From 77816ef9787fe80601b54dd6774b81579dbe908c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2023 03:47:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x1d Jun.15' --- .../_hkers/2023-06-01-quiet-cyber-front.md | 61 ++++++++++++++++ .../_hkers/2023-06-05-kingdom-of-change.md | 70 +++++++++++++++++++ ...-06-14-ukraines-counteroffensive-begins.md | 40 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 171 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-quiet-cyber-front.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-06-05-kingdom-of-change.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-ukraines-counteroffensive-begins.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-quiet-cyber-front.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-quiet-cyber-front.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0fb7ad8b --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-quiet-cyber-front.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Quiet Cyber Front? +author: Pia Hüsch and Joseph Jarnecki +date : 2023-06-01 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/hrZOXHO.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "All Quiet on the Cyber Front? Explaining Russia’s Limited Cyber Effects" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Russian cyber operations in Ukraine have not met expectations that a ‘cyber Pearl Harbour’ would form part of the next large-scale military confrontation. Victor Zhora, Deputy Chairman and Chief Digital Transformation Officer of the SSSCIP (the State Special Communications Service of Ukraine), provided his perspective on the lack of Russian success in the cyber domain._ + + + +Ukraine, having long been targeted by Russian cyber operations, has been subject to an uptick in attacks both before and since the Russian invasion in February 2022. These can be divided into three types of cyber operations: cyber espionage that seeks to collect information and data; subversive operations including propaganda, influence and information operations; and destructive and disruptive operations – for example, those seeking to disrupt communications systems. Zhora’s contribution focused primarily on Russian destructive and disruptive operations against Ukraine and their limited success to date. + +Zhora suggested that some key Russian accesses to Ukrainian networks were compromised before the February 2022 invasion. This denied Russia the ability to leverage these to deliver cyber operations. Attempts to secure new accesses are time-consuming and complicated, thereby delaying any potential impact operations. + +Further, Zhora identified several resource challenges to Russian operations that he argued have limited their effectiveness. He argued that the emigration of Russian tech professionals has seen a ‘brain drain’ of vital skills from Russia, which has constrained its ability to deploy sophisticated hacking capabilities against Ukraine as the war has unfolded. + +Zhora also asserted that Western sanctions have played a part in limiting Russia’s cyber effectiveness. Many states, led by the EU and the US, have imposed increased sanctions against Russia since February 2022, including in the area of technology. Zhora argues these sanctions have made it challenging for Russia to expand sovereign cloud systems. Instead, Russia has to rely on servers abroad, an unattractive choice given that many Western tech companies have stopped selling cloud services in Russia, and that the Kremlin also fears that data stored on foreign cloud services is more easily monitored by foreign intelligence agencies. Zhora believes that, among other things, this has hampered Russia’s ability to launch cyber operations. + +___`Private sector support is a vital part of Ukraine’s cyber defence, and cooperation with international partners has been key to Ukrainian success`___ + +In addition, Zhora acknowledged the fundamental point that in a brutal kinetic conflict like Russia’s war against Ukraine, destructive cyber operations are simply much less relevant. Russia is using traditional kinetic weapons to achieve desired effects on critical infrastructure, rather than attempting to undertake complex cyber operations. + + +### Russian Weaknesses Meet Ukrainian Strengths + +Alongside Russia’s issues, Zhora highlighted the strength of Ukrainian cyber defence as a decisive factor limiting Russian successes in cyberspace. As Russian weaknesses and Ukrainian strengths are two sides of the same coin, it makes sense to take a closer look at what makes Ukraine’s cyber defence successful. He highlighted two factors: continued private sector support, and the support of overseas governments and volunteers who have joined Ukrainian efforts in cyberspace. + + +### Private Sector Support for Ukrainian Cyber Defence + +Ukrainian cyber defence has been bolstered by the rapid delivery of cyber capacities and capabilities by the private sector. This has, broadly, materialised in two ways. First, companies have provided direct support to the Ukrainian government ecosystem. In this case, big tech companies such as