From 738ef92a228d44ee096a38e06468e998680c551b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 08:51:27 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?0x2f=20Patch=20Build=20VOL.47=20=C2=A9=20MMXXIV?= =?UTF-8?q?=20ac7a6f7?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- c2/index.html | 48 +- c2/page10/index.html | 48 +- c2/page11/index.html | 48 +- c2/page12/index.html | 48 +- c2/page13/index.html | 48 +- c2/page14/index.html | 48 +- c2/page15/index.html | 48 +- c2/page16/index.html | 48 +- c2/page17/index.html | 48 +- c2/page18/index.html | 48 +- c2/page19/index.html | 48 +- c2/page2/index.html | 48 +- c2/page20/index.html | 48 +- c2/page21/index.html | 48 +- c2/page22/index.html | 48 +- c2/page23/index.html | 48 +- c2/page24/index.html | 48 +- c2/page25/index.html | 48 +- c2/page26/index.html | 48 +- c2/page27/index.html | 48 +- c2/page28/index.html | 48 +- c2/page29/index.html | 48 +- c2/page3/index.html | 48 +- c2/page30/index.html | 48 +- c2/page31/index.html | 48 +- c2/page32/index.html | 48 +- c2/page33/index.html | 48 +- c2/page34/index.html | 48 +- c2/page35/index.html | 48 +- c2/page36/index.html | 48 +- c2/page37/index.html | 24 + c2/page4/index.html | 48 +- c2/page5/index.html | 48 +- c2/page6/index.html | 48 +- c2/page7/index.html | 48 +- c2/page8/index.html | 48 +- c2/page9/index.html | 48 +- columns.xml | 2 +- feed.xml | 2 +- heros.xml | 2 +- hkers.xml | 1104 ++++++++++++----- hkers/2024-10-31-more-than-meets-the-eye.html | 250 ++++ .../2024-11-01-crossing-deepfake-rubicon.html | 333 +++++ ...-11-12-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem.html | 488 ++++++++ hkers/index.html | 90 +- 45 files changed, 2815 insertions(+), 1208 deletions(-) create mode 100644 hkers/2024-10-31-more-than-meets-the-eye.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-11-01-crossing-deepfake-rubicon.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-11-12-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem.html diff --git a/c2/index.html b/c2/index.html index 08c58026..15caf39a 100644 --- a/c2/index.html +++ b/c2/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,14 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+
+
+ + +
+
+
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page10/index.html b/c2/page10/index.html index 16a59cca..4210e145 100644 --- a/c2/page10/index.html +++ b/c2/page10/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page11/index.html b/c2/page11/index.html index 1ec43764..ef43a86e 100644 --- a/c2/page11/index.html +++ b/c2/page11/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page12/index.html b/c2/page12/index.html index f3c02526..d99b6a6a 100644 --- a/c2/page12/index.html +++ b/c2/page12/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page13/index.html b/c2/page13/index.html index 93fef36d..aed45083 100644 --- a/c2/page13/index.html +++ b/c2/page13/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page14/index.html b/c2/page14/index.html index a8a63271..3190ccc2 100644 --- a/c2/page14/index.html +++ b/c2/page14/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page15/index.html b/c2/page15/index.html index 3a070062..273bca1a 100644 --- a/c2/page15/index.html +++ b/c2/page15/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page16/index.html b/c2/page16/index.html index 18b0f06f..f078e747 100644 --- a/c2/page16/index.html +++ b/c2/page16/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page17/index.html b/c2/page17/index.html index 03c4358c..5355038b 100644 --- a/c2/page17/index.html +++ b/c2/page17/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page18/index.html b/c2/page18/index.html index a8e4d7ac..3da097e8 100644 --- a/c2/page18/index.html +++ b/c2/page18/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page19/index.html b/c2/page19/index.html index 06d1d2f9..e5baea73 100644 --- a/c2/page19/index.html +++ b/c2/page19/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page2/index.html b/c2/page2/index.html index ffd3c545..eb825288 100644 --- a/c2/page2/index.html +++ b/c2/page2/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page20/index.html b/c2/page20/index.html index 2975ba4e..2c5856c6 100644 --- a/c2/page20/index.html +++ b/c2/page20/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page21/index.html b/c2/page21/index.html index 6d1eafba..ee888d48 100644 --- a/c2/page21/index.html +++ b/c2/page21/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page22/index.html b/c2/page22/index.html index f8d96e70..327f24c2 100644 --- a/c2/page22/index.html +++ b/c2/page22/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page23/index.html b/c2/page23/index.html index 38bf75dc..3567b8e4 100644 --- a/c2/page23/index.html +++ b/c2/page23/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page24/index.html b/c2/page24/index.html index 58b99234..d28c8891 100644 --- a/c2/page24/index.html +++ b/c2/page24/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page25/index.html b/c2/page25/index.html index 6487974b..aa80d8fb 100644 --- a/c2/page25/index.html +++ b/c2/page25/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page26/index.html b/c2/page26/index.html index 36c470a5..22b9d40d 100644 --- a/c2/page26/index.html +++ b/c2/page26/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page27/index.html b/c2/page27/index.html index adcdb79d..f20788d2 100644 --- a/c2/page27/index.html +++ b/c2/page27/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page28/index.html b/c2/page28/index.html index b99a4330..3c93bb2c 100644 --- a/c2/page28/index.html +++ b/c2/page28/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page29/index.html b/c2/page29/index.html index 29746c21..7b922120 100644 --- a/c2/page29/index.html +++ b/c2/page29/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page3/index.html b/c2/page3/index.html index 09c3f1d5..de7cd13a 100644 --- a/c2/page3/index.html +++ b/c2/page3/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page30/index.html b/c2/page30/index.html index 28cdb119..9ec37171 100644 --- a/c2/page30/index.html +++ b/c2/page30/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page31/index.html b/c2/page31/index.html index f892d948..d57182c3 100644 --- a/c2/page31/index.html +++ b/c2/page31/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page32/index.html b/c2/page32/index.html index 366edc36..2e76b94b 100644 --- a/c2/page32/index.html +++ b/c2/page32/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page33/index.html b/c2/page33/index.html index 6ef20e1a..f16f2a48 100644 --- a/c2/page33/index.html +++ b/c2/page33/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page34/index.html b/c2/page34/index.html index 7a23c97e..9bf98d04 100644 --- a/c2/page34/index.html +++ b/c2/page34/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page35/index.html b/c2/page35/index.html index 578107a8..25385fd1 100644 --- a/c2/page35/index.html +++ b/c2/page35/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page36/index.html b/c2/page36/index.html index aa3f9ca6..235c109c 100644 --- a/c2/page36/index.html +++ b/c2/page36/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page37/index.html b/c2/page37/index.html index 8d0900f9..08595019 100644 --- a/c2/page37/index.html +++ b/c2/page37/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+

