diff --git a/c2/index.html b/c2/index.html index cc3406cb..ecc1f752 100644 --- a/c2/index.html +++ b/c2/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,14 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+
+
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page10/index.html b/c2/page10/index.html index 957f93d7..8e9756d0 100644 --- a/c2/page10/index.html +++ b/c2/page10/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page11/index.html b/c2/page11/index.html index 00a64f27..f45b5e76 100644 --- a/c2/page11/index.html +++ b/c2/page11/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page12/index.html b/c2/page12/index.html index 872a6d88..577e596e 100644 --- a/c2/page12/index.html +++ b/c2/page12/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
-
-

Meatgrinder

-
Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds | 2023-05-19
-
- -
-
diff --git a/c2/page13/index.html b/c2/page13/index.html index b6439f2e..fec07420 100644 --- a/c2/page13/index.html +++ b/c2/page13/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+
+

Meatgrinder

+
Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds | 2023-05-19
+
+ +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page14/index.html b/c2/page14/index.html index 0f40d7c5..9d4a485f 100644 --- a/c2/page14/index.html +++ b/c2/page14/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
-
-

The CLOUD Act

-
Georgia Wood and James A. Lewis | 2023-03-29
-
- -
-
diff --git a/c2/page15/index.html b/c2/page15/index.html index b44377f6..176e4033 100644 --- a/c2/page15/index.html +++ b/c2/page15/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+
+

The CLOUD Act

+
Georgia Wood and James A. Lewis | 2023-03-29
+
+ +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page16/index.html b/c2/page16/index.html index 9133e9a7..7c443c30 100644 --- a/c2/page16/index.html +++ b/c2/page16/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page17/index.html b/c2/page17/index.html index cbcc9adb..b333f71d 100644 --- a/c2/page17/index.html +++ b/c2/page17/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page18/index.html b/c2/page18/index.html index 62cdf4d0..9dce042d 100644 --- a/c2/page18/index.html +++ b/c2/page18/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page19/index.html b/c2/page19/index.html index 2899d755..6d235445 100644 --- a/c2/page19/index.html +++ b/c2/page19/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page2/index.html b/c2/page2/index.html index d3cdf878..0b16d150 100644 --- a/c2/page2/index.html +++ b/c2/page2/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page20/index.html b/c2/page20/index.html index 4695b984..01e27ce5 100644 --- a/c2/page20/index.html +++ b/c2/page20/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page21/index.html b/c2/page21/index.html index 04e49deb..e2bae264 100644 --- a/c2/page21/index.html +++ b/c2/page21/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page22/index.html b/c2/page22/index.html index a315c45c..21585961 100644 --- a/c2/page22/index.html +++ b/c2/page22/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page23/index.html b/c2/page23/index.html index 7c0d5ee4..4a16b47f 100644 --- a/c2/page23/index.html +++ b/c2/page23/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+