Microsoft, Google and Amazon have been forward-leaning across diverse areas including the provision of licenses, threat hunting and cloud migration. Second, companies have been contracted by foreign governments to provide support. The UK Ukraine Cyber Programme, for example, has engaged partnerships with industry to provide incident response to support Ukrainian government entities against malicious attacks and tools to limit attacker access to vital networks. Private sector support is a vital part of Ukraine’s cyber defence, and cooperation with international partners has been key to Ukrainian success. + + +### Volunteers Supporting Ukrainian Cyber Defence Efforts + +Throughout his talk, Zhora repeatedly stressed the importance of efforts by ‘volunteers’ to Ukrainian successes – including in cyberspace. Zhora explicitly mentioned private sector-led schemes which allow volunteers to identify vulnerabilities in Ukrainian networks; however, the label also encompasses Ukrainian patriotic hackers who launch offensive cyber operations, including against Russian civilian infrastructure. The level of involvement by the Ukrainian government with these networks is problematically unclear, given that the extent of government control has consequences under international law. While Ukrainian officials frequently claim there is no coordination, there has at the very least been encouragement from the authorities. For example, Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov urged ‘digital talents’ to join the ‘Ukrainian IT army’ – essentially a loosely organised movement made up of members of a Telegram chat who not only identify and patch Ukrainian vulnerabilities, but also target Russian and Belarusian infrastructure. The Ukrainian IT army has raised questions concerning international law, including fears that the civilianisation of cyber operations is ‘a risky trend’. Throughout the conversation, Zhora was careful not to refer directly to the ‘Ukrainian IT army’, but instead spoke exclusively of the supporting role of volunteers and Ukrainian plans to incorporate a cyber reserve into military structures, a proposal that is reportedly inspired by the Estonian Cyber Defense Unit. + +___`While there have been no overwhelmingly destructive cyber attacks in Ukraine so far, the cyber front is far from ‘quiet’`___ + + +### Cyber Warfare in Ukraine Setting Precedents + +The absence of a strategically significant destructive cyber campaign targeting Ukraine does not mean that the role of cyber operations in interstate relations should be underestimated. On the contrary, countries will continue to monitor the effectiveness of cyber operations in Ukraine, as it represents a pivotal case study. Both China and Taiwan will doubtless be looking for lessons to improve their respective capabilities. More broadly, other countries need to ask themselves what they can do to strengthen their cyber defences. Zhora spoke about a number of measures taken to improve Ukrainian cyber defences, repeating often heard but nonetheless vital calls for greater cyber security awareness, education and training. However, implementing procedures and protocols requires a trained cyber workforce – a global problem which is not unique to Ukraine. + + +### No Reason to Relax on Cyber Defence – Support for Ukraine Remains Needed + +When asked whether he expects destructive Russian cyber attacks will continue to have minimal impact, Zhora stressed that this depends largely on Ukrainian defence capabilities. He warned that Russia persists in seeking greater effect through its cyber operations, pointing to ongoing efforts to identify vulnerabilities in Ukrainian systems. For Ukraine’s allies, this means that support for the country’s cyber defence must be maintained. Continued support from international partners – notably those within the NATO alliance like the US and UK – and support from the private sector remain pivotal. Zhora explained, for example, that Ukrainian budgets for cyber defence have decreased given the need to purchase kinetic weapons. Without the necessary resources – whether it is money, people or technology – Ukraine’s cyber defence risks faltering. + +While there have been no overwhelmingly destructive cyber attacks in Ukraine so far, the cyber front is far from ‘quiet’. Cyber remains a key domain across which Russia seeks operational effects to impact and disrupt Ukraine, as well as to influence and undermine its position. As such, continued efforts towards cyber defence must remain crucial for Ukraine, its supporters and its allies – be they in the public or private sector. + +--- + +__Pia Hüsch__ is a Research Analyst in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focusses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations. Prior to joining RUSI, Pia conducted her doctoral research on the lawfulness of low-intensity offensive cyber operations in international law, particularly under the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Her other research interests include the governance of cyberspace, election interference, cyberwarfare and