【香港保衛戰當年今日・八】

diff --git a/c2/page4/index.html b/c2/page4/index.html index 623b532c..2d48de03 100644 --- a/c2/page4/index.html +++ b/c2/page4/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page5/index.html b/c2/page5/index.html index 9589ae35..5762eb4b 100644 --- a/c2/page5/index.html +++ b/c2/page5/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page6/index.html b/c2/page6/index.html index 2fba5757..a5e6e2f2 100644 --- a/c2/page6/index.html +++ b/c2/page6/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page7/index.html b/c2/page7/index.html index 3528e730..13170e8b 100644 --- a/c2/page7/index.html +++ b/c2/page7/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page8/index.html b/c2/page8/index.html index 1da3e1b9..16f54630 100644 --- a/c2/page8/index.html +++ b/c2/page8/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/c2/page9/index.html b/c2/page9/index.html index 9c7b480b..ad5e29cc 100644 --- a/c2/page9/index.html +++ b/c2/page9/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,30 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+
-
- - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
-
diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index 1ec6929f..35ff97c7 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-11-26T11:22:23+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV尋香記2024-09-02T12:00:00+08:002024-09-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/fragrance-of-time<p>我七月初就知道「尋香記」這個展覽了，但一直沒有動身，身心靈也像一個木頭人。為什麼呢？如果這是在二十年前，我肯定會在第一天第一時間就衝過去，興奮得不得了。想想也是挺有意思，我跟香味這東西，總算是有些不解之緣吧。八月的最後一天，我終於踏進了展廳。不過，就算來晚了，那份對香氣的喜愛，還是一點都沒少。有心動，也有感動。</p> +Jekyll2024-11-28T08:50:10+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV尋香記2024-09-02T12:00:00+08:002024-09-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/fragrance-of-time<p>我七月初就知道「尋香記」這個展覽了，但一直沒有動身，身心靈也像一個木頭人。為什麼呢？如果這是在二十年前，我肯定會在第一天第一時間就衝過去，興奮得不得了。想想也是挺有意思，我跟香味這東西，總算是有些不解之緣吧。八月的最後一天，我終於踏進了展廳。不過，就算來晚了，那份對香氣的喜愛，還是一點都沒少。有心動，也有感動。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index b08597e5..7b062792 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-11-26T11:22:23+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-11-28T08:50:10+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index 17802096..eac9078b 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-11-26T11:22:23+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV暴力与父权：泰国男子从军经历调查2022-08-05T12:00:00+08:002022-08-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/2022-08-05-ElinBjarnegard/ElinBjarnegard...-a1_l-armed-violence-and-patriarchal-values<p>本研究超越男女二元性的论调，强调男性内部对于暴力的态度因意识形态影响而存在分化：志愿参军的人通常更亲近父权制意识形态，而不是军队塑造了士兵的父权思想；强制参军对不希望主动参军人士的父权思想并无明显影响。</p> +Jekyll2024-11-28T08:50:10+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV暴力与父权：泰国男子从军经历调查2022-08-05T12:00:00+08:002022-08-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/2022-08-05-ElinBjarnegard/ElinBjarnegard...-a1_l-armed-violence-and-patriarchal-values<p>本研究超越男女二元性的论调，强调男性内部对于暴力的态度因意识形态影响而存在分化：志愿参军的人通常更亲近父权制意识形态，而不是军队塑造了士兵的父权思想；强制参军对不希望主动参军人士的父权思想并无明显影响。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index 408e64cf..b55305ec 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,4 +1,399 @@ -Jekyll2024-11-26T11:22:23+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIVToo Good To Lose2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/too-good-to-lose<p><em>When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.</em></p> +Jekyll2024-11-28T08:50:10+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIVUkraine’s Military AI Ecosystem2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem<p><em>This report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>This report is the first part of a series on military artificial intelligence (AI) development and its application in the war in Ukraine. It will focus on two critical aspects of AI adoption in Ukraine’s military:</p> + +<ol> + <li> + <p>The conditions and factors that contributed to military AI development from the beginning of the war with Russia in 2014</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The key government institutions and initiatives responsible for driving AI adoption, along with a summary of their major AI-related initiatives</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<p>The summary section below presents key findings and insights on both of these aspects.</p> + +<h4 id="1-ai-is-in-experimental-deployment-and-is-overwhelmingly-geared-toward-supportive-functions">1. AI is in experimental deployment and is overwhelmingly geared toward supportive functions.</h4> + +<p>Although AI is frequently discussed in the context of the war in Ukraine, its full deployment on the battlefield remains limited. Numerous AI-driven capabilities and technologies are being tested along the frontlines, in long-range strikes within Russian territory, and across multidomain operations, but these efforts are largely experimental rather than indicative of AI systematically replacing human functions in warfare. AI currently assumes a predominantly supportive and informational role, and even when AI capabilities advance and improve, they are not yet implemented in fully autonomous modes on the battlefield.</p> + +<h4 id="2-there-is-growing-government-involvement-in-ai-development-in-ukraine-through-organizational-regulative-and-technological-initiatives-led-by-various-government-stakeholders">2. There is growing government involvement in AI development in Ukraine through organizational, regulative, and technological initiatives led by various government stakeholders.</h4> + +<p>Initially, the development of AI-driven technologies in Ukraine was spearheaded by the private sector and volunteer initiatives. However, government institutions and agencies have recently begun to build their own capacities for advancing new technologies. This shift is evident in the creation of new organizational divisions and units within government institutions and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which are specifically dedicated to AI-focused technologies and their deployment. These efforts mark a significant step toward the institutionalization of AI innovation within the public sector.</p> + +<h4 id="3-the-ukrainian-government-is-focusing-on-the-adoption-of-commercial-ai-rather-than-on-developing-new-technology-within-government-institutions">3. The Ukrainian government is focusing on the adoption of commercial AI rather than on developing new technology within government institutions.</h4> + +<p>Ukrainian authorities, having recognized that the speed and quality of technology development in the private sector far exceed those of the government sector, have prioritized creating infrastructure and procedures for the fast adoption of commercial technology. This approach has resulted in simplifying regulations on the adoption of innovation by the AFU, initiating programs for prototype testing, and providing grant funding to early-stage start-ups, among other initiatives. Moreover, most newly established units within Ukraine’s military, such as the Unmanned Systems Forces, are dedicated to integrating new technologies into military operations rather than participating in combat itself.</p> + +<h4 id="4-the-absence-of-a-long-term-strategy-for-military-ai-development-poses-significant-challenges-to-the-sustained-and-effective-adoption-of-these-technologies">4. The absence of a long-term strategy for military AI development poses significant challenges to the sustained and effective adoption of these technologies.</h4> + +<p>The lack of a long-term strategy for military AI development represents a critical gap within the government’s approach to emerging technologies. Despite Ukraine’s recognized technological potential, there is no unified vision guiding the use of AI in defense. This strategic void is primarily driven by limited management capacity across government institutions and by the inexperience of political leadership in addressing the complexities of warfare. As a result, the focus has been on immediate, tactical solutions rather than on establishing a cohesive, forward-looking strategy to harness the full potential of AI in military operations.</p> + +<h4 id="5-between-2014-and-2022-two-grassroots-applications--analytics-for-situational-awareness-and-drones-for-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance-isr--laid-the-groundwork-for-the-post-2022-surge-in-military-ai-following-russias-full-scale-invasion-military-ai-expanded-significantly-across-six-major-applications-with-a-growing-number-of-companies-focusing-on-autonomy">5. Between 2014 and 2022, two grassroots applications — analytics for situational awareness and drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) — laid the groundwork for the post-2022 surge in military AI. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, military AI expanded significantly across six major applications, with a growing number of companies focusing on autonomy.</h4> + +<p>This report categorizes AI applications in Ukraine’s military operations into six major areas, listed below. A more detailed analysis of these applications will be provided in subsequent reports in this series.</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Autonomy.</strong> The most significant advancements have been in autonomous systems, where Ukraine is making strides in areas such as GPS-denied navigation and swarm operations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Open-source intelligence and fighting disinformation.</strong> AI helps to analyze large volumes of digital content from media and social networks and to identify Russian narratives, propaganda, and information campaigns spreading disinformation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Situational awareness and command and control.</strong> AI enhances situational awareness with numerous software platforms used by the military to analyze battlefield and intelligence data and to facilitate real-time efficient decisionmaking.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Demining.</strong> AI-powered analytic software and AI-enabled unmanned ground vehicles improve the efficiency and safety of mine clearance.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Training and simulation.</strong> AI-driven training simulations are helping soldiers adapt to complex battlefield conditions by playing close-to-real combat scenarios with AI adjustments to address warfighters’ skill gaps.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Damage assessment.</strong> AI is crucial in damage assessment, utilizing satellite data and drone imagery to analyze damage, losses, and devastation and to estimate future recovery efforts.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="6-several-factors-have-facilitated-the-rapid-development-of-military-ai-in-ukraine-creating-a-unique-environment-for-defense-innovation">6. Several factors have facilitated the rapid development of military AI in Ukraine, creating a unique environment for defense innovation.</h4> + +<p>The situation in Ukraine over the last decade, particularly the ongoing conflict with Russia, has affected all aspects of society and necessitated rapid adaptation in defense and related fields. These factors have enabled Ukraine to test and deploy AI-driven solutions in real battlefield conditions, leading to numerous innovations, particularly in the realm of autonomy and autonomous weapon systems.</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Existential need for advanced technology.</strong> The Russian invasion of 2022 created an urgent, existential need for Ukraine to develop advanced defense technologies rapidly. The high-stakes environment pushed both government and private sectors to prioritize technological advancements, such as AI, to enhance military capabilities. This urgency also catalyzed a willingness to experiment with AI, leading to quicker deployment of AI-driven capabilities in combat.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Active civil society and a robust private sector.</strong> Ukraine’s vibrant civil society and entrepreneurial private sector have been instrumental in driving defense innovation. Even before the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian entrepreneurial spirit, combined with a deep sense of national defense responsibility, led many private companies and start-ups to actively contribute to the war effort. These organizations have developed AI-driven solutions ranging from autonomous drones to advanced surveillance systems, with many innovations coming from small teams responding quickly to military demands. The active participation of nongovernmental actors in AI-enabled defense technology development and the fast deployment of commercial technology have significantly accelerated progress in this area.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Permissive regulatory frameworks.</strong> Ukraine’s regulatory environment for military AI was absent before the invasion. Unlike in many other countries, where regulatory bottlenecks can slow down innovation, Ukraine’s government refused to regulate military AI, allowing innovators to respond quickly to frontline needs and develop AI applications that could be immediately deployed in combat settings. The Ministry of Digital Transformation (MDT) prioritizes a soft, business-friendly approach, aiming to avoid overregulation. Instead of imposing strict rules, the ministry uses a bottom-up strategy, offering voluntary guidelines and tools to prepare businesses for future regulations. This approach extends to the defense sector, as the MDT has indicated that it does not plan to introduce regulation of AI in the defense sector.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Direct communication between engineers and military personnel.</strong> One of the most significant accelerators of military AI development in Ukraine has been direct communication between engineers and military personnel. Through a well-established network of technical workshops positioned near the frontline or within military units, including mobile drone repair vans, engineers from private companies are able to closely monitor and assess the performance of their systems in real combat scenarios. This proximity enables engineers working on unmanned systems and autonomous capabilities to receive real-time feedback, allowing for the rapid refinement of their technologies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Foreign assistance providing access to new technologies.</strong> International support, from both governments and private companies, has been crucial in allowing Ukraine to leap forward in its technological capabilities. This support has facilitated Ukraine’s adoption of new technologies, such as analytical tools from Palantir, communication infrastructure via Starlink, and the migration of critical government data to Microsoft’s cloud services, to name just a few examples. This external assistance has not only equipped Ukraine with essential tools for innovation but has also fostered opportunities for collaborative development between Ukrainian and foreign companies, thereby strengthening Ukraine’s military and technological capabilities.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="7-collaboration-on-ai-between-ukraine-and-the-us-government-can-be-mutually-beneficial">7. Collaboration on AI between Ukraine and the U.S. government can be mutually beneficial.</h4> + +<p>What follows are several key recommendations for the U.S. government to foster closer collaboration in AI development between the United States and Ukraine in a way that will be beneficial to both countries.</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Strategic support.</strong> The United States should leverage its technological leadership to help Ukraine develop a cohesive long-term strategy for integrating AI into defense operations. By providing strategic guidance, the United States can help to align Ukraine’s national priorities in AI development while gaining valuable insights into AI applications in active warfare.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Closing the feedback loop.</strong> A structured feedback system for evaluating the performance of U.S.-provided drones and military technologies in Ukraine would benefit both nations. U.S. companies could quickly iterate and improve their technologies, while Ukraine would receive more tailored and effective capabilities, enhancing battlefield operations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>AI in U.S. foreign aid.</strong> The United States should integrate AI development into its foreign aid programs for Ukraine, providing essential computing infrastructure to support AI innovation. This would strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities and establish the country as a hub for military AI development, benefiting U.S. strategic interests in global AI leadership.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>AI-focused training and entrepreneurial development.</strong> The United States should establish AI-related programs for Ukrainian defense entrepreneurs and business leaders. These initiatives would foster Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem and strengthen U.S.-Ukraine collaboration, positioning both countries to lead in AI-driven defense innovation.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h3 id="understanding-ukraines-ai-ecosystem">Understanding Ukraine’s AI Ecosystem</h3> + +<p>This section provides a comprehensive overview of Ukraine’s military AI ecosystem. It begins by providing a background to Ukraine’s commercial AI sector, which for more than a decade has been quite successful — more than is commonly recognized in the West. Next, the paper examines how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 resulted in major changes to the Ukrainian military’s approach to software and data, changes that were critical to the foundation of the military’s post-2022 introduction of AI technologies. Finally, it provides an overview of the key government organizations responsible for driving AI adoption throughout Ukraine’s military as well as a summary of their AI-related initiatives.</p> + +<h4 id="commercial-ai-in-ukraine-a-decade-of-quiet-success">Commercial AI in Ukraine: A Decade of Quiet Success</h4> + +<p>In the race for leadership in artificial intelligence, Ukraine may appear an unlikely contender. However, this comparatively small nation is demonstrating significant potential, with a highly skilled and technologically adept population. Notably, nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians express optimism regarding AI’s potential to enhance human life, reflecting widespread public confidence in the transformative capabilities of the technology.</p> + +<p>Indeed, for more than a decade, Ukraine has quietly served as a developer of innovative AI capabilities that have captured the world’s imagination. While a full list is beyond the scope of this paper, three companies — Looksery, Respeecher, and Augmented Pixels — provide a helpful illustration of how Ukraine’s commercial AI sector has long been more impactful and more capable than is commonly understood outside technology communities.</p> + +<p>First, in 2015, Snap Inc. — a Santa Monica-based technology company and the maker of the popular Snapchat social media app — spent $150 million to acquire Looksery, a two-year-old Ukrainian AI tech firm. Looksery’s AI-based facial recognition and augmented reality technology laid the foundation for Snapchat’s Lens portfolio, which today boasts 250 million daily users. In 2022, Snap Inc. stated that the company still employed 300 Ukrainian staff, almost all of whom are engineers.</p> + +<p>Second, Ukrainian AI companies have also been involved in Hollywood, providing AI technology for audio generation. In 2020, Disney sought to include a younger version of Luke Skywalker in the television series The Mandalorian, but faced a challenge in that Star Wars actor Mark Hamill was 68 years old. Disney contracted with the Ukrainian AI company Respeecher to synthesize a younger voice that was sufficiently high-quality to meet Disney’s exacting standards.</p> + +<p>Third and finally, Qualcomm acquired Augmented Pixels in 2022. Founded in 2010 in Odesa, Augmented Pixels developed AI navigation technologies, such as 3D mapping and localization, for drones and AI glasses. At the time of purchase, Augmented Pixels’ commercial customers included National Geographic, LG Electronics, Intel, and more.</p> + +<p>The main takeaway from these cases is that Ukraine’s AI sector was a meaningful player in commercial technology markets — taken seriously even by leading Western companies — long before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. A 2024 study conducted on behalf of Ukraine’s MDT found that Ukraine has 243 AI-focused companies and a broader information technology (IT) and software workforce comprising more than 307,000 specialists. Additionally, Ukrainian universities have launched a remarkable 106 specialized AI and machine learning (ML) programs across 42 institutions, resulting in a 122 percent increase in enrollment over five years. The report found that Ukraine produces more IT graduates than any other Central or Eastern European country, with a quarter of these graduates specializing in AI/ML.</p> + +<p>Despite Ukraine’s aforementioned strengths, its AI sector continues to encounter substantial challenges. According to the 2023 Government AI Readiness Index by Oxford Insights, Ukraine was ranked 60th out of 193 countries in AI integration into public service. The country’s AI development is hindered by several factors, including insufficient computing infrastructure and a shortage of skilled human capital due to the relocation of IT engineers fleeing the war (although some have continued working remotely for their Ukrainian employers). Additionally, Ukraine’s low government research and development investment further constrains the sector’s growth.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nzE7KG9.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Comparison of Ukraine and United States in Government AI Readiness Index 2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://oxfordinsights.com/ai-readiness/ai-readiness-index/">“Government AI Readiness Index 2023,” Oxford Insights</a>.</em></p> + +<p>Surprisingly, the Oxford Insights report found that Ukraine matches the United States — the index’s top-ranked country — in one crucial aspect: vision. However, vision alone is not enough to boost AI development and deployment. Ukraine’s position in the index underscores a critical gap between the ambitious plans of its tech sector and the resources needed to execute them.</p> + +<h3 id="military-ai-in-ukraine-since-2014-necessary-growth">Military AI in Ukraine since 2014: Necessary Growth</h3> + +<h4 id="pre-2022-laying-a-digital-foundation">Pre-2022: Laying a Digital Foundation</h4> + +<p>Though the 2022 full-scale invasion shocked the world, for Ukrainians, it was not the start of the war with Russia. Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories in 2014 was a major wake up call for Ukrainian society — including Ukraine’s tech sector, which became increasingly willing to directly support Ukrainian armed forces.</p> + +<p>The 2022 full-scale invasion, however, did mark a watershed moment in Ukraine’s approach to military artificial intelligence. Prior to 2022, Kyiv had not prioritized AI in its defense strategy, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas region. However, groundwork laid by volunteer groups since 2014 — focused not on AI but on software for data collection, analysis, and warfighting operational support — has proved instrumental in facilitating rapid military AI development and adoption since 2022.</p> + +<p>This subsection will examine two key military use cases from the 2014–2022 period that enabled AI integration after the full-scale invasion: situational awareness systems and drones. After 2014, volunteers from Ukraine’s tech sector developed systems using modern data and software techniques (though not ML/AI). Over time, these systems dramatically improved Ukraine’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities and even overtook competing official systems in adoption and impact.</p> + +<p><em>Situational Awareness</em></p> + +<p>Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine’s tech-savvy and patriotic workforce developed and introduced 11 new situational awareness and battlefield management systems to the Ukrainian military. Because they were unofficial and unsanctioned, one might think that these volunteer initiatives would be divorced from real military requirements. In practice, however, the volunteer groups had direct communication with front line operational forces, allowing them to focus their development efforts on high-priority military needs. One of the initiatives, the situational awareness system Delta, was eventually adopted and formally integrated into the Ukrainian military. The remarkable fact is that some unofficial volunteer systems and software have achieved near-universal adoption by the relevant Ukrainian forces, vastly exceeding the adoption rate of some official military technology initiatives that sought (and usually failed) to provide similar capabilities.</p> + +<p>The diverse capabilities of these systems — generally originating from explicit military requests — ranged from fire control, artillery optimization, and air traffic management to combat command and control. These systems not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">[Early situational awareness and command and control systems] not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>One of the most noteworthy volunteer groups is Aerorozvidka, whose situational awareness system Delta has become a linchpin in Ukraine’s multidomain operations. Started in 2016 and transferred to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (MoD) in 2023, Delta seamlessly integrates NATO ISTAR standards to provide essential situational awareness across all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Building on this foundation, Aerorozvidka has spearheaded the creation of situational awareness centers in eight cities, each focused on gathering information from its respective section of the front. These centers serve as technological hubs, uniting and coordinating intelligence from a wide variety of sources — drones, satellites, stationary cameras, sensors, field scouts, and data from allies. The system even digitizes information from loyal informants in temporarily occupied territories, who interface with government apps and chatbots. Bringing all these different data sources together in a unified software platform is a challenge even for the United States military, but Delta achieves this and enjoys high user satisfaction among Ukrainian forces. As will be discussed further in this paper, Delta has recently been enhanced with AI/ML-enabled capabilities. At one point, there was an officially sanctioned military system — Dzvin — in development that promised similar capabilities as the volunteer-built Delta. However, this fell victim to bureaucratic hurdles and corruption and never achieved meaningful adoption despite its official introduction into the AFU in 2022. A diverse range of military officials told CSIS that Delta now is the de facto standard and Dzvin is functionally irrelevant. Delta is also of keen interest to NATO, which has described the system as “ground-breaking” following its victory in a 2017 NATO hackathon and prominent testing in NATO military exercises, most recently in 2024.</p> + +<p>The Kropyva artillery software system improves target accuracy and routinely reduces the time between receiving orders and striking targets by up to tenfold. Ukrainian artillerymen access Kropyva through a tablet or mobile phone, then enter enemy coordinates, which are automatically translated to the nearest available artillery battery along with precalculated aiming trajectories. The Army SOS volunteer organization developed Kropyva in 2014, and 90 to 95 percent of Ukrainian artillery units have adopted it as their primary artillery fire control system. Another military system helping to coordinate artillery strikes, GisArta, attracted widespread attention in the Western press as “Uber for artillery,” even though Kropyva is more widely used and impactful according to Ukrainian military officials in conversation with CSIS.</p> + +<p>Kropyva and Delta are just two of dozens of examples demonstrating how systems initially developed by tech industry volunteers changed Ukraine’s armed forces after 2014. Many of these systems began with the modest goal of supporting warfighter decisionmaking and have since evolved into advanced situational awareness and battle management systems routinely used by hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Prior to 2022, the adoption of these modern software and data-driven platforms also laid the groundwork for AI/ML integration. As critical information sources were networked and digitized, the data they generated became the raw material for training AI models and enabling AI-driven capabilities.</p> + +<p>The success of volunteer-led grassroots projects underscores a crucial point: in the face of existential threats, innovation in Ukraine has primarily thrived outside traditional channels. However, this decentralized approach is not without its challenges. Many of these teams still operate on shoestring budgets, relying heavily on donations. The lack of systemic support and funding raises concerns about the long-term sustainability and interoperability of this diversity of systems. Ukraine still possesses a hard-won technological edge, but the government needs to ensure that these successful initiatives are put on a more secure long-term foundation and incorporated into official plans and strategies. Unfortunately, multiple executives in Ukraine’s defense technology ecosystem told CSIS that the scale of Ukraine’s technological edge is shrinking as Russian forces improve their own technology and their pace of innovation adoption. Whereas previously Russian forces would take a month or more to adapt to new Ukrainian innovations before adopting countermeasures in the form of new tactics or technologies, now Russian forces may need as little as two or three days.</p> + +<p><em>Drones</em></p> + +<p>Prior to 2022, drones were in use by both sides, mostly for remotely piloted ISR missions and without AI/ML capabilities. Drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the post-2022 war with Russia, widely recognized as a transformational capability for both sides. However, the impact of drones during the 2014–2022 period was considerably more limited.</p> + +<p>The war in Donbas served as an early testing ground for commercial drones, with both sides exploring their potential. While Russian forces made early strides in drone warfare, the Ukrainian side’s attempts to leverage commercial drones were met with mixed results. The lack of trained operators, coupled with the high attrition rate of these relatively expensive items for Ukrainian soldiers who usually had to buy them at their own expense, initially dampened enthusiasm for their widespread adoption. Volunteer organizations, which have played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine’s military efforts, did not — prior to 2022 — prioritize drone acquisition. Similarly, official military decisionmakers were slow to recognize the potential of these systems, focusing instead on more traditional assets.</p> + +<p>In cases where Ukrainian forces did use drones, the priority use case was ISR. China was a major supplier of commercial drones to Ukraine, primarily for civilian purposes such as agriculture and event photography, often referred to as “wedding” drones. However, these also saw usage in combat, even prior to 2022, again mostly for ISR. Hence, Ukrainian defense companies focused their military drone development efforts primarily on medium and long-range reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. Notable examples include the PD-2 from UkrSpecSystems, the Furia from Athlone Avia, the R18 from Aerorozvidka, and the ACS-3M from Skyeton. Companies like DeVIRo also contributed with their Leleka-100, further expanding Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities, while the Punisher, a strike drone produced by UA Dynamics, represents Ukraine’s foray into offensive drone technology.</p> + +<p>Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities. However, increased familiarity with drones would set the stage for later AI adoption.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> + +<h4 id="post-invasion-ai-surge-wide-ranging-military-ai-applications">Post-Invasion AI Surge: Wide-Ranging Military AI Applications</h4> + +<p>Despite Ukraine having been at war with Russia for nearly a decade, its 2022 full-scale invasion was a shock to the Ukrainian military system. The survival of Ukraine as an independent state was at stake, and leaders across civilian, military, and commercial structures reacted accordingly. Society as a whole mobilized to support the armed forces, and in many cases, everyday citizens volunteered to participate in combat and defend Ukraine.</p> + +<p>The commercial technology sector of Ukraine was also swept up in this wave. What had been a volunteering side project for many became the dominant focus of their professional life. In numerous cases, these efforts were centered on maintaining and enhancing existing digital platforms like Delta and Kropyva. However, a new suite of volunteer-built capabilities focusing on the opportunities of AI technology also emerged.</p> + +<p>As with the pre-2022 era, there was no centrally guided plan to accelerate the adoption of AI for priority use cases. Rather, experimentation with AI emerged organically, as technically proficient volunteers explored solutions to the diverse security challenges facing all of Ukrainian society — from disinformation to cyberwar to front-line conflict.</p> + +<p>While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> + +<h3 id="the-institutional-landscape-for-military-ai-development-in-ukraine">The Institutional Landscape for Military AI Development in Ukraine</h3> + +<p>The institutional landscape supporting AI development in Ukraine has evolved significantly since 2022, with many government agencies and institutions shifting from initially neglecting AI to actively creating specialized departments and units dedicated to developing AI capabilities. This transformation has been driven largely by the pressing demands of the ongoing war against Russia, where AI technologies have repeatedly demonstrated the potential to provide an advantage on the battlefield.</p> + +<p>Of special note, Ukraine has gone so far as to create an entirely new branch of its armed forces, the Unmanned Systems Forces. While smaller than the other branches of the Ukrainian military, it is nevertheless technically their peer, and it serves as evidence that Ukrainian leadership views as critical the task of driving organizational reforms to account for new technological realities.</p> + +<p>Other defense and security institutions have also created new organizations and empowered them to accelerate technology innovation, such as Special Unit Typhoon, a new part of the National Guard of Ukraine. One newly created organization within the MoD, the Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies (CIDT), is a direct outgrowth of the tech volunteer community’s efforts. In 2023, the CIDT took official responsibility for upgrading and developing situational awareness technologies, including the Delta system discussed in a previous section. In 2024, the developers began integrating AI/ML capabilities into Delta with an initial focus on video and text processing for the identification of enemy forces in real time.</p> + +<p>In other cases, the war has led organizations to reinvent their mandate. Both the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU, a subordinate body of the MoD) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) have taken a leading role in developing and executing long-range precision strikes on Russian infrastructure. In previous years, these organizations would not have been responsible for such missions. AI is a useful enabling technology for long-range precision strikes, and both organizations have developed the relevant competencies to be at the forefront of AI adoption. For example, AI-based computer vision is helpful for accurate navigation in GPS-denied environments, such as the territory on both sides of the Russian border. More broadly, both the DIU and the SSU have adopted AI for processing and analyzing vast volumes of battlefield data.</p> + +<p>Beyond creating new institutions and changing the mandate of existing ones, Ukrainian authorities are also implementing regulatory reforms and launching diverse initiatives to make it easier for companies to develop AI — and for military units to adopt it. The MDT, which is responsible for policymaking in AI development, is fostering an innovation-friendly regulatory environment, avoiding overregulation and promoting AI development through initiatives such as the Army of Drones and the Brave1 platform (further discussed below). These initiatives have accelerated the deployment of unmanned systems — including AI-driven ones — by providing essential financial and organizational support to early-stage projects.</p> + +<h4 id="profiles-of-organizations-in-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem">Profiles of Organizations in Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem</h4> + +<p>The development of AI-enabled warfare is not occurring in isolation; it is shaped by a complex institutional landscape of government agencies and stakeholders. This section provides an overview of key institutions, along with their initiatives specifically related to developing military AI and drones, while excluding the broader scope of these institutions’ functions as it falls outside the focus of this research. Due to the classified nature of much of the information on government initiatives, this overview remains general, without going into the technical specifics of the projects and technologies involved. The purpose of this section is to offer a clearer understanding of Ukraine’s somewhat unstructured governmental approach to military AI development, as well as to facilitate the identification of relevant counterparts for collaboration where Ukrainian models or initiatives align with U.S. government objectives.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NM8CBwz.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Map of Military AI Stakeholders in Ukraine.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis.</em></p> + +<h4 id="ministry-of-defense">Ministry of Defense</h4> + +<p>The MoD of Ukraine is the government body responsible for overseeing national defense and the AFU. The MoD is headed by the minister of defense, while the president of Ukraine holds the position of supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces.</p> + +<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies.</strong> In 2021, the MoD established the CIDT to reform its approach to IT project management. Its primary objective is to modernize automated combat management systems and develop future operational-strategic, tactical, and situational awareness systems. A notable achievement in this workstream is the formal adoption of the Delta situational awareness system by the MoD in 2023, which the CIDT inherited from the volunteer organization Aerorozvidka. Public information on the CIDT’s AI-related initiatives is limited, particularly beyond its focus on the Delta platform. However, recent job postings for machine learning engineers, MLOps specialists, and computer vision researchers suggest that the CIDT is prioritizing the integration of AI-enabled solutions into Delta.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> A dedicated branch of the AFU, the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), was established to systematize and expand the experience gained in the deployment of unmanned systems while formalizing a doctrinal approach suited to the realities of asymmetrical warfare. The USF is responsible for operations across all domains and levels, ranging from frontline engagements to deep strikes within enemy territory. Under the leadership of Colonel Vadym Sukharevsky, the USF plays a central role in introducing unmanned systems throughout the AFU, adopting emerging technologies, sharing innovations, and training units and brigades to use new systems. The USF is tasked with identifying the most effective systems to address the diverse challenges faced by the AFU on the battlefield. To date, over 170 models of unmanned systems have been integrated into frontline operations, positioning the USF as a critical driver of technological innovation in combat.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li><strong>Innovation Development Accelerator.</strong> The MoD has sought to accelerate the development and adoption of defense technologies through the creation of the Innovation Development Accelerator. Established in 2023, this initiative is designed to streamline and modernize the ministry’s operations by addressing issues of overregulation, lengthy processes, and inefficiencies in collaboration with defense companies. The accelerator aims to reduce the time required for the implementation of weapons and equipment from more than two years to approximately 45 days, while simplifying bureaucratic procedures to enhance operational efficiency. One of its six core priorities is the advancement of robotization and AI tech adoption for unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as ground and water drones.</li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Doctrine for Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> The USF has developed a comprehensive doctrine and statute for all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is currently being tested in operational units. The documentation is developed for every level, from squad to battalion, and it will standardize tactics and procedures for the use of unmanned systems across the AFU. The creation of this statute marks a significant step toward the formalization and regulation of unmanned system deployment, ensuring consistent operational practices across the military.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy.</strong> The only AI-related regulatory initiative in which the MoD is currently involved is the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy, launched in 2023. This provides a framework for the responsible use of military AI and aims to build international consensus, guiding states in the ethical development, deployment, and use of military AI technologies. Besides this international initiative, the MoD has not yet released any public strategies or formalized vision regarding AI implementation or the development of autonomous systems.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="defense-intelligence-of-the-mod-of-ukraine">Defense Intelligence of the MoD of Ukraine</h4> + +<p>The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the MoD, also known as the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU), serves as the military intelligence agency to the country’s leadership and the AFU. Its portfolio includes intelligence, cyber, technology development, and occasionally direct execution of high-priority missions.</p> + +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives:</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>AI for analytics.</strong> The DIU has emerged as one of the most advanced users and adopters of AI technology within the military. According to Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the DIU, the increasing volume of acquired intelligence data necessitated the enhancement of analytical capabilities. To address this challenge, the analytical branch has been significantly bolstered with technologies for automated data processing, integrating artificial intelligence to improve the efficiency and accuracy of analysis. This integration of AI has been critical in managing large datasets and enhancing the decisionmaking process within the intelligence operations of Ukraine.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Drones for long-range strikes.</strong> The DIU is a leading agency in conducting long-range strikes into Russian territory using drones equipped with some elements of autonomy. These autonomous drones play a crucial role in Ukraine’s ability to carry out precision strikes at extended distances, significantly expanding the operational capabilities of its military. The use of such autonomous systems represents a forward-looking approach to modern warfare, where AI-enabled technologies enhance the effectiveness of long-range operations while minimizing the need for direct human intervention. While the Ukrainian government has not disclosed all of the functions that AI plays in this mission, government officials told CSIS that AI does play an important role. This positions the DIU as a key player in the development and application of autonomous military technologies in Ukraine.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="security-service-of-ukraine">Security Service of Ukraine</h4> + +<p>The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) serves as the country’s principal security and intelligence agency, tasked with safeguarding national security, conducting counterintelligence operations and counterterrorism efforts, and combating organized crime. It operates under the authority of the president of Ukraine.</p> + +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li><strong>Naval drones.</strong> One of the SSU’s most innovative contributions to the war effort is its use of naval drones, which have significantly impacted the balance of power in the Black Sea. These drones are not just simple unmanned vessels; due to constant close interaction between the SSU and its drone operators and engineers, they have evolved into multifunctional platforms that are constantly undergoing technological improvements. For example, the Sea Baby drones, initially designed for explosive attacks on Russian naval ships and infrastructure, have been enhanced to perform additional functions such as offensive sea mining. They have successfully laid mines in strategic locations, significantly impacting Russian naval operations. Moreover, due to recent upgrades, the drones are equipped with rocket systems — specifically the Grad multiple rocket launchers, which have already shown effectiveness in targeting Russian positions.</li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="national-guard-of-ukraine">National Guard of Ukraine</h4> + +<p>The National Guard of Ukraine is a military force under the command of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it is tasked with protecting public order, securing strategically important facilities, and countering illegal paramilitary groups. During martial law periods, the units of the National Guard are subordinate to the AFU.</p> + +<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li>In 2024, the National Guard of Ukraine established a specialized unit known as Typhoon, which is focused on the deployment of unmanned aerial systems for military operations. This unit, composed of seasoned Special Forces veterans, has been created with the objective of enhancing the operational capabilities of combat brigades by integrating advanced unmanned systems into their strategic and tactical frameworks. The veterans within the unit bring a wealth of combat experience, which is crucial for the effective deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in complex battlefield environments. By integrating unmanned systems into combat operations, the Typhoon unit aims to increase both the flexibility and responsiveness of brigade-level engagements, enhancing operational efficiency and reducing risks to personnel.</li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="ministry-of-digital-transformation">Ministry of Digital Transformation</h4> + +<p>The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine (MDT), established in 2019, is responsible for shaping and implementing state policy in digitalization, the digital economy, and digital innovation. It focuses on e-government, digital democracy, the development of digital skills and rights, open data, national electronic resources, and broadband infrastructure.</p> + +<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li><strong>The Expert Committee on AI Development.</strong> The Expert Committee on AI Development, established under the MDT in December 2019, plays an important role in enhancing the country’s competitiveness in the field of AI. Composed predominantly of business and science representatives, the committee’s main task is to drive AI policy recommendations, facilitate research and development, and nurture talent across various domains.</li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Army of Drones.</strong> Launched in July 2022 by the MDT, the Army of Drones initiative represents a significant effort to integrate unmanned aerial vehicles into Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Initially conceived as a fundraising campaign, the initiative quickly evolved into a systematic and comprehensive program aimed at both procuring drones and training operators for their effective deployment on the battlefield. The program’s scope has grown to encompass not only the direct supply of drones to frontline units but also the promotion of domestic UAV production, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s defense industrial base. One of the core objectives of the Army of Drones initiative is to equip Ukrainian armed forces with modern, locally produced UAVs that can be used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and tactical strikes.</p> + + <p>Moreover, the initiative places significant emphasis on the training and skill enhancement of drone operators, ensuring that personnel are proficient in utilizing the advanced technologies embedded in contemporary UAV systems. By the end of 2023, 20,000 operators had successfully completed the training. This comprehensive approach — combining procurement, production, and operator training — has had a transformative impact on the use of drones in frontline operations, making the Army of Drones a pivotal component of Ukraine’s broader defense strategy.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Brave1.</strong> As an effort to support projects and companies in their early stages, a platform dubbed “Brave1” was established in July 2023. It is designed to facilitate collaboration among all major stakeholders in the government’s defense sector, the tech industry, and investors and volunteers. Manufacturers who meet the 12 priority verticals of technological development identified by the general staff of the AFU for the Brave1 cluster and have passed a defense expert review can apply to get military expertise; testing opportunities; and organizational, informational, and financial support for their projects. Brave1 also funds early-stage miltech start-ups, giving grants up to UAH 8,000,000 (approximately USD 194,000). As of September 2024, the program has awarded 299 grants totaling USD 6.5 million.</p> + + <p>In October 2024, the MDT stated that the list of priority verticals of technological development will be revised, with a larger focus on electronic warfare and AI-enabled capabilities.</p> + + <p>Events organized by Brave1 provide valuable insights into the urgent technological needs and priorities of the AFU, as the topics and competition areas reflect requests gathered by the Brave1 team from various military institutions and agencies. For example, the deputy commander-in-chief of the AFU has identified key areas for technological advancement, including alternative navigation systems, jamming-resistant communications, drone swarm technologies, “friend or foe” identification, and improved target identification and engagement capabilities. Events such as the Precision Hackathon exemplify the immediate demand for AI-driven solutions in defense technology — including advanced targeting systems, real-time data integration, and innovative smart munitions capable of adjusting their trajectories to engage dynamic targets. The emphasis on autonomous and semi-autonomous systems with precision targeting capabilities and network-centric tools for combat operations reflects a broader shift toward AI-enabled autonomy in military applications. Furthermore, events like the AI for Ukraine Recovery Hackathon, which focused on topics such as cybersecurity, damage assessment, and disinformation prevention, underscore the pivotal role of AI in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities and supporting its recovery efforts.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Approach to AI regulation.</strong> The MDT is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s digital development, digital economy, and innovation, with AI being an integral component of this policy. Consequently, the ministry also holds responsibility for AI regulation. However, it has explicitly emphasized a commitment to avoiding overregulation by adopting a soft, business-friendly approach. The MDT plans to implement a bottom-up strategy, initially preparing businesses for future regulations before moving toward formal implementation. In the early stages, the state will provide businesses with tools such as general and sector-specific recommendations, voluntary codes of conduct, a legal assistance platform, and a regulatory sandbox for product testing, all aimed at facilitating compliance with forthcoming legislation.</p> + + <p>The current regulatory framework includes the Concept of Development of Artificial Intelligence in Ukraine, adopted in 2020, followed by the AI Regulation Roadmap introduced in 2023. While neither document constitutes formal regulation, they provide guiding principles for AI development within the country.</p> + + <p>The MDT also plays a significant role in fostering defense innovation, making its approach to AI regulation in the defense sector particularly clear in its white paper “Artificial Intelligence Regulation in Ukraine: Vision of the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine.” The ministry has stated that it does not intend to propose any regulation of AI systems within the defense sector, emphasizing a noninterventionist stance in this domain.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Simplifying regulation for local high-tech defense industry.</strong> To boost local production, the MDT has made some considerable steps in terms of regulatory simplification for private drone companies. By implementing regulatory changes, the allowed profit margin for Ukrainian drone manufacturers was increased from 1 percent to 25 percent. This change makes the drone production business more financially viable and attractive for local companies. Previously, the low profitability cap of 1 percent limited potential earnings, discouraging investment and innovation. By raising the limit to 25 percent, the government aims to stimulate growth in the domestic high-tech defense industry, encouraging companies to scale up production and invest in advanced technologies.</p> + + <p>Furthermore, regulations governing contract negotiations, goods acceptance for military use, operational clearance, and delivery to the front were streamlined. Measures were also implemented to accelerate the operational approval process for UAV manufacturers, facilitating faster integration into state procurement contracts and supply chains for frontline operations. The government eliminated the requirement for export service control documents, simplifying the import of drones and their components, and removed the need for Security Service approvals, significantly expediting the overall approval process. Additionally, drone manufacturers can opt into the special “Diia.City” tax regime for IT companies, which allows up to 50 percent of employees eligible for military service to be exempted from active duty.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="innovations-development-fund">Innovations Development Fund</h4> + +<p>The Innovations Development Fund (previously called the Ukrainian Startup Fund) is the first and only state institution dedicated to helping innovative projects and tech start-ups secure early-stage funding and launch their ventures. Established in 2018 by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, it has been managed by the MDT since 2023.</p> + +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Program for defense start-ups.</strong> The “Fast Track to Victory” program is an example of Ukraine’s capacity to rapidly adapt and use existing infrastructure to foster innovation in defense technologies. This program streamlines the interaction between the MoD and UAV manufacturers, facilitating a more efficient approval process for drone technologies. By leveraging the fund’s web portal, UAV developers with finished products can apply directly for official ministry approval. This approval is essential as it authorizes the MoD to procure the products and allows the AFU to deploy them.</p> + + <p>According to government documents describing the program, the application process is designed to be efficient, with all submissions reviewed by MoD representatives in a timely manner. The program specifically targets UAVs that meet the tactical and technical characteristics required by the military, ensuring that the products are immediately relevant to the operational needs of the AFU. Once approved, the products can be integrated into military service, streamlining the deployment of innovative drone technologies on the battlefield.