【香港保衛戰當年今日・十五】

diff --git a/c2/page3/index.html b/c2/page3/index.html index 10dcc4b4..bab3110d 100644 --- a/c2/page3/index.html +++ b/c2/page3/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page4/index.html b/c2/page4/index.html index 42a61ab3..13b5dbbd 100644 --- a/c2/page4/index.html +++ b/c2/page4/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page5/index.html b/c2/page5/index.html index 3c133011..8711c47d 100644 --- a/c2/page5/index.html +++ b/c2/page5/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page6/index.html b/c2/page6/index.html index b7bf6969..fa3030ac 100644 --- a/c2/page6/index.html +++ b/c2/page6/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page7/index.html b/c2/page7/index.html index 28aa4066..c779027c 100644 --- a/c2/page7/index.html +++ b/c2/page7/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page8/index.html b/c2/page8/index.html index ca8143cb..77414818 100644 --- a/c2/page8/index.html +++ b/c2/page8/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page9/index.html b/c2/page9/index.html index d3fe4bd6..03554524 100644 --- a/c2/page9/index.html +++ b/c2/page9/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index 8bee7e90..2e020bed 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-04-12T15:47:42+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV假如我現在離職2024-02-19T12:00:00+08:002024-02-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/if-i-resign-now<p>這篇是不折不扣的腦震盪之作。我相信改變始於想像。無論這改變是關乎世界還是關乎個人,想像是一切改變的起始。因此,我想劃下自己脫離上班族一員之後的生活藍圖。</p> +Jekyll2024-04-15T16:06:31+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV假如我現在離職2024-02-19T12:00:00+08:002024-02-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/if-i-resign-now<p>這篇是不折不扣的腦震盪之作。我相信改變始於想像。無論這改變是關乎世界還是關乎個人,想像是一切改變的起始。因此,我想劃下自己脫離上班族一員之後的生活藍圖。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index 0b18e3c6..9dfe1563 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-04-12T15:47:42+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-04-15T16:06:31+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index 9386df4b..0f8d9869 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-04-12T15:47:42+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV成为无治主义者2023-12-23T12:00:00+08:002023-12-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/CatherineMalabou-a1_c-being-an-anarchist<blockquote> +Jekyll2024-04-15T16:06:31+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV成为无治主义者2023-12-23T12:00:00+08:002023-12-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/CatherineMalabou-a1_c-being-an-anarchist<blockquote> <p>“任何潜入无意识核心的女性或男性,都会自然而然地成为无治主义者。” <!--more--></p> <h4 id="jacques-lesage-de-la-haye">——Jacques Lesage de la Haye</h4> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index e48abd09..ac3efdc5 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,4 +1,101 @@ -Jekyll2024-04-12T15:47:42+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV【黎智英案・審訊第卌六日】2024-03-15T12:00:00+08:002024-03-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46<ul> +Jekyll2024-04-15T16:06:31+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIVThe Attritional Art Of War2024-03-18T12:00:00+08:002024-03-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-attritional-art-of-war<p><em>If the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>Attritional wars require their own “Art of War” and are fought with a “force-centric” approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are “terrain-focused”. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.</p> + +<p>The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short “winner takes all” clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude. Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.</p> + +<h3 id="the-economic-dimension">The Economic Dimension</h3> + +<p>Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and weapons is imperative in order to win.</p> + +<p>High-end weapons have exceptional performance but are difficult to manufacture, especially when needed to arm a rapidly mobilised army subjected to a high rate of attrition. For example, during the Second World War German Panzers were superb tanks, but using approximately the same production resources, the Soviets rolled out eight T-34s for every German Panzer. The difference in performance did not justify the numerical disparity in production. High-end weapons also require high-end troops. These take significant time to train – time which is unavailable in a war with high attrition rates.</p> + +<p>It is easier and faster to produce large numbers of cheap weapons and munitions, especially if their subcomponents are interchangeable with civilian goods, ensuring mass quantity without the expansion of production lines. New recruits also absorb simpler weapons faster, allowing rapid generation of new formations or the reconstitution of existing ones.</p> + +<p>Achieving mass is difficult for higher-end Western economies. To achieve hyper-efficiency, they shed excess capacity and struggle to rapidly expand, especially since lower-tier industries have been transferred abroad for economic reasons. During war, global supply chains are disrupted and subcomponents can no longer be secured. Added to this conundrum is the lack of a skilled workforce with experience in a particular industry. These skills are acquired over decades, and once an industry is shuttered it takes decades to rebuild. The 2018 US government interagency report on US industrial capacity highlighted these problems. The bottom line is that the West must take a hard look at ensuring peacetime excess capacity in its military industrial complex, or risk losing the next war.</p> + +<h3 id="force-generation">Force Generation</h3> + +<p>Industrial output exists so it can be channelled into replacing losses and generating new formations. This requires appropriate doctrine and command and control structures. There are two main models; NATO (most Western armies) and the old Soviet model, with most states fielding something in between.</p> + +<p>NATO armies are highly professional, backed by a strong non-commissioned officer (NCO) Corps, with extensive peacetime military education and experience. They build upon this professionalism for their military doctrine (fundamentals, tactics and techniques) to stress individual initiative, delegating a great deal of leeway to junior officers and NCOs. NATO formations enjoy tremendous agility and flexibility to exploit opportunities on a dynamic battlefield.</p> + +<p>In attritional war, this method has a downside. The officers and NCOs required to execute this doctrine require extensive training and, above all, experience. A US Army NCO takes years to develop. A squad leader generally has at least three years in service and a platoon sergeant has at least seven. In an attritional war characterised by heavy casualties, there simply isn’t time to replace lost NCOs or generate them for new units. The idea that civilians can be given three-month training courses, sergeant’s chevrons and then expected to perform in the same manner as a seven-year veteran is a recipe for disaster. Only time can generate leaders capable of executing NATO doctrine, and time is one thing that the massive demands of attritional war do not give.</p> + +<p>The Soviet Union built its army for large-scale conflict with NATO. It was intended to be able to rapidly expand by calling up massed reserves. Every male in the Soviet Union underwent two years of basic training right out of high school. The constant turnover of enlisted personnel precluded creation of a Western-style NCO corps but generated a massive pool of semi-trained reserves available in times of war. The absence of reliable NCOs created an officer-centric command model, less flexible than NATO’s but more adaptable to the large-scale expansion required by attritional warfare.</p> + +<p>However, as a war progresses past a one-year mark, front-line units will gain experience and an improved NCO corps is likely to emerge, giving the Soviet model greater flexibility. By 1943, the Red Army had developed a robust NCO corps, which then disappeared after the Second World War as combat formations were demobilised. A key difference between the models is that NATO doctrine cannot function without high-performing NCOs. The Soviet doctrine was enhanced by experienced NCOs but did not require them.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>The most effective model is a mixture of the two, in which a state maintains a medium-sized professional army, together with a mass of draftees available for mobilisation. This leads directly to a high/low mixture. Professional pre-war forces form the high end of this army, becoming fire brigades – moving from sector to sector in battle to stabilise the situation and conduct decisive attacks. Low-end formations hold the line and gain experience slowly, increasing their quality until they gain the capability to conduct offensive operations. Victory is attained by creating the highest quality low-end formations possible.</p> + +<p>Forging new units into combat-capable soldiers instead of civilian mobs is done through training and combat experience. A new formation should train for at least six months, and only if manned by reservists with previous individual training. Conscripts take longer. These units should also have professional soldiers and NCOs brought in from the pre-war army to add professionalism. Once initial training is complete, they should only be fed into the battle in secondary sectors. No formation should be allowed to fall below 70% strength. Withdrawing formations early allows experience to proliferate among the new replacements as veterans pass on their skills. Otherwise, valuable experience is lost, causing the process to start all over. Another implication is that resources should prioritise replacements over new formations, preserving combat edge in both the pre-war army (high) and newly raised (low) formations. It’s advisable to disband several pre-war (high-end) formations to spread professional soldiers among newly created low-end formations in order to raise initial quality.</p> + +<h3 id="the-military-dimension">The Military Dimension</h3> + +<p>Military operations in an attritional conflict are very distinct from those in a war of manoeuvre. Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own. In this context, a successful strategy accepts that the war will last at least two years and be broken into two distinct phases. The first phase ranges from initiation of hostilities to the point where sufficient combat power has been mobilised to allow decisive action. It will see little positional shifting on the ground, focusing on favourable exchange of losses and building up combat power in the rear. The dominant form of combat is fires rather than manoeuvre, complemented by extensive fortifications and camouflage. The peacetime army starts the war and conducts holding actions, providing time to mobilise resources and train the new army.</p> + +<p>The second phase can commence after one side has met the following conditions.</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>Newly mobilised forces have completed their training and gained sufficient experience to make them combat-effective formations, capable of rapidly integrating all their assets in a cohesive manner.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The enemy’s strategic reserve is exhausted, leaving it unable to reinforce the threatened sector.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Fires and reconnaissance superiority are achieved, allowing the attacker to effectively mass fires on a key sector while denying the enemy the same.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The enemy’s industrial sector is degraded to the point where it is unable to replace battlefield losses. In the case of fighting against a coalition of countries, their industrial resources must also be exhausted or at least accounted for.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p>Only after meeting these criteria should offensive operations commence. They should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points with shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside a layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. Concentration of forces on one main effort should be avoided as this gives an indication of the offensive’s location and an opportunity for the enemy to concentrate their reserves against this key point. The Brusilov Offensive of 1916, which resulted in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, is a good example of a successful attritional offensive at the tactical and operational level. By attacking along a broad front, the Russian army prevented the Austro-Hungarians from concentrating their reserves, resulting in a collapse all along the front. At the strategic level, however, the Brusilov Offensive is an example of failure. Russian forces failed to set conditions against the whole enemy coalition, focusing only on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and neglecting German capacity. The Russians expended crucial resources which they could not replace, without defeating the strongest coalition member. To reemphasise the key point, an offensive will only succeed once key criteria are met. Attempting to launch an offensive earlier will result in losses without any strategic gains, playing directly into enemy hands.</p> + +<h3 id="modern-war">Modern War</h3> + +<p>The modern battlefield is an integrated system of systems which includes various types of electronic warfare (EW), three basic types of air defences, four different types of artillery, countless aircraft types, strike and reconnaissance drones, construction and sapper engineers, traditional infantry, armour formations and, above all, logistics. Artillery has become more dangerous thanks to increased ranges and advanced targeting, stretching the depth of the battlefield.</p> + +<p>In practice, this means it is easier to mass fires than forces. Deep manoeuvre, which requires the massing of combat power, is no longer possible because any massed force will be destroyed by indirect fires before it can achieve success in depth. Instead, a ground offensive requires a tight protective bubble to ward off enemy strike systems. This bubble is generated through layering friendly counter-fire, air defence and EW assets. Moving numerous interdependent systems is highly complicated and unlikely to be successful. Shallow attacks along the forward line of troops are most likely to be successful at an acceptable cost ratio; attempts at deep penetration will be exposed to massed fires the moment they exit the protection of the defensive bubble.</p> + +<p>Integration of these overlapping assets requires centralised planning and exceptionally well-trained staff officers, capable of integrating multiple capabilities on the fly. It takes years to train such officers, and even combat experience does not generate such skills in a short time. Checklists and mandatory procedures can alleviate these deficiencies, but only on a less-complicated, static front. Dynamic offensive operations require fast reaction times, which semi-trained officers are incapable of performing.</p> + +<p>An example of this complexity is an attack by a platoon of 30 soldiers. This would require EW systems to jam enemy drones; another EW system to jam enemy communications preventing adjustment of enemy fires; and a third EW system to jam space navigation systems denying use of precision guided munitions. In addition, fires require counterbattery radars to defeat enemy artillery. Further complicating planning is the fact that enemy EW will locate and destroy any friendly radar or EW emitter that is emitting for too long. Engineers will have to clear paths through minefields, while friendly drones provide time-sensitive ISR and fire support if needed. (This task requires a great deal of training with the supporting units to avoid dropping munitions on friendly attacking troops.) Finally, artillery needs to provide support both on the objective and enemy rear, targeting reserves and suppressing artillery. All these systems need to work as an integrated team just to support 30 men in several vehicles attacking another 30 men or less. A lack of coordination between these assets will result in failed attacks and horrific losses without ever seeing the enemy. As the size of formation conducting operations increases, so do the number and complexity of assets that need to be integrated.</p> + +<h3 id="implications-for-combat-operations">Implications for Combat Operations</h3> + +<p>Deep fires – further than 100–150 km (the average range of tactical rockets) behind the front line – target an enemy’s ability to generate combat power. This includes production facilities, munitions dumps, repair depots, and energy and transportation infrastructure. Of particular importance are targets that require significant production capabilities and that are difficult to replace/repair, as their destruction will inflict long term damage. As with all aspects of attritional war, such strikes will take significant time to have an effect, with timelines running into years. The low global production volumes of long-range precision-guided munitions, effective deception and concealment actions, large stockpiles of anti-aircraft missiles and the sheer repair capacities of strong, determined states all combine to prolong conflicts. Effective layering of air defences must include high-end systems at all altitudes coupled with cheaper systems to counter the enemy’s massed low-end attack platforms. Combined with mass-scale manufacturing and effective EW, this is the only way to defeat enemy deep fires.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Victory in an attritional war is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Successful attritional war focuses on the preservation of one’s own combat power. This usually translates into a relatively static front interrupted by limited local attacks to improve positions, using artillery for most of the fighting. Fortification and concealment of all forces including logistics is the key to minimising losses. The long time required to construct fortifications prevents significant ground movement. An attacking force which cannot rapidly entrench will suffer significant losses from enemy artillery fires.</p> + +<p>Defensive operations buy time to develop low-end combat formations, allowing newly mobilised troops to gain combat experience without suffering heavy losses in large-scale attacks. Building up experienced low-tier combat formations generates the capability for future offensive operations.</p> + +<p>The early stages of attritional war range from initiation of hostilities to the point where mobilised resources are available in large numbers and are ready for combat operations. In the case of a surprise attack, a rapid offensive by one side may be possible until the defender can form a solid front. After that, combat solidifies. This period lasts at least a year-and-a-half to two years. During this period, major offensive operations should be avoided. Even if large attacks are successful, they will result in significant casualties, often for meaningless territorial gains. An army should never accept a battle on unfavourable terms. In attritional war, any terrain that does not have a vital industrial centre is irrelevant. It is always better to retreat and preserve forces, regardless of the political consequences. Fighting on disadvantageous terrain burns up units, losing experienced soldiers who are key to victory. The German obsession with Stalingrad in 1942 is a prime example of fighting on unfavourable terrain for political reasons. Germany burned up vital units that it could not afford to lose, simply to capture a city bearing Stalin’s name. It is also wise to push the enemy into fighting on disadvantageous terrain through information operations, exploiting politically sensitive enemy objectives. The goal is to force the enemy to expend vital material and strategic reserves on strategically meaningless operations. A key pitfall to avoid is being dragged into the very same trap that has been set for the enemy. In the First World War, Germans did just that at Verdun, where it planned to use surprise to capture key, politically sensitive terrain, provoking costly French counterattacks. Unfortunately for the Germans, they fell into their own trap. They failed to gain key, defendable terrain early on, and the battle devolved instead into a series of costly infantry assaults by both sides, with artillery fires devastating attacking infantry.</p> + +<p>When the second phase begins, the offensive should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points using shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside the layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. There is a cascading effect in which a crisis in one sector forces the defenders to shift reserves from a second sector, only to generate a crisis there in turn. As forces start falling back and leaving prepared fortifications, morale plummets, with the obvious question: “If we can’t hold the mega-fortress, how can we hold these new trenches?” Retreat then turns into rout. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. The Allies’ Offensive in 1918 is an example. The Allies attacked along a broad front, while the Germans lacked sufficient resources to defend the entire line. Once the German Army began to retreat it proved impossible to stop.</p> + +<p>The attritional strategy, centred on defence, is counterintuitive to most Western military officers. Western military thought views the offensive as the only means of achieving the decisive strategic goal of forcing the enemy to come to the negotiating table on unfavourable terms. The strategic patience required to set the conditions for an offensive runs against their combat experience acquired in overseas counterinsurgency operations.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>The conduct of attritional wars is vastly different from wars of manoeuvre. They last longer and end up testing a country’s industrial capacity. Victory is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime.</p> + +<p>Victory is attainable by carefully analysing one’s own and the enemy’s political objectives. The key is recognising the strengths and weaknesses of competing economic models and identifying the economic strategies that are most likely to generate maximum resources. These resources can then be utilised to build a massive army using the high/low force and weapons mixture. The military conduct of war is driven by overall political strategic objectives, military realities and economic limitations. Combat operations are shallow and focus on destroying enemy resources, not on gaining terrain. Propaganda is used to support military operations, not the other way around. With patience and careful planning, a war can be won.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the geography and the population and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the economy, doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict.</p> + +<p>If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Alex Vershinin</strong>, Lt Col (Retd), has 10 years of frontline experience in Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan. For the last decade before his retirement, he worked as a modelling and simulations officer in concept development and experimentation for NATO and the US Army.</p>Alex VershininIf the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.【黎智英案・審訊第卌六日】2024-03-15T12:00:00+08:002024-03-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46<ul> <li>李宇軒指英國登報眾籌餘款供「攬炒巴」等人辦活動、安排見英議員及監察區選</li> </ul> @@ -189,7 +286,363 @@ <hr /> -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導財務文件顯示眾志參與G20登報 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》China In Sub-Saharan Africa2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-sub-saharan-africa<p><em>Chinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.</em></p> +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導財務文件顯示眾志參與G20登報 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》Power Plays2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/power-plays<p><em>This report examines the trade in Russian enriched uranium.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<h3 id="introduction-and-report-overview">Introduction and Report Overview</h3> + +<p>On 17 February 2024, almost two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenksy addressed the Munich Security Conference, pleading for unity against the aggression perpetuated by Russian President Vladimir Putin and for continued support for Ukraine in its fight. Among his calls to action, Zelensky stressed the need to close “all loopholes in the sanctions against Russia”, singling out Russia’s nuclear industry in particular. “There should be no sectors of the Russian economy involved in its aggression that are still free from sanctions”, he said. “This particularly relates to the nuclear sector”.</p> + +<p>Russia’s Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is an important player in the international nuclear energy industry, with a major presence across various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The company, through its subsidiaries JSC TVEL and Techsnabexport LLC (better known as TENEX), is the biggest supplier of uranium enrichment to the global market, and has continued to export significant volumes of enriched uranium product since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In 2022, Russia accounted for 30% of the separative work units (SWU, the unit of measurement for uranium enrichment services) delivered to EU utilities and for 44% of global enrichment capacity. In the US, 24% of SWU purchased by US utilities in 2022 came from Russia.</p> + +<p>This report examines the extent of Western (European and US) dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and identifies ways in which Rosatom may be continuing to access global, including Western, nuclear fuel supply chains, despite some efforts in the US and Europe to diversify away from Russian supply. The report studies changes in Russian enriched uranium trade patterns since the start of 2022 to identify possible indicators of efforts to adapt to restrictions on Russian uranium supply that have been or may be introduced by governments and companies.</p> + +<p>The report examines four main case studies. In the first case study, the report outlines possible Chinese displacement activity using Russian material, identifying trade patterns that suggest that increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into China may be facilitating greater exports of Chinese enriched uranium supply, including to the US. The second case study addresses well-documented increases in enriched uranium imports from Russia to France and considers a range of possible explanations for this growth. While the precise flow and use of the additional Russian material that is being imported into France is difficult to ascertain definitively, it appears that France may be offering an outlet for Russian enriched uranium that is no longer welcome in other countries. This may be facilitating the reallocation of Russian supplies across European utilities’ supply chains, allowing Russia to continue accessing the European nuclear fuel market even as some countries seek to diversify away from Russian supply. The third case study examines reported deliveries through France and possibly the Netherlands of Russian enriched uranium to a French-owned fuel fabrication facility in Germany. The trade data reviewed for this report could not confirm the extent of deliveries to Germany of Russian material through third countries, or whether there have been shifts in such activity since the start of 2022; however, any such deliveries to Germany may be providing an additional option for Russian enriched uranium imports no longer welcome in other countries and may potentially be used in the future fabrication of VVER assemblies in Germany. The fourth case study touches on US dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and the likely limits of a proposed US ban on imports of Russian uranium in limiting Russia’s role in global nuclear fuel supply chains and Rosatom revenues.</p> + +<p>Ultimately, the report demonstrates how Russia may be able to take advantage of incongruencies in sanctions or other restrictions, as well as persistent contractual dependencies and supply challenges, to maintain access to Western nuclear fuel supply chains and continue generating revenue through its enriched uranium exports. To improve effectiveness, any future sanctions or other bans aimed at limiting Russia’s presence in global nuclear fuel supply chains must be multilateral and accompanied by a concerted effort to increase Western and partner capacity across the supply chain, to successfully undercut dependence on Russian supply.</p> + +<p>It is worth noting that most of the activities described in this report are entirely legal and likely represent logical efforts by companies to adapt to the changing trade and geopolitical landscape while continuing to meet whatever contractual obligations they may have for continued purchase and import of Russian material. As such, the report does not imply any violations of the laws of any relevant jurisdiction, or any international laws or sanctions. As described in more detail in Chapter II, the delivery to the US of enriched uranium that has been displaced by Russian supply, as may be the case with Chinese enriched uranium trade, may be in contravention of US regulation, unless assurances have been given to US authorities that such displacement is not taking place.</p> + +<p>The practices described in this report raise questions over the extent of Western dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supply, the implications for Western energy security, the imbalance of vulnerability this may create between some Western governments and Moscow, and the effectiveness of efforts to cut Russia out of global, or even Western, nuclear supply chains. While the nuclear sector holds strategic significance for Moscow, it is not a major revenue source for Russia when compared to Russian trade in other commodities, such as oil and gas. However, as outlined in this report, Western reliance on Russian enriched uranium supply is proving challenging to shake, at least in the short term, and may create some difficulties for Western generation of nuclear energy, although experts disagree on the urgency and extent of potential challenges. The willingness, or necessity, of some Western countries to overlook Russian adaptations following efforts by other countries to limit Russian presence in Western nuclear fuel supply chains also points to a political and moral dissonance with stated US and European commitments to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression.</p> + +<h4 id="data-and-research-methodology">Data and Research Methodology</h4> + +<p>The data for this report was collected from a range of publicly accessible sources. These include: the UN Comtrade Database; the Eurostat database; trade data made available by national governments; trade data sourced from third-party trade data providers; corporate reporting documents and other publicly available corporate information; analysis published by think tanks, academic institutions, consultancies, industry associations and interest groups; and media reporting. Some of the data was sourced from non-English-language sources. Data from Russian-, Ukrainian-, French- and Spanish-language sources was viewed in its original language. Data from other language sources was viewed using digital translation. Urenco, the project funder, provided additional data and feedback throughout the research process. Any data that was subsequently included in the report or informed the analysis was independently verified through publicly available (or publicly accessible) sources. The report was subsequently subject to several internal and external peer reviews.</p> + +<p>Fourteen unstructured anonymous interviews with a range of experts were also conducted to test some of the assumptions and hypotheses being drawn from the data, to identify possible alternative explanations for some of the trade patterns observed, and to capture any necessary nuance or overlooked data. To ensure the highest quality insights, interview questions were tailored to each expert’s distinct area of expertise, because, given the commercial sensitivity of nuclear fuel contracts and the intricate nature of global nuclear supply chains, not all experts consulted were necessarily familiar with all the dynamics being examined in this report. This approach facilitated a more nuanced understanding of the subject matter, reinforcing the robustness of the methodology employed in this report. While conducting this research, input was sought from key industry stakeholders and relevant organisations. To ensure comprehensive coverage and balanced perspective, outreach was extended to several entities mentioned in the report. Unfortunately, not all entities that were approached responded.</p> + +<p>As with any large data set, the trade data accessed for this report may include some inconsistencies, omissions or duplicates. Misreporting in customs data is also possible. Efforts have been made to clean the datasets (by removing apparent duplicate entries from transaction-level datasets or disregarding datasets that were clearly incorrect) and to validate trends in data across multiple datasets, but it is possible that some inaccuracies remain.</p> + +<p>Because Russia does not release data on its enriched uranium exports, values for trade with Russia were sourced from parallel import data of importing countries. Russia is not the only country that does not make information on its enriched uranium exports publicly available. For instance, the UK also does not publicly report its trade in enriched uranium. This limited the analysis that could be conducted for this report to those countries whose data could be accessed through publicly accessible sources. Any reference to exports from a given country indicates values sourced from the export data of that country; any reference to imports into a given country indicates values sourced from the import data of that country. In many instances, the import and export data of two trading partners differed somewhat; this may be due to differences in customs reporting between the two countries or delays between the export of material from one country and its arrival in the other. Such discrepancies have been noted throughout the report and given due attention in instances where they were particularly significant.</p> + +<p>It is worth noting that the prices of natural uranium and enrichment services – which are included in the value of enriched uranium product – fluctuate. The spot price (the price of uranium purchased outside existing contracts) of natural (unenriched) uranium has risen significantly in the past three years. To avoid conflating increases in the values and volumes of trade in enriched uranium, data on both the monetary values and the net weight of enriched uranium (in the form of uranium hexafluoride) and nuclear fuel being traded has been included in the report, where available. However, data on the weight of material traded can also vary between datasets. While the data largely captures net weight, in some instances, data may also be capturing gross weight. As such, both the value and volume of goods should be reviewed together when analysing the data. The two largely bear out similar patterns. Where there are notable discrepancies, this has been highlighted.</p> + +<p>When querying trade data for enriched uranium, where possible, searches were conducted for HS code 28442035, the commodity code for uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds. Some databases only allow for searches of six-digit HS codes; in these instances, HS code 284420 was queried instead, which includes the following commodities: uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds; plutonium and its compounds; alloys; dispersions (including metal-ceramics); ceramic products and mixtures containing uranium enriched in U-235; plutonium or compounds of these products. As such, data queried using the six-digit code may also include some materials besides enriched uranium. However, data for HS code 284420 is normally overwhelmingly made up of enriched uranium, with any other materials appearing in relatively small quantities. Variations of HS code 284420 were used in some instances – HS code 28442000 to query Chinese data (similar considerations relating to queries using HS code 284420 apply) and HS code 2844200020 to query US data (which captures uranium fluoride enriched in U-235) to access information on the weight of traded material, not just value.</p> + +<h3 id="i-nuclear-fuel-supply-chains-and-russias-role">I. Nuclear Fuel Supply Chains and Russia’s Role</h3> + +<p>Before examining Russia’s enriched uranium trade, it is worth understanding the nature of global nuclear fuel supply chains. Figure 1 includes a simplified overview of the nuclear fuel cycle. This report is only concerned with the front end of the cycle, and more specifically the enrichment stage.</p> + +<h4 id="overview-of-market-dynamics-in-the-front-end-of-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle">Overview of Market Dynamics in the Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle</h4> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XnJgzSr.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Overview of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.</strong> Source: Data from <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/nuclear-fuel-cycle-overview.aspx">World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Overview”, updated April 2021</a>.</em></p> + +<p>The generation of energy from nuclear fuel depends on the splitting of atoms of the uranium isotope U-235 inside a nuclear reactor (nuclear fission). Mined uranium ore is made up of about 0.7% of U-235, with the remainder consisting of U-238. To make the fissile U-235 isotope suitable for nuclear energy generation in light water reactors its concentration must be increased before the uranium can be used to produce nuclear fuel assemblies (for most contemporary nuclear reactors, the concentration is about 3–5% U-235, which is classified as low enriched uranium (LEU)). This is done through the uranium enrichment process, using one of several possible methods. Globally, there is a limited number of companies that offer enrichment services, with almost all commercial enrichment conducted by one of four companies: Rosatom; China National Nuclear Corporation; Orano; and Urenco. Enrichment capacity is measured in SWU, which represent the effort required to separate isotopes of U-235 and U-238.</p> + +<p>Nuclear fuel fabrication is also limited to a relatively small number of manufacturers. Once manufactured, nuclear fuel assemblies may be used in the country of fabrication or shipped for loading into reactors in other countries. Due to the challenges associated with transporting radioactive material, nuclear fuel is usually fabricated broadly in the same region of the world where it will be used.</p> + +<p>The ultimate consumers of uranium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle are energy utilities, which generate electricity through the operation of nuclear reactors and sell it to consumers. Most often, the utility purchases the uranium it needs directly from uranium mine operators and owns the uranium throughout the rest of the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The utility then purchases the services necessary to turn mined uranium into usable nuclear reactor fuel (that is, conversion, enrichment, deconversion and fuel fabrication) from relevant service providers; however, the utility normally remains the sole owner of the material throughout the process.</p> + +<p>The various service providers may be – and often are – located in countries other than the one where the material will eventually be used in reactors for energy generation. As a hypothetical example, uranium ore mined in Kazakhstan may be purchased by a Swiss utility, sent to Russia to be converted and enriched by Russian companies, then transported to a French-owned nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Germany to be made into nuclear fuel assemblies, before finally being delivered to Switzerland for use in Swiss nuclear reactors. Throughout this process, the Swiss utility would maintain ownership of the uranium material.</p> + +<p>An alternative supply model involves the purchase and sale of uranium at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle by brokers and traders, who have themselves purchased the uranium or services in question from providers and sell these on to utilities.</p> + +<h4 id="russian-presence-across-the-global-nuclear-fuel-supply-chain">Russian Presence Across the Global Nuclear Fuel Supply Chain</h4> + +<p>While Russian companies offer services across the nuclear fuel cycle, this report focuses on the provision of Russian enrichment services, as enrichment and conversion are the parts of the global nuclear supply chain where there are the greatest dependencies on Russia. Russia and, more specifically, the Rosatom subsidiaries TVEL and TENEX, is the greatest supplier of enrichment services to the global market. In 2022, Rosatom provided 35% of uranium enrichment services globally, according to the company’s 2022 annual report, and, according to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), provided 44% of global enrichment capacity in 2022.</p> + +<p>The precise value of Russian enriched uranium exports over the past two years is difficult to ascertain as Russia does not make data on its enriched uranium trade publicly available. Some estimates are possible using import data from Russian customer countries reported through publicly accessible sources such as UN Comtrade, Eurostat, individual government reporting and third-party trade data providers. However, as noted earlier, some countries, for example, the UK, do not report their enriched uranium imports. Furthermore, at least in the case of the US, the import values of Russian enriched uranium include “returned feed”, that is, unenriched uranium the equivalent of which is returned to Russia, as required under US regulation (for more details, see Chapter V). As such, estimates of Russian enriched uranium exports are likely to be inexact and are not necessarily representative of the revenue that Rosatom generates from this trade. UN Comtrade data shows $2.03 billion in global imports from Russia under HS code 284420 in 2022, up from $1.29 billion in 2021. Data compiled from a range of sources shows $2.7 billion of enriched uranium imports from Russia in 2023.</p> + +<p>Several Western and partner governments have taken some limited measures to sanction Rosatom or to make trade with Russia in nuclear materials more challenging or unattractive. The UK, the US and others have sanctioned parts of the Rosatom leadership and/or a small number of the company’s subsidiaries. In July 2022, the UK also introduced a new 35% tariff on imports of radioactive chemical elements and isotopes from Russia, which includes enriched uranium. While the EU has not introduced sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector, some European countries and companies have undertaken efforts to diversify away from Russian imports, turning to alternative suppliers of nuclear reactor technology and nuclear fuel. A bill that would restrict the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US was also passed in the US House of Representatives in December 2023 and, at the time of writing, was awaiting debate by the US Senate.</p> + +<p>While analysts disagree on precisely how much the termination of Russian enriched uranium deliveries would impact Western utilities, there seems to be broad agreement that, in the absence of additional Western capacity coming online, such an embargo, whether introduced by Western governments or by Russia, as Moscow has previously threatened, would create at least some challenges for Western utilities. Several experts interviewed for this research expressed concerns that some US utilities may struggle to keep nuclear power plants operating should Russian enriched uranium supply be cut off; one interviewee noted that the concern is probably over longer-term supply and that utilities likely have sufficient stockpiles to carry them over in the short term. Furthermore, as time passes, governments and utilities may become increasingly better prepared to deal with disruptions in Russian enriched uranium supply. (For a further discussion on potential supply challenges, see Chapter V.)</p> + +<p>Alternative enrichment capacity exists in Europe and the US – a combined 25,400 tonnes of SWU as of 2022, according to the WNA. In its latest report on global nuclear fuel markets, the WNA concludes that there is currently an oversupply of global enrichment capacity when compared to demand; however, Russia accounts for nearly half of current global SWU capacity. Additional Western capacity is being added through the expansion of Urenco’s enrichment plant in Eunice, New Mexico (an additional 700 tonnes of SWU per year, with the first cascades expected to become operational in 2025), Urenco’s Dutch facility at Almelo (an additional 750 tonnes of SWU per year, with the first cascades expected to become operational in 2027), Urenco’s enrichment plant in Gronau, Germany, and Orano’s Georges Besse II plant in southern France (an additional 2,500 tonnes of SWU per year, with additional capacity starting to become operational in 2028). Increased uranium enrichment in the US and Europe will also depend on the availability of the stage in the nuclear fuel cycle that precedes enrichment – conversion, where Russia also dominates the market. There are also enriched uranium inventories in the US and Europe, which stood at 3,963 tonnes of uranium in Europe and 2,670 tonnes of uranium in the US at the end of 2021 and which may help alleviate (at least partially) shortages caused by a termination of Russian supply. However, inventories vary between countries and utilities.</p> + +<p>Russia is also a major supplier of nuclear reactor technology and nuclear reactor fuel, although the dependencies in this context have historically been in Eastern Europe and are now increasing in the Global South. Western suppliers have begun successfully replacing Russia’s supply of reactor and fuel technology to certain markets. Russia is also an important supplier in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, taking deliveries of spent nuclear fuel (which has already been irradiated in a nuclear reactor) for long-term storage or for reprocessing (the extraction of uranium from used reactor fuel, which can then be enriched and reused in the production of new nuclear fuel). France has historically sent reprocessed uranium from its reactors to Russia for re-enrichment. In 2018, Urenco concluded a contract with French utility EDF to enrich uranium recovered from reprocessed fuel from French reactors; the reprocessed fuel will be converted in Russia and delivered to Urenco’s facility in Almelo (the Netherlands) for enrichment, before being sent to a fuel fabrication plant at Romans-sur-Isère (France) for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for French reactors. The UK’s nuclear reactor at the Sizewell-B nuclear power plant has also previously used Framatome-manufactured nuclear fuel containing enriched reprocessed uranium (ERU) which was enriched in Russia. Sizewell-B has now switched to using natural (non-reprocessed) uranium enriched by Orano.</p> + +<p>As this report focuses on Russian enrichment services, Russian presence across the rest of the fuel cycle, including in uranium conversion and reprocessing services, is not discussed at length. However, it is worth noting that weaning utilities in Western and partner countries off dependencies on Russian enriched uranium will only tackle one piece of the puzzle. Curtailing dependencies on Russia in Western countries’ nuclear energy supply chains will require investment in non-Russian capacity in other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, too, with conversion services being a particular chokepoint.</p> + +<h4 id="rosatom-and-the-war-in-ukraine">Rosatom and the War in Ukraine</h4> + +<p>Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear state enterprise, is responsible – through its many subsidiaries – for the development and export of Russian nuclear energy-related technology, services and materials. However, the company has also been reported as being connected with Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, and is headed up by some of the most senior people in Russia’s political and security circles. The company’s supervisory board is chaired by Sergey Kirienko, former prime minister of Russia and currently first deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Kirienko has admitted to orchestrating Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s occupied territories. According to Rosatom’s webpage, its board also includes: Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev; Assistant to the President of Russia Larissa Brychyova; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry Denis Manturov; First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Sergey Korolev; Deputy Prime Minister (and former Minister of Energy) Alexander Novak; Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev; Assistant to the President Maxim Oreshkin; and former Russian Ambassador to the US and currently Advisor to the President Yuri Ushakov. All members of the Rosatom supervisory board, with the exception of Ushakov, have been sanctioned by either the UK, the US or both. At the time of writing, there are no sanctions on Rosatom nor its leadership from the EU.</p> + +<p>The company has reportedly offered to provide technology for the Russian military, and Rosatom staff were allegedly present at the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone following the Russian occupation of the site in February 2022. The company has also been reported as playing an important role in Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear power plant (NPP) in Europe, which was attacked and occupied by the Russian military on 4 March 2022. Following the occupation, Rosatom was reported as having taken over management of the plant. In October 2022, the Joint Stock Company Operating Organisation of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (JSC ZNPP OO) was established and currently operates the ZNPP. Kirienko has also repeatedly visited the ZNPP since its occupation.</p> + +<p>There have been media reports of torture and harassment of the ZNPP’s Ukrainian staff since the invasion. Staff that had not fled the fighting around the plant were reportedly forced to sign contracts with Rosatom. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly raised concerns over the safety and security of the ZNPP and the wellbeing of its staff, while US and European governments have condemned Russian behaviour at the plant. An apparent interest by Rosatom in the ZNPP’s Western-supplied fuel and related technology has also raised concerns of industrial espionage and the security of the nuclear material at the facility.</p> + +<p>TVEL, which operates Russia’s uranium enrichment plants, and TENEX, which supplies Russian enriched uranium abroad, are important members of the Rosatom family of companies. They are also closely related to JSC ZNPP OO, which is owned by JSC Rosenergoatom Concern (Rosenergoatom), the state enterprise responsible for the operation of Russia’s NPPs. TVEL, TENEX and Rosenergoatom are in turn owned by JSC Atomenergoprom (Atomenergoprom), the Russian state enterprise established “to consolidate the assets of the civilian part of the Russian nuclear industry” and which is a direct subsidiary of Rosatom. Figure 2 shows these relationships.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/X6TKBlo.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Ownership Structures of Rosatom Subsidiaries.