the relationship between law and technology, including cyber and artificial intelligence. + +__Joseph Jarnecki__ is a Research Fellow in cyber threats and cyber security. His research focuses on cyber security capacity building and how advanced technologies pose opportunities and risks to economic security. Prior to joining RUSI, he worked as a research assistant at King’s College London on projects focusing on practices of democratic oversight and control over intelligence services, as well as on risk and responsibility in cyber security. His research interests include UK cyber policy, both foreign and domestic, as well as transnational data security, ransomware, the development of smart cities and the place of the internet in developing democratic and economic participation. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-05-kingdom-of-change.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-05-kingdom-of-change.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..51117331 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-05-kingdom-of-change.md @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Kingdom Of Change +author: Tobias Borck +date : 2023-06-05 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/gknTPoC.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Saudi Arabia’s Evolving Foreign Policy" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_What lies behind Riyadh’s recent spate of diplomatic initiatives – and how likely are they to succeed?_ + + + +Over the past few months, Saudi Arabia has attracted international attention with one diplomatic initiative after another – from its beginning of normalisation with Iran, to peace talks with the Yemeni Houthis, to the reintegration of Syria into the Arab League, to efforts to broker a ceasefire in Sudan, to hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during the Arab League Summit in Jeddah in mid-May. + +Media coverage under headlines like ‘Saudi Arabia’s journey from troublemaker to diplomat’ seems to suggest that this is the result of some sort of recent about-face in Saudi foreign policy. In reality, however, it reflects a coming to the fore of what has long been the Kingdom’s preferred approach to foreign affairs. It highlights an evolution in how Saudi Arabia is positioning itself and operating on the regional and international stage, but without indicating a change in the country’s strategic direction. + +One of the primary objectives of Saudi foreign policy has always been to counter and contain instability in the Middle East in order to keep threats at bay, limit risks to the free flow of oil exports from the Gulf and facilitate the Kingdom’s domestic economic development. + +Since the rise to power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the mid-2010s, this has become even more explicit. Riyadh’s number-one priority is the implementation of Vision 2030, the hugely ambitious socio-economic reform programme that is supposed to transform Saudi Arabia into a modern, globally integrated knowledge economy which is less and less reliant on its hydrocarbon riches. The primary task for Saudi foreign policy is to support and enable this process, not least by reducing the threats posed to the Vision by instability or conflict in Saudi Arabia’s neighbourhood. + +The various actions during the early years of the Mohammed bin Salman era that earned Saudi Arabia a lot of international criticism and a reputation for imperious foreign policy adventurism were driven by this same objective. + +In Yemen, Saudi Arabia saw the Houthis as posing an unacceptable threat to its national security that it hoped to remove with a short and decisive military intervention. But Saudi Arabia both underestimated the Houthis and overestimated its own military capabilities, and since its start in 2015, the conflict has essentially become the Kingdom’s own ‘forever war’, one which it is increasingly eager to extricate itself from. + +The diplomatic and economic boycott that Saudi Arabia and others in the region imposed on Qatar in 2017 was supposed to rein in Doha’s regional activism, which Riyadh regarded as undermining regional stability. But Qatar proved to be more resilient than anticipated, and most countries around the world – including Saudi Arabia’s partners in the West – regarded the rift between the Gulf monarchies as an entirely unnecessary irritant. + +The November 2017 attempt to pressure then-Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign in protest against Hezbollah and Iranian interference was part of a wider Saudi effort to push back against what Riyadh saw as Tehran’s malign and destabilising behaviour across the region. But the move only sparked international controversy and outrage, while Iranian influence grew. + +___`Saudi Arabia is not looking to substitute Beijing for Washington – it has no illusions that China would want or be able to become the main guarantor of maritime security in the Gulf`___ + +Just as international observers could assess that these and other Saudi actions did not lead to the desired outcomes, decision-makers