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="ministry-of-strategic-industries-and-ukrainian-defense-industry">Ministry of Strategic Industries and Ukrainian Defense Industry</h4> + +<p>The Ministry of Strategic Industries is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s military-industrial complex, which includes a state-owned enterprise named Ukrainian Defense Industry (formerly known as UkrOboronProm). This entity manages over 100 defense-related enterprises, many of which are remnants of Soviet-era companies. While efforts are underway to modernize some of these enterprises to meet the demands of the current war, the ministry and its associated industries remain predominantly focused on traditional defense platforms — such as artillery production and missile programs — rather than on emerging technologies like software-driven systems and AI, which are increasingly defining modern warfare.</p> + +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>AI implementation together with the MDT.</strong> In 2021, Ukrainian Defense Industry signed a memorandum of intent with the MDT to coordinate efforts in advancing the digital economy and fostering innovation, with a specific focus on AI technology. Formerly, UkrOboronProm had also expressed plans to establish a dedicated unit for AI development. However, Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that these initiatives have not yet been realized or advanced, highlighting a gap between stated intentions and actual implementation in the area of digital and AI-driven defense innovation. This suggests that while there is recognition of the importance of emerging technologies, the practical shift toward their integration in Ukraine’s defense industry remains limited.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Cooperation with Helsing.</strong> In 2024, the Ministry for Strategic Industries signed a memorandum with Helsing GmbH, a German company specializing in software development and AI integration in defense technologies. This cooperation aims to enhance Ukrainian defense technologies by integrating AI into drones, particularly Ukrainian-made UAVs. This is probably the only public mention of ministry- or state-owned enterprises introducing AI technology in their production.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li><strong>Upcoming strategic AI project for key economic sectors.</strong> Somewhat unexpectedly, given the ministry’s responsibilities and the current situation in the country, the Ukrainian government has approved a concept for a state program using artificial intelligence in strategic sectors of the economy and has designated the Ministry of Strategic Industries as responsible for the development of a detailed AI program for these priority sectors. The program aims to enhance Ukraine’s economic potential and strengthen its global market position by 2026 in such sectors as machinery, chemicals, defense, nuclear industry, agriculture, healthcare, and scientific activities.</li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="money-matters">Money Matters</h4> + +<p>The development of the defense industry and the sustainability of military operations are heavily dependent on the government’s purchasing capacity, regardless of the scale and quality of research, development, and production. In FY 2024, the Ukrainian government has allocated UAH 58.8 billion (USD 1.4 billion) for the acquisition of UAVs and an additional UAH 1.5 billion (USD 36 million) to support the Brave1 platform.</p> + +<p>However, Ukrainian defense companies face significant challenges, including export bans imposed since the onset of the full-scale war due to the need to satisfy the demand for weapon systems for the AFU first. As a result, many defense factories remain underutilized due to insufficient funding for weapons procurement in the state budget and the consequent low purchasing capacity from the government. Although the defense industry’s capacity is estimated at around USD 20 billion, the maximum government procurement budget for 2024 is only USD 6 billion. In response, discussions have recently begun regarding the reopening of defense exports. A parliamentary working group is currently evaluating risks and developing a mechanism to enable Ukraine’s reentry into the global arms market.</p> + +<p>Drone production represents a significant area of expansion. Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that the current production output for FPV drones alone exceeds 2 million units in 2024, although only 1 million have been contracted by the government to date. A survey conducted among defense companies revealed that 38 percent of them have more than half of their production capacity idle, while 85 percent are considering relocation abroad. The primary factors that could prevent such relocation include the reopening of exports, an increase in government procurement orders, and the establishment of long-term contracts.</p> + +<p>Besides that, the Ministry of Strategic Industries is actively working to address current challenges in the industry, with a key focus on securing external funding for the purchase of Ukrainian defense products, including UAVs. ZBROYARI: Manufacturing Freedom is a global fundraising campaign aimed at raising USD 10 billion from partner countries to produce Ukrainian weapons in 2024. Of EUR 60 million in Dutch contributions, EUR 20 million is for FPV drones, EUR 22.5 million for Dutch drones, and EUR 17.5 million for Ukrainian-made naval drones.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>Military AI in Ukraine underwent a rapid transition from being a secondary concern during almost eight years of war in Donbas to becoming a cornerstone of the country’s survival after the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022. This dramatic transition is reflected in the growth of private companies developing military AI capabilities, which have increased from two dozen or so in the beginning of 2022 to over a thousand in 2024. The Ukrainian government embraced the role of innovation enabler by streamlining the bureaucratic processes for technology adoption, adapting its organizational structures to meet rapidly advancing technological capabilities, and providing funding to the commercial defense sector.</p> + +<p>As a result of these efforts, most of the industry representatives and brigade commanders interviewed by CSIS confirmed that numerous AI solutions are currently being tested on the frontline. They expect a transition to semi-autonomous unmanned capabilities in a year or two, wherein the human role will only be in confirmation of a strike. However, Ukraine may not have the luxury of time and must fast-track the realization of this vision.</p> + +<p>To achieve this, Ukraine must overcome several challenges that are hindering its military AI development: insufficient funding, the limited capacity of small companies and their fragmented efforts in developing AI capabilities, competition within the government for resources, and a lack of coordination among key defense and military institutions to create a unified approach to military AI. Additionally, there is a shortage of computing power and experienced AI professionals in the country to work on classified technology, which are critical for making military AI a game-changer in the fight against Russia.</p> + +<p>While Russia is investing enormous resources into transitioning to an economy on a war footing with a focus on technological advancement within its military, Ukraine requires support from its international partners to fully leverage the advantages of AI as a competitive edge across all battlefields and frontlines in its fight against a conventionally superior adversary.</p> + +<p>The conclusion of this paper presents recommendations on how the U.S. government can collaborate with Ukraine to harness the advantages of military AI development and ensure that both nations remain at the forefront of AI and defense innovation.</p> + +<h4 id="1-providing-strategic-support">1. Providing strategic support</h4> + +<p>The United States, with its technological superiority and numerous AI-related defense programs, is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine in addressing its challenge of lacking a cohesive, government-led strategy for defense technology development. Given the United States’ forward-looking and long-term AI development plans, it can collaborate with Ukraine to craft a comprehensive, mid-term strategy for integrating AI into its military for beyond immediate tactical solutions.</p> + +<p>This support would offer Ukraine much-needed guidance to align its decentralized bottom-up approach with a coherent national vision, allowing volunteer groups, start-ups, the defense sector, and government institutions to operate in synergy with national priorities. This approach could help Ukraine align government stakeholders’ efforts in accordance with a single strategy in order to avoid wasting resources, and it could increase competition by promoting efficient resource allocation and funding for AI-enabled capabilities development.</p> + +<p>The benefits for the United States are twofold. First, by collaborating with Ukraine, the United States can access real-time insights into the application of AI technologies in active warfare, gaining valuable data that can enhance its own AI capabilities. Second, support for Ukraine’s efforts is a contribution to strengthening the global security architecture and countering common adversaries.</p> + +<h4 id="2-unlocking-battlefield-data-for-innovation">2. Unlocking battlefield data for innovation</h4> + +<p>To harness the full potential of AI in defense, Ukraine must build a collaborative framework that brings government authorities and private sector innovators together on data-sharing strategies. This framework should regulate access to and use of real-world combat data by establishing clear legal procedures and protocols for data collection, storage, and sharing — all while safeguarding national security. Such an environment would streamline access for approved developers and foster sustainable business models, incentivizing private investment in military AI research.</p> + +<p>The United States could play a pivotal role in enabling this effort, helping Ukraine develop a technical and regulative framework by drawing from its own experience of data exchange within global projects such as the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, where military data is shared among allied countries and the U.S. military. This initiative could set a global precedent for responsible data sharing in defense technology development. Ukraine could monetize its combat data by offering access to countries, organizations such as NATO, and even private defense companies in order to improve their AI tech and the interoperability of all parties involved.</p> + +<h4 id="3-closing-a-feedback-loop">3. Closing a feedback loop</h4> + +<p>Currently, the United States sends significant military aid to Ukraine, including drones, and many U.S. start-ups and drone manufacturers are contributing by donating their products through volunteers, NGOs, and Ukrainian government initiatives. However, there is no established system for collecting feedback on the performance and effectiveness of these drones on the battlefield, leaving the feedback loop incomplete. Establishing a more structured and standardized feedback collection process would be highly beneficial for both parties.</p> + +<p>For U.S. companies, faster and more organized feedback would enable them to shorten their iteration cycles, update their platforms and software more rapidly, and scale up production of cutting-edge technology. This is particularly important when it comes to AI, where software updates can be implemented much quicker than hardware — without the need to alter supply chains, source new components, or update manufacturing processes. On the Ukrainian side, this would mean receiving more advanced and better-suited capabilities for their battlefield conditions, as U.S. companies have the resources and capital to accelerate drone and AI development, as well as to scale up production. By closing this feedback loop, both the United States and Ukraine can enhance their technological capabilities and improve the effectiveness of military assistance on the ground.</p> + +<h4 id="4-considering-ukraines-ai-in-us-foreign-aid">4. Considering Ukraine’s AI in U.S. foreign aid</h4> + +<p>Current U.S. financial assistance to Ukraine, primarily through USAID, has been vital for the digital development of the country. However, by integrating an AI component into this aid, the United States can achieve two key objectives: enhancing Ukraine’s AI capabilities and securing a role in what could become a global AI development hub.</p> + +<p>Ukraine’s regulatory environment for AI is highly permissive, and its political leadership is open to embracing technological risks for significant advancements. This combination creates a unique “laboratory” for AI development that the United States cannot afford to overlook. This approach requires more than just funding; it necessitates providing computing infrastructure to key AI innovation centers in Ukraine, such as the MoD, research institutions, and labs. By equipping these entities with the necessary computational power, AI research and development can accelerate at an unprecedented pace.</p> + +<h4 id="5-offering-ai-focused-training-experience-exchange-and-entrepreneurial-development-programs">5. Offering AI-focused training, experience exchange, and entrepreneurial development programs</h4> + +<p>The U.S. government should establish training and experience exchange programs for Ukraine’s defense entrepreneurs. These programs would focus on developing expertise in AI applications, the specifics of defense industry, and international market and investor relations to build successful defense-oriented enterprises. Given the rapid growth of Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem, these initiatives would enable entrepreneurs to gain a deeper understanding of how to attract investments, scale innovations, and align with national security objectives. For the United States, such programs offer the opportunity to strengthen collaboration with Ukraine’s emerging defense sector. This partnership would give the United States valuable connections with Ukrainian innovators across the defense industry, benefiting both nations in shaping the future of AI in national security and defense.</p> + +<p>The development and integration of military AI into future weapon systems is inevitable. While the United States leads in technological innovation, it faces limitations in testing these advancements under real combat conditions. Collaboration with Ukraine presents a unique and mutually beneficial opportunity to bridge this gap. By working together with Ukraine, the United States can gain firsthand insights into the practical applications of military AI and autonomous systems without putting “boots on the ground.” Otherwise, real combat environments remain theoretical or simulated for U.S. systems manufacturers. Moreover, this partnership can provide valuable contributions to the international debate on safe and responsible AI deployment, offering concrete evidence from battlefield usage to help construct a global framework for military AI governance. As AI continues to reshape defense landscapes, U.S.-Ukraine collaboration stands to advance technological innovation while setting standards for responsible and ethical AI integration into military systems worldwide.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Kateryna Bondar</strong> is a fellow with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>Kateryna BondarThis report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.Too Good To Lose2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/too-good-to-lose<p><em>When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -335,25 +730,265 @@ <p>Another issue, one participant said, was the lack of knowledge within South African banks about how to consider trade-related sanctions and restrictive measures. There was little discussion, they said, between the trade finance and sanctions teams. As a result, “a lot of the banking industry doesn’t know how to apply sanctions in a trade environment”.</p> -<h3 id="aligning-financial-services-supervision">Aligning Financial Services Supervision</h3> +<h3 id="aligning-financial-services-supervision">Aligning Financial Services Supervision</h3> + +<p>Another theme from the engagement with government representatives was that supervision was spread across several departments spanning banking and non-banking financial services, financial surveillance and the SARB payments department. Participants said that there was an “imbalance” in the capacity and coverage of the sectors.</p> + +<p>Participants said they had been surprised by the Jersey MONEYVAL evaluation because the jurisdiction had one main supervisor, causing them to consider their own supervision architecture. The participants said they were also engaging with other international regulatory bodies to understand their supervision model. The key, participants agreed, was to have consistency and communication between them.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>Based on these discussions, it was clear that the South African government had a clear policy of non-alignment and neutrality when it comes to G7 sanctions on Russia, despite trade relations favouring closer alignment with the West. At the same time, there appears to be room for open and pragmatic conversations on both sides: for South African policymakers to express their reservations and material concerns about the financial impacts of sanctions for their economic security, stability and development, and for G7 governments to provide greater information about their priorities. There may also be an opportunity for G7 countries to consider the specific concerns of South Africa (and other non-aligned countries) – for example, how to support both alternative resolutions to energy supply issues (notably the forthcoming gas supply issue), and intra-African trade. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population.</p> + +<p>Many of the concerns raised by the private sector centred on how to obtain better information relevant to their context to improve their financial crime compliance (including but not limited to information related to Russian sanctions). This may include G7 countries providing country- or region-specific typologies for Russian evasion and circumvention. It may also include better communication between correspondent banks and their partners in South Africa. At the same time, private sector representatives remain legally bound to comply with South African law, which excludes the G7 sanctions.</p> + +<p>One partial solution to this tension may be to improve wider financial crime controls, highlighted by South Africa’s focus on better beneficial owner identification, which was driven by the country’s effort to escape the FATF greylist. However, this can only be a partial solution at best: banks will face the same dilemmas if they receive beneficial ownership information indicating that an account is held by a sanctioned Russian individual.</p> + +<p>In sum, when it comes to sanctions on Russia, the private sector in South Africa finds itself caught in an invidious position between stewarding critical international relationships (notably with correspondent banks) that are central to the country’s economic security and a government that for political – not economic – reasons, chooses a policy of non-alignment with the West.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.</p>Olivia AllisonThis report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.Crossing Deepfake Rubicon2024-11-01T12:00:00+08:002024-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/crossing-deepfake-rubicon<p><em>New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>In recent years, threat actors have increasingly used synthetic media — digital content produced or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) — to enhance their deceptive activities, harming individuals and organizations worldwide with growing frequency.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In addition, the weaponization of synthetic media has also begun to undermine people’s trust in information integrity more widely, posing concerning implications for the stability and resilience of the U.S.’s information environment.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>At present, an individual’s ability to recognize AI-generated content remains the primary defense against people falling prey to deceptively presented synthetic media.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>However, a recent experimental study by CSIS found that people are no longer able to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated images, audio, and video sourced from publicly available tools.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>That human detection has ceased to be a reliable method for identifying synthetic media only heightens the dangers posed by the technology’s misuse, underscoring the pressing need to implement alternative countermeasures to address this emerging threat.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>Synthetic media, which refers to text, images, audio, and video generated or manipulated by AI, presents both significant opportunities and risks. Recent advancements in generative AI technology have considerably reduced the data, computing power, and cost required to create highly realistic synthetic content. Coupled with the technology’s growing accessibility, as evident from the rapidly expanding constellation of widely available user-friendly offerings, it has become easier than ever for anyone to manufacture genuine-seeming digital content using AI. The uses of such technology are seemingly endless, from the humorous, such as making fictional images of the pope wearing Balenciaga or videos of Tom Cruise dancing, to the commercial, such as streamlining work by assisting in email writing or creating digital avatars of people to use in training videos, news stories, or even for speaking with simulations of deceased loved ones. There has also been significant interest in harnessing generative AI’s transformative potential for the greater good, from accelerating critical scientific research to making sophisticated disability aids like glasses that translate speech to text for the hard of hearing.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5iB2pou.jpeg" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Synthetic images of Pope Francis wearing Balenciaga, first shared on Reddit by creator Pablo Xavier, which quickly went viral across social media platforms. To this day, many viewers still do not realize this is AI-generated.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/midjourney/comments/120vhdc/the_pope_drip/">Pablo Xavier, “The Pope Drip,” Reddit, March 24, 2023</a>.</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/x5mAyuM.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>One of the many videos featured on the now widely notorious Tom Cruise deepfake account on TikTok.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@deeptomcruise/video/7181490100314885382?lang=en">deeptomcruise, TikTok video, December 26, 2022, 00:19</a>.</em></p> + +<p>Yet, generative AI has also become a potent tool for misuse. On the morning of May 22, 2023, an AI-generated photograph reportedly showing an explosion near the Pentagon began to circulate extensively on social media platforms, causing widespread confusion and panic as well as a temporary but meaningful dip in the U.S. stock market. While any adverse effects from this particular incident, in the end, were nominal, its occurrence nonetheless is illustrative of a broader trend of synthetic media being utilized to damaging ends. From criminal activities to adversarial military and intelligence operations, generative AI has more and more empowered the deception capabilities of threat actors, permitting them to manufacture convincingly realistic but fake digital content (colloquially known by many as “deepfakes”) at unprecedented speed, scale, and degrees of precision. The rising ease of use and utility of the technology has led to a boom of AI-enabled deception incidents taking place over recent years, with the technology’s abuse inflicting a growing amount of financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm to individuals and organizations worldwide. Already, the dangers posed by weaponized synthetic media have begun to shift from the theoretical to the realized.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xvc9yZI.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>This synthetic image was falsely reported as a photograph of an explosion near the Pentagon. It was widely circulated before being debunked as fake, causing widespread confusion and even a temporary dip in the U.S. stock market.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1660650575569059840/photo/1">OSINTdefender (@sentdefender), X post, May 22, 2023, 09:04 am</a>.</em></p> + +<p>Thus far, the threat that has garnered the most public attention and alarm has been the risk of AI-enabled deceptions disrupting political elections by influencing voting outcomes, instigating unrest and violence, or damaging trust in the electoral process. Among the record number of elections held in 2024, the majority have already been subject to widely-circulated synthetic content that falsely depicts politicians or famous figures engaging in inappropriate or controversial behavior, criticizing their opposition, and promising policy changes. With the U.S. presidential election only a week away, widespread concerns have been understandably raised about the dangers of a flood of AI-generated content amplifying misinformation, or of an opportunely timed viral synthetic image or video of a political candidate influencing voters’ decisions.</p> + +<p>Today’s synthetic media threat landscape extends far beyond the realm of political elections. AI-enabled financial fraud was found to have risen by 700 percent in 2023, and experts have predicted it will result in losses of up to $40 billion by 2027. Meanwhile, AI nonconsensual intimate media, accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic videos online as of 2019, has already claimed what is estimated to be millions of adults and children as victims — with that number expected to rise swiftly. Other AI-enabled deception incidents have also occurred with increasing frequency, spanning gray zone warfare such as influence operations and cyberattacks, espionage and surveillance, military deception operations, domestic disinformation, and more. As improvements in the technology’s capabilities and accessibility continue, the volume and breadth of deception activity will likely grow.</p> + +<p>The discrete harms arising from these incidents are further compounded by a more insidious danger: AI-enabled deception threatens to corrode the public’s trust in the integrity of all information more broadly. There is already evidence that this has started to occur. In turn, this risks imperiling the foundations of the U.S.’s information environment, a vital pillar of societal stability and resilience.</p> + +<p>Today, the principal defense against AI-enabled deceptions is people’s ability to recognize synthetic media when encountering it in their day-to-day lives. However, rapid advancements in generative AI have increasingly constrained human detection capabilities as synthetic media has become more convincingly realistic. While the necessity of adopting alternative countermeasures, spanning from the technological to the regulatory, to compensate has been widely recognized as critical, in practice, implementation of these measures remains largely nascent. As such, this growing vulnerability means that awareness of when people are no longer able to depend solely on their eyes and ears to detect AI-generated content is critical in order to better recognize when human detection is no longer an effective safeguard against the technology’s misuse.</p> + +<p>To determine the current level of human detection capabilities, CSIS conducted a large-scale experimental study testing individuals’ ability to differentiate between authentic media and synthetic images, audio, and videos sourced from publicly accessible generative AI technology. Overall, the study found that people struggled to accurately identify AI-generated content to any meaningful degree, with some demographics being more susceptible to certain types of synthetic media than others. This brief reviews the study’s key findings and offers an overview of the current synthetic media threat landscape, examining both ongoing and speculative harms in areas in which the abuse of this technology has become more prevalent. It is clear that weaponized synthetic media has begun to mature from an emergent to an established national security threat. That the inflection point has now been reached where human detection capabilities are unreliable only serves to underscore the pressing need to implement robust alternative countermeasures to address this growing danger.</p> + +<h3 id="the-study-results">The Study Results</h3> + +<p>To assess how well people were able to detect AI-generated content, CSIS conducted a perceptual study involving nearly 1,300 North Americans aged from 18 to 85. Participants were asked to distinguish between synthetic and authentic media items, including images, audio, and videos both silent and fully audiovisual. The study also examined how other factors affected detection performance, including authenticity, language, modality, image subject matter, age, and participants’ preexisting familiarity with synthetic media. To ensure that the AI-generated content would be representative of the quality and type of synthetic media people were likely to come across “in the wild”, or in their daily lives, all synthetic test items were sourced from publicly available products and services.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FZ4l7RX.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Average Detection Accuracy by Media Type.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> + +<p>Altogether, the study’s findings paint a bleak picture of people’s ability to discern the legitimacy of digital content in today’s world. On average, participants correctly distinguished between synthetic and authentic media 51.2 percent of the time — roughly equivalent in accuracy to a coin toss. Images were the most difficult for participants to identify (49 percent average accuracy), with better detection performance on silent videos (51 percent) and audio clips (54 percent). Participants were the most successful at determining the authenticity of fully audiovisual clips (55 percent). These results are relatively unsurprising since public discourse and scientific research have closely monitored people’s diminishing detection capabilities as generative AI has advanced in recent years. Nonetheless, it is valuable to confirm that this critical watershed moment has indeed been reached: humans can no longer depend solely on their own eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between reality and AI-generated falsehoods.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K4iLc5K.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic image: Only 10.7 percent of all participants correctly identified this as an AI-generated image, with the rest believing it to be a photograph of a real person.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b2dj9kL.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic audiovisual clip: When participants were presented with the AI-manipulated video clip (of comedian Nora Tschirner) on the right, 75.8 percent incorrectly labeled it as authentic. In comparison, the original video (of anchorwoman Marietta Slomka) is on the left.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4ln4SyVNjg&amp;list=PL8ax9s9DVKClTiPm9c5Wkq9wOG4hGKyVH&amp;index=5">Deepfacelabfan, “Deepfake — Marietta Slomka zu Nora Tschirner — 128 LIAE 15k RW only — 90min FAKE,” YouTube video, April 7, 2022, 00:46</a>.</em></p> + +<p>This does not mean that all AI-generated content being produced today is now indistinguishable from authentic media. Low- and mid-quality synthetic media still contains artifacts, or observable AI glitches such as bizarre-looking hands or illegible text, which make their provenance apparent. Regardless, our study demonstrates that numerous generative AI tools which are easily accessible to the public today can produce sufficiently realistic synthetic content that is relatively indistinguishable from authentic content to the human senses. Moreover, as the average quality of synthetic media improves while the technology matures, even low- and mid-quality outputs will become more realistic. For example, later iterations of AI image generators have already become increasingly capable of rendering real-looking hands, which makes relying on them as a potential “tell” of AI-generated content being present decreasingly useful.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xiDUnsF.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Detection Performance by Language Familiarity.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e0GPfI7.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Detection Performance by Age.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> + +<p>The study’s other findings offer more nuanced insights into people’s vulnerabilities to different types of AI-enabled deceptions, examining how various elements may impact an individual’s detection capabilities. For instance, participants’ average detection accuracy was found to be significantly lower for audio, video, and audiovisual items featuring a foreign language than for items featuring languages in which they were fluent (Figure 2). Meanwhile, younger participants outperformed their older counterparts to the greatest degree when tested on audiovisual and audio-only clips (Figure 3). These findings indicate that people are more likely to misidentify synthetic media presented in a foreign language, and that older individuals are less sensitive to recognizing synthetic audio-based media. Given the rise of multilingual synthetic misinformation as well as the growing popularity of AI phone scams which often target older generations, these findings suggest that these two demographics may be more vulnerable to certain types of AI-enabled deceptions than previously realized.</p> + +<h3 id="the-threat-landscape">The Threat Landscape</h3> + +<p>The proliferation of weaponized synthetic media presents a clear and present danger to national security. To more effectively address these dangers, a more comprehensive understanding of the risks posed by its misuse and the various ways it has already been weaponized is required. Within only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has expanded rapidly, with generative AI increasingly being exploited for nefarious purposes. Consequently, this rise in AI-enabled deception incidents has resulted in individuals and organizations around the world suffering financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm, even death, and countries worldwide experiencing detrimental effects on their societal stability and resilience. Now that it is clear publicly available generative AI tools can produce highly realistic synthetic media capable of deceiving even the most discerning of observers, these dangers have only become even more acute.</p> + +<p>Generative AI has become an increasingly powerful force multiplier for deception, making it easier, faster, and cheaper to conduct more sophisticated stratagems than ever before — from producing synthetic content at an industrial scale to more precisely tailoring it to a target’s specific vulnerabilities. These lowering barriers have, in turn, expanded the pool of threat actors who now are able to leverage this technology, from extremist organizations and organized crime groups to lone individuals with malicious intent. As of today, it costs less than $10 to create 30 minutes of customized synthetic audio featuring a target’s voice or to manufacture a batch of over 1,000 individually personalized spear-phishing emails. Efforts to prevent the misuse of commercial products and services have been inconsistent in both their implementation and effectiveness, enabling the circumnavigation of guardrails to varying degrees of success. Meanwhile, open-source generative AI tools, which by their nature have more easily removable safeguards, have also furnished threat actors with a diverse and customizable toolkit, such as live face-swapping and voice-masking software, found to be used in real-time impersonation schemes. In addition, a shadow industry has begun to quickly develop to address this growing demand for purpose-built deception technologies. Spreading throughout the dark web and encrypted messaging platforms, it sells everything from prebuilt custom software to more bespoke services for explicitly abusive purposes.</p> + +<p>However, the rise in AI-enabled deceptions has not been uniform. Rather, generative AI tools have been co-opted to greater degrees in scenarios where they currently provide a significant offensive edge to threat actors’ stratagems over existing non-AI methods. For instance, the sharp rise of AI-enabled financial fraud over the past few years is a direct result of the substantial advantage afforded by AI technology, as AI text and audio generation tools are able to produce compelling synthetic content in less resource-intensive manners than when utilizing non-AI techniques. Conversely, AI-enabled deception incidents have been less prevalent in areas where synthetic media presently does not provide a similarly significant offensive edge. This has been found to be the case with deceptions involving the dissemination of false narratives, where conventional techniques such as manipulatively editing authentic media or sharing it out of context still remain highly effective and relatively easy to accomplish, limiting the comparative utility of generative AI tools. Regardless, as the technology’s capabilities improve and barriers to using it decrease, it will undoubtedly be more extensively adopted for all manner of stratagems.</p> + +<p>Compounding these harms is the second-order risk posed by weaponized synthetic media: the corrosion of information integrity. The proliferation of deceptive AI-generated content risks damaging the public’s trust in the veracity of any information they encounter more generally as they become increasingly unable to trust their eyes and ears to reliably inform them as to what is real and what is fake. This degradation of trust in the truth jeopardizes the resilience of the U.S.’s information environment, or its “epistemic security” — which risks heightening its vulnerability to political and economic instability and constraining national security capabilities. Less epistemically secure societies are more limited in their ability to engage in collective and timely decision-making, making them more susceptible to adversarial manipulation, reducing their capacity for effective crisis response, and constraining critical defense and intelligence capabilities. This threat is not a novel one. Instances of widespread conventional misinformation have already been found to have diminished public trust in information from media and government institutions, resulting in decreased faith in political election integrity, weakened confidence in national security organizations, and led to violence and unrest. For example, pervasive false anti-vaccination narratives during the Covid-19 pandemic undermined vaccine confidence and institutional trust in the United States. The proliferation of these falsehoods, in turn, stymied economic growth, trade, and diplomacy, damaged education, and increased the number of vaccine-preventable outbreaks.</p> + +<p>Synthetic media misuse risks intensifying the damage done to the public’s trust in information by making it harder to distinguish fact from fiction. One can easily imagine how the viral AI-generated image of an explosion near the Pentagon, mentioned at the beginning of this brief, may have resulted in more significant adverse effects in a less epistemically secure society. Decreased public trust in information from institutional sources could have made later debunking by authorities less successful or take longer, enabling the falsehood to disseminate further and permitting greater knock-on effects to occur, such as more extensive financial volatility than just a brief dip in the stock market, which in turn could have led to civil unrest or facilitated the ability of foreign adversaries to leverage the unrest to their benefit.</p> + +<p>There are signs that the increased prevalence of synthetic media has already begun to damage the public’s epistemic trust. Research shows that repeated exposure to unlabelled synthetic media makes individuals more susceptible to misidentifying future synthetic content as well as reduces individuals’ confidence in the truthfulness of all information. More recently, it was discovered that Russia’s extensive use of AI-enabled deceptions throughout the still ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict has had a detrimental effect on Ukrainian citizens’ confidence in information, making them significantly more skeptical of the truthfulness of all digital content they encounter online. Even just the existence of synthetic media itself has begun to erode aspects of the public’s trust, as evident in the increasing frequency of authentic media being wrongly dismissed as AI-generated. The trend has become especially prevalent in information-contested spaces, such as political elections or the Israel-Hamas conflict, where both sides have frequently decried real digital content as being fake. As the synthetic media threat landscape continues to expand, these adverse effects will likely only grow stronger. Ultimately, it is the convergence of these immediate and systemic threats that makes countering weaponized synthetic media a national security imperative.</p> + +<h3 id="types-of-ai-enabled-deceptions">Types of AI-Enabled Deceptions</h3> + +<p>The current synthetic media threat landscape can be broadly divided into six categories of AI-enabled deceptions: gray zone warfare, espionage and surveillance, military deception, domestic politics, nonconsensual intimate media, and financial crime. However, with the technology’s continued advancement, it is anticipated that the depth and breadth of AI-enabled deception incidents will also expand and diversify, including hate crimes, falsification of evidence in legal proceedings, corporate espionage or sabotage, and more. To better illustrate the contours of today’s landscape, a selection of particularly noteworthy AI deception incidents that have taken place across the six major categories have been shared below.</p> + +<h4 id="gray-zone-warfare">Gray Zone Warfare</h4> + +<p>Synthetic media has been increasingly weaponized within gray zone warfare, or actions that take place in the murky waters between regular statecraft and outright warfare, such as information warfare, cyberattacks, and political and economic coercion. Examples of AI-enabled deception incidents that have occurred in the gray zone include the following:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>State-affiliated influence operations have disseminated synthetic images and videos as part of propaganda or information campaigns surrounding major political focal points or noteworthy events, including elections in Europe and Taiwan, U.S. politics, the Russo-Ukrainian and Israeli-Hamas conflicts, and the 2023 Maui wildfires.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Real-time face-swapping software was used to successfully impersonate Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko in a series of video calls with several mayors of major European cities as part of a targeted influence operation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An alleged AI-generated sex tape of a presidential candidate in the 2023 Turkish elections, purportedly published by an adversarial state, was widely circulated, leading to the candidate’s withdrawal from the race.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and Russian state-affiliated actors were found to have been manufacturing synthetic content for spear phishing as part of cyberattacks they were planning to conduct.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kW7uO1I.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Fake news channel clips featuring AI-generated TV anchors were shared by bot accounts online as a part of pro-Chinese information campaigns.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/technology/artificial-intelligence-training-deepfake.html">Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur, “The People Onscreen Are Fake. The Disinformation Is Real.,” New York Times, February 7, 2022</a>.</em></p> + +<h4 id="espionage-and-surveillance">Espionage and Surveillance</h4> + +<p>Synthetic media has also been leveraged to a lesser extent, at least to public knowledge, for espionage and surveillance operations by states and the private cyber surveillance industry, strengthening online impersonations of real or fictitious individuals to obtain confidential information from targets. Examples of AI-enabled espionage and surveillance incidents include the following:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>Synthetic media was used in a fictitious Washington think tank employee’s made-up LinkedIn account, which was suspected of being run as part of a Russian espionage operation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Private cyber-intelligence companies used hundreds of fake accounts of social media content, impersonating activists, journalists, and young women, to covertly gather information from targets, including IP addresses and personal contact information.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>State-affiliated actors used social engineering assisted by large language models (LLM) to manipulate targets and facilitate the collection and analysis of open-source information.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/easgrTO.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>This fake LinkedIn account of a fictitious Washington think tank employee, suspected of being used for a Russian espionage operation, was found to have used a synthetic image for the profile photo.</strong> Source: <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-artificial-intelligence-social-platforms-think-tanks-politics-bc2f19097a4c4fffaa00de6770b8a60d">Raphael Satter, “Experts: Spy used AI-generated face to connect with targets,” AP News, June 13, 2019</a>.</em></p> + +<h4 id="military-deception">Military Deception</h4> + +<p>Although the adversarial use of synthetic media for targeted military operations has so far been limited in practice, AI-enabled military deception remains a topic of great concern due to the large number of ways in which the technology could be leveraged to gain a battlefield advantage. This includes creating entirely fictitious events to alter or skew enemy intelligence, impersonating military personnel to falsify or muddle orders, and manufacturing noise to mask one’s actions from an adversary or to overwhelm and confuse them. There are two particularly noteworthy examples of AI-enabled military deception incidents:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>AI-generated content featuring Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has been published and circulated extensively on social media to sow confusion and discord, including a synthetic video of him calling for his troops to immediately lay down their arms and surrender to Russian forces.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russian radio and TV networks were hacked to air fictitious AI-generated emergency broadcasts of Russian president Vladimir Putin declaring martial law due to Ukrainian forces invading Russian territory, causing some to actually evacuate in confusion.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DbhTCki.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>A social media post shows the airing of an emergency Russian TV broadcast featuring an AI-generated video that falsely depicted Russian president Vladamir Putin declaring martial law and calling for evacuation due to the Ukrainian invasion.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1665709387648827397">Alex Kokcharov (@Alex Kokcharov), X post, June 15, 2023, 6:17 am</a>.</em></p> + +<h4 id="domestic-politics">Domestic Politics</h4> + +<p>In recent years, there has been a surge in synthetic media being employed by domestic actors to create deceptive political content, predominately in regard to political elections. A selection of AI-enabled incidents include the following:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>The Venezuelan government ran fake news stories featuring AI-generated newscasters as part of a widespread domestic propaganda campaign to influence its citizens.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian social media accounts shared synthetic images of the ongoing Gaza conflict, such as AI-generated photos of a crying baby among bomb wreckage, to further false narratives.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An AI-generated nonconsensual pornographic video of a senior U.S. government official at the Department of Homeland Security was circulated online as part of an ongoing smear campaign.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Synthetic images of former president Donald Trump, portrayed as being real, were used in an attack ad by an opposition candidate during the U.S. presidential primaries.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Synthetic media of politicians were falsely portrayed as authentic, including videos of UK prime minister Keir Starmer shouting at staff, U.S. president Joe Biden calling for a military draft, and a Slovakian presidential candidate discussing vote rigging during the election’s final days.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A robocall campaign used a synthetic audio clip of President Biden’s voice to urge thousands of New Hampshire residents not to vote in the state’s primary.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>UK far-right actors and politicians widely circulated anti-immigrant and Islamophobic synthetic content across social media ahead of the 2024 elections.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Fictitious videos and images of celebrities such as Taylor Swift, as well as entirely AI-generated Black voters, endorsing former president Trump’s 2024 U.S. presidential campaign have been frequently shared online by political supporters in the run up to the 2024 elections.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="nonconsensual-intimate-media">Nonconsensual Intimate Media</h4> + +<p>One of the most prolific abuses of generative AI to date has been the production of AI-generated nonconsensual intimate media of adults and children. Accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic media videos in existence in 2019, the adult nonconsensual pornography industry and the online trafficking of child sexual abuse materials have exploded in the years since, claiming millions of adult and child victims to date. Examples of incidents include the following:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>An Indian journalist investigating the rape of a young girl was the target of an extensive hate campaign, which included synthetic pornography of her being circulated online.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An automated Telegram bot service created and published sexual images of an estimated 24,000 women and girls.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Sexually explicit images and videos of school girls and female teachers being produced and shared online by male students in Korea, Brazil, Spain, and the United States, among others.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A recently uncovered worldwide trafficking ring producing and selling sexually synthetic images depicting photorealistic children on a reported “industrial scale.”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A deluge of synthetic pornography featuring Taylor Swift spread across the social media platform X, forcing the online platform to block searches of the celebrity temporarily.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="financial-crime">Financial Crime</h4> + +<p>AI-enabled financial crime has quickly become one of the most widespread misuses of synthetic media. Criminals have employed generative AI tools to impersonate, extort, and hack for a multitude of fraudulent activities, with personalized AI spear-phishing emails and voice phone scams experiencing the largest growth. With an estimated 700 percent increase in incidents in 2023 from the previous year, financial experts predict that AI-enabled financial fraud could lead to losses of $40 billion by 2027. Noteworthy incidents include the following:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>The head of a UK energy firm was personally tricked into transferring nearly $250,000 by fraudsters who used voice cloning to impersonate the parent company’s CEO.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reportedly the largest AI-generated scam to date, thousands of synthetic videos of celebrities such as Elon Musk and MrBeast promoting fake financial schemes have been widely circulated on social media platforms.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An Arizona woman was the target of a fake ransoming scheme in which fraudsters impersonated her daughter over the phone using voice-cloning technology.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An employee of a financial firm was tricked during a week-long ruse into paying out $25 million to fraudsters after the scammers used real-time synthetic audiovisual software to impersonate the employee’s senior personnel and colleagues through a series of group video conferences, emails, and calls.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The Yahoo Boys, a crime collective, have widely adopted AI tools for romance scams and sextortion, employing live face and voice impersonation software and “nudification” apps to trick and blackmail targets. This has led not only to financial loss but also to tragic deaths in which some targets, frequently teenagers, took their own lives.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Another theme from the engagement with government representatives was that supervision was spread across several departments spanning banking and non-banking financial services, financial surveillance and the SARB payments department. Participants said that there was an “imbalance” in the capacity and coverage of the sectors.</p> +<p>As generative AI technology continues to advance, so does the potential for its misuse. In only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has changed dramatically. AI-enabled deceptions have become increasingly complex and varied, ranging from gray zone warfare to financial fraud and beyond. Not only has the weaponization of synthetic media already begun to cause real and substantial harm to people and organizations worldwide, but it also threatens to undermine public trust in all information online, regardless of the truth. Overall, these developments present troubling implications for U.S. national security.</p> -<p>Participants said they had been surprised by the Jersey MONEYVAL evaluation because the jurisdiction had one main supervisor, causing them to consider their own supervision architecture. The participants said they were also engaging with other international regulatory bodies to understand their supervision model. The key, participants agreed, was to have consistency and communication between them.</p> +<p>These dangers have become even more severe as it has been made clear that widely available generative AI technology has progressed to the point that people can no longer depend on their eyes and ears to reliably detect the synthetic content they might encounter in their everyday lives. With this primary line of defense compromised, pursuing alternative solutions has never been so vital. Now more than ever, stakeholders across the private and public sectors must work together to implement multifaceted countermeasures that bridge the technological, regulatory, and educational domains to oppose the growing threat posed by weaponized synthetic media.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<hr /> -<p>Based on these discussions, it was clear that the South African government had a clear policy of non-alignment and neutrality when it comes to G7 sanctions on Russia, despite trade relations favouring closer alignment with the West. At the same time, there appears to be room for open and pragmatic conversations on both sides: for South African policymakers to express their reservations and material concerns about the financial impacts of sanctions for their economic security, stability and development, and for G7 governments to provide greater information about their priorities. There may also be an opportunity for G7 countries to consider the specific concerns of South Africa (and other non-aligned countries) – for example, how to support both alternative resolutions to energy supply issues (notably the forthcoming gas supply issue), and intra-African trade. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population.</p> +<p><strong>Di Cooke</strong> is a horizon fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>Many of the concerns raised by the private sector centred on how to obtain better information relevant to their context to improve their financial crime compliance (including but not limited to information related to Russian sanctions). This may include G7 countries providing country- or region-specific typologies for Russian evasion and circumvention. It may also include better communication between correspondent banks and their partners in South Africa. At the same time, private sector representatives remain legally bound to comply with South African law, which excludes the G7 sanctions.</p> +<p><strong>Abby Edwards</strong> is a former research associate in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<p>One partial solution to this tension may be to improve wider financial crime controls, highlighted by South Africa’s focus on better beneficial owner identification, which was driven by the country’s effort to escape the FATF greylist. However, this can only be a partial solution at best: banks will face the same dilemmas if they receive beneficial ownership information indicating that an account is held by a sanctioned Russian individual.</p> +<p><strong>Alexis Day</strong> is an associate director for the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.</p> -<p>In sum, when it comes to sanctions on Russia, the private sector in South Africa finds itself caught in an invidious position between stewarding critical international relationships (notably with correspondent banks) that are central to the country’s economic security and a government that for political – not economic – reasons, chooses a policy of non-alignment with the West.</p> +<p><strong>Devi Nair</strong> is a former associate director and associate fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong>Sophia Barkoff</strong> is a former research intern in Defending Democratic Institutions in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.</p>Olivia AllisonThis report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.SIFMANet Budapest Report2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-budapest-report<p><em>Discussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.</em></p> +<p><strong>Katie Kelly</strong> is a former social media and outreach intern in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Di Cooke, et al.New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?SIFMANet Budapest Report2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-budapest-report<p><em>Discussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -450,7 +1085,164 @@ <p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Finance and Security research team at RUSI.</p> -<p><strong>Balázs Gyimesi</strong> is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Balázs GyimesiDiscussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.China In Global South Ports2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-global-south-ports<p><em>Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.</em></p> +<p><strong>Balázs Gyimesi</strong> is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Balázs GyimesiDiscussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.More Than Meets The Eye2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/more-than-meets-the-eye<p><em>Though U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>The size and scope of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation is well documented; however, the quantitative and qualitative impacts on the Philippines are poorly understood. Without comprehensive, accurate, and easily accessible data on U.S. investments and their effects in the Philippines, malign actors may promote false or harmful narratives, thereby weakening public support for the U.S.-Philippine alliance. It is crucial for the United States to improve public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</p> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>The United States and the Philippines share a robust and enduring relationship based on shared values, national interest, and dense people-to-people connections. Filipinos regularly identify the United States as one of the country’s most trusted partners. Traditionally, the United States has been a key military partner for the Philippines, and since the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the two countries have stood together in defense of their common interests. The alliance is the United States’ oldest in the Indo-Pacific. While the military relationship between the two countries is often at the forefront of policy conversations, the United States’ economic relationship with the Philippines is also of great significance. Creating strong economic linkages between like-minded partners throughout the region, such as the Philippines, is crucial to upholding a rules-based order and meeting countries’ demands for tangible benefits to cooperation.</p> + +<p>The economic relationship between the United States and the Philippines dates to the early twentieth century, when the Philippines was a U.S. territory. After the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Philippines came under the administration of the United States and remained so for nearly 50 years. During this time, the Philippine economy was strongly tethered to the United States and remained deeply intertwined even after Philippine independence in 1946. The Bell Trade Act of 1946, for instance, coupled the newly independent Philippine economy to that of the United States by allowing for free trade for 8 years and implementing a gradual application of tariffs over the next 20. U.S.-Philippine efforts at economic cooperation paved the way for future advancement, with U.S. investments playing a key role in the development of the Philippine manufacturing, agricultural, and services sectors. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has collaborated with the Philippine government since 1961, investing nearly $5 billion over the past 60 years.</p> + +<p>Under President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the Philippines became one of 14 negotiating parties in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). More significant for the time being, the United States and Philippines have launched a series of bilateral economic initiatives under the administrations of Marcos and President Joe Biden. These include the Luzon Economic Corridor, meant to develop critical infrastructure in the Philippines, the first-ever Presidential Trade and Investment Mission to Manila in March 2024, and the U.S.-Philippines Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (or the 123 Agreement) that entered into force in July 2024.</p> + +<p>Though the direct trade, investment, and aid figures between the United States and Philippines are well documented, the quantitative and qualitative impacts of this deep economic relationship are not. Information on the effects of the United States’ investment efforts in the Philippines is often difficult to find, obscuring the depth of this partnership. Furthermore, this underreporting creates opportunity for malign actors to minimize or mischaracterize U.S. initiatives in order to manipulate Philippine public opinion. Already, disinformation regarding the U.S. defense commitment to Filipino forces in the South China Sea is pervasive on Philippine social media. Discrediting the accomplishments made possible by close cooperation between the two governments has the potential to weaken decades of collaboration and jeopardize the current renaissance in the alliance. In an attempt to illuminate the results of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, this brief explores the ways in which significant U.S. investments in several sectors deliver wide-ranging benefits for the Philippine public.</p> + +<h3 id="state-of-us-philippine-economic-ties">State of U.S.-Philippine Economic Ties</h3> + +<p>Goods and services trade between the United States and the Philippines reached an estimated $36.1 billion in 2022, with exports to the Philippines accounting for $12.8 billion and imports into the United States $23.3 billion. In 2022, the United States was the Philippines’ top export destination, accounting for 14.1 percent of Philippine exports at $15.5 billion; China follows at 13.9 percent, Hong Kong at 11.5, Japan at 10.2, and Singapore at 6.42, respectively. In contrast, in import terms, China’s supply of imported goods to the country is valued at $53.6 billion, amounting to 32.1 percent of the Philippines’ total imports; Indonesia trails behind at 8.15 percent, South Korea at 7.49, the United States at 5.02, and Taiwan at 4.52, respectively. Trade figures from May 2024 demonstrate that the United States remains the Philippines’ top export destination, and that the economic growth trend between the two countries continues to grow.</p> + +<p>In terms of investment, between 2013 and the first quarter of 2024, the Philippine Statistics Authority recorded the United States as the fifth-largest source of approved foreign investment, accounting for 7 percent, or roughly $3.6 billion. The United States is trailed closely by China, the sixth-largest source of approved foreign investment, clocking in at $3.2 billion. In 2022, U.S. foreign investment in the Philippines rose 15.7 percent year over year from 2021 to $6.2 billion, led by a combination of manufacturing and professional, scientific, and technical services, along with wholesale trade.</p> + +<p>Since the launch of IPEF in 2022, the United States and the Philippines have continued to mark significant accomplishments in their economic partnership. During President Marcos’ visit to Washington in April 2024 for trilateral discussions with President Biden and Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio, the three countries announced the first Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) corridor in the Indo-Pacific, the Luzon Economic Corridor. Aiming to support connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas, the Luzon Economic Corridor is the first project of the PGI-IPEF Investment Accelerator and will allow the three countries to coordinate investments in infrastructure projects, clean energy, and semiconductor supply chains. Through this larger policy, the United States can work with IPEF partners to develop country-specific investment approaches in key sectors as targeted by each IPEF partner. In the same document, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation announced a $20 million loan for affordable housing throughout the country as well as its intent to open a regional office in the Philippines.</p> + +<p>When it comes to development assistance, USAID invests some $120 million annually to support market-driven growth in the Philippines, as well as to foster stronger democratic systems and improve education and health services. The Philippines has also been a major beneficiary of other assistance programs, such as Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grants. In February 2024, the MCC began talks with Philippine officials about restarting threshold programs, smaller scale grants aimed at improving policies. The Philippines previously had received MCC threshold grants (2006–2009) amounting to $20.7 million; in 2016, it received its first compact grant — aimed at poverty reduction and economic stimulus — for $434 million.</p> + +<p>Beyond traditional channels of economic engagement, since 2015, the U.S. Department of State has provided the Philippines with $463 million in security assistance through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), international military education and training, as well as peacekeeping operations funded through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. FMF figures are growing rapidly, with the United States providing $100 million in FY 2022 to potentially quintupling FMF to $500 million each year from FY 2025–2029. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the United States has already allotted $109 million in support of base facility improvements, supplies, and military equipment, with an additional $128 million planned in the 2025 fiscal year. In the 2+2 talks held in the Philippines in July 2024, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin pledged an additional $500 million in military financing from the FY 2024 budget.</p> + +<h3 id="benefits-of-us-private-investment-in-the-philippines">Benefits of U.S. Private Investment in the Philippines</h3> + +<p>Foreign and domestic businesses may register with one of the Philippines’ 19 investment promotion authorities, including the Philippine Board of Investment and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). These authorities are split based on geographic regions and industry strengths, such as the manufacturing and logistics network in Luzon, the tourism cluster throughout Luzon and Mindanao, and the agro-industrial cluster in Mindanao.</p> + +<p>Much of the foreign investment into the Philippines’ export-oriented manufacturing and services industries is routed through special economic zones managed by PEZA, which works to facilitate investor operations all the way down to registration and paperwork filing. As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises. Within the zones, the Philippine government can dole out tax incentives while sparing foreign businesses from lengthy bureaucratic procedures.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>More important than investment from U.S. government programs is the U.S. private investment that flourishes in and beyond the PEZA zones, covering a variety of sectors of the Philippine economy. The CSIS Southeast Asia Program selected seven of these sectors for study based on their growth and importance to the Philippines. Ranging from renewable energy investments to aerospace engineering, the following case studies examine how U.S. private investment delivers tangible benefits for the Philippines that go beyond simply reporting overall investment and trade figures.</p> + +<h4 id="renewable-energy">Renewable Energy</h4> + +<p>The Philippine government under President Marcos has identified clean energy development as a top priority and embraced cooperation with partner nations on that front, including through the clean economy pillar of IPEF. As one of the countries most affected by increasingly severe weather events, this is necessary not only to meet the Philippines’ net-zero goals, but also to grow other industries, like semiconductor manufacturing, in which foreign investors are seeking access to renewable energy. This is why the development of renewable energy is one of the three initial priorities of the Luzon Economic Corridor, announced in April 2024, the other two being rail and port modernization and the advancement of commercial enterprises at Subic Bay.</p> + +<p>Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities. An archipelagic nation, the Philippine energy grid is deeply reliant on imported fossil fuels. Though 97.5 percent of Philippine households are electrified, the mountainous and archipelagic nature of the country’s geography presents significant challenges to consistent, inexpensive power. Successive Philippine administrations have prioritized a more resilient regional grid based on modular renewable energy. The 2020 census indicated that there were about 26.39 million households throughout the country. U.S. investments in Philippine nuclear power would be of great benefit to local communities isolated from main power grids and for improving quality of life and maintaining consistent, cheap electrification in major cities. Geothermal, solar, and wind energy account for 32.7 percent of the country’s energy sources. The Philippines aims to reach 50 percent renewable energy by 2050. Under the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, lawmakers amended the Public Services Act to allow for 100 percent ownership by foreign investors of utilities ranging from power to telecoms, opening the door to more foreign investment in the Philippine energy grid. As a result of this and other reforms, the Philippines has become one of the most attractive emerging markets for investment in renewables, according to BloombergNEF’s 2023 climate report.</p> + +<p>Given its geographic location, the Philippines has immense solar energy potential. U.S.-based BrightNight Power, in collaboration with the Ayala Group’s ACEN, has agreed to jointly invest $1.2 billion over the next five years to develop the Philippines’ renewable energy capacity. U.S. solar panel manufacturers are increasingly looking to the Philippines for production, allowing Filipinos easier access to domestically produced, cheaper solar panels while also exporting those panels to countries like the United States and Canada. Sol-Go Inc., participating in Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, announced that it will build a new solar panel factory in the Philippines in addition to its current factory operating in Batangas. This additional investment will allow Sol-Go to triple its locally sourced workforce and increase its capacity so that it can produce 50 megawatts (MW) of solar panels. With the average Filipino household using 200 kilowatt-hours of energy per month, 50 MW could easily power 180,000 homes.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>The 123 Agreement between the United States and the Philippines sets the stage for nuclear energy collaboration between the two countries moving forward by allowing U.S. companies to invest in nuclear projects throughout the country. NuScale Power, for instance, aims to invest up to $7.5 billion through 2031 to build small modular reactors in the Philippines. These reactors would greatly benefit more geographically isolated communities with tenuous connections to main power grids, while also touting smaller footprints, reduced cost, and locational flexibility in comparison to traditional nuclear reactors.</p> + +<h4 id="information-technology-and-business-process-management">Information Technology and Business Process Management</h4> + +<p>The information technology and business process management (IT-BPM) sector covers a wide range of services in the Philippines, all aimed at managing certain aspects of business operations for third parties.</p> + +<p>During the 2008 global recession, demand for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) decreased significantly, prompting the Philippine government to provide training for OFWs to become call center agents. By 2010, the Philippines had surpassed India in voice-based IT-BPM services. As of 2023, the IT-BPM industry had reached 1.57 million employees, and it is forecast to employ 2.5 million by 2028. In April 2024, the ubiquity of Philippine IT-BPM services went viral on social media when a Philippines-based IT-BPM employee worked as a virtual cashier in a New York City restaurant thousands of miles away.</p> + +<p>U.S. businesses have increasingly outsourced services to the Philippines in the last few decades, and U.S. investment has played a crucial role in the development of the sector. From 2014 to 2023, the Philippines has benefitted from nearly $5.2 billion worth of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States in general professional, scientific, and technical services. With its young, tech-literate, and largely English-proficient population, the Philippines presents an ideal location for U.S. IT-BPM investments. Government initiatives, including Republic Act No. 7916, which established Special Economic Zones through PEZA, offer tax incentives and ease the ability to conduct business for foreign investors. From 2003 to 2021, 395 U.S.-based firms invested $22.4 billion in the Philippines, 35 percent of which, or around $7.8 billion, went to the IT-BPM sector, one of the key growth drivers for PEZA, bringing in nearly $260 million of investments from the first quarter of 2024 alone.</p> + +<p>IT-BPM companies are often desirable places of employment for Filipinos. U.S.-owned companies ranging from American Express to Synchrony and Accenture rank near the top of a “best workplaces” list compiled by the Information Technology and Business Process Association of the Philippines and Great Place to Work. Surveys undertaken by Great Place to Work, a platform that uses employee data to certify workplaces with good levels of trust and work culture, indicate that from January 2022 to May 2023, “94 percent of IT-BPM employees in best workplaces experience a high-trust workplace culture.” The schedule flexibility offered by IT-BPM companies, paired with the flexibility to work from home that such jobs involve, makes the sector particularly attractive to recent graduates. The Philippines produces about 850,000 college graduates yearly, 87,000 of whom have degrees in fields suited to the IT-BPM sector.</p> + +<p>Both foreign and domestic investment in the Philippines has historically been concentrated within the Metro Manila National Capital Region and the surrounding regions of Luzon. Investments are slowly flowing to other emerging regions, particularly northern Luzon and the Visayas. Moreover, even though the IT-BPM sector is more widely distributed than most, it is still concentrated in a few urban centers; Bacolod, Cebu, Clark, Davao, and Iloilo are the main hubs. Nationwide broadband speeds, while improving, still lag behind those of other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Through the Digital Cities 2025 Initiative, the Philippine government is providing basic digital literacy and skills training in more rural provinces. These initiatives will likely pay dividends as the Philippines continues to advertise itself as an IT-BPM hub to U.S. investors.</p> + +<h4 id="semiconductor-manufacturing">Semiconductor Manufacturing</h4> + +<p>With highly educated, English-proficient workers, the Philippines is an appealing location for semiconductor manufacturing. Concentrated in Metro Manila, Calabarzon (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon), northern and central Luzon, and Cebu, the Philippine electronics industry is split between 73 percent semiconductor manufacturing and 27 percent electronics manufacturing. Electronics exports reached $12.9 billion in 2023, nearly 60 percent of total Philippine exports. From 2014 to 2023, the United States invested roughly $7.91 billion in Philippine computer and electronic manufacturing.</p> + +<p>Given the number of Filipinos employed in the semiconductor industry, disruptions in U.S. investment can and have proven damaging to local communities. At its peak in 2008, Intel employed 5,000 direct workers and around 36,000 indirect workers in the Philippines. In the aftermath of the 2008 global recession, however, Intel shut down its Cavite-based chip assembly, testing, and packaging facility. As the global semiconductor manufacturing supply chain continues to evolve and mature, it is important to recognize the value of these private investments to local communities. As of April 2023, the semiconductor industry employed 2.5 million Filipinos.</p> + +<p>Through the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, the United States seeks to diversify and de-risk the global semiconductor ecosystem by boosting manufacturing and research both at home and in trusted partner countries. The International Technology Security and Innovation Fund, under the CHIPS Act, earmarked $500 million over five years to promote a secure, trustworthy telecommunications network aimed at ensuring semiconductor supply chain security by spreading out the traditionally concentrated semiconductor supply chain among friendly partners, including the Philippines.</p> + +<p>In 2023, the Department of State announced that it would collaborate with the Philippine government to explore further cooperation in semiconductor supply chain security. During the Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, Secretary Raimondo announced an investment of over $1 billion in the Philippine technology sector, aiming to double the number of semiconductor factories in the country; currently, there are 13 semiconductor factories focused on the assembly, testing, and packaging segment of the semiconductor supply chain.</p> + +<p>In November 2023, President Marcos stressed that semiconductors and electronics remain top-priority sectors for his administration. PEZA aims to aggressively promote the Philippines as a site for overseas electronic and semiconductor manufacturing. Together with IT-BPM, electronics and semiconductors have been among the Philippines’ top exports in 2024.</p> + +<p>U.S. companies have been increasingly investing in the Philippine semiconductor space. In May 2023, Analog Devices announced an investment of $200 million in a research and development facility in Cavite. In August 2023, Texas Instruments announced that it would invest up to $1 billion in facility expansion in Clark and Baguio City. The Philippines aims to move up the semiconductor value chain, hoping to establish a lab-scale wafer fabrication plant by 2028.</p> + +<h4 id="agriculture">Agriculture</h4> + +<p>The United States and the Philippines are longtime partners in the agricultural sector — in 2022, U.S.-Philippine bilateral agricultural trade exceeded $4 billion. With its growing population, expanding middle class, and increasing household income, the Philippines is an important destination for U.S. agricultural goods. The United States and the Philippines convened their first Food Security Dialogue in May 2023. Ongoing U.S. projects in the Philippines aim to support capacity building in food regulatory agencies and agricultural industries while digitizing the connection between farmers and buyers. A plurality of Philippine agriculture (39 percent) is based in Luzon, followed by Mindanao and Visayas at 33.4 and 27.4 percent, respectively.</p> + +<p>Despite this, the Philippines is vulnerable to food insecurity, a situation further exacerbated by climate change. Its reliance on imported food makes the Philippines the most food-insecure country in the region. Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains. President Marcos has made the strengthening of the Philippines’ food supply a key priority of his administration, boosting the budget for agricultural programs. Under the Marcos administration, the Department of Agriculture’s budget was boosted by nearly 70 percent from 2022 to 2024 compared to the 2017–2021 appropriation under the previous administration.</p> + +<p>From September to October 2023, the United States’ first Agricultural Technology Trade Mission explored opportunities to help support the Philippine agricultural supply chain as it traveled to Davao and Manila. The trade mission brought together various Philippine companies, government agencies, local businesses, and U.S. companies to discuss the importance of food security collaboration. The trade mission highlighted innovations in agricultural technology that have the potential to enhance the country’s agricultural productivity.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>U.S. investors, including Cargill, John Deere, and PepsiCo, have a long history of investment in the Philippine agricultural space. Cargill, which has had a presence in the Philippines since 1947, has made several key investments over the past decade. It collaborated with the Jollibee Foods Corporation to create a joint-venture poultry processing facility in Batangas in 2017, creating 1,000 new jobs. As of 2022, the facility employs 1,200 workers. Similarly, Cargill operates a joint-venture plant in Laguna that produces carrageenan, a common food additive and thickener. In 2018, the company announced that it would invest $235 million over two years to help the country meet the increasing demand for chicken and pork. As of 2024, Cargill directly employs over 950 people throughout the country.</p> + +<h4 id="defense-and-aerospace-manufacturing">Defense and Aerospace Manufacturing</h4> + +<p>Given its strategic location and well-educated workforce, the Philippines is in a prime position to contribute to defense and aerospace supply chains. The defense and aerospace sectors, made especially pertinent due to ongoing tensions between the Philippines and China over disputed territories in the South China Sea, are critical to the Philippines’ defense modernization initiatives. To support foreign investments in national defense, Philippine senators have proposed spending roughly $17.5 million under the Self-Reliant Defense Posture Revitalization Act aimed at encouraging investment in the local manufacturing of defense equipment.</p> + +<p>The Philippines hosts two prominent U.S. aerospace and defense manufacturing companies: RTX’s Collins Aerospace and Moog Controls Corporation. Collins Aerospace manufactures airplane parts and interiors within the Philippines, supplying both Airbus and Boeing. Collins Aerospace established a facility in Tanauan City, Batangas, in 2012, manufacturing myriad cabin interior products ranging from airplane galleys and galley inserts to oxygen equipment and lavatories. The facility has expanded from task-based engineering to design drawing and process refinement; by 2018, the Philippines-based engineering team was supporting the design of complex galleys and had already designed a head of version shipset, or the first configured and manufactured aircraft of the order. In 2023, the company began producing seats for Boeing, Airbus, and Embraer.</p> + +<p>As of 2024, Collins Aerospace plans to expand its existing operations in the Philippines — hoping to add 300,000 sq. ft. to its existing 400,000 sq. ft. complex in Tanauan City. Collins Aerospace’s community outreach to regional universities has the potential to create a significant impact. In 2023, for example, the company challenged students from the De La Salle College of Saint Benilde to develop and design aircraft cabin proposals under the university’s Benilde Industrial Design program. The same year, Collins explored potential partnerships with Batangas State University-Lipa.</p> + +<p>Moog Controls Corporation, a U.S. designer and manufacturer of precision control products found in military and commercial aircraft, has been established in Baguio City since 1984. Spread out over two campuses, one for servovalves (a type of valve used to regulate control or pressure of fluid in response to an electrical signal) and actuation systems for commercial aircraft applications and the other for high-performance motion control solutions, Moog employs about 1,400 personnel. In 2018, the company announced their intention to boost aerospace industry output in the Philippines, citing the growth of the aerospace market. Moog received a PEZA Excellence Award in 2023 as an outstanding employer behind community projects.</p> + +<h4 id="critical-minerals-and-electric-vehicles">Critical Minerals and Electric Vehicles</h4> + +<p>The Philippines’ critical mineral wealth, which has largely gone untapped, makes it an ideal partner in electrical vehicle (EV) battery and component supply chains. Only 5 percent of the Philippines’ $1 trillion worth of gold, nickel, zinc, and silver reserves has been explored. Moreover, with the growing importance of electric vehicles (EVs) in international decarbonization efforts, the Philippines’ critical mineral wealth makes it an ideal partner for EV battery and component supply chains. As of 2023, PEZA remains in talks with several EV manufacturers, including one U.S. firm, Envirotech Vehicles, to manufacture electric buses, cars, and heavy equipment in-country. In September 2023, Envirotech Vehicles announced its acquisition of a 3,000 square meter final assembly facility in the Clark Free Trade Zone; it eventually plans to open two manufacturing lines capable of producing more than 2,000 vehicles per year at the plant.</p> + +<h4 id="logistics-and-shipping">Logistics and Shipping</h4> + +<p>With convenient access to markets in Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as its proximity to Australia and India, the Philippines is in a prime location for logistics, transportation, and shipping services. As of March 2023, the Philippine freight and logistics market was valued at $16.8 billion. The growing ubiquity of e-commerce within the country, and throughout the region, necessitates not only strong general infrastructure in ports, roads, and rail connections, but also robust freight and logistics networks.</p> + +<p>In the aftermath of the global Covid-19 pandemic, e-commerce grew more popular within the country — from March 2020 to January 2021, the number of Philippine online vendors increased from 1,700 to 93,818. Leading e-commerce sites like Shoppee, Lazada, Zalora, and Beauty MNL brought in $17 billion in revenue from 73 million monthly, active users. To handle this flow, the Philippine government has partnered with foreign investors for infrastructure investments as well as freight and logistics services.</p> + +<p>New Clark City, a planned municipality built about fifty miles from Metro Manila, has emerged as an ideal location within the Philippines for logistics investments. After 36 years in the Philippines, FedEx opened a $30 million gateway facility in Clark City, aimed at improving the company’s ability to operate within the country and in the region at large. Manila’s main airport, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, is notorious for congestion and inefficiency, prompting government agencies to consider outlying areas around the capital, such as Clark, as new logistics and transportation hubs. FedEx’s Clark investments followed up on refurbishments to the company’s headquarters in Makati in 2018, as well as making an additional $2.2 million worth of investments in two facilities in 2017.</p> + +<p>UPS, another major global logistics company, announced in 2024 that it would build a new hub at Clark International Airport by 2025 to strengthen its supply chain and logistics services, which is necessary given the growth of e-commerce. In partnership with the Luzon International Premiere Airport Development Group, this is part of a $250 million investment push UPS is making throughout the region.</p> + +<h3 id="institutional-barriers-to-us-philippine-trade-and-investment">Institutional Barriers to U.S.-Philippine Trade and Investment</h3> + +<p>The current Philippine constitution, ratified in 1987, includes several economic provisions that have negatively impacted the Philippines’ net inflow of foreign direct investment, notably restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors. In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s World Investment Report 2023, the Philippines ranked sixth among its Southeast Asian peers in FDI inflows. Under the Marcos administration, the Philippines now aims to improve its standing to second by 2028. A 2022 amendment to the Public Service Act, made effective in 2023, allowed full public ownership of industries such as airports, railways, and telecommunications, creating a new area of opportunity for foreign investors. The same year, an amendment to the Foreign Investment Act allowed foreign investors to set up and fully own domestic enterprises, easing access to the Philippine market. The Philippine House of Representatives and Senate are currently debating whether to amend the constitution to further promote foreign economic investment, though similar efforts in previous administrations have failed. Talks of amendment have stalled at least until the 2025 midterm elections.</p> + +<h3 id="key-findings-and-recommendations">Key Findings and Recommendations</h3> + +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> U.S. companies operating in the Philippines demonstrate varying degrees of transparency in their official databases and on their websites. Investment and employment figures are quite vague, effectively obscuring the impact of these investments.</p> + +<ul> + <li><strong>Recommendation 1:</strong> The United States should work with the private sector and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive database outlining U.S. investment in the Philippines, clearly and transparently listing the specific impacts of such investments, including employment figures. Though press releases offer insight into ongoing and future projects initiated by foreign businesses, they do not paint a cohesive picture of the community impact made by such investments.</li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Current resources for collating the impact of U.S. investment in the Philippines, or even foreign investment generally, are not user friendly. Further complicating matters, U.S. and Philippine numbers vary significantly, which obscures the impact of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation. Data from the Philippine Statistics Authority only accounts for investments through investment promotion agencies that have been granted incentives from the Philippine government, reflecting just a fraction of total U.S. investments. Meanwhile, data from the various investment promotion authorities only account for those investments granted incentives by the Philippine government.</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Recommendation 2:</strong> The U.S. and Philippine governments should partner closely in collating their data and making both sets mutually intelligible. Consistency among the two countries’ platforms and datasets would help create a more cohesive, easily accessible narrative. It would be to the benefit of the United States and the Philippines to create a joint resource with which to harmonize their datasets and investment figures.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Recommendation 3:</strong> PEZA and the Philippine Statistics Authority should better aggregate incoming investments into the Philippines’ many economic zones and investment promotion authorities within unified charts, demonstrating aggregate total investments from specific countries in specific sectors. For example, it is currently not possible to filter foreign investments by country of investor, industry, promotion authority, or region within the same table.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Neither businesses nor the U.S. government adequately socialize the impacts of their investments on local communities, missing a key opportunity to point the narrative toward the efficacy of the U.S.-Philippine economic partnership. Most announcements are limited to business press briefings that are not often accessible to the audiences they are targeting.</p> + +<ul> + <li><strong>Recommendation 4:</strong> Businesses and the U.S. government should expand their online presences to counter rising disinformation and counter narratives that threaten to sway public opinion. U.S. companies should more actively use popular social media platforms in the Philippines to highlight the benefits brought by their investments.</li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Despite the longstanding economic partnership, relatively few U.S. business leaders have traveled to the Philippines or have become aware of the potential of its rapidly growing and increasingly open economy. The 2024 Presidential Trade and Investment Mission was successful in bringing representatives from 22 U.S. businesses to the Philippines. In a similar vein, the 2023 Agricultural Technology Trade Mission to Mindanao brought together key stakeholders from throughout the private sector and government to brainstorm future opportunities for improving the Philippines’ agricultural supply chain.</p> + +<ul> + <li><strong>Recommendation 5:</strong> Person-to-person exchanges should remain consistent throughout administrations. Both recent U.S. government–led trade missions were the first of their kind. The United States, regardless of administration, should ensure the continuation of such exchanges.</li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Investments in the Philippines remain strongly centered in Luzon, and particularly in and around Metro Manila and its surrounding areas. Business interest in areas such as Cebu and Davao are growing, but Manila remains oversaturated with investment. Moreover, with limited availability and bureaucratic red tape preventing easy access to cheap land, both business owners and potential employees are thus at a disadvantage.</p> + +<ul> + <li><strong>Recommendation 6:</strong> The United States should work to diversify the span of its investments throughout the Philippines. The unitary nature of the Philippine government and the ongoing narrative of “Imperial Manila,” that is, that most of the country’s progress is concentrated in the capital region, makes this difficult to achieve. Expanding investment projects into emerging regions — from Iloilo and Cebu in the central Philippines to Davao and its surroundings in the south — would offer excellent opportunities for Filipinos. The expansion of the IT-BPM sector throughout the Philippines, for instance, helped to more evenly distribute work away from Manila, leading to the development and revitalization of other urban hubs.</li> +</ul> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Japhet Quitzon</strong> is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> + +<p><strong>Gregory B. Poling</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.</p>Japhet Quitzon and Gregory B. PolingThough U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.China In Global South Ports2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-global-south-ports<p><em>Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -11951,290 +12743,4 @@ <p><strong>Eliot A. Cohen</strong> is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Robert E. Osgood Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he has taught since 1990.</p> -<p><strong>Phillips O’Brien</strong> is the chair of strategic studies and head of the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. He has published widely on issues of conflict, politics, war, and strategy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.</p>Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O’BrienThe Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was a shock but not a surprise. It was a shock because, in a world where the use of aggressive war has been a contravention of international law since 1945. It was not a surprise because Western intelligence agencies had detected indications of a possible attack from late 2021, and they had made their conclusions public.An Uneasy Stalemate?2024-09-24T12:00:00+08:002024-09-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/an-uneasy-stalemate<p><em>Iran and Turkey increasingly risk clashing through proxies in Iraqi Kurdistan as Turkey escalates its operations against the PKK, further complicating regional dynamics amid the Gaza war.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>The pace of the ebb and flow in the Middle East was on display in real time as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited the Kurdistan Region of Iraq on 12–13 September at a time of widening Turkish operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) targets there, and only days after Turkey’s foreign minister attended the ministerial meeting of the League of Arab States in Cairo. As the war in Gaza rages on, it is important not to overlook what is unfolding in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq – a pivotal arena where Iran and Turkey, long aligned against Kurdish separatist movements, have both indirectly clashed through local factions as they seek to navigate their overlapping spheres of influence.</p> - -<p>The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) has escalated its cross-border strikes against PKK strongholds in recent months, with reports that it has advanced as far as 15 kilometres into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The PKK has been proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK since March 2001 and is also listed as a terrorist organisation in over a dozen other countries, as well as by the EU. While this puts the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) under pressure, it also pits Ankara against Iranian interests, as well as raising concerns among Arab League countries about Turkey’s expansionist regional ambitions. Like Syria next door, Iraqi Kurdistan remains a key battleground for Turkey and Iran, and Tehran in recent years has steadily moved to amplify its influence vis-à-vis the Iraqi Kurds.</p> - -<p>Turkey’s decision to step up the intensity of its cross-border activities rests on several considerations. These include the Turkish security establishment’s assessment of a heightened risk of PKK militancy, combined with a weaker and divided political administration in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and re-centralising state dynamics in Iraq that are favourable to Turkish military objectives.</p> - -<h3 id="turkeys-claw-operation-in-iraq">Turkey’s Claw Operation in Iraq</h3> - -<p>On 22–23 December 2023, twin PKK attacks left 12 Turkish soldiers dead in the Harkuk and Dohuk regions in northern Iraq. Then, on 12 January 2024, the PKK killed nine Turkish soldiers and wounded another four in strikes against a Turkish military base. While cross-border operations in the region have been a grim reality since 2018, with periodic casualties among Turkish forces, the proximity of these latest attacks raised fresh alarm bells. Since 2022, Turkey has conducted a military operation known as Operation Claw-Lock to secure the northern Dohuk area in Iraq along its border. And while President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on 10 July, “We will close the lock very soon in the Claw Operation Zone”, this is unlikely to mean the end of Turkish military presence in the operational area, including a network of bases, checkpoints and secured military roads to minimise reliance on aircraft for logistical transport and movement.</p> - -<p>Since 2022, Turkey has expanded its operations against the PKK in northern Iraq, reaching into areas as far as the countryside of Sulaymaniyah and even regions along the road to Kirkuk. Turkish forces have established numerous bases in the areas where operations have been conducted, with consequences for local civilians and agricultural land. In northeastern Syria, the TAF has targeted key infrastructure, and it makes no distinction between Iraq and Syria in its fight against PKK-linked terrorism.</p> - -<p>The current Turkish operation in Iraq, which has been conducted below the threshold of a ground invasion, aims to degrade the PKK and deprive it of forward bases, and to prevent insurgents from reoccupying areas that have been cleared. This entails pushing PKK fighters southwards and away from the border, using a series of operations that leverage Turkey’s advanced military capabilities, such as surveillance and air superiority.</p> - -<p>The recent phase of Turkish operations has been localised, aiming to secure the Matin mountains within the Amedi district north of Dohuk in northern Iraq. The area is significant because it is crucial for any future operations in the larger Gara mountain range, where the PKK has established a network of sophisticated bases. Gara’s strategic importance stems from its central location, linking Qandil with Syria, Turkey and Sinjar.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Turkish pressure and shifting realities on the ground have rendered Baghdad and Erbil more pliable on the question of the PKK in recent years</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The PKK established a foothold in Sinjar in 2014 when so-called Islamic State attacked the local Yazidi peoples in a genocidal campaign, leading to mass civilian casualties and atrocities. The region has been penetrated by a medley of groups, including Iran-backed Shiite militias and Yazidi armed groups linked to the PKK. Sinjar is a crucial supply line that allows transit for the PKK across Iraq and Syria; losing its access will lessen the influence it holds in northeastern Syria.</p> - -<h3 id="the-pkks-posture-in-iraq">The PKK’s Posture in Iraq</h3> - -<p>Three regions stand out for their strategic significance for the PKK: Mahmur, Sinjar and the so-called Medya Defence Zones. Having evolved over four decades, these enclaves represent strategic assets for the organisation, following its shift from bases in Syria and Lebanon to northern Iraq. Over time, the PKK expanded into civilian areas by expanding into cities, towns and villages through social, political and economic structures, giving it access to material assets and overland smuggling routes in the borderlands.</p> - -<p>Turkish pressure and shifting realities on the ground have rendered Baghdad and Erbil more pliable on the question of the PKK in recent years. The central government’s formal ban of the group – which falls short of the terrorist designation Ankara wanted – is more than a symbolic gesture. Iraqi officials have warned against the possibility of PKK-linked attacks on oil refineries and other critical national infrastructure, an indication that Ankara has made strides in persuading Baghdad that the organisation poses a risk to Iraqi national interests.</p> - -<p>At the same time, the PKK’s slow and steady encroachment into civilian areas, infringing upon the territorial authority of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), has triggered a legitimacy crisis at a time when the latter is already under pressure from Baghdad and local opponents. The PKK maintains a presence in the area of Sinjar, despite the agreement in October 2020 between the central government and the KRG that calls for the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the area. As the PKK’s freedom of movement has grown in the area of Sulaymaniyah, which is controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), tensions have intensified between Turkey and Iran. For Erbil, the effect of PUK cooperation with Iran is to hand greater leverage to Baghdad over the Iraqi Kurds and the ability to degrade the region’s autonomy through economic, judicial and security interventions.</p> - -<p>In a series of setbacks to the power-sharing arrangement that has held since 2005, the KRG has seen its autonomy come under mounting pressure from Iranian- and Shia-influenced politics in Baghdad. In February 2022, the Federal Supreme Court decreed that the KRG’s 2007 natural resource law was unconstitutional and its oil exports and contracts illegal. This was followed in January 2023 by a ruling against new federal budget transfers to the Kurdistan region. In March 2023, the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce ruled in favour of Iraq in a decade-long arbitration case that led to the Iraq–Turkey pipeline closure, which remains unresolved. In a further blow, in a February 2024 decision, the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq ruled that the KRG must hand over control of its finances to the federal government.</p> - -<p>The war in Gaza has amplified the role of various Iran-aligned Shia militias in Iraq, a patchwork of ideologically like-minded groups that have been called to action against US military targets since the 7 October attacks on Israel. Iran views Turkey’s sizeable military footprint as a threat to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ and Shia militias’ areas of operation inside northern Iraq and the border areas. To prevent Turkey from regaining a foothold in areas like Mosul and Kirkuk, and to degrade its existing influence over Erbil and Duhok, Iran has both targeted the KDP in ways that are a throwback to the dynamics which defined the region in the 1990s, as well as engaged with it in recent months.</p> - -<p>In the mid-1990s, as US influence receded from northern Iraq, a delicate balance of power took shape among the region’s key players. Turkey threw its weight behind the KDP, while Iran lent support to the PUK. Meanwhile, the PKK entrenched itself in the rugged, mountainous terrain along the Turkish-Iraqi border – territory neither the KDP nor the PUK could decisively control. During this period, the PKK forged strategic ties with the PUK, a relationship that shaped the insurgent dynamics of the region for years to come. The PKK has historically moved to exploit local fractures for its own survival.</p> - -<h3 id="re-centralisation-dynamics-in-iraq">Re-centralisation Dynamics in Iraq</h3> - -<p>Since the unsuccessful independence referendum held in 2017, the KRG has seen its authority weakened by the federal government in Baghdad through political manoeuvres and tools of lawfare, a series of judicial decisions that Iraqi Kurds believe have incrementally eroded the region’s constitutionally mandated autonomy.</p> - -<p>While Ankara benefits from closer security cooperation with the KDP, it has simultaneously benefited from the centralising dynamics that have transferred greater control to the central government at the expense of the KRG’s constitutionally mandated autonomy. Iraq continues to be a key foreign policy and security priority for Turkey, as evidenced by a series of high-level meetings in quick succession early this year. On 14 March, the Turkish defence and foreign ministers and the head of the National Intelligence Organisation visited Baghdad. A Turkish diplomatic win came in March ahead of Erdogan’s visit to Iraq on 22 April 2024 – the first in 12 years – when the government of Iraq designated the PKK a “banned” group on Iraqi soil, effectively rendering the activities of the group illegal inside Iraq and clearing the path for Iraqi state forces (in principle, at least) to pursue, prosecute and punish militants.</p> - -<p>On 21 July, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani inaugurated a 115-km power transmission line that had been stalled for 20 years, running through the Kisik station west of Mosul to supply the provinces of Nineveh, Salahuddin and Kirkuk with a capacity of 300 megawatts. This dwarfs in comparison to the proposed $20 billion Iraq Development Road project, a landmark network of railways and highways that will alter existing supply chains and link Asia to European markets via Basra and overland via Turkey. The proposed transit route will traverse through Mosul, the outskirts of Kirkuk, areas of Islamic State cell activity as well as PKK presence, and clearing this insurgent-held territory is essential to minimising the chances of disruption or sabotage. The project will not effectively counter growing Iranian hegemony in Iraq. On the contrary, the route will run through territory that is under Iran’s influence, and if Tehran wants to block it, it probably can.</p> - -<p>The PKK is unsettled by the deepening rapprochement between its adversary and the Iraqi government, and for good reason. Northern Iraq has long served as a strategic haven for the group, providing a safe zone for its leadership, military assets, and logistical networks. Any disruption to this sanctuary would have cascading effects across the PKK’s operations, both in Iraq and Syria.</p> - -<h3 id="irans-role">Iran’s Role</h3> - -<p>Iraq has become even more critical for Iran against the backdrop of the Gaza war. Iraq is a critical node in the highly networked supply chains of logistical and financial support that feed not only the militia there, but also Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and militias in Syria. Iraqi Kurdistan is important for Iran as it seeks to limit the activities of armed Iranian Kurdish groups such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komeleh and the Free Life Party, consolidate its influence over the country, and apply pressure on Turkey.</p> - -<p>The KDP accuses the PUK of engaging in opaque relations with Baghdad, Tehran and Shiite groups, as worries mount that the increasing influence of the PUK may result in a growing Iranian dominance over the KRG. The KDP initially attempted to counterbalance the alliance between the PUK and Iran-linked Shiite groups by converging with Sunni Arab factions and Muqtada al-Sadr, but this failed as Iran successfully downgraded al-Sadr’s influence and divided the Sunni Arab coalition.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Instability in the Kurdistan Region, and increased Iranian infiltration, does not bode well for wider Western interests in the Middle East</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>On 15 January 2024, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards claimed to have targeted an Israeli “espionage headquarters” near the US consulate in Erbil, with Iran-backed Iraqi militias having made similar claims following strikes conducted in December 2023. Iranian sources claimed the attacks were in retaliation for Israel’s role in targeting commanders of the “Axis of Resistance”. Four were killed, including a prominent Iraqi Kurdish businessman.</p> - -<p>As he has consolidated his leadership over the PUK, Bafel Talabani has grown closer to Iran. But he is not alone. In early May, President of the Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani paid an official visit to Tehran, in an attempt to recover from the January strikes and to balance interests between Turkey and Iran. Shortly after his return, the Iraqi Supreme Federal Court issued a ruling that favoured Masrour Barzani’s formal objection to the election law that altered the distribution of seats and the minority quota in the Kurdish parliament. The KDP will be cautious about confronting Iran-linked militia because the stakes are so high. Antagonising Iran may lead to unforeseen circumstances that will work against its claim to ensure stability as the governing party.