent of those in Taiwan in 2023 believed that the United States is a trustworthy country, a decline of more than 11 percentage points from 2021. Researchers assessed that the drop was partly caused by a perception that U.S. resolve is weakening in Europe, including in Ukraine.</p> +<p>The United States has several enduring interests in Europe. They include protecting the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people from threats based in Europe, including from Russia; promoting and expanding economic prosperity and opportunity; realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and defending and supporting the United States’ European allies. While some U.S. politicians and pundits have questioned the value of NATO, U.S. interests in Europe remain significant and enduring. Still, a number of European governments need to increase defense spending in light of the precarious security environment. Numerous NATO countries (especially those on NATO’s eastern flank) spend over 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, such as Poland (3.9 percent), Estonia (2.73 percent), Lithuania (2.54 percent), Finland (2.45 percent), and the United Kingdom (2.07 percent). But some others do not.</p> -<p>First, it would embolden a revanchist Moscow and undermine deterrence in Europe. President Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders would likely see a declining U.S. force posture in Europe as a sign of weakening U.S. resolve and potentially declining power. The United States’ limited response following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and military action in eastern Ukraine later that year likely encouraged Russia to take future action. Second, a deteriorating U.S. posture would likely embolden other U.S. adversaries, such as China, and heighten concerns among U.S. allies and partners in Asia about U.S. resolve. The views in Taipei, the most likely flashpoint with China, are striking. Some of Taiwan’s national security leaders have warned that a reduced U.S. commitment to Europe — including aid to Ukraine — would heighten Taiwanese concerns about U.S. resolve.1 Only 34 percent of those in Taiwan in 2023 believed that the United States is a trustworthy country, a decline of more than 11 percentage points from 2021. Researchers assessed that the drop was partly caused by a perception that U.S. resolve is weakening in Europe, including in Ukraine.</p> +<h4 id="persistent-russian-threat">Persistent Russian Threat</h4> -<h4 id="persistent-us-interests-in-europe">PERSISTENT U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE</h4> +<p>Russia will likely remain a significant and dangerous threat to the United States and NATO. Russia likely does not pose an immediate conventional threat to NATO. Over the next several years, however, there are several factors that could change the military balance in Europe. The United States could become overstretched with a war against China in the Indo-Pacific, North Korea on the Korean Peninsula, or Iran or terrorist groups in the Middle East. In addition, Russia could continue to rebuild its military over the next several years with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. A Russian military victory in Ukraine — or even significant Russian military advances on the battlefield — would also increase the Russian threat.</p> -<p>The United States has several enduring interests in Europe: protect the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people from threats based in Europe; promote and expand economic prosperity and opportunity; realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and defend and support the United States’ European allies. As noted in more detail below, Russia will remain the most significant threat to Europe for the foreseeable future.</p> +<h4 id="forward-defense-posture">Forward Defense Posture</h4> -<p>U.S. interests in Europe are likely to endure even with a U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific and other regions. Based on these interests, the United States has several defense objectives in Europe:</p> +<p>The United States should take several steps to enhance its posture in Europe over the next several years in ways that are sustainable and affordable:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Deter and defeat conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and U.S. allies, as well as coerce, persuade, and influence adversary behavior;</p> + <p><strong>Ground:</strong> The United States should adopt a 4+2 posture beginning in 2025 that consists of four U.S. BCTs — in Poland, Italy, Germany, and Romania — and two headquarters, in Germany and Poland. This force posture would involve eventually shifting from a rotational to a permanent ABCT in Poland to strengthen deterrence against a revanchist Russia.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Counter irregular and gray zone activities and compete effectively below the threshold of conventional conflict using both defensive and offensive means;</p> + <p><strong>Air:</strong> The United States should maintain all seven forward-deployed fighter squadrons currently based in Europe and add an additional F-16 squadron to Spangdahlem Air Base.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Counter terrorist and other transnational threats;</p> + <p><strong>Maritime:</strong> The United States should continue its current naval presence in the Baltic Sea region to deter Russian aggression and strengthen interoperability with allies and partners. In addition, the U.S. Navy should supplement existing NATO anti-submarine warfare capabilities by developing and deploying additional systems to the region.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Deter and prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction; and</p> + <p><strong>Prepositioned Equipment and Munitions Stockpiles:</strong> The United States should bolster its prepositioned equipment and munitions stocks in Europe to enhance the readiness of U.S. forces. While the Army Prepositioned Stock 2 has been somewhat augmented by funding from the European Deterrence Initiative, the U.S. Army should take additional steps to improve the readiness of this equipment and the forces overseeing it.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Maintain access to trade routes and global commons.</p> + <p><strong>Integrated Air and Missile Defense:</strong> The United States should increase air and missile defense capabilities in Poland in coordination with a permanent ABCT. Given the utility of, and demand for, air and missile defense assets across multiple combatant commands, the Army should also prioritize the development and deployment of additional Patriot battalions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Nuclear Posture:</strong> The United States should increase modernization efforts, exercises, and scheduled deployments of assets to the European theater to bolster its deterrent capabilities and reassure allies. This includes modernizing its gravity bombs with the new B61-12. The U.S. military and NATO should also continue to conduct exercises with nuclear-capable platforms, including Bomber Task Force missions, to enhance readiness and assure allies of U.S. support.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Cyber and Space:</strong> U.S. forces should continue to enhance the security and resilience of their cyber systems and networks while simultaneously assisting European partners and allies. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) should deploy additional “hunt forward” teams to Europe to counter threats from Russia and Russian-backed groups to U.S. forces and allies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Security Cooperation:</strong> The United States should help strengthen European military capabilities and encourage greater investment in such areas as combat support, including short-range air defense and long-range fires; airlift; heavy maneuver forces; maritime capabilities, including sensors and survivability systems; sufficient quantities of long-range precision strike weapons; and multi-spectrum ranges to train and maintain high-readiness forces. Security cooperation efforts should also involve additional security assistance, arms sales, training, partner capacity missions, industrial base cooperation, and strategic coordination between the United States, NATO, and European states on the development of forces and capabilities. Still, a number of European governments need to increase defense spending in light of the precarious security environment.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>U.S. interests and defense objectives in Europe are based, to a great extent, on deterring a revanchist Russia. In the short term, NATO should be able to effectively deter a Russian conventional or nuclear attack against NATO territory, though Russia possesses significant irregular and gray zone capabilities. Over the next three to five years, however, the threat from Russia will likely increase. Moscow has the intentions and is developing the capabilities to threaten the United States, Europe, and their allies and partners.</p> +<p>Europe remains a vital region for the United States. The last two U.S. national security and national defense strategies prioritized China as the main global threat. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, continuing aggression, and growing cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea are stark reminders that the United States has significant and enduring interests in Europe as well.</p> -<p>Over the long run, there are several factors that could change the military balance in Europe. For example, the United States could become overstretched due to a major theater war against China in the Indo-Pacific. European conventional and logistical capabilities are limited — particularly for high-end war — which creates vulnerabilities if the United States were to withdraw significant air, naval, and even ground forces from the region. U.S. or European political will to develop robust military capabilities or strengthen NATO could also weaken, undermining deterrence.</p> +<h3 id="ch-01">CH. 01</h3> +<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> -<p>Russia could rebuild its military capabilities over the next several years with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. Indeed, the speed of Russian military reconstitution will likely be impacted by help from China’s industrial base, as well as assistance from Iran, North Korea, and other countries. China has already provided several types of assistance to Russian defense firms, such as navigation equipment for M-17 military transport helicopters; jamming technology, such as telescoping antennas for military vehicles; parts for fighter jets; parts for radar units, which are used to detect enemy aircraft, missiles, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) as part of Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft missile system; semiconductor chips for weapons systems; more than $12 million in UASs and UAS parts; and substantial aid to offset Western sanctions. As a 2023 U.S. intelligence report concluded, China “has also become an increasingly important buttress for Russia in its war effort” by “supplying Moscow with key technology and dual-use equipment used in Ukraine.”</p> +<p>Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine dramatically shifted the strategic landscape in Europe, triggering the most devastating war in Europe since World War II. More Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine than in all previous Soviet and Russian wars combined since World War II, including Russia’s bloody wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The war has caused the most significant refugee crisis in Europe since World War II, driving over 6 million refugees to Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, and other countries. The war also has had substantial humanitarian implications, causing widespread civilian deaths and destruction in Ukraine and disrupting public access to water, electricity, heating, health care, and education.</p> -<p>In addition, Iran has provided several types of assistance to Russia, such as UASs, particularly the Shahed-136 precision-attack suicide drone; over 300,000 artillery shells and over 1 million rounds of ammunition; infrastructure, including helping to build a UAS factory in the Russian town of Yelabuga; and potentially ballistic missiles. Finally, North Korea has provided some military assistance, including artillery shells and other munitions, to Russia. Growing foreign assistance to Russia from China, Iran, and North Korea will help facilitate the reconstitution of its military.</p> +<p>In addition, Russian leaders have threatened to use nuclear weapons, raising concerns about nuclear escalation. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council and a former Russian president, remarked, “Just imagine that the [Ukrainian] offensive . . . in tandem with NATO, succeeded and end up with part of our land being taken away. Then we would have to use nuclear weapons by virtue of the stipulations of the Russian Presidential Decree.” He continued by warning that “our enemies should pray to our fighters that they do not allow the world to go up in nuclear flames.” In response, some Western leaders have worried that Russia might consider using tactical nuclear weapons if Moscow faces sustained military losses in Ukraine. “Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they’ve faced so far, militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons,” remarked William J. Burns, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in April 2022.</p> -<h4 id="developing-a-posture-of-forward-defense">DEVELOPING A POSTURE OF FORWARD DEFENSE</h4> +<p>Despite Russian aggression and an escalation in tensions between NATO and Russia, two consecutive U.S. administrations have committed to shifting military resources to the Indo-Pacific to deal with China. The Biden administration’s Global Posture Review identified the Indo-Pacific as the most important region for U.S. national security to “advance initiatives that contribute to regional stability and deter potential Chinese military aggression and threats from North Korea.” In addition, the administration’s National Defense Strategy reaffirmed that the United States’ is prioritizing the Indo-Pacific region in its efforts to counter China.</p> -<p>U.S. posture in Europe should be flexible enough to maintain deterrence but also allow some U.S. air and naval forces to surge to other regions — such as the Indo-Pacific — in case of contingencies. While this study does not conduct a global posture study, it assesses that the United States will likely need to deter two major adversaries, Russia and China. The United States should take several steps to enhance its posture in Europe over the next several years to strengthen deterrence and reassure its NATO allies in response to a Russia whose leaders are rebuilding their military and possess revanchist ambitions.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, there is a need to re-evaluate U.S. force posture in Europe based on Russia’s aggressive military actions and the prospect of a protracted war in Ukraine. Future U.S. posture in Europe has significant implications for deterring adversaries in Europe and other regions, including the Indo-Pacific; assuring allies and partners in Europe and other regions; fighting wars effectively if deterrence fails; and preserving security institutions, including NATO. There have been numerous studies on U.S. posture in Europe over the past several years. But the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, expansion of NATO to Finland and Sweden, and Russian threats to Poland, Baltic states, and other countries create an urgent need to re-examine U.S. defense posture in Europe.</p> -<p><strong>Ground:</strong> The United States should adopt a 4+2 posture beginning in 2025 that consists of four U.S. brigade combat teams (BCTs) and two headquarters, in Germany and Poland. This force posture would involve shifting from a rotational to a permanent armored brigade combat team (ABCT) in Poland to strengthen deterrence against a revanchist Russia. Overall, the United States should retain three permanent forward-stationed BCTs — one ABCT in Poland, one infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) in Italy, and one Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) in Germany — and one rotational IBCT headquartered in Romania. This model should include the permanent forward-basing of two combat aviation brigades. In addition, the United States should increase its long-range fires capabilities in Europe by facilitating further sales of systems, such as the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), to NATO allies. Finally, the U.S. military should increase efforts to build and enhance allied and partner special operations capabilities, with a focus on Eastern flank states, as part of forward defense.</p> +<h4 id="research-design">RESEARCH DESIGN</h4> -<p><strong>Air:</strong> In terms of air combat capabilities, a forward defense posture recommends maintaining all seven forward-deployed fighter squadrons currently based in Europe and adding an additional F-16 squadron to Spangdahlem Air Base. Forward-deployed F-35 squadrons enhance the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces, given the aircraft’s ability to collect and transfer electronic data from adversary systems to provide greater situational awareness. In addition, this analysis recommends forward-stationing an additional F-16 squadron at Spangdahlem to provide greater short-term combat capacity as allied F-35 squadrons come online.</p> +<p>In light of these challenges, this report asks several questions. First, what are the main security threats in Europe for the United States and its allies? Second, what are U.S. interests in Europe? Third, what is the appropriate U.S. force posture in Europe?</p> -<p><strong>Maritime:</strong> The United States should continue its naval presence in the Baltic Sea region to deter Russian aggression and strengthen interoperability with allies and partners. In addition, the U.S. Navy should supplement existing NATO anti-submarine warfare capabilities by developing and deploying additional systems to the region. The United States should also expand its Arctic posture and capabilities to counter Russian and Chinese security interests. The U.S. Coast Guard could expand its icebreaking fleet with the procurement of three heavy Polar Security Cutters and three medium Arctic Security Cutters.</p> +<p>To answer these research questions, the report pursues a mixed methods approach. To answer the first question, it assesses the conventional and nuclear balance in Europe in such areas as land, air, maritime, and nuclear capabilities. It also examines Russia’s attempts to reconstitute its military, the nature of the Russian threat to the West over the next several years, and European capabilities and capability gaps. To answer the second question, the report outlines U.S. interests and objectives in the context of broader U.S. strategic considerations. To answer the third question, the report assesses U.S. posture in several domains: land (including forward-stationed forces, rotational forces, and Army Prepositioned Stocks); air (including sensors, fighter aircraft, integrated air and missile defense, and long-range strike); naval (including all-domain naval operations, theater security cooperation, prepositioning, and the deployment of carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups and Marine expeditionary units, and the U.S. Sixth and Second Fleets); space (including coordination with U.S. Space Command); cyber (including coordination with Joint Force Headquarters–Cyber and U.S. Cyber Command); and nuclear (including nuclear forces and dual-capable aircraft).</p> -<p><strong>Prepositioned Equipment and Munitions Stockpiles:</strong> The United States should bolster its prepositioned equipment and munitions stocks in Europe to enhance the readiness of U.S. forces. While the Army Prepositioned Stock-2 has been somewhat augmented by funding from the European Deterrence Initiative, the Army should take additional steps to improve the readiness of this equipment and the forces overseeing it.</p> +<p>The project team leveraged primary- and secondary-source documents from relevant organizations (such as NATO, U.S. European Command, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, the U.S. Department of State, European countries, and EU officials), open-source materials from policymakers and subject-matter experts, and interviews.</p> -<p><strong>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:</strong> The demand for U.S. ISR assets will only increase as the military expands missions and operations in the Indo-Pacific and the Russian military reconstitutes its capabilities on NATO’s eastern flank. While priority may be given to the Indo-Pacific, the Department of Defense (DOD) should maximize its available ISR assets for use by both U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The DOD is currently seeking to modernize its ISR capabilities, with plans to retire the RQ-4 by FY 2027 and the MQ-9 by FY 2035. However, the DOD and the services must ensure that any gaps in ISR coverage are limited. This could be managed by timing the retirement of certain platforms to coincide with the activation of new assets. Alternatively, the DOD could leverage commercial capabilities to cover any gaps until requirements are established and new platforms come online. The Army is currently testing commercial assets in operations in Europe under its High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES) to define the requirements for the replacement for the RC-12 Guardrail aircraft.</p> +<h4 id="definitions">DEFINITIONS</h4> -<p><strong>Integrated Air and Missile Defense:</strong> The United States should increase air and missile defense capabilities in Poland in coordination with a permanent ABCT in Poland. The Army should also prioritize the development and deployment of additional Patriot battalions. In terms of ballistic missile defense, the United States should maintain its current posture and force structure in line with Operation Atlantic Sentry. Relevant units include the six Aegis destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain, along with the two Aegis Ashore sites based in Romania and Poland.</p> +<p>As used here, force posture refers to the military capabilities, personnel, footprint (including bases, facilities, and support infrastructure), and agreements that support defense operations and plans. U.S. posture in Europe is significantly influenced by agreements with host countries, which provide access to facilities, airspace, and territory. In addition, the number of U.S. military personnel in Europe is based on the deployment of U.S. forces into and out of the region, which increase as assets such as carrier strike groups or Bomber Task Force units flow into Europe and decrease as they depart. While this report focuses on U.S. posture in Europe, the United States’ regional posture is impacted by its global posture. The report adopts a broad definition of Europe in line with the area that is currently in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, which includes 51 countries in Europe and portions of Asia and the Middle East, with a total population of nearly 1 billion people.</p> -<p><strong>Nuclear Posture:</strong> The United States should increase modernization efforts, exercises, and scheduled deployments of assets to the European theater to bolster its deterrent capabilities and reassure allies. This includes modernizing its gravity bombs with the new B61-12. The U.S. military and NATO should also continue to conduct exercises with nuclear-capable platforms, including Bomber Task Force missions, to enhance readiness and assure allies of U.S. support.</p> +<p>Overseas force posture generally involves trade-offs. On the one hand, overseas posture can help a country prepare for military operations, deter adversaries, assure allies and partners, and build local capacity through security cooperation. On the other hand, it can also incur risks by increasing the vulnerability of forces to attack from hostile states, stressing the readiness of the force, encouraging free riding by allies and partners, and potentially dragging forces into unwanted wars.</p> -<p><strong>Cyber and Space:</strong> U.S. forces should continue to enhance the security and resilience of their cyber systems and networks while simultaneously assisting European partners and allies. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) should deploy additional “hunt forward” teams to Europe to counter threats to U.S. forces and allies from Russia and Russian-backed groups. To capably resource further deployments and ensure readiness, CYBERCOM should also seek to expand the number of cyber mission teams across the services. The United States should also expand deployments of U.S. Space Force units and personnel to Europe. Space Force units can play a major role in supporting forward-deployed U.S. forces by preventing enemy interference and maintaining open lines of satellite communication.</p> +<p>The report examines the viability of strategic and operational concepts, including dynamic force employment and agile combat employment. Dynamic force employment involves deploying U.S. forces in ways that are strategically predictable for allies and operationally unpredictable for competitors. Examples might include deploying fifth-generation fighters, Bomber Task Force missions, U.S. Army or Marine forces, or guided-missile destroyers to various locations in Europe for snap exercises with allies and partners. Agile combat employment involves the use of small, dispersed air bases abroad — rather than relying on large overseas bases — to reduce vulnerability to adversary attacks.</p> -<p><strong>Security Cooperation:</strong> The United States should focus on helping strengthen European military capabilities in such areas as combat support, including short-range air defense and long-range fires; airlift; heavy maneuver forces; maritime capabilities, including sensors and survivability systems; sufficient quantities of long-range precision strike weapons, such as long-range anti-ship missiles; and multi-spectrum ranges to train and maintain high-readiness forces. Security cooperation efforts should also involve additional security assistance, arms sales, training, partner capacity missions, and strategic coordination between the United States, NATO, and European states on the development of forces and capabilities.</p> +<h4 id="caveats">CAVEATS</h4> -<p>Europe remains a vital region for the United States. The last two U.S. national security and national defense strategies have prioritized China as the main global threat. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, continuing aggression, and growing cooperation with China are stark reminders that the United States has significant and enduring interests in Europe as well.</p> +<p>There are several caveats about what this analysis does — and does not — attempt to do. First, the report does not conduct a systematic cost analysis of U.S. force posture in Europe, though it does broadly discuss the cost implications associated with overseas posture. This report does not build a model that includes the cost of the current condition of overseas and U.S. installations (including a need to modernize installations or restore facilities and capabilities), host-nation support that the U.S. Department of Defense receives when it stations forces in a foreign country, or the incremental costs beyond the United States’ stationing and maintaining overseas bases and forces (including the cost difference in permanent and rotational presence options).</p> -<hr /> +<p>Instead, this report focuses predominantly on strategic and operational U.S. interests, objectives, and force postures in Europe. A detailed cost analysis is important and should be a component of any final U.S. decision on force posture in the Middle East and elsewhere around the globe. But the most important determinants of U.S. force posture in the region are likely to be the relative benefits and risks of U.S. strategic objectives and interests. Additionally, the cost differential in the event of a reduction in U.S. presence in the region would be relatively minor if those forces were deployed elsewhere overseas or returned to the United States. Significant savings would only be generated if the units and force structure elements were deactivated.</p> -<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, director of the International Security Program, and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He focuses on defense strategy, military operations, force posture, and irregular warfare. He leads a bipartisan team of over 50 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent strategic insights and policy solutions that shape national security.</p> +<p>Second, the report does not conduct a systematic analysis of U.S. force posture around the globe. The focus is squarely on Europe. Nevertheless, as highlighted in every chapter of this report, the analysis and conclusions were informed by U.S. global posture considerations. Any decision regarding U.S. force posture in Europe needs to be understood in the context of U.S. national security interests and U.S. posture in other regions — especially the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<p><strong>Seamus P. Daniels</strong> is a fellow for Defense Budget Analysis in the International Security Program at CSIS, where he researches issues related to defense funding, force structure, and military readiness.</p> +<p>Third, the report focuses on U.S. military posture in the region. It does not conduct a systematic analysis of all U.S. activity in Europe, including diplomatic activity conducted by the U.S. State Department; intelligence activity conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and other organizations within the U.S. intelligence community; development activity by the U.S. Agency for International Development and non-governmental organizations; and financial, law enforcement, and other activity conducted by such organizations as the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Commerce, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. These non-military actions are critical, and military force should not be viewed as the principal tool to deal with the region’s challenges.</p> -<p><strong>Catrina Doxsee</strong> is a fellow with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS, where she analyzes international and domestic terrorism and the irregular activities of countries such as Russia, China, and Iran. Outside of CSIS, she is a member of the editorial board for the Irregular Warfare Initiative at the Modern War Institute at West Point.</p> +<p>While the report focuses predominantly on U.S. military posture, it does highlight other U.S. government actions where appropriate and acknowledges the importance of diplomacy, development, information operations, and other activities. The report does not conduct a systematic analysis of all NATO or EU militaries, though it does nest the analysis in a broader understanding of European military capabilities and political will.</p> -<p><strong>Daniel Fata</strong> is the president of Fata Advisory LLC. He is a public policy expert, national security consultant, and strategic adviser focused on helping companies and organizations enhance their product and program offerings through the development of comprehensive government affairs strategies, risk assessments, strategic planning, and advocacy initiatives.</p> +<h4 id="organization-of-the-report">ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT</h4> -<p><strong>Kathleen McInnis</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS. Her research areas include the intersection of gender and national security; global security strategy; defense policy; and transatlantic security.</p>Seth G. Jones, et al.Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States’ role in Europe.【黎智英案・審訊第卌一日】2024-03-08T12:00:00+08:002024-03-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-41<ul> - <li>楊清奇指李柱銘文章比較強調法治、胡志偉則支持抗爭和制裁林鄭</li> -</ul> +<p>The rest of this report is divided into several parts and chapters. Part I explores the strategic landscape in Europe. Chapter 2 examines the U.S. military presence in Europe from World War II to today. Chapter 3 analyzes the evolving threat landscape in Europe, including the threat from Russia. Chapter 4 assesses European military capabilities, including at the high-end of the military spectrum. Part II turns to force posture. Chapter 5 provides an overview of U.S. interests in Europe in the context of other U.S. interests at home and abroad, as well as U.S. defense objectives. Chapter 6 offers recommendations for future U.S. force posture in Europe. Chapter 7 assesses alternative options and weighs their pros and cons. Finally, Part III provides a conclusion, with Chapter 9 summarizing the main recommendations.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h2 id="strategic-landscape">STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE</h2> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3xZoeG3.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<h3 id="ch-02">CH. 02</h3> +<h3 id="historical-trends">HISTORICAL TRENDS</h3> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（8日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第41日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊的職責之一是管理報紙論壇版，控方向他展示多篇曾刊登於論壇版的文章，並問及各個作者的寫作角度。就民主黨創黨元老李柱銘，楊指他「比較強調法治」，而且「比較堅持一國兩制原本嘅解釋」，又指印象中李曾對《國安法》表示過擔心。前政協委員劉夢熊撰寫的文章亦曾被刊出，楊指劉的文章是由上司轉交給他，通常需要符合3個主要原則，即「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。至於在《國安法》生效數天後宣布「擱筆」的專欄作家古德明，楊指其文章「通常係以古諷今，咁對獨裁政治、對於侵犯人權事件都係比較批判嘅。」</p> +<p>The United States’ military posture in Europe has considerably evolved from the end of World War II to the present. Changes to the number and types of capabilities of U.S. forces in Europe have been driven by several factors, such as the perception of threat posed by the Soviet Union and Russia to the United States and its European allies, the relative balance of military capabilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the evolution of U.S. strategy and political considerations, and the relationship between the United States and its allies.</p> + +<p>President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy emphasized a reliance on nuclear weapons, though he was committed to keeping U.S. forces in Europe “as long as the need existed.” The Kennedy and Johnson administrations shifted to a policy of “Flexible Response,” which was adopted by NATO in 1967 and gave the U.S. president the ability to select from a suite of military and non-military options when responding to a crisis. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations largely pursued a policy of detente with the Soviet Union before the Carter administration’s Dual-Track strategy and President Ronald Reagan’s defense buildup. The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War led to a major drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe as the United States prioritized contingencies elsewhere. However, Russian aggression in Ukraine, beginning in 2014 and continuing through the February 2022 invasion, prompted a rethinking of the role and capabilities of U.S. forces in Europe.</p> + +<p>This chapter provides a qualitative and quantitative assessment of U.S. military posture in Europe in the post-World War II era to the present. It examines trends in capabilities and personnel, and it identifies strategic and operational inflection points in U.S. force posture. The chapter concludes by presenting a baseline of current U.S. posture and discussing NATO force posture development. The baseline serves to inform the posture options presented in subsequent chapters.</p> + +<h4 id="trends-in-us-military-personnel-in-europe">TRENDS IN U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN EUROPE</h4> + +<p>The number of U.S. military personnel in Europe shifted considerably during the Cold War, as shown in Figure 2.1. End strength in Europe peaked in 1957 at 473,000, a significant increase from the 122,000 stationed there in 1950. That figure fell by 45 percent to 262,000 by 1970 during détente. By 1985, however, the number of U.S. military personnel in Europe grew to 359,000 during the Reagan buildup. Following the end of the Cold War, the number of U.S. personnel declined nearly 42 percent by 1992 from 1985 levels, and U.S. forces continued to decrease to a post-World War II low of 66,000 in 2013. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to yet another shift, with the number of U.S. forces increasing to over 100,000 by 2023.</p> + +<p>More U.S. personnel have been stationed in Europe than any other region during periods of peace. Figure 2.2 compares the deployment of U.S. active-duty military personnel globally. U.S. forces in Asia exceeded those in Europe during the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Despite the drawdown of personnel following the Cold War, more forces remained in Europe than any other region until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.</p> + +<p>The following sections detail the policy and strategic developments which shaped these trends in U.S. military and capabilities in Europe.</p> + +<h4 id="historical-trends-in-us-force-posture">HISTORICAL TRENDS IN U.S. FORCE POSTURE</h4> + +<p><strong>The End of World War II and Early Stages of the Cold War</strong></p> + +<p>Tensions quickly mounted between the Western allies and the Soviet Union despite collaboration between the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union during World War II to defeat the Axis powers. Winston Churchill, following his 1945 electoral defeat, described this emerging incompatibility between allied and Soviet worldviews and interests the following year as the descent of an “iron curtain” over the continent, dividing East from West.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wp6ROpy.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.1: U.S. Active-Duty Military Personnel in Europe.</strong> Source: Compiled by authors from various sources.</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qo2utzr.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.2: U.S. Active-Duty Military Personnel Overseas, 1950–2023.</strong> Source: Compiled by authors from various sources.</em></p> + +<p>Despite these geopolitical warnings, post-World War II peacetime demobilization and drawdowns of forces by Western powers proceeded at a blistering pace. U.S. end strength fell from over 12 million personnel in 1945 to just 1.4 million by 1948. The United States’ military posture in Europe reduced given its transition from an invasion force to an occupation force in Germany. In the late 1940s, the U.S. presence was roughly 150,000. By 1950, the Army’s European Command only controlled one infantry division in Germany, while four were stationed in Japan. By the time of the creation of NATO in 1949, the United States, United Kingdom, and France could barely account for 12 total divisions, which were dedicated primarily to the occupation of Germany. These forces paled in comparison to the 26 Soviet divisions forward deployed in Eastern Europe and the estimated 75 Soviet divisions based in western Russia. On balance, neither the military dimensions nor the military requirements of the emerging competition with the Soviet Union were fully appreciated by Western powers in the early stages of the Cold War.</p> + +<p>The June 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea fundamentally altered U.S. and Western strategic calculus regarding the roles, missions, and necessity of military forces in confronting an expansionist and aggressive Soviet Union. Communist China and the Soviet Union backed North Korea, and U.S. leaders viewed the conflict as an attempt to impose communist rule by force on non-communist nations. The Truman administration adopted a policy of containment, as outlined in NSC-68, to limit the spread of communist and Soviet influence globally. This strategy required a buildup of both conventional and nuclear forces to meet the expansive demands of deterring and defending against Soviet aggression.</p> + +<p>The Korean War had the practical effect of waking the United States and Europe up to the military dimensions of the Cold War. Not only did allies contribute troops and capabilities toward the defense of South Korea, but they also began prioritizing the defense of Western Europe against possible Soviet incursions. Following the outbreak of the war, the United States and NATO took steps to significantly increase their military presence. NATO plans in 1950 called for 18 active and 16 reserve divisions. The United States increased its posture in Europe to four divisions and prepositioned equipment and supplies on the continent. In a February 1952 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, NATO pursued an even more ambitious target of reaching 50 active and 46 reserve divisions by 1954. However, NATO failed to meet the Lisbon Force goals, only fielding 25 active and 25 reserve divisions by 1955. During this period, the U.S. military pushed for the creation of an integrated NATO command structure and took on critical NATO staff roles, including a U.S. general as the supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR). The United States also established U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in August 1952.</p> + +<p><strong>New Look and Flexible Response</strong></p> + +<p>In 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower, former U.S. Army chief of staff and the first SACEUR, was elected president on a platform of balancing the federal budget. Eisenhower vowed to reduce defense spending, which had spiked under Truman, and to pursue a more sustainable defense strategy. Despite the buildup of U.S. and NATO forces, the West still faced a significant numerical disadvantage against the Soviet Union in Europe. This disparity shaped the development of the Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” strategy of massive retaliation beginning in 1953 and its eventual adoption by NATO in 1957. The policy of massive retaliation emerged out of a strategy review known as Project Solarium, which affirmed the goals of the containment strategy identified by the Truman administration. However, the strategy document which eventually emerged, NSC 162/2, outlined a more economically sustainable deterrent based on a retaliatory nuclear response. This approach reduced the role of conventional Western forces in Europe to a “tripwire” and “delaying force” that would prevent Europe from “being entirely overrun before the effect of the U.S. nuclear attack on the Soviet homeland was fully felt.”</p> -<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第五天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> +<p>The United States and NATO shifted their strategy from massive retaliation to “flexible response” during the 1960s and 1970s. This shift was due in part to the belief that massive retaliation was no longer a credible deterrent given expanding Soviet nuclear capabilities and the Kennedy administration’s pursuit of a more “balanced” approach to defense. The United States expanded its ground forces from 11 to 16 active divisions and deployed an additional two to Germany following the 1961 Berlin Wall crisis. Additionally, U.S. army divisions placed greater emphasis on conventional firepower, tactical mobility, and decentralized command and control. While U.S. officials felt a greater sense of optimism regarding the balance of allied conventional military capabilities against the Soviets, particularly given the United States’ qualitative advantage in terms of capabilities, U.S. forces in Europe in the late 1960s declined largely because of the U.S. war in Vietnam. During the 1970s, the U.S. military placed greater emphasis on its ability to provide outside reinforcements to NATO in the event of a crisis, including plans to deploy 10 divisions and 60 tactical fighter squadrons to Europe in only 10 days. This led to a greater emphasis on the prepositioning of Army and Air Force equipment in Europe and securing allied host-nation support.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RF9bZr9.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> +<p><strong>The Dual-Track Strategy and Peace through Strength</strong></p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指翻譯評論文章前毋須徵得作者同意">楊清奇指翻譯評論文章前毋須徵得作者同意</h4> +<p>In 1976, the Soviet Union began deploying its SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, prompting concerns from Western European allies. In response, the Carter administration and NATO announced the dual-track decision in December 1979, which entailed deploying 108 Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy. In addition, the dual-track decision involved simultaneously pursuing arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce each side’s missiles.</p> -<p>控方展示楊清奇和盧峯（前主筆馮偉光）之間的訊息，談及資深傳媒人區家麟的英語版個人簡介。楊指，區是以中文寫作的，《蘋果》英文版面世之後，由英文版的同事將其文章翻譯成英文。楊又指，將中文評論文章翻譯成英文及刊登在英文版之前，並不需要徵得相關作者的同意，「所以有一啲作者都會投訴翻譯得唔好嘅。」楊指，若作者的文章在實體報紙刊登，可獲得稿費，但是當他們的文章刊登在英文版，則沒有額外的稿費。</p> +<p>Under the Reagan administration, U.S. forces in Europe increased as part of a broader defense buildup. The administration’s decision to confront the Soviet Union through its “peace through strength” plan led to a buildup of U.S. military forces in Europe — in addition to the planned deployment of Pershing 2 nuclear missiles to West Germany in 1983 and NATO’s Able Archer 83 exercises in the same year. At the same time, Reagan officials also conducted a series of arms control negotiations, such as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/G673tn3.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 區家麟</p> +<p>By the end of the Cold War, a sophisticated network of political-military arrangements designed to communicate the capability and credibility of allied forces to deter a Soviet attack underpinned U.S. and NATO posture. Division-level exercises, such as REFORGER, allowed the United States to test its ability to deploy its troops from the continental United States to Europe and reseize NATO territory. NATO’s International Military Staff worked to build common war plans and interoperability standards among allies in order to minimize tactical frictions commonly associated with fighting in military coalitions. The SACEUR possessed pre-delegated authorities to retaliate against a Soviet incursion with nuclear weapons in the event that London, for example, could not be contacted during a crisis.</p> -<h4 id="特朗普簽署香港自治法後-楊清奇以中美對抗升級作為星期六論壇版主題">特朗普簽署《香港自治法》後 楊清奇以「中美對抗升級」作為星期六論壇版主題</h4> +<p><strong>Post-Cold War</strong></p> -<p>控方指旅美作家「一劍飄塵」的文章〈美國會制裁林鄭月娥嗎〉，在2020年7月18日刊登在評論版，當日論壇版有特定主題「中美對抗升級」。楊確認當日是星期六，而逢星期六論壇版會有主題。</p> +<p>The fall of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War led successive governments on both sides of the Atlantic to realize the gains of a “peace dividend” and reduce military spending, military forces, and the U.S. military presence in Europe. Building on planning that was initially conducted during the Reagan administration, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell developed the “Base Force” plan in 1991 to determine the future force structure requirements for the United States in the post-Cold War era. The central premise of the Base Force was that global conflict was increasingly unlikely, while regional conflicts were becoming more likely. U.S. policymakers designed the initial assumptions for the Base Force before the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, but the Bush administration argued that military design and end-strength determinations were still relevant. As one observer wrote:</p> -<p>被問到為何使用「中美對抗升級」作為主題，楊指時任美國總統特朗普在同年7月14日簽署了《香港自治法案》，相信當時應該是想做相關社會反應，所以他決定了用這個主題。不過他當時雖然知道會有制裁名單，但基於時差問題，其時尚未知道誰人會被列入名單。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Like its predecessors, JSCP FY 1989-90 [which informed the Base Force], written in the spring of 1988, considered the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation that could erupt into global war as the most serious threat to U.S. interests. But, with the Soviet Union reducing its military presence in Eastern Europe, reducing and consolidating its military forces, and undertaking domestic reform, the JSCP argued that calculated Soviet aggression in Central Europe was unlikely. The more likely threats were indigenously caused conventional regional conflicts with little likelihood of direct Soviet intervention.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>控方提到與「一劍飄塵」安排在同一版面的另外兩篇文章，分別是〈「玫瑰園廢話」〉和〈南海爭奪戰——中美環球戰略對抗第一步〉，作者分別是美國教授夏明和香港學者許楨。</p> +<p>Accordingly, senior U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officials argued at the time that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact meant that further reductions in nuclear forces might be warranted and that U.S. posture in Europe should also decrease. Yet they did so with a caveat: U.S. presence in Europe should not be reduced any further than the planned end strength of 150,000 personnel. The United States also returned a number of installations to host countries.</p> -<h4 id="蘋果曾收前政協劉夢熊投稿-楊清奇上司轉發文章多數會刊登">《蘋果》曾收前政協劉夢熊投稿 楊清奇：上司轉發文章多數會刊登</h4> +<p>This decrease in U.S. force posture accelerated under the Clinton administration, which planned for a final end strength of 100,000 by 1996 (down from 185,000 in 1993). Yet U.S. posture in Europe only reached a low of 113,000 in 1997 because of U.S. involvement in the Balkan wars. Between December 1995 and January 1996, the United States deployed 20,000 military personnel to Bosnia under a NATO-led force to implement a peace agreement.</p> -<p>控方展示 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄，顯示時任執行總編輯林文宗在2020年1月21日，向楊清奇轉發了一篇由前政協委員劉夢熊撰寫的文章，並指「劉夢熊投稿」。楊表示，對於這篇投稿，「我會視之為上司要我刊出嘅散稿嚟」，當收到上司的投稿，他在多數的情況都會刊登，只有個別有問題的文章，楊才會告知林不會刊登。控方遂展示於報紙論壇版刊出了的文章〈一國兩制：香港在做 台灣在看〉，日期為2020年1月23日。</p> +<p>In 2004, the George W. Bush administration announced that it would withdraw 40,000 U.S. military personnel from Europe as part of a broader effort to redeploy and return troops to the United States. This removal included the heavy armored brigades of the 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division, which returned to the United States. The reassignment of U.S. forces continued until late 2007 when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates temporarily halted the withdrawal of the last two heavy brigades. He was concerned that there was insufficient basing for the troops in the United States. U.S. military commanders in Europe also argued that armored capabilities were necessary to meet theater security requirements. Still, the number of U.S. military personnel fell by over 40 percent, from 115,000 personnel in 2004 to 66,000 in 2008. By 2011, only four brigade combat teams (BCTs) remained in Europe.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Pc3NTKI.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 劉夢熊</p> +<p>In 2012, however, the Obama administration announced that it would withdraw the two remaining armored brigades, in line with its Defense Strategic Guidance, leaving only two light BCTs. The number of U.S. personnel in Europe reached a post-World War II low of 63,000 in 2013. A rotational battalion-sized task force known as the European Rotational Force replaced the armored brigades.</p> -<p>楊確認在2019至2021年之間，由上司給予的散稿，包括劉夢熊的文章，都需要符合3個主要原則，即「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。他覺得這亦符合黎的觀點，「因為啲高層都好清楚黎先生嘅觀點嘅。」不過劉的文章很少出現在論壇版。</p> +<p>As U.S. troop strength in Europe decreased and U.S. strategic priorities shifted to other regions, there were two major arguments for retaining a presence in Europe. First, some argued that the United States needed a military presence in Italy and Germany to launch and support counterterrorism operations in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Second, some argued that the United States needed to maintain a robust suite of security cooperation activities to ensure that former Warsaw Pact countries continued reforming their militaries to be compatible with their recently established democratic institutions. In addition, the United States continued to deploy forces to the Balkans as part of the Kosovo Force.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指收到李柱銘朋友投稿-後來刊於論壇版">楊清奇指收到李柱銘朋友投稿 後來刊於論壇版</h4> +<p><strong>Russia’s 2014 Military Action in Ukraine</strong></p> -<p>控方續展示2020年4月23日由林文宗傳送給楊清奇的訊息，指「馬丁」的朋友有篇文章想在論壇版刊登，原稿題為〈江菁名言——主席叫我咬誰就咬誰〉，作者署名是「牧民」。楊問林：「作者係乜身份？」林回覆「問吓」。</p> +<p>Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Obama administration responded by bolstering the United States’ defense posture in Europe. In April, EUCOM launched Operation Atlantic Resolve to increase U.S. presence in the region. The operation was funded by the European Reassurance Initiative, later renamed the European Deterrence Initiative, a special account requested by the administration to fund rotational deployments, exercises, training, and security cooperation efforts with partners and allies. Much of the initial years of this funding went toward recapitalizing basing and infrastructure that had been underinvested in over prior decades. While the initial rotational deployments of the European Rotational Force in 2014 sent only a battalion-sized force to the region, those deployments expanded to meet the new mission requirements of Atlantic Resolve beginning in 2015. In January 2017, the DOD announced the beginning of a continuous armored brigade combat team (ABCT) rotational presence in Europe and back-to-back rotations of U.S. troops and equipment to Europe. By 2023, the 7,000-person rotational force included four elements: a division headquarters located in Poznan, Poland; a combat aviation brigade; an ABCT; and a sustainment task force.</p> -<p>楊指訊息中的「馬丁」就是民主黨創黨主席李柱銘（Martin Lee）。楊指一般情況下，他會問作者是否願意披露真實身份，如果不願意的話，就會介紹該作者為「自由撰稿人」。楊記得林文宗最後並未有回覆「牧民」的身份，所以就視他為不願意披露真實身份。</p> +<p>In July 2020, the Trump administration announced that it planned to withdraw almost 12,000 U.S. personnel from Germany. As part of that redeployment, approximately 6,400 troops would return to the United States, while the remainder would be moved to Belgium and Italy. The Biden administration announced that the withdrawal plans were on hold shortly after taking office.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NKnEZCr.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 李柱銘</p> +<h4 id="the-us-response-to-russias-2022-invasion-and-us-posture-today">THE U.S. RESPONSE TO RUSSIA’S 2022 INVASION AND U.S. POSTURE TODAY</h4> -<p>楊另指，原稿標題的「江菁」寫錯，他記得有替他改為「江青」。控方遂展示最後刊登於《蘋果》論壇版的文章，標題改為〈「主席叫我咬誰就咬誰」〉，作者是「牧民 自由撰稿人」。</p> +<p>As Russian forces massed on its border with Ukraine in late 2021 and early 2022, the Biden administration announced several deployments as part of its deterrence and reassurance efforts. In early February 2022, the United States deployed approximately 4,700 personnel of the 82nd Airborne Division and additional troops from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps to Germany and Poland and repositioned a Stryker squadron from Germany to Romania. Later that month, the DOD deployed the main V Corps Headquarters to Germany and the main 1st Infantry Division Headquarters and the 1st Infantry Division Artillery Headquarters to Poland, which totaled approximately 1,300 soldiers. The United States also deployed additional forces — including an infantry battalion task force, F-35 strike fighters, and attack aviation — to countries along NATO’s eastern flank. By the beginning of Russia’s invasion on February 24, 2022, the U.S. presence in Europe had increased to 90,000 personnel.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指李柱銘文章強調法治堅持一國兩制原本解釋-曾對國安法表示擔心">楊清奇指李柱銘文章強調法治、堅持一國兩制原本解釋 曾對國安法表示擔心</h4> +<p>Following the invasion, the DOD announced that it had deployed or extended over 20,000 additional forces to Europe, bringing the total number of U.S. personnel in Europe to over 100,000. These forces included the deployment of an ABCT, a High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battalion, and KC-135 refueling aircraft, among other forces. At the Madrid NATO Summit in July 2022, President Biden announced several “long-term commitments to bolster European security,” including:</p> -<p>楊清奇指李柱銘本來在《壹週刊》有專欄，但《壹週刊》不再出版實體版之後，陳沛敏便告訴他，李連同另外3個作家的專欄會轉移到《蘋果》論壇版，惟他不知道背後由誰決定。而李的專欄文章每逢星期三刊出，直至《蘋果》停運。控方遂展示刊出於2020年5月20日，由李柱銘撰寫的文章，題為〈法治興亡 匹夫有責〉。</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>In Poland, the permanent forward-stationing of the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters, and a field support battalion;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In Romania, the deployment of an additional rotational BCT;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In the Baltics, enhanced rotational deployments;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In Spain, an increase in the number of destroyers stationed at Rota from four to six;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In the United Kingdom, the forward-stationing of two F-35 squadrons;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In Germany, the forward-stationing of an air defense artillery brigade headquarters, a short-range air defense battalion, a combat sustainment support battalion headquarters, and an engineer brigade headquarters; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In Italy, the forward-stationing of a short-range air defense battery.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>楊指在2019至2021年期間，李柱銘的寫作角度是「比較強調法治」，「而且係比較堅持一國兩制原本嘅解釋，佢曾經係基本法起草委員會成員。」楊又指：「我印象中，佢對《國安法》係表示過擔心嘅」，不過相關文章實在太多，所以記不起細節。</p> +<p>The U.S. force posture in Europe rose by almost 60 percent from its historic low point in 2013. This increase coincided with an expanded footprint on the continent, with forward operating and training sites in addition to traditional bases and garris Europe. U.S. Army Europe and Africa has eight main operating bases across Germany, Belgium, and Italy, supported by seven Army garrison. It additionally maintains forward operating sites and training locations in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.</p> -<p>楊早前證供指黎智英、陳沛敏和他曾經於2016年討論過《蘋果》論壇版的作者名單，他今在庭上表示醒起李柱銘出現在當時的名單上。</p> +<p>The U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA) is headquartered at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and oversees approximately 35,000 personnel (including active-duty, guard, reserve, and civilian) and 217 aircraft. USAFE-AFAFRICA’s capabilities include fighter, attack, rotary-wing, tanker, and transport aircraft which perform close air support, air interdiction, air defense, in-flight refueling, long-range transport, and support of maritime operations. The command operates from seven main bases, including Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath and RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom; Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air Bases in Germany; Aviano Air Base in Italy; Lajes Field in the Azores; and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. While U.S. F-35 squadrons are primarily stationed at RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom and Sangadahlem Air Base in Germany, the fifth-generation aircraft deployed to the Baltic and Black Sea regions for air policing missions to deter against Russian aggression.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EpwtBuk.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<p>The U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, oversees an area of responsibility that covers approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean, from the Arctic Ocean to the coast of Antarctica, as well as the Adriatic, Baltic, Barents, Black, Caspian, Mediterranean, and North Seas. The fleet is headquartered at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Naples, Italy. Notably, the Sixth Fleet maintains Task Force 65/Destroyer Squadron 60 in Rota, Spain, which includes the forward stationing of six destroyers.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指胡志偉寫作角度支持抗爭支持制裁林鄭">楊清奇指胡志偉寫作角度「支持抗爭，支持制裁林鄭」</h4> +<h4 id="nato-posture-and-the-2022-strategic-concept">NATO POSTURE AND THE 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT</h4> -<p>控方續展示時任民主黨主席胡志偉的文章〈中港走回文革與冷戰之路〉，刊登日期為2020年5月28日。楊指胡是自由撰稿人，有時他會自己投稿，有時則是由他邀請胡撰文，就一些新聞作出回應，而這篇文章是胡投稿的。被問到胡的寫作角度，楊指：「佢係支持抗爭，支持制裁林鄭嘅。」</p> +<p>NATO responded to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 by establishing a high-readiness response force and enhancing its forward presence with four battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. These four battlegroups, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, respectively, totaled 4,530 personnel by May 2017. NATO’s presence on its eastern flank has expanded considerably since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine, with four new battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, for a total presence of 10,232 personnel as of November 2022. NATO has also adopted an increased air and missile defense posture on the eastern flank, which it refers to as “air shielding.”</p> -<p>控方指上述胡志偉文章的網上版有一張美術設計圖，可見國家主席習近平一臉猙獰，雙手正在摧毀地球，上面有香港的地圖。圖上引述文篇內容：「『習近平新獨裁時代』只是錯判形勢，只會將香港與中國拉回文革與冷戰的回頭路，內鬥外戰可達數十年計，人命經濟損失難以估算。」楊指這幅圖片是他當時找美術組同事畫的。</p> +<p>At its Madrid summit in June 2022, NATO announced a new strategic concept in response to Russia’s aggression. The new concept calls for a “fundamental shift to [NATO’s] deterrence and defence” by expanding NATO forces and capabilities. This shift includes the expansion of the forward-deployed battlegroups to brigade-sized units “where and when required.” NATO leaders also agreed to a new NATO Force Model for the high-readiness response force, with the goal of growing from 40,00 to over 300,000 troops. The NATO Force Model envisions two tiers of high-readiness forces, including 100,000 personnel ready to deploy within 10 days and an additional 200,000 ready within 30 days. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept also stresses the importance of enhancing prepositioned equipment to maintain readiness. This development marks a shift in NATO posture away from a “forward-presence tripwire” of limited forces on the eastern flank to a more credible force capable of deterrence by denial. In addition to releasing its new strategic concept at the Madrid summit, NATO also invited Finland and Sweden to join the alliance following the submission of their official letters of application in May. Finland officially joined NATO on April 4, 2023.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WQhsojh.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 胡志偉</p> +<p>In July 2023, NATO took further steps to enhance its posture by establishing new regional plans to defend NATO across all of its flanks with new command and control arrangements and by establishing a new Allied Reaction Force. Allies also agreed through a new Defense Investment Pledge to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense in an update to the 2014 agreement.</p> -<p>時任總編輯羅偉光與楊清奇之間的訊息紀錄顯示，羅於2020年11月18日轉發胡志偉的文章檔案給楊，並指這是胡的離職感言。楊庭上表示當時胡仍然是立法會議員，有份審理初選案的法官李運騰聞言問，在2020年11月18日的時候，胡志偉是否仍然擔任立法會議員。楊其後表示不肯定。</p> +<h4 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h4> -<h4 id="國安法生效後宣布擱筆-楊清奇指古德明對獨裁政治侵犯人權比較批判">國安法生效後宣布擱筆 楊清奇指古德明對獨裁政治、侵犯人權比較批判</h4> +<p>Since the end of World War II, the United States’ military posture in Europe has been impacted by a range of factors, especially the threat posed by the Soviet Union and then Russia. While the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to a major decline in U.S. forces in Europe, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has raised numerous questions about the future. The next chapter examines the threat landscape in Europe through 2030.</p> -<p>控方另提及專欄作家古德明，他在2020年7月6日發表文章〈「國安法」下，唯有擱筆〉。楊指古除了替《蘋果》論壇版撰文之外，也有為副刊寫專欄文章，但是他宣布「擱筆」之後，就沒有再替論壇版撰文。</p> +<h3 id="ch-03">CH. 03</h3> +<h3 id="europes-evolving-threat-landscape">EUROPE’S EVOLVING THREAT LANDSCAPE</h3> -<p>控方同樣問及古德明的寫作角度，楊形容：「佢嘅文章係比較特別，通常係以古諷今，咁對獨裁政治、對於侵犯人權事件都係比較批判嘅。」</p> +<p>This chapter examines the evolving threat landscape in Europe. It focuses on the military balance with Russia, which is the most significant threat to Europe in the foreseeable future. It also briefly examines terrorism, Iran, China, illegal migration, and other threats, such as pandemics and climate change. Applying a planning horizon through 2030 is far enough away to be helpful to policymakers considering force posture decisions, which can take years to develop. It is also near enough to make plausible assumptions about the future.</p> -<p>控方另展示新聞工作者林海於2020年9月1日刊登於《蘋果》論壇版的文章，題為〈兩個8.31〉，是關於2019年8月31日太子站事件及2014年8月31日全國人大常委會通過「8.31決定」，就普選方案「落閘」。楊表示最初邀請林海撰文的人是他自己，林是自由撰稿人，大約每一至兩星期撰文一次。至於林的寫作角度，楊形容：「都係支持抗爭，同埋支持制裁。」</p> +<p>The chapter argues that Russia will remain the most significant threat to Europe for the foreseeable future. Today, NATO enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent. In the event of a potential near-term Russian attack against NATO’s eastern flank, however unlikely, there are several factors in NATO’s favor: the inherent advantage of the defense, the force-to-space ratio problem for Russia, limited avenues of approach from Russia into Eastern Europe, and the qualitative superiority of NATO forces. In addition, NATO retains a robust nuclear deterrent.</p> -<p>控方又展示台灣學者林宗弦（Lin Thung Hong）的文章〈攬炒港人，北京輸掉全世界？〉，以黎智英被警察帶走的新聞相片作為配圖，刊登在台灣《蘋果》網站。該文章其後被翻譯成英文，並在香港《蘋果》英文版刊登。楊指林宗弦並沒有替香港《蘋果》的論壇版撰寫過文章。</p> +<p>Nevertheless, Russia has the will and intentions to threaten one or more NATO countries, and it is re-building its capabilities. Russian military thinking is dominated by a view that the United States is — and will remain — Moscow’s main enemy (главный враг) for the foreseeable future. This view of the United States as the main enemy has increased since the 2022 invasion. Russian political and military leaders assess that Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have been largely due to U.S. and broader NATO aid, which Russian leaders interpret as direct participation in the war. In addition, Russian leaders believe that the United States is attempting to expand its power, further encircle Russia, and weaken Russia militarily, politically, and economically. These sentiments make Russia a dangerous enemy over the next several years and will likely drive Moscow’s desire to reconstitute its military as rapidly as possible, prepare to fight the West if deterrence fails, and engage in irregular and hybrid activities.</p> -<p>案件下周一續審。</p> +<p>In addition, several factors could change the military balance in Europe over the next decade. First, the United States could become overstretched due to a major theater war in another region, such as against China in the Indo-Pacific. European conventional and logistical capabilities are limited — particularly for high-end war — creating potential vulnerabilities if the United States were to withdraw significant air, naval, and ground forces from the region. Second, Russia could rebuild its military capabilities over the next several years with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. China, in particular, is developing significant military capabilities, such as fifth- and sixth-generation fighters, hypersonic weapons, and emerging technologies, which could change the European balance of power if there were a notable increase in defense cooperation with Russia. Third, U.S. or European political will could erode to build sufficient military capabilities to deter Russia, based on differences in strategic culture, domestic financial and popular constraints, distinct threat perceptions, or other factors. Fourth, there are several other potential wildcards that could impact the threat environment, such as a Russian leadership change or use of a nuclear weapon.</p> -<hr /> +<p>There are several caveats in conducting any analysis of the future security environment, including the military balance. One is that this analysis is based on open-source reporting, not classified intelligence, which creates some gaps. For example, there is imperfect information about the size, composition, equipment, and capabilities of Russian forces, what is known as “order of battle.” Russia has utilized maskirovka — or denial and deception — to mask its activities, strengths, and vulnerabilities. It is also difficult to foresee how the future threat environment will evolve. For example, it was unclear in February 2021 that Russia would invade Ukraine a year later — and then suffer a series of battlefield losses. These uncertainties suggest that any analysis of the future security environment in Europe should have sufficient modesty and humility.</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇指李柱銘文章比較強調法治、胡志偉則支持抗爭和制裁林鄭【黎智英案・審訊第四十日】2024-03-07T12:00:00+08:002024-03-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-40<ul> - <li>楊清奇指黎智英慷慨向員工派股票 但用人「殘忍」頻換高層</li> - <li>楊清奇指專欄文「擦邊」避國安法 例如諷刺官說不怕制裁如「夜行吹哨」</li> -</ul> +<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines the military balance in Europe with Russia. The second section assesses other threats to Europe, such as terrorism, Iran, China, and illegal immigration. The third outlines possible wildcards that could change the military balance in Europe and impact the threat environment. The fourth section provides a brief summary.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="military-balance-in-europe">MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tpCpgod.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>This section begins by examining Russia and the conventional balance in Europe and then turns to the nuclear balance</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（7日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第40日審訊，繼續由前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。他解釋遵從黎智英指示是因為對方是個「慷慨又殘忍」的老闆，黎在蘋果股票上市時會向員工派股票，令早前部分高層成為「千萬、億萬富翁」，但若黎認為員工不合心意，「好快就換人」，他任職23年期間，單是社長和總編輯已各換7至8人。他又指示黎智英對新聞要求是「求新求變」，最簡單直接的方法，就是「換人去做」。</p> +<p><strong>The Conventional Balance</strong></p> -<p>楊清奇提及黎智英與其他高層有時會就論壇版專欄作家名單變動提出建議。法官李運騰問及黎在《蘋果》有否職位，楊表示沒有，他解釋仍聽從指示的原因，是印象中「黎先生係個慷慨老闆，又係一個殘忍嘅老闆」，說是「慷慨」是因為蘋果在股票上市和分拆網上版時，黎向員工派股票，「造就咗早期一啲高層管理層，成為千萬富翁，或億萬富翁。」</p> +<p>Any analysis assessing the military balance should begin by positing the goals and strategies of the two sides, and it should then proceed to explore the ability of each side to execute its strategy. In Eastern Europe, NATO’s primary goal is to deter an attack and defend its eastern flank, if necessary. To achieve this goal, NATO has adopted a conventional strategy that aims, in the words of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, to “defend forward with robust in-place, multi-domain, combat-ready forces, enhanced command and control arrangements, prepositioned ammunition and equipment and improved capacity and infrastructure to rapidly reinforce any Ally, including at short or no notice.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/A3ka7wS.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> +<p>Russia’s strategy has generally focused on “active defense” (активная оборона), which involves taking measures to deny victory in the initial period of a foreign invasion. But Russia’s strategy envisions occasionally shifting to the offense, as it did in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin seeks a growing sphere of influence in Europe, the Middle East, and other regions, and he has expressed admiration for the historical Russian Empire and Russian conquerors such as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. In his essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” Putin argued that Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians are descendants of the Rus and that Ukraine has never been a sovereign country. Putin has also expressed interest in a new Slavic union composed of Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and perhaps the northern part of Kazakhstan.</p> -<h4 id="搖大樹換人-想留在蘋果須做好本份">「搖大樹」換人 想留在蘋果須做好本份</h4> +<p>Based on this revisionist worldview, NATO countries need to deter future Russian activity — including irregular or gray zone activities — in Eastern Europe, especially such countries as the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland. Russian military thinking is dominated by a view that the United States — and NATO more broadly — is Moscow’s main enemy (главный враг). Russian political and military leaders assess that the country’s struggles in Ukraine have been largely due to U.S. and broader NATO assistance. As one senior Russian diplomat remarked, “The United States became a direct participant of this conflict long ago, and they have long been waging a hybrid war against my country. Ukraine is only an instrument in their hands, a tip of the spear held by the U.S.-led collective West. Their goal is to destroy a sovereign, independent Russia as a factor in international politics.” Russian leaders also believe that the United States is expanding its influence, attempting to further encircle Russia, and trying to weaken Russia militarily, politically, and economically. The result is that Russia’s insecurity and animosity toward the West — and the United States in particular — will likely deepen.</p> -<p>楊表示形容黎智英「殘忍」是「誇張咗啲，但佢用人用到盡嘅」，若遇到員工「唔啱佢心意，好快就換人」，在他任職《蘋果》23年期，他記得總編緝換了7至8個人，社長亦相同。楊又指黎智英對新聞要求是「求新求變」，最簡單直方式是「換人去做」，又指黎智英會用「搖大樹」方法換人，若想在留在《蘋果》工作，必須聽從老闆指示，主動做好手頭工作。</p> +<p>While a Russian conventional attack against NATO countries, such as the Baltic states, is unlikely today, NATO needs to deter a Russian attack in the future. There are several factors that are important to assess deterrence: (1) the relative strength of the available forces possessed by Russia and NATO; (2) the force-to-space ratio; (3) the relative rate at which each side can marshal and deploy forces; (4) the individual initiative and flexibility of Russian commanders; and (5) the character of the terrain in the theater.</p> -<p>就論壇版的文章，楊清奇確認分兩類，一類是「專欄作家」定期供稿，另一類是「自由撰稿人」。專欄作家有戴耀廷、李柱銘、Simon Lee、盧峯（馮偉光）、古立、劉細良、古德明、錢志健、安裕、潘小濤、蔡子強等。在2019年後，海外人士朱牧民、羅冠聰和旅美作家「一劍飄塵」等人亦有為《蘋果》供稿。</p> +<p><strong>Relative Capabilities of Opposing Forces:</strong> The first factor is the relative strength of the opposing forces. The best measures of relative conventional strength are those that capture the full range of combat capabilities of a force.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1OJHxJ7.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》英文版主筆馮偉光，筆名「盧峯」</p> +<p>While Russian soldiers have struggled in Ukraine, the Russian military is attempting to modernize its forces, including main battle tanks (such as the T-14 Armata), infantry fight vehicles (such as the BMP-2M and T-15), armored personnel carriers (such as the BTR‐82A and BTR‐82AM), and artillery (such as the 300-mm 9K515 Tornado-S [Smerch] and 122-mm 9K51M Tornado-G [Grad] multiple rocket launcher system). Russia is also modernizing its legacy aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, and radars. Over the next year or two, Russia plans to deploy two regiments equipped with RS-26 Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia’s navy is modernizing elements of its fleet, including with the Borey-class (Project 955/955A) ballistic missile submarine, guided missile submarines such as the Project 949A Oscar II-class), and missiles (such as the 3M14 Kalibr land-attack cruise missile). Russia is also focused on improving other components of its anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities through 2030, including air defense, coastal missiles, and layered defenses. Russia’s defense industry, which has been handicapped by sanctions, will likely be under stress to match its leaders’ ambitions, though it is producing new equipment.</p> -<h4 id="李官不明控方為何不停兜圈旁敲">李官不明控方為何不停兜圈旁敲</h4> +<p>Russia is in the midst of a shift in force design. The Russian army will likely continue to move away from battalion formations to infantry, marine, and airborne divisions. This would mark a significant shift away from the changes implemented under former minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov, who scrapped the Soviet-era structure of the armed forces that included large divisions as part of the “New Look” reforms.</p> -<p>控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤向楊展示多張他與其他《蘋果》高層的 WhatsApp 對話，內容提及如何安排刊登朱牧民和羅冠聰的文章，又提及他負責的周六「每周熱話」專題版如何選材。張卓勤問楊，黎智英有沒有指示專題版內容需要與暴動、示威或制裁有關。辯方反對問題，法官李運騰同意問題具引導性，指控方若有黎智英指示楊的 WhatsApp 截圖，何不直接出示，不解控方為何不停兜圈。</p> +<p>As part of its restructuring plan, the military re-established the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts as joint force strategic territorial units within the armed forces. This was another blow to the Serdyukov “New Look” reforms, since he had condensed six military districts into four, as well as changed their command and control relationships. The Western Military District’s failure during the invasion of Ukraine may have contributed to its downfall. The Russian military will also likely increase the number of contract service members, or kontraktniki (контрактники), and raise the age ceiling for conscription.</p> -<p>張卓勤稱是希望法官能更「熟悉」論壇版的事件，李官直接向楊問，在2019年至2021年期間，就版面選材事宜，有否曾收到高層指示。楊清奇顯出不耐煩，說：「你個問題，我𢲷到頭都爆」，因為控方不停考他記憶。張卓勤改問一個發生2019年12月24日的 WhatsApp 對話，一個關於「林鄭向落選區議員派公職」的周六專題，是否由高層指示撰寫，楊表示該專題是他和同事決定。</p> +<p>Yet the Russian military faces several challenges. First, Russia’s deepening economic crisis will somewhat constrain its efforts to expand the quantity and quality of its ground, air, and naval forces. The war in Ukraine has fueled Russia’s worst labor crunch in decades; hundreds of thousands of workers have fled the country or have been sent to fight in Ukraine, weakening an economy weighed down by economic sanctions and international isolation. Second, corruption remains rampant in the Russian military, which could undermine Moscow’s overall plan to structure, staff, train, and equip its forces. Third, Russia’s defense industrial base faces several challenges. One is replacement of losses from the war in Ukraine. A protracted war in Ukraine will likely compound these challenges. In addition, economic sanctions have created shortages of higher-end foreign components and forced Moscow to substitute them with lower-quality alternatives.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CG0uWvW.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> +<p>In short, the conventional balance in Europe favors the United States and Europe today. This advantage includes forces currently deployed to NATO’s eastern flank, as well as forces that Russia and NATO could deploy as part of a war that are stationed elsewhere. As Figure 3.1 highlights, for example, the United States and other NATO forces have a significant advantage in the number of active and reserve army personnel, main battle tanks, other armored fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and air and missile defenses already deployed on the collective territory. This importantly does not include the potential reinforcements and rotational positioning that U.S. and allied forces can produce. Russia’s war in Ukraine significantly deteriorated Russian capabilities.</p> -<h4 id="楊不滿問題考記憶-笑謂背唐詩宋詞更易">楊不滿問題考記憶 笑謂背唐詩宋詞更易</h4> +<p>In addition, the United States and other NATO forces have some advantages in naval capabilities, including submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and other surface ships, as highlighted in Figure 3.2. The same is true in air forces, as highlighted in Figure 3.3, where the United States and NATO have an advantage in bombers, fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, command and control aircraft, electronic warfare, and other aircraft.</p> -<p>李官插問，在2019至2021年期間的周六專題，其中有否由高層指示題材？楊清奇謂道：「又係考記憶力嘅問題，我背幾百首唐詩宋詞畀你仲易。」他續指，專題選材是「互動」的，有時由他提出建議，有時由同事食飯傾計時提出，不過議題大多包括最熱門的話題，就當時而言，制裁、社會事件和《國安法》都會包括在內。他又補充自己未曾被要求更改主題，認為反映選材符合黎智英的要求。</p> +<p>There are two other themes of note based on the data. First, the United States’ armed forces constitute a majority of NATO’s overall military capabilities. As discussed later in this chapter, U.S. involvement in a war in the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, or another region would likely impact the type and number of forces available in Europe, potentially changing this balance. Second, while the conventional balance in Europe heavily favors NATO, Russia’s weakness is particularly apparent compared to Chinese capabilities. As highlighted later in this chapter, China could provide weapons systems and technology to Russia that would change the balance.</p> -<p>控方其後觸及在《國安法》實施後，他負責的論壇版在選材和挑選投稿時有否改變運作方式。楊清奇表示沒有收到黎智英的指示要求改變《蘋果》立場，他認為意思是繼續支持制裁，他個人撰寫的評論保持相同立場。但由於任何人公開呼籲制裁，將會觸犯《國安法》，「作為一個編緝，唔想佢觸犯《國安法》，又要保持原本立場，咁喺寫作時要作出啲變化」，即改成「打擦邊球」。</p> +<p><strong>Force-to-Space Ratio:</strong> A second factor includes force-to-space ratio constraints. The size of the forces that both sides can place on the front lines is limited by the nature of the local geography and the transportation infrastructure. Beyond a certain number, more forces will not fit on the front. Many of the attacker’s vehicles must travel on roads, require significant logistics tails, and need to be spaced out to decrease the possibility of strikes from aircraft, artillery, and ambushes. If the attacker crams too many forces at or near the point of attack, a traffic jam could develop that makes it difficult to maneuver the offender’s armored forces. The defender can place more forces in prepared positions off the roads, but there are limits to the size of the defender’s forward forces as well. This limit, known as the maximum force-to-space ratio, is roughly one brigade per seven kilometers of front, although these are approximate estimates.</p> -<h4 id="擦邊球翻譯一度惹來笑聲">「擦邊球」翻譯一度惹來笑聲</h4> +<p>Some of these challenges were evident in the first days and weeks following the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Russian army faced significant logistical and maintenance challenges operating in contested areas deep inside of Ukraine. Without access to rail transport infrastructure that is typically used to move Russian heavy equipment and with the few roads available clogged with traffic, it became increasingly difficult for Russian forces operating on the Kyiv axis to move food, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies to forward-deployed forces. These problems were compounded by the Russian army’s failure to provide convoy security to logistics vehicles, such as trucks carrying food, water, fuel, medical equipment, mobile kitchen equipment, and spare parts. Forward-deployed Russian vehicles broke down, but many had to be abandoned because of a lack of spare parts, mechanics, and recovery vehicles. The Russian military also lacked modern shipping containers, mechanized loaders, forklifts, or pallets to efficiently move supplies into Ukraine. Instead of a mechanized logistics system, Russia’s military relied on conscript labor to move gear, often in unwieldy wooden crates.</p> -<p>他解釋不論在寫作和挑選文章，他都不再公開呼籲制裁，但會通過評論裁制事件，分析「下一個制裁方法嚴重性」，他認為可以表示繼續表達出支持制裁的立場。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/c7mLj6k.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.1: Military Balance in Selected Land Forces, 2023.</strong> Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2023 (London: Routledge, 2023).</em></p> -<p>至於挑選「公開投稿」的標準，楊清奇表示要視乎文章能否回應社會事件或政治新聞，亦要判斷文章是否符合《蘋果》讀者的口味，例如支持反修例運動和支持制裁。他認為黎智英撰寫的專欄文章持相同觀點，並視之為他寫稿的「指引」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cgZeYMJ.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.2: Military Balance in Selected Maritime Forces, 2023.</strong> Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023.</em></p> -<p>就「擦邊球」的翻釋，庭上發生一段小插曲，出身葡籍法律世家的李素蘭法官不理解「擦邊球」意思，更一度反問：「ball?」楊清奇表示可以簡單概括，《國安法》畫的紅線（red line）「大家當時都係估估下，我打出呢個波，又唔想打出界變成犯法（go beyond the line）」，於是他就打在邊界上（land at the line），舉例網球、羽毛球也有邊界位。李運騰法官其後提議可意譯做「skirt the line（擦邊）」或「playing in grey area（遊走在灰色地帶）」，楊認同意思正確。</p> +<p>Force-to-space ratio constraints generally help the defender — in this case NATO — by preventing the attacker from exploiting whatever local materiel superiority might be enjoyed at breakthrough points. The attacker strives to achieve overwhelming superiority at the breakthrough points by suddenly concentrating forces there. An attacker likely requires a local force advantage of at least 3:1 to open a breach in the defender’s front. If both sides have large forces at their disposal, however, the attacker may be unable to place enough units forward to gain a 3:1 advantage, even if it has local materiel superiority, simply because there is insufficient room at the front. Instead, the attacker must stack forces up behind the front, where they cannot contribute to the breakthrough battle. But stacking forces up puts them in danger of being targeted by long-range strike.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AEk7y6K.png" alt="image05" /></p> +<p>Russia faces considerable force-to-space ratio constraints in Eastern Europe today. A Russian buildup along NATO’s eastern flank, including in Belarus, would likely lead to a rapid NATO deterrent buildup in response — and deny Russia from gaining a force-to-space ratio advantage.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】蘋果案第40日審訊，下午續審，《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇續以「從犯證人」作供，他提及多名專欄作者的寫作立場，例如戴耀廷在2019年時支持抗爭，其後發動初選；區家麟對國安法持批評態度；李怡的政治取向「激進」，從支持抗爭和反對《國安法》，其觀點都非常鮮明，甚至在《國安法》實施後仍在評論文章支持制裁。法官李運騰質疑，為何他容許刊登支持制裁的文章，楊表示李怡用「擦邊球」方式，例如諷刺被制裁的中港官員，聲稱不怕制裁，卻如「夜行人吹口哨」。</p> +<p><strong>Relative Rates of Reinforcement into Breakthrough Area:</strong> A third factor affecting the balance is the relative rate of reinforcement into the breakthrough battle area. The defender must match the attacker’s concentration at the main point of attack. To do this, the defender — in this case NATO forces — must be able to move forces already in the theater. The defender must also be able to compete with the attacker in bringing outside forces into the theater. The defender’s basic aim is to ensure that the attacker does not win the breakthrough battle by wearing down the defender to the point where the defender has virtually no forces remaining.</p> -<p>代表控方的助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤向楊清奇展示他與陳沛敏的 WhatsApp 對話，其中一句提及「聖旨」一詞，張卓勤問是代表黎智英指示論壇版的主題，楊清奇表示不是，主題通常在逢周二的策劃會決定。他又指專欄寫手有如「專家」，有自己的立場，通常他不會定出角度，而是「由佢哋發揮」。</p> +<p>In most wargames over the past decade involving a Russian invasion in Eastern Europe — especially the Baltics — forward-deployed NATO ground forces were badly outgunned by Russia both by forces massing from mainland Russia but also from the heavily militarized enclave of Kaliningrad, located on the Baltic Sea between Lithuania and Poland. NATO airpower was able to impose significant attrition on attacking Russian forces, destroying the equivalent of two to three battalion equivalents per day in some games. But without a heavy NATO ground force to slow down Russian forces, NATO forces failed to halt the invasion. More recently, however, NATO has strengthened its eastern flank, improving its relative rate of reinforcement. For example, the Baltic region has been a focal point for NATO, which agreed on the Readiness Action Plan at the 2014 Wales summit and established the Enhanced Forward Presence at the 2016 Warsaw summit. This forward presence was first deployed in 2017, with the creation of four multinational battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, respectively. In the southeast, a tailored presence on land, at sea, and in the air contributed to increased allied activity in the region as well as enhanced situational awareness, interoperability, and responsiveness.</p> -<h4 id="黎智英讚區家麟評論文章好">黎智英讚區家麟評論文章好</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NjSrDYh.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.3: Military Balance in Selected Air Forces, 2023.</strong> Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023.</em></p> -<p>張卓勤轉為問資深傳媒人區家麟與《蘋果》的關係，並展示2020年4月19日的一個對話截圖，黎智英稱讚「李平，區家麟文章好，請考慮邀寫評論版，謝謝。黎」。楊清奇表示區家麟本來已是副刊版的其中一名專欄作家，黎智英意思是邀請區再在A疊的論壇版再寫文章。他相信黎智英看中區家麟的文筆流暢，加上對《國安法》持批評態度。</p> +<p>Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO reinforced the existing battlegroups and established four more multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. Known as the Eastern Flank Initiative, this brought the total number of multinational battlegroups to eight, effectively doubling the number of troops on the ground when fully established and extending NATO’s forward presence along the alliance’s eastern flank — from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mlSVSLu.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 區家麟</p> +<p>The four northeastern battlegroups (in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) are under NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters in Szczecin, Poland. Two division-level headquarters coordinate the training and preparation activities of their respective battlegroups. Multinational Division Northeast Headquarters, located in Elblag, Poland, has been fully operational since December 2018. This headquarters works closely with the battlegroups in Poland and Lithuania. A complementary Multinational Division North Headquarters was activated by NATO in October 2020 and is moving toward full operational capability. Its forward elements are located in Adazi, Latvia, while the rest of the headquarters is located in Karup, Denmark. This headquarters cooperates closely with the battlegroups in Estonia and Latvia. At the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, NATO allies agreed to enhance the multinational battlegroups from battalions up to brigade size, where and when required. These steps have changed the relative rates of reinforcement, making it more difficult for Russia to conduct a successful breakthrough.</p> -<p>控方展示區家麟數篇撰寫的評論，包括〈摧毀即貫幑 攬炒即繁榮〉，〈2020香港新詞〉、〈穿官袍戴假髮演一台爛戲〉、〈「煽動」作為一種法律武器〉。張卓勤稱，似乎大部份區的文章都獲得版面上方位置，是否有任何特別含意，楊表示很難一概而論，要視乎文章當日「質量」。</p> +<p>In addition, an attacker’s penetrating armies will be vulnerable to counterattack since they will be moving forward rapidly on unfamiliar terrain at the head of long logistical columns. The defender therefore may be able to seal off the penetration if it rapidly brings reserves to bear. The size and quality of the defender’s reserves become important for this reason. Again, NATO has made adjustments over the past several years. NATO’s rapid reinforcement strategy ensures that forward-presence forces will be reinforced by NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the broader NATO Response Force, additional high-readiness forces, and NATO’s heavier follow-on forces. At the 2022 Madrid summit, NATO agreed on a new NATO Force Model, which represented a broader expansion of high-readiness forces potentially available to NATO, where and when required. NATO allies have also agreed to boost NATO’s ability to reinforce its forces in the east by developing:</p> -<h4 id="戴耀廷2021年初停供稿">戴耀廷2021年初停供稿</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>More prepositioned equipment and weapons stockpiles;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>More forward-deployed capabilities, including integrated air and missile defense systems;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Strengthened command and control; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Upgraded defense plans, with specific forces preassigned to the defense of specific allies.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>至於戴耀廷，楊表示在他接手論壇版前，戴已經是《蘋果》的專欄作家，他不知道最初由誰邀請戴寫文章。張卓勤問戴耀廷寫文角度是什麼，楊表示戴在2019年「主要支持抗爭嘅」，後來他「發動咗初選」，撰寫多篇文章都與初選有關。在2021年1月15日，他獲時任執行總編林文宗告之，戴暫時不能為論壇版供稿，他估計是戴當時因為初選案被捕，他透過港聞記者轉達。</p> +<p><strong>Flexibility and Initiative of Attacking Forces:</strong> The fourth factor is the ability of attacking forces to maximize flexibility and initiative. To forestall a successful counterattack, the attacker must take immediate advantage of the breakthrough opening and then maintain a rapid rate of advance to keep the defender constantly off balance. This is a demanding task because the commanders of the attacker’s forces, operating in a fog of war, will have to make rapid-fire decisions based on incomplete information while facing a constantly changing situation. A deep strategic penetration is best served by a flexible command and control structure and a joint force commanded at all levels by individuals capable of intelligently exercising initiative. Delegating responsibility to officers and non-commissioned officers who can make bold decisions in difficult circumstances maximizes the prospects that the attacking forces will not get bogged down, undermining the blitzkrieg.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IJlQlWK.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 戴耀廷</p> +<p>Russian forces currently lack flexibility and initiative. During the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, for example, a failure of small-unit cohesion and initiative likely contributed to the defeat of some Russian forces. Russian units included a mix of troops with variable levels of training, experience, and equipment — and with little time spent working together. The lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps in the Russian army likely inhibited the cohesion of these units. Additional deficiencies included small-unit tactics and morale, which are usually the purview of junior and non-commissioned officers. Small-unit leaders failed to break with the Soviet tradition of passively waiting for orders, which discourages initiative and punishes mistakes. It did not help that many Russian soldiers were not informed that they were being sent to war, but were instead told they were headed to a training mission. Furthermore, the massive casualties among Russia’s contract soldiers — disproportionately concentrated among the airborne and special forces — in the first month of the war left many surviving soldiers deeply reluctant to embark on offensive operations. The most experienced troops who should have been critical to leading newly mobilized personnel were, in many cases, the most reluctant to conduct attacks.</p> -<p>控方再問有關李怡的政治立場，楊表示李怡「政治取向係激進啲，從支持抗爭，到反對《國安法》，佢嘅觀點都好鮮明嘅」，他又形容李怡是一名資深評論員，且「黎先生好欣賞佢嘅」。他又指李怡即使在《國安法》實施後，文章的取態仍是支持制裁。</p> +<p>Consequently, the Russian military — especially Russian ground forces — lacks sufficient initiative to be able to effectively execute a conventionally focused blitzkrieg operation against NATO countries.</p> -<h4 id="黎智英指新冠是中共史上最大挑戰">黎智英指新冠是中共史上最大挑戰</h4> +<p><strong>Geography:</strong> Geography is a fifth factor impacting the outcome of a successful breakthrough battle. The defender generally prefers a front covered with obstacles — rivers, mountains, forests, swamps, jungles, and prepared defensive positions — so that there are few locations where the attacker can place a main axis of attack. The defender then has a good chance of predicting where the attacker will strike, minimizing the attacker’s prospects of outmaneuvering the defender. Also, a defender faced with few possible breakthrough points along the front can concentrate forces in front of them, since the defender does not have to worry much about the obstacle-ridden portion of the front.</p> -<p>法官李運騰質疑，為何楊清奇容許支持制裁的文章刊登在《蘋果》？楊表示李怡寫文章的手法是「打擦邊球」，例如一篇題為「夜行人吹口哨」的文章，李怡諷刺被制裁的中港官員，他們覺得自己不怕制裁，但就如夜行人吹口哨。李官問道，這就是他認為是「擦邊球」原因？楊確認是。</p> +<p>Geography poses a challenge for NATO in Eastern Europe, though it does not outweigh other factors, such as both sides’ relative capabilities and the attacker’s initiative. The Baltic states, for example, are largely flat, though the terrain is dotted with lakes, bogs, and marshes. In some places, off-road mobility could be difficult, especially during the rasputitsa — or thaw — when travel on unpaved roads becomes difficult because of muddy conditions caused by rain or melting snow. Still, there is a fairly robust network of roads and highways in the Baltics, and the distances are short.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RSgyd0I.png" alt="image08" /> -▲ 李怡（已歿）</p> +<p>It is only 213 kilometers from Ivangorod, Russia, which is situated along the Russian-Estonian border, to Talinn along the E20 highway in flat terrain. Lithuania is in an even more precarious situation. There are multiple direct routes from Belarus to Vilnius, Lithuania’s capital, in relatively flat terrain. It is a short 35-kilometer drive from the border crossing at Kamenny Log to Vilnius along the E28 highway, and a 34-kilometer drive from the border crossing at Kotlovka to Vilnius along the 103 highway. Russia’s enclave in Kaliningrad could interfere with the movement of NATO forces into the Baltics. To move from Poland into Lithuania by land, for example, NATO forces would have to transit the “Kaliningrad corridor,” a 110- to 150-kilometer gap in Poland between the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus that could be attacked from both sides and could require substantial air, sea, and ground forces to secure. Instead of moving over land from Poland, NATO forces could arrive by air or by sea, but they would have to contend with Russian interdiction.</p> -<p>控方又展示一段黎智英向楊清奇傳送的一段長訊息，黎提及自己對 COVID-19 的看法，他表示「這可能是中共有史以來最大的挑戰」，提及「武漢 coronavirus 事件」引起人們對中共的恐慌，「只相信無論政府說什麼都是假的，沒有說的才是真實，那種無助感使人向最壞處想像，原本可控制的最後都失控，都只因為失信」。</p> +<p>Finland, which shares a 1,300-kilometer border with Russia, also presents a challenge for NATO. Finland’s geography is characterized by intermingled boreal forests and lakes, with archipelagoes and coastal lowlands in the south, a slightly higher central lake plateau, and uplands in the north and northeast. Northern and eastern Finland are sparsely populated and contain vast wilderness areas, with taiga forest as the dominant vegetation type. But the terrain in Finland is mostly flat, and it is only 191 kilometers from the Torfyanovka border crossing to Helsinki along the E18 highway.</p> -<h4 id="控方叫楊清奇演譯黎智英想法-法官感驚訝">控方叫楊清奇演譯黎智英想法 法官感驚訝</h4> +<p>The same is true of Poland, whose plains have made it susceptible to invasion throughout history, from the Mongols in the thirteenth century to the Nazi and Soviet invasions in the twentieth century. Poland’s geographic location is, in part, why Norman Davies titled his history of Poland God’s Playground. Poland’s relatively flat central terrain is partly why wargames of a Russian invasion of Poland, including Winter-20, have been bleak.</p> -<p>張卓勤問楊清奇，黎智英用「武漢 coronavirus」一詞，是否反映黎對事件看法，法官李素蘭驚訝表示控方怎可以這樣提問，張即尷尬示意「可能是因為下午（maybe because of afteroon）」，改為問其後見報版本，有沒有任何修改，楊清奇表示黎智英在其撰寫的評論曾用「武漢冠狀病毒流感」一詞，不過楊認為意思重複，故他刪去「流感」兩字，後來基本上《蘋果日報》都採用「武漢肺炎」一詞。</p> +<p>While these geographic features present challenges, they do not outweigh the other factors, such as the relative capabilities of the forces possessed by the sides, the force-to-space ratio, the relative rate at which each side can marshal and deploy reinforcements, and the individual initiative and flexibility of the attacker’s commanders. The conventional balance heavily favors NATO, which has a very good chance of defeating any conventional Russian attack in Eastern Europe. This reality is very different from the military balance in Central Europe for part of the Cold War.</p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p><strong>The Nuclear Balance</strong></p> -<hr /> +<p>Russia has improved its nuclear capabilities and still maintains the largest inventory of strategic weapons in the world, providing it with a strong deterrent capability against conventional and nuclear threats. Moscow has been — and will likely continue to be — committed to retaining a full range of sea-, land-, and air-based systems. Russia’s land‐based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are under the control of the Strategic Missile Forces, while sea‐ and air‐based strategic systems are operationally managed by the Russian navy and air force. Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS) brings together Russia’s aviation, air defense, and missile defense systems, as well as the country’s missile early-warning and space control and monitoring systems, under a unified and integrated command and control structure. Moscow may also be developing a nuclear space-based weapon capable of targeting satellites.</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇指黎智英慷慨向員工派股票 但用人「殘忍」頻換高層 楊清奇指專欄文「擦邊」避國安法 例如諷刺官說不怕制裁如「夜行吹哨」War Clouds Over India?2024-03-06T12:00:00+08:002024-03-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/war-clouds-over-india<p><em>While wars elsewhere hold the world’s attention, a new conflict may be on the cards along the Line of Actual Control between India and China in Eastern Ladakh.</em></p> +<p>Overall, examples of Russian modernization priorities include: the RS-26 Avangard ICBM, equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle; the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM; the Poseidon nuclear-capable, long-range unmanned underwater vehicle; the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (Dagger) air-launched high-speed ballistic missile; the Tu-160M strategic bomber; and the PAK-DA next-generation strategic bomber.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>As Figure 3.4 highlights, however, the United States and NATO possess a strong nuclear deterrent. The United States has roughly 400 Minuteman III ICBMs. In addition, the U.S. arsenal includes roughly 280 Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the United Kingdom has another 48 Trident I/II D5 SLBMs, and France has 64 M51 SLBMs. In addition, the United States currently possesses roughly 66 aircraft (B-2s and B-52s) capable of carrying nuclear weapons, while France has 40 Rafales. The certification of the F-35 as a dual-capable aircraft (DCA) will increase the number of tactical air delivery systems available in Europe. The result is near parity in the number of warheads: approximately 4,495 for Russia and roughly 4,300 for the United States, United Kingdom, and France. NATO’s strategic air-, land-, and maritime-based capabilities give it a viable second-strike capability and a strong deterrent.</p> -<p>India is in China’s crosshairs. As the Russia–Ukraine War in Eastern Europe and the Israel–Gaza War in West Asia enter their respective endgames, the inevitable question that arises is: “Where will the next war be?” If Taiwan comes to mind, think again. The second China–India War will most likely be fought in Eastern Ladakh in India’s far northwest region sometime between 2025 and 2030.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l0j70Pb.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.4: The Nuclear Balance in Selected Strategic Offensive Weapons, 2023.</strong> Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023.</em></p> -<p>Eastern Ladakh refers to the area of the Indian union territory of Ladakh currently under the administrative control of the Government of India that lies east of the Indus River and west of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates it from the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, held by Beijing since the first China-India War of 1962. Eastern Ladakh is of critical geostrategic importance for China and India from the perspective of each country’s vital national interests. The driver for China is energy security, while for India it is territorial integrity. The 2025–2030 timeframe represents the optimum window of opportunity for China and the maximum period of vulnerability for India, reflecting the significant asymmetric balance of power in favour of China. Absent a modus vivendi between these two nuclear-armed adversaries, conventional war (and the spectre of nuclear war) will be impossible to avoid.</p> +<p>The United States is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal. For example, existing strategic delivery systems are undergoing modernization, including complete rebuilds of the Minuteman III ICBM and Trident II SLBM. The service lives of the Navy’s 14 Trident Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines are being extended. Additionally, Columbia-class submarines will replace Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. The U.S. Air Force is also building a new strategic bomber, the B-21 Raider, and a new nuclear-capable cruise missile, the Long Range Stand Off Weapon, to replace the existing air-launched cruise missile. These modernization efforts will likely ensure that NATO retains a strong nuclear deterrent in Europe.</p> -<h3 id="through-chinese-spectacles">Through Chinese Spectacles</h3> +<p>While NATO enjoys a robust nuclear deterrent, it is less clear whether Russia will be deterred from using nuclear weapons against a country outside of NATO, such as Ukraine. Any Russian use of nuclear weapons against any non-NATO country would cause significant political concern across Europe.</p> -<p>Beijing views Eastern Ladakh through the lens of energy security. China’s political, economic and military power is inextricably intertwined with its energy security, given its heavy dependence on oil and gas imports. Eastern Ladakh is the only pathway from which a hostile power can launch an attack to invade and occupy Kashgar, China’s crucial energy entrepot in the far Western province of Xinjiang. A vital pillar of China’s energy security is the planned land-based pipeline connecting Iran’s oil and gas fields to Kashgar, transiting through Pakistan via the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As the US Department of Defense (DoD) notes in its 2023 annual report on China, “through … projects associated with pipelines and port construction in Pakistan, it [China] seeks to become less reliant on transporting energy resources through strategic choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca”. The planned route of CPEC runs from the port city of Gwadar near the Pakistan–Iran border through the key city of Gilgit in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (also claimed by India) to the Khunjerab Pass, which is the sole transit point connecting Pakistan with China’s Kashgar terminus. It is likely to take at least a decade to complete the energy pipeline, by which time the DoD’s report suggests that China will no longer be dependent on maritime routes for its energy imports.</p> +<p><strong>Other Threats</strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The harsh reality India faces is that for the foreseeable future, there will continue to be an asymmetric balance of power in favour of China</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In addition to Russia, there are other threats to Europe. This section focuses on several threats: Iran, China, terrorism, illegal immigration, and illegal drug trafficking. These represent the most acute threats to Europe over the next decade. There are other threats — involving climate change, pandemics, energy, and cyber — that also present long-term threats.</p> -<p>If China’s energy security is to rely on land-based oil and gas pipelines connecting friendly energy producers to China, the pipelines must be outside the effective military reach of hostile powers. According to the DoD’s China report, the critical first phase of Beijing’s three-phase military modernisation programme is expected to be completed by 2027. From a military perspective, the most logical land route to seize Kashgar would be to march an expeditionary force along the road which runs from Kargil, on the Line of Control with Pakistan near the west bank of the Indus River in the Indian union territory of Ladakh, and cross into Pakistan-held Kashmir, proceeding via Skardu to Gilgit and then following the road connecting Gilgit to the Khunjerab Pass. Essentially, the invasion route would run through Pakistan-administered Kashmir, over which India claims sovereignty as the area was part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir when it acceded to India in October 1947. The only way China can prevent such a possible attack would be to pre-emptively wrest control of a strategically significant portion of Eastern Ladakh from India and to annex the seized territory and incorporate it into Aksai Chin. China’s success in encroaching on Indian-held positions along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh in May–June 2020, which incrementally nudged the LAC westward, is a preview of Beijing’s intentions.</p> +<p><strong>Iran:</strong> European states will likely face a lingering threat from Iran, including from long-range missiles. Under the oversight of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Forces, Iran will likely continue to field more accurate and longer-range missiles over the next decade, as Figure 3.6 highlights. A ballistic missile based on Iran’s Zoljanah space launch vehicle could carry a one-ton warhead as far as 5,000 kilometers, allowing Iran to strike every European capital. These developments will supplement other Iranian missiles, such as the Shahab-3 and Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missiles, which have an operational range of up to 2,000 kilometers. Iran also has layered area denial and anti-surface warfare capabilities, including naval mining (such as moored contact, drifting contact, and limpet mines), small boat swarming tactics, and coastal defenses.</p> -<h3 id="through-an-indian-veil">Through an Indian Veil</h3> +<p>However, there are serious challenges with Europe’s integrated air and missile defense capabilities, particularly in ground-based air defense, command and control, and defense against emerging advanced threats. The European Sky Shield Initiative, which is led by Germany, could theoretically address some of these problems. But it is under significant political pressure, and several countries, such as France, Poland, and Italy, have opted out of the initiative. The result is that European missile defense capabilities are a poorly integrated jumble of capabilities. For example, France and Italy possess SAMP/T ground-based air defense missile systems; Germany and the Netherlands have the Patriot surface-to-air missile system; and Greece and Romania have Patriot, SA-20, and I-HAWK systems. There are numerous future plans in the works. For instance, NATO’s ballistic missile defense program is unlikely to be fully operational until roughly 2030. Most of the European countries developing sea-based, lower-layer ballistic missile defense are forecasting delays — including to the development of a suitable interceptor missile — through the end of the decade. The U.S. contribution to NATO’s ballistic missile defense architecture will remain critical, including the Aegis Ashore and periodic rotation of the Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) missile defense system.</p> -<p>India’s perspective with respect to Eastern Ladakh is difficult to discern because it is shrouded in a veil weaved with strands of rhetorical posturing and cautious action. The official map of the union territory of Ladakh depicts the geographic scope of the claims asserted by India. The map is imaginary because it fails to reflect the actual facts on the ground that limit the area under India’s control. Moreover, the LAC exists purely in the eyes of the beholder, as it is not demarcated. The Indian government has not publicly published its perception of the LAC. India has made no attempt to recover Aksai Chin since the area was lost to China in 1962. Likewise, India has made no attempt to evict Chinese forces from the incremental encroachments in 2020 that were designed to shift the LAC westwards.</p> +<p><strong>China:</strong> Security competition between the United States and China has increased — and will likely continue to increase over the next decade. But there are different views of the Chinese threat in European capitals.</p> -<p>The harsh reality India faces is that for the foreseeable future, there will continue to be an asymmetric balance of power in favour of China. India is dependent on Russia for a majority of its imports of military equipment – a position that has prevailed for over half a century. In a war with China, India will not be able to rely on a military equipment lifeline from Moscow, given Russia’s growing dependence on China for its economic security. Moreover, reflecting the heavy burden of providing a continuous flow of military equipment and supplies to support Ukraine and Israel in their respective wars against Russia and Gaza, the US is unlikely to have the capacity to meet urgent Indian military requirements in the case of a war with China. The embryonic India–US strategic partnership is not expected to develop into a bilateral military security pact within the 2025–2030 timeframe. Crafting a pathway from mutually assured destruction to mutually assured survival is the ultimate challenge confronting New Delhi and Beijing.</p> +<p>The United Kingdom, for example, has been critical of China’s crackdowns in Hong Kong, has been willing to speak out about China’s human rights abuses, and is increasingly vocal about the threat from China. The head of MI5, the United Kingdom’s domestic intelligence agency, bluntly remarked in 2022 that the “most game-changing challenge we face comes from the Chinese Communist Party. It’s covertly applying pressure across the globe.” France, which has overseas departments, territories, and communities in the Indo-Pacific, has established a harder line against China than many European countries. In addition, Denmark’s economic relationship with China is limited, and its leaders have been wary of Chinese intentions in Greenland and the Arctic. Denmark joined the U.S.-led Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative, alongside Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, which is designed to stem the flow of sensitive technologies to authoritarian governments such as China. Lithuania has faced economic coercion from China for its moves to recognize a Taiwanese office in Vilnius as well as for withdrawing from an economic initiative focusing on China and Central and Eastern Europe.</p> -<hr /> +<p>But other European countries have been less concerned about China. Germany’s relationship with China is complicated due to Germany’s dependence on Chinese manufacturing and markets. For example, a study from a German industry association found that “approximately 5,200 German companies comprising over one million employees” were operating in China and that many more had “large sums of investments tied up in China.” This situation has created some German dependencies on Chinese supply chains and value creation networks, and the Chinese shipping giant COSCO bought a 35 percent stake in a container terminal at the port of Hamburg. In Greece, China’s COSCO now owns more than 51 percent of the commercial port of Piraeus, which is often used by NATO for port visits, exercise staging, and transport. This dependency raises questions about whether Greece might hesitate to act (or be constrained from acting) in a conflict with China. Italy has also established close relations with China. For example, Italy signed a memorandum of understanding with China, which is valid until 2024, in support of the Belt and Road Initiative.</p> -<p><strong>Samir Tata</strong> is founder and president of International Political Risk Analytics, an advisory firm based in Reston, Virginia, USA.</p>Samir TataWhile wars elsewhere hold the world’s attention, a new conflict may be on the cards along the Line of Actual Control between India and China in Eastern Ladakh.【黎智英案・審訊第卅九日】2024-03-06T12:00:00+08:002024-03-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-39<ul> - <li>楊清奇呻遭顏純鈎投訴、張劍虹要求停盧峯專欄兼「當住同事面鬧我」</li> - <li>楊清奇指黎智英冀論壇版多元化 推薦建制派撰文 惟2018年後轉推薦激進作者</li> -</ul> +<p>A majority of Europeans are opposed to engaging in conflict with China, according to some survey data. Similarly, a majority believe that they are not in any type of a Cold War with China, though a growing percentage also say their views of China have worsened over time and expressed concern about Chinese ownership of key infrastructure. The populations of Sweden and the Netherlands have the most unfavorable views of China, while those of Greece, Hungary, Italy, and several other countries have more favorable views. A substantial percentage of Europeans (36 percent) consider China to be a necessary partner. Only 12 percent of all respondents in one survey saw China as an adversary. Some polling also suggests that a large majority of European populations would prefer to remain neutral in a conflict between the United States and China.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>These realities suggest that there are differences among European governments and populations about the perceived threat posed by China. This is an important consideration for U.S. military planners and political leaders: it is not clear nor inevitable that NATO and Europe writ large can be counted on to join military actions in the Indo-Pacific through 2030. And this may be an acceptable outcome in order to maintain some strategic balance against Russia.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LbgPOEV.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p><strong>Terrorism:</strong> Terrorism in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia will likely present a continuing threat to Europe. Salafi-jihadist groups linked to the Islamic State and al Qaeda are active across these regions. There are several groups linked to al Qaeda, including Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (or al Shabaab) in Somalia; Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in West Africa; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria; Hurras al-Din in Syria; al Qaeda core and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent in Afghanistan; and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. There are also several groups linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Islamic State), including the leadership in Iraq and Syria; the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in West Africa; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt; the Islamic State-Libya; the Islamic State-Khorasan; the Islamic State-Yemen, Islamic State networks in Somalia, which host the al-Karrar office. In addition, Shia groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, continue to operate in Europe, though primarily to fundraise and recruit individuals rather than plot attacks. The most significant external terrorist threat to Europe is likely attacks by individuals inspired by the Islamic State or al Qaeda — especially with connections to the Middle East and Africa.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（6日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第39日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊指時任社長張劍虹要求暫停盧峯（馮偉光）的論壇版專欄，惟楊稱：「我唔係咁同意嘅。」楊又在庭上大呻，指張劍虹「後來仲叫我去佢辦公室，當住同事面鬧我嘅，嗰時就知道投訴嗰個人就係顏純鈎」。楊提到黎智英很欣賞顏純鈎，因此張劍虹重視顏的文章，因而要中止盧峯的專欄。楊指張後來安排顏所撰寫的《蘋果》社論數目，由每星期一篇增加至兩篇，加上張覺得楊「唔聽話」，所以將顏的專欄文章放在副刊，而不需要經楊管理。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RyApZzZ.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.5: Iran’s Ballistic and Cruise Missile Ranges through 2030.</strong> Source: <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/">Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Iran,” Missile Threat, CSIS, June 14, 2018, Last modified July 17, 2020</a>; <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3907877">“Identical Letters Dated 7 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Digital Library, April 8, 2021</a>.</em></p> -<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第三天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> +<p><strong>Illegal Immigration:</strong> Europe faces a continuing threat from illegal immigration, including human trafficking for all forms of exploitation, such as labor and sexual exploitation. Migrant-smuggling networks transport individuals illegally through the Western, Central, and Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans into Europe, requiring extensive monitoring. In 2021, Belarus organized immigrants from the Middle East, including Iraqi Kurdistan, to cross into Poland. It was part of a political coercion campaign by Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko, who threatened to “flood” the European Union with illegal immigrants and drug traffickers. In response, European countries have been involved in efforts to detect, monitor, and counter the movement of illegal immigrants, including European Union Naval Force Mediterranean, Operation Triton, Operation Themis, and Operation Mare Nostrum.</p> -<h4 id="群組國安法應變委員會截圖顯示-林文宗移除被捕高層">群組「國安法應變委員會」截圖顯示 林文宗移除被捕高層</h4> +<p><strong>Illegal Drug Trafficking:</strong> European states will likely face persistent threats from illegal drugs and drug trafficking, including from cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, methamphetamines, MDMA, and other drugs. In response, European states are likely to remain focused on detecting, monitoring, and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs coming from West and South Asia, South America, North Africa, and other regions. Recent European counter-drug campaigns have included the European Union Military Operation in the Central African Republic and Operation Atalanta.</p> -<p>控方提到2021年6月17日，時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹等人被警方拘捕，而楊則於同月23日才被拘捕。控方展示「國安法應變委員會」的 Signal 群組截圖，顯示時任執行總編輯林文宗在6月17日移除了4人，包括時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹、副社長陳沛敏、總編輯羅偉光和動新聞平台總監張志偉，而該截圖是警方從楊的手機中發現。控方問楊為何會截圖，楊表示不記得。</p> +<p><strong>Other Threats:</strong> European states will also face several other threats. One is from pandemics, such as new strains of influenza or a novel coronavirus. Another is from climate change. Concerns about global climate change are likely to remain high in many European countries, as such events as wildfires, floods, and extreme heat cause significant disruption across the continent. Worries about climate change are not shared by all Europeans and are generally lower among those who support far-right populist parties. In Germany, for instance, only 55 percent of supporters of the Alternative for Germany party view climate change as a major threat, compared with 77 percent of those who do not support the party. Similar divisions also appear in Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Europe will also continue to face a threat from cyberattacks from a range of state and non-state actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Finally, Europe will likely face a persistent energy crisis because of a decline in Russian gas deliveries, supply chain disruptions, and volatility in the oil and gas markets.</p> -<p>楊又指，群組本來是在另一通訊軟件 WhatsApp ，成員包括高層和不同部門的主管，至於群組何時、為何移動至 Signal 則不記得。</p> +<p><strong>Possible Wildcards</strong></p> -<p>控方指，楊的手機另外儲存了一張黎的訊息截圖，內容是「李平兄，以律師談過每月從我私人戶口支付一萬天（元）給我作為供 Twitter 報酬小心些是可以的，我將每月安排付款給你。謝謝。」控方問到楊為何會替此訊息截圖，楊則指他曾經刪除與黎之間的訊息，「咁為咗方便睇返之前嘅訊息」，因為「嗰時覺得呢樣嘢有啲用」，所以便截圖。</p> +<p>Despite these threats, Russia will likely remain the most significant threat to Europe in the foreseeable future, and there are several wildcards that could change the conventional military balance in Europe. This section focuses on several possibilities: U.S. involvement in a major war outside of Europe, a Russian military buildup with assistance from China and other countries, and erosion of U.S. or European political will. These are by no means the only possibilities, though they are plausible wildcards that could significantly impact the threat landscape.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5lfdCqR.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> +<p><strong>Major War Outside of Europe:</strong> The United States could become overstretched with a major theater war in another region, such as against China in the Indo-Pacific. European conventional and logistical capabilities are limited — particularly for high-end war — and U.S. involvement in a major war in another region could potentially alter the balance in Europe. One example is a war between the United States and China over Taiwan. There are at least two major implications for Europe.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英不只一次將讀者來信轉交給他">楊清奇指黎智英不只一次將讀者來信轉交給他</h4> +<p>First, the United States would likely require significant resources in a Taiwan conflict, including air defense systems, such as Patriots; long-range bombers, such as the B-21; long-range precision strike capabilities, such as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER); and submarines, such as Virginia-class and Columbia-class vessels. Overall, the requirements and political attention necessary for a U.S. war with China in the Indo-Pacific would likely require deploying U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and possibly Army personnel and capabilities to the Indo-Pacific for an extended period. It is likely that a war could be protracted, dragging out for months or longer.</p> -<p>控方展示一封寄給黎智英的來信，信件是一篇手寫文章，題為「簡談習近平執政以來的風格」，欲投稿至「蘋果論壇」，署名是「自由撰稿人趙小華」。信件並附上黎手寫的便利貼，寫有「李平，我沒看過他的文章，請過目看是否有用，謝」。文章形容「中共邪惡政權」所發出的號角是「如此肆無忌憚」。</p> +<p>Second, the United States would likely lose a significant portion of its military forces, especially in a protracted war. In the more pessimistic scenario from a recent CSIS wargame, for example, the United States loses nearly 500 aircraft and 14 surface combatant ships. Roughly 90 percent of U.S. aircraft losses occur while they sit on airfields, not in the air. Across scenarios, the United States typically loses more than 500 U.S. aircraft in all, as well as at least two aircraft carriers and between 10 and 20 large surface combatants. These high losses occur because U.S. aircraft and surface ships deploy forward to strike at the Chinese fleet, particularly the amphibious forces, before establishing air and maritime dominance. Chinese losses are also high, with over 300 aircraft losses and over 100 surface combatant ships destroyed. Overall, Chinese air losses varied across the wargame scenarios from several dozen to over 700.</p> -<p>楊指黎透過秘書將該信件轉交給他，並確認後來有安排文章刊登在論壇版，但是他並未有通知黎，「因為佢睇報紙睇得好實嘅，如果有登，佢會睇到」，所以不需要通知黎。楊又指黎不只一次將來信轉交給他，不過頻率「好少嘅」，如果他閱畢文章覺得沒有問題，便會安排刊登。</p> +<p>In a Taiwan conflict, the United States would likely have to shift considerable military resources and political focus to the Indo-Pacific and away from Europe. U.S. military power would also be eroded through attrition. This could have at least two consequences. It could change the conventional balance in Europe by requiring the United States to pull some military forces out of Europe and deploy them to the Indo-Pacific. In addition, Russia could be emboldened to conduct offensive actions against the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, or another country. A U.S. withdrawal of forces to another theater, such as the Indo-Pacific, could create a window of opportunity for offensive actions by Russian leaders, who may conclude that the advantages of defense in Europe have weakened. Historically, leaders have developed offensive military strategies when they possess revisionist war aims and believe the balance of power is shifting in their favor.</p> -<p>控方展示另一封由讀者撰寫的來信，日期是2020年8月15日，附上黎手寫的便利貼：「李平，此讀者有關評論版意（見）值得參考！」楊指，這封信是黎交給他的，不過他認為「不論黎先生又好，個讀者又好，都係混淆咗一啲嘢嘅」，因信中提及的作者都是副刊專欄的作者，「我覺得佢講緊嘅唔係我嘅論壇版」，惟黎認為該讀者是談論「評論版」，因而轉交給他，所以他不知道該讀者意見是針對副刊還是論壇版。</p> +<p>It is also conceivable that the United States could become involved in a major war elsewhere — such as against North Korea, Iran, or terrorist groups in the Middle East or South Asia — which Russian leaders could attempt to exploit. Following Hamas’ brutal attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, conflict in the Middle East expanded to include Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指台蘋支持香港人抗爭及呼籲國際社會關注">楊清奇指台蘋支持香港人抗爭及呼籲國際社會關注</h4> +<p><strong>Russian Military Modernization:</strong> Russia could significantly rebuild its conventional capabilities — as well as further invest in asymmetric ones — with help from China and other countries, such as North Korea and Iran. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its land forces to prepare for deterrence and warfighting against NATO. The Russian army will likely continue to move away from battalion formations to infantry, marine, and airborne divisions. This would mark a significant shift away from the changes implemented under former minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov, who scrapped the Soviet-era structure of the armed forces that included large divisions as part of the “New Look” reforms.</p> -<p>控方展示張劍虹與楊清奇之間的訊息，張在2019年8月1日說：「台蘋論壇也找到一些逆權運動的不錯文章，我們也可以採用。我已經請台蘋社長跟偉光聯絡。請跟進」、「非常時期，有好文章多點版位也有需要。請文宗加人給你便可。謝謝」。</p> +<p>For example, Russian military leaders have indicated an intention to create at least nine new divisions: five artillery divisions, including super-heavy artillery brigades for building artillery reserves; two air assault divisions in the Russian Airborne Forces, bringing its force structure to roughly equal with Soviet times; and two motorized infantry divisions integrated into combined arms forces. The Ministry of Defence will likely transform seven motorized infantry brigades into motorized infantry divisions in the Western, Central, and Eastern Districts, as well as in the Northern Fleet. It will also likely expand an army corps in Karelia, across the border from Finland. In addition, each combined arms (tank) army may have a composite aviation division within it and an army aviation brigade with 80 to 100 combat helicopters under the control of ground force units — not the Russian Aerospace Forces. This decision was likely a result of the poor joint operations in Ukraine, especially air-land battle, though it does not fix poor coordination between Russian land and air forces.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6IIDuWL.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> +<p>Russian leaders have expressed an interest in strengthening Russian naval forces — including submarines — in response to growing tensions with the United States and NATO. The Ministry of Defence has announced a desire to create five naval infantry brigades for the navy’s coastal troops based on existing naval infantry brigades. This expansion followed Russia’s adoption of a new maritime doctrine in July 2022, which identified the United States and NATO as major threats. In addition, the doctrine expressed an interest in building modern aircraft carriers, though it also highlighted the challenges of Russia’s lack of overseas naval bases and the constraints on Russia’s shipbuilding industry because of the West’s economic sanctions. Senior Russian officials have identified nuclear-powered submarines as critical in future force design.</p> -<p>楊表示，張劍虹當時傳送上述訊息給他之前，其實他與羅偉光經已溝通過。他又呻：「論壇版係《蘋果》最細嘅部門，得我同另外一個同事，每日一個版已經係好辛苦」，因此張劍虹指如果要加版數便要增加人手，「不過好遺憾啦，張劍虹先生未睇過篇文章，就話有好文章就話要出。」楊又指林文宗並未有增加人手，因此論壇版一直都是每日一版，以及只有兩名編輯。</p> +<p>Beijing could accelerate Russian military modernization. China possesses significant fifth-generation military capabilities, technology, and money that could impact the European balance of power if Beijing calculated that it was in its interest to help Russia modernize its military. The Chinese Communist Party’s 14th Five Year Plan, which goes through 2025, calls for accelerated development of military mechanization, informatization, and “intelligentization.” China is focusing on military applications for such areas as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, biotechnology, information technology, quantum computing, robotics, advanced materials and manufacturing, and deep-sea technologies.</p> -<p>控方問及台灣《蘋果》的觀點，楊指：「一個係支持香港市民嘅抗爭，一個係呼籲國際社會關注。」</p> +<p>China is developing the J-20A and J-20B fifth-generation stealth fighter, armed stealth unmanned aircraft systems, and the J-31 medium-weight stealth fighter by 2025. China is also developing kinetic kill vehicle technology to field an upper-tier ballistic missile interceptor by 2030; longer-range, more accurate, and increasingly lethal ballistic and cruise missiles; air defenses; and other platforms and systems. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLANAF) is fielding new carrier-based aircraft, as well as anti-submarine warfare, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, land-based maritime strike, and air defense forces. China may have as many as five aircraft carriers by 2030, aided by helicopter carriers and a fleet of destroyers. The development of China’s space, counterspace, and electronics sectors has enabled it to increase the pace of satellite launches and deploy a wider range of sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites. Some modeling suggests that the effectiveness of the Chinese submarine fleet (as measured by the number of attack opportunities it might achieve against carriers) has risen significantly over the past 25 years.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇稱會議較少談及論壇版-若黎智英或高層有指示必須聽從">楊清奇稱會議較少談及論壇版 若黎智英或高層有指示必須聽從</h4> +<p>Based on these developments, China could potentially provide significant air, land, and maritime weapon systems and technology to Russia through exports, joint development projects, funding, or other arrangements that facilitate a Russian defense revitalization. After all, Russia and China have pledged to deepen defense cooperation through arms sales, military exercises, and other activities.</p> -<p>控方談及《蘋果》日常運作的三個會議，包括「初會」、「鋤報會」、「編前會」，惟楊指他不一定每天出席三個會議。他又指理論上「鋤報會」上會談及所有版位，「但大家都知道論壇版係相對獨立嘅個人意見，所以鋤報會好少有人會去『鋤』論壇版嘅。」</p> +<p><strong>Eroding Political Will:</strong> An erosion of European — or U.S. — political will could weaken NATO’s cohesion and threaten its ability to project and conduct credible deterrence. Political will refers to the proclivity and decision of political leaders to conduct activities, including military activities. Politics and war are deeply intertwined. As the Prussian general and theorist Carl von Clausewitz argued, “war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.” For Clausewitz, will is an essential component of military operations: “If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separate, namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the Will.”</p> -<p>至於每週舉行一次的「Planning會」，楊指是大家討論未來一星期的新聞如何籌劃，即使他未有出席該會議，他也會 WhatsApp 陳沛敏或林文宗以尋求指示。但事實上會議很少討論論壇版，楊指他會報告星期六論壇版有什麼主題，基本上他很少聽過其他部門主管給予意見，有時高層會給他指示。</p> +<p>In addition, economists and political scientists who study the logic of collective action have identified burden sharing as a persistent problem in multinational organizations. Larger, richer allies step up to provide a public good, which leads to free-riding behavior by smaller, less wealthy allies. For NATO, deterrence and collective defense became that public good during the Cold War. During this period, there was a close correlation between allies’ GDPs and their respective levels of defense spending. Larger allies were willing to tolerate a degree of free riding in light of the existential, overarching threat posed by the Soviet Union.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/H7oeDTq.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<p>Several factors — such as strategic culture, domestic constraints, voluntary force recruitment challenges, technology usage concerns, differences in threat perception, or even an economic depression — could undermine the political will of European countries or the United States to sufficiently deter Russia. For example, domestic constraints can undermine political will. They can be political, such as the degree of fragmentation within a government or friction between different elements in the bureaucracy. The former is particularly problematic in Europe, where coalition or minority governments are becoming the norm rather than the exception. Some countries attempt to reduce fragmentation and limit “ministerial drift” by locking in their priorities and policies through formal coalition agreements (e.g., Germany) or cross-party defense agreements (e.g., Denmark).</p> -<p>楊指，如果黎智英有指示的話，社長張劍虹、副社長陳沛敏、總編輯羅偉光或執行總編輯林文宗便會在會議中轉達。控方問黎的指示是什麼，楊則稱「唔記得」，但是「如果佢有指示，我會跟嘅」。</p> +<p>Domestic constraints on political will can also be structural. These include legal limitations on deployment of forces, requirements for parliamentary approval to deploy forces, and operational caveats on deployments. In Afghanistan, only a few countries (such as Denmark, Georgia, Poland, the United States, and the United Kingdom) operated caveat-free, with most imposing restrictions on everything from the rules of engagement to the geographic areas in which their forces were able to operate. Legal limitations on the deployment of forces, requirements for parliamentary approval to deploy forces, domestic politics and logrolling, and imposition of operational caveats on deployments and the use of certain technologies will remain a challenge for some European countries and could impact their willingness to build sufficient capabilities to deter Russian aggression.</p> -<p>楊又指，對於上級的指示「我係要聽嘅」，有時他提出論壇版專題，高層會提議一些相關作者，但此情況很少見，因為楊通常會自行找作者撰寫文章。他指由於好少有4名高層同時給予指示，或者各人給予不同的指示，所以他不會覺得執行上有困難。</p> +<p>The 2024 U.S. elections also raise major questions about U.S. political will in Europe. It is possible, for example, that Donald Trump could withdraw from NATO in a second term, raising serious questions about credible deterrence against Russia.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指林本利曾短暫撰寫蘋果社論-後來自行決定不寫">楊清奇指林本利曾短暫撰寫《蘋果》社論 後來自行決定不寫</h4> +<p><strong>Other Wildcards:</strong> There are several other wildcards that could change the balance in Europe or otherwise impact the threat landscape. First, Russia could successfully use an irregular or a limited aims strategy in Eastern Europe. The goal of an irregular strategy would be to destabilize one or more European countries through subversion rather than a conventional military campaign. This could include, for example, aiding non-state actors in the Baltic states or other countries — including pro-Russian populations — to cause instability. Moscow adopted this type of a strategy in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Russia could also adopt a limited-aims strategy and seize only a portion of territory in Europe or Central Asia. Second, a leadership change in Russia could create a more dangerous — or friendlier — neighbor, impacting the threat from Russia. Third, Russia could use nuclear weapons, including battlefield nuclear weapons against Ukraine, breaking the nuclear taboo that has existed since 1945. This would cause significant concerns in European capitals about the threat from Moscow.</p> -<p>就2019至2021年期間的《蘋果》社論，楊供稱共有4名作者，包括馮偉光（筆名盧峯）、楊懷康（筆名古立）、顏純鈎（筆名方圓）和他本人（筆名李平）。社論作者人選方面，「最後決定係黎先生。但如果係推薦寫手嘅話，張劍虹和陳沛敏都有推薦嘅權嘅。」</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-1">CONCLUSION</h4> -<p>楊指，除了上述4人之外，專欄作家林本利亦曾經短時間替《蘋果》寫社論，「佢離開嘅時候係張先生話畀我知嘅。」他指當初是張劍虹聯絡林本利撰寫「蘋論」，後來林本利自己決定不再撰寫。被問到林本利寫哪一種題材居多，楊則指「蘋論」沒有限制界別，會涉及政治、經濟和社會的題材。</p> +<p>As the evidence presented in this chapter suggests, NATO likely possesses a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent against a possible Russian threat in the short term. Other potential threats to Europe — such as Iran, China, terrorism, illegal migration, illegal drug trafficking, pandemics, and climate change — do not pose an existential crisis in the near term.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇呻被顏純鈎投訴-之後被張劍虹當住同事面鬧我">楊清奇呻被顏純鈎投訴 之後被張劍虹「當住同事面鬧我」</h4> +<p>Over the long term, however, Russia will likely constitute a serious threat to the United States and Europe. Russian president Vladimir Putin retains the political will and intentions to expand Russian power abroad, and Russia is reconstituting its military capabilities with help from China, Iran, and North Korea. The military balance could shift, and deterrence could weaken — perhaps significantly — if the United States were to become involved in a major war in the Indo-Pacific or another region, if Russia were able to rearm and rebuild with Chinese and other assistance, or if U.S. or European political will eroded. The key takeaway is that neither today’s military balance nor deterrence is guaranteed ad infinitum. To help understand the future military balance in Europe, the next chapter examines European military capabilities.</p> -<p>2020年4月12日，張劍虹向楊清奇傳送訊息，提及「主筆，有論壇作者指我們有時壓稿。我明白或許有時稿擠，但盧峯每週已經寫兩篇社論，或許就不用寫論壇。謝謝」。楊指盧峯當時離開了《蘋果》，是以自由撰稿人的身份撰文，後來他在2020年6月重返《蘋果》。</p> +<h3 id="ch-04">CH. 04</h3> +<h3 id="european-military-capabilities">EUROPEAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES</h3> -<p>控方問及誰人決定盧峯不用寫專欄。楊則指：「呢個係張劍虹先生畀我嘅訊息，佢係要求我停咗盧峯嘅論壇，我唔係咁同意嘅，所以我話會同作者多溝通，我記得後來我都冇停咗盧峯嘅專欄。」</p> +<p>This chapter examines European military capabilities. Any analysis of U.S. force posture in Europe needs to assess European military capabilities at present and in the future, which is reflected in NATO’s own 2030 plan from the Brussels summit and the subsequent 2022 Strategic Concept from the Madrid summit. This chapter asks one central question: What types of missions will European allies and partners of the United States be able and unable to effectively perform by 2030?</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jM1fcmM.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》英文版主筆馮偉光，筆名「盧峯」</p> +<p>To answer this question, this chapter uses a combination of methods. It builds an analytical framework that includes a range of military missions, from small-scale humanitarian assistance missions to large-scale combat. The chapter then uses this framework to evaluate the ability of European countries to accomplish these missions. It also builds a data set of specific European operations over the past three decades, including operations conducted through NATO and the European Union. The data provide a useful context for the types and frequency of missions in which European states may engage. Finally, it uses the results and analyses from wargames, scenarios, exercises, after-action reviews, and other analyses to assess the ability of European states to perform military missions through 2030.</p> -<p>楊繼而大吐苦水，因為張的訊息指有人投訴楊沒有用到作者的稿，「佢（張劍虹）後來仲叫我去佢辦公室，當住同事面鬧我嘅。嗰時就知道投訴嗰個人就係顏純鈎。」楊又指黎智英之所以讓顏撰寫社論，是因為顏自己投稿，惟「我係冇應承畀佢開專欄出嘅」。</p> +<p>Based on the analysis, this chapter makes two main arguments. First, if member states meet their “NATO 2030” goals, most NATO militaries will likely be able to conduct the majority of military missions by 2030 at the lower end of the conflict continuum with little or no U.S. assistance. But European militaries will likely have difficulty conducting operations at the higher end of the conflict continuum without significant assistance from the United States. European states still lack sufficient capabilities in the following areas:</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英好欣賞顏純鈎-故張劍虹重視其文章">楊清奇：黎智英好欣賞顏純鈎 故張劍虹重視其文章</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Combat support, such as short-range air defense and long-range indirect fires;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Airlift and other logistical means of transporting troops and material;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Quantity, quality, and capabilities of ground forces, especially heavy maneuver forces;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maritime capabilities, including sensors (such as sub-surface sensors) and survivability systems;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Sufficient quantities of long-range precision strike, such as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM); and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Multi-spectrum ranges to train and maintain high-readiness forces.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>法官李運騰此時打斷，指楊的證供十分有趣，但是有需要澄清一些事實，控方的問題是問誰人決定暫停盧峯的專欄，究竟是張劍虹的決定，還是張僅負責轉達相關相定？楊則回答他當時理解是張劍虹的決定，「但後來知道顏純鈎投訴咁緊張，因為黎生好欣賞顏純鈎，所以張劍虹就重視顏純鈎嘅文章，所以要停咗盧峯文章。」</p> +<p>To help make up for some of these shortfalls, Chapter 6 outlines several security cooperation steps to improve European military capabilities. Nevertheless, the most significant obstacle to fixing these capability gaps is a lack of political will in European capabilities.</p> -<p>被問到何以得知黎欣賞顏純鈎，楊則指張劍虹後來告訴他，決定將顏所撰寫的「蘋論」，由每星期一篇，增加至每星期兩篇，「佢（張劍虹）覺得我唔聽話啦，所以將顏純鈎嘅文章擺喺副刊，而冇擺喺專欄。」換言之，顏除了每週寫兩篇《蘋果》社論之外，還會在副刊撰寫專欄文章。</p> +<p>Second, most European militaries will likely continue to face serious challenges projecting power into regions such as the Indo-Pacific. They lack significantly deployable capabilities in such areas as anti-submarine warfare; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); ballistic missile defense; air precision strike; suppression of enemy air defense; and expeditionary logistics. What capabilities European allies do have in these categories should likely be prioritized for a Europe-based fight.</p> -<p>被問到為何楊被指「唔聽話」，楊表示：「因為我冇聽佢指示停咗盧峯嘅論壇版專欄。」他其後補充，雖然盧峯的固定專欄後來停了，但他會不定期刊登盧峯的文章。</p> +<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first develops a framework for understanding and analyzing military missions. The second section assesses European participation in military missions through 2030. The third section provides a summary of the main conclusions.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y94ZgfM.png" alt="image06" /></p> +<h4 id="framework-for-understanding-military-missions">FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING MILITARY MISSIONS</h4> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（6日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第39日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊的職責之一是管理報紙論壇版，他稱選擇文章的主要原則有3點，包括「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。楊提到黎智英要求論壇版「求新求變」，所以在2016年初曾經討論更換作者群。楊當時看過黎推薦的作者名單，「我和同事都好吃驚啦，有幾個係建制派嘅人物嚟嘅」，當中包括兩名行政會議成員，反映黎希望多元化。惟楊認為黎在2018年起轉趨激進，他此後推薦的評論作者「立場都係比較激進」，並舉例指黎推薦過傳媒人區家麟和「一劍飄塵」。</p> +<p>This chapter focuses on the ability of European militaries to perform a mission, a military task to complete an action with a specific purpose. An important metric of military power is the ability of military forces to successfully prosecute a variety of missions. Military missions are often categorized by their focus. Examples include noncombatant evacuation, foreign humanitarian assistance, security force assistance, freedom of navigation, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and large-scale combat missions. Military missions are distinct from civilian missions in that they are conducted by military personnel, even if the activities lack a uniquely martial component. In addition, this chapter also discusses military operations, which include specific military actions to carry out strategic, operational, tactical, or other objectives. As used here, missions refer to the general tasks that militaries are asked to perform, while operations refer to specific, named efforts. Named operations include such examples as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Unified Protector in Libya, Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslavia, and Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean.</p> -<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第三天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> +<p>Much of the policy focus on European capabilities has been on tracking quantitative metrics. For example, NATO has collected and analyzed such metrics as the percent of GDP that a country spends on defense and procurement of major new equipment (including research and development), the percent of allied forces that are deployable, the percent of allied forces that are sustainable, and contributions to NATO Command Structure positions. While valuable, these metrics do not provide a good indication of whether countries will be able to perform specific military missions. Most do not translate defense spending or military capabilities into whether and how countries will be able to perform on the battlefield.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指盧峯立場是支持抗爭-與黎智英觀點一致">楊清奇指盧峯立場是「支持抗爭」 與黎智英觀點一致</h4> +<p>Assessing military performance is a complex undertaking. How a state — or states — perform in conducting military missions can include a wide range of factors, such as strategy, tactics, morale, numerical preponderance, technology, combat motivation, force employment, leadership, and materiel. Other factors are also important, such as readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure. In fact, NATO countries spend an average of 40 percent of their defense budgets on personnel costs, with an emphasis on recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer force. Some countries, such as Spain and Italy, spend roughly 60 percent on personnel. These estimates do not include equipping and fielding the fighting force, which leads to inaccurate or incomplete metrics on how well an individual NATO member state may perform on any given military mission.</p> -<p>楊清奇在上午的證供中提及，時任社長張劍虹要求中止盧峯（馮偉光）的論壇版專欄，並將顏純鈎的專欄調至副刊，不經楊的論壇版管轄。</p> +<p>To complicate matters, military forces frequently perform a wide range of missions, such as countering terrorists, deterring aggressors, conducting peace-keeping efforts, enforcing sanctions, performing freedom of navigation missions, and training foreign police and soldiers. Proficiency in one or several missions does not indicate proficiency in all or even most missions.</p> -<p>控方下午問及盧峯的寫作角度，楊表示「作為（《蘋果》社論）寫手，我哋都明白，要跟從報館嘅基本立場，啫係要留意黎智英先生嘅立場」，因此在2019年反修例期間，《蘋果》社論作者的觀點和立場都是沒有分別，「都係支持抗爭，要求政府收回條例」，而這觀點與黎的專欄所表達鼓勵市民上街抗爭是一致的。</p> +<p>To better understand military missions, this chapter divides missions into three categories: small-scale missions; medium-scale missions; and large-scale combat. These categories can be differentiated by their scale and scope. Small-scale missions, for example, are at one end of the conflict continuum and generally include limited or no combat. Large-scale combat sits at the other end of the conflict continuum and can involve joint, multi-domain operations involving the air, ground, maritime, cyber, and space domains. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the types of military missions and examples of current and historical operations involving European countries.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇社論稱誓必和勇一家香港國際聯線抗爭到底">楊清奇社論稱「誓必和勇一家，香港國際聯線，抗爭到底」</h4> +<p>First, small-scale missions sit at one end of the conflict continuum. They include such activities as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace-keeping, and foreign humanitarian assistance efforts. NEOs involve situations in which military forces attempt to evacuate noncombatants from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster.</p> -<p>控方向楊清奇展示4篇由他撰寫的《蘋果》社論。首篇題為〈蘋論：林鄭反議會 市民反黑警 誓不兩立〉，刊登日期為2020年5月12日。文中提到：「如今漢賊誓不兩立，港人不會跪低，不會偏安，誓必和勇一家，香港國際聯線，抗爭到底。」</p> +<p>Peacekeeping consists of military support to diplomatic, economic, or other efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict — often to support such regional or international institutions as the United Nations or African Union. As highlighted in Figure 4.1, historical examples involving European countries include Operation Concordia and Operation Allied Harmony in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and numerous operations in support of UN peacekeeping efforts across the globe.</p> -<p>楊解釋，「漢賊」是傳統中國文化的一個用詞，一般是指兩邊對立的雙方，他理解為「一邊係提出修例嘅政府，另一邊係反對修例嘅市民」，而「誓必和勇一家」是指「和理非」及「勇武」一起合作。至於「香港國際聯線」，楊指意思是「香港都係要爭取國際社會嘅支持」，以使到政府收回修訂條例。楊並確認，黎智英在其個人專欄的觀點與他差不多。</p> +<p>Finally, humanitarian assistance involves the use of military forces to reduce human suffering, pandemics, disease, or hunger. Examples of foreign humanitarian assistance include the European Union Force Chad and Central African Republic and NATO’s humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan following the October 2005 earthquake, which killed an estimated 53,000 people.</p> -<p>控方特別提到社論最後一句：「至於中共港共想攬炒，那就放馬過來吧。」控方問楊這句是什麼意思。楊則說：「我覺得文字已經好清楚㗎喇，冇嘢補充。」</p> +<p>Second, medium-scale missions include a wide range of activities to establish, shape, and maintain relations with other nations. The general objective is to protect national interests by building or maintaining support to partner nations, enhancing their capability to provide security and maintain stability, and establishing operational access. Security cooperation involves military interactions with foreign security agencies to build or maintain defense relationships, develop their capabilities, and provide access.</p> -<p>法官李運騰關注以上社論刊登日期是2020年5月，其時「撤回修例」是否仍是社會爭議的話題。楊指市民仍在爭取「五大訴求」，當中包括「撤回修例」。控方問到當時的社會環境是如何，楊指示威「減少咗好多」，主要原因是疫情，而且2019年區議會選舉之後，市民的焦點轉移至2020年立法會選舉。</p> +<p>Crisis management missions include efforts to conduct expeditionary air, land, and maritime deployments. Many of these specific operations — such as Operation Allied Force, Operation Deliberate Force, and Operation Unified Protector — involve multiservice military deployments that require several thousand personnel. NATO’s Operation Unified Protector, for instance, had three components: the enforcement of an arms embargo in the Mediterranean, the enforcement of a no-fly zone to prevent aircraft from bombing civilian targets, and air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇社論倡對中共採取強有力的制裁-免繼續禍港禍全球">楊清奇社論倡對中共採取「強有力的制裁」 免「繼續禍港禍全球」</h4> +<p>These types of activities can also involve deterrence (which includes actions to persuade an adversary not to initiate a war or other military activity because the expected costs and risks outweigh the anticipated benefits) and assurance (which includes actions to support an ally or partner’s government and population and communicate a credible message of confidence in the dependability of its security commitment). Assurance measures might involve flying airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), deploying Patriot air defense systems, conducting enhanced air policing, deploying a ship or a maritme strike group off a threatened country’s coast, rotating high-readiness forces into a particular country or region, and utilizing surface-to-air, medium-range platform terrain (SAMP/T) systems. NATO created the tailored Forward Presence in 2016 to help reassure Bulgaria and Romania and establish a Black Sea presence.</p> -<p>控方展示2020年5月26日的《蘋果》社論，題為〈蘋論：播毒殺港 中共邪惡 世界埋單〉。楊指文章主要內容是新冠病毒在全球造成很多傷亡，《國安法》即將立法，可能摧毀香港民主自由，「全世界都要為此埋單，付出代價。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DpwcxAV.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.1: Types of Military Missions.</strong> Source: CSIS.</em></p> -<p>控方提到文中提及：「無畏無懼的香港人已挺身而出，反抗強權，如果民主世界還止步於口頭聲援，不在政治、經濟、軍事上對中共採取強有力的制裁，何異於讓真正的人類公敵、千古罪人繼續禍港禍全球？」楊確認這段反映他對制裁的觀點，也反映了《蘋果》和黎智英的觀點。</p> +<p>Third, large-scale combat sits at the other end of the conflict spectrum from crisis response. Large-scale combat involves a series of tactical actions — such as battles — conducted by combat forces to achieve strategic or operational objectives. It can include a range of activities, from wars in specific countries or regions involving a combination of multidomain air, ground, maritime, and other capabilities, to world wars among great powers. These types of missions generally require substantial power-projection capabilities, including the ability to deploy and employ military forces rapidly over long distances and for sustained periods. Historical examples involving European countries include Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as highlighted in Figure 4.1.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇社論諷刺中共反制裁無威懾力">楊清奇社論諷刺中共反制裁無威懾力</h4> +<h4 id="assessment-of-european-capabilities">ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN CAPABILITIES</h4> -<p>控方展示2020年7月14日的《蘋果》社論，題為〈蘋論：中共的打壓與制裁不足畏〉。楊指文章主要內容是「諷刺中共嘅反制裁係冇力嘅」，因為他認為中共的反制裁「唔會嚇親制裁嘅對象，冇威懾力嘅」，並指可以參考副標題「不以為懼，反以為榮」以下的段落。楊確認文章反映到《蘋果》和黎智英的觀點，因黎的專欄文章曾經提及類似觀點。</p> +<p>This section applies the framework outlined in Figure 4.1 to analyze European capabilities to perform specific missions. It provides a qualitative judgment of European capabilities through 2030 — especially from major powers such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany — based on the results and analyses from wargames, scenarios, exercises, after-action reviews, and other analyses. The goal is to provide reasonable estimates of whether European states may be able to conduct future missions across the continuum of conflict in four regions: Europe (including the Mediterranean), the Middle East, Africa (especially North, West, and East Africa), and the Indo-Pacific. These are the regions where European forces are most likely to deploy in the future, based on future planning considerations and past actions.</p> -<h3 id="楊清奇指中國官媒刪除李克強指示-令人質疑隱瞞疫情">楊清奇指中國官媒刪除李克強指示 令人質疑隱瞞疫情</h3> +<p>The assessment is based on whether the evidence from wargames and other analyses suggests that European states can successfully conduct the designated mission with no, limited, or significant U.S. support. In Figure 4.2, “High” (or green) means that the major European states — such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany — generally have the capability to successfully conduct the designated type of mission in the identified region without U.S. aid. A “high” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong. “Medium” (or yellow) means that major European states have the capability to successfully conduct the designated type of mission in the identified region with moderate U.S. aid, such as transport, aerial refueling, or ISR capabilities. “Low” (or red) means that major European states have the capability to successfully conduct the designated mission in the identified region only with significant U.S. aid. Figure 4.2 provides a summary of the main findings.</p> -<p>控方另展示2021年1月15日的《蘋果》社論，題為〈蘋論：政府目標是武肺清零還是自由清零？〉，楊指文章主要內容是質疑政府的監督，「係為咗防疫，還是限制市民自由？」</p> +<p><strong>Small-Scale Missions:</strong> Major European states have a high likelihood of performing most small-scale missions through at least 2030 with limited U.S. aid or, in some cases, with none at all. NATO 2030 provides a set of targets that individual allies and the broader NATO alliance are expected to meet. Europe’s ability to perform critical missions is especially high in Europe, the Middle East, and parts of East, West, and North Africa, though there may still be challenges in some areas.</p> -<p>楊又指副標題「官媒剋扣李克強指示」以下的段落亦有提及，「因為中國官方嘅媒體都刪除咗李克強嘅指示，咁令人懷疑中國係咪真係有隱瞞疫情嘅」，所以他在文章中質疑，「類似武漢式嘅封城係冇用嘅，咁香港繼續用封城式嘅方法，咁有用定係冇用呢？」</p> +<p>First, European states may face difficulties conducting some missions in Asia and parts of Africa because of limited posture (especially bases), few enablers (such as airlift, aerial refueling, maritime logistics, command and control, and ISR), and a large geographic area. These factors could also impact the speed that European militaries could respond to contingency missions because of the small number of European personnel in the region and a vast geographic area. Germany, for instance, already faces airlift, combat search and rescue, and other limitations that will complicate noncombatant evacuation and other missions in Asia or parts of Africa. Although German chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a €100 billion ($106 billion) special fund for Bundeswehr development — including a heavy focus on air capabilities — shortly after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the allocation will primarily finance existing military plans that had been unfunded or underfunded rather than support new developments.</p> -<p>楊早前證供提及黎希望找一些作者寫中共高層權鬥內幕，他表示雖然文章並未講到中共權鬥，但是以中國而言，有權刪除時任總理李克強講話的人，就只有中共總書記習近平。</p> +<p>Second, the deployment of Russian and Chinese assets — including intelligence, electronic warfare, and anti-aircraft weapons systems — could complicate missions in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Russia has expanded its military presence in the Middle East and Africa, particularly in countries such as Syria and Libya. China continues to build military and civilian infrastructure in countries such as Djibouti, where France has a significant military presence, and Chinese private security companies such as China Security Technology Group (中国安保技术集团), Hua Xin Zhong An (Beijing) Security Service (HXZA) (华信中安集团), and Zhongjun Junhong (中军军弘安保集团) conduct armed maritime escort and other security services in strategic waterways in Africa and the Middle East.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇稱不記得撰文時有否想起黎智英指示-有時乃有感而發">楊清奇稱不記得撰文時有否想起黎智英指示 有時乃「有感而發」</h4> +<p>In addition, growing competition could lead Moscow and Beijing to pressure some host-nation countries in these regions to limit or reject U.S. and European militaries from using their air bases or ports or to deny overflight access. During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Union routinely pressured foreign countries to refuse U.S. basing rights and overflight permission for operations that Moscow opposed. Already, Russia has helped to dislodge French, EU, and UN missions in countries such as Mali, including through the use of private military companies and other quasi-independent proxies. Russia is unlikely to replicate this approach widely outside of states with weak governance and autocratic leadership, but China may prove more capable in this regard. By 2030, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) probably will be able to deploy and sustain military forces across Asia and much of Africa, and will likely maintain a lower level of power-projection capabilities in areas with key Chinese economic interests, such as Latin America and the Middle East. Chinese competence may include military airlift and sealift capabilities, and its efforts to expand overseas basing and logistics infrastructure may enable the intelligence, logistics, and communications support needed to deal with threats to China or to disrupt its adversaries’ global operations. China may also have the ability and posture to deploy aircraft carrier strike groups to the Indian and Pacific Oceans by 2030.</p> -<p>控方指楊撰寫文章的時候，黎已經正在還柙，問他為何會把黎的觀點寫出來。楊重申：「其實作為一個評論嘅寫手，寫稿嘅時候一定要考慮報館同埋老闆嘅立場，唔係次次去諗老闆有咩指示我去寫啲乜，有時係有感而發，因為始終都係有署名喺度。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ESXIrEl.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.2: Overview of European Capabilities to Perform Missions.</strong> Note: CSIS.</em></p> -<p>控方追問楊當時是否仍然視黎為老闆，楊表示：「係，黎先生仲係老闆嘅，但係我嗰時唔記得我係咪諗起老闆嘅指示先會咁寫嘅。」控方再問，黎提及中共權鬥內幕的指示，距離楊撰寫社論的時候有數個月，為何仍然會在社論中提及權鬥？楊僅表示：「我已經講咗喇，我寫嘅時候唔記得有冇諗起黎先生嘅指示」，他補充，他可能看到中國媒體刪除李克強的指示，有感而發而寫出來。</p> +<p><strong>Medium-Scale Missions:</strong> Europe’s largest militaries will likely be able to perform numerous medium-scale missions through 2030 with limited U.S. assistance — especially in Europe and the Middle East — and potentially beyond 2030 with enhanced capabilities as a result of NATO’s 2030 plan. For example, European militaries will be able to conduct numerous deterrence missions in Europe. Similarly, European militaries likely will be able to conduct most assurance missions to support governments and their populations, such as flying AWACS, conducting enhanced air policing, and deploying SAMP/T systems.</p> -<p>控方問楊會否閱讀其他人撰寫的社論，楊回答：「有時會嘅」，之後補充：「因為有啲文章睇咗標題，就唔想睇嘅。」</p> +<p>France is likely to retain sufficient capabilities to conduct many of these missions in Europe, the Middle East, and possibly West Africa. France has undertaken medium-footprint expeditionary interventions, such as the 4,000-troop mission to defeat Islamist militants in Mali in 2013 to 2014. In recent years, however, France has experienced diplomatic setbacks in West Africa that may limit its ability to operate in the region, including the termination of Operation Barkhane in Mali and deteriorating relationships with other West African states. Nonetheless, through 2030, France will likely retain a sustained capability to conduct unilateral and joint expeditionary operations, especially as it resolves its shortfalls in aerial refueling, strategic and tactical airlift, unmanned aircraft systems, and precision-guided munitions. In addition, the French navy will likely remain capable of performing freedom of navigation, counterpiracy, counter smuggling, counternarcotics, and presence patrols — especially in such areas as the Mediterranean Sea, North Atlantic, Red Sea, and Arctic Ocean.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英要求論壇版求新求變-曾討論更換作者群">楊清奇指黎智英要求論壇版「求新求變」 曾討論更換作者群</h4> +<p>Similarly, the United Kingdom will likely be able to perform many of these medium-scale missions through 2030 in Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Africa. But the United Kingdom will likely have significant limitations operating in the Indo-Pacific, where there are at least 1.7 million UK citizens. The United Kingdom is attempting to expand its presence and activity and conduct such missions as freedom of navigation and maritime patrol. The United Kingdom has conducted some exercises in the Indo-Pacific — including with Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and New Zealand — to enable it to play at least a limited role. In addition, the United Kingdom is developing a fifth-generation carrier strike group and investing in some next-generation capabilities, such as directed energy weapons and swarming drones.</p> -<p>楊早前供稱，他的職責除了撰寫《蘋果》社論外，還有管理論壇版。控方問楊揀選文章的準則是什麼。楊指他在大約2014年5月開始接手負責《蘋果》論壇版，至2015年年底晉升為《蘋果》主筆。他指同事與他交接論壇版工作時，選擇文章的主要原則只有3點，包括「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」，因此論壇版是比較開放。</p> +<p>More broadly, European states will likely retain sufficient capabilities to perform several of these missions. France, the United Kingdom, and several other European countries — such as Germany — maintain competent special operations forces, allowing them to conduct security force assistance, counterterrorism, and other types of missions. In addition, Europe has several competent law enforcement and paramilitary forces — such as France’s Gendarmerie and Italy’s Carabinieri — capable of security force assistance, including training and advising foreign security forces. Several European states — such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom — will also likely retain significant capabilites to conduct offensive and defensive cyber operations, including against higher-end threats such as Russia and China. Despite these capabilities, some European states may be hesitant to integrate offensive cyber capabilities into multilateral operations because of national sensitivities. European countries are also improving their ability to build computer network resilience, cyber institutions, and response strategies, which will likely improve their ability to engage in offensive and defensive cyber missions. Finally, European countries will also likely have sufficient capabilities to conduct deterrence and assurance missions, such as enhanced air policing, maritime patrol aircraft, and forward-deployed troops.</p> -<p>楊續指，他接手論壇版之後，黎智英當時要求論壇版「求新求變」，要不時更換作者群，故此黎和當時的總編輯陳沛敏曾經跟他一起討論作者名單。楊指該名單列舉出一些作者，包括一些他們希望去邀請的作者，也有一些是陳沛敏提議的作者。</p> +<p>European states may face several types of challenges, based on a review of wargames and other analyses. First, they will likely face some problems in the Indo-Pacific region and parts of Africa with conducting military engagement, security cooperation, and similar types of missions without help from the United States and other partners. France has some bases in New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Mayotte, Réunion, Djibouti, and the United Arab Emirates. The United Kingdom likewise has overseas bases in Brunei and Diego Garcia. Still, European militaries — even France and the United Kingdom — lack sufficient basing, airlift, logistics, aerial refueling, and power-projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英推薦作者名單包括建制派人物-同事感吃驚">楊清奇指黎智英推薦作者名單包括建制派人物 同事感吃驚</h4> +<p>Second, if planned new investments are not realized, air and naval patrol missions could become challenging even within Europe. Personnel shortages, low aircraft-readiness rates, and some allies’ lack of investment in integrated air and missile defense capabilities will likely inhibit future missions. Staff air patrol shortfalls, for example, have impacted missions in some areas such as the Black Sea. Fortunately, several allies are currently investing in ground-based air defense, short-range air defense, new fighter jets, and long-range patrol assets that will be in service by 2030.</p> -<p>楊憶述他在2016年初開始熟悉論壇版運作後，便按照黎的指示更換作者人選，他提到當時看過黎推薦的作者名單，「我和同事都好吃驚啦，有幾個係建制派嘅人物嚟嘅。我記得好清楚，有兩個應該係行政會議成員嚟。」</p> +<p>Similarly, if current defense plans are not realized, some types of maritime patrol missions could be impacted by shortages in frigates, problems with information sharing, and limited specialized capabilities such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Operation Sea Guardian, which occurred in the Mediterranean, was chronically underresourced and faced particularly acute shortfalls in such areas as naval vessels (including surface combatants) and maritime patrol aircraft. The German navy, for example, will likely continue to face personnel shortages, maintenance delays, spare part shortfalls, and procurement challenges. The major allies recognize these deficencies and are investing significantly in frigates and other ASW platforms that will enter service by 2030, if not sooner. Nevertheless, challenges may remain acute in the Indo-Pacific region, with such significant distances to cover in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.</p> -<p>楊表示，從黎的推薦作者名單來看，「我覺得佢仍然希望論壇版係多元化嘅。反而我和同事就覺得，會唔會天真咗啲？」，「因為呢啲建制派領袖人物呢，冇可能同我哋寫稿。」楊和同事當時曾嘗試邀請這些建制派，但是都不成功，黎則表示只有其中一個人跟他「傾到計」，黎亦有親自邀請該人士，但最終不成功。</p> +<p>Third, shortfalls could impact some types of security force assistance missions, especially in countries that face high levels of terrorism and insurgency and present a non-permissive environment. In the NATO Training Mission Iraq, there were shortfalls in filling Mobile Training Teams as well as force protection concerns. The NATO mission in Kosovo, called Kosovo Force, faced personnel and intelligence shortfalls, including in human and signals intelligence.</p> -<p>被問到2016年的時候，論壇版作者的寫作角度是怎樣，楊指「簡單講就係符合我之前講嘅原則」。他提到，大約2016至2017年時，仍然有建制派領袖人物替《蘋果》撰寫評論文章，雖然這些撰文的建制派領袖人物「係好少嘅」，「但都唔會好似2019年之後咁完全冇立法會議員。」</p> +<p><strong>Large-Scale Combat:</strong> European states are likely to face significant challenges conducting large-scale combat missions, particularly in such areas as heavy maneuver forces, naval combatants, and support capabilities such as logistics and fire support. While much of this section focuses on European challenges in conducting large-scale combat involving Russia, China, or Iran, there are some broader problems that may impact large-scale combat. For example, while NATO 2030 lays out an ambitious agenda for all member states to improve their national capabilties, it is unclear whether European states will realize planned major improvements in the interoperability of their forces regarding the usability of land maneuver formations; suppression of enemy air defense; electronic warfare; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; and medical support to operations. It is also unlikely that European militaries will be able to operate at scale in high-end scenarios against countries such as Russia and China without significant U.S. assistance.</p> -<p>楊引述自己早前的證供，他認為黎智英在2018年起轉變立場，變得激進和尖銳，所以此後黎推薦的評論作者「立場都係比較激進」。楊舉例指黎曾推薦過傳媒人區家麟和「一劍飄塵」。</p> +<p>In addition, challenges in the land and maritime domains will likely impact Europe’s ability to successfully perform high-end missions. While there may be new main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, it is unclear if European militaries will adequately fix problems in combat support and training or address widespread shortfalls in materiel stockpiles by 2030. Significant numbers of infantry battalions are likely to lack their required combat capabilities over the next decade, half of all combat brigades may lack short-range air defense, and roughly one-quarter of infantry divisions may lack long-range indirect fire capabilities. Maritime capabilities also pose a challenge for large-scale combat, including a qualitative shortfall in sensors (including sub-surface sensors), weapons, force protection, and survivability systems.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CSEhcM4.png" alt="image09" /> -▲ 區家麟</p> +<p>Despite these challenges, European militaries are improving their capabilities in some areas. For example, European combat air capabilities will likely improve, with the shift to fifth-generation combat aircraft and improvement in air-to-air refueling, transport, and cargo capabilities because of the multinational Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft fleet. Members of the F-35 consortium — such as Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom — are transitioning their fourth-generation F-16 fighters to fifth-generation F-35s. Several aspects of the F-35s, such as stealth and data-sharing capabilities, will be particularly helpful in conducting large-scale combat missions. Several other European countries, such as Belgium, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Switzerland, are also procuring and operating F-35s. The United Kingdom, along with Italy and Sweden, is developing a sixth-generation future combat aircraft, the Tempest, which is expected to enter service in the mid-2030s. Furthermore, the reevaluation of defense priorities after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and efforts to supply materiel to Ukraine have accelerated the modernization of equipment and ammunition stocks, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.</p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p>The Russian invasion has also motivated a European Commission review of the EU defense industrial base and a range of new initiatives to increase weapons and munitions stocks, modernize equipment, invest in research and development, and increase cooperation between EU member states. In October 2023, for example, the Council of the European Union approved the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act, a €300 million ($318 million) instrument that directly incentivizes collaborative defense procurement. Such efforts aim to reduce fragmentation in EU defense capabilities and planning and to strengthen the European defense industrial base, but their ability to impact large-scale European capabilities through 2030 will require sustained support and significantly increased resourcing. European countries will likely continue to develop substantial space-based capabilities that will facilitate their participation in large-scale combat. For example, France has committed to increasing its military space budget to improve its space and counterspace capabilities, including active defense for space objects. The United Kingdom is also attempting to augment its satellite communications capability, Skynet, and develop opportunies for utilizing or enhancing quantum field sensors; space-based ISR with multi-sensor capabilities; additional payloads for Skynet; and new options to exploit electromagnetic targets.</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="high-end-challenges">HIGH-END CHALLENGES</h4> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇呻遭顏純鈎投訴、張劍虹要求停盧峯專欄兼「當住同事面鬧我」 楊清奇指黎智英冀論壇版多元化 推薦建制派撰文 惟2018年後轉推薦激進作者China Outpacing U.S. DIB2024-03-06T12:00:00+08:002024-03-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-outpacing-us-dib<p><em>China’s defense industrial base is moving to a wartime footing, while the United States is largely in a peacetime stance. Absent urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities against China and other competitors.</em></p> +<p>This section highlights several scenarios that help examine Europe’s ability to effectively perform high-end military missions: a war with Russia in the Baltics, a war with Iran in the Persian Gulf, and wars with China in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. These cases represent plausible future scenarios involving large-scale combat and have been important as part of U.S. Operation Plans (OPLANS). This section uses the results and analyses from wargames, scenarios, exercises, and other analyses to assess the ability of European states to perform military missions through 2030.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>War with Russia:</strong> The results of wargames, scenarios, and other analyses of a war with Russia in the Baltics indicate some challenges with a war in Eastern Europe, even with current Russian weaknesses. As outlined in Chapter 3, these challenges could increase if Russia is able to rebuild its military capabilities over the next decade with help from China and other countries, and if European countries are slow to build their capabilities or fail to learn from the war in Ukraine, including in their efforts to re-strategize, modernize forces, and increase complementarity in research, development, and procurement.</p> -<h3 id="executive-summary">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</h3> +<p>Wargames and other analyses show a major disparity in long-range fires between Europe and Russia even with projected European investments in such systems. European forces will likely continue to be susceptible to fire throughout the theater from Russian systems and lack sufficient ground-based air defense capabilities to counter Russian cruise and ballistic missiles. These problems could be compounded by Russian long-range integrated air defense systems (IADS), which can prevent European states from using airpower in a decisive way early in a conflict. Russian rockets and artillery may also outrange their European counterparts and threaten ground forces.</p> -<p>The U.S. defense industrial base — including the executive branch, Congress, and defense companies — lacks the capacity, responsiveness, flexibility, and surge capability to meet the U.S. military’s production needs as China ramps up defense industrial production. Unless there are urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities against China and other competitors. A significant part of the problem is that the U.S. defense ecosystem remains on a peacetime footing, despite a protracted war in Ukraine, an active war in the Middle East, and growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific in such areas as the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula.</p> +<p>There are also significant challenges with the number, quality, and capabilities of most European ground forces. While Germany’s current defense plan aims to have three combat-capable divisions by the end of the decade, reaching this milestone is unlikely because the German army is shrinking. The United Kingdom has also cut the size of its army and plans to rely more heavily on reserve forces to make up the delta.</p> -<p>The United States faces several acute challenges.</p> +<p>Other European capability gaps that could impact operations include: a longer-range, fast-flying radar-homing missile for suppressing modern surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems; mobile short-range air defense systems; Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs); and area munitions for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)/Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). These problems would be particularly serious without U.S. involvement, though allies’ investments in some of these systems could help them hold initial ground. These include acquisitions of ATACMS and Patriots by Poland and Hungary, the National/Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) by Lithuania, and the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) by Poland. German and other European forces might also face significant challenges neutralizing the Bastion-P coastal defense cruise missile systems located in Kaliningrad and could face sigificant command and control problems.</p> -<p>First, the Chinese defense industrial base is increasingly on a wartime footing and, in some areas, outpacing the U.S. defense industrial base. Most open-source research and analysis on the U.S. defense industrial base has been conducted in a vacuum and has not systematically assessed China’s defense industrial base. Chinese defense companies, such as China North Industries Group Corporation Limited and the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, are producing a growing quantity and quality of land, maritime, air, space, and other capabilities. China increased its defense budget by 7.2 percent in 2024 and is heavily investing in munitions and acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States, according to some U.S. government estimates. China is now the world’s largest shipbuilder and has a shipbuilding capacity that is roughly 230 times larger than the United States. One of China’s large shipyards, such as Jiangnan Shipyard, has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined, according to U.S. Navy estimates.</p> +<p><strong>Iranian Missile Threat:</strong> European states will likely face significant challenges dealing with a missile threat from Iran, based on a review of wargames, scenarios, and other analyses. Under the oversight of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Forces Al Ghadir Missile Command, Iran will likely focus on fielding more accurate and longer-range missiles over the next decade that include counter-measures for defeating U.S. and partner missile defense systems. Iran will likely continue to expand its missile ranges through 2030. A ballistic missile based on Iran’s Zoljanah space launch vehicle could carry a one-ton warhead as far as 5,000 kilometers, allowing Iran to strike every European capital. These developments will supplement other Iranian missiles, such as the Shahab-3 and Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missiles, which have have an operational range of up to 2,000 kilometers. Iran also has layered area denial and anti-surface warfare capabilities, including naval mining (e.g., moored contact, drifting contact, and limpet mines), small boat swarming tactics, and coastal defenses.</p> -<p>Second, the U.S. defense industrial base continues to face a range of production challenges, including a lack of urgency in revitalizing the defense industrial ecosystem. The U.S. Department of Defense has taken some helpful steps to strengthen the industrial base, such as developing a National Defense Industrial Strategy, increasing production for some weapons systems, and pushing for multiyear procurement. But there is still a shortfall of munitions and other weapons systems for a protracted war in such areas as the Indo-Pacific. Supply chain challenges also remain serious, and today’s workforce is inadequate to meet the demands of the defense industrial base.</p> +<p>European missile defense capabilities are lagging. Figure 4.3 outlines EU and NATO multinational air and missile defense projects, many of which will not be fully operational until 2030 or later. For example, NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program — which is designed to protect European populations from a ballistic missile attack from a country such as Iran — likely will not achieve full operational capabilities until at least 2030. France possesses one SAMP/T ground-based air defense missile squadron that will be updated by 2025. Spain is expected to have two long-range radars by 2024. Most of the European countries developing sea-based, lower-layer ballistic missile defense are forecasting delays — including to the development of a suitable interceptor missile — through the end of the decade. The U.S. contribution to NATO’s BMD architecture will remain critical, including the Aegis Ashore and periodic rotation of the Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) missile defense system.</p> -<p>Third, the United States has not sufficiently leveraged its relationships with allies and partners, though it has taken some steps through such arrangements as the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) partnership. Nevertheless, there are too many bureaucratic hurdles and inefficiencies in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and other policies and procedures. Co-development, co-production, co-sustainment, and other forms of cooperation between the United States and its closest allies and partners have been stifled. While the current National Defense Strategy notes that U.S. defense strategy needs to be “anchored” in allies and partners, the United States has fallen short in defense industrial base cooperation with its friends.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/8QUQ5oT.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.3: EU and NATO Multinational Air and Missile Defense Initiatives.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/making-most-european-sky-shield-initiative">Sean Monaghan and John Christianson, Making the Most of the European Sky Shield Initiative (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2023), 8</a>.</em></p> -<p>There are multiple reasons for these challenges. One is that the U.S. defense industrial base is much bigger than any one agency or department. The Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, Congress, the private sector, and other organizations play important roles in the industrial base. But they often have different interests and priorities. In addition, there is significant political and bureaucratic resistance to reforming the defense industrial base and broader defense ecosystem. Some areas of the executive and legislative branches remain too risk averse in sharing sensitive technology with allies and partners. Others mistakenly see a revitalization of the defense industrial base as giving money to greedy executives engaged in waste, fraud, and abuse.</p> +<p>Most scenarios involving an Iranian missile threat in the Persian Gulf suggest that European countries will be able to play at best a limited role. Forces from several allied nations — particularly air, naval, and long-range fires forces from Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates — might participate alongside the United States. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman could each potentially commit one or more combat squadrons (and Saudi Arabia one or more wings) to a conflict. Some Middle Eastern countries possess the HIMARS with ATACMS and could conduct fires across the Persian Gulf against Iranian targets. European allies, such as the United Kingdom and France, could commit some naval and air forces and possibly forward station assets at their bases in the region. But their missile defense capabilities are limited. Barring extended warning of potential Iranian aggression, and without substantial airlift assets, it is unlikely that European forces would be available during the critical early days of a Persian Gulf conflict.</p> -<p>Moving forward, the United States needs to take several steps to revitalize the defense industrial base and broader ecosystem in an increasingly dangerous world.</p> +<p><strong>War with China in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea:</strong> European states will likely lack the capability by 2030 to successfully conduct large-scale combat operations against China, including in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait. The challenges in Asia are significant — even for the United States, which has likely lost “overmatch” with China. The Chinese Communist Party’s 14th Five Year Plan, which goes through 2025, calls for accelerated development of military mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. China is focusing on military applications for such areas as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, biotechnology, information technology, quantum computing, robotics, advanced materials and manufacturing, and deep-sea technologies.</p> -<p><strong>White House–Led Initiative:</strong> There is an urgent need for the U.S. president to create a body that provides strategic guidance and helps oversee a revitalization of the defense industrial base. Revitalization will not occur without White House leadership, as the history of the U.S. defense industrial base demonstrates. During major crises in U.S. history, such as World War II and the Cold War, presidential leadership was essential. Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ronald Reagan, and others were pivotal in providing the leadership, strategic vision, organization, and funding to revitalize the defense industry. One option is a variant of the production boards that existed during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Such a body could be established by the U.S. president and exercise general direction over U.S. defense procurement and production; help determine the policies, plans, and procedures of federal departments regarding defense procurement, production, arms sales, and technology transfers; establish priorities in the distribution of materials and services; fix bureaucratic problems; incentivize industry; improve communication with industry; and, perhaps most importantly, provide a sense of urgency.</p> +<p>Much of China’s activity has focused on the development or acquisition of power-projection capabilities — from fifth-generation aircraft to China’s third aircraft carrier — designed to give China greater ability to influence actions in the Indo-Pacific. The PLA increasingly has the ability to put aircraft carrier strike groups at risk and neutralize ground-based air-power. By 2030, the PLA will likely have the capability to deny operations within the First Island Chain and to complicate operations within the Second Island Chain. By 2030, the PLA may increasingly advance and integrate joint capabilities across multiple domains, which will improve China’s strike capabilities, extend the range and efficacy of force projection, and protect China’s interests.</p> -<p><strong>Defense Spending:</strong> The United States likely cannot revamp its defense industrial base without additional spending on the development and production of weapons systems necessary for deterrence and warfighting. During the Cold War, the U.S. defense budget was between 9 and 11 percent of GDP during the Eisenhower administration, between 8 and 9 percent during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and over 6 percent during the Reagan administration. Today’s defense budget of roughly 3 percent of GDP is not consistent with a security environment in which authoritarian states, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are threatening the United States and its allies and partners across the globe. Without an increase in funding for the development and production of weapons systems, it will be virtually impossible to revitalize the defense industrial base to compete with China.</p> +<p>China is developing the J-20A and J-20B fifth-generation stealth fighters, armed stealth unmanned aircraft systems, the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile that carries an advanced hypersonic glide vehicle, and the J-31 medium-weight stealth fighter. China is also developing kinetic kill vehicle technology to field an upper-tier ballistic missile interceptor by 2030; longer-range, more accurate, and increasingly lethal ballistic and cruise missiles, including conventionally armed intercontinental-range missile systems; air defenses; and other platforms and systems. China also continues to expand its development and modernization efforts of unmanned aircraft systems, including next-generation capabilities such as air-to-air and air-to-ground combat and swarming capabilities.</p> -<p><strong>Multiyear Contracting:</strong> The Department of Defense and Congress need to expand the use of multiyear procurement to create sustained demand signals that will promote investment in the defense industrial base. Congressional appropriators need to fund — and the military services need to spend — a wider range of munitions important for warfighting and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East. Multiyear procurement is important to build a consistent and predictable demand signal that creates more transparency and less risk for prime contractors and more fragile sub-tier suppliers.</p> +<p>The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is fielding new carrier-based aircraft, as well as ASW, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, land-based maritime strike, and air defense forces. China may have as many as five aircraft carriers by 2030, aided by helicopter carriers and a fleet of destroyers. The overall PLAN battle force will likely comprise 435 ships by 2030. China has developed a credible and increasingly robust over-the-horizon ISR capability. The development of China’s space, counterspace, and electronics sectors has enabled it to increase the pace of satellite launches and deploy a wider range of sophisticated ISR satellites. China’s development of anti-ship ballistic missiles presents a heightened maritime threat. At the same time, the ongoing modernization of Chinese air and submarine capabilities represents a more challenging threat to carrier strike groups. Some modeling suggests that the effectiveness of the Chinese submarine fleet (as measured by the number of attack opportunities it might achieve against carriers) has risen significantly over the past 25 years. Chinese submarines would present a credible threat to surface ships in a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea. The PLAN’s total submarine force is expected to number 65 by 2025 and 80 by 2035.</p> -<p><strong>Strategic Stockpiles:</strong> The Department of Defense and Congress should allocate additional funding for contracts and other incentives (such as tax incentives, regulatory relief, and long-term contracts) to build and maintain surge production capacity. This funding can be used to modernize and expand facilities and develop flexible production. The Department of Defense maintains stockpiles of key munitions, minerals, chemicals, technology, and medical supplies, but it needs to better manage inventory and stockpile planning to decrease near-term risk.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/r06dv6U.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.4: China’s Regional Missile Threats: Fielded Nuclear Ballistic Missiles.</strong> Source: <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF">Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 2023), 68</a>.</em></p> -<p><strong>Workforce and Supply Chains:</strong> The United States needs to create the conditions that diversify the supplier base for the defense industry and invest in new production methods. The Department of Defense should look for opportunities to assist companies with upskilling and reskilling workers by offering incentives, such as expanding investments in the Manufacturing Innovation Institutes and in programs designed to support the talent necessary for defense-related manufacturing and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics jobs.</p> +<p>Based on these developments, European militaries will not likely have the power-projection architecture and capabilities to play a major role in large-scale combat against China. They lack significantly deployable capabilities in such areas as ASW; ISR; ballistic missile defense; air precision strike; expeditionary logistics; and suppression of enemy air defense — and would likely prioritize the capabilties they do have for a Europe-based fight. Although NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept identified China’s political ambitions and coercive activities as a challenge for the first time, the document emphasized the Chinese threat to Euro-Atlantic security — indicating that the development of capabilities in the Indo-Pacific is not currently an alliance priority. With the exception of France, which has military assets and some 7,000 to 8,000 troops permanently stationed in the region, European countries lack the significant posture and prepositioned forces in the Indo-Pacific region needed to move quickly in the early stages of any conflict. The huge distances in the Indo-Pacific will also stress European allies’ air-to-air refueling and transport capabilities. Nevertheless, European states can provide some capabilities — such as cyber and space — to support the United States or other countries in the region, including Australia, South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand, and contribute to lower-end deterrence and assurance missions.</p> -<p><strong>Allies and Partners:</strong> The White House — or a White House–appointed body — needs to focus increased attention on streamlining FMS and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) review policies and procedures, as well as support co-development, co-production, and other types of arrangements with allies and partners. The Department of Defense should develop a more efficient review process for releasing technology, accelerate acquisition and contracting assistance, and ensure broad U.S. government support to improve the FMS process. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, working with the services and military departments, should establish a rapid contracting process to reduce the backlog in getting approved FMS cases on contract. The administration should move quickly to put in place regulations that will provide broad exemptions for the United Kingdom and Australia, much like the United States has provided to Canada. In addition, the U.S. government should increase co-production, co-development, and other arrangements with key allies and partners in such areas as munitions, shipbuilding, and ground vehicles.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-2">CONCLUSION</h4> -<p>These steps are important to strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base in a competitive security environment. In his “Victory Speech” in December 1940, one year before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt implored the nation to revitalize its defense industry. It is a message that is just as relevant today. “We must be the great arsenal of democracy,” Roosevelt said. “For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.”</p> +<p>The goal of this chapter was to focus on military missions and to move beyond assessing whether European countries will be able to increase their defense spending to 2 percent of GDP or fix capability gaps. In examining which types of missions European militaries will be able to effectively perform in Europe, the Middle East, parts of Africa, and the Indo-Pacific, this analysis highlights several findings.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> +<p>To begin with, European reliance on the United States can be divided into several tiers, as illustrated below. These tiers represent a judgment about whether European states could operate independently of the U.S. military, not whether they should. They include:</p> -<p><strong>Growing international competition between</strong> the United States and China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, war in the Middle East, and increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula have raised questions about the state of the U.S. defense industrial base. Does the United States have sufficient capacity and flexibility in its defense industrial base for deterrence and warfighting? If not, what else needs to be done? These questions are particularly important since the structure of the international system has changed over the past decade from one of unipolarity, where the United States had no major peers, to one centered on Washington and Beijing. In addition, military capabilities are rapidly evolving in such areas as robotics, sensors, artificial intelligence, cyber, space, long-range precision strike, hypersonics, and advanced communications, command, and control.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Tier 1 Missions: Low Reliance on the United States:</strong> Most European states likely will not require aid from the United States for such missions as noncombatant evacuation, peackeeping, foreign humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, security force assistance, counter illegal migration, air patrol, and maritime patrol missions — particularly in and around Europe.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Tier 2 Missions: Medium Reliance on the United States:</strong> Most European states likely will require some aid from the United States for military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and assurance missions in parts of the Middle East and Africa. In these regions, most European militaries could face some challenges with airlift, aerial refueling, basing, and other issues over extensive geographic areas.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Tier 3 Missions: High Reliance on the United States:</strong> Most European states likely will require significant aid from the United States for large-scale combat, particularly with Russia and China. In addition, European militaries likely will also require U.S. aid to effectively perform numerous missions (such as deterrence and assurance) in the Indo-Pacific.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>For some, the U.S. defense industrial base is adequate for today and tomorrow. As one U.S. Department of Defense report concludes, “the defense industry is financially healthy, and its financial health has improved over time.” Other analysts and policymakers contend that the United States’ capacity is more than sufficient to deter or win a war against another major power such as China. The United States enjoys significant economic and production advantages over its competitors, this argument goes, and “the overall picture is one of stability and health, not decline” in the defense industry. Others argue that the push to increase defense production is largely due to lobbying by defense companies, not military requirements. As one assessment concludes, increased investment in the defense industry “would require a permanent expansion of U.S. weapons manufacturing capability. And once the new factories exist, there will be pressure to keep them open in perpetuity, at a cost of untold billions of dollars.” Indeed, some see defense revitalization as wasting taxpayer money and increasing the possibility of waste, fraud, and abuse. Five U.S. senators — Bernie Sanders (D-VT), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Charles Grassley (R-IA), and Mike Braun (R-IN) — wrote in a letter to U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin in May 2023 that some defense companies were “dramatically overcharging the Department and U.S. taxpayers while reaping enormous profits, seeing their stock prices soar, and handing out massive executive compensation packages.”</p> +<p>In addition, some European states — particularly larger powers such as the United Kingdom and France — will likely have the capability to conduct most types of missions at the lower end of the conflict continuum without U.S. military aid. Examples include noncombatant evacuations, peacekeeping, and foreign humanitarian assistance.</p> -<h4 id="research-design">Research Design</h4> +<p>Major European states will also likely be able to conduct most types of medium-scale missions, such as security force assistance, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and air and maritime patrol. European militaries may face resource issues, including shortfalls in the number of aircraft, naval vessels, personnel, or spare parts, which could stress their ability to fill several missions concurrently or for an extended duration. Nevertheless, they likely will not have significant capability gaps in accomplishing most of these missions, particularly in Europe.</p> -<p>To better understand the U.S. defense industrial base, this report asks several questions: What is the state of China’s defense industrial base? In light of growing competition with China and other international contingencies, how prepared is the U.S. defense industrial base for deterrence and warfighting over the next five years? What steps should the United States take to establish a more effective defense industrial base?</p> +<p>However, European militaries — including the United Kingdom and France — will likely struggle to conduct large-scale combat, where European states still lack sufficient heavy maneuver forces, airlift, naval combatants, and support capabilities, such as logistics and fire support. Although European allies and partners of the United States plan to improve these capabilities by 2030 as part of a greater NATO-agreed initiative, it is unclear whether they will be successful. European challenges may be particularly notable with large-scale, high-end conflict at short notice given most European countries’ persistent readiness challenges. Another challenge will likely be missions in the Indo-Pacific, where European maritime and air forces lack sufficient airlift, aerial refueling, and basing to sustain operations. Countries such as France and the United Kingdom could mitigate basing challenges by reaching agreements with some countries in the region. As highlighted later in Chapter 6, these are areas on which the United States can focus as part of security cooperation and industrial base cooperation with European allies and partners.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZJBVJWm.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1.1 Example of Differences between Commercial and Defense Markets.</strong> Source: Jacques S. Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First Century Defense Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 282.</em></p> +<p>As noted earlier in this chapter, Germany and the United Kingdom may struggle to field some units because of manpower shortages. The shrinking forces of both countries reflect an overall trend affecting not only Europe but also the United States and Canada in trying to recruit and retain an all-volunteer, professional armed force. This is a challenge that needs to be addressed by all Western nations. Without adequate active-duty volunteers, many national leaders will need to consider whether a greater reliance on reservists will be needed to meet force goals and operational requirements. Additionally, consideration may need to be given to reinstitute conscription in some form to have a minimally trained reserve force capable of being called up and deployed if needed.</p> -<p>To answer these questions, this report adopts a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. It compiles and analyzes a range of data to better understand the U.S. and Chinese industrial bases, including in such areas as the defense sector and maritime, air, land, and missile capabilities. The report collects and analyzes other types of information, including White House–led defense bodies since World War II (such as the National Defense Advisory Committee and the War Production Board) and U.S defense spending as a percentage of GDP since World War II. The report also utilizes information from interviews with a wide range of individuals from the Department of Defense, Department of State, Congress (both members and staff), defense companies, and other subject-matter experts. Finally, this report incorporates qualitative information from both primary and secondary sources, including on the history of the U.S. defense industrial base.</p> +<p>There are also a range of factors that could impact the outcome of European missions, such as political will, financial constraints, and variation in threat perception. While all members have pledged to honor NATO’s Article V commitment, many allies in Western and Southern Europe have a significantly different perception of the Russian threat than those nations of Northern and Eastern Europe. Conversely, nations in Northern and Eastern Europe have a different threat perception of illegal migration and terrorist flows than those in Southern and Western Europe. Although the overall strategic focus in Europe has shifted toward the northeast following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, effective development of allied capabilities and strategy will require a balanced threat assessment. Ensuring that all allies share a common risk assessment and understanding that the alliance, as a whole, needs a wide spectrum of deep capabilities to address these threats is what NATO 2030 was designed to achieve and what allied leaders reaffirmed at the Madrid summit in June 2022.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The defense industrial base is a subset of the broader economy and includes the set of companies involved in the research, development, design, production, delivery, and maintenance of weapons systems.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Recruitment, training, operations and maintenance, and purchasing of spare parts will also be key factors in assessing whether NATO allies — including the United States — can meet the 2030 goals and be able to maintain them post-2030. If NATO leaders can find the political will to ensure its 2021 Brussels and 2022 Madrid declarations are not hollow, then many of the missions outlined above can be achieved and many of the present identified gaps can be filled. However, if there is not ample political support — as well as adequate funding — to do what is needed to meet 2030 objectives, many of the challenges noted in this chapter may become even more difficult.</p> -<p>As used here, the defense industrial base is a subset of the broader economy and includes the set of companies involved in the research, development, design, production, delivery, and maintenance of weapons systems. Defense is not a free market system. It is a monopsony, a market arrangement in which there are several suppliers but only one buyer. Defense is also a government-regulated industry, not a government-managed one. Government auditors monitor the costs, purchases, and profits of defense contractors. In the United States, congressional investigations have led to volumes of binding regulations — which are often cumbersome and inefficient — that contractors must follow if they are to remain eligible to work on defense projects. Table 1.1 highlights several rough differences between the commercial and defense markets. However, a substantial number of companies are hybrid, with an increasing share of their revenue coming from commercial sales.</p> +<h2 id="forward-defense">FORWARD DEFENSE</h2> -<h4 id="organization-of-the-report">Organization of the Report</h4> +<h3 id="ch-05">CH. 05</h3> +<h3 id="us-interests-and-defense-objectives">U.S. INTERESTS AND DEFENSE OBJECTIVES</h3> -<p>The rest of this report is divided into three chapters. Chapter 2 analyzes China’s defense industrial base (including Chinese defense companies) with a focus on the military capabilities produced by the Chinese defense industry and some of China’s defense-related weaknesses and operational challenges. Chapter 3 examines the strengths and weaknesses in the U.S. defense industrial base, including in such areas as presidential-level support, defense production, and cooperation with allies and partners. Chapter 4 offers policy recommendations.</p> +<p>This chapter examines U.S. interests and objectives in Europe in the context of U.S. military posture. It asks several questions. What are U.S. interests in Europe? In light of these interests, what should be the United States’ major defense objectives and capabilities in Europe? Based on the analysis, this chapter makes three main arguments.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-defense-industrial-base-and-capabilities">CHINA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND CAPABILITIES</h3> +<p>First, the United States has several enduring interests in Europe: protect the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people; promote and expand economic prosperity and opportunity; realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and defend and support the United States’ European allies and partners. Second, the United States has several defense objectives that flow from these interests, such as deterring and defeating conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and NATO allies. Third, deterrence should be the conceptual lynchpin of U.S. posture in Europe, including a combination of deterrence by punishment (for areas of NATO’s eastern flank) and deterrence by denial (for much of the rest of Europe). Nevertheless, deterrence is likely to be more difficult below the threshold of conventional war for Russian gray zone activities and irregular warfare.</p> -<p>This chapter examines China’s defense industrial base and Chinese military capabilities. It concludes that China’s defense industrial base is moving to a wartime footing, which means that China is rapidly developing and producing weapons systems and preparing to fight a war against another major power, particularly the United States. As U.S. secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall III put it, “China is preparing for a war and specifically for a war with the United States.” Great power wars have historically been won by those nations or coalitions that can outbuild, outspend, outmobilize, and outfight their adversaries. Both modern history and the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrate that the ability to produce more arms and equipment is crucial for a nation at war. There is little reason to believe that a war between China and the United States would be different, and the relative strengths of their defense industrial bases is therefore a key factor in strategic competition.</p> +<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. The first outlines U.S. interests in Europe. The second section examines U.S. defense objectives, which flow from U.S. interests. The third explores deterrence. The fourth section examines several operational concepts. The fifth section analyzes risks to U.S. posture in Europe.</p> -<p>Strengthening China’s defense industrial base is one part of China’s broader strategy of competition. Chinese leaders have articulated a long-term national strategy to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts” by 2049, including developing a “world-class” military. Along these lines, China is focused on outperforming the United States and other countries in the research, development, production, and innovation of information technologies and weapons systems, all of which are central to the future of warfare. In addition, China’s research, acquisition, and production processes and capabilities are improving. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has poured vast resources into capitalizing on the growing capabilities of artificial intelligence, big data, advanced computing, 5G, and supporting military and dual-use technologies. The PLA is developing advanced weapons systems, such as stealth and hypersonic capabilities. In addition, the PLA is amassing a formidable and ever-expanding arsenal of medium- and long-range precision missiles capable of striking U.S. and partner land, air, and sea bases. The PLA is also building a dense web of integrated air defense systems to challenge U.S. forces attempting to operate near such areas as the Taiwan Strait.</p> +<h4 id="us-interests">U.S. INTERESTS</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China’s defense industrial base is moving to a wartime footing, which means that China is rapidly developing and producing weapons systems and preparing to fight a war against another major power, particularly the United States.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The United States has several broad security interests in Europe today, which will likely persist over the next decade:</p> -<p>Overall, trends in military production suggest that China is closing the gap with the United States, though China falls short of the United States on several measures of military power discussed at the end of this chapter. As highlighted in Table 2.1 later in this chapter, China has almost 50 percent more military personnel and twice as many active ground and paramilitary forces as the United States, can take advantage of its large fleet of smaller missile-armed watercraft in fighting near its shores, and operates nearly twice as many main battle tanks and 50 percent more artillery systems than the United States. Although the size of its stockpiles and its rate of production are unclear, China may also have a preponderance of cruise missiles, given the emphasis the PLA places on their use in a conflict with the United States.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Protect the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people, including from threats emanating from Europe;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Promote and expand U.S. economic prosperity and opportunity;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Defend and support the United States’ European allies and partners.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into seven sections. The first examines China’s defense sector, including a comparison of U.S. and Chinese military capabilities. The next four sections analyze Chinese maritime, air, land, and missile capabilities. The sixth assesses Chinese defense industrial weaknesses. The final section explores operational challenges for China.</p> +<p>The United States has interests elsewhere in the world. In particular, China will likely be the United States’ main global competitor. China poses a challenge to the United States around the globe because of its expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities, irregular warfare and gray zone activities, technological and economic competitiveness, and “wolf warrior” diplomacy. The United States has other important interests in other regions, including in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.</p> -<h4 id="defense-sector">Defense Sector</h4> +<p>But it is a false dichotomy to argue that the United States needs to choose between these interests — especially between China and Russia. Both are authoritarian regimes cooperating on two major axes. Beijing and Moscow have deepened their military, economic, and diplomatic ties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States should develop a two-front strategy that works with allies and partners to counter China and Russia. U.S. interests in Europe are significant, and U.S. allies and partners in Europe share the United States’ democratic values and account for significant military, economic, and technological power. Examples include:</p> -<p>China’s rise as a global economic power has made it the preeminent Indo-Pacific military power next to the United States, even with China’s recent economic challenges in such areas as the country’s property crisis, rising unemployment (including youth unemployment), and rapidly aging population. Estimated Chinese defense spending has accounted for at least 2 percent of GDP for the past 30 years, but China’s GDP and defense spending have both increased nearly ninefold during that time. In March 2024, China announced a 7.2 percent increase in its defense budget to continue modernizing its armed forces and strengthen its defense industrial base.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Democracy:</strong> Europe accounts for the largest number of democratic countries of any continent in the world. Europe’s commitment to freedom and democracy is particularly critical because of 16 straight years of democratic decline worldwide due to the global expansion of authoritarian regimes, including China, Russia, and Iran.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Military Power:</strong> European countries have 4 of the 10 largest defense budgets in the world.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Economic Power:</strong> Europe includes 3 of the 10 largest economies in the world, as measured by purchasing power parity. Combined, the European Union has the third-largest economy in the world.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Population:</strong> The population of the entire European Union is 447.7 million, which would make it the third-largest country in the world.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The impact of China’s rise on the regional balance of power has been dramatic. China’s neighbors have not come close to matching its level of spending, as seen in Figure 2.1. Although the United States still spends more on defense than China, the gap is narrowing. Twenty years ago, U.S. military spending was nine times that of China. Last year, it was less than three times as much. The gap is narrower than it looks. The United States has global commitments, while China can focus far more on its immediate neighborhood.</p> +<p>Public support for NATO in the United States has been over 70 percent for the past two decades. In 2022, at least three-quarters of Republicans, Democrats, and independents believed that the United States should maintain or increase its support to NATO, according to a Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll. In 2023, U.S. support for NATO remained high, though some Republicans and independents were more likely to focus on domestic issues. Still, a significant 91 percent of Americans — including Republicans and Democrats — had unfavorable views of Russia in 2023.</p> -<p>China’s defense industry has grown along with its military spending. As shown in Figure 2.2, four of the world’s ten largest defense companies are now Chinese enterprises. China’s biggest defense companies have been growing even larger, but the market has been expanding in other ways, with smaller defense contractors growing more numerous. China has taken what one U.S. government assessment calls a set of “unprecedented steps to facilitate the entry of private firms into the defense industrial base.” That assessment identified 183 private Chinese companies that contributed goods or services to defense aviation and aerospace, 108 of which had ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or PLA that could give them access to advantages not typically available to private commercial entities. The CCP has undertaken significant steps to grow its defense industrial base, a key driver of military power.</p> +<p>Since its establishment in the 1949 Washington Treaty, NATO has been the lynchpin of U.S. security in Europe. The bedrock of NATO is a collective defense provision — an attack on one is an attack on all — that was codified in Article V of the Washington Treaty. During the Cold War, the alliance served as the primary bulwark against the expansion of the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, NATO became the major framework for organizing transatlantic efforts on collective security matters, including military interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. In addition, several former Soviet republics (such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and members of the Soviet-aligned Warsaw Pact (such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia) became NATO members.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YVCcMJ0.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.1 Share of Indo-Pacific Defense Spending by Country Note Vietnam, North Korea, Myanmar, and Timor Leste are excluded due to lack of data.</strong> Source: <a href="https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685">“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</a>.</em></p> +<p>These treaty relationships have benefited the United States for several reasons. One is supporting U.S. leadership. As a result of the United States’ central role in transatlantic and international relations that NATO has in many ways cemented, Americans have enjoyed unprecedented economic prosperity and freedom. Successive American governments have been afforded both de facto and de jure privileged status related to such issues as trade partnerships and access to bases in large part because of the outsized role that the country plays in the defense of its allies. For example, the United States would not have been able to prosecute expeditionary and counterterrorism operations in the Middle East and Africa were it not for the bases and prepositioned equipment that the United States has been able to maintain on allied soil in Europe.</p> -<p>China’s defense industrial potential is probably even higher than its military spending and domestic defense industries suggest. China has adopted a strategy of military-civil fusion (军民融合), promoting coordination between and integration of military and civilian industry, economies, and systems. Many technologies produced by its civilian sectors have clear military applications, and the CCP is likely seeking to exploit these technologies. China has built military requirements into the construction of civilian infrastructure and sought ways to use civilian construction and logistics for military purposes. Commercial Chinese unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) have been used in Ukraine in large numbers. The PLA has experimented with using civilian roll-on/roll-off watercraft (commonly referred to as “ROROs”) in an invasion of Taiwan, conducting several exercises to develop the necessary doctrine and skills. Chinese companies have also dramatically increased their orders of these ROROs for 2024 and 2025, likely heralding a major expansion in construction. The military implications of any one of these developments are unclear, but China’s defense industrial capacity is likely even greater than it appears on the surface.</p> +<p>Another long-standing reason for U.S. engagement in Europe is to enable U.S. strategic depth. The United States’ geographic location, protected by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, no longer provides the same security as in previous decades because of advances in long-range strike, cyber operations, space, and other technological developments. As a result, it is prudent to station U.S. forces overseas to contend with adversary aggression — if not outright conflict — far from the U.S. homeland. Not only does this make the U.S. homeland less vulnerable to outright war, but forward presence is also relatively cost effective.</p> -<p>China has also improved its defense acquisition system. Over the past decade, the PLA has markedly enhanced its research, development, and acquisition (RDA) process. This progress has allowed the PLA to produce advanced platforms in such difficult areas as carrier-based aviation, hypersonics, and propulsion systems. China’s RDA process appears to have five general steps: feasibility study, project design, engineering and development, experiment and design finalization, and batch production (if a system passes all of these stages). According to one U.S. defense official, it takes China less than seven years, on average, to deliver an operational capability, compared to 16 years for the United States. As an analysis of the Chinese defense acquisition system concludes, “Given sufficient time and money, the Chinese RDA system is capable of producing innovative and sophisticated weapons. It is capable of devoting massive resources toward ambitious, priority projects over very long periods, resulting in incremental progress and eventual achievement of its goals.”</p> +<p>Finally, the NATO alliance today affords the United States strategic flexibility. Most of the United States’ main security challenges — from China and Russia to Iran and terrorism — cannot be tackled by one state alone, not even the United States. Allies are critical. They enable flexible cooperation and consultation on any number of strategic issues as they arise. In short, the United States has significant interests in Europe that will likely persist over the next decade.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Over the past decade, the PLA has markedly enhanced its research, development, and acquisition (RDA) process.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="defense-objectives">DEFENSE OBJECTIVES</h4> -<p>The Chinese system has several advantages over the U.S. system, as well as some disadvantages discussed later in the chapter. The government’s centralized power and decisionmaking process help drive whole-of-government strategies. By linking the defense budget to GDP, China can reliably forecast and plan future defense spending. China’s military-civil fusion allows the state to direct university-based research to prioritized science and technology areas. China also places multiple bets in defense research and development by funding numerous concepts, choosing winners, and producing systems and platforms in large numbers.</p> +<p>Based on these interests, the United States has several defense objectives in Europe:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KLsgYCp.png" alt="image03" /> -_▲ <strong>Figure 2.2 The 10 Largest Defense Companies Globally by Total Revenue, 2022.</strong> Source: <a href="https://people.defensenews.com/top-100/">“Top 100 for 2023,” Defense News</a>.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Deter and defeat conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and U.S. allies, as well as coerce, persuade, and influence adversary behavior;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Counter irregular and gray zone activities, as well as compete effectively below the threshold of conventional conflict using both defensive and offensive means;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Counter terrorist and other transnational threats;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Deter and prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maintain access to trade routes and global commons.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Table 2.1 provides an overview of U.S. and Chinese capabilities in such areas as the defense sector and maritime, air, land, and missile capabilities. In addition to these categories, China has also focused on building its network-centric warfare capabilities to fight a joint campaign against the United States. For example, the PLA has developed a concept called “multi-domain precision warfare” (多域精确战). The operational concept is designed to leverage a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network; rapidly coordinate firepower using artificial intelligence, big data, and other emerging technologies; and identify and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. China has also made advances in other areas, including space and cyber. Taken together, China’s production of major combat assets like ships and planes — as well as its creation of the concepts and supporting infrastructure necessary to fight a twenty-first-century adversary — suggest a military and industrial base increasingly prepared for conflict with the United States.</p> +<p>A key defense objective should be to deter and defeat conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and NATO allies, as well as to coerce, persuade, and influence adversary behavior. This objective includes preventing a country with hegemonic ambitions, such as Russia, from expanding its power through territorial conquest, covert influence, and other means. As Putin explained at length in discussing the historical exploits of Peter I, military expansion was about returning what rightly belonged to Russia:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Bm9uKz3.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2.1 Chinese and U.S. Military Capabilities Note Principal surface combatants were defined as aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes.</strong> Source: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2295206">Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 1 (January 2, 2024): 49–72</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2156686">Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 1 (January 2, 2023): 28–52</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685">“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2023</a>; <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “World Military Expenditure Reaches New Record High as European Spending Surges,” Press release, April 24, 2023</a>; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China; and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Military-Balance-2024/for-Strategic-Studies-IISS/p/book/9781032780047">International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024 (London: Routledge, 2024)</a>.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>Peter the Great waged the Great Northern War for 21 years. On the face of it, he was at war with Sweden taking something away from it. . . . He was not taking away anything, he was returning. This is how it was. The areas around Lake Ladoga, where St Petersburg was founded. When he founded the new capital, none of the European countries recognized this territory as part of Russia; everyone recognized it as part of Sweden. However, from time immemorial, the Slavs lived there along with the Finno-Ugric peoples, and this territory was under Russia’s control. The same is true of the western direction, Narva and his first campaigns. Why would he go there? He was returning and reinforcing, that is what he was doing.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NK2QBq8.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.3 Principal Surface and Subsurface Combatants Operated by the PLAN.</strong> Source: Data sourced from the 2004–2024 editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.</em></p> +<p>This logic is revanchist. Putin went on to highlight the need for expansion today. “Clearly, it fell to our lot to reclaim and strengthen as well. And if we operate on the premise that these basic values constitute the basis of our existence, we will certainly succeed in achieving our goals.” Putin’s desire to expand territorial control is cloaked in the language that the Kremlin is merely acquiring what already belongs to Russia. Putin likely has other countries on his colonial agenda, such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which were Soviet republics. Putin’s revanchist aims makes it important to deter and defeat armed aggression.</p> -<h4 id="maritime">Maritime</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FO3KurR.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5.1: European Underwater Fiber-Optic Cables.</strong> Source: <a href="https://submarine-cable-map-2022.telegeography.com/">“Submarine Cable Map 2022,” Telegeography</a> (CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED); and <a href="https://assets.weforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/151104-submarine-cables-internet-world-map.png">“How Can We Protect the Internet’s Undersea Cables?,” World Economic Forum, November 4, 2015</a>.</em></p> -<p>The main beneficiary of China’s defense industrial growth has been the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), especially through a growth in China’s shipbuilding capabilities. China’s ability to rapidly build large numbers of ships represents a possible advantage in a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. China is now the world’s largest shipbuilder by a significant margin. It has a shipbuilding capacity that is more than 230 times larger than that of the United States and sufficient to build 23 million tons of vessels compared to less than 100,000 tons in the United States. According to U.S. Navy estimates, a single Chinese shipyard currently has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined. The PLAN’s growth has made it the largest navy in the world. But the U.S. Navy likely remains more capable by most measures, including physical indicators like tonnage or Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells and operational competencies such as anti-submarine warfare, joint operations, and long-range targeting.</p> +<p>The United States has other defense objectives, such as countering gray zone activities, terrorism, and other transnational threats. For instance, Europe has critical infrastructure that could be threatened by state and non-state activity and pose a threat to the United States. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, one example is the underwater fiber-optic cables that connect Europe with North America and European countries with each other. There are currently 16 cables running under the Atlantic that connect the United States with mainland Europe. They are primarily operated by such companies as Google, Microsoft, France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks, and China’s Huawei Marine Networks. Submarine cables are critical for global communication and account for roughly 95 percent of all transatlantic data traffic. Militaries also use them. These cables are vulnerable to subversion and sabotage by special operations forces and intelligence units; maritime vessels, such as submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles; and possibly non-state actors.</p> -<p>As shown in Figure 2.3, the PLAN has been growing larger since at least 2006, with increases coming in notable categories: the steady increase in corvette construction since 2014, the completion of the Type 002 aircraft carrier Shandong (山东) and the Type 003 carrierFujian (福建舰) in 2017 and 2022 respectively, and the construction of eight Type 055 destroyers (designated by NATO as a cruiser) since 2019. Some of these ships will grow the Chinese fleet, but others will be swapped with older comparable systems, modernizing the PLAN without increasing its size. However, the overall trend is toward greater size and capability.</p> +<p>In January 2022, the Russian navy allegedly mapped out the undersea cables off the coast of Ireland and carried out maneuvers, raising serious concerns in Europe and the United States about Russian sabotage. In addition, a Russian government unit allegedly cut an underwater fiber-optic cable off the coast of Svalbard, Norway, in January 2022 in the Arctic Ocean.</p> -<p>The PLAN still trails the U.S. Navy in other indicators of military might. China may have more ships than the United States, but they are smaller. The aggregate displacement of the PLAN’s surface warships is a little more than a third that of the U.S. Navy. The PLAN is also capable of carrying roughly half as many missiles as the U.S. Navy, indicating a relative disadvantage in firepower.</p> +<p>Europe’s intricate network of gas and oil pipelines are also vulnerable to sabotage and subversion. In September 2022, for example, there were explosions in the Baltic Sea on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines. Europe is vulnerable to other threats below the threshold of conventional war — such as cyberattacks, misinformation and disinformation, assassinations, terrorist attacks, illegal drugs, human trafficking, and the weaponization of immigrants — from state and non-state actors that may require U.S. defense assistance. In 2021, Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko threatened to “flood” the European Union with “drugs and migrants,” and then his government sent thousands of migrants from Iraq and other countries to the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in 2021 and 2022.</p> -<p>That said, both gaps are closing, and China would have the advantage of fighting close to its borders in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or South or East China Seas, where its naval power will be supplemented by planes and missiles launched from the Chinese mainland as well as resupply with munitions, weapons systems, and spare parts from the mainland. In contrast, the United States maintains significant global commitments beyond East Asia, which will limit its ability to bring to bear the full power of the U.S. Navy and other services against China in conflicts around the Taiwan Strait or South or East China Seas. The United States maintains an unchallenged global advantage at sea, but its advantage is eroding near the Chinese mainland.</p> +<p>In addition, the United States will likely need to help deter and prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction. On several occasions, Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons in response to U.S. and other Western aid to Ukraine following the Russian invasion. Russian military leaders also discussed the use of battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine, according to U.S. intelligence. The United States could also help track and counter the acquisition — or attempted acquisition — of fissile material and chemical or biological agents or precursors as well as the movement of these materials and their possible use.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GVT3IUR.png" alt="image06" /></p> +<p>A final defense objective is maintaining access to major trade routes and global commons. Europe has some of the most significant trade routes, such as the Dover Strait (between the United Kingdom and France) and the Suez Canal (between the Mediterranean and Red Sea). On March 23, 2021, for example, the cargo ship Ever Given ran aground in the Suez Canal and created a massive backlog of over 400 vessels, significantly disrupting global supply chains, delaying goods from reaching their destinations, and holding up an estimated $9.6 billion of trade each day. U.S. and European maritime vessels — including from the U.S. Sixth Fleet — and aircraft can help to ensure these shipping lanes remain open. As the Arctic ice melts, the Arctic Ocean also represents a major global common with potential shipping lanes.</p> -<p>Even if China’s fleet does not yet threaten U.S. naval supremacy across the globe, PLAN expansion will likely continue. The number of Chinese ballistic missile submarines, nuclear attack submarines, and large surface combatants may double by 2030, according to U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence assessments. Chinese shipbuilding facilities have been expanding for years, with China’s Changxing Island shipbuilding base growing to approximately 11.5 square kilometers by 2022, about 64 percent larger than China’s historic Jiangnan Shipyard. The expansion is slated to continue, with an additional 4.3 square kilometers planned for the future. Nor is Changxing alone. China has dozens of commercial shipyards that are significantly larger than the biggest U.S. shipyards in size and throughput. Many of these shipyards are used for both military and civilian construction, meaning that China would be able to surge its military shipbuilding capacity more readily than the United States. The result is that China can produce far more ships than the United States, which will allow it to increasingly challenge U.S. dominance, threaten U.S. interests outside of Asia, and potentially prevail in a war of attrition at sea.</p> +<h4 id="deterrence">DETERRENCE</h4> -<p>Similar trends hold for comparisons of the U.S. and Chinese submarine fleet. The PLAN operates about the same number of submarines as the U.S. Navy, but they are much less powerful and of lower quality. China operates only 12 nuclear submarines (about a quarter of its subsurface fleet), while the United States exclusively operates nuclear submarines. Chinese submarines are growing more numerous and capable, but the United States plans to increase its submarine production in the coming decade and will probably still maintain its advantage if current expectations hold.</p> +<p>Deterrence should be the lynchpin of U.S. posture in Europe. Deterrence involves preventing an adversary from taking an action that it might otherwise take. There are two types of deterrence relevant to Europe. Deterrence by denial involves preventing an action, such as Russian aggression, by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives. Deterrence by punishment includes preventing an action, such as Russian aggression, by imposing severe costs if an attack occurs. Some have referred to this as deterrence by cost imposition.</p> -<p>How long it will maintain this advantage remains unclear. China’s submarine industrial base is expanding rapidly. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates a high rate of Chinese submarine production, projecting that the PLAN “submarine force will grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units [from 59] by 2035 despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls.” This translates to a rate of completion much faster than one new submarine every eight months, although how much faster is unclear. The U.S. Navy currently plans to buy 15 to 17 new submarines over the next 15 years, which means that the United States will produce fewer submarines but greater aggregate tonnage and combat power.</p> +<p>A potential attacker’s fears about the costs of military action, especially when weighed against the benefits, are central to both concepts of deterrence. Costs are often a function of military and civilian casualties, military equipment destroyed or lost, the losses associated with economic sanctions imposed by opponents, trade disrupted, and the expense of mobilizing, deploying, and maintaining forces. In the case of successful deterrence, the attacker might not conduct an action because it believes the probability of success is low and the costs and risks are high. For example, the attacker might assess that it cannot successfully achieve its objectives quickly and with limited costs using a blitzkrieg strategy and would instead face a protracted and bloody war of attrition. As former U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson noted: “The only deterrence to the imposition of Russian will in Western Europe is the belief that from the outset of any such attempt American power would be employed in stopping it, and if necessary, would inflict on the Soviet Union injury which the Moscow regime would not wish to suffer.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2XRSgvB.png" alt="image07" /></p> +<p>Deterrence by denial may be achievable for much, though not all, of Europe. A denial strategy requires deploying sufficient numbers and types of conventional forces (such as armored brigade combat teams, fifth-generation aircraft, bombers, artillery, and main battle tanks) and nuclear weapons to prevent the advance of an adversary — such as Russia — on the battlefield. Other factors, such as strategy, are also important. Consequently, for deterrence by denial to be effective in Europe, the United States and its NATO allies need to develop a strategy designed to blunt a Russian blitzkrieg, deploy sufficient numbers of armored brigade combat teams and weapons systems to frontline states in Eastern Europe, and ensure that the defense industrial base of the United States and its allies can produce sufficient munitions and weapons systems for a protracted war.</p> -<p>The United States’ production advantage is likely eroding. The anticipated rate of U.S. nuclear submarine production only exceeds Chinese nuclear submarine production over the previous 15 years by three to five units. Because China has almost certainly improved its ability to produce nuclear submarines since 2010, it can probably match or surpass the United States’ rate of production over the next 15 years if it continues to produce submarines at current levels of quality, although improvements in its submarine quality might slow production. This rate of production suggests that U.S. dominance under the sea is not assured in the longer term, although the U.S. subsurface fleet will remain a key strategic advantage in the coming decade despite the PLAN’s expansion.</p> +<p>In some countries, such as the Baltic states and perhaps Finland, deterrence by denial may be difficult. NATO likely lacks a forward posture — including ground forces and capabilities — in some frontline states to prevent a Russian fait accompli. In these cases, the United States and its NATO allies will likely need to credibly signal to Moscow that the costs of a Russian attack would far outweigh the benefits. Examples might include strengthening the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to quickly surge into targeted countries to repel an advance, using — or threatening to use — nuclear weapons, or developing sufficient host-nation capabilities to mount a costly insurgency. In the case of nuclear weapons, deterrence by punishment can sometimes involve an implicit or explicit threat to destroy large portions of an opponent’s industry and other targets. In the case of a potential insurgency, countries such as Switzerland have deterred invasions in part by developing and training local defense units (supported by regular forces) in irregular warfare, prepositioning stockpiles of weapons and equipment to wage a protracted insurgency, and preparing military and civilian units for decentralized and aggressive resistance.</p> -<p>Overall, China’s economic and defense industrial growth has spurred major expansion and improvement of the PLAN. The CCP’s navy remains beset by major issues, some of which are outlined in a later section of this chapter. But China has transformed in the past few decades into the world’s most productive naval industrial base. Given the role that naval forces would play in any war between the United States and China, China’s ability to produce warships suggests that a prolonged war at sea between China and the United States or a U.S. partner would play to a key Chinese strength, although that is far from a guarantee of victory.</p> +<p>However, deterrence is more difficult below the threshold of conventional war, including for irregular warfare and gray zone activities. Offensive cyberattacks, sabotage, anti-satellite attacks, assassinations, and other types of activities are difficult to deter.</p> -<h4 id="air-china-has-spent-the-last-few-decades">Air China has spent the last few decades</h4> +<p>In addition to deterrence, assurance will remain important in Europe. Assurance, which includes land, maritime, and air activities designed to give confidence to allies and partners, can be helpful. Examples might include the stationing of permanent or rotational ground forces and equipment, air and maritime patrols, and military exercises. But assurance is not the same as deterrence, and steps to assure allies and partners do not necessarily deter adversaries. For example, air and maritime patrols may provide some confidence and comfort to host-nation countries near where these patrols occur, but there is little evidence that they deter adversary behavior. Consequently, while assurance steps are important, deterrence should be the conceptual lynchpin of U.S. posture in Europe.</p> -<p>dramatically increasing the rate and quality of its military aircraft production. The United States continues to operate the world’s largest and most advanced fleet of fighter aircraft, but its long-term ability to dominate the air is more uncertain than at any time since the end of the Cold War. China has been rapidly modernizing its air forces, and its ability to produce military aircraft continues to increase as the country reduces its dependence on foreign engines.</p> +<h4 id="operational-concepts">OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS</h4> -<p>China operates the third-largest fleet of military aircraft in the world, after only the United States and Russia. The number of Chinese combat aircraft has not grown dramatically over the past 20 years, but China’s air fleet has grown significantly more capable. The air forces operated by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN consist of approximately 2,250 combat aircraft, up slightly from 2,120 a decade ago. As shown in Figure 2.4, those planes are increasingly modern. The PLA had approximately 800 fourth- and fifth-generation combat aircraft at the end of 2016. It had almost 1,500 at the end of 2023. China has also produced at least 200 fifth-generation J-20 fighters since the airframe’s debut in 2010, with rates of J-20 completion set to increase in the coming years. These numbers still trail those of the United States, which operates more than 3,300 fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, but they represent an impressive rate of military aircraft production. The United States still retains a major advantage in the number of fifth-generation aircraft, with active-duty units operating 165 F-22 and 606 F-35 aircraft.</p> +<p>There are several operational concepts relevant to examining force posture in Europe. One is agile combat employment (ACE), which is designed to increase survivability and generate combat power in the face of an imminent threat or action. The intent is to complicate the adversary’s targeting process, create political and operational dilemmas for the enemy, and create flexibility for U.S. or allied and partner forces. Aircraft are particularly vulnerable if they are postured on bases that are few in number, lack passive defenses (such as shelters and decoys), and lack sufficient active defenses (such as kinetic and non-kinetic interceptors, electronic warfare, and directed-energy weapons) that can help counter air and missile threats.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/z61n6dY.png" alt="image08" /></p> +<p>ACE in Europe involves responding to a rising threat — such as an increase in U.S.-Russian tensions, a Russian military buildup along NATO’s eastern flank, or even a preemptive Russian strike against NATO. ACE might include rapidly moving U.S. and allied aircraft and key personnel, materiel, and logistics from large bases (or main operating bases) to dispersed contingency locations (or forward operating sites) in Europe and perhaps other regions.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/k9GokHQ.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.4 Fixed-Wing, Crewed Combat Aircraft Operated by the PLA.</strong> Note: Retrofitted aircraft are classified as their original generation type due to lack of reliable data on when retrofitting occurred. Source: Data sourced from the 2009–2024 editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.</em></p> +<p>One example might involve quickly dispersing aircraft, materiel, and personnel from such main operating bases as Ramstein Air Base in Germany to forward operating sites in Greece, Slovenia, Poland, Romania, or other countries. Rapid dispersal relies on airlift and logistical flows between main operating bases and forward operating sites, ideally covered by air and missile defense. ACE also involves massing and utilizing forces from forward operating sites to potentially strike enemy targets. To be effective, ACE generally requires prepositioning war reserve materiel and building infrastructure at forward operating sites, as well as conducting training and exercises, negotiating access through host-nation agreements, and engaging in other activities with European partners.</p> -<p>Rapid Chinese modernization will likely continue, and China is closing the production gap with the United States. Recent estimates of J-20 production suggest that China is producing more than 100 fifth-generation J-20 airframes per year. Although this is lower than the expected annual F-35 production of 156 airframes per year starting in 2023, the production rate is much closer than has previously been the case and actual J-20 production numbers remain secret. China has also nearly tripled the number of its more advanced J-10C, J-16, and J-20 aircraft in use over the past decade, suggesting a high rate of production. A major factor in China’s improving domestic manufacturing capability is the Chinese-made WS-10 and WS-20 engines, which are replacing imported Russian engines in Chinese aircraft. However, China does not dominate global aircraft production the way it does shipbuilding. The United States and Europe maintain a global duopoly on large passenger aircraft. In contrast, China’s first domestic airliner took its initial commercial flight in June 2023 and is dependent on U.S. and European suppliers for parts.</p> +<p>In addition, dynamic force employment (DFE) is an operational concept designed to demonstrate operational unpredictability to adversaries, improve deterrence, and support allies. DFE missions might include posturing a guided-missile destroyer to the High North, conducting Bomber Task Force missions, or deploying an F-35 squadron. The idea is to employ forces in ways that demonstrate the United States’ ability to quickly generate combat power and deter adversary action. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy concluded, DFE provides “options for proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force” and facilitates “combat-credible, flexible theater postures [that] will enhance our ability to compete and provide freedom of maneuver during conflict, providing national decision-makers with better military options.”</p> -<p>There are also indications that China is seeking to take advantage of its legacy fleet in new ways. China has been steadily retiring its fleet of second- and third-generation J-6, J-7, and J-8 fighter aircraft, retooling some into UASs, which would boost the size of the Chinese air fleet at low cost. This could allow China to absorb much greater attrition of aircraft in a Taiwan contingency than its industrial base or pilot training systems could otherwise support. However, these UASs remain unproven, and it would be premature to include them in assessments of Chinese airpower. What they demonstrate instead is an apparent commitment to experimentation and an effort to multiply the advantages conferred by China’s rapid military modernization.</p> +<p>The Defender-Europe exercise involved the rapid deployment of air and land capabilities (including Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and M113 armored personnel carriers) from the United States and Germany to Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area in Poland. U.S. Army units then conducted company-level, live-fire exercises with Poland’s 17th Mechanized Brigade and 11th Armor Cavalry Division.</p> -<h4 id="missiles">Missiles</h4> +<p>However, there are at least three challenges with DFE and deterrence. First, there is little empirical evidence that DFE actually deters adversaries. For example, it is unclear if — and perhaps unlikely that — Russia has been deterred by the occasional deployment of an F-35 squadron, guided-missile destroyer, or Bomber Task Force mission in Europe. To effectively deter, actions need to make an adversary’s activity infeasible or impose severe costs if the activity occurs. DFE likely does neither. Second, DFE may weaken assurance of U.S. allies and partners in cases where permanent or rotational forces are replaced by those engaged in DFE. Third, there is often little or nothing “dynamic” about DFE, since it can sometimes take several months to negotiate with local partners and allow for adversary intelligence collection and warning.</p> -<p>Chinese missile capabilities are a key element of its “assassin’s mace” (杀手锏) approach to combat. The ability to use a multimillion-dollar missile to neutralize a $13 billion aircraft carrier represents an advantage in a prolonged industrial conflict. Some mathematical modeling and wargames indicate that the ability to fire large numbers of missiles is an important determinant of attrition in a conflict between the United States and China. This makes the expansion of China’s missile industry an important advantage in such a conflict. The Chinese arsenal is formidable, and it consists of a rapidly growing ballistic missile stockpile and a variety of cruise missiles for which production rates are difficult to determine. China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile program in the world. China also fielded its first missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2022.</p> +<h4 id="potential-risks">POTENTIAL RISKS</h4> -<p>China’s missile industry has been producing at a high rate. For at least the last four years, China has launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of the world combined. While the number of China’s ballistic missiles is difficult to quantify, the U.S. Department of Defense assesses roughly a 200 percent increase in the number of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) between 2016 and 2022. Differences in methodology make the exact figure highly uncertain, but the growth of China’s missile forces is unquestionable. China’s growing number of launchers suggests a high rate of production, as highlighted in Figure 2.5. In the last five years alone, China’s active ballistic missile launchers increased by about 15 percent, with the number of active ICBM launchers doubling and the number of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launchers increasing almost fivefold. This increase follows years of improvements in the Chinese ballistic missile industry.</p> +<p>As this chapter argues, the United States has enduring interests in Europe. In particular, Russia presents a long-term threat to the United States and its European allies and partners because of its revanchist intentions and efforts to rebuild its military capabilities. Based on these interests, the United States has several defense objectives in Europe, such as deterring and defeating conventional and nuclear-armed conflict, countering irregular and gray zone activities, countering terrorist and other trans-national threats, deterring and preventing state and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining access to key trade routes and global commons. To achieve these objectives, the United States needs sufficient land, maritime, air, space, cyber, nuclear, and special operations capabilities in or near Europe.</p> -<p>The composition of China’s missile forces has also been changing as the Chinese missile industry produces more advanced missiles. The decrease in missile launchers recorded between 2021 and 2022 is the result of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) losing several DF-16 and DF-21 missile brigades and gaining two DF-31AG brigades and one DF-17 brigade. The DF-16 and DF-21 are short-range (SRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), respectively. While the DF-16 has been employed only since the mid-2010s, the DF-21 has been in service since the 1990s. The DF-31AG is an upgraded ICBM capable of off-road movement and requiring fewer support vehicles, and the DF-17 is a MRBM that carries an advanced HGV. This process is still ongoing, with the PLARF in the process of constructing at least two more DF-17 brigades along with one IRBM brigade and five ICBM brigades.</p> +<p>In addition, deterrence should be the lynchpin of U.S. posture in Europe, and it should include a combination of deterrence by punishment (for areas of NATO’s eastern flank) and deterrence by denial (for most of Europe). But deterrence is likely to be weaker below the threshold of conventional war — including for irregular warfare and gray zone activities, such as cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, and subversion. This reality suggests that the United States and its European allies should be aggressive in conducting both defensive and offensive action below the threshold of conventional war.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SrBKtxH.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.5 Ballistic Missile Launchers Operated by the PLARF.</strong> Source: Data sourced from the 2010–2024 editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.</em></p> +<p>Nevertheless, any U.S. force posture has risks that need to be managed. Examples include:</p> -<p>The DF-17 in particular presents a greater threat than a traditional ballistic missile because of the ability of its HGV to travel faster than Mach 5 and its greater degree of maneuverability after reentering the atmosphere. One analysis estimates that China will field between 108 and 144 DF-17 launchers by 2028, at least doubling, if not quintupling, the number of active HGV systems in just five years. In contrast, the United States is still struggling to field hypersonic missiles, with none of the prototypes it planned to field in 2023 arriving on schedule. U.S. delays may not stem from defense industrial inferiority but from more ambitious requirements. Nonetheless, China’s modernization remains a threat to U.S. freedom of action.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><em>European Military Capabilities:</em> European capabilities remain limited, including for high-end warfare. Particular concerns are such areas as integrated air and missile defense, long-range fires, hypersonics, and sufficient stockpiles of critical munitions, such as for integrated air defense systems and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em>Interoperability:</em> Military interoperability remains a challenge across NATO militaries.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em>Political Will:</em> Political will may be fragile in some European countries, including to support U.S. basing, access, and overflight.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em>European Defense Industrial Base:</em> The defense industrial bases of most European countries are not adequately prepared for the current security environment. Most have not produced sufficient quantities of the most important munitions and weapons systems — such as long-range fires and integrated air and missile defense systems — for a major war. Most also do not have sufficient surge capacity for a protracted war.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em>Escalation:</em> Some posture actions, such as deploying armored brigade combat teams to Finland, could unnecessarily provoke Moscow and risk escalation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em>U.S. Contingencies:</em> Some U.S. forces could be deployed to other regions — such as the Indo-Pacific or Middle East — for contingencies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em>Domestic U.S. Constraints:</em> There are several domestic factors that could impact U.S. force posture in Europe, including the size of the U.S. defense budget or an isolationist turn in U.S. politics.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Chinese ballistic missile producers have been expanding their facilities and hiring more workers. This includes producers of missiles, engines, and launch vehicles, such as the Capital Aerospace Machinery Company, and research and development bodies, including the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s Fourth Academy. This increase comes alongside a 20-year effort to increase efficiency and reduce waste by consolidating China’s missile industry. As with China’s shipbuilding industry, these expansions suggest increasing production capacity and quality. Whether in the context of a prolonged industrial war or long-term strategic competition, China’s ability to produce large numbers of missiles, especially advanced hypersonic missiles, will represent a source of strength.</p> +<p>Based on these risks, U.S. posture in Europe needs to be flexible enough to allow some U.S. forces to surge to other regions — such as the Indo-Pacific or Middle East — in case of contingencies. The next chapter provides more details about U.S. posture.</p> -<h4 id="land">Land</h4> +<h3 id="ch-06">CH. 06</h3> +<h3 id="a-forward-defense-posture">A FORWARD DEFENSE POSTURE</h3> -<p>The PLA ground forces have not benefited from increases in Chinese defense spending as much as the country’s naval, air, and missile forces. Still, China’s ground forces are more numerous and operate more main battle tanks and artillery pieces than their U.S. counterparts, and the People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) has been modernizing its ground equipment with domestic platforms over the past five years.</p> +<p>This chapter outlines recommendations for the future of U.S. military posture in Europe based on the interests, objectives, capabilities, and operational concepts identified in the previous chapter, as well as concerns about Russian military reconstitution and political revanchism. The chapter begins with a discussion of the methodology and assumptions underpinning them, including considerations of the time frame for implementing new U.S. policies, the state of the war in Ukraine and the reconstitution of Russia’s military capabilities, the state of competition with China and the likelihood of a Taiwan conflict, and U.S. global posture writ large.</p> -<p>The PLAA is the world’s largest ground force. Over the past five years, it has not meaningfully increased in size, but it has grown heavier, adding nine armored brigades while reducing the number of light and mechanized infantry brigades. The equipping of these new units is ongoing, but open-source analysis indicates that 70 percent of the PLAA’s main battle tanks are now modern and that more than 60 percent of its heavy and medium combined arms brigades are equipped with modern vehicles. These vehicles are Chinese products rather than imports — including newly developed tanks, self-propelled howitzers, and assault vehicles. This is part of China’s strategy of moving its military from a “quantity-scale” type to a “quality-efficiency” type.</p> +<p>This chapter also provides recommendations in line with a posture of “forward defense.” It is organized around the categories of ground forces; air combat forces; naval forces; air and missile defense; logistics and enablers; and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR). The recommendations seek to bolster U.S. ground forces, particularly in NATO’s eastern flank, as a deterrent against Russian military reconstitution and revanchism. In the air and maritime domains, they aim to adopt a flexible posture and work with allies to fill capability gaps in the event of a contingency in the Indo-Pacific or other regions. Finally, they strive to enhance coordination with NATO allies by building partner capacity missions, security assistance, and arms sales to fill capability gaps, improve interoperability, and enhance allied lethality.</p> -<p>China has also developed several capabilities in the past 10 years that will probably increase the PLAA’s role in a Taiwan contingency. The first are helicopters in the PLAA’s aviation arm. China has been trying to improve the ability of its helicopter units to operate as part of a joint campaign. China has also been steadily increasing the number of Z-10, Z-19, Z-20, and Z-8 helicopters for the past five years, as shown in Figure 2.6. PLAA helicopters were observed rearming and refueling onboard PLAN vessels for the first time in 2022. These capabilities could play an important role in an invasion of Taiwan.</p> +<h4 id="methodology-and-assumptions">METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS</h4> -<p>A second important system is the PCH191 multiple rocket launcher, a modular system capable of firing a variety of rocket types. Long-range precision strike plays a key role in China’s military strategy in the Western Pacific. The launcher is capable of firing low-cost rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles, and land attack missiles. The additional range offered by the system and its ability to strike ships will likely increase the role the PLAA can play in a Taiwan invasion, making it a key contributor to fires delivery against the island and naval forces attempting to operate in the Taiwan Strait. The apparent low price of the system’s rockets could also give the PLAA an important role to play in a prolonged conflict involving land forces.</p> +<p>The posture recommendations were developed based on the analysis in preceding chapters as well as an evaluation of the U.S. military’s posture both currently and prior to the war in Ukraine. Those postures served as a baseline from which the study team recommended changes according to the objectives and interests identified in Chapter 5, the state of European military capabilities as assessed in Chapter 6, and the analysis of the threat landscape in Chapter 4. The recommendations were then evaluated against alternative postures discussed in Chapter 7 and assessed against several operational scenarios.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jqdumNZ.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.6 Select Helicopters Operated by the PLAA.</strong> Source Data sourced from the 2011–2024 editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.</em></p> +<p>Additionally, several assumptions inform the recommendations. Regarding the timeline to enact policy and posture changes, these recommendations are designed for U.S. military force posture in Europe through 2030. In the case of some recommendations that may have a more immediate impact (such as increased port visits) or delayed impact (such as new bases), the approximate timeline will be specified.</p> -<p>The PLAA has benefited far less from China’s military-industrial development than the PLA’s other combat arms, but it remains the world’s largest ground force and its equipment has grown heavier and more modern over the past five years. Although the skill and technology employed by a military are major determinants of its combat power, the war in Ukraine should remind strategists that quantity still has a quality of its own. The sheer size of the PLAA remains an asset in a prolonged interstate war, especially if one of its neighbors is forced by domestic U.S. politics to fight alone.</p> +<p>Offering recommendations on the future of U.S. posture in Europe is also complicated by the current state of the war in Ukraine. This study assumes that the war will likely continue for the foreseeable future, though the intensity of the fighting could wax and wane based on several factors, including political negotiations. The study assumes that the Russian military will attempt to reconstitute its military forces and capabilities, to include the modernization of the army. China will likely provide economic and some military assistance to Russia to aid in its modernization efforts. The study team also assumes that Iran, North Korea, and other countries will provide military assistance to Russia.</p> -<p>Overall, China’s defense industrial base has grown ever more capable of waging war. Given the tendency of interstate war to develop into a contest of industrial production, the rise of Chinese defense industrial capacity shifts the regional, if not yet global, balance of power toward China. But just how much it has shifted depends on more than just the number of ships, planes, and missiles China can make each year. China’s industrial base and the military end users of its products have numerous weaknesses that cannot be solved by the expansion of a shipyard or an increase in jet fighter production. It is to those weaknesses that this report now turns.</p> +<p>The recommendations offered in this study are not made in a vacuum absent considerations of U.S. posture elsewhere in the world. This report seeks to offer realistic policy options informed by global trade-offs in terms of U.S. forces and capabilities. As outlined above, while the United States has significant interests and objectives, China is the United States’ main geostrategic competitor. Accordingly, this report identifies areas of risk where preferred capabilities may not be available for use in the European theater due to their deployment in the Indo-Pacific theater and offers options to mitigate that risk. The recommendations assume that U.S. tensions with China will continue, including over Taiwan. Finally, this study does not conduct a detailed budget analysis of forward defense, but it does highlight the budgetary implications of certain policies or force posture changes as well as political considerations.</p> -<h4 id="chinese-weaknesses">Chinese Weaknesses</h4> +<p>The rest of this chapter examines posture and capability recommendations in the following categories: ground forces, air combat forces, naval forces, air and missile defense, logistics and enablers, ISR, and nuclear forces.</p> -<p>China’s defense industry is formidable but has at least four weaknesses: an overreliance on foreign imports, uneven quality of systems, corruption, and a lack of allies and partners. Nevertheless, the size and opacity of China’s defense industry make it hard for external observers to assess with complete fidelity. The result is that there may also be a variety of weaknesses that go unseen by both CCP and foreign analysts, weaknesses that could prove pivotal in a major war.</p> +<h4 id="ground-forces">GROUND FORCES</h4> -<p>First, China has supply chain vulnerabilities in its defense industrial base and relies on foreign inputs, although China has reduced its reliance on some foreign parts. For example, China’s current diesel submarine fleet relies to some extent on German engines. Airplane engines are another important area of weakness, although China has prioritized developing its own high-quality aerospace engines. China also depends on integrated circuits — computer chips with military and civilian uses. While China is a major exporter of some circuits, it is also a net importer. The United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all major net exporters, particularly for high-end chips. Chinese chips remain lower quality than those produced abroad, and U.S. export control regulations enacted in late 2022 limit or effectively cut off China’s access to the expertise, equipment, and export markets required to rapidly advance its chip industry.</p> +<p>The nature of operations in Ukraine illustrates the continued significance of ground forces in combat in the European theater. Consequently, U.S. ground forces in Europe will play a major role in deterring and responding to acts of Russian aggression and should be strengthened in a “forward defense” posture.</p> -<p>A comparable weakness exists in China’s dependence on imported manufacturing equipment. Chinese machine tools perform worse than foreign tools on several metrics, contributing to low rates of domestic machine tools used in high-tech industries such as aerospace. The result is that high-end manufacturing still depends on imported manufacturing equipment, most of which comes from U.S. partners Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The result of this dependence on foreign parts and manufacturing equipment is that the United States will have opportunities to weaken Chinese military production by cutting off imports through diplomatic or military measures if the two countries go to war.</p> +<p>As the war in Ukraine highlights, land warfare remains important, including in Europe. There are several types of capabilities important for achieving U.S. defense objectives highlighted in the previous chapter, including deterring and defeating conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and NATO allies. Key examples include:</p> -<p>The extent to which China can continue to decrease its reliance on foreign parts and tools will be a key determinant of China’s actual military capacity, but the CCP is determined to do so. China is seeking to decrease its dependence on foreign parts and equipment. It has steadily reduced its arms imports in recent decades, as shown in Figure 2.7. Especially notable are the decreases in aircraft imports after major investments in weapons development programs in the mid-2000s. Equally notable is the rise in engine imports as China has expanded its air forces without the ability to produce high-quality domestic aerospace engines, especially after 2017. That trend also may be coming to an end due to breakthroughs in development of aircraft engines using novel techniques and the direct acquisition of foreign firms such as Germany’s Thielert Aircraft, Continental Aerospace Technologies, Superior Air Parts, and Diamond Aircraft. The development of indigenous replacements will be a long and uneven process, however. Until it grows less dependent on imports or improves its relationship with major European and Asian producers, China’s ability to replace destroyed systems in a major war will be limited either by military or political constraints on such imports.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Army units, including armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs);</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Integrated air and missile defense systems;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Long-range fires;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Manned and unmanned aircraft;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Multi-domain command and control; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Additional investments and equipment — including logistics — such as munitions stockpiles, spare parts, hardened facilities, and improved lines of communication.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kSLPsAG.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.7 Chinese Defense Imports (Select Categories Displayed).</strong> Source: <a href="https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685">“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2023</a>.</em></p> +<p>These and other land-based capabilities fall under U.S. Army Europe. In addition, achieving U.S. defense objectives in Europe requires active defenses, passive defenses, and counterstrike. Active defense refers to assets that directly target and eliminate incoming threats, including integrated air and missile defense capabilities, such as Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot surface-to-air missile systems (including radars, fire control, battle management, and command and control). Passive defense refers to hardened infrastructure and dispersal of assets through concepts of operation such as agile combat employment (ACE). These passive defense actions minimize damage to installations from kinetic threats by absorbing strikes and forcing U.S. adversaries to expend more munitions on hardened targets. Finally, counterstrike includes the ability to conduct retaliatory actions against enemy forces and to prevent or mitigate damage from additional follow-on attacks.</p> -<p>Second, the quality of some Chinese systems is lower than that of their Western counterparts. For example, China struggles to design specialized sound-absorbing coatings, deal with vibration-suppression issues created by steam turbines, and decrease the sonar signature of its submarine hull designs. Chinese submarines will therefore be easier to find and destroy than U.S. submarines, rendering them relatively ineffective in a conflict with the United States. Depending on how widespread the problems with Chinese systems are, China’s military could be far less impressive in reality than it is on paper. If China’s systems are far less survivable or lethal than U.S. equivalents, then its productive advantages could be negated or their effects significantly reduced.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fnHJLAQ.png" alt="image13" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6.1: U.S. Military Force Posture in Europe, 2024.</strong> Source: Compiled by CSIS based on DOD and open-source reporting.</em></p> -<p>Third, corruption within the CCP, PLA, and Chinese defense industrial base is likely another weakness. Corruption has a negative impact on military effectiveness, as the Russian military discovered to its detriment during its invasion of Ukraine. The extent of corruption throughout the Chinese defense sector is unclear. A spate of corruption investigations within the defense sector took place in 2022 and 2023, most notably in connection with the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, but the opacity of the CCP makes it difficult to determine whether the investigations are truly driven by rooting out corruption or by ulterior domestic political motives. Corruption within the PLA itself has historically been more widespread, with reports of corruption surrounding promotions being common.</p> +<p>The United States should prepare for Russia to revitalize its military capabilities and pose a threat to NATO’s eastern flank. It should consequently take steps to strengthen its presence from pre-February 2022 levels by increasing the number of permanent forward-stationed maneuver forces to deter and effectively respond to Russian aggression. That increase entails shifting the rotational ABCT associated with Operation Atlantic Resolve (along with the associated combat aviation brigade) to a permanent, forward-stationed ABCT headquartered in Poland. The United States should also maintain its enduring rotational infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) presence in Romania, as well as rotational deployments to the Baltic states in the near term and incorporate them into Operation Atlantic Resolve under the command of the V Corps headquarters. However, the requirement for these rotational forces may shift depending on changes to the threat environment.</p> -<p>Fourth, China’s lack of major allies and partners is detrimental to its defense industrial base. China will likely benefit much less from its network than will the United States. South Korea and Japan have the second- and third-largest shipbuilding industries in the world, and both have among the largest navies in the world by total tonnage. The Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security partnership is already deepening defense cooperation between the participant countries in nuclear-powered submarines, and it could expand to other areas under AUKUS Pillar Two as well. NATO is increasingly focused on China, naming it as a “challenge” in its 2022 Strategic Concept. While China has some partners, they lack the industrial and financial power of the U.S. alliance network. Russia will be a net drain on China’s industrial capacity as long as it remains bogged down in Ukraine. North Korea and Iran’s economies have been crippled by sanctions, and their arms industries are focused on lower-end systems that are unlikely to help China prevail in a high-end conventional fight in the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<p>These changes to U.S. ground force posture would shift the U.S. Army to a posture model of four total brigade combat teams (BCTs) in Europe (three permanent, forward-stationed BCTs and one rotational BCT) plus two headquarters in Germany and Poland (four BCTs + two headquarters model) from the previous 3+1 model prior to the war in Ukraine. This model would also include the permanent forward basing of two combat aviation brigades (the existing 12th Combat Aviation Brigade plus another). Prior to the February 2022 invasion, the United States maintained two permanent, forward-stationed BCTs in Europe plus one rotational BCT. The permanent units include the 2nd Cavalry Regiment Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) headquartered in Vilseck, Germany, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade across Vincenza, Italy, and Grafenwoehr, Germany, as well as the forward-stationed 12th Combat Aviation Brigade. The rotational ABCT, established in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, serves as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, which deploys approximately 7,000 U.S. Army personnel (including the ABCT plus a combat aviation brigade, sustainment task force, and forward division headquarters) to Europe on nine-month rotations.</p> -<h4 id="operational-uncertainties">Operational Uncertainties</h4> +<p>Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, U.S. ground forces in the U.S European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility increased significantly, shifting to a 5+2 model with the deployment of two additional BCTs (one ABCT and one IBCT), the V Corps division headquarters in Poland, a High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battalion, and enablers. The second IBCT serves as a rotational unit headquartered in Romania to provide an additional brigade on the eastern flank. Additionally, it was announced that the United States would “enhance its rotational deployments” to the Baltics states — including armored, aviation, air defense, and special operations forces — and “maintain a persistent heel-to-toe presence in the region.” From an operational perspective, EUCOM also deployed its permanently forward-stationed forces to NATO’s eastern flank in response to Russia’s invasion, including the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, Patriot forces, and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade.</p> -<p>The PLA likely has a variety of operational weaknesses in translating defense capabilities to effectiveness, though China is attempting to address them. Overall, the PLA suffers from what it calls “peace disease” (和平病), its lack of combat experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Its soldiers, equipment, and doctrine are not battle-tested, and both the PLA and external observers have identified several areas in which PLA performance may fall short.</p> +<p>The recommended changes in this report for a 4+2 model would thus maintain the permanent SBCT in Germany and IBCT in Italy and Germany, create a permanent, forward-stationed ABCT at a new base in Poland, maintain the rotational IBCT in Romania, and maintain two permanent headquarters in Germany and Poland.</p> -<p>The first problem China faces is its ability to achieve “jointness” — tight coordination of the actions of multiple services across multiple domains to maximize combat power. Structural obstacles within China’s command and control systems make joint operations problematic. The PLA has created theater commands for ground, naval, and air forces, leaving the Central Military Commission responsible for command of the PLARF and People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). The result is that China’s ground, air, and maritime forces would be part of a joint command, while its space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities would be part of separate command systems. Cultural issues also abound. Chinese analysts point to interservice rivalry as a major impediment to cooperation between the PLA services. CCP and PLA leadership have sought to reduce these obstacles, but it is unclear how successful these reforms have been in practice.</p> +<p>Forward-stationing an ABCT in Poland offers several benefits to maintaining U.S. interests and achieving objectives in Europe, including (1) providing a credible force to swiftly respond to acts of Russian aggression against NATO partners; (2) reassuring allies of the U.S. commitment while building interoperability with partner forces; and (3) enhancing the general readiness of U.S. forces at large and reducing costs in the long run. Poland would provide the most practical and beneficial location to establish a new military base for an ABCT from an operational and political perspective. As announced at the 2022 NATO summit, Poland already hosts the V Corps Forward Command Post Headquarters, an Army garrison, and sustainment capabilities — the “first permanent stationing of U.S. forces on NATO’s eastern flank.”</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The PLA suffers from what it calls “peace disease” (和平病), its lack of combat experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>More critically, forward-stationing U.S. units in Poland would facilitate the speed of assembly and movement for U.S. operations in Europe, in which ABCTs would play a major role. According to a U.S. Army War College study, “The heart of the combat capability of a division configured for Europe is its ABCTs,” which “provide the bulk of ground force combat power and are the fulcrum around which the remainder of the ground campaign acts.” A forward-stationed ABCT in Poland would limit the amount of time required to build a combat-credible force to counter acts of Russian aggression against NATO. This capability would play a particularly major role in deterring or responding to a contingency in the Baltic states. Russian forces could threaten to cut off or slow the access of U.S. and NATO forces to the Baltic states by closing the Suwalki Gap, also known as the Kaliningrad Corridor — the 40-mile gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus where Lithuania borders Poland. Poland also offers greater strategic depth than alternative locations, such as the Baltic states, and interconnected rail lines with the rest of Europe that would ease resupply and reinforcement efforts.</p> -<p>A second challenge is in the individual levels of competence exhibited by China’s military personnel. Chinese media identify the “Five Incapables,” a set of shortfalls in command competence. PLA assessments state that some commanders cannot “(1) judge situations, (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions, (3) make operational decisions, (4) deploy forces, and (5) manage unexpected situations.” China has consistently attempted to improve its training over the past several years, in part to keep up with its rate of industrial production and to reduce operational weaknesses. In late 2022, for example, the PLAAF expanded its training of pilots for fourth-generation aircraft to a second of its three flight academies, which will probably make its training more efficient and increase PLAAF readiness. PLAAF training prioritizes capabilities that would be vital to war with the United States, including joint air defense, electronic warfare, combat sustainment, long-range offensive strike, and maritime strike. It has also sought to improve its corps of noncommissioned officers, the backbone of any modern military. The success of these reforms is likely uneven.</p> +<p>Forward-stationing a U.S. ABCT where it swiftly reinforces the Baltic states in the event of a contingency would also mitigate risks posed by shortcomings in NATO’s posture and capabilities. As discussed in Chapter 4, European militaries have insufficient numbers of maneuver forces. Moreover, Germany has struggled to expand its forces in Lithuania. However, U.S. and NATO force planners would also have to consider the Russian response to permanently forward-stationing a U.S. ABCT in Poland. The Russian government would likely consider this act to be a provocation and a further violation of the 1997 NATO Russia Founding Act. Consequently, the selection of a specific location for an ABCT base in the country would also have to balance operational efficiency with the risk posed by Russian escalation.</p> -<p>Third is logistics. The PLA would be dependent on airlift and sealift in any conflict with the United States. According to some wargames, U.S. attrition of Chinese sealift is a crucial variable determining the outcome of hostilities in Taiwan. Logistics is likely a major weakness in the PLAA, and a lesser one in the PLAAF and PLAN. In a Taiwan scenario, a further difficulty could be created by the lack of sufficient ground transportation within Taiwan due to a lack of heavy equipment transporters. Another constraint on PLA logistics would likely be the airfield network, which would reduce both combat sorties and available airlift in a Taiwan scenario. The PLA can also expect the United States or its allies to target at least some components in its logistics network, particularly sealift.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, the permanent U.S. presence would provide greater reassurance to Poland and to allies and partners on NATO’s eastern flank. According to a U.S. Army War College study, ABCTs have an “even greater political salience with Allied policymakers and populations due to their easily understood symbolic value,” and “rotational forces represent less commitment on the part of the United States and so have less reassurance value from the perspective of the ally or partner.” From a political perspective, the Polish government has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to host a permanent forward U.S. presence and share costs with the U.S. military. Poland already provides significant infrastructure and logistical support for the existing U.S. forces there.</p> -<p>A fourth challenge is anti-submarine warfare. China is attempting to improve its anti-submarine warfare capabilities, but it is still likely years away from being able to consistently find and destroy submarines in deep water. The highly variable acoustic properties of the ocean environment make it difficult to detect, identify, track, and engage enemy submarines. Anti-submarine warfare requires national and joint intelligence collection platforms because of the complexities of the operating environment, the size of the maritime area that needs to be covered, and the overall mission to find, fix, track, target, and potentially engage enemy submarines. Some assessments suggest that the PLAN has underinvested in anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which have largely been neglected during modernization. Numerous PLAN ships lack organic sensors, such as towed-array and variable-depth sonar systems, and the PLA as a whole lacks sufficient helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft comparable to the U.S. Navy’s P-8.</p> +<p>Forward-stationing additional U.S. forces can also enhance interoperability with allied forces and society. Forward-stationed U.S. units develop valuable relationships interacting with host-country military and civilian personnel on a regular basis and become more culturally attuned by learning about the community and environment. There are also vital benefits to increased interoperability both in times of crisis (easier coordination and problem solving) and stability (fewer violations of laws thanks to familiarity with local statutes and practices). As one assessment concludes, “the benefits of tactical and operational interoperability that come with forward stationing are most useful to those units that require the greatest depth of knowledge of local rules, regulations, customs, terrain, airspace, and counterparts.” In the case of Europe, this suggests that ABCTs are best placed to permanently forward station rather than IBCTs or SBCTs.</p> -<p>China likely faces other operational challenges. For example, Chinese military thinkers may have underestimated the need for a prolonged ground campaign in Taiwan, focusing on a few examples of urban warfare in which the attackers were unusually successful. As Russia discovered in Ukraine, the lightning successes of the First Gulf War are difficult to replicate. In addition, Taiwan’s defenders could engage in a long and costly insurgency against PLA forces. There are other questions about Chinese capabilities in the maritime, air, and other domains — including in such areas as surface warfare, mine warfare, amphibious operations, close air support, and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.</p> +<p>Interoperability is likely further enhanced when U.S. personnel are forward stationed with their dependents. Military families, about 60 percent of whom live on base, engage with host-country neighbors and businesses as de facto ambassadors. This strengthens strategic interoperability between the United States and host countries by improving cultural understanding and, in the case of Europe, reinforcing transatlantic ties and the role of NATO. When comparing the readiness between forward-stationed and rotational forces, these factors — increased interoperability and the presence of dependents — play a major role in the superior long-term readiness of permanent units compared to rotational forces.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> +<p>Permanent stationed forces typically have significantly higher unit-manning rates than rotational forces. Manning levels for rotational forces can be as low as 67 percent. Their superior training readiness is further offset by the interoperability and awareness of forward-stationed forces with the host-country military, society, and regulations as well as heightened morale. Some evidence suggests that rotational deployments, which separate military personnel from their families for nine months at a time, cause lower morale than permanent deployments, which keep personnel with their dependents. Rotational deployments also lead to more discipline issues and increased divorce rates. A comparison of re-enlistment rates between rotational BCTs and all Army BCTs found a lower re-enlistment rate for rotational personnel, which was even lower when compared to the forward-stationed 2nd Cavalry Regiment SBCT based in Vilseck, Germany.</p> -<p>As this chapter has argued, China’s defense industrial base is increasingly operating on a wartime footing and is rapidly building capabilities to deter and, if necessary, fight the United States. China is also improving its research, acquisition, and production processes and capabilities in its defense industrial base, though it has some weaknesses and operational challenges. “It’s really impressive,” said Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante in discussing China’s defense industrial base. “They’ve developed . . . really good high-end capability in numbers. So, they’ve done the development, and the development has been pretty continuous and not just one thing. They place multipl bets. We don’t do that. We . . . very rarely will place multiple bets and . . . [have] three different development activities going on. We used to do that. We don’t do that.”</p> +<p>From a force-planning and budgetary perspective, the costs of permanently stationed forces are also lower. In terms of the force-generation model, an enduring and constant rotational ABCT presence in Europe for a nine-month deployment requires three total ABCTs. As an illustrative example, U.S.-based ABCT-1 must be training and preparing to deploy to replace ABCT-2 currently in Europe. ABCT-3, also U.S.-based, after recently ending its nine-month deployment, must then recover and begin training to deploy following ABCT-1’s tour overseas. This model, rather than having one unit permanently stationed in Europe, eats up more of the Army’s force structure and long-term readiness.</p> -<p>China is operating with a sense of urgency to catch up — and potentially surpass — the United States. As the next chapter argues, however, the U.S. government is not operating with the same sense of urgency.</p> +<p>From a fiscal cost perspective, establishing a new U.S. military base in Poland would initially have high budgetary costs and take roughly seven years to put in place. However, the financial burden of permanently stationed forces would be lower in the long run. Operation and sustainment costs would be significantly lower than those of rotational force. A forward-stationed ABCT incurs 75 percent of the additional operational tempo (OPTEMPO) costs that a rotationally deployed ABCT would, and it also generates savings over time. Moreover, given the cost of moving their equipment, ABCTs are the most expensive unit to rotationally deploy, suggesting that IBCTs or SBCTs are better suited to that deployment model.</p> -<h3 id="challenges-with-the-us-defense-industrial-base">CHALLENGES WITH THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE</h3> +<p><strong>Long-Range Fires:</strong> Long-range fires offer a valuable capability to deter Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern flank, as evidenced by the reactivation of the 56th Artillery Command in Germany and the activation of the Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force in 2021. Long-range fires units, including those with HIMARS capabilities, have also deployed on a rotational basis to conduct training and improve interoperability with NATO allies. In March 2023, the Army’s V Corps announced its European HIMARS initiative to formalize these efforts, particularly across the eastern flank, with participation from 56th Artillery Command, 41st Field Artillery Brigade, and elements of the 101st Airborne and 4th Infantry Divisions.</p> -<p>This chapter examines challenges with the U.S. defense industrial base. Numerous U.S. policymakers recognize the importance of the defense industrial base for deterrence and warfighting in an increasingly contested international landscape. As the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy notes, “We will prioritize joint efforts with the full range of domestic and international partners in the defense ecosystem to fortify the defense industrial base, our logistical systems, and relevant global supply chains against subversion, compromise, and theft.” In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense’s National Defense Industrial Strategy outlines a way forward to “bolster and expand America’s ability to innovate and produce the warfighting capabilities at a speed and scale that will help guarantee the ability to fight and win in any conflict.” The United States, including the Department of Defense, has made progress in some areas of the industrial base. For example, the United States has ramped up production lines for some weapons systems, such as 155-millimeter rounds, Stinger air defense systems, Javelin anti-tank weapons systems, and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) air defense systems.</p> +<p>Given the applicability of the capability to operations in Europe as well as the Indo-Pacific, long-range fire units must be balanced across both theaters. European militaries, however, lack a strong long-range indirect fire capability, as discussed earlier. The United States can increase its capabilities in Europe by permitting further sales of HIMARS systems to NATO allies. Between 2022 and 2023, the United States completed sales of HIMARS systems to Estonia, Poland, and the Netherlands. To enhance allied lethality, the Army should also continue rotational deployments of HIMARS units in support of the European HIMARS Initiative. Furthermore, the Army should continue the modernization of the long-range fires, to include the development of hypersonic capabilities and fielding of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) to replace existing HIMARS and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) munitions.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, these steps are inadequate. The U.S. defense industrial base and broader defense ecosystem still lack the capacity to meet the U.S. military’s production needs for a competitive security environment. The United States lacks the ability to respond at speed and scale — and with sufficient flexibility — to meet the needs for deterrence and warfighting. A more robust and resilient industrial base is just as critical to deter adversary actions as it is for warfighting.</p> +<p><strong>Special Operations Forces and Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs):</strong> U.S. special operations forces and U.S. Army SFABs are helpful in such areas as:</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States lacks the ability to respond at speed and scale — and with sufficient flexibility — to meet the needs for deterrence and warfighting.</code></em></strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><em>Foreign internal defense</em>, which involves efforts to build the capacity of foreign governments. This can include training and equipping partners in Europe that border Russia, such as Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. Special operations forces are an essential part of foreign internal defense. These activities can also include broader efforts to conduct security force assistance.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em>Unconventional warfare</em>, which includes operations to advise, assist, and accompany non-state partners resisting a hostile actor by operating with or through an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em>Information operations</em> — or Military Information Support Operations — which involve activities to influence foreign audiences.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>China’s defense industrial base is increasingly on a wartime footing, which means that Beijing is producing weapons systems and preparing, if necessary, to fight and win a war against the United States. Russia is putting significant resources into revitalizing its defense industrial base with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. Iran remains active in the Middle East, presents a significant irregular and gray zone threat to the United States and its allies, and has increased its capacity to develop and produce medium- and long-range missiles, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and loitering munitions. And North Korea continues to expand its arsenal of nuclear and conventional capabilities. There is also growing defense cooperation between these countries.</p> +<p>There are other critical activities, such as special reconnaissance, civil affairs operations, direct action, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterinsurgency, and hostage rescue and recovery. Special operations forces can counter Moscow economically, militarily, and diplomatically below the threshold of conventional war — including through information operations. For example, U.S. forces can also proactively highlight examples of Russian malign activity, human rights abuses, and corruption. Examples of subjects that could be highlighted include:</p> -<p>In addition, U.S. defense spending is historically low as a percentage of GDP, which has hamstrung Department of Defense efforts to revitalize the industrial base. Defense spending is also historically low as a percentage of total federal outlays. The United States currently spends around 3.5 percent of GDP on defense. As Nobel Prize–winning economist Thomas Schelling argued, effective deterrence is a function of both the intentions and capabilities of the deterrer. Countries need to show that they possess the military power and credible willingness to use force. As Figure 3.1 highlights, the U.S. defense budget peaked at 14 percent of GDP during the Korean War. It was between 9 and 11 percent during President Eisenhower’s “New Look” policies in the 1950s, between 8 and 9 percent during President John F. Kennedy and President Lyndon Johnson’s “Flexible Response” period in the 1960s, and over 6 percent during President Ronald Reagan’s defense buildup in the 1980s.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Russian direct or indirect involvement in human rights abuses, including in Ukraine;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russian involvement in the assassination (or attempted assassination) of defectors, political opponents, and those — such as journalists and lawyers — investigating or prosecuting Russian corruption or human rights abuses;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russian proxies involved in abuses, including Russian private military companies such as the Wagner Group;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Corruption in Russia, including by senior Russian officials;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russian support to terrorist and insurgent groups, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Lebanese Hezbollah and Shia militias in Syria;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russian economic problems; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Anti-regime riots, protests, and demonstrations in Russia or in Russian-allied countries, such as Belarus.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YlpSuLB.png" alt="image13" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.1 U.S. Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1951–2023.</strong> Source: <a href="htts://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685">“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2023</a>.</em></p> +<p>The U.S. military should increase efforts to build and enhance allied and partner capabilities, with a focus on eastern flank states. The United States has already undertaken significant and credible missions to train partner forces in the Baltics and Ukraine since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine by deploying special operations forces, the Army’s 4th SFAB, and Army National Guard units. U.S. special operations forces units have taken the lead in training Baltic militaries to counter Russian hybrid and irregular warfare capabilities. To that end, as well as to establish a forward operating site, U.S. forces established a new special operations site in Riga, Latvia, in 2020. The U.S. security cooperation efforts in the region are simultaneously boosted by the National Guard’s State Partnership Program, which assigns certain National Guard units from specific states with partner countries to train forces there. The 4th SFAB similarly operates between the “Baltics and the Black Sea” and, as of September 2022, had 19 teams of military advisers in 10 European countries.</p> -<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, defense budgets dramatically decreased to 3 to 4 percent in the absence of a major conventional threat. In addition, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Deputy of Secretary of Defense William Perry convened a remarkable dinner of defense industry executives in 1993 at the Pentagon, which infamously became known as the “Last Supper.” Perry told the group that the administration was cutting the defense budget and that they needed to consolidate. In response, the number of defense companies plummeted from 107 large and small companies in 1990 to 5 major primes by the end of the decade. Defense budgets briefly crept above 4 percent during the surges in Afghanistan and Iraq, although the funding went to wartime operations and not to revitalizing the defense industrial base. Nevertheless, defense budgets shortly fell back to the 3 percent range. The post–Cold War decline in the defense budget was understandable and appropriate. But the situation has changed dramatically over the past few years. Today’s defense budget is historically small, particularly in light of such adversaries as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</p> +<p>Forces from the 4th SFAB have also been involved in the training of Ukrainian personnel. However, that effort has been led by the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) under the direction of the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U). National Guard units, including a New York State BCT, have trained Ukrainian forces under the JMTG-U to great effect. Where possible, the United States should increase its training of Ukrainian units and personnel to strengthen their ability to withstand and counter further Russian aggression. This should be complemented by an expansion of training programs with the militaries of the Baltic states and other relevant Eastern flank states to defend against hybrid Russian threats. Special operations forces may also provide civil defense training practices to those populations in the event of a heightened or resurgent Russian threat.</p> -<p>The rest of this chapter examines the U.S. defense industrial base in several areas: presidential-level support, defense production (including munitions stockpiles, the contracting process, supply chains, and the workforce), and allies and partners (including foreign military sales and technology transfers). These areas were chosen because they represent critical parts of the defense industrial base. There are numerous other areas, such as research, development, and the acquisitions process, that deserve attention. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of arguments against major changes in the defense industrial base.</p> +<p>However, the United States should also take steps to ensure greater coordination among its various security cooperation efforts in Eastern Europe. The Department of Defense (DOD) should assign one entity to lead and manage security cooperation missions in the region to ensure the efficient allocation of units and resources.</p> -<h4 id="bureaucratic-challenges">Bureaucratic Challenges</h4> +<h4 id="air-combat-forces">AIR COMBAT FORCES</h4> -<p>There is little urgency today from the White House to revitalize the United States’ lagging defense ecosystem and insufficient incentives for industry. In addition, there are major coordination challenges at various levels of the defense industrial base: between various U.S. government departments and agencies, between the government and private sector, and between the U.S. government and foreign governments. Within the United States, many entities beyond the Department of Defense play important roles in the defense industrial base, including the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, Congress, the private sector, and other stakeholders. In fact, the growing role of commercial technology in modern defense systems has increased the role of non-defense agencies in the industrial base.</p> +<p>Air capabilities are critical to achieve U.S. defense objectives, including deterring and defeating armed conflict, countering terrorist and other transnational threats, and maintaining access to trade routes and global commons. Russia has considerable air and air defense capabilities, such as the S-400, which would undermine the United States’ ability to gain air supremacy in a war.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is little urgency from the White House to revitalize the United States’ lagging defense ecosystem and insufficient incentives for industry.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>For future U.S. posture, there are several important categories of air assets. First, fixed-wing aircraft, such as F-35, F-16, and F-15 squadrons, are helpful for conducting close air support, suppression of enemy air defense, combat air patrol, defensive counter air, strike, and other missions. So are bombers, such as the B-52H Stratofortress and B-21 Raider, which can be useful to attack ground and naval targets. Second, ISR capabilities are important for intelligence and warning. Examples include unmanned aircraft systems (such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-9A, and MQ-9B); airborne early warning and command and control (such as the E-8 Joint STARS, E-3 Sentry, and E-7); and electronic warfare. Along with space capabilities, persistent aerial ISR is critical to collect intelligence, including communications and electronic intelligence. Third are enablers, including transport (such as the C-17 and C-130), aerial refueling (such as the KC-135 and KC-46), and medical evacuation. Fourth are logistics, such as stockpiling spare parts and munitions, personnel, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants.</p> -<p>However, there are several challenges with the current situation.</p> +<p>Global posture considerations play a major role in recommendations for the air domain in Europe given the value of air combat capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater. Consequently, a forward defense posture that enhances deterrence should ensure flexibility in the air domain to surge forces to the Indo-Pacific if necessary. It also means that the United States needs to be prepared to accept some risk that can be mitigated through allied capabilities.</p> -<p>First, there is no major body that can serve as an executive agent directly under the president with the power and authority to break bureaucratic logjams and coordinate across departments and agencies. Multiple agencies — such as the Departments of State and Commerce, as well as various organizations within the Department of Defense (including the military services) — have competing interests, priorities, and authorities. In addition, Congress, the defense industry, and other actors have their own interests, priorities, and authorities.</p> +<p>In terms of air combat capabilities, a forward defense posture includes maintaining all seven forward-deployed fighter squadrons currently based in Europe and adding an additional F-16 squadron to Spangdahlem Air Base. Four squadrons are based at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath in the United Kingdom under the 48th Fighter Air Wing, including two squadrons of F-35A aircraft and 2 F-15E squadrons. Two squadrons of F-16 aircraft are stationed at Aviano Air Base in Italy under the 31st Fighter Wing, and one additional F-16 squadron is currently stationed at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany under the 52nd Fighter Wing. While stationed out of their respective bases, these units have often been forward deployed to NATO’s eastern flank to provide additional posture amid the war in Ukraine.</p> -<p>These challenges are not new, but they are part of the reality of bureaucratic politics in the United States. As Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp conclude in their influential book Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, the government “consists of numerous individuals” and agencies with “very different interests and priorities, and they are concerned with very different questions.” One example is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which oversees the production, export, and import of defense articles, defense services, and other activities. There are bureaucratic differences in how broadly limits on arms transfers should apply. Department of Defense officials have sometimes erred on the side of providing technology to allies and partners, while the Department of State — and some members of Congress and their staff — have been less willing to accept risk.</p> +<p>Forward-stationed forces are supplemented by deployments of U.S.-based fighter aircraft to enhance the United States’ forward posture, increasing in the lead-up to and throughout the Ukraine conflict. These supplemental units have included active-duty, reserve, and Air National Guard F-35 units operating out of Spangdahlem Air Base and forward-deployed to allied air bases on the eastern flank in support of NATO Enhanced Air Policing Missions, as well as U.S.-based F-22 and fourth-generation aircraft.</p> -<p>Second, there has been insufficient action to fix current problems. The president plays a particularly important role in providing strategic guidance and urgency. As Halperin and Clapp argue, “The president stands at the center of the foreign policy process in the United States. . . . In any foreign policy decision widely believed at the time to be important, the president will almost always be the principal figure determining the general direction of actions.” Without direct and forceful presidential action, major changes in the defense industrial base are significantly more challenging. As noted below, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan played important roles in revitalizing the defense industrial base during their presidencies.</p> +<p>Forward-deployed F-35 squadrons enhance the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces to establish air superiority against robust and experienced Russian integrated air defense systems (IADS). F-35 aircraft can also collect electronic signals from and compile a picture of hostile and friendly forces in an area. However, given requirements for the Indo-Pacific region, adding another F-35 squadron to the two currently stationed at RAF Lakenheath is not optimal.</p> -<p>These problems are not new. Presidential leadership has been essential during critical periods of U.S. history to strengthen — or consolidate — the defense industrial base. But words have generally not been sufficient. Roosevelt, Truman, Reagan, and others created institutional bodies to advise the president on better strategic guidance and coordination across the U.S. government and with the private sector, issue directives, and even directly plan, coordinate, direct, and control industrial mobilization. Table 3.1 shows several examples of institutional structures designed to jump-start the defense industrial base.</p> +<p>Instead, this analysis recommends forward stationing an additional F-16 squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base to provide greater short-term combat capacity as allied F-35 squadrons come online. Additional permanently based fifth-generation squadrons in Europe may be more likely to come as future replacements for the Air Force’s F-15E squadrons, which the service plans to cut by more than half by 2028. F-16 fighters, such as those currently based at Spangdahlem and Aviano Air Bases, will likely continue to serve into the 2040s. However, U.S. Air Forces in Europe should supplement these aircraft with deployments of U.S.-based fifth-generation squadrons of fighter aircraft — either F-35 or F-22 aircraft — as demanded by the threat environment.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7p8i5Tb.png" alt="image14" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 3.1 Example of White House–Led Defense Institutions.</strong> Source CSIS.</em></p> +<p>As previously discussed, ACE will continue to play a vital role in maximizing the flexibility and survivability of forward-deployed fighter aircraft. ACE will require U.S. aircraft and pilots to operate and rapidly deploy from forward operating sites on allied and partner airfields as part of a hub-and-spoke system. These sites should be “light, lean, and agile,” as noted by General CQ Brown. However, the Air Force needs to ensure that its dispersed sites are equipped with adequate prepositioned equipment and war reserve materiel, including scalable logistics packages, resilient communications, command and control, munitions, spare parts, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants; are resilient from missile and cyber attacks; have adequate infrastructure for storing munitions, fuel, and other materiel; and have forces trained for quick response to enemy missile attacks, including runway repair and medical care.</p> -<p>In May 1940, a year and a half before Pearl Harbor and the United States’ entry into World War II, a perceptive President Roosevelt created the National Defense Advisory Committee (NDAC) to help coordinate various segments of the U.S. defense industrial base. It included seven members: William Knudsen, the president of General Motors; Edward Stettinius, Jr., president of U.S. Steel; Chester C. Davis, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Leon Henderson, a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission; Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America; Ralph Budd, chairman of the board of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad; and Harriet Elliott, dean of women from the University of North Carolina. When Knudsen asked Roosevelt at the first meeting who was head of the group, Roosevelt responded that he was as president of the United States. Roosevelt’s point was that a major revitalization of the defense industrial base required the oversight of the U.S. president. Roosevelt’s strategic guidance and decision to spend money on defense was essential to mobilization well before World War II.</p> +<p>To further maximize flexibility, U.S. air combat forces based in or deployed to Europe must also be prepared to surge to the Indo-Pacific in the event of a contingency. The Air Force has already leveraged EUCOM assets to fill capability gaps in the Indo-Pacific with the temporary transfer of F-16 aircraft from the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base to Kadena Air Base in Japan amid the return of its F-15C/D fighter aircraft to the United States. The Air Force and NATO must prepare plans to fill its own capability gaps in the event of further transfers.</p> -<p>On January 16, 1942, Roosevelt created the War Production Board to supervise production. He appointed Donald M. Nelson, executive vice president of Sears Roebuck, as the chair. The body exercised general direction over U.S. war procurement and production; determined the policies, plans, and procedures of federal departments regarding procurement and production; directed conversion of companies from peacetime to wartime work; established priorities in the distribution of materials and services; and prohibited nonessential production. Since the country was at war, the War Production Board also rationed such commodities as gasoline, heating oil, metals, rubber, paper, and plastics.</p> +<h4 id="naval-forces">NAVAL FORCES</h4> -<p>President Truman abolished the Office of War Mobilization after World War II, but he quickly switched gears as the Cold War began. He established a cabinet-level Office of Defense Mobilization to plan, coordinate, direct, and control all defense industrial production. He established a National Security Resources Board to mobilize natural resources and the scientific community to meet the United States’ growing military demands. Truman also signed the Defense Production Act on September 8, 1950, which authorized the president to force companies to prioritize defense production, set aside price ceilings, and expand private and public production capacity during the Korean War. The National Security Resources Board also helped mobilize the economy for war through regulation of the private market and takeover of industrial production. Under the act, the government could control prices, build defense plants, regulate credit, and streamline resources and products for manufacturing. Congress would go on to reauthorize the Defense Production Act at least 53 times over the next seven decades.</p> +<p>To achieve defense objectives in Europe, the United States will likely need several types of maritime capabilities led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe-U.S. Sixth Fleet. Maritime capabilities will be helpful to deter and defeat conventional armed conflict, counter irregular and gray zone activities, maintain access to trade routes and global commons (including in the Arctic), and other objectives. The Russian navy possesses significant maritime capabilities, such as submarines, and it has added the Project 955A Borey-A nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and the Project 08851 Yasen-M nuclear-powered guided missile submarine to its fleet. European maritime capabilities, as previously discussed, are likely lacking in large-scale combat, given qualitative shortfalls in sensors, weapons, force protection, and survivability systems as well as due to manning, maintenance, and procurement challenges for some navies.</p> -<p>In 1981, President Reagan created the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board to improve mobilization capabilities and interagency cooperation within the federal government to respond to major peacetime or war-related emergencies. The board consisted of the representatives of 22 key federal agencies at the deputy secretary or under secretary level and was chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs. A full-time secretariat was established to support the board and monitor the implementation of its recommendations by federal agencies. It included senior representatives from several departments and agencies:</p> +<p>To fully leverage its naval capabilities in Europe and compensate for the shortcomings of allied and partner militaries, the United States should expand operations, port visits, and exercises in partnership with allied and partner forces and consider investments in future capabilities to deploy to Europe. However, the United States also needs to pursue flexibility and mitigate risk in its posture given requirements in the Indo-Pacific theater.</p> -<ul> - <li>Department of Defense</li> - <li>Department of Commerce</li> - <li>Department of Agriculture</li> - <li>Department of the Treasury</li> - <li>Department of Justice</li> - <li>Federal Emergency Management Agency</li> - <li>Department of Health and Human Services</li> - <li>Department of Labor</li> -</ul> +<p>The U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Naples, Italy, conducts and oversees naval operations in the European theater. The Sixth Fleet maintains six destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain, as part of Task Force 65. These destroyers play a critical role in NATO’s ballistic missile defense mission under Operation Atlantic Sentry. The vessels also conduct regular Forward-Deployed Naval Forces-Europe (FDNF-E) patrols throughout the Sixth Fleet area of operations to conduct port visits and strengthen interoperability with allied and partner forces. In addition to the destroyer presence at Rota, the United States also conducts regular carrier strike group deployments and occasional amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit deployments, the latter of which falls under the Sixth Fleet’s Task Force 61/2.</p> -<p>These institutional bodies were particularly important during periods of significant strategic competition (such as at various points in the Cold War) and during wars. As President Roosevelt recognized before World War II and President Reagan decided during heightened tension, a presidential-level body can be critical before war — in part to strengthen deterrence and potentially avert war. President Roosevelt perhaps said it best in arguing that “we must be the great arsenal of democracy” and to “build now with all possible speed every machine, every arsenal, every factory that we need to manufacture our defense material.” The absence of an effective institution tied to the president has made it difficult to revitalize the defense industrial base.</p> +<p>To achieve a posture of forward defense in the European area of operations, the United States should enhance its naval presence in the Baltic Sea region with small surface combatants and unmanned vessels through 2030 to reassure and improve interoperability with allies and partners in the region and to deter potential acts of Russian aggression. Russia still maintains a sizeable presence in the region. In 2022, the Swedish government requested a strengthened U.S. naval posture in the region. U.S. ships should conduct more frequent port visits, including both FDNF-E patrols and deployments of U.S.-based assets, as well as bilateral and multilateral exercises.</p> -<h4 id="defense-production">Defense Production</h4> +<p>The United States must also act in coordination with its NATO allies to tackle several mission sets. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) remains a critical mission, both in the Baltic and North Seas, which has been much neglected. NATO has consequently increased its joint ASW exercises among allied forces, including Operation Dynamic Mongoose in the North Atlantic in 2022 and Dynamic Manta off the coast of Italy in 2023.</p> -<p>Today, the United States faces substantial challenges in defense production. The war in Ukraine has highlighted some significant production problems, even when the United States is not directly at war and has not committed soldiers, sailors, and air crews to fight in Ukraine. In response to initial production challenges, the Department of Defense and private sector eventually increased production for some weapons systems, such as 155-millimeter rounds, Stingers, Javelins, and PAC-3 systems.</p> +<p>The U.S. Navy could supplement existing NATO ASW capabilities by developing and deploying additional systems to the region. One option is homeporting the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, which has ASW capabilities, in German ports to provide improved situational awareness in the Baltics. Given the Navy’s apparent commitment to retire the Littoral Combat Ship, it could deploy its Constellation-class frigates, which also have ASW capabilities, to the region once they are operational beginning in 2027. However, operational requirements for the presence of surface ships and submarines in the Indo-Pacific should take priority over Baltic deployments.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, the U.S. defense industrial ecosystem — the executive branch, Congress, and industry — lack the speed, agility, and depth to replace weapons stockpiles and systems in a sufficient timeframe for the current security environment. As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante acknowledged, the U.S. defense industrial base is “dialed down to the minimum amount. . . . [We have] very few development programs, [a] minimal amount, and then very few production programs.” In addition, as the United States and other countries have reduced their stockpiles of weapons systems to send to such countries as Ukraine, they often do not replenish with the exact same systems. In some cases, the infrastructure and tooling does not exist anymore to replace depleted stockpiles of legacy systems, so the U.S. government turns to the latest generation. But new generations aren’t always available, creating a gap and compounding shortfalls.</p> +<p>Given Indo-Pacific demands for naval forces, the Navy could also leverage its developing unmanned surface and undersea vessels for ASW and additional missions in the Baltic Sea. Pioneered under the Fifth Fleet’s Task Force 59 in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the Navy recently announced its intention to deploy these capabilities to the broader fleet beginning with Fourth Fleet under U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in the summer of 2023. The United States and partners should also increase their number of sonobuoys and static hydrophone networks to track the subsurface threat.</p> -<p>Congressional dysfunction has been unhelpful to the industrial base, including the failure to pass budgets and the reliance on continuing resolutions (CRs). As Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth explained, “The Army cannot exercise its Multi-Year Procurement to purchase additional Patriot missiles or begin construction on a Guided Missile Maintenance Building under a CR. This will impede our ability to send a consistent demand signal to industry and will limit production and maintenance capacity on critical munitions.” CRs can also delay acquisition efforts and the awarding of contracts for critical weapons systems and infrastructure upgrades for the industrial base.</p> +<p>The U.S. Navy and NATO allies should additionally prioritize three maritime missions in the Baltic region: hybrid gray zone operations, offensive and defensive mining, and missile defense and suppression. They must develop a plan to tackle hybrid threats to undersea cables and pipelines and other infrastructure that could disrupt the flow of commerce, energy, and data. This is critical to managing escalation and preventing Russia from destabilizing the region. Furthermore, the United States and NATO should plan to leverage the extensive mining and demining capabilities of new members Finland and Sweden in the event of a possible contingency with Russia that threatens naval deployments and the commercial shipping of partners and allies. Finally, the United States and NATO must anticipate the use of anti-ship cruise missiles in a potential conflict with Russia and seek to neutralize this threat through the coordination of the Baltic Air Policing mission and Allied Maritime Command.</p> -<p>There are several broad challenges with defense production.</p> +<p>As the Navy expands its mission set and presence in the Baltic and North Seas, it should strengthen its forward posture by considering homeporting vessels in the region or establishing logistical points to resupply, given the distance from existing sites in Spain, Italy, and Crete. While this would require significant diplomatic outreach, the Navy could explore the possibility of establishing sites at existing ports or naval bases in Germany, Denmark, or other allied states.</p> -<p><strong>Munitions Shortfalls:</strong> The U.S. military continues to have a shortfall of munitions and other weapons system for deterrence and warfighting. As Figure 3.3 highlights, examples include the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), PAC-3, Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), MK-48, Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAM), Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), and Naval Strike Missile. Some analysis suggests that protracted regional conflicts will expend significant quantities of munitions, likely exceeding current Department of Defense planning efforts. In nearly two dozen iterations of a CSIS wargame that examined a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait, the United States typically expended more than 5,000 long-range missiles in three weeks of conflict, including 4,000 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs), 450 LRASMs, 400 Harpoons, and 400 TLAMs. One of the most important munitions to prevent a Chinese seizure of all of Taiwan were long-range precision missiles, including missiles launched by U.S. submarines.</p> +<p>In the Black Sea, the United States must work with its NATO allies and partners in the region to enhance its maritime domain awareness. The United States and the NATO alliance should encourage regional partners to cooperate and modernize their military capabilities, including by strengthening sea power in ways that are consistent with the Montreux Convention. The United States should also increase engagement with allied and partner militaries in the region. This could include seeking a more active partnership with the Turkish military in the Black Sea as part of a broader agreement to improve U.S.-Turkish strategic cooperation on a handful of key issues.</p> -<p>LRASMs offer a useful case study. In every iteration of the wargame, the United States expended its inventory of LRASMs within the first week of the conflict. These missiles were particularly useful because of their ability to strike Chinese naval forces from outside of the range of Chinese air defenses. As the wargame showed, Chinese defenses are likely to be formidable — especially early on — thus preventing most aircraft from moving close enough to drop short-range munitions. Bombers generally employed these munitions because they could be based outside of the range of Chinese missiles. In addition, it takes nearly two years to produce LRASMs, creating a time lag to fix the shortfall.</p> +<p>The Arctic represents another vital region for U.S. maritime interests. The United States should expand its capabilities and posture in the Arctic through the U.S. Coast Guard. The 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region outlined security as one of its four strategic pillars for the region. The strategy called for “expanding the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker fleet to support persistent presence in the U.S. Arctic and additional presence as needed in the European Arctic.” The primary goal of U.S. forces in the region is to support the homeland defense mission as well as power-projection and deterrence goals, alongside safeguarding commercial and scientific activities. While the strategy primarily emphasizes the need to deter aggression from Russia in the Arctic, it also notes expanded Chinese activities there. Russia seeks to maintain its economic interests, such as oil and gas megaprojects, in the region while leveraging the Arctic for greater power projection and potentially hybrid activities to threaten European Arctic countries. Russia currently operates more than 40 icebreakers. China has increased its presence and posture in the Arctic, maintaining three research sites in Svalbard, Iceland, and Sweden and operating two icebreakers, with a third under development.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. military continues to have a shortfall of munitions and other weapons system for deterrence and warfighting.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The United States should seek to expand its Arctic posture and capabilities as rapidly as possible to counter Russian and Chinese security interests in the region. Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard only operates two icebreakers, the heavy cutter Polar Star and the medium cutter Healy, neither of which can be used for all-year Arctic icebreaking missions. The Coast Guard plans to expand its icebreaking fleet with the procurement of three heavy Polar Security Cutters (PSCs), although delays have pushed the delivery of the first vessel back to 2026 or 2027, and three medium Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs). In 2021, then-commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard Karl Schultz called for a fleet of nine total icebreakers (six PSCs and three ASCs). As the United States awaits delivery of its new vessels, it should seek to enhance cooperation with Arctic allies through joint operations and combined exercises and training.</p> -<p>One challenge with munitions stockpiles is having sufficient numbers for a protracted conflict. The dilemma for the government, in particular, is to try to match the production rate of weapons systems with the consumption rate in a possible war. This is more of an art than a science, since it requires estimating the possible timelines and munitions usage in a future war. For example, will a possible conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan be short or long? Will it spread to other theaters? What types of munitions and weapons systems will it involve? There are no clear answers to these questions, and numerous variables impact the duration and geographic expanse of wars. But several issues need to be considered.</p> +<h4 id="logistics-and-enablers">LOGISTICS AND ENABLERS</h4> -<p>First, wars between major powers can be long in duration. In general, the mean war duration for interstate wars is roughly 15 months. But wars involving one or more major powers can last for longer, including the Crimean War (28 months), Russo-Japanese War (16 months), World War I (52 months), World War II (over 60 months), Korean War (36 months), Vietnam War (121 months), and Sino-Vietnamese War (60 months). Consequently, it would be prudent to plan for wars of longer, rather than shorter, durations.</p> +<p>This section examines several types of logistics and enablers, including prepositioned equipment and munitions stockpiles, ISR, integrated air and missile defense, and infrastructure and mobility.</p> -<p>Second, wars involving major powers can use significant quantities of munitions. In addition, weapons systems and platforms — such as main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and fighter aircraft — are destroyed or experience significant wear and tear from constant use. The war in Ukraine highlights that conventional wars involving one or more major powers can require a robust defense industry (or access to the defense industry of allies) to produce sufficient quantities of munitions and weapons systems.</p> +<p><strong>Prepositioned Equipment and Munitions Stockpiles:</strong> The United States should take steps to bolster its prepositioned equipment and munitions stocks in Europe to enhance the readiness of U.S. forces in the event of a contingency with Russia. The Army maintains its Army Prepositioned Stock-2 (APS-2) across four sites in three different countries (Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands), with a fifth APS-2 site planned for Poland. These sites, operated by the 405th Army Field Support Brigade, contain enough materiel to equip two ABCTs. The Army issued some of this stock in March 2022 to the 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While APS-2 stocks have been bolstered by funding from the European Deterrence Initiative, the Army should take additional steps to improve the readiness of this equipment and the forces overseeing it. A DOD inspector general investigation found that some materiel provided from APS-2 was “non-fully mission capable” and that “maintenance and coordination shortfalls occurred.” In the event of a direct conflict against Russia, U.S. forces arriving in theater must be assured that they will receive capable equipment to rapidly equip and engage the enemy.</p> -<p>Third, stockpiles are important not just for warfighting, but for deterrence. As highlighted by Thomas Schelling’s work, deterrence is more effective if states have sufficient stockpiles (capabilities) and are prepared to use them (intentions). “Production is deterrence,” remarked Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante. And this is not just for typical ground, air, and maritime systems — but also for satellites. Take, for example, the production of satellites for low Earth orbit (LEO). It is beneficial to have hot production lines for satellites for several reasons, including to ensure a proliferated constellation to maximize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; replace satellites with short life spans; and increase deterrence. If an adversary sees that a state is mass-producing LEO satellites, shooting them down has a limited impact.</p> +<p>In addition to enhancing prepositioned equipment, the DOD must ensure that EUCOM is maintaining appropriate inventories of munitions in the region. The war in Ukraine has illustrated the role of long-range artillery, and U.S. and NATO forces must have enough missiles and munitions in theater to contend with and counter Russian forces. That includes munitions for the Air Force, which must develop plans to maintain weapons for aircraft operating under the ACE concept at forward locations, and the Army EUCOM’s munitions starter stocks, which preposition key munitions — including Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement — in Europe for use in the event of a contingency. Additionally, EUCOM should seek to reinforce and build additional facilities to store munitions to distribute across the theater for easier access and enhanced survivability.</p> -<p><strong>Contracting Challenges:</strong> The contracting process continues to be a challenge for defense production, though there has been progress. The Department of Defense has created a Joint Production Accelerator Cell (JPAC) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to improve production capacity, resiliency, and surge capacity for specific weapons systems and supplies. JPAC is the successor to the Munitions Industrial Base Deep Dive. One of JPAC’s successes has been to extend multiyear procurement to some nontraditional items, as well as to use multiyear procurement with large lot procurement methods.</p> +<p><strong>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:</strong> The demand for U.S. ISR assets will only increase as the U.S. military expands missions and operations in the Indo-Pacific and the Russian military reconstitutes its capabilities on NATO’s eastern flank. While the United States should prioritize the Indo-Pacific, the DOD should maximize its available ISR assets for use by both EUCOM and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). The DOD is currently seeking to modernize its ISR capabilities, with plans to retire the RQ-4 by FY 2027 and the MQ-9 by FY 2035. However, the DOD and the services must ensure that any gaps in ISR coverage are limited. This could be managed by timing the retirement of certain platforms to coincide with the activation of new assets. Alternatively, the DOD could leverage commercial capabilities to cover any gaps until requirements are established and new platforms are deployed.</p> -<p>Yet some congressional members and staff — including from the House and Senate Appropriations Committees — are risk averse on such issues as multiyear contracts. As discussed at the end of this chapter, some policymakers are concerned that multiyear contracts will unnecessarily commit the United States to fund weapons systems and reduce budget flexibility. Yet multiyear contracts are critical for increasing production capacity, resilience, and supply chain support. Defense companies are unwilling to take financial risks without contracts — particularly multiyear contracts — in place. It is not a sound business decision to produce more munitions or weapons systems without a clear demand signal and financial commitments, especially given the large capital investment and number of personnel required.</p> +<p>The Army is currently testing commercial assets in operations in Europe under its High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES) to define the requirements for the replacement for the RC-12 Guardrail aircraft.</p> -<p>This risk aversion is compounded if companies have to make additional capital investments to increase defense production — especially investments for facilities, infrastructure, and tooling. As one Department of Defense study concluded, “Producers benefit from steady or predictable orders, so the DoD’s inconsistent procurement and concurrent production ramps (both increases and decreases) exacerbate the challenges suppliers face across the DIB [defense industrial base].” There has been an inconsistent demand signal from the Department of Defense to build up stockpiles, which risks production lines being shut down. Part of the challenge is the difficulty of predicting future demand. For example, what if the war in Ukraine winds down following a negotiated settlement? What if the current or future administration loses interest in supporting another “forever war?” Or what if Congress refuses to obligate funds?</p> +<p>Space-based ISR assets will play a major role in both covering gaps and supplementing ISR provided by traditional airborne assets. Commercial satellite imagery has already been used by NATO to fill gaps in coverage and played a major role in identifying Russian military movements in the lead-up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the next few years, the United States should further leverage commercial satellite imagery to bolster its ISR capabilities in Europe. Over the long term, however, the DOD must ultimately determine the appropriate balance between leasing commercial services and establishing its own systems to ensure sustainable and reliable coverage.</p> -<p>While the Department of Defense signs multiyear contracts for ships and airplanes, it does not sign multiyear contracts for a range of munitions and other weapons systems. After all, the services — such as the Navy and Marine Corps — have historically cut munitions from their budgets to make room for other priorities, or to fix problems that arise during the acquisition of those systems.</p> +<p><strong>Integrated Air and Missile Defense:</strong> Some changes to U.S. air and missile defense posture should be made in the event that some of the recommendations here are adopted, including the permanent basing of an ABCT in Poland. If a new base is established, the United States should consider shifting the headquarters of the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command from Rhine Ordnance Barracks in Germany. A new base in Poland would require a significant investment in air and missile defense capabilities given its proximity to Russia. If the Army chooses not to move the entire command to Poland, it should prioritize shifting the battalion headquarters of the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, which provides command and control operations of Patriot batteries, and the 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment and its short-range air defense capabilities.</p> -<p>More broadly, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) process is too bureaucratic, time intensive, and inefficient. It tends to stifle innovation, reward compliance rather than results, and discourages many world-class commercial companies from doing business with the U.S. government. As Jacques Gansler, former undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, acknowledged over a decade ago, “Such excessive regulation also discourages government contracting personnel from applying management flexbility as they interpret the steps that should be taken in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness.”</p> +<p>From a broader force-planning perspective, however, the Army should prioritize the deployment of additional Patriot battalions, which operate at the highest OPTEMPO of Army units and are in high demand from multiple combatant commands. Given their value in potential conflicts with China and Russia, the Army should create additional units to limit the stress and degradation of readiness of existing units, particularly given the lack of European capabilities in this area.</p> -<p><strong>Supply Chain Issues:</strong> There continue to be supply chain challenges that hinder production. For example, there is limited production of key components, such as solid rocket motors, processor assemblies, castings, forgings, ball bearings, microelectronics, and seekers for munitions. Dependence on a small number of private firms — or even a single source — leaves the United States highly vulnerable to supply disruption. In addition, the United States is overreliant on single or foreign sources for key components or materials. This dependence has been particularly acute for certain strategic and critical materials, including antimony, lithium, and some rare-earth minerals. China dominates the advanced battery supply chain across the globe, such as lithium hydroxide, electrolyte, lithium carbonate, anodes, and cathodes. As noted in Chapter 2, however, China’s defense industrial base also has supply chain vulnerabilities.</p> +<p>In terms of ballistic missile defense, the United States should also maintain its current posture and force structure in line with Operation Atlantic Sentry. Relevant units include the six Aegis destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain, along with the two Aegis Ashore sites based in Romania and Poland.</p> -<p>Sub-tier suppliers are also at risk. Many operate on narrow profit margins, which makes them susceptible to cyclical defense demands and changes in the defense budget. These challenges undermine the ability and willingness of some sub-tier suppliers to remain in the defense market. In a 2023 report, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment concluded:</p> +<p><strong>Infrastructure, Mobility, and Access:</strong> The United States, in partnership with host nations and other NATO allies, should also take steps to improve military infrastructure and mobility to ensure ease of access, transportation, and reliable communications throughout the European theater. These include enhancements to infrastructure on both U.S. bases and in partner countries, such as the installation of fiber-optic cables and improvements to rail, road networks, and bridges. The DOD and European Defence Agency have identified military mobility as one area of collaboration under an Administrative Arrangement reached in April 2023 (see security cooperation section below).</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Supply chain risks are not unique to the Department, but such risks take on greater urgency when considered in light of national security. For example, to keep aging weapon systems operational, we [DOD] depend on a finite number of repair parts suppliers, some of which are precariously close to fiscal collapse. The proliferation of counterfeit items (particularly for microelectronics) increases the risk of mission delay or imperiled safety. Intellectual property vulnerabilities and lowered integrity of sensitive data and secure networks undermine the protections around our weapon system designs. Dependence on foreign entities for critical items and cyber disruptions to the manufacturing and transportation domains likewise jeopardize mission support and success.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The United States should also continue to update its security and defense cooperation agreements with its partners and allies to ensure ease of access. In December 2023, the United States reached new agreements with Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that provided U.S. forces with access to bases and other infrastructure in those countries.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Today’s workforce is inadequate to meet the challenges of the defense industrial base.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="nuclear-posture">NUCLEAR POSTURE</h4> -<p><strong>Workforce Constraints:</strong> Today’s workforce is inadequate to meet the challenges of the defense industrial base. The U.S. labor market is unable to provide a sufficient number of workers with the right skills to meet the defense demands of today and tomorrow. Retention is also a significant challenge. Skills in short supply range from software engineers to welders. As Under Secretary of Defense LaPlante argued, “the workforce in many ways is the most stressing element right now, both talented workforce, in terms of writing software, engineering, but also the workforce that does the production and is conversant in advanced production, whether it’s additive or subtractive manufacturing.”</p> +<p>The United States should continue with planned nuclear modernization efforts, exercises, and scheduled deployments of assets to the European theater to bolster its deterrent capabilities and reassure allies. The United States currently deploys 100 tactical bombs — the B61-3 and B61-4 gravity bombs — in air bases in Europe across five countries. Under current U.S. nuclear-sharing policy, control over those bombs is maintained by the U.S. Air Force, but seven countries contribute dual-capable aircraft to the mission (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and the United States) and four air forces (from Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy) are assigned an active nuclear strike role with those weapons in the event that a nuclear mission is approved.</p> -<p>Shipyards are particularly problematic. Some skills sets, such as nuclear welding, are particularly difficult to acquire outside of U.S. Navy procurement. But the workforce shortage is widespread. In 2024, the Navy briefed Congress that the first Constellation-class guided-missile frigate (FFG-62) will be at least a year late because of workforce shortfalls at Fincantieri’s Marinette Marine shipyard. The Wisconsin shipyard is short of several hundred blue- and white-collar workers, including welders. In 2022, the Navy ended the fiscal year short 1,200 workers across its four shipyards. As the head of Naval Sea Systems Command remarked, hiring and retaining skilled workers in government repair yards and private sector shipbuilding is the Navy’ top strategic challenge across the enterprise. In addition, construction of the Block V version of the Virginia-class fast-attack submarine is at least two years behind schedule because of workforce constraints and other factors.</p> +<p>The United States is currently in the process of modernizing its gravity bombs, with the new B61-12 having begun full-scale production in 2022 and deployment originally planned for the spring of 2023.</p> -<h4 id="allies-and-partners">Allies and Partners</h4> +<p>A range of U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft will be certified to operate the B61-12, including the F-15E, F-35A, F-16, B-2, and German PA-200 Tornado (currently planned to be retired and replaced by the F-35A by 2030).</p> -<p>The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy rightly emphasize the importance of allies and partners in today’s competitive landscape. In the defense industrial base, working with allies and partners involves several examples: co-development, co-production, co-sustainment, second-sourcing, and licensed production. Some foreign companies — particularly from allied and partner countries — have U.S.-based subsidiaries, such as Leonardo DRS, BAE Systems, and Austal, which manufacture products or conduct services for unclassified and classified Department of Defense programs.</p> +<p>NATO is also modernizing its nuclear weapons storage facilities, including making upgrades to command and control structures and base security.</p> -<p>Yet the United States does a poor job of sharing technology and selling weapons systems to its most important friends — the countries with which it needs to cooperate for both deterrence and warfighting. It is virtually inconceivable that the United States would fight a major war on its own. U.S. export controls and technology security and foreign disclosure processes undermine the ability to collaborate with allies and partners. This reality is especially disconcerting because the United States shares some of its most sensitive secrets with allies and partners — including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, which make up the “Five Eyes” intelligence community.</p> +<p>The U.S. military and NATO should also continue to conduct exercises with nuclear-capable platforms, including Bomber Task Force missions, to enhance readiness and assure allies of U.S. support. These include the annual NATO Steadfast Noon exercise, which practices nuclear sharing. However, such exercises should occur on a regularly scheduled timeline to ensure consistency and limit the potential for escalation with or misinterpretation by Russia. There is no evidence that unscheduled Bomber Task Force deployments conducted under the dynamic force employment model offered additional deterrent value, particularly given the still lengthy amount of time necessary to organize such missions.</p> -<p>This section focuses on two areas where the United States faces serious challenges: foreign military sales and technology transfer policies and procedures.</p> +<h4 id="cyber-and-space">CYBER AND SPACE</h4> -<p><strong>Foreign Military Sales:</strong> The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a form of security assistance in which the United States sells defense articles and services to foreign countries. The Department of State’s Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers, located in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, oversees FMS transactions. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements specific FMS cases. The Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), which also sits within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, issues and administers licenses for commercial sales. Congress ultimately reviews foreign military sales that rise to the threshold for congressional notification. Several parts of the Department of State are involved, including the Bureau of Political Military-Affairs, the Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers, the Office of Security Assistance, and the DDTC. Several parts of the Department of Defense are involved in FMS, including the DSCA, the military services, the Joint Staff, and various offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.</p> +<p>In the cyber and space domains, U.S. forces should take steps to enhance the security and resilience of their own systems and networks while simultaneously assisting European partners and allies in securing their own capabilities. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) should deploy additional “hunt forward” teams to Europe in line with its “defend forward” strategy to counter threats from Russia and Russian-backed groups to U.S. forces and allies. CYBERCOM deployed its largest hunt forward team to Ukraine between 2021 and 2022. To capably resource further deployments and ensure readiness, CYBERCOM should also seek to expand the number of cyber mission teams across the services.</p> -<p>When an eligible foreign government opts to purchase or otherwise acquire a U.S. defense system or service, it initiates the formal process by issuing a letter of request (LOR). The government submits the LOR to a U.S. security organization or the DSCA. Following approval of the transfer, the United States responds with a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA). The time it takes to prepare an LOA can vary based on such factors as the foreign government involved, the weapons system or service requested, and the overall complexity of the sale. It can be fast for routine items, but long and difficult for others. Then there is the production of the system, including non-recurring items such as software updates and modifications.</p> +<p>The United States should further define its authorities for and consider expanding its conduct of offensive cyber operations against Russian forces, particularly in the event that the conflict in Ukraine and Russian cyberattacks persist. The United States should also expand deployments of U.S. Space Force units and personnel to Europe and define their role within NATO. The service is currently standing up its own component to operate in EUCOM. Space Force units can play a major role in supporting forward-deployed U.S. forces by preventing enemy interference and maintaining open lines of satellite communication. Additionally, space-based ISR assets will continue to play a major role in the European theater, and the U.S. military should also further leverage commercial capabilities to fill gaps.</p> -<p>There has been some progress in improving the FMS process. For example, the Department of Defense completed an FMS Tiger Team with several dozen concrete actions to streamline FMS. In addition, Department of State officials report that they approve 95 percent of FMS cases within 48 hours for their portion of FMS.</p> +<p>Finally, U.S. forces should enhance redundancy, in addition to improving the resilience of U.S. assets and networks in terms of both software and hardware. Establishing clear fallback options for communications and ISR in the event of a contingency is vital to ensuring the survivability of networks.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, the entire FMS process — from initial discussions to LOR, LOA, production, and modifications — is too long. It takes an average of 18 months to get FMS cases on contract. There is also no real accountability in the FMS system. The Department of State statutorily owns it, but execution largely falls to the Department of Defense and is split among the military services and several Department of Defense agencies. No one is held accountable for strategic success or failure. Partner and ally requests for U.S. systems can go unanswered for months or even years. FMS programs are executed under a U.S. government contract negotiated and awarded by a U.S. military service contracting officer on behalf of the FMS partner. The Department of Defense contracting community is understaffed. FMS contracts are sometimes given a low priority by contracting officers, who look first to support U.S. service personnel, then to contracts to support innovation for next-generation capabilities for U.S. service personnel, then to FMS. In addition, staffing constraints, technological limitations, and the increasing complexity of systems could slow the rate at which transactions are approved if there is a major increase in FMS.</p> +<h4 id="security-cooperation">SECURITY COOPERATION</h4> -<p><strong>Technology Transfer Policies and Procedures:</strong> A related issue includes technology transfer review policies and procedures — including ITAR — for FMS and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). ITAR is the U.S. regulation that controls the manufacture, sale, and distribution of defense and space-related articles and services. ITAR and other regulations are important and are designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology to adversaries and, in some instances, to signal disapproval to foreign countries because of their actions.</p> +<p>In addition to maintaining and bolstering traditional partner capacity-building efforts, the DOD, in tandem with EUCOM and the U.S. Department of State, should adopt a broader approach to security cooperation in the region. This would entail supporting the efforts of NATO allies and other European partners to develop and acquire advanced military capabilities and lessen their reliance on U.S. units and platforms, particularly enabling forces that support operations.</p> -<p>The United States has a long-standing exemption for Canada and can transfer some unclassified defense material and services without an export license. This exemption is limited, and companies sometimes avoid using the exemption because they are worried about the consequences of ITAR violations. Exports to Canada of classified and more sensitive material and services still require a license. In addition, there have been several historical cases in which the United States has made exceptions to technology transfers when there are strategic imperatives, such as countering the Soviet Union’s growing capabilities during the Cold War or aiding Ukraine following Russia’s 2022 invasion. For example, the United States and United Kingdom signed the Polaris Sales Agreement in 1963, which allowed the United States to export Polaris missiles, launch tubes, fire control systems, and relevant technologies to the United Kingdom to build and maintain its submarine-based nuclear weapons systems. U.S. and other NATO officials had become increasingly concerned about the Soviet Union’s nuclear and conventional capabilities and their impact on the military balance in Europe.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b1N9P6o.png" alt="image14" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6.2: U.S. Nuclear Posture in Europe.</strong> Source: Compiled based on data from Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, Federation of American Scientists, 2023, and Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection, Nuclear Threat Initiative.</em></p> -<p>There were several failed efforts to gain ITAR exemptions for the United Kingdom and Australia in the early 2000s. In 2010, the United States tried again and signed treaties, ratified by the Senate, that created a “trusted community” of companies in the United States, Australia, and United Kingdom that could share technology and compete for opportunities. But these treaties and other arrangements failed to significantly increase technology cooperation and have almost never been used by industry.</p> +<p>As part of this effort, the DOD should consider standing up a new organization within EUCOM to coordinate broader U.S. security cooperation efforts in Europe. This organization should have representation from the services, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and work closely with the Department of State. It would directly interface with NATO headquarters and allied militaries to manage requests for security assistance and arms sales, as well as provide guidance on the development of new capabilities, as needed. The organization’s objective would be to bolster allied and partner capacity by focusing on closing quantitative and qualitative gaps within European militaries that drive their reliance on U.S. forces in some areas. It could also pursue greater coordination and information sharing between the United States and European allies in the development of new technologies and capabilities, thereby ensuring interoperability.</p> -<p>The reality today is that the United States has failed to make significant progress in reducing export barriers, particularly with its closest allies and partners. These obstacles undermine co-development, co-production, co-sustainment, and other types of cooperative arrangements that provide benefits by increasing economies of scale, supporting the U.S. defense industrial base (including providing jobs to U.S. workers), and strengthening allies and partners. Incorporating allies and partners into the development, execution, and sustainment of programs is not always a top-level priority for some U.S. defense acquisitions specialists, even with a push by senior Department of Defense officials for greater technology sharing with allies and partners. In the development of acquisition programs, requirements documents are too frequently overclassified and marked “SECRET//NOFORN,” which prohibits sharing with foreign governments.</p> +<p>The DOD has already taken some steps to bolster cooperation efforts and information sharing with European partners in its April 2023 Administrative Arrangement reached with the European Defence Agency (EDA). The agreement provides a framework for the United States and EDA to “exchange information and explore collaborative activities falling within the scope of EDA’s mission,” with a focus on areas including supply chain issues, military mobility, and the impact of climate change on defense activities. However, the terms of the agreement specifically preclude “research and technology” from the scope of the arrangement.</p> -<p>Even for close allies, there are notable delays, confusion, and unpredictability with the U.S. technology transfer process — a sign of a peacetime, not a wartime, process. The U.S. Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) process often causes delays for close allies, which prevent them from doing technical assessments before they even get to the LOR stage. The TSFD process is also far too opaque and unpredictable. These challenges can significantly impact time-sensitive actions, such as refitting ships during fixed docking periods.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-3">CONCLUSION</h4> -<p>With the United Kingdom, for example, U.S. delays held up a routine upgrade on sonar systems for UK Royal Navy submarines for several months, while another UK submarine had to wait months to be serviced by a cleared contractor until the U.S. Department of State authorized an export-controlled component. As one analysis concluded, “months went by waiting for a license that just added cost and risk to an ally’s military capability.” More broadly, the United Kingdom spends a shocking $500 million each year — almost 1 percent of its defense budget — complying with ITAR regulations. As another assessment concluded: “When close U.S. allies — or their defense firms — wish to develop technology or acquire capability from the United States, they have to navigate a byzantine system of regulation. This costs time and money, undermines allies’ sovereignty, stifles innovation, and blunts the United States’ edge in the strategic competition with China.”</p> +<p>The recommendations outlined in this chapter seek to enhance U.S. military posture from its levels before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. While this posture strengthens the ability of the United States and NATO to deter and repel Russian aggression on the continent, it also pursues more sustainable policies by shifting the presence of U.S. ground forces largely to permanent, forward-stationed forces and articulates trade-offs and limitations with other strategic pri orities, such as competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, it seeks to accommodate both the benefits and shortcomings of allied capabilities in the region.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The reality today is that the United States has failed to make significant progress in reducing export barriers, particularly with its closest allies and partners.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="ch-07">CH. 07</h3> +<h3 id="alternative-options">ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS</h3> -<p>The United States is far too risk averse and needs to rethink the benefits of sharing technology with its closest allies and partners, as well as the risk of not sharing that information. As Under Secretary of Defense LaPlante argued, “the system is built around a risk of technology exploitation by an adversary. High risk of that. We want to make sure we mitigate against that. Well, you have that risk but now we also have the operational imperative of what we’re facing in the Indo-Pacific, and we have to just get over it with close allies and partners like the UK and Australia.”</p> +<p>The recommendations for the future of U.S. military posture in Europe, as outlined in the preceding chapter, provide the necessary forces and capabilities to realize the United States’ interests and strategic objectives outlined in Chapter 5. There are, however, alternative military postures to this “forward defense” approach that the United States could adopt based on different interests and objectives. This chapter briefly assesses the components of alternative U.S. posture options for Europe through 2030, along with their associated advantages and limitations.</p> -<p>Similarly, the chief of the United Kingdom’s navy, Admiral Sir Ben Key, remarked that “what we want to be able to do is move quicker” in today’s competitive security environment in the area of technology transfers. The risks of an overly regulated and risk-averse defense culture is highlighted in Andrew Gordon’s book, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, which examined British failures between the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of Jutland. In periods of peace, regulators often predominate. But in periods of war, in which countries must move quickly against cunning adversaries, “rat catchers” need to dominate. As Admiral Key asked, “Are we setting up the ITAR and all the rest of it to allow the regulators or the rat catchers? And what is it we’re trying to achieve?” He continued that “what we really want to do is in a contested environment, when the pressure is really on, we want the information to move between allies and partners and friends as fast as we possibly can with as few hurdles as we can.”</p> +<p>This chapter focuses chiefly on three broad approaches: an extension of the U.S. military’s current posture in Europe in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; a strategy of restraint; and a China-first strategy that strictly prioritizes competition with China above all other objectives. It should be noted that the latter two strategies do not represent a singular, cohesive approach that is uniformly agreed upon by their advocates. Similarly, there is overlap in the views and advocates of these two approaches. While these strategies may offer some benefits to U.S. foreign policy, such as prioritizing resources for competition in the Indo-Pacific, their significant cuts to U.S. posture in Europe would severely undermine the ability of the United States and NATO to deter and respond to threats from a revanchist Russia.</p> -<p>There was some hope that AUKUS — the security pact initiated in 2022 between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to cooperate on sensitive technologies, including nuclear-powered submarines — might usher in a new era of technology cooperation between the three countries. But that has not been the case — at least not yet. As outlined in Table 3.2, the second pillar of AUKUS raises the prospect of expanding the research, development, and fielding of advanced capabilities in six technological areas (undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare) and two broad functional areas (innovation and information sharing).</p> +<h4 id="maintain-current-us-posture">MAINTAIN CURRENT U.S. POSTURE</h4> -<p>Another example of a challenge in technology sharing is the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB). It was first codified in U.S. law in 1992 when the United States and Canada were designated as one national technology industrial base. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) added the United Kingdom and Australia — and the 2023 NDAA added New Zealand. The NTIB consists of the people and organizations engaged in national security and dual-use research and development, production, maintenance, and related activities within the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. But the NTIB is largely failing. There has been some progress in coordinating foreign investment reviews, but little has been achieved in facilitating export control processes. As one study concludes, the NTIB “has not been utilized to foster industrial collaboration in any meaningful way and many have begun to question NTIB’s utility as a vehicle for such efforts.”</p> +<p>One alternative is to extend the U.S. military’s existing posture in Europe, as currently oriented in response to Russia’s invasion, through 2030. This posture is based on an operational concept of deterrence by denial, and it relies on an enhanced military presence, as illustrated by the United States’ current end strength of approximately 100,000 personnel in Europe. The U.S. military would maintain that posture throughout the time frame or until European allies bolster their capabilities and capacity to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7VEqF0L.png" alt="image15" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 3.2 AUKUS Pillar Two Technologies and Functional Areas.</strong> Sources: <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">“AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022</a>; and <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47599">Patrick Parrish and Luke A. Nicastro, AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report NO. R47599 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 2023)</a>.</em></p> +<p>Such a posture would be based on the current 5+2 model that maintains five total brigade combat teams (BCTs), including the two additional BCTs deployed after Russia’s invasion (one rotational armored brigade combat team [ABCT] and one rotational infantry brigade combat team [IBCT] in Romania) in addition to the pre-war units (a forward-stationed IBCT and Stryker brigade combat team [SBCT] based in Italy and Germany, respectively, and one rotational ABCT as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve). The model would keep headquarters in Germany and Poland as well. In terms of air combat forces, this posture would maintain the seven fighter squadrons currently forward deployed and add a persistent rotational deployment of fifth-generation aircraft to NATO’s eastern flank. Other force structure elements would remain largely unchanged from the status quo.</p> -<p>Finally, some of the United States’ “Buy America” provisions are generally counterproductive and undermine the ability to work closely with allies and partners who the United States will need in almost any conceivable war or military operation. After all, modern weapons systems are products of a globalized market. Take the F-35 Lightning II combat aircraft program. Production and sustainment relies on 1,900 companies around the globe in 48 states and 10 countries.</p> +<p>The current U.S. military posture provides greater combat capability for U.S. and allied forces in Europe with the deployment of an additional ABCT, which could consequently provide increased deterrent value against Russia. This strengthened posture also serves to reassure European allies, particularly those on the eastern flank, of the United States’ commitment. However, there are drawbacks to maintaining this enhanced posture over the long term. While a second ABCT provides greater combat capability and potential deterrent value, it does not ensure that NATO would be able to defeat a determined Russian invasion on the eastern flank, particularly an attack against the Baltic states, where there is limited strategic depth.</p> -<p>Part of the challenge with reforming FMS and technology transfers to allies and partners in today’s international security landscape is that there are so many U.S. government agencies involved. Within the Department of Defense, examples include the DSCA, Defense Technology Security Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and military services. Within the Department of State, there are several offices within the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and the regional bureaus. There are also other entities with various roles, such as the Department of Commerce and the Department of the Treasury. Within Congress, several committees have roles in FMS and technology transfer policies and procedures, such as the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.</p> +<p>Maintaining the current enhanced military posture in Europe would also force the United States to incur greater costs in terms of operating expenses and readiness. As discussed in the preceding chapter, rotationally deployed units are more expensive from both a cost and readiness standpoint than forward-deployed units. Two rotational ABCTs would put greater stress on the Army’s force-generation model, given the time and additional units required to replace following the end of their deployment. While constructing a permanent military base in Poland would entail costs in the short-term, it would prove more sustainable over the long term and allow units to integrate into the local community.</p> -<h4 id="resistance-to-change">Resistance to Change</h4> +<p>Finally, maintaining the current 5+2 posture model in Europe risks encouraging free riding from U.S. allies and delaying their efforts to strengthen their own military capabilities in terms of both force size and modernization. The recommended 4+2 model, with a permanent forward-stationed ABCT in Poland, highlights U.S. long-term resolve and commitment while also stressing that NATO militaries must swiftly enhance their forces and posture on the eastern flank in the short term.</p> -<p>There are several reasons why some policymakers have resisted significant change.</p> +<h4 id="strategic-restraint">STRATEGIC RESTRAINT</h4> -<p>First, some individuals and offices remain overly cautious about sharing sensitive technology with other countries — even to some of the United States’ closest allies with whom it shares its most sensitive intelligence. While the United States needs to prevent its sensitive technology from falling into the hands of its adversaries, such as China, Russia, and Iran, some of the concerns are anachronistic and counterproductive.</p> +<p>Strategic restraint, sometimes called offshore balancing, argues that the United States is fundamentally secure based on its relative geographic isolation, nuclear arsenal, and military power. According to this view, the United States has over-extended itself with costly overseas commitments and misguided interventions in countries and missions that are not critical to U.S. interests. Consequently, advocates for strategic restraint call for the United States to draw down its global military presence and missions to focus on more limited objectives, to include homeland defense or preventing rivals from disrupting the global or regional balances of power.</p> -<p>Second, some see a revitalization of the defense industrial base as giving money to greedy executives that produce deadly weapons systems. They also want more accountability for an industry they see as already engaging in waste, fraud, and abuse. For example, 60 Minutes, produced by CBS News, alleged that defense contractors had overcharged the Department of Defense for a wide array of defense equipment, potentially costing the U.S. government billions of dollars. In addition, the Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector General found some instances of overcharging, including a pattern of behavior by the contractor TransDigm. The House Committee on Oversight and Accountability summarized TransDigm’s actions as “rampant price gouging on mission-critical aircraft parts.” In May 2023, five senators alleged in a letter to the secretary of defense that some companies had “abused the trust government has placed in them, exploiting their position as sole suppliers for certain items to increase prices far above inflation or any reasonable profit margin.”</p> +<p>Advocates for strategic restraint largely argue for a drawdown or the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Some have even called for reconsidering the United States’ membership in NATO, although that is by no means a universally shared view within the restraint community. While restraint is a broad and ideologically diverse approach, most advocates agree that the United States should end or significantly reduce its military presence in Europe on geopolitical and budgetary grounds.</p> -<p>These accusations of fraud, waste, and abuse need to be taken seriously, and any individuals and companies found guilty need to be appropriately punished. The Department of Justice, Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector General, and other organizations are designed to conduct investigations and take necessary actions. But major waste, fraud, and abuse are the exceptions. In addition, closer inspection suggests that several of the charges leveled in the CBS News report, including price gouging, were inaccurate. The outlier cases should not be an excuse for failing to strengthen the defense industrial base and improve technology transfers to key allies and partners.</p> +<p>While advocates call for a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, they have yet to offer detailed analysis of the future U.S. posture they envision and the force elements that would remain on the continent. However, the main component of a restraint force posture would entail a reduction in U.S. presence from Europe over 5 to 10 years to the eventual withdrawal of most U.S. forces. The United States would end access agreements with European partners and either close or repurpose most of its bases, predominantly Army bases. For example, Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Barry Posen calls for remaining bases to be converted to forward operating sites or cooperative security locations for use in the event of a contingency. Forces along the eastern flank, including the rotational ABCT presence in Poland and the IBCT in Romania, would be removed.</p> -<p>Third, some policymakers oppose multiyear contracts because these types of contracts commit the government to fund the weapons systems or programs, reducing budget flexibility in out years. Government agencies lose liquidity, and it can be more difficult to move money over the course of a fiscal year if a military service or other entity wants to shift priorities. Munitions are sometimes a “bill payer,” a part of the defense budget from which officials can trim to fund other programs. Without multiyear contracts that guarantee funding, however, companies have little incentive to take financial risk and grow capacity. It’s not worth investing if there is unreliable demand. And the costs and risks are high. Multiyear contracts keep supply lines warm, sustain supply chain subcontractors, increase production efficiencies that help industry better respond to surges, and encourage investment in facilities and equipment.</p> +<p>Nonetheless, some U.S. forces would likely remain in theater. In terms of ground forces, the United States could retain its forward-stationed IBCT to serve as a contingency response force, and special operations forces could also retain a small footprint to realize limited U.S. objectives on the ground. While the United States would withdraw its F-35 squadrons from the United Kingdom, it could retain its F-15E presence at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath and consider maintaining its F-16 presence at either Spangdahlem or Aviano Air Bases.</p> -<p>A growing number of qualitative analyses and wargames suggest that the Department of Defense lacks key munitions stockpiles for a protracted conflict — or even a short one — in such theaters as the Indo-Pacific. In today’s security environment, it increasingly makes sense for the government to take on more of the risk of buying weapons systems — perhaps even risking overbuying — because the risks associated with underbuying are so significant.</p> +<p>In terms of the maritime domain, the United States could retain naval bases, including in Rota and Naples, and forces to ensure freedom of navigation at sea and U.S. command over the maritime commons. Finally, the United States may seek to maintain some nuclear weapons in Europe and the nuclear-sharing mission to counter major aggression from Russia. To compensate for the lack of forces in the area, it may opt to increase stocks of prepositioned equipment for use in the event of a contingency.</p> -<p>Consequently, the arguments opposed to revitalizing the defense ecosystem are largely unpersuasive, obsolete, and ultimately counterproductive in today’s competitive international landscape. As this chapter argues, the U.S. defense industrial base remains unprepared for the current security environment. The next chapter turns to possible solutions.</p> +<p>Supporters argue that the primary benefit of adopting a posture of restraint in Europe would be to free up forces and resources that could be allocated elsewhere, since many believe that the United States is “not capable of conducting full-scale operations against China and Russia simultaneously.” The strategy of restraint would reduce the U.S. position in Europe to a supporting role, which advocates justify by arguing that its NATO allies and the European Union possess enough military and economic power to counter Russian forces and other security crises. The United States could then prioritize allocation of resources toward other priorities, such as strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Multiyear contracts keep supply lines warm, sustain supply chain subcontractors, increase production efficiencies that help industry better respond to surges, and encourage investment in facilities and equipment.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Moreover, advocates of restraint argue that withdrawing forces from Europe would significantly reduce the challenge of free riding by NATO allies and encourage greater European investment toward defense capabilities. While other NATO allies have lagged behind the United States in terms of security investment, supporters of strategic restraint argue that the strong U.S. presence in Europe has “long suppressed” the development of indigenous defense capabilities on the continent and hindered cooperation between European states. Withdrawing U.S. forces would require Europe to invest much more significantly in its own defense and would result in budgetary savings for the United States.</p> -<h3 id="the-way-ahead">THE WAY AHEAD</h3> +<p>Despite these arguments, the drawbacks of a restraint-based posture in Europe outweigh its advantages. First, a significantly reduced U.S. presence would incur significant risk and potentially embolden a revanchist Russia to pursue acts of aggression against states on the eastern flank. As argued in Chapter 3, Russia is actively modernizing and rebuilding its military with some help from China, Iran, and other countries. In the event of a contingency, U.S. forces would take longer to deploy from the United States and respond to threats against NATO.</p> -<p>The risks of failing to adequately revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base and broader defense ecosystem are significant and growing, especially with China putting significant resources into its defense industrial base and building advanced military capabilities. Without urgent changes, the United States could find itself with substantial supply and matériel shortfalls, which severely impact both deterrence and warfighting. The United States could also face a situation in which surge capacity lags, innovation stagnates, maintenance of critical supply chains is disincentivized, and the defense industrial base is underprepared for future stockpile requirements. The U.S. defense industrial base — led by a robust and strengthened commercial industry — needs to be a key pillar of broader U.S. industrial policy strategy to compete with China economically, technologically, and militarily.</p> +<p>Second, while allies and partners may invest more in their own defense, they would likely not be able to develop the forces and capabilities necessary to compensate for withdrawn U.S. forces even in the event of a phased drawdown over several years. As outlined in Chapter 4, while European nations are largely able to perform small-scale military missions and some medium-scale missions without U.S. assistance, they typically require U.S. collaboration to successfully execute large-scale operations. European forces rely heavily on the U.S. military for assistance in areas such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), logistics support, long-range precision support, heavy maneuver forces, and maritime operations. Most lack capacity in their defense industrial base to indigenously develop the required systems in a short time frame, and many face ongoing personnel and equipment shortages, interoperability challenges, and uncertain future funding for efforts such as air and naval patrol missions.</p> -<p>The “peace dividend” that emerged at the end of the Cold War is over. The international security environment has dramatically shifted. In February 2022, Russia invaded democratic Ukraine in a brazen move that has led to a protracted war of attrition. Since then, Russia has doubled down and ramped up defense production and imported weapons systems and components from such countries as China, Iran, and North Korea. In October 2023, Hamas conducted a bloody attack against Israel, and then Iranian-linked groups targeted U.S. and partner forces in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries. Iran and Iranian-linked groups possess a growing arsenal of sophisticated stand-off weapons, from missiles to unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and loitering munitions, which require improved air defense and counter-UAS capabilities. In the Indo-Pacific, China has become increasingly aggressive against Taiwan, the United States, and numerous countries in the region, such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. Finally, North Korea is expanding its arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, which threaten South Korea, the United States, and other countries.</p> +<p>Finally, advocates of restraint overstate the budgetary savings associated with reducing the overseas presence of U.S. forces. To generate significant savings, the Department of Defense would have to wholly eliminate units and divest equipment rather than simply return U.S. units and personnel to the contiguous United States. In addition to being politically and logistically difficult, such eliminations would leave the U.S. military unable to redeploy forces to other theaters such as the Indo-Pacific — thus negating the first and most important benefit that restraint advocates hope to achieve.</p> -<p>China’s defense industrial base is also increasingly operating on a wartime footing and is developing and producing weapons systems in all major domains — land, air, maritime, cyber, and space. As Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall remarked, “China has been reoptimizing its forces for great power competition and to prevail against the U.S. and the Western Pacific for over 20 years. . . . China has been building a military capability specifically designed to achieve their national goals and to do so even if opposed by the United States.”</p> +<p>Together, the detrimental effects of a force posture based on restraint would outweigh its alleged benefits. Such a posture would create significant security risks and operational gaps across the European continent without producing meaningful savings for the United States.</p> -<p>There is good news, however. The U.S. private sector is innovative, and the United States has a history of rejuvenating its defense sector in the face of authoritarian military action. U.S. revitalization has not just occurred during wartime, such as World War II or the Korean War, but also during times of increased strategic competition, such as during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In addition, a strengthened U.S. defense industrial base is good for U.S. jobs, since every state in the United States has workers in the defense sector.</p> +<h4 id="china-first">CHINA FIRST</h4> -<p>This chapter provides recommendations to help revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base. It focuses on several areas: a White House–level initiative, defense production, and allies and partners. These recommendations are not intended to be comprehensive, but rather illustrative of the type of urgent changes necessary. There are many others worth considering, such as broad acquisition reform, strengthening economic security agreements, protecting against cyberattacks, improving international interoperability, and reducing the United States’ reliance on China and other competitors for raw materials.</p> +<p>A China-first strategy shares similar underpinnings to the “offshore balancing” strain of restraint. Advocates of this approach argue that U.S. forces and resources dedicated to European security and, more specifically, to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia undermine the United States’ ability to compete with China in the Indo-Pacific and to defend Taiwan. Advocates of a China-first strategy argue that if Taiwan is taken by China, the United States’ military position in the region and the confidence of Asian partners states in the ability of the United States to confront China would weaken. Members of the restraint community note that the alignment of China-first “hawks” with foreign policy realists has “reshaped” the debate over U.S. security commitments to Europe. However, restraint advocates generally do not view the China threat as urgent as China-first supporters do, while some view U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific more narrowly. Consequently, restraint advocates argue for reductions in U.S. forces in Europe on geopolitical and budgetary grounds, as noted above.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China’s defense industrial base is increasingly operating on a wartime footing and is developing and producing weapons systems in all major domains — land, air, maritime, cyber, and space.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>China-first advocates have similarly not built out detailed posture recommendations for U.S. forces in Europe. However, they have articulated the types of capabilities and trade-offs they would seek to bolster U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific at the expense of U.S. posture in Europe. These trade-offs would result in major cuts to U.S. forces and capabilities in Europe that could significantly hinder NATO’s ability to deter Russian aggression. As one China-first advocate writes:</p> -<h4 id="white-houseled-effort">White House–Led Effort</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>So long as China is our priority, the United States will be forced to withhold forces from Europe to deter or defeat Chinese aggression, even if Russia attacks NATO first. This will significantly limit our ability to help deter, deny, or repel a Russian assault because many of the capabilities required for a Taiwan contingency are also vital for Europe, including air and naval strike platforms; long-range missiles; air and missile defenses; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and logistics forces.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>There is an urgent need for a presidential-led body to provide strategic guidance across government and to oversee a major revitalization of the defense industrial base and defense ecosystem. The Department of Defense cannot do it alone. The Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, Congress, private sector, and other organizations also play important roles in the defense industrial base. Revitalization will likely not occur without White House leadership, as the history of the U.S. defense industrial base suggests.</p> +<p>According to this approach, force structure elements that would be removed or reduced from the United States’ current military posture in Europe for redeployment to the Indo-Pacific would include the two F-35 squadrons from RAF Lakenheath and at least some number of the six destroyers currently forward-stationed at Rota. In terms of ground forces, a China-first posture would similarly reduce long-range fires and theater air and missile defense assets to be prioritized for competition in the Indo-Pacific. Critical enablers — including airlift and aerial refueling, prepositioned stocks, and munitions stockpiles — would similarly be de-prioritized in the European theater.</p> -<p>There are several options. One is a variant of the production boards that existed during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. This body could be created by the president and could exercise general direction over U.S. defense procurement and production; help determine the policies, plans, and procedures of federal departments regarding procurement and production; establish priorities in the distribution of materials and services; break through bureaucrat gridlock; and provide a sense of urgency in revitalizing the defense industrial base. A second option is a variant of the Reagan administration’s Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board, which was designed to improve mobilization capabilities and interagency cooperation within the federal government. The board might consist of representatives from key federal agencies at the deputy secretary or under secretary level, be chaired by the national security advisor, and include a full-time secretariat. A third option is the establishment of a national commission — composed of prominent former government officials, industry executives, and other subject-matter experts — designed to make recommendations to the U.S. president. A critical part of all of these options is to tie the body to the U.S. president.</p> +<p>A China-first approach to posture in Europe is thus willing to incur major risk and even potential military setbacks to field the needed capabilities and systems in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, advocates call on NATO allies and partners in the European Union to take on a significantly greater burden in providing for their own defense. While a China-first posture in Europe may retain more U.S. forces relative to a restraint posture, such as ABCTs, China-first supporters are willing to divest those forces and units in a resource-constrained fiscal environment.</p> -<h4 id="defense-production-1">Defense Production</h4> +<p>In addition to shifting current forces from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, China-first advocates also call for shifting force planning and security assistance efforts toward competition with China and the defense of Taiwan. They argue that procurement policy and the development of new capabilities should prioritize systems and capabilities for Indo-Pacific missions and the Taiwan contingency, such as surface ships, submarines, and precision-guided munitions. They also call for greater investments in improving the resilience of Indo-Pacific basing and infrastructure at the expense of similar investments in Europe. Advocates more forcefully argue against the security assistance currently provided to Ukraine in its war against Russia. They contend that this assistance, particularly of munitions, has at least two problems: it is contributing to dwindling U.S. stockpiles that could be used in a contingency with China, and munitions should instead be allocated to the defense of Taiwan.</p> -<p>Ramping up defense production should include several steps. An important goal should be for industry to produce high-volume and high-impact systems at affordable costs over time that help the United State strengthen deterrence and warfighting. Doing this will require shifting the incentives governing the defense industrial base on a range of issues, such as multiyear contracting.</p> +<p>Advocates of a China-first approach to strategy and posture generally recognize the high level of risk they are willing to incur in order to prioritize the Indo-Pacific and ensure that Taiwan does not fall to China. However, a Europe posture based on this strategy poses many of the same drawbacks as restraint. But the immediate shift in forces and capabilities from Europe to the Indo-Pacific associated with a China-first strategy poses much greater short-term risk in Europe, particularly if assistance to Ukraine is drastically reduced at the same time. The reduction in military aid vital to the Ukrainian war effort could allow the Russian military to gain the upper hand in the conflict, conquer all (or at least more) territory in Ukraine, encourage Russia to take military action elsewhere in Europe and other regions, and embolden China.</p> -<p><strong>Defense Spending:</strong> The United States likely cannot revamp its defense industrial base without increasing defense spending. The goal should be to increase funding for the development and production of critical weapons systems. An infusion of cash would strengthen the defense industrial base using Title 3 funds in the Defense Production Act, including such components as rocket boosters, energetics, engines, munitions, and new weapons systems. It might also be helpful for the government to increase investments in defense infrastructure, such as factories, which can be difficult and risky for industry to invest in quickly. One option might be to establish more government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities. Amid the Cold War, the last major period of strategic competition, the U.S. defense budget hovered between 9 and 11 percent of GDP during the Eisenhower administration, between 8 and 9 percent during Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and over 6 percent during the Reagan administration.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-4">CONCLUSION</h4> -<p>This report has not conducted a comprehensive defense budget analysis. However, today’s current defense budget of approximately 3 percent of GDP is not historically consistent with a security environment in which authoritarian states, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are increasingly threatening the United States and its allies and partners. China, in particular, is developing a robust defense industrial base that is focused on warfighting and deterrence against the United States. In this environment, the United States needs to analyze defense budget options at least closer to the levels of the 1980s.</p> +<p>In short, any benefits of the three alternatives — extending the U.S. military’s current posture in Europe, restraint, or China-first — are outweighed by the costs and risks. As noted in Chapter 8, a significant withdrawal of U.S. forces along the lines of restraint or a China-first approach would jeopardize U.S. national security interests and significantly embolden authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere.</p> -<p><strong>Multiyear Contracting:</strong> The Department of Defense and Congress need to expand the use of multiyear procurement to create sustained demand signals that can promote investment into the capacity of the industrial base. These types of contracts have typically been reserved for only the most expensive acquisition types, such as procurement of large Navy ships. Multiyear procurement is a step in building a consistent and predictable demand signal that creates more transparency and less risk for both prime contractors as well as more fragile sub-tier suppliers. Reliance on cost savings only is too restrictive, and promoting defense industrial base stability and effective deterrence and warfighting is an important justification for multiyear contracts.</p> +<h2 id="part-iii-conclusion">PART III CONCLUSION</h2> -<p>The fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act authorized multiyear procurement for some munitions, such as JASSM, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), LRASM, and PAC-3. While helpful, the problem has generally not been the authorization of multiyear contracts, but rather the failure of appropriators or the military services to fund or spend multiyear contracts. Appropriators need to fund — and the services need to spend — critical munitions important for warfighting and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East. There are several munitions that should be considered for future multiyear funding, such as the AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), Javelin, Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Extended Range (AARGM-ER), AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), and Harpoon.</p> +<h3 id="ch-08">CH. 08</h3> +<h3 id="final-thoughts">FINAL THOUGHTS</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Department of Defense and Congress need to expand the use of multiyear procurement to create sustained demand signals that can promote investment into the capacity of the industrial base.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The U.S. military presence in Europe will likely remain contentious for several reasons. First, a substantial number of U.S. policymakers and analysts assess that China is the most significant threat to the United States for the foreseeable future and that the United States should focus the bulk of its military posture and attention — including its military air, naval, and maritime forces — in the Indo-Pacific. Second, some policymakers and analysts support decreasing the U.S. presence in Europe because European governments have generally failed to increase their defense budgets or focus on high-end military capabilities. Third, some contend that the United States should focus on problems at home, such as combatting immigration, improving health care, and stemming the production, trafficking, and use of such drugs as fentanyl. Fourth, still others assess that Russia poses little conventional or nuclear threat to the United States and its NATO allies in the short- or long-term.</p> -<p><strong>Strategic Stockpiles:</strong> The Department of Defense maintains stockpiles of some key minerals, munitions, chemicals, technology, and medical supplies. But it needs to better manage inventory and stockpile planning to decrease near-term risk and mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities. It also needs to stockpile (or develop alternative markets for) such critical minerals as antimony, titanium, nickel, and cobalt. For example, the United States imports a significant amount of titanium sponge from Russia and China, which could be cut off or interrupted in a war.</p> +<p>There is validity in some of these points. China is a major threat, European governments need to spend more (and spend more effectively) on defense, and the United States needs to better address a wide range of challenges at home. As this report maintains, however, the United States has significant and enduring interests in Europe that will require a force posture of “forward defense.” A notable decline in the United States’ force posture in Europe would likely be significant and dangerous for U.S. national security in several ways.</p> -<p>The Department of Defense and Congress should allocate additional funding for contracts and other incentives — such as tax incentives, regulatory relief, and long-term contracts — to build and maintain spare production capacity. Such funding should be used to modernize and expand facilities and develop flexible production. The Department of Defense and Congress should also increase funding to expand domestic production of components critical for deterrence and warfighting in such areas as the Indo-Pacific, such as cruise missile motor capacity expansion (which is important for Harpoon, Tomahawk, LRASM, JASSM, and other long-range missiles), solid rocket motor capacity expansion, energetics, and batteries.</p> +<p>First, it would embolden a revanchist Moscow and undermine deterrence in Europe. President Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders would likely see a declining U.S. force posture in Europe as a sign of weakening U.S. resolve and potentially declining power. The United States’ limited response following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and military action in eastern Ukraine later that year likely encouraged Russia to take future action. Second, a deteriorating U.S. posture would likely embolden other U.S. adversaries, such as China, and heighten concerns among U.S. allies and partners in Asia about U.S. resolve. The views in Taipei, the most likely flashpoint with China, are striking. Some of Taiwan’s national security leaders have warned that a reduced U.S. commitment to Europe — including aid to Ukraine — would heighten Taiwanese concerns about U.S. resolve. Only 34 percent of those in Taiwan in 2023 believed that the United States is a trustworthy country, a decline of more than 11 percentage points from 2021. Researchers assessed that the drop was partly caused by a perception that U.S. resolve is weakening in Europe, including in Ukraine.</p> -<p>Working with industry partners, the Department of Defense should also identify and establish stockpiles of the critical parts, finished goods, and commodities needed to meet production requirements for conducting sustained military campaigns against adversaries. In addition, the Department of Defense should identify the stockpiling requirements of critical minerals and components necessary to continue production in cases where international conflict or crisis may inhibit normal functioning of supply chains. The essential role of these stockpiles should be to mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities and ensure the military’s operational freedom and effectiveness. One example is the field-programmable gate array chips that are manufactured in Taiwan and extensively used in U.S. weapons systems, such as F-35s, missiles, and command and control equipment. It will take years to set up the production capability in the United States, so the U.S. government needs to stockpile these chips in case of a Taiwan contingency.</p> +<p>First, it would embolden a revanchist Moscow and undermine deterrence in Europe. President Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders would likely see a declining U.S. force posture in Europe as a sign of weakening U.S. resolve and potentially declining power. The United States’ limited response following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and military action in eastern Ukraine later that year likely encouraged Russia to take future action. Second, a deteriorating U.S. posture would likely embolden other U.S. adversaries, such as China, and heighten concerns among U.S. allies and partners in Asia about U.S. resolve. The views in Taipei, the most likely flashpoint with China, are striking. Some of Taiwan’s national security leaders have warned that a reduced U.S. commitment to Europe — including aid to Ukraine — would heighten Taiwanese concerns about U.S. resolve.1 Only 34 percent of those in Taiwan in 2023 believed that the United States is a trustworthy country, a decline of more than 11 percentage points from 2021. Researchers assessed that the drop was partly caused by a perception that U.S. resolve is weakening in Europe, including in Ukraine.</p> -<p><strong>Improvements to the Workforce and Supply Chains:</strong> The United States needs to diversify the supplier base and invest in new or different production methods. For example, defense companies could increasingly use cast iron processes, rather than forging. Casting is generally less expensive and more versatile than forging, though it has some potential disadvantages such as less resistance to wear.</p> +<h4 id="persistent-us-interests-in-europe">PERSISTENT U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE</h4> -<p>The Department of Defense should look for opportunities to assist companies with upskilling and reskilling workers by offering incentives. Examples of such actions include the following:</p> +<p>The United States has several enduring interests in Europe: protect the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people from threats based in Europe; promote and expand economic prosperity and opportunity; realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and defend and support the United States’ European allies. As noted in more detail below, Russia will remain the most significant threat to Europe for the foreseeable future.</p> + +<p>U.S. interests in Europe are likely to endure even with a U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific and other regions. Based on these interests, the United States has several defense objectives in Europe:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Expand investments in the Department of Defense’s Manufacturing Innovation Institutes, including by supporting public-private partnerships with colleges, universities, high schools, and other institutions.</p> + <p>Deter and defeat conventional and nuclear-armed conflict directed against the U.S. homeland and U.S. allies, as well as coerce, persuade, and influence adversary behavior;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Invest in institutions and programs that support workforce development to address skill gaps in defense-related manufacturing and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) jobs.</p> + <p>Counter irregular and gray zone activities and compete effectively below the threshold of conventional conflict using both defensive and offensive means;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Expand programs such as Project MFG, photonics certifications, IDREAM4D, the Microelectronics Security Training Center, and Scalable Asymmetric Lifecycle Engagement. The Department of Defense helped establish these programs to support the talent needed for defense-related manufacturing and STEM jobs.</p> + <p>Counter terrorist and other transnational threats;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Increase federal funding for vocational schools that train individuals for defense workforce jobs, such as shipyard welders.</p> + <p>Deter and prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maintain access to trade routes and global commons.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>The Department of Defense should also consider increasing the use of defense industrial base programs, such as Defense Production Act Title III, to incentivize the expansion of existing U.S. sources and the establishment of new ones. The secretary of the Navy’s maritime statecraft initiative outlines an approach to revitalize commercial shipbuilding by using long-dormant subsidies and other steps to invest in commercial shipyards in the United States, modernize and expand shipbuilding industrial capacity, and develop a more capable and competitive workforce.</p> +<p>U.S. interests and defense objectives in Europe are based, to a great extent, on deterring a revanchist Russia. In the short term, NATO should be able to effectively deter a Russian conventional or nuclear attack against NATO territory, though Russia possesses significant irregular and gray zone capabilities. Over the next three to five years, however, the threat from Russia will likely increase. Moscow has the intentions and is developing the capabilities to threaten the United States, Europe, and their allies and partners.</p> + +<p>Over the long run, there are several factors that could change the military balance in Europe. For example, the United States could become overstretched due to a major theater war against China in the Indo-Pacific. European conventional and logistical capabilities are limited — particularly for high-end war — which creates vulnerabilities if the United States were to withdraw significant air, naval, and even ground forces from the region. U.S. or European political will to develop robust military capabilities or strengthen NATO could also weaken, undermining deterrence.</p> + +<p>Russia could rebuild its military capabilities over the next several years with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. Indeed, the speed of Russian military reconstitution will likely be impacted by help from China’s industrial base, as well as assistance from Iran, North Korea, and other countries. China has already provided several types of assistance to Russian defense firms, such as navigation equipment for M-17 military transport helicopters; jamming technology, such as telescoping antennas for military vehicles; parts for fighter jets; parts for radar units, which are used to detect enemy aircraft, missiles, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) as part of Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft missile system; semiconductor chips for weapons systems; more than $12 million in UASs and UAS parts; and substantial aid to offset Western sanctions. As a 2023 U.S. intelligence report concluded, China “has also become an increasingly important buttress for Russia in its war effort” by “supplying Moscow with key technology and dual-use equipment used in Ukraine.”</p> + +<p>In addition, Iran has provided several types of assistance to Russia, such as UASs, particularly the Shahed-136 precision-attack suicide drone; over 300,000 artillery shells and over 1 million rounds of ammunition; infrastructure, including helping to build a UAS factory in the Russian town of Yelabuga; and potentially ballistic missiles. Finally, North Korea has provided some military assistance, including artillery shells and other munitions, to Russia. Growing foreign assistance to Russia from China, Iran, and North Korea will help facilitate the reconstitution of its military.</p> + +<h4 id="developing-a-posture-of-forward-defense">DEVELOPING A POSTURE OF FORWARD DEFENSE</h4> + +<p>U.S. posture in Europe should be flexible enough to maintain deterrence but also allow some U.S. air and naval forces to surge to other regions — such as the Indo-Pacific — in case of contingencies. While this study does not conduct a global posture study, it assesses that the United States will likely need to deter two major adversaries, Russia and China. The United States should take several steps to enhance its posture in Europe over the next several years to strengthen deterrence and reassure its NATO allies in response to a Russia whose leaders are rebuilding their military and possess revanchist ambitions.</p> + +<p><strong>Ground:</strong> The United States should adopt a 4+2 posture beginning in 2025 that consists of four U.S. brigade combat teams (BCTs) and two headquarters, in Germany and Poland. This force posture would involve shifting from a rotational to a permanent armored brigade combat team (ABCT) in Poland to strengthen deterrence against a revanchist Russia. Overall, the United States should retain three permanent forward-stationed BCTs — one ABCT in Poland, one infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) in Italy, and one Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) in Germany — and one rotational IBCT headquartered in Romania. This model should include the permanent forward-basing of two combat aviation brigades. In addition, the United States should increase its long-range fires capabilities in Europe by facilitating further sales of systems, such as the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), to NATO allies. Finally, the U.S. military should increase efforts to build and enhance allied and partner special operations capabilities, with a focus on Eastern flank states, as part of forward defense.</p> + +<p><strong>Air:</strong> In terms of air combat capabilities, a forward defense posture recommends maintaining all seven forward-deployed fighter squadrons currently based in Europe and adding an additional F-16 squadron to Spangdahlem Air Base. Forward-deployed F-35 squadrons enhance the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces, given the aircraft’s ability to collect and transfer electronic data from adversary systems to provide greater situational awareness. In addition, this analysis recommends forward-stationing an additional F-16 squadron at Spangdahlem to provide greater short-term combat capacity as allied F-35 squadrons come online.</p> + +<p><strong>Maritime:</strong> The United States should continue its naval presence in the Baltic Sea region to deter Russian aggression and strengthen interoperability with allies and partners. In addition, the U.S. Navy should supplement existing NATO anti-submarine warfare capabilities by developing and deploying additional systems to the region. The United States should also expand its Arctic posture and capabilities to counter Russian and Chinese security interests. The U.S. Coast Guard could expand its icebreaking fleet with the procurement of three heavy Polar Security Cutters and three medium Arctic Security Cutters.</p> + +<p><strong>Prepositioned Equipment and Munitions Stockpiles:</strong> The United States should bolster its prepositioned equipment and munitions stocks in Europe to enhance the readiness of U.S. forces. While the Army Prepositioned Stock-2 has been somewhat augmented by funding from the European Deterrence Initiative, the Army should take additional steps to improve the readiness of this equipment and the forces overseeing it.</p> + +<p><strong>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:</strong> The demand for U.S. ISR assets will only increase as the military expands missions and operations in the Indo-Pacific and the Russian military reconstitutes its capabilities on NATO’s eastern flank. While priority may be given to the Indo-Pacific, the Department of Defense (DOD) should maximize its available ISR assets for use by both U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The DOD is currently seeking to modernize its ISR capabilities, with plans to retire the RQ-4 by FY 2027 and the MQ-9 by FY 2035. However, the DOD and the services must ensure that any gaps in ISR coverage are limited. This could be managed by timing the retirement of certain platforms to coincide with the activation of new assets. Alternatively, the DOD could leverage commercial capabilities to cover any gaps until requirements are established and new platforms come online. The Army is currently testing commercial assets in operations in Europe under its High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES) to define the requirements for the replacement for the RC-12 Guardrail aircraft.</p> + +<p><strong>Integrated Air and Missile Defense:</strong> The United States should increase air and missile defense capabilities in Poland in coordination with a permanent ABCT in Poland. The Army should also prioritize the development and deployment of additional Patriot battalions. In terms of ballistic missile defense, the United States should maintain its current posture and force structure in line with Operation Atlantic Sentry. Relevant units include the six Aegis destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain, along with the two Aegis Ashore sites based in Romania and Poland.</p> + +<p><strong>Nuclear Posture:</strong> The United States should increase modernization efforts, exercises, and scheduled deployments of assets to the European theater to bolster its deterrent capabilities and reassure allies. This includes modernizing its gravity bombs with the new B61-12. The U.S. military and NATO should also continue to conduct exercises with nuclear-capable platforms, including Bomber Task Force missions, to enhance readiness and assure allies of U.S. support.</p> + +<p><strong>Cyber and Space:</strong> U.S. forces should continue to enhance the security and resilience of their cyber systems and networks while simultaneously assisting European partners and allies. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) should deploy additional “hunt forward” teams to Europe to counter threats to U.S. forces and allies from Russia and Russian-backed groups. To capably resource further deployments and ensure readiness, CYBERCOM should also seek to expand the number of cyber mission teams across the services. The United States should also expand deployments of U.S. Space Force units and personnel to Europe. Space Force units can play a major role in supporting forward-deployed U.S. forces by preventing enemy interference and maintaining open lines of satellite communication.</p> + +<p><strong>Security Cooperation:</strong> The United States should focus on helping strengthen European military capabilities in such areas as combat support, including short-range air defense and long-range fires; airlift; heavy maneuver forces; maritime capabilities, including sensors and survivability systems; sufficient quantities of long-range precision strike weapons, such as long-range anti-ship missiles; and multi-spectrum ranges to train and maintain high-readiness forces. Security cooperation efforts should also involve additional security assistance, arms sales, training, partner capacity missions, and strategic coordination between the United States, NATO, and European states on the development of forces and capabilities.</p> + +<p>Europe remains a vital region for the United States. The last two U.S. national security and national defense strategies have prioritized China as the main global threat. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, continuing aggression, and growing cooperation with China are stark reminders that the United States has significant and enduring interests in Europe as well.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, director of the International Security Program, and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He focuses on defense strategy, military operations, force posture, and irregular warfare. He leads a bipartisan team of over 50 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent strategic insights and policy solutions that shape national security.</p> + +<p><strong>Seamus P. Daniels</strong> is a fellow for Defense Budget Analysis in the International Security Program at CSIS, where he researches issues related to defense funding, force structure, and military readiness.</p> + +<p><strong>Catrina Doxsee</strong> is a fellow with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS, where she analyzes international and domestic terrorism and the irregular activities of countries such as Russia, China, and Iran. Outside of CSIS, she is a member of the editorial board for the Irregular Warfare Initiative at the Modern War Institute at West Point.</p> + +<p><strong>Daniel Fata</strong> is the president of Fata Advisory LLC. He is a public policy expert, national security consultant, and strategic adviser focused on helping companies and organizations enhance their product and program offerings through the development of comprehensive government affairs strategies, risk assessments, strategic planning, and advocacy initiatives.</p> -<h4 id="allies-and-partners-1">Allies and Partners</h4> +<p><strong>Kathleen McInnis</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS. Her research areas include the intersection of gender and national security; global security strategy; defense policy; and transatlantic security.</p>Seth G. Jones, et al.Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States’ role in Europe.【黎智英案・審訊第卌一日】2024-03-08T12:00:00+08:002024-03-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-41<ul> + <li>楊清奇指李柱銘文章比較強調法治、胡志偉則支持抗爭和制裁林鄭</li> +</ul> -<p>The White House needs to focus significant attention on improving and streamlining the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and other processes and procedures across the U.S. government to expand co-development, co-production, co-sustainment, and other types of cooperation with critical allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Significant progress will not happen without White House–level intervention.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>For FMS, the Department of Defense should develop a more efficient review process for releasing technology, provide allies and partners with relevant priority capabilities, accelerate acquisition and contracting support, and ensure broad U.S. government support to improve the FMS process. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, working with the services and military departments, should establish a rapid contracting process to reduce the backlog in getting approved FMS cases on contract. The Department of State should consider instituting internal deadlines for bureaus and offices to respond to FMS requests. These deadlines should be standard and understood by stakeholders outside of the Department of State.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3xZoeG3.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Congressional notifications for FMS should include the date on which the United States received an official request from the partner nation for the times and services included in the notification. This would allow members to understand just how long international partners are waiting for replies to requests. The date used should be the date on which the letter of request was first received by a U.S. security cooperation organization, such as the in-country Security Cooperation Office, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, combatant command staff, or service implementing agency.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（8日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第41日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊的職責之一是管理報紙論壇版，控方向他展示多篇曾刊登於論壇版的文章，並問及各個作者的寫作角度。就民主黨創黨元老李柱銘，楊指他「比較強調法治」，而且「比較堅持一國兩制原本嘅解釋」，又指印象中李曾對《國安法》表示過擔心。前政協委員劉夢熊撰寫的文章亦曾被刊出，楊指劉的文章是由上司轉交給他，通常需要符合3個主要原則，即「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。至於在《國安法》生效數天後宣布「擱筆」的專欄作家古德明，楊指其文章「通常係以古諷今，咁對獨裁政治、對於侵犯人權事件都係比較批判嘅。」</p> -<p>On technology cooperation, the administration should also move quickly to put in place regulations that will provide broad exemptions for the United Kingdom and Australia, much like the United States has provided to Canada. In addition, the U.S. government should increase co-production, co-development, and other arrangements with key allies and partners in such areas as munitions, shipbuilding, and ground vehicles. For example, South Korea and Japan have robust shipbuilding capabilities through companies, such as Daewoo, Hyundai Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Imabari Shipbuilding, that could be useful. There have been several recent examples of co-production with allies and partners, such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) with Poland, Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) and GMLRS with Australia, Naval Strike Missile with Norway, and SM-6 components and Tomahawks for Japan and Australia. But these examples are the exception rather than the rule.</p> +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第五天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> -<p>Doing this effectively will require limiting “Buy America” protectionism, especially for allies that the United States may need to operate and fight with in future military contingencies. Expanding reciprocal defense procurement (RDP) agreements with allies could be helpful. The United States has RDP agreements with Australia and Japan, but not with South Korea. Such provisions as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (better known as the Jones Act) have made it difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to effectively collaborate in such areas as shipbuilding with Japanese, South Korean, or other allies that have sufficient capacity. The act is archaic and counterproductive in a world where defense collaboration is increasingly important with U.S. allies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RF9bZr9.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> -<p>Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States was involved in setting up recurring engagements with the heads of the ministries of defense and national armaments directors to coordinate support efforts. This body jump-started initiatives to expand ammunition production, establish an international support fund, and organize the delivery and sustainment of critical capabilities. The United States should consider convening the leadership of allied and partner nations within the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, to deepen multilateral collaboration on regional industrial base and manufacturing production challenges.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指翻譯評論文章前毋須徵得作者同意">楊清奇指翻譯評論文章前毋須徵得作者同意</h4> -<p>The recommendations outlined in this chapter would go a long way to revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base in a competitive security environment. Key recommendations include developing a White House–level body to oversee revitalization of the defense industrial base; ramping up defense production in such areas as multiyear contracting, strategic stockpiles, supply chains, and the workforce; and improving defense industrial cooperation with partners and allies. Unless these types of urgent changes occur, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and other regions against China and other competitors, including Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</p> +<p>控方展示楊清奇和盧峯（前主筆馮偉光）之間的訊息，談及資深傳媒人區家麟的英語版個人簡介。楊指，區是以中文寫作的，《蘋果》英文版面世之後，由英文版的同事將其文章翻譯成英文。楊又指，將中文評論文章翻譯成英文及刊登在英文版之前，並不需要徵得相關作者的同意，「所以有一啲作者都會投訴翻譯得唔好嘅。」楊指，若作者的文章在實體報紙刊登，可獲得稿費，但是當他們的文章刊登在英文版，則沒有額外的稿費。</p> -<p>The United States has the tools to reinvigorate its industrial base, including an innovative and technologically advanced private sector. The United States has also been in similar positions before — and succeeded. It is worth quoting at length President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s December 1940 speech — one year before Pearl Harbor — arguing that that the United States needs to be an arsenal of democracy. Roosevelt’s words are highly relevant today:</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/G673tn3.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 區家麟</p> -<blockquote> - <p>I want to make it clear that it is the purpose of the nation to build now with all possible speed every machine, every arsenal, every factory that we need to manufacture our defense material. We have the men, the skill, the wealth, and above all, the will. I am confident that if and when production of consumer or luxury goods in certain industries requires the use of machines and raw materials that are essential for defense purposes, then such production must yield, and will gladly yield, to our primary and compelling purpose.</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="特朗普簽署香港自治法後-楊清奇以中美對抗升級作為星期六論壇版主題">特朗普簽署《香港自治法》後 楊清奇以「中美對抗升級」作為星期六論壇版主題</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>So I appeal to the owners of plants, to the managers, to the workers, to our own government employees to put every ounce of effort into producing these munitions swiftly and without stint. With this appeal I give you the pledge that all of us who are officers of your government will devote ourselves to the same whole-hearted extent to the great task that lies ahead.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>控方指旅美作家「一劍飄塵」的文章〈美國會制裁林鄭月娥嗎〉，在2020年7月18日刊登在評論版，當日論壇版有特定主題「中美對抗升級」。楊確認當日是星期六，而逢星期六論壇版會有主題。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>As planes and ships and guns and shells are produced, your government, with its defense experts, can then determine how best to use them to defend this hemisphere. The decision as to how much shall be sent abroad and how much shall remain at home must be made on the basis of our overall military necessities.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>被問到為何使用「中美對抗升級」作為主題，楊指時任美國總統特朗普在同年7月14日簽署了《香港自治法案》，相信當時應該是想做相關社會反應，所以他決定了用這個主題。不過他當時雖然知道會有制裁名單，但基於時差問題，其時尚未知道誰人會被列入名單。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>We must be the great arsenal of democracy.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>控方提到與「一劍飄塵」安排在同一版面的另外兩篇文章，分別是〈「玫瑰園廢話」〉和〈南海爭奪戰——中美環球戰略對抗第一步〉，作者分別是美國教授夏明和香港學者許楨。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="蘋果曾收前政協劉夢熊投稿-楊清奇上司轉發文章多數會刊登">《蘋果》曾收前政協劉夢熊投稿 楊清奇：上司轉發文章多數會刊登</h4> -<hr /> +<p>控方展示 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄，顯示時任執行總編輯林文宗在2020年1月21日，向楊清奇轉發了一篇由前政協委員劉夢熊撰寫的文章，並指「劉夢熊投稿」。楊表示，對於這篇投稿，「我會視之為上司要我刊出嘅散稿嚟」，當收到上司的投稿，他在多數的情況都會刊登，只有個別有問題的文章，楊才會告知林不會刊登。控方遂展示於報紙論壇版刊出了的文章〈一國兩制：香港在做 台灣在看〉，日期為2020年1月23日。</p> -<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Pc3NTKI.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 劉夢熊</p> -<p><strong>Alexander Palmer</strong> is an associate fellow in the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p>Seth G. Jones and Alexander PalmerChina’s defense industrial base is moving to a wartime footing, while the United States is largely in a peacetime stance. Absent urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities against China and other competitors.【黎智英案・審訊第卅八日】2024-03-05T12:00:00+08:002024-03-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-38<ul> - <li>楊清奇：國安法後專欄作者擔心紅線「唔知點樣劃」，部份認為替蘋果撰文風險特別高</li> - <li>楊清奇指日本專欄作家文句不通、立場矛盾 嘆「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」</li> -</ul> +<p>楊確認在2019至2021年之間，由上司給予的散稿，包括劉夢熊的文章，都需要符合3個主要原則，即「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。他覺得這亦符合黎的觀點，「因為啲高層都好清楚黎先生嘅觀點嘅。」不過劉的文章很少出現在論壇版。</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="楊清奇指收到李柱銘朋友投稿-後來刊於論壇版">楊清奇指收到李柱銘朋友投稿 後來刊於論壇版</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uGtwz92.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>控方續展示2020年4月23日由林文宗傳送給楊清奇的訊息，指「馬丁」的朋友有篇文章想在論壇版刊登，原稿題為〈江菁名言——主席叫我咬誰就咬誰〉，作者署名是「牧民」。楊問林：「作者係乜身份？」林回覆「問吓」。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（5日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第38日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。庭上提到，專欄作家古德明在2020年7月6日發表文章〈「國安法」下，唯有擱筆〉，楊指很多專欄作家和自由撰稿人「都擔心《國安法》嗰條紅線唔知點樣劃嘅」，又指「有啲作者覺得同《蘋果日報》寫，風險特別高嘅」，所以後來黎要求邀請北京的人和知道中共權鬥內情的人撰文，「咁啲作者都話風險好高，唔敢寫。」</p> +<p>楊指訊息中的「馬丁」就是民主黨創黨主席李柱銘（Martin Lee）。楊指一般情況下，他會問作者是否願意披露真實身份，如果不願意的話，就會介紹該作者為「自由撰稿人」。楊記得林文宗最後並未有回覆「牧民」的身份，所以就視他為不願意披露真實身份。</p> -<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇第二天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NKnEZCr.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 李柱銘</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Sj9wRpQ.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> +<p>楊另指，原稿標題的「江菁」寫錯，他記得有替他改為「江青」。控方遂展示最後刊登於《蘋果》論壇版的文章，標題改為〈「主席叫我咬誰就咬誰」〉，作者是「牧民 自由撰稿人」。</p> -<h4 id="訊息顯示黎智英提出楊清奇替twitter供稿-予每月1萬元報酬">訊息顯示黎智英提出楊清奇替Twitter供稿 予每月1萬元報酬</h4> +<h4 id="楊清奇指李柱銘文章強調法治堅持一國兩制原本解釋-曾對國安法表示擔心">楊清奇指李柱銘文章強調法治、堅持一國兩制原本解釋 曾對國安法表示擔心</h4> -<p>2020年5月25日，黎向楊傳送訊息：「李平兄，以律師談過每月從我私人戶口支付一萬天（元）給我作為供 Twitter 報酬」、「小心些是可以的，我將每月安排付款給你。謝謝。」楊當時回覆：「謝謝」，之後又說「卑職自當盡力，共擔輿論之責」。</p> +<p>楊清奇指李柱銘本來在《壹週刊》有專欄，但《壹週刊》不再出版實體版之後，陳沛敏便告訴他，李連同另外3個作家的專欄會轉移到《蘋果》論壇版，惟他不知道背後由誰決定。而李的專欄文章每逢星期三刊出，直至《蘋果》停運。控方遂展示刊出於2020年5月20日，由李柱銘撰寫的文章，題為〈法治興亡 匹夫有責〉。</p> -<p>楊解釋，黎早前向他提及過，若他替黎的 Twitter 供稿，可以每月獲得1萬元報酬，他後來有按照黎的指示供稿，「不過後來一分錢都冇畀過嘅。」</p> +<p>楊指在2019至2021年期間，李柱銘的寫作角度是「比較強調法治」，「而且係比較堅持一國兩制原本嘅解釋，佢曾經係基本法起草委員會成員。」楊又指：「我印象中，佢對《國安法》係表示過擔心嘅」，不過相關文章實在太多，所以記不起細節。</p> -<p>控方問「共擔輿論之責」是什麼意思。楊指黎之前提及過，開設 Twitter 是為了加強自己和《蘋果》的影響力，因而影響輿論，「啫係我供稿，就承擔輿論之責嘅。」</p> +<p>楊早前證供指黎智英、陳沛敏和他曾經於2016年討論過《蘋果》論壇版的作者名單，他今在庭上表示醒起李柱銘出現在當時的名單上。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英替外媒撰文-不時查問資料">楊清奇：黎智英替外媒撰文 不時查問資料</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EpwtBuk.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> -<p>控方續指，2020年5月29日黎向楊傳送一則語音訊息，黎向楊稱：「習近平呢佢嘅鴻圖大業呢⋯⋯佢就有一路一帶啦，2025年啦⋯⋯嗰個就叫做科技乜鬼嘢啦吓」、「你睇睇佢有冇佢啲鴻圖大計啲計劃，可唔可以寫一寫畀我呀？因為我寫緊稿。」</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指胡志偉寫作角度支持抗爭支持制裁林鄭">楊清奇指胡志偉寫作角度「支持抗爭，支持制裁林鄭」</h4> -<p>楊指黎會替外媒撰文，不時會找他搜尋資料，他記得黎曾要求提供關於中共權鬥和南韓光州運動的資料，黎撰寫關於《國安法》文章的時候也有詢問過他。</p> +<p>控方續展示時任民主黨主席胡志偉的文章〈中港走回文革與冷戰之路〉，刊登日期為2020年5月28日。楊指胡是自由撰稿人，有時他會自己投稿，有時則是由他邀請胡撰文，就一些新聞作出回應，而這篇文章是胡投稿的。被問到胡的寫作角度，楊指：「佢係支持抗爭，支持制裁林鄭嘅。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KHA7jVn.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> +<p>控方指上述胡志偉文章的網上版有一張美術設計圖，可見國家主席習近平一臉猙獰，雙手正在摧毀地球，上面有香港的地圖。圖上引述文篇內容：「『習近平新獨裁時代』只是錯判形勢，只會將香港與中國拉回文革與冷戰的回頭路，內鬥外戰可達數十年計，人命經濟損失難以估算。」楊指這幅圖片是他當時找美術組同事畫的。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇曾提出邀請高瑜撰文-但不符合黎智英要求-故最後未有執行">楊清奇：曾提出邀請高瑜撰文 但不符合黎智英要求 故最後未有執行</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WQhsojh.png" alt="image07" /> +▲ 胡志偉</p> -<p>控方續展示2020年6月12日的訊息，楊向黎稱：「老闆，已找北京高瑜、南方都市報前主筆長平，為英文版撰寫即時評論，具體安排我再同盧峯傾。」黎其後表示：「李平，盡量多找有份量有內幕消息的人寫，不只是感想而是有寫（內）情的。謝謝。」</p> +<p>時任總編輯羅偉光與楊清奇之間的訊息紀錄顯示，羅於2020年11月18日轉發胡志偉的文章檔案給楊，並指這是胡的離職感言。楊庭上表示當時胡仍然是立法會議員，有份審理初選案的法官李運騰聞言問，在2020年11月18日的時候，胡志偉是否仍然擔任立法會議員。楊其後表示不肯定。</p> -<p>楊解釋，訊息中提及的高瑜是一名北京學者，他當時找了高瑜撰稿，但是黎並不滿意，因為他想有作者可以寫中共權鬥內情，而不是感想。被問到最後有否聯絡高瑜，楊表示沒有，因為黎要求有撰寫內幕的作者，而不是評論，所以最後沒有聯絡高瑜。</p> +<h4 id="國安法生效後宣布擱筆-楊清奇指古德明對獨裁政治侵犯人權比較批判">國安法生效後宣布擱筆 楊清奇指古德明對獨裁政治、侵犯人權比較批判</h4> -<p>控方問高瑜會用真名還是筆名寫作。楊指高瑜有時用真名，有時用筆名，但他不記得筆名是什麼。評論角度方面，楊指高瑜會評論中國的新聞，「佢係資深嘅傳媒人嚟嘅，所以評論會中立啲。」控方又問長平是誰。楊指從訊息可見他是《南方都市報》前主筆，與高瑜差不多，都是資深的傳媒人。楊又指，以他理解，黎應該認識高瑜，但他不肯定黎是否認識長平。</p> +<p>控方另提及專欄作家古德明，他在2020年7月6日發表文章〈「國安法」下，唯有擱筆〉。楊指古除了替《蘋果》論壇版撰文之外，也有為副刊寫專欄文章，但是他宣布「擱筆」之後，就沒有再替論壇版撰文。</p> -<p>被問到最後有否跟盧峯（前英文版主筆馮偉光）商討，楊表示沒有，「因為黎生已經否定咗我請其他寫稿嘅人。」</p> +<p>控方同樣問及古德明的寫作角度，楊形容：「佢嘅文章係比較特別，通常係以古諷今，咁對獨裁政治、對於侵犯人權事件都係比較批判嘅。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/S8EUZ3H.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》英文版主筆 馮偉光，筆名「盧峯」</p> +<p>控方另展示新聞工作者林海於2020年9月1日刊登於《蘋果》論壇版的文章，題為〈兩個8.31〉，是關於2019年8月31日太子站事件及2014年8月31日全國人大常委會通過「8.31決定」，就普選方案「落閘」。楊表示最初邀請林海撰文的人是他自己，林是自由撰稿人，大約每一至兩星期撰文一次。至於林的寫作角度，楊形容：「都係支持抗爭，同埋支持制裁。」</p> -<h4 id="訊息顯示楊清奇提供六四新聞給黎智英於twitter發布">訊息顯示楊清奇提供六四新聞給黎智英於Twitter發布</h4> +<p>控方又展示台灣學者林宗弦（Lin Thung Hong）的文章〈攬炒港人，北京輸掉全世界？〉，以黎智英被警察帶走的新聞相片作為配圖，刊登在台灣《蘋果》網站。該文章其後被翻譯成英文，並在香港《蘋果》英文版刊登。楊指林宗弦並沒有替香港《蘋果》的論壇版撰寫過文章。</p> -<p>控方展示2020年6月4日的訊息對話，黎說：「李平，看今天6.4是否（有）些大陸新聞給我上 Twitter. 謝謝。」楊其後回覆：「有兩樣，抗命軍長遺憾未留文字及天安門死難者家屬拜祭，畀咗 Simon」，黎回覆：「好。謝謝。」</p> +<p>案件下周一續審。</p> -<p>楊解釋，黎要求他提供新聞在 Twitter 發布，他找到相關新聞後，便傳送給負責管理該帳戶的李兆富（Simon Lee）。控方續展示同日兩則黎的 Twitter 帖文，分別關於當年拒絕執行清場任務命令的解放軍軍長徐勤先，以及天安門母親拜祭受難子女。</p> +<hr /> -<p>楊確認上述帖文與他提供給黎的資料有關，又提到：「呢個係天安門母親，佢哋每年六四都會拜祭佢哋仔女嘅。」</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇指李柱銘文章比較強調法治、胡志偉則支持抗爭和制裁林鄭【黎智英案・審訊第四十日】2024-03-07T12:00:00+08:002024-03-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-40<ul> + <li>楊清奇指黎智英慷慨向員工派股票 但用人「殘忍」頻換高層</li> + <li>楊清奇指專欄文「擦邊」避國安法 例如諷刺官說不怕制裁如「夜行吹哨」</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="楊清奇李怡年紀大減文章數目-黎智英要求邀劉細良增加稿量-角度支持民主派">楊清奇：李怡年紀大減文章數目 黎智英要求邀劉細良增加稿量 角度支持民主派</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>控方又展示時任總編輯羅偉光與楊清奇之間的訊息對話。2020年5月13日羅問楊是否認識「沈月」，因為黎智英提到「沈月」；楊則指不認識，只認識「呂月」，其真實身份是高瑜。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tpCpgod.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wAYa6Fa.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》總編輯 羅偉光</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（7日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第40日審訊，繼續由前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。他解釋遵從黎智英指示是因為對方是個「慷慨又殘忍」的老闆，黎在蘋果股票上市時會向員工派股票，令早前部分高層成為「千萬、億萬富翁」，但若黎認為員工不合心意，「好快就換人」，他任職23年期間，單是社長和總編輯已各換7至8人。他又指示黎智英對新聞要求是「求新求變」，最簡單直接的方法，就是「換人去做」。</p> -<p>2020年5月31日，羅偉光向楊傳送一段關焯照的英文簡介，叫楊詢問關焯照認為是否可以，楊其後轉述關指可以。訊息顯示關焯照是冠域商業及經濟研究中心主任。楊解釋，關焯照在論壇版有專欄，楊相信羅偉光將關的文章翻譯成英文，然後刊登在英文版網站，所以楊將作者簡介的英文版本傳送給關，而關認為可以。</p> +<p>楊清奇提及黎智英與其他高層有時會就論壇版專欄作家名單變動提出建議。法官李運騰問及黎在《蘋果》有否職位，楊表示沒有，他解釋仍聽從指示的原因，是印象中「黎先生係個慷慨老闆，又係一個殘忍嘅老闆」，說是「慷慨」是因為蘋果在股票上市和分拆網上版時，黎向員工派股票，「造就咗早期一啲高層管理層，成為千萬富翁，或億萬富翁。」</p> -<p>同日，羅偉光另傳送政治評論人劉細良的英文簡介給楊，同樣叫楊詢問劉意見；楊之後回覆劉表示可以。楊庭上指劉是《蘋果》論壇版的專欄作家之一，「劉細良都係支持民主派嘅」，已故作家李怡當時表示年紀大，不能夠每日寫一篇稿，所以黎智英透過副社長陳沛敏和楊，邀請劉每周寫多兩篇，最後亦有執行到。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/A3ka7wS.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/d44JJB5.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<h4 id="搖大樹換人-想留在蘋果須做好本份">「搖大樹」換人 想留在蘋果須做好本份</h4> -<h4 id="蓬佩奧會見王丹等六四倖存者-總編要求楊清奇找作者正面評論分析該會面">蓬佩奧會見王丹等六四倖存者 總編要求楊清奇找作者正面評論分析該會面</h4> +<p>楊表示形容黎智英「殘忍」是「誇張咗啲，但佢用人用到盡嘅」，若遇到員工「唔啱佢心意，好快就換人」，在他任職《蘋果》23年期，他記得總編緝換了7至8個人，社長亦相同。楊又指黎智英對新聞要求是「求新求變」，最簡單直方式是「換人去做」，又指黎智英會用「搖大樹」方法換人，若想在留在《蘋果》工作，必須聽從老闆指示，主動做好手頭工作。</p> -<p>2020年6月4日，羅偉光向楊提到時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧會見前學運領袖王丹等六四倖存者，以及表揚「天安門母親」，會作為當天評論節目「焦點燃論」的主題，並會持續跟進相關新聞，羅又要求楊幫忙找人撰寫評論和分析，稍後會翻譯及刊登於英文版。楊之後回覆「都係請中國版同樣搵林和立或夫子評。論壇版周五已約稿」。</p> +<p>就論壇版的文章，楊清奇確認分兩類，一類是「專欄作家」定期供稿，另一類是「自由撰稿人」。專欄作家有戴耀廷、李柱銘、Simon Lee、盧峯（馮偉光）、古立、劉細良、古德明、錢志健、安裕、潘小濤、蔡子強等。在2019年後，海外人士朱牧民、羅冠聰和旅美作家「一劍飄塵」等人亦有為《蘋果》供稿。</p> -<p>楊表示，不記得最後有否找到人撰寫評論和分析，他亦不知道羅的訊息背後是誰人的主意。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1OJHxJ7.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》英文版主筆馮偉光，筆名「盧峯」</p> -<p>當控方問到林和立是誰，楊突表示：「我覺得嗰兩個作者同案情無關嘅」，之後又說：「我係覺得呢兩個作者嘅身份，同呢個檢控無關」，因此認為不需要披露二人身份。控方則改口稱問題原意只是想問二人的寫作角度，而不是要求楊披露二人的真實身份或筆名。</p> +<h4 id="李官不明控方為何不停兜圈旁敲">李官不明控方為何不停兜圈旁敲</h4> -<p>楊遂指，林和立及夫子都是比較資深的中國問題專家，「佢哋嘅評論都係比較中立」，並且有固定專欄。至於楊的訊息「專欄安裕李怡關焯照都唔啱」，他解釋因為以上3人都不是六四相關範疇的作家。</p> +<p>控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤向楊展示多張他與其他《蘋果》高層的 WhatsApp 對話，內容提及如何安排刊登朱牧民和羅冠聰的文章，又提及他負責的周六「每周熱話」專題版如何選材。張卓勤問楊，黎智英有沒有指示專題版內容需要與暴動、示威或制裁有關。辯方反對問題，法官李運騰同意問題具引導性，指控方若有黎智英指示楊的 WhatsApp 截圖，何不直接出示，不解控方為何不停兜圈。</p> -<p>羅偉光其後訊息稱：「請你幫我搵人寫一篇正面評價此會面及分析，可網上論壇，我主要是翻譯做英文」，楊其後稱「潘小濤寫3點半交稿」。楊將潘的文章傳送給羅之後，羅表示「用蓬佩奧相」。楊確認「正面評價此會面」是指篷佩奧和王丹等人的會面，他亦確認後來有找潘小濤撰文，同事翻譯好文章後，會同時在《蘋果》中文版和英文版網站刊出。</p> +<p>張卓勤稱是希望法官能更「熟悉」論壇版的事件，李官直接向楊問，在2019年至2021年期間，就版面選材事宜，有否曾收到高層指示。楊清奇顯出不耐煩，說：「你個問題，我𢲷到頭都爆」，因為控方不停考他記憶。張卓勤改問一個發生2019年12月24日的 WhatsApp 對話，一個關於「林鄭向落選區議員派公職」的周六專題，是否由高層指示撰寫，楊表示該專題是他和同事決定。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>pic.twitter.com/W6ATJykhre — Secretary Pompeo (@SecPompeo) June 3, 2020</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CG0uWvW.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇稱馮偉光按照黎智英主意營運英文版-包括關心香港人權狀況">楊清奇稱馮偉光按照黎智英主意營運英文版 包括關心香港人權狀況</h4> +<h4 id="楊不滿問題考記憶-笑謂背唐詩宋詞更易">楊不滿問題考記憶 笑謂背唐詩宋詞更易</h4> -<p>控方指，2020年6月馮偉光重新入職《蘋果日報》，擔任英文版主筆，而昨日楊作供時提到二人的辦公室房間相鄰，會不時傾談，控方問馮有否談及英文版事宜。楊則指：「佢（馮）係比較專業嘅人，佢唔會干涉我嘅論壇版，我亦唔會干涉佢嘅英文版」，並指二人獨立工作。</p> +<p>李官插問，在2019至2021年期間的周六專題，其中有否由高層指示題材？楊清奇謂道：「又係考記憶力嘅問題，我背幾百首唐詩宋詞畀你仲易。」他續指，專題選材是「互動」的，有時由他提出建議，有時由同事食飯傾計時提出，不過議題大多包括最熱門的話題，就當時而言，制裁、社會事件和《國安法》都會包括在內。他又補充自己未曾被要求更改主題，認為反映選材符合黎智英的要求。</p> -<p>控方又問，馮有否按照黎在飯局中提出的主意去營運英文版。楊稱：「我睇到係有」，以他對英文版的觀察，「的確係關心香港嘅人權狀況嘅。」控方追問英文版有否任何關於中國內地的內容，楊則表示「唔係好肯定」，而他只負責將論壇版的文章傳送給馮，至於揀選文章和翻譯工作則由馮負責。</p> +<p>控方其後觸及在《國安法》實施後，他負責的論壇版在選材和挑選投稿時有否改變運作方式。楊清奇表示沒有收到黎智英的指示要求改變《蘋果》立場，他認為意思是繼續支持制裁，他個人撰寫的評論保持相同立場。但由於任何人公開呼籲制裁，將會觸犯《國安法》，「作為一個編緝，唔想佢觸犯《國安法》，又要保持原本立場，咁喺寫作時要作出啲變化」，即改成「打擦邊球」。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指專欄作家擔心國安法嗰條紅線唔知點樣劃嘅">楊清奇指專欄作家「擔心《國安法》嗰條紅線唔知點樣劃嘅」</h4> +<h4 id="擦邊球翻譯一度惹來笑聲">「擦邊球」翻譯一度惹來笑聲</h4> -<p>專欄作家古德明在2020年7月6日撰寫文章〈「國安法」下，唯有擱筆〉，並宣布暫停《蘋果》的專欄。同日，羅向楊傳送訊息：「真係唔寫？」、「咁大壓力？」、「我叫同事寫段新聞」；楊確認古德明不再寫專欄文章，又指：「依家都冇乜來稿，正周圍搵人。請幫手介紹啲」、「都係唔好出新聞，費事嚇親其他作者」；羅則回覆：「唔寫大家都睇到喎，你今日在公司？」</p> +<p>他解釋不論在寫作和挑選文章，他都不再公開呼籲制裁，但會通過評論裁制事件，分析「下一個制裁方法嚴重性」，他認為可以表示繼續表達出支持制裁的立場。</p> -<p>楊表示，因為很多專欄作家和自由撰稿人「都擔心《國安法》嗰條紅線唔知點樣劃嘅」，他當時亦提議不要報導古德明擱筆一事，以免使其他人擔心，惟羅認為：「佢（古德明）都寫咗出嚟，大家都睇到，唔需要迴避啦。」</p> +<p>至於挑選「公開投稿」的標準，楊清奇表示要視乎文章能否回應社會事件或政治新聞，亦要判斷文章是否符合《蘋果》讀者的口味，例如支持反修例運動和支持制裁。他認為黎智英撰寫的專欄文章持相同觀點，並視之為他寫稿的「指引」。</p> -<p>楊其後在同日訊息中稱：「唉，啲人話到明唔敢幫蘋果寫」、「肥佬一直要我搵多啲北京人寫，人哋真係唔敢。稿酬又唔吸引😂」。楊庭上解釋，「有啲作者覺得同《蘋果日報》寫，風險特別高嘅」，所以後來黎要求邀請北京的人和知道中共權鬥內情的人撰文，「咁啲作者都話風險好高，唔敢寫。」</p> +<p>就「擦邊球」的翻釋，庭上發生一段小插曲，出身葡籍法律世家的李素蘭法官不理解「擦邊球」意思，更一度反問：「ball?」楊清奇表示可以簡單概括，《國安法》畫的紅線（red line）「大家當時都係估估下，我打出呢個波，又唔想打出界變成犯法（go beyond the line）」，於是他就打在邊界上（land at the line），舉例網球、羽毛球也有邊界位。李運騰法官其後提議可意譯做「skirt the line（擦邊）」或「playing in grey area（遊走在灰色地帶）」，楊認同意思正確。</p> -<p>楊又指，上述訊息與他昨日提到黎指示多邀約海外作者撰文相關，因為《國安法》生效之後，本地作者擔心風險會很高，但海外作者則有較少顧忌。控方問到，海外作者是否包括北京的作者。楊則指：「通常海外作者唔包括北京嘅。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AEk7y6K.png" alt="image05" /></p> -<h4 id="楊清奇以黎文章觀點作為揀選評論文章的方針">楊清奇：以黎文章觀點作為揀選評論文章的「方針」</h4> +<p>【獨媒報導】蘋果案第40日審訊，下午續審，《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇續以「從犯證人」作供，他提及多名專欄作者的寫作立場，例如戴耀廷在2019年時支持抗爭，其後發動初選；區家麟對國安法持批評態度；李怡的政治取向「激進」，從支持抗爭和反對《國安法》，其觀點都非常鮮明，甚至在《國安法》實施後仍在評論文章支持制裁。法官李運騰質疑，為何他容許刊登支持制裁的文章，楊表示李怡用「擦邊球」方式，例如諷刺被制裁的中港官員，聲稱不怕制裁，卻如「夜行人吹口哨」。</p> -<p>控方另展示楊清奇與張劍虹之間的訊息，張在2020年8月3日向楊說：「清奇，政府通緝多名海外人士，說他們違反國安法，如果他們來稿，我們也不方便付稿費。內容當然也按按原定方針把關」，楊回覆「收到🙏」。</p> +<p>代表控方的助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤向楊清奇展示他與陳沛敏的 WhatsApp 對話，其中一句提及「聖旨」一詞，張卓勤問是代表黎智英指示論壇版的主題，楊清奇表示不是，主題通常在逢周二的策劃會決定。他又指專欄寫手有如「專家」，有自己的立場，通常他不會定出角度，而是「由佢哋發揮」。</p> -<p>楊解釋，張當時指若果《蘋果》向海外被通緝人士給予稿費，就代表《蘋果》支持他們，所以即使日後收到他們的稿，也不會給予稿費。惟楊補充：「不過始終冇收到海外人士嘅稿嘅。」</p> +<h4 id="黎智英讚區家麟評論文章好">黎智英讚區家麟評論文章好</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Q9jyBKx.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> +<p>張卓勤轉為問資深傳媒人區家麟與《蘋果》的關係，並展示2020年4月19日的一個對話截圖，黎智英稱讚「李平，區家麟文章好，請考慮邀寫評論版，謝謝。黎」。楊清奇表示區家麟本來已是副刊版的其中一名專欄作家，黎智英意思是邀請區再在A疊的論壇版再寫文章。他相信黎智英看中區家麟的文筆流暢，加上對《國安法》持批評態度。</p> -<p>控方追問，若然收到海外人士來稿，會交由誰人負責。楊則指，因為沒有收到他們的稿件，所以很難說得出交給哪個部門負責。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mlSVSLu.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 區家麟</p> -<p>控方又問，張訊息中提到的「原定方針」是關於什麼。楊則指張並未有在訊息中說明，但是《國安法》生效之後，楊留意到黎在個人專欄裡多次提到《國安法》，「從編輯嘅角度嚟睇，我覺得有啲標題係好好嘅」，令他印象深刻，例如「時間就是武器」、「大時代快將來臨」。楊續指，「大家都知道，黎先生嘅文章，係冇人夠膽改佢嘅，咁呢啲文章我覺得好真實咁反映到佢嘅睇法」，其中有提及制裁的問題，不過黎認為美國和西方國家對中國的制裁不會緩和下來，「因為美國對華政策嘅調整呢，短時間內係唔會逆轉嘅，咁美國嘅制裁對中國嘅經濟影響係好深遠嘅」，因此他覺得黎的文章所述觀點，便是他揀選評論文章的方針，他亦認為「原定方針」可以如此理解。</p> +<p>控方展示區家麟數篇撰寫的評論，包括〈摧毀即貫幑 攬炒即繁榮〉，〈2020香港新詞〉、〈穿官袍戴假髮演一台爛戲〉、〈「煽動」作為一種法律武器〉。張卓勤稱，似乎大部份區的文章都獲得版面上方位置，是否有任何特別含意，楊表示很難一概而論，要視乎文章當日「質量」。</p> -<p>楊又指，譬如2019年反修例運動期間，「咁都喺黎先生嘅文章度睇到一啲原則嘅」，因他的專欄文章逢星期日刊登，「當時嗰啲大規模遊行示威都喺星期日，所以黎生嘅文章好多時都好直接呼籲人去上街」，因此楊揀選評論文章和撰寫社評時，都會以鼓勵人上街示威為主題。</p> +<h4 id="戴耀廷2021年初停供稿">戴耀廷2021年初停供稿</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SrdrDL1.png" alt="image08" /></p> +<p>至於戴耀廷，楊表示在他接手論壇版前，戴已經是《蘋果》的專欄作家，他不知道最初由誰邀請戴寫文章。張卓勤問戴耀廷寫文角度是什麼，楊表示戴在2019年「主要支持抗爭嘅」，後來他「發動咗初選」，撰寫多篇文章都與初選有關。在2021年1月15日，他獲時任執行總編林文宗告之，戴暫時不能為論壇版供稿，他估計是戴當時因為初選案被捕，他透過港聞記者轉達。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（5日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第38日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。庭上談及日本專欄作家高橋，楊直指他的中文不時有問題，例如在訊息中把前美國總統特朗普說成是「已死總統」。楊又指高橋的立場矛盾，一方面聲稱「港臺日民眾要正對大陸，否則咱們不知不覺中被中共吞掉」，但同時認為日本提出制裁「都係做吓 show、冇用嘅」。楊慨嘆儘管作者文句不通，但是「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IJlQlWK.png" alt="image07" /> +▲ 戴耀廷</p> -<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第二天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> +<p>控方再問有關李怡的政治立場，楊表示李怡「政治取向係激進啲，從支持抗爭，到反對《國安法》，佢嘅觀點都好鮮明嘅」，他又形容李怡是一名資深評論員，且「黎先生好欣賞佢嘅」。他又指李怡即使在《國安法》實施後，文章的取態仍是支持制裁。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英要求邀請馬鐵穎撰寫評論文章">楊清奇指黎智英要求邀請馬鐵穎撰寫評論文章</h4> +<h4 id="黎智英指新冠是中共史上最大挑戰">黎智英指新冠是中共史上最大挑戰</h4> -<p>控方展示2020年9月14日的訊息紀錄，黎智英向楊說：「李平，今日看左丁山專欄講到一位評論專家馬鐵穎，說他的中國和日本評論有料到，是否請他為我們寫評論版。謝謝。」楊庭上解釋，左丁山的專欄既不在評論版也不在「蘋論」刊登，而是在副刊。楊指黎的訊息重點是要求他找馬鐵穎撰寫文章供論壇版刊登。</p> +<p>法官李運騰質疑，為何楊清奇容許支持制裁的文章刊登在《蘋果》？楊表示李怡寫文章的手法是「打擦邊球」，例如一篇題為「夜行人吹口哨」的文章，李怡諷刺被制裁的中港官員，他們覺得自己不怕制裁，但就如夜行人吹口哨。李官問道，這就是他認為是「擦邊球」原因？楊確認是。</p> -<p>被問到馬鐵穎的寫作角度，楊指黎在訊息中形容馬的評論「有料到」，可能是指馬的評論比較尖銳，或者是有時「爆料」、揭露內幕消息，而當時黎很重視中共內幕資料，因此估計黎覺得馬是合適人選。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RSgyd0I.png" alt="image08" /> +▲ 李怡（已歿）</p> -<p>楊當時回覆黎：「張劍虹已搵咗日本資深記者甘粕代三撰文，返（逢）周三出。」、「馬鐵穎，我再搵下佢，睇點安排。」楊解釋，甘粕代三是一名日本資深記者，時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹將甘粕代三的聯絡資料，透過時任副社長陳沛敏交給他，並要求他讓甘粕代三撰寫專欄，每星期有固定字數。楊確認「甘粕代三」是日本作家高橋的筆名，因為黎想找日本記者寫日本的評論，而「黎生畀我嘅指示一定要執行」，所以他當時回覆黎會作安排。</p> +<p>控方又展示一段黎智英向楊清奇傳送的一段長訊息，黎提及自己對 COVID-19 的看法，他表示「這可能是中共有史以來最大的挑戰」，提及「武漢 coronavirus 事件」引起人們對中共的恐慌，「只相信無論政府說什麼都是假的，沒有說的才是真實，那種無助感使人向最壞處想像，原本可控制的最後都失控，都只因為失信」。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎要求多邀請海外作者-故游說中央黨校教授蔡霞撰文">楊清奇指黎要求多邀請海外作者 故游說中央黨校教授蔡霞撰文</h4> +<h4 id="控方叫楊清奇演譯黎智英想法-法官感驚訝">控方叫楊清奇演譯黎智英想法 法官感驚訝</h4> -<p>楊向黎傳送另一段訊息，指：「轉一段中央黨校教授蔡霞講你同蘋果的對話畀你聽下。正繼續遊說她撰文」，並轉發一段來自蔡霞的語音訊息。楊解釋，蔡霞稱讚《蘋果》的文有正義感，亦留意到《蘋果》很有影響力，「我記得佢講過啲市民為咗支持《蘋果》，《蘋果》啲股價可以一日升到好高嘅。」楊又指，之所以遊說蔡霞撰文，是因為黎要求他多邀請海外作者，雖然黎未有特別指明邀請哪些作者，但楊有見蔡當時已在美國定居，所以便透過朋友聯絡到蔡，邀請她寫文章。</p> +<p>張卓勤問楊清奇，黎智英用「武漢 coronavirus」一詞，是否反映黎對事件看法，法官李素蘭驚訝表示控方怎可以這樣提問，張即尷尬示意「可能是因為下午（maybe because of afteroon）」，改為問其後見報版本，有沒有任何修改，楊清奇表示黎智英在其撰寫的評論曾用「武漢冠狀病毒流感」一詞，不過楊認為意思重複，故他刪去「流感」兩字，後來基本上《蘋果日報》都採用「武漢肺炎」一詞。</p> -<p>控方問蔡霞是否符合黎要求的作者，楊確認，並指蔡是中央黨校教授，她到達美國之後，有批評中國的人權狀況，也有關注香港的狀況，「所以想黎生親自出面邀請」，因成功機會較高。</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p>訊息紀錄顯示，黎傳送了一段語音訊息，之後楊表示會轉發給蔡霞。庭上展示語音訊息謄本，黎向蔡稱：「謝謝你的美言，我們做香港人一定會鬥爭下去，這是我們的本份。」、「請你有時間為我們寫社評呀」、「我也很崇拜你的，希望你幫我們寫寫你對中國的看法，因為你對中國的了解是沒人跟你比拼的，謝謝你」。</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英作為老闆有權決定誰人撰寫社評">楊清奇指黎智英作為老闆有權決定誰人撰寫社評</h4> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇指黎智英慷慨向員工派股票 但用人「殘忍」頻換高層 楊清奇指專欄文「擦邊」避國安法 例如諷刺官說不怕制裁如「夜行吹哨」War Clouds Over India?2024-03-06T12:00:00+08:002024-03-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/war-clouds-over-india<p><em>While wars elsewhere hold the world’s attention, a new conflict may be on the cards along the Line of Actual Control between India and China in Eastern Ladakh.</em></p> -<p>控方問為何黎會請蔡霞撰寫「社評」，楊則指黎是想邀請蔡撰寫評論文章，但可能講錯為「社評」，「當然黎生係老闆，佢有權決定邊個寫社評」，又指顏純鈎也是經過黎的「提名」之後，可以撰寫《蘋果》社評，張劍虹亦有通知他。</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>法官李運騰問到，就顏純鈎撰寫社評一事，為何張劍虹要通知楊？楊指因為他撰寫社評的時間要調整，本來他負責星期二和五的社評，但是顏想寫星期五的社評，所以「我就變成要寫星期六嘅」。</p> +<p>India is in China’s crosshairs. As the Russia–Ukraine War in Eastern Europe and the Israel–Gaza War in West Asia enter their respective endgames, the inevitable question that arises is: “Where will the next war be?” If Taiwan comes to mind, think again. The second China–India War will most likely be fought in Eastern Ladakh in India’s far northwest region sometime between 2025 and 2030.</p> -<p>控方指，黎於2020年12月被捕、被起訴及還柙，問楊會如何形容此後張劍虹的角色。楊指黎還柙之後，張是「最高負責人」，不單只在經營方面，也在《蘋果日報》、網上版和英文版上，「所有出版都係喺佢監督之下啦」，至於在黎還柙之前，則是由黎負責這個監督角色。</p> +<p>Eastern Ladakh refers to the area of the Indian union territory of Ladakh currently under the administrative control of the Government of India that lies east of the Indus River and west of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates it from the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, held by Beijing since the first China-India War of 1962. Eastern Ladakh is of critical geostrategic importance for China and India from the perspective of each country’s vital national interests. The driver for China is energy security, while for India it is territorial integrity. The 2025–2030 timeframe represents the optimum window of opportunity for China and the maximum period of vulnerability for India, reflecting the significant asymmetric balance of power in favour of China. Absent a modus vivendi between these two nuclear-armed adversaries, conventional war (and the spectre of nuclear war) will be impossible to avoid.</p> -<h4 id="張劍虹查問高橋為何稱要停專欄-楊清奇反指高橋中文有問題">張劍虹查問高橋為何稱要停專欄 楊清奇反指高橋中文有問題</h4> +<h3 id="through-chinese-spectacles">Through Chinese Spectacles</h3> -<p>控方展示2020年12月13日張劍虹傳送給楊的訊息：「主筆，高橋先生說他在論壇的稿要停？是否寫得太密或什麼原因？」；楊回覆：「他說要停嗎？未同我講」；張說：「他是說你是不是想停他專欄，我說我不知道。」</p> +<p>Beijing views Eastern Ladakh through the lens of energy security. China’s political, economic and military power is inextricably intertwined with its energy security, given its heavy dependence on oil and gas imports. Eastern Ladakh is the only pathway from which a hostile power can launch an attack to invade and occupy Kashgar, China’s crucial energy entrepot in the far Western province of Xinjiang. A vital pillar of China’s energy security is the planned land-based pipeline connecting Iran’s oil and gas fields to Kashgar, transiting through Pakistan via the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As the US Department of Defense (DoD) notes in its 2023 annual report on China, “through … projects associated with pipelines and port construction in Pakistan, it [China] seeks to become less reliant on transporting energy resources through strategic choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca”. The planned route of CPEC runs from the port city of Gwadar near the Pakistan–Iran border through the key city of Gilgit in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (also claimed by India) to the Khunjerab Pass, which is the sole transit point connecting Pakistan with China’s Kashgar terminus. It is likely to take at least a decade to complete the energy pipeline, by which time the DoD’s report suggests that China will no longer be dependent on maritime routes for its energy imports.</p> -<p>楊庭上提到，通常由黎和陳沛敏等高層指定的評論文章作者，「我會好小心去處理，好認真去跟進嘅」，否則「一有少少嘅問題，佢哋就直情去搵高層去投訴嘅，咁我就好被動嘅」。他續指，該次他與高橋之間有誤會，「佢嘅中文不時有問題，因為佢係日本人嚟嘅，啫係我哋會話『美國前總統特朗普』，佢就演繹成『美國已故總統』。」他又說：「咁同事都好辛苦，要同佢執清楚。」</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The harsh reality India faces is that for the foreseeable future, there will continue to be an asymmetric balance of power in favour of China</code></em></strong></p> -<p>楊提及另一次事件，他曾告訴高橋，「佢講太多歷史，讀者係唔想睇嘅，我希望佢轉主題，佢就同張劍虹先生投訴，話要停咗佢嘅專欄。」</p> +<p>If China’s energy security is to rely on land-based oil and gas pipelines connecting friendly energy producers to China, the pipelines must be outside the effective military reach of hostile powers. According to the DoD’s China report, the critical first phase of Beijing’s three-phase military modernisation programme is expected to be completed by 2027. From a military perspective, the most logical land route to seize Kashgar would be to march an expeditionary force along the road which runs from Kargil, on the Line of Control with Pakistan near the west bank of the Indus River in the Indian union territory of Ladakh, and cross into Pakistan-held Kashmir, proceeding via Skardu to Gilgit and then following the road connecting Gilgit to the Khunjerab Pass. Essentially, the invasion route would run through Pakistan-administered Kashmir, over which India claims sovereignty as the area was part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir when it acceded to India in October 1947. The only way China can prevent such a possible attack would be to pre-emptively wrest control of a strategically significant portion of Eastern Ladakh from India and to annex the seized territory and incorporate it into Aksai Chin. China’s success in encroaching on Indian-held positions along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh in May–June 2020, which incrementally nudged the LAC westward, is a preview of Beijing’s intentions.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指張劍虹重視日本於亞洲地位-要求給予高橋較高稿費">楊清奇指張劍虹重視日本於亞洲地位 要求給予高橋較高稿費</h4> +<h3 id="through-an-indian-veil">Through an Indian Veil</h3> -<p>楊指，黎在「飯盒會」上指示多找外國作者，「張劍虹先生可能覺得我嗰時進展唔好啦，所以親自搵咗一個日本記者為我哋寫稿」，張其後將高橋的聯絡方式給楊。</p> +<p>India’s perspective with respect to Eastern Ladakh is difficult to discern because it is shrouded in a veil weaved with strands of rhetorical posturing and cautious action. The official map of the union territory of Ladakh depicts the geographic scope of the claims asserted by India. The map is imaginary because it fails to reflect the actual facts on the ground that limit the area under India’s control. Moreover, the LAC exists purely in the eyes of the beholder, as it is not demarcated. The Indian government has not publicly published its perception of the LAC. India has made no attempt to recover Aksai Chin since the area was lost to China in 1962. Likewise, India has made no attempt to evict Chinese forces from the incremental encroachments in 2020 that were designed to shift the LAC westwards.</p> -<p>楊指，從張的訊息可見，「佢係好重視美國重返亞洲之後，嗰個日本嘅地位係好重要嘅，應該寫多啲日中關係、日本喺亞洲嘅地位。」楊又提到，張要求楊支付高橋較高稿費，正常的稿費是每一篇1,200元，但高橋的稿費調高至1,600元。</p> +<p>The harsh reality India faces is that for the foreseeable future, there will continue to be an asymmetric balance of power in favour of China. India is dependent on Russia for a majority of its imports of military equipment – a position that has prevailed for over half a century. In a war with China, India will not be able to rely on a military equipment lifeline from Moscow, given Russia’s growing dependence on China for its economic security. Moreover, reflecting the heavy burden of providing a continuous flow of military equipment and supplies to support Ukraine and Israel in their respective wars against Russia and Gaza, the US is unlikely to have the capacity to meet urgent Indian military requirements in the case of a war with China. The embryonic India–US strategic partnership is not expected to develop into a bilateral military security pact within the 2025–2030 timeframe. Crafting a pathway from mutually assured destruction to mutually assured survival is the ultimate challenge confronting New Delhi and Beijing.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指高橋文句不通-稱特朗普為已死總統嘆高層指定我用我都不得不用">楊清奇指高橋文句不通 稱特朗普為「已死總統」嘆「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」</h4> +<hr /> -<p>控方展示2020年12月10日高橋與楊清奇之間的訊息，高橋稱：「但我深信日府根本不會制裁林鄭等。你地知道日本這個太監國家，安保靠美，經濟靠中。加上打出強烈制裁的美國瘋總統已沒命，日本政府已開始跟拜登溝通，怎會聽已死總統命令。」</p> +<p><strong>Samir Tata</strong> is founder and president of International Political Risk Analytics, an advisory firm based in Reston, Virginia, USA.</p>Samir TataWhile wars elsewhere hold the world’s attention, a new conflict may be on the cards along the Line of Actual Control between India and China in Eastern Ladakh.【黎智英案・審訊第卅九日】2024-03-06T12:00:00+08:002024-03-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-39<ul> + <li>楊清奇呻遭顏純鈎投訴、張劍虹要求停盧峯專欄兼「當住同事面鬧我」</li> + <li>楊清奇指黎智英冀論壇版多元化 推薦建制派撰文 惟2018年後轉推薦激進作者</li> +</ul> -<p>楊庭上直指：「所以個問題就喺呢度，啲作者中文都唔通嘅」，但是「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」。</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="楊清奇指高橋立場矛盾認為日本制裁做吓show冇用嘅">楊清奇指高橋立場矛盾、認為日本制裁「做吓show、冇用嘅」</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LbgPOEV.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>訊息紀錄顯示楊當時回覆高橋，稱「你可以考慮評論有關新聞。但你的觀點恐怕難以被蘋果多數讀者認同。制裁不是已死總統的命令，是美國聲援港人」。高橋則回應：「不，特朗普只是說說而已，這松原仁也是。也可以專訪他。我覺得傳媒任務要分為兩種。當然要討好讀者，另一半要啟發。我特意寫港臺讀者逆耳的話題。但港臺日民眾要正對大陸，否則咱們不知不覺中被中共吞掉。」</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（6日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第39日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊指時任社長張劍虹要求暫停盧峯（馮偉光）的論壇版專欄，惟楊稱：「我唔係咁同意嘅。」楊又在庭上大呻，指張劍虹「後來仲叫我去佢辦公室，當住同事面鬧我嘅，嗰時就知道投訴嗰個人就係顏純鈎」。楊提到黎智英很欣賞顏純鈎，因此張劍虹重視顏的文章，因而要中止盧峯的專欄。楊指張後來安排顏所撰寫的《蘋果》社論數目，由每星期一篇增加至兩篇，加上張覺得楊「唔聽話」，所以將顏的專欄文章放在副刊，而不需要經楊管理。</p> -<p>楊解釋，「因為佢講話『日本制裁只係議員做 show』，咁我就話畀佢知，《蘋果日報》讀者應該比較認同制裁嘅，咁我都話制裁唔係『已死總統嘅命令』，而係聲援香港人。」</p> +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第三天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> -<p>楊又指：「佢自己好多時矛盾，講唔清楚」，例如高橋在訊息中稱「港臺日民眾要正對大陸，否則咱們不知不覺中被中共吞掉」，「但佢寫稿有時唔係咁嘅態度，啫係『日本都係做吓 show、冇用嘅』」，而且有時不是太認同《蘋果》取態，「啫我有時唔知係佢表達嘅問題，定係佢嘅立場係有矛盾。」</p> +<h4 id="群組國安法應變委員會截圖顯示-林文宗移除被捕高層">群組「國安法應變委員會」截圖顯示 林文宗移除被捕高層</h4> -<p>控方問及《蘋果》對於制裁的立場，楊指上述他向高橋提及的觀點，乃「同高層和讀者口味，都係一致」。楊指「高層」包括黎智英和張劍虹。</p> +<p>控方提到2021年6月17日，時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹等人被警方拘捕，而楊則於同月23日才被拘捕。控方展示「國安法應變委員會」的 Signal 群組截圖，顯示時任執行總編輯林文宗在6月17日移除了4人，包括時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹、副社長陳沛敏、總編輯羅偉光和動新聞平台總監張志偉，而該截圖是警方從楊的手機中發現。控方問楊為何會截圖，楊表示不記得。</p> -<h4 id="微調方向文件指蘋果受壓-故棄用某些字眼">「微調方向」文件指《蘋果》受壓 故棄用某些字眼</h4> +<p>楊又指，群組本來是在另一通訊軟件 WhatsApp ，成員包括高層和不同部門的主管，至於群組何時、為何移動至 Signal 則不記得。</p> -<p>控方指，警方在楊的電腦中發現一份題為「《蘋果》受壓 微調方向」的文件，當中提到時任警務處處長鄧炳強不點名批評《蘋果》，表示考慮以煽惑罪檢控傳媒，加上《文匯報》和《大公報》接連發表社論呼籲取締《蘋果》，《東方日報》亦要求調查壹傳媒股價異常波動，終於令《蘋果》受到壓力。</p> +<p>控方指，楊的手機另外儲存了一張黎的訊息截圖，內容是「李平兄，以律師談過每月從我私人戶口支付一萬天（元）給我作為供 Twitter 報酬小心些是可以的，我將每月安排付款給你。謝謝。」控方問到楊為何會替此訊息截圖，楊則指他曾經刪除與黎之間的訊息，「咁為咗方便睇返之前嘅訊息」，因為「嗰時覺得呢樣嘢有啲用」，所以便截圖。</p> -<p>文件第一點提到顏純鈎（筆名方圓）查詢可否使用「黑警」一詞，張劍虹則表示：「以目前時勢，黑警等字眼還是不用較好，並要求主筆李平把好關。」第二點提到羅偉光發出指令棄用「武漢肺炎」。第三點提到「員工士氣受挫」，有論壇版編輯提出辭職，因父母擔心其安全，而張劍虹只回應「盡力做」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5lfdCqR.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> -<p>楊供稱，這份文件是關於用字的調整，他通常不會修改來稿，所以要及時通知作者公司做法改變，讓他們在撰寫文章時自行修改字眼，而不需楊修改。楊指他只會把第一及第二點傳送給論壇版作者，但如果有人關心編輯政策，便會連同第三點傳送。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英不只一次將讀者來信轉交給他">楊清奇指黎智英不只一次將讀者來信轉交給他</h4> -<h4 id="楊清奇獲告知蘋果社論和報導棄用武漢肺炎">楊清奇獲告知《蘋果》社論和報導棄用「武漢肺炎」</h4> +<p>控方展示一封寄給黎智英的來信，信件是一篇手寫文章，題為「簡談習近平執政以來的風格」，欲投稿至「蘋果論壇」，署名是「自由撰稿人趙小華」。信件並附上黎手寫的便利貼，寫有「李平，我沒看過他的文章，請過目看是否有用，謝」。文章形容「中共邪惡政權」所發出的號角是「如此肆無忌憚」。</p> -<p>控方又展示副社長陳沛敏於2021年4月18日傳送給楊的訊息：「老總決定，今起報道不用『武肺』，因此社論也不用，論壇則作者自決。編輯會通知社論其他作者。」陳亦轉發時任總編輯羅偉光的訊息，稱：「各位，我打倒昨日的我：武漢肺炎這題 tag，即日起暫時唔用，水印亦唔用。以『最新疫情』、『疫苗接種』、『防疫措施』、『限聚措施』、『變種病毒』、『社區爆發』、『隱形傳播』呢幾個題 tag 代替。」</p> +<p>楊指黎透過秘書將該信件轉交給他，並確認後來有安排文章刊登在論壇版，但是他並未有通知黎，「因為佢睇報紙睇得好實嘅，如果有登，佢會睇到」，所以不需要通知黎。楊又指黎不只一次將來信轉交給他，不過頻率「好少嘅」，如果他閱畢文章覺得沒有問題，便會安排刊登。</p> -<p>楊解釋，因為海外作者未必緊貼香港新聞，如果他們問起用字，便可以向他們解釋。</p> +<p>控方展示另一封由讀者撰寫的來信，日期是2020年8月15日，附上黎手寫的便利貼：「李平，此讀者有關評論版意（見）值得參考！」楊指，這封信是黎交給他的，不過他認為「不論黎先生又好，個讀者又好，都係混淆咗一啲嘢嘅」，因信中提及的作者都是副刊專欄的作者，「我覺得佢講緊嘅唔係我嘅論壇版」，惟黎認為該讀者是談論「評論版」，因而轉交給他，所以他不知道該讀者意見是針對副刊還是論壇版。</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇指台蘋支持香港人抗爭及呼籲國際社會關注">楊清奇指台蘋支持香港人抗爭及呼籲國際社會關注</h4> -<h4 id="楊清奇指結束一黨專政在香港嗌咗幾十年惟大公報文章演繹為要推翻執政黨">楊清奇指「結束一黨專政」在香港「嗌咗幾十年」惟《大公報》文章演繹為要推翻執政黨</h4> +<p>控方展示張劍虹與楊清奇之間的訊息，張在2019年8月1日說：「台蘋論壇也找到一些逆權運動的不錯文章，我們也可以採用。我已經請台蘋社長跟偉光聯絡。請跟進」、「非常時期，有好文章多點版位也有需要。請文宗加人給你便可。謝謝」。</p> -<p>張劍虹於2021年4月21日向楊清奇傳送一張《大公報》文章截圖，當中指稱《蘋果》鼓吹顛覆國家政權，張問楊：「主筆，你印象中我們社評有寫過這些？」楊表示「國安法出台前可能有」，張覆道「出台前就不算違法」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6IIDuWL.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> -<p>楊認為當時張可能擔心社評觸犯《國安法》，不過他補充：「其實（《大公報》）文章入面有啲用詞係扭曲咗，例如『結束一黨專政』呢個口號，喺香港真係嗌咗幾十年，佢就演繹成為要推翻國家執政黨。」他又表示上述與張劍虹的對答反映他當時的理解，因為他理解《國安法》是沒有追溯力。</p> +<p>楊表示，張劍虹當時傳送上述訊息給他之前，其實他與羅偉光經已溝通過。他又呻：「論壇版係《蘋果》最細嘅部門，得我同另外一個同事，每日一個版已經係好辛苦」，因此張劍虹指如果要加版數便要增加人手，「不過好遺憾啦，張劍虹先生未睇過篇文章，就話有好文章就話要出。」楊又指林文宗並未有增加人手，因此論壇版一直都是每日一版，以及只有兩名編輯。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英獄中信提醒同事要小心啲">楊清奇指黎智英獄中信提醒同事「要小心啲」</h4> +<p>控方問及台灣《蘋果》的觀點，楊指：「一個係支持香港市民嘅抗爭，一個係呼籲國際社會關注。」</p> -<p>控方提到2021年5月舉行的《蘋果》員工大會，張劍虹在該次場合中發言。楊確認他當日亦在場，但會上討論並沒有直接觸及論壇版。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇稱會議較少談及論壇版-若黎智英或高層有指示必須聽從">楊清奇稱會議較少談及論壇版 若黎智英或高層有指示必須聽從</h4> -<p>羅偉光於2021年5月25日傳送訊息給楊：「黎生有來信，想直接給你看看。」控方問該封信內容是什麼。楊表示：「我記得佢（黎）有喺信中提醒同事要小心啲」，但不記得具體字眼。楊相信該信是寫給羅偉光，「可能羅偉光認為我負責論壇版要小心啲，所以畀我睇。」</p> +<p>控方談及《蘋果》日常運作的三個會議，包括「初會」、「鋤報會」、「編前會」，惟楊指他不一定每天出席三個會議。他又指理論上「鋤報會」上會談及所有版位，「但大家都知道論壇版係相對獨立嘅個人意見，所以鋤報會好少有人會去『鋤』論壇版嘅。」</p> -<p>控方遂向楊出示一份載有黎獄中信的文件，惟楊庭上閱讀文件後，表示它並非羅偉光給他看的那一封信，不過信中同樣有提到「要小心」。</p> +<p>至於每週舉行一次的「Planning會」，楊指是大家討論未來一星期的新聞如何籌劃，即使他未有出席該會議，他也會 WhatsApp 陳沛敏或林文宗以尋求指示。但事實上會議很少討論論壇版，楊指他會報告星期六論壇版有什麼主題，基本上他很少聽過其他部門主管給予意見，有時高層會給他指示。</p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/H7oeDTq.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> -<hr /> +<p>楊指，如果黎智英有指示的話，社長張劍虹、副社長陳沛敏、總編輯羅偉光或執行總編輯林文宗便會在會議中轉達。控方問黎的指示是什麼，楊則稱「唔記得」，但是「如果佢有指示，我會跟嘅」。</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇：國安法後專欄作者擔心紅線「唔知點樣劃」，部份認為替蘋果撰文風險特別高 楊清奇指日本專欄作家文句不通、立場矛盾 嘆「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」【黎智英案・審訊第卅七日】2024-03-04T12:00:00+08:002024-03-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-37<ul> - <li>前主筆楊清奇指黎智英認為彭斯演講代表「美國反枱」、自此政治立場變得激進</li> - <li>楊清奇：黎智英強調邀作者寫中共高層權鬥內幕消息 以增英文版影響力</li> -</ul> +<p>楊又指，對於上級的指示「我係要聽嘅」，有時他提出論壇版專題，高層會提議一些相關作者，但此情況很少見，因為楊通常會自行找作者撰寫文章。他指由於好少有4名高層同時給予指示，或者各人給予不同的指示，所以他不會覺得執行上有困難。</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="楊清奇指林本利曾短暫撰寫蘋果社論-後來自行決定不寫">楊清奇指林本利曾短暫撰寫《蘋果》社論 後來自行決定不寫</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ea26ytC.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>就2019至2021年期間的《蘋果》社論，楊供稱共有4名作者，包括馮偉光（筆名盧峯）、楊懷康（筆名古立）、顏純鈎（筆名方圓）和他本人（筆名李平）。社論作者人選方面，「最後決定係黎先生。但如果係推薦寫手嘅話，張劍虹和陳沛敏都有推薦嘅權嘅。」</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（4日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第37日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊供稱，黎智英會透過「飯盒會」向《蘋果》各個部門給予指示，會議期間並不會有意見交流或討論。例如他曾提出《國安法》出台後論壇版作者不足夠的問題，後來黎在會上講：「如果香港作者唔夠，咁咪搵海外作者囉。」楊又指，雖然黎的個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」並非刊於楊主理的論壇版，但是楊必須閱讀黎的文章以了解其立場取態，以免論壇版刊登了一些與黎取態不一致的文章，「論壇版一定唔會同佢作對嘅，一定唔會反對佢嘅。」楊提到彭斯於2018年10月發表演講時提及美國對華政策，黎當時認為演講內容意味「美國反枱」，楊表示：「我覺得佢喺嗰個時候開始，黎先生嘅政治立場就變得激進啲。」</p> +<p>楊指，除了上述4人之外，專欄作家林本利亦曾經短時間替《蘋果》寫社論，「佢離開嘅時候係張先生話畀我知嘅。」他指當初是張劍虹聯絡林本利撰寫「蘋論」，後來林本利自己決定不再撰寫。被問到林本利寫哪一種題材居多，楊則指「蘋論」沒有限制界別，會涉及政治、經濟和社會的題材。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇出庭作供-1998年加入蘋果中國版">楊清奇出庭作供 1998年加入《蘋果》中國版</h4> +<h4 id="楊清奇呻被顏純鈎投訴-之後被張劍虹當住同事面鬧我">楊清奇呻被顏純鈎投訴 之後被張劍虹「當住同事面鬧我」</h4> -<p>前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏上周作供完畢。控方今開始傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，他由3名懲教人員的帶領下，循法庭特別通道進入庭內，其後以非宗教形式宣誓。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤開始作主問。</p> +<p>2020年4月12日，張劍虹向楊清奇傳送訊息，提及「主筆，有論壇作者指我們有時壓稿。我明白或許有時稿擠，但盧峯每週已經寫兩篇社論，或許就不用寫論壇。謝謝」。楊指盧峯當時離開了《蘋果》，是以自由撰稿人的身份撰文，後來他在2020年6月重返《蘋果》。</p> -<p>控方指，楊在中國內地出生，在內地大學接受教育，於1993年來港定居。楊於1998年加入《蘋果日報》，當時任職中國版高級記者。楊確認。他續稱，他後來晉升為中國版助理採訪主任，之後晉升為採訪主任，其後擔任《蘋果》副主筆，最後在2015年升任為主筆。</p> +<p>控方問及誰人決定盧峯不用寫專欄。楊則指：「呢個係張劍虹先生畀我嘅訊息，佢係要求我停咗盧峯嘅論壇，我唔係咁同意嘅，所以我話會同作者多溝通，我記得後來我都冇停咗盧峯嘅專欄。」</p> -<p>2020年8月10日警方首度拘捕黎智英及搜查壹傳媒大樓，但當時楊並未被捕。2021年6月23日，楊於其住所被警方拘捕，之後被起訴及帶上法庭提堂。後來楊承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全罪」，現正還柙等候判刑。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jM1fcmM.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》英文版主筆馮偉光，筆名「盧峯」</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇日常工作負責撰寫社評和管理論壇版">楊清奇：日常工作負責撰寫社評和管理論壇版</h4> +<p>楊繼而大吐苦水，因為張的訊息指有人投訴楊沒有用到作者的稿，「佢（張劍虹）後來仲叫我去佢辦公室，當住同事面鬧我嘅。嗰時就知道投訴嗰個人就係顏純鈎。」楊又指黎智英之所以讓顏撰寫社論，是因為顏自己投稿，惟「我係冇應承畀佢開專欄出嘅」。</p> -<p>楊供稱，他日常工作主要有兩項，一是撰寫《蘋果》社評，刊登於實體報紙的「蘋論」欄目；另一項工作是負責管理論壇版，而每逢星期六論壇版會有主題評論，由不同作者撰寫。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英好欣賞顏純鈎-故張劍虹重視其文章">楊清奇：黎智英好欣賞顏純鈎 故張劍虹重視其文章</h4> -<p>楊稱，刊登於《蘋果》網站的評論文章比刊登於實體報紙的文章為多，因網上版有其他同事負責，除了他本人可批准文章刊登於網上版之外，時任總編輯羅偉光亦可以作出批核，而不需要經過楊的同意。雖然可能會出現分歧，但他表示會「尊重同事意見」，而這種情況亦很少發生。但就實體報紙的論壇版而言，嚴格來說只有他能夠批准哪些文章可以刊登。實體報紙的論壇版文章會被上載至《蘋果》網站的論壇版，若果他發現有的文章沒有被上載，亦會叫負責網站的同事去處理。</p> +<p>法官李運騰此時打斷，指楊的證供十分有趣，但是有需要澄清一些事實，控方的問題是問誰人決定暫停盧峯的專欄，究竟是張劍虹的決定，還是張僅負責轉達相關相定？楊則回答他當時理解是張劍虹的決定，「但後來知道顏純鈎投訴咁緊張，因為黎生好欣賞顏純鈎，所以張劍虹就重視顏純鈎嘅文章，所以要停咗盧峯文章。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/P1tLpfJ.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》總編輯 羅偉光</p> +<p>被問到何以得知黎欣賞顏純鈎，楊則指張劍虹後來告訴他，決定將顏所撰寫的「蘋論」，由每星期一篇，增加至每星期兩篇，「佢（張劍虹）覺得我唔聽話啦，所以將顏純鈎嘅文章擺喺副刊，而冇擺喺專欄。」換言之，顏除了每週寫兩篇《蘋果》社論之外，還會在副刊撰寫專欄文章。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇稱國安法後評論作者不足-黎智英提出找海外作者">楊清奇稱國安法後評論作者不足 黎智英提出找海外作者</h4> +<p>被問到為何楊被指「唔聽話」，楊表示：「因為我冇聽佢指示停咗盧峯嘅論壇版專欄。」他其後補充，雖然盧峯的固定專欄後來停了，但他會不定期刊登盧峯的文章。</p> -<p>楊清奇稱，平日會透過 WhatsApp、電郵和正式會議與黎智英溝通，有時黎亦會叫他到其辦公室的房間內商討。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y94ZgfM.png" alt="image06" /></p> -<p>楊又表示，對於2020年7月的一次「飯盒會」印象最深刻。在每次舉行「飯盒會」之前，時任副社長陳沛敏都會要求出席者透過訊息給她，表明「我想喺嗰個會上，向黎先生請示一啲問題嘅」。楊記得在該次會議之前，他曾提出《國安法》出台後論壇版作者不足夠的問題，所以後來黎在會上講：「如果香港作者唔夠，咁咪搵海外作者囉。」至於其他同事的意見，楊則不太記得，看到會議紀錄才會記得。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（6日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第39日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊的職責之一是管理報紙論壇版，他稱選擇文章的主要原則有3點，包括「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。楊提到黎智英要求論壇版「求新求變」，所以在2016年初曾經討論更換作者群。楊當時看過黎推薦的作者名單，「我和同事都好吃驚啦，有幾個係建制派嘅人物嚟嘅」，當中包括兩名行政會議成員，反映黎希望多元化。惟楊認為黎在2018年起轉趨激進，他此後推薦的評論作者「立場都係比較激進」，並舉例指黎推薦過傳媒人區家麟和「一劍飄塵」。</p> -<p>控方遂展示2020年7月17日的「飯盒會」會議討論重點，由陳沛敏上載至 Slack 群組。其中一點提到「多約海外作者」，楊確認他談論的正是該次會議。</p> +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第三天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Wcoc7WB.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指盧峯立場是支持抗爭-與黎智英觀點一致">楊清奇指盧峯立場是「支持抗爭」 與黎智英觀點一致</h4> -<h4 id="楊清奇飯盒會上無討論-只有黎智英給予回應和指示">楊清奇：飯盒會上無「討論」 只有黎智英給予回應和指示</h4> +<p>楊清奇在上午的證供中提及，時任社長張劍虹要求中止盧峯（馮偉光）的論壇版專欄，並將顏純鈎的專欄調至副刊，不經楊的論壇版管轄。</p> -<p>楊又表示「會議討論重點」中的「討論」，字眼上「唔係咁合適」，因為開會的時候，基本上是各個部門請示黎，然後黎會給予指示，「因為係黎先生畀回應、畀指示，係冇討論嘅。」楊稱他亦不會干預其他部門的問題，「其他同事提出嘅問題，我基本上都唔會插手嘅」；反之，楊提出的問題，其他同事也不會給予意見，只有黎會給予意見。</p> +<p>控方下午問及盧峯的寫作角度，楊表示「作為（《蘋果》社論）寫手，我哋都明白，要跟從報館嘅基本立場，啫係要留意黎智英先生嘅立場」，因此在2019年反修例期間，《蘋果》社論作者的觀點和立場都是沒有分別，「都係支持抗爭，要求政府收回條例」，而這觀點與黎的專欄所表達鼓勵市民上街抗爭是一致的。</p> -<p>被問到會上有否任何意見交流，楊稱沒有，所以會議紀錄不是「討論重點」，而是「黎先生嘅回應」，而且「佢（黎）嘅回應，我認為係指示嚟嘅」，並且有需要執行。例如楊提出的作者不足問題，時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹得悉之後，曾經協助尋找新作者。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇社論稱誓必和勇一家香港國際聯線抗爭到底">楊清奇社論稱「誓必和勇一家，香港國際聯線，抗爭到底」</h4> -<h4 id="楊清奇指海外作者對政府批評較尖銳-較少擔心國安法影響">楊清奇指海外作者對政府批評較尖銳 較少擔心國安法影響</h4> +<p>控方向楊清奇展示4篇由他撰寫的《蘋果》社論。首篇題為〈蘋論：林鄭反議會 市民反黑警 誓不兩立〉，刊登日期為2020年5月12日。文中提到：「如今漢賊誓不兩立，港人不會跪低，不會偏安，誓必和勇一家，香港國際聯線，抗爭到底。」</p> -<p>控方問到，海外作者的特別之處在哪裡。楊則指，「海外作者冇咁擔心《國安法》對佢哋嘅影響，佢哋提出嘅問題、對政府嘅批評比較尖銳，冇咁多擔心。」至於黎指示「多約海外作者」，楊確認後來有執行到。</p> +<p>楊解釋，「漢賊」是傳統中國文化的一個用詞，一般是指兩邊對立的雙方，他理解為「一邊係提出修例嘅政府，另一邊係反對修例嘅市民」，而「誓必和勇一家」是指「和理非」及「勇武」一起合作。至於「香港國際聯線」，楊指意思是「香港都係要爭取國際社會嘅支持」，以使到政府收回修訂條例。楊並確認，黎智英在其個人專欄的觀點與他差不多。</p> -<p>不過，楊稱他並不是每次「飯盒會」都出席，而是在受到邀請的時候才會出席，他亦不清楚出席頻率，因他只是一個部門主管，而非管理層。</p> +<p>控方特別提到社論最後一句：「至於中共港共想攬炒，那就放馬過來吧。」控方問楊這句是什麼意思。楊則說：「我覺得文字已經好清楚㗎喇，冇嘢補充。」</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇飯盒會目的是收集各部門問題-然後黎智英給予指示">楊清奇：飯盒會目的是收集各部門問題 然後黎智英給予指示</h4> +<p>法官李運騰關注以上社論刊登日期是2020年5月，其時「撤回修例」是否仍是社會爭議的話題。楊指市民仍在爭取「五大訴求」，當中包括「撤回修例」。控方問到當時的社會環境是如何，楊指示威「減少咗好多」，主要原因是疫情，而且2019年區議會選舉之後，市民的焦點轉移至2020年立法會選舉。</p> -<p>控方問「飯盒會」舉行的目的是什麼。楊指是為了收集各個部門的問題，然後黎會作出指示。控方又問楊有否執行黎的指示，楊則表示：「一定要執行嘅」，例如黎指示邀請多些海外作者撰文，「社長張劍虹先生覺得我做得唔好，所以佢自己去搵囉。」楊又指黎在「飯盒會」上給予指示後，社長和副社長會作出跟進。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇社論倡對中共採取強有力的制裁-免繼續禍港禍全球">楊清奇社論倡對中共採取「強有力的制裁」 免「繼續禍港禍全球」</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EmLes6M.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> +<p>控方展示2020年5月26日的《蘋果》社論，題為〈蘋論：播毒殺港 中共邪惡 世界埋單〉。楊指文章主要內容是新冠病毒在全球造成很多傷亡，《國安法》即將立法，可能摧毀香港民主自由，「全世界都要為此埋單，付出代價。」</p> -<p>楊指，除了邀請海外作者之外，黎作出的指示包括「有指定一啲文章畀我，有指定一啲一作者畀我嘅」，因在反修例的時候，「好明顯有啲係支持抗爭嘅文章。」在《國安法》出台之後，黎亦有向楊指定一些不滿《國安法》的作者。</p> +<p>控方提到文中提及：「無畏無懼的香港人已挺身而出，反抗強權，如果民主世界還止步於口頭聲援，不在政治、經濟、軍事上對中共採取強有力的制裁，何異於讓真正的人類公敵、千古罪人繼續禍港禍全球？」楊確認這段反映他對制裁的觀點，也反映了《蘋果》和黎智英的觀點。</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇必須閱讀黎智英專欄-比口頭指示更明確-論壇版一定唔會同佢作對">楊清奇：必須閱讀黎智英專欄 比口頭指示更明確 論壇版「一定唔會同佢作對」</h4> +<h4 id="楊清奇社論諷刺中共反制裁無威懾力">楊清奇社論諷刺中共反制裁無威懾力</h4> -<p>2019年2至3月，政府推出引渡條例修訂後，黎並沒有向論壇版直接給予指示，但黎同時有在個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」撰文，而在文章中「佢有好清晰嘅態度嘅」。楊指，雖然黎的專欄刊登於副刊而非論壇版，但他作為論壇版主管，必須閱讀所有黎的文章，「佢喺論壇版嘅文章，當然比佢口頭嘅指示更加明確清晰嘅。」</p> +<p>控方展示2020年7月14日的《蘋果》社論，題為〈蘋論：中共的打壓與制裁不足畏〉。楊指文章主要內容是「諷刺中共嘅反制裁係冇力嘅」，因為他認為中共的反制裁「唔會嚇親制裁嘅對象，冇威懾力嘅」，並指可以參考副標題「不以為懼，反以為榮」以下的段落。楊確認文章反映到《蘋果》和黎智英的觀點，因黎的專欄文章曾經提及類似觀點。</p> -<p>楊續指，若他不閱讀黎的文章，「如果論壇版出嚟嘅文章，同黎先生嘅意見唔同，就唔得嘅」，因為「論壇版一定唔會同佢作對嘅，一定唔會反對佢嘅」。若然黎在其專欄文章中表態，「更加要跟隨佢。」楊亦確認他作為《蘋果》主筆，一直有閱讀黎的專欄文章，並跟從黎的立場取態。</p> +<h3 id="楊清奇指中國官媒刪除李克強指示-令人質疑隱瞞疫情">楊清奇指中國官媒刪除李克強指示 令人質疑隱瞞疫情</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GTv6BpD.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> +<p>控方另展示2021年1月15日的《蘋果》社論，題為〈蘋論：政府目標是武肺清零還是自由清零？〉，楊指文章主要內容是質疑政府的監督，「係為咗防疫，還是限制市民自由？」</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英認為2018年彭斯演講代表美國反枱-自此立場變得激進">楊清奇：黎智英認為2018年彭斯演講代表「美國反枱」 自此立場變得激進</h4> +<p>楊又指副標題「官媒剋扣李克強指示」以下的段落亦有提及，「因為中國官方嘅媒體都刪除咗李克強嘅指示，咁令人懷疑中國係咪真係有隱瞞疫情嘅」，所以他在文章中質疑，「類似武漢式嘅封城係冇用嘅，咁香港繼續用封城式嘅方法，咁有用定係冇用呢？」</p> -<p>控方指，2019年7月《蘋果》報導黎智英會見時任美國副總統彭斯，楊稱在事前事後均未有與黎談論此旅程，因與論壇版無關，「有關會面我都係睇報紙先知道。」不過楊提到2018年10月，彭斯在哈德遜研究所發表演講時提及美國對華政策，其後黎透過 WhatsApp 告訴楊，認為彭斯的演講意味「美國反枱」，即美國帶領日本和其他國家改變對華政策，「美國係乘住中國弱勢嘅時候落井下石」，楊表示：「我覺得佢喺嗰個時候開始，黎先生嘅政治立場就變得激進啲。」所以反修例出台後，《蘋果》的報導角度變得激進，「《國安法》生效之後，唔再追求平衡報導喇。」</p> +<p>楊早前證供提及黎希望找一些作者寫中共高層權鬥內幕，他表示雖然文章並未講到中共權鬥，但是以中國而言，有權刪除時任總理李克強講話的人，就只有中共總書記習近平。</p> -<p>控方提到，《蘋果》在《國安法》生效之前已有報導制裁事宜，論壇版亦有文章提及。楊認為這與彭斯的演說有關，因為彭斯的演講代表著美國整個對華政策的改變，黎傳送給楊的訊息可見，黎見到對華政策的轉變，並且能夠把握這轉變的機遇。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇稱不記得撰文時有否想起黎智英指示-有時乃有感而發">楊清奇稱不記得撰文時有否想起黎智英指示 有時乃「有感而發」</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive &amp; an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy &amp; the rights &amp; autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020</p> -</blockquote> +<p>控方指楊撰寫文章的時候，黎已經正在還柙，問他為何會把黎的觀點寫出來。楊重申：「其實作為一個評論嘅寫手，寫稿嘅時候一定要考慮報館同埋老闆嘅立場，唔係次次去諗老闆有咩指示我去寫啲乜，有時係有感而發，因為始終都係有署名喺度。」</p> -<p>控方另提到，《蘋果》在2019年10月第二次報導黎智英訪美，並會見了時任美國眾議院議長佩洛西。楊同樣表示事前並不知道此事，在事後看相關新聞才知道。</p> +<p>控方追問楊當時是否仍然視黎為老闆，楊表示：「係，黎先生仲係老闆嘅，但係我嗰時唔記得我係咪諗起老闆嘅指示先會咁寫嘅。」控方再問，黎提及中共權鬥內幕的指示，距離楊撰寫社論的時候有數個月，為何仍然會在社論中提及權鬥？楊僅表示：「我已經講咗喇，我寫嘅時候唔記得有冇諗起黎先生嘅指示」，他補充，他可能看到中國媒體刪除李克強的指示，有感而發而寫出來。</p> -<p>楊稱，對於《蘋果》報導角度的主要印象，是「鼓勵抗爭，希望政府撤回條例」。</p> +<p>控方問楊會否閱讀其他人撰寫的社論，楊回答：「有時會嘅」，之後補充：「因為有啲文章睇咗標題，就唔想睇嘅。」</p> -<p>此外，控方庭上透露楊清奇作供完畢後，會傳召另一名「從犯證人」李宇軒出庭作供。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英要求論壇版求新求變-曾討論更換作者群">楊清奇指黎智英要求論壇版「求新求變」 曾討論更換作者群</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NYf7zWv.png" alt="image06" /></p> +<p>楊早前供稱，他的職責除了撰寫《蘋果》社論外，還有管理論壇版。控方問楊揀選文章的準則是什麼。楊指他在大約2014年5月開始接手負責《蘋果》論壇版，至2015年年底晉升為《蘋果》主筆。他指同事與他交接論壇版工作時，選擇文章的主要原則只有3點，包括「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」，因此論壇版是比較開放。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（4日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第37日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊供稱，黎智英於2020年5至6月期間三度邀請他、其他時事評論員和專欄作者，到其住所食飯，期間黎提及想籌備英文版，希望將香港情況告訴美國人，並且「希望美國政府採取更強硬嘅措施」，包括制裁。楊又提到，黎特別強調要找認識中共高層權鬥內幕消息的人撰文，以增加英文版的影響力。在6月的一次飯局中，出席者關注黎會否被捕，楊憶述黎表明「唔驚」，並稱：「如果佢被拉呢，咁更加證明到中國和香港政府對人權嘅打壓，同時都係打壓新聞自由，佢相信美國、英國同歐洲係唔會坐視不理嘅。」</p> +<p>楊續指，他接手論壇版之後，黎智英當時要求論壇版「求新求變」，要不時更換作者群，故此黎和當時的總編輯陳沛敏曾經跟他一起討論作者名單。楊指該名單列舉出一些作者，包括一些他們希望去邀請的作者，也有一些是陳沛敏提議的作者。</p> -<p>控方今早開始傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平），以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，他由3名懲教人員的帶領下，循法庭特別通道進入庭內，其後以非宗教形式宣誓。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英推薦作者名單包括建制派人物-同事感吃驚">楊清奇指黎智英推薦作者名單包括建制派人物 同事感吃驚</h4> -<h4 id="楊清奇指蘋果批評中國政府隱瞞疫情-搞到世界大亂">楊清奇指《蘋果》批評中國政府隱瞞疫情 「搞到世界大亂」</h4> +<p>楊憶述他在2016年初開始熟悉論壇版運作後，便按照黎的指示更換作者人選，他提到當時看過黎推薦的作者名單，「我和同事都好吃驚啦，有幾個係建制派嘅人物嚟嘅。我記得好清楚，有兩個應該係行政會議成員嚟。」</p> -<p>楊供稱，他與時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹、副社長陳沛敏和總編輯羅偉光不時透過文字訊息溝通，惟與時任動新聞平台總監張志偉則比較少溝通，因他負責網上平台的動新聞。楊又指，他與前英文版主筆馮偉光（筆名「盧峯」）比較多溝通，因為二人在辦公室的房間相鄰，會不時傾談。</p> +<p>楊表示，從黎的推薦作者名單來看，「我覺得佢仍然希望論壇版係多元化嘅。反而我和同事就覺得，會唔會天真咗啲？」，「因為呢啲建制派領袖人物呢，冇可能同我哋寫稿。」楊和同事當時曾嘗試邀請這些建制派，但是都不成功，黎則表示只有其中一個人跟他「傾到計」，黎亦有親自邀請該人士，但最終不成功。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iNvcNz7.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》英文版主筆馮偉光，筆名「盧峯」</p> +<p>被問到2016年的時候，論壇版作者的寫作角度是怎樣，楊指「簡單講就係符合我之前講嘅原則」。他提到，大約2016至2017年時，仍然有建制派領袖人物替《蘋果》撰寫評論文章，雖然這些撰文的建制派領袖人物「係好少嘅」，「但都唔會好似2019年之後咁完全冇立法會議員。」</p> -<p>楊指，2020年初爆發新冠肺炎疫情，《蘋果》的報導角度「主要係批評中國政府隱瞞疫情，搞到世界大亂嘅」。</p> +<p>楊引述自己早前的證供，他認為黎智英在2018年起轉變立場，變得激進和尖銳，所以此後黎推薦的評論作者「立場都係比較激進」。楊舉例指黎曾推薦過傳媒人區家麟和「一劍飄塵」。</p> -<p>《蘋果》於2020年5月以頭版發起「一人一信救香港」行動，楊表示他沒有參與籌備，黎事前也沒有與他談論，直至登報後楊才看到。楊續指，後來黎於2020年12月被捕及還柙後，在一次由張劍虹主持的「飯盒會」上，張指「一人一信救香港」是黎的意思。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CSEhcM4.png" alt="image09" /> +▲ 區家麟</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英邀請專欄作者等人參與飯局-就英文版及twitter給予意見">楊清奇：黎智英邀請專欄作者等人參與飯局 就英文版及Twitter給予意見</h4> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p>控方指，《蘋果》英文版在2020年5月面世。楊表示此前知悉《蘋果》會推出英文版，因為黎當時邀請他及其他時事評論員和專欄作者，到其住所食飯，期間黎提及想籌備英文版，希望《蘋果》英文版可在美國擴大影響力，而且「將香港人權受到壓迫、《國安法》可能出台，可以話畀美國人知」。黎又指以當時形勢而言，不只美國政府，一般大眾和政治人物都會關注香港，所以希望在座人士能提供意見。</p> +<hr /> -<p>控方遂展示楊清奇與黎的秘書之間的訊息紀錄，顯示楊曾分別於2020年5月6日、5月19日和6月23日，獲邀到黎的住所出席飯局。</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇呻遭顏純鈎投訴、張劍虹要求停盧峯專欄兼「當住同事面鬧我」 楊清奇指黎智英冀論壇版多元化 推薦建制派撰文 惟2018年後轉推薦激進作者China Outpacing U.S. DIB2024-03-06T12:00:00+08:002024-03-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-outpacing-us-dib<p><em>China’s defense industrial base is moving to a wartime footing, while the United States is largely in a peacetime stance. Absent urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities against China and other competitors.</em></p> -<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英冀國際關注香港人權被打壓-以牽制中國政府">楊清奇：黎智英冀國際關注香港人權被打壓 以牽制中國政府</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>就5月6日，即第一次的飯局，訊息顯示受邀人士包括林本利、桑普、盧峯（馮偉光）、楊懷康（筆名古立）、程翔及林和立。</p> +<h3 id="executive-summary">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</h3> -<p>楊憶述黎在席間表示要設立 Twitter 帳戶，籲在座人士提供新聞和評論，供他在 Twitter 發表，「佢希望通過呢個社交媒體，擴大佢嘅影響力，擴大《蘋果日報》嘅影響力。」被問到黎有否表明想要哪類型的新聞，楊指黎在飯局上未有明確提及，但是後來黎有向他提出要求，指「譬如抗爭嘅新聞，六四嘅新聞」。</p> +<p>The U.S. defense industrial base — including the executive branch, Congress, and defense companies — lacks the capacity, responsiveness, flexibility, and surge capability to meet the U.S. military’s production needs as China ramps up defense industrial production. Unless there are urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities against China and other competitors. A significant part of the problem is that the U.S. defense ecosystem remains on a peacetime footing, despite a protracted war in Ukraine, an active war in the Middle East, and growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific in such areas as the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula.</p> -<p>楊續指，黎希望國際關注香港的情況，因當時香港人權受到打壓，如果國際社會有更多關注的話，能夠牽制到中國政府。至於牽制的手法，楊指：「當時講得多係制裁嘅。」</p> +<p>The United States faces several acute challenges.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇當時同意黎觀點-制裁令政府推遲國安法-社會成本較低">楊清奇：當時同意黎觀點 制裁令政府推遲國安法 社會成本較低</h4> +<p>First, the Chinese defense industrial base is increasingly on a wartime footing and, in some areas, outpacing the U.S. defense industrial base. Most open-source research and analysis on the U.S. defense industrial base has been conducted in a vacuum and has not systematically assessed China’s defense industrial base. Chinese defense companies, such as China North Industries Group Corporation Limited and the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, are producing a growing quantity and quality of land, maritime, air, space, and other capabilities. China increased its defense budget by 7.2 percent in 2024 and is heavily investing in munitions and acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States, according to some U.S. government estimates. China is now the world’s largest shipbuilder and has a shipbuilding capacity that is roughly 230 times larger than the United States. One of China’s large shipyards, such as Jiangnan Shipyard, has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined, according to U.S. Navy estimates.</p> -<p>就5月19日，即第二次飯局，訊息顯示受邀者除了楊清奇之外，還包括桑普、盧峯（馮偉光）、林和立及李兆富（Simon Lee）。</p> +<p>Second, the U.S. defense industrial base continues to face a range of production challenges, including a lack of urgency in revitalizing the defense industrial ecosystem. The U.S. Department of Defense has taken some helpful steps to strengthen the industrial base, such as developing a National Defense Industrial Strategy, increasing production for some weapons systems, and pushing for multiyear procurement. But there is still a shortfall of munitions and other weapons systems for a protracted war in such areas as the Indo-Pacific. Supply chain challenges also remain serious, and today’s workforce is inadequate to meet the demands of the defense industrial base.</p> -<p>楊憶述該次飯局中，黎表示美國政府和人民都會關注香港的情況，他希望開設《蘋果》英文版，幫助美國人更加了解香港情況，「希望美國政府採取更強硬嘅措施，咁《蘋果》英文版有多啲呢啲內容，咁美國政府就可以做嘢。」控方追問黎想美國政府採取什麼行動？楊指：「當時講得最多係制裁。」</p> +<p>Third, the United States has not sufficiently leveraged its relationships with allies and partners, though it has taken some steps through such arrangements as the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) partnership. Nevertheless, there are too many bureaucratic hurdles and inefficiencies in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and other policies and procedures. Co-development, co-production, co-sustainment, and other forms of cooperation between the United States and its closest allies and partners have been stifled. While the current National Defense Strategy notes that U.S. defense strategy needs to be “anchored” in allies and partners, the United States has fallen short in defense industrial base cooperation with its friends.</p> -<p>楊又表示，他個人認為制裁官員從而令政府撤回修例及推遲《國安法》生效，「咁成個社會付出嘅成本係比較低啲嘅」，因此在《國安法》出台前後，當黎談及制裁時，「我喺蘋論版（《蘋果》社論）都係持一種支持嘅態度嘅。」他確認當時同意黎的觀點。</p> +<p>There are multiple reasons for these challenges. One is that the U.S. defense industrial base is much bigger than any one agency or department. The Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, Congress, the private sector, and other organizations play important roles in the industrial base. But they often have different interests and priorities. In addition, there is significant political and bureaucratic resistance to reforming the defense industrial base and broader defense ecosystem. Some areas of the executive and legislative branches remain too risk averse in sharing sensitive technology with allies and partners. Others mistakenly see a revitalization of the defense industrial base as giving money to greedy executives engaged in waste, fraud, and abuse.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英強調找作者寫中共內部權鬥消息-以增英文版影響力">楊清奇：黎智英強調找作者寫中共內部權鬥消息 以增英文版影響力</h4> +<p>Moving forward, the United States needs to take several steps to revitalize the defense industrial base and broader ecosystem in an increasingly dangerous world.</p> -<p>控方問飯局期間有否討論《蘋果》英文版的報導角度。楊指沒有，不過他提到黎後來以 WhatsApp 傳送訊息，特別強調要找認識中共高層權鬥的人撰文，並非常強調要懂得權鬥內幕和消息，「唔係淨係識得去評論嘅。」楊又指，「佢（黎）認為英文版可以𢭃多啲料呢，影響力就會大啲嘅。」</p> +<p><strong>White House–Led Initiative:</strong> There is an urgent need for the U.S. president to create a body that provides strategic guidance and helps oversee a revitalization of the defense industrial base. Revitalization will not occur without White House leadership, as the history of the U.S. defense industrial base demonstrates. During major crises in U.S. history, such as World War II and the Cold War, presidential leadership was essential. Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ronald Reagan, and others were pivotal in providing the leadership, strategic vision, organization, and funding to revitalize the defense industry. One option is a variant of the production boards that existed during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Such a body could be established by the U.S. president and exercise general direction over U.S. defense procurement and production; help determine the policies, plans, and procedures of federal departments regarding defense procurement, production, arms sales, and technology transfers; establish priorities in the distribution of materials and services; fix bureaucratic problems; incentivize industry; improve communication with industry; and, perhaps most importantly, provide a sense of urgency.</p> -<p>控方遂展示黎的 WhatsApp 訊息，黎於2020年6月12日向楊說：「李平，盡量多找有份量有內幕消息的人寫，不只是感想而是有寫情（況）的。謝謝。」、「李平，可以找到人分析習李權鬥浮面的內情嗎？謝謝。」楊當時回覆「收到。再努力」。楊庭上確認相關訊息，並指文章可以中文撰寫，之後會有同事翻譯成英文。</p> +<p><strong>Defense Spending:</strong> The United States likely cannot revamp its defense industrial base without additional spending on the development and production of weapons systems necessary for deterrence and warfighting. During the Cold War, the U.S. defense budget was between 9 and 11 percent of GDP during the Eisenhower administration, between 8 and 9 percent during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and over 6 percent during the Reagan administration. Today’s defense budget of roughly 3 percent of GDP is not consistent with a security environment in which authoritarian states, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are threatening the United States and its allies and partners across the globe. Without an increase in funding for the development and production of weapons systems, it will be virtually impossible to revitalize the defense industrial base to compete with China.</p> -<p>控方續展示另一段訊息，黎於2020年6月30日向楊說：「李平，中共權鬥問題是否有料，及經濟及水災情況如何？謝謝。」楊當時回覆：「Sorry，權鬥未收到料。水災和三峽沒有炒作般嚴重。」黎回覆：「很好。謝謝。」</p> +<p><strong>Multiyear Contracting:</strong> The Department of Defense and Congress need to expand the use of multiyear procurement to create sustained demand signals that will promote investment in the defense industrial base. Congressional appropriators need to fund — and the military services need to spend — a wider range of munitions important for warfighting and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East. Multiyear procurement is important to build a consistent and predictable demand signal that creates more transparency and less risk for prime contractors and more fragile sub-tier suppliers.</p> -<p>楊庭上解釋，「佢（黎）催得我好緊，但係我做唔到囉」，所以回覆黎稱可以嘗試，但是最終仍然找不到符合黎要求的作者。他形容黎很想發布中共內部權鬥的消息，以增加《蘋果》英文版的影響力。</p> +<p><strong>Strategic Stockpiles:</strong> The Department of Defense and Congress should allocate additional funding for contracts and other incentives (such as tax incentives, regulatory relief, and long-term contracts) to build and maintain surge production capacity. This funding can be used to modernize and expand facilities and develop flexible production. The Department of Defense maintains stockpiles of key munitions, minerals, chemicals, technology, and medical supplies, but it needs to better manage inventory and stockpile planning to decrease near-term risk.</p> -<p>至於訊息提及的「水災和三峽」，楊指當時海外媒體炒作內地三峽和水災的新聞，「炒得幾嚴重，話三峽就嚟冧，咁我當時收到消息話冇咁嚴重，咁唔想《蘋果日報》炒作。」</p> +<p><strong>Workforce and Supply Chains:</strong> The United States needs to create the conditions that diversify the supplier base for the defense industry and invest in new production methods. The Department of Defense should look for opportunities to assist companies with upskilling and reskilling workers by offering incentives, such as expanding investments in the Manufacturing Innovation Institutes and in programs designed to support the talent necessary for defense-related manufacturing and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics jobs.</p> -<p>被問到出席飯局的盧峯、桑普和李兆富有否提出意見，楊表示不記得，「我連自己講咗咩，我都唔記得嘅。」</p> +<p><strong>Allies and Partners:</strong> The White House — or a White House–appointed body — needs to focus increased attention on streamlining FMS and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) review policies and procedures, as well as support co-development, co-production, and other types of arrangements with allies and partners. The Department of Defense should develop a more efficient review process for releasing technology, accelerate acquisition and contracting assistance, and ensure broad U.S. government support to improve the FMS process. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, working with the services and military departments, should establish a rapid contracting process to reduce the backlog in getting approved FMS cases on contract. The administration should move quickly to put in place regulations that will provide broad exemptions for the United Kingdom and Australia, much like the United States has provided to Canada. In addition, the U.S. government should increase co-production, co-development, and other arrangements with key allies and partners in such areas as munitions, shipbuilding, and ground vehicles.</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇轉述黎智英稱不怕被捕-若被捕即證明到中國和港府打壓人權">楊清奇轉述黎智英稱不怕被捕 若被捕即證明到中國和港府打壓人權</h4> +<p>These steps are important to strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base in a competitive security environment. In his “Victory Speech” in December 1940, one year before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt implored the nation to revitalize its defense industry. It is a message that is just as relevant today. “We must be the great arsenal of democracy,” Roosevelt said. “For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.”</p> -<p>至於2020年6月23日進行的第三次飯局，訊息紀錄顯示受邀人士包括楊清奇、盧峯、姜國元、桑普、楊懷康和李兆富。</p> +<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> -<p>楊記得席上未有談及《蘋果》英文版和黎的 Twitter，不過因為當時是接近《國安法》生效的時候，他們有討論到《國安法》。楊指出席者關注黎會否被捕，「佢（黎）話唔驚嘅，如果佢被拉呢，咁更加證明到中國和香港政府對人權嘅打壓，同時都係打壓新聞自由，佢相信美國、英國同歐洲係唔會坐視不理嘅。」楊轉述黎認為只有實施制裁，才能有助改善香港的人權狀況。</p> +<p><strong>Growing international competition between</strong> the United States and China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, war in the Middle East, and increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula have raised questions about the state of the U.S. defense industrial base. Does the United States have sufficient capacity and flexibility in its defense industrial base for deterrence and warfighting? If not, what else needs to be done? These questions are particularly important since the structure of the international system has changed over the past decade from one of unipolarity, where the United States had no major peers, to one centered on Washington and Beijing. In addition, military capabilities are rapidly evolving in such areas as robotics, sensors, artificial intelligence, cyber, space, long-range precision strike, hypersonics, and advanced communications, command, and control.</p> -<p>控方追問，黎曾否提及制裁的對象。楊則指「冇好具體嘅名單」，但在公眾意見的角度而言，制裁對象主要是北京主要負責香港事務的官員，以及香港主要官員。</p> +<p>For some, the U.S. defense industrial base is adequate for today and tomorrow. As one U.S. Department of Defense report concludes, “the defense industry is financially healthy, and its financial health has improved over time.” Other analysts and policymakers contend that the United States’ capacity is more than sufficient to deter or win a war against another major power such as China. The United States enjoys significant economic and production advantages over its competitors, this argument goes, and “the overall picture is one of stability and health, not decline” in the defense industry. Others argue that the push to increase defense production is largely due to lobbying by defense companies, not military requirements. As one assessment concludes, increased investment in the defense industry “would require a permanent expansion of U.S. weapons manufacturing capability. And once the new factories exist, there will be pressure to keep them open in perpetuity, at a cost of untold billions of dollars.” Indeed, some see defense revitalization as wasting taxpayer money and increasing the possibility of waste, fraud, and abuse. Five U.S. senators — Bernie Sanders (D-VT), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Charles Grassley (R-IA), and Mike Braun (R-IN) — wrote in a letter to U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin in May 2023 that some defense companies were “dramatically overcharging the Department and U.S. taxpayers while reaping enormous profits, seeing their stock prices soar, and handing out massive executive compensation packages.”</p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指桑普主張港獨-黎被捕後指示邀撰文">楊清奇指桑普主張港獨 黎被捕後指示邀撰文</h4> +<h4 id="research-design">Research Design</h4> -<p>控方問及受邀者的身份，楊指林本利是由張劍虹邀請撰寫「蘋論」的作者。楊指桑普則「傾向支持港獨」，所以他有很多文章都沒有辦法刊登出來。</p> +<p>To better understand the U.S. defense industrial base, this report asks several questions: What is the state of China’s defense industrial base? In light of growing competition with China and other international contingencies, how prepared is the U.S. defense industrial base for deterrence and warfighting over the next five years? What steps should the United States take to establish a more effective defense industrial base?</p> -<p>楊又提到，黎被捕之後，曾經透過高層指示他邀請桑普撰寫專欄，其後他向副社長陳沛敏表達，桑普經常撰文主張港獨，不適合刊登，因為《蘋果》通常不會修改專欄文章，「佢寫嘅稿我哋用唔用都麻煩」，陳表示會跟社長張劍虹反映。楊指後來高層未有再提起桑普，估計「佢哋上面接受咗我嘅提議，就冇再講喇」。不過《蘋果》過去曾經刊登桑普的文章，主要立場是批評中國共產黨和香港政府，早期曾提到制裁，但後期便沒有提起。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZJBVJWm.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1.1 Example of Differences between Commercial and Defense Markets.</strong> Source: Jacques S. Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First Century Defense Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 282.</em></p> -<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英受訪時公開李兆富負責twitter帳戶-李因憂慮風險而辭職">楊清奇指黎智英受訪時公開李兆富負責Twitter帳戶 李因憂慮風險而辭職</h4> +<p>To answer these questions, this report adopts a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. It compiles and analyzes a range of data to better understand the U.S. and Chinese industrial bases, including in such areas as the defense sector and maritime, air, land, and missile capabilities. The report collects and analyzes other types of information, including White House–led defense bodies since World War II (such as the National Defense Advisory Committee and the War Production Board) and U.S defense spending as a percentage of GDP since World War II. The report also utilizes information from interviews with a wide range of individuals from the Department of Defense, Department of State, Congress (both members and staff), defense companies, and other subject-matter experts. Finally, this report incorporates qualitative information from both primary and secondary sources, including on the history of the U.S. defense industrial base.</p> -<p>至於李兆富，楊指他的筆名是「利世民」，亦替黎智英管理 Twitter 帳戶。不過楊指，黎在接受外媒採訪時透露李有份管理其 Twitter 帳戶，李之後以 WhatsApp 傳送該受訪片段給楊，「佢覺得 Twitter 會唔會有啲嘢係觸犯咗《國安法》嘅，咁黎生公開咗由佢負責嘅話，佢係有風險」，所以李「覺得唔舒服，就唔做喇」。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The defense industrial base is a subset of the broader economy and includes the set of companies involved in the research, development, design, production, delivery, and maintenance of weapons systems.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p>As used here, the defense industrial base is a subset of the broader economy and includes the set of companies involved in the research, development, design, production, delivery, and maintenance of weapons systems. Defense is not a free market system. It is a monopsony, a market arrangement in which there are several suppliers but only one buyer. Defense is also a government-regulated industry, not a government-managed one. Government auditors monitor the costs, purchases, and profits of defense contractors. In the United States, congressional investigations have led to volumes of binding regulations — which are often cumbersome and inefficient — that contractors must follow if they are to remain eligible to work on defense projects. Table 1.1 highlights several rough differences between the commercial and defense markets. However, a substantial number of companies are hybrid, with an increasing share of their revenue coming from commercial sales.</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="organization-of-the-report">Organization of the Report</h4> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導前主筆楊清奇指黎智英認為彭斯演講代表「美國反枱」、自此政治立場變得激進 楊清奇：黎智英強調邀作者寫中共高層權鬥內幕消息 以增英文版影響力Russia Busting Sanctions2024-03-04T12:00:00+08:002024-03-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/russia-busting-sanctions<p><em>Moscow’s long practice and tolerance of illicit activities makes Russia well placed to bust Western sanctions. Two years on from Putin’s illegal invasion, what more can be done?</em></p> +<p>The rest of this report is divided into three chapters. Chapter 2 analyzes China’s defense industrial base (including Chinese defense companies) with a focus on the military capabilities produced by the Chinese defense industry and some of China’s defense-related weaknesses and operational challenges. Chapter 3 examines the strengths and weaknesses in the U.S. defense industrial base, including in such areas as presidential-level support, defense production, and cooperation with allies and partners. Chapter 4 offers policy recommendations.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="chinas-defense-industrial-base-and-capabilities">CHINA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND CAPABILITIES</h3> -<p>On Feb. 23, President Joe Biden announced over 500 new sanctions on Russia and parts of its military production apparatus following the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny one week earlier. The U.S. was joined by the European Union, which issued its own set of sanctions against nearly 200 Russian individuals and entities. Although these sanctions — and the many that have come before them — appropriately demonstrate to the international community the West’s disapproval of Russia’s military effort and Moscow’s conduct more broadly, the effectiveness of these sanctions regimes will be severely limited unless the U.S. and its partners adjust their views about sanctions busting.</p> +<p>This chapter examines China’s defense industrial base and Chinese military capabilities. It concludes that China’s defense industrial base is moving to a wartime footing, which means that China is rapidly developing and producing weapons systems and preparing to fight a war against another major power, particularly the United States. As U.S. secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall III put it, “China is preparing for a war and specifically for a war with the United States.” Great power wars have historically been won by those nations or coalitions that can outbuild, outspend, outmobilize, and outfight their adversaries. Both modern history and the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrate that the ability to produce more arms and equipment is crucial for a nation at war. There is little reason to believe that a war between China and the United States would be different, and the relative strengths of their defense industrial bases is therefore a key factor in strategic competition.</p> -<p>After more than two decades focusing on Iran’s and North Korea’s sanctions-busting machinery, Western officials have now turned their attention to Russia’s keen ability to evade economic, financial, and trade sanctions — whether busting through the oil price cap or illegally acquiring microelectronics to support its war in Ukraine. Two common questions percolating in foreign policy circles in Washington, Brussels, and London are what lessons can the West learn from Iran’s and North Korea’s years of sanctions evasion, and how can these governments apply those lessons to Russia. What these discussions fail to consider, however, is that it is Iran and North Korea that draw upon Russia’s decades of embargo- and sanctions-busting expertise — not the other way around. Consequently, by focusing too myopically on techniques and tactics, policymakers are missing the big picture when it comes to addressing sanctions circumvention.</p> +<p>Strengthening China’s defense industrial base is one part of China’s broader strategy of competition. Chinese leaders have articulated a long-term national strategy to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts” by 2049, including developing a “world-class” military. Along these lines, China is focused on outperforming the United States and other countries in the research, development, production, and innovation of information technologies and weapons systems, all of which are central to the future of warfare. In addition, China’s research, acquisition, and production processes and capabilities are improving. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has poured vast resources into capitalizing on the growing capabilities of artificial intelligence, big data, advanced computing, 5G, and supporting military and dual-use technologies. The PLA is developing advanced weapons systems, such as stealth and hypersonic capabilities. In addition, the PLA is amassing a formidable and ever-expanding arsenal of medium- and long-range precision missiles capable of striking U.S. and partner land, air, and sea bases. The PLA is also building a dense web of integrated air defense systems to challenge U.S. forces attempting to operate near such areas as the Taiwan Strait.</p> -<p>From the earliest years of the Cold War through the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has shown itself to be extremely capable of procuring embargoed Western technology. The post-Cold War era saw oligarchs exploit loosely regulated aspects of the global financial system to move, hide, and launder wealth, while those engaged in organized crime and illicit arms dealers flourished during the 1990s in an environment tolerant of criminality. The net effect is a long history of evading restrictive measures and a well-oiled machine capable of circumventing Western sanction regimes.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China’s defense industrial base is moving to a wartime footing, which means that China is rapidly developing and producing weapons systems and preparing to fight a war against another major power, particularly the United States.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>To effectively target Russia’s ability to circumvent Western sanctions, the West must focus on dismantling the infrastructure that permits transnational crime to flourish, better integrate their individual sanctions regimes, and close long-standing gaps in global trade and finance regulations.</p> +<p>Overall, trends in military production suggest that China is closing the gap with the United States, though China falls short of the United States on several measures of military power discussed at the end of this chapter. As highlighted in Table 2.1 later in this chapter, China has almost 50 percent more military personnel and twice as many active ground and paramilitary forces as the United States, can take advantage of its large fleet of smaller missile-armed watercraft in fighting near its shores, and operates nearly twice as many main battle tanks and 50 percent more artillery systems than the United States. Although the size of its stockpiles and its rate of production are unclear, China may also have a preponderance of cruise missiles, given the emphasis the PLA places on their use in a conflict with the United States.</p> -<h3 id="from-cocom-to-orlan">From CoCom to Orlan</h3> +<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into seven sections. The first examines China’s defense sector, including a comparison of U.S. and Chinese military capabilities. The next four sections analyze Chinese maritime, air, land, and missile capabilities. The sixth assesses Chinese defense industrial weaknesses. The final section explores operational challenges for China.</p> -<p>The U.S. Department of Justice in August 2023 indicted a Russian-German national for his role in an expansive illicit procurement network designed to supply Russia’s war machine with export-controlled microelectronics. The indictment is only the latest in a growing series of enforcement actions by Western officials trying to fix a leaky export control and sanctions regime targeting Russia’s military industrial base.</p> +<h4 id="defense-sector">Defense Sector</h4> -<p>But Moscow’s ability to acquire needed parts covered by sanctions should not be surprising. From the earliest days of the Soviet Union, Moscow has been dependent on imported technology. In the aftermath of World War II, as East-West tensions unfolded, the U.S. and key Western allies established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) — an early attempt to prevent Western military technologies from entering the Eastern Bloc, primarily the Soviet Union.</p> +<p>China’s rise as a global economic power has made it the preeminent Indo-Pacific military power next to the United States, even with China’s recent economic challenges in such areas as the country’s property crisis, rising unemployment (including youth unemployment), and rapidly aging population. Estimated Chinese defense spending has accounted for at least 2 percent of GDP for the past 30 years, but China’s GDP and defense spending have both increased nearly ninefold during that time. In March 2024, China announced a 7.2 percent increase in its defense budget to continue modernizing its armed forces and strengthen its defense industrial base.</p> -<p>The informal nature of the CoCom, its lack of enforcement mechanisms, and diverging interests between the U.S. and its European allies led operatives in Moscow and Western businesses to easily circumvent the West’s restrictions and embargoes. Often, controlled technology flowed into the Soviet Union via reparations from Germany, across the initially porous inner German border and through the Warsaw Pact states, and through other loosely regulated hubs of convenience that were not strictly CoCom members, such as Hong Kong and Switzerland.</p> +<p>The impact of China’s rise on the regional balance of power has been dramatic. China’s neighbors have not come close to matching its level of spending, as seen in Figure 2.1. Although the United States still spends more on defense than China, the gap is narrowing. Twenty years ago, U.S. military spending was nine times that of China. Last year, it was less than three times as much. The gap is narrower than it looks. The United States has global commitments, while China can focus far more on its immediate neighborhood.</p> -<p>While the Soviet Union’s procurement of restricted technology and machinery was once a highly secretive affair, now-declassified reports shed new light on the methods and tactics the country used to evade Western controls. A CIA report from 1977, among others from that time, describes transhipment through third-party intermediaries, the use of fraudulent shipping documentation, and the use of shell companies to obtain integrated circuits and semiconductors from the West.</p> +<p>China’s defense industry has grown along with its military spending. As shown in Figure 2.2, four of the world’s ten largest defense companies are now Chinese enterprises. China’s biggest defense companies have been growing even larger, but the market has been expanding in other ways, with smaller defense contractors growing more numerous. China has taken what one U.S. government assessment calls a set of “unprecedented steps to facilitate the entry of private firms into the defense industrial base.” That assessment identified 183 private Chinese companies that contributed goods or services to defense aviation and aerospace, 108 of which had ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or PLA that could give them access to advantages not typically available to private commercial entities. The CCP has undertaken significant steps to grow its defense industrial base, a key driver of military power.</p> -<p>One of the most successful tactics, according to the report, was Moscow’s exploitation of legitimate Western firms and falsified end-user certifications. In essence, Western firms would sell restricted technologies to legitimate and approved buyers in foreign countries, only to have those technologies transhipped to the Soviet Union. This might sound familiar.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YVCcMJ0.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.1 Share of Indo-Pacific Defense Spending by Country Note Vietnam, North Korea, Myanmar, and Timor Leste are excluded due to lack of data.</strong> Source: <a href="https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685">“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</a>.</em></p> -<p>A December 2022 joint investigation by the Royal United Services Institute and Reuters detailed how Russia has evaded Western export controls and sanctions during the war in Ukraine to acquire microelectronics for its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) — including the Orlan-10 — which the country has used with devastating effectiveness. Mirroring its Soviet-era methods, Moscow has relied on overseas, state-backed procurement networks to illegally acquire export-controlled technologies often manufactured and produced by legitimate Western firms. As the Orlan report notes, Russia has used entities based in the United States, Europe, China, South Korea, and Hong Kong to procure Western technologies for the UAV system.</p> +<p>China’s defense industrial potential is probably even higher than its military spending and domestic defense industries suggest. China has adopted a strategy of military-civil fusion (军民融合), promoting coordination between and integration of military and civilian industry, economies, and systems. Many technologies produced by its civilian sectors have clear military applications, and the CCP is likely seeking to exploit these technologies. China has built military requirements into the construction of civilian infrastructure and sought ways to use civilian construction and logistics for military purposes. Commercial Chinese unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) have been used in Ukraine in large numbers. The PLA has experimented with using civilian roll-on/roll-off watercraft (commonly referred to as “ROROs”) in an invasion of Taiwan, conducting several exercises to develop the necessary doctrine and skills. Chinese companies have also dramatically increased their orders of these ROROs for 2024 and 2025, likely heralding a major expansion in construction. The military implications of any one of these developments are unclear, but China’s defense industrial capacity is likely even greater than it appears on the surface.</p> -<p>The number of these cases keeps growing and is reflected in U.S. designations. Just recently following Navalny’s death and marking two years since Putin’s invasion, the U.S. Department of Commerce added over 90 companies to its denied entities list for helping Russia obtain restricted microelectronics, continuing to highlight the difficulties of export-control enforcement. The Treasury and State Departments also added over 500 entities to its sanctions lists.</p> +<p>China has also improved its defense acquisition system. Over the past decade, the PLA has markedly enhanced its research, development, and acquisition (RDA) process. This progress has allowed the PLA to produce advanced platforms in such difficult areas as carrier-based aviation, hypersonics, and propulsion systems. China’s RDA process appears to have five general steps: feasibility study, project design, engineering and development, experiment and design finalization, and batch production (if a system passes all of these stages). According to one U.S. defense official, it takes China less than seven years, on average, to deliver an operational capability, compared to 16 years for the United States. As an analysis of the Chinese defense acquisition system concludes, “Given sufficient time and money, the Chinese RDA system is capable of producing innovative and sophisticated weapons. It is capable of devoting massive resources toward ambitious, priority projects over very long periods, resulting in incremental progress and eventual achievement of its goals.”</p> -<h3 id="the-moscow-mafiya">The Moscow “Mafiya”</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Over the past decade, the PLA has markedly enhanced its research, development, and acquisition (RDA) process.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In a 2001, William Weschler, former special adviser to the U.S. secretary of the treasury during the Bush administration, described the growing risks of transnational crime and corruption, noting that “[n]owhere was this more evident than in the post-Soviet states. Funds from organized crime, government kickbacks, widespread tax evasion, the rape of natural resources, and old-fashioned legal capital flight all went to banks promising secrecy.” He further notes that in 1998, in the midst of the ruble’s financial crisis, over $74 billion moved from Russian banks to offshore havens, like Nauru and Cyprus.</p> +<p>The Chinese system has several advantages over the U.S. system, as well as some disadvantages discussed later in the chapter. The government’s centralized power and decisionmaking process help drive whole-of-government strategies. By linking the defense budget to GDP, China can reliably forecast and plan future defense spending. China’s military-civil fusion allows the state to direct university-based research to prioritized science and technology areas. China also places multiple bets in defense research and development by funding numerous concepts, choosing winners, and producing systems and platforms in large numbers.</p> -<p>By the early 2000s, Washington was taking note of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s burgeoning relationship with the country’s oligarchs — the prominent businessmen who accumulated billions of dollars in wealth during Russia’s economic liberalization throughout the 1990s. This prompted concerns over the rise of a perceived “mafia state,” the influence of its capture of strategic industries, and the role that the international financial system played in facilitating corruption, tax evasion, and money laundering.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KLsgYCp.png" alt="image03" /> +_▲ <strong>Figure 2.2 The 10 Largest Defense Companies Globally by Total Revenue, 2022.</strong> Source: <a href="https://people.defensenews.com/top-100/">“Top 100 for 2023,” Defense News</a>.</p> -<p>A common scheme for some of the country’s largest enterprises was to move profits offshore to jurisdictions like Cyprus, through complex shell companies, only to return the money disguised as foreign investment, which was taxed at lower rates. In fact, a 2019 report by the International Monetary Fund found that nearly 25 percent of Russia’s real foreign direct investment was actually domestically owned — a truly massive share compared to mostly negligible amounts in developed countries.</p> +<p>Table 2.1 provides an overview of U.S. and Chinese capabilities in such areas as the defense sector and maritime, air, land, and missile capabilities. In addition to these categories, China has also focused on building its network-centric warfare capabilities to fight a joint campaign against the United States. For example, the PLA has developed a concept called “multi-domain precision warfare” (多域精确战). The operational concept is designed to leverage a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network; rapidly coordinate firepower using artificial intelligence, big data, and other emerging technologies; and identify and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. China has also made advances in other areas, including space and cyber. Taken together, China’s production of major combat assets like ships and planes — as well as its creation of the concepts and supporting infrastructure necessary to fight a twenty-first-century adversary — suggest a military and industrial base increasingly prepared for conflict with the United States.</p> -<p>The cheap sale of state resources in the early 1990s also saw the growth of state-connected smuggling operations, such as the global arms trafficking operation overseen by Viktor Bout. Bout took advantage of cheap cargo planes to run a logistical operation moving cheap arms to warlords, dictators, terrorist groups, and war zones around the world. He too relied on the infrastructure and laxity facilitating the more legitimate side of globalization — registering companies and planes in jurisdictions with weak oversight and exploiting loose regulatory environments and jurisdictions rife with corruption.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Bm9uKz3.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2.1 Chinese and U.S. Military Capabilities Note Principal surface combatants were defined as aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes.</strong> Source: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2295206">Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 1 (January 2, 2024): 49–72</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2156686">Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 1 (January 2, 2023): 28–52</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685">“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2023</a>; <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “World Military Expenditure Reaches New Record High as European Spending Surges,” Press release, April 24, 2023</a>; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China; and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Military-Balance-2024/for-Strategic-Studies-IISS/p/book/9781032780047">International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024 (London: Routledge, 2024)</a>.</em></p> -<h3 id="lessons-learned">Lessons Learned</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NK2QBq8.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.3 Principal Surface and Subsurface Combatants Operated by the PLAN.</strong> Source: Data sourced from the 2004–2024 editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.</em></p> -<p>The overall takeaway is that Russia has benefited from decades of honing its smuggling, illicit procurement, and money laundering craft. Asking what Russia can learn from sanctions evaders like North Korea and Iran is the wrong question. Rather, experts and policymakers should be asking why has Russia — and its renewed partners North Korea and Iran — been able to continue to exploit the same trade and financial infrastructure over the past 30 years?</p> +<h4 id="maritime">Maritime</h4> -<p>The answer is neither convenient nor comfortable for the West. The global infrastructures that allow Russia, Iran, and North Korea to skirt sanctions are the same that allow narcotics trafficking, terrorist financing, and corruption, among other illicit industries, to proliferate and flourish. Leaky export-control regimes, jurisdictions that permit anonymous or pseudo-anonymous corporate structures, and weak legal institutions are all key contributors.</p> +<p>The main beneficiary of China’s defense industrial growth has been the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), especially through a growth in China’s shipbuilding capabilities. China’s ability to rapidly build large numbers of ships represents a possible advantage in a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. China is now the world’s largest shipbuilder by a significant margin. It has a shipbuilding capacity that is more than 230 times larger than that of the United States and sufficient to build 23 million tons of vessels compared to less than 100,000 tons in the United States. According to U.S. Navy estimates, a single Chinese shipyard currently has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined. The PLAN’s growth has made it the largest navy in the world. But the U.S. Navy likely remains more capable by most measures, including physical indicators like tonnage or Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells and operational competencies such as anti-submarine warfare, joint operations, and long-range targeting.</p> -<p>These problems are not new or unknown to policymakers.</p> +<p>As shown in Figure 2.3, the PLAN has been growing larger since at least 2006, with increases coming in notable categories: the steady increase in corvette construction since 2014, the completion of the Type 002 aircraft carrier Shandong (山东) and the Type 003 carrierFujian (福建舰) in 2017 and 2022 respectively, and the construction of eight Type 055 destroyers (designated by NATO as a cruiser) since 2019. Some of these ships will grow the Chinese fleet, but others will be swapped with older comparable systems, modernizing the PLAN without increasing its size. However, the overall trend is toward greater size and capability.</p> -<p>Over the past two decades, international organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) — the international body responsible for setting anti-financial crime standards — have become increasingly influential and vocal in establishing robust anti-money laundering norms and bringing much-needed attention to threats to the global financial system. In April 2022, the FATF published its “Report on the State of Effectiveness and Compliance With the FATF Standards,” which shows that, overall, countries have made significant progress increasing technical compliance with its anti-money laundering recommendations — satisfactory compliance has risen to 76 percent, compared to 36 percent in 2012.</p> +<p>The PLAN still trails the U.S. Navy in other indicators of military might. China may have more ships than the United States, but they are smaller. The aggregate displacement of the PLAN’s surface warships is a little more than a third that of the U.S. Navy. The PLAN is also capable of carrying roughly half as many missiles as the U.S. Navy, indicating a relative disadvantage in firepower.</p> -<p>But it is important to recognize that Russia is a criminal state and has little regard for a rules-based system. In February 2023, the FATF suspended Russia’s membership in the organization, noting that Russia’s actions “run counter to the FATF core principles aiming to promote security, safety, and the integrity of the global financial system.” While this can be viewed as a significant political move, it has about as much pragmatic effect as the FATF asking Pablo Escobar’s drug cartel to implement anti-money laundering standards.</p> +<p>That said, both gaps are closing, and China would have the advantage of fighting close to its borders in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or South or East China Seas, where its naval power will be supplemented by planes and missiles launched from the Chinese mainland as well as resupply with munitions, weapons systems, and spare parts from the mainland. In contrast, the United States maintains significant global commitments beyond East Asia, which will limit its ability to bring to bear the full power of the U.S. Navy and other services against China in conflicts around the Taiwan Strait or South or East China Seas. The United States maintains an unchallenged global advantage at sea, but its advantage is eroding near the Chinese mainland.</p> -<p>Russia will continue to do what it has shown it is fully capable of doing for decades — finding and exploiting weak points within global trade and financial systems. Unfortunately, there is no quick fix. Time and again, strong legal and democratic institutions prove the best antidote to curing the rot that permits transnational crime — including the circumvention of sanctions — to spread.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GVT3IUR.png" alt="image06" /></p> -<p>What can be done in the short term? First, states imposing sanctions against Russia should broaden transnational enforcement cooperation — especially in areas that may not be directly associated with sanctions. Consider, for example, the Global South’s general reluctance to implement Western sanctions against Russia. Rather than coaxing or threatening these countries with extraterritorial sanctions, substantive engagement over counter-transnational crime enforcement may ultimately help achieve the same objective.</p> +<p>Even if China’s fleet does not yet threaten U.S. naval supremacy across the globe, PLAN expansion will likely continue. The number of Chinese ballistic missile submarines, nuclear attack submarines, and large surface combatants may double by 2030, according to U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence assessments. Chinese shipbuilding facilities have been expanding for years, with China’s Changxing Island shipbuilding base growing to approximately 11.5 square kilometers by 2022, about 64 percent larger than China’s historic Jiangnan Shipyard. The expansion is slated to continue, with an additional 4.3 square kilometers planned for the future. Nor is Changxing alone. China has dozens of commercial shipyards that are significantly larger than the biggest U.S. shipyards in size and throughput. Many of these shipyards are used for both military and civilian construction, meaning that China would be able to surge its military shipbuilding capacity more readily than the United States. The result is that China can produce far more ships than the United States, which will allow it to increasingly challenge U.S. dominance, threaten U.S. interests outside of Asia, and potentially prevail in a war of attrition at sea.</p> -<p>Even China recently noted its willingness to enhance bilateral cooperation, share intelligence, provide mutual legal assistance, and hunt down and recover illicit assets related to transnational organized crime. While these are areas not directly related to sanctions implementation, they are inextricably tied to the infrastructures that enable Russia’s sanctions circumvention.</p> +<p>Similar trends hold for comparisons of the U.S. and Chinese submarine fleet. The PLAN operates about the same number of submarines as the U.S. Navy, but they are much less powerful and of lower quality. China operates only 12 nuclear submarines (about a quarter of its subsurface fleet), while the United States exclusively operates nuclear submarines. Chinese submarines are growing more numerous and capable, but the United States plans to increase its submarine production in the coming decade and will probably still maintain its advantage if current expectations hold.</p> -<p>Second, the corporate service providers, attorneys, and accountants that Russia and others rely on to circumvent sanctions should be held to account. The Biden administration recently announced its intention to target financial institutions anywhere in the world that facilitate significant transactions that contribute to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. While it remains to be seen whether and to what extent the White House makes good on its threats, the other enablers of Russia’s war machine should be included in the crosshairs.</p> +<p>How long it will maintain this advantage remains unclear. China’s submarine industrial base is expanding rapidly. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates a high rate of Chinese submarine production, projecting that the PLAN “submarine force will grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units [from 59] by 2035 despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls.” This translates to a rate of completion much faster than one new submarine every eight months, although how much faster is unclear. The U.S. Navy currently plans to buy 15 to 17 new submarines over the next 15 years, which means that the United States will produce fewer submarines but greater aggregate tonnage and combat power.</p> -<p>In sum, focusing on the “lessons learned” from implementing sanctions against Iran and North Korea to fortify sanctions against Russia may lead to sanctions myopia. Russia’s long history of embargo-busting, exploitation of the global financial system, and criminal state capture show the country is more than capable of circumventing Western-imposed sanctions. However, closing loopholes that facilitate smuggling, money laundering, and transnational crime will help sanctions to bite across the board.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2XRSgvB.png" alt="image07" /></p> -<hr /> +<p>The United States’ production advantage is likely eroding. The anticipated rate of U.S. nuclear submarine production only exceeds Chinese nuclear submarine production over the previous 15 years by three to five units. Because China has almost certainly improved its ability to produce nuclear submarines since 2010, it can probably match or surpass the United States’ rate of production over the next 15 years if it continues to produce submarines at current levels of quality, although improvements in its submarine quality might slow production. This rate of production suggests that U.S. dominance under the sea is not assured in the longer term, although the U.S. subsurface fleet will remain a key strategic advantage in the coming decade despite the PLAN’s expansion.</p> -<p><strong>Aaron Arnold</strong> is a Senior Associate Fellow with the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI, where his work focuses on sanctions and proliferation financing.</p> +<p>Overall, China’s economic and defense industrial growth has spurred major expansion and improvement of the PLAN. The CCP’s navy remains beset by major issues, some of which are outlined in a later section of this chapter. But China has transformed in the past few decades into the world’s most productive naval industrial base. Given the role that naval forces would play in any war between the United States and China, China’s ability to produce warships suggests that a prolonged war at sea between China and the United States or a U.S. partner would play to a key Chinese strength, although that is far from a guarantee of victory.</p> -<p><strong>Daniel Salisbury</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.</p>Aaron Arnold and Daniel SalisburyMoscow’s long practice and tolerance of illicit activities makes Russia well placed to bust Western sanctions. Two years on from Putin’s illegal invasion, what more can be done?【黎智英案・審訊第卅六日】2024-03-01T12:00:00+08:002024-03-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-36<ul> - <li>陳沛敏：黎智英對示威者非和平手段諒解、認同「和勇不分」</li> -</ul> +<h4 id="air-china-has-spent-the-last-few-decades">Air China has spent the last few decades</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>dramatically increasing the rate and quality of its military aircraft production. The United States continues to operate the world’s largest and most advanced fleet of fighter aircraft, but its long-term ability to dominate the air is more uncertain than at any time since the end of the Cold War. China has been rapidly modernizing its air forces, and its ability to produce military aircraft continues to increase as the country reduces its dependence on foreign engines.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kDpCygS.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>China operates the third-largest fleet of military aircraft in the world, after only the United States and Russia. The number of Chinese combat aircraft has not grown dramatically over the past 20 years, but China’s air fleet has grown significantly more capable. The air forces operated by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN consist of approximately 2,250 combat aircraft, up slightly from 2,120 a decade ago. As shown in Figure 2.4, those planes are increasingly modern. The PLA had approximately 800 fourth- and fifth-generation combat aircraft at the end of 2016. It had almost 1,500 at the end of 2023. China has also produced at least 200 fifth-generation J-20 fighters since the airframe’s debut in 2010, with rates of J-20 completion set to increase in the coming years. These numbers still trail those of the United States, which operates more than 3,300 fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, but they represent an impressive rate of military aircraft production. The United States still retains a major advantage in the number of fifth-generation aircraft, with active-duty units operating 165 F-22 and 606 F-35 aircraft.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（1日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第36日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。陳供稱，在2019年之後，黎會以諒解態度看待示威者的非和平手段，例如7月1日示威者衝擊立法會之後，黎想《蘋果》報導多些年青人心聲，從而「令公眾都會諒解，同明白點解佢哋會咁做」。陳又指，基於對運動的支持，黎亦會認同「和勇不分」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/z61n6dY.png" alt="image08" /></p> -<p>已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第15天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻繼續盤問。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/k9GokHQ.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.4 Fixed-Wing, Crewed Combat Aircraft Operated by the PLA.</strong> Note: Retrofitted aircraft are classified as their original generation type due to lack of reliable data on when retrofitting occurred. Source: Data sourced from the 2009–2024 editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.</em></p> -<h4 id="辯方封面報導指黎智英出賣壹週刊-社長未有因此被處罰">辯方：封面報導指黎智英「出賣」壹週刊 社長未有因此被處罰</h4> +<p>Rapid Chinese modernization will likely continue, and China is closing the production gap with the United States. Recent estimates of J-20 production suggest that China is producing more than 100 fifth-generation J-20 airframes per year. Although this is lower than the expected annual F-35 production of 156 airframes per year starting in 2023, the production rate is much closer than has previously been the case and actual J-20 production numbers remain secret. China has also nearly tripled the number of its more advanced J-10C, J-16, and J-20 aircraft in use over the past decade, suggesting a high rate of production. A major factor in China’s improving domestic manufacturing capability is the Chinese-made WS-10 and WS-20 engines, which are replacing imported Russian engines in Chinese aircraft. However, China does not dominate global aircraft production the way it does shipbuilding. The United States and Europe maintain a global duopoly on large passenger aircraft. In contrast, China’s first domestic airliner took its initial commercial flight in June 2023 and is dependent on U.S. and European suppliers for parts.</p> -<p>辯方向陳沛敏展示2017年7月20日的《壹週刊》封面，題為〈出賣壹週刊內幕〉。辯方問陳，是否同意封面上的黎智英黑白大頭照看似不討好（unflattering）。惟法官杜麗冰打斷指這是一個很主觀的形容。</p> +<p>There are also indications that China is seeking to take advantage of its legacy fleet in new ways. China has been steadily retiring its fleet of second- and third-generation J-6, J-7, and J-8 fighter aircraft, retooling some into UASs, which would boost the size of the Chinese air fleet at low cost. This could allow China to absorb much greater attrition of aircraft in a Taiwan contingency than its industrial base or pilot training systems could otherwise support. However, these UASs remain unproven, and it would be premature to include them in assessments of Chinese airpower. What they demonstrate instead is an apparent commitment to experimentation and an effort to multiply the advantages conferred by China’s rapid military modernization.</p> -<p>辯方則指，該期封面似乎指稱黎智英出賣由他一手創辦的《壹週刊》，當時負責此封面的《壹週刊》社長黃麗裳，並沒有因此而被處罰。惟陳表示她對《壹週刊》的內部事務不太清楚。辯方則指，根據公司年報所述，黃於1998年2月入職，直至2017年10月，之後於2018年重新入職，這是不爭議的紀錄。</p> +<h4 id="missiles">Missiles</h4> -<p>法官杜麗冰一度指，「出賣」的中文意思未必帶有背叛或負面的意思，有可能純粹指「出售」。法官李運騰留意到，封面標題中的「出賣」兩字是黃色，不肯定是否有特別意思。辯方回應指，標題可以有很多字眼選擇，但是他們選擇了使用「出賣」一詞，如此措辭至少是引人注目（eye-catching）。</p> +<p>Chinese missile capabilities are a key element of its “assassin’s mace” (杀手锏) approach to combat. The ability to use a multimillion-dollar missile to neutralize a $13 billion aircraft carrier represents an advantage in a prolonged industrial conflict. Some mathematical modeling and wargames indicate that the ability to fire large numbers of missiles is an important determinant of attrition in a conflict between the United States and China. This makes the expansion of China’s missile industry an important advantage in such a conflict. The Chinese arsenal is formidable, and it consists of a rapidly growing ballistic missile stockpile and a variety of cruise missiles for which production rates are difficult to determine. China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile program in the world. China also fielded its first missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2022.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/i5Bn6yN.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p>China’s missile industry has been producing at a high rate. For at least the last four years, China has launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of the world combined. While the number of China’s ballistic missiles is difficult to quantify, the U.S. Department of Defense assesses roughly a 200 percent increase in the number of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) between 2016 and 2022. Differences in methodology make the exact figure highly uncertain, but the growth of China’s missile forces is unquestionable. China’s growing number of launchers suggests a high rate of production, as highlighted in Figure 2.5. In the last five years alone, China’s active ballistic missile launchers increased by about 15 percent, with the number of active ICBM launchers doubling and the number of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launchers increasing almost fivefold. This increase follows years of improvements in the Chinese ballistic missile industry.</p> -<h4 id="辯方指媒體有特定立場並不是問題-陳沛敏同意">辯方指媒體有特定立場並不是問題 陳沛敏同意</h4> +<p>The composition of China’s missile forces has also been changing as the Chinese missile industry produces more advanced missiles. The decrease in missile launchers recorded between 2021 and 2022 is the result of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) losing several DF-16 and DF-21 missile brigades and gaining two DF-31AG brigades and one DF-17 brigade. The DF-16 and DF-21 are short-range (SRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), respectively. While the DF-16 has been employed only since the mid-2010s, the DF-21 has been in service since the 1990s. The DF-31AG is an upgraded ICBM capable of off-road movement and requiring fewer support vehicles, and the DF-17 is a MRBM that carries an advanced HGV. This process is still ongoing, with the PLARF in the process of constructing at least two more DF-17 brigades along with one IRBM brigade and five ICBM brigades.</p> -<p>辯方談及新聞角度，問陳是否同意不同報紙或媒體均可以有不同報導角度。陳同意。辯方舉例指，《紐約時報》立場上比較偏向自由主義（liberal），《華爾街日報》立場則偏向保守（conservative）。法官杜麗冰打斷指，辯方的例子未必恰當，因以上兩間媒體的取態隨著不同時期而改變，只能說他們較支持美國民主黨或共和黨，而不能說他們較傾向自由主義或保守。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SrBKtxH.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.5 Ballistic Missile Launchers Operated by the PLARF.</strong> Source: Data sourced from the 2010–2024 editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.</em></p> -<p>辯方遂以本地報紙為例，《蘋果》在2020年的時候較傾向自由主義（liberal）和對於政府較批判性。陳確認：「可以咁講。」</p> +<p>The DF-17 in particular presents a greater threat than a traditional ballistic missile because of the ability of its HGV to travel faster than Mach 5 and its greater degree of maneuverability after reentering the atmosphere. One analysis estimates that China will field between 108 and 144 DF-17 launchers by 2028, at least doubling, if not quintupling, the number of active HGV systems in just five years. In contrast, the United States is still struggling to field hypersonic missiles, with none of the prototypes it planned to field in 2023 arriving on schedule. U.S. delays may not stem from defense industrial inferiority but from more ambitious requirements. Nonetheless, China’s modernization remains a threat to U.S. freedom of action.</p> -<p>辯方續指，《明報》和《經濟日報》則稍微偏向保守和支持政府。陳則笑言：「我唔想演繹其他傳媒嘅路線。」辯方指，《文匯報》和《大公報》則是比較極端的例子，兩者都是支持政府。陳回答：「我觀察到都係嘅。」她亦同意辯方所指媒體有特定立場並不是問題。</p> +<p>Chinese ballistic missile producers have been expanding their facilities and hiring more workers. This includes producers of missiles, engines, and launch vehicles, such as the Capital Aerospace Machinery Company, and research and development bodies, including the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s Fourth Academy. This increase comes alongside a 20-year effort to increase efficiency and reduce waste by consolidating China’s missile industry. As with China’s shipbuilding industry, these expansions suggest increasing production capacity and quality. Whether in the context of a prolonged industrial war or long-term strategic competition, China’s ability to produce large numbers of missiles, especially advanced hypersonic missiles, will represent a source of strength.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/beTg6Dk.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<h4 id="land">Land</h4> -<h4 id="陳沛敏2019年後黎智英對非和平手法諒解">陳沛敏：2019年後黎智英對非和平手法諒解</h4> +<p>The PLA ground forces have not benefited from increases in Chinese defense spending as much as the country’s naval, air, and missile forces. Still, China’s ground forces are more numerous and operate more main battle tanks and artillery pieces than their U.S. counterparts, and the People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) has been modernizing its ground equipment with domestic platforms over the past five years.</p> -<p>辯方盤問完畢。其後控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤作出覆問。陳早前供稱黎智英在2019年之前主張和平示威，控方問陳，在2019年之後，黎的立場又如何呢？陳回答：「我係會覺得，佢對於非和平嗰啲手法，佢係會用一種諒解嘅態度囉」，例如7月1日示威者衝擊立法會，事件在好多人眼中並不是和平，「佢畀我嘅指示係，我會理解為，因為佢唔想個運動消失或者停止啦」，所以黎會想《蘋果》報導多些年青人心聲，「令公眾都會諒解，同明白點解佢哋會咁做。」</p> +<p>The PLAA is the world’s largest ground force. Over the past five years, it has not meaningfully increased in size, but it has grown heavier, adding nine armored brigades while reducing the number of light and mechanized infantry brigades. The equipping of these new units is ongoing, but open-source analysis indicates that 70 percent of the PLAA’s main battle tanks are now modern and that more than 60 percent of its heavy and medium combined arms brigades are equipped with modern vehicles. These vehicles are Chinese products rather than imports — including newly developed tanks, self-propelled howitzers, and assault vehicles. This is part of China’s strategy of moving its military from a “quantity-scale” type to a “quality-efficiency” type.</p> -<p>陳又指，當時示威者之間有一句口號「和勇不分」，即和平和勇武示威者要團結，「咁黎生同樣，因為對個運動個支持，都會認同呢個講法囉。」她又確認早前提及按照黎的觀點來行事，當中的觀點包括上述提及的觀點。</p> +<p>China has also developed several capabilities in the past 10 years that will probably increase the PLAA’s role in a Taiwan contingency. The first are helicopters in the PLAA’s aviation arm. China has been trying to improve the ability of its helicopter units to operate as part of a joint campaign. China has also been steadily increasing the number of Z-10, Z-19, Z-20, and Z-8 helicopters for the past five years, as shown in Figure 2.6. PLAA helicopters were observed rearming and refueling onboard PLAN vessels for the first time in 2022. These capabilities could play an important role in an invasion of Taiwan.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pbnN2n0.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> +<p>A second important system is the PCH191 multiple rocket launcher, a modular system capable of firing a variety of rocket types. Long-range precision strike plays a key role in China’s military strategy in the Western Pacific. The launcher is capable of firing low-cost rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles, and land attack missiles. The additional range offered by the system and its ability to strike ships will likely increase the role the PLAA can play in a Taiwan invasion, making it a key contributor to fires delivery against the island and naval forces attempting to operate in the Taiwan Strait. The apparent low price of the system’s rockets could also give the PLAA an important role to play in a prolonged conflict involving land forces.</p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏指報導要基於事實-確保編採自主乃靠同事意識">陳沛敏指報導要基於事實 確保編採自主乃靠同事意識</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jqdumNZ.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.6 Select Helicopters Operated by the PLAA.</strong> Source Data sourced from the 2011–2024 editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.</em></p> -<p>辯方早前盤問時提及《蘋果日報編輯室約章》，控方指約章於2019年4月1日生效，陳確認。其中第五條指出「新聞報道秉持真實、公正、客觀、獨立原則，這並非等於將所有各方觀點、所有資料全部鋪陳出來，而是不受任何政府、商業、宗教或其他利益左右」。陳沛敏同意不同的報紙可以持有不同的政治立場，可以在社論中討論哪一個政治系統較好，但是第五條所指的「新聞報道」是基於事實真相去做報導，所以新聞報導與評論文章是不同的。假設有人將評論文章投稿，該文章明顯是表達觀點和立場，但新聞報導則是基於事實。</p> +<p>The PLAA has benefited far less from China’s military-industrial development than the PLA’s other combat arms, but it remains the world’s largest ground force and its equipment has grown heavier and more modern over the past five years. Although the skill and technology employed by a military are major determinants of its combat power, the war in Ukraine should remind strategists that quantity still has a quality of its own. The sheer size of the PLAA remains an asset in a prolonged interstate war, especially if one of its neighbors is forced by domestic U.S. politics to fight alone.</p> -<p>法官杜麗冰問陳是否同意，不論報館的立場如何，他們都應該「秉持真實、公正、客觀、獨立原則」。陳同意。</p> +<p>Overall, China’s defense industrial base has grown ever more capable of waging war. Given the tendency of interstate war to develop into a contest of industrial production, the rise of Chinese defense industrial capacity shifts the regional, if not yet global, balance of power toward China. But just how much it has shifted depends on more than just the number of ships, planes, and missiles China can make each year. China’s industrial base and the military end users of its products have numerous weaknesses that cannot be solved by the expansion of a shipyard or an increase in jet fighter production. It is to those weaknesses that this report now turns.</p> -<p>法官李運騰問到，《蘋果》有否設立任何機制去確保「編採自主」。陳一邊思考一邊表示：「其實都係靠同事自己嘅意識囉⋯⋯啫係 awareness。」</p> +<h4 id="chinese-weaknesses">Chinese Weaknesses</h4> -<h4 id="陳沛敏黎智英支持罷工-員工關注能否行使罷工權">陳沛敏：黎智英支持罷工 員工關注能否行使罷工權</h4> +<p>China’s defense industry is formidable but has at least four weaknesses: an overreliance on foreign imports, uneven quality of systems, corruption, and a lack of allies and partners. Nevertheless, the size and opacity of China’s defense industry make it hard for external observers to assess with complete fidelity. The result is that there may also be a variety of weaknesses that go unseen by both CCP and foreign analysts, weaknesses that could prove pivotal in a major war.</p> -<p>控方展示陳沛敏與時任執行總編輯林文宗之間的訊息紀錄，2019年8月1日陳向林說：「我已跟社長打了招呼，星期一報紙頭版開天窗，並會有段文字交代一下我們支持罷工，但基於社會角色欲罷不能之類。」</p> +<p>First, China has supply chain vulnerabilities in its defense industrial base and relies on foreign inputs, although China has reduced its reliance on some foreign parts. For example, China’s current diesel submarine fleet relies to some extent on German engines. Airplane engines are another important area of weakness, although China has prioritized developing its own high-quality aerospace engines. China also depends on integrated circuits — computer chips with military and civilian uses. While China is a major exporter of some circuits, it is also a net importer. The United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all major net exporters, particularly for high-end chips. Chinese chips remain lower quality than those produced abroad, and U.S. export control regulations enacted in late 2022 limit or effectively cut off China’s access to the expertise, equipment, and export markets required to rapidly advance its chip industry.</p> -<p>陳沛敏補充相關事件背景，公司的人都知道黎支持罷工和有叫張劍虹寫「反送中」和「罷工、罷課、罷市」毛筆字，有部份中層和前線的同事提出「可唔可以行使佢哋嘅罷工權呢？」，「咁我哋管理層呢，就覺得我哋作為傳媒嘅角色，我哋唔可以話我哋參加罷工而唔出報紙。咁我哋拗咗好耐呢件事，我哋最後決定咁樣處理」，即頭版留白。</p> +<p>A comparable weakness exists in China’s dependence on imported manufacturing equipment. Chinese machine tools perform worse than foreign tools on several metrics, contributing to low rates of domestic machine tools used in high-tech industries such as aerospace. The result is that high-end manufacturing still depends on imported manufacturing equipment, most of which comes from U.S. partners Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The result of this dependence on foreign parts and manufacturing equipment is that the United States will have opportunities to weaken Chinese military production by cutting off imports through diplomatic or military measures if the two countries go to war.</p> -<p>控方問到頭版「開天窗」是誰人的主意。陳回答：「係管理層商討出嚟呢個方法，既解釋到點解我哋唔可以參加罷工，但又表達咗我哋嘅態度囉。」</p> +<p>The extent to which China can continue to decrease its reliance on foreign parts and tools will be a key determinant of China’s actual military capacity, but the CCP is determined to do so. China is seeking to decrease its dependence on foreign parts and equipment. It has steadily reduced its arms imports in recent decades, as shown in Figure 2.7. Especially notable are the decreases in aircraft imports after major investments in weapons development programs in the mid-2000s. Equally notable is the rise in engine imports as China has expanded its air forces without the ability to produce high-quality domestic aerospace engines, especially after 2017. That trend also may be coming to an end due to breakthroughs in development of aircraft engines using novel techniques and the direct acquisition of foreign firms such as Germany’s Thielert Aircraft, Continental Aerospace Technologies, Superior Air Parts, and Diamond Aircraft. The development of indigenous replacements will be a long and uneven process, however. Until it grows less dependent on imports or improves its relationship with major European and Asian producers, China’s ability to replace destroyed systems in a major war will be limited either by military or political constraints on such imports.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lOXAn4A.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kSLPsAG.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.7 Chinese Defense Imports (Select Categories Displayed).</strong> Source: <a href="https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685">“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2023</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="黎智英訊息稱先要想好策略對付不用魯莽-陳沛敏未細心思考策略所指為何">黎智英訊息稱「先要想好策略對付，不用魯莽」 陳沛敏：未細心思考「策略」所指為何</h4> +<p>Second, the quality of some Chinese systems is lower than that of their Western counterparts. For example, China struggles to design specialized sound-absorbing coatings, deal with vibration-suppression issues created by steam turbines, and decrease the sonar signature of its submarine hull designs. Chinese submarines will therefore be easier to find and destroy than U.S. submarines, rendering them relatively ineffective in a conflict with the United States. Depending on how widespread the problems with Chinese systems are, China’s military could be far less impressive in reality than it is on paper. If China’s systems are far less survivable or lethal than U.S. equivalents, then its productive advantages could be negated or their effects significantly reduced.</p> -<p>2020年7月1日，黎智英向陳傳送訊息稱看到《國安法》條文後「嚇了一跳」，又籲「先要想好策略對付，不用魯莽」。控方問陳，黎所指的「策略」是什麼、「魯莽」是指什麼。陳則指黎當時「就咁好空泛咁講完啦」，而時任社長張劍虹曾經提醒他們報導敏感字眼、敏感題目時要謹慎，因此她理解「不要魯莽」是這個意思。</p> +<p>Third, corruption within the CCP, PLA, and Chinese defense industrial base is likely another weakness. Corruption has a negative impact on military effectiveness, as the Russian military discovered to its detriment during its invasion of Ukraine. The extent of corruption throughout the Chinese defense sector is unclear. A spate of corruption investigations within the defense sector took place in 2022 and 2023, most notably in connection with the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, but the opacity of the CCP makes it difficult to determine whether the investigations are truly driven by rooting out corruption or by ulterior domestic political motives. Corruption within the PLA itself has historically been more widespread, with reports of corruption surrounding promotions being common.</p> -<p>控方追問黎所稱「對付」是要對付什麼？陳表示當時沒有細心思考要「對付」什麼，因為黎之後稱「劍虹已有方案」，所以她理解張劍虹稍後會跟她詳細解釋，因而「冇深入諗黎生講嘅策略係乜嘢」。</p> +<p>Fourth, China’s lack of major allies and partners is detrimental to its defense industrial base. China will likely benefit much less from its network than will the United States. South Korea and Japan have the second- and third-largest shipbuilding industries in the world, and both have among the largest navies in the world by total tonnage. The Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security partnership is already deepening defense cooperation between the participant countries in nuclear-powered submarines, and it could expand to other areas under AUKUS Pillar Two as well. NATO is increasingly focused on China, naming it as a “challenge” in its 2022 Strategic Concept. While China has some partners, they lack the industrial and financial power of the U.S. alliance network. Russia will be a net drain on China’s industrial capacity as long as it remains bogged down in Ukraine. North Korea and Iran’s economies have been crippled by sanctions, and their arms industries are focused on lower-end systems that are unlikely to help China prevail in a high-end conventional fight in the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TtfrKdC.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> +<h4 id="operational-uncertainties">Operational Uncertainties</h4> -<h4 id="報導指陳與黎共事多年不影響新聞判斷-陳關於法庭報導重點應否落在黎身上">報導指陳與黎共事多年不影響新聞判斷 陳：關於法庭報導重點應否落在黎身上</h4> +<p>The PLA likely has a variety of operational weaknesses in translating defense capabilities to effectiveness, though China is attempting to address them. Overall, the PLA suffers from what it calls “peace disease” (和平病), its lack of combat experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Its soldiers, equipment, and doctrine are not battle-tested, and both the PLA and external observers have identified several areas in which PLA performance may fall short.</p> -<p>辯方早前問及黎智英的觀點會否影響到陳沛敏的新聞判斷，而辯方引述2021年6月18日刊登的《蘋果》報導〈夫︰她冷靜堅強鎮定 陳沛敏選擇留在災難現場〉，當中提及同年4月1日，黎智英、民主黨創黨主席李柱銘和前公民黨立法會議員吳靄儀等人因為非法集結罪成，並指：「敏姐說，雖然與黎智英共事多年，不影響新聞判斷，當日頭條重點是資深大律師中資歷最深的李柱銘首次被判罪成。」</p> +<p>The first problem China faces is its ability to achieve “jointness” — tight coordination of the actions of multiple services across multiple domains to maximize combat power. Structural obstacles within China’s command and control systems make joint operations problematic. The PLA has created theater commands for ground, naval, and air forces, leaving the Central Military Commission responsible for command of the PLARF and People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). The result is that China’s ground, air, and maritime forces would be part of a joint command, while its space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities would be part of separate command systems. Cultural issues also abound. Chinese analysts point to interservice rivalry as a major impediment to cooperation between the PLA services. CCP and PLA leadership have sought to reduce these obstacles, but it is unclear how successful these reforms have been in practice.</p> -<p>控方問該次報導的背景。陳解釋是關於一宗非法集結的報導，該案件中黎智英是其中一個被定罪的被告，有編輯詢問報導重點是否應該落在黎身上，但她與其他同事則覺得，另一名被告李柱銘是首次被判罪成，所以報導重點應該放在李身上。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The PLA suffers from what it calls “peace disease” (和平病), its lack of combat experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>翻查資料，黎智英、李柱銘等人牽涉8.18「流水式集會」而被裁定組織及參與未經批准集結罪成。相關上訴程序仍然進行中。</p> +<p>A second challenge is in the individual levels of competence exhibited by China’s military personnel. Chinese media identify the “Five Incapables,” a set of shortfalls in command competence. PLA assessments state that some commanders cannot “(1) judge situations, (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions, (3) make operational decisions, (4) deploy forces, and (5) manage unexpected situations.” China has consistently attempted to improve its training over the past several years, in part to keep up with its rate of industrial production and to reduce operational weaknesses. In late 2022, for example, the PLAAF expanded its training of pilots for fourth-generation aircraft to a second of its three flight academies, which will probably make its training more efficient and increase PLAAF readiness. PLAAF training prioritizes capabilities that would be vital to war with the United States, including joint air defense, electronic warfare, combat sustainment, long-range offensive strike, and maritime strike. It has also sought to improve its corps of noncommissioned officers, the backbone of any modern military. The success of these reforms is likely uneven.</p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏質疑網上節目參考頭條新聞加入評論環節不符認真報導風格-惟黎堅持">陳沛敏質疑網上節目參考《頭條新聞》加入評論環節不符認真報導風格 惟黎堅持</h4> +<p>Third is logistics. The PLA would be dependent on airlift and sealift in any conflict with the United States. According to some wargames, U.S. attrition of Chinese sealift is a crucial variable determining the outcome of hostilities in Taiwan. Logistics is likely a major weakness in the PLAA, and a lesser one in the PLAAF and PLAN. In a Taiwan scenario, a further difficulty could be created by the lack of sufficient ground transportation within Taiwan due to a lack of heavy equipment transporters. Another constraint on PLA logistics would likely be the airfield network, which would reduce both combat sorties and available airlift in a Taiwan scenario. The PLA can also expect the United States or its allies to target at least some components in its logistics network, particularly sealift.</p> -<p>控方向陳沛敏展示通訊軟件 Slack 群組「港蘋報紙對話」的訊息紀錄，其中2019年9月的「飯盒會」會議議程包括討論「最近公眾最關心的8.31」、「福健幫起底」、「勇武升級的考量」和「可供讀者收藏的百日特刊」等。陳確認「百日特刊」是指《自由之夏》。</p> +<p>A fourth challenge is anti-submarine warfare. China is attempting to improve its anti-submarine warfare capabilities, but it is still likely years away from being able to consistently find and destroy submarines in deep water. The highly variable acoustic properties of the ocean environment make it difficult to detect, identify, track, and engage enemy submarines. Anti-submarine warfare requires national and joint intelligence collection platforms because of the complexities of the operating environment, the size of the maritime area that needs to be covered, and the overall mission to find, fix, track, target, and potentially engage enemy submarines. Some assessments suggest that the PLAN has underinvested in anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which have largely been neglected during modernization. Numerous PLAN ships lack organic sensors, such as towed-array and variable-depth sonar systems, and the PLA as a whole lacks sufficient helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft comparable to the U.S. Navy’s P-8.</p> -<p>2020年5月6日的群組訊息顯示，黎智英要求「飯盒會」改期舉行。控方問為何要改期。陳指因為張劍虹未能準備該次「飯盒會」，她確認後來改期進行的「飯盒會」上有討論到《蘋果》英文版。</p> +<p>China likely faces other operational challenges. For example, Chinese military thinkers may have underestimated the need for a prolonged ground campaign in Taiwan, focusing on a few examples of urban warfare in which the attackers were unusually successful. As Russia discovered in Ukraine, the lightning successes of the First Gulf War are difficult to replicate. In addition, Taiwan’s defenders could engage in a long and costly insurgency against PLA forces. There are other questions about Chinese capabilities in the maritime, air, and other domains — including in such areas as surface warfare, mine warfare, amphibious operations, close air support, and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.</p> -<p>2020年10月的群組訊息紀錄曾提及參考已遭停播的港台節目《頭條新聞》。陳沛敏解釋，當時黎提出籌備一個類似電視新聞的節目，在《蘋果》網上平台播放，但黎不想節目太傳統，例如好像晚間電視新聞的風格，而且黎想邀請一些人作評論，例如藝人王喜和時事評論人桑普。</p> +<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> -<p>陳續指，在「飯盒會」期間，她曾就此表達意見：「如果你想做認真嘅報導，但又加入呢啲環節，咁我又覺得唔係好合適囉」，不過最後黎堅持加入這些環節，「話會『活潑啲』。」法官李運騰追問，即是陳的意見被黎拒絕了？陳確認：「係，同埋反正唔係實體報紙關事嘅嘢」，而黎所提議的新聞報導節目後來有在網上平台實行到。陳亦確認以上是她早前形容黎「比較強勢」的例子之一。</p> +<p>As this chapter has argued, China’s defense industrial base is increasingly operating on a wartime footing and is rapidly building capabilities to deter and, if necessary, fight the United States. China is also improving its research, acquisition, and production processes and capabilities in its defense industrial base, though it has some weaknesses and operational challenges. “It’s really impressive,” said Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante in discussing China’s defense industrial base. “They’ve developed . . . really good high-end capability in numbers. So, they’ve done the development, and the development has been pretty continuous and not just one thing. They place multipl bets. We don’t do that. We . . . very rarely will place multiple bets and . . . [have] three different development activities going on. We used to do that. We don’t do that.”</p> -<h4 id="控方下周一傳召另一證人-官關注審訊進度">控方下周一傳召另一證人 官關注審訊進度</h4> +<p>China is operating with a sense of urgency to catch up — and potentially surpass — the United States. As the next chapter argues, however, the U.S. government is not operating with the same sense of urgency.</p> -<p>控方表示覆問完畢，法官杜麗冰指示陳沛敏可以先行離開。她遂由3名懲教人員的帶領下，循法庭特別通道離開法庭。</p> +<h3 id="challenges-with-the-us-defense-industrial-base">CHALLENGES WITH THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE</h3> -<p>控方另向法庭申請下一名證人的「提犯令」。法官李運騰指，現時控方只傳召了兩名證人，卻使用了接近一半的審期，問控方還需要多久時間舉證。助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤則指下一名證人的作供時間不會如早前的證人般長，並承諾會盡力有效地運用法庭時間。</p> +<p>This chapter examines challenges with the U.S. defense industrial base. Numerous U.S. policymakers recognize the importance of the defense industrial base for deterrence and warfighting in an increasingly contested international landscape. As the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy notes, “We will prioritize joint efforts with the full range of domestic and international partners in the defense ecosystem to fortify the defense industrial base, our logistical systems, and relevant global supply chains against subversion, compromise, and theft.” In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense’s National Defense Industrial Strategy outlines a way forward to “bolster and expand America’s ability to innovate and produce the warfighting capabilities at a speed and scale that will help guarantee the ability to fight and win in any conflict.” The United States, including the Department of Defense, has made progress in some areas of the industrial base. For example, the United States has ramped up production lines for some weapons systems, such as 155-millimeter rounds, Stinger air defense systems, Javelin anti-tank weapons systems, and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) air defense systems.</p> -<p>法官則指他們正在認真地考慮6月的工作日程，因他們手上有一些案件仍待安排，而本案的審訊進度將有所影響。張卓勤則稱，保守估計下一名證人的主問需時7日。</p> +<p>Nevertheless, these steps are inadequate. The U.S. defense industrial base and broader defense ecosystem still lack the capacity to meet the U.S. military’s production needs for a competitive security environment. The United States lacks the ability to respond at speed and scale — and with sufficient flexibility — to meet the needs for deterrence and warfighting. A more robust and resilient industrial base is just as critical to deter adversary actions as it is for warfighting.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aGhyJNK.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States lacks the ability to respond at speed and scale — and with sufficient flexibility — to meet the needs for deterrence and warfighting.</code></em></strong></p> -<hr /> +<p>China’s defense industrial base is increasingly on a wartime footing, which means that Beijing is producing weapons systems and preparing, if necessary, to fight and win a war against the United States. Russia is putting significant resources into revitalizing its defense industrial base with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. Iran remains active in the Middle East, presents a significant irregular and gray zone threat to the United States and its allies, and has increased its capacity to develop and produce medium- and long-range missiles, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and loitering munitions. And North Korea continues to expand its arsenal of nuclear and conventional capabilities. There is also growing defense cooperation between these countries.</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導陳沛敏：黎智英對示威者非和平手段諒解、認同「和勇不分」Hi-Tech, High Risk?2024-03-01T12:00:00+08:002024-03-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/hi-tech-high-risk<p><em>Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, China has kept the world in suspense regarding its military aid to Moscow.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>While China remains hesitant about the breadth and intensity of its military support for Russia, its cooperation with Moscow on civilian cellular and satellite technologies could have significant intelligence and military outcomes.</em></p> +<p>In addition, U.S. defense spending is historically low as a percentage of GDP, which has hamstrung Department of Defense efforts to revitalize the industrial base. Defense spending is also historically low as a percentage of total federal outlays. The United States currently spends around 3.5 percent of GDP on defense. As Nobel Prize–winning economist Thomas Schelling argued, effective deterrence is a function of both the intentions and capabilities of the deterrer. Countries need to show that they possess the military power and credible willingness to use force. As Figure 3.1 highlights, the U.S. defense budget peaked at 14 percent of GDP during the Korean War. It was between 9 and 11 percent during President Eisenhower’s “New Look” policies in the 1950s, between 8 and 9 percent during President John F. Kennedy and President Lyndon Johnson’s “Flexible Response” period in the 1960s, and over 6 percent during President Ronald Reagan’s defense buildup in the 1980s.</p> -<p>Despite backing Moscow politically and diplomatically, Beijing has declared that it will not send weapons to Russia or Ukraine. Nonetheless, this has not dissuaded Chinese companies from reportedly supplying Russia with assault rifles, body armour and drones via clandestine shipments, nor has it impeded China’s collaboration with Russia on 5G and satellite technologies with abundant (and, often, already utilised) battlefield applications, particularly in Ukraine.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YlpSuLB.png" alt="image13" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.1 U.S. Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1951–2023.</strong> Source: <a href="htts://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685">“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2023</a>.</em></p> -<p>Extensive deployment of drones and advanced telecommunications equipment have been crucial on all fronts in Ukraine, from intelligence collection to airstrike campaigns. These technologies, though critical, require steady connectivity and geospatial support, making cooperation with China a potential solution to Moscow’s desire for a military breakthrough.</p> +<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, defense budgets dramatically decreased to 3 to 4 percent in the absence of a major conventional threat. In addition, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Deputy of Secretary of Defense William Perry convened a remarkable dinner of defense industry executives in 1993 at the Pentagon, which infamously became known as the “Last Supper.” Perry told the group that the administration was cutting the defense budget and that they needed to consolidate. In response, the number of defense companies plummeted from 107 large and small companies in 1990 to 5 major primes by the end of the decade. Defense budgets briefly crept above 4 percent during the surges in Afghanistan and Iraq, although the funding went to wartime operations and not to revitalizing the defense industrial base. Nevertheless, defense budgets shortly fell back to the 3 percent range. The post–Cold War decline in the defense budget was understandable and appropriate. But the situation has changed dramatically over the past few years. Today’s defense budget is historically small, particularly in light of such adversaries as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</p> -<h3 id="reaching-out-improving-connectivity-with-5g">Reaching Out: Improving Connectivity with 5G</h3> +<p>The rest of this chapter examines the U.S. defense industrial base in several areas: presidential-level support, defense production (including munitions stockpiles, the contracting process, supply chains, and the workforce), and allies and partners (including foreign military sales and technology transfers). These areas were chosen because they represent critical parts of the defense industrial base. There are numerous other areas, such as research, development, and the acquisitions process, that deserve attention. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of arguments against major changes in the defense industrial base.</p> -<p>5G has the potential to reshape the battlefield through enhanced tracking of military objects; faster transferring and real-time processing of large sensor datasets (like soldiers’ biometrics or large-resolution drone images); and enhanced communications, including between autonomous vehicles. Given the urgency of Russia’s objectives in Ukraine, it may want to tap into such potential – something which could be aided by China.</p> +<h4 id="bureaucratic-challenges">Bureaucratic Challenges</h4> -<p>Recently, 5G network development has accrued particular significance in the Russo-Chinese strategic calculus, resulting in a series of agreements between Huawei and major Russian ICT players including MTS and Beeline. In 2021, Huawei and MTS successfully launched commercial 5G networks across 14 locations in Moscow and implemented a pilot 5G network reaching data transfer speeds of 5.6 Gbps – a record for Russia at the time. This new technology allowed for very sophisticated and remote operations: for example, Russia’s GMS Hospital, with support from Beeline and Huawei, performed surgeries using 5G-connected medical equipment that enabled the real-time transfer of high-resolution images to doctors remotely assisting their colleagues in the operating theatre.</p> +<p>There is little urgency today from the White House to revitalize the United States’ lagging defense ecosystem and insufficient incentives for industry. In addition, there are major coordination challenges at various levels of the defense industrial base: between various U.S. government departments and agencies, between the government and private sector, and between the U.S. government and foreign governments. Within the United States, many entities beyond the Department of Defense play important roles in the defense industrial base, including the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, Congress, the private sector, and other stakeholders. In fact, the growing role of commercial technology in modern defense systems has increased the role of non-defense agencies in the industrial base.</p> -<p>Beeline and Huawei have also cooperated on 5G-driven machine-to-machine interactions, and in 2020 they launched a pilot 5G zone to operate unmanned and remotely controlled dump trucks at a Russian coal mine. As previously mentioned, increased network throughput, high-speed data transfer and integration of networks into civilian and military autonomous vehicles are precisely the features that could render Russo-Chinese 5G cooperation extremely useful in a wartime context – and therefore create a heightened risk for Ukraine.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is little urgency from the White House to revitalize the United States’ lagging defense ecosystem and insufficient incentives for industry.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>However, there are operational and institutional constraints on Russia’s battlefield integration of 5G technology. At the onset of the invasion, Russian troops extensively utilised unencrypted, high-frequency radio for long-range communications, allowing Ukrainians to successfully intercept signals and conversations. The deep-seated tendency within the Russian military to favour risk-prone communication methods may render the integration of 5G into Russian command-and-control quite problematic.</p> +<p>However, there are several challenges with the current situation.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Strategic collaboration between Russia and China in a contested, future-oriented domain like satellite technology could have serious implications for Ukraine</code></em></strong></p> +<p>First, there is no major body that can serve as an executive agent directly under the president with the power and authority to break bureaucratic logjams and coordinate across departments and agencies. Multiple agencies — such as the Departments of State and Commerce, as well as various organizations within the Department of Defense (including the military services) — have competing interests, priorities, and authorities. In addition, Congress, the defense industry, and other actors have their own interests, priorities, and authorities.</p> -<p>Beyond that, Russia’s Ministry of Defence, Federal Security Service and Federal Space Agency have already prevented mobile operators, including those cooperating with Huawei on 5G networks, from using the frequencies most conducive to 5G deployment – the 3.4–3.8 GHz range – by reserving their use for the Russian security apparatus.</p> +<p>These challenges are not new, but they are part of the reality of bureaucratic politics in the United States. As Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp conclude in their influential book Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, the government “consists of numerous individuals” and agencies with “very different interests and priorities, and they are concerned with very different questions.” One example is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which oversees the production, export, and import of defense articles, defense services, and other activities. There are bureaucratic differences in how broadly limits on arms transfers should apply. Department of Defense officials have sometimes erred on the side of providing technology to allies and partners, while the Department of State — and some members of Congress and their staff — have been less willing to accept risk.</p> -<h3 id="reaching-up-enhancing-navigation-and-observation-with-satellites">Reaching Up: Enhancing Navigation and Observation with Satellites</h3> +<p>Second, there has been insufficient action to fix current problems. The president plays a particularly important role in providing strategic guidance and urgency. As Halperin and Clapp argue, “The president stands at the center of the foreign policy process in the United States. . . . In any foreign policy decision widely believed at the time to be important, the president will almost always be the principal figure determining the general direction of actions.” Without direct and forceful presidential action, major changes in the defense industrial base are significantly more challenging. As noted below, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan played important roles in revitalizing the defense industrial base during their presidencies.</p> -<p>Satellite technology, another instrument capable of augmenting Russia’s military performance, is already the focus of intense Russo-Chinese collaboration. These tools collect valuable imagery, weather and terrain data; improve logistics management; track and predict troop movements; and enhance precision in the identification and elimination of ground targets.</p> +<p>These problems are not new. Presidential leadership has been essential during critical periods of U.S. history to strengthen — or consolidate — the defense industrial base. But words have generally not been sufficient. Roosevelt, Truman, Reagan, and others created institutional bodies to advise the president on better strategic guidance and coordination across the U.S. government and with the private sector, issue directives, and even directly plan, coordinate, direct, and control industrial mobilization. Table 3.1 shows several examples of institutional structures designed to jump-start the defense industrial base.</p> -<p>Since 2014, Russia and China have discussed collaboration between the Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS and its Chinese equivalent, Beidou. Russia has repeatedly tested GLONASS/Beidou compatibility on Russian transport routes along the Belt and Road corridor; tentative results from 2017 and 2018 claimed improved satellite navigation in 100% of monitored cases, allegedly surpassing individual results from GLONASS as well as Western GPS and Galileo systems. In 2018, Russia and China agreed on the joint application of GLONASS/Beidou and, in 2022, they decided to build three Russian monitoring stations in the Chinese cities of Changchun, Ürümqi and Shanghai and three Chinese stations in the Russian cities of Obninsk, Irkutsk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7p8i5Tb.png" alt="image14" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 3.1 Example of White House–Led Defense Institutions.</strong> Source CSIS.</em></p> -<p>Satellites are the ultimate enablers of Russian strategic air capabilities. In Ukraine, GLONASS has already enabled Russian missile and drone strikes via satellite correction and supported communications between Russian troops through its connection to Azart portable digital radios. The Russian Azart manufacturer, Angstrem, has collaborated with Huawei since 2011 and reportedly imported almost fully assembled Azart radios from China, causing a corruption scandal in Russia in 2021. RUSI previously identified Angstrem microchips in Russian weapons used in Ukraine. The resulting Chinese footprint in Azart radios could help Russia expedite GLONASS/Beidou integration to improve satellite-driven tactical operations. Additionally, Russia could exploit Beidou’s ability to facilitate the navigation and tracking of autonomous vehicles for strategic attacks with missiles and drones.</p> +<p>In May 1940, a year and a half before Pearl Harbor and the United States’ entry into World War II, a perceptive President Roosevelt created the National Defense Advisory Committee (NDAC) to help coordinate various segments of the U.S. defense industrial base. It included seven members: William Knudsen, the president of General Motors; Edward Stettinius, Jr., president of U.S. Steel; Chester C. Davis, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Leon Henderson, a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission; Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America; Ralph Budd, chairman of the board of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad; and Harriet Elliott, dean of women from the University of North Carolina. When Knudsen asked Roosevelt at the first meeting who was head of the group, Roosevelt responded that he was as president of the United States. Roosevelt’s point was that a major revitalization of the defense industrial base required the oversight of the U.S. president. Roosevelt’s strategic guidance and decision to spend money on defense was essential to mobilization well before World War II.</p> -<p>Strategic collaboration between the two states in a contested, future-oriented domain like satellite technology could have serious implications for Ukraine, despite claims that such cooperation is in pursuit of “peaceful goals”. Russia’s published map of GLONASS and Beidou satellites, updated regularly, periodically shows satellites reaching over Ukraine. Coupled with the anticipated construction of Beidou’s Obninsk monitoring station, the closest of the three Chinese stations to Ukraine, Russia is increasingly capable of leveraging satellite cooperation with China against Ukraine.</p> +<p>On January 16, 1942, Roosevelt created the War Production Board to supervise production. He appointed Donald M. Nelson, executive vice president of Sears Roebuck, as the chair. The body exercised general direction over U.S. war procurement and production; determined the policies, plans, and procedures of federal departments regarding procurement and production; directed conversion of companies from peacetime to wartime work; established priorities in the distribution of materials and services; and prohibited nonessential production. Since the country was at war, the War Production Board also rationed such commodities as gasoline, heating oil, metals, rubber, paper, and plastics.</p> -<p>There is also the risk of China assisting Moscow on imagery and geospatial intelligence through other satellite-based platforms, potentially leading to worrisome scenarios in which China tests the waters for escalated tensions with the West.</p> +<p>President Truman abolished the Office of War Mobilization after World War II, but he quickly switched gears as the Cold War began. He established a cabinet-level Office of Defense Mobilization to plan, coordinate, direct, and control all defense industrial production. He established a National Security Resources Board to mobilize natural resources and the scientific community to meet the United States’ growing military demands. Truman also signed the Defense Production Act on September 8, 1950, which authorized the president to force companies to prioritize defense production, set aside price ceilings, and expand private and public production capacity during the Korean War. The National Security Resources Board also helped mobilize the economy for war through regulation of the private market and takeover of industrial production. Under the act, the government could control prices, build defense plants, regulate credit, and streamline resources and products for manufacturing. Congress would go on to reauthorize the Defense Production Act at least 53 times over the next seven decades.</p> -<p>After Western geospatial companies exited Russia in 2022, Chinese companies signed agreements with Russian MoD partner Racurs to provide remote sensing data for security management, infrastructure monitoring and other applications. One company, HEAD Aerospace, has already provided more remote sensing data than its leading Russian competitor across a geography of delivery encompassing Donbas and Crimea.</p> +<p>In 1981, President Reagan created the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board to improve mobilization capabilities and interagency cooperation within the federal government to respond to major peacetime or war-related emergencies. The board consisted of the representatives of 22 key federal agencies at the deputy secretary or under secretary level and was chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs. A full-time secretariat was established to support the board and monitor the implementation of its recommendations by federal agencies. It included senior representatives from several departments and agencies:</p> -<p>Racurs has also considered sharing photogrammetric software with Chinese counterparts to improve drone image processing, and a Chinese company sold two high-resolution observation satellites to the Wagner Group in 2022 to aid its intelligence capabilities in Ukraine and across Africa. Ultimately, such dynamic interactions with Chinese companies may improve Russian military logistics, reconnaissance capabilities, geospatial intelligence and drone deployment in Ukraine. Additionally, lessons learned through such cooperation could feasibly be applied in other theatres, including a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.</p> +<ul> + <li>Department of Defense</li> + <li>Department of Commerce</li> + <li>Department of Agriculture</li> + <li>Department of the Treasury</li> + <li>Department of Justice</li> + <li>Federal Emergency Management Agency</li> + <li>Department of Health and Human Services</li> + <li>Department of Labor</li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ukraine and its Western partners should prepare for the potential expansion of Russo-Chinese technological collaboration on the battlefield</code></em></strong></p> +<p>These institutional bodies were particularly important during periods of significant strategic competition (such as at various points in the Cold War) and during wars. As President Roosevelt recognized before World War II and President Reagan decided during heightened tension, a presidential-level body can be critical before war — in part to strengthen deterrence and potentially avert war. President Roosevelt perhaps said it best in arguing that “we must be the great arsenal of democracy” and to “build now with all possible speed every machine, every arsenal, every factory that we need to manufacture our defense material.” The absence of an effective institution tied to the president has made it difficult to revitalize the defense industrial base.</p> -<p>However, China has already exhibited potential reticence towards satellite technology transfers to Moscow. Despite a 2017 joint agreement between Moscow and Beijing to develop a GLONASS/Beidou navigation chipset for facilitating the systems’ integration, Beijing allegedly decided in 2020 to limit cooperation on some GLONASS chipsets to prioritise its own national satellite system. Such apprehension has clearly not completely stalled Russo-Chinese satellite technology collaboration, but it does reveal China’s wariness about leaning too fully into a lockstep relationship with Russia.</p> +<h4 id="defense-production">Defense Production</h4> -<h3 id="all-eyes-to-the-east-what-comes-next">All Eyes to the East: What Comes Next?</h3> +<p>Today, the United States faces substantial challenges in defense production. The war in Ukraine has highlighted some significant production problems, even when the United States is not directly at war and has not committed soldiers, sailors, and air crews to fight in Ukraine. In response to initial production challenges, the Department of Defense and private sector eventually increased production for some weapons systems, such as 155-millimeter rounds, Stingers, Javelins, and PAC-3 systems.</p> -<p>Russia’s capacity for repurposing civilian 5G and satellite cooperation with China for military applications continues to expand, albeit at different paces on each respective front. Battlefield integration of 5G networks may face domestic hurdles, but infrastructure enabling China to assist Russian satellite usage already exists and can facilitate Russian military action in Ukraine.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, the U.S. defense industrial ecosystem — the executive branch, Congress, and industry — lack the speed, agility, and depth to replace weapons stockpiles and systems in a sufficient timeframe for the current security environment. As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante acknowledged, the U.S. defense industrial base is “dialed down to the minimum amount. . . . [We have] very few development programs, [a] minimal amount, and then very few production programs.” In addition, as the United States and other countries have reduced their stockpiles of weapons systems to send to such countries as Ukraine, they often do not replenish with the exact same systems. In some cases, the infrastructure and tooling does not exist anymore to replace depleted stockpiles of legacy systems, so the U.S. government turns to the latest generation. But new generations aren’t always available, creating a gap and compounding shortfalls.</p> -<p>Admittedly, Russo-Chinese cooperation is not always smooth sailing, but differences in policy are unlikely to inhibit the strengthening of ties between the two states. Therefore, it is imperative that the international community – especially partners of Ukraine – are aware of Moscow and Beijing’s intentions for 5G and satellite technology sharing and respond through political calculus and risk management strategies.</p> +<p>Congressional dysfunction has been unhelpful to the industrial base, including the failure to pass budgets and the reliance on continuing resolutions (CRs). As Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth explained, “The Army cannot exercise its Multi-Year Procurement to purchase additional Patriot missiles or begin construction on a Guided Missile Maintenance Building under a CR. This will impede our ability to send a consistent demand signal to industry and will limit production and maintenance capacity on critical munitions.” CRs can also delay acquisition efforts and the awarding of contracts for critical weapons systems and infrastructure upgrades for the industrial base.</p> -<p>Such a response would ideally adopt a two-pronged approach. First, governments should disincentivise military applications of Russo-Chinese 5G and satellite collaboration – for example, through economic restrictions on the flow of Western technology into Russia or China related to joint programmes with likely military applications, or through political pressure to work together in exclusively civilian capacities. Concurrently, Ukraine should prepare for the potential expansion of Russo-Chinese technological collaboration on the battlefield – and so should the West, given that the impacts of such cooperation will extend to its ongoing lines of support.</p> +<p>There are several broad challenges with defense production.</p> -<p>A proactive reaction from Ukraine and its partners may not only prove decisive in evading any artificial enhancement of Russia’s battlefield capabilities, but it may very well also prevent a wider rift between Russia and China and the West from looming ever more heavily on the horizon.</p> +<p><strong>Munitions Shortfalls:</strong> The U.S. military continues to have a shortfall of munitions and other weapons system for deterrence and warfighting. As Figure 3.3 highlights, examples include the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), PAC-3, Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), MK-48, Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAM), Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), and Naval Strike Missile. Some analysis suggests that protracted regional conflicts will expend significant quantities of munitions, likely exceeding current Department of Defense planning efforts. In nearly two dozen iterations of a CSIS wargame that examined a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait, the United States typically expended more than 5,000 long-range missiles in three weeks of conflict, including 4,000 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs), 450 LRASMs, 400 Harpoons, and 400 TLAMs. One of the most important munitions to prevent a Chinese seizure of all of Taiwan were long-range precision missiles, including missiles launched by U.S. submarines.</p> -<hr /> +<p>LRASMs offer a useful case study. In every iteration of the wargame, the United States expended its inventory of LRASMs within the first week of the conflict. These missiles were particularly useful because of their ability to strike Chinese naval forces from outside of the range of Chinese air defenses. As the wargame showed, Chinese defenses are likely to be formidable — especially early on — thus preventing most aircraft from moving close enough to drop short-range munitions. Bombers generally employed these munitions because they could be based outside of the range of Chinese missiles. In addition, it takes nearly two years to produce LRASMs, creating a time lag to fix the shortfall.</p> -<p><strong>Roman Kolodii</strong> is an expert in international security focusing on Russo-Chinese cooperation in science, technology and military affairs. Currently, he is a PhD candidate at the Institute of International Studies, Charles University (Czech Republic), where his dissertation examines Russo-Chinese strategic alignment in dual-use technologies.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. military continues to have a shortfall of munitions and other weapons system for deterrence and warfighting.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Giangiuseppe Pili</strong> is an Assistant Professor in the Intelligence Analysis Program at James Madison University. He was a Research Fellow at Open Source Intelligence and Analysis at the Royal United Services Institute. He is an external member of Intelligence Lab – Calabria University and a former lecturer in intelligence studies.</p> +<p>One challenge with munitions stockpiles is having sufficient numbers for a protracted conflict. The dilemma for the government, in particular, is to try to match the production rate of weapons systems with the consumption rate in a possible war. This is more of an art than a science, since it requires estimating the possible timelines and munitions usage in a future war. For example, will a possible conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan be short or long? Will it spread to other theaters? What types of munitions and weapons systems will it involve? There are no clear answers to these questions, and numerous variables impact the duration and geographic expanse of wars. But several issues need to be considered.</p> -<p><strong>Jack Crawford</strong> is a transatlantic security specialist and Research Analyst with the Open Source Intelligence and Analysis research group. Jack is also a member of New America’s Nuclear Futures Working Group, and he previously worked in the think tank and government sectors on transatlantic security, European economic policy and legislative components of US foreign policymaking.</p>Roman Kolodii, et al.Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, China has kept the world in suspense regarding its military aid to Moscow.【黎智英案・審訊第卅五日】2024-02-29T12:00:00+08:002024-02-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-35<ul> - <li>辯方：黎智英開會談業務、改善報紙 非落編採指示 陳沛敏：黎一錘定音</li> -</ul> +<p>First, wars between major powers can be long in duration. In general, the mean war duration for interstate wars is roughly 15 months. But wars involving one or more major powers can last for longer, including the Crimean War (28 months), Russo-Japanese War (16 months), World War I (52 months), World War II (over 60 months), Korean War (36 months), Vietnam War (121 months), and Sino-Vietnamese War (60 months). Consequently, it would be prudent to plan for wars of longer, rather than shorter, durations.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Second, wars involving major powers can use significant quantities of munitions. In addition, weapons systems and platforms — such as main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and fighter aircraft — are destroyed or experience significant wear and tear from constant use. The war in Ukraine highlights that conventional wars involving one or more major powers can require a robust defense industry (or access to the defense industry of allies) to produce sufficient quantities of munitions and weapons systems.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nRW0eYN.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>Third, stockpiles are important not just for warfighting, but for deterrence. As highlighted by Thomas Schelling’s work, deterrence is more effective if states have sufficient stockpiles (capabilities) and are prepared to use them (intentions). “Production is deterrence,” remarked Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante. And this is not just for typical ground, air, and maritime systems — but also for satellites. Take, for example, the production of satellites for low Earth orbit (LEO). It is beneficial to have hot production lines for satellites for several reasons, including to ensure a proliferated constellation to maximize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; replace satellites with short life spans; and increase deterrence. If an adversary sees that a state is mass-producing LEO satellites, shooting them down has a limited impact.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（29日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第35日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方指，黎智英在2018年有見《蘋果》內部士氣低落，遂設立「飯盒會」以收集員工的意見。辯方又指，黎重視報紙質素，「飯盒會」是為了討論公司業務、經營事宜和如何改善報紙，而不是為了給予編採指示。惟陳沛敏表示：「唔係好同意」，因黎有在會上提及編採指示，「如果你話改善報紙，好難唔觸及點樣做新聞。」而且她形容黎「都係一個好有睇法嘅人」，有些時候會比較強勢，雖然會議上有討論，但最後決定會由黎一錘定音。</p> +<p><strong>Contracting Challenges:</strong> The contracting process continues to be a challenge for defense production, though there has been progress. The Department of Defense has created a Joint Production Accelerator Cell (JPAC) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to improve production capacity, resiliency, and surge capacity for specific weapons systems and supplies. JPAC is the successor to the Munitions Industrial Base Deep Dive. One of JPAC’s successes has been to extend multiyear procurement to some nontraditional items, as well as to use multiyear procurement with large lot procurement methods.</p> -<p>已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第14天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻繼續盤問。</p> +<p>Yet some congressional members and staff — including from the House and Senate Appropriations Committees — are risk averse on such issues as multiyear contracts. As discussed at the end of this chapter, some policymakers are concerned that multiyear contracts will unnecessarily commit the United States to fund weapons systems and reduce budget flexibility. Yet multiyear contracts are critical for increasing production capacity, resilience, and supply chain support. Defense companies are unwilling to take financial risks without contracts — particularly multiyear contracts — in place. It is not a sound business decision to produce more munitions or weapons systems without a clear demand signal and financial commitments, especially given the large capital investment and number of personnel required.</p> -<h4 id="辯方蘋果士氣低落-飯盒會設立目的是收集員工意見">辯方：《蘋果》士氣低落 飯盒會設立目的是收集員工意見</h4> +<p>This risk aversion is compounded if companies have to make additional capital investments to increase defense production — especially investments for facilities, infrastructure, and tooling. As one Department of Defense study concluded, “Producers benefit from steady or predictable orders, so the DoD’s inconsistent procurement and concurrent production ramps (both increases and decreases) exacerbate the challenges suppliers face across the DIB [defense industrial base].” There has been an inconsistent demand signal from the Department of Defense to build up stockpiles, which risks production lines being shut down. Part of the challenge is the difficulty of predicting future demand. For example, what if the war in Ukraine winds down following a negotiated settlement? What if the current or future administration loses interest in supporting another “forever war?” Or what if Congress refuses to obligate funds?</p> -<p>辯方昨日提到，黎智英在2014年下半年辭去壹傳媒主席，《蘋果》其後錄得虧蝕，但黎在2018年回來積極參與之後，公司利潤有所增長，但是《蘋果》內部的士氣仍然低落，所以黎想設立渠道與員工溝通。陳僅指：「我記得佢（黎）係改善咗飯堂嘅服務囉。」</p> +<p>While the Department of Defense signs multiyear contracts for ships and airplanes, it does not sign multiyear contracts for a range of munitions and other weapons systems. After all, the services — such as the Navy and Marine Corps — have historically cut munitions from their budgets to make room for other priorities, or to fix problems that arise during the acquisition of those systems.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uKkAyNW.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<p>More broadly, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) process is too bureaucratic, time intensive, and inefficient. It tends to stifle innovation, reward compliance rather than results, and discourages many world-class commercial companies from doing business with the U.S. government. As Jacques Gansler, former undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, acknowledged over a decade ago, “Such excessive regulation also discourages government contracting personnel from applying management flexbility as they interpret the steps that should be taken in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness.”</p> -<p>辯方續指，「飯盒會」設立的目的是收集《蘋果》員工的意見。惟陳表示：「佢（黎）搞飯盒會，我會覺得佢係會多啲佢嘅理念」，包括做生意和時政的理念。</p> +<p><strong>Supply Chain Issues:</strong> There continue to be supply chain challenges that hinder production. For example, there is limited production of key components, such as solid rocket motors, processor assemblies, castings, forgings, ball bearings, microelectronics, and seekers for munitions. Dependence on a small number of private firms — or even a single source — leaves the United States highly vulnerable to supply disruption. In addition, the United States is overreliant on single or foreign sources for key components or materials. This dependence has been particularly acute for certain strategic and critical materials, including antimony, lithium, and some rare-earth minerals. China dominates the advanced battery supply chain across the globe, such as lithium hydroxide, electrolyte, lithium carbonate, anodes, and cathodes. As noted in Chapter 2, however, China’s defense industrial base also has supply chain vulnerabilities.</p> -<p>辯方續指，黎智英更籌備問卷調查，以收集員工意見，並展示2018年5月的訊息紀錄，顯示陳向黎傳送問卷調查的初稿過目。辯方又展示陳沛敏與時任《蘋果》執行總編輯林文宗的訊息紀錄，林向陳傳送「老闆同網主管開會的紀錄」，顯示黎曾經與《蘋果》網站主管開會。辯方問陳，這是否「飯盒會」的前身，陳則不肯定。</p> +<p>Sub-tier suppliers are also at risk. Many operate on narrow profit margins, which makes them susceptible to cyclical defense demands and changes in the defense budget. These challenges undermine the ability and willingness of some sub-tier suppliers to remain in the defense market. In a 2023 report, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment concluded:</p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏形容黎智英好有睇法-若對某議題有興趣會講多些-若缺興趣會輕輕帶過">陳沛敏形容黎智英「好有睇法」 若對某議題有興趣會講多些 若缺興趣會輕輕帶過</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>Supply chain risks are not unique to the Department, but such risks take on greater urgency when considered in light of national security. For example, to keep aging weapon systems operational, we [DOD] depend on a finite number of repair parts suppliers, some of which are precariously close to fiscal collapse. The proliferation of counterfeit items (particularly for microelectronics) increases the risk of mission delay or imperiled safety. Intellectual property vulnerabilities and lowered integrity of sensitive data and secure networks undermine the protections around our weapon system designs. Dependence on foreign entities for critical items and cyber disruptions to the manufacturing and transportation domains likewise jeopardize mission support and success.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>辯方指，黎在該段時候開始與不同部門開「飯盒會」，包括實體報紙、網站、廣告部門等的「飯盒會」。在開會之前兩至三日，黎會先要求員工就一些議題提出問題和意見，而出席會議的人會透過通訊平台 Slack 群組提出觀點，以替會議設立討論框架。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Today’s workforce is inadequate to meet the challenges of the defense industrial base.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>陳指「飯盒會」上會討論 Slack 群組所設立的框架，「但係我有個感覺係，如果黎生對某個題目冇好大興趣嘅話，就會輕輕帶過」，她又指，「咁黎生都係一個好有睇法嘅人，如果黎生有個題目係好想講，佢會講多啲，同埋發揮多啲佢嘅意見囉。」</p> +<p><strong>Workforce Constraints:</strong> Today’s workforce is inadequate to meet the challenges of the defense industrial base. The U.S. labor market is unable to provide a sufficient number of workers with the right skills to meet the defense demands of today and tomorrow. Retention is also a significant challenge. Skills in short supply range from software engineers to welders. As Under Secretary of Defense LaPlante argued, “the workforce in many ways is the most stressing element right now, both talented workforce, in terms of writing software, engineering, but also the workforce that does the production and is conversant in advanced production, whether it’s additive or subtractive manufacturing.”</p> -<p>辯方指，「飯盒會」的總結會被傳閱，以讓員工做跟進工作。陳確認會議紀錄由張劍虹負責，當張沒有出席會議時，她才會負責會議紀錄。若果黎未能出席會議，便沒有需要開「飯盒會」，因管理層之間可以直接開會。</p> +<p>Shipyards are particularly problematic. Some skills sets, such as nuclear welding, are particularly difficult to acquire outside of U.S. Navy procurement. But the workforce shortage is widespread. In 2024, the Navy briefed Congress that the first Constellation-class guided-missile frigate (FFG-62) will be at least a year late because of workforce shortfalls at Fincantieri’s Marinette Marine shipyard. The Wisconsin shipyard is short of several hundred blue- and white-collar workers, including welders. In 2022, the Navy ended the fiscal year short 1,200 workers across its four shipyards. As the head of Naval Sea Systems Command remarked, hiring and retaining skilled workers in government repair yards and private sector shipbuilding is the Navy’ top strategic challenge across the enterprise. In addition, construction of the Block V version of the Virginia-class fast-attack submarine is at least two years behind schedule because of workforce constraints and other factors.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/L4Tldfh.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> +<h4 id="allies-and-partners">Allies and Partners</h4> -<h4 id="辯方飯盒會為討論業務改善報紙而設-而非供黎落編採指示">辯方：飯盒會為討論業務、改善報紙而設 而非供黎落編採指示</h4> +<p>The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy rightly emphasize the importance of allies and partners in today’s competitive landscape. In the defense industrial base, working with allies and partners involves several examples: co-development, co-production, co-sustainment, second-sourcing, and licensed production. Some foreign companies — particularly from allied and partner countries — have U.S.-based subsidiaries, such as Leonardo DRS, BAE Systems, and Austal, which manufacture products or conduct services for unclassified and classified Department of Defense programs.</p> -<p>辯方指，黎智英重視報紙質素，設立「飯盒會」的用意是討論公司業務、經營事宜和如何改善報紙，而不是為了給予編採指示。陳則回答：「唔係好同意。」因為黎會提到辯方所指如何改善報紙生意和經營策略，但是他亦會講一些編採指示，而且出席會議的人都是編採人員，「有時好難分開」，「如果你話改善報紙，好難唔觸及點樣做新聞。」</p> +<p>Yet the United States does a poor job of sharing technology and selling weapons systems to its most important friends — the countries with which it needs to cooperate for both deterrence and warfighting. It is virtually inconceivable that the United States would fight a major war on its own. U.S. export controls and technology security and foreign disclosure processes undermine the ability to collaborate with allies and partners. This reality is especially disconcerting because the United States shares some of its most sensitive secrets with allies and partners — including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, which make up the “Five Eyes” intelligence community.</p> -<p>辯方質疑，如果會上有提到編採指示的話，會議紀錄理應會顯示出來。惟陳指會議紀錄只會講重點和需要跟進的工作。</p> +<p>This section focuses on two areas where the United States faces serious challenges: foreign military sales and technology transfer policies and procedures.</p> -<p>辯方則指「編採指示」的意思是特定指示某些新聞要報導、某些新聞不要報導，而不是指一般的報導角度。法官李運騰問，黎有否在會議中提及哪些新聞要報導、哪些新聞不要報導。惟陳指黎比較少講哪些新聞不要報導，但是當發生重大的新聞，例如2019年的社會運動和2020年爆發疫情，這些事件不常見，而且持續很長時間，黎便會在該段時期的「飯盒會」中提及。陳又指，黎當然不會要求訪問特定的示威者，但是他「可能講到嗰個方向，例如佢想講多啲呢啲人嘅心聲」。</p> +<p><strong>Foreign Military Sales:</strong> The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a form of security assistance in which the United States sells defense articles and services to foreign countries. The Department of State’s Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers, located in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, oversees FMS transactions. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements specific FMS cases. The Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), which also sits within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, issues and administers licenses for commercial sales. Congress ultimately reviews foreign military sales that rise to the threshold for congressional notification. Several parts of the Department of State are involved, including the Bureau of Political Military-Affairs, the Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers, the Office of Security Assistance, and the DDTC. Several parts of the Department of Defense are involved in FMS, including the DSCA, the military services, the Joint Staff, and various offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.</p> -<p>李官續問，黎有否在「飯盒會」上提及一般的新聞角度。陳回答：「我嘅認知係都會有討論到囉。」</p> +<p>When an eligible foreign government opts to purchase or otherwise acquire a U.S. defense system or service, it initiates the formal process by issuing a letter of request (LOR). The government submits the LOR to a U.S. security organization or the DSCA. Following approval of the transfer, the United States responds with a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA). The time it takes to prepare an LOA can vary based on such factors as the foreign government involved, the weapons system or service requested, and the overall complexity of the sale. It can be fast for routine items, but long and difficult for others. Then there is the production of the system, including non-recurring items such as software updates and modifications.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3Kd9Pom.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p>There has been some progress in improving the FMS process. For example, the Department of Defense completed an FMS Tiger Team with several dozen concrete actions to streamline FMS. In addition, Department of State officials report that they approve 95 percent of FMS cases within 48 hours for their portion of FMS.</p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏雖有討論-但最後由黎智英一錘定音">陳沛敏：雖有討論 但最後由黎智英一錘定音</h4> +<p>Nevertheless, the entire FMS process — from initial discussions to LOR, LOA, production, and modifications — is too long. It takes an average of 18 months to get FMS cases on contract. There is also no real accountability in the FMS system. The Department of State statutorily owns it, but execution largely falls to the Department of Defense and is split among the military services and several Department of Defense agencies. No one is held accountable for strategic success or failure. Partner and ally requests for U.S. systems can go unanswered for months or even years. FMS programs are executed under a U.S. government contract negotiated and awarded by a U.S. military service contracting officer on behalf of the FMS partner. The Department of Defense contracting community is understaffed. FMS contracts are sometimes given a low priority by contracting officers, who look first to support U.S. service personnel, then to contracts to support innovation for next-generation capabilities for U.S. service personnel, then to FMS. In addition, staffing constraints, technological limitations, and the increasing complexity of systems could slow the rate at which transactions are approved if there is a major increase in FMS.</p> -<p>辯方向陳展示《蘋果》Slack 群組「港蘋報紙對話」的訊息紀錄，張劍虹會傳出「飯盒會」的會議紀錄重點，黎智英曾吩咐陳根據張傳出來的會議紀錄作出跟進；黎智英亦曾在群組中要求各位同事，就「報紙雜誌化」過程中做了什麼、準備做些什麼，在群組中提出意見，陳歸納意見後傳出群組，黎回覆會稍後一起討論。</p> +<p><strong>Technology Transfer Policies and Procedures:</strong> A related issue includes technology transfer review policies and procedures — including ITAR — for FMS and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). ITAR is the U.S. regulation that controls the manufacture, sale, and distribution of defense and space-related articles and services. ITAR and other regulations are important and are designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology to adversaries and, in some instances, to signal disapproval to foreign countries because of their actions.</p> -<p>陳又確認，從訊息紀錄可見，黎會就林文宗提出的建議回應，但同時補充：「咁其實都係會觸及到做新聞的角度。」她又指，黎作為老闆在「飯盒會」上給予的意見，會作為總結及跟進工作；相反，如果黎在會上提出某些事情不需要做，他們便不會作任何跟進。</p> +<p>The United States has a long-standing exemption for Canada and can transfer some unclassified defense material and services without an export license. This exemption is limited, and companies sometimes avoid using the exemption because they are worried about the consequences of ITAR violations. Exports to Canada of classified and more sensitive material and services still require a license. In addition, there have been several historical cases in which the United States has made exceptions to technology transfers when there are strategic imperatives, such as countering the Soviet Union’s growing capabilities during the Cold War or aiding Ukraine following Russia’s 2022 invasion. For example, the United States and United Kingdom signed the Polaris Sales Agreement in 1963, which allowed the United States to export Polaris missiles, launch tubes, fire control systems, and relevant technologies to the United Kingdom to build and maintain its submarine-based nuclear weapons systems. U.S. and other NATO officials had become increasingly concerned about the Soviet Union’s nuclear and conventional capabilities and their impact on the military balance in Europe.</p> -<p>陳同意辯方所指，黎會就一些議題與其他人討論，之後才得出結論，但她同時重申：「黎生係好有睇法，同埋喺某啲時候都係比較強勢」，所以最後會由黎一錘定音。</p> +<p>There were several failed efforts to gain ITAR exemptions for the United Kingdom and Australia in the early 2000s. In 2010, the United States tried again and signed treaties, ratified by the Senate, that created a “trusted community” of companies in the United States, Australia, and United Kingdom that could share technology and compete for opportunities. But these treaties and other arrangements failed to significantly increase technology cooperation and have almost never been used by industry.</p> -<p>不過辯方指，黎有時會使用「呢個意見幾好，我哋咁樣做啦」之類的言辭，例如黎在群組中說：「OK。就依他們做法吧。謝謝。」陳亦確認。</p> +<p>The reality today is that the United States has failed to make significant progress in reducing export barriers, particularly with its closest allies and partners. These obstacles undermine co-development, co-production, co-sustainment, and other types of cooperative arrangements that provide benefits by increasing economies of scale, supporting the U.S. defense industrial base (including providing jobs to U.S. workers), and strengthening allies and partners. Incorporating allies and partners into the development, execution, and sustainment of programs is not always a top-level priority for some U.S. defense acquisitions specialists, even with a push by senior Department of Defense officials for greater technology sharing with allies and partners. In the development of acquisition programs, requirements documents are too frequently overclassified and marked “SECRET//NOFORN,” which prohibits sharing with foreign governments.</p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏飯盒會會議紀錄只會寫下黎智英同意及需要跟進事項">陳沛敏：「飯盒會」會議紀錄只會寫下黎智英同意及需要跟進事項</h4> +<p>Even for close allies, there are notable delays, confusion, and unpredictability with the U.S. technology transfer process — a sign of a peacetime, not a wartime, process. The U.S. Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) process often causes delays for close allies, which prevent them from doing technical assessments before they even get to the LOR stage. The TSFD process is also far too opaque and unpredictable. These challenges can significantly impact time-sensitive actions, such as refitting ships during fixed docking periods.</p> -<p>被問到庭上展示的 Slack 群組訊息紀錄是否準確地反映黎與員工之間的討論，陳確認。但當法官李運騰問到，以「飯盒會」的討論而言，是否能如實及準確地反映在上載至群組的會議紀錄中。陳則說：「只能夠講呢個（會議紀錄）係一個簡略」，若然「飯盒會」有一小時，他們只會將黎智英同意而且需要跟進的事項寫在會議紀錄中。</p> +<p>With the United Kingdom, for example, U.S. delays held up a routine upgrade on sonar systems for UK Royal Navy submarines for several months, while another UK submarine had to wait months to be serviced by a cleared contractor until the U.S. Department of State authorized an export-controlled component. As one analysis concluded, “months went by waiting for a license that just added cost and risk to an ally’s military capability.” More broadly, the United Kingdom spends a shocking $500 million each year — almost 1 percent of its defense budget — complying with ITAR regulations. As another assessment concluded: “When close U.S. allies — or their defense firms — wish to develop technology or acquire capability from the United States, they have to navigate a byzantine system of regulation. This costs time and money, undermines allies’ sovereignty, stifles innovation, and blunts the United States’ edge in the strategic competition with China.”</p> -<p>辯方指出，「飯盒會」的討論主要是關於公司業務和怎樣改善報紙，問陳是否同意。陳同意會議會談到這些議題，但是亦會討論到時事和新聞報導角度。她又指，黎會要求邀請哪些作者替論壇版撰文，或者要求報導和訪問多些曾經質疑內地隱瞞疫情的人。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The reality today is that the United States has failed to make significant progress in reducing export barriers, particularly with its closest allies and partners.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>辯方則指，新冠肺炎病毒源頭是有新聞價值，而且是全球關注的議題。陳確認。</p> +<p>The United States is far too risk averse and needs to rethink the benefits of sharing technology with its closest allies and partners, as well as the risk of not sharing that information. As Under Secretary of Defense LaPlante argued, “the system is built around a risk of technology exploitation by an adversary. High risk of that. We want to make sure we mitigate against that. Well, you have that risk but now we also have the operational imperative of what we’re facing in the Indo-Pacific, and we have to just get over it with close allies and partners like the UK and Australia.”</p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p>Similarly, the chief of the United Kingdom’s navy, Admiral Sir Ben Key, remarked that “what we want to be able to do is move quicker” in today’s competitive security environment in the area of technology transfers. The risks of an overly regulated and risk-averse defense culture is highlighted in Andrew Gordon’s book, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, which examined British failures between the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of Jutland. In periods of peace, regulators often predominate. But in periods of war, in which countries must move quickly against cunning adversaries, “rat catchers” need to dominate. As Admiral Key asked, “Are we setting up the ITAR and all the rest of it to allow the regulators or the rat catchers? And what is it we’re trying to achieve?” He continued that “what we really want to do is in a contested environment, when the pressure is really on, we want the information to move between allies and partners and friends as fast as we possibly can with as few hurdles as we can.”</p> -<hr /> +<p>There was some hope that AUKUS — the security pact initiated in 2022 between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to cooperate on sensitive technologies, including nuclear-powered submarines — might usher in a new era of technology cooperation between the three countries. But that has not been the case — at least not yet. As outlined in Table 3.2, the second pillar of AUKUS raises the prospect of expanding the research, development, and fielding of advanced capabilities in six technological areas (undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare) and two broad functional areas (innovation and information sharing).</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導辯方：黎智英開會談業務、改善報紙 非落編採指示 陳沛敏：黎一錘定音Food As “Silent Weapon”2024-02-29T12:00:00+08:002024-02-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/food-as-silent-weapon<p><em>As Russia’s war on Ukraine enters its third year, new data on the growth of Russia’s global agricultural market shares and the extent to which it has forcefully diminished Ukraine’s production and exports indicates a long-term trend.</em></p> +<p>Another example of a challenge in technology sharing is the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB). It was first codified in U.S. law in 1992 when the United States and Canada were designated as one national technology industrial base. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) added the United Kingdom and Australia — and the 2023 NDAA added New Zealand. The NTIB consists of the people and organizations engaged in national security and dual-use research and development, production, maintenance, and related activities within the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. But the NTIB is largely failing. There has been some progress in coordinating foreign investment reviews, but little has been achieved in facilitating export control processes. As one study concludes, the NTIB “has not been utilized to foster industrial collaboration in any meaningful way and many have begun to question NTIB’s utility as a vehicle for such efforts.”</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7VEqF0L.png" alt="image15" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 3.2 AUKUS Pillar Two Technologies and Functional Areas.</strong> Sources: <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">“AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022</a>; and <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47599">Patrick Parrish and Luke A. Nicastro, AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report NO. R47599 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 2023)</a>.</em></p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Finally, some of the United States’ “Buy America” provisions are generally counterproductive and undermine the ability to work closely with allies and partners who the United States will need in almost any conceivable war or military operation. After all, modern weapons systems are products of a globalized market. Take the F-35 Lightning II combat aircraft program. Production and sustainment relies on 1,900 companies around the globe in 48 states and 10 countries.</p> -<p>Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused the greatest military-related disruption to global agricultural markets in at least a century. Ukraine’s agricultural sector has been a major front in Russia’s war since February 2022, and the primary purpose of Russia’s targeting of Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure is likely to undercut a main source of Ukraine’s income. Ukraine’s GDP contracted by more than 29 percent in 2022 compared to 2021, and the value of agriculture as a proportion of Ukraine’s GDP was 39 percent lower in 2022 than 2021.</p> +<p>Part of the challenge with reforming FMS and technology transfers to allies and partners in today’s international security landscape is that there are so many U.S. government agencies involved. Within the Department of Defense, examples include the DSCA, Defense Technology Security Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and military services. Within the Department of State, there are several offices within the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and the regional bureaus. There are also other entities with various roles, such as the Department of Commerce and the Department of the Treasury. Within Congress, several committees have roles in FMS and technology transfer policies and procedures, such as the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.</p> -<p>The global disruptions to the agricultural market due to Ukraine’s diminished production and exports have been stark: world food prices reached all-time nominal highs in March 2022, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization Food Price Index. In 2022, 258 million people suffered from acute food insecurity, an all-time high, according to the Global Report on Food Crises. At the same time, the cost of addressing these challenges also soared due to concurrent shocks in the global energy and fertilizer markets brought on by Russia’s war. For example, the cost of the delivery of humanitarian assistance also peaked due to the increased cost of food and fuel for operations. At the same time, for countries hoping to address domestic food insecurity with domestic agricultural production, the increased cost of fertilizer became a limiting factor. Likewise, countries dealing with the high price of food imports, high prices of agricultural inputs, and high levels of food insecurity also had less fiscal space for social programs following the Covid-19 pandemic, which drained national budgets.</p> +<h4 id="resistance-to-change">Resistance to Change</h4> -<p>If Ukraine’s depleted agricultural GDP has been a boon to Russia, the rising global food insecurity that has resulted from Russia’s war has also been beneficial: Ukraine’s diminished exports have created openings for Russia, another major global agricultural exporter, to make up for Ukraine’s losses, with Russia using its agricultural exports as a source of soft power. In early 2022, Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and current deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, declared food to be Russia’s “silent weapon.” By August 2023, President Vladimir Putin declared Moscow’s intention to “replace Ukrainian grain” with Russian grain, particularly to “needy countries.”</p> +<p>There are several reasons why some policymakers have resisted significant change.</p> -<p>Since 2022, data show increases in Russia’s production and exports and decreases in Ukraine’s production and exports of key agricultural commodities. However, the specific regions to which Russia has exported more, and to which Ukraine has exported less, are unclear. Likewise, trends in Russia’s fertilizer exports have been difficult to discern. Using the best data available, this white paper assesses the change in Ukraine and Russia’s agricultural exports and trading partners for wheat and corn, as well as Russia’s fertilizer exports, since February 2022.</p> +<p>First, some individuals and offices remain overly cautious about sharing sensitive technology with other countries — even to some of the United States’ closest allies with whom it shares its most sensitive intelligence. While the United States needs to prevent its sensitive technology from falling into the hands of its adversaries, such as China, Russia, and Iran, some of the concerns are anachronistic and counterproductive.</p> -<h3 id="the-impact-of-the-war-on-ukraines-crop-production">The Impact of the War on Ukraine’s Crop Production</h3> +<p>Second, some see a revitalization of the defense industrial base as giving money to greedy executives that produce deadly weapons systems. They also want more accountability for an industry they see as already engaging in waste, fraud, and abuse. For example, 60 Minutes, produced by CBS News, alleged that defense contractors had overcharged the Department of Defense for a wide array of defense equipment, potentially costing the U.S. government billions of dollars. In addition, the Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector General found some instances of overcharging, including a pattern of behavior by the contractor TransDigm. The House Committee on Oversight and Accountability summarized TransDigm’s actions as “rampant price gouging on mission-critical aircraft parts.” In May 2023, five senators alleged in a letter to the secretary of defense that some companies had “abused the trust government has placed in them, exploiting their position as sole suppliers for certain items to increase prices far above inflation or any reasonable profit margin.”</p> -<p>The war has had direct and indirect impacts on agricultural production in Ukraine. The occupied regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia accounted for about 21 percent of wheat, 17 percent of barley, and 19 percent of sunflower seed produced in Ukraine between 2016 and 2020, while very little corn is grown in the occupied areas. Analysis by NASA Harvest, NASA’s Global Food Security and Agriculture Consortium, estimates that the amount of abandoned cropland in Ukraine in 2023 due to the war is equivalent to about 7.5 percent of total cropland in the country. In addition, the war has increased the costs of transporting grain and other agricultural products to export markets. Most of these costs have been absorbed by Ukrainian producers in the form of lower prices, which has reduced profitability of crops such as wheat and corn. As a result, Ukraine has planted and harvested fewer crops. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that harvested area for wheat, corn (maize), and barley for 2023 is down 32 percent, 27 percent, and 37 percent, respectively, from 2021 levels.[1] Sunflower area is also down 15 percent, while the combined area for soybeans and rapeseed has actually increased 21 percent. However, net area for the six crops is down 19.5 percent over the past two years. For 2024, Ukrainian producers are expected to cut corn-planted areas further but continue to increase areas with oilseeds, especially soybeans, according to survey results from a recent survey from the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine.</p> +<p>These accusations of fraud, waste, and abuse need to be taken seriously, and any individuals and companies found guilty need to be appropriately punished. The Department of Justice, Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector General, and other organizations are designed to conduct investigations and take necessary actions. But major waste, fraud, and abuse are the exceptions. In addition, closer inspection suggests that several of the charges leveled in the CBS News report, including price gouging, were inaccurate. The outlier cases should not be an excuse for failing to strengthen the defense industrial base and improve technology transfers to key allies and partners.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0MqyVHY.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Ukraine Harvested Area</em></p> +<p>Third, some policymakers oppose multiyear contracts because these types of contracts commit the government to fund the weapons systems or programs, reducing budget flexibility in out years. Government agencies lose liquidity, and it can be more difficult to move money over the course of a fiscal year if a military service or other entity wants to shift priorities. Munitions are sometimes a “bill payer,” a part of the defense budget from which officials can trim to fund other programs. Without multiyear contracts that guarantee funding, however, companies have little incentive to take financial risk and grow capacity. It’s not worth investing if there is unreliable demand. And the costs and risks are high. Multiyear contracts keep supply lines warm, sustain supply chain subcontractors, increase production efficiencies that help industry better respond to surges, and encourage investment in facilities and equipment.</p> -<h3 id="impacts-on-ukrainian-exports">Impacts on Ukrainian Exports</h3> +<p>A growing number of qualitative analyses and wargames suggest that the Department of Defense lacks key munitions stockpiles for a protracted conflict — or even a short one — in such theaters as the Indo-Pacific. In today’s security environment, it increasingly makes sense for the government to take on more of the risk of buying weapons systems — perhaps even risking overbuying — because the risks associated with underbuying are so significant.</p> -<p>The impact of the war on Ukrainian exports was immediate (see Figure 2). Shipping out of Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea came to a halt in the week leading up to the invasion as shipping lanes were mined and Russian ships patrolled sea lanes. By the time of the invasion on February 24, Ukraine had shipped most of its wheat and barley harvested in the previous summer, but about 40 to 45 percent of its corn remained to be shipped. With shipping out of the Black Sea halted, exports were transported over land and by river on rail, truck, and barge through Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania to destinations in Europe and to the Romanian port of Constanta. These so-called solidarity lanes exported about one-third of the level that would typically be shipped through the Black Sea ports during that period. As crops planted in the fall began to be harvested in the spring, Ukrainian producers began to face storage constraints which, combined with higher transportation costs, drove down local grain and oilseed prices. Sunflower seed crushers, many located near Black Sea port facilities, found it more profitable to export the oilseed rather than the oil and meal components.</p> +<p>Consequently, the arguments opposed to revitalizing the defense ecosystem are largely unpersuasive, obsolete, and ultimately counterproductive in today’s competitive international landscape. As this chapter argues, the U.S. defense industrial base remains unprepared for the current security environment. The next chapter turns to possible solutions.</p> -<p>The UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) went into effect in late July 2022, and Ukrainian grain and oilseed exports resumed shipping out of three ports around Odesa. Export volumes more than doubled, which eased storage constraints at a critical juncture when the fall harvest began. By February 2022, grain export levels were approaching prewar totals. Russia temporarily suspended the agreement in November 2022 and then repeatedly threatened to pull out in 2023 before finally terminating the agreement in July 2023. Nonetheless, over the 12 months during which the BSGI was in effect, Ukraine shipped nearly 33 million metric tons (mmt) of grains and other agricultural products from its Black Sea ports, which helped contribute to a decline in international prices of staple foods and helped sustain global food supplies.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Multiyear contracts keep supply lines warm, sustain supply chain subcontractors, increase production efficiencies that help industry better respond to surges, and encourage investment in facilities and equipment.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nlvKvkS.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Figure 2: Ukraine Grain Exports, January 2022 – November 2023</em></p> +<h3 id="the-way-ahead">THE WAY AHEAD</h3> -<p>Termination of the BSGI resulted in a sharp decrease in exports in the late summer and early fall of 2023 as exporters sought alternative routes. Ukraine’s military successes in the Black Sea resulted in a retreat of the Russian naval fleet from the western Black Sea, which helped enable the re-establishment of a “humanitarian corridor” that allows shipping of agricultural products from Black Sea ports. Export volumes by the late fall of 2023 had rebounded significantly.</p> +<p>The risks of failing to adequately revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base and broader defense ecosystem are significant and growing, especially with China putting significant resources into its defense industrial base and building advanced military capabilities. Without urgent changes, the United States could find itself with substantial supply and matériel shortfalls, which severely impact both deterrence and warfighting. The United States could also face a situation in which surge capacity lags, innovation stagnates, maintenance of critical supply chains is disincentivized, and the defense industrial base is underprepared for future stockpile requirements. The U.S. defense industrial base — led by a robust and strengthened commercial industry — needs to be a key pillar of broader U.S. industrial policy strategy to compete with China economically, technologically, and militarily.</p> -<h3 id="how-the-war-has-affected-trade-flows">How the War Has Affected Trade Flows</h3> +<p>The “peace dividend” that emerged at the end of the Cold War is over. The international security environment has dramatically shifted. In February 2022, Russia invaded democratic Ukraine in a brazen move that has led to a protracted war of attrition. Since then, Russia has doubled down and ramped up defense production and imported weapons systems and components from such countries as China, Iran, and North Korea. In October 2023, Hamas conducted a bloody attack against Israel, and then Iranian-linked groups targeted U.S. and partner forces in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries. Iran and Iranian-linked groups possess a growing arsenal of sophisticated stand-off weapons, from missiles to unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and loitering munitions, which require improved air defense and counter-UAS capabilities. In the Indo-Pacific, China has become increasingly aggressive against Taiwan, the United States, and numerous countries in the region, such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. Finally, North Korea is expanding its arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, which threaten South Korea, the United States, and other countries.</p> -<p>Disruption to shipping in the Black Sea has resulted in more Ukrainian exports going to Europe and less going to regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Between January 2021 and February 2022, less than 2 percent of total Ukrainian wheat exports went to European markets, but since February 2022, European markets have received 50 percent of total wheat exports (see Figure 3). While countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA, including Turkey) remain large markets for Ukraine, the share of exports has dropped from 53 percent to 34 percent over these same periods. The largest impact to wheat exports has been felt by Sub-Saharan Africa, which fell from 10 percent to 3 percent, and South and Southeast Asia, which fell from 30 percent to 12 percent.</p> +<p>China’s defense industrial base is also increasingly operating on a wartime footing and is developing and producing weapons systems in all major domains — land, air, maritime, cyber, and space. As Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall remarked, “China has been reoptimizing its forces for great power competition and to prevail against the U.S. and the Western Pacific for over 20 years. . . . China has been building a military capability specifically designed to achieve their national goals and to do so even if opposed by the United States.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/np9FkYs.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Figure 3: Ukraine Corn Wheat Exports by Region, January 2021 – November 2023</em></p> +<p>There is good news, however. The U.S. private sector is innovative, and the United States has a history of rejuvenating its defense sector in the face of authoritarian military action. U.S. revitalization has not just occurred during wartime, such as World War II or the Korean War, but also during times of increased strategic competition, such as during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In addition, a strengthened U.S. defense industrial base is good for U.S. jobs, since every state in the United States has workers in the defense sector.</p> -<p>Europe also saw a large increase in corn imports from Ukraine after February 2022 (see Figure 4). Over 64 percent of total corn exports from Ukraine went to European markets after the start of the war, compared to 36 percent in the 14-month period prior to the invasion. Corn exports to Middle East and North African countries (including Turkey) dropped from almost 25 percent of total exports to 17 percent. Ukraine corn exports to East Asia (primarily China) have also fallen since the war. Corn exports to East Asia accounted for over 34 percent of total corn exports before the invasion, but that share fell to less than 19 percent after February 2022.</p> +<p>This chapter provides recommendations to help revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base. It focuses on several areas: a White House–level initiative, defense production, and allies and partners. These recommendations are not intended to be comprehensive, but rather illustrative of the type of urgent changes necessary. There are many others worth considering, such as broad acquisition reform, strengthening economic security agreements, protecting against cyberattacks, improving international interoperability, and reducing the United States’ reliance on China and other competitors for raw materials.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dXRg7X5.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Figure 4: Ukraine Corn (Maize) Exports by Region, January 2021 – November 2023</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China’s defense industrial base is increasingly operating on a wartime footing and is developing and producing weapons systems in all major domains — land, air, maritime, cyber, and space.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="impacts-of-the-war-on-russian-exports-of-wheat-and-fertilizers">Impacts of the War on Russian Exports of Wheat and Fertilizers</h3> +<h4 id="white-houseled-effort">White House–Led Effort</h4> -<p>Russia is the world’s largest exporter of wheat and accounts for a large share of global exports of fertilizer components such as potash, urea, diammonium phosphate (DAP), and anhydrous ammonia. Market prices for these commodities spiked after the invasion in February 2022, in part because of the fear that Russian exports, as well as Ukraine’s, would be adversely affected. The sanctions imposed by the European Union, United States, Canada, and other countries on Russia and Belarus following Russia’s 2022 invasion included restrictions on banking, trade, technology transfers, and specific individuals. (These came on top of earlier sanctions on both countries — on Russia in response to its 2014 annexation of Crimea and on Belarus in response to human rights violations in 2020 and its forced grounding of Ryanair Flight 4798 to seize a dissident journalist in 2021.) But these sanctions exempted the agricultural sector, including inputs such as fertilizers, to avoid side effects on global food security.</p> +<p>There is an urgent need for a presidential-led body to provide strategic guidance across government and to oversee a major revitalization of the defense industrial base and defense ecosystem. The Department of Defense cannot do it alone. The Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, Congress, private sector, and other organizations also play important roles in the defense industrial base. Revitalization will likely not occur without White House leadership, as the history of the U.S. defense industrial base suggests.</p> -<p>Russian wheat production over the past two marketing seasons has been at a record high due to record plantings and yields (see Figure 5). The USDA estimates that Russian wheat exports will likely be a record-high 51 mmt for the 2023–2024 marketing year.</p> +<p>There are several options. One is a variant of the production boards that existed during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. This body could be created by the president and could exercise general direction over U.S. defense procurement and production; help determine the policies, plans, and procedures of federal departments regarding procurement and production; establish priorities in the distribution of materials and services; break through bureaucrat gridlock; and provide a sense of urgency in revitalizing the defense industrial base. A second option is a variant of the Reagan administration’s Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board, which was designed to improve mobilization capabilities and interagency cooperation within the federal government. The board might consist of representatives from key federal agencies at the deputy secretary or under secretary level, be chaired by the national security advisor, and include a full-time secretariat. A third option is the establishment of a national commission — composed of prominent former government officials, industry executives, and other subject-matter experts — designed to make recommendations to the U.S. president. A critical part of all of these options is to tie the body to the U.S. president.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2YAAZP8.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ Figure 5: Russian Wheat Production and Exports</em></p> +<h4 id="defense-production-1">Defense Production</h4> -<p>Analyzing the impact of the war on Russian exports is complicated by the fact that Russia discontinued reporting exports (and imports) to the United Nations in early 2022. To estimate the impacts on trade, one must resort to so-called mirror trade methodologies (aggregating data from importing countries who report imports from Russia) or by examining maritime shipment data that is collected by private sources. Neither is ideal, but shipment data for wheat is superior to mirror trade data, as the latter only captures a small share of total exports due to missing key data from regions where import reporting lags, such as Sub-Saharan Africa. (For example, for the July 2020–June 2021 marketing year, Russia reported wheat exports at 38.1 mmt, while mirror trade data over the same period showed only 14.0 mmt.) This paper uses shipment data collected by KPLR and processed by the International Grains Council (IGC) and World Trade Organization (WTO) and published by the WTO’s Global Trade Data Portal.</p> +<p>Ramping up defense production should include several steps. An important goal should be for industry to produce high-volume and high-impact systems at affordable costs over time that help the United State strengthen deterrence and warfighting. Doing this will require shifting the incentives governing the defense industrial base on a range of issues, such as multiyear contracting.</p> -<p>Cumulative shipment data collected over the period July 1, 2023, to January 31, 2024, allows a comparison of exports during the current 2023/24 marketing year to last year’s exports over the same seven-month period and to a three-year average level taken over the 2020–2021, 2021–2022, and 2022–2023 periods (see Figure 6). Russian wheat exports dipped in the first few months after the invasion began but recovered by mid-summer that year. Total wheat shipments over the period July 1, 2023, to January 31, 2024, totaled 22.1 mmt, compared to 21.9 million tons for the same period last year and an average 20.4 mmt over the three-year average).</p> +<p><strong>Defense Spending:</strong> The United States likely cannot revamp its defense industrial base without increasing defense spending. The goal should be to increase funding for the development and production of critical weapons systems. An infusion of cash would strengthen the defense industrial base using Title 3 funds in the Defense Production Act, including such components as rocket boosters, energetics, engines, munitions, and new weapons systems. It might also be helpful for the government to increase investments in defense infrastructure, such as factories, which can be difficult and risky for industry to invest in quickly. One option might be to establish more government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities. Amid the Cold War, the last major period of strategic competition, the U.S. defense budget hovered between 9 and 11 percent of GDP during the Eisenhower administration, between 8 and 9 percent during Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and over 6 percent during the Reagan administration.</p> -<p>Figure 6 shows that more wheat shipments during the 2022–2023 marketing year went to North Africa and Western Asia and proportionately less wheat went to Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern and Southeastern Asian markets than in prior years. But for the first seven months of the 2023/24 marketing years, Russia’s wheat trade has largely reverted to more traditional pattern, with more wheat going to Sub-Saharan Africa.</p> +<p>This report has not conducted a comprehensive defense budget analysis. However, today’s current defense budget of approximately 3 percent of GDP is not historically consistent with a security environment in which authoritarian states, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are increasingly threatening the United States and its allies and partners. China, in particular, is developing a robust defense industrial base that is focused on warfighting and deterrence against the United States. In this environment, the United States needs to analyze defense budget options at least closer to the levels of the 1980s.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Uw3sYHn.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ Figure 6: Russia Cumulative Wheat Exports through January 31</em></p> +<p><strong>Multiyear Contracting:</strong> The Department of Defense and Congress need to expand the use of multiyear procurement to create sustained demand signals that can promote investment into the capacity of the industrial base. These types of contracts have typically been reserved for only the most expensive acquisition types, such as procurement of large Navy ships. Multiyear procurement is a step in building a consistent and predictable demand signal that creates more transparency and less risk for both prime contractors as well as more fragile sub-tier suppliers. Reliance on cost savings only is too restrictive, and promoting defense industrial base stability and effective deterrence and warfighting is an important justification for multiyear contracts.</p> -<p>The impact of the war on Russia’s fertilizer exports has been mixed (see Table 1). Based on mirror trade data, potash exports were down in 2022 compared to 2020 and 2021 levels but have rebounded strongly in 2023. Urea and DAP exports both were up in 2022 and for the first 11 months of 2023. By contrast, exports of anhydrous ammonia fell by more than 70 percent in 2022 and have declined further in 2023. This largely reflects the impacts of the closure of the Tolyatti-Pivdennyi ammonia pipeline and Russia’s difficulties in moving exports to more remote ports on the Baltic Sea. Unlike for wheat, where key import data is lacking, mirror trade data for fertilizer typically captures 80–90 percent of exports based on data for 2020 and 2021.</p> +<p>The fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act authorized multiyear procurement for some munitions, such as JASSM, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), LRASM, and PAC-3. While helpful, the problem has generally not been the authorization of multiyear contracts, but rather the failure of appropriators or the military services to fund or spend multiyear contracts. Appropriators need to fund — and the services need to spend — critical munitions important for warfighting and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East. There are several munitions that should be considered for future multiyear funding, such as the AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), Javelin, Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Extended Range (AARGM-ER), AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), and Harpoon.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/B9FkiZK.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Global Fertilizer Imports from Russia</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Department of Defense and Congress need to expand the use of multiyear procurement to create sustained demand signals that can promote investment into the capacity of the industrial base.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="analysis">Analysis</h3> +<p><strong>Strategic Stockpiles:</strong> The Department of Defense maintains stockpiles of some key minerals, munitions, chemicals, technology, and medical supplies. But it needs to better manage inventory and stockpile planning to decrease near-term risk and mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities. It also needs to stockpile (or develop alternative markets for) such critical minerals as antimony, titanium, nickel, and cobalt. For example, the United States imports a significant amount of titanium sponge from Russia and China, which could be cut off or interrupted in a war.</p> -<p>The data presented here offer insights regarding the impact of Russia’s war on agricultural production, exports, and market shares for both Ukraine and Russia.</p> +<p>The Department of Defense and Congress should allocate additional funding for contracts and other incentives — such as tax incentives, regulatory relief, and long-term contracts — to build and maintain spare production capacity. Such funding should be used to modernize and expand facilities and develop flexible production. The Department of Defense and Congress should also increase funding to expand domestic production of components critical for deterrence and warfighting in such areas as the Indo-Pacific, such as cruise missile motor capacity expansion (which is important for Harpoon, Tomahawk, LRASM, JASSM, and other long-range missiles), solid rocket motor capacity expansion, energetics, and batteries.</p> -<p>Ukraine’s wheat and corn exports have fallen relative to prewar exports for every region except Europe. Wheat exports to Europe grew from 2 percent in the period preceding Russia’s invasion to 50 percent post-invasion, and corn exports to Europe grew from 36 percent pre-invasion to 64 percent. These figures mask the ultimate destinations of much of Ukraine’s wheat and corn, as some European countries further export Ukrainian grains to countries outside of the region. Nonetheless, the sudden increase in Ukrainian exports to its European neighbors resulted in market disruptions in many of these countries, particularly the “frontline five” — Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Trade disputes have erupted between Ukraine and these countries, and disagreements have emerged within the European Union regarding ways to maintain support for Ukraine’s agriculture sector while not overburdening its neighbors’ agricultural markets or diminishing their farmers’ incomes. Agricultural market disruptions have influenced national elections in some countries, and tensions with Ukraine and within the European Union are ongoing.</p> +<p>Working with industry partners, the Department of Defense should also identify and establish stockpiles of the critical parts, finished goods, and commodities needed to meet production requirements for conducting sustained military campaigns against adversaries. In addition, the Department of Defense should identify the stockpiling requirements of critical minerals and components necessary to continue production in cases where international conflict or crisis may inhibit normal functioning of supply chains. The essential role of these stockpiles should be to mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities and ensure the military’s operational freedom and effectiveness. One example is the field-programmable gate array chips that are manufactured in Taiwan and extensively used in U.S. weapons systems, such as F-35s, missiles, and command and control equipment. It will take years to set up the production capability in the United States, so the U.S. government needs to stockpile these chips in case of a Taiwan contingency.</p> -<p>While Ukraine’s exports to Europe spiked and exports to all other regions fell, one country noticeably affected is China. Prior to Russia’s invasion, East Asia (primarily China) accounted for 34 percent of Ukraine’s corn exports, but it has accounted for less than 19 percent since February 2022. While the BSGI was operational, China was the major beneficiary of Ukraine’s exports, importing nearly 8 million of the almost 33 mmt of grains and other agricultural products exported under the BSGI between July 2022 and July 2023. Almost 73 percent of China’s imports (by volume) from Ukraine under the BSGI was corn, with Ukraine providing 27 percent of China’s corn imports during this period. China’s reliance on Ukraine as a relatively inexpensive source of corn, a major form of animal feed, kept these countries close for much of the period since Russia invaded Ukraine, perhaps tempering Russia’s influence on China during this period. Since the cessation of the BSGI, however, China has turned from Ukraine to South America, mainly Brazil, as a source of corn.</p> +<p><strong>Improvements to the Workforce and Supply Chains:</strong> The United States needs to diversify the supplier base and invest in new or different production methods. For example, defense companies could increasingly use cast iron processes, rather than forging. Casting is generally less expensive and more versatile than forging, though it has some potential disadvantages such as less resistance to wear.</p> -<p>From the prewar period to today, Ukraine’s wheat exports to Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 10 percent of Ukraine’s total to 3 percent, and Ukraine’s wheat exports to North Africa fell from 53 percent to 34 percent. Whether Russia has successfully “replaced” Ukraine as a source of wheat to the African continent is not possible to determine with available data, but certain patterns are clear. Between the 2022–2023 and 2023–2024 marketing year, Russia’s exports of wheat increased to each WTO region of Sub-Saharan Africa (Eastern Africa, Central Africa, Western Africa, and Southern Africa). In this period, Russia has tried to assuage opposition from African countries who disapproved of Russia’s termination of the BSGI on the grounds that it would increase the cost of food imports. Speaking at a Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg on July 27, 2023, President Putin said that Russia was ready to replace Ukrainian grain exports to Africa and offered to provide Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and Eritrea with 25,000–50,000 metric tons of free grain each in the next three to four months. Russian state news reported on February 21, 2024 that Russia’s agriculture ministry had completed delivery of grains to these countries, including 25,000 million tons of wheat each to Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Mali, and Zimbabwe, and 50,000 million tons of wheat to Somalia and the Central African Republic. In September 2023, Russia announced an agreement with Turkey and Qatar to move 1 mmt of Russian grains to the “neediest countries” in Africa. Increased exports to Sub-Saharan Africa reflect efforts by Russia to bolster support in the region and deflate criticism over termination of the BSGI.</p> +<p>The Department of Defense should look for opportunities to assist companies with upskilling and reskilling workers by offering incentives. Examples of such actions include the following:</p> -<p>Russia’s wheat exports to North Africa for the first seven months of 2023–2024 are down from the same period a year ago, but their market share has remained roughly the same at 47 percent, and North Africa remains the top destination of Russian wheat. Russian wheat exports to Western Asia over the first seven months of 2023–2024 have similarly declined, but Russia’s market share has actually increased from 51 percent to 59 percent.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Expand investments in the Department of Defense’s Manufacturing Innovation Institutes, including by supporting public-private partnerships with colleges, universities, high schools, and other institutions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Invest in institutions and programs that support workforce development to address skill gaps in defense-related manufacturing and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) jobs.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Expand programs such as Project MFG, photonics certifications, IDREAM4D, the Microelectronics Security Training Center, and Scalable Asymmetric Lifecycle Engagement. The Department of Defense helped establish these programs to support the talent needed for defense-related manufacturing and STEM jobs.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Increase federal funding for vocational schools that train individuals for defense workforce jobs, such as shipyard welders.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The BSGI had promised to secure Russia’s exports of anhydrous ammonia through the Tolyatti-Pivdennyi pipeline, which terminates near Odesa. Ukraine has obstructed the flow of ammonia through the pipeline since February 2022. In early June 2023, Russia and Ukraine reported damage to the pipeline. As a result, BSGI-facilitated inspections of ships into and out of Pivdennyi ground to a halt in June 2023. Some analysts suggested that repairs to the pipeline, and eventual resumption of exports of Russia’s anhydrous ammonia, would be necessary to renew the BSGI in July 2023. Instead, Russia terminated the deal that month.</p> +<p>The Department of Defense should also consider increasing the use of defense industrial base programs, such as Defense Production Act Title III, to incentivize the expansion of existing U.S. sources and the establishment of new ones. The secretary of the Navy’s maritime statecraft initiative outlines an approach to revitalize commercial shipbuilding by using long-dormant subsidies and other steps to invest in commercial shipyards in the United States, modernize and expand shipbuilding industrial capacity, and develop a more capable and competitive workforce.</p> -<p>Regarding fertilizer, Russia’s exports of potash, urea, and diammonium phosphate have rebounded, though exports of anhydrous ammonia have stalled. Sales of all fertilizer types were lower during the first 10 months of 2022 than in November and December of that year. Nonetheless, because Russia’s war disrupted fertilizer markets, causing fertilizer prices to climb, Russia’s revenues from fertilizer sales in the first 10 months of 2022 were 70 percent higher than the same period in 2021. One of Russia’s explanations for terminating the BSGI was that its own agriculture sector has suffered during the war and particularly since the BSGI was implemented. Record-high levels of wheat exports and rebounding sales of fertilizers (except anhydrous ammonia) indicate Russia’s bluff, underscoring the real reasons Russia has been targeting Ukraine’s agriculture sector: to gain wartime economic and political advantage.</p> +<h4 id="allies-and-partners-1">Allies and Partners</h4> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>The White House needs to focus significant attention on improving and streamlining the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and other processes and procedures across the U.S. government to expand co-development, co-production, co-sustainment, and other types of cooperation with critical allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Significant progress will not happen without White House–level intervention.</p> -<p>Agriculture and food security are central to Russia’s war strategy. Ukraine’s agricultural sector has been a major target of Russia’s attacks since February 2022. Ukraine’s agricultural production, exports, and GDP have declined as a direct result. Russia’s war in Ukraine has also led to historic disruptions to global agriculture, energy, and fertilizer markets, with food insecurity increasing among millions as a result. Russia has exploited food insecurity in low- and lower-middle-income countries for its benefit in two ways: (1) by aiming to decrease (or even eliminate) Ukraine as a source of food for these countries, thereby decreasing Ukraine’s potential influence in these places, and (2) by increasing these countries’ reliance on Russia as a source of food, thereby increasing Russia’s influence.</p> +<p>For FMS, the Department of Defense should develop a more efficient review process for releasing technology, provide allies and partners with relevant priority capabilities, accelerate acquisition and contracting support, and ensure broad U.S. government support to improve the FMS process. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, working with the services and military departments, should establish a rapid contracting process to reduce the backlog in getting approved FMS cases on contract. The Department of State should consider instituting internal deadlines for bureaus and offices to respond to FMS requests. These deadlines should be standard and understood by stakeholders outside of the Department of State.</p> -<p>Since February 2022, it is apparent that Russia’s production and exports of food has increased, and that Ukraine’s has decreased. The data presented here sheds light regarding the specific regions to which Russia’s exports have increased and the regions to which Ukraine has exported less because of Russia’s war. Time and innovations in trade data will further clarify the patterns explained here. Without a significant change in the course of the war, however, one can expect Russia to continue to use food and fertilizer as potent soft power tools, and to continue to capitalize on the destruction of Ukraine’s agriculture sector and the damage done to global food security as a result.</p> +<p>Congressional notifications for FMS should include the date on which the United States received an official request from the partner nation for the times and services included in the notification. This would allow members to understand just how long international partners are waiting for replies to requests. The date used should be the date on which the letter of request was first received by a U.S. security cooperation organization, such as the in-country Security Cooperation Office, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, combatant command staff, or service implementing agency.</p> -<hr /> +<p>On technology cooperation, the administration should also move quickly to put in place regulations that will provide broad exemptions for the United Kingdom and Australia, much like the United States has provided to Canada. In addition, the U.S. government should increase co-production, co-development, and other arrangements with key allies and partners in such areas as munitions, shipbuilding, and ground vehicles. For example, South Korea and Japan have robust shipbuilding capabilities through companies, such as Daewoo, Hyundai Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Imabari Shipbuilding, that could be useful. There have been several recent examples of co-production with allies and partners, such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) with Poland, Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) and GMLRS with Australia, Naval Strike Missile with Norway, and SM-6 components and Tomahawks for Japan and Australia. But these examples are the exception rather than the rule.</p> -<p><strong>Caitlin Welsh</strong> is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she analyzes the drivers and consequences of food and water insecurity around the world, including for U.S. national security. Her specific areas of focus include the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security and nutrition, food insecurity in the U.S. military, and the coherence between U.S. global water security policy and U.S. global food security policy.</p> +<p>Doing this effectively will require limiting “Buy America” protectionism, especially for allies that the United States may need to operate and fight with in future military contingencies. Expanding reciprocal defense procurement (RDP) agreements with allies could be helpful. The United States has RDP agreements with Australia and Japan, but not with South Korea. Such provisions as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (better known as the Jones Act) have made it difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to effectively collaborate in such areas as shipbuilding with Japanese, South Korean, or other allies that have sufficient capacity. The act is archaic and counterproductive in a world where defense collaboration is increasingly important with U.S. allies.</p> -<p><strong>Joe Glauber</strong> is a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and currently serves as interim secretary of the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS). He is also a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a non-resident senior adviser at CSIS.</p>Caitlin Welsh and Joseph GlauberAs Russia’s war on Ukraine enters its third year, new data on the growth of Russia’s global agricultural market shares and the extent to which it has forcefully diminished Ukraine’s production and exports indicates a long-term trend.【黎智英案・審訊第卅四日】2024-02-28T12:00:00+08:002024-02-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-34<ul> - <li>辯方：黎智英反對港獨 陳沛敏：未曾與黎深入討論、不記得黎曾否明言反對</li> - <li>陳沛敏確認黎智英從沒指示做違國安法事情 惟當時不肯定發布黎文章是否違法</li> -</ul> +<p>Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States was involved in setting up recurring engagements with the heads of the ministries of defense and national armaments directors to coordinate support efforts. This body jump-started initiatives to expand ammunition production, establish an international support fund, and organize the delivery and sustainment of critical capabilities. The United States should consider convening the leadership of allied and partner nations within the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, to deepen multilateral collaboration on regional industrial base and manufacturing production challenges.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The recommendations outlined in this chapter would go a long way to revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base in a competitive security environment. Key recommendations include developing a White House–level body to oversee revitalization of the defense industrial base; ramping up defense production in such areas as multiyear contracting, strategic stockpiles, supply chains, and the workforce; and improving defense industrial cooperation with partners and allies. Unless these types of urgent changes occur, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and other regions against China and other competitors, including Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IEycp9Z.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>The United States has the tools to reinvigorate its industrial base, including an innovative and technologically advanced private sector. The United States has also been in similar positions before — and succeeded. It is worth quoting at length President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s December 1940 speech — one year before Pearl Harbor — arguing that that the United States needs to be an arsenal of democracy. Roosevelt’s words are highly relevant today:</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第34日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方向陳展示數段訊息，以確認黎提出建議時有禮貌，惟陳雖然認同黎的語氣可謂客氣，但是當他親自提出建議的時候，「我好難置之不理咁囉。」辯方另指黎智英從不曾主張港獨，陳確認未曾聽過他有如此主張。惟當辯方指黎更加反對港獨，陳僅說：「我冇深入同佢討論過呢個問題」，也不記得黎有否使用過「我反對港獨」這類字眼來表達意見。陳另指黎建議找時評作者桑普撰文，但是他曾主張港獨，高層討論過相關法律風險之後，最後沒有邀請他撰文。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>I want to make it clear that it is the purpose of the nation to build now with all possible speed every machine, every arsenal, every factory that we need to manufacture our defense material. We have the men, the skill, the wealth, and above all, the will. I am confident that if and when production of consumer or luxury goods in certain industries requires the use of machines and raw materials that are essential for defense purposes, then such production must yield, and will gladly yield, to our primary and compelling purpose.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第13天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻繼續盤問。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>So I appeal to the owners of plants, to the managers, to the workers, to our own government employees to put every ounce of effort into producing these munitions swiftly and without stint. With this appeal I give you the pledge that all of us who are officers of your government will devote ourselves to the same whole-hearted extent to the great task that lies ahead.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vGjBWDY.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）</p> +<blockquote> + <p>As planes and ships and guns and shells are produced, your government, with its defense experts, can then determine how best to use them to defend this hemisphere. The decision as to how much shall be sent abroad and how much shall remain at home must be made on the basis of our overall military necessities.</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="陳沛敏黎智英提議時語氣客氣-惟我好難置之不理">陳沛敏：黎智英提議時語氣客氣 惟「我好難置之不理」</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>We must be the great arsenal of democracy.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>辯方昨日提到黎智英提出建議時態度有禮貌，他今向陳沛敏展示數段訊息以作確認。2018年5月6日，黎向陳傳送訊息：「沛敏，例如今日的頭條我們是否可以找退休警官或前 ICAC 官員撰寫些 insight 融合其中？Jist (Just) a thought. Thanks, Jimmy」；2019年4月8日，黎向陳轉發民主黨李永達的訊息：「可否考慮將其中幾個重點/分析，在新聞版逐日詳細寫，等讀者易消化」，並稱：「以上是李永達提議，是否可以像他提議再處理，或甚至找到這人訪問，可以不出面用背影出現？謝謝。」</p> +<blockquote> + <p>For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>辯方問，從以上訊息可見，黎是否有禮貌地提議。陳沛敏指：「佢個語氣係客氣啦，可以咁講，但係係佢親自提出（建議）嘅話，我好難置之不理咁囉。」陳續指，時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹有時都會知道黎的建議，張會向她查問進展，「咁我會視之為我要執行嘅事囉。」</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DUNfrtn.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<h4 id="黎智英轉發香港監察新聞稿-陳沛敏理解黎作為老闆推薦報導">黎智英轉發香港監察新聞稿 陳沛敏：理解黎作為老闆推薦報導</h4> +<p><strong>Alexander Palmer</strong> is an associate fellow in the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p>Seth G. Jones and Alexander PalmerChina’s defense industrial base is moving to a wartime footing, while the United States is largely in a peacetime stance. Absent urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities against China and other competitors.【黎智英案・審訊第卅八日】2024-03-05T12:00:00+08:002024-03-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-38<ul> + <li>楊清奇：國安法後專欄作者擔心紅線「唔知點樣劃」，部份認為替蘋果撰文風險特別高</li> + <li>楊清奇指日本專欄作家文句不通、立場矛盾 嘆「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」</li> +</ul> -<p>辯方另展示黎智英與陳沛敏之間的 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄，黎向陳轉發來自「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）的訊息和新聞稿，黎並稱：「Don’t know what you want to do with it. It’s from Ben Rogers.」，陳則回覆黎「他有傳給我們，thanks」。</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>辯方稱，黎傳送上述訊息、提出建議之後，便沒有任何跟進，由陳決定做法如何。陳則認為，黎既已將她的聯絡電話交給羅傑斯，讓羅傑斯可以直接向她傳送新聞稿，「點解又要透過黎生，又要再傳多一次畀我呢？」因此她當時的認知是，羅傑斯會覺得若然直接傳送新聞稿給她，「我哋會未夠重視啦」，所以黎在知道羅傑斯會直接傳送給她和《蘋果》編輯的情況下，依然會替羅傑斯傳送多一次給他們，「我會理解係，黎生作為一個老闆，佢會推薦我哋出呢個新聞稿囉。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uGtwz92.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>辯方指黎的做法可以有另一個詮釋，因黎是羅傑斯的朋友，所以黎認為自己有責任傳送新聞稿給編輯，但具體做法則交給編輯決定。惟陳堅稱她當時的理解是上述提及的理解，又形容黎「似乎好重視 Benedict Rogers 同埋佢個機構嘅事」。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（5日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第38日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。庭上提到，專欄作家古德明在2020年7月6日發表文章〈「國安法」下，唯有擱筆〉，楊指很多專欄作家和自由撰稿人「都擔心《國安法》嗰條紅線唔知點樣劃嘅」，又指「有啲作者覺得同《蘋果日報》寫，風險特別高嘅」，所以後來黎要求邀請北京的人和知道中共權鬥內情的人撰文，「咁啲作者都話風險好高，唔敢寫。」</p> -<p>陳指正如訊息顯示，她回覆黎：「他有傳給我們，thanks」，用意是想「婉轉地話畀黎生聽，我哋其實已經收到啦」，可是正如早前庭上展示的訊息可見，每當有羅傑斯和香港監察的新聞稿，黎便會轉發給她。</p> +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇第二天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏若黎認為事情不重要-大可以叫對方直接傳送新聞稿給同事">陳沛敏：若黎認為事情不重要 大可以叫對方直接傳送新聞稿給同事</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Sj9wRpQ.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> -<p>辯方續展示另一組訊息，羅傑斯向黎傳送一份給被捕香港示威者的公開信，並說：「I was asked if I would release an open letter to detainees to encourage them, and so attach it here. If you felt able to cover it that would be great.」；黎回覆羅傑斯「I’ll send to my publisher for her to decide. Thanks, Jimmy」。黎之後轉發以上兩則訊息給陳。</p> +<h4 id="訊息顯示黎智英提出楊清奇替twitter供稿-予每月1萬元報酬">訊息顯示黎智英提出楊清奇替Twitter供稿 予每月1萬元報酬</h4> -<p>辯方指，上述訊息的其中一種解讀可以是黎不想明確答覆羅傑斯可否報導，而是交由陳沛敏決定。法官李運騰修正問法，問陳認為有沒有可能黎並不是在給予指示，而她覺得黎在給予指示，只是她的個人感覺。惟陳表示：「我覺得可能性唔大囉」，因為如果黎認為事情根本不重要，他大可以叫對方直接將新聞稿傳送給同事。</p> +<p>2020年5月25日，黎向楊傳送訊息：「李平兄，以律師談過每月從我私人戶口支付一萬天（元）給我作為供 Twitter 報酬」、「小心些是可以的，我將每月安排付款給你。謝謝。」楊當時回覆：「謝謝」，之後又說「卑職自當盡力，共擔輿論之責」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SK7cEq9.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> +<p>楊解釋，黎早前向他提及過，若他替黎的 Twitter 供稿，可以每月獲得1萬元報酬，他後來有按照黎的指示供稿，「不過後來一分錢都冇畀過嘅。」</p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏確認有時黎會給予指示">陳沛敏確認有時黎會給予指示</h4> +<p>控方問「共擔輿論之責」是什麼意思。楊指黎之前提及過，開設 Twitter 是為了加強自己和《蘋果》的影響力，因而影響輿論，「啫係我供稿，就承擔輿論之責嘅。」</p> -<p>辯方展示2020年3月29日訊息紀錄，羅傑斯指與英國保守黨人權委員會成員裴德倫（Luke de Pulford）撰寫了評論文章，希望《蘋果》可以報導；黎回覆羅傑斯，會交予陳沛敏和主理網站的時任總編輯羅偉光處理。其後黎向陳轉發上述訊息，並稱「Please see what you can do to help Ben. Thanks, Jimmy」。陳回覆「收到」。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英替外媒撰文-不時查問資料">楊清奇：黎智英替外媒撰文 不時查問資料</h4> -<p>辯方指，黎的訊息看起來較像「指示」，多於「提議」。陳表示「字面上可以咁講」。辯方繼而指此類情況是例外情況，問陳是否同意。陳僅表示說不出頻率，但她憑早前的訊息，例如黎就美國大選提出個人見解，或在7.1衝擊立法會事件之後感覺到要求採訪某些人，「我都會覺得係指示囉。」</p> +<p>控方續指，2020年5月29日黎向楊傳送一則語音訊息，黎向楊稱：「習近平呢佢嘅鴻圖大業呢⋯⋯佢就有一路一帶啦，2025年啦⋯⋯嗰個就叫做科技乜鬼嘢啦吓」、「你睇睇佢有冇佢啲鴻圖大計啲計劃，可唔可以寫一寫畀我呀？因為我寫緊稿。」</p> -<p>辯方續問陳是否同意黎很少就其建議作出跟進。陳說「可以咁講」，但是黎不只向她落指示，例如張劍虹也會知道這些指示，「咁張劍虹先生都會嚟問我跟進成點。」</p> +<p>楊指黎會替外媒撰文，不時會找他搜尋資料，他記得黎曾要求提供關於中共權鬥和南韓光州運動的資料，黎撰寫關於《國安法》文章的時候也有詢問過他。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iegxVz2.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KHA7jVn.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏確認831放頭版-因有新聞價值-同時意識到黎很重視警暴新聞">陳沛敏確認8.31放頭版 因有新聞價值 同時意識到黎很重視警暴新聞</h4> +<h4 id="楊清奇曾提出邀請高瑜撰文-但不符合黎智英要求-故最後未有執行">楊清奇：曾提出邀請高瑜撰文 但不符合黎智英要求 故最後未有執行</h4> -<p>辯方續展示陳沛敏與時任執行總編輯林文宗之間的訊息紀錄，林向陳說：「我已跟社長打了招呼，星期一報紙頭版開天窗，並會有段文字交代一下我們支持罷工，但基於社會角色欲罷不能之類。」陳庭上稱當時將此決定告訴張劍虹，但不知道張有否轉告黎智英。</p> +<p>控方續展示2020年6月12日的訊息，楊向黎稱：「老闆，已找北京高瑜、南方都市報前主筆長平，為英文版撰寫即時評論，具體安排我再同盧峯傾。」黎其後表示：「李平，盡量多找有份量有內幕消息的人寫，不只是感想而是有寫（內）情的。謝謝。」</p> -<p>訊息紀錄又顯示，在8.31太子站事件之後，林向陳表示：「我改太子站無差別打人做A1」、「臥底警察做A2」、「有打人，有攬住喊」。</p> +<p>楊解釋，訊息中提及的高瑜是一名北京學者，他當時找了高瑜撰稿，但是黎並不滿意，因為他想有作者可以寫中共權鬥內情，而不是感想。被問到最後有否聯絡高瑜，楊表示沒有，因為黎要求有撰寫內幕的作者，而不是評論，所以最後沒有聯絡高瑜。</p> -<p>陳稱當時她已經下班，不在公司，因為8.31事件比較夜發生，林便通知她會把原本的「臥底警」頭版報導調往A2，改以8.31事件作為頭版，「當然我係同意做A1嘅，因為我喺電視睇新聞，同埋睇到社交媒體嘅一啲片段，同埋輿論嘅即時反應，咁我覺得（8.31事件）可以做A1嘅。」</p> +<p>控方問高瑜會用真名還是筆名寫作。楊指高瑜有時用真名，有時用筆名，但他不記得筆名是什麼。評論角度方面，楊指高瑜會評論中國的新聞，「佢係資深嘅傳媒人嚟嘅，所以評論會中立啲。」控方又問長平是誰。楊指從訊息可見他是《南方都市報》前主筆，與高瑜差不多，都是資深的傳媒人。楊又指，以他理解，黎應該認識高瑜，但他不肯定黎是否認識長平。</p> -<p>辯方追問，是否因為8.31太子站是一件有新聞價值的事件，而且陳反對「警暴」，所以決定做頭版。陳確認是，但她同時補充，正如她早前作供提及，她與林文宗都意識到黎很重視警暴新聞。</p> +<p>被問到最後有否跟盧峯（前英文版主筆馮偉光）商討，楊表示沒有，「因為黎生已經否定咗我請其他寫稿嘅人。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lc53mav.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 2019年8月31日 太子站（資料圖片）</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/S8EUZ3H.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》英文版主筆 馮偉光，筆名「盧峯」</p> -<h4 id="黎智英提議邀請桑普撰文-後者曾主張港獨-陳沛敏考慮法律風險後最終未有邀稿">黎智英提議邀請桑普撰文 後者曾主張港獨 陳沛敏：考慮法律風險後最終未有邀稿</h4> +<h4 id="訊息顯示楊清奇提供六四新聞給黎智英於twitter發布">訊息顯示楊清奇提供六四新聞給黎智英於Twitter發布</h4> -<p>辯方另展示陳沛敏與楊清奇之間的 WhatsApp 訊息，陳曾經向楊提議邀請前《有線新聞》林妙茵撰文，又轉發社運攝影師「蕭雲」的投稿文章給楊。辯方問陳是否向楊提議，然後交由楊決定是否採用。陳則表示她在訊息中並不是「提議」，只是當有人投稿，她會傳送給楊。辯方則指這與黎智英的做法無異，分別在於黎的身份是一名老闆。陳僅指雖然她有份簽署批准楊請假，但是她不會過問論壇版的事務，新聞部與論壇版之間可謂獨立運作。</p> +<p>控方展示2020年6月4日的訊息對話，黎說：「李平，看今天6.4是否（有）些大陸新聞給我上 Twitter. 謝謝。」楊其後回覆：「有兩樣，抗命軍長遺憾未留文字及天安門死難者家屬拜祭，畀咗 Simon」，黎回覆：「好。謝謝。」</p> -<p>二人的訊息顯示，陳曾提到黎建議找時評作者桑普撰文，問論壇版是否有位；楊則回覆「他的文章怪怪的，而且公開主張港獨。所以，一直沒敢讓他開專欄。否則，交了稿，出唔出都麻煩」。陳庭上解釋，張劍虹轉述黎智英提議邀請桑普，惟討論過相關法律風險之後，最後沒有邀請他撰文。</p> +<p>楊解釋，黎要求他提供新聞在 Twitter 發布，他找到相關新聞後，便傳送給負責管理該帳戶的李兆富（Simon Lee）。控方續展示同日兩則黎的 Twitter 帖文，分別關於當年拒絕執行清場任務命令的解放軍軍長徐勤先，以及天安門母親拜祭受難子女。</p> -<h4 id="辯方黎智英反對港獨-陳沛敏未曾與黎深入討論">辯方：黎智英反對港獨 陳沛敏：未曾與黎深入討論</h4> +<p>楊確認上述帖文與他提供給黎的資料有關，又提到：「呢個係天安門母親，佢哋每年六四都會拜祭佢哋仔女嘅。」</p> -<p>辯方續指，談到港獨這話題，黎智英從不曾主張港獨，問陳是否同意。陳僅回答：「冇聽過佢有咁嘅主張。」辯方指，黎不只沒有提倡港獨，更加反對港獨，問以陳所知這說法是否正確。陳僅說：「我冇深入同佢討論過呢個問題。」</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇李怡年紀大減文章數目-黎智英要求邀劉細良增加稿量-角度支持民主派">楊清奇：李怡年紀大減文章數目 黎智英要求邀劉細良增加稿量 角度支持民主派</h4> -<p>法官李運騰追問陳是否知道，黎有否曾經說過他「反對港獨」。陳回答，她不記得黎有否使用過「我反對港獨」這類字眼來表達他的意見。</p> +<p>控方又展示時任總編輯羅偉光與楊清奇之間的訊息對話。2020年5月13日羅問楊是否認識「沈月」，因為黎智英提到「沈月」；楊則指不認識，只認識「呂月」，其真實身份是高瑜。</p> -<h4 id="辯方梁振英追擊廣告商-致蘋果收入減少">辯方：梁振英追擊廣告商 致《蘋果》收入減少</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wAYa6Fa.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》總編輯 羅偉光</p> -<p>辯方另提到，壹傳媒集團在2015至2018年之間錄得虧蝕，而黎智英在這段時期並不投入於集團事務。2018年之後，黎變得積極地參與在《蘋果》事務，並於2019年重新擔任壹傳媒集團主席，自此集團錄得的虧損有所減少。</p> +<p>2020年5月31日，羅偉光向楊傳送一段關焯照的英文簡介，叫楊詢問關焯照認為是否可以，楊其後轉述關指可以。訊息顯示關焯照是冠域商業及經濟研究中心主任。楊解釋，關焯照在論壇版有專欄，楊相信羅偉光將關的文章翻譯成英文，然後刊登在英文版網站，所以楊將作者簡介的英文版本傳送給關，而關認為可以。</p> -<p>辯方又指，一般報紙的主要收入來源理應是廣告商，而且是銷售報紙所得收入的兩倍，可是自2020年起，《蘋果》的情況「掉返轉」，即銷售報紙和讀者訂閱所得的收入，是多於廣告收入。陳則表示不太記得，只記得《蘋果》的訂閱人數顯著增加。</p> +<p>同日，羅偉光另傳送政治評論人劉細良的英文簡介給楊，同樣叫楊詢問劉意見；楊之後回覆劉表示可以。楊庭上指劉是《蘋果》論壇版的專欄作家之一，「劉細良都係支持民主派嘅」，已故作家李怡當時表示年紀大，不能夠每日寫一篇稿，所以黎智英透過副社長陳沛敏和楊，邀請劉每周寫多兩篇，最後亦有執行到。</p> -<p>辯方指，自2019年3月起，《蘋果》的廣告收入大大地減少，因為前特首梁振英發動一個針對《蘋果》的「運動（campaign）」，即梁會將在《蘋果》的廣告客戶資料發布於梁的個人臉書，明顯地想廣告客戶不要在《蘋果》落廣告。而這「運動」引起了組織「無國界記者」的關注，曾發表聲明反對該「運動」。陳表示記得上述事件令《蘋果》收入減少，但是她不記得減少幅度和數據。辯方透露稍後會在證人講述相關證供。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/d44JJB5.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Toc8zwh.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<h4 id="蓬佩奧會見王丹等六四倖存者-總編要求楊清奇找作者正面評論分析該會面">蓬佩奧會見王丹等六四倖存者 總編要求楊清奇找作者正面評論分析該會面</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZxaTkUS.png" alt="image08" /></p> +<p>2020年6月4日，羅偉光向楊提到時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧會見前學運領袖王丹等六四倖存者，以及表揚「天安門母親」，會作為當天評論節目「焦點燃論」的主題，並會持續跟進相關新聞，羅又要求楊幫忙找人撰寫評論和分析，稍後會翻譯及刊登於英文版。楊之後回覆「都係請中國版同樣搵林和立或夫子評。論壇版周五已約稿」。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第34日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方指黎智英在《國安法》生效之後，向陳表示：「看了國安法細節嚇了一跳」，並籲「先要想好策略對付，不容魯莽」，意思是叫她行事不要違反《國安法》。陳亦確認高層之間曾經討論報導時避免使用某些字眼，又在黎還柙之後研究將其文章和直播節目下架。辯方指出，黎從沒有指示陳做任何違反《國安法》的事情，陳同意但同時補充，她當時雖然不肯定黎的文章是否違法，但是的確有在《蘋果》實體報紙和網站發布黎的專欄文章和直播節目。她確認如果當時意識到文章和節目觸犯國安法，是不會發布，「但係黎生嘅文，我哋基本上唔會改動，而 Live Chat 我哋更加係冇得參與。」</p> +<p>楊表示，不記得最後有否找到人撰寫評論和分析，他亦不知道羅的訊息背後是誰人的主意。</p> -<p>已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第13天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻繼續盤問。</p> +<p>當控方問到林和立是誰，楊突表示：「我覺得嗰兩個作者同案情無關嘅」，之後又說：「我係覺得呢兩個作者嘅身份，同呢個檢控無關」，因此認為不需要披露二人身份。控方則改口稱問題原意只是想問二人的寫作角度，而不是要求楊披露二人的真實身份或筆名。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英訊息稱不容魯莽-陳沛敏確認其後商討報導字眼研下架黎文章-免違國安法">黎智英訊息稱「不容魯莽」 陳沛敏確認其後商討報導字眼、研下架黎文章 免違國安法</h4> +<p>楊遂指，林和立及夫子都是比較資深的中國問題專家，「佢哋嘅評論都係比較中立」，並且有固定專欄。至於楊的訊息「專欄安裕李怡關焯照都唔啱」，他解釋因為以上3人都不是六四相關範疇的作家。</p> -<p>辯方談及2020年7月《國安法》生效，黎智英向陳沛敏傳送訊息：「沛敏，看了國安法細節嚇了一跳」，並指：「香港將無法治和自由，政府行政無法無天，泛民寸步難移，動彈不得，先要想好策略對付，不容魯莽。」</p> +<p>羅偉光其後訊息稱：「請你幫我搵人寫一篇正面評價此會面及分析，可網上論壇，我主要是翻譯做英文」，楊其後稱「潘小濤寫3點半交稿」。楊將潘的文章傳送給羅之後，羅表示「用蓬佩奧相」。楊確認「正面評價此會面」是指篷佩奧和王丹等人的會面，他亦確認後來有找潘小濤撰文，同事翻譯好文章後，會同時在《蘋果》中文版和英文版網站刊出。</p> -<p>辯方問，以陳的理解，黎以上訊息的意思是否籲她行事不要違反《國安法》。陳表示「係」，但同時補充，正因為如此，所以當她見到黎繼續進行直播對談節目時，「我同同事都有啲驚訝囉。」</p> +<blockquote> + <p>pic.twitter.com/W6ATJykhre — Secretary Pompeo (@SecPompeo) June 3, 2020</p> +</blockquote> -<p>辯方指，所以陳與其他編輯採取行動避免違反《國安法》，包括討論避免使用某些字眼，又研究將黎智英的文章和直播節目下架。辯方遂展示訊息紀錄，在2020年12月11日，即黎還柙之後，張劍虹向陳沛敏傳送訊息：「老闆在副刊、Twitter live、Twitter post、外媒訪問，不少被列出來做證據」，又表示會徵詢《蘋果》內部法律顧問和外間法律意見。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇稱馮偉光按照黎智英主意營運英文版-包括關心香港人權狀況">楊清奇稱馮偉光按照黎智英主意營運英文版 包括關心香港人權狀況</h4> -<h4 id="辯方黎從沒指示做違反國安法事情-陳確認-惟補充有份刊登">辯方：黎從沒指示做違反國安法事情 陳確認 惟補充有份刊登</h4> +<p>控方指，2020年6月馮偉光重新入職《蘋果日報》，擔任英文版主筆，而昨日楊作供時提到二人的辦公室房間相鄰，會不時傾談，控方問馮有否談及英文版事宜。楊則指：「佢（馮）係比較專業嘅人，佢唔會干涉我嘅論壇版，我亦唔會干涉佢嘅英文版」，並指二人獨立工作。</p> -<p>辯方又提到，陳早前作供表示2020年8月警方拘捕黎智英及搜查壹傳媒大樓時，她不認為《蘋果》有做任何違反事情。陳則解釋，當時雖然警方搜查報館，但是他們的講法是並非針對新聞材料，加上牽涉案件的人例如李宇軒，都不是《蘋果》的人，所以她理解警方的行動與《蘋果》所作的報導並沒有關係。</p> +<p>控方又問，馮有否按照黎在飯局中提出的主意去營運英文版。楊稱：「我睇到係有」，以他對英文版的觀察，「的確係關心香港嘅人權狀況嘅。」控方追問英文版有否任何關於中國內地的內容，楊則表示「唔係好肯定」，而他只負責將論壇版的文章傳送給馮，至於揀選文章和翻譯工作則由馮負責。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EVJ2M1v.png" alt="image09" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指專欄作家擔心國安法嗰條紅線唔知點樣劃嘅">楊清奇指專欄作家「擔心《國安法》嗰條紅線唔知點樣劃嘅」</h4> -<p>辯方指出，黎從沒有指示陳做任何違反《國安法》的事情。陳說：「可以咁講。」她其後補充，黎的專欄文章和直播節目分別透過《蘋果》實體報紙和網站發布，雖然她與其他同事在內容上不能參與，但他們的確有刊登黎的文章，當然刊登時不肯定文章是否違法，「但喺咁嘅情況下，都係登咗出嚟囉。」</p> +<p>專欄作家古德明在2020年7月6日撰寫文章〈「國安法」下，唯有擱筆〉，並宣布暫停《蘋果》的專欄。同日，羅向楊傳送訊息：「真係唔寫？」、「咁大壓力？」、「我叫同事寫段新聞」；楊確認古德明不再寫專欄文章，又指：「依家都冇乜來稿，正周圍搵人。請幫手介紹啲」、「都係唔好出新聞，費事嚇親其他作者」；羅則回覆：「唔寫大家都睇到喎，你今日在公司？」</p> -<p>辯方問，如果當時意識到文章和節目觸犯《國安法》，陳是否不會發布？陳表示：「可以咁講」，張劍虹亦曾提醒他們小心處理，「但係黎生嘅文，我哋基本上唔會改動，而 Live Chat 我哋更加係冇得參與。」</p> +<p>楊表示，因為很多專欄作家和自由撰稿人「都擔心《國安法》嗰條紅線唔知點樣劃嘅」，他當時亦提議不要報導古德明擱筆一事，以免使其他人擔心，惟羅認為：「佢（古德明）都寫咗出嚟，大家都睇到，唔需要迴避啦。」</p> -<h4 id="辯方稱黎純粹轉發訊息惟陳沛敏誤解為落指示">辯方稱黎純粹轉發訊息惟陳沛敏誤解為落指示</h4> +<p>楊其後在同日訊息中稱：「唉，啲人話到明唔敢幫蘋果寫」、「肥佬一直要我搵多啲北京人寫，人哋真係唔敢。稿酬又唔吸引😂」。楊庭上解釋，「有啲作者覺得同《蘋果日報》寫，風險特別高嘅」，所以後來黎要求邀請北京的人和知道中共權鬥內情的人撰文，「咁啲作者都話風險好高，唔敢寫。」</p> -<p>早前證供提到2020年7月14日時任美國總統特朗普簽署《香港自治法》之後，黎智英向陳沛敏傳送相關行政命令內文，訊息中包含一句：「I’d say we should work up a shit list on those involved in censorship, which can include intimidation.」，因應黎的訊息，陳曾跟同事商量。</p> +<p>楊又指，上述訊息與他昨日提到黎指示多邀約海外作者撰文相關，因為《國安法》生效之後，本地作者擔心風險會很高，但海外作者則有較少顧忌。控方問到，海外作者是否包括北京的作者。楊則指：「通常海外作者唔包括北京嘅。」</p> -<p>辯方的說法是，上述連同行政命令和含「shit list」字眼的訊息，均是另一人的訊息，而黎純粹將該訊息轉發給陳，因「shit list」並不是黎慣用的行文字眼。</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇以黎文章觀點作為揀選評論文章的方針">楊清奇：以黎文章觀點作為揀選評論文章的「方針」</h4> -<p>辯方指陳有機會誤解黎的訊息為一個「指示」，問陳是否同意。陳則說：「但係我會覺得好奇怪，無端端整段咁嘅嘢畀我睇」，黎亦未有交代訊息是由誰人撰寫，「咁我又唔明佢嘅用意係咩囉。」辯方表示會在陳詞中處理此議題。</p> +<p>控方另展示楊清奇與張劍虹之間的訊息，張在2020年8月3日向楊說：「清奇，政府通緝多名海外人士，說他們違反國安法，如果他們來稿，我們也不方便付稿費。內容當然也按按原定方針把關」，楊回覆「收到🙏」。</p> -<h4 id="辯方黎從沒叫其他人撐住-陳沛敏不同意">辯方：黎從沒叫其他人「撐住」 陳沛敏不同意</h4> +<p>楊解釋，張當時指若果《蘋果》向海外被通緝人士給予稿費，就代表《蘋果》支持他們，所以即使日後收到他們的稿，也不會給予稿費。惟楊補充：「不過始終冇收到海外人士嘅稿嘅。」</p> -<p>辯方庭上播放《蘋果》25週年慶典的錄影片段，黎智英在壹傳媒大樓內向員工發表講話，陳確認當時她在場。辯方指，黎說：「無人會迫你哋點樣去做，無人會迫到你哋做烈士」，意思是他不會叫人去違反《國安法》。陳則回應：「我諗佢（黎）呢個係一個好空泛嘅講法，啫係佢話喺呢度返工都係你嘅決定嚟嘅。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Q9jyBKx.png" alt="image07" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> -<p>辯方指，黎智英在2020年12月還柙之後，曾說自己會「撐住」，但沒有叫其他外面的人「撐住」。陳堅稱：「我記憶中，佢有叫公司嘅人撐住囉。」</p> +<p>控方追問，若然收到海外人士來稿，會交由誰人負責。楊則指，因為沒有收到他們的稿件，所以很難說得出交給哪個部門負責。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bxHYFUz.png" alt="image10" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p>控方又問，張訊息中提到的「原定方針」是關於什麼。楊則指張並未有在訊息中說明，但是《國安法》生效之後，楊留意到黎在個人專欄裡多次提到《國安法》，「從編輯嘅角度嚟睇，我覺得有啲標題係好好嘅」，令他印象深刻，例如「時間就是武器」、「大時代快將來臨」。楊續指，「大家都知道，黎先生嘅文章，係冇人夠膽改佢嘅，咁呢啲文章我覺得好真實咁反映到佢嘅睇法」，其中有提及制裁的問題，不過黎認為美國和西方國家對中國的制裁不會緩和下來，「因為美國對華政策嘅調整呢，短時間內係唔會逆轉嘅，咁美國嘅制裁對中國嘅經濟影響係好深遠嘅」，因此他覺得黎的文章所述觀點，便是他揀選評論文章的方針，他亦認為「原定方針」可以如此理解。</p> -<p>辯方遂展示張劍虹於2020年12月7日傳送給陳沛敏的訊息：「老闆說，不要把他新聞放太大，我說已經沒有」，又列出黎的說話：「1. 不用擔心我；2. 對我來講，係造化，有機會定落嚟睇吓書；3. 亂世，仍然要往前行」，陳回覆張：「收到他很勇敢，宗教信仰也有幫助」。辯方指以上訊息並沒有提及「撐住」。陳僅說：「佢係冇用到呢個字眼囉。」</p> +<p>楊又指，譬如2019年反修例運動期間，「咁都喺黎先生嘅文章度睇到一啲原則嘅」，因他的專欄文章逢星期日刊登，「當時嗰啲大規模遊行示威都喺星期日，所以黎生嘅文章好多時都好直接呼籲人去上街」，因此楊揀選評論文章和撰寫社評時，都會以鼓勵人上街示威為主題。</p> -<p>辯方指，事實上陳探訪黎的時候，黎亦沒有叫外面的人「撐住」，並向陳出示由她本人撰寫的文章，當中提及她第二次到監獄探訪黎：「他說讀報看到有關47人案的文章，很感動。『我會撐住，但我唔會叫出面啲人撐住囉。』他的意思是，香港情況太壞，叫人撐住，撐下去的人承擔的代價可能很大。」陳則回應，根據撰寫文章當時的語境，黎是指初選案，因為他有些朋友來自政界，所以「出面啲人」是指政界和社運界朋友，而黎的意思是叫這些朋友撐住，代價會很大。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SrdrDL1.png" alt="image08" /></p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏確認蘋果報導角度不變-於法律限制之內">陳沛敏確認《蘋果》報導角度不變 於法律限制之內</h4> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（5日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第38日審訊。控方傳召前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。庭上談及日本專欄作家高橋，楊直指他的中文不時有問題，例如在訊息中把前美國總統特朗普說成是「已死總統」。楊又指高橋的立場矛盾，一方面聲稱「港臺日民眾要正對大陸，否則咱們不知不覺中被中共吞掉」，但同時認為日本提出制裁「都係做吓 show、冇用嘅」。楊慨嘆儘管作者文句不通，但是「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」。</p> -<p>辯方在庭上播放2021年5月《蘋果》全體員工大會的錄音，張劍虹發言時稱：「我哋唔係犯法，我哋唔係一個犯罪組織，我哋係做新聞㗎嘛」，辯方問陳是否相信張的說法。陳表示：「我當時係相信張先生講嘅嘢。」</p> +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第二天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問。</p> -<p>辯方續指，張在大會中引述黎智英的獄中信：「新聞自由的工作是危險的，大家保重，盡量要小心。」辯方指張的意思是不但高層要小心，前線同事也要小心。陳確認張有說過上述說話，但她補充張同時有說：「咁樣唔代表我哋褪呔，《蘋果》絕對唔會褪呔。」</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英要求邀請馬鐵穎撰寫評論文章">楊清奇指黎智英要求邀請馬鐵穎撰寫評論文章</h4> -<p>辯方指《蘋果》的報導角度不會改變，但同時會在法律限制之內。陳回答：「可以咁講。」</p> +<p>控方展示2020年9月14日的訊息紀錄，黎智英向楊說：「李平，今日看左丁山專欄講到一位評論專家馬鐵穎，說他的中國和日本評論有料到，是否請他為我們寫評論版。謝謝。」楊庭上解釋，左丁山的專欄既不在評論版也不在「蘋論」刊登，而是在副刊。楊指黎的訊息重點是要求他找馬鐵穎撰寫文章供論壇版刊登。</p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p>被問到馬鐵穎的寫作角度，楊指黎在訊息中形容馬的評論「有料到」，可能是指馬的評論比較尖銳，或者是有時「爆料」、揭露內幕消息，而當時黎很重視中共內幕資料，因此估計黎覺得馬是合適人選。</p> -<hr /> +<p>楊當時回覆黎：「張劍虹已搵咗日本資深記者甘粕代三撰文，返（逢）周三出。」、「馬鐵穎，我再搵下佢，睇點安排。」楊解釋，甘粕代三是一名日本資深記者，時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹將甘粕代三的聯絡資料，透過時任副社長陳沛敏交給他，並要求他讓甘粕代三撰寫專欄，每星期有固定字數。楊確認「甘粕代三」是日本作家高橋的筆名，因為黎想找日本記者寫日本的評論，而「黎生畀我嘅指示一定要執行」，所以他當時回覆黎會作安排。</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導辯方：黎智英反對港獨 陳沛敏：未曾與黎深入討論、不記得黎曾否明言反對 陳沛敏確認黎智英從沒指示做違國安法事情 惟當時不肯定發布黎文章是否違法Ukraine’s Private Sector2024-02-27T12:00:00+08:002024-02-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraines-private-sector<p><em>During Russia’s war against Ukraine, the private sector is playing a decisive role in Ukraine’s economy, as companies are keeping the economy running by employing Ukrainians, transferring technology and know-how, and financing the government by paying taxes.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Ukraine’s allies and partners are also supporting the country by providing military aid, as well as humanitarian and budgetary assistance, thus helping the economy stay afloat.</em></p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎要求多邀請海外作者-故游說中央黨校教授蔡霞撰文">楊清奇指黎要求多邀請海外作者 故游說中央黨校教授蔡霞撰文</h4> -<p>However, only a small part of this aid is being directly used to help current businesses and attract new investors. So far, the West has committed around $2 billion through the World Bank’s Economic Resilience Action program, which aims to provide financial and advisory support for Ukraine’s private sector. In comparison, government-to-government commitments to Ukraine between January 24, 2022, and January 15, 2023, totaled $154 billion, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.</p> +<p>楊向黎傳送另一段訊息，指：「轉一段中央黨校教授蔡霞講你同蘋果的對話畀你聽下。正繼續遊說她撰文」，並轉發一段來自蔡霞的語音訊息。楊解釋，蔡霞稱讚《蘋果》的文有正義感，亦留意到《蘋果》很有影響力，「我記得佢講過啲市民為咗支持《蘋果》，《蘋果》啲股價可以一日升到好高嘅。」楊又指，之所以遊說蔡霞撰文，是因為黎要求他多邀請海外作者，雖然黎未有特別指明邀請哪些作者，但楊有見蔡當時已在美國定居，所以便透過朋友聯絡到蔡，邀請她寫文章。</p> -<p>Ukraine also needs to attract significant foreign direct investment to transform and modernize its economy. Although it is risky to invest in the country due to the war, not all of Ukraine has seen damage or is in active combat; less than 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory is currently illegally occupied. Regions that do not require demining — primarily in the western part of the country — are ripe for business opportunities. Investors and international partners do not have to wait for every part of Ukraine’s territory to be freed from Russian troops to start operating there.</p> +<p>控方問蔡霞是否符合黎要求的作者，楊確認，並指蔡是中央黨校教授，她到達美國之後，有批評中國的人權狀況，也有關注香港的狀況，「所以想黎生親自出面邀請」，因成功機會較高。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Although it is risky to invest in the country due to the war, not all of Ukraine has seen damage or is in active combat; less than 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory is currently illegally occupied.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>訊息紀錄顯示，黎傳送了一段語音訊息，之後楊表示會轉發給蔡霞。庭上展示語音訊息謄本，黎向蔡稱：「謝謝你的美言，我們做香港人一定會鬥爭下去，這是我們的本份。」、「請你有時間為我們寫社評呀」、「我也很崇拜你的，希望你幫我們寫寫你對中國的看法，因為你對中國的了解是沒人跟你比拼的，謝謝你」。</p> -<p>Supporting the private sector is an area in which international financial institutions (IFIs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) could do more, even amid the war. Strengthening Ukraine’s private sector in the present will fundamentally shape how recovery efforts proceed during the postwar period. As these institutions approach their operations in Ukraine, they should be more creative, coordinated, and willing to take on risks.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英作為老闆有權決定誰人撰寫社評">楊清奇指黎智英作為老闆有權決定誰人撰寫社評</h4> -<h3 id="financing-challenges">Financing Challenges</h3> +<p>控方問為何黎會請蔡霞撰寫「社評」，楊則指黎是想邀請蔡撰寫評論文章，但可能講錯為「社評」，「當然黎生係老闆，佢有權決定邊個寫社評」，又指顏純鈎也是經過黎的「提名」之後，可以撰寫《蘋果》社評，張劍虹亦有通知他。</p> -<p>Businesses in Ukraine are facing many obstacles. As the war drags on with no immediate prospect for a political settlement, this situation complicates the outlook for the private sector. There are many financing hurdles, including a lack of affordable credit, a dearth of equity investments, and a disrupted insurance market. Additionally, scant health and life insurance coverage in war zones, requirements for new construction to have bomb shelters, and expensive security details compound the costs that firms confront.</p> +<p>法官李運騰問到，就顏純鈎撰寫社評一事，為何張劍虹要通知楊？楊指因為他撰寫社評的時間要調整，本來他負責星期二和五的社評，但是顏想寫星期五的社評，所以「我就變成要寫星期六嘅」。</p> -<p>Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are finding it particularly difficult to attract capital or get credit at reasonable rates. Most of the multilateral funding goes toward larger companies, ones that had been receiving money even before Russia’s full-scale invasion. This, in turn, affects the client pool for the banking sector. Companies are also unable to access medium- to long-term loans. There are some sources of more affordable capital for SMEs, such as the German-funded 5–7–9 interest-subsidy program through the Business Development Fund, yet these programs are still limited.</p> +<p>控方指，黎於2020年12月被捕、被起訴及還柙，問楊會如何形容此後張劍虹的角色。楊指黎還柙之後，張是「最高負責人」，不單只在經營方面，也在《蘋果日報》、網上版和英文版上，「所有出版都係喺佢監督之下啦」，至於在黎還柙之前，則是由黎負責這個監督角色。</p> -<p>In addition, there is a major mismatch between the demand and supply of capital in Ukraine. The destruction of manufacturing facilities, logistical lines, and supply chains has forced some companies to rebuild their business models from scratch. While a few were able to adapt to the war, many businesses need new sources of capital.</p> +<h4 id="張劍虹查問高橋為何稱要停專欄-楊清奇反指高橋中文有問題">張劍虹查問高橋為何稱要停專欄 楊清奇反指高橋中文有問題</h4> -<p>Companies operating in Ukraine and potential investors also voice unease over political uncertainty and the unavailability of political and war risk insurance mechanisms. Risk-mitigation and risk-sharing instruments are crucial in unleashing the private sector in Ukraine, especially as the war wages.</p> +<p>控方展示2020年12月13日張劍虹傳送給楊的訊息：「主筆，高橋先生說他在論壇的稿要停？是否寫得太密或什麼原因？」；楊回覆：「他說要停嗎？未同我講」；張說：「他是說你是不是想停他專欄，我說我不知道。」</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Risk-mitigation and risk-sharing instruments are crucial in unleashing the private sector in Ukraine, especially as the war wages.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>楊庭上提到，通常由黎和陳沛敏等高層指定的評論文章作者，「我會好小心去處理，好認真去跟進嘅」，否則「一有少少嘅問題，佢哋就直情去搵高層去投訴嘅，咁我就好被動嘅」。他續指，該次他與高橋之間有誤會，「佢嘅中文不時有問題，因為佢係日本人嚟嘅，啫係我哋會話『美國前總統特朗普』，佢就演繹成『美國已故總統』。」他又說：「咁同事都好辛苦，要同佢執清楚。」</p> -<h3 id="barriers-to-doing-business">Barriers to Doing Business</h3> +<p>楊提及另一次事件，他曾告訴高橋，「佢講太多歷史，讀者係唔想睇嘅，我希望佢轉主題，佢就同張劍虹先生投訴，話要停咗佢嘅專欄。」</p> -<p>Beyond access to finance, there are other hurdles for the private sector. Even before the war, the conditions for doing business in Ukraine were not optimal. The country attracted little foreign direct investment (FDI) because of its difficult business climate. From 2011 to 2021, the net inflow of FDI in neighboring Poland and Romania averaged $16.9 billion and $5.4 billion per year, respectively. Meanwhile, during the same period, Ukraine saw an average FDI net inflow of $4.3 billion per year.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指張劍虹重視日本於亞洲地位-要求給予高橋較高稿費">楊清奇指張劍虹重視日本於亞洲地位 要求給予高橋較高稿費</h4> -<p>The World Bank’s Doing Business project ranked Ukraine at 64 out of 190 economies in 2020. Ukraine scored higher on indicators related to starting a business and dealing with construction permits, but electricity access and resolving insolvency weighed down the overall score. Ukraine also has a negative reputation in terms of corruption. For 2023, Ukraine ranked 104 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index with a score of 36 out of 100. Although the score is low, it is Ukraine’s best result since 2012 because of various measures that Kyiv has instituted in the past two years to combat corruption. By gaining three points, Ukraine showed one of the best improvements of any country in 2023 despite the war.</p> +<p>楊指，黎在「飯盒會」上指示多找外國作者，「張劍虹先生可能覺得我嗰時進展唔好啦，所以親自搵咗一個日本記者為我哋寫稿」，張其後將高橋的聯絡方式給楊。</p> -<p>President Volodymyr Zelensky demonstrated his willingness to uproot sources of corruption by removing over a dozen officials in the Ministry of Defense in January 2023. Moreover, the government has ramped up criminal proceedings against suspected perpetrators, introducing much-needed judiciary reforms and a competitive selection process for the heads of the main anti-corruption agencies, along with other steps such as improvements in public procurement. As a result of these efforts, the New Europe Center, along with several civil society and media organizations partners in Ukraine — the National Interests Advocacy Network, Anti-Corruption Action Center, Dejure Foundation, European Pravda, Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, Transparency International Ukraine, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, and Detector Media — gave Ukraine an 8.1 out of 10 in its September 2023 joint assessment of Ukraine’s implementation of recommendations for EU candidates. Ukraine scored the highest in media regulation reforms and weakest in constitutional court reform and fighting against money laundering.</p> +<p>楊指，從張的訊息可見，「佢係好重視美國重返亞洲之後，嗰個日本嘅地位係好重要嘅，應該寫多啲日中關係、日本喺亞洲嘅地位。」楊又提到，張要求楊支付高橋較高稿費，正常的稿費是每一篇1,200元，但高橋的稿費調高至1,600元。</p> -<p>The mass exodus of working-age talent also presents a challenge for the private sector. According to the United Nations, there were 6.5 million Ukrainian refugees as of January 2024 and 3.7 million internally displaced as of September 2023; approximately 14.6 million people in the country are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2024. In addition, many internally displaced Ukrainians do not have the infrastructure and housing that would enable them to thrive professionally.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指高橋文句不通-稱特朗普為已死總統嘆高層指定我用我都不得不用">楊清奇指高橋文句不通 稱特朗普為「已死總統」嘆「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」</h4> -<p>Personnel shortages are a significant problem for labor-intensive sectors such as construction and metallurgy. A December 2022 survey by Deloitte and the American Chamber of Commerce found major concerns among business managers regarding how to attract, retain, and ensure the safety of talent during wartime. However, this brain drain is not new, since many Ukrainians were already leaving the country before the war. The difference, however, is that the human capital shortage has significantly intensified and is affecting every sector of Ukraine’s economy, including information technology (IT), which has been a catalyst for economic innovation and growth even during the current conflict.</p> +<p>控方展示2020年12月10日高橋與楊清奇之間的訊息，高橋稱：「但我深信日府根本不會制裁林鄭等。你地知道日本這個太監國家，安保靠美，經濟靠中。加上打出強烈制裁的美國瘋總統已沒命，日本政府已開始跟拜登溝通，怎會聽已死總統命令。」</p> -<h3 id="support-from-the-international-community">Support from the International Community</h3> +<p>楊庭上直指：「所以個問題就喺呢度，啲作者中文都唔通嘅」，但是「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」。</p> -<p>Companies in Ukraine are operating in a difficult war environment. The international community plays a crucial role in supporting these firms with tools adapted to wartime realities. DFIs and multilateral development banks (MDBs) need to be creative and further adapt their operations and capital-deployment mechanisms to support a country at war. How can they go about this task?</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指高橋立場矛盾認為日本制裁做吓show冇用嘅">楊清奇指高橋立場矛盾、認為日本制裁「做吓show、冇用嘅」</h4> -<p>First, these institutions can consolidate their currently scattered efforts. For example, although there are multiple war insurance programs (see the appendix for a list), these are isolated and insufficient. Businesses are struggling to know where to look and whom to trust. A consolidation effort could ameliorate the problem, for example, by setting up a user-friendly and transparent portal. If an investor is willing to co-invest or share the risk of an investment with another party, this could have a powerful effect in catalyzing Ukraine’s private sector. As such, it is essential that Ukraine’s DFI and MDB partners coordinate and pool together resources, which will alleviate the risk burden for any one institution and scale both financing and insurance for Ukrainian companies.</p> +<p>訊息紀錄顯示楊當時回覆高橋，稱「你可以考慮評論有關新聞。但你的觀點恐怕難以被蘋果多數讀者認同。制裁不是已死總統的命令，是美國聲援港人」。高橋則回應：「不，特朗普只是說說而已，這松原仁也是。也可以專訪他。我覺得傳媒任務要分為兩種。當然要討好讀者，另一半要啟發。我特意寫港臺讀者逆耳的話題。但港臺日民眾要正對大陸，否則咱們不知不覺中被中共吞掉。」</p> -<p>Second, as mentioned earlier, many of these institutions are refinancing to reduce their risk exposure but not making new investments. To complicate matters, some institutions do not allow their staff to be on the ground in Ukraine to execute due diligence on local projects. There is a need to attract new investments in Ukraine rather than simply continue using grants to support existing projects, refinance clients, or fund only technical assistance and policy work. Multilateral institutions could establish new vehicles such as investment funds or enterprise funds that would provide targeted technical assistance in combination with their debt products and support for private equity. The impact that new capital can produce in this environment is enormous.</p> +<p>楊解釋，「因為佢講話『日本制裁只係議員做 show』，咁我就話畀佢知，《蘋果日報》讀者應該比較認同制裁嘅，咁我都話制裁唔係『已死總統嘅命令』，而係聲援香港人。」</p> -<p>Third, there is a need for financial innovation. These institutions can provide capital to help jump-start creative financial initiatives in Ukraine that the private sector can then replicate at a much larger scale. Risk sharing, including with commercial banks, can be highly beneficial. To unleash this money effectively, these institutions should experiment with various approaches before they “triple down” on those that work best. While ambitious multi-million- and billion-dollar projects are welcome, there is need for small-scale community pilot programs that can bolster Ukraine’s resilience. For example, diversifying Ukraine’s water and energy systems to smaller-scale sources would make its infrastructure less of an easy target for missile attacks. Furthermore, multilateral projects should prioritize businesses that have a rebounding effect: those that strengthen Ukraine’s EU accession and internal absorption capacity, as well as reduce trade turnover bottlenecks such as border controls. There is an ongoing discussion regarding whether to allow multilateral institutions to use hybrid capital products to invest in start-ups but with capped returns in case the country’s recovery happens more quickly than predicted. This could encourage a more level playing field within the business environment and help ensure that equity stays within the country and thus encourages faster recovery. The opposite of this happened in 2015 when Ukraine’s government, to avoid a default, agreed with its creditors to a 20 percent write-down and delayed maturities in exchange for linking the securities to Ukraine’s GDP growth without capping the investment returns (more commonly known as GDP-linked warrants).</p> +<p>楊又指：「佢自己好多時矛盾，講唔清楚」，例如高橋在訊息中稱「港臺日民眾要正對大陸，否則咱們不知不覺中被中共吞掉」，「但佢寫稿有時唔係咁嘅態度，啫係『日本都係做吓 show、冇用嘅』」，而且有時不是太認同《蘋果》取態，「啫我有時唔知係佢表達嘅問題，定係佢嘅立場係有矛盾。」</p> -<p>In this regard, targeting projects and companies that can create jobs for Ukrainians — and thus attract Ukrainian externally displaced people back home — is paramount.</p> +<p>控方問及《蘋果》對於制裁的立場，楊指上述他向高橋提及的觀點，乃「同高層和讀者口味，都係一致」。楊指「高層」包括黎智英和張劍虹。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">DFIs and multilateral development banks (MDBs) need to be creative and further adapt their operations and capital-deployment mechanisms to support a country at war.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="微調方向文件指蘋果受壓-故棄用某些字眼">「微調方向」文件指《蘋果》受壓 故棄用某些字眼</h4> -<p>Finally, Ukraine’s partners could also do more to improve governance and support the country’s fight against corruption, including through technical assistance and training programs. This is an area in which the international community can play a critical role, providing both advice and pressure for reforms. Ukrainian civil society and independent journalists are important allies in this fight.</p> +<p>控方指，警方在楊的電腦中發現一份題為「《蘋果》受壓 微調方向」的文件，當中提到時任警務處處長鄧炳強不點名批評《蘋果》，表示考慮以煽惑罪檢控傳媒，加上《文匯報》和《大公報》接連發表社論呼籲取締《蘋果》，《東方日報》亦要求調查壹傳媒股價異常波動，終於令《蘋果》受到壓力。</p> -<p>Ultimately, for DFIs and IFIs to be effective, they need to be more innovative and collaborative, willing to take more risk and to understand what specifically works in the Ukrainian market. By demonstrating a willingness to experiment and set up collaborative frameworks, they can catalyze the flow of more private capital into Ukraine. Much of this will require more effective coordination and pooling of resources among institutions, allowing them to co-invest in projects without repeating or overlapping efforts. Moreover, these institutions need to create concrete plans for execution and set specific performance indicators for measuring results and holding themselves accountable.</p> +<p>文件第一點提到顏純鈎（筆名方圓）查詢可否使用「黑警」一詞，張劍虹則表示：「以目前時勢，黑警等字眼還是不用較好，並要求主筆李平把好關。」第二點提到羅偉光發出指令棄用「武漢肺炎」。第三點提到「員工士氣受挫」，有論壇版編輯提出辭職，因父母擔心其安全，而張劍虹只回應「盡力做」。</p> -<h3 id="the-role-of-the-ukrainian-government">The Role of the Ukrainian Government</h3> +<p>楊供稱，這份文件是關於用字的調整，他通常不會修改來稿，所以要及時通知作者公司做法改變，讓他們在撰寫文章時自行修改字眼，而不需楊修改。楊指他只會把第一及第二點傳送給論壇版作者，但如果有人關心編輯政策，便會連同第三點傳送。</p> -<p>In parallel, Ukraine needs to make more significant governance and economic reforms to reduce barriers to doing business. Kyiv is working with partners on legislation and initiatives that will improve the business climate. For example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is assisting the National Bank of Ukraine in aligning its regulations, policies, and practices with those of the European Union regarding bank and capital market supervision. Moreover, Ukraine is working on public-private partnership (PPP) legislation that should provide more flexibility and speed for these types of ventures. Having the appropriate PPP legislation can play a significant part in Ukraine’s recovery, as international investors will be able to contribute a wide range of assets. Whatever the law is on paper, it will have to ensure that in practice there is a robust, transparent, fair, and open PPP framework that encourages privatization in key sectors such as energy and transportation. As part of a reform initiative that started in 2023, Kyiv is in the process of removing and updating hundreds of documents to boost Ukraine’s business climate.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇獲告知蘋果社論和報導棄用武漢肺炎">楊清奇獲告知《蘋果》社論和報導棄用「武漢肺炎」</h4> -<p>Ukraine is also developing an Export Credit Agency (ECA) that will help insure investments into the country. In April 2023, Kyiv announced it will provide state guarantees such as war insurance for domestic exporters via this agency. In addition, the Ukrainian parliament passed draft law No. 9015 at the end of November 2023 to provide war insurance for investments of both international companies and Ukrainian companies. Currently, the Ukrainian government is communicating with the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the EBRD, and other donors regarding the need for $100 million to reinsure its ECA.</p> +<p>控方又展示副社長陳沛敏於2021年4月18日傳送給楊的訊息：「老總決定，今起報道不用『武肺』，因此社論也不用，論壇則作者自決。編輯會通知社論其他作者。」陳亦轉發時任總編輯羅偉光的訊息，稱：「各位，我打倒昨日的我：武漢肺炎這題 tag，即日起暫時唔用，水印亦唔用。以『最新疫情』、『疫苗接種』、『防疫措施』、『限聚措施』、『變種病毒』、『社區爆發』、『隱形傳播』呢幾個題 tag 代替。」</p> -<p>The war has obviously disrupted Ukraine’s financial attractiveness, so Kyiv is offering special investment agreements, according to the Ukraine Investment Promotion Office (UkraineInvest). These include</p> +<p>楊解釋，因為海外作者未必緊貼香港新聞，如果他們問起用字，便可以向他們解釋。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>up to 30 percent state support of the investment’s capital expenditure;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>state funding for the construction of related infrastructure;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>up to 10 years of corporate income tax (CIT) relief for most companies; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>CIT relief for electric vehicle manufacturers through 2036.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="楊清奇指結束一黨專政在香港嗌咗幾十年惟大公報文章演繹為要推翻執政黨">楊清奇指「結束一黨專政」在香港「嗌咗幾十年」惟《大公報》文章演繹為要推翻執政黨</h4> -<h3 id="the-special-role-of-frozen-russian-central-bank-assets">The Special Role of Frozen Russian Central Bank Assets</h3> +<p>張劍虹於2021年4月21日向楊清奇傳送一張《大公報》文章截圖，當中指稱《蘋果》鼓吹顛覆國家政權，張問楊：「主筆，你印象中我們社評有寫過這些？」楊表示「國安法出台前可能有」，張覆道「出台前就不算違法」。</p> -<p>In addition to these mechanisms, there are untapped resources that could be used to buttress the private sector. There are currently more than $300 billion in Russian central bank assets in Group of Seven (G7) countries that have been frozen since the full-scale invasion. Ukraine has suggested using these assets to back the issuance of reconstruction bonds and as loss-absorbing, risk-curtailing capital. Kyiv has also demonstrated that the seizure of Russian assets is possible, as it relocated at least 28.3 billion hryvnias ($784 million) to its state coffers between February 2022 and November 2023. These assets could also be used to set up new finance vehicles, such as investment funds through which donors could provide a first-loss tranche to attract other investors.</p> +<p>楊認為當時張可能擔心社評觸犯《國安法》，不過他補充：「其實（《大公報》）文章入面有啲用詞係扭曲咗，例如『結束一黨專政』呢個口號，喺香港真係嗌咗幾十年，佢就演繹成為要推翻國家執政黨。」他又表示上述與張劍虹的對答反映他當時的理解，因為他理解《國安法》是沒有追溯力。</p> -<p>There are legal, economic, and reputational arguments for seizing these assets, and leading experts have analyzed these issues and proposed solutions to move forward. Moreover, some countries have taken initial steps to make use of these assets:</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英獄中信提醒同事要小心啲">楊清奇指黎智英獄中信提醒同事「要小心啲」</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>In June 2022, Canada implemented measures to enable it to seize and sell Russian assets that belong to individuals on the country’s sanctions list. More recently, the World Refugee and Migration Council, a refugee advocacy group chaired by Canada’s former minister of foreign affairs Lloyd Axworthy, advocated for a trust fund that would distribute seized Russian assets to Ukrainians.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>On November 8, 2023, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved a bill to transfer billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s recovery. The bill also prohibits the return of these assets to Russia until the Kremlin fully compensates Ukraine for the damage it has caused. On January 23, 2024, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Act, which paves the way for the United States to confiscate the assets and transfer them to Ukraine.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Belgium holds about two-thirds of the EU-housed Russian assets via its Euroclear Despite Belgium being one of the largest critics of the seizing of Russian assets, Prime Minister Alexander De Croo has said the country is putting together a €1.7 billion fund for Ukraine financed by tax revenue generated from the seized Russian assets.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In January 2023, the European Council Legal Service came up with a plan for how to transfer close to $40 billion in frozen assets to fund Ukraine’s recovery.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>控方提到2021年5月舉行的《蘋果》員工大會，張劍虹在該次場合中發言。楊確認他當日亦在場，但會上討論並沒有直接觸及論壇版。</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>羅偉光於2021年5月25日傳送訊息給楊：「黎生有來信，想直接給你看看。」控方問該封信內容是什麼。楊表示：「我記得佢（黎）有喺信中提醒同事要小心啲」，但不記得具體字眼。楊相信該信是寫給羅偉光，「可能羅偉光認為我負責論壇版要小心啲，所以畀我睇。」</p> -<p>Ukraine and its international partners need to find practical solutions to sustain Ukraine’s economy, especially to support the private sector. Creativity will be at the core of finding such a multilayered approach. By working with Ukrainian stakeholders and private actors, development and finance institutions can explore innovative tools and avenues to support current businesses in the short run and attract new investments in the medium run.</p> +<p>控方遂向楊出示一份載有黎獄中信的文件，惟楊庭上閱讀文件後，表示它並非羅偉光給他看的那一封信，不過信中同樣有提到「要小心」。</p> -<p>There is huge business potential in Ukraine, where investors can make significant returns. However, some investors are more skeptical and believe the country is currently more of a charity case. Regardless, the opportunity is there — especially within the context of Ukraine’s path toward EU accession, availability of raw materials, large consumer base, and high-quality and relatively inexpensive labor.</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Romina Bandura</strong> is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ms. Bandura is an economist with more than 20 years of experience in international development research, policy analysis, and project management. Her current research focuses on digital transformation and the future of work in developing countries.</p> - -<p><strong>Ilya Timtchenko</strong> is the program manager and research associate with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS, where he supports the program’s research agenda, business development, and management.</p> - -<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. In this role, he supports the team’s research agenda, business development opportunities, and event coordination.</p>Romina Bandura, et al.During Russia’s war against Ukraine, the private sector is playing a decisive role in Ukraine’s economy, as companies are keeping the economy running by employing Ukrainians, transferring technology and know-how, and financing the government by paying taxes. \ No newline at end of file +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇：國安法後專欄作者擔心紅線「唔知點樣劃」，部份認為替蘋果撰文風險特別高 楊清奇指日本專欄作家文句不通、立場矛盾 嘆「高層指定我用，我都不得不用」 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2024-04-04-nato-at-75.html b/hkers/2024-04-04-nato-at-75.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8e2756c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-04-04-nato-at-75.html @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ + + + + + + + + + + NATO At 75 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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NATO At 75

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Peter Ricketts | 2024.04.04

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As the Alliance celebrates its 75th anniversary, the author, who headed Britain’s diplomatic corps and, among other positions, served as the UK permanent representative to NATO, reflects on NATO’s accomplishments and challenges.

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Isn’t it remarkable that an organisation that is 75 years old is still absolutely at the heart of European and transatlantic security issues? Other parts of the post-Cold War’s international security architecture are all looking their age and finding it increasingly challenging. Think of the UN Security Council: inevitably, when the major powers are at loggerheads, the Security Council cannot act on issues such as Ukraine, or indeed on anything to do with the growing menace from China. That blockage was foreseen by those who negotiated the UN Charter; the British were very prominent on that point with the Americans. And even when the delegations were signing the UN Charter in San Francisco in the summer of 1945, the British Foreign Office negotiators, including my own personal hero, the permanent secretary at the time, my lineal predecessor, Alec Cadogan, knew that the Security Council was flawed because at any time when the great powers were against each other, it could not work. And so even then, in 1945, the Foreign Office started planning for a Western security organisation for the post-war period. It did not share the optimism that Winston Churchill had in those days that the tactical alliance of the “Big Three” during the war would continue into the post-war period. And that scepticism was shared when we had a new foreign secretary. The Labour government came in at the time of Potsdam in the summer of 1945. Ernest Bevin had absolutely no illusions about Joseph Stalin, and he turned immediately to his Foreign Office officials who had in their files the first plans for organising European security. We had the Dunkirk Treaty with France in 1947. We had the Western European Union, the Brussels Treaty, in 1948. And then, even as the Brussels Treaty was being signed, Bevin was sending papers to George Marshall, the US secretary of state, with his ideas for an Atlantic Pact. And it was really Bevin and Marshall and people such as Senator Arthur Vandenberg in the US who were the godfathers of the NATO Treaty signed 75 years ago.

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How can one explain NATO’s longevity? Why is it still an effective organisation 75 years on? The answer lies – partly – by looking at the treaty. The NATO Washington Treaty is terse. It sticks to principles and objectives. It is 14 articles long. Compare that with the Treaty of Rome at 248 articles, four annexes, countless protocols. They are very, very different things because, of course, the EU is a supranational, law-based organisation, with all the complexity that has. And the NATO treaty, to my mind, found an elusive point of balance between being a very solemn political commitment between the allies, but leaving each ally maximum discretion as to how it carries out that commitment. I am sure everybody taking part in the celebrations can recite Article 5 by heart: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”. And that, consequently, they agree that they “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”. So, there is no binding obligation to do anything. The US Senate would never have accepted that for the Americans. But it has given NATO a strength in its flexibility. NATO’s strength is not in its treaty text, but in its shared political objectives and trust between allies. And that is why it has had a capacity to flex and adapt as security priorities have changed. In the Cold War it was the essential vehicle for deterrence and territorial defence against the Soviet Union.

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I am old enough that I first joined the UK Delegation to NATO in 1978. It was at the height of the Cold War. We used to practise nuclear release procedures every winter in a Wintex exercise. So, the nuclear deterrence of NATO was a real thing and was exercised and practised regularly. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO turned to so-called out-of-area operations: expeditionary interventions. These have a rather a bad name now, but it is worth bearing in mind that the interventions in Bosnia, in 1995, and in Kosovo, in 1999, did succeed in their objective of damping down ethnic cleansing, which was the terrible crisis at that point. And although not every country in the region has taken the opportunity, they were given the chance to build more stable, peaceful societies. I might note that in this year of anniversaries, it is the NATO-led KFOR’s (Kosovo Force) 25th anniversary. KFOR is still at work in Kosovo, helping peace and stability there. Of course, interventions then got more difficult. During the early period of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan, it did succeed in working in and around Kabul to help the Hamid Karzai government put down roots. Things went wrong after that. But it is not true to say that the expeditionary interventions of NATO all proved to be disastrous. NATO was not directly involved in the Iraq intervention in 2003. That was a very difficult period in the Alliance. At that time, I was back as permanent representative for the UK and there were deep divisions between allies, genuinely held differences of conviction, which made life quite interesting around the North Atlantic Council table for some time.

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But within a year after that, NATO was back together again, and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq was established at the Istanbul Conference summit in 2004 and helped to bring allies together again after that very bruising period. One more piece of reminiscence: by 2011, I was national security adviser. The Libya air campaign was another test for NATO’s capacity to flex, adapt and innovate. Because, as you remember, President Barack Obama decided that the US would not be directly involved. So, senior US officers in the command structure were pulled back. European officers and Canadian officers took their place and NATO managed a complex air campaign, in that rather new guise. Again, things did not turn out too well. We did not have boots on the ground. We were not able to control the situation, but the NATO machine, in my mind, worked well and showed once again it could adapt to new circumstances.

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NATO’s strength is not in its treaty text, but in its shared political objectives and trust between allies. And that is why it has had a capacity to flex and adapt as security priorities have changed

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Now we are back to NATO at its original purpose. Thank you, President Putin, for that! We are facing the most serious threat to European security since 1945. And I think NATO has risen very well to the challenge. I can say that as an outsider. But watching NATO function was very impressive. The US reinforced Europe using those plans that had been in SHAPE’s filing cabinets for decades. Other allies pushed their forces under the enhanced forward presence operation into the territories of the NATO allies, eight battle groups at the moment, with the UK playing a major role. NATO deterrence has worked: President Vladimir Putin has not put one Russian boot across a NATO border. And in many ways, the aggression against Ukraine has already been a strategic disaster for Putin. The Russians have achieved none of their objectives, despite taking enormous numbers of casualties. The Russian armed forces have been shown up to be poorly equipped, badly led with low morale. And when confronted with Western weapons, the Russians have not done well. Their economy will be weakened by sanctions in the medium term; at the moment, it is surfing on the oil price. But in terms of technology and investment, Russia will increasingly lag behind. We now proudly have Finland and Sweden as staunch members of the Alliance, enormously strengthening the northern flank. I remember in my time as NATO permanent representative that Finland and Sweden were proud neutrals, extremely active in the partnership council, in many ways more active than many allies. But I could never have imagined them being members. Thank you again, President Putin, for that. It is a change that will long outlast Putin and what he has been trying to do.

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To me, NATO feels more united, more purposeful, and, of course, larger, than it has been certainly since the end of the Cold War. I would also say that the EU has responded effectively as well. The fact that Western Europe has weaned itself off dependence on Russian oil and gas is a major strategic advantage for us. It has broken a piece of leverage that Putin held in his hands. We have seen the EU break through some very long-held taboos about the use of the EU budget to fund arms deliveries to Ukraine. Again, this is not something I would have expected from decades of watching the very slow process of European political cooperation. And the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and many other countries – Georgia, Moldova, and countries in the Western Balkans – is a very significant downpayment on future European stability.

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Of course, such an enlargement will take many years to achieve, but it is a big step in the right direction. Personally, I would like to see NATO sending even stronger signals in the same direction at the Washington summit. NATO–EU cooperation was for decades not easy; there were all kinds of complexities. I am sure they are still there, in the institutional sense, but things are improving, certainly. In the Vilnius summit conclusions, I read some very positive words about NATO–EU cooperation.

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I chair a House of Lords European Affairs Committee, and we recently published a report on the impact of Ukraine on UK and EU relations. We expressed our hope that the undertaking in Vilnius for the non-EU allies – that of the fullest involvement in EU defence – is something that the British government will take active steps to lead on.

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I give high marks to Western countries for the response to Ukraine so far. But there are major problems ahead. Everybody is very well aware of the central issue, which seems to me to be that of finding the political will as well as the resources to sustain Ukraine into the next phase of this grinding long war that it is facing. And the stakes are very high. The Ukrainian armed forces have shown extraordinary courage and resilience, as has the whole population, but they are more and more dependent on continuing Western military and economic support. It is clear beyond doubt that Ukraine needs right now a lot more artillery shells, anti-missile interceptors and other weapons. So far, looking at the figures, the US has supplied the lion’s share of military resources for Ukraine. The figures that I have indicate that, in the first two years of the war, US military support amounted to around $43 billion, against about $38 billion for European countries collectively, including the UK.

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The threat landscape in Europe has changed durably, and whoever is in the Oval Office next year, Europeans need to be showing that they are on a path to take on more of the burden of security in Europe than has been true in the past

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And of course, we are all watching very carefully the fate of this $60-billion package, which is now stuck in the US House of Representatives. If it continues to be delayed, and given how depleted our own stockpiles are in most growing non-US NATO countries, it seems to me the only solution in the short term is to do the sort of thing that the Czech government has been very forward in pursuing: buying in materials from South Korea and other places. But that, in itself, is a wake-up call to all countries in Europe.

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The honest truth is that for far too long, far too many European countries have been spending far too little on defence. Of course, that has been changing and it has been changing since 2014. Thank you again, President Putin. Perhaps we should also give credit to the pressure Donald Trump exerted when he was president, but it is mainly due to President Putin. RUSI’s Malcolm Chalmers has a very recent paper about the trends in this area, and he identified a 60% increase in European defence spending in real terms since 2014. If that is right, then that is a very impressive figure. And it looks like we should get to 18, perhaps 20, members of NATO meeting the 2% of GDP defence spending target this year. This is definitely better late than never. The new cash, of course, now needs to be turned into real capability. And that is not going to happen immediately. It means removing, as far as possible, the obstacles in the way of European defence-industrial cooperation. The House of Lords report has some points about that, in particular in relation to the pretty restrictive arrangements for the European Defence Fund, which do not make it easy for the UK to partner with other European defence industries.

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Another element to consider about rising defence spending in Europe is it has to be sustained, if it is going to be of any use. The threat landscape in Europe has changed durably, and whoever is in the Oval Office next year, Europeans need to be showing that they are on a path to take on more of the burden of security in Europe than has been true in the past.

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I am sure NATO also needs to review its own collective defence in the light of what we have learned from watching the first drone-age war in Europe. Ukrainian armed forces, I am sure, will have a great deal to tell us which will be important for NATO’s collective defence planning. There are all sorts of other issues on NATO’s agenda. I am very conscious that China is a rising concern in many of our countries. Consultations on China are vital between allies. This is also the case between NATO allies and the Asian allies, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan. And I personally wonder whether some sort of NATO+ format could be the right forum for wider consultations on the threats from China.

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In any case, the breadth of the agenda is proof of the vitality of this sprightly 75-year-old that is NATO. But if it is going to survive for another generation, it has to ensure that Putin does not win in Ukraine.

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Peter Ricketts, The Loard, GCMG, GCVO, spent 40 years as a British diplomat before retiring in early 2016. His last post was Ambassador to France, where he was heavily involved with UK-French defence cooperation following from the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties.

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Azerbaijan’s Pivot

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Azerbaijan’s Pivot to Central Asia

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Rusif Huseynov and Gulkhanim Mammadova | 2024.04.08

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While continuing its equidistance policy regarding Russia and the West, Azerbaijan is looking towards Central Asia and identifying its position in the new Great Game.

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Against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has reshaped perceptions of influence, Central Asia has surged to prominence in the 21st-century geopolitical arena. Recognising its newfound importance, the West seems to have pivoted its focus towards the region, one which Russia has long viewed as its backyard and where China has become increasingly economically dominant. Summits in the 5+1 format (with Central Asia’s five republics) have already been organised by the US (September 2023) and Germany (October 2023), with the UK and Italy also expected to host their own. Added to this, European politicians have embarked on tours of Central Asia, such as German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier (June 2023), French President Emmanuel Macron (November 2023) and Italian President Sergio Mattarella (November 2023). Do these activities allow us to speculate that we are witnessing a Great Game 2.0., a sequel to the multifaceted geopolitical competition that once took place over Central Asia between the Russian and British Empires? Whether this is the case or not, it is a fact that the current Central Asian geopolitical context features more actors, including multiple Western powers, China and, to some extent, India and Pakistan.

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Enter Azerbaijan, which is determined to become an integral piece in the puzzle of Central Asian geopolitics. In its pivot to Central Asia, Baku’s ambitions, position and attitude are certainly different from those of the above-mentioned countries. Since its independence in 1991, Azerbaijan has directed almost all of its resources toward the resolution of the decades-long Karabakh conflict. Now, with the finalisation of the Karabakh chapter and the restoration of its territorial integrity, Azerbaijan needs to rethink and reshape its foreign policy priorities.

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Baku’s foreign policy over the past 15–16 years has been marked by a balancing or “equidistance” between Russo-centric Eurasian structures and the Western power bloc. The hostility between Russia and the West has only strengthened Azerbaijan’s determination not to align itself with either of the confronting parties. At the same time, this has led to a quest for a new geopolitical structure and direction for Baku’s foreign policy and economic development. Here, Central Asia emerges as a potential strategic partner for Azerbaijan, offering a mutually beneficial geopolitical and economic alignment.

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This geopolitical calculation is driven by several factors, but mostly by common roots, ethnolinguistic kinship and a shared historical legacy. The concept of Turkic unity itself originated in Azerbaijan during the late 19th century, while Azerbaijan together with Turkey has been zealously pushing the Turkic agenda and integrationist projects since the 1990s. Although these initiatives were initially rooted in and designed to promote cultural ties between Turkic societies, there has been a noticeable shift, in recent years, towards greater political and economic convergence among the Turkic states. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), loosely modelled on the EU, possesses the potential to evolve into a supranational organisation if effectively managed. OTS member states have also had the chance to turn their integrationist ideas into tangible projects such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route – also known as the Middle Corridor – whose significance has only been growing in light of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

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Azerbaijan aims to position itself not only as a Caucasian or Caspian state but also as a bridge to Central Asia

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The increased importance of the Middle Corridor is also attracting greater international attention to the region. The EU recently announced the allocation of €10 billion for the development of this massive connectivity project, which would circumvent Russian infrastructure. Within this substantial investment, 33 infrastructure projects, with a particular focus on rail initiatives, are earmarked for financing. The Middle Corridor further accentuates the key position of Azerbaijan, which plays a crucial role in this framework by serving as a vital link between Europe and Asia. This significance is attributed to its well-established transportation infrastructure, featuring ports along the Caspian Sea and robust connections with neighbouring countries such as Georgia and Turkey, which comprise the European leg of the Middle Corridor.

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In other words, Azerbaijan – or more precisely, the Azerbaijan–Turkey tandem (as the two countries usually work together in such geopolitical and geo-economic projects) – can become a bottleneck for the West, which seeks to establish deeper connections with Central Asia. Having economically expanded into Central Asia since the 1990s, Turkey has also grown its political and even military presence in the region by signing military agreements with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and selling Turkish UAVs (drones) to Kyrgyzstan.

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The development of Azerbaijan’s relations with Central Asia is being fostered on both shores of the Caspian Sea. This explains Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s participation as an “honoured guest” at the 5th Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Dushanbe in September 2023. The inclusion of Aliyev indicates that Central Asian countries are increasingly acknowledging Azerbaijan as an integral participant in their regional dynamics. At the same time, Aliyev himself, in his latest remarks – especially in his inauguration speech in February – has placed special emphasis on relations with the Turkic states of Central Asia when announcing “our family is the Turkic world” slogan.

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Looking ahead, Azerbaijan aims to position itself not only as a Caucasian or Caspian state but also as a bridge to Central Asia. This strategic positioning sends a clear message, particularly to Western powers who seek deeper cooperation with Central Asia: Azerbaijan, together with Turkey, is the gateway for engagement with the region. Azerbaijan’s pivot towards Central Asia is underpinned by a calculated evaluation of the region as a less risky alternative compared to alignment with either the Russo-centric Eurasian structures or the Western power bloc. As a means of avoiding the potentially destabilising entanglements associated with alignment with more dominant powers, Central Asia has emerged as a geopolitical structure that offers relative stability and opportunity for Baku.

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Rusif Huseynov is the director of Topchubashov Center, Azerbaijan. His main interests are socio-political developments, frozen conflicts, and ethnic minorities, in post-Soviet countries, while his focus areas mainly cover Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. He is a ReThink.CEE (2021) fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States and served as Local Focal Point within the EU4Dialogue project.

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Gulkhanim Mammadova is a researcher with a focus on gender studies, peacebuilding, and conflict transformation at Topchubashov Center. She has taken part in numerous cross-border dialogues and youth projects, such as EU4Dialogue, Corridors, and Conflict School. Gulkhanim is a John Smith Trust Fellow 2023 and a participant in the 2nd Edition of the OSCE Women’s Peace Leadership Programme.

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-04-08-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-55.html b/hkers/2024-04-08-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-55.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b461b676 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-04-08-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-55.html @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 55 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 55 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.04.08

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  • 李宇軒供稱協助日本議員成立關注對華政策聯盟 及支援推動人權法案
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（8日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第55日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。在《國安法》生效之後，IPAC 開始討論游說各國終止與香港的引渡協議，電郵紀錄顯示，李將 IPAC 相關小組會議紀錄翻譯成日文，並以電郵傳送給日本議員山尾志櫻里。同年7月，山尾志櫻里和另一名日本議員中谷元成立 JPAC（Japanese Parliamentary Alliance on China），宗旨是請求中國不要肆意侵害普世價值和基本人權。李供稱他曾協助山尾籌備成立 JPAC，又協助 JPAC 與 IPAC 之間的訊息傳遞和翻譯，並聯絡數個在日港人組織。訊息和電郵紀錄又顯示，李曾串連 IPAC 創辦人裴倫德和英國金融家 Bill Browder 與山尾志櫻里開會，希望協助山尾在日本議會上推動人權法案，惟李在該會議之前已被捕。

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「十二港人」之一李宇軒第12天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。

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李宇軒指IPAC小組會議談引渡協議 惟未有共識採取什麼行動

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上次聆訊提到，李宇軒向「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC）創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）提議游說外國取消與香港簽訂的司法互助協議或引渡逃犯措施。2020年7月3日 IPAC 舉行小組會議，各聯盟成員講述各自地區與香港司法管轄區之間的司法互助和引渡協議。

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Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) October 10, 2020

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image02 +▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）

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李確認與會者包括裴倫德、英國國會議員 Iain Duncan Smith 、新西蘭眾議員 Simon O’Connor、澳洲參議員 Kimberly Kitching 和加拿大眾議員 Garnett Genuis 等，而李則是列席者。

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控方指李宇軒事後把小組會議紀錄翻譯成日文，並以電郵傳送給日本議員山尾志櫻里（本名「菅野志桜里」）。庭上展示的會議紀錄指稱習近平利用經濟發展來進行統治，有與會者指不應該有任何人引渡回港受審，控方問李，以上是否小組會議的共識。李則指該次會議並沒有達成任何共識，會議紀錄不見提及任何將會採取的行動，只見不同國家的聯盟代表發言及意見。

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2020年7月4日，裴倫德傳送一則 Twitter 帖文給李，內容提及 IPAC 經過開會討論國安法和引渡協議之後，一致同意不應有逃犯引渡協議，裴倫德希望 SWHK 轉發此帖文。

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SWHK曾去信捷克、愛爾蘭和葡萄牙 要求終止引渡協議

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控方指在李宇軒的電腦發現3封由「重光團隊」（Stand with Hong Kong, Fight for Freedom, SWHK）分別撰寫給捷克、愛爾蘭和葡萄牙首長和外交部的信件，要求上述3個國家終止與香港的引渡逃犯協議。

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李表示以他理解，愛爾蘭和葡萄牙均沒有 IPAC 的成員，捷克則不肯定，但上述3封信均是由 SWHK 其他成員與顧問公司 Whitehouse Consultancy 合作撰寫，亦有其他團隊成員作出跟進，所以李並沒有協助跟進這3封信。

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日本關注對華政策聯盟成立 李宇軒協助山尾志櫻里籌備

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2020年7月19日，李宇軒透過 Telegram 告知裴倫德，兩名日本議員山尾志櫻里和中谷元將會正式成立日本的「IPAC衛星組織（satellite IPAC）」，名叫 JPAC（Japanese Parliamentary Alliance on China）。李庭上稱，JPAC 的成立目的是讓一些關心對華政策的日本議員「好似 IPAC 咁走埋一齊」，以討論對華政策。

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現在のJPAC所属議員名簿はこちらです。同じURLで随時更新していきます。

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The current list of #JPAC members can be found here. This list will be updated as new members join in. https://t.co/MSRYsr0WgQ

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— JPAC（対中政策に関する国会議員連盟）公式アカウント (@Japan_pac) December 4, 2020

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訊息顯示，李告訴裴倫德，JPAC 會在2020年7月29日舉行記者會公布成立，日本團隊的發言者將會談及「救生艇」、馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act）、暫緩日本與香港的司法互助協議，以及阻止日本企業或組織向香港政府提供協助。李庭上指以上四點並不是 JPAC 的目標，只是記者會當日的發言重點，因記者會除了宣布成立 JPAC 之外，也會有一些關心中國和香港的社運人士發言。

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李又表示，他在 JPAC 並沒有任何角色，在山尾志櫻里籌備 JPAC 的階段，他僅以義工的身份協助山尾。

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李宇軒稱向日本議員提供語言支援及聯絡日本港人組織

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在 Telegram 訊息中，裴倫德表示想認識山尾志櫻里，邀請李宇軒作為介紹橋樑。李則回覆，他與山尾之間的溝通似乎只有日語，而「溝通鏈」似乎是山尾及其團隊經日本港人組織與李溝通，然後李將相關信息轉達給 IPAC，以及裴倫德將 IPAC 的信息轉達給李，之後由李轉達給山尾。李又指，山尾的團隊並沒有人具備足夠英語能力，所以來自香港的義工會協助山尾處理英文材料。

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李庭上確認：「我的確係有將啲訊息 pass 嚟 pass 去」，他在日本線的工作主要有兩方面，一是在山尾志櫻里和中谷元參與會議的時候，提供語言支援；二是協助聯絡日本的港人組織，包括「Act with HK」、「SWHK@JPN」和「香港之黎明（香港の夜明け）」。

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image03 +▲ 山尾志櫻里（左），本名「菅野志桜里」；中谷元（右）（資料圖片）

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此外，李將 JPAC 的成員名單傳送給裴倫德，當中包括山尾志櫻里、中谷元、長島昭久、有村治子、山田宏、櫻井周、井上一德和串田誠一等。

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庭上展示 JPAC 的會章，以日文撰寫。李指該會章第二條提及 JPAC 的宗旨是請求中國不要肆意侵害普世價值和基本人權。

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裴倫德邀李穿針引線介紹Bill Browder給山尾志櫻里

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Telegram 訊息顯示，裴倫德告知李宇軒，英國金融家 Bill Browder 希望協助山尾志櫻里在日本推動人權法案，邀請李穿針引線安排一次線上會議，讓 Bill Browder 與「SWHK@JPN」成員溝通，然後一同協助山尾。

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李解釋，Bill Browder 是一名想幫手在全球各地推動馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act）的人，但他不想猜測 Bill Browder 的目的，而法案是針對人權侵害事件。因為當時有港人組織想推動馬格尼茨基法案，而 Bill Browder 同樣想推動，所以兩者有共同的利益，至於 Bill Browder 想法案應用在哪些地方，李則不知道。

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李指裴倫德希望能把 Bill Browder 介紹給山尾志櫻里，然後雙方可以合作。由於山尾以日語溝通較自在，所以會議中需要有義工協助山尾翻譯，作為 Bill Browder 和山尾之間的溝通橋樑，該義工人選可能是「Act with HK」、「SWHK@JPN」和「香港之黎明（香港の夜明け）」的成員，或者李本人。

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李宇軒：會議定於8月12日 惟此前被拘捕

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裴倫德在2020年8月4日開設 Signal 群組「Magnitsky Japan」，成員還有李宇軒和 Bill Browder。裴倫德在群組中介紹李，指他與日本團隊溝通，並會協助轉達。李則在群組中發送訊息，表示會安排一個會議，告知山尾志櫻里有什麼支援，又表示需要與山尾和其他日本議員商討策略，包括論調及在什麼時機推動法案。

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控方另展示一系列電郵紀錄，山尾向 Bill Browder 表示想在8月12日開會。李庭上確認會議定於8月12日舉行，但是他在當日之前被警方拘捕，不知道會議最終有否如期進行。

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羅冠聰和黃台仰出席IPAC會議 談論香港國安法實施後情況

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控方展示一份 IPAC 的會議記錄，出席者包括英國、新西蘭、加拿大、澳洲、日本、立陶宛、德國、瑞典和挪威等13個國家的聯盟代表，而列席者包括流亡海外的前香港眾志立法會議員羅冠聰和前「本土民主前線」發言人黃台仰。事後 IPAC 在 Twitter 發表帖文，指會議討論減少對中國的「策略性依賴」（“reducing strategic dependency” on China），又提到羅和黃有參與討論。

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A few hours ago 22 #IPAC Co-Chairs from 13 legislatures 🇪🇺🇳🇿🇨🇿🇬🇧🇩🇪🇯🇵🇳🇴🇬🇧🇨🇦🇫🇷🇨🇭🇱🇹🇮🇹 met to discuss “reducing strategic dependency” on China chaired by 🇦🇺 @kimbakit and Andrew Hastie MP.

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In addition, #IPAC was privileged to hear from @nathanlawkc @Ray_WongHKI

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— Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) (@ipacglobal) August 4, 2020

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李宇軒確認會議大約在2020年8月3日進行，羅冠聰和黃台仰在會上簡述香港在《國安法》實施之後的情況，之後 IPAC 的聯盟代表向二人提問，然後大家討論未來跟進行動，並需要在同年9月初發表文件分析不同國家對中國的「策略性依賴」。

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會議紀錄的「其他事項」提到，日本代表中谷元表示正與香港的社運人士聯絡，推動馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act），針對違反國際法的人。

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陳梓華訊息指若李宇軒做「枱面人」會令身邊人被「照肺」

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控方另展示李宇軒與另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）之間的 Signal 對話，當中陳問李：「你安排好哂香港D野未」、「你去打最終件事會係你身邊所有人都會照肺」；李則回覆「我搞掂咗要搞嘅家人s」。

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李庭上解釋，訊息意思是「如果要打嘅話，身邊嘅人包括T會被照肺」，所以他回覆陳的訊息意思是：「如果要照肺嘅話都會照，唔會取決於我打唔打。」

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控方追問李要「打」什麼，李僅指：「浮上枱面做枱面人。」法官李運騰問，是否很多社運人士都是「枱底的人」？李同意。

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案件明日續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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+ Made with by Agora + +

+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-04-09-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-56.html b/hkers/2024-04-09-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-56.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47a11655 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-04-09-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-56.html @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 56 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 56 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.04.09

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  • 李宇軒與陳梓華曾討論籌組流亡政府 陳因人脈廣被懷疑是「肥佬黎嘅仔」
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（9日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第56日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。2020年7月，李與另一名被告陳梓華曾經透過 Signal 訊息討論在外地籌組「流亡政府」，前提是需要找人願意「浮上枱面做枱面人」，期間李和陳均有考慮擔任「枱面人」，惟陳告訴李如果他做「枱面人」，可能會面臨政治檢控或政治迫害。至同年8月10日，黎智英被警方拘捕，李指一些 Telegram 群組成員覺得陳的人脈甚廣（well connected），懷疑他是「肥佬黎嘅仔」，於是討論「洗唔洗踢肥佬黎個仔出 TG group」。李又指，二人不時討論應否離開香港，陳曾向李表示，作為一名領袖需要留下直至最後一刻，反問「走走走，我若離開，誰來帶隊」。

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「十二港人」之一李宇軒第13天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作主問。

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李宇軒：若做「枱面人」或面臨政治檢控或迫害

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控方昨日展示李宇軒與另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）之間的 Signal 對話，當中陳問李：「你安排好哂香港D野未」、「你去打最終件事會係你身邊所有人都會照肺」；李則回覆「我搞掂咗要搞嘅家人s」。

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李今再解釋，陳之所以問他「安排好哂香港D野未」，是因為香港有政治壓迫，無論他選擇留在香港還是離開都好，他都需要處理好香港的事。

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法官李運騰指二人的對話中提及前「青年新政」成員梁頌恆、前「香港民族黨」召集人陳浩天、前英國駐港總領事館職員鄭文傑、前「本土民主前線」發言人黃台仰以及梁繼平，李宇軒又提到他去聯合國會見職員，李官問二人在怎樣的情況下討論上述話題。

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李回答有兩方面，第一是他當時與陳梓華討論他的個人未來方向，包括在譚競嫦（Sharon Hom）的組織「中國人權」工作，或者跟裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）協助 IPAC（對華政策跨國議會聯盟）的工作；第二方面是陳梓華認為 SWHK 需要轉型。李指本來二人討論 SWHK，之後討論到國際和社運形勢，後來他和陳梓華得出結論是有樽頸位（bottle neck）或權力真空（power vacuum）的情況。

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李續指，他們然後討論會否推舉一個「枱面人」，可以對運動提供推動力，後來結論是需要一個「枱面人」，二人繼而討論誰人適合擔任「枱面人」，所以陳在之後的訊息中指「你去打最終件事會係你身邊所有人都會照肺」，意思是如果李「浮上枱面做枱面人」的話，可能會面臨政治檢控或政治迫害。

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李宇軒指另一被告陳梓華亦曾考慮做「枱面人」

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法官李運騰好奇一問，為何陳梓華沒有自動請纓做「枱面人」。李則指陳有考慮過，所以在之前的訊息中，當李說：「數完一圈⋯⋯總結無人」，陳便回覆：「Shit」、「咁我做啦屌」，不過陳隨即說：「唔係喎」、「仲有本記（本土派）果班問過未？」李指陳有考慮過，只是想先詢問本土派有沒有人願意做「枱面人」。

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李宇軒指「枱面人」需離開香港籌組「流亡政府」

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李提到，當他們找到「枱面人」之後，該「枱面人」需要離開香港，在外地籌組「流亡政府」。法官李運騰聞言一度問：「這討論是否認真？」不過李指，因為找不到「枱面人」，所以最後沒有結論。

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李官指，二人的訊息討論是在2020年7月23日，當時《港區國安法》已經生效，問李宇軒為何仍然考慮是否做「枱面人」。李表示，「因為唔企出嚟嘅話，香港依然會畀中國共產黨操控嘅政權統治，所以已經跌入咗一個有政治迫害嘅環境入面，即係已經夠差。」李官續問，在如此的情況下，李依然討論在香港以外籌組流亡政府？李同意。

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李並指，籌組流亡政府有兩個先決條件，一是要離開香港，因為若果留在香港的話，「會畀香港政府冚佢檔。」另一個條件是要有「枱面人」，「因為淨係得枱底人嘅流亡政府，係唔會有人 take it seriously。」李指，如果有流亡政府的話，會以流亡政府的名義進行國際游說，但是如果沒有的話，亦可以繼續以個人名義做國際游說。

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李宇軒：黎智英被捕後 有組員懷疑陳梓華是「肥佬黎嘅仔」

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2020年8月10日早上，黎智英等人被拘捕。李宇軒在 Signal 傳送訊息給陳梓華，指有組員問是否需要把陳「踢出」 Telegram 群組，「因為肥佬黎出咗事」；陳其後回覆「No need」。

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image02 +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）

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李庭上解釋，他當時向陳轉達 Telegram 群組成員的說話，有人覺得陳的 Telegram 帳戶「太過 well connected」，並且「估計呢度係咪有個人係肥佬黎嘅仔」。當時黎智英被警方國安處拘捕，因此組員討論「洗唔洗踢肥佬黎個仔出 TG group」。

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陳梓華稱作為領袖需留至最後一刻 反問「我若離開，誰來帶隊」

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訊息紀錄顯示，陳向李表示，作為一名領袖，他需要留下直至最後一刻，「走走走，我若離開，誰來帶隊」；李則回應自己只是純粹轉達組員的訊息。

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李庭上解釋，每當有人被拘捕，的確有人叫他及其他仍在香港的人離開，因為他曾經數次使用真名行事。法官李素蘭問到，陳梓華訊息提及「帶隊」，而李是否其中一個隊員？李則表示，他並不屬於任何一個陳梓華所帶領的團隊。

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被問到二人此前有否討論過離開香港，李指相關話題「耐唔耐有浮過出嚟」，因為這並不是一個特別的話題，時不時便會討論，「好似晏晝食飯食咩呀呢種 topic」，討論內容大多圍繞應否離港、離港之後可以做什麼等等。李表示，不論他是否有任何罪名，預計到香港政權總會想到辦法去拘捕他。

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訊息紀錄顯示，陳梓華在同日下午約3時半傳送訊息給李宇軒，叫李離開香港，留下陳一個在香港，因為承受不了國際線再失去多一人（“Brother, leave me here - we can’t afford one more lost in international line.”）。李表示印象中他在同日大約中午時份被拘捕，所以陳傳送上述訊息給他時，「啲差佬搜緊我屋。」

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李宇軒提供立法會選舉被DQ名單 並協助把IPAC聲明翻譯成日文

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控方另展示 Telegram 群組「SWHK IPAC」的訊息紀錄，就原定於2020年9月舉行的立法會選舉（後來政府以疫情為由取消），李宇軒轉發「氣象巴打」的帖文及被 DQ 候選人的名單，包括黃之鋒、劉頴匡、何桂藍、岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、梁晃維及公民黨的楊岳橋等。後來裴倫德把草擬好的聲明傳送至群組，題為「Statement on the obstruction of the democratic process ahead of the 2020 Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections（就2020年香港立法會選舉阻撓民主進程的聲明）」。李確認他在群組提供了被DQ名單之後，IPAC 等人才開始撰寫聲明，然後李和其他在日港人一起把聲明翻譯成日文。

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Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) October 10, 2020

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image03 +▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）

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控方表示接近完成主問，料辯方明日開始盤問李。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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+ Made with by Agora + +

+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-04-10-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-57.html b/hkers/2024-04-10-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-57.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..53f2b7f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-04-10-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-57.html @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 57 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 57 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.04.10

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  • 李宇軒：從未與黎智英見面或交談、「重光團隊」靠眾籌運作無收黎錢
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（10日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第57日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。在辯方的盤問下，李表示：「我冇見過黎智英」，也從沒以任何形式與他交談。李亦確認，他本人及「重光團隊（SWHK）」沒有接收過黎智英或其助手 Mark Simon 任何錢。就 SWHK 的性質，李確認它是一個鬆散、沒有會章的組織，成員之間的共同點是「想去為香港爭取自由民主」。此外，對於辯方形容 SWHK 是一個草根階層、依靠眾籌來營運的倡議組織（grassroots crowdfunded advocacy group），李表示同意。惟法官李運騰指李廿多歲的時候戶口便有300萬元積蓄，質疑他依然形容自己是「草根」，李則回答：「冇諗過呢個問題。」

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「十二港人」之一李宇軒第14天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行完成主問，接著由代表黎智英的大律師 Marc Corlett 盤問。

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image02 +▲ 大律師 Marc Corlett（左）、資深大律師 彭耀鴻（右）

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李宇軒稱從沒見過黎智英、沒任何直接溝通

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辯方問李宇軒與黎智英是否從來沒有見面，李回答：「我冇見過黎智英。」辯方續問，李是否從來沒有與黎交談過，李表示不論是電話、線上會議還是其他方式都好，他沒有與黎交談過。李亦確認，在2020年7月1日《國安法》生效之前，他與黎沒有任何直接的溝通，《國安法》之後也沒有。

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李宇軒稱僅見過Mark Simon一次 國安法前後均沒接觸

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至於黎的私人助手 Mark Simon ，李早前供稱 2019年9月29日會見訪港的美議員斯科特（Rick Scott）的時候，有同場見過 Mark Simon。李今在辯方的盤問下，確認該場合是他第一次，也是唯一一次見過 Mark Simon。李另確認，他從來沒有透過電話或者視像通話與 Mark Simon 交談。

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電郵方面，李則指在另一名被告陳梓華與 Mark Simon 在一系列電郵商討墊支款項時，李不肯定陳有否副本抄送至他的電郵。

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WhatsApp 群組方面，辯方指李宇軒與 Mark Simon 的共同群組只有「Coffee on Sunday」和「Sunday Meeting」，兩個群組均是因為會見美議員斯科特而開設。辯方問，除了電郵和 WhatsApp 群組之外，李在2020年7月1日《國安法》生效之前，便沒有與 Mark Simon 有任何接觸。李同意。辯方續問，《國安法》生效之後，李與 Mark Simon 也沒有任何接觸。李同意：「完全冇聯繫。」

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李宇軒指Mark Simon就會見美議員沒有給予指示

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辯方續指，上述兩個 WhatsApp 群組僅談論會見斯科特的安排。李則把兩個群組內容總結為會面流程安排、人選及「見面講啲咩」。辯方指，群組從沒談論制裁、封鎖或禁售人群管理武器等話題，李同意。

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辯方又指，Mark Simon 從沒有在群組中指示或要求李去做什麼事。惟法官杜麗冰指，Mark Simon 的確有在群組中提及見到斯科特時要說什麼。李則回答，他同意群組入面談論的都是流程和建議，但不是「指示」。

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李亦同意辯方所指，他們會見斯科特的目的是讓他知道更多香港情況。他亦有在會面期間跟斯科特說美國可以做一些事，但沒有提及任何特定行動，也沒有同場人士提及美國可做什麼特定行動。

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法官李運騰指 Mark Simon 在該次會面中基本上發言不多，李同意。

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李宇軒確認「重光團隊」從沒接收黎智英或Mark Simon的錢

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李宇軒早前作供提及2019年8月的第三次眾籌「G攬運動」，Mark Simon 借出其美國銀行帳戶接收眾籌平台的180萬美元款項，然後轉帳至「The Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。李宇軒又提及 Mark Simon 仍有欠款，因此整理相關帳戶後傳送給另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）。

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財務收支紀錄顯示，Mark Simon 在2019年9月30日從眾籌平台「Gofundme」接收約170萬美元，然後分別在2019年11月4日、2020年1月7日和2月3日，把款項分三筆還給「The Project Hong Kong Trust」，亦在2019年11月21日將50萬美元轉帳至李宇軒的戶口。該紀錄顯示 Mark Simon 仍拖欠約26,000美元，需要歸還給「The Project Hong Kong Trust」。李宇軒庭上指，他曾叫陳梓華安排 Mark Simon 還款，但是因為在陳著手處理之前已經被拘捕，所以最後不了了之。

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就 Mark Simon 轉帳給他的50萬美元，李宇軒指它本質上並非 Mark Simon 的錢，而是「The Project Hong Kong Trust」的錢。

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辯方指，在2019年9月30日之後，除了獲歸還曾經墊支的款項50萬美元之外，李便沒有接收過 Mark Simon 或與其有聯繫的人的任何錢。李同意。

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辯方又指，李亦沒有接收過黎智英任何錢。李回應：「從來都冇。」辯方續指，李亦沒有接收過力高顧問有限公司、Lais Hotel Property Limited、Chartwell Holding Limited ，或任何與黎有聯繫的人士或公司的錢。李確認。

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至於「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK），李確認據他所知，在2019年9月30日之後，SWHK 沒有從黎智英、Mark Simon 或與他們有聯繫的人士接收過任何款項。

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辯方指成立信託基金乃由SWHK成員而非Mark Simon提出

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李早前作供提及，Mark Simon 答應借用戶口接收眾籌款項時，提議在美國開設一個信託基金來儲存款項，以避開款項遭香港銀行凍結的風險。

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辯方今展示李於2019年9月傳送給陳梓華的電郵，當中列出尋找願意接收眾籌款項的人選期間面對的困難，其中一點提到網名「Surely」的美國 SWHK 成員 Shirley Ho 不能接收眾籌款項，因為對於她及其家人過於冒險；Shirley Ho 研究相關法例後提議可以成立一個非牟利的機構（non-profit entity）去接收眾籌款項，以及作日後用途。辯方指，成立信託基金這個主意其實是由 Shirley Ho 提出的。李同意，不過同時指 Shirley Ho 當時僅提及非牟利機構。

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李宇軒指SWHK是鬆散組織 成員共同點是為香港爭取自由民主

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李早前作供時形容 SWHK 是一個鬆散的組織、定義含糊而且沒有會章。李再次確認：「佢（SWHK）係一個 loose 嘅 organisation，佢係一個冇 articles（會章）嘅 organisation ，佢入面大家嘅 common ground 係想去為香港爭取自由民主。」

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辯方展示李宇軒在 Telegram 傳送給自己的訊息，當中提到 SWHK 本身有很多定義，包括「SWHK元祖」、「SWHK JP」、「SWHK global」和、「SWHK UK」。辯方問「SWHK元祖」是代表什麼，李則指一開始籌辦「中英聯合聲明登報」期間，組員之間投票選出「Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong」口號作為團體的名稱，並以這個團體的名義登報，從而引申出來的概念便是「SWHK元祖」。

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李提到因為 SWHK 不是一個有會章或正確的組織，若果不同的人認同某個 SWHK 的身份的話，例如 SWHK 或 SWHK Japan，就會由他們個人自行決定去認同這個「label」。在不同活動之中，也會交給不同行動者自行決定以哪一個身份去參與活動。

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法官質疑李宇軒廿多歲有300萬仍說自己是「草根」

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法官李運騰指，沒有任何人能夠壟斷 SWHK 的名義。李回應：「冇人。」李官又指，人們可以自己決定以什麼名義參與，李宇軒確認：「係。」李又補充，因為當時香港的運動是「無大台（decentralised）」，所以會有如此的現象。

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辯方指，SWHK 沒有正式會員架構、沒有會員登記制度，或者需要經任何程序去認證會員身份。李表示：「同意呢個。」辯方又形容 SWHK 是一個草根階層、依靠眾籌來營運的倡議組織（grassroots crowdfunded advocacy group）。李同意。

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此時法官李運騰打斷，指李宇軒廿多歲的時候戶口便有300萬元積蓄，但李依然形容自己是「草根」嗎？李沉默數秒後，才回答：「冇諗過呢個問題。」

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李宇軒確認SWHK無任何領導架構 成員可選擇不參與活動

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在辯方盤問下，李同意不同 SWHK 成員，不論是以網名或是真名示人也好，都會就如何達成 SWHK 目標表達不同意見。辯方續指，SWHK 並沒有任何領導架構，李同意沒有，不過隨著時間過去，一些比較活躍的成員傾向在不同活動中都會提出意見。

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辯方又指，若果有成員對某個活動不支持，大可以不參與。李回答，他們可以選擇不參加活動，或者去說服其他人不去籌辦該活動。

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李又確認，他可以自行決定是否參與某個活動，當中取決於很多理由，其中一個理由是他是否同意該活動，另一個因素是視乎他有否技能協助到活動。

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辯方指李不能主導 SWHK 成員的意見。李同意：「我唔可以 dictate，我只可以同大家傾㗎啫。」辯方續指，其他人亦不能主導 SWHK，正如李剛才提到這是一個「無大台」的組織（decentralised organisation）。李則表示：「呢個係其中一個方面。」

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李宇軒同意陳梓華屬年輕一代 但不知道陳是否視自己為SWHK成員之一

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李早前供稱曾獲時任英國駐港領事賀恩德（Andy Heyn）邀請到其住所參與會議，同場的民主黨創黨主席李柱銘和前政務司司長陳方安生代表「老一啲嘅民主派」；時任立法會議員郭榮鏗和莫乃光「就喺中間」，而李自己就是「再後生嘅 generation」。

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辯方問李，可否形容 SWHK 為年輕一代的一員？李表示，就他所認識的 SWHK 成員，「佢哋的確大部份係年輕一代」，例如「攬炒巴」劉祖廸是其中之一。至於一些只透過網名溝通的成員，李指憑他們的說話方式、感覺和觀點，似乎都符合他對「年輕一代」的印象。

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法官李運騰聞言指，如果他們不是年輕的話，他們也是心態上年輕（young at heart）。法官李素蘭問及李何時出生，李回答他在1990年出生。李素蘭又問，在李眼中，是否在1990年以後出生的人就是年輕人。李則說：「我諗冇乜 definition，望落去 young。」

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李官問另一名被告陳梓華是否算年輕人。李則表示，如果把陳都視為 SWHK 成員的話「佢都係年輕一代」。

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辯方追問陳梓華是否 SWHK 成員，李指如果陳視自己為 SWHK 成員的話，「我就當係」；但如果陳覺得自己只是個人或者義工「咁我冇得話佢係 SWHK」。李指他沒有與陳討論過這個問題，不過二人過往在交談期間，陳似乎將 SWHK 和李「擺埋喺同一邊」。李表示簡而言之他不知道陳視自己為 SWHK 一員與否。

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辯方：李宇軒和陳梓華都是年輕人 均對民主運動有興趣 所以保持聯繫

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李宇軒另確認他本來在網上認識陳梓華，之後透過 Telegram 保持聯絡，就共同感興趣的話題討論和互相交流觀點。辯方指，陳就如李一樣都是年輕一代，或心態上年輕。李同意：「係，同埋佢仲後生過我。」辯方續指，除了年輕以外，二人均對於香港的民主運動感興趣，所以二人之間有連結（connection）和共同點（common ground）。

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不過辯方指，根據李早前的證供，陳屬於「前線的人」，而李則屬於「較後線的人」，因此二人不會就所有問題都討論。李同意，例如 IPAC 正式公布成立之前，他遵守保密承諾而沒有告訴陳，又指「唔係全部嘅活動都有同T傾」。

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辯方盤問未完，案件明日續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-04-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-58.html b/hkers/2024-04-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-58.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d56d9436 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-04-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-58.html @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 58 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 58 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.04.11

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  • 國安法後續游說倡議 李宇軒：若被北京視為政敵總會有方法起訴、無關是否繼續
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  • 李宇軒：陳梓華稱以色列軍隊可助訓練「勇武」、其小隊涉口岸爆炸品和721等事件
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第58日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，他表示在《國安法》之前理解自己會見外國議員等活動是合法。在《國安法》生效之後，李和另一名被告陳梓華曾討論是否繼續國際游說和倡議工作，還是到美國任職非政府組織「中國人權」，後來李決定繼續游說工作，「呢個決定唔係一個令我特別 comfortable 嘅決定，但對我嚟講，佢似乎係一個 least evil 嘅決定。」李形容《國安法》條文含糊，又預料北京會「搬龍門」來針對政敵，法官問李為何不停止游說工作，李則表示：「因為如果北京覺得你係政敵嘅話，就算你做唔做某啲嘢，佢都會搵到方法嚟政治檢控你。所以我繼唔繼續做一啲嘢，無關係。」

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「十二港人」之一李宇軒第15天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的新西蘭御用大律師 Marc Corlett 盤問。

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image02 +▲ 大律師 Marc Corlett（左）、資深大律師 彭耀鴻（右）

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曾赴聯合國及會見外國議員 李宇軒：國安法之前是合法活動

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辯方指，在2020年7月1日《國安法》生效之前，李曾會見訪港的美國議員 Rick Scott、到訪聯合國和法國，以及協助「攬炒巴」劉祖廸接待訪港的英國議員 Bob Seely。辯方問以李的理解，上述活動在《國安法》生效之前是否合法。李回答：「合法嘅。」

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辯方續指，李所面對的控罪涵蓋2020年7月1日至2021年2月15日，所以並沒有因為上述的活動而被起訴，而李直到現在仍然相信這些活動是合法的。李同意：「全部合法嘅。」

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在辯方的盤問下，李確認在2019年6月至2020年7月期間，「重光團隊」（Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）內部從來沒有共識推舉李代表 SWHK 做任何違法行為，而李也沒有基於協議而同意做違法行為，以及沒有協助其他人去做違法行為。

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李並確認，他不知道上述活動是違法，直至2020年6月30日午夜《國安法》條文出爐，又指：「《國安法》會令之前合法的行為變成不合法。」

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李宇軒訊息告訴裴倫德「根據國安法你已經犯了法」 因有條文含糊、有「域外效力」

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辯方展示李宇軒與「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC）創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）之間的 Telegram 訊息對話。李向裴倫德指《國安法》條文中文版已公佈，條文內容比想像中更差（“it’s worse than we thought”），又指根據條文裴倫德已經犯了法（“you have committed a crime according to the text :)”）：

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Laam Chau 🔥 https://t.co/VLScT2548V — Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) October 10, 2020

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image03 +▲ 裴倫德 Luke de Pulford（左）、劉祖廸（右）（資料圖片）

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李庭上解釋，上述訊息的意思是裴倫德既不是香港公民也不身處於香港的司法管轄區之內，但《國安法》第38條提及「域外效力」，所以根據條文定義，裴倫德已經是犯了法，「同埋《國安法》個條文，我係覺得好 vague（含糊）嘅」，因此可以廣闊到涵蓋裴倫德正在做的事。

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李宇軒：憂北京用國安法針對政敵 向裴倫德提議游說各國取消引渡協議

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2020年7月2日，李宇軒向裴倫德徵詢意見，問他是否應該游說其他國家取消與香港的司法互助和引渡協議，以及國際倡議的效用。

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李庭上解釋：「我理解《國安法》第29條個用字係好闊，而第38條係講緊全球嘅人都適用，類似咁解」，加上北京對於條文的廣闊詮釋，預料《國安法》「會用落 political enemy 度」，所以他透過訊息告訴裴倫德「《國安法》會 reach 到你個國家，同埋其他國家嘅 citizens」，為了保障其他國家的公民，有需要檢視是否取消與香港的司法互助和引渡逃犯協議，「防止《國安法》的政治檢控落到去你個國家同其他國家嘅公民度。」

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李宇軒稱北京總會找到方法針對政敵 與是否繼續做手上工作沒有關係

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辯方問李對於《國安法》「紅線」有什麼理解，包括有什麼事可做、有什麼事不可以做。李回答：「我嘅 understanding 係北京會搬龍門，所以冇得由我或者其他嘅 citizens 去知道個紅線喺邊，rather 我嘅 understanding 會係有一個 broad 嘅 interpretation 去畀北京搬龍門。」

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法官李運騰問，既然李有上述擔憂，為何不直接叫裴倫德停止他手上的工作。李則回答：「因為我覺得北京會搬龍門，所以即使你唔做一樣嘢，如果北京要政治檢控你，佢就會用第二啲嘢嚟 charge 你。」李續指，無論是否《國安法》也好，北京會「搬龍門」說現在起訴的罪名已經是法律所涵蓋範圍。

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李官追問，《國安法》條文有提及對於《國安法》生效之前的行為沒有追溯力。惟李表示：「我唔信嗰條文會係好似字面咁解地去被 interpreted。」

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李官又問，為何他不停止正在做的事。李宇軒表示：「因為如果北京覺得你係政敵嘅話，就算你做唔做某啲嘢，佢都會搵到方法嚟政治檢控你。所以我繼唔繼續做一啲嘢，無關係。」李官說，所以李決定繼續做下去。李宇軒同意。

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國安法後決定繼續國際游說 李宇軒指「似乎係一個least evil嘅決定」

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辯方另展示李宇軒與另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）在2020年7月23日的 Signal 訊息對話，二人討論李是否應該到美國的非政府組織「中國人權」工作，或者繼續做國際游說工作。

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辯方問，直到當天，李就《國安法》對他是否有影響的理解，是否與《國安法》剛開始生效的時候差不多，還是有改變。李則表示，「我當時覺得反而係 confirm 咗我對《國安法》嘅 suspicion，因為真係用咗佢嚟拉嗰啲社運人士。」所以他在7月2日與裴倫德傳送訊息時提及對於《國安法》的理解，直至7月23日時仍然一樣。

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辯方問李後來決定繼續做游說工作，是否他自己的決定。李則表示有跟陳梓華討論過，又表示：「呢個決定唔係一個令我特別 comfortable 嘅決定，但對我嚟講，佢似乎係一個 least evil 嘅決定。」

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法官李運騰問，李當時面對兩個選項，一是冒著更大觸犯法律和被拘捕的風險，二是不繼續游說工作，然而李卻選擇了前者。李則回答：「唔係，我當時個 mind 入面唔係呢兩個選項」，當時他懷疑北京可能已經將他視為政敵，所以政權已經有方法拘捕及起訴他，但是擺在他面前的問題是「即使繼唔繼續，都會被拘捕」，因此他當時考慮的問題是應否繼續游說工作。

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李宇軒確認SWHK從沒公開提流亡政府

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辯方指，李宇軒和陳梓華曾經討論在外地成立流亡政府，問李是否同意 SWHK 從來沒有在其網站發布相關內容。李同意，他又指 SWHK 內部從來沒有討論過成立流亡政府。

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辯方又指李從沒有採取任何行動成立流亡政府。李則表示他曾經問過梁頌恆、陳浩天、黃台仰和梁繼平等人是否願意籌組流亡政府，但他們均表示不會做。

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李宇軒指更新SWHK和IPAC網站之前不會徵詢黎智英、Mark Simon或陳梓華

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李早前供稱他協助 SWHK 將內容上載至網站。在辯方的盤問下，李確認他並沒有負責將內容發佈至 SWHK 的 Facebook 和 Twitter，新聞稿也不是他撰寫的。

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辯方問李，他上載文章等內容至 SWHK 網站之前，並沒有與黎智英或其私人助手 Mark Simon 討論過。李確認。至於陳梓華，李表示他與陳有討論過一些 SWHK 的活動，但是他把活動資料上載至網站時，並不會事先徵詢陳梓華。

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辯方指，《國安法》生效之後，李繼續協助 IPAC 更新網站，和列席會議，並指李事前從沒與黎智英和 Mark Simon 討論。李同意：「冇討論過。」至於陳梓華，李表示他有時與陳討論 IPAC 的事，但不會在更新網站之前徵詢陳的意見或批准。

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李又確認他在不會對其他人作出指示，「我可以邀請人哋去幫手，as an individual activist」，例如有一份 IPAC 會議紀錄，他會問日本群組的會否自願幫手，但他不可以落指示：「喂，你一定要過嚟翻譯啦！」

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第58日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方盤問時指，另一名被告陳梓華曾經告訴李，如果香港成立到軍隊的話，以色列軍隊可以協助訓練「勇武」人士，李確認陳曾提出這想法，但「我唔知佢有幾認真」。此外，李亦確認陳提及其「勇武隊」涉及7.21白衣人事件，以及2020年農曆新年期間邊境口岸的爆炸品事件。李於2020年8月10日被捕，他確認從警署獲釋之後，陳在電話中聲稱會安排他離開香港。李指，其後有不同的帳戶使用「化名」告知他入住「安全屋」、乘坐專車到布袋澳碼頭和聯絡「船家」等，並叫他乘船到達台灣之後自動投案，因已將李的個人資料交給陸委會。李又指有人告訴他，當時有捷克代表訪台，當李獲釋之後，若果趕得及的話，應該跟隨捷克的代表乘坐回程的私人包機，到達捷克之後便找方法前往倫敦。惟「走鬼」計劃未能成事，李最終被大陸公安拘捕。

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「十二港人」之一李宇軒第15天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的新西蘭御用大律師 Marc Corlett 盤問。

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辯方：陳梓華把「勇武小隊隊長」介紹給李宇軒

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對於另一名被告陳梓華（網名T）是否帶領多於一隊「勇武小隊」，李宇軒表示不知道。辯方又問以李所理解，陳是否視「勇武」為削弱香港政府管治的方法。李則表示，以他對陳的理解，陳認為「勇武」能夠「做到一個政權唔係實際上管治到一個領土」。至於陳是否認同使用「勇武」，李則指：「部份同意，或者 conditionally agree。」

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辯方提到，陳梓華曾經叫李宇軒到火炭工業區一幢建築物見面，並將一名叫「Cap」的人介紹給李，同場還有一名叫「Cath」的女子和一名叫「廢老」的男子。辯方問，陳介紹「Cap」時，有否形容他是「勇武小隊隊長」。李指「Cap」即是「Captain」，所以他估計其名稱是這個意思。

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辯方問，陳梓華有否告訴李「Cath」是負責製造爆炸品和汽油彈。李則指「冇咁 detail」，當時陳使用「科學實驗」字眼，而且作出「引號」的手勢。辯方又問，陳有否提及「勇武隊」儲藏爆炸品的地方。李指：「應該係話，T 嗰隊勇武有自己嘅地方擺佢自己嘅嘢。」

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李宇軒指陳梓華曾提及口岸爆炸品事件與其「勇武隊」有關、不滿有人「咁快玩槍」

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辯方問，陳有否告訴李，陳的「勇武隊」曾經涉及7.21白衣人事件之中。李確認有，但不肯定陳是否在火炭那次會面中講過。辯方又問，陳有否提及他的隊伍涉及中聯辦外的騷亂事件。李則指陳並沒有詳述，只說過「搞中聯辦嗰次」。

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辯方問，陳有否提及其隊伍牽涉在2020年農曆新年期間邊境口岸放置爆炸品的事件。李指陳曾提及事件與他的「勇武隊」有關。

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辯方又問，就大埔有人開槍的事件，陳有否向李提及過。李指陳只說過「有人喺大埔玩槍」，之後說了類似：「屌，做乜咁快玩槍呀！」李並指，「屌」一字在該句說話中是重要，「一來我係理解 T 係知道呢件事，同埋佢 disapproved of 嗰個人，同埋屌嗰個人咁 pre-maturely 玩槍。」

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李宇軒確認陳梓華曾提及以色列軍隊可協助訓練「勇武」 惟不知是否認真

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辯方指，在另一個場合之中，陳梓華曾向李宇軒談及如果成立到流亡政府的話，陳會負責成立和訓練軍隊。李則指這是兩條不同戰線，「如果將國際游說推到盡，就係成立流亡政府；如果將啲勇武推到盡，就係軍隊。」辯方追問，陳有否說過會訓練軍隊。李指如果成立到軍隊的話，會由陳或其他發展出來。

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辯方續指，在另一個場合中，陳告訴李，如果成立到軍隊的話，以色列軍隊可以協助訓練「勇武」。李則指上述似乎不是陳說話原文，而且陳好像是在談論其他事的時候提出這想法，但「我唔知佢有幾認真」。

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李宇軒確認被捕後陳梓華稱會安排他離開香港

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辯方指，李宇軒在2020年8月23日涉非法偷越邊境罪而被拘捕。李確認，並指「畀大陸公安拉」：「大陸嗰啲著住藍色衫，膊頭有個牌寫住公安嗰啲。」

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辯方指，李原本在2020年8月10日在香港被拘捕，其後在8月12日獲警方批准擔保。李獲釋之後，曾與陳梓華透過電話通話，而陳稱會替李安排離開香港。李確認，但實際安排方面，「我唔知係佢（陳）做，定係第二啲人做，然後由佢傳話。」

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辯方指，在2020年8月18日，陳梓華叫李前往將軍澳日出康城。惟李指他原本的手機被警方沒收，從警署獲釋之後，他使用另一部手機作為「鬼機」，而他百份之一百肯定所有聯絡他的人都是使用「化名（pseudo name）」。李表示，雖然陳知悉他的「鬼機」電話號碼，但是當有一個人叫他前往日出康城時，他不肯定對方是否與陳梓華有關。

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李又指，有人安排「走鬼」期間，會有不同的帳戶聯絡他，中間這些帳戶甚至通訊軟件也換過幾次，雖然他不肯定是否一個人聯絡他，但是從訊息來看，「好似 pick up 到當時發生咩事個 thread，咁我就 trust it。」

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李指除了陳梓華之外，知道他使用「鬼機」的人還有其大妹 Beatrice。而李相信陳梓華和其大妹將他的情況告知其他人。

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李宇軒確認有人安排「安全屋」、專車和「船家」 並叫他到台灣後投案

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李亦確認曾經有一個帳戶叫他提防被跟蹤，但是不肯定對方是否陳梓華。此外，李確認有一個人將「安全屋」業主的聯絡方法交給他，告訴他有專車接送他去另一間「安全屋」，而且車上有「畀我換嘅衫」，但李不知道對方是否陳梓華。

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辯方問，陳梓華或另一個帳戶是否在2020年8月23日凌晨3時，叫李前往西貢布袋澳碼頭。李記得當時是深夜，但不知道是什麼時間。李又確認，陳梓華或另一個帳戶將「船家」的聯絡方法交給他，而此前他已經知道他將會去台灣。

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李確認，陳梓華或另一個帳戶曾叫他乘船到達台灣之後自動投案，對方亦稱已經將李的個人資料交給陸委會。李指有人告訴他，當時捷克有代表訪台，當李獲釋之後，若果趕得及的話，應該跟隨捷克的代表乘坐返回捷克的私人包機，到達捷克之後便找方法前往倫敦。

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官問如何能有300萬元積蓄 李宇軒指靠寫電腦程式獲取收入

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辯方盤問完畢之後，法官李素蘭問及李宇軒的個人背景。李稱在2019年的時候，他任職電腦程式編寫員，會接一些專案來做，有時是他一手包辦，有時他會找認識的程式編寫員一起做。李素蘭指，李宇軒在2019年時積極參與社運，有否繼續做編寫程式的工作。李確認他繼續工作。

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李又表示，他自大學畢業起便開始任職電腦程式編寫員，至2019年僅僅接近10年，而他的主要收入來源是這份工作。

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法官李素蘭問，李如何能夠儲存到300萬元銀行積蓄。李則表示閱讀銀行紀錄之後，發覺自己記錯金額，正確金額應該有逾400萬元，這是靠「做 programming 嘅錢」而累積而來。

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法官李運騰問，李到訪日內瓦的聯合國總部、法國、日本等地方，有否獲得任何資助。李稱他支付自己的機票、酒店和大部份費用，但是有部份行程的費用則是向眾籌基金報銷。

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稅單顯示李宇軒年薪達120萬元

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辯方展示李宇軒在2018至2019年度的稅單，當中顯示他的年薪達120萬元，扣除強積金和免稅額後，應課稅入息實額為105萬元，應繳稅款為約14萬元。

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李稱，就編寫電腦程式的工作，一開始時薪是15美元，幾個月後升至時薪40美元，後來接多了專案，時薪再慢慢升至40至50多美元，其後時薪繼續上升。李又補充，因為工作是以專案為單位，有時可以接多些專案，但有時可以沒有任何專案。

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李宇軒作供完畢。控方替下一名「從犯證人」陳梓華申請「提犯令」，料明日傳召他出庭作供。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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Euro SIFMANet Riga Report

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European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network, Riga Summit 2024: Data Sharing and Sanctions Against Russia

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Benjamin Hilgenstock | 2024.04.12

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Roundtable held in Riga in March 2024 highlighted the importance of data sharing in improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia.

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Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, unprecedented and comprehensive sanctions have been imposed on it. Among the measures taken in the first several months of the war were the immobilisation of the Bank of Russia’s reserves, sanctions on several large Russian financial institutions and their disconnection from SWIFT, the EU’s embargo on Russian oil, the G7 oil price cap regime, and comprehensive export controls on dual-use goods. More restrictions have been added since. However, the focus of the work of governments, think tanks and wider civil society has shifted to questions of implementation and enforcement. As the Russia sanctions regime is likely to remain in place for years, these issues will continue to play a major role. In addition, they are of utmost importance for the future credibility of sanctions beyond the Russia case.

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The coalition’s actions have had a significant impact on Russia – curtailing export earnings, reducing policy space and limiting access to critical inputs for its military industry. But clearly, they have not succeeded yet at achieving their ultimate objective: to bring the war to an end and rein in the threat to peace and prosperity in Europe – as well as to the rules-based international order – that Russia poses. In fact, serious issues hinder effective implementation and enforcement of key measures such as the oil price cap and export controls. Over a period of more than two years, the RUSI-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet) has contributed to efforts aimed at understanding which sanctions work, which are plagued by practical challenges, and what needs to be done to improve their effectiveness and ensure their credibility.

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Previous SIFMANet events have established that all stakeholders – whether governments monitoring sanctions circumvention and evasion, private sector actors seeking to ensure their compliance with the restrictions, or civil society attempting to shed light on key developments – need more and better data. To gain further insights on this issue, the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI hosted a roundtable discussion in Riga in March 2024, with the support of the Financial Intelligence Unit of Latvia, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. The event gathered experts from public and private sectors across Europe to explore, under the Chatham House rule, the critical importance of data sharing and develop proposals for improvements in this area. This report summarises the main findings from the discussion.

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Data is Critical for Effective Sanctions Implementation

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The way sanctions are thought about has changed dramatically in recent years – and with it, the approach to implementation and enforcement. Participants of the roundtable agreed that, for many years, sanctions – if they were more than simply a foreign policy messaging tool – largely fell on to the compliance departments of financial institutions. A global economy made traditional trade embargoes much more difficult to enforce. In response, the US began to leverage the primacy of its financial system to extend the reach of its sanctions. The threat of disconnection from correspondent banking accounts and loss of access to the US dollar meant that most financial institutions around the world had no choice but to comply.

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The discussion described the Russia sanctions regime as fundamentally different from past cases in several respects. First, the sanctions coalition’s measures target an economy more integrated into trade and global financial flows than in any previous case. Second, the measures go far beyond restrictions on the financial system – they include interventions into global energy markets as well as complex supply chains and distribution networks for dual-use goods. Third, the Russia sanctions aim to restrict an aggressor’s capacities during an ongoing military confrontation, putting a much greater sense of urgency on making them work.

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As SIFMANet discussions have established previously, data is key. Governments need as much information as possible to guide the implementation of sanctions at home, to investigate and prosecute violators, and to target circumvention networks in third countries. But it is not only the public sector that relies on data. Financial and non-financial corporates can only ensure that their business activities comply with sanctions if they have access to a wide range of information. Finally, think tanks such as RUSI and its partners use data to complement governments’ efforts in the area of sanctions. The complexity of the issues at hand as well as resource constraints in the public sector mean that ensuring their effective implementation and enforcement truly must be a whole-of-society effort.

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Participants of the roundtable recognised that the use of data has improved noticeably over the past two years. Many of the agencies involved in analysing and improving the effectiveness of sanctions now have access to a wealth of critical information. In addition, they have stepped up their efforts to analyse this data by linking information from different sources. Furthermore, cooperation between different agencies – within governments and across jurisdictions – has increased significantly over the past two years. Important challenges on data access and sharing remain, but participants agreed that substantial progress has been made in understanding how sanctions work in practice and on the operation of Russian evasion schemes.

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A Changing Focus: From “Red Flags” to Actionable Evidence

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The increasing complexity of the Russia sanctions regime poses major challenges for implementation and enforcement – and calls for a different approach to the use of data. For instance, assessing the effectiveness of the G7 oil price cap requires that government agencies not only establish that a certain transaction involving Russian oil as well as a coalition-based entity took place, but also identify the specific contractual terms – that is, the price – at which it did. This information must be collected from a variety of sources – which are not always publicly available and whose reliability raises legitimate concerns – and be merged to develop a comprehensive picture. Think tanks face essentially the same limitations and challenges when it comes to their work in this area.

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Another example of the magnitude of the task concerns the private sector. Many large economies do not participate in the sanctions, pushing trade and financial transactions to places with far less transparency. For instance, participants highlighted that a large share of Russia’s imports of so-called “battlefield goods” continues to come from coalition-based producers but via third-country intermediaries in China, Turkey and the UAE, as well as countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Non-financial corporates are being asked to go well beyond traditional sanctions screening of business partners. Instead, they are tasked with controlling complex supply chains and distribution networks – a task for which they are neither prepared nor properly incentivised. In addition, the cross-jurisdictional nature of the transactions itself provides considerable room to conceal illicit activities.

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For civil society, the task has also changed. Participating authorities emphasised that governments are looking for researchers and think tanks to identify much more than suspicious patterns or “red flags”. Rather, enforcement agencies are seeking actionable information that can be used to prosecute sanctions violators and/or target entities with new restrictions. In addition, they seek concrete and detailed assessments of how their measures impact transactions and sanctions compliance.

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Key Challenges Surrounding Data Availability, Sharing and Use

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From the discussion in Riga, several key points emerged on the challenges of acquiring, sharing and properly using data for effective sanctions implementation and enforcement.

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Missing and Inconsistent Information

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As mentioned above, the Russia sanctions regime differs from past cases (such as Iran and North Korea) insofar as it imposes complex restrictions on trade and financial transactions. In addition, it has led to multi-layered and cross-jurisdictional circumvention and evasion schemes. This means that authorities in coalition countries must acquire and merge information from a wide variety of sources. This is often challenging. For instance, identifying a violation of the G7 oil price cap requires data on the entities involved in oil transport as well as on the price of the transaction.

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Even if access to the information is secured, it is often difficult to match it to other data and develop a comprehensive picture. On export controls, participants added that an understanding of the entire supply chain and distribution network is needed to determine if a coalition-based producer of battlefield goods has violated sanctions. As the physical shipments of such goods largely take place outside of coalition countries, their own customs data is of little help. And many countries through which the bulk of this trade is conducted do not share information because they do not participate in the sanctions.

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Authorities can certainly establish that suspicious activities take place, but their ultimate objective of generating actionable intelligence is severely impacted by data constraints. To an extent, these are also the result of regulatory gaps. For instance, incomplete customs declarations can be penalised or prosecuted – but rarely are. And important fields in SWIFT are optional. This includes some that would be critical for the monitoring and identification of potential violations, including locations where physical shipments related to financial flows took place as well as trade codes identifying goods.

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Access to and Quality of External Data

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To a large extent, governments, the private sector and civil society have relied on Russian trade data to assess the effectiveness of sanctions. But with Russia increasingly restricting access to its data, representatives from these three sectors acknowledge that their ability to monitor developments is at risk. While some important information is commercially available, its reliability can be legitimately questioned. And such questions extend beyond Russian data. Outreach to countries that are strongly suspected to function as circumvention hubs – Turkey, countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia – has been a focus of coalition governments and the EU. One of the key objectives is to acquire data which can shine light on the extent of illicit transactions and the people and entities involved. Beyond capacity constraints that compromise the quality of the information, customs data is often incomplete (for example, due to smuggling) and/or subject to falsification. In fact, coalition authorities often find significant inconsistencies when comparing data related to the exact same transaction from different sources. Most often, codes identifying the goods in question – so-called Harmonised System (HS) codes – differ between exports to Russia as reported in coalition or third-country customs declarations and imports from those countries to Russia as reflected in the Russian trade data.

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Data Sharing Within the Public Sector

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Many of the countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia have decentralised implementation and enforcement structures. Participants provided several examples for responsibilities being divided between multiple institutions – ministries of foreign affairs, finance, and economy as well as customs services, banking supervisors, financial intelligence units (FIUs) and law enforcement agencies. This inevitably leads to a less-than-optimal exchange of information and can slow down procedures. Challenges related to data sharing go beyond issues related to institutional setup, however. In many countries, data protection standards are high, making it difficult for key agencies to access information. This can be the case, for instance, for information on physical flows of goods provided by customs services, and on financial transactions provided by central banks and FIUs. Barriers can generally be overcome in the case of suspicions of concrete illicit actions, but they often inhibit efforts to monitor sanctions-related developments more broadly. Detecting problematic patterns and developing strategies to improve the effectiveness of sanctions is, thus, made more complicated. Similar challenges exist for data sharing between governments. In addition, existing systems for information exchange – such as the Egmont Group, which facilitates cooperation between FIUs – are set up for very specific purposes and are limited to specific types of data.

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Decentralised Enforcement in the EU

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The issue of decentralisation extends beyond individual governments. In the EU, despite 13 sanctions packages at the union level, member states are responsible for carrying out these measures in practice. And, not surprisingly, participants of the discussion reported that the 27 countries do things very differently. This concerns the institutional setup (that is, who is in charge of sanctions-related issues), staffing and resources (that is, what capacities are available for the task at hand), legal frameworks (that is, national legislation and regulations, criminalisation of violations, among others), access to critical information and political priorities. Inevitably, this leads to the fragmentation of sanctions enforcement and implementation in the EU. The involvement of government agencies from 27 member states – where responsibilities are also often split up between multiple players (as outlined above) – and the EU’s own institutions poses serious practical challenges to an effective exchange of information.

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Private Sector Capacity Constraints

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In the past, sanctions implementation has often fallen on the private sector, especially the compliance departments of financial institutions. The Russia sanctions regime is only exacerbating this dynamic. For instance, non-financial corporates have to control their supply chains and distribution networks related to goods critical for the Russian military industry. While buy-in from the private sector is essential, participants pointed out that governments must recognise existing capacity constraints to develop a sanctions implementation approach that works in practice. Many of the producers whose goods continue to reach Russia are large multinational corporations with significant resources to establish compliance structures and carry out the due diligence that is required of them – but not all of the involved companies are. Many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are involved as well, especially in the manufacturing of hi-tech machinery such as CNC machines.

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Slow Pace of Adaptation to Challenges

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It is important to recognise that economic sanctions are not static. Rather, they require frequent adjustments as their target adapts to restrictions and establishes evasion and circumvention schemes. This is particularly relevant in the current case of a far-from-global sanctions regime and an adversary – Russia – that has considerable experience with manoeuvring around such restrictions. After all, it has done so for roughly 10 years since sanctions were first imposed in 2014. Participants expressed serious concerns about the ability of coalition government to react swiftly to Russia’s actions and, more fundamentally, questioned if the issue is treated with a proper sense of urgency. For Russia on the other hand, the existential nature of the challenge is clear. And, as an increasingly repressive dictatorship, Russia has more flexibility to act compared with the democratic systems of the coalition.

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Leveraging the Role of the Financial Industry

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A topic that had emerged at previous SIFMANet events was again the focus in Riga: the financial industry’s role in sanctions implementation and enforcement. As mentioned above, banks have been involved in these efforts for a long time, but their responsibilities are likely to grow significantly. US President Joe Biden’s Executive Order of 22 December 2023 sent a clear message to foreign financial institutions that they risk losing access to the US financial system if they facilitate significant transactions relating to Russia’s military-industrial base. This represents a clear threat of secondary sanctions in the area of export controls. However, it will likely also make banks much more careful when it comes to any other transactions that involve Russia.

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Participants expressed support for leveraging the role of banks in cross-border transactions to improve the effectiveness of the Russia sanctions regime. But they also urged caution regarding such an approach’s practical execution. For instance, simply adding new requirements to the industry’s compliance efforts is unlikely to result in functional procedures without proper guidance. What is more, efforts to involve the financial industry will need to go beyond those global banks that have traditionally been tasked with the implementation of sanctions. Financial flows are fungible and, especially when related to illicit activities, will be quickly redirected through any entities not in focus. This concerns smaller traditional banks as well as non-bank financial institutions such as payments services providers or actors in the crypto sphere. These entities, however, are not insulated from sanctions. Many of them also rely on access to the US financial system and the US dollar. They are also connected, through correspondent accounts and other business dealings, with those large global banks that have substantial experience with sanctions compliance and could hand on due diligence requirements.

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Recommendations: Data is Key to Making Sanctions Work

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The way sanctions are viewed has changed dramatically. Implementation and enforcement of an ever-more comprehensive and complex sanctions regime poses new and growing challenges to governments, the private sector and civil society more broadly. Data is key to making these measures work as effectively as possible and constrain Russia’s ability to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine. Specifically, access to data as well as its effective exchange and use are critical to assessing and improving the implementation of sanctions at home, investigating and prosecuting violations, and informing steps to rein in circumvention networks abroad. Throughout the roundtable, participants discussed ideas to improve data-related efforts. The specific recommendations from the event are as follows:

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    Centralise sanctions responsibilities within countries. Some EU member states are leading the way when it comes to centralising sanctions-related functions by designating competent authorities for implementation and enforcement. Participants expressed that cooperation and coordination within governments and across borders, including for data, would benefit from other countries following suit. As sanctions will remain a key element of foreign policy in the coming years, now is the time to equip institutions with proper resources and procedures. Clearly assigning responsibilities and mandates must be an integral part of this strategy.

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    Improve cooperation and data sharing across jurisdictions. One of the key findings of the roundtable is that authorities across the coalition have much better access to information now than two years ago. In addition, efforts are underway to link different data sources to develop a comprehensive view on the effectiveness of sanctions. However, improvements are needed when it comes to the exchange of information across jurisdictions. Existing systems require modifications so that they can be used to address the challenges emerging from the type of unprecedented and comprehensive sanctions that have been imposed on Russia.

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    Exchange best practices and learn from one another. Some jurisdictions, mainly the US, have significantly more experience with comprehensive financial and technology sanctions. All involved countries should cooperate closely on best practices and learn from one another’s successes and failures. Specifically, authorities across the coalition should look at jurisdictions where sanctions violations have been successfully prosecuted in the past and assess how they can implement the most-effective procedures.

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    Leverage the role of financial institutions in trade. Banks have emerged as a key player in sanctions implementation and enforcement and their role will only grow in areas such as export controls as it may be easier to trace trade-related financial transactions than physical shipments. While banks have established compliance resources and procedures and already provide much information to supervisory bodies and other enforcement agencies, it is critical to enable them to play an expanded role by adapting the regulatory framework. For instance, certain fields in SWIFT such as HS trade codes should be made mandatory. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult for banks to identify red flags and stop illicit transactions in their tracks.

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    Expand interactions with non-financial corporates. Many coalition governments have taken steps to reach out to the private sector beyond the financial industry to provide guidance and offer technical assistance. It is critical that they continue to do so regularly and intensify this cooperation. With sanctions evasion and circumvention networks adapting rapidly to changing conditions on the ground, government agencies must engage in an ongoing dialogue with the private sector. Importantly, this should include establishing clear feedback mechanisms through which they can tap into companies’ expertise.

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    Work with trade organisations to extend reach. As more comprehensive and complex sanctions place growing responsibilities on the private sector, it is critical to make sure that SMEs can also play their role. Given their relative lack of resources and experience with sanctions compliance, governments should work closely with trade organisations to provide guidance and technical assistance to companies. Industry bodies should be leveraged to ensure that due diligence efforts go beyond large multinationals.

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    Involve civil society in sanctions monitoring efforts. The experience of the past two years has shown that civil society – including institutes such as RUSI and research networks such as SIFMANet – plays an essential role in using data to assess the effectiveness of sanctions and develop concrete recommendations for their improvement. Think tanks, NGOs and other similar organisations not only complement scarce resources in the public sector but can also provide a more strategic vision, which is often crowded out by governments’ urgent policy design and implementation tasks.

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    Continue diplomatic outreach to third countries. Considering the limits of data availability and important gaps in the tracing of supply chains and distribution networks, coalition governments need to undertake efforts to gain access to information from third countries. While not the case for all jurisdictions involved in sanctions evasion and circumvention (such as China and the UAE), many, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia, can be incentivised to share more data as they are interested in deeper commercial ties with the EU and other coalition countries. Data sharing, however, will not be sufficient if not accompanied by technical assistance to public and private sectors alike to build capacities and improve data reliability.

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Roundtable participants stressed that it will become clear in the coming months if coalition countries are up to the task of responding decisively and quickly to Russia’s attempts to work around the sanctions regime. Fundamentally, they were optimistic that, if the extraordinary wealth of information available is leveraged to assess the effectiveness of existing measures, identify and prosecute violators, as well as develop strategies to improve the implementation and enforcement of sanctions, Russia’s capacity to wage war on Ukraine and undermine the rules-based international order can be constrained. It will require improvements to institutional setups and the facilitation of information exchange within governments and across borders, as well as leveraging the role of the private sector and involving civil society. More fundamentally, it will need an understanding of the existential nature of the challenge.

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Benjamin Hilgenstock is a Senior Economist at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute. Benjamin focuses on the Russia sanctions regime, in particular, in the areas of energy, trade, finance and export controls.

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-04-12-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-59.html b/hkers/2024-04-12-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-59.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f7b6c98 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-04-12-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-59.html @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 59 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 59 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.04.12

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  • 陳梓華：G20全球登報遇資金困難 Mark Simon稱黎智英願墊支500萬惟事後要還
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  • 陳梓華：黎智英和Mark Simon非常滿意G20登報成果 提議辦展覽延續影響力
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（12日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第59日審訊。控方傳召另一名已認罪被告陳梓華以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。陳供稱，2019年6月G20峰會全球文宣登報計劃面對資金問題，在「公海群組」成員的提議下，陳經民主黨創黨主席李柱銘聯絡黎智英，希望黎可以借貸。在李的協助下，陳聯絡上黎的私人助手 Mark Simon，對方表示「呢個計劃好符合佢哋個政治主張」，希望可以令政府回應市民訴求，遂願意墊支500萬元，但事後一定要還款。Mark Simon 又稱黎智英「會願意提供 all kinds of help 去支持呢類型嘅文宣活動」。

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「十二港人」之一李宇軒昨日完成了15日的作供，控方今傳召另一名已認罪被告陳梓華，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。

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陳梓華出庭作供 學歷至碩士程度 任職律師樓

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陳身穿灰色西裝、戴眼鏡，在3名懲教人員帶領下，循法庭特別通道進入庭內證人台就坐，並以非宗教儀式宣誓，其後開始作供。

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陳供稱他的英文名是 Wayland，大學時修讀法律，碩士課程則修讀中國法律，主要收入來源是在律師樓工作的薪金。

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陳亦確認，他在2020年8月10日被警方以「協助罪犯」罪名拘捕，之後獲警方擔保。陳在2021年2月15日再次被捕，罪名是「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」。至同年2月17日，陳被正式起訴「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」，被指與黎智英、Mark Simon 及「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人串謀呼籲外國機構制裁香港特區及中國，另被控「串謀協助罪犯」。陳確認。

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控方指，陳在2021年7月7日承認「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，而「串謀協助罪犯」罪則留法庭存檔，不予起訴。陳確認。

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陳梓華指冀透過G20登報關注反修例運動 惟出現資金問題

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就2019年的事件，控方問陳是否認識黎智英，陳表示：「我認識。」他並稱在2019年6月透過李柱銘聯絡黎智英。

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陳指，當時他在一個關於G20峰會的 Telegram「公海群組」，見到一個叫「rip」的用戶聲稱需要資金去做全球文宣登報，然後陳私訊「rip」了解情況，「rip」便直接打電話給陳，「我聽到把聲係男聲」，因而知道對方是一名男性。陳指「rip」當時解釋，雖然眾籌已經達標，但是他無法立即取得該筆眾籌款項。

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就G20登報計劃，陳指「佢係一個全球登報嘅一個計劃，趁住當時G20個峰會，就希望可以表達到當時反修例運動，同埋關注香港嘅情況」，又指「當時亦都想表達到，暫緩呢個逃犯修訂條例，唔等如撤回」。

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陳梓華指後來知道用戶「rip」真實身份是李宇軒

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陳又提到他的 Telegram 用戶名稱是「T」，但一開始是使用「蜂蜜T奶」這名字。

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至於「rip」，陳表示起初不知道這用戶的真實身份，直至大約2019年7月，他與「rip」簽過一份類似借據的協議，期間看過「rip」的身份證，所以知道他的身份是李宇軒。

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陳梓華指「公海群組」有人提議經李柱銘聯絡黎智英 以解決資金問題

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陳指，當時「公海群組」有過千或過萬人，其中有一個叫「Uncle Walkie」的用戶提議可以聯絡黎智英或其朋友去解決資金問題。陳看到訊息後，在群組入面問：「咁有冇人認識黎智英？」然後有人提議，如果沒有人認識黎的話，可以聯絡李柱銘，「因為眾所周知，佢兩個關係好好。」

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陳續指，他便在群組中問：「咁有冇人識李柱銘呀？」然後有人把李柱銘的電話號碼傳送至群組。「當我見到個電話號碼，我以為嗰個人係搞笑，因為個電話號碼好特別，有六個字係一模一樣，然後我就大膽打電話過去，然後聯絡到李柱銘。」

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陳稱，在電話中「我話我冒眛唐突咁打擾你，但係呢當時有一個G20嘅全球文宣登報計劃，個宗旨係想喺G20峰會度，表達到香港人嘅訴求」，但是眾籌計劃在程序上面，無法直接取得該筆款項，「所以我哋冇辦法按照當時所想嘅去俾到錢報章，去 hold 住啲版位，我哋需要一筆 bridge loan。」陳亦在電話中提及需要金額為300萬元，並稱這筆貸款一定會還，所以想看看李柱銘能否幫忙聯絡黎智英。

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image02 +▲ 李柱銘（資料圖片）

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陳憶述當時李柱銘在電話中表示明白，「但係我𠵱家唔得閒，我晏少少打返電話畀你。」後來李回電，要求陳再一次解釋為何需要貸款，因為按照李的理解，既然眾籌已經達標，理論上可以做到他們想做的事；陳遂向李解釋，「的而且確眾籌達標，但係眾籌平台 Gogetfund hold 住嗰筆錢，未能夠馬上就俾到我哋。」陳指李聽罷表示明白，「佢話佢會聯絡黎智英。」

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陳指李柱銘其後回電，指中「黎智英已經知道呢件事喇，但係佢唔喺香港，所以我可以搵佢個助手 Mark Simon，直接同 Mark Simon 對話。」陳引述李指：「但係初步聽落去，黎智英係 OK 呢件事（借貸）。」李傳送了 Mark Simon 的電話號碼給陳，之後陳「幾乎馬上」聯絡 Mark Simon。

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陳梓華引述黎智英助手Mark Simon稱G20登報計劃符合其政治主張 故會聯絡老闆

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陳指聯絡到 Mark Simon 之後，「我將我哋遇到嘅困難去話俾佢聽，然後我哋需要呢個 bridge loan 去完成 G20 之前可以登到報紙。」陳轉述 Mark Simon 指，他大概知道這件事情，而陳並非第一個就此事聯絡他的人，「但我表達得比較清楚，所以佢願意同我合作。」陳又引述 Mark Simon 的說話：「佢話呢個計劃好符合佢哋個政治主張，佢都希望呢個計劃可以令政府回應市民訴求」，他聲稱會「同佢老細聯絡」，惟 Mark Simon 並沒未有在該次通話中提及其政治主張是什麼。

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陳續指，相隔10至15分鐘之後，Mark Simon 再次來電，「佢話呢個 bridge loan 冇問題，佢願意墊支500萬，但係要還。」陳理解當時 Mark Simon 所指的500萬元是限額，不能再多。

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陳梓華：Mark Simon稱黎智英會願意提供任何形式協助

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控方問，Mark Simon 有否在電話中提及其老闆。陳則指：「當時佢話 Jimmy 會願意提供 all kinds of help 去支持呢類型嘅文宣活動。」而以陳所理解，Jimmy 即是黎智英。

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陳亦引述 Mark Simon 說：「呢一筆錢唔可以經我哋任何人手，佢希望個方式係，當啲報章去出一個invoice 嘅時候，然後佢去直接付款畀呢啲報章。」Mark Simon 又說，如果他們想在《蘋果》旗下報章登廣告的話，「係可以先行登報，然後再付款。」

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陳梓華告知李宇軒資金問題解決 並承諾若有需要「可以再聯絡黎智英同Mark Simon」

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陳指，他與 Mark Simon 通話之後，同日便透過 Telegram 聯絡李宇軒，告知「蘋果黎智英嗰邊願意墊支500萬」，並叫李將報館的廣告費發票電郵給他們「找數」。陳形容李「當初一開始唔相信呢件事，然後我再同佢講，我好確定我哋可以做到」，他並向李表示「若然你之後喺文宣國際線上面需要幫忙嘅話，我可以再聯絡黎智英同 Mark Simon」。

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陳指，李聽罷之後，「佢當時好興奮，話要搞咗啲報紙先，然後就大家開始處理喺邊啲地區國家登報紙。」

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控方問，為何陳當時特別聯絡網名「rip」的李宇軒，而不是其他人。陳表示，因為見到「rip」有權限把訊息置頂，因此相信「rip」當時是「群主」。加上當時他較早前就財務事宜聯絡過「rip」，相信「rip」負責財政，所以才會聯絡「rip」而不是其他人。

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陳梓華指李宇軒在登報計劃中是資助者及協調者

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就陳梓華在登報計劃之中的角色，陳稱自己負責協調報館發票和收據的往來，就《衛報》、《華盛頓郵報》、兩間法國報紙及一份意大利報紙，李宇軒會將發票電郵給他，他會將之轉發給 Mark Simon，其後當 Mark Simon 繳付款項之後，就會將收據傳送給陳，然後陳轉發給李。

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至於其他報紙的發票和收據，陳並沒有收到，他當時知道李宇軒會收到所有報館的發票，而李會繳付廣告費。

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就李宇軒的角色，陳表示以他的認知，李在「高登」或「連登」討論區得知G20全球登報計劃，當李參與眾籌計劃時，李負責選擇使用哪一個眾籌平台，然後將收款人設定為自己；當他們確定在哪些報紙登報的時候，李便用自己的錢繳付廣告費。因此陳認為李的角色除了是一個資助者（funder）之外，還是一個匯總、協調者，「去將唔同報章嘅內容，最尾擺埋一齊。」

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兩公司墊支部份廣告費 Mark Simon事後提供還款戶口資料 稱都係「屬於佢老細」

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控方在庭上展示不同報館的發票和匯款紀錄，顯示《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費用是85,050美元，由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 代表李宇軒繳付。

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《衛報》發出的收據顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 代表李宇軒支付了18,000英鎊廣告費。

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就意大利《晚郵報》（Corriere Della Sera）的廣告費，匯豐銀行的付款紀錄顯示，力高顧問有限公司（Dico Consultants Limited）代表李宇軒支付2萬元歐羅。

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控方問陳，當時 Mark Simon 有否提及 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高顧問有限公司的事。陳則回答當時沒有，但之後在2019年7月，第一次與 Mark Simon 見面的時候，對方則有提及。

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就歸還墊支款項事宜，陳指他在2019年7月與 Mark Simon 見面時，從對方手上接過單據和3個用以還款的戶口資料，然後轉交給李宇軒。

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陳指3個戶口分別是加拿大、香港和台灣的戶口，當時 Mark Simon 跟他說：「希望、如果可以，可以 send 返啲錢去加拿大，但若然方便你哋，你哋揀任何一個戶口都可以，因為3個戶口都係屬於佢老細。」

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（12日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第59日審訊。控方傳召另一名已認罪被告陳梓華以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。陳供稱，在2019年6月籌辦G20峰會全球文宣登報計劃期間，他與李宇軒首次親身見面，他問李為何願意墊支400萬元，李當時回應：「為咗香港，都一定要咁做，就算按咗層樓，佢都會咁做。」同年7月，陳與 Mark Simon 首次親身見面，對方「大讚」登報文宣，表示非常滿意成果和效果。Mark Simon 又提議舉辦展覽以延續G20登報的影響力，若果符合他與黎智英的政治理念，「佢哋願意提供經濟上、人脈上，同埋傳媒方面嘅協助。」Mark Simon 亦提到「國際上面嘅 lobbying」，惟陳「當時對 lobbying 冇乜認知」，所以僅向對方說會嘗試參與報紙展覽。

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「十二港人」之一李宇軒昨日完成了15日的作供，控方今傳召另一名已認罪被告陳梓華，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。

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陳梓華問李宇軒為何墊支巨額 李稱「為咗香港，都一定要咁做」

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陳梓華上午提到，2019年6月G20峰會全球文宣登報計劃遇到資金問題，故他嘗試經李柱銘聯絡黎智英，後來聯絡上黎的私人助手 Mark Simon。Mark Simon 稱他及黎願意墊支500萬元，惟事後須要還款。最終 Mark Simon 及黎一方墊支了約150萬元，其餘廣告費則由李宇軒墊支。

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有關陳梓華與李宇軒第一次見面，陳指在籌辦G20登報期間，即2019年6月25至29日之間，二人在金鐘親身見面，「嗰次係純粹大家見個面，我問佢點解要佢自己墊支嗰筆錢」，因為據陳所知，李差不多要墊支400萬元，然後黎智英一方要墊支約200萬元，但是李當時回應：「為咗香港，都一定要咁做，就算按咗層樓，佢都會咁做。」此外，陳確認在該次見面中，有把一些匯款通知書交給李。惟陳當時並未知道李宇軒的真名。

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陳梓華：G20後詢問李宇軒還款安排惟李「唔應機」 遂要求簽借據

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陳續指，G20登報計劃在13個國家、20份報紙刊登廣告之後，他便開始問李宇軒是否已經成功收到眾籌款項，「但佢一直都唔應機，於是乎我就喺群組入面問咗幾個網友點算。」陳指其中一個網友提議陳和李之間簽署借據，「令佢（李）個人承擔返嗰150萬元。」陳表示：「我認為呢種做法，係無論對 Mark Simon 定黎智英，定抑或係G20本身，都係負責任嘅做法。」

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陳指，他準備好借據之後便打電話給李宇軒，打了數次後李才接電話，他向李解釋情況，「因為阿 Mark 都話有人問過嗰筆錢幾時會返番去、有冇時間表，但李宇軒乜都冇覆。」

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於是陳相約李到金鐘力寶中心見面，並在哪裡與李共同簽署一份借據。陳指同場有兩名見證人，皆是群組入面的網友，而簽署好的借據由兩名見證人保管。

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陳指借據上並沒有規定還款日期，只是提及李宇軒向代表 Mark Simon 的陳梓華借錢，欠款約150萬元。該次是陳和李第二次見面。

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陳梓華指李宇軒獲得還款戶口號碼後 便稱已還款 不需利息

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陳續指，在簽署借據當日的晚上，他與 Mark Simon 透過 WhatsApp call 通話，陳向對方稱，「李宇軒係願意個人去承擔呢筆債務，所以佢唔會拖數。」陳又解釋，因為 Mark Simon 提供了3個還款戶口，分別是加拿大、台灣和香港的戶口，所以李不知道如何還錢，究竟是一次過還錢，還是分別還去3個戶口。Mark Simon 則稱會稍後回覆。

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陳指，大概在7月底，Mark Simon 回覆他，指李可以還款去任何一個戶口，但最好是一筆過地還款。

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控方問 Mark Simon 有否提及該3個戶口的持有人是誰。陳引述 Mark Simon 指3個戶口「都係佢老細」，但是沒有提及戶口持有人是誰，換言之 Mark Simon 實際上只提供了3個戶口號碼。

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陳指，他其後把 Mark Simon 的說話及3個還款戶口號碼轉述給李宇軒，數天之後，李宇軒「佢就話佢找咗筆錢喇」。控方問該筆貸款是否有利息，陳則指沒有。

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陳梓華：Mark Simon和黎智英滿意G20登報效果 並稱可就展覽提供協助

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陳梓華提到他與 Mark Simon 於2019年7月首次親身見面，當日在中環文華酒店的咖啡廳，同場還有 Mark Simon 的兒子，「係一個細路仔嚟嘅，然後 Mark Simon 就話呢個係佢個仔。」

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陳指二人會合後，Mark Simon 介紹自己為黎智英的助手，「咁佢就 basically 執行佢個 boss 嘅order。」陳續指，「佢（Mark Simon）首先大讚G20全球登報文宣，佢哋好滿意，佢話佢哋非常滿意個成果同效果。」而陳指「佢哋」是代表黎智英和 Mark Simon。

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陳引述 Mark Simon 稱：「佢認為未來嘅文宣方向，應該係延續返G20登報嘅影響力。」Mark Simon 舉例指可舉辦展覽，「因為佢話，並唔係人人都會睇報紙，若然我哋可以喺呢方面做多啲，亦都符合佢哋嘅政治理念，佢哋願意提供經濟上、人脈上，同埋傳媒方面嘅協助。」

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控方追問當時 Mark Simon 有否談及其政治理念是什麼。陳指 Mark Simon 沒有特別講到政治理念，「但佢有幾次強調『民主』呢個單字。」此外，在該次會面中，Mark Simon 把一個棕色信封交給他，內含G20廣告費的發票和收據，以及3個還款戶口的資料。

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陳梓華稱開離岸公司戶口有困難 Mark Simon稱可幫忙、「當係個獎勵俾自己」

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陳又指，Mark Simon 有問他未來想做什麼，陳當時稱有朋友想邀請他一起做生意，「其實我鍾意做生意多啲」，然後他談論了想做什麼類型的生意。Mark Simon 一度問陳是否遇到什麼困難，陳則指好難在香港開設到一間離岸公司的銀行戶口。Mark Simon 則稱「應該唔難」，並表示「其實我可以幫到你，你就當係個獎勵畀自己」。

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陳梓華指Mark Simon有提及國際游說 惟當時對國際游說沒有認知

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陳指 Mark Simon 還有問他會否繼續參與文宣工作，陳當時回答「我會繼續」。Mark Simon 有談及本土的文宣工作，也有談及「國際上面嘅 lobbying」。陳表示，「但我當時對 lobbying 冇乜認知，所以我就同佢講，我會嘗試參與更加多喺報紙展覽。」

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控方追問 Mark Simon 口中的「國際上 lobbying」是指什麼。陳則表示當時不清楚。被問到游說的目的，陳指是爭取「五大訴求」，即要求政府撤回逃犯條例修訂、推翻612暴動定性及承諾不檢控被捕人士、成立獨立調查委員會調查警暴，以及落實雙普選。

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陳梓華視李宇軒為「攬炒團隊」一員

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陳指，2019年6月之後，由「攬炒巴」劉祖廸帶領的「攬炒團隊」籌辦另一次登報行動，但主題與G20不同，因G20是關於反修例和「五大訴求」，但是「攬炒團隊」的登報行動則是關於中英聯合聲明，「希望英國政府可以履行佢哋道德責任。」

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陳提到當時有大量「公海群組」，目的是聚集更多志同道合的人，俗稱「圈人」，至於實際工作則不是在「公海」討論，而是有另外一些非公開小組。

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以陳的理解，李宇軒是「攬炒團隊」成員之一，因為當時李告訴陳，「攬炒團隊」需要有人幫手做眾籌，「我當時嘅理解係佢又想搵人墊支」，然後陳跟李說「你去做啦」，因他相信「攬炒團隊」需要一個有經驗、做過眾籌的人，而李有足夠能力協助他們處理。陳不記得李當時怎樣回覆，「但係我哋下次對話嘅時候，佢已經喺攬炒團隊入面做緊。」

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案件下周一（4月15日）續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.40 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
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Chip Export Control

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【黎智英案・審訊第 59 日】

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Barath Harithas | 2024.04.09
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Export control evasion of controlled chips is a known concern, but the specifics of this activity are opaque. In addition, a systematic analysis of the entire chip smuggling pipeline, from initial procurement to unlawful distribution, remains conspicuously absent.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.04.12
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  • 陳梓華：G20全球登報遇資金困難 Mark Simon稱黎智英願墊支500萬惟事後要還
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  • 陳梓華：黎智英和Mark Simon非常滿意G20登報成果 提議辦展覽延續影響力
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Ships, Trains, And Trucks

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Euro SIFMANet Riga Report

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Romina Bandura, et al. | 2024.04.08
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The full-scale Russian invasion has devastating effects on Ukraine’s trade causing vast destruction of its transport and logistics infrastructure. Ukraine and its partners have to be creative and determined in finding new trade corridors to support business operations.

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Benjamin Hilgenstock | 2024.04.12
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Roundtable held in Riga in March 2024 highlighted the importance of data sharing in improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia.

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Eroding Trust In Government

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【黎智英案・審訊第 58 日】

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Yasir Atalan, et al. | 2024.04.08
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In the future, malign actors will seek to undermine trust in government through disrupting basic needs and services such as food aid and medical assistance, in place of costly offensive cyber campaigns.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.04.11
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  • 國安法後續游說倡議 李宇軒：若被北京視為政敵總會有方法起訴、無關是否繼續
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  • 李宇軒：陳梓華稱以色列軍隊可助訓練「勇武」、其小隊涉口岸爆炸品和721等事件
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U.S.-Japan Alliance In 2024

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【黎智英案・審訊第 57 日】

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Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye | 2024.04.04
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The U.S.-Japan alliance is at a moment of historic strength, even as both countries confront daunting challenges in the international system. This report calls for an alliance that is more integrated across the economic and security realms to uphold the rules-based order.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.04.10
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  • 李宇軒：從未與黎智英見面或交談、「重光團隊」靠眾籌運作無收黎錢
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Friendshore Lithium-Ion

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【黎智英案・審訊第 56 日】

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William Alan Reinsch, et al. | 2024.04.01
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Reforming the lithium-ion supply chain constitutes a critical cornerstone of US foreign policy. The first in a series of three, this report discusses the processing and refining stage of the lithium-ion supply chain.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.04.09
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  • 李宇軒與陳梓華曾討論籌組流亡政府 陳因人脈廣被懷疑是「肥佬黎嘅仔」
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Ukraine’s Financial System

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Chip Export Control

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Oksana Ihnatenko and Arzu Abbasova | 2024.03.28
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This report highlights key stakeholder views from a recent workshop on developments in Ukraine’s financial system.

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Barath Harithas | 2024.04.09
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Export control evasion of controlled chips is a known concern, but the specifics of this activity are opaque. In addition, a systematic analysis of the entire chip smuggling pipeline, from initial procurement to unlawful distribution, remains conspicuously absent.

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Wagner Group In Mali

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Ships, Trains, And Trucks

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Antonio Giustozzi | 2024.03.27
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Despite the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations in Mali continue. But how do locals feel about the mercenaries?

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Romina Bandura, et al. | 2024.04.08
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The full-scale Russian invasion has devastating effects on Ukraine’s trade causing vast destruction of its transport and logistics infrastructure. Ukraine and its partners have to be creative and determined in finding new trade corridors to support business operations.

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【黎智英案・審訊第 53 日】

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Eroding Trust In Government

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獨媒報導 | 2024.03.27
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  • 李宇軒群組中稱馬格尼茨基法最有力 裴倫德則指立法過程緩慢、證據門檻高
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Yasir Atalan, et al. | 2024.04.08
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In the future, malign actors will seek to undermine trust in government through disrupting basic needs and services such as food aid and medical assistance, in place of costly offensive cyber campaigns.

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G7’s AI Code Of Conduct

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Azerbaijan’s Pivot

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Gregory C. Allen and Georgia Adamson | 2024.03.27
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It is the G7’s chance to mature the code of conduct to confer a presumption of conformity to the European Union’s AI Act and to enhance AI regulatory interoperability at the G7 this year.

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Rusif Huseynov and Gulkhanim Mammadova | 2024.04.08
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While continuing its equidistance policy regarding Russia and the West, Azerbaijan is looking towards Central Asia and identifying its position in the new Great Game.

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