in Riyadh – including Mohammed bin Salman – will likely also have concluded that their approach was not working. This was also helped by the fact that Mohammed bin Salman had increasingly identified capable and trusted individuals for key positions, including his brother Khalid bin Salman at the Ministry of Defence (as Deputy Minister since 2019 and Minister since 2022) and Prince Faisal bin Farhan as Minister of Foreign Affairs (since 2019). + +This sense that something needed to change was further reinforced by an increasing disillusionment with US policy towards the region. Ups and downs in the bilateral relationship between Riyadh and Washington are nothing new, but over the past two decades, Saudi Arabia has grown ever more doubtful of the US’s commitment to upholding the Middle East’s basic regional order. The George W Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq, and the Obama administration’s pursuit of a nuclear deal with Iran over the heads of Saudi Arabia and other regional countries, were key moments in this regard. + +But the most important moment came in September 2019. A drone and missile attack on some of the Kingdom’s most important oil installations in Abqaiq and Khurais, which was widely attributed to Iran, painfully demonstrated Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability in any potential military confrontation with the Islamic Republic. More importantly, the lack of a decisive US response to the attack was taken as a sign that Washington could not be relied upon to stand up for the Kingdom’s security, or even for the security of the oil industry. + +In the years since, Saudi Arabia has recalibrated its foreign policy, continuing to focus on the same overall objective of supporting Vision 2030, but looking to leverage Saudi instruments of power in a more patient and pragmatic manner. This includes trying out new approaches to existing challenges while being prepared for the fact that they might not work out, and working with alternative partners where suitable, even in the face of criticism from Washington or other Western capitals. Riyadh remains open to collaborating with the US – as is evident from the current joint Saudi-US mediation efforts in Sudan – but in areas where it feels that the US has adopted an unhelpful position or is not sufficiently engaged, it is prepared to go it alone or to solicit help from China or others. + +Much ink has been spilled over the past year about the state of the US-Saudi relationship, with many interpreting Riyadh’s dealings with Beijing or Moscow as specifically directed against Washington or signifying an attempt to move away from the West’s orbit and towards the East. From Riyadh’s perspective, however, this is not what it is trying to do. + +Saudi Arabia is not looking to substitute Beijing for Washington – it certainly has no illusions that China or any other country would want or be able to take on the mantle of being the main guarantor of maritime security in the Gulf, which has been worn by the US Fifth Fleet for decades. It still sees the US and – to a lesser extent – the UK and France as its most important defence partners, and still sees Western economies as key sources of inspiration, technology and investment for making Vision 2030 a reality. The West also remains the favoured destination for investments by Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund. + +However, without wanting to put any of this in jeopardy, Riyadh is also looking to expand ties with China, which it increasingly regards as a strategic partner capable of much more than buying up large quantities of Saudi oil – particularly with regard to technology transfer; and with Russia, which Saudi Arabia sees as an indispensable partner in trying to manage and influence international oil markets within the context of OPEC+. + +Overall, Saudi Arabia is trying put itself in a position in which it can have constructive relations with everyone – including global powers that are at odds with one another – and in which disputes on specific issues do not have to lead to ruptures in relations, but can be tolerated by agreeing to disagree. This is also the posture Saudi Arabia has adopted with regard to regional affairs. + +___`Buoyed by impressive economic growth and a sense that its international image has mostly recovered from the crisis of the late 2010s, Saudi Arabia feels that things are going its way`___ + +The 2017–2021 dispute with Qatar was not so much resolved as simply declared to be a thing of the past. Riyadh and Doha still do not see eye to eye on everything, but there seems to be a mutual acceptance of the need to look for ways to work together while managing disagreements quietly. + +Saudi Arabia has entered the process of normalising relations with Iran without any illusions that the regime in Tehran and its destabilising regional agenda have changed or will fundamentally change anytime soon. Instead, it hopes that China will exert sufficient influence over Iran to reduce risks to security in the Gulf and secure Iranian buy-in for de-escalation of