</p> - -<p>In June, three Iranian Kurdish armed groups under the “Komeleh” umbrella were relocated to a “less accessible” camp in Iraqi Kurdistan, restricting their activities, logistical access to weapons and supplies. This stems from a security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran signed in March 2023 that saw Iraqi Kurds push several armed factions away from the Iranian border in order to comply with Tehran’s demands. In July, Nechirvan Barzani attended the inauguration ceremony of President Pezeshkian.</p> - -<p>These overtures seem to have paid off. On 12 September, Pezeshkian visited Erbil (after touching down in Baghdad) on his first overseas visit since taking office, showcasing the level of priority given to a neighbour that Tehran wields significant influence over and extracts considerable value from. Pezeshkian also visited Sulaymaniyah, effectively acknowledging that the Kurdistan Region has two centres of authority.</p> - -<p>The outcome of the region’s parliamentary elections, which look to be finally going ahead on 20 October, will impact these dynamics. If the KRG is fragmented further, or the results are disputed by either of the major parties leading to instability, this will impact the federal balance of power in Iraq, as well as complicate US and allied interests in the region. Ankara may opt to take steps to prevent the KDP from falling under Iranian control, a scenario that would curtail the manoeuvrability of Turkey’s counterterrorism operations. One possibility would be supporting the KDP to strengthen the local economy in order to stem popular discontent, which may include building momentum towards finally reopening the oil pipeline to Turkey.</p> - -<p>As US forces prepare to withdraw from Iraq, the scramble to fill the inevitable void has long been underway. The increased activity of local and regional actors needs to be read within the context of a future US withdrawal, or rather, drawdown. Instability in the Kurdistan Region, and increased Iranian infiltration, does not bode well for wider Western interests in the Middle East, especially given the current fragility in the region. Curtailing Iranian influence is a persistent concern, which is ever more pressing – and simultaneously difficult – given Tehran’s deeply embedded networks and vested interests across the rest of Iraq.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Burcu Ozcelik</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security within the International Security department at RUSI. With over 15 years’ experience in geopolitical risk analysis, security and threat assessments, and strategic advisory in both the public and private sector, Burcu specialises in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean.</p>Burcu OzcelikIran and Turkey increasingly risk clashing through proxies in Iraqi Kurdistan as Turkey escalates its operations against the PKK, further complicating regional dynamics amid the Gaza war.UK And The Indo-Pacific2024-09-19T12:00:00+08:002024-09-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-and-the-indo-pacific<p><em>As the new Minister for the Indo-Pacific visits Asia, given the UK’s vast interests in this consequential region, Whitehall should focus on deepening its diplomatic and military engagement.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Speaking at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, French Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly could not resist taking the mickey out of her UK counterpart. She boasted that she had gone to the high-level defence ministerial forum with her entourage, plus a carrier strike group (CSG) comprising the Charles de Gaulle carrier, escorted by destroyers, tankers, Rafale fighters and helicopters. The UK, she said with a mischievous grin, “would be kind enough not to reciprocate”.</p> - -<p>Parly’s dig at the UK might have been light-hearted, but the issue of European deployments and engagement in the broader Indo-Pacific is serious business, given the growing geopolitical weight of the region. Consider the numbers: the region includes five of the world’s biggest-spending military powers (China, India, Japan, Russia and the US); four formidable democratic powers (the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue); three powers in an extensive trilateral arrangement (Australia, the UK and the US); two of the biggest global powers (China and the US); and a dynamic regional institution (ASEAN).</p> - -<p>Granted, many key European powers - such as France, Germany and the EU - have tabled elaborate documents detailing their plans for the Indo-Pacific, and in particular, Southeast Asia. But to many Southeast Asian observers concerned about delicate regional hotspots – such as the South China Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the Taiwan Strait – the key question is how much military power European countries can bring to bear to bolster deterrence and regional stability. Ultimately, these Indo-Pacific strategies must be complemented by tangible exercises of hard power, particularly given the tough regional environment. As the oft-quoted retort by Stalin goes: “How many divisions does the Pope have?”</p> - -<p>To their credit, countries like Germany and France have stepped up. The former will send its latest F125-class frigate with a support ship to the region this year (in addition to deployments by the Air Force). As for the latter, French Rafales deployed on the Charles De Gaulle conducted a power projection exercise from the Indian Ocean to Singapore in 2023.</p> - -<p>In this game, however, the new UK government appears to be lagging in the stakes. It has been two months since Labour became the governing party in the UK, and all signs point to a desire to strengthen relationships across the Atlantic and the English Channel at the expense of the Indo-Pacific region. In his first international visit since taking office, Prime Minister Keir Starmer jetted off to Washington to participate in a NATO summit. He followed this up by hosting the fourth summit of the European Political Community, making good on his campaign promise to forge a stronger relationship with European allies and maintain an “unshakable” commitment to NATO. Following his lead, Chancellor Rachel Reeves also visited New York and Toronto in a bid to shore up investment in key sectors of the UK economy.</p> - -<p>In stark contrast, the new UK government has kept relatively mum on its approach to the Indo-Pacific. There have been some suggestions that Labour will conduct a “full audit” of London’s relations with China, as it puts its “three C’s” approach – “challenge, compete and cooperate” – towards Beijing into action.</p> - -<p>More broadly, there has been an emphasis on the need for “progressive realism” – using realist methods to prosecute progressive ends – since before the general election. John Healey, the new defence secretary, has already given a big hint as to London’s overall policy direction. Under Labour, he said in an interview last year, London will remain a staunch ally of Australia and New Zealand. But the UK cannot be a “strong military force in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic simultaneously”.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Any form of retrenchment from the Indo-Pacific – and in particular, ASEAN – would be detrimental to the UK’s long-term interests in the region</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>There are reasonable grounds for such an approach. The UK’s defence budget is stretched. The previous Conservative government sought to raise the UK’s defence spending from 2.3% of GDP to 2.5% in the long term, but this was conditioned on favourable “fiscal and economic circumstances”. Labour has stated the same aspiration, but contingent on a review of defence strategy.</p> - -<p>However, Reeves has made clear that the new government has inherited a £22 billion budgetary hole from the previous Tory government, leaving Westminster with “difficult decisions” to make and portending the need for further spending cuts. Speaking to the Financial Times in July, a senior MoD official said that the UK armed forces could not defend the “British homelands properly”, let alone fight in a “conflict of any scale”.</p> - -<p>The UK is also focused on shoring up Ukraine in the latter’s war with Russia, and on its participation in NATO and European security, particularly with the possibility of a second Trump administration come January 2025. This is true to form for Labour, which has traditionally been an Atlanticist party.</p> - -<p>That said, any form of retrenchment from the Indo-Pacific – and in particular, ASEAN – would be detrimental to the UK’s long-term interests in the region.</p> - -<p>The UK has long-standing interests in the region, as highlighted by its “Refresh” of its 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy in 2023. The Refresh doubled down on the UK’s so-called “tilt” towards the Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the UK secured a dialogue partnership with ASEAN. Two years later, it signed the accession protocol to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).</p> - -<p>The UK has also committed itself to AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership with Australia and the US. This will see the forward deployment of a UK Astute-class submarine in Western Australia later this decade. Likewise, the UK is part of the Global Combat Air Programme with Japan and Italy.</p> - -<p>According to a report by International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the UK also remains engaged with regional partners through combined military exercises. In 2023, the UK expanded its annual combined exercise with Tokyo, Exercise Vigilant Isles, marking the “first time British troops have been embedded with their Japanese counterparts”. London also routinely deploys its troops to Australian exercises, such as Exercise Talisman Sabre and Exercise Pitch Black. Moreover, the UK has committed forces to combined exercises with Washington, most notably the deployment of the RAF’s Atlas A400M transport aircraft under the US-led Exercise Mobility Guardian in Guam.</p> - -<p>Following its withdrawal from east of Suez in 1967, the UK retained a security footprint in the region with the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). It has detachments in Singapore and Brunei and maintains two forward-deployed offshore patrol vessels in the region. As part of the FPDA, the UK also engages annually with Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and Australia through Exercise Bersama Lima and Exercise Bersama Shield.</p> - -<p>Unsurprisingly, the UK was ranked among the major powers as the sixth most strategically relevant to ASEAN in ISEAS’s 2024 State of Southeast Asia Survey, just above Australia (to much consternation in Canberra, which considers itself to be far more involved in Southeast Asia and the wider region than London).</p> - -<p>More importantly, the new UK government cannot argue that more pressing concerns in the Atlantic and Europe should lead to reduced commitments in the region. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida put this across well when he said that “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow”. That is, conflicts on the western end of Eurasia could come home to roost in the eastern part, and vice versa. Indeed, the aforementioned IISS report suggests that major EU member states, such as Germany, France and Italy, recognise this interconnectedness and have been stepping up their engagement in the Indo-Pacific (albeit in a piecemeal fashion), even as the bloc makes steady progress towards its commitment of spending at least 2% of its GDP on defence.</p> - -<p>Still, given Labour’s fiscal constraints and the urgent need to reinvigorate growth in the UK economy, what can be done?</p> - -<p>For a start, the UK should continue to ask for a seat at the table at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit, building on the momentum of its conferment as an ASEAN dialogue partner in 2021. Participating in ASEAN-led platforms is no panacea, but it would give London access to established regional networks while also signalling the UK’s support for the (much-vaunted) centrality of ASEAN at a minimum.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ultimately, the sheer importance of the Indo-Pacific to the UK’s national interests behooves it to lean more towards the region rather than turn away</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>In a step in the right direction, the UK also announced in early August 2024 that it would deploy a CSG to the Indo-Pacific in 2025. To be led by the HMS Prince of Wales carrier, the group would include Royal Navy escorts and aircraft, and be bolstered by two ships, including a frigate, from Norway. This CSG would train with the navies of the US and Japan – two powers that are key members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which seeks to manage the challenge posed by China.</p> - -<p>Given that Southeast Asian countries remain wary about assertive Chinese actions in the South China Sea, the UK could also participate in so-called “Quad-lite” exercises (working with Quad countries, without the “Quad” brand) with like-minded Southeast Asian states, demonstrating the active presence of other powers in the region. A good example would be Super Garuda Shield 2023, which involved six participating contingents (including from Indonesia, the US, Japan and the UK) and nine observer countries. The exercise last year was timely given Indonesia and China’s standoffs in disputed waters off the Natuna islands.</p> - -<p>Beyond this, the UK should provide assistance to countries that are seeking to build their own capacities to defend the existing rules-based order.</p> - -<p>A cost-effective option would be a reciprocal access agreement (RAA) with the Philippines, which is at the forefront of the South China Sea dispute with China. This is not a bridge too far: the UK has signed a similar RAA with Japan, while Tokyo inked an RAA with Manila on 8 July this year and a similar agreement with Australia in 2022. The Japan–UK RAA would also allow the UK to generate significant bang for its buck, as the agreement would not require it to maintain a permanent deployment of troops, and would allow for greater flexibility in the conduct of joint training and exercises. In fact, the latter are key to upholding regional stability, as Japan and the UK can plan for “complex military exercises and deployments” in their own territories as well as the wider Indo-Pacific (most likely with like-minded countries such as Australia, the Philippines and the US).</p> - -<p>Taking a leaf from Japan’s playbook, London should also consider augmenting its existing training with coastguards in Asia by providing coastguard ships to countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines. Labour has previously expressed its desire to “restore the UK’s leadership in international development” by reversing the Tory government’s decision to reduce the Overseas Development Assistance budget, and it could explore an arrangement akin to Tokyo’s Official Security Assistance to beef up the capabilities of regional allies.</p> - -<p>Expectations of a UK military contribution to a Taiwan Strait contingency are low. But it is likely that the US would value the deployment of UK forces already in the region. According to another IISS report, Whitehall should at least consider some forward planning as to the likely assets that it could bring to the region in the event of a conflagration in the Taiwan Strait, be it a naval task group or a brigade-sized land force.</p> - -<p>It goes without saying that any major power’s regional engagement is contingent on whether it serves the national interest and is sustainable. London’s historic withdrawal from “east of Suez” in 1967 served its interests at the time, given the dire financial straits it was in and its inclination to reduce its global military footprint. Today, the obverse is true: to be a power of consequence, it needs to be present in strength in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, the sheer importance of the Indo-Pacific to the UK’s national interests behooves it to lean more towards the dynamic region rather than turn away.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>William Choong</strong> is a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, and the managing editor of Fulcrum, the institute’s commentary and analysis website.</p> - -<p><strong>Eugene Tan</strong> is a research officer at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.</p>William Choong and Eugene TanAs the new Minister for the Indo-Pacific visits Asia, given the UK’s vast interests in this consequential region, Whitehall should focus on deepening its diplomatic and military engagement.Driving Change2024-09-19T12:00:00+08:002024-09-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/driving-change<p><em>Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are navigating a new geopolitical moment. Some LAC countries are benefitting from increased access to low-cost, high-quality electric vehicles (EVs) and new investment throughout the value chain from China that can help meet governments’ climate and economic objectives.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>However, this comes with risks, as dependencies on Beijing may be exacerbated at a time when China’s economy is underperforming and geopolitical competition with the United States is on the rise. Washington should find new ways to engage with the region to find solutions that address local demands and simultaneously mitigate U.S. geopolitical risk.</em></p> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>China’s external economic engagement is evolving rapidly and is reshaping its relationship with countries in the developing world, including in LAC. Beijing’s continued commitment to industrial policy is causing increasing tensions with countries concerned about overcapacity and a second “China shock.” However, China’s growing exports and nascent overseas production of high-tech green products such as EVs are changing the country’s offerings to regions such as LAC, which exports many critical raw materials, desires more value-added manufacturing investment, seeks to address climate change, and imports an increasing number of vehicles from China.</p> - -<p>Growing tensions between the United States and China have raised concerns globally, but some countries in LAC see great power competition as an opportunity to position themselves as new nodes in this evolving trade and investment environment. Given LAC’s growing importance to the economic security strategy of the United States, the changing relationship of the region with China is worth analyzing more closely — especially with respect to the EV supply chain.</p> - -<p>Beijing’s high-profile Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has shaped its relations with the LAC region for much of the last decade, but this is rapidly changing as the number of new Chinese-backed large-scale infrastructure projects declines. Instead, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) is becoming more common in the region. Although China’s investments remain concentrated in the mining segment of the supply chain, there are signs of increasing interest from Chinese firms to expand their international presence in refining, assembly, and manufacturing, particularly in the EV supply chain. If this trend holds, it would represent a significant shift in Beijing’s offerings to potential partners in the developing world. Crucially for LAC, this would allow China to answer a growing regional call for investment in higher-value segments of the local supply chain while also helping meet governments’ climate goals. LAC is increasingly a market for Chinese EVs as well, and although much smaller than Europe and Asia, it is growing quickly (see Figure 1).</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ETNz0B0.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Chinese EV Exports by Region</em></p> - -<p>There are several reasons why Chinese firms are considering investments beyond mining in LAC, and why the EV industry appears to be at the forefront of this trend. China’s slowing economy and high levels of competition are encouraging companies to seek new markets. This is particularly evident in the automotive industry, which has received significant state support over the years. Because economies of scale and acquiring more data are crucial to the innovation process and cost competitiveness in the EV industry, companies have a strong incentive to seek new customers globally.</p> - -<p>Recently, Chinese companies have been focusing more on developing markets, in part due to partial or complete closures of larger automotive markets such as Europe and the United States through tariffs. However, many emerging economies have their own industrial ambitions in this space. Take Brazil, which became a top importer of Chinese EVs before President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s second tranche of tariffs came into force in the summer of 2024 (see Figure 2).</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/m2DrrPf.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Figure 2: Chinese Exports of EVs to Select Latin American Countries</em></p> - -<p>Lula’s government has also enthusiastically welcomed BYD — China’s and the world’s leading EV manufacturer — which is taking over an old Ford plant to build EVs in the country. This is one of three Chinese automotive companies with plans to make EVs in Brazil. Greater investment on the ground in LAC could allow Chinese firms to meet the region’s growing need for affordable EVs while also boosting the local economy through value-added manufacturing, especially if local workers are employed. It would also integrate the region further with China, both economically and technologically.</p> - -<p>Another important driver is derisking policies in the United States itself. To comply with requirements in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and to avoid tariffs, for example, Chinese companies have been exploring opportunities to expand assembly and manufacturing in third countries, including in the LAC region. Indeed, the United States and other developed countries are putting in place incentives and restrictions that aim to onshore supply chains and direct companies to invest outside of China — especially in places closer to home, such as LAC. The IRA, with its EV tax credit requirements, represents one of the most ambitious policies so far when it comes to redirecting investment in third countries.</p> - -<p>The rest of this paper will proceed by offering an overview of Chinese firms’ involvement in various segments of the EV supply chain in LAC and the implications for U.S. strategy. Although the value chain can be quite complex (see Figure 3), this paper will focus on key minerals (i.e., lithium and copper), the production of battery cells and packs, and vehicle assembly.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BBKTCeo.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Figure 3: Electric Vehicle Battery Supply Chain</em></p> - -<h3 id="mining">Mining</h3> - -<p>The mining industry in LAC has attracted international attention as governments seek to transition to green technologies, which require critical minerals such as lithium, found in large quantities in the region. China is ahead of its competitors in forging partnerships and catalyzing investment in LAC’s minerals space for use in the energy transition. China maintains outsized control over the mining of several critical minerals used in EV battery manufacturing, such as lithium and copper (see Figure 4). It does so by investing in complete acquisitions of local mines, purchasing significant shares in Western mining companies, and partnering with local governments.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ebYHyN4.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Figure 4: Chinese Investment in Lithium Mining and Refining in LAC</em></p> - -<h4 id="lithium">Lithium</h4> - -<p>The importance of lithium carbonate, the key compound used in EV batteries, has increased tremendously in the last decade. While Australia is currently the world’s largest lithium producer, LAC is home to the renowned lithium triangle — comprised of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile — which is estimated to hold around 58 percent of the world’s lithium reserves. These countries have become major exporters of the mineral to China (see Figure 5). However, lack of infrastructure, weak institutions, and water crises are only a few of the challenges the region faces as it seeks to turn its lithium mining potential into reality.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PzQ4mXU.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ Figure 5: China’s Imports of Lithium Carbonate from Chile and Argentina</em></p> - -<p>On paper, Bolivia has the world’s largest reserves of lithium, at 23 million tons, followed by Argentina (22 million tons) and Chile (11 million tons). But Bolivia’s efforts to capitalize on its resources remain mired in domestic politics — namely its effort to nationalize lithium starting in 2008 and the tight political control over the resource since exercised by the state-owned company YLB. In February 2019, President Evo Morales announced that his country would partner with China’s Xinjiang TBEA Group to advance the industrialization of the Coipasa and Pastos Grandes salt flats. This agreement eventually fell apart, however, due to the political turmoil caused by Morales’s election theft and subsequent flight from the country. The latest attempt to advance Bolivia’s lithium production came in June 2023 with the announcement of a $1.4 billion partnership with a consortium led by battery giant CATL to develop two lithium projects in the Uyuni and Coipasa salt flats. It remains to be seen if this venture will succeed.</p> - -<p>Argentina has positioned itself ahead of Bolivia by retaining business-friendly policies that have attracted investment in its lithium mining sector. These policies have propelled Argentina to become the fourth-largest producer of lithium in the world — after Australia, Chile, and China — generating around 5 percent of the world’s supply at three mines in the provinces of Jujuy, Salta, and Catamarca. According to some estimates, Argentina could overtake Chile as the largest producer in the lithium triangle by 2030.</p> - -<p>Argentina’s mining laws and regulatory landscape make it a more attractive partner. While the Bolivian government maintains full control of mining operations in its territory, Argentina’s laws allow local provinces to negotiate mining agreements directly with the private sector and limit royalties owed to the provinces to 3 percent. These benefits, and the ability of foreign companies to buy and operate mines, have allowed Chinese mining companies to acquire lithium mining operations and buy a significant percentage of the shares of other lithium mining companies.</p> - -<p>According to the Argentine government, there are currently 49 new lithium mining projects under development in the country’s northeast, seven of which are being developed by China. Of the seven lithium projects owned or partially owned by China, the Caucharí-Olaroz project has started production of lithium carbonate and the Mariana project has begun operations and is expected to begin production soon. The rest of the projects are in different stages of development, with two in the construction phase, two in the feasibility stage, and one in advanced exploration.</p> - -<p>Chile is currently the top lithium producer in South America and the second-largest producer in the world, though this position may soon be overtaken by Argentina. In 2022, Chile produced about one-third of the world’s lithium and accounted for 89.5 percent of China’s total lithium carbonate imports, making it a key player in the industry.</p> - -<p>Until last year, Chile’s relatively open business environment attracted companies from the United States, Canada, and key Asian countries such as Japan. However, President Gabriel Boric’s new National Lithium Strategy, a move characterized by some as nationalization, has quickly reshaped the business landscape and may alter investor sentiment. According to the strategy, private sector entities must gradually transfer control of lithium operations to state-owned company Codelco, in what some experts argue is an effort to position Chile higher up the value chain.</p> - -<p>Until now, lithium extraction in Chile has been in the hands of two private companies, SQM and Albemarle. Albemarle is an American-based company, while SQM is a Chilean company in which China’s Tianqi Lithium has a 22 percent stake. It is unclear whether both SQM and Albemarle will continue their operations in the country past their contracts’ sunset clauses in 2030 and 2043, respectively. Indeed, at the time of writing, Tianqi had initiated an appeal that could slow down SQM’s planned partnership with Codelco. Chinese EV giant BYD was expected to invest $290 million in a new lithium project that combines mining, refining, and a cathode factory, answering Chile’s call for more local investment, but the project was recently reported as being on hold.</p> - -<p>The challenges faced by Chinese companies in Chile should be contextualized in the overall strong bilateral economic relationship. Chile was the first country in LAC to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with China, which it did in 2005, a time when China was growing at double-digit rates yearly and rapidly expanding its engagement with the region. Since then, Chile’s trade with China has surpassed its trade with the United States. It remains to be seen if concerns over exposure to Chinese markets and disputes over investments in Chile could lead Santiago to seek a more forceful economic diversification strategy.</p> - -<p>If Chile’s lithium strategy has created some new challenges for Chinese companies, Mexico’s policies on natural resources over the past few years have shifted the lay of the land for Chinese companies seeking to tap into Mexico’s lithium reserves, estimated at 1.7 million tons. In 2022, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador ordered the creation of a state-owned company, LitioMx, which would take over the exploration, exploitation, and refining of lithium in the country. This decree jeopardized major concessions in the state of Sonora given to Bacanora Lithium in 2009, acquired later by Ganfeng, and should they win arbitration, it would cover the largest deposit of lithium identified in Mexico. In June of 2024, Ganfeng filed an arbitration case against Mexico, and although President Lopez Obrador has indicated a desire to find an agreement with the company, the road ahead is one of legal limbo. The incoming president, Claudia Sheinbaum, a close ally of Lopez Obrador, is expected to maintain a similar approach to retaining government control of mineral resources and has been vocal about her desire to expand Mexico’s position as an active player in the EV value chain, including in lithium.</p> - -<h4 id="copper">Copper</h4> - -<p>Though not categorized as a critical mineral by the United States until 2023, copper is essential for EV production and is used in components ranging from batteries to wires. This makes LAC a pivotal player, as it produces about 40 percent of the world’s copper and contains the largest deposits of the ore, primarily located in Chile, Peru, and Mexico. China is a leading importer of copper, and its companies have made key investments in LAC to secure access to the resource.</p> - -<p>Chinese companies such as Minmetals (MMG), Guoxin, and Citic are important players in Peru’s mining sector. As a share of Peru’s total copper exports, sales of copper ore and copper concentrate to China have grown from 41 percent in 2012 to 76 percent in 2022, according to UN Comtrade data. Peru is an important case given its favorable business environment, which enabled Chinese companies to acquire two of the country’s largest copper mines, Las Bambas and Toromocho, though political instability in the country has caused a slowdown in investment.</p> - -<p>Yet Chile is undoubtedly the largest player in the copper industry, which accounts for over half of Chile’s total exports. Copper is a key commodity in the thriving Chile-China economic relationship. In 2022, out of the $22.8 billion in copper ore that Chile exported, $15.6 billion went to China, followed by Japan at $4.0 billion and South Korea at $935 million.</p> - -<p>In Chile, 72 percent of copper mines are owned and operated by private companies; the other 28 percent are operated by Codelco, the state-owned enterprise, which gives China less latitude to invest in copper mines in the country or to buy them outright. While Chinese-owned firms play a smaller role in Chile than in Peru, China still maintains a strong investment presence in the country.</p> - -<p>Altogether, Chinese companies remain important in the Latin American mining industry, but local conditions matter. Resource nationalization and especially political volatility can lead to declining investment overall, as epitomized by Bolivia’s challenges, and could have long-term impacts on the sector. However, tighter controls on the exploitation of natural resources by host governments can be beneficial, among other things, in ensuring more diversified sources of investment and in negotiating greater local benefits. Finally, some countries, such as Bolivia and Mexico, may see Chinese investment as the most realistic pathway to developing domestic resources and tapping into a growing export market.</p> - -<h3 id="refining">Refining</h3> - -<p>While investment in mineral extraction is a clear strategic goal, less intuitive are the forces behind a surge in interest in lithium refining in South America. One important driver of this trend is U.S. government policy. Per IRA rules, an EV qualifies for tax incentives if it is assembled in North America and the battery meets a series of requirements regarding mineral sourcing and the ownership of the companies involved throughout its value chain. All of these rules aim to incentivize lower levels of Chinese control over the supply chain and provide incentives for production outside of China. The result has been an immediate interest in countries that have FTAs with the United States (e.g., Chile) and those that may be able to secure sectoral agreements (e.g., Argentina).</p> - -<p>Currently, the processing of critical minerals is concentrated in China, with some experts estimating that the country refines around 90 percent of the world’s rare earth minerals and 60–70 percent of lithium and cobalt. This has raised global concerns about the potential for disruption, price manipulation, and weaponization of highly concentrated supply chains. China’s 2023 decision to introduce export controls on graphite, germanium, and gallium has further fueled economic security concerns around minerals. Finally, as the United States makes historic investments in the energy transition, policymakers have tried to restrict how much of those financial incentives benefit Chinese companies.</p> - -<p>Among other things, China’s position as the top smelter and refiner has long gone unchallenged because of the highly polluting and energy-intensive nature of those industries, though recent efforts by China to open new refining capabilities in LAC and Southeast Asia may signal a shift in this trend. In the case of lithium, for example, the raw material must undergo a series of chemical processes to produce lithium carbonate. With current technology, this process is very energy intensive and involves vast amounts of water, which in places such as Chile and Argentina can prove to be a significant challenge.</p> - -<p>Another driver for Chinese companies to invest in refining capacity in LAC is the policies of countries in the region, most notably Chile. Despite having well-established copper refining operations, Chile’s lithium refining industry is still underdeveloped relative to its mining. With its new strategy, Chile seeks to position itself as the fourth-largest lithium refiner in the world to complement its sizable production of the mineral and, following protests about wealth inequality and development, ensure that more of Chile’s mineral wealth delivers local benefits. In October 2023, President Boric announced an investment of $233 million by Chinese giant Tsingshan Holding Group in Mejillones (located in the Antofagasta region) for a refining plant. Boric and his economic minister linked the deal explicitly to the country’s national strategy, which seeks to facilitate knowledge transfer and generate more value added. The Tsingshan deal followed the now-uncertain commitment by Chinese EV manufacturer BYD to build a refining facility in Chile.</p> - -<p>Lithium refining is gaining momentum in Argentina as well, with several projects in various stages of development. In 2022, China’s battery giant Gotion High-Tech signed a joint venture agreement with Jujuy’s state-run mining company. Additionally, in 2021, Tsingshan signed a $1.7 billion joint venture with French firm Eramet, aiming to produce 24,000 tons of refined lithium carbonate. Questions remain in Chile and Argentina over the vast water requirements of the industry, which has sparked debates about the long-term viability of their lithium industries. The introduction by Chinese companies of direct lithium extraction technology could ameliorate some of these concerns, though it is liable to raise costs.</p> - -<p>Domestic policies play an important role in attracting investment in segments of the industry with higher value added. Governments are attempting to leverage access to their natural resources (an example set by Indonesia with its rules in the nickel industry) and their commercial links to larger markets such as the United States, as well as potential growth in their own markets. Access to the U.S. market and compliance with IRA tax credit requirements appear to be important factors, especially for Chile, which has an FTA with the United States. (Argentina is hoping for an exception to IRA rules, much like the one granted to Japan and the European Union, in order to qualify for IRA tax credits.) Long-awaited rules by the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service — as well as the Department of Energy’s Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) rule, which sets ownership standards as low as 25 percent to qualify for tax credits — have raised some challenges for Chinese companies hoping to qualify for tax credits.</p> - -<h3 id="battery-manufacturing">Battery Manufacturing</h3> - -<p>While there may be nascent signs that Chinese and LAC companies are interested in expanding lithium refining, the Latin American lithium-ion battery industry remains less dynamic. The industry overall is limited to a handful of factories throughout the continent. The only Chinese investment related to battery manufacturing appears to be a BYD plant in Manaus, Brazil, which started production in 2020. It is unclear if the facility can produce battery cells; it appears to be mainly focused on battery pack assembly.</p> - -<p>BYD is largely known for its vehicles, but the company is a leading battery manufacturer and supplies other automakers as well. The Manaus plant, however, appears to be primarily dedicated to producing batteries for BYD buses made at the Campinas plant near São Paulo, which opened in 2015 in southeastern Brazil. This may change as BYD’s new auto factory in Camaçari, in eastern Brazil, comes online in 2025 and increases demand for batteries. BYD also produces solar panels in the country, which are increasingly installed alongside stationary battery storage worldwide. It is not immediately clear if the batteries that support the solar plants are produced by BYD or whether they may be produced locally at the Manaus plant in the future.</p> - -<p>BYD’s battery production in Brazil is likely aimed primarily at fulfilling local demand and supporting the company’s automotive production in the country, which is the largest market in LAC. Indeed, given current transportation costs and the large investments taking place within the United States, it seems unlikely that Chinese-led battery production in Brazil could be aimed at the export market. This is very different from the dynamic observed in refining and mining, where Chinese firms are tapping into LAC natural resources for export to China or are establishing refining facilities to better access markets in third countries such as the United States.</p> - -<p>There have been at least two other high-profile Chinese battery plant projects that have received news coverage without making any significant progress. Chery, a Chinese automotive manufacturer that is a significant player in the internal combustion engine (ICE) and EV industries, announced a large project in Argentina in early 2023. Although some reports suggest that the proposed manufacturing complex would feature battery manufacturing capacity, this seems unlikely, since the company does not produce its own batteries. Regardless, the project seems to have stalled in the past year and a half.</p> - -<p>The second project that has failed to come to fruition is a CATL factory in Mexico, first reported in 2022, which could have potentially supplied Tesla’s factory in Texas. However, the plan has been on pause since the fall of 2022 after the IRA was made law. CATL has since pursued a licensing agreement with Ford to make lithium iron phosphate batteries in Michigan.</p> - -<p>CATL’s pivot to the U.S. market reflects a general challenge to building batteries (and EVs) in LAC. The incentives offered by the IRA have led to a surge of investments in the United States by some of the world’s leading battery manufacturers (BYD being a notable exception). The IRA has also helped to drive more refining investment in countries that have FTAs with the United States, including Chile, as well as more manufacturing investment in Mexico, but it has complicated the position of Chinese firms that would otherwise be the biggest players in these sectors. Moreover, given the incentives available in the United States — expected to remain the largest EV market in the Americas for the foreseeable future — there is less reason for battery manufacturers to make investments in other countries.</p> - -<h3 id="ev-manufacturing-and-assembly">EV Manufacturing and Assembly</h3> - -<p>When it comes to the manufacturing of EVs and their components, two countries stand out: Brazil and Mexico (see Figure 6). This makes sense, as they are the largest markets in LAC, as well as the most sophisticated manufacturing bases — including in the automotive sector. Yet there are significant differences between the two countries and in the types of investments that Chinese firms are making. The biggest variable appears to be Mexico’s special trading relationship with the United States, epitomized by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Indeed, Mexico benefits significantly from the IRA, which allows companies in the country to qualify for the same credits as those making vehicles and batteries in the United States. However, this also means that Mexico has been under pressure to be more cautious in its approach to Chinese investment, as such investment is viewed as a direct pathway to the U.S. market.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gnqgGF8.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ Figure 6: Chinese Investments in EV Manufacturing in Latin America</em></p> - -<p>As a result of these dynamics, there have been no overt investments in Mexico by Chinese EV manufacturers to date, despite significant news coverage. Although BYD has signaled interest in opening a plant in Mexico and is reportedly in discussions with state governments, reports suggest that the project is on pause until at least the outcomes of the 2024 U.S. elections and Mexico’s judicial reforms are known. Similarly, Chery’s subsidiary Jetour announced its interest in investing in a $3 billion facility with a local partner to assemble vehicles, including EVs, in Mexico in 2023, but no progress has been made even in identifying the location. Finally, Foton, a Chinese manufacturer of commercial vehicles that has a plant for ICE vehicles in Mexico, also announced its plans to build an EV factory in the country in 2023. However, no progress has been reported.</p> - -<p>One reason why announcements may have not led to actual investments is that Mexico City has made clear that it will not offer financial incentives to Chinese firms looking to establish facilities in the country, leaving Chinese firms requesting such incentives from state governments with fewer resources. Additionally, only a few state governments are likely destinations for Chinese auto manufacturers, meaning that only a small subset of states would be likely to receive local benefits in the absence of federal incentives.</p> - -<p>This contrasts with the rapid expansion of Chinese investments in Mexico (most prominently in Nuevo León) in less sensitive sectors that can more easily export products to the United States, including furniture and automotive components. New restrictions on connected vehicles using Chinese software and equipment are expected once the U.S. Department of Commerce completes its security review, likely precluding Chinese companies from exporting to the United States from Mexico. This means that it is increasingly likely that any investments in Mexico by Chinese EV makers would predominantly aim to serve the local market and demand from countries in Central and South America. This is consistent with the strategy pursued in other emerging markets ranging from Thailand to Brazil. Chinese firms may believe that locating themselves in Mexico would allow them to take advantage of its strong automotive manufacturing base and the common language throughout much of the region.</p> - -<p>Investments in Brazil are even more clearly aimed at the domestic and regional markets. In 2023, the Brazilian automotive market reached 2.3 million vehicles, which although by far the largest in South America is much smaller than the 15.5 million sold in the same year in the United States. Yet Brazil’s sizable population — 216 million in 2023, according to the World Bank — makes it a potentially lucrative market as its middle class continues to grow. Most leading automotive companies have an established presence in the country.</p> - -<p>Brazil’s existing industrial infrastructure, combined with a growing market, has likely been a draw for Chinese firms. Demand for EVs in Brazil has outpaced expectations, surging from 1 percent to almost 5 percent of sales between April 2023 and April 2024. Of the battery electric and plug-in hybrid models sold in the country, the majority are Chinese brands with highly competitive prices.</p> - -<p>Great Wall Motor (GWM) took over a Mercedes-Benz plant in Iracemápolis in 2021 and is expected to start production of hybrid models there in 2024. BYD, to great fanfare, began revamping a former Ford factory in Bahia in the same year, part of a large EV manufacturing hub that could help meet President Lula’s green industrial policy objectives. If BYD starts production in 2025 as planned, this would be its third factory in the country, after the Manaus battery facility and the Campinas bus-manufacturing facility. Finally, CAOA Chery, a joint venture between CAOA, a Brazilian company, and Chery, which owns two plants in the country, is reportedly aiming to start production of two EV models in 2025.</p> - -<p>Although the Brazilian market is potentially attractive, GWM and BYD are likely looking beyond the country’s borders in the long term. Brazil could easily serve as an export hub for the region if demand in LAC countries grows — especially if Chinese manufacturing in Mexico becomes too controversial or does not take off. However, exports to the United States are unlikely at this stage because these factories are not yet operational and will likely be producing vehicles for a different market — at least initially. Regulation of software and data collection capacity through connected vehicles, the subject of an ongoing probe at the U.S. Department of Commerce, may also restrict the ability of Chinese auto manufacturers to export to the United States for the foreseeable future.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>Chinese investments in the EV value chain in LAC appear to remain highly concentrated in mining, although more investments are observable in the refining and assembly segments. Market demand, local government policies, and U.S. market access requirements are likely to determine whether investment continues to expand in the industry. Another crucial factor worth watching will be the successes and challenges faced by the Chinese companies that are undertaking these novel types of investments; their experiences will inform decisions by other firms, as well as Beijing’s own strategy of engagement with countries in the region.</p> - -<p>The trends outlined in this paper suggest that LAC countries may find new opportunities to meet their own development targets and potentially accelerate their transitions to low-emissions transportation sectors. However, for many countries, deepening dependency on China will present risks, especially at a time when the country is unlikely to experience the high growth rates of previous decades. While Chinese investments could offer a welcome path to economic and FDI diversification in some sectors for some countries (e.g., battery and vehicle assembly in Brazil), they may lead to further concentration of critical resources under Chinese-controlled firms in others (e.g., Argentina or Peru). This points to a fragile balance that governments will need to strike to both meet their own goals and maintain a productive relationship with the United States. Indeed, growing geopolitical tensions between Washington and Beijing are unlikely to soften in the short term and could have some negative spillover effects for countries in LAC.</p> - -<p>This context is important for U.S. policymakers as they evaluate the risks and opportunities that emerge from China’s engagement with LAC in this space. In many ways, U.S. policy shapes how these investments and supply chains develop. IRA clauses that catalyze investment around the world, including in LAC, can help diversify supply chains and could generate growth in LAC countries. This could help strengthen ties to the United States and should be further explored as a tool that can create mutual benefits with partner countries.</p> - -<p>Ultimately, however, the United States will need to use its political capital carefully. In some situations, Washington may want to discourage specific Chinese investments, should they be a threat to national security. However, encouraging countries to reject Chinese FDI altogether would damage U.S. relationships. This is especially true at a time when the United States is experiencing historic influxes of FDI in the battery and EV industry domestically.</p> - -<p>If the United States pursues a policy of limiting Chinese investments that threaten national security, identifying the real risks to U.S. national security in China’s new outbound investment surge will be crucial. What emerges from the case of EV value chains in LAC, for example, is a significant variation in the nature and objectives of the investments, as well as in host countries’ policies to attract investment and manage trade. Although a large number of projects fall under Chinese FDI, their implications and risk levels vary.</p> - -<p>Current U.S. economic security strategy is coalescing around the objective of building more resilient and diversified supply chains for critical resources. This points to the importance of tracking Chinese investments in the mining industry in LAC. It is critical to follow which companies are investing where and how those investments fit in the context of the host country, as well as to identify chokepoints and policies that can ameliorate risks. For example, one productive approach could include working with LAC governments to develop policies that ensure more local government control over resources and encourage the cultivation of a diverse set of economic actors. This could include using new technologies to help enforce stricter environmental, social, and governance standards, as well as improving transparency on the part of companies that invest in the region.</p> - -<p>LAC countries could consider new policies that would support their own economic targets as well as U.S. supply chain diversification objectives. For example, they could pursue policies that incentivize Chinese companies to share technology and invest more in value added sectors, such as through joint ventures. Governments could also take more direct action by providing targeted seed funding to universities and companies to encourage them to move up the value chain in key industries. These firms would need markets, and to this end LAC governments could seek reciprocity with China in value-added sectors and diversify exports. Finally, governments should continue to ensure that all investments meet the highest environmental standards. Strong implementation will continue to be important as the mining and refining of critical minerals expands in the coming years.</p> - -<p>Chinese manufacturing investment aimed at supplying the non-U.S. market is clearly less of a direct security challenge for the United States, but it may remain a significant challenge for U.S. companies operating in LAC. Mexico’s proximity to the United States puts it in a special position and earns it extra scrutiny. In fact, it is likely that concerns over Chinese investments in Mexican manufacturing will have a deleterious impact on the 2026 USMCA review.</p> - -<p>The LAC manufacturing question points to the bigger issue of U.S. competitiveness. Although Chinese firms in the EV and battery space have benefitted and continue to benefit from large state subsidies, they have also reshaped the automotive industry and raised the bar significantly in terms of performance and affordability for EVs — with affordability often being the decisive sales factor in developing regions such as LAC. An affirmative strategy to incentivize U.S. companies to produce better products for non-U.S. markets would likely have better long-term results than solely focusing on market protection tools. Indeed, competition with Chinese companies may in some cases help U.S. firms engage with cutting-edge technology and improve their offerings.</p> - -<p>Although this study has limited itself to analyzing investments in the EV manufacturing value chain, two connected industries will likely become more important in the coming years as EV adoption grows in LAC: (1) software and data managements, and (2) EV charging. Software and data management is an area where more cooperation with places such as the United States, which is hampered by the lack of comprehensive national regulation, and the European Union, which has one of the most developed data protection regimes globally, would be beneficial for LAC stakeholders. Concerns over connected vehicles powered by Chinese software are increasing, and more research would be beneficial to evaluate risks and technical solutions. Without a concerted effort on software and data management issues, Chinese firms could continue to dominate in those industries as they do in LAC’s digital infrastructure and information and communications technology networks.</p> - -<p>In terms of EV charging, Chinese state-owned companies control significant electricity transmission infrastructure in Peru and Brazil. The increased demand for electric charging infrastructure may provide more opportunities for Chinese companies, which could benefit from significant vertical integration despite the existence of strong international competitors. In this sector, as in the others analyzed, the United States would benefit from careful analysis of real risks and alternative pathways to encourage more diversification.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Ilaria Mazzocco</strong> is a senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> - -<p><strong>Ryan C. Berg</strong> is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Rubi Bledsoe</strong> is a research associate with the Americas Program at CSIS.</p>Ilaria Mazzocco, et al.Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are navigating a new geopolitical moment. Some LAC countries are benefitting from increased access to low-cost, high-quality electric vehicles (EVs) and new investment throughout the value chain from China that can help meet governments’ climate and economic objectives. \ No newline at end of file +<p><strong>Phillips O’Brien</strong> is the chair of strategic studies and head of the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. He has published widely on issues of conflict, politics, war, and strategy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.</p>Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O’BrienThe Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was a shock but not a surprise. It was a shock because, in a world where the use of aggressive war has been a contravention of international law since 1945. It was not a surprise because Western intelligence agencies had detected indications of a possible attack from late 2021, and they had made their conclusions public. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2024-10-31-more-than-meets-the-eye.html b/hkers/2024-10-31-more-than-meets-the-eye.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..08e0b329 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-10-31-more-than-meets-the-eye.html @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ + + + + + + + + + + More Than Meets The Eye · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + +
+
+ +
+

More Than Meets The Eye

+
+
+ +
+

U.S. Investment in the Philippines

+

Japhet Quitzon and Gregory B. Poling | 2024.10.31

+
+
+

Though U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.

+ + + +

The size and scope of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation is well documented; however, the quantitative and qualitative impacts on the Philippines are poorly understood. Without comprehensive, accurate, and easily accessible data on U.S. investments and their effects in the Philippines, malign actors may promote false or harmful narratives, thereby weakening public support for the U.S.-Philippine alliance. It is crucial for the United States to improve public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.

+ +

Introduction

+ +

The United States and the Philippines share a robust and enduring relationship based on shared values, national interest, and dense people-to-people connections. Filipinos regularly identify the United States as one of the country’s most trusted partners. Traditionally, the United States has been a key military partner for the Philippines, and since the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the two countries have stood together in defense of their common interests. The alliance is the United States’ oldest in the Indo-Pacific. While the military relationship between the two countries is often at the forefront of policy conversations, the United States’ economic relationship with the Philippines is also of great significance. Creating strong economic linkages between like-minded partners throughout the region, such as the Philippines, is crucial to upholding a rules-based order and meeting countries’ demands for tangible benefits to cooperation.

+ +

The economic relationship between the United States and the Philippines dates to the early twentieth century, when the Philippines was a U.S. territory. After the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Philippines came under the administration of the United States and remained so for nearly 50 years. During this time, the Philippine economy was strongly tethered to the United States and remained deeply intertwined even after Philippine independence in 1946. The Bell Trade Act of 1946, for instance, coupled the newly independent Philippine economy to that of the United States by allowing for free trade for 8 years and implementing a gradual application of tariffs over the next 20. U.S.-Philippine efforts at economic cooperation paved the way for future advancement, with U.S. investments playing a key role in the development of the Philippine manufacturing, agricultural, and services sectors. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has collaborated with the Philippine government since 1961, investing nearly $5 billion over the past 60 years.

+ +

Under President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the Philippines became one of 14 negotiating parties in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). More significant for the time being, the United States and Philippines have launched a series of bilateral economic initiatives under the administrations of Marcos and President Joe Biden. These include the Luzon Economic Corridor, meant to develop critical infrastructure in the Philippines, the first-ever Presidential Trade and Investment Mission to Manila in March 2024, and the U.S.-Philippines Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (or the 123 Agreement) that entered into force in July 2024.

+ +

Though the direct trade, investment, and aid figures between the United States and Philippines are well documented, the quantitative and qualitative impacts of this deep economic relationship are not. Information on the effects of the United States’ investment efforts in the Philippines is often difficult to find, obscuring the depth of this partnership. Furthermore, this underreporting creates opportunity for malign actors to minimize or mischaracterize U.S. initiatives in order to manipulate Philippine public opinion. Already, disinformation regarding the U.S. defense commitment to Filipino forces in the South China Sea is pervasive on Philippine social media. Discrediting the accomplishments made possible by close cooperation between the two governments has the potential to weaken decades of collaboration and jeopardize the current renaissance in the alliance. In an attempt to illuminate the results of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, this brief explores the ways in which significant U.S. investments in several sectors deliver wide-ranging benefits for the Philippine public.

+ +

State of U.S.-Philippine Economic Ties

+ +

Goods and services trade between the United States and the Philippines reached an estimated $36.1 billion in 2022, with exports to the Philippines accounting for $12.8 billion and imports into the United States $23.3 billion. In 2022, the United States was the Philippines’ top export destination, accounting for 14.1 percent of Philippine exports at $15.5 billion; China follows at 13.9 percent, Hong Kong at 11.5, Japan at 10.2, and Singapore at 6.42, respectively. In contrast, in import terms, China’s supply of imported goods to the country is valued at $53.6 billion, amounting to 32.1 percent of the Philippines’ total imports; Indonesia trails behind at 8.15 percent, South Korea at 7.49, the United States at 5.02, and Taiwan at 4.52, respectively. Trade figures from May 2024 demonstrate that the United States remains the Philippines’ top export destination, and that the economic growth trend between the two countries continues to grow.

+ +

In terms of investment, between 2013 and the first quarter of 2024, the Philippine Statistics Authority recorded the United States as the fifth-largest source of approved foreign investment, accounting for 7 percent, or roughly $3.6 billion. The United States is trailed closely by China, the sixth-largest source of approved foreign investment, clocking in at $3.2 billion. In 2022, U.S. foreign investment in the Philippines rose 15.7 percent year over year from 2021 to $6.2 billion, led by a combination of manufacturing and professional, scientific, and technical services, along with wholesale trade.

+ +

Since the launch of IPEF in 2022, the United States and the Philippines have continued to mark significant accomplishments in their economic partnership. During President Marcos’ visit to Washington in April 2024 for trilateral discussions with President Biden and Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio, the three countries announced the first Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) corridor in the Indo-Pacific, the Luzon Economic Corridor. Aiming to support connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas, the Luzon Economic Corridor is the first project of the PGI-IPEF Investment Accelerator and will allow the three countries to coordinate investments in infrastructure projects, clean energy, and semiconductor supply chains. Through this larger policy, the United States can work with IPEF partners to develop country-specific investment approaches in key sectors as targeted by each IPEF partner. In the same document, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation announced a $20 million loan for affordable housing throughout the country as well as its intent to open a regional office in the Philippines.

+ +

When it comes to development assistance, USAID invests some $120 million annually to support market-driven growth in the Philippines, as well as to foster stronger democratic systems and improve education and health services. The Philippines has also been a major beneficiary of other assistance programs, such as Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grants. In February 2024, the MCC began talks with Philippine officials about restarting threshold programs, smaller scale grants aimed at improving policies. The Philippines previously had received MCC threshold grants (2006–2009) amounting to $20.7 million; in 2016, it received its first compact grant — aimed at poverty reduction and economic stimulus — for $434 million.

+ +

Beyond traditional channels of economic engagement, since 2015, the U.S. Department of State has provided the Philippines with $463 million in security assistance through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), international military education and training, as well as peacekeeping operations funded through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. FMF figures are growing rapidly, with the United States providing $100 million in FY 2022 to potentially quintupling FMF to $500 million each year from FY 2025–2029. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the United States has already allotted $109 million in support of base facility improvements, supplies, and military equipment, with an additional $128 million planned in the 2025 fiscal year. In the 2+2 talks held in the Philippines in July 2024, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin pledged an additional $500 million in military financing from the FY 2024 budget.

+ +

Benefits of U.S. Private Investment in the Philippines

+ +

Foreign and domestic businesses may register with one of the Philippines’ 19 investment promotion authorities, including the Philippine Board of Investment and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). These authorities are split based on geographic regions and industry strengths, such as the manufacturing and logistics network in Luzon, the tourism cluster throughout Luzon and Mindanao, and the agro-industrial cluster in Mindanao.

+ +

Much of the foreign investment into the Philippines’ export-oriented manufacturing and services industries is routed through special economic zones managed by PEZA, which works to facilitate investor operations all the way down to registration and paperwork filing. As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises. Within the zones, the Philippine government can dole out tax incentives while sparing foreign businesses from lengthy bureaucratic procedures.

+ +

As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises.

+ +

More important than investment from U.S. government programs is the U.S. private investment that flourishes in and beyond the PEZA zones, covering a variety of sectors of the Philippine economy. The CSIS Southeast Asia Program selected seven of these sectors for study based on their growth and importance to the Philippines. Ranging from renewable energy investments to aerospace engineering, the following case studies examine how U.S. private investment delivers tangible benefits for the Philippines that go beyond simply reporting overall investment and trade figures.

+ +

Renewable Energy

+ +

The Philippine government under President Marcos has identified clean energy development as a top priority and embraced cooperation with partner nations on that front, including through the clean economy pillar of IPEF. As one of the countries most affected by increasingly severe weather events, this is necessary not only to meet the Philippines’ net-zero goals, but also to grow other industries, like semiconductor manufacturing, in which foreign investors are seeking access to renewable energy. This is why the development of renewable energy is one of the three initial priorities of the Luzon Economic Corridor, announced in April 2024, the other two being rail and port modernization and the advancement of commercial enterprises at Subic Bay.

+ +

Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities. An archipelagic nation, the Philippine energy grid is deeply reliant on imported fossil fuels. Though 97.5 percent of Philippine households are electrified, the mountainous and archipelagic nature of the country’s geography presents significant challenges to consistent, inexpensive power. Successive Philippine administrations have prioritized a more resilient regional grid based on modular renewable energy. The 2020 census indicated that there were about 26.39 million households throughout the country. U.S. investments in Philippine nuclear power would be of great benefit to local communities isolated from main power grids and for improving quality of life and maintaining consistent, cheap electrification in major cities. Geothermal, solar, and wind energy account for 32.7 percent of the country’s energy sources. The Philippines aims to reach 50 percent renewable energy by 2050. Under the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, lawmakers amended the Public Services Act to allow for 100 percent ownership by foreign investors of utilities ranging from power to telecoms, opening the door to more foreign investment in the Philippine energy grid. As a result of this and other reforms, the Philippines has become one of the most attractive emerging markets for investment in renewables, according to BloombergNEF’s 2023 climate report.

+ +

Given its geographic location, the Philippines has immense solar energy potential. U.S.-based BrightNight Power, in collaboration with the Ayala Group’s ACEN, has agreed to jointly invest $1.2 billion over the next five years to develop the Philippines’ renewable energy capacity. U.S. solar panel manufacturers are increasingly looking to the Philippines for production, allowing Filipinos easier access to domestically produced, cheaper solar panels while also exporting those panels to countries like the United States and Canada. Sol-Go Inc., participating in Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, announced that it will build a new solar panel factory in the Philippines in addition to its current factory operating in Batangas. This additional investment will allow Sol-Go to triple its locally sourced workforce and increase its capacity so that it can produce 50 megawatts (MW) of solar panels. With the average Filipino household using 200 kilowatt-hours of energy per month, 50 MW could easily power 180,000 homes.

+ +

Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities.

+ +

The 123 Agreement between the United States and the Philippines sets the stage for nuclear energy collaboration between the two countries moving forward by allowing U.S. companies to invest in nuclear projects throughout the country. NuScale Power, for instance, aims to invest up to $7.5 billion through 2031 to build small modular reactors in the Philippines. These reactors would greatly benefit more geographically isolated communities with tenuous connections to main power grids, while also touting smaller footprints, reduced cost, and locational flexibility in comparison to traditional nuclear reactors.

+ +

Information Technology and Business Process Management

+ +

The information technology and business process management (IT-BPM) sector covers a wide range of services in the Philippines, all aimed at managing certain aspects of business operations for third parties.

+ +

During the 2008 global recession, demand for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) decreased significantly, prompting the Philippine government to provide training for OFWs to become call center agents. By 2010, the Philippines had surpassed India in voice-based IT-BPM services. As of 2023, the IT-BPM industry had reached 1.57 million employees, and it is forecast to employ 2.5 million by 2028. In April 2024, the ubiquity of Philippine IT-BPM services went viral on social media when a Philippines-based IT-BPM employee worked as a virtual cashier in a New York City restaurant thousands of miles away.

+ +

U.S. businesses have increasingly outsourced services to the Philippines in the last few decades, and U.S. investment has played a crucial role in the development of the sector. From 2014 to 2023, the Philippines has benefitted from nearly $5.2 billion worth of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States in general professional, scientific, and technical services. With its young, tech-literate, and largely English-proficient population, the Philippines presents an ideal location for U.S. IT-BPM investments. Government initiatives, including Republic Act No. 7916, which established Special Economic Zones through PEZA, offer tax incentives and ease the ability to conduct business for foreign investors. From 2003 to 2021, 395 U.S.-based firms invested $22.4 billion in the Philippines, 35 percent of which, or around $7.8 billion, went to the IT-BPM sector, one of the key growth drivers for PEZA, bringing in nearly $260 million of investments from the first quarter of 2024 alone.

+ +

IT-BPM companies are often desirable places of employment for Filipinos. U.S.-owned companies ranging from American Express to Synchrony and Accenture rank near the top of a “best workplaces” list compiled by the Information Technology and Business Process Association of the Philippines and Great Place to Work. Surveys undertaken by Great Place to Work, a platform that uses employee data to certify workplaces with good levels of trust and work culture, indicate that from January 2022 to May 2023, “94 percent of IT-BPM employees in best workplaces experience a high-trust workplace culture.” The schedule flexibility offered by IT-BPM companies, paired with the flexibility to work from home that such jobs involve, makes the sector particularly attractive to recent graduates. The Philippines produces about 850,000 college graduates yearly, 87,000 of whom have degrees in fields suited to the IT-BPM sector.

+ +

Both foreign and domestic investment in the Philippines has historically been concentrated within the Metro Manila National Capital Region and the surrounding regions of Luzon. Investments are slowly flowing to other emerging regions, particularly northern Luzon and the Visayas. Moreover, even though the IT-BPM sector is more widely distributed than most, it is still concentrated in a few urban centers; Bacolod, Cebu, Clark, Davao, and Iloilo are the main hubs. Nationwide broadband speeds, while improving, still lag behind those of other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Through the Digital Cities 2025 Initiative, the Philippine government is providing basic digital literacy and skills training in more rural provinces. These initiatives will likely pay dividends as the Philippines continues to advertise itself as an IT-BPM hub to U.S. investors.

+ +

Semiconductor Manufacturing

+ +

With highly educated, English-proficient workers, the Philippines is an appealing location for semiconductor manufacturing. Concentrated in Metro Manila, Calabarzon (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon), northern and central Luzon, and Cebu, the Philippine electronics industry is split between 73 percent semiconductor manufacturing and 27 percent electronics manufacturing. Electronics exports reached $12.9 billion in 2023, nearly 60 percent of total Philippine exports. From 2014 to 2023, the United States invested roughly $7.91 billion in Philippine computer and electronic manufacturing.

+ +

Given the number of Filipinos employed in the semiconductor industry, disruptions in U.S. investment can and have proven damaging to local communities. At its peak in 2008, Intel employed 5,000 direct workers and around 36,000 indirect workers in the Philippines. In the aftermath of the 2008 global recession, however, Intel shut down its Cavite-based chip assembly, testing, and packaging facility. As the global semiconductor manufacturing supply chain continues to evolve and mature, it is important to recognize the value of these private investments to local communities. As of April 2023, the semiconductor industry employed 2.5 million Filipinos.

+ +

Through the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, the United States seeks to diversify and de-risk the global semiconductor ecosystem by boosting manufacturing and research both at home and in trusted partner countries. The International Technology Security and Innovation Fund, under the CHIPS Act, earmarked $500 million over five years to promote a secure, trustworthy telecommunications network aimed at ensuring semiconductor supply chain security by spreading out the traditionally concentrated semiconductor supply chain among friendly partners, including the Philippines.

+ +

In 2023, the Department of State announced that it would collaborate with the Philippine government to explore further cooperation in semiconductor supply chain security. During the Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, Secretary Raimondo announced an investment of over $1 billion in the Philippine technology sector, aiming to double the number of semiconductor factories in the country; currently, there are 13 semiconductor factories focused on the assembly, testing, and packaging segment of the semiconductor supply chain.

+ +

In November 2023, President Marcos stressed that semiconductors and electronics remain top-priority sectors for his administration. PEZA aims to aggressively promote the Philippines as a site for overseas electronic and semiconductor manufacturing. Together with IT-BPM, electronics and semiconductors have been among the Philippines’ top exports in 2024.

+ +

U.S. companies have been increasingly investing in the Philippine semiconductor space. In May 2023, Analog Devices announced an investment of $200 million in a research and development facility in Cavite. In August 2023, Texas Instruments announced that it would invest up to $1 billion in facility expansion in Clark and Baguio City. The Philippines aims to move up the semiconductor value chain, hoping to establish a lab-scale wafer fabrication plant by 2028.

+ +

Agriculture

+ +

The United States and the Philippines are longtime partners in the agricultural sector — in 2022, U.S.-Philippine bilateral agricultural trade exceeded $4 billion. With its growing population, expanding middle class, and increasing household income, the Philippines is an important destination for U.S. agricultural goods. The United States and the Philippines convened their first Food Security Dialogue in May 2023. Ongoing U.S. projects in the Philippines aim to support capacity building in food regulatory agencies and agricultural industries while digitizing the connection between farmers and buyers. A plurality of Philippine agriculture (39 percent) is based in Luzon, followed by Mindanao and Visayas at 33.4 and 27.4 percent, respectively.

+ +

Despite this, the Philippines is vulnerable to food insecurity, a situation further exacerbated by climate change. Its reliance on imported food makes the Philippines the most food-insecure country in the region. Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains. President Marcos has made the strengthening of the Philippines’ food supply a key priority of his administration, boosting the budget for agricultural programs. Under the Marcos administration, the Department of Agriculture’s budget was boosted by nearly 70 percent from 2022 to 2024 compared to the 2017–2021 appropriation under the previous administration.

+ +

From September to October 2023, the United States’ first Agricultural Technology Trade Mission explored opportunities to help support the Philippine agricultural supply chain as it traveled to Davao and Manila. The trade mission brought together various Philippine companies, government agencies, local businesses, and U.S. companies to discuss the importance of food security collaboration. The trade mission highlighted innovations in agricultural technology that have the potential to enhance the country’s agricultural productivity.

+ +

Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains.

+ +

U.S. investors, including Cargill, John Deere, and PepsiCo, have a long history of investment in the Philippine agricultural space. Cargill, which has had a presence in the Philippines since 1947, has made several key investments over the past decade. It collaborated with the Jollibee Foods Corporation to create a joint-venture poultry processing facility in Batangas in 2017, creating 1,000 new jobs. As of 2022, the facility employs 1,200 workers. Similarly, Cargill operates a joint-venture plant in Laguna that produces carrageenan, a common food additive and thickener. In 2018, the company announced that it would invest $235 million over two years to help the country meet the increasing demand for chicken and pork. As of 2024, Cargill directly employs over 950 people throughout the country.

+ +

Defense and Aerospace Manufacturing

+ +

Given its strategic location and well-educated workforce, the Philippines is in a prime position to contribute to defense and aerospace supply chains. The defense and aerospace sectors, made especially pertinent due to ongoing tensions between the Philippines and China over disputed territories in the South China Sea, are critical to the Philippines’ defense modernization initiatives. To support foreign investments in national defense, Philippine senators have proposed spending roughly $17.5 million under the Self-Reliant Defense Posture Revitalization Act aimed at encouraging investment in the local manufacturing of defense equipment.

+ +

The Philippines hosts two prominent U.S. aerospace and defense manufacturing companies: RTX’s Collins Aerospace and Moog Controls Corporation. Collins Aerospace manufactures airplane parts and interiors within the Philippines, supplying both Airbus and Boeing. Collins Aerospace established a facility in Tanauan City, Batangas, in 2012, manufacturing myriad cabin interior products ranging from airplane galleys and galley inserts to oxygen equipment and lavatories. The facility has expanded from task-based engineering to design drawing and process refinement; by 2018, the Philippines-based engineering team was supporting the design of complex galleys and had already designed a head of version shipset, or the first configured and manufactured aircraft of the order. In 2023, the company began producing seats for Boeing, Airbus, and Embraer.

+ +

As of 2024, Collins Aerospace plans to expand its existing operations in the Philippines — hoping to add 300,000 sq. ft. to its existing 400,000 sq. ft. complex in Tanauan City. Collins Aerospace’s community outreach to regional universities has the potential to create a significant impact. In 2023, for example, the company challenged students from the De La Salle College of Saint Benilde to develop and design aircraft cabin proposals under the university’s Benilde Industrial Design program. The same year, Collins explored potential partnerships with Batangas State University-Lipa.

+ +

Moog Controls Corporation, a U.S. designer and manufacturer of precision control products found in military and commercial aircraft, has been established in Baguio City since 1984. Spread out over two campuses, one for servovalves (a type of valve used to regulate control or pressure of fluid in response to an electrical signal) and actuation systems for commercial aircraft applications and the other for high-performance motion control solutions, Moog employs about 1,400 personnel. In 2018, the company announced their intention to boost aerospace industry output in the Philippines, citing the growth of the aerospace market. Moog received a PEZA Excellence Award in 2023 as an outstanding employer behind community projects.

+ +

Critical Minerals and Electric Vehicles

+ +

The Philippines’ critical mineral wealth, which has largely gone untapped, makes it an ideal partner in electrical vehicle (EV) battery and component supply chains. Only 5 percent of the Philippines’ $1 trillion worth of gold, nickel, zinc, and silver reserves has been explored. Moreover, with the growing importance of electric vehicles (EVs) in international decarbonization efforts, the Philippines’ critical mineral wealth makes it an ideal partner for EV battery and component supply chains. As of 2023, PEZA remains in talks with several EV manufacturers, including one U.S. firm, Envirotech Vehicles, to manufacture electric buses, cars, and heavy equipment in-country. In September 2023, Envirotech Vehicles announced its acquisition of a 3,000 square meter final assembly facility in the Clark Free Trade Zone; it eventually plans to open two manufacturing lines capable of producing more than 2,000 vehicles per year at the plant.

+ +

Logistics and Shipping

+ +

With convenient access to markets in Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as its proximity to Australia and India, the Philippines is in a prime location for logistics, transportation, and shipping services. As of March 2023, the Philippine freight and logistics market was valued at $16.8 billion. The growing ubiquity of e-commerce within the country, and throughout the region, necessitates not only strong general infrastructure in ports, roads, and rail connections, but also robust freight and logistics networks.

+ +

In the aftermath of the global Covid-19 pandemic, e-commerce grew more popular within the country — from March 2020 to January 2021, the number of Philippine online vendors increased from 1,700 to 93,818. Leading e-commerce sites like Shoppee, Lazada, Zalora, and Beauty MNL brought in $17 billion in revenue from 73 million monthly, active users. To handle this flow, the Philippine government has partnered with foreign investors for infrastructure investments as well as freight and logistics services.

+ +

New Clark City, a planned municipality built about fifty miles from Metro Manila, has emerged as an ideal location within the Philippines for logistics investments. After 36 years in the Philippines, FedEx opened a $30 million gateway facility in Clark City, aimed at improving the company’s ability to operate within the country and in the region at large. Manila’s main airport, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, is notorious for congestion and inefficiency, prompting government agencies to consider outlying areas around the capital, such as Clark, as new logistics and transportation hubs. FedEx’s Clark investments followed up on refurbishments to the company’s headquarters in Makati in 2018, as well as making an additional $2.2 million worth of investments in two facilities in 2017.

+ +

UPS, another major global logistics company, announced in 2024 that it would build a new hub at Clark International Airport by 2025 to strengthen its supply chain and logistics services, which is necessary given the growth of e-commerce. In partnership with the Luzon International Premiere Airport Development Group, this is part of a $250 million investment push UPS is making throughout the region.

+ +

Institutional Barriers to U.S.-Philippine Trade and Investment

+ +

The current Philippine constitution, ratified in 1987, includes several economic provisions that have negatively impacted the Philippines’ net inflow of foreign direct investment, notably restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors. In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s World Investment Report 2023, the Philippines ranked sixth among its Southeast Asian peers in FDI inflows. Under the Marcos administration, the Philippines now aims to improve its standing to second by 2028. A 2022 amendment to the Public Service Act, made effective in 2023, allowed full public ownership of industries such as airports, railways, and telecommunications, creating a new area of opportunity for foreign investors. The same year, an amendment to the Foreign Investment Act allowed foreign investors to set up and fully own domestic enterprises, easing access to the Philippine market. The Philippine House of Representatives and Senate are currently debating whether to amend the constitution to further promote foreign economic investment, though similar efforts in previous administrations have failed. Talks of amendment have stalled at least until the 2025 midterm elections.

+ +

Key Findings and Recommendations

+ +

Finding: U.S. companies operating in the Philippines demonstrate varying degrees of transparency in their official databases and on their websites. Investment and employment figures are quite vague, effectively obscuring the impact of these investments.

+ +
    +
  • Recommendation 1: The United States should work with the private sector and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive database outlining U.S. investment in the Philippines, clearly and transparently listing the specific impacts of such investments, including employment figures. Though press releases offer insight into ongoing and future projects initiated by foreign businesses, they do not paint a cohesive picture of the community impact made by such investments.
    • +
+ +

Finding: Current resources for collating the impact of U.S. investment in the Philippines, or even foreign investment generally, are not user friendly. Further complicating matters, U.S. and Philippine numbers vary significantly, which obscures the impact of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation. Data from the Philippine Statistics Authority only accounts for investments through investment promotion agencies that have been granted incentives from the Philippine government, reflecting just a fraction of total U.S. investments. Meanwhile, data from the various investment promotion authorities only account for those investments granted incentives by the Philippine government.

+ +
    +
  • +

    Recommendation 2: The U.S. and Philippine governments should partner closely in collating their data and making both sets mutually intelligible. Consistency among the two countries’ platforms and datasets would help create a more cohesive, easily accessible narrative. It would be to the benefit of the United States and the Philippines to create a joint resource with which to harmonize their datasets and investment figures.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Recommendation 3: PEZA and the Philippine Statistics Authority should better aggregate incoming investments into the Philippines’ many economic zones and investment promotion authorities within unified charts, demonstrating aggregate total investments from specific countries in specific sectors. For example, it is currently not possible to filter foreign investments by country of investor, industry, promotion authority, or region within the same table.

    +
    • +
+ +

Finding: Neither businesses nor the U.S. government adequately socialize the impacts of their investments on local communities, missing a key opportunity to point the narrative toward the efficacy of the U.S.-Philippine economic partnership. Most announcements are limited to business press briefings that are not often accessible to the audiences they are targeting.

+ +
    +
  • Recommendation 4: Businesses and the U.S. government should expand their online presences to counter rising disinformation and counter narratives that threaten to sway public opinion. U.S. companies should more actively use popular social media platforms in the Philippines to highlight the benefits brought by their investments.
    • +
+ +

Finding: Despite the longstanding economic partnership, relatively few U.S. business leaders have traveled to the Philippines or have become aware of the potential of its rapidly growing and increasingly open economy. The 2024 Presidential Trade and Investment Mission was successful in bringing representatives from 22 U.S. businesses to the Philippines. In a similar vein, the 2023 Agricultural Technology Trade Mission to Mindanao brought together key stakeholders from throughout the private sector and government to brainstorm future opportunities for improving the Philippines’ agricultural supply chain.

+ +
    +
  • Recommendation 5: Person-to-person exchanges should remain consistent throughout administrations. Both recent U.S. government–led trade missions were the first of their kind. The United States, regardless of administration, should ensure the continuation of such exchanges.
    • +
+ +

Finding: Investments in the Philippines remain strongly centered in Luzon, and particularly in and around Metro Manila and its surrounding areas. Business interest in areas such as Cebu and Davao are growing, but Manila remains oversaturated with investment. Moreover, with limited availability and bureaucratic red tape preventing easy access to cheap land, both business owners and potential employees are thus at a disadvantage.

+ +
    +
  • Recommendation 6: The United States should work to diversify the span of its investments throughout the Philippines. The unitary nature of the Philippine government and the ongoing narrative of “Imperial Manila,” that is, that most of the country’s progress is concentrated in the capital region, makes this difficult to achieve. Expanding investment projects into emerging regions — from Iloilo and Cebu in the central Philippines to Davao and its surroundings in the south — would offer excellent opportunities for Filipinos. The expansion of the IT-BPM sector throughout the Philippines, for instance, helped to more evenly distribute work away from Manila, leading to the development and revitalization of other urban hubs.
    • +
+ +
+ +

Japhet Quitzon is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

+ +

Gregory B. Poling is a senior fellow and director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.

+ +
+ +
+ +
+ + + + + +

+ Made with by Agora + +

+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-11-01-crossing-deepfake-rubicon.html b/hkers/2024-11-01-crossing-deepfake-rubicon.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d3fa1c62 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-11-01-crossing-deepfake-rubicon.html @@ -0,0 +1,333 @@ + + + + + + + + + + Crossing Deepfake Rubicon · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + +
+
+ +
+

Crossing Deepfake Rubicon

+
+
+ +
+

The Maturing Synthetic Media Threat Landscape

+

Di Cooke, et al. | 2024.11.01

+
+
+

New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?

+ + + +
    +
  • +

    In recent years, threat actors have increasingly used synthetic media — digital content produced or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) — to enhance their deceptive activities, harming individuals and organizations worldwide with growing frequency.

    +
    • +
  • +

    In addition, the weaponization of synthetic media has also begun to undermine people’s trust in information integrity more widely, posing concerning implications for the stability and resilience of the U.S.’s information environment.

    +
    • +
  • +

    At present, an individual’s ability to recognize AI-generated content remains the primary defense against people falling prey to deceptively presented synthetic media.

    +
    • +
  • +

    However, a recent experimental study by CSIS found that people are no longer able to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated images, audio, and video sourced from publicly available tools.

    +
    • +
  • +

    That human detection has ceased to be a reliable method for identifying synthetic media only heightens the dangers posed by the technology’s misuse, underscoring the pressing need to implement alternative countermeasures to address this emerging threat.

    +
    • +
+ +

Introduction

+ +

Synthetic media, which refers to text, images, audio, and video generated or manipulated by AI, presents both significant opportunities and risks. Recent advancements in generative AI technology have considerably reduced the data, computing power, and cost required to create highly realistic synthetic content. Coupled with the technology’s growing accessibility, as evident from the rapidly expanding constellation of widely available user-friendly offerings, it has become easier than ever for anyone to manufacture genuine-seeming digital content using AI. The uses of such technology are seemingly endless, from the humorous, such as making fictional images of the pope wearing Balenciaga or videos of Tom Cruise dancing, to the commercial, such as streamlining work by assisting in email writing or creating digital avatars of people to use in training videos, news stories, or even for speaking with simulations of deceased loved ones. There has also been significant interest in harnessing generative AI’s transformative potential for the greater good, from accelerating critical scientific research to making sophisticated disability aids like glasses that translate speech to text for the hard of hearing.

+ +

image01 +▲ Synthetic images of Pope Francis wearing Balenciaga, first shared on Reddit by creator Pablo Xavier, which quickly went viral across social media platforms. To this day, many viewers still do not realize this is AI-generated. Source: Pablo Xavier, “The Pope Drip,” Reddit, March 24, 2023.

+ +

image02 +▲ One of the many videos featured on the now widely notorious Tom Cruise deepfake account on TikTok. Source: deeptomcruise, TikTok video, December 26, 2022, 00:19.

+ +

Yet, generative AI has also become a potent tool for misuse. On the morning of May 22, 2023, an AI-generated photograph reportedly showing an explosion near the Pentagon began to circulate extensively on social media platforms, causing widespread confusion and panic as well as a temporary but meaningful dip in the U.S. stock market. While any adverse effects from this particular incident, in the end, were nominal, its occurrence nonetheless is illustrative of a broader trend of synthetic media being utilized to damaging ends. From criminal activities to adversarial military and intelligence operations, generative AI has more and more empowered the deception capabilities of threat actors, permitting them to manufacture convincingly realistic but fake digital content (colloquially known by many as “deepfakes”) at unprecedented speed, scale, and degrees of precision. The rising ease of use and utility of the technology has led to a boom of AI-enabled deception incidents taking place over recent years, with the technology’s abuse inflicting a growing amount of financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm to individuals and organizations worldwide. Already, the dangers posed by weaponized synthetic media have begun to shift from the theoretical to the realized.

+ +

image03 +▲ This synthetic image was falsely reported as a photograph of an explosion near the Pentagon. It was widely circulated before being debunked as fake, causing widespread confusion and even a temporary dip in the U.S. stock market. Source: OSINTdefender (@sentdefender), X post, May 22, 2023, 09:04 am.

+ +

Thus far, the threat that has garnered the most public attention and alarm has been the risk of AI-enabled deceptions disrupting political elections by influencing voting outcomes, instigating unrest and violence, or damaging trust in the electoral process. Among the record number of elections held in 2024, the majority have already been subject to widely-circulated synthetic content that falsely depicts politicians or famous figures engaging in inappropriate or controversial behavior, criticizing their opposition, and promising policy changes. With the U.S. presidential election only a week away, widespread concerns have been understandably raised about the dangers of a flood of AI-generated content amplifying misinformation, or of an opportunely timed viral synthetic image or video of a political candidate influencing voters’ decisions.

+ +

Today’s synthetic media threat landscape extends far beyond the realm of political elections. AI-enabled financial fraud was found to have risen by 700 percent in 2023, and experts have predicted it will result in losses of up to $40 billion by 2027. Meanwhile, AI nonconsensual intimate media, accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic videos online as of 2019, has already claimed what is estimated to be millions of adults and children as victims — with that number expected to rise swiftly. Other AI-enabled deception incidents have also occurred with increasing frequency, spanning gray zone warfare such as influence operations and cyberattacks, espionage and surveillance, military deception operations, domestic disinformation, and more. As improvements in the technology’s capabilities and accessibility continue, the volume and breadth of deception activity will likely grow.

+ +

The discrete harms arising from these incidents are further compounded by a more insidious danger: AI-enabled deception threatens to corrode the public’s trust in the integrity of all information more broadly. There is already evidence that this has started to occur. In turn, this risks imperiling the foundations of the U.S.’s information environment, a vital pillar of societal stability and resilience.

+ +

Today, the principal defense against AI-enabled deceptions is people’s ability to recognize synthetic media when encountering it in their day-to-day lives. However, rapid advancements in generative AI have increasingly constrained human detection capabilities as synthetic media has become more convincingly realistic. While the necessity of adopting alternative countermeasures, spanning from the technological to the regulatory, to compensate has been widely recognized as critical, in practice, implementation of these measures remains largely nascent. As such, this growing vulnerability means that awareness of when people are no longer able to depend solely on their eyes and ears to detect AI-generated content is critical in order to better recognize when human detection is no longer an effective safeguard against the technology’s misuse.

+ +

To determine the current level of human detection capabilities, CSIS conducted a large-scale experimental study testing individuals’ ability to differentiate between authentic media and synthetic images, audio, and videos sourced from publicly accessible generative AI technology. Overall, the study found that people struggled to accurately identify AI-generated content to any meaningful degree, with some demographics being more susceptible to certain types of synthetic media than others. This brief reviews the study’s key findings and offers an overview of the current synthetic media threat landscape, examining both ongoing and speculative harms in areas in which the abuse of this technology has become more prevalent. It is clear that weaponized synthetic media has begun to mature from an emergent to an established national security threat. That the inflection point has now been reached where human detection capabilities are unreliable only serves to underscore the pressing need to implement robust alternative countermeasures to address this growing danger.

+ +

The Study Results

+ +

To assess how well people were able to detect AI-generated content, CSIS conducted a perceptual study involving nearly 1,300 North Americans aged from 18 to 85. Participants were asked to distinguish between synthetic and authentic media items, including images, audio, and videos both silent and fully audiovisual. The study also examined how other factors affected detection performance, including authenticity, language, modality, image subject matter, age, and participants’ preexisting familiarity with synthetic media. To ensure that the AI-generated content would be representative of the quality and type of synthetic media people were likely to come across “in the wild”, or in their daily lives, all synthetic test items were sourced from publicly available products and services.

+ +

image04 +▲ Figure 1: Average Detection Accuracy by Media Type. Source: Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024.

+ +

Altogether, the study’s findings paint a bleak picture of people’s ability to discern the legitimacy of digital content in today’s world. On average, participants correctly distinguished between synthetic and authentic media 51.2 percent of the time — roughly equivalent in accuracy to a coin toss. Images were the most difficult for participants to identify (49 percent average accuracy), with better detection performance on silent videos (51 percent) and audio clips (54 percent). Participants were the most successful at determining the authenticity of fully audiovisual clips (55 percent). These results are relatively unsurprising since public discourse and scientific research have closely monitored people’s diminishing detection capabilities as generative AI has advanced in recent years. Nonetheless, it is valuable to confirm that this critical watershed moment has indeed been reached: humans can no longer depend solely on their own eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between reality and AI-generated falsehoods.

+ +

image05 +▲ The study’s most convincing synthetic image: Only 10.7 percent of all participants correctly identified this as an AI-generated image, with the rest believing it to be a photograph of a real person. Source: Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024.

+ +

image06 +▲ The study’s most convincing synthetic audiovisual clip: When participants were presented with the AI-manipulated video clip (of comedian Nora Tschirner) on the right, 75.8 percent incorrectly labeled it as authentic. In comparison, the original video (of anchorwoman Marietta Slomka) is on the left. Source: Deepfacelabfan, “Deepfake — Marietta Slomka zu Nora Tschirner — 128 LIAE 15k RW only — 90min FAKE,” YouTube video, April 7, 2022, 00:46.

+ +

This does not mean that all AI-generated content being produced today is now indistinguishable from authentic media. Low- and mid-quality synthetic media still contains artifacts, or observable AI glitches such as bizarre-looking hands or illegible text, which make their provenance apparent. Regardless, our study demonstrates that numerous generative AI tools which are easily accessible to the public today can produce sufficiently realistic synthetic content that is relatively indistinguishable from authentic content to the human senses. Moreover, as the average quality of synthetic media improves while the technology matures, even low- and mid-quality outputs will become more realistic. For example, later iterations of AI image generators have already become increasingly capable of rendering real-looking hands, which makes relying on them as a potential “tell” of AI-generated content being present decreasingly useful.

+ +

image07 +▲ Figure 2: Detection Performance by Language Familiarity. Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”

+ +

image08 +▲ Figure 3: Detection Performance by Age. Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”

+ +

The study’s other findings offer more nuanced insights into people’s vulnerabilities to different types of AI-enabled deceptions, examining how various elements may impact an individual’s detection capabilities. For instance, participants’ average detection accuracy was found to be significantly lower for audio, video, and audiovisual items featuring a foreign language than for items featuring languages in which they were fluent (Figure 2). Meanwhile, younger participants outperformed their older counterparts to the greatest degree when tested on audiovisual and audio-only clips (Figure 3). These findings indicate that people are more likely to misidentify synthetic media presented in a foreign language, and that older individuals are less sensitive to recognizing synthetic audio-based media. Given the rise of multilingual synthetic misinformation as well as the growing popularity of AI phone scams which often target older generations, these findings suggest that these two demographics may be more vulnerable to certain types of AI-enabled deceptions than previously realized.

+ +

The Threat Landscape

+ +

The proliferation of weaponized synthetic media presents a clear and present danger to national security. To more effectively address these dangers, a more comprehensive understanding of the risks posed by its misuse and the various ways it has already been weaponized is required. Within only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has expanded rapidly, with generative AI increasingly being exploited for nefarious purposes. Consequently, this rise in AI-enabled deception incidents has resulted in individuals and organizations around the world suffering financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm, even death, and countries worldwide experiencing detrimental effects on their societal stability and resilience. Now that it is clear publicly available generative AI tools can produce highly realistic synthetic media capable of deceiving even the most discerning of observers, these dangers have only become even more acute.

+ +

Generative AI has become an increasingly powerful force multiplier for deception, making it easier, faster, and cheaper to conduct more sophisticated stratagems than ever before — from producing synthetic content at an industrial scale to more precisely tailoring it to a target’s specific vulnerabilities. These lowering barriers have, in turn, expanded the pool of threat actors who now are able to leverage this technology, from extremist organizations and organized crime groups to lone individuals with malicious intent. As of today, it costs less than $10 to create 30 minutes of customized synthetic audio featuring a target’s voice or to manufacture a batch of over 1,000 individually personalized spear-phishing emails. Efforts to prevent the misuse of commercial products and services have been inconsistent in both their implementation and effectiveness, enabling the circumnavigation of guardrails to varying degrees of success. Meanwhile, open-source generative AI tools, which by their nature have more easily removable safeguards, have also furnished threat actors with a diverse and customizable toolkit, such as live face-swapping and voice-masking software, found to be used in real-time impersonation schemes. In addition, a shadow industry has begun to quickly develop to address this growing demand for purpose-built deception technologies. Spreading throughout the dark web and encrypted messaging platforms, it sells everything from prebuilt custom software to more bespoke services for explicitly abusive purposes.

+ +

However, the rise in AI-enabled deceptions has not been uniform. Rather, generative AI tools have been co-opted to greater degrees in scenarios where they currently provide a significant offensive edge to threat actors’ stratagems over existing non-AI methods. For instance, the sharp rise of AI-enabled financial fraud over the past few years is a direct result of the substantial advantage afforded by AI technology, as AI text and audio generation tools are able to produce compelling synthetic content in less resource-intensive manners than when utilizing non-AI techniques. Conversely, AI-enabled deception incidents have been less prevalent in areas where synthetic media presently does not provide a similarly significant offensive edge. This has been found to be the case with deceptions involving the dissemination of false narratives, where conventional techniques such as manipulatively editing authentic media or sharing it out of context still remain highly effective and relatively easy to accomplish, limiting the comparative utility of generative AI tools. Regardless, as the technology’s capabilities improve and barriers to using it decrease, it will undoubtedly be more extensively adopted for all manner of stratagems.

+ +

Compounding these harms is the second-order risk posed by weaponized synthetic media: the corrosion of information integrity. The proliferation of deceptive AI-generated content risks damaging the public’s trust in the veracity of any information they encounter more generally as they become increasingly unable to trust their eyes and ears to reliably inform them as to what is real and what is fake. This degradation of trust in the truth jeopardizes the resilience of the U.S.’s information environment, or its “epistemic security” — which risks heightening its vulnerability to political and economic instability and constraining national security capabilities. Less epistemically secure societies are more limited in their ability to engage in collective and timely decision-making, making them more susceptible to adversarial manipulation, reducing their capacity for effective crisis response, and constraining critical defense and intelligence capabilities. This threat is not a novel one. Instances of widespread conventional misinformation have already been found to have diminished public trust in information from media and government institutions, resulting in decreased faith in political election integrity, weakened confidence in national security organizations, and led to violence and unrest. For example, pervasive false anti-vaccination narratives during the Covid-19 pandemic undermined vaccine confidence and institutional trust in the United States. The proliferation of these falsehoods, in turn, stymied economic growth, trade, and diplomacy, damaged education, and increased the number of vaccine-preventable outbreaks.

+ +

Synthetic media misuse risks intensifying the damage done to the public’s trust in information by making it harder to distinguish fact from fiction. One can easily imagine how the viral AI-generated image of an explosion near the Pentagon, mentioned at the beginning of this brief, may have resulted in more significant adverse effects in a less epistemically secure society. Decreased public trust in information from institutional sources could have made later debunking by authorities less successful or take longer, enabling the falsehood to disseminate further and permitting greater knock-on effects to occur, such as more extensive financial volatility than just a brief dip in the stock market, which in turn could have led to civil unrest or facilitated the ability of foreign adversaries to leverage the unrest to their benefit.

+ +

There are signs that the increased prevalence of synthetic media has already begun to damage the public’s epistemic trust. Research shows that repeated exposure to unlabelled synthetic media makes individuals more susceptible to misidentifying future synthetic content as well as reduces individuals’ confidence in the truthfulness of all information. More recently, it was discovered that Russia’s extensive use of AI-enabled deceptions throughout the still ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict has had a detrimental effect on Ukrainian citizens’ confidence in information, making them significantly more skeptical of the truthfulness of all digital content they encounter online. Even just the existence of synthetic media itself has begun to erode aspects of the public’s trust, as evident in the increasing frequency of authentic media being wrongly dismissed as AI-generated. The trend has become especially prevalent in information-contested spaces, such as political elections or the Israel-Hamas conflict, where both sides have frequently decried real digital content as being fake. As the synthetic media threat landscape continues to expand, these adverse effects will likely only grow stronger. Ultimately, it is the convergence of these immediate and systemic threats that makes countering weaponized synthetic media a national security imperative.

+ +

Types of AI-Enabled Deceptions

+ +

The current synthetic media threat landscape can be broadly divided into six categories of AI-enabled deceptions: gray zone warfare, espionage and surveillance, military deception, domestic politics, nonconsensual intimate media, and financial crime. However, with the technology’s continued advancement, it is anticipated that the depth and breadth of AI-enabled deception incidents will also expand and diversify, including hate crimes, falsification of evidence in legal proceedings, corporate espionage or sabotage, and more. To better illustrate the contours of today’s landscape, a selection of particularly noteworthy AI deception incidents that have taken place across the six major categories have been shared below.

+ +

Gray Zone Warfare

+ +

Synthetic media has been increasingly weaponized within gray zone warfare, or actions that take place in the murky waters between regular statecraft and outright warfare, such as information warfare, cyberattacks, and political and economic coercion. Examples of AI-enabled deception incidents that have occurred in the gray zone include the following:

+ +
    +
  • +

    State-affiliated influence operations have disseminated synthetic images and videos as part of propaganda or information campaigns surrounding major political focal points or noteworthy events, including elections in Europe and Taiwan, U.S. politics, the Russo-Ukrainian and Israeli-Hamas conflicts, and the 2023 Maui wildfires.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Real-time face-swapping software was used to successfully impersonate Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko in a series of video calls with several mayors of major European cities as part of a targeted influence operation.

    +
    • +
  • +

    An alleged AI-generated sex tape of a presidential candidate in the 2023 Turkish elections, purportedly published by an adversarial state, was widely circulated, leading to the candidate’s withdrawal from the race.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and Russian state-affiliated actors were found to have been manufacturing synthetic content for spear phishing as part of cyberattacks they were planning to conduct.

    +
    • +
+ +

image09 +▲ Fake news channel clips featuring AI-generated TV anchors were shared by bot accounts online as a part of pro-Chinese information campaigns. Source: Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur, “The People Onscreen Are Fake. The Disinformation Is Real.,” New York Times, February 7, 2022.

+ +

Espionage and Surveillance

+ +

Synthetic media has also been leveraged to a lesser extent, at least to public knowledge, for espionage and surveillance operations by states and the private cyber surveillance industry, strengthening online impersonations of real or fictitious individuals to obtain confidential information from targets. Examples of AI-enabled espionage and surveillance incidents include the following:

+ +
    +
  • +

    Synthetic media was used in a fictitious Washington think tank employee’s made-up LinkedIn account, which was suspected of being run as part of a Russian espionage operation.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Private cyber-intelligence companies used hundreds of fake accounts of social media content, impersonating activists, journalists, and young women, to covertly gather information from targets, including IP addresses and personal contact information.

    +
    • +
  • +

    State-affiliated actors used social engineering assisted by large language models (LLM) to manipulate targets and facilitate the collection and analysis of open-source information.

    +
    • +
+ +

image10 +▲ This fake LinkedIn account of a fictitious Washington think tank employee, suspected of being used for a Russian espionage operation, was found to have used a synthetic image for the profile photo. Source: Raphael Satter, “Experts: Spy used AI-generated face to connect with targets,” AP News, June 13, 2019.

+ +

Military Deception

+ +

Although the adversarial use of synthetic media for targeted military operations has so far been limited in practice, AI-enabled military deception remains a topic of great concern due to the large number of ways in which the technology could be leveraged to gain a battlefield advantage. This includes creating entirely fictitious events to alter or skew enemy intelligence, impersonating military personnel to falsify or muddle orders, and manufacturing noise to mask one’s actions from an adversary or to overwhelm and confuse them. There are two particularly noteworthy examples of AI-enabled military deception incidents:

+ +
    +
  • +

    AI-generated content featuring Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has been published and circulated extensively on social media to sow confusion and discord, including a synthetic video of him calling for his troops to immediately lay down their arms and surrender to Russian forces.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Russian radio and TV networks were hacked to air fictitious AI-generated emergency broadcasts of Russian president Vladimir Putin declaring martial law due to Ukrainian forces invading Russian territory, causing some to actually evacuate in confusion.

    +
    • +
+ +

image11 +▲ A social media post shows the airing of an emergency Russian TV broadcast featuring an AI-generated video that falsely depicted Russian president Vladamir Putin declaring martial law and calling for evacuation due to the Ukrainian invasion. Source: Alex Kokcharov (@Alex Kokcharov), X post, June 15, 2023, 6:17 am.

+ +

Domestic Politics

+ +

In recent years, there has been a surge in synthetic media being employed by domestic actors to create deceptive political content, predominately in regard to political elections. A selection of AI-enabled incidents include the following:

+ +
    +
  • +

    The Venezuelan government ran fake news stories featuring AI-generated newscasters as part of a widespread domestic propaganda campaign to influence its citizens.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian social media accounts shared synthetic images of the ongoing Gaza conflict, such as AI-generated photos of a crying baby among bomb wreckage, to further false narratives.

    +
    • +
  • +

    An AI-generated nonconsensual pornographic video of a senior U.S. government official at the Department of Homeland Security was circulated online as part of an ongoing smear campaign.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Synthetic images of former president Donald Trump, portrayed as being real, were used in an attack ad by an opposition candidate during the U.S. presidential primaries.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Synthetic media of politicians were falsely portrayed as authentic, including videos of UK prime minister Keir Starmer shouting at staff, U.S. president Joe Biden calling for a military draft, and a Slovakian presidential candidate discussing vote rigging during the election’s final days.

    +
    • +
  • +

    A robocall campaign used a synthetic audio clip of President Biden’s voice to urge thousands of New Hampshire residents not to vote in the state’s primary.

    +
    • +
  • +

    UK far-right actors and politicians widely circulated anti-immigrant and Islamophobic synthetic content across social media ahead of the 2024 elections.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Fictitious videos and images of celebrities such as Taylor Swift, as well as entirely AI-generated Black voters, endorsing former president Trump’s 2024 U.S. presidential campaign have been frequently shared online by political supporters in the run up to the 2024 elections.

    +
    • +
+ +

Nonconsensual Intimate Media

+ +

One of the most prolific abuses of generative AI to date has been the production of AI-generated nonconsensual intimate media of adults and children. Accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic media videos in existence in 2019, the adult nonconsensual pornography industry and the online trafficking of child sexual abuse materials have exploded in the years since, claiming millions of adult and child victims to date. Examples of incidents include the following:

+ +
    +
  • +

    An Indian journalist investigating the rape of a young girl was the target of an extensive hate campaign, which included synthetic pornography of her being circulated online.

    +
    • +
  • +

    An automated Telegram bot service created and published sexual images of an estimated 24,000 women and girls.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Sexually explicit images and videos of school girls and female teachers being produced and shared online by male students in Korea, Brazil, Spain, and the United States, among others.

    +
    • +
  • +

    A recently uncovered worldwide trafficking ring producing and selling sexually synthetic images depicting photorealistic children on a reported “industrial scale.”

    +
    • +
  • +

    A deluge of synthetic pornography featuring Taylor Swift spread across the social media platform X, forcing the online platform to block searches of the celebrity temporarily.

    +
    • +
+ +

Financial Crime

+ +

AI-enabled financial crime has quickly become one of the most widespread misuses of synthetic media. Criminals have employed generative AI tools to impersonate, extort, and hack for a multitude of fraudulent activities, with personalized AI spear-phishing emails and voice phone scams experiencing the largest growth. With an estimated 700 percent increase in incidents in 2023 from the previous year, financial experts predict that AI-enabled financial fraud could lead to losses of $40 billion by 2027. Noteworthy incidents include the following:

+ +
    +
  • +

    The head of a UK energy firm was personally tricked into transferring nearly $250,000 by fraudsters who used voice cloning to impersonate the parent company’s CEO.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Reportedly the largest AI-generated scam to date, thousands of synthetic videos of celebrities such as Elon Musk and MrBeast promoting fake financial schemes have been widely circulated on social media platforms.

    +
    • +
  • +

    An Arizona woman was the target of a fake ransoming scheme in which fraudsters impersonated her daughter over the phone using voice-cloning technology.

    +
    • +
  • +

    An employee of a financial firm was tricked during a week-long ruse into paying out $25 million to fraudsters after the scammers used real-time synthetic audiovisual software to impersonate the employee’s senior personnel and colleagues through a series of group video conferences, emails, and calls.

    +
    • +
  • +

    The Yahoo Boys, a crime collective, have widely adopted AI tools for romance scams and sextortion, employing live face and voice impersonation software and “nudification” apps to trick and blackmail targets. This has led not only to financial loss but also to tragic deaths in which some targets, frequently teenagers, took their own lives.

    +
    • +
+ +

Conclusion

+ +

As generative AI technology continues to advance, so does the potential for its misuse. In only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has changed dramatically. AI-enabled deceptions have become increasingly complex and varied, ranging from gray zone warfare to financial fraud and beyond. Not only has the weaponization of synthetic media already begun to cause real and substantial harm to people and organizations worldwide, but it also threatens to undermine public trust in all information online, regardless of the truth. Overall, these developments present troubling implications for U.S. national security.

+ +

These dangers have become even more severe as it has been made clear that widely available generative AI technology has progressed to the point that people can no longer depend on their eyes and ears to reliably detect the synthetic content they might encounter in their everyday lives. With this primary line of defense compromised, pursuing alternative solutions has never been so vital. Now more than ever, stakeholders across the private and public sectors must work together to implement multifaceted countermeasures that bridge the technological, regulatory, and educational domains to oppose the growing threat posed by weaponized synthetic media.

+ +
+ +

Di Cooke is a horizon fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

+ +

Abby Edwards is a former research associate in the International Security Program at CSIS.

+ +

Alexis Day is an associate director for the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.

+ +

Devi Nair is a former associate director and associate fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.

+ +

Sophia Barkoff is a former research intern in Defending Democratic Institutions in the International Security Program at CSIS.

+ +

Katie Kelly is a former social media and outreach intern in the International Security Program at CSIS.

+ +
+ +
+ +
+ + + + + +

+ Made with by Agora + +

+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-11-12-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem.html b/hkers/2024-11-12-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01ce3fd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-11-12-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem.html @@ -0,0 +1,488 @@ + + + + + + + + + + Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + +
+
+ +
+

Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem

+
+
+ +
+

Understanding the Military AI Ecosystem of Ukraine

+

Kateryna Bondar | 2024.11.12

+
+
+

This report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.

+ + + +

This report is the first part of a series on military artificial intelligence (AI) development and its application in the war in Ukraine. It will focus on two critical aspects of AI adoption in Ukraine’s military:

+ +
    +
  1. +

    The conditions and factors that contributed to military AI development from the beginning of the war with Russia in 2014

    +
    2. +
  2. +

    The key government institutions and initiatives responsible for driving AI adoption, along with a summary of their major AI-related initiatives

    +
    3. +
+ +

The summary section below presents key findings and insights on both of these aspects.

+ +

1. AI is in experimental deployment and is overwhelmingly geared toward supportive functions.

+ +

Although AI is frequently discussed in the context of the war in Ukraine, its full deployment on the battlefield remains limited. Numerous AI-driven capabilities and technologies are being tested along the frontlines, in long-range strikes within Russian territory, and across multidomain operations, but these efforts are largely experimental rather than indicative of AI systematically replacing human functions in warfare. AI currently assumes a predominantly supportive and informational role, and even when AI capabilities advance and improve, they are not yet implemented in fully autonomous modes on the battlefield.

+ +

2. There is growing government involvement in AI development in Ukraine through organizational, regulative, and technological initiatives led by various government stakeholders.

+ +

Initially, the development of AI-driven technologies in Ukraine was spearheaded by the private sector and volunteer initiatives. However, government institutions and agencies have recently begun to build their own capacities for advancing new technologies. This shift is evident in the creation of new organizational divisions and units within government institutions and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which are specifically dedicated to AI-focused technologies and their deployment. These efforts mark a significant step toward the institutionalization of AI innovation within the public sector.

+ +

3. The Ukrainian government is focusing on the adoption of commercial AI rather than on developing new technology within government institutions.

+ +

Ukrainian authorities, having recognized that the speed and quality of technology development in the private sector far exceed those of the government sector, have prioritized creating infrastructure and procedures for the fast adoption of commercial technology. This approach has resulted in simplifying regulations on the adoption of innovation by the AFU, initiating programs for prototype testing, and providing grant funding to early-stage start-ups, among other initiatives. Moreover, most newly established units within Ukraine’s military, such as the Unmanned Systems Forces, are dedicated to integrating new technologies into military operations rather than participating in combat itself.

+ +

4. The absence of a long-term strategy for military AI development poses significant challenges to the sustained and effective adoption of these technologies.

+ +

The lack of a long-term strategy for military AI development represents a critical gap within the government’s approach to emerging technologies. Despite Ukraine’s recognized technological potential, there is no unified vision guiding the use of AI in defense. This strategic void is primarily driven by limited management capacity across government institutions and by the inexperience of political leadership in addressing the complexities of warfare. As a result, the focus has been on immediate, tactical solutions rather than on establishing a cohesive, forward-looking strategy to harness the full potential of AI in military operations.

+ +

5. Between 2014 and 2022, two grassroots applications — analytics for situational awareness and drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) — laid the groundwork for the post-2022 surge in military AI. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, military AI expanded significantly across six major applications, with a growing number of companies focusing on autonomy.

+ +

This report categorizes AI applications in Ukraine’s military operations into six major areas, listed below. A more detailed analysis of these applications will be provided in subsequent reports in this series.

+ +
    +
  • +

    Autonomy. The most significant advancements have been in autonomous systems, where Ukraine is making strides in areas such as GPS-denied navigation and swarm operations.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Open-source intelligence and fighting disinformation. AI helps to analyze large volumes of digital content from media and social networks and to identify Russian narratives, propaganda, and information campaigns spreading disinformation.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Situational awareness and command and control. AI enhances situational awareness with numerous software platforms used by the military to analyze battlefield and intelligence data and to facilitate real-time efficient decisionmaking.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Demining. AI-powered analytic software and AI-enabled unmanned ground vehicles improve the efficiency and safety of mine clearance.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Training and simulation. AI-driven training simulations are helping soldiers adapt to complex battlefield conditions by playing close-to-real combat scenarios with AI adjustments to address warfighters’ skill gaps.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Damage assessment. AI is crucial in damage assessment, utilizing satellite data and drone imagery to analyze damage, losses, and devastation and to estimate future recovery efforts.

    +
    • +
+ +

6. Several factors have facilitated the rapid development of military AI in Ukraine, creating a unique environment for defense innovation.

+ +

The situation in Ukraine over the last decade, particularly the ongoing conflict with Russia, has affected all aspects of society and necessitated rapid adaptation in defense and related fields. These factors have enabled Ukraine to test and deploy AI-driven solutions in real battlefield conditions, leading to numerous innovations, particularly in the realm of autonomy and autonomous weapon systems.

+ +
    +
  • +

    Existential need for advanced technology. The Russian invasion of 2022 created an urgent, existential need for Ukraine to develop advanced defense technologies rapidly. The high-stakes environment pushed both government and private sectors to prioritize technological advancements, such as AI, to enhance military capabilities. This urgency also catalyzed a willingness to experiment with AI, leading to quicker deployment of AI-driven capabilities in combat.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Active civil society and a robust private sector. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society and entrepreneurial private sector have been instrumental in driving defense innovation. Even before the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian entrepreneurial spirit, combined with a deep sense of national defense responsibility, led many private companies and start-ups to actively contribute to the war effort. These organizations have developed AI-driven solutions ranging from autonomous drones to advanced surveillance systems, with many innovations coming from small teams responding quickly to military demands. The active participation of nongovernmental actors in AI-enabled defense technology development and the fast deployment of commercial technology have significantly accelerated progress in this area.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Permissive regulatory frameworks. Ukraine’s regulatory environment for military AI was absent before the invasion. Unlike in many other countries, where regulatory bottlenecks can slow down innovation, Ukraine’s government refused to regulate military AI, allowing innovators to respond quickly to frontline needs and develop AI applications that could be immediately deployed in combat settings. The Ministry of Digital Transformation (MDT) prioritizes a soft, business-friendly approach, aiming to avoid overregulation. Instead of imposing strict rules, the ministry uses a bottom-up strategy, offering voluntary guidelines and tools to prepare businesses for future regulations. This approach extends to the defense sector, as the MDT has indicated that it does not plan to introduce regulation of AI in the defense sector.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Direct communication between engineers and military personnel. One of the most significant accelerators of military AI development in Ukraine has been direct communication between engineers and military personnel. Through a well-established network of technical workshops positioned near the frontline or within military units, including mobile drone repair vans, engineers from private companies are able to closely monitor and assess the performance of their systems in real combat scenarios. This proximity enables engineers working on unmanned systems and autonomous capabilities to receive real-time feedback, allowing for the rapid refinement of their technologies.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Foreign assistance providing access to new technologies. International support, from both governments and private companies, has been crucial in allowing Ukraine to leap forward in its technological capabilities. This support has facilitated Ukraine’s adoption of new technologies, such as analytical tools from Palantir, communication infrastructure via Starlink, and the migration of critical government data to Microsoft’s cloud services, to name just a few examples. This external assistance has not only equipped Ukraine with essential tools for innovation but has also fostered opportunities for collaborative development between Ukrainian and foreign companies, thereby strengthening Ukraine’s military and technological capabilities.

    +
    • +
+ +

7. Collaboration on AI between Ukraine and the U.S. government can be mutually beneficial.

+ +

What follows are several key recommendations for the U.S. government to foster closer collaboration in AI development between the United States and Ukraine in a way that will be beneficial to both countries.

+ +
    +
  • +

    Strategic support. The United States should leverage its technological leadership to help Ukraine develop a cohesive long-term strategy for integrating AI into defense operations. By providing strategic guidance, the United States can help to align Ukraine’s national priorities in AI development while gaining valuable insights into AI applications in active warfare.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Closing the feedback loop. A structured feedback system for evaluating the performance of U.S.-provided drones and military technologies in Ukraine would benefit both nations. U.S. companies could quickly iterate and improve their technologies, while Ukraine would receive more tailored and effective capabilities, enhancing battlefield operations.

    +
    • +
  • +

    AI in U.S. foreign aid. The United States should integrate AI development into its foreign aid programs for Ukraine, providing essential computing infrastructure to support AI innovation. This would strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities and establish the country as a hub for military AI development, benefiting U.S. strategic interests in global AI leadership.

    +
    • +
  • +

    AI-focused training and entrepreneurial development. The United States should establish AI-related programs for Ukrainian defense entrepreneurs and business leaders. These initiatives would foster Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem and strengthen U.S.-Ukraine collaboration, positioning both countries to lead in AI-driven defense innovation.

    +
    • +
+ +

Understanding Ukraine’s AI Ecosystem

+ +

This section provides a comprehensive overview of Ukraine’s military AI ecosystem. It begins by providing a background to Ukraine’s commercial AI sector, which for more than a decade has been quite successful — more than is commonly recognized in the West. Next, the paper examines how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 resulted in major changes to the Ukrainian military’s approach to software and data, changes that were critical to the foundation of the military’s post-2022 introduction of AI technologies. Finally, it provides an overview of the key government organizations responsible for driving AI adoption throughout Ukraine’s military as well as a summary of their AI-related initiatives.

+ +

Commercial AI in Ukraine: A Decade of Quiet Success

+ +

In the race for leadership in artificial intelligence, Ukraine may appear an unlikely contender. However, this comparatively small nation is demonstrating significant potential, with a highly skilled and technologically adept population. Notably, nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians express optimism regarding AI’s potential to enhance human life, reflecting widespread public confidence in the transformative capabilities of the technology.

+ +

Indeed, for more than a decade, Ukraine has quietly served as a developer of innovative AI capabilities that have captured the world’s imagination. While a full list is beyond the scope of this paper, three companies — Looksery, Respeecher, and Augmented Pixels — provide a helpful illustration of how Ukraine’s commercial AI sector has long been more impactful and more capable than is commonly understood outside technology communities.

+ +

First, in 2015, Snap Inc. — a Santa Monica-based technology company and the maker of the popular Snapchat social media app — spent $150 million to acquire Looksery, a two-year-old Ukrainian AI tech firm. Looksery’s AI-based facial recognition and augmented reality technology laid the foundation for Snapchat’s Lens portfolio, which today boasts 250 million daily users. In 2022, Snap Inc. stated that the company still employed 300 Ukrainian staff, almost all of whom are engineers.

+ +

Second, Ukrainian AI companies have also been involved in Hollywood, providing AI technology for audio generation. In 2020, Disney sought to include a younger version of Luke Skywalker in the television series The Mandalorian, but faced a challenge in that Star Wars actor Mark Hamill was 68 years old. Disney contracted with the Ukrainian AI company Respeecher to synthesize a younger voice that was sufficiently high-quality to meet Disney’s exacting standards.

+ +

Third and finally, Qualcomm acquired Augmented Pixels in 2022. Founded in 2010 in Odesa, Augmented Pixels developed AI navigation technologies, such as 3D mapping and localization, for drones and AI glasses. At the time of purchase, Augmented Pixels’ commercial customers included National Geographic, LG Electronics, Intel, and more.

+ +

The main takeaway from these cases is that Ukraine’s AI sector was a meaningful player in commercial technology markets — taken seriously even by leading Western companies — long before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. A 2024 study conducted on behalf of Ukraine’s MDT found that Ukraine has 243 AI-focused companies and a broader information technology (IT) and software workforce comprising more than 307,000 specialists. Additionally, Ukrainian universities have launched a remarkable 106 specialized AI and machine learning (ML) programs across 42 institutions, resulting in a 122 percent increase in enrollment over five years. The report found that Ukraine produces more IT graduates than any other Central or Eastern European country, with a quarter of these graduates specializing in AI/ML.

+ +

Despite Ukraine’s aforementioned strengths, its AI sector continues to encounter substantial challenges. According to the 2023 Government AI Readiness Index by Oxford Insights, Ukraine was ranked 60th out of 193 countries in AI integration into public service. The country’s AI development is hindered by several factors, including insufficient computing infrastructure and a shortage of skilled human capital due to the relocation of IT engineers fleeing the war (although some have continued working remotely for their Ukrainian employers). Additionally, Ukraine’s low government research and development investment further constrains the sector’s growth.

+ +

image01 +▲ Figure 1: Comparison of Ukraine and United States in Government AI Readiness Index 2023. Source: “Government AI Readiness Index 2023,” Oxford Insights.

+ +

Surprisingly, the Oxford Insights report found that Ukraine matches the United States — the index’s top-ranked country — in one crucial aspect: vision. However, vision alone is not enough to boost AI development and deployment. Ukraine’s position in the index underscores a critical gap between the ambitious plans of its tech sector and the resources needed to execute them.

+ +

Military AI in Ukraine since 2014: Necessary Growth

+ +

Pre-2022: Laying a Digital Foundation

+ +

Though the 2022 full-scale invasion shocked the world, for Ukrainians, it was not the start of the war with Russia. Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories in 2014 was a major wake up call for Ukrainian society — including Ukraine’s tech sector, which became increasingly willing to directly support Ukrainian armed forces.

+ +

The 2022 full-scale invasion, however, did mark a watershed moment in Ukraine’s approach to military artificial intelligence. Prior to 2022, Kyiv had not prioritized AI in its defense strategy, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas region. However, groundwork laid by volunteer groups since 2014 — focused not on AI but on software for data collection, analysis, and warfighting operational support — has proved instrumental in facilitating rapid military AI development and adoption since 2022.

+ +

This subsection will examine two key military use cases from the 2014–2022 period that enabled AI integration after the full-scale invasion: situational awareness systems and drones. After 2014, volunteers from Ukraine’s tech sector developed systems using modern data and software techniques (though not ML/AI). Over time, these systems dramatically improved Ukraine’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities and even overtook competing official systems in adoption and impact.

+ +

Situational Awareness

+ +

Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine’s tech-savvy and patriotic workforce developed and introduced 11 new situational awareness and battlefield management systems to the Ukrainian military. Because they were unofficial and unsanctioned, one might think that these volunteer initiatives would be divorced from real military requirements. In practice, however, the volunteer groups had direct communication with front line operational forces, allowing them to focus their development efforts on high-priority military needs. One of the initiatives, the situational awareness system Delta, was eventually adopted and formally integrated into the Ukrainian military. The remarkable fact is that some unofficial volunteer systems and software have achieved near-universal adoption by the relevant Ukrainian forces, vastly exceeding the adoption rate of some official military technology initiatives that sought (and usually failed) to provide similar capabilities.

+ +

The diverse capabilities of these systems — generally originating from explicit military requests — ranged from fire control, artillery optimization, and air traffic management to combat command and control. These systems not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.

+ +

[Early situational awareness and command and control systems] not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.

+ +

One of the most noteworthy volunteer groups is Aerorozvidka, whose situational awareness system Delta has become a linchpin in Ukraine’s multidomain operations. Started in 2016 and transferred to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (MoD) in 2023, Delta seamlessly integrates NATO ISTAR standards to provide essential situational awareness across all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Building on this foundation, Aerorozvidka has spearheaded the creation of situational awareness centers in eight cities, each focused on gathering information from its respective section of the front. These centers serve as technological hubs, uniting and coordinating intelligence from a wide variety of sources — drones, satellites, stationary cameras, sensors, field scouts, and data from allies. The system even digitizes information from loyal informants in temporarily occupied territories, who interface with government apps and chatbots. Bringing all these different data sources together in a unified software platform is a challenge even for the United States military, but Delta achieves this and enjoys high user satisfaction among Ukrainian forces. As will be discussed further in this paper, Delta has recently been enhanced with AI/ML-enabled capabilities. At one point, there was an officially sanctioned military system — Dzvin — in development that promised similar capabilities as the volunteer-built Delta. However, this fell victim to bureaucratic hurdles and corruption and never achieved meaningful adoption despite its official introduction into the AFU in 2022. A diverse range of military officials told CSIS that Delta now is the de facto standard and Dzvin is functionally irrelevant. Delta is also of keen interest to NATO, which has described the system as “ground-breaking” following its victory in a 2017 NATO hackathon and prominent testing in NATO military exercises, most recently in 2024.

+ +

The Kropyva artillery software system improves target accuracy and routinely reduces the time between receiving orders and striking targets by up to tenfold. Ukrainian artillerymen access Kropyva through a tablet or mobile phone, then enter enemy coordinates, which are automatically translated to the nearest available artillery battery along with precalculated aiming trajectories. The Army SOS volunteer organization developed Kropyva in 2014, and 90 to 95 percent of Ukrainian artillery units have adopted it as their primary artillery fire control system. Another military system helping to coordinate artillery strikes, GisArta, attracted widespread attention in the Western press as “Uber for artillery,” even though Kropyva is more widely used and impactful according to Ukrainian military officials in conversation with CSIS.

+ +

Kropyva and Delta are just two of dozens of examples demonstrating how systems initially developed by tech industry volunteers changed Ukraine’s armed forces after 2014. Many of these systems began with the modest goal of supporting warfighter decisionmaking and have since evolved into advanced situational awareness and battle management systems routinely used by hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Prior to 2022, the adoption of these modern software and data-driven platforms also laid the groundwork for AI/ML integration. As critical information sources were networked and digitized, the data they generated became the raw material for training AI models and enabling AI-driven capabilities.

+ +

The success of volunteer-led grassroots projects underscores a crucial point: in the face of existential threats, innovation in Ukraine has primarily thrived outside traditional channels. However, this decentralized approach is not without its challenges. Many of these teams still operate on shoestring budgets, relying heavily on donations. The lack of systemic support and funding raises concerns about the long-term sustainability and interoperability of this diversity of systems. Ukraine still possesses a hard-won technological edge, but the government needs to ensure that these successful initiatives are put on a more secure long-term foundation and incorporated into official plans and strategies. Unfortunately, multiple executives in Ukraine’s defense technology ecosystem told CSIS that the scale of Ukraine’s technological edge is shrinking as Russian forces improve their own technology and their pace of innovation adoption. Whereas previously Russian forces would take a month or more to adapt to new Ukrainian innovations before adopting countermeasures in the form of new tactics or technologies, now Russian forces may need as little as two or three days.

+ +

Drones

+ +

Prior to 2022, drones were in use by both sides, mostly for remotely piloted ISR missions and without AI/ML capabilities. Drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the post-2022 war with Russia, widely recognized as a transformational capability for both sides. However, the impact of drones during the 2014–2022 period was considerably more limited.

+ +

The war in Donbas served as an early testing ground for commercial drones, with both sides exploring their potential. While Russian forces made early strides in drone warfare, the Ukrainian side’s attempts to leverage commercial drones were met with mixed results. The lack of trained operators, coupled with the high attrition rate of these relatively expensive items for Ukrainian soldiers who usually had to buy them at their own expense, initially dampened enthusiasm for their widespread adoption. Volunteer organizations, which have played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine’s military efforts, did not — prior to 2022 — prioritize drone acquisition. Similarly, official military decisionmakers were slow to recognize the potential of these systems, focusing instead on more traditional assets.

+ +

In cases where Ukrainian forces did use drones, the priority use case was ISR. China was a major supplier of commercial drones to Ukraine, primarily for civilian purposes such as agriculture and event photography, often referred to as “wedding” drones. However, these also saw usage in combat, even prior to 2022, again mostly for ISR. Hence, Ukrainian defense companies focused their military drone development efforts primarily on medium and long-range reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. Notable examples include the PD-2 from UkrSpecSystems, the Furia from Athlone Avia, the R18 from Aerorozvidka, and the ACS-3M from Skyeton. Companies like DeVIRo also contributed with their Leleka-100, further expanding Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities, while the Punisher, a strike drone produced by UA Dynamics, represents Ukraine’s foray into offensive drone technology.

+ +

Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities. However, increased familiarity with drones would set the stage for later AI adoption.

+ +

Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities.

+ +

Post-Invasion AI Surge: Wide-Ranging Military AI Applications

+ +

Despite Ukraine having been at war with Russia for nearly a decade, its 2022 full-scale invasion was a shock to the Ukrainian military system. The survival of Ukraine as an independent state was at stake, and leaders across civilian, military, and commercial structures reacted accordingly. Society as a whole mobilized to support the armed forces, and in many cases, everyday citizens volunteered to participate in combat and defend Ukraine.

+ +

The commercial technology sector of Ukraine was also swept up in this wave. What had been a volunteering side project for many became the dominant focus of their professional life. In numerous cases, these efforts were centered on maintaining and enhancing existing digital platforms like Delta and Kropyva. However, a new suite of volunteer-built capabilities focusing on the opportunities of AI technology also emerged.

+ +

As with the pre-2022 era, there was no centrally guided plan to accelerate the adoption of AI for priority use cases. Rather, experimentation with AI emerged organically, as technically proficient volunteers explored solutions to the diverse security challenges facing all of Ukrainian society — from disinformation to cyberwar to front-line conflict.

+ +

While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.

+ +

While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.

+ +

The Institutional Landscape for Military AI Development in Ukraine

+ +

The institutional landscape supporting AI development in Ukraine has evolved significantly since 2022, with many government agencies and institutions shifting from initially neglecting AI to actively creating specialized departments and units dedicated to developing AI capabilities. This transformation has been driven largely by the pressing demands of the ongoing war against Russia, where AI technologies have repeatedly demonstrated the potential to provide an advantage on the battlefield.

+ +

Of special note, Ukraine has gone so far as to create an entirely new branch of its armed forces, the Unmanned Systems Forces. While smaller than the other branches of the Ukrainian military, it is nevertheless technically their peer, and it serves as evidence that Ukrainian leadership views as critical the task of driving organizational reforms to account for new technological realities.

+ +

Other defense and security institutions have also created new organizations and empowered them to accelerate technology innovation, such as Special Unit Typhoon, a new part of the National Guard of Ukraine. One newly created organization within the MoD, the Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies (CIDT), is a direct outgrowth of the tech volunteer community’s efforts. In 2023, the CIDT took official responsibility for upgrading and developing situational awareness technologies, including the Delta system discussed in a previous section. In 2024, the developers began integrating AI/ML capabilities into Delta with an initial focus on video and text processing for the identification of enemy forces in real time.

+ +

In other cases, the war has led organizations to reinvent their mandate. Both the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU, a subordinate body of the MoD) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) have taken a leading role in developing and executing long-range precision strikes on Russian infrastructure. In previous years, these organizations would not have been responsible for such missions. AI is a useful enabling technology for long-range precision strikes, and both organizations have developed the relevant competencies to be at the forefront of AI adoption. For example, AI-based computer vision is helpful for accurate navigation in GPS-denied environments, such as the territory on both sides of the Russian border. More broadly, both the DIU and the SSU have adopted AI for processing and analyzing vast volumes of battlefield data.

+ +

Beyond creating new institutions and changing the mandate of existing ones, Ukrainian authorities are also implementing regulatory reforms and launching diverse initiatives to make it easier for companies to develop AI — and for military units to adopt it. The MDT, which is responsible for policymaking in AI development, is fostering an innovation-friendly regulatory environment, avoiding overregulation and promoting AI development through initiatives such as the Army of Drones and the Brave1 platform (further discussed below). These initiatives have accelerated the deployment of unmanned systems — including AI-driven ones — by providing essential financial and organizational support to early-stage projects.

+ +

Profiles of Organizations in Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem

+ +

The development of AI-enabled warfare is not occurring in isolation; it is shaped by a complex institutional landscape of government agencies and stakeholders. This section provides an overview of key institutions, along with their initiatives specifically related to developing military AI and drones, while excluding the broader scope of these institutions’ functions as it falls outside the focus of this research. Due to the classified nature of much of the information on government initiatives, this overview remains general, without going into the technical specifics of the projects and technologies involved. The purpose of this section is to offer a clearer understanding of Ukraine’s somewhat unstructured governmental approach to military AI development, as well as to facilitate the identification of relevant counterparts for collaboration where Ukrainian models or initiatives align with U.S. government objectives.

+ +

image02 +▲ Figure 2: Map of Military AI Stakeholders in Ukraine. Source: CSIS analysis.

+ +

Ministry of Defense

+ +

The MoD of Ukraine is the government body responsible for overseeing national defense and the AFU. The MoD is headed by the minister of defense, while the president of Ukraine holds the position of supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

+ +

Organizational AI Initiatives

+ +
    +
  • +

    Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies. In 2021, the MoD established the CIDT to reform its approach to IT project management. Its primary objective is to modernize automated combat management systems and develop future operational-strategic, tactical, and situational awareness systems. A notable achievement in this workstream is the formal adoption of the Delta situational awareness system by the MoD in 2023, which the CIDT inherited from the volunteer organization Aerorozvidka. Public information on the CIDT’s AI-related initiatives is limited, particularly beyond its focus on the Delta platform. However, recent job postings for machine learning engineers, MLOps specialists, and computer vision researchers suggest that the CIDT is prioritizing the integration of AI-enabled solutions into Delta.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Unmanned Systems Forces. A dedicated branch of the AFU, the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), was established to systematize and expand the experience gained in the deployment of unmanned systems while formalizing a doctrinal approach suited to the realities of asymmetrical warfare. The USF is responsible for operations across all domains and levels, ranging from frontline engagements to deep strikes within enemy territory. Under the leadership of Colonel Vadym Sukharevsky, the USF plays a central role in introducing unmanned systems throughout the AFU, adopting emerging technologies, sharing innovations, and training units and brigades to use new systems. The USF is tasked with identifying the most effective systems to address the diverse challenges faced by the AFU on the battlefield. To date, over 170 models of unmanned systems have been integrated into frontline operations, positioning the USF as a critical driver of technological innovation in combat.

    +
    • +
+ +

AI Technology Initiatives

+ +
    +
  • Innovation Development Accelerator. The MoD has sought to accelerate the development and adoption of defense technologies through the creation of the Innovation Development Accelerator. Established in 2023, this initiative is designed to streamline and modernize the ministry’s operations by addressing issues of overregulation, lengthy processes, and inefficiencies in collaboration with defense companies. The accelerator aims to reduce the time required for the implementation of weapons and equipment from more than two years to approximately 45 days, while simplifying bureaucratic procedures to enhance operational efficiency. One of its six core priorities is the advancement of robotization and AI tech adoption for unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as ground and water drones.
    • +
+ +

Initiatives in AI Regulation

+ +
    +
  • +

    Doctrine for Unmanned Systems Forces. The USF has developed a comprehensive doctrine and statute for all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is currently being tested in operational units. The documentation is developed for every level, from squad to battalion, and it will standardize tactics and procedures for the use of unmanned systems across the AFU. The creation of this statute marks a significant step toward the formalization and regulation of unmanned system deployment, ensuring consistent operational practices across the military.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy. The only AI-related regulatory initiative in which the MoD is currently involved is the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy, launched in 2023. This provides a framework for the responsible use of military AI and aims to build international consensus, guiding states in the ethical development, deployment, and use of military AI technologies. Besides this international initiative, the MoD has not yet released any public strategies or formalized vision regarding AI implementation or the development of autonomous systems.

    +
    • +
+ +

Defense Intelligence of the MoD of Ukraine

+ +

The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the MoD, also known as the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU), serves as the military intelligence agency to the country’s leadership and the AFU. Its portfolio includes intelligence, cyber, technology development, and occasionally direct execution of high-priority missions.

+ +

AI Technology Initiatives:

+ +
    +
  • +

    AI for analytics. The DIU has emerged as one of the most advanced users and adopters of AI technology within the military. According to Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the DIU, the increasing volume of acquired intelligence data necessitated the enhancement of analytical capabilities. To address this challenge, the analytical branch has been significantly bolstered with technologies for automated data processing, integrating artificial intelligence to improve the efficiency and accuracy of analysis. This integration of AI has been critical in managing large datasets and enhancing the decisionmaking process within the intelligence operations of Ukraine.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Drones for long-range strikes. The DIU is a leading agency in conducting long-range strikes into Russian territory using drones equipped with some elements of autonomy. These autonomous drones play a crucial role in Ukraine’s ability to carry out precision strikes at extended distances, significantly expanding the operational capabilities of its military. The use of such autonomous systems represents a forward-looking approach to modern warfare, where AI-enabled technologies enhance the effectiveness of long-range operations while minimizing the need for direct human intervention. While the Ukrainian government has not disclosed all of the functions that AI plays in this mission, government officials told CSIS that AI does play an important role. This positions the DIU as a key player in the development and application of autonomous military technologies in Ukraine.

    +
    • +
+ +

Security Service of Ukraine

+ +

The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) serves as the country’s principal security and intelligence agency, tasked with safeguarding national security, conducting counterintelligence operations and counterterrorism efforts, and combating organized crime. It operates under the authority of the president of Ukraine.

+ +

AI Technology Initiatives

+ +
    +
  • Naval drones. One of the SSU’s most innovative contributions to the war effort is its use of naval drones, which have significantly impacted the balance of power in the Black Sea. These drones are not just simple unmanned vessels; due to constant close interaction between the SSU and its drone operators and engineers, they have evolved into multifunctional platforms that are constantly undergoing technological improvements. For example, the Sea Baby drones, initially designed for explosive attacks on Russian naval ships and infrastructure, have been enhanced to perform additional functions such as offensive sea mining. They have successfully laid mines in strategic locations, significantly impacting Russian naval operations. Moreover, due to recent upgrades, the drones are equipped with rocket systems — specifically the Grad multiple rocket launchers, which have already shown effectiveness in targeting Russian positions.
    • +
+ +

National Guard of Ukraine

+ +

The National Guard of Ukraine is a military force under the command of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it is tasked with protecting public order, securing strategically important facilities, and countering illegal paramilitary groups. During martial law periods, the units of the National Guard are subordinate to the AFU.

+ +

Organizational AI Initiatives

+ +
    +
  • In 2024, the National Guard of Ukraine established a specialized unit known as Typhoon, which is focused on the deployment of unmanned aerial systems for military operations. This unit, composed of seasoned Special Forces veterans, has been created with the objective of enhancing the operational capabilities of combat brigades by integrating advanced unmanned systems into their strategic and tactical frameworks. The veterans within the unit bring a wealth of combat experience, which is crucial for the effective deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in complex battlefield environments. By integrating unmanned systems into combat operations, the Typhoon unit aims to increase both the flexibility and responsiveness of brigade-level engagements, enhancing operational efficiency and reducing risks to personnel.
    • +
+ +

Ministry of Digital Transformation

+ +

The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine (MDT), established in 2019, is responsible for shaping and implementing state policy in digitalization, the digital economy, and digital innovation. It focuses on e-government, digital democracy, the development of digital skills and rights, open data, national electronic resources, and broadband infrastructure.

+ +

Organizational AI Initiatives

+ +
    +
  • The Expert Committee on AI Development. The Expert Committee on AI Development, established under the MDT in December 2019, plays an important role in enhancing the country’s competitiveness in the field of AI. Composed predominantly of business and science representatives, the committee’s main task is to drive AI policy recommendations, facilitate research and development, and nurture talent across various domains.
    • +
+ +

AI Technology Initiatives

+ +
    +
  • +

    Army of Drones. Launched in July 2022 by the MDT, the Army of Drones initiative represents a significant effort to integrate unmanned aerial vehicles into Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Initially conceived as a fundraising campaign, the initiative quickly evolved into a systematic and comprehensive program aimed at both procuring drones and training operators for their effective deployment on the battlefield. The program’s scope has grown to encompass not only the direct supply of drones to frontline units but also the promotion of domestic UAV production, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s defense industrial base. One of the core objectives of the Army of Drones initiative is to equip Ukrainian armed forces with modern, locally produced UAVs that can be used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and tactical strikes.

    + +

    Moreover, the initiative places significant emphasis on the training and skill enhancement of drone operators, ensuring that personnel are proficient in utilizing the advanced technologies embedded in contemporary UAV systems. By the end of 2023, 20,000 operators had successfully completed the training. This comprehensive approach — combining procurement, production, and operator training — has had a transformative impact on the use of drones in frontline operations, making the Army of Drones a pivotal component of Ukraine’s broader defense strategy.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Brave1. As an effort to support projects and companies in their early stages, a platform dubbed “Brave1” was established in July 2023. It is designed to facilitate collaboration among all major stakeholders in the government’s defense sector, the tech industry, and investors and volunteers. Manufacturers who meet the 12 priority verticals of technological development identified by the general staff of the AFU for the Brave1 cluster and have passed a defense expert review can apply to get military expertise; testing opportunities; and organizational, informational, and financial support for their projects. Brave1 also funds early-stage miltech start-ups, giving grants up to UAH 8,000,000 (approximately USD 194,000). As of September 2024, the program has awarded 299 grants totaling USD 6.5 million.

    + +

    In October 2024, the MDT stated that the list of priority verticals of technological development will be revised, with a larger focus on electronic warfare and AI-enabled capabilities.

    + +

    Events organized by Brave1 provide valuable insights into the urgent technological needs and priorities of the AFU, as the topics and competition areas reflect requests gathered by the Brave1 team from various military institutions and agencies. For example, the deputy commander-in-chief of the AFU has identified key areas for technological advancement, including alternative navigation systems, jamming-resistant communications, drone swarm technologies, “friend or foe” identification, and improved target identification and engagement capabilities. Events such as the Precision Hackathon exemplify the immediate demand for AI-driven solutions in defense technology — including advanced targeting systems, real-time data integration, and innovative smart munitions capable of adjusting their trajectories to engage dynamic targets. The emphasis on autonomous and semi-autonomous systems with precision targeting capabilities and network-centric tools for combat operations reflects a broader shift toward AI-enabled autonomy in military applications. Furthermore, events like the AI for Ukraine Recovery Hackathon, which focused on topics such as cybersecurity, damage assessment, and disinformation prevention, underscore the pivotal role of AI in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities and supporting its recovery efforts.

    +
    • +
+ +

Initiatives in AI Regulation

+ +
    +
  • +

    Approach to AI regulation. The MDT is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s digital development, digital economy, and innovation, with AI being an integral component of this policy. Consequently, the ministry also holds responsibility for AI regulation. However, it has explicitly emphasized a commitment to avoiding overregulation by adopting a soft, business-friendly approach. The MDT plans to implement a bottom-up strategy, initially preparing businesses for future regulations before moving toward formal implementation. In the early stages, the state will provide businesses with tools such as general and sector-specific recommendations, voluntary codes of conduct, a legal assistance platform, and a regulatory sandbox for product testing, all aimed at facilitating compliance with forthcoming legislation.

    + +

    The current regulatory framework includes the Concept of Development of Artificial Intelligence in Ukraine, adopted in 2020, followed by the AI Regulation Roadmap introduced in 2023. While neither document constitutes formal regulation, they provide guiding principles for AI development within the country.

    + +

    The MDT also plays a significant role in fostering defense innovation, making its approach to AI regulation in the defense sector particularly clear in its white paper “Artificial Intelligence Regulation in Ukraine: Vision of the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine.” The ministry has stated that it does not intend to propose any regulation of AI systems within the defense sector, emphasizing a noninterventionist stance in this domain.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Simplifying regulation for local high-tech defense industry. To boost local production, the MDT has made some considerable steps in terms of regulatory simplification for private drone companies. By implementing regulatory changes, the allowed profit margin for Ukrainian drone manufacturers was increased from 1 percent to 25 percent. This change makes the drone production business more financially viable and attractive for local companies. Previously, the low profitability cap of 1 percent limited potential earnings, discouraging investment and innovation. By raising the limit to 25 percent, the government aims to stimulate growth in the domestic high-tech defense industry, encouraging companies to scale up production and invest in advanced technologies.

    + +

    Furthermore, regulations governing contract negotiations, goods acceptance for military use, operational clearance, and delivery to the front were streamlined. Measures were also implemented to accelerate the operational approval process for UAV manufacturers, facilitating faster integration into state procurement contracts and supply chains for frontline operations. The government eliminated the requirement for export service control documents, simplifying the import of drones and their components, and removed the need for Security Service approvals, significantly expediting the overall approval process. Additionally, drone manufacturers can opt into the special “Diia.City” tax regime for IT companies, which allows up to 50 percent of employees eligible for military service to be exempted from active duty.

    +
    • +
+ +

Innovations Development Fund

+ +

The Innovations Development Fund (previously called the Ukrainian Startup Fund) is the first and only state institution dedicated to helping innovative projects and tech start-ups secure early-stage funding and launch their ventures. Established in 2018 by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, it has been managed by the MDT since 2023.

+ +

AI Technology Initiatives

+ +
    +
  • +

    Program for defense start-ups. The “Fast Track to Victory” program is an example of Ukraine’s capacity to rapidly adapt and use existing infrastructure to foster innovation in defense technologies. This program streamlines the interaction between the MoD and UAV manufacturers, facilitating a more efficient approval process for drone technologies. By leveraging the fund’s web portal, UAV developers with finished products can apply directly for official ministry approval. This approval is essential as it authorizes the MoD to procure the products and allows the AFU to deploy them.

    + +

    According to government documents describing the program, the application process is designed to be efficient, with all submissions reviewed by MoD representatives in a timely manner. The program specifically targets UAVs that meet the tactical and technical characteristics required by the military, ensuring that the products are immediately relevant to the operational needs of the AFU. Once approved, the products can be integrated into military service, streamlining the deployment of innovative drone technologies on the battlefield.

    +
    • +
+ +

Ministry of Strategic Industries and Ukrainian Defense Industry

+ +

The Ministry of Strategic Industries is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s military-industrial complex, which includes a state-owned enterprise named Ukrainian Defense Industry (formerly known as UkrOboronProm). This entity manages over 100 defense-related enterprises, many of which are remnants of Soviet-era companies. While efforts are underway to modernize some of these enterprises to meet the demands of the current war, the ministry and its associated industries remain predominantly focused on traditional defense platforms — such as artillery production and missile programs — rather than on emerging technologies like software-driven systems and AI, which are increasingly defining modern warfare.

+ +

AI Technology Initiatives

+ +
    +
  • +

    AI implementation together with the MDT. In 2021, Ukrainian Defense Industry signed a memorandum of intent with the MDT to coordinate efforts in advancing the digital economy and fostering innovation, with a specific focus on AI technology. Formerly, UkrOboronProm had also expressed plans to establish a dedicated unit for AI development. However, Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that these initiatives have not yet been realized or advanced, highlighting a gap between stated intentions and actual implementation in the area of digital and AI-driven defense innovation. This suggests that while there is recognition of the importance of emerging technologies, the practical shift toward their integration in Ukraine’s defense industry remains limited.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Cooperation with Helsing. In 2024, the Ministry for Strategic Industries signed a memorandum with Helsing GmbH, a German company specializing in software development and AI integration in defense technologies. This cooperation aims to enhance Ukrainian defense technologies by integrating AI into drones, particularly Ukrainian-made UAVs. This is probably the only public mention of ministry- or state-owned enterprises introducing AI technology in their production.

    +
    • +
+ +

Initiatives in AI Regulation

+ +
    +
  • Upcoming strategic AI project for key economic sectors. Somewhat unexpectedly, given the ministry’s responsibilities and the current situation in the country, the Ukrainian government has approved a concept for a state program using artificial intelligence in strategic sectors of the economy and has designated the Ministry of Strategic Industries as responsible for the development of a detailed AI program for these priority sectors. The program aims to enhance Ukraine’s economic potential and strengthen its global market position by 2026 in such sectors as machinery, chemicals, defense, nuclear industry, agriculture, healthcare, and scientific activities.
    • +
+ +

Money Matters

+ +

The development of the defense industry and the sustainability of military operations are heavily dependent on the government’s purchasing capacity, regardless of the scale and quality of research, development, and production. In FY 2024, the Ukrainian government has allocated UAH 58.8 billion (USD 1.4 billion) for the acquisition of UAVs and an additional UAH 1.5 billion (USD 36 million) to support the Brave1 platform.

+ +

However, Ukrainian defense companies face significant challenges, including export bans imposed since the onset of the full-scale war due to the need to satisfy the demand for weapon systems for the AFU first. As a result, many defense factories remain underutilized due to insufficient funding for weapons procurement in the state budget and the consequent low purchasing capacity from the government. Although the defense industry’s capacity is estimated at around USD 20 billion, the maximum government procurement budget for 2024 is only USD 6 billion. In response, discussions have recently begun regarding the reopening of defense exports. A parliamentary working group is currently evaluating risks and developing a mechanism to enable Ukraine’s reentry into the global arms market.

+ +

Drone production represents a significant area of expansion. Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that the current production output for FPV drones alone exceeds 2 million units in 2024, although only 1 million have been contracted by the government to date. A survey conducted among defense companies revealed that 38 percent of them have more than half of their production capacity idle, while 85 percent are considering relocation abroad. The primary factors that could prevent such relocation include the reopening of exports, an increase in government procurement orders, and the establishment of long-term contracts.

+ +

Besides that, the Ministry of Strategic Industries is actively working to address current challenges in the industry, with a key focus on securing external funding for the purchase of Ukrainian defense products, including UAVs. ZBROYARI: Manufacturing Freedom is a global fundraising campaign aimed at raising USD 10 billion from partner countries to produce Ukrainian weapons in 2024. Of EUR 60 million in Dutch contributions, EUR 20 million is for FPV drones, EUR 22.5 million for Dutch drones, and EUR 17.5 million for Ukrainian-made naval drones.

+ +

Conclusion

+ +

Military AI in Ukraine underwent a rapid transition from being a secondary concern during almost eight years of war in Donbas to becoming a cornerstone of the country’s survival after the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022. This dramatic transition is reflected in the growth of private companies developing military AI capabilities, which have increased from two dozen or so in the beginning of 2022 to over a thousand in 2024. The Ukrainian government embraced the role of innovation enabler by streamlining the bureaucratic processes for technology adoption, adapting its organizational structures to meet rapidly advancing technological capabilities, and providing funding to the commercial defense sector.

+ +

As a result of these efforts, most of the industry representatives and brigade commanders interviewed by CSIS confirmed that numerous AI solutions are currently being tested on the frontline. They expect a transition to semi-autonomous unmanned capabilities in a year or two, wherein the human role will only be in confirmation of a strike. However, Ukraine may not have the luxury of time and must fast-track the realization of this vision.

+ +

To achieve this, Ukraine must overcome several challenges that are hindering its military AI development: insufficient funding, the limited capacity of small companies and their fragmented efforts in developing AI capabilities, competition within the government for resources, and a lack of coordination among key defense and military institutions to create a unified approach to military AI. Additionally, there is a shortage of computing power and experienced AI professionals in the country to work on classified technology, which are critical for making military AI a game-changer in the fight against Russia.

+ +

While Russia is investing enormous resources into transitioning to an economy on a war footing with a focus on technological advancement within its military, Ukraine requires support from its international partners to fully leverage the advantages of AI as a competitive edge across all battlefields and frontlines in its fight against a conventionally superior adversary.

+ +

The conclusion of this paper presents recommendations on how the U.S. government can collaborate with Ukraine to harness the advantages of military AI development and ensure that both nations remain at the forefront of AI and defense innovation.

+ +

1. Providing strategic support

+ +

The United States, with its technological superiority and numerous AI-related defense programs, is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine in addressing its challenge of lacking a cohesive, government-led strategy for defense technology development. Given the United States’ forward-looking and long-term AI development plans, it can collaborate with Ukraine to craft a comprehensive, mid-term strategy for integrating AI into its military for beyond immediate tactical solutions.

+ +

This support would offer Ukraine much-needed guidance to align its decentralized bottom-up approach with a coherent national vision, allowing volunteer groups, start-ups, the defense sector, and government institutions to operate in synergy with national priorities. This approach could help Ukraine align government stakeholders’ efforts in accordance with a single strategy in order to avoid wasting resources, and it could increase competition by promoting efficient resource allocation and funding for AI-enabled capabilities development.

+ +

The benefits for the United States are twofold. First, by collaborating with Ukraine, the United States can access real-time insights into the application of AI technologies in active warfare, gaining valuable data that can enhance its own AI capabilities. Second, support for Ukraine’s efforts is a contribution to strengthening the global security architecture and countering common adversaries.

+ +

2. Unlocking battlefield data for innovation

+ +

To harness the full potential of AI in defense, Ukraine must build a collaborative framework that brings government authorities and private sector innovators together on data-sharing strategies. This framework should regulate access to and use of real-world combat data by establishing clear legal procedures and protocols for data collection, storage, and sharing — all while safeguarding national security. Such an environment would streamline access for approved developers and foster sustainable business models, incentivizing private investment in military AI research.

+ +

The United States could play a pivotal role in enabling this effort, helping Ukraine develop a technical and regulative framework by drawing from its own experience of data exchange within global projects such as the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, where military data is shared among allied countries and the U.S. military. This initiative could set a global precedent for responsible data sharing in defense technology development. Ukraine could monetize its combat data by offering access to countries, organizations such as NATO, and even private defense companies in order to improve their AI tech and the interoperability of all parties involved.

+ +

3. Closing a feedback loop

+ +

Currently, the United States sends significant military aid to Ukraine, including drones, and many U.S. start-ups and drone manufacturers are contributing by donating their products through volunteers, NGOs, and Ukrainian government initiatives. However, there is no established system for collecting feedback on the performance and effectiveness of these drones on the battlefield, leaving the feedback loop incomplete. Establishing a more structured and standardized feedback collection process would be highly beneficial for both parties.

+ +

For U.S. companies, faster and more organized feedback would enable them to shorten their iteration cycles, update their platforms and software more rapidly, and scale up production of cutting-edge technology. This is particularly important when it comes to AI, where software updates can be implemented much quicker than hardware — without the need to alter supply chains, source new components, or update manufacturing processes. On the Ukrainian side, this would mean receiving more advanced and better-suited capabilities for their battlefield conditions, as U.S. companies have the resources and capital to accelerate drone and AI development, as well as to scale up production. By closing this feedback loop, both the United States and Ukraine can enhance their technological capabilities and improve the effectiveness of military assistance on the ground.

+ +

4. Considering Ukraine’s AI in U.S. foreign aid

+ +

Current U.S. financial assistance to Ukraine, primarily through USAID, has been vital for the digital development of the country. However, by integrating an AI component into this aid, the United States can achieve two key objectives: enhancing Ukraine’s AI capabilities and securing a role in what could become a global AI development hub.

+ +

Ukraine’s regulatory environment for AI is highly permissive, and its political leadership is open to embracing technological risks for significant advancements. This combination creates a unique “laboratory” for AI development that the United States cannot afford to overlook. This approach requires more than just funding; it necessitates providing computing infrastructure to key AI innovation centers in Ukraine, such as the MoD, research institutions, and labs. By equipping these entities with the necessary computational power, AI research and development can accelerate at an unprecedented pace.

+ +

5. Offering AI-focused training, experience exchange, and entrepreneurial development programs

+ +

The U.S. government should establish training and experience exchange programs for Ukraine’s defense entrepreneurs. These programs would focus on developing expertise in AI applications, the specifics of defense industry, and international market and investor relations to build successful defense-oriented enterprises. Given the rapid growth of Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem, these initiatives would enable entrepreneurs to gain a deeper understanding of how to attract investments, scale innovations, and align with national security objectives. For the United States, such programs offer the opportunity to strengthen collaboration with Ukraine’s emerging defense sector. This partnership would give the United States valuable connections with Ukrainian innovators across the defense industry, benefiting both nations in shaping the future of AI in national security and defense.

+ +

The development and integration of military AI into future weapon systems is inevitable. While the United States leads in technological innovation, it faces limitations in testing these advancements under real combat conditions. Collaboration with Ukraine presents a unique and mutually beneficial opportunity to bridge this gap. By working together with Ukraine, the United States can gain firsthand insights into the practical applications of military AI and autonomous systems without putting “boots on the ground.” Otherwise, real combat environments remain theoretical or simulated for U.S. systems manufacturers. Moreover, this partnership can provide valuable contributions to the international debate on safe and responsible AI deployment, offering concrete evidence from battlefield usage to help construct a global framework for military AI governance. As AI continues to reshape defense landscapes, U.S.-Ukraine collaboration stands to advance technological innovation while setting standards for responsible and ethical AI integration into military systems worldwide.

+ +
+ +

Kateryna Bondar is a fellow with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

+ +
+ +
+ +
+ + + + + +

+ Made with by Agora + +

+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/index.html b/hkers/index.html index 811e630e..0033a582 100644 --- a/hkers/index.html +++ b/hkers/index.html @@ -67,6 +67,22 @@
UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
+
+
+

Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem

+ + +
Kateryna Bondar | 2024.11.12
+

This report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.

+ + +
< Full Article >
+
+ +
+ + +

Too Good To Lose

@@ -117,14 +133,14 @@
<
-

SIFMANet Budapest Report

- +

Crossing Deepfake Rubicon

+ -
Gonzalo Saiz and Balázs Gyimesi | 2024.10.31
-

Discussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.

+
Di Cooke, et al. | 2024.11.01
+

New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?

-
< Full Article >
+
< Full Article >
@@ -133,14 +149,14 @@
<
-

China In Global South Ports

- +

SIFMANet Budapest Report

+ -
Daniel F. Runde, et al. | 2024.10.30
-

Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.

+
Gonzalo Saiz and Balázs Gyimesi | 2024.10.31
+

Discussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.

-
< Full Article >
+
< Full Article >
@@ -149,14 +165,14 @@
<
-

AI Safety Institute Network

- +

More Than Meets The Eye

+ -
Gregory C. Allen and Georgia Adamson | 2024.10.30
-

The AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.

+
Japhet Quitzon and Gregory B. Poling | 2024.10.31
+

Though U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.

-
< Full Article >
+
< Full Article >
@@ -165,14 +181,14 @@
<
-

Stay Ahead

- +

China In Global South Ports

+ -
Navin Girishankar, et al. | 2024.10.29
-

This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.

+
Daniel F. Runde, et al. | 2024.10.30
+

Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.

-
< Full Article >
+
< Full Article >
@@ -181,14 +197,14 @@
<
-

Cockpit Or Command Center?

- +

AI Safety Institute Network

+ -
Benjamin Jensen, et al. | 2024.10.29
-

The future of airpower hinges on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to integrate autonomous drones into manned formations. This analysis explores the trade-offs between cockpit and command center–based control in shaping the next era of combat operations.

+
Gregory C. Allen and Georgia Adamson | 2024.10.30
+

The AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.

-
< Full Article >
+
< Full Article >
@@ -197,33 +213,23 @@
<
-

Operation Days Of Repentance

- +

Stay Ahead

+ -
Matthew Savill and Dr Burcu Ozcelik | 2024.10.28
-

Israel’s recent strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure signal the vulnerability of Tehran’s air defences and expose the limitations of its regional deterrence strategy.

+
Navin Girishankar, et al. | 2024.10.29
+

This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.

-
< Full Article >
+
< Full Article >
-
-
-

Japan-U.S. Cybersecurity

- -
Taro Hashimoto | 2024.10.25
-

Cybersecurity is the foundation for a robust U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the cybersecurity policies of both countries and the prospects for future collaboration on critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.

- - -
< Full Article >
-
- -
+ +