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.rosenergoatom.ru/en/about-us/">Rosenergoatom, “About Us”</a>; <a href="https://atomenergoprom.ru/en/">Atomenergoprom</a>; <a href="https://www.tenex.ru/download/330/articles_of_association_of_tenex__joint_stock_company__revision_dated_march_27__2020_.pdf">Articles of Association of TENEX, Joint-Stock Company</a>; Russian Federal Tax Register documents sourced through <a href="https://sayari.com/">Sayari Analytics</a>; IBR EU Power Technologies LLC, Department of Nuclear Power Engineering and Nuclear Fuel Cycle, “Russian Uranium Enrichment Industry State and Prospects of Development”, 2023, pp. 22–24.</em></p> + +<h4 id="pursuit-for-continued-market-access">Pursuit for Continued Market Access</h4> + +<p>Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Rosatom and its subsidiaries have continued to do business with customers around the world, including the sale of enriched uranium to Europe, the US and globally. Rosatom’s 2022 annual report noted a 14.9% increase from the previous year (2021) in revenue for the company’s fuel division, which includes enrichment services (but also encompasses conversion services and production of nuclear fuel for reactors). Rosatom has also made no revisions to its business strategy up to 2030, which was last revised in 2020 and expects to see an increase in Rosatom’s revenue to 4 trillion RUB. This suggests a certain level of confidence (or at least an effort to portray confidence) in continued demand, despite clearly countervailing winds in trade with Russia among Western countries.</p> + +<p>One likely reason for this apparent confidence is Rosatom’s determined pursuit of the development and sale of new products, as well as expansion into new markets, particularly as it relates to the construction of NPPs abroad. Yet, Rosatom’s continued engagement with some of its traditional customers may also offer the company alternative or indirect access into markets that may otherwise be trying to diversify away from Russian supplies. One strategy that Rosatom may be trying to employ in its enriched uranium business is displacement, increasing its deliveries of enriched uranium to countries that are still willing – or contractually obligated – to accept them and which may then be able to increase exports of their own enriched uranium to global markets. This has been suggested in a report by nuclear industry consultancy I BR EU Power Technologies LLC. The company was established in 1991 “by a group of researchers and engineers who had previously worked at the research centers of the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry and the Ministry’s headquarters”. The company’s latest report on the state and development of the Russian nuclear enrichment industry, published in October 2023, notes that, in examining data on enriched uranium exports from Russia in 2022, the report’s authors were able to draw “preliminary conclusions” about Rosatom’s introduction of a new strategy in response to decreased purchases of Russian enriched uranium by some foreign customers, as a result of the war in Ukraine. The report notes:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>The essence of this element can be formulated as follows – to increase the supply of EUP [enriched uranium product] to countries that have a fleet of their own nuclear power plants and a uranium enrichment industry, with the aim of using this EUP at local nuclear power plants, which will partially free up local uranium enrichment capacities from the production of EUP for local nuclear power plants and use freed-up capacity for the production of EUP for export.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>The report singles out France and China in its analysis of a potential Russian displacement strategy, noting the significant increase of enriched uranium imports by these two countries in 2022, as compared to 2021, driven primarily by imports from Russia. The report’s authors point to a planned increase in enriched uranium exports from France to the US, as well as a 2026–31 contract for the provision of SWU by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to South Korea’s KHNP (Korea Hydro &amp; Nuclear Power), as potential vehicles for this strategy.</p> + +<p>The data presented and analysed later in this report tries, in part, to test this displacement hypothesis. While this report is unable to definitively confirm using publicly available sources that displacement activity is occurring, at least in China’s case, shifts in trade patterns appear to be consistent with what one would expect to see if a displacement strategy was being introduced. Testing the possibility of displacement through France is even more challenging, considering the complexities of European nuclear fuel supply chains and the central role that France plays therein. Changes to French trade in enriched uranium could technically point to displacement, but – as in the case of China – there are other possible explanations for the shifts in trade patterns.</p> + +<p>The nuclear sector is not the only instance where Russia has been accused of resorting to a displacement strategy to compensate for the loss of certain markets in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. A similar tactic has been reported in relation to the oil sector. Media reporting has detailed increases in German imports of refined oil products from India in 2023 as compared to 2022, at the same time as India became a leading importer of Russian crude in 2022, thus apparently providing what has been called a “backdoor route” for Russian oil into European markets. Some have even suggested that some of the oil products shipped from India to European countries may include Russian material. If such activity is taking place to circumvent sanctions on Russian oil trade, it would not be inconceivable that a similar strategy may be applied in the nuclear sector, which has yet to be sanctioned to the same extent as the Russian petroleum sector.</p> + +<p>The following sections of this report examine whether and how similar displacement, and other possible adaptation methods, may be playing out (or may play out in future) in Russian trade in enriched uranium and enrichment services. They also offer and test possible alternative explanations for the observed shifts in Russian enriched uranium trade patterns.</p> + +<h3 id="ii-case-study-china">II. Case Study: China</h3> + +<p>Russia has been a long-time partner of the Chinese nuclear energy industry, having built numerous nuclear reactors in China, contributed to the development of China’s domestic enrichment capabilities, and served as a long-time supplier of enriched uranium and nuclear fuel to the country. Trade data made available by the Chinese government reveals a number of shifts in China’s enriched uranium trade patterns since 2022, including with regard to its imports of Russian material and exports to the US. While the trade data alone cannot definitively confirm the hypothesis put forward by IBR EU Power Technologies that displacement of enriched uranium is taking place through China backed by greater Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium, it does point to the possibility of such activity. As China may be seeking to carve out a greater role for itself in world enriched uranium markets, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium may facilitate the pursuit of Beijing’s ambitions.</p> + +<p>Figures 3 and 4 show the value and weight of enriched uranium imports from Russia into China since 2015, respectively. After importing no enriched uranium from Russia in 2021 and 44 tonnes in 2020, Chinese enriched uranium imports from Russia rose to 685 tonnes ($492.6 million) in 2022. This was the highest level since 2011 (when Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium stood at 779 tonnes [$544 million]), as well as a 36% increase in volume from the next-highest yearly value – observed in 2019 (504 tonnes [$292 million]). The 2023 value of Russian imports of enriched uranium into China reached 467 tonnes ($418 million), a slight decrease from 2022 but still much higher than in many previous years.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5l2YS5D.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Chinese Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (USD).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KQIJVe5.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Chinese Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> + +<h4 id="possible-stockpiling-and-domestic-demand">Possible Stockpiling and Domestic Demand</h4> + +<p>The relatively high volumes of Chinese imports of enriched uranium from Russia in the last two years could potentially be attributed to Chinese stockpiling efforts to meet nuclear fuel needs for its domestic fleet of reactors. This was the conclusion of a number of the experts interviewed for this report when shown trade data indicating an increase in the value of Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium. Indeed, in 2021, the chairperson of a China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation (CNEIC) subsidiary and a member of the National People’s Congress said that China should prioritise the expansion of the domestic strategic enriched uranium stockpile to limit the impact of enriched uranium price fluctuations, possible supply chain risks and other potential challenges.</p> + +<p>China is a major nuclear energy power. As of December 2023, it was operating 55 nuclear reactors, with a further 22 under construction. Chinese SWU requirements are expected to rise significantly over the next decade. Chinese enrichment capacity is not reported publicly, but expert estimates seem to expect that China will increase its enrichment capacity to meet domestic demand. As these are simply estimates they may be subject to developments in opportunities to increase supply and inventories through additional imports. In its 2023 report “Global Inventories of Secondary Uranium Supplies” the IAEA estimates that China has also maintained a strategic enriched uranium stockpile since before 2010, which it believes may have increased by as much as 910 tonnes of enriched uranium product (tEUP) since then (the IAEA does not provide estimates of material stockpiled before 2010). The IAEA has observed that the strategic stockpile is intended for domestic consumption but notes that it may also be used to meet export demand, should China choose to increase its presence on international markets.</p> + +<h4 id="chinese-exports-of-enriched-uranium">Chinese Exports of Enriched Uranium</h4> + +<p>Historically, China has been a net importer of enriched uranium, exporting material only to Kazakhstan, the US, South Korea (until recently), and a small annual value ($100) to Austria, as well as nuclear fuel assemblies to Pakistan. However, it appears that China may be interested in becoming a greater supplier of enriched uranium to global markets. In October 2023, China reportedly completed its first export since 2014 of enriched uranium using imported feed material. In other words, for the first time in nearly a decade, China has provided enrichment services for a customer that had sourced the feed material elsewhere. Reports on this development noted that the resumption of trade in enrichment services (and the efforts that had gone into ensuring that the necessary regulatory and licensing frameworks are in place to allow this trade) are part of a CNEIC strategic policy of “going out, grabbing orders, and stabilizing growth” in the nuclear fuel trade, in light of the “historical window period” since the start of the “conflict between Russia and Ukraine” and its impact on international nuclear fuel demand and prices.</p> + +<p>The introduction of this option for enrichment-service-only trade, combined with the articulated policy to capture more of the global nuclear fuel market, supports assessments that China may be looking to play an increasingly larger role as a supplier of enriched uranium and enrichment services. Increased imports of Russian material could help China meet the expanded demand that will result from a combination of the expected growth in its domestic enriched uranium needs and any expected increase in exports. In 2022, China announced a number of long-term nuclear fuel contracts with US and EU utilities, although it is unclear what those contracts involved specifically, whether they include deliveries of Chinese enriched uranium and, if so, when these would commence.</p> + +<p>The IBR EU Power Technologies report pointed to a 2026–31 CNEIC contract with KHNP as a potential vehicle for enriched uranium displacement through China.</p> + +<p>Should China be engaging in the displacement of enriched uranium, facilitated by the observed increases in imports of Russian material, one would expect to see an increase in Chinese exports of enriched uranium since 2022, as Russian supply freed up domestic capacity for export. While the 2022 value and volume of Chinese exports of enriched uranium (97 tonnes [$65 million]) remained more or less on a par with 2021 figures (95 tonnes [$64 million]) and well below the values and volumes of exports in previous years, the volume of Chinese exports in 2023 (368 tonnes [$445 million]) increased by 288% from 2021. The increase is less dramatic when compared to previous years but is still noteworthy. The increase in exports in 2023 was in large part due to a spike in Chinese exports of enriched uranium to the US, which amounted to 175 tonnes ($316 million) in 2023, following three years (2019–21) of no Chinese exports to the US appearing in Chinese or US government trade data, and 5% higher than the volume of all Chinese exports of enriched uranium to the US from 2015 to 2022 combined (see Figure 5). Trade data made available by the US government confirms the Chinese-reported export values, although US import data shows much higher volumes of material delivered in 2023 (293 tonnes) than those reported in Chinese export data (the reason for this discrepancy is not clear). Besides the US, China also exported enriched uranium to Kazakhstan in 2023, with the value of these exports also increasing significantly, nearly doubling from 2022 (97 tonnes [$65 million]) to 2023 (193 tonnes [$130 million]). The additional exports under HS code 284420 from China to Kazakhstan could be related to the fabrication of nuclear fuel for Chinese reactors at a nuclear fabrication facility in Kazakhstan. The plant is operated by a Kazakh-Chinese joint venture and made its first delivery of fuel assemblies to China in early 2023.</p> + +<p>An increase in Chinese exports of enriched uranium, even if coupled with an increase in enriched uranium imports from Russia, is not in itself sufficient to prove that displacement is occurring, as increased exports may also be the result of expanded domestic enrichment activity. The cyclical nature of trade in the nuclear energy sector and long contracting lead times for supply of enriched uranium for fuel manufacturing also mean that one cannot read too closely into variations in enriched uranium trade values. Furthermore, the volume of Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023 is significantly greater than the volume of 2023 Chinese exports to the US. This suggests that at least some of the material may be being used for the manufacturing of nuclear fuel inside China or being stockpiled – either to meet Chinese domestic demand or perhaps to support a future expansion of Chinese exports. In the absence of data on Chinese enriched uranium stockpiles, this is difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the scale of the increase in the volume and value of Chinese deliveries to the US in 2023 is noteworthy.</p> + +<p>The reason for these increases is not clear. However, trade records for 2023 Chinese deliveries of enriched uranium to the US sourced through corporate and trade data provider Sayari Analytics indicate that Global Nuclear Fuel Americas LLC and Westinghouse Electric Company, both manufacturers of nuclear fuel, received shipments of uranium hexafluoride from China in 2023. It is unclear whether the enriched uranium was ultimately used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel in the US, or who the ultimate recipient of any manufactured nuclear fuel may have been, including whether customers are domestic or foreign utilities. For instance, when asked about likely drivers for increased Chinese enriched uranium imports into the US, one expert interviewed for this report suggested that the increased imports of Chinese material into the US may be meant for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for Chinese reactors and therefore may be re-exported back to China.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GfzMy87.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Chinese Exports to the US under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (USD).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gSFX03b.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Chinese Exports to the US under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Chinese customs data made available by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).</em></p> + +<h4 id="implications">Implications</h4> + +<p>The limited publicly available information on domestic Chinese enrichment activity and the opacity of China’s internal nuclear fuel supply chains make it challenging to ascertain whether the increase in the value of exports of enriched uranium to the US in 2023 has been backed by increases in enrichment activity at domestic Chinese facilities or is the result of displacement facilitated by increased imports of Russian material into China. However, the data reviewed here points to the possibility that displacement may be taking place.</p> + +<p>As the US seeks to diversify away from Russian uranium supply and curtail Rosatom revenues, to what extent might any such efforts be undermined by increased Russian access to the Chinese market and subsequent increases in deliveries of Chinese material to the US? Under US regulation that limits the amount of enriched uranium that can be imported into the country from Russia (“The Russian Suspension Agreement” [1992], discussed in greater detail in Chapter V), imports of enriched uranium “which can be shown to have resulted in the ultimate delivery or sale into the United States of displaced uranium products of any type, regardless of the sequence of the transactions” are considered a circumvention tactic. Importers of enriched uranium into the US are required to “submit at the time of entry a written statement certifying that the uranium being imported was not obtained under any arrangement, swap, or other exchange designed to circumvent the export limits for uranium of Russian Federation origin established by this Agreement”. A bill passed in the US House of Representatives in December 2023, which would prohibit the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US (but which has not yet passed the Senate or received presidential approval at the time of drafting), contains a similar anti-circumvention provision, prohibiting the import of “unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is determined to have been exchanged with, swapped for, or otherwise obtained in lieu of unirradiated low-enriched uranium [produced in the Russian Federation or by a Russian entity] in a manner designed to circumvent the restrictions under this section”.</p> + +<p>It is not clear whether imports of enriched uranium from China into the US were accompanied by any such certification. Such a declaration would likely have been subject to processes governed by contractual confidentiality. Considering the complexity and commercial sensitivity inherent to nuclear fuel supply chains, definitively proving that any given import of enriched uranium into a given country is not the product of displacement using Russian enriched uranium is likely to be challenging. However, should such displacement be occurring, it would undermine US efforts to diversify away from Russian supply. While imports of enriched uranium from China into the US remain a minor share of all US imports of enriched uranium, the stark increase in the value of deliveries in 2023 should be examined more closely. US utilities and government would also do well to consider the risks of swapping dependencies on Russia for dependencies on China in its enriched uranium supply. China’s apparent interest in taking advantage of the shifts occurring in global nuclear supply chains suggests that China may be actively angling to replace Russia in the US’s nuclear energy supply chain, potentially using increased imports of Russian material.</p> + +<h3 id="iii-case-study-france">III. Case Study: France</h3> + +<p>France is regularly mentioned in media coverage and expert discussion of continued Western reliance on Russian enriched uranium. The French nuclear sector has a long history of partnership with Russia, with Rosatom entering the French market in the 1970s. The value and volume of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia rose notably in 2022 and has remained high in 2023, relative to pre-2022 levels. According to Eurostat data, in 2021, France imported 110 tonnes (€93 million) from Russia under HS code 28442035. In 2022, the volume of imports rose to 312 tonnes (€359 million), an increase of 184% from 2021. Eurostat data shows 223 tonnes in imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2023, a 103% increase in volume from 2021 but a decrease of 29% from 2022 imports. Comparable levels of imports from Russia into France were last seen in 2014, when France imported 399 tonnes (€398 million) of enriched uranium from Russia. It is worth noting that the value of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2023 actually increased from 2022, to €396 million, pointing to a discrepancy between changes in the value and weight of imports from Russia in 2023. The reason for this discrepancy was not clear. Figures 7 and 8 show the value and weight, respectively, of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia from 2015 to 2023.</p> + +<p>Several explanations for the increase in French imports of Russian material are possible and are explored in this chapter. Based on a review of trade data, publicly available information on nuclear fuel supply chains in Europe and other public reporting, one likely explanation (although difficult to prove with certainty) is that the increased imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and continued relatively high levels in 2023 may be the result of the redistribution of Russian enriched uranium by some utilities across their supply chains – delivering more of their Russian-sourced material for fuel fabrication in France instead of to fabrication facilities in other countries that may be less willing to accept Russian supply. If true, this would mean that efforts to move away from Russian enriched uranium supply by some companies and governments may be being offset – at least in part – by greater imports of Russian enriched uranium into France. This chapter outlines these developments and tests a number of other possible explanations for the observed increases in French imports of Russian enriched uranium since 2022.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kdTELAw.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: French Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (EUR).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Eurostat, “EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QH6aZfB.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: French Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Eurostat, “EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> + +<h4 id="overview-of-the-french-nuclear-energy-sector">Overview of the French Nuclear Energy Sector</h4> + +<p>France plays a significant role in European and global nuclear fuel supply chains. The country is not only a major producer and consumer of nuclear energy, but it also hosts conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing facilities. At the time of writing, France hosted 56 operational reactors with a total net electrical capacity of 61.37 GW(e), second only to the US on both metrics. Another reactor is expected to be connected to the grid in mid-2024. France’s nuclear reactor fleet is operated by Électricité de France SA (EDF), which is fully owned by the French state. France also performs uranium conversion at the Philippe Coste plant (an Orano facility), uranium enrichment at the Georges Besse II plant (also an Orano facility) and nuclear fuel fabrication at the Romans-sur-Isère plant (a Framatome facility). According to its webpage, Framatome is owned by EDF (80.5%) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (19.5%). Through its subsidiary companies, Framatome also operates nuclear fuel fabrication plants at Lingen, Germany (Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH) and in Richland, Washington (Framatome, Inc.). Fuel manufactured at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère facility serves both the French domestic fleet of reactors and nuclear utilities and research reactors abroad. French reactors are also loaded with fuel manufactured at the fuel fabrication plant at Västerås, Sweden (owned by a subsidiary of US company Westinghouse Electric), at a plant in Juzbado, Spain (owned by Spanish company Enusa; Westinghouse manufactures EDF fuel at the facility), and at the Westinghouse-operated facility at Springfields, UK. Components of fuel assemblies destined for French reactors may also be manufactured at Framatome’s facility in Lingen. Figure 9 shows a simplified summary of the locations of uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in Europe and the UK.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mWbApMI.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Locations of European and UK Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities.</strong> Source: Generated based on data from various sources.</em></p> + +<p>As such, enriched uranium may theoretically be imported into France for the following purposes:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>Production of nuclear fuel in France (at the Romans-sur-Isère facility) for the French reactor fleet.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Production of nuclear fuel in France (at the Romans-sur-Isère facility) for export to utilities abroad.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Further shipment of the enriched uranium from France to Germany, Sweden, the UK or Spain (via other countries for deconversion) to be used in the production of nuclear fuel for the French reactor fleet.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Further shipment of the enriched uranium from France to Germany, Sweden, the UK or Spain (via other countries for deconversion) to be used in the production of nuclear fuel for export to utilities abroad.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p>An increase in French imports of Russian enriched uranium could therefore be explained by an increase in demand for enriched uranium generally, or for Russian material specifically, for one or several of these purposes.</p> + +<h4 id="possible-stockpiling-in-france">Possible Stockpiling in France</h4> + +<p>One possible explanation for the increased French imports of Russian enriched uranium, and the initial suspicion of a number of the experts consulted for this report, is that French utilities and fuel manufacturing facilities have been in a rush to stockpile Russian material for future use, in advance of possible future bans on enriched uranium imports from Russia. Such stockpiling would help to ensure that sufficient inventories are in place to meet long-term domestic French needs as well as future demand of foreign customers.</p> + +<p>To test this hypothesis, an assessment of changes in French enriched uranium stockpiles is needed. Information on France’s annual national inventories of enriched uranium is made available in reports by France’s national agency for radioactive waste management (Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs, ANDRA). At the time of writing, ANDRA has not made available information on 2022 or 2023 stockpiles. Its estimates of French enriched uranium stocks up to 2040 predict relatively consistent inventory levels over this time period, although it notes that the estimates are based on historical trends and do not represent (or reflect) an industrial strategy. The financial reports of EDF and Framatome indicate a drop in the monetary value of their holdings of nuclear fuel between 2021 and 2022, while Orano reported a slight increase in the value of its “inventories and in-process” material from 2021 to 2022 (of €15 million). However, these figures are not an ideal point of analysis, as they include materials other than enriched uranium and are expressed in terms of monetary value (which can fluctuate) instead of volume. The data also does not offer any insights on where any enriched uranium in the inventories may have come from.</p> + +<p>In comments made to the press in response to questions about the increase of imports into France of Russian enriched uranium, an EDF representative noted that the company has not increased its dependence on Russian enriched uranium and is purchasing as per “the contractual minimums with its Russian partners”. This suggests that the French utility is not maxing out its contractual options in an effort to import as much Russian material as possible in advance of a potential ban. In the case of Orano, considering that the company is itself a provider of uranium enrichment services, it is unlikely, although technically possible, that the company is importing and stockpiling large volumes of Russian enriched uranium.</p> + +<p>It is worth noting that ANDRA does not capture enriched uranium inventories held in France by non-French utilities. As such, it is possible that some non-French utilities are importing and maintaining stocks of Russian material in France. Swiss utilities, for instance, have been known to hold natural and enriched uranium stocks in Germany, France, Sweden and the UK. Testing this hypothesis would likely require access to commercially sensitive information. One could also compare the sum of EDF’s imports and Orano-produced enriched uranium against the sum of domestic uranium consumption and total enriched uranium and fabricated fuel exports, to determine the overall stocks of enriched uranium in the country, including any changes in stocks that may belong to foreign utilities. Such an assessment was not undertaken as part of the analysis for this report. Data on uranium inventories across Europe made available by the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) shows a decrease in overall inventories from 2021 to 2022, however the figure is an aggregate of total stocks across Europe and captures uranium at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle (not just enriched uranium). As mentioned earlier, the monetary value of nuclear fuel held by Framatome did not increase in 2022, also suggesting that significant stockpiling, even for fabrication of fuel for foreign customers, is likely not happening.</p> + +<p>As such, based on publicly available data, there is no obvious indication that significant stockpiling of enriched uranium is taking place in France. However, there is also insufficient data to definitively discount the possibility that the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium into France is due to a major stockpiling drive. Details on 2022 and 2023 uranium inventories in future ANDRA reporting, or future IAEA reports on French enriched uranium inventories, will provide a clearer picture of how French stocks of enriched uranium may have changed and whether these changes are reflective of the significant increase in imports from Russia.</p> + +<h4 id="possible-shifts-in-domestic-demand">Possible Shifts in Domestic Demand</h4> + +<p>An increase in France’s domestic demand for enriched uranium to respond to greater domestic nuclear energy production could also technically explain the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023. However, this explanation does not appear very likely. Based on WNA projections of France’s enriched uranium production and needs through 2040, it appears that the country has sufficient domestic uranium enrichment capacity to cover its domestic needs. The WNA estimates that France’s enriched uranium needs up to 2040 will not rise significantly, reaching a peak of 6,986 thousand SWU in 2023 and fluctuating below that number in the subsequent 17 years. This indicates about a 4.7% increase from the 2022 demand of 6,639 thousand SWU, hardly justifying the 184% increase in the volume of imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and the continued relatively high volume of imports in 2023. Of course, the projections for French demand do not account for the enriched uranium that will be needed by French fuel fabricators to fulfil their contracts with foreign customers, which is likely to be significant.</p> + +<p>There are other indicators that French domestic demand for Russian material specifically has not increased. Based on public reporting and statements by French authorities and EDF, it appears that only a limited amount of Russian enriched uranium is actually used in France’s energy generation. In its 2022 “Universal Registration Document”, EDF notes that it “has a limited dependence on imports of Russian uranium, considering existing inventories and diversified and long-term supply contracts”. As mentioned earlier, EDF representatives have also stated to the media that the company “has not increased its share of enrichment of its natural uranium carried out in Russia in 2022 compared to 2021, in accordance with ‘the contractual minimums with its Russian partners’” and that uranium enriched in Russia “represents a very small part of its enrichment activities”.</p> + +<p>Spikes can also sometimes be seen in trade data for enriched uranium corresponding to reactor refuelling cycles, which usually see a quarter to a third of the assemblies in a reactor core replaced every 12, 18 or 24 months. In other words, deliveries of enriched uranium to fabrication facilities (like the one at Romans-sur-Isère) might spike at predictable intervals (for instance, every other year) to account for the fabrication of new fuel assemblies in advance of a reactor reload. It is technically possible that the refuelling cycles of a number of facilities that use the Romans-sur-Isère plant aligned. However, the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium to France in 2022, and continued high levels of imports in 2023, do not match any observable pattern of regular increases in preceding years. Furthermore, the high levels of Russian imports into France (relative to pre-2022 values) have persisted for two consecutive years.</p> + +<h4 id="possible-reallocation-of-russian-enriched-uranium-across-european-supply-chains">Possible Reallocation of Russian Enriched Uranium Across European Supply Chains</h4> + +<p>An April 2023 news report for Le Monde provides additional indication as to possible drivers for the increase in French imports of Russian enriched material in 2022. The article notes:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>When questioned, EDF said that its imports of Russian-enriched uranium have remained at the same level between 2021 and 2022. But it added that it has made more use of French factories for the manufacture of fuel assemblies, which would partly explain the difference. In other words, in previous years, some of the enriched uranium imported did not arrive in France but at plants in Sweden or the UK and was therefore not accounted for in the same way by customs.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>In its 2022 annual report, EDF noted that it sources its enriched uranium from Orano, Urenco and TENEX. Based on the above comments, it appears that EDF may be reallocating its supply of Russian enriched uranium from Sweden (which hosts a fuel fabrication facility at Västerås, operated by Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB) and/or the UK (which hosts a fuel fabrication facility at Springfields, operated by Westinghouse Springfields Fuels Ltd) to France, for fabrication of nuclear fuel at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère plant. This would mean that, as some European countries are trying to diversify away from Russian enriched uranium, France may be offering an alternative entry point for Rosatom to the European nuclear fuel market.</p> + +<p>On the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Swedish energy giant Vattenfall announced that it would no longer be accepting deliveries of Russian nuclear fuel, until further notice. As it eventually became clear, that would also include all Russian enriched uranium. In April 2022, Sweden’s other utility also announced that it was pausing deliveries of enriched uranium from TENEX. While there is currently no ban on imports of Russian material into Sweden at a national level, trade data made available by the Swedish government shows a complete stop of imports of enriched uranium from Russia into Sweden as of 2022.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uplqt0F.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Swedish Imports under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (SEK).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Imports of Goods from Country of Consignment. Not Adjusted for Non Response, SEK thousand by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jpnRLnI.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Swedish Imports under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Imports of Goods from Country of Consignment. Not Adjusted for Non Response, Metric Ton by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS code 28442035).</em></p> + +<p>This is significant not only for Sweden’s own nuclear energy sector but also for nuclear energy production across Europe, as the nuclear fuel production facility at V ästerås manufactures fuel for Vattenfall and reactors across Europe. The Västerås facility also has the capability to produce fuel for Soviet and Russian-built VVER-type reactors (водо-водяной энергетический реактор [vodo-vodyanoi enyergeticheskiy reactor]), offering an alternative supply of VVER fuel for countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, which have historically relied on Rosatom subsidiary TVEL for their supply. Västerås-manufactured VVER fuel has already been supplied to Ukrainian reactors and deliveries are planned for reactors in Bulgaria in 2024.</p> + +<p>The cessation of imports of enriched uranium from Russia to Sweden after 2022 indicates that all the utilities using the Västerås facility for their fuel manufacturing, and which may have previously relied on Russian enriched uranium supply, have found alternative enriched uranium suppliers for the manufacture of their fuel at Västerås. In 2022 and 2023, the value of imports of enriched uranium into Sweden increased from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, suggesting an uptick in deliveries from Orano (France) and Urenco (the UK, the Netherlands and Germany). The German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (Bundesamt für die Sicherheit der nuklearen Entsorgung, BASE) has also issued a permit for the transport to Västerås through German territory of uranium hexafluoride from enrichment facilities in France (Orano), the Netherlands (Urenco) and Germany (Urenco), with regular transport activity recorded throughout 2023. At the time of writing, no such permit has been reported by the German authorities for the transport of enriched uranium to Västerås from TENEX, although it is unclear when the last permit for such transit expired.</p> + +<p>Supply of enriched uranium is normally secured by utilities under long-term contracts, meaning that utilities still obligated to source enriched uranium from Russia but suddenly unable to send it to Sweden will have needed to deliver it to fuel fabrication facilities in countries still willing to accept Russian material. According to Eurostat data, since February 2022 France and Germany are the only European countries that have continued to import enriched uranium from Russia, although the latter at much lower volumes than before 2022. Both host nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. At least some imports of Russian-origin material also appear to have been delivered to Spain in 2022; a fuel fabrication facility is located at Juzbado, owned by Enusa.</p> + +<p>At the time of writing, the webpage of the Västerås fabrication plant noted that, alongside Ukraine, France is its biggest customer. This is also borne out in trade data, which shows France as the primary destination for Swedish nuclear fuel exports (See Figure 13). It is unclear from publicly available sources how much, if any, of EDF’s TENEX-sourced supply had historically been sent to Sweden, but the complete cessation of Russian enriched uranium imports into Sweden suggests that all of EDF’s TENEX-supplied material is now being delivered to one of the other fuel fabrication facilities the company uses. Other utilities that have used the Västerås facility – Swedish, Ukrainian, German and Finnish companies – had also historically relied on the Russian supply of enriched uranium, some of which may have been delivered to Västerås prior to 2022.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LpOdP8B.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Swedish Exports under HS Code 84013000, 2015–23 (SEK).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Exports of Goods to Country of Destination. Not Adjusted for Non Response, SEK Thousand by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS Code 84013000).</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3T73YHa.png" alt="image13" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: Swedish Exports Under HS Code 84013000, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Exports of Goods to Country of Destination. Not Adjusted for Non Response, Metric Ton by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS Code 84013000).</em></p> + +<p>Fuel for French reactors is also manufactured at the nuclear fuel manufacturing facility at Springfields (UK), operated by a subsidiary of Westinghouse. Eurostat data shows imports under HS code 840130 – which captures nuclear fuel assemblies (but may also include components thereof) – from the UK into France from 2021 onwards, including 49 tonnes of imports in 2022 and 74 tonnes in 2023. It is unclear whether Russian enriched uranium is or has in the past been used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel for French reactors at the facility. As neither Russia nor the UK publicly report their trade in enriched uranium, any deliveries of Russian enriched material to the UK, or changes in any such trade, cannot be tracked through a review of trade data. However, in July 2022, the UK introduced a 35% tariff on goods under HS code 2844 (“Radioactive chemical elements and radioactive isotopes (including the fissile or fertile chemical elements and isotopes) and their compounds; mixtures and residues containing these products”) imported into the UK from Russia, which includes enriched uranium. As such, while deliveries of Russian enriched uranium into the UK are still permitted and may therefore be taking place, the introduction of the 35% tariff makes it unlikely that such imports have continued since July 2022. This means that EDF’s supply of Russian enriched uranium is now likely being sent to one of two facilities – the Enusa facility in Juzbado (Spain) or the Framatome facility at Romans-sur-Isère (France).</p> + +<p>A reallocation of Russian material by EDF from other facilities – Västerås or Springfields – to France would explain, at least in part, the increase in 2022 of imports of Russian enriched uranium into the country. It also aligns with statements by EDF that the company “has made more use of French factories for the manufacture of fuel assemblies” in 2022 than in past years and that it has not increased its overall reliance on Russian enriched uranium. However, any such reallocation is difficult to confirm from publicly available information, as supply contracts tend to be commercially sensitive.</p> + +<p>In its 2022 annual report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France, the nuclear safety authority (Autorité de s ûreté nucléaire, ASN) reported an increase compared with 2021 in the amount of TENEX-supplied enriched uranium processed at the Romans-sur-Isère facility, from 21 to 40 tonnes. However, compared to Orano- and Urenco-supplied product processed by the facility in 2022 (564 tonnes and 142 tonnes, respectively), the 19-tonne increase in TENEX-supplied enriched uranium processed at Romans-sur-Isère in 2022 is not significant in terms of volume and certainly does not fully account for the increase of Russian enriched uranium into France. The ANS report refers to enriched uranium “processed” (not necessarily “delivered”) at the facility in a given year, meaning that it is possible that any additional deliveries of Russian material to the facility made in 2022 may not actually be processed until 2023 or later. Alternatively, the additional TENEX material processed may have been drawn from existing stocks, not new deliveries.</p> + +<p>Exports under HS code 840130 from Sweden and the UK to France continued in 2022 and 2023, albeit at lower volumes than pre-2022 in the case of exports from Sweden. If, as per EDF’s comments in Le Monde, less of the company’s Russian supply of enriched uranium is being delivered to fuel fabrication facilities abroad, that material may have been replaced by deliveries to those facilities of non-Russian material from elsewhere in EDF’s supply chain. The value of French exports of enriched uranium to Sweden increased from 40 tonnes in 2021 to 120 tonnes in 2022 and to 153 tonnes in 2023. French exports of enriched uranium to the UK have decreased, from 167 tonnes in 2021 to 129 tonnes in 2022 and 90 tonnes in 2023. US imports of enriched uranium from France increased from 121 tonnes in 2021 to 327 tonnes in 2023. However, at least some of the additional exports of enriched uranium from France are very likely the result of deliveries for non-French utilities under new contracts with enrichment services provider Orano as countries seek to diversify away from Rosatom supply. For instance, Sweden’s utility Vattenfall, which previously received enriched uranium from Russia, is now sourcing its supply from Orano in France and Urenco in the UK. US-based broker of enrichment services Centrus Energy Corp. (Centrus) also started taking deliveries of enriched uranium from Orano in 2023 under a contract that was concluded in 2018.</p> + +<p>In its comments to Le Monde, EDF also highlighted that it is not the only importer of uranium into France, and the news article points out that part of a delivery of Russian enriched uranium to Dunkirk in November 2022 belonged to Framatome, which operates the Romans-sur-Isère facility and manufactures fuel for a number of other European utilities at fabrication facilities in France and Germany. It is unclear whether that particular shipment remained in France or was transported onwards to Germany. As such, the increase of Russian enriched uranium deliveries to the site may be for the fabrication of nuclear fuel for other reactors, not just the French fleet. The 2021 and 2022 ANS reports record deliveries of nuclear fuel assemblies from Romans-sur-Isère to Switzerland, Belgium and China. The plant also produces nuclear fuel assemblies for South Africa. Theoretically, the additional imports into France of Russian enriched uranium could have been for integration into fuel assemblies for some of these customers. As of April 2022, Swiss energy utility Axpo was reported as having considerable dependencies on Russian uranium and stated that it would honour its existing contracts but not sign new ones. It is unclear from the report whether the dependency was in relation to mined or enriched uranium and when the existing contracts expire. China is also a well-established consumer of Russian enriched uranium and, as discussed in Chapter II, ramped up its own imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and 2023. Synatom, which provides enriched uranium to Belgium’s nuclear power plants, was reported in early 2022 to be relying on Russian uranium supply, although the report seems to have been referencing mined uranium and not enrichment services. While Belgium’s supply contract with Rosatom is no longer active, it reportedly took its last delivery of enriched uranium from Rosatom in May 2022. It is unclear which fabrication facility took delivery of this material.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="russian-enriched-uranium-deliveries-to-spain"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russian Enriched Uranium Deliveries to Spain</code></h4> +</blockquote> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Besides Springfields, Västerås and Romans-sur-Isère, the nuclear fuel fabrication plant at Juzbado in Spain is the other facility that fabricates nuclear fuel for EDF. The facility also produces nuclear fuel for reactors in Spanish, Belgian, Swedish and Finnish reactors and has taken delivery of Russian enriched uranium since February 2022. It is technically possible that Russian enriched material delivered to Juzbado (if such deliveries have continued) may be used for fuel fabrication for a number of European utilities. Swedish and Finnish policies of diversification away from Russian supply mean that any deliveries of Russian enriched uranium to Juzbado would likely only be for the production of fuel for Spanish, Belgian or French reactors.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Tracking shifts in the flow of enriched uranium into Spain is challenging. As Spain does not have a domestic deconversion capacity, enriched uranium destined for Juzbado undergoes deconversion abroad before being delivered to Spain for fuel fabrication. Enusa’s contract for the supply of enriched uranium to Spanish reactors from TENEX runs until 2027 and the Spanish government has confirmed that Enusa has taken delivery of Russian enriched uranium in the UK and the US (as well as in Germany) since February 2022. Eighteen tonnes of the material were eventually delivered to Spain from the US in March 2023. However, it is unclear when the deliveries were made to the US and the UK or whether the two countries have since taken any other deliveries of Russian enriched uranium for Enusa.</code></em></p> + +<h4 id="implications-1">Implications</h4> + +<p>Due to the commercial sensitivity of uranium supply and fuel manufacturing contracts, limited information on French uranium stocks and any stockpiles held in France by foreign utilities, as well as the difficulties inherent in tracing complex supply chain dynamics, it is challenging to ascertain the precise drivers of increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France. While at least some reallocation of Russian supplies to France appears to be happening, the degree to which such activity is responsible for the additional import of Russian material into France is difficult to confirm. A range of other explanations for the increased Russian enriched uranium imports into France are also technically possible, some of which have been outlined earlier in this chapter.</p> + +<p>In the absence of EU sanctions on Rosatom, there is no legal basis on which to disallow continued imports of Russian enriched uranium into EU countries. Neither is any redistribution of Russian and non-Russian supplies across European nuclear fuel supply chains prohibited in any way. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, there has been no public reporting of new contracts for enriched uranium supply between Rosatom and European utilities; as such, if any reallocation of Russian material into France is taking place, it is likely facilitating the execution of existing contracts by companies still obligated to continue taking Russian enriched uranium, the breach of which may have proven very costly for the companies in question. France’s willingness to continue accepting Russian imports of enriched uranium may therefore be granting utilities the flexibility they need in their supply chains to maintain continuity of supply and to avoid breaching existing contracts. Industry will do what it must to adjust to changing market dynamics and can hardly be blamed for doing so, within the parameters permitted by regulation. However, it points to the importance of considering how industry is likely to adapt to the implementation of new restrictions and what measures may be needed to facilitate and incentivise alignment of private sector behaviour with political objectives. The observed increase in imports of Russian material into France, even as other European countries look to move away from Russian supply, also highlights the limited impact of unilateral national or company efforts to cut Russia out of the highly interconnected European nuclear fuel supply chain.</p> + +<h3 id="iv-case-study-germany">IV. Case Study: Germany</h3> + +<p>Germany is the other country in Europe which has continued to import enriched uranium from Russia since February 2022, according to Eurostat data. The only nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Germany is the Lingen plant, which is owned by a subsidiary of France’s Framatome and has been reported as apparently continuing to accept deliveries of Russian uranium. This raises questions over whether the Lingen plant could be another possible diversion point for Russian material that is no longer wanted in other countries, now or in the future.</p> + +<h4 id="deliveries-of-russian-enriched-uranium-to-germany">Deliveries of Russian Enriched Uranium to Germany</h4> + +<p>The Lingen plant produces fuel assemblies for customers around the world and supplies “components and fuel for Framatome’s fuel assembly plants in the USA and Europe”. The IAEA’s 2023 report “Global Inventories of Secondary Uranium Supplies” notes that Lingen manufactures fuel for customers in the Netherlands and that Spain has received deliveries of fuel from Germany. UN Comtrade data also shows exports since 2019 from Germany of goods under HS code 840130 to Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the UK, Belgium, France, Finland, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Brazil and a number of other countries; however, while the code captures unirradiated nuclear fuel, it also includes nuclear assembly parts – as such, exports recorded under this code do not necessarily signify the delivery of manufactured fuel assemblies. Russian-origin enriched uranium has also previously been supplied to the UK via Lingen for use in UK reactors operated by EDF’s British subsidiary EDF Energy.</p> + +<p>In August 2023, BASE issued a permit to Orano NCS GmbH (a nuclear logistics provider and part of the Orano Group of companies) for the transport of enriched uranium (in the form of uranium hexafluoride) from JSC TENEX to Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) GmbH, the Framatome subsidiary that operates nuclear fuel manufacturing facility at Lingen. The current permit is valid from 7 August 2023 to 31 December 2024; however, as of 29 February 2024, only two transport activities had been recorded under this permit, on 5 September 2023 and 8 February 2024. It is unclear where the transport originated. The cargo vessel Mikhail Dudin, which has been known to transport Russian enriched uranium to Europe, made a port call in Rotterdam on 5 September 2023. The cargo vessel Baltiysky-202, which had previously been reported unloading Russian enriched uranium in Dunkirk, called at the port of Rotterdam on 8 February 2024 and the port of Dunkirk on 9 February 2024. However, the Netherlands has not reported any imports of enriched uranium from Russia since February 2022. On at least one occasion, Russian enriched uranium being delivered by the Mikhail Dudin to Dunkirk was reportedly on its way to Lingen. According to reports by environmental activist groups, the delivery had been due to arrive in Rotterdam but was ultimately delivered to France instead.</p> + +<p>Between March 2022 and January 2024, the Mikhail Dudin called at the port of Rotterdam at least eight times and at least 12 times at Dunkirk. The vessel has also made four port calls at Vlissingen in the Netherlands and multiple calls at other ports in Europe and the UK. It is unclear what, if anything, was loaded or unloaded during these calls or where the final destination of any deliveries may have been. The Baltiysky-202 has called at the port of Rotterdam four times since March 2022 and nine times at Dunkirk (as well as one port call at Cherbourg, France).</p> + +<p>As such, it appears that some of the Russian material entering France, and possibly the Netherlands, may be passing through these countries on its way to Lingen in Germany. However, trade data reviewed for this report does not provide a clear enough picture to confirm how much Russian material is actually arriving at Lingen, whether the value or volume of any such Russian deliveries has changed since the start of 2022, which customers may be benefiting and which routes may be being used.</p> + +<p>Unlike in the case of France, the value of Germany’s imports of enriched uranium from Russia decreased from 2021 to 2022. One possible explanation may be German reactor closures, at least some of which appear to have used the Lingen facility for the fabrication of their fuel and had historically relied on Russian re-enrichment of reprocessed uranium. In 2022, the value of imports of enriched uranium into Germany increased from the Netherlands and from France; however, imports from these two countries fell to below pre-2022 levels in 2023.</p> + +<p>The cause of the increases in 2022 is difficult to ascertain and several explanations are possible. For instance, the increases in import values may be capturing deliveries to the Lingen plant of enriched uranium secured under renewed contracts with or expanded deliveries from Urenco (the Netherlands) or Orano (France) as utilities using the fabrication plant seek alternative, non-Russian, suppliers. Urenco also hosts an enrichment facility at Gronau in Germany; as such, the data may be capturing Urenco’s internal company transfers and not material travelling to Lingen for fuel fabrication. Transfers from the Netherlands and France into Germany, including to the Lingen facility, by Orano and Urenco have been recorded in German transport licence documents. As mentioned earlier, Urenco has also concluded an agreement with EDF to enrich reprocessed uranium from French reactors at its Almelo facility, which will first be converted by Rosatom in Russia. As such, from 2024, Dutch trade data is likely to show increased imports of reprocessed uranium from Russia (although not enriched uranium), as well as increased exports of enriched uranium from the Netherlands to France for the fabrication of nuclear fuel at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère facility. The decrease in the value and volume of imports of enriched uranium from France and the Netherlands into Germany in 2023 also raises the possibility that any increase in 2022 deliveries may not be part of a sustained pattern but a one-off.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, there are significant discrepancies in Eurostat data between German-reported import data and French- and Dutch-reported data on the export of enriched uranium to Germany, which suggests that the data must be treated with some caution. While data on French exports as well as data on German exports made available through Eurostat both show increases in the value of French exports to Germany (in the case of the German data, French imports into Germany) of enriched uranium in 2022, German import data shows a much lower increase than the French export data. A similar discrepancy can be observed when comparing Eurostat data on German imports with data on Dutch exports, with the former showing markedly lower values of enriched material transferred in 2022 than the latter. Furthermore, in contrast to German import data, Dutch export data shows an overall decrease from 2021 to 2022 in the net weight of enriched uranium exported to Germany. The reason for these discrepancies in the reporting is unclear but may be due to particularities in the recording of transhipment data or delays between the recording of export and import data. Critically, as mentioned earlier, trade data reviewed for this report shows no deliveries of enriched uranium from Russia to the Netherlands since February 2022.</p> + +<h4 id="implications-2">Implications</h4> + +<p>As with reallocation of Russian supplies across a utility’s supply chain, shipment of enriched uranium, Russian or otherwise, through third jurisdictions, if such activity is indeed occurring through France or the Netherlands, is a perfectly permissible activity and does not suggest any wrongdoing. Furthermore, because of the specialised nature of radioactive material transport and the associated logistics and certification required, not all ports are able to receive deliveries of enriched uranium, limiting supply routes. As mentioned above, there is currently also no legal obligation for Germany, France, Spain or any other EU country to terminate existing contracts for Russian supply, prevent the conclusion of new ones, or deny delivery of Russian material to facilities on their territory. As the German government has rightly pointed out in response to questions about deliveries of Russian material to the Lingen facility, there are no legal grounds on which to deny shipments of Russian material to the plant as Russian enriched uranium is not covered by EU sanctions. However, transhipment activity would add further opacity to European nuclear supply chains and may provide additional, less obvious, entry points for Russian material into the European market. It may also allow countries to save face by officially refusing to accept Russian enriched uranium at their ports, all the while continuing to import it through third jurisdictions or accepting non-Russian material from a third country which has been displaced by Russian imports.</p> + +<p>Of note is the fact that ANF has applied to German authorities for permission to manufacture VVER fuel assemblies at the Lingen plant. According to reports, fabrication of VVER fuel at the plant may take place in collaboration with Rosatom; however, prospects of German government approval remain unclear. Framatome has signed agreements for VVER fuel supply with Bulgaria and Czechia. It is unclear where fuel assemblies for Bulgarian and Czech VVER reactors will take place and who would be the supplier of enriched uranium for these or any other VVER fuel assemblies. However, should fuel fabrication for VVER reactors take place at the Lingen facility with the use of Rosatom-supplied enriched uranium and in collaboration with Rosatom, this could hardly be considered successful diversification away from Russia for Framatome’s VVER fuel customers.</p> + +<h3 id="v-case-study-us">V. Case Study: US</h3> + +<p>In the trade data reviewed for this report, the US stands out conspicuously as the largest importer of Russian material, both prior to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and since. Figure 14 shows the value of US imports of enriched uranium from Russia since 2015; Figure 15 shows the weight of imports in tonnes. As mentioned earlier, data on US imports of Russian enriched uranium requires caveating. Some US customers purchase only SWU from Russia, meaning that some natural (unenriched) uranium is returned to Russia as “returned feed”, while other customers purchase both the feed and the services from Russia. As such, the values (and volume) of US imports of enriched uranium are not necessarily representative of the values (or volume) of Russian materials and services that are actually consumed by US utilities. This is in addition to any nuclear fuel assemblies that may be manufactured in the US and exported for use by utilities abroad. US-based think tank Third Way, citing data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and other sources, has estimated that in 2022 US utilities purchased $168 million in processed natural uranium and $344 million in enrichment services. As noted earlier, the EIA has reported that 24% of the SWU delivered to US utilities in 2022 came from Russia.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yV1IBYf.png" alt="image14" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: US Imports from Russia under HS Code 2844200020, 2015–23 (USD).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the US Census Bureau (HS code 2844200020).</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T4xMXA6.png" alt="image15" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: US Imports from Russia under HS Code 2844200020, 2015–23 (Tonnes).</strong> Source: Data sourced from the US Census Bureau (HS code 2844200020).</em></p> + +<h4 id="history-of-us-dependency-on-russian-enriched-uranium-and-efforts-to-limit-supply">History of US Dependency on Russian Enriched Uranium and Efforts to Limit Supply</h4> + +<p>US reliance on Russian enriched uranium is in part a legacy of the “Megatons to Megawatts” initiative, which ran from 1995 to 2013 and saw the conversion of 500 metric tonnes of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons into over 14,000 metric tonnes of low enriched uranium for the generation of nuclear energy in the US, accounting for 10% of US electricity production at the time. The agreement was executed by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and TENEX, with the former accepting low enriched uranium, chemically processed and diluted by TENEX from highly enriched uranium withdrawn from Russian nuclear weapons, and selling it on to utility customers. As a result of this significant Russian supply of enriched uranium into the US nuclear energy supply chain, as well as the longstanding low prices of Russian material, there was little ability or need for domestic enrichment production to compete with Russian supply and the US enrichment industry atrophied.</p> + +<p>However, Russian exports of enriched uranium to Western countries, including the US, pre-dates the “Megatons to Megawatts” initiative, as do concerns over excessive Russian access to the US enriched uranium market and efforts to limit it. In an effort to prevent an influx of cheap Russian enrichment services into the US following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US nuclear energy industry instigated an anti-dumping petition in 1991. The petition eventually resulted in the adoption in 1992 of the “Russian Suspension Agreement” (RSA) between the US Department of Commerce and Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (succeeded by Rosatom). The RSA, which was amended in 2008 and 2020, introduced formal quotas on the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US.</p> + +<p>At present, the only commercial enrichment facility operating in the US is a plant in Eunice, New Mexico owned by Urenco, a joint venture between the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. The company recently announced an expansion of its capacity at the Eunice plant by 15%, with additional enrichment commencing in 2025 and eventually providing an additional 700 tonnes of SWU per year. Several US companies, including Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) LLC and Centrus, also offer enrichment technology and may look to enter (or re-enter) the commercial enrichment market. In October 2023, Centruslaunched operations at its enrichment facility in Piketon, Ohio for the enrichment of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). Commercial US reactors do not currently take HALEU but many advanced reactor models will require HALEU fuel.</p> + +<h4 id="efforts-to-diversify-away-from-russia-and-related-challenges">Efforts to Diversify Away from Russia and Related Challenges</h4> + +<p>As discussed earlier, there are some ongoing efforts in the US to diversify away from Russian enriched uranium supply. In December 2023, the US House of Representatives passed a bill that would prohibit the import into the US of “unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is produced in the Russian Federation or by a Russian entity” through 2040. The bill, which at the time of writing was awaiting debate by the Senate, would allow the secretary of energy, in consultation with the secretary of state and the secretary of commerce, to issue waivers for imports of Russian enriched uranium in instances where alternative supply is not available or if such imports would be in the national interest. RSA quotas on imports of any Russian material would still apply and any waivers would be terminated by 1 January 2028. A similar bill was introduced in the Senate in March 2023.</p> + +<p>As noted earlier, concerns over the availability of alternative, non-Russian, enriched uranium supply for US utilities have been raised by a number of experts. However, the extent of the challenge that US utilities may face in replacing Russian material with non-Russian supply in the short, medium and long term is the subject of some debate and likely varies between utilities. In comments to media, Urenco leadership has stated that “it has enough capacity to replace Russian supplies if Washington bans imports from the country” and “there are no constraints in the short term in replacing Russian materials in the western world”. Some analysts have nevertheless pointed to likely shortages in supply for US utilities should imports of Russian uranium stop, although they have noted that assessing the full impact of a ban on Russian imports is challenging as various utilities are likely to have different dependencies on Russian supply and varying nuclear fuel reserves.</p> + +<p>With time, individual utilities and the US nuclear energy sector more broadly will likely become more prepared to withstand the impact of a ban on imports of Russian uranium into the US. In December 2023, the governments of the US, Canada, France, Japan and the UK announced a commitment “to pursue at least USD $4.2 billion in government-led and private investment in our five nations’ collective enrichment and conversion capacity over the next three years”. In February 2024, as part of the Emergency National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, the US Senate approved $2.7 billion in funding to expand the production in the US of LEU and HALEU. The Nuclear Energy Institute – which is the “policy organisation of the nuclear technologies industry” in the US – also supports a ban on imports of Russian uranium, with its leadership noting that: “The U.S. commercial nuclear industry is committed to transitioning to a secure domestic nuclear fuel supply, and this bill is an important step toward that goal”.</p> + +<p>However, some have raised concerns. Centrus, which acts as a broker of enriched uranium (sourcing foreign SWU and supplying SWU and uranium to US and international customers), has raised concerns over potential risks to its supply that may result from restrictions on trade in uranium with Russia. Such restrictions may come in the form of US sanctions on Russian enriched uranium imports, refusal by its US and/or foreign customers to accept Russian SWU, or a decision by Russia to stop exports of uranium to the US. According to its 2023 annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, TENEX is Centrus’s largest supplier of SWU, followed by French company Orano. Centrus has commitments with TENEX for the supply of Russian enrichment services (in the form of SWU) to 2028. Despite having access to alternative sources of enriched uranium, in its 2023 report Centrus notes that, short of securing a waiver from the secretary of energy, the proposed ban would preclude the company from importing Russian LEU into the US and that its alternative supply would not be sufficient to replace the Russian LEU it is currently permitted to import under the RSA.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, the proposed ban on imports into the US of Russian enriched uranium could mean that a greater proportion of the Russian material that Centrus is committed to purchasing from TENEX may have to be directed to non-US utilities. Due to the RSA quotas, not all of the material that Centrus purchases from TENEX can be sold to US utilities. In its 2023 report, the company notes:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>We will need to make new sales to place all the Russian LEU we must order to meet our SWU purchase obligations to TENEX. In addition, because the [RSA] quotas do not cover all of the LEU that we must order to fulfill our purchase obligations under the TENEX Supply Contract, we expect that a portion of the Russian LEU that we order during the term of the TENEX Supply Contract will need to be delivered to customers that will use it in overseas reactors.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>Centrus also noted prior to 2022 that the company expected to have to deliver some of the LEU it would source from TENEX during the term of its supply agreement with the Russian company to customers for use in overseas reactors. Yet, should a potential ban on imports of Russian material into the US be introduced, and if Centrus commitments to purchase Russian SWU remain unaffected by the ban or other factors, this raises questions over whether a greater fraction of the Russian SWU that Centrus is committed to purchasing from TENEX would need to get sold to customers elsewhere and, if so, how much and to whom.</p> + +<p>Should new customers need to be found for Russian material no longer accepted in the US, these are likely to be companies and countries that would probably have purchased Russian SWU directly from Russia anyway. As such, any redirection of Russian SWU from the US to alternative customers following a US ban would not necessarily increase Rosatom’s footprint in global supply chains. However, it would also tamper the impact of the US ban on overall Russian access to global enrichment supply chains – simply shifting Russian supply elsewhere. Furthermore, should material that is no longer accepted in the US be sold to China or another country that is still willing to take Russian SWU and has a domestic enrichment capacity, the supply could in theory be used in a displacement strategy in efforts to circumvent existing restrictions on the import of Russian material into the US.</p> + +<p>Of course, alternative customers, other than China or other countries that could adopt a displacement strategy, could potentially be found for the excess Russian material, for instance, South Korea, the UAE or some Latin American countries with operating nuclear reactors. However, the willingness of utilities in these countries to purchase enriched uranium no longer accepted in the US would depend on their readiness to accept Russian supply as well as any existing contracts they may have for alternative enriched uranium and enrichment services. These two factors may therefore limit opportunities for – and likelihood of – reallocation of Russian supply to new non-US customers.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, a ban on imports of enriched uranium into the US may impact on businesses’ commitments to source SWU from TENEX. The introduction of a ban might allow companies the opportunity to terminate supply contracts with Russia on the grounds that the US has introduced restriction on such trade, depending on the nature of the restrictions put in place. However, this would not resolve the issue of any supply challenges that may result for US nuclear industry from a loss of access to Russian enriched uranium and enrichment services. As such, seeking a way out of supply contracts may therefore not be the preferred option for TENEX customers. In fact, US companies are likely to seek waivers to allow them to continue purchasing and importing Russian LEU into the US. As such, reallocation of Russian supply from US utilities to utilities in other countries, as described above, may not be necessary. However, the granting of waivers – while maybe necessary to ensure continued security of supply for some in the US nuclear industry – would in itself diminish the short-term impact of efforts to limit Russian access to US nuclear supply chains.</p> + +<p>As with some of the adaptations described in the case studies on France and Germany, a ban on the import of Russian uranium into the US may cause some challenges for industry – either as a result of contractual obligations or concerns over security of supply. A ban is therefore likely to result in adaptations which may temper the ban’s ability to reduce Rosatom’s revenue generation and Russia’s presence in global and Western nuclear supply chains, at least in the short term. This is not a reason to forego pursuing such restrictions on imports of Russian enriched uranium into the US, but rather a reminder of the need for a considered approach to the institution of such restrictions – one which takes into account both political objectives and the practicalities faced by industry. To help incentivise and facilitate industry behaviour which aligns with political objectives, the articulation and application of a ban must rely on thorough consultation with customers and suppliers in the US’s nuclear energy sector. It needs to be accompanied by the development of domestic and partner enrichment capacity to ensure a sustainable transition away from Russian supply, and must seek to identify and mitigate the ways in which Russia may continue to access global nuclear fuel supply chains despite the introduction of restrictions.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion-and-policy-recommendations">Conclusion and Policy Recommendations</h3> + +<p>This report has outlined four case studies that demonstrate the scale of Western and global dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supplies, the economic and contractual challenges that stand in the way of ending these dependencies, the adaptations to efforts by some Western countries and companies to cut Russia out of their nuclear fuel supply chains, and the likely limitations of efforts to cut Russia out of global nuclear fuel supply chains. In particular, Russia may rely on countries still willing or obligated to accept its enriched uranium to implement displacement strategies or simply serve as alternative entry points into markets from which it is being squeezed out. Such strategies simply push the issue of Russian dependency to a different part of the supply chain but do little to ultimately squeeze Rosatom’s bottom line and, in some instances, to decrease Western dependencies on Russian enriched uranium.</p> + +<p>Of particular concern are trends in trade data that could point to the adoption of a displacement strategy – as may be the case with China. As Beijing may be seeking to increase its role as an exporter of enriched uranium to global markets, including to the US, it could rely on increased imports into China of Russian enriched uranium to facilitate this expansion. An increase in the value of Russian enriched uranium imports by China since 2022 has been accompanied by an increase in the value of Chinese exports of enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023, driven primarily by deliveries to the US. However, publicly available data reviewed for this report is insufficient to conclude definitively whether displacement is actually occurring.</p> + +<p>In the case of Europe, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France and continued deliveries of Russian material to Germany also raise questions over the effectiveness of unilateral efforts by other players in the European nuclear fuel supply chain to cut dependencies on Russia. While it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the drivers of recent increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France or to confirm whether and how much Russian enriched uranium may be arriving in Germany through third countries, the willingness of certain countries to continue accepting Russian material may continue to grant Rosatom alternative entry points into the European nuclear fuel supply chain. Should Russian material delivered to Germany be integrated into the future fabrication of VVER nuclear fuel assemblies in cooperation with Rosatom, this would also be counterproductive to efforts by Eastern European VVER operators to diversify away from Russian supplies.</p> + +<p>The report also briefly examined US dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supplies, as the US remains the most important importer of Russian enriched uranium. While a prohibition on imports of Russian enriched uranium into the US may cut Russia out of US supply chains, the extent to which such a ban may cause supply challenges for US nuclear fuel supply chains remains the subject of some debate. Furthermore, some of the Russian material that may no longer be accepted in the US may need to be redirected to other customers around the world that are still willing to accept Russian material. While this is unlikely to have a significant impact on the presence of Russian enriched uranium on global markets, as the excess supply is likely to be redirected to countries willing to do business with Russia and which would have probably purchased Russian supply anyway, it highlights again the challenges and limitations inherent to unilateral efforts to cut Russia out of global nuclear fuel supply chains. The case studies presented in this report – including that of the US – also point to the need for close engagement with the nuclear industry to ensure that restrictions on trade in uranium and enrichment services with Russia are developed and implemented in a manner that incentivises and facilitates maximum industry buy-in on the objectives of such restrictions – in this case, sustainable diversification away from Russian enriched uranium supply in Western nuclear fuel supply chains.</p> + +<p>The limitations of current restrictions on purchases of Russian enriched uranium and enrichment services described in this report should not serve to dissuade the further introduction of such restrictions. Not only is diversification away from Russia’s nuclear industry important for ensuring nuclear energy security in the US and Europe, it is also critical to avoiding the political and moral dissonance inherent in claims to support Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression while continuing to engage in business with a strategically significant Russian state-enterprise. Instead, they should serve as a further reminder to ensure that any future restrictions aim for a multilateral approach, identify and address likely opportunities for circumvention through countries still willing to do business with Russia, are introduced in close consultation with industry and are accompanied by measures that incentivise and facilitate maximum industry buy-in and compliance. The six recommendations outlined below are aimed at facilitating diversification and preventing circumvention, both in instances where continued intake of Russian material is contractually obligated and when it may be being used as part of a deliberate strategy to gain greater market access by competing suppliers.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation 1: Invest in the further expansion of enrichment capacity in partner countries.</strong> While additional capacity from Urenco and Orano is due to come online in 2025 and 2028 respectively, the US, the UK, European and other Western-allied governments must invest in additional enrichment capacity to ensure long-term security of supply and facilitate a sustainable diversification away from Russian supply while limiting negative impacts on Western nuclear industry and energy production. This could include investments in the development of new enrichment technologies that may be easier and quicker to scale up and would allow for the entry into the market of new enrichment service providers. Recent US and UK efforts to support domestic production of HALEU fuel should be commended to this end. Making available competitive government incentives for enrichment service providers to invest in expanded enrichment capacity, as well as incentives for utilities (that is, the customers) to provide guarantees of sustained demand in the form of long-term contracts will also help encourage further investment by enrichers into additional capacity.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation 2: Once alternative supply can be assured, implement multilateral restrictions on imports of Russian enriched uranium.</strong> To increase the effectiveness and limit the negative impacts of any sanctions or restrictions on the Western nuclear sector, any initiatives at diversification should be undertaken only following extensive consultations with relevant actors within the nuclear energy industry and only once sufficient alternative enriched uranium supply has been secured, either through expanded Western and partner enrichment capacity or through enriched uranium inventories. Every effort must also be made to ensure a unanimous approach to sanctions across US, European and other allied markets. The adaptation activities outlined in this report rely on Russia’s ability to access some markets while others adopt diversification policies. As such, unilateral efforts by individual countries or companies to cut Russia out of the West’s nuclear supply chain will be vulnerable to circumvention.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation 3: Establish methods for enforcing the “displacement swap” prohibition under the RSA.</strong> The US Department of Commerce, as the authority responsible for monitoring possible circumvention of the RSA provisions, should work with other departments in US government as well as with industry to identify methods for enforcing the prohibition of displacement swaps. To demonstrate that enriched uranium imported into the US was not the result of displacement using Russian material, importers could, for instance, be asked to demonstrate the allocation to various customers of enriched uranium imports into their country or show proof of increases in domestic enrichment capacity to meet demand for exports to the US. Considering the commercial sensitivity of some of this information, government authorities in the country of export could be asked to collate this information and provide assurances on behalf of industry.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation 4: Adopt prohibitions on displacement swaps alongside other national or multilateral (EU) bans on imports of Russian enriched uranium.</strong> Should individual countries or the EU decide to adopt a ban on Russian enriched uranium, they should include prohibitions of displacement swaps, similar to those included in the RSA. Such prohibitions, if enforced as per Recommendation 3, will help close potential loopholes that Russia could exploit to maintain indirect access to markets that are trying to cut Russia out, undermining efforts to squeeze Rosatom’s bottom line.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation 5: Examine and work to address dependencies on Russia across the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle.</strong> Uranium enrichment is not the only aspect of the global nuclear fuel supply chain where dependencies on Russia are critical. Rosatom also plays a major role in global NPP construction, uranium conversion and spent fuel management. Cutting dependencies on Russia in one part of the supply chain, while a good start, will not have as great an effect on Rosatom’s revenue generation as ensuring that the West and partner countries, as well as undecided customers, have alternative suppliers across the nuclear fuel cycle. Russia and China have invested extensively in their civil nuclear sectors as strategic industries, having understood the long-term dependencies they can create in the countries to which they sell their technology and services. While the economies and the government–industry relations in Russia and China differ significantly from those in Western and partner countries, supporting the development of domestic nuclear industries and their ability to compete internationally should be a priority.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation 6: Avoid trading dependencies on Russia for dependencies on China.</strong> As companies and governments seek to diversify away from Russia in their sourcing of enriched uranium supplies and across the nuclear fuel cycle, China may look to take advantage of openings to present itself as an alternative supplier. It is imperative that Western and partner governments focus on investment in domestic capacity and the capacity of partner countries, not on sourcing services and technology from China. Not only may increased Chinese exports of enriched uranium be backed by increased imports of Russian material (undermining the impact of Western and partner sanctions on the Russian nuclear industry), but allowing Chinese companies to play an important role in nuclear supply chains runs the risk of creating problematic dependencies not dissimilar to those that currently exist on Russia.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Darya Dolzikova</strong> is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and strategic aspects of civil nuclear technology. She has conducted research on the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, nuclear safety in Ukraine, the role of Russia in global civil nuclear supply chains, and other issues relating to nuclear technology and proliferation.</p>Darya DolzikovaThis report examines the trade in Russian enriched uranium.China In Sub-Saharan Africa2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-sub-saharan-africa<p><em>Chinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -8132,317 +8585,4 @@ Simon 嘅,但都唔想連累 Simon 受無妄之災。國安震懾之下找個 <hr /> -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導陳沛敏:黎智英鮮明地反修例 很重視4.28遊行 當天報紙全版登尊子政治漫畫 陳沛敏:韓國電影以「逆權」為名 香港人始認識兩字 起初在中文不常用Crisis And Adaptation Of IS-K2024-02-06T12:00:00+08:002024-02-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/crisis-and-adaptation-of-is-k<p><em>The paper discusses the conditions of the Islamic State in Khorasan and how its strategy and structures evolved after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The author also assesses the potential for the Islamic State in Khorasan to recover strength and expand its activities again in the future, in the context of Taliban counter-terrorism.</em></p> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>Assessments of the state of the Islamic State, including of its branches, are routinely released by policy makers and official sources. These assessments, however, are often divergent. The UN monitoring reports, based on data fed by member states indicate numbers that fluctuate wildly year on year, depending on the member state. The same agency might release contrasting figures, such as the US Forces Afghanistan’s assessment of the strength of the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) before the Taliban takeover in 2021. For years it was kept at an astonishingly low 1,000 members, until it was suddenly raised to 5,000 in spring 2019, without much explanation. While assessments by the US military were mostly keeping IS-K numbers low, Russian official sources tended to do the exact opposite. Hence the need for an independent, fresh assessment of just how powerful IS-K is, one of the aims of this paper.</p> - -<p>The other aim of this paper is to analyse how IS-K coped with the emerging challenge posed by the Taliban in power in Kabul. Even as recently as the summer of 2023, the predominant view among analysts was that IS-K was in good shape, in part at least because of its efforts to project its activities regionally. Acknowledging IS-K’s internal difficulties has been rare. This paper shows that IS-K has been increasingly struggling in Afghanistan, but also that it has been to adapt to a very considerable extent. The question this paper seeks to answer is what this adaptation is turning IS-K into.</p> - -<p>Given that the conflict is still underway, any findings of this paper can be only partial and preliminary. With no access to primary written sources, there are limitations by necessity to the research methodology adopted: primarily oral sources, supported by news reports. The reader should be aware that researching this topic required several methodological compromises, as reaching out to sources in the context of Afghanistan under the Taliban is extremely difficult. IS-K recruiters and members were the most difficult ones to speak to. As a result, the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete; gaps abound, and following up on specific themes was often not possible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this.</p> - -<p>This analysis is based on a series of fifty-five interviews, carried out between March 2021 and June 2023 with ten Taliban officials, sixteen IS-K cadres and members, eight former IS-K members, twelve Salafi elders, Ulema and other elders, four members of the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan, two Hawala traders, one IS Central cadre, one Iranian official, and one local source. The interviews were carried out by three researchers who did not know each other, to avoid the risk of collusion in manipulating the content of the interviews. The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in a publication, the type of which was not specified. All the interviews have been anonymised and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed. The risk that respondents could use the interviews to influence or misrepresent the facts was assumed from the start as a precautionary measure. This risk was mitigated by using different types of sources, representing contrasting points of views, by interviewing individuals separately and without them being aware of other interviews taking place, and by inserting questions where the answer was already known. Public-domain sources have also been used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees.</p> - -<p>The paper is organised into several sections. The first one discusses IS-K’s initial strategy against the Taliban’s Emirate. The second section addresses how that strategy started appearing as a dead end during 2022. The third section shows how IS-K sought to adapt its strategy. The fourth and final section discusses how IS-K’s crisis deepened in 2023 and was still very serious as of January 2024, when this paper was drafted.</p> - -<h3 id="is-ks-challenge-to-the-taliban-in-2021-22">IS-K’s challenge to the Taliban in 2021-22</h3> - -<p>There has long been a debate on whether IS-K was really closely connected to the central leadership of the Islamic State (IS-C), rather than being a group of opportunists who tried to exploit the 2014-15 successes of IS-C for fundraising and recruitment purposes. That IS-K still existed in 2018-23 despite the decline of the Caliphate in Syria and in Iraq bears witness to the fact that its emergence was not just due to opportunism. Over the years, IS-C sought the original, heterogeneous mix of groups into a more ideological, Salafi-jihadist organisation. The transformation was quite successful, helped by the high casualty rate incurred by the first generation of joiners. By 2021, IS-K was a largely Salafi organisation, with a strong a committed hard core of ideologically motivated members. For the largest part of its existence, IS-K was heavily dependent on funding accruing from IS-C, but the latter allowed IS-K a degree of autonomy in choosing its leaders — if the process was smooth and not too divisive. During the period discussed in this paper, however, the decline and crisis of IS-C started posing major challenges to IS-K.</p> - -<p>The Taliban takeover in August 2021 was no good news for IS-K. The Taliban had been IS-K’s primary enemy, and it could be expected that they would turn on the IS-K as soon as feasible after power consolidation. The leadership of IS-K decided to catch the Taliban off guard while the latter were busy setting up their government and suffering from manpower shortages. Tens of cells were transferred to the cities, where in the following months they unleashed their most intense terror campaign yet. Not only in Kabul and Jalalabad, where IS-K had been active for years, but also Kunduz, Kandahar, Charikar, Herat and Mazar-I Sharif. In addition, IS-K sought to unleash a guerrilla campaign in eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban initially struggled to cope, especially in the cities where they had no counter-terrorism experience. Provincial officials of the Emirate in eastern Afghanistan adopted extreme measures against the Salafi community, widely believed to be largely supportive of IS-K, including death squad tactics in Nangarhar and systematic closures of Salafi mosques and madrasas. This deeply antagonised the Salafi community.</p> - -<p>The IS-K terror campaign peaked in the first half of 2022 and started losing steam in the second half of the year, as the Taliban were finally getting on top of the counter-terrorism challenge. From a peak of between five to ten guerrilla attacks and over ten bomb attacks per month during the first half of 2022, IS-K activity fell to between two and five guerrilla attacks and three to six bomb attacks in the second half of the year (see graph 1 ). By then it could be argued that the guerrilla campaign in the east had declined to negligible levels, as confirmed by local observers too. The terror campaign in the cities was beginning to falter too, however. Moreover, there were no signs that terror attacks in the cities were achieving much in terms of destabilising the Emirate, which was gradually also overcoming its initial manpower shortages. Despite still being short of cash, in January 2022 the Emirate quickly upgraded its plans for army and police, overseeing the gradual expansion of the army towards a target of at least 150,000 men, and the police to as many as 60,000.</p> - -<p>IS-K’s main aim with its 2021-22 offensive was likely to buy time, while it restructured to face the mutating threat represented by the Taliban. The process of strengthening its presence in the north of Afghanistan had already started by 2020 but intensified after the Taliban takeover. The residual overt presence of IS-K — limited by August 2021 to some areas of Nuristan and Kunar — started being disposed of, as IS-K moved entirely underground and began relying exclusively on mobile bases and training camps. In its new shape, IS-K had little use for large numbers of foreign fighters — mostly Pakistanis, followed by Central Asians as the second largest group — and the bulk of them started being moved to Pakistan either to Tirah valley, where had some bases, or to the cities, primarily Peshawar. IS-K also massively intensified its online and social media operations, presumably with multiple intents such as distracting the Taliban from its delicate transition, exchanging face-to-face with remote recruitment, enhancing fund raising, and keeping an increasingly dispersed membership together.</p> - -<p>All considered, the leadership of IS-K managed the transition quite efficiently, taking limited casualties. However, the Taliban’s Emirate had not just been increasing the size of its armed forces. Its intelligence apparatus adapted to its new tasks, building an extensive intelligence network in the cities. During 2022 the Taliban started busting IS-K cells in the cities, and terrorist attacks stopped in Kunduz, Charikar and Jalalabad. Several cells were also destroyed in Kabul, Mazar-i Sharif, and Herat (see Graph 1 for figures). The Taliban’s intelligence also started infiltrating IS-K social media operations.</p> - -<p>IS-K’s adaptation also faced some structural limitations. The increasingly dispersed character of the organisation made its trademark centralised command and control unfeasible. The group likely also faced a shortage of cadres, as the cells compromised in the cities during 2022 often included quite senior members. It would be odd for IS-K to move senior figures to the frontlines, unless it faced major command and control issues and/or a shortage of cadres. The expansion of IS-K’s presence in the cities, relying on an underground structure of small cells, required a much more cadre-heavy staffing than the guerrilla operations had demanded. IS-K tried to intensify recruitment of new cadres, but the Taliban’s crackdown on Salafi madrasas (outside Kunar province) choked a major source of recruits. IS-K had to rely increasingly on recruiting university students, itself a complicated matter due to heavy Taliban scrutiny over the campuses.</p> - -<p>Overall, IS-K appears to have been able to maintain its numbers between August 2021 and autumn 2022. During this period, IS-K sources were putting total membership at around 8,000 between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Considering that a substantial portion of these were in Pakistan at any given time, these numbers are well within the range of estimates by governments reporting to the UN monitoring committee. This is not quite as good as it seems, given that this membership level is close to its lowest during 2015-21, but at least numbers did not fall. Of the 8,000 or so members, at least a third were in non-combat roles (support, intelligence, admin), and of the 5,000 or so fighters a substantial portion were Salafi villagers who had joined to protect their communities and were poorly motivated to follow IS-K very far. The Salafi community had felt threatened when the Taliban appeared in eastern Afghanistan in strength from 2009 onwards. Having failed to obtain protection from the government, they welcomed IS-K when it turned up years later, as a force capable of protecting them. It is a common tale, heard from surrendered IS-K members, that many Salafi elders were encouraging villagers to join IS-K, whose teams had regular meetings with them, encouraging them to mobilise villagers. Especially among these villagers, morale was low in 2021 already.</p> - -<h3 id="is-ks-campaign-in-crisis-winter-2022-23">IS-K’s Campaign in Crisis: Winter 2022-23</h3> - -<p>The Taliban reacted to IS-K’s challenge more quickly and with greater sophistication than expected, ordering its provincial officials to avoid indiscriminate repression of the Salafis and promoting instead efforts to reconcile IS-K members, by both involving community elders and offering reintegration packages. Although arbitrary violence against suspect IS-K members and sympathisers — peaking in the first few months after regime change — did not stop altogether, the Taliban’s efforts were quite successful; in Nangarhar province a few hundred IS-K insurgents reconciled.</p> - -<p>By the winter of 2022-23 it was clear that the campaign launched by IS-K was not achieving much success in undermining the Taliban’s Emirate. Although IS-K managed to sustain the pace of its terrorist attacks in Kabul and to start a campaign in Mazar-I Sharif — and in Herat, to some extent — its campaign in Jalalabad failed and the campaigns in Kunduz and Kandahar could not be sustained. Indeed, an IS-K source mentioned in April 2023 that Kabul, Mazar-i Sharif, and Herat were the cities where their urban terror cells were concentrated. Even in Kabul, IS-K had been taking several hits. The same IS-K source acknowledged that in February 2023 the head of the special military commission for Kabul, Qari Saheb Fateh, was “martyred” by the Taliban. Interestingly, according to an IS-K cadre, as of April 2023 no replacement had been appointed yet, again suggesting that the Taliban counter-terrorism campaign might be causing a shortage of senior cadres. Another IS-K source acknowledged that recruitment teams took several hits in Kabul, Nangarhar and Kunar, with members arrested or killed; only Badakhshan remaining untouched. These hits resulted in much reduced activities, especially in Kabul, where, after one terrorist attack on 11 January 2023 and one on 27 March 2023, there was a lull of seven months with no successful IS-K attack. Both these attacks targeted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ending up with detonations outside the Ministry, resulting in civilian casualties but little damage to the Taliban.</p> - -<p>IS-K propaganda regularly claims it is strengthening recruitment, has the support of 70% of the population in the east and north-east, and even that it is attracting growing numbers of sympathisers in the south as well. Ironically, when comparing claims made by internal IS-K sources on recruitment alongside previous claims (see above), this reveals in fact that overall IS-K numbers were declining significantly in late 2022 and into early 2023: falling to 7,000 by the beginning of 2023. In practice, IS-K’s presence in Afghanistan was shrinking even faster, as an increasing number of its members were being moved to Pakistan.</p> - -<p>It seems obvious that the Taliban’s efforts to reconcile IS-K members through negotiations with the elders was making a dent in the latter’s self-confidence. Although the pace of the surrenders slowed during the end of last year and in recent months, in early 2023 another 100 reportedly surrendered in Nangarhar, later acknowledged by IS-J sources. According to one former member, even some of the reinforcements sent by IS-K to Nangarhar from Kunar decided quickly to surrender. Similarly, the campaign to attract Taliban members was clearly lagging. Despite IS-K propaganda touting successes in infiltrating the Taliban, there is little evidence of success. In fact, open defections to IS-K, which were never high, appear to have slowed down to a near halt between the beginning of 2022 and mid-2023. The Taliban dismissed the few defectors as people expelled for bad behaviour or who quit for not having been offered prestigious jobs within the ranks of the Emirate. For example, one of the few cases of Taliban joining IS-K during that period was that of a minor commander called Sangari; in January 2023 Sangari defected to IS-K with his three men in Lal Poor district, after the Emirate failed to give him a job. While the Taliban might well be reluctant to acknowledge defections from their ranks, as late as June 2023 a senior source in IS-K could not provide concrete examples of recent defections and talked instead of “negotiations” with “several groups of Taliban in different provinces” over their defection to IS-K.</p> - -<p>Reflecting this reality, IS-K propaganda has shifted from defections towards claims of infiltration of the Taliban. One known case of an official of the Emirate detained on allegations of having links to IS-K was that of Obaidullah Mobariz, the Emirate’s Chief of Police for Panjshir’s Shotul district — detained on 16 January 2023. Mobariz had been detained by the previous government for links to IS-K. The Emirate appointed him and seemingly was unaware of his past until his suspicious behaviour attracted attention; a serious security lapse. There were also allegations, relaunched by IS-K sources, of receiving internal help for their attack on the governor of Balkh — Muzamil — in March 2023. However, few other attacks carried out by IS-K after the Taliban takeover suggest insider support. Typically, these attacks were failures in terms of attempts to break through Taliban security belts. The few successful ones were mostly against pro-Taliban clerics, who did not occupy official positions within the Emirate and were not protected by the Taliban’s security apparatus.</p> - -<p>IS-K’s difficulties are also evident from their 2023 propaganda efforts on Telegram, encouraging members to escalate jihadi activities during the holy month of Ramadan (22 March-20 April 2023); embarrassingly, IS-K activities during that month were at their lowest level ever. A more implicit admission of the group’s decline in Nangarhar was a letter published by them, warning of retaliation to those extorting money from shopkeepers and other citizens of Jalalabad in the name of IS-K. While the letter’s intent was likely to show that IS-K still had power, as it encouraged the shopkeepers to report extortion to its intelligence service, the letter also revealed that small time gangsters were not afraid of IS-K anymore; perhaps even that isolated and under-funded IS-K members were now on the loose.</p> - -<h3 id="is-ks-adaptation">IS-K’s Adaptation</h3> - -<p>According to an IS-K cadre, during 2022 the leadership of IS-K decided to adapt its strategy: it abandoned any short-term plans to hold or re-gain territory, even in the remotest parts of the country, and instead focusing on targeting cadres and leaders of the Taliban and intensifying recruitment efforts. The aim of challenging the Taliban’s territorial control remained but was moved to the long-term. In line with this, during 2022 IS-K gave up on plans to wage a guerrilla campaign in Kunar, the primary intent of which had been to force the Taliban to pull out of parts of the province. The assessment of a member of the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) was that by early 2023 there was little IS-K activity in Kunar: “they have some hideouts in the mountains and in the valleys, but they don’t have permanent military bases in Kunar province”. The source believed that IS-K was facing morale issues, with members reluctant to fight, even if not ready to surrender to the Taliban: “Because there are lots of places for hiding out in the valleys and mountain, these Khawarij Daesh prefer to stay there, rather than surrender to the Taliban”. As noted above in IS-K’s challenge to the Taliban, IS-K have faced morale issues, so this GDI officer’s assessment is plausible. However, he also acknowledged that while “local villagers received warnings from the Taliban, not to support [IS-K], some Salafi families and communities” were still “secretly supporting [IS-K] members and offering safe haven in their villages”. While the source estimated in March 2023 that IS-K had been crushed in Nangarhar province, large scale IS-K activity underground still existed within Kunar province. Overall, only 30-40 members of IS-K were confirmed to have surrendered in Kunar, as opposed to more than 600 in Nangarhar (up to March 2023).</p> - -<p>Thus, IS-K was not finished yet. The group was re-organising and learning to rely on thinner, underground networks of cells in the villages, focusing on maintaining influence and keeping recruitment growing rather than fighting. In the words of a surrendered IS-K member: “During the night, [IS-K is] very powerful in the valleys and villages close to the mountains, but during the day they disappear”. Despite the decision to move north (see above), IS-K could not just abandon its strongholds in the east to their fate. According to a source in the Taliban, in March 2023 Kunar was also still functioning as the source of IS-K cells re-infiltrating other areas. Both Kunar and neighbouring Nuristan did not just supply cells to Nangarhar, but also to Kabul and possibly other provinces.</p> - -<p>A considerable proportion of IS-K forces in Kunar was nonetheless moved to Pakistan and to the north of Afghanistan during 2021-23. The relocation northwards had started slowly in mid-2020 but there is clear evidence that it started accelerating in 2022. IS-K sources placed the number of IS-K members in the north and north-east in early 2023 at least double the numbers present there in mid-2021. Even GDI sources confirmed in March 2023 the shift of IS-K members to the north-east, with a growing presence in the north as well. Several small bases were identified in Badakhshan and Kunduz, while there were believed to be several cells in Mazar-I Sharif. The north-east was believed to be supplying attack teams, composed of Central Asians, to Kabul.</p> - -<p>Transferring many members northwards was undoubtedly a considerable feat for IS-K. However, in terms of inflicting critical damage to the Emirate there, impact was limited. On 9 March 2023, the governor of Balkh, Mohammad Daud Muzamil — one of the most capable Helmandi commanders of the Emirate and a close ally of the Amir, Haibatullah — was assassinated in Mazar-i Sharif. This attack was part of a campaign of assassinations of Taliban officials; as of October 2023 these were only carried out in the new areas of IS-K activity: north, north-east, and west. Aside from Muzamil, the other main success of this campaign was the killing of Nissar Ahmad Ahmadi, the deputy governor of Badakhshan province, on 6 June 2023; this was followed two days later by a suicide bombing at Ahmadi’s funeral, killing three other Taliban dignitaries plus several bystanders. Low rank officials of the Emirate were also assassinated: Mohammad Nader Kakar, head of Herat’s Water Supply Department, in March 2023; director of mines Abdul Fattah, in Faizabad on 24 April 2022; security chief Abdulhaq Abu Omar also in Faizabad on 26 December 2022; and Rahman Munawar, the Taliban Head of Economy for Faryab province, on 10 October 2022.</p> - -<p>Although in the big scheme of things these attacks did not even get close to making the Taliban’s hold on northern Afghanistan implode, even the GDI acknowledged that the situation in Mazar-i Sharif was somewhat worrying. The GDI estimated in April 2023 that there were dozens of IS-K hideouts in Mazar, with some 200 members already based in the city and another 150 planning to move in. Based on the interrogation of the detainees, the GDI assessed that IS-K intended to destabilise the Emirate by attacking the northern cities.</p> - -<p>By 2020, one major problem for IS-K in trying to spread through the north was that the organisation had a stronger Salafi character than when it was originally formed in 2014-15. Of the original crowd of former TTP and Taliban members, many of whom did not identify as Salafis, little was left by that time; IS-K rejected being characterised as a Salafist group. The Taliban’s assessment in 2022 was that IS-K was very dependent on the Salafi community for recruits. Even then, after the crackdown on Salafi madrasas of the previous months, the Taliban believed that some were still sending recruits to IS-K and planning to shut them down. While over 80% of the Afghan population follows the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, there is a small Salafi minority accounting for perhaps 2-3% of the population, mostly concentrated in eastern Afghanistan. Afghan Salafism is characterised by a much stricter textualist approach. All sources confirmed that by 2020 there were few Hanafis in IS-K in Nangarhar. In Kunar, the preponderance of Salafis was even greater. A former IS-K member of almost five years, who travelled around Kunar and Nuristan, says he never saw any non-Salafi members. As far as the north and the west are concerned, IS-K sources claimed a mixed membership in early 2023. One IS-K source said that while the majority of the members in Badakhshan were Salafis, Hanafis were the majority in the north, especially Jowzjan and Faryab. While this may well be true, there were few IS-K members in either Jowzjan or Faryab at that time. The IS-K leadership was aware that the strongly Salafi characterisation of IS-K was becoming a major issue and already in spring 2021 it decided to shift away from the recent years’ focus on recruiting Salafis and toward recruiting more Hanafi members. In reality, even in spring 2023 IS-K seemed to have limited hopes that large numbers of Hanafis would join. As an IS-K cadre acknowledged as late as April 2023: “Our priority is to recruit fighters from, and train them in, Kunar, Badakhshan, Kunduz and Nuristan”; that is, all provinces either with a largely Salafi population (Kunar and Nuristan), or with significant Salafi pockets (Badakhshan and, to a lesser extent, Kunduz).</p> - -<p>In part because of its lack of strong roots in almost all the north and north-east — the only major exception being some parts of Badakhshan — the move north implied moving even deeper underground for IS-K than was the case in the east, with most cells being completely isolated from society and from each other. This inevitably created command and control issues, which IS-K sought to manage with command decentralisation. A new structure was adopted, featuring three different centres of operations, each with full operational autonomy. As of April 2023, these main centres of operation were:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Kunar — responsible for eastern Afghanistan but also supporting operations in Kabul, sending in attack teams. The leadership of this operational centre was largely composed of Central Asians.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Kabul — a “special military commission” responsible to operations in the capital.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Badakhshan — responsible for operations in the north and north-east.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>A second measure, to cope with command-and-control issues, was an even greater reliance on educated and ideologised cadres and members. The importance of ideologised cadres was stressed by a commander as key to keeping morale high:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p><em>IS-K always focused on recruitment of highly aware (Hoshyar) fighters from Sharia faculties and universities. Students who study Sharia in Afghanistan’s universities are mostly aware of Islam and they are very good in preaching and spreading Islam and teaching the rules applying to Mujahidin and the value of Jihad to the other fighters. They can improve the morale of other. This is why IS-K is focusing on Afghan universities to recruit students of the Sharia faculty.</em></p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The need for decentralisation was all the stronger due to the need to protect the leadership. Having suffered heavy leadership losses since its inception, IS-K invested in securing its internal communications, designed to survive interception by the Americans. IS-K sources claimed these were quite advanced by April 2023. According to one source, “Dr. Shahab [al Muhajir, the governor of Khorasan] has his own technology team that manages communications between him and other members of the group”. Clearly, however, internal communications have been increasing in complexity.</p> - -<p>The move underground also complicated recruitment and training. It is revealing that IS-K began experimenting with online learning for its members. In February 2023, a new Telegram channel was established to provide basic military training. The channel was called Funun-e-Nezami (Military Skills), and its members posted pictures of weapons alongside descriptions of the ways in which they can be used, including a range of guns and IEDs. Another IS-K channel dedicated to online military training was (Commandos of Caliphate), which was irregularly active. The option of training all members in person within proper camps was no longer available. The al-Afraad al-Arqam channel instead warned to avoid compromising mobile numbers.</p> - -<p>Increasingly evident is IS-K’s growing reliance on online propaganda, especially via social media. A mapping of IS-K activities on social media by the Centre for Information Resilience identified thirty Facebook groups run by either the group or its supporters, used for recruitment purposes. In addition, IS-K activists were also seen using at least twenty-four student, Salafi and Islamic interest groups on Facebook for spreading their propaganda. Typical themes found on these pages included complaints about the policies of the Taliban’s Emirate, such as the lack of religious freedom for Salafis under the Taliban and the perceived tolerance of the Taliban towards other religious sects in Afghanistan: Shi’as, Sikhs, and Hindus. A common propaganda topic in 2022-3 has been the Taliban’s relations with foreign governments unpopular with Islamic extremists: the US, Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, as well as with the EU and the UN. IS-K propaganda has also very obviously tried to exploit intra-ethnic tensions to its advantage, alleging that land conflict in the north-west is driving Uzbek Taliban to quit the organisation. However, IS-K propaganda also features more subjective claims, such as what they describe as the un-Islamic character of Taliban governance. Other claims are far-fetched, such as calling the Taliban “servants of the Pakistani ISI” (see below on Taliban-Pakistan relations) and accused of having been corrupted by the Americans; IS-K falsely claimed that the Taliban agreed in Doha to implement an American-designed democratic system in Afghanistan to protect pagans like Hindus, Shi’as, and Sufis. Even when claims have some grounds in reality, IS-K propaganda strongly manipulate them; for example claiming that the Taliban obeyed the “orders” of the UN. The same propaganda video featured a clip of Donald Trump saying:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p><em>I met with Taliban leaders; they promised me that they will fight against all terrorist groups and bad people in Afghanistan including ISKP, and that they would be our men who fight against terrorism and the ISKP mujahideen.</em></p> -</blockquote> - -<p>IS-K propaganda also makes good use of alarmist claims made by international governments and media concerning their capabilities and power. In the aforementioned video, for example, feature several speeches of leaders of Central Asia Republics, in which they speak of the threat to their countries from ISKP, of their concern that the strength of ISKP has grown to 6,500 fighters and of the presence of these fighters in northern Afghanistan which has long borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.</p> - -<p>Another key dimension of IS-K propaganda has been portraying itself as the creator and administrator of a utopian society. In March 2023 a new IS-K Telegram channel in Pashto and Dari dedicated to this strand of propaganda activities appeared, called Daastaan-e-Shab (Story of the Night), through which it shared accounts of its recruited members every Friday night. Every member was shown as being kind and hospitable, and as having sensitive aspects to his personality — as opposed to simply being bloodthirsty militants. The target of this propaganda seemingly was to inspire members of the Salafi community who are not already members of IS-K.</p> - -<p>IS-K’s social media effort eventually started running afoul of Taliban counterterrorism. It also ran into issues with Telegram, where many pro-IS-K accounts were banned in May 2023. IS-K in response started sharing with its members via its remaining Telegram channels standard OSINT best practices, which highlights the group’s sophistication with respect to social media. Users were being advised to flesh out their accounts by adding profile pictures to them, and to follow non-ISKP channels which cover topics as diverse as fashion to avoid drawing suspicion of being linked to a proscribed group.</p> - -<p>Apart from going underground, decentralising and investing in an expanded social media campaign, IS-K also tried to undermine the Taliban’s reconciliation and reintegration efforts, bringing pressure on the elders to not facilitate negotiations between IS-K members and Taliban. One surrendering member heard from villagers that:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p><em>Daesh is trying a lot to undermine this process. Several elders who were secretly facilitating the negotiations and connecting IS-K members with the Taliban for their surrender have been threatened.</em></p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Others who surrendered confirmed the same, adding that threats consisted of death warnings and of burning homes down. IS-K also increased counter-intelligence efforts among its own ranks. These countermeasures were deemed to be effective former IS-K members, as they were under the impression that surrenders had either diminished in numbers or even ceased. A few surrendered IS-K members reportedly re-joined IS-K in Nangarhar.</p> - -<p>Overall, IS-K invested considerable efforts trying to re-launch its campaign against the Emirate. These efforts appear to have reduced the impact of the Taliban’s counter-IS-K campaign. They did not, however, completely reverse the negative trend.</p> - -<h3 id="is-k-on-the-brink-spring-2023">IS-K on the Brink: Spring 2023</h3> - -<p>Although, as discussed above, IS-K sought hard to adapt to the challenges posed by the Taliban, by spring 2023 it was in a very serious predicament. In part this was the result of the cumulative impact of counter-IS-K efforts by the Taliban. Despite keeping its overall level of activity low and limiting casualties, successful Taliban raids against IS-K cells in the cities appear to have made a dent on IS-K morale. While the actual number of killed in action, relative to the total strength of IS-K, might have been as low as four percent per year according to an internal source, these were mostly selected core members of urban cells. Although the total number of these core members is not known, the total size of the IS-K structure in the cities was certainly less than 1,000, with operational cells perhaps a third of that number and the rest being support elements. Hence, the casualty rate among these elite operational cells was certainly high. A senior source in IS-K acknowledged not just that the Taliban had busted several IS-K cells, but also that many safe houses had been seized, at great cost for the organisation. Moreover, IS-K sources might well understate the level of their casualties, either knowingly or because of being themselves fed disinformation by their leaders. At the end of May 2023, a source in Kunar, who was in regular contact with IS-K members, stated that he was hearing them complaining about being hit by the Taliban all the time.</p> - -<p>It is also important to understand that keeping clashes with the Taliban at a minimum was not without side effects. It was hardly a morale raiser for an insurgent organisation. There are indeed signs that the collapse of IS-K military activities was deepening IS-K’s morale crisis in spring 2023. The accelerating withdrawal into Pakistan was also bound to affect morale. IS-K propaganda tried to present the transfer of members to Pakistan as a demonstration of tactical skills, but as more and more members ended up in Pakistan, in many cases even dragging family members with them, the transfer must have been started looking more and more like a rout. An IS-K source indicated in April 2023 that almost two thirds of IS-K’s members were in Pakistan. Multiple sources within the TTP signalled an intensified presence of IS-K members in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan in spring 2023, not only in the traditional IS-K hideout of Tirah valley, but also in Orakzai, Bajaur and even in Peshawar.</p> - -<p>There deeper cause of the crisis was the worsening financial crisis, affecting IS-K in early 2023. Local elders in Kunar, in regular contact with the families of IS-K members, and sometimes with the members themselves, indicated that salaries to IS-K fighters — between $300 and $500 per month — had not been paid for months. While there were no reports of IS-K fighters forcing villagers to feed them, villagers were known to have started sending food to IS-K fighters hiding in the mountains. At the end of May 2023, a source in Kunar, who was in regular contact with IS-K members, stated that he was hearing them complaining about funds shortages. IS-K members reported to him having to asking for food in the villages; something never before reported. The elders also confirmed that IS-K had started collecting Zakat for the first time and “bring[ing] pressure on specific shopkeepers, businessmen and other rich people in the districts and in Asadabad city to pay for them. People are forced to pay them…”. Extortion from local businesses in Salafi communities was something new for IS-K.</p> - -<p>In part, the crisis was the result of the Taliban getting better at making it harder for IS-K to transfer money into Afghanistan via the hawala system. Already in September 2022, an IS-K source acknowledged that just three hawala traders in all of Afghanistan were willing to do transfers for IS-K. Hawala traders reported intensifying Taliban controls, with the enforcement of rules dictating the registration of personal details, including IDs, for each transaction. The traders reported their feeling that while in the past some Hawala traders were ready to take some risk and accept transfers of large sums by dubious individuals without registering the transactions, by spring 2023 the risk was becoming too high. The situation was compounded by the fact that the Turkish authorities in November 2022 cracked down on the main IS-K financial hub, leading to the detention of twenty cadres who were used to transfer money via the hawala system. Although IS-K was able to partially replace the lost capabilities, some damage was permanent. At the end of May 2023, a source in Kunar, who was in regular contact with IS-K members, received hints that receiving hawala transfers from abroad was no longer possible.</p> - -<p>The financial issues faced by IS-K were not entirely of the Taliban’s making, however. For years IS-K had been experiencing some unreliability from the IS central leadership regarding financial commitments. For example, in 2021 the central leadership only delivered half of the funds originally allocated. In 2022, the level of funding remained relatively modest, but promises of a big increase in funding for 2023 were made. The first signs, at the time of writing, were that these promises were far from being met in 2023 either. Although assessing the wealth of Islamic State is always difficult, there were signs that in 2022-23 its fundraising effort was lagging; sources mentioned “on-going efforts”, such as visits to various Gulf countries, but little in terms of actual donations. In April 2023 a source in the IS finance commission for Iraq mentioned that orders had been issued to transfer stockpiles of cash from Iraq to Turkey. Presumably, IS Central too was low in new funds and forced to rely on its reserves to keep going. As for why the external funding to IS has slowed down, it is too complex a topic to be addressed in this paper; suffice to say, a source within the Iranian government indicated that, as part of the agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia of 10 March 2023, the Saudis committed to block any support accruing to IS from their country.</p> - -<p>Additional evidence points towards difficulties with funding from even potentially sympathetic donors: a senior source in IS-K revealingly commented that “Islamic donors pay every group according to the activities of that group; we invested lots of money for a long-term offensive against our enemies”. He further explained that “IS-K in the past two years have invested lots of money in transferring members from one province of Afghanistan to another and from one region to another and also spent money on building and renting houses in different provinces of Afghanistan, buying weapons and other expenses”, but then the Taliban’s crackdown hit hard. The same source confirmed that in recent months IS-K faced “some financial problem” and that IS-K had to ask sympathisers in Afghanistan and Pakistan to help with cash donations and pay taxes like Zakat for the first time, as mentioned above by the elders of Kunar. He also implicitly admitted that IS-K members might be relying on food donations from sympathisers and relatives, whereas in the past IS-K had proudly stated the ability of its logistics to feed its fighters without having to rely on the villagers. He claimed that the leaderships of IS-K and IS was working to fix the problem with “Islamic governments and Salafi charities”.</p> - -<p>The Taliban’s counter-IS-K operations and IS-K’s financial issues both contributed to forcing the group to slow down operations, according to the senior source mentioned above. The difficult financial and military situation has also led to the re-emergence of internal fissures. A local source in Kunar, well connected with IS-K members, said that his contacts revealed tensions and struggles within the leadership about the negative trend, with talks of yet another strategy being in the works and rumours of changes at the leadership level. The same senior source already mentioned a problem of “weak leadership of some people” and the “betrayal” of others, who reported about several cells and hideouts to the Taliban. He acknowledged that “there were some internal tensions”, but quickly added that they had been resolved by June 2023.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vQXxBYH.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Graph 1. IS-K attacks and counter-terrorism operations, 2022-23.</strong> Source: Afghan Witness. Created with Datawrapper.</em></p> - -<h3 id="is-ks-hopes-for-recovery-summer-2023">IS-K’s Hopes for Recovery: Summer 2023</h3> - -<p>As we have seen above, the spring crisis had complex and converging causes, some of which were upstream in the IS-K funding system. Given that funding was obviously key to IS-K’s viability, the organisation moved quickly to seek solutions. IS-K tried hard to figure out how to transfer some cash to Afghanistan, without going through the Afghan hawala sector; cross-border trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan as a covert way to transfer money to its forces within the latter. In June, one courier was caught with a lot of cash, just after crossing from Pakistan, according to local sources. Another technique for transferring money adopted by IS-K in the summer was sending goods (such as oil) into Afghanistan from both Pakistan and Central Asia as if they were being traded. IS-K members would then sell them on the market and keep the entire amount. Cryptocurrencies also appear to have become one of IS-K’s favourite ways of moving money. IS-K magazine Voice of Khurasan called for donations in cryptocurrency via Monero.</p> - -<p>IS-K also sought to increase local revenue, for example by cooperating with kidnappers’ gangs for ransom. Extortion of money from wealthy individuals in eastern Afghanistan continued. However, given the lack of territorial control, as one IS-K source acknowledged in August 2023, tax collection did not amount to much compared to the amount IS-K had been able to obtain in the past.</p> - -<p>Overall, by the summer of 2023, the financial situation was improving somewhat, at least in part because of the counter-measures discussed above. By October 2023, demands for food had completely stopped. Some IS-K members, who had been taking small loans (10,000-15,000 Afs) to feed their teams in Spring, were talking of returning the loans thanks to the improved financial situation. The financial recovery of IS-K should not be overstated, however: as one source noted, the payment of salaries was still suspended. One IS-K source in Kunar commented in October that “We have managed to restore capability and regain the trust of our financial partners and are faring much better than we were some months ago”. He then added that “If we compare the Islamic State’s current financial situation to what it was two years ago when the Americans surrendered in Afghanistan to the apostate Taliban, it can be said that we still have financial problems. However, compared to how things were six months ago, we are much better now….” The feeling was that IS-K had recovered from the nadir reached in the spring when it could not even feed its fighters, but was still far from having reached even the funding levels of late 2021-early 2022. Indeed extortion from local businessmen, a recent innovation, continued. Neither IS-K combat strength returned to the level of 2021. Under the new conditions, IS-K had to rely in Afghanistan largely on Afghan members, whereas in the past of its combat force was made up of Pakistanis. One IS-K source estimated in October 2023 that “around 80%” of IS-K’s fighters were Afghans, the rest being mainly from Central Asia.</p> - -<p>Reports also started emerging that recruitment in Kunar restarted, including in some Salafi madrasas. There were also reports of IS-K beginning to invest again in rebuilding its urban networks. A weapons smuggler in Kunar, with whom IS-K had accumulated a debt due to its insolvency in spring, indicated in August that IS-K had just paid cash to him for a weapons shipment. By October, IS-K guerrilla activities in Kunar reached the apparent rate of an attack every few days, causing limited casualties to the Taliban — one to two killed per attack even according to IS-K’s own claims on social media. As IS-K members flowed back into Kunar, they also started establishing more underground structures, such as training centres in areas of difficult access. The Taliban were forced to increase patrols again. In Afghanistan as a whole, throughout June - August 2023 there was an upsurge in IS-K attacks from April and May, when no attacks took place (Graph 1).</p> - -<p>From the summer of 2023 onwards, IS-K also resumed dispatching cells to previously unaffected northern cities, such as Pul-i Khumri, where on 13 October 2023 it was able to bomb a Shi’a Mosque, killing seven.</p> - -<p>IS-K continued to adapt its propaganda to the new strategic environment. The more it had to reduce the scale of its violent activities, the more IS-K maintained an aggressive attitude, constantly threatening attacks against the Taliban and the West, to the point that the discrepancy with reality became more and more noticeable even on pro-IS-K social media. IS-K also began extending the threats to Sunni clerics. In October 2023 pro-IS-K media outlet al-Mursalat started threatening Afghan ulema into not complying with the Taliban’s demands to condemn IS-K in their sermons. During the summer of 2023, IS-K media intensified propaganda efforts aimed at the ethnic minorities, with a special focus on Panjshiris — still believed to be supportive of other opposition groups, such as the National Resistance Front — warning them that the western countries would not help them and pointing out how the old leaders betrayed them. Despite rising Taliban-Shi’a tension in the summer, IS-K propaganda continued accusing the Taliban of protecting the Shi’a community and reproduced videos of members of the Taliban security forces proudly stating their duty of protecting the Shi’as.</p> - -<p>Perhaps more importantly, IS-K also began utilising social media for purposes other than propaganda. Online IS-K chats highlighted in September 2023 how recent online recruits in areas remote from IS-K bases are cut off and unable to participate in activities for now. In one such chat, Ghamgin-o-Gharibam, the following exchange took place:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p><em>Chat member: “While we cannot migrate to Caliphate areas because we lack territory in Khurasan, how can we attack our enemy? We also don’t have weapons.”</em></p> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p><em>Admin response: “Very soon the way for emigrating to the Caliphate ground will be opened.”</em></p> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p><em>Chat member: “By when? Our friends are being arrested daily and we also fear being detained.”</em></p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The admin agreed to teach basic military methods and promised that it would commence training with a lesson called “How to Carry Out a Guerrilla Attack Against Enemies in Cities”. IS-K was discouraging new members from travelling to its concentration areas, presumably for security reasons. Hence, one of the intentions behind investment in propaganda was to boost the morale of increasingly dispersed members and to convince them that the jihad was succeeding. IS-K tried to diminish the Taliban’s achievements and to stimulate revenge among IS-K members, for example claiming that the Taliban had deliberately killed IS-K family members during their raids against city cells. It is noteworthy that IS-K media channels would seek to reassure members about the prospect of being detained by the Taliban, with promises of freeing all detainees.</p> - -<p>While IS-K was somewhat energised by the relative improvement of its financial streams, even in the summer of 2023 it seemed to be struggling to identify a viable strategy and was instead focusing on trying to maintain its core structure, while the lower ranks shrank, waiting for the Taliban to make mistakes. One IS-K source in Kunar noted that in the summer of 2023 the “new” strategy adopted by the leadership of IS-K consisted of: hit and run attacks; attacks on IS-K defectors; attacks on Taliban leaders and commander; and attacks on Taliban Imams.</p> - -<p>This strategy is not new, and repeats what IS-K has been doing since August 2021: keeping its core structure as safe as possible, while waiting for opportunities. From time to time, some developments do play in IS-K’s favour, at least temporarily. Repeated efforts to infiltrate the Taliban occasionally bear fruit, thanks to the growing frustration of ethnic minority Taliban with their Pashtun leaders and persistent general ethnic tension in the north. According to an elder previously connected to the Public Uprising Forces — a militia sponsored by the intelligence services of the previous regime — IS-K is indeed targeting former militiamen for recruitment, at least in northern Takhar. The source himself sounded quite sympathetic to IS-K and may have joined its membership. These recruits seem motivated largely by the desire of obtaining protection against the Taliban, as well as a thirst for revenge. As far as disgruntled Taliban are concerned, in October 2023 the Taliban detained four of their commanders, all Tajiks, in north-eastern Afghanistan, on accusation of having links to IS-K. Local Taliban sources reported that among the Tajik Taliban of the north-east there is widespread dissatisfaction at what they describe as their marginalisation by Pashtuns within the organisation. IS-K is aware of these tensions and proactively courts Tajiks commanders, some of whom are believed to be cooperating with it smuggling weapons and other logistics.</p> - -<p>IS-K also positioned itself to exploit worsening Kabul-Islamabad relations; its attacks in Pakistan during 2022-23 could be interpreted as an attempt to put pressure on Islamabad, perhaps with a “support vs immunity from IS-K terrorism” trade-off in mind. Such deals were reported in the past, and the Taliban claim that they are still in place today, though they appear to have long fallen off. The Pakistani authorities bear grudges concerning the Emirate giving hospitality to the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP), so the concept is not far-fetched.</p> - -<p>If this strategy were the case, then, IS-K has so far failed, possibly because at the same time it was also courting the TTP — the biggest insurgent group opposed to the Pakistani government. These efforts appeared to have a more realistic chance of success, due to the Taliban’s effort to restrain foreign jihadists based on their territory. While the TTP was able to resist such efforts better than other groups, serious friction with the Taliban occurred. Tension peaked after the Chitral fighting (September 2023), when the Taliban detained tens of TTP members who were on their way back to Afghanistan, prompting more anger and resulting in high level TTP-Taliban talks to defuse tension.</p> - -<p>Taliban leaders sought repeatedly to convince the TTP to avoid carrying out raids into Pakistan from Afghan territory and avoid recruiting Afghans into its ranks. Ultimately, however, the Taliban refused to crack down on TTP activities as demanded by Islamabad, fearful that IS-K accusations of betraying the cause of jihad in Pakistan gain credibility. The Taliban fear that the TTP, which has thousands of armed men inside Afghanistan, might see large scale defections to IS-K, or even ally with it. There is evidence of some cooperation between IS-K and TTP from Spring 2023 onwards. Reportedly, TTP leaders had for several months been constantly alluding to the possibility of “defections” to IS-K from their ranks, whenever the Afghan Taliban put them under pressure. The Taliban’s leadership, aware of widespread sympathies for the TTP within its ranks, for all of 2022 and 2023 prioritised relations with the TTP over relations with Islamabad, resulting in gradually worsening Afghanistan-Pakistan relations: in November 2023, Pakistan expelled Afghans illegally residing on Pakistani soil.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>Despite the major difficulties it faced after the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, IS-K demonstrated great resilience. Its strategic choices were often based on over-optimistic assessment of the weaknesses of the Taliban and the rigid ideological approach of the organisation greatly limited its ability to expand its ranks. However, the tactical choices made by the leadership were mostly sound from the perspective of a violent extremist organisation: it rapidly bailed out of direct confrontation with the Taliban, even in the east where it had its main stronghold; it went on the offensive in the cities; it sought to spare its forces; it invested massively in its propaganda operations, which helped it convey an image of much greater strength than it actually had.</p> - -<p>A critical flaw of IS-K was that it remained crucially dependent on funding accruing from abroad. Not only did the Taliban get gradually better at interdicting the flow of money but IS-K also struggled to provide a compelling rationale for prospective donors to fund it. The idea of a jihad against the Taliban had little appeal among traditional sympathisers and supporters of IS-K in the Gulf countries and IS-K struggled to offer an alternative and convincing rationale. Eventually, even the central leadership of IS, which had made up for IS-K’s failure to raise enough of its own funds, seemed to have started running out of cash. Even if in the latter half of 2023 the situation was easing somewhat, this remained a critical vulnerability for IS-K.</p> - -<p>Despite being undermined by the gradually reducing flow of money and having to decentralise its operations, IS-K was able to maintain a considerable level of organisational coherence, helped by the Taliban’s failure to offer attractive packages to disillusioned members. Moving IS-K members to Pakistan was likely part of a wider strategy meant to put a large part of its structure in “reserve” or “freeze” mode, in the hope of new funding accruing soon. Indeed, as soon as some money started flowing again, many of these re-entered Afghanistan, but parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan remain available to IS-K as safe havens.</p> - -<p>It remains to be seen how long this organisational coherence will last if funding cannot be kept at sufficient levels. Maintaining a large structure underground is expensive and makes recruitment harder to carry on. As importantly, the low level of activity and relative passivity in the face of Taliban crackdowns should be expected to affect morale. Given that the prospects for IS central to enjoy a renaissance looked rather dim as of mid-2023, IS-K’s best chances of reversing a negative trend are if intra-Taliban divisions deepen, resulting in the implosion of the Emirate — of which there is little visible sign — or some regional power deciding to support it against the Taliban for its own reasons.</p> - -<p>Much, of course, will also depend on how the Taliban will develop their counter-IS-K efforts. This paper shows how IS-K’s original challenge to the Emirate had to repeatedly adapt to the Taliban’s own evolving response. Overall, IS-K’s flexibility, its capacity to adapt, and even to migrate geographically is striking. If there were any doubt that IS-K has absorbed organisational know-how from the original Islamic State, it should have been dispelled by post-August 2021 developments. IS-K clearly seems to have inherited the resilience of the mother organisation. It is worth noting that IS-K has clearly been prioritising maintaining its core structure of highly motivated and well-prepared cadres, even at the price of sacrificing its foot soldiers. That core structure is the repository of the know-how inherited from IS-Central or developed by IS-K itself throughout its history. That the core has shown the ability to develop new tactics and ability to function as a relatively large underground organisation represents the greatest threat. IS-K might eventually survive the Taliban’s onslaught, but if it does it will emerge as a much more dangerous organisation than before.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Antonio Giustozzi</strong> is the senior research fellow at RUSI in the Terrorism and Conflict research group. He has been working in and on Afghanistan in various respects since the 1990s and has published extensively on the conflict and specifically the Taliban and the Islamic State. His main research interests are global jihadism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the security sector, state-building and insurgencies. He is currently project director for Strive Afghanistan, which is pioneering new P/CVE approaches. He is also associated with the LSE (South Asia Centre) and was previously associated with War Studies at KCL.</p>Antonio GiustozziThe paper discusses the conditions of the Islamic State in Khorasan and how its strategy and structures evolved after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021.【黎智英案・審訊第廿三日】2024-02-05T12:00:00+08:002024-02-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-23<ul> - <li>林榮基赴台擺頭版 陳沛敏:係我嘅決定,因有新聞價值、持獨家照片者要求</li> -</ul> - -<excerpt /> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cTaUc9i.png" alt="image01" /></p> - -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(5日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第23日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。庭上展示黎智英與陳沛敏之間的訊息紀錄,黎指示陳:「請繼續做在大陸做生意的香港商人面對的危險,嚇壞那些生意佬讓建制派不敢造次。」控方指其後文章〈西環集中營:集結商界 專業人士7.1上街〉提及商界反對修例,陳則表示不肯定文章內容如此寫,是否因為黎的指示,還是純屬巧合。另外,《蘋果》於2019年4月頭版報導林榮基修例前赴台,陳稱:「係我嘅決定」,因她認為有新聞價值,加上持有相關獨家照片的人士開出條件,若果《蘋果》打算頭條報導,才會願意提供相片。</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英邀香港監察羅傑斯聯絡陳-陳沛敏反送中後傳送新聞稿較頻密">黎智英邀「香港監察」羅傑斯聯絡陳 陳沛敏:反送中後傳送新聞稿較頻密</h4> - -<p>已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏,第二天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。</p> - -<p>控方展示訊息紀錄,黎智英於2017年10月向陳沛敏發送訊息,稱「沛敏,我剛同Ben Rogers晚飯,他剛與一些MP成立了HK WATCH維護香港自由,我對他說有需要傳媒的幫忙請他找你並給了他你的聯絡,謝謝。黎」。</p> - -<p>陳表示對羅傑斯(Benedict Rogers)認識不多,只知道他與一些英國國會議員成立了「香港監察」。黎傳送上述訊息之後,羅傑斯的確有聯絡她,傳送一些傳媒新聞稿,開頭僅是一些介紹「香港監察」的資料,但到了2019年《逃犯條例》引起社會運動,羅傑斯傳送新聞稿的頻率「係密咗、多啲就香港事務出新聞稿囉」。</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>1/2 Tomorrow I will begin a 24 hour fast &amp; hunger strike for Hong Kong. I call it a fast &amp; a hunger strike because they have two meanings. A fast is spiritual &amp; includes prayer. A hunger strike is political &amp; involves protest. #HongKong #StandwithHK #democracyforhongkong pic.twitter.com/1pLvwgiCAf — Benedict Rogers 羅傑斯 (@benedictrogers) November 15, 2019</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>此外,陳確認羅傑斯是「香港監察」的信託主席,相信《蘋果日報》曾經報導過「香港監察」成立,以及羅傑斯被香港政府當局拒絕入境。</p> - -<h4 id="陳沛敏形容香港監察對中國帶批判性">陳沛敏形容「香港監察」對中國帶批判性</h4> - -<p>2018年5月16日,羅傑斯傳送了一篇文章給黎智英,之後黎轉發該訊息給陳沛敏。文章題為〈香港政府發動的政治檢控壓毀民主派的希望(“Lawfare Waged by the Hong Kong Government is Crushing the Hopes of Democrats”)〉,由羅傑斯撰寫,於2018年5月15日刊登。陳沛敏閱讀後,指文章提及DQ立法會議員、檢控佔中運動中的某些議員,惟她不肯定《蘋果》有否報導此文章。</p> - -<p>控方問陳,「香港監察」可說是支持中國,還是反中國?陳回答:「我諗佢好 critical 囉」,意指對中國帶有批判性,同樣形容亦適用於羅傑斯。</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英指示做大美總領事演說-陳沛敏此前經已報導">黎智英指示「做大」美總領事演說 陳沛敏:此前經已報導</h4> - -<p>2019年3月4日,其時政府已推出了《逃犯條例》修訂,黎智英向陳沛敏傳送一篇《華盛頓郵報》報導,指示她報導時任美國駐港澳總領事 Kurt Tong 於同年2月27日的公開演說,黎並說「請做大」。陳之後回覆,已用A2全版報導,而「明天見報會繼續」。</p> - -<p>陳沛敏指,A2僅次於頭版,因此A2全版報導算是「幾大」。控方問黎此前曾否要求她「做大」某些新聞,陳稱:「應該有。」但黎並沒有解釋為何想她「做大」該新聞。</p> - -<p>陳其後解釋,其實在黎傳送上述訊息之前,《蘋果》已經用了A2全版來報導演說,可能黎當時並未留意,所以其後黎發覺後,才會有一則訊息指「好的,對不起,我不知道,謝謝」。</p> - -<h4 id="官質疑陳毫不猶豫地遵從黎要求">官質疑陳毫不猶豫地遵從黎要求</h4> - -<p>法官李運騰指,該演說在早前發生,不再是新聞,而是一則舊聞,可是陳卻似乎毫不猶豫地遵從黎的要求,而不是告訴黎「這是舊聞」或「沒有需要放在A2」,還是因為陳覺得值得放在A2?陳則澄清,她的意思是,當黎叫她「做大」美領事演說時,「其實我哋已經做大咗喇」,因《蘋果》在演說翌日便已全版報導。而她當時回覆的訊息只是「婉轉地話畀佢(黎)我哋已經做大咗」。</p> - -<p>李官追問,但陳並沒有拒絕黎的要求,而她剛才供稱「應該有」遵從黎的指示。陳則表示,既然黎如此重視這新聞,而且《蘋果》已經報導了,「但都會睇吓會有咩跟進報導囉。譬如輿論有冇對個演說有新回應,而唔係重覆再報導多一次個演說」,所以她回覆黎表示會跟進報導,而不是明言拒絕他。</p> - -<p>控方續問,不論黎重視或不重視某些新聞,是否都會影響《蘋果》的編採方向。陳回答:「都會嘅。」</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PUmkHbW.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗(左)、副社長 陳沛敏(右)</p> - -<h4 id="訊息顯示黎指示報導陳太與彭斯會面-做到最大效果-陳沛敏有新聞價值">訊息顯示黎指示報導陳太與彭斯會面 「做到最大效果」 陳沛敏:有新聞價值</h4> - -<p>控方展示 WhatsApp 訊息,黎智英向陳沛敏轉發一張照片,是前政務司司長陳方安生與時任美國副總統彭斯會面時握手的照片,黎指這是「大新聞(big news)」,指示陳將新聞「做到最大效果(use it to the maximum effect)」。陳確認其後有將新聞做到「最大效果」,即是將報聞「擺喺顯著位置,篇幅大啲」。</p> - -<p>控方展示《蘋果日報》於2019年3月24日的頭版報導,標題為〈彭斯晤陳太 關注港人權〉,頭版下方有一篇配稿題為「主導對華政策」、「港問題或成中美角力戰」。控方問這是否陳當時對中美關係的理解,陳回答是。</p> - -<p>控方又提及,頭版照片下方標註是由公民黨提供,而且報導提及有其他公民黨成員陪同陳方安生訪美。控方另指,根據訊息紀錄,黎智英轉發給陳的訊息,是來自前公民黨立法會議員郭榮鏗。</p> - -<p>控方問陳為何要將此新聞放在頭版,陳表示:「都覺得佢係有新聞價值。當然黎生話要做大,都係一個因素嚟嘅。」</p> - -<h4 id="陳沛敏黎曾希望約見記協執委-惟記協內部有不同意見-最後沒有成事">陳沛敏:黎曾希望約見記協執委 惟記協內部有不同意見 最後沒有成事</h4> - -<p>控方指2019年3月29日及30日的訊息均有提及香港記協,陳沛敏起初表示不記得是什麼事件,但閱過訊息紀錄後,憶述當時黎智英希望約見記協執委,相信他有意談論《逃犯條例》對新聞業的影響,於是想經她聯絡對方。惟記協執委則表示內部對於是否會面有不同意見,陳於是將相關回覆轉告黎。</p> - -<h4 id="報導引述黎稱倘修例慘過23條-陳沛敏黎認為條例用作政治檢控">報導引述黎稱倘修例「慘過23條」 陳沛敏:黎認為條例用作「政治檢控」</h4> - -<p>控方續展示2019年4月1日《蘋果》報導,題為〈黎智英:倘修例傳媒冇得做〉,文中引述黎稱若果通過修例會「慘過23條」,又稱「呢單嘢好緊要㗎大佬,呢單嘢過咗,我哋冇得做㗎!傳媒冇得做㗎!你話報道大陸新聞,佢話你揭露國家機密;你批評佢,佢又話你顛覆國家安全,咁就冇㗎嘞,新聞自由依家少少都冇埋㗎喇」。</p> - -<p>控方問到,為何黎會將《基本法》23條與《逃犯條例》相提並論?陳指因為黎認為《逃犯條例》是用來「針對一啲政治檢控」、「政治檢控用途」。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UsPg92y.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 黎智英(資料圖片)</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英指示多報導商界對修例擔心-嚇壞那些生意佬讓建制派不敢造次">黎智英指示多報導商界對修例擔心 「嚇壞那些生意佬讓建制派不敢造次」</h4> - -<p>控方續展示2019年3月30日的訊息,黎向陳稱:「沛敏,今日頭條做得很好,只是沒有說做大陸新聞分分鐘被視為揭露國家機密,和批評中國政府文章會被標籤顛覆國家安全等罪名。但很好了。請繼續做在大陸做生意的香港商人面對的危險,嚇壞那些生意佬讓建制派不敢造次。謝謝。」陳回覆,稱「收到。商界有票,所以政府才稍微讓步,如果他們反對,政府就沒戲唱了」。黎回覆:「對,對付這些怕死鬼可能是我們絕招。謝謝。」</p> - -<p>陳沛敏指,黎認為他們「要報導多啲商界對《逃犯條例》的擔心,或者反對《逃犯條例》的意見」。法官李運騰問陳認為黎的訊息是「指示」、「建議」還是其他?陳認為是「指示」,因為黎並不是在提出建議,陳當時亦同意黎的指示。控方問到,黎口中的「怕死鬼」是哪些人,陳相信是指做生意的人。</p> - -<p>黎其後再傳來訊息:「沛敏,你今日的文章畫龍點睛,寫得真好。」陳在庭上表示,她有替副刊專欄撰寫文章,每隔一個星期六刊登一篇,專欄名為「堆填生活」。</p> - -<h4 id="黎落指示後文章出現相關內容-陳不肯定有否因果關係">黎落指示後文章出現相關內容 陳:不肯定有否因果關係</h4> - -<p>控方展示2019年4月3日的《蘋果日報》文章,題為〈西環集中營:集結商界 專業人士7.1上街〉。陳沛敏解釋,此專欄主要是寫政界花邊,多數由政治組同事執筆,雖然每次撰寫的同事可能不同,但是均會使用同一筆名「季陶」。</p> - -<p>控方指文章提及「有民主派人士稱,現時各個界別反修訂《逃犯條例》的人已越來越多,特別是商界及專業界,但礙於怕北京及林鄭政府秋後算賬,大多不敢公開表態,他們正研究如何集結這些力量」。控方問,上述提及商界的內容與黎早前的指示有沒有關係?</p> - -<p>陳則表示不肯定,因為她有跟同事轉達要做多些關於商界擔心的報導,但上述文章是否因為黎下達指示,然後剛巧有一位民主派說商界和專業界擔心,而哪一件事導致同事寫這篇文章,她就沒有查問下去。</p> - -<p>法官李運騰追問,所以陳是不肯定當中的因果關係?陳回答是。法官杜麗冰又問陳知不知道文章由誰撰寫,陳表示只知道是政治組同事寫,但不知道是哪一位同事。杜官問,所以陳不知道文章內容如此寫是因為黎的指示,還是巧合?陳確認。</p> - -<h4 id="陳沛敏黎智英曾建議訪問司法界前輩-惟因聯絡不到而告吹">陳沛敏:黎智英曾建議訪問「司法界前輩」 惟因聯絡不到而告吹</h4> - -<p>控方另展示訊息紀錄,黎智英轉發來自民主黨李永達的訊息,並稱「以上是李永達提議」。李的訊息建議《蘋果》將修例其中幾個重點逐日分析,讓讀者逐點消化。陳相信當時《蘋果》有執行此建議。</p> - -<p>黎又在訊息中提及文章〈跟司法界前輩談引渡惡法〉寫得很好,問陳可否訪問文中提及的「司法界前輩」。陳理解這是一項「建議」,因為黎的訊息有問「係咪可以?」,所以陳認為:「佢都唔肯定係咪可以做到,但建議我哋諗吓。」</p> - -<p>陳指,其後她在公司與黎親身討論,黎重申覺得該專欄文章內容寫得很好,籲陳考慮寫成報導及怎樣表達重點,又問可否找到文中提及的「司法界前輩」,如果對方不肯露面,又能否要求只刊出背影。</p> - -<p>控方問陳最終有否執行黎的建議。陳則稱當時應該聯絡不到受訪者,因為他們希望經文章作者聯絡「司法界前輩」,惟後來沒有回音。</p> - -<h4 id="陳沛敏稱林榮基赴台新聞做頭條乃其決定-因有新聞價值提供獨家照片人士要求">陳沛敏稱林榮基赴台新聞做頭條乃其決定 因有新聞價值、提供獨家照片人士要求</h4> - -<p>控方續展示2019年4月26日的訊息紀錄,關於黎要求報導前銅鑼灣書店店長林榮基離港赴台。陳沛敏稱:「黎生喺清晨時 send 咗幾十個 message 畀我」,直到早上10至11時,她才醒來看到黎的訊息,於是聯絡羅偉光,並得悉《蘋果》網站版同事已經正在處理,以及下午3時準備在網站刊登林榮基的新聞。陳續指,她向黎交代之後,下午才上班,而結果林榮基的新聞成為翌日實體報紙的頭條。</p> - -<p>陳表示,以林榮基作為頭條「係我嘅決定」,因為她認為本身有新聞價值,加上提供相關獨家照片的人士開出條件,「如果做A1(頭條),佢先畀(照片)我哋用。」</p> - -<p>陳又憶述,前《蘋果》社長張劍虹當時似乎「好緊張呢件事」,所以陳決定把林榮基的報導放在頭條。陳指當時張在台灣,相信他透過台灣《蘋果》同事的協助找林做訪問,「佢有去幫手寫埋、採訪埋,佢亦有同黎生講佢喺採訪途中。」</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dbBSP92.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 林榮基(資料圖片)</p> - -<h4 id="陳沛敏蘋果每天召開數個會議-決定報紙內容和頭條">陳沛敏:《蘋果》每天召開數個會議 決定報紙內容和頭條</h4> - -<p>另外,控方問及《蘋果日報》實體報紙的出版流程。陳供稱,她每天約2時半會出席「鋤報會」,同場有不同部組的主管,每人輪流發表對當日出版的報紙的意見,可以是關於新聞角度、圖片選擇、其他報紙有但《蘋果》沒有的新聞,或者就同一單新聞《蘋果》有什麼做得比其他報紙遜色。最後由陳沛敏和前執行總編輯林文宗作總結,會議歷時約半小時。</p> - -<p>控方問及陳沛敏與林文宗在職能上有何分別,陳指林可謂她的副手,正如她上周五提及,她身體狀況不容許她工作太長時間,所以林文宗負責「守到報紙出版最後時間」,而且她休假期間林會接手她的工作。</p> - -<p>陳沛敏續指,開完「鋤報會」之後,下午約3時會有「初會」,各部組會派代表出席,通常是採訪主任或各部組的副總編輯。會議中各部組會報告當天有什麼重要新聞、正準備什麼新聞角度、有何跟進工作等,之後他們會揀選一些能夠「做得大」的新聞放在頭版,而陳和林會提供意見,例如可以如何跟進。</p> - -<p>陳續指,她在下午5時會參與「編前會議」,主要是跟進「初會」,包括揀選哪些新聞放在頭幾頁。不過,「編前會議」至報紙出版之間的一段時間,可能會有大新聞發生,或事件出現新進展,假設有一宗大新聞發生於晚上9時,需要更改新聞的編排位置,然則「我哋都會改過晒佢」。</p> - -<p>控方問到上述三種會議有否保存會議記錄,陳稱沒有,因當日工作結束之後,這些紀錄便沒有需要再保存。</p> - -<h4 id="陳沛敏總編輯羅偉光不時出席會議">陳沛敏:總編輯羅偉光不時出席會議</h4> - -<p>控方又問,有沒有高層出席上述會議。陳指《蘋果日報》總編輯羅偉光不時出席,大約每周數次,視乎有否重大新聞發生。</p> - -<p>陳沛敏續指,《蘋果日報》逢周三會有一個「Planning會」,除陳自己和林文宗之外,出席者包括港聞組、中國組、國際組和財經組等各部組,會上各部組會談及未來一星期有什麼重點新聞、、會著重什麼新聞角度及會怎樣部署,陳和林亦會提供意見,例如可以如何跟進。至於羅偉光,陳形容「因為佢真係好忙」,未能出席每次會議,因此即使他不在場,會議都會如期舉行。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e09fRCi.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》總編輯 羅偉光</p> - -<p>案件明日續審。</p> - -<hr /> - -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導林榮基赴台擺頭版 陳沛敏:係我嘅決定,因有新聞價值、持獨家照片者要求 \ No newline at end of file +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導陳沛敏:黎智英鮮明地反修例 很重視4.28遊行 當天報紙全版登尊子政治漫畫 陳沛敏:韓國電影以「逆權」為名 香港人始認識兩字 起初在中文不常用 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2024-03-14-power-plays.html b/hkers/2024-03-14-power-plays.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c586d1c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-03-14-power-plays.html @@ -0,0 +1,449 @@ + + + + + + + + + + Power Plays · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + +
+
+ +
+

Power Plays

+
+
+ +
+

Developments in Russian Enriched Uranium Trade

+

Darya Dolzikova | 2024.03.14

+
+
+

This report examines the trade in Russian enriched uranium.

+ + + +

Introduction and Report Overview

+ +

On 17 February 2024, almost two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenksy addressed the Munich Security Conference, pleading for unity against the aggression perpetuated by Russian President Vladimir Putin and for continued support for Ukraine in its fight. Among his calls to action, Zelensky stressed the need to close “all loopholes in the sanctions against Russia”, singling out Russia’s nuclear industry in particular. “There should be no sectors of the Russian economy involved in its aggression that are still free from sanctions”, he said. “This particularly relates to the nuclear sector”.

+ +

Russia’s Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is an important player in the international nuclear energy industry, with a major presence across various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The company, through its subsidiaries JSC TVEL and Techsnabexport LLC (better known as TENEX), is the biggest supplier of uranium enrichment to the global market, and has continued to export significant volumes of enriched uranium product since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In 2022, Russia accounted for 30% of the separative work units (SWU, the unit of measurement for uranium enrichment services) delivered to EU utilities and for 44% of global enrichment capacity. In the US, 24% of SWU purchased by US utilities in 2022 came from Russia.

+ +

This report examines the extent of Western (European and US) dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and identifies ways in which Rosatom may be continuing to access global, including Western, nuclear fuel supply chains, despite some efforts in the US and Europe to diversify away from Russian supply. The report studies changes in Russian enriched uranium trade patterns since the start of 2022 to identify possible indicators of efforts to adapt to restrictions on Russian uranium supply that have been or may be introduced by governments and companies.

+ +

The report examines four main case studies. In the first case study, the report outlines possible Chinese displacement activity using Russian material, identifying trade patterns that suggest that increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into China may be facilitating greater exports of Chinese enriched uranium supply, including to the US. The second case study addresses well-documented increases in enriched uranium imports from Russia to France and considers a range of possible explanations for this growth. While the precise flow and use of the additional Russian material that is being imported into France is difficult to ascertain definitively, it appears that France may be offering an outlet for Russian enriched uranium that is no longer welcome in other countries. This may be facilitating the reallocation of Russian supplies across European utilities’ supply chains, allowing Russia to continue accessing the European nuclear fuel market even as some countries seek to diversify away from Russian supply. The third case study examines reported deliveries through France and possibly the Netherlands of Russian enriched uranium to a French-owned fuel fabrication facility in Germany. The trade data reviewed for this report could not confirm the extent of deliveries to Germany of Russian material through third countries, or whether there have been shifts in such activity since the start of 2022; however, any such deliveries to Germany may be providing an additional option for Russian enriched uranium imports no longer welcome in other countries and may potentially be used in the future fabrication of VVER assemblies in Germany. The fourth case study touches on US dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and the likely limits of a proposed US ban on imports of Russian uranium in limiting Russia’s role in global nuclear fuel supply chains and Rosatom revenues.

+ +

Ultimately, the report demonstrates how Russia may be able to take advantage of incongruencies in sanctions or other restrictions, as well as persistent contractual dependencies and supply challenges, to maintain access to Western nuclear fuel supply chains and continue generating revenue through its enriched uranium exports. To improve effectiveness, any future sanctions or other bans aimed at limiting Russia’s presence in global nuclear fuel supply chains must be multilateral and accompanied by a concerted effort to increase Western and partner capacity across the supply chain, to successfully undercut dependence on Russian supply.

+ +

It is worth noting that most of the activities described in this report are entirely legal and likely represent logical efforts by companies to adapt to the changing trade and geopolitical landscape while continuing to meet whatever contractual obligations they may have for continued purchase and import of Russian material. As such, the report does not imply any violations of the laws of any relevant jurisdiction, or any international laws or sanctions. As described in more detail in Chapter II, the delivery to the US of enriched uranium that has been displaced by Russian supply, as may be the case with Chinese enriched uranium trade, may be in contravention of US regulation, unless assurances have been given to US authorities that such displacement is not taking place.

+ +

The practices described in this report raise questions over the extent of Western dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supply, the implications for Western energy security, the imbalance of vulnerability this may create between some Western governments and Moscow, and the effectiveness of efforts to cut Russia out of global, or even Western, nuclear supply chains. While the nuclear sector holds strategic significance for Moscow, it is not a major revenue source for Russia when compared to Russian trade in other commodities, such as oil and gas. However, as outlined in this report, Western reliance on Russian enriched uranium supply is proving challenging to shake, at least in the short term, and may create some difficulties for Western generation of nuclear energy, although experts disagree on the urgency and extent of potential challenges. The willingness, or necessity, of some Western countries to overlook Russian adaptations following efforts by other countries to limit Russian presence in Western nuclear fuel supply chains also points to a political and moral dissonance with stated US and European commitments to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression.

+ +

Data and Research Methodology

+ +

The data for this report was collected from a range of publicly accessible sources. These include: the UN Comtrade Database; the Eurostat database; trade data made available by national governments; trade data sourced from third-party trade data providers; corporate reporting documents and other publicly available corporate information; analysis published by think tanks, academic institutions, consultancies, industry associations and interest groups; and media reporting. Some of the data was sourced from non-English-language sources. Data from Russian-, Ukrainian-, French- and Spanish-language sources was viewed in its original language. Data from other language sources was viewed using digital translation. Urenco, the project funder, provided additional data and feedback throughout the research process. Any data that was subsequently included in the report or informed the analysis was independently verified through publicly available (or publicly accessible) sources. The report was subsequently subject to several internal and external peer reviews.

+ +

Fourteen unstructured anonymous interviews with a range of experts were also conducted to test some of the assumptions and hypotheses being drawn from the data, to identify possible alternative explanations for some of the trade patterns observed, and to capture any necessary nuance or overlooked data. To ensure the highest quality insights, interview questions were tailored to each expert’s distinct area of expertise, because, given the commercial sensitivity of nuclear fuel contracts and the intricate nature of global nuclear supply chains, not all experts consulted were necessarily familiar with all the dynamics being examined in this report. This approach facilitated a more nuanced understanding of the subject matter, reinforcing the robustness of the methodology employed in this report. While conducting this research, input was sought from key industry stakeholders and relevant organisations. To ensure comprehensive coverage and balanced perspective, outreach was extended to several entities mentioned in the report. Unfortunately, not all entities that were approached responded.

+ +

As with any large data set, the trade data accessed for this report may include some inconsistencies, omissions or duplicates. Misreporting in customs data is also possible. Efforts have been made to clean the datasets (by removing apparent duplicate entries from transaction-level datasets or disregarding datasets that were clearly incorrect) and to validate trends in data across multiple datasets, but it is possible that some inaccuracies remain.

+ +

Because Russia does not release data on its enriched uranium exports, values for trade with Russia were sourced from parallel import data of importing countries. Russia is not the only country that does not make information on its enriched uranium exports publicly available. For instance, the UK also does not publicly report its trade in enriched uranium. This limited the analysis that could be conducted for this report to those countries whose data could be accessed through publicly accessible sources. Any reference to exports from a given country indicates values sourced from the export data of that country; any reference to imports into a given country indicates values sourced from the import data of that country. In many instances, the import and export data of two trading partners differed somewhat; this may be due to differences in customs reporting between the two countries or delays between the export of material from one country and its arrival in the other. Such discrepancies have been noted throughout the report and given due attention in instances where they were particularly significant.

+ +

It is worth noting that the prices of natural uranium and enrichment services – which are included in the value of enriched uranium product – fluctuate. The spot price (the price of uranium purchased outside existing contracts) of natural (unenriched) uranium has risen significantly in the past three years. To avoid conflating increases in the values and volumes of trade in enriched uranium, data on both the monetary values and the net weight of enriched uranium (in the form of uranium hexafluoride) and nuclear fuel being traded has been included in the report, where available. However, data on the weight of material traded can also vary between datasets. While the data largely captures net weight, in some instances, data may also be capturing gross weight. As such, both the value and volume of goods should be reviewed together when analysing the data. The two largely bear out similar patterns. Where there are notable discrepancies, this has been highlighted.

+ +

When querying trade data for enriched uranium, where possible, searches were conducted for HS code 28442035, the commodity code for uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds. Some databases only allow for searches of six-digit HS codes; in these instances, HS code 284420 was queried instead, which includes the following commodities: uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds; plutonium and its compounds; alloys; dispersions (including metal-ceramics); ceramic products and mixtures containing uranium enriched in U-235; plutonium or compounds of these products. As such, data queried using the six-digit code may also include some materials besides enriched uranium. However, data for HS code 284420 is normally overwhelmingly made up of enriched uranium, with any other materials appearing in relatively small quantities. Variations of HS code 284420 were used in some instances – HS code 28442000 to query Chinese data (similar considerations relating to queries using HS code 284420 apply) and HS code 2844200020 to query US data (which captures uranium fluoride enriched in U-235) to access information on the weight of traded material, not just value.

+ +

I. Nuclear Fuel Supply Chains and Russia’s Role

+ +

Before examining Russia’s enriched uranium trade, it is worth understanding the nature of global nuclear fuel supply chains. Figure 1 includes a simplified overview of the nuclear fuel cycle. This report is only concerned with the front end of the cycle, and more specifically the enrichment stage.

+ +

Overview of Market Dynamics in the Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

+ +

image01 +Figure 1: Overview of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Source: Data from World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Overview”, updated April 2021.

+ +

The generation of energy from nuclear fuel depends on the splitting of atoms of the uranium isotope U-235 inside a nuclear reactor (nuclear fission). Mined uranium ore is made up of about 0.7% of U-235, with the remainder consisting of U-238. To make the fissile U-235 isotope suitable for nuclear energy generation in light water reactors its concentration must be increased before the uranium can be used to produce nuclear fuel assemblies (for most contemporary nuclear reactors, the concentration is about 3–5% U-235, which is classified as low enriched uranium (LEU)). This is done through the uranium enrichment process, using one of several possible methods. Globally, there is a limited number of companies that offer enrichment services, with almost all commercial enrichment conducted by one of four companies: Rosatom; China National Nuclear Corporation; Orano; and Urenco. Enrichment capacity is measured in SWU, which represent the effort required to separate isotopes of U-235 and U-238.

+ +

Nuclear fuel fabrication is also limited to a relatively small number of manufacturers. Once manufactured, nuclear fuel assemblies may be used in the country of fabrication or shipped for loading into reactors in other countries. Due to the challenges associated with transporting radioactive material, nuclear fuel is usually fabricated broadly in the same region of the world where it will be used.

+ +

The ultimate consumers of uranium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle are energy utilities, which generate electricity through the operation of nuclear reactors and sell it to consumers. Most often, the utility purchases the uranium it needs directly from uranium mine operators and owns the uranium throughout the rest of the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The utility then purchases the services necessary to turn mined uranium into usable nuclear reactor fuel (that is, conversion, enrichment, deconversion and fuel fabrication) from relevant service providers; however, the utility normally remains the sole owner of the material throughout the process.

+ +

The various service providers may be – and often are – located in countries other than the one where the material will eventually be used in reactors for energy generation. As a hypothetical example, uranium ore mined in Kazakhstan may be purchased by a Swiss utility, sent to Russia to be converted and enriched by Russian companies, then transported to a French-owned nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Germany to be made into nuclear fuel assemblies, before finally being delivered to Switzerland for use in Swiss nuclear reactors. Throughout this process, the Swiss utility would maintain ownership of the uranium material.

+ +

An alternative supply model involves the purchase and sale of uranium at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle by brokers and traders, who have themselves purchased the uranium or services in question from providers and sell these on to utilities.

+ +

Russian Presence Across the Global Nuclear Fuel Supply Chain

+ +

While Russian companies offer services across the nuclear fuel cycle, this report focuses on the provision of Russian enrichment services, as enrichment and conversion are the parts of the global nuclear supply chain where there are the greatest dependencies on Russia. Russia and, more specifically, the Rosatom subsidiaries TVEL and TENEX, is the greatest supplier of enrichment services to the global market. In 2022, Rosatom provided 35% of uranium enrichment services globally, according to the company’s 2022 annual report, and, according to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), provided 44% of global enrichment capacity in 2022.

+ +

The precise value of Russian enriched uranium exports over the past two years is difficult to ascertain as Russia does not make data on its enriched uranium trade publicly available. Some estimates are possible using import data from Russian customer countries reported through publicly accessible sources such as UN Comtrade, Eurostat, individual government reporting and third-party trade data providers. However, as noted earlier, some countries, for example, the UK, do not report their enriched uranium imports. Furthermore, at least in the case of the US, the import values of Russian enriched uranium include “returned feed”, that is, unenriched uranium the equivalent of which is returned to Russia, as required under US regulation (for more details, see Chapter V). As such, estimates of Russian enriched uranium exports are likely to be inexact and are not necessarily representative of the revenue that Rosatom generates from this trade. UN Comtrade data shows $2.03 billion in global imports from Russia under HS code 284420 in 2022, up from $1.29 billion in 2021. Data compiled from a range of sources shows $2.7 billion of enriched uranium imports from Russia in 2023.

+ +

Several Western and partner governments have taken some limited measures to sanction Rosatom or to make trade with Russia in nuclear materials more challenging or unattractive. The UK, the US and others have sanctioned parts of the Rosatom leadership and/or a small number of the company’s subsidiaries. In July 2022, the UK also introduced a new 35% tariff on imports of radioactive chemical elements and isotopes from Russia, which includes enriched uranium. While the EU has not introduced sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector, some European countries and companies have undertaken efforts to diversify away from Russian imports, turning to alternative suppliers of nuclear reactor technology and nuclear fuel. A bill that would restrict the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US was also passed in the US House of Representatives in December 2023 and, at the time of writing, was awaiting debate by the US Senate.

+ +

While analysts disagree on precisely how much the termination of Russian enriched uranium deliveries would impact Western utilities, there seems to be broad agreement that, in the absence of additional Western capacity coming online, such an embargo, whether introduced by Western governments or by Russia, as Moscow has previously threatened, would create at least some challenges for Western utilities. Several experts interviewed for this research expressed concerns that some US utilities may struggle to keep nuclear power plants operating should Russian enriched uranium supply be cut off; one interviewee noted that the concern is probably over longer-term supply and that utilities likely have sufficient stockpiles to carry them over in the short term. Furthermore, as time passes, governments and utilities may become increasingly better prepared to deal with disruptions in Russian enriched uranium supply. (For a further discussion on potential supply challenges, see Chapter V.)

+ +

Alternative enrichment capacity exists in Europe and the US – a combined 25,400 tonnes of SWU as of 2022, according to the WNA. In its latest report on global nuclear fuel markets, the WNA concludes that there is currently an oversupply of global enrichment capacity when compared to demand; however, Russia accounts for nearly half of current global SWU capacity. Additional Western capacity is being added through the expansion of Urenco’s enrichment plant in Eunice, New Mexico (an additional 700 tonnes of SWU per year, with the first cascades expected to become operational in 2025), Urenco’s Dutch facility at Almelo (an additional 750 tonnes of SWU per year, with the first cascades expected to become operational in 2027), Urenco’s enrichment plant in Gronau, Germany, and Orano’s Georges Besse II plant in southern France (an additional 2,500 tonnes of SWU per year, with additional capacity starting to become operational in 2028). Increased uranium enrichment in the US and Europe will also depend on the availability of the stage in the nuclear fuel cycle that precedes enrichment – conversion, where Russia also dominates the market. There are also enriched uranium inventories in the US and Europe, which stood at 3,963 tonnes of uranium in Europe and 2,670 tonnes of uranium in the US at the end of 2021 and which may help alleviate (at least partially) shortages caused by a termination of Russian supply. However, inventories vary between countries and utilities.

+ +

Russia is also a major supplier of nuclear reactor technology and nuclear reactor fuel, although the dependencies in this context have historically been in Eastern Europe and are now increasing in the Global South. Western suppliers have begun successfully replacing Russia’s supply of reactor and fuel technology to certain markets. Russia is also an important supplier in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, taking deliveries of spent nuclear fuel (which has already been irradiated in a nuclear reactor) for long-term storage or for reprocessing (the extraction of uranium from used reactor fuel, which can then be enriched and reused in the production of new nuclear fuel). France has historically sent reprocessed uranium from its reactors to Russia for re-enrichment. In 2018, Urenco concluded a contract with French utility EDF to enrich uranium recovered from reprocessed fuel from French reactors; the reprocessed fuel will be converted in Russia and delivered to Urenco’s facility in Almelo (the Netherlands) for enrichment, before being sent to a fuel fabrication plant at Romans-sur-Isère (France) for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for French reactors. The UK’s nuclear reactor at the Sizewell-B nuclear power plant has also previously used Framatome-manufactured nuclear fuel containing enriched reprocessed uranium (ERU) which was enriched in Russia. Sizewell-B has now switched to using natural (non-reprocessed) uranium enriched by Orano.

+ +

As this report focuses on Russian enrichment services, Russian presence across the rest of the fuel cycle, including in uranium conversion and reprocessing services, is not discussed at length. However, it is worth noting that weaning utilities in Western and partner countries off dependencies on Russian enriched uranium will only tackle one piece of the puzzle. Curtailing dependencies on Russia in Western countries’ nuclear energy supply chains will require investment in non-Russian capacity in other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, too, with conversion services being a particular chokepoint.

+ +

Rosatom and the War in Ukraine

+ +

Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear state enterprise, is responsible – through its many subsidiaries – for the development and export of Russian nuclear energy-related technology, services and materials. However, the company has also been reported as being connected with Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, and is headed up by some of the most senior people in Russia’s political and security circles. The company’s supervisory board is chaired by Sergey Kirienko, former prime minister of Russia and currently first deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Kirienko has admitted to orchestrating Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s occupied territories. According to Rosatom’s webpage, its board also includes: Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev; Assistant to the President of Russia Larissa Brychyova; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry Denis Manturov; First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Sergey Korolev; Deputy Prime Minister (and former Minister of Energy) Alexander Novak; Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev; Assistant to the President Maxim Oreshkin; and former Russian Ambassador to the US and currently Advisor to the President Yuri Ushakov. All members of the Rosatom supervisory board, with the exception of Ushakov, have been sanctioned by either the UK, the US or both. At the time of writing, there are no sanctions on Rosatom nor its leadership from the EU.

+ +

The company has reportedly offered to provide technology for the Russian military, and Rosatom staff were allegedly present at the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone following the Russian occupation of the site in February 2022. The company has also been reported as playing an important role in Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear power plant (NPP) in Europe, which was attacked and occupied by the Russian military on 4 March 2022. Following the occupation, Rosatom was reported as having taken over management of the plant. In October 2022, the Joint Stock Company Operating Organisation of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (JSC ZNPP OO) was established and currently operates the ZNPP. Kirienko has also repeatedly visited the ZNPP since its occupation.

+ +

There have been media reports of torture and harassment of the ZNPP’s Ukrainian staff since the invasion. Staff that had not fled the fighting around the plant were reportedly forced to sign contracts with Rosatom. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly raised concerns over the safety and security of the ZNPP and the wellbeing of its staff, while US and European governments have condemned Russian behaviour at the plant. An apparent interest by Rosatom in the ZNPP’s Western-supplied fuel and related technology has also raised concerns of industrial espionage and the security of the nuclear material at the facility.

+ +

TVEL, which operates Russia’s uranium enrichment plants, and TENEX, which supplies Russian enriched uranium abroad, are important members of the Rosatom family of companies. They are also closely related to JSC ZNPP OO, which is owned by JSC Rosenergoatom Concern (Rosenergoatom), the state enterprise responsible for the operation of Russia’s NPPs. TVEL, TENEX and Rosenergoatom are in turn owned by JSC Atomenergoprom (Atomenergoprom), the Russian state enterprise established “to consolidate the assets of the civilian part of the Russian nuclear industry” and which is a direct subsidiary of Rosatom. Figure 2 shows these relationships.

+ +

image02 +Figure 2: Ownership Structures of Rosatom Subsidiaries. Source: Rosenergoatom, “About Us”; Atomenergoprom; Articles of Association of TENEX, Joint-Stock Company; Russian Federal Tax Register documents sourced through Sayari Analytics; IBR EU Power Technologies LLC, Department of Nuclear Power Engineering and Nuclear Fuel Cycle, “Russian Uranium Enrichment Industry State and Prospects of Development”, 2023, pp. 22–24.

+ +

Pursuit for Continued Market Access

+ +

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Rosatom and its subsidiaries have continued to do business with customers around the world, including the sale of enriched uranium to Europe, the US and globally. Rosatom’s 2022 annual report noted a 14.9% increase from the previous year (2021) in revenue for the company’s fuel division, which includes enrichment services (but also encompasses conversion services and production of nuclear fuel for reactors). Rosatom has also made no revisions to its business strategy up to 2030, which was last revised in 2020 and expects to see an increase in Rosatom’s revenue to 4 trillion RUB. This suggests a certain level of confidence (or at least an effort to portray confidence) in continued demand, despite clearly countervailing winds in trade with Russia among Western countries.

+ +

One likely reason for this apparent confidence is Rosatom’s determined pursuit of the development and sale of new products, as well as expansion into new markets, particularly as it relates to the construction of NPPs abroad. Yet, Rosatom’s continued engagement with some of its traditional customers may also offer the company alternative or indirect access into markets that may otherwise be trying to diversify away from Russian supplies. One strategy that Rosatom may be trying to employ in its enriched uranium business is displacement, increasing its deliveries of enriched uranium to countries that are still willing – or contractually obligated – to accept them and which may then be able to increase exports of their own enriched uranium to global markets. This has been suggested in a report by nuclear industry consultancy I BR EU Power Technologies LLC. The company was established in 1991 “by a group of researchers and engineers who had previously worked at the research centers of the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry and the Ministry’s headquarters”. The company’s latest report on the state and development of the Russian nuclear enrichment industry, published in October 2023, notes that, in examining data on enriched uranium exports from Russia in 2022, the report’s authors were able to draw “preliminary conclusions” about Rosatom’s introduction of a new strategy in response to decreased purchases of Russian enriched uranium by some foreign customers, as a result of the war in Ukraine. The report notes:

+ +
+

The essence of this element can be formulated as follows – to increase the supply of EUP [enriched uranium product] to countries that have a fleet of their own nuclear power plants and a uranium enrichment industry, with the aim of using this EUP at local nuclear power plants, which will partially free up local uranium enrichment capacities from the production of EUP for local nuclear power plants and use freed-up capacity for the production of EUP for export.

+
+ +

The report singles out France and China in its analysis of a potential Russian displacement strategy, noting the significant increase of enriched uranium imports by these two countries in 2022, as compared to 2021, driven primarily by imports from Russia. The report’s authors point to a planned increase in enriched uranium exports from France to the US, as well as a 2026–31 contract for the provision of SWU by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to South Korea’s KHNP (Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power), as potential vehicles for this strategy.

+ +

The data presented and analysed later in this report tries, in part, to test this displacement hypothesis. While this report is unable to definitively confirm using publicly available sources that displacement activity is occurring, at least in China’s case, shifts in trade patterns appear to be consistent with what one would expect to see if a displacement strategy was being introduced. Testing the possibility of displacement through France is even more challenging, considering the complexities of European nuclear fuel supply chains and the central role that France plays therein. Changes to French trade in enriched uranium could technically point to displacement, but – as in the case of China – there are other possible explanations for the shifts in trade patterns.

+ +

The nuclear sector is not the only instance where Russia has been accused of resorting to a displacement strategy to compensate for the loss of certain markets in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. A similar tactic has been reported in relation to the oil sector. Media reporting has detailed increases in German imports of refined oil products from India in 2023 as compared to 2022, at the same time as India became a leading importer of Russian crude in 2022, thus apparently providing what has been called a “backdoor route” for Russian oil into European markets. Some have even suggested that some of the oil products shipped from India to European countries may include Russian material. If such activity is taking place to circumvent sanctions on Russian oil trade, it would not be inconceivable that a similar strategy may be applied in the nuclear sector, which has yet to be sanctioned to the same extent as the Russian petroleum sector.

+ +

The following sections of this report examine whether and how similar displacement, and other possible adaptation methods, may be playing out (or may play out in future) in Russian trade in enriched uranium and enrichment services. They also offer and test possible alternative explanations for the observed shifts in Russian enriched uranium trade patterns.

+ +

II. Case Study: China

+ +

Russia has been a long-time partner of the Chinese nuclear energy industry, having built numerous nuclear reactors in China, contributed to the development of China’s domestic enrichment capabilities, and served as a long-time supplier of enriched uranium and nuclear fuel to the country. Trade data made available by the Chinese government reveals a number of shifts in China’s enriched uranium trade patterns since 2022, including with regard to its imports of Russian material and exports to the US. While the trade data alone cannot definitively confirm the hypothesis put forward by IBR EU Power Technologies that displacement of enriched uranium is taking place through China backed by greater Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium, it does point to the possibility of such activity. As China may be seeking to carve out a greater role for itself in world enriched uranium markets, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium may facilitate the pursuit of Beijing’s ambitions.

+ +

Figures 3 and 4 show the value and weight of enriched uranium imports from Russia into China since 2015, respectively. After importing no enriched uranium from Russia in 2021 and 44 tonnes in 2020, Chinese enriched uranium imports from Russia rose to 685 tonnes ($492.6 million) in 2022. This was the highest level since 2011 (when Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium stood at 779 tonnes [$544 million]), as well as a 36% increase in volume from the next-highest yearly value – observed in 2019 (504 tonnes [$292 million]). The 2023 value of Russian imports of enriched uranium into China reached 467 tonnes ($418 million), a slight decrease from 2022 but still much higher than in many previous years.

+ +

image03 +Figure 3: Chinese Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (USD). Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).

+ +

image04 +Figure 4: Chinese Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (Tonnes). Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).

+ +

Possible Stockpiling and Domestic Demand

+ +

The relatively high volumes of Chinese imports of enriched uranium from Russia in the last two years could potentially be attributed to Chinese stockpiling efforts to meet nuclear fuel needs for its domestic fleet of reactors. This was the conclusion of a number of the experts interviewed for this report when shown trade data indicating an increase in the value of Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium. Indeed, in 2021, the chairperson of a China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation (CNEIC) subsidiary and a member of the National People’s Congress said that China should prioritise the expansion of the domestic strategic enriched uranium stockpile to limit the impact of enriched uranium price fluctuations, possible supply chain risks and other potential challenges.

+ +

China is a major nuclear energy power. As of December 2023, it was operating 55 nuclear reactors, with a further 22 under construction. Chinese SWU requirements are expected to rise significantly over the next decade. Chinese enrichment capacity is not reported publicly, but expert estimates seem to expect that China will increase its enrichment capacity to meet domestic demand. As these are simply estimates they may be subject to developments in opportunities to increase supply and inventories through additional imports. In its 2023 report “Global Inventories of Secondary Uranium Supplies” the IAEA estimates that China has also maintained a strategic enriched uranium stockpile since before 2010, which it believes may have increased by as much as 910 tonnes of enriched uranium product (tEUP) since then (the IAEA does not provide estimates of material stockpiled before 2010). The IAEA has observed that the strategic stockpile is intended for domestic consumption but notes that it may also be used to meet export demand, should China choose to increase its presence on international markets.

+ +

Chinese Exports of Enriched Uranium

+ +

Historically, China has been a net importer of enriched uranium, exporting material only to Kazakhstan, the US, South Korea (until recently), and a small annual value ($100) to Austria, as well as nuclear fuel assemblies to Pakistan. However, it appears that China may be interested in becoming a greater supplier of enriched uranium to global markets. In October 2023, China reportedly completed its first export since 2014 of enriched uranium using imported feed material. In other words, for the first time in nearly a decade, China has provided enrichment services for a customer that had sourced the feed material elsewhere. Reports on this development noted that the resumption of trade in enrichment services (and the efforts that had gone into ensuring that the necessary regulatory and licensing frameworks are in place to allow this trade) are part of a CNEIC strategic policy of “going out, grabbing orders, and stabilizing growth” in the nuclear fuel trade, in light of the “historical window period” since the start of the “conflict between Russia and Ukraine” and its impact on international nuclear fuel demand and prices.

+ +

The introduction of this option for enrichment-service-only trade, combined with the articulated policy to capture more of the global nuclear fuel market, supports assessments that China may be looking to play an increasingly larger role as a supplier of enriched uranium and enrichment services. Increased imports of Russian material could help China meet the expanded demand that will result from a combination of the expected growth in its domestic enriched uranium needs and any expected increase in exports. In 2022, China announced a number of long-term nuclear fuel contracts with US and EU utilities, although it is unclear what those contracts involved specifically, whether they include deliveries of Chinese enriched uranium and, if so, when these would commence.

+ +

The IBR EU Power Technologies report pointed to a 2026–31 CNEIC contract with KHNP as a potential vehicle for enriched uranium displacement through China.

+ +

Should China be engaging in the displacement of enriched uranium, facilitated by the observed increases in imports of Russian material, one would expect to see an increase in Chinese exports of enriched uranium since 2022, as Russian supply freed up domestic capacity for export. While the 2022 value and volume of Chinese exports of enriched uranium (97 tonnes [$65 million]) remained more or less on a par with 2021 figures (95 tonnes [$64 million]) and well below the values and volumes of exports in previous years, the volume of Chinese exports in 2023 (368 tonnes [$445 million]) increased by 288% from 2021. The increase is less dramatic when compared to previous years but is still noteworthy. The increase in exports in 2023 was in large part due to a spike in Chinese exports of enriched uranium to the US, which amounted to 175 tonnes ($316 million) in 2023, following three years (2019–21) of no Chinese exports to the US appearing in Chinese or US government trade data, and 5% higher than the volume of all Chinese exports of enriched uranium to the US from 2015 to 2022 combined (see Figure 5). Trade data made available by the US government confirms the Chinese-reported export values, although US import data shows much higher volumes of material delivered in 2023 (293 tonnes) than those reported in Chinese export data (the reason for this discrepancy is not clear). Besides the US, China also exported enriched uranium to Kazakhstan in 2023, with the value of these exports also increasing significantly, nearly doubling from 2022 (97 tonnes [$65 million]) to 2023 (193 tonnes [$130 million]). The additional exports under HS code 284420 from China to Kazakhstan could be related to the fabrication of nuclear fuel for Chinese reactors at a nuclear fabrication facility in Kazakhstan. The plant is operated by a Kazakh-Chinese joint venture and made its first delivery of fuel assemblies to China in early 2023.

+ +

An increase in Chinese exports of enriched uranium, even if coupled with an increase in enriched uranium imports from Russia, is not in itself sufficient to prove that displacement is occurring, as increased exports may also be the result of expanded domestic enrichment activity. The cyclical nature of trade in the nuclear energy sector and long contracting lead times for supply of enriched uranium for fuel manufacturing also mean that one cannot read too closely into variations in enriched uranium trade values. Furthermore, the volume of Chinese imports of Russian enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023 is significantly greater than the volume of 2023 Chinese exports to the US. This suggests that at least some of the material may be being used for the manufacturing of nuclear fuel inside China or being stockpiled – either to meet Chinese domestic demand or perhaps to support a future expansion of Chinese exports. In the absence of data on Chinese enriched uranium stockpiles, this is difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the scale of the increase in the volume and value of Chinese deliveries to the US in 2023 is noteworthy.

+ +

The reason for these increases is not clear. However, trade records for 2023 Chinese deliveries of enriched uranium to the US sourced through corporate and trade data provider Sayari Analytics indicate that Global Nuclear Fuel Americas LLC and Westinghouse Electric Company, both manufacturers of nuclear fuel, received shipments of uranium hexafluoride from China in 2023. It is unclear whether the enriched uranium was ultimately used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel in the US, or who the ultimate recipient of any manufactured nuclear fuel may have been, including whether customers are domestic or foreign utilities. For instance, when asked about likely drivers for increased Chinese enriched uranium imports into the US, one expert interviewed for this report suggested that the increased imports of Chinese material into the US may be meant for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for Chinese reactors and therefore may be re-exported back to China.

+ +

image05 +Figure 5: Chinese Exports to the US under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (USD). Source: Data sourced from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).

+ +

image06 +Figure 6: Chinese Exports to the US under HS Code 28442000, 2015–23 (Tonnes). Source: Chinese customs data made available by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (HS code 28442000).

+ +

Implications

+ +

The limited publicly available information on domestic Chinese enrichment activity and the opacity of China’s internal nuclear fuel supply chains make it challenging to ascertain whether the increase in the value of exports of enriched uranium to the US in 2023 has been backed by increases in enrichment activity at domestic Chinese facilities or is the result of displacement facilitated by increased imports of Russian material into China. However, the data reviewed here points to the possibility that displacement may be taking place.

+ +

As the US seeks to diversify away from Russian uranium supply and curtail Rosatom revenues, to what extent might any such efforts be undermined by increased Russian access to the Chinese market and subsequent increases in deliveries of Chinese material to the US? Under US regulation that limits the amount of enriched uranium that can be imported into the country from Russia (“The Russian Suspension Agreement” [1992], discussed in greater detail in Chapter V), imports of enriched uranium “which can be shown to have resulted in the ultimate delivery or sale into the United States of displaced uranium products of any type, regardless of the sequence of the transactions” are considered a circumvention tactic. Importers of enriched uranium into the US are required to “submit at the time of entry a written statement certifying that the uranium being imported was not obtained under any arrangement, swap, or other exchange designed to circumvent the export limits for uranium of Russian Federation origin established by this Agreement”. A bill passed in the US House of Representatives in December 2023, which would prohibit the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US (but which has not yet passed the Senate or received presidential approval at the time of drafting), contains a similar anti-circumvention provision, prohibiting the import of “unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is determined to have been exchanged with, swapped for, or otherwise obtained in lieu of unirradiated low-enriched uranium [produced in the Russian Federation or by a Russian entity] in a manner designed to circumvent the restrictions under this section”.

+ +

It is not clear whether imports of enriched uranium from China into the US were accompanied by any such certification. Such a declaration would likely have been subject to processes governed by contractual confidentiality. Considering the complexity and commercial sensitivity inherent to nuclear fuel supply chains, definitively proving that any given import of enriched uranium into a given country is not the product of displacement using Russian enriched uranium is likely to be challenging. However, should such displacement be occurring, it would undermine US efforts to diversify away from Russian supply. While imports of enriched uranium from China into the US remain a minor share of all US imports of enriched uranium, the stark increase in the value of deliveries in 2023 should be examined more closely. US utilities and government would also do well to consider the risks of swapping dependencies on Russia for dependencies on China in its enriched uranium supply. China’s apparent interest in taking advantage of the shifts occurring in global nuclear supply chains suggests that China may be actively angling to replace Russia in the US’s nuclear energy supply chain, potentially using increased imports of Russian material.

+ +

III. Case Study: France

+ +

France is regularly mentioned in media coverage and expert discussion of continued Western reliance on Russian enriched uranium. The French nuclear sector has a long history of partnership with Russia, with Rosatom entering the French market in the 1970s. The value and volume of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia rose notably in 2022 and has remained high in 2023, relative to pre-2022 levels. According to Eurostat data, in 2021, France imported 110 tonnes (€93 million) from Russia under HS code 28442035. In 2022, the volume of imports rose to 312 tonnes (€359 million), an increase of 184% from 2021. Eurostat data shows 223 tonnes in imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2023, a 103% increase in volume from 2021 but a decrease of 29% from 2022 imports. Comparable levels of imports from Russia into France were last seen in 2014, when France imported 399 tonnes (€398 million) of enriched uranium from Russia. It is worth noting that the value of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2023 actually increased from 2022, to €396 million, pointing to a discrepancy between changes in the value and weight of imports from Russia in 2023. The reason for this discrepancy was not clear. Figures 7 and 8 show the value and weight, respectively, of French imports of enriched uranium from Russia from 2015 to 2023.

+ +

Several explanations for the increase in French imports of Russian material are possible and are explored in this chapter. Based on a review of trade data, publicly available information on nuclear fuel supply chains in Europe and other public reporting, one likely explanation (although difficult to prove with certainty) is that the increased imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and continued relatively high levels in 2023 may be the result of the redistribution of Russian enriched uranium by some utilities across their supply chains – delivering more of their Russian-sourced material for fuel fabrication in France instead of to fabrication facilities in other countries that may be less willing to accept Russian supply. If true, this would mean that efforts to move away from Russian enriched uranium supply by some companies and governments may be being offset – at least in part – by greater imports of Russian enriched uranium into France. This chapter outlines these developments and tests a number of other possible explanations for the observed increases in French imports of Russian enriched uranium since 2022.

+ +

image07 +Figure 7: French Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (EUR). Source: Data sourced from Eurostat, “EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8” (HS code 28442035).

+ +

image08 +Figure 8: French Imports from Russia under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (Tonnes). Source: Data sourced from Eurostat, “EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8” (HS code 28442035).

+ +

Overview of the French Nuclear Energy Sector

+ +

France plays a significant role in European and global nuclear fuel supply chains. The country is not only a major producer and consumer of nuclear energy, but it also hosts conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing facilities. At the time of writing, France hosted 56 operational reactors with a total net electrical capacity of 61.37 GW(e), second only to the US on both metrics. Another reactor is expected to be connected to the grid in mid-2024. France’s nuclear reactor fleet is operated by Électricité de France SA (EDF), which is fully owned by the French state. France also performs uranium conversion at the Philippe Coste plant (an Orano facility), uranium enrichment at the Georges Besse II plant (also an Orano facility) and nuclear fuel fabrication at the Romans-sur-Isère plant (a Framatome facility). According to its webpage, Framatome is owned by EDF (80.5%) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (19.5%). Through its subsidiary companies, Framatome also operates nuclear fuel fabrication plants at Lingen, Germany (Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH) and in Richland, Washington (Framatome, Inc.). Fuel manufactured at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère facility serves both the French domestic fleet of reactors and nuclear utilities and research reactors abroad. French reactors are also loaded with fuel manufactured at the fuel fabrication plant at Västerås, Sweden (owned by a subsidiary of US company Westinghouse Electric), at a plant in Juzbado, Spain (owned by Spanish company Enusa; Westinghouse manufactures EDF fuel at the facility), and at the Westinghouse-operated facility at Springfields, UK. Components of fuel assemblies destined for French reactors may also be manufactured at Framatome’s facility in Lingen. Figure 9 shows a simplified summary of the locations of uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in Europe and the UK.

+ +

image09 +Figure 9: Locations of European and UK Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities. Source: Generated based on data from various sources.

+ +

As such, enriched uranium may theoretically be imported into France for the following purposes:

+ +
    +
  • +

    Production of nuclear fuel in France (at the Romans-sur-Isère facility) for the French reactor fleet.

    +
  • +
  • +

    Production of nuclear fuel in France (at the Romans-sur-Isère facility) for export to utilities abroad.

    +
  • +
  • +

    Further shipment of the enriched uranium from France to Germany, Sweden, the UK or Spain (via other countries for deconversion) to be used in the production of nuclear fuel for the French reactor fleet.

    +
  • +
  • +

    Further shipment of the enriched uranium from France to Germany, Sweden, the UK or Spain (via other countries for deconversion) to be used in the production of nuclear fuel for export to utilities abroad.

    +
  • +
+ +

An increase in French imports of Russian enriched uranium could therefore be explained by an increase in demand for enriched uranium generally, or for Russian material specifically, for one or several of these purposes.

+ +

Possible Stockpiling in France

+ +

One possible explanation for the increased French imports of Russian enriched uranium, and the initial suspicion of a number of the experts consulted for this report, is that French utilities and fuel manufacturing facilities have been in a rush to stockpile Russian material for future use, in advance of possible future bans on enriched uranium imports from Russia. Such stockpiling would help to ensure that sufficient inventories are in place to meet long-term domestic French needs as well as future demand of foreign customers.

+ +

To test this hypothesis, an assessment of changes in French enriched uranium stockpiles is needed. Information on France’s annual national inventories of enriched uranium is made available in reports by France’s national agency for radioactive waste management (Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs, ANDRA). At the time of writing, ANDRA has not made available information on 2022 or 2023 stockpiles. Its estimates of French enriched uranium stocks up to 2040 predict relatively consistent inventory levels over this time period, although it notes that the estimates are based on historical trends and do not represent (or reflect) an industrial strategy. The financial reports of EDF and Framatome indicate a drop in the monetary value of their holdings of nuclear fuel between 2021 and 2022, while Orano reported a slight increase in the value of its “inventories and in-process” material from 2021 to 2022 (of €15 million). However, these figures are not an ideal point of analysis, as they include materials other than enriched uranium and are expressed in terms of monetary value (which can fluctuate) instead of volume. The data also does not offer any insights on where any enriched uranium in the inventories may have come from.

+ +

In comments made to the press in response to questions about the increase of imports into France of Russian enriched uranium, an EDF representative noted that the company has not increased its dependence on Russian enriched uranium and is purchasing as per “the contractual minimums with its Russian partners”. This suggests that the French utility is not maxing out its contractual options in an effort to import as much Russian material as possible in advance of a potential ban. In the case of Orano, considering that the company is itself a provider of uranium enrichment services, it is unlikely, although technically possible, that the company is importing and stockpiling large volumes of Russian enriched uranium.

+ +

It is worth noting that ANDRA does not capture enriched uranium inventories held in France by non-French utilities. As such, it is possible that some non-French utilities are importing and maintaining stocks of Russian material in France. Swiss utilities, for instance, have been known to hold natural and enriched uranium stocks in Germany, France, Sweden and the UK. Testing this hypothesis would likely require access to commercially sensitive information. One could also compare the sum of EDF’s imports and Orano-produced enriched uranium against the sum of domestic uranium consumption and total enriched uranium and fabricated fuel exports, to determine the overall stocks of enriched uranium in the country, including any changes in stocks that may belong to foreign utilities. Such an assessment was not undertaken as part of the analysis for this report. Data on uranium inventories across Europe made available by the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) shows a decrease in overall inventories from 2021 to 2022, however the figure is an aggregate of total stocks across Europe and captures uranium at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle (not just enriched uranium). As mentioned earlier, the monetary value of nuclear fuel held by Framatome did not increase in 2022, also suggesting that significant stockpiling, even for fabrication of fuel for foreign customers, is likely not happening.

+ +

As such, based on publicly available data, there is no obvious indication that significant stockpiling of enriched uranium is taking place in France. However, there is also insufficient data to definitively discount the possibility that the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium into France is due to a major stockpiling drive. Details on 2022 and 2023 uranium inventories in future ANDRA reporting, or future IAEA reports on French enriched uranium inventories, will provide a clearer picture of how French stocks of enriched uranium may have changed and whether these changes are reflective of the significant increase in imports from Russia.

+ +

Possible Shifts in Domestic Demand

+ +

An increase in France’s domestic demand for enriched uranium to respond to greater domestic nuclear energy production could also technically explain the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023. However, this explanation does not appear very likely. Based on WNA projections of France’s enriched uranium production and needs through 2040, it appears that the country has sufficient domestic uranium enrichment capacity to cover its domestic needs. The WNA estimates that France’s enriched uranium needs up to 2040 will not rise significantly, reaching a peak of 6,986 thousand SWU in 2023 and fluctuating below that number in the subsequent 17 years. This indicates about a 4.7% increase from the 2022 demand of 6,639 thousand SWU, hardly justifying the 184% increase in the volume of imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and the continued relatively high volume of imports in 2023. Of course, the projections for French demand do not account for the enriched uranium that will be needed by French fuel fabricators to fulfil their contracts with foreign customers, which is likely to be significant.

+ +

There are other indicators that French domestic demand for Russian material specifically has not increased. Based on public reporting and statements by French authorities and EDF, it appears that only a limited amount of Russian enriched uranium is actually used in France’s energy generation. In its 2022 “Universal Registration Document”, EDF notes that it “has a limited dependence on imports of Russian uranium, considering existing inventories and diversified and long-term supply contracts”. As mentioned earlier, EDF representatives have also stated to the media that the company “has not increased its share of enrichment of its natural uranium carried out in Russia in 2022 compared to 2021, in accordance with ‘the contractual minimums with its Russian partners’” and that uranium enriched in Russia “represents a very small part of its enrichment activities”.

+ +

Spikes can also sometimes be seen in trade data for enriched uranium corresponding to reactor refuelling cycles, which usually see a quarter to a third of the assemblies in a reactor core replaced every 12, 18 or 24 months. In other words, deliveries of enriched uranium to fabrication facilities (like the one at Romans-sur-Isère) might spike at predictable intervals (for instance, every other year) to account for the fabrication of new fuel assemblies in advance of a reactor reload. It is technically possible that the refuelling cycles of a number of facilities that use the Romans-sur-Isère plant aligned. However, the increase in imports of Russian enriched uranium to France in 2022, and continued high levels of imports in 2023, do not match any observable pattern of regular increases in preceding years. Furthermore, the high levels of Russian imports into France (relative to pre-2022 values) have persisted for two consecutive years.

+ +

Possible Reallocation of Russian Enriched Uranium Across European Supply Chains

+ +

An April 2023 news report for Le Monde provides additional indication as to possible drivers for the increase in French imports of Russian enriched material in 2022. The article notes:

+ +
+

When questioned, EDF said that its imports of Russian-enriched uranium have remained at the same level between 2021 and 2022. But it added that it has made more use of French factories for the manufacture of fuel assemblies, which would partly explain the difference. In other words, in previous years, some of the enriched uranium imported did not arrive in France but at plants in Sweden or the UK and was therefore not accounted for in the same way by customs.

+
+ +

In its 2022 annual report, EDF noted that it sources its enriched uranium from Orano, Urenco and TENEX. Based on the above comments, it appears that EDF may be reallocating its supply of Russian enriched uranium from Sweden (which hosts a fuel fabrication facility at Västerås, operated by Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB) and/or the UK (which hosts a fuel fabrication facility at Springfields, operated by Westinghouse Springfields Fuels Ltd) to France, for fabrication of nuclear fuel at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère plant. This would mean that, as some European countries are trying to diversify away from Russian enriched uranium, France may be offering an alternative entry point for Rosatom to the European nuclear fuel market.

+ +

On the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Swedish energy giant Vattenfall announced that it would no longer be accepting deliveries of Russian nuclear fuel, until further notice. As it eventually became clear, that would also include all Russian enriched uranium. In April 2022, Sweden’s other utility also announced that it was pausing deliveries of enriched uranium from TENEX. While there is currently no ban on imports of Russian material into Sweden at a national level, trade data made available by the Swedish government shows a complete stop of imports of enriched uranium from Russia into Sweden as of 2022.

+ +

image10 +Figure 10: Swedish Imports under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (SEK). Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Imports of Goods from Country of Consignment. Not Adjusted for Non Response, SEK thousand by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS code 28442035).

+ +

image11 +Figure 11: Swedish Imports under HS Code 28442035, 2015–23 (Tonnes). Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Imports of Goods from Country of Consignment. Not Adjusted for Non Response, Metric Ton by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS code 28442035).

+ +

This is significant not only for Sweden’s own nuclear energy sector but also for nuclear energy production across Europe, as the nuclear fuel production facility at V ästerås manufactures fuel for Vattenfall and reactors across Europe. The Västerås facility also has the capability to produce fuel for Soviet and Russian-built VVER-type reactors (водо-водяной энергетический реактор [vodo-vodyanoi enyergeticheskiy reactor]), offering an alternative supply of VVER fuel for countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, which have historically relied on Rosatom subsidiary TVEL for their supply. Västerås-manufactured VVER fuel has already been supplied to Ukrainian reactors and deliveries are planned for reactors in Bulgaria in 2024.

+ +

The cessation of imports of enriched uranium from Russia to Sweden after 2022 indicates that all the utilities using the Västerås facility for their fuel manufacturing, and which may have previously relied on Russian enriched uranium supply, have found alternative enriched uranium suppliers for the manufacture of their fuel at Västerås. In 2022 and 2023, the value of imports of enriched uranium into Sweden increased from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, suggesting an uptick in deliveries from Orano (France) and Urenco (the UK, the Netherlands and Germany). The German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (Bundesamt für die Sicherheit der nuklearen Entsorgung, BASE) has also issued a permit for the transport to Västerås through German territory of uranium hexafluoride from enrichment facilities in France (Orano), the Netherlands (Urenco) and Germany (Urenco), with regular transport activity recorded throughout 2023. At the time of writing, no such permit has been reported by the German authorities for the transport of enriched uranium to Västerås from TENEX, although it is unclear when the last permit for such transit expired.

+ +

Supply of enriched uranium is normally secured by utilities under long-term contracts, meaning that utilities still obligated to source enriched uranium from Russia but suddenly unable to send it to Sweden will have needed to deliver it to fuel fabrication facilities in countries still willing to accept Russian material. According to Eurostat data, since February 2022 France and Germany are the only European countries that have continued to import enriched uranium from Russia, although the latter at much lower volumes than before 2022. Both host nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. At least some imports of Russian-origin material also appear to have been delivered to Spain in 2022; a fuel fabrication facility is located at Juzbado, owned by Enusa.

+ +

At the time of writing, the webpage of the Västerås fabrication plant noted that, alongside Ukraine, France is its biggest customer. This is also borne out in trade data, which shows France as the primary destination for Swedish nuclear fuel exports (See Figure 13). It is unclear from publicly available sources how much, if any, of EDF’s TENEX-sourced supply had historically been sent to Sweden, but the complete cessation of Russian enriched uranium imports into Sweden suggests that all of EDF’s TENEX-supplied material is now being delivered to one of the other fuel fabrication facilities the company uses. Other utilities that have used the Västerås facility – Swedish, Ukrainian, German and Finnish companies – had also historically relied on the Russian supply of enriched uranium, some of which may have been delivered to Västerås prior to 2022.

+ +

image12 +Figure 12: Swedish Exports under HS Code 84013000, 2015–23 (SEK). Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Exports of Goods to Country of Destination. Not Adjusted for Non Response, SEK Thousand by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS Code 84013000).

+ +

image13 +Figure 13: Swedish Exports Under HS Code 84013000, 2015–23 (Tonnes). Source: Data sourced from Official Statistics of Sweden, “Exports of Goods to Country of Destination. Not Adjusted for Non Response, Metric Ton by Commodity Group According to CN, Trading Partner and Year” (HS Code 84013000).

+ +

Fuel for French reactors is also manufactured at the nuclear fuel manufacturing facility at Springfields (UK), operated by a subsidiary of Westinghouse. Eurostat data shows imports under HS code 840130 – which captures nuclear fuel assemblies (but may also include components thereof) – from the UK into France from 2021 onwards, including 49 tonnes of imports in 2022 and 74 tonnes in 2023. It is unclear whether Russian enriched uranium is or has in the past been used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel for French reactors at the facility. As neither Russia nor the UK publicly report their trade in enriched uranium, any deliveries of Russian enriched material to the UK, or changes in any such trade, cannot be tracked through a review of trade data. However, in July 2022, the UK introduced a 35% tariff on goods under HS code 2844 (“Radioactive chemical elements and radioactive isotopes (including the fissile or fertile chemical elements and isotopes) and their compounds; mixtures and residues containing these products”) imported into the UK from Russia, which includes enriched uranium. As such, while deliveries of Russian enriched uranium into the UK are still permitted and may therefore be taking place, the introduction of the 35% tariff makes it unlikely that such imports have continued since July 2022. This means that EDF’s supply of Russian enriched uranium is now likely being sent to one of two facilities – the Enusa facility in Juzbado (Spain) or the Framatome facility at Romans-sur-Isère (France).

+ +

A reallocation of Russian material by EDF from other facilities – Västerås or Springfields – to France would explain, at least in part, the increase in 2022 of imports of Russian enriched uranium into the country. It also aligns with statements by EDF that the company “has made more use of French factories for the manufacture of fuel assemblies” in 2022 than in past years and that it has not increased its overall reliance on Russian enriched uranium. However, any such reallocation is difficult to confirm from publicly available information, as supply contracts tend to be commercially sensitive.

+ +

In its 2022 annual report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France, the nuclear safety authority (Autorité de s ûreté nucléaire, ASN) reported an increase compared with 2021 in the amount of TENEX-supplied enriched uranium processed at the Romans-sur-Isère facility, from 21 to 40 tonnes. However, compared to Orano- and Urenco-supplied product processed by the facility in 2022 (564 tonnes and 142 tonnes, respectively), the 19-tonne increase in TENEX-supplied enriched uranium processed at Romans-sur-Isère in 2022 is not significant in terms of volume and certainly does not fully account for the increase of Russian enriched uranium into France. The ANS report refers to enriched uranium “processed” (not necessarily “delivered”) at the facility in a given year, meaning that it is possible that any additional deliveries of Russian material to the facility made in 2022 may not actually be processed until 2023 or later. Alternatively, the additional TENEX material processed may have been drawn from existing stocks, not new deliveries.

+ +

Exports under HS code 840130 from Sweden and the UK to France continued in 2022 and 2023, albeit at lower volumes than pre-2022 in the case of exports from Sweden. If, as per EDF’s comments in Le Monde, less of the company’s Russian supply of enriched uranium is being delivered to fuel fabrication facilities abroad, that material may have been replaced by deliveries to those facilities of non-Russian material from elsewhere in EDF’s supply chain. The value of French exports of enriched uranium to Sweden increased from 40 tonnes in 2021 to 120 tonnes in 2022 and to 153 tonnes in 2023. French exports of enriched uranium to the UK have decreased, from 167 tonnes in 2021 to 129 tonnes in 2022 and 90 tonnes in 2023. US imports of enriched uranium from France increased from 121 tonnes in 2021 to 327 tonnes in 2023. However, at least some of the additional exports of enriched uranium from France are very likely the result of deliveries for non-French utilities under new contracts with enrichment services provider Orano as countries seek to diversify away from Rosatom supply. For instance, Sweden’s utility Vattenfall, which previously received enriched uranium from Russia, is now sourcing its supply from Orano in France and Urenco in the UK. US-based broker of enrichment services Centrus Energy Corp. (Centrus) also started taking deliveries of enriched uranium from Orano in 2023 under a contract that was concluded in 2018.

+ +

In its comments to Le Monde, EDF also highlighted that it is not the only importer of uranium into France, and the news article points out that part of a delivery of Russian enriched uranium to Dunkirk in November 2022 belonged to Framatome, which operates the Romans-sur-Isère facility and manufactures fuel for a number of other European utilities at fabrication facilities in France and Germany. It is unclear whether that particular shipment remained in France or was transported onwards to Germany. As such, the increase of Russian enriched uranium deliveries to the site may be for the fabrication of nuclear fuel for other reactors, not just the French fleet. The 2021 and 2022 ANS reports record deliveries of nuclear fuel assemblies from Romans-sur-Isère to Switzerland, Belgium and China. The plant also produces nuclear fuel assemblies for South Africa. Theoretically, the additional imports into France of Russian enriched uranium could have been for integration into fuel assemblies for some of these customers. As of April 2022, Swiss energy utility Axpo was reported as having considerable dependencies on Russian uranium and stated that it would honour its existing contracts but not sign new ones. It is unclear from the report whether the dependency was in relation to mined or enriched uranium and when the existing contracts expire. China is also a well-established consumer of Russian enriched uranium and, as discussed in Chapter II, ramped up its own imports of enriched uranium from Russia in 2022 and 2023. Synatom, which provides enriched uranium to Belgium’s nuclear power plants, was reported in early 2022 to be relying on Russian uranium supply, although the report seems to have been referencing mined uranium and not enrichment services. While Belgium’s supply contract with Rosatom is no longer active, it reportedly took its last delivery of enriched uranium from Rosatom in May 2022. It is unclear which fabrication facility took delivery of this material.

+ +
+

Russian Enriched Uranium Deliveries to Spain

+
+ +

Besides Springfields, Västerås and Romans-sur-Isère, the nuclear fuel fabrication plant at Juzbado in Spain is the other facility that fabricates nuclear fuel for EDF. The facility also produces nuclear fuel for reactors in Spanish, Belgian, Swedish and Finnish reactors and has taken delivery of Russian enriched uranium since February 2022. It is technically possible that Russian enriched material delivered to Juzbado (if such deliveries have continued) may be used for fuel fabrication for a number of European utilities. Swedish and Finnish policies of diversification away from Russian supply mean that any deliveries of Russian enriched uranium to Juzbado would likely only be for the production of fuel for Spanish, Belgian or French reactors.

+ +

Tracking shifts in the flow of enriched uranium into Spain is challenging. As Spain does not have a domestic deconversion capacity, enriched uranium destined for Juzbado undergoes deconversion abroad before being delivered to Spain for fuel fabrication. Enusa’s contract for the supply of enriched uranium to Spanish reactors from TENEX runs until 2027 and the Spanish government has confirmed that Enusa has taken delivery of Russian enriched uranium in the UK and the US (as well as in Germany) since February 2022. Eighteen tonnes of the material were eventually delivered to Spain from the US in March 2023. However, it is unclear when the deliveries were made to the US and the UK or whether the two countries have since taken any other deliveries of Russian enriched uranium for Enusa.

+ +

Implications

+ +

Due to the commercial sensitivity of uranium supply and fuel manufacturing contracts, limited information on French uranium stocks and any stockpiles held in France by foreign utilities, as well as the difficulties inherent in tracing complex supply chain dynamics, it is challenging to ascertain the precise drivers of increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France. While at least some reallocation of Russian supplies to France appears to be happening, the degree to which such activity is responsible for the additional import of Russian material into France is difficult to confirm. A range of other explanations for the increased Russian enriched uranium imports into France are also technically possible, some of which have been outlined earlier in this chapter.

+ +

In the absence of EU sanctions on Rosatom, there is no legal basis on which to disallow continued imports of Russian enriched uranium into EU countries. Neither is any redistribution of Russian and non-Russian supplies across European nuclear fuel supply chains prohibited in any way. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, there has been no public reporting of new contracts for enriched uranium supply between Rosatom and European utilities; as such, if any reallocation of Russian material into France is taking place, it is likely facilitating the execution of existing contracts by companies still obligated to continue taking Russian enriched uranium, the breach of which may have proven very costly for the companies in question. France’s willingness to continue accepting Russian imports of enriched uranium may therefore be granting utilities the flexibility they need in their supply chains to maintain continuity of supply and to avoid breaching existing contracts. Industry will do what it must to adjust to changing market dynamics and can hardly be blamed for doing so, within the parameters permitted by regulation. However, it points to the importance of considering how industry is likely to adapt to the implementation of new restrictions and what measures may be needed to facilitate and incentivise alignment of private sector behaviour with political objectives. The observed increase in imports of Russian material into France, even as other European countries look to move away from Russian supply, also highlights the limited impact of unilateral national or company efforts to cut Russia out of the highly interconnected European nuclear fuel supply chain.

+ +

IV. Case Study: Germany

+ +

Germany is the other country in Europe which has continued to import enriched uranium from Russia since February 2022, according to Eurostat data. The only nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Germany is the Lingen plant, which is owned by a subsidiary of France’s Framatome and has been reported as apparently continuing to accept deliveries of Russian uranium. This raises questions over whether the Lingen plant could be another possible diversion point for Russian material that is no longer wanted in other countries, now or in the future.

+ +

Deliveries of Russian Enriched Uranium to Germany

+ +

The Lingen plant produces fuel assemblies for customers around the world and supplies “components and fuel for Framatome’s fuel assembly plants in the USA and Europe”. The IAEA’s 2023 report “Global Inventories of Secondary Uranium Supplies” notes that Lingen manufactures fuel for customers in the Netherlands and that Spain has received deliveries of fuel from Germany. UN Comtrade data also shows exports since 2019 from Germany of goods under HS code 840130 to Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the UK, Belgium, France, Finland, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Brazil and a number of other countries; however, while the code captures unirradiated nuclear fuel, it also includes nuclear assembly parts – as such, exports recorded under this code do not necessarily signify the delivery of manufactured fuel assemblies. Russian-origin enriched uranium has also previously been supplied to the UK via Lingen for use in UK reactors operated by EDF’s British subsidiary EDF Energy.

+ +

In August 2023, BASE issued a permit to Orano NCS GmbH (a nuclear logistics provider and part of the Orano Group of companies) for the transport of enriched uranium (in the form of uranium hexafluoride) from JSC TENEX to Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) GmbH, the Framatome subsidiary that operates nuclear fuel manufacturing facility at Lingen. The current permit is valid from 7 August 2023 to 31 December 2024; however, as of 29 February 2024, only two transport activities had been recorded under this permit, on 5 September 2023 and 8 February 2024. It is unclear where the transport originated. The cargo vessel Mikhail Dudin, which has been known to transport Russian enriched uranium to Europe, made a port call in Rotterdam on 5 September 2023. The cargo vessel Baltiysky-202, which had previously been reported unloading Russian enriched uranium in Dunkirk, called at the port of Rotterdam on 8 February 2024 and the port of Dunkirk on 9 February 2024. However, the Netherlands has not reported any imports of enriched uranium from Russia since February 2022. On at least one occasion, Russian enriched uranium being delivered by the Mikhail Dudin to Dunkirk was reportedly on its way to Lingen. According to reports by environmental activist groups, the delivery had been due to arrive in Rotterdam but was ultimately delivered to France instead.

+ +

Between March 2022 and January 2024, the Mikhail Dudin called at the port of Rotterdam at least eight times and at least 12 times at Dunkirk. The vessel has also made four port calls at Vlissingen in the Netherlands and multiple calls at other ports in Europe and the UK. It is unclear what, if anything, was loaded or unloaded during these calls or where the final destination of any deliveries may have been. The Baltiysky-202 has called at the port of Rotterdam four times since March 2022 and nine times at Dunkirk (as well as one port call at Cherbourg, France).

+ +

As such, it appears that some of the Russian material entering France, and possibly the Netherlands, may be passing through these countries on its way to Lingen in Germany. However, trade data reviewed for this report does not provide a clear enough picture to confirm how much Russian material is actually arriving at Lingen, whether the value or volume of any such Russian deliveries has changed since the start of 2022, which customers may be benefiting and which routes may be being used.

+ +

Unlike in the case of France, the value of Germany’s imports of enriched uranium from Russia decreased from 2021 to 2022. One possible explanation may be German reactor closures, at least some of which appear to have used the Lingen facility for the fabrication of their fuel and had historically relied on Russian re-enrichment of reprocessed uranium. In 2022, the value of imports of enriched uranium into Germany increased from the Netherlands and from France; however, imports from these two countries fell to below pre-2022 levels in 2023.

+ +

The cause of the increases in 2022 is difficult to ascertain and several explanations are possible. For instance, the increases in import values may be capturing deliveries to the Lingen plant of enriched uranium secured under renewed contracts with or expanded deliveries from Urenco (the Netherlands) or Orano (France) as utilities using the fabrication plant seek alternative, non-Russian, suppliers. Urenco also hosts an enrichment facility at Gronau in Germany; as such, the data may be capturing Urenco’s internal company transfers and not material travelling to Lingen for fuel fabrication. Transfers from the Netherlands and France into Germany, including to the Lingen facility, by Orano and Urenco have been recorded in German transport licence documents. As mentioned earlier, Urenco has also concluded an agreement with EDF to enrich reprocessed uranium from French reactors at its Almelo facility, which will first be converted by Rosatom in Russia. As such, from 2024, Dutch trade data is likely to show increased imports of reprocessed uranium from Russia (although not enriched uranium), as well as increased exports of enriched uranium from the Netherlands to France for the fabrication of nuclear fuel at Framatome’s Romans-sur-Isère facility. The decrease in the value and volume of imports of enriched uranium from France and the Netherlands into Germany in 2023 also raises the possibility that any increase in 2022 deliveries may not be part of a sustained pattern but a one-off.

+ +

Furthermore, there are significant discrepancies in Eurostat data between German-reported import data and French- and Dutch-reported data on the export of enriched uranium to Germany, which suggests that the data must be treated with some caution. While data on French exports as well as data on German exports made available through Eurostat both show increases in the value of French exports to Germany (in the case of the German data, French imports into Germany) of enriched uranium in 2022, German import data shows a much lower increase than the French export data. A similar discrepancy can be observed when comparing Eurostat data on German imports with data on Dutch exports, with the former showing markedly lower values of enriched material transferred in 2022 than the latter. Furthermore, in contrast to German import data, Dutch export data shows an overall decrease from 2021 to 2022 in the net weight of enriched uranium exported to Germany. The reason for these discrepancies in the reporting is unclear but may be due to particularities in the recording of transhipment data or delays between the recording of export and import data. Critically, as mentioned earlier, trade data reviewed for this report shows no deliveries of enriched uranium from Russia to the Netherlands since February 2022.

+ +

Implications

+ +

As with reallocation of Russian supplies across a utility’s supply chain, shipment of enriched uranium, Russian or otherwise, through third jurisdictions, if such activity is indeed occurring through France or the Netherlands, is a perfectly permissible activity and does not suggest any wrongdoing. Furthermore, because of the specialised nature of radioactive material transport and the associated logistics and certification required, not all ports are able to receive deliveries of enriched uranium, limiting supply routes. As mentioned above, there is currently also no legal obligation for Germany, France, Spain or any other EU country to terminate existing contracts for Russian supply, prevent the conclusion of new ones, or deny delivery of Russian material to facilities on their territory. As the German government has rightly pointed out in response to questions about deliveries of Russian material to the Lingen facility, there are no legal grounds on which to deny shipments of Russian material to the plant as Russian enriched uranium is not covered by EU sanctions. However, transhipment activity would add further opacity to European nuclear supply chains and may provide additional, less obvious, entry points for Russian material into the European market. It may also allow countries to save face by officially refusing to accept Russian enriched uranium at their ports, all the while continuing to import it through third jurisdictions or accepting non-Russian material from a third country which has been displaced by Russian imports.

+ +

Of note is the fact that ANF has applied to German authorities for permission to manufacture VVER fuel assemblies at the Lingen plant. According to reports, fabrication of VVER fuel at the plant may take place in collaboration with Rosatom; however, prospects of German government approval remain unclear. Framatome has signed agreements for VVER fuel supply with Bulgaria and Czechia. It is unclear where fuel assemblies for Bulgarian and Czech VVER reactors will take place and who would be the supplier of enriched uranium for these or any other VVER fuel assemblies. However, should fuel fabrication for VVER reactors take place at the Lingen facility with the use of Rosatom-supplied enriched uranium and in collaboration with Rosatom, this could hardly be considered successful diversification away from Russia for Framatome’s VVER fuel customers.

+ +

V. Case Study: US

+ +

In the trade data reviewed for this report, the US stands out conspicuously as the largest importer of Russian material, both prior to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and since. Figure 14 shows the value of US imports of enriched uranium from Russia since 2015; Figure 15 shows the weight of imports in tonnes. As mentioned earlier, data on US imports of Russian enriched uranium requires caveating. Some US customers purchase only SWU from Russia, meaning that some natural (unenriched) uranium is returned to Russia as “returned feed”, while other customers purchase both the feed and the services from Russia. As such, the values (and volume) of US imports of enriched uranium are not necessarily representative of the values (or volume) of Russian materials and services that are actually consumed by US utilities. This is in addition to any nuclear fuel assemblies that may be manufactured in the US and exported for use by utilities abroad. US-based think tank Third Way, citing data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and other sources, has estimated that in 2022 US utilities purchased $168 million in processed natural uranium and $344 million in enrichment services. As noted earlier, the EIA has reported that 24% of the SWU delivered to US utilities in 2022 came from Russia.

+ +

image14 +Figure 14: US Imports from Russia under HS Code 2844200020, 2015–23 (USD). Source: Data sourced from the US Census Bureau (HS code 2844200020).

+ +

image15 +Figure 15: US Imports from Russia under HS Code 2844200020, 2015–23 (Tonnes). Source: Data sourced from the US Census Bureau (HS code 2844200020).

+ +

History of US Dependency on Russian Enriched Uranium and Efforts to Limit Supply

+ +

US reliance on Russian enriched uranium is in part a legacy of the “Megatons to Megawatts” initiative, which ran from 1995 to 2013 and saw the conversion of 500 metric tonnes of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons into over 14,000 metric tonnes of low enriched uranium for the generation of nuclear energy in the US, accounting for 10% of US electricity production at the time. The agreement was executed by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and TENEX, with the former accepting low enriched uranium, chemically processed and diluted by TENEX from highly enriched uranium withdrawn from Russian nuclear weapons, and selling it on to utility customers. As a result of this significant Russian supply of enriched uranium into the US nuclear energy supply chain, as well as the longstanding low prices of Russian material, there was little ability or need for domestic enrichment production to compete with Russian supply and the US enrichment industry atrophied.

+ +

However, Russian exports of enriched uranium to Western countries, including the US, pre-dates the “Megatons to Megawatts” initiative, as do concerns over excessive Russian access to the US enriched uranium market and efforts to limit it. In an effort to prevent an influx of cheap Russian enrichment services into the US following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US nuclear energy industry instigated an anti-dumping petition in 1991. The petition eventually resulted in the adoption in 1992 of the “Russian Suspension Agreement” (RSA) between the US Department of Commerce and Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (succeeded by Rosatom). The RSA, which was amended in 2008 and 2020, introduced formal quotas on the import of Russian enriched uranium into the US.

+ +

At present, the only commercial enrichment facility operating in the US is a plant in Eunice, New Mexico owned by Urenco, a joint venture between the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. The company recently announced an expansion of its capacity at the Eunice plant by 15%, with additional enrichment commencing in 2025 and eventually providing an additional 700 tonnes of SWU per year. Several US companies, including Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) LLC and Centrus, also offer enrichment technology and may look to enter (or re-enter) the commercial enrichment market. In October 2023, Centruslaunched operations at its enrichment facility in Piketon, Ohio for the enrichment of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). Commercial US reactors do not currently take HALEU but many advanced reactor models will require HALEU fuel.

+ + + +

As discussed earlier, there are some ongoing efforts in the US to diversify away from Russian enriched uranium supply. In December 2023, the US House of Representatives passed a bill that would prohibit the import into the US of “unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is produced in the Russian Federation or by a Russian entity” through 2040. The bill, which at the time of writing was awaiting debate by the Senate, would allow the secretary of energy, in consultation with the secretary of state and the secretary of commerce, to issue waivers for imports of Russian enriched uranium in instances where alternative supply is not available or if such imports would be in the national interest. RSA quotas on imports of any Russian material would still apply and any waivers would be terminated by 1 January 2028. A similar bill was introduced in the Senate in March 2023.

+ +

As noted earlier, concerns over the availability of alternative, non-Russian, enriched uranium supply for US utilities have been raised by a number of experts. However, the extent of the challenge that US utilities may face in replacing Russian material with non-Russian supply in the short, medium and long term is the subject of some debate and likely varies between utilities. In comments to media, Urenco leadership has stated that “it has enough capacity to replace Russian supplies if Washington bans imports from the country” and “there are no constraints in the short term in replacing Russian materials in the western world”. Some analysts have nevertheless pointed to likely shortages in supply for US utilities should imports of Russian uranium stop, although they have noted that assessing the full impact of a ban on Russian imports is challenging as various utilities are likely to have different dependencies on Russian supply and varying nuclear fuel reserves.

+ +

With time, individual utilities and the US nuclear energy sector more broadly will likely become more prepared to withstand the impact of a ban on imports of Russian uranium into the US. In December 2023, the governments of the US, Canada, France, Japan and the UK announced a commitment “to pursue at least USD $4.2 billion in government-led and private investment in our five nations’ collective enrichment and conversion capacity over the next three years”. In February 2024, as part of the Emergency National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, the US Senate approved $2.7 billion in funding to expand the production in the US of LEU and HALEU. The Nuclear Energy Institute – which is the “policy organisation of the nuclear technologies industry” in the US – also supports a ban on imports of Russian uranium, with its leadership noting that: “The U.S. commercial nuclear industry is committed to transitioning to a secure domestic nuclear fuel supply, and this bill is an important step toward that goal”.

+ +

However, some have raised concerns. Centrus, which acts as a broker of enriched uranium (sourcing foreign SWU and supplying SWU and uranium to US and international customers), has raised concerns over potential risks to its supply that may result from restrictions on trade in uranium with Russia. Such restrictions may come in the form of US sanctions on Russian enriched uranium imports, refusal by its US and/or foreign customers to accept Russian SWU, or a decision by Russia to stop exports of uranium to the US. According to its 2023 annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, TENEX is Centrus’s largest supplier of SWU, followed by French company Orano. Centrus has commitments with TENEX for the supply of Russian enrichment services (in the form of SWU) to 2028. Despite having access to alternative sources of enriched uranium, in its 2023 report Centrus notes that, short of securing a waiver from the secretary of energy, the proposed ban would preclude the company from importing Russian LEU into the US and that its alternative supply would not be sufficient to replace the Russian LEU it is currently permitted to import under the RSA.

+ +

Furthermore, the proposed ban on imports into the US of Russian enriched uranium could mean that a greater proportion of the Russian material that Centrus is committed to purchasing from TENEX may have to be directed to non-US utilities. Due to the RSA quotas, not all of the material that Centrus purchases from TENEX can be sold to US utilities. In its 2023 report, the company notes:

+ +
+

We will need to make new sales to place all the Russian LEU we must order to meet our SWU purchase obligations to TENEX. In addition, because the [RSA] quotas do not cover all of the LEU that we must order to fulfill our purchase obligations under the TENEX Supply Contract, we expect that a portion of the Russian LEU that we order during the term of the TENEX Supply Contract will need to be delivered to customers that will use it in overseas reactors.

+
+ +

Centrus also noted prior to 2022 that the company expected to have to deliver some of the LEU it would source from TENEX during the term of its supply agreement with the Russian company to customers for use in overseas reactors. Yet, should a potential ban on imports of Russian material into the US be introduced, and if Centrus commitments to purchase Russian SWU remain unaffected by the ban or other factors, this raises questions over whether a greater fraction of the Russian SWU that Centrus is committed to purchasing from TENEX would need to get sold to customers elsewhere and, if so, how much and to whom.

+ +

Should new customers need to be found for Russian material no longer accepted in the US, these are likely to be companies and countries that would probably have purchased Russian SWU directly from Russia anyway. As such, any redirection of Russian SWU from the US to alternative customers following a US ban would not necessarily increase Rosatom’s footprint in global supply chains. However, it would also tamper the impact of the US ban on overall Russian access to global enrichment supply chains – simply shifting Russian supply elsewhere. Furthermore, should material that is no longer accepted in the US be sold to China or another country that is still willing to take Russian SWU and has a domestic enrichment capacity, the supply could in theory be used in a displacement strategy in efforts to circumvent existing restrictions on the import of Russian material into the US.

+ +

Of course, alternative customers, other than China or other countries that could adopt a displacement strategy, could potentially be found for the excess Russian material, for instance, South Korea, the UAE or some Latin American countries with operating nuclear reactors. However, the willingness of utilities in these countries to purchase enriched uranium no longer accepted in the US would depend on their readiness to accept Russian supply as well as any existing contracts they may have for alternative enriched uranium and enrichment services. These two factors may therefore limit opportunities for – and likelihood of – reallocation of Russian supply to new non-US customers.

+ +

Furthermore, a ban on imports of enriched uranium into the US may impact on businesses’ commitments to source SWU from TENEX. The introduction of a ban might allow companies the opportunity to terminate supply contracts with Russia on the grounds that the US has introduced restriction on such trade, depending on the nature of the restrictions put in place. However, this would not resolve the issue of any supply challenges that may result for US nuclear industry from a loss of access to Russian enriched uranium and enrichment services. As such, seeking a way out of supply contracts may therefore not be the preferred option for TENEX customers. In fact, US companies are likely to seek waivers to allow them to continue purchasing and importing Russian LEU into the US. As such, reallocation of Russian supply from US utilities to utilities in other countries, as described above, may not be necessary. However, the granting of waivers – while maybe necessary to ensure continued security of supply for some in the US nuclear industry – would in itself diminish the short-term impact of efforts to limit Russian access to US nuclear supply chains.

+ +

As with some of the adaptations described in the case studies on France and Germany, a ban on the import of Russian uranium into the US may cause some challenges for industry – either as a result of contractual obligations or concerns over security of supply. A ban is therefore likely to result in adaptations which may temper the ban’s ability to reduce Rosatom’s revenue generation and Russia’s presence in global and Western nuclear supply chains, at least in the short term. This is not a reason to forego pursuing such restrictions on imports of Russian enriched uranium into the US, but rather a reminder of the need for a considered approach to the institution of such restrictions – one which takes into account both political objectives and the practicalities faced by industry. To help incentivise and facilitate industry behaviour which aligns with political objectives, the articulation and application of a ban must rely on thorough consultation with customers and suppliers in the US’s nuclear energy sector. It needs to be accompanied by the development of domestic and partner enrichment capacity to ensure a sustainable transition away from Russian supply, and must seek to identify and mitigate the ways in which Russia may continue to access global nuclear fuel supply chains despite the introduction of restrictions.

+ +

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

+ +

This report has outlined four case studies that demonstrate the scale of Western and global dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supplies, the economic and contractual challenges that stand in the way of ending these dependencies, the adaptations to efforts by some Western countries and companies to cut Russia out of their nuclear fuel supply chains, and the likely limitations of efforts to cut Russia out of global nuclear fuel supply chains. In particular, Russia may rely on countries still willing or obligated to accept its enriched uranium to implement displacement strategies or simply serve as alternative entry points into markets from which it is being squeezed out. Such strategies simply push the issue of Russian dependency to a different part of the supply chain but do little to ultimately squeeze Rosatom’s bottom line and, in some instances, to decrease Western dependencies on Russian enriched uranium.

+ +

Of particular concern are trends in trade data that could point to the adoption of a displacement strategy – as may be the case with China. As Beijing may be seeking to increase its role as an exporter of enriched uranium to global markets, including to the US, it could rely on increased imports into China of Russian enriched uranium to facilitate this expansion. An increase in the value of Russian enriched uranium imports by China since 2022 has been accompanied by an increase in the value of Chinese exports of enriched uranium in 2022 and 2023, driven primarily by deliveries to the US. However, publicly available data reviewed for this report is insufficient to conclude definitively whether displacement is actually occurring.

+ +

In the case of Europe, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France and continued deliveries of Russian material to Germany also raise questions over the effectiveness of unilateral efforts by other players in the European nuclear fuel supply chain to cut dependencies on Russia. While it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the drivers of recent increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into France or to confirm whether and how much Russian enriched uranium may be arriving in Germany through third countries, the willingness of certain countries to continue accepting Russian material may continue to grant Rosatom alternative entry points into the European nuclear fuel supply chain. Should Russian material delivered to Germany be integrated into the future fabrication of VVER nuclear fuel assemblies in cooperation with Rosatom, this would also be counterproductive to efforts by Eastern European VVER operators to diversify away from Russian supplies.

+ +

The report also briefly examined US dependencies on Russian enriched uranium supplies, as the US remains the most important importer of Russian enriched uranium. While a prohibition on imports of Russian enriched uranium into the US may cut Russia out of US supply chains, the extent to which such a ban may cause supply challenges for US nuclear fuel supply chains remains the subject of some debate. Furthermore, some of the Russian material that may no longer be accepted in the US may need to be redirected to other customers around the world that are still willing to accept Russian material. While this is unlikely to have a significant impact on the presence of Russian enriched uranium on global markets, as the excess supply is likely to be redirected to countries willing to do business with Russia and which would have probably purchased Russian supply anyway, it highlights again the challenges and limitations inherent to unilateral efforts to cut Russia out of global nuclear fuel supply chains. The case studies presented in this report – including that of the US – also point to the need for close engagement with the nuclear industry to ensure that restrictions on trade in uranium and enrichment services with Russia are developed and implemented in a manner that incentivises and facilitates maximum industry buy-in on the objectives of such restrictions – in this case, sustainable diversification away from Russian enriched uranium supply in Western nuclear fuel supply chains.

+ +

The limitations of current restrictions on purchases of Russian enriched uranium and enrichment services described in this report should not serve to dissuade the further introduction of such restrictions. Not only is diversification away from Russia’s nuclear industry important for ensuring nuclear energy security in the US and Europe, it is also critical to avoiding the political and moral dissonance inherent in claims to support Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression while continuing to engage in business with a strategically significant Russian state-enterprise. Instead, they should serve as a further reminder to ensure that any future restrictions aim for a multilateral approach, identify and address likely opportunities for circumvention through countries still willing to do business with Russia, are introduced in close consultation with industry and are accompanied by measures that incentivise and facilitate maximum industry buy-in and compliance. The six recommendations outlined below are aimed at facilitating diversification and preventing circumvention, both in instances where continued intake of Russian material is contractually obligated and when it may be being used as part of a deliberate strategy to gain greater market access by competing suppliers.

+ +

Recommendation 1: Invest in the further expansion of enrichment capacity in partner countries. While additional capacity from Urenco and Orano is due to come online in 2025 and 2028 respectively, the US, the UK, European and other Western-allied governments must invest in additional enrichment capacity to ensure long-term security of supply and facilitate a sustainable diversification away from Russian supply while limiting negative impacts on Western nuclear industry and energy production. This could include investments in the development of new enrichment technologies that may be easier and quicker to scale up and would allow for the entry into the market of new enrichment service providers. Recent US and UK efforts to support domestic production of HALEU fuel should be commended to this end. Making available competitive government incentives for enrichment service providers to invest in expanded enrichment capacity, as well as incentives for utilities (that is, the customers) to provide guarantees of sustained demand in the form of long-term contracts will also help encourage further investment by enrichers into additional capacity.

+ +

Recommendation 2: Once alternative supply can be assured, implement multilateral restrictions on imports of Russian enriched uranium. To increase the effectiveness and limit the negative impacts of any sanctions or restrictions on the Western nuclear sector, any initiatives at diversification should be undertaken only following extensive consultations with relevant actors within the nuclear energy industry and only once sufficient alternative enriched uranium supply has been secured, either through expanded Western and partner enrichment capacity or through enriched uranium inventories. Every effort must also be made to ensure a unanimous approach to sanctions across US, European and other allied markets. The adaptation activities outlined in this report rely on Russia’s ability to access some markets while others adopt diversification policies. As such, unilateral efforts by individual countries or companies to cut Russia out of the West’s nuclear supply chain will be vulnerable to circumvention.

+ +

Recommendation 3: Establish methods for enforcing the “displacement swap” prohibition under the RSA. The US Department of Commerce, as the authority responsible for monitoring possible circumvention of the RSA provisions, should work with other departments in US government as well as with industry to identify methods for enforcing the prohibition of displacement swaps. To demonstrate that enriched uranium imported into the US was not the result of displacement using Russian material, importers could, for instance, be asked to demonstrate the allocation to various customers of enriched uranium imports into their country or show proof of increases in domestic enrichment capacity to meet demand for exports to the US. Considering the commercial sensitivity of some of this information, government authorities in the country of export could be asked to collate this information and provide assurances on behalf of industry.

+ +

Recommendation 4: Adopt prohibitions on displacement swaps alongside other national or multilateral (EU) bans on imports of Russian enriched uranium. Should individual countries or the EU decide to adopt a ban on Russian enriched uranium, they should include prohibitions of displacement swaps, similar to those included in the RSA. Such prohibitions, if enforced as per Recommendation 3, will help close potential loopholes that Russia could exploit to maintain indirect access to markets that are trying to cut Russia out, undermining efforts to squeeze Rosatom’s bottom line.

+ +

Recommendation 5: Examine and work to address dependencies on Russia across the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle. Uranium enrichment is not the only aspect of the global nuclear fuel supply chain where dependencies on Russia are critical. Rosatom also plays a major role in global NPP construction, uranium conversion and spent fuel management. Cutting dependencies on Russia in one part of the supply chain, while a good start, will not have as great an effect on Rosatom’s revenue generation as ensuring that the West and partner countries, as well as undecided customers, have alternative suppliers across the nuclear fuel cycle. Russia and China have invested extensively in their civil nuclear sectors as strategic industries, having understood the long-term dependencies they can create in the countries to which they sell their technology and services. While the economies and the government–industry relations in Russia and China differ significantly from those in Western and partner countries, supporting the development of domestic nuclear industries and their ability to compete internationally should be a priority.

+ +

Recommendation 6: Avoid trading dependencies on Russia for dependencies on China. As companies and governments seek to diversify away from Russia in their sourcing of enriched uranium supplies and across the nuclear fuel cycle, China may look to take advantage of openings to present itself as an alternative supplier. It is imperative that Western and partner governments focus on investment in domestic capacity and the capacity of partner countries, not on sourcing services and technology from China. Not only may increased Chinese exports of enriched uranium be backed by increased imports of Russian material (undermining the impact of Western and partner sanctions on the Russian nuclear industry), but allowing Chinese companies to play an important role in nuclear supply chains runs the risk of creating problematic dependencies not dissimilar to those that currently exist on Russia.

+ +
+ +

Darya Dolzikova is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and strategic aspects of civil nuclear technology. She has conducted research on the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, nuclear safety in Ukraine, the role of Russia in global civil nuclear supply chains, and other issues relating to nuclear technology and proliferation.

+ +
+ +
+ +
+ + + + + +

+ Made with by Agora + +

+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-03-18-the-attritional-art-of-war.html b/hkers/2024-03-18-the-attritional-art-of-war.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac12c33e --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-03-18-the-attritional-art-of-war.html @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ + + + + + + + + + + The Attritional Art Of War · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + +
+
+ +
+

The Attritional Art Of War

+
+
+ +
+

Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine

+

Alex Vershinin | 2024.03.18

+
+
+

If the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.

+ + + +

Attritional wars require their own “Art of War” and are fought with a “force-centric” approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are “terrain-focused”. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.

+ +

The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short “winner takes all” clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude. Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.

+ +

The Economic Dimension

+ +

Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and weapons is imperative in order to win.

+ +

High-end weapons have exceptional performance but are difficult to manufacture, especially when needed to arm a rapidly mobilised army subjected to a high rate of attrition. For example, during the Second World War German Panzers were superb tanks, but using approximately the same production resources, the Soviets rolled out eight T-34s for every German Panzer. The difference in performance did not justify the numerical disparity in production. High-end weapons also require high-end troops. These take significant time to train – time which is unavailable in a war with high attrition rates.

+ +

It is easier and faster to produce large numbers of cheap weapons and munitions, especially if their subcomponents are interchangeable with civilian goods, ensuring mass quantity without the expansion of production lines. New recruits also absorb simpler weapons faster, allowing rapid generation of new formations or the reconstitution of existing ones.

+ +

Achieving mass is difficult for higher-end Western economies. To achieve hyper-efficiency, they shed excess capacity and struggle to rapidly expand, especially since lower-tier industries have been transferred abroad for economic reasons. During war, global supply chains are disrupted and subcomponents can no longer be secured. Added to this conundrum is the lack of a skilled workforce with experience in a particular industry. These skills are acquired over decades, and once an industry is shuttered it takes decades to rebuild. The 2018 US government interagency report on US industrial capacity highlighted these problems. The bottom line is that the West must take a hard look at ensuring peacetime excess capacity in its military industrial complex, or risk losing the next war.

+ +

Force Generation

+ +

Industrial output exists so it can be channelled into replacing losses and generating new formations. This requires appropriate doctrine and command and control structures. There are two main models; NATO (most Western armies) and the old Soviet model, with most states fielding something in between.

+ +

NATO armies are highly professional, backed by a strong non-commissioned officer (NCO) Corps, with extensive peacetime military education and experience. They build upon this professionalism for their military doctrine (fundamentals, tactics and techniques) to stress individual initiative, delegating a great deal of leeway to junior officers and NCOs. NATO formations enjoy tremendous agility and flexibility to exploit opportunities on a dynamic battlefield.

+ +

In attritional war, this method has a downside. The officers and NCOs required to execute this doctrine require extensive training and, above all, experience. A US Army NCO takes years to develop. A squad leader generally has at least three years in service and a platoon sergeant has at least seven. In an attritional war characterised by heavy casualties, there simply isn’t time to replace lost NCOs or generate them for new units. The idea that civilians can be given three-month training courses, sergeant’s chevrons and then expected to perform in the same manner as a seven-year veteran is a recipe for disaster. Only time can generate leaders capable of executing NATO doctrine, and time is one thing that the massive demands of attritional war do not give.

+ +

The Soviet Union built its army for large-scale conflict with NATO. It was intended to be able to rapidly expand by calling up massed reserves. Every male in the Soviet Union underwent two years of basic training right out of high school. The constant turnover of enlisted personnel precluded creation of a Western-style NCO corps but generated a massive pool of semi-trained reserves available in times of war. The absence of reliable NCOs created an officer-centric command model, less flexible than NATO’s but more adaptable to the large-scale expansion required by attritional warfare.

+ +

However, as a war progresses past a one-year mark, front-line units will gain experience and an improved NCO corps is likely to emerge, giving the Soviet model greater flexibility. By 1943, the Red Army had developed a robust NCO corps, which then disappeared after the Second World War as combat formations were demobilised. A key difference between the models is that NATO doctrine cannot function without high-performing NCOs. The Soviet doctrine was enhanced by experienced NCOs but did not require them.

+ +

Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own

+ +

The most effective model is a mixture of the two, in which a state maintains a medium-sized professional army, together with a mass of draftees available for mobilisation. This leads directly to a high/low mixture. Professional pre-war forces form the high end of this army, becoming fire brigades – moving from sector to sector in battle to stabilise the situation and conduct decisive attacks. Low-end formations hold the line and gain experience slowly, increasing their quality until they gain the capability to conduct offensive operations. Victory is attained by creating the highest quality low-end formations possible.

+ +

Forging new units into combat-capable soldiers instead of civilian mobs is done through training and combat experience. A new formation should train for at least six months, and only if manned by reservists with previous individual training. Conscripts take longer. These units should also have professional soldiers and NCOs brought in from the pre-war army to add professionalism. Once initial training is complete, they should only be fed into the battle in secondary sectors. No formation should be allowed to fall below 70% strength. Withdrawing formations early allows experience to proliferate among the new replacements as veterans pass on their skills. Otherwise, valuable experience is lost, causing the process to start all over. Another implication is that resources should prioritise replacements over new formations, preserving combat edge in both the pre-war army (high) and newly raised (low) formations. It’s advisable to disband several pre-war (high-end) formations to spread professional soldiers among newly created low-end formations in order to raise initial quality.

+ +

The Military Dimension

+ +

Military operations in an attritional conflict are very distinct from those in a war of manoeuvre. Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own. In this context, a successful strategy accepts that the war will last at least two years and be broken into two distinct phases. The first phase ranges from initiation of hostilities to the point where sufficient combat power has been mobilised to allow decisive action. It will see little positional shifting on the ground, focusing on favourable exchange of losses and building up combat power in the rear. The dominant form of combat is fires rather than manoeuvre, complemented by extensive fortifications and camouflage. The peacetime army starts the war and conducts holding actions, providing time to mobilise resources and train the new army.

+ +

The second phase can commence after one side has met the following conditions.

+ +
    +
  • +

    Newly mobilised forces have completed their training and gained sufficient experience to make them combat-effective formations, capable of rapidly integrating all their assets in a cohesive manner.

    +
  • +
  • +

    The enemy’s strategic reserve is exhausted, leaving it unable to reinforce the threatened sector.

    +
  • +
  • +

    Fires and reconnaissance superiority are achieved, allowing the attacker to effectively mass fires on a key sector while denying the enemy the same.

    +
  • +
  • +

    The enemy’s industrial sector is degraded to the point where it is unable to replace battlefield losses. In the case of fighting against a coalition of countries, their industrial resources must also be exhausted or at least accounted for.

    +
  • +
+ +

Only after meeting these criteria should offensive operations commence. They should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points with shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside a layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. Concentration of forces on one main effort should be avoided as this gives an indication of the offensive’s location and an opportunity for the enemy to concentrate their reserves against this key point. The Brusilov Offensive of 1916, which resulted in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, is a good example of a successful attritional offensive at the tactical and operational level. By attacking along a broad front, the Russian army prevented the Austro-Hungarians from concentrating their reserves, resulting in a collapse all along the front. At the strategic level, however, the Brusilov Offensive is an example of failure. Russian forces failed to set conditions against the whole enemy coalition, focusing only on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and neglecting German capacity. The Russians expended crucial resources which they could not replace, without defeating the strongest coalition member. To reemphasise the key point, an offensive will only succeed once key criteria are met. Attempting to launch an offensive earlier will result in losses without any strategic gains, playing directly into enemy hands.

+ +

Modern War

+ +

The modern battlefield is an integrated system of systems which includes various types of electronic warfare (EW), three basic types of air defences, four different types of artillery, countless aircraft types, strike and reconnaissance drones, construction and sapper engineers, traditional infantry, armour formations and, above all, logistics. Artillery has become more dangerous thanks to increased ranges and advanced targeting, stretching the depth of the battlefield.

+ +

In practice, this means it is easier to mass fires than forces. Deep manoeuvre, which requires the massing of combat power, is no longer possible because any massed force will be destroyed by indirect fires before it can achieve success in depth. Instead, a ground offensive requires a tight protective bubble to ward off enemy strike systems. This bubble is generated through layering friendly counter-fire, air defence and EW assets. Moving numerous interdependent systems is highly complicated and unlikely to be successful. Shallow attacks along the forward line of troops are most likely to be successful at an acceptable cost ratio; attempts at deep penetration will be exposed to massed fires the moment they exit the protection of the defensive bubble.

+ +

Integration of these overlapping assets requires centralised planning and exceptionally well-trained staff officers, capable of integrating multiple capabilities on the fly. It takes years to train such officers, and even combat experience does not generate such skills in a short time. Checklists and mandatory procedures can alleviate these deficiencies, but only on a less-complicated, static front. Dynamic offensive operations require fast reaction times, which semi-trained officers are incapable of performing.

+ +

An example of this complexity is an attack by a platoon of 30 soldiers. This would require EW systems to jam enemy drones; another EW system to jam enemy communications preventing adjustment of enemy fires; and a third EW system to jam space navigation systems denying use of precision guided munitions. In addition, fires require counterbattery radars to defeat enemy artillery. Further complicating planning is the fact that enemy EW will locate and destroy any friendly radar or EW emitter that is emitting for too long. Engineers will have to clear paths through minefields, while friendly drones provide time-sensitive ISR and fire support if needed. (This task requires a great deal of training with the supporting units to avoid dropping munitions on friendly attacking troops.) Finally, artillery needs to provide support both on the objective and enemy rear, targeting reserves and suppressing artillery. All these systems need to work as an integrated team just to support 30 men in several vehicles attacking another 30 men or less. A lack of coordination between these assets will result in failed attacks and horrific losses without ever seeing the enemy. As the size of formation conducting operations increases, so do the number and complexity of assets that need to be integrated.

+ +

Implications for Combat Operations

+ +

Deep fires – further than 100–150 km (the average range of tactical rockets) behind the front line – target an enemy’s ability to generate combat power. This includes production facilities, munitions dumps, repair depots, and energy and transportation infrastructure. Of particular importance are targets that require significant production capabilities and that are difficult to replace/repair, as their destruction will inflict long term damage. As with all aspects of attritional war, such strikes will take significant time to have an effect, with timelines running into years. The low global production volumes of long-range precision-guided munitions, effective deception and concealment actions, large stockpiles of anti-aircraft missiles and the sheer repair capacities of strong, determined states all combine to prolong conflicts. Effective layering of air defences must include high-end systems at all altitudes coupled with cheaper systems to counter the enemy’s massed low-end attack platforms. Combined with mass-scale manufacturing and effective EW, this is the only way to defeat enemy deep fires.

+ +

Victory in an attritional war is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime

+ +

Successful attritional war focuses on the preservation of one’s own combat power. This usually translates into a relatively static front interrupted by limited local attacks to improve positions, using artillery for most of the fighting. Fortification and concealment of all forces including logistics is the key to minimising losses. The long time required to construct fortifications prevents significant ground movement. An attacking force which cannot rapidly entrench will suffer significant losses from enemy artillery fires.

+ +

Defensive operations buy time to develop low-end combat formations, allowing newly mobilised troops to gain combat experience without suffering heavy losses in large-scale attacks. Building up experienced low-tier combat formations generates the capability for future offensive operations.

+ +

The early stages of attritional war range from initiation of hostilities to the point where mobilised resources are available in large numbers and are ready for combat operations. In the case of a surprise attack, a rapid offensive by one side may be possible until the defender can form a solid front. After that, combat solidifies. This period lasts at least a year-and-a-half to two years. During this period, major offensive operations should be avoided. Even if large attacks are successful, they will result in significant casualties, often for meaningless territorial gains. An army should never accept a battle on unfavourable terms. In attritional war, any terrain that does not have a vital industrial centre is irrelevant. It is always better to retreat and preserve forces, regardless of the political consequences. Fighting on disadvantageous terrain burns up units, losing experienced soldiers who are key to victory. The German obsession with Stalingrad in 1942 is a prime example of fighting on unfavourable terrain for political reasons. Germany burned up vital units that it could not afford to lose, simply to capture a city bearing Stalin’s name. It is also wise to push the enemy into fighting on disadvantageous terrain through information operations, exploiting politically sensitive enemy objectives. The goal is to force the enemy to expend vital material and strategic reserves on strategically meaningless operations. A key pitfall to avoid is being dragged into the very same trap that has been set for the enemy. In the First World War, Germans did just that at Verdun, where it planned to use surprise to capture key, politically sensitive terrain, provoking costly French counterattacks. Unfortunately for the Germans, they fell into their own trap. They failed to gain key, defendable terrain early on, and the battle devolved instead into a series of costly infantry assaults by both sides, with artillery fires devastating attacking infantry.

+ +

When the second phase begins, the offensive should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points using shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside the layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. There is a cascading effect in which a crisis in one sector forces the defenders to shift reserves from a second sector, only to generate a crisis there in turn. As forces start falling back and leaving prepared fortifications, morale plummets, with the obvious question: “If we can’t hold the mega-fortress, how can we hold these new trenches?” Retreat then turns into rout. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. The Allies’ Offensive in 1918 is an example. The Allies attacked along a broad front, while the Germans lacked sufficient resources to defend the entire line. Once the German Army began to retreat it proved impossible to stop.

+ +

The attritional strategy, centred on defence, is counterintuitive to most Western military officers. Western military thought views the offensive as the only means of achieving the decisive strategic goal of forcing the enemy to come to the negotiating table on unfavourable terms. The strategic patience required to set the conditions for an offensive runs against their combat experience acquired in overseas counterinsurgency operations.

+ +

Conclusion

+ +

The conduct of attritional wars is vastly different from wars of manoeuvre. They last longer and end up testing a country’s industrial capacity. Victory is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime.

+ +

Victory is attainable by carefully analysing one’s own and the enemy’s political objectives. The key is recognising the strengths and weaknesses of competing economic models and identifying the economic strategies that are most likely to generate maximum resources. These resources can then be utilised to build a massive army using the high/low force and weapons mixture. The military conduct of war is driven by overall political strategic objectives, military realities and economic limitations. Combat operations are shallow and focus on destroying enemy resources, not on gaining terrain. Propaganda is used to support military operations, not the other way around. With patience and careful planning, a war can be won.

+ +

Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the geography and the population and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the economy, doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict.

+ +

If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method.

+ +
+ +

Alex Vershinin, Lt Col (Retd), has 10 years of frontline experience in Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan. For the last decade before his retirement, he worked as a modelling and simulations officer in concept development and experimentation for NATO and the US Army.

+ +
+ +
+ +
+ + + + + +

+ Made with by Agora + +

+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/index.html b/hkers/index.html index 46e6ca43..dd2925fd 100644 --- a/hkers/index.html +++ b/hkers/index.html @@ -67,6 +67,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+
+

The Attritional Art Of War

+ + +
Alex Vershinin | 2024.03.18
+

If the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.

+ + +
< Full Article >
+
+ +
+ + +
+ + +

China In Sub-Saharan Africa

@@ -206,37 +238,7 @@
< -
-

Forward Defense

- -
Seth G. Jones, et al. | 2024.03.11
-

Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States’ role in Europe.

- - -
< Full Article >
-
- -
- - - -
- - -