the war in Yemen. At the same time, Riyadh is looking to improve its ability to defend itself against future Iranian attacks, while making a long-term bet that the success of its domestic socio-economic reforms will eventually inspire change in Arab countries dominated by Iran and, ultimately, in Iran itself. + +In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has – however begrudgingly – accepted that the Houthis cannot be militarily defeated for now. Working with trusted interlocutors like Oman, and hoping for Chinese influence to restrain Iran, it is therefore trying to arrive at a new modus operandi with the group, which remains in control of the Yemeni capital of Sanaa and much of the northern part of the country. It wants to secure a permanent end to cross-border attacks – especially the missile and drone strikes that threaten Saudi cities and tarnish the Kingdom’s image as an attractive place to invest and do business – and adopt a position as the main mediator between all Yemeni factions, including the Houthis and those aligned within the fragile Presidential Council arrangement. Here, it would also like the UN to be involved again. + +With regard to Syria, Saudi Arabia has essentially embraced and supercharged an initiative put forward by Jordan to re-engage Damascus in order to address pressing challenges. Based on a sense that the West has lost all interest in Syria now that the threat from Islamic State has been contained and overall levels of violence have decreased, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and others have come to the conclusion that they have no other option but to engage with the Assad regime in order to deal with Syrian refugee populations (a major concern for Jordan) and – most immediately – the flow of drugs from Syria, for which un- and underemployed young people across the Arab world, and especially in the Gulf, are a significant customer base. + +The question is, of course, what kind of concessions Saudi Arabia and its partners can actually elicit from the Syrian regime, for which the drug trade appears to be a primary source of income. The normalisation process is supposed to follow a step-for-step approach, but thus far Damascus appears to have offered next to nothing. + +In fact, the outcomes of all of these diplomatic initiatives by Saudi Arabia are highly uncertain. Much of it is simply outside the Kingdom’s control – from China’s actual willingness and ability to exert influence over Tehran, to the machinations of the various components of the Iranian and Syrian regimes, to the readiness of the Houthis to abandon years of intransigence. On the global stage, too, Saudi Arabia may want to be able to freely develop and expand its relations with all major powers at the same time, but it would find it very difficult indeed to navigate a world in which the US and China were to tie their own willingness to deal with the Kingdom to Riyadh shunning the other power. + +For the moment, Saudi Arabia’s answers to such questions reflect its self-confidence. Buoyed by impressive economic growth on the back of windfall oil revenues and a sense that its international image – and that of its Crown Prince – has mostly recovered from the crisis of the late 2010s, Saudi Arabia feels that things are going its way. It insists that it is in a strong enough position – as the world’s leading oil exporter, a G20 member with the ambition to soon be among the world’s top 15 economies, and the Arab and Islamic world’s centre of gravity – to chart its own course and to resist any pressure to choose sides. And in the region, it feels that even if its own initiatives might not be perfect, they are at least better than what anyone else has come up with in recent years. + +That said, should things fall apart, Saudi Arabia and its foreign policy will continue to adjust. What will remain the same, however, is Riyadh’s central mantra: doing whatever it takes to secure the ongoing development and modernisation effort at home. + +--- + +__Tobias Borck__ is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East. He also co-leads the development and delivery of the RUSI Leadership Centre’s programme of executive education training courses, including for diplomats, military personnel, and security professionals from the Middle East and beyond. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-ukraines-counteroffensive-begins.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-ukraines-counteroffensive-begins.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..341b6e85 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-ukraines-counteroffensive-begins.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : UA’s Counteroffensive Begins +author: Jack Watling +date : 2023-06-14 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/POcfAnj.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Begins: Shall the Leopards Break Free?" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Ukrainian forces are making gains, but the offensive is some way from its decisive phase; we must refrain from premature pronouncements of success or failure._ + + + +Ukrainian forces have launched their long-anticipated offensive in an attempt to break through Russian defence lines to liberate the occupied territories. Ukrainian troops have broken through initial fighting positions along a broad part of the front, but remain some distance from Russia’s main defence line. Kyiv has yet to commit the bulk of its forces as its lead elements try to set the conditions for a breakthrough. + +The fighting so far has been tough. Russia’s initial fighting positions constituted fox holes and hand-dug trenches, but behind these were complex minefields of anti-tank and antipersonnel mines, covered by Russian UAVs and artillery. The main defence line, still 15–20 km from Ukrainian positions, has properly dug trenches and concrete-reinforced firing posts, tank obstacles, ground-laid cable to coordinate artillery strikes, and even more mines. Behind that are the reserve fighting positions of the third defence line. + +The fighting will likely get tougher. As Ukrainian forces penetrate deeper into the defences, they will come into range of more Russian artillery firing posts. Moreover, their own artillery will be able to deliver fewer counterbattery missions, and the Ukrainian lines of advance will become more predictable, as they must follow the breaches identified in the minefields. As Ukrainian troops push forwards, they will also be covered by fewer air defences, and will likely come under greater attack by the Russian Aerospace Forces and aviation. + +Given these threats, the Ukrainian military is currently trying to achieve three things. Firstly, there is an intense counterbattery duel being fought, with both sides trying to strike each other’s logistics, command and control, reconnaissance, and artillery systems. The Russians are hunting for Ukraine’s artillery with Lancet UAVs. The Ukrainians are utilising Storm Shadow and GMLRS to try to destroy Russian command and control and munitions stockpiles. + +Secondly, the Ukrainians are trying to get the Russians to commit their reserves, moving troops from the third defence line to bolster sectors under pressure. Once these troops are pulled forwards, it will become easier to identify the weak points in the Russian lines, where a breakthrough will not be met by a new screen of repositioned forces. + +___`Success is binary, not linear. The line is either broken or it is not, and Kyiv must shape the battlefield to maximise the probability of a breach`___ + +Thirdly, the Ukrainian military is trying to put pressure across the front to advance through the first line of defences in as much breadth as possible. The reason for this is to increase the options for attacking the main defence line and to keep Russian forces uncertain as to where the main effort will be launched. Furthermore, with such a long front, stretching out Russian troops limits their ability to stack units in depth, pulling more forward. + +At some point, the Ukrainians will have to decide where to commit their main assault units, and the offensive will enter its decisive phase. This decision must be conditions-based. It isn’t about adhering to some fixed timeline. When these units are committed, the offensive will either achieve a breakthrough or fail. Success is binary, not linear. The line is either broken or it is not, and Kyiv must shape the battlefield to maximise the probability of a breach. + +The extent of a success will be determined by how much progress is made on the other side of the breach. If a breach can be achieved, then the critical question will be how many units Ukraine has in reserve to surge forward and exploit the success. If operations are currently methodical, once a breach in the line occurs, speed will be of the essence. + +The uncertain variable in the current offensive is Russian morale. Russian units are currently fighting from prepared positions and their command-and-control infrastructure is mostly intact, though some key command posts have been struck. If Russian units can be forced to reposition, however, the poor training and discipline of Moscow’s forces could see the defence become uncoordinated and susceptible to collapse. Bringing about such conditions would require some significant actions by the Ukrainians to get the Russians moving, but it is possible under such conditions for the strength of the defence to crumble rapidly. Ukraine can endeavour to bring such a situation about, but it cannot be counted on. + +For Ukraine’s international partners, the summer is likely to be deeply uncomfortable. Losses will mount and success will take time. It is vital, however, that there is no diminution in the strengthening of the training programmes allowing Ukraine to continue to generate combat units, or the mobilisation of defence industry to put supply to the Ukrainian military on a sustainable basis. However much territory is liberated in this offensive, the critical variable is convincing the Kremlin that even if its defeat comes in stages, it is coming. + +--- + +__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts.