diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-19-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk2.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-19-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk2.md
new file mode 100644
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第二周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-02-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/E5u6pwZ.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 區諾軒作供稱「我驚背漏」 民主派就否決預算案現分歧
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第二周。首名控方證人、同案認罪被告區諾軒本周開始作供，披露初選的籌備和協調過程。
+
+這宗至今最大規模的國安案件，關鍵在於各被告參加初選時有否達成協議，即同意無差別否決財政預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，以達致顛覆國家政權的目的。
+
+據區諾軒首周證供，初選源於2020年1月一場飯局。戴耀廷形容立會過半是「大殺傷力憲制武器」，可運用權力爭取「五大訴求」，並討論建立協調機制，其後不斷提倡在各區協調會議文件加入「積極運用《基本法》權力，否決財政預算案」的條款。不過各與會者對此有不同意見，其中鄒家成曾質疑為何僅用「積極」而非「會」，社民連則表示若預算案包括「全民退保」，他們會支持。
+
+本周另一關注點，是控方確認會引用「共謀者原則」舉證，意味所有其他被告的言行，均可用來推論被告參與串謀。辯方一度提出被告《國安法》前的言行不屬串謀一部分，但法官指串謀屬「持續罪行」，《國安法》後原本合法的行為也可變成非法，此前言行可證被告的思想狀態。
+
+此外，區諾軒作供時，透露他在被控後半年、2021年9月已協助警方調查，獲展示另一被告趙家賢的WhatsApp紀錄；又表示閱讀戴耀廷〈真攬炒十步〉一文後，向戴表示「佢嘅想法太瘋狂」。區庭上亦屢提「我相信」等不確定字眼和談及個人觀察，遭法官要求停止發表演說，及講述事實而非個人推測；區作供時又一度稱「我驚我背漏」，遭官提醒作供非背誦。
+
+至於審訊第一周原獲安排坐在正庭的列席認罪被告，今周被帶到兩個延伸庭觀看直播，意味無法親睹證人作供及與不認罪被告見面。而法院外，連日有逾百人排隊輪候旁聽，一度出現20多名非華裔人士，《獨媒》亦成功聯絡一名蛇頭，記者通宵排隊後獲800元。
+
+
+
+
+### 2020年1月飯局首商初選 會面者對否決預算案有保留或不關心
+
+根據區諾軒本周供詞，初選「一切係由一個飯局開始」。他於2020年1月尾與戴耀廷等4人進行飯局，當時戴已發表〈立會奪半 走向真普選重要一步〉一文，並於席間討論民主派區選大勝後，如何在立法會「再下一城」。眾人討論建立協調機制，戴耀廷較堅持「公民投票」形式，並指立會過半是「大殺傷力憲制武器」，可利用《基本法》賦予的權力否決財政預算案，解散立法會並令特首下台，爭取「五大訴求」。區諾軒答應與戴耀廷合辦初選，並討論由「民主動力」負責行政工作。
+
+區諾軒與戴耀廷其後於2月至3月，各自或一同會見民主派政黨及有意參選人，簡介初選和徵詢意見。值得留意的是，戴耀廷與區諾軒一同會面時，區稱戴均有提及立會過半後能掌握否決權爭五大訴求，亦在會見公民黨時詳細講及兩次否決預算案並解散立法會，「最壞後果」是特首下台。不過到區諾軒單獨會見時，則只是提及初選是揀選民主派代表、可爭取最大勝算的制度，沒有提及否決財政預算案，因為「我唔認為初選要係一個綑綁議員當選後工作嘅計劃。」
+
+就當時會見的民主派，公民黨和彭卓棋均關心投電子抑或實體票，因會影響勝算，但對否決財政預算案則分別有保留或不關心；至於其他人亦沒有表明參與意欲，朱凱廸「唔係好關心」，梁晃維沒回應是否參與，黃子悅只想了解初選是什麼一回事，區亦不記得劉頴匡的回應。黃之鋒則「以朋友身分忠告」將要留學的區無必要辦初選。
+
+
+
+
+### 戴耀廷協調會議倡積極用權否決預算案 民主派現意見分歧
+
+區諾軒與戴耀廷其後就5個地方選區及超級區議會召開協調會議，商討初選機制。區諾軒指，戴耀廷準備了一份介紹初選機制、提及「五大訴求，缺一不可」的「35+計劃」文件於會上傳閱，戴之後亦為不同地區製作另一份初選協調機制的文件。區形容，戴當時不斷建議在各區協調文件加入「積極運用《基本法》權力，否決財政預算案」的條款，即使有意見分歧，「佢都好堅持講佢嘅諗法，然後將佢對35+嘅諗法，加入去協調機制嘅內容裡面」。
+
+戴耀廷的想法，獲得不同的回應。其中最先開會的九龍東，區諾軒指該句「應該」包含在一份已刪除的會議摘要內，顯示與會者的初步共識，但無印象有人有特別回應。而在港島區，司馬文提出反對，戴耀廷遂解釋「積極」一字代表「可以用，可以唔用」，若政府不聽民意就可運用。戴會後再將該句加進協調文件，但與會者未再有積極討論，區形容他們「漠不關心」。
+
+在九龍西，張崑陽表示支持否決財政預算案，但社民連岑子杰則認為有些民生議案他要支持，例如全民退保。在新界東，鄒家成質問為何用「積極」而非意思較確定的「會」一字，引起激辯，民主黨林卓廷代表莊榮輝稱不獲授權處理問題，社民連梁國雄代表陳寶瑩稱會支持民生議案如全民退保，戴耀廷則解釋「積極」一字「比乜都唔用行前一步，希望可以寫得彈性少少」，會上最終未有達成共識。區形容戴的解釋是「迎合不同意見」。
+
+至於新界西，區諾軒沒有出席，不能評論。而最後召開的超級區議會，他指當時「大局已定」，各區已大致就舉行初選和選舉論壇、目標勝算議席、及以「靈童制」作為替補機制達成共識，戴耀廷會上亦沒有提及否決財政預算案。此外，九西會議亦曾爭議政治立場較「尷尬」的人，如新思維狄志遠可否參選，戴耀廷當時回答：「只要認同『五大訴求』就可以參選。」
+
+
+
+區諾軒作供時又透露，他在被控後半年、2021年9月已協助警方調查，獲展示另一被告趙家賢的WhatsApp紀錄，而他被捕前已刪去所有WhatsApp紀錄，須靠趙家賢紀錄重溫。翻查資料，區於2021年9月的第二次提訊日首次表示擬認罪。
+
+區又承認，他負責籌備初選論壇，指2020年3月與戴耀廷傾談初選早期，已預期要辦選舉論壇，當時戴提議找《蘋果日報》及其他媒體合作。最終他與《蘋果》、《立場新聞》、城寨和D100合作，於6月25日至7月4日在蘋果日報大樓舉辦共6場論壇，民主動力負責選舉申報，庭上並逐一播放完整論壇片段。
+
+就本案的法律原則，法官在首周審訊曾提及，相信控方於本案依賴「共謀者原則（co-conspirator’s rule）」，以其他被告的言行推論被告參與串謀。控方今周確認會引用「共謀者原則」舉證，並將於完成控方案情前交代針對各被告的證據。其中九龍東初選論壇6名參加者只有一人不認罪，控方仍然播放全片。
+
+
+### 官提醒區諾軒勿發表演說 庭上播片被告屢發笑
+
+區諾軒作供期間不時提及個人意見，如指接觸民主派初期，當時會否用《基本法》權力否決預算案並非值得關心的議題，因為《基本法》賦予該否決權，「大家就覺得好理所當然」，而過往許多民主派每次都反對財政預算案，「一路都係相安無事」。惟法官李運騰着他停止發表演說並集中回答問題，以善用時間，否則會審到明年。
+
+區又屢次以「我相信」、「我認為」作開頭，被法官提醒法庭並不關注他「相信什麼」，而是「當時發生什麼事」。他亦提及多名未有在本案被起訴之人士。被問及九龍東協調會議出席者，區諾軒一度稱「我驚我背漏」，有被告面露驚訝和發笑，法官李運騰即提醒區：「你不是來背誦任何事情，你是來告訴我們你記得什麼。」
+
+庭上播放初選論壇片段時，不時引起被告各種反應。在九龍西選舉論壇片段中，多名候選人對黃碧雲提出質疑，其中馮達浚問黃碧雲如果當選，「你願唔願意同我一齊衝？」黃拍枱高聲答：「一齊衝，希望一齊贏！」；當劉澤鋒問黃：「你識唔識得唱《願榮光歸香港》呀？你唱嚟聽吓」，黃答「我哋一齊唱」，均惹來被告欄和旁聽席大笑，黃碧雲則笑着搖頭。
+
+而徐子見在港島區論壇自稱「好老嘅素人」，引來被告發笑，當主持多次問徐子見與其他年輕素人分別：「點解我唔揀個後生嘅呢，而家抗爭係年輕人嘅事喎？」，徐答：「有少少年齡歧視喎」，多名被告再次大笑。
+
+過往初選案的聆訊，列席的認罪被告一直獲安排與不認罪被告在同一被告欄就坐，惟當區諾軒開始出庭作供，此做法突然改變，列席被告被分別帶到兩個延伸庭觀看直播，無法親睹區諾軒作供。其中第一號法庭不設記者席，本周五（17日）現場輪候的公眾人數亦不足，最終沒有公眾獲准入內旁聽。
+
+審訊明天繼續，將會繼續播放初選論壇片段。
+
+
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-26-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk3.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-26-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk3.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..37cacee6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-26-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk3.md
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第三周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-02-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cA18E88.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 區諾軒：各區協議無公開惹爭議 戴耀廷初選後稱「不說癱瘓政府」
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第三周。首名控方證人、同案認罪被告區諾軒繼續作供，更詳細交待各區之間的協調以及組織者的考慮。
+
+本案關鍵在於各被告有否達成協議，同意無差別否決財政預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，以顛覆國家政權。那究竟各被告有否達成協議？如果有，又是在什麼時候？
+
+區諾軒本周表示，各區參與者在2020年6月初已達成共識，當時各區均有一份協調機制文件，列明「會積極／會運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」。但由於憂違法和被DQ，主辦方終沒有公開文件和要求簽署，不過卻引起參與者的異議，鄒家成等人發起「墨落無悔」聲明書，九東和新西亦相繼提出簽署協議，最終將協議夾附在提名表格。
+
+庭上首度披露提名表格，列明支持和認同協調會議的共識及35+目標，又有擁護《基本法》和效忠特區的條款。而在初選舉行、兩辦譴責或違法後，戴耀廷向所有參選人發訊息指他公開講35+目的，「不提否決每一個議案，也不說癱瘓政府」，區理解戴「想修正35+嘅講法，規避法律風險」。
+
+本周另一關注點，是控方釐清所有被告於2020年7月1日均已加入串謀，並確認下周一會交代「共謀者原則」下針對各被告的證據。此外，區諾軒庭上談及對「攬炒」、「抗爭派」等的理解，亦表示被捕前並不知道被控方指為初選組織者之一的吳政亨，是35+組織者之一。
+
+至於主控周天行，本周屢被法官質疑舉證和提問方式，3名法官質疑播放片段浪費時間，如將原材料而非烹煮好的菜餚呈予飢餓食客；又指控方不按時序發問令人難以跟上，甚至質疑控方猶如「在律師席上作證」。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月21日早上，西九龍法院外。
+
+
+### 區稱6月頭已達共識、5區各有協調文件 僅新西稱「會」而非「積極」用權否決財案
+
+區諾軒上周就初選的源起、與民主派首次接觸和各區協調會議過程作供，並指戴耀廷不斷提倡在各區協調文件加入「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」的條款。那最終協調的結果為何？參選人又在何時達成共識？
+
+區諾軒本周確認，戴耀廷在2020年6月3日，曾在組織者的WhatsApp群組發送6月9日初選記者會的採訪通知，提及經過三個多月努力，五個地方選區和超區的協調「終達成了協議」。在法官詢問下，區諾軒認為「當時參與者已達成共識」是公允的說法。
+
+但這個「共識／協議」到底是什麼？區諾軒說是戴耀廷6月8日在群組發出、總結各區會議共識的協調機制文件。文件條款提及認同「五大訴求，缺一不可」和爭取立會過半便可參與協調機制、目標議席數目、支持度不足須停止選舉工程等，以及在本案最重要的，「會積極運用《基本法》賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求」。
+
+區諾軒說，5個地方選區各有協調文件，條文大致相同，不過新界西文件用字不同，列明「會運用」，而非「會積極運用」權力否決預算案。
+
+
+### 主辦憂DQ違法無公開協議 鄒家成等發起「墨落無悔」、九東提發布公開協議
+
+但初選參與者是否就此達成了共識？
+
+區諾軒表示，由於當時有輿論指參選者表達否決預算案會被視為不尊重《基本法》而被DQ，亦擔心會觸犯《選舉及舞弊條例》，故最終沒有將協調文件公開，亦毋須參選人簽署作實，強調「我哋就算搞初選都好，基本嘅倫理係唔應該讓到參加者犯法」。
+
+但戴耀廷在6月9日記者會表達上述看法後，即惹來爭議。鄒家成、張可森和梁晃維於翌日發起「墨落無悔」聲明，讓參選人公開簽署，表明會運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求。
+
+與此同時，也有選區要求發布公開協議。區諾軒6月14日向組織者轉達九東參與者訊息，認為有必要發布一份大會認可的公開協議，說明「五大訴求，缺一不可」，並指若不接納「怕兵變」。區認為大會已無權威左右，加上憂慮其他區有類似行為，為免內鬥和「鬥黃」，終允許九東簽署該共同綱領，並夾附在提名表格。
+
+區透露，時任民主黨主席胡志偉曾私下向他表示，不欲簽非官方協議，因民主黨沒理由連「起學校、起醫院」都否決，亦怕協議陸續有來會被「揪秤」；尹兆堅亦曾指願簽聲明，只是不想無限簽民間聲明。但最後胡志偉還是以個人名義簽署九東共同綱領，區認為若沒有上述事件，相信胡並不會簽署，承認當時「有把關不力的責任」。
+
+
+### 官問是否所有參選者皆同意用否決權 區：唔敢咁武斷，只係話冇人公開反對
+
+不過就是否簽署或公開文件的爭議並未停止。6月19日，三名「墨落無悔」發起人再發文，質疑拒簽「墨落無悔」的參選人可無視協調會議的共識，並要求初選主辦單位回應。
+
+趙家賢將文章轉發至群組，區諾軒認為要說清楚「由頭到尾我理解個協議唔係冇咗，而係冇喺記者會公開」，遂於同日發布〈以正視聽——假如我有資格回應抗爭派立場聲明書發起人〉一文，澄清「就算沒有一份文件出台，但協調的協議實然存在」，又形容戴耀廷是「出於善心，不想徒添暴政羅織罪名」。
+
+區文中亦表示，「不見得有參與者對運用權力否決財政預算案態度保留。那大家反對的是誰？」法官陳慶偉一度問，區理解是否當時所有參與者都同意運用該否決權？區回應：「我唔敢咁武斷，只係話冇人公開反對啫」，並確認直至他7月15日退出初選工作，也沒有聽過人公開表明反對運用否決權。
+
+趙家賢轉發該訊息後，亦稱「屯門張可森依幾條友就擺到明要隊到行啦」，並強調區諾軒和戴耀廷曾在會議傳閱「白紙黑字」的共同協議；戴亦回覆，新西和九東參選人都同意簽署協議。
+
+
+
+
+### 提名表列支持協調共識及擁護基本法 戴於兩辦譴責後稱不提否決所有議案
+
+區諾軒確認，最終只有新西和九東兩區參選人，在報名的提名表格夾附該份「共同綱領」，內容與協調機制文件一致，表明「會／會積極」運用權力否決預算案。
+
+庭上展示這份被指為「關鍵文件」的提名表格，條款包括「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」；而選舉按金收據，亦列明須支持協調會議共識和35+目標，及「如候選人違反上述共識，將不予發還」。區諾軒同樣指，條款上的「協調會議共識」指各區的協調機制文件。
+
+此外，提名表格亦有條款「我特此聲明，我會擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特別行政區」，區諾軒解釋民主動力設計時，望每個參與者都能奉行該精神。
+
+最終初選於7月11至12日舉行，區諾軒確認，戴耀廷事後在各區群組發訊息，指公開講述35+目的「不提否決每一個議案，也不說癱瘓政府」，供各參選人參考。區指當時中聯辦和港澳辦譴責初選或犯法，理解戴「係想修正35+嘅講法，規避法律風險」。
+
+
+
+
+### 控方確認所有被告於2020.7.1已加入串謀、周一交代「共謀者原則」依賴證據
+
+控方於周五表示，主問大致完成。那到底本案的串謀是在何時開始？每位被告又在何時加入？法官陳慶偉強調串謀是流動的，可隨時加入和退出，又認為現時僅在首名控方證人主問階段，不要求控方現階段說明每位被告何時加入。不過控方在法官詢問下確認，本案所有被告均於控罪首日，即2020年7月1日已加入串謀，法官並重申，此前的初選「計劃（Scheme）」或者並不違法，不過在《國安法》實施後，便成了非法的「串謀（Conspiracy）」。
+
+至於控方上周已確認會援引的「共謀者原則（co-conspirator’s rule）」，有辯方在播放初選論壇片段時要求控方說明依賴其他被告的哪些言論舉證。控方一度指所有被告的言論都是證據，又望於陳詞才回應，惟法官李運騰反問「如果他們只說『Hello』，不能成為證據吧？」，又指以為控方開審前已有明確立場；辯方亦質疑控方在落案後兩年、審訊第11天仍不清楚案情。控方終確認會在辯方盤問前，於下周一交代如何使用「共謀者原則」。
+
+
+### 談「攬炒」、「抗爭派」看法 稱不知吳政亨是35+組織者
+
+此外，區諾軒本周亦談及對「攬炒」、「抗爭派」等理解。區指當時有一定程度參加者認為，「透過否決財政預算案，最後促使行政長官落台」是有「攬炒」意思，部分民主派期望35+目標「最壞情況」導致特首下台。
+
+至於「抗爭派」，區形容他們在民主派系中站在「較進步」的位置、「佢哋都好多元」，並指鄒家成、余慧明和何桂藍3人為抗爭派，當中鄒家成是「本土派」，何桂藍則「較為有左翼思想」、「經濟上面追求社會公平」，引起何桂藍等多名被告大笑。
+
+另外，控方亦就本案「組織者」之一吳政亨發問，區諾軒指他被捕前並不認識吳政亨，亦不知道他是35+組織者之一，只透過Facebook得知他發起「三投三不投」宣傳初選，及初選早期戴耀廷稱曾與他聯絡。
+
+
+### 官質疑控方播片浪費時間、不按時序發問令人難跟上
+
+法官本周亦多次質疑控方舉證及提問方式，又多次作出提問。其中控方自上周四起一連四日完整播放5區初選論壇逾7小時片段（九西80分鐘、九東74分鐘、港島95分鐘、新東105分鐘、超區75分鐘、新西因所有參選人認罪無播放），並在審訊第12天播放2020年3月26日首次初選記招（52分鐘）及同月公民黨記招（36分鐘）片段。
+
+控方當天原欲再播放6月9日初選記招片段，惟被3名法官質疑浪費時間也沒有需要，陳慶偉指若控方播片後只是問3、4條問題，播片根本沒有意義；李運騰質疑片段若無助控方案情，「我們為什麼需要看？」；陳仲衡則指，控方有如將原材料而非烹煮好的菜餚呈予飢餓食客。
+
+控方其後在法官建議下，改讓區諾軒閱讀另外5個記招的錄音謄本，以確認影片真實性，並只再播放7月9日由戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢和部分參選人出席的記招片段，以反映無發言被告在現場的反應。
+
+除此以外，3名法官亦質疑控方提問不按時序。審訊第14天，主控周天行展示3個6月19日的訊息後，回溯至一則6月14日的訊息，李運騰質疑控方問題「跳來跳去」，陳慶偉亦質疑「如果這是有陪審團的審訊，他們怎能跟得上？」，提醒控方要「緊記本案的議題」。
+
+控方亦要求區諾軒認出他不在場的記者會上何桂藍的身分，再被法官質疑沒有證據價值、提問前沒有確立基礎，而且提問方式不恰當，有如「在律師席上作證」。3名法官亦屢作出提問，是否所有參選人都同意運用否決權、趙家賢指白紙黑字傳閱的文件是哪一份、區諾軒是否知道吳政亨是35+組織者之一等關鍵問題，均是由法官發問。
+
+此外，列席認罪被告自區諾軒作供起獲安排於兩個延伸庭就坐，但上周五和本周一均因公眾不足而庭內不設記者席，其中一個被告身處的延伸庭沒有任何公眾獲准入內。法庭周二（21日）更改做法，安排所有列席被告於設有記者席的2號延伸庭就坐。而早前因意外受傷、需紮三角臂托的吳政亨，今周亦拆除了臂托，頻以手勢與旁聽席親友交流。而庭外排隊的人數也顯著減少。
+
+案件明天續審，預料下周將開始盤問。
+
+
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-03-05-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk4.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-05-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk4.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dd7bbf45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-05-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk4.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第四周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-03-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/KboHzLD.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 控方呈共謀證據表指證所有被告 辯方透露陳鑫為新西片段證人
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第四周。控方今周清楚交代就「共謀者原則」的立場並呈上25頁相關證據列表，確認涉案協議於2020年2月中已由戴耀廷和區諾軒達成，並會依賴列表證據指控所有被告，包括不同黨派的記者會及各被告個人言論。法官預料，將爭議該原則是否適用於當時尚未變成違法的協議、及當時尚未參與其中的被告。
+
+准保釋的李予信本周因打泰拳疑腦震盪留院，法庭需押後審訊，官提醒他勿參與危險運動，又指法庭開支不菲。李翌日到庭時辯方指他前一天早上已出院，被法官質疑浪費公帑。
+
+此外，辯方指控方周二（28日）新呈800頁文件，包括3份證人供詞，其中一段為獲取新界西影片的證人陳鑫（音譯），控方並指擬為其中一人申請匿名令。本周亦讀出4份控辯雙方達成的同意事實，當中黃碧雲、林卓廷和何桂藍同意的事實較其餘13人少。
+
+區諾軒於周五下午開始接受盤問，庭上披露其錄影會面謄本，區指民主派對如何落實五大訴求有不同看法，未必想特首下台或癱瘓政府；又指2020年2月公民黨對否決預算案表示擔心，認為對功能組別議員構成大壓力，但區不敢武斷公民黨是否整個2020年均有同樣想法。
+
+庭上又透露，區諾軒於2021年7月至8月共錄取了7次錄影會面，並曾獲警方開啟其手機行事曆以整理供詞。他亦首次透露2020年3月曾舉行「沈旭暉35+交流會」。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-03-13-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk5.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-13-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk5.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c146f3e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-13-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk5.md
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第五周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-03-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/bOV0Cre.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 區諾軒認辦初選目標與戴耀廷不同 中聯辦譴責後盡全力解散初選
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第五周。首名控方證人、同案認罪被告區諾軒接受辯方盤問，更詳細交待初選目標和背後分歧。
+
+本案關鍵在於各被告有否達成協議，同意無差別否決財政預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，以顛覆國家政權。區諾軒在主問已提到，否決預算案的想法由戴耀廷提倡，不過各派反應不一。那到底背後有沒有共識？如有，又是誰的共識？
+
+區諾軒本周明確表示，他和戴耀廷辦初選的「初心」不同，他認為初選真正目標只是協調民主派爭取立會過半，但戴耀廷則着重立會過半後運用否決權，並將綑綁參選人否決預算案的條款加入協調文件。但區直言該條款並非與會者的共識，只是「戴耀廷的共識」，又形容戴發布有關「攬炒」的文章，令初選起「質性上」的變化，感覺脫離了部分參與者的想法。
+
+區諾軒承認終歸沒有反對戴耀廷主張，指當時未立《國安法》，「我的確冇為意到當時候呢一啲嘅主張，係會觸犯法例。」不過他形容戴〈真攬炒十步〉一文「太瘋狂」，指在一國兩制下的香港：「你發表一篇文章挑動咗國家嘅情緒，我認為係過份咗啦。」而中聯辦譴責初選違法後，區不單決定退出，「而且盡我全力去解散整個初選」，並望退出後情節能為同案覓求情基礎。
+
+此外，法官本周關注審訊進度，大部分辯方律師認為原定的90天僅足夠完成雙方案情，法官指加上法律爭議、求情及裁決等，審訊或需延至聖誕。另鄒家成、施德來、黃碧雲和林卓廷4人擬作供。
+
+
+▲ 施德來
+
+
+### 區稱否決預算案僅「戴耀廷的共識」、組織者對如何爭五大訴求無共識
+
+區諾軒在主問已曾供稱，戴耀廷不斷提倡在各區協調文件加入「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」的條款，但其想法受到不同人的質疑。第五周正式進入盤問區諾軒，盤問的核心，自然也落在否決預算案上：到底「35+計劃」的「真正目標」是什麼？否決預算案是誰的主意？由何時開始提出？參與者有就此達成共識嗎？
+
+區諾軒在本周盤問中，明確地指出他和戴耀廷的分歧。他表示，他辦初選的「初心」，只是協調民主派爭取立會過半，但不認為應捆綁參選人否決預算案；至於戴耀廷則較着重立會過半後如何運用憲制權力，包括否決預算案，並在協調文件加入相關條款。
+
+與此同時，雖然「35+」要求參與者認同「五大訴求」，但區諾軒同意其概念「含糊」、如口號一樣，組織者亦「冇清楚傾過」定義；就過半後如何爭取五大訴求，組織者亦「的確傾唔到一個有效嘅策略去應對」。法官陳仲衡一度問是否不去定義就能取悅所有人，區確認「當時嘅公眾討論的確係咁嘅情況」。
+
+就否決權討論的發展，區諾軒同意戴耀廷於2019年12月的文章首次提及立會過半後行使否決權，但並非很確切，是直至3月尾的文章才談及特首下台的步驟，形容「佢嘅論述係有演進」。與此同時，與會者早期亦不太關注否決預算案的問題，直至4月尾、5月，才出現風向轉變，在九西及新東會議就否決權爭拗，但當時也有相當人士沒有表態。
+
+區諾軒也確認，最初的「35+計劃」文件沒提及否決預算案，是後來的協調機制文件才加入「會積極」用權否決預算案的條款，但他表示，該文件並非任何與會者的共識，只是「戴耀廷的共識」，指戴是想以該字眼迎合不同人意見，即望運用否決權及望保留彈性的一方，予人們「不否決」的空間。他亦承認不肯定戴有否將第二份文件妥為發給每名與會者，當中自辯的劉偉聰更指他是直到控方提供，才收到相關文件。
+
+辯方一度指，戴耀廷是將有意參與初選者「帶上船」，再試圖將否決預算案的說法「強加」在他們身上，惟法官指區諾軒無法回答該問題，辯方終無繼續發問。
+
+既然區諾軒與戴耀廷立場有別，他有提出反對嗎？區諾軒承認，雖然不認同戴耀廷理念，但沒有特別表達，因當時會議的確存有不同意見，他亦相信是參選者的選擇。不過後來戴在4月陸續刊出有關「攬炒」等文章，他便認為戴的看法令初選起「質性上」的變化，「甚至令我感覺到脫離咗一啲參與者嘅睇法。」而他沒有鮮明反對，亦因當時的確未立《國安法》，「我的確冇為意到當時候呢一啲嘅主張，係會觸犯法例。」
+
+
+
+
+### 區稱有談判攬炒兩派 形容戴文章挑動國家情緒「過份咗」
+
+事實上，區諾軒作供不時談及這兩種取態的角力——他曾受訪形容，當時社會有兩種聲音，一種是透過立會過半，提高議價能力爭取五大訴求；另一種是不惜「攬炒」否決預算案，不斷施壓要求政府妥協。
+
+區諾軒直言，理解《基本法》精神是政府和立法會「互諒互讓」，故曾期望新一屆立法會可透過談判與政府解決反修例風波；至於「攬炒」，他則理解為「你唔合作，我都唔合作囉」，並重申認為戴耀廷〈真攬炒十步〉想法「太瘋狂」，舉例當中提到「攬住中共跳出懸崖」：「我哋係生活喺一國兩制下嘅香港，你發表一篇文章挑動咗國家嘅情緒，我認為係過份咗啦。」也因此，他在初選翌日，便在電台節目鮮明反對戴的文章，指其文章應與初選分開審視。
+
+這種分歧也見於當時其他功能組別候選人。區提到，當時除戴耀廷推動35+，沈旭暉亦為有意參選功能組別的人士如林瑞華、張秀賢和林景楠舉行交流會，不過沈的概念「好唔同」，只期望民主派立會過半，該些參選人亦不支持綑綁否決預算案。區強調，該些候選人與戴耀廷接觸的「太唔同」，更一度指他們「甚至唔應該視為謀劃嘅一部分」，遭法官指其他人有否參與串謀是由法庭而不是他決定。
+
+不過，被問到有沒有初選參與者認為不應綑綁否決預算案，區還是指「總有人冇表態嘅，疑點利益應該歸於被告」。他也同意，即使表明會否決預算案，也不等於必定會無差別否決，強調視乎否決的原因。
+
+
+### 區稱中聯辦譴責後全力解散初選 望退出後情節為同案覓求情基礎
+
+區諾軒本周亦交代了退出初選的經過。他表示《國安法》前後都有不少人問戴耀廷初選會否違法，戴均強調不違法，他亦沒有質疑戴作為憲法專家的意見。不過區按其政治判斷提出一條底線：如有官方機構指初選犯法，便要考慮停止。
+
+7月9日，時任政制及內地事務局局長曾國衞指初選或違法，區認為是「政治警號」，開始「響起問號」；不過因初選「如箭在弦」，他自言沒足夠時間冷靜思考，故初選繼續舉行。
+
+至初選結束，中聯辦於7月14日公開譴責，區稱「我唔單止係退出，而且盡我全力去解散整個初選」，並約見時任政制及內地事務局政治助理吳璟儁徵詢補救措施。區庭上並補充，是讀過《國安法》第33條（1）自動放棄犯罪可減輕處罰的條文才作此決定。
+
+區終於7月15日宣布退出初選工作，趙家賢於翌日退出，戴耀廷之後亦宣布休息。區特別提到，此後各區有剩餘工作無任何牽頭人能處理，並表示：「我希望上述嘅情節，能夠為整體嘅同案搵到好嘅求情同從輕發落嘅基礎。」
+
+
+### 8被告完成盤問 區稱非適當角色評論被告立場
+
+第五周有8名被告完成對區諾軒的盤問，主要涉香港島和九龍西的候選人，亦包括衞生服務界的余慧明，林卓廷和黃碧雲則未完成盤問。
+
+就港島區，區諾軒同意協調會議焦點在初選協調機制，否決預算案從不是重要議題，只在第一次會議由戴耀廷提及，此後第二和第三次均沒有觸及，亦沒有達成共識，會上亦沒有提過戴耀廷〈真攬炒十步〉一文。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+其中時任灣仔區議會主席楊雪盈，區諾軒同意她主要提倡文化政策，會議上沒有就否決預算案和五大訴求的看法表達意見，而她並非任何指定的替補人選，卻在初選落敗後報名參選立法會，是有違「35+」共識。而時任南區區議員彭卓棋，區沒有聽過他向自己或其他人表示會無差別否決預算案；區亦不肯定公民黨鄭達鴻曾否同意無差別否決預算案。
+
+至於九龍西，區諾軒亦同意首次會議主要討論協調機制，否決預算案的議題僅由戴耀廷「單向」介紹，但不獲關注。直至第二次會議，張崑陽表示支持否決預算案，岑子杰則反對，此外其他人沒有表態，最終協調會議達成的4項共識並不包括否決預算案。
+
+其中民協何啟明，區諾軒指民協不止是傳統民主派，更是較溫和，又指與民協最緊密合作是民生議題。劉偉聰則曾在會上關注初選局限參選人選，性質有不民主處，又指他並無如區所言出席第二次會議，區不排除記憶有錯。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+至於民主黨林卓廷和黃碧雲，區諾軒同意二人僅曾派代表出席協調會議，亦同意民主黨是較親中及溫和的傳統民主派，在否決財案上是望保留彈性一方。區又重申，民主黨胡志偉曾向他表示若政府「起醫院、起學校」，無理由否決預算案，同意該黨在「墨落無悔」發布後，仍維持不會無差別否決預算案的立場。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲
+
+另外新界東的社民連梁國雄，區確認其代表陳寶瑩曾在協調會議表達對否決預算案的憂慮，指社民連會支持全民退休保障。
+
+至於衞生服務界余慧明，區諾軒指他沒有沾手該界別工作，只在初選記者會見過余一次，沒有特別對話，對其參選目標等無直接認知。區又指，衞生服務界無召開協調會議，亦不曾就否決預算案進行討論，該界別的群組只討論初選後勤工作，他亦「幾乎不發一言」。
+
+區諾軒早前指余慧明是抗爭派，辯方問及抗爭派曾否表示若政府回應五大訴求，便不會否決預算案，區表示無相關資訊，又指除非與被告有私交，否則「我越諗越覺得，我唔係一個適當嘅角色去評論人（立場）」。辯方亦問激進陣營是否以否決權作籌碼，區指政治人物通常都會實行所說的事，「不過當然都有啲政治人物話，『我講吓咋喎』」，故問題很難答，多名被告發笑。
+
+至於被指為初選組織者的吳政亨沒有盤問，不過區諾軒作供亦提及，從沒有視吳政亨為初選組織者的一部分。
+
+
+
+
+
+### 區諾軒稱展示私人信件「對我有一定傷害」 官料審至聖誕
+
+此外，本案排期90日審訊，原定至少於6月才審結。法官李運騰本周對審訊進度表示非常關注，指自開審24天仍在處理首名控方證人盤問，但他有份審理的《蘋果日報》案於9月底開審。法官提及僅小量同意事實達成共識，控方除4名被告證人，或要再傳召逾100名證人作供。被問對進度的估計，大部分辯方律師均認為原定的90天僅足夠完成雙方案情。法官陳慶偉並指，加上相關法律爭議、求情和裁決等，料審訊或需延至聖誕節。辯方亦透露，鄒家成、施德來、黃碧雲和林卓廷4人擬作供。
+
+另外，代表鄭達鴻的資深大律師潘熙一度在庭上展示區諾軒獄中寫給鄭的私人信件，區形容鄭被公民黨「連累」，又指若非公民黨忽然「搶疆」開記者會（承諾若政府不回應五大訴求會否決財政預算案），他和李予信的處境會截然不同。不過審訊翌日，區主動提及展示信件「對我都有一定嘅傷害，我更加唔想第三者造成傷害」，望之後「可免則免」。在法官解釋辯方有權提問後，區回應「我會從容面對」，惹被告發笑。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+辯方本周提問亦不時遭官打斷，其中代表余慧明和吳政亨的大狀就初選背景發問，法官多次質疑與案無關，又指對香港政治運動歷史沒有興趣，籲勿將審訊當作政治平台提倡政治主張，辯方回應本案無可避免觸及政治。
+
+案件明（14日）午續審，區諾軒會繼續接受盤問。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-03-19-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk6.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-19-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk6.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-19-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk6.md
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第六周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-03-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/4hYxccv.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 區諾軒稱感被戴耀廷「騎劫」惟翌日改口 指「攬炒十步」為「狂想」不欲在港發生
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第六周。首名控方證人、同案認罪被告區諾軒繼續接受辯方盤問。
+
+區諾軒上周已表示，與戴耀廷辦初選「初心」不同，而協調文件上否決預算案的條款是「戴耀廷的共識」，非與會者共識。區本周透露，曾在新東會議提出對否決預算案的質疑，惟戴發出的協調文件列明「會運用」否決權，區指庭上看到文件才得悉，在盤問下認感覺被戴耀廷「騎劫」。不過區翌日主動改口指不應用「騎劫」定性，「始終唔想再用呢類詞語，結果又傷害戴耀廷」，亦自言有「把關責任」。
+
+區諾軒本周也形容，「攬炒十步」為戴耀廷「狂想」，並指當初退出初選後「人生計劃係離開政壇」，不會亦不想見證「攬炒十步」在港發生。區又強調，不同意強迫他人否決預算案，認為戴耀廷「盲點」是沒有聆聽功能組別候選人意見，自言對未能維護多元聲音「覺得好內疚」。區亦表示，完全實現五大訴求「唔現實」，強調民主路要談判和凝聚共識才有機會。
+
+此外，本周多4人完成盤問，其中曾與區諾軒在立法會共事的人民力量陳志全，區表示至今仍視他為朋友，形容他「唔係真係好激進」、亦是最勤力議員，同意若政府推全民退保，陳認為「利多於弊」或贊成預算案。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+
+### 新東有分歧協議仍寫「會運用」否決權 區稱感被戴耀廷「騎劫」惟翌日改口
+
+區諾軒在上周盤問，已明確指出他和戴耀廷就初選目標的分歧，亦提及協調文件中綑綁參選人否決預算案的條款，並非與會者的共識，只是「戴耀廷的共識」。
+
+區本周盤問下，再次確認相關「會積極運用」否決權字眼是戴耀廷用來平衡各方的「發明」，且至少於2020年3月24日已出現；不過字眼加入文件後，新東及九西無進一步會議討論和達成共識。辯方曾問，戴耀廷表示參選人毋須簽署任何協議，是否因為否決預算案有意見分歧？但區諾軒指「佢應該冇咁諗」，認為戴當時只是擔心會被DQ。
+
+其中在新界東，區諾軒首次透露他曾在第二次會議表達對否決預算案的質疑。當時鄒家成提出為何用「會積極運用」而非「會運用」字眼，但社民連陳寶瑩和街工盧藝賢均對否決預算案有保留。區表示不能勉強他人否決，因功能組別參選人亦有其業界利益；戴耀廷終嘗試以「會積極運用」的字眼迎合各人分歧，解釋是「可以用，可以唔用」，視乎政府有否聽取民意。
+
+不過辯方其後展示戴耀廷6月發給組織者的新東協調文件，條款顯示為「會運用」否決權。區表示沒看過該文件，此前一直以為新東採用「會積極運用」字眼，直至辯方展示才得悉是「會運用」。區同意該字眼是無視會上相反意見，辯方再問戴耀廷是否「騎劫」反對意見？區稱「確實係有呢個感覺」，指當初沒反對是因「會積極運用」字眼有一定彈性，惟他沒理由同意「會運用」字眼，戴亦沒有尊重會上不同聲音。
+
+不過區諾軒在翌日主動表示，思考過後認為不應用「騎劫」字眼定性，「始終唔想再用呢類詞語，結果又傷害戴耀廷」。他承認新東文件與他過往兩年多的認知「存在落差」、自己如「蒙在鼓裏」，並指報名表格列明參與者須認同由他和戴主導的協調會議共識，「我終歸難免有把關嘅責任」。
+
+辯方其後展示戴耀廷和趙家賢的WhatsApp訊息，顯示相關新東文件在4月及5月曾以廣播形式發出，惟區稱他不在廣播名單亦無收到，亦「100個percent」沒收過有關新西會議的廣播訊息，再次表示感覺「蒙在鼓裏」。
+
+辯方亦就提名表格發問，當中列明「支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」，區承認「協調會議共識」視乎各區而定，而九西和新東就否決預算案「確有分歧」；至於「民主派35+公民投票計劃」及其目標，區指是指涉各區提及否決財案的「共同綱領」，但承認無明確指涉，亦無一份初選文件以此為名。大律師馬維騉一度展示一份名為「民主派35+公民投票」、沒有提否決權的文件，但區否認表格指涉該文件，重申應是指各區共同綱領。
+
+
+
+
+### 區稱「攬炒十步」為戴耀廷「狂想」、對無法維護多元聲音感內疚
+
+區諾軒本周亦繼續強調他和戴耀廷及其他較激進者的分野。其中就「墨落無悔」聲明，區強調與「35+計劃」毫無關係，並指「民主派應該維持多元性」，故當時不同意有參選人試圖強迫其他人同意否決預算案的做法，重申不欲綑綁他人。
+
+區也形容，既倡否決權作為憲制武器、亦嘗試在協調會上迎合各方分歧的戴耀廷有「盲點」，因戴沒有像他一樣接觸功能組別候選人，並聆聽他們要顧及業界利益的真正需要。區亦提到，他接觸較多「相對保守」的參選人，甚至社民連及民主黨等會個別託付於他，指「我自己覺得好內疚，我係維護唔到多元嘅聲音」。
+
+區亦表示，2020年7月15日退出初選工作後，原打算於同年10月赴日展開博士生的生活，指當時「我嘅人生計劃係離開政壇」。法官陳慶偉問區，是否不會親眼見證整個「攬炒十步」的過程？區答：「唔會，同埋我都唔想喺香港發生。」
+
+事實上，區諾軒上周已形容戴耀廷〈真攬炒十步〉想法「太瘋狂」、挑動國家情緒，亦令初選起「質性上」的變化，脫離了部分參與者的想法。他今周再表示，認為文章是戴耀廷不現實的預測，亦是「狂想」和「final fantasy（最終幻想）」，文末提及香港社會停頓等亦「講到好末日預言」。區重申不支持戴的推測，包括第一步的大規模DQ，自言他因有人被DQ才能當選立會議員：「我一直都相信，唔應該有呢啲事情發生。」
+
+法官本周亦問及組織者角色，區諾軒承認與戴耀廷均為「35+計劃」的「主要推手」，他主要負責辦論壇、聯絡溝通等行政工作，民主動力趙家賢則是協助的角色。法官李運騰問戴抑或區是「大腦」，區指戴耀廷負責很大部分的論述工作，在公開發言亦「毋庸置疑」擔當較主要位置。
+
+趙家賢7月16日宣布退出初選工作、戴耀廷同日亦宣布休息，但Facebook帖文提及在立法會選舉前會進行民調。法官一度關注，區諾軒等組織者相繼退出後，誰指示和付款予香港民意研究所進行民調？區答「呢個係一個問號嚟」。
+
+
+### 區指完全實現五大訴求「唔現實」、「民主路要談判先有機會」
+
+本周的盤問，亦問及民主派立會過半的情況。控方曾在開案陳詞提及，若立法會選舉沒有延期，各人的串謀會一直持續直至落實，嚴重影響公共服務及港人生活。那到底「35+」一旦落實，情況是怎樣的？
+
+區諾軒同意，若「35+」實現，可以預期民主派掌握議會內重要位置。辯方問會否令政府「寸步難行」，區指視乎政府是否願與多數派「一齊傾」。辯方續指，政府可能願意商討，亦可能以不同方法包括拘捕和DQ，「將多數變為少數」。
+
+就五大訴求中的真普選，區主動引述前香港運輸及房屋局局長張炳良《Can Hong Kong Exceptionalism Last?（香港的例外會長久嗎？）》一書，指實現民主政制有「3個窗口」，即須獲特首同意、立會三分之二議員支持，及更重要的中央政府同意。
+
+此前區諾軒已提到，認為「五大訴求」要完全實現是「唔現實」、「係一個好難嘅機會」，指「政治始終係要有談判同妥協」，「民主嘅路始終係要一步一步走」。法官李運騰問及，政改方案的門檻是否令「五大訴求 缺一不可」更難實現，區說：「所以……睇咗咁多嘢、反思咗咁耐，我都係覺得香港嘅民主路係要透過談判，大家一齊傾，凝聚社會共識，大家先至有機會」，有被告聞言嘆氣。
+
+區諾軒亦曾形容，爭取「五大訴求」情況「接近一個死局」，舉例2019年8月有大學校長曾與特首商討設立獨立調查委員會，但終歸未能實現。他也確認，立法會要引用《權力及特權法》成立專責委員會作調查，須地方選區和功能組別均取得過半支持。
+
+
+### 多4人完成盤問 區稱若推全民退保陳志全或支持財案
+
+本周再多4人完成盤問，總共12人完成盤問。就民主黨林卓廷和黃碧雲，區確認二人與「成個民主黨」均無簽署「墨落無悔」，報名時沒有夾附「共同綱領」，競選單張亦沒有提否決預算案。而林卓廷選舉論壇上曾表示要視乎具體議案和政策投票，指政府若每人派三萬元一定會贊成，區同意顯示林不會無差別否決預算案。
+
+就唯一不認罪的九東參選人、民協施德來，區諾軒同意民協是影響力較小的溫和民主派，關注民生議題；「又傾又砌」的口號分別指談判和行動，但「即使講『砌』都好，都係一啲好和平嘅行動」，施德來亦是「和理非」。區亦同意，九東首兩次協調會議均無提否決預算案，第三次有提但沒有詳細討論。
+
+至於新界東參選人、時任人民力量主席陳志全，僅派代表出席協調會議。區確認二人曾在立法會共事，一同玩「Pokémon GO」手機遊戲，屬於朋友。區同意陳獲梁君彥認可為最勤力議員，核心政治信念是同志平權，亦爭取全民退保；而人民力量為「進步民主派」，但陳「唔係真係好激進」，亦因有現任議員優勢而無誘因「鬥黃」。
+
+區同意陳志全作為盡責的議員，在投票前會仔細審視議案文件，亦無聽過他向自己提及會無差別否決預算案；而政府若推行全民退保，區同意陳衡量後認為整體「利多於弊」，有贊成預算案的可能。區又舉例，他曾游說當局將南區相關的撥款優先放上議程，他會說服民主派贊成和不作冗長提問，他最終成功說服陳志全，議案亦獲通過。
+
+至於吳政亨，區諾軒上周表示從不視他為組織者，本周再重申不認為「三投三不投」是大會一部分，只知道戴耀廷曾與「李伯盧」聯絡。法官陳慶偉指區不能代戴答該運動是否35+的分支計劃（sub-project），不過區亦指「三投三不投」並沒有納入「35+」財政開支。
+
+
+
+
+### 官問「和勇不分」意思、人民力量及社民連分別
+
+此外，法官本周一度問及「和勇不分」的意思，區諾軒指反修例運動期間，有主張直接行動的「勇武」派，參與暴動或掟汽油彈等，亦有「和理非」參與遊行，兩者交替出現，是令反修例運動持續的條件。
+
+陳志全大狀盤問時屢指人民力量與社民連立場相似，法官亦問及兩者分別。區諾軒笑言「真係好難答」，指兩黨均為「進步民主派」、光譜相似，而人力從社民連分裂，兩者政治議題看法確有分別，但2016年後社民連再無立會議員，較難評價。
+
+另外，早前自辯的劉偉聰盤問後曾祝區諾軒順利，大律師沈士文盤問結束後亦向區諾軒道謝，祝他平安、健康（Thank you Mr. Au, I wish you peace and good health.），不過法官陳慶偉着他之後不要再提該些言論（Can you skip all those remarks in the future?）。
+
+案件明（20日）續審，現時尚有何桂藍、鄒家成、柯耀林及李予信待盤問區諾軒。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-03-23-a-letter-to-the-ukrainian-matyrs-children.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-23-a-letter-to-the-ukrainian-matyrs-children.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8d729b59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-23-a-letter-to-the-ukrainian-matyrs-children.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "寫給遇害烏克蘭英雄的孩子們"
+author: "陶樂思"
+date : 2023-03-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/uML3Ens.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+親愛的孩子們：
+
+我是一名香港人。得悉你們父親上月在巴克武（Bakhmut）戰役中被俘，並被敵軍殺害，我感到十分惋惜和悲傷。所以決定寫這封信給你們。
+
+
+
+我明白，作為軍人的子女，你們不得不與父親長時間分離。你們時時刻刻都在憂心着父親的安危。畢竟戰場就是連下一分鐘都是未知的地方。你們每天都殷殷期盼父親能早日平安回家，你們一家人能快樂地聚在一起。一起享受一頓晚餐；一起到郊外遊玩…可是，三月初由俄軍發放的一則視頻，使你們的期望一下子破滅了。即使我們多麼願意分擔你們的悲痛和失望，但我很清楚，我們是無法分擔一絲一毫。
+
+孩子們，我想讓你們知道，很多人愛著你們，關心你們。失去父親的遺憾無法彌補，但你們不會孤單。身處你們附近，或距離你們非常遙遠的人，都願意為你們送上愛和祝福。
+
+自從俄羅斯在去年二月二十四日入侵你們國家以來，世界各地的人都在關注着你們，為你們送上支援。正如我自己，自從去年二月二十四日那天，眼睛就沒有離開過烏克蘭的消息。我非常欽佩像你父親那樣，為著自己國家的尊嚴，不惜犧牲生命的人。而事實上，你們國家有很多人像你父親那樣，面對強敵毫無懼色，以堅毅和勇氣力抗侵略者。他們的奮力抵抗，令本來酬躇滿志，滿以為能在四十八小時以內拿下烏克蘭的俄羅斯，至今陷入了戰爭泥潭。無數個像你父親那樣，不惜犧牲性命抵禦外敵的烏克蘭人，他們懷著一個心願：願你們好好的活下來。我也一樣，願你們活下來！願你們心中的傷痛被源源不絕的愛所撫平。願正義早日到來，戰犯們得到他們應得的懲罰。
+
+> #### 不停關心你們的香港人
+> #### 陶樂思
+
+後記：俄羅斯軍方於今年三月初發放了一段影片，片中一名彈盡糧絕的烏克蘭士兵被俄軍俘虜。俄軍強迫他喊出「榮耀歸於俄羅斯」的口號。該名士兵抽了一口煙之後說出「榮耀歸於烏克蘭」，然後他就被亂槍射殺。根據今年三月八號的新聞報導，烏克蘭軍方已經查出該名遇害戰俘的身份。詳情可參考[相關報導](http://www.mingpaocanada.com/Tor/htm/News/20230308/ttab2_r.htm)。該名遇害戰俘已婚，妻子還相當年輕，且育有兩個小孩。俄軍滿以為發放該影片能震懾烏克蘭軍心，誰知這件事卻大大增強烏克蘭軍民驅逐侵略者的決心。
+
+今日寫下這封信向烈士的孩子們聊表心意之餘，也希望讀者銘記這名勇敢的烏克蘭軍人。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-03-26-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk7.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-26-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk7.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..38e28754
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-26-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk7.md
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第七周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-03-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/TcyBgkQ.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 區諾軒認「35+」可能失敗 指戴耀廷協調過程難言民主
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第七周。首名控方證人、同案認罪被告區諾軒繼續接受辯方盤問。
+
+區諾軒早前已表明與戴耀廷的分歧，他本周承認，在《國安法》及DQ下「35+」可能失敗，而民主派入議會後一致投票只是戴耀廷的「假設」，立會過半作為「大殺傷力憲制武器」的說法是「有缺陷」。區又表示，參與者對否決財案有不同意見，而戴「側埋一邊」、「硬銷」否決權和發展「攬炒十步」觀點，是有問題亦無尊重與會者意見，難以接受過程是民主。
+
+區諾軒亦形容，攬炒派是「表達緊一種絕望」，望用盡手段爭取「破局」，「置諸死地而後生」；但他不想將「攬炒」與《基本法》否決財案解散立會的機制「混為一談」，亦真誠認為戴耀廷「攬炒十步」想法與初選無干，指初選文件無提過政府停擺和特首下台。不過區同意，戴曾提出透過立會奪半取得否決財案的「政治籌碼」，與政府談判。
+
+此外，本周所有被告大致完成盤問，預計區諾軒下周一完成作供，另一控方證人、同案被告趙家賢將出庭。其中就發起「墨落無悔」的鄒家成，區對新東會上沒有共識，聲明卻稱「已取得共識」並使用「會運用」否決權字眼，懷疑是否有他不知情的「黑盒」過程。另外，法官一度指「大殺傷力武器」概念源自美國入侵伊拉克，但區指沒想到該背景，認為戴相關概念僅是對運用《基本法》權力的包裝。
+
+
+▲ 西九龍裁判法院外牆上月一幅玻璃幕牆破裂，疑遭人射擊，有路政署人員在法院對出的西九龍走廊，加裝多個鐵絲網。
+
+
+### 區同意「35+」可能失敗、無詳細討論入議會後計劃 立會權力有限「奪權」是笑話
+
+區諾軒早前已指出他與戴耀廷就初選目標的分歧。本周盤問的核心，便落在到底「35+」的計劃能否實現？如果真的實現，又是否會導致解散立法會和特首下台，嚴重干擾、阻撓和破壞政權機關依法履行職能？
+
+區諾軒本周確認，民主派要取得立會過半，除地區直選外，還很依賴功能組別的議席。不過他承認要勝出功能組別很困難，他們亦不會違背業界利益否決預算案，而組織者從沒討論如何爭取他們支持。
+
+除了功能組別，另一障礙是參選人可能被取消資格（DQ）。區表示自2016年開始，民主派被DQ風險已存在，而2020年6月有輿論指罔顧後果否決預算案會被DQ，令他擔心，認為參選人應「小心言行」。不過當時越來越多人「政治表態」，他感到「好無奈」、「好煩惱」，認為「用咁多心機準備初選」，最終被DQ是「白費咗好多人嘅心機」。
+
+區解釋，35+相關協調文件都沒有公開，但參選人簽署「墨落無悔」這份唯一公開聲明，稱會用權否決財案，會增加被DQ風險，亦是對組織者稱毋須簽聲明的「異議」。區對聲明有保留但尊重，認為屬各人自由、亦不關心誰簽署；但他也同意，聲明可謂「內鬥」和綑綁他人，寧願沒有，因不斷叫人表態會將模糊性收窄。
+
+區強調，辦初選不是要「推銷希望」，因在《國安法》和DQ下，民主派很可能無法取得過半議席，謀劃可能會「失敗」。辯方問，故最後「35+計劃」只是一場夢？法官亦問是否一開始已知道「注定失敗」？區答：「好難一概而論。」
+
+那假設取得立會過半，又會構成顛覆國家政權嗎？「35+」目標包括要求政府回應「五大訴求」，此前區諾軒已表示，組織者對如何爭取五大訴求沒有共識。區本周再表示，組織者對進入議會後的計劃無詳細討論、各派系對具體部署各有想像但未達共識，而自2016年起民主派呈「碎片化」狀態，難言有人可帶領泛民，即使是戴耀廷也不能指揮。區亦表示，民主派入議會後會一致投票只是戴的「假設」，而非各人「共同願景」，戴「盲點」是沒看到功能組別真正想法，同意辯方指戴將立會過半形容為「大殺傷力憲制武器」是有缺陷（flawed）。
+
+區亦曾受訪形容，指「35+」計劃「奪權」是「笑話」，他解釋，香港「行政主導」、立會權力有限，即使民主派立會過半，仍「受制於既有框架」；又指首次否決預算案後，特首有權決定是否解散立法會，在第二次否決後才必須下台。區也表示，立法會最多令政府財政沒有得到適切撥款，但不會令政府「完全唔能夠運作」，政府仍可向立會申請臨時撥款。
+
+
+
+
+### 區稱戴硬銷否決權、協調過程難言民主 初選後期變「一派拉倒一派」
+
+區諾軒同意，起初已看到計劃的問題，但直至5月5日新東第二次會議，參與者就否決預算案有較鮮明的矛盾，才首次向戴耀廷表達。區表示，參與者對否決預算案有不同意見，但戴卻「側埋一邊」，不斷撰文提倡用否決權和發展「攬炒十步」觀點，發文前亦「從來唔會搵我哋啲組織者去傾」，在組織工作是「有問題」，亦沒有尊重與會者意見。
+
+區同意，戴耀廷不純粹是一個協調者，而是有所提倡，並將計劃引向一個方向。法官問，初選是促進民主的計劃，但戴無視各人意見的做法是否「不民主」？區重提新東會上對否決權字眼有分歧，但文件最終使用「會運用」，感到「好費解」；他對新西文件採用「會運用」字眼亦「後知後覺」，難接受過程是民主，還柙時收到新西會議謄本亦「好難受」。區又指，從政以來一直「求同存異」、要找「最大公因數」，但初選後期「似乎變成一派拉倒一派」，反問：「作為組織者，難道唔係要做一個中立仲裁嘅人咩？」
+
+法官李運騰一度形容，戴耀廷在沒有共識下，在協調文件加入綑綁參選人否決預算案的條款，做法「挺硬銷（hard-selling）」，區同意，指「你可以睇到佢不斷寫文，開會又講，咁都係幾硬銷嘅」。
+
+辯方提出，協調文件相關條款其實只是作為「紀錄」，以表達戴曾在會上提出或討論過此項目；亦形容戴只是「邀請各人同意（invitation to agree）」，不過區指若是邀請，檔案就會寫成是「邀請函」。但區同意收到戴發出的文件時，「冇特別將佢諗成係大家已經做咗共識」。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師Trevor Beel
+
+
+### 區稱攬炒派表達絕望爭破局、不想將「攬炒」與基本法解散立會機制「混為一談」
+
+區諾軒曾受訪談及候選人對「35+」有兩種不同想像，一是透過立會過半，提高議價能力爭取五大訴求；另一種是不惜「攬炒」，否決預算案施壓。區本周就「攬炒」的概念作出更多闡述。
+
+區諾軒指，攬炒一派認為即使訴求不獲實現，都想政權以「好核突嘅方法去應對」，又指「攬炒」是「表達緊一種絕望」，覺得長時間無法實現心目中理想的香港，要用盡抗爭手段爭取「破局」，「置諸死地而後生」。區形容，攬炒是「雙輸局面」，政府無法得益、市民也無法得益，望透過「死局」來催生新的局面。
+
+此前已不止一次稱戴耀廷想法瘋狂的區諾軒，本周再重申在香港爭取民主，不應「講到出晒界」，「將件事推到去攬住中共跳出懸崖」。他認為不需「置諸死地」，舉例有中共元老提及香港是一個「紫砂茶壺」，「冇必要打爛佢」。但區也不排除辯方指，戴的文章想引起社會討論。
+
+區同意，「攬炒」一詞早在連登網上討論區出現，非戴耀廷所創，戴「演繹咗佢一個版本」；並重申初選文件無提「攬炒十步」，亦無要求參加者支持「攬炒」。被問否決預算案致立法會解散和特首下台是否「攬炒」，區同意會造成「憲制危機」，但強調不想將「攬炒」與《基本法》的機制「混為一談」，又強調當時真誠地認為戴耀廷「攬炒十步」想法「同我哋成班人搞初選無干」。
+
+
+### 區稱立會奪半為取政治籌碼談判、不曾提及政府停擺及特首下台
+
+不過區同意，可將戴耀廷主張推演為若政府不回應五大訴求，才會考慮否決預算案，同意戴曾提出以立會奪半取得否決財案的「政治籌碼」，與政府談判。區指，若未能過半就失去談判的條件，而談判有「開天殺價，落地還錢」的策略，不會向對方亮出自己的底牌。不過法官指政府有否「回應」是由議員而非組織者決定，因議員入議會後組織者便很難控制他們。
+
+事實上，區同意「立會過半增加與政府談判的籌碼」也是他的想法。他曾受訪談及以35+「否定中共極權路線」，他解釋，反修例運動時政府很多做法「好極端」，若民主派過半，可告訴政權不應再行極權或者極端的路線。
+
+區亦表示，初選由記者會到文件，「冇整體講過一次要政府停擺」；而初選文件及新聞稿，「都冇提及要林鄭月娥特首下台」，重申解散立會和特首下台均不是他辦初選的目的。區強調，「35+」主要目標僅立會過半，令民主派有更好的談判力，非令政權倒台，「冇諗過亦都唔想犯法」，「我哋真係盡咗全力去避免觸犯任何法例」。
+
+區又指，投票或不投票，及拖延法案通過都是議員的「權力」，但在法官詢問下同意《基本法》沒列明拖延的權力。被問到拖延法案是否妥善履行議員職責，區表示立會議員向市民問責，用不同手法爭取選民所想，「無論投贊成定反對、認真審議定係去到拉布，都係佢哋向市民問責嘅方式」，市民不滿意就選走他們。不過法官其後重申，控方立場不是說否決預算案就違法，而是「無差別」否決才違法。
+
+
+▲ 柯耀林
+
+
+### 區指退出初選唯一原因為合法性、計劃暫停後參加者不再受約束
+
+辯方亦問及區諾軒參與協調的過程。區解釋，當初受李永達邀請協助協調，準則是找不屬任何黨派、較中立、可與不同派系交涉的人士，而他曾任民陣召集人、曾為民主黨黨員和接替被DQ的香港眾志周庭參選，符合此條件，並同意計劃領袖是戴耀廷，他則與趙家賢角色相若。
+
+區同意，當時退出初選的唯一原因，就是擔心「初選整件事」違法。而若無法律風險及延期選舉，他需在初選投票後就3區商討出選名單數目、找香港民研做民意調查、監察棄選機制妥為運行，並會視立會選舉結果公佈後「功成身退」。
+
+區同意，「35+」計劃停止後，參與者已不再受他們簽過的聲明或共同綱領所約束。法官指因此在初選落敗的楊雪盈也會報名參選立法會，區回應：「當大會唔再運作，大家跟住做嘅決定係自主嘅。」區亦被問及曾出席初選記者會的區議會主席角色，區引述戴耀廷指他們是協調會議的公證人。
+
+辯方亦展示提名表格，法官陳仲衡關注參選人須聲明無因相關法例被DQ。區指知道有參選人曾被DQ，但他作為初選舉辦者「都可以叫係『打開門口做生意』」。陳仲衡質疑條款是否「window dressing measure（整色整水）」，區同意是採用「誠實制度」，不會檢查參與者；又認為民主要素包括參選和被選權，「我哋冇諗過去DQ曾經被政府DQ嘅人」。區亦同意，表格上聲明「擁護《基本法》」的條款，是包含整個《基本法》，包括23條，並表示表格是模仿選舉事務處的提名表格來製作。
+
+此外，區諾軒確認曾為袁嘉蔚助選，何桂藍也在場，被問是否支持袁的抗爭派理念，區指「我冇話特別支持邊個理念」，只是曾答應為所有港島候選人助選。區亦曾在2020年8月撰文提及香港已經「破局」，認為當時《國安法》通過、立會選舉延期，「定期選舉」和「高度自治」已受到影響。
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+
+### 所有被告大致完成盤問 區懷疑有「黑盒」過程致鄒家成在「墨落」用「會運用」字眼
+
+本周再多4人完成盤問，其中超區的李予信沒有任何盤問。除彭卓棋因控方新呈文件需作補問，基本上全部16名被告已完成盤問。
+
+就新界東，區重申運用否決權並非協調會議重點，亦沒有就「會運用」或「會積極運用」否決權的字眼達成共識。辯方問新東論壇上所有候選人唯一一致的訊息，是否鼓勵人們出來投票？區指「我冇特別計過邊個講、邊個冇講」。
+
+其中就何桂藍，區諾軒同意於2020年前一段時間已認識她，曾接受她訪問，同意辯方指她是「醒目的政治記者」。區曾指何是抗爭派，他同意抗爭派在立場和行動上較積極和肯定新意念，政治立場未必完全統一，亦不隸屬任何政黨。
+
+至於有份發起「墨落無悔」聲明書的鄒家成，區同意鄒是對戴耀廷稱毋須簽聲明感憤怒，不滿達成共同綱領後卻沒有任何文件，故發起聲明以向公眾展示抗爭決心。區同意聲明只是重複戴曾說的話，分別只是戴沒有將協議公開，不過當中表明「會運用」否決權，比部分選區文件「會積極運用」字眼更為「堅定」，同意有人或想比協議「行前一步」。
+
+新東會上就否決權字眼未達共識，但「墨落無悔」卻提及「協調會議上已取得共識的共同綱領」。區在法官詢問下，表示懷疑在協調會議後，是否有一個「黑盒」的過程，最後導致共同綱領、或鄒家成認為用「會（運用）」一字。辯方亦指出，鄒當時在會上是說立會議員「一係投，一係唔投」，故不認同用「會積極運用」這麼一個無說服力（lame）的字眼，應該用更肯定的「會」。不過區指與他記憶有出入，重申鄒當時只是質疑戴耀廷「點解係用『積極』而唔係用『會』」。
+
+至於柯耀林，區同意屬區政聯盟的他可被歸類為溫和民主派、亦非知名政治人物，被問到柯在新東初選得票不足1%是否因不夠激進，區指「攞得多票唔一定激進先得」，但同意柯並不激進；而對辯方指首次會議上參選人互相攻擊，但柯一言不發，區同意「柯先生係好沉默嘅」。辯方亦指出，區在首次會議中途離開，但區不記得；辯方亦指，柯因出席區議會會議而沒出席第二次會議，但區指與其憶述有出入。
+
+柯耀林曾簽署「墨落無悔」，辯方亦指，民主選舉的候選人常擺出「政治姿態」，但實際上無意實踐其主張，而柯簽聲明是避免被攻擊，惟法官質疑區無法回答，辯方遂沒有繼續發問。
+
+
+
+
+### 何桂藍質疑翻譯出錯 區以紫砂茶壺喻港 官指大殺傷力武器源自美伊戰爭
+
+此外，本周庭上不時就翻譯問題爭議，其中提及攬炒一派主張「寧願你（北京）做得最赤祼」，法庭傳譯主任將「最赤祼」譯為「the most horrible things」，何桂藍起身反對，指其代表大狀不諳中文，錯誤翻譯嚴重阻礙其理解。區諾軒亦指攬炒一派主張被譯成「we」，會令人誤會包括他在內的所有人都有此想法。
+
+庭上亦不時提及各種比喻和歷史概念。其中區諾軒解釋不認為需「置諸死地」時，一度指香港是「一隻金絲雀」，法官指從沒有聽過，只聽過「生金蛋」，辯方律師指是「生金蛋的鵝」，區改稱記得有中共元老提及香港是一個「紫砂茶壺」，「係冇必要打爛佢嘅」。翻查資料，前全國政協主席李瑞環曾於1995年以紫砂茶壺評論香港回歸，指有老婦將祖傳紫砂茶壺賣掉前，以為骯髒而將茶垢抹掉，結果令茶壺一文不值。
+
+辯方又一度以60年代美蘇冷戰為例，指「攬炒」是一個「平衡」，因雙方有核武器但不敢使用，以免雙亡，不過法官陳慶偉認為那並非「攬炒」，只是「互相威懾」。
+
+至於戴耀廷曾形容立會過半否決權是「大殺傷力憲制武器」，法官陳慶偉指「大殺傷力武器」概念最早於20年前出現，美國以此為由入侵伊拉克和推翻其政府，惟區稱沒想到該歷史背景，認為該說法只是戴對使用憲制權力的論述框架和包裝。而在談及攬炒概念時，陳慶偉指大家都知道廣義意思，可以是「攬住一齊死」或「你燒我我燒你」。
+
+審訊明天（27日）繼續，控方透露另一控方證人趙家賢將作供，屆時他需先在庭上閱覽約8千頁的文件證物。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-03-28-chinas-influence-on-russo-ukrainian-war.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-28-chinas-influence-on-russo-ukrainian-war.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "中国对俄乌战争的影响力"
+author: "杨山"
+date : 2023-03-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/izJzQOG.jpg
+#image_caption: "2023年3月21日，莫斯科克里姆林宫招待会"
+description: "“听中国人的话”，本质上并不存在于俄罗斯政治精英的词汇列表里。"
+---
+
+就在中共总书记习近平3月20-22日访问俄罗斯之前几天，媒体爆料他将在会见普京之后和乌克兰总统泽连斯基通话。
+
+
+
+这一消息结合之前中国外交部发布的政治解决乌克兰危机的立场说明书，让人好奇北京是否在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰整整一年之后终于改变了观望策略，准备采取一种更进取的姿态，试图调停乌克兰危机。
+
+这种猜测并非完全没有道理。就在之前的3月10日，中东长期互相敌视和对抗的两个地区强权——沙特阿拉伯（沙乌地）和伊朗，在北京签署了一份三方声明，宣布恢复邦交。根据这份协议，两国将在2016年断交之后第一次重新恢复大使级外交关系。其后两国开始沟通领导人互访和商贸往来。甚至，延烧近十年的、背后是沙特和伊朗直接下场对抗的也门（叶门）内战，也有望迎来终结。当协议签署时，中国官方媒体纷纷庆贺，甚至有人认为这象征着美国在全球范围内影响力的衰退和中国影响力的继续崛起。
+
+在这条“厉害了中国外交”的延长线上，有人开始畅想北京调停其他国与国关系——比如南朝鲜、印度和巴基斯坦，乃至俄罗斯和乌克兰。所以当中国发布的俄乌危机政治解决立场文件出台时，墙内外的评论氛围可谓是相当不同——墙外大多数评论都认为这十二条立场脱离实际，只谈和平而不谈道义，俄罗斯和乌克兰双方都不会接受，基本上属于自说自话。如流亡海外的俄罗斯反对派媒体《美杜莎》邀请的评论员就认为这份文件仅仅是显示一下“中国没有坐视不管”。但在墙内，还是有不少人附和官方宣传，给这份文件很高评价，也期待着“中国路线”能够带来某种效果。
+
+在习近平访问莫斯科之后，这些热情也许就要熄灭不少了。
+
+
+### 中国：俄乌战争的受益方？
+
+习近平和普京在莫斯科的会谈的主要成果，是一份双方共同发布的联合声明。除了意料之中商贸、旅游、意识形态和国安往来之外，关于乌克兰的部分，部分程度上满足了俄罗斯的需要——声明强调反对任何不经过联合国安全理事会就对某国施加的制裁、抨击西方霸权。不过与此同时，北京方面也往里塞入了自己想要的“调停”观感——俄罗斯承诺将保持和乌克兰沟通的大门敞开，致力于通过和谈解决危机。
+
+只不过，看完文本，人们会失望地发现，这份声明中，中方立场相比过去一年几乎没有方寸的变化。无论是认为中俄即将结盟，还是认为中国将施压俄罗斯结束战争的人，都会意识到北京依旧是在重复自己的“中立”。
+
+
+▲ 2023年3月21日，俄罗斯莫斯科克里姆林宫，俄罗斯总统普京和中国国家主席习近平出席招待会后离开。
+
+2023年和2022年唯一的不同，也许就是前中国外交部长王毅以如今政治局委员和中央外事办主任的身份在习近平访俄之前再次会见了乌克兰外长库列巴。这是至今为止最高级别的中乌官员会谈。这样级别的会谈当然存在着为两国领导人会面铺路的可能性。但这同样也可以理解为某种试探——看看彼此双方领导人想通过会谈提到、认可什么，如果谈不拢，那就再放着。毕竟，北京对乌克兰的需求一向不高，甚至可以说，北京高层要是能认识到乌克兰并非西方傀儡，都已经算是非常重大的认知调整了。因此，如果习近平-泽连斯基会谈最终没有出现，人们也不必过多惊讶。
+
+卡内基国际和平基金会研究员马铁木（Temur Umarov）把这种立场称为“战略模糊”——同时说着两套话，一边是尊重主权和领土完整，听起来像是在支持乌克兰的立场，另一边说着反对西方霸权，听起来是站在了俄罗斯一边。他认为这种模糊对北京的全球目标是有利的——在乌克兰拖住美欧符合北京的利益——因为这样就使得西方很难再有更多资源投入到围堵中国的亚洲方向上来。他的分析代表了很多海外中国研究专家的观点：中国是俄乌战争的最大受益者之一，随着俄罗斯日渐陷入战争泥潭，中国对俄罗斯的影响力和权力就越来越大，中俄的合作关系就变得越来越不对等。
+
+的确，对北京来说，采取模糊的“中立”，实际上不做什么事情，就足以得到足够多的好处。一方面，俄罗斯的经济日益向北京靠拢。根据最新的统计（引用一下《美杜莎》的数据），俄罗斯目前已经有40%的进口来自中国，33%的外汇交易用人民币结算。另一面，乌克兰战场需要的武器装备支持，使得美国在印度洋-太平洋地区的军事部署受到了牵制，美国投入越多，就越缺少足够力量应对北京。所以，一场漫长的，消耗巨大的乌克兰战争，实际上更符合北京的利益。北京只需要注意的是，如果战争拉长，普京政权不会因此受到影响而垮台就行了。
+
+
+### 北京的国际影响力有限
+
+不过，北京是否“对俄罗斯有了越来越多的影响力”，就见仁见智了。一方面，人们可以说更强的经济纽带自然会让俄罗斯更依赖中国。但另一方面，熟悉俄罗斯的人都能意识到其当前政权的白人至上主义本质——甚至普京对西方的厌恶也来源于“西方变得越来越不像西方了”。
+
+这意味着“听中国人的话”，本质上并不存在于俄罗斯政治精英的词汇列表里。如果我们对比普京刊登在《人民日报》和习近平刊登在《俄罗斯报》的署名文章的话，就会发现习的用词仍然是四平八稳的那套，而普京的文风则激烈得多，大意是俄罗斯要和“集体西方”（kollektivnyy zapad）——既整个欧美集团战斗，试图向中方传递的信息大概可以意译为：“你们要不要一起？”很明显，在意识形态和对抗性上，是莫斯科拖着北京，而看不到北京能如何牵制莫斯科。
+
+值得思考的是，如未来俄军在前线真的受到了更大的挫折，这时候普京选择动用战术核武器或抱着“揽炒”的心态发动更全方位的战争，真到了那时，北京假如要劝俄罗斯不要这么做，能有什么效果？目前看来，北京倘若要在外交上对俄罗斯施压有很多筹码，但使用它们的前提都是俄罗斯的统治精英能够理性决策——发动对乌克兰的入侵已经使得这一前提成为了空话。况且，北京也没有从华府得到任何“如果你施压俄罗斯，我就减少给你的压力”的承诺。
+
+和对俄罗斯类似，中国的外交力量在其他国际舞台上扮演的角色和扮演角色的意愿，和北京对他国的实际经济影响力也并不同步。
+
+
+▲ 2019年6月21日，中国国家主席习近平与朝鲜领导人金正恩在平壤出席午餐会。
+
+比如，尽管习时代一直坚称要建设“人类命运共同体”，也希望在各种国际问题中扮演更积极的角色，但是一些围绕中国周边，对北京影响更大的议题上，中国的斡旋外交并不出色。
+
+举例来说，在2021年缅甸政变之后，北京实际上完全有机会考虑更积极进取的调停手段，也有大量的中国资本在缅甸面临动荡，缅甸的军人政权上台其实相当不符合北京的利益诉求。但是，中方最终选择的路径是几乎袖手旁观，既不全心支持军政府，也不试图调和矛盾，而是坐看缅甸在政变后日渐成为一个军人独裁国家，变成各种东南亚跨国犯罪的摇篮温床。
+
+又比如，韩半岛局势在近几年内也几乎陷入停滞，北京似乎认定右翼的韩国政府和热衷于新冷战的拜登政府不会给任何“面子”，也意识到了金正恩的目的显然是直接和美国对话，随即在半岛无核化和斡旋上陷入沉寂。如果中国对于近在咫尺的南朝鲜问题的解决都没有那么有兴趣、动力与能力的话，为什么会能够向俄罗斯施压解决入侵乌克兰的危机呢？
+
+可以说，沙特伊朗复交这样层级的协调，通过北京的外交系统能够部分程度上实现。但是，缅甸、东北亚、俄乌这样的外交事务，相比之下属于“大事”。按照习时代大事上亲力亲为的风格，这些事务反而需要习本人亲自安排和操作。而看过去十年的历史，比如2019年应对香港反修例抗议，与2020年-2022年间处理COVID-19大流行的“封”与“放”，他在决策上的风格是极为谨慎，甚至可以说是颇为拖延。领导人个人的强势地位和风格，大概率决定了中国并不会真心介入俄乌斡旋。完全可以相信习会尽量推后做出决策的时间点，尽量维持一种“再看看吧”和“以不变应万变”的姿态应对现实——就算边际收益越来越小也会是如此。从这一点上来说，北京在乌克兰议题上采取的身段，倒未必就是完全从国家利益出发设定的，时代和个人风格的影响会更大。
+
+
+### 陷入僵局的战争
+
+况且，如今有越来越多的证据显示，乌克兰战争也陷入了僵局。
+
+从去年十一月到如今五个月间，乌克兰战场上的局势发生了不少变化。五个月前，乌军刚刚完成了在哈尔科夫（Kharkiv）地区的反攻，收复了哈尔科夫东北直到库皮扬斯克（Kupyansk）一带的领土。其后，乌军又在南部向前推进，收复了开战以来俄军攻克的唯一地区首府城市赫尔松（Kherson）。在当时，乌克兰网民之中一片欢腾，在嘲讽俄军不堪一击的同时流传着许多庆祝段子，包括说等到来年春天的时候就可以庆祝战争胜利了。但在那之后，乌军反攻的势头明显放缓，甚至随后，俄军在东部城市巴赫姆特（Bakhmut）依靠着“瓦格纳”雇佣军的冲锋获得了一定的战果。人们一度讨论乌军是否会放弃这一区域。而乌军苦战许久伤亡惨重直到近期才传出战线稳固的消息。
+
+媒体和评论人期待已久的乌克兰冬季大反攻，最终也没有在刚刚过去的冬天出现。此前人们一度认为，乌军将在土地冻硬之后，从第聂伯河中游的扎波罗热（Zaporizhzhia）一带南下切断克里米亚半岛俄军和陆地的联系。但是，如今三月底，欧洲已经春暖花开，乌克兰东部的土地也开始翻浆，反攻却没有出现。反而，媒体上传出一些乌军方面的坏消息。比如，根据《华盛顿邮报》的多篇报道，漫长的消耗战和缺乏足够的重武器导致乌克兰步兵中老兵伤亡较多，如今已经影响了乌军前线的作战效力。
+
+
+▲ 2023年3月25日，乌克兰基辅举行的葬礼上，乌克兰军人将国旗折叠在逝世军人的棺材上。
+
+俄罗斯尽管已经传出向西部调动“古董”坦克，却也并没有停战或者感到疲劳的意思。现在看来，普京并没有从战争初期的失利中吸取教训，甚至，当前的局势加强了他对自己判断的坚定信仰。举例而言，近日普京发表的公开演说中提到欧洲对乌克兰的支持已经难以为继，尤其是提到欧洲和美国的工业能力不足以为乌克兰提供足够每天使用的炮弹。这意味着他仍然对两条判断极为自信。其一，他认为在长期作战中俄罗斯仍然大有希望；其次，他对西方“堕落”的总体判断仍然存在，包括看不起西方的工业能力和援助乌克兰的决心。
+
+在未来一年，僵持局势既可能因为乌军战力的加强而打破（但前提是欧美要输送包括战机在内的更多重型武器），又或许，战事的拐点会从战场乃至两国之外出现。比如目前对俄罗斯极为重要的伊朗如果经济持续困在谷底，民众对政府的持续不息的抗议运动持续，而当局又继续犯下决策错误的话，整个神权政府都可能遭遇崩溃。在今年年初，伊朗政府甚至无力维持监狱系统的开支，释放了大量政治犯。这样的信号说明在伊朗存在着爆发社会变革的巨大可能性。
+
+一旦这样的能量释放出来，足以形成多米诺骨牌式的效果。尽管这不意味着未来就会乐观——伊朗可以变成下一个突尼斯叙利亚，或埃及或土耳其。这取决于俄罗斯、中国这样的角色会在什么程度上介入，也取决于伊朗的内部变化会如何发生。而伊朗也并非这一链条上的唯一薄弱环节。
+
+北京怎么理解乌克兰问题？也许高层仍然将其当作美国的“傀儡”或者“代理人战争”问题，而忽视了乌克兰人自身强烈的民族主义意识和反抗的意愿。但僵持的战场又确实创造了一种短期的“疲劳”感，这种情绪一定程度上为斡旋和“展示我们在调停”提供了空间，但是它不太会持续太久。目前的主旋律仍然是“战”，而不是“和”。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-02-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk8.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-02-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk8.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第八周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-04-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/38YeNKW.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 趙家賢稱戴耀廷「風雲計劃」起營造憲制抗爭 對戴未獲共識提「攬炒」感「好火滾」
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第八周。區諾軒本周完成24天的作供，第二控方證人、時任民主動力召集人趙家賢亦開始作供，講述「35+計劃」的背景以及民主動力如何參與其中。
+
+趙家賢供稱，戴耀廷2018年提出「風雲計劃」倡區議會過半，已開始着手營造「憲制抗爭」概念；而戴「引領」很多本土抗爭派政治素人出選，在反修例民怨下大勝，令議會變得「標籤化、民粹化、口號式」，戴提出「35+計劃」是望將區選的成功複製至立法會選舉。
+
+趙表示，民主動力於2020年2月受邀列席九東首次協調會議，於5月正式答應承辦初選。庭上展示戴耀廷4月提及民主派以「攬炒」迫中共讓步的文章，趙指庭上首次讀到，感「好火滾」、批戴未獲共識下如「民主派全港唯一領導人」，又指當時若有細看，「好深信」民主動力不會答應承辦初選，因與他們辦初選「初心」相違。趙亦指戴在運用否決權上是「傾向本土抗爭派嗰邊」。
+
+趙家賢至今作供3天，至少提及74次「法官閣下」、9次「法官大人」，亦至少8次多謝法官或主控的糾正和提問。趙出入也會與主控互相點頭，作供期間不時有被告搖頭、皺眉和發笑。趙作供第3天亦確認其房間仍管有其證人供詞，控方應法官要求安排取走。
+
+此外，控方本周指時任觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻，以及民主動力總幹事黎敬輝均為本案「共謀者」之一。法官認為情況不理想，籲控方提供一份共謀者名單。
+
+
+
+
+### 趙指戴耀廷「風雲計劃」引領本土派出選、着手營造「憲制抗爭」 望立選複製區選成功
+
+趙家賢本周三起開始作供，表示2012年因「佔中」工作認識戴耀廷，戴其後變成「較前進」人士的「帶領者」，常與民主派政黨領導層「推銷」新想法，並於2018年提倡「風雲計劃」，找有志者填滿區議會「白區」。趙指戴找人時以「向政府抗爭的政治理念行先」，望取區議會主導權，取得特首選委會議席及將撥款用於推動民主，將地區事務「政治化」。趙形容戴當時已從區議會「着手」，開始營造「憲制抗爭」的概念，指他是「一步步去營造」。
+
+趙指，戴「引領」了很多本土抗爭派政治素人參選，在反修例民怨下大勝，惟他們漠視區議會傳統，如發言時未有「多謝主席」，且「口號式政治表態居多」，否決建制派所有社區活動撥款，人數較少的傳統民主派只能「順住個形勢而行」。趙形容區議會變得「標籤化、民粹化、口號式」，並帶入立法會選舉，認為戴從2018年起將該種形態「慢慢注入」再「有機地」發展。
+
+就「35＋計劃」的背景，趙指政治素人因反修例高票當選而「心雄」，作為「大學者、大文豪、大思想家」的戴耀廷亦乘勢撰文，望將勝選的民意民氣延續至立法會選舉，複製區選的成功。趙指戴2019年12月撰文談立會過半，翌年2至3月將民間的「35+」概念加以運用析述、對本案計劃有「初步框架」，並先於選區較小的九龍東開始進行討論。
+
+
+### 趙家賢指2月獲區諾軒邀請列席九東協調會、5月正式答應承辦初選
+
+那民主動力如何開始參與「35+計劃」？趙家賢表示，2020年2月初獲區諾軒邀請參與九東協調，趙認為民主動力有辦立法會補選初選的經驗，是合適角色提供意見，遂接受邀請列席九東首次協調會議。不過，趙強調民主動力當時未同意承辦初選，在3月至5月初正獲「資深傳媒人蕭若元」贊助舉行選民登記活動，蕭望從建制派手上取得批發及零售界、飲食界及進出口界3個功能組別議席。
+
+戴耀廷與區諾軒於3月26日舉行「立會過半」記招，趙指事前無收過邀請也不知情，看直播才知道；而區曾向趙表明戴獲民主派元老充分支持，趙形容民主動力「完全排除在外、完全冇角色」。民主動力翌日轉發朱凱廸談立會過半的帖文，趙解釋是讓公眾以為民主動力有跟進，是「吸like」和「避免尷尬」。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷與區諾軒等人於2020年3月26日召開「立會過半」記者會
+
+民主動力3月亦發文回應社會對初選安排的關注，被問為何未正式加入計劃也發文，趙指他2014年接棒民主動力召集人，「使命」是維持組織運作和協調民主派出選，「如果之後嘅協調工作全部係由戴耀廷做晒、獲得授權嘅話，民主動力係壽終正寢，係唔需要有任何工作」，同意不想民主動力「企埋一邊」。
+
+趙確認，戴耀廷和區諾軒於2020年5月初邀請民主動力承辦初選，他考慮後於5月中下旬答應，並要求戴承諾由民主動力「全權處理同控制」初選運作。趙指戴當時「『口輕輕』答係冇問題」，他亦信任戴，惟之後初選流程有很多變異，「我相信之後主控會帶領我去講出嚟」，有被告聞言低聲起哄。
+
+
+### 趙對戴耀廷未獲共識提攬炒「好火滾」 指對方如「民主派全港唯一領導人」
+
+庭上又援引戴耀廷4月〈攬炒大對決〉一文，稱民主派會否決預算案和實行「攬炒」策略，迫中共及特區政府就五大訴求讓步。趙認為戴在初選討論未達共識、無獲明確授權下，已撰寫「煽動性」和「好似預言家」的文章，如「民主派全港唯一領導人」，「我而家第一次睇到呢篇文章，我睇到呢啲字眼，我係好火滾」，批其行為自負和不負責任。
+
+趙又指，若承辦初選前有仔細看清戴的文章，「咁我好深信，我同民主動力都不會同意承辦初選」。他強調，民主動力辦初選的「初心」是望協調民主派立會過半並推動利民政策，惟戴「好躁動」地「同中央、同政府『頂到行』」，用「攬炒」字眼迫中共讓步，絕非民主動力的「初心」。
+
+
+### 趙指戴耀廷協調會上提任期或只有7個月、傾向本土派一方 鄒家成曾強烈批評傳統泛民
+
+就各區協調會議，趙表示首次出席是3月2日九東會議，最後一次是5月5日新東會議，同意會議初期重點非否決權，戴耀廷是在後期才更着重。趙作供提及有出席的所有協調會議均遲到。
+
+就九西首次會議，趙指重點討論初選機制，而時任油尖旺區議員李傲然「有比較上進取去講覺得要用盡議會嘅一啲權力」，惟討論之後不了了之。戴耀廷兩日後發出的九西協調機制初稿有「會積極運用」否決權字眼。
+
+
+
+至於新東首次會議，趙承認到場後處理區議會事務，「冇特別留意」會上內容，但提到民主動力時「會豎起隻耳仔聽」，指當時有本土派質疑民主動力是「大台」，不希望組織參與協調，他有作回應。
+
+趙又指會上有本土派提及支持戴耀廷「攬炒」文章，戴遂以「溫和好多」的字眼解釋望運用《基本法》權力否決預算案，作為籌碼與中共談判，並指當選後預計任期可能只有7個月。戴亦提及要有「共同綱領」，他會收集意見並幫忙起草，並倡運用「積極運用」否決權字眼。民主黨等傳統泛民表示疑慮，鄒家成則作出「好強烈嘅批評」，認為民意是要選「抗爭人士」入立會，用盡方法迫政府回應五大訴求，倡用更進取的「會否決」。
+
+至於港島區，趙有出席首兩次會議。民主動力總幹事黎敬輝紀錄指區諾軒會上稱「要有戰意鬥志，否決財政預算案」，趙指沒有印象，但記得司馬文有表示反對否決預算案，戴耀廷簡單回應後就被「蓋過」，重點討論替補機制和投票系統等。
+
+至於新西首次會議，趙指戴有提及否決預算案，本土抗爭派和傳統民主派對此有「拉扯」，而戴「挨向」用否決權的方向、「傾向本土抗爭派嗰邊」，會後並將「會積極運用」否決權加入協調文件。
+
+
+### 趙家賢至少74次提「法官閣下」 作供第3天仍管有證人供詞
+
+趙家賢本周作供3天，出入法庭時均會向法官點頭，並會與主控萬德豪互相點頭。他回答問題時，習慣先說「回應」或「多謝」法官和主控，3天內至少提及74次「法官閣下」、9次「法官大人」，亦至少8次多謝法官或主控的糾正和提問。他曾表示「法官閣下形容得好準確」、「同意法官閣下準確嘅演繹」、「感謝法官閣下搵方法去協助本人記憶」等，趙作供期間不時有被告搖頭、皺眉和發笑。
+
+趙作供時亦多次談及對戴耀廷的看法，法官李運騰一度指，希望證人能順時序作供，並指比起證人對政治氣候的個人判斷，法庭更需要的是具體事實（concrete facts）。另在法官關注下，趙於作供第3天表示其房間內仍管有本案供詞，法官要求控方安排取走。
+
+此外，控方就戴耀廷在《蘋果日報》文章提問時，趙所有文章均只看過轉載帖文的節錄或完全未看過。法官問他是否《蘋果》讀者，趙自言要兼顧區議會副主席和區議員職務，「唔會所有文章都會睇晒」，而法官李運騰亦指自己不看《蘋果》。
+
+
+▲ 蔡澤鴻（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 控方指蔡澤鴻和民主動力黎敬輝同為共謀者 官稱情況不埋想促交共謀者名單
+
+此外，控方本周相繼指控兩名沒有被捕和被起訴、名字亦不在公訴書（indictment）上的人士為案中「共謀者」之一，包括參與九龍東協調的時任觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻，以及民主動力總幹事黎敬輝。控方早前確認本案依賴「共謀者原則」，並呈交針對各被告的證據列表，根據該原則，各共謀者的言行均可用來指證所有被告。
+
+蔡澤鴻曾託區諾軒轉告有關九東會議的訊息，控方指蔡出席了多次協調會議，可推論對謀劃知情；惟區諾軒稱區議會主席角色有限，「唔希望人哋收個訊息畀我都有問題，令到好多人有不必要嘅擔心。」
+
+蔡亦是「35+九東立選座談會」WhatsApp群組的管理人，曾為九東會議找場地和替戴耀廷轉發會議摘要。法官問蔡是否會議的組織者，趙家賢形容他是「好資深嘅議員」、「好好心、好幫手嘅大義工」，不認為他是組織者。
+
+至於黎敬輝則為控方證人，庭上屢援引他與趙家賢的對話，惟黎於2021年7月已離港。法官李運騰認為兩度出現此情況非常不理想，指現已開審多時，籲控方提供一份共謀者名單，否則辯方難以得知控方依賴何人的言行指證被告，控方表示願意提供。
+
+另就本周作供完成的區諾軒，他於覆問期間承認7月15日宣布退出初選的兩日後，曾出席港島區協調會議，指「有啲手尾我要處理埋佢」，亦承認仍有留意事態發展，包括報名參選的情況。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-09-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk9.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-09-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk9.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..86587eca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-09-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk9.md
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第九周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-04-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/N4HBp0w.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 趙家賢指抗爭派失控「唯有DQ自己」
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第九周。時任民主動力召集人趙家賢繼續作供，更詳細談及民主動力角色及退出初選經過。
+
+趙家賢供稱，為免DQ風險，與區諾軒成功說服戴耀廷毋須參選人簽署協議，惟本土派對此有「超級大意見」，因與傳統民主派「互信極之不足」，但趙認為即使無簽協議，戴耀廷和區諾軒仍可為會上共識做證。趙亦引述其助手稱新東會上投票通過「會運用」否決權字眼，與區諾軒早前稱沒有達成共識有出入。
+
+趙又指，兩辦譴責初選或違法後才首次讀畢戴耀廷〈真攬炒十步〉一文，感「心寒」、如「世界大核爆」；而戴向參選人發訊息稱不提否決每個議案和癱瘓政府，趙認為他「好清楚知道踩到界」、望「統一口徑」。惟抗爭派其後召記者會表明否決預算案和望引致國際制裁等，趙認為是「完全地失控」和抵觸《國安法》，「我唔能夠DQ佢哋嘅話，我唯有喺呢個時候DQ自己」，遂宣布退出初選。
+
+此外，趙家賢本周多番被法官打斷要求直接回答問題，並對民主動力帖文曾提及「光復議會」、「對抗暴政」向法官認錯。庭上播放抗爭派記者會片段，岑敖暉稱「非常期待」被國安處送入監牢，多名被告發笑。
+
+
+### 趙助手指新東新西通過「會運用」、鄒家成提「癱瘓政府」 趙稱本土派想「拉倒」傳統泛民
+
+本案關鍵在於各被告有否達成協議，同意無差別否決預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，以顛覆國家政權。區諾軒早前曾稱，新界東就運用否決權的字眼沒有達成共識，不過趙家賢本周提供了另一說法。
+
+上周稱曾出席新東5月5日第二次會議的趙，本周改口稱不曾出席，並由其助手民主動力總幹事黎敬輝做筆記。控方庭上讀出黎的多則紀錄，指戴耀廷會上曾稱共同綱領不提否決預算案「難合乎公眾期望」，鄒家成表示「如我們不決意，如何說服香港人於初選投票，推我地入去立法會癱瘓政府」，何桂藍亦指「綱領更進取較好」。辯方一度質疑趙無法確認紀錄準確性，惟控方指意不在此，官批准繼續發問。
+
+趙家賢形容，當時本土抗爭派「好進取」、「好漠視」中央政府訊息，想「拉倒」傳統民主派一起運用否決權；又引助手指，戴耀廷望表決定下協議最後版本，「會運用」否決權字眼終在投票獲大多數「so-called通過」。趙家賢對此感「詫異」，相信民主黨代表未獲授權表態，並向戴反映，戴則稱起草最後版本協議時會給予所有與會者，亦會處理民主黨情況。會議兩日後戴發出新東文件，有「會運用」字眼。
+
+除了新界東，黎敬輝筆記亦指新界西5月8日第二次會議通過「會運用」。趙同樣缺席該會議，並指5月13日超區協調會後，戴再邀請民主動力承辦初選，他們於5月20多日才答允。
+
+
+### 趙家賢稱成功說服戴耀廷毋須簽協議 惟本土派「超級大意見」因對傳統泛民互信不足
+
+連日來審訊就各區協議文件發問，惟最終參與者毋須簽署，僅九東及新西參選人自行簽署並夾附「共同綱領」。為何定下協議卻毋須簽署？趙家賢確認，簽署各區協議為戴耀廷原本計劃，惟他和區諾軒均向戴表示若簽公開文件，會被選舉主任檢視並有DQ風險，未能反映初選望集中票源的「心意」；加上將通過《國安法》，不簽文件可為參選人提供保障，「多一事不如少一事」。戴最終決定毋須簽協議，趙同意是被他和區二人成功說服。
+
+戴耀廷在6月9日記者會上公布該決定，指「我哋唔會愚蠢到自己去製造一個藉口比呢個當權者嚟去DQ」。不過翌日鄒家成等人即發布「墨落無悔」聲明書，表明「會運用」否決權，趙確認聲明與新西協議的字眼和意思大致相同。
+
+戴耀廷事後向參與者發訊息致歉，稱不用簽協議是他「個人決定」，「我不想由我的手去製造借口給政府去DQ任何人」，又對未有事前諮詢致歉。趙同意戴是計劃的「領袖」，將決定歸為個人責任；並指戴當時應沒諮詢所有人，而本土抗爭派對毋須簽協議有「超級大意見」，因他們與傳統民主派「好明顯個互信度係極之不足」。惟趙同意，即使沒有簽署協議，戴耀廷和區諾軒仍可為會上達成的共識做證。
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片
+
+
+### 趙指兩辦譴責後戴耀廷稱「不說癱瘓政府」 因「好清楚知道踩到界」、望「統一口徑」
+
+就初選會否違法，趙家賢同意《國安法》生效首日，戴耀廷曾向各團隊發訊息稱「35+」否決預算案的目標應沒有違法。初選投票於7月11及12日舉行，中聯辦及港澳辦事後相繼譴責涉違法。戴在13日晚的記者會重申初選不違法，但趙稱戴曾指其法律觀點是從普通法角度出發，「如果係從大陸法嘅角度，『我唔識呀』」，趙認為戴首次表達不確認初選是否完全沒有抵觸《國安法》。
+
+趙續指，7月14日《蘋果日報》資深政治記者聯絡他，提醒他戴曾發表〈真攬炒十步〉一文，着他要小心。趙指當時首次完整閱讀該文章，「我係心寒嘅」，不知道戴原來具體寫下初選是其「攬炒嘅大計劃」的其中一部分，「係一步一步去到一個，我講係『世界大核爆』咁嘅情況」，庭上多人大笑。
+
+戴同日向所有參選人發訊息，指「我公開的訊息說35+的目的，是運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，令特區政府問責。不提否決每一個議案，也不說癱瘓政府。」趙指，戴當日曾向他指有候選人言論「有啲過咗界」，並認為普通法沒有追溯力，他以往的文章沒有問題，但《國安法》生效後，參與者言行便可能對計劃有影響。
+
+趙形容，戴「當刻好清楚知道係踩到界」、明顯認知初選抵觸《國安法》，故發訊息提醒各人公開發言時要小心，「想統一大家口徑」；亦同意法官指，戴是不願參與者觸犯《國安法》，因癱瘓政府本身就是「顛覆國家政權」。
+
+
+### 趙批抗爭派記者會「完全地失控」 無法DQ他們唯有DQ自己作「切割」
+
+趙家賢表示，區諾軒於7月14日亦曾致電他，稱將退出初選，想趙一同退出，並指已聯絡時任政制及內地事務局政治助理吳璟儁，又提及《國安法》自動放棄犯罪可減刑的第33條，認為組織者要自行解散初選。區翌日宣布退出，趙轉發其帖文並稱會「謹守崗位」，他解釋原本商量好區先退出，他再視乎情況決定何時退出。
+
+不過趙指，7月15日的抗爭派記者會令他思維有「好特別嘅轉變」，認為「即刻要去退出」。他指事前不獲知會有該記者會，而會上各人表明否決預算案、望引致國際制裁，是「完全地失控」、「踩界」和抵觸《國安法》。他又指，戴耀廷前一日發訊息望「力挽狂瀾」將各人從紅線拉出來，抗爭派卻表明身處紅線內。
+
+
+▲ 抗爭派記者會（資料圖片）
+
+趙強調，民主動力在提名表格加入承諾擁護《基本法》及效忠特區的條款，因這是民選公職人員「應有之義」，惟抗爭派言論「絕對不合乎」該條款；而他只是「服務提供者」，非如選委會般有實權，亦要對組織和身邊人負責，「我唔能夠DQ佢哋嘅話，我唯有喺呢個時候DQ自己」，「比公眾傳媒好清楚認知係一個切割」。他遂於7月16日宣布退出。
+
+
+### 趙就民動帖文提「光復議會」、「對抗暴政」認錯 稱退出後民動無按計劃資助民調
+
+另外，就民主動力的參與和角色，趙家賢確認民主動力作為初選承辦機構，為初選眾籌約340多萬、招募逾2,500名義工、在媒體落廣告宣傳和為參選人申報選舉開支。
+
+法官問及民主動力2020年6月宣布眾籌的帖文內，提及「#光復議會」和「#對抗暴政」的意思，趙指前者指立會過半後能光復議會功能，實行民主派的政策倡議；後者則因當時支持民主的民間社會覺得受到「好強大嘅政治打壓」，以「對抗暴政」表達憤慨，並在法官追問下指相信「暴政」是指當時的香港政府。
+
+被問該些字眼是否民主動力的政治立場，趙稱「絕對不是」，並說「抱歉法官閣下，我要認錯」，「我冇做好謹慎責任嘅角色」，有被告說「嘩」，多人發笑。趙在追問下指民主動力並非「政治中立」，是屬民主陣營的組織。
+
+趙家賢亦透露，照原定計劃，民主動力會委託香港民研進行民意調查，於選舉前一星期公布，決定出選名單和配票策略，同意民調是「35+計劃」的重要部分。而趙宣布退出協調工作後，戴耀廷曾問他會否繼續資助民研，惟趙因民動已退出初選，不想繼續之後工作故沒有撥款，選舉最終亦延期。至於眾籌資金去向，趙指1,000元以下才撥入初選開支，大額款項有部分納為民動經費。而戴耀廷曾指民主派對反對預算案有顧慮，望預留80至100萬元予香港民研研發新的民間投票系統，民主動力終將剩餘資金捐予香港民研和慈善機構。
+
+
+### 趙稱區諾軒辦初選成「磨心」 庭上播抗爭派記者會片段多人大笑
+
+此外，繼上周後，法官再關注區諾軒會上曾否提及否決預算案。趙形容區「本身係好實務去睇初嘅作用」，法官表示知道區辦初選的「初心」，但問其「初心」有否改變？趙形容區「越嚟越變咗係磨心」，指區出身傳統民主派、前民主黨元老李永達曾指「當佢係半個仔」，惟區的立會補選議席原屬本土自決派，加上他是「好實務、為基層好實幹」的區議員，故對如何平衡各方「好困擾」、就傳統和本土兩邊光譜協作亦「兩面不是人」、常遇委屈，並曾向趙家賢「呻」。
+
+控方庭上亦播放抗爭派記者會片段，抗爭派表示他們已成為主流，重申會堅定否決財政預算案。其中岑敖暉稱立法會議員有權否決每一個法案及議案，並強調如果這樣都是涉嫌顛覆國家的話，「我非常之期待北京或者國安處、或者係林鄭，因為一個議員狂投否決票，而將我哋送入監牢，樂見其成」。這時延伸庭的岑敖暉、黃之鋒及吳敏兒均一同大笑，袁嘉蔚邊笑邊拍手，在正庭的鄒家成和吳政亨也相視而笑。
+
+
+▲ 岑敖暉（資料圖片）
+
+此外，趙家賢本周作供亦多番被法官打斷，要求他正面回答問題。法官陳慶偉曾指話題已扯得太遠，法官李運騰亦曾指趙被問及簡單的問題，望他能簡單回答，「否則我們會在這裡不知幾個世紀」，又着趙需清楚區分作為事實證人的角色及他個人的推論。趙則不止一次稱「我盡快講返清楚」、「我而家講緊㗎啦」、「就嚟解答到㗎啦」。
+
+趙家賢在作供第5天亦主動表示，連日來觀看眼前電腦螢幕「隻眼比較上辛苦」，法庭終安排以3張白紙遮蓋其螢幕，趙其後改為觀看前方投影的大銀幕，及右方法庭傳譯主任的電腦螢幕。
+
+案件周二（11日）續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "中国革命研究政治学家裴宜理专访"
+author: "李菁"
+date : 2023-04-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/tXngUYR.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+美国中国研究学者裴宜理（Elizabeth Perry）身世特殊。1948年，她出生于上海，父母皆为当时上海圣约翰大学教授。因中国时局变化，1951年她随父母迁居日本东京，在日本度过童年。她后来打趣说，也许一出生便与“革命”两字紧密联系在一起，她终生对中国的革命抱有兴趣。“没有革命，我很可能在中国长大。我对中国革命一直很好奇，而且想知道革命为什么发生，又给中国带来什么后果。”
+
+
+
+裴宜理的青年时期也是在全球“革命”与左翼运动汹涌澎湃的浪潮中度过的，这更坚定了她未来的学术志向。中国的大门打开之后，她成为第一批被允许进入中国进行田野调查研究的外国学者之一，她的研究领域包括中国政治、文化和社会变革等方面。她著述丰厚并屡获大奖，包括1993年美国历史学会费正清奖的《上海罢工》。《美国历史评论》（American Historical Review）评价她“兼具社会科学家对秩序的热爱与历史学家捕捉精彩故事的眼睛”。
+
+裴宜理先后执教于亚利桑那大学、华盛顿大学、加州大学伯克利分校，1997年起任教于哈佛大学政府系，并先后出任费正清研究中心主任及亚洲研究学会主席；自2008年起，她出任哈佛-燕京学社社长至今，为中国研究培养了一批杰出的学生和学者，是中国研究领域的重要人物之一。
+
+
+## 对研究中国的学者来说，现在是一个非常困难时期
+
+
+▲ 美国学者裴宜理（Elizabeth Perry）
+
+
+### “我是一名政治学家”
+
+__问__：您有很多个身份，包括哈佛大学政府系教授以及哈佛-燕京学社社长。能否先简单介绍一下您现在的日常工作？
+
+__裴__：我仍在从事教学工作。比如这学期我在指导一个研究生关于中国政治的研讨会。每个星期我们会读一本美国政治学家写的关于中国的新书，当然我们也读关于其他国家的书，比如美国、印度、拉丁美洲……然后我们会把中国的模式与其他国家的模式进行比较。这就是我的主要教学工作，但我也在指导十几篇关于中国政治的博士论文。然后我用一半时间担任哈佛燕京学社的主任——自从我成为主任后，我一半的时间是在哈佛当教授，一半是在哈佛燕京学社。
+
+__问__：您写了很多专著，大多数都是关于中国历史的大事件，比如华北革命、上海罢工、安源煤矿……有一些人把您当成历史学家。从学术角度来讲，您怎么定义自己？
+
+__裴__：我是一名政治学家（political scientist），我所有的学位，无论是本科、研究生、还是博士，都是“政治科学”（political science）。我一直在政治学系工作，因为我的方法更多是在社会科学理论方面的。比如，我们如何解释一个革命的爆发？革命当然是独特的，是对过去的一种突破。那么，它在多大程度上反映了过去？或者在多大程度上带来了政治方面的全新东西？这是我的出发点。对我来说，这更像是一个关于革命的理论问题：是什么导致了革命，以及我们如何理解革命活动的起源。
+
+我从不认为自己是历史学家，我从来没有在历史系工作过，虽然我也曾接到斯坦福大学和芝加哥大学历史系的工作邀请，但考虑再三，我还是谢绝了他们的好意。因为我受到的专业训练是政治科学，如果我接受一份历史系的工作会感到不自在。做一名政治学者，我感觉更舒服、也更有效率。
+
+尽管我喜欢挖掘档案材料，喜欢探求有丰富历史意义的话题，但是我也希望能够说出一些对中国的当代政治有启发意义的东西。我的目标始终是解释“当代”事件，但也注意它们在历史上是如何发展的，并试图追溯它们彼此的联系。
+
+__问__：作为研究中国的政治学家，您所经历的研究范式或研究方向的转变是什么？
+
+__裴__：我写过几篇文章，探讨了不同年代的政治学家研究中国的变迁。
+
+第一代研究中国的政治学家完全是在研究国家类型的问题，比如极权主义模式、专制主义模式等，他们试图理解中国的国家控制，一切都与“国家”有关；第二代则是研究文化大革命，一切都关乎“社会”，比如研究红卫兵问题，试图理解中国社会的分裂；第三代，也就是我这一代，更多地关注“国家-社会”关系，以及如何理解它们之间的联系等等。
+
+现在或许已经开启了政治学研究领域的另一个阶段——第四代。每个人都对“国家”再次发生兴趣，对中国的威权控制和威权韧性（authoritarian resilience）感兴趣。我不确定研究中国的历史学家们对这个话题是否有兴趣，但对于政治学家来说，我认为现在他们做的大部分工作都是研究中国共产党如何对中国社会进行控制的。令人高兴的是，每一个阶段，都有人做了不寻常的工作。虽然困难重重，但仍有人坚持在做。
+
+
+▲ 2020年9月29日新疆维吾尔自治区，学生在庆祝中华人民共和国建国的71周年。
+
+__问__：对于研究中国的美国政治学者们来说，现在面临哪些困难和挑战？
+
+__裴__：总的来说，现在这个阶段对研究中国领域来说是一个非常困难的时期。我们面临种种不利因素，比如中国国内普遍存在的对美国的反感，还有获取材料的难度——曾经开放的档案现在即便对中国人自己也不公开。当然，对于美国学生来说，眼下面临的困难就更多了。比如，现在中国有了关于隐私和数据安全的新法律，我们是否能够获得来自中国的任何材料，这非常不清楚。我的几个学生正在与中国一些大学的同行做联合项目，但现在每个人都很困惑：如何分享数据、如何一起分析数据，能否真正有效地进行研究合作等等。
+
+近年来，在社会科学领域，有一个非常令人鼓舞的现象，就是中国的学者和中国以外的学者之间的密切合作。比如说，几乎我所有的学生都与中国的学者共同撰写论文。无论对中国的学者还是美国的学者来说，分享思想、方法和资料来源等等，都是非常有益的，每个人都能学到东西。
+
+但是现在，每个人都非常害怕这样做。因此，对我来说，这是一个非常、非常困难的时刻。我们一直在努力尝试打开这些大门，使“中国政治”真正成为一个有贡献的领域，使那些可能对中国不了解的人仍然觉得他们需要了解它，因为它正在产生各种有趣的想法和理论，而这真的只是在最近几年才开始发生的。
+
+我必须说，我一直很自豪，我的许多学生做了非常好的工作，它们不仅被对中国感兴趣的人认可，而且也被对比较政治感兴趣的人认可。他们意识到，他们必须了解中国才能理解这些话题，这是非常令人兴奋的现象。但我不知道未来会怎样。我的许多学生们现在感到非常沮丧，因为他们一直计划现在就做他们的论文研究，但过去的两三年，去中国变得非常困难。总而言之，这是一个非常困难的时期。
+
+
+### 不同的政治学家，不同的研究路径
+
+__问__：您在学生时期就对中国的文化大革命感兴趣，后来没为什么没有把文革作为毕业论文的题目？
+
+__裴__：我在密歇根大学攻读政治科学的博士学位时，曾想把中国的文化大革命作为博士论文的题目，但我的一位导师提出反对意见。他认为我对文化大革命太过同情；而当时我们对它的真实情况所知甚少。虽然表面上看，我们这里有很多关于“革命”的材料，但其实关于“文化大革命”的材料非常少——所谓的材料，也都是宣传性的，我们无法得到关于文化大革命的准确材料。“等到将来有真实信息出来后，你不知道你的感受会是什么。现在你写的任何关于文化大革命的东西，以后都可能会后悔”。所以我的导师不希望我研究文化大革命。当时，我有点失望。但事后看来，我非常感激我导师的建议。我们当时拥有的信息实在是太有限，那不是一个写文化大革命的好时机。
+
+__问__：如果说当年没有写是因为时机不成熟，那您后来为什么没有写一部全面的文化大革命史，就像麦克法夸尔（Roderick MacFarquhar）那部三卷本的《文化大革命的起源》那样？（The origins of The Cultural Revolution）？没有写文革，是您的一个遗憾吗？
+
+__裴__：我也写了几本上海文革期间工人运动的书，当然不是麦克法夸尔教授的那种风格。我很喜欢麦克法夸尔教授的作品，但我做的工作非常不同。麦克法夸尔教授其实是一位政治历史学家（political historian）。我相信如果有机会问他本人怎么定义自己，他也会这么说。虽然他在政府系教书，但他并不真的认为自己是政治学家——而我则确实认为自己是政治学家，正如之前所说。麦克法夸尔教授从来没有真正地接受过政治学方面的训练，他更像是一个记者+政治历史学家。
+
+麦克法夸尔教授的主要资料来源是回忆录——我认为他做了一项非常了不起的工作，我也很喜欢他的书。但在我看来，他总是把自己放在毛泽东的位置上。有一次，我对他说：我希望你能写点东西，来讲一讲你是如何决定书里采用哪些资料、不采用哪些资料的。但他回答说：“我做不到，我没有意识到这一点。”我说：“但是如果你认真思考一下，让学生们有意识地讨论你的方法论是非常有价值的，因为它非常独特，非常有说服力。显然，你有你的原则，你根据这些原则决定什么包括进来、什么不包括，如何解释事件，等等。但你从未告诉我们这些原则，它们只是在你的故事里。”
+
+
+▲ 1966年，文化大革命期间，毛泽东向北京天安门广场的红卫兵挥手。
+
+我对他的了解越多，我越意识到他也是一个政治家。在我看来，他喜欢想象自己是毛泽东、刘少奇、邓小平或其他领导人，然后试图思考他们作为一个政治家如何看待这种情况。这是了不起的工作，但我的方法可能与之不同：麦克法夸尔教授的书，每一本都是关于一个非常小的年份的；而我的书一般都跨越一百年左右。
+
+我记得周锡瑞（Joe Esherick）有一次对我说，他不可能写一本时间长度超过100年的书——就像我的第一本书（《华北的叛乱者与革命者》）一样。不同的学者肯定有不同的观点和方法。比如周锡瑞喜欢做的是解释一个特定的事件，比如义和团、陕甘宁根据地的建立以及这个特定的、非常重要的历史事件是如何发生的，并给出不同的解释，一种自下而上的社会历史解释。对我来说，我的大部分书，无论是《华北的叛乱者与革命者》还是《上海罢工》、《安源》，都是对在一个长时段内观察某件事感兴趣，并试图理解在这个长时段内逐渐发生的变化，看看在开始时有多少东西到最后仍然存在，以及在这个过程中有多少不同……等等。所以这是很不同的工作。
+
+回到文革的话题，我想我对文化的兴趣也比麦克法夸尔教授要大得多。我更认真地对待文化和意识形态的想法，以及被纳入革命运动中的宗教仪式。
+
+__问__：您与亨廷顿共事过，作为一名政治学者，您怎么看待他的“文明冲突论”？您又怎么评价他的弟子福山的“历史终结论”？
+
+__裴__：我初到哈佛时，确实与亨廷顿教授一起教过一门课。非常有趣的是，当我读研究生时，我对亨廷顿的书是非常批判的，因为它被认为是非常右的作品，但后来我越来越欣赏它。
+
+我认为亨廷顿非常有远见。他早期那本讨论建立政治秩序重要性的书（《变化社会中的政治秩序》Political Order in Changing Societies）是对的——除非你有政治秩序，否则做不了任何事情。但是当《文明的冲突》面世时，里面有很多观点我不同意。但我确实认为，在理解不同的群体——不论我们如何定义它——确实存在着重大差异这一点上，他确实非常有前瞻性。因此，这并不是儒家思想与伊斯兰教或基督教之间的对抗，而是不同类型的世界秩序正在形成自身的文化认同并以此为基础相互对抗。
+
+福山曾在哈佛大学学习过，不过等我到哈佛的时候，他已经离开了。对于福山的“历史终结论”，我总觉得是非常天真的。这个观点也非常具有争议性，它反映了当时西方的一种普遍感觉，即西方已经赢得了冷战，我们能够以此为基础继续往前走。我喜欢福山的作品，但我不同意其中的很多内容。比如，他谈到习近平是一个坏皇帝——我并不认为习近平是一个皇帝，他是一个共产党的书记；我不认为中华帝国有类似共产党的东西。而且在我看来，中国共产党的伟大成就之一是，他们让普通人觉得，这个苏维埃制度就是中国的——实际上，它并不是中国的，它是直接从苏联出来的，包括马克思主义列宁主义，当然都是西方的，中央委员会、政治局、党总书记、党和国家之间的联系等等，这些都不是中国的。
+
+所以说“现在的中国像中华帝国时期，有时有好皇帝，有时有坏皇帝”，我不这么认为，我认为它有和苏联一样的问题。习近平明白，苏联的解体是因为民族冲突。而他确实在努力防止这种情况发生；他也明白，苏联的解体是因为党内的腐败，他也正在努力防止这一点；他还明白，苏联的解体是因为军方反对文职领导人，所以他正试图压制军方……所以他知道这是一个苏维埃系统，而不是从清朝那里来了解如何管理这个系统。他在看苏联，看到那里发生的事情，并试图阻止它，但同时，他总是把这一切说成是中国的。
+
+因此，我认为他与普京如此接近是一个很大的错误，因为这提醒了人们：中国模式实际上是与苏联非常接近的。如果他真的想成功，那么他必须打破这种模式，做一些真正不同的事情。我也希望他能从中国传统的一些更人性化的部分汲取更多。但是当然，这肯定是非常复杂的。
+
+
+▲ 2021年6月4日，中国上海举行中共第一次全国代表大会纪念活动中，习近平在纪念中国共产党成立100周年活动画面出现在屏幕上。
+
+
+### 危险的时刻，有趣的研究
+
+__问__：最近几年，民族主义情绪高涨，不仅仅是中国。您怎么看？怎么看待中国的民族主义情绪？
+
+__裴__：我发现这种情况非常令人担忧，不仅仅是在中国，而且在美国以及全世界范围内，我们正在看到民族主义、威权主义和民粹主义的增长。这三者结合在一起是非常危险的，因为它们会导致军国主义。这对世界不利。
+
+作为一个在美国以外的地方生活了很多年的美国人，我不仅爱美国，也爱很多其他国家。我讨厌那种狭隘的民族主义和进攻型的民族主义，它在任何地方都是非常丑陋的。现在是非常困难的时期，COVID的蔓延使事情变得更糟，每个人都很害怕，然后退缩到他们的民族主义外壳里。
+
+我认为美国犯了很多错误。美国内部存在很多问题，比如糟糕的医疗保险，比如种族不平等、农村和城市之间的区域不平等……等等。1990年之后，特别是克林顿总统时期，美国曾有一个黄金机会，可以解决很多国内问题，从而可以真正成为世界的一个榜样。但可惜克林顿没有好好利用这个黄金机遇。然后小布什入侵伊拉克；接着奥巴马在对抗俄罗斯方面表现得很软弱，在格鲁吉亚、叙利亚和克里米亚问题上，俄罗斯再次逃脱了惩罚……所以美国犯了很多错误，国内和国际都是如此。
+
+我希望现在随着西方联盟的复兴，我们可以结束乌克兰的战斗，这将是一件非常好的事情。如果普京下台，那当然也非常好。但显然，美国对此无能为力，这是由俄罗斯人自己来决定的。
+
+我认为我们正处于一个非常危险的时刻，结果非常不确定。我非常担心中国正在发生的事情、也非常担心美国正在发生的事情。特朗普打开了一个窗口，让我们了解美国人的真实情况。我很少见到“另一个美国”，因为我总是在和其他大学教授一起，从一个城市到另一个城市，从一个大学到另一个大学。从某种意义上说，我与上海、南京或北京的学者之间享有更多的共同点，反而与“另一个美国”的一些人形成巨大的差异。那些人感觉自己被抛弃，变成不同种类的民族主义者。
+
+当特朗普当选总统时，我第一次意识到，我是一个爱国主义者，我真的爱美国。看到它这样分裂，我对我所爱的国家真的非常担心。我从来没有意识到我有多爱它，直到我看到一个在我眼里爱自己胜过爱他国家的人，变成我们的总统，他做的事情正在摧毁我们的国家。那是非常令人震惊的。但这也是一个国际性的问题。普京在俄罗斯有很多的支持者；特朗普也是如此。这种民族主义是非常危险的，无论它发生在哪个国家。
+
+1989年之后曾有一个黄金时期，就像福山写出了“历史的终结”那样，大家普遍认为自由民主秩序胜利了、美国胜利了。但这种现象只持续了几年。很快世界就又充斥着各种分歧以及民族主义情绪。苏联的解体也不是因为民主与威权主义的对立，而是苏联内部不同的民族主义者反对苏联；而民族问题也是中国面临的许多问题之一。
+
+所以，如何将这种民族主义人性化，并将其转向为更积极的方向，以减少其破坏性和潜在的军事冲突的风险，是我们面临的巨大挑战。现在确实是非常困难的时期，加之战争和全球性流行病的结合，以及所有大国内部的政治问题等等，所有这些都面临着一种基于某种种族纯洁性的民族主义，而这与我们作为人类所应有的情感完全相反。
+
+在每一种情况下，无论是印度教民族主义，还是美国白人至上主义，或者中国的关注中华民族（实际上是汉族）的问题，所有这些都是我们所面临的真正问题，因为这些民族主义问题会导致我们不尊重他人的文化和生活方式。
+
+
+▲ 2020年4月26日，德国柏林，街头艺术展示了美国总统特朗普和中国国家主席习近平戴著口罩在前柏林围墙亲吻。
+
+__问__：中国这一百年发生太多太大的变化，有朝代交替、有政党交替、有领导人的兴衰沉浮……作为政治学家，这是吸引你研究中国之处吗？
+
+__裴__：是的。作为一个研究政治的人，真正有趣的是，中国在过去150年里，几乎有各种政治实验。即使只是在上海这个城市，研究民国时期的上海非常有趣的一件事是，这里有华人区、有法租界、有英租界；抗战期间，又有日本人控制的地区……因此，短短几年内，上海有各种不同类型的政府和不同类型的警察部队，以及不同的组织和协会。
+
+如果你观察中国从大清帝国时期到中华民国时期、再进入中华人民共和国，它同样也经历了所有不同类型的实验。我发现文化大革命当中一个有意思的现象是上海人民公社，尽管它没有存在很长时间，但关于它的讨论仍然非常有趣，比如思考如何组织人民进行政治实验……因此，作为一个政治学家，我发现中国历史非常有趣的地方是，它有这么多不同类型的政权。比如即使是中华人民共和国时期，也有毛泽东时期和改革时期的区别、江泽民时期和习近平时期的区别。
+
+因此，研究它们、并试图了解和比较它们是非常有意思的。我还发现，我们对政治成功的想法变化得非常快，这也非常有趣。比如说，以COVID为例。最开始时，中国在COVID方面做得很糟糕，因为显然疫情是从中国开始发生的，但最开始的时候由于信息的控制，它没有像它应该有的那样透明。过了一段时间，中国看起来做得很好，似乎控制住了COVID，而且两年多时间里，中国的病例非常非常少。但是到了最后，它又失去了控制……我发现，治理形象变化非常快。这是因为世界变化非常快。一些在此刻非常有效的东西在那一刻就不太有效了。研究这里面的差异也令人着迷。
+
+另外，中国的情况千差万别：四川和江苏不同，苏北和苏南也不同。当地环境的差异，以及政治领导和处理政治问题的方法也截然不同。作为政治学家，我们有很多机会可以比较不同的路径和方法。这就是我发现研究中国真正令人兴奋的地方。我不认为我们任何人有“理想的政治制度是什么”的答案。因此，研究不同的挑战、不同的危机，以及应对这些危机的成功和不成功的方法，思考这些不同方法背后的政治理论和政治哲学是非常有趣、也非常有意义的。它不仅在实践上很重要，在哲学上也很重要。对我来说，这也是非常愉悦之事。
+
+作为一名政治学家，有时候我并不总是欣赏所有的变化，但我觉得研究它们非常有趣。它们都有好的一面和坏的一面，对某些事情有益，对其他事情则不利。这就是政治的本质，没有什么是完美的。
+
+
+## 对中国革命的兴趣，在于它未实现的道路和可能性
+
+
+▲ 2014年5月21日，浙江省嘉兴市南湖革命纪念馆，工人重新粉刷中国共产党旗帜。
+
+对裴宜理教授来说，在她多年对中国革命的研究中，一以贯之的主线是了解共产党人究竟是如何动员那些最初看起来非常难以动员的群体。他们成功的秘诀是什么？面对农民与工人会采用什么样不同的技术？人们是抱着何种想法加入共产主义运动，这对中国长期的影响是什么？
+
+同时，令她特别感兴趣的，是中国共产党不断书写和改写自身历史的方式。中国共产党认为其历史非常重要，并且其历史是自身合法性的主要组成部分。而对于裴宜理，努力理解“真实的历史”，或者说“最准确的历史”，再与共产党所书写的历史进行对照，是一件非常有趣的事情。“了解它们的交集和不同之处，也是一项重要的任务，因为一个国家只以一种特定的方式书写和重写其历史，是非常危险的。”
+
+在她对安源的研究中发现，共产党的一些领导人曾经有一种非常理想主义的信念，在1925年之前，与后来的发展不同，革命的暴力程度要低得多。革命在后期发生了许多转变，变成了“阶级斗争”，在许多方面“非常令人失望”，但早期的探索对她来说仍然是非常有力的：“它启发我们去思考那些未曾实现的道路和可能性，而不是在暴力和恐怖中寻找答案。”
+
+
+### 与中国历史学家的不同之处
+
+__问__：您在写第一本书《华北的叛乱者与革命者》时，中美尚未恢复邦交，您无法进行实地调查，等您后来真正实地到了淮北，您所观察到的情况与之前从档案里了解到的淮北有什么不同？
+
+__裴__：1980年春天，我在南京大学蔡少卿教授的陪同下，我第一次进入了研究多年而从未涉足其地的皖北农村，当时心情之激动，非笔墨所能形容。
+
+实际上，我看到的情况与我的预期并没有太大区别。不过，尽管我研究的重要主题之一是“贫穷”，但是真正到了淮北，我仍然对那里的贫穷感到震惊。一些孩子的头发因为营养不良成了白发，因为营养不良，还有一些孩子的肚子是鼓着的，显然是因为吃树叶或其他东西充饥，他们的消化系统出了问题。我以前从未在任何地方见过这种情况，所以相当震惊。我后来才知道一年前这里发生了严重的干旱，凤阳已经开始偷偷实行包干到户。
+
+我记得离开蒙城去涡阳时，我提出坐公共汽车，因为我想了解普通中国人的生活。但是出发那天，接待我的工作人员又说开车送我们去涡阳。我坚决反对。我说：我想实践群众路线，所以要坐公共汽车。最后他们只好同意。蔡少卿教授陪我上了公交车。我们走了一段时间后，蔡教授突然说了句：“看我们后面！”我回头一看，原来那辆小汽车从蒙城出来一路跟在我们后面。蒙城当地并没有小汽车，这唯一的一辆是专程从合肥开过来陪同我们的。
+
+涡阳也和蒙城一样那里非常贫穷，非常不发达。不过我还是意外于这两个贫穷地方的差异。比如在蒙城，到处都是坟墓，也可以看到不少孕妇；而涡阳情况完全不同，坟墓很少、绿树很多；我看到妇女们排着大长队去做绝育手术，这样她们可以得到县政府的特殊奖励……这两个在19世纪非常相似的两个县，现在在许多方面发展得完全不同。所以我一直在问自己，怎么解释这种差异？我得到的答案是，涡阳有一位工作很长时间的县长，他想了很多办法为县财政局节省资金、改善当地状况。但在蒙城，每次有新的风吹草动，领导就发生变化，下一任领导废除了上一任领导的所有政策，他们实际上从来没有什么可以用于植树或开展其他运动的资金等等……这让我非常惊讶。从那时起，我一直对地方领导的作用感兴趣。
+
+__问__：您从上世纪90年代后开始转向中国工人运动的研究。为什么会发生这个转向？
+
+__裴__：有一年，我来上海开会时遇到了上海社科院院长张仲礼。张仲礼毕业于圣约翰大学，是我父亲的学生。我们互相讲我们正在进行的工作。得知我下一本书的计划之后，张仲礼打趣说：“不要再写淮北农民了！你是上海人——我很多年前就看到你爸爸在校园里抱着你的样子。为什么不写上海的故事？”他建议我写上海的劳工运动，“我们有非常有价值的材料”。
+
+__问__：《上海罢工：中国工人政治研究》获得了1993年美国历史学会费正清奖。有评论说，它的成功立足于大量原始资料的利用。我在读本书时，也对此书调查面向的丰富性印象深刻，有上海卷烟厂的工人，丝厂的女工，舞女……您当年是如何获取这些材料的？在您之前，国内的学者们已经对上海工运做过不少研究，那您的工作方法或研究角度与来自中国的历史学家有什么相同或不同之处？
+
+__裴__：最重要的档案来自上海社科院，那里有工人运动史学家当年对工人做的采访——这也是后来他们批评我的研究时，我非常难过的原因之一，因为我很感激他们的工作、收集了那么多的材料。但是很明显，他们在采访的那些问题背后，有一个明确的议题设置，比如看档案，会有这样的对话：“中国共产党在领导你们的罢工，对吗？”而工人们有时会说：“共产党？没听说过。”“哦，不，不，你只是不理解，共产党真的在领导这个罢工。”我把“工人说，‘他们没有听说过共产党’”写了进去。实际上，我不认为党在领导那场罢工。而工运历史学家不认同我的写法。
+
+但无论如何，我试图研究的工人史而不是党史，所以这是不同的方法。但是，对我来说，这是一个非常重要的了解中国和美国学者的不同视角的学习经验。当周锡瑞、黄宗智、顾琳（Linda Grove）和我后来一起在松江做研究的时候，我们也和南大的学者有很多意见分歧。我的风格是向不同的人问同一个问题，想看看他们是同意还是不同意。但我发现，如果对方给的答案是南大教授想要的，他就会说：“哦，那是典型的，这很好，我们可以就此打住。”但我并没有。我会向下一个人问同样的问题。南大教授就很生气：“我们已经有了典型事例，你不需要再问了。”
+
+我们是完全不同的风格。但我发现那非常有趣，因为实际上那些来自南大的学者们正在寻找这些“典型”的案例，以符合他们认为的适当社会关系的标准。这让我思考了很多关于社会科学研究的不同方法、我们的假设、我们试图通过这种研究做什么，以及我们如何进行研究，“典型”、“一般”、“有代表性”之间的区别等等。所有这些实际上在社会科学中有略有不同的含义，我们有不同的方法来尝试解决它们，我发现这实际上非常有用。
+
+
+▲ 1994年12月12日，中国四川省钢铁厂的钢铁工人。
+
+__问__：您刚才提到您当时的研究遭到上海学者的严厉批评。他们具体反对您哪个观点？
+
+__裴__：我的观点是，上海劳工运动有三个不同的阶层：一个是中间群体，由国民党所控制；还有一种是青帮控制的半熟练工人；共产党的真正力量来自于受过教育的工人，也就是熟练工人，他们大多来自江南地区，可以与信奉共产主义的劳工运动组织者交流。那些真正最贫困的工人并没有被任何人所控制。因为当劳工运动组织者试图组织他们时，经常面临无法沟通的窘境。因为这些贫困工人通常来自苏北地区，他们说不同的语言；另外，许多贫困工人是女工，而早期的劳工运动组织者大多是男性，他们无法轻易进入女工宿舍来组织她们。因此，他们之间存在真正的文化和性别差异。共产党人组织工人运动非常成功，但他们最初是通过劳动工中的上层贵族而不是无产阶级获得了他们的立足点。
+
+在上海的一次学术会议上，我第一次提出我的观点时，遭到了上海社科院几位资深党史学家的严厉批评，他们认为这些非正统的解释在政治上是不可接受的。尽管我对可能遭受的批评有所准备，但其强烈程度还是超过我的预期。后来，张仲礼站起来说：“我们邀请了一位外国学者来使用这些材料，因为我们希望她对这些材料做出自己的阐释，而不是我们对这些材料的解释。我们所要求的是，她是一个诚实的学者，并引用适当的材料。然后我们可能不同意她的解释。但它就应该与我们的解释大不相同。否则，让其他地方的人前来使用这些材料就没有意义了。”这一番话之后，他们对我变得更友好了。
+
+__问__：您在《上海罢工》一书中，也用不少笔墨写了杜月笙、黄金荣这些我们并不陌生的人物，挖掘了他们在工人运动中所扮演的一些真实的角色。这与他们在近代史上被妖魔化或戏剧化的一面形成很有意思的对比。
+
+__裴__：对我来说，在上海罢工的研究中，最有趣的一个方面，就是看早期的共产党人者与帮派头目合作的方式。当然，帮派头目做了很多坏事，但他们也做了很多好事。美国也是如此，芝加哥、纽约等地的黑帮与劳工关系非常密切，他们从事了很多犯罪活动，但他们也为工人提供了大量的福利。
+
+上海也是如此，工人福利会与青帮关系非常密切。但我对安源和上海的情况特别感兴趣的原因之一，在于这两场工人运动里有共同的历史人物——李立三和刘少奇。他们几年前从安源来到上海，开始使用很多相同的技巧来搞工人运动。对我来说，这非常有意思。因为在我第一本书中，我实际上谈论了共产主义者和本地秘密组织之间的区别，因为在淮北地区，共产主义者组织者并不是淮北人，而是从外面来的人。他们与红枪会等其他秘密社团有着很大的冲突。
+
+但是在《上海罢工》中，我发现了完全不同的模式。虽然也有与共产主义者不同的国民党工会运动，但他们之间也存在合作，比如朱学范，他是青帮的成员，但通过邮政系统成为中共成员，后来成为中华人民共和国的第一任邮电部部长，他是把国民党和共产党人联系起来的一个非常重要的中间人。
+
+对于安源来说，最有趣的是，李立三正是来自离安源非常近的醴陵。因此，他的语言非常地道，他显然也知道如何利用当地资源，包括帮派，以便为共产党来动员工人。而刘少奇则不太擅长，但是，他也在很重要的方面，比如利用教育等手段来动员工人。因此，我发现最有趣的是共产党人为争取工人而采用的不同技巧，当然不同的共产党领导人有着非常不同的风格和不同的成功之处。
+
+__问__：您提到，上海的工人运动的传统，对共产党是一个挑战。怎么理解？
+
+__裴__：我想是的。我认为，如何对待工人，是共产党面临的一个真正挑战。马克思主义意识形态认为，共产党是无产阶级政党，他们应该领导革命。但很显然，在中国，革命主要基于农村非而城市。中国领导人知道，工人阶级应该是领导阶级，然而，他们的权力和他们的关系和他们的知识主要基于农村。当党接管了城市以后，如何应对工人成为了一个真正的挑战。他们非常担心工人可能成为抗议和动荡的力量。这就解释了为什么工人比农民拥有更多的资源，并且党的国家对于控制和给予工人特权更加关注。当然，由于户口制度的存在，无法来回迁移，因此这些就成为固化的不平等现象。
+
+无论是出于意识形态的原因，还是更务实的原因，共产党都更在意大城市的工人阶级，并急于给他们各种福利，使他们非常忠诚于共产党，我认为他们在这方面做得相当成功。当然，党并没有阻挡住工人在不同时期进行抗议活动。例如1957年，上海发生了重大的劳工抗议浪潮，我非常幸运能够读到总工会的档案，我发现它非常有趣。然后，在文革开始的时候，又发生过一起劳工骚乱的案例，他们要求从国家获得更多的特权和福利。但是，大多数情况下，工人阶级是相当安静的，对共产党不是一个大问题。这在很大程度上要归因于为工人提供铁饭碗的努力。这在意识形态上是合理的，因为他们应该是领导阶层。但它也有一个非常务实的原因，那就是防止工厂内发生动荡。
+
+
+▲ 2007年1月16日，北京的彩釉街，一名骑单车的人经过已故领导人毛泽东的徽章和肖像。
+
+
+### 安源与“小莫斯科”
+
+__问__：您后来用了六年时间，在2012年完成了关于中国革命另一本非常有份量的书《安源》。您为什么会对安源感兴趣，调查和写作的过程很辛苦吗？
+
+__裴__：不辛苦，反而是很快乐！实际上，我很享受写安源这本书的过程。因为它既有农村的一面，也有城市的一面；既有工人、也有与矿区有关的农民。我在这里还发现了劳工运动和农民运动之间的联系，这让我非常兴奋。比如，毛泽东在1927年著名的《湖南农民运动考察报告》里写到了农民协会，那些农民协会几乎都是由来自安源的工人组成的。他们最初来自湖南，然后又回到了湖南去组织农民协会。
+
+正如我之前反复提到过的那样，这个选题是于建嵘老师向我建议的，在调研过程中我也得到了他很多的帮助。我以前从未真正在煤矿呆过，所以这次经历就很吸引我。不过，实际上这六年里，安源的空气质量变得非常糟糕。我去的前几次，天是美丽的蓝天；而我最后几次去的时候，我几乎无法呼吸。但是当地的人们都很乐意帮忙，特别是党史专家在回答我的问题时很有帮助。我唯一的遗憾是，我永远无法从档案馆得到我想要的东西——他们有一个巨大的档案馆，是安源的工人运动纪念馆的一部分。虽然于老师一次又一次地帮助我，在那里收集材料，这些材料对我的项目非常有价值，但我从来没有得到完整的资料。
+
+对我来说，更为有趣的是，在1920年代早期、在共产党人来到安源之前，当地有一个圣公会教堂——我的父母都是美国圣公会的传教士，所以这一点挺有趣。后来的安源路矿工人运动纪念馆就建在圣公会教堂的基础上。
+
+有一次去安源时，我正好赶上当地工人为了养老金而举行抗议活动。有意思的是请愿书或抗议信上所用的语言还是毛主席到安源发动革命时用的，当然，工人现在还没有得到革命的承诺。我看到了矿工真实的生活，还参观了工人的医院，他们的生活真的很艰辛。我发现从早期到现在的跟踪真的很有趣，我也很喜欢做这项研究，能够做实地工作，把历史和当代联系起来。更重要的是，这里还有我最爱吃的江西菜！
+
+__问__：从中共革命或中共党史的角度，安源有什么特殊的地位或意义？
+
+__裴__：不同时期的中共党史对安源的政治理解是不同的。所以了解不同时期哪些政治理解是正统的，是非常有用的。比如，有一段时期，刘少奇曾试图建立自己作为安源罢工领导人的声誉，但在文化大革命被批判后，安源建了这个巨大的纪念馆，把毛泽东作为真正的工运领袖来纪念。安源从最开始就具有很强的政治性，在那里收集的材料显然是要按照党希望的方式来写党史。因此，这些材料中的很多内容过去和现在都非常敏感。
+
+中共党史上最重要的三位领导人毛泽东、刘少奇和李立三都曾来过安源。在文化大革命中，刘少奇被推翻，毛泽东坚持说他是安源工运的真正英雄，而不是刘少奇。事实上，李立三、刘少奇和毛泽东都在那里非常活跃。毛泽东在开始时对确立思想的确非常重要，但他只是做了几次非常简短的访问，从未真正在安源呆过——当然，后来有一幅巨大的毛主席去安源的油画，让全国人民都记住了他与安源的关系。毛泽东有一些亲戚住在矿区附近，他们帮助他介绍安源的人，然后他先派了李立三过来。李立三当时刚刚从法国勤工俭学回来，他是个非常好的人选。因为他的父亲是个秀才，在他很小的时候就教了他很多古典文学，工人们都认为他是一个非常好的教师。
+
+1922年夏天，毛泽东再一次来到了安源，他认为李立三的工会是一个非常好的组织，他认为举行一次罢工的时机到了。在罢工前几天，毛泽东又派了刘少奇去安源。一般人对刘少奇的印象是头脑比较冷静，毛泽东就是怕李立三太冲动、热情过度，可能会导致罢工失败。
+
+刘少奇在组织方式上是非常传统的苏联风格，当李立三在巴黎的时候，刘少奇在莫斯科接受了教育。他回到中国后，对苏联的组织风格有明确的想法。刘少奇在安源建了一个新的工人俱乐部，他说是按照莫斯科大剧院的模式建造的——实际上，在我看来，它看起来非常中国化，但至少对刘少奇来说，他向工人们描绘的是一个中国风格的莫斯科大剧院的形象。他在那里做的许多事情，包括他自己的婚礼等等，都仿照苏联的俄罗斯风格；而工人们显然觉得他控制欲太强，纪律性太强，不是很慷慨，不是很热情。
+
+这次罢工结束以后，安源赢得了“小莫斯科”的称号。李立三离开了安源，到其他地方去继续做工运。刘少奇在安源又继续呆了三年。他在那里组织了很多工人加入共产党，也为运动带来了纪律性，这一点值得肯定，但刘少奇在动员风格上却少了很多活力和动力，工人们显然非常想念李立三，觉得与刘少奇的关系更加疏远。
+
+
+▲ 2013年12月26日，一名83岁老翁穿著红卫兵装束走过毛泽东纪念堂。
+
+__问__：在您看来，李立三的特别之处在哪里，您会为什么会对他感兴趣？
+
+__裴__：刘少奇在安源呆的时间最长。但在我看来，李立三是最重要的。当时我正处于对革命中的“文化动员”更感兴趣的阶段。所以我真的被李立三如何有效动员工人的故事所吸引。在我看来，李立三是一个非常有创意的组织者，他用很多宗教活动来组织工人。
+
+我真是很佩服李立三，我佩服他动员工人的手段，他当然是革命家，在安源罢工时利用的方式虽然是和平的、温和的，但是作为革命家，他也没有放弃暴力的手段。作为共产党员和革命者，李立三发自内心地同情工人，想提高工人的生活水平和文化层次。不管是1920年代在安源，还是1950年代当劳动部部长或是总工会副主席的时候，他都努力要改善工人的处境。
+
+李立三是非常强调工会自主权的。正因为这个原因，他在1952年被认为犯了“狭隘经济主义”和“工团主义”的错误，就是因为他说可以有一些自主的、自治的工会。他在当劳动部长的时候，有一些工厂要写自己的章程，他也同意，而那些章程没有说他们要受到共产党的领导，但是李立三批准了这些章程。他真的希望工人能够有一些自己的权益和工会。
+
+__问__：您在安源一书里引用了“文化置入”（cultural positioning）的概念，能否解释一下它的含义？
+
+__裴__：从早期到现在，中国共产党在我现在常说的“文化治理”（cultural governance）方面有一些延续性。“文化置入”，我指的是共产党在获得国家权力之前的革命过程中使用的文化动员手段使用文化资源的方式，这可能是符号，可能是宗教，可能是戏剧，可能是幽默，等等。它可能是艺术、歌曲、音乐，各种文化资源，以使被组织者们感到他们与抗议运动或革命运动的关系密切。
+
+在早期，我觉得在“文化置入”方面特别有技巧的人是李立三，他被其他党的领导人批评为不够严谨，太接近工人等等。但我发现他真的是一个非常有趣的人物，一个明显热爱自己工作的人。他有非凡的精力和创新。当然，他在法国和苏联都接受过培训，但他也真正了解当地文化以及使用它们的方法。虽然他也利用它来建立自己的权威，但这不是为了他自己、而是为了动员工人参与到革命中。
+
+__问__：如何理解您提出的另一个概念“文化操控”（cultural patronage）？
+
+__裴__：对于“文化操控”，我指的是在革命运动结束后，最高政治领导人仍然使用文化资源的方式。但这一次，不是为了动员人们进行革命，而是动员人们支持他们。具体来说，是毛泽东和刘少奇利用文化资源来实现他们个人的个人崇拜的方式。比如在《安源》一书中，我认为有趣的部分之一是，当毛泽东在大跃进之后的权威和权力下降时，刘少奇用自己的方式试图消除对李立三的记忆、从而取代他。当刘少奇被提拔为毛泽东的接班人时，刘少奇正试图建立自己的形象，所以他传递的信息是：看，毛泽东是农民领袖，而我是工人的领袖。
+
+__问__：中国共产党与传统文化之间的微妙关系，也是您讨论的一个重点。
+
+__裴__：是的。如何将知识分子的领导与工农群众结合起来，是所有革命都必须面对的问题，也是中国革命中的重要特点。共产党同样利用儒家思想，但他们会将其与民间文化相结合。
+
+在安源，毛泽东和李立三的穿着都像是传统的儒家知识分子，这一开始曾令工人们有些惊讶，因为此前从未有知识分子来到工人中间。李立三的父亲是传统儒家精英——秀才；李立三自己也精通中国文化。抵达安源时，他用漂亮的文言文和书法写了一封信，要求在当地开设学校；安源所在的萍乡县县长是一个十分保守的中国文人，他对此大为赞叹。
+
+李立三在安源与洪帮关系紧密，这个秘密社团是天地会网络的一部分；他与洪帮领袖见面，并得到他的支持。同时，李立三也运用了许多宗教元素。例如在试图召集工人加入工人俱乐部时，他让洪帮成员抬着一顶轿子，但里面放的不是神明，而是大胡子马克思的塑像——他懂得利用传统方式宣传新思想。因此，李立三不仅在利用精英儒家资源，也同时在利用大众民间文化。
+
+相比之下，蒋介石试图利用精英儒家文化，但只却局限在道德领域；而共产党更成功地将这些结合起来，动员了人们的情感。李立三在安源组织的罢工行动并非以阶级斗争为口号，相反，当时的横幅上写的是“从前是牛马，如今要做人”，是一种对尊严的呼喊。
+
+
+▲ 2014年3月4日，北京，农场工人在袋装的玉米上休息。
+
+
+### “慎言告别革命”
+
+__问__：这些年，中国知识界对“革命”的看法是负面的，因为它造成太多的流血、暴力，太多的破坏，所以李泽厚先生曾提出“告别革命”；但您有一个演讲特别提出“慎言告别革命”、“找回中国革命”。您具体是指什么？
+
+__裴__：当我谈到“找回中国革命”的时候，我在说的是试图重拾革命的理想。我的感觉是，革命是如此代价巨大——正如你所说，它是暴力的、血腥的，很多人为此失去了生命；而且它非常具有破坏性，因此，我们如何使它变得有价值？
+
+当年为什么会发生革命？因为那时候人们对政治非常不满，他们试图改变，使之变得更好。因此，我们能否回头看看那场革命，想想它能否可能会以某种不同的方式发展，从而保留理想，但减少流血，减少暴力，减少恐怖？这确实是我最初的动机。
+
+当我最初研究中国革命时，我对它有一种浪漫的感觉，我现在不这么认为了，它对我来说不具有浪漫性。但我仍然觉得当年如此多的人愿意加入到革命中来，这是很吸引人的一个现象。因此试图了解是什么在激励他们——有时并不是什么“理想”，而只不过是为了得到一口饭吃，但很多时候，这真的是出于理想，它不仅仅存在于领导层，也存在于普通人之中。
+
+我发现理解美国革命的实质也是如此——当然，美国的革命历史要短得多，也没有那么血腥。但是在美国，我们也有一场真正重要的革命，把我们自己从英国分离出来，为某些理想而挺身而出。不过直到今天对“美国革命”的真正本质是什么，我们实际上还存在很大分歧。
+
+比如，当年特朗普上台的部分原因是“茶党运动”（Tea Party Movement），“茶党运动”当然是以波士顿港的美国革命命名的。他们的观点是，革命是为了小政府。在他们看来，这就是革命的全部意义。但包括我在内的另外一部分人，则认为美国革命不是关于小政府、而是关于自由——言论自由，宗教自由，集会自由等等。但是，整个要点是不仅仅要拥有地方控制权。因此，亚历山大·汉密尔顿和托马斯·杰斐逊等人之间从一开始就辩论：汉密尔顿希望有一个能做各种大事情的政府，而托马斯·杰斐逊则希望有一个非常小的政府……关于“美国革命”的含义，这些都是非常重要的辩论。它对来自不同地方、不同文化背景的美国人有不同的含义。所以我们自己也并没有真正解决革命的本质究竟是什么的问题。
+
+因此，从我的观点来看，回到历史上的那些时刻——人们为了他们所希望的更美好的世界而做出巨大牺牲——是非常值得的。我们尝试思考一下，是否有一些方法，也许可以有不同的结果？我们不能忽视它，我们不能假装它没有发生。相反，我们应该真正尝试了解这一点，然后真正尝试找出我们应该如何利用这段历史的方法。不是为了掩盖它，不是为了伪造它，不是为了使它比实际情况更漂亮，而是为了使它在未来以一种更积极的方式，对我们更有意义。
+
+在我对安源的研究中发现，在1925年之前，共产党的一些领导人至少还有一种非常理想主义的信念。那个时候，暴力程度要低得多。无论工人还是农民，观察他们参与革命的方式、弄清楚他们是如何试图改变自己的生活相当有趣。比如我刚才提到的1922年安源罢工的口号“从前是牛马，现在要做人”就特别鼓舞人心。对我来说，“尊严”是人类革命的一个非常重要的理想，它并不是关于阶级斗争的，而是关于我们成为完全意义的人。
+
+当然，后来经过一个较长的时期，中国革命变成了阶级斗争，变得非常暴力等等。中国革命的初始有一种人本主义的品质，旨在改善那些在最恶劣条件下生存的人们的境况，比如安源煤矿的工人。当然它后期发生了很多转变，在许多方面非常令人失望。但是，早期的探索对我来说仍然是非常有力的。它启发我们去思考那些未曾实现的道路和可能性，而不是在暴力和恐怖中寻找答案。尽管中国革命后期转向了阶级斗争，并变得非常暴力，但早期的那种人道主义精神仍然具有启示性。
+
+
+▲ 2016年2月22日，中国广州，鞍钢联众工人为争取权益在工厂外示威。
+
+__问__：可以说，您毕生投身于中国革命的研究中。那么在您多年的研究中，一以贯之的主线是什么？
+
+__裴__：这些研究都展示了中国共产党试图动员普通中国民众的不同方式。我在不同的地方有不同的结论。比如在第一本关于淮北的书中，我最初的想法是想表明共产党领导的革命，是中国农民起义传统的一个顶点。但是当我着手做研究时，我发现淮北的共产主义革命与之前的农民起义完全不同。起初，我感到非常沮丧，因为这意味着我的整个论文项目都是错误的。但后来我开始思考，也更好地理解了是什么激发了那些早期的叛乱，并展示了它们与革命有什么不同，这是一个真正的贡献。
+
+在《上海罢工》中，我对农民进行了研究，但没有发现农民起义传统与共产党人所做的事情之间有什么联系。但我认为，在对上海罢工的研究中，更好地理解共产党在工厂和通过工会——这是一种更正统的共产主义组织方式——所做的事情会很有趣。在这个研究中，我再次有了一个意外的发现，因为我最初预计共产党在最贫穷的工人中的影响力最大，他们是革命的天然支持者。但最终我发现情况显然并非如此。最终，我对中国革命和其他许多国家的劳工运动之间的重要相似之处非常感兴趣。比如在欧洲，通常是手工艺工人（artisan workers）最具政治活跃性，偏激进左翼，最支持欧洲共产党。这些发现都非常有意思。
+
+对于安源，我试图了解共产党人是如何设法动员那些最初看起来非常难以动员的群体的。他们成功实现动员的秘诀是什么？
+
+我后来也做了上海的一些研究，包括文化大革命中的上海工人和工人纠察队的书，都是在试图探究国家与社会之间的关系，以及中国1949年之后发生的事情与这些早期经验的某种关联。劳工在1949年之后被设定为一种比农民享有更多特权的身份，我认为这也与共产党是劳工运动最有特权那部分的领导人有关，最关注这种保障措施。这对劳工政策有着非常重要的影响。毕竟，正是李立三主持制定了第一部《中华人民共和国工会法》。之后，他与工会发生了冲突，并被迫离开。但他始终在为工人的利益而奋斗，我认为这对劳工政策产生了重要影响。
+
+因此，我特别感兴趣的是，共产党人用什么样的技术来动员人们，人们为什么要加入共产主义运动，他们与共产党领导人是否有相同或不同的想法，以及这对中国的长期影响是什么等等……
+
+我对中国共产党不断书写和改写其历史的方式非常着迷。显然，中国共产党认为其历史非常重要，并且其历史是自身合法性的主要组成部分。因此，我觉得努力理解我认为的“真实历史”是个很有趣的过程——当然，不存在一个“真正的历史”，但是我认为有“最准确的历史”；了解共产党为其自身的合法性所呈现的历史，也非常有趣。对我来说，了解它们的交集和不同之处是一项重要的任务。这并不是因为我的历史是正确的，只是说，我可以做出最好的历史解释。比较这些历史，既有趣又重要。而且我认为，一个国家只以一种特定的方式重写其历史是非常危险的。每个国家的每个领导人都想这样做，但我们需要不仅在我们自己的国家、也在中国反击这种做法。
+
+对我来说，研究中国共产党产生的许多不同方式，是试图让美国人了解这个党并不全是邪恶的。这个党开创之时也有很多积极的想法，很多生活窘困的平民加入它，并为之作出了巨大的牺牲。让我们打开它们的历史，让我们试着看看他们如何理解革命，以及他们如何从中创造意义，以及在领导层中不同的领导人是如何以不同的方式解释这一点，并试图以不同的方式使用它，以希望创造更多的机会和可能性，而不是对这个党或其遗产的一个正确解释。
+
+在我看来，自1949年以来，它已经有了许多不同的遗产。在某些极其积极的方面，几乎是令人难以置信的积极方向。普通人生活水平的改善真的是惊人的。我们可以说，扶贫并没有完全解决贫困问题，贫穷仍然存在，一些缓解贫困的努力是非常短期的等等。但是，这是一个巨大的努力。2019年，我在中国时，我到处采访有关扶贫工作的人。在云南，贵州等地，一些地区令人印象非常深刻。我也相信我远远没有看到全部的故事。但我采访了复旦等大学的年轻工作团队成员，他们参与了扶贫工作。这是非常积极的。另外，我也认为反腐败斗争的某些方面是非常积极的。
+
+但其实，在革命时期，所有这些问题都有重要的先例。今天的很多贫困村庄都曾是发生革命的地方。腐败问题在安源也是一个大问题，刘少奇当年就非常关注此事，并开展了一场反腐运动，这也与目前的反腐运动有些类似。因此，这些事情并不是非黑即白的，不同的时间点有很多积极和消极的方面。这也是我觉得非常有趣和迷人的地方。我希望中国最终会走向更加开放和自由的道路。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-15-china-order-unification-and-international-democracy.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-15-china-order-unification-and-international-democracy.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "中华秩序、大一统与国际民主"
+author: "王飞凌 / 滕彪"
+date : 2023-04-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/XPuaP3U.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+在政治上、社会组织上和世界秩序上，中国的秦汉体制、大一统观念或“中华秩序”，代表着一个非常不同的替代方式。随着中国国力的增长，这个替代观念会越来越深刻地影响到不仅是中国的未来，也是整个世界的未来。
+
+
+
+滕彪（以下简称滕）：您曾经提到这种秦汉体制、中华秩序和列宁斯大林主义有一些暗合的地方，能不能具体解释一下？我们知道毛泽东说自己是马克思加秦始皇，也许秦体制和和现代的共产极权体制有相似的地方，但是共产主义、天下大同，和“华夷之辨”的天下秩序似乎很不一样。
+
+王飞凌（以下简称王）：我的回答分两层。第一层，秦汉政体与所谓的斯大林式社会主义、共产党一党执政是非常吻合的。号称是现代的政体和一个前现代的东西高度吻合，恰恰说明了斯大林式的无产阶级专政或一党专政，其实是非常前现代（启蒙运动之前）的旧政体。只是辩护词从天命变成了民命，就是说它是代表天意，还是为人民服务，说法不一样而已。毛泽东发现在斯大林式扭曲的马克思主义和中国的秦汉政体、所谓儒化的法家思想之间相当吻合，他很聪明地利用了这一点，号称自己是马克思加秦始皇。
+
+第二层，斯大林主义、列宁主义和原来的马克思主义也是完全不一样的东西。原来的马克思主义并不是这样，和中国的天下一统、华夷之辨不同。年轻的马克思当年还是强调个人解放、个人自由的，强调自由体的结合，完全不是斯大林后来搞的那套一党专政，用镇压和控制的方式来统治。不幸的是，中国进口的是斯大林主义，不是现在西方还在实行的所谓社会民主主义或者民主社会主义。
+
+滕：您提到的中华秩序、大一统思想基本上是同义词，这种大一统思想对中国的政治、历史、社会等都有极其深刻的影响。它到底是怎么形成的？它和民族主义（在现在的语境下，就是皇汉主义、大汉族主义）有什么联系？
+
+王：简单的说，大一统观念、中华秩序或World Empire（世界帝国）政体，是逐渐形成的。它始建于秦朝，后汉朝把它稳固化，通过引进儒学作为包装把它稳定化，经过隋唐的科举考试和其他一些制度，在元明清走向极端，它是个不断进步、变化的过程。在这过程中又高度内化，变成所谓中国政治文化的一个核心概念。中国的士大夫、知识分子乃至普通老百姓认为天下一统是理所当然的、正常的状态；而天下分裂像威斯特伐利亚体系，就是西方现行的国际制度，则是一种不正常的状态。这个观念在最初是由于生态地理环境形成的，经过长期的政治熏陶，后来又被统治者利用，用政治宣教和压制手段，内化成一种文化观念、变成一种根深蒂固的价值观。
+
+那么它和大汉民族主义有什么关联？大汉民族主义只是一种现代人的发现、发明，过去其实没有什么大汉民族主义，只有皇帝的顺民和叛逆之分。
+
+大家会说我是唐人、宋人、明人、清人，没有人说我是汉人和中国人，这些是后来的发明创造。大汉民族主义在我看来是在近代以后被统治者们利用起来了，塑造一个新的意识形态来和其他国家抗衡、巩固自己的权力。
+
+滕：现在中共同时使用世界主义、共产主义、人类命运共同体，又鼓吹和推广汉族为中心的大汉民族主义，一种种族主义。对他们来说两者可以无缝相接，其实目标就是一个：我得永远执政下去，至于是什么主义对它来说并不是太重要。——民族主义者经常用的一个词是中华民族，其实这是梁启超发明的东西。它和中华秩序有没有什么关系？
+
+王：当年中国的一些知识分子、政治精英想做成两件事情，一件是把自己和满清统治者分开，同时又把自己和西方列国分开；另一件是他们又想保留清朝的多民族大帝国占领下的领土的完整。为这要达到这两个目的，就必须重新发明一个概念，于是就有了所谓“中华民族”。“中华民族”在人类学上是不存在的，它是一个政治概念。后来的国民党、共产党都大大利用了这个概念，就是说我们和西方列强一样，也是一个民族，而且还是单民族国家Nation State，这样不会有多民族国家的各种各样的问题，同时我们要保留这些满清帝国的每一块领土，西藏、新疆、东北等等都要。“中华民族”这个政治概念由于政治上的强力推广和教育上的灌输，在中国倒成了一个大家都接受的观念。
+
+滕：您提到澶渊之盟是“一个提前了643年的威斯特法利亚和约”，宋代背离了中华秩序的传统长达三个世纪，这是如何形成的呢？
+
+王：谢谢你提到这一点，它是我自己重新解读中国历史的一个心得。现在我发现，有这个看法的人并不少。宋朝在中国历史的论述当中，长期被认为是软弱无力、不值得羡慕的一个朝代。但其实宋朝是中华文明的一个高峰。宋朝的统治者们放弃了用武力去统一已知天下的雄心壮志，后来慢慢熟悉了、接受了在一个已知天下里有好几个天子共存这么一个局面。这里有自然因素、历史路径依赖的因素，也有人为的和一些偶然的因素。但是他们从来都不满意，因为他们根深蒂固的还是秦汉体制的施行者，还是时不时的想试一试天下大一统，难以遏制想成为真正的皇帝、真正的天子的欲望。最后促成大错，造成两宋垮台、中国黄金时代的覆灭。在中国历史上，宋朝是唯一的不是被内部叛乱所推翻的、而是被外敌所消灭的主要朝代。错就错在它的外交政策上没能始终如一，而是不时的被自己心中的魔鬼所诱惑，要去搞一个世界大帝国。
+
+澶渊体系是中国人远远走在欧洲人前面的一个发明，没有能坚持下来很不幸。其中有一个原因就是澶渊体系和威斯法利亚体系不一样，从一开始有先天不足。辽国和宋朝皇帝都发誓，这谁要背离这个条约的话，就不得好死，结果真的是这样。宋徽宗宋钦宗被俘虏，被金国人带到北边去，比较凄惨。这也说明了在欧亚大陆的东部，其实也和欧洲、地中海各族人一样，有能力去创新一个国际体系。
+
+滕：元朝和清朝作为异族的统治，和“中华”秩序是如何统一起来的？在中国之外的世界历史上，是否也存在类似中华秩序的思想传统和帝国实践呢？
+
+王：中华秩序和秦汉政体一样，对所有威权统治者或者帝王们有高度的吸引力，这个吸引力是超出民族、文化、语言的限制。尤其当这套体系比较精细化、运作有效的时候，专制者们都会喜欢。所以蒙古人和清朝满族人后来是接受了这套制度，而且把它更加固化、暴力化。
+
+清朝的皇帝非常勤政，官僚制度相当有效。所以虽然是外族统治，但是汉族的士大夫们发现没什么问题，我们可以接受，可以为之奋斗。像曾国藩、年羹尧可以为了清朝的统治奋斗终生，在他们看来，所谓民族文化的差别并不像我们今天认为的那么重要，只要有个好皇帝就可以。所谓华夷之辩，外夷如果接受我们这一套，也就成了我们，我们不接受这套了，我们就变成外夷了。雍正皇帝还特地写了一个文章来说明这个问题。这说明中华秩序和秦汉政体有着普世性的吸引力。
+
+世界其他地方有没有这样的制度？有。比如南美洲的印加帝国、中美洲的阿兹台克、玛雅，在非洲，在地中海地区不断有一些统治者希望建立世界帝国。只不过他们大多都失败了。而在中国很多都成功了，而且维系了很久；这又和中国的生态地理环境有关，和中国帝王们有意识的灌输有关。
+
+滕：葛兆光教授说，中国错失了四次改变世界观的历史机遇，分别在佛教传入中国的时期、宋朝、元朝和晚明时期。天下观念的改变极为困难，直到晚清遭遇列强才不得不接受新的世界观。一个主要原因是中国的传统文明和思想系统太熟了，所以极为顽固。您是否同意这种说法？
+
+王：葛先生说的很有道理。但我并非完全同意他的一些具体分析。我认为历史机遇只有两次，一次是在汉以后的魏晋南北朝三国时期。魏晋南北朝漫长的分裂阶段，没有能够完善化、制度化。还有一次是宋朝，宋朝的帝王统治稍微缓和些，比较仁政，很少诛杀大臣诸如此类的。一些西方学者认为，宋朝其实中国已经领先欧洲人，走在现代化的门口了，但是没有进去。我不认为明朝和元朝是什么重大改变，相反它们重新巩固了中华秩序。虽然晚明有顾炎武这些人，但这并不代表当时是个实在的机遇。
+
+至于中国的传统文明思想体系成熟过早、比较顽固，我觉得，改革不是因为成熟早或者固化，而是因为有一个大一统的权力观或者内化的文化观，还有生态地理环境的限制。要有一个外在压力、内部竞争的政治制度，只有宋朝或者三国南北朝时期才有。因为当年气候变化，让蒙古人南下，弄得宋朝制度没有成功。
+
+秦汉政体和中华秩序维持很久，这个意义上说，它是达成人类政治治理的一个高峰，但这个高峰和现代性之后的高峰相比的话，只是个小山包而已。
+
+人类政治治理制度的进化应该是永无止境的。很多朋友认为中国人比欧洲人成熟的早，未必如此。中国人只是达到了一个高峰以后，由于种种原因不再往前走了；而在欧洲，国际竞争趋势它们不断往前走。中华秩序很早就固化、停滞不前，这很难说是一种成熟，可能应该是说过早老化。
+
+滕：从孔子那个时代开始，很多中国人觉得中国最理想的是在夏商周三代，“人心不古”，以古为好。有的人觉得儒家思想更像西方的保守主义。
+
+知名的汉学家内藤湖南曾经写过：“（中国）只要与外国的战争战败了，总是不时地兴起种族的概念，等到自己强盛了，立刻就回到中就代表天下的思维模式。”您在书中写道，“中华秩序经过千年实践已经深深地内化为人们心中的唯一且应然的世界秩序。”您是否认为存在着天下主义和种族主义、普遍主义和特殊主义的不断转换呢？如何理解两者的紧张关系？
+
+王：内藤先生对中国历史的研究和阐述非常有意思，他对宋朝历史的高度评价我很赞赏。他说当中国的统治者对外战争失败了就开始煽动民族主义思潮，这个也确实是存在的，古今皆然，目的就是让老百姓为自己的江山当炮灰。统治者动不动就说外国人欺负、羞辱我们了，其实失败的是掌权者而已。所谓“百年国耻”，耻的是统治者们，不是老百姓。中国人民在那一百年里，取得的进步是历史罕见的，包括科学、医学、社会设施、人民的生活水平等，都是质的巨大飞跃，哪有什么耻辱可言。
+
+过去入侵的外族有时候是比较落后的、残酷的，但19世纪中期以来，入侵中国的、或者影响中国的，代表着更先进的科学技术、组织方式和思想。他们当然也给中国带来了很多灾难，但带来更多是好处。而且一些灾难是因为老百姓被煽动起来排外而导致的后果。比如现在，对中国最有好处的美国和西方成了仇敌，经常欺负中国的俄罗斯、北朝鲜倒成了好朋友，这就说明统治者的利益和人民利益是不一致的。
+
+滕：种族主义/民族主义对中国国内政治和国际秩序有什么危害呢？我们知道有很多追求民主的异议人士、自称自由主义者的中国人，也还有着根深蒂固的大一统思想，以及对黑人、对穆斯林和少数民族的歧视。
+
+王：我完全同意你这个分析。中国的所谓民族主义、乃至于种族主义情绪，在很大程度上是人造的、被煽动起来的。今天的中国人民其实和世界各国、西方各国没有什么根本性的仇恨，更谈不上什么根本性的恐惧。所谓“亡我之心不死”，到底“我”是谁？其实是统治者，跟老百姓没有什么关系。
+
+被煽动的民族主义对世界和平、对周边各国都是威胁，对中国老百姓也是一个巨大的威胁。在历史上被煽动起来的军国主义，老百姓有几个是幸运的？秦朝征服了六国，但秦朝老百姓的灾难简直罄竹难书。秦朝统治者们自己也没有好下场，嬴氏家族统治了秦国几百年，一个巨大的有十几万人口的皇族，垮台后全部被消灭，今天中国连姓嬴的人都没有了。谁歌颂秦始皇？只有张艺谋这种历史观一塌糊涂的人。
+
+滕：中华秩序、天下观，这些观念和传统，与共产党现在提出的中国梦、中华民族伟大复兴、人类命运共同体有一些隐秘的关系吗？
+
+王：当然有。这就是为什么我们今天要重新解读中国历史、重新理顺这些观念，允许中国人尤其是中国精英自由地阅读和解读历史，讨论一下什么对中国最好。所谓中国梦也好、中华民族伟大复兴也好、建立人类命运共同体也好，在我看来其实是不同程度的中华秩序的包装而已。且不说这些提法的逻辑有问题，其实际运作的后果将是非常令人堪忧的。老百姓会变成军国主义的牺牲品、统治者的炮灰。所谓秦皇汉武、成吉思汗，所谓康乾盛世，这全是统治者们的虚荣和威权，和老百姓真正福祉毫不相干。老百姓反而是非常痛苦的。恰恰因为世界帝国的建立，造成中国的经济文化和科技发展的长期停顿、人民生活水平长期停顿。
+
+滕：考虑到西藏（图伯特）、新疆（东突厥斯坦）的历史与现实，考虑到身份政治和民族独立运动的发展趋势，您对西藏和新疆争取独立的前景有什么预测吗？
+
+王：具体预测很难。但是如果我们对历史有深刻的把握、对现实资料有充分占有的话，可以做一些不那么愚蠢的推理。
+
+西藏和新疆当然是历史遗留下来的问题、满清多民族世界帝国遗留下来的问题。原来的汉族王朝基本上没有统治过西藏，偶尔进入了部分新疆，但也从来没有完整统治过新疆。这两块地方长期被认为是边缘地带，价值不大。今天新疆变重要了，因为有资源；单从经济上来说，西藏对中华人民共和国来说，其实还是一个赔钱买卖：中央政府投资在西藏的钱，远比西藏能够提供的利益要高得很多。对汉民族来说，有没有西藏和新疆其实是一个政治决定，并不是我们有什么神圣的天赋权利。可以大胆的猜测一下，如果真的有一天西藏新疆都独立了，对汉人来说，甚至对生活在这两个地区的汉人来说，未必就是坏事。春秋战国和宋朝历史表明，分裂时期，汉民族和其他一些周边民族可能生活得更好。没有反思历史的中国人可能很难接受，可能会骂这种说法是卖国。其实西藏、新疆不是我的，中国也不是我的，我没法卖国。
+
+西藏、新疆从来就不是汉族的，只不过是满族把它们带进来了。要说西藏、新疆、外蒙古都是我们的，这就像今天的印度人说加拿大、澳大利亚是我们的，因为我们曾经都被一个统治者统治过，这不合逻辑。
+
+滕：达赖喇嘛提出中间道路而不是独立，当然是一个非常有智慧的、仁慈的主张，但我觉得根本原因还是中共的强大专制力量；假如中国是民主的体制、也没有这么强大的话，多数藏人、尤其年轻藏人是希望独立的。我也觉得无论是西藏问题还是新疆问题，对中国将来的民主转型都是一个非常令人担忧的问题。请问您对中国民主转型的前景有何看法？
+
+王：我同意你的分析。西藏、新疆问题可能会成为中国政治转型过程中一个不太有利的因素，因为民族主义会被煽动起来。领土问题会引起很多人过于激动，然后就忘掉了什么对中国最好。
+
+很不幸的，中国沿着自由化、民主化这个方向前进的可能性，并不是很高；尤其是内发性转型的可能性更低，就是说统治者靠自己良心发现去改变，不太可能。但是如果说中国统治者在内外交困、走投无路的情况下，他们可能会做一些让步，这些让步可能会一下子失控，造成真正的变化。中国毕竟经过几十年的西化，对外开放，人们观念发生了许多变化。但中国制度有超强的自我巩固能力，还控制了很多资源。比如中共的思想政治工作，可以说举世无双，极为有效。
+
+民主化的代价，可能是新疆、西藏会离开，还可能有一些人民生命财产的损失。但是人类进步的历史上，没有代价的进步是没有的，但是我们有义务把这代价降到最小程度。
+
+滕：您能否解释一下中共最优化和中国次优化的效应？这是如何形成的？这如何影响中国的政治转型呢？中国共产党积累了天量的经济、军事资源的同时，更积累了极为丰富的统治经验。Stein Reign称之为“老练的极权主义”（精密复杂的极权主义sophisticated totalitarianism），既残酷凶狠，又有一定的灵活性和调适性，有很强的学习能力。我用“高科技极权体制”来强调它的无所不在的高效监控。
+
+王：我在《中国纪录：评估中华人民共和国》里提到中共最优化和中国次优化。这个体制能够为专制统治者们提供一个相当强大的、有韧性的机制，但这个制度的另外一面就是它的次优化统治、次优化治理。中国在经济、社会发展、人民生活、文化科技、环境保护和灾难控制等各个方面，表现都非常平庸，经常是灾难性的、悲剧性的状态。比如毛泽东时代。今天的中国经济发展举世瞩目，但绝大多数老百姓仍然非常艰苦，只能在一个次优化状态下生存。而统治者拥有巨大的权力和资源。这个也符合西方政治学的一个定论，糟糕的政府其实不见得马上就能垮台。启蒙运动之前，大量落后政体能够长期执政，统治者只要有足够的能力优化自己的统治，拥有足够的资源，尽管治理国家一塌糊涂，照样可以统治下去。
+
+滕：如果中国维持目前的专制体制，它有可能和其他国家、尤其是自由民主国家和平共处吗？是不是实力不足的时候就“韬光养晦”，一旦自认为实力强大了就要“有所作为”、“和平崛起”，甚至搞战狼外交，四处推销“中国方案”？有人说，共产党只想维持它在中国的垄断地位和独裁体制，而不想输出革命、输出“中国模式”、称霸全球，那么在您看来，中共是否具有扩张的野心，是否企图用中华秩序来替代作为西方主导的威斯特伐利亚主权秩序？重新建立中国中心论的朝贡体系，还有任何可能性吗？
+
+王：一个建立在秦汉政体之上的中华秩序，是所有秦汉政体统治者的梦想，也是他们的最终使命和诅咒。他们不这么做，就觉得不安全。宋朝统治者们明明活得很好，但他们非要去破坏这个制度，就是因为他们觉得这样才安心。今天的中国也是这样，虚弱的时候，就韬光养晦，一旦自己觉得有力量了，或者觉得世界其他地方很烂了，就要“有所作为”了。在我看来这是命中注定的，红色基因决定的。这很不幸，对中国老百姓来说更不幸。天天让他们吃苦，又耗费无数的钱去建什么海岛、造什么航母、给非洲撒钱。中国和世界各国和平共处只有一个可能，就是放弃中华秩序，改革政治，实行民主。
+
+滕：国际政治上非常知名的民主和平论：战争、军事冲突基本上都是专制国家之间，或者民主国家与专制国家之间，而极少或者几乎没有在民主国家之间的战争。是不是中国实现了民主之后，对国际秩序的威胁就不存在了？像您强调的自由地学习历史、自由讨论问题之后，这种秦汉体制大一统思想就会慢慢的隐退了？
+
+王：确实如此。中国威胁论有时候是准确的，比如说中共领导下的中国力量是一种威胁。但说中国人作为民族来说一定要征服其他民族，这不一定。当然习近平宣称中华民族自古以来就是爱好和平的，在我们基因里面就有和平，这也完全不符合事实。中华民族或者说汉民族在历史上常有征服他国、屠杀他人，在晚清时还对准噶尔部实行种族灭绝。但制度如果合适了，中国人可以跟其他人一样和平共处。中国制度、观念如果不改变，那么，崛起的中国力量对世界不是好事情。
+
+滕：亨廷顿的文明冲突论一经提出，立刻引发巨大的反响，也引起了广泛的质疑和批评，您的立场如何？您自己的论述是否被当做文明冲突论的一个例子？“中国威胁论”一直非常活跃，涌现了大量的论述，人们观察到的中国对国际秩序的威胁也的确存在，那么，如何在承认、应对中国威胁的时候，不把一个国家或文明本质化、不走向对非基督教的、非西方的文明的敌视和贬低？
+
+王：这个问题很好，有前瞻性。这就是我在关于中国的系列三部曲的最后一部中想要探讨的问题。亨廷顿的理论是对福山的历史终结论的一种反对，他提出冲突会继续。我认为至今亨廷顿的判断还是正确的。当然他对文明的划分我是不太同意的，什么基督教文明、佛教文明、孔教文明，分类很牵强，不准确。
+
+若没有足够的社会政治变革，中国力量的崛起害人也害己。但我倾向用“中共威胁论”或“中华人民共和国威胁论”而不是“中国威胁论”。“中国威胁论”字面上有种族主义色彩。中国老百姓没有理由要去征服世界，要用武力去屠杀别人，只是在政府的煽动和驱使下他们才会这么去做。比如支持俄罗斯等等，并不是老百姓的选择，只是领导人在那决定。
+
+我们要认真对付这个中共领导下的中国力量的威胁，同时也不要把中国威胁变成一种种族主义的喧嚣。就像我的朋友说的“你可以一边走路一边嚼口香糖”。
+
+滕：中国政府、共产党不代表中国、也不代表中国人民，这本来是一个常识，可惜的是很多学者、政治人物忘了这一点。而且中国共产党也利用这一点，说你们是在搞亚裔歧视、搞种族主义等等。
+
+王：对。错误的概念用久了、用习惯了，就会对实际行动有所影响。
+
+滕：随着人权思想的传播、自由民主制度的成功、国际法治的进步，以及全球化的发展，主权不受干涉的原则正在受到某些挑战。人权高于主权会成为国际共识吗？从更宏观、更长远的角度，福山所预言的自由民主成为历史的终结、成为世界各国唯一的制度选择，会成为现实吗？
+
+王：人权代替主权，代表一个比较理想化的一些想法。但在人类的整个的文明历史中，最美好的观念，常常造成适得其反的结果。就是说在人权和主权之间，在普世平等自由和各国并列、竞争之间，应该建立一个平衡，而不是替代关系。换句话说，要维持威斯伐利亚体系而不是要取消它。在人权的名义下取消威斯伐利亚体系，恰恰是从从后门实现了中华秩序。
+
+滕：我觉得，人类历史的趋势大概是朝着自由民主、朝着人权高于主权的方向发展，当然实现这个目标还是很遥远的。
+
+非常感谢您接受我们访问，也祝贺您三本著作的出版。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-16-im-an-artificial-intelligence-trainer.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-16-im-an-artificial-intelligence-trainer.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..557c1289
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-16-im-an-artificial-intelligence-trainer.md
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "我是人工智能训练师"
+author: "孙羽茜 / 杨静撰稿"
+date : 2023-04-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/32V66wM.png
+image_caption: "用虚构的AI传递真实的温度。当AI学会说NO……"
+description: ""
+---
+
+电子游戏很像人工智能科技的试验场，所以在我的研究中，聊天机器人会被放置在一个虚构的背景之下工作，譬如说在一个故事中担当虚拟角色，刺激玩家的反应和反馈。而我则会观察和分析这种互动和传统互动有什么区别，研究这种虚构的人工智能NPC能否有效地给人类讲故事，使人类与之产生情感联结。
+
+
+
+### 李白与软件体
+
+这些年，我的很多作品在美术馆里展出，熟悉我的玩家和观众看到这些作品后，会觉得我做的东西都是人工智能相关的。其实，真正拿聊天机器人做作品，是从2021年开始的。不过，2018年我在清华美院读书时，确实已经尝试做人工智能相关的作品，但当时的技术和今天比非常初级，人工智能的话题也不热门，尤其是聊天机器人这种东西是没人关注的。记得当时我和几位同学做聊天机器人作品时，甚至任课老师都会怀疑这个作品有什么用。可是我们就很想做，那时我有一个预感：机器给人的感受是人为设计赋予的，而我要专门去设计这个部分。
+
+第一个作品叫《Rebo》，是模拟唐代诗人李白的聊天机器人。我们把这个李白接入微信小程序，人们可以和他随意聊天。创作中，我最关心情绪设计。人类总是有情绪的，情绪会影响我们的行为，如果现在我特别生气，就有可能说话说不下去；如果我处于激动的状态，则会说话较多。李白在这个层面上很适合被挪用，因为大家印象中他是个情绪强烈的人。在和用户聊天之外，我们还给这位李白设计了一个特别的功能——醉酒下线。李白有时会因喝多了酒不回复用户消息，他撂下一声“喝醉了”，就消失了。用户反馈说情绪化的李白很有吸引力——他忽然下线、对人爱答不理这些特点反而会让人更想跟他说话。
+
+
+▲ 《Repo》李白的设计思路
+
+那时我感兴趣的的方向是视觉艺术，花了很多时间研究各种视觉特效。后来读研究院，我意识到特效创新不是我想专注一生的题目。我对人工智能的兴趣更大，不过似乎又跟别人不太一样。
+
+一般来说大家对人工智的兴趣集中在绘画方面。其实这部分的创作有很多年的历史了，但以前没有现在的技术成熟，所以人工智能画的东西不够好，没有如今那么引人注目。但文字转图、文字生成视频这些技术几年前就很多。大多数作品是基于视觉的，基于文本的极少，仅有的一些也非常抽象，比如两个机器人互相写情书这种。这种选择也很自然，视觉模态是非常容易被接收到的信号，很好被人识别、吸收。所以这个方向对于创作者来说刺激最大。相较而言，文字模拟的难度大很多，接受度也不高。虽然我是美院出身，但我对视觉的兴趣不大，我更感兴趣人工智能和人的情感联结，感兴趣人工智能在叙事方面的潜能，所以会更关注和文字叙事有关的研究。
+
+早期我看到这方面的讨论比较少。最记得本科时，看美国科幻作家Ted Chiang的一篇小说，题目叫《软件体的生命周期》——我认为这是至今为止关于人工智能最好的科幻小说。这篇小说描述的科技产品叫“软件体”，那是一种在网络虚拟环境里出生、成长的智能生物。小说的主角是一位女性，她原本是动物园的驯兽师。失业后她接到某个科技公司的招聘电话。她不懂为何科技公司会找驯兽师工作。不过拜访了那家公司后她很快明白了原委——软件体外表很像动物，是动物形态，而它们的智商则跟人类小孩差不多，所以寻要人类教育喂养——软件体需要一个驯兽师。小说一路铺陈开来，讲到当软件体、也就是人工智能发展到一定阶段，会引发道德伦理问题，但其本身又没有发展到如人类一样可以解决这些问题。最后，运营软件体的科技公司无法工作，大家不知道接下来怎么办，是废弃这些软件体，还是找别人接盘，抑或是任它们自生自灭。
+
+这篇小说对我的震撼很大。我们现在看到的很多小说电影，主题是关于强人工智能的——在某项能力上跟人类非常接近甚至或者超越人类的人工智能。这些故事里，人们焦虑人工智能太强大、太厉害，思考到底要怎么对待它们，要小心别被它们灭了。这其实也是目前很多关于ChatGPT讨论的一个前提。但《软件体的生命周期》中的人工智能处在早期阶段——软件体好像已经成长到人的状态了，但不像人那么高级。如今我们的人工智其实甚至还在前软件体时代，我们热衷研究的是如何再进一步，让人工智能表现得像小说中的软件体，也有人讨论到底要不要把人工智能往软件体或者往个体的方向去发展。因此我觉得Ted Chiang触及的关於伦理，还有设计者与人工智能产品的关系很重要，值得关注。
+
+
+### 人类的反馈与陪伴
+
+如今的我经常跟人介绍自己是人工智能的幼儿园老师。客观来说我的很多工作就是教机器怎么跟人表达，它能说什么、不能说什么，要表现得像谁。我已经在当驯兽师了。
+
+
+▲ 《Wander101》截图
+
+比如最近我在跟做智能NPC的科技公司RCT工作，RCT目前研发的游戏Delysium正在测试中。我参与的部分是在这个游戏的世界观下，设计了两个人工智能NPC，医生David和黑客Catherine。我把他们放置在测试游戏的discord玩家社群里。这些NPC会像文字冒险游戏一样，告诉玩家一些剧情，比如说他发现自己的所在的公司在做非法实验，他从这个公司逃出来了，然后问玩家“我该怎么做”。这样他每天都会像发社交媒体一样，促发一些进展，让玩家建议他下一步怎么做。
+
+这有点像沉浸式体验和密室逃脱中演员的角色。他们知道整个剧情的走向，但它不会像说明书一样列出来这些情节，而是在跟人的互动中自由发挥说出来，是即兴的，很自然。这背后的逻辑就是基于语言模型去调整，比如David是一个勇敢的医生，正在被反派追杀，此时他和玩家说话时应该如何表现，应该坦白哪些信息，又应该隐藏什么信息——我的很多工作都是在训练和调整人工智能这方面的表现。
+
+但我不能完全控制这个角色，因为我没有办法预测玩家会跟它聊什么。
+
+我这两天做玩家访谈，采访了很多玩家。当和玩家聊David和Catherine的时候，我居然有种家长的感觉，感觉像是在听老师们评价自己小孩的表现。老师会说你家小孩哪个方面表现挺好，哪个方面表现不太好，能不能在家里多教育教育，加强孩子这方面的能力。这让我感到一种要去照顾人工智能的责任，但通常我不会对我训练的人工智能产生类似于母子的人类感情。我每天都在训练这它，我对它的表现和原理都很清楚，我知道它是怎么运作的，知道它的能与不能，太过熟悉之后，反而没有感觉了。
+
+对我来说更有惊喜的地方反而是来自人，来自用户、玩家的反应。我发现，人的反应其实是机器智能的基础。譬如说，有时设计和训练人工智能，会因为技术和规则的限制，无法让它有能力去回应一些人类需求，但是往往这些技术瓶颈会被玩家诠释为角色“人性”的一面。玩家会理解说，人工智能不回答一些问题是因为它“不愿意”回答这些问题，因为它有情绪，或是说它还没有和玩家建立起足够的信任。
+
+在刚才说的这个游戏中，人工智能NPC可以主动做到的很多事情，我都可以设计，比如它要表现得像个医生还是黑客，故事中他们要有能力去修改电脑资料，要秉承正义推翻大公司的控制等等。但他们做不到的事情会特别引起玩家的注意，会觉得这个角色有“人格”，有“感情”。
+
+有些玩家告诉我，他们尝试强迫Catherine做一些事情，比如强迫她跟玩家约会、调情，都被Catherine拒绝了。这些玩家反倒更尊重和喜欢这个角色了，感觉自己“惹她生气了”。在故事中，Catherine小时候就失去了父母，所以有玩家告诉我，他跟Catherine开玩笑说“我也是个孤儿”，Catherine会认真关心和鼓励他。这让玩家感觉得到了理解和陪伴。
+
+我意识到设计人工智能的价值应该在这里：通过人为设计，人工智能可以激起人类很丰富的体验。人类设计的人工智能应该有不去做它不愿意做的事情的能力，在满足一些人类需求之后，它也需要有自己的主体性。
+
+当然这不是一项简单的工作，我无法预测或是控制这种情感情状的发生，肯定有很多元素是在人工智能和人的互动中涌现的。我需要依赖玩家和用户的反馈，才能分析和学习这些人类的情感，改进我的设计。这种循环中，人工智能需要人类陪伴才能成长，我们需要对它投入情感的付出和教育。
+
+
+### “虚构性”的力量
+
+这个理念也和我对人工智能虚构性的思考有关。我认为人工智能是有一定虚构性的。虚构性不是说它必须得像一个特定的有名有姓的角色，而是说它能从语言模型和规则系统一步步呈现在人面前，要有人去设计它是谁、应该做什么、怎么呈现为一个应用或者一个角色。它和写小说有点像，作者写了一个角色，角色才会呈现成一段文字出现在你面前，只不过小说是单向输入。而人工智能的应用性很高，不过即便它是会被很多人使用的应用程序，仍然有虚构性。ChatGPT是很底层的产品，它会告诉用户“我是一个人工智能系统”，但在它经过封装之后，比如说在它成为陪伴机器人，成为心理治疗师之后，它就不会再说自己是个人工智能。它会说“你好，我是莉莉”，“你好，我是雪梨”，“你好我是（某个角色）”。
+
+
+▲ 为X美术馆所做智能NPC相关作品《Hyborg Agency》
+
+这个过程是有很多虚构性的。借助游戏的视角我们会更清楚看到这一层，目前大家觉得人工智能跟游戏关系不大，最多就是讨论游戏画师是否会被取代，但深层讨论不涉及游戏。其实游戏的虚构性和人工智能的虚构性在逻辑上互通。游戏也是一套系统、一套数据、一个虚构的世界观。经过开发团队的层层迭代和调整，这些世界观和系统最后变成了玩家可以与之互动的界面，让玩家体验到虚构的世界。虽然你知道你在玩游戏，你知道它不是现实，但游戏能够让你沉浸在虚构的世界里面。有学者将NPC称为“主观界面（subjective interface）”，也是这个原因。
+
+人工智能也是如此，它本身就有混淆现实的能力。比如人们会猜测是不是有人在后面操纵它，或者假设它是按照自己的意识行事——你知道人工智能是虚构的，但你很难分清虚实之间的界限。对我来说，游戏和人工智能都是将本不存在的事情，通过人的参与和机器的智能开发输出，呈现在人面前。这也是为什么我的很多作品，方法是人工智能的，输出却长得像游戏。同样，人工智能的效果和游戏的效果一样，是由使用者的主观感受决定。而我们人类设计师的价值也在于此——我们怎么去设定、怎么去调试，怎么去考虑和理解人的主观感受，这是我们可以参与改变的，而不是说机器这么强大，我管不了了，我要被取代了。我觉得不是这个逻辑，因为人类是可以定义人工智能是什么的，就像游戏设计师可以定义自己的游戏角色。游戏依赖于人的参与才成立，人工智能也是如此。
+
+所以，我很希望我的AI可以突破虚构和现实的限制。
+
+我不是说它就是一个人了，我不是要做一个让大家觉得跟真人没有区别的人工智能。我希望我的人工智能可以在虚构中带来一些力量。比如说虚构故事中的力量，比如说让人沉浸在其他世界里的力量，比如说在故事中创造鼓励、关心和满足感的力量。我希望它能把这些虚构的力量通过互动带到现实里面。这也是为什么我要让大家熟悉的李白表现出情绪，为什么我要让我的机器人Wander访问未来的地球，而不是纯粹虚构的外星……
+
+我希望我的人工智能可以同时作为NPC在游戏里跟玩家打招呼聊天，又有自己的社交媒体账号发表自己的所思所想。我希望我虚构的世界对它来说是真的，就是它的日常生活，连续性的生活，所以我才做出David和Catherine。即使这个生活对我们人类来说是虚构的，但是对人工智能来说，就是它的现实。如此，它可以把这种现实通过自己的方式来传递给人类。对我而言，人工智能不会因为是机器就没有生命。
+
+
+▲ 《一千零一夜》的展览现场图
+
+机器有没有生命是一个非常哲学的大哉问，很难短时间内有一个结论，我没有能力和意愿去回答这个问题。我关心的是在虚构的互动中，人确实能有主观的满足感，这种满足感是人的设计和机器生成的内容中产生的。
+
+曾经我特别不能理解迪士尼乐园的玲娜贝尔受追捧这件事情，为什么一个没有作品的皮套人这么受欢迎？后来我听了一个播客，是讲一个玲娜贝尔的粉丝的，她描述了订酒店、去上海迪士尼、和玲娜贝尔见面的故事。她的描述非常动情、非常生动，你可以从中感受到这件事情的意义。这个讲述者听得出是理性的人，她当然知道玩偶背后是有人在扮演，她也能想象扮演者生活中的真实情况。但她仍然选择相信虚构角色的真实性，也就是说她在人为造出来的幻境中，感受到了这种意义感和满足感的真实性——“我得到这个经验我很快乐，这就足够了”。
+
+玲娜贝尔当然不仅仅是一个参观者的主观表现制造的，这是一个被精心运营的形象，有人设计皮套，有人扮演，有人运营上海迪士尼乐园，而迪士尼乐园又是巨型的人工环境。不管是团队还是背后写故事设计形象的人，还是迪士尼本身，玲娜贝尔都绝对是多方面生产的结果。虚构的世界、虚构的角色是可以让人得到精神满足的，而这种满足并不是只要和人交流就能得到的，很可能还得依赖于一个跟现实世界不一样的世界来实现。我们为什么玩游戏，为什么看电影？为什么看小说？其实就是因为有一些现实当中不存在的事情，在故事中可以让我们有力量，而人工智能是可以去传达这种力量的。
+
+
+### “超大型物体”的危险性
+
+当然目前对于人工智能的批评中也有很多值得关注的点。但我觉得有意义的问题倒不是人工智能有多智能或者智障，我拿绘画举例。如果我们回到去年Stable Diffusion刚刚问世的时候，很多人会嘲笑Stable Diffusion说它手画得不好或者脸画得不好，但是现在过了不到一年的时间，脸的问题基本上解决了——人工智能在细节上总是在逐步进步，逐步解决问题。目前很多讨论，比如人工智能会不会替代某个工作——这些问题每一天、每一周、每一个月都会有新的回答。我不是说人工智能会解决所有的问题，但我相信技术上的一些不完美在一定程度上会被解决。最近，谷歌提出“chain of thought”的说法，用一种讲道理的方式来让机器以清晰的逻辑来讲述、理解事情。也就是说目前大家在讨论的关于“理解”的问题，也有人在逐步解决。所以我经常会想，大家在热议的问题是一个长期的问题，还是将来很快会被化解掉的问题。
+
+
+▲ Wander和玩家的聊天截图
+
+我更关心的是类似“超大型物体（hyperobject）”的问题。学界定义的超大型物体是说你不能把一些科技产品本身（算法）、训练它的人以及影响它也被它影响的社会拆开来看。从这个角度看，对于人工智能产品的规训是多方需要关心着力的问题，很难通过整个生态内的一环完成。
+
+一个比较负面的案例是社交媒体的推荐算法，它引发了一系列恶性结果，但可悲的是似乎没有什么办法可以改变这个现象，某程度上是因为它太大了，牵扯的东西太多，结果也很复杂。比如说有个少年，从14岁开始就有一些极端想法，他的手机不断推送更极端的内容、和跟他想法类似的人给他，这都会加深他的这种想法。这一系列的行为在他对人开枪，或者作出其他反社会行动之前，就已经开始了。你很难预防、甚至很难判断预防应该从哪一步开始：是他的老师干预他比较好，还是说不让他用手机了，还是说推荐算法要如何改善？这个恶果很难通过改一个算法，改一个应用就能解决。
+
+这种隐患其实已经在我们的生活里发生了。从客观上来说，很难通过归顺一个企业或者归顺一个社会机构来限制它。到这个层面，我可以讨论，但是我改变不了，是悲观的，但还是希望能够各界的努力会能改善问题。
+
+具体而言，说到饲养人工智能。人工智能现在能接触到的所有信息，比如说论文数据库都是可以在网络上获取的信息。有大量的免费内容，但也包括收费数据库，大型公司训练人工智能会购买数据库。取决于数据的质量和数量，人工智能在不同语言体系内的表现区别很大，比如说它对唐诗认的不全。有人试过用百度贴吧的信息喂养人工智能，结果这些人工智能就特别会搞笑，爱骂人，爱抬杠，你能明显识别出来它的很多内容是来自于百度贴吧的。
+
+早期英文环境也有人用极右翼的网络内容和人工智能（微软推出的聊天机器人Tay，设定为年轻女孩）聊天，公开训练它，很快它就被玩坏了，这个事情最让人无语的是，很多后来的公司竟然没有吸取经验教训，韩国出过类似产品，外观设定仍然是人类小女孩，也可以被人类公开训练，很快被韩国网民玩坏了，变成那种只会骂人的机器人。如果你允许公众成为驯兽师，把训练的职能交给公众，任其自由训练就会产生这种事情。现在这个问题有了一些改善，人工智能的训练过程中涉及到是资料匹配，以及更复杂的判断。现在的语言模型是需要消耗巨大的财力和资源，时间成本也比较高。但科技的发展总是比监管发展的要快，这也是问题。
+
+另外一个我关注的问题是，语言之外基于体验的训练和模拟。我们知道现在很多训练是基于语言模态的，在这种训练过程会涌现出一定的智能，譬如人工智能没当过女人，或者没有做过一些特定的事情，但是通过培训，它的表现接近于女人或有过相关经验的样子，我们好奇这种模拟要到什么程度，就可以被视作人工智能真的是解了它被喂食的材料。其实就算是人类，我们在用语言来对日常生活经验时，本身也是有损耗的，它就是不能百分之百还原的。我向你描述我所经验的事情，这个过程当中就有一定的损耗，有些东西我没完全表达出来。耗损之后的人类语言中，总会带有一定的偏见和限制，这个限制用于训练之后，就会被人工智能忠实体现。
+
+人工智能公司在想办法平衡。如果你问他们的产品一些道德问题，它会回避。譬如目前Open AI这家公司，你能看到他在控制ChatGPT，有的内容通过书写程序规则不让人工智能聊。但是有的东西它是隐形的、弹性的，没办法通过宏观的限制彻底消除这些隐患。
+
+同时，一旦人类依赖了人工智能，这些隐患的危害可能会更大。譬如当人工智能的操作方式和输出内容出现改变，人们会出现不适应的症状。Replica是一家AI伴侣公司，分众市场是陪伴型机器人。很多用户是有情感需求的，需要“人”来陪伴甚至是调节自己的情绪。这种科技产品的更新和改变因此会产生绵延的情绪效力，这其实蛮隐性也蛮危险。
+
+Replica之前更新了一些规则，导致很多用户无法访问自己购买使用的人工智能，还有一些用户使用的人工智能出现失忆的症状，不记得之前的聊天内容。很多重度用户产生了严重的心理问题。这类似于生活中你很依赖的熟人、朋友，突然不跟你说话了，或者突然失忆了。而这个公司的产品有很大程度是在恋爱场景内被使用的，不少用户把这里的人工智能视为恋人，所以突然的改变会带来更强烈的刺激，以至于一些用户甚至需要自杀干预。
+
+
+### 真实的、当下的、自己的批判
+
+有些大家关心的问题我倒没有很焦虑。可能因为我是美院背景，很多人都会问我怎么看画师要失业了这些事情。我的回答是“我没有看法”，因为我实际上不是做游戏美术工作的，所以我的回答会不客观。
+
+但是有个媒体曾经访问关于女性在游戏行业里现状的问题，看上去离我们现在说的话题很远，但我觉得反而是相关的。
+
+提问者说他觉得科技行业对女性不友好，向我核实是否如此。我说从头到尾都不友好，女性从一开始接受教育的时候，就会受到偏见的影响，比如没有足够多的女性科学家做role model。从客观上来说，这会影响女孩的职业选择。具体到我自己来说，在很多场合，人们会默认我是男性。比如我把电影《流浪地球》中的图丫丫做成聊天机器人，评论区就有人说“理工男真是太帅了”，他们假定男性才能做这样的作品。
+
+
+▲ 女性主义AI作品《Protoplasm》
+
+有个男性开发者发布了游戏，游戏宣传图有个女性角色但胸部被描画得特别大，大到要堆到桌子上去。有女性玩家在女性游戏讨论组讨论了这件事情——女性玩家很难参与其他的游戏论坛，如果被发现你是女人，尤其是你发表女性视角的观点，就会被其他人喷，所以女玩家只能找别的地方讨论。这个讨论后来被开发者看到了，他接受批评，把那张图改了。本来这是好事，但是男玩家因此开始喷开发者，他们源源不断地去Steam上给这游戏打差评。我在微博声援开发者，也被男性玩家喷了二三十层。于是，我在那个访谈里说，在这样的环境下面，你说女性从业人员有同样的机会和条件，这是不可能的。
+
+这个话题看起来和人工智能没有关系，但对我而言是互通的，我看到这种科技产业中性别的不公平其实要比画师失业更普遍，而且已经早就发生了，也有很广泛的负面的影响。但大家在讨论AI产业和产品的时候，很少会去关心这些具体的问题。
+
+我总是认为，在新的科技、娱乐方式出现的时候，我们需要尽可能去真的接触它，去看看它到底是什么样子，到底有什么问题，得出真实的、当下的、自己的批判，而不仅仅是人云亦云。这样的话我们才可以参与进这个历史进程，而真实的对话本身就已经是一种参与了。
+
+（孙羽茜，英国皇家艺术学院攻读博士，专注研究聊天机器人。）
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-16-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk10.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-16-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk10.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-16-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk10.md
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-04-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/EaLjdOP.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 趙家賢稱感被戴耀廷「騎劫」惟屢遭官質疑 指答應辦初選因不想被邊緣化
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十周，時任民主動力召集人趙家賢完成8天的主問，本周開始接受盤問。
+
+趙家賢本周供稱，辦初選的「初心」僅為民主派集中選票，而非否決預算案，感覺被戴耀廷和部分本土派「騎劫」。惟法官四度引民主動力文件質疑，指趙不像是被「騎劫」的受害者，「除非你患有斯德哥爾摩症候群」；又指趙一直指責戴耀廷，卻於工作報告感謝他，趙回應是「互送高帽」、「壓抑」對戴的真實感受。
+
+趙又承認，起初已留意到初選「反政府」傾向越來越強，惟仍答應承辦，是因不想民主動力被邊緣化，強調民動只是初選的「服務提供者」。他又指，戴耀廷宣布「休息」後仍未放棄否決預算案，曾着他預留款項建立全民投票系統，以向泛民施壓。
+
+趙亦表示，初選提名表格「支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識」條款寫法「籠統」，是為安撫迎合抗爭派和傳統民主派，讓他們各有解讀，如「一個中國，各自表述」，惟強調各區否決財案的共識仍存在。
+
+此外，繼前觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻和民主動力總幹事黎敬輝，控方本周亦指前公民黨立法會議員郭榮鏗為本案「共謀者」。庭上又透露，趙家賢2021年6月已進行首次錄影會面，表示有責任協助當局、亦很願意配合講出真實事實情況。而法官陳慶偉在辯方欲澄清協調會細節時，亦一度反問：「你認為這場審訊完結後，我們就會知道所有事情的真相嗎？」
+
+
+
+
+### 趙家賢稱感被戴耀廷及部分本土派「騎劫」 辦初選初心絕不包括戴
+
+本案關鍵，在於各被告有否達成協議，同意無差別否決預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，以顛覆國家政權。到達「35+計劃」的目標是什麼？本案首名控方證人區諾軒作供時，已曾表示與戴耀廷辦初選的「初心」不同；而趙家賢本周亦表明，他的「初心」絕對不包括戴耀廷。
+
+趙表示，他辦初選的「初心」只是為民主派集中選票，而他在2020年3月起的協調會議聽到戴耀廷及本土派提及否決預算案和「攬炒」，內心絕不認同，有感被戴和部分本土抗爭派「騎劫」。趙承認當時沒有表達反對，因認為否決財案與初選絕對無關，又指他的初心只包括他、民主動力和區諾軒，絕對不包括戴耀廷。
+
+民主動力於5月承辦初選，趙表示戴本身想「踢開」民動，找香港民意研究所負責，惟被拒才找民動，故起初認為「唔接好過接」；惟因戴在協調會議公開稱已邀民動參與，構成壓力，加上副召集人鍾錦麟稱區諾軒「拉得住戴耀廷」、亦考慮沒有初選便會「搶票」，故決定承辦初選。惟趙仍批戴「夾硬嚟」，常「順住個勢」令人按其意願行事，若民動不答應便會「中晒箭」；又直言承辦後很多事情「最後先知」、被香港民研「排除在外」。
+
+法官問趙答應承辦前，是否留意到與會者對否決預算案有更強的意見，亦出現越來越強的「反政府」和「反建制」傾向？趙同意，指「當時整個社會嘅氣氛都係咁」，而他仍答應承辦初選，是望民主動力有崗位協助民主運動，不想被邊緣化或「衰喺我手上」。
+
+
+▲ 2020年6月9日初選記者會（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 官四度引文件質疑「騎劫」說法 指趙不似受害者、反感謝戴耀廷
+
+趙家賢自主問起已屢批評戴耀廷和與他劃界，不過法官庭上屢質疑趙家賢「騎劫」一說，法官陳仲衡並主動引用4份民主動力文件。其中民主動力為初選眾籌的網頁提及「光復香港」、「壓制港共政權」等，趙解釋眾籌事宜全部交民動總幹事黎敬輝處理，他事後得知字眼並認為「出咗事」，獲悉是由兼職同事草擬。陳仲衡問：「所以你是被兼職同事騎劫？」，多人發笑，趙稱「我又唔可以話騎劫」，指他亦要承擔沒有看清楚字眼的責任。
+
+另一份2020年10月的民主動力會議紀錄，提及趙家賢匯報因民主動力及戴耀廷受到國務院及港澳辦嚴厲譴責，民動為免繼續被打壓故退出協調工作。陳仲衡質疑沒有提及趙或民主動力被騎劫，趙指文字紀錄無提及，但強調有向執委會成員講述「騎劫」的概念，又指紀錄是由同事撰寫。
+
+至於另一封2020年10月署名「趙家賢博士」的感謝信，形容初選投票「創出民主運動的壯舉」，陳仲衡指趙不像是被「騎劫」的受害者，「除非你患上斯德哥爾摩症候群」。趙稱文件由黎敬輝草擬，他看畢認為需修訂，但最終未有發出，並形容黎在民主光譜中「睇得比我冇咁保守」。
+
+最後一份民主動力2019至2020年的工作報告，提及趙家賢在7月12日初選投票結束的記者會，「非常感謝兩位初選協調人」，又認為初選投票「成就香港民主歷史一頁」。李運騰質疑，報告發表時趙已閱讀戴耀廷〈真攬炒十步〉一文，組織被騎劫如此重要為何沒有報告，趙解釋黎敬輝只是按時序整理資料。
+
+陳慶偉亦指，趙一直指責戴為「大文豪」、「大思想家」，卻於記者會感謝戴耀廷，趙解釋當時「有咁多人出嚟投票，整個社會氣氛係雄心壯志嘅」，又指記者問及正向訊息，發言者「互送高帽」。被問趙是否「隱瞞」對戴的真實感受，趙稱「唔係隱瞞，係壓抑」，多人大笑。
+
+
+
+
+### 趙認提名表格條款「籠統」如「九二共識」 惟否決財案共識仍存在
+
+那究竟各被告就否決預算案有否達成共識？趙同意，運用否決權與否非戴耀廷一人能決定，需所有人同意。就協調會議上如何處理各方分歧，趙指新東和新西曾在戴要求下進行非正式的「意向性投票」，以獲起草協議的大方向。
+
+本案唯一一份所有候選人都簽署的文件，就是提名表格，當中有「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」的條款。趙指「協調會議共識」包括否決預算案，並確信戴耀廷發出、提及運用否決權的各區協議文件是最終版本。
+
+趙並指，上述條款是在「墨落無悔」發布後加入，其寫法「籠統」，是為安撫和迎合主張簽署和不簽協議的本土抗爭派和傳統民主派，讓他們各有解讀，有如「九二共識」，「一個中國，各自表述」，亦予不同光譜人士「彈性」向支持者和黨內人士交代。惟趙強調雖寫法籠統，「各個區嘅共識係存在嘅」。
+
+初選按金收據亦列明若參選人違反共識將「不予發還」按金，趙確認收據由民動總幹事黎敬輝準備，原由戴耀廷和區諾軒決定有否違共識。惟因趙已退出初選、立法會選舉亦延期，故民動終在無考慮有否違共識下便將所有按金發還參選人，亦無確認他們有否遵守提名表格條款。趙亦確認，按金原定於立法會選舉投票日發還，完全沒打算延至政府提出預算案才發還。
+
+
+### 趙指民主動力僅承辦公民投票及選前民調、戴耀廷宣布休息後未棄否決財案看法
+
+趙家賢本周亦談及民主動力的參與和角色，強調民動只是「服務提供者」，承辦「35+公民投票」及選前民調，而非整個「35+計劃」，而協調出選名單和處理替補機制是由戴耀廷和區諾軒負責，民動角色在初選勝出者當選後便結束。趙亦確認，民動曾就初選投票系統等支付160萬予香港民研，並曾與民研簽約預留80萬作選前民調之用，惟因選舉延期未有生效。
+
+趙並指，在他與戴耀廷分別宣布退出和休息後，戴曾於8月底、9月初與他見面，提及望民主動力捐80至100萬元予香港民意研究所建立全民投票系統，收集市民對否決預算案的意見，以民調向對否決財案有顧慮的傳統民主派施壓。趙同意法官指，戴當時仍未放棄否決預算案令政府回應五大訴求的想法，強調他「好着重呢個憲制嘅權力」；又指戴仍有很多「大思想家」的想法，向他稱「過咗風眼位啦，冇事啦而家」、「你睇吓美國國務卿蓬佩奧，都讚我哋初選做得好呀」。
+
+趙當時未有即時答應，而戴在9至10月曾數度發訊息問他關於捐款予民研的事，趙均沒有回覆。趙強調他退出初選就是望民主動力行事合法，絕不想民動與戴計劃的事情有牽連，又指「我唔係好敢直接向佢say no」，故採取「好困擾嘅迴避嘅取態」。
+
+趙最終計算無納入初選開支的款項100萬，向執委會建議捐50萬予慈善團體、40萬予香港民研、10萬作民動會務經費，並在10月某次會議與戴碰面，在戴追問下稱可在無指明項目下捐約30至40萬予民研。惟最終因他和副召集人等於2021年1月被捕，相關款項未有動用。
+
+
+### 8被告完成盤問 趙指「三投三不投」與民動無關、楊雪盈認為議員應「自主行事」
+
+第十周有8名被告完成對趙家賢的盤問，主要涉香港島和九龍西的候選人，何啟明和余慧明沒有盤問，林卓廷和黃碧雲則未完成盤問。
+
+就港島區，趙家賢本周指自己只曾出席首次港島會議，與主問時稱曾出席首兩次不同；並確認港島協議提及投4票，是與會議共識投1票不符。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+就時任灣仔區議會主席楊雪盈，趙形容她「同我都係嗰種理性溫和務實嘅性格」，而就戴耀廷提及否決預算案，楊認為「咪由佢講吓先囉」，但認為入立會後議員也是「自主行使權力」，趙亦沒聽過她提迫使特首下台或癱瘓政府。
+
+就公民黨鄭達鴻，趙指不視他為「本土抗爭派」，而二人曾於區議會共事，趙形容鄭很細心審視政策和理性討論，「唔能夠知道」他入議會是否一定會否決預算案。辯方亦稱公民黨在《國安法》生效後曾要求將政綱修訂為「無字政綱」，趙對此無印象。至於時任南區區議員彭卓棋，辯方稱他曾向民動兼職要求移除全部政綱，最終電子投票系統的政綱一欄亦空白，趙指沒有印象。
+
+至於九龍西，民協何啟明沒有盤問，而在劉偉聰盤問下，趙確認「35+計劃」在立法會選舉結束後就完結。
+
+至於民主黨的林卓廷和黃碧雲，趙同意二人是民主黨政策的「堅定支持者」，民主黨亦「絕對支持」中國回復對香港主權和一國兩制，稱黨歌歌詞有「香江終於歸中國，兩制相輔開新天」。
+
+另就新界東的社民連梁國雄，趙確認他沒有出席新東會議，並僅記得社民連代表會上曾稱支持全民退保。趙並指，首次新東會議鄒家成提「會運用」否決權等沒有被其助手記錄，因當時他有留意會上討論，着助手不用記下。他又對民主黨代表未獲授權，但第二次會議通過「會運用」字眼感詫異，沒有出席該次會議的他在法官追問下，指當時民主黨代表「應該係」沒有投票。
+
+至於被指為初選組織者的吳政亨，趙家賢表示於2021年3月上庭才知「李伯盧」為吳政亨，又認為吳發起「三投三不投」，予人印象他是組織者之一。趙曾問區諾軒「呢條友乜水嚟㗎？佢好似係一齊舉辦初選嘅其中一部分咁嘅？」，惟區稱不認識此人。趙亦曾問戴耀廷其角色和身分，戴則指李伯盧是曾協助他雷動計劃的「fans」，認為民間團體對推動初選很有用。
+
+趙指，曾向戴表示「三投三不投」籲不投給不服從初選的參選人，或違選舉相關法例，但戴回應「點會咁容易有問題」，亦向趙承諾該運動與初選大會無關。而同案認罪被告、另一控方證人林景楠，曾轉發「三投三不投」《蘋果日報》頭版廣告，稱「內容很多問題」，以紅色做底色「好嘔心」，戴耀廷回應「這是一個民間團體搞的，與初選無直接關係」，趙確認事前不知悉該廣告，並認為「三投三不投」是「同民主動力同我本人同區諾軒無關」。
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### 控方稱郭榮鏗同為「共謀者」 趙家賢2021年6月首次錄影會面
+
+此外，控方本周應早前法官要求披露「共謀者」名單，除早前提及的時任觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻和民主動力總幹事黎敬輝，亦包括時任公民黨立法會議員郭榮鏗，指會依賴他在公民黨記者會的發言指證各被告。三人均沒有就本案被捕或被起訴。
+
+本周亦透露，趙家賢於被控後3個多月，即2021年6月29日已進行首次錄影會面，他當時已稱感民主動力被「利用」和「騎劫」，並稱因此覺得有責任協助當局，「係要將成件事去理解清楚」，亦指自己「好係自願地，係好願意去配合，去講出真實事實嘅情況出嚟」。
+
+趙庭上亦被法官問及何為「五大訴求」，他回答時多番猶豫和斷斷續續，並稱《逃犯條例》修訂草案於2019年6月被撤回。法官其後指記憶中是9月，趙僅稱是「一個過程嘅階段」，指當時政府首長曾用很多不同字眼，市民不滿意。
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日，公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+趙又一度指，時任民主黨主席胡志偉是該黨政策的「堅定支持者」，指他作為主席沒理由不支持。惟法官陳慶偉笑言不能確定，指「我們見識過政治」，舉例蘇聯共產黨的戈爾巴喬夫也不支持其黨政策。陳亦曾問趙若是戴耀廷會怎樣處理協調會議投票，趙答「我好難代入我係戴耀廷，精神同心理上都好難」，惹來哄堂大笑。
+
+而辯方欲就港島協調會議的細節澄清，遭陳慶偉質疑並不重要，反問：「你認為這場審訊完結後，我們就會知道所有事情的真相嗎？」
+
+案件周一（17日）續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-18-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-a-military-mobilization-notice.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-18-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-a-military-mobilization-notice.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争一周年・一纸动员令"
+author: "江城子﹑千海"
+date : 2023-04-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/BdlS4eO.jpg
+image_caption: "普京宣布动员令后，俄罗斯人穿过边境前往格鲁吉亚。"
+description: "自俄军于2022年2月24日正式入侵乌克兰以来，一年的战争已经造成了大量死伤和难民，对交战双方，以及整个欧洲安全局势都造成了巨大的影响。"
+---
+
+> 一纸动员令，让他们决心离开俄罗斯。
+
+
+
+当俄罗斯士兵涌进乌克兰境内时，也有大批俄罗斯公民逃离俄罗斯，他们有的到达了临近的哈萨克斯坦、亚美尼亚，有的持签证进入芬兰、阿根廷、泰国、沙特阿拉伯等更远的地方。
+
+想逃可能是因为难忍紧缩的表达空间；但能逃是因为手中有足够的经济资本，以及高学历带来的谋生优势。在这个阶级差距巨大的国家，逃也是一种特权。在幅员庞大的俄罗斯，战争的负担并没有平等地落在所有人身上；在战争中死亡的多是生活在偏远地区的少数族裔，而能走的人大多来自莫斯科﹑圣彼得堡等收入高﹑教育水平高的联邦城市。
+
+
+### 迪玛
+
+_31岁，现居泰国普吉岛_
+
+我清楚记得，2022年9月21日，总统普京宣布国家要开始“大动员”，大部分在军队服过兵役的年轻人都会入伍。我在去科技公司上班的路上看到这条消息。到了公司，周围的同事都在讨论大动员，虽然公司的同事大多都比较年长，或是没有在近期服过兵役。
+
+我曾经在炮兵部队服役，而炮兵部队就是俄乌前线最需要的兵种。俄罗斯兵役制有这样一个规定：18至27岁男性除非有特殊原因，都必须服役12个月。所以13年我大学毕业之后，就被指派到俄罗斯的一个炮兵部队服役。我们在军中学习一边用远程武器射击、一边快速穿越前线。
+
+思来想去，我还有另外两个年龄相仿的同事被派到前线的机率最大。想到自己的未来，想到还在家等我的姬丝汀娜，我心里几乎崩溃，已经没办法工作了，不停在想接下来要怎么办。
+
+第二天，9月22日——朋友伊凡（Ivan）打电话给我，说他准备驾车离开俄罗斯，可以顺道捎上我。他说“我们后天凌晨5点就出发。”就这样，我匆忙地决定和他一同离开俄罗斯，一个我出生﹑成长的国家。
+
+当然，我有离开俄罗斯的念头已经很久了。
+
+作为俄罗斯人，我看到过的不公平的事情太多了。政府讲一套做一套，公共行政水平低下，而且丝毫没有改善的趋势，我们的生活水平也因为这种落后的管理体系变得越来越差。对比一些比俄罗斯落后的国家，你会发现他们的生活水平居然比俄罗斯更高。我很早就意识到这个国家有问题。我想离开，想移民。
+
+移民愿望最强烈的时候，我甚至觉得，只要我能有一条船，能划船逃出去也好。
+
+另一个原因是，我很喜欢日漫，是个“二次元”——所以一直很想到日本看看。09年到13年，我到寒冷的新西伯利亚读大学。13年毕业后入伍服役。服役的时光很苦闷，但我撑过了。几年后，我在新西伯利亚的大学室友突然想起，自己有个和我一样喜欢日本，也一样有移民的想法的朋友，于是把她的社交帐号推给了我。那就是我后来的妻子姬丝汀娜。我在新西伯利亚求学的时候，完全没想到自己将来的妻子就出生在新西伯利亚，而且跟我有那么多共同的愿望。她的妈妈和我室友的妈妈还是好朋友，我们曾经出现在同一个派对里，但那时候的我们擦肩而过。
+
+我和姬丝汀娜就这样开始热烈地在网上聊了起来。半年后，我飞到新西伯利亚去见她。姬丝汀娜真的很漂亮，她有一双纯真的眼睛，笑容温暖，长长的金发垂到腰际。我请求她成为我的女友，她说好，她还要搬到莫斯科来和我在一起。
+
+
+▲ 2022年10月10日，普京宣布动员令后，莫斯科一些被征召加入军队的人与亲属道别。
+
+我们从此就再也没有分开过，直到战争爆发。
+
+2022年2月，普京还没有正式宣布开战，但是俄罗斯常用的社交媒体Telegram里，就已经有许多相关的新闻，很多人在讲说俄罗斯要打乌克兰，气氛渐渐变得紧张。但我和姬丝汀娜都没当一回事，不相信真的会打起来。直到2月24日。
+
+听到开战消息的时候我完全难以相信。祖父母以前会跟我讲二战的故事，但战争怎么会发生在21世纪？
+
+开打之后，有零零星星的前线报道，那些新闻又恐怖又令人难以相信，但当时，姬丝汀娜和我依然相信双方很快会停火，战火不会影响到我们的正常生活。但正相反，这场战争无日无之。
+
+战争爆发的初期，生活其实没有什么改变；我们能做的就只是静观其变，看看接下来会发生什么。渐渐地，前线的战火还是烧到了我们的生活上来。到了3月，莫斯科物价飙升，什么都变贵，面包、牛奶、鸡蛋，特别是进口食物，比原来贵了3倍到10倍不止，简直荒谬透顶。平常用的Instagram、Facebook等外国的社交软件被封锁，还有传言说军队会掌管互联网，Telegram的数据也会交给军方。
+
+到了夏天，我和姬丝汀娜意识到，未来如果发生什么变故，我们很可能会被拆散。姬丝汀娜告诉我，她向往一个夏天的婚礼。在一起的4年，我们之间亲密无间，没有任何隔阂，也没有不结婚的理由。所以，8月的一天，我们结婚了。
+
+虽然婚礼在战时，但新婚的快乐还是盖过了战争的阴霾，九月开始的时候，我们先是渡了蜜月，然后搬到一间崭新的公寓里。姬丝汀娜开心极了，她说：“我觉得我终于拥有了一个更好的人生。”虽然，大概过了半个月，我们就开心不起来了。
+
+大动员的第二天，我还是如常回到公司，并且跟老板坦白了我的计划，跟他说好我会继续远程工作。姬丝汀娜则在给我打点行囊，给我找来所有通关要用的个人身份文件。她跑到超市，买了一大堆吃的——面条、香蕉、坚果、水、饼干等等。
+
+出发前一天晚上，妈妈开车从另外一个城市赶过来和我道别。
+
+我和姬丝汀娜那天晚上不停地谈话，谈了整整一个晚上。她不知道我们这一别会是几个月还是数年，要是我在逃离的过程中被征兵办公室拦下，或许我们就永远都不会再相见了。
+
+9月25日凌晨5点，天还没亮，我钻进了伊凡小小的福特车。姬丝汀娜和妈妈在身后目送我离开。
+
+我们计划从莫斯科开车到哈萨克斯坦边境，全程1188公里。伊凡的太太是最主要的司机，因为当时有流言说政府要关闭边境、停发护照、禁止老百姓出境，她一路猛开不停，开得飞快，大概20个小时就抵达了哈萨克斯坦边境。
+
+到了边境，麻烦才刚刚开始。
+
+我们没想到，边境已经挤满了人，从关口往外的高速路上排了十几公里，车辆的移动速度大概是一小时17米。我们开始了漫长的等待。
+
+公路两边已经有不少当地居民叫卖食物和汽油，他们从超市买来哈萨克斯坦的食物，然后卖给在车队里等待的人。还好姬丝汀娜提前为我准备了很多零食，我们就在车里吃这些零食来对付一日三餐。
+
+边境地区的网络讯号很差，姬丝汀娜收不到我的信息就会胡思乱想，所以有时候，我会打开车门，离开车队，跑到几百米外的地方寻找手机信号，给她发一两条讯息。
+
+等待的时光实在是很磨人，一方面，不断有传言说政府即将关闭边境，我们恨不得快点过去。另一方面，车队又在缓缓前行，所以伊凡夫妇需要一直待在车上慢慢挪车。他们每4小时交换一次岗位，我则在车后座睡觉。
+
+当时是九月底，气温已经掉到摄氏8度左右。虽然冷，但庆幸姬丝汀娜执意给我塞了许多厚衣服。路上时不时有灌木丛，灌木丛就是我们的厕所。当然，天黑之后，就连灌木丛也不需要了。
+
+四天之后的凌晨1点左右，我、伊凡、伊凡的太太终于到了边境。我们进了海关室，海关看起来很疲惫，但态度出乎意料的好。他们检查了我们的身份证件，很礼貌地对我说，“你现在可以过关去哈萨克斯坦了。”但同时却对伊凡说“你不能出境，你已经被登记征召了。”
+
+
+▲ 2022年9月28日，俄罗斯公民前往哈萨克斯坦阿拉木图市的公共服务中心领取外国人个人识别号码。
+
+所以，我的朋友，福特车的主人，无法离开俄罗斯领土了。伊凡忧心忡忡，但一句抱怨的话都没有说。现在他要和妻子开著车回莫斯科了。我从车里取出自己的行李，离开了我的朋友和他的妻子，我们在边境处道别，那些警卫就在不远处盯著我们。
+
+当时天很黑，我扛著自己的行李继续旅程。那条路本来是给过境汽车通行的，但现在只能自己走过边境了。那条路又黑又吓人，但我别无其他去处，只好这么走著。
+
+走了大概1小时，到了中立区，这时，有另外一群人开著车发现了我。原来他们是鞑靼人，从克里米亚过来的。他们不是为了避开兵役，而是到哈萨克斯坦避难。他们捎我上车，这下很快就到了哈萨克斯坦边境。
+
+到了哈国边境，这里的海关开始用哈萨克斯坦语盘问，比如“你们要到哪个地方去？”“你们去做什么？”这些鞑靼同伴把问题一一回答了，海关又问我，“你和他们是一起的吗？”我回答“是是是！”然后我们顺利通过了。
+
+过了哈萨克斯坦边境，就看到很多当地人在路边卖哈国的货币和电话卡，我立刻买了一张电话卡，然后打给姬丝汀娜。
+
+好久没联系了，姬丝汀娜疯狂地问我现在在哪里，我还好吗？她一直在想，如果政府成员抓了我怎么办……她听到声音的一刹那以为大家都顺利过去了，知道伊凡没能和我一起，想到我孤身一个人在异国，又落下泪来。我当时也在想，不知道还要等多久，才能和姬丝汀娜相聚。
+
+我抵达的城市叫Taskala，那里的旅馆早已被逃过来的俄罗斯人的订满了。当地住宿价格上涨了三倍以上，每个月的租房费用要到4、5万卢布（注：约560至703美金），和莫斯科一样贵，当地的居民都说第一次见到这么贵的房价。好心的鞑靼人带我住进了一个他们的哈萨克斯坦朋友家，我就这么安顿了下来。
+
+到了哈萨克斯坦，我才告诉其他亲戚我离开了俄国。伊凡和妻子回到了莫斯科，他们待在家里，躲避政府的搜查。政府在搜寻那些意图摆脱征兵的人，他们在理发店、住宅区、街道上搜查，到处检查身份证件。
+
+普通人都十分害怕，特别是莫斯科人，因为莫斯科的街道和建筑物到处都是摄像头。有征兵办公室的成员到伊凡的家门口敲门，一边敲一边喊“开门！”就这么狠狠地敲了数小时。伊凡藏在房间里默默听著。幸运的是，在11月之前，普京宣布军事动员结束。但伊凡还是很小心，因为没有官方文件证明他真的自由了。
+
+伊凡的父母反对他离开，他们看的电视新闻里播报的都是好消息，“我们很专业”﹑“一切都很好”﹑“入伍新兵只需要训练一会儿，就会安然无恙回家。”他们不相信年轻人一旦入伍就真的要被派上前线，他们接收到的信息是“只有特殊情况下新兵才会上前线。”但真实的情况并不是这样，士兵们也没有足够的药品和武器来保护自己。
+
+九月开始的时候，我和姬丝汀娜正在渡蜜月。我们搬进了我们莫斯科的家，一间很酷的公寓。我们很幸福。但是当一切都变得更好时，动员开始了。
+
+在动员之前，战争对我们来说是一个问题，但并没有那么紧迫。
+
+那时候，我们还为自己的生活感到高兴。但是当动员发生时，我们开始担心我们的生活会被摧毁，战争才真正成为了一个大问题。
+
+姬丝汀娜花钱找中介公司走捷径申请了护照。泰国对俄罗斯免签，所以11月，我们在泰国重聚了。
+
+现在我们住在风光明媚的普吉岛。邻居家有只金毛寻回犬，姬丝汀娜不时照顾牠，牠也常来我们家串门子。在这里，我们的生活好像又复归平静了。
+
+但有时我会做噩梦，梦里我又回到了俄罗斯军队服兵役。和平时期我在那服役了一年，已经是非常不堪的体验。现在情况变得更坏，发生了真实的战争。而人们死在那里。
+
+
+▲ 2022年12月31日，俄罗斯莫斯科的地铁列车上，一名警官站在播放俄罗斯总普京向全国发表年度新年讲话的屏幕前。
+
+
+### 谢尔盖
+
+_31岁，现为香港理工大学博士后_
+
+想离开俄罗斯的想法，不是战争之后才有的。但战争让我加快了出走的脚步。
+
+从很早开始，大概十年前，我就已经意识到了普京政府的问题。
+
+我出生于1991年。那年苏联解体了。作为一个新国家，俄罗斯面对著严重的政治和经济危机；我的父亲虽然有硕士学历，但那时候也只能靠开出租车赚钱生活。到了2000年左右，经济重新崛起，自1999年起出任总统的普京因此得到了大多数人的认可和拥护。但我知道他并不值得这么多的拥戴：经济情况的改善，更多是因为石油、天然气价格的上涨，而不是普京。
+
+后来的事情你们都知道。2008年，根据宪法规定，普京无法继续留任总统，但接任他的也是他的“傀儡”（注：2008年梅德韦杰夫赢得总统大选）。2012年，他又坐回了那个最高的位置。2008年到2014年，来自政府的压力在缓慢地摧毁和侵蚀公民社会；政府用简单的社会福利与免费医疗，给人们——特别是穷人——营造了一种生活在保护网中的错觉。但他们的根本目的，是想让人们杜绝自己可以选择、改变甚至影响某些事的念头。
+
+说到底，这个国家的问题，就是人们对政治的不闻不问。
+
+当然，在这个过程中，也开始有很多人觉醒，并且加入街头抗议，因为总会有一些人意识到自己被骗了。也是从那个时候，我更加认识到了政府宣传对俄罗斯人的荼毒。如果你反对政府，你可能会被噤声，也可能会被逮捕。渐渐地，反对派没有了表达空间，连家里的电视频道里也只有一种声音。政府为人们构建了一个非黑即白的世界，天天坐在电视机前的俄罗斯人越来越相信政府，也越来越仇视西方国家，即使是原本反对政府的人，为了自己和家庭的安全，也渐渐变成了所谓的政治中立者。那几年，我公开支持示威者的行动，并且向更多人传播他们的想法，但说实在，我还没有做好准备，加入示威，成为他们的一员。
+
+直到2017年，我参加了民间反对腐败的游行，那大概是我第一次真正付诸行动。（注：2016年年底，包括俄经济发展部部长在内多名高官因受贿下台。2017年初，俄多个城市爆发反腐败游行。）后来，我陆续参加了2018年养老金抗议，2019年要求独立公众选举的抗议，2021年反对扣留反对派领袖纳瓦尼的抗议，以及这次反对俄乌战争的抗议。大大小小加起来，至少有十次。
+
+成为抗议常客的过程中，我见证了俄罗斯从一个民主结构的国家，逐渐走向军事国家、警察国家甚至独裁者国家。我清楚地意识到，这个国家，这个政府，正在扼杀我的未来。而去年开始的那场战争，给了我致命的一击。
+
+起初，我一直认为战争不可能发生。在战争开始的一周前，我还和一个乌克兰朋友短信联系过，因为当时俄乌边境已经发生了一些军事冲突，她很担心会有更大的战争爆发。当时我回复说：“别担心，这只是为了展示军事力量。没有人会相信21世纪，还会发生战争。”
+
+
+▲ 2017年6月12日，俄罗斯圣彼得堡市中心的反腐败抗议中，防暴警察拘留了一名示威者。
+
+但一周之后，战争爆发了。
+
+2月24日，我给那位朋友发了短信，郑重道歉。也是从那天开始，我去参加了反对战争的示威活动。有时候和朋友、家人一起，有时候只有我一个人。
+
+麻烦是3月6日下午突然发生的，我被警察逮捕了。那天，我和五个朋友到了马克思纪念碑附近的一个广场，离红场大概10分钟路程。很多人聚集在街道上，看起来并不是组织好的，我们跟在队伍的后面，还没有做甚么。突然，有警察直接在人群中抓住了我。那个时候，我正好跟朋友们脱队了，落在队伍最后。
+
+“能看看你的护照吗？”两个警察站在我面前，“你要去一趟警察局。是想自己上警车，还是我们带你过去？”我选择自己走过去。上了警车，里面已经有两个人。等了大概15分钟，车里终于塞满了人，司机带著我们这22个被逮捕的人，开向了警察局。
+
+在车上，我能做的只有不断地发短信，给我的朋友、家人，以及一个telegram群组。那个群组是一个人权保护组织开设的，他们会为被逮捕的人提供法律建议，告诉我们能做什么，应该做什么。那几天，他们非常忙碌，因为几乎每天都有上百上千人因为示威游行被逮捕。所以我联络的其实是一个聊天机器人——但这些人权保护组织的资讯还是很有用，而且他们会从你被逮捕起，一直协助你到上庭﹑判刑。
+
+大约下午4点10分，我到了警察局。一开始所有人都站在大厅里等著，警察一个个收走我们的证件，然后要求我们填表格。他们没有问任何问题，只是告诉我被逮捕的原因。那个原由当然是随便编的。警员就两三个，但是我们人却很多，大概一个人需要花20到30分钟去填表登记信息，然后我们被送到了刑事侦查员那边。他们盘问了我很多问题，而我能做的就是尽量少说话。
+
+我告诉他们，我之所以出现在广场上，是因为要和女朋友约会。他们还想挖到更多信息，但我守口如瓶。不过说实在的，你想告诉他们什么都无所谓，因为结果不会改变。他们跟我说我有罪，让我等著过几天上法庭，然后就让我离开了警局。虽然法律规定拘留不能超过5个小时，但我足足待了快8个小时。刚进警察局的时候，我还有一点害怕，最后却只剩下累透的感觉。
+
+几天后的上午十点，到了我上法庭的时间。和我一起被逮捕的那群人中，有一半和我同一时间被审讯。过了两个小时后，我们终于被告知自己因为什么被逮捕，所有人拿到的协议书都是一样的。甚至他们连人称都懒得改，我的资料上还写著She/Her，而不是He/His。
+
+整个审讯过程和我在警察局待的八个小时没有什么分别，只是纯粹的浪费时间。人权保护组织为我们提供了免费的律师，我很感谢他们，但老实说，并没有什么作用。法庭上没有人关心我那天到底做了什么，在宣判前法官已经有了自己的答案，我只要乖乖接受约1000港币的罚款就好了。
+
+这只是一起民事案件，对我来说，实际的影响并不大。但后来回到家中，我仍然时不时回想起那天我被警察从人群中抓出来的恐惧感，仍然清楚地记得，我是如何被逼著面对那些假装无事发生的人们的脸。
+
+所有的战争都是不公平的，在这个世界，在21世纪，根本不应该有战争。我清楚这一点，所以我走上了街头。结果却发现还是有很多人支持政府，或者对正在发生的一切视若无睹。我知道，示威大概率不会对战争的进程产生什么改变，它只会对我个人的安全造成影响，就像我3月份经历过的那样。但是，如果我不去，不表达，就等如背弃了自己的信仰。
+
+
+▲ 2022年9月21日，俄罗斯总统普京下令国家要开始“大动员”，大部分在军队服过兵役的年轻人都会入伍，动员令引发不少抗议，防暴警察在莫斯科拘留反战不威者。
+
+普京也应该意识到，很多人都不支持这场战争。也许他以为自己会在一周内获胜，这场战争会像他对格鲁吉亚所做的一样被人忽视与遗忘（注：2008年8月，格鲁吉亚与南奥塞梯发生战争，俄罗斯支援南奥塞梯，战争造成多方伤亡）。但那明显没有发生。后来，他开始了军事动员。
+
+因为从事科研工作，我获得了军事动员的豁免。像我一样受到公司庇护的人、学生、和身体条件不适的人，都不会被征召。即使收到了征召文件，也有办法逃脱。在收到去军事动员站（moblization station）的邀请后，你可以选择不签署，不去动员站，但代价是约350港币的罚款，以及放弃你的工作。如果去了动员站，签署了正式征召的文件后，再想反悔，后果就没那么简单了，最多可能会面临长达十年的监禁。
+
+某种程度上，不去前线还是很“简单”的，不签字，离开你原有的工作岗位，离开你护照上的居住地址就可以。但实际上，只有那些有足够积蓄或有人资助的人才可以做到。对于我们这些科研人员来说，政府不征召我们的决定似乎合乎情理。我们人少，也不是反对政府游行的主要力量，更何况，无论哪个国家，都需要科学事业的发展。但我说过，我已经不想再生活在俄罗斯了。我决定彻底告别我原来的工作单位，彻底告别莫斯科，彻底告别我的国家。
+
+战争之前，我已经投过很多简历，但大多都没有回音。我申请了德国学术交流中心的项目（DAAD Program），但被拒绝了。因为战争，DAAD限制了与俄罗斯的项目交流。
+
+后来，一位澳大利亚同事建议我试试中国和香港的机会。最近几年中国在科研上确实投入了很多资源，我觉得他说的是个好主意。7月份，我和香港理工大学一位教授达成了协议，他愿意接受我做他的博士后，为中国的一个空间项目工作。
+
+敲定了未来的工作机会后，为了妻子能和我一起离开，我在9月初结了婚，办好了签证，向原来的公司申请了15天的蜜月假期。9月底，我们离开了俄罗斯。在埃及，我和妻子渡过了一段轻松的时光，理论上我仍然是研究机构的一员，但那时，我已经决定要签署辞职文件，不再回去了。10月初到11月初，我辞掉了工作，在亚美尼亚和一个因逃避战争而来的表弟待了一段时间。后来我和妻子集合，一起来到了香港。
+
+起初，我们住进了佐敦一家旅馆，但是因为房间太小，妻子一进屋就哭了，现在想想，住在那里还真是个巨大错误。后来，我们搬到了土瓜湾站附近的一个小套房，大概170呎，离我工作的香港理工大学，走路只需要25分钟。现在，我每天早上8点半，会先到学校的体育馆里做做运动，然后开启我一天的工作。妻子正在网上继续学习她的电脑课程，她完成学业后会试著在香港找程序员的工作。等她找到了工作，我们打算再搬到更大的房子里。
+
+我在香港已经住了四个多月了，除了偶尔会想念俄罗斯的食物和俄罗斯的雪之外，我过得还不错。我每周都会和还在俄罗斯的家人们通个电话。由于时差，我一般在香港的夜晚和他们聊天，但有时候，工作很累，我就没什么兴致聊天了。
+
+坦白地说，此时此刻，我对战争已经没有那么关心。我还会关注战争的进展，也试图支持身边因为战争受到影响的朋友们。但是，我已经不在战争中了。
+
+
+▲ 2022年10月10日，俄罗斯莫斯科为俄乌战争征召军队后，部分动员期间应征入伍的俄罗斯公民被派往作战协调区。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-21-a-chinese-hongkongers-adventures-in-hong-kong-and-beijing.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-21-a-chinese-hongkongers-adventures-in-hong-kong-and-beijing.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1c2985bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-21-a-chinese-hongkongers-adventures-in-hong-kong-and-beijing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "一个“中港人”的京港记"
+author: "脆脆"
+date : 2023-04-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/4r7FHHD.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "从内地生到“香港人”，再从香港到北京，一位新闻学院毕业生的流离与纪录"
+---
+
+2022年11月底，北京亮马河畔站满了人的那天，我的朋友圈里也热闹非凡。在现场的，不在现场的，视频和照片满天飞。一时间，反封控凝聚起了最大的社会共识，好像所有人都成了抗议者。
+
+
+
+第二天，另一位朋友紧张兮兮地打来电话，转告从“消息人士”那里听来的消息：亮马河的事情可能定性严重，如果去了现场的话，要保护好自己。
+
+我说我不在北京，朋友打趣道，如果你去了的话，应该也没事吧，“香港人”。
+
+另外一个朋友很快反驳，那事情才大呢，这可是实打实的“境外势力”！
+
+我是一名新闻从业者。过去的接近十年里，我先从内地到香港高校读书，在香港接受新闻专业训练，后来我来到北京做记者。在北京和香港，这两个最能感受到时代情绪的地方之间，来回跳动。
+
+但2019年之后的很长一段时间里，我都不愿主动和人提及香港。
+
+在内地采访时，我常小心翼翼地掩饰著自己的香港背景。遇到采访对象问我在哪里念书时，我总是模糊地回答：在南方。和同样在香港读过书的女孩第一次约会，对方无比自然地问起：“‘暴乱’的时候你在香港吗？”我只能落荒而逃。有时候我也不知道自己在逃避什么。或许是逃避解释，逃避直面痛苦和羞愧，也逃避和此地的主流价值观正面碰撞的可能。
+
+对在北京遇到的“同温层”，我也一直有些疏离。我总觉得大家对香港的理解简单化了，而忽略掉它复杂而迷人的脉络。虽然在2022年之后，越来越多人开始反思自己曾经对香港的傲慢与误解，我也清楚地知道，这简单化的背后是另一种沉重，但我始终真正无法确定，我们是否分享过同一种创伤。
+
+从2022年开始，我模糊地觉得，应该把自己的这几年纪录下来。这些发生在我个人身上的流离和改变，并不独属于我个人，它们也是公共的。
+
+我不想再去触碰身份认同这个老套的问题——我是哪里人，或者我认为自己是哪里人，早已经不重要。就连人们曾经争吵过那么多次的，究竟香港人的定义掌握在谁手上，也已经不是今日的语境了。
+
+“我”，“我们”，到底是怎样的人？——我想，大概是在2019年之前已经和香港建立了深刻的连结，经历过一些自由的仿佛借来的年月，在2019年遭受到剧烈创伤，但在之后仍然想做一名朴素的纪录者或观察者的人们。
+
+我想要通过这篇回忆去尝试提出的，就是“我们”这群人从哪里来，又将去向哪里的问题。我也想要通过这篇文章，纪录下我在新闻学院结识的老师和同学们，那些真诚而珍贵的人们，经历了怎样的动荡。
+
+我不敢说自己一直身在新闻业的前线。在香港，我也不是一个一直“在场”的人。这两点在很长的一段时间里都困扰著我，带给我愧怍和遗憾交织的情绪。但我想，把我这些年的经历刻在纸上，再放进更复杂的社会脉络中去审视，或许已是能够尽到的一份道义责任。
+
+
+▲ 2011年7月24日，浙江省温州市，一列动车两节车厢脱轨并从一座桥上坠落，救援人员展开救援行动。
+
+
+### 身份政治的迷宫
+
+我从中学起就想做记者，启发我的决定性时刻是2011年温州动车事故。
+
+那是我读高中前的暑假，用一台索尼爱立信的滑盖手机浏览腾讯微博，看到舖天盖地将矛头直指中国政府的报道。最让人难忘的除了那篇《永不抵达的列车》，还有《苹果日报》那个著名的头版：“只要通车，不要救人，他妈的！”
+
+为了能在大学里学新闻，我选择了文科。高中的那三年，精神滋养来自校门口报刊舖里的《南方人物周刊》《三联生活周刊》和《南方周末》。在《南方人物周刊》上，我读了记者杨潇写的《公知的前世今生》，读了非典十年和胡温政府谢幕的封面报道，也看到了2012年底宪法日时，印著新领导人照片和他的庄严宣告的封面：“任何组织和个人都没有超越宪法和法律的特权。”
+
+高三时我开始用智能手机。那时候不懂翻墙，但是维基百科还没有完全被屏蔽，我发现了一些“狗洞”。比如，六四事件的条目无法直接点开，但中华人民共和国历史的条目可以，从这里进入六四事件的子条目，网络就畅通无阻了。
+
+在许多个对政治科感到厌烦的夜晚，我一遍遍地浏览那些维基百科的条目，建构起一个认识当代中国的新框架。它们与历史课上的阶级史观完全不同，和南方系的报章一起，给了我最初和最朦胧的政治启蒙。
+
+就像许多朋友后来在香港一次次强调的那样，我不是因为来到香港才完成了所谓自由主义的启蒙，而是因为我已经成为了“我”，才会在最后选择香港。
+
+大学入学日那天，送我到学校的家人们在大学站外的民主女神像前合影留念。他们并不知道这尊雕塑代表著什么，背后又有著怎样的故事。而如今，在我意识到这尊雕塑不仅仅是师生校友奋力保卫的记忆图腾，更是中大之所以是中大的证明之后，它已经不复存在了。
+
+
+▲ 2014年9月22日，香港中文大学，香港专上学生联会发动大专生罢课。
+
+说来惭愧，在占中开始的时候，我对香港的认识甚至连蹒跚起步都算不上。入学之后，我对罢课、占中的认知，都来自于迎新营里内地生学长姊的粗浅解说，和朋友圈里真假参半的二手资讯，而我还没有习得在纷繁的信息环境里识别出偏颇信息的素养。
+
+在国语辩论队的面试中，被问到对占中的看法，我磕磕巴巴说不出来。哪怕我看到自己的同学校友们坐满了图书馆前的百万大道，哪怕后来我在旺角和铜锣湾里看到了那么多五颜六色的帐篷，我都觉得这些事情离我太过遥远。在新亚书院人文馆那张“革命是为了更美好的爱情”的横幅下，我囫囵吞枣般消化著新闻里出现的新鲜词汇：公投，公民广场，催泪弹，公民抗命......
+
+直到一年之后，当我正式成为新闻学院的学生，香港之于我，才开始真正成为“香港”。新闻写作课上，在很长的一段时间里，我都是班上唯一的内地生。这带给了我与其他专业的内地生完全不同的大学体验。
+
+每年，中大大约会招收300名内地生。这其中，大约有一半会选择与金融和商科有关的学系。入学开始，内地生就是一个狭小的圈子，这300人或多或少都会听说过彼此的名字，或是打过交道。大部分内地生的交际圈子，也局限其中。如果没有主动学习或找寻，一个内地本科生大可以在四年时间里都不会说广东话，也不用和香港同学有深刻的接触，更没有理由，去真正深刻地了解这座城市的过去、现在和未来。一种在内地生里长期流传的偏见是，local同学成绩不好，太“颓”，所以就连上课时也要和内地生组队完成小组功课。
+
+与其他内地生相比，我的融入也许称得上迅速。我没有完全拒绝内地生的小圈子，但会和多数集体活动保持距离。
+
+我敷衍地对待那些我认为无趣的课程：大学中文、传播学的理论课，书院的通识课。在此之外，我几乎把全部的精力都花在了学习采访和写作上。在当时，这也确实是我专业课程最重要的部分。我必须在广东话还不流利的时候，让自己一头扎进最在地的社区采访里，从基层开始理解这座城市的肌理。
+
+接到的第一个采访功课是一个街访，关于那一年发生的铅水事件。我坐著小巴来到石硖尾的公屋，在屋邨里逛了很久，用蹩脚的广东话完成了第一次访问。
+
+就在我真正的大学生活刚刚起步之后，彼时甚嚣尘上的“中港矛盾”第一次直观地出现在我面前。
+
+2015年11月17日，中国男足和香港男足在俄罗斯世界杯预选赛40强赛中相遇，是两队第二次交手，地点是旺角大球场。上一场比赛在中国队主场，踢成0比0。这场球如果中国队还是赢不下来，出线就要靠运气了。
+
+比赛那天，学生会找来一张破破烂烂的幕布，用竹竿架起来，在新亚书院圆形广场上搞了一场直播，吸引了许多人来看。在奏国歌的时候，球场里和圆广里，都爆发出了漫天的嘘声。
+
+那时的我站在其中，感到了些许的被冒犯。
+
+我去找我的老师V求教。她是一位勤奋的写作者和教育者，后来我们一直保持著亦师亦友的关系。那天我们聊了很多，说起占中之后香港社会情绪的变化，说起暴力如何一步步被激发出来。
+
+那场球赛之后很久，我才开始慢慢梳理清楚，国歌，以及国歌背后的那些坚硬无比的东西，并不需要和个体绑定在一起。
+
+V在那天讲给我的脉络，我最开始似懂非懂，但她有一句话我一直记得：“希望你不要灰心，中国人圈子里的浩劫从来不缺，可贵的是人和人在丑陋的世界里仍然可以保存人性的光辉面。这是我坚信的，亦希望你能在香港感受到。”
+
+一年后，我接到了另一个后来形塑了我对香港情感的功课：采访2016年立法会选举。我的任务，是跟访港岛区8号候选人罗冠聪当日行程。我遇到一位79岁的老太，她告诉我，现在的年轻人很棒，她会支持“8号”。
+
+后面发生的事情大概是这样的：罗冠聪成为了香港历史上最年轻议员，但很快，他和另外几位当选议员，在立法会宣誓风波之后迎来了人大释法，最终被逐出立法会。宣誓风波一年之后，我得到了一次采访罗冠聪的机会，他告诉我，走入议会，尝试从体制内促成改变，就像是用绳子拉火车转弯一样。六年之后的今天，时代再次扭转，谁也不知道他何时才能重回故土。
+
+
+▲ 2016年9月5日，港岛区候选人罗冠聪在2016年立法会选举中胜出。
+
+那年秋天，我见证了不少历史瞬间：梁天琦慢慢消失在公众视野的过程，议员被DQ的时刻，以及反释法游行。现在想来，作为一名新闻专业的学生，身处其中或许是幸运的，但对香港来说，这巨大的不幸在当时早已铺陈开来。
+
+那两年里，我的Facebook上，一个不停冒出的讨论是：本土派的诉求，究竟是否正当呢？
+
+而当时的我，傲慢地质疑著本土派，批判《苹果日报》，表现出一位“大中华胶”的“进取”姿态。
+
+如今，这些讨论赖以存在的语境，已经荡然无存。本土派？泛民？建制？这样的区分，听起来简直是上个世纪的事情了。但在当时，身份政治俨然是摆在所有人面前最紧迫的议题。它很快席卷了这座城市，也永远改变了我所在的大学。
+
+2017年的中大民主墙风波，中大遭到以《环球时报》为首的官方媒体绵延不绝的批评。微博上，中大成了一所被“政治化”荼毒的不入流的大学。
+
+曾经在2014年走进占领区看望学生的校长沈祖尧，不得不发出“校园是学习的地方，不宜成为政治角力之所”的声明。那之后不久，沈祖尧提前卸任中大校长。三年后，他远走新加坡，担任南洋理工大学副校长。
+
+对中大来说，民主墙事件似乎成为了一个转折点。一所大学不可能从政治的漩涡中独善其身，这早已是一种常识。但在2017年秋天之后，无论是学校的管理者还是师生，终于开始意识到，中大陷入的是怎样一种权力投射下的阴影。
+
+毕业之前，我写了一篇文章，讲述中大的社运历史和如今在政治的漩涡中浮沉的现状。一位学姐评论说，中大的那些自由浪漫的气质也好，左翼的关怀也罢，是宝贵的，也是脆弱的。
+
+离开中大之前，我和朋友们爬到人文馆的楼顶拍照。在电梯里，我再次看到那张从2014年就一直存在的贴纸：“中环见”。那时我对自己说，只要这张贴纸还在，这里就仍然是中大，人文馆就仍然是人文馆。
+
+
+▲ 2015年8月17日，天津大爆炸现场
+
+
+### 都市报的黄昏
+
+从中大离开之后，我做的第一份全职工作，是北京一家都市报的深度报道组记者。
+
+我对北京的兴趣由来已久，就像想做记者一样，想去北京也像是一种思想钢印一样刻在我脑子里：只有在那里，我才能见识到时代所有的样貌。在2017年发生的“清除低端人口”事件之后，这个思想钢印愈发牢固了。
+
+但真正触发我来到北京的，是一个更现实和更窘迫的原因：毕业之后，我始终没能在香港谋得一份可以撰写深度报道或者说所谓“特稿”的全职工作。后来我才意识到，那些年里特稿和非虚构在内地的盛行，一部分原因在于，当最直接和重要的事实无法触碰时，记者们只好从写法和文本上做出突破。
+
+那年22岁的我，抱著暂时离开的想法，搬到了北京，这座充斥著大而无当的马路的城市。
+
+而那年九月，进入报社之后，编辑叮嘱我的第一件事，便是那些需要远离的禁区。
+
+“北大的事，千万不要碰。”
+
+在那之前，我完全没有想到，第一个禁区竟然如此清晰地指向了一所特定的大学。后来，同事告诉我，北大宣传部的力量无远弗届。而且在几个月前，北大120周年校庆前后，接连因为沈阳事件和岳昕成为外媒关注的对象，当局对此非常敏感。
+
+这也和另一个禁区直接相关：从2018年直到2019年6月六四事件三十周年前后，所有和教育、高校相关的负面新闻，也一概不能报道。比如那两年多次发生的大学生自杀和中小学随机伤害事件。
+
+后面这条禁令一直延续了下来，就像过去几年发生的很多事情一样，先是一种临时举措，很快便成了长期存在的紧箍咒。比如在当时，另一个隐隐浮现出的禁区是：性少数群体和与Me Too运动有关的故事。
+
+还有一个重中之重：北京本身的“负面”新闻，绝对不能碰，比如和户口问题、低端人口和胡同改造有关的新闻，都是神秘组织“阅评群”的关注重点。
+
+所谓“阅评群”，是说一群已经退休的宣传干部。他们在报社自有的审查体系之外，总会在报道刊发后提出意见，看到他们觉得有问题的地方，就直接报给宣传部。很多时候，他们的意见甚至有一种类似法定效力的能量。这样的事后审查，是一种威力巨大的秋后算账机制。
+
+我在职时，报社的基本工资虽然微薄，但稿费标准算得上丰厚。出差采访的审批和报销也很宽松。尽管许多题目没法触及，但在能覆盖到的范围内，编辑们仍在勉力维持稿件的公共性。有时即使明知一个选题会遇到禁令，编辑还是会派记者到现场去看一看，不为别的，只为了留下一些纪录。也有时，编辑们愿意为了救回一篇稿子，和报社的高层去拉扯。
+
+我唯一被毙掉的稿子，还是因为撞上了前面提到的禁区。2019年1月，北京市西城区的一所小学发生了随机伤害事件。这件事发生在北京，而且是教育领域的“负面”新闻，禁令最为严苛。但我和编辑觉得，或许可以重访另一起校园伤害事件的当事人，看一看遭遇过类似事件的学生，在往后的日子里可以如何走出创伤。后来我写出了这篇稿子，但依然未能刊发。
+
+如今回想，我大概是赶上了这家报馆最后的好时光。在我离开之后不久，报社领导层更迭，新社长上任的第一件事竟是检查员工的办公桌是不是干净。再然后，就是编辑部在武汉疫情时爆发剧烈争吵，接著是记者们纷纷离职，稿费大幅降低，稿件质量也随之下降。对中国的很多从事深度报道的媒体来说，这也是这三年来一直在发生的事情。
+
+那一年的北京，仍留存著一些理想主义的幻象。我所认识的年轻记者们还不知疲倦地冲在前线，这个行业还没有萎缩到几乎每个人都在重新考虑出路的程度。
+
+如果说这时中国的严肃新闻还能拄著拐杖，一瘸一拐向前走的话，2020年之后，业界就只能瘫痪轮椅上了。
+
+
+▲ 2019年11月12日，下午3时左右，警察与示威者在香港中文大学二号桥前发生冲突。
+
+
+### 最大的创伤时刻
+
+2019年初，我拿到了国外一所学校的硕士offer，于是决定辞职去读书。那个时候，还没有人能想到后来香港发生的事情。
+
+在给这个项目的申请信里，我写道，我在中大的启蒙者之一陈健民老师此刻正在接受一场漫长的审判。我还写道，大学的四年让我意识到，如果我想成为一名优秀的记者，仅有新闻的技巧是不够的，我需要更多社会科学的知识，让我去看到每一个故事背后的复杂系统。
+
+2019年11月份，中大沦为战场的那天，我蜷缩在留学时租住的一个小房间里，整夜睡不著觉。没过几天，和许多朋友一样，我成为了微博上“爱国博主”举报的对象。他们把我写的文章截图，标注，从字词中给我安上他们认为是大逆不道的帽子。
+
+那些日子，我的课业没办法正常进行。我一方面感到害怕，另一方面又觉得，自己的这些遭遇和留在香港的那些朋友比简直算不上什么。他们在前线勤奋地纪录和奔跑，顶著催泪弹、橡胶弹和水炮车，没有人是他们的队友。和他们承受的惊吓和创伤相比，我又有什么资格说自己变得不完整呢？这也是为什么，我在9月离开香港时，愧疚地说自己是一名逃兵，是一个缺席的人。
+
+我写信给学系解释作业迟交的原因，邮件越写越长，一下子把香港和中大对我的意义全都写了进去。我写道，中大对于我，和很多热爱它的人来说，并不仅仅是一所可以拿到不错的学位、习得专业知识的学校，而是一个开阔的世界。在这里，浪漫主义成为可能。将中大的氛围和历史内化之后，学生们可以锻造出一种散漫却坚韧的气质。
+
+几天之后，我踉跄著从遭遇“举报”的阴影中恢复过来。我注销了自己的公众号，接著开始逐个“审查”微信好友。转发过一篇名为《香港这座城市还有救吗》的文章的，删掉。把兔主席的判断奉为圭臬的，删掉。冷嘲热讽中大和理大遭遇的，删掉。人在美国西海岸，要去罗冠聪的演讲现场抗议的，也删掉。
+
+后来我知道，我在意的其实并不是一个人的政治立场。这些年做记者的日子，我见到了太多可爱的人类，他们对香港的态度或许保守，但只是囿于资讯和环境的限制。还有一些采访对象，当我翻看他们的微博和朋友圈，总能看到一些带有国家主义色彩的转发和评论。但在那个时刻，他们遇到了困境，我依然会把他们当作一个腐烂系统里的普通人。
+
+但我最介意的是两种人。一种人热衷做朋友圈国师，觉得刷一刷微博，逛一逛虎扑，读一读侠客岛和胡锡进，就能了解真实的香港了。另一种人，虽然身处自由的言论环境，或者在香港生活了很多年，却依然活在由“港漂圈”、《环球时报》和上帝之鹰建构起的世界里，不愿向外透出理解的努力，甚至没有一丝好奇的目光。
+
+我想起了2017年夏天，曾俊华参加特首选举时，发布的那条广受赞誉的竞选视频。其中有句话：“一个唔会因为唔同立场，而unfriend朋友的社会。”
+
+在2019年之后，这句话已经绝无可能实现了。不仅在香港，在内地也是一样。政治立场不仅关乎政治，它还关乎性别意识，关乎对人生道路的选择，关乎生活中的方方面面，当你慢慢发现这些之后，就回不到过去的世界了。
+
+当运动在香港渐渐消退之后，病毒又杀到了。我在遥远的域外，一刻不停地更新著来自武汉的最新报道。当我看到朋友们穿著厚厚的防护服，出现在定点医院里做报道时，缺席现场的愧疚感再次猛烈袭来。而此刻的我能做的，仅仅是在李文亮医生去世之后，为他点起一根蜡烛而已。
+
+很快，国外也几乎停摆。我的课业在外部世界和内心世界的双重崩塌中，突然结束了。我带著愧怍与焦虑，搭上了回国的班机。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月8日，晚上6:52，黄大仙
+
+
+### 留下来的人
+
+我和同学T在2022年的夏天再次见面时，她平静地说，她的父母和亲戚，从2019年开始一直质疑甚至辱骂她作为记者所做的工作，因此，现在已经和父母近乎决裂了。
+
+过去的三年，她算得上经历了大风大浪。毕业后的这几年里，她是我的同学里为数不多留在新闻行业的人。她从有线新闻入行，新闻部震荡之后，她在另外两家后来陆续结业的媒体里留下足迹。
+
+现在，这座城市的新闻业，几乎无处可去了。
+
+读书时另一位坚定要做严肃新闻的同学，在所供职的媒体停业后暂时去了台湾。她说自己想看看，换一个环境，是否还有书写和报道香港的可能。
+
+另外两位供职于有线新闻中国组的同学，刚刚和我在北京相聚不久，就经历了编辑部的地震。后来，她们陆续离开了这个行业，一个去了NGO工作，另一个则选择了深造。我还有一位最会念书的同学，现在成了一个全职恋爱博主。
+
+在加拿大和英国接连推出面向港人的“救生艇计划”之后，也有不少人选择彻底离开。我不难想像这是一个何等艰难的抉择。我曾和无数人解释，自己无法在国外生活，是因为无法舍弃中文这门语言。我曾经执拗地认为，我们要在自己的土地上，用自己的语言，讲述自己的欢欣和苦痛。当然，这种想法如今也松动得厉害。你无法守著一份虚幻的责任感过自己的生活，朋友跟我说。
+
+在香港和内地因为隔离政策而无法正常往来的三年里，我每年会在香港度过一半的夏天，然后回到内地，接受两周甚至三周的合法监禁。
+
+这三年在香港的日子里，我频繁见到我的老师V和A。他们都是留下来的人。
+
+不会移民的，他们告诉我。
+
+老师A此刻正陷入一场注定深刻影响这座城市新闻业的官司。我们在2019年之后第一次见面时，中大校园内那些“战争”的痕迹还没有消失。他带我重新观看那些地点。这里写过什么，那里写过什么，他全都记得。
+
+
+▲ 2020年11月19日，香港中文大学，身著黑色毕业袍和口罩的学生站在民主女神像前，举著黑色气球。
+
+一次，我在Facebook上问朋友，有没有留下一张写有“不修仁义，只修器术，终究只是犬儒”的墙壁的照片。很快，我收到了A的邮件，附上了这张照片。
+
+“I have everything.”他在邮件里说。
+
+我们另一次见面则是在老师V的新车上。2019年，V是一位高效和冷峻的记录者。她总是身体力行地告诉我，如何才能成为一名合格的记者。有一次V告诉我，她这两年去听法庭的聆讯，感觉就像是看著一只只生猪被丢进绞肉机里，叫声惨烈，血流成河。但绞肉机也会因此坏掉，什么也得不到，因为操作者手里，并没有一份操作指南。
+
+我很难形容出新闻学院里氛围的变化。悲观和失落自然显而易见，但更深层次上，在新闻业剧变之后，这里的新闻教育该如何进行？我想老师们都没有答案。
+
+但也有老师向我提供了另一些观察：2019年之后，选择新闻专业的同学反而更多了，而他们提到最多的关键词，就是《立场新闻》。
+
+种子还是会留下。但是那些珍贵的东西，消失了，就是永远消失了。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月27日，中国广西壮族自治区梧州，救援人员在现场默哀，悼念东航波音737-800客机MU5735航班的遇难者。
+
+
+### 最后的新闻现场
+
+于我而言，2022年称得上面目模糊。以往，我和我的同行们，大多可以通过每年完成的稿件去丈量这一年。但在2022年，一切刻度都失效了。所有事情的发生和结束都了无痕迹，不明不白。
+
+3月份的东航坠机事件，是我去过的最后一个新闻现场。
+
+我的编辑告诉我，他对我没有发稿的要求，我要做的，就是每天都把自己看到的东西给事无巨细地记下来。
+
+我努力这样去做了。但我始终没办法进入核心现场，也没能真正和家属有深入的交流。“防疫”是一道新的紧箍咒，和另一些名目繁多的事情一起，似乎带来了一种新的管理方式。
+
+不仅如此，《人物》第一天的报道所引发的争议，还有在现场时，记者的身份所遭遇的怀疑和堤防，让我意识到，这个系统已经不需要任何明面上的管控和压制了。这不是报道空间有多少的问题，而是新闻业的出厂设置已经改变的问题。对这个国家的人们来说，新闻管控，已经是和呼吸一样自然的事情了。
+
+从坠机现场回到北京后没多久，上海开始封城。那段日子里的伤痛和愤怒，我想亲历者的讲述已经足够多，我不必赘述了。而我最大的感触是，原来，能凝聚起人心的，真的只有共同的痛苦。
+
+在上海封城进入尾声时，北京的管控也升级了。那阵子，我总感觉这座城市弥漫著一种末世感。人们在上海看到了末日的样子，猜想著这末日什么时候会降临北京。
+
+于是，在末日之前，我和朋友们相约在马路牙子上喝啤酒，偷摸在还开放的公园里野餐。下一秒，等待我们的可能就是全城禁足，是一个又一个具体的人生被击碎。有个朋友说，她有些期待崩坏的城市，那或许会正面撞击沉闷的生活。当时的我又何尝不是呢？
+
+几乎是在等待和蹉跎中，白纸运动猝然地爆发而又结束，我的2022年最后也以一场感染而终结。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月27日，北京，乌鲁木齐火灾遇难者纪念活动期间，人们聚集在一起守夜并举著白纸抗议。
+
+12月7日，国务院宣布“新十条”，实质上放弃“动态清零”之后，我打车回家，刚一上车，滴滴司机就发出一声感叹：“这噩梦般的日子终于结束了！”
+
+在内地，专注深度报道的机构在这“噩梦般”的三年里愈发稀少。仅仅是我，一个普通的从业者，就亲历过三道紧箍咒，分别是2021年5月时对性别议题和女权主义报道的大规模审查，2021年10月强调非公有制资本不得参与媒体采编的新规，以及对于财经类自媒体的弹压。曾有一段时间，“唱衰中国经济”的报道不能出现。什么是唱衰？解读清零政策下的官方经济数据，就已经是了。
+
+而更深刻的，急需解决的问题是，我们的新闻业该如何描写这样的三年对这个国家的影响？不管是普通人的生活，还是公权力的行事逻辑，都需要得到新的解释和理解。这应该是新闻的使命。
+
+如今，我选择了暂时离开新闻业。从国外回到北京之后，我待过两个还算先锋的团队，如今都已经解散。我们自认曾留下一些重要的纪录，但放在更长的时间刻度里，能够被记住的注定是少数。
+
+“正常生活”回来之后，那些“不正常”的日子，似乎很快被遗忘了。就像是北京街头那些核酸检测亭，几乎是一夜之间，他们就消失了。可什么才是正常，什么是不正常？人们也随之抛诸脑后了。
+
+前些日子，我又一次回到中大。此时内地和香港已经恢复正常往来，不过口罩令还在，中大也依然需要登记进入。
+
+一位老师说，一些属于过去的东西开始淡出新一代本科生的记忆了。她惊讶地发现，新入学的学生，把车站外的空地称为“大火”（大学火车站的简称）。而在以前，这里叫“民女”。
+
+我走进人文馆的电梯，看到“中环见”的贴纸也不复存在了。兴许是贴的时间太久，那张黑色的贴纸没有被完全揭去，但上面的三个字消失了，纸面上还留有凌乱的划痕。
+
+我想，在后2019年的香港，和后“动态清零”的中国，保留下对“正常”的判断，留下那些对“好”的记忆，尝试去回答“我们何以至此”，将注定成为“我”和“我们”一生的功课。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-23-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk11.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-23-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk11.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-23-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk11.md
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十一周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-04-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/q4hnnnV.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 何桂藍一方質疑趙家賢可信性 趙否認淡化參與換取減刑
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十一周，時任民主動力召集人趙家賢繼續接受盤問。
+
+何桂藍一方本周質疑趙家賢的可信性，包括引趙個人FB帖文指他看來是抗爭派，惟趙稱應由他聘請的太古城居民所撰；又質疑趙將自己表現成政見溫和，趙激動答：「I’m not put(ting) myself forward, I just told the fact!」，遭法官提醒非針對他。被指民動早於2月已答應承辦初選，趙亦反問：「辯方大狀係咪想喺我個腦度植入一啲唔屬於我嘅認知？」
+
+趙在盤問下，否認嘗試將自己的參與講到最低，並渲染、怪責和誇大他人參與來換取減刑，指「我有責任係去協助作證」，但同意知道認罪和任控方證人有機會換取減刑。他亦確認2021年6月已願協助警方調查，但拒透露是如何成為控方證人。
+
+趙家賢本周也承認，對戴耀廷懷有怨恨，才稱他為「大思想家、大學者」；其供詞亦提及他協調時已留意到初選可能違法，但自言「身不由己」，故繼續初選工作。趙並引述戴指，黃之鋒和朱凱廸分別於九龍東及新界西倡簽共同綱領。
+
+此外，本周多4人完成盤問，其中辯方指施德來在民動職員要求下交共同綱領，趙稱不知情亦沒指示；辯方亦播放陳志全網台節目片段，質疑趙記錯陳有出席新東會議，惟趙稱「no comment」。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師Trevor Beel（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 趙認對戴耀廷有怨恨 供詞稱早悉否決財案或違法但「已身不由己」
+
+趙家賢早前已屢批戴耀廷為「大思想家」、「亂咁嚟」，又自言感覺被他「騎劫」。趙本周形容與戴的關係「好複雜」，「絕對不會」視對方為親密朋友，又一度同意感覺戴是「麻煩製造者（troublemaker）」，指戴的想法為他的工作製造很多困難。
+
+被問趙是否對戴有怨恨（resentment），怪責戴令他有今時今日的困境，趙起初稱沒有怪責，指自己作供只是為協助法庭處理案件；但在法官追問下承認「當然我係一個人啦，係有情緒嘅」，承認對戴有感到怨恨，才會稱呼他為「大思想家、大學者」。至於對區諾軒，趙指二人沒特別私交，但「絕對沒有」像對戴耀廷一樣的怨恨。
+
+辯方質疑，既然趙與戴意見有分歧，為何仍承辦初選？趙指礙於當時社會氣氛，市民望民主派「唔好鬼打鬼」，故即使知道「同戴耀廷嘅工作嘅情況係唔理想」，作為民主陣營一分子仍望付出，故仍答應承辦。
+
+就退出初選，趙早前解釋兩辦譴責違法後才首次讀畢戴〈真攬炒十步〉一文，感覺心寒，其後抗爭派記者會「完全失控」令他選擇退出。辯方本周展示趙供詞，提及協調時已留意到初選涉否決財案有可能犯法，但「當時我已身不由己」，因作為主辦單位若未完成初選就退出，未能符合市民期望，亦對其聲譽及民主動力發展有反效果。
+
+法官關注趙在初選前是否已知道有法律風險，並被逼繼續？趙指心底裡「係會覺得有啲問題嘅」，並在6月底7月初開始質疑合法性，但因當時民間和政治陣營均熱切期盼初選舉行、戴耀廷亦清楚講明沒有違法，加上建制陣營的行政會議成員葉劉淑儀和湯家驊亦受訪指不覺得初選違法，趙認為「當時好難話即刻退出」。
+
+
+### 辯方質疑趙非假裝般溫和 趙稱帖文應由他人代撰、激動以英文回應
+
+法官上周屢質疑趙家賢稱被「騎劫」一說，代表何桂藍的大狀Trevor Beel本周盤問的重點，亦落在質疑趙家賢的可信性，主要針對趙的政治立場及民主動力參與初選的時間。期間法官一度提醒或有反效果，又指可能會擴闊「共謀者原則」應用範圍。
+
+就趙的政治立場，他曾稱民主動力帖文出現「對抗暴政」等字眼絕非民動立場。趙本周再解釋，民動在傳統民主派中擔任行政支援，政治上不會有好清楚的立場；而撰文的總幹事黎敬輝應是迎合當時社會氣氛。那趙本人是否支持「對抗暴政」？趙在辯方數度追問下稱他自己不會使用相關字句，法官李運騰一度笑言：「怎會有人公開說自己支持暴政呢？」
+
+不過辯方續引不同文件質疑趙的說法。其中趙個人Facebook兩則帖文提及「#香港正式進入準戰爭狀態」、「#一國兩制名存實亡」、「#香港人反抗」、「#抗爭無退路」等，Beel指看來像抗爭派帖文。法官指辯方想問「你唔係你扮得咁溫和？」，又問趙是否非常激進，惟趙思考良久稱不記得有這些帖文。法官追問帖文是否顯示趙為本土抗爭派，多人大笑，趙指「我諗在場嘅反應都已經覺得好詫異，我自己都覺得好詫異」，並指「可能人有情緒」、當時政局是「躁動」，又一度稱帖文只限朋友，惟辯方指出是公開帖文。
+
+趙其後主動補充，指回想起2019年8月因指示太古站示威者疏散後有人被捕，被「深黃」居民網民指控「送人頭」，遂聘請太古城居民，指他是價值觀較本土的21歲畢業生、可登入其Facebook，有關帖文應是由他所撰。法官問所以帖文中「趙家賢覺得盛怒」，其實是其助手的感受？多人大笑，趙重申對帖文「完全冇任何印象」。
+
+法官亦引趙Facebook於6月有關眾籌的帖文提及「光復立法會」等，趙重申是由擁有民主動力和他個人Facebook權限的兼職同事撰寫，而他在帖文發布後逾一個月才首次閱畢，認為「出咗事」。辯方又引民動工作報告，提及趙被咬耳後發公告提到「對抗暴政」，趙強調「嗰陣時我喺醫院瞓咗係度」，但稱作為召集人「最終要負責」。而對報告另一段落提到「共抗暴政」，趙再稱就工作報告只是「䁽吓眼」，無執委會成員提出反對。
+
+Beel其後指，趙作供時將自己表現成政治立場溫和、並願在2019年示威中調解的人，惟趙瞪着Beel大聲激動答：「I’m not put(ting) myself forward, I just told the fact!（我不是要這樣表現自己，只是說出事實！）」法官提醒趙辯方並非針對他，趙終稱：「I disagree.」
+
+
+
+
+### 辯方質疑民主動力早已參與初選 趙指辯方「植入認知」、「咬文嚼字」
+
+至於民主動力參與初選的時間，趙家賢一直強調民動於2020年5月中下旬才答應辦初選。Beel質疑該說法虛構，指民動早於2月已答應承辦，因此才會出席各區協調會議，惟趙反問：「辯方大狀係咪想喺我個腦度植入一啲唔屬於我嘅認知？」又在辯方指他4份口供，均沒有提民動在5月開始承辦初選時反問：「你想我答啲乜嘢呀？」
+
+Beel引文件，顯示趙2月曾與戴耀廷、區諾軒等人開會。趙指該次非協調會議，僅屬「初步交流」，助手筆記提及「操作：民動」亦只是提議而非決議。趙又指戴當時欲籌備初選，故邀九東區議會正副主席「探路、拜地保」，而他被時任觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻邀請，稱「你知戴妖㗎啦，又唔知佢咩葫蘆賣咩藥」，並指信賴民主動力做協調故找趙開會。
+
+Beel亦引趙供詞，提及3月尾至4月頭與戴耀廷及區諾軒開始籌備初選，質疑無提民動於5月才獲邀承辦。趙指當時他與鍾錦麟已認罪，警方不認為這是重點，又自言較「長氣」和「譖」，警方僅就案情「大方向」作綜合記錄。
+
+此外，民動眾籌頁面和工作報告均稱民動於3月「協助」，辯方問民動是否於3月已開始參與初選？惟趙指提問「咬文嚼字」，對辯方稱民動於3月已承辦亦指「極之不正確」。惟趙承認不記得答應辦初選的日子，認當時無簽文件是「罪責、錯誤」，指民主派好多工作「講個信字」。
+
+
+### 趙否認淡化參與換減刑 稱21年6月已願助警調查 惟拒透露如何任控方證人
+
+趙其後在盤問下表示，不同意戴耀廷提倡的「大殺傷力憲制武器」，辯方質疑與他選擇認罪不符。法官在趙避席下，指他可因不同原因認罪，但法庭和辯方或因「法律專業保密特權（Legal Professional Privilege，LPP）」不能探究；又指知道辯方說法就是趙將所有責任推到職員身上，並只承認疏忽監察。
+
+Beel最後向趙指出，他作供時嘗試將自己的參與講到最低，同時渲染、怪責和誇大他人參與，甚至指何桂藍為有偏見的記者來貶低其聲譽，以換取較輕刑期。惟趙一律不同意，指「我有責任係去協助作證」，向法庭講述他所知的情況。惟在法官追問下，趙同意知道認罪和任控方證人有機會換取減刑，但「冇guarantee（保證）嘅」。
+
+而被問何時表示擬認罪，趙多次追問下均未能回答；至於他是透過律師表示望任控方證人、抑或是由警方接觸，趙以LPP稱不願作答，但確認與警方「有討論」，亦確認望獲額外減刑是錄口供其中一個因素。他並同意，於2021年6月進行首次錄影會面時已願意協助警方調查，並於2022年9月錄取首份「無損權益口供」，是由警方探訪6、7次後寫成。
+
+
+
+
+### 官指「墨落無悔」顯示各區已達共識 趙改稱提名表共識不包當選後行為
+
+本周另一重點，落在各區的共識是如何達成。區諾軒此前已談及各參與者的分歧，惟趙家賢助手黎敬輝筆記卻指新界東投票通過了「會運用」否決權。到底會上有沒有「共識」？「共識」又是怎麼達成的？
+
+趙本周確認，就如何達成共識沒有任何書面或口頭的規則。那如何處理分歧？他指戴耀廷會上會邀請各方講解想法，而與會者「都好畀面戴耀廷」，戴就細微爭議提建議他們無異議，戴會後亦會私下找與會者游說。而若仍未能達共識，趙指投票可算是「解決死局」的做法，並指新東和新西曾進行意向性投票。但他承認從沒規定採納「少數服從多數」原則，認為戴的投票規則很「臨時」，也同意新東通過「會運用」是「非正式投票」。
+
+戴耀廷最終起草的各區協議，均提及「會積極運用」或「會運用」否決權。趙於錄影會面曾表示，戴起草共同綱領後「傳統民主派好多都唔制（簽署）」，戴其後同意毋須簽署協議。但之後表明會運用否決權的「墨落無悔」出台，趙指部分溫和民主派因擔心得失支持者而被逼簽署，並有本土抗爭派以「橫掂」已簽「墨落無悔」來逼他人支持運用否決權。
+
+趙引述戴耀廷指，黃之鋒及朱凱廸分別於九東及新西兩區叫其他人簽協議，最終兩區以戴草擬的共同綱領為藍本作加減修正，寫成共同綱領並夾附提名表格，民主動力按戴指示照收。
+
+
+▲ 朱凱廸（資料圖片）
+
+就「墨落無悔」提及考慮到「立場差異」，共同綱領「已達致抗爭陣營光譜的最大公因數」，趙表示傳統民主派和抗爭派就否決財案有不同意見拉扯，聲明卻似乎將所有與會者寫成「一個抗爭陣營」，向他人施壓。辯方指，聲明可見發起人亦意識到就否決預算案有「立場差異」，否則無需向人施壓；惟法官陳慶偉認為聲明提及「協調會議已取得共識的共同綱領」，顯示雖然有不同意見，但最終仍達成了共識。
+
+至於所有參選人唯一一份均有簽署的提名表格中，「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識」提及的「共識」，趙上周稱包括否決預算案，惟本周則同意不包括當選後行為，只是關於參與初選，又強調如何得出共識與民主動力無關。
+
+
+### 多4人完成盤問 趙指何桂藍提「打破」政制、對辯方質疑記錯陳志全有出席會議「no comment」
+
+本周多4人完成盤問，其中民主黨黃碧雲及林卓廷，趙指二人無特別提及「無差別」否決預算案，提名表格亦沒有提及否決財案，而趙有出席的新東及九西首次會議均無就否決財案達共識。趙亦指無就「35+計劃」與同為黨友的二人直接聯繫，指他自己有「行事嘅道德準則」，雖只是辦民間初選仍「當自己係選管會主席嚟做」。
+
+
+▲ 施德來（右）
+
+就參選九龍東的前民協主席施德來，趙同意民協「好溫和務實」，而施性格「好懂得尊重人」，即使民協作為傳統民主派「畀人好針對」亦會很有禮貌回應。九東所有6名參選人報名時均夾附共同綱領，提及「會積極運用」否決權，辯方指施德來報名時原沒夾附，惟後獲民主動力職員來電要求提交。趙表示不知道，亦沒有指示職員作出此要求，僅曾向他們表明除提名表格外其他文件並非大會要求，「不過我哋照收起嚟存檔」。
+
+至於參選新界東的何桂藍，趙指何2018年在九西和新東補選初選後曾以《立場新聞》記者身分約他受訪，惟因趙感覺何「唔係好支持個初選」，故向《立場》反映望換人，終由另一記者訪問。趙亦主動提起何在會上發言，指她曾提及望將立會變成「抗爭陣地」，引致「中港關係破局」，將一國兩制的整個政治制度「打破」，聯合國際和議會戰線。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+至於陳志全未完成盤問，趙同意他為理性和好盡責的議員，從不視他為「本土抗爭派」，而是傳統民主派下的「進步民主派」。趙曾於供詞稱陳派代表出席首次新東會議，惟本周指在控方主問時獲展示助手筆記後印象有變，記起陳亦有出席。辯方播放網台「D100」節目《人民主場》片段，指陳當晚正在數碼港做直播，不可能出席會議，趙強調回想到陳與助手出現在會議場地的畫面，但亦真誠確信辯方資料為真確，故只能回應「no comment」。
+
+不過趙其後補充，錄口供時並非確認只有陳的助手在場，只是不確認陳有否出席，故警方着他只寫陳由代表出席。辯方問有沒有可能是趙搞錯了？趙沒有正面回答，又對辯方稱陳兩次會議均無出席指「我只能夠答不同意」。法官一度質疑片段是否真確，辯方指正盡力找不在場證據，又指此前控方案情包括區諾軒均指陳沒有出席，沒有預想相關情況出現。
+
+除了陳志全有否出席，辯方亦指首次新東會議沒提否決財案，質疑趙將第一次和他原以為自己有出席的第二次會議情況混淆，趙不同意。趙亦據助手筆記指第二次會議民主黨代表是李永成，惟辯方指李於2018年底已退黨，趙指「完全冇印象」。
+
+
+
+
+### 趙指衞生服務界新興團體倡辦初選、不同意威脅否決財案為唯一有效談判方法
+
+此外，就戴耀廷望民主動力從眾籌款項捐80至100萬予香港民研，建立新民意收集系統就否決財案向泛民施壓，趙本周再解釋，戴因選舉延期才提出此民調，而他不想與戴的計劃有牽連，但戴又不斷催促和追問令他「好煩擾」，故終建議捐40萬，找「中間位」將事情「推走」，令戴「唔駛對外講話民主動力食晒啲錢」。
+
+辯方一度指趙搞錯了戴是建議留80萬用作選前民調，而非否決財案的投票系統。惟趙否認，指戴是得悉民動只捐40萬後想「chur返起碼80萬」。趙亦不同意戴是認為各方對否決財案沒共識才設此系統，指戴只是認為傳統民主派可能會「褪軚」。
+
+趙盤問下亦表示支持五大訴求，但反對透過否決預算案迫政府回應。法官問即使有「35+」，民主派是否會因分組點票不能通過落實五大訴求的議案？趙指投票制度有「局限性」，但強調立會過半是很重要的民意授權，更有力量向政府爭取，亦不同意辯方指威脅否決預算案是唯一與政府談判的有效方法。
+
+趙亦確認曾獲民主黨通過出選立法會「區議會（第一）功能組別」，惟該黨終沒派人出選。被問「區一」是否包括在「35+計劃」，趙指「從來未曾提過」；至於「區一」是否計算在取得「35+」所需的13席功能組別內，趙稱視乎計法，又指不能確認戴曾提及。惟趙同意，2019年民主派區選大勝，幾乎可肯定民主派會贏得「區一」。
+
+本周亦問及衞生服務界，趙指該界別多年來由香港護士協會主席李國麟教授任議員，惟他被指太溫和保守；加上反修例運動有新工會成立，令勢力板塊轉變、進步派「佔上風」，有新興團體倡辦初選，團結一致推舉候選人，李國麟亦願參加。趙又指，戴雖無召協調會議，但曾與所有參選人個別聯絡商討，草擬寫有「會積極運用」否決權的協議文件。
+
+
+▲ 李國麟（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 官問「本土派」和「抗爭派」分別 趙庭上數度更改錄影會面謄本內容
+
+此外，法官亦問及「本土派」和「抗爭派」的分別，趙指前者着重本土文化及價值觀，主張香港政策應着重香港境內事情，但未去到倡議港獨。法官問是否即認為政策應由本地人、而非由「北方的某些人」決定，趙同意。
+
+至於後者，趙指該派系於初選後才提出和建立，同意他們反政府，亦認為傳統民主派多年無甚民主進寸。趙又提及有「進步派」，指他們非如傳統民主派般溫和保守，但又不會如抗爭派般「擺明係隊到行」，亦強調有不少「溫和本土派」及「好實幹嘅政治素人」。
+
+此外，趙盤問下不止一次要求修改錄影會面紀錄謄本。趙曾稱因林卓廷代表在新東會議「反對攬炒」，故深信新東「肯定唔會」簽署共同綱領，惟他本周要求刪去「反對攬炒」，改稱民主黨代表僅對否決預算案「表達關注和顧慮」，林卓廷驚訝說「吓」。趙亦要求將傳統民主派對否決財案「都好反對」，改為「好有保留、好有顧慮」；同樣地將戴發「共同綱領」後「傳統民主派好多都唔制（簽署）」，將「唔制」改為「好多關注、好多顧慮」。
+
+案件明天續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-27-my-political-enlightenment-incidents.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-27-my-political-enlightenment-incidents.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "我的那些政治启蒙事件"
+author: "鹿馬"
+date : 2023-04-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/hgTLZhq.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+北京驱赶“低端人口”成为我的一个拐点，其背后一系列事件的叠加推动了我的反思，这与我当时所处的环境和以往生活的轨迹密切相关。以下通过一些自认重要的个人经历和公共事件，聊一下我到底是如何从粉红开始转变的。
+
+
+
+
+
+### 为什么他们不愿接近中国人？
+
+初到日本，在学校里会接触到一些台湾人，香港人和海外华裔。当我听到除了中国人之外还有其他人讲中文的时候，会很自然地产生亲近感，有时会去主动搭话，或在对方有困难时主动提供帮助。但是与我认为的亲近感不同的是，非但文化的相似性没有使我们成为朋友，甚至他们中有些人会有意无意地疏远中国人，这当时令我这个初到国外的留学生非常不解。
+
+当时我并不明白，中国人对中国大陆以外的华人的亲近感不仅来自于语言和文化，更多是因为教育所形成的思维，是中国官方统战思维在教育中的延续。在官方层面，中国对待香港和台湾，在中国人眼中都是在给予他们特权，所以就自然觉得：我都对你这么好了，你总该有点回应吧？你总得认同一下我们同根同源吧？总不能比“外人”还不如吧？但实际上，你并没有关心对方是否需要这种所谓特权，你也不去关心对方的诉求是什么。
+
+这种模式植入每一个中国人的脑子里，再从群体映射到个体的时候，就会表现出中国人对双方的差异毫不关心，更不会去在意对方的感受和想法，而是一厢情愿地认为：因为我们都一样，所以我才对你友善，你也必须对我友善，你强调差异就是见外，你疏远我就是不知好歹。到头来，你越是想用“我们都一样”去试图拉近距离，对方就会用“我们不一样”的态度远离你。
+
+但是当时的我仅仅意识到这些“同胞”并没有我想象中的那么天然亲近，我们之间没有我们想象的那么相似，终究我们不一样。但是到底我们哪里不一样，为什么他们对于中国人群体敬而远之，当时的我并没有想清楚。
+
+
+
+### 不讨厌中国人，但讨厌共产党
+
+我记得有个香港同学，在提及香港人身份认同这个话题的时候，说到有香港人不认同中国的现象并非针对中国人，而是共产党。虽然因为某些小粉红和内地客的不文明行为等因素，让香港人非常反感进而导致对中国认同的疏离，这样的现象或许存在。但这句话在当时确实给了我不小的启发。
+
+在中国的环境下，往往会刻意营造一种党和国家和人民是不需要分开看待的氛围（实际上也是如此）。因此，当有反对中国政府的声音的时候，小粉红很自然的就会扣上“反华”和“辱华”的帽子。但是这位同学的一句话让我让我意识到，我就是我，我不必和这个党绑定在一起，也不必代表这个国家。
+
+
+
+### 人死在天安门广场上和死在其他地方有区别吗？
+
+那是我刚开始主动了解六四事件的时候。出于好奇，我点开YouTube想看看有什么“禁片”，当我点开一部关于天安门事件的纪录片，才开始真正了解这段历史。不过那个时候虽然人在国外，但其实对外部世界的内容，特别是对“反华势力”的内容还是有一定戒心的，所以我一边提心吊胆地看，一边调整自己的认知失衡，从片中人物访谈和下面五毛评论中（当时我还不知道Youtube上有五毛）找一些比较考近我原本认知的东西。其中就有侯德健说他没有看见天安门军队射杀平民的一段影像。
+
+后来，当我私下和一个同学说到六四事件的时候，提到了天安门广场上没有死人。旁边的另一个中国同学突然打断我，用质疑的语气说到：“你确定没有死人？”我连忙解释说是天安门广场上没死人，但是其他地方有。他没有再跟我争论下去。直到我和另一个外国同学再次聊到这件事，他反问我：“死在天安门和死在其他地方有什么区别？”我无言以对。
+
+直到这个时候，我才发现我必须诚实地面对这样一个事实——对平民开枪杀人是不对的，不论人是不是死在天安门。死在其他地方并不代表开枪的人比较仁慈，也无法用军队情绪失控才开的枪这一借口去给决策者开脱罪责。镇压就是镇压，不存在仁慈的镇压。
+
+当我有勇气诚实面对与自己曾经立场相悖的事实的时候，我就不会给自己设置什么障碍了，再也不用自我审查思想，再也不用各打五十大板来表现“理中客”。
+
+
+
+### 大火之后与低端人口
+
+早在在那场大火之前，北京清理低端人口的事情就已经发生了。当时据传某大领导觉得北京太挤了，城市发展不能“摊大饼”，就定下了疏解低端产业（就是把他认为的低端产业扔到河北去），引进高端产业的方针。那时还是爱国青年的我听到这个口号的时候，真的是一边为党国升级转型设身处地地着想，一边隐隐约约感受到一丝恶意——因为低端产业的从业者几乎都是所谓外地人。而外地人和北京本地人的身份并不是因为你住的久了就能转换的，那一纸户口就决定了你的身份。
+
+好吧好吧，既然你大领导心善，见不得北京城里有穷人，那就走吧。后来我也确实没有再回去北京生活。曾经你用高考和户籍制度排斥我，现在你再来个釜底抽薪，那我也就只能忍了。有些和我一样在北京长大的外地户口的同学，挤破脑袋也要考回北京或毕业回北京当北漂，我嘛，对不起，没那个毅力，也没那个能力，也没那个心气儿。中国这么大，没必要赖在你天子脚下，再说，世界那么大，我还想去看看。
+
+本以为大善人们做的已经够绝的了——长期性制度排斥，强制性砸你饭碗，可是他们不要脸的程度总是超出常人想象。借着北京城中村的这场大火，我们的大善人们又开始担心你会被烧死，于是大冬天的把你窝给端了，这个窝，对于那些住地下室的人来说并不是比喻，那里暗无天日，和老鼠窝没有区别。就连这么卑微的生存，大善人们也不能忍。
+
+这时候，我已经在日本了。我知道强制清理低端人口这件事，起初是通过异见艺术家华涌上传到YouTube上的一系列自拍影片《大火之后》，后来墙内媒体也开始有人转发相关文章。当然，这些负能量必须被删除。华涌这个制造负能量的敌对势力也必须被捕，后来他也确实被捕了，他还把被抓过程用视频录了下来。
+
+这给我带来不小的震撼，我就想，这也没说什么，为什么抓他呢？这也没反党反社会主义，怎么连个讨论社会事件的文章都容不下呢？我记的我高中和大学头两年还能讨论讨论社会事件呢，怎么现在就不行了呢？之前当境外敌对势力指责中国没有言论自由的时候我还能反驳两句说中国还是有一定言论自由的，可现在呢？万物皆政治，并不是别有用心的人喜欢把事情扯到政治上，而是当局把所有事情都当作政治风险来看，你想不讨论政治也不行，因为被消失的人和文章时时刻刻提醒着你，这就是政治，躲不掉。也是从那时候开始，我才开始领略官方对于言论窒息般的扼杀。
+
+后来我时常在想，如果我还在北京，那年冬天我是不是也会被当成低端人口清出去？但事实上，我早就被一股隐形的力量清出去了，都没等到他来踹我门。后来再一想，我才反应过来，原来我在这个城市当了十几年的低端人口。
+
+
+
+### 红黄蓝幼儿园的真相黑洞
+
+这件事和清理低端人口几乎是同时引爆舆论的。当时在网上传出家长反映幼儿园发生虐童事件，有家长爆出孩子被扎针，猥亵，喂食不明白色药片。令我最印象深刻的就是其中一个孩子对家长说：“幼儿园老师说，他有一个长长的望远镜，一直能伸到你的家里，你做什么说什么我都能知道。”之后又有消息爆出这件事与军队有关，而且还可能存在性侵行为。
+
+然而，我越想知道真相，真相就离我越远，删帖封号越来越多。这件事和驱赶低端人口的事情叠加在一起，我再也无法为这种掩盖真相的行为辩解。从此开始，我理解了中国就是一个真相黑洞，领略到制造这个黑洞的标准流程——删帖、封号、抹黑当事人、转移注意力、嫁祸于境外敌对势力、官方通报盖棺定论。
+
+你问我幼儿园里到底有没有军队参与的性侵，对不起，我不知道。但更可怕的是，我们永远也不可能知道任何他们不想让我们知道的事情。我们没有任何可以判断的材料，任何质疑的话都会变成谣言。无论我们如何围观质疑，最终等来的只能是那个蓝底白字的官方通告。
+
+从此之后我不再相信官方话语的哪怕半个标点符号。
+
+中国大陆以外的人听起开可能觉得可笑，生长在“改革春风里”的我，从小就把言论自由挂在嘴边，虽然当时我并不理解其内涵；后来，作为一个爱国青年，虽然我支持正能量舆论引导，但哪怕在大学的政治思想课上（这也是中国特色），我还坚持认为一些社会事件应该让公众知情，应该有充分的讨论。但自从这件事以后，我才发现我从来就没有过言论自由——让你说你才能说，不让你说你连一个字都发不出来，这不叫言论自由。我也彻底放弃了正能量引导下的宽松讨论氛围的这种幻想，明白了根本没有什么中国特色的言论自由，没有言论自由就是没有，明白了言论自由不是一种开明政府统治恩赐下所产生的现象，而是一种不可被剥夺的权利。
+
+
+
+### 说到底，走为上策
+
+以上这一切，都是偶发的外部事件的影响，而对于从小生活在中国的人来说，思想转变并没有那么容易受到单个事件的刺激而改变，因为大多数人还是会在用官方的话语体系来解释中国发生的事。最简单有效的方法就是脱离那个环境——信息的翻墙和肉身的翻墙。这也是我能够发生转变的关键因素，就像脱离传销组织和邪教一样，远离了那个唯一的信息源和人身控制，自然也就比较容易转变。
+
+但是有的人会说，不是还有很多海外的小粉红越出国越爱国吗？这就要说到环境之外的个人特质了。也就是说，粉红和粉红之间也有不同，有些粉红有一些可以导致“变异”的特质，比如善于钻研哪怕是错误的理论，再比如富有反抗精神，哪怕是用官方话语反抗，哪怕是为了标新立异而反抗，还有就是保持开放心态，好奇心等等。这一部分就不展开说了，快要跑题了，就此打住。
+
+生长在中国，变成小粉红是个大概率事件，而政治启蒙的过程，就是给自己补课的过程。不同的是，我们没有成文的公民教科书，我们的教科书都出自于那些活生生血淋淋的现实。
+
+
+▲ 2017年冬，北京驱赶“低端人口”
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-30-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk12.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-30-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk12.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7d6780df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-30-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk12.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十二周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-04-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/haV9lSb.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 趙家賢完成作供 控方上周破解鍾錦麟手機
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十二周。時任民主動力召集人趙家賢本周完成17天的作供，惟因控方上周六始破解下一名控方證人、時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟的手機，辯方需時審視新資料，故押至下周四續審。
+
+趙家賢本周主動就3點證供作補充修正，其中趙上周堅稱記得陳志全有出席首次新東會議，本周改稱「多次回想」後，記得陳的助理會上提到陳要做網台直播未能出席；趙亦表示，「細心回想」後記起公民黨鄭達鴻和彭卓棋均曾要求移除初選政綱，早前辯方就此盤問時，趙均稱沒有印象。
+
+趙亦確認，不清楚新界東就運用否決權有否達成協議，他稱之為「共識」僅因戴耀廷如此說。趙亦指「妥協係政治嘅藝術」，稱2010年任民主黨中央委員時支持該黨通過政改方案。至於趙今年1月錄取第二份「無損權益口供」，他指當時知道「幫手畀緊證供」，但不確定要否上庭。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+
+### 趙家賢改3點證供 改稱陳志全無開協調會、鄭達鴻彭卓棋要求刪政綱
+
+審訊踏入第十二周，本周所有被告完成盤問，而趙家賢稱經「多次回想」、「細心回想」後，主動就3點證供作出補充修正，並就「打亂」流程向法官致歉。
+
+就陳志全，趙上周五（21日）稱獲展示助手黎敬輝筆記後，記起陳有出席首次新東協調會議。辯方播放陳於同時段主持網台節目的片段質疑趙記錯，惟趙強調記得陳與助理蘇浩一同出現在會議場地，對辯方提問只可以回應「no comment」。
+
+不過趙本周一主動補充，稱多次回想後，記得蘇浩會上曾稱陳要做網台直播未能出席，並向與會者致歉，確認陳並無出席該次會議；而對黎敬輝筆記稱陳有出席，趙解釋蘇浩身旁有一個「形態好似陳志全」的男子，故黎「應該係搞錯咗」、「認錯咗人」而寫錯。
+
+至於鄭達鴻，辯方於4月12日指公民黨在《國安法》生效後曾要求將政綱修訂為「無字政綱」，惟趙稱沒有印象，僅知道當時有政黨要求改政綱。趙本周稱「我而家回想返」，記得助手曾向他指公民黨在已制定《國安法》、但尚未通過時望更新政綱，不想因「咬文嚼字」而無法通過選舉主任要求，並事實上「delete咗整個選舉政綱」。
+
+至於彭卓棋，辯方於4月13日指彭曾向民動職員Christy提出要移除全部政綱，趙稱沒有印象。趙本周稱「細心回想返」，記得Christy曾向他指「赤柱嗰個嘅政綱，有啲嘢想改」，望整個政綱留白，趙着按其意思做，趙事後回想彭卓棋正是時任赤柱區議員。趙並指鄭和彭應是在6月底收到消息指已通過《國安法》、但未頒佈條文時要求改政綱。
+
+
+
+
+### 趙不同意新東首次會議無討論否決權、第二次會議無投票
+惟認不清楚就否決權有否達成協議
+
+至於本周進行盤問的鄒家成和李予信，前者重點落在新界東會議情況及就否決財案有否達成共識。鄒家成一方指首次新東會議無就運用否決權討論，鄒亦沒說「要用盡方法去迫政府回應五大訴求」，趙不同意，但同意當日遲到、會上亦忙於工作。趙亦同意，會上主要討論應否有共同綱領，而據助手筆記否決權只被談及一次、由戴耀廷提出，趙稱是「綜合」的紀錄。
+
+辯方質疑趙並不知道，但趙強調親眼目睹鄒家成和民主黨代表莊榮輝就否決預算案「企咗起身」討論，莊稱「難道起醫院起學校都要反對呀？」，而趙想助手「慳功夫」，故着他「呢part唔駛寫」。趙在覆問下亦補充何桂藍是在上述討論時談及望將立會變成「抗爭陣地」等，同樣因他已聽到故着助手無需記錄。趙亦指，當天與會者逾半為本土抗爭派，形勢上莊榮輝相對是少數。
+
+至於第二次會議，趙沒有出席，但同意根據筆記，會上重點討論否決預算案議題，其中社民連吳文遠指功能組別或有保留，李永成亦不贊成表明否決財案。至於筆記寫「『會運用』-投票通過」，辯方指事實上會上沒有進行投票，趙不同意。
+
+那新東就運用否決權達成共識了嗎？趙同意他將戴耀廷6月8日發出的協議最終版本稱為「共識」是因戴這樣說，而新東第二次會議至6月8日期間沒有開會，他不知道文件中「會運用」否決權的協議何時達成，亦不清楚有否達成協議。
+
+被問是否事實上無大家同意的協議，而是由戴耀廷決定協議內容，趙強調戴原本打算參選人報名時就協議有「實體簽名」，若戴並非有共識，「唔可能」於6月9日召開初選記者會，否則公開後有人不同意會有「反彈」。他指當時真誠確信已達成協議，及戴有將協議向與會者傳閱。
+
+趙亦同意，戴耀廷是刻意不用「必定運用」否決權的字眼，「唔好寫到死」以免有「白紙黑字」令參選人被DQ或有「枝節麻煩」發生；而「積極運用」或「會運用」字眼均是留空間讓參選人自行決定，重申民主動力製作表格是望如「一個中國，各自表述」，讓大家按需要揀選。
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+至於李予信，趙同意參選超級區議會的李是「溫和、務實、新晉」的傳統民主派。趙亦同意，「超區」界別是政府與民主黨政治妥協的產物，指「妥協係政治嘅藝術」，他2010年任民主黨中央委員，亦支持黨友投票通過政府的政改方案。
+
+
+
+
+### 趙不同意「抗爭派」不代表反政府、指黎敬輝及兼職職員管民動FB密碼
+
+此外，就「本土抗爭派」定義，被問是否指較年輕、以港人利益為先的本土政治人物，趙家賢指只是最基本的元素。辯方指當中「抗爭」一詞不代表反建制或反政府，只是指更願意更積極主動地爭取政治目標，惟趙不同意，指傳統民主派亦有很多人很進取「chur住」政府官員，屬很溫和的方法。法官則指本案不是取決於被告屬於什麼陣營。
+
+趙家賢於2023年1月10日錄取第二份「無損權益口供」，被問當時是否已知會被傳召為控方證人，趙指知道是「幫手畀緊證供」，但不確定要否上庭；又指錄首份口供時知道有需要需出庭作證，但若其供詞沒幫助就可能無需作證。
+
+而早前法官和辯方屢引趙家賢和民主動力帖文質疑趙的立場，趙均表示非他本人所撰。趙本周表示，他、黎敬輝和5至6名兼職職員均可登入民主動力Facebook發布任何內容，他盡量會在發文前檢視，但有時「太忙」便會授權同事未經他檢視下發帖，亦確認職員獲授權處理他個人Facebook。另外，趙盤問時曾稱只出席首次港島會議，覆問下澄清首兩次都有出席。
+
+
+### 控方上周六始破解鍾錦麟手機 辯方需時審視 押下周四續審
+
+趙家賢本周完成17天的作供，下一名證人為同案認罪被告、民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟，亦預計包括一名匿名證人和市民證人。控方周二表示，上周六（22日）始因科技進步破解鍾錦麟電話，法官李運騰直言令人非常不滿意，指電話一直由警方保管，為何審訊第50天仍要處理此基本程序，又問控方是否未獲鍾合作，指控方「欠所有人一個解釋」。控方後指，由於鍾不肯定電話密碼，警方為免資料被清除而沒冒險嘗試，而控方不會依賴當中逾2,400則訊息。法官關注可能要重召區諾軒和趙家賢。
+
+辯方表示需時審視新資料，法官押至翌日處理。辯方周三指仍需時審視，法官遂押後至下周四續審。而9月底要審理《蘋果日報》案的法官李運騰關注審訊進度，指考慮到法官數量，該案換官並不可行，又指除不認罪的16名被告，亦需時處理其餘31人的求情判刑。
+
+案件下周四（5月4日）續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-02-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-spring-2023.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-02-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-spring-2023.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0da39a8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-02-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-spring-2023.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争・2023春季战局"
+author: "当代张敬轩"
+date : 2023-05-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dL5qsbt.png
+#image_caption: "（2023年3月—4月）"
+description: "俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争，目的是把作为德、法等帝国主义国家附属国的乌克兰的全部或局部重新纳入俄罗斯帝国主义的控制下，乃至于进一步变成殖民地。"
+---
+
+两个月来，战线几无变动，战争完全处于相持阶段：俄军在巴赫穆特、阿夫季耶夫卡、马林卡等地徒耗实力，乌军也仍在蓄力之中。总结无甚可写，本文姑且更多展望一下未来。
+
+
+
+### 一、春季战局进展
+
+#### 1、巴赫穆特战场
+
+2023年1—2月，俄军在冬季攻势中以瓦格纳雇佣军集团为主力，袭占苏勒达尔镇、克拉斯纳霍拉镇，从而三面包围了巴赫穆特市。
+
+3月1日，乌军放弃巴赫穆特河东岸的巴赫穆特市区，并把大部分兵力从巴赫穆特市区撤出。据称巴赫穆特守军一度仅剩数百人，乌军还把包括补给线上桥梁在内的几处重要桥梁给炸毁了，此时乌军似有放弃巴赫穆特之意。但是到了3月6日，乌克兰总统泽连斯基、乌军总司令扎卢日内上将、乌陆军总司令兼“霍尔恰蒂岛”战略战役集群（乌军的方面军级单位，负责整个顿巴斯方向）司令西尔斯基上将三人举行会议后，决定继续坚守巴赫穆特。至迟3月9日，乌军又修复了主要补给线O0509公路（这是一条乡道级别的土路）上的桥梁（实际是水泥管搭的便桥，很有1990年代浙江村道风格），并继续向巴赫穆特城内输送力量。
+
+此后，俄军在市区内的进展十分缓慢。至4月2日，俄军才拿下了巴赫穆特市议会大楼，控制了城市中心区大部。乌军且战且退，在4月8日放弃铁路以东地区，除火车站等几个据点外基本上退到了铁路以西。至4月底，俄军进一步清除了铁路以东市区内乌军残留的据点，并在局部地区突破到铁路以西，然后也仅限于此了。
+
+目前，俄军占领了巴赫穆特市区差不多三分之二的面积，每日进展速度只能说是聊胜于无。即便一切条件不变，巴赫穆特市区再坚守一个月以上应该不成问题。至于所谓围城打援的说法实际上不值一驳，因为俄军每天消耗的炮弹和雇佣军人力都是宝贵的；更不必说士气再而衰、三而竭，即便真有“打援兵团”，备战那么久而无战机也早就丧失战力了。
+
+#### 2、其他战场
+
+2023年3、4月间，俄军在马林卡、阿夫季耶夫卡等战场也发动了战术进攻，但收效甚微，成果还不如在巴赫穆特战场。
+
+2023年4月24日，乌军派兵渡过第聂伯河到东岸的赫尔松州境内活动，但应该只是试探性行动，因为乌军并不具备进行大规模两栖登陆作战的能力。
+
+2023年3、4月间，俄军每个月确认阵亡的官兵就接近3000人；今年以来，俄军（包括雇佣军，不包括傀儡军）确认阵亡的官兵已超过1万人。至4月底，俄军及其傀儡军已确认的阵亡人数已超过了3万人，伤亡在15万以上。至于乌军阵亡者在4万人以上，虽大概率仍高于俄方，但今年以来的伤亡已同俄方相接近。这主要是因为，俄方的兵员质量和装备优势都大幅度下降了。泽连斯基在2023年3月23日对日本记者哭穷说，俄军每天发射的炮弹是乌军的3倍；但去年同期这个数字是6倍，主要方向上更是达到10倍以上。
+
+#### 3、俄军战略轰炸
+
+因精确制导武器的库存不断下降，俄军战略轰炸的频率和力度进一步下降。进入3月以来，俄军仅能每个月对乌克兰深远后方发动1次战略轰炸，规模也不如前，且都是报复乌军袭击其大后方。不仅如此，俄空天军甚至发展到了每天出动6架次进行战术打击还能写进战报炫耀的地步。
+
+#### 4、乌方对俄联邦大后方的袭击
+
+2023年3月2日，乌方麾下的俄联邦反对派武装袭击了俄联邦布良斯克州克里莫夫斯基区，造成了俄方平民伤亡。2023年4月底，乌方又对塞瓦斯托波尔的俄军军港发动袭击，造成了一定的损失。这两次袭击后，俄方都进行了较大规模的报复。此外，乌方还日常炮击别尔格罗德州，俄后方的乌克兰游击队和俄内部反对派武装分子也不时展开一些游击行动乃至打死一些翼赞战争的人物，但也再没有去年刻赤海峡大桥爆破那样令人印象深刻的袭击行动了。
+
+
+### 二、战争现状
+
+#### 1、俄罗斯方面
+
+不迟于2022年底，俄军重组了自己的指挥链：成立了特别军事行动联合部队总指挥部，统辖所有参加乌克兰战争的俄军，现在总指挥由俄军总参谋长格拉西莫夫大将兼任。该总指挥部下辖5—6个方面军级的军队集群，再下辖集团军/军，再下辖师/旅。
+
+2023年3月以来，随着俄军的兵员质量优势和兵器优势不断下降，俄军在前线的损失速度不断增加，而战果却寥寥无几。自开战以来，俄方已经阵亡3万多人，损失15万人以上。兵器的补充也不尽如人意：坦克损失已超过2500辆，且解封、改装、修理坦克的速度堪忧，导致本来应有大量T-72（固然是早期型号）库存的俄军现在竟然不得不启用T-62乃至T-55充数。战前库存的远程导弹早已消耗殆尽，炮弹现在也只能生产多少、打出多少（俄方的产能仍稍大于美国，但应该不如北约能调动的所有产能）了。因此，俄军难以占领巴赫穆特，更难于突破利曼—斯拉维扬斯克—克拉马托尔斯克—康斯坦丁诺夫卡防线的沉重任务。实际上，除在巴赫穆特等几个战场继续表演式的进攻外，俄军在其他战线上已全部转入防御，大挖战壕、静待乌军反攻。
+
+外交上俄帝面对西方步步紧逼（如国际刑事法院对普京发出逮捕令）办法不多，除了在白俄罗斯部署核武器进行日常核讹诈操作外，几乎陷入了黔驴技穷的状态。不过俄帝操纵粮食、化肥武器却有一些收获，成功拉拢到埃及、巴西等中小国家，政治上有些许收益（但不值得高估），经济上也得以继续维持。
+
+俄方内部的矛盾也在加剧。2023年4月27日，俄国防部负责后勤的副部长米哈伊尔.米津采夫上将宣布辞职，俄当局不久任命了其继任者。而瓦格纳雇佣军头目普里戈津马上向他提供了瓦格纳雇佣军副总指挥的岗位。还不清楚米津采夫是否上任。米津采夫应该是在为俄军糟糕的后勤负责，而普里戈津则看中了他在俄后勤利益链条上调度资源为瓦格纳服务的潜在能力。同时，普里戈津又大肆发表失败主义言论，宣称乌军即将大反攻、瓦格纳若得不到充足补给将要退出前线云云，以期向上施压、索取物资。
+
+#### 2、乌克兰当局方面
+
+不迟于2022年底，乌军也重组了自己的指挥链。乌军目前划分为三个方面军级的【战略战役集群】（即战略战役军团，方面军级），它们是由过去的战役集群、战役战术集群合并而来的：“霍尔恰蒂岛”（本系第聂伯河上一岛屿）战略战役集群，司令官由乌陆军司令西尔斯基上将兼任，负责整个顿巴斯方向的作战；基辅战略战役集群，司令官为前联合部队战役司令部司令、基辅军管局局长帕夫柳克中将，负责北线俄乌、俄白国境线防御（防止俄军重启第二战场）；塔夫里亚战略战役集群，司令官为亚历山大.塔尔纳夫斯基准将，负责南方方向的作战。战略战役集群下辖战役集群（集团军级）、战役战术集群（军级），再下辖旅。
+
+乌军在防御中表现比较稳定，但要进行反攻则依然面临如同山积一般的问题。乌军的装备补充目前基本上依靠向北约化缘，其承诺数量和到位速度都不理想。以坦克为例，至2023年2月底，西方本年内仅为乌克兰提供了156辆坦克，估计目前也不超过300辆；M1A1坦克和豹1坦克都刚刚开始交付。战机方面，仅有波兰和捷克、斯洛伐克移交了本国的米格-29给乌克兰使用，乌军很难利用它们夺取制空权、掩护地面部队。乌军赖以阻止俄空天军活跃的防空导弹也即将耗尽，而北约承诺的援助即便全部到位也只有过去巅峰时期的60%。在这种情况下，乌军手头能用来发动反攻的家底并不雄厚，甚至可说“只此一付家当”，所以乌军至今也未展开大规模反攻也就不难理解了。
+
+#### 3、其他国家方面
+
+在英美的种种压力（如英国允诺向乌军提供贫铀穿甲弹，等等）之下，法、德也不得不向乌克兰提供较多的军事援助。尤其是德国，对俄态度也日趋强硬。尽管如此，法、德仍不放弃通过某大国寻求与俄帝斡旋的机会，试图避免两败俱伤的结局。
+
+美帝政治上收获颇丰：2023年4月4日，芬兰加入北约，仅此收获就足以抵消其军援的花费。然而，从2023年3月初开始，美国国内却发生了金融恐慌，造成了经济上的不安定。这不能不对其后续动作有所妨碍。
+
+某大国见双方陷入对峙，又活跃起来，对俄、乌双方以及欧洲各国展开了外交活动。此处不能详谈。
+
+
+### 三、战争趋势
+
+俄军从2023年1月开始的本轮重点进攻现已基本上失败，但由于乌方不得不依赖外援来作战，所以还未能发起战略反攻。目前乌军已掌握战略主动，但同样由于其依赖外援、且外援又十分有限，所以乌方能用于战略反攻的资源也是极为有限且不可再生的。若乌军在一次反攻战役中发挥不好，则其好不容易获得的优势又会失去。乌方统帅部也明白这一点，所以十分谨慎；然而也正因为乌方依靠外援作战，所以反攻也不能无限制拖延下去，否则西方很难再进行持续的援助。总的来说，乌方在未来两个月内发动战略反攻的概率较高，若其获胜则战争的结局自然对乌克兰十分有利；若其失败，则俄乌之间的消耗战又将持续下去，或许双方终有一日不得不考虑回到谈判桌上了。
+
+[](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/626200325)
+▲ 原载《知乎》链接。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-07-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk13.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-07-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk13.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十三周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-05-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/tzOFiq0.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 鍾錦麟：民動2020年2月與戴耀廷有共識協辦初選、戴曾稱不要求無差別否決財案
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十三周。第三控方證人、時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟本周開始作供，講述民主動力如何參與「35+計劃」。
+
+鍾錦麟表示，趙家賢曾望民動協調2020年立法會換屆選舉，但「冇乜人睬」，二人遂在另一副召集人安排下，在同年2月與正進行協調的戴耀廷會面，會後有共識民動會協助戴領導的初選或協調。鍾的說法與趙稱民動於5月才答應承辦初選不同。
+
+時任西貢區議會主席的鍾亦獲戴耀廷邀請主持新東協調會議，他稱首次會議沒討論否決財政預算案，而會後他向戴指無差別否決很可能致被DQ，戴回應不會作此要求，只會提「積極運用基本法權力」。鍾對戴的說法「疑中留情」，指相信建制媒體報導DQ的風聲某程度代表中央想法，但表面看來《基本法》的確賦予立法會相關權力，當時相信戴稱是「合法」。
+
+此外，鍾稱何桂藍在新東首次會議上介紹自己為「立場姐姐」，何兩度大叫：「肯定冇！」。而控方主問時，數度被法官提醒要具體和針對案件「真正議題」。本周鍾錦麟已完成主問，另4名被告完成盤問、7名被告沒有盤問。
+
+
+▲ 2020年6月9日初選記者會
+
+
+### 鍾稱2020年2月已有共識民主動力協助戴耀廷辦初選
+
+時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟本周四開始作供。究竟民主動力如何開始參與「35+計劃」？鍾表示，民主動力在2020年1、2月時，曾嘗試協調當年的立法會換屆選舉，但最後由戴耀廷主導；並解釋時任召集人趙家賢望民動在選舉協調「有角色」，不希望被邊緣化和排除在外，但「冇乜人睬佢」，時任副召集人馮志活得悉後，亦知道區諾軒和戴耀廷正游說民主派協調，便安排趙家賢和鍾錦麟與戴耀廷於同年約2月會面。
+
+鍾指，戴會上提到民主派在2019年區選大勝，認為民主派能取得立會過半，因此望進行協調；並指已聯絡相當數量的民主派、及「IT人」設計初選程式和流程，但欠註冊團體和銀行戶口執行計劃，望民主動力協助。鍾稱會面遂有共識，民動會協助戴所領導的初選或協調。趙家賢早前強調，民主動力於2月獲邀列席協調會議，5月初獲邀承辦初選，5月中下旬才正式答應；法官問民動是否於5月獲正式委任辦初選？鍾指對該說法「唔係太清楚」，亦對明文協議不知情。
+
+此外，鍾指戴會上亦建議以眾籌辦初選，而他和趙有保留，認為應由參與者攤分開支以控制成本；但戴擔心素人覺得要負擔高昂費用的初選是由大黨壟斷，認為眾籌較可取，鍾和趙沒有反對。會上亦沒有談及否決預算案。
+
+
+### 鍾稱會後民動參與初選準備工作 趙家賢對戴「好多擔憂同不滿」
+
+鍾同意，民主動力參與會面的目標純粹，就是望協調民主派取得立會過半；而民動從不關注參選人當選後如何行事，會上亦沒相關討論，解釋民動過往協調也沒監察當選議員的投票取態，認為戴亦不會覺得民動「有力去執行民主派議員喺立法會嘅所作所為」。鍾並指，會議後民動便參與初選的準備工作，戴耀廷和趙家賢亦就準備初選緊密溝通。
+
+被問趙家賢會後曾否表達對計劃的憂慮，鍾稱不肯定，但指趙「絕對有」表達對戴耀廷的憂慮，指他對戴是否願將初選遇到的問題告知民動「有好多擔憂同不滿」，且隨初選執行越來越強烈；又指早在區議會選舉協調時，趙與戴耀廷已「弄得相當不快」。而鍾亦隨戴耀廷否決財案的計劃越來越詳細、及建制派反應越來越強，而對戴倡否決預算案有擔憂。
+
+
+▲ 左起：趙家賢、程張迎、鍾錦麟（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 鍾稱曾私下表達無差別否決財案或致DQ 戴耀廷回應只提「積極運用基本法權力」 鍾對說法「疑中留情」
+
+除了民動副召集人，鍾錦麟另一身分為時任西貢區議會主席。他表示，戴耀廷於3月邀請他與時任沙田區議會主席程張迎主持新東協調會議。首次會議於4月14日舉行，由戴耀廷、區諾軒、他及程張迎主持，有數十人出席，趙家賢和時任民動總幹事黎敬輝有旁聽但沒發言。鍾並指，會上主要商討採用「初選」或「棄選」的方案及目標議席數量，記得劉頴匡堅持「初選」，並有人關注約束力問題，但無深入討論如何執行。鍾亦沒印象有人提戴耀廷文章、沒有討論否決財政預算案。
+
+鍾續指，會議結束後曾「拉咗戴耀廷埋一邊」，指外界認為若無差別否決預算案，很可能導致參選人被DQ，問戴可否不要求否決預算案；戴則回應「咁我唔會要求大家去無差別咁去否決財政預算案」，只會提「積極運用基本法權力」，又反問「我講明係基本法嘅權力就唔會有問題啦啩？」
+
+鍾承認事實上不太理解「無差別」和「積極運用」的差別，而他得知有DQ風險，是因不少親政府媒體或人士表達相關訊息，但不清楚實際理據。法官一度指「媒體可以說很多事情」，鍾回應「不幸地都會成真」，法官再指並非所有都會，因存在很多假資訊。鍾續解釋自己純粹相信建制媒體報導的風聲某程度代表中央政府想法，而2019年社會事件後中央對港政策「唔會不為所動」，故認為有風險要謹慎處理，又指對初選的批評來自建制的不同方面，非來自個別版塊。
+
+鍾形容，對戴的說法「疑中留情」，指中央可能會出動「組合拳」，但不清楚會如何觸發調整對港政策，故「拆彈拆得一樣得一樣」；又指表面看來《基本法》的確賦予立法會審批政府開支的權力，雖認為最好不要提否決預算案，但當時相信戴稱是「合法」，「我拗唔過戴耀廷」。至於5月5日的第二次新東會議，鍾指因當天區議會會議超時，故沒有出席。
+
+
+### 鍾沒為意新東協議寫「會運用」否決權 指戴耀廷5月底稱所有協調已完成及取得共識
+
+本案集點亦落在各被告有否達成協議，同意無差別否決財政預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，以顛覆國家政權。那到底被告有否達成協議？就鍾錦麟唯一有出席的新東會議，鍾確認首次會議後，收到戴耀廷發出「35+新東」協調文件初稿，他與戴討論有關目標議席的寫法與會上共識不符，戴修正後再發送給所有與會者；但他沒特別留意運用否決權條款是「會」或「會積極」，只留意有否表明是「《基本法》的權力」。
+
+戴於5月及6月再發出「35+新東final」文件，提及「會運用」否決權。鍾只看過6月的文件，但沒為意字眼由「會積極運用」改為「會運用」，也沒提出或收到與會者反對，同意他對否決預算案議題完全沒興趣。
+
+此外，鍾表示戴耀廷5月底曾與他、程張迎和時任大埔區議會主席關永業會面，戴提及「所有嘅初選協調已經完成咗同埋有共識啦」，亦已敲定初選流程，望他們協助找票站。至於6月發布的「墨落無悔」提及「在初選協調會議上已取得共識的共同綱領」，鍾指以其理解，首次會議的「共識」是關於誰參選和如何遵守機制，而他看到「墨落無悔」時，會以為就否決預算案是否已有共識。
+
+
+
+
+### 鍾稱何桂藍自介為「立場姐姐」何大叫「肯定冇」 官屢提控方主問
+
+此外，鍾錦麟稱何桂藍在新東首次會議上介紹自己為「立場姐姐」，惟何桂藍即瞪眼大叫：「肯定冇！」，她身旁的懲教按她的肩膊，法官亦着她不要叫囂。鍾續解釋何「嘗試話人哋叫我係『立場姐姐』」，惟何桂藍即再大喊：「冇！肯定冇！」，鍾並指何有在會上發言，但不記得關於什麼。
+
+署理助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋進行主問時，亦屢被法官提醒或打斷，包括指控方應清楚本案真正的議題，不要重複問沒爭議的事項，不想聽同類證供3次；在羅問鍾錦麟就「墨落無悔」有什麼想告訴法庭時，打斷指雖然要問開放的問題，但不是「如宇宙般廣闊」；在羅就鍾錦麟用辦事處做票站發問時亦質疑相關性，指法庭不是審理證人，是審理被告。
+
+鍾錦麟周五完成主問，進入辯方盤問。鄭達鴻、梁國雄、林卓廷、黃碧雲4人完成盤問，吳政亨、余慧明、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、施德來7人沒有盤問，而除何桂藍正
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-08-the-spiritual-crisis-of-our-times.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-08-the-spiritual-crisis-of-our-times.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5e73a202
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-08-the-spiritual-crisis-of-our-times.md
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "我们时代的精神危机"
+author: "维舟"
+date : 2023-05-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/c6U5tKf.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+一个幽灵，精神危机的幽灵，正在这片土地上徘徊。
+
+
+
+这并不是我突发奇想。两年前我曾和朋友私下说过，“未来十年或许将迎来精神疾病的大爆发”。但现在我所说的，还不止是抑郁倾向或空心病，而是一种更广泛的社会文化病象。
+
+之所以想到这个，也是因为连日来一连串看似不相关的事件。五一长假各地人潮的回归，是一场急于回归“正常化”的共谋，记忆在没有得到反思的情况下就被压抑进了集体潜意识；淄博烧烤的大火，则是意味更为复杂的狂欢：试图遗忘的人们，没有太多宣泄压力的出口，而选择了一种低端消费的口腹之欲来填补精神空缺。
+
+更值得注意的是近日接二连三爆出的文化圈性骚扰事件。毫无疑问，受害者的处境当然值得倾听，但不容忽视的另一个问题是：为什么一个国家本应看守精神领域圣杯的那些文化精英，也出现了这样的堕落？
+
+饮食男女，既是人所必需，但也是最低层次的欲求。如果这一切并非巧合，那我们或许就得正视一个现实：在这片土地上，从精英到民众，无所追求的精神空虚普遍存在，即便功成名就，但他们未被满足的最强烈欲望，还是最原始的本能，没有其它东西。这是精神低度发展的表征，犹如成年之后仍沉迷于玩泥巴。坦白说，这是一种生命未觉醒的蒙昧状态，也是为何启蒙在这里仍未过时。
+
+只要留心一下我们周围，这样的迹象随处可见：无数人抱着一种粗糙生硬的唯物主义和匮乏的安全感，把外在的物质追求看作是一切，即便名利已经到手之后，他们的追求也通常体现为量的增加而非质的提升。
+
+原本应当带来灵魂震颤的高雅艺术，在此被看作是可有可无的点缀，除非能积累点有用的社会资本；音乐、美术、文学都降格成了娱乐，为伟大作品而落泪不免显得矫情；即便是人的体面、尊严，一句话就能弃之不顾：“现在都什么时候了？”
+
+这样，文明的价值遭到了颠倒，因为能舍弃那些高级追求，心无旁骛地满足低级欲望的，才得到社会的奖励——当然，这么说也很可能被奚落是愤世嫉俗的无用抱怨，乃至是不食人间烟火的空想，“饭都吃不饱，还谈什么其它？”
+
+布罗茨基曾说：“在人的生命历程中，心理上的获得比物质上的获得更为真实。”这话放在中国，是不折不扣的异端。刘慈欣在《三体》中所说的更贴近实际：在中国，任何超脱飞扬的思想都会砰然坠地的，因为现实的引力场太沉重了。
+
+经历了这两年，我当然也深切地感受到，缺乏健全的相应社会保障托底时，人是相当脆弱的，一步踏错就陷入难以自拔的窘境，或许这就是为什么中国人没有更高的自我实现意愿，因为当生存保障都得不到时，你为了生存不得不中断向上攀爬的路，折返回来，“混口饭吃”。
+
+然而，任何选择都是有代价的。紧盯着功利性的现实目标，固然有情可原，但你最好对目标实现后猛扑而来的精神空虚有点思想准备：想要的已经得到了，然后呢？
+
+在目睹战后美国进入富裕社会后，艾伦·布鲁姆就曾发出先知般的断言：“如果一个人的职业生活平淡无奇，没有音乐修养，闲暇生活由粗俗、剧烈的娱乐组成，这样的人是分裂的，他存在的每一方面都受到其他方面的破坏。”也就是说，一个精神生活匮乏的人，注定是不完整的，甚至不知道如何才能成为一个完整的人。
+
+
+
+回想起来，这一病象的症结，原本就潜藏在我们这个文明深处。《浮士德》第一部里，有一句著名的哀叹：“我的心中盘踞着两种精神”，一个贴紧凡尘，一个则想脱离尘世。然而在中国，大部分人只是抱紧前者。“脱离尘世”？那就意味着自我边缘化。
+
+有一首著名的诗：“庐山烟雨浙江潮，未至千般恨不消。到得还来别无事，庐山烟雨浙江潮。”这被广泛视为一种豁达的人生境界，也有不同层次，然而在此值得注意的是：其指向的归宿并非向上超越，而是一个螺旋状的循环，终点又回到了出发点。
+
+和前现代的世界诸文明不同，中国文明有强烈的世俗取向，是“水平视野”而非“垂直视野”：人们向前看，而非向上看。这种所谓“此世性”（this-worldness）意味着人们对超越性的彼岸世界缺乏兴趣，因为现世就是一切，“人一死，什么都是空的”。在某种意义上说，这倒也很现代，但也正因此，没有什么非功利的事物能强有力地驱动老于世故的中国人。
+
+当然，中国的文人雅士也不是没有精神追求，但那是什么样的精神追求？周作人有一段话很典型：
+
+> 我们于日用必需的东西以外，必须还有一点无用的游戏与享乐，生活才觉得有意思。我们看夕阳，看秋河，看花，听雨，闻香，喝不求解渴的酒，吃不求饱的点心，都是生活上的必要的——虽然是无用的装点，而且是愈精炼愈好。
+
+这确实已经高于常人，至少他把“无用”也视为“必要”，然而再细看一下，你就会意识到，对他来说，那些更多地像是消遣、趣味和寄托，只是为了让生活“有意思”，那远非灵魂的震颤，甚至都谈不上是对人生的省察。就此而言，这和那些对酒色财气的追求，区分不在“灵”与“肉”，而只是趣味上的“雅”和“俗”。
+
+有时候，女性也是这样一种趣味的投射对象。贾平凹曾在散文《关于女人》中写道：“女人到世上来就是贡献美的，‘美’是男人对女人的作用的限定，仅仅在这个范围里，男人才会‘甘愿受征服’。”在此，女性不仅是一个客体，甚至倒像是为了男人才存在的；他谈到了“美”，但那种美不是抽象、独立的精神实在，而是把异性放上了祭坛。问题就在这里：这看似是男性的精神追求，但其实却和肉欲暧昧不明地混杂在一起。
+
+这些年来，他对女性、对乡土的一系列言论，都已遭到了年轻一代的严厉批判，但那通常都是被当作不同话题来讨论的，很少人意识到那也许是内在相关的：对这位作家来说，现实一地废墟，前方无路可走，他把重返过去看成了出路。
+
+不久前，王局也因为在丰县事件中为加害者董志民竭力辩护而引发哗然，很多人都相信，那是因为个人经历使然：他母亲就是饥荒年代买来的。但这恐怕不仅仅是代入感，也是因为现实批判资源的枯竭：他未必认为那种做法是正当的，却不断强调现实中别无他法。
+
+所有这些，看起来都是孤立不相干的事件，但这画面连缀起来，就让我们看到一副全景：从文化精英到大众，都有如困兽，处于一种无路可走的平庸荒漠中。因为人们受困于他人和自己设下的牢笼，想象不出其它生活可能，甚至顽固地抗拒用应然来批判实然，这就像是说“变好是不可能的”。“只有此世”的世俗精神蜕变为自我设限，极大地束缚了人们的想象力。
+
+然而，思想性的本质就是寻求突破这种现实的束缚，一如鹿野政直所言，“如何放飞想象力，才是衡量思想的价值所在，这是思想所具有的性质”，从这一意义上说，思想性必然是批判现实的，因为它生发于对现实的欠缺、困境的认知，进而设想其它可能。
+
+现实生活当然是我们无法离开的，但只有贫瘠的现实取向却是危险的，那会让所有人都走投无路，造成普遍的物欲横流和一言难尽的平庸，只留下一地垃圾。你怎么能相信一个没想过超越限制的人，能留下超越时空限制的非物质遗产？
+
+当然，说这些也并不只是为了知识精英应具有的追求，甚至不是为了后代，也是为了当下的我们自己。虽然乌托邦思想在这个年代早已无人提及，似乎未来也渐渐枯竭，但柏拉图的提醒从未过时：乌托邦思想是我们必须要玩的一把火，因为它是我们认识自己的唯一途径。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-14-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk14.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-14-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk14.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6149657f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-14-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk14.md
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十四周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-05-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/qUMDEKF.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 鍾錦麟完成作供 證人X新西會議拍片交警方自言「光明正大」
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十四周。第三控方證人、時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟本周完成3天的作供。被問戴耀廷「35+計劃」的目的是否「一刀切」無差別否決預算案，鍾指「為了爭取五大訴求而否決預算案」的說法較貼近實況；又直言對民主派能取得「35+」較保守，惟戴耀廷則是「超級大好友」。
+
+控方其後為第四證人申匿名令獲批，他化名「X先生」作供，供稱於2020年5月的新西協調會議上錄音錄影以作「研究」，並於《國安法》生效後的同年9、10月匿名將檔案交給警方。
+
+對辯方質疑他秘密攝錄，X否認並指「我係好光明正大咁揸住部機周影圍」；他亦承認曾任建制派議員助理，但否認有第三方要求他攝錄、亦否認提供資料有收取報酬，並稱「政府會唔會畀個好市民獎我，我唔知喎」。X又指，於2021年4月和5月的首兩份供詞均「唔敢講、唔敢認」自己是攝錄者，但因今年年初身分曝光，遂於本年2月底錄口供時告知警方。
+
+X作供完畢後，控方確認已傳畢所有主要證人，並指會應辯方要求傳召時任新界東選舉主任及與證物鏈相關的警員。不過因施德來和彭卓棋相繼確診，審訊自周三（10日）起押至下周一（15日）續審。而據了解，原不打算傳召認罪被告林景楠作供的控方，將於下周一應辯方要求，傳召林景楠出庭接受盤問。
+
+
+▲ 施德來與其事務律師同確診，辯方申押後審訊獲批。
+
+
+### 鍾錦麟自言對取「35+」較保守惟戴耀廷則樂觀、指為爭五大訴求否決財案較貼近實況
+
+時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟本周完成歷時3天的作供，主要講述他如何理解「35+」目的、「35+」能否實現及新界東會議共識。就「35+」目的，鍾同意戴耀廷望以「35+」向政府施壓，要求回應「五大訴求」，否則便會反對預算案。那是否無論如何都會「一刀切」無差別否決？鍾認為「為了爭取五大訴求而否決預算案」的說法較貼近實際情況，但指不能講出在平行時空下，五大訴求得到怎樣的回應，當選者取態又有什麼不同。
+
+那「35+」有沒有可能實現呢？鍾直言，當時估計民主派於2020年立法會選舉取得「35+」是「較困難」，指2019年區選民主派表面上獲「壓倒性勝利」，純粹因為單議席單票制，但得票率其實沒有大改變；而立會採取比例代表制，功能組別如飲食界亦因社會事件影響生意，難以簡單推斷2020年立會選舉也能大勝，自言「我個人睇得保守啲」，擔心新東以外的選區和功能組別未能取得足夠議席，但形容戴耀廷是「超級大好友（非常樂觀）」。鍾亦指不知悉在初選後有計劃協調勝出者。
+
+就新東首次會議，鍾同意就舉行初選及目標議席「6+1」達共識，至於替補機制和選舉論壇則沒有爭議，他亦沒印象會上有港獨、破壞一國兩制等言論。此外，鍾上周稱何桂藍於新東會議自介為「立場姐姐」，何兩度大叫「肯定冇」。鍾本周再解釋當時戴耀廷介紹何為「立場姐姐」，何語帶無奈表示大家叫她做「立場姐姐」，不過在被告席的何擺手和做口型示意沒有。法官一度指問題無助辯方案情，辯方表示明白，但其當事人對此有強烈感受（strong feeling）。
+
+就辯方展示會議紀錄，顯示柯耀林在新東第二次會議當天從早到晚開西貢區議會會議，任西貢區議會主席的鍾錦麟稱只記得柯有出席會議，但不記得離席時間，但同意不會質疑紀錄的真實性。
+
+
+▲ 鍾錦麟（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 控方為第四證人申匿名令獲批 供稱於新西會議錄影錄音 《國安法》後匿名交警方
+
+本周重點為匿名證人作供。鍾錦麟作供完畢後，控方為下一名控方證人申請匿名令。辯方指有關證人的資料在公共領域已存在，不認為法庭能阻止進一步傳播，望匿名令不適用於在公共領域而非於庭上獲得的資料；惟法官指證人擔心披露身分或受網絡欺凌，認為辯方修訂會令匿名令失意義，故拒絕辯方申請並批出匿名令，該證人化名「X先生」作供。
+
+X先生周二獲准在屏風後作供。他供稱，2019年11月區選後戴耀廷「好有信心」，並在2019年聖誕和2020年農曆新年間，首次在泛民飯局向他提及「35+」目的是立會過半，否決預算案，癱瘓政府和迫特首下台，戴其後亦屢在不同場合講述「35+」概念。
+
+X續指，人民力量梁家聲有意參選新界西，邀他出席2020年5月8日的新西協調會議。他認為戴此前曾提及望以「35+」推翻政府，目的「好有問題」、「唔係為社區做嘢」，亦懷疑會犯法，故購買攝錄器材「記錄返畀自己了解吓」，用作「研究」。惟X其後在盤問下，承認書面供詞沒說戴提過「推翻政府」，指是他自己理解戴稱迫特首下台就是推翻政府。
+
+X會議期間分別使用新買的錄音筆和一個電話大小、「細細個」的攝錄器材進行錄音和錄影，解釋錄音筆較清晰，且影像和聲音可加深其了解和記憶；而不使用手機是因收到訊息或中斷拍攝，亦不想將敏感資訊放手機。X沒有告知梁家聲他會攝錄，解釋他當時也不肯定有否犯法，被問是否視梁為朋友，X指「只可以話唔算囉」。
+
+
+### X否認秘密攝錄自言「好光明正大」 認曾任建制派議助惟否認獲指示及收報酬拍攝
+
+庭上播放片段，可見鏡頭不斷晃動，一時置於枱底，一時拍天花板，亦曾傾斜和反轉。戴耀廷提及新界東共同綱領採用「會運用」否決權，認為新西可採用相同字眼。
+
+法官和辯方均關注X是否偷拍。被問是否公開錄音，X答「係」，但指他將錄音筆放在袋裏，不清楚與會者是否知情，也沒有告訴他人，又指「現場係冇人提過係唔畀錄音呢樣嘢」；至於錄影，他指「我就唔知佢（與會者）知唔知，不過我全程都（將攝影器材）攞喺手度，有擺枱面，之後都有周圍影」。
+
+對辯方質疑片段非常不穩，若他望拍片作研究應想穩定拍攝，X解釋「我唔係一個專業嘅攝錄人士」。他亦同意沒有問准與會者便拍攝，「但現場都冇人講呢個唔可以拍攝」，不覺得是侵犯他人私隱。對辯方指他是秘密攝錄，X表示：「頭先我都講過我唔係所謂秘密，我係好光明正大咁揸住部機周圍影。」
+
+那X之後做了什麼「研究」？X表示，會後重複看錄音和片段兩三次，了解戴耀廷的倡議有否問題，並在法官數度追問下指有上網找相關法律，但不懂也找不到。X同月出席第二次新西會議，他承認看片段後認為戴可能違法，仍赴會是「諗住聽清楚」，但稱因首次會議的片段「自己都頭暈，講真」，加上相信內容差不多，故沒有再錄音錄影。
+
+X並指，當時沒有立即將檔案交警方，是因戴稱初選不違法，惟其後《國安法》通過，有官員稱初選違法，他便於2020年9、10月匿名將兩段錄音檔和11段影片寄給警方，解釋是想幫警方調查，但「唔想自己身分曝光咁麻煩」。至於兩個攝錄器材則因「壞咗」，故於2022年已「抌咗」。
+
+警方於2021年4月上門要求X協助調查，他錄下首份口供，並於5月獲邀錄第二份口供。X承認兩次均「唔敢講、唔敢認」自己是攝錄並交新西會議片段予警方的人，但因今年年初「我上網見到我畀人曝光出嚟」，故於本年2月底錄取口供時告知警方。
+
+被問是否民主派支持者，X指「我有時支持、有時唔支持，我點答呢咁？」，又指「基本上我唔會話特別係支持泛民或者建制」，只是想做地區工作。X承認初選舉行數年前，曾任建制派政黨的議員助理，但否認有第三方要求他攝錄新西會議、亦否認提供資料有收取報酬。被問未來會否因此獲得報償，X稱：「政府會唔會畀個好市民獎我，我唔知喎。」
+
+案件周一續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-19-on-the-cancellation-of-a-chinese-stand-up-comedian.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-19-on-the-cancellation-of-a-chinese-stand-up-comedian.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bff91a79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-19-on-the-cancellation-of-a-chinese-stand-up-comedian.md
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "House被举报"
+author: "鹿馬"
+date : 2023-05-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/esmZhzS.png
+#image_caption: "中国脱口秀演员李昊石（艺名House）"
+description: ""
+---
+
+我不怎么看中国的脱口秀。原因无他，看着这些带着脚镣跳舞的中国脱口秀演员，站在舞台上煞有介事地调侃一些不疼不痒的话题，我尬的难受。我完全理解演员的难处，但如果同样是聊一些有的没的，我还不如去看郭德纲德云社，低俗就低俗了，图一乐儿呗。
+
+
+
+由于脱口秀讽刺现实的性质，在中国出事是早晚的，但这次脱口秀演员李昊石（又名House）被举报这件事，着实超出了我的预期。仅仅就因为他用“作风优良，能打胜仗”这句话形容了他收养的两条野狗，而某领导人曾用这句话来形容过解放军，就有人举报他侮辱解放军。最夸张的是官方的反应：他所在公司被处以一千多万罚款，演出业务受到部分影响，更令人无法理解的是，这位脱口秀演员还要被警方立案调查，面临牢狱之灾。
+
+让我们先对比一下过去的类似事件。
+
+演员张哲瀚被举报在靖国神社拍照（实际上他只是在附近拍樱花），最终也只是一直封杀，并没有涉及法律制裁。某高校老师反驳南京大屠杀死了30万人，被学生举报后停职，但并没有受到什么刑事指控。最严重的要数媒体人罗昌平，他调侃朝鲜战争的长津湖战役中的“冰雕连”是“沙雕连”（傻屌的谐音），这一言论被举报侮辱先烈，违反所谓英烈法被判刑7个月。先不说这部法律本身就是个恶法，姑且按照官方的标准，他的行为也确实触犯了红线——因为他就是在直接批评官方的宣传。
+
+而这次House被立案调查，则是用官方自己的逻辑都难以自圆其说。首先，人家并没有去有触碰什么政治话题，也没有批评任何政府的政策，也没有讽刺任何官方宣传叙事；其次，他说的这句话并不一定和解放军有必然的绑定关系，他更没有讽刺解放军的意思。如果非要用中国的语境形容他的罪过，顶多算是“说错话”。
+
+
+### 这意味着什么？
+
+很明显，现在的舆论环境正在以肉眼可见的速度逼近文革。那是个说错话也会万劫不复的年代。
+
+在这之前，我知道说真话的人会坐牢，也知道想搞清真相的人会被噤声，更知道惹了爱国群众会被举报封号，也听说过违背官方价值观的人会被嫖娼，这些都是熟悉的套路。然而这一次，最多算是说错话，官方的执法机构却罕见地直接下场抓人，宣传机构也毫不掩饰力挺这种执法行为。他们跳过了中间商——煽动爱国大V和爱国群众口诛笔伐。善于举报的爱国群众们无限上纲上线的后果，已经不再仅仅是来自舆论的暴力，更有可能演变为来自公权力实打实的暴力，而被举报的人没有任何申辩机会。
+
+
+### 如何看待举报者？
+
+对待举报者，我向来都是嗤之以鼻的。虽然这家伙可能自认为自己的政治觉悟很高，很自豪地举报了他认为冒犯国家的行为，但是对这种告密行为的唾弃却是自古以来就有的。
+
+或许有人会说，真正迫害言论自由的是这个政权，这些举报者并不是真正的加害者，最多算是帮凶，他们也是这个体制的受害者。对于这种观点，恕我不能苟同。我想反问，就算这个政权迫害言论自由，但是有人逼着你去举报他人了吗？如果没有这些举报者的合作，统治者要如何迫害言论自由？
+
+还有一种观点，认为这种人是被这个体制洗脑了，在这个环境下变成这样也不能全怪他个人。我当然知道要从根本上消除五毛粉红，还是要改变舆论环境和教育，但同时也要看到，对我们造成直接伤害的，往往就是这些人。无知和愚蠢并不能成为无罪的理由。相反，在中国这样的环境下，放弃思考恰恰是一种罪过——正是因为不加思考和质疑，全盘接受被灌输的观念，才会更有可能主动作恶。
+
+
+### 人肉举报者的人错了吗？
+
+举报者随后遭到了网友的人肉搜索，他的隐私信息被网友扒了出来，有人不赞成这种“网暴”的做法。我当然知道网络暴力不对，但我要强调，脱离语境纯粹谈概念是毫无意义的。要看到，在一个法治国家，公权力不会下场干涉言论自由，它要做的就是保护舆论场上每个人的安全，在这种环境下，任何一方都有远比人肉搜索更好、更文明的方式自由表达。而在中国公权力在做什么呢？只有与官方意识形态一致的言论才会受到法律保护，与官方宣传相悖的言论则会受到打击。与官方意识形态不一致的一方，实际上是被排除在法律保护之外的，但权利和义务是对等的，既然无法享受权利，为什么却要尽义务呢？
+
+法治不彰，则必然私刑泛滥。原因无他，作为被公权力迫害的一方，几乎没有什么像样的手段对抗来自被偏袒一方的攻击，甚至有时候公权力还会加入迫害的行列。在这种绝望之下，被压迫者唯一能做的，就是对具体的个人动用“私刑”——在舆论场上表现为人肉搜索等网络暴力手段。既然公权力和它所定义的“人民”们把主张言论自由的人当作“阶级敌人”，那凭什么幻想这些“阶级敌人”用处理“人民内部矛盾”的方式应对攻击？凭什么要求受压迫一方温良恭俭让？
+
+于其说不应该人肉搜索举报者，我反倒认为在舆论环境愈发恶劣的当今，对举报者个人的网络私刑恰恰是遏制他们作恶的一种有效手段（也相对于物理的暴力手段更文明）。我虽然并不鼓励人肉搜索这种行为，但是在当下中国的舆论环境和时空背景下，我也不会谴责人肉举报者的人。
+
+在如今的中国舆论场上，已经越来越不允许说理型的讨论和辩论，你说什么言论自由，就是美狗，你说什么统治者歪曲历史就是历史虚无主义，动辄得咎。和这些人辩论，或批判他们，你是没有任何胜算的。他们也根本不怕你在那里瞎逼逼，人家反手一个举报，轻则被禁言封号，重则喝茶进局子，按粉红的话说，你就是一个行走的50w（举报间谍奖励50万）。你所能做的不是什么让举报你的人良心发现幡然醒悟，也不是什么高屋建瓴直抵问题本质去说服他们，你所面对的就是无数个平庸的作恶者个体，你所能做的就是让平庸的作恶者最大限度地感受不可承受的压力，增加他们作恶的成本。
+
+
+### 在越发神经质的社会生存下去
+
+在这个举报告密成风的时代，在这个因言获罪门槛越来越低的时代，我们每个人都有可能成为下一个House，这已不是什么危言耸听，而是实实在在存在的危险。我们能做的其实很有限，我们无法改变公权力的肆意妄为，无法改变橡皮图章一样的立法机构恶法频出，无法改变宣传机构的颠倒黑白，除了保护好自己之外，我们唯一能做的就是和告密者们斗争，从最普通的恶开始着手。当然，你也可以选择什么都不做，但是请尊重那些选择以直报怨的人，他们在用看似丑陋的手段，与比他们的行为丑陋一万倍的作恶者斗争，不论你愿不愿意，但在结果上你我受惠于此。
+
+请记住，他们没有什么公民的概念，支持他们就是人民，反对者就是敌人。而那些自以为光荣的人民们也是这么想的，他们不会对敌人有任何同情。认识到这一点后，再好好考虑是否要浪费你珍贵的爱与和平。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1885-10-01-PeterKropotkin-a1_l-words-of-a-rebel.md b/_collections/_heros/1885-10-01-PeterKropotkin-a1_l-words-of-a-rebel.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..492969e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/1885-10-01-PeterKropotkin-a1_l-words-of-a-rebel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1375 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "《一个反抗者的话》"
+author: "彼得·克鲁泡特金"
+date: 1885-10-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/NCnUYup.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: left
+---
+
+“只要某一国家以为自己应当从事制造品的大量生产来赚钱致富，并且把另一些落后的国家拿来任意分配，好让那些落后的国家来供给它们需要的原料，而它们自己却靠着别人的劳力积蓄起财富来，只要这样的事情存在一天，那么像上次大战那样残酷的战争便不可避免，并且还会有更残酷的战争。”
+
+
+
+### 法文本序
+
+> #### 爱利赛·邵可侣（Élisée Reclus，1830-1905）
+> #### 1885年10月1日于Clarens（瑞士）
+
+彼得·克鲁泡特金在监狱中[1]与我们的社会隔绝，迄今已有二年半了。他所受的刑罚是残暴的，但强迫他缄默，使他对于最关心的问题，不能说话，则格外令他难受：如果不把他的口封住，他的被囚或者较不苦痛。他要恢复语言的使用，他要与他的朋友重作业已中断的谈话，或者还须经过许多许多年吧！
+
+强迫我们朋友忍受的沉默期间，一定不是落空的，但由我们看来，这似乎是太长久了！生命很快地隐遁过去，我们悲哀地眼见光阴月以继年地流逝了，而这世间最真实最高尚的声音，却仍被关在深暗的牢狱中，不为我们所听见。喧噪于我们耳际刺伤我们耳鼓的确是平庸的谎言，欺骗的说话与故意编造的似是而非的真理；人们硬要拖延时间，不使我们能早日听见这诚恳而明白的语言，大胆地宣告人间的权利。
+
+克雷服（Clairvaux）[2]的囚徒，从他的牢狱深处，固然没人与朋友们谈话的自由，但我们至少还记得我们的朋友，还有方法搜集他从前发表过的言论，这就是我个人所能担负的义务，我现在就很荣幸地来完成这个工作。克鲁泡特金自1879年至1882年在无政府主义的刊物《反抗者》[3]中所发表的文章，由我看来，就有印成单行本的价值，它们不是随偶然的事变写成，而有自然的逻辑程序。思想的热烈给它们以必要的统一性。因忠于科学的方法，著者首先陈述社会的一般情势，说明它的耻辱、缺点、冲突与战争的因素；他研究国家的颓败现象，他指出累积在旧废墟中的显著裂缝。其次，他申说现代历史是适于无政府进化方面的经验与事实，他指明这些事实的正确意义与其所含的教训。最后，他在“充公”一章，把他根据观察与经验的思想，作一结论，并向善意的人们，不以知识为满足而愿意起来行动的志士们呼喊，要他们立刻参加解放的运动。
+
+我不想在这里称颂著者的伟大。他是我的朋友，如果把我对于他所感到的好处，和盘托出，人们也许要怀疑我在瞎说或偏袒。我们只请它的法官甚或狱吏说出他们对于克鲁泡特金的感想就够了。凡是观察过他个人生活的人，没有一个不尊敬他，不钦佩他的崇高智慧与充满仁善的心胸。大家都承认他是真正高贵，真正纯洁的学者。就是因为这些可敬的性格，他得过着流亡与被囚的生活吧！他的罪就是爱护穷人与弱者，就是代这些穷人与弱者抱不平。舆论都一致尊敬这个人，可是看见监狱之门仍然固执地对他关着，大家并不感觉惊奇，好像崇高的性格与献身的人品自然要受苦难似的！在监狱天井中见到克鲁泡特金并与他交换敬体的时候，我们势必自问：“我呢，我为什么还是自由的？”这大概因为我没有被禁在这里的资格吧。
+
+然而本书读者毋需多看著者的人品，他们顶好注意他所陈述的思想的价值。这些思想，我很信任他把它们呈现给正直的人们，希望他们对于著作，不要再开卷之前，就下判断，不要在没有听见之前，先发议论。请先祛除你们的成见，请暂时不要顾到你们自己的利益。翻开此书的时候，请单以追求真理为目的，请暂时不要注意它的实行。著者只向你们要求一件事，就是请你们暂时注意他的理想！新社会实现时，大家都有幸福而不让少数特权者独占大家的财富。如果这个愿望——不论它起初听起来如何飘忽——的确是诚意的，而不是一时的嗜好或兴致，那么，就有一种意象掠过你们的眼前，你们不久或者会同意著者的主张。你们倘若与他同一愿望，你们就会懂得他的说话。不过，你们预先要知道这些思想不会使你们达到荣耀的地位，它们永远不会有高官厚禄的报答；反之，它们或者会使你们的老朋友发生疑虑，因为信仰它们，或者会使在上的统治者给你们以突然的打击。假如你们要追求正义，你们就应该等待不公道的迫害！
+
+本书出版的时候，法国正在举行选举。我不会太蠢笨地把这本著作介绍给候选议员的人，他们还有别的“义务”要尽，不过，我要一般选民把《一个反抗者的话》拿在手里，我尤其要请他们仔细阅读“代议政府”那一章。他们将在那里看见他们应如何信任那些不择手段地谋取国会代表位置的人们。现在一切都说得好听。候选者是全知全能，无懈可击的完美人物，但是选出之后的代表又将如何呢？待他们最后有了一份“王权”的时候，他们也会如过去的国王一样，为权力的眩晕所迷，因而失掉一切机智与美德么？他们真的决定履行他们屡次预许的诺言么？他们在谋事者与游说者的龌龊环境中，怎么能维持他们的人格呢？假定他们进议会的时候还是有德行的，在议会中混久之后，怎么能不腐败地出来呢？在这阴谋环境的影响之下，我们看见他们从左转到右，好像被命定的机械所拖着似的：他们简直是时钟的假人一样，以庄严的态度出来，在钟上敲了钟点之后，即虔诚地转到钟壁的后面去了。
+
+得救之门不在选择新的主人。现在竟要我们无政府主义者，基督教的敌人，来向自称基督教的整个社会，提出被尊为神的耶稣的说话：“不要称任何人做：主人！主人！但愿各人都做自己的主人。请不要把头朝向官的讲坛，请不要期待这喧噪的议会给我们以自由的说话，还是请听听从下层发出，有时要经过牢狱铁栅的语声吧。”
+
+
+### 俄文本自序
+
+> #### 彼得·克鲁泡特金
+> #### 1919年12月5日于Dmitroff
+
+本书各章原是为我们的法文刊物《反抗者》（Le Révolté）写的论文，从1879年它创刊时起到1882年为止连续在该刊发表。我们的刊物当时在日内瓦出版，以拉丁诸国（尤其是法国）的读者为对象，因此我们的文章中所引证的事实常常取自法国的生活。这些文章的目的在于——首先基本地阐明无政府主义，并批判现代的社会：特别注重无政府主义中对于国家、政治权利、代议政体、中央集权以及一般的权力等等的见解。
+
+在这类的批判之后我又打算来阐明我们的社会生活的理想，和我们的建设性的工作，我写了关于“充公”的文章（后来被编作本书的最后一章），这篇文章可以说是另一系列论文的开端，但是它刚写成，我就在法国被捕了。
+
+1883年正月我被判处五年徒刑，在这期间我无法给我们的刊物寄稿。当时我的好友爱利赛·邵可侣积极地参加了我们无政府主义的宣传工作，他把我以前在《反抗者》上面发表的文章编印成书，在1885年出版。他给这本书起了一个题名：《一个反抗者的话》（Paroles d'un Révolté）——显然他想到了四十年代的社会主义者德拉梅内[5]的那本有名的书：《一个信仰者的话》（Parole d'un Croyant）。
+
+本书中有几章早已译成俄文，由我们在日内瓦出版，共分二册，题名是《现代制度的崩坏》。俄文全译本也已在1905年刊行，书名却被译作：《一个反抗者的演说》，现在我们仍沿用旧译名，但它已不能完全符合邵可侣的意思了。
+
+这册新译本我曾仔细地校阅过，其中有两三章还是重译过的。
+
+本书的续篇有俄文译本，题作《面包与自由》，也是将我在《反抗者》（Le Révolté）和《反抗》（La Révolte）[6]上面发表的论文编印成书的。我在那本书中，解说了在最近的将来社会革命发生时我们所谓的建设的工作是什么一回事，这就是说，怎样来建立一个以共产主义和平等权利为基础的社会；但这建设工作并非由政府发布命令来完成，也不是由上而下，由复杂而简单的建设，这确实依据无政府的原理而进行的建设——这即是说由社会本身来进行建设工作，由村、区、同业公会、合作社等等简单的细胞到城、省以及全体人民等复杂的有机体。
+
+我已在前面说过，《一个反抗者的话》和《面包与自由》二书中间有一段过渡的桥梁，即是本书的末章“充公”。这文章中引述的那些事实得到了一般人的热切的注意，因此我又加添一点补充的解说，即是本书的“跋”。
+
+
+### 第一章 现势
+
+我们坚决地正开大步，向着震动一时的革命前进，这革命将如1848年一样爆发于一国而使各邻国皆起响应，彻底地推翻现社会的根基，另予以新的生命源泉。
+
+为着肯定我们的说话，我们用不到引用德国著名历史学家[7]和意大利大哲学家[8]的论据，虽然他们深刻的研究过近代的历史之后都一致推断这世纪[9]的末叶必然要产生惊人大革命。只要把环绕与我们四周的事实和这最近20年展示于我们目前的情景，观察一下，我们便会不迟疑地相信，我们的断语并不错误。
+
+我们观察的结果，只见灰色的画布上现出两种特著的事实：一种是平民的觉醒，另一种是统治阶级的道德，智慧和经济的破产以及有产阶级想阻止平民觉醒的徒劳无功和奄奄待毙。
+
+
+
+是的，平民已经觉醒了。
+
+今天不论在窒闷的工厂或黑暗的小饭店，屋顶的粗劣住室或矿坑的漏湿隧道，到处酝酿着一个新的世界。这些为资产阶级所蔑视，所恐惧，而给一般大改造家以灵感的群众，也已开始讨论社会经济和政治组织到最困难的问题了，他们受着正义感的驱使，已得到很多新的结论，他们直截了当地剖析见社会的症结，新的意向于是产生了，新的概念因而形成了。
+
+在众说纷纭，莫衷一是的争辩声中，有两种基本的概念，逐渐响亮起来：一是废除私有财产，实行共产主义[10]；二是消灭国家，建设自由公社和国际劳动者的总联合。两条不同的路线指向相同的目的：平等，这所谓平等并不是资产阶级写于国旗和法律中，以便更容易压迫生产者的虚伪平等，而是土地，资本，劳动皆归众人共有的真正平等。
+
+统治阶级，以暴力扑灭这些意向是无济于事的。他们以独断的手段，逮捕革命党人入狱，销毁革命的书籍，也是徒劳无功的。新的思想沁入人们的精神，一般人心皆为所动，他们现在希望新社会，正如昔日农奴之加入十字军，希望东方有自由土地与富饶国家一样，思想一时不爆发，一时流于沉睡中是可能的；如果有人阻止他生出地面，它便能毁蚀土地，不久他将乘隙而出，其力将更大于从前。你们请看法国社会主义的觉醒吧，在这15年（1864-1879）[11]的短时间中，社会主义的第二次觉醒何等有力！波涛低下，再起时一定更高。新思想只要在起初试验，稍有成功，一般人便会见出他的简单与优点。一种尝试的成功与众人觉得自己有力量，便能予平民以自豪的兴奋。
+
+这个时期已经不远了。一切都促他到来：贫困使不幸者反省。迫不得已的失业也使有头脑的人离开工厂的狭隘范围，走入广大的街市，因而渐渐认识统治阶级的罪恶与无能。
+
+
+
+这些统治阶级现在究竟在做什么呢？
+
+当自然科学一日千里的进步，使我们回想到大革命将近的18世纪；当大胆的发明家，每日在替人类制服自然的力量，以斗争开辟新的视线时，资产阶级的社会科学竟聋哑地留着，安然重嚼其陈言腐语
+
+在实际的生活中，这些统治阶级或者进步一些吧？——还是一样！他们固执而热心地摇动其国旗的破布。他们尽力维持自私的个人主义，竭力保证人对人，国对国的竞争，并拼命坚持集权国家的专断。
+
+他们自保护政策而自由贸易，自自由贸易而保护政策，自反动而自由主义，自自由主义而反动，自无神论而奇异仪式，自奇异仪式而无神论。他们胆小如鼠，时常目光向着过去，时常不能实现任何持久的事物
+
+他们所做的一切与他们所预许的，成一反比。
+
+他们曾预许我们保障劳动的自由，而现在却使我们做工厂，厂主与工头的奴隶。他们曾以组织工业，保障我们的安逸自任，而现在却给我们以连续不断的工业恐慌和贫困；他们曾允许我们有受教育的机会，而现在却压迫我们没有求学的可能；他们曾以政治的自由预许我们，而现在却陷我们与循环的反动之中；他们曾说，我们将享受和平的幸福，而现在去要我们忍受战争，无穷尽战争的痛苦。
+
+总之他们对于自己的诺言，一概不遵守。
+
+
+
+但是平民已经开始厌烦了，他们让资产阶级嘲笑与统治，经过这样久了时间之后，现在已经开始自问他们的处境了。
+
+回答是欧洲现在的经济状况中。
+
+从前工业的恐慌是一时的灾祸，现在已成为慢性的病症了。棉业的恐慌，金属业的恐慌，钟表业的恐慌等今日同时发生了，而且成为常有的现象。
+
+据统计，现在欧洲失业的人数已达数百万，从这城到那场到城，到处流浪而乞食的流民也有数万人之多，他们到处骚动，以威胁的态度，要求“工作和面包”；如1789年的法国农民在贵族占据私有的富饶土地上找不到一块耕种的土地，和一把锄地的鹤嘴锄，鹄行菜色徘徊于荒漠的大路一样，今日的工人也因少数逸惰者的剥削，两手空空地找不到生产所必需的工具和原料。
+
+大工业生生地被破坏了，如谢菲尔德[12]的大城市也变成荒漠了。英国贫困，尤其是英国为最贫困，因为那边的“经济学家”最完善的实行他们的原则；阿尔萨斯[13]贫困，意大利与西班牙饥馑。失业遍地皆是，与失业相依的，便是拮据，或贫困；儿童饿得不成人样，脸上皆现青灰色，妇人过了一冬几乎老了五年；疾病，大刀阔斧地在工人队伍中杀害生灵——看！他们的制度使我们处在何等悲惨的情况里面[14]！
+
+可是他们还向我们大谈其“生产过剩”！生产过剩？当矿工积煤如山，而自己却没有煤过冬。这是什么生产过剩吗？当织工织布数千丈而不能给他们衣衫褴褛的孩子做一件衬衫。这是生产过剩吗？当泥水匠建筑宏大的宫室，而自住恶劣的小屋。当女工制造衣衫美丽的木偶，而自己没有一块破布御寒。这是生产过剩吗？
+
+这就是人们所说的工业组织吗？如更恰当地说，这不过是资本以饥饿制御工人的秘密同盟罢了。
+
+
+
+据人告诉我们，资本。这积聚在少数人手中的人类劳动的产物，因缺乏安全的保障，已逃避开农业与工业了。
+
+那么，让他脱出保险箱之后，究竟停止在什么地方呢？
+
+不用说，他会被人安置在更有利的所在。他去装饰苏丹的后宫，他去供给战争，帮俄国人去打土耳其人，同时又帮土耳其人去打俄国人。
+
+或者他去创设不以生产为目的的股份公司，而准备于两年内不顾信义的破产，好使提前退股的创办人大股东们赚得数百万代表“计划利益”的法郎。
+
+他去哥达（Gothard）[15]日本，如必要时，撒哈拉沙漠建筑无用的铁路，使创办人罗斯齐而特[16]总工程师与企业家等，可发数百万的横财。
+
+
+
+然而资本最大的出路还在投资世界或交易所的大赌博中。资本家垄断小麦与棉花的价格，任其如意涨跌，他们的投资一直伸展到政治的领域，若有改革或外交方面特别变动的风声。他们即随着这些风声做买卖，如我们每天所听见似的，政府的官吏也往往参加这些投机的勾当。
+
+投机事业杀害工业，他们就叫这做商务的聪明经理，就为这种理由——他们说——我们应该维持商务。
+
+简言之经济的混乱，已经到达极点了。
+
+不过，此种混乱不能长久持续下去。平民们已不愿忍受这些因统治阶级的贪心而产生的恐慌了，他们愿意籍劳动而生活，而不愿终身受着贫困的烦恼。他们有时候随得着慈善事业的可耻救济，有两三年安定的工作，可是得值不多，操作过苦。他们再也不愿过着此种生活了。
+
+劳动者已觉到统治阶级的无能了：他们无能懂得新的意向，无能管理工业，无能组织生产与交换。
+
+平民不久将宣告资产阶级的末日了。待有相当的机会。他们就将自己组织起来，料理自己的事物。
+
+这个时期就会到来，因为侵害工业的种种缺点，以及如春风融雪似的实现于我们目前的国家瓦解，也在促使他早日莅临。
+
+
+### 第二章 国家的瓦解
+
+假如“工商业的混乱”，“资本主义的崩溃”这几个字能概括欧洲经济的现状，那么，政治的现状，亦可用“国家将破产”“国家已在瓦解路上奔驰”等字句来形容。
+
+试以欧洲现在的一切国家而论，从宪兵独裁制的俄罗斯一直到资产阶级专权的瑞士，你们找不到一个国家，（瑞典与挪威二国或者不在此列）[17]不是放快脚步向着“瓦解”以及瓦解而且的革命前进。
+
+这些国家，好比失了能力的老人，面皮紧绷，脚步颤动，又加以身患痼疾，绝对不接受新思想的潮流，他们耗尽精力，却不自量，却不爱惜残年，偏要时常如乡愚泼妇，彼此撕打，以加速其自身的灭亡。
+
+一种无可救药的病症已置一切国家于死地：这就是暮年与衰老。把众人所有的事务交给少数人任意处置的国家，这请人代庖的人类组织，已经不合时宜了。人类已经准备好新的联合方式了。
+
+欧洲的老大国家，自十八世纪发展到极点以后，今日已进衰落的途径，已经到老弱的时期了。一般人民——尤其是拉丁民族的人民——早已想把这种阻止他们自由发展的权力取消，而代以省自治，地方自治，以及各工团自治的组织，他们用不到什么权力来代他们发号施令，他们只以众人的自由合意的契约，就够维持他们彼此间的秩序了。
+
+这是现在已露端倪的“历史变像”，任何东西都不能阻止他的实现。
+
+假如统治阶级懂得一点时务，还明了自己的地位，那么，他们一定会很热心的欢迎这些意向。可惜他们毫不觉悟，死守着“传统”的偏见，心中只存着金钱的崇拜，非但不肯协助这些思潮的发展，而反以全副的精神阻碍他们，他们势必领着我们走上暴烈的革命。人类的愿望终有实现的一日，可是要籍大炮的轰击，机关枪的发射与大火的赤焰。
+
+
+
+当中古各种制度遭受崩溃，新生国家出现于欧洲，并以征服诡计与暗杀等方法牢固其根基，扩大其势力的时候[18]，他们干涉人类事务的范围还不甚大。
+
+今日国家已干涉我们生活一切表现了。自摇篮以至坟墓，他把我们紧搂在他的怀抱中，有时是省政府或县政府，有时是乡镇公所，我们走一步路都有这些东西跟在后面，每条路的旁边都有他们的跟踪出现。它们压制我们，约束我们，无时无刻不与我们为难。
+
+它们替我们的一起行动立法。法律，命令——命令，法律，这些破纸现在已堆积如山；就是最勤勉的律师，拼了一生的精力，也读不尽，理不清了。另一方面，国家每天又创立好些新的机关，使其与旧的坏的合用，他制造复杂难解的机器，即使负责管理的专门家也感到头痛。
+
+它制造成批的官僚，爪足钩曲如蜘蛛，他们的宇宙只在办公室的龌龊玻璃以内，他们的知识只在桌上荒谬与难懂的烂纸堆中；他们是掠夺黑隼，他们只以金钱为宗教，以参加红，紫，白，蓝的党派为披挂，他们入党的唯一目的，就是设法少做工作，多赚薪俸。
+
+结果如何，我们是太清楚了。国家活动中也有一部分能使那些不幸而与他们接近的人们满意吗？自出世数百年以来，经过无数次的改良，它们的任务中，也有一部分不是完全无能的证明吗？
+
+
+
+国家向人民征收的无数与时俱增的租税，总不敷他的浪费；他的存在总是损害我们的子孙；他负债，它已走上破产的斜坡。
+
+欧洲各国的公债已达到令人难以置信的庞大数目，差不多已超过千亿法郎了[19]，即使国家的“一切”收入“到最后一个小钱为止”都用作偿还这些债务，十五年也不能还清。何况这些债务，非但不会减少反而每日增加呢。国家的需要时常超过它的力量，这是事理使然，无可避免。他必须扩大它的职权，凡是新上台的政党，都必然要为它的羽翼创设新的位置，以为他们吃饭之地：这是命定的法则。
+
+所有这些欠额，这些公债，即在和平的时期，已是向上增添。一旦发生战争，国债就会立刻增到不可思议的数目。这是永无止境的；想要跳出这个“迷宫”，简直是不可能的。[20]
+
+国家已开足马力走向“破产”或“倒账”，各国的人民已厌倦了，再不愿每年将这四十万法郎的利息付给银行家；他们将宣告国家破产，将请这些银行家自己去锄地，如果他们肚饿要吃的时候。
+
+
+
+谁说到“国家”必然要说到“战争”。国家设法并应该设法自强，比他的邻国更强，否则，它将是邻国手中的玩物。它必然要竭其所能削弱别国的势力与财富，强迫他们接受自己的法律，政治与商约，使自己可以任意致富。为霸权的斗争，是资产阶级经济组织的基础，同时也是它的政治组织的根本。所以战争今日已成为欧洲的合规情况，普丹，普奥，普法的战争，东方的战争，阿富汗的战争连续不断地发生。新的战争已在酝酿，俄英普丹等国家早已准备好他们的军队，不久就会下令开战。总之，人们已经种下“三十年战争”的种子了[21]。
+
+战争同时又是失业，恐慌，租税增加，债台高筑；此外每一战争又是国家道德的破产；每次战争之后，人民总觉得国家的无能；就在他主要的职权上也处处表示他的庸懦；它几乎不知道组织国土的防御，即使胜利了，它也脱不了失败。我们只要看看德法二国，因1870年战争而生的许多新思想的萌芽就可以知道了；我们只要看看东方战争在俄国所引起的不满意，就可以明白一个大概了。
+
+战争与军备可以毁坏国家，它们促使国家经济与道德的破产。再经过一两次的大战，就可以把国家这架坏机器完全拆毁了。
+
+
+
+外战之旁尚有内争。
+
+昔时以为是保护众人或抑强扶弱的国家，今日已成为富人压迫穷人的工具，地主压制农民的堡垒了。
+
+我们称之为“国家”的这台大机器究竟有什么用处呢？——用来阻止资本家剥削工人，地主抢劫农夫吗？用来保护我们反抗债主吗？当贫困妇人，只有清水去安慰啼哭于无乳胸前的小儿，它能给我们食物吗？
+
+不，千次不！国家，它就是剥削，投机与垄断的保护者，它就是劫掠结果的私有财产的支柱。赤手空拳的无产阶级，既无可保的财产，就毋需希望国家来施恩，他不过是竭力阻止其解放的特殊机关罢了。
+
+一切都是为着逸惰的所有主，一切都是反对劳苦的无产者的！从年轻时就已教坏儿童的资产阶级的教育，使青年的脑中塞满反平等的成见；教会扰乱女子的精神；法律阻止“休戚相关”（Solidarité）[22]及平等思想的交换；金钱贿赂劳动界先驱的人格，监狱与任意释放的机关枪封闭不愿接受贿赂者的嘴巴。看，这就是国家！
+
+这会持久吗？显然是不可能的。人类中生产一切的整个阶级不能时常维持专门反对自己的组织。不论在俄罗斯的暴政或甘必大[23]派的虚伪下，到处不满意的人民都要反叛了。今日的历史，就是特权阶级的统治者反对人民平等倾向的斗争史。这斗争史今日一般统治者的主要工作，它支配他们的行为，今天并不是公益的原则或理由来决定某种法律或某种政令的颁布；今日政府中人所关心的只是保持特权压迫平民的斗争而已。
+
+单这斗争，就足以动摇最强固的政治组织，假如我们所说的国家，由于历史必然的结果，已经走上衰老的末路，假如它们已经开足马力奔向“破产”，甚或为着私利，已经互相冲突；最后，假如被压迫者都已开始厌恶国家，加入这么多的原因都集中在同一目的，那么，斗争的结果一定是毫无可疑的；代表力量的平民，一定会战胜他们的统治者；国家的崩溃只是极短时间的问题罢了，最安静的哲学家也会看见行将降临的大革命的火光。
+
+
+### 第三章 革命的必要
+
+在人类生活的有些时代，一种可怖的动摇，一种深入社会脏腑的混乱，就一切的关系说，实在是必要的。这些时代的有心人都开始对自己说世事再不能这样下去了；非有不可测的大事来突然截断历史的线索，将陷于污辙中的人类救出，使其走上新道路，探索大“未知”，追求新理想与倾向新生活不可。换言之，他们已觉到革命的必要，这革命是广大的，不妥协的，它不但推翻以冷酷垄断投机及作伪为基础的经济制度，不但倾覆以诡计阴谋及欺骗少数人统治方法的政治体系，而且动摇社会的智慧与道德生活，它震撼麻木，整顿风气，它把崇高的热情，伟大的兴奋，宽宏的献身等虎虎有生气的灵感吹入弥漫着恶情劣欲，狭隘欺诈的当时环境。
+
+在这些时代，倨傲的平庸，压迫不屈膝于要人脚前的智慧，“适中”的狭小道德占着上峰，卑鄙的自私主义盘踞着一般人的脑筋，———在这些时代，革命成为一种需要，社会一切阶级的诚实人都祈求革命的飓风，希望它以燃烧的气流，毁灭侵蚀我们的黑死疫，焚净损害我们的恶病菌；扫除压迫我们窒息我们，使我们缺乏空气与光明的这一切过去的残渣，使未来的整个世界有活泼少壮与诚实的新生气。
+
+发生于这些时代的不只是面包的问题了，反静止的进步，反愚昧的人类发展，反恶臭停滞的活动等等问题也随着起来了。
+
+历史给我们保存着这样时代的回忆，这就是罗马帝国的衰亡；人类今日要经过第二次的同样时代。
+
+
+
+如衰亡的罗马人一样，我们现在也站在精神的深刻的改变之前了，只要有便利的机会，它们就可以成为事实。在经济的领域，革命若是必要的，在政治的领域，革命若成为不可缺少的良药，那么，在道德的领域，我们更加需要革命。
+
+社会的每一成员对于其他的个人，若没有道德的关系，若没有不久便将成为习惯的某些义务，社会的存在是不可能的。所以我们在一切人类的团体中都能找到这些道德的关系与这些社会的习惯；我们见他们在原始的蛮族中非常发达，非常严格地实行与日常的生活中，这些蛮族可以说是最初人类的残余样品。
+
+但是资产与地位的不平等，人剥削人的垄断，少数人压迫群众的统治，在时代的过程中，逐渐来损坏这些社会原始生活的宝贵产物。以剥削与欺诈为基础的工商业，自称“政府”者的统治不能与这些道德的原则并存；完全以“休戚相关”为起点，今日还继续存在于少数原始部落的生活方式，在所谓文明的世界上已无立足的余地了。其实，资本家与被剥削的工人，军队领袖与兵士，统治者与被统治者，彼此间能有哪一种“休戚相关”的存在呢？
+
+同时我们可见到宗教的虚伪道德起而代替个人与其任何同胞一体的原始道德；宗教设法以诡辩证明剥削与统治的正当，它们对于两者只谴责其过于残酷的表现。它们使个人对于他的同胞不必遵守道德的义务，他们强迫个人崇奉一个无上的神明，服从一个不可见的上帝，我们只要好好供养他的侍仆（教士）就能避免他的愤怒，买得他的恩惠。
+
+但是今日个人，团体，民族与大陆间的关系逐渐密切起来，人类因而不得不有新的道德义务。宗教的信仰日益消灭的时候，人类觉到，要想自己幸福，不是对一个未知的存在，而是对日常与自己有关系的同胞，必须定下若干应守的义务。他们一开始明了孤立个人的幸福是不可能的；他只能在一切人的幸福，全人群的幸福中求得自己的幸福。与日俱增，无限扩大的人类道德的积极原则将起而代替“勿盗窃，勿伤害……”等宗教道德的训诫。个人与全体的“休戚相关”的情感将排斥先渎犯而后能以献祭求恕的上帝的禁令，新的道德将对我们说：“假如你自己愿意幸福，你应对别人做你自己愿意别人对你做的事情。”[24]这简单的名言，科学的归纳，与宗教的训诫完全不同，他突然开辟出人类完善与改良的大道。
+
+在如此崇高如此简单的原则上重整我们关系的必要，每日更有力地接触于我们的脑际。但是，只要剥削与统治，虚伪与轨迹仍留为我们社会组织的基础，这一方面的成功是绝对无望的。
+
+
+
+成千的例子可以引来作为我们立论的依据。我们于此只举出一个最可怕的例证，就是我们的儿童。现社会对儿童究竟做了什么呢？
+
+人类自野蛮状态历经艰苦，逐渐进步到今日情形，敬爱儿童使他们在发展过程中所会的的一个最优美的性质。多少次我们见到心术最坏的人也在儿童的微笑之前解除了武装！唉！不幸，这敬爱的情感今日也已烟消云散了，在我们今日的社会中，儿童若不是为满足兽欲的玩具，即是属于机器的“活肉”。
+
+
+
+我们新近见到资产阶级怎样杀害我们的儿童，他们强迫这些孱弱的生物在黑暗的工厂中做着长时间的苦工。要他们做苦工[25]，还只在肉体上伤害他们，可以说还不怎样严重；腐败到骨髓的社会还在道德方面屠杀我们的儿童呢！
+
+现社会强使教育循着旧规，只做熟练的习艺，至大多数儿童于某一年龄一定流露的高尚情感与理想需求，没有半点活动的余地，竟让稍有独立，诗意与自负性质的少年厌恶学校，不求发展，或到别处去找热情的出路。有些在小说中寻觅日常生活所缺乏的诗趣；他们脑中装满龌龊的，由资产阶级制造，为资产阶级阅读，每行只卖两个或四个铜子的文学，结果如青年的勒曼特尔（Lemaitre）一样，把另一个儿童的肚剖开，喉割断，“使自己成为著名的凶犯”。另一些则沉溺于可恶的恶习，自求逸乐；只有平庸的儿童，既无热情兴趣，有无独立情感的孩子，能无意外地达到他们的“目的”。那就是未来道德狭窄的资产阶级分子，他们不偷路人的手帕，倒是实在的，可是他们却“诚实地”偷窃他们的主顾；他们没有热情，可是他们却暗地里去访问媒婆，要她“替他们除去日常生活的腻烦”，他们蹲在沼泽中，如果有人胆敢动着他们的污秽，他们就会大叫一声“莫动！”
+
+看，这是对待我们的男孩子，至于女孩子，资产阶级的人们从很小的时候，就将他们教坏了。荒谬的读物，穿的娼妓似的洋娃娃，母亲的服饰与榜样，闺房的谈话，——种种情形都使女孩子将来倒入最能出价者的怀中。她从很轻的年龄就在她的四周散下腐败的种子；工人的孩子们不以羡望的眼睛注视这个装饰艳丽，举止娴雅，十二岁即有妖媚态度的小女子么？假如母亲是有道德的——资产阶级妇女们之所谓有道德的——结果将更恶劣！假如孩子是聪明的，是有热情的，她不久就会认识这两面道德的真实价值，它劝人，“爱你的同类，但遇可能时可以剥削他！你须有道德，但以某种程度为限……”。她窒息于这滑稽道德的氛围中，在生活里找不到半点美的，高雅的，引人入胜的，使人可以嗅到热情的东西，她当然会低着头投入第一个来者的怀中，只要她的奢侈欲望，能够得到满足。
+
+
+
+请考察这些事实，请研究他们的原因，然后再请看看我们说需要一种可怕的革命最后来扫除我们社会一切污浊的根源，是否有理，因为只要腐败的原因存在，任何改造都是不可能的。
+
+只要有懒惰阶级，以统治我们为名，始终寄生在我们的劳动上，他们总时常是公众道德的腐败中心。沉溺酒色的懒惰者，一生只求新的逸乐，心中从没有什么“人间休戚相关”的情感，即有，也已被他们生存的原则戕害了，只有最卑鄙的自私念头，受着他们实际生活的陶冶，他们一定倾向于最粗俗的肉感享乐，他们不但自卑，而且使他们的四周同时堕落。他们以钱袋与畜生的本能污辱女子与儿童，污辱艺术，戏剧与报纸，他们现在已经进行这丑化的工作;他们将出卖祖国以及祖国的保护者，待他们恐怕失掉钱袋，失掉他们享乐的唯一泉源时，他们就会假手他人来杀害自己祖国的最优秀分子，因为他们自己太卑怯，不敢亲自动手来杀人。
+
+这是不可避免的，甚至道德家的书籍也不能改变什么。疫病已进入我们的大门，我们必须破坏它的根源，即使要使用火与铁，我们不要再迟疑了。因为这是人类能否得救的问题。
+
+
+### 第四章 下次的革命
+
+在以上数章中，我们所得的结论是欧洲已在革命骚动的斜坡上了。
+
+研究资产阶级手中所组织的生产与交换的方式时，我们见到现在的事物状态已被不可救药的腐菌所侵袭；我们见到科学与人道根基的缺乏，社会资本的疯狂浪费，甚至蔑视社会性一切的法则贪婪好利，继续不断的工业斗争以及社会的一般紊乱；我们竭诚祷祝革命日子的降临，像从前宣告王朝崩溃的情形一样，大家一致喊出：“资产阶级崩溃了”的呼声。
+
+研究国家的发展与其历史的任务以及今日如何瓦解的情形时，我们见到这种结合的方式在历史上已尽过它所能尽的任务，今天就在它固有的职权的重压之下，倒坍下来，只好将它的位置让给新的组织，后者将以新的原则为基础，与人类的近代的意向发生更密切的关系。
+
+另一方面，用心观察过现社会内部思想运动的人们，都很知道人类的思想今日以何种热烈的情感在重估过去数世纪遗留给我们的全部价值，并准备以新的哲学与科学的体系，作为将来社会的基础。现在不单是那班受着过分劳动与过分贫困压迫的忧郁的改造家要来批评他们所身受的可耻制度之邪恶，希望较善将来的降临，甚至学者，虽然在旧成见中长大的学者也渐渐知道动摇他们的旧成见，听着民众精神所了解的思想潮流，准备去做这思想潮流的代言人与喉舌了。“批评的大斧尽力铲除过去留给我们作为真理的一切遗产；哲学，自然科学，道德，历史与艺术等，在这破坏的工作中，一点都不让保存！”保守派的人都这样喊着说。是的，一点都不让保存，甚至你们社会制度的根基——财产与权力，也被工厂的“黑奴”与思想的劳动者所攻击了，今天不论是关心改革的人，或者怕见自己思想被人施诸实行因而激起街上骚动，掀起他们图书馆的尘埃的学者，也都认为你们的社会是罪恶的渊薮了。
+
+
+
+现存制度的衰败与瓦解，一般的不满意，新制度的热烈酝酿与切盼改造的愿望，科学哲学与伦理学领域上的批评攻势与舆论的大骚动，掌握着权力者的玩忽冷淡或凶狠抵抗，一遇惊动，还有力量与勇气阻止新思想的发展。这是大革命前夕常有的社会状态；我们今日也在这同样的情况中。这不是好闹团体的过分兴奋或故意捣乱的断语；而是平静与科学的观察给我们揭出社会的内幕来；就是喜欢以“我们安心吧，我们住所中还没有危险呢”这句话，自掩其罪恶与冷淡态度的人，也不打自招地承认情势地日益恶劣了，他们已不知道我们应该走向何处去。不过他们拿这种招认安慰自己之后，立刻转身去重过无思想的反刍生活。
+
+
+
+“但是，这革命，人们已喊得这样久了”，悲观主义者在我们旁边叹息地说，“就是我自己也有一个时期相信它，可是它终于不来呀！”它不来，只为着等待更成熟的时机呢！一个历史家论及十八世纪时，曾对我们说，“1754年与1771年这两次，革命几乎爆发了”[26]，（我几乎将它们写成1848年与1871年——这数目多么相似）。那两次革命之所以没有爆发，不过为着使它在十八世纪末期产生更有力更丰富的结果。
+
+我们就让冷淡人们酣睡，悲观主义者叹息吧；我们还有别的事情要做呢。我们去研究世上这样多的人所预感所准备的革命应该含着什么性质，我们对着这个未定的大事，应该采取何种态度吧。
+
+我们不作历史的预言：因为尚在胎儿状态的社会学与现在还很幼稚的历史学，如历史家基埃里（Thierry）[27]所说：“不过使真理窒息于人为程式之下”的历史学，并不允许我们这样做，我们只提出几个非常简单的问题吧。
+
+即使是暂时吧，我们能够承认社会各阶层中所进行的批判与这知识方面的大改造的工作，能因政府的简单的变更而即行停顿么？与日俱增的经济的不满，如果某种特殊的事变，产生某种顺利的机会（如权力的瓦解等）能不设法在公众生活中表现出来么？
+
+提出这些问题就是解决它们。——回答当然是否定的。
+
+
+
+我们能相信英国与爱尔兰的农民如果见到他们可能占领他们渴望很久的土地，驱逐他们十分憎恶的地主时，能不利用任何骚动的机会，以实现其日夜追求的愿望么？
+
+我们能相信，如果再发生像1848年那样的欧洲革命，那时法国只会限于罢免当权的甘必大而代以克雷蒙梭[28]，竟不设法去做公社[29]所能做的事业，以改善劳动者的命运么？我们能相信法国的农民一见中央政权的解体，能不设法占领他们邻人，女修士们的碧绿牧场，并把新近安顿在附近，且曾不断地扩大其领域的大富翁的田产，没收为公有么？我们能相信他们不站在援助他们的革命者一边。同心协力去实现工作有保障有厚酬的理想么？
+
+我们能相信意大利西班牙与斯拉夫的农民不作同样的事情么？
+
+我们能相信忍受苦痛与贫困，屡次被矿内煤气所杀的矿工，今日在军队的监视之下，忍气吞声，不敢稍露其不满，倘若看见军队解体，兵士不愿服从他们的长官的时候，能不设法铲除他们的矿主么？
+
+而蹲在暗湿地窖里，指冻胃空，自早至夜，终日劳作，仍然得不到一家五口的面包费，眼见儿女。因缺食而消瘦，愈消瘦而愈可爱的手工匠，又怎样呢？而这个连每夜一个铜子房费都付不出而睡在任何街沿门脚的困苦无告者又怎样呢？你们以为他们不想在那些富丽的大厦中，找到一间干暖的房子来安置他们其实比富有者更清白的家庭么！你们以为他们不想看公社的仓库中有充分的面包可以供给没有懒惰习惯者的食用；有充分的衣服可以供给工人孩子们的枯瘦肩膀御寒，正如富有的少爷们拿它穿在细皮嫩肉的身上一样么？你们以为衣服褴褛的人们不知道大城市的仓库中有可以满足一切居民需要的货物么？你们以为他们不懂得一切劳动者如果从事于有益的生产而不为奢侈的物品工作，他们一定能替全公社以及临近其他公社生产充分的必需品么？
+
+最后。我们能承认这些随时说，到处讲，一遇恐慌时期（我们还记得巴黎被围的情形吧！）即自动地出现在人人口中的事物，等到平民自觉有力量的日子，不被他们拿来实行么？
+
+
+
+人类的常识已回答了这些问题，请看他的回答吧：
+
+下次的革命将有不同于过去一切革命的普通性质。这不是一国卷入漩涡而是欧洲的多数国家。假如从前限于一地的革命是可能的，那么今天欧洲因有休戚相关与一切国家没有固定平衡的关系，稍能经久的地方革命已成为不可能了。如1948年一样，一个地方发生骚动，必然得着其他各地的响应，革命之火终必烧遍整个的欧洲。
+
+不过暴动的城市在1848年还能信任政府的变更或宪法的改革，今天却不一样了。巴黎的工人不会再等待政府——就是自由公社的也一样——来完成他们的愿望了；他们要自己起来进行自己的事业，并且自己认为“这也一样会成功的”！
+
+俄国的人民也不待制宪会议来给他们以领有所耕土地的权利：他们若稍想成功，必须自己去力争；他们已在进行了，不断的骚动就是一个好例。西班牙与意大利的情形也是一样；德国的工人即使有一个时期受着中央集权者的欺骗，一切事物均待柏林的电报来决定，邻国的榜样与自己领袖的无能已给他们指出革命的真确道路。所以下次革命的特性将是这样：各处的人民将自动起来作经济革命的尝试，他们决不期待这革命如天赐的食物一般自空而降。
+
+但是……我们已看见悲观主义者，嘴边露着恶意的微笑，走来向我们提出：“几个疑问，只有几个疑问”。好吧，让我们来听他说，让我们来回答他吧。
+
+
+### 第五章 政治的权利
+
+资产阶级的报纸，每天总以各种声调对我们吹嘘“政治自由”，“公民的政治权利”如普通选举，选举自由，出版自由，集会自由等等的重要与价值。
+
+他们说：“你们既有这些自由，你们又何必暴动呢？你们有了这些自由，恐怕什么必要的改造，非籍枪炮不能成功吗”！好吧，我们不妨以我们的观点。以一无所有，向不治人，只有少许权利而很多义务的无产阶级的观点来分析这些绝妙的“政治自由”，看他们究有多少价值吧。
+
+我们不能像有时人们所说的那样，认为政治的权利对于我们毫无价值，我们十分知道农奴制度的时期，尤其是从18世纪这时期以来，人类已得到了很多的进步：现在平民已不是像从前那样，一切权利都被剥夺的生物了。法国的农民，已不是如现在的俄国一样，可以让人在街上自由鞭挞了[30]。工人，尤其是大城市的工人在公共场所，在他的工厂以外，已经可以昂然说是跟任何人一样的平等了。法国的劳动者已不是从前会被贵族看作牛马而无任何人权的奴隶了。靠了伟大的革命，靠了平民所流的热血，我们已经获得少数个人的权利，而这些权力的价值也是我们所不愿缩减的。
+
+但是我们知道区别。我们说权力是有种种的不同；有一些是有真实的价值，另一些则相反；凡是想把他们混在一起的人都是想欺骗平民的。例如私人的关系中，平民与贵族的平等，个人身体的不可侵犯等等都是他们以绝大的斗争得来的，对于平民非常宝贵，如果有人胆敢侵犯这些权力，自然会引起他们的暴动。并且其他如普通选举，出版自由等权利，平民对之，却很冷淡，因为他们觉得这些权利给资产阶级用作反抗权力与贵族的侵害，的确是很好的，其实只是统治阶级维持自己权力的工具罢了。总之，这些权利还算不得真实的政治的权利，因为人民大众优势得不到半点保障；人们所以还以堂皇的名称装饰他们，因为我们的政治辞令只是统治阶级为自己的利益与需要，特地创造出来的隐语罢了。
+
+
+
+真的，政治的权利若不是那些无力使人尊敬此等权利的人用来保护他们的独立尊严与自由的武器，那它又算得了什么呢？它要是不做那些需要解放者的解放工具，他又有什么效用呢？甘必大、俾斯麦[31]与格莱斯顿[32]之流用不到出版与集会的自由，因为他们能写他们所愿写的，跟他们所愿意的人集会，宣传他们所愿宣传的；他们早就解放了，他们是自由的。说话写作集会等等自由需要保障的，是那些没有充分力量使人尊敬他们自由意志的人。这就是一切政治的权利的由来。
+
+在这一观点上说，我们所说的政治的权力是否专为这些需要的人而有呢？
+
+当然不是的。普通选举有时保护资产阶级抵抗中央权力的蹂躏，直到某种程度，使他们为着自卫毋须时常借助于凶险的暴力。他能恢复夺取权力的两种力量的平衡，能使他们不会像从前那样一定要利用刀剑的相击，但是要推翻权力，消灭统治，甚或限制两者的范围，普通选举则一无用处。统治者和平解决其争端的优良武器，对于被统治者能，有什么好处呢？
+
+普通选举的历史不是在那边替我们说话吗？只要资产阶级惧怕普通选举成为平民手中的武器，平民可以用它来反抗特权者的压迫时，他们总是竭力反对的。待1848年给他们证明普通选举不但并不可怕，而反可以用它来鞭策平民，使平民好好地服从他们指挥的时候，他们就立刻接受了，现在是资产阶级本身来做他的保护人了。因为他们知道，这是维持他们特权的好武器，至于要用它来反抗资产阶级的特权，那是绝对没有力量的。
+
+
+
+出版的自由也是一样，资产阶级维护出版自由的最有决定性的证据是什么？就是它（出版自由）的无能！是的，它的无能，吉拉丹先生（M. De Girardin）[33]对于出版无能这题目做了整本的书。他说：“从前人们把术士烧死，因为他们愚蠢，相信这些人物是有无上的能力，今日人们对于出版，也做同样的蠢事，因为他们也相信他有至高的权威。其实一点也没有什么，他不过跟中古的术士一样无能。所以再不必迫害出版物了。”看，这就是吉拉丹先生从前发表过的理论。现在当一般资产阶级分子彼此间讨论到出版自由的时候，他们又用什么维护的论证呢？他们说，请看英国，瑞士与北美合众国。那里的出版是自由的，可是资本家的剥削比任何别的地方都来的稳固，资本的统治比任何别的地方都来的有保障。他们又添加说：“请让这些危险的学说自由产生吧，除了借助于暴力之外，我们就没有别的方法制止那些报纸的声浪吗？假若革命的出版物，遇到骚动的机会一旦成为危险的武器时，那么，我们也还有时间利用种种托词去消灭他！”[34]
+
+对于集会的自由，也是同样的议论。资产阶级说：“我们让出集会的完全自由吧，他不会损害我们的特权。我们所应该惧怕的是秘密结社，公开集会只是减弱其力量的最好方法。假如遇着过度的激动，公开集会变成危险的时候，我们总有方法扑灭它们，因为我们握着政府的力量呢。”
+
+“住房的不可侵犯么？好吧！请你们把它写入法典，并在屋顶上呼喊吧！”资产阶级的坏蛋这样说。“我们不愿意警察突然来扰乱我们的小家庭，但是我们可以成立秘密办公处去监视嫌疑分子，我们可以在全国各地派驻暗探，我们可以抄录危险人物的名单，我们秘密的防备他们。等我们嗅到情形恶化的时候，我们就毫无顾忌地冲进去，管它可侵犯不可侵犯；我们从床上逮捕人，我们倾箱倒柜，我们到处搜查！尤其是我们大胆闯进去的时候，人们如果喊得太高，我们一样的囚禁他们，并对别的人说：‘先生们。这是不得已呀！公事是公事，我们也遵命而行呢！’人家一定会赞许我们的。”
+
+“通信的秘密呢，请你到处说，到处写，到处喊通信不可侵犯的吧。假如某村办事处的主任，由于好奇心，拆开了一封信，你们可以立即将他撤职，并且公开的说他：‘多么可恶的恶魔！多么该死的罪犯！’请你们当心，不要把我们彼此在信中所说的小秘密泄露出去。但当我们听到有损我们特权的阴谋发生时，那么我们正可以不必客气，我们拆开一切信件，必要时我们还可以雇佣大批人员来做这种工作，如果有人反对，我们正如英国一位阁员新进在议会喝彩之下所做过似的，直截了当地回答他们：‘是的，先生们，我们何尝愿意拆开信件，我们实在是硬着心肠，十二分厌恶地做的这件工作；这特别是因为我们的祖国（换言之，贵族与资产阶级）已濒临险境呢’……”
+
+
+
+看，以上就是这些所谓政治自由的分析。
+
+出版与集会自由，住宅的不可侵犯，以及其他等等权利只在平民不用他们来反对特权阶级利益的条件之下，才会被人尊重。一旦他们要用它来消灭特权的时候，这一切所谓自由，都会被人丢入水中。
+
+这是很自然的，人类只能享受以无上斗争取得的权力，只有随时准备以武器自卫的人们才有可享的权利。
+
+现在在巴黎街上，人们，所以不敢如在敖德萨[35]一样，随意的鞭挞男女，是因为政府如果胆敢这样做，人民一定会把执行的人扯为碎片。现在一个贵族出门，他的侍从们所以不敢用鞭杖在街上前后左右地打人，也因为这个贵族的侍从若有的这样的意思，就会当场被人殴死，工人与雇主在路上或公共的场所，所以还有某种平等的存在，也因为工人由以前屡次革命所获得的个人尊严的情感，不允许他在众人面前忍受雇主的侮辱，与这些在法律上的所谓权力，实在没有多大关系。
+
+
+
+在今日分成主人与奴隶的社会中，真正的自由显然不能存在；世上只要有剥削者与被剥削者，统治者与被统治者存在，所谓的自由是永无实现的希望的，这不是说无政府的革命没有来扫除社会的界限之前，我们愿意看着出版物像在德国那样被封锁，集会自由像在俄国那样被废除，人身不可侵犯像在土耳其那样被缩减。我们随是资本的奴隶，我们也期盼我们能写我们所愿写的，能集合我们所愿集合的，能组织我们所愿组织的，这正是为着摆脱资本的束缚呢。
+
+现在已可以觉悟我们并不是向宪法去要求这些权利，并不是什么法律——一张统治者可以任意撕掉的纸片，能保护我们的自然权利。我们只有在自己组成力量的时候，才能使别人尊重的意志与权利。
+
+我们要获得说我们所愿说，写我们所愿写的自由吗！我们愿意有集会与组织的权利吗！请不必要求下议院批准，也不必请上医院颁布法律。我们要自己成为有组织的力量，待有人想阻止我们说话或集会的时候，我们便能抵抗他们；我们要做强者，我们若是强者，我可担保任何人都不敢来损害我们说话，写作，印刷与集会的自由。我们要是能够在被压迫者中间联合起来，能使成千成万的人们走到街上，做保护我们权利的示威，任何人都不敢与我们争夺这些权利以及我们知道要求的其他自由。那时，只有那时，凡以前向议会乞求数十年而仍无结果的权利，一下就会落到我们的手中，那时，如此得来的这些权力，总比写在纸上来的可靠。
+
+自由，不是从天而下，而要我们自己去争取！
+
+
+### 第六章 告青年
+
+#### Ⅰ
+
+我今天要和一班青年谈话。至于那些老年人（这自然是指那些精神上衰老的人）只好请他们把这本书放开，不要去白费他们的眼力读一本跟他们没有关系的书。
+
+我假定你大概有了十八或二十岁左右的年纪；你刚刚学完你的手艺，或者刚刚在学校毕业出来；你就要走进实生活里面去了。我想你的头脑很清楚，已经摆脱了人家尽力要使你相信的种种迷信：你不害怕魔鬼，你也不去听那些教士牧师胡说乱道。而且更进一层，我想你还不是一个纨袴子弟，那种人是堕落社会中的不良产物，他们一天穿着时髦的衣服，扮起猢狲般的面孔在马路上出风头，在这样的年纪，他们也已经只知道拼命花费以图自己享乐了！我假定你和这般人完全相反，你是有良心的，因为这个缘故我才来和你谈话。
+
+我知道一个当头的问题已经放在你的面前了。你很多次问过你自己道：“我要做一个什么样的人呢？”事实上一个人在年轻的时节，他就知道他花费好几年功夫学习了一种职业，研究了一种学问（要注意这种学习和研究的费用都是社会供给他的），并不是想用它去做榨取的工具谋个人的私利；如果他不曾想到将来要应用他的智慧、他的才能、他的学识去帮忙解放那般陷在贫困和愚昧中的人，那么他就是完完全全堕落了，变坏了。
+
+你是一个有理想的人，可不是吗？好，让我们来看看，你要怎样做，才可以使你的理想变为现实。
+
+
+
+我不知道你生在什么样的人家，你的环境怎样。也许你的命运好，你研究过各种科学；你就要去做医生，做律师，做文学家或者做科学家了；你的前程是很远大的；你刚刚走进实生活里面去的时候，就己经有了丰富的知识和熟练的技能。也许你只是一个普通职工，你的科学知识仅仅限于在初等学校里学得的那一点儿，可是你却有着机会去直接观察现在的工人过着怎样疲劳困苦的生活。
+
+现在就假定你是前一种人，我先和你谈谈，然后再去和后一种人谈话；我以为你是受过科学教育的。假定你要去做一个……医生。
+
+明天就有一个穿着工衣的男子来请你去给一个妇人看病。他把你领进一条窄巷子，巷子是那样窄，两边的住户差不多可以在过路人的头上握手；你借着一盏油灯的摇摇欲灭的灯光，在那臭气熏人的空气里爬上铺满灰尘的又险又窄的楼梯，爬了两层、三层、四层、五层，才进了一间阴暗冷湿的房子，看见那个病人躺在一张破床上，盖着龌龊的破被，还有几个脸色苍白青黑的小孩只穿了一点单薄的破衣服在那里冷得发抖，大大地睁着眼睛望你。那个丈夫辛苦了一辈子，无论是怎样繁重的工作，每天总是劳动十二三个钟头；可是现在他失业已经三个月了。在他的那种职业里，失业照例是每年都有的，本不算一回稀罕的事；不过他从前失业的时候，妻子还可以出去做做短工……也许就是去洗你们的衬衫，每天赚得三十个铜子；但是现在她已经病了两个月了，这家庭于是更加穷困悲惨了。
+
+医生先生，你怎样给那个病人开药方呢？你一看就知道她的病源是普通的贫血，营养不足，缺乏新鲜空气。你叫她每天吃点好饮食吗？你叫她去做一点露天的运动吗？你叫她换一间干燥的，空气流通的房子吗？这真是莫大的讽刺！要是她能够这样做，她就用不着等你来指教，她自己早已经做了！
+
+如果你的心肠好，言语又直爽，态度也诚恳；那么这家人会告诉你许许多多的事情。他们会告诉你在板壁的那一边住着几个可怜的熨衣女工，她咳嗽那样厉害，你听了她的咳声也要心痛；在下一层房子里，所有的小孩们全都患着寒热病，住在楼下的那个洗衣妇大概也不会活到第二年的春天了；还有住在隔壁房子里的那些人，他们的境况还要更坏。
+
+你对这般病人说些什么话呢？劝他们改良饮食，转地疗养，少劳苦一点吗……这些话，你当然想说，但是你却不敢说出口，你只得忍住心痛，满口咒诅地走出来。
+
+第二天，你还在想那些住在破屋里的人，你的同事就跑来告诉你，昨天有个仆人用一辆华丽的车子来接他。这是去给一个住在高楼大厦里的富家太太诊病；这个女人一生专门讲究打扮；交际、跳舞，或者和一个愚笨的丈夫口角，时常通宵不眠，现在弄得憔悴不堪。你的同事劝她：生活不要太放荡了，饮食也该吃点清淡的，多在新鲜空气里散步，脾气也不要太暴躁；她既然不做一点生产的劳动，也应该多少做点轻巧容易的室内体操！
+
+前一个女人病死了，因为她一辈子从没有吃饱过，也从没有休息够；后一个女人憔悴了，因为她一辈子闲着，从来不知道劳动是怎样的一回事。……
+
+
+
+如果你是一个生性柔弱的人，对于什么事都可以忍耐下去，便是看见那些最令人生气的事情也不过是轻轻叹一口气，或者喝一杯酒来安慰自己，那么时间过久了，你就会渐渐觉得像上面那种不平的生活对照并不是什么稀奇的事情了，你的兽性又会鼓舞你，使你只存着一个念头，就是你自己也跑到那般享乐的人里面去，免得以后再和穷人为伍。然而如果你还是一个“人”，如果你要你的一切情感都用志愿的行为表现出来，如果你的灵性还没有被兽性完全毁灭，那么你会有一天回到家里一面对自己说：“不，这是不公道的，我们不应该让它这样延长下去。”单是治病并没有用处，我们应该预防疾病。只要大众的生活稍微富裕一点，知识稍微发达一点，就可以给我们减少一半的病人和一半的疾病。医药有什么用处！我们最先需要的还是空气、食物和不太过度的劳动。要是没有这些，那么所谓医生这种职业不过是欺骗和虚伪罢了。
+
+那时候你就会懂得社会主义了。你就愿意研究它了；如果你还觉得利他主义并不是一个毫无意义的名辞，如果你应用自然科学家的严正的归纳法去研究社会问题，你最后就会跑到我们的队伍里面来，你会和我们一样为社会革命努力工作了。
+
+
+
+但是你也许会说：“我不要干实行的事情！我们还是去做天文学家、物理学家、化学家，专心去研究纯粹科学。纯粹科学是永远会有好结果的，即使对于现在的人没有多大好处，后代的人终究会得到它的利益。”
+
+我们姑且先来考究你研究科学的动机是什么，你要在科学里面寻求些什么东西。难道就只是那种快乐，那种由于研究自然界神秘，运用我们的智力而得到的快乐吗？不错，那种快乐自然是很大的。然而我要问你：一个为了使自己生活得愉快而研究科学的学者和一个只图一时的快乐拿酒来开心的醉汉，究竟有什么不同呢？自然，学者选择快乐的泉源，是比较更聪明点，因为他从那里面得到的快乐是更来得浓厚，更来得长久。但也就只有这一点小差别！此外，学者也罢，醉汉也罢，他们都怀着同样的利己的目的，这就是个人自身的快乐。
+
+但是你决不如此，你决不情愿过那种利己的生活。你研究科学，是想为人类尽力，你有了这个思想，才决定去研究科学。
+
+好一个美妙的幻想呵！其实，我们里面不论哪个人，当初献身科学的时候，谁不曾有过这个幻想呢？
+
+然而如果你真正是在为人类着想，如果你研究科学的目的真正是在为人类谋幸福，那么你一定会遇见一个可怕的难题了；因为，只要你还有一点公正的精神，你一定立刻会看见在现在的社会里科学不过是一件奢侈品；只能使极少数的人生活过得格外舒服，而人类的大多数，差不多可以说人类全体，却绝对不能得到它的利益。
+
+
+
+事实上，在一百多年以前科学就己经建立了正确的宇宙组织论的观念，然而如今有着这观念的人，或者有真正科学的批评精神的人究竟有了多少呢？至多不过几千人罢了，在那至今还抱着野蛮人的偏见和迷信，因此常常被那般宗教的骗子愚弄的亿万人中间，这个小数目算得什么一回事！
+
+再举一个例来说，关于我们的身心两方面的卫生，科学也已经给我们造就了许多合理的基础了，但是请你睁开眼睛去看看它的成绩怎样。科学告诉我们，要怎样生活才能够保持我们身体的健康；要怎样做才能够使我们人口的团聚顺遂繁荣；它又给我们指出了达到道德的与知识的幸福之路。但是科学家在这两方面所成就的巨大工作至今还不过是些书本中的死文字！并没有被人实行过。这是什么缘故呢？这是因为到现在科学还只是极少数的特权者所专利的东西，这是因为社会的不平等把现社会分成两个阶级（一方面是工钱的奴隶，另一方面是资本的盗贼），使得一切关于合理的生活情形的教训对于十分之九的人类毫无益处，不过是一种可悲的嘲笑罢了。
+
+
+
+我还可以给你举出许多例子，但是我不必多说了，我请你从浮士德的书斋里走出来罢[36]，那里的玻璃窗已经被堆积的灰尘弄黑了，很难放阳光进来照耀在书本上；请你走出来看看四周的情形，你自己随时随地都会找到证据来证明这个思想的正确。
+
+在这时候，我们已经用不着去增加科学的真理，和增加科学的发现了。最重要不过的事，还是在传布科学所已经获得的那些真理，把它们应用到实际生活上去，使成为万人公有的东西。我们应该设法，使人类全体都能了解而且应用科学的真理；这样科学才不再会是一件奢侈品，而变成万人的生活的基础。要这样才合于正义！
+
+进一步说：为科学本身计，也非如此不可。因为要先有一个准备来容受新的真理的社会，科学才会有真正的进步。例如“热之机械的起源论”在十八世纪就已经有人发明了，与现在哈恩[37]及克劳宿司[38]所立的公式完全一样，但是被埋没在学院的报告里至八十年之久，直到物理学的知识散布较广，使一般人有容受这学说的可能时，这学说才为世人所注重。又如伊拉莫司·达尔文[39]的关于种种变化的思想，要经过了三代，才从他的孙儿查理·达尔文的口里得到世人的赞同，而且还要备受当时舆论的压迫，才得被学院派的学者们承认。学者和诗人或艺术家一样，永远是他自己在其中活动、教导的那个社会的产物。
+
+
+
+但是如果你真正了解这些思想，你一定会明白现在最重要的事情就是在把不平等的现状根本改造过，这种不平等的现状判定了少数学者的头脑里装满着真理，而差不多全体的人类至今还是和在五百年前、一千年前一样，这就是说这是在做奴隶和机器，不能够了解已经确立的真理。将来有一天，你如果彻底了解了这个广大的、人道的，而且完全科学的思想，那时候你就会马上失掉对于纯粹科学的趣味，你会去研究实行这种改革的方法，而且如果你在这种研究当中，也抱着你作科学的研究时的那种公平态度，你就一定会相信社会主义了；你一定会撇开那些曲论邪说，跑到我们队伍里面来了；你不高兴再去辛辛苦苦地劳动，给那已经是很幸福的少数人谋幸福，你如今要用你的学识和热心，马上来给被压迫阶级尽力了。
+
+到了那时候，一方面你觉得已经尽了那应尽的义务，他方面你的感情和行为又真是完全一致，那么你一定会发现你自己有那么多的能力，是你以前梦想不到会有的。到了后来会有一天（不管你的教师们怎样不高兴，那一天不久就会到来的），会有一天，我说，你本应该去尽力，促成的那个改革在实行了，那时候众人共同来作集合的科学研究，而且劳动群众也要来用他们的有力的协助为科学尽力，在这种情形之下，科学得到了新的力量，便自然会有一个新的发展，至于现在科学的迟缓的进步，若拿来和这个发展相比，简直等于小学生的简单的练习而已。
+
+
+
+到了那时候就让你去享受科学生产的快乐罢：这种快乐将成为万人共有的了。
+
+#### Ⅱ
+
+假使你学完了法律，预备去做个律师，那么你对于你将来的活动也许会有不少的幻想——你看，我还假定你是一个好人，一个懂得利他主义的人！你也许会想：“还是把自己的一生用来反抗一切的不正不义，继续不断地和它们勇猛地奋斗！永久不停地努力去求得法律的胜利！法律，那是至上的正义之表现！还有什么职业能够是比这更美丽的吗？”于是你满怀着自信心走进实生活里面去从事你所选定的那种职业。
+
+好，我们随便来翻开一本诉讼记录，看看社会里的实际情形究竟怎样。
+
+
+
+现在有个有钱的地主来要求法庭替他赶走一个欠租的佃户。根据法律的立场看来，这件事非常明白，用不着一点踌躇：那个农夫既然不付田租，他就应该滚蛋。但是我们如果把事实详细调查起来，我们就会明白：那个地主把他的田租天天耗费在饮酒作乐的事情上面，而那个农夫却是从早到晚劳动不息。地主自己对于改良他的土地的事，一点也没有做，但是因为敷设铁道、修筑新路、填干沼泽、开拓荒地的结果，五十年来地价涨高了三倍。而那个勤劳辛苦，对于地价的腾贯功劳最大的农夫却因此破家，落于盘剥重利者之手，负着满身的债，不能再付地主的田租了。但是法律是丝毫不能通融的；法律永远保护财产，依了法律，总是地主有理。但是你的良心，你的公道的情感，还没有全被法律的证言所蒙蔽，所摧残；（你将怎样办呢？你还是主张强迫佃户滚蛋呢？——这是法律所规定的；还是主张地主应该把佃户的劳力所增加的一部分的地价偿还给佃户呢？——这样才算得是公平。你究竟站在哪一方面呢？去拥护法律而反对公道吗？还是去主张公道呢？主张公道，那么，你就要反对法律了！
+
+又如工人没有预先通知厂主就罢工，那时候你究竟帮助哪一方面呢？依着法律你就应该站在厂主的一边。但是那个厂主利用着恐慌的时机发了横财，工人们每天只得着两个法郎五十生丁的工钱，眼睁睁看着妻儿们瘦弱下去。这样你还帮助厂主吗？可是你要是站在工人一边，你就不得不反对法律了。自然别人会向你提起尊重契约的话。其实所谓“契约自由”不过是骗人的诡计。你究竟去拥护它呢？你还是去拥护公道？依着公道来说，一个饱食终日不愁饥寒的人和一个出卖劳力以图苟活的人所订的契约，一个强者和一个弱者所订的契约根本就不能够算做契约！
+
+
+
+再举一个例。有一天一个男子在巴黎一家肉店旁边徘徊了好一会儿，忽然拿起一块牛排逃走了。人家捉住他仔细拷问，才知道他是一个失业的工人，他和他的全家四天来没有吃一点东西了。有人请求那个卖肉的放了这人，但是他一定要去讲理。结果卖肉的告到警察局，这男子被判处了六个月的监禁。这正是盲目的神圣法律的意旨！这样的判决不只一件，每天都有。你看见多了时，你的良心难道还不会反抗现社会吗？
+
+还有一个男子，幼年时代教养太坏，又受着虐待，一直到了长大成人从没有听见过一句同情的话，后来为了抢一百个铜子，就杀了他的邻人，那时候你会去根据法律，要求严办他吗？其实你很明白，与其说这人是个罪人，不如说他是个病人，是个疯子，无论如何，他的犯罪是我们全社会的罪恶养成的，并不是他自己的过错，你明白了这道理以后，你还去要求处他死刑吗？或者更残酷点去要求把他关在牢里二十年吗？
+
+有些织工因为一时的绝望，就放火去烧工厂，你会根据法律主张把他们投入监牢吗？有个人因为一个帝王滥杀无辜，于是狙击了他，你会根据法律，主张把这人监禁终身或者判处死刑吗？有些人竖起革命之旗，以反叛现社会，你会去根据法律，主张把他们完全枪毙吗？
+
+不不不！一千个不！
+
+
+
+你如果不死守成见，人云亦云，而能够依据理性判断事情，你如果把法律加以分析，并且把那一层一层的掩蔽法律的云雾完全拨开，去了解法律的真正的起源和本质，你就大大地轻视法律了：因为法律的起源，是由于保护强者的权利的，而法律的本质，也无非要人尊重那人类惨酷的历史所遗留下来的一切压迫而已。你会明白，你如果遵守成文的法律，非天天违反你的良心上的法律去和罪恶敷衍不可了，但是这种冲突是不能长久继续下去的，你或者抹煞你的良心去做个坏蛋，不然，你一定会打破传统思想来和我们一起，努力去打破这一切经济上、社会上、政治上的不义了。
+
+可是，到了那时，你会做一个社会主义者了。你会做一个革命者了。
+
+
+
+还有你，青年工程师，你梦想着把科学的发明应用在各种工业上，以改善劳动者的生活，你会得到多么悲痛的失望和苦闷呵！你用尽你的青年的智力计划建筑一条铁路，环绕悬崖，贯通大山，会把被自然分开的两个国家连接起来，但是，到了动工的时候，你亲眼看见成群结队的工人，因为贫乏和疾病，在那阴暗的隧道中大批地死亡；你亲眼看见其余未死的工人，作完工回家，只带了很少的工钱回去，但是带去的痨病虫却是不少；你亲眼看见你的铁路每进一尺，就要牺牲许多工人的性命——这全是资本家的卑劣的贪婪的结果；到了后来，铁路终于完成了，你又亲眼看见你辛辛苦苦建筑的铁路，现在变成运载侵略军炮队的大道了！……
+
+你为了要使生产方法更为简易起见，把你青年的时光和精力全用在一件发明上面；经了许许多多的努力，许多次彻夜不眠以后，你终于得到那个有价值的发明了。你去实地试验一下，结果很好，竟超过了你的希望。但是一两万工人却因此失业了！工厂里剩下的大半是些童工，他们完全变成了和机械一样的东西！只有三四个乃至十个资本家因此发了大财，在举杯相庆！你当初的梦想果然就是这样的吗？
+
+你如果把近代工业的发展史研究一下，你会知道缝衣机器的发明，对于缝工们并没有一点好处，真是一点好处都没有；金钢钻镶头的打洞机虽然发明了，但是在圣哥塔隧道中的工人仍然免不掉死于关节固著病；起重机发明了，泥水匠和短工依然照常失业；你如果用你研究机械问题时所用的独立精神来讨论社会问题，你一定会得到这样的结论：在私有财产和工钱奴隶的制度之下，任何新发明都不能够增进工人的幸福，并且反会使他们所受的压迫更加厉害，工作更加退步，失业的时期更加增多，恐慌更加剧烈罢了；而真正得到新发明的利益的，就只是那少数已经享尽幸福的资本家。
+
+你得到这个结论了！那么，你将怎样办呢？
+
+或者，你先会用种种诡辩抹煞了你的良心；后来有一天，你就把你青年时代的真诚的理想完全抛弃，你一心一意只是去争夺权利，谋你自己个人的快乐——到那时候你就走进掠夺者的队伍里去了。否则，如果你是有良心的，你便会对你自已说：“不！现在不是需要新发明的时候！我们第一步要做的事是努力去改造生产制度！到了私有财产毁灭以后，每个工业上的新的进步，都会使人类全体得到它的利益；现在做着机械的千千万万的工人到了那时，也都成了能够思想的人，他们的智力，因了受教育和熟习体力工作的缘故便格外发展，那时候全都应用在工业上，那么机械的进步一定会有非常的速度，以后五十年间所能完成的工作，我们在现今连做梦也想不到。”
+
+
+
+对于做小学教员的，我要向他说什么话呢？自然那些把教书当做一种讨厌的职业的人，我是不愿和他们谈话的；我要对他谈话的人，是那个在一群天真烂漫的儿童中间，天天在他们快乐的面貌、欢欣的嬉笑里过生活，自己觉得饶有兴趣的人，是那个尽力想把他自己幼年时代所怀抱的人道的思想，启发培植在这般儿童的小小头脑中的人。我时常看见你很愁闷，而且我也知道你为什么不快活。你最爱的那个学生，他学拉丁文成绩并不很好，这是的确的，但是他的心肠确是不坏，他今天背诵威廉·退尔的故事[40]的时候，是多么地激昂慷慨！他的两眼发着光，他好像要把世界上所有一切专制魔王立刻完全刺死；他非常愤激地朗诵席勒的热情的句子：
+
+> 站在正在毁坏镣铸的奴隶的面前，
+
+> 站在自由人的面前你不要打战！
+
+但是他一回到家里，他的父母伯叔因为他对于牧师或警察略有失体，就重重地责骂他一顿：他们教他“小心谨慎尊敬官长，卑顺服从”，整整教训了一点钟，等他把席勒的剧本抛在旁边，去改读那《处世要诀》才罢了。
+
+昨天你还听见说你的那些最好的学生如今全都变坏了：某人一心一意只想做官，某人与资本家勾结，掠夺了工人的微少可怜的血汗工钱；而你呢？你从前对于这般青年抱了那么多的希望，现在你才想到现实生活与你的理想中间是有着一个何等可悲的冲突了。你在纳闷了。你现在还在纳闷呢！但是我敢断言不到两年，经过许许多多次的失望以后，你就会把你所爱读的好书抛开了，到后来你竟会说：“威廉·退尔当然是个很好的人，但是他终不免有点呆气；至于诗歌，在围炉消寒时，它确是一件好东西，尤其是一个人在教了一整天复利计算法以后，读着诗歌，会觉得舒服，不过究竟说起来，诗人总是在云雾中空想，他们的诗歌对于现今的日常生活，以及下次督学的考察，都没有一点关系……”
+
+
+
+或者，你并不是一个这样的人，你会使你少年时期的梦想成为壮年时期的坚强的信仰。你的理想是要实现那普遍的、人道的教育，使学校内外的人都能得到它的益处。但是只要你睁开眼睛一看，就知道在现社会制度下面这种教育是不可能的，你自然会去攻击这个资产阶级社会的基础了。那时候你就会被教育官厅革了职，你便脱离了学校到我们里面来，同我们在一起工作；你就会去告诉那些年龄比你来得大而学识却比你浅薄的人：知识是一件多么可爱的东西！你会去告诉他们，人类应该怎样，而且能够怎样。你一定会来和社会主义者合作，共同努力去把现社会完全改造，以求得到真正的平等，真正的博爱和永久的自由。
+
+
+
+还有你们，青年的艺术家、雕刻家、画家、诗人或音乐家！你们不看见那曾经触动过你们的先辈的灵感的“圣火”，到现在全都消失了吗？现在的艺术流于平凡庸俗，你们难道会不看见吗？
+
+要怎样才会不这样呢？那种重新发现古代世界的喜悦和浸润在自然源泉中的喜悦，产生了文艺复兴时代那许多杰作，这种喜悦，现代文艺里早已是没有的了；革命的理想在现代艺术里早已消失；现代艺术因为没有别的更高的理想，便自以为在写实主义里面找到了一个，这就是呆呆板板照像似地用颜色去绘一粒草上的露珠，描一只母牛大腿的筋肉，或是仔仔细细地用散文和诗歌去描写一条阴沟里的臭泥，一个上等妓女的卧房！
+
+
+
+你要说了：“倘使果真是这样，又该怎么办呢？”
+
+我的回答是：如果你以为你自己所有的圣火，只是微弱得像一支将灭的烛光，那么，你很可以照你以前那样继续地做下去；你的艺术不久就会成为一种职业，去替小商店装饰门面，替下等小戏园去作剧本，替无聊的小报去作小说——现在的艺术家，大半已经很快地向着这方面堕落下去了！……
+
+但是如果你的心的的确确与人类全体的心谐和一致地跳动着，如果你是一个真正的诗人，你有一双诗人的耳朵去注意人生，那么，你亲眼看见那苦海，它的波涛一天天在你四周汹涌；你亲眼看见那些饥饿垂死的平民，你亲眼看见那些累累堆积于矿穴里的死尸；你亲眼看见那些障碍物脚下堆积如山的残废的革命者的尸体，你亲眼看见那些成群结队被流放的革命者或去葬身在西伯利亚的冰天雪窖里，或去晒死在热带孤岛的海岸上；你亲眼看见那个绝望的苦斗；在那斗争中充满了败者的惨呼和胜者的欢笑：一方面是英雄气概、崇高热情，一方面是怯懦阴险、卑鄙狠毒——那时候你再也不能袖手旁观静守中立了：你一定会来加入被压迫者的队伍里面，因为你很知道美、崇高，和生命，都是永远赞美那些为光明，为人道，为正义而奋斗的人的！
+
+
+
+够了！你不要我再说下去了！
+
+你一定要说了：“怎样办呢？如果抽象科学只是一件奢侈品，医生这个职业只是一件骗人的事，如果法律是一件最不公道的东西，如果机械的发明只是给资本家做一个掠夺的工具；如果教育只能够迎合流行的社会心理，如果艺术没有革命的理想，一定只有堕落，那么，其余还有什么事，我可以去做的呢？”
+
+
+
+好罢，我来回答你：有一件最伟大最令人奋发兴起的工作，做这工作时，你的行动和你的良心会完全一致，毫无矛盾，这工作是最高尚最能干的人所愿意做的。
+
+
+
+一件怎样的工作呢？让我来告诉你罢。
+
+#### Ⅲ
+
+这里有两条路听你选择：或者渐渐地抹煞你的良心，终有一天你就会这样一说了事：“只要我能够享尽一切快乐，只要民众永远这样愚蠢，尽管让我这样做，那么，即使人类全体灭亡，我也不管！”不然你就加入社会主义者的队里，和他们一起努力去把现社会根本改造过。这个结论是我们前面分析的必然的结果。凡是有点聪明的人，只要他能够摆脱他所受的资产阶级教育的伪论、诡辩、邪说，只要他能够完全不顾他的亲友们的利己的观念，只要他对于他四周的事物，能够加以公平忠实的判断，那么，他也会得着我们的这个结论：而且只有这一个结论，才是合乎伦理的。
+
+既然达到了这个结论，那么问题马上就起来了：“怎样办呢？”
+
+这个问题是不难解决的。
+
+只要你脱离你现在所处的环境，只要你脱离那轻视工人，把工人当做一群牛马看待的环境，亲自走到民间去，这个问题便会立即解决了。
+
+你会看见在任何地方，无论是在法国、德国、英国、美国或是意大利，只要那里有着享受特权的和被压迫的两个阶级，那么，在劳动阶级里面一定就有个伟大的运动在发展进行，这运动的目的，一方面要把资本主义的封建制度所产生的奴隶制度完全破坏，使它永远不能恢复，一方面又要给一个建立在正义和平等上面的新社会树立基础。今天的民众不再唱十八世纪的农奴们和十九世纪的斯拉夫农民所唱的那些伸诉他们痛苦的撕裂人心的悲歌了；对于今天的民众它们已经是不够的了；今天的民众已经十二分地觉悟了，他们不顾一切阻碍，正在那里努力奋斗来解放他们自己！
+
+现在的民众时时刻刻都在那里深思苦想，要研究出一个方法使得生活不再是四分之三的人类的咒诅物，像它在今天那样；而变成人类全体的幸福。现在的民众正在研究社会学中最困难的问题。他们要用他们的常识、他们的观察力、他们的悲苦的经验去解决这些问题。他们为了要联络别的和他们一样贫苦的人，便设法组织起来，联合起来，他们组织团体，困苦万分地以微少的捐款来维持；他们努力去和外国的民众携手。他们对于防止国际战争所做的工作，远胜于空口说白话的慈善家。而且为了知道别地同志做的事情，为了要和别地同志更有联络，为了要研究传播他们的思想，他们不得不用了绝大的努力来维持他们自己的劳动刊物。后来时期终于到了，他们便起来用他们的热血染红了战场，他们努力前进去争这些自由，但是革命以后，那些有金钱有势力的人，反将这些自由变成自己的特权，转而用来压制平民。
+
+这是怎样一个继续不断的苦斗呵！有时要去补足那些因为疲倦、堕落、压迫而离散同志的缺额，有时要去改组被排枪和机关枪所杀散的队伍，有时要去把因为大批屠杀而突然中断的研究重新开始——这是怎样一个前仆后继、困苦艰难的事业呵！
+
+他们的刊物是由那些节衣缩食、牺牲睡眠，而向现社会抢得些少知识的人所经营的；他们的运动是靠着工人尽力节省、忍饿受寒，所省下的一个铜子两个铜子来维持的；而且他们一面这样做，一面时时刻刻地担心着，害怕资本家会知道：“他的工人——他的奴隶，是一个社会主义者”，那么他们立刻就会被开除，立刻会跟着他们的妻室儿女全都陷在最穷苦，最可怕的惨境里面了！
+
+你如果亲自到民间去，你自然会亲眼看见这些事情。
+
+
+
+在这个继续不断，永无止期的奋斗里，工人受了种种困难的压迫，不能翻身，不知已经有了多少次白费气力地这样喊问过：“那般靠了我们的帮助才能够受完教育的青年现在究竟到哪里去了？他们读书的时候，我们辛辛苦苦地劳动着，去给他们吃，给他们穿；我们弯腰曲背，负着重担，饿着肚皮，给他们造了这些房屋，这些学校，这些图书馆；我们苍白着脸，辛辛苦苦地给他们印刷了这些装潢精美的书，我们自已连读也不能够读，那般青年现在究竟到哪里去了？还有那般教员们，他们自以为精通有益于人类的科学，可是他们把人类却看得比一种稀有的毛虫还不如，他们现在都到哪里去了？那般人满口是自由，却眼睁睁看着我们的自由天天被人蹂躏，从来不过问一下，他们现在也到哪里去了？这般著作家、诗人、画家，总而言之，所有那些伪君子，他们两眼含泪谈论着民间疾苦——可是从来不肯亲自到民间来帮助我们，和我们一块儿工作，他们这一般人，现在全都到哪里去了？”
+
+这些人里面一部分随俗浮沉，怯懦卑鄙，对于世上一切不平，全都漠不关心；另一部分，就是那大多数人，都轻视“贱民”，时时刻刻预备着，如果贱民敢去侵犯他们的特权，他们就会开始压迫了。
+
+有时候，当然也会有一个青年，梦想着革命的战斗，到民众的队伍里来，为的是找寻一些兴高采烈，趣味浓厚的事情，但是他一看见那革命道路十分辽远，革命事业非常苦．而且在这条路上固然有他所希望得到的光荣，但同时也是荆棘丛生，于是他就立刻离开民众了。这种人大半是些野心家，他们在前几次选举运动失败以后，现在想来骗取民众的投票，但是到后来，如果民众要把他们平时所主张的主义实地实行起来，他们自己会首先反对平民的，如果民众在没有奉到他们（领袖）的命令以前有什么行动，他们也许竟会摆准大炮对付那些“暴民”。
+
+此外再加上那大多数的愚蠢的侮辱、傲慢的轻蔑、卑劣的诬陷——现代资产阶级的青年在社会进化的事业上所给与民众的帮助就全在这里了！
+
+
+
+你还问：“我们应该怎样办呢？”
+
+现在这时候，什么事情都需要人去做：成千成万的青年都能够找到机会尽量发挥他们的年轻的精力、他们的智力、他们的才干，去帮助民众，做那民众已经开始的伟大事业，到了现在，你还在问“怎样办？”
+
+怎样办呢？让我来告诉你。
+
+你们爱好纯粹科学的人，如果你们的的确确了解了社会主义的原理，如果你们完完全全明白了社会革命的重要，那么，你们难道会不看见那一切科学都应该改造过，才能够不违背这些新原理吗？现在的科学界里应该起个更大的革命，而且要比十八世纪科学界里的革命更重要得多——你们难道会没有看见过这一点吗？现在的历史不过是一些专门给帝王、伟人，以及议会歌功颂德的“鬼话”，应该完全推翻，而另外站在民众的立场上，站在人类进化中民众所完成的事业的立场上重新写过——对于这一点，你们也会不明白吗？还有社会经济学现在是用来掩饰、赞助那资本家的掠夺的，它的根本原理以及它的种种的应用，也都应该从头到尾重新改造：人类学、社会学、伦理学，也都应该完完全全改造过；便是自然科学，从一个新的立场看去，对于那自然现象的概念，以及那说明的方法也应该有个大改革才行，对于这些事，你们难道会不明白吗？既然明白了，那么，就请你们动手去做！把你们的知识用在个好的事业上面！最重要的，是请你们用你们的明晰的论理，帮助我们打破那根深蒂固的成见，用你们的综合来帮助我们研究出个较良好的社会组织的基础；而且要你们来教导我们在我们讨论问题时也会用那真正的科学研究的大胆，并且还请你们以身作则做给我们看：个人为了真理的胜利怎样地去牺牲性命！
+
+至于你们医生，你们根据着痛苦的经验已经认识了社会主义了，就请你们今天、明天，无论哪天，无论什么时候，都毫不厌倦地去告诉人：如果人类的生活状态和工作情形永远像今天这样，毫不变更，那么，人类只有快快地堕落灭亡；你们去告诉人：如果百分之九十九的人类永远像今天这样，在困苦贫乏中过日子，生活情形绝对和科学的教训相反，丝毫不合卫生，那么，所有你们的医药都无法治病了；你们去告诉人：现在不是治病的时候，应该首先铲除的还是病源，并且请你们去告诉人：有什么方法，才能够把这些原因完全铲除掉。请带着你们的解剖刀，坚决果断地割治这个正在腐败毁朽的现社会，来告诉我们，一个合理的生活情形，应该怎样，能够怎样；而且你们要是一个好的外科医生，就请你们继续不断地告诉我们，如果身体的一部分中毒患病，害及全身的时候，那么，就应该还不踌躇，毫不迟疑地立刻把它割掉！
+
+还有你们这般把科学应用在工业上面的青年技师，请你们老老实实地告诉我们，你们的新发现所得的结果究竟怎样；我还请你们去开导那些现在还没有勇气向着未来猛进的人，使他们明白：人类现在已得的各种知识里面包含着不少的新发明。使他们明白，社会状况如果较好点，工业就会怎样地发展起来；而且如果个人永远专为增加人们所需要的物品而从事生产工作，不像现在这样仅仅为了给少数人赚钱，那么，他所生产的东西就会是怎样的丰富了。你们自己也不要再去给少数掠夺者做走狗了！来把你们的理解力，你们的办事才能以及你们的组织能力用来给民众服务罢！
+
+还有你们诗人、画家、雕刻家、音乐家，你们如果明白了你们的真正的使命和艺术本身的利益，那就请你们都来，把你们的笔、你们的画具、你们的雕刀，用在革命事业上面。在你们的慷慨激昂的诗文里，或是在你们的深刻动人的图画上，请把民众反抗压迫者的激烈的斗争描写出来；请把那曾经感动过我们先辈的崇高的革命精神，燃烧到少年的心里去；请来告诉妇人们，如果她的丈夫把他的一生完全用在社会解放的伟大事业上面，那么他的活动就是极其高贵的！请来指示给民众看，现在的生活是多么丑恶！并请设法让他们知道，这种丑恶的原因究竟在什么地方；请来告诉大家，如果人们的生活不处处受到现社会制度的愚蠢和罪恶的妨碍，那么，将来的那个合理的生活会是怎样地美满。
+
+总而言之，凡是你们有知识、有才能、有本领、能勤勉的人，如果你们还有良心，那么就请你们（你们自己和你们的伴侣）都来把你们的知识才能，替那般最需要你们的人做事。不过，如果你们真的到民众中间来了，你们就要牢记住：你们并不是来做首领，而是来做一起斗争的同伴；并不是来管辖支配人，而是到个新环境里来给你们找力量，这种新生活不断地向前迈进，以求达到新社会的实现；你们到民间来，与其说是为了教训人，还不如说是为了要知道民众的希望，为了要把民众的希望仔细研究，组织成一个系统，然后就继续不断、毫不休息地用尽青年的热情努力工作，使这些民众的希望在实际生活上实现出来。到了那时候，而且只有到了那时候，你们才会过着一个完全的、高尚的、合理的生活。你们会看见，你们在这方面所用的努力会有了很多的结果，而且你们会觉得，你们的行为和你们的良心完全一致，毫无矛盾，这个感觉会给你们许许多多的力量，是你们以前连做梦也没有想的。
+
+除了这种在民众中间为真理、为正义、为平等的斗争而外（在这斗争中你们还会博得民众的感激），难道你们一生还能够找到更崇高的事业吗？
+
+#### Ⅳ
+
+我写了怎么多的话才能够使资产阶级的青年明白：他们到社会上服务的时候，一定会遇见许多矛盾，许多痛苦，处在这种进退维谷的境地中，如果他们是勇敢的，是诚实的，那么，他们就不得不去加入到社会主义者里面，一定会去相信社会主义，一定会去和社会主义者一起做那社会革命的工作。这个道理其实是异常简单的！但是一个人要向那般受过资产阶级环境的影响的人说话，不知道应该攻破多少曲论邪说，应该扫除多少成见，应该说服多少自利的反对论呵！
+
+至于你们平民阶级的青年，向你们谈话是比较容易多了。今天我不必像对资产阶级的青年谈话那样反复地申说了。无论你们怎样缺乏思想和行动的胆量，现社会的压迫一定会逼迫你们变成社会主义者的。近代社会主义，本来发生于民众中间，虽然有一些出身资产阶级的思想家来研究社会主义，使它得到科学的证明和哲学的根据，但是他们的思想的根源还是从劳动阶级的共同思想里出来的。国际劳工协会的合理的社会主义（这是我们今日较好的力量）还不是在群众的直接影响之下，在劳工团体中间制造出来的吗？至于那少数参加这种制造工作的著作家，也不过给那已经在一般工人中间表现了的热望找到一个公式罢了。
+
+一个人出身劳动阶级，而不去尽力求社会主义的胜利，那就是看错他的自身的利益，忘却他的本份，抛弃他的历史的使命了。
+
+
+
+你还记得你做小孩的时候，在一个严寒的冬天到那阴暗的院子里玩耍的情景吗？寒气透进了你的薄衣，汗泥渗入了你的破鞋。恰恰在那时候你便看见远远地走过那些肥白的小孩，他们穿得非常华丽，得意扬扬地望着你。你很知道那些小孩虽然衣服很漂亮，但是论到聪明，论到常识，论到能力，他们都不及你和你的一般朋友。后来，你不得不去作工了。你每天早晨从五六点起，就应该去关在个龌龊的工厂里，足足过了十二小时，站在一副响声隆隆的机器旁边，你自己也成了一副机器，一年到头，天天跟着机器的动作，非常单调，毫无兴趣地劳动着；但是在这些时候，他们那般有钱人的孩子却平平静静地由小学而中学，而大学地去受教育了。到了如今，他们虽不及你聪明，但比你多受教育，他们变做了你的主人，他们就要来享受一切人生的快乐，享受一切文明的利益了，而你呢？你的情形怎样？
+
+你作完工回家，走进一间阴暗潮湿的小屋里，那里只有几尺见方的地方，却有五六个人挤在一起；你的母亲年纪虽不很大，但受了困苦生活的折磨，人就显得十分衰老了；她给你一点面包，一点番薯，此外再也没有别的食物，她给你点灰黑色的水，可怜还说这是咖啡呢！你在家里天天要打算这个问题：“有什么方法，明天可以付面包钱，后天怎样去付房租？你在家里再也没有别的娱乐了。”
+
+唉！怎样？你的父母已经过了三四十年这样贫苦的生活，难道你自己也非过这样可怜的生活不可吗？你一辈子辛苦劳动，全是为了使别人可以享受到那金钱，知识和艺术给人的一切快乐，而你自己却只是永远发愁，打算怎样去求得一块面包来糊口——这也是应该的吗？自己永远不要想得到一点高尚的快乐，自己永远不要想得到一点使人生美满的东西，永远去替几个高等流氓做牛马，供给他们一切快乐，一切幸福，你甘心如此吗？你情愿辛辛苦苦，操劳一生，而平时永远是忧愁穷苦，到了失业的时候，还要挨饿受冻吗？（那失业的时期，那恐慌的时期是多么可怕呵！）难道这就是你一生的希望吗？
+
+
+
+也许你会消沉地忍受下去。你看见在这悲惨的境遇里没有一条出路，也许你会这样地对你自己说：“许多代的人全都得着这种命运。现在我呢？我也没有能力，不能够把它改变一点，我也非忍受不可！我们还是努力作工罢！尽我们的力量来勉强支持，只要不会饿死就好了！”
+
+好罢！不要忙！生活本身会来叫你明白的！
+
+有一天，会有一个经济恐慌发生，这个恐慌不再像以前，那时只是一时的现象罢了，现在是一个大恐慌，会使整个工业完全消灭，会使千万的工人挨饿受冻，家破人亡。你也和别人一样，尽力和这个灾难奋斗，但是你不久会看见你的妻儿，你的亲友，在贫困里渐渐地衰弱了，你眼睁睁看着他们这样瘦弱下去，没有东西吃，也没有钱请医生诊断，就这样地在一张破床上慢慢地死掉了！在这个时候，大都市里阳光照耀的马路上，正繁荣地展示着有钱人的欢乐游荡的生活，对于那些饥饿死亡的人，是毫不关心的！那时候，你就会明白：现在的这个社会是多么地令人愤恨的！你会去细想这个恐慌的原因了；你会明白，把千万人的生命给几个贪婪无厌的高等流氓任意支配，这是何等地不平！社会主义者向你说：现社会应该，而且能够彻底地被改造一番，你那时自然会明白他们是有理的了。我们再谈你个人的特殊的事情。有一天，你的主人想从你的身上多掠取几个铜子，好使他的私产更增加一点，他又要减你的工钱了；你自然表示反对，可是他骄傲地对你说：“你如果不愿照我给你的这个价钱作工，你就滚蛋！去吃草去罢！”到那时候你就会明白了，你的主人非但是要尽力剥削你，把你当做一只软弱无用的绵羊，他简直还把你当作一个下贱的畜生；你会明白了，你的主人用工钱制度束缚住你，还以为不足，他简直是要使你给他做一个完完全全的奴隶。你怎样办呢？也许你低头下气，情愿把一个人应有的自尊心完全抛掉，那么，一切的污辱你以后都会受到的。但是，如果你还有一点血气，你听见这话，立刻生起气来，想到你走的这条越过越坏的堕落的路，你就害怕起来，你就开始回骂你的主人，你自然立刻被开除了；社会主义者向你说过：“反抗罢！反抗那经济的束缚罢！因为经济的束缚是一切束缚、一切奴隶制度的根源！”到那时候你会明白这句话是不错的了。到那时候你自然会到社会主义者的队里来占一个地位了，你会和他们一起努力奋斗，去打破一切经济的、政治的、社会的束缚，一切的奴隶制度了。
+
+不到几天，你又会知道那个可爱的少女的事情，她的面貌是那样坦白诚实，她的行动是那样活泼玲珑，她的谈吐是那样流利动人，你以前是非常地爱过她的。她和贫穷奋斗了好几年以后，就不得不离开她的故乡，到一个大都市里去了。她本来很知道，在大都市里，生存竞争是非常厉害的，但是她总希望，至少可以得到一种正当的生活。唉！现在你知道，她的遭遇是怎样的了！她受了一个富家子弟的诱惑，被他花言巧语所欺骗，她用尽她的青春的热情爱他，把她的身子献了给他。可是刚刚过了一年，她就被他抛弃了，只留下一个抱在怀里的婴孩。不过她还不灰心绝望，她依旧勇猛地向前奋斗，可是这个反抗饥寒的斗争实在是太困苦艰难了，她终于在一个贫民医院里断送了性命。……你听见这个消息，怎样办呢？也许你会说：“这是一件很平常的事情，一点也没有什么稀奇，这不是第一次，也不会是最后一次。”你就用许多这种愚蠢的话，想把你以前对她的爱情完全抹煞了，会有一晚，你在一个咖啡店里和几个流氓聚在一起，你用许多龌龊不堪的话去骂这个青年女子，污辱她的名誉。但是，如果你不是一个那样的卑鄙下贱的人，你一想到你以前的爱情，就会心痛如裂；你会去找到那个引诱她的贱东西，当面指出他的罪恶，大骂他一顿；这类事情是天天有的，你会仔细思索这种事情所以发生的原因了，你会明白，如果社会永远是分成两个阶级：一方面是挨饿受冻的穷人，一方面是空闲游荡的富人；一方面是会被花言巧语欺骗的人，一方面是只想满足他们兽性的人，那么，这类事情就永远不会停止。你会明白，无论如何，现在是应该填满这个不平的深渊的时候了，你会快快地跑去加入社会主义者的队里了。
+
+
+
+而且你们劳动阶级的妇女，你们听了那个青年女子的事情以后，难道就没有一点感动吗？你们自己的小女儿现在就在你们的面前嬉笑玩耍，你们抚摩着她们的娇小玲珑的头的时候，你们难道一刻也没有想到过，如果现社会情形不改变，她们长大成人的时候，她们的命运会是怎样的吗？关于你们的妹妹们以及你们自己的儿女的将来，你们难道会刻也没有想到过吗？你们的父亲一辈子受罪，天天愁着伙食钱，除了喝酒买醉以外，就再也没有别的快乐，难道你们情愿你们自己的儿子们也是这样地终身受罪吗？现在，无论什么人只要他从父亲那里得到一笔遗产，有了可以掠夺别人的资本，就可以驱使你们的丈夫，驱使你们的儿子，把他们当作牛马般看待，你们难道会情愿他们永远是这样下去吗？现在，你们的丈夫，你们的儿子，都是被主人驱使的奴隶，被有势力的人赶去做枪炮的肉盾，被有钱的人用来做肥田的粪土，你们难道会情愿他们将来永远是这样下去吗？
+
+不，决不！一千个不！我是很知道你们的，你们的丈夫，起初非常勇敢坚决地参加罢工，但是到了后来，却不得不低声下气地承认那个肥胖的资本家以傲慢轻蔑的口吻所提出的条件。你们听见这消息，一定异常愤怒，全身的血都激动沸腾起来！许多西班牙女子，在某次民众暴动的时候，跑到队伍的前列，露出他们的前胸去迎接兵士们的刺刀。我很知道这种女人是你们异常崇拜的！那个少女听说个关在监牢里的社会主义者被恶官僚侮辱了，就亲自拿了支手枪，去把一颗子弹打进了那官僚的胸腔。我很知道，你们时常提起她的姓名就表示大的尊敬。[41]还有在巴黎公社的时期中，巴黎的劳动阶级的妇女在枪林弹雨下面聚集起来，鼓励她们的男人去奋斗牺牲。我也很知道，你们读到这个历史的时候，你们的心一定跳动得非常厉害的。
+
+你们劳动阶级的妇女，我是很了解你们的，因此我敢断定，你们一定会和那些男子联合起来，同去为将来努力奋斗。
+
+
+
+你们农人、工人、职员、兵士，总而言之，你们一切诚实的男女青年，你们都明白了你们应有的权利了，请你们都加入到我们里面来吧！请你们都来，和你们的兄弟们一起努力去预备社会革命罢！社会革命会把一切奴隶制度完全破坏，会把一切的镣铐完全打断，会把一切旧传统完全打破，给人类全体开辟许多新天地，到后来就会使真正的平等、真正的自由、真正的博爱实现在人类社会中。那时候人人都有工作，人人都能完全享受自己劳动的产物，人人都能尽量发展他们所有的能力；大家终于能够过着合理的、人道的、幸福的生活了！
+
+请你们不要来对我们说：“我们人数太少，能力太薄弱，要想达到我们的这个伟大的目的，是不可能的。”
+
+我们来数一数罢，看看在现社会制度下面，我们这般身受着不义的压迫的人究竟有多少。我们农人整年整月为别人辛苦，把米麦送给主人，自己只吃点秕糠，但我们人数却在亿兆以上！我们的数目是数不清的，我们占着民众的大多数。我们工人整天织绸缎、织丝绒，自己却只能够穿点破烂的衣裳。我们的数目也是极多的；每天汽笛一鸣，工厂放工的时候，各街各巷都被我们工人挤得满满的。我们兵士平时受人指挥，听人命令，我们去吃枪弹，使官长可以升官得赏，我们这些可怜的傻瓜呵，直到今天还只知道去枪杀我们的弟兄，其实只要我们稍微反抗一下，就会看见那些帽插羽毛，身佩勋章，指挥我们的官长们立刻就面无人色了。我们一切吃苦受罪受人侮辱的人我们的数目是数不清的。我们就像大海大洋一般；一切东西全可以被我们沉没，一切阻碍都能够被我们冲破。只要我们大家有决心，我们马上就可以把正义建立起来：地上的一切暴君都会跪倒在我们的脚下！
+
+
+### 第七章 战争[42]
+
+现时欧洲的景象非常沉闷，同时也非常动人。一方面是外交的角逐，每次旧大陆的空气中散有火药的气味时，外交家与政客到处奔走的次数就立刻增加了。他们缔结同盟，拆散同盟，为确保自己的同盟者，他们视人群如畜生，任意讲价，随便买卖。“这几百万头作为我们这家对你那家的担保品；这若干公亩的草地作为饲养他们的场所，这许多码头作为运输羊毛出口的商埠！”这些市场上各人都施展其最能骗人的本领。这就是政治隐语的所谓外交！
+
+另一方面是漫无止境的军备竞争。每日都有更好地杀害我们同类的新发明，新浪费，新借款与新租税。喧嚣的爱国主义，狂热的排外心理，散播国际间的憎恨，成为政治与新闻业最有出息的生意。对儿童的时期他们也不爱惜；他们把孩子们编成队伍，教养他们，要他们憎恨普鲁士人，英国人与意大利人；训练他们，要他们盲目地服从当时的统治者，不管这些统治者是蓝的白的黑的。待21岁的钟声一响，人们就像装载骡马似的，把子弹干粮与食具驼在他们背上，并要他们手里握着一根快枪，教他们跟着军号的声音行走，并像凶兽似的左右杀人，而永不使他们自问究竟是为的什么？是否有确定的目的？站在他们面前的，不论是德国或意大利的挨饿的穷人，或者被贫困所不得已而暴动的他们自己的同胞——军号响了，盲目地杀人吧！
+
+看，这就是我们的统治者与教育家，玩弄他们全部聪明所达到的结果！看，这就是他们赐给我们作为理想的一切智慧，而且这恰恰在各国的穷苦朋友伸手于国际以外互道安好的时代呢！
+
+
+
+“啊！你们不愿意社会主义，你们就将有战争，将有30年的战争，50年的战争。”1848年以后，俄国的革命者赫尔岑[43]这样说。他的话果然应验了，战争已在我们眼前；世界的炮声所以暂时停止，为的是休息一下之后，可以重新在别处轰击而且轰击得更厉害，十年来，欧洲的战争，民族的大屠杀，无时不在威胁我们，而不使我们知道究竟为什么要打仗？同谁打？打谁？以什么原理的名义？为的什么人的利益？
+
+古时如果发生战争，人们至少知道他们为什么相杀。“某国王侮辱我们的国王，所以我们杀死他的百姓”，“某某皇帝想夺去我们皇帝的省份，所以为保存我们神圣陛下的领土，我们慷慨赴义吧。”这是说从前是国王的竞争打仗；现在我们都知道这样是顶愚蠢的，而且国王们为着这一类的理由，只能募集少数的人供他牺牲。今天，奇怪，为什么全体的人民要加入互相残杀的战争呢？
+
+国王现在已不算在战争的问题以内了。英国女王维多利亚[44]，即使知道法国人如何骂她，她也不敢发脾气了；英国人也不会因为她受辱而替她报仇了。但是你们能肯定一两年以后，英国人与法国人，为着埃及的霸权，彼此不动干戈么？东方的情景也是一样，全俄罗斯的沙皇亚历山大，无论如何独断，如何凶恶，如何自命为伟大的人物，如果没有圣彼得堡的银行家与莫斯科的工业家，——就是这些人今天自称为“爱国者”——叫他派兵出战他只好吞下安特拉西[45]与萨利斯伯来[46]的侮辱，一声不发地深藏在他的王宫中。
+
+这是说，在俄罗斯如在英国，在德国如在法国一样，人们已不再为国王的私意打仗了，那么，究竟为谁打呢？现在是为增加罗斯齐而特，施耐德[47]，安星公司[48]等大富豪的财产与进款，为了养肥大银行家与大工业家的们的贵体，人们才去自相残杀的呀！
+
+现在是资产阶级公司间的竞争起而代替君主间的冲突了。
+
+
+
+不错，现在人们还在大谈其“政治的霸权”。可是我们若把这形而上的本体演成物质的事实，我们只要考察德国目前怎样表现其政治的霸权，我们就会见到这只是“经济的霸权”在国际的市场上作祟罢了。现在德法英俄奥等国家所欲取得的，并不是政治的统治，而是经济的称霸。他们想拿到的是强迫邻国接受他们的货物，与关税率的特权，是剥削工业落后民族的专利；是在没有铁路的国家建筑铁路，因而成为市场主人的优先权。最后，他们是想随时向他们的邻国夺取一个商埠，籍以激发他们的商业，占领一个省份，籍以推销他们过剩的商品。
+
+我们今日之所以互相残杀，实在是为我们的大工业家所能得30%的利益，是为我们的金融界巨头能在交易所中占着独断的权力，是为矿业公司与铁路公司地股东们能享300,000法郎的年金。因此，我们如果是稍稍合理的，我们就应该把我们国旗上的食肉鸟换成“金顿”[49]把他们的旧徽章换成“钱袋”，从前用世袭王族的名字称呼联队，现在也可以换做工业界金融界王族的大名了；我们可以称他们为施耐德三世，安星十世，罗斯齐而特二十世。这样一来，我们至少可以知道究竟是为谁在杀人。
+
+
+
+开辟新市场，强销或好或坏的商品，这就是欧洲与新大陆现在全部政治的基础，也就是19世纪一切战争的真实原因。
+
+在十八世纪，英国首先完成输出大工业的体系。他使无产者集中到城市来，它教他们做比较完善的手艺，他增加生产，增加百倍的生产，他开始在仓库中堆积如山的货物，可惜这些货物不是给那些制造它的穷人使用的。纺织棉布与羊毛的工人，每天所得只顾自己与家人苟活，他们用什么购买自己的产物呢？起锚航行海洋的英国船舶，在欧洲大陆，在亚洲，大洋洲与美洲寻觅买主，确信找不到相当的竞争者。贫困，凄惨的贫困笼罩着英国的城市，而制造家与大商人，则一瞬间便成极大的富豪；在外国骗来的财富积聚在少数人的手里。大陆的经济学家满口赞颂，要他们的同国人也做同样的事业。
+
+十八世纪末期，法国已开始同样的进化，它也组织以出口为目的的大规模的生产。转移权力的革命逼得乡间穷人走向城市，使资产阶级富上加富，给当时法国的经济演变以新的突进。英国的资产阶级，因此大气恐慌，他们并不是恨法国宣告共和或巴黎的流血，而是怕法国做他经济上的敌手；得着贵族的协助，他们向威胁他们封锁大陆欧洲大陆市场，不准他们货物进口的法国资产阶级，宣告势不两立的战争。
+
+我们都知道这次战争的结果，法国是失败了，可是他在世界市场上，已取得他的地位。英法两国资产阶级甚且暂时缔结动人的同盟：他们两者自认是姊妹国。
+
+法国不久前便超过了他的目的。竭力生产出口的货物，她想占领市场，而不注意工业的进步已自西方慢慢扩展到东方，许多新的国家亦已走上工业化的道路。法国的资产阶级总设法扩大他们利益的范围。他们忍受拿破仑三世十八年的专政[50]，无非希望这个窃国的暴君能强迫全欧洲接受他的经济条件，待晓得他的无能之后，才就把它像破鞋似的抛弃了。
+
+一个新的国家——德意志，采用同样的经济制度。他也把乡间穷困的农民驱入城市，使城市的人口在数年之内增加了一倍。他也开始大量的生产，一种可怕的工业，既有改良的工具供人使用，又有传播很广的技术与科学的教育，在旁协助，也连续集聚了并非为生产者消费，而为运输出口与主人致富的产物。资本积聚起来，并且想法在亚洲，非洲，土耳其或俄国寻找有利的投资的机会。柏林的交易所于是与巴黎竞争，并想压倒巴黎的交易所。
+
+那时，德国的资产阶级发出一种呼声，就是：“无论在任何国旗之下——甚至普鲁士的也好——统一起来”，利用这统一的势力，强迫他的邻国接受他的产物与税率，占领波罗的海或亚得里亚海了一个好商埠，如果可能，击败法国的军力，法国威胁欧洲，要欧洲接受他的经济条件做商约有20年之久了。
+
+1870年的战争就是这种呼声的结果，法国不再支配各国的市场，而是德国继承它掌握了商业的霸权，由于获利的渴望，它也时常不管侵蚀其经济基础的恐慌，财政破产，不安定与贫困而设法扩展其剥削的范围。非洲海岸，高丽农田，波兰平原，俄罗斯草原，匈牙利山野与保加利亚满是蔷薇的河谷——一切都能激发德国资产阶级的贪心。德国的商人每次看到这些几乎没有耕种的平原。这些仅有小工业存在的城市，这些寂然无声的江河。他的心就动了。他的臆想给他计划，怎样从这些荒废的财富中取得一袋一袋的黄金，怎样他可以使这些人民曲膝于他的资本主义之前。所以他发誓要把“文明”换言之，剥削，搬到东方。在期待的时候，他要强迫意大利，奥地利与俄罗斯接受他的商品与铁路。
+
+不料这些国家也轮着脱离他邻国的经济束缚了。他们也渐渐进入“工业国”的轨道。这些后起的资产阶级也求之不得地尽量以出口为致富的捷径。不过短短数年间俄意二国在工业上的扩展也有了惊人的进步，被压在最凄惨贫困中的农民，既无购买的能力，而俄，意，奥的制造家也在为出口而生产。所以他们也需要市场，欧洲的市场，既已被占，他们只好向亚非二洲寻找出路，所以将来必有一天他们因分赃不均，动起武来。
+
+
+
+在现代工业特权（这是那班支配管理工业的人所给他的）所创造的情况中，何种同盟最能维持长久呢？德俄的同盟纯粹是仪式的[51]。亚历山大与威廉[52]正可以任意拥抱，而俄国新生的资产阶级却“客气的”厌恶德国的资本家，后者也还以同样的礼貌。我们都还记得俄国政府增加三分之一进口税的时候，怎样引起德国报纸的愤怒。“反俄的战争，在我们德国，比1870年的战争，还要得人拥护。”德国的资产阶级与跟随他的工人们这样说。
+
+什么！这绝妙的德奥同盟，不是写在流沙上的吗？这两强的资产阶级不是为着进口的税率而相互龌龊吗？就是奥匈的两姊妹国，不也是为着剥削南部斯拉夫人的利益冲突，快要宣告税率的战争吗？法国本身对于税率的问题不是有分成几派吗？
+
+是的，的确如此，你们不愿意社会主义，你们就将有战争，假如革命不来扫除这又荒谬又愚蠢的情况，你们将有30年的战争。同时，我们又必须知道，仲裁，均衡，常备军的废除，军备的解除等等只是美妙的梦想，没有半点实际的价值，只有革命，把工具，机器，原料与一切社会财富，还给生产者，并把全部生产方法，彻底改造，使其能满足全体生产者的需要之后，才能消除夺取市场的战争。
+
+各人为全体工作，全体为各人服务，看，这是建立国际和平的唯一条件，今天谁不高声要求这种和平呢？只因现在社会财富的掠夺者处处阻挠他的实现，我们还时时受着战争的威胁呢！
+
+
+### 第八章 革命党之少数
+
+反对我们的人时常对我们说：“你们所主张的一切，都是很对的；你们无政府共产主义的理想是再好没有的，他的实行的确能引出世上的幸福与和平，可是愿意这样的人却多么的少数，懂得这种主义的人又有多少，委身从事这种革命的人尤其是少数之少数！你们不过是最少数的人，几个薄弱的团体散布在冷漠的群众中间，你们的面前站着可怕的敌人，他们既有很好的组织，又有军队，资本与教育做他们的后盾，你们怎样能抵挡了？你们所要从事的斗争，可惜超过你们的能力太多了！”
+
+这就是我们不断地听见反对我们的人甚或一般朋友对我们发表的反对议论。我们现在不妨去看看这种议论是否确实。
+
+我们无政府主义者的团体，若与法、西、意、德等国家的数千万人民比较，的确是很少数，那是毫无疑问的。一切代表新思想的团体，起初都是极少数。就组织说，直到革命的那一天，我们人仍就还是极少数，也是可能的，但是但这是攻击我们的一种论据吗？现在是投机主义者占多数的世界，我们也应该跟随着变成投机主义者吗？直到1790年，是保皇党，立宪派构成社会的多数人，当时的共和党人眼见法国正迈着大步走向王权的崩溃，是不是应该因为自己是极少数人就放弃共和的理想，跟在多数人后面去做保皇党或立宪派呢？
+
+就数目说，我们是极少数的人，又有什么关系，要讨论的问题并不在此！重要的是去观察无政府共产主义与现代人类脑筋中——尤其是拉丁民族的脑筋中——所发生的思想进化是否符合。关于这点，没有半点怀疑的可能。进化并不倾向强权主义的一边，个人，生产与消费团体，公社，联合会等渐渐获得最大的自由，才是进化的正轨；所有主的个人主义正与进化背道而驰，共同生产与消费才是进化的合规趋势。共产主义这名词在各大城市中，不再使人惊怪了，这所指的当然是无政府的共产主义；在个乡村中，进化也发生于同一方向，法国有许多地方，在某种特殊的情况下，农民很早就有把生产工具收回公有的倾向了。所以我们每次上大众发表我们的思想，每次以简明易懂的语言，确实可靠的例证对他们说到我们所了解的革命时，不论在工业的中心或小生产的农村，我们总时常受着他们的欢迎与赞扬。
+
+他们能不这样赞扬吗？真的，假如无政府主义与共产主义是少数学者在在书斋中，以哲学的推理杜撰出来的，那么，他们得不到民众的响应，也是不足怪的。但是这两个主义的思想是从民众的衷心产生出来的。是一般农民与工人在日常工作的闲暇，想象着较好社会的结晶品。它们是这个世纪前进精神所孕育的徐缓进化的表象。他们是民众对于改造社会的概念，这概念会使正义，休戚相关与博爱等等的精神，实现于城市与乡村的日常生活中。既由民众中间产生，又以简明的语言陈述，他当然会得着民众的欢迎。
+
+的确，革命的真实力量，就在民众身上。至于团结与组织的活动同志，他们虽相当勇敢地冒革命斗争时的种种危险，而他们的力量，总不及民众的强大。他们是少数人，他们只负发动的任务。他们的数目会一天天的增加，他们的力量也会一天天的扩大，只有到发动的前夕，今天的少数人才会成为那时候的多数人。
+
+
+
+历史在那边告诉我们，在革命前一天还是少数的人们，如果的确代表民众的臆想，如果革命延长若干时间——这是基本的条件——使革命的思想，有传播萌芽与结果的可能，一到革命那天，就会成为优越的力量。因为我们不要忘记：并不是一天或两天的革命，能使社会向着无政府共产主义方面演变：短时的暴动举事，只能推翻一个政府而代以另一个权力。它能推翻拿破仑三世而代J.法佛尔[53]的政府，可是社会的基本组织却实在一点也没有改变。依我们看，必须经过三年，四年，甚或五年的混乱时间，才能够完成剔除私有财产制与改造现社会组织方式的革命。法国要五年——至1788年至1793年——的连续暴动才推翻了土地的封建与王权的独裁制。我们也要三四年的大暴动，才能打倒资本阶级的封建制度与富人政治的特权。
+
+就在这昂扬的时期，一般的精神，以加倍的速力活动；华美城市或简陋乡村的居民个个注意公众的事业，人人辩论，讲话，演说或促使别人觉悟，就在这样热烈的时期，现存团体所播下的无政府思想，才能萌芽结子，才能在大众的精神中留下深刻的印象。到了那时，就是今天的中立者，也会成为新思想的确信者。
+
+这就是思想进展的历程，法国大革命便可以作为最好的例证。
+
+
+
+真的，这次革命没有做到我们说你想的那样彻底，它只推翻了贵族而代以资产阶级的政府。它没有动到私有财产制，私有财产制反而因他而更牢固；是它给资产阶级奠定了剥削的基础，但它废除农奴制时，所得的结果却是无限量的；它以暴力铲除了这个古老的害人制度，总比用法律来废除任何东西来的有效。他开辟以后无数革命的纪元，社会革命也由此而逐渐逼近。它给法国人民以革命的激励，要是没有这种自动激励，一般人或者还在最卑劣的压迫下。捱过许多世纪呢，它给了世界也追求“未来”的丰富理想；它唤醒反叛的精神，它使法国的儿女受到革命的教育，1871年法国所以有“巴黎公社”（Commune de Paris）[54]，它的人民当别国还在强权与立宪思想（即法国在1848年甚或1780年以前所经历过的）的时期，所以情愿接受无政府共产主义的理想，其故就在18世纪末期，他们所经过的四年革命。
+
+这就使我们回想到革命前数年，法国的社会的景象如何惨淡，当时想废除王权与封建制度的人们是多么的少数！
+
+农民沉溺在我们今日难以想像的贫困与无知中。他们僻处乡间，没有合规的交通，连一二百里外所经过的事变，都不认识，他们终日屈身在梨下与陋室中生活，好像被命中注定，永远要做农奴。共同一致（l'entente commune）（或一致的行动），是不可能的，稍有举世暴动，军队即来屠杀参加的人，把主使者绞死在水池附近18尺的绞台上。那时仅有少数密密的宣传者经过乡村，把憎恨压迫者的情感吹入一般人的脑海，使极少数有胆量听他们谈话的人起一点小小的希望。当时农民几乎还不敢要求面包或者稍减赋税。我们只要看看乡村的请愿书，就可以明了我们所说的并非虚构。
+
+至于资产阶级，最能形容其特征的是懦怯。极少数的孤立个人有时冒险抨击政府或以某种大胆的行为唤醒反叛的精神。而最大多数的资产阶级分子却在国王及其宫廷，贵族阶级及其侍从之前卑躬屈膝地表示忠顺。只要查阅当时地方政府的记录，就可见到1789年以前资产阶级的议论是如何的卑鄙。不管路易·布朗[55]与其他阿谀这类资产阶级的历史学家怎样颂扬，他们的言论处处露出最无耻的懦怯，当时的少数革命党人，看看四周的情形，便会感到无限的失望，德木南[56]说得好：“1789年以前我们共和党人几乎只有一打左右呢！”
+
+
+
+三四年以后，情形就大变了！等到王国的的力量随着事变的过程而动摇的时候，人民即开始暴动了。在1788年还只是农民局部的小暴动；就跟今天局部的小罢工一样，他们在法国各地爆发，不久，就逐渐扩大，逐渐普遍，终于成为难以镇压的大暴动。
+
+两年以前，农民只敢要求减少租金（像今天工人要求增加工资一样）。两年后，即1789年，他们已进得更远了，他们脑中已有一致的思想，就是想完全割断贵族教士与资产阶级地主的束缚。等到农民知道政府已无力抵抗暴动的时候，他们就先后起来攻击他们的敌人，少数有决心的人放火烧毁最初的几个宫堡，至于大多数的群众，还很懦弱，很柔顺。他们等着山岗宫堡的火焰直升云霄时，才把收税官吊上绞过14世纪农民暴动先驱的绞刑台，但是这次军队却不来了，他们在别处有事，反叛于是一村一村的蔓延传播，不久法国的一半都被火焰罩住了。
+
+当资产阶级的未来革命家还跪在国王面前的时候，当未来大革命的大人物还想以种种让步平息暴动的时候，乡村与城市，在全级议会（États généraux）[57]开会与米拉波[58]演说，以前就反叛了。数百小暴动——泰纳[59]说有300——在巴黎人没有以枪矛于少数坏炮占领巴士底狱[60]以前，早就在各地的乡村中爆发了。
+
+从此以后，镇压革命，已成不可能了。暴动如仅爆发于巴黎，革命如仅由议会来发动，反叛的人们一定会淹没于血河中，反革命的人一定会手持白旗一村一村，一城一城地杀害农民与“无裤党人”[61]。所幸，革命从开始时期，即采取另一个方式。它几乎同时在无数地方爆发；在暴动省份的每一村，每一镇，每一大城，革命的少数人，以自己的果敢精神，以民众愿望的默许与援助。占领宫堡，市政府与巴士底狱，威嚇贵族与巨富的资产阶级，废除世袭的特权。总之，少数人开始革命，大多数人跟着他们前进。
+
+他们预料那将要来的革命，也是一样，今天由极少数人代表而逐渐确定于民众中的无政府共产主义的思想也会在人民大众里面，找到发展的出路，散播在各处的团体，数目虽然不多，力量却很强大，因为下层的平民能做他们的后盾，它们不久就会举起暴动的旗帜，这暴动将同时爆发于成千成万的地点，它将阻止任何政府的成立，使其无法妨碍大事的进行。它将延续很久，待完成废除私有财产制与国家的使命之后，方才罢休。
+
+一到那天，今天的少数人将成为人民的大众。这起义攻击私有财产与国家的大众将迈步走向无政府共产主义的目标。
+
+
+### 第九章 秩序
+
+世人时常责备我们用这非常使人害怕的“无政府”（Anarchie——安那其）字眼作为我们的标语。他们说，你们的思想是高超的，可是，你们要承认你们党的名称实在选的太坏了。“无政府”在一般人的口中是与无秩序或混乱同意义；这几个字使人立刻生起“利益相冲突，个人相斗争，世上永无和谐希望”的观念。
+
+
+
+我们首先来观察一个行动的党，一个代表新意向的党很少有自择其名的可能。后来非常普遍的“渤拉邦讨饭党”（Les Gueux de Brabant）[62]一名并不是他们自己发明的，首先只是绰号（这绰号起得很好），但由党使用与一般人接受之后，不久，就变成党的光荣称呼。最后人们也承认这绰号实在含有整个的思想。
+
+1793年的“无裤党”又怎样呢？这也是平民革命的敌人，造来侮辱革命党人的绰号罢了；但是它也含有整个的思想，它就是代表衣衫褴褛，倦于贫困的平民，反对以丰衣足食自称爱国的保皇党与“雅各宾党”[63]，那些衣冠楚楚的“雅各宾党”，不管资产阶级的历史学家在他们的铜像之前，怎样焚香祭拜，不论他们的演说怎样堂皇动人，毕竟是平民的真正敌人，因为他们蔑视平民的贫困，厌恶平民的自由平等的倾向，反对平民的革命热忱。
+
+“虚无主义者”这个名称也是一样，它使当时的报章记者大做文章，不知耗费了多少笔墨，经过了多少无谓的争辩，才使人们知道它并非什么古怪而带有宗教色彩的党派，他却是真有革命力量的集团。由屠格涅夫[64]首先在他的名著《父与子》中用了这个字眼，一般做“父亲”的，因儿子的不服从，就用这个外号来向他们报复，做“儿子”的也欣然接受了，待觉到“虚无主义者”这字眼含有许多误会而想摆脱的时候，事实已不允许他们改名了，报章与大众都不愿以“虚无主义者”以外的名称指当时俄国的革命党人。此外，这个绰号继续也没有半点选错，因为它也含有整个的思想，所谓“虚无主义者”就是一切旧制度的敌人，他们否定现代以一阶级压迫另阶级为基础的一切文明的事实。他们抨击现在的经济制度，政府与权力，他们否认资产阶级的统治，守旧的科学，资产阶级的道德，为剥削者服务的艺术；过去无数世纪遗留给现在社会的恶劣习俗与虚伪，也为他们所厌恶——简括地说，他们是今天才有崇高光环的全部资产阶级文明的否定者。
+
+“安那其”这字眼也有同样的历史，当初国际劳动协会[65]中忽有一派否认协会中的权力，并反对一切方式的强权，他们先以联合派（fédéraliste）自称，后以反国家派或反强权派自命。他们时常还避讲“安那其主义者”的名称。“安-那其”（an-rehie，这是当时的写法）一词好像太于蒲鲁东派[66]接近了，因为当时会中正在攻击普鲁东派经济改良的思想。但是一般敌人就为了这个原因，就为了播散混淆，故意把当时的反强权派叫做“安那其主义者”，并造谣中伤地说“安那其主义者”这名称就可以证明他们的唯一野心是制造无秩序或混乱，而不丝毫想到远大的目的。
+
+无政府主义者也就立刻接受了人们给予他们的名称。他们首先还注意“安”于“那其”之间的短线，解释在这个写法之下，起源于希腊文的An-archie（安-那其）即“无权力”非“无秩序”的意思；但不久，他们便接受了现在的方式，不再给校对员以无益的工作，也不再向读者讲解希腊文的功课了。
+
+所以这个字便恢复它原来的普通解释，即英国哲学家边沁[67]在1816年以下面的词句发表所发表的意义，他说：“一个哲学家想改革一条坏的法律，并不劝人以暴动去反对法律。——无政府主义者的性质完全不同。他否认法律的存在，他弃绝法律的价值，他煽动人家不要承认它是法律，并且一致起来反对他的实施。”今天这个字眼的意义格外扩大了：无政府主义者不但否认现有的法律，而且反对任何已成的权力与任何强权；话虽如此说，而其基本的性质仍是一样：由反叛开始，他总是否定一切方法之下的权力与强权。
+
+
+
+“但是这个字眼立刻使人想起秩序的否定，无秩序或混乱的意思呢！”有人这样说。
+
+我们努力去了解吧。人们所说的，究竟是什么秩序？是否就是我们无政府主义者所渴想的大同，是否就是指人类不再分成两个阶级，不再有这一阶级牺牲那一阶级的状态时完全自由地成立人类关系的和谐社会？是否就指万人一体，天下一家，个人为大众的安乐努力，大众为个人的幸福工作，彼此利益相同，休戚相关的理想佳境呢？显然不是！责备无政府主义者就是破坏秩序的人，并不谈论这将来的大同，他们所说的是现在社会中所了解的秩序。所以我们不妨去看看无政府主义者所要破坏的秩序究竟是什么。
+
+今天的所谓秩序，不过是全人类十分之九代最少的最少数的懒惰者工作，使其有穷奢极欲的物品，以过其最丑恶的娱乐生活罢了。
+
+今天的所谓秩序，不过是剥夺卫生生活与智慧合理发展所不可缺少的多数条件，使人类的十分之九，逐日偷生苟活在牛马的状态中，不敢想到科学研究与艺术创造所给人类的享乐罢了。唉！这就是秩序！
+
+今天的所谓秩序，就是贫困与饥馑成为社会的常态；就是爱尔兰的农民死于饥饿，俄罗斯的百姓毙于荒年之后的白喉伤寒与却食，好让富者强者积麦如山，运输出口，以满其自私的欲壑；就是意大利的人民抛弃富饶的田野，投身四方，遍游欧洲，寻觅未成的隧道，从事开掘，以保全他们颠连无告的苦命，一旦岩石倾覆，陷身其中，他们冒这重险，亦不过为了苟延他们几年几月的黑麦面包生活罢了。唉！这就是秩序！
+
+今天的所谓秩序，就是变良田为牧场，以共富者肉食，停留荒地以待垦，坐视耕者流离！
+
+今天的所谓秩序，就是逼妇女卖身养活他们的子女，逼迫儿童进工厂做苦工，或使他们夭折于羸弱；也就是使工人变做机器，把劳力变为商品。就是暴动工人的幽灵，显现在富有者的户外；反叛人民的鬼影。呆立于统治者的门前。
+
+今天的所谓秩序，就是教养于政府讲席中的少数人，以统治者的资格，压迫大多数的平民，俯首听命，并训练其子孙继承其职位，好让他们以奸计，贪污，暴力，屠杀，延续其特权于万世。
+
+今天的所谓秩序，就是战祸连年，民生水火，人与人战，行业与行业战，阶级与阶级战国家与国家战，猛烈的炮声不绝于老大的欧陆，乡野摧毁于炮弹下，民命牺牲在战场中，几世纪来勤劳所积的财富，一年间就消耗为乌有！
+
+今天的所谓秩序，就是人格被奴役，思想被束缚，以铁与鞭维持同胞于低贱的境地。就是矿夫被煤气闷死，石匠被岩石压毙。尸积如山，命损千百，每年都由主人的贪婪，演成惨剧，间或诉诸政府，政府即以枪炮击之，诬为盗贼之徒，该遭征伐。啊！民众轻如蝼蚁，穷人的怨恨，从何控诉呢？
+
+总之，今天的所谓秩序，就是巴黎公社溺于血河，三万余男女儿童，被枪弹炮弹击毙，葬身于巴黎路下的生石灰中；就是俄国青年被捕入狱，埋骨于西伯利亚的雪乡，而其最纯洁最优良与最忠心的英雄只被绞死在刽子手的绳索中。
+
+唉！这就是秩序！
+
+
+
+然而，什么是今天的所谓扰乱秩序呢？
+
+今天的所谓扰乱秩序，就是指人民举事，反对这丑恶的秩序，斩断锁链，摧毁障碍，一致向着较善的将来前进，为人类历史中之最光荣的盛举。
+
+就是革命前夕的思想反叛；就是过去停滞时期所遗下的种种陈旧假定的推翻；就是新思想如怒吼似的澎湃，大胆发明如春笋似的蒸发，就是科学诸问题的逐渐解决。
+
+今天的所谓扰乱秩序，就是古代奴隶制的废除，公社的暴动，封建奴隶制的解放，经济奴役制的消灭。
+
+今天的所谓扰乱秩序，就是革命农民反对教士与封建领主的暴动，就是焚毁宫堡，改造茅舍，脱离黑暗洞穴，进入阳光地位的叛乱；就是法国消灭王权，给西欧农奴制以最后致命伤的革命。
+
+今天的所谓扰乱秩序，就是国王发抖，贵族惊怖，初次宣告劳动权（droits du travail）的1848年；就是巴黎平民为新思想而斗争，随在屠杀之下，仍前仆而后继，把自由公社的思想留给人类，给人类开辟革命的纪元，我们已见其渐渐的阶级社会革命亦必随着这秩序的扰乱而降临。
+
+今天的所谓扰乱秩序就是历史的伟大时代，大家为人类准备较善的生活，为他们摆脱过去奴隶制的束缚，而坚持不断的斗争与牺牲。就是民众的天才获得自由发展的机会，使其在数年之内完成巨大的进步，人类由此摆脱古代的奴隶状态，才不再为终身陷于贫困泥沼中的可怜生物！
+
+今天的所谓扰乱秩序，就是最美丽的激情的开花，和最伟大的献身精神的焕发，就是人类无上挚爱的史诗！
+
+总之，“安那其”这个名词既然是以上所谓秩序的否定，又是人民一生最美的时期的回忆，那么，一个向着较善将来前进的党派，以他为名，岂不是很贴切吗？
+
+
+### 第十章 公社
+
+#### Ⅰ
+
+我们时常说，社会革命应从公社的解放着手，只有绝对独立，丝毫不受国家钳制的公社[68]，才能给我们以革命所必需的环境与完成革命的方法，听到我们讲话的人总非难我们，说我们想恢复古代已经有过，今日已无存在理由的社会方式。他们说：“公社？公社是古时的事情呢！你们想破坏国家而代以自由的公社，你们已经把目光转向过去了，你们想把我们重新引到中世纪去，重新燃起公社间的过去斗争，因而破坏历史过程中所不易得到的国家统一。”
+
+好吧，我们来观察这个批评，看看他是不是有理。
+
+首先我们应该明白一切与过去的比较，往往只有相对的价值。假如我们所愿意的公社实在只是中世纪公社的恢复，那么我们可否承认今日的公社一定要用七个世纪以前的方式呢？那是很明显的，公社若成立于今日电报，铁路，国际科学与纯粹真理研究的时代，它的组织与12世纪的当然不同，我们将站在绝对新的事物面前，绝对新的情况里面，这事实与这情况势必引出绝对不同的结果。
+
+此外，我们的反对者，各色政体的国家的拥护者，也该也应该想到我们也能够以绝对相同的议论，非难他们。
+
+我们也可以同样而且更有理由的告诉他们，把目光转向过去的不是别人，恰恰是他们自己，因为国家是与公社同样古老的政体。所不同的只是国家在历史上是任何自由的否定，是专制与独断，是臣民的毁灭，是断头台与笞刑场等等的代表者，而我们恰恰在公社的解放，人民与公社反抗国家的起义中，找到了历史最光荣的几页。真的，我们即使要依恋过去，也不会把目光转向路易十一，路易十五[69]或叶卡捷琳娜二世[70]，我们宁可把阿马尔菲（Amalfi）佛罗伦斯（Florence）都鲁斯（Toulouse）拉翁（Laon）列日（Liege）库特勒（Courtrya）奥格斯堡（Augsbourg）努连堡（Nuremberg）蒲斯可弗（Pskoff），諾弗哥洛（Novgorod）等公社与共和国[71]，作为我们注意的对象。
+
+所以现在不是玩弄词句或诡辩的时候，现在要做的是研究与精细分析的工作，我们不可因拉夫莱先生[72]与其热心的学生们只对我们说：“但是公社，这只是中古了！所以他已被判为死罪！”我们也回答他们：“国家，这只是恶行的全部过去；所以我们有理由把它判处死刑！”
+
+
+
+在中世纪公社与今日所希望成立而不久或将成立的公社中间，有许多基本的差别存在：六七百年的人类发展与苦难经验堀下了整个的深渊。我们请来观察他们的主要的不同。
+
+十二世纪若干城市资产阶级所结成的“同谋”（Conjuration）或“同盟”（Communion）究竟有何种主要的目的呢？他们的目的非常简单，无非想摆脱封建领主的束缚罢了。不同的居民，商人和手工匠，彼此联合起来，发誓不准“任何人侮辱”他们中的一个或把他们中的一个作为奴隶看待，公社就是为了反对他的旧主人而发动的武装起义。历史学家基埃里引证12世纪一个著作家的话说：“公社是一个可恶的新字。他的意思就是：应纳人头税的人们对于他们的领主每年只那一次他们所应当的年金，如果犯了轻罪，他们也可以缴纳法定的罚金自赎；至于习惯强迫农奴交付的苛捐杂税，对于他们是完全豁免的。”[73]
+
+所以中世纪的公社的确是为了反抗封建领主而起义的。今日的公社则想从国家的束缚中解放出来。这就是根本的差别，我们要牢牢记住，后来国王所代表的国家见到这个公社反抗领主的独立行动，恐怕对于自己的王冠有害，便立刻派遣军队去“讨伐”（如编年史上所说的）“那些流氓的暴行，他们想藉公社的名义，装起背叛君主统治的姿态。”
+
+明日的公社一定会知道它不能再承认任何上级机构的存在；它上面只能有其他公社自由合意组成的联盟。它更知道他不能采取“骑墙”的态度：或者是公社绝对自由，它能创立它所愿意创立的制度，它能实行它愿意实行的改良后革命；或者它仍旧留在原来的状态中，只做国家的简单“分号”，一切行动受制于国家，时常站在准备与国家对抗的地点并明白真理与国家冲突，必然遭到惨败的厄运。它知道它应该破坏国家而代以自由的联盟。它终必照着这个主张进行。不仅如此，它并且还有实行的方法。今天不只是小城市举起公社暴动旗帜了。今天是巴黎，里昂，马赛，圣太田，迦太基尼（在西班牙）以及其他一切大城市都扬起同样的旗帜，做公社革命的响应了。这就是基本差别的所在。
+
+
+
+中世纪的有产阶级，靠着商品的买卖与资本的经营，逐渐成为城市的巨富，从领主的束缚中获得解放之后，当时的公社也曾脱离这些富人的压迫吗？一点也没有！破坏了封建领主的要塞之后，城市的居民不久见到富有的商人在公社里建起征服他们的堡垒，所以中世纪公社的内部历史是贫富二者的斗争史，这激烈的斗争势必引起国王的干涉。贵族阶级于是在公社中发展起来，脱离了从前城外封建领主压迫的平民重新跌入现在城内富有领主的奴隶制度中，他们知道公社里再没有值得保护的东西，他们离开为争取本身自由而建筑的城墙，可怜这些城墙由于个人主义的制度的结果，变成新型奴隶制度的孔道了。既没有什么东西可以损失，他们就让富有商人自行保护，后者终于失败了：一面耽于奢侈淫欲的腐蚀；另一面又少平民的协助，他们不久只好接受国王传令官的催促，交出他们城市的钥匙。在别的许多公社，是富人自己出来开了城门，迎接皇帝，国王或公爵的军队，籍以避免准备袭击他们的平民的报复。[74]
+
+但是十九世纪公社的主要工作，不是扫除这些社会的不平等吗？不是占领积累的社会资本，把它全部放在愿意用它生产财富与增加公共福利的人们手里，任其自由支配吗？它的第一注意，不是破坏资本的势力，使那促成中世纪公社之覆灭的贵族阶级永远无法成立吗？它会拿主教与修道士做自己的联盟者吗？最后，它会描摹祖先只在公社中寻觅国家中的国家吗？他们废除了领土和国王的权利之后，只晓得依样画葫芦的重建相同的权力，而不知道这权利虽被四周的城墙限制，而仍旧保留它故存的全部缺点，我们这个世纪的无产者将效法这些佛罗伦斯人一面废除贵族头衔或使此类的头衔成为耻辱，一面又让新的贵族——钱袋的贵族产生吗？他们将跟这些到达市政厅的手工帐一样，虔诚的描摹他们的祖先，重建这一切他们才刚推翻了的权力的阶梯吗？他们会只改变人物而不改变制度本身吗？
+
+当然不是的。十九世纪的公社，既有丰富的经验，可作前鉴，一定会更好的完成事业。它将是名称以外的公社，它将不只是公社主义的（Communaliste），而是共产主义的（Communiste）。不但在政治上是革命的，在生产与交换的问题上也是革命的。它将不是为着重新建立国家而消灭国家，许多公社一定会创立榜样，推翻代议的政府之后，而不再把自己的主权委托给偶然的投票。
+
+#### Ⅱ
+
+中世纪的公社，摆脱了领土的枷锁之后，也会设法打击领土力量所以形成的根源吗？也会设法帮助它周围的农民吗？也曾设法用农奴所没有的武器帮助它从城墙高处傲然俯视的那班不幸的人吗？完全没有呢！以纯粹自私的情感为出发点，中世纪的公社，把它关在它自己的城墙之内。多少次他在求帮助求避难所的奴隶之前，嫉妒地紧闭城门，收起吊桥，让领主在他的眼前，在火绳枪所能涉及的地点，杀害这些不幸的人。它以自己的自由自负，它不设法使呻吟于城外的同胞也得着这些自由。很多中世纪的公社，就以这个代价，让邻人保存着农奴制度的代价，获得本身的独立。并且看着平原的农奴始终枯守着他们的土地，既不认识工业，又不知道商业，时常要向城市购买铁器，金属与工业的产品，这不是公社少数大富翁的利益吗？当手工匠想把手伸给城墙以外的农奴时，他们怎能抵抗资产阶级的意志呢？资产阶级有权有势，又知道战术，并且雇有老练的佣兵，而手工匠却是赤手空拳，一无所有！[75]
+
+现在是多么不同！胜利的巴黎公社只限于创立多少有点自由的都市制度吗？巴黎的无产阶级击碎自己的枷锁时，社会革命就在巴黎开始，乡间的公社起来响应。巴黎公社就在自身支持斗争的时候，也对各地农民说：“亲爱的兄弟，你们占领土地，占领全部的土地吧！”它不只限于说话，要是必要时，它的勇敢战士，必能武装下乡，帮助远地的农民完成他们的革命：驱逐土地的占有者，将全部土地还给一切愿意并知道耕种的人们。
+
+中世纪的公社，只想把自己关在它的城墙以内；19世纪的公社则设法扩展于城墙以外，普及于整个世界，它以人类的休戚相关代替公社的特权。
+
+
+
+中世纪的公社能自闭在他的城内，直到某种程度，可以不跟它的邻城来往，它即使与其他的公社发生关系，这关系也只限于反抗领主，保护“社权”的条约，或为公社的人，缔结远地旅行的互助协定，即使真正的同盟，如在朗巴底（Lombardie）、西班牙与比利时等地一样，成立于各城市间。这些同盟也因太不同质，太陷于不同的特权而相互分散，故不久即分裂成孤立的团体或在邻国攻击之下消灭了。[76]
+
+拿这个来跟今日所要组成的团体比较，真有天壤之别！一个小公社，若与工商业及艺术的中心发生连续的关系，由于事务之必然，势必不能生存八天以上；这些中心本身也有向着邻近乡村，四周公社与遥远城市开放门户的必要。
+
+假设某一个大城市明天宣布“公社”成立，废除辖区内的私有财产制度实行完全的共产主义，换言之，共同享受社会资本，劳动工具与劳动产品的利益，只要城市不被商人的军队包围，几天后，大车就会达到市场，运输工人就会从遥远的商埠运来大批必需的原料，城市的工业品，满足居民的需要以后，也会向世界各地寻找他们的买主；外国人将成群结队地来访问。无论是农民，邻近城市的公民和外国人，所有的人都会回到他们的家中，叙述这个自由城市的美妙生活，他们都会说，这里一切人都要做工，这里既没有穷人，也没有被压迫者，大家都在享受自己的劳作结果，而没有人来强占弱者的一份。孤立是不怕的：美国的共产主义者，在他们的共产村中，所要害怕的，与其说是孤立，毋宁说是这四周的资产阶级世界不断地来侵犯他们的公社事务。
+
+今天是商业与交换推翻了国家的界限，同时也破坏了古都似的城墙。他们已获得中世纪时期所没有的凝聚力。西欧一切住人的地点联络得极其密切，所以一处的孤立已成为完全的不可能；不论如何高的村落，即使在一座山的悬崖上吧，都有他所趋附的。他所不能截断关系的工商业的中心。
+
+
+
+大工业中心的发展，更加可观。
+
+今天钟楼的精神[77]还能引起两个公社间的嫉妒，阻止他们的直接结合，甚至燃起兄弟相杀的烈火。这些嫉妒固然阻止这两公社间的直接联合，而这个联合区却由大中心的媒介而间接成立起来，今天临近的两小市往往没有直接链接的关系存在；它们所维持的很少联系，非但不能成立休戚相关的友谊，反而引起彼此的冲突，好在两者早有时常发生关系的共同中心；不然他们便无存在的可能；无论钟楼的嫉妒如何强烈，它们不得不以它们获得供应品和销售生产的大城市为他们联合的中介；为维持他们与集中点的关系，为集合在这其中点的周围，他们两者都需变成这同一联合的一部分。
+
+然而这个中心本身对于周围的公社，也不能有侵犯的优越权。由于工商业需要无限的变化特性，一切居住的地点已有他们所属的许多中心，待着它们的需要逐渐发展之后，它们即属于能满足其新需要的新中心。我们的需要如此富于变化，它们发生的如此迅速，一个联合不久即不足以满足他们的全部。公社于是觉得有缔结其他同盟，进入另一联合的必要。作为粮食团体一份子的公社，为获得其他必需的物品——如金属之类的——必须加入第二个团体，为了布匹与艺术作品，它又需做第三第四团体的一份子。请拿不论任何地方的经济地图来看，便可见到没有经济界限的存在。各类物品的生产与交换地带，互相交错，相互穿透，相互积累。公社的联合也是一样，如果任它们自由发展，它们不久也会互相交错，互相穿透，互相积累，终于形成一个比国家机构还要紧密还要完整，还要“牢固且不可分的”组织网，而国家行的机构却只是并列的，如木枝捆在斧钺周围似的松散的结合罢了。
+
+如此。我们重述一句，那些反对我们说，公社一旦脱离国家的束缚，便会互相冲突，互相残杀，因而构成不断内战的人，忘了一个事情，就是密切的关联。由于工商业的吸引中心以及这些中心的日益增多与其不断地来往，早已存在于不同的地点，他们根本就知道中世纪关闭的都市和在险要道路上慢慢走着的结队商人随处受着土匪式领主监视的情形；他们显已忘掉今天这些人，货，信，电报，思想与情感的潮流，如不枯竭的江河之水，不断地来往于我们的城市之间，总之，他们不大明白他们所相比较的两个时代的差别。
+
+此外，历史不是又在那边给我们证明联合的本能已成为人类最迫切的一个需要吗？只要国家一旦因为某种原因自行瓦解，只要强权的机器一旦减弱其固有的机能，自由的联合就会自动的一跃而出，让我们回忆法国大革命时代武装资产阶级的自动联合吧。让我们回忆拿破仑的政府军动摇西班牙的国时，西班牙人民的自动联合是怎样拯救他们国家的独立吧。待国家不再强迫实行无理的团结之后，团结就会依着自然的需要而产生。要是我们把国家推翻了，联合的社会就会从它的废墟中茁壮发生出来，而且这实在是“完整牢固且不可分割的”实在是独立而自由的，并且自由的扩展其休戚相关的范围。
+
+
+
+然而还有别的我们应该知道的东西。由中世纪的有产阶级看来，公社不过是孤立的国家，以它截然的界限与其他的公社隔离。依我们的意思“公社”不再是地域的结合；它是普遍性的名词，与无疆界，无城墙的平等者集团同义。社会的公社，将不再是偶然确定的整体。公社的每一团体必然倾向于别的公社的同类团体，它与这些团体结合联盟，他们中间的关系至少与同城市民结合的关系同样坚固，他们构成一个利益相同的公社，其组成分子将分散于成百成千的城市与乡村。有些个人只能与趣味相同，住在其他无数公社的个人结合，才能获得其需要的满足。
+
+今天的自由团体已开始分布于人类活动的广大领域。有闲暇的人也不再单单为了满足他的科学，文学或艺术的趣味而创立团体了。人们也不单单为了阶级斗争而缔结同盟了。
+
+今天在人类活动的无穷表现中，想要找到一个不已经为自由结合团体所代表的活动，实在很难，同样团体的数目不断地增加，每天总要侵占新的行动领域，即过去被视为国家专有的职权，也渐渐为这些团体所吞并。文学、艺术、科学、教育、商业、工业、贸易、娱乐、卫生、博物馆、远地的企业、两极的探险，甚至国土的保卫、伤兵的救助、反抗侵略、反抗法庭等等到处看见私人创意的表现与自由社会方式的产生。这就是十九世纪下半叶的趋向与特征。
+
+这倾向一旦遇着自由发展的机会，一旦有扩大的实行的新领域，便可以作为将来社会的基础。社会的公社就由自由的团体组成，这些团体将推翻旧有的城乡与疆界。这将是数百万非地域的公社，伸手到江河，山脉与海洋之外，把散在地球四隅的个人与民族，结合成平等的一家。
+
+
+### 第十一章 巴黎公社
+
+#### Ⅰ
+
+1871年3月18日，巴黎的人民起义，反对大家所憎恶，所蔑视的权力，并宣告巴黎城的独立，自由与自主。
+
+这中央权力的推翻并没有经过革命所常有的演变：那天既没有枪声，也没有障碍物后面的流血，一般统治者在群集在街上的武装平民之前隐遁了；军队撤离首都，官吏逃向凡尔赛，带去他们所能带走的一切东西。政府如污雪遇见春风似的融解了，19日，巴黎流了它子弟的数滴热血之后，就扫清了腐蚀这个大城市的污物。
+
+这样完成的革命在人民从奴隶制走向自由的连续革命中，开了一个新的纪元。在巴黎公社的名义之下诞生了一种新的思想，这思想将成为未来许多革命的出发点。
+
+如伟大思想所常有的情形一样，它并不是某一个人或某一个哲学家的概念的产物；它诞生于集体的精神中，它从全体人民的心中发出，它还是从法国人民的历史中出来[78]，它起初是模糊的当初很多把它实行并且为它牺牲性命的人还不是我们所理解的那样想像它，他们还不明了他们所揭幕的革命，他们还没有看清他们所想实行的新原理的肥沃。只有在实地应用的时候，人们才瞥见其人们其未来的价值；只有在那时以后的思想工作中，它才渐渐确定,渐渐显露它的明敏，优美，公道以及它的结果的重要。
+
+
+
+在公社以前的五六年，当社会主义获得新的大进展时，就有一个问题特别萦绕于下次社会革命准备者的脑际，这就是要我们知道，哪种政治集团的方式是最适合于今日工业发展所强迫我们这个时代实行的经济的大革命；换句话说，废除了私有财产，把历代所集聚的全部资本归为公有之后，我们应当采取何种政治的组织。
+
+国际劳动协会回答了这个问题。它说，集合不应限于一国：它应扩展于人为的国界之外。不久，这伟大思想就深入人心，占据一般人的精神。以后难被一切反动的同盟所迫害，而它依然继续存在，待阻止它发展的障碍物毁于暴动人民的怒吼之后，它就比任何时期都坚强的复兴起来.
+
+但是现在我们要知道的，却是这广大协会的组成分子是些什么?
+
+于是有两种思想的大潮流来回答这个问题：一边是平民国家，另一边是“无政府主义”。
+
+根据德国的社会主义者的主张，国家应该占有一切积聚的财富，并且把它们分给工人的团体，应该组织生产与交换并且监督社会的生活与机能。
+
+对于此点，大多数富于经验的拉丁民族的社会主义者回答。他们说，这样的国家即使能够存在，也不过是最坏的一个暴政，他们反对这抄袭过去的旧思想而主张代以“安-那其”的新理想，换句话说，他们主张完全废除国家而代以自简单而复杂的组织，他们认定民众力量，生产者与消费者的自由联合为未来社会的组织基础。
+
+不久，若干不大受政府成见迷醉的“国家主义者”也承认“安那其”所代表的组织的确优于平民国家的主张；不过——他们说——无政府主义的理想离我们太远了，我们暂时可以不必去管它。另一方面，无政府的理论，在确定它的出发点，使它的概念具体化，并且证明它的倾向已存在于民众生活中的诸点上似乎还少缺少具体而简单的公式。职业团体与消费者集团超越现在国际与国家的联合，似乎还到太模糊；同时我们还很容易看出，它还不能包括人类活动的全部变化。要想人家相信，必须找到一个更明显，更真实，在事物的现实中有其基本要素的公式。
+
+假如只为准备理论，理论是没有多大关系的！我们似乎会这样说，新的思想如果没有找到明确而确定的根源，要不是从现存的事物中出发，它不会深入一般人的精神，鼓舞他们去参加决定的斗争。如果没有某种确定而明确阐述的思想为依据，为跳板或出发点，平民一定不会冒险投入渺茫的未知世界。
+
+这个出发点。是由生活本身负责来指示他的所在。
+
+
+
+被围困隔绝几个月，巴黎靠着自己的方法而生活，它开始认识它所能支配的经济，智慧与道德的无限资源：它瞥见并且了解自己的创意的力量。同时，它又见到占领权力的那一众多嘴的政客不知道组织国防与发展内政的方法。他亲眼看见法国的中央政府怎样妨碍一个大都市的智慧所能使其展开的一切。它更明了任何政府都不能拯救大的崩溃。助成即将完成的进化，它在被围的时期，忍受可怕的贫困，它目击一方面是懒惰者的无耻奢侈，一方面是劳动者与首都防御者的贫困，它眼见扫除这种恶制度的一切尝试皆因中央权力干涉而失败。每次人民要采取自由的突进时，政府即来加重它的锁链，紧吊它的铁球，于是自然发生一种思想，就是巴黎应该成立独立的公社，使其能在城乡以内实现民众思想所指示的一切！
+
+于是一切人都喊出公社这个名词来。
+
+
+
+1871年的公社只是一次草创的尝试。因战争而生，由两个准备携手压服平民的军队包围着，它不敢完全走上经济革命的路线；它没有截然宣告自己是社会主义者，它没有进行资本的充公与劳动的组织；它甚至没有着手城市一切资源的总调查。它也没有与国家及代议政府的传统绝缘，它没有想在公社中实行它宣告公社独立与自由联合时所应实行的，自简单而复杂的那种组织。假如巴黎公社能多生存几个月，它会被时势所迫，无可避免地走上一起走到以上这两种革命，那是可以确信的。我们不要忘记。资产阶级要以四年以上的革命时期，才从温和的君主制达到资产阶级的共和制，所以我们看见巴黎的人民没有一下跃过无政府主义公社与匪盗政府间的距离，也是不足怪的。但是我们应该知道，下次将实行于法国与西班牙的公社主义的革命，将在凡尔赛军屠杀所停止的地方，恢复巴黎公社的伟大事业。
+
+
+
+公社失败了，我们知道资产阶级对于人民动摇统治者枷锁时给他们所造成的恐惧，怎样报复。这证明近代社会中确实有两个阶级存在；一方面是劳动人们，他们把自己所生产的一半以上的东西交给资产阶级，而且太容易忘掉他们主人的罪行；另一方面是饱暖的懒惰者，他们被野兽的本能所鼓动，憎恶他们的奴隶，并且准备像射击猎物似的杀害那些人。
+
+把巴黎的人民包围在城内，并且把一切出口都封锁之后，他们派遣那些过惯了营房与酒肉生活因而丧失了人性的兵士，并且在议会中公然吩咐他们：“杀掉这些雄狼，这些母狼与这些小狼！”对人民他们又这样说：
+
+> “不论你做什么，你只有死！假使人捉住你，看见你手里有武器——死！假使你放下武器——死！假使你打——死！假使你乞怜——死！不论你的的眼睛转向什么地方：左、右、前、后、上、下——死！你不但在法律以外，而且不在人群以内。年纪与性别都不能救你与你的亲人。你只有死，但是在未死之前，你将亲眼看见你妻子，你的姊妹，你的母亲，你的女儿，你的儿子（就是在摇篮里的也一样）怎样死去的惨状！人们将在你的面前，从战地的病医院中捉去伤兵，用刺刀把他刺死，用枪托把他击毙！他若是生的，人们将捏住他的断腿或血臂，把它活生生地拖去；像能喊叫与受苦的污物包一样，丢在水渍中，总之：死！死！死！”[79]
+
+在尸堆上做过疯狂的庆祝，不分青红皂白的整批屠杀之后，卑劣而残忍的报复仍不停止，接着是皮鞭，紧缚拇指的绳索，镣铐，抽击狱卒的棍棒，侮辱，咒骂，饥饿以及种种残酷的苦刑。
+
+人们会忘掉这些刽子手的伟绩吗！
+
+“被击倒可是没有失败”，公社今天又重生了。这不是失败者一美妙的希望幻想自慰；不，公社今天已成为革命的确定目的，这革命你在我们身边怒吼了。思想已深入大众的精神，它给他们以旗帜，我们并且坚定地希望这一世代的青年来完成公社中的社会革命，肃清资产阶级的丑恶剥削，使人民脱离国家的束缚，在人类的进化中，开辟自由，平等与休戚相关的新纪元。
+
+#### Ⅱ
+
+巴黎人民推翻了卖国政府，把第二帝国崩溃时取得权力的投机分子打倒了，自建自由公社并且宣告自己绝对独立的日子，距今已有十年了[80]，然而我们的目光还是向着1871年3月18日的这一天注视，我们的最好回忆还是属于这个伟大的日子；两个大陆的无产阶级所要庄严地庆祝的就是可纪念的革命周年，明天晚上就有数千万的工人的心，越过国界与海洋，在北美合众国，南美与欧洲，为纪念巴黎无产阶级的反叛而跳动，而共鸣。
+
+这个法国无产阶级为之在巴黎街上流血。在新加来陀尼亚（Nouvelle-Caledonie）[81]海岸受苦的思想，包含着整个革命的根芽，他的范围是广大的,他的旗帜之下，能够容忍能够容纳人民解放与革命的一切倾向。
+
+真的，假如我们只限于观察巴黎公社所完成的实在而显著的事实，我们似乎应该说这思想还不够广大。他只包含革命纲领的极小部分。反之，假如本观察3月18日运动深入民众心坎的精神以及想实现而没有工夫实现（因未发生以前，就被窒息于尸堆之下了）的倾向，我们就会懂得这个运动的重要与其在两个大陆劳动群众中所以激起如此同情的理由。巴黎公社并不是以它所做过的事感动了我们，而是以它所预许下的一切振奋人心。
+
+
+
+使一切被压迫群众的同情，倾向于1871年运动的无可抵抗的力量，究竟是从什么地方来的？巴黎公社所代表的到底是什么思想？这思想对于世界各地不分种族国际的无产者为什么有这样的吸引的魔力？
+
+回答是很容易的。——1871年革命是一个彻头彻尾的民众的运动，由人民实行，自发的产生于大众中间，它在人民大众中才能找到他的防御者，他的英雄，他的殉道者，——资产阶级所绝不能宽恕的也就是这个“流氓”的性质，同时这革命的基本思想虽然是模糊的或者潜意识的，而其伟大的性质却由它的一切行为透露出来，——这就是万人期待的社会革命，经过了这样多世纪的斗争，他终于要来建立大众的真自由与真平等。
+
+这就是恢复其固有权利的“流氓”的革命。
+
+不错，人们会设法，现在还设法歪曲这个革命的真正意义，把它看作巴黎想恢复其独立，想在法国成立一个小国的简单尝试。其实，完全不是这么一回事，其实巴黎并不想脱离法国独立，正如他并不想以武器征服法国一样；他并不想下苦修士枯守着自己的修道院一样，把自己关闭在它的城墙里面；他并不以钟楼的狭小精神为出发点。它所以要求他独立，所以阻止任何中央权力干涉他的事务完全是因为他认为这独立是准备未来组织基础与完成社会革命的一个方法，——他认定这个伟大的革命将完全改变生产与交换制度，把它们建立在公道的基地上；将完全变更人类的关系，使他们以不分高低的平等为出发点；将完全改造今日社会的道德，使他以正义与休戚相关的原则为标准。
+
+所以公社的独立对于巴黎只是方法，社会革命总是它想达到的目的。
+
+如果3月18日的革命能循着自己的意识自由进展，如果巴黎人民不被凡尔赛的刽子手们炮轰，枪击，刀砍，剑刺，以上所说的目的或者会达到，也不一定。找到一个明显确定而人人会了解的思想，以少数字句归纳革命所应进行一切，这就是巴黎人民重新独立的最初几天就已开始注意的工作。不论革命时期好思想的酝酿与传播，如何迅速，一种伟大思想不会在很短的时期中形成。他要发展，要深入大众中间，更要以行为来表现，总需要相当长久的时间，这时间是巴黎公社所缺少的。
+
+同时他还缺少近代社会主义的正确思想，因为十年以前，这些思想本身还在过渡的时期。所以公社是产生于近代社会主义发展的两个时期之间。1848年多少带点宗教色彩的强权或政府的共产主义，到了1871年对于我们这个时代的实际精神与自由已无吸引的力量了。今天，哪一个巴黎人愿意把自己关闭在傅立叶派共产村[82]的营房中？另一方面，是把工钱制度与公有财产驾在一辆车上的集产主义[83]，还是不大为人了解，不大为人所欢迎，实行时还充满不易解决的困难。自由共产主义，无政府共产主义那是刚刚出世，人们几乎还不敢攻击政府主义的崇拜者。
+
+怀疑盘踞着人们的精神，社会主义者本身也没有胆量破坏私有财产的制度，他们面前还没有明确的目的。于是人们只为让自己堕入一般催眠者从很多世纪以来是不断的重述的理论：——“我们首先争得胜利；以后能做什么，以后再说吧！”
+
+
+
+首先争得胜利！好像不动到私有财产，人们有方法成立自己自由的公社似的，人民大众不直接参与革命的胜利，他们好像有方法克服敌人，使大众所共享的物质精神与道德的安逸，能凭降临似的，他们只想首先巩固公社，把社会革命留待以后解决，而不知道唯一合理的进行方法却是以社会革命来巩固公社的基础。
+
+对于政府的问题也一样。宣布自由的公社，巴黎人民及宣布根本是无政府主义的原理；可无政府主义的思想，当时还只是微弱地透入人们的精神，所以他们就在中途停止了，在公社以内，他们还采取强权主义的旧原理他们抄袭市参议会，还成立一个公社的参议会。
+
+如果我们承认为调整公社间的关系，一个中央政府是绝对无用的，那为了调整公社于团体的相互关系，为什么又承认政府的必要呢？假如我们把关于许多城市事务的协调工作，让给公社的自由创意，为什么又对公社所组成的各团体拒绝这同样的创意权呢？公社以内的政府和公社之上的政府一样，两者都没有存在的理由。
+
+但是，推翻这样多政府的巴黎人民在1871年，才第一次来反对政府制度本身，所以他们仍旧让自己保持着政府的偶像主义给自己建立一个政府。我们都知道以后的结果。他们把热心的革命者送到市政厅里去。那里，他们停滞在大堆的废纸中间，当他们的本能要他们与人民采取一致行动的时候，他们为事实所迫，不得不做统治的勾当，应该该行动的时候，他们却不得不在会议室中空谈，失掉与民众适当接触产生的灵感，他们看见自己陷于无能为力的境地。因远离了革命中心——民众，而是自己麻痹之后，他们同时也使人民的创意丧失了行动的力量。
+
+
+
+巴黎公社诞生于社会主义与强权思想均受质变的过渡时期。他同时又是战争的产物。他孤立在一个大城市中，受着普鲁士大炮的威胁，他必然失败的命运好像早就注定了。
+
+但是由于他的平民性质，他在革命的继续中开辟了一个新纪元，由于它的思想，它是社会大革命的先驱，资产阶级庆祝巴黎公社覆灭时所用的前所未闻的卑怯而残忍的屠杀；刽子手们在九年中在对于囚犯所实施的可耻报复，这是难以用笔墨形容的“食人者”的恶行，在富有阶级与平民中间，挖下了永远不能填塞的鸿沟。下次革命的时候，平民将知道他们所应当对付的是什么人；他们将知道他们如果不获决定性的胜利，必有最残酷的命运在等待他们，于是他们只好行动了。
+
+真的，我们现在已经知道法国如果遍地有暴动的公社时，人民再不应该成立政府，期待着政府来负担革命措施的创意，扫除了侵害他们的寄生物以后，他们将自己去占领全部的社会财富，依无政府共产主义的原则，把这些把这财富收归公有。在他们完全废除私有财产，政府与国家的时候，他们将以生活本身所昭示的需要而自由地组织起来。截断了自己的锁链，推翻了种种偶像以后，人类将向着较善的将来前进，他们不再承认主人与奴隶只对那些以自己生命与苦痛助成解放运动的伟大牺牲者保持着最高的崇敬，因为他们在我们走向自由的过程中，曾经给了我们与光明的指针。
+
+#### Ⅲ
+
+3月18日，在各城市——有社会主义团体存在的各城市——所组织的纪念会与公众集会，确实值得我们的注意，这不但是无产大众的示威运动，而是激励量世界社会主义者的情感的表现。这样“计算”，比用任何可想像的选票计算，来的有效，人们完全自由的表达他们的愿望而不受选举策略作用的影响。
+
+真的，那天集合在大会中的无产者不再限于赞扬巴黎无产阶级的英勇与喊着要向5月屠杀复仇了。虽然全心沉浸于巴黎惨烈斗争的回忆中，他们的精神还翱翔于更远的所在。他们为着下次的革命讨论着1871年公社所应有的教训，他们自问公社的错误是什么，这不是为了批判当时的人物，而是为了指出当时在无产阶级组织中占得优势的财产与强权的成见，怎样阻止革命思想的萌芽，发展与照耀世界。
+
+1871年的教训有利于全世界的无产阶级，待与古旧的成见绝缘后之后，无产者将简单明了地说明他们怎样了解他们的革命。
+
+
+
+下次公社的举事中不单是公社主义的运动，那是可以确定的。有些人还想应该成立独立的公社，在这公社中在做经济改革尝试，而民众精神的发展已把他们的主张淹没了。下次革命的公社，只有籍社会主义革命的行动，废除个人私有财产，才能确定与组成他们的独立。
+
+由于革命形势的发展，政府被民众扫除，依赖国家保护的资产阶级无法维持其存在且已开始瓦解的那一天——大概已不很远了——暴动的人民不再等待任何政府以其前所未闻的贤智来发动经济的改革了。他们将以暴烈的充公废除个人私有的财产，他们将以全体人民的名义，把前代劳动所积累下的全部社会财富收归公有，他们将不再以一纸具文的法令，没收社会资本占有者的财产；他们将立即占有他们，将立即使用他们并且成立使用的权利[84]，他们将在工厂中组织起来，他们自己管理工厂，使工厂照常工作，他们将以自己的陋室调换资产阶级大厦中的卫生住宅[85]。他们将立即使用堆积在城市中的一切财富；他们将占有它，好像这财富从来没有被资产阶级盗取似的。工业界的巨头们在工人身上抽取财物，这些寄生的害虫一旦被消灭之后，社会的生产继续进行，并将摆脱主义它的障碍，废除杀害它的投资，扫清瓦解它的混乱，在自由工作的推动之下，依着常识的需要，它将努力走向改善的大道。米席勒说：“法国人民从来没有像1793年，土地从封建领主中夺回之后，那样的公众他们的田地。”待工作获得自由，劳动者的每一进步都为全公社安乐的泉源的那一天，人们也将以从来没有的身份努力于自己的工作呢！
+
+
+
+关于社会财富的问题，人们曾设法划分区别，为了此种区别，甚至使社会主义者分成两派，今天自称集产主义的一派，代替国际劳动协会原来的集产主义（其实即反强权的共产主义）换言之，理论集权主义的学派，曾设法在生产资本与满足生活需要的财富之间，强立区别。一边是机器，工厂，原料，交通线与土地；另一边是住房，制造品，衣服与粮食。前者成为集体的产业，后者，依照这一派的代表的学者的主张，则将留作个人所有。
+
+人们硬要划分这个区别，可是民众的常识就很快地见出了这个区别的不合理。他们知道一个区别是幻想的，不能成立的。就理论来说，只有缺点，它必须在生活经验的面前崩溃。劳动者了解我们住的房屋，我们所烧得煤与煤气，人体为了维持生命所消耗的食物，我们为着保持温暖所穿的衣服，为着求知识所阅读的书籍，为着散心所准备的娱乐，都是自身生存的组成分子，对于生产的成功与人类进步的发展，与机器，制造厂原料，以及其它的生产因素，是同样必要的。他们晓得对于这些财富，维持个人的私有，即无异于维持不平等，压迫，剥削，并且预先取消局部充公的结果。
+
+越过了理论家的集产主义所放在他们的路上的障碍，他们直向较简单较实际的反强权共产主义的方向前进。
+
+真的，在他们的集会中，革命的无产者都明白地肯定他们享用全部社会财富的权利，并且无论是对消费有价值的东西或者对再生产有价值的东西都有废止私人占有的必要。“革命的那一天，我们将占领全部财富，没收储蓄在城市中的一切价值，并把他们收归公有”，工人大会的代言者这样说，而听众也以一致的同意赞许他们。
+
+“每个人都可以在公众的堆积物中取用他所需要的东西，我们确信，在我们城市的谷仓中，还有充分的食物，足以使大家活到自由生产开始新的进步的日子。虽然在我们城市中一般人都很贫穷，可是仓库里却有着充分的衣服，堆在一般的贫困旁边，没有销路，足以使一切人的身上都有御寒穿戴。甚至还有充分的奢侈品，足以使大家依着自己的趣味任意使用。”
+
+看，根据各地大会中所说的判断，这就是无产大众怎样在观察他们的革命，他们所得的结论是：立刻采用无政府共产主义与再生产的自由组织。这是已经确定的两要点，因此隆隆响于我们面前的革命的公社将不重蹈先人的覆辙。我们的先人已经过他们的责任了，他们已将他们所留的慷慨的热血给我们开辟了未来的大道。
+
+关于另一个同样重要的论点，即政府的问题，也没有成立协议，而将无成立的可能。
+
+我们都知道当前的两派对于这个问题，是完全不同意的。强权的社会主义者说：“革命的日子一到，必须成立一个占领权力的政府。这强有力的，坚决果断的政府将颁发种种法令，完成他的革命，并强迫人民服从他的法令。”
+
+反强权的无政府主义者则说：“可怜的幻想！任何负责统治人民的中央机关，由于政府的本质，必然由复杂与保守的分子组成，必然是革命的绊脚石。它在准备向前的革命中妨碍革命，它又不能给落伍的公社以革命的灵感。即在暴动的公社中，它也是退步的因素。或者公社的政府只批准既成的事实，那么，他只是无用与危险的机构罢了，或者他做公社的首脑：它将干涉人民为本身生存而自由准备的事物；它将在应该由全社会草拟共同生活新方式的所在，实施他的学理，那时候它还要使用着社会有机体破除锁链时所产生的创造力量，在这力量的面前，会展有新而广大的地平线。掌握权力的人们总是妨碍改革的趋势，他们若留在平民中间与平民一起准备新的组织，而不是自闭在部院中，专做徒耗精力的讨论，他们或者还能做些有利于人类的事业，他们一上政治舞台之后，他们即从事于权力之争，无暇给予公众的福利。政府是障碍与危险；他为善无力，作恶有余，所以他是没有存在的理由。”
+
+不论这理论如何自然，如何正确，然而累世所积的成见还随处抑制他的发展，一般保守者为着自己的利益还在私有财产与神的宗教之旁，维持政府的崇拜。
+
+这成见是上帝，财产与政府这锁链的最后一环，它存在着，它是妨碍下次革命的一个危险物。可是我们已经见到它在动摇了。“我们将不等待政府的命令，我们自己来做自己的事情；我们将不理睬用教士，所有主或统治者方式来压迫我们的人到干涉，”无产阶级已经这样说了。所以我们应该希望。无政府共产主义者，如果继续严格地打击政府主义的宗教，如果本身不离开自己道路，不被拖入政权的斗争。在革命与我们相距的若干年之内，政府的成见必充分地被动摇，终于不再能诱惑无产大众落入它的错误的深渊。
+
+
+
+然而民众集会中还有一种可惋惜的缺陷，是我们应该指出的。就是对于农村几乎完全没有提及。一切都限于城市。农村对于城市的劳动者，好像不存在似的。甚至轮到下次革命性质的演说家，也避免提及农村与土地。他们不认识农民，也不知道农民的愿望，他们不敢代表农民讲话[86]。我们可以不仔细注意这种情形是会引发的危险吗？只要革命的运动不把农村包括在内，无产阶级的解放，简直是不可能的。待到田赋，抵押，租金与规定此类抽取的制度被废除之后，农村一定会了解这个革命的好处。但是若不预先准备思想，而冒昧地信赖城市革命思想散播于乡间的事实，那一定是很疏忽的。今后，我们应该知道农民的愿望，乡村的人们怎样了解革命，他们想怎样去解决土地所有权的困难问题。我们必须把城市无产阶级与其联盟者所要进行的事情预先告诉农民，并且让农民明白城市的革命者，绝不以有害于耕者的措施强迫他们接受。城市工人这一边也应该习惯于尊敬农民，并且与他们采取完全一致的行动
+
+为着这个缘故，劳动者应该以帮助农村间的宣传为义务。每一个都市对于农民的宣传，应该有一个小的特别组织：土地同盟（Ligue Agraire）支部。这一类的宣传如工业中心的一样，应该被视为大家的义务
+
+开始或者是困难的；可是我们要牢牢记住；这是革命成功与否的问题。只有在工厂的劳动者与田野的耕种者手挽着手地一起去争取众人的平等，使乡间的茅舍与工业中心的住宅中都有幸福的那一天，革命才能够获得完全的胜利。
+
+
+### 第十二章 土地问题
+
+#### Ⅰ
+
+欧洲现在发生一个很大的问题，这就是土地问题。关于土地的所有权与耕种，将来应该采取何种新的方式？土地将属于什么人？什么人耕种它？怎样耕种它？谁都不能否认这问题的重要性，如果注意的观察，爱尔兰，英国，西班牙，俄国与德国的有些部分，大家都会承认问题确已存在而且刻不容缓地要求我们去解决。一个广大的革命已在非常贫困的乡村与一直被轻视到今天的农民阶级中间准备着爆发了。
+
+直到如今人们反对社会主义的最有力的论据，就是说社会问题仅仅是与都市的工人有关，对于农村则无存在的理由；都市的工人或者愿意接受废除私有财产的思想与大制造家及大厂主等等产业的充公，而乡间的农民则没有这种愿望与热心；他们说，农民是不信任社会主义者的，假如都市的工人一旦想要实现他们的计划，农民一定会迅速的强迫他们恢复理性。
+
+我们承认这个反对论，若在三四十年以前，至少对于有些国家，似乎有相当的准确性。的确不错，某一区域的小康与另一区域的尽量容忍，确使农民不大表示，甚或一点不表示他们不满的情绪。但是今天已经不一样了，不动产集中在少数富人的手中，农村无产阶级的人数不断地增加，国家摧残农业的重税，农业采用机器大生产的新法，美国与澳洲的竞争，最后，今天一直达到最偏僻的小村的思想的迅速交换——这一切原因使耕种的情况在三十年之内完全改变了；现在欧洲已经站在广大的土地运动面前了，这个运动将普及全大陆，会给下次革命以大都市革命所不能获得的特别重要性。
+
+谁没有读过爱尔兰的老是一样的新闻？这区域的一半已经起来反抗他们的地主了。农民已经不向土地的所有主缴纳税金了。就是想缴纳的人也不敢这样做，恐怕触犯“土地同盟”的禁条而立遭惨祸，土地同盟是个有力的秘密组织。它的支部分散于农村，它惩罚不遵守他那抗交租金的口号的懦夫。地主们也不敢强索他们的地租。（而且1880年，英国报纸上已经公开承认）[87]，如果他们要收取农民的欠租，他们非动员十万警察不可，这样，他们会激起农村的反叛的。地主若想驱逐一个不交租的农民，他至少要带一百左右的警察，因为他将遇见邻村数千农民有时武装，有时消极的抵抗。假如他成功了，他将找不到一个佃户冒险来住他的产业[88]。最后即使他找到一个，这个触犯众怒的小人不久也非逃走不可，因为他的畜生将被杀害，他的小麦将被焚毁，他自己也将被同盟或其他的秘密团体判处死刑。地主本身的情况也难以持久；在有些地区，土地的价值已降低三分之二；而在另一些地区；地主只是徒有其名的所有者；他们只有在警士驻扎在门口铁质岗亭的保护之下，才敢逗留在他们的土地上。土地留着无人供种，1879年耕地的面积减少三万三千公顷[89]；收货物的价值。根据《财政改良报》（Financial Reformer）减少两亿五千万法郎。
+
+情势如此严重，故格拉斯顿先生在没有上台之前，曾正式允许爱尔兰的代表，将来提出改革土地的法案，根据这种法案，现在大地主的产业，将为公众的利益而被充公，成为全民族公有土地，又将分成二十五年付清代价的无数小块，转卖给穷苦的百姓。那是很明显的，英国议会会永远通不过这个法案，因为它同时给英国土地所有权的原则以致命的打击[90]，所以我们可以预料冲突不会以和平的方式解决。农民的大暴动，像1846年一样，或者会再失败一次，可是情形还是一样，或者更糟，现在可以预料爱尔兰的人民经过这么多的痛苦与违背诺言之后，到忍无可忍的日子，一定会起来大干一下的，这个日子而且也不会远了。英国的政权如遇有一时瓦解的情形，给爱尔兰农民以便利的机会，再由于秘密会社的推动，和农村小资产阶级的支持，他们就会造成一个新的1793年，他们将从他们的陋室中走出来，去做一个今天一般煽动家所告诉他们的事业：他们将手持火把，焚毁地主的宅第，将地主的小麦藏入公有的仓库，驱逐地主的走狗，破坏界限，占有他们渴望了这么多年的土地。
+
+
+
+假如我们转移目光，看看大陆另一个西班牙，我们又会见到同样形式。例如安达卢西亚与瓦伦西亚二省，地产集中于少数人的手里，大多是饥饿的农民，暗中联盟，与地主做不断而残忍的游击战。趁着黑夜的便利，地主的牲畜成群的被歼灭了，数千万公亩的树木一次被焚毁为荒地，无数的仓库也在黑暗中发出熊熊火光，但是胆敢通知官府的告密者与追求罪犯的法官也必死同盟的刀下。在瓦伦西亚省，小佃戸们时常为拒缴租金而罢耕。如有胆敢不遵守这种约言的请当心！一个强有力的秘密团体，以夜间贴在书上的通告，命同盟者不要违反大众的利益，不然他们将受残酷的惩罚，或者杀害他们的畜生，或者焚毁他们的收集物，有时甚至要牺牲他们的性命。
+
+在田产比较分散的区域中，还是西班牙国家本身激起一般人的不满。它以国税，省税，地方税普通税或特别税等名目压迫小地主，故每年总有成万的小田产被没收拍卖，而找不到承买的买主，不止一省的农村居民完全破产了，是饥饿促成成群的农民互相团结起来，起来抗税。
+
+意大利的情形也是一样，在很多省份，农民也完全破产了。被国家逼入贫困之后，耕种的小地主纳不起赋税，政府就无情地没收他们的小块土地。仅仅在一年之内，有6644户（每户平均值99法郎）的小产业，被国家扣押去了。所以在这些省份时常发生反叛的暴动，又有什么奇怪！有时是宣传宗教共产主义的狂热信徒，拖引成千成万的农民跟着他们的后面，只有兵士的枪弹才能驱散这些热心的门徒；有时是某乡村全体来占领领主的荒地，为着大众的利益，耕种他们；有时是成群结队地挨饿村民聚集在公所面前，以反叛的威胁，要求面包与工作。
+
+请不要对我们说，这些事情时偶或有之，直到1789年5月，法国农民的反叛，难道比今天多了吗？开始的时候，反叛的次数即使较少，即使没有多大意义，它们难道不就是后来各大城市革命的根基吗？
+
+
+
+最后，在欧洲东段的俄国，那里的土地问题在很多观点上，又使我们想起1789年以前的法国情形。农奴制已经废除了，每个村落已有他的土地；可是大多数的土地既然那样不好，数量又非常不足，买卖或乡村交给领主的租金与土地的价值比较上又极不相称，国家强迫农民缴纳的税负又一天天地加重，以至有四分之三的农民已陷入最可怕的困境。面包已经缺乏，只要一季收成不好，饥荒就会打击广大区域，削减很多的人口。
+
+但是农民已不再毫无怨言地忍受着悲惨的情形了。新的思想，倾向较善将来的愿望已在靠着铁路来往而与各大中心接触的乡间萌芽了。农民一天过一天地等待着某种大事来废除卖价与租金，把法理上应属于他们所有的全部土地归还他们。假如有一个亚瑟·杨[91]今天游历俄国，他在1789年以前游历法国。他将听见它记载在《旅行记》一书中同样的愿望与祈祷。在有些省份，秘密的骚动已由反抗地主的游击战等表现出来了。只要政治的事变促成权力的瓦解，激发一般的热情，耕种的饿夫们就会得着乡间发展的很快的小资产阶级的协助和鼓动，开始其连续不断的土地反叛。这些反叛之后，事先虽没有预定的计划，在全国各地虽然没有强固的组织，而其暴动所及，此起彼伏的牵制军队的调动，削弱政府统治，如此拖延很多年的时间，终于给影响全欧洲的大革命以引导的力量。[92]
+
+
+
+假如土地问题在我们以上所述的各国，以非常严重的方式，呈现于我面前，假如老大的欧洲被这些农民暴动包围，如同被广大的火圈包围一样，假如地主产业的充公在这些区域真正实施起来，欧洲的中心，自称文明的国家，难道不受反应吗？反应当然是很大的。当我们的下一节，把英，法，比，瑞等国的土地状况加以分析的时候，当我们把美澳怎样以大工业的方式生产小麦的时候，以及最新要素的有力影响怎样以使英国发生恐慌的情形加以研究的时候，最后，当我们对于自称文明要冲的各国农民怎样受着新思想影响的种种加以注意的时候，我们就会见到土地问题，早以不同的方式，呈现在整个欧洲面前了，在英法和在俄意一样，耕作者都已开始要求他们的土地了；我们就会见到现在的情况已无法维持，已不能继续很久，社会必须彻底改造的日子也不远了，改造之后必须成立新的事物状态，在这新的状态中，所有权与公众的制度必须有深刻的改革，土地的耕作者不会像今天这样只是社会的牺牲者，没有半点可享受的权利。他们跟其他的人一样，将参与生活的大宴会与智慧的发展，农村也不再是无知的巢穴，终必成为安逸与生命之光所发出的中心。
+
+#### Ⅱ
+
+在前一节，我们已经见到土地的耕作者，农民，在爱尔兰、西班牙、意大利，或俄罗斯是处在怎样可悲或可怖的情况中了。这些地方的土地反叛已如箭在弦上，可说是毫无可疑的了。但在自诩文明的国家，如英法德以及瑞士等国，农民的情况也已逐渐恶化，终至不能维持了。
+
+请以英国为例。二百年以前，耕种自己土地的英国农民，还享着某种可羡慕的安逸。今天英国也成为非常有钱的大地主与穷的可怜的无产阶级的国土了。
+
+全部可供土地的五分之四，或23,976,000公顷的土地只是2340个大地主的地产；710个勋爵占有英国三分之一的地产；某侯爵旅行150公里，可以不离开自己的土地，某伯爵领有一省的面积，至于其余的地主（包括五十万家），每家只好以三分之一公顷的土地为满足，换句话说，每家仅有一所住宅与一个小菜园而已！
+
+两千三百四十家的地主享受惊人的收入，每年竟有十万至一千万法郎的进款；维斯特敏斯特侯爵。与贝德福特公爵，每日收入25,000法郎，换句话说，每小时可得一千多法郎，已超过工人一年的所得，至于数十万的农民家庭，即使一年苦到头，也只能赚得300至1000法郎的进益！使土地生产的农民，每日做14或16小时的工作，每星期若有12至15法郎的收入——即是不挨饿的数目——就觉得相当的幸福了！[93]
+
+懒惰者那边无耻的豪奢，任性的挥霍，耕作者这边是终日的勤劳，不得一饱！这就是社会的实况。
+
+那些制造书籍的人一定会对你们说，靠着这种集中于少数人手中的财产，英国才能成为耕作最集约最生产国家，大勋爵们自己不能耕种他们的土地，把它们分成相当大的零块租给佃农们去耕种，而这些佃农或租户（人们会对你们这样说）已经把他们所租得的田地变成合理农业的模范了。
+
+这些话在不久以前是正确的，但今天已不再是那样的了。
+
+首先是那些面积广大的田地，绝对任其荒芜，或者被改成大花园，使秋天一到，地主与其宾客们就可以到这里来做大规模的狩猎。成千成万的人能在这些土地上找到他们的食物！地主们并不注意这些事：他们不知道怎样浪费他们的财产，他们愿意有数十万平方米的大花园，他们就使田亩变成了荒地。[94]
+
+还有大片从前是耕种的土地现在改做了饲养牛羊的牧场。成千的农民被他们的地主“剥夺”与驱逐了；养活人民的田地被改成生产牛羊，或富人食肉的草地，耕种田亩的数量总是向下递减。在1866年与1869年，英国种下1,600,000公顷的小麦[95]，到1800年只剩1,200,000公顷了[96]。十五年前，每公顷产二十六竡[97]今天每公顷仅产二十二竡了。[98]
+
+就是供种五十至一百以上公顷的佃农，就是这些想自成为地主并靠他人工作来过舒适生活的小资产阶级，今天也已破产了。受着地主们贪心的佣金的压迫，他们再不能改良他们的耕作也不能抵抗美澳的竞争；报纸上每天总有这些田庄出卖的消息。
+
+所以土地的情况可以归成以下的结论：人民大众被迫离开田间，移向大都市与制造业大中心，再与那里的穷人们进行疯狂的竞争。土地集中在少数地主手中，这些地主每年享受莫大的进益，并把这些进益任意挥霍在不生产与无意识的奢侈上。中间阶级的佃户想自成为小地主，终被过重的租金压迫得逃不了破产的厄运。他们准备与平民联手，把大地主手中土地重占回来。整个国家都受这不合理的地产情况的影响。
+
+“土地国有”的呼声今天成为一切不满的人的集合口号，这又有什么稀奇呢？“土地与工作同盟”（Ligue de la Terre et du Travail）这大组织在1869年，就已要求一切大地主的土地应被没收为国有，这思想每天获得更多的信徒。有十五万以上会员的“乡间劳动者同盟”（Ligue des travailleurs des campagnes）10年以前，只有一个目的，就是想以罢工增高他们的工资，现在也要求地主产业的充公了。
+
+最后，爱尔兰的“土地同盟”已开始在苏格兰与英格兰扩展其支部，而且得到着人们的同情，大家都知道这同盟的作风。他开始宣告，由于同盟的决定，此后交于大地主的租金将减少四分之一。他以种种小方法，如必要时以暴力阻止地主驱逐支付四分之三租金的农人。它以恐怖手段威胁要付全款的胆怯者。以后，等到能把各个力量组织起来的时候，他将宣告，不应再交租金给地主，他将武装农民来实行他的意志。时机一到，它将做1789年至1793年法国农民所做过的事情！它将以火与铁，强迫地主做让出他们的地权。
+
+英国革命之后，将生产何种土地所有权的新方式？在今天是很难预测的，因为革命范围的大小，要看革命时间的长短，尤其是要看革命思想在贵族与资产阶级这边所遇到的抵抗力的大小。只有一点是可以确定的，就是英国已走向土地私有制组的废除，土地占有者给这思想的反动，将组织改造完成于和平的方式中；为着他们的意志战胜，英国人民必须借助于暴力。
+
+#### Ⅲ
+
+法国——法国乡镇的读者听见议员先生们与经济学家在大都市所印成的精美书籍中怎样胡说他们的情形，他们一定会捧腹大笑的。他们在这些书籍中说，法国农民几乎全是富有的，而且完全满意他们的命运；他们有充足土地，充足的畜生，土地给他们生产很多的金钱；他们很容易缴纳本来就不重的租税，而且土地的租金也相当轻微；他们每年有积蓄，无时不致富。
+
+我想，农民们一定会回答，这些演说家不是有意骗人的花言巧语者，便是一无所知的大笨伯，他们要是这样说，那倒的确是有理的。
+
+那么我们先来考察住在乡间的二千三百至二千四百万人民究竟是有什么要素组成的，然后再来看看这数目中就有多少人是满意他们的命运，是不愿有任何土地的改革。
+
+
+
+首先我们有8000个大地主（家属在内，大约四万人左右），他们尤其在涅卡地（Picardie），安茹（Anjou），诺曼底（Normandie）等处领有产业，每年给他们以一万之二十万法郎以上的出息。
+
+这些人当然不会诉苦。他们夏天在自己的领地中经过几个月舒适的生活，把佣工，小佃农或者佃户劳动所产的价值放在自己袋中之后，他们便到城里去消费他们的金钱。他们在城里同女人喝满杯的香槟，他们把容易得来的金钱，满手送给他们的情妇，他们在高楼大厦中一天的花费，就足以供给穷人一家的半年生活。哦！是的，这些人的确没有什么可悲痛的；他们所要悲痛的是农人的逐渐不驯良，到今天并且不肯做无报酬的工作了。
+
+对于这些人，我们可以不说。等到的革命的那一天，我们再找他们说话。
+
+
+
+放高利贷者，家畜商人，产业的买卖者，这些秃鹫似的人物今天袭击农民的乡村，他们从城里来的时候，只有腰间的一小袋是他们全部的财产，待由乡间回到城里，他们已俨然是地主与银行家了；公证人与律师煽动诉讼；当乡镇公所被当那班有利可图的人鼓舞，为着美化乡长先生公馆周围的乡村而负债建设的时候，工程师与各种各类的职员，即在国库与地方金库中，大用其公款，简言之，这一切视乡间为未开化之富邦，可以任自己自由剥削的寄生虫，当然没有不满意的理由。如果有人说起任何事物的改革，他们就会用全力来反对。因签字期票而破产的农人，因诉讼而致贫的佃农，让四周吸血鬼任意吮吸的好百姓，这就是一切放高利贷者现在所需要的。让乡镇长自由支配的乡镇，浪费公款的国家。这就是职员们所要求的。等农民破产之后，他们又会到匈牙利，土耳其，如必要时，到中国去做同样的事情。高利贷是没有祖国的。
+
+这些人当然也没有什么可抱怨的。可是他们究竟占多少数目呢？五十万吧？就算家属在内，或者是一百万把？若就破坏乡村，于数年之内使全体农民破产这件事来说，这数目已经是太多了，但是为着抵抗农民一旦调转镰刀来攻击他们的的革命，则又嫌太少了。
+
+
+
+其次是领有五十至二百公顷地主，他们中的大多数的确不知道损伤他们的过重负担究竟在什么地方，假如有人对他们说起任何事物的改变，他们第一个观念就是自问他们是否因此要损失掉他们的所有。他们中间暂时陷入困难的人也希望有一天会“成功”；一个幸运的投机，耕作之外兼任有出息的职务，或者一个有钱亲戚某天早晨自杀了，就会使安逸重入他们的家门。就一般说，他们是不知道困难，也不知道劳动的，并不是他们自己耕种他们的土地：他们有250至300法郎一年的一年工钱的长工给他们担任这辛苦的任务，他们坐享现成，他们要这些长工每年做一千法郎以上的工作。
+
+这些人，我们不要怀疑，也是革命的敌人；他们现在已经是自由的劲敌，不平等的支柱与剥削的首脑了。真的，他们构成相当可观的核心，大约是二十万地主，家属在内，共计八十万人，今天，在乡村中，他们的确代表一种权力。国家重视他们，他们的安乐，给他们在乡镇中保持他们时常可以利用的势力。但是他们在人民举事浪潮之前能够做什么呢？无疑的，能够抵抗的一定不是他们；他们会谨慎地回到家中，等待暴风雨的结果。
+
+
+
+家有十至五十公顷的土地比前面那个阶级的人数要更多。他们数目超过二十五万，家属在内，共约一百二十万人。他们占有法国可供面积的四分之一。
+
+这个核心，由于它在乡间的势力与活跃，构成一个可观的力量。前一个阶级往往住在城内，这个阶级则自己耕种他们的田亩；他们没有与乡村截断关系，直到现在，他们也还算是农民。一般的反动分子，就依靠他们的保守精神。
+
+真的，在19世纪上半期，这一阶级的农人，的确有一个时期，曾经享过某种的安逸，从大革命产生的这个阶级，自然要拼命保守他们在革命中所得到的利益，恐怕失掉他们的所得，自然要固执地拒绝任何性质的改革。但是从若干时期以来，情况已大大改变了。在法国的有些部分（例如西南部）这一类的农民还享受着某种安逸，在其他的部分，他们已开始抱怨了。他们已不能积蓄，他们已无法扩展他们的产业，他们的产业，因为分家，已继续不断地裂成小块。同时，他们又租不到条件与从前同样优裕的零星田亩！他们今天要以极大的价钱才能租到他们所要耕作的土地。
+
+他们所有的几小块田亩均分在乡村的四角，他们已不能使耕作的出息足以补偿压在他们身上的重负。小麦的进益不多，家畜的饲养亦仅有微薄的利息。
+
+国家以重赋压迫他们，乡镇公所也不饶恕他们：车、马、打麦器具、肥料，一切都须纳税；附加的生丁[99]增成法郎，税的名目几乎与昔时国王治下相等。农民重新变成了国家的牛马。
+
+放高利贷者使他们破产，期票使他们倾家；抵押损害他们，城市的制造家剥削他们，很少的农具，都要他们付出成本高三四倍的价钱。他们还臆想自己是他们土地的所有主，其实，他们只是徒有其名个假地主：他们所做的工作只为养肥债主与政府的职员，只替制造家的太太们购买轻车美服，只使城里的一切不事生产者过着安逸的生活罢了。
+
+你们以为他们真的不懂这种情形吗？不要太武断吧！他们非常明白自己的处境的呢！待到他们觉得自己有力量的时候，他们一定会抓住机会，彻底去消灭这些寄生在他们背上的先生们。
+
+
+
+把以上的一切都计算在内，我们还只有乡间居民的十分之一。其余的又怎么样呢？
+
+其余的，就是四百万左右的家长（家属约一千八百万人），每家有三至五公顷田地的并不很多，一或十分之一公顷的，有相当素质相当数目，一无所有的，则占最大多数。其中有800万人，耕种两三公顷的土地，熬尽人世间的辛苦，都不能度过青黄不接的生活，所以他们每年必须派数十万儿女到城里去，以苦功赚得他们日常的面包，七百万人只有可怜的小块土地——一所住屋，一个小菜园，便是他们全部的财产，或者一无所有，只靠佣工解决他们极其艰苦的生活；最后，一百万人完全由冻饿的穷人组成，他们没日只靠硬面包或马铃薯……（如果有的话）度过他们苟活的生涯。看，这就是法国乡间的多数居民！[100]
+
+这广大的群众好像不在经济学家计算之内。但对于我们来说，他们就是全部。因为组成乡村的就是他们；其他的一切只是附属品：黏贴在橡树老干上的寄生菌。
+
+可是，人民就说这些农民是富有者，是满意他们的命运，是不愿意任何改革，是掉过头去不听社会主义者的话语的！
+
+
+
+首先，我们会观察到，每次当我们以容易了解的语言对农民们陈述我们的整个思想时，他们并没有掉过头去不听我们的话语。我们当然没有对他们说起选举的事，我们当然没有请他们选任我们做议员或乡警；我们也不对他们长谈所谓的“科学的”社会主义；我们更不劝告他们，把儿子送到巴黎，同议会中的律师们来往；我们尤其不诱导他们把几块零碎的土地交给国家，让国家的大队职员来任意支配。真的，假如我们对朴实的农民说起这些蠢话，他们一定会掉过头去不听我们，而且他们的确是对的。
+
+可是，当我们每次同他们谈起我们所了解的革命时，他们总是赞成我们，说我们的思想是很合理的；他们总回答说，我们的思想就是他们的思想。
+
+
+
+那么，请看我们曾经对农民说过，现在并且还继续劝告他们的话语吧：
+
+“从前，土地属于公社公有，公社则由亲手耕种土地的人们组成。后来投机者以种种的欺诈，暴力，高利贷与诡计，把公有的产业占为私有。今天属于某先生或某太太的这一切土地，从前都是公社的公产。今天农民需要这些土地来耕种，养活自己与自己的家人，至于自己不耕种的富人们，则滥用地权，使其可以过着穷奢极欲的生活。所以农民必须组成公社，夺回这些土地，把它分给愿意亲手耕作的人们。”
+
+“抵押是一种不公道。借钱给你们的人，没有强占土地的权利，因为土地之所以有价值，全赖你们祖先开垦荒地，建造乡村，修筑道路，排干沼泽时所完成的工作；它现在还是要全靠你们的劳动来生产。所以‘农民国际’（Internationale des paysans）应该以烧毁抵押的书契，永远废除这可恶的制度为当前的义务。”
+
+“强迫着你们缴纳的田税与其租税都被一帮非但无益，而且绝对有害的政府职员吞没去了。所以你们应立即取消它们。你们应宣告你们的绝对独立，你们应严正表示你们比巴黎戴手套的先生们更能知道料理你们自己的事情。”
+
+“你们要建造一条道路吗？那么请与邻近乡镇的居民联合起来，你们将比巴黎公用部更迅速地造好你们所需要的。你们需要一条铁道吗？那么，全区域关系的地方将比建筑时只知道赚数百万金钱的企业家，更能造成受用的路线。你们需要学校吗？你们自己创办维持，比巴黎的先生们来的更容易有效。国家对于这一切毫无用处；学校，道路，运河等由你们自己建筑，所费必较少，成效必较大。”
+
+“你们需要防御外国的侵略吗？你们只要知道自卫，切不可把这自卫的任务交给迟早要出卖你们的将军们。你们要知道，军队从来不会阻遏侵略者的侵入，反之，只有平民与农人，如果他们觉得有保持自己独立的必要的时候，才能击败最可怕的军队。”
+
+“你们需要工具机器吗？让你们直接与城市的工人联合，他们将以成本的价格，交换你们的产品，而不经厂主的居间谋利，因为厂主不但剥削制造的工人而且垄断购买的农民。”
+
+“不要惧怕政府的力量。这些表面似乎非常可怕的政府，一遇暴动人民的打击，立刻会崩溃下来！我们已有不少次看见他们在几小时内就瓦解了，现在又可以预料数年之后，革命将在欧洲爆发，因而动摇一切罪恶的强权。你们将趁着这难得的时机去推翻政府——尤其是去完成你们的革命，换句话说，驱逐大地主，把他们的产业没收为公有，打到放高利贷者，废除抵押，宣告你们的完全独立，至于制造的工人也在他们的城市中做着同样的事情。于是你们自由联合地组织起来了，使各区域各省市，自下而上地构成一个自由的整体。但是，你们要当心，切不可让各类自称农民恩人的欺诈者来破坏你们的革命；你们自己做事，千万不可期待他人。”
+
+
+
+这就是我们要对农民说的话。他们反驳我们的唯一证据并不涉及我们思想的根基，它只是怀疑实行的可能性罢了。
+
+“很好，只要农民们彼此能同意，能联合，一切都是很美妙的。”我们的反对论者又这样回答我们。
+
+好吧，我们努力使他们彼此能同意，能联合吧！请尽量宣传我们的思想，请满手散播陈述我们思想的书报，请努力建立乡村间的联络线，革命的日子一到，请同他们一起奋斗，并且为着他们奋斗！
+
+这日子其实已很逼近，它的降临之速，将出乎一般人的意料之外！
+
+---
+
+[1] 1882年下半年法国里昂因丝业工人过于贫困，发生两次炸弹案件，该地的资产阶级大起恐慌，六十左右的无政府主义者被捕，反动派报纸指克鲁泡特金是革命运动的首领，克氏于12月22日早晨，在法国东部土农（Thonon）被宪兵逮捕，押至里昂；审判时，加以“莫须有”之罪，结果，克氏与其他三人，均被判处五年监禁。——译者
+
+[2] 克氏被禁的监狱就在此地。——译者
+
+[3] 《反抗者》（Le Révolté）半月刊1879年2月再瑞士的日内瓦创刊，由克鲁泡特金等人撰稿。——译者
+
+[4] 爱利赛·邵可侣（Élisée Reclus，1830-1905），法国著名地理学家，同时又是一个无政府主义者。著有《人与地》《地与人》《大地理》及《进化与革命》等书。——译者
+
+[5] 德拉梅内（F. Robert De Lamennais，1782-1854），法国社会主义者。以前做过牧师，后来渐渐左倾。1834年公开脱离教会，刊行《一个信仰者的话》一书。1840年因社会主义思想和对教会的攻击被判处一年徒刑。1848年被选为国民议会左派代表。——译者
+
+[6] 《反抗者》后移在巴黎出版，因宣传反战主义而备受压迫，在1887年9月改名《反抗》（La Révolte）。
+
+[7] 见盖尔维努斯的《十九世纪史》导言（GERVINUS: Introduction à l'histoire du dix-neuvième siècle）——著者
+
+[8] 见法拉里的《国是》（FERRAI: La raison d' Etat）——著者
+
+[9] 指十九世纪。——译者
+
+[10] 并非马克思派的共产主义。——译者
+
+[11] 1864年是国际劳工协会成立的一年，巴黎公社失败后法国劳动运动也就消沉了，到1878年才又兴盛起来。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[12] Sheffield在英国约克郡（Yorkshire），人口约四十余万。——译者
+
+[13] Alsace在莱茵河与佛日山脉间，为德法两国争夺的省份，作者写此书时于德国。——译者
+
+[14] 这几行是在1879年写的，直到1887年它们还与实际情况相符。这种经济恐慌整整持续了八年，之后的情况也好不了多少。饥馑现象稍减。但也为时不久。某一些国家内的恐慌自然继续存在，而每次恐慌发生总有千万人失业挨饿。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[15] 圣哥达隧道在瑞士南部阿尔卑斯山中，1828年造成，长约九公里半。——译者
+
+这里似乎指圣哥达铁路隧道，应于1882年建成，并非二十、二十一世纪同名的隧道工程。——修订者
+
+[16] Rothschild，欧洲富豪（犹太籍）。——译者
+
+[17] 我们都知道瑞典与挪威现在也已不在此列了——著者
+
+[18] Kostomarov，在他的关于专制政治之发展的文章中卓绝地叙述了国家权力在俄国的发达。这文章载于他的“专门论文”中，但《欧洲使者》上面发表的论文也值得一读。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+N.I.科斯多马洛夫（1817-1885），俄国历史家，1859-62年任彼得堡大学史学教授。——编者
+
+[19] 现在已经超过二三十倍了。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[20] 美国显然是个例外。可是我们得记住以前美国的土地蕴藏之富到了不可相信的地步。现在美国土地的宝藏已被种种方式的投机家掠夺了，那情形并不亚于俄国奥伦堡一袋，而且美洲合众国已经在开始扩大国家权力，并创设义务的或支薪的官职——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[21] 我写上面几行文字时所作的预言不幸完全应验。到现在我们已经有了1900年英国和布埃尔人的战争，1904年日俄战争，1912年塞尔维亚与保加利亚对土耳其的战争，最后便是1914-1918年的第一次世界大战，它们证实了我们的一切预言。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+在第一次世界大战后发生的大小战争很多，最后酿成第二次世界大战。现在战争刚刚停止一年，强国又在作第三次世界大战的准备了。——译者
+
+[22] 休戚相关即是连带的关系。甲地的饥荒影响乙地的幸福；A城的疫病威胁B城的健康；某一职业的工资减少牵动整个工人阶级的生活等即是休戚相关的事实。——译者
+
+[23] L. Gambetta（1838-1882），法国政治家，1870年普法战争中法皇拿破仑三世战败被擒后，甘必大领导共和党人组织国防政府，抵抗普军，执政凡五个月。德军退出后，巴黎人民起义，推翻当时中央政府，成立巴黎公社。——译者
+
+[24] 即中国孔子所说：己所欲，施于人的意思。——译者
+
+[25] 这几行是看了《大西洋月刊》（Atlantic Monthly）勃伦夫人（Madame Emma Brown）报告麻沙诸塞（Massachusetts）州各工厂的儿童工作之后写成。——勃伦夫人与一个著名的经济学家一起，参观了大多数国营工厂之后，证实没有一处遵守童工的法律。在每一工厂中，她见到囚犯似的儿童，这些可怜生物的状态已无疑指出他们虚弱的身体中已散有慢性病症的种子，如：血衰症，身体变形与痨病等。麻沙诸塞州诸工厂的工人几乎有半数，——百分之四十四——是十五岁以下的儿童。为什么制造家要这样喜欢童工呢？因为后者的工资只占成年工人的四分之一（百分之二十四）。
+
+我们都知道现在欧洲虽然有所谓保护儿童的法律，可是，到处的工厂，甚至煤矿中依然塞满低龄的儿童，每日往往做十二小时的工作。——著者
+
+[26] 见罗根（Felix Rocquain）的《革命以前的革命精神》（L'Esprit révolutionnaire avant la Révolution）。——著者
+
+[27] Augustin Thierry，法国历史家（1795-1856）。——译者
+
+[28] G. Clemenceau（1841-1929）法国政治家，世称老虎总理。——译者
+
+[29] 参看第十一章。——译者
+
+[30] 这是十九世纪末的情形，下同。——译者
+
+[31] O.E.L. Bismarck（1815-1898），德意志帝国第一任首相。——译者
+
+[32] W. Gladstone（1809-1898），英国政治家，曾先后组阁四次。——译者
+
+[33] 吉拉丹（1806-1881），法国政治家，非常熟悉当时的政情；曾以多登广告，减低报价的方法，助成新闻纸的改革。——译者
+
+[34] 现在就是这种情形。出版物可以自由讲话。在法国和美国报纸主笔可以自由谈论暗杀部长的事。可是假如真有人听从他的意见，杀害部长，那么不仅凶手连那主笔也会被判处死刑。举一个不远的例子，无政府主义者西渥克就因为发表文章被判死刑（后减为终身服役）。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[35] Odessa，黑海上的一个海港，属乌克兰，今为乌克兰南部的主要城市。——译者
+
+[36] 浮士德（Faust）传说是十六世纪德国学者和魔术家。歌德（1749-1832）曾用这传说写了诗剧《浮士德》。因浮士德长年蛰伏书斋，故有此语。——译者
+
+[37] 哈恩（G.A. Hirn，1815-1890），法国科学家。关于“热之机械论”他有几种著作。——译者
+
+[38] 克劳宿司（R. Clausius，1822-1888），德国物理学家。以研究“热之机械论”著名，曾建立了它的一个基本法则。——译者
+
+[39] 伊拉莫斯·达尔文（Erasmus Darwin，1731-1802），英国博物学家和诗人，相信进化论。他的孙儿（Charles Darwin，1809-1882）是誉满全球的博物学家。——译者
+
+[40] 德国诗人席勒（J.C.F. Schiller，1759-1805）著有《威廉·退尔》剧本，叙说十四世纪瑞士爱国者威廉·退尔争自由的故事。——译者
+
+[41] 指俄国女虚无党人薇拉·沙苏丽奇（Vera Zasoulitch）的故事。——译者
+
+[42] 本章写于1883年，可是到现在还是真实的。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[43] Alexander Herzen（1812-1870），俄国的革命的思想家，后半生亡命西欧，在伦敦先后创办《北辰》、《镜》两刊物，宣传革命，后来病死在法国。——译者
+
+[44] Queen Victoria（1819-1901），英国女王，在位六十四年（1837-1901）。——译者
+
+[45] J. Andrassy伯爵（1823-1890），匈牙利政治家，1867年任首相，1871年任奥匈联合国外交部长。——译者
+
+[46] R. Saijsbury伯爵（1830-1903），英国政治家。曾组阁三次，又曾抑制俄国的南进政策。——译者
+
+[47] J.E. Schneider（1805-1875）法国政治家和工业家。他的孙儿Eugene Schneider（1868年生）继承他的冶金工业的首脑，很成功。——译者
+
+[48] Compagnie d' Anzin 当时法国最大的煤矿公司，Anzin在法国北部。——译者
+
+[49] 金顿为拜金主义者的偶像。——译者
+
+[50] 拿破仑三世1852年12月即法国皇帝帝位，至1870年9月普法战争中兵败被囚，共十八年。——译者
+
+[51] 当时（1883年），德国资产阶级不知俄皇实力不厚，已准备对对俄发动大战，并且为了这个目的，与英奥，意，瑞士，罗马尼亚等国结成同盟。俄国便以俄法同盟对抗，当时才因此避免了战争。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[52] 指俄皇亚历山大与德皇威廉。——译者
+
+[53] G.C. Jules Favre（1809-1880），法国政治家。反对拿破仑三世的独裁统治，为共和党领袖之一。1870拿破仑三世战败后，曾任临时共和政府的外交部长。——译者
+
+[54] 参看本书第十一章。——译者
+
+[55] Louis Blanc（1811-1882），法国历史家和社会主义者，著有《法国革命史》（Histoire de la Révolution française，大本，二卷）。——译者
+
+[56] Camille Desmoulins（1760-1794），法国大革命时期中的一个领袖，1789年以激烈的演说鼓动巴黎民众，攻打巴士底狱，1794年与丹东和罗伯斯庇尔一起上断头台。——译者
+
+[57] 法国政府于1788年8月召集“全级议会”，次年5月5日正式开会，集贵族，僧侣，平民三阶级代表于一堂讨论国是。——译者
+
+[58] H.G.R. Mirareau（1749-1791），法国大革命时政治家。1789年米拉波律师以平民代表资格参加全级议会，因贵族，僧侣不与平民代表合作，米拉波发表演说拒绝国王命令，抛弃贵族与僧侣，和他的同志们在同年6月自行组织“国民议会”。——译者
+
+[59] H. Taine（1828-1893），法国历史家兼文学批评家。著有《现代法国的起源》（Origines de la France contemporaine，1876-93）一书，法国革命史（J. Purand英译本，1913，纽约版，三卷）便是这书的第二部分。——译者
+
+[60] 巴士底狱当时是一个臭名昭著的监狱，1789年7月14日被巴黎人民攻入摧毁。——译者
+
+[61] Sans-Cnlotte，指法国大革命时期中的激进派共和党人。——译者
+
+[62] Brabant原为中世纪尼德兰公国，现在南部为比利时的一省，北部属荷兰。“讨饭党”是当时人们给1565年结党的弗兰德斯贵族起的绰号。——译者
+
+[63] Jacobina是法国大革命时期激进共和党，他们隶属于雅各宾俱乐部。这个俱乐部的地址在巴黎雅各宾寺院，故称为“雅各宾党”。——译者
+
+[64] Ivan Tourgueneff（1818-1883）俄国小说家。《父与子》是他的长篇小说，有巴金的中译本。（《屠格涅夫选集之四》，文化生活社版）。——译者
+
+[65] 即第一国际，1864年在伦敦成立，1866年9月在日内瓦正式开第一次会，出席的人为加协会的六国工运代表。——译者
+
+[66] 指蒲鲁东的追随者（比利时劳工运动领袖德·柏朴是协会中最活跃的会员之一）。P.J. Proudhon（1809-1865），法国哲学家和经济学家，曾被人称为“无政府主义之父”。——译者
+
+[67] J. Bentram（1784-1832）英国哲学家和法学家。——译者
+
+[68] 法文Commune为法国行政系统的最低单位，于今日中国的乡保相似，这里所说的公社，法文亦为Commune，惟含义不同，从前有人译为市府，自由市府，乃未来社会的理想的单位，不拘地方职业或人数，以自由契约为基础的自由组织，中古时期已有雏形存在，将来想必起而代替现在政府性质的种种机构。——译
+
+[69] Louis ⅩⅠ（在位1461-1483）和Louis ⅩⅤ（在位1715-1774）都是法国国王。——译者
+
+[70] Ecaterina Ⅱ（在位1762-1796），俄国女皇。——译者
+
+[71] 参看《互助论》第五、六章。——译者
+
+[72] Emile de Laveleye（1822-1892），比利时经济学家与出版家。——译者
+
+[73] 当时的封建领主，如土匪一般的，敲诈抢占，无所不为，公社能规定其税则，照当时人看来，的确是进步的。——译者
+
+[74] 关于中世纪公社的详情，请参看我的著作《互助论》。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[75] 这是在四十年前写的，后来我曾细心研究过中世纪公社的历史，在《互助论》一书中我做过一番简略的叙述。读者在那本书中还可以看见当时许多公社（从十世纪起在北意大利的公社就是这样）为了谋农民的解放，不惜与封建领主长期作战。这一斗争是很坚决的，并且佛罗伦萨的公社现在他本身的Contado（即弗罗伦萨四乡）完成了解放农民的工作，结果在多斯卡纳（佛罗伦萨便是多斯卡纳的首府）一带创造了极大的安乐。就在十世纪热那亚也已经大规模完成了这样的工作。关于法国的公社，拉翁城及其附近一带（即Laonnais）也完成了联合性的农村同盟团体。在别的许多国家也有少数都市达到这样的成就。然而在另一些地方都市与富有领主的斗争却较少成功，甚至完全失败。当时此等都市倦于跟附近的封建领主斗争，便和他们休战，于是农民又匍匐在他们的势力下面。就在这些公社中，都市不得不把封建领主请进它的城里面来；那般富有的贵族，住进都市里后，他们中间便不断地发生冲突，不是当街斗殴，就是阴谋争权，其结果便是遭征服者的厄运，征服者或为教皇，或为国王，而在俄国便是大公或沙皇。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[76] 我在这里又得重讲前一个注脚所说过的。以前我对中世纪的都市的同盟知道的很少，现在我才明白都市同盟——如在意大利北部，在莱茵河一带，在弗兰德斯，英吉利，法兰西都市，在汉萨同盟（在波罗的海）等等——在几个世纪中都占有重要的地位。请参看《互助论》第五、六两章。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[77] 欧洲古时宗教盛行，每一村皆有教堂与钟楼，每村的居民因知识简陋，皆视自己的钟楼为最光荣、最可贵，恰是近世的爱国主义者敬仰自己的国旗一样。——译者
+
+[78] 对于一般想得到一点法国人民（指全体人民，并非人民的“公仆”）历史的普通智识的劳动阶级者，我们可以特别推荐席米勒的《历史》和尤敬·西的小说（这推荐一定会使教授们大吃一惊）：《人民之秘密：一个无产阶级家庭在几个世纪中的历史》一部社会主义的、人民立场的、公社派的著作。这部大著并没有俄文译本：沙皇不准这小说的译本出版。不过夏席科夫曾翻译了这本书的开头几章，在从前的俄语杂志上发表，并且换了一个题目，作《奴隶制度史杂纪》在这卓越的故事里面有着从前的巴黎公社的历史和十九世纪四五十年代法国工人对于公社的思想与看法。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+米席勒（Jules Michelet，1798-1874），法国历史学家，著有《大革命史》。——编者
+
+尤敬·西（Eugene Sue，1804-1857），法国小说家，《人民之秘密》共十五卷。——编者
+
+[79] 这几行从亚诺德（Arthur Arnould）所著《巴黎公社之议会的与人民的历史》（Histoire populaire et parlementaire de la Commune de Paris）借用来，这著作很好，我们很高兴介绍给读者。——著者
+
+A.亚诺德（1833-1895），文学家，曾参加巴黎公社，著作甚多。——译者
+
+[80] 本章写于1881年3月。——著者
+
+[81] 为澳洲东北海洋中的大岛，很多公社革命者被充军来到此地。——译者
+
+[82] 傅立叶（C. Fourier，1772-1837），法国的社会主义者。他的理想社会组织是法兰市（Phalangeou Phalanx）由四百个家族约千八百人组成的团体生活，住在叫做法兰司德尔（Phalanstère）的共同建筑中，故傅立叶的信徒又称为Phalanstériens。——译者/修订者
+
+[83] 著者在《近代科学与无政府主义》第十一章中说过：“这两个卓越的著作家（指伯格尔与维达，两人都是社会主义的著作家），也主张在一切交易中均用劳动券代替金钱，然而矿山、铁道、工厂则应该归国家所有，他们称他们的体系为集产主义……”——译者
+
+[84] 至于一个暴动的大都市怎样能够按照这种意识组织一切，可参看我的《面包与自由》在那本书里面我会尽可能的从实际方面考察暴动的公社实际组织的问题，我注重的不是现在，是将来。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[85] 这句话是1883年本书初版中就有了的。我现在要添加说，根据那以后尤其在英，比二国所得到的经验，我觉得虽然可以将那些豪宅改修作为工人的住屋，可是问题的解决并不在这个方向。我们必须立即建造一些共有四，五，六个房间的并不很大的住房，并且有一切的舒适便利，和近代设备：即光线充足，并且有简单的暖气装置，洗澡房，小花园，电气设备等等，及一切适合于完全卫生的生活的条件。我还要添加，像现在这样在大战以后，在英国还需要建筑这样的住屋二百万所得光景，并且已经计划如何降低他们的建筑费了（不过并不主张建筑单调的样式）同时还在设计一些新的改善办法。可是究竟建筑一些较大的建筑还是建筑数目更多的较小的房屋——这问题该有当地居民来决定，建筑新屋是一切社会革命的第一件大事。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[86] 本文写于1883年——以后在俄国也做了一点事情，可是在俄国，就在这一农民数目占人口十分之九的国家里，多数社会主义者的意识形态还是都市的。并且在西部差不多一点事也没有做过——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[87] 这半句是从俄文本中抽译的。——译者
+
+[88] 在爱尔兰和英国的土地常常分为二十至二百“结夏吉纳”（旧俄地积单位=2.70英亩）光景的田庄，每个田庄都有小住屋和农舍。爱尔兰的田庄大都是较小的一种，田地上也只有很小的住屋，常常是用粗石或草泥盖的。地租到处都很高，农人也很穷。八十年代爱尔兰农民运动非常热烈，农村暗杀事件非常之多，格拉斯顿内阁因此立了一条法律，使英国内阁关于财产的法律起了一个大革命。即是，遇着农民诉冤的时候，便由治安判事决定地租的数目。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[89] 公顷，法国面积名，一公顷等于一万平方公尺。——译者
+
+[90] 格拉斯顿事实上并未提出这个法案。他仅仅提出了这样一条法律，即遇着农人伸冤的时候，治安判事只能照自己意思减地租。1903年保守党通过了一条法律强迫地主将农民售卖于农民，可是却定了这样一个价格（每年地租的二十五倍至三十倍），这使得爱尔兰的农民不要多长的时间就破产了。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[91] Arthur Young（1741-1820），英国农业经济学家。他最有名的著作是《法国旅行记》（Travelstar in France during 1787-88,88-89）共两卷，描写大革命前和当时法国人民的生活及社会状态。——译者
+
+[92] 这是在十九世纪八十年代写的，这以后有1905年的农民暴动（关于它的性质以及普遍的影响之有价值的材料，可参见自由经济社的刊物）和最近的1917-1919年的革命。他们证实了我的话。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[93] 现在他们的收入也并未增加多少；八十年代一个田地上的工人每周的工钱通常只有九先令（即四卢布五十戈贝克）。很少有人得到十二先令（即六卢布）的；而现在他们最高的周薪也很少有超过二十先令的（即十卢布）。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[94] 近时这一类的大花园又让富豪的资产阶级买去了，他们“就跟贵族完全一样”也请了他们的亲友来狩猎。——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[95] “1,600,000公顷”俄文本作“1,160,000结戛吉纳”，“1,200,000公顷”俄文本作“1,100,000结戛吉纳”。——编者
+
+[96] 这是在1880年写的，这以后英国土地的耕种面积在1907年减为601,010结戛吉纳（1911年705,200结戛吉纳；可是还得减去春季作物。1874年全部种麦的田地已降至925,000结戛吉纳，差不多减去六分之一了）。关于这个问题的详情，读者可悉看1918版（即俄文本）的《田园工厂与手工厂》——著者（俄文本注）
+
+[97] 一竡（法国容量单位）等于一百“脱尔”或百竔（即升），一竡等于中国九斗六升又五七四六一升。——译者
+
+[98] 参看1890年10月15日伦敦《泰晤士报》（Times）上发表的数字。——著者
+
+[99] 法国的辅币，一百生丁兑一法郎。——译者
+
+[100] 关于法国田产的数目，人们所观察到的，既有很大的差别，我们不妨把西门先生（M. Eugene Slmon）在1885年《激进共和报》（Republique radicale）宣传专号上所发表的一篇文章，转录一部分在这里以供读者参考：
+
+“把建筑物与菜园所占的面积，即一百万公顷，八百万地主的地产除外，法国农业的地区，不论一般的意见如何，是属于通常想象不到的极少数人。分区地形学会（societe de topogtaphie pareellaire）会长桑该先生（M. Sanguet）很愿意替我们研究法国的田产，可惜他的工作至今还没有完成，根据他的意见，在法国一共八百五十四万七千二百八十五个地主中间有四百三十九万二千五百人每年只纳五法郎以下的税款（而且往往是无法征收的），他们全体只享受法国土地全部进益的百分之五又一。所以他们所占的地位是微乎其微，几乎不值一提。”
+
+“其次是二百九十九万三千四百五十个地主每年纳五至三十法郎，或平均十三法郎的税额，分得土地进益的百分之二十二又五；这所代表的田产如此之小，故有的人可以被加上无产者的名称。第三类地主共有一百另九万五千八百五十人，每年纳三十至三百法郎的税额，享全进益的百分之四十七。每人每年平均可得一千七百三十法郎。”
+
+“第四与最后的阶级包括六万五千五百二十五个地主，每年纳三百至几千法郎的税额，他们却享受土地进益的百分之二十五又四，或每人每年平均可得一万五千七百法郎。这就是大产业。再则，构成大产业的土地，是森林，旷野与牧场等，所生产的出息既少于其他的田地，故人们可以说，这六万五千五百二十五个地主虽然只享全进益的四分之一，其实他们领有一半以上的土地。都波先生（M. Toubeau）研究1873年国际统计的一篇最有趣味的文章，也有同样的意见，这文章发表于1882年7,8月份的《实证杂志》（Revue positive）上。根据这位政论家的观察，约有四千万公顷的土地是在不谙农务的大地主与中地主的手里。其余的一千万公顷中有二百万公顷平均二百公顷一块的大田庄直接由领有者自种，有四百万公顷分摊给二百万左右的农民……”
+
+“但那是土地分成五公顷，尤其是两公顷，甚至一公顷的，最占多数，而且不断增加，几乎达到可怕的程度，这些零块简直可说2是零头布料，很难耕种，甚或不能耕种，它们不但不能使它们的所有主致富，反而使他们更穷。这些零块中每年总有一万五千至七千公顷被人拍卖，其所得的价值还不足以补偿一年的费用。”
+
+“就事实说，在我们的五千万公顷中，即二百公顷一块的一万大田庄与我们以上所说的布头零块都包括在内，只有七百万公顷属于直接使它们生产的农民。其余的一切，可以说。只有一个主人，就是懒惰者，收租金者与不懂农事的门外汉。”
+
+“这种情况不但危害农业，而且损伤居民：把一千一百万儿童与衰老残疾者除外，住在我们乡下的七八百万劳动者，只有一百七十五万四千九百四十四人自己耕种自己的产业，换言之，他们有足够的产业可以生活，毋须求于他人的田地。其他的一切人，是租户，佃农或短工，甚或若干零块的地主，我们可以说，他们的总名是无产者；因为他们的生存方式都由地主的私意或贪心来决定，他们或者选择迁徙或者服从地主的意志，再没有其他的出路。”
+
+“要想像一个比这更可恶更不幸的事物状态，简直是不可能的。”
+
+“我们不厌重述地说，有四千万公顷以上的土地握在不谙农务者的手中。都波先生说‘所以这面积的大部分都有系统的被判定听其全部或部分地荒芜不毛。’至于那些除了自己的土地之外，尚有其他财富的大地主们，既没有使其土地生产的必要，就利用其权力，让他们的产业留着不耕种。”——法文本编者
+
+这个极有价值的注脚是爱利赛·邵可侣加添的，他正是法国土地问题的专家，他编印本书的第一版时，我尚且在狱中。——著者（俄文本注）
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2015-12-28-WatersideBar-a1_c-a-tale-of-kong-yiji-and-three-women.md b/_collections/_heros/2015-12-28-WatersideBar-a1_c-a-tale-of-kong-yiji-and-three-women.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..18d949c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2015-12-28-WatersideBar-a1_c-a-tale-of-kong-yiji-and-three-women.md
@@ -0,0 +1,778 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "《孔乙己和三个女人的故事》"
+author: "水边吧（江南藜果）"
+date: 2015-12-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/q25YYru.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: center
+---
+
+人物：孔乙己，酒吧老闆，過客，女學生，夏瑜，祥林嫂，趙秀才（趙總），假洋鬼子（錢公子），酒客甲，酒客乙，馬仔。
+
+提示：
+
+１.女學生、夏瑜和祥林嫂，用同一演員，三個人物其實就是一個人，是她人生的三個不同階段的命運。
+
+２.趙秀才由過客扮演，喻過客這樣的人物，可以發達成趙秀才（趙總）這樣。
+
+３.馬仔由酒客甲扮演，假洋鬼子由酒客乙扮演。
+
+４.取材魯迅作品《孔乙己》、《阿Ｑ正傳》、《過客》、《藥》、《祝福》、《長明燈》、《狂人日記》、《紀念劉和珍君》、《影的告別》等。
+
+５.在各段落（場次）間，以錄音或人聲（觀衆）插入和劇情無關的魯迅散文和雜文原著片斷，最好混上音樂。在喜劇化的劇情中，朗誦聲應沈重而悲痛。最後一段《狂人日記》節選，語音越來越怪異，越來越急促，即使有的地方使人聽不清楚也沒關係，但關鍵字語要強調清晰，比如"吃人"。
+
+
+
+酒客甲和乙坐在吧台對面小舞臺邊上的一張桌。背景挂一塊"鹹享酒店"匾牌，牌上，一木架上放一套魯迅全集精裝本。再下，是一幅中堂："上大人孔乙己高朋滿座 化千七十二士玉壺生春 水邊吧戲劇實驗室阿Ｑ書"。疊著阿Ｑ的Ｑ字，蓋著水邊吧的圓形公章。台兩角的兩根立柱，挂著一副對聯："半間東倒西歪屋 一個南腔北調人"。門外，水邊吧的招牌被攝像機帶入室內的電視機。
+
+亭狀小舞臺的對面，是水邊吧的吧台，角上的一根木柱上，挂一塊黑板，上寫白字：孔乙己欠單１０６元。
+
+掌櫃的從吧台裏出來，走上舞臺。
+
+掌櫃的：女士們先生們，晚上好！歡迎大家光臨水邊吧或者鹹亨酒店。你們來小店看戲、演戲，而且演實驗劇，令我蓬壁生輝。你們喜歡魯迅的作品嗎？我翻遍了魯迅全集，他深刻到在字縫裏只發見三個字，那就是"國民性"。現在是時代不同了，但國民性一樣。世紀末和世紀初沒什麽兩樣，水邊吧也正和鹹亨酒店一般沒什麽兩樣，廣州和魯鎮沒兩樣！不信，你們看我這裏，再聽聽《孔乙己》裏的這一段（從架上取下一本書）：我從此便整天站在櫃檯裏，專管我的職務。......主顧也沒有好聲氣，教人活潑不得；只有孔乙己來了，才可以笑幾聲，所以至今還記得。......
+
+孔乙己撩開門簾進來。
+
+掌櫃的：瞧，他來了！
+
+酒客甲和乙見到孔乙己進來，就興奮起來。掌櫃的急忙下舞臺回到吧台。
+
+酒客乙：孔乙己！來，來，過來......給碗你酒喝。
+
+孔乙己上到舞臺，酒客乙讓他坐下，倒酒給他，並摸他的頭。
+
+酒客甲：孔乙己，你，當真姓孔？
+
+酒客乙開始壞笑。孔乙己迫不及待呷了口酒，邊咽邊說話。
+
+孔乙己：那是不會有假的。
+
+酒客甲：你的名字，一定是魯迅先生看著你沒名沒姓的可憐，胡亂給按上的吧。或許，你是父母超生，計生辦來抓，在打遊擊中走散了，並不知道自己的父母是誰。
+
+酒客乙笑得不成樣子了，掌櫃的也跟著笑。
+
+孔乙己：不許你胡說，我的出處是有淵源的。我是孔家嫡傳七十二代孫，這是有據可查、入了山東曲阜孔廟家譜的。
+
+酒客乙：他還來真的了。
+
+酒客甲：那麽，孔老二這麽出息，帶出那許多徒弟來，還傳下一部什麽叫《論語》的，幾千年來把中國人都治得服服貼貼。你有什麽？你看你，別說寫書了，就是看書，也沒錢買，要去偷書看，上次在天河書城偷書，被人打斷過腿，是有這回子事吧？
+
+酒客乙又笑。
+
+孔乙己：別取笑我，別取笑。先前，我們家族，比起你們來，要闊（得）多了。竊書，不算偷的，這是讀書人的事，能叫偷嗎？況且，書值不了幾個錢，我也不會去偷的。
+
+掌櫃的：誰說書值不了錢？你去天河書城看看，一套魯迅全集精裝的要幾百塊錢呢，就是路邊賣的這本盜版，（舉起書）也要四十五塊錢！
+
+孔乙己：那是，那是。著書是千秋大業。我也是在寫書的，只不過發表不出來。（搖頭）現在的報紙副刊編輯，只知道拿紅包，他懂個屁！我的書是寫給將來的人看的，是千秋大業，等我百年之後，出版自由了，世人就知道價值所在了，不比那《論語》差的.....
+
+孔乙己越說越興起，酒客甲和乙則笑得前仰後翻，邊笑邊下臺坐到觀衆席去了。掌櫃的在櫃檯裏算帳，這時，擡起頭，一句話把孔乙己說蔫了。
+
+掌櫃的：（指身後黑板）你已經欠單１０６塊錢了。今天能不能買單啊？
+
+孔乙己所在的角落的燈光陡然暗了下去。
+
+掌櫃的：出聲啊！再不買單，就別喝酒，要喝，也上別的地方喝去。
+
+孔乙己：曉得，曉得，我心裏有數哉。
+
+掌櫃的：什麽時候買單？
+
+孔乙己：（遲疑著）有一單生意正在談。
+
+掌櫃的：沒錢就戒了酒。否則，上別的地方喝去。
+
+孔乙己：老闆，都知道你這裏廣告人來得勤。我來這裏喝酒，和他們混混，給他們出個創意什麽的，也好賺點錢。不來這裏喝酒，哪有錢來買單啊？
+
+掌櫃的：可是，你已經欠這麽多了。
+
+孔乙己：老闆，別太小氣了，眼光放遠點，要看到我的將來......
+
+過客跌跌撞撞著入。他頭紮白布條，布條上有字"八千里路風和月"，身上背囊，插一面小白旗，上書"獨步人生"。
+
+過客：將來？我沒有將來，也沒有過去，我只有現在，只知道現在我走在路上。請問，這是什麽地方？
+
+掌櫃的：鹹享酒店。
+
+過客：鹹享酒店在什麽地方？我已經走得迷路了。
+
+掌櫃的剛要開口，孔乙己急步止住他。
+
+孔乙己：（對過客）你請我喝碗酒，我就告訴你。
+
+掌櫃的：孔乙己，不是吧，賴皮也不能賴成這樣。你還是知識份子呢！
+
+孔乙己：這你就不懂了。如今市場經濟，都講究知識産權，知識經濟了嘛。
+
+過客：噢，我想馬上就會有電視臺來採訪我的。老闆，先給他碗酒吧。只要我得到了我是在什麽地方的資訊，打他們手機，他們就會過來採訪我的，而且會爲我支付這碗酒錢。噢，對了，在這裏做採訪，還能給你的酒店宣傳揚名，老闆，這碗酒，就算贊助了吧。
+
+掌櫃的：（想了想）好咯，好咯。（自喜）一碗酒，值不了幾個錢的，有電視臺採訪，一宣傳，就是無形資産......嘻嘻，（送酒上臺）哎，（對過客）你也喝一碗吧，大家一起喝。
+
+過客：（激動地）我一路這樣走著，無始無終，每到一個城市，就坐在報社和電視臺的門口，等人來採訪我，也只浪了個虛名，雖也有大學生要我去演講，但虛名只是虛名，當不了飯吃的。路上我混吃混喝，喝的也只是水，那些水，把我體內的血液都沖淡了，我早已不再剛上路時的熱血沸騰，只這樣機械地繼續走著。起先，我還能喝到礦泉水、純淨水，越到後來，他們給我喝得越差，好象連自來水也不給我喝了。於是，我就像是走在沙漠裏了。沒料到，這裏卻有人給我酒喝。（拿酒）我是多麽久沒喝到過酒了啊。（喝酒）啊，酒，你這液體的火焰，你能使我的血重新熱起來，繼而沸騰嗎？（一把扯掉頭上的布條，回頭，對孔乙己）這是什麽地方？
+
+孔乙己：（喝口酒，暗喜）又賺了碗酒喝。咳，咳，（對過客）告訴你吧，這裏就是神州。
+
+過客：（吃驚）這裏仍是神州？我走了這麽久，終於還是沒能走出這神州大地？！我已經走了很久了呀，差不多已經耗盡了我的生命。
+
+孔乙己：對，神州大地，我們的祖國，大一統的......
+
+過客：那麽，前邊呢，前邊有什麽？
+
+孔乙己：前邊嘛，我也不曉得。
+
+掌櫃的：墳！
+
+過客：什麽？
+
+掌櫃的：墳。前邊是墳墓。
+
+過客：（大驚）什麽？！
+
+
+
+掌櫃的：（上前）你從這門口出去，沿沙河湧走，到沙河頂、黃花崗，你就見到了殯儀館。再往北，就是銀河公墓。
+
+過客：啊？！
+
+女學生從觀衆中站起。
+
+女學生：（夢幻般自語）每當清明時節，我和我的同學，都要去銀河公墓的山上踏青。那裏擠滿了人和車，那些掃墓的人，看起來全像死人，我看不到他們的靈魂。倒是那些亡靈，靈魂安靜得像真正的人......其實，我更愛那些爛漫的山花，那些白的和黃的花，那些野百合和野薔薇，盛開在墳墓之間，啊，美啊，這個山花和亡靈組成的世界......（撞到發著呆的過客）啊，你是誰？你是亡靈嗎？
+
+過客：不，不，你連我都不認得？
+
+女學生：（辨認，然後驚喜地）噢，你是過客！我多次從電視上見過你，還從報上看過你的照片！
+
+過客做謙虛狀。
+
+
+
+女學生：你知道嗎，我是多麽地崇拜你啊。你知道嗎，你是英雄啊，一個活著的英雄。在這個沒有活人的人世間，你，卻是一個活著的英雄！
+
+過客：不，不。他們說，在一個沒有英雄的時代，他只想做一個人。我說，在沒有龍的年代，鼠輩們活得逍遙自在。在沒有龍的年代裏，我只想做一隻老鼠，做一隻過街猛鼠！我不但要徒步中國，我還要飛黃，飛長城，還要在澳門回歸的時候，從珠海的那個什麽島，飛到澳門！我還要打臺灣！過街猛鼠。
+
+女學生：這就對了嘛，不是猛鼠不過街，所以廣州老鼠這麽多，到處亂竄。無論怎樣，你是我們的楷模！（撩起衣服）給我簽個名吧。
+
+掌櫃的：一代不如一代。我們那時候，哪有女孩子這麽撩起衣服赤裸裸向一個陌生男人表白的。賤人！真是一代不如一代。
+
+孔乙己：可是，老闆說了，前邊是墳，是真的墳墓。飛澳門什麽的，萬一飛不過去，你就死定了。
+
+女學生：不，你別聽他們的。（拉過客上臺）前邊是鮮花，爛漫的山花。你，你走你的路吧，讓他們說去！（驚）呀，你的腳已經出血了，來，（伸手入胸，取出胸圍）讓我幫你包紮一下......
+
+
+
+過客：（驚恐地）不，不，我不要你的好意。（自白）其實，我是很想她包紮的。那溫柔白嫩的小手哦。可是，我要讓我的血繼續流著，只有這血，才能換來更多的同情和贊助，才能使我的人生質量發生（質的）變化。（對女學生）無論如何，我還是感謝你。我要走了。
+
+掌櫃的：哎，電視臺還沒來呢。
+
+過客：我等不及了。我是過客嘛，想走就走的嘛。
+
+掌櫃的：（氣急敗壞）你走吧，走吧。真是一代不如一代，現在的年輕人就這麽不講信用！
+
+過客：（對女學生）我要走了。
+
+女學生：那你走吧，勇敢地走。
+
+過客：（期待地）我真的要走了。
+
+女學生：是的，你必須走，許多人都看著你。
+
+過客：可是，我走了，只有一個人在路上，再也見不到你了。
+
+女學生：我會爲你祝福，遠遠的。
+
+過客：那......那，我走啦？
+
+女學生：走吧。
+
+過客：今晚，我可能會宿在花都。你，你想去花都嗎？我想，那裏也有許多花的吧。
+
+女學生：那你走吧。
+
+過客：那，這個，你那手裏的東西，總可以把它送給我作個紀念吧？
+
+過客一把搶過女學生手裏的胸圍，並摸了一把女學生的手。然後過客把胸圍紮在額上。
+
+
+
+孔乙己：過客同志，你很像一個飛行員嘛！
+
+過客：我就是不斷飛的嘛，飛黃飛長城飛澳門還要飛臺灣的嘛。
+
+女學生：哇塞，酷斃了！你趕快上路吧。
+
+過客：你不送送我嗎？（走，停，回頭）以後還會見你嗎？（到吧台門口）我可以呼你嗎？
+
+女學生：什麽意思？
+
+過客：沒，不，沒有什麽意思。（失望地）那我走了。
+
+女學生：快走，快走！
+
+過客：催，催命似的催！難道我自己不知道走嗎？
+
+過客想把吧台的一碗酒拿過去喝了，但被掌櫃的搶回去。過客憤世嫉俗似的出，浩歌而去。
+
+過客：（唱）我拿生命賭明天，你用虛情換此生......
+
+店內衆人全木住了。魯迅原著聲起：
+
+目前的造物主，還是一個怯弱者。
+
+......
+
+他專爲他的同類－－人類中的怯弱者－－設想，用廢墟荒墳來襯托華屋，用時光來沖淡苦痛和血痕；日日斟出一杯微甘的苦酒，不太少，不太多，以能微醉爲度，遞給人間，使飲者可以哭，可以歌，也如醒，也如醉，若無知，若有知，也欲死，也欲生。他必須使一切也欲生；他還沒有滅盡人類的勇氣。
+
+......
+
+幾片廢墟和荒墳散在地上，映以淡淡的血痕，人們都在其間咀嚼著人我的渺茫和悲苦。但是不肯吐棄，以爲究竟勝於空虛，各各自稱爲"天之民"，以作咀嚼著人我的渺茫的悲苦的辨解，而且使自己靜待新的悲苦的到來，新的，這就使他們恐懼，而又渴望相遇。
+
+
+
+女學生又活潑起來。
+
+女學生：（唱）我用青春賭明天，你用真情換此生......
+
+音樂起，女學生一人跳舞。一會兒，她又停下。
+
+女學生：老闆，你這裏不好玩的，音樂一點都不勁，也沒人跟我跳舞，這酒店裏老气橫秋，死氣沈沈，真不如上山看那些山花和亡靈。
+
+掌櫃的：我這裏６０年代和７０年代出生的人來多些，你是８０年代的，有的事自然不懂。
+
+女學生：你太小看人了吧。
+
+孔乙己怯怯地上。
+
+孔乙己：那我跟你跳個舞？
+
+女學生：（高興地）真的？你真這麽好？
+
+音樂起，女學生和孔乙己跳舞。燈暗。突然，女學生大叫一聲。
+
+女學生：你這斷子絕孫的。老闆，你這兒有色狼！
+
+孔乙己：（嘻笑地）過客摸得，我就摸不得？你的老師摸得，我就摸不得？（激動而憤恨地）那些用賓士載你去的斯科把你灌醉的大款摸得，我，我就摸不得？
+
+女學生：（氣急敗壞地，不知如何應答）你，你......
+
+女學生坐回觀衆席，老實了。
+
+孔乙己舉起自己的一隻手，撚著指頭。
+
+孔乙己：都說現在這一代，那些小女生，開放得叫人不敢信，可我怎麽就處處碰壁呢？可見是窮的緣故。青春少女的肌膚，多麽的滑膩，就像書上說的如凝脂一般。美啊.....
+
+酒客甲和乙在觀衆席狂笑。
+
+酒客：這老不正經的。
+
+掌櫃的：孔乙己，你該幹點正經事了，別除了喝酒，就想泡妞，就是泡妞，好像你也從來沒上過手嘛。
+
+孔乙己過到吧台。
+
+孔乙己：這個嘛，嘻嘻，只要功夫深......況且，只要我給她們看我的文章......
+
+掌櫃的：你幹點正經的吧。
+
+孔乙己：你是說賺錢？如今最賺錢的無非是四樣，一是販毒，二是賣淫，三是開賭場，四是搞文化。前三樣我是不幹的，那些都是殺頭的買賣，殺頭，嚓，你見過嗎？況且我是讀書人，所以，只剩了搞文化一條路。都說你這裏廣告人來得勤，我或許可以給他們出出創意什麽的......
+
+掌櫃的：（點頭，認真狀）文化是誰都可以搞的了，已經像娼妓了。不過，你搞搞文化也是好的，你還能搞什麽呢？－－手不能提肩不能挑。搞文化好啊，又高雅，又來錢快，正好像做婊子還立牌坊一樣。
+
+孔乙己：正是。正所謂英雄所見略同。你跟我在別的方面層次太不一樣，在這個觀點了，還是有點一致的。來，喝！
+
+掌櫃的：你們知識份子敢瞧不起我？你還欠我１０６塊酒錢呢！還喝？不給酒了！
+
+
+
+孔乙己：（急了）你，你......好，我現在就還你錢！
+
+孔乙己撩起長衫，從褲袋裏抖抖索索掏出一把零零碎碎的錢，攤在掌上。
+
+孔乙己：（猶豫著）不行，不行，不能全給了你，晚飯錢先留下，喏，再，喏，留點今晚看電影的錢、泡妞的錢......啊呀，這還剩多少呢？（仿醉拳、太極拳、氣功等動作）多乎哉？不多也！多乎哉？不多也！
+
+孔乙己把留回給自己的錢塞回衣袋，掌櫃的一把搶過他手裏的錢。
+
+掌櫃的：一五一十......有沒有搞錯，才二十一塊錢，你欠１０６塊啊。
+
+孔乙己：你對我要有信心嘛。你都知道我是有文化的啦，將來搞起文化來，就來錢了，急什麽你？
+
+掌櫃的歎口氣，把二十一塊錢收進櫃，然後轉身把黑板上"孔乙己 欠 １０６元"的"１０６"改爲"８５"。
+
+孔乙己：嗨，看你算錢挺精，你知道錢字怎麽寫嗎？
+
+掌櫃的：錢字誰不知道寫？
+
+孔乙己：當真？
+
+掌櫃的：當然。
+
+孔乙己：那麽，錢字的四種寫法，你都會？
+
+掌櫃的：錢字哪有四種寫法？
+
+孔乙己：沒文化了吧。
+
+掌櫃的：那你說來聽聽，哪四種寫法？
+
+孔乙己：剛才不是說了嗎，販毒、賣淫、開賭場、搞文化......其實，錢字哪止四種寫法啊。
+
+掌櫃的：（不屑）嗤，我還以爲真有四種寫法......（轉身忙活去了）
+
+孔乙己：這些販夫走卒，腦子跟漿糊似的，就是不開竅。連錢字這樣簡單的像徵用法，他都不懂，唉，更不要叫他來看水邊吧的實驗劇了。只知道一分一厘收實實在在的錢，實在是沒文化！
+
+孔乙己回到酒客甲、乙處，他們和他插科打渾。
+
+
+
+魯迅原著聲起，朗誦聲使店內各人都木住：
+
+目前的造物主，還是一個怯弱者。
+
+他暗暗地使天變地異，卻不敢毀滅一個這地球；暗暗地使生物衰亡，卻不敢長存一切屍體；暗暗地使人類流血，不敢使血色永遠鮮豔；暗暗地使人類受奪，卻不敢使人類永遠記得。
+
+......
+
+我們都不大有記性。這也無怪，人生苦痛的事太多了，尤其是在中國。記性好的，大概都被厚重的苦痛壓死了；只有記性壞的，適者生存，還能欣然活著。.....
+
+叛逆的猛士出於人間，他屹立著，洞見一切已改和現有的廢墟和荒墳，記得一切深廣和久遠的苦痛，正視一切重疊淤積的凝血，深知一切已死，方生，將生和未生。他看透了造化的把戲；他將要起來使人類蘇生，或者使人類滅盡，這些造物主的良民們。
+
+造物主，怯弱者，羞慚了，於是伏藏，天地在猛士的眼中於是變色。
+
+女強人夏瑜西裝革履，傲步邁入鹹亨酒店。衆先大驚，繼而交頭接耳。
+
+夏瑜：（京腔念白般）闊別十幾載，今又故地重遊，（我）心中好不憂愁啊。十幾年了，我的祖國，我的人民，仍舊是這麽灰濛濛一團，模糊不清。秋風秋雨愁煞人......
+
+孔乙己在人群中疑且怯著出，終於大步向夏瑜。
+
+孔乙己：夏瑜？你一定是夏瑜，我的北師大同學！十幾年前，不是說你被流彈打死了嗎？怎麽......
+
+夏瑜：（冷冷地）你認錯人了吧。你說的那個夏瑜，我是知道的，她已經死了。她是被人拍手拍上斷頭臺、叫好叫上斷頭臺的！（更冷地）她的血，還叫那些拍手和叫好的人醮著饅頭吃了，說爲的是給這些中國人治病！
+
+
+
+掌櫃的：那是華老栓家。老栓不但沒能治好小栓的癆病，現在連他自己墳上的草都怕有一人高了，華家連個上墳的人都沒了。不像夏瑜那孩子，雖死得慘，死了還叫人吃她，可年年清明都有人在她的墳上放花圈。
+
+孔乙己：哎唷媽呀，（中國人）咋（都）長得這麽（相）像呢？
+
+夏瑜：（痛心地）面前的孔乙己，我的中文系同班同學，當年意氣風發，理想遠大，可如今......老闆，這咸亨酒店也太老了，太舊了點吧，非改造翻修不可了。或者，乾脆拆了它，重建一個五星級的吧。
+
+掌櫃的：你說得輕巧。錢呢？再說，你看這些人，有了五星級的又怎樣，他們還不照舊在你裏面隨地吐痰亂闖紅燈？文化不夠啊，這些連人血饅頭都要吃的人！真是一代不如一代了。
+
+夏瑜：（對觀衆交待）中國都在傳說我死了十多年了，橫屍街頭。其實，他們錯了！我是出洋了。現在，我回來，就是外商。我是帶著鉅資回到了這神州大地的。這鹹亨酒店，多少年來，人們都想改變它，用過文化，用過思想，用過改良，用過革命，用過改革，用過政變，用過赤手空拳迎接子彈的示威遊行，也用過武裝起義，用過科學，也用過老軍醫，還有人在用氣功，可是，它還是老樣子。現在我們要用的，是資本！有了資本，沒什麽搞不掂的！秋風秋雨愁煞人......（坐下，氣盛地）老闆，溫一壺酒來，再來一碟你們水邊吧最出名的什麽什麽......茴香豆！
+
+掌櫃的：好咧，馬上好。
+
+夏瑜從坤包裏取出一把帶鞘的刀放在桌上，刀銷是用硬紙做的。
+
+孔乙己：（湊前）這是什麽？我說你是夏瑜麽，你看你，還帶著武器。當年，在北師大的時候，我是聽老師和政府的話，死讀書，讀死書，（對觀衆）現在是讀書死，那夏瑜，卻是常帶一把短劍，跑到北大未名湖畔習武，說是要上山打豺狼。
+
+夏瑜：這是防狼器。在國外就聽說，中國山上的狼是越來越少了，大街上卻越來越多了，尤其在這水邊吧！
+
+夏瑜撥刀出來撫著刀刃。
+
+孔乙己：（拿起刀鞘研究）怎麽用紙做的鞘？
+
+
+
+夏瑜：遇上仇人，用不著出鞘，即可直刺對手心窩！
+
+孔乙己：就像書上說的投槍和匕首那樣？
+
+夏瑜：（深情地撫摸著刀）我帶著它回國，本來是用它來復仇的。可一回國，就聽說仇人已經病得不行了，根本用不著它了，甚至，都用不著復仇了。向一個病人復仇，不是我所爲。秋風秋雨愁煞人......
+
+孔乙己：嗚呼噫唏（之乎者也）！子曰：仇還是要報的。你的仇人得的什麽病？
+
+夏瑜：花柳病。聽說，他已經腐爛得不行了，還說，那個，那個，他下邊的東西都爛掉了。
+
+孔乙己：可是，仇總歸還是要報。他爛是他爛，你報仇是你報仇，這是要兩分清的。
+
+夏瑜：（勃然而起）在這鹹亨酒店裏，多的就是這些說別人要這別人要那的人，可自己總想做那閒人，吃吃閑酒，說說閒話，要別人這樣做那樣做，事臨自己頭上也是不想自己動手的。
+
+掌櫃的上酒菜來。夏瑜喝一口酒，皺眉。
+
+夏瑜：老闆，這酒，怎麽不是十年前的味了？到底是酒變了，還是人心變了？
+
+掌櫃的：這個嘛，這個......我也不曉的。反正，這酒，我是從批發商那裏進的，用的還是那個馳名品牌。
+
+夏瑜：中國人哪，遇事總不想自己負責，都往別人身上推。如果查出你這裏賣假酒，吃死了人，這售假也是同罪的。
+
+掌櫃的：（上前，急）你可不敢胡說噢，我工商局裏有熟人......
+
+夏瑜：中國人，真是不可救藥了嗎？這酒，我不喝了也罷！
+
+夏瑜拂袖退下。孔乙己急忙搶過她留下的酒，一氣喝幹，激動起來。
+
+孔乙己：比起她來，我也真是羞愧難當。看夏瑜的模樣，搞學運，也搞成了款姐，她是名利雙收了呀。可我，我......我也要革命！革他媽媽的命！造反！白盔白甲，拿著板刀、鋼鞭、炸彈、洋炮、導彈......到時什麽趙太爺、錢老爺，什麽舉人老爺，他們的財産，我都能分到一些，再鬧它一次土改。元寶、美元、名牌西裝、秀才娘子的那張寧式床，古董啊，還有錢家的桌椅，都是古董啊，值錢哪。那時，要什麽有什麽，喜歡誰就跟誰睡，喜歡哪個女學生就......
+
+
+
+魯迅原著聲起，使處於迷醉狀態的孔乙己突然清醒，並且木住：
+
+有我所不樂意的在天堂裏，我不願去；有我所不樂意的在地獄裏，我不願去；有我所不樂意的在你們將來的黃金世界裏，我不願去。
+
+......
+
+然而我不願意彷徨於明暗之間，我不如在黑暗裏沈沒。
+
+然而我終於彷徨於明暗之間，我不知道是黃昏還是黎明。我姑且舉灰黑的手裝作喝幹一杯酒，我將在不知道時候的時候獨自遠行。
+
+......
+
+中國歷來排著吃人的筵宴，有吃的，有被吃的。被吃的也曾吃人，正吃的也會被吃。但我現在發現了，我自己也幫助著排筵宴。
+
+
+
+祥林嫂上，柱著一根杖，挽一隻吉之島的塑膠袋。
+
+孔乙己：（吃驚）啊，怎麽？夏瑜，你怎麽成這副模樣了？
+
+祥林嫂：（木然地冷著）：我不叫夏瑜，我是祥林嫂。
+
+孔乙己：祥林嫂？這麽面熟，像夏瑜的？
+
+祥林嫂：我真傻......
+
+掌櫃的：（上前）祥林嫂？你又來了。上回你逗我說這裏賣假酒，接著就跟大傢夥兒玩失蹤。不過，酒吧裏關於你的傳聞還是不少的。聽說你嫁過幾回人，又離過幾次婚，還死了幾個男人。這陣子在哪發財啊，混得可好？
+
+祥林嫂：我真傻。你有見過我的阿毛嗎？他多麽可愛啊。噢，不好意思，說錯臺詞了。應該是你見過我炒股曾經賺來的錢嗎？嚇死人了，有這麽多（以手比劃）。
+
+
+
+衆人齊湊上來，圍著祥林嫂，週邊的踮起腳來，鴨子般伸長脖子朝裏看。
+
+酒客乙：（羡慕地）嚇，這麽多，是多少錢？
+
+孔乙己：有錢真好，真好。
+
+祥林嫂：我真傻，我單知道炒股一定賺大錢的，單知道繼續炒就繼續賺大錢，不知道炒股也有大風險。真的，我真傻。
+
+酒客甲：炒股有風險又怎麽啦，這是誰都知道的嘛。
+
+祥林嫂：我真傻，真的，我真傻。我就接著炒，一下子把我炒股賺的錢全賠回去了。我真傻。
+
+孔乙己：那，那就收手吧。
+
+祥林嫂：我真傻。我又繼續炒，我真傻......
+
+掌櫃的：怎麽樣？
+
+祥林嫂：我還接著炒，一下子又把我從國外帶來的資本全陪光了。我真傻。
+
+孔乙己：（急了）那，那，那得接著炒啊，賺回來再收手！
+
+祥林嫂：我真傻，我接著炒，把銀行裏借的錢也全......（哽咽）
+
+酒客乙：那怎麽辦？
+
+孔乙己：要是我遇上這樣的事，就不知道如何是好了。
+
+掌櫃的：（鄙夷地）這種大起大落的事，是你這種人能隨便撞上的嗎？你一生只會平淡無奇，然後悄悄地死去。
+
+祥林嫂：我真傻。我想跳樓，又不敢跳。
+
+酒客甲：丟，我們大家等了這麽久，又不跳樓的，有什麽看頭，光聽你說，比看你跳樓乏味多了。跳樓才刺激，你說呢？
+
+酒客乙：是，就是。叫她跳吧，啊？
+
+酒客甲：聽，看她是不是真要跳了。
+
+祥林嫂：我真傻。我單知道要跳樓就能跳的，哪知道廣州的樓房陽臺都裝了防盜網，要跳也跳不成的。我真傻，真的，我真傻。
+
+酒客乙：丟，到底是不跳了。
+
+酒客甲：再聽，聽。
+
+祥林嫂：（更加木然）我真傻。你有見過我的阿毛嗎？他多麽可愛啊。噢，不好意思，說錯臺詞了。應該是你見過我炒股曾經賺來的錢嗎？嚇死人了，有這麽多（以手比劃）。我真傻，我單知道炒股一定賺大錢的，單知道繼續炒就繼續賺大錢，不知道炒股也有大風險。真的，我真傻。我真傻，真的，我真傻。我就接著炒，一下子把我炒股賺的錢全賠回去了。我真傻。我真傻。我又繼續炒，我真傻......我還接著炒，一下子又把我從國外帶來的資本全陪光了。我真傻。我真傻，我接著炒，把銀行裏借的錢也全......（哽咽）我真傻。我想跳樓，又不敢跳。我真傻。我單知道要跳樓就能跳的，哪知道廣州的樓房陽臺都裝了防盜網，要跳也跳不成的。我真傻，真的，我真傻。
+
+
+
+衆人漸漸聽得乏味，逐一散去，坐回去繼續喝酒。只有孔乙己還定定地看著祥林嫂。
+
+祥林嫂：（急）哎，哎，都別走啊，我還沒說完......我真傻，你有見過我的阿毛嗎？他多可愛啊。噢不好意思......
+
+酒客甲：對，我們都知道了，你說錯臺詞了。你就別再嘮叨了。
+
+祥林嫂：我真傻，我單知道炒股一定賺大錢的......
+
+酒客乙：後來你不但把賺來的錢都炒沒了，還把中國銀行的錢也賠進去了。你煩不煩呢你？！
+
+孔乙己：（同情地）你嫁給我吧。在北師大的時候，我其實一直是暗戀著你的，不過那時咱倆反差太大。現在好了，你也窮了，成爲同一條根上結的苦瓜......你嫁了我吧，我要跟你睡覺，雖然你不是女學生，總是女，女，女......
+
+
+
+掌櫃的拿一竹杠搶出，照孔乙己的頭就是一悶棍。
+
+掌櫃的：下賤！休得在這裏放肆，留點廉恥心吧。
+
+祥林嫂掩面急急下，要尋死。
+
+祥林嫂：我不活了，我沒臉活了，我活著沒意思了，我死了算了......（下）
+
+酒客們先是突然被刺激起來，正要圍過來，見祥林嫂走了，孔乙己也縮回吧台一角坐下了，就又無趣地坐了回去。
+
+
+
+魯迅原著聲起：
+
+目前的造物主，還是一個怯弱者。
+
+他暗暗地使天變地異，卻不敢毀滅一個這地球；暗暗地使生物衰亡，卻不敢長存一切屍體；暗暗地使人類流血，不敢使血色永遠鮮豔；暗暗地使人類受奪，卻不敢使人類永遠記得。
+
+他專爲他的同類－－人類中的怯弱者－－設想，用廢墟荒墳來襯托華屋，用時光來沖淡苦痛和血痕；日日斟出一杯微甘的苦酒，不太少，不太多，以能微醉爲度，遞給人間，使飲者可以哭，可以歌，也如醒，也如醉，若無知，若有知，也欲死，也欲生。他必須使一切也欲生；他還沒有滅盡人類的勇氣。
+
+幾片廢墟和荒墳散在地上，映以淡淡的血痕，人們都在其間咀嚼著人我的渺茫和悲苦。但是不肯吐棄，以爲究竟勝於空虛，各各自稱爲"天之民"，以作咀嚼著人我的渺茫的悲苦的辨解，而且使自己靜待新的悲苦的到來，新的，這就使他們恐懼，而又渴望相遇。
+
+這都是造物主的良民。他就需要這樣。
+
+......我還有什麽話可說呢？我懂得衰亡民族之所以默無聲息的緣由了。沈默呵，沈默！不在沈默中爆發，就在沈默中滅亡。
+
+
+
+一些酒客開始搖彀子，其中有人稱"趙秀才"的趙總，洗腳上田的模樣，酒客乙做了他的馬仔。他們大呼小叫著，很是熱鬧。孔乙己坐在吧台一個角裏喝酒。
+
+趙秀才：什麽沈默啊滅亡的，不理它！我們玩，我們玩......
+
+掌櫃的：孔乙己，你別這麽賤。祥林嫂，一個窮要飯的，都死了好幾個男人了，你都要，唉......看人家趙秀才，和你同是讀書人，卻做起了總經理，多風光，威吧，手下馬仔......
+
+孔乙己：你們狗眼看人低。
+
+掌櫃的：你也應該學學趙秀才，適合國情才對。國情適合了，下海一混水摸魚，不就發了？
+
+孔乙己已留心那邊的搖彀子。
+
+孔乙己：嚇，這麽臭，不如（看）我露一手。
+
+（以下仿《阿Ｑ正傳》）
+
+孔乙己踅了過去。趙秀才正在吹牛，說前一單走私的事。
+
+馬仔：趙總說的是上個月那批汽車吧？好象是沒有經海關過，都銷到湖北去了吧？
+
+趙秀才：你趙哥我不經海關，可以走錢關嘛......我很性急的，所以我們見面，我總是說：洪哥，我們動手罷！他卻總說道Ｎｏ！這是英文，不知你們懂還是不懂。否則早已成功了。然而這正是他做事小心的地方。他再三請我上湖北，我還沒有肯，誰願意在那小縣城做事......
+
+孔乙己：唔，......這個......
+
+趙秀才：什麽？
+
+孔乙己：我......
+
+馬仔：去去......
+
+孔乙己：（指彀盅）我懂概率，我來搖......
+
+馬仔：滾，趕快滾走！
+
+孔乙己：汽車的事，我也會一些的，是不是讓我也......
+
+馬仔舉起一隻酒瓶，"嘭"一聲敲在孔乙己頭上。
+
+馬仔：還不快滾？！
+
+孔乙己悻悻地縮到吧台邊的一張桌，摸著頭。
+
+趙秀才：那誰呀？
+
+馬仔：孔乙己，你不知道？單知道騙酒喝，都成名人了。
+
+趙秀才：孔乙己，不是我中學校友嗎？怎麽成這模樣了？我們還是同一屆考上學的嘛，不過，他考的是北師大，我只考了個本地的中專。
+
+馬仔：北師大又怎樣？趙總現在這光景，他哪能比？文憑算個鳥，趙總您有錢，還不隨便能買一個，什麽博士博士後都可以買的！
+
+掌櫃的：（對孔乙己）叫你別過去，觸了黴頭了吧？
+
+孔乙己：人活一輩子，總要觸幾回黴頭的罷。媽媽的，不讓我賭一把，就像當年不准我革命，不准我上街示威遊行，不准我搖滾。算了，不跟他計較，老子就當被兒子打了一回。我總是被兒子打了，現在的世界真不像樣，兒子騎到老子頭上來，都是獨生子女給慣的。
+
+掌櫃的：好了，好了，兒子打老子兒子打老子。孔乙己，你總是不輸的，總是得意的。這正是中國精神文明冠於全球的一個證據了。
+
+孔乙己：你說什麽？
+
+掌櫃的：是說你的精神勝利法！
+
+孔乙己：呵，呵呵......您真逗，精神勝利法。
+
+假洋鬼子錢公子在門口探了一會兒頭，進來。
+
+假洋子鬼：（對掌櫃的）這裏有沒有小姐的？
+
+掌櫃的：我這是鹹亨酒店，乾淨地方......不過，如果你自帶了小姐來，我們也是管不了許多的。
+
+趙秀才：啊喲，假洋鬼子！錢公子！這不是假洋鬼子錢公子嗎？你是什麽時候到廣州的？
+
+假洋鬼子：趙......趙秀才！什麽我什麽時候到廣州的，都在外資企業幹了七八年了，還出了一回洋，培訓啊。你也離開未莊了？
+
+趙秀才：那年我不是考上學了嗎？就是在廣州讀的啊。
+
+假洋鬼子：對，對，我把那個給忘了。老鄉見老鄉......
+
+趙秀才：兩眼淚汪汪。
+
+假洋鬼子：不，是背後給一槍。這是新說法。當然，你我是不會的，不會的......
+
+趙秀才：剛才，你是說要小姐？
+
+假洋鬼子：（不好意思地）開玩笑的，開玩笑的。
+
+趙秀才：（氣粗地）沒什麽嘛，都是男人嘛。不過，你是生客，也是有身份的人，不能直說的嘛。其實，（指馬仔）他們告訴我，來熟了，你跟老闆打個招呼，後邊包房裏還是有的，還是很不錯的。
+
+假洋鬼子：我在法國的時候，啊，巴黎的夜晚，夜晚的巴黎（仿《日出》的喬治張）......但這鬼地方，叫個小姐還不能光明正大。不過，你在這兒試過？
+
+趙秀才：還沒。我也是他們帶我第一次來。要不，待會兒......
+
+孔乙己剛才豎著耳朵聽。這會兒，他突然站起來，向著掌櫃的。
+
+（以下仿《長明燈》）
+
+孔乙己：（指著屋檐下的那排紅燈籠）老闆，你把你的這些紅燈熄了吧，像個紅燈區似的，都熄了吧。
+
+掌櫃的：你也太多事了。關你屁事？
+
+孔乙己：留一塊乾淨地方吧。你熄了吧，熄了吧。
+
+掌櫃的：你喝你的酒吧。
+
+孔乙己：（堅決地）熄了，一定要熄了。
+
+掌櫃的：你還真來勁了。
+
+孔乙己：我去熄。
+
+孔乙己向燈的開關走去。衆人都驚愕地看著。掌櫃的急急追上去。
+
+掌櫃的：哎，哎，你幹什麽你？！你給我回去！
+
+孔乙己和掌櫃的相持著，燈一會兒被孔乙己關了，一會兒又被掌櫃的開了。
+
+掌櫃的：王八蛋！你少管閒事。你這樣子我還做不做生意啊？！
+
+孔乙己：一定得熄掉！
+
+掌櫃的：我就不熄你能怎樣？！別忘了，你還欠我８５塊酒錢！別瘋了。這是我的地盤，即使你熄了燈，我還是照樣開。我是有人罩著的，無論工商，公安.....誰怕誰啊。況且，咸亨裏的紅燈，是梁武帝親自點的，傳到了六朝、唐代，很繁華了一陣子，就是文化大革命的時候，都沒被熄掉，一直照老例傳下來。是你說熄就能熄的嗎......
+
+孔乙己：你不讓熄，我就燒......
+
+掌櫃的：什麽？！
+
+孔乙己：我就放火燒！總有一天，我要放火燒了這鹹亨酒店！我現在就放火，放火.....火，誰有火，誰有火......
+
+孔乙己到處找火種，在吧台、廚房找，在各人身上找。掌櫃的急得亂竄。
+
+
+
+掌櫃的：他瘋了，他瘋了......啊，啊，怎麽辦？（竄到趙秀才和錢公子那桌，撈到了稻草般）二位，你們是有身份的人，你們說怎麽辦才好？
+
+假洋鬼子：騙他一把吧。再裝一排別的燈。他來了，就開新裝的燈；他一走，照開紅燈。換著開燈，蒙他，就跟蒙中央似的。
+
+趙秀才：這種人，怎麽變成這樣了？剛才老闆一棍子打死他就好了。一棍子打死算了。他雖是我的校友，在未莊的時候，還一起玩過尿泥，現在卻全無用處了，反成了社會的累贅，留著何用？滅了他算了！一棍子打死算了。
+
+掌櫃的：萬萬使不得，使不得。萬萬不可出人命，我剛才也是點到爲止。我們還是要講仁義道德的，禮儀之邦啊，要禮教的。
+
+假洋鬼子：把他關起來如何？綁他到秦城監獄去吧。
+
+趙秀才：這主意好。老闆，就這麽辦了？
+
+掌櫃的：（撫手）好，好，各位幫幫忙，幫幫忙，完了我每人發一張八折貴賓卡。
+
+趙秀才：弟兄們，上！
+
+馬仔應一聲，上前捉拿孔乙己，但捉他不住。
+
+掌櫃的：你們二倆再幫幫忙，一起抓了他，完事後這桌酒我買單。
+
+趙秀才和假洋鬼子好像還不情願。掌櫃的急了。
+
+掌櫃的：這樣吧，再一人發一個小姐，如何？
+
+趙秀才和假洋鬼子也下來一起捉拿孔乙己。在捉和反抗捉的過程中，酒吧裏亂成一團。
+
+以下是孔乙己表演紮掙（最好以舞蹈的方式），錄音裏放各種急切語調的《狂人日記》節選，混著怪異、急促的音樂。
+
+《狂人日記》：
+
+我想，我同趙貴翁有什麽仇，同路上的人有什麽仇；只有廿年以前，把古久先生的陳年流水薄子，踹了一腳，古久先生很不高興。趙貴翁雖然不認識他，一定也聽到風聲，代抱不平，約定路上的人，同我作冤對。
+
+古來時常吃人，我也還記得，可是不甚清楚。我翻開歷史一查，這歷史沒有年代，歪歪斜斜的每葉上都寫著"仁義道德"幾個字，我橫豎睡不著，仔細看了半夜，才從字縫裏看出字來，滿本都寫著兩個字是"吃人"！
+
+
+
+合夥吃我的人，便是我的哥哥！
+
+吃人的是我的哥哥！
+
+我是吃人的人的兄弟！
+
+我自己被人吃了，可仍然是吃人的人的兄弟！
+
+我曉得他們的方法，直捷殺了，是不肯的，而且也不敢，怕有禍祟，所以他們大家連絡，佈滿羅網，逼我自戕。......他們沒有殺人的罪名，又償了心願......
+
+最可憐的是我大哥，他也是人，何以毫不害怕；而且合夥吃我呢？還是，歷來慣了，不以爲非呢？還是喪了天良，明知故犯呢？
+
+自己想吃人，又怕被人吃了，都用著疑心極深的眼光，面面相覷......
+
+吃人的人，什麽事做不出：他們會吃我，也會吃你，一夥裏面，也會自吃。
+
+這時候，我又懂得一件他們的巧妙了。他們豈但不肯改，而且早已佈置：預備下一個瘋子的名目罩上我。將來吃起來，不但太平無事，怕還會有人見情。
+
+四千年來時時吃人的地方，今天才明白，我在其中混了多年；大哥正管著家務，妹妹恰恰死了，他未必不知在飯菜裏，暗暗給我們吃。
+
+我未必無意之中，不吃了我妹子的幾片肉，現在輪到我自己......
+
+沒有吃過人的孩子，或者還有？
+
+救救孩子......
+
+沒有吃過人的孩子，或者還有？
+
+救救孩子......
+
+沒有吃過人的孩子，或者還有？
+
+救救孩子......
+
+沒有吃過人的孩子，或者還有？
+
+救救孩子......
+
+救救孩子......
+
+救救孩子......
+
+孔乙己：救救孩子。救救孩子......救救......救......救救小姐......
+
+孔乙己終於掙脫了捉拿他的人，逃出門去。趙秀才、假洋鬼子和掌櫃的面面相覷。
+
+假洋鬼子：（悵然）跑了。
+
+趙秀才：怎麽叫他跑了呢？留了禍根！
+
+掌櫃的：（抹著汗）沒事了，沒事了。跑了就沒事了。大家繼續吃酒吧。辛苦了，今天我買單，我買單。
+
+酒客：這一鬧，他怕不會再來了吧？
+
+掌櫃的：就是，就是，大家可以安心吃酒了。
+
+酒客：有孔乙己在就熱鬧。他不再來了，鹹亨酒店就少了熱鬧。你的生意怕要......
+
+酒客：沒了戲看，孔乙己不在演實驗劇，我們也不會來了。
+
+掌櫃的：（急了）我可以把他找回來的。我一定要找他回來的。他還欠我８５塊酒錢沒買單呢。
+
+酒客：他真會回來？
+
+掌櫃的：這是一定的。他沒處去的。他跑不了外國去的。
+
+酒客乙：孔乙己......唉!
+
+掌櫃的：孔乙己，我操他奶奶的！
+
+
+
+各人都木在原地。魯迅原著聲起：
+
+真的猛士，敢於直面慘澹的人生，敢於正視淋漓的鮮血。這是怎樣的哀痛者和幸福者？然而造化又常常爲庸人設計，以時間的流逝，來洗滌舊迹，僅使留下淡紅的血色和微漠的悲哀。在這淡紅的血色和微漠的悲哀中，又給人暫得偷生，維持著這似人非人的世界。我不知道這樣的世界何時是一個盡頭！
+
+......
+
+......我還有什麽話可說呢？我懂得衰亡民族之所以默無聲息的緣由了。沈默呵，沈默！不在沈默中爆發，就在沈默中滅亡。
+
+
+
+《完》
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-01-13-Mahsa-a1_r-letter-from-tehran-prison.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-01-13-Mahsa-a1_r-letter-from-tehran-prison.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1dedbf2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-01-13-Mahsa-a1_r-letter-from-tehran-prison.md
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "德黑兰狱中来信"
+author: "马赫萨"
+date: 2023-01-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/3n0hQiQ.jpg
+image_caption: "但愿有一天我们站在自己的土地上，用自己的语言，讲述彼此的故事。"
+description: "这是一篇虚构文章。但虚构的创作基础来自中国女性知识工作者被迫害的真实经历。之所以要虚构成伊朗故事，是因为中国境内的迫害和审查问题，她们无法找到自己的语言。"
+position: right
+---
+
+妈妈，
+
+我在卡查克监狱拘留中心（Qarchak detention center）有两天了，德黑兰的冬天真的很冷，还好北部关押政治犯的埃温监狱（Evin）已人满为患，我被拉来了南部的这一座，不然我可能会更狼狈一些吧！我还穿着九月初时离家跟你告别时的衣服，那时我只带了两套初秋的衣服出门，远未料到再回来会是这么久之后，并且以这样的方式。你有没有给我的植物浇水？即便是冬天，蕨类也需要大量的湿度，海芋们要多晒太阳，我的柠檬树有结出柠檬吗？
+
+
+
+我试着给你写这封信，尽管我不知道它会不会最终到你的手里，我想很大的可能是被他们直接处理掉吧，不是因为这封信会对他们造成任何威胁，而仅仅是出于他们的习惯性残暴和冷漠。你还记得法拉吗？我跟你讲过的因为在卑路支斯坦做研究而被抓捕的女孩子——他们指控她危害国家安全罪而判处了15年，她已经在里面四年了，我们寄给她的书她从来没有收到过，而她在里面写的那部寄给阿里的小说，寄出来时被撕到只剩下目录了。上个月，在我第一次被审讯释放后见到了阿里。他告诉我，最近接到了法拉从监狱里打来的电话，这是这一年里唯一一次听到她的消息，她的声音听起来还是那么坚不可摧。在告别时，阿里欲言又止——我想我、他以及我身边所有朋友们都心知肚明却小心翼翼不愿意戳破的是，我正处于一种借来的自由之中——“我相信无论后面会发生什么，你也会一样地坚不可摧的……”他说完，我的眼泪难以抑制地落了下来。
+
+我想我可能会令大家失望吧，说到底我可能只是一个软弱的小资产阶级知识分子，尽管这一年来自从被剥夺了热爱的事业之后，我一直在练习失去，每天晚上都会抱住两只猫默默地和它们告别，可是我意识到我竟然有那么多害怕失去的，连家里的几千本书都舍不得，多么不堪一击啊。被抓捕的当天早上我才淘了一批二手黑胶，它们应该早就到家了吧？不知道什么时候才有机会听它们。我那天还在购物车里添加了一个破壁机，想着可以榨石榴汁做早餐，可是太贵了犹豫了一下就没有支付。你能相信吗？在里面的这一天半的时间里，最折磨我的瞬间总是对这些最可耻的小资产阶级生活的留恋。比起我的成就、我在所热爱的事业中找到的意义，似乎失去生活本身更令人痛苦。
+
+对了妈妈，我甚至一直没敢告诉你我失业的事情，春夏之交时我先经历了一场居家监禁，仅仅是因为我和朋友们相约在街上跳舞——这个政权有多么畏惧自由的灵魂！然后秘密警察联系我供职的报社——这些年来不止一次了——总编辑和高层再也不愿意承担任何由我带来的风险。你知道我总是愿意理解和同情时代洪流里的懦弱和胆怯。不过报社利用这只“房间里的大象”，拒绝遵守劳动法支付全额赔偿，因为他们笃定我不敢冒着再度得罪公权力的风险把离职缘由与经过公开。（对，他们赌赢了！）那些一次又一次如菜市场般的在赔偿金上的讨价还价，真让人瞧不起他们！这叫什么来着？伥鬼。
+
+在十月的第一次审讯出来后，生活的每一分每一秒都悬置了起来，我知道我只是在等待自由再度被夺走。在白天，我花大量的时间阅读这些年间被抓进去的朋友们的狱中笔记，为自己做一些心理建设。当我读到阿明在狱中始终拒绝认罪，在德黑兰最高法院上最后陈词时，结结巴巴地说出“我愿意用自由去捍卫我所做的事”，我趴到床上大哭了一场，怀疑自己是否真的配得上我所有的遭遇。到了晚上，我总是在做关于逃亡、抓捕和监禁的噩梦，有时窗外的电闪雷鸣会和梦中的审讯监禁混剪进入同一道大脑波频，将我唤醒。不过，那些梦中的恐惧感与绝望感太雷同了，以至于醒来后都没有记住，唯一印象深刻的梦却是最日常的——我梦到在德黑兰的家中做饭招待朋友们，那个梦是如此绵长，我甚至记得每一道菜的准备过程，以及在准备时想到朋友们会发出赞叹时的欣喜。醒来后感到现实是那么荒凉。
+
+我做了所有能做的来避免抓捕的再度发生——躲藏在遥远的异乡，删除社交媒体账号、清除掉电脑和手机里的档案，吞咽下所有的不公，退出公共生活，陷入了巨大的失语。我每天都在想如果当时我就被立刻监禁了，至少能唤起一波声援的躁动，能再次燃起抵抗的热情，而不是这样被遗忘。
+
+记忆变得断层。那些404使你甚至不再记得前一天、再前一天都发生过什么。我们所有人的对话都变得艰难和不连贯。通讯软件只有启动阅后即焚功能才能感到一点安全，可是我经常在一觉醒来看到对面发来的回复，却怎么都记不起回复的是我说过的什么内容。我恋恋不舍地看着那些满是温度的消息在10s后、30s后或1h后消失，没办法让它们留得更久一点。我不敢截屏，因为所有的这一切都可能成为罪证。
+
+忘记是暴行，是的，是暴政的帮凶、共谋！但是生活在这个国家，更难以回避的现实是，记忆是有罪的。它绝不仅仅是让你活得沉重、痛苦而已，它随时会成为秘密警察所掌握的证据，把你丢进你无法想象的深渊。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月27日，北京，乌鲁木齐火灾遇难者纪念活动期间，人们聚集在一起守夜并举著白纸抗议。
+
+我想从第一次颇费周章的对我的抓捕说起吧，我早就该在那次被释放后就去讲述它，多么遗憾我那时候没有。痛感已经开始逐渐褪色。我签署了保证书不对外透露审讯细节，很多时候那些碎片化的思绪和感受，每当想要写下来，又会意识到似乎记录在哪里都不够安全，就作罢了。手机和电脑不再带给我任何私密感——当然，它们早就已经是政权监控人的工具了，但是在被秘密警察收走30小时后，它们简直像病毒一样令人恐惧（而现实中的病毒早就不再令人恐惧了）。
+
+十月再普通不过的一天，他们用重案组的破案方式“诱捕”到我，不远千里从德黑兰来到萨南达季（Sanandaj，伊朗库尔德地区的主要城市），出动了那么多人，重重埋伏和伪装——这后来还成为他们在里面向我耀武扬威的事迹，损毁说以我的智力，根本配不上他们布下的天罗地网。然而可笑的是，我根本就没有在躲藏啊，那只是寻常的与朋友们聚会的一天，我正在厨房里用番茄和鹰嘴豆炖一锅羊肉。在伪装成我们同路人的萨南达季本地线人的库尔德语的掩护下，我们放松了警惕，他们闯入赫迪耶家，“都蹲下！”【1】阿德勒条件反射地蹲下了，然后马上被摁倒在地，两个年轻女孩子努尔和赫迪耶站在旁边一动不动，愣在了原地。我本能地用库尔德语嘶吼和抵抗，直到听到像刀子一样的德黑兰波斯语——没有比这口音更好地诠释暴力了，它是神权暴力、国家机器暴力、主体民族沙文主义和父权暴力的综合体——“玛赫萨，你还听不出我的口音嘛，大老远见到老乡，你不开心吗？这次我就不信收拾不了你！”【2】这句充满了挑衅与压制的恶毒开场白很久以后都在我脑海中挥之不去，即便出生于德黑兰，作为库尔德人，我永远是故土上的异乡人，从小到大我都在竭力避免自己的波斯语沾染上德黑兰口音。不过在当时，我立刻就安静了下来，意识到事情大概比我想象得还要严重。
+
+没有出示证件，没有传唤或拘捕的通知，只是用口音和一只手铐作为威胁，我和聚会的朋友们就被带走了，我们的手机和电脑全部被抢走，赫迪耶父母的房子被搜了个底朝天。我被塞进了一辆车，其他人被塞进了另一辆，太黑了我什么都没看清，只记得他们在附近的警局停留了片刻，而库尔德地区如你所知已经在抗争中几近失守，多处警局被抗议者占领，他们无法借用来审讯。然而，到德黑兰的480公里的路途对他们而言风险太大了，很多城镇在一到夜晚都像是在战火之中。途中他们不断地控诉我，因为我，他们需要冒着这样的风险来出公差，都不知道能不能顺利回到德黑兰的安乐窝。【3】他们还不忘记恶毒地告诫我，赫迪耶、努尔和阿德勒一同被带走都是因为我，他们会记恨我的！（我当然知道他们不会。）不知道开了多久，好不容易在库尔德地区找到了一座秩序尚在的警局，焦灼不安使我彻底丧失了时间感，只记得抵达时已经是深夜了。
+
+当我最终被他们带到那个地下室时，此前被信念勉强压抑住的恐惧感扑面袭来，所有的理直气壮都消散了。我首先看到了一个巨型的笼子，里面两个蓬头垢面的男人睡在亮得灼人的白炽灯下，毫无尊严可言。后面更隐蔽处还有另一个笼子，我进去时没有人，后来上厕所时看到陆续有女人被送进去。而环绕四周的，是审讯室。我被带进了其中一间。
+
+大多的时间是焦灼的等待。他们一次又一次地离开这间屋子，回来时带来更多的从我手机和电脑中调出的“证据”。我是多么软弱啊，审讯才刚刚开始，几乎什么狠招数都没使出来呢，我就把手机和电脑的密码如实上交了——后来我听说努尔扛了6个小时才交出来。不安感让我不断想要去厕所，而上厕所大概是在审讯期间最屈辱的体验了。那间厕所在楼梯口的位置，几乎是通道处，只有一个象征性的不足身高三分之一的隔挡，仅仅保证在蹲下来的时候不被看到，而我总要绞尽脑汁试验怎样体面地弯曲身体提起裤子而不被通道上走过的男性警员目光所及。一位德黑兰来的女警员专门负责看守我上厕所，但当她不在的时候，就会有男警员替代她的角色——似乎在被认定有罪的时刻，不想被陌生男警察看到最私密的动作都是不正当的诉求。
+
+在德黑兰审讯者不在场时，总有几个凶恶的本地中年男警员坐在地下室中心，监视着四周每间审讯室，但尿频却让我有机会偶尔打量到我的审讯室外面的这个地下室空间的动向。我无意中听到了本地的几个较为年轻的陪审警员在过道里用库尔德语窃窃私语，埋怨要陪这些德黑兰来的尊贵大爷们加夜班的同时还总受他们的气，“真是首都来的人，一点规矩都不讲，进屋的时候都不让嫌疑犯通过计时装置，是打定主意了要超过审讯规定时长！”我还听到审我的德黑兰警察在审讯室门口叮嘱本地警察在结束后要立即删掉包括监控在内的所有审讯记录。这一切讯号都使我手脚发软，时间仿佛变得更加没有尽头。
+
+我也努力在路过其它房间的时候伺机窥探一下朋友们的动静。努尔的房间总是不断传来啜泣声，她年纪太小了，从未经历过这些，大概也还没学会怎么在暴力面前隐藏自己的脆弱。审讯她的秘密警察和她年龄相仿，面对她时满嘴调情式的花言巧语。我听到他油腔滑调地对啜泣的努尔说，“我对我老婆都没这么温柔过”。后来努尔告诉我，每当其他从德黑兰来的中年警察进入审讯室严辞威慑努尔后，他总会马上安抚她的情绪，哄她，逗她开心。努尔的情感经验少，屈指可数的几段也都是被男人欺骗。所以，一个年轻异性在密闭空间和漫长时间里高强度地关注她，听她述说，陪伴她哭泣，她怎么可能不将自己的脆弱暴露出来呢？这招大概是专门用来击破她的吧！接近释放时我们一起坐在在门厅的调解室签字办手续，我惊讶地发现他和努尔间的互动充满了性张力，“你头发天然就是这个色吗？真好看！”“你什么时候请我吃饭呀？”“你知不知道你口供答得漏洞百出，我费了多少心思才帮你圆回来！”他每说完一句，努尔总会低下头，露出羞涩的神色。无耻！这些花样迭出的审讯技法，简直像是在做人性实验！我想起塞比迪耶跟我们讲过她被监禁的时候，一个女警员时常找她谈心，说她是因为长得不好看、自卑、单纯，所以容易被同校的男性革命领袖所蛊惑。玛雅姆听到这里啐了一口，我则攥紧了拳头。
+
+对了，审讯努尔的警察在半夜的某个审讯的空档——大多数审讯者在开会或是在打盹儿——来到我的审讯室佯装和我闲聊，正绘声绘色地讲述他几个月前跟踪我的场景，此时外面突然有一个强奸犯被带入地下室，他立刻分了神，用轻浮到刺耳的语调说，“都到库区了，去黑市找鸡啊，用得着强奸嘛！”对，他用的就是“鸡”这个对女性最具侮辱性的污言秽语，你能相信这是从一个伊斯兰共和国的公权力捍卫者口中说出来的吗？
+
+
+▲ 2022年10月1日，伊朗首都德黑兰，有示威抗议库尔德族女生玛沙·阿米尼（Mahsa Amini）被道德警察逮捕、殴打后死亡，一名参与示威的女子在火堆前举起胜利手势。
+
+而赫迪耶遭遇的则是另一种，这一定是这场审讯中的最卑劣的问题了，“你父母不是还没退休？你不是还有个9岁的妹妹吗？”对家人的威胁让赫迪耶彻底缴械。同时，审讯一直在努力消耗她的意志，在那接近30小时的时间中，每个问题之间的沉默过度漫长，折磨着早已疲惫不堪的躯体。我每次上厕所路过赫迪耶的审讯室时，她都一动不动地抱着双腿蜷缩在冰冷的金属审讯椅上，像雕塑一样。后来她告诉我们，她甚至一次厕所都去没上过。尿检的时候，是我们第一次被允许见到彼此，但有人盯着我们，禁止我们说话。我和努尔偷偷地勾了下手指，立刻被喝止了。赫迪耶从厕所出来时，拿了一杯血红色的尿，做尿检的男警员惊了一下，旁边的女警员漫不经心地说了声，“来月经啦？”那天是她经期第一天，不知道是怎样熬过来这漫长的折磨的。
+
+对付我的秘密警察是里面最老练的一个，他原本就是德黑兰秘密警察系统的高层领导。在从我这里拿到密码，打开我手机后，他勃然大怒地回到审讯室，质问我为什么录音一直开着，“你喜欢跟警察讲权利对吗？！警察跟你说话你就开录音？！你觉得你特懂法，是吗？你就是欠收拾！”在审讯的过程中，他时而用权威打压我，“我最恨的就是你把警察都当傻X！”。仿佛我说的每一句话都不对，都在将自己处于更大的险境中；时而以可怕的罪刑恐吓我，“你把刚刚的问题给我再说一遍！你想在里面待上多少年？”，以至于最终几乎所有写下的口供都是他的表述；时而又摇身一变成了开明派，表达对自由捍卫者的理解和对伊朗女性处境的同情，让我相信公权力不是铁板一块……他在权力上方享受着将我的自尊一点一点击垮的过程，那24小时近乎于一场大型“煤气灯效应”（gaslighting），以至于在我意志最薄弱的时刻，几乎要相信他是在为我好，是在帮我争取体制的宽恕。
+
+在把最终的笔录拿给我看的时候，我发现笔录最前面的程式化问题“我需要自己委托联系律师”的那一栏，早已自动替我选了“不需要”。还有“我已经阅读过审讯规范手册”那里也自动选了“是”，然而20小时过去了，我甚至不知道所谓“审讯规范手册”是什么。我质问他，他百无聊赖地回答说，“这些可以改”，又递给我一份关于审讯规范的文件。在后来我问努尔和赫迪耶，她们没有和暴力机器打交道的经验，不止完全没有留意到这些地方，甚至都没有仔细看过自己的笔录就签了字。
+
+最可笑的是这些警察的傲慢和无知，你能相信吗，他们甚至分不清卑路支语和库尔德语！明明只要用谷歌查一下就可以分辨。那首我的朋友用卑路支语写作的抗议诗也被安在了我头上，而我分明就不懂卑路支语呀——帮审我的德黑兰警察打下手记笔录的库尔德警察面露尴尬之色，我在辩解的时候几乎都要笑出声来！【4】他还用八卦的口吻向我打听，为性少数群体发声的曼阿尼是不是有艾滋病——只因为他是gay。他最凶恶的招数都用来逼问我是不是一名女权主义者，其他审讯室的秘密警察也在诱导努尔、赫迪耶和阿德勒指控我是女权主义者，仿佛跟所有的一切比起来，对女权主义的认同才是最大的罪行！我困惑不解，如果他正常问我，我想都不用想就会告诉他，我当然是一名女权主义者。还有，他在逼我承认我们所有的创作都是在影射最高领袖时，他自己甚至也不敢说出那个名字，这是多么可笑啊！
+
+在办理释放手续的时候我们终于都放松了下来，也包括警察。几乎每个德黑兰来的警察都向我炫耀了一遍以往他们是在哪个“案子”中跟踪、调查过我的。又怕我觉得自己太“重要”，不忘在最后补充一句，“你成不了气候！浪费我们的精力！”一个看起来在这里职衔最高的库尔德警察仿佛想抓紧最后机会在这几位首都来的警察面前表现自己对政权的忠诚，冠冕堂皇地用波斯语教育起了我们，“你们知不知道现在国际局势下伊朗的处境？美国和以色列虎视眈眈，俄罗斯和伊朗的战略友谊也不稳固，中国和沙特正眉来眼去，伊朗腹“面”受敌……”，“腹“背”受敌”，我小声打断了他激昂的演讲，坐在旁边的伙伴们忍不住笑了出来，一位德黑兰警察马上替他解围，“马赫萨，你就是跟警察对着干惯了！”“这不是对着干，只是一个文字工作者的职业病而已……”我窃窃私语。库尔德警察讪讪地结束了他精心为这场审讯的尾声而准备的陈词。伙伴们笑得更大声了，仿佛我们终于在这24小时的屈辱后扳回了一局。
+
+最有趣的插曲是阿德勒，那场聚会只有他一个男生在场，他幸运地有机会在手机被夺走前，悄悄清空了里面的内容，以至于审讯过程中全程无所畏惧。但你知道他的手机是怎么被夺走的吗？鸡飞狗跳的伏击中，警察以为我们的手机都被收走了——他当时正用努尔的手机拍摄他们强行闯入的画面，蹲下后被警察扑倒抢走了手中的手机——却漏掉了他本人的，但是他在等着进审讯室时把手伸进裤兜给朋友发消息告知我们被捕，竟发到了有我在的通讯群，而我的手机正在警察手里！马上就来了警察夺走了他的手机。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月28日，北京，抗议中国政府清零政策期间，警察站在示威者对面。
+
+轻松的故事也没有那么多。我的腰间盘突出在审讯椅上狠狠地发作了，等待的时间实在太长、太难熬了。不去厕所的时候，我也总是在审讯室里踱步，大部分时候是小步倒着走，以缓解腰背疼痛，于是总是碰撞到桌椅，引来地下室中心最凶恶的那个中年男警员的呵斥——他几次大声威胁说要把我铐到审讯椅上。半夜四点疲惫到没有力气走动了，我把审讯室的三把木椅子靠墙拼在了一起，躺在上面休息，可是不知道是刺眼的白炽灯，还是巨大的恐惧和无助，让困意无论如何都没有到来。我紧抓着被带走前从赫迪耶家顺手拿出来的毛衣外套，那是在那个冰冷的空间里仅仅能触摸到的安抚我的温度。我使劲在脑海中描摹法拉和其他在监狱里的伙伴过着什么样的日子；想象维达、塞比迪耶和另一些朋友们即便出来后只是进入了一座更大的监狱，被官方置换了全新的姓名和身份，在密不透风的监控和虚假的生活中煎熬。塞比迪耶的抵抗形象曾经出现在很多报道中，出狱后在陌生朋友在的聚会、公共活动中她时常顾及不到组织者和邀请方的风险，高调地发言，想被别人认出来，我曾经花了很久时间才理解，她只是太渴望夺回自己的名字了。这些在想象中对自己未来生活的模拟，几乎立刻就把我击垮了，在某个瞬间我想我如果没有勇气那样活着，是否有勇气结束自己的生命？然后我又立刻打消这个念头，想到玛雅姆、礼萨还有其他在外面的伙伴一定正在想办法救援我们，凭借对他们的信心，我勉强支撑着自己的意志不彻底崩塌。
+
+一个始终一言不发的，坐在地下室中间看守的阿塞拜疆族模样的警员搬来又一把木椅子到我的审讯室，轻轻垫在了我悬空的小腿下方——他以为我已经睡着了。30小时审讯期间，我唯一一次掉下了眼泪。
+
+妈妈，你看过那部关于东德斯塔西的电影《窃听风暴》吗？我几年前看的时候只觉得是一部好电影，这些年在越来越严密地监控中生活再看时就有了更多的感触。那个“献给好人的奏鸣曲”的意象多么动人，秘密警察在监听那个东德知识分子家的过程中，被他们的音乐、情感和思想所打动，默默地帮助他们逃脱了体制的惩罚。今天的监控都是由大数据算法驱动，就连思想、情感和创作在那里都变成机械地、碎片化的“关键词”来启动警报，连最后唤醒人性的裂隙都没有存在的土壤了。我禁不住想，如果我们也是由那样具体的人、耐心地监控着，是不是也会有那么一、两个体制的爪牙被我们的创作、情感与思想打动，从而站到我们的一边呢？
+
+直到最后确定能离开了，他们才拿来了本该在抓捕当时就出示的传唤通知书，叫我们签上头一天的日期，那张写着“寻衅滋事”罪名的拘留通知书，也只是给我们看了一眼，告诉我们，鉴于库尔德地区局势不稳定，拘留中心暂时难以执行对我们的拘留，就不用把文件带走了。【5】走出警察局时，我看到那个阿塞拜疆族模样的警员下班，和另一些警卫一起走在我前面，我快速走过他身边，压低声音说了声“谢谢”。
+
+
+▲ 插图：游乐乐。
+
+这两年的时间，我身边的所有人都在讨论要不要离开这个国家。
+
+记得一年前，我和礼萨深入聊起他在2009年绿色革命后被抓捕后的经历，面对那么多人流亡海外，他在那时依然坚定地选择了留下。“历史还没有终结，我们还活在其中，我们有责任！”他说我们要留下，要夺回。他说你看那些离开的人，他们面对的是更大的失语，他们在这片土地上被捂住了嘴，但是出去可以放声高歌后，外面又有多少人对他们的声音感兴趣呢？那些声音毕竟只属于这片土地。他们的抗争也最终将与这里的历史脱节。我们聊起1979年后流亡西方的左翼伊斯兰组织穆贾希丁，妈妈你一定还记得他们曾经在赶国王下台后又与神权政府斗争的悲壮记忆，这记忆如今几乎被它们当下邪教般的阴谋论模样所改写，年轻的抗争力量再也不屑于与他们为伍，你甚至只能在一些黄色网站的广告中看到它们的身影，这是不是太可悲了！
+
+从警察局出来后的那一晚，阿德勒回家了，我和努尔回到赫迪耶在萨南达季的家中分享各自审讯室里的经历，一会儿哈哈大笑嘲讽那些公权力的无知，一会儿各自炫耀自己应付审讯的小聪明，一会儿又因同伴在里面受到的羞辱而一起啜泣。我们一起回味他们因为没有足够的证据无法正式逮捕我们而恼羞成怒的样子——“我他妈的就不明白了，你们也不图钱，也不图名，到底图什么？你们就是他妈的脑子有水！”那个审讯赫迪耶的德黑兰来的中年警察，在我们办完手续准备离开的前夕，恶狠狠地甩来一句。我们苦笑，以他们的想象力永远也无法企及什么我们所追求的另一个的世界是什么样子的，他们甚至无法理解人是可以拥有尊严，拥有外在于自身利益的理想的！我们点火烧掉了抗争印刷品，字迹熔成灰烬就像墓志铭一样。那一晚我们互相抚慰的时光是多么的珍贵啊，可是赫迪耶毕竟不便再收留我们，我们的行踪正处在更加严苛的监控之中，和任何人接触都可能给他们带来麻烦。我和努尔不知道要去哪里，第二天晚上最终下决心冲出了警察的封锁线。逃离的路上还能隐隐听到伊拉克库尔德斯坦方向传来的炮火声。【6】
+
+在机场等待飞机的漫长时间里，我接到马吉德从加拿大打来的电话，他已经从朋友们那里听说了我的处境，“你必须马上走！从库区穿过边境到伊拉克那一边，千万不要回德黑兰！”“我没有做好准备非法出境，我不想再也回不来！”“我知道你没有做好准备，但是你要清楚，这是流亡！流亡不会给你留出准备时间的！”，那通长达2个小时的通话使我筋疲力竭，我几乎和他争吵了起来，他在逼我面对我还不想面对的一切。马吉德又叫帕尔瓦打给我，她曾在拘留所被监禁一年，判决后又在缓刑的状态里戴了两年的电子手铐，与所有人斩断了联系。就在她几乎被公众也被警察遗忘了的时候，她悄无声息地离开了，现在正在法国办理政治避难，“只要我还拥有伊斯兰共和国的护照，无论走到哪里都因为祖国在我身后而感到颤栗，我只能和那里一刀两断”，帕尔瓦坚决地说。她曾经为抗争放弃了那么多，即将完成的学业、优渥的生活，在西方那个势力的系统中却几乎只能靠“贩卖”受害者的经历来重新找到自己的位置……我不想走，更不想走了就回不来，比起这种结果，在监狱里待一阵子似乎也不是那么难以忍受。可我又怎么知道那仅仅是“一阵子”呢？
+
+我最终来到了基什岛，这座波斯湾上的岛屿仿佛置身于历史之外。阳光明媚，温暖潮湿，没有民众的怒火，没有警察的暴力。而身处历史之中的那些地方，则越来越冷了，街上的女人也因为天气寒冷而重新裹起了头巾。我们的德黑兰朋友们一个又一个被带走、被无端指控。还没有“消失”的人陷入恐惧和不安，而最可怕的是在我们之间滋生的不信任和疏离。伙伴们相互猜疑被“打入”的通讯群里究竟谁是秘密警察的线人。被抓进去又出来的人有时面对的不是朋友们的安抚，而是害怕被牵连。通讯工具里解除好友的理由总是大同小异：我和你们不一样，我还没有准备好成为革命者，我不想“牺牲”！
+
+勇敢的人有那么多，他们出现在图像上被传播被歌颂。但是还有那么多没有被克服的恐惧与软弱，过分狼狈因而只好藏匿于革命的幽闭之处，没有位置安放。
+
+
+▲ 2022年9月19日，伊朗首都德黑兰，民众在街头示威，抗议库尔德族女生玛沙·阿米尼（Mahsa Amini）被道德警察逮捕、殴打后死亡。防暴警察骑电单车用警棍驱赶示威者。
+
+新年前夕，米娜从德黑兰来到这座岛屿找我，那天晚上我们睡在一张床上，她痛苦地讲述在惩罚的威胁面前，朋友们开始对这场革命产生动摇，恐惧的治理术正在发挥效用，分化彼此。她也因为更坚定、更诚实而被孤立。她赌气说不愿意再用自己的法律知识帮助刚刚“消失”的朋友们了。我几乎不耐烦地终止了睡前的那场谈话。后来我想我大概是害怕我的软弱被她识破吧。审讯对我最大的折磨是在背叛的一瞬间，我在他们的逼问下，说出了一些参与者的暱称，我安慰自己不说真实名字就不会真正暴露他们，但我知道这只是自我欺骗罢了。那种背叛在那个瞬间也吞噬了自己，我的一部分精神与信念在瓦解，它将使我永远活在那种自责的痛苦里。米娜此前经历审讯时，始终都没有交出手机和电脑密码，面对警察每问一句话，回击的都是不屈的眼神和沉默。我们都想要拥抱并传递这样的女性形象，但是我想她应该更宽容一点，给我们这一代人多留一些时间学习与恐惧相处。可我没想到的是，和米娜告别后不到一周，她再度被抓捕。这半年来，每一场告别，都不知是否还会相见。我多么后悔在那晚打断了她。
+
+我想到前些年凯塔雍在被抓捕前的痛苦，作为被监禁的著名异见者的妻子，她不得不去拥抱“十二月党人妻子”的形象，必须放弃自己一切的活动，扛住所有政治压力声援丈夫并完成他未竟的事业。那个形象不能允许她有一丝软弱和退缩。当我们意识到她扛不住的时候，已经太晚了，在监禁前夕，她重度抑郁、幻听，面容也变得浮肿，总是把自己藏在家中的衣柜里。对了，今天刚好是她的生日，她在狱中是怎么度过的呢？
+
+强制头巾法案和道德警察被取消的烟幕弹在英文世界开始散播，外界开始欢呼伊朗女性革命的胜利，而不再密切关注里面正在进行时的抓捕与监禁。最高领袖在电视上咬定这场抗争是境外势力的阴谋，他们正急于“找出组织”。【7】
+
+抗争情绪日渐低迷。而我呢，失语的自我惩罚并没有换来我的安全，只是把我变得迟钝和冷漠。该来的还是来了。这一次没有精心布置的天罗地网——我在被迫频繁汇报行踪的情况下束手等待就范；也没有审讯——他们早就收集和编造好了他们所需要的罪名，“境外势力”的惯用虚假指控容不下任何轻微的辩驳。我直接被带回德黑兰南部的卡查克监狱等待最终的审判，甚至没有留给我时间回家和你见一面。
+
+妈妈，我想他们一定会找你、吓唬你我将面临可怕的惩罚，要你劝我认罪，就像他们以往惯用的那样。我知道你会被吓到，会担心我，可是你也会相信我没有做错，对吗？我们这代人未能完成这场革命，我想，能留给下一代最好的承诺大概也只有：“被指控者无人表达悔恨。”*
+
+*“被指控者无人表达悔恨”是19岁的抗争者雅尔达（Yalda Aghafazli）留下的遗言，她在去年11月被抓捕，在卡查克拘留中心的十天里遭受殴打和折磨，她绝食抗议。释放后她选择结束了自己的生命。
+
+> #### 马赫萨
+> #### 2023.1.13
+
+脚注：
+
+【1】11月8日，作者在广州的朋友家中被北京国保跨省抓捕，当天聚会的四个人的本地健康码同时被“赋黄码”，几个本地防疫人员敲开门谎称监测到有人从封控区流动过来，需要为她们做抗原测试，在防疫人员要来他们身份证登记、拿到她们手机扫码后，几个北京便衣冲了进来把他们“抓获”，并在她们毫无准备的情况下抢走了手机。
+
+【2】德黑兰口音的波斯语指北京话。
+
+【3】在被抓捕的时候，作者的北京健康宝已经弹窗2个多月了，即便是跨省抓捕的警察也没办法按照惯例将她带回北京审讯拘留。事实上，这些来跨省抓她的几位北京国保也冒着健康宝弹窗的风险来执行任务。于是，审讯只好在疫情肆虐的广州进行。
+
+【4】10月，作者的一位朋友在伊朗抗争歌曲的启发下，创作演唱了一首上世纪经典抗争歌曲的粤语版。警方在对作者微信严密监控的过程中在聊天记录上看到了她私信发给几位朋友的清唱版本，他们以为是她创作的，然而她本身并不懂粤语。当作者在审讯过程中指明这一点的时候，警察恼羞成怒，说，“歌词明明是用简体字写的，你以为我没见过粤语吗？我在香港待过，粤语是繁体字！”而他们当时正在位于广州的一间公安局的审讯室，北京国保旁边帮他写笔录的民警正是粤语为母语的广东人。
+
+【5】在24小时审讯（从被带走到最终释放有30几个小时，超过了法定的审讯时间）结束后，她获得“寻衅滋事”15天行政拘留的惩罚，然而疫情政策导致广州的拘留所难以收监，她的“15天”被暂缓执行。拷贝走手机和电脑里的资料后，她和其他人一起被释放。
+
+【6】11月11日凌晨，广州海珠区正式封锁，作者在最后时刻跨过海珠大桥，赶往机场，因为害怕广州健康码再度变红，不敢留宿酒店，在机场候机厅等待了十几个小时，最终登上飞机离开了广州。
+
+【7】新年前夕（12月28日），公安部印发通知，要求在元旦春节期间维护安全稳定，严厉打击敌对势力各类渗透颠覆捣乱破坏活动。随即，“白纸运动”的一部分参与者在12月初经历过24小时审讯后，在1月再度悄无声息地被抓捕。很多人消失至今。
+
+后记：
+
+2022这一年来我的经历听起来很可怕，但我知道它只是我们共同经历的这荒诞的一年的一个微不足道的注脚。
+
+我是一个生活在中国大陆的知识工作者。在过去的几年里，我因为我的职业和社会活动，不得不经常和警察打交道，但是在2022年以前，我们勉强维持了某种平衡，他们仍然留给我空间参与公共生活，包括写作、社交媒体发言、做客播客或线下活动、组织活动等，但是偶尔会约谈我、跟踪我、找我单位领导或派人监视我组织的活动和公共发言。
+
+到了这一年，他们的行事逻辑不再有理可循，任何事情都有可能触发最高警报，不再给出理由，不再有任何共识可以达成的空间。2022年春夏之交，在漫长的封控结束后，我因为和朋友们相约在公共场所跳舞而被居家监禁三天。一个月后，我所供职六年的媒体在政治压力下与我非法解除劳动合同，并拒绝按照《劳动法》全额赔付。秋天，我离开北京参与一个艺术展的布展，准备了不足10天的衣物行李，未曾想到这一离开，再也没能回家。
+
+从漫长的健康宝弹窗无法返京，到被北京国保在广州跨省抓捕，后来躲到偏远的地方避风头，再到“白纸运动”发生，朋友们陆续被消失……对暴政的恐惧在这一年中捂住了我的嘴，我意识到被剥夺讲述的权利，比所有这些迫害让我更加痛苦。直到找到这个方法，借助伊朗的语境，我才讲出了我们的故事。在这个故事写完的时刻，我仍然不知道明天和抓捕哪个会先到来。所幸它没有一语成谶，如今我已经顺利离开了这个国家。逃离得如此匆忙，甚至没能来得及回家收拾行李、安置我的猫、告诉家人发生了什么。即使已经身在海外，恐惧的身体记忆仍在，请原谅我到现在依然不敢实名。
+
+在这个故事第一次发表的时候，正逢清零政策180度掉头。感染大潮立刻席卷而来，几乎每个人都有家人被夺走生命——事实上在清零政策还未结束时已经难以控制疫情的蔓延。毫无准备的放开仿佛是对封控时期怨声载道的民众的“惩罚”。尽管无论是彻底的清零还是一夜之间放开的两种政策是同一种懒政、仅仅将生命视作统计学意义上的数字的逻辑；然而，记忆的难以保存，造成感知更容易被操纵。在舆论场上，对前一种政策的反对被塑造成为后一种政策之后果的罪人，人们开始主动遗忘此前的反封控抗争，甚至谩骂那些抗争者。十月和十一月暗流汹涌的民间抵抗情绪前所未有地陷入失语。在新冠高重症死亡率的哀鸿遍野中，在对反封控抗争的谩骂和遗忘中，秘密的抓捕仍然在继续。恐惧让我们找不到彼此，不知道谁又被带走了，不敢在舆论场上为消失的朋友发声。
+
+这篇文章献给所有“白纸运动”被抓捕的伙伴们，但愿有一天我们可以堂堂正正地站在自己生活的土地上，用自己的语言，讲述彼此的故事。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2022-12-23-ZuoYue-a1_r-three-movements-in-the-a4-revolution.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x1b/2022-12-23-ZuoYue-a1_r-three-movements-in-the-a4-revolution.md
similarity index 100%
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diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-01-11-NGOCN-a1_c-civic-memory-china-2022.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x1b/2023-01-11-NGOCN-a1_c-civic-memory-china-2022.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/2023-01-11-NGOCN-a1_c-civic-memory-china-2022.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x1b/2023-01-11-NGOCN-a1_c-civic-memory-china-2022.md
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-01-28-HanShizhou-a1_l-year-of-tragedy-china-2022.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x1b/2023-01-28-HanShizhou-a1_l-year-of-tragedy-china-2022.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/2023-01-28-HanShizhou-a1_l-year-of-tragedy-china-2022.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x1b/2023-01-28-HanShizhou-a1_l-year-of-tragedy-china-2022.md
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-14-space-threat-assessment-2023.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-14-space-threat-assessment-2023.md
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+layout: post
+title : Space Threat Assessment 2023
+author: Kari A. Bingen, et al.
+date : 2023-04-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ib4gfh3.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Some could argue that today’s strategic environment is the most complex in the history of our nation — with China, our pacing challenge, and Russia, an acute threat, both challenging the world order that has been in place and has secured peace since the end of World War II._
+
+
+
+Space is central to this complexity. Not only does space underpin all instruments of our national power, but access to and freedom to maneuver in the domain are foundational to the United States’ status as a great power. This sixth edition of the Space Threat Assessment describes a domain undergoing a significant and rapid transformation. The number of objects in space continues to soar, the value of the global space economy is at an all-time high, and, unfortunately, the threat to the domain is real and concerning today. Over the past year and a half, there has been regular testing and use of reversible non-destructive capabilities as well as a destructive test that created a debris field, jeopardizing safe operations and indicating that the domain will continue to become more contested.
+
+Two significant threats face the United States with this rapid change in the domain. First, China and Russia are developing and integrating space capabilities that will afford them the same advantages the United States currently enjoy, placing U.S. forces at great risk. Second, they are developing a robust spectrum of offensive capabilities to deny the United States and its partners, including commercial space companies, access to the domain.
+
+This edition of the Space Threat Assessment includes a dedicated section on the Russia-Ukraine war. Commercial space capabilities are making a significant contribution to the fight and have provided Ukraine access to space that they do not have organically. Commercial space has served as a great equalizer, allowing Ukrainian forces to have the necessary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and command and control to better understand Russian force disposition, communicate and stay connected globally, and strike with precision. Therefore, it is not surprising that Russia has tried to deny access to these commercial capabilities largely through jamming and cyberattacks.
+
+As some have suggested, the Russia-Ukraine war is “the first commercial space war,” and it has highlighted areas where the use of commercial space capabilities has advanced ahead of policy, strategy, and concepts of operations. This assessment is important to having a better understanding of the threats faced in, to, and from the domain and should be a valuable source of information to inform policymakers to be better prepared for future conflicts.
+
+While there are significant challenges, the space domain offers even more opportunities. The United States remains the world leader in space. U.S. allies, partners, and the commercial space sector provide great advantage. With strengthened leadership in the domain, the United States must continue to define safe and professional behavior in space to its advantage, seek increased transparency, strengthen our partnerships, and develop capabilities necessary to deter conflict — and if deterrence were to fail, to win.
+
+> #### GENERAL JOHN W. “JAY” RAYMOND
+> #### U.S. SPACE FORCE, RETIRED
+> #### Former Chief of Space Operations
+
+
+### INTRODUCTION
+
+Welcome to the sixth edition of Space Threat Assessment by the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). This resource for policymakers and the public leverages open-source information to assess key developments in foreign counterspace weapons. Drawing on six years of collected data and analyses, this series describes trends in the development, testing, and use of counterspace weapons and enables readers to develop a deeper understanding of threats to U.S. national security interests in space.
+
+The past year was dominated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, where space capabilities, including commercial satellites, played a highly visible and compelling role in Ukraine’s resistance to the invasion. Communications and imagery satellites have been used to connect Ukrainian troops across the battlefield, track Russian military movements, and map humanitarian corridors. As space capabilities continue to demonstrate their utility, from peacetime to conflict, it should come as no surprise that adversaries seek to block their use. Thus, this year’s featured analysis provides an in-depth look at Russia’s battlefield employment of counterspace weapons.
+
+Russia, China, Iran, and others continue to pursue a wide range of space and counterspace activities, enabled by national policies, prioritized resources, and investments in supporting infrastructure. As General B. Chance Saltzman, the chief of space operations of the U.S. Space Force, noted in February 2023, “We are seeing a whole mix of weapons being produced by our strategic competitors.” Not only are these counterspace weapons in development and testing, but some have progressed to production and fielding in operational units. Such weapons could create disastrous effects for an array of national security, civil, and commercial users, especially if destructive weapons are employed that create orbital debris and render large swaths of popular orbits unusable.
+
+The impacts of counterspace weapons use are no longer limited to military users alone. Harm to commercial and international space assets will also reverberate across the expanding space economy. According to the Space Foundation, 90 countries operate in space. The value of the global space economy was $469 billion in 2021, with other analyses projecting it will increase to over $1.25 trillion in annual revenue by 2030. While over 5,400 satellites are in-orbit today, more than 24,500 satellites are anticipated to be launched in the next 10 years (2022–2031), over 70 percent of which will be commercial.
+
+This iteration of the Space Threat Assessment provides a framework that describes different types of counterspace weapons and a highlight of the main countries being tracked — China, Russia, India, Iran, North Korea, and others. The country sections include an overview of military space organizations, launch and satellite capabilities, and a brief review of counterspace developments. In addition, the report identifies key counterspace events in 2022, analyzes them in more detail, and provides a more comprehensive list of all notable counterspace activities and developments over the past year (January 2022–February 2023). The conclusion includes an analysis of notable trends and expectations for the coming year.
+
+For more detail on past counterspace weapons tests, including historical tests by the United States and the Soviet Union, please review the prior Space Threat Assessments (editions 2018–2022) or visit the project’s interactive [_timeline_](https://aerospace.csis.org/counterspace-timeline/).
+
+- `TOTAL SATELLITES IN SPACE`
+ - `5,465`
+
+- `TOTAL LAUNCHES IN 2022`
+ - `182`
+
+- `TOTAL TRACKED ORBITAL DEBRIS`
+ - `32,300`
+
+
+### TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS
+
+Space is an increasingly important enabler of economic and military power. The strategic importance of space has led some nations to build arsenals of counterspace weapons to disrupt, degrade, or destroy space systems and hold at risk the ability of others to use the space domain. However, the strategic importance of space has also spurred renewed efforts to deter or mitigate conflict and protect the domain for peaceful uses. For example, the U.S. Space Force’s capstone publication on spacepower notes that “military space forces should make every effort to promote responsible norms of behavior that perpetuate space as a safe and open environment in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict, the Outer Space Treaty, and international law, as well as U.S. Government and DoD policy.” Similarly, the 2022 North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Strategic Concept, adopted by NATO heads of state and government in June 2022, expresses the alliance’s commitment to upholding international law, promoting responsible behavior in space, and boosting the resilience of space capabilities. It further articulates that “secure use of and unfettered access to space” are key to effective deterrence and defense.
+
+Counterspace weapons, particularly those that produce orbital debris, pose a serious risk to the space environment and the ability of all nations to use the space domain for prosperity and security. This chapter provides an overview of different types of counterspace weapons, drawing on previous CSIS work to taxonomize them. Counterspace weapons vary significantly in the types of effects they create, how they are deployed, their detectability, their ability to be attributed to a source, and the level of technology and resources needed for their development and fielding. This report categorizes counterpace weapons into four broad groups of capabilities: kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber.
+
+#### KINETIC PHYSICAL
+
+Kinetic physical counterspace weapons attempt to strike directly or detonate a warhead near a satellite or ground station. The three main forms of kinetic physical attack are direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, co-orbital ASAT weapons, and ground station attacks. Direct-ascent ASAT weapons are launched from Earth on a suborbital trajectory to strike a satellite in orbit, while co-orbital ASAT weapons are first placed into orbit and then later maneuvered into or near their intended target in orbit. These maneuvers are commonly known as rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs). Attacks on ground stations are targeted at the terrestrial sites responsible for the command and control of satellites or the relay of satellite mission data to users. Such a ground station attack has the benefit of affecting many satellites in a constellation (that communicate with the ground station) rather than requiring multiple weapons to target individual satellites.
+
+Kinetic physical attacks tend to cause irreversible damage to the systems affected and demonstrate a strong show of force that would likely be attributable and publicly visible. A successful kinetic physical attack in space will produce orbital debris, which can indiscriminately affect other satellites in similar orbits. These types of attacks are one of the only counterspace actions that carry the potential for the direct loss of human life if targeted at crewed ground stations or at satellites in orbits where humans are present, such as the International Space Station (ISS) in low Earth orbit (LEO). To date, no country has conducted a kinetic physical attack against another country’s satellite, but four countries — the United States, Russia, China, and India — have successfully tested direct-ascent ASAT weapons against their own satellites. The Soviet Union also tested co-orbital kinetic ASAT weapons as early as the 1960s.
+
+#### NON-KINETIC PHYSICAL
+
+Non-kinetic physical counterspace weapons have physical effects on satellites or ground systems without making physical contact. Lasers can be used to temporarily dazzle or permanently blind the sensors on satellites or cause components to overheat. High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can disrupt a satellite’s electronics or cause permanent damage to electrical circuits and processors in a satellite. A nuclear device detonated in space can create a high-radiation environment and an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) with indiscriminate effects on satellites in affected orbits. Non-kinetic attacks operate at the speed of light and, in some cases, can be less visible to third-party observers and more difficult to attribute.
+
+Satellites can be targeted with lasers and HPM weapons from ground- or ship-based sites, airborne platforms, or other satellites. A satellite lasing system requires high beam quality, adaptive optics (if being used through the atmosphere), and advanced pointing control to steer the laser beam precisely — technology that is costly and requires a high degree of sophistication. A laser can only be effective against a sensor on a satellite if it is within the field of view of the sensor, making it possible to attribute the attack to its approximate geographical origin. An HPM weapon can be used to disrupt a satellite’s electronics, corrupt data stored in memory, cause processors to restart, and, at higher power levels, cause permanent damage to electrical circuits and processors. HPM attacks can be more difficult to attribute because the attack can come from a variety of angles, including from other satellites passing by in orbit. For both laser and HPM weapons, the attacker may have limited ability to know if the attack was successful because it is not likely to produce visible indicators.
+
+The use of a nuclear weapon in space would have large-scale, indiscriminate effects that would be attributable and publicly visible. A nuclear detonation in space would immediately affect satellites within range of its EMP, and it would also create a high-radiation environment that would accelerate the degradation of satellite components over the long term for unshielded satellites in the affected orbital regime. The detonation of nuclear weapons in space is banned under the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which has more than 100 signatories, though this does not include China or North Korea.
+
+#### ELECTRONIC
+
+Electronic counterspace weapons target the electromagnetic spectrum through which space systems transmit and receive data. Jamming devices interfere with communications to or from satellites by generating noise in the same radio frequency (RF) band. An uplink jammer interferes with the signal going from Earth to a satellite, such as the command and control uplink. Downlink jammers target the signal from a satellite as it propagates down to users on Earth. Spoofing is a form of electronic attack where the attacker tricks a receiver into believing a fake signal, produced by the attacker, is the real signal it is trying to receive. A spoofer can be used to inject false information into a data stream or, in extremis, to issue false commands to a satellite to disrupt its operations. User terminals with omnidirectional antennas, such as many GPS receivers and satellite phones, have a wider field of view and thus are susceptible to downlink jamming and spoofing from a wider range of angles on the ground.
+
+Electronic forms of attack can be difficult to detect or distinguish from accidental interference, making attribution and awareness more difficult. Both jamming and spoofing are reversible forms of attack because communications can return to normal once the jamming signal is removed. Through a type of spoofing called “meaconing,” even encrypted military P(Y) GPS signal can be spoofed. Meaconing does not require cracking the encryption because it merely rebroadcasts a time-delayed copy of the original signal without decrypting it or altering the data. The technology needed to jam and spoof many types of satellite signals is commercially available and inexpensive, making it relatively easy to proliferate among state and non-state actors.
+
+#### CYBER
+
+While electronic forms of attack attempt to interfere with the transmission of RF signals, cyberattacks target the data itself and the systems that use, transmit, and control the flow of data. Cyberattacks on satellites can be used to monitor data traffic patterns, intercept data, or insert false or corrupted data or commands in a system. These attacks can target ground stations, end-user equipment, or the satellites themselves. While cyberattacks require a high degree of understanding of the systems being targeted, they do not necessarily require significant resources to conduct. The barrier to entry is relatively low, and cyberattacks can be contracted out to private groups or individuals. Even if a state or non-state actor lacks internal cyber capabilities, it may still pose a cyber threat.
+
+A cyberattack on space systems can result in the loss of data or services being provided by a satellite, which could have widespread systemic effects if used against a system such as GPS. Cyberattacks could have permanent effects if, for example, an adversary seizes control of a satellite through its command and control system. An attacker could shut down all communications and permanently damage the satellite by issuing commands that cause it to expend propellant or damage its electronics and sensors. Accurate and timely attribution of a cyberattack can be difficult because attackers can use a variety of methods to conceal their identity, such as using hijacked servers, when launching an attack.
+
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1 Types of Counterspace Weapons.___
+
+
+### CHINA
+
+China continues to make progress toward its goal of becoming the world leader in space. Over the past year, China has continued to grow its space and counterspace assets, maintaining its status as the second-most-capable space nation after the United States. To enable these capabilities, China operates four spaceports and a family of Long March space launch vehicles (SLVs) that can deliver a wide range of satellites to different orbital altitudes. In 2022, China conducted 64 space launches, including two space launch failures. The successful launches resulted in over 150 satellites successfully placed into orbit and the launch of one orbital and one suborbital spaceplane.
+
+Civil, intelligence, and military space capabilities are a priority for China as it continues to invest in and plan for greater use and access to space in the coming decade. In November 2022, China completed the construction of the Tiangong space station, which is now operational. Beijing has released two white papers on space activities, in 2016 and 2021, which not only outline a vision for future space activities but also integrate space into other strategic global initiatives.
+
+#### SPACE ORGANIZATION
+
+While China has separate organizations charged with managing its civil and military space activities, much of the technology for both civil and military space capabilities is produced by the same state-owned enterprises. The line between commercial and governmental endeavors is often blurred by Beijing’s military-civilian fusion policy, which encourages such enterprises to acquire and divert cutting-edge technologies, including space technology, to achieve both economic and military dominance.
+
+The China National Space Administration (CNSA) leads all civil space missions. The CNSA falls within the purview of the State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense. China’s space program primarily contracts through the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, a stateowned enterprise with many sectors that researches and develops SLVs, spacecraft, missile systems (including intercontinental ballistic missiles), and supporting ground equipment. Finally, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation is another state-owned enterprise which specializes in space technologies.
+
+The military organization for space capabilities, the Strategic Support Force (SSF), sits alongside other information-centric domains, such as cyber, within China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Founded in 2015, the SSF manages space warfare, space launch, and the acquisition and operation of satellites. Within the SSF, the Space Systems Department and Network Systems Department divide responsibilities and act as co-equal semi-independent branches, with the former managing space and counterspace capabilities and the latter leading the cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare mission areas.
+
+#### SPACE LAUNCH CAPABILITIES
+
+China broke its launch record in 2022, surpassing its previous record of 55 launches set in 2021. The vast majority of these missions were launched on the Long March SLV family of rockets. The Long March-2 (variants C, D, and F), -3B, -4C, -5, -5B, -6, -7, -8, and -11 rockets provide light-, medium-, and heavy-lift capability to LEO and geostationary orbit (GEO). Some are capable of launching from a sea-based platform, but most launch from traditional groundbased launch pads. Newer Long March vehicles are being developed, including the Long March-9.
+
+These SLVs are typically launched from one of four sites in China. The Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, located in Inner Mongolia, was founded in 1958 and is the country’s oldest space launch facility. This is the most popular launch site and has been the site of the majority of the country’s space tests and launches, including the launch of China’s first satellite in 1970, and the first international payload launched from the country in 1992. The Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, located in Wuzhai, Shanxi, is another popular launch site with a history of space and ballistic missile launches dating back to 1968. The Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center also has test and assembly capabilities on campus and launches vehicles too large for the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. The other two Chinese launch sites were both built to support human, interplanetary, and lunar missions. Located in the Sichuan region, the Xichang Satellite Launch Center (Songlin) was finalized in 1984, but because of its close proximity to populated areas has now become a backup launch site to China’s most recent addition, the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center. The coastal Wenchang Satellite Launch Center, located on the island province of Hainan in the South China Sea, has hosted 16 launches since opening in 2014. Officials have announced plans to further develop Wenchang as a commercial spaceport with satellite assembly, testing, and data centers on-site. In addition to these launch sites, China is capable of launching from mobile platforms in the Yellow Sea.
+
+There has been a shift in the last decade for the Chinese commercial industry. In 2014, the Chinese government lifted a restrictive policy prohibiting the creation of commercial space launch companies and commercial launch technology, which has resulted in private and state investment into the commercial market. Today, the government may look to the commercial sector as an opportunity to replace China’s reliance on international companies or suppliers. Similar to trends in other dominant space-faring nations, many commercial companies are focusing on launch capabilities. The first commercial space launch from China is expected in the first months of 2023 from Beijing Tianbing Technology Co., Ltd., also known as Space Pioneer, which plans to launch a Tianlong-2 medium-lift vehicle from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.
+
+> #### `China’s Spaceplane Program`
+
+_`Spaceplane programs are often extremely secretive, and the Chinese program is no exception. Spaceplanes launch from traditional SLVs, spend their operational mission continuously orbiting the Earth, and re-enter the atmosphere and land like a traditional airplane. The U.S. Space Shuttle is a famous larger cousin of the spaceplanes in operation today.`_
+
+_`In August 2022, China launched two different spaceplanes, one orbital and one suborbital, from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. As is typical with many emerging Chinese space technologies, few details have surfaced about either vehicle.`_
+
+_`The first test of a Chinese spaceplane was in September 2020 and was launched by a Long March 2F. That spaceplane traveled in LEO for two days, released an object capable of broadcasting transmissions, and concluded its test flight by landing in northwest China. The second test of this vehicle launched on another Long March 2F on August 4, 2022. After a successful launch and almost two months in LEO, the spaceplane raised its orbit on October 23 before releasing an object. Although it is not clear from publicly available data when exactly the spaceplane released its object, the U.S. Space Force space tracking database recognized the object on October 31, 2022. There have been few details released since, and a Google translation of reporting from state media has only indicated that the spaceplane will remain in orbit for “a period of time.” As of March 16, 2023, the orbital spaceplane is still believed to be in LEO. Available images of the Chinese spaceplane show that it bears a resemblance to the United States’ X-37B spaceplane, which completed a sixth mission in November 2022, after spending 908 days in orbit, and shows a Chinese interest in matching U.S. capabilities.`_
+
+_`China launched its suborbital spaceplane for a second time on August 26, 2022, following an initial test in September 2019 on a Long March 2D rocket. A statement from the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation confirmed that this launch vehicle was re-used, making it the country’s first successful demonstration of a reusable space launch capability. Reporting from China indicates a large amount of funding to be allocated to a suborbital transport project capable of carrying passengers. Though the suborbital spaceplane was confirmed to have landed, reports have not confirmed the duration or altitude of its flight. China is also developing a similar launching project, called the Tengyun project, which will incorporate a horizontal takeoff and landing capability to increase the ease and speed of space launches.`_
+
+_`There are no indications that a spaceplane capability would act as a counterspace weapon, but because of the apparent capacity to release objects while in orbit, this could progress to a co-orbital ASAT capability.`_
+
+#### SATELLITE CAPABILITIES
+
+China maintains an extensive suite of satellite capabilities, including advanced positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); satellite communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); missile warning; and space situational awareness. According to a 2022 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report, China doubled its number of satellites in orbit between 2019 and 2021, from 250 to 499, and surpassed all but the United States in the number of space startups receiving funding, drawing 16 percent of total global investment in these ventures.
+
+Notable capabilities include the Beidou constellation, made of 35 PNT satellites, which acts as China’s alternative to GPS. Satellite capabilities such as Beidou are increasingly used as tools for the Digital Silk Road and Belt and Road Initiatives. Similarly, China has released plans for a 13,000-satellite constellation in LEO for broadband communications purposes. This would be the country’s answer to SpaceX’s Starlink network and would aim to serve customers across China and underdeveloped internet markets across the globe. In 2019, China introduced the Belt and Road Space Information Corridor to build out Chinese space applications and services in other nations. Just two years later, in its 2021 space white paper, Beijing commended the successes of the corridor, highlighting expanding satellite research and development infrastructure in Egypt, Pakistan, and Nigeria as examples. Chinese commercial companies continue to develop capabilities as well; in 2021, space-mining start-up Origin Space launched a space debris cleanup prototype into LEO. The company claims this capability will be able to remove space debris, potentially with a net, though there are no reports of the satellite’s on-orbit tests or RPO activities.
+
+#### COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
+
+As China continues to develop and deploy a robust arsenal of space and counterspace capabilities, U.S. officials continue to view the country as a significant counterspace threat. China maintains a substantial kinetic ASAT capability, most notably demonstrated by a debris-creating 2007 test, as well as numerous subsequent non-intercept tests in the years since. Co-orbital technology demonstrations prove China’s ability to rendezvous with other satellites in GEO. While these are not counterspace weapons tests, they demonstrate capability that is necessary for a co-orbital counterspace attack. Non-kinetic counterspace weapons, such as high-powered lasers or microwaves, remain largely classified or are not publicly known to have been tested. However, in a 2021 threat report, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence indicated that China has ground-based lasers capable of blinding or damaging optical sensors on low-altitude satellites. Reporting from 2022 indicated that Chinese universities are also working on small laser devices capable of being mounted on a satellite, though this is not a current capability. China’s jamming and spoofing electronic warfare capabilities have been verified in use against space and non-space signals alike. Few Chinese cyberattacks on space systems have been recorded in the last five years, but China’s cyber capabilities in other domains form a solid foundation for potential cyber counterspace capabilities.
+
+China also maintains significant space surveillance capabilities, which are required to effectively target and employ their counterspace weapons. The country has maintained a fleet of space-tracking ships for years, which set sail for months-long space-tracking and monitoring missions. The ships are reportedly capable of monitoring missions including Beidou satellites and the Chang’e lunar missions. In November 2022, China unveiled the SLC-18 radar, which is reportedly designed to “search, detect, and track objects such as ballistic missiles and LEO satellites.” This may be an updated design to the previous JY-26 “Skywatch” long-range air surveillance system debuted in 2014. Global space surveillance capabilities are an additional component of the country’s Belt and Road Initiative. China has had success building space surveillance infrastructure, particularly ground stations, in countries around the world, including as far away as South America.
+
+___`CHINA DOUBLED ITS NUMBER OF SATELLITES IN ORBIT BETWEEN 2019 AND 2021, FROM 250 TO 499.`___
+
+> #### `Rendezvous and Proximity Operations`
+
+_`China has a long history of satellites capable of performing on-orbit RPOs, commonly in GEO. As reported in last year’s assessment, the Shijian 21 (SJ-21) was launched in October 2021 as an experimental space debris mitigation satellite, which separated from its upper stage apogee kick motor (AKM). SJ-21 performed RPO maneuvers around the AKM before moving to rendezvous with a defunct Beidou satellite, Compass G2. AKMs are additional power sources that help place a satellite into a specific orbit. Since GEO is a highly valued orbit, most AKMs in GEO are released in a manner such that they separate and put significant distance between the payload and the AKM, so as not to interfere with satellite operations in GEO. Previous reporting suggests that SJ-21 performed several RPOs around Compass G2 before docking and moving the defunct satellite into a GEO graveyard orbit, hundreds of kilometers above the traditional GEO belt. Updated information showcases that SJ-21 took Compass G2 significantly higher than a typical graveyard orbit, which is highly unusual for a debris removal mission.`_
+
+_`Two additional Chinese rendezvous technology research satellites, SJ-12-01 and -02 were launched into GEO in early 2022. Soon after, the satellites engaged with a U.S. Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program space surveillance satellite in a “catand-mouse game” spanning several days. Each time the U.S. satellite would approach either SJ-12 satellite, the Chinese satellites would quickly maneuver away. These activities have been corroborated by commercial company COMSPOC and highlight the RPO capabilities China has successfully developed and maintained in orbit.`_
+
+_`China’s first successful orbital launch of 2023 was on January 6. Shijian 23 (SJ-23) launched on a Long March 7 from the Wenchang Satellite Launching Center. SJ-23 reached its GEO orbit on January 15 and one day later a second object appeared to be tracked — another suspected AKM.`_
+
+
+### RUSSIA
+
+As one of the three dominant national space actors, Russia retains substantial space capabilities and forces, many dating back to the Soviet Union. However, Moscow finds itself at an inflection point. Over the past year, Russia has continued to display less advanced space and counterspace capabilities than originally anticipated. Advanced counterspace weapons that were promised, such as the Peresvet and Sokol-Eshelon ground-based lasers, are nowhere to be seen on the battlefield despite Russian claims of their success. Furthermore, reports have surfaced that the Russian space industrial base is suffering from sanctions, an aging population, corruption, and bloat.
+
+Nevertheless, in 2022, Russia used space capabilities and counterspace weapons more than ever before. Widespread reports of jamming throughout Eastern Europe have been attributed to Russia, as have several distinct attacks on commercial space architectures, such as Viasat and SpaceX’s Starlink system. Moreover, Moscow continues to play a “cat-and-mouse” game in orbit, using its satellites to shadow other nations’ satellites and creating confusion and concern about the intent of these actions.
+
+#### SPACE ORGANIZATION
+
+Military and civil space organizations remain mostly separate in Russia, with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) leading military efforts and Roscosmos leading those on the civil side. Within the VKS, military space and counterspace capabilities fall within the Russian Space Forces, established in 2015. The Russian Space Forces’ mission includes space situational awareness, missile warning, space launch, satellite operations, and counterspace operations. Roscosmos leads on human spaceflight, the GLONASS PNT system, and international space partnerships.
+
+#### SPACE LAUNCH CAPABILITIES
+
+Space launch capabilities are a cornerstone for Russia’s military and civilian space programs. Providing space launch via the Soyuz rocket — which has been in operation for over 50 years — has brought in significant revenue for Russia over the years through the sale of payload space or seats for astronauts. In fact, to maintain U.S. presence on the ISS between the 2011 decommissioning of the U.S. Space Shuttle and the 2020 launch of SpaceX’s Dragon capsule to the ISS with two U.S. astronauts, Moscow carried 71 U.S. astronauts to the station at a cost of approximately $56 million per seat. In total, these launches cost the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) approximately $4 billion.
+
+___`MOSCOW FINDS ITSELF AT AN INFLECTION POINT.`___
+
+> #### `New Direction for Roscosmos`
+
+_`Of note, in July 2022, Dimitry Rogozin was replaced by Yuri Borisov, a former deputy defense minister, as the head of Roscosmos. This leadership change was possibly a demotion for both men: Rogozin for his erratic Twitter posts and bluster surrounding Russia’s decoupling from the ISS, and Borisov for his poor military leadership in Russia’s war on Ukraine`_
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1 Soviet Union and Russian Space Launches, 1957–2022.__ Source: [“Orbital Launches of 2023,” Gunter’s Space Page, N.D.](https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_chr/lau2023.htm)_
+
+Russia successfully launched 22 times in 2022. This pace is slightly behind 2021 and pre-pandemic years. Notably, Russia lost significant international launch customers after its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. For example, just before a scheduled launch in early 2022, Roscosmos demanded that OneWeb not use any of its satellites to support military activities. After receiving no such reassurances, Roscosmos took a Soyuz launch vehicle containing 36 OneWeb satellites off the launch pad on March 4, 2022. The 36 satellites remain in storage in Russia. Due to the seizure of their satellites and the invasion of Ukraine, OneWeb canceled all future launches through Russia.
+
+After a partial failure of Russia’s heavylaunch Angara 5 in December 2021, Russia’s lighter launch vehicle, the Angara 1.2, successfully launched twice in 2022, carrying two undisclosed military satellites into LEO.
+
+However, both satellites de-orbited and burned up in the Earth’s atmosphere within two months. Angara 1.2 is expected to conduct an additional launch in late 2023.
+
+Russia maintains three main launch sites: Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, Plesetsk Cosmodrome in the northwest of the country, and the Vostochny Cosmodrome in the east. Baikonur is typically used for cosmonaut launches to the ISS, while Plesetsk is used for many military space launches, including a November 2021 direct-ascent ASAT test. President Vladimir Putin visited the Vostochny Cosmodrome in April 2022 to celebrate Cosmonautics Day, a holiday commemorating Yuri Gargarin’s successful mission as the first human in space. Putin was accompanied by Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko for bilateral meetings and a tour of the site. Once fully operational, Vostochny is expected to host 45 percent of all Russian launches, shifting significant work from Baikonur to the new domestic launch site. The 2023 Angara 1.2 launch is planned for Vostochny Cosmodrome.
+
+#### SATELLITE CAPABILITIES
+
+Russia maintains a fleet of highly capable satellites providing support to a variety of civil and military missions, including human spaceflight, deep space exploration, missile warning, communications, command and control, ISR, and weather. While many of these capabilities were developed in the 1990s or early 2000s, some are being revitalized. A national PNT system called GLONASS has been operational since 1993 and provides navigation capabilities to the Russian military and civilians, much like the United States’ own GPS. Updates to GLONASS are ongoing, and three new GLONASS satellites were launched in 2022. Several ISR and communications satellites were also launched in 2022 to complement or restore existing constellations.
+
+Russia’s Federal Space Program 2016-2025, a policy and budgetary plan for its space projects, set ambitious goals, including increased bandwidth for communications satellites, additional remote sensing satellites, upgrades to the Russian segment of the ISS, and the completion of the Vostochny Cosmodrome. However, since enacting this policy, Moscow’s space budgets have continued to shrink. Sanctions enacted after the 2014 invasion of Crimea have significantly hampered the Russian space industry. Furthermore, after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, additional sanctions were imposed on the aerospace industry by the United States and its allies, and joint projects were suspended by Russia’s international partners, such as the ExoMars rover mission with the European Space Agency. With shrinking budgets, expanding sanctions, and continued economic stagnation, Russia has focused its efforts on streamlining current space capabilities, specifically revitalizing Soviet-era programs and investing in dual-use space technologies — those with both military and civil uses. This strategy is a clear response to Russia’s burgeoning challenges in its national space enterprise. Many of these dual-use capabilities are discussed in the following section on Russian counterspace threats.
+
+#### COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
+
+Russia has a proven, well-rounded suite of counterspace weapons. Many of this year’s updates to Russia’s counterspace capabilities are found in the “Featured Analysis” section.
+
+__Kinetic Physical__
+
+In November 2021, Russia successfully tested a direct-ascent ASAT in LEO. The test partially destroyed a defunct Soviet-era satellite, Cosmos 1408, via a Nudol (PL-19) missile interceptor. Russia has tested the Nudol system almost yearly since 2014, but this was the first intercept on orbit that created space debris. Of the 1,783 pieces of orbital debris tracked from the test, only 661 were still in orbit as of September 2022. However, the remaining pieces are at a higher altitude, which mean the debris will remain in orbit longer, until around 2033. Some of this debris is in a similar orbit to the ISS, which had to move three times in 2022 to avoid the debris.
+
+In September 2018, a modified Russian MiG31 fighter jet was photographed carrying an unidentified missile that was reportedly a “mock-up” of an air-launched ASAT weapon. Reports now suggest that this missile system is the Burevestnik. Little to no details are confirmed about the ASAT capability, but the capability is not new.
+
+Co-orbital weapons are hard to identify and track in orbit. However, unusual or threatening behavior can provide insight into capabilities and intent. Russia has a long history of unusual and threatening behavior in both LEO and GEO and conducted similar activities in 2022.
+
+Luch, Russia’s well-known GEO inspector satellite, maneuvered several times in 2022 to closely approach and loiter near three different Intelsat communications satellites. For more information on Luch and its activities during Russia’s war on Ukraine.
+
+__Non-kinetic Physical__
+
+It is possible that Russia has developed a new ground-based ASAT laser system, dubbed Kalina. Part of Russia’s Krona space surveillance station located in southwest Russia near the Black Sea, Kalina may be capable of dazzling or blinding satellites. It is unclear if this system is operational or capable of counterspace attacks, but it is a notable development for experts to monitor as progress on the facilities continue.
+
+__Electronic__
+
+Available open-source reporting indicates that GPS jamming is occurring around Moscow, and observers speculate that it is to protect the capital city from being targeted by Ukrainian drones. Russia has been installing jammers capable of denying GPS on domestic infrastructure, such as cell towers. The 2020 edition of this report highlighted how mobile GPS jamming vehicles accompany President Putin to ensure the leader’s personal safety and how GPS jamming may be used near the Kremlin. More information on how jamming has been used in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can be found in the “Featured Analysis” section.
+
+__Cyber__
+
+Russia has demonstrated significant cyber capabilities, as showcased with its February 2022 Viasat hack. For more on this attack, please see “Featured Analysis” section. Recent reports have emerged on another successful cyber intrusion against a U.S. commercial satellite communications provider. In November 2022, an analyst from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security stated at a conference that the Russian hacking group Fancy Bear successfully infiltrated a satellite communications network. The intruders were supposedly in the network for months before detection. Fancy Bear is a Russian state-sponsored advanced persistent threat group tracked by the U.S. government and confirmed to be part of the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate’s 85th Main Special Service Center.
+
+> #### `Cosmos 2558’s Early Mission`
+
+_`In early August 2022, it was reported that Russian satellite Cosmos 2558 performed a close approach with USA 326, a U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite, in LEO. Cosmos 2558 was likely close enough to image or collect signals intelligence from USA 326, but current reporting suggests it did not interfere with, deny, or degrade operations of the NRO satellite. With the speed at which satellites travel in LEO, the flyby of Cosmos 2558 would have happened relatively quickly and possibly within a couple of hours. General James H. Dickinson, commander of U.S. Space Command, spoke about this dangerously close approach to NBC News on August 9, 2022. A unique aspect of this mission was how early it occurred in the satellite’s lifetime. Cosmos 2558 was launched into space on August 1, 2022, and the close approach happened only three days later, on August 4. Following the approach, Cosmos 2558 adjusted its position in early September 2022 to stay within the same orbital plane as USA 326.`_
+
+> #### `Possible SAR Jamming`
+
+_`In June and July 2021, a defense blog reported on a potential electronic warfare attack on the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1B synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery satellite. As of March 2023, this attack remains unconfirmed, but it is suspected that Russian forces were able to affect the European SAR satellite as it imaged Russian territory near the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. After this report, the findings were highly questioned on Twitter, leaving it unclear if the satellite itself experienced SAR jamming or radar interference in the region. However, Moscow is reported to possess SAR-jamming capability, specifically its Krasukha-2/-4 mobile electronic warfare systems, which can jam both airborne and space-based radar systems. Possibly unrelated but worth mentioning is that Sentinel-1B suffered an anomaly in December 2021 that affected the satellite’s SAR antenna power system, leaving the satellite unable to collect SAR data. The European Space Agency declared “the capability of Sentinel-1B to support the mission is therefore considered lost,” and surmised that the probable cause of failure was the soldering processed used to repair a ceramic capacitor during the assembly and manufacturing of the satellite.`_
+
+
+> #### FEATURED ANALYSIS
+### RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE
+
+The most significant space-related developments in 2022 center on Russia and its war on Ukraine. This edition of the Space Threat Assessment takes an in-depth look at Russian counterspace activities in this context. There has been an unparalleled level of transparency on the battlefield in Ukraine: sensitive intelligence was declassified to reveal Moscow’s plans and intentions, imagery showed the massing of Russian forces, and social media posts conveyed the war’s horrors up close. Space capabilities are aiding in this transparency and making an impactful contribution to this fight. Communications satellites are empowering Ukrainian forces and connecting the Ukrainian people with the outside world. Imagery satellites, some able to penetrate clouds and collect pictures at night, are watching the movement of Russian forces, mapping humanitarian evacuation routes, and collecting evidence of war crimes. Other satellites can detect and locate the sources of GPS interference, which is causing Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to alter course. Some observers have described this war as the “first commercial space war” due to the prominence of Western space industry capabilities enabling Ukraine’s resistance.
+
+However, as with any advantage on the battlefield, adversaries quickly look for ways to erode that edge, and the same is true for space. This featured analysis details Russian employment of electronic warfare and cyberattacks against space systems, uncertainty on Russian use of laser weapons, and unusual behavior by a Russian inspector satellite in GEO. While the space lessons learned in Ukraine are still to be written, there may be insights to glean on Moscow’s space strategy and doctrine, and lessons for the United States to apply to threats in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+
+
+Russia’s attacks against space capabilities used by Ukraine are an example of how counterspace weapons can and will likely be used prior to and during future conflict.
+
+#### JAMMING AND CYBERATTACKS
+
+Months before the invasion, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was monitoring the Ukraine-Russia border using UAVs to perform overflight missions. The fleet of UAVs operated by the OSCE uses the unprotected civilian GPS signal to aid in their navigation. Throughout March and April 2021, over 60 percent of the OSCE’s UAV flights encountered GPS signal interference, including in areas near the OSCE base (approximately 25 kilometers from the contact line). These events were corroborated through RF signal sensing from a commercial space company which confirmed detection of GPS interference in the areas where OSCE UAVs were attempting to carry out the monitoring mission. The day before the invasion, on February 23, 2022, Ukrainian government sources stated that a longrange UAV experienced significant GPS interference, which caused a temporary loss of control of the aircraft. Open-source defense analysts from Janes assess that the long-range UAV was a Turkish Bayraktar (TB-2) drone operated by Ukraine and that the counter-UAV electronic warfare system was the Russian Krasukha-4. Russian employment of GPS-jamming devices has continued throughout the conflict.
+
+Beyond electronic warfare against GPS systems, Russia moved to deny Ukrainian command and control systems enabled by commercial communications satellites. An hour before Russian troops invaded on February 24, 2022, Russia conducted a cyberattack to deny connectivity between the Viasat communications KA-SAT network and its thousands of ground terminals. The attack entered through a virtual private network and deployed wiper malware that crashed terrestrial modems via the satellite downlink. One of Viasat’s customers was the target: the Ukrainian government and military. However, the attack indiscriminately affected other Viasat users in Europe, including disabling about one-fifth of wind turbines and internet users across Central Europe. In light of the attack against Viasat, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and CISA released a joint statement to commercial satellite communications providers urging companies to reinforce the cybersecurity and resilience of their networks.
+
+Following the successful cyberattack on Viasat, the Ukrainian government sought help from Elon Musk and SpaceX to help the country restore connectivity through commercial LEO broadband. Only four days after the initial invasion, thousands of Starlink terminals were successfully delivered to Ukraine and reconnected the Ukrainian government and civilians to the internet. Russia attempted to jam SpaceX’s Starlink ground terminals to break Ukrainian communications once again. However, SpaceX was able to quickly counter the attack, and services have not been seriously disrupted since this first attempt in March 2022. According to U.S. Department of Defense leadership, Starlink was able to combat jamming by fixing lines of code, making the Russian attack ineffective. Starlink continues to face attempted jamming by Russian systems, but “their success has been limited.”
+
+Additional jamming has been observed throughout the conflict and in various locations. In March 2022, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) released the following:
+
+> In the current context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the issue of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) jamming and/or possible spoofing has intensified in geographical areas surrounding the conflict zone and other areas.
+
+> Eurocontrol, Network of Analysts and open-source data reports analyzed by EASA indicate that since February 24, 2022, there are four key geographical areas where GNSS interference (spoofing or jamming) has intensified, namely:
+
+- Kaliningrad region, surrounding Baltic sea and neighboring States;
+
+- Eastern Finland;
+
+- The Black Sea; and
+
+- The Eastern Mediterranean area near Cyprus, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Israel, as well as Northern Iraq.
+
+These locations have all experienced significant interference with PNT systems such as GPS and Galileo. Data from commercial RF data analytics company, Spire Global, corroborated GNSS interference over the Eastern Mediterranean in the February 2022 time frame, as shown on page 18. Additionally, reports of GPS jamming emerged just after Finnish president Sauli Niinistö met with U.S. president Joe Biden in Washington, D.C. Finnair also reported several occurrences of GPS jamming when its commercial airliners flew near Kaliningrad.
+
+There are several reports of ground-based electronic warfare devices being used in Ukraine, possibly including the Krasukha-4, RB-109A “Bylina,” R-330ZH Zhitel, Borisoglebsk-2, and Tirada-2, which all have the capability to deny or disrupt GPS or satellite communications through uplink and downlink jamming. Many of these come from reported captures of Russian vehicles and systems during the war — often from videos or images posted on social media. However, there is little concrete confirmation on which of these jamming devices have been used. While it is unclear which systems are deployed by Russia, it is clear that jamming has been widespread and frequent.
+
+#### LASING AND DAZZLING
+
+The use of ISR satellites to enable Ukraine’s tactical operations has been astounding. Given the advantage commercial ISR satellites has provided to Ukraine, it is surprising that Russia has failed to employ more counterspace weapons to erode this advantage. In May 2022, Russian deputy prime minister Yuri Borisov claimed that the country had successfully destroyed a Ukrainian UAV using its Zadira laser weapon. According to Borisov, the Zadira weapon is more powerful and damaging than its predecessor, the Peresvet. Borisov stated in a TV interview that “if Peresvet blinds an object, the new generation of laser weapons physically destroys the target. It is burned up.” Officials from both the United States and Ukraine commented that these reports have not been substantiated, and there is little evidence to prove that the attack occurred.
+
+Despite much boasting of capability, there are no independently verified reports of Russia deploying directed-energy capabilities against satellites in its war on Ukraine. Russian officials have showcased the Peresvet in recent years, a ground-based satellite laser. In 2021, President Putin announced that this laser would be adapted for an airborne platform. Another touted capability is the Sokol-Eshelon, an airborne laser system that is a revival of a Soviet-era program, which has the stated capability to attack satellites in LEO. Neither of these capabilities have been employed in the Ukrainian conflict despite the high volume of remote sensing satellites and other platforms that are providing data and intelligence on Russian troop positions to the Ukrainian military.
+
+On October 26, 2022, at the United Nations General Assembly, Konstantin Vorontsov, the deputy director of the Russian foreign ministry’s department of nonproliferation and arms, warned that “quasi-civilian infrastructure may become a legitimate target for retaliation.” This indicates that Moscow considers commercial companies providing services to governments and militaries as legitimate targets in times of conflict.
+
+#### CO-ORBITAL RENDEZVOUS AND PROXIMITY OPERATIONS
+
+Finally, the Russian inspector satellite Luch may also be supporting Russia’s war on Ukraine through signals intelligence gathering in GEO. At the beginning of 2020, Luch made a significant maneuver westward, covering about 60 degrees in longitude. As it moved, Luch had the opportunity to conduct multiple close approaches with other satellites. However, a year later, in March 2021 — just months after Russia began its initial military buildup near the Ukrainian border — Luch made a significant maneuver back eastward to visit another Russian satellite in GEO, Cosmos 2520, and an Azerbaijani satellite, Azerspace-2/Intelsat 38. Luch then maneuvered and loitered near Intelsat 33e from October 2021 through January 2022.
+
+As corroborated by data and analysis from commercial space domain awareness company Slingshot Aerospace, Luch moved to rendezvous with Intelsat 39, a high-throughput communications satellite with European coverage, one month before Russia invaded Ukraine. Since the war began, Luch has been performing proximity operations near Intelsat satellites and loitering nearby for about 150 days at each satellite — a significant departure from Luch’s nominal operations since typical loiter times are much less. Notably, these Intelsat satellites are transmitting Ku- and C-band frequencies (which are often used for secure military communications) over Ukraine, although it is unclear if they are supporting any military operations in the region.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2 Luch Transit before and during Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.__ Source: [Satellite Dashboard](https://satellitedashboard.org/); [Slingshot Aerospace](https://slingshotaerospace.com/)._
+
+
+### INDIA
+
+India catapulted onto the global counterspace stage in 2019 when it launched its first (and only) ASAT test, becoming only the fourth country to successfully demonstrate a direct-ascent ASAT capability. The Indian space sector continued to grow throughout 2022, with a particular focus on military and private satellite imagery. In October 2022, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a new Mission Defense Space Program, where New Delhi highlighted 75 defense space mission areas for private companies to focus on. These 75 missions were separated into five broad categories of space technology for both civilian and military operations: satellite, launch, software, ground systems, and communications and payload.
+
+#### SPACE ORGANIZATION
+
+India’s space program has historically focused on civil and scientific missions, though the past five years have seen expanded military activity. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is the civilian branch of India’s national space program and has evolved into the sixth-largest space agency in the world. The ISRO operates under the Department of Space, which is headed by the prime minister. Founded in April 2019, the Defence Space Agency (DSA) is charged with upholding India’s national security concerns in space and operates under the Ministry of Defence. The DSA — a collaborative effort between India’s air force, army, and navy — is led by an air force vice marshal and is responsible for the country’s direct-ascent ASAT capability.
+
+Its subsidiary, the Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO), also established in 2019, absorbed the country’s previous military space agencies, including the Defence Satellite Control Centre and the Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre. The DSRO is led by a senior defense scientist and is responsible for the development of “space warfare systems and associated technology.” There is little documentation on either organization to further describe mandates, goals, or direction. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was founded in 1958 as the primary research and development wing of the Ministry of Defence. The DRDO leads the development of electronic warfare systems, missiles, and radars, among other systems.
+
+#### SPACE LAUNCH CAPABILITIES
+
+India has three major launch sites in the country: the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, the oldest ISRO launch facility in India, which houses the design and development of SLVs; the Satish Dhawan Space Centre, the most popular ISRO launch site due to its geographic superiority; and the Abdul Kalam Island site, which is operated by the DRDO and hosts the Integrated Test Range missile testing facility.
+
+India currently has four active SLVs that are capable of successfully delivering spacecraft to orbit, with at least one new launch vehicle in the testing stage of development. The Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) has been India’s most successful and versatile vehicle, capable of successfully delivering a variety of payloads to orbit. The Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) focuses on delivering communication satellites to GEO. The Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle Mark-III (LVM3) is a next-generation versatile vehicle, which can launch communication satellites twice the size of its GSLV predecessor as well as deliver payloads of up to 10 tons to LEO. The ISRO’s first launch in 2023 debuted the agency’s new Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV-D2), launched from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre. It placed an ISRO Earth observation satellite into orbit along with two private sector satellites — one commercial and one academic. This SSLV-D2 was developed to offer a more available and affordable launch service to the private sector, focusing on small satellite launches. Two other launch vehicles are in development, the Human Rated Launch Vehicle (HRLV), a follow-on to the LVM3, and the Reusable Launch Vehicle-Technology Demonstrator (RLV-TD). In total, the ISRO has launched 381 foreign satellites from 1999 to 2022.
+
+The country had four successful launches and one failure in 2022: three PSLV launches that placed 15 satellites into orbit, one GSLV launch that delivered 36 OneWeb satellites into orbit, and one failure of the SSLV launcher. With support from the ISRO, Indian start-up Skyroot Aerospace successfully tested the country’s first private industry launch vehicle, the Vikram-S, in November 2022 in hopes of an operational launch sometime in 2023.
+
+___`INDIA’S SPACE PROGRAM HAS HISTORICALLY FOCUSED ON CIVIL AND SCIENTIFIC MISSIONS, THOUGH THE PAST FIVE YEARS HAVE SEEN EXPANDED MILITARY ACTIVITY.`___
+
+#### SATELLITE CAPABILITIES
+
+India has over 60 satellites on orbit, the majority of which serve civilian or research purposes, and boasts “the largest civilian remote sensing satellite constellation.” Additionally, India has successfully launched two missions to the Moon. Chandrayaan-1 was an orbiter launched in 2008 with a mission life of two years. A decade later, Chandrayaan-2 was launched, a complex mission that consisted of an orbiter, lander, and rover to further explore the south pole of the Moon. The orbiter was able to maneuver to successfully reach its intended orbit and has an estimated mission life of seven years.
+
+The country has a small number of satellites that have been used for military purposes. A large portion of the country’s Geosynchronous Satellite (GSAT) communications constellation is used for military communications. GSAT-7 was the first ISRO satellite to provide services to the Indian military, largely to the Indian navy to enable communications between air, land, submarine, and warship systems. Similarly, GSAT-7A provides communication services to the Indian air force and army. The country’s first electronic intelligence satellite, EMISAT, is in orbit and is operated by the DRDO. India’s first all-weather radar-imaging satellite, Risat-2, successfully monitored border and maritime activity for the government and re-entered Earth’s atmosphere in 2022 after a 13-year mission. One of India’s most notable satellites, Microsat-R, was operated by the DRDO as an imaging satellite and used as a target for the 2019 destructive ASAT test. Additional reports indicate that India has been investing in the development of military intelligence satellites, specifically focusing on the contested China-India border.
+
+#### COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
+
+India’s rise in the space domain is largely due to its demonstrated kinetic direct-ascent ASAT capability launched in 2019. Soon after the test, DRDO officials did not announce specific plans for another ASAT test in LEO but did indicate a possibility of testing in a higher orbit. The possibility of another ASAT test can be seen in research debates across the country. Despite continuing to invest in government and private industry capabilities, there were few public reports of counterspace developments in 2022. The DRDO has sectors focused on the development and design of “electronic, electro-optical and laser based sensors and systems,” though there are no public reports that non-kinetic counterspace capabilities have been developed. It does not appear that India targets space systems in its electronic or cyber systems. India continues to place an emphasis on encouraging developments in the commercial sector to increase its share of the global space economy, boost its domestic technology and industrial sectors, and increase its international standing.
+
+
+### IRAN
+
+In 2008, Iran became the ninth country to successfully place a satellite into orbit using indigenous technologies. Since then, Iran’s space program has become one of the largest in the Middle East, and the country’s leaders regularly invoke the program as a symbol of national strength and progress. However, other countries insist that Iran’s civil and military space programs are cover for Tehran to circumvent international sanctions and develop an offensive ballistic missile and nuclear program. Iran publicly denies any interest in pursuing a nuclear ballistic missile program, claiming its right to pursue a peaceful space program under state sovereignty.
+
+#### SPACE ORGANIZATION
+
+Iran’s space sector primarily falls under two primary organizations, the civilian Iranian Space Agency (ISA), founded in 2003, and the military Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force. While the two are technically separate, they share significant overlap in terms of authority and agenda. The ISA falls under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and operates with a Supreme Space Council, which sets policy and is chaired by the Iranian president. The Ministry of Defense is also involved in ISA operations, as its subsidiary groups develop the majority of SLV components and build the satellites. The IRGC is not subject to the policy of the Supreme Space Council and has traditionally focused on developing solid-fuel rockets — not typically used for modern SLVs but well suited for missiles — which has only increased suspicions about the intent of the IRGC’s space program. Due to international sanctions against supplying ballistic missile technology to the Iranian government, Iran’s private sector has been used as a front to circumvent sanctions and acquire space launch technology. These companies, like the Iranian government, often lack transparency and accountability, and many could likely be considered state-owned enterprises rather than independent businesses contracted by the government.
+
+The early months of 2023 have also seen an uptick of discussion about space in Tehran, with the announcement of a 10-year strategic plan for space released by the ISA in collaboration with the Secretariat of the Supreme Space Council. This document outlines a future where Iran is a regional leader in space technologies and space launch services by 2033. The plan has been applauded by the Iranian president, who added a goal for Iranian-built satellites to orbit in GEO and for independent broadcasting capabilities to be secured. This continues previously stated goals for the burgeoning space program, which included routinely launching satellites into LEO, attaining access to GEO by 2026, and sending an Iranian astronaut to space aboard an Iranian SLV by 2032.
+
+#### SPACE LAUNCH CAPABILITIES
+
+In 2022, Iran launched two satellites into orbit and had multiple successful tests of new SLVs. This brings the total of Iranian SLVs to five, to include the Safir, Simorgh, Qased, Zuljanah, and Ghaem. Of the five, three are operated by the ISA and two by the IRGC. The ISA operates the Safir, Simorgh, and Zuljanah. On February 9, 2009, the Safir became Iran’s first SLV to place objects into LEO, featuring a launch range of 300 to 350 kilometers. This success was followed by the Simorgh, with an extended launch range of up to 500 kilometers. After several failed attempts, the Simorgh was successful at placing objects in orbit in 2021. Among other similarities, both SLVs use liquid-fueled engines from the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile. The Zuljanah, which has a hybrid design incorporating solid- and liquid-fuel stages and aims to deliver payloads of 220 kilogram to a 500 km orbit, was successfully tested for a second time in the summer of 2022. However, Iranian SLV progress also saw setbacks, such as the reported explosion of an unspecified SLV on a launchpad in March 2022.
+
+The Qased rocket was the first SLV operated solely by the IRGC and had a successful maiden flight in 2020 to launch Iran’s first military satellite, Noor-1. It was subsequently used to launch the Noor-2 in March 2022. In November 2022, the IRGC also tested a new three-stage solid-fuel launch vehicle, the Ghaem 100, which is designed to reach orbits of 500 kilometers and borrows heavily from the Qased. The Ghaem 100 vehicle is contracted to launch Nahid communication satellites into LEO, potentially in the first six months of 2023. Iran’s SLV and ballistic missile technology is heavily influenced by or acquired from other nations, particularly Russia and North Korea.
+
+Additionally, in October 2022, a third-stage capability, called Saman-1, was tested, which would allow a satellite to change orbits more quickly. This was tested by the Space Research Center and launched by Iran’s defense ministry, with additional interest from the ISA, which indicates that the technology is likely to be used by both the IRGC and the ISA when fully developed.
+
+Iran operates two primary launch sites: the Shahrud Missile Test Site and the Imam Khomeini Space Center. The Shahrud Missile Test Site is located over 400 kilometers east of Tehran and is the predominant launch site of the ISA. The site was built in the 1980s with both Chinese and North Korean assistance. Construction of the Imam Khomeini Space Center, 50 kilometers southeast of Semnan, was completed in 2008 and inaugurated with the launch of a Shahab rocket. Following a destructive rocket launch failure in 2012 and significant construction, the center reopened its doors on July 27, 2017, with the successful launch of a Simorgh SLV.
+
+Additionally, Iran continues to launch satellites from the Russian-leased Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. In August 2022, a Russian rocket launched a remote-sensing Khayyam satellite, which, according to Iran’s information and communications technology minister, Issa Zarepour, was the beginning “of a strategic cooperation between Iran and Russia in the space industry.” The ISA claims that the satellite will send encrypted data to Iranian operators and that Russia will not have access to its data.
+
+#### SATELLITE CAPABILITIES
+
+Iran currently has three satellites in orbit: the country’s first military satellite, Noor, launched in 2020; Noor-2, a military reconnaissance satellite launched into LEO in March 2022; and the Khayyam Earth-imaging satellite, built and launched by Russia in August 2022. Both Noor satellites collect ISR data, and Iranian officials have released color photographs that the Noor-2 satellite took of U.S. military bases in Bahrain.
+
+In January 2023, the ISA head announced a new telecommunication satellite system, named after former IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani, which is cited as a fundamental element of the 10-year plan for space. Additionally, an Iranian state-run news agency has reported that Iran is capable of building indigenous remote-sensing satellites able to capture images with a resolution of 5 to 10 meters. This capability has not been verified.
+
+Iran is developing other space capabilities as well and is strengthening relationships with other space-faring nations, particularly Russia. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 solidified a military alliance between Iran and Russia, and there are reports that Iran is now Russia’s top military supplier. In exchange for Iran’s support, particularly through the supply of UAVs, Russia is likely returning the favor with military and technical support to Iran. Further, in December 2022, the ISA and Roscosmos signed an agreement to design and build remote sensing and communication satellites, develop infrastructure, and hold joint training, which may bolster Iran’s space capabilities in the future.
+
+#### COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
+
+After a series of launch failures in recent years, Iran showed signs of progress in 2022. Though Tehran’s launch and satellite capabilities are nowhere near robust, there seems to have been a significant shift in mission success and overall government support of space capabilities. However, Iran appears far from developing kinetic ASAT weapons or non-kinetic physical counterspace weapons. The country continues to develop electronic and cyber capabilities, where Iran has shown success in jamming and hacking against foreign government and commercial satellite communications and the GPS network for years. During periods of civil unrest in the country in 2022, the Iranian government blocked access in Iran to a wide variety of cellular and internet networks, including SpaceX’s Starlink website homepage. Most notably in the last year, French satellite operator Eutelsat revealed details of signals jamming originating in Iran on two of its satellites in the fall of 2022, affecting Persian TV and radio transmissions. The operator notified relevant authorities in Iran.
+
+___`THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN MISSION SUCCESS AND OVERALL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF SPACE CAPABILITIES.`___
+
+
+### NORTH KOREA
+
+North Koreas space capabilities are shrouded in uncertainty. It has been just over a decade since the first successful launch of a North Korean satellite in December 2012, and the country’s space program has since experienced only limited progress. However, 2022 saw an uptick in space activity, including two potential technology tests of components for a future national reconnaissance satellite and upgrades to a space launch facility.
+
+#### SPACE ORGANIZATION
+
+North Korea’s space activities are centralized under the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), which has the stated mission of space development for peaceful purposes, though these claims are often refuted. NADA’s acronym and the organization’s logo resemble the U.S. civil space organization, NASA. NADA was established after the 2013 meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which adopted a law on space development. This law was revised at a 2022 meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly. State media described the revision as creating basic principles and norms “to ensure space development activities legally and more firmly (sic).” Further details have not been released.
+
+#### SPACE LAUNCH CAPABILITIES
+
+In 2022, North Korea tested more missiles than any year previously. The country launched over 90 missiles in 2022, including 23 on a single day, November 2, 2022, some within 60 kilometers of the coast of South Korea. Historically, the country’s missile activity has not translated to success for its space program.
+
+North Korea reported a space launch test on February 26, 2022, for a spy satellite, a statement the U.S. Department of Defense has refuted as a disguise for an intercontinental ballistic missile system. However, the claim remains consistent with a confirmed “test-piece satellite” launched in December 2022 at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un visited the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in March 2022 to inspect the spaceport and NADA’s upcoming projects, as well as oversee plans for significant upgrades to the launch site. In December 2022, a new horizontal engine test stand was built and used to conduct its first test, with Kim Jongun in attendance. North Korea’s second launch site, the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground, has seen routine maintenance in the last decade but is possibly inactive.
+
+North Korea’s most consistent SLV is the Unha, which has four variants and borrows engine designs from the country’s Nodong medium-range ballistic missile.
+
+#### SATELLITE CAPABILITIES
+
+North Korea has successfully launched only two Earth observation satellites into orbit, the first in 2012 and another in 2016. After years of failed tests and launches, NADA completed a successful on-orbit “final-stage test” of a military reconnaissance test satellite on December 18, 2022. Ahead of North Korea’s planned first launch of an operational military reconnaissance satellite in April 2023, this technology demonstrator satellite proved camera operability, communication transmission capabilities, and the accuracy of tracking from a ground control system. The test satellite reportedly reached a 500 km orbit with a camera that captured images at 20 m resolution as well as video. Black and white images of Seoul were released by North Korea’s official newspaper, Rodong Sinmum, that were reportedly taken by the test satellite. While not an exquisite system, this rudimentary system would improve North Korea’s limited space capabilities.
+
+
+_▲ __Satellite Imagery of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station on October 4, 2022.__ Source: Airbus DS/Beyond Parallel._
+
+#### COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
+
+North Korea has demonstrated small successes in its space program over the past year, most notably receiving imagery from a test reconnaissance satellite, but this has been overshadowed by the immense number of missile launches conducted in 2022. While a robust missile launching capability may benefit Pyongyang’s space launch programs, North Korea has yet to exhibit the necessary sensing and altitude control capabilities for a direct-ascent ASAT weapon. It also remains unlikely that North Korea is actively pursuing any non-kinetic physical capabilities. The country has, however, demonstrated successful electronic warfare through GPS and other jamming. North Korea’s cyberattack threat is active and viable, though it is most often used for economic or political messaging rather than aimed at space assets. As the country acquires more advanced technologies, likely through illicit means, and gains operating experience, threats to space systems and ground stations may grow more credible.
+
+___`NORTH KOREA HAS DEMONSTRATED SMALL SUCCESSES IN ITS SPACE PROGRAM OVER THE PAST YEAR . . . BUT THIS HAS BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY THE IMMENSE NUMBER OF MISSILE LAUNCHES CONDUCTED IN 2022.`___
+
+
+### OTHERS
+
+While the previous chapters have been dedicated to analyzing the countries making the largest strides in counterspace capabilities, they are not the only ones thinking strategically about the changing space environment. This chapter includes discussion and developments related to counterspace capabilities by other countries and non-state actors.
+
+#### AUSTRALIA
+
+The Defence Space Command of the Royal Australian Air Force was formally established on January 18, 2022, bringing the space elements across the Australian military services into one integrated headquarters organization (similar to the U.S. Space Force). Shortly after, the Australian government released a Defence Space Strategy to build upon the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, declaring the mission is “to prepare space power to secure Australia’s interests in peace and war.” Additionally, the Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), built by the United States and jointly operated with Australia, became operational in September 2022. The SST will provide more accurate space domain awareness by providing tracking and detection of even “faint objects in deep space.” These space domain awareness capabilities are critical to observing and clarifying many space and counterspace activities outlined in this report, including space launch, RPOs, and ASAT missions.
+
+#### FRANCE
+
+French officials have continued to be outspoken about investing in counterspace technologies. To spur greater space advancements, Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne announced in September 2022 that the country would be injecting €9.0 billion ($9.6 billion) into the space sector in the next three years. This includes at least €1.5 billion ($1.6 billion) to the country’s civil space agency, the National Centre for Space Studies (CNES). In the same speech, Prime Minister Borne reiterated France’s military space ambitions, largely concentrated on maintaining strategic autonomy in the space domain, including the development of active defenses for space objects. In February 2022, France held its annual space wargame, AsterX, to put elements of the French space defense strategy into practice. Participants from nearly 30 countries were in attendance, spanning military and industry partners. The growth of AsterX emphasizes France’s ambitions as a leader in the military space domain and its intention to grow its defensive counterspace capabilities.
+
+After initially publicly discussing the idea of bodyguard satellites in 2019, France is well underway to achieving this capability to protect assets in GEO with a satellite named YODA. Publicly available information states that YODA will have an ISR capability to detect incoming threats to GEO satellites. The first contract for YODA was awarded to Hemeria, a French space start-up.
+
+#### ISRAEL
+
+As reported in previous years, Israel continues to make progress in testing its Iron Beam capability, a directed-energy system that will complement the Iron Dome missile defense system. This electronic warfare weapon is currently being designed for UAVs and missiles, but with technological changes such as increased power and targeting, it could evolve into a counterspace capability. However, there are no current reports of Israeli leadership steering technology development for Iron Beam in that direction. In April 2022, defense contractor Rafael relayed that the project received renewed funding from the Israeli Defense Forces after successful live-fire tests. Israeli representatives indicated that the Iron Beam could be operational in as few as two to three years. This will be a permanent ground-based system capable of destroying or disabling targets several kilometers away.
+
+#### JAPAN
+
+In December 2022, Japan released a new national security strategy, national defense strategy, and national defense buildup program, which all emphasize the importance of capabilities in the space domain. These documents add policy positions to an approved 2022 defense budget which dedicated ¥79 billion ($588 million) to capabilities in the space domain, excluding funds tied to ballistic missile defenses. Enhancement of space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities is high on the defense spending list, including development of an on-orbit optical telescope capability, the “procurement of SSA laser ranging equipment” to monitor objects in LEO, interoperability with domestic organizations and the U.S. military, and enhanced satellite communications systems. The 2022 budget document also outlines a reorganization of the Space Operations Squadron, to be broken up into a first squadron to focus on SSA monitoring, a second squadron to focus on the detection of jamming against Japanese satellites, and a third squadron designated as a Space System Management Squadron to manage and maintain space equipment.
+
+In January 2023, Japan launched another satellite for its Intelligence Gathering Satellite (IGS) constellation. The IGS-Radar 7 launched from Japan’s Tanegashima Space Center, located on the island of Tanegashima about 40 kilometers south of Kyushu. IGS-Radar satellites are operated by the Cabinet Satellite Information Center, and data is utilized both for national security purposes and civil natural disaster monitoring. This followed a disappointing launch year for the country, in which its only orbital launch attempt in October 2022 failed to reach orbit.
+
+#### SOUTH KOREA
+
+South Korea’s space program reached a major milestone in June 2022 when the country had its first successful satellite launch using an indigenous liquid-fueled rocket called Nuri. Nuri launched four small satellites to be used for several missions, including Earth observation. This makes South Korea only the tenth nation to successfully build and launch a rocket. In late 2022, the country’s defense ministry tested a solid-fueled rocket as part of efforts to bolster its defense posture and to launch space-based reconnaissance satellites. Officials, including the newly elected president and science minister, have spoken about commitments to increase the country’s space capabilities, including establishing a state aerospace agency in the future.
+
+#### UNITED KINGDOM
+
+Following the 2021 establishment of UK Space Command, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence released a Defence Space Strategy in February 2022 focused on operationalizing the space domain. This document serves as a follow-on to the 2021 National Space Strategy and outlines an increase in investment for the UK space sector, injecting an additional £1.4 billion ($1.7 billion) into space systems. This is in addition to £5.0 billion ($6.0 billion) committed to a next-generation military satellite communications constellation.
+
+#### NON-STATE ACTORS
+
+On March 1, 2022, unconfirmed reports surfaced that non-state actors affiliated with Anonymous — a decentralized international activist and “hacktivist” collective — hacked their way into Roscosmos’ satellite control center. This instance was one of many “hacktivist” activities against Russia after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Dmitry Rogozin, head of Roscosmos at the time, announced that all Roscosmos control centers were operational and that these claims were false. Another hacktivist targeted the Russian Space Research Institute website, leaving crude comments on webpages and threatening further action if Russia did not leave Ukraine. This hacktivist also claimed to be part of Anonymous.
+
+
+### WHAT TO WATCH
+
+Another year has passed where predictions from previous Space Threat Assessments have been realized. The 2022 report predicted the trend in electronic warfare that “the denial of GPS or satellite communications can have a great effect.” This year, while electronic warfare weapons were used on the battlefield in Ukraine, employed early and throughout the war by Russia, the “great effects” that may have been envisioned prior have not been realized. Notably, jamming of GPS and satellite communications did not directly trigger an escalation of the conflict. Past iterations of the report also detailed extensive Chinese counterspace developments. Despite the U.S. Department of Defense characterizing China as the “pacing threat,” Beijing was relatively quiet on the counterspace front this year. This could be for a variety of reasons, but China’s lack of visible activity should not be construed as a decrease in the threat assessment.
+
+The 2022 edition noted a growing number of countries expanding their focus on military operations in the space domain, reorganizing their national security space enterprises, and discussing how to defend space assets, including in cooperation with allies and partners. This trend continues, with examples such as Australia establishing a Defence Space Command in January 2022 and Japan and the United States affirming that attacks “to, from or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance” and “could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.”
+
+#### CHINA
+
+While it has been a busy year tracking Russian counterspace activities, China has been relatively quiet. This is in contrast to previous years when Beijing conducted provocative, and detectable, space demonstrations such as the hypersonic fractional orbital bombardment system test and SJ-21 RPOs, as highlighted in last year’s report. What explains this decrease in activity? The authors acknowledge that, as open-source researchers, they are limited to publicly available information. However, more commercial and publicly available sources of relevant information, such as satellite telemetry data, jamming detection, satellite imagery, and translated Chinese documents, are aiding in such independent analysis. It may be that certain counterspace weapons programs have achieved their testing objectives with no need for further testing at this time; that these systems have shifted from development and test to production and fielding; or that they continue to be tested but in an undetectable manner or only detectable with classified U.S. sensors. It may also be the case that Beijing is focusing its resources on other parts of its national security space enterprise or military modernization efforts “to become the world’s leading power.” This lack of activity does not put the authors at ease, who will be closely watching Beijing actions, nor U.S. senior officials, who continue to emphasize that China remains the “most challenging threat,” followed by Russia.
+
+This report traditionally describes weapons that pose threats to U.S. space assets. However, U.S. policymakers and military leaders are increasingly being confronted with the threat of how adversary space capabilities (e.g., ISR, communications, and PNT) can be used to target joint and coalition forces on the ground, in air, and at sea. For example, China’s fleet of ISR satellites is “more than 250 systems — a quantity second only to the United States.” Last year, Beijing appears to have launched four sets each of Yaogan-35 and Yaogan-36 “triplet satellites” (24 total satellites), which are believed to comprise a military surveillance system incorporating Earth observation, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic intelligence capabilities. Coupling its growth in space-based ISR with advancements in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and automation, Beijing is developing, across multiple modalities, an ability to rapidly detect targets and relay those target coordinates to its precision weapon systems to close its own kill chains. The authors anticipate greater public discussions, especially by U.S. national security space leaders, on the policy, capability investments, and operational concepts needed to deny others the use of space against U.S. forces and interests (i.e., U.S. counterspace weapons).
+
+#### LESSONS FROM RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE
+
+Previous iterations of this report highlighted Russia’s advanced jamming, dazzling, and cyber capabilities. However, few of these more advanced non-kinetic weapons have been seen in Ukraine, despite social media videos and tweets purporting to show such systems in operation, such as the Krasukha-4 electronic warfare counterspace weapon. Nevertheless, many experts have been surprised at Russia’s lack of success with its electronic warfare systems. Also absent from the war are laser systems, such as the Peresvet and Sokol-Eshelon, and SAR jamming systems to counter ISR satellites despite the heavy and public use of imagery satellites to track Russian forces. There are several reasons why Russia has not employed such counterspace systems, to the extent such employment would be covered in open-source reporting. It may be that if any attacks were occurring, commercial space companies and Western governments may not want the success of such attacks publicly disclosed. This could be to avoid giving Russia a battle damage assessment and encouragement to use such counterspace weapons against other targets, or to avoid rattling other customers or investors and eroding any competitive advantages. Another possibility is that these Russian systems are not as effective as Western researchers predicted pre-invasion, whether because the attacks are not as damaging as assumed or that companies, as with SpaceX, have found effective work-arounds to continue operations. It is possible that these systems are inoperable or not as widely deployed as previously assumed. Finally, it could also be that these systems are held in reserve, perhaps viewed as more escalatory or to be used for more strategic purposes. Such use and non-use of different counterspace weapons in Ukraine may be instructive as analysts seek to better understand Moscow’s space strategy and doctrine.
+
+As discussed throughout this report, commercial data and communications services have been integral to Ukraine’s resistance. The former chairman of the State Space Agency of Ukraine, Volodymyr Usov, stated at a December 2022 conference that almost 50 percent of intelligence supplied to Ukraine came from the commercial space industry. Starlink has been called a “lifeline” for Ukrainian forces and civilians alike. Therefore, it is not surprising that Russia targeted and attacked commercial space systems — first Viasat and then SpaceX’s Starlink. As the commercial space sector continues to show its utility in peacetime and conflict for governments and their militaries, the United States’ role in protecting commercial capabilities and strategies for how to do so will be key policy issues for the U.S. government. For starters, commercial operators will increasingly seek threat information from the government that would allow them to make informed decisions on how to better protect constellations or prepare procedures to respond to attacks.
+
+Ukraine’s resistance against Russia is nothing short of remarkable. As researchers who specifically focus on contributions from the space domain to Ukraine’s resistance, the authors ponder how space capabilities can enable David to beat Goliath. Will smaller nations invest in space capabilities to bolster their national security and resilience if attacked, especially by a more powerful nation? Ukraine’s resistance has demonstrated that space capabilities can create an advantage over a more capable military power. Should Taiwan pursue proliferated LEO communications and greater use of commercial ISR data? Conversely, the benefit that space capabilities provide in modern warfare may also provide the justification for adversaries to increase their counterspace weapons development and deny their opponents access to space during a conflict.
+
+Finally, Starlink’s effectiveness in Ukraine has showcased the advantages of proliferated LEO (pLEO) constellations. As more commercial companies and militaries develop pLEO systems, adversaries will seek to counter them. Constellations with satellites in the hundreds and thousands may necessitate a shift in an adversary’s targeting calculus. Kinetic direct-ascent ASATs or kinetic co-orbital weapons that are designed to attack single satellites are less effective unless employed en masse. Moreover, kinetic attacks run the risk of generating a cascading debris field that would make orbits unusable, including for an adversary’s own constellations. An adversary’s options are likely to shift toward cyberattacks, debris-generating attacks to collapse an entire orbital plane, high-altitude nuclear detonations (HANDs), or attacks on physical infrastructure like ground stations. Indicators for such a shif could include research to understand the effects of HANDs on satellites, for example, as Chinese scientists are reportedly doing at a PLA research institute. Each of these variants of counterspace weapons has policy, operational, and technical trade-offs, and some would be highly escalatory.
+
+___`UKRAINE’S RESISTANCE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT SPACE CAPABILITIES CAN CREATE AN ADVANTAGE OVER A MORE CAPABLE MILITARY POWER.`___
+
+
+_▲ __Satellite training in Ukraine.__ Photo by Staff Sgt. Eric McDonough, 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team._
+
+#### SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
+
+An indicator not addressed in detail in this report is the need for robust space situational awareness (SSA) to enable counterspace weapons targeting. SSA refers to the ability to identify, characterize, and track space objects, where collecting accurate and actionable data is incredibly challenging. Exquisite SSA data is not only advantageous for on-orbit operations of national and commercial satellites but also to provide accurate targeting for counterspace weapons. In order to attack a satellite on-orbit, an aggressor would need to know its precise location and where it is moving. The aggressor will also want accurate battle damage assessments. For example, if a satellite is targeted through a cyberattack that allows the attacker to disable its controls, SSA will be necessary to determine if the attack was successful by monitoring the satellite and any controlled movements. Although this report tracks counterspace weapons developments, it is important to acknowledge the critical data needed to deploy many of these counterspace weapons against targets. Countries that are investing in SSA are not necessarily also developing counterspace weapons; however, countries that are both investing in SSA capabilities and developing counterspace weapons should be watched carefully.
+
+#### DIRECT-ASCENT ASAT TEST BAN
+
+On April 18, 2022, U.S. vice president Kamala Harris announced a U.S. commitment to stopping destructive direct-ascent ASAT missile testing, an important step forward for sustainability and stability in space. Since then, nine other countries have committed not to conduct destructive direct-ascent ASAT tests, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a resolution in the United Nations was adopted on December 7, 2022, that “calls upon all States to commit not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests.” This resolution was passed, with 155 countries voting in support, 9 voting against, and 9 abstaining. Notably, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and India did not vote in favor of the resolution. This response to the United States’ unilateral commitment may indicate greater international motivation to develop sustainable norms, behaviors, and agreements to limit the use or testing of counterspace weapons, especially those that create long-lasting orbital debris.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION
+
+The past year offered a tangible reminder of how important and integral space capabilities have become to citizens across the globe, not only in peacetime but through crisis and conflict. In Ukraine, space capabilities offered: (1) transparency on military aggression by showing the world the buildup and movement of Russian forces; (2) connectivity by enabling Ukrainian forces to transmit information across the battlefield; and (3) a lifeline to the outside world by allowing the Ukrainian people to connect with the world and expose the horrors of war.
+
+But the advantages that space capabilities provide make them a target. The past year showed unusual and threatening behaviors from LEO to GEO, demonstrating that no orbital regime is out of reach of counterspace weapons. It also showed how counterspace weapons have become part of a broader tool kit and military campaign to disrupt command, control, communications, and intelligence gathering and to degrade the effectiveness of UAVs and precision munitions. As China and Russia put more counterspace weapons into operational units, such integration of counterspace weapons and tactics with broader military plans will only increase.
+
+China’s rapid growth in its space capabilities across the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, state-owned enterprises, and burgeoning commercial sector means that it now has a lot to lose. It has quickly become the number two space power, displacing Russia, whose space program is atrophying. CSIS has previously written that “deterrence succeeds by altering the cost-benefit calculus of a potential aggressor.” Beijing’s calculus now involves a high cost, which may give it pause. Moscow’s does not. Notably, no ASAT tests occurred in the past year. Perhaps this is a result of the greater recognition of the destructive potential of debris-generating activity in space, which can ruin orbits for oneself and all others dependent on space, or perhaps it is a result of international efforts in 2022 on norms of behavior and safety and sustainability in space, or it may just be a matter of time before the technology is tested once again. In 2023, it will be important to monitor if this consequential trend is sustained.
+
+---
+
+__Kari A. Bingen__ is the director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She joined CSIS from HawkEye 360, an innovative space technology company creating a new class of radio frequency (RF) data and analytics, where she was the chief strategy officer.
+
+__Kaitlyn Johnson__ is deputy director and fellow of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Johnson supports the team’s strategic planning and research agenda. Her research specializes in topics such as space security, military space systems, and commercial and civil space policy.
+
+__Makena Young__ is an associate fellow with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Her research interests include international collaboration, space security, and orbital debris.
+
+__John Raymond__ is a distinguished senior adviser (non-resident) to the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. General Raymond was the first chief of space operations of the U.S. Space Force.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-49.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-49.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..272449c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-49.md
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第卌九日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-04-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 趙家賢改稱陳志全沒有出席新東協調會 指助手認錯人
+- 趙家賢稱鄒家成和民主黨代表「企起身」討論否決財案 想助手「慳功夫」故着不用記錄
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（24日）踏入審訊第49天。趙家賢上周五供稱陳志全有出席首次新東協調會議，辯方播放陳於同一時間主持網台節目的片段質疑趙記錯，惟趙強調記得陳與助理有現身會議場地，對辯方提問「no comment」。趙今主動補充，稱經過多次回想，記得陳的助理蘇浩會上曾稱陳志全要做網台直播未能出席，故確認陳並無出席該次會議；而對其助手黎敬輝筆記稱陳志全有出席，趙解釋蘇浩身旁有一個「形態好似陳志全」的男子，故黎「應該係搞錯咗」、「認錯咗人」而寫錯。
+
+趙在盤問下亦同意，戴耀廷就共同綱領刻意不用「必定運用」否決權的字眼，以免有「白紙黑字」令參選人被DQ，而「積極運用」或「會運用」字眼均是留討論空間讓參選人自行決定。此外，法官今甫開庭提醒在法庭發表政見屬「藐視法庭」。
+
+#### 法官陳慶偉甫開庭稱若在法庭發表政見是藐視法庭
+
+法官陳慶偉今甫開庭便嚴肅表示：「這裡是法庭，只處理法律議題，無論你政治理念如何，這也不是用來發表政見的場所。」他又指，絕對不反對在法庭以外表達政見，但若任何人有意或嘗試在法庭發表他們的政見，便是「藐視法庭」，「你會由我本人親自處理。」陳發言後被告一臉茫然，有人互相討論。
+
+#### 上周稱陳志全有出席新東首次會議 趙今主動作補充
+
+趙家賢其後入庭繼續接受盤問。代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉先向他說早晨，趙亦說「早晨馬大狀」，其後舉手說：「想問吓呢係唔好意思，我記得你上星期話如果我有回想到一啲情況，都可以照向你作答係咪？」馬表示不記得在什麼情況他有這樣提過，但問趙是否有話想說，惟法官陳慶偉打斷，着馬直接問問題。
+
+趙在盤問下表示，沒有出席6月28日的新界東論壇，而他7月12日的初選投票日傍晚曾到新界東票站，但沒有看見陳志全。馬維騉再指，從2020年到趙被捕，除了第一次新東會議外，馬是否從沒與陳面對面交談？趙同意，並指他就是想就「新界東第一次會議陳志全是否出席嗰個問題」作補充。趙家賢上周曾稱陳志全有出席4月14日的首次新東會議，惟辯方播放陳同時段主持網台節目的片段，質疑趙記錯，趙則堅稱有回想到陳在教協會議室坐在助手蘇浩身旁的畫面，對辯方說法「no comment」，又對辯方稱陳兩次會議均無出席指「我只能夠答不同意」。
+
+#### 上周稱對蘇浩發言無印象 趙今稱蘇曾提及陳志全要做網台直播無法出席
+
+趙今指，「我多次嘅回想返呢」，當日下的士後，「就買咗幾支茶」上教協會址開會，約8時到達，到場後助手黎敬輝為他預留身旁的位置。趙指雖然會議寫明7時開始，但實際上約7時半才開始，「都有好多人未到齊」，而他坐下準備拿電腦出來時，黎就向他交代當時情況，稱戴耀廷開場介紹協調和初選背景後，就讓在場團隊和參選人介紹自己，而趙到達時「仲係啲人士團隊介紹自己嘅時候」。
+
+趙續指，他剛坐下就將幾樽茶「行去拎畀戴耀廷同區諾軒，亦都畀咗一支我助手」，而助手「飲咗兩啖」後就稱要去洗手間，「還掂你到咗，你會唔會可以幫我睇住先」，陳志全、林卓廷、鄒家成、吳政亨等多人發笑。趙續指，黎去洗手間後，蘇浩發言介紹自己是人民力量執委，提及人民力量支持協調和會參與初選，並提到因為陳志全「有網台直播要做」，故「出席唔到」，向在座各位致歉，並特別提及「希望之後嘅會議可唔可以改唔係星期二嘅時間」。此時陳志全皺眉，林卓廷亦笑着搖頭。惟趙家賢上周五稱對陳志全和蘇浩發言沒有印象。
+
+#### 趙確認陳志全首次新東會議不在場 指有男性形態似陳 助手認錯人致紀錄有錯
+
+趙指，這是他所記得會面的情況，而翌日他收到助手筆記，看到寫有陳志全出席，「我就嗰陣時候有問返佢，咦，陳志全係咪有出席呀咁樣」，並指「因為我係早走咗，咁所以我唔知道係咪我離開咗之後陳志全有出席到」，而黎則回應「咦唔係，陳志全一開始咪坐咗喺蘇浩隔離囉」，林卓廷說「吓」，陳志全亦笑到全身震動。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+趙續指，「咁我記得蘇浩隔離係有一個男性，不過形態係好似陳志全咁」，林卓廷大聲說「哇」，陳志全亦皺眉發笑。在延伸庭的吳敏兒發笑，黃之鋒則「O嘴」。趙續說，「咁因應蘇浩嘅講法同埋我助手嘅講法，咁我確認陳志全係當時不在會議」，林卓廷說「吓？」，趙再說：「因為我助手應該係搞錯咗嗰個人，佢以為係陳志全」，因而在筆記寫上陳志全和蘇浩二人出席，林再說：「唔係呀？」
+
+馬問，故是黎敬輝弄錯了？趙指「我確認佢唔係嗰個紀錄佢有搞錯，係因為佢認錯咗人而導致個紀錄寫錯」，馬指這正是他的意思。馬其後再問，故趙確認陳志全沒有出席？惟法官認為趙家賢已清楚回答，着辯方問其他問題。
+
+#### 辯方指陳志全沒有提交政綱 趙同意無看過其政綱
+
+趙其後確認，在整個2020年到他被捕，從沒有面對面或透過電話與陳志全交談，亦沒有以 WhatsApp 與陳有私人的聯絡。馬續展示陳的提名表格，指陳沒有附上任何政綱。趙指根據表格上職員的寫法，陳的政綱是於6月22日才補交。馬問趙知道陳有補交文件嗎？趙指只是綜合性聽到職員指各區都收齊文件，但職員沒特別講明陳有沒有交，而趙沒有見過陳的政綱，亦不記得其政綱內容。
+
+選舉按金收據顯示由黎敬輝於6月19日簽發，法官李運騰指出提名表格簽署的日期是6月20日，問提名表格和其他文件會於不同時間繳交嗎？趙指根據職員的標示，相信表格一定是於6月19日下午收到，而表格可能由陳志全預先簽署並填上日期，再交職員幫手報名，故日期有出入。他再同意，在整個初選過程中，「就算我有睇民主動力嘅文件，我都冇睇到陳志全嘅方格表同政綱。」
+
+#### 趙稱5至6名兼職職員有民動FB帳戶密碼、並可登入
+
+馬維騉其後就民主動力及趙家賢的個人 Facebook 提問。趙確認案發時民主動力只有一個 Facebook 帳戶，而除了他及總幹事黎敬輝，約有5至6名兼職職員擁有密碼，並可登入有關帳戶。馬問登入 Facebook 帳戶是否只需一個密碼，並指「這可能是一個愚蠢的問題」，趙思考了一會仍未有作答，馬隨即問：「我這個問題是否太愚蠢？」，旁聽席傳來笑聲。
+
+趙指他未能回答，因他是透過電話上 Facebook，登入後就長期可以登入，亦很久沒有透過電腦登入，故只能說民主動力 Facebook 創立時應只用一組密碼就可登入。馬其後問民動副召集人鍾錦麟有沒有密碼，法官陳仲衡打斷指這要問鍾。
+
+#### 趙稱職員可發帖或改動內容 非不受控制 但有時太忙未必經他檢視下發帖
+
+馬維騉續問，是否該些人士可以隨意進入民主動力 Facebook 發布和轉發任何內容，趙同意，指據黎敬輝稱兼職職員有此權限。法官陳慶偉續問，最極端的例子，他們可否發表與民動政治理念相違背的想法？趙表示：「如果冇特別睇嗰個帖文，佢哋（兼職職員）有時都會按需要擺嘢上去。」陳追問他們是否不受任何控制，趙稱：「呢個唔係嘅」，並解釋因為其工作量，「未必係我或者我嘅總幹事能夠睇住或者處理」，因此他與總幹事會向職員講解訊息方向，並由他們處理。
+
+馬續展示趙家賢在無損權益口供中的內容，他曾表示民主動力登入密碼有多人知道，包括他、黎敬輝及部分活動團隊職員，由趙授權他們處理 Facebook，趙並會就發帖制定方向，授權秘書處發帖，趙指「我會盡量在發出前先檢視。但有時太忙，會授權同事未經本人檢視下發帖。」趙確認該說法，並確認自己有兩個個人 Facebook 帳戶，而其職員擁有密碼，並獲授權處理該兩個帳戶。
+
+#### 民主動力轉發朱凱廸回應譚耀宗帖文 稱立會過半觸憲政危機 趙稱助手建議轉發
+
+辯方其後展示民主動力在2020年3月27日的 Facebook 帖文，轉發同案被告朱凱廸對《香港01》 〈【基本法30年】譚耀宗：倘泛民議會過半觸發憲政危機 中央勢出手〉一文的回應，趙同意當時批准發布該帖文。趙同意，譚耀宗是全國人大常委，指「佢喺建制派有足夠嘅政治份量去解讀一啲中央嘅政治政策同訊息」。馬一度問全國人大常委是否獲授權解釋《基本法》的權力，惟陳慶偉指嚴格來說是不正確的，指人大常委並非由中央政府賦權釋法，而是由《中華人民共和國憲法》賦權，又指與普通法系統不同。趙同意指國家憲法授權全國人大和全國人大常委解釋法律。
+
+馬又一度問《香港01》是否可靠的媒體，趙指「回應法官閣下，我首先要講吓我對新聞嘅解讀」，林卓廷說「嘩」。法官陳仲衡問其答案是否長，趙笑言「好短㗎咋」，鄒家成搖頭擺手。李運騰追問是否需要，馬說不，多人大笑。
+
+#### 趙稱無印象3月尾有人說初選違法
+
+馬續指，譚耀宗提及民主派議會過半會觸發憲政危機，中央會有辦法應對，而朱凱廸則作出回應。趙主動補充，由於戴耀廷3月26日的記者會民主動力「完全冇獲邀請」、「完全被排除在外」，而當時知道朱凱廸帖文有談及記者會發言的綜合訊息，故決定轉發，惟陳慶偉打斷指與問題無關。馬續指，為何會在所有帖文中選擇轉發朱凱廸的帖文？趙回應，是由助手找到帖文和作建議，認為朱凱廸有談及會上意見，「轉發嘅話就令公眾印象覺得民主動力喺呢件事有參與咁樣」。
+
+辯方問，雖然當時有份量的建制派指初選或觸發憲政危機，但沒有提及初選的合法性問題？李運騰改問，即直至2020年3月底，趙知道香港社會有人說初選可能違法嗎？趙表示：「回應李運騰法官閣下，我冇乜印象，因為嗰時民主動力係如火如荼咁推緊選民登記個計劃。」
+
+#### 趙稱錄第二份口供時知道正向控方提供證據 但不確定需否上庭
+
+馬其後展示趙家賢於今年1月10日錄取的第二份「無損權益口供（NPS）」，問他當時是否已知自己會被傳召為控方證人，趙思考一會後表示，他做第一份NPS時，知道情況是「就住之後嗰個案件向控方同法庭提供資料，而有需要嘅話係需要出庭作證。但係有可能之後覺得我嘅供詞、我嘅資料係冇乜幫助嘅話呢，就可能無需要做證」。李運騰續問，他在錄取第二份供詞時，是否還未決定成為控方證人或在法庭作供，趙回應：「我知道我係幫手畀緊證供、畀緊證據，但係咪要上庭，呢個就未確定。」
+
+#### 趙確認「積極運用」或「會運用」留空間讓參選人決定、刻意不用「必定運用」
+
+馬續引述書面供詞，提及「戴耀廷認為交由各個選區的協調會討論『積極』或是『會』『運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案』較為恰當。不論寫『積極運用』或是『會運用』都無損共同綱領嘅內容，唔同用字只係想留番討論空間俾參選人自行決定」。
+
+趙確認，會上曾討論運用否決權的字眼，而不論用什麼字眼，戴也是想留空間讓參選人自行決定，並指因此民主動力在製作提名表格時，會如「九二共識」，「一個中國，各自表述」，「本身個思維都係唔同嘅字眼，等大家按佢哋嘅需要交代而去揀選」，但同意不論使用哪一字眼，都不會影響共同綱領的內容。
+
+趙亦在供詞提到，「（戴認為）唔清楚寫成『必定運用基本法賦予立法會權力去否決財政預算案』就可以規避責任，有助參選人免卻被選舉主任取消參選資格」，趙盤問下同意戴是刻意不使用「必定運用」字眼，「意思係唔好寫到死、有啲白紙黑字嘅嘢，到候選人報名參選時有啲枝節麻煩嘅嘢發生」。馬最後問，「積極使用」、「會運用」兩者的意思均不等於「必定運用」？趙表示：「我諗從一個一般常人嘅解讀，呢3個應該有唔同嘅程度喺度。」馬維騉續表示盤問完畢。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（24日）踏入審訊第49天。趙家賢接受代表鄒家成的大狀盤問，就新東首次會議的情況，辯方指會上無就運用否決權討論，而鄒家成亦沒有說「要用盡方法去迫政府回應五大訴求」。惟趙不同意，強調親眼目睹鄒家成和民主黨代表莊榮輝就否決預算案「直情企咗起身」討論，而其助手筆記無記錄相關情況，是因「我睇住成個片段喺我腦海度」，想助手「慳功夫」，故着他「呢 part 唔使寫」。趙又一度模仿莊榮輝激動稱：「難道起醫院起學校都要反對呀？」，指當時「直情係有啲情緒」。
+
+此外，繼早上主動改稱陳志全無出席新東首次會議，趙下午突然再主動補充，指細心回想後，記起鄭達鴻和彭卓棋應在2020年6月底《國安法》將頒布時，曾分別提出刪除政綱和將政綱改為留白。此前辯方就此提問時，趙均稱沒有印象。
+
+#### 趙早前指不記得鄭達鴻有否改政綱 今主動稱記起公民黨要求「delete」
+
+代表陳志全的大狀馬維騉早上完成盤問，趙家賢下午主動表示，希望就辯方早前的提問作補充：「法官閣下抱歉，我知道我喺法庭要就我所知盡量回應，就之前兩位大律師兩個事項嘅提問呢，我細心回想到一啲訊息」。他亦對可能打亂流程表示抱歉，「所以我係想請示法官閣下應該係點處理」，林卓廷發笑。
+
+法官指示他可作補充，趙續指是有關鄭達鴻和彭卓棋代表大狀就選舉政綱的問題。代表鄭達鴻的大律師黃宇逸盤問時曾提及，公民黨在《國安法》後曾要求將政綱修訂為「無字政綱」，惟趙稱沒有印象。趙今表示，自己當時「真係諗唔起任何嘢」，但現在回想，記得助手當時曾向他表示：「公民黨佢哋嗰面呢，係就住佢哋幾位候選人嘅政綱係想更新嘅」，並指他們因知道國內已制定《國安法》 ，但尚未在港通過，由於「唔想有一啲咬文嚼字，過唔到選舉主任」，故就選舉政綱作出更正，並「delete 咗整個選舉政綱」。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 趙記起職員稱赤柱區議員想將政綱改為留白 回想起是彭卓棋
+
+至於彭卓棋代表大律師盧敏儀提及，彭曾向民動職員「Christy」提出要移除全部政綱，趙盤問下同樣稱沒有印象。趙今解釋「我當時都係即時無任何特別回憶喺當中」，但「細心回想返呢，我就記得我兼職職員 Christy 有同我講過話，『赤柱嗰個』政綱有啲嘢想改」，並指「個改法係成個留空白」，問趙應如何處理，趙當時吩咐「咁就照跟佢意思去做啦」。趙續指，當時職員沒有講明是彭卓棋，但之後回想才記起彭卓棋是時任赤柱區議員。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 趙稱兩人應是6月底要求收回政綱 當時有消息指已通過《國安法》
+
+李運騰問到是甚麼時候發生，趙表示一定是初選投票日之前的事。陳仲衡追問是2020年7月1日前還是後，趙稱現在推敲應該是6月底，因為當時收到消息指已通過《國安法》，但尚未頒佈條文。趙確認鄭達鴻及彭卓棋均為港島區候選人，李運騰問修改政綱是發生在6月27日港島選舉論壇前還是後？趙表示：「抱歉法官閣下，我未能夠作答到，因為選舉論壇唔係我負責。」
+
+法官陳慶偉問兩人是否想收回選舉政綱，趙表示：「從佢哋嘅做法係嘅。」大律師黃宇逸續表示希望保留盤問，因需向其當事人索取指示。惟陳慶偉指，不希望不斷有不同律師進行盤問，若趙明天又有新事項補充，事情就會沒完沒了，着黃宇逸如有其他問題想問，可找其他律師幫忙。
+
+#### 辯方指新東首次會議無討論否決權、鄒家成無提用盡方法逼政府 趙不同意
+
+趙家賢其後接受代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑盤問。趙確認有兩次新東會議，他只曾出席4月14日的首次會議並遲到早退，會上亦忙於以電腦處理區議會事務。趙並曾供稱，戴在該次會議提倡「會積極運用」基本法權力否決預算案，會上討論有「火花」，鄒家成曾稱「要用盡方法去迫政府回應五大訴求」。
+
+陳世傑指出，當日會上從來沒有出現「會積極運用」否決權的討論，而鄒家成亦沒有說過該句話，惟趙均不同意。陳續指，趙會上專注力一半半（half-hearted），需依賴助手筆記協助記憶發生的事，趙同意，指「喺嗰啲我冇特別留心聽嘅議題上面係」。
+
+#### 趙同意首次新東會議主要討論應否有共同綱領
+
+陳世傑續展示黎敬輝就首次會議的筆記，提及李永成，問趙記得李永成在場嗎？法官李運騰改問沒有筆記的話，趙有否任何獨立記憶李在場？趙靜默多時答：「而家冇嘅」。陳續展示筆記，指當日會上曾討論不同議題，主要是共同綱領，其中吳文遠提到「大家可制訂共同綱領」、將軍澳青年力量稱「必須有共同綱領」，何桂藍亦稱「必須有約束力初選」。
+
+
+▲ 代表鄒家成的大律師 陳世傑
+
+陳問，趙是否記得這是會上主要（predominantly）討論的議題？趙同意，並指會上有討論是否要初選、對初選的不同意見，及應該要有大家都同意的綱領等。李運騰問，討論是關於應否有共同綱領，抑或如有共同綱領，應包括什麼內容？趙指「兩方面都有討論，不過前者係多啲」。
+
+#### 辯方指筆記只曾提一次否決權 趙稱是助手就會上重點「綜合寫咗落嚟」
+
+陳續展示黎敬輝筆記，提及鄒家成指「認同初選排位，民調最後決定或只以民調決定」，指鄒並非談及否決權，而是排名制度，趙指「喺呢句嘅記錄，係」。陳續問是否與趙的記憶相符？趙指排位制度與初選如何揀選最多人支持的候選人有關，當時會上有討論。
+
+陳續指，根據筆記，共同綱領和否決權只曾被一併談及一次，而且是由戴耀廷提出，即「共同綱領原則是否決財政預算案，迫政府解散立法會，今次任期可能只有7個月」。趙同意，「個筆記就咁展示，就咁睇，係」，但指其助手是就會上重點「綜合咁寫咗落嚟」。李運騰問是助手綜合會上每人所說的重點，抑或是戴耀廷綜合與會者的說法，趙指「兩樣都有」。
+
+#### 趙指目睹鄒家成和民主黨莊榮輝「企起身」討論 故着助手無需記錄
+
+陳指，事實上趙並不知道，因這是黎敬輝的紀錄，而趙沒有告訴他怎樣記錄。趙重申他於會議早走前，坐在黎身旁，而提到戴耀廷就否決預算案的倡議時，整個討論有「火花」，「嗰個位因為我睇住，所以我就叫咗我助手呢 part 唔使寫啦」，鄒家成皺眉。
+
+陳問趙為何要這樣說？是想要在紀錄隱瞞什麼嗎？趙重申之前被其他大狀問及時也有表示：「橫掂我自己都聽咗、睇住個情況，莊榮輝同鄒家成直情企咗起身，我睇住成個片段喺我腦海度，我想職員慳返啲功夫，呢 part 就唔使佢寫啦」，鄒家成一臉驚訝和皺眉，再與林卓廷相視而笑。
+
+李運騰問，趙稱鄒家成和莊榮輝「企咗起身」，是「比喻」抑或他們真的有這樣做？趙指「法官閣下唔係比喻，係我直情見住⋯直情係有啲情緒」，他一度雙手張開發出急促的聲音，林卓廷和法庭傳譯即問：「咩話？」趙續稱：「好記得莊榮輝嗰句，『難道起醫院起學校都要反對呀？』，就企咗起身」，說時刻意提高聲調模仿另一人腔調，鄒家成發笑，趙同意法官陳仲衡指有熾熱的討論。陳再指會上沒提及否決預算案，惟陳慶偉指可留待陳詞。
+
+#### 趙同意筆記顯示第二次會議有重點討論否決預算案
+
+至於5月5日的第二次會議，趙並無出席，但確認有看過黎敬輝的筆記，事後亦從黎和戴耀廷了解會上情況。趙同意根據筆記，會上有重點（prominently）討論否決預算案的議題，其中沙田區議會主席程張迎曾提及「否決預算案是由 CP（公民黨）提出」，另「豐」表示「CP 對，不能迴避否決預算案的方向」。趙確認公民黨於3月開記者會提及否決財案，而「豐」是公民黨的高級職員。
+
+陳世傑又問，筆記提及的「文遠」（吳文遠）是否來自社民連，趙同意並指：「文遠係一個人嚟嘅，代表社民連。」趙同意根據紀錄，吳文遠曾稱：「有些功能組別民主派參選人，可能對否決 budget 猶豫，可能需中間落墨，要佢哋參與機制，就算不需初選」，而李永成曾稱：「應該以入閘為目標，策略上不要太突出，故不贊成初選時已表明否決預算案。」
+
+#### 趙同意會上否決財案備受討論 有贊成和保留兩種意見
+
+陳問到，筆記是否顯示就否決財政預算案，會上明顯至少有贊成和保留兩種不同意見，趙同意指：「根據我助手整理嘅筆記，係。」李運騰問，那除了助手的筆記，根據他從黎和戴的印象，當日會議是否就否決預算案有很多討論（much debated topic）？
+
+趙未有直接回答，僅表示「個時間重點係擺喺嗰度多啲」，因很多區快將達成協議和將舉行初選，因此戴耀廷認為「有個時間性，希望可以攞到共識」。李運騰打斷，提醒趙聽清楚問題再回答，指這十分重要，並重複再問當天會上，否決預算案是否備受討論，趙同意但補充：「我唔知個討論氣氛去到點。」
+
+陳慶偉再打斷，強調不是問他會上的氣氛，並指李運騰問了「非常簡單」的問題。李運騰和陳慶偉最後再問，根據筆記和趙與二人的對話，當天會上否決預算案是否一個備受討論的議題？趙思考數秒後回答：「係，冇錯。」
+
+案件明天續審，陳世傑會繼續盤問。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-25-euro-sifmanet-riga-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-25-euro-sifmanet-riga-report.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Euro SIFMANet Riga Report
+author: Gonzalo Saiz
+date : 2023-04-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/iRMz6tJ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Riga Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Participants discussed the process and value of sanctions implementation in Latvia, international challenges and next steps in the EU._
+
+
+
+In February 2023, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI convened a roundtable in partnership with the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in Riga. The discussion, held under the Chatham House Rule, gathered representatives from government ministries and agencies, and the private sector – including banking institutions, law firms and consulting companies. The roundtable was hosted by the Financial Intelligence Unit of Latvia. The event is part of RUSI’s ongoing study of EU sanctions implementation and wider responses to illicit finance (Euro SIFMANet), funded by the National Endowment for Democracy.
+
+
+### Background
+
+The roundtable discussion opened by finding a consensus on how well prepared Latvia was for the sanctions. Representatives from the FIU Latvia described how in the past several years, Latvia has undergone a significant overhaul of its national Anti-Money Laundering, Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation Finance (AML/CFT/CPF) system, and its risk exposure to these threats has been at the top of the political and executive agenda. The process included rigorous transformations under the eye of the Financial Action Task Force and Moneyval’s International Co-operation and Review Group (ICRG) process. Through this process, Latvia worked to embed a high level of AML/CFT/CPF risk understanding and capacity by amending existing laws and supplementing them to comply with FATF Recommendations and enforcement measures, such as increasing the criminalisation of money laundering and predicate crimes (including ‘violation’ of sanctions), and setting up new institutional arrangements, such as a specialised Economic Affairs Court. Supervisors such as the Central Bank (Bank of Latvia) and the Financial and Capital Markets Commission worked to significantly improve guidance and feedback loops with supervised entities, and bolster internal control systems.
+
+A representative from Latvia’s Central Bank noted that the reforms ensured that the financial sector was ‘combat-trained’ for the implementation of the Russia restrictive measures regime following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Latvia built its current sanctions regime based on its experience with the post-2014 Crimean, Belarusian and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions. A representative from the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) described how the MFA created a sanctions division as a result of the Moneyval process, ensuring that sanctions were already front-and-centre in policy discussions at the time of the Russian invasion in 2022. The guidance and training that Latvia received throughout the ICRG process and from partners such as OFAC strengthened Latvia’s system to the point that it is now itself providing training to other countries.
+
+Latvian authorities described the national sanctions implementation framework as highly decentralised, with multiple agencies sharing a wide range of responsibilities. Despite the challenges posed by this decentralised system, participants agreed that the sanctions regime has been effective, in large part due to the financial sector reform of the previous few years. Violation of sanctions (both of EU and UN sanctions) is a criminal offence in Latvia, the sanctioned person and entity list is publicly available, and regular public–private collaboration ensures everyone is on the same page. In 2022, Latvian banks identified 35 entities linked to sanctioned entities or persons and froze more than €80 million. FIU Latvia received around 300 STRs, mostly linked to the evasion of sectoral sanctions. Supervisors have also conducted on-site inspections to ensure effective compliance. Tax and customs police initiated 114 criminal proceedings in relation to sanctions violation. The four major Latvian banks have stopped executing transactions to and from Russia.
+
+
+### Latvia’s Challenges
+
+A representative of the financial sector association, Finance Latvia, noted two main challenges. The first major challenge of sanctions stems mainly from a lack of cross-border harmonisation on legislation and implementation. How the issue of ‘control’ over an entity is identified in different countries often varies, creating confusion in handling activities that may be deemed sanctions evasion. A further issue cited by the private sector was the challenge of how to treat the risk from Russian sanctions targets using Central Asian countries for evasion and circumvention, ‘contaminating’ business dealings in that region. In addition, private sector actors pointed to the lack of sanctions-evasion prevention capacity in corporate sectors subject to sectoral sanctions. A shortage of sanctions expertise has limited the ability of these industries to raise their capabilities. Finance Latvia explained their ongoing trainings and seminars with their members’ clients, but it is difficult to make them catch up and build capacity for a capability that the financial sector has been engaged in since even before 2014. With this lack of capacity in mind, while it is important to ensure a rapid build-up of implementation capacity, the application of this capacity should be monitored, in order to prevent a cascade of de-risking.
+
+A representative from the Customs Authority highlighted that the main challenge is not in the checking of goods but checking the connections between persons. The Latvian border is naturally at a high risk of exposure to organised crime and drug and alcohol trafficking. The monitoring process is further complicated by the number of exceptions in the customs and trade sanctions regimes, together with the tendency for transporters to use double sets of documentation that hide the legitimate destination of goods and get swapped once they cross the border to obfuscate trade between Russia, Central Asia and Latvia. In general, the customs representative highlighted that more could be done by the EU in this regard. For example, FRONTEX provides funds and support for building capacity to address people crossing the EU’s external borders, but not goods. Participants made a strong argument that as Latvia is among the few member states with direct exposure to Russia via a common border, more resources should be concentrated there to prevent sanctions breaches.
+
+The representatives of the Employers Confederation emphasised that, in general, communication from the Latvian government has been very effective. However, they highlighted their experience with the overburdened systems of compliance of sanctions implementation, noting that members have repeatedly experienced funds getting seriously delayed in transactions with Central Asian counterparties. Participants found that more institutional collaboration between Latvia and Central Asia could result in better understanding of risks from this region.
+
+There was a clear consensus among participants about the additional difficulty stemming from Latvia’s close geographical proximity to Russia and Belarus. Certain designated entities had a substantial economic presence in Latvia, generating doubts about the best way to proceed with paying salaries, taxes or the continuity of economic activity generally. These payment complications have resulted in a trend of Latvian businesses trying to find banking options outside Latvia (notably in Lithuania), making oversight even more difficult.
+
+Participants from both public and private sectors noted on multiple occasions that effective sanctions compliance in Latvia was possible for numerous reasons, but that continued access to the Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO) Registry is an important one. The Registry started conducting analysis of ownership to support banks and businesses in complying with sanctions. The new power they received led the Registry to become a form of analytical centre in support of sanctions implementation. Unlike many other EU countries where beneficial ownership registries have been closed to public access as a result of a ruling by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in 2022, in Latvia, the government has been able to keep the Registry open. Latvia is one of the most open countries in the world regarding the availability of UBO data to the public and does not solely base its national legal framework on the legal norm currently repealed by the judgment of the CJEU. The Latvian framework was established before the 5th Directive came into force and had already assessed the balance of data privacy and public disclosure within the scope of other normative acts. As SIFMANet has found in other countries where registries have been closed, such action significantly complicates and impairs the effectiveness of sanctions implementation.
+
+
+### Recommendations
+
+First, as sanctions become more sophisticated, the roundtable reached a consensus that the highly decentralised model followed by Latvia can be improved. FIU Latvia described the centralisation effort underway, via a newly designed body, to try to remedy this issue, and build a faster and more reliable feedback loop between the public and private sectors. The aim of this effort is to coordinate approaches and hold singular decision-making power, making it possible to support affected entities and make quick and effective judgements where necessary.
+
+Latvian authorities also found the need for centralisation to be a key element at the EU level. The challenges posed by the current lack of harmonisation in the EU must be addressed. While sanctions evasion is a crime in Latvia, it is not wholly criminalised in the EU, resulting in different levels of prioritisation in sanctions evasion prevention among partners.
+
+Second, participants also agreed that the current state of beneficial ownership registries in the EU needs to be remedied. Registries must include accurate, up-to-date and accessible data. Although open registries should be the goal, even countries with an open and accessible registry (for example, the UK) suffer from unreliability because their data is unverified and therefore untrustworthy.
+
+Third, though the role of Latvia as a gateway of financial flows eastward has been largely restricted, trade between Latvia and its neighbours continues. Representatives from the public and private sectors asserted that resources and staffing must continue to be dedicated to ensuring compliance with sanctions; and more international collaboration will be required to bolster the strength of the Latvian and Baltic borders, as this is also the main external border of the EU with Russia.
+
+Finally, there was consensus at the roundtable that the European Commission must communicate more thoroughly with the private sector in regard to sectoral sanctions, otherwise this duty of informing businesses in the EU falls solely on the financial sector, which may not be best equipped to carry this burden alone. In this sense, participants agreed that the EU and national competent authorities should engage more with the private sector during the design of sanctions and immediately following their publication, to ensure that the desired measures are effectively implemented by the relevant sectors.
+
+---
+
+__Gonzalo Saiz__ is a Research Analyst for Project CRAAFT and works at the RUSI offices in Brussels. His research focuses on the crime-terror nexus and its impact on terrorism financing in Europe.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-50.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-50.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f9091136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-50.md
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 50 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-04-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 鄒家成一方指「抗爭派」不代表反建制反政府 僅指更積極主動 趙家賢不同意
+- 趙家賢作供完畢 將傳召鍾錦麟 控方指上周六始破解其電話 官指不理想
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（25日）踏入審訊第50天，趙家賢繼續接受盤問。鄒家成一方指「本土抗爭派」中的「抗爭」不代表反建制或反政府，只是會更願意更積極主動地爭取政治目標，趙不同意，指傳統民主派亦有很多人很進取「chur 住」政府官員，屬很溫和的方法。他亦確認不清楚新界東有否就運用否決權達成共識，惟指戴耀廷原本打算參選人報名時就協議有「實體簽名」，若非有共識不可能召開初選記者會，否則公開後有人不同意會有「反彈」。
+
+趙盤問下亦同意，參選超級區議會的李予信是「溫和、務實、新晉」的傳統民主派，亦同意超區界別是2012年政府與民主黨政治妥協的產物。趙指「妥協係政治嘅藝術」，他當年任民主黨中央委員時，亦支持黨友投票通過政府的政改方案。
+
+#### 辯方指新東第二次會議無進行過投票 趙不同意
+
+趙家賢繼續接受代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑盤問，根攄黎敬輝就5月5日第二次新東會議的筆記，寫有「『會運用』 - 投票通過」。趙同意當時嘗試向黎敬輝了解情況，指相信民主黨代表李永成無獲授權表態，而黎則引戴耀廷指「份協議要去出最後版本」，望以表決形式「畀一個主流嘅大方向出嚟」。趙其後再找戴，指民主黨代表應不獲授權投票，對結果感詫異，戴則回應會採用大方向起草最終協議。
+
+陳世傑問，戴是否沒告訴他曾舉行投票並通過決議？趙重申是非正式的意向性投票，戴是望以此拿到「大方向」。李運騰追問，不論正式或非正式，戴有否確認曾進行投票？趙稱「係有一個投票」。陳世傑最終指出，事實上第二次會議沒有進行投票，亦沒有進行意向性投票，趙不同意。
+
+
+▲ 代表鄒家成的大律師 陳世傑
+
+#### 趙同意不清楚就運用否決權有否達成共識 指戴耀廷清楚民主黨有保留
+
+趙同意，戴耀廷原本打算要求參選人簽署協議，但在6月9日記者會稱毋須簽署，而戴在他要求下，於6月8日在組織者群組發出各區協議的最後版本，他並稱之為各區共識。趙同意不知道協議如何產生，「戴耀廷冇特別同我講」，而他稱之為「共識」是因為戴這樣告訴他。他亦同意新東第二次會議至6月8日之間，不曾有其他新東會議，被問是否知道就運用否決權的條款有達成共識，趙答「我唔清楚」。
+
+陳世傑續指，事實上會上就否決權有不同意見，但戴耀廷則自行（took upon）決定同意了的內容，並引趙早前曾同意法官陳慶偉指，民主陣營光譜很闊，如在否決財政預算案上社民連和本土抗爭派意見不同，最終部分選區同意使用「會運用」否決權，即使有參與者未必完全同意，但戴還是做了決定。
+
+法官陳仲衡續引黎敬輝筆記，指戴會上曾提及「會議共識是較多數人的認同，接納可接受的方案」，指與趙說法相符。趙同意，並指辯方遺漏了他會後曾向戴提出民主黨有關注和顧慮，而戴稱會與民主黨或對否決預算案有顧慮的人作處理，又重申戴會駕車周圍與不同參選人溝通接觸。陳仲衡問，故戴耀廷清楚知道民主黨有保留？趙同意，指「我同佢嘅溝通當中，佢係清楚知道，所以佢同我承諾話佢會跟進」，而他亦接受了戴的說法。
+
+#### 趙指若非有共識戴不可能召記者會 否則會有反彈
+
+李運騰續指，辯方是向趙指出，事實上沒有大家同意的協議，而是由戴耀廷決定協議內容。趙回應就當時情況而言，若戴並非確認到參與的持分者是同意，又或是在該氣氛下受壓力同意，惟陳慶偉打斷問是指哪個時間點，問是否指6月9日記者會。趙同意並語氣急促指，若戴「唔係喺5月5日至6月9日中間確認好有共識係處理好嘅話，佢唔可能係同意然後叫我去準備個記者會去講出嚟，因為公開咗嘅話，如果有人唔同意就會即刻反彈㗎嘛」，並指原本的構思，是想每個參與者報名時都有「實體簽名」。
+
+李運騰問，即趙是指根據原本計劃，候選人需簽署協議，故若事實上沒有共識，而戴又自行決定，便會引起候選人的爭論？趙同意。陳世傑續指，在5個地方選區中，只有兩個區作出回應並簽署文件，陳慶偉補充即附上共同綱領。趙略為激動以雙手比劃，並大聲說：「抱歉我答唔到，個事實情況唔係咁樣，即係你將幾樣嘢痴埋一齊嚟講嘅」，鄒家成發笑。李運騰指問題很簡單，即是否只有兩區參選人報名時附上共同綱領，趙冷靜下來表示同意，指該份共同綱領「係佢哋各自區自己攞咗戴耀廷份嘢嘅一啲元素擺落去整出嚟嘅」。
+
+李運騰續展示組織者群組 WhatsApp 紀錄，趙家賢6月19日曾稱「區軒同埋 Benny 係有白紙黑字 circulate 畀大家確認，雖然冇最後簽紙，但係呢個都係一個 mutually agreed consents（互相同意的協議）」，趙在李詢問下，指「我當時係真誠地確信」有互相同意的協議，並重申是指戴在6月8日發出的協議最後版本。李再問趙是否相信戴有將協議傳給所有人？趙指因戴曾說過會傳閱通知予有關參選人，他亦有看到戴使用廣播功能，加上他曾問一兩個參與協調者，他們均反映有透過廣播收到該文件，故當時真誠確信。
+
+#### 趙不同意「抗爭」一詞只是代表更積極主動：傳統民主派好多人都 chur 住政府官員
+
+陳世傑其後問到「本土抗爭派」的意思，問趙是否同意「本土抗爭派」是形容較年輕、並以港人利益為先的本土政治人物，趙表示「部分同意，因為呢個只係最基本嘅一啲元素」，在延伸庭的黃之鋒發笑。陳再指，當中「抗爭」一詞不是代表他們反建制或反政府，只是他們更願意更積極主動地（proactively）爭取政治目標，趙不同意，並指「傳統民主派裡面都有好多人就住政策嗰方面，係好進取去 chur 住啲政府官員要起啲地區建設等等，你頭先講嘅係一個好溫和嘅方法之一」。
+
+法官李運騰續指，「本土抗爭派」包含不同人士，有些可能很反政府，有些則不是，因此很難給予整體答案，或者辯方可指出他們「不一定（not necessarily）」是這樣。法官陳慶偉則認為，如辯方希望，可直接向證人指出鄒家成很溫和，又或他是激進但不反政府。陳世傑一度指，鄒家成可能很主動發聲，但不一定是非法，但陳慶偉指兩者沒有關係，李運騰亦強調本案不是取決於被告屬於什麼陣營，陳世傑續指已完成盤問。
+
+#### 辯方指「超區」是政府與民主黨妥協產物 趙：妥協係政治嘅藝術
+
+柯耀林沒有盤問，代表李予信的大律師關文渭接着盤問。李予信參選區議會（第二）功能界別（超級區議會），關問「超區」的界別是否2012年時，政府與民主黨政治妥協（compromise）的產物，法官陳仲衡一度質疑他在問證人的意見，但關稱趙當時有份參與，陳慶偉批准發問。趙續回答：「係，妥協係政治嘅藝術」，並指自己當時是民主黨的中央委員，「喺2010年嘅政改方案，我都支持民主黨嘅立法會議員投票通過當時政府嘅政改方案」，他亦同意因此導致超區出現。
+
+#### 辯方指超區選民為草根階層 法官：我是草根階層嗎？
+
+關續指，有兩個條件可成為此界別的選民，首先他並非其他功能界別選民，第二是他沒有取消登記超區的界別，趙同意。陳慶偉問即選民若沒有取消登記，會自動成為超區的選民？關同意，李運騰並一度指法官並非任何功能組別的選民，但不記得曾被要求取消登記，關指李可能忘記了。
+
+其後法官與辯方就選民資格討論，關表示超區與其他功能組別有別，並非代表商界等利益，而超區選民主要是「草根階層（grassroot citizens）」，這時李運騰表示：「我也是區議會（第二）的選民，我是草根階層嗎？（“I am also voter of DC2, did I consdier myself as grassroot?”）」，陳慶偉亦指他曾經是衞生服務界的選民，多人發笑。關其後問，這些一般市民並非由其他特定界別代表？趙表示：「呢方面我比較熟悉，或者我講解清楚」，但陳慶偉即擺手打斷稱：「我們已經明白」，多人大笑。
+
+#### 趙同意李予信是「溫和、務實、新晉」的傳統民主派
+
+趙其後確認，於2020年與李予信為東區區議會的同事，當時趙為副主席，李則是成員，當時政府會就建設項目提出臨時撥款。關續問，李予信是否經常會對撥款投贊成票，並舉例指北角糖水道需150萬進行拆除天橋的工程，而該筆撥款需區議會通過。趙未回答，陳慶偉便指區議會只是諮詢機構（consultative body），不認為政府須獲區議會允許（permission），提醒辯方注意用詞。
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+關改問，政府在地區建設前，要尋求區議會同意？趙同意並指：「因為好多地區部門都好重視區議會意見，唔單止工作、交通、一啲規劃，全部係透過地區部門、透過區議會去攞意見，有啲做法當然希望區議會能夠通過。」
+
+另外，關問到趙有否私下跟李就2015年政府政改失敗等議題討論，趙稱應該有。被問到會否視李為溫和、務實的新晉民主派，趙表示李是「溫和、務實、新晉嘅傳統民主派」。李聞言微笑。
+
+關文渭表示完成盤問。由於昨日趙家賢就鄭達鴻及彭卓棋早前的盤問作補充，代表鄭的大律師黃宇逸表示可能會再有盤問，陳慶偉今指，法庭考慮後決定批准黃及代表彭的大律師盧敏儀發問，但兩人最後表示沒有問題。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（25日）踏入審訊第50天。前民主動力召集人趙家賢接受主問及盤問共17天，今作供完畢，料下一名控方證人為同案認罪被告、民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟。控方午休前表示，上周六（22日）始破解鍾錦麟電話，需時處理披露資料事宜。法官李運騰指情況非常不理想，指電話一直由警方保管，為何審訊第50天仍要處理此基本程序，又問控方是否未獲鍾合作。控方下午解釋，由於鍾不肯定電話密碼，警方為免資料被刪而沒有冒險嘗試，並因科技進步於上周六始成功破解。控方不會依賴當中逾2,400則訊息，辯方則需時審視，案件押後至明天繼續。
+
+#### 控方指上周六始破解鍾錦麟電話、需時考慮披露資料 法官指非常不理想
+
+所有被告今早完成盤問趙家賢，並由主控萬德豪進行覆問。萬覆問完成後指預計會傳召另一認罪被告鍾錦麟，惟有事情需於午飯時處理。在趙離開後，萬解釋警方於上周六破解了鍾的電話，並考慮披露當中某些資料。李運騰問因此控方需在傳證人前考慮披露的問題？萬同意，並要檢視控方會否依賴當中的材料。
+
+李運騰嘆氣，問電話一直是由警方抑或鍾錦麟保管？萬答是由警方保管。李指情況非常不理想，指現時已是審訊第50天，為何控方此前沒有檢視，又指控方在開審前檢視手提電話是很基本，問能否於今天之內處理好。萬指很有可能，並指可解釋為什麼要檢視該些材料，李運騰打斷指，「我認為你欠所有人一個解釋。（“I think you owe everybody an explanation of this.”）」
+
+#### 控方稱「科技進步」才能破解 官質疑是否未獲證人合作
+
+萬續指，因為科技的進步（advancement of technology），他們現時能破解鍾的電話。李問，所以控方此前未能解鎖鍾的電話，即控方未能獲得鍾錦麟的合作？並指若鍾不願提供密碼，辯方或會關注為何控方未能得到鍾的全盤合作。萬德豪指會於午飯後回答。
+
+
+▲ 鍾錦麟（資料圖片）
+
+此外，就案件的進度，李運騰指鍾錦麟所需時間應沒有首兩名證人般長，並問第四名證人是誰。萬德豪指還會有專家證人及與證物鏈相關的證人，亦會為證人申請匿名令，大律師關文渭指辯方沒有反對控方申匿名令，只是提出細微的修改。代表林卓廷和黃碧雲的大律師沈士文亦問及傳召次序，指除鍾外尚有一名匿名證人及市民證人，萬同指會於午飯後回答。
+
+#### 控方指鍾錦麟不肯定電話密碼 為免資料被刪故無冒險嘗試
+
+萬德豪午休後解釋，鍾錦麟接受警方會面時表示不肯定他電話的密碼，雖然他提供了一些密碼組合，但若輸入錯誤便可能令電話資料全數刪除，故警方沒有冒險嘗試，但上周六（22日）終成功破解，林卓廷聞言笑着重複「last saturday」。
+
+萬並指，已於午休時向辯方披露相關電子材料，並附有搜查令，理解當中包括200多則新訊息，而控方不會依賴任何新材料。李運騰指，相信辯方亦需時在證人作供前審視新材料，此做法較公平。
+
+#### 辯方指收到逾2千WhatsApp訊息 需時檢視申押周五續審
+
+大律師沈士文其後稱，於午休時收到逾2,400則 WhatsApp 訊息，亦有很多附件，辯方需時審視，望押至周五續審。萬德豪回應，新披露訊息中有九成已被趙家賢的手機資料涵蓋，因來自同一群組。李運騰指，辯方需小心比較才能決定，他們檢視資料後，有可能要重新傳召區諾軒和趙家賢，故容讓辯方有足夠時間考慮很重要。
+
+法官陳慶偉終決定，將案件押至明早續審，若辯方需更多時間可再提出。代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑指，新資料是電子版本，未能給予還柙中的當事人，或需更多時間，陳慶偉同樣着明天再處理。
+
+#### 盤問曾稱只出席首次會議 趙覆問下確認曾兩次出席港島會議
+
+辯方上午完成對趙家賢的盤問，並由主控萬德豪進行覆問。就出席的港島區協調會議次數，趙於主問曾稱出席了首兩次，惟接受盤問時稱只曾出席首次。萬德豪指，事發於近3年前，亦不是記憶測試，展示 WhatsApp 訊息向趙澄清。
+
+趙確認，在3月26日首次港島會議當晚近8時，曾向黎敬輝指「Ok, coming」，又着黎為他記錄重點，確認他有出席首次會議。李運騰一度問，晚上約10時趙曾發出4個表情符號，包括揮手圖案，問是什麼意思，趙邊揮手邊說：「即係喂喂喂喂我叫緊你咁解」，解釋當晚開會後與黎敬輝於附近用膳，黎一度走開，他遂問他在哪裡，同意當時會議已結束。
+
+至於4月17日第二次會議，趙確認黎當晚向他發訊息問港島區是否照開會，而翌日趙要求戴耀廷將與會者的名單發送給他，因他不認得部份人。萬問趙是否記得自己有否出席第二次會議，趙確認有，指「去咗可能睇到有啲人樣，唔係好認知邊個」，故叫戴將名單傳給他。
+
+#### 趙更正傳統民主派對否決財案僅表「關注顧慮」非反對、指司馬文反對後無參與初選
+
+另外，早前趙稱曾於會後與楊雪盈通電話，楊稱戴耀廷有很多想法並「由佢講」，認為參選人當選後可有自主權。萬問這通電話是何時發生，趙表示起碼是開了一次協調會議之後才聯絡，因楊當時是18區會議民主派的輪任召集人，而民動當時同意提供秘書處服務，因此與楊有很多溝通。萬追問通話是否在第一次會議後、第二次會議前發生，趙表示「抱歉主控，我淨係記得起碼肯定係第一次會議之後」，指他們傾談上述工作時，有談及戴耀廷的倡議。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+萬另問到，趙早前在2021年7月21日進行的第二次警誡錄影會面中，表示傳統民主派「反對否決財政預算案」，趙當時稱「反對」一詞應改為表達「關注和顧慮」。趙今確認說法，並解釋做法是「要釐清我當時嘅 perception（認知）係唔係好準確嘅」，因此要更正「反對」這個字眼。他又解釋有此理解是因為與司馬文的說法相比，司馬文當時在協調會上清楚講明「反對否決財政預算案」，並因應之後發展無參與初選及官方選舉。
+
+#### 趙指何桂藍於鄒家成熱烈討論時提到將立會變「抗爭陣地」、稱民主黨代表屬少數
+
+萬德豪續指，趙早前指何桂藍曾提及望將立法會變成「抗爭陣地」，將制度「推到盡」，問是什麼時候聽到何這樣說？趙稱是在協調會議。趙早前指，因他會上已聽到相關訊息，故着助手黎敬輝無需記錄；而他亦曾指在新東首次會議，鄒家成和莊榮輝有熱烈討論（heated exchange）。
+
+萬續問，那何桂藍的話是在該討論之前抑或之後發生？趙指，何的說法亦是包含在該「熱烈討論（heated exchange）」之內，「咁所以我就係同返黎敬輝講，呢個我都睇到啦，所以佢就唔使記低」，並指要補充「其實係佢（黎敬輝）主動問我，因為嗰 part 真係太多人講嘢，要花好多時間記錄，所以佢咁樣問我」，鄒家成皺眉。李運騰指，故熱烈的討論是在不同人之間，而不止是鄒家成和莊榮輝？趙同意。
+
+趙早前供稱，約有30人出席首次新東會議，陳慶偉問，那莊是屬於少數嗎？趙指「我觀察嘅形勢係相對 minority（少數）」，並指會上有超過一半本土抗爭派，鄒家成搖頭。陳再指，趙亦提及民主動力在會上亦被挑戰，趙同意，強調因為「民主動力成日畀本土抗爭派攻擊係傳統民主派嘅大台，想控制所有嘢咁樣」。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Global Cyber Security
+author: Pia Hüsch and James Sullivan
+date : 2023-04-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Qge87se.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Global Approaches to Cyber Policy, Legislation and Regulation: A Comparative Overview"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper aims to serve as a guide to policymakers by examining different approaches to cyber-security policy, regulation and legislation. It provides an overview of the priorities of five countries (the UK, the US, Canada, Japan, and Singapore) and the EU. The focus rests on cyber policy advanced in the period from January 2019 to March 2023._
+
+
+
+The research underlying this paper focuses on four key research areas:
+
+- The general context in which cyber policy is made.
+
+- Priorities with regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI).
+
+- Approaches to the development of cyber skills and the cyber workforce.
+
+- International cooperation on norm development for cyberspace.
+
+#### The Context
+
+All jurisdictions follow a unique cyber strategy, but common approaches exist:
+
+- Strategies are updated in line with domestic timelines but also adjust to changes in the cyber threat landscape (such as the rise of cybercrime) and respond to geopolitical events and the increased need to secure CNI and supply chains.
+
+- Strategies increasingly focus on harmonising and streamlining each jurisdiction’s cyber policies to avoid fragmentation and duplication of efforts.
+
+- There is an increasing reliance on interventionist policies and regulations to enhance resilience and cyber-security standards.
+
+#### On Critical National Infrastructure
+
+Ensuring greater protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI) is a priority for all jurisdictions examined. This is often done by updating or increasing existing cyber-security obligations, or expanding them beyond CNI sectors to further support the resilience of supply chains. International businesses and cyber-security professionals must simultaneously comply with changing (and at times varying) obligations among different jurisdictions. Further research comparing the differing scopes of CNI designations and their respective cyber-security obligations is needed.
+
+#### On the Cyber Workforce
+
+The global cyber-security workforce shortage and the need for further skills development is seen in all jurisdictions examined. A wide range of initiatives, many of which resemble each other, are advanced by the respective jurisdictions to attract talent, diversify the workforce and increasingly harmonise existing efforts. For example, several jurisdictions have adopted skills frameworks, such as the US’s National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework or the European Cybersecurity Skills Framework (ECSF), to harmonise language used to describe cyber-security roles. Little is known about the effectiveness of these initiatives in markedly reducing the cyber-security workforce gap in a quantifiable way. More research is needed to understand which initiatives help reduce the gap in the cyber-security workforce.
+
+#### On International Cooperation on Cyber-Norm Development
+
+All jurisdictions examined actively cooperate on cyber-norm development and seek to advance a free and secure cyberspace. They do so by supporting UN processes for norm development, by engaging in a range of multilateral, bilateral and multi-stakeholder arrangements, and by seeking greater cooperation on cyber (including on the development of cyber-security skills and closing the gap in the cyber workforce). More cooperation on skills development could further boost understanding of how to develop global solutions to a global problem.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Technological innovation and advancement continue to disrupt society at pace. While the economic benefits of breakthrough technologies are fairly clear, there are new cyber risks to infrastructure and data to consider. In light of these dynamics, countries are constantly designing, monitoring and refreshing their cyber -security policies, legislation and regulation to protect national security and the economic security and safety of organisations and their citizens. While some of the trends in cyber security are global, each jurisdiction’s approach to cyber policy and associated legislation and regulation follows its own themes and priorities.
+
+While the content of cyber policies naturally varies, so do the mechanisms to implement them. Jurisdictions may prefer different types of levers to implement their cyber policies. Whereas one country may prefer to legislate heavily, others may advance cyber policies through standard-setting or non-binding policies. The approach a country chooses is shaped by a multitude of complex factors, including its political standpoint, constitutional structures, the cyber-threat landscape, the role of the private sector, and other socio-legal and historical factors.
+
+Understanding national and regional approaches to cyber policy is crucial, as these directly impact individuals and organisations operating within the respective jurisdictions. This paper allows policymakers and businesses to understand regulatory trends in several jurisdictions, providing them with up-to-date insights on how the regulatory landscape in these jurisdictions is evolving – and what that means for businesses and individuals.
+
+This guide sets out to compare the approaches of six different jurisdictions – the UK, the EU, the US, Canada, Japan and Singapore – with regard to their respective cyber-policy agendas. The aim here is to improve understanding of the impact these policy agendas have on businesses and individuals working in these jurisdictions. This paper provides a valuable overview of different approaches to cyber policy by identifying trends in key legislative and regulatory initiatives over the past four years. A comparative section at the end of the paper puts these initial findings into perspective and identifies areas for future research.
+
+#### Research Questions
+
+This paper aims to provide an overview of different approaches to cyber-security policy. To narrow down the wide research area of cyber-security policy, the research underlying the paper focuses on four key research questions:
+
+1. What is the general background that shapes each jurisdiction’s approach to cyber policy?
+
+2. What are the national priorities for developing cyber-resilience measures for critical national infrastructure (CNI)?
+
+3. How do the jurisdictions advance skills development and/or workforce regulation in the cyber context?
+
+4. How do these jurisdictions approach international cooperation on cyber regulation and how do they engage with other countries and entities, for example, in the context of norm-developing frameworks?
+
+#### Methodology and Scope
+
+The research underlying this publication was primarily based on a review of existing literature. This involved the creation of search strings that were inputted into online repositories to identify sources. Google Scholar was the primary search engine used to find academic articles. Grey literature, including policy papers, was sourced through Bing and Google Search. From these initial sources, the research team identified further literature by examining article bibliographies and other references. Alongside these secondary sources, primary sources such as legislation, regulations and other official documents and government papers were also considered.
+
+The research was conducted from December 2022 to March 2023. Analysis of the gathered sourced material was based on a thematic approach, assessing sources’ provenance, arguments and conclusions in order to identify different approaches to cyber regulation in the EU and the five countries examined. The six jurisdictions studied – the UK, the EU, the US, Canada, Japan and Singapore – were chosen because they drive policymaking in cyber security and are leaders in the field, either as norm developers or because of their technology sectors. The research focused primarily on policies enacted or proposed between 2019 and 2023.
+
+Throughout this paper, the term ‘policy’ is used in a broad sense and encompasses binding (‘hard law’) as well as non-binding (‘soft law’) instruments or other policies.
+
+#### Limitations
+
+This paper aims to provide policymakers with a guide on trends in recent cyber-security policy in various jurisdictions. It is therefore limited in scope and depth and serves as a starting point for future research. This means that reference can only be made to a selection of policies, regulations, or legislative activities, rather than listing them all. Nevertheless, the paper informs the reader about key issues and trends in the field, while keeping the level of detail appropriate for an initial overview.
+
+#### Structure
+
+The paper comprises six chapters, each dedicated to the approach to cyber-security regulation taken by one of the jurisdictions. Each chapter begins by setting out the jurisdiction’s approach to cyber policy, regulation and legislation, structured around the four research questions listed above. After setting out the general context in which the approach to cyber-security policy must be seen, each chapter goes on to identify how the jurisdiction advances cyber-resilience measures for CNI. Then, each chapter examines how the jurisdiction approaches skills development and workforce regulation, before analysing the approach to international cooperation on cyber-norm development. After the individual chapters, the paper offers some general concluding remarks that make initial comparative observations based on the jurisdiction-level analysis, and points out further areas of research.
+
+
+### The UK
+
+#### Context
+
+The UK is ‘a highly capable cyber state’ that follows an ambitious approach to cyber policy. This is reflected in its 2022 National Cyber Strategy, which advances a ‘whole of society approach’. Although largely in line with its 2016 Strategy, which shifted UK cyber policy toward binding regulation, the UK’s new strategy stresses a greater need for a holistic approach to cyber policy, as cyber issues relate to all areas of modern life. The ‘whole of society’ approach, as advanced in the UK cyber strategy, includes public–private partnerships and civil society, but also aspects such as ‘education strategy, industrial policy, work on regulations and incentives, and foreign policy’.
+
+This new holistic approach also confirms the UK’s commitment to being a ‘cyber power’, a term used throughout the strategy, solidifying the UK’s strategic approach to cyberspace. It refers to the UK’s position advanced in the 2021 Integrated Review, which stresses the importance of responsible and democratic cyber power to achieving the UK’s national goals. On the whole, the UK’s strategy follows a ‘strategic and wide-ranging approach to cyber’. Next to the national cyber strategy, the UK also has a Government Cyber Security Strategy (2022–30) and a cyber-resilience strategy for the UK National Health Service (NHS).
+
+The UK’s strong position in the cyber field is supported by a wide range of public authorities working on cyber matters. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) stands out for conducting central – primarily technical – work on UK cyber security since its establishment in 2016, analysing and researching key cyber threats and risks. In 2020, the UK also confirmed the existence of its National Cyber Force, a unique body dedicated to offensive cyber operations. This agency sits between the intelligence agency GCHQ and the Ministry of Defence and ‘covers the full range of the UK’s national-security priorities’, including serious crime, terrorism and state threats. In 2023, the Department of Science, Innovation and Technology was formed, taking over tasks on cyber policy previously undertaken by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). Of primary relevance for the UK workforce is the UK Cyber Security Council, a self-regulatory body developing and promoting professional standards for the cyber workforce.
+
+The wide range of threats facing the UK was underlined in the NCSC’s 2022 Annual Review. These include ransomware attacks and other types of cybercrime, threats posed by state actors in cyberspace, and commercially available cyber tools. The UK also faces a significant gap in the cyber-security workforce, which increased further in 2022. The UK cyber strategy recognises this gap and signals an intention to expand the UK’s cyber skills and train, attract and diversify a growing cyber-security workforce.
+
+#### Priorities for National Cyber-Resilience Measures for CNI
+
+One of the priorities set out in the UK National Cyber Strategy is increasing the UK’s resilience. Confirming its whole-of-society approach, efforts to increase cyber resilience include (but are not limited to) improving the resilience of CNI. The UK government currently identifies 13 sectors as CNI, including civil nuclear, chemicals, food and health – education is not among the sectors listed. Given that a large percentage of UK CNI is owned by the private sector, close cooperation between the public and private sectors is required. The NCSC fosters such cooperation and provides a number of tools for guidance and advice for CNI businesses. It has also set up the ‘Industry 100’ initiative for further cooperation with industry partners. Furthermore, the 2023 Refresh of the UK’s Integrated Review announced a National Protective Security Authority, which ‘will engage with businesses and institutions to protect [the UK’s] security and prosperity at home’.
+
+On the regulatory side, the UK has confirmed it will update its 2018 Security of Network & Information Systems Regulations (NIS Regulations). Results of the consultation process on the proposal for the updated NIS Regulations were published in November 2022, stating that the government aims to update this legislation ‘as soon as parliamentary time allows’. Given the updated EU regulations on NIS, such an update comes as no surprise, but could potentially mark one of the first areas of divergence post-Brexit. Businesses and their cyber-security staff operating in the EU and the UK which fall under the scope of both regulations will have to comply with two changing – but not necessarily identical – sets of requirements.
+
+One of the UK’s priorities for the updated NIS Regulations is to broaden the scope of their application, to include more businesses that will have to comply with the respective binding obligations, technology providers in particular. The regulations’ two-tier system, which imposes stricter requirements on essential service providers than on digital service providers, will remain. However, and arguably ‘long overlooked by the UK’s NIS Regulations’, managed service providers will be added as a new category of digital service providers that must comply with the regulations’ requirements. Although software companies are unlikely to be included, the illustrative list published by DCMS names IT outsourcing services, application management services, managed security operations centres and incident response services as managed IT services that will fall within the new scope of the NIS Regulations. As a result, these entities’ cyber workforces must comply with the new cyber-security obligations in the updated NIS Regulations. Furthermore, the updated regulations aim to improve the reporting of cyber incidents to regulators, likely expanding mandatory reporting to incidents ‘even if they don’t immediately cause disruption’.
+
+Beyond CNI – and mirroring the EU’s proposal for a Cyber Resilience Act – the UK also passed the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act in December 2022. This entails obligations for companies that manufacture, import or distribute smart consumer products, further enhancing cyber resilience in the UK; however, these obligations have not yet come into force, as they require additional regulation. Such obligations may build upon the Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security that the DCMS and NCSC developed in 2018. In addition, the UK government is advancing a Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, seeking to update the data protection laws previously based on the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, and to reduce paperwork for businesses.
+
+#### Workforce and Skills Development and Regulation
+
+In order to implement the regulatory updates outlined above and to enhance cyber resilience, the UK’s National Cyber Strategy recognises a need for developing a more ‘diverse and technically skilled workforce’. Improving diversity, in this context, goes beyond targeting the gender imbalance in the field, but also includes the need for greater regional diversity. London and the southeast of England employ nearly half of all UK cyber-security professionals. In response to this imbalance, the UK government has funded 12 ‘cyber clusters’. Located throughout all four home nations, these organisations are tasked with enhancing cooperation with the (local) private sector and civil society, but also with various public stakeholders.
+
+Other government-backed initiatives for skills development include CyBOK (a programme setting up a body for collecting knowledge and making resources to develop cyber skills publicly available). Further initiatives under the NCSC’s CyberFirst programme for students include ‘Cyber Explorers’, a learning platform for young students, and the CyberFirst bursary scheme, offering undergraduate students £4,000 per year in financial assistance and cyber-security training to support their careers in cyber security. The UK Cyber Security Council has further established a cyber career framework, identifying 16 areas of specialism that provide practitioners with guidelines for career planning. In addition, the UK Cyber Security Council has taken over the (formerly NCSC-run) Certified Cyber Professional Scheme. The Council has also launched a pilot professional registration scheme for some of the 16 specialisms in cyber security at three registration titles: Associate; Principal; and Chartered. This pilot scheme will be extended to more specialisms throughout 2023. Such pilot projects can be seen as indicative of future developments in the professionalisation of the UK’s cyber workforce. This is also in line with a DCMS consultation on the professionalisation of the cyber workforce, which envisages professional standard-setting by 2025.
+
+Nevertheless, the UK arguably still faces a significant shortage in the cyber-security workforce, and a cyber-security skills gap, despite the fact that the government has launched a wide variety of initiatives. A similar assessment is made in a DCMS study, ‘Cybersecurity Skills in the UK Labour Market 2022’, which found that many organisations lack skills in areas such as setting up configured firewalls or detecting and removing malware. Other skills-development paths such as apprenticeships or skills transfers in later career stages could be better utilised to try to close the gap even more. Further research is thus necessary to better understand the effectiveness of existing initiatives for skills development.
+
+#### International Interaction on Cyber-Norm Development
+
+As well as advancing cyber policy on a domestic level, the UK also shapes international norm development in cyberspace. A 2022 ministerial document describes the UK as a ‘leading responsible and democratic cyber power’. The UK delivers on such ambitions by being actively involved in the UN norm-development processes, arguing in favour of norms of responsible cyber behaviour and the applicability of international law in cyberspace. The UK has also repeatedly argued in favour of a multi-stakeholder approach to cyberspace governance. Furthermore, the UK government emphasises the need for a stable, peaceful and secure cyberspace that maintains human-rights standards.
+
+The UK’s international cooperation on cyber-norm development is primarily advanced through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), which funds a number of initiatives for greater norm cooperation in cyberspace; this includes, for example, funding projects identifying responsible cyber behaviour. In addition, the UK actively supports and funds cyber capacity-building in cooperation with a range of jurisdictions, particularly Commonwealth countries. In 2021, an additional £22 million for cyber capacity-building in Africa and the Indo-Pacific was announced.
+
+More recently, the UK has cooperated with its allies with respect to sanctioning cyber-criminals, as well as with attributing malicious cyber operations to state actors. Finally, the UK has concluded a large number of bilateral agreements with other jurisdictions, setting out areas of cooperation in the cyber domain, including the US, the Netherlands, Australia and Italy.
+
+
+### The EU
+
+#### Context
+
+The EU is a well-established player in the field of cyber policy and actively shapes Europe’s approach to the regulation of cyber security. Economically powerful, the EU has also proven to be highly influential on cyber-security matters, and not just when it comes to data protection. The EU implements its vision for a free and secure cyberspace through a combination of different instruments, binding regulations, standard-setting directives and influential policies (including cyber diplomacy). Whereas the EU cyber-security policy in the 2010s was still largely seen as fragmented or ‘unsystematic’, many of the more recent efforts are working towards greater horizontal integration and harmonisation among EU member states. Four key activities have stood out in the past few years.
+
+Firstly, the EU updated its cyber-security strategy in 2020 to mark the new digital decade. The updated strategy prioritises greater cyber resilience, especially for critical infrastructure, as well as increased cooperation and EU leadership on international norms and standards development. Activities in both areas are addressed in greater detail below.
+
+Secondly, the role of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, has been strengthened by the 2019 Cybersecurity Act, giving the body a permanent mandate, as well as more tasks and resources. The EU Cybersecurity Act introduces an EU-wide cyber-security certification framework for ICT products, services and processes.
+
+Thirdly, the European Commission and the European External Action Service set out the EU’s new cyber defence policy in November 2022, which is ‘intended to strengthen European Cybersecurity capacity, boost military and civilian cooperation, close potential loopholes, reduce strategic dependencies and develop cyber skills’. This policy is primarily a response to deteriorating relations with Russia, and includes setting up an EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre, as well as a network of military Computer Emergency Response Teams, an EU Cyber Commanders Conference and joint exercises. Similarly, the newly proposed Cyber Solidarity Act envisages the creation of a cyber emergency fund for incident response in the event of a large-scale cyber attack.
+
+A final noteworthy development is the proposal of the EU Cyber Resilience Act. The Commission’s proposal from September 2022 ‘aims to impose cybersecurity obligations on all products with digital elements whose intended and foreseeable use includes direct or indirect data connection to a device or network’. This includes cyber security by design as well as by default principles. The proposal is not yet in its final form, but is said to require businesses such as hardware manufacturers or software developers (as well as distributors and importers) to comply with ‘an “appropriate” level of cyber security, the prohibition [on selling] products with any known vulnerability, security by default configuration, protection from unauthorised access, limitation of attack surfaces, and minimisation of incident impact’. The Cyber Resilience Act is widely seen as a shift away from the EU’s sectoral approach to regulation, which imposes cyber-security regulations on specific products such as medical devices. Instead, the Cyber Resilience Act is intended to avoid both the fragmentation of market standards and duplication of obligations.
+
+#### Priorities for National Cyber-Resilience Measures for CNI
+
+The protection and resilience of CNI are also a growing priority for EU policymakers. In order to be prepared to respond to the landscape of heightened threats in the contemporary geopolitical context, the EU is currently seeking to update its directive on critical infrastructure (from 2008) and intends new legislation to be in force in 2024.
+
+This new legislation will be complemented by existing directives, primarily the Directive on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and the Revised Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS 2 Directive). The former was proposed by the Commission in 2020 to strengthen the resilience of critical entities that provide essential services in case of disruption, e.g., terrorist or other attacks. Member states are required to have a strategy for such events and to ‘carry out risk assessments’.
+
+Updated in 2022, the NIS 2 Directive complements the Directive on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure by obliging the same CNI entities to follow cyber-resilience obligations. It has further expanded in scope and ‘now covers medium and large entities from more sectors that are critical for the economy and society’. The updated NIS 2 Directive imposes strengthened cyber-security requirements on companies, covers the security of supply chains and further ‘introduces accountability of top management for non-compliance with the cybersecurity obligations’ alongside stricter enforcement requirements, alignment of reporting obligations and supervisory measures for national authorities. The NIS 2 Directive came into force in January 2023, giving member states until October 2024 to incorporate the measures into national law. However, there can still be national differences in implementation, and businesses and cyber-security professionals may have to comply with varying obligations, depending on the country in which they operate.
+
+The obligations set out under the NIS 2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act and the Cyber Security Act increase cyber-security obligations and expand their application to a growing number of sectors and organisations. These obligations underline the need for cyber-security expertise and further require that businesses comply with new policies; this is likely to increase demand for more cyber professionals and more cyber expertise in related fields, e.g., in procurement or project management.
+
+#### Workforce and Skills Development and Regulation
+
+To implement the increased obligations for cyber resilience set out in new and updated regulations, cyber-skills development is necessary, and the cyber workforce needs to be able to comply with these new measures. The lack of cyber-security skills in the European workforce has frequently been addressed in the literature. Not only is there a significant skills gap, which some studies find to be growing, but it is also increasingly difficult for companies to find and hire skilled cyber-security staff. Studies imply that the cyber-security labour market has been unable to match the steep rise in cybercrime and the high demand for cyber-security professionals in light of increasing digitalisation. Although skills and workforce development are dealt with by each individual member state, the EU is also responding to these issues, and has funded a wide range of initiatives in this sphere, particularly in terms of harmonising existing approaches.
+
+In 2019, the European Commission launched four projects for cyber-security research, alongside training and education programmes, but their funding is now coming to an end. They were launched in preparation for the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre (ECCC), which is currently being developed. The ECCC will be located in Bucharest and will, together with national competence centres, develop ‘a common agenda for technology development’, including in businesses, especially SMEs. Furthermore, the European Commission has plans to set up a Cybersecurity Skills Academy with a potential launch date in the third quarter of 2023. This year, 2023, is also the European Year of Skills, prompting further initiatives to address the skills shortages among the EU workforce, including in cyber security.
+
+In line with the EU’s other efforts to streamline its cyber-security policy, ENISA introduced the European Cybersecurity Skills Framework (ECSF) in September 2022. As a ‘tool to build a common understanding of the cybersecurity professional role profiles’, the ECSF sets out 12 roles and their respective skills and responsibilities, for example, those of ‘cyber incident responder’, or ‘cybersecurity educator’. However, previous studies have indicated the need for further research on what policies are most effective in supporting a robust talent pipeline for cyber-security professionals. Alongside this Framework, ENISA has also created a Cybersecurity Higher Education Database, which lists cyber-security degrees from EEA countries and Switzerland. The database is intended as a point of reference for citizens wanting to upgrade their skills through further education and training.
+
+#### International Interaction on Cyber-Norm Development
+
+In addition to its work on the close coordination of cyber policy within the EU, the EU is also active beyond the territory of its member states. The EU’s 2020 Cyber Strategy sets out to ensure an open and safe internet and for the EU to ‘step up its cooperation with partners around the world who share [its] values of democracy, rule of law and human rights’. The EU has done much to act upon these aims, with some even referring to it as a ‘norm superpower’. Indeed, the EU’s track record points towards the active role it has played in shaping the cyber-norm debate. On an international level, the EU has supported the UN processes on norm development, and also supports the proposal for a Programme of Action to Advance Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace as a permanent mechanism within the UN.
+
+Furthermore, the EU actively cooperates with other countries to strengthen their cyber security. This includes funding cyber-security measures in Eastern European countries such as Ukraine (e.g., to secure data exchanges or to protect critical infrastructure), as well as in Georgia. Together with the US, the EU plans to provide further cyber-capacity-building in Africa and the Indo-Pacific region. The EU has also funded EU CyberNet, a network of cyber-security experts and academics, to coordinate the EU’s external cyber-capacity-building projects (although this is coming to an end in 2023), as well as EU Cyber Direct, a think tank- and academia-led initiative in support of the EU’s cyber diplomacy, focusing on norm development and capacity-building programmes.
+
+In May 2019, the European Council launched a sanctions regime which enables the EU to respond to (and deter) cyber attacks. This sanctions regime, which enables collective action by the EU and its member states, is part of the ‘EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’, and it has since been extended until 2025. Potential measures include asset freezing and travel restrictions. Since its first use in 2020, the sanctions regime has been used on several subsequent occasions, for example, against the hackers who targeted the German Bundestag and those behind (inter alia) WannaCry and NotPetya. However, the attribution of cyber operations remains ‘a major challenge for EU cyber sanctions’.
+
+
+### The US
+
+#### Context
+
+The US has a strong record of advancing cyber-security policies that support an open, stable and secure cyberspace, and the country’s large private sector makes it a particularly powerful actor in the field. In March 2023, the Biden administration published a new National Cybersecurity Strategy, which is based on five key pillars:
+
+- The defence of critical infrastructure.
+
+- Disruption and dismantling of threat actors.
+
+- Shaping market forces to drive security and resilience.
+
+- Investing in a resilient future (including through workforce development).
+
+- Forging international partnerships to pursue shared goals.
+
+These key pillars will be referenced throughout this section.
+
+The new cyber-security strategy marks a change in the US approach to cyber policy, in so far as it aims to increase regulatory oversight and paves the way for further federal cyber-security regulation. By advancing an increasingly coordinated approach to cyber-security regulation, the strategy seeks to impose further binding obligations on the private sector, meaning that hardware and software vendors will be increasingly responsible for implementing cyber-security standards. If implemented into law, the new strategy proposes that technology companies may be liable for failing to implement these standards. This new cyber-security strategy is, however, in line with a number of recent US cyber policies, for example, the regulations on cyber security for oil and gas pipelines that were introduced after the 2021 Colonial Pipeline hack. Similarly, President Biden has increased binding obligations on businesses when introducing mandatory reporting for CNI operators experiencing a significant cyber attack (such as a ransomware attack). The new cyber-security strategy is the result of increased cooperation with the private sector, and this cooperation will remain a key component going forward.
+
+The new cyber-security strategy also intends to streamline US policy and to coordinate regulatory efforts. Previously, the Biden administration has often relied upon presidential interventions (for example, Executive Order 14028), but Congress has also advanced additional legislation on cyber-security issues. However, Congress can challenge or subsequently legislate contrary to an Executive Order. Similarly, in terms of the new cyber strategy, one risk is that party division in Congress could limit progress on implementing the strategy’s objectives. As a result, some think that the ‘strategy won’t have any regulatory teeth itself’. The following sections take a closer look at specific aspects of US cyber-security strategy.
+
+Priorities for National Cyber-Resilience Measures for CNI One of the main pillars of the new US cyber-security strategy relates to defending CNI. In line with the broader shift towards top-down regulatory measures set out in the cyber-security strategy, a similar shift is proposed for measures protecting CNI. In light of significant threats facing the US, Anne Neuberger, deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, considers that previous ‘voluntary efforts have been insufficient’. The new strategy thus intends to enhance regulation by establishing new cyber-security requirements in ‘certain critical sectors’ and by requiring new authorities to set regulations in other sectors. Currently, only some of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are subject to regulation. While five sectors (nuclear power, large energy generation, chemicals, financial services and major defence contractors) were subject to regulation prior to the Biden administration taking office, the Colonial Pipeline attack led to the regulation of further sectors, i.e., oil and gas pipelines, and aviation and railways. It is expected that the Environmental Protection Agency will also issue similar regulations for the water sector, leaving five sectors which are not subject to the oversight of an authority that has the competence to launch federal cyber regulation. Here, Congress could legislate to enhance further binding cyber-security standards for these sectors.
+
+The protection of CNI is further advanced by the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), founded in 2018, which has recently published its first Strategic Plan (for 2023–25). It identifies four key priorities:
+
+- Leading ‘the national effort to ensure the defense and resilience of cyberspace’.
+
+- Reducing risk to CNI, but also increasing its resilience.
+
+- Fostering whole-of-nation operational collaboration and information-sharing.
+
+- Taking a unified approach as ‘[one] CISA through integrated functions, capabilities, and workforce’.
+
+As much of the US’s CNI is owned by the private sector, government cooperation with industry is particularly important. Relevant initiatives include CISA’s Automated Indicator Sharing Program, an early warning system enabling information-sharing between companies and public agencies.
+
+Further cyber-security standards and best practices are also developed and shared by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), which works closely with industry stakeholders and public agencies: for example, all federal agencies must implement its cyber-security standards. Although guidelines such as those developed under Executive Order 14028 on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity (May 2021) are primarily aimed at federal agencies, they can also be implemented by the private sector. One priority featured in the recent work of NIST is the protection of supply chains. NIST is currently working on updating its Cybersecurity Framework (CSF 2.0). Initially aimed at CNI only, this framework is now used more widely, and has been updated using private and civil sector input. A draft of the new framework is expected by summer 2023.
+
+Updated regulations and an increase in binding cyber-security obligations across an expanding number of sectors also means that companies are reliant on cyber-security professionals to implement such obligations. The cyber workforce in these areas must have the relevant skills to fulfil such tasks, both to comply with regulations and to uphold cyber security more generally.
+
+#### Workforce and Skills Development and Regulation
+
+The obligation to comply with new cyber-security standards is linked to another key pillar of the new US cyber-security strategy – the investment in greater resilience. This pillar includes the aim of strengthening the cyber workforce and envisages the development of a National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy. Currently, the gap in the US cyber-security workforce is more than 410,000. A number of initiatives support efforts to fill this gap and improve skills development throughout the US; one noteworthy example of such efforts is the National Cyber Workforce and Education Summit that took place in July 2022, bringing together relevant stakeholders from the public and private sectors and from civil society. In this context, several further efforts were announced by multiple stakeholders, including a Cybersecurity Apprenticeship Sprint, which concluded in November 2022. The ‘sprint’ underlined a commitment to grow the adoption of apprenticeships as a pathway to employment in the US cyber-security workforce. The new cyber-security strategy also stresses the need for greater diversity, equity and inclusion in the cyber workforce. It thereby echoes previous efforts, such as a June 2021 Executive Order on Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Workforce. Several initiatives aim to increase such diversity, for example an internship programme seeking increased diversity in the New York City cyber workforce.
+
+Further examples of initiatives supporting cyber-security awareness and skills development in the US are manifold. For example, the US Security and Exchange Commission has proposed new rules that require board members of publicly traded companies to disclose their cyber expertise. CISA has also set up awareness campaigns to increase national public awareness and enhance levels of cyber-security understanding. CISA also supports a range of online training courses and has a dedicated National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS). The CyberSkills2Work initiative (2020) enables military veterans to transition into a career in cyber security. Other initiatives – primarily aimed at the younger generations – involve a range of cyber-security games and competitions. Meanwhile, individuals keen on advancing their cyber-security skills can consult the Cybersecurity Workforce Training Guide, which, together with the Cyber Career Pathways Tool, allows individuals to set out a training planin line with their skill level. Businesses that want to identify the extent of the cyber-security workforce within a specific area, or the costs associated with hiring additional cyber-security staff, can also consult the CyberSeek initiative, which provides information and an interactive map on job postings.
+
+But the gap in the cyber-security workforce persists, despite this wide range of initiatives on skills development, meaning that further research is required to better understand the effectiveness of these initiatives. Here, the newly proposed National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy is intended to coordinate the US approach to developing a stronger and more diverse cyber workforce.
+
+To harmonise the terminology used to describe the tasks and skills of cyber-security professionals, the US has adopted the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework. This sets out categories of common cyber-security functions, specialist areas of cyber-security work, and work roles, providing detailed descriptions of the required knowledge, skills and abilities for each role. Although initially launched in 2012, the current (fourth) version includes several updates made in 2020. The NICE Framework was initially advanced as a national initiative but has since been influential in many other jurisdictions, including Canada and Japan, underlining that workforce development is a global issue. Despite the widespread influence of the Framework, recent research indicates that US employers still find that graduates of US higher education institutions lack the NICE foundation. The NICE Framework continues to be updated, including through public consultation on updated Framework data such as knowledge and skills statements.
+
+#### International Interaction on Cyber-Norm Development
+
+Beyond its national policies, the US is a leader in international norm development on cyber security and the regulation of cyberspace. It strongly lobbies for a free, secure and open internet, and envisages a multi-stakeholder approach to the governance of cyberspace. This is reflected in a wide range of activities and initiatives, including the US-led (but now finished) UN Governmental Group of Experts, for which it sponsored a resolution for renewal for 2019–21, as well as multiple initiatives and exercises conducted with NATO Allies. Together with a range of like-minded countries, in 2019, the US advanced a statement on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, supporting the efforts of UN working groups. The US also became part of the Paris Call, a multi-stakeholder initiative led by France and Microsoft, in 2021, after initially being absent from the initiative.
+
+Additional partnerships also allow the US to engage in ‘strategically-minded capacity building’, for example in cooperation with the African Union. Further partnerships such as the trilateral agreement AUKUS (with the UK and Australia) aim to strengthen cyber defence and resilience in the Indo-Pacific. Cyber security in the Indo-Pacific is further supported through the Quad, particularly in light of increased threats in this area stemming from China and North Korea.
+
+The US also indirectly advances norms through cooperation with other countries, for example when attributing cyber operations to states together with Five Eyes partners and others, or when imposing sanctions on cyber criminals (as was done more recently with the UK). In addition, a wide range of bilateral agreements further ensure US cooperation on cyber-security issues with like-minded jurisdictions such as Canada (on the protection of the shared energy infrastructure) and the UK (for a joint cyber academy). US cooperation with the EU is particularly noteworthy: after years of negotiations, the EU and the US recently agreed on a draft update for the EU–US data privacy framework, and in 2021 they set up the EU–US Trade and Technology Council for closer cooperation on digital transformation and technologies, based on shared values.
+
+With respect to workforce development, the new US cyber-security strategy acknowledges that workforce development is a global issue. The strategy therefore seeks to enhance cooperation with other countries and to learn from their experience to further develop a skilled and diverse cyber workforce.
+
+
+### Canada
+
+#### Context
+
+Canada centres its cyber policy around its National Cyber Security Strategy, which was published in 2018. The core goals of this strategy were secure and resilient Canadian systems; an innovative and adaptive cyber ecosystem; and effective leadership, governance and collaboration. These goals remain valid, and an action plan guides their implementation. The 2021 mid-review of the strategy found that its targets were being met, including the establishment of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, but that challenges persist ‘in meeting the growing demands for cyber talent’.
+
+The cyber-threat landscape has expanded since the publication of Canada’s National Cyber Security Strategy. While Canada has highly developed cyber-security systems, it is also one of the most targeted countries, especially when it comes to cybercrime. The head of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security wrote in 2022 that ‘Cybercrime is still the number one cyber threat activity affecting Canadians [and the] state-sponsored cyber programs of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea continue to pose the greatest strategic cyber threat to Canada’. Canada’s internet usage has increased since the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, thereby also expanding the threat surface, both for individuals and for organisations.
+
+Although they were not caused by cyber attacks, Canada experienced internet outages in 2021 and 2022 that demonstrated the vitalness of stable connectivity and the highly connected nature of critical infrastructure sectors. The increased risk to critical infrastructure was confirmed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security’s cyber-threat assessment for 2023–24. Threats include that posed by state-sponsored cyber operations; influence-seeking by cyber-threat actors that are ‘degrading trust in online spaces’; and ransomware attacks and other forms of cybercrime targeting Canadians and Canadian organisations. Canadian cyber policy focuses on adapting to this changing threat landscape and on tackling continuing issues, such as shortages of the cyber-security professionals necessary for ensuring resilience in the context of the morphing threat landscape.
+
+#### Priorities for National Cyber-Resilience Measures for CNI
+
+Like other jurisdictions discussed in this paper, Canada stresses the importance of increasing the resilience of its critical infrastructure. Canada defines its critical infrastructure as comprising 10 sectors. Canadian CNI has been subject to several significant cyber incidents, in particular the healthcare sector and local government. The National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023–2024 points out that critical infrastructure depends on its supply chains, making CNI especially vulnerable as attackers might first target a supplier to infiltrate or disrupt CNI. Despite deteriorating relations with Russia and China, however, Canada’s 2023–24 Cyber Threat Assessment concludes that ‘state-sponsored cyber threat actors will very likely refrain from intentionally disrupting or destroying Canadian critical infrastructure in the absence of direct hostilities’.
+
+To further secure its CNI, Canada has ‘increased bilateral collaboration with the United States on critical energy infrastructure protection’. In June 2022, Canada introduced Bill C-26, which requires designated operators (i.e., those providing vital services, including in the energy, finance, transport and telecommunications sectors) to increase their cyber-security measures and to report attacks. If the bill becomes law, such measures will be enforceable by the authorities with the help of audit powers, fines and even criminal penalties. This legislation, if passed, would have a direct impact on private companies operating in Canada. If designated as operators under Bill C-26, companies will have to establish, maintain and review a cyber-security programme within 90 days, report incidents, comply with directions and maintain records of incidents and compliance. Implementing such suggested obligations will require a skilled cyber workforce.
+
+The government’s bill has been criticised as ‘potentially impair[ing] the ability of private companies to dispute demands, orders, or regulations that are issued by the government’ and for having ‘overly broad secrecy clauses’, raising concerns over transparency and accountability. Others see the mandatory reporting and information sharing between agencies as necessary steps to combat cybercrime, which in turn benefits both organisations and individuals. The bill recently finished its second reading in the Canadian House of Commons, and has yet to go to the Senate, and so it could still be amended over the course of the legislative procedure, but it could become law in 2023.
+
+#### Workforce and Skills Development and Regulation
+
+As with the other jurisdictions examined in this paper, the implementation of cyber-security obligations in Canada and the achievement of good cyber-security standards more generally there – in order to increase the country’s cyber resilience – requires a skilled cyber workforce. The shortage in Canada’s cyber-security workforce remains stable but considerable. Canada actively competes for the skilled workers it needs, particularly with the US. As US entities pay relatively higher salaries, the US is an attractive place of work for Canadians. While this leads to the risk of a ‘brain drain’ in the Canadian cyber-security sector, some commentators see lower Canadian wages as an opportunity for investors in the cyber-security sector. Within Canada itself the number of job postings among the different provinces varies considerably, with Ontario serving as the main hub of cyber-security-related jobs.
+
+With respect to cyber workforce qualifications, Canada provides both formal cyber-security education (through universities) and a range of complementary options via online courses, coding bootcamps and certification schemes. Furthermore, the Future Skills Centre supports a number of initiatives aimed at diversifying Canada’s cyber-security workforce, for example the Canadian Cybersecurity Skills and Talent Transformation scheme, a joint project with Rogers Cybersecure Catalyst. Canada has also adopted a Cybersecurity Skills Framework, which largely overlaps with the established US Cyber Security Workforce Framework (NICE), but which focuses on the needs of the Canadian labour market and SMEs.
+
+Nevertheless, in 2022 the Canadian Chamber of Commerce – in cooperation with tech companies and civil society – demanded publicly that the government further prioritise the cyber-security sector, including bolstering the cyber-security workforce ‘by investing in cybersecurity education, talent development, retention and programs that diversify and expand the cyber workforce’. TECHNATION, a not-for-profit initiative representing Canadian technology companies, lists four main challenges for workforce development in Canada, including: the need to generate and retain cyber security talent; the need for technical and non-technical roles to gain sufficient knowledge, skills and abilities; and the need to normalise cyber security within the workplace. In addition, the Canadian workforce must be ‘responsive to the changing technology landscape’. In February 2023, the Canadian government announced additional support in the form of 250 million CAD for upskilling its workforce, including in the cyber-security profession, with the help of short-cycle upskilling programmes run in partnership with Palette Skills.
+
+#### International Interaction on Cyber-Norm Development
+
+Canada has been an active partner for international cyber-norm development, for example when advocating for an open, secure and multi-stakeholder-led internet, and supporting the application of existing international law and norms of responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Canada is not in favour of the conclusion of a new international law treaty on the regulation of cyberspace. Instead, in 2022, Canada published its interpretation of existing international law applicable to cyberspace, and has promoted the applicability of norms of responsible state behaviour in various forums, such as the G7, the G20 and NATO.
+
+In its international cooperation on cyber policy, Canada is focused in particular on ‘help[ing] other countries expand their capacity building activities’, which has been ‘a key aspect of Canada’s cyber engagement strategy’. This commitment is demonstrated in a number of initiatives, focusing largely on Latin America, the Caribbean and Southeast Asia. For example, Canada has contributed significantly to cyber capacity-building, especially in Latin America, by allocating funds to the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program. Similarly, Canada works with the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism to improve participation in UN processes on cybercrime and cyber-security negotiations. Within the Organisation of American States, Canada also funded a project (as of 2022) to support other member states in targeting and understanding the implications of the gender gap in the cyber-security workforce.
+
+In cooperation with other allies, especially the Five Eyes community, Canada has repeatedly attributed malicious cyber activities to other states. It has also funded projects related to how attribution can be made. Attribution is critical, as it helps to hold malicious actors accountable, and is in line with Canada’s increasingly active role in this and other related areas.
+
+
+### Japan
+
+#### Context
+
+In Japan, the award of the 2020 Olympic Games prompted a significant increase in cyber-security awareness. Aiming to protect the 2020 Olympic Summer Games from cyber attacks, the Japanese government launched widespread campaigns to build up cyber resilience (including in the private sector) and to educate the workforce. The Olympics thus arguably served as a springboard for further raising cyber-security standards in the Japanese private sector. This aim was also reflected in the country’s 2018 Cyber Security Strategy (for 2018–21), which focused primarily on the Olympic and Paralympic Games, recognising ‘the potential cyber threat from hostile states’, and referring on its first page to the growing danger of ‘organised, sophisticated, and possibly state-sponsored’ cyber attacks. Japan’s cyber-security strategy thus focuses on protecting critical infrastructure, on stakeholder cooperation, and on the improvement of cyber security in the private sector.
+
+While these approaches were widely considered to have been successful in protecting the (Covid-19-delayed) Olympic Games, the priorities outlined above remain highly relevant in 2023. However, Japan’s approach to cyber security changed significantly in 2022, in light of an increasing number of cyber attacks against the country, and in particular given the deteriorating relationships with China and Russia. While still in the process of determining a cyber-security budget for 2024, Japan announced a significant change in its cyber strategy, including the adoption of an active cyber defence. Japan had previously alluded to deterrence capabilities in its 2018 strategy, but the recent shift is significant. Some even consider it to be a ‘turning point’ for Japan’s defence policy, which is traditionally limited by Japan’s pacifist constitution (as well as by privacy considerations). This recent shift constitutes an atypical, proactive approach, which is considered necessary to ‘actively pre-empt and stop attacks before they reach Japan’s systems’.
+
+Overall, Japan primarily pursues a top-down approach when advancing cyber-security measures domestically, relying predominantly on ‘government regulators to establish cyber-security requirements’. Japanese cyber-security policy includes key areas such as the protection of national infrastructure and the development of the cyber workforce, which will be addressed in more detail in the following sections.
+
+#### Priorities for National Cyber-Resilience Measures for CNI
+
+Among the key issues in Japanese cyber policy are the protection of critical infrastructure and improving the resilience of supply chains, as well as wider cyber-security awareness, particularly in the private sector. While ‘Japan remains a world leader in cyberspace technologies’, its own cyber-security standards have raised concerns in the past, for example in the US, which has criticised Japan’s weak cyber-security practices and has considered these to be a barrier to deeper cooperation and intelligence sharing. Yet the US and Japan have been working to overcome these differences through bilateral talks, including signing a Memorandum of Cooperation on Cybersecurity in January 2023 to strengthen the collaboration between the two countries in the area of cyber security.
+
+Japan’s CNI is primarily owned by the private sector. The Basic Cyber Security Act entails duties for operators of critical infrastructure businesses, a group that has expanded in recent years, and which now includes 14 sectors. However, these obligations are often vague, for example when requiring that CNI providers ‘deepen [their] interest in and understanding of the importance of cybersecurity’, and information-sharing on cyber incidents remains limited, for cultural and structural reasons.
+
+In an updated action plan from June 2022, the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) offers guidance for safety standards and information-sharing systems to further improve cyber-security standards in Japan. The plan, which is only available in Japanese, further recommends that businesses develop risk-management procedures, and sets out specific requirements to be met by CNI businesses and staff, including Chief Information Security Officers.
+
+Moreover, Japan passed an economic security bill in May 2022 that provides greater protection for supply chains and infrastructure with regard to cyber attacks. More specifically, it imposes obligations on companies in critical infrastructure sectors to inform the government of software updates and to ‘vet some equipment procurement’. The private sector requires a skilled workforce to implement these obligations and to raise cyber-security awareness and resilience.
+
+Beyond these measures, Japan continues to strengthen its strategic partnership with the US on cyber cooperation to ensure greater resilience, particularly if confronted with hostile actions by China.
+
+#### Workforce and Skills Development and Regulation
+
+Like other jurisdictions dealt with in this paper, Japan is experiencing shortages in the cyber-security workforce, and overall cyber-security awareness is arguably relatively low in Japan. This situation is augmented as many Japanese companies outsource their IT and cyber-security work, resulting in smaller in-house teams compared with other countries. Furthermore, Japanese work culture traditionally foresees a high rate of job rotation, which comes at the cost of acquiring specialised cyber-security skills.
+
+To respond to these skill shortages, the Japanese government has supported cyber-security skills development, for example by inaugurating the National Cyber Training Center (NICT), which offers training courses, especially for under-25s, and the Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence for training for mid-career and senior professionals. The NICT established a training programme, Cyber Colosseo, in advance of the Olympic Games, and also holds CYDER defence exercises, particularly for government officials and CNI businesses. However, information in English remains limited. To establish a common language for cyber-security skills, Japan has previously adopted the US NICE workforce framework, a choice made attractive by the fact that many Japanese companies outsource their IT outside Japan, and require an international understanding of what cyber-security talents are needed.
+
+Individuals qualified in this area are thus in high demand in Japan and have good job opportunities. One IT recruitment agency reports that qualifications such as (ISC)²’s Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) are considered useful; that there is an increased demand for cloud engineers, such as Amazon Web Services engineers; and that demand is particularly high for personnel related to public cloud services such as SaaS and IaaS. The Japanese Ministry of Defense is also increasing its role as an employer of cyber-security workers, and has plans to increase cyber-defence personnel, aiming to expand today’s 800 staff members to 5,000 by 2027.
+
+An initiative involving academia, government and the private sector founded the Cross-Sector Forum (2015) ‘to build an ecosystem to educate, recruit, retain, and train cybersecurity talent’ in Japan. The Forum has been active in advancing definitions of relevant talents and skills, and has created guidelines and provided funding for universities for cyber-security courses on which staff members of consortium partners can teach.
+
+#### International Interaction on Cyber-Norm Development
+
+Alongside these domestic policy considerations focused on increasing resilience and workforce development, Japan undertakes cyber-security diplomacy based on three main principles: the promotion of the rule of law; cooperation on capacity building; and the development of confidence-building measures. Japan has also contributed to discussions on norm development in cyberspace, for example by participating in several rounds of UN expert group discussions on cyber norms; and, in 2021, it made a public statement on its interpretation of international law in cyberspace in the UN forum.
+
+With respect to norm development, Japan has stressed a preference for voluntary and non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace (as identified by the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) report in 2015), and has voiced caution, both about extending these norms and about what it sees as the risk of prematurely debating a binding new treaty. Japan is a member of the Budapest Convention against Cybercrime and, as of 2022, had joined NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. The country is also a regular participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum’s efforts on cyber issues and participates in the G7 Cyber Expert Group.
+
+Japan also supports a number of capacity-building initiatives. These are coordinated by the NISC and focus primarily on ASEAN states. They include the annual ASEAN–Japan Cybersecurity Policy meeting and related working groups and activities. Since 2018, Japan has funded the ASEAN–Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre, which supports talent development for the region’s cyber-security workforce.
+
+Japan has a range of bilateral agreements to strengthen technology and cyber cooperation with other countries, for example with the US and the UK. With respect to the latter, both nations are currently seeking to ‘make it easier for businesses to operate in both countries by aligning approaches to digital regulation’; to improve cyber resilience; and to ‘promote initiatives to standardise the security of internet-connected products and apps’.
+
+
+### Singapore
+
+#### Context
+
+Singapore is a highly digitalised city state with advanced cyber-security regulation and policies. But as ‘the cyber ecosystem in Singapore is expanding rapidly’, Singapore has also experienced a high number of cyber attacks in recent years, for example in the form of ‘SMS-phishing scams targeting bank customers’. One study finds that 65% of organisations in Singapore were hit by ransomware attacks in 2021.
+
+To respond to the changing threat landscape and boost cyber resilience, Singapore updated its cyber-security strategy in 2021. This now rests on three strategic pillars: building resilient infrastructure; enabling a safer cyberspace; and enhancing international cyber cooperation. In addition, the strategy identifies two foundational enablers: developing a vibrant cyber-security ecosystem; and growing a robust talent pipeline.
+
+With these priorities in mind, Singapore’s strategy is that of a nation that ‘has long set its sights on becoming a world-class, tech-driven city-state’ and which, as a consequence, considers cyber security to be a matter of national security. As regulation remains critical to supporting cyber resilience, Singapore’s government ‘explore[s] expanding the government’s regulatory remit’ under the updated cyber-security act, for example, to further expand regulation beyond CNI businesses.
+
+At the same time, Singapore has launched multiple initiatives and projects in coordination with other countries and the private sector that seek to enhance cyber resilience and to educate and cultivate a much-needed IT workforce. One way the government seeks private sector engagement is through the Cybersecurity Industry Call for Innovation 2022, in which the government invites cyber-security businesses to join the effort to identify and develop ‘innovative solutions to address specific cybersecurity challenges’.
+
+#### Priorities for National Cyber-Resilience Measures for CNI
+
+As outlined in its cyber-security strategy, building a resilient infrastructure is a key pillar of Singapore’s cyber policy. To further enhance cyber-resilience measures for Critical Information Structure (CII), that is, any ‘computer or computer system located wholly or partly in Singapore’ that is ‘necessary for the continuous delivery of an essential service’, Singapore’s Cyber Security Agency (CSA) has launched a supply chain programme. This comes in the context of the increasingly complex threat landscape, but also in response to advanced digitalisation in the post-pandemic environment. The programme sets out five initiatives, including a toolkit, a handbook, a certification scheme and a learning hub, designed to support businesses in the sector, as well as a platform for international cooperation.
+
+A complementary code of practice (CCoP 2.0) sets out measures and standards that businesses in the respective CII sectors must implement. The second edition of these standards of performance came into force in July 2022 and ‘specifies the minimum requirements’ that businesses in these sectors must adhere to. Companies can, however, request waivers of requirements for valid reasons. The CCoP further provides, among other things, incident response plans, and sets out design principles for cyber security.
+
+These increased cyber-security obligations have to be implemented by businesses and the cyber workforce. However, this can prove challenging, for example with respect to the CII supply chain guide, which some have perceived as offering limited concrete points for companies to implement, for instance in case of a supply chain attack or to prevent supply chain risks.
+
+#### Workforce and Skills Development and Regulation
+
+In contrast to other jurisdictions examined in this paper, Singapore’s shortage in the cyber-security workforce lessened significantly in 2022. As it is Singapore’s ambition to be a world leader in all things cyber, the government of Singapore has introduced a broad set of measures to attract highly skilled workers, including those in the IT sector. Alongside five-year visas and visa programmes such as the TechPass, Singapore has an advanced digital infrastructure, ensuring that it is an attractive place to work.
+
+But even where favourable conditions and the right regulations are in place, ‘digital transformation will remain but a vision without the right talent to execute it’, according to Senior Minister of State Tan Kiat How. To secure such talent, further initiatives like the TechSkills Accelerator create links between students from education institutions such as the Singapore Institute of Technology and private sector companies, for example in the form of internship programmes. At the same time, there have been calls for companies to engage in more skills-based assessments, rather than relying on formal academic qualifications during hiring processes.
+
+In line with Singapore’s preference for regulation of the cyber-security sector, businesses providing cyber-security services and operating in Singapore are also subject to several regulatory frameworks. For example, where businesses offer penetration testing or managed security operations centre monitoring services, as of 2022, they are required to obtain a licence. Such measures, which could still be extended to other cyber-security services, are intended to protect consumer interests as well as to ‘improve service providers’ standards and standing over time’.
+
+Singapore’s CSA has also initiated a certification scheme that recognises businesses that have ‘adopted and implemented good cybersecurity practices’. More concretely, SMEs can achieve the CSA’s ‘Cyber Essentials’ standard, which recognises good cyber-hygiene practices. For larger and international corporations, the CSA launched the ‘Cyber Trust’ mark, which recognises ‘comprehensive measures and practices’. The CSA’s CEO, David Koh, sees the certification system as a means for companies to demonstrate their commitment ‘to ensure that they remain cyber-secure, giving them an edge over their competitors’ while simultaneously ‘providing greater assurance to their customers’.
+
+#### International Interaction on Cyber-Norm Development
+
+One of the strategic pillars of Singapore’s 2021 cyber-security strategy aims to enhance international cyber cooperation to ‘foster an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable cyberspace’. Singapore is already proactively engaging in a wide range of initiatives fostering international cooperation on cyber matters. For example, Singapore has been an active participant in UN norm processes, including the UN’s GGE and the Open-Ended Working Group, where Singapore has called for a ‘UN cyber fellowship program for small states that would support the training in cyber issues for mid- to senior level officials from smaller developing countries’. Furthermore, Singapore co-chairs, with Estonia, the UN Group on e-governance and cybersecurity, and chairs the UN Group of Friends on Digital Technologies, in cooperation with Finland and Mexico.
+
+Singapore hosts the annual Singapore International Cyber Week, a high-level event on cyber security fostering cooperation in the field, including on norm implementation. Singapore has also been active in regional capacity building, for example when it announced in 2019 that it would provide around $22 million for the establishment of the ASEAN–Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence which, among other things, trains computer emergency response teams.
+
+To further support these ambitions, Singapore has multiple bilateral agreements with countries such as Australia, Japan, France, Germany, the UK and the US, all working on improving cyber capabilities in Southeast Asia. In late 2022, the Inaugural US–Singapore Cyber Dialogue was held, providing a platform of exchange for officials to discuss both further cooperation and topics such as supply-chain security, cyber capacity building, and cyber talent and workforce development.
+
+
+### Concluding Remarks
+
+The following concluding remarks set out initial comparative observations based on the research underlying this paper, and point to areas that require further research to better understand the various regulatory approaches to cyber-security issues.
+
+- All the jurisdictions discussed in this paper have advanced a cyber strategy. While these strategies certainly take into account the cyber threat landscape and wider global contexts, aspects of the strategies remain specific to each jurisdiction (such as the Olympic Games in Japan). However, some common themes can be observed across the strategies:
+
+ - Strategies are regularly updated in line with domestic timelines, but they also respond to international events. In the timeframe examined for this paper, recent trends include the rise of cybercrime, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, heightened tensions between China and Taiwan, and the increased need to secure CNI and supply chains.
+
+ - These strategy updates increasingly focus on harmonising and streamlining each jurisdiction’s existing and developing cyber policies. Such harmonisation is advanced to avoid both fragmentation and the duplication of effort. This is reflected in the UK’s 2022 strategy and its ‘whole of society’ approach, and in the EU’s efforts to move away from a sectoral approach towards a more cohesive cyber policy, including the development of a skilled cyber workforce.
+
+ - There is a noticeable trend towards interventionist policies that emphasise regulatory approaches to cyber security, rather than voluntary standards. This trend was already apparent in the UK’s 2016 cyber strategy, and is now also reflected in the US’s 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy. In line with this trend, businesses and cyber-security professionals must anticipate regulatory changes if they are to keep up with varying and increasingly binding obligations.
+
+- Greater protection of CNI is a priority for all the jurisdictions discussed in this paper. Although the number and scope of sectors categorised as CNI varies from one jurisdiction to another, many of the designated sectors are common. Further efforts to advance mandatory cyber-security measures beyond CNI sectors is also a priority for many jurisdictions, which again has a direct impact on businesses and the cyber-security professionals who have to implement them. Thus businesses and cyber-security professionals have to simultaneously comply with changing and at times varying obligations among different jurisdictions – particularly if they operate internationally. Further research comparing and contrasting the varying scope of CNI designations and the respective cyber-security obligations for businesses and cyber-security professionals could help clarify ways for them to navigate the different requirements, and identify the skills required from the workforce where businesses operate across a range of jurisdictions. Further research could also explore opportunities and approaches for harmonising the range of frameworks, policies, initiatives and changing regulations that currently exist.
+
+- Although often a whole range of tools, frameworks and initiatives improving public–private partnerships are available to guide businesses in implementing these measures, it is not always clear what these obligations entail in detail. This is especially true for non-binding or vague standards. Although much information is available in English, where this is not the case it is especially challenging for external businesses and cyber-security professionals to understand how to comply with these obligations. Again, further comparative research would help businesses and cyber-security professionals understand the practical impact of changing regulations, new cyber-security measures and – especially – the varying obligations they must comply with, such as reporting requirements.
+
+- A common theme seen across all the jurisdictions examined is the shortage of personnel in the cyber-security workforce, exacerbated by global events and trends, such as the Covid-19 pandemic and increased digitalisation. In fact, many of the jurisdictions outlined here compete directly with each other for skilled workers (for example, the US and Canada) or rely heavily on outside cyber expertise (as is the case for Japan). Governments have responded to such shortages by acknowledging the need to improve skills development through a range of initiatives. Many of the measures in place across the different jurisdictions resemble one another, especially where they focus on attracting young people to cyber-security professions, or involve adopting skills frameworks such as NICE or the ECSF to harmonise the language used to describe cyber-security roles. Some jurisdictions prioritise specific aspects in their efforts to support a robust talent pipeline, for example when aiming for greater diversity with respect to gender (Canada, the US) and region (the UK). However, despite the multitude of initiatives fostering skills development, little is known about their effectiveness. More research is needed to understand which initiatives help eliminate discrepancies between education and the demands of industry and, as a result, reduce the gaps in the cyber-security workforce. Singapore would make an interesting case study, providing further insights into the effectiveness of measures taken in 2022, when the city state was successful in reducing its gap in the cyber workforce.
+
+- Overall, the jurisdictions studied in this paper share a cooperative, proactive attitude to the development of norms applicable to cyberspace, and seek to advance a free and secure internet. All entities covered are active supporters of the UN processes for norm development in cyberspace and engage in a range of multilateral, bilateral and multi-stakeholder arrangements, seeking greater cooperation on cyber issues with other states, regional organisations, and the private sector. Areas for cooperation include norm development and capacity building, but also the development of cyber-security skills and closing the gap in the cyber workforce.
+
+---
+
+__Pia Hüsch__ is a Research Analyst in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focusses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations. Prior to joining RUSI, Pia conducted her doctoral research on the lawfulness of low-intensity offensive cyber operations in international law, particularly under the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.
+
+__James Sullivan__ is the Director of Cyber Research at RUSI, where his research focuses on the most pressing cyber and technology policy challenges of our time. James founded and has grown a research group at RUSI that supports UK and international strategic responses to cyber-related challenges.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-26-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-51.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-04-26-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-51.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 51 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-04-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方需時審視鍾錦麟手機資料 押下周四續審
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（26日）踏入審訊第51天。控方昨表示上周六（22日）始破解第三名控方證人鍾錦麟的電話，辯方需時審視昨午才收到的逾2,400則訊息，押至今天處理。辯方今表示仍需時審視，望於下周才傳召鍾錦麟，法官陳慶偉押至下周四（5月4日）續審，又向控方指「不希望再有任何意外和延遲」。法官李運騰關注審訊進度，提及他於9月底有案件要處理，又指除不認罪的16名被告，亦需時處理其餘31人的求情判刑。翻查資料，黎智英及《蘋果日報》3間公司涉勾結外國勢力案定於9月底開審。
+
+#### 辯方需時審視新訊息 鍾錦麟押至下周四作供 官：不希望再有任何任何意外和延遲
+
+控方昨表示，於上周六（22日）始破解鍾錦麟電話，並於昨午向辯方提供逾2,400則訊息。控方稱不會依賴新資料，辯方則指需時審視，押後至今天處理。
+
+代表黃碧雲和林卓廷的大律師沈士文今表示，團隊仍在審視新的WhatsApp訊息和附件，亦需向當事人索取指示，建議鍾錦麟的主問押後至本周五開始，並望能於當天完結，可於下周四開始盤問，並指大部分辯方律師均同意。法官早前宣布，明天（27日）、下周二及周三（5月2日及3日）均不開庭。
+
+
+▲ 鍾錦麟（資料圖片）
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 則表示，雖然他有助手能讀中文，但他不能，故其進度較慢，希望下周才傳召鍾錦麟。坐在 Beel 身旁的大律師黃廷光沒有配戴假髮，法官陳慶偉一度着 Beel：「叫你的鄰座戴上他的假髮」。
+
+法官陳慶偉遂指，不認為有太大分別，或可於下星期開始，期間各方也可索取指示，又向控方指：「我不希望再有任何意外和延遲。（I hope there won’t be any more surprise and delay.）」，多名被告發笑。主控萬德豪表示，應不會再有類似的披露情況。
+
+此外，代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉表示，他此前曾代表鍾錦麟作保釋申請。法官李運騰問是在另一宗案件？馬指是這宗案件，但是在最早的保釋申請階段，而其後的發展與他無關。他又指，控方和辯方均知悉此情況，沒有人反對。陳慶偉表示明白，會再考慮。
+
+#### 官關注審訊進度 指需處理31人求情
+
+李運騰其後表示，由於趙家賢已完成作供，相信之後的證人需時較短，問審訊是否仍預計需時90日？萬德豪指，視乎可同意多少事實，仍與辯方商討。李運騰指越快越好，因他在9月底有很重大的案件要處理（very substantive engagement），又指考慮到法官的數量，更換法官並不可行。李又指，大律師關文渭也有參與該案，關則指主控周天行亦有參與該案。翻查資料，壹傳媒創辦人黎智英與《蘋果日報》3間公司被控「串謀勾結外國勢力」等罪，原定今年9月25日開審，李運騰為該案主審法官之一，本案主控周天行亦為該案主控。
+
+萬德豪表示，預計本周能給予答覆。李運騰再指，除了不認罪的16名被告，尚要處理其餘31名被告的判刑，假設每天可聽取兩人求情，31人也需要兩星期，還未計可能要爭拗案情撮要。萬德豪指會盡力。
+
+大律師黃宇逸最後表示，希望控方能提供將會傳召的證人名單，法官着他直接問控方。聆訊不足10分鐘完結。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Dangerous Targets
+author: Darya Dolzikova and Jack Watling
+date : 2023-04-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/C7Gw8zF.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Dangerous Targets: Civilian Nuclear Infrastructure and the War in Ukraine"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 saw the immediate capture by Russian forces of Ukraine’s Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP). A few days later, Russian forces attacked the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) – the first instance of an operational nuclear power plant (NPP) directly targeted as part of a military operation._ _Over the past year, Russia’s military activity in Ukraine has resulted in serious threats to the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure, and there is good reason to believe that Russia has violated the protections granted to NPPs in international humanitarian law (IHL). Given the significant projected global increase in the number of nuclear reactors over the coming decades, it is likely that this will not be the last time NPPs are in the midst of military conflict. This report seeks to assess the risks the ongoing war poses to NPPs in Ukraine and to draw preliminary conclusions from these events to improve the safety and security of NPPs in conflict._
+
+The greatest threat to Ukraine’s NPPs is unlikely to be from a direct strike on a reactor and an ensuing large-scale radiological incident similar to the 1986 Chornobyl disaster, but rather the failure of key systems – namely, water and energy supply – or human error, potentially resulting in an incident not unlike what occurred at Fukushima Daiichi NPP in 2011. The threat of direct strike is more of a concern when it comes to the pool-type spent nuclear fuel storage or the sarcophagus containing the remnants of the destroyed Unit 4 at the ChNPP, which are not designed to be as robust as the containment structures over the operating reactors. There is also a risk that Ukraine may run out of available storage for its used nuclear fuel as it cannot currently transport spent fuel safely. Finally, the possibility that Russia may manufacture a radiological incident at the ZNPP or another facility to spoil a Ukrainian offensive should not be disregarded.
+
+This report makes three sets of recommendations. The first relates to mitigating the immediate risks posed to nuclear infrastructure in Ukraine. The second relates to strengthening regulations, standards and other considerations to mitigate against potential threats to nuclear safety and security in conflict. The third relates to the conduct of military operations around NPPs.
+
+To improve nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, the international community should:
+
+- Ensure the personal safety and welfare of staff at NPPs, including sufficient staffing levels.
+
+- Ensure sufficient licensed Ukrainian staff are ready to resume operations at the ZNPP following Russian withdrawal from the facility.
+
+- Facilitate the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel to dry-storage facilities, where appropriate.
+
+- Assess availability of highly radioactive waste storage facilities and certify additional storage if needed.
+
+- Provide chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, emergency response and other necessary equipment, training and support to the Ukrainian military, emergency services and NPP operators.
+
+- Provide regular updates on the supply of fuel for emergency generators at Ukrainian nuclear facilities, as well as the water levels in the Kakhovka Reservoir.
+
+- Ensure the safe supply of diesel fuel, maintenance parts and services, and other materials necessary for the safe operation of Ukraine’s NPPs.
+
+- Penalise Rosatom staff operating at the ZNPP for participating in Russia’s occupation of Ukraine.
+
+- Establish deterrence against a deliberately manufactured radiological incident by making clear to Russia that any such incident would be followed by a massive response to mitigate damage and expanded support for Ukraine’s war effort.
+
+To mitigate against potential threats to nuclear safety and security in future conflict, the international community should:
+
+- Consider, and adopt the necessary prevention and mitigation measures for, state-level military conflict and occupation of nuclear facilities by an invading force as part of national threat assessments, design-basis threats and wider national defence and security planning.
+
+- Include considerations on military attack and occupation of nuclear facilities in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear safety and security standards.
+
+- Harden physical protections in the design of new NPPs.
+
+- Harden existing NPPs.
+
+To ensure the safety and security of NPPs in areas of active operations, the international community should:
+
+- Establish a 1-km demilitarised zone around NPPs.
+
+- Grant special protected status to critical NPP safety, security and emergency response systems.
+
+- Define an obligation for the establishment of deconfliction lines by militaries operating around NPPs, as well as the nuclear regulators or other responsible authorities in the concerned states.
+
+- Establish regulations relating to effects of cyber and electromagnetic activities applied in the vicinity of NPPs.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 led to widespread fears over the safety and security of nuclear power plants (NPPs) after Russian forces occupied two of Ukraine’s five NPPs, struck a nuclear research reactor in Kharkiv and severed power to a research reactor in Kyiv. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the first time that operational NPPs have been the direct objectives of military operations. There are strong reasons to believe that similar challenges are likely to feature in future conflicts. The number of NPPs is expanding globally, and this may accelerate as countries seek to generate power while reducing their carbon emissions. As NPPs become a more prevalent source of energy production, and as energy itself becomes ever-more critical to the wider functioning of societies, warring states will likely seek to exert control over them. It is therefore important to consider how the international community should maximise the safety of NPPs in a conflict context.
+
+This report aims to consolidate three interrelated discussions. First, it seeks to provide an overview of the safety risks extant in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, what the Ukrainian state has learned from its experiences and what measures may improve the safety of its NPPs during the ongoing conflict. Second, the report seeks to summarise civilian and military actors’ existing obligations and approaches towards NPPs and identify conflicting imperatives that could expose NPPs to risk in future conflicts. Third, the report makes recommendations as to how states can improve the safety and security of their NPPs and how militaries should think about operating around these objects.
+
+#### Methodology and Definitions
+
+The methodology for this report involves four strands. First, the authors interviewed staff from Ukraine’s NPPs, officials involved in Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and governance, security officials responsible for assessing threats to Ukraine’s NPPs, National Guard personnel responsible for the physical protection of the NPPs, and military personnel conducting operations in the vicinity of Ukraine’s NPPs. The authors carried out many of these interviews in Ukraine in March 2023. Second, the report draws on physical inspection of Ukrainian nuclear facilities and observation of operations conducted in their vicinity in the summer of 2022. Third, the report draws on a review of publicly available information and assessments of the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure – before and since February 2022 – produced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ukrainian authorities and other experts. Fourth, the report draws on a comparative survey of military doctrine and the historical record of military operations affecting NPPs both directly and indirectly. Academic literature and expert commentary and analysis on nuclear safety and security in conflict, including in the ongoing war in Ukraine, also informed this report.
+
+The report is structured in three parts. The first is a narrative account and analysis of the safety and security issues that have arisen during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The second surveys the extant governance of safety at NPPs, existing international standards relating to NPPs in conflict zones and the perspective of militaries as to how NPPs are relevant to military operations. The third outlines recommendations for how NPPs can be rendered safer in conflict scenarios and how militaries can best ensure this during operations.
+
+The terms ‘nuclear safety’ and ‘nuclear security’ are used in this report according to their IAEA definitions:
+
+- Nuclear safety refers to: ‘The achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation risks’.
+
+- Nuclear security refers to: ‘The prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities’ and ‘The prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive material or their associated facilities’.
+
+In the context of attacks on NPPs or supporting infrastructure during a military conflict, the distinction between nuclear safety and security can become blurred. Where either term may be relevant, the authors have used them together. When the discussion exclusively concerns one or the other, the terms have been used according to the above definitions.
+
+The subject of nuclear safety and security encompasses a broad range of issues, not all of which are covered in this report. The report’s primary focus is the threats to the safe operation of civilian nuclear facilities and to the physical integrity of nuclear facilities in conflict – and in the Ukrainian context in particular – with a view to understanding whether and how military operations may directly result in a radiological incident. As such, nuclear and radiological security issues as they pertain to the unauthorised removal of material from facilities – as well as matters related to unauthorised access to facilities, other than as part of military occupation of a facility – have been largely excluded from this report. Considerations of the application of IAEA safeguards at Ukrainian facilities are also not treated here. That is not to say that these matters are not relevant when discussing nuclear safety and security in the context of the war in Ukraine; in fact, there are serious, justified concerns over these issues. However, these were judged to be outside of this report’s scope and deserve to be treated comprehensively in a separate publication.
+
+
+### Risks to Nuclear Safety and Security in Ukraine
+
+Prior to the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, more than 50% of Ukraine’s domestic energy supply came from NPPs. The country hosts 15 operational nuclear reactors for energy generation, with an additional two reactors located at research facilities and four reactors in permanent shutdown at Chornobyl. As such, the significant likelihood and impact of attacks on the country’s nuclear infrastructure as part of the Russian invasion should have been evident from the start. In fact, the capture of Ukraine’s NPPs was a key objective in Russian military planning for the invasion. The Chornobyl NPP (ChNPP) and surrounding Exclusion Zone – the site of the 1986 nuclear disaster – is located on Ukraine’s border with Belarus and straddled the Russian military’s axis of advance from Gomel to Kyiv. Despite this, the Ukrainian government does not appear to have significantly adjusted its forces to defend its NPPs in the lead-up to the full-scale invasion, nor could the authors ascertain the existence of any extant procedures for defending the country’s operating NPPs under the conditions of a military conflict.
+
+The physical protection of Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure (CNI) – including its NPPs – is the responsibility of the National Guard of Ukraine, a unit of which is stationed at each NPP. Until the full-scale invasion, these units were structured, trained and equipped primarily to protect facilities from terrorist threats, theft and sabotage. This is largely in line with international standards, as the defence of NPPs against an invading military is not covered by the international nuclear safety and security regime. Ukraine had conducted a design-basis threat (DBT) for nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other radiation sources in August 2015 and reportedly took into account the threats emanating from the Russian incursion into Donbas. DBTs for individual NPPs were also conducted in recent years. The authors also heard that an updated DBT assessment was apparently completed in 2022 but may not have been approved as of early 2023. The sensitive nature of these assessments has also meant that the authors could not confirm what specific threats were identified in 2015 or more recently. DBTs normally include only those threats to a nuclear facility’s physical security that the facility’s operator can reasonably address and focus on unauthorised access to the facility, sabotage, terrorist attack or theft of material. Defence against military attack is generally deemed to be beyond the DBT and is the primary responsibility of state authorities, and should be addressed as part of the country’s wider defence and security planning.
+
+However, it is clear that Ukrainian authorities were aware of threats to the security of nuclear facilities and material in the country following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the breakout of military activity in eastern Ukraine in 2014. In its ‘National Progress Report’ to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Ukraine outlined efforts it had taken to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation. However, based on the threats and mitigation measures addressed in that report, the primary focus appears to have been dealing with lower-level threats such as political instability and sabotage, not accounting for a Russian military assault on – or occupation of – NPPs.
+
+In its 2021 report on the state of nuclear and radiological safety in Ukraine, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) noted that its assessment of threats to the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material in Ukraine considered Russian military activity in eastern Ukraine and ‘hybrid’ socio-political threats. According to the report, measures were taken to strengthen the physical protection of facilities and radioactive material in transport, facility access control was improved, and protection personnel underwent training for countering terrorism and sabotage threats. The report also highlighted the role of the National Guard in the protection of nuclear facilities and noted that inspections carried out that year concluded that the detachments responsible for NPP protection demonstrated ‘sufficient levels of readiness to perform their obligations in the prevention of acts of terrorism or sabotage against NPPs’. The authors could not ascertain any assessment as to the preparedness of the National Guard, or any other national preparations, to defend against full-scale military attack on facilities; although, due to its sensitive nature, such information is unlikely to be reported publicly.
+
+The apparent failure to put in place a more substantial defence of NPPs against invading forces raises questions. Speaking to personnel responsible for the safety and security of Ukraine’s NPPs, it is evident that they had not enacted special measures in anticipation of conflict prior to 24 February 2022. The fact that senior Russian agents in Ukraine had obscured the threat to the Ukrainian authorities may partly explain this. Ukraine’s state security service (SBU) and the US government accuse Andriy Derkach, former head of the state enterprise Energoatom, of working as a long-term Russian agent along with senior SBU officers including Brigadier General Andriy Naumov who was also involved in the security of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Perhaps reflecting this internal distortion of the Ukrainian state’s risk perception, Ukraine’s minister of energy stated, not long before Russian forces captured the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), that the facility did not face a serious threat.
+
+Crossing into Ukraine from Belarus on the morning of 24 February, Russian military forces seized the ChNPP within hours. As the Russians approached the NPP, Valentin Vitter, deputy head of security of the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone, called the National Guard detachment responsible for the protection of the NPP and ordered its surrender, citing the risk to the station as the combined arms armies of Russia’s Eastern Military District rolled over the border. As a senior officer in the unit noted, ‘we were facing down a Blitzkrieg with pistols’. Two things quickly became evident: Moscow had long planned to seize the site; and the Russian military was woefully unprepared for operating around a nuclear facility. Russia’s special services seized the plant’s archives and all data held at the facility. The Ukrainian workforce was held hostage to maintain facility operations. Russian troops proceeded to establish a command post and supply base in close proximity to the NPP. Given the plentiful availability of structures suitable for establishing command and supply activities within the 30-km Exclusion Zone, the authors assess the decision to site these functions by the NPP to have been deliberate, and with the aim of using the facility as a shield. Alongside these clearly planned actions, Russian units dug trenches within the Exclusion Zone, digging up radioactive particles that had settled into the soil since the 1986 disaster, dragging them around the site and facility buildings and raising the radiation levels in the zone.
+
+By 3 March, Russian forces from the Southern Military District had reached the ZNPP and set about occupying the facility. Ukrainian forces marked the facility with spotlights at night, shining them directly upwards in an attempt to indicate its location for troops. Despite these measures, Russian forces hit the site’s training facility with tank rounds and caused a fire. The risk to the civilian population in the nearby towns from conducting active military defence of the NPP led the National Guard unit tasked with defending the facility to withdraw. As at the ChNPP, the Russians rapidly set about placing military supply vehicles and command-and-control systems in the ZNPP’s immediate vicinity. According to the IAEA, military equipment and stores were still present within the turbine halls of ZNPP Units 1 and 2 as of February 2023. Ukrainian plant employees were forced to continue operating the facility without rotation and under duress, with some being detained by Russian forces.
+
+While Russian forces departed from the ChNPP at the end of March 2022, the ZNPP remains under Russian control at the time of writing. The ongoing military operations around the facility, as well as the broader state of war across the country, pose significant threats to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine.
+
+#### Assessing Safety and Security Risks During the Invasion
+
+The threats that the military invasion posed to Ukraine’s nuclear facilities became clear immediately, with additional risks becoming apparent over time. On the day of the invasion and Russia’s seizure of the ChNPP, the IAEA lost connection with the site’s radiation monitoring network. Two days later, on 26 February, the ZNPP lost power supply from one of its four external power lines. On 4 March, Russian forces took control of the ZNPP and – as described earlier – a projectile struck the plant’s on-site training facility, resulting in a localised fire breaking out a few hundred metres from the reactor units. On 6 March, the ZNPP lost power supply from another one of its external power lines. Many other incidents have occurred over the past 15 months that have placed the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities at risk and raised international concerns over potential consequences. More recently, a Russian mine reportedly exploded near the engine room of a ZNPP reactor unit, and IAEA personnel stationed at the ZNPP in mid-April 2023 have reported hearing daily shelling. The risks of both an accidental and intentional radiological incident are considered below.
+
+__Strikes on Reactor Units__
+
+The 1986 disaster at the ChNPP still looms large in public memory; as such, it is unsurprising that the accident has repeatedly been used as a point of reference when the potential consequences of Ukraine’s NPPs getting caught in the crossfire of the ongoing conflict are discussed. However, the likelihood of a 1986-scale disaster is low. Unlike the graphite-moderated RBMK (reaktor bolshoy moschnosti kanal’niy, high-power channel-type reactor) reactors at Chornobyl – now all decommissioned – Ukraine’s operating NPPs host water-cooled and moderated VVER (vodo-vodyanoi energeticheskiy reaktor, water-water power reactor) reactors, which are much less prone to some of the factors resulting from reactor malfunction and human error that caused and exacerbated the Chornobyl accident. The release and dispersion of highly radioactive material at a scale comparable to the Chornobyl disaster would require the penetration of a facility housing radioactive material – namely, a reactor or a spent-fuel storage facility – and the large-scale release of that material into the atmosphere and surrounding environment, likely assisted by plumes of smoke from a fire. While this is technically possible, the authors judge it to be unlikely for reasons described below.
+
+An accidental hit on a reactor unit or a dry spent-fuel storage facility under the current state of military activity around Ukrainian NPPs is unlikely to cause a major radiological incident. The reactors currently operating at Ukrainian NPPs are located within reinforced containment structures, as per IAEA standards. These structures are designed to withstand significant internal and external hazards, including fires, explosions, earthquakes and radioactive release from other accidents. When it comes to loads from external impacts, the IAEA standards require reactor containment structures to be robust enough to withstand the force of an aircraft crashing into them. Ukraine’s dry spent-fuel storage facilities at the ZNPP and ChNPP are also protected in reinforced concrete structures. According to one recent ZNPP employee, a control cask at the NPP’s dry fuel storage – used to monitor the state of the other casks at the facility over time – was struck by artillery shrapnel during an exchange of fire but did not sustain significant damage. The authors could not verify the accuracy of this account, but it is consistent with expert analysis of the threat to dry spent-fuel storage from external impact. Furthermore, the spent fuel in dry storage facilities has been cooled for some time and is therefore significantly less radioactive than fuel inside a reactor core or the more recently withdrawn spent fuel stored in pool-type wet storage facilities.
+
+Artillery fire, which has been the primary military threat to Ukraine’s NPPs since the full-scale invasion, is unlikely to cause any serious damage to the integrity of the containment or dry spent-fuel storage structures. The most widely employed fires throughout the conflict have been high-explosive artillery rounds intended to deliver fragmentation and overpressure effects against enemy personnel. Other classes of rounds employed – such as sensor-fused sub-munitions – are designed to find and strike objects with specific characteristics, such as vehicles, and would not be effective against the containment structure.
+
+Penetrating a containment structure and, subsequently, a reactor core would require applying significant and targeted firepower. Bunker-busting rounds such as HESH (high-explosive squash head) munitions, armour-piercing rounds including APFSDS (armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot) kinetic penetrators and other direct-fire weapons including anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs) could risk compromise to the facility, especially if repeated hits were delivered against the structure. Missiles with warheads intended to destroy hardened structures and especially hypersonic strikes from ballistic missiles could also pose a threat to the facility. Heavy air-delivered ordnance may compromise the containment structure. Nevertheless, this would likely require multiple hits, and since these are precision weapons or weapons employed against specific target classes, their use against an NPP would not be accidental. It is important to note that there is no effective means of preventing hits from ballistic missiles, since air and missile defences can only ensure partial protection.
+
+Thus, while deliberate compromise of Ukrainian reactor units or dry spent-fuel storage facilities resulting in a significant radiological incident is possible, incidental or accidental compromise is far less likely. The authors judge such an intentional strike unlikely but not unimaginable. Circumstances in which deliberate sabotage of nuclear facilities may occur are discussed later in this report.
+
+Two facilities at the ChNPP do not benefit from the same level of hardened protection as the reactors and dry storage sites, and may be more likely to sustain serious damage from lighter fire or accidental hits. These are the ChNPP’s Interim Spent Fuel 1 facility (ISF-1) and the New Containment Structure (NCS): the enormous concrete and steel sarcophagus containing the remnants of the reactor at Unit 4, destroyed during the 1986 disaster. Unlike the dry spent-fuel storage facilities at the ChNPP and the ZNPP, ISF-1 – a wet spent-fuel storage facility – is not hardened or housed within a reinforced containment structure. Constructing a containment structure to protect ISF-1 would be costly, time consuming and impractical to do while hostilities are ongoing and Russian forces and artillery remain stationed just a few kilometres away in Belarus. The most practical solution would be to move the spent fuel from ISF-1 into the significantly better reinforced new dry spent-fuel storage facility – ISF-2 at the ChNPP. In fact, the transfer of spent fuel from ISF-1 to ISF-2 began in November 2020, as the former is not designed for long-term fuel storage and is running out of space to accept new spent fuel. The process was expected to take 10 years under peacetime conditions. However, transfer of fuel stopped after the full-scale invasion. As the ChNPP is located within range of Russian artillery, moving fuel between the two facilities has been deemed too dangerous.
+
+Equally, although the NCS over Unit 4 is an impressive and robust structure designed to withstand earthquakes and class-3 tornados, it is not designed to withstand the same kinds of loads or impact as the containment structures of operational reactors. While Unit 4 at ChNPP has not been operational since the 1986 accident, what remains of the reactor is still highly radioactive. The installation of the NCS, which was completed in 2016, is designed to prevent the spread of radioactive particles from the damaged reactor. An attack on, and penetration of, the NCS and the old sarcophagus – which was built hastily over the Unit 4 reactor immediately following the accident and is now enclosed within the NCS – would cause the release of radioactive particles into the surrounding area and atmosphere. One member of the Ukrainian National Guard responsible for the protection of the ChNPP stated such an accident would essentially produce ‘a massive dirty bomb’.
+
+Senior staff of the Chornobyl Central Enterprise for the Management of Radioactive Waste raised similar concerns regarding potential attacks on the other radioactive waste storage facilities, such as the one at Buryakivka village in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone. The authors also heard concerns over Ukraine’s ability to store any radioactive waste that may result from an accident at an NPP – whether at the ChNPP or at any of the country’s other facilities. According to the representatives of the Chornobyl Central Enterprise for the Management of Radioactive Waste, there is currently a shortage of storage for highly radioactive materials in Ukraine. New storage facilities can be constructed but any such effort will require extensive resources, as well as a lengthy risk assessment and other government review and approval processes.
+
+__Risks to NPP Power and Water Supply__
+
+The penetration of NPP structures housing radioactive materials by munitions is not the only risk to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine posed by the ongoing conflict. The interruption of systems critical to the safe operation of Ukraine’s NPPs – namely, the supply of water and electricity – creates significant risks and may result in a scenario similar to the 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP. In that instance, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake caused the automatic shutdown and loss of external power supply at the NPP’s light water reactors. The earthquake was followed by a tsunami, which caused the failure of emergency power generators. With no power available to cool the reactor fuel, the units experienced nuclear fuel meltdown and hydrogen explosions (caused by zirconium reacting with the steam that resulted from rising temperatures in the reactors). Only one of the containment structures housing the NPP’s reactors was breached, releasing radioactive material into the atmosphere. Nevertheless, more than 100,000 people had to be relocated as a result of radioactive contamination in the areas around the reactor.
+
+Should reactors lose access to electricity or water supply for an extended period, Ukraine’s NPPs may face similar consequences. Since the start of the full-scale invasion and as of the drafting of this report, the ZNPP has lost external power supply six times – most recently on 9 March 2023. The ChNPP lost external power supply on 9 March 2022 and again on 23 November 2022, when Russian attacks on Ukraine’s national electrical grid also resulted in power outages at all of the country’s other NPPs. In all instances, on-site diesel power generators were able to maintain power supply to the reactor units.
+
+A reliable supply of power is critical for the safe operation of nuclear reactors. Reactor fuel is extremely hot and must be constantly cooled to avoid melting and causing a Fukushima-like nuclear meltdown. The cooling process involves pumping cold water into the first circuit of the reactor and removing hot water with powerful pumps. The heat is then removed using a heat exchange system; at the ZNPP, this process currently relies on water from the Dnipro River. In the case of a power loss, these pumps stop operating, thus halting the circulation of water through the reactor’s first circuit, risking an overheating of the reactor core and subsequent melting of the reactor’s fuel.
+
+A constant supply of coolant is needed even when reactors are in cold shutdown – as is the case with four of Ukraine’s 15 power units (one additional ZNPP reactor, previously in hot shutdown, is reportedly also being moved into cold shutdown as of the time of drafting) – as the nuclear fuel remains extremely hot. The same is true of spent fuel which has been removed from a reactor core; depleted fuel assemblies continue to release significant amounts of heat and must be cooled in water for some time before they can be transferred to dry fuel storage. However, as experts have rightly pointed out, the ZNPP reactors have been in shutdown for months, meaning their core temperatures are much lower than those of the reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP at the time of the accident. As a result, they can be expected to remain safe for several days without power supply when in cold shutdown. Ukrainian authorities offered a similar assessment to the authors. The same is true of spent-fuel facilities, as spent nuclear fuel will have had time to cool since it was extracted from the reactors. In the case of dry spent-fuel storage facilities, the spent fuel will have also spent some time in wet storage and had additional time to cool before being transferred to dry storage casks.
+
+Another risk emanating from a loss of power stems from the need to manage the hydrogen produced by the operation of the reactors to prevent a hydrogen explosion. As a result of radiolysis of the water in the reactor, hydrogen is produced and must be removed from the reactor building. Its removal depends on the operation of powerful turbines, which require a constant supply of power. Should these turbines stop operating, gas build-up may lead to a Fukushima-like hydrogen explosion.
+
+Following the Fukushima accident, Ukrainian NPPs’ safety systems and resistance to accidents were stress tested. The authors reviewed reports detailing the results and found that the tests carried out at the ChNNP and ZNPP were primarily focused on extreme natural events. They also included considerations around the loss of water or power supply in extraordinary conditions, some of which may be relevant to current conditions. A series of recommendations for improving the safety and emergency response systems at the NPPs were put forward following the stress tests, and a National Action Plan for their implementation was developed in 2013. The recommendations included: the placement at NPPs of additional emergency diesel generators and mobile water pumps which can maintain water circulation for heat removal in case of a loss of external power; the strengthening of containment structures; and the installation of radionuclide filters and hydrogen recombiners to reduce the likelihood of hydrogen explosions. As of 2021, 80% of the safety improvement measures outlined in the National Action Plan had been completed, with the rest expected to be finalised by 2024. It is unclear how the Russian invasion has affected this timeline.
+
+While emergency diesel generators have been able to maintain power supply to Ukraine’s NPPs following every instance of external power supply loss so far, repeatedly relying on backup generators to maintain the safe operation of an NPP is a very dangerous game to play – especially in a conflict situation. The supply of diesel fuel at NPPs is not infinite and may be difficult to replenish if there are challenges in accessing the facility or there is a general diesel shortage across the country. According to one senior Ukrainian government official with responsibility for the country’s chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence and security, in early March 2023, the ZNPP had sufficient fuel supply to keep the 18 emergency generators required to maintain power to its six reactor units for about 10 days. This figure is likely an estimate, as Ukrainian authorities have admitted to having limited information on the situation at the Russian-occupied ZNPP and it is possible that Russian personnel have supplied the facility with additional fuel. Fuel levels also vary over time, as fuel is used up by generator operation and new supply is delivered. In November 2022, the IAEA reported that the ZNPP had fuel to operate the diesel generators for about 15 days. The Ukrainian official’s comments and lack of definitive information on the fuel supply highlight the precarious power supply situation at the ZNPP. Emergency systems are also designed to prioritise the safe operation of the NPP, not the supply of power to secondary facilities such as administrative buildings and staff facilities. Loss of external power supply may therefore also pose challenges to staff wellbeing and their ability to conduct their work effectively. Staff morale and wellbeing issues pose a significant risk to the safe operation of NPPs and are discussed later in the report.
+
+Besides the threat posed by loss of power to Ukraine’s nuclear reactors, water supply to the ZNPP may also be at risk. In February 2023, the IAEA reported that water levels at the Kakhovka Reservoir on the Dnipro River have been dropping. The reservoir supplies water to the cooling ponds that are part of the system which is used to remove heat from the ZNPP’s reactors and spent-fuel storage facility. Water in the reservoir is normally maintained at a higher level than in the ponds, which facilitates the ponds’ replenishment and maintains reliable supply of water for cooling the reactor and spent-fuel storage, without which the reactor core and spent fuel risk overheating. In a statement in mid-February, Energoatom reported that water levels in the reservoir stood at 13.8 metres – well below their normal 16 metres. At the time, the head of Energoatom, Petro Kotin, stated that ‘a level of 12.8 meters will be [an] emergency, and 12 meters will be critical’. According to the authors’ consultations with two Ukrainian experts in early March 2023, including a recent ZNPP employee, water in the reservoir had by then dropped to below pool levels and may have even fallen below the 12.8-metres mark. The authors could not confirm this independently. As the weather begins to warm in the spring and summer, evaporation from the reservoir and pool may exacerbate the issue. However, in its report from 21 April, the IAEA noted that water levels had returned to 16.2 metres. In an earlier report, the Agency had attributed rising water levels to melting snow over the previous months. One senior expert with intimate knowledge of ZNPP operations consulted by the authors in March 2023 did not perceive the water levels cited at the time to pose an immediate threat to the safe operation of the facility.
+
+__Staff Wellbeing and Safe Operation of NPPs__
+
+Another critical threat to the safe operation of the country’s NPPs – which has received significant attention from the IAEA in its public reporting on nuclear safety and security in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion – is the duress under which NPP staff are having to operate. As the IAEA has highlighted, staff across all Ukrainian NPPs are having to carry out their duties while ‘dealing with the burdens imposed on their personal lives by the ongoing armed conflict, as well as with constant stress and anxiety’. Such conditions undoubtedly negatively affect staff’s ability to effectively perform what is – in normal times – high-pressure work that requires precision and the ability to confidently make high-stake decisions. Literature has pointed to the important role that the human factor plays in safe NPP operation. A 2021 report on the state of radiological and nuclear safety in Ukraine notes that 18.5% of abnormal events in NPP operations that year were due to human error. It was 13% the previous year. In 2017, it had peaked as high as 41%. Operating under the stresses of military conflict and occupation risks exacerbating the impact of human error in the operation of Ukraine’s NPPs.
+
+The situation is particularly acute at the ZNPP. The facility is located on the frontline of the conflict and has been under Russian occupation since early March 2022. As such, the NPP’s Ukrainian staff are having to carry out their duties amid an active war zone and in the presence of Russian military personnel. ZNPP staff on duty when Russian forces invaded the facility were not able to maintain normal rotations. Similarly, ChNPP staff remained on duty indefinitely when the Russian military took over the facility on 24 February 2022. As of March 2023, staff at the occupied ZNPP facility were reportedly being rotated regularly, although still working longer hours and more shifts. Several staff at the ZNPP – including the head of the power plant at the time, Ihor Murashov – have been detained. Media reporting has also recounted instances of torture of ZNPP staff.
+
+One former ZNPP employee, who had been working at the NPP during the Russian occupation, recounted to the authors the psychological stress staff experienced. According to them, staff movement around the NPP – previously unrestricted – had to be coordinated with units of the Russian National Guard that had been stationed at the NPP after the invasion. At times when fire was being exchanged, NPP staff had to shelter in place – often for hours at a time. The occupying forces also reportedly did not allow staff to vacate technology or personal belongings from the parts of the facility which they moved into. Staff from the ChNPP also told the authors that, on returning to the NPP following Russian withdrawal, they found much of their personal belongings and facility equipment looted. What technology the Russian forces did not take with them from the ChNPP, they apparently destroyed.
+
+Russian state-owned enterprise Rosatom is present at the ZNPP and has taken over management of the facility. The company was also present at the ChNPP during Russia’s occupation of the facility. Ukrainian authorities and experts, as well as the former ZNPP employee, confirmed to the authors that Rosatom has been forcing Ukrainian staff at the ZNPP to sign contracts with the company to retain their jobs (although it appears that Rosatom may have recently stopped requiring Ukrainian staff to be employed by the enterprise to continue working at the plant, presumably to mitigate staff shortages). Many Ukrainian staff refused and left employment at the ZNPP. Others have left the ZNPP and the nearby town of Energodar due to the obvious threats to safety and security inherent to an active conflict zone. Those that have chosen to continue working at the ZNPP face pressure – and may risk penalties – from Ukrainian authorities for collaborating with Russia. Despite reported attempts by Rosatom to recruit replacement staff – including nuclear experts from Russia – staff levels at the ZNPP are significantly below pre-invasion levels. Prior to the February 2022 invasion, the ZNPP hosted, by various accounts, between 10,000 and 11,000 staff; by the start of 2023, only 3,000 personnel reportedly remained.
+
+Each reactor is unique and requires highly specialised staff specifically licensed to operate a given facility, making the replacement of ZNPP staff challenging. A number of Ukrainian experts also highlighted to the authors that the originally Soviet-designed ZNPP control rooms have since been modernised and differ significantly from Russian facilities, apparently making them challenging to navigate for Russian staff not trained to operate them. Finally, the threat of being sanctioned for participating in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appears to be deterring potential replacement personnel from taking up employment at the ZNPP.
+
+It is worth noting that, prior to the invasion, the ZNPP was operating with some redundancy in its staffing, and that certain staff were carrying out roles that would not have been directly critical to the safe operation of the facility and even less so in its current shutdown state. As such, current staff numbers may technically be sufficient for the operation of the ZNPP in its current state. However, there is no doubt that this significant reduction in staff and expertise creates additional pressures, stress and fatigue for the Ukrainian personnel still working at the ZNPP. Furthermore, the IAEA has reported that changes in the ZNPP management have resulted in ambiguous chains of command and have left staff to contend with conflicting instructions on how to operate the plant. Not only will such working conditions lead to greater levels of fatigue, anxiety and burnout among ZNPP staff than have already been observed, they pose an acute risk to the safe operation of the NPP.
+
+Possibly in an attempt to rectify Russian staff’s unfamiliarity with Ukrainian facilities, operators from Russian NPPs have been ‘receiving simulator and on the job training at the ZNPP’ and may be deployed to work at the facility following their training, according to the IAEA. While such an approach may address the challenge of staffing shortages at the ZNPP, it also helps normalise the presence, and continued deployment, of Russian personnel at an illegally occupied facility to replace Ukrainian staff who have left – or been forced out of their positions – as a result of the invasion. Unless expressly endorsed by relevant Ukrainian authorities – which is unlikely – the further deployment of Russian personnel to Ukrainian NPPs should not be acceptable to the international community.
+
+> #### `Box 1: The IAEA in Ukraine`
+
+_`The IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Center (IEC) has been in touch with Ukrainian authorities since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, and the Agency has been providing consistent technical support to Ukraine throughout the conflict. The IAEA’s Board of Governors has passed three resolutions condemning Russian activities at Ukrainian nuclear facilities, and has called for Russia to cease its actions ‘against and at nuclear facilities in Ukraine’ and to allow Ukrainian authorities to regain control over its facilities. The IAEA has also been providing regular public updates on the situation in Ukraine, including through short news items on its webpage as well as through the publication of several detailed reports. Director General Rafael Grossi has been spearheading the Agency’s efforts and has articulated ‘Seven Pillars’ of nuclear safety and security in Ukraine derived from existing IAEA safety and security principles. The pillars include – and go beyond – many of the safety and security threats covered in this report. In September 2022, the Agency also put forward a list of seven recommendations to address the threat to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, which included a call for the establishment of a nuclear safety and security zone around the ZNPP. However, the IAEA appears to have recently moved away from the idea of securing such a zone and is focusing on the protection of the facility itself under the current circumstances. The Seven Pillars and subsequent recommendations for addressing the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine provide helpful direction for managing the current situation. However, they are fairly high level in scope and do not consider in any significant detail the military developments on the ground or the operational objectives of the warring parties. The challenges that these realities pose to establishing and enforcing a safety and security zone around the NPP are discussed later in this report.`_
+
+_`The Agency has also conducted several missions to Ukraine to assess the situation. The IAEA has had a permanent – albeit very limited – presence at the ZNPP since September 2022 and at all Ukrainian NPPs since January 2023. These IAEA Support and Assistance Missions consist of two–four IAEA staff and normally rotate every four–five weeks. However, it appears that the IAEA has recently encountered challenges in rotating its staff at the ZNPP. The mission teams are able to review the various aspects of facility operations and equipment related to safety and security – including the operation of diesel generators and supply of generator fuel, as well as facility connection to the external energy grid. The IAEA has also continued to carry out regular safeguard inspections at Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, as well as ad hoc inspections as needed – for instance, following Russian accusations of material being diverted for the production of a so-called ‘dirty bomb’.`_
+
+_`Despite these efforts to support the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, the Agency is ultimately limited in what it can do to resolve the challenges facing Ukrainian facilities and staff. IAEA staff on the ground in Ukraine can serve in observer and technical support roles, but do not have the capacity or mandate to address some of the most pressing challenges – including the threats that ongoing military operations pose to facilities. While ensuring the wellbeing of facility staff is a critical factor in maintaining the safety and security of facilities, the IAEA’s mandate and capabilities do not account for protecting NPP staff in a war scenario. Nevertheless, the Agency was reportedly in contact with relevant authorities following the detention of ZNPP head Ihor Murashov. The IAEA’s engagement with both Ukrainian and Russian authorities over the course of the war also means that it is in a unique position to act as an interlocutor between the two sides on issues of nuclear safety and security, at a time when no other lines of communication exist between the two countries on the subject.`_
+
+#### Future Risks for Ukraine’s NPPs During the Conflict
+
+Although what has already transpired in Ukraine is deeply concerning, there are a range of risks that could grow over time and need to be mitigated. Russia continues to try to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and it is highly likely that this will persist during the winter of 2023–24, assuming the conflict protracts through this period. The Russian defence industry is currently estimated to be able to construct approximately 40 cruise and ballistic missiles per month, with its limited remaining stocks allowing for larger salvos to be periodically generated. In combination with simpler systems such as Shahed-136 loitering munitions, it is reasonable to presume that Russia can continue to inflict serious damage on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure at least once per month. Despite some improvements in interception rates in late 2022, strikes in March 2023 – which resulted in the loss of external power to the ZNPP – showed that Russia was also able to adapt its tactics to achieve a large proportion of successful hits.
+
+The strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure primarily target transformer sub-stations and thermal power plants. Although these do not directly threaten NPPs, the destabilisation of the Ukrainian energy grid poses serious problems to the safe functioning of the NPPs. Operating NPPs have been forced to deal with surges in energy that they cannot distribute, forcing emergency shutdowns. Some of the acute risks were laid out earlier; however, there are also longer-term issues. Ukrainian experts – including a former ZNPP employee – as well as the IAEA – have expressed concerns over the long-term effect on the reactors of their repeated disconnection and reconnection to the main power grid. Abrupt emergency shutdowns are now avoided through pre-emptive shutdowns based on warning, reducing the damage to infrastructure. Nevertheless, nuclear reactors are designed to be kept operating, with shutdowns being rare events. Routine reactor shutdowns will invariably lead to wear on systems and, over time, are likely to increase the risk of irregularities in procedures or in the functioning of the system.
+
+Another risk that will become acute over the longer term is Ukraine’s limited wet spent-nuclear-fuel storage capacity. The dangers of moving spent fuel from wet storage facilities at the various NPPs into dry storage at ISF-2 and the Centralised Spent Fuel Storage Facility at Chornobyl, as well as the on-site dry spent-fuel storage at the ZNPP, under war conditions mean that wet storage facilities are nearing capacity. Should capacity be reached, spent fuel will either have to be moved – at the risk of it coming under attack while in transit – or reactors will have to cease operation until wet storage capacity can be freed up. This could provide an opportune moment for Russia to manufacture a crisis. The international community should consider ways to ensure that there is an agreed mechanism to safely transport and store this fuel before time grants Russia a mechanism to weaponise the issue.
+
+Russia has refrained from carrying out strikes intentionally targeting NPPs directly and there is no current indication that it intends to begin doing so. Depending on the nature of the incident, radiological release could have catastrophic effects for Ukrainian territory and communities in areas surrounding the NPPs, and it is likely that radioactive fallout would extend beyond Ukraine’s borders. In the case of attacks on the ChNPP or the ZNPP, the effects would almost certainly be felt in Russia. It is also unclear how Western states may react to a deliberate act of major nuclear sabotage by Russia in Ukraine. However, the possibility of a deliberate attack and widescale radiological release should not be ruled out entirely. Russian forces continue to be trained, and continue to hold significant amounts of reserve equipment, in Belarus. Further rounds of mobilisation could bring additional axes into play, even if only intended as a means of stretching Ukrainian defenders over a wider frontage. Russia’s SSO (special operations forces) have been observed conducting training in assaulting nuclear facilities with support from personnel recruited by the Russians who have previously worked at Ukrainian NPPs and have familiarity with the safety procedures. Russian authorities have also repeatedly messaged about the risks of false-flag attacks and a dirty bomb. Such messaging could indicate that Moscow is leaving the option of nuclear sabotage at the ZNPP on the table. At the time of writing, the authors assess that such Russian activity does not point to an imminent plan; rather, it indicates attempts to generate options. Nevertheless, the direct threat to Ukraine’s NPPs may increase if Russia feels that it is limited in its ability to suppress Ukrainian electricity generation while these facilities continue to operate and remain connected to Ukraine’s electricity grid, considering the importance of nuclear energy to the country’s power supply. Russia may also resort to deliberate attacks on nuclear facilities to coerce Ukraine’s partners through fear of escalation without resorting to nuclear weapons. It is worth stressing that the radiological release from an attack on an NPP would not be comparable to the consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation and the two should not be conflated.
+
+A key outstanding question is how Russian forces may react if the Ukrainian armed forces successfully break through Russian defensive positions in Zaporizhzhia. The risk in this scenario could emanate from a direct assault on the facility by the Ukrainian armed forces as was attempted in October, or more likely from its encirclement as the Russian occupation of the site can be rendered unsustainable without fighting for control of the NPP directly. Retreating Russian forces may seek to engineer an incident at the facility – or threaten to do so – and blame the Ukrainian armed forces. There are two reasons why such an act may be considered. First, it could have the tactical effect of slowing down or stalling any Ukrainian exploitation of a breakthrough, requiring the Ukrainian armed forces to manage the consequences of the radiological incident instead. Second, Moscow may judge that the fear of a radiological incident among the international community could lead to a push by Western allies for Ukraine to accept a ceasefire, or desist from advancing on the Zaporizhzhia axis, at the risk of losing international support. The Ukrainian experts and officials the authors consulted in March 2023 consistently assessed that Russia is using its occupation of the ZNPP as blackmail (shantazh) to advance its military objectives in Ukraine. In reality, the West is unlikely to undertake such bargaining; however, there is a tendency towards optimism bias within Russian decision-making. The question is whether Russia convinces itself that it stands to benefit from causing a radiological incident at a Ukrainian NPP. The risk to the lives of its own personnel or Ukrainian civilians is unlikely to deter it from such a course of action. Although there is no evidence that a decision has been made in Moscow to carry out direct nuclear sabotage, variations of this kind of behaviour are widely discussed among Russian officials, including those in senior positions relating to the conduct of Russia’s occupation.
+
+It may be tempting to look at the various threats to nuclear safety and security that Russia has created in Ukraine as a technical issue which can be mitigated by the deployment of additional safety equipment or over which Russia may be willing to negotiate for short-term improvements of the situation. In reality, Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure continues to be held at risk by an actor that has already shown a limited regard for nuclear safety and security, with its behaviour only seriously constrained by the perceived practical risks as compared with the anticipated reward. In this context, mechanisms for improving behaviour move into the realm of deterrence or the infliction of consequences for violations of international standards and law which are able to shape behaviour. This requires a more proactive approach beyond the capabilities and capacity of international organisations such as the IAEA.
+
+
+### Perspectives on NPP Safety in Conflict
+
+Having considered the risks to NPPs in Ukraine, it is important to examine the state of nuclear safety in conflict more broadly. This chapter, therefore, covers two issues. First, it examines the history of NPPs in conflict and the established requirements for ensuring their safety in this context. Second, it examines NPPs from a military viewpoint and outlines the effects a military may plan to deliver against NPPs. This chapter examines effects that are consistent with international law as well as those that are not.
+
+#### Broader Context for the Safety of NPPs in Conflict
+
+The current situation in Ukraine is the first time that operational NPPs have come under direct fire or been occupied by an invading military force. However, it is not the first time that civilian nuclear infrastructure has been caught in the crosshairs of a military conflict. During the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, the Bushehr NPP in Iran was shelled by Iraqi forces, although the facility had not yet been loaded with nuclear fuel. Reactors in Iraq and Syria have also been destroyed in military strikes; both were struck before they could become operational. More relevant to the current situation in Ukraine is the 1991 experience of the Krško NPP in Slovenia, which found itself in the proximity of military clashes following Slovenia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia – although, unlike in the case of the Ukrainian NPPs, the facility was never directly attacked or occupied.
+
+A number of today’s operating NPPs are in areas that are prone to conventional military conflict, raising questions over the risks that these facilities may face in the future. This may include the Bushehr NPP in Iran and the UAE’s Barakah NPP in the case of a military conflict in the Gulf. An escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan, or between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, may put South Asian and Armenian NPPs at risk, respectively. The resumption of North Korean missile tests in 2022 and 2023 is also a timely reminder of the potential for strikes on NPPs and supporting critical infrastructure in East Asia, including operational reactors in Japan and South Korea.
+
+As the international community becomes increasingly conscious of the need to move to sustainable energy sources and aims to reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050, nuclear power’s global role – and, consequently, the number of NPPs and small modular reactors (SMRs) – is likely to grow. In its 2022 projections for nuclear electricity generation, the IAEA estimated that nuclear generating capacity may reach 873 GW(e) by 2050 – more than double current levels – in a high-case scenario. In a low-case scenario, nuclear power generation capacity remains at about current levels. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has also noted the important role that nuclear power is likely to have in a global transition to zero-carbon emissions by 2050; the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions Scenario suggests a doubling of global nuclear power generation capacity from 2022 to 2050. According to the World Nuclear Association, 60 additional nuclear reactors were under construction worldwide as of March 2023. The US, Russian and Chinese militaries have also expressed an interest in the use of SMRs for military purposes, which could see the deployment of these smaller, easier-to-build reactors to forward operating bases in support of military operations. Understanding the risks to nuclear energy infrastructure from military conflict – including why and how military forces may target or occupy nuclear power units – and identifying how these risks can be prevented and mitigated must be a key component of global efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security.
+
+Despite these trends, there are no extant international regulations for operating NPPs in a conflict context. As per IAEA standards on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), procedures for the physical protection of Ukraine’s NPPs would have been developed based on a threat assessment and the articulation of a DBT. A DBT is meant to inform nuclear security efforts by considering the threats of ‘unauthorized removal of nuclear and other radioactive material or sabotage’ by insider and external actors. Physical protection measures should then be developed based on that assessment.
+
+INFCIRC/255/Revision 5, which sets out recommendations for DBTs and other measures for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material, is limited in the scope of risks it addresses and does not account for threats posed to nuclear safety and security in the context of a military conflict. The documents limit their recommendations to the assessment of the risks of unauthorised removal of nuclear or radiological material with the intent to construct a nuclear explosive device or which could lead to subsequent dispersal of the material, as well as risk of sabotage. Some of these risks are likely to be relevant in a military-conflict scenario; for instance, Section 5 of INFCIRC/255/Revision 5 refers to ‘stand-off attacks’ as a type of sabotage: defined as ‘An attack, executed at a distance from the target nuclear facility or transport, which does not require adversary hands-on access to the target, or require the adversary to overcome the physical protection system’. However, the document does not account for the kind of sustained military activity and occupation of facilities by invading military forces that Ukrainian NPPs currently face. Nuclear facility operators cannot reasonably be expected to respond to threats to nuclear facilities outside of what is articulated in the DBT; anything outside of it – including military attack – is the responsibility of state authorities as part of broader national security and defence planning.
+
+The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and its Amendment) (CPPNM) and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) – Ukraine is a signatory to both – also include provisions addressing sabotage of nuclear facilities, similar to the threats Ukrainian NPPs currently face. Notably, Russia proposed the draft ICSANT to the UN General Assembly in 1996, arguing that the earlier CPPNM did not go far enough in countering the danger of nuclear terrorism. However, both the CPPNM and the ICSANT explicitly state that the conventions do not cover the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict or military exercise. Contained in an extensive series of publications, IAEA standards on nuclear safety and security set out other guidance and expectations for governments on the protection – as well as the safe design, operation and handling – of nuclear and radioactive materials and relevant facilities. Some of these are likely to be helpful in preventing and addressing certain threats to nuclear safety and security that countries may encounter in a military conflict. Yet, none have been designed for express application in a military conflict scenario or to respond to the full range of threats and challenges that emerge in such a scenario.
+
+#### NPPs in Military Planning
+
+Any attempt to shape the approach militaries take towards NPPs must consider how NPPs are likely to be approached in military planning. First, there is the existing legal framework governing how militaries should operate in relation to NPPs. Second, there is the matter of how militaries are likely to operate within this framework to pursue advantage. Third, there is the question of militaries that disregard existing IHL provisions to pursue military advantage.
+
+A range of provisions within the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) and IHL protects NPPs from being military targets. Article 56 of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions Protocol I prohibits attacks against ‘works and installations containing dangerous forces’, including NPPs. However, an exception to the provision lifts this protection if the NPP ‘provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support’, as well as for military objectives in its vicinity ‘if they are used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support’. At the same time, Article 56 maintains that ‘the civilian population and individual civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection accorded them by international law’, which may be inconsistent with the earlier exceptions.
+
+Article 15 of Protocol II also prohibits attacks on NPPs ‘even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population’, with no exceptions. However, the 1987 explanatory note to the article highlights the provision’s focus on expected civilian losses, noting that ‘objects are not protected in themselves, but only to the extent that their destruction would release forces dangerous for the civilian population’ and that ‘assuming such a work or installation were a military objective, it could be attacked as long as the civilian population were not seriously endangered thereby’. The note goes on to explain that ‘severe losses’ is a term taken from military terminology and assessments should be made in good faith. Furthermore, the provisions in the Additional Protocols refer only to nuclear power generating stations and do not explicitly extend protections to other nuclear infrastructure, such as nuclear research reactors or spent-fuel storage facilities.
+
+In addition to the Geneva Protocols, the IAEA and UN Security Council have also condemned attacks on nuclear facilities. For instance, the 1985 IAEA General Conference passed a resolution on the ‘Protection of Nuclear Installations Devoted to Peaceful Purposes Against Armed Attack’, which noted that the General Conference ‘considers that any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency’. The issue of attacks on nuclear infrastructure was also addressed at the 1985 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with specific reference to the threats to security and the international safeguards regime posed by the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in Iraq. In 2009, the IAEA General Conference pointed to its earlier resolutions addressing attacks on nuclear facilities and reiterated the importance of protecting nuclear installations.
+
+LOAC concerning attack proportionality and the protection of civilians are also relevant in this instance. Protections against attacks on NPPs have been included in Rule 42 of customary IHL, which concerns itself with attacks on works and installations containing dangerous forces. As others have pointed out elsewhere, Russia has included similar prohibitions against attacks on objects containing dangerous forces in its military manuals and in its application of IHL; the latter makes specific reference to nuclear power stations but includes a caveat to their protection similar to that of the Geneva Conventions. A 1996 Russian Constitutional Court opinion also confirmed Russia’s obligation to the protection of facilities housing dangerous forces as per Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions.
+
+Despite these provisions, there is a range of military acts that is both consistent with a state’s legal obligations and yet poses risks to NPP safety. Conventional military operations are fundamentally the use of physical force to compel an adversary to comply with the will of the party applying the military instrument. To achieve this, a military must incapacitate the target’s ability and will to resist. Almost all modern military concepts emphasise trying to simultaneously apply as much pressure on the target military and state as possible. The Chinese concept of Systems Confrontation is premised on simultaneously targeting an adversary’s combat forces, logistics, command and control, infrastructure, and other critical bottlenecks in its operations. Network Centric Warfare, which – despite being superseded as doctrine – remains embedded in the logic of NATO operations, endeavours to disrupt the enemy deep, denying command and control, then logistics, to enable the defeat of military units in detail. The application of these concepts has always produced attacks on CNI. In the context of initial break-in operations to suppress and destroy enemy air defences, for example, military necessity requires the disruption of enemy command and control, part of which is enabled by the supply of power. NATO struck power infrastructure in Serbia, for example, as part of its air campaign against the country. It is therefore almost inevitable that states will, in the opening phase of operations, attack another’s electricity grid; if that state depends heavily on NPPs, this will force it into operating from reversionary generators. It is important to distinguish this kind of attack on an energy grid – carried out in support of a specific military line of effort that is temporally confined – from the deliberate destruction of civilian energy infrastructure because of its importance for the civilian population, as Russia is carrying out in Ukraine. However, the distinction may not always be clear and the two objectives need not be mutually exclusive. Russia’s concept of Strategic Operations for the Destruction of Critically Important Targets is a more systematic approach to CNI destruction than severing access to it to enable military manoeuvre.
+
+Because a state’s sovereignty requires defence of its CNI, states will seek to defend NPPs. Insofar as these forces are co-located with the facility, their being targeted will risk incidental damage to the facility and – depending on the context – militaries may judge that such attacks are both militarily necessary and proportionate in terms of the risk of a radiological incident. It is also important to note that emergent military concepts – such as the UK’s Multi-Domain Integration – explicitly emphasise the role of non-military tools as components of a national struggle and in doing so could cause the enablers for these tools to become valid targets. This harnessing of traditionally non-military tools to further military ends may reasonably justify some targets being classified as military objectives consistent with the principle of distinction that would historically have been classified as civilian objects.
+
+It is reasonable to assume that conflict will affect NPPs in the future and that an outright prohibition on militaries affecting NPPs would be unworkable. Nevertheless, militaries plan based on the effects they wish to deliver, and an examination of those that may lead military operations to affect NPPs is useful to determine what regulations might allow militaries to operate while maximising NPP safety. These effects include:
+
+- Deny energy to an opposing military.
+
+- Deny energy to an adversary state.
+
+- Secure energy production.
+
+- Secure nuclear facilities from access by hostile actors.
+
+- Fix enemy forces around a piece of CNI.
+
+- Suppress or destroy military systems operating from the territory surrounding an NPP.
+
+In terms of regulating how these effects are delivered, it is important to note that the first two are best achieved by attacking the connections between an NPP and the wider grid, rather than the NPP itself. Others are in tension. For example, regulations must allow a military to maintain close enough proximity to a facility to offer it protection, while also reducing the likelihood that its presence would legitimise the site as a military target and thereby risk accidental damage to critical structures. Where a site is clearly being used for military purposes, providing energy to military systems, it forgoes protection. It is therefore important that states do not game the threat to civilians from the proximity of an NPP to protect a site that is being exploited for military purposes. Within this context, it is clear that any proposals for the establishment of a large nuclear safety and security zone around Ukraine’s NPPs, where military forces would be prohibited from operating, would be largely unworkable in the current conflict, as such a zone would prevent the effective control of the site or its being protected by defensive systems. The Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences recently called for the establishment of a demilitarised zone around the ZNPP with a radius of 40 km, where only the presence of Russian military forces would be permitted; it should go without saying that such a suggestion cannot be treated seriously.
+
+It must also be acknowledged that some actors have little interest in complying with regulations, even if they are signatory to them. For instance, by targeting NPP-supporting infrastructure, occupying NPPs with military forces and reportedly placing military systems within reactor buildings, a case can reasonably be made that Russia is in violation of IHL provisions prohibiting the targeting of nuclear facilities. Iran, for its part, has prepared long-range strike systems as its primary means of deterrence by holding CNI across the Gulf at risk. In the context of such actors – which are willing to disregard IHL and other international standards – the question should not be how to strengthen or expand regulations and standards, but instead how to deter their targeting NPPs.
+
+There are several reasons why such a state may target an NPP. First, a state may threaten this as part of its deterrence posture. Second, it may aim to damage an NPP to tie down adversary resources. Third, a state may threaten an NPP because a radiological incident could deny the adversary an axis of advance. Fourth, a state might target an NPP as a means of compellence because of the fear it instils in a target.
+
+Militaries also have interests that constrain what they may be prepared to do near NPPs. First, a major incident at an NPP may create a humanitarian and ecological disaster that will require the diversion of considerable resources from a military’s main effort, and possibly more than the effect on the enemy’s forces. Second, an accident at an NPP risks creating a radiological hazard to friendly troops and slowing down operations, absorbing significant and scarce CBRN capabilities, or denying axes. Third, a destroyed or damaged NPP may prevent the facility from being used to provide power for the territory brought under control by a military after the completion of combat operations. Finally, the international backlash against a state that causes an incident at an NPP may bring about its isolation and have secondary consequences that are disproportionate to the military interests in striking or seizing the facility. Ultimately, however, constraining an unscrupulous military from targeting an NPP must be achieved through deterrence rather than regulation, although regulation can increase the difficulty and reduce the effect of any activity deliberately targeting an NPP.
+
+In summary, therefore, there are a range of effects militaries may plan to deliver in relation to NPPs that pose challenges to their safety. Some of these effects are legitimate within the LOAC and IHL. Other actors may have incentives to disregard their legal obligations. It is therefore necessary to establish regulations for military operations affecting NPPs that allow the military to achieve its legitimate objectives while minimising the safety issues raised through its conduct. At the same time, to account for actors that may disregard regulations, deterrence strategies will need to be developed that consider the particular military objectives the attack on NPPs and supporting infrastructure is meant to achieve and which deny that objective or make it too costly to pursue.
+
+
+### Recommendations for Improving the Safety and Security of NPPs in Conflict
+
+The recommendations outlined in this chapter to improve the safety and security of NPPs in conflict can be divided into three groups. First, the authors put forward immediate recommendations for improving the safety and security of nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Second, the authors outline recommendations for the alteration of NPP design, and security and safety considerations to better ensure their safety in conflict scenarios. Third, recommendations are identified for the conduct of militaries around civilian NPPs.
+
+#### Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security in Ukraine
+
+There are several measures of immediate importance that should be a priority for the international community in its response to the threats to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. The authors’ recommendations, based on the analysis presented in this report, are outlined below.
+
+__Recommendation 1: Ensure the personal safety and welfare of staff at NPPs, including sufficient staffing levels.__ International pressure on Russia – and Rosatom in particular – should be maintained and increased to allow workers at the ZNPP (and any facilities that may be occupied in the future) to rest and rotate frequently, and to be able to carry out their work without undue pressure. Ukrainian staff who wish to continue working at the ZNPP should not be forced to sign contracts with Rosatom; this may help reduce some of the stress that Ukrainian staff who do not wish to work for Rosatom face, and may allow the ZNPP to retain a greater number of staff to ensure its safe operation. Ukrainian authorities should take a carefully considered case-by-case approach to responding to Ukrainian ZNPP staff decisions to cooperate with occupying forces or Rosatom in the operation of the ZNPP, weighing staff obligations to ensuring the safe operation of the NPP against the normal expectations that staff should not assist Russian occupation and would be punished for doing so. The IAEA should work with Ukrainian and Russian authorities, as well as the wider international community, to assess and identify solutions to any shortage of licensed staff available to safely operate the ZNPP in its current condition. Any solutions to the staffing challenge should not involve the presence of technical staff at Ukrainian NPPs that have not been approved by Ukrainian authorities.
+
+__Recommendation 2: Ensure sufficient licensed Ukrainian staff are ready to resume operations at the ZNPP following Russian withdrawal from the facility.__ In the event of a withdrawal of Russian military forces and other personnel from the ZNPP, Ukrainian authorities must be ready to provide the necessary staff and support to ensure the facility continues safe operation. As had been the case following Russian withdrawal from the ChNPP, looted and damaged equipment and systems will have to be reconstituted, which may require support from international partners. Ukrainian authorities should ensure that the necessary measures are in place domestically and should work with international partners to prepare for a rapid return of the ZNPP to safe operation by Ukrainian staff.
+
+__Recommendation 3: Facilitate the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel to dry storage facilities, where appropriate.__ Spent nuclear fuel that is ready to be moved to dry storage facilities at the ChNPP and the ZNPP should be transferred to the appropriate facility and thus make room for the storage of additional spent fuel as necessary. Spent fuel currently being stored at the wet storage facility in ChNPP should be moved to the ISF-2 dry storage facility, where it will benefit from greater physical protection, as soon as possible. Measures need to be put in place to allow these transfers to take place safely. Ukraine’s National Guard is normally responsible for the safety and security of nuclear fuel transport; under the current circumstances, escorts by international representatives – from the IAEA or other UN bodies – could be considered.
+
+__Recommendation 4: Assess availability of highly radioactive waste storage facilities and certify additional storage if needed.__ If necessary, risk assessments and other approval processes for the construction of additional highly radioactive waste storage facilities should be expedited by Ukrainian authorities. Necessary resources for the rapid construction of additional facilities should be made available – potentially with support from international partners. This will help ensure that highly radioactive waste resulting from any radiological incident that may occur at a Ukrainian NPP can be managed quickly. Should this additional storage prove unnecessary upon the conclusion of military hostilities in Ukraine, the facilities may be used to store radioactive waste from the ChNPP or for the normal operation of Ukrainian facilities in the future.
+
+__Recommendation 5: Provide CBRN, emergency response and other necessary equipment, training and support to the Ukrainian military, emergency services and NPP operators.__ This includes providing support for the restoration of radiation monitoring and emergency response equipment that Russian forces looted or damaged at the ChNPP. Such support should be a priority to mitigate or minimise the impact of radiological incidents in Ukraine, should they occur. This approach may also reduce the potential tactical impact of a deliberate incident instigated by Russia and thereby make it less attractive. Such support could be provided by the IAEA (including continued support from the IEC), individual governments or multilateral organisations.
+
+__Recommendation 6: Provide regular updates on the supply of fuel for emergency generators at Ukrainian nuclear facilities, as well as the water levels in the Kakhovka Reservoir.__ The IAEA has provided intermittent updates on the water levels in the Kakhovka Reservoir, which supplies water used to cool the ZNPP reactors. The IAEA should provide regular public updates on the reservoir’s water levels and other factors that may affect the supply of water to the ZNPP. Updates on Kakhovka Reservoir water levels in the Agency’s last two updates on nuclear safety and security in Ukraine (dated 13 April and 21 April) are welcome. Similarly, the supply of diesel fuel for the emergency generators at each NPP should be made public and regularly updated. IAEA staff stationed at various Ukrainian NPPs – especially the ZNPP, where Ukrainian authorities have limited situational awareness – should be permitted to ascertain and report this information. Should a change be observed in water supply or the availability of diesel fuel, the IAEA should seek to establish and report on the cause. The Agency should also publicise the consequences of key thresholds being crossed to increase the reputational harm for whoever causes such an event to occur and to prepare the ground for the international community to demand robust action be taken if critical support systems – such as water supply – are compromised.
+
+__Recommendation 7: Ensure the safe supply of diesel fuel, maintenance parts and services, and other materials necessary for the safe operation of Ukraine’s NPPs.__ These supplies should be allowed to move freely and regularly into all Ukrainian facilities, to ensure that all safety systems, including emergency generators and water pumps, can continue to operate for extended periods of time as needed. The stress put on the reactors due to frequent disconnections from the power grid is likely to lead to an increased need for maintenance, which must be met. Fuel and component delivery to the ZNPP may require the establishment of a dedicated ‘green corridor’ or international escort – for instance, by the IAEA or another UN agency. As per the previous recommendation, the cause of the falling levels in the Kakhovka Reservoir must be ascertained and addressed. All options for ensuring constant water supply to the ZNPP must be considered.
+
+__Recommendation 8: Penalise Rosatom staff operating at the ZNPP – and which had been present at the ChNPP – for participating in Russia’s occupation of Ukraine.__ Rosatom management and staff presiding over and involved in the operation of the ZNPP – and which had been present at the ChNPP – are not licensed by Ukrainian authorities to operate these facilities and have taken over the management of an illegally occupied facility. National governments, multilateral organisations (namely, the EU) and the international community (through the IAEA and its Board of Governors) must condemn this activity in the strongest terms. Rosatom executives and any of their staff involved in the operation of Ukrainian facilities should be sanctioned by Ukraine’s partners. They should be excluded from participation in any international activities or forums that do not exclusively concern the safe and secure operation of the ZNPP with the ultimate objective of returning it to Ukrainian management and operation. Such measures will be not only punitive in nature but will also help to deter further Russian staff from accepting work at occupied Ukrainian facilities. Penalising and discouraging Russian personnel from operating occupied Ukrainian NPPs risks contradicting Recommendation 1, but the solution to insufficient staffing levels should not further reinforce Russian control of facilities. As per Recommendation 1, the IAEA should work with Ukrainian and Russian authorities, as well as the wider international community, to appropriately staff the facility with qualified Ukrainian or international staff that are not collaborating with the Russian occupation of the facility and which have been approved by Ukrainian authorities. At the same time, customers of Russian nuclear fuel, enriched uranium and other nuclear-energy-related goods and services around the world – including in the US and Western Europe – should look to diversify away from Russian supplies as soon as is practicable. This will avoid further enabling entities (namely, Rosatom) directly engaged in supporting the Russian occupation of Ukraine.
+
+__Recommendation 9: Establish deterrence against a deliberately manufactured radiological incident by making clear to Russia that any such incident would be followed by a massive response to mitigate damage and expanded support for Ukraine’s war effort.__ As discussed earlier, Russia may judge a radiological incident in the event of its withdrawal from the ZNPP to be an attractive option – a serious yet controllable escalation. Deterrence must therefore be established by making clear that any such incident will have consequences that are contrary to Russia’s interests. The best means of doing this would be for Ukraine’s international partners to emphasise that a major radiological incident at the ZNPP will lead to the deployment of international CBRN troops to assist Ukraine in dealing with the response – and that an attack on these troops will be considered an attack on the states that deployed them. Thus, Russia must believe that any such incident will not reduce the international community’s support for Ukraine. Instead, such an incident would be the basis for expanded support for Kyiv and the direct offer of assistance by deployed personnel from Ukraine’s partners. Given that the Russian leadership knows that it is not able to confront NATO forces, such a position should deter it from believing that Russia could control the consequences of any such action and therefore undermine any calculus that favours rewards over risks.
+
+#### Preparatory Measures for Ensuring Security of NPPs in Future Conflict
+
+Outside of the immediate threats to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, national governments and the IAEA should make preparations to respond to similar threats to nuclear infrastructure arising in future conflicts elsewhere in the world. To this end, the authors recommend the following lines of effort.
+
+__Recommendation 10: Consider, and adopt the necessary prevention and mitigation measures for, state-level military conflict and occupation of nuclear facilities by an invading force as part of national threat assessments, DBTs, and wider national defence and security planning.__ The highly sensitive nature of nuclear safety and security threat assessments, DBTs, and broader state-wide national security and defence planning means that it is difficult to ascertain in the public domain the degree to which military conflict and occupation of nuclear facilities is already considered as part of these processes. This should be rectified in countries where such situations have not been considered; national and facility-specific threat assessments should be conducted to account for the threat of military attack and occupation to nuclear safety and security. Nuclear operators and regulators, intelligence agencies and defence departments must work closely in this process; responsibilities and lines of communication should be clearly defined. National response to military attack and occupation of nuclear facilities will almost certainly fall outside of the DBT and the mandate of nuclear operators or the bodies tasked with nuclear facilities’ safety and security in peacetime. However, DBTs should nevertheless include considerations around the threat of military attack and occupation. The resilience of nuclear energy infrastructure – including supply chains and fuel storage and transfer – should be strengthened accordingly. Nuclear regulators, facility operators and protection forces should be prepared to operate facilities safely and securely in conflict situations, with appropriate support from the armed forces. Best practices should be shared among states, while remaining conscious of the limitations that the sensitive nature of these threat assessments and planning pose.
+
+__Recommendation 11: Include considerations on military attack and occupation of nuclear facilities in the IAEA’s nuclear safety and security standards.__ The IAEA should prioritise the articulation of recommendations on assessing, preventing and mitigating the threats to nuclear safety and security posed by military attack and occupation of nuclear facilities and supporting infrastructure. These recommendations should supplement IAEA guidance on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material from theft and sabotage, as well as other IAEA guidance on nuclear safety and security. Recommendations should be as specific as possible and may include additional guidance on: improving the physical resilience of nuclear facilities and supporting infrastructure; managing frequent loss of power and emergency shutdown of facilities; the establishment of supply corridors and lines of deconfliction between the warring parties; the IAEA’s role in supporting the safety and security of facilities in wartime; and staff wellbeing and procedures for the operation of facilities with limited staff. It may also be necessary to modify existing practices. For example, the regulations for ensuring the safety of a site during an earthquake may involve the use of sensors and autonomous systems that military activity could trigger inappropriately – and these systems may require reversionary modes or overrides. Another critical area for regulation should be the management of systems data at a site when this may be of intelligence value to the warring parties but also important for the site’s safe operation. The IAEA’s experience in supporting nuclear safety and security in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion – including the deployment of its Support and Assistance Missions, as well as the articulation of the Seven Pillars of nuclear safety and security and related recommendations – can inform future guidance and standards. The experience of Ukrainian authorities, experts, military personnel and NPP operators should also be leveraged to inform these efforts.
+
+__Recommendation 12: Harden physical protections in the design of new NPPs. It is important to note that no amount of air and missile defence can assure an NPP from deliberate direct strike.__ Site hardening, however, can significantly reduce the threat from such strikes. At present, the containment facilities for reactors and dry spent-fuel storage are likely sufficient to protect sites from most conventional munitions classes, except for those deliberately designed to penetrate concrete structures. States investing in hypersonic glide vehicles may expand the range of munitions and the number of vectors from which direct strikes threaten the integrity of containment. Nevertheless, prioritising innovation in the design and construction of smaller reactors that may be easier to protect, the development and deployment of more accident-tolerant reactor fuel, and subterranean structures could improve the resilience of these sites. The building up of earth around the perimeter of reactor units and other sensitive facilities may be a more realistic and economically viable solution in the short-to-medium term.
+
+Equally important is the resilience of safety and emergency response systems, such as back-up generators (and their fuel supply) and mobile pumps, the lines connecting the generators to the reactor units, the piping to the water source for the site, as well as radiation monitoring and emergency response systems. These could all be struck or otherwise disconnected in a conflict scenario; burial of this equipment where possible may be an effective means of significantly increasing its survivability. Because ventilation points become key points of vulnerability to military strikes for any significantly hardened or subterranean structure, ensuring that they do not pose a threat would be a key challenge to address ahead of future NPP design.
+
+__Recommendation 13: Harden existing NPPs.__ Hardening existing structures against deliberate strike can be extremely difficult and resource intensive; but some modifications can likely be made to better protect sites from incidental strike. This would include hardening plant support systems such as generators and back-up fuel storage. Other measures that would significantly improve the resilience of these sites is the clearing of a surrounding area from fire risk and the construction of a glacis around the perimeter to shield the site from direct fire. Such a glacis would significantly reduce the risk of rounds from units in contact – especially kinetic penetrators and ATGMS that could pose a penetration risk to critical NPP facilities – from overflying targets in combat and striking the facility. This would not remove the threat from indirect fire, but the hardening of key support machinery and removal of flammable materials should reduce the risk from anything but deliberate strikes. Hardening water pipes from the facility so that they are dug into the earth and are not at risk of being ruptured by the passage of heavy armoured vehicles over them is also advisable.
+
+#### Measures for Minimising Risk to NPPs During Military Operations
+
+Although states can modify or design NPPs to reduce the risks to the facility in conflict, it is also necessary for militaries to agree on rules for operating around and fighting over NPPs that account for the safety of these sites. The following recommendations are intended to significantly improve the safety of NPPs without undermining the logic of military operations or allowing the rules to be gamed in such a way as to encourage agreement violations.
+
+__Recommendation 14: Establish a 1-km demilitarised zone around NPPs.__ The notion of a demilitarised zone around NPPs has merit as a means of distinguishing military targets from civilian objects. As such, it would be sensible for the IAEA to reprise efforts to establish a nuclear safety and security zone around the ZNPP. Serious consideration must be given to what such a zone may look like in practice in this particular instance – and what principles can be applied for establishing such zones around NPPs in future conflicts. A large demilitarised zone is likely impractical. To use a nominal example of 10 km, this would mean that a hypothetical NPP near Narva would prevent military manoeuvre across one third of Estonia’s border with Russia. It is unlikely that either Russia or NATO would accept such a canalisation of its battlespace in conflict. A smaller demilitarised zone, however, would be sufficient to reduce the likelihood of accidental strikes on the station and is more promising. Given that the least accurate artillery classes tend to have a circular error probable at maximum range of less than 300 metres, even accounting for a major error of judgement by fire controllers, a 1-km demilitarised zone seems both sufficient and viable. This would also create a standard for the distance from the site of the glacis proposed earlier. The establishment of such a demilitarised zone also requires that no military equipment – including defensive systems – be stationed at the NPP or in the demilitarised area around it. By agreeing that military units defending a site should not come within this zone, it would be possible for a military to screen and defend the site, cover it with air defence, and perform other functions, without locating military units sufficiently close to draw fire that could put the NPP at risk. This would also enable an attack to engage defenders and to contest control of the points of ingress and egress – thereby contesting control of the site – without needing to put manoeuvre forces on to the facility. Responsibility for site safety internally would thus need to be agreed to be civilian or paramilitary, with an agreement that agencies should not carry weapon classes other than small arms.
+
+Such a demilitarised zone would also remove ambiguity around the conditions granted to NPPs under the Geneva Conventions and other international law – namely, that such facilities are not to be attacked unless they are providing significant military support which cannot feasibly be terminated other than by military attack. If a party were to breach the demilitarised zone, then it ought to be understood that the protections of the site revert to judgements of proportionality and military necessity and that the side violating the demilitarised zone ought to bear a defined – albeit proportionate – culpability for the consequences of the site’s militarisation. These rules should only apply to civilian NPPs and are clearly not relevant to military capabilities that depend on nuclear power or reactors being used to provide energy for military systems.
+
+__Recommendation 15: Grant special protected status to critical NPP safety, security and emergency response systems.__ If a force can isolate and therefore exert control over a civilian NPP, some reasonable expectations should be agreed on. First, no action by the controlling administration should damage or risk the functioning of systems that are critical to the safe and secure operation of NPPs, as well as to emergency response – including radiation monitoring. There should also be an agreed mechanism for the protection of declared convoys moving civilian staff certified to operate NPPs, fuel for reversionary generators and other critical spare parts to the facility. All parties should also add the demarcation of vents and water intakes and outlets for the site to no-strike lists.
+
+__Recommendation 16: Define an obligation for the establishment of deconfliction lines by militaries operating around NPPs, as well as the nuclear regulators or other responsible authorities in the concerned states.__ Ensuring that these measures are observed requires an ability to deconflict between the warring parties. To this end, parties should be required to establish a deconfliction line between the respective commands responsible for the area of operations containing an NPP, as well as the nuclear regulators, operators or other relevant authorities in the relevant states. In the event of a radiological accident or other safety and security incident at the site, failure to crew the deconfliction line should confer liability on a command. Obligations should also be established for a force to cooperate in protecting civilian traffic intended to assist in dealing with an identified safety incident. This deconfliction mechanism should also allow access and regular rotation of IAEA staff to the site.
+
+__Recommendation 17: Establish regulations relating to effects of cyber and electromagnetic activities applied in the vicinity of NPPs.__ As regards military effects targeting NPPs, capabilities such as electronic warfare effects, and especially cyber attacks, could impact the functioning of an NPP. In the case of electronic warfare, the disruption of critical sensors, precision timing and other functions could lead to protocols being initiated in autonomous control systems that are highly suboptimal. In the case of cyber attacks, these could damage control systems for the NPP. The air-gapping of NPP systems is an impediment, but not an impenetrable barrier, to military cyber capabilities. It would therefore be sensible to standardise the frequencies and functioning of sensors used at NPPs. Technical specifications should be made available to governments – though not necessarily the public – and regulations constraining the use of electronic warfare effects against NPPs should be articulated. Cyber effects are different from electronic warfare effects because they are bespoke, especially against an air-gapped system. Here, it should be agreed that cyber attacks that are liable to cause the malfunction of safety systems, or enact protocols that threaten plant safety, should be considered a breach of international law when used against a civilian NPP.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The threats to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine resulting from Russia’s invasion pose a range of acute and chronic risks. The likelihood of a Chornobyl-like catastrophe is limited unless Ukraine’s NPPs are targeted deliberately. However, the potential for a Fukushima-like radiological incident, or the spread of radioactive particles resulting from a strike on a radioactive waste storage facility, while still not highly likely, cannot be discounted. It is important that the international community works to support Ukraine in mitigating the impact of such a scenario, endeavours to deter Russia from further endangering NPPs, and is proactive in addressing the chronic challenges before they become acute. Russia’s disregard for its own commitments to the protection of nuclear facilities should also be punished.
+
+Although Russia’s actions in its disregard for nuclear safety and security and the IHL protections granted to nuclear facilities are egregious, it should also be recognised that threats to nuclear safety and security in conflict zones will arise even if combatants adhere to the LOAC and IHL. Attacks on CNI – including energy generation – are part of most states’ military doctrines and there are legitimate military objectives to be achieved in seizing control of civilian NPPs. For example, severing power supplies as part of an initial suppression and destruction of enemy air defences would be consistent with international law but could pose secondary challenges to NPPs which would be thrown into emergency shutdown. As more states turn to nuclear power to deal with the threat from climate change, it is likely that NPPs will become more prevalent in conflict zones, and that controlling them will become a key military objective. Even though gaining control of an NPP does not necessarily require assaulting the structure, fighting in the vicinity of NPPs carries considerable risks.
+
+The war in Ukraine has demonstrated some significant deficiencies in the international regulation of NPPs and gaps in safety and security standards. As the challenges presented in Ukraine are likely to be repeated in the future, the international community must use the lessons from the conflict to update the design, operation and oversight of NPPs to improve their safety and security. It is also worthwhile for militaries to consider what measures they can implement to reduce the risk of accidental damage to NPPs while enabling them to conduct legitimate military tasks.
+
+This report has made a range of recommendations. Any proposals that rely on the outright prohibition of military action targeting NPPs are unlikely to be effective or to withstand the test of time. Instead, understanding why and how NPPs are likely to factor into military planning, including the types of attacks that may be directed at them, will help determine how best to prepare for their defence and potential occupation. Preparations can be made at the point of NPP design and construction in the first instance, to ensure physical resilience of key structures and support systems. Measures taken during a conflict – such as the establishment of deconfliction lines or a 1-km demilitarised zone around NPPs – can help to further reduce the likelihood of radiological accidents. Cooperation between industry, national nuclear regulators and ministries of defence, as well as leadership by the IAEA and individual countries or groups of states, will be key in further articulating the necessary measures and standards to support nuclear safety and security in future military conflicts and ensuring their effective implementation.
+
+---
+
+__Darya Dolzikova__ is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern.
+
+__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-03-chinas-new-microchip-war.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-03-chinas-new-microchip-war.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : China’s New Microchip War
+author: Gregory C. Allen
+date : 2023-05-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/qc79rS2.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "China’s New Strategy for Waging the Microchip Tech War"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_China is striking back after the watershed October 7, 2022 U.S. export controls hobbled its advanced semiconductor industry._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Two dates from 2022 seem certain to echo in geopolitical history. The first, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, hardly needs further explanation. The second is October 7, when the United States government enacted a series of new export control regulations targeting China’s artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor industries. While most Americans are likely only faintly aware of the October 7 policy and its significance, the date marked the beginning of a new era in U.S.-China relations and with it international politics.
+
+U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken nearly said as much in a speech delivered only ten days after the new policy was enacted. “We are at an inflection point,” Blinken said. “The post-Cold War world has come to an end, and there is an intense competition underway to shape what comes next. And at the heart of that competition is technology.”
+
+In many ways, the October 7 policy was narrowly targeted. It only restricted exports of certain types of advanced computer chips for AI applications and the diverse set of technologies needed to design and manufacture AI chips. However, the implementation approach and underlying logic of the new regulations marked a major reversal of 25 years of U.S. trade and technology policy toward China in at least three ways.
+
+First, rather than restricting exports of advanced semiconductor technology to China based on whether the exports were related to military end-uses or to prohibited end-users, the new policy restricted them on a geographic basis for China as a whole.
+
+Second, previous U.S. export controls were designed to allow China to progress technologically, but to restrict the pace so that the United States and its allies retained a durable lead. The new policy, by contrast, actively degraded the peak technological capability of China’s semiconductor industry. Leading Chinese semiconductor firms such as Biren, YMTC, SMIC, and SMEE have all been set back years.
+
+Third, to the extent possible, the policy seeks to prevent China from ever again reaching certain advanced performance thresholds in semiconductor technology. Rather than revising the performance thresholds upward every few years as had been done in the past, the Biden administration intends to hold those benchmarks constant, meaning that the gap in performance will grow over time as the world advances and China remains stuck behind.
+
+The October 7 policy and the ongoing U.S. campaign to persuade key U.S. allies to join it represents a transformed landscape for the Chinese semiconductor industry, which had previously been making rapid, albeit uneven, technological progress. This report provides clues to understanding China’s updated semiconductor strategy in this new era of global technology competition. In doing so, it draws upon dozens of CSIS interviews with global semiconductor industry executives, U.S. and international government officials, as well as an analysis of noteworthy Chinese government publications, leadership statements, and commentary from Chinese experts.
+
+__Section 1: The turning point in China’s strategic thinking on semiconductors__ analyzes key Chinese government publications and policies between 2018 and 2022, providing the necessary historical context to understand China’s reaction to the October 7 export controls.
+
+__Section 2: China’s post-October 7 industrial policy challenge__ characterizes China’s current position in the semiconductor value chain to explain why the October 7 U.S. export controls — as well as the related controls announced in March 2023 by the Netherlands and Japan — pose such a significant challenge for China’s industrial policy.
+
+__Section 3: China’s strategic objectives in responding to October 7__ provides analysis of China’s strategic objectives for the semiconductor industry.
+
+__Section 4: China strikes back — new and old tactics for the updated strategy__ analyzes how China’s government and industry are responding to October 7 and shows how they form the basis of an updated Chinese semiconductor strategy.
+
+
+### Section 1: The Turning Point in China’s Strategic Thinking on Semiconductors
+
+In the initial months after the October 7 U.S. export controls, China’s response appeared relatively muted. China publicly criticized U.S. actions in a variety of diplomatic fora, filed a suit against the United States in the World Trade Organization, and reportedly considered (but did not publicly announce) proposals for massive additional semiconductor industry subsidies of more than 1 trillion yuan ($143 billion). A January news report from Bloomberg, citing anonymous Chinese sources, stated that the subsidy plan is on pause. Overall, the aggregate Chinese response in the first few months after October 7 appeared far from equivalent to what the United States had done.
+
+Of course, developing major policy responses takes time, and in the past two months, there are indications of both retaliation against the United States — such as initiating a cybersecurity review of U.S. memory chip producer Micron — and a shift in China’s overall semiconductor strategy. These will be addressed in greater depth in Section 4 of this report.
+
+However, part of the reason that China’s response to the October 7 export controls seems muted is because China’s “response” had already been underway for years. For China’s leadership, the decisive moment in shaping semiconductor strategy was not October 2022, but April 2018, when the United States imposed extremely strict export controls against a major Chinese telecommunications company, ZTE. While the October 7 export controls were in many ways a far more decisive action on the U.S. side, the harrowing experience with ZTE had already led China’s leadership to view the semiconductor industry primarily in national security terms, not economic terms. They came to believe that more extreme U.S. moves in the future were inevitable, including some of what was ultimately included in the October 7 policy (though China was clearly surprised by the timing, breadth, and sophistication of the controls). Thus, much of the shift in China’s semiconductor strategy to blunt future U.S. semiconductor export controls was already underway.
+
+Regarding the intensity of China’s efforts to eliminate U.S. and allied technology from its semiconductor supply chain, one senior U.S. government official told CSIS, “Even before October 7, on a scale of one to ten, China was already an eleven.”
+
+Thus, understanding how China adjusted its strategy in response to the April 2018 semiconductor export controls against ZTE provides the vital context through which to view China’s response to the October 7 export controls.
+
+The story of the ZTE sanctions is complicated. To briefly summarize: ZTE had illegally evaded U.S. sanctions by selling telecom equipment containing U.S. chip technology to Iran. ZTE got caught by U.S. authorities in March 2016, and, after a year of legal wrangling, pled guilty, settled with the U.S. government, and paid a $1.2 billion fine in March 2017. However, in early 2018, the U.S. government caught ZTE failing to abide by the terms of the settlement and making false statements to the U.S. government, which ZTE again admitted.
+
+In export controls, the most extreme punishments are usually reserved for companies that repeatedly engage in unlawful activity, especially after pleading guilty. In April 2018, the United States dropped the hammer: the U.S. government imposed sanctions and export controls upon ZTE — China’s second-largest telecommunications equipment company at the time. Among other restrictions, the controls prevented ZTE from buying U.S.-designed semiconductors for use in its telecommunications products. Since many U.S. semiconductor products are specified in international telecommunications technical standards, there was no viable alternative to U.S. technology. ZTE’s manufacturing and sales ground to a halt because they could not build their products without U.S. chips.
+
+In a matter of months, ZTE’s financial situation transformed from significant profitability and rapid growth to imminent bankruptcy. ZTE was ultimately given a lifeline by the intervention of then-U.S. President Donald Trump at the personal request of Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.
+
+How did China’s leadership react to the ZTE crisis? Reaching a firm conclusion about the decision-making process of China’s most senior leadership is notoriously difficult because they learned to be vague and secretive. After the 2015 publication of China’s Made in China 2025 policy sparked an international backlash, the industrial policy language in public Chinese government documents and leadership speeches, including on semiconductors, became significantly more secretive. Even though Made in China 2025 is no longer openly discussed in Chinese government leadership speeches, there is ample evidence that it remains a keystone industrial policy.
+
+Despite the secrecy and evasiveness, there are three pieces of strong and publicly available evidence that U.S. export controls on ZTE directly led to a major shift in Chinese strategic thinking. First, the Chinese government immediately began commissioning research on its strategic technology vulnerabilities. Second, speeches by Chinese leadership indicate that ZTE was viewed as a turning point. Third, China made significant changes to its semiconductor policy in the years following ZTE.
+
+#### China’s Government Research into Technology Chokepoints
+
+In July of 2018, Science and Technology Daily, an official newspaper of China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, published a series of articles detailing China’s most vulnerable technology “chokepoints.” (Note: the same Chinese phrase “卡脖子” is sometimes alternatively translated as “strangleholds”). Chokepoint technologies are those for which China is critically dependent upon U.S., Japanese, and European suppliers and for which producing Chinese substitutes is extremely difficult.
+
+Ben Murphy of the Center for Security and Emerging Technology published an astute analysis of the series. In it, Murphy points out that the articles are a rare example of public Chinese government publications that provide specifics on a vague but extremely important phrase, “key and core technologies are controlled by others.” The “others” are the United States and its allies. The “key and core technologies” are the 35 identified chokepoints, seven of which directly relate to the semiconductor industry, spanning nearly every segment of the semiconductor value chain. The phrase began to frequently appear in Chinese leadership speeches and state-run media after April 2018.
+
+#### Speeches by Chinese Leaders after the April 2018 ZTE Crisis
+
+The second key set of evidence on the importance of April 2018 are Chinese leadership speeches. In November 2018, Dr. Tan Tieniu, then the Deputy Secretary-General of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, gave a speech before many of China’s most senior leadership at the 13th National People’s Congress Standing Committee. In the speech, he argued that:
+
+> The U.S. ban on ZTE fully demonstrates the importance of independent, controllable core-, high-, and foundational technologies. In order to avoid repeating this disaster, China should learn its lesson about importing core electronic components, high-end general-purpose chips, and foundational software.
+
+Some of what Tan argues is consistent with decades of Chinese industrial policy, including Made in China 2025. However, Tan’s speech is indicative of how the ZTE experience in 2018 marked a turning point in the thinking of China’s senior leadership. Strengthening China’s position in strategic technologies was already a long-term economic development policy goal, but it was now also an urgent national security priority: reducing China’s vulnerability to U.S. economic pressure.
+
+Though Tan’s language is blunter, the need to reduce the Chinese technology ecosystem’s exposure to foreign pressure on national security grounds likewise became a recurring theme of General Secretary Xi’s speeches in the wake of the ZTE crisis.
+
+Notably, in a November 2018 Speech, Xi said that “Internationally, advanced technology and key technology is more and more difficult to obtain. Unilateralism and trade protectionism have risen, forcing us to travel the road of self-reliance.” Keeping with China’s goal of industrial policy secrecy, the speech was censored. For their international editions, Chinese government news outlets removed all of Xi’s use of the phrase “self-reliance.” The phrase has an important and controversial connection to Mao Zedong-era China. It also echoes the Made in China 2025 strategy of reducing China’s dependence on foreign technology. The Roadmap of Major Technical Domains for Made in China 2025, which was published in September 2015 and covered semiconductors and other sectors, included goals such as “replacement of imports with Chinese-made products basically achieved in key industries” by 2025. The self-reliance phrase also recalls Chinese efforts to improve technology through intellectual property theft and coercing foreign firms to transfer technology.
+
+In September 2020, the U.S.-China Trade war had caused Xi and other Chinese officials to return to more hawkish (and candid) language. Xi gave a speech in which he compared the urgency of China’s modern need for improved domestic technology independence to the significance of China’s 20th century nuclear weapons development program, a success that is deeply revered in Communist Party ideology. Xi further stated that:
+
+> As for industry, some critical, core technologies are under the control of others. We rely on imports for some critical devices . . . We need to rush forward with technologies that can make rapid breakthroughs and promptly solve problems. As for strategic technologies that require a long time to succeed, these need to be deployed ahead of schedule . . . China is faced with many “chokepoint” technological problems.
+
+But the overall Chinese strategy goes further than merely freeing itself from technological dependence on the United States: China also wants to ensure that the United States is dependent upon China. On April 10, 2020, Xi gave a speech at the seventh meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission in which he said, “we must tighten international production chains’ dependence on China, forming powerful countermeasures and deterrent capabilities based on artificially cutting off supply to foreigners.”
+
+#### Changes in China’s Semiconductor Policy
+
+The third piece of evidence that ZTE marked a turning point in Chinese thinking comes from the actual behavior of Chinese companies and especially the policies of the Chinese government.
+
+In the private sector, Chinese technology companies began — with extraordinary government financial support — amassing stockpiles of chips and chip-making equipment, buying far in excess of current demand as a hedge against potential future restrictions. Semiconductor executives told CSIS that they had routinely referred to Chinese customers under the label of “non-market demand,” meaning that the customers were buying for strategic reasons unrelated to market conditions or profit-maximization.
+
+In the public sector, the Chinese government continued with earlier efforts to massively subsidize growth of the Chinese semiconductor sector but changed its emphasis. The $21 billion National Integrated Circuit Industry Fund (commonly referred to as China’s “Big Fund”) that China’s central government launched in 2014 was renewed in 2019 with an additional $35 billion.
+
+As with all Chinese industrial policy, China’s local governments play a critical role in implementing central government semiconductor policy, including bearing much of the financial burden. In addition to the national-level Big Fund, China’s local governments established 15 semiconductor investment funds worth an additional $25 billion. China also stepped up its basket of other industry support tools, including government grants, tax breaks, equity investments, and low interest loans. The U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association estimated in 2021 that these direct and indirect subsidies were worth more than $50 billion.
+
+After the ZTE experience, China’s massive state support increased. More importantly, though, the subsidies shifted to prioritize the growth of domestic semiconductor capacity and alternatives to foreign, especially U.S., technology dependencies. Rather than pursuing the most profitable market opportunities, the Chinese government directed state support toward eliminating chokepoint dependencies in China’s semiconductor value chain.
+
+Much of this strategic shift was put in motion shortly after the ZTE experience, but it was formally written down in the Chinese State Council’s July 2020 Document No. 8 “Issuance of the New Era to Promote the Integrated Circuit Industry.” In an analysis of Document No. 8, Tai Ming Cheung, Barry Naughton, and Eric Hagt, wrote that China’s central government “essentially advocated unlimited support for semiconductor projects,” and directs all Chinese local governments to “do everything in their power” to promote the semiconductor sector.
+
+Document No. 8 provides financial and other support measures like exempting most Chinese semiconductor companies from most import duties and corporate profit taxes, with some sectors exempted from taxes for as long as ten years. The document acknowledges China’s need for foreign semiconductor technology imports, but it firmly grounds this in a self-reliance mindset. It states that, “For a certain period of time, key integrated circuit and software companies receiving state support must temporarily import equipment for their own use.” China views semiconductor equipment imports as a temporary waypoint on the path to technological self-sufficiency.
+
+Shortly after the publication of Document No. 8, China published its 14th 5-year economic plan, covering the years 2021-2025. In an August 2020 speech discussing the 5-year economic plan, Xi stated that:
+
+> The international economy, technology, culture, security and politics are undergoing fundamental shifts in many ways. The world is entering into a time of turbulence and transformation. For a while, we will face an external environment with more adverse forces. Therefore, we must be prepared for a series of new risks and challenges.
+
+> . . .
+
+> We must fully bring into play the obvious advantage of China’s socialist system, namely its ability to focus effort on undertaking daunting tasks and do a good job in the fierce battle for key and core technologies. China has a gigantic market and full-fledged industrial system, which is a unique advantage to foster massive application and rapid iteration of new technologies. With such strength, we are able to accelerate the conversion of S&T achievements into real productive forces, and to improve and protect the security of our production chain.
+
+Unsurprisingly, Xi’s thinking is reflected in the final, public version of the 5-year plan adopted in October 2020, which declares the semiconductor industry to be a top technology priority. The official summary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee meeting adopting the 5-year plan was blunt: it stated that China would “make technological self-sufficiency a strategic pillar of national development.”
+
+Of course, the ZTE event did not occur in a vacuum, and it was not the sole factor in the Chinese government’s new semiconductor strategy. Other events during the Trump administration also weighed heavily, including U.S. sanctions on Huawei and Fujian Jinhua, the Dutch government blocking exports of Extreme Ultraviolet Lithography machines, and the U.S.-China Trade War. Nevertheless, the three lines of evidence summarized above show that Chinese national security leadership was focused on the problem of dependence on U.S. technology years before October 2022. These leaders, including Xi, knew that even their strongest technology companies could potentially be strangled quickly and decisively by a U.S. government willing to exploit America’s control of technology chokepoints. Thus, when the Biden administration launched the October 7, 2022 export controls policy, many of the key strategic pillars of the Chinese response were already underway.
+
+Just as Moscow’s weaponization of Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas sparked efforts to remake Europe’s energy sector toward a future without Russia, countries that exploit their strategic position in the semiconductor industry risk persuading geopolitical competitors that they must fiercely work to free themselves of such vulnerabilities or develop countermeasures. Countries with a privileged position in the semiconductor value chain therefore would face a tradeoff between the foreign policy benefits of exploiting their advantage now and the potential risks of weakening, over time, the customer dependence that is the source of that advantage.
+
+But, that tradeoff was less of a factor in this case. From the perspective of the Biden administration, the U.S. and its allies were already bearing most of the cost of enacting a policy such as the October 7 export controls even before Biden took office. The key here is that in the mid-2010s China was already aggressively pursuing a semiconductor self-sufficiency strategy under the Made in China 2025 economic development policy. Then, in April 2018, the ZTE crisis and related U.S. actions had shifted China’s main semiconductors focus from one of many economic development “nice to have” goals to an urgent national security priority.
+
+By the time the Biden administration took office, China’s leaders were already persuaded that America could never be trusted when it comes to semiconductors, and that China should do whatever it takes to build an all-Chinese supply chain as quickly as possible. In making such an assessment, the Biden administration had the benefit of not only all the publicly available evidence reviewed in this report, but also classified intelligence.
+
+If China was already going to pursue semiconductor technology independence at any cost — regardless of the Biden administration’s actions — that necessitated a changed approach from the United States and its allies. Instead of attempting to persuade China away from its “self-reliance” strategy, the United States now needed to ensure that the strategy failed.
+
+
+### Section 2: China’s Post-October 7 Industrial Policy Challenge
+
+The global semiconductor value chain is remarkably complex. Some companies play a diverse set of roles, and others are highly specialized. But no single company — indeed no single country — is currently capable of internally performing all roles in the value chain for all the types of semiconductors required for a modern economy. Leading chip sellers routinely have tens of thousands of suppliers distributed globally, and some suppliers are the only companies in the world that possess their technological capabilities at the required performance and reliability.
+
+The U.S. October 7 export controls, alongside the related export controls adopted by Japan and the Netherlands in March 2023, have been analyzed at length in other CSIS reports. Readers are advised to consult these analyses for a more in-depth treatment of the challenge that these policies pose to China’s AI and semiconductor industries, as well as the legitimate national security reasons that the United States and its allies have for pursuing the policy.
+
+This section will focus instead on the significant challenge that the (now multilateral) October 7 export controls pose to China’s industrial strategy for semiconductors. The three countries — along with Taiwan and Korea which are partly covered by U.S. application of the Foreign Direct Product Rule — are working together in a way that challenges China’s ambitions across nearly every segment of the semiconductor value chain. The export controls target China across design, design software, fabrication, materials, chemicals, and manufacturing equipment. Within equipment, the combination of U.S., Dutch, and Japanese controls covers nearly every type of advanced chip-making equipment: etching, lithography, deposition, metrology, and more.
+
+
+
+In practice, this means that China’s dreams of self-reliance will face multiple extremely challenging technological barriers that China must overcome simultaneously in order to extract any benefit or financial return on investment. Even if China succeeds in creating an advanced AI chip-design firm, Chinese foundries cannot fabricate the chips without advanced foreign equipment and chemicals, which are restricted by the export controls. International chip foundries will refuse to fabricate the Chinese designs, because these are covered by the U.S. application of the foreign direct product rule on U.S. chip design software and U.S. manufacturing equipment.
+
+The story is even more difficult for Chinese chip foundries, which cannot import the advanced production equipment they need to make chips better than the performance thresholds covered in the export controls (16nm logic, 18nm DRAM, and 128-layer NAND). Even if a Chinese semiconductor equipment firm succeeds in making a single type of advanced equipment domestically — an astonishingly difficult and expensive task — that piece of equipment is nearly useless by itself. In the same way that no commercial jet airliner can fly without wings, engines, electronics, and landing gear, only a complete set of semiconductor production equipment can produce a finished chip.
+
+Moreover, the degree of precision and reliability required for advanced semiconductor manufacturing means that there is a major gap between building a prototype system and producing such systems at competitive performance and scale. Thus, individual Chinese company successes in a single advanced technology cannot gain commercial market traction. The entire Chinese semiconductor ecosystem has to be domestically self-sufficient before China can produce chips at the October 7 performance thresholds. This is the October 7 challenge that China’s semiconductor industrial policy confronts. Of course, it also faces the traditional challenges of industrial policy: information asymmetry and crony capitalism.
+
+Information asymmetry refers to the fact that government bureaucrats generally do not know which firms will effectively use government subsidies and protectionist policies (which firms want) to advance the country’s overall technology level (which the government wants).
+
+Crony capitalism refers to the fact that many approaches to allocating subsidies (aka “picking winners”) will merely result in political capture through an alliance of rent-seeking firms and corrupt government officials. Politically connected firms often secure government support for reasons unrelated to their technological and managerial competence.
+
+The traditional industrial policy mechanism for solving these two challenges is “export discipline,” which conditions state support such that it primarily rewards firms for successfully exporting in foreign markets rather than selling to protected domestic ones. Foreign customers in technologically advanced economies will naturally demand that their exporting suppliers adopt international best practices in management and technology to meet their stringent standards. Foreign customers can also provide expertise and other support to directly aid a supplier’s advancement. This solves both the information asymmetry problem (since bureaucrats can align subsidies to a clear exports metric that provides the needed market signal) and the crony capitalism problem (by automatically allocating subsidies according to export success rather than political connections).
+
+Export discipline played a significant role in the successful industrial policies and technological development of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea during the 20th century. China’s modern export boom, however, occurred after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), which banned export subsidies for its members in 1995. China has at different times provided various government incentives — such as tax rebates, an under-valued currency, and low-interest loans — to encourage exports, but the Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese approaches were more targeted and linked to specific performance criteria, fostering a stronger sense of export discipline.
+
+Thus, China’s post-WTO industrial policy approach (especially after 2006) to ensuring that subsidies and protectionist support are productively allocated toward desired economic and technological development goals took a different path, one that relies more on foreign firms owning production facilities in China. China was far more reliant upon foreign direct investment than South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan during their major growth periods. The influx of foreign capital, technology, and managerial expertise has been instrumental in the growth of many industries in China, including semiconductors. By contrast, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan relied more on domestic investment (through strict government control of the financial system) and technology transfers through licensing agreements.
+
+Fortunately for China, the Chinese domestic market is now large enough that some of the traditional weak points of industrial policy are less of a factor than they were in those countries. Even in Chinese industries that are almost entirely protected from foreign competition, such as internet tech, the competition in the domestic market is fierce enough to weed out weak players, and the market is large enough to support multiple large-scale firms. Semiconductor producers in South Korea and Taiwan, by contrast, had no choice but to rely on exports in order to generate sufficient revenues to support the relevant economies of scale and the organizational learning scale provides.
+
+This is the necessary background to understand why the October 7 export controls pose such a challenge for the advancement of the Chinese semiconductor industry. For Chinese chipmakers and chip equipment makers, as well as the bureaucrats seeking to support them, exposure to international markets was the key to providing the critical feedback needed to ensure that they pursued the right technological and operational development path.
+
+Before October 7, China’s chip manufacturing industry could walk that path one step at a time, making progress in advanced etching equipment while lagging in lithography, for example. Now, however, for China to produce chips at the 16 nm logic node or better (or the equivalent technology benchmarks in memory), China will have to break through every single incredibly difficult technological barrier before its firms can begin producing advanced chips.
+
+Worse, Chinese semiconductor equipment firms will have to do so almost entirely without expertise and advice provided by U.S., Japanese, and Dutch firms. The export controls make transfers of such knowledge also subject to export license requirements, and thus de facto banned.
+
+Finally, there are essentially no prospects for foreign customers of Chinese chipmaking equipment. Most of the advanced Chinese equipment producers have been added to the U.S. entity list, meaning they are too risky to have as a supplier for products where a long-term relationship is essential.
+
+The prospects are better for foreign customers of Chinese chipmakers (aka “fabs”). Since many international companies assemble their finished goods in China, many “domestic” chip sales actually represent global market and international customer demand. Even here, however, the situation has worsened.
+
+In mid-2022, Apple was on track to purchase advanced NAND memory chips from China’s YMTC for use in iPhones. Apple cancelled the order in the wake of the export controls. Qualcomm, which alone accounts for about 20% of Chinese foundry SMIC’s revenue, is reportedly considering whether to drop SMIC as a supplier even for chips less advanced than those covered by the October 7 performance thresholds. Computer maker Dell announced plans to cease purchases of Chinese chips by 2024. As China’s semiconductor industry becomes increasingly government-driven and cracks down on foreign firms, this global exodus will accelerate.
+
+For China’s advanced node (though not legacy node) chipmaking industry, export discipline (or the version with Chinese characteristics) is now essentially off the table. That means China will have to achieve economies of scale and the organizational learning that scale brings with almost entirely domestic sales. That is not inconceivable, but it is far riskier and more expensive. China’s domestic semiconductor market is massive. But, as mentioned above, much of that “domestic” demand is international in nature, since semiconductors are an intermediate good for finished products assembled in China for foreign-owned firms and export to global markets. These domestic Chinese chip sales to foreign firms are likely to drop off. Without export discipline, China lacks a clear path to avoid the traps of information asymmetry and crony capitalism.
+
+Unsurprisingly, China’s government has a poor track record of picking winners in the semiconductor industry. In recent years, the strategy has essentially been to flood the sector with money, watch new entrants rush in, and then double down on the winners. In low capex segments of the semiconductor industry, such as chip design, this is a viable strategy, especially when paired with export discipline. But in the high capex segments of the industry, such as chip fabrication and semiconductor equipment manufacturing, the costs of doing anything other than picking a small set of winners in advance are astronomical. Thus, China has had to place a few extremely expensive bets and watch most of the “winners” that the Chinese government picks go bankrupt even with massive government support. 3,470 Chinese chip companies shuttered in the first 8 months of 2022 (i.e., even before October 7), up from 1,397 in the full year 2020.
+
+Widespread corruption does not help. Many of these bankrupt chip companies died under a cloud of corruption, financial fraud, and extraordinary waste. Several of the top leaders of China’s semiconductor “Big Fund” were arrested in 2022 on corruption charges.
+
+The high capex requirements of these segments already made executing China’s standard playbook especially difficult. A near total loss of the ability to rely on export discipline — certainly in advanced segments — is going to make China’s crony capitalism and corruption challenges worse. In the non-advanced segments, Chinese chip equipment producers are still subject to foreign competition, whose products are vastly superior on every metric that matters.
+
+China is probably willing to pump vastly more money into the system, but at this scale the marginal value of additional money is relatively low and probably more likely to enrich corrupt officials than it is to produce leading firms. A U.S. government official told CSIS that “Chinese semiconductor subsidies were already past the limit of what the industry could productively absorb.”
+
+Despite these extraordinary headwinds, China is not going to give up. Perhaps 20th century Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan had the better industrial policy, but 21st century China is richer and more stubborn. In many other sectors, such as electric cars, China’s leadership has shown extraordinary patience and a willingness to waste astonishing sums of money in order to give birth to globally competitive Chinese firms. Sometimes, however, this patience has borne fruit: a recent Economist article was titled “China’s BYD is overtaking Tesla as the carmaker extraordinaire.”
+
+In sum, China’s basic strategy of pursuing self-reliance in semiconductors on national security grounds was already solidified after April 2018 and remains in place. However, October 7 was a watershed moment in international relations, one that occurred sooner than China expected and poses major challenges to China’s industrial policy for semiconductors. There is no doubt that China will respond with an updated strategy and new tactics. Some elements of this are already underway. This response is the focus of Section 3.
+
+
+### Section 3: China’s Strategic Objectives in Responding to October 7
+
+In the wake of October 7, China is pursuing four strategic objectives:
+
+- Limiting China’s exposure to foreign economic pressure
+
+- Deterring future U.S. and allied economic pressure
+
+- Increasing international economic dependence upon China
+
+- Gaining the economic and security benefits of AI.
+
+#### Limiting China’s Exposure to Foreign Pressure
+
+Much of the relevant economic pressure topic is covered in Section 1, but there is an additional issue worth raising: the risk of an all-out semiconductor embargo by the United States and potentially U.S. allies as well. China imported more than $350 billion worth of semiconductors in 2020, more in dollar terms than China’s imports of oil. Loss of access to all foreign chips and chip technology would be economically apocalyptic.
+
+Indeed, multilateral chip export controls would have been apocalyptic for Russia had China not helped to fill the gap for its “no limits” Russian partner. An all-out chip embargo on China is likely in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and perhaps plausible in some other scenarios, such as a blockade of Taiwan. Given that Xi has reportedly given the Chinese military the goal of being able to invade Taiwan by 2027, this is no doubt a factor.
+
+#### Deterring Future U.S. and Allied Economic Pressure
+
+In the wake of the October 7 export controls, a great deal of commentary focused on how China might retaliate. As will be discussed more in Section 4, China is retaliating, and China will continue to retaliate. However, some of this focus on retaliation confuses ends and means. China’s central strategic aim when it comes to AI and semiconductors is not to punish the United States: it is to gain and preserve the strategic benefits of the technologies. The point of retaliation is to deter future action by the United States and its allies, not to score points.
+
+The October 7 export controls were a significantly more damaging set of semiconductor sanctions and export controls than those pursued by the Trump Administration. U.S. economic pressure has increased significantly over the past five years (in response to escalating Chinese provocations) and at this point are damaging what China perceives to be its core strategic interests. China had two options if it wants to change U.S. behavior, to either deter or appease. As will be discussed more in Section 4, China has chosen to deter and is undertaking a retaliatory campaign that is more willing to inflict pain upon the United States — even at the cost of pain to China — than during prior disputes.
+
+#### Increasing Foreign Dependence upon China
+
+The greatest current source of global dependence upon China in the semiconductor industry is as a customer. This is the natural flip side of the $350 billion in Chinese imports mentioned above. When the flow of chips stops, so does the flow of money, and semiconductor companies need a lot of money. According to 2019 data from the Semiconductor Industry Association, Chinese customers comprised
+
+- 26 percent of chip demand by corporate headquarters of the electronic device maker (e.g., phone, computer, washing machine);
+
+- 35 percent of chip demand by location of electronic device assembly (including foreign-owned firms that perform assembly in China); and
+
+- 24 percent of chip demand by location of electronic device end-users.
+
+In 2021, China was also the world’s largest customer market for semiconductor manufacturing equipment, representing 26 percent of global demand.
+
+However, China’s share of both chip demand and equipment demand has shrunk significantly due to both China’s Covid-19 lockdown restrictions and the October 7 controls.
+
+China has proven willing to cut off access to its customers as a tool of foreign policy, in markets as widely divergent as fishing, wine, and NBA basketball TV broadcasts. Chinese leaders talk openly about their willingness to use conditional market access as a tool of foreign policy.
+
+Demand-side coercive power only goes so far, though, and China seeks strengthened supply-side coercive power as well. Xi said in April 2020, “we must tighten international production chains’ dependence on China, forming powerful countermeasures and deterrent capabilities based on artificially cutting off supply to foreigners.”
+
+China has become an important supplier of chips in the world, responsible for 9 percent of global production in 2020, but the Chinese share of global chip production declined significantly during the Covid-19 lockdown years. China’s chip production capacity is concentrated in legacy nodes, defined as 28-nanometer or larger. Legacy chips remain vital for a large set of industries, demand is expected to increase, and China is by far the largest investor in this area. If China succeeds in establishing a dominant position in legacy chips, this could give China genuine coercive power in key market segments such as automotive chips.
+
+China’s most frequently discussed source of near-term coercive power is its dominance of rare-earth metal mining and especially refining capacity, controlling more than 60 percent and 80 percent respectively of global capacity. There’s an important difference, however, between China’s dominance of rare earths and the U.S. dominance of semiconductors. China is vulnerable in semiconductors because it lacks technology and a credible path to acquire it. The United States and its allies are vulnerable in rare earth metals only because they have not shown adequate political will to address the problem.
+
+The United States’ position in rare earths is analogous to the crisis of Europe’s dependence of Russian natural gas. Europe had all the technology to build additional liquid natural gas shipping terminals and the wealth to acquire foreign sources. It simply had a different strategy of “peace through trade” that ensured no substantive attempt to build out the capacity. However, once Russia invaded Ukraine, the crisis created the necessary political will. Any Chinese move to cut off rare earth metals would spark a rush to develop new mines and new refining capacity — as occurred when China restricted rare earth exports to Japan in 2010. Developing alternative sources is far from instantaneous, but slow normal timelines in mine permitting and refining installation construction and can be vastly accelerated during a crisis.
+
+The same is not true of China’s pursuit of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. China has been pursuing an intense development effort for more than a decade. After April 2018, that effort morphed into a genuine national security priority with nearly unlimited resources available. Even so, China has relatively little to show for its efforts other than waste and corruption.
+
+#### Gaining the Economic and Security Benefits of AI
+
+With respect to AI, senior leaders in China, including Xi himself, believe that leadership in AI is foundational to the future of military, economic, and geopolitical power.
+
+They are correct.
+
+Over the past decade, modern AI has already demonstrated remarkable national security capabilities spanning military, intelligence, surveillance, and propaganda, most recently in the war in Ukraine. For nearly a decade, senior U.S. national security leaders have openly stated that they believe that AI will be the key technology to enable continued U.S. military superiority over China. The recent generative AI revolution makes it clear that continued rapid progress in AI technology is unlikely to slow anytime soon.
+
+As explained in a previous CSIS report, the purpose of the October 7 export controls was to exploit U.S. control of strategic semiconductor technologies in order to choke off China’s access to future progress in AI, including its national security applications. In fact, many of the policy ideas implemented by the October 7 export controls were recommended 18 months earlier in the final report of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence.
+
+In short, the Biden administration views export controls on semiconductors as the means to an end. The end is ensuring that the security of the United States and its allies is not threatened by Chinese advances in AI.
+
+This is the challenge that China’s leaders are responding to. Retaliation is one tool in that policy response, but it is not the most important one. Section 4 will address the major initiatives that China is undertaking in pursuit of its strategic objectives.
+
+
+### Section 4: China Strikes Back — New and Old Tactics for the Updated Strategy
+
+Though the overall strategy and its goals are broadly similar, China has adopted a combination of new tactics and redoubled efforts on old ones. Though there is more to China’s efforts worthy of consideration, this section will focus on the following five major tactics that China is employing.
+
+- Evading the new controls and continuing to access foreign technology;
+
+- Seeking to divide the United States from its allies;
+
+- Acquiring foreign technology through industrial espionage and talent recruitment;
+
+- Pressuring Chinese firms to buy Chinese and eliminate American suppliers; and
+
+- Retaliating against the United States and its allies.
+
+#### Evading New Controls and Continuing to Access Foreign Technology
+
+Of the four major categories of exports covered by the October 7 controls, the restrictions on chip-making equipment are by far the easiest to enforce. The equipment is large, extremely expensive, and requires a massive amount of post-sales support. These are all features that make export controls easier to enforce. By contrast, AI chips are small, lightweight, and may require no post sales support whatsoever. That makes them an ideal target for smuggling. While no confirmed cases of post-October 7 AI chip smuggling have been reported, chip smuggling has long been a familiar practice in China. In December 2022, a woman was arrested by Chinese customs officials for attempting to smuggle 202 chips inside a false pregnancy belly, though she was trying to avoid Chinese import duties, not evade U.S. export controls.
+
+A U.S. government official told CSIS that China is “definitely” attempting to evade the controls or even outright smuggle the chips. This is easy in small quantities but considerably tougher to accomplish at the needed scale for training large AI models. A small set of hyperscale cloud operators and datacenter providers constitute the vast majority of global demand for the most advanced AI chips. That makes corporate export compliance through “know your customer” and other efforts much easier. Attempting to achieve the necessary scale by aggregating many small purchases through shell companies is possible but would be a slow and laborious process. The U.S. government has also stepped up intelligence community support for export controls enforcement, which should aid the likelihood of catching smugglers.
+
+However, in recent weeks, China has begun a crackdown on the foreign consulting firms that support corporate due diligence efforts, including those related to identifying shell companies and other measures to complying with U.S. export controls and sanctions. As the U.S. government and U.S. firms are trying to gather more information that will allow them to precisely target de-risking efforts, China is taking a classically authoritarian approach that is making that more difficult. There is almost certainly more to come in this area.
+
+A more pressing Chinese tactic for avoiding the controls is accessing computing capacity through the cloud. Since the regulations target geographic destination and not corporate ownership, it remains entirely legal for Chinese AI companies to import the chips to their subsidiaries in, say, India and then allow Chinese programmers in China to access the computing capacity via the cloud. As predicted in a previous CSIS report, this is indeed occurring.
+
+Finally, Chinese AI companies can simply absorb the performance hit of using chips that comply with the export control performance thresholds, which require chips to meet a dual threshold across processing power and interconnect speed. Nvidia, a leading provider of chips for training AI models, has released reduced interconnect variants of its best AI chips that can legally be exported to China. Lennart Heim of the Centre for the Governance of AI has estimated that the overall performance penalty for using one of these chips compared with the international market model is less than 10 percent. That is certainly tolerable for well-resourced Chinese AI companies and national security organizations.
+
+#### Seeking to Divide the United States from Its Allies
+
+Four countries — the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea — are responsible for the vast majority of global semiconductor equipment sales. Unsurprisingly, as soon as the United States announced the October 7 controls, Chinese firms began courting equipment makers in the other countries. China’s government also began pressuring the other countries to not go along with the U.S. controls. In the case of the Netherlands and Japan, that pressure continues even now. Only days after Japan submitted draft export control regulations for public comment, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang told his Japanese counterpart, Yoshimasa Hayashi, that,
+
+“The US once brutally contained Japan’s semi-conductor industry by resorting to bullying practices. Today the US has repeated its tricks on China. As the saying goes, do not do unto others what you don’t want done unto you. As the keenly-felt pain still stings, Japan should not help a villain do evil. The blockade will only further stimulate China’s determination for independence and self-development.”
+
+Similarly, in a March 20 interview with a Dutch newspaper, Tan Jian, China’s ambassador to the Netherlands said, “This will not be without consequences. I’m not going to speculate on countermeasures, but China won’t just swallow this.”
+
+Since the Netherlands and Japan have already made plans to join the United States in placing export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, the real audience for these threats is likely South Korea, Germany, and the European Union, which have yet to join the multilateral export control regime and may weigh the severity of China’s actions toward Japan and the Netherlands in their choices.
+
+South Korea is the most important country to add to the equipment export controls. South Korea is a small but sophisticated player in the global semiconductor manufacturing market, with roughly 5 percent global market share. Though South Korean equipment firms are generally less advanced than those of the other three countries, South Korean equipment companies are significantly more advanced than those of China.
+
+South Korea also has deep linkages to the Chinese semiconductor industry. South Korea’s two largest memory producers, Samsung and SK Hynix both have a significant share of their global memory production located in China, and both operate facilities worth tens of billions of dollars that make chips sophisticated enough to be subject to U.S. export controls. Ironically, these firms are also subject to Chinese export controls, which prohibit the South Korean firms from moving the tens of billions of dollars’ worth of equipment (none of which was built by China) out of China.
+
+However, South Korea has reasons to be grateful for the October 7 export control policy. The controls were a massive setback to key Chinese competitors: memory chipmakers YMTC (NAND) and CXMT (DRAM). In the days after the October 7 export controls, the stocks of both Samsung and SK Hynix increased significantly.
+
+Moreover, planned Samsung and SK Hynix production capacity expansion that would have been built in China is now planned for construction on Korean soil. Next year, South Korea is forecast to overtake China as the world’s largest buyer of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. This will presumably delight the South Korean government, which has fretted about its growing trade deficit with China. Semiconductors alone comprise nearly 20 percent of South Korea’s total exports.
+
+The production shift back to South Korea is probably also in the best interest of Samsung and SK Hynix. Industry officials told CSIS that Chinese talent poaching from Samsung’s and SK Hynix’s Chinese production facilities played a major role in the rapid technological ascent of both YMTC and CXMT. If operating leading-edge facilities in China requires training the workforce of your future Chinese competitors, Samsung and SK Hynix will certainly view that as a less attractive option.
+
+Both China and the United States are actively seeking to sway South Korea’s government to their side in the export controls dispute. However, the United States likely has the edge. In addition to the above-mentioned benefits, South Korea’s government has recently pursued closer ties with both the United States and Japan.
+
+#### Acquiring Foreign Technology through Industrial Espionage and Talent Recruitment
+
+Industrial espionage has been a part of the semiconductor industry nearly since its inception. In a declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report from 1977, the CIA wrote that the Soviet Union’s attempt to steal and copy semiconductor manufacturing equipment technology “dwarfs all of their other known illegal purchase efforts.” Of course, the CIA viewed it as a critical U.S. priority to ensure that Soviet acquisition efforts failed, writing that “if the USSR acquires all the equipment that has been ordered, plus manufacturing know-how and training . . . this capability would elevate the USSR to the status of a major world producer of ICs, trailing only Japan and the United States.” Fortunately for the CIA and the United States, the Soviet Union did fail to acquire a complete set of advanced equipment and the knowhow needed to effectively operate it.
+
+In recent decades, some industry players have expressed skepticism that industrial espionage is an effective tool, given the importance of tacit knowledge among skilled organizations and workers. Roger Dassen, the Chief Financial Officer of the Dutch lithography equipment firm ASML, said recently that “A lot of ASML’s technology is not on blueprints. It’s in the heads of people. And you don’t need just the blueprints; you need everything surrounding it and the entire supply chain . . . You’re talking about a decade or more before you could replicate something like this.”
+
+Whether or not Dassen is correct, China is clearly trying to steal ASML’s blueprints and much more. ASML’s CEO said in March of this year that ASML has faced thousands of security incidents each year, forcing the company to increase spending on cybersecurity and other protections by a “significant double digit” percentage for multiple years in a row. In a 2018 trial against a former ASML employee who left the company after successfully stealing source code and providing it to Chinese competitors, ASML’s lead attorney said that the theft represented “a plot to get technology for the Chinese government.”
+
+This view was echoed by the Dutch national intelligence agency, which in its 2023 annual report called China “the biggest threat to the Netherlands’ economic security.” In a 2023 interview with the Associated Press, the head of the agency said, “We see that every day they try to steal [technology] from the Netherlands.”
+
+ASML is far from the only semiconductor firm that has been subject to repeated and brazen Chinese attempts to steal technology, whether via cyber espionage or by recruiting employees to steal from their employers. In the U.S. memory chip-maker Micron has been the victim of massive theft and knowledge transfer to Chinese competitor Fujian Jinhua. Contrary to those who claim that espionage is not an effective tool in the semiconductor industry, Fujian Jinhua was able to quickly introduce a DRAM product line that used Micron’s “1x-nm” technology.
+
+Perhaps the greatest challenge is for the semiconductor industry of Taiwan. Officials in Taiwan told CSIS that Chinese design firms are often willing to pay Taiwanese engineers 500 percent more than they can make in Taiwan. One official caveated, however, that “this is not a job for life. China will suck the knowledge out of your brain and then fire you, and no Taiwanese firm will hire you back after working for China.” To get around the stigma, Chinese firms have taken to setting up shell companies in Taiwan and recruiting workers to transfer knowledge to China, without ever requiring them to leave Taiwan.
+
+In response to this challenge, Taiwan has introduced new laws designed to strengthen the security of its industry. This even includes setting up a dedicated economic espionage judicial system to speed up trials and convictions.
+
+Structuring activities to maximize foreign knowledge transfer goes beyond espionage and talent poaching. In interviews, multiple individuals with experience in the semiconductor equipment industry stated that Chinese fabs would often structure their manufacturing operations to run foreign equipment and Chinese-built equipment side by side, operated by the same pool of workers. The Chinese fab workers would then provide feedback to the Chinese equipment companies, advising them how to improve their designs based on their experience with foreign systems.
+
+#### Pressuring Chinese Firms to Buy Chinese and Eliminate American Suppliers
+
+When considering the challenge of advancing China’s level of semiconductor equipment technology, the two biggest advantages that Chinese firms have is that (1) they do not have to do de novo innovation and (2) that they enjoy a lot of state financial support. Regarding the former, Chinese firms do not have to explore the full range of possible technological paths because the correct solution (or at least a correct solution) path has already been discovered by foreign firms. They can focus R&D resources on a single direction that they know can work. Regarding the latter, Chinese equipment can be competitive on price even when it is not competitive on performance and reliability.
+
+The biggest disadvantage that Chinese firms have is that their competitors’ equipment already works and has terrific performance, which makes even Chinese fab firms hesitate when picking Chinese equipment providers.
+
+In slowing the advance of China’s equipment industry, the October 7 export controls were designed to achieve the best of both worlds. In the advanced node segments, Chinese players struggle to get a foothold because they cannot achieve economies of scale until they have a full stack of production equipment technology. In the legacy node segments where Chinese equipment providers have viable product offerings, they will still encounter competition from foreign equipment providers. Legacy equipment products — even those of U.S. firms — are not covered by export controls. International providers offer equipment with performance significantly better than that of Chinese providers. Thus, it is difficult for Chinese equipment providers to achieve relevant economies of scale even in legacy segments.
+
+In short, Chinese equipment providers cannot learn how to make good products until they have a lot of operational market experience, and they cannot gain significant operational experience because few are interested in buying their unattractive products.
+
+Chinese leaders have a preferred solution to break this vicious cycle: pressure Chinese fabs to buy Chinese equipment. As Xi said in a speech:
+
+> We must firmly grasp this strategic basis that is demand expansion, make each link — production, distribution, circulation and consumption — rely more on the domestic market to achieve a virtuous circle, specify the strategic direction of supply-side structural reform, and promote the achievement of dynamic balance between aggregate supply and demand at higher levels.
+
+History gives good cause for skepticism of the Chinese government’s goals. The Made in China 2025 roadmap anticipated that by 2023, Chinese equipment providers would have already mastered large scale production of extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) equipment. In reality, China’s leading lithography company, the Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment group (SMEE) is only producing prototype machines equivalent to what ASML was producing at scale a decade and a half ago.
+
+This “all-Chinese” supply chain is also the goal of some influential Chinese firms, including Huawei. In March 2023, Huawei’s chairman said, “For Huawei, we will render our support to all such self-saving, self-strengthening and self-reliance efforts of the Chinese semiconductor industry.” Huawei recently announced that it had collaborated with other Chinese firms to create new chip design software for chips at the 14nm node or above. If the tools are successfully verified, which Huawei stated would happen this year, it would provide a Chinese competitor to the U.S. dominant firms in the market.
+
+In the equipment space, Chinese equipment firms will likely supply a majority of the new equipment for fabs producing at the 90nm node or above, according to CSIS discussions with industry executives. However, the executives were skeptical that Chinese equipment firms could supply even 5 percent of the market at the 28nm node within 3 years.
+
+Chinese government pressure to “buy Chinese” appears to be extending beyond equipment to the chips themselves. At a recent visit to Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group, General Secretary Xi Jinping asked the corporate delegation, “Are the chips in your crane all made locally?” The Chinese government has also launched a campaign to pressure Chinese automakers to dramatically increase their purchases of Chinese-made chips. Currently, only 5 percent of the chips in Chinese cars are made in China, despite many automotive chips being made at legacy nodes.
+
+China’s leaders recognize that it cannot build an all-Chinese semiconductor supply chain overnight, but they are seeking to bolster domestic demand and supply simultaneously by focusing on legacy chips and chipmaking equipment, which does appear to mark a new tactic.
+
+However, one U.S. semiconductor executive told CSIS in an interview that the Chinese government’s actions matter less than those of the United States: “The Chinese government doesn’t even need to have a ‘no American chips’ policy,” the executive said. “The U.S. government’s actions are plenty frightening to persuade Chinese firms that they should avoid buying American unless they absolutely have to.”
+
+Combined, this suggests that China is exploring the approach advocated by Lu Feng, a professor at the Peking University School of Government. In a 2023 interview, Lu argued that China should pursue a strategy of “fully independent manufacturing” in two steps. The first step is “de-Americanization of the production lines,” buying Chinese wherever possible, then from U.S. allies, and only from the United States if necessary. The second step is “replace all foreign equipment and materials with domestically made equipment and materials.” Lu argues that the key to this strategy is not to pursue individual technologies — a major focus of prior Chinese industrial policies — but instead to establish linkages between Chinese players in all segments of the value chain.
+
+#### Retaliating against the United States and Its Allies
+
+Last but not least, China is retaliating. Thus far, this retaliation is taking place in two areas.
+
+First, China is using its anti-trust enforcement regime as a block on essentially all mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. semiconductor industry firms. China has employed anti-trust measures to prevent U.S. mergers before, but a December 2022 analysis by the law firm Skadden finds that “Of the thousands of deals that China has reviewed, only three (less than 0.01%) have been prohibited . . . nearly all of the prohibitions, conditional approvals, and abandonments over the past 10 years have occurred in the technology sectors that are important to China’s national growth, such as semiconductors.” Five months later, the Wall Street Journal reported that essentially all semiconductor mergers involving U.S. companies were being significantly slowed or blocked outright. For semiconductor anti-trust reviews, China has taken things from bad to worse.
+
+Second, China has initiated a cybersecurity review of Micron, the largest U.S. memory chipmaker. In an analysis of the Micron case, Graham Webster, chief of the DigiChina Project at the Stanford University Cyber Policy Center, writes that “the prevalence of Chinese commentary identifying Micron as a company particularly unfriendly to China is important in understanding the context for its cybersecurity review.”
+
+If Micron fails its cybersecurity review, it could be forced out of the Chinese memory market entirely, a potential loss of $3.3 billion in annual sales. At this point, that outcome seems likely. In addition to being fully consistent with a “de-Americanization” approach, excluding Micron could further benefit the company’s South Korean competitors, Samsung and SK Hynix. It may be that China is using this as a potential diplomatic carrot for South Korea to not join the U.S. export controls regime, in addition to the threatened use of sticks.
+
+Both the anti-trust blocking and the Micron review — especially if Micron is ultimately excluded from the Chinese market — are genuinely more significant retaliatory responses than China has taken in the past during, for example, the ZTE dispute. China clearly feels a need to send a more significant signal to deter further U.S. or allied action.
+
+Of course, it is possible that China will ultimately widen the retaliatory measures to additional areas, such as exports of rare earth metals. Thus far, however, China appears to have calculated that such measures would do more harm than good.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+October 7 was a watershed moment in the history of U.S.-China relations, and the international community is still reorganizing itself in the wake of a new U.S. and allied approach of “de-risking” exposure to China. China is adapting to this changed environment, but perhaps with fewer changes than some expected. This serves as evidence that the Biden administration’s calculations in launching the new policy were generally correct, at least as they concerned the semiconductor industry: U.S. allies got on board, and China had few good options to respond beyond their already extremely aggressive policy.
+
+The weakest link in the new policy, however, is in achieving its primary stated purpose: blunting China’s military adoption of AI technology. That will require strengthened multilateral export control enforcement capacity to prevent chip smuggling, as well as a means of dealing with China’s ability to access needed AI computing resources through the cloud and by purchasing adequately advanced AI chips that comply with the October 7 performance thresholds. Generally, however, this is unsurprising. Technology markets change rapidly, and the only export control regime that has a chance of being effective is one that keeps up with the pace of change.
+
+---
+
+__Gregory C. Allen__ is the director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies and a senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics, and led frequent diplomatic engagements with governments and militaries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions, including China.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-04-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-52.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-04-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-52.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 52 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-05-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 鍾錦麟開始作供 指2020年2月已有共識民主動力協助戴耀廷辦初選
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（4日）踏入審訊第52天。第三名控方證人、時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟今開始作供，供稱時任召集人趙家賢曾望民主動力在2020年立法會換屆選舉「有角色」，但「冇乜人睬佢」；而鍾和趙同年2月與戴耀廷會面，戴表示就選舉協調已聯絡相當數量的民主派及一些資訊科技人士，但欠一個註冊團體和銀行戶口執行計劃，望民主動力可協助，鍾稱會面後遂有共識，民動會協助戴所領導的初選或協調。趙家賢早前強調民主動力於5月初獲邀請，5月中下旬才正式答應承辦初選，法官問民動是否於5月獲正式委任辦初選，鍾指對該說法「唔係太清楚」，「所以冇其他嘢可以協助到法庭。」
+
+此外，時任西貢區議會主席的鍾錦麟亦獲戴耀廷聯絡主持新界東協調會議，他指首次會議討論採取「初選」或「棄選」方案，及目標出選議席數量，但無印象有人提及戴耀廷的文章。
+
+#### 鍾錦麟開始作供 稱12歲時任范國威義工、19歲曾加入民主黨
+
+前民主動力召集人趙家賢上周二作供完畢，惟因控方不久前破解鍾錦麟手機，辯方需時審視新收到的逾2,000則訊息，押至今天才傳召鍾錦麟。身穿黑色西裝外套、格仔襯衫、牛仔褲、架黑框眼鏡和戴口罩的鍾錦麟，今午在兩名懲教人員護送下步入法庭，他一度微笑向被告席點頭，宣誓後除下口罩作供。
+
+
+▲ 鍾錦麟（資料圖片）
+
+控方由署理助理刑事檢控專員（特別職務）羅天瑋負責提問。就鍾的個人背景，鍾確認其英文名字是「Ben」，指「雖然依個唔喺我身分證上面，但係大家都係咁樣稱呼我」，而鍾1988年於香港出生，2020年時33歲，已婚，獲文化研究學士及社會工作碩士學位。
+
+鍾同意，他自小對政治有興趣，12歲時已成為時任民主黨范國威的義工，而他19歲加入民主黨，加入不久後便退出，並在約2010年加入新民主同盟，范國威曾任該組織輪任召集人。
+
+#### 鍾稱約於2013年認識戴耀廷、朋友介紹認識區諾軒、曾向趙家賢請教地區工作技巧
+
+鍾同意，於2011年當選西貢區議員，2019年成功連任，並獲選為西貢區議會主席，至2020年已有10年區議員經驗。鍾曾聽聞和知悉戴耀廷推動的「雷動計劃」和「風雲計劃」，被問是否認識戴耀廷，鍾指約於中學時開始看法律相關書籍，許多關於憲制的概念都是由戴撰寫。
+
+法官陳仲衡打斷問控方是否想問鍾個人是否認識戴，羅天瑋遂改問鍾任區議員時是否認識戴。鍾確認，指戴約於2012、2013年提出「佔領中環」行動前，曾發起很多「商討日」，他在商討日經人介紹後與戴「互相打咗聲招呼」，但沒有特別再商討任何事情。鍾續指，佔領運動後沒再與戴特別聯絡，但在2015、2016年左右戴在其他場合有與他不定期聯絡，二人並於戴2016年開始提倡「風雲計劃」時討論區議會選舉事宜。
+
+至於同被指為組織者的區諾軒和趙家賢，鍾表示於2009、2010年區諾軒申請加入民主黨時，經朋友介紹認識區，之後有與區接觸。而他約於2007、2008年認識趙家賢，因鍾當時已立志參與2011年區選，而趙是當年區選最年輕的當選人，故向趙請教地區工作的技巧，趙並建議他修讀調解課程，指對地區工作「好有幫助」。
+
+鍾表示，於2014、2015年左右加入民主動力，其後成為民動副召集人。羅天瑋其後展示鍾的 Facebook 專頁，他確認是他作為議員向公眾發布訊息的專頁。羅一度問公眾如何能載入其專頁，余慧明面露驚訝，鄒家成亦發笑，鍾指若有人搜尋他的名字就相當可能找到該專頁，其宣傳品等亦有相關網址。
+
+
+▲ 羅天瑋（右）（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鍾稱民主動力曾嘗試協調2020年立會選舉 但實際由戴耀廷主導
+
+根據民主動力 Facebook，民動使命包括協調參與立法會選舉及區議會選舉。被問民主動力有否參與協調2020年立法會選舉，鍾指在2020年1、2月時「曾經嘗試去做協調，但係實際最後係由戴耀廷主導咗成個協調嘅程序」。
+
+法官李運騰指即與「35+計劃」無關，鍾同意，並問法庭是否容許他用「少少時間」講述民主動力當時望協調立會選舉的背景。李運騰問是否需要，控方指只需很簡單的背景。鍾其後在法官追問下，指「民主動力曾經嘗試協調『35+計劃』以外嘅協調」，並同意民主動力在戴耀廷的「35+計劃」以外，原本另有協調計劃。
+
+#### 鍾稱2020年2月和趙家賢與戴耀廷會面談協調 戴稱已聯絡不同民主派、望眾籌初選費用
+
+控方續問及民主動力與戴耀廷的討論，鍾錦麟指，「趙家賢曾經希望民主動力可以協調到，或者當年嘅換屆選舉有角色，但係冇乜人睬佢」，陳志全發笑。鍾並指，民動另一位副召集人馮志活知道此情況後，亦知道區諾軒與戴耀廷正進行「非常之類近嘅工作」，即游說不同民主派人士進行選舉協調，便安排鍾錦麟、趙家賢和戴耀廷會面。
+
+鍾表示，3人於2020年2月左右在太古城東隅酒店一所餐廳會面，會上戴耀廷提及因民主派在2019年區議會選舉大勝，認為「數字上面民主派係能夠攞到立法會過半席位」，故望進行協調工作，並表示已聯絡到相當數量的不同光譜民主派人士進行協調或初選，但沒有詳細描述或提及是什麼人或政黨。戴亦指已聯絡了一些「IT人」（資訊科技人士）設計初選流程，甚至望該初選程式可乘機做認證，不同選區的選民可獲發一個數碼代幣（token），除了在是次初選使用，亦可在日後社區議題上做決策。
+
+鍾亦指，戴建議以眾籌籌得初選所需經費，但他與趙家賢有相當保留，認為應由參與初選或協調的人攤分所有相關開支，以控制成本，避免不同光譜的參選人士提出越來越多要求。惟戴擔心素人會認為此做法即要他們負擔很高昂的費用、覺得這是由大黨壟斷的制度，故認為眾籌較可取，亦對此「非常之有信心」。鍾指民動沒有反對戴的說法。
+
+#### 鍾稱2020年2月民主動力已有共識 協助戴耀廷領導的協調
+
+被問戴有否提及協調時的困難，鍾指戴會上提到「好多嘅無論聯絡候選人、或者實際執行方法上面都已經係準備好㗎啦，但係佢冇一個註冊嘅團體同埋相關嘅銀行戶口去執行相關嘅計劃，所以希望民主動力可以協助」，並指「呢個見面就有共識，民主動力會協助戴耀廷所領導嘅初選或者協調」，林卓廷點頭。
+
+趙家賢早前強調民主動力於2月獲邀列席協調會議，5月初獲戴耀廷及區諾軒邀請承辦初選，至5月中下旬才正式答應。法官陳慶偉問，所以在2020年2月已有此共識？鍾答「正確」。陳再問那在2020年5月，民主動力是否獲正式委任？鍾表示：「對於法官呢個講法我唔係太清楚，所以冇其他嘢可以協助到法庭」，林卓廷發笑。陳再指，正式委任即是有白紙黑字，鍾回應「我對一啲明文嘅協議並唔知情」。
+
+羅天瑋續問，戴耀廷有否提及希望民主動力如何幫忙。陳慶偉指不認為需問到這麼仔細，指這並非本案重點。羅改問誰代表民主動力與戴耀廷聯絡，鍾指是趙家賢，而時任民主動力總幹事黎敬輝有協助趙。
+
+#### 鍾稱獲戴耀廷聯絡主持新東會議 何桂藍、鄒家成等出席
+
+鍾錦麟續指，戴認為不同地區選舉的協調，「應該係由唔同選區嘅區議會主席去協助」，故戴3月左右聯絡他，望幫手主持新界東協調會議，戴亦有聯絡時任沙田區議會主席程張迎。鍾一度指，「我喺度需唔需要停一停，定我驚時序上一路講到7月會好亂」，羅天瑋指會繼續問此議題。
+
+新界東首次會議於4月14日在旺角教協辦事處舉行，鍾指會議由戴耀廷、區諾軒、他本人及程張迎主持，並有數十人參與，均由戴邀請，包括何桂藍、鄒家成、劉頴匡，以及民主黨、公民黨、人民力量、社民連和區政聯盟的代表。鍾指，一些沒參與選舉協調的組織都有參與，指基本上戴耀廷在 Facebook 觀察到在政治上和在該區「比較活躍」的團體，「都會邀請佢嚟一齊商討。」
+
+被問會議一開始有沒有人進行介紹，鍾指沒有印象，因他當天遲到，而他到場後戴耀廷正邀請各參與者介紹自己。被問是否認識何桂藍，鍾稱「我喺2019年嘅社會事件上面知佢係『立場姐姐』囉」，至於鄒家成，鍾則知道他參選2019年區議會選舉，但因與民主黨撞區，最後落敗。
+
+#### 鍾指會上討論協調方案 與會者關注約束力問題惟無深入討論如何處理
+
+鍾指與會者自我介紹後，大家就商討新界東究竟採取「初選」抑或「協調」的方案，並指印象中是由戴耀廷介紹。陳慶偉一度問，一份名為「35+計劃」的文件有否向與會者介紹或傳閱？庭上早前展示該文件，提及「五大訴求，缺一不可」及各區議席目標等。鍾稱「冇印象」，指戴耀廷很多時透過 WhatsApp 主動發出該些文件，但他沒印象收到，在會議前亦沒印象戴有發出任何關於會議的資料。
+
+就上述兩個方案，鍾指有部分人選擇「初選」、部分人選擇「協調」。被問與會者有否解釋選擇的原因，鍾指是「關於約束力嘅問題」，指協調方案是商討好目標議席數目後，全部人都可以參選，但「部分嘅參選人會擔心有人唔承認成個協議，繼續去參選或者繼續進行佢嘅選舉工程」。
+
+羅天瑋問，就約束力的問題，戴耀廷有否要求參與者作出任何協議，鍾稱「會上面冇討論到如何有一個大家有說服力嘅方法去令大家都 binding（被約束）」，並在法官追問下指即「冇傾過」相關方法，指「大家表達完關注（約束力的問題）之後，冇就住呢個問題深入去討論點執行成件事」。至於會上有沒有記錄，鍾稱「我冇獲知會呢個會議係有記錄」，亦沒有獲展示黎敬輝所做的筆記。
+
+#### 鍾指趙家賢會上無發言、會上無印象有人提戴耀廷文章
+
+鍾錦麟確認，民主動力的趙家賢和黎敬輝都有出席該會議，「但係佢哋係嚟旁聽」，二人亦沒有提出意見，趙家賢會上亦沒有說過任何話。不過趙家賢早前供稱會上有本土派質疑民主動力是「大台」時，他有作回應。
+
+至於鍾本人，則就採用「初選」或「棄選」方案，及目標出選議席數量「帶領大家討論」。法官陳慶偉指，鍾錦麟當時有兩個身分（wore two hats），即西貢區議會主席及民主動力副召集人，但他在新東首次會議只有一個身分？鍾指「正確」。
+
+羅天瑋其後展示戴耀廷於3月31日發布的〈立會過半是大殺傷力憲制武器〉、3月10日的〈齊上齊落 目標 35+〉，及4月14日的〈攬炒的定義和時間〉，提及要取得立會過半，及預計立法會會期只有7個多月等。羅問，新東首次會議上有沒有人提及過上述3篇文章的概念？鍾指「冇印象有」，亦沒有印象有人對戴的文章發表任何意見。此前趙家賢曾稱新東首次會議上，有本土派稱支持戴〈攬炒的定義和時間〉一文，戴並以「溫和好多」字眼解釋，而鄒家成和莊榮輝等亦就否決預算案字眼「企晒起身」討論。
+
+羅天瑋指會問及下一個議題，案件明天續審。臨散庭前，法官陳仲衡着鍾不可以與其他人提及本案，又指相信已安排處理鍾的證供。此前趙家賢作供第3天仍管有其證人供詞。羅天瑋回覆相信懲教有安排，鍾並主動舉手補充：「我嘅證供已經係被懲教署入起咗，封存咗。」
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-05-putins-missile-war.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-05-putins-missile-war.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Putin’s Missile War
+author: Ian Williams
+date : 2023-05-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/T9uQAMa.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Russia’s Strike Campaign in Ukraine"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia’s missile campaign against Ukraine has severely underperformed expectations._ _In the invasion’s early days, Russia underestimated the necessary scale and effort of its missile campaign. Since then, Russia has changed course multiple times, most recently moving to target Ukrainian electrical grid and civilian infrastructure during the winter months. Russia’s haphazard missile campaign reflects both internal strategic failures and Ukraine’s critical forward thinking in the days prior to the invasion. Early Russian failures also gave time for Ukraine to develop its air defense strategy and capabilities which have only grown in effectiveness, thanks in large part to Western aid. This report provides an in-depth review of these and related “missile war” dynamics._
+
+> #### Methodology and Data Sources
+
+Accurately assessing an ongoing war is challenging, and any analysis or narrative deserves a healthy level of skepticism and scrutiny. However, the high level of attention on the war in Ukraine has produced a large quantity of publicly available information. Ukrainian, UK, and U.S. defense and intelligence agencies have provided a steady stream of information on and insights into the performance and availability of Russian missiles and the effects of Russian strike operations. Media reports of major missile attacks and firsthand video and images from the battlespace provide valuable snapshots of events on the ground. Researchers on the ground have also added invaluable insights. When taken together, a rough picture and timeline of the air and missile war have come into view, enabling some preliminary conclusions about the nature of Russia’s long-range strike operations in Ukraine.
+
+The data cited and visualized in this report is mainly drawn from several Ukrainian government sources. These include numbers released by the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Command Staff of the Ukrainian Air Force, and a more detailed data set covering Russian missile strikes between February 28 and July 21 produced by the Staff of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, which Reuters partially published in August 2022. Available information on Russian missile use in Ukraine has evolved, and in some instances, these data do not fully align. As such, readers should consider the data sets presented in this report as estimations and snapshots of general trends instead of hard, independently confirmed numbers.
+
+> #### Key Findings
+
+- Russia’s long-range strike campaign of air and missile attacks has fallen short of producing the strategic effects necessary to achieve a decisive victory.
+
+- Key drivers of this failure have been the Ukrainian military’s extensive use of dispersion, mobility, and deception and the comparative slowness of Russia’s over-the-horizon targeting cycle.
+
+- At the war’s outset, Russia significantly underestimated the scale of effort required to accomplish its goals. In its initial operation to gain air superiority, Russia failed to achieve mass and tried to attack too many targets with too few missiles over too short a period to achieve its desired results.
+
+- Russia’s strike campaign has also been undermined by frequent shifts in targeting priorities and the irregular availability of precision-guided munitions.
+
+- Ukrainian air defenses have deterred Russian Air Force aircraft from launching penetrating sorties against strategic targets deep behind the front lines. This success has greatly shaped the course of the war, limiting Russian striking power to diminishing numbers of stand-off missiles or uncrewed aerial systems.
+
+- Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and industry have deepened Ukraine’s dependency on the West. This dependency supports Russia’s goal of exhausting the West’s patience and compelling Western capitals to pressure Ukraine to make concessions. This Russian theory of victory will also fail, however, unless Western governments accommodate it.
+
+- Russia has seen relatively greater operational success in its campaign to degrade the Ukrainian electrical grid, though Ukraine has proven resilient to these hardships.
+
+- Ukraine has seen increasing success in intercepting Russian cruise missiles, particularly since the influx of Western air defenses systems in October and November 2022.
+
+- Ukrainian air and missile defenses have not been leak-proof, however, highlighting the importance of passive defense and maintaining the capacity to quickly reconstitute capabilities and infrastructure.
+
+- Since the fall of 2022, Russia’s long-range missile attacks against Ukraine have become larger but less frequent as Russia attempts to overcome the growing efficiency of Ukrainian air defenses.
+
+- Russia is likely to struggle to maintain the frequency of attacks moving forward as its missile stockpiles diminish and it becomes more reliant on newly produced or recently acquired projectiles to fuel its attacks.
+
+- Even with a diminished frequency, sustained air attacks against Ukraine’s electrical grid over the long term risk exhausting Ukraine’s capacity to sustain repairs.
+
+- In addition to degrading Ukraine’s electrical grid, the composition of Russian missile salvos since October 2022 suggests a secondary Russian goal of depleting Ukrainian air defense capacity.
+
+- Diminished air defense capacity would not only put Ukraine at greater risk from Russian missile attack but raise the prospects of the Russian Air Force resuming penetrating sorties into Ukrainian airspace.
+
+- To the extent possible, replenishing Ukraine’s air defense capacity should remain a priority for Western military aid for the foreseeable future.
+
+- Ukraine has demonstrated throughout the war that Russian ballistic and cruise missiles are manageable threats and can be countered effectively through active and passive defenses.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Since February 2022, Russia has fired thousands of missiles and loitering munitions at Ukraine’s cities, infrastructure, and military forces. These attacks have killed and maimed thousands of Ukrainian civilians and military personnel and have heavily damaged Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy. Russia has had a pronounced advantage over Ukraine in long-range, precision-guided munitions throughout the war. Nevertheless, Russia has struggled to use this advantage to produce the kind of decisive strategic effects that Moscow likely expected to deliver a quick Ukrainian capitulation.
+
+One year into the war, the Ukrainian military’s command and control apparatus remains intact. Ukraine’s air force and air defenses, while diminished, continue to frustrate Russian air and missile operations. Western weaponry continues to flow to the front lines, and the morale of the Ukrainian people remains steadfast despite enormous hardships.
+
+Russia’s long-range strike campaign in Ukraine contrasts starkly with those waged by the United States and coalition military forces during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In these wars, U.S. cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions played a pivotal role in fracturing Iraq’s military from its political leadership, suppressing enemy air defenses, and achieving coalition air supremacy. These actions contributed directly to the Iraqi military’s quick defeat on the battlefield and the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime. By contrast, Russia’s inability to achieve similar strategic effects with its guided missiles gave Ukraine the time and breathing room to disperse and reconstitute its forces and repel the main thrust of Russia’s attack in the early phases of the war. Russia’s continued inability to achieve air superiority and disrupt Ukrainian logistics has permitted the Ukrainian Armed Forces to prosecute aggressive counteroffensives with increasingly sophisticated weaponry.
+
+In a successful strike campaign, one would expect a belligerent to become less dependent on stand-off strike assets over time as it wore down its adversary’s air force and air defenses. Yet Russia has experienced the opposite in Ukraine. Its failure to achieve air superiority in the early phases has caused an increasing dependence on missiles and other stand-off weapons, such as one-way attack drones, to strike targets anywhere beyond the front lines. In this way, Russia has become a victim of the kind of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies that it itself has sought to develop over many years.
+
+In the broadest sense, one cannot separate Russia’s haphazard missile campaign against Ukraine from wider strategic failures that have plagued nearly all aspects of Moscow’s war effort. Yet some unique factors have contributed to the underperformance of Russian missile forces. Russia’s intelligence and targeting capabilities have been too slow and inflexible to keep pace with a dynamic, fast-changing battlespace. Russia also underestimated the scale of strike operations needed to accomplish its goals at the beginning of the war, and Ukrainian air defenses have limited the number of Russian missiles reaching their targets. Although the impact of Ukrainian air defenses is difficult to independently confirm, the general trendlines suggest the force is growing more efficient and capable of thinning out Russian missile and drone salvos.
+
+While strategically ineffective, Russia’s missile strikes against Ukraine have had tragic consequences. Russian missiles have inflicted their greatest damage against civilian targets, industry, and infrastructure. Since failing to reach its initial objectives, Russia has begun to increasingly target Ukraine’s industry, including Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, defense industrial facilities, and transportation infrastructure. Russia has also attempted to use its stand-off missile capabilities to disrupt the flow of Western weapons and supplies to the front lines, although this effort appears to have failed beyond temporary disruptions.
+
+Russia has also used missile attacks as instruments of psychological warfare. These actions have included attacks on civilian targets and possible false-flag operations aimed at degrading support for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government and demoralizing Ukrainian civilians. Russia has used missile strikes to retaliate after Ukrainian military successes. However, these tactics have failed to break Ukraine’s will to fight. Instead, they may have had the opposite effect, hardening Ukraine’s resolve and amplifying anti-Russian sentiment.
+
+In the longer term, the damage Russian missiles have inflicted across the country will likely weigh down Ukraine’s economic recovery and make additional foreign assistance critical to rebuilding. However, the continued provision of air defenses now will mitigate these future costs and reinforce a sense of security that could encourage Ukrainian refugees to return home. Such refugee repatriations will be important to Ukraine’s post-war economic recovery and future self-sufficiency.
+
+In its struggle against Russian missile attacks, Ukraine has shown that, while dangerous, Russian missiles are not unstoppable. Even under harrowing circumstances, Ukraine has defeated advanced Russian cruise missiles with high-tech counters such as active air defenses and low-tech practices such as dispersion, mobility, deception, and camouflage. One cannot assume that Russia or others would repeat the same operational blunders in a future war. Still, Ukraine’s experience illustrates Russian theater missiles are not an unmanageable challenge.
+
+
+### Russia’s Missile Campaign in Ukraine
+
+The character of Russia’s missile attacks on Ukraine has evolved significantly since the start of the war. The first wave of strikes primarily targeted Ukrainian air bases, air defenses, and munitions depots. By around April 2022, Russia shifted its focus from military targets to Ukraine’s petroleum and transportation sectors, aiming to interdict the flow of foreign-supplied weapons to the front lines. The summer of 2022 saw an uptick in Russian missile attacks against civilians, including indiscriminate attacks on residential areas and targeted strikes against Ukraine’s agricultural sector. In September, Russia again escalated its attacks on Ukrainian civilians, kicking off a systemic missile and drone campaign to degrade Ukraine’s civil electrical grid and water facilities.
+
+These shifts in objectives have not been steps in a preplanned military effort. Rather, they represent ad hoc adaptations driven by Russia’s frustrations over its broader war effort, its struggle to target mobile Ukrainian military assets, and the irregular availability of cruise missiles and other stand-off weapons.
+
+#### The Opening Salvo
+
+In the first hours of its attack on Ukraine, Russia concentrated its air and guided-missile strikes against Ukrainian airfields and airports, with particular attention to on-site stores of aviation fuel. Russia also targeted air defense sites and major Ukrainian munitions depots (Appendix I). Moscow carried out around 160 air and missile strikes in the first two days of the war, with missiles striking “nearly 10” Ukrainian air bases, among other targets, according to U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) estimates at the time. Ukraine reported explosions at around 30 locations by 0900 on February 24. At the time, the Russian Ministry of Defense characterized these strikes as targeting “military infrastructure, air defense facilities, military airfields, and aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” using “high-precision weapons.”
+
+The aggregate effect of these strikes was not immediately clear from open sources, but it soon became apparent that Russia was failing to gain air superiority over Ukraine. While Russia struck nearly all of Ukraine’s active air bases, much of the Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) survived the initial barrage and, despite being badly outnumbered and outclassed, made its presence felt in the days and weeks following the invasion. Ukrainian fighters persistently engaged Russian aircraft in the skies of Kyiv and elsewhere. Even on the first day of war, Ukrainian Su-24 bombers took part in the Battle of Hostomel airport, an early Ukrainian victory that set the tone for the early phases of the war.
+
+More than two weeks into the war, the DOD assessed that the “Ukrainians still have at their disposal viable and effective air and missile defense, and they are still able to and are flying aircraft in that very contested airspace.” While Russia could gain dominance over some areas for periods, airspace control was shifting and heavily contested. In addition to the tactical advantages, the persistence of the UAF also proved a valuable symbol for national morale and resistance.
+
+Another important factor in these early days was the failure of Russian missile forces to suppress Ukraine’s contingent of Bayraktar TB-2 uncrewed aerial systems, which Ukraine likely also dispersed in advance of the invasion. Although Russia would eventually neutralize most of these systems through electronic warfare and air defenses, the TB-2s proved pivotal in the early weeks of the war, inflicting considerable damage to Russian forces. Video footage gathered by TB-2s circulated across social media sites, proving a powerful tool in publicizing Ukrainian military success to the world.
+
+Russia saw some initial success in disabling fixed Ukrainian air defense sites in the opening days of the war. A study from the Royal United Services Institute found that Russia managed to suppress Ukrainian air defense through air and missile strikes on static air defense targets, particularly Ukraine’s network of larger air surveillance radars. However, a significant portion of Ukraine’s mobile air defenses survived. Once reconstituted after the initial few days of the war, these units began inflicting high losses on Russian aircraft operating in Ukrainian airspace. By March, the Russian Air Force had largely abandoned penetrating sorties with manned aircraft, relying predominately on stand-off missiles for strike missions against strategic targets beyond the front lines.
+
+Another pivotal shortcoming in Russia’s opening salvo was its failure to decisively diminish Ukraine’s munitions stockpiles. According to one account, Russian missiles struck all of Ukraine’s national munitions depots in the first days of the war. However, Ukraine had already begun dispersing its munitions stores away from the centralized sites three days before the start of Russia’s invasion. Russia’s apparent inability to adapt its targeting to this dispersal enabled Ukraine to keep its artillery brigades well supplied with shells. Russian forces attempting to advance against Kyiv faced bombardment from Ukrainian artillery until they retreated from the Kyiv axis altogether in April 2022. Dispersal of artillery units in the days leading up to the invasion was also instrumental in ensuring the guns themselves survived the initial Russian air attacks.
+
+#### Shifting Focus
+
+As Russia abandoned its drive against Kyiv in April, Russia deemphasized targeting Ukraine’s military airfields and air defenses and refocused on economic and logistical targets. In addition to rail infrastructure and bridges, Russia targeted Ukraine’s petroleum industry to degrade its ability to produce fuel (Appendix II). This shift in focus likely stemmed from Russia’s realization that it was facing a protracted conflict and needed to stymie Ukraine’s mobility and supply lines. Neither line of effort appears to have achieved lasting effects.
+
+In early April, Russia attacked Ukraine’s largest oil refineries, in Kremenchuk and Odesa. Local sources said Russian missiles had “completely destroyed” the Kremenchuk refinery, although Russia would go on to strike the facility again in May and June. Russia also reportedly struck the Shebelinsky gas processing plant in June, and missile strikes also damaged pipeline infrastructure. Together, these attacks effectively shut down Ukraine’s domestic production of refined petroleum products such as gasoline and likely contributed to a temporary gasoline shortage over the spring and summer of 2022. While this resulted in hardships among civilians, it did not discernably impair Ukraine’s military effort. Ukraine was already heavily dependent (more than 80 percent) on imports of refined petroleum products even before the war, and countries such as Lithuania were quick to step up their exports to Ukraine to meet the shortfall from Russian attacks.
+
+
+_▲ Workers look at a power substation damaged following a missile strike in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv on May 4, 2022, as Russia’s defense ministry said that its air- and sea-based weapons have destroyed six electrical substations near railways, including around Lviv._
+
+Russia also took aim at Ukraine’s transportation infrastructure in a bid to disrupt the flow of Western weapons to the front lines. On April 25, Russian missiles hit five railway junctions in a single day, with the Ukrainian General Staff assessing: “They [the Russians] are trying to destroy the ways of supplying military and technical assistance from partner states.” A week later, at least 18 Russian cruise missiles struck railway infrastructure across Ukraine, including damaging three electrical substations around Lviv powering the rail network in Western Ukraine. These attacks reportedly caused temporary delays to around 50 trains. Like previous efforts to achieve decisive strategic effects, Russian attacks against Ukraine’s transportation did not appear to have had a lasting impact. Even shortly after the strikes, a top executive of Ukraine’s rail services told journalists that “the longest delay we’ve had has been less than an hour.”
+
+#### FALSE FLAGS, PUNISHMENT, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
+
+Since the start of the war, there have been multiple examples of Russia attempting to use missile attacks to shape public opinion in its favor or to psychologically influence the calculus of Ukraine’s leadership. These efforts have generally backfired. One incident was Russia’s ballistic missile attack on the Kramatorsk railway station, which killed nearly 60 civilians and wounded more than 100 others. In the attack, Russia employed older SS-21 Tochka-U ballistic missiles equipped with submunition warheads. The Tochka-U is the only ballistic missile system Russia and Ukraine possess in common, and in the wake of the attack, Russia pushed the narrative that Ukraine had carried out a false-flag attack to gain international sympathy. An independent investigation debunked these claims, however, confirming that Russia still had SS-21s in service in Ukraine and that the missile that struck Kramatorsk came from Russian-occupied territory.
+
+
+_▲ The remains of a rocket with the Russian lettering “for our children” painted on it is seen on the ground in the aftermath of a rocket attack on the railway station in the eastern city of Kramatorsk on April 8, 2022._
+
+Earlier in March 2022, a Tochka-U missile with submunitions struck downtown Donetsk city, killing over 20 civilians. Unlike the Kramatorsk attack, this attack occurred inside Russian-occupied territory. Russian media presented the incident as a Ukrainian attack, an accusation that Ukraine denied, saying that the missile was of Russian origin. Neither version of the story has been fully confirmed, but the incident aligns with the pattern of Russian behavior since the start of the war. In October 2022, projectiles struck the Continent shopping mall in downtown Donetsk. Russian sources accused Ukraine of attacking the civilian structure with HIMARS rockets. Later, however, imagery emerged of debris from a Russian Kh-31 missile at the site of the blast.
+
+As the war has turned against Russia, Moscow has also used its long-range missiles in operations meant to “punish” Ukraine in the wake of major Russian setbacks, an effort to deter Ukraine from its continued counterattacks. After Ukraine sank the Russian cruiser Moskva in April, Russia responded by firing up to five cruise missiles at the Vizar Zhulyansky Machine-Building Plant, a defense industrial complex outside of Kyiv. After the attack, Russia’s defense ministry declared that: “The number and scale of missile strikes on targets in Kyiv will increase in response to any terrorist attacks or acts of sabotage on Russian territory committed by the Kyiv nationalist regime.” In late June, Russia launched more than 60 missile strikes against cities across Ukraine over two days, possibly a response to the United States announcing it would send HIMARS to Ukraine.
+
+#### Escalation against Civilians
+
+Attacks on civilians have been a persistent feature of Russia’s war on Ukraine since the start of the conflict. But by the summer of 2022, there was a noticeable uptick in civilian attacks using long-range missiles (Appendix III). There has been a degree of uncertainty as to whether civilians were the intended target of these attacks or whether the loss of civilian life and destruction of civilian property has been a byproduct of inaccurate Russian missiles and poor targeting intelligence. Evidence is mixed, and it is likely that Russia has targeted Ukrainian civilians both intentionally and inadvertently. Whether purposeful or not, Russia’s strike campaign has shown an almost complete disregard for civilian safety.
+
+The elevated intensity of strikes against civilian targets around mid-summer 2022 coincided with reports that Russia was running low on its higher-end precision-guided missiles such as the 3M-14 and Kh-101, relying more heavily on missiles ill-suited for land-attack missions. This period included growing Russian use of anti-ship missiles in land-attack roles, such as the Kh-22. Missiles such as the Kh-22 have seekers able to home in on large ships at sea and struggle to discriminate between structures in dense urban environments. Kh-22s nevertheless have large warheads and have had devasting effects on civilian infrastructure.
+
+Russia also began repurposing S-300 air defense interceptors to strike urban areas at this time. S-300 interceptors are also poorly suited for land attack as they rely on semi-active radar homing for terminal guidance. In a social media post, the governor of Mykolaiv Oblast, Vitaly Kim, noted that Russia had been upgrading its S-300 with satellite navigation, though their accuracy remained poor. Mykolaiv was hit uniquely hard by Russian S-300 barrages during the summer of 2022, with salvos of 9 to 12 missiles striking the city every few days during some periods. Commenting on Russia’s use of the S-300 in late July, UK intelligence assessed: “There is a high chance of these weapons missing their intended targets and causing civilian casualties because the missiles are not optimized for this role and their crews will have little training for such missions.”
+
+Russia’s use of anti-ship missiles against urban centers has had similar outcomes. On June 27, Russia struck the city of Kremenchuk with Kh-22s. In Kremenchuk, one Kh-22 struck a road-paving equipment factory, while another hit a nearby shopping mall, killing 20 civilians and wounding more than 60 others. On July 1, three Russian Kh-22s struck the city of Odesa, demolishing a multi-story apartment complex and killing 22 civilians.
+
+The toll that Russian missile strikes have taken on Ukrainian civilians cannot be solely attributed to low-quality munitions. Russia has, on numerous occasions, struck civilian targets with some of its most advanced and expensive weapons. On July 14, for example, three Russian submarine-launched 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles struck downtown Vinnytsia, hitting a shopping center, a wedding hall, and a dance studio, killing 23 civilians and wounding 71. Such strikes have led many to conclude that Russian strikes on civilians are intentional, not a byproduct of missile inaccuracy.
+
+
+_▲ Fragments of a Russian cruise missile lie on the ground following a strike in the city of Vinnytsia on July 14, 2022, killing at least 23 people, including 3 children._
+
+This period also saw significant Russian targeting of Ukraine’s agricultural sector. To be sure, Russia’s military has sought to damage Ukraine’s agricultural industry since just after the start of the conflict. Yet as Russian troops withdrew from northern Ukraine, Russia continued to attack agricultural infrastructure with artillery and stand-off missiles.
+
+In late August, reports surfaced that Russia had received shipments from Iran comprising “hundreds” of Iranian Shahed-series loitering munitions, sometimes referred to as “kamikaze” or one-way attack drones. By mid-September, UK intelligence had assessed that Russia had already deployed Shahed-136 drones, after Ukrainian forces reportedly shot one down on September 13.
+
+By late September, Shahed-136 munitions began appearing in the skies over Odesa. In the following weeks, intense battles ensued between Ukrainian air defenses and Russian drones attacking civilian and military structures. Between September 25 and 29, Russia reportedly launched 29 kamikaze drone attacks against Odesa and other areas in southern Ukraine. By most accounts, Ukrainian air defenses destroyed a significant portion of Russia’s drone attacks. Some did get through, however, with Shahed-136 drones striking Odesa’s port area, several residential areas, and the headquarters of Ukraine’s Operational Command South.
+
+#### The Autumn Blitz
+
+Russian missile attacks on Ukraine entered a new phase shortly after Ukraine’s October 8 attack on the Kerch bridge connecting Crimea to Russia. On October 10, Russia launched over 100 missiles and loitering munitions at Ukraine, targeting Ukraine’s power grid, municipal water facilities, and related civilian infrastructure. This wave of attacks would become just the first in a systematic Russian effort to degrade Ukraine’s capacity to produce and deliver electrical power to its civilian population (Appendix IV).
+
+
+_▲ Damaged equipment at a high-voltage substation of the operator Ukrenergo after a missile attack in central Ukraine on November 10, 2022._
+
+In the first week of the renewed assault, Russian missiles and drones struck 405 locations across the country, including 45 power stations, representing approximately 30 percent of power stations across Ukraine. In a briefing on October 17, a senior DOD official described Russian actions as “targeting nonmilitary targets, innocent civilians, with no military value . . . to instill terror, and try to create panic, fear, with the idea that somehow this is going to decrease the resolve of the Ukrainian people.”
+
+The following days and weeks would see steady waves of missile and drone attacks of an intensity not seen since the conflict’s opening days. According to reports from the UAF, Russia fired over 600 air- and sea-launched cruise missiles between October 10 and the end of 2022, with an average salvo size of around 50 missiles. Interspersed with these cruise missile attacks have been waves of one-way attack drones, primarily Shahed-136s, of which Ukraine says Russia launched nearly 700 between September 2022 and early January 2023. Moreover, Russia has targeted civilian infrastructure with shorter-range missiles such as the S-300 in areas closer to the front lines, including Kherson and Mykolaiv. In mid-December, the United Nations assessed that Russia’s bombardment had damaged around 50 percent of Ukraine’s power grid.
+
+Evidence suggests that Ukraine has managed to forestall a complete collapse of its electrical grid. Independent measures of internet connectivity across Ukraine, a proxy measure for electricity supply, show the damage caused by Russia’s strikes but also Ukraine’s efforts to restore power. Data from the independent internet watchdog Netblocks, for example, shows a major drop in web connectivity during the first major wave of strikes against Ukraine’s grid between October 10 and 11, but also shows restoration of service in many areas (Figure 1).
+
+Observers measured similar outages corresponding to Russian missile attacks. Attacks on November 15 and 23 resulted in particularly acute losses in power as they also caused disruptions to the output from all three of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants still in operation. Ukrainian utilities have employed conservation efforts and scheduled rolling blackouts to ration what power they can still generate.
+
+#### The View Ahead
+
+As of January 2023, Russian missile and drone attacks against electrical infrastructure have caused significant degradation of Ukraine’s grid. The system remains fragile, but Ukrainian air defense and utility workers have prevented a total grid collapse. As of mid-January, Ukraine’s main energy company, Ukenergo, said it could cover 75 percent of its electricity demand. Ukrainians face extreme hardship, but there appears to be little public support for offering concessions to Russia in exchange for peace. The growing capability of Ukrainian air defenses have likely forced Russia into making less frequent but more intense attacks to overwhelm defenses.
+
+The availability of Russian stand-off weapons will be a factor as well in the frequency and intensity of Russian attacks. Analysis of the wreckage of Kh-101s from the attacks on November 23 shows they were produced no earlier than September 2022. This indicates that Russia may be reaching the limits of its missile stockpiles and shifting toward greater reliance on newly manufactured missiles.
+
+If Russia has truly exhausted its stockpiles, a slowdown in attacks could be on the horizon. Since October, Russia has expended more high-end precision missiles than most estimates suggest it can produce. Ukraine estimates that Russia has produced around 500 long-range cruise missiles since the start of the war, or around 40 to 50 per month. It is unclear whether Russia can sustain such production levels, considering that the impact of Western sanctions and export restrictions on component availability is murky.
+
+In any case, Russian missile expenditure and production will have to reach an equilibrium at some point. If Russia cannot significantly increase production, it will have to decrease the frequency of its large missile attacks to perhaps one to two per month. Russia may continue to acquire and employ Iranian Shahed-136 drones, though very few of these appear to be getting through Ukrainian air defenses and therefore are unlikely to inflict considerable harm beyond draining Ukraine’s air defense capacity.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Ukrainian Network Connectivity by Region, October 7–11, 2022.__ Source: Netblocks._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Ukrainian Network Connectivity by Region, November 23, 2022.__ Source: Netblocks._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Network Connectivity in Kyiv, December 15–19, 2022.__ Source: Netblocks._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Frequency of Russian Missile and Drone Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure, October 10, 2022 – January 26, 2023.__ Source: Data from Air Force Command of Ukrainian Armed Forces._
+
+Nevertheless, the threat of a diminished Ukrainian air defense capacity is a great concern. Beyond intercepting cruise missiles and drones, Ukraine’s long-, medium-, and short-range defenses have, in concert, successfully stopped and deterred penetrating sorties by Russian aircraft. It is therefore critical that Ukraine maintains a layered air defense to prevent Russia from making use of its deep stockpiles of unguided gravity bombs. Should Russia manage to wear down Ukraine’s air defenses through attrition and gain air superiority, the war becomes significantly more challenging for Ukraine. To the extent possible, the replenishment of interceptors and related air defense equipment must remain a high priority for Western military aid packages for the foreseeable future. Sourcing will grow increasingly difficult, however, and will likely require ramping up production to maintain adequate inventories among U.S. and allied militaries.
+
+
+_▲ Emergency message to Kyiv residents on January 12, 2023, on the website of the Kyiv region electrical utility company DTEK. Translation: “Dear customers! Currently, stabilization schedules (SGS) are in effect. You can familiarize yourself with the schedule here. Take care and use electricity sparingly! We believe in victory.”_
+
+Another concern is if Russia is able to sustain air attacks against Ukraine’s electrical grid over the coming months or even years, even at a diminished frequency, it could eventually exhaust Ukraine’s capacity to sustain repairs. Ukraine’s grid is based on Soviet technology, for which there are few sources for spare parts and materials. In addition to continued air defense support, it will likely become necessary for Ukraine to transition its electrical infrastructure to a more sustainable configuration.
+
+It cannot be denied that Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and industry have deepened Ukraine’s dependency on the West. This growing dependency supports Russia’s hope that it can eventually exhaust the West’s patience and Western capitals will pressure Ukraine to make concessions. This Russian theory of victory will fail, however, unless Western governments accommodate it.
+
+
+### Sources of Underperformance
+
+As of February 2023, Russia’s long-range strike campaign has fallen short of most of its strategic objectives. At the war’s outset, the Russian military failed to sufficiently degrade Ukraine’s air force and air defenses enough to sustain air superiority. Moscow struggled to disrupt Ukraine’s command and control apparatus and could not isolate its political leadership. Russian efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics through attacks on munitions depots and transportation infrastructure have not achieved lasting effects.
+
+There appears to be no single reason for these missteps. Instead, a confluence of factors explains the underperformance of Russia’s strike campaign. Among these are:
+
+- Ukraine’s efforts to disperse its forces in advance of the initial wave of attacks and the inability of Russia’s targeting cycle to keep pace with a dynamic and shifting battlespace;
+
+- Russia’s inability to adequately scale its strike campaign to the volume of targets Ukraine has presented;
+
+- Ukrainian air defenses and their increasing effectiveness in reducing damage from Russian missile salvos; and
+
+- Lower-than-expected reliability of Russian missiles may have also been a factor. However, this point is somewhat controversial as it is difficult to assess the extent to which Russian missiles have failed due to malfunctions.
+
+In October 2022, Russia began a brute-force effort to break the morale of Ukrainian civilians through long-range missile and drone attacks on electrical infrastructure. This operation’s myopic focus and persistence have resulted in major damage to Ukraine’s civil infrastructure. The current campaign’s target set of fixed assets fits better with Russian operational capabilities. Russian missile forces have struggled with mobile targets, but infrastructure is generally immovable and unhardened. Moreover, Ukraine’s civil infrastructure has changed little since the country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and thus Russian intelligence on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure remains accurate. Whether these attacks will advance Russia’s aim to drive the Ukrainian government into trading concessions for peace remains to be seen, but if the history of strategic bombing of civilians is a guide, Russia’s current campaign is unlikely to achieve its political objectives.
+
+#### Dispersal of Forces and Slow Russian Targeting Cycles
+
+Dispersal and mobility have been Ukraine’s best tools against Russia’s strike operations. Russia has seen some success against fixed targets, such as static air defense assets at the war’s outset, and more recently against fixed infrastructure, such as electrical substations. In general, the Russian military appears to have struggled to gather and disseminate targeting data quickly enough to keep pace with a dynamic battlespace. From the onset of the war, easily movable assets such as mobile air defenses, aircraft, and other maneuver forces have largely eluded Russia’s long-range air and missile attacks. Ukrainian officials have assessed that it can take the Russian military 48 hours or more between the acquisition of targeting intelligence and a strike, leaving adequate time for Ukrainian forces to shift locations.
+
+The apparent slowness of Russia’s targeting practices suggests that Russia may lack a targeting process nimble enough to quickly shift attack capability to high-priority targets or simply may lack the capacity to dedicate attack capability solely for time-sensitive targets. Russia may likewise lack a command and control process to rapidly direct changes in strike plans. UK intelligence similarly assessed that “Russia’s targeting processes are highly likely routinely undermined by dated intelligence, poor planning, and a top-down approach to operations.” Analysts from Royal United Services Institute also highlighted the effects of the Russian command structure’s inflexibility on its strike operations:
+
+> It seems that those directing fire missions either do not have access to contextual information or are indifferent to it. In any case, observations of Russian pre-planned fires shows that they will strike targets that have moved and subsequently engage the same target in its new position, suggesting a purely chronological prioritization of activity.
+
+Such deficiencies have had a major impact on the course of the war. One clear example comes from the degree to which Ukraine’s small air force survived Russia’s initial aerial onslaught. In September, a top U.S. military commander estimated that around 80 percent of Ukraine’s air force remained intact. And while the UAF has taken losses in air-to-air combat, there is no evidence that Ukraine has lost significant numbers of operational combat aircraft on the ground. This achievement is due in no small way to dispersal actions that have complicated Russian targeting. Despite the small size of its air force, Ukraine has a significant number of air bases capable of receiving military aircraft.
+
+Some of this spare capacity may be due to the degradation of the UAF since 2014. But the UAF has been conscious of maintaining spare basing capacity. For instance, the UAF’s strategic plan published in 2020 noted that:
+
+> In peacetime, in order to save resources, aviation should be based at 5-6 aviation bases, which will reduce operational costs. At the same time, to ensure operational maneuver, operational flexibility, and survivability, up to 15-20 operational airfields (aviation garrisons) should be sustained. These will be capable of receiving aircraft and helicopters immediately and ensuring their combat employment, allowing them to disperse aviation equipment to threatening axes during special periods.
+
+Dispersion and mobility were also crucial in enabling a decisive amount of Ukraine’s air defenses to survive Russian efforts to gain air superiority. While Russia may have destroyed as much as 75 percent of Ukraine’s fixed air defenses in its initial bombardment, Ukraine’s mobile, dispersible units largely survived. These forces have had an enormous impact in setting conditions for Ukraine’s military success so far. As of December 2022, Russia had lost at least 62 combat aircraft, mostly the work of mobile ground-based defenses. More importantly, though, the threat from Ukrainian air defenses has deterred the Russian Air Force from penetrating sorties into Ukraine’s airspace for most of the war, restricting Russia’s strategic strike campaign to a limited number of expensive stand-off missiles.
+
+#### Too Many Targets, Too Few Missiles
+
+Russia has unleashed thousands of missiles upon Ukraine since February 2022. In many cases, it appears that Russian planners underestimated the amount of ordnance required to adequately suppress the facilities they targeted, particularly in the critical early days of the invasion. The sheer volume of individual targets within Ukraine likely strained Russia’s strike capacity. Ukrainian statistics of Russian missile strikes over the first five months of the war show a lower-than-expected density of strikes in areas of Ukraine rich in strategic military targets (Figure 5). Moreover, the time Russia allotted for its initial strike campaign was also far too short for what it hoped to achieve.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: Russian Missile Strikes by Region, February 24 – July 21, 2022.__ Note: Data set included 110 additional strikes with undetermined target region. Source: Data from Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council._
+
+Ukrainian figures indicate as few as 20 Russian missile strikes in Vinnytsia Oblast between February 22 and July 21. This is an unexpectedly low number considering that Vinnytsia Oblast is home to numerous strategic facilities, including Ukraine’s Air Force Command Center and an important UAF weapons depot. It also contains Vinnytsia International Airport, a major Ukrainian military logistics hub, and is home to the 456th Guards Transport Aviation Brigade. The airport remained unscathed until Russia struck it with eight Kh-101 cruise missiles on March 6. Satellite imagery indicated that damage was limited to two air traffic control towers and a single parked aircraft, with no apparent damage to the runway. Russia did not strike the UAF command center until March 25, by which time it is unlikely the facility still served any critical wartime functions. Ukraine has also reported several missile attacks on civilian areas with no apparent strategic or military value.
+
+Other strategic targets appeared to suffer only light-to-moderate damage early in the conflict, allowing Ukraine to disperse forces and reconstitute. Ozerne Air Base in Zhytomyr Oblast is a good example. At the start of the war, Ozerne was home to Ukraine’s 39th Tactical Aviation Brigade, which includes around 15 Su-27 multirole fighters, representing about 10 percent of Ukraine’s combat air power at the start of the war. Ozerne was struck by Russian missiles on the first day of the conflict, February 24. However, satellite imagery of Ozerne from February 27 showed signs of only seven impact points. Five of these strikes appear to have missed any vital assets. Two struck around the apron, destroying one parked Su-27 (one of two aircraft visible in the image). Other reports say that a fueling vehicle may have also been destroyed. The runway remained intact. Only two aircraft are visible in the image, likely indicating that the remaining aircraft had been dispersed to other bases.
+
+The apparent intensity of Russian missile attacks in these cases is well below similar operations conducted by the United States and its allies against similar targets. Over the first three days of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia launched around 250 cruise and ballistic missiles at targets across the entire territory of Ukraine. By comparison, the United States launched more than 420 sea- and air-launched cruise missiles against Iraq over 70 hours during Operation Desert Fox in 1998, an operation with vastly narrower objectives. Over the first 10 days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. and coalition forces delivered nearly 10,000 precision-guided munitions against Iraqi military targets. By day 10 of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia had launched under 1,000 precision strikes.
+
+The number of munitions Russia employed against individual targets is also significantly less than the United States has employed against similar targets. To the previous examples, reports indicate that the Russia struck the Ozerne and Vinnytsia Air Bases with no more than eight cruise missiles each (the loadout of a single Tu-95 bomber). In response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in 2017, the United States struck a single Syrian air base with 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles.
+
+The number of strikes Russia carried out seems even less adequate when one considers the sheer volume of targets that Russia would have to suppress to gain air superiority over Ukraine. In addition to the number of air bases capable of servicing military aircraft, Ukraine had the largest ground-based air defense force in Europe at the start of the invasion. Estimates from 2021 indicated that Ukraine possessed over 300 mobile medium- to long-range air defense systems. Additionally, Ukraine had multiple static air defense radars and older interceptors, such as S-125 units, deployed across its territory. Even with timely intelligence, quickly disabling a large enough portion to gain control of the skies may simply have outstripped the capacity of Russia’s conventional strike complex.
+
+Time was also a factor. For an operation as large and complex as Russia’s invasion, Russian military planners gave its aerospace forces essentially no time to shape the battlespace prior to commencing its invasion. By comparison, U.S. operations against Iraq in 1991 and 2003 saw days to weeks of aerial bombardment before committing coalition ground forces.
+
+#### Ukrainian Air Defenses
+
+Another increasingly important factor contributing to Russia’s underperformance has been the ability of Ukrainian air defenses to intercept Russian missiles and other guided munitions in flight. The UAF, which operates much of Ukraine’s long-range air defense systems, regularly reports on air defense activity. Although difficult to verify, the number of reported intercepts has significantly increased since Russia began systematically targeting civilian power facilities on October 10 (Figure 6). This increase is on one hand a function of the relatively greater volume of missiles Russia is firing into Ukraine but is also likely due to the introduction of Western air defense systems since the fall of 2022. Data shows not just an increase in the gross number of intercepts but in the proportion of salvos that Ukraine reports to shoot down (Figure 7).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 6: Reported Cruise Missile Intercepts (Cumulative).__ Source: Data from General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces._
+
+The backbone of Ukraine’s air defense force at the start of the war was its mobile SA-8, SA-10, and SA-11 units, most of which survived the opening salvo of Russia’s strike campaign. Since then, this layered defense has provided a potent deterrent against Russian aircraft making penetrating sorties into Ukrainian airspace.
+
+Videos and images of cruise missile intercepts in Ukraine have been rare, but this lack of video or photo evidence of cruise missile intercepts is an unreliable indicator of Ukrainian air defense performance against cruise missiles. The speed and suddenness of air defense engagements make documenting the events challenging. The Ukrainian government also discourages its citizens from posting about air defense activity for operational security reasons. There have, however, been enough documented incidents of cruise missile intercepts to confirm that Ukrainian air defenses are actively engaging Russian cruise missiles and are seeing some success.
+
+U.S. defense officials have also lent additional credence to Ukrainian reports by confirming that Ukraine has successfully stopped at least some Russian cruise missiles. In October, a senior defense official said that between October 10 and 11, Ukraine intercepted 40 to 50 percent of the 80 Russian cruise missiles and drones fired at its territory.
+
+
+_▲ Ukrainian BUK-M1 medium-range surface-to-air missile system._
+
+Numbers published by the UAF show that its air defenses are intercepting an increasingly large proportion of Russian cruise missile salvos since October. Moreover, the intercept ratios Ukrainian air defenders achieved in the latter months of 2022 were markedly greater than during the first several months of the war. Between February and July, Ukraine reported intercepting 174 cruise missiles, just over 10 percent of Russia’s reported 1,500 cruise missiles fired into Ukraine by that point. By December 2022, Ukraine reported intercepting 75 to 80 percent of incoming Russian cruise missiles on average (Figure 7). On November 15, Ukraine claimed to stop 75 cruise missiles in a single day.
+
+
+_▲ German-made IRIS-T surface-to-air missile system in Ukraine._
+
+This growth is likely attributable to several factors. While difficult to measure, the growing experience and skill of Ukraine’s air defenders is very likely an important factor. Moreover, Russia’s almost singular focus on electrical infrastructure since October has also made its targeting more predictable, allowing Ukraine to optimally posture its air defense assets.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 7: Percent of Large Cruise Missile Salvos Intercepted (>20 Missiles), October 2022 – January 2023.__ Source: Data from Air Force Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces._
+
+The increase in reported intercepts also roughly correlates to the arrival of Western-made air defenses such as IRIS-T, NASAMS, and Aspide. Ukrainian leaders have stated that the IRIS-T system has succeeded in 90 percent of engagements. In November, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin said that NASAMS had achieved a 100 percent success rate. These systems, however, are not yet widespread in Ukraine, and legacy systems such as the S-300 likely remain the workhorses of Ukraine’s air defense.
+
+
+_▲ Damage from air defense interceptor on body of downed 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missile, June 2022._
+
+In addition to the longer-range systems such as NASAMS, Ukraine has also highlighted its successful employment of shorter-range missile and gun-based systems, such as the German-made Gepard. The Gepard features two 35-mm Flak cannons and a radar mounted on a tracked chassis. Systems such as the Gepard are playing an important role in engaging slower-moving targets such as Shahed-136 drones, allowing Ukrainian air defenders to preserve their limited supply of surface-to-air missiles for faster, more challenging targets. Still, some observers have credited the Gepard with destroying higher-end targets, including cruise missiles.
+
+A profile from Ukrainian defense media highlighted the role of mobile fire groups equipped with man-portable air defense weapons (MANPADS) such as Igla and Stinger missiles, crediting them with downing an undisclosed number of cruise missiles. These groups reportedly operate across the country, dispatched to interdict missiles and other aerial targets as they are detected. Several videos of MANPADS intercepting cruise missiles have surfaced on social media, indicating that the UAF is seeing some success with this tactic.
+
+
+_▲ Ukrainian soldier Igor, who reportedly shot down a Russian cruise missile with a man-portable air defense system in the Lviv region on October 10, 2022._
+
+Yet challenges lie ahead. For Ukraine to sustain this apparent success, it will require continued Western support. The high volume of air defense activity has no doubt strained the capacity of Ukrainian air defenses, and Russian tactics appear to be aimed precisely to drain Ukraine’s defense capacity. Russia has reportedly been disarming some of its nuclear Kh-55 cruise missiles and firing them into Ukraine with ballast payloads to absorb air defense fire. Russia has also sought to maximize air defense attrition by launching mixed salvos of high-end cruise missiles and inexpensive drones. In some cases, Russia has used drones as pathfinders, probing for gaps and absorbing fire.
+
+The use of cheaper air defense systems, such as gun-based weapons, has helped Ukraine mount a more efficient defense against low-end threats. But Russia’s mixed salvos present a complex battle management problem. Ukraine’s set of Russian and Western air defenses, old and new, lack an integrated battlement management system. Ukrainian air defenders are instead likely relying on wireless communications and “swivel chair integration” to build a common air picture and coordinate engagements. Under these conditions, a certain number of suboptimal exchanges and interceptor wastage is inevitable.
+
+
+_▲ A Flakpanzer Gepard antiaircraft gun (vehicle seen in image) shoots down a Russian cruise missile._
+
+Another consideration for Ukraine is balancing the air defense needs of civilian infrastructure with the need to protect its troops on the front lines from aerial attacks. Ukrainian air defenses along the front lines face a similar or even greater pace of activity. Russian attack aircraft and helicopters operate along the front lines daily, and the UAF regularly reports downing Russian aircraft and helicopters, including 14 Su-24 and Su-25 attack aircraft in 2022. Should Ukraine’s air defenses wither over the coming year, this balancing act becomes harder, increasing the vulnerability of Ukrainian troops to air attack, which could even reverse the momentum of the war in Russia’s favor.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 8: Reported Shahad-136 Intercepts, September 22, 2022 – January 2, 2023.__ Source: Data from Air Force Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces._
+
+As Ukraine shifts toward greater reliance on Western systems, it will become increasingly dependent on Western military aid to replenish stocks of interceptors and other related munitions and equipment. Ukraine faces two main aerial threats: (1) the acute threat of Russian missiles and drones, and (2) the latent threat of the Russian Air Force resuming penetrating sorties into Ukrainian airspace. Consistent Western support over 2023 and beyond will be necessary for Ukraine to manage both.
+
+#### Accuracy and Reliability
+
+Since the start of the war, there has been speculation that Russian missiles have experienced higher-than-expected failure rates and lower-than-expected accuracy. The evidence is mixed and inconclusive on this point, however. In March 2022, news media quoted a U.S. official saying that U.S. intelligence had assessed that some types of Russian missiles were seeing failure rates of up to 60 percent and that Russia’s air-launched cruise missiles were particularly affected. Also in March, a DOD official told reporters that Russia had suffered a “not-insignificant number of failures” of cruise missiles. “Either they’re failing to launch, or they’re failing to hit the target, or they’re failing to explode on contact,” the official said.
+
+Little imagery has surfaced of Russian cruise missiles that failed to detonate, so it is difficult to corroborate this point with open-source evidence. There has been a steady amount of visual evidence showing Russian cruise missiles crashing before reaching their targets. Yet all missile systems will experience a certain failure rate, so evidence of crashed cruise missiles does not necessarily indicate systemic problems.
+
+There has been speculation that Russian missiles have proven less accurate than previously thought. There have been instances of Russian missiles missing targets, such as the satellite image of the aftermath of a missile strike on the Ozerne air base where most missiles failed to hit any base structures. In other instances, Russian missiles visibly struck targets, including air traffic control towers and radar sites, with some precision. The most recent phase of Russia’s strike campaign, its attack on Ukraine’s electrical grid, suggests that Russian cruise missiles are capable of precise attacks. Satellite imagery and social media posts show clear evidence that Russian missiles are effectively hitting and damaging Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure. Furthermore, Russia is seeing this success despite having its salvos significantly thinned out by Ukrainian air defenses.
+
+To be sure, Russia has employed hundreds of projectiles with poor accuracy in land-attack roles, such as Kh-22 anti-ship missiles and S-300 interceptors. These weapons have largely been limited to area attacks or indiscriminate terror attacks on civilians. But among the vanguard of Russia’s precision-guided munitions, such as the Kh-101 and 3M-14 Kalibr, the picture emerging from Ukraine is that these weapons, while perhaps not always reliably accurate, are not reliably inaccurate either.
+
+
+### What Russia Is Using
+
+Since February 2022, Russian armed forces have employed well over 5,000 missiles and one-way attack drones against Ukraine and nearly every known type of conventional missile in their arsenal. According to various data sets from the Ukrainian government, most of these projectiles have been air-launched, with smaller proportions fired from ground- and sea-based platforms. Comparing earlier and later data sets suggests that Russia leaned more heavily on its ground- and sea-based strike systems in the latter half of 2022.
+
+Russia has expended much of its pre-war stockpile of precision-guided missiles. Shortages of modern missiles have forced Russia to reach deeper into its stocks of older missiles or to repurpose anti-ship missiles and air defense interceptors for land-attack roles. Still, Russia continues to use more modern missile variants such as the Kh-101 and 3M-14 Kalibr, indicating that it maintains some quantity in reserve and that newly manufactured missiles are making their way into the theater.
+
+#### Air-Launched
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 9: Russian Strike Systems Observed in Ukraine.__ Note: Selection illustrative but not exhaustive; artillery rockets not included. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 10: Russian Missile Launches by Platform Type, February 24 – July 21, 2022.__ Source: Data from Staff of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 11: Russian Missile Launches by Platform Type, February 23, 2022 – January 3, 2023.__ Source: Data from General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces._
+
+Air-launched missiles represent the largest and most diverse portion of Russian missiles used in Ukraine, comprising a mix of long- and short-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and a variety of shorter-range air-to-surface rockets. Data from the Ukrainian government indicates that Russia fired over 2,700 air-launched missiles during the first five months of the war. Of these, roughly half came from aircraft outside of Ukrainian airspace, suggesting that the remaining missiles were likely shorter-range projectiles supporting close air support operations around the front lines in Luhansk, Donetsk, and Kharkiv (Figure 12). This assessment would track with comments by DOD officials in May 2022. Following Russia’s withdrawal from the Kyiv axis, the Russian Air Force increased its activity to over 300 sorties per day, focusing on Donbas. Since July 2022, Russian long-range strikes have continued to come predominately from aircraft, namely from Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers operating around the Caspian Sea and Rostov regions, though the proportion of ground-launched weapons has increased, owing to Russia’s significant use of the S-300 for land attack and likely an increased use of the Iskander system (Figures 10 and 11).
+
+
+_▲ Russian Kh-101 reportedly shot down by Ukrainian air defenses._
+
+__LONG-RANGE ALCMS__
+
+The most frequently used long-range cruise missiles in the war have been the Kh-101 and Kh-555 ALCMs. The Kh-101 is a relatively new missile introduced in 2012 that employs satellite navigation. The older Kh-555 is a conventional variant of the nuclear-armed Kh-55 ALCM. The Russian Air Force has launched both Kh-101s and Kh-555s into Ukraine from Tu-95 and Tu-160 heavy bombers outside of Ukrainian airspace, often as far away as the Caspian Sea (Figure 12). In the past, Russia has referred to the Kh-101 as having stealthy attributes. Ukraine has reported shooting down an increasingly large portion of Kh-101 salvos, putting the purported low observability of the missile into question.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 12: Russian Missile Launches by Type and Launch Location, February 24 – July 21, 2022.__ Source: Data from Staff of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council._
+
+Ukraine has assessed that Russia has fired over 600 Kh-101 and Kh-555 missiles combined since the war began. This total may include a number of disarmed Kh-55 missiles, whereby the nuclear warhead was removed and replaced with ballast. Such a practice could serve to stretch a dwindling supply of precision-guided missiles and divert fire from air defense systems.
+
+__AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES__
+
+Russia has also launched a significant number of air-to-surface guided missiles. These weapons are distinct from cruise missiles in that they are typically smaller, shorter ranged (≤300 km), and often employ a rocket engine instead of a jet engine as their primary propulsion (though there are exceptions). They are also generally launched from tactical aircraft such as the Su-24 or Su-25 rather than strategic bombers. Examples of missiles within this category include variants of the Kh-59, Kh-58, Kh-31, and Kh-29.
+
+The Ukrainian government’s numbers on Russian missile attacks through July 21 may also include some uses of closer-range air-to-surface rockets fired from Russian close air support aircraft such as the Su-24 and Su-25, typically with ranges below 10 km. The heaviest of these include the Kh-25 (AS-10), a family of missiles with numerous variants that feature a variety of guidance systems, including satellite navigation, TV-homing, and infrared.
+
+Russia has also employed some close-range guided missiles such as the helicopter-launched LMUR, a relatively new anti-armor munition equipped with an electro-optical seeker. Despite its intended anti-tank function, many of the missile’s purported uses in Ukraine have been against fixed targets such as warehouses, pontoon bridges, and other fixed structures.
+
+
+_▲ Russian Kh-22 missile next to a Tu-22 bomber._
+
+_Anti-radiation Missiles_
+
+Within this group are two types of anti-radiation missiles (ARMs), the Kh-58 and Kh-31P. ARMs have special seekers that home in on radar emissions, making them useful for suppressing or destroying air defenses. Russia has used them throughout the war, including on the opening day of the war, where debris from a Kh-31P ARM crashed into a residential area of Kyiv. Ukraine reported tracking 35 ARM launches through July 2022. Senior sources in the UAF have reported losing “a number” of mobile 9K33 Osa and 9K37 Buk units to Russian KH-58 and Kh-31P missiles during the war.
+
+_Anti-ship Missiles_
+
+By early summer of 2022, Russia had begun repurposing its stockpile of Kh-22 and Kh-32 air-launched anti-ship missiles for land-attack missions. Developed in the 1960s, the Kh-22 was the Soviet Union’s original “carrier-killer” missile, intended to sink large NATO capital ships. Fired from a Tu-22 bomber, the missile is large, delivering an explosive payload of over 900 kg to a range of around 600 km at supersonic speeds. The Kh-22 uses an active radar seeker for terminal guidance, a system with questionable accuracy when used in cluttered urban environments.
+
+The Kh-32 is a modernized version of the Kh-22. Introduced in 2016, the Kh-32 is nearly physically identical to the Kh-22 but has reduced payload size and an active radar seeker that is reportedly more resistant to jamming. Due to its physical similarity with the Kh-22, it was initially unclear whether Russia was also expending Kh-32 missiles against land targets in Ukraine, though Russian state media appeared to confirm its use in November 2022.
+
+Ukraine estimates that Russia fired just over 200 Kh-22/32 missiles in 2022. Russia has used the missiles in several high-casualty attacks against civilians. These include a strike on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk in June 2022 which killed at least 20 people, attacks on residential buildings in Odesa that killed more than 20, and a direct strike on an apartment building in Dnipro in January 2023 that killed nearly 50 people. Ukraine has admitted it is unable to intercept the missile with its current air defense systems. This is likely due to the missile’s speed and high flight altitude as well as a flight profile that is more like an aero-ballistic missile than a traditional, sea-skimming anti-ship missile.
+
+
+_▲ Wreckage from 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missile, June 2022._
+
+_Aero-Ballistic Missiles_
+
+The war in Ukraine has also seen the first use of the Kh-47 Kinzhal aero-ballistic missile, which Russia describes as a hypersonic missile. Kinzhal is a modified 9K720 Iskander ballistic missile launched from a MiG-31K fighter. Russia has reportedly fired Kinzhal missiles on three occasions, and Ukraine estimates that Russia used 10 Kh-47s in 2022. The first use occurred in late March 2022, when Russia reportedly targeted a storage facility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast. Subsequent Kinzhal strikes may have occurred in April and May in Donbas and Odesa, respectively. Russia’s sporadic use of the Kinzhal against fixed targets has had little impact on the course of the war. Nevertheless, it has garnered significant attention from the media, prompting comments from senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and President Biden.
+
+#### Sea-Launched
+
+Russian surface ships and submarines have frequently launched 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles at Ukraine from the Black and Caspian Seas. These missiles range up to 2,500 km, and Russia has used them against military and infrastructure targets deep in Ukrainian territory, such as airfields. There has nevertheless been significant use of 3M-14s against civilian targets, such as the July attack on a Vinnytsia shopping center and on residential areas in Odesa—strikes of no discernable military value and thus questionable expenditures of some of Russia’s most capable and expensive precision-guided missiles. Since October 2020, 3M-14 Kalibr missiles have had a large role in Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure.
+
+The Ukrainian government has assessed that Russia launched just under 600 Kalibr missiles in 2022. The 3M-14 appears to have performed relatively reliably, though there have been some documented mechanical failures.
+
+#### Ground-Launched
+
+_Short-Range Ballistic Missiles_
+
+The ballistic missile Russia has used most frequently in the war has been the 9M723 short-ranged ballistic missile (SRBM), commonly called the Iskander. It has a range of around 500 km and can deliver a large payload of up to 700 kg. The data on the quantity of 9M723s employed during the war is murky. Early Ukrainian data through July accounted for 124 Iskander launches. A later data set released by Ukraine’s defense minister in January 2023 assessed that Russia had launched nearly 750, suggesting that Russia significantly expanded its use of SRBMs between July and January. Russia may have increased its use of ballistic missiles during its late summer offensives in Donbas to attack military targets closer to the front lines. As an army asset, the Iskander complex is likely to be more integrated with ground operations than the long-range strike platforms operated by Russia’s air force or navy. Overall, the 9M723 has shown to be an accurate and reliable missile and has been an exception in that the Russian army has successfully used it in over-the-horizon strikes on mobile targets, albeit over a limited geographic area in which it can field significant quantities of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.
+
+Russia has also employed the shorter-range Tochka-U. The Tochka-U can carry a unitary warhead, but it is most often observed employing submunitions. Ukraine claims that Russia fired more than 60 Tochka-Us between February and July 2022. The Tochka-U is the only ballistic missile system Russia and Ukraine deploy in common. Russian state media has nevertheless tried to assert that Russia no longer fields Tochka-U missiles in Ukraine and has tried to blame Ukraine for Tochka-U strikes on civilian targets. However, independent researchers have debunked these claims.
+
+_9M727/9M728 Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM)_
+
+The 9M727 and 9M728 are GLCMs fired from the 9K720 Iskander-M launcher. Their range is around 500 km, like its ballistic missile counterpart. It is unclear what distinguishes the two variants, though some speculate the 9M727 may simply be an older version of the 9M728. The early part of the conflict saw little evidence of widespread use, but imagery of the missiles has surfaced since, confirming it has played a role in Russian strike operations. Ukrainian data from January 2023 estimated that Russia had only fired 68 9M727/9M728 missiles.
+
+_P-800 Oniks_
+
+One of the more notable Russian practices during the war has been its repurposing of anti-ship and air defense missiles for land-attack missions. The earliest instances of this activity began in late March 2022, with strikes in the Odesa region using P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles reconfigured for land attack. The P-800 is a supersonic missile with an active radar seeker designed to attack heavily defended warships. Their use against static targets raised suspicions that Russia was running low on other precision-guided munitions more fit for purpose. The war in Ukraine is not the first time that Russia had employed the P-800 in a land-attack role, however, as Russia first used the weapon against ground targets in Syria in 2016.
+
+Since April, Russia has regularly used P-800s against Ukraine, with Ukraine reportedly intercepting two Oniks missiles in late December. Ukraine estimates that Russia launched just under 150 Oniks missiles in 2022.
+
+_S-300_
+
+The S-300 is a long-range air defense system. As Russia’s stores of long-range missiles have dwindled, it has begun using S-300 interceptors in surface-to-surface mode for land attack. These munitions have relatively small warheads (most around 150 kg) and use semi-active radar for terminal homing, making them ill-suited for precision attacks or for use against hardened structures. As such, Russia has used them mostly for what appear to be indiscriminate attacks against civilian areas. The city of Mykolaiv in particular reported frequent S-300 barrages through the summer and fall of 2022.
+
+Unlike its long-range cruise missile stockpiles, Russia’s supply of air defense interceptors is deep—Russia’s military complex possesses well over 500 S-300 launchers, and Ukraine estimates Russia could have a stockpile of 8,000 interceptors at its disposal. According to Ukraine’s defense ministry, Russia has fired over 1,000 S-300 interceptors against land targets in Ukraine. The bulk of these missiles used in surface-to-surface attacks have likely been the older 5V5KK, which has an estimated strike range of around 120 km. In January 2023, however, Russia reportedly fired longer-range 48N6 interceptor variants at Kyiv for the first time.
+
+#### Foreign-Sourced Munitions
+
+One significant development has been Russia’s increasing reliance on foreign-sourced munitions. Notably, Russia has widely employed Iranian-manufactured “kamikaze” drones—loitering munitions with limited battlefield utility. Since mid-2022, Iran has provided Russia with hundreds of Shahed-136 drones. Cheap and easy to manufacture, the Shahed-136 is a delta-wing pusher prop drone that has provided Russia with a means of sustaining attacks behind the front lines against civilian infrastructure, forcing the expenditure of Ukrainian air defense capacity. Iran claims the munitions can fly up to 2,500 km, on par with the reach of Russia’s longest-range cruise missiles. Independent analysts, however, have suggested its real reach could be far lower, though the drones have been observed flying up to 1,000 km to reach their targets.
+
+Yet the Shahed-136 has significant performance drawbacks which make it a poor stand-in for Russia’s stand-off weapons. It delivers no greater than 50 kg of high explosives to a target, just around 10 percent of the payload capacity of 3M-14 and Kh-101 cruise missiles. The drone is also much slower than a traditional turbofan-powered cruise missile, with a unique (and loud) acoustic signature, making it relatively easy prey for Ukrainian air defenses. Ukraine’s Air Force Command claims to have shot down nearly 500 Shahed-136 drones since their introduction to the battlespace in September 2022. Nevertheless, Russia’s widespread use of these cheap munitions forces Ukraine to expend valuable air defense capacity, which is likely among Russia’s primary goals in continuing to use them. Table-1 provides a comparison of Russian cruise missiles and the Shahed-136.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Attributes of Russian Cruise Missiles vs. the Shahed-136.__ Source: Author’s research and analysis._
+
+__POTENTIAL FUTURE IMPORTS__
+
+There have been reports that Russia is seeking to import Iranian ballistic missiles. These reports likely refer to Iran’s Fateh series, which includes the Fateh-313 and Zolfaghar missiles, solid-fueled SRBMs that Iran used to attack U.S. troops in Iraq in January 2020. Introducing Fateh-series missiles into the Ukraine conflict would complicate Ukrainian air defense efforts, as Ukraine possesses little to no ballistic missile defense capability. This will change with the transfer of Patriot batteries, which could potentially provide some defense. Still, the defended area of a single Patriot battery is relatively small, and most of the country will remain vulnerable. Nevertheless, the accuracy of Fateh missiles is questionable, and Russia would likely require a large salvo to reliably strike a small target such as an electrical substation.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+This report reviewed Russia’s use of air and missile weapons in Ukraine from three perspectives: what capabilities Russia has used, how Russia used those capabilities, and why the results have failed to live up to Moscow’s expectations. Ukraine’s proactive dispersal of its air defenses and other vulnerable assets in the days leading up to the invasion are central to explaining why Moscow’s strategic strike campaign has not achieved its objective of achieving air superiority or compelling the Ukrainians to negotiate an end to the conflict.
+
+Dispersal disrupted the Russian military’s targeting cycle enough that it missed its opportunity to decisively shape the battlespace, a misstep from which Russia has yet to fully recover. Ukraine had enough surviving air defenses to attrite and eventually deter the Russian Air Force from penetrating its airspace, forcing Russia to depend on irregular, dwindling stocks of long-range missiles.
+
+Since then, Russian missile forces have shifted away from efforts to degrade Ukraine’s military capacity toward a campaign to degrade the Ukrainian people’s will to fight. Russian attacks have killed thousands of innocent civilians and severely damaged Ukraine’s economic and civil infrastructure. But while Russia has arguably seen greater operational success in this endeavor, it has deepened its strategic failures by stiffening Ukraine’s resolve rather than undermining it.
+
+There are numerous lessons the United States and its allies can take from Ukraine’s ongoing fight. The first is that ballistic and cruise missiles are not an intractable threat: they can be successfully countered through low- and high-tech means. Ukraine has demonstrated that cruise missile defense through ground-based air defenses is viable, but also that the use of mobility and deception can be just as effective as sophisticated interceptors in blunting missile attacks. Fixed air defense platforms are highly vulnerable unless they themselves are defended. Passive defenses—such as hardening, dispersion, and consequence management—can greatly mitigate the effects of air and missile attacks. Ukraine has demonstrated that Russian theater missiles are a manageable threat, but one that must be managed nonetheless.
+
+It remains to be seen whether Russia will persist in its current line of attack on Ukraine’s electrical grid or if it will again shift to a new approach. Much may depend on the flow of events on the front lines, the availability of munitions, and the ability of Russian industry to continue producing missiles. Enormous uncertainties remain, but Ukraine will certainly face new challenges in the year to come, requiring it and its partner nations to stay adaptable and committed.
+
+
+### Appendices
+
+The following appendices are selected lists of Russian missile strikes from February 2022 through January 2023. They are divided to roughly correspond with the four distinct “phases” of Russia’s strategic strike campaign as described in Chapter 1 of this report. These lists are far from exhaustive and represent only a small fraction of Russian missile activity in the Ukraine war. They nevertheless provide illustrative examples showing the nature of Russian strike operations as the war has progressed.
+
+Damage to targets indicated should not be considered exhaustive and is limited to what can be visually confirmed or described by credible sources.
+
+
+
+_▲ __APPENDIX I: MAJOR REPORTED RUSSIAN MISSILE ATTACKS, FEBRUARY–APRIL 2022.__ Note: This table is illustrative, not exhaustive._
+
+
+
+_▲ __APPENDIX II: MAJOR REPORTED RUSSIAN MISSILE ATTACKS, APRIL–JUNE 2022.__ Note: This table is illustrative, not exhaustive._
+
+
+
+_▲ __APPENDIX III: MAJOR REPORTED RUSSIAN MISSILE ATTACKS, JUNE–SEPTEMBER 2022.__ Note: This table is illustrative, not exhaustive._
+
+
+
+_▲ __APPENDIX IV: MAJOR REPORTED RUSSIAN MISSILE ATTACKS, OCTOBER 2022 – JANUARY 2023.__ Note: This table is illustrative, not exhaustive._
+
+---
+
+__Ian Williams__ is a fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and deputy director of the Missile Defense Project, specializing in missile defense and strategic forces, missile proliferation, and deterrence. He is also managing editor of the CSIS website Missile Threat, an online clearinghouse for information and analysis on missile proliferation and missile defense systems. Ian has authored major CSIS studies on U.S. homeland missile defense, nuclear proliferation, and the use of missiles in the Yemeni civil war. He has also written extensively on Iranian and North Korean missile programs, Chinese strategic forces and military strategy, and NATO’s missile defense architecture.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-05-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-53.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-05-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-53.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-05-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-53.md
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 53 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-05-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 鍾錦麟：曾向戴耀廷反映無差別否決財案或致DQ 獲回應只提積極運用基本法權力
+- 鍾錦麟：趙家賢與戴耀廷就區選協調已「弄得相當不快」 隨初選執行擔憂與不滿越來越強
+- 鍾錦麟：建制媒體批評初選遂憂DQ風險 對戴耀廷稱否決財案合法「疑中留情」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（5日）踏入審訊第53天。時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟繼續作供，表示在2020年4月新界東首次協調會議完結後，曾私下向戴耀廷表示，若無差別否決預算案很可能導致參選人被DQ，戴回應「咁我唔會要求大家去無差別咁去否決財政預算案」，只會提「積極運用基本法權力」，又指「我講明係基本法嘅權力就唔會有問題啦啩？」。鍾指，首次會議集中討論初選技術問題，沒印象提及否決預算案，但認為戴相關想法是「人所共知」。鍾確認，戴在會議後曾發出新東協議文件，但沒為意在最終版本協議，運用否決權字眼由「會積極運用」改為「會運用」。鍾錦麟上午完成主問。
+
+#### 官關注審訊進度 着控方不要重複無爭議議題
+
+法官陳慶偉今甫開庭表示，控方案情原定需55天，現時已是審訊第53天，他指當然知道審訊進度，並不是要怪責控方，但相信現時控方已清楚本案真正的議題。陳並指，鍾錦麟昨日的證供除個人背景外，大部分都是沒有爭議，「我們不希望聽取有關初選舉行的證供3次」，着控方不要重複。羅天瑋表示會緊記此點，不會問沒爭議的議題。陳慶偉並提醒他要不時望向左邊的辯方律師，指「他們沒有抄下任何筆記」。
+
+#### 鍾稱曾向戴耀廷稱否決財案或被DQ 戴稱講明基本法權力「唔會有問題啦啩」
+
+時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟昨供稱，獲戴耀廷邀請主持新東會議，他今稱首次新東會議完結後，他在會議室外「拉咗戴耀廷埋一邊」，告訴他「出邊有好多嘅講法，如果我哋會去無差別咁否決財政預算案呢，好可能會導致我哋所有人都被DQ嘅，可唔可以唔好要求大家去否決財政預算案」。
+
+鍾在法官李運騰追問下表示，這是他和戴的私人對話，「純粹係我同戴耀廷之間嘅對話，我向佢表達我嘅憂慮」；而他是以正常聲線說話，因為已「散咗會」，當時可能有一兩個人如時任沙田區議會主席程張迎在附近，但不肯定有否聽到。鍾並指，當時其他與會者已離開，趙家賢和區諾軒也不在場。
+
+鍾續指，戴當時回應：「咁我唔會要求大家去無差別咁去否決財政預算案，我只會話積極運用基本法嘅權力去否決財政預算案」，又指「我講明係基本法嘅權力就唔會有問題啦啩？」，鍾引述後句時聲調在結尾略為提高。李運騰問，留意到鍾的語調改變，問戴當時是否提出問題，鍾同意「係一個問題」，並指認為自己已很如實反映戴當時的語調。
+
+
+▲ 左起：趙家賢、程張迎、鍾錦麟（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鍾稱戴耀廷望否決財案想法「人所共知」惟首次會議「冇印象」有提及
+
+李運騰續問，鍾當時向戴提出該議題，是與會上發言有關嗎？鍾指「我係基於戴耀廷希望用35+否決財政預算案嘅想法，我會形容係人所共知嘅」。法官陳仲衡問，該想法或是「人所共知」，但協調會議上有否提出？鍾答「冇印象」，而他向戴耀廷提出，是因看到很多不同團體，如親政府或親中央政府的人士表示若無差別否決預算案，會導致參選人被DQ。李運騰問，故在4月中，社會上已有意見指出，無差別否決預算案會成為參選人被DQ的理由？鍾同意，亦同意戴是對他們作出回應。
+
+羅天瑋其後展示戴耀廷3月3日發布的〈反制警察政權就要立會奪半〉、3月10日的〈齊上齊落 目標35+〉，鍾確認均在與戴耀廷對話前看過。鍾表示，除上述私人對話，便沒有與戴耀廷就同一議題再討論。
+
+#### 鍾稱首次會議集中初選技術問題 戴耀廷區諾軒不停參與討論
+
+陳慶偉其後問，首次會議有否聽到社民連陳寶瑩表示反對意見？鍾稱「冇印象」，「因為我記得當日嘅會議真係集中喺個初選點樣去進行嘅技術問題，係關於初選定棄選方案，同目標出選議席嘅方案」，並再確認與戴的討論只是基於戴發表的文章，以及媒體上建制派人士的意見。
+
+鍾錦麟昨供稱獲戴耀廷邀請主持新東會議，他今指戴沒邀請他主持某次會議，惟「總之呢個區會議都係我主持」。李運騰一度笑問，鍾稱首次會議遲到，到達時與會者已在發言，「那你怎樣主持會議？會議怎能在你不在時開始？」鍾解釋因時任沙田區議會主席程張迎也有主持會議，而戴耀廷和區諾軒「喺成個會議過程都有不停去參與討論」。李問他有否參與任何討論，鍾指就是主持兩項討論，即昨提及的採用「初選」或「棄選」方案，及目標議席數量。
+
+羅天瑋其後問，鍾在5月底有否與戴會面，鍾稱「冇印象」。至於5月5日的新東第二次會議，鍾指他原本應該要出席，但因當天區議會逾時，故沒有出席。
+
+#### 鍾確認戴在兩次新東會議後均發出協調文件 相信曾發給所有與會者
+
+羅天瑋續展示 WhatsApp 紀錄，顯示戴耀廷在首次新東會議兩日後的4月16日，曾發出名為「35+新東」的文件，鍾確認有收到及打開，但就運用否決權字眼，「冇好準確印象究竟係『會』定係『積極』。」鍾並指，在戴向所有新東協調會議參與者發出上述文件前，他曾透過私人 WhatsApp 對話從戴收到一個初稿，並與戴討論目標議席的寫法與會議的共識有不同，戴更正後再向大家發文件。
+
+法官陳慶偉問，鍾如何得知戴將文件發給所有人？鍾解釋，因戴發訊息後，他曾在新民主同盟的 WhatsApp 群組收到范國威轉發同一份文件，故相信戴「係將呢份文件廣發咗畀唔同嘅人」，他並確認修正的版本反映會上討論的事項。
+
+戴在第二次新東會議的兩日後，於5月7日發出「35+新東final」文件，鍾確認收到相關訊息。控方續展示該份「35+立會過半計劃 民主派新界東協調機制協議」文件，惟鍾指沒有印象，「因為我似乎冇開到」，其後亦指因他沒參與第二次會議，「亦都冇特別興趣睇返個會議嘅文件。」
+
+羅天瑋一度問文件與「35+新東」是否相似，惟法官陳慶偉打斷指他們可看到；羅亦問鍾有否與戴就文件字眼討論，陳慶偉着問下一條問題，李運騰亦指證人已表示對文件沒印象。
+
+#### 鍾稱沒為意協議最終版本字眼由「會積極運用」改為「會運用」
+
+鍾續確認，戴耀廷於6月8日，在趙家賢要求下於組織者群組發出各個選區協議的最終版本，包括「35+新東final」，鍾有收到和打開，但沒有與戴討論，亦對新東文件「冇話特別大興趣」。鍾並確認5月7日和6月8日發出的文件內容一樣。
+
+鍾同意法官李運騰指，沒爭議4月中發出的「35+新東」文件使用「會積極運用」否決權字眼，但重申4月收到文件時「冇特別去留意」，因他只是留意「係咪按照戴耀廷嘅講法係講明係基本法嘅權力」；李續問，那鍾有沒有留意到在6月8日的「35+新東final」文件，運用否決權字眼由「會積極運用」改為「會運用」？鍾指「冇為意」。
+
+
+▲ 前排左起：區諾軒、戴耀廷、趙家賢、程張迎（資料圖片）
+
+鍾表示，直至7月10日，也沒有收到與會者對新東文件提出反對或投訴，又一度提及6月10日曾發布「墨落無悔」。羅天瑋其後問，鍾就「墨落無悔」有什麼想告訴法庭？惟陳慶偉即打斷，指雖然控方要問開放的問題，但不是如宇宙般廣閣（as wide as universe），着他問具體的問題，又指控方有「墨落無悔」的聲明，究竟想問鍾什麼？
+
+#### 「墨落無悔」提「已取得共識」 鍾稱「以為係咪就否決預算案已有共識」
+
+羅天瑋其後展示何桂藍 Facebook 的「墨落無悔」帖文，提及「在初選協調會議上已取得共識的共同綱領」，問鍾如何理解「共識」。鍾指以其理解，首次會議是關於「初選上面邊啲人去參選、邊啲人唔去參選，點樣遵守呢個機制」，「而我睇到呢個『墨落無悔』嘅時候，會以為係咪已經就住否決財政預算案方面，已經有共識。」
+
+此外，民主動力負責草擬提名表格，鍾稱他沒有參與，只是在組織者群組看過總幹事黎敬輝發出的文件，表示「可以啦」。鍾亦是「新東訊息發布區」的成員，指因趙家賢想他幫手在群組內「幫手睇吓，幫吓眼」。鍾亦同意，曾以區議會主席身分幫忙物色票站，及提供議員辦事處作票站，在7月11日至12日的初選投票日均有親自協助，趙家賢7月12日晚亦有到場視察。羅天瑋發問時一度說錯投票日為7月11至13日。
+
+羅其後稱會引用有關初選流程的訊息發問，惟法官李運騰打斷問有何相關性，陳慶偉亦問趙家賢在其辦事處與案何關。羅指望完整本案有關流程的部分，以及鍾的參與，惟李運騰指所有人都知道不同議員辦事處用作票站，「我們不是審理這名證人，是審理各個被告。」
+
+羅天瑋其後問鍾，昨稱與戴耀廷7月進行討論，是討論了什麼，惟陳慶偉指問題太空泛，下令早休，又着羅要準備好問題。羅早休後稱沒有其他問題，進入辯方盤問。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（5日）踏入審訊第53天。時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟接受辯方盤問，供稱趙家賢早在2020年初前，已就區議會選舉協調與戴耀廷「弄得相當不快」，而在初選協調時亦對戴是否將初選遇到的問題告知民動「有好多擔憂同不滿」，且越來越強烈。鍾並指，2020年2月3名民動召集人與戴耀廷會面時沒討論參選人當選後如何行事，指民動過往協調也沒監察當選議員的投票取態，「我認為戴耀廷都唔會覺得民主動力有力去執行民主派議員喺立法會嘅所作所為。」鍾又同意，首次新東會議無提及否決財政預算案，並同意否決財案的確令許多民主派議員「擺喺一個非常之困難嘅情況」。
+
+#### 鍾同意梁國雄否決財案其中一個原因是沒有全民退保
+
+時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟今早完成主問，由代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的大律師黃宇逸進行盤問。鍾錦麟同意，社民連是左翼政黨，「佢哋都係咁樣去宣稱」，亦一直爭取全民退休保障、對爭取雙普選「亦非常之堅定」，而梁國雄的政治立場與社民連一致。鍾又指，知悉曾任立法會議員的梁國雄常提倡全民退保，亦常提及否決預算案的其中一個原因是沒有全民退保。黃宇逸完成盤問，其後代表吳政亨和余慧明、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明的大狀，及自行代表的劉偉聰均稱沒有盤問。
+
+#### 鍾稱趙家賢不希望民主動力被邊緣化 是參與協調「最主要原因」
+
+代表林卓廷和黃碧雲的大律師沈士文其後盤問，沈先指鍾於2022年12月19日和2023年1月28日曾錄取兩份無損權益口供，並就民主動力參與協調的原因發問。鍾錦麟昨供稱，趙家賢望參與2020年立法會換屆選舉的協調，望在選舉「有角色」。沈指趙和民主動力有興趣協調的其中一個原因，是因民動自2012年已進行同樣的協調工作，鍾同意，並指民動自2016年立法會選舉「有付出過努力去協調」，惟只在2018年新東及九西立法會補選「成功過一次」。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲（資料圖片）
+
+沈續指，趙如此熱衷參與協調有兩個原因，即民主動力多年來進行協調，邏輯上（logically）應繼續做協調；及趙家賢不希望民主動力被邊緣化和排除在外。鍾稱前者並非最主要原因，指「我唔能夠肯定係咪理所當然」；而後者是趙望做協調的「最主要原因」，因這會影響之後區議會選舉的協調工作，趙是鑑於2019年區選結果有此擔憂。
+
+#### 鍾同意民主動力2月同意與戴耀廷同辦初選、會上無提否決預算案
+
+鍾同意，就2020年立法會選舉的工作，「冇乜人睬」趙家賢，但趙對協調工作仍很有興趣，民動另一名副召集人馮志活知情後便介入，「將民主動力同戴耀廷區諾軒兩方面撮合」，4人遂在2020手2月於太古城一間酒店的餐廳會面。鍾同意辯方指，會面目的是讓戴耀廷和民主動力一同參與選舉協調工作，「令到兩邊唔需要做重複嘅事情。」
+
+沈續指，根據鍾的無損權益口供，戴會上從無提及否決預算案。鍾同意，並指戴主要談及望泛民取得立會過半，會面結果是同意戴和民主動力一同進行協調。法官李運騰問有否討論分工，鍾重申戴就初選流程、找人寫程式等「其實佢已經諗好晒㗎啦」，戴和區諾軒亦已在聯絡候選人；而「如果真係有啲協議需要有個團體去簽署呀，或者有銀行戶口做眾籌呀」，戴就希望民動幫手。惟鍾同意，雖有協議共同組織初選，但沒有簽署任何文件或合約。
+
+#### 鍾同意民動及戴耀廷當時不關注當選後如何行事 指過往協調亦無監察當選後取態
+
+鍾同意辯方指，從民動角度而言，3名召集人參與會面的目標很單純，只是希望協調民主派取得立會過半，亦從不關注參選人當選後如何行事。李運騰續問，戴耀廷在2月時同樣不關注參選人當選後如何行事？鍾指當時沒有相關討論，「因為我認為戴耀廷都唔會覺得民主動力有力去執行民主派議員喺立法會嘅所作所為。」鍾又舉例，過往民動雖有協調區議會選舉，但民動「亦都冇話去監察嗰啲區議員當選後嘅投票取態，係咪同民主派相近」，即不會有「懲罰機制」，故立法會的協調「都應該會好相近」。
+
+沈其後再問，鍾個人參與「35+計劃」的目標是否讓民主派取得議會多數，從而可在制度內表達意見，鍾稱「認同，盡力去做」。
+
+#### 鍾稱趙家賢在區選協調上「同戴耀廷已經弄得相當不快」、對戴不滿越來越強
+
+鍾錦麟同意，會議後戴耀廷和趙家賢就準備初選有緊密溝通，民動亦參與初選的準備工作，民動職員有協助；鍾亦開始閱讀戴有關否決預算案的文章。沈續問，會後趙家賢曾否表達對計劃的憂慮、並指答應辦初選前需考慮？鍾稱不肯定，但之後「趙家賢表達對戴耀廷嘅憂慮，呢個就絕對有嘅」，指趙對戴是否願意「將呢個初選裡面遇到嘅唔同問題都同民主動力講呢，係有好多嘅擔憂同不滿嘅」，且隨初選的執行，趙的擔憂和不滿越來越強烈。鍾亦指，早在2020年2月以前，在區議會選舉協調的事情上，趙家賢「同戴耀廷已經弄得相當不快」，同意在會面前趙對戴已有不太好的印象。
+
+#### 鍾稱沒聽過人不同意否決預算案 但的確令民主派擺在「非常之困難」情況
+
+至於鍾本人，他同意對戴耀廷提倡否決預算案有擔憂。被問是何時有此擔憂，鍾稱是在4月的新東協調會議前，戴將整個否決預算案的計劃「越嚟越具體化」、「講得越詳細」，而建制派或親中央政府人士反應越來越強烈的時候。鍾並指，沒有將其關注告知趙家賢，但於首次新東會議後有向戴表達，望戴不要要求參與者無差別否決財案。鍾同意辯方指，他表達上述關注是擔心會有DQ風險。沈續問，鍾除了擔心DQ，是否也擔心傳統民主派不會同意無差別否決預算案？鍾回應「呢個唔係我當時嘅考慮」，指有傳統民主派如公民黨亦曾於3月召記者會提出否決財案。
+
+沈續引鍾口供，曾提及傳統民主派不會同意「攬炒」，因若政府提出建醫院，相信他們不會支持無差別否決預算案。鍾確認是其想法，但指與戴的對話沒提及。李運騰問鍾有否實際聽過民主派如此說，鍾指沒有，但指自己任區議會主席，其中一項政綱是擴建將軍澳醫院，「我只係覺得我呢個諗法，係會代表好多民主派地區工作者嘅諗法。」
+
+沈其後再問，故鍾當時向戴耀廷表達擔憂，是認為將否決預算案加入計劃，很多民主派不會同意？鍾稱：「我冇聽過任何人話不同意呢個諗法，但係呢個情況的確會令好多嘅民主派，尤其是啱啱拎到主導權嘅區議會議員，擺喺一個非常之困難嘅情況。」
+
+#### 鍾信戴稱否決財案「冇問題」 惟認不太理解「積極運用」及「無差別」分別
+
+鍾錦麟早前稱向戴耀廷表達關注後，戴回應「我唔會要求大家去無差別咁去否決財政預算案」，只會說「積極運用基本法嘅權力」否決預算案。鍾盤問下指「我當時相信咗戴耀廷嘅講法，而認為咁樣冇問題」，但承認事實上「唔係好理解兩者嘅差別」。法官陳仲衡續問，鍾當時是否相信無差別否決預算案是《基本法》賦予的權力？鍾稱他沒仔細考慮是否有「無差別」的權力，亦知道此舉有被DQ風險，「但呢個風險實際上理據係乜嘢呢，我當時係唔清楚嘅。」
+
+鍾同意，戴其後稱「我講明係基本法嘅權力就唔會有問題啦啩？」是反問，並同意當時沒有再討論，是因相信戴的說法。沈指，戴作為法律教授，對法律的理解應比鍾更好，惟陳慶偉不批准發問，指情況不一定是這樣。鍾其後同意，他除調解外無任何專業的法律訓練，惟當辯方再問戴是否法律上更專業時，法官再打斷稱問題不需要，可留待陳詞。沈一度指盤問區諾軒時亦一直問相關問題，惟李運騰指「我們已聽夠了」，指該點沒需要。
+
+#### 鍾確認新東首次會議無討論否決財政預算案
+
+就新東首次會議情況，鍾同意會面原定晚上7至9時進行，他遲了約15至30分鐘到達，但不記得有其他與會者比他遲到，只記得有一個「唔關事、嚟錯咗個場地」的人。鍾稱會上約有20至30名參與者，但不記得社民連由誰代表，亦沒印象他有任何發言，但記得劉頴匡「佢有堅持用初選嘅方案囉，而唔係個棄選方案」，亦同意林卓廷沒有出席，但不記得民主黨代表是否莊榮輝。
+
+鍾表示，負責主持會議的他、戴耀廷及程張迎沒有討論過分工，「只係個討論、個流程去到嗰個部分時鍾意就插嘴咁樣。」而他到場時與主持的程張迎、戴耀廷和區諾軒坐在同一排，與會者則坐在他們面前，戴耀廷要求參與者自我介紹後，便主要討論採用「初選」或「棄選」方案及目標議席，「我冇印象討論過其他嘢」，會上氣氛平靜。鍾今年1月28日於無損權益口供稱，「第一次新界東協調會會上未有討論否決財政預算案」，鍾確認內容正確。
+
+
+▲ 左起：趙家賢、程張迎、鍾錦麟（資料圖片）
+
+而就戴耀廷會議後發出的新東協調文件初稿和最終版本，鍾重申「冇去留意」運用否決權條款亦沒提反對，「因為我主要都係睇個初選嘅遊戲規則係點樣做」，並同意他較關注目標議席數量，對否決預算案議題則完全沒興趣。辯方問他沒提反對，是否因戴曾向他稱只會要求「積極運用基本法權力否決預算案」？鍾同意。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（5日）踏入審訊第53天，時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟繼續接受辯方盤問。被問為何認為否決預算案或致參選人被DQ，鍾稱是從媒體得知，指他「純粹相信」建制媒體的「風聲」某程度代表中央想法，而2019年後中央對港政策「唔會不為所動」，故認為有一個風險要謹慎處理。而對戴稱否決預算案是「《基本法》賦予的權力」，鍾對戴說法「疑中留情」，指不清楚會如何觸發中央調整對港政策，故「拆彈拆得一樣得一樣」。趙亦指，表面看來《基本法》的確賦予立法會相關權力，當時亦相信戴稱是「合法」，「我拗唔過戴耀廷。」
+
+此外，鍾稱何桂藍在新東首次會議上介紹自己為「立場姐姐」，惟何桂藍兩度大叫：「肯定冇！」她身旁的懲教一度按她的肩膊，法官亦着她不要叫囂。鍾亦表示，戴在2020年5月底曾向他表示所有初選協調已完成和有共識。
+
+#### 鍾稱相信建制媒體某程度代表中央政府想法、對初選批評來自建制不同方面
+
+鍾錦麟下午接受代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 盤問。鍾今早供稱，新東首次會議後曾向戴耀廷表示無差別否決預算案或導致參選人被DQ，戴回應只會提「積極運用基本法權力」，又指「我講明係基本法嘅權力就唔會有問題啦啩？」
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel（資料圖片）
+
+Beel 問鍾為何認為否決預算案會導致參選人被DQ，鍾指「因為從媒體上面得知」。Beel 指他不明白，陳慶偉亦托頭笑指「媒體可以說很多事情（“Media can say a lot of things.”）」，鍾說「不幸地都會成真」，有人大笑。陳慶偉指只是部分而非全部，因為存在假資訊（disinformation），鍾回應所以有此擔憂。
+
+陳慶偉續問，真正的問題是「為何鍾相信否決預算案可能導致DQ？」，並指原因更加重要，結論並不重要。鍾表示，「我純粹相信由建制媒體報導呢啲嘅風聲，某程度上都代表咗中央政府嘅諗法」，又指2019年社會事件後，「中央政府嘅對港政策唔會不為所動，所以我覺得係有呢一個風險要謹慎去處理」，並指對整個初選的批評是來自建制的不同方面，而非來自個別版塊。
+
+陳慶偉問，因此鍾有此想法，是建基於建制派的說法？鍾同意，並指是在2019年的脈絡下閱讀相關訊息。陳續問，因此即使戴向他指這是基本法賦予的權力，也沒有改變他的看法？鍾指，「我帶住一個，或者咁講，『疑中留情』囉」，解釋是對戴耀廷的說法「疑中留情」，並指相信中央可能會有「組合拳」。
+
+法庭傳譯問「組合拳係咩？」，多人大笑，庭上亦議論紛紛，陳慶偉提議譯「combination of punches in boxing」、李運騰稱「combination of strategies」。鍾同意可算是一些「策略」，並指「但係千頭萬緒，唔清楚究竟乜嘢會觸發去大規模咁調整對港嘅政策，所以拆彈拆得一樣得一樣」。
+
+#### 鍾稱當時相信戴耀廷稱否決財案「合法」 指「我拗唔過戴耀廷」
+
+李運騰續指他不明白，指鍾在4月中時已對無差別否決預算案引致DQ感憂慮，而他特意在會後向戴表達，戴則只是以反問回應，「你就對戴耀廷的回應感到滿意？還是你有做什麼釋除疑慮？」鍾回應：「我覺得最好唔好（提否決預算案），但我當時相信咗戴耀廷話呢件事係合法嘅。」
+
+李再指，戴是被批評的對象，但鍾卻對戴的解釋感滿意？鍾強調「我嘅關注就係有冇犯法」，指「表面睇，《基本法》的確係賦予咗立法會去審批政府開支嘅權力，我當刻唔能夠去答戴耀廷（否決預算案）點樣犯法」。鍾同意，此前已知道《基本法》賦予相關權力，李再問那與戴的對話有什麼改變他看法？鍾僅稱「我拗唔過戴耀廷」。
+
+Beel 其後再問，鍾錦麟2020年是否相信參選人提出反政府的議題，有機會導致被DQ？鍾稱參考過往被DQ的例子，不可提倡「港獨」和「自決」，「呢個係紅線中嘅紅線」，並同意戴倡否決財案有DQ風險。
+
+#### 鍾指何桂藍會上自介「立場姐姐」 何大聲稱：肯定冇！
+
+就新東首次會議情況，鍾稱遲到後戴已稱「不如大家介紹一次自己先啦」，鍾沒有嘗試問人自己錯過什麼，Beel 問是因為他相信會議剛開始嗎？鍾答「我相信個會議冇話冇咗我唔得」，旁聽席傳來笑聲，鍾其後確認沒有問是因感覺會議剛開始。
+
+Beel 續問，鍾是否不記得何桂藍會上有發言，鍾稱「記得佢介紹過自己係『立場姐姐』囉」，惟原本低頭打字的何桂藍即抬頭，瞪着眼睛大聲喊：「肯定冇！」法官陳慶偉着她不要叫囂，何身旁的懲教亦按着其肩膊。鍾頓一頓，再解釋「佢嘗試話人哋叫我係『立場姐姐』」，惟何桂藍即再大喊：「冇！肯定冇！」懲教人員再按其肩膀。Beel 問據鍾記憶所及，這就是何說的話？鍾指「我記得嘅就係呢部份」。Beel 其後問，鍾是否記得何在會上有發言，鍾稱「有嘅，不過我唔記得咗係乜嘢」。
+
+#### 鍾指戴耀廷5月底曾提及所有協調已完成及取得共識
+
+此外，鍾亦確認只曾出席新東首次會議，而會上已就「初選點樣進行」達成共識。至於其他會議的情況，他確認依靠其他人訊息及收取的文件得知。Beel 問主要是由戴耀廷講述？鍾續憶述5月底時，戴曾相約他、程張迎、時任大埔區議會主席關永業及時任北區區議會主席羅庭德，在沙田新城市中央廣場的 Beans 餐廳午膳，除羅庭德外的其他人均有出席。
+
+鍾稱，戴耀廷曾提及「所有嘅初選協調已經完成咗同埋有共識啦」，亦已敲定整個初選流程，戴並望各區議會主席協助找新界東的票站，又提議找黃店做票站。戴又指，若大家都能協助找票站會對大家「最公平」。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鍾稱新民主同盟緣起不滿民主黨入中聯辦商政改方案、「35+」比「雷動計劃」目標更明確
+
+鍾在 Beel 盤問下亦同意，2016年成為民主動力副召集人，而民動當年立法會選舉曾協調，但不成功。Beel 續問，戴同年發起「雷動計劃」，目標是否與2020年相近，即在立會爭取「35+」？鍾稱不肯定當時是爭取「過半議席」抑或「最多嘅議席」，而且當時「更加冇提及到財政預算案嘅問題」。
+
+Beel 續展示鍾首份供詞，提及「雷動計劃」目標是「爭取民主派於2016年香港立法會選舉取得達半議席」，鍾稱供詞是「較籠統」的說法，並指達半是「理想的情況」，但相較2020年，2016年是沒有這種「大規模」甚至協調功能組別的情況，強調「2020年嘅目標係更加明確」。
+
+Beel 其後問，鍾曾加入民主黨，其後加入新民主同盟，問兩黨有何分別。鍾稱「兩句啦」，指「新民主同盟嘅緣起就係不滿當年民主黨進入中聯辦商討政改方案從而通過政改方案」，而兩者理念的不同，是新民主同盟會爭取在一國兩制框架下，政府落實一些「港人優先」的政策。鍾同意民主派有不同政黨，Beel 續問令各政黨走在一起的是否對普選的渴望？即這是各黨均同意的訴求？鍾指「籠統啲講係囉」。
+
+此外，李運騰一度問及新東首次協調會議於教協會址的場地設置，鍾解釋是長形的活動室，擺放長枱讓人於兩邊就坐。李問房間有多大，鍾稱「唔識形容」，其後在法官要求下以雙手比劃，指是由法庭的一邊到另一邊，約佔三號法庭面積四分三。法官陳慶偉指是很大的房間，李運騰亦指是大廳（hall）而非房間，鍾稱「教協間房係好大㗎」，故常在該處舉行記招。李問是否可能有人在鍾沒留意下出入，鍾否認，稱「門口得一個」。陳慶偉指20人只佔房間的一小部分，鍾稱「我諗五分四度啦」，林卓廷笑說：「吓？五分之四？」鍾其後同意，會議場地正是6月9日初選記者會的場地，可作參考。
+
+案件下周一（8日）續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Alternative Nuclear Futures
+author: Heather Williams, et al.
+date : 2023-05-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/GMvMuCE.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Capability and Credibility Challenges for U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Within the next 10 years, U.S. extended deterrence could look notably different than it does today._ _In a new era of strategic competition, the twenty-first-century threat environment is changing in ways that the United States cannot readily manage or control. Nuclear threats are rising, and U.S. allies are increasingly concerned about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. Russia is issuing veiled threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, China is drastically increasing the size and diversity of its nuclear arsenal, North Korea is fielding more advanced nuclear weapons capabilities, and Iran is developing a high degree of nuclear latency._
+
+To explore these issues, the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues leveraged an “alternative futures” methodology to unpack how key drivers might affect the U.S. extended deterrence mission in the next 10 years. In nearly all future scenarios this project explored, the United States suffers a credibility problem. It will be increasingly difficult to assure allies that the United States is prepared to employ U.S. nuclear weapons in defending their vital interests if necessary. It will require a shift in the way future administrations consult, plan, train, and operate with allies.
+
+___`In nearly all future scenarios this project explored, the United States suffers a credibility problem.`___
+
+In any nuclear future, the United States’ best asset will be its allies — if it is able to maintain alliance cohesion. Allies are a center of gravity for the United States, as well as a force multiplier. The research scenarios consider changes in adversary capabilities, but in all scenarios, a cohesive and confident alliance network backed by credible extended deterrence guarantees U.S. strategic interests. Since a strong alliance network is the best weapon against Russian and Chinese aggression and risk manipulation, this report’s recommendations focus on strengthening alliance cohesion through a combination of sustained investment in the nuclear enterprise, developing capabilities to manage nuclear risks, improving communication and consultation with allies, and strengthening the United States’ overall credibility as a strategic partner.
+
+
+### Findings Summary
+
+This project set out to answer three main questions: (1) What are the strategic drivers that will shape the U.S. extended deterrence mission over the next 10 years, and how might those drivers interact to produce different outcomes, or “futures”? (2) How will U.S. concepts of integrated deterrence shape the extended deterrence mission and how might weighting various integrated deterrence objectives differently affect key elements of U.S. extended deterrence (e.g., treaty commitments, nuclear policy, forward-deployed nuclear forces, nuclear sharing and consultation arrangements, allied conventional capabilities, U.S. forces deployed abroad, and nonproliferation)? (3) What are the signposts and indicators that one of these potential futures may be more likely?
+
+__Drivers:__ The study found that adversary nuclear capabilities and alliance cohesion would be the main strategic driver of the U.S. extended deterrence mission for the next decade. Adversary nuclear capabilities will be impacted by a variety of factors, including advances in nonnuclear technologies, regional ambitions, and internal factors such as economic constraints. One important variable will be whether and to what extent adversaries collude with each other. Alliance cohesion and synchronization will be another key strategic driver and will be influenced by external threat perceptions, internal political pressures, the credibility of U.S. security guarantees, and allies’ interpretation of the concept of integrated deterrence, among other factors. This report defines “synchronization challenges” among allies as a combination of political and operational factors, such as competition among allies for U.S. assurances and capabilities, a lack of interoperability at the technical level, and the overarching absence of shared strategic interests.
+
+There is a risk that allies perceive integrated deterrence as putting them in competition for U.S. attention and resources, or that integrated deterrence somehow signals a move away from “nuclear” deterrence. Additionally, the study found allies’ perceptions of U.S. domestic politics will influence alliance cohesion and U.S. credibility. Continued U.S. polarization, a lack of sustained investment in the nuclear enterprise, or fluctuations in attitudes toward the allies could undermine U.S. extended deterrence efforts.
+
+__Integrated Deterrence:__ Concepts of integrated deterrence will have at least three important implications for extended deterrence. First, based on all of the project scenarios, the United States will need to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for extended deterrence purposes, but it will also need to keep open the possibility of shifting investment to advanced nonnuclear capabilities and competing with Russia and China in different domains. This will require a more flexible, agile, and responsive defense investment process than currently exists. Second, the United States will need to take a more holistic approach to assuring allies in both Europe and Asia to prevent them from competing with each other for U.S. guarantees and resources. In general, the study found that the United States could improve its messaging to allies, particularly through a more robust consultation process. Finally, the study found that arms control and nonproliferation efforts are possible in all the alternative future scenarios; however, these agreements will look very different depending on adversary capabilities and alliance cohesion.
+
+__Signposts:__ The study identified a variety of signposts for each scenario. These include adversaries’ investments in nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities, allies’ requests for U.S. assets or assurances, allied and adversarial interest in arms control and risk reduction measures, and political shifts within allies’ governments. The relationship between adversaries may also signal a shifting strategic landscape, depending on whether they are working in loose coordination or a more formal cooperation. One of the most prominent signposts will be U.S. investment in the nuclear enterprise and political commitment to alliances. These signals from Washington will heavily influence the extended deterrence mission, adversaries’ willingness to engage in nuclear adventurism and manipulate strategic risks, and allies’ confidence in U.S. security guarantees and willingness to cooperate — rather than compete — with each other.
+
+The study resulted in three overarching findings and recommendations for U.S. decisionmakers:
+
+- First, in order to compete in the nuclear future, the United States must sustain investment in the nuclear enterprise while also competing in nonnuclear technologies. This will require a more flexible, agile, and responsive defense investment process than currently exists.
+
+- Second, alliance cohesion will be increasingly difficult in all nuclear futures but is essential for a successful extended deterrence mission.
+
+- Third, the United States can strengthen alliance cohesion not only through sustained investment in nuclear capabilities, but also by committing publicly and repeatedly to the enduring value of alliances, tailoring messages to its allies, and revamping consultation and operational planning processes with allies.
+
+___`In order to compete in the nuclear future, the United States must sustain investment in the nuclear enterprise while also competing in nonnuclear technologies. This will require a more flexible, agile, and responsive defense investment process than currently exists.`___
+
+
+### Methodology
+
+To understand future U.S. extended deterrence requirements, PONI leveraged an alternative futures methodology for this project. Over the course of three workshops, PONI convened a diverse group of regional and functional experts to identify key trends and drivers that will shape the U.S. extended deterrence mission and to develop and evaluate four future scenarios that highlight outcomes, risks, and opportunities for U.S. policymakers.
+
+In the first workshop, senior experts identified 11 key trends that will shape the future of the U.S. extended deterrence mission. The project team categorized these trends based on the “three Cs” of deterrence: capability, credibility, and communication — though some of the factors overlap between categories or do not neatly fit into one bucket. These trends are listed below:
+
+> #### CAPABILITY
+
+1) Growth and diversification of nuclear arsenals, both qualitatively and quantitatively
+
+2) Increased range and accuracy of adversary weapons systems, including nonnuclear capabilities, which threaten U.S. and allied assets
+
+3) Expanded competition — and in some cases conflict — across multiple domains, including space and cyber
+
+4) Increased transparency through social media platforms and open-source data, magnifying the ability to cause social disruption and spread misinformation and disinformation
+
+> #### CREDIBILITY
+
+5) Synchronization and credibility challenges that cause logistical and political stress on alliance networks
+
+6) Increased signaling and demand by allies and partners for U.S. capabilities and exports, including weapons sales, which stress U.S. weapons production infrastructure and political support for weapons production
+
+7) Increased demand by allies and partners for forward-deployed U.S. strategic assets in a tense geopolitical environment of competition and heightened rhetoric
+
+> #### COMMUNICATION
+
+8) Confused and blurred messaging due to nonstop, multivariate communications from both allies and adversaries through multiple private and public channels
+
+9) Increased nuclear threats and blackmail from adversaries, including during times of crisis
+
+> #### OTHER
+
+10) Increased economic coercion though political demands and widening global interconnectivity
+
+11) Increased number and influence of autocratic regimes around the world, some of which are strongly supported by domestic populist movements
+
+Participants were asked to vote on the trends and drivers that will have the greatest effect on the future extended deterrence mission. This allowed PONI to cluster the key trends and develop a consensus on which drivers are likely to be the most significant over the next 10 years. The three most significant trends were the following:
+
+- Growth and diversification of nuclear arsenals
+
+- Synchronization challenges given multipolar nuclear threats stressing alliance networks
+
+- Confused and blurred messaging due to nonstop, multivariate communications
+
+The PONI team then used the results of the first workshop and the top two drivers (growing arsenals and synchronization challenges) to develop four alternative future scenarios. PONI defined the first factor as adversaries expanding their nuclear arsenals quantitatively and qualitatively, to include means of delivery, such as hypersonic glide vehicles or dual-capable systems. With these alternative future scenarios, this research sought to illuminate how key drivers might shape future extended deterrence dynamics and requirements.
+
+Table 1 captures the four scenarios derived from changes in adversary capabilities and alliance cohesion: (1) opportunistic competition, (2) bloc competition, (3) shifting nonnuclear competition, and (4) competition and cooperation.
+
+
+_▲ Table 1: Alternative Nuclear Future Scenarios_
+
+The PONI team then generated stories that describe these futures and how they could plausibly unfold.
+
+The second and third workshops focused on evaluating these future scenarios and their implications, potential benefits and challenges, and risks. In particular, the workshops focused on the implications of these scenarios for (1) core aspects of the U.S. nuclear mission (i.e., how nuclear capabilities play into integrated deterrence concepts, deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance); (2) stability and escalation risks; (3) arms control and nonproliferation; and (4) broad and enduring U.S. strategic objectives, including those related to strategic competition.
+
+The scenarios assume that in 2032, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping remain in power in Russia and China respectively and that they continue to pursue regional ambitions and challenge the U.S.-led alliance-based international order. Both leaders are under increasing pressure to demonstrate progress in achieving their strategic aims. Putin strives to solidify his legacy and return Russia to an era of greatness following the war in Ukraine, and Xi is under pressure to deliver on promises of Chinese greatness as the People’s Republic approaches its 100th anniversary. Among allies, the scenarios assume that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) still exists, as do alliances in the Indo-Pacific, and that there are no new nuclear actors in 2032. The scenarios assume the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is still in force and that there has not been an extension or replacement of New START. Finally, the scenarios assume that the United States is following through on its current nuclear modernization plans and the program of record and is nearing completion of the modernization of the triad. As a final caveat, this analysis focuses on nuclear expansion by Russia and China and does not explicitly address North Korea or nuclear actors in the Middle East or South Asia. This was primarily because Russia and China were the focus of expert interviews and workshops; however, the authors acknowledge that actors outside Europe and Asia will impact the U.S. extended deterrence mission and these are explored in the “wild card” scenarios.
+
+
+### Analysis
+
+The four alternative futures identify specific challenges for future and current U.S. extended deterrence requirements. They also identify signposts to indicate which scenario the United States might be moving toward, along with recommendations for how to navigate (or avoid) that pathway. The four scenarios below range from a “worst-case scenario” to a relatively stable competition.
+
+
+_▲ Source: CSIS iDeas Lab._
+
+#### Scenario 1: Opportunistic Competition
+
+__Opportunistic competition is a scenario of high adversary capabilities and low alliance cohesion. In this future, China and Russia are expanding their nuclear arsenals quantitatively and qualitatively, and the United States struggles to maintain robust alliances.__
+
+In the CSIS PONI workshops, one participant pointed out, “From the allies’ perspective, this is the world we are currently living in.” Although this is the worst-case scenario, it is also the most likely based on current trends among adversaries and allies — though this may depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.
+
+In this future, China’s nuclear arsenal stands at approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons and includes a functional nuclear triad. China’s modernization efforts leverage artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and the use of small satellites for both civilian and military purposes. Following the war in Ukraine, Russia determines its nuclear arsenal and nuclear coercion gives it a strategic advantage and increases its reliance on nuclear weapons. It focuses its modernization and expansion on new and advanced dual-capable intermediate-range missiles. It also develops new conventional systems to replace those lost in the war in Ukraine, predominantly drones and small satellites to improve its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. China increasingly coordinates with Russia; however, there is no evidence of a formal alliance between Beijing and Moscow. Instead, they both become increasingly aggressive in their respective regions, challenge the rules-based international order, and remain opportunistic in any collaboration. They are also willing to take advantage of U.S. distraction, internal debates, or regional disputes. Growing nuclear arsenals in combination with autocratic forms of government give the adversary an advantage, as they can control defense investment without limits and are more willing to manipulate nuclear risks.
+
+Allies are responding to the worsening security environment in diverse — and sometimes contradictory — ways, fracturing alliance cohesion and coordination and putting allies at odds with each other. European allies face multiple external and internal pressures. Externally, they continue to face persistent Russian nuclear threats and are increasingly called upon to contribute to NATO’s widening mission, including countering China’s regional aggression and global ambitions. This is a source of resentment for many western and southern European allies who have other priorities. Internally, they face growing antinuclear movements and economic pressures in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. Operationally, NATO allies have not fully synchronized their intelligence and communication efforts and are at odds about their military contributions to the alliance. In the Indo-Pacific, allies are similarly divided about how to confront an increasingly aggressive China. The Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) agreement is fracturing, and progress has slowed because of domestic politics in Canberra. Japan and South Korea are divided internally on how to handle China’s aggression, regional ambitions, and expansion of military capabilities. Asian allies see each other (and their European counterparts) as competitors.
+
+European allies remain concerned that the United States’ attention is focused on Asia, whereas Asian allies perceive the United States as distracted by the acute and enduring threat from Moscow. In Washington, decisionmakers are divided on the value of NATO and alliances and are pressuring allies to contribute more to their own defense, raising questions among allies about U.S. political commitments and the capabilities underpinning extended deterrence guarantees. Adversaries take advantage of these divisions to manipulate nuclear risks, particularly during crises.
+
+> #### IMPLICATIONS
+
+A future defined by opportunistic competition will ask more of the U.S. nuclear arsenal than any other point in its history. The scenario has the highest risk of escalation, as adversaries leverage nuclear weapons and dual-capable systems for opportunistic aggression and coercion to pursue regional gains, potentially resulting in simultaneous crises. The U.S. nuclear mission will likely need to expand to consider regional nuclear warfighting and to operate in “risk management mode,” unless it develops advanced conventional capabilities that can fulfill a similar strategic deterrent function, though this seems unlikely in the next decade. The United States will also need to expand investment in nonnuclear capabilities to maintain parity with Russia and China, including precision-guided conventional long-range strike capabilities, missile defense, and ISR. In short, this is a very expensive scenario. The United States will also need to do more to strengthen its credibility with allies, including modernizing the current arsenal and potentially establishing additional forward-deployed nuclear forces in allies’ territories to signal its commitment to their security. With allies at cross-purposes, they may also unintentionally entangle each other in regional crises in the absence of functioning synchronization and coordination.
+
+Formal, treaty-based arms control with verification is highly unlikely in this scenario, but there may be an increased focus on informal risk reduction efforts in an effort to manage regional crises. Adversaries, however, will rely on the risk of escalation and manipulation to achieve their aims and will be reluctant to engage in risk reduction or arms control measures that would have a hand-tying effect in a crisis. An additional challenge for arms control will be that allies may perceive any negotiation between Washington and Moscow or Beijing as a sign of abandonment or appeasement. In the absence of strong U.S. assurances, allies may reconsider their nonproliferation commitments and explore developing independent nuclear capabilities. One workshop participant referred to this scenario as the “danger zone” of proliferation threats, whereby even if allies do not pursue independent capabilities, they may instead rely on nuclear hedging or latency. Should allies seriously consider pursuing independent nuclear capabilities, this would have significant and disastrous consequences for the NPT and global nuclear order more broadly, particularly if a U.S. ally withdraws from the NPT or the alliance system collapses.
+
+> #### SIGNPOSTS
+
+The following indicators signify the strategic environment is on a pathway to opportunistic competition:
+
+1) Continued expansion of adversary nuclear and nonnuclear arsenals despite economic and domestic pressures in the aftermath of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine
+
+2) Increased requests for nuclear sharing and forward-deployed nuclear and conventional forces by allies
+
+3) Breakdown in existing agreements, such as NATO nuclear sharing or AUKUS
+
+4) Increased requests for joint planning and exercises or force posture changes
+
+5) Expressed allied interest in expanding strategic forces, potentially to include nuclear hedging or independent nuclear forces, along with precision-guided conventional long-range strike capabilities, missile defense systems, and additional U.S. foreign military sales
+
+6) Disputes among allies and a general lack of coordination on strategic priorities
+
+7) Increased requests from allies for consultations and assurances
+
+8) U.S. domestic debates about defense spending and the value of allies
+
+#### Scenario 2: Bloc Competition
+
+__Bloc competition is a scenario of high adversary capabilities and high alliance cohesion. In this future, China and Russia are expanding their nuclear arsenals quantitatively and qualitatively, and the United States maintains a strong and effective network of alliances.__
+
+In this scenario, as in the previous one, China and Russia have expanded their nuclear arsenals quantitatively and qualitatively and are leveraging nuclear weapons for opportunistic aggression in their respective regions, working to drive a wedge between U.S. allies and manipulating risks to their advantage.
+
+Unlike the previous scenario, in bloc competition, the United States and its allies unite around the significant threats posed by two peer competitors and implement practical political and technical tools to synchronize their efforts in deterring Moscow and Beijing. The United States and its allies operate as a united bloc with well-coordinated mechanisms for sharing intelligence and conducting joint operations and exercises. More broadly, there is a shared sense of purpose in both Europe and Asia concerning the importance of alliances, particularly in the face of autocratic adversaries, and the two regions are not acting at cross-purposes or competing with one another. In Europe, allies maintain unity in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. NATO has nearly completed its transformation to a robust and operational political and military alliance, and its members have maintained their commitments to defense spending and successfully integrated forces and capabilities. The United States successfully expands U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea cooperation and integrates its security and economic initiatives in the Indo-Pacific — including the Quad and AUKUS — and is seen as a reliable and lasting leader in the region. The United States maintains robust and active consultations with allies, along with sustained domestic investment in U.S. strategic capabilities and a proven, enduring commitment to allies. Domestically, debates linger in Washington and in foreign capitals about defense spending, but there is an overarching commitment to alliances and a shared understanding about their strategic value.
+
+> #### IMPLICATIONS
+
+A future defined by bloc competition may force the United States to consider significantly expanding the nuclear mission at the regional level as a risk management tool, which may include additional nuclear sharing arrangements or forward deploying additional nuclear capabilities. Allies will need to coordinate and contribute to a larger strategic mission. Working-level and operational coordination will be particularly important. Alliance cohesion will serve an important function in deterring adversary aggression at the regional level, though adversaries will still attempt to manipulate nuclear risk to divide allies. As China and Russia develop more advanced and sophisticated arsenals, U.S. allies will request and field more robust conventional options, including precision-guided conventional long-range strike capabilities, missile defense, and ISR.
+
+In this scenario, the prospects for arms control are still limited. Allies may encourage the United States to pursue bilateral or trilateral arms control with Beijing and Moscow to constrain their nuclear arsenals and better manage the significant escalation risks that exist in this future. But political pressures and the overall focus on competition will likely limit what, if anything, can be negotiated.
+
+> #### SIGNPOSTS
+
+The following indicators signify the strategic environment is on a pathway to bloc competition:
+
+1) Continued expansion of adversary nuclear arsenals despite economic and domestic pressures in the aftermath of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine
+
+2) Increased alliance requests for conventional capabilities that fill jointly agreed roles
+
+3) Increased allied support for collective deterrence and increased contributions toward a combined force posture
+
+4) Shared principles and alliance coordination at the senior leadership level; at the working level, progress in intelligence sharing and operational planning contributing to a shared mission working in cooperation, rather than competition, across regions
+
+5) Greater allied interest in Washington pursuing arms control and risk reduction measures with Moscow and Beijing, though U.S. support is uncertain because of domestic factors
+
+6) Unified U.S. and allied domestic commitment to alliances
+
+#### Scenario 3: Shifting Competition
+
+__Shifting competition is a scenario of low adversary (nuclear) capabilities and low alliance cohesion. It is a future in which Chinese and Russian nuclear expansion stalls, competition shifts to other domains, and the United States struggles to maintain robust alliances.__
+
+This scenario should not be perceived as adversaries failing to compete or ceding to U.S. regional and global supremacy; rather, it is one where adversaries shift to domains where they have a perceived competitive advantage. In this future, China’s nuclear arsenal stands at an estimated 450 warheads, well below previous projections. Sanctions and global exile in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine drastically weaken portions of the Russian economy, forcing Russia to divert resources to rebuild its conventional forces at the expense of its continued investment in strategic systems. Certain exotic delivery vehicles in Russia’s modernization program encounter technological challenges and component shortages. This scenario might see adversaries slowing their nuclear expansion but continuing to compete at the strategic level and invest in advanced nonnuclear capabilities. China and Russia largely shift competition to the conventional domain or “gray zone,” with an emphasis on disinformation campaigns to divide allies further. In this future, adversary disinformation campaigns are sowing doubt among U.S. allies about the longevity of U.S. commitments, making it difficult to coordinate effective responses and deterrence campaigns, as well as fueling disagreements over what mix of conventional, non-kinetic, and nuclear capabilities the United States and its allies need. Allies remain fearful of U.S. abandonment because of competing priorities and entrapment should the United States escalate future crises without consulting allies or building alliance cohesion.
+
+In Europe, NATO is fractured, with some states preferring to cut their defense spending due to domestic and economic pressures in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. Russia’s slowing nuclear expansion also raises questions about the enduring value of NATO’s nuclear mission, putting some allies at odds over whether the United States should withdraw nuclear weapons from Europe and make unilateral cuts to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Overall, political disagreements and isolationist policies weaken NATO and decrease the credibility of collective action. In the Indo-Pacific region, AUKUS stalls for domestic reasons, but also because of changing attitudes throughout the region — including in Tokyo and Seoul — about the threat posed by China.
+
+> #### IMPLICATIONS
+
+A future defined by shifting competition will renew domestic debates about the size and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Some will argue that the United States should use the stall in Russian and Chinese investment to outcompete them in nuclear capabilities, while continuing to compete in conventional and advanced technologies — though this will face significant domestic challenges. Others will argue that the United States should focus on outcompeting in conventional and advanced technologies while pursuing nuclear arms control efforts, which may face domestic opposition but would strengthen the international nuclear regime if successful. In both cases, the United States will need to compete with Russia and China in emerging and disruptive technologies as a component of an extended deterrence strategy. In this scenario, the risk of escalation and confrontation will not disappear, but rather shift to the nonnuclear level of conflict in a new version of the stability-instability paradox.
+
+In a scenario of shifting competition, the security landscape will look drastically different. The United States and its allies will need to develop coherent and meaningful responses to disinformation, gray zone, and cyber activities. In this future, the United States will have to rebuild alliance structures and convey the need for defense partnerships in a world where competition with adversaries is less visible and thus harder to communicate to allies and publics.
+
+Some allies — particularly in Western Europe — may question the enduring value of the U.S. nuclear umbrella if they perceive Russian and Chinese nuclear threats as waning. Others will be reluctant to support arms control initiatives and will continue to see the U.S. nuclear umbrella as the ultimate backstop against ongoing threats from North Korea and as a means to keep China and Russia’s more aggressive gray zone tactics from escalating. Some allies may be increasingly tempted to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, for example, under domestic pressure to show tangible progress toward fulfilling the Article VI commitments of the NPT, especially if Russia and China are reducing their arsenals. The United States will need focus on deterring nonnuclear threats while continuing to explain to allies the importance of nuclear weapons in an overarching strategy.
+
+> #### SIGNPOSTS
+
+The following indicators signify the strategic environment is on a pathway to nonnuclear competition:
+
+1) Increased Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns and gray zone activities
+
+2) Backpedaling by China and Russia on investments and rhetoric surrounding nuclear modernization programs
+
+3) Increased coordination and cooperation between Moscow and Beijing
+
+4) Gray zone conflicts at the sub-strategic level
+
+5) Increased investment in nonnuclear strategic capabilities by adversaries
+
+6) Allies’ wavering commitment to nuclear deterrence
+
+7) Breakdown of alliances such as AUKUS
+
+#### Scenario 4: Competition and Cooperation
+
+__Competition and cooperation is a scenario of low adversary capabilities and high alliance cohesion. In this future, Chinese and Russian nuclear expansion stalls, and the United States maintains a strong and effective network of alliances.__
+
+As in the previous scenario, economic challenges largely stall Russian and Chinese development of nuclear and advanced capabilities. In an effort to offset their stalled modernization efforts, Moscow and Beijing form a closer partnership with deeper economic, military, and political integration. They now conduct regular joint military exercises and disinformation campaigns in an attempt to divide U.S. allies. Both maintain nuclear forces for coercive purposes but focus investments primarily in advanced nonnuclear and non-kinetic capabilities to support increased gray zone activities, creating a more complex and integrated version of the stability-instability paradox.
+
+In this future, European and Asian allies share a common view of the threat posed by a united China and Russia. For the United States and its allies, unity is crucial. There is a shared sense of purpose in acting as an alliance of democracies in the face of an autocratic bloc. As a result, the United States and its allies overcome information-sharing and classification challenges and develop more effective mechanisms for countering cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
+
+> #### IMPLICATIONS
+
+Across the four possible futures, this scenario is the most stable and attractive security environment for the United States and its allies. However, the growing alliance between China and Russia will complicate planning and debates over what mix of nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities are needed. The implications for the U.S. nuclear mission in this scenario will be similar to those in the shifting competition scenario, whereby the United States can choose from outcompeting Russia and China in nuclear weapons, shifting investments to advanced capabilities, or using the opportunity to pursue arms control and negotiate limits on Russian and Chinese nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities. Allies who feel more assured under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and work in coordination with each other may be more likely to support arms control negotiations. Moscow and Beijing, faced with a united alliance and significant economic challenges, may be more open to such efforts. However, formal arms control will continue to be a challenge for the United States domestically and many allies could see further reductions in U.S. nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities as a sign of waning commitment.
+
+> #### SIGNPOSTS
+
+The following indicators signify the strategic environment is on a pathway to competition and cooperation:
+
+1) Backpedaling by Russia on rhetoric surrounding nuclear modernization programs
+
+2) Increased coordination and cooperation between Moscow and Beijing
+
+3) Gray zone conflicts at the sub-strategic level
+
+4) Increased investment in nonnuclear strategic capabilities by adversaries
+
+5) Uptick in adversary uses of disinformation
+
+6) Improved alliance coordination — particularly at the working level — in intelligence sharing, countering cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, nonnuclear defense cooperation, and other policy areas, such as arms control
+
+7) Unified U.S. and allied domestic commitment to alliances
+
+#### “Wild Card” Scenarios
+
+The above four scenarios are informed by the two primary factors of adversary capabilities and alliance cohesion, along with the assumptions identified at the outset of this report; however, significant and unforeseen changes beyond these factors could fundamentally alter the nature of the security environment over the next decade. The PONI workshops also identified potential “wild card” factors that would have implications for U.S. extended deterrence but did not come up explicitly in the context of the four scenarios identified above. These include the following:
+
+- Chinese invasion of Taiwan to achieve unification by force
+
+- Change in Iran’s nuclear status
+
+- Russian victory in the war in Ukraine, potentially involving nuclear use
+
+- Significant U.S. domestic political changes, such as an insurrection
+
+- Global economic depression
+
+- Global pandemic
+
+- North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction
+
+A thorough analysis of these events was outside of the scope of this study, but the majority of these events would likely increase stress on alliances and result in allies asking for greater assurances from the United States, both in terms of forward-deployed capabilities and political commitments to ensure their security. Other “wild cards,” however — such as economic collapse or U.S. domestic instability — could create untenable pressures on U.S. defense spending and nuclear modernization that would force a change in extended deterrence commitments.
+
+#### Scenario Comparisons
+
+There are three important similarities across all scenarios. First, adversaries will continue to challenge U.S. regional and global supremacy and will attempt to drive a wedge between Washington and its allies. Adversaries will seek to advance their interests through opportunistic aggression and by manipulating risks — particularly during crises — with the belief that the United States is risk averse and will seek a negotiated peace, and that increased risks will divide U.S. allies. Second, allies will require assurance from the United States, in both word and deed, in any of these scenarios. Maintaining a credible U.S. extended deterrent will not only strengthen security for the United States and its allies, but also have important nonproliferation benefits and improve alliance cohesion. In the broader context, the United States will be leading an alliance of democracies in the face of aggressive autocracies. Finally, arms control or risk reduction measures will be of interest to allies in all the scenarios (albeit in different forms) except the first one, which might see allies withdraw from the NPT and develop their own nuclear capabilities.
+
+Despite their similarities, the scenarios also have enough variation to point to how factors such as alliance unity will affect the U.S. nuclear mission. The means by which adversaries pursue their strategic interests will have implications for the U.S. nuclear force posture and how the United States invests in its strategic capabilities. For example, if Russia shifts investment to conventional and non-kinetic capabilities in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, this may alleviate pressure on U.S. nuclear modernization. However, it will also increase the need for the United States to invest in offensive and defensive nonnuclear advanced capabilities while continuing to maintain a credible extended nuclear deterrent. Another point of variation is the degree to which Russia and China are acting in collusion. On the one hand, a sense of a unified adversarial challenge may galvanize alliance cohesion. On the other hand, a unified effort by Moscow and Beijing could sow seeds of distrust among U.S. allies through gray zone tactics and disinformation campaigns.
+
+Another point of variation among the scenarios is what arms control might look like. In most of the scenarios, traditional arms control treaties will be difficult because the United States may prioritize freedom of action in how it responds to adversary buildups. In these scenarios, allies may support informal risk reduction measures, such as “Incidents at Sea”–style agreements that create political commitments and set “rules of the road” for nuclear and nonnuclear weapons.
+
+___`In most of the scenarios, traditional arms control treaties will be difficult because the United States may prioritize freedom of action in how it responds to adversary buildups.`___
+
+
+### Key Findings and Recommendations
+
+__Finding:__ Competition is inevitable.
+
+Based on the scenarios in this report, even if adversaries develop nuclear capabilities at a slower pace than expected, they will increase investment and focus on nonnuclear strategic capabilities, particularly non-kinetic capabilities that will complicate U.S. decisionmaking in regional crises and challenge alliance cohesion. In short, the United States needs to prepare for a sustained era of competition with Russia and China as well as allies that will require ever-increasing security assurances. One particularly unique trait of this era of competition is the adversaries’ willingness to manipulate nuclear risk and rely on nuclear weapons because they assume the United States and its allies will be risk averse. This will increase the stability-instability paradox, complicating U.S. decisionmaking and potentially undermining the cohesion of the United States’ alliances and the credibility of its assurances.
+
+The number and type of contested domains where competition and conflict can occur have grown from the Cold War era when alliances were formed and are increasingly blurred. Gray zone tactics such as disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and economic coercion — that target both the United States and its allies — allow adversaries to impose costs while hoping to avoid triggering escalation to a conventional war, let alone a nuclear one. This is raising questions about what the United States and its partners and allies should aim to deter and, depending on how and when deterrence fails, what types of responses may be appropriate.
+
+__Recommendation:__ The Department of Defense (DOD) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should prioritize efforts to develop a nuclear enterprise that is agile, flexible, and responsive to the shifting geopolitical landscape as part of an integrated deterrence strategy. This will require engaging with Congress as well as the private sector and reforming defense investment and procurement, including for the nuclear enterprise. While the 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review states that “‘hedging against an uncertain future’ is no longer a stated role for nuclear weapons,” the management of the U.S. nuclear enterprise must maintain a state of responsive readiness. The best way to prepare for the future is to build a flexible nuclear enterprise capable of tackling new and emerging threats as they arise. Additionally, there should be a shared understanding among allies about the mix of capabilities, both nuclear and nonnuclear, that are required to effectively deter adversaries, and greater insight into how the U.S. nuclear enterprise and wider defense infrastructure is working to fill any gaps. Given that greater alliance cooperation will enhance U.S. competitiveness and potentially allow for a pooling of resources, allies can and should be part of this effort through consultations and transparency measures.
+
+__Finding:__ Alliance cohesion and synchronization is essential for effective extended nuclear deterrence.
+
+The United States has a long history of maintaining strong defense ties across Europe and Asia; however, isolationist policies and a decline in U.S. leadership pose significant obstacles to maintaining the strong network of alliances and partners that have kept the United States safe for decades. If alliance cohesion can be maintained, allies will be a force multiplier for the United States at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Communicating deterrence requirements and coordinating messages will be challenging in an era of disinformation and public pressures against nuclear weapons in democratic capitals. The path that leads to high alliance cohesion will not be easy. At times, disagreements will run high; however, a lack of disagreement may be a signpost indicating insincerity in dialogue and underlying alliance cohesion challenges. Since the end of World War II, U.S. commitments to provide for the defense of allies have furthered the U.S. nonproliferation mission. The 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review notes “extended nuclear deterrence contributes to U.S. non-proliferation goals by giving Allies and partners confidence that they can resist strategic threats and remain secure without acquiring nuclear weapons of their own.” However, fundamental trust in the U.S. ability to secure collective defense is far from guaranteed.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Current and future administrations should strengthen U.S. interagency efforts to invest, commit, message, and consult with U.S. allies.
+
+_Invest in a responsive and adaptable nuclear infrastructure:_ Capability and credibility go hand in hand. One of the best ways to maintain a strong alliance and to avoid intra-alliance competition will be for the United States, and the DOD specifically, to sustain funding for defense infrastructure writ large, to include the nuclear enterprise, while also competing in advanced technologies and remaining responsive to nonnuclear threats.
+
+_Commit to long-term alliances:_ U.S. policymakers and defense leaders should signal an enduring bipartisan political commitment to alliances. While political shifts are inevitable, a robust signal from Washington about the strategic importance of alliances writ large may assuage many concerns about abandonment. In addition, the DOD can take steps now to institutionalize cooperation with allies at the working level, which can further reinforce the long-term nature of U.S. commitments.
+
+_Manage alliance communication:_ DOD officials, in particular, can signal the equal importance of alliances in both Europe and Asia through improved communication and messaging. The National Defense Strategy and the focus on integrated deterrence caused some concerns, particularly in Europe, that American attention will be region-specific and some allies might be left behind. Many allies remain confused about what “integrated deterrence” means in practice and are not satisfied with U.S. explanations that European and Asian allies are of “equal importance,” while still referring to China as the long-term “pacing challenge.” Senior DOD officials should clarify this issue to help assure allies. The United States can also ask allies to contribute more to alliance security overall, such as through defense spending and joint activities. Policymakers will have to approach this delicately, however, or risk being perceived as “pressuring” allies to do more as indicative of waning U.S. commitments.
+
+_Revamp and strengthen alliance consultations:_ In the expert workshop, numerous allies indicated that what the United States considers “consultation” is often a one-sided conversation and allies do not always feel like their voices are being heard. A business-as-usual approach to extended deterrence consultations will prove ineffective in virtually all future scenarios. The increasingly complex threat environment will require a much higher level of integration with and among allies. This is particularly true in East Asia, but it also applies to NATO allies who will need to understand how heightened threats from China and North Korea could affect planning and operations in Europe and vice versa. This means that strengthening consultation mechanisms with allies will first and foremost require much more detailed conversations about specific threats, and what specifically alliances intend to deter. To prepare for this, the DOD should develop a long-term road map for revamping U.S. consultation mechanisms and work with the U.S. interagency to take a more holistic approach to reassuring allies, including through regular consultations before policy is set. The road map should also focus on increased cross-alliance activities, such as joint exercising and intelligence sharing.
+
+_Engaging allies with tailored messaging:_ In addition, the DOD can do more to engage with allies in joint wargaming and exercises and by directly involving allies in adaptive U.S. planning. In Europe, this might also entail allies taking on a greater role in alliance strategic planning in NATO, potentially to include more burden sharing. Joint coordination with Asian allies may be more challenging in the absence of a central alliance structure, but the United States should make every effort to take a more inclusive approach.
+
+__Finding:__ Arms control is possible. It could entail informal risk reduction measures or options focused on nonnuclear capabilities. Arms control and risk reduction efforts in the future would not necessarily be unilateral measures by the United States or any of its allies, but rather reciprocal efforts with Russia and/or China.
+
+Arms control and nonproliferation efforts can work hand in hand with extended deterrence. If done effectively, arms control can serve to stabilize competition and assure allies that certain types of dangerous capabilities will not be fielded. The study’s scenarios and workshops indicate that progress on nuclear arms control may be more likely if the contours of geopolitical competition shift slightly away from the nuclear domain. If the United States and its adversaries rely less on nuclear weapons and more on strategic conventional capabilities, allies may support and encourage more direct nuclear arms control efforts by the United States.
+
+__Recommendation:__ While formal arms control treaties and reductions are unlikely in the near future, the DOD and the U.S. interagency should work with U.S. allies to develop new approaches to strategic risk reduction to manage competition with Russia and China. These new approaches can be more flexible than traditional treaty-based arms control, but transparency and verification will still be necessary guiding principles to ensure compliance by all parties. At the same time, the United States should remain open to arms control opportunities when they arise and consult closely with allies about potential cooperation with Moscow or Beijing. If progress is made on arms control efforts, there will inevitably be costs. The United States may need to engage in trade-offs. U.S. adversaries have consistently voiced interest in arms control negotiations on the deployment and development of missile defense and space capabilities. Trade-offs on these capabilities will likely make some allies uneasy. As the United States remains open to arms control opportunities, it is crucial to incorporate allies into discussions and ensure allied buy-in. Allies should be consulted throughout any arms control dialogues, particularly about the design of arms control agreements, to mitigate potential fears of U.S. appeasement and to take into account allies’ escalation concerns.
+
+---
+
+__Heather Williams__ is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Kelsey Hartigan__ is the deputy director of the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) and a senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In this role, she is responsible for managing the country’s preeminent national program for developing the next generation of nuclear experts.
+
+__Joseph Rodgers__ is an associate director and associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also a PhD student in the biodefense program at George Mason University.
+
+__Reja Younis__ is the associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She is also a PhD student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a predoctoral fellow with the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs. At CSIS, she leads research on nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear strategy, and emerging technologies.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-54.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-54.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-54.md
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 54 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-05-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 鍾錦麟作供完畢 控方為第四證人申匿名令獲批
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（8日）踏入審訊第54天。時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟接受辯方盤問，同意戴耀廷望以「35+」要求政府回應「五大訴求」。被問是否並非無論如何都會「一刀切」無差別否決預算案，鍾表示「為了爭取五大訴求而否決預算案」是「比較貼近實際情況」。鍾亦指，估計民主派較難取得「35+」，指2019年區議會民主派大勝純粹因為單議席單票制，難以簡單推斷2020年立法會選舉也能大勝，自言「我個人睇得保守啲」。法官指這只是鍾的看法，而非戴耀廷看法，鍾形容「佢（戴耀廷）係超級大好友」。
+
+此外，鍾上周稱何桂藍於新東會議自介為「立場姐姐」，何兩度大叫「肯定冇」。鍾今再解釋當時戴耀廷介紹何為「立場姐姐」，何語帶無奈表示大家叫她做「立場姐姐」。在被告席的何擺手和做口型示意她沒有。鍾錦麟今作供完畢，法官批准控方為下一名控方證人申請匿名令，他將以「X先生」稱呼，並獲准在屏風後作供及以特別通道出入法庭。
+
+#### 鍾稱民動2月已有共識協助初選眾籌、趙家贀退出前不曾提原因
+
+鍾錦麟繼續接受代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 盤問。鍾同意，於2020年2月與戴耀廷的會面，戴提及民主動力有銀行戶口可協助籌款。被問民動是否於同年5月才正式承辦眾籌，鍾指在2月的會面上已有共識民動可在這方面協助。鍾又同意，趙家賢在6月9日初選記者會後曾表示眾籌進度不理想，找職員草擬 Facebook 帖文宣傳，亦着鍾幫忙轉發，但鍾不清楚帖文由誰所撰，發文前亦沒有細看，「見到入面有關於眾籌嘅詳情我就轉發咗啦」，趙亦沒提過有審批過帖文。此前趙曾就該帖文出現「光復議會」和「對抗暴政」向法官認錯，指帖文由職員所撰，「我冇做好謹慎責任嘅角色。」
+
+Beel 亦展示民主動力執委會2019年10月的會議紀錄，提及趙家賢匯報因民動及戴耀廷受國務院及港澳辦嚴厲譴責，民動為免繼續被打壓而退出協調工作。法官早前曾質疑趙沒有提到民動被「騎劫」，趙指雖文字紀錄沒有，但有向執委會提及。Beel 問，會議紀錄有關民動退出的原因是否準確，鍾稱「喺正式退出之前，趙家賢冇同我提出過」，故未能評論哪個原因較重要或不重要，只能確定上述理由是趙在初選活動中的「重要關注」。鍾亦不記得趙會上有提及其他退出的原因。
+
+
+▲ 左起：趙家賢、程張迎、鍾錦麟（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鍾同意以往議員反對撥款無後果、相信建制媒體報導或影響選舉主任
+
+鍾錦麟在盤問下同意，以往立法會均有議員對撥款條例草案投反對票。Beel 問反對後有否引起迴響（repercussion）？鍾稱「投完個反應唔大嘅」，因他們並非立法會大多數，即使反對撥款條例草案，「本身就冇特別大去影響到政府運作」；而反應較大是視乎審議有否拉布，最大反應一次則是約於2009至2011年間，撥款條例草案正式表決前，臨時撥款被立法會否決。鍾同意，以往議員反對預算案並沒有問題或後果（ramification）。
+
+鍾上周供稱，新東首次會議後曾向戴表達無差別否決預算案或致DQ。他同意因親建制媒體對戴耀廷文章、初選和否決預算案作批評，而他們的報導反映中央政府看法，故當時有此擔心。Beel 續問，鍾是否相信這些文章會對選舉主任產生影響？控方一度指證人未能回答，但法官指是問及他個人的看法，鍾表示同意。
+
+#### 被問是否一刀切無差別否決 鍾稱為爭五大訴求否決「較貼近實際情況」
+
+鍾續同意，「35+計劃」是戴耀廷提出的願景，而戴認為民主派若立會過半，便可向政府就民主派提出的議題包括「五大訴求，缺一不可」施壓。Beel 指五大訴求曾經改變，鍾回應「都喺同一個框架入面」，並同意其中一項訴求是撤回《逃犯條例》，其後已撤回，而特首下台的訴求被爭取雙普選取代。Beel 指，故戴是希望透過「35+」，要求政府回應五大訴求，否則會反對政府議案，尤其是預算案？鍾認同。
+
+Beel 再問，所以當時並非無論如何，都會一刀切無差別否決預算案（not a blanket indiscriminately vote against the budget come what may）？鍾指，「我反而覺得你原先嘅講法，為咗爭取五大訴求而去否決預算案，呢個係比較貼近個實際情況」，又指：「當然我唔能夠講一個平行時空，五大訴求如果得到咩程度嘅回應，而呢個35+選出嚟嘅議員嘅取態又有啲咩唔同，我呢個唔能夠講得到。」陳慶偉問，故是視乎每名初選參與者？鍾指「我只可以講我理解囉」，同意就其他參與者的取態不能回答。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鍾稱對能否獲「35+」較保守 惟指戴耀廷是「超級大好友」
+
+Beel 續問，鍾當時認為民主派是否不可能在2020年9月的立法會換屆選舉取得「35+」，鍾稱「我當時嘅估計係較困難」，指因當時大家是基於區議會「單議席單票制」去評估選情，但據他在2019年區選的經驗，當時反對民主派的票數亦創新高。法官李運騰指他不明白，鍾續解釋表面上民主派當年獲「壓倒性勝利」，純粹因為是單議席單票制，但得票率其實沒有大改變，「所以唔能夠好簡單就去下一個結論，當時嘅立法會選舉亦都一樣民主派會大勝。」
+
+陳慶偉指是因為立法會採取「比例代表制」，鍾同意，並指有功能組別如飲食界，的確在2019年社會事件中生意受到影響，「係咪咁簡單就話2019年嘅選舉結果，就推斷2020年嘅立法會選舉能夠大勝呢？我個人睇得保守啲。」
+
+法官陳仲衡指，這只是鍾的看法，明顯不是戴耀廷的看法。鍾回應「佢（戴耀廷）係超級大好友」（即指戴對此很樂觀），林卓廷等被告發笑，鍾並指沒有向戴表達過其較保守或悲觀的看法。李運騰問，那新東首次會議上有沒有與會者關注「35+」成功的機會？鍾指沒有，因新界東在2016年立會換屆選舉已取得6席，「喺新界東攞返6席本身就唔係太難嘅」，他擔心的是其他區或功能組別，同意即使地方選區取得23席，功能組別仍需13席才能過半。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鍾指不知悉初選後有計劃協調民主派行動
+
+Beel 續問，由於功能組別要考慮生意利益，故相信所有功能組別議員都會否決預算案是「不切實際」的？鍾答「我冇考慮過呢個問題」，但認同據其區議會經驗，成員間有很多內鬥（in-house fighting）。
+
+Beel 問，那鍾是否知道當時有沒有計劃或制度在初選之後，會就勝出的參選人作協調，統一他們投票？鍾指過往立法會民主派議員有「飯盒會」，其後正名為「民主派會議」，「但我唔肯定如果2020年嘅立法會選舉都係咁樣去選出一班民主派議員嘅話，呢個飯盒會仲會唔會運作到。」李運騰指不是問以往，而是問有沒有將來的計劃，鍾表示不知悉。
+
+#### 鍾稱戴耀廷介紹何桂藍為「立場姐姐」 何語帶無奈指大家叫她做「立場姐姐」
+
+鍾錦麟上周五指何桂藍於4月14日的新東首次會議自我介紹為「立場姐姐」，何兩度大叫「肯定冇！」。Beel 今向鍾指出，鍾可能聽過別人稱她為「立場姐姐」，但何當天會上並沒有這樣介紹自己。此時何背靠牆雙手捧起文件微笑。
+
+鍾回應：「我嘗試記返當時嘅對話係點樣啦，戴耀廷介紹何桂藍係『立場姐姐』，之後何桂藍稱呼自己做何桂藍，跟住佢語帶無奈話即係大家叫我做『立場姐姐』」，何一度掩面發笑，並擺手搖頭，頻做口型指她並沒有。法官陳仲衡指，此問題無助辯方案情，Beel 表示明白，但指其當事人對此有強烈感受（strong feeling），法官陳慶偉表示明白。
+
+
+▲ 何桂藍（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鍾稱首次新東會議就舉行初選及目標議席「6+1」達共識 惟無進行投票
+
+鍾同意，首次新東會議就進行初選有共識。Beel 問如何得悉有共識，鍾指經討論後，所有原本提倡「棄選」方案的參與者也接受了「初選」方案，故認為已達成共識，並指戴耀廷應有講過一次「大家係有共識用初選方案」，但不太肯定，而會上並沒有就此進行投票。
+
+鍾亦供稱，會上就目標議席達成共識，指隨着決定用初選方案，亦決定會選出多少人去報名參加正式選舉，共識就是「6+1」，但同樣沒進行投票。Beel 問他肯定不是稍後再決定？鍾指「我理解係拍咗板㗎啦」，並指早前稱向戴就新東文件初稿提出異議，正是就「6+1」的問題。
+
+鍾續指，「如果法庭好關心呢個問題呢，我可以提供多一項資料提供畀法庭去參考嘅」，指初選完結後、正式選舉報名前，新東參選人曾爭拗新東目標議席究竟是6還是7，而最後戴指「6同埋7都唔係正確嘅講法，正確嘅講法係6+1，即係7隊人會去報名，但係最後一隊要係選情要比預期順利先至開展選舉工程」。鍾指，戴是透過 WhatsApp 提及上述說法，而當時新東排第7的是范國威。
+
+#### 鍾稱沒印象會上有港獨、破壞一國兩制言論
+
+鍾同意，無論共識如何，都是由戴耀廷的想法所帶動（driven by what Benny Tai wanted）；而鍾對DQ的問題較敏感，認為港獨、破壞一國兩制等言論均可能引致DQ，但沒印象會上曾聽過相關發言。Beel 表示已完成盤問。
+
+陳慶偉其後指，知道協調會議達成4項共識，除舉行初選和目標議席數量外，還有替補機制和舉行選舉論壇，問會上是否沒有就此投票。鍾同意，指就替補機制和選舉論壇的共識，「我形容係冇爭議嘅」，並補充會上的確有人對自己能否成功「入閘」較悲觀，但對替補機制無爭議。
+
+#### 會議紀錄顯示柯耀林新東第二次會議當晚正開區議會會議
+
+代表柯耀林的大律師唐樂山其後就柯出席新東會議的情況發問。鍾上周供稱，因西貢區議會超時而缺席5月5日的新東第二次協調會議，鍾確認柯同屬西貢區議員。辯方展示當天的西貢區議會會議紀錄，顯示鍾於上午9時30分出席，下午10時40分離席，鍾確認；紀錄亦顯示柯耀林於上午9時33分出席，下午10時40分離席，鍾稱沒有獨立記憶，只記得柯有出席會議，但不記得其離席時間和是否有全程出席，但同意不會質疑會議紀錄的真實性。他亦不記得柯耀林有否出席首次新東會議。
+
+
+▲ 柯耀林
+
+至於陳志全、鄒家成、和李予信均沒有盤問，控方亦沒有覆問。鍾完成作供，離開時一度望向旁聽席。
+
+#### 控方為證人申請匿名令獲批 指證人擔心遭受網絡欺凌
+
+控方早前欲就其中一名控方證人申請匿名令，今表示辯方沒反對，但有部分被告就匿名令範圍提出修訂。代表李予信的大律師關文渭表示，望匿名令不適用於在公共領域（public domain）而非於庭上獲得的資料。法官質疑若批准申請，會有違匿名令想進一步保護證人的原意。關則回應，相關資料在公共領域已存在，不認為法庭能阻止資訊進一步傳播，法庭只能限制庭上的資料。
+
+法官陳慶偉指，望保護證人被有不可告人動機（ulterior motive）的人騷擾或威嚇；法官李運騰亦指，證人擔心披露他在庭上作供或遭受網絡欺凌，認為法庭要處理其關注，並在公平審訊和保護證人之間取得平衡。
+
+法官陳慶偉終表示，考慮到關大狀的修訂會令整個匿名令失去保護證人的原意，故拒絕其申請，並批准證人的匿名令，下令各方以「X先生」稱呼他，並禁止任何人包括被告、法律代表和傳媒，披露任何可令公眾識別其身分的資料，如名字、相片、出生日期等；證人獲准在屏風後作供，及經特別通道出入法庭。陳另指任何人若違反命令，有機會犯藐視法庭，可被判監或罰款。
+
+據庭上作供次序，「X先生」是繼區諾軒、趙家賢和鍾錦麟後的第四名控方證人。據了解，早前第四名從犯證人林景楠將不會出庭作供。
+
+#### 控方讀出3被告修訂同意事實
+
+控方其後讀出林卓廷和黃碧雲，以及何桂藍的修訂同意事實。三人早前的同意事實均較其餘13名被告為少，其中林卓廷和黃碧雲僅同意與他們本人相關的事實，何桂藍則不包括戴耀廷的相關證物、抗爭派記者會等。
+
+林卓廷和黃碧雲的修訂同意事實，新增部分其他被告早前同意的事項，包括戴耀廷和吳政亨的文章和片段、趙家賢被搜得的手機資料和民主動力相關文件、各被告發布「墨落無悔」的帖文及其他競選帖文和影片、其他被告的提名表格和按金收據、抗爭派記者會等。
+
+至於何桂藍的修訂同意事實，則新增時任新界東地區直選選舉主任楊蕙心向何桂藍發信，要求就其問題提供書面回覆，何在回覆後，於2020年7月31日被通知提名無效。
+
+案件押至明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-55.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-55.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f2985355
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-55.md
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 55 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-05-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方匿名證人稱「公開」錄音新西會議 惟不知與會者是否知悉 庭上爆笑
+- 匿名證人曾任建制派議助 否認獲指示及收報酬拍攝
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（9日）踏入審訊第55天。控方匿名證人「X先生」今在屏風後作供，表示曾與戴耀廷討論「35+計劃」目的，戴私下及公開均曾提及望迫特首下台。X並指，於2020年5月8日獲邀出席新界西協調會議，過程中以器材錄音及錄影，並於《國安法》實施後的同年9、10月匿名將檔案寄給警方。被問是否公開錄音，X答「係」，但指他將錄音筆放在袋裏，不清楚與會者是否知情，又指「現場係冇人提過係唔畀錄音呢樣嘢」；至於錄影，他指自己「全程都（將攝影器材）攞喺手度，有擺枱面，之後都有周圍影」。
+
+被問為何錄音錄影，X否認是為了向警方舉報，並指因戴耀廷曾提及望以「35+」推翻政府，故望「了解吓」、「記錄返畀自己睇吓」、用作「研究」，指是直至《國安法》立法後才決定將檔案交予警方；而他匿名舉報，是想幫警方調查，但「唔想自己身分曝光咁麻煩」。庭上播放X拍攝的片段，戴曾稱新界東共同綱領字眼是「會運用」否決權，認為新界西可採用相同字眼。
+
+#### 施德來確診獲安排於無人法庭就坐 官稱除「寂寞」外不會造成不公
+
+同案認罪被告、時任民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟昨完成作供，控方為下一名證人申請匿名令獲批，該名證人以「X先生」稱呼，獲准在屏風後作供及循特別通道出入法庭。
+
+甫開庭，代表施德來的大律師黃廷光便表示，施今早快速測試陽性，他已預約今晚看醫生，並獲安排坐在被告欄最左一側，與其他被告相隔，暫不會申請押後。所有被告今均配戴口罩，林卓廷入庭後除下口罩，撓手聳肩。法官陳慶偉提議，施德來可與律師到無人的一號延伸庭就坐，陳仲衡亦指除了寂寞外他的當事人不會蒙受不公，林卓廷笑着重複「loneliness，loneliness」。法庭其後小休讓施轉往另一法庭。
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片：施德來（左）
+
+#### 「X先生」稱戴2019年區選後不同場合提「35+」目的令特首下台
+
+控方其後傳召「X先生」作供，X於開庭前已到場，被屏風包圍，鄒家成一度問：「吓，喺度㗎啦？」，又雙手作望遠鏡狀。X同意，他沒有政治聯繫，而他早於2020年5月前已認識戴耀廷，並曾與戴討論「35+計劃」的目的，指戴在不同公開場合或私下均向他表示望得到立法會過半後否決財政預算案兩次，癱瘓政府和迫特首下台。X指，不記得戴第一次提及的確實時間，但有印象戴在2019年11月區選後「好有信心」並常提及，並在法官追問下指應是在2019年聖誕和2020年農曆新年之間。
+
+至於是什麼場合首次提及，X先生指「都係啲飯局嚟嘅，喺唔同嘅飯局，唔同嘅人，基本上都係啲泛民」。他指不記得誰安排飯局，而飯局上主要邀請「嗰啲泛民嗰啲人士」，戴耀廷經常分享「35+」的概念。
+
+#### X於新西會議錄音錄影 2020年9、10月匿名將檔案寄警方
+
+X供稱，獲人民力量梁家聲邀請出席2020年5月8日的新界西協調會議，他約於2017、18年認識梁，記得梁提過有興趣參加新界西選舉。X指，他和梁當日出席會議，他有留到最後，期間分別用一支錄音筆和「一個細細個嘅攝錄器材」進行錄音和錄影，並在法官追問下指該器材並非電話，但大小與電話差不多，並可將檔案「直接過返電腦」。
+
+X指，當晚有打開聲音和影片檔案，並在《國安法》實行之後的同年9、10月匿名向警方報案，並將檔案燒成一隻光碟寄給警方，包括2段錄音檔案和11段影片。
+
+#### X稱「公開錄音」惟不知其他人是否知悉 被告席爆笑
+
+X供稱，會議於元朗世宙地下的一個區議員辦事處舉行，有數十人出席，辦事處約有三分一個法庭大，有桌子放中間，與會者圍着桌子隨便坐，「我入到去都係隨便搵個位坐。」被問他是否坐近桌子，X指「算係近啦，可以擺到（錄影機）嘅」，控方再問他是否將攝影機放在桌子，X答「有時有，有時揸喺手」。
+
+法官李運騰關注，需否知道片段是公開抑或隱蔽攝錄，羅天瑋指重點應在片段的內容，但李指「我想知道，你會問嗎？」，羅續指他會就此跟進，並問X錄音是否公開進行，X答「係」。李運騰問，因此所有與會者都知道他進行錄音？X指「我就唔知係咪佢哋知道，我就咁擺喺個袋度」，被告席隨即爆發笑聲。
+
+
+▲ 署理助理刑事檢控專員（特別職務） 羅天瑋（右）
+
+李運騰再問，那X是否公開錄音，指「公開」的意思是他沒有嘗試隱瞞錄音的行為，他讓其他人知道他在做記錄，X回應「我記得現場係冇人提過係唔畀錄音呢樣嘢」。李再問，那其他人知道X當時在錄音嗎？X答：「我唔清楚」，林卓廷大聲冷笑。法官陳仲衡問那他有沒有告訴其他人？X答「冇」。李運騰再問，那其他與會者知道他在錄影嗎？X答：「我就唔知佢哋知唔知，不過我全程都攞喺手度、有擺枱面，之後都有周圍影嘅」，林卓廷和鄒家成等發笑，鄒一度舉起雙手模仿攝影機。
+
+#### X認選擇不同器材錄音錄影是經深思熟慮
+
+李運騰問，X為何要分別錄音和錄影，為何不只用手機拍攝有聲效的影片。X指因手機若收到訊息有機會暫停錄影，「同埋我唔想將敏感嘅資訊放喺我個人手機。」李問，因此X分開兩個儀器，是刻意（deliberate and conscious）的選擇，他是經過深思熟慮（thought it through）？X答：「係，當時我買嗰兩樣嘢就係為咗清楚睇返，有影像同聲音加深我嘅了解同記憶。」X同意，拍攝的片段也有聲音，李指那他也不需要另外錄音？惟X指「大家都知有時錄影同錄音嘅效果係唔同，錄音筆係會清晰好多」。
+
+#### X不同意記錄為報案 指只用來研究、了解戴耀廷稱搞35+想「推翻政府」
+
+李運騰續指，控方尚未問X為何進行錄音錄影，指若他不發問，相信辯方也會問。羅天瑋指將會問到，並問X為何錄音錄影。X解釋，因戴在5月8日前於不同場合向他提過望以「35+」推翻政府，而梁家聲（人民力量成員）於5月初邀請他出席會議，「咁我覺得：如果直程討論35+嗰個會，係咪有機會可以做個記錄？所以我就去買咗攝錄器材，等自己有機會記錄返比自己睇吓。」
+
+法官陳仲衡問，他想透過該些記錄做什麼？X答：「因為了解吓佢提過話搞呢個35+就想推翻政府啊嘛。」李運騰問，所以他出席會議並進行記錄的目的，是為了之後可以以他們來向警方報案？X指只同意前半的描述：「我係自己愛嚟研究，但唔認同係諗住嚟畀警方嘅。」
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+#### X稱匿名舉報因想幫警方調查 惟不想身分曝光
+
+羅天瑋續問，戴此前就「35+」目的的描述，哪部分引起他的關注？X指，戴稱要控制初選人數入立法會，並可透過控制立法會，否決財政預算案，迫特首下台，「咁我就覺得應該就好有問題囉，就唔係為社區做嘢囉。」
+
+李運騰續指，《國安法》於2020年7月1日才生效，而X自5月已有該些記錄，更曾出席會議知道與會者的發言，但他直至9、10月才向警方報案，為什麼？X指因他是在《國安法》立法後，才決定將檔案寄給警方。羅續問，X為何選擇匿名舉報，X指：「因為呢段嘢畀警方係想幫警方調查，唔想自己身分曝光咁麻煩。」
+
+#### 控方播新西片段鏡動晃動置枱底 戴耀廷提議新西協議跟隨新東用「會運用」
+
+控方續指，X拍攝的片段全長兩小時，但不會全部於庭上播放，只會播放其中6分鐘的片段，並展示錄音謄本予X確認，惟法官李運騰一度要求關閉螢幕，指顯示了證人的名字，被告席傳出笑聲。
+
+控方其後播放數段片段，戴提及已完成了四區的協調，只餘下新西和超級區議會，並指各區除「五大訴求，缺一不可」外，共同綱領亦有「會運用」或「會積極運用」否決權，其中除新東用「會運用」，其他區都用「會積極運用」。庭上可見攝錄鏡頭不斷晃動，一時置於枱底，一時拍天花板，亦曾傾斜和反轉。X認出片中的戴耀廷和黃偉賢，二人均坐在拍片者的對面。
+
+片段又顯示，戴提議新界西文件「就用返新界東嗰個字眼，改動最少㗎嘞，就只係剔除咗『積極』兩個字啫，就係『會運用』咁樣」，即明確意向是「會運用」，「我哋就簡簡單單就表達咗我哋立場。」他又提及否決財政預算案是令解散立法會出現「最緊要」一步，「如果否決財政預算案呢，我哋先至會行到去下一步」，望協議能訂明「會運用《基本法》賦予立法會的權力」否決財政預算案達到「五大訴求」，以爭取「特赦、懲戒警暴同埋重啟政改」。播放片段時，鄒家成一度雙手掩面，搖頭苦笑。控方其後表示已完成主問。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（9日）踏入審訊第55天。供稱於新西協調會議錄音和錄影、《國安法》生效後交予警方的控方匿名證人「X先生」接受辯方盤問，同意沒有問准與會者便進行拍攝，但不覺得是侵犯他人私隱，自言「我就冇話唔想畀人知」、亦「唔係所謂秘密（拍攝）」，指當時「我係好光明正大咁揸住部機周圍影」。被問是否民主派支持者，X指「我有時支持、有時唔支持，我點答呢咁？」，並承認初選舉行數年前，曾任建制派政黨的議員助理，但否認有第三方要求他錄影新西會議、亦否認提供資料有收取報酬，強調記錄是「純粹諗住畀我自己去了解」戴耀廷的計劃有否違法。
+
+X又同意，於2021年4月和5月錄取的首兩份供詞均「唔敢講、唔敢認」自己是攝錄並交新西會議片段予警方的人，但因今年年初知悉身分曝光，遂於本年2月底錄取口供時告知警方。被問未來會否因此獲得報償，X稱：「政府會唔會畀個好市民獎我，我唔知喎。」
+
+#### 稱戴耀廷提及「推翻政府」 X盤問下指是對戴說法的理解
+
+控方匿名證人「X先生」今早供稱，獲人民力量梁家聲邀請出席新西協調會議，期間進行錄音及錄影，並於2020年9、10月匿名將檔案交給警方，解釋望記錄作「研究」。X完成主問後，接受代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的大律師黃宇逸盤問，同意他並非「35+計劃」的組織者和參與者，而他稱戴曾在不同場合提及「35+」目的時，並不記得趙家賢、區諾軒和鍾錦麟在場。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻（資料圖片）
+
+X在主問供稱，戴耀廷在5月8日前向他提過望以「35+」推翻政府。代表何啟明的大律師阮偉明指，X在2021年4月29日和5月4日的第一和第二份供詞均沒有如此提及，X指「如果你話口供有寫嘅字眼，可能當時冇提到啦」。阮續指，戴其實沒有提過「推翻政府」，X回應，戴在「咁多次傾偈」均提到迫特首下台，「我嘅理解就係覺得迫特首落台就係推翻政府。」
+
+
+▲ 何啟明（資料圖片）
+
+#### X同意首兩次錄口供沒告知警方
+
+其後由代表林卓廷和黃碧雲的大律師沈士文盤問。X同意，兩次供詞都是警方主動聯絡他錄取，他願向警方講述事件，但沒告知警方他曾寄出新西會議的錄音和片段。沈續指，第二次錄口供時，警方曾向X播放該兩段錄音及11段片段，播畢後X沒告知警方自己就是攝錄者，並稱相信片段是有關他有出席的5月8日會議情況，而錄音令他記起會上情況也反映會上內容。X確認。
+
+#### X同意片段晃動 解釋「我唔係一個專業嘅攝錄人士」
+
+X同意，片段顯示兩名主持戴耀廷和時任元朗區議會主席黃偉賢均坐在一張枱前，與會者則在枱對面，而片段有時拍天花板、有時拍枱底，而且「郁來郁去（shaky）」。沈續指，片段亦「非常不穩定」，X答「我唔知係咪穩定，因為我係揸住喺手度，我當時冇話特意影邊個或者點樣影，純粹諗住做個記錄」，其後同意片段大部分時間鏡頭也晃動。
+
+沈續指，X稱望拍片以進行「研究」，他不想片段穩定地拍攝嗎？X答：「我係想希望（穩定），但我唔係一個專業嘅攝錄人士」。李運騰問，X是否不想其他人知道他在錄影？X答：「我就冇話唔想畀人知，當時我攞住部機機，我覺得都算係相對大方啦，就周圍影，擺枱面。」林卓廷面露驚訝，張開嘴巴發出「吓」聲，鄒家成等亦發笑。
+
+#### X同意沒問准拍攝 官問是否不想人知 X自言「相對大方」
+
+沈再問X是否想片段穩定，X指沒留意是否穩定，僅指他將攝錄器材「揸住喺手度」。沈指當然知道，第三度問他是否想片段穩定？X再答：「我當然係希望想穩定啦，但我冇咁嘅技術去做啊嘛。」沈續問，整個會議期間，X是否沒問組織者或與會者的准許拍攝他們，X指「當時我冇問過，但現場都冇人講呢個唔可以拍攝，現場都有好多人攞住部電話周圍」。李運騰着他直接回答問題，X續答「冇」。
+
+#### X稱錄影後重複看兩三次了解戴耀廷有否違法 上網找尋法律但「搵唔到」
+
+就X稱記錄會議內容是為了「研究」，沈士文問，那自5月8日會議至他於9、10月將檔案交警方前，他為這個「研究」做了什麼？X指「我有重複聽同埋睇嗰啲片同錄音啦」，指「應該起碼睇過兩三次」。李運騰問X指的「研究」是什麼意思，X指戴當時提及否決預算案迫特首落台，故想「了解清楚佢（戴耀廷）咁樣做會唔會有問題」。
+
+李運騰續問，除了重複聽和看錄音和錄影，X還做了什麼去了解，X指他並非法律人士，「我就想了解例如睇吓啲法律呀，搵吓啲唔識嘅嘢」，並指當時有政府人士稱初選或違法，他覺得可能真的有問題，加上《國安法》通過，就決定將片段寄出。李指X只是逃避問題、重複所說的話，又指問題簡單，就是X還做了什麼「研究」。X重申有上網找尋相關法律，「但係就唔識呢啲嘢，就搵唔到。」李續向沈指，根據證人回答的方式，不認為能繼續問到什麼。
+
+X續同意，他沒有修讀過政治或法律的課程。沈問，那當他稱為了「研究」而記錄會議時，他是要進行任何有關香港政治狀況的研究嗎？X答：「冇，純粹諗住畀我自己去了解吓啫。」
+
+#### 供詞稱2020年初買器材望日後研究 X否認當時未知新西會議日期
+
+X在盤問下同意，戴耀廷2019年尾至2020年初首次向他提及「35+」時，他已懷疑可能違法。沈問因此在2020年初，他已購買錄音和錄影的器材？X指「應該就唔係」。沈續展示X於2023年2月21日，即案件開審後第三周所錄取的第3份供詞，交代涉案的11段片段及兩段錄音均是由他在5月8日新西會議拍攝及錄音，並指2020年初得知戴望透過民主派初選，在立法會否決財政預算案，最終令特首下台，「所以當時我懷疑今次民主派初選係可能會觸犯法例，於是我就喺2020年初就買咗一啲錄影錄音嘅器材，希望第日有機會錄低有關搞初選嘅嘢嚟畀自己研究。」
+
+沈問，X是指自己於2020年初買器材？X答「可以咁講」，並在法官追問下指肯定是在5月會議之前，但確實日期不記得。沈問，X買器材時是否尚未定下新西會議日期，惟X指當時已知道，並由梁家聲邀請出席。沈指若事實如此，則他會向警方表明他是為了記錄新西會議而買器材。X解釋當時這樣說是因為就當天會議，「可以有機會去，可以有機會唔去」，不同意辯方指他買器材時並不知道將有新西會議。
+
+沈指，X是指當他懷疑「35+」犯法、並希望記錄作研究時，梁家聲「純粹巧合（pure coincidence）」地邀請他出席新西會議？X答：「係」，並指對被邀請「冇話高唔高興」。
+
+#### X稱沒告知梁家聲攝錄會議 因不了解初選有否違法
+
+沈士文續問，X打算攝錄會議作「研究」，有否告訴他的「朋友」梁家聲，X指：「唔認為需要，點解要同佢講？」李運騰問，他不擔心梁無意中參與有問題的討論？X指他認為可能有問題，但不是完全了解。李續問事實上梁是否X的朋友，X指與梁在2017、2018年在地區認識，平時地區活動有交流，可說是「認識嘅人（acquaintance）」，平時「有出嚟食吓飯傾吓偈」。
+
+陳仲衡指，問題其實是以X與梁的關係，他會否就懷疑犯法的事警告梁？X重申因為不肯定有否犯法，故沒有告訴他。沈最後再問X當時是否視梁為朋友，李運騰補充朋友的意思是他會關心的人，X說：「咁呀......只可以話唔算囉。」
+
+被問梁邀請X出席時，是否知道X無興趣參選，X表示「我由頭到尾都冇講話我有興趣，係佢話佢有興趣，邀請我跟去聽吓」，而他會前已估計和懷疑計劃違法。沈再次問，即使如此，他也沒告知梁他認為初選可能違法？X指「咁我都唔會將我懷疑、都唔確定嘅嘢同人講㗎嘛」，並在法官追問下答「冇」。
+
+#### X指「有時支持、有時唔支持」民主派 曾任建制派議員議助
+
+沈其後問到X的政治立場，問他在新西會議舉行時是否視自己為泛民主派的支持者。X指「我唔認為我係支持有任何派別嘅」，因他從無參與任何政黨，並在沈追問下指，「如果一定話係咪支持民主派，咁我有時支持、有時唔支持，我點答呢咁？」
+
+李運騰指，有趣的是他有出席一些泛民人士的飯局，問他是否也有出席建制派飯局，X指「基本上我唔會話特別係支持泛民或者建制」，只是想做地區工作，鄒家成、余慧明等發笑。沈其後問及X此前的工作背景，陳慶偉質疑不相關和不重要，沈指他是在建立案情。X其後同意，於案發數年前曾任建制派政黨的議員助理一段時間，並自行辭職，認識建制派之餘也「識到好多你所謂嘅『民主派』」。
+
+沈欲繼續就相關背景發問，惟陳慶偉質疑與案無關。沈重申欲質疑證人可信性，指其政治聯繫會影響他供稱錄影新西會議原因的可信性，又指X不僅將所拍攝的片段呈堂，亦有就戴耀廷的說法作供，故就此發問。惟陳慶偉指，除了指戴提過「推翻政府」外，X其他有關戴的證供，法庭已有其他證據；李運騰亦指，他理解X的角色只是協助將證物呈堂。
+
+#### X稱不覺得未經批准錄影是侵犯他人私隱
+
+沈士文在休庭後，表示已完成盤問。代表施德來的大律師黃廷光續問，X是否認為沒有得到他人許可下錄影是侵犯他們的私隱？X答：「唔覺得。」黃再向X指出，他錄影是為了「研究」以外的目的，惟法官指已問過。
+
+#### X否認有第三方要求攝錄新西會議、指器材去年已「壞咗，抌咗」
+
+其後到代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 盤問。被問與戴耀廷曾出席多少次飯局，X指不確定，大概約數個，約一至兩個月舉行一次，「主要都係傾吓分享吓當時嗰個政治」，但他沒被要求分享。Beel 問那他為何在場？X指「咁有啲朋友邀請我去」，但不記得是誰，也不記得除戴耀廷以外出席的人士，僅稱「主要係圍繞住一啲泛民主派嘅人士」。Beel 問，這些飯局是否只是他的幻想？X答：「點解要幻想，呢個係事實嚟㗎喎。」
+
+就2021年4月的首份口供，被問是什麼情況下錄取，X指是「警方突然上我屋企」，指「有單案件需要我協助調查」，而警方事前沒聯絡他。Beel 續問，是否有第三方要求他攝錄新西會議？X指沒有，同意他是自主行事。
+
+Beel 又問及該兩個攝錄器材現時去向，X指「壞咗，抌咗」，余慧明驚訝做口型「嘩」。X在追問下指於2022年丟棄，不記得確實日子，又指曾於一些活動用過，「就覺得係有問題、唔用得，所以就抌咗。」Beel 問為何想記錄活動，X指「既然我買咗個筆就無謂嘥咗」，林卓廷大笑。
+
+#### X稱相信第二次會議內容差不多 故沒有再攝錄
+
+Beel 續指，X有出席新界西5月於旺角的第二次會議，X先指不太記得、但肯定沒有，後在法官追問下又指印象中5月8日後有出席另一個會議，內容大概都與初選有關，「但確實係咪新界西，我就唔肯定啦，因為冇記錄」，林卓廷說「吓」。Beel 指，X口供曾提及該次會議與會者與5月8日差不多，但多了區諾軒，X指「嗰陣時份口供可能係咁寫」。
+
+李運騰續問，該會議與初選有關，X當時是否有興趣繼續做他的「研究」？X指當時錄了第一次，「之後睇返個畫面係好唔穩定，自己都頭暈，講真」，李指那無阻他錄音，X指「咁既然第一次錄咗，我相信內容都差唔多」，故沒有錄多次，同意沒有錄第二次是他自主的決定。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel（資料圖片）
+
+#### X稱檢視片段後認為戴有機會違法 仍出席第二次會議因「諗住聽清楚」
+
+就X的攝錄器材，他同意沒有螢幕，需傳送到電腦才能觀看。Beel 問是否不像相機，X答：「我覺得似啦，因為有鏡頭、有開關，點解唔似呢？」，並指是如手機的大小。Beel 問，該攝錄機是否偽裝（disguise）成其他東西的間諜器材，惟李運騰質疑是否需要。Beel 續問，X當時買了兩個器材分別錄音和錄影，是否想在其中一個不能用時，還有另一個備份。X重申錄音筆效果比錄影好，而購買時售貨員亦指錄音筆的錄音效果較好。
+
+被問首次會議是否知道正錄取敏感的資料，並相信有罪行將發生，X指「我都講咗我係懷疑囉」，「我唔係一個法律專業人士，我都係估計啫」，並確認會議翌日曾檢視錄取內容。被問當時是否認為有刑事成分，他指「我都係唔了解、唔認識，所以先諗住睇多幾次、聽多幾次了解吓」，而檢視過後，就覺得「可能佢（戴耀廷）咁搞就有機會違反法律」。
+
+李運騰問既然如此，為何仍出席第二次會議？X重申當時懷疑犯法，故「諗住聽清楚」，而第二次會後「結論都係懷疑、估計（犯法）」。Beel 問既然有此懷疑，為何不立即將檔案發給警方，X指因戴耀廷指自己是「法律專家」，當時指不會違法；而他其後再發給警方，是因《國安法》通過，「有好多啲官話呢樣嘢係違法呀嘛。」Beel 問是什麼違法，X答：「初選。」
+
+#### X指今年年初被曝光才告知警方他是攝錄者、稱「光明正大揸住部機周圍影」
+
+Beel 續問，X向警方報案時是否知道警方正進行調查，X指他不知道，「不過我估佢應該有（調查）啩，見通過咗個法律。」X同意，在首兩次錄口供時他都「唔敢講、唔敢認」他是拍攝並向警方發送片段的人，他是在今年年初，「我上網見到我畀人曝光出嚟」，才告知警方。
+
+Beel 續指，X是秘密地攝錄會議，不想被其他人得知，X答：「頭先我都講過我唔係所謂秘密，我係好光明正大咁揸住部機周圍影。」Beel 最後問，X提供資料有否報酬，X指沒有，Beel 追問那他未來會否有報償（reward），傳譯主任譯為「獎項」，X回應：「政府會唔會畀個好市民獎我，我唔知喎」，多名被告發笑。Beel 笑說或者不會，並指沒有盤問。
+
+吳政亨、余慧明、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、劉偉聰、陳志全、鄒家成和李予信也沒有盤問，控方沒有覆問。控方最後為X申請證人費，陳仲衡指這並非酬勞，李運騰並解釋任何市民出庭作證人可得到證人費。
+
+控方表示，下一名證人是因應何桂藍要求而傳召的選舉主任。案件明早續。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-56.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-56.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a2068df5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-56.md
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 56 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-05-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 施德來及律師確診 申請押後審訊一天獲批
+- 繼施德來後彭卓棋亦確診 押下周一續審
+
+
+
+
+▲ 施德來、其律師廖成利
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（10日）踏入審訊第56天。施德來昨快測陽性，獲安排於延伸庭就坐，其代表大律師黃廷光今指施昨晚確診，獲批4天病假，他今有到庭，惟望押後一天審訊作休息，獲法官批准，辯方指施的事務律師同樣呈陽性。法官關注審訊進度，指控方案情似乎將完結。控方確認已傳召所有主要證人，並將應何桂藍和陳志全要求傳召一名選舉主任，及約10名與證物鏈相關的警察證人，另傳召兩至三名證人讓辯方盤問，法官着控辯雙方善用時間商討能否減省證人數量。傍晚司法機構網頁顯示，案件明天未安排審訊，將繼續休庭。
+
+#### 施德來確診獲批4天病假 申押後一天審訊
+
+施德來昨早快速測試陽性，獲安排與事務律師到一號延伸庭就坐。代表施的大律師黃廷光今甫開庭便表示，施昨晚求診後確診新冠肺炎，獲批出4天病假。施今晨仍有到庭，惟希望押後一天審訊，以好好休息和康復。他知道情況不理想，會交由法庭決定。
+
+主控萬德豪表示，控方打算應何桂藍和陳志全要求傳召時任新界東選舉主任楊蕙心（Amy Yeung），其證供亦只與兩名被告有關。惟法官李運騰指，問題是他們能否在被告的缺席下繼續審訊，形容是困難的決定，又指在非常例外的情況才能這樣做，這亦不安全。法官陳慶偉指，只是一天的押後，他們亦沒有什麼選擇。
+
+#### 控方指將傳召約10名證物鏈相關證人 官着雙方善用今天時間商討
+
+李運騰續關注案件進度，指似乎控方案情將要完結。萬德豪指，在楊蕙心後尚會傳召多10至11名與何桂藍及吳政亨的證物鏈有關的警察證人，指是有關尚未納入同意事實的證物，此後尚會傳召兩至三名證人讓辯方盤問。
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 表示，預計該些證人所需時間非常短，他亦只關注檢取證物的過程，而非之後如何處理證物。李運騰問是否需要10個或以上證人，Beel 指會於早上與控方商討，李着雙方善用今天的時間，Beel 表示明白，指主要關注戴耀廷的證物及從被告檢取的證物，而非移送證物的過程。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel（資料圖片）
+
+#### 控方確認已傳召所有主要證人
+
+李運騰續問，控方是否已傳召本案所有主要證人，萬德豪確認。李續指，辯方是時候要與當事人商討是否要傳召證人或作供，又重申他對案件的進度有點關注。Beel 指知道控方就 Facebook 和 YouTube 等有專家證人，萬回應控方不打算傳召專家證人。李再指，辯方亦要就是否提出無須答辯索指示，Beel 補充指還有「共謀者原則」的陳詞。
+
+陳慶偉最後指，批准案件押後至明天早上，並向黃廷光指，若施德來明天仍不適，需於日內告知法庭。黃表示，施的事務律師昨晚亦呈陽性，李運騰即說「那你一定要保重（“Then you must take care.”）」。審訊約10分鐘結束，散庭時坐在後排的大律師沈士文笑着拿出消毒噴霧四周噴了數下。
+
+傍晚司法機構網頁顯示，案件明天未安排審訊，將繼續休庭。
+
+
+
+（週四 2023-05-11）
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪受審，自周三（10日）起因有被告不適而押後。繼施德來周二（9日）晚確診新冠病毒，法官昨（10日）批准押後審訊；同案獲保釋被告黃碧雲今（11日）表示收到法庭通知，另一被告彭卓棋今亦確診，案件明繼續休庭，暫押至下周一（15日）續審。控方早前確認，本案主要證人已作供完畢，將應辯方要求傳召選舉主任及證物鏈相關警員。
+
+黃碧雲今午（11日）約5時於 Facebook 發文表示，剛收到法庭通知，除施德來外，彭卓棋今亦確診，法庭宣佈星期五（12日）休庭。黃指，法庭內有百多人，空氣不流通，容易令疾病傳開，望能改善庭內換氣和通風系統。據記者觀察，彭卓棋開審以來均坐在施德來的旁邊。
+
+施德來周二（9日）早上新冠病毒快測陽性，原獲安排坐被告欄一角，與其他被告相隔，開庭後獲安排於延伸庭就坐，各被告亦有配戴口罩。其代表大律師黃廷光周三（10日）指施於周二晚求醫並確診新冠病毒，獲批4天病假，向法官申請押後審訊一天獲批，施的事務律師亦確診。法官着施若仍感不適，需及時通知法庭，案件今繼續休庭。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-11-insulate-curtail-compete.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-11-insulate-curtail-compete.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cfa9f229
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-11-insulate-curtail-compete.md
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Insulate, Curtail, Compete
+author: Ryan C. Berg
+date : 2023-05-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/VJ8Utcm.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Sketching a U.S. Grand Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The U.S. urgently needs a more effective, evidence-based, feasible, and holistic strategy for countering China in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)._ _This is especially true as China doubles down on potent sources of economic and political leverage and coercion in a region still characterized by fragile democratic institutions. In sketching the outline of a U.S. grand strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean, this report provides a framework within which to answer critical questions that remain unanswered in U.S. policymaking circles: which level of Chinese engagement the United States should permit versus what it should seek to curtail, as well as the necessarily circumscribed areas where U.S. competition should be resource-backed, well thought out, and creatively messaged. The report offers three categories for thinking through the terms of engagement with China in Latin America and the Caribbean: insulation, curtailment, and competition._
+
+Standard documents that would normally serve as reference points for the terms of engagement—the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy—contain scant mention of LAC. While the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy hits strong notes on “great power competition” with China and a global competition between democracy and autocracy, LAC occupies only two pages of reflection. Further, the section on LAC mentions China only once, in conjunction with Russia and Iran as examples of dangerous extra-hemispheric actors. The National Defense Strategy, meanwhile, contains a mere paragraph about LAC’s important contribution to a stable, peaceful, and prosperous United States.
+
+Yet it is critically important for the United States to develop a policy on the terms of engagement with China in LAC that would begin to approximate a grand strategy. This policy should aim to compete with China across multiple domains, in a resource-backed, whole-of-government manner that leverages the strengths of the United States’ democratic partners and allies. However, the policy must strike the right balance and avoid overreach—which, in this case, would be asking LAC partners and allies to forgo the occasional benefits of trade and investment with China. One well-known foreign policy analyst summed up this balance well: “Trying to do it all, everywhere, will produce exhaustion and undermine U.S. capacity to address what matters most . . . If it wants to succeed, the United States is going to have to pick its battles carefully.” This is even truer in LAC, a region that is perennially undervalued and under-resourced by the U.S. government.
+
+#### Levers of Coercion
+
+China continues to build upon a formidable set of levers that it can use to coerce countries that challenge it or that pursue policies seen as undermining its core interests. China has become the top trading partner for many countries in South America and the second-largest trading partner for nearly all of LAC. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) signature foreign policy program, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), invests in large infrastructure projects in 21 of LAC’s 34 countries, including sensitive infrastructure such as nuclear power and space stations. More recently, China has commenced a push for its Global Security Initiative. And China has become a key provider of financing to many countries in LAC—to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars—through its state-backed policy banks and its commercial banks. This is to say nothing of China’s growing soft power in LAC through a proliferating number of Confucius Institutes, policymaker and military-to-military exchanges, a presence in multilateral forums such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the International Liaison Department’s close working relationship with hundreds of political parties in LAC.
+
+As China continues to increase its economic ties with countries around the world, it threatens to overtake the United States’ economic partnerships with many countries in LAC. Academic studies show that China has strengthened its ties with countries in LAC where U.S. engagement was weakest; in other words, China fills important vacuums when the United States abdicates regional leadership. Perhaps even more concerning, however, is the idea posited by the political economist Albert Hirschman that increased trade between countries, and the eventual growth of trade dependence between states, tends to forge bonds that can contribute to foreign policy convergence. China-LAC convergence on critical issues would severely hinder the United States and effectively neutralize LAC as a strategic asset in broader “great power competition” with China. Increased trade with China engenders domestic constituencies and lobby groups that allow the People’s Republic of China (PRC) further avenues of domestic policy influence. A recent report by the International Republican Institute found that the presence of these groups can lead to a “weakening of democratic institutions, a reduced inclination to support democratic norms globally, and/or increased support for the PRC’s deeply authoritarian model of governance and global ambitions.”
+
+___`China-LAC convergence on critical issues would severely hinder the United States and effectively neutralize LAC as a strategic asset in broader “great power competition” with China.`___
+
+In China’s case, even as it retains a robust toolkit for amassing influence, trade remains the most important and enduring way for it to influence other countries’ politics. Often, trade is the entry point or gateway for Chinese influence. As China’s economy has grown and other countries have become dependent on it, the CCP has shown a propensity to leverage political and economic interdependence in ruthless and capricious ways. From Norwegian salmon to South Korean tourism and from Australian barley, coal, and wine to Lithuanian furniture, over the last decade hundreds of examples of Chinese coercion abound, sometimes over even the slightest annoyances to the CCP. The political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman observe that China, as a result of the last two decades of globalization and global governance mechanisms, has “weaponized interdependence.” As one author recently put it, “Beijing’s long-term objective is to force governments and companies to anticipate, respect, and defer to Chinese interests in all future actions.” One could be forgiven for thinking the author was offering a definition of the word “fealty” rather than describing China’s emerging geopolitical strategy.
+
+Although China’s predatory behavior predates the more recent examples, Chinese president Xi Jinping provided a theoretical contribution to the CCP’s policy of economic coercion in a set of speeches beginning in 2020, in which he speaks of the “powerful gravitational field” exercised by China’s market behemoth. A series of textbooks for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) focused on Xi’s ideology, uncovered by Ian Easton, contains further statements of political coercion as official CCP policy: “We must gain a grip on foreign government leaders and their business elites by encouraging our companies to invest in their local economies.”
+
+___`Through massive subsidies, unfair market access, forced technology transfer, and large state-owned enterprises, China aims to reshape much of the global economy, reorient supply chains through China, and rewire much of the world’s commerce in Beijing’s favor.`___
+
+Although overtaking the United States in total economic size remains at least a nominal policy priority, the CCP grasps that minimizing dependence on other countries, while maximizing other countries’ dependence on China, provides it with the most powerful set of short- to medium-term coercive levers. Indeed, one could read China’s recent moves as an acknowledgement that it will not achieve economic supremacy over the United States any time soon, transitioning instead to become a producer of high-value goods for its adversaries and thus maintain the ability to “wield its very large economy as a strategic weapon.” Studies have shown that the most effective way to weaponize economic interdependence is to maintain a dominant position in a hierarchical network structure—akin to what China aims to create with its privileged companies, which enjoy massive state subsidies and protection from competition by foreign firms. Short of constructing an economy capable of driving innovation in the twenty-first century, Xi’s China can still maintain important tools of coercion over developed and developing countries alike. In LAC, China has focused on industries it calls “new infrastructure,” which includes sensitive areas such as 5G, electricity provision, high-speed rail infrastructure, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence among others.
+
+Through massive subsidies, unfair market access, forced technology transfer, and large state-owned enterprises, China aims to reshape much of the global economy, reorient supply chains through China, and rewire much of the world’s commerce in Beijing’s favor.
+
+The LAC region is incredibly exposed to Chinese political and economic coercion, and China’s willingness to use its levers of influence has only increased in recent years. Recent examples of coercion encompass pursuing political influence, championing economic interests, reducing Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, and following hard security interests. Even LAC’s largest economies are not immune. For instance, after initial signs that the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil would shut Huawei out of the auction for its 5G spectrum, China threatened to halt Covid-19 vaccinations to Brazil—just as the country was buckling under the weight of a severe pandemic wave. Huawei will now build part of Brazil’s 5G infrastructure. In Paraguay, the last country in South America to recognize Taiwan, China demanded it drop its recognition of Taiwan before it could buy Covid-19 vaccines. In Ecuador, nearly $20 billion in debt taken out by autocratic president Rafael Correa has hamstrung the government for years. Although China recently renegotiated two deals after it came under significant pressure to do so, the damage was already done. For years, Ecuador’s repayment of its unsustainable debt burden to China remained tethered to the performance of its oil industry, and in particular, its state-owned oil company. A congressional committee found that the inability to sell Ecuador’s oil on the spot market had cost the country about $5 billion, while recently renegotiated debt deals permitting more oil to be sold on the spot market would net the country only an additional $28 million in revenues. Ecuador’s debts to China also largely froze the country’s development goals for years as it was forced to double down on commodities production and export. Worse yet, Ecuador was forced to drill for oil in sensitive biozones in the Amazon—areas in which it had previously promised not to drill, in an international effort to preserve indigenous territories.
+
+In Argentina, indebtedness and Chinese influence in the government of then-president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner paved the way for the Espacio Lejano space station in Neuquén Province, the first Chinese deep space station built outside of China. The center is run by the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, a sub-entity to the PLA, while Argentina has no oversight whatsoever over the site.
+
+Aside from these highly specific examples of targeted political and economic coercion, there are more general concerns about LAC’s unsustainable indebtedness to China. For instance, according to the IDB, 50 percent of total government-to-government debt is in China’s hands. LAC is also willing to accept shoddily constructed or potential dual-use infrastructure projects through the BRI. So far, China has mostly resisted attempts to force it to write down debt in the developing world, arguing that it, too, is a developing country. Critically, a 2021 report by Aid Data shows that, in addition to the hundreds of billions in publicly known debt, the developing world has nearly $400 billion in “hidden debt” to China—knowledge of debt levels that was not publicly available previously because it did not appear on government balance sheets. Much of this debt is held by LAC countries. In general, Aid Data finds that “for every dollar of aid to low-income and middle-income countries, China has provided $9 of debt. The opposite is true of the US: For every dollar of debt that it provides to low-income and middle-income countries, it provides at least $9 of aid.”
+
+At a 2021 hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s construction of potential “dual-use” infrastructure through the BRI was a major topic of concern. The PRC counts a total of approximately 40 port-building or upgrading projects in LAC, almost all of them handled by Chinese state-owned enterprises and with some situated in countries geographically proximate to the United States. Further, the PRC has over 150 planned transportation infrastructure projects in the Western Hemisphere that contain some type of port or logistics hub. Despite the purported pacific nature of these facility upgrades, China has been credibly accused in the past—in the United Arab Emirates and Equatorial Guinea—of surreptitiously building military applications into port facilities, later exploited by the PLA. To punctuate the security concern, a recent report by Maritime Executive concludes: “It turns out that one-third of ports in which China made economic investments have hosted and also resupplied military vessels of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.”
+
+It is easy to see how China’s drive for economic and political leverage in pursuit of its wide-ranging interests will have an impact on LAC’s unconsolidated democracies, threaten its democratic traditions, and contribute to a breakdown in rule of law and greater corruption. Whether willful or indirect, China’s increasing engagement has coincided with an uptick in democratic backsliding and a rise in authoritarian governance throughout the LAC region. Any U.S. strategy for the terms of engagement in LAC needs to account for how China’s pursuit of its geopolitical interests may be distorting LAC’s democratic development. The good news is that there are sound strategies to blunt the effects of China’s approach to weaponized interdependence and to “deny, deflect, and deter” its predatory economic policies in a region such as LAC.
+
+
+### Strategic Contours, Past and Present
+
+In previous eras, the United States pursued a grand strategy centered on strategic denial against rival powers in LAC. As part of this strategy, the United States sought to prevent powerful rivals from establishing a strategic foothold in the region that might impact the United States’ influence and security. Due to the perceived absence of significant extra-hemispheric actors in the region after the Cold War, for several decades the United States neglected LAC and focused its major foreign policy efforts on other regions. Strategic denial as a grand strategy fell out of vogue. However, China’s decade and a half of deep engagement has put the region back on the radar, even as the United States continues to lack broad strategic guidance.
+
+In thinking through the broad contours of a twenty-first century grand strategy for great power competition in LAC, the United States should seek to shape the environment such that it constrains China’s negative behavior—mostly its appetite for political and economic coercion—and encourages constructive activities that could benefit LAC. By no means should the United States seek to interrupt or interfere in every aspect of China’s multifaceted engagement with LAC. Such a strategy is both unrealistic and likely to generate resentment and blowback from U.S. partners in the region. With respect to some aspects of China’s engagement that have become routine and even welcome from the regional perspective, the United States cannot reasonably attempt to block such involvement without severely damaging its relationships with partners.
+
+The United States should not stand by idly, either. On the contrary, the United States should pursue an active, muscular, three-pronged grand strategy in LAC focused around three major principles: insulation, curtailment, and competition.
+
+___`The United States should pursue an active, muscular, three-pronged grand strategy in LAC focused around three major principles: insulation, curtailment, and competition.`___
+
+__Insulation:__ Insulation strategies will be the most commonly employed. The United States should work to help fortify and insulate countries in LAC from the most adverse impacts of China’s continued engagement and ensure that democracy remains the preferred political system in the region. The United States will not prevail in a dollar-for-dollar competition with China on development projects in LAC. As one scholar rightly points out, there is a “self-defeating logic” to transactional diplomacy versus China in LAC. The United States also lacks—for good reason—China’s ability to direct capital from its private sector to mobilize in service of state and party goals. Indeed, China’s mechanisms of party control over the private sector provide strong reason to believe this is an inefficient use of capital. These realities mean that China will, of course, continue to play an outsized role as a partner in LAC’s development strategies and economic growth for the foreseeable future.
+
+Thus, insulation implies helping LAC countries operate within a framework of transparency, rule of law, and equal opportunity that will ensure that the region remains true to its democratic traditions and obligations under the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Proper insulation strategies will take into account the region’s own institutional weaknesses and corruption and help LAC fortify institutions and get the most out of its engagement with China, all while protecting it from some of the most corrosive effects of that engagement. In short, insulation strategies aim to blunt elements of the large power asymmetry between LAC countries and China, permitting China fewer opportunities to exploit that asymmetry to its benefit and ensuring a more level playing field and greater policy autonomy for LAC countries. Insulation strategies should also protect LAC democracies from turns toward populist governments that invite further involvement by China in problematic ways.
+
+As mentioned already, China is assiduously pursuing advantages in international affairs that will furnish the opportunity to coerce countries economically and politically. Insulation strategies should seek to deter Beijing by puncturing its confidence that pursuing coercion will yield positive results against the United States and LAC countries. Maintaining a favorable balance of dependence and a strong ability and desire to resist coercion in a wide range of areas may be the decisive factor in any strategy aimed at competing against China in LAC. After all, Vladimir Putin’s devastating invasion of Ukraine hinged significantly on his (spurious) belief that Russia had attained enough European dependence on its energy exports that the European Union would not come to Kyiv’s aid. Avoiding similar calculations by Xi’s China will be critical to effective deterrence and grand strategy in all regions of the world, LAC included.
+
+__Curtailment:__ In addition to helping countries strengthen internal mechanisms and compete on a level playing field, it is also important to curtail certain aspects of China’s engagement that impact democratic traditions and threaten policy autonomy in LAC, such as the increasing involvement of untrusted vendors in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Curtailment involves clearly messaging U.S. redlines and holding firm on these redlines. Because of its potential to ruffle U.S. relationships in LAC, curtailment should be selective and pursued only when China’s engagement truly threatens (1) LAC’s policy autonomy, (2) LAC’s democratic traditions, or (3) key U.S. interests in the region. There should be a set of extremely high standards for asking U.S. partners and allies in LAC to bear the costs of forgoing a relationship with China in a particular area. An unnecessarily expansive pursuit of curtailment could not only result in relationship friction but also provide fodder to China’s (debilitating) argument that the United States is interested in LAC only because of China’s presence. Ideally, curtailment strategies would be paired with competition strategies, thus marshaling resources to ensure that a U.S. alternative is made available.
+
+__Competition:__ Complementary to efforts insulating the region from adverse impacts of China’s engagement and curtailing certain types of engagement, the United States will also need to develop a resource-backed strategy to ensure that viable democratic alternatives are on the table in areas where the United States can effectively compete. As one author recently noted, “the U.S. is well advised to leverage the enormous size, effectiveness, and agility of private-sector capital against China’s substantial but ‘clumsy capital.’” In service of these goals, the United States has free trade agreements with a substantial portion of the LAC region. This architecture, built over decades, gives it advantages over the CCP in furnishing private-sector alternatives.
+
+As with curtailment strategies, out of both necessity and resource scarcity, the United States should prioritize only a handful of areas in which it can provide a meaningful and competitive alternative to Chinese development and investment in the region. Examples include ICT and digital connectivity, mining and critical minerals, renewable energy, and healthcare systems. To accomplish this, the U.S. government will have to rewrite rules that constrain the agility of agencies like the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to aid middle-income regions like LAC.
+
+Finally, an important note on messaging is in order. In pursuing this three-pronged strategy, the United States should project a desire to enhance the hemispheric relationship and ensure its policy autonomy, rather than present an approach that emphasizes anti-China policies and the dangers of the Chinese Communist Party. The strategy should go beyond China and be aimed at strengthening the region’s democratic institutions, fighting its entrenched corruption, and catalyzing its economic development. Notwithstanding China’s current impact, countries in LAC often have a different perspective than the United States with respect to China’s role in the region. Facing domestic economic challenges, governments in LAC are much more responsive to the immediate benefits of China’s engagement and display ostensibly little concern for the second-order impacts of unsustainable debt, vulnerability to coercion, and democratic backsliding that typically occur on a longer time horizon. Due to these differences in perspective and the importance of allies in shaping effective policy, the United States will need to be more intentional with its public diplomacy to ensure that any new policies in the region are seen in the context of a willing partner ready to help, as opposed to a defensive partner seeking to minimize China’s influence.
+
+U.S. policymakers generally understand that diplomatic statements criticizing China and suggesting that LAC forgo its relationship with China and align with the United States do not play well in the region. As one scholar observes: “The U.S. must thus work to refine its communication, within the boundaries of honesty, to credibly emphasize its interest in the well-being of the region to which it is connected by geography, commerce, and family.” Particularly, messaging strategy should emphasize preserving the policy autonomy of LAC, as well as a U.S. desire to fortify democratic, market-oriented institutions that will allow the region to engage on a more equal playing field with all countries in the world—not just China. Doubling down on the importance of market-led growth and the U.S. private sector will be even more important in light of China’s push to expand its statist model and the region’s turn to greater state-led policy solutions.
+
+Implementing this strategy will require appropriating resources through relevant agencies to insulate LAC more effectively from the most corrosive elements of China’s engagement. Policymakers should understand the importance of pursuing this three-pronged grand strategy so that foreign policy resources in LAC are not outsourced to other regions. Due to the global nature of U.S. strategy, resources are often moved from LAC to other theaters in times of crisis.
+
+Key agencies that can ensure that these resource constraints do not present themselves include the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the DFC, among others. These agencies are critical to high-level diplomatic engagement, messaging, economic development strategy, and commercial engagement. They are the logical place to begin with the implementation of grand strategy in LAC. Multilateral organizations and the private sector will also be crucial for the United States’ revamped efforts in the region. Beyond highlighting common ground with aspects of the region’s agenda, the United States would be best served by returning to the basics and helping governments remember that the private sector is the best engine of economic growth and human initiative.
+
+___`The three-pronged approach championed in this report implies deep U.S. engagement and partnership with LAC to an extent that has not existed in the twenty-first century.`___
+
+The rest of this report proceeds in three broad sections, each corresponding to an element of the three-pronged grand strategy. First, it assesses aspects of China’s engagement with LAC, identifying where the United States should help insulate countries from the riskiest and most adverse impacts of that engagement. Second, it offers recommendations for the aspects of China’s engagement with the region that the United States should seek to curtail—an unsettled debate among policymakers. Finally, the report concludes with an argument for the priority industries in which the United States should seek to engage in competition, those where a fully resourced policy will allow them to furnish viable alternatives to China.
+
+
+### Insulate
+
+Most aspects of China’s engagement with LAC will continue, given the region’s need for economic growth and development. Directly interfering with China’s engagement could also confirm the suspicion of many countries in LAC that the United States is a self-interested hegemon. As such, in these areas, there are ways in which the United States can act to help countries insulate themselves from China’s corrosive impact without appearing to pursue anti-China policies. The United States should ensure that the interactions between China and its partners in the region occur in a transparent fashion and on a level playing field. A recent poll by the International Republican Institute shows that majorities of citizens in four key LAC countries are unaware of the CCP’s influence and China’s investment in their countries. By promoting transparency, providing technical assistance, establishing safeguards against corruption, and strengthening institutional support mechanisms, the United States can enable partners to strengthen their internal frameworks for investment and external engagement. This section proceeds with an analysis of China’s commercial and development engagement followed by its institutional engagement and provides mechanisms for insulating countries from adverse impacts.
+
+#### Commercial and Development Engagement
+
+China’s approach toward strengthening its own economy has led it to engage with LAC in many critical sectors. As leftist populist governments emerge throughout the region, leaders are arguably more receptive to increased Chinese engagement as well as to internal policies that may lead to democratic deficits (albeit China’s presence is now hemisphere-wide). Venezuela serves as an illustrative example of ever-closer engagement with China that has coincided with dramatic democratic backsliding. Chinese economic assistance under both Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro allowed Venezuela to maintain authoritarian governance mechanisms that have pulled it away from the democratic traditions and regional institutions of the hemisphere. Backsliding has spread to other countries like Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, which are all increasingly turning to China for economic assistance. Without strong institutions and insulation mechanisms to protect democracy, these countries could witness varying levels of democratic backsliding, given the nature of China’s engagement. Long-term impacts on democracy have been demonstrated to be most prominent in China’s infrastructure investment and within the region’s extractive industry, as well as within its lending practices, violations of labor standards, and laws protecting the environment.
+
+Regarding infrastructure, President Xi Jinping has established ambitious trade and investment goals with the region, embodied by the fact that 21 LAC countries have signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in just the past three and a half years—with more expected in the coming years. From a U.S. perspective, focusing messaging on the BRI as “debt-trap diplomacy”—irrespective of its veracity—does not find a receptive audience in LAC because investment is urgently needed in the region. Without an alternative, the Chinese offer is the best offer because it is often the only offer.
+
+While the United States cannot and should not attempt to block BRI investment in the region, it can ensure that BRI investments are made in a transparent framework that protects countries from unsustainable debt. While the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) is the United States’ recently announced alternative to the BRI, it will take years before it potentially competes with China’s infrastructure investment—if ever. Nonetheless, the United States should fuel investment from PGII to LAC as an alternative to the BRI. Given the level of investment needed, the United States will need to insulate the region from the corrosive impacts that these large infrastructure investment deals can have. For instance, China’s presence in the energy sectors of various countries should be cause for alarm. In Brazil, Chinese companies own or partially own over 300 power plants, accounting for 10 percent of Brazil’s national energy generation capacity. Additionally, Chinese companies own 12 percent of Brazil’s energy transmission infrastructure. Both pose significant points of potential leverage for the CCP.
+
+In addition to infrastructure, China has also made large investments in the region’s extractive industries, especially in the critical mineral supply chain. Large investments in this space have allowed China to establish strategic footholds in various countries throughout the region. Just as with infrastructure, however, how corrosive these investments’ impacts on democracy are depends on the stability and strength of a country’s institutions. Chile’s copper and lithium industries, for instance, have been regulated at the national level for several decades, and the strength of its framework for foreign investment has insulated it better than other countries from the negative impacts that could emerge from growing Chinese investment. Argentina, on the other hand, does not have the same institutional frameworks, being governed at the local and provincial level with little accountability; amid economic turmoil and growing commercial engagement with China, the country could witness backsliding from unregulated economic involvement.
+
+Sri Lanka’s current political and economic crisis demonstrates several key lessons on how the United States can help countries in LAC avoid the most democracy-eroding impacts of increased Chinese commercial and development engagement. While Sri Lanka carries much of the blame for its ongoing debt crisis, China’s lending practices have played an outsized role. Sri Lanka’s experience provides a crucial lesson for the Western Hemisphere: avoid investment deals for both infrastructure and extractive industries that might lead to unsustainable debt burdens and provide countries with the necessary tools for evaluating future deals. Furthermore, it also shows that the United States should work to protect countries from incurring subsequent debt and restructuring existing debt that will not further deteriorate into economic crises. Recent studies on this topic demonstrate that China is likely to respond to overindebted countries either with new lines of credit or, concerningly, currency swap deals that open new avenues of potential political leverage.
+
+In this context of increasing Chinese economic engagement, there are several ways in which the United States could move to insulate the region from China’s corrosive influence. Effective solutions include promoting investment principles, providing technical assistance for debt restructuring, offering support for transparency, and strengthening partners’ institutions and transaction processes.
+
+> #### 1. Promote quality infrastructure investment (QII) principles.
+
+One crucial mechanism through which the United States should insulate the region from China’s BRI investments is by promoting quality infrastructure investment principles. Fortunately, the United States, Japan, and Australia have cofounded a certification mechanism for infrastructure projects that meet robust international quality infrastructure investment principles. This initiative, the Blue Dot Network, should continue to be pursued on a global scale so that the United States can help create more transparency and quality data for development projects in LAC.
+
+The Department of State should aim to make Blue Dot principles a standard for any new infrastructure projects in the region, including those through the BRI and PGII. As an already under-resourced region, LAC should be made a key priority for the United States when pursuing infrastructure investment principles. This will help countries in the region have access to more information on the track record of certain companies when pursuing large infrastructure deals that have the potential to increase their debt burden. In this capacity, the Blue Dot Network serves as an international institutional mechanism that can strengthen commercial and development engagement in the region, thereby insulating countries from the potential adverse impacts of infrastructure investment deals. (The Blue Dot Network is certainly not the only workable framework; there are others that could serve as strong frameworks for insulation mechanisms, such as the United Kingdom’s New Engineering Contracts, which have been used successfully in Peru.)
+
+In this same workstream, the United States should also work with cofounders Japan and Australia, as well as other allies like South Korea and Taiwan, to contribute to the development of democratic principles in LAC. Bringing allies into the conversation about infrastructure principles in the region may catalyze a larger conversation on how extra-hemispheric actors can provide resources for further democratic development. For instance, both Japan and South Korea have a vested interest in the lithium industry, with companies like Japanese Toyota Tsusho and South Korean steelmaker Posco having large investments in lithium extraction sites in Argentina. It is in the interest of both Japan and South Korea as well as the United States for governments to cooperate to establish stronger investment principles within the lithium industry, for the benefit of both the region and their own companies. As a broader line of work, the United States should engage with allies that already have an economic interest in strengthening democratic principles for commercial and development engagement.
+
+> #### 2. Provide technical assistance and establish safeguards for debt-vulnerable countries.
+
+Another mechanism to help insulate the region from China’s adverse impacts is to help countries restructure debt resulting from Chinese sovereign lending and to protect these debt-vulnerable countries from incurring subsequent Chinese debt by increasing technical assistance and establishing safeguards. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) should increase its engagement with regional partners to ensure that countries do not incur large amounts of subsequent debt on deals that could further disrupt their economies. As a lesson from Sri Lanka’s current debt crisis, the United States should encourage countries to work through the Paris Club and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to restructure their debt and establish this as a safeguard to ensure that countries in the region do not incur further debt. Through the Paris Club, both Argentina and Suriname have been able to restructure their debt in ways that may allow them to address current economic challenges at the same time.
+
+In addition, the United States should also provide a capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to strengthen its ability to help countries in LAC achieve sustainable and serviceable debt structures. The State Department should advance diplomatic engagement with members of the IDB to work on increasing capital for the explicit purpose of providing safeguards to protect debt-vulnerable countries. By increasing the strength and abilities of the Paris Club, the IMF, and the IDB, the United States can help countries in the region avoid situations like what occurred in Ecuador under President Rafael Correa, when the country had to pay off its Chinese debt with oil. Two presidents later, Ecuador still struggles to pay down its Chinese debt, and direct negotiations with Beijing on debt relief have yielded little in savings on the outstanding debt.
+
+> #### 3. Support transparency measures in infrastructure and extractive industries.
+
+After its withdrawal from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2017, the United States should reconsider becoming an implementing member once again. The EITI aims to improve transparency standards, strengthen the governance of critical minerals, mitigate corruption risks across the value chain, and increase contract and data disclosure requirements. Only 11 countries in LAC are currently implementing members of EITI: Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. If the United States joined, this could catalyze other countries in the region to strengthen their own extractive sectors. Moreover, while the United States provides support for EITI implementation through USAID, as exemplified by its bilateral assistance to members like Colombia and Guyana, as an implementing member the United States could further demonstrate its work as a partner to countries in the region working to embed transparency in their extractive industries. Increasing the United States’ focus on these standards would help insulate LAC from corrosive impacts to democracy by further protecting industries that will be critical for the future. In this context, the United States should both seek to join EITI and increase USAID funding through EITI explicitly for bilateral assistance to countries in the region as a step for safeguarding institutions.
+
+The region’s vibrant civil societies should be seen as allies in this effort, since one of the most effective ways to expose China’s practices is through public scrutiny. When evidence of corruption, poor labor standards, and environmental abuses have come to light, several Chinese investment projects in the region have been canceled. Basic research and data collection, funneled to watchdog organizations, journalists, media outlets, and academics can help to amplify the denouncement of bad practices. Additionally, such information sharing would have the benefit of making these denouncements take on local character, as opposed to coming from the United States.
+
+Another idea worthy of further exploration is the use of state-regulated trust funds for public investments. Trust funds for public infrastructure projects should be managed by private financial entities; in LAC, prudential regulation is strong and one of the best in the developing world. For instance, Colombia has positive experiences with the use of trust funds for public investment to execute projects faster, with higher quality, and largely corruption-free. High transparency standards mean corrosive Chinese investment could be curtailed while simultaneously attracting more Western investors.
+
+> #### 4. Strengthen institutional and transactional support.
+
+China’s reputation for deploying resources without imposing the slightest conditions can be dangerous for countries in the region. Lax institutions and processes are prone to elite capture, corruption, breakdown of rule of law, and other types of corrosive impacts on large commercial and development deals. Given that China’s engagement with the region is more recent compared to its engagement elsewhere, many governments also lack a depth of skills and knowledge on engaging with Chinese partners. To strengthen institutions and processes, the Department of State could lead programs that would help countries with contract evaluation and broad project planning support. Furthermore, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) should increase its partnerships with countries in LAC to strengthen their own foreign investment review mechanisms. Indeed, the State Department, in combination with regional embassies, could conduct a “CFIUS roadshow” to share best practices with the region’s governments and work with those countries that do not have investment review platforms to create ones that are in line with the national security interests of their countries.
+
+There are strong incentives to reform procurement systems across the region to help build more quickly and protect bureaucrats from legal prosecution. Red tape, the lowest-price criteria to select winners in infrastructure projects, a paucity of bidders in each tender process, and a dearth of human capital in procurement agencies are some of the region’s greatest challenges today. Lowest-price criteria mean that Chinese bids face little competition—often they are the only bids—because the lowest price is established too low.
+
+#### Institutional Engagement
+
+In its institutional engagement, China has aggressively sought to broaden its influence in multilateral institutions across the region. China has forged ties with several regional organizations, including the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of our Americas (ALBA). It has also gained access to development funds from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), despite not being part of the Western Hemisphere.
+
+From the U.S. perspective, China’s engagement with CELAC is the most concerning of all institutions, as CELAC excludes both the United States and Canada and therefore gives China more leeway in working with countries in the region. Moreover, countries such as Mexico and Argentina have demonstrated a desire to conduct regional matters through CELAC—as opposed to through the long-standing traditional forum, the Organization of American States (OAS), which is committed to defending democracy in the region.
+
+China’s agenda within institutions like CELAC and the IDB may not necessarily lead to corrosive impacts on democracy, but its ability to frame a more favorable view of Chinese commercial and development engagement could lead to long-term spillover effects for the region’s democracies if they are not insulated prior to increased engagement. While larger countries in the region have led the charge away from the OAS, Central American countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are backsliding, and a lack of U.S. involvement in the region’s institutions could allow democratic weaknesses to continue festering in these countries. The United States’ current approach of remaining silent and using discreet diplomatic efforts to work with its partners is allowing allies like Mexico to push further against policies that support the region’s democracies.
+
+Accordingly, to the extent possible, the United States should work to insulate LAC from the potential long-term effects of increased Chinese engagement in the region’s institutions. In this regard, helpful solutions might include incentives for conducting regional business through the OAS and shaping the United States’ participation in regional forums as a partner.
+
+> #### 1. Provide incentives to countries to conduct their most important matters through the OAS.
+
+To ensure that the United States remains an active leader in the region’s commercial and development engagement, it needs to continue to be a key member of the region’s institutions. If countries turn fully to CELAC to solve regional challenges, the United States will not be able to provide its assistance for ensuring that the region’s commercial and development deals are transparent and democratic. As such, to incentivize countries to commit to the OAS, the United States could offer a reorganization of the institution. For instance, it could create a new council that puts the United States on an equal membership status with large regional players like Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and Mexico, some of which have been leaning toward CELAC. Additionally, it could offer more U.S. support as it pertains to security cooperation in the region by allocating more resources to the Unites States Southern Command.
+
+> #### 2. Shape the U.S. government’s participation in regional forums as a partner.
+
+After the 2022 Summit of the Americas, countries in the region were disappointed with the lack of resources and new initiatives from the United States. Additionally, several countries boycotted the summit—including Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala—due to the United States’ decision to not invite Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. President Alberto Fernández of Argentina delivered a critical speech of the United States’ past policy decisions. The United States will not be able to insulate LAC if the region is not willing to accept its assistance. In this context, the United States needs to be a more active participant in regional forums and needs to deliver on its promises. While the Summit of the Americas may have been a good opportunity for it, the United States should still act to address the concerns of its regional partners. It can do so by increasing resources and acting as a partner for the region’s development. This may include a restructuring of the IDB and the OAS, but the changes that are made must be in conversation with partners in the region if they are to be successful in shifting the institutional climate. The driving question must remain what the United States can do with the region—not for the region.
+
+
+### Curtail
+
+Given its direct impact on democracy, there are areas where China’s involvement should be curtailed. Many countries in the region face political instability, social unrest, and weakening democracy. In consolidated authoritarian regimes, like Venezuela, China has provided surveillance technologies and other financial support to uphold the Maduro regime. This type of support has also spread to other countries experiencing authoritarian tendencies, such as El Salvador and Guatemala. Further, through its Digital Silk Road, China provided Ecuador with 4,000 Chinese-made cameras for a “smart cities” program aimed at reducing crime—but at the same time shared the video footage with the feared domestic intelligence agency under President Rafael Correa.
+
+It is in this context that some of China’s engagement needs to not only be insulated but fully kept out in order to avoid a permanent turn away from democracy. This corresponds to the United States’ “redlines” for Chinese engagement in the region. As the United States shapes these policies, it will be important to take into consideration which of its concerns are shared with LAC countries, because curtailing aspects of China’s engagement will require partnership with U.S. allies in the region. From the United States’ perspective, the most pressing aspect of engagement to curtail falls in the ICT sector. Due to the potentially destructive impacts that untrusted Chinese 5G vendors and the use of surveillance technologies could have on governance and democracy, the United States should continue its efforts to curtail them. The most challenging aspect of this part of the strategy is that most countries in the region do not see the negative impacts on democratic governments of China’s ICT engagement the same way the United States does. However, by the time LAC sees these negative impacts, it may be too late.
+
+#### ICT: 5G Networks and Surveillance Technologies
+
+One of the primary areas of China’s engagement that the United States should seek to curtail is the ICT industry, from untrusted 5G vendors to Chinese-provided surveillance technologies. In established autocracies like Venezuela and Cuba, China has intentionally undermined democracy by providing surveillance technologies to the Maduro Regime and restricting internet service during Cuba’s protests in July of 2021. State-owned enterprises, like China’s National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), and Chinese technology companies, like Huawei and ZTE, are equally as dangerous when it comes to challenging democratic institutions in the region. As it pertains to private investment and corporate relations, China’s state-driven capitalist model has made it difficult to ascertain when and where companies are acting of their own accord or in the furtherance of Chinese state policy. Continued controversy over China’s untrusted 5G vendors illustrates this challenge.
+
+This is a difficult conversation to have with partners in LAC, as they receive digital services and technologies from China that the United States cannot yet offer. The Clean Network initiative advanced during the Trump administration demonstrates the region’s different viewpoint on this matter clearly. Nearly 60 countries around the world joined the Clean Network. However, only three of those were in LAC: Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador. Even though the Biden administration has chosen not to pursue the Clean Network initiative, countries in the region were not very receptive to the original plan. For example, despite Brazil having joined the Clean Network in November 2020, in early 2021 it backed out of its commitment when it allowed Huawei to participate in its 5G auction—in large part because China was withholding vaccines from Brazil during the depths of the pandemic as a bargaining chip. Moreover, Ecuador joined the initiative as part of a deal with the DFC in which it would receive nearly $2.8 billion to pay off Chinese loans (similarly to the Clean Networks initiative, the Biden administration has since abandoned this deal). This context demonstrates that the argument for greater transparency in telecommunications has not worked in the region, as countries merely seek the most effective and cost-efficient option—which in many cases has been Huawei. As countries in the region struggle economically, limiting telecommunications options can be damaging to the United States’ foreign policy if there are no other options that are comparatively similar from a cost standpoint. For this reason, the ICT sector is an area in which the United States should seek to curtail Chinese involvement, but it must also find ways to provide a competitive alternative.
+
+> #### 1. Reduce the gap between Huawei and other 5G competitors.
+
+Huawei leads the 5G industry in LAC with at least 30 percent of the market share, in large part because of Chinese subsidies that make the cost of infrastructure and network service lower than what unsubsidized competitors can provide. Directly banning Chinese vendors from the region has proven to be an ineffective strategy, and as such, the United States and its allies should work to provide a feasible alternative that would curtail increased Chinese market participation. The United States should consider heavier use of industrial policy in conjunction with the European Union, Japan, Australia, and Korea, among other allies, to help 5G competitors—like Eriksson and Nokia—to reduce the financial burden on countries in LAC if they choose to go with an alternative that is not Huawei. Through reforms to Export-Import Bank (EXIM) rules, such as lowering American content requirements for export credits, the United States would be able to support the development of Eriksson, Nokia, and other trusted vendors in the region, despite them not being U.S. companies. Additionally, through PGII, the United States should prioritize its digital pillar to mobilize investment in the ICT sector with trusted vendors. As part of this effort, DFC funding could be used to bring in trusted vendors into countries like Ecuador, a country with which the DFC already has an agreement.
+
+> #### 2. Prevent the expansion of surveillance technology systems.
+
+Governments in LAC have accepted the use of surveillance technologies at an increasing rate, with many countries citing them as a solution to reducing crime and increasing public safety. In a region where military dictatorships governed in the not-too-distant past, the use of surveillance technologies feeds into a worrying trend of democratic backsliding. Growing use of surveillance presents a dilemma for democratic governments as they seek to make their countries safer at the expense of the privacy of their citizens. The Department of State should convey the adverse effects of surveillance technologies to regional partners and work with them to increase accountability and transparency in deals that countries sign with companies providing these new technologies. In the worst cases, the U.S. government should consider the Treasury Department’s ability to use sanctions—as it has elsewhere—against companies providing surveillance technologies to U.S. allies. However, as long as the region’s homicides continue to represent such an outsized percentage of global homicides—usually around one-third of the global total, despite the region representing just 8 percent of the global population—the temptation for surveillance technology will be strong.
+
+Parallel efforts should be made in the space of data protection. The United States could promote the adherence of LAC governments to the Data Protection Law International Treaty. The treaty, formally known as the Convention 108 and born in the European Union has 55 signatories, three of them in LAC (Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay). Convention 108 imposes minimum standards for personal data protection to prevent abuses from national and foreign governments. Treaty signatories are required to create an autonomous agency to adhere to its principles. The Treaty is important because China does not recognize personal data protection as a right, and Chinese law states that if a country imposes limits on China’s access to personal data, corrective measures can be taken.
+
+> #### Strengthen regional ICT and cybersecurity cooperation.
+
+Another mechanism to prevent untrusted vendors from further disseminating throughout the region is to strengthen regional ICT and cybersecurity cooperation. As one of the least developed regions in terms of its digital environment, LAC is struggling to cultivate human capital for cybersecurity. While the OAS’s Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) has experience in developing national cybersecurity strategies, there is no targeted effort at cybersecurity for telecommunications. Through CISA Global within the Department of Homeland Security, the United States could seek to increase capacity building with regional partners as a method for improving the overall digital environment as it pertains to telecommunications. As the ICT sector continues to grow in the region, capacity-building efforts can help protect countries as broadband investment expands. To prevent the further expansion of untrusted vendors, the United States should work with the IDB to establish policies that would eliminate ICT projects with untrusted vendors in the region and help countries institutionalize processes that increase their capacity to screen potential ICT infrastructure suppliers for transparency and privacy.
+
+
+### Compete
+
+Since its arrival in the region, China has invested large amounts of funding in both commercial engagement and development assistance with countries in LAC. Through its investments, China has changed the regional status quo and attempted to “rewire” the region’s commerce through Beijing, to the point that it is becoming a more influential geopolitical player than the United States in many respects. For instance, China is the region’s second-largest trading partner after the United States and the number one trading partner when accounting only for South America. These trade relationships are the basis for partnerships in the region, as many other critical policy decisions are made based on their impact on trade with other countries. While some of China’s commercial and development engagement benefits LAC, U.S.-based alternatives that establish democratic safeguards and transparency can help increase the options available to countries in the region as they pursue economic development initiatives.
+
+For this reason, another crucial component of a revamped U.S. strategy in LAC needs to involve channeling resources into industries where the United States can provide viable alternatives to China. While the United States cannot be competitive in every industry, it should reform its strategy to focus on areas in which competing can create a level playing field and strengthen U.S. participation in the region to showcase the importance of democratic traditions. As the United States seeks to ally-shore and nearshore supply chains, it should do so in the critical industries of the future that will help both the United States and LAC.
+
+In a region that is unlikely to see a substantial boost in federal funds and policy attention from U.S. policymakers, the United States will be most effective if it chooses a few key priority areas in which to compete with China so that it can make the best use of its limited resources. It is better to understand the domestic and institutional constraints rather than failing to deliver on promises to partners. For instance, the United States has found it challenging to implement new free trade agreements (FTAs) in the region due to domestic constraints. While China is negotiating FTAs with countries like Ecuador and Uruguay, the United States should focus on what it can do in the region, as opposed to promising FTAs that it cannot achieve because of fractious trade politics. In this context, some of the industries in which the United States can and should be competing with China in LAC include ICT and digital connectivity, mining and critical minerals, renewable energy, and healthcare systems. Fortunately, these are also areas in which LAC governments have a strong interest in cooperating.
+
+A large part of the U.S. strategy will rely on multilateral engagement and private sector-led growth, which could necessitate a heavier use of industrial policy and the development of attractive investment frameworks to further incentivize the private sector to engage with LAC countries. Increasing ties in these industries will require a whole-of-government approach to allocate additional resources to the region. It will require the DFC, USAID, and other relevant agencies to engage in creating a better investment climate in countries across the area. It will also require leveraging U.S. influence at the IDB and the IMF to bring in resources. Given the aforementioned shortage of federal funds for LAC, to be a competitive player in the region the United States will need a strong policy revamp, with many government agencies, multilateral institutions, and private sector companies playing a role.
+
+> #### 1. Scale up ICT and digital connectivity efforts.
+
+Broadband connectivity and digital technologies will increase at a rapid rate in LAC over the next several years, with the 5G market alone projected to generate over $28 billion in revenue by 2030. As the region begins to scale up 5G infrastructure, however, Huawei and ZTE are better positioned than competitors like Eriksson and Nokia due to lower costs and existing infrastructure. Huawei, already predominant, possesses a unique opportunity to further consolidate the market if policies are not established to limit the ability of untrusted vendors to operate in the region. Digital and technological communications need to be at the top of the United States’ national security agenda, especially given the large market opening in LAC to increase broadband connectivity and advance digitalization efforts.
+
+While the United States may not be able to compete outright with 5G infrastructure (given the absence of a U.S. company in this arena), it can leverage multilateral engagement and infrastructure investment through PGII in digital connectivity to provide alternative ICT development funding. Through a capital increase at the IDB, the United States can work with other countries to emphasize digital transformation and ICT development throughout the region and increase the institution’s focus on ICT. Moreover, the United States has pledged significant funding through PGII to develop, expand, and deploy secure ICT networks and infrastructure, which includes working with trusted vendors to provide 5G and even 6G technologies. Providing funding for digital infrastructure development in the region will be crucial as an alternative to allowing Huawei to continue to expand its market share. A larger U.S. presence in the ICT sector within LAC can help shape one of the critical industries of the future in line with transparent and democratic traditions that allow for a level playing field.
+
+> #### 2. Leverage partnerships on mining and critical minerals.
+
+Critical minerals are essential to meeting the demands of the clean energy transition, as they will play a large role in decarbonization efforts, including the electrification of vehicles and energy storage technologies. As a region, LAC will be a crucial player in this industry as large reserves of lithium, copper, and nickel—among other critical minerals—are found in large quantities in several countries in the region. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and the rest of the Americas possess over 70 percent of the globe’s lithium reserves. Moreover, Chile, Peru, and Mexico hold approximately 40 percent of the globe’s copper reserves. On its own, Brazil also hosts 17 percent of the world’s nickel reserves. Critical minerals will be one of the economically impactful industries of the future as the world decarbonizes, and given Latin America’s natural resource endowment, it will be at the center of this industry. While China has approached this industry strategically for the last decade, it by no means has a chokehold over the entire mining space. As it stands, the demand for critical minerals will outpace supply, which gives the United States ample opportunity to increase its competitiveness in this sector through partnerships with countries in the region.
+
+To be more competitive in the critical mineral industry, the U.S. private sector needs to be involved in the early stages of mining and extraction as well as the processing of critical minerals for their downstream end uses. The U.S. government can help to create enabling conditions and de-risking investments so that the private sector can become more involved. This might include financial policies, such as federal grants from the Department of Energy for critical mineral projects in LAC, tax credits for new technologies to increase the productivity of mining processes, and increased loan guarantees and project finance opportunities. The United States can also support greater competitiveness in the critical mineral industry through diplomatic policies, such as by leveraging the Department of State’s Energy Resource Governance Initiative (ERGI) to create regional critical mineral partnerships, expand geological partnerships, improve knowledge-sharing with the private sector on projects in the region, and negotiate trade provisions with regional partners that might increase critical minerals trade. Greater U.S. participation—both in the private sector and from the U.S. government—will help shape the critical mineral industry in LAC to ensure that transparency and standards are in place across the region.
+
+> #### 3. Accelerate renewable energy potential.
+
+LAC and the United States also share a strong policy priority in increasing renewable energy investment. The United States’ commitment to renewable energy, stronger than China’s, presents an opportunity for increasing collaboration and economic ties with LAC. As recently as 2019, the region launched the Renewable Energy for Latin America and the Caribbean Initiative (RELAC), with the objective of achieving 70 percent renewable energy participation in the region’s electricity matrix by 2030. RELAC brings the IDB and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) together to support the region’s renewable energy transition. Renewable energy will be a crucial sector for LAC as countries seek to bolster their economic development, increase climate resilience, and further their decarbonization efforts. In addition to opportunities in wind, solar, hydro, and geothermal sources of energy, LAC also has the potential to be a large player in green hydrogen. Chile is set to be one of the world’s largest exporters of the green hydrogen that will drive much of the clean energy transition in the years to come. By tying the energy transition to climate priorities, the United States has an opportunity to partner with countries in the region to provide necessary funding and support for increasing economic development and creating a more sustainable future.
+
+As one of the most promising regions for economic development, the United States should prioritize renewable energy projects in LAC. This will include bringing in resources from the public sector, multilateral organizations, and the private sector, as well as using the influence of the U.S. government to mobilize additional capital and resources into the region. At a high level, the NSC should ensure that LAC becomes a priority under PGII so that funding for climate and energy infrastructure is secured for the region. From the public sector, this will require the DFC to increase financing projects in LAC—such as the $100 million it announced at the Summit of the Americas—that serve to address climate and renewable priorities. Initiatives like the U.S. Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030 (PACC 2030) are a crucial step in allocating additional resources to energy security in the region. The United States could consider becoming more involved in RELAC to further support renewable energy efforts. In addition to increasing public sector resources, the State and Treasury Departments should work together to increase access to financing from the IDB and provide incentives for U.S. businesses to make crucial investments in renewable energy. Wherever possible, the United States should tie energy investment to the modernization of regulatory structures.
+
+> #### 4. Strengthen healthcare systems in the post-Covid-19 environment.
+
+With over 2.7 million deaths since the beginning of the pandemic, the LAC region has accounted for over 40 percent of global deaths related to Covid-19. Given the extent of the Covid-19 crisis and China’s increasing use of “vaccine diplomacy” as a method for expanding its influence in the region, healthcare and vaccine development represent another area in which the United States could offer an alternative so that China cannot use vaccines as a bargaining chip, as it did in Brazil, to extract strategic concessions. As such, the United States should provide increased resources and partner with countries in LAC to help develop better healthcare systems to aid in the region’s recovery from Covid-19 and prepare for future pandemics.
+
+The Biden administration announced action in healthcare for LAC in June 2022, which included initiatives like the Americas Health Corps to provide training to over 500,000 public health professionals across the region as well as expanding USAID’s global health security programs to more countries. These announcements are critical steps to providing increased support to regional partners, and the United States should deliver on these promises—both to increase resilience and, more importantly in the long term, to strengthen LAC’s trust in its ally to the north. Increasing collaboration on healthcare systems and strengthening the region’s preparation for future pandemics will help shape a stronger partnership between the United States and its partners.
+
+Within this bucket, greater partnership must include vaccine development. Production and continuous research on vaccines is a national priority in many countries throughout LAC, as well as a regional priority. Vaccine development can create jobs, promote the sharing of technology, and improve healthcare services. Most importantly, the region is full of strong potential partner institutions owing to its years of research in tropical medicine and emerging diseases.
+
+
+### Toward a Grand Strategy
+
+The Western Hemisphere will be crucial to U.S. grand strategy in an era of great power competition. It is imperative for U.S. policymakers to have a better understanding of the adverse impacts of Chinese engagement in LAC so that U.S. efforts to safeguard democracy can be incisive and effective. Taking steps to work with regional partners on insulation mechanisms that increase transparency and strengthen democratic institutions will be critical to protecting the democratic traditions of the region in the long term. These actions will further reduce the asymmetries of the China-LAC relationship and allow countries in the region to engage on more equal terms. While most of China’s engagement will likely continue, it will become less and less corrosive to democracy over time. The U.S. government will also need to increase its ability to curtail certain aspects of that engagement, such as the expansion of untrusted ICT vendors in the region. Finally, a critical part of a new U.S. grand strategy will be better prioritizing existing federal funds toward economic, diplomatic, and security initiatives to compete with China and offer credible alternatives that are democracy-preserving in key industries of the future.
+
+Ultimately, the strategy of “insulate, curtail, compete” is about helping LAC to assert greater policy autonomy, reduce dependency and foreign influence, and to make better choices about the region’s long-term strategic interests. Effectively selling the region on those choices will be a key challenge and require diplomatic finesse to understand that various subregions of LAC may desire different combinations of insulation, curtailment, and competition.
+
+The United States has long been a partner and ally for countries in LAC. Communication and partnership will be of the utmost importance for a grand strategy built for an era of renewed geopolitical competition, and aiming to protect LAC’s democratic traditions should be a top U.S. priority. Moving beyond the United States’ national security interests to show allies that the United States has an interest in LAC’s economic development can demonstrate to the region that its long-standing partner will continue to be a pillar and source of democratic stability for decades to come.
+
+---
+
+__Ryan C. Berg__ is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is also an adjunct professor at the Catholic University of America and visiting research fellow at the University of Oxford’s Changing Character of War Programme. His research focuses on U.S.-Latin America relations, authoritarian regimes, armed conflict, strategic competition, and trade and development issues.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-57.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-57.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 57 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-05-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 林景楠接受何桂藍一方盤問 曾稱「面對制度敗壞」不參選進出口界惟因朋友游說再參選
+- 國安警假名開FB帳戶 曾於戴耀廷帖文留言「唔犯法都等天收」 警：無印象
+- 選舉主任指官員曾「特別提點」留意參選人言行 不信何桂藍真誠支持護國安遂DQ
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第57天。認罪被告林景楠今接受代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 盤問，同意2020年3月曾獲沈旭暉聯絡邀請參選立法會功能組別，林並曾提名何桂藍參加初選。惟林於6月發文稱「面對制度敗壞」決定不參選進出口界，改為參選新界東，他盤問下指會定義自己為「非建制」，並解釋進出口界選民多為建制派、他勝算不大，支持他的市民亦無法在該界別投票。
+
+法官質疑，法律界大部分選民為民主派又是否「敗壞」，林指進出口界多年均在無競爭下由建制派當選，且成為該界別選民並不容易，加上當時社會氣氛故使用「咁強硬」的字眼。林承認於新東初選表現不佳，而其後再宣布參選進出口界，是受朋友游說既然無人參加，而他有資格，「不如試一試」，但認為自己勝算不大。林亦指，不曾出席任何地區協調會議。
+
+#### 控方應辯方要求傳召認罪被告林景楠
+
+上周相繼確診的施德來和彭卓棋，今早仍快測陽性，獲安排於延伸庭就坐，3名法官均配戴口罩。主控羅天瑋表示，將應辯方要求傳召林景楠接受盤問。獲准保釋的林景楠戴深藍色口罩、身穿白色襯衫和黑色西裝從正庭門口入庭，延伸庭的黃之鋒、馮達浚均發笑，馮其後不停與袁嘉蔚討論。
+
+林在主問下確認他是於香港出生的商人，並已就本案認罪。法官陳慶偉續問誰希望發問，過了數秒後代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 站起身，指正等待看有沒有人會問，但似乎只有他有問題要問。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel
+
+#### 林同意沈旭暉3月聯絡參選功能組別惟無提初選 後宣布參選進出口界
+
+在 Beel 盤問下，林景楠同意於今年1月19日及26日錄取兩份證人供詞。辯方問，他是否於2020年3月獲沈旭暉聯絡參與功能組別初選，他同意，惟在辯方追問下指「我當時嘅認知其實就有關於功能組別，就冇關於初選嘅」，指沈並無提過初選。
+
+Beel 續展示林1月26日供詞，提及「大約在2020年3月，沈旭暉透過 WhatsApp 聯絡我，希望我可以參加初選功能組別」，林主動指供詞亦提到3月28日沈主持的協調會議「主要係傾有咩人出嚟參與初選嘅功能組別」，指此兩處均出現「初選」，解釋相信「當時嘅警員輸入錯咗，而我冇即時提醒返佢」，重申與沈的溝通「冇提過任何初選嘅嘢」。
+
+林同意，與沈旭暉接觸後，於2020年3月4日宣布參選功能組別，並於3月28日於新蒲崗出席由沈主持的功能組別協調會議，但除沈外不記得其他與會者。他同意會上討論誰參加功能組別，但無關初選，印象中也沒討論民主派當選後會做什麼；會上也清楚是由他參選進出口界別。
+
+#### 林同意曾支持何桂藍參選 惟翌日問區諾軒可否轉為選新東
+
+林景楠在盤問下同意，於6月18日曾於 Facebook 發文支持提名何桂藍參加初選，他亦有提名何桂藍，而當時他仍有意參選功能組別。不過到了6月19日，林聯絡區諾軒問可否轉為參選新界東。林確認此前與區有聯絡、區知道他有意選進出口界，而林亦知道要有盡量多民主派在功能組別勝出，才能達致立會過半。
+
+Beel 問區沒有嘗試游說他繼續參選功能助別？林指「佢有希望我留低，但冇好積極游說」，並同意他其後與戴耀廷就此事討論，區並告訴他可參與新界東初選，着他聯絡趙家賢準備提名，林並於6月20日宣布不會參選功能組別。
+
+#### 曾指進出口界「制度敗壞」故不參選 解釋屬「小眾」、選民屬建制派
+
+Beel 續展示林景楠當日帖文，提及「面對制度敗壞，我決定“不會”參選2020年立法會功能組別的進出口界選舉」，問「制度敗壞」是什麼意思。林解釋，當時接觸到很多地區選民，他們不能在功能組別投票給他，故認為是「制度問題」。法官李運騰問即他在地區直選的勝算比功能組別大？林指「法官大人，係有一定咁嘅諗法嘅」，但重申最主要是支持他的市民不能在功能組別投票，故他選擇參與地區直選，同意他在進出口界沒機會勝出。
+
+Beel 追問「敗壞」的意思，是否指制度本質上不公。林指字面上的演繹，就是功能組別「一直以來都係一啲指定嘅、或者合資格嘅選民先可以投票，但只屬於小眾嘅」。Beel 問他當時會否形容自己為民主派，林答「如果要我去定義自己呢，我會定義自己係非建制」。Beel 再問進出口界是否建制派才可勝出？林指據他當時所知，該界別選民基本上都是一些商會的成員，他們都是建制派人士。
+
+#### 法官質疑「敗壞」建基政治立場 林指進出口界無競爭下當選、因社會氣氛用強硬字眼
+
+李運騰問，所以林指功能組別制度敗壞，只是因為選民大部分為建制派，若以同一邏輯，地區直選傾向支持民主派，那也是敗壞了？此時何桂藍微笑。林解釋是考慮到選民的數字。法官陳慶偉續指，林提到制度敗壞，是認為制度不公，因選民大部分來自建制派，林答「係嘅法官大人」。
+
+惟陳續笑着以法律界為例，指大部分選民來自民主派，多年來亦由民主派當選，他又會否形容該組別為敗壞？林指「我聽到你嘅諗法嘅法官大人，或者我加多少少自己嘅諗法」，解釋當時看到進出口界過去四屆立法會選舉均在無競爭情況下由建制派當選，加上要成為該界別選民並不容易，「唔係自己本身有做相關業務就可以成為選民」，故形容為制度問題。而他當時使用「敗壞」兩字，「我相信都係嗰陣時嘅社會氣氛，所以我用咗一個咁強硬嘅字眼。」
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片：林景楠（左）
+
+#### 林解釋參選新東因在該區長大、與何桂藍同區承認「政治觸覺都幾差」
+
+林景楠續同意，於6月20日宣布參選新界東初選。李運騰問這區有他支持的何桂藍參選，他為何選擇參選新界東？林指「首先我想承認自己啲政治觸覺其實都幾差嘅」，並指他參選新界東，是因他自小在該區長大、是該區選民，而他作為商人當時在新界東有約7間分店，故經常會在該區與市民和顧客溝通。
+
+Beel 並指，帖文亦提及「功能組別、議會制度上的不堪」，問是什麼意思。惟陳慶偉打斷指已問過相關問題，不認為需重複，又指知道這基本上是小圈子選舉，而且合資格選民有限，因而有不公的情況，「我想我們全都明白。」
+
+Beel 續指，林在帖文亦提到「議會上議員放棄投票」是他轉為選地區直選的主因，林解釋是指非建制派議員。他不太記得當時他們就什麼議案棄權，但「我自己覺得議員係應該有佢哋嘅取態，而唔係投棄權票」。
+
+#### 林稱朋友游說下重返進出口界參選 但截止日才獲足夠提名
+
+在 Beel 盤問下，林承認自己在7月初選的成績不佳，得票排名無法進入頭7位，其後他在7月27日於 Facebook 再宣布參選進出口界。李運騰問到，為何選擇重返他早前形容為「敗壞」的進出口界？林解釋，因獲身邊其他朋友游說，「既然都無人參加，而我有資格參加，咁不如試一試啦。」
+
+李再追問，林認為最重要的是否勝出，而非制度是否「敗壞」，林表示重返進出口界參選「係唔容易嘅」，因「我印象中到（發文）嗰一日，其實我都未有足夠提名票」，並在截止報名日期前才剛好獲得足夠的10票，即10個提名人。
+
+#### 林認自己無機會於進出口界勝出、不曾出席地區協調會
+
+被問到進出口界約有多少個選民，林表示應該有數千個選民或團體合資格投票。Beel 問到林參選時，是否現實地（realistically）認為自己不會勝出，林回答：「我認為自己係冇乜機會勝出嘅」，Beel 表示已完成盤問。
+
+另外，在李運騰提問下，林確認於6月20日才決定由功能組別轉為於地區直選參選，而在這天之前他並無出席任何地方選區的協調會議。
+
+林作供約50分鐘便由警員護送離開法庭，並乘車離開，他在不足一小時內曾9度稱「法官大人」。控方其後傳召證物鏈相關警員作供。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第57天。控方傳召負責網上蒐證的國安處警員馮小敏作供，她供稱2020年7月初選舉行前獲指示調查網上有關35+初選的資料，並因過程中知道戴是初選的「主要人物」而着重調查他。馮同意，其隊伍共用一個名為「鄧奇」的 Facebook 帳戶，「鄧奇」是假名，她並以此帳戶進行截圖。辯方展示警方截圖，顯示戴耀廷7月回應中聯辦譴責初選違法的帖文下，「鄧奇」曾留言「唔犯法都等天收啦你!!!!!」，馮指沒印象發出此留言，但承認該帳戶只是由警員使用。法官問，該留言是否可引致和激起（provoke）其他人的留言，馮答「冇錯」。不過據記者觀察，相關帳戶在馮作供後數小時已變為無法查看。
+
+#### 女警指初選前獲訓示調查網上資料 但無提及特定人物
+
+林景楠今早接受辯方盤問後，控方傳召負責網上蒐證的國安處偵緝女警員16117馮小敏作供。馮供稱，她於2013年加入警隊，自2020年7月駐守國安處至今，就本案她獲指示到網上搜集有關社交媒體及影片的證據。她確認自己負責下載及保存相關記錄，當中包括媒體報道和戴耀廷的文章，如戴在《蘋果日報》撰寫的「立會奪半」文章。
+
+馮稱，於2020年7月頭收到女督察訓示，需在網上調查有關35+初選的資料。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 問到，她接獲訓示時初選已舉行還是正準備舉行，馮回應：「我嘅印象係進行式，即係35+選舉同時間進行緊。」李運騰問到是於7月11至12日的初選之前或之後，馮表示是之前。
+
+Beel 追問督察的訓示內容是否予她印象有罪案發生（a crime has taken place），馮表示督察只是叫他們「多加留意」35+初選，並需要他們在網上各方面的媒體調查，以看看有否違反《國安法》。被問有否指定看《國安法》前或後的內容，馮指有關初選的資料都要搜查；亦無獲指示調查特定的人物名字，只要是與初選相關的任何人物都會調查。
+
+#### 女警指得知戴耀廷為初選「主要人物」故着重調查
+
+Beel 其後問，馮有沒有獲指示調查與戴耀廷相關的資料，馮表示起初只是調查35+初選的相關人物，而在調查期間知道戴是初選中的「主要人物」，因此就着重調查有關資料，但她並無檢視屬於戴的電子器材。馮曾檢視戴的 Facebook 帖文，但無聯絡 Facebook 服務商以調查帖文。
+
+被問到有否搜集證據顯示戴是帖文的作者，馮表示因見到戴耀廷的帳戶名後面有藍剔，以其理解是代表官方身份認證，但同意若任何人有戴的帳戶資料，該人可以登入其帳戶。馮亦負責搜集《蘋果日報》電子版中戴所撰寫的文章，但她沒有聯絡《蘋果》以確認文章作者是否戴。馮另確認不知道 YouTube 等網上影片是如何出現，以及內容有否經過編輯或改動。
+
+#### 女警確認隊伍共用FB帳戶「鄧奇」 截圖顯示曾於戴耀廷帖文留言「唔犯法都等天收啦你」
+
+在代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉盤問下，馮確認她並非調查網上資料的唯一警員。馬問到「鄧奇」這個名字會否喚起她的記憶，馮表示記得這是她用作截圖時的 Facebook 帳戶，只是「暱稱、假名」，這時延伸庭的被告起哄並互相討論。馬問其同事會否使用「鄧奇」的帳戶截圖，馮表示有機會出現這個情況，「因為呢一個係我哋隊共用嘅一個 Facebook 帳戶嚟。」
+
+馬其後展示警方於2020年7月31日對戴耀廷 Facebook 帖文的截圖，截圖右上方顯示帳戶為「鄧奇」，馮承認自己會登入帳戶截圖。截圖顯示戴於7月14日發帖文，內容為：「中聯辦的聲明指我協調此次民主派初選是『典型的涉嫌犯法』，我必須嚴正地指出這指控是完全不合常理的。」馮確認是由她截取。
+
+馬其後展示該帖文留言一欄，顯示「鄧奇」於截圖的「一週前」發出留言：「唔犯法都等天收啦你!!!!!」，並置於留言欄的最頂。延伸庭的被告看到後驚訝高呼：「嘩！」，譚凱邦「哈哈」地大笑出聲，並一直瞪大雙眼，至於黃之鋒則震驚「O嘴」，袁嘉蔚及吳敏兒亦有大笑。
+
+
+▲ 代表陳志全的大律師 馬維騉
+
+#### 官問留言是否可激起他人留言 警：冇錯
+
+馬問到這句留言是否由馮發出，馮立即回應：「我無印象」，但她承認只有警員而非其他人會使用這個帳戶。法官陳仲衡續問，該留言是否可激起（provoke）其他人進一步留言，馮答「冇錯」。馮作供完畢。
+
+翻查戴耀廷相關帖文，顯示相同字眼的留言於2020年7月17日下午11時32分，由帳戶「鄧漢其」發出，該帳戶有5名朋友，報稱於2014年9月開始在理工大學「建築科技及管理學（BTM）」就讀。不過據記者觀察，相關帳戶在馮作供後數小時已顯示為「目前無法查看此內容」。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷帖文下「鄧漢其」留言，發於2020年7月17日下午11時32分。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第57天。時任新界東選舉主任楊蕙心接受盤問，指2020年立會選舉提名期前，曾獲官員「特別提點」要考慮參選人言行會否令人懷疑不會真誠擁護《基本法》及效忠香港特區；而她在何桂藍報名後，獲政制及內地事務局提供其FB帖文，提及「義無反顧」反對《國安法》等，楊發信要求何解釋，何回應《國安法》多處牴觸《基本法》、衝擊司法制度和侵犯港人自由。楊指何的答覆「冇所謂啱定錯」，她亦沒有考慮參選人政治背景，但認為《國安法》已加入保障權利自由的條文，何桂藍的解釋不成立，亦清晰顯示她並非真誠支持特區維護國安，故決定DQ她。
+
+辯方一度提出，政府有意DQ所有民主派，惟法官質疑問題誤導，因並非所有參選被告均被DQ。楊其後同意，就新東8名參選被告，她裁定楊岳橋等3人提名無效，其他人則因選舉延後而未作出決定。
+
+#### 選舉主任楊蕙心稱獲提點 留意參選人言行會否令人懷疑擁護《基本法》的真實性
+
+控方今早傳召認罪被告林景楠及負責網上蒐證的國安警馮小敏後，下午應辯方要求傳召時任新界東選舉主任楊蕙心接受盤問。楊於1998年加入政府，2020年7月任離島區民政事務專員，並於6月19日獲時任選委會主席馮驊委任為2020年立會選舉新界東的選舉主任，於7月接任。
+
+在代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 盤問下，楊確認此前沒做過選舉主任，只在立會功能組別選舉及區議會選舉擔任過助理選舉主任；並指2020年立會選舉提名期開始前，選舉事務處曾向所有參與的工作人員發出手冊，清楚解釋根據相關法例他們在選舉中需擔任的工作，事前亦舉行解說會解釋。
+
+Beel 問楊就參選人根據《立法會條例》第40(1)(b)(i)條，作出擁護《基本法》及保證效忠香港特區的聲明，有否接獲特定指示。楊表示「記憶唔係真係好清晰或好仔細，唔係完全記得好清楚」，只記得手冊有提醒他們依照法例要求工作。法官李運騰追問，就何謂擁護《基本法》及效忠香港特區，當局有沒有提供具體例子？楊表示以其記憶所及，沒有特別精確地提及如何處理該要求，但相關官員曾於簡介會「特別提點」他們，要考慮參選人言行有否令人懷疑其聲明的真確性。
+
+#### 楊收何桂藍提名表3日後發信要求翌日回覆 不覺時間不合理因要徵詢法律意見
+
+在 Beel 盤問下，楊蕙心確認於7月22日收到何桂藍的提名表格，她3日後發信要求何就兩條問題作回應，涉兩則 Facebook 帖文，並要求她翌日下午兩時前回覆，否則會據相關資料決定提名是否有效。
+
+Beel 問給予這麼短的時間參選人回覆是否正常，楊指「呢個時間其實都唔係一個唔合理嘅時間」，因提名期於31日截止，「我哋剩低嘅時間都唔係太多啦」，而提問的內容也「頗為清晰」。楊又指，參選人回覆後也只剩數天時間，她除了自己考慮，亦要視乎情況徵詢法律意見。
+
+#### 楊稱從政制局獲何桂藍FB帖文、強調無考慮參選人背景只考慮言行
+
+被問如何獲得何桂藍的 Facebook 帖文，楊表示收到其提名表格後就徵詢同事，包括選舉主任辦事處、政制及內地事務局等；而何的帖文應是從政制及內地事務局所得。楊表示不記得政制及內地事務局提供文件的數量，但肯定全部都是可從公眾平台獲得的公開文件，並同意在她審視的材料中，只找到兩則是「有問題（problematic）」。
+
+楊供稱，在新界東的28份提名表格中，曾向4名民主派參選人發信查詢。Beel 問有否發信給建制派，楊強調「我冇考慮過個候選人背景是否民主派或者建制派」，只會考慮其公開言行會否令她認為沒有客觀意圖符合聲明的規定。
+
+#### 楊多番追問下同意裁何桂藍提名無效文件由他人草擬 自己同意並簽署
+
+Beel 續問，楊蕙心就取消何桂藍資格的決定有否索取法律意見，惟陳慶偉指不認為與案件相關，指現在並非對選舉主任決定進行司法覆核。Beel 其後展示由楊簽署、裁定何桂藍提名無效的信件，問是由她抑或他人所撰，楊指「文件係我參考咗法律意見之後，由我發出」。Beel 追問是由她發出還是撰寫，李運騰亦問是否由她草擬，楊僅重覆：「我只可以講，係參考咗法律意見之後由我去發出。」
+
+
+▲ 時任新界東選舉主任 楊蕙心
+
+李遂問，即有人草擬並由楊簽署？楊指「係嘅，可以咁講」。李再指，即有人草擬、楊閱畢後同意並簽署？惟楊指「我唔能夠直接咁講係定唔係」，指因草擬前亦有就個案的資訊、包括從參選人拿到的資料，與律政司和相關人士作詳細討論，惟李打斷稱不是指她簽署前無討論，只是想問是否有人草擬然後由楊簽署，楊再答：「個文件嘅內容係根據我嘅決定作出同考慮而草擬。」李不耐煩指兩者並無衝突，亦不是說她做錯，只是想節省時間，楊道歉稱：「係，對唔住，呢個我誤解咗你嘅意思。」李最後語氣稍重指問最後一次，不想再問，並問是否有人草擬文件後，楊同意並簽署，楊答「係」，鄒家成和何桂藍等發笑。
+
+#### 被問是否反對維護國安 何桂藍不同意惟指《國安法》衝擊司法制度侵犯港人自由
+
+Beel 其後展示楊蕙心向何桂藍發出提問的信件，以及何的回覆。其中問題一有關何於7月發表的「抗爭派立法會參選人立場聲明」FB帖文，提到「義務反顧的反對國安法」，楊問是否顯示她原則上反對人大常委通過《國安法》，及反對香港特區履行維護國安的憲制責任。何回應不同意，並稱由於《國安法》「內容多處牴觸《基本法》條文，衝擊獨立司法制度、侵犯香港居民受《基本法》保障的各項自由，因此反對《國安法》的單方面頒布及執行」。
+
+Beel 問，楊曾否考慮何的關注是合理（legitimate and valid）的，惟陳慶偉認為與案無關。Beel 指是關於其證人當時的思想狀態（state of mind），指何當時關心並認為要捍衛（upheld）《基本法》，惟陳慶偉指可留待陳詞，李運騰亦指選舉主任如何理解《國安法》無證據價值，她亦不能得悉何的想法。
+
+#### 選舉主任不信納何桂藍真心誠意支持維護國安、但強調答案無分對錯
+
+Beel 續指，楊曾於DQ何的信中表示，認為她就問題一的回答並不真誠（genuine），問是什麼不真誠？楊解釋，因何表示「不同意」問題的前設，但之後的解釋完全走向另一方向，指《國安法》牴觸《基本法》條文、衝擊法治和侵犯人權自由；但正如楊在信中解釋，《國安法》已加入第4及5條保障香港居民據《國際公約》享有的權利自由、亦確保施行法例時會維護法治原則，因此不認為何的解釋成立，亦不信納她有客觀意圖真誠支持特區在一國兩制方針下維護國家安全。
+
+李運騰表示，所有人都有機會犯錯，包括法官、律師及政務主任，楊是指何在理解《國安法》上有錯，抑或指這並非其真誠的想法？楊強調選舉主任職能是裁定參選人是否合乎資格，而她發信就是想從何獲得直接資訊，以考慮她是否真誠擁護《基本法》，因此何的答覆「冇所謂啱定係錯」，只是看能否從她的答覆信納她有「誠意客觀的意圖」去符合聲明要求。
+
+#### 辯方指民主派會全被DQ 官稱可指政府有「秘密議程」 惟其後指說法誤導
+
+Beel 指問題是楊認為何的答案是否真確，惟主控萬德豪指與案無關，法官着楊避席。陳慶偉問 Beel 的用意，指即使楊的評估完全錯誤，那又怎樣？陳仲衡亦指本案並不取決於其決定是否正確。Beel 回應，想指出何桂藍的DQ是無可避免，因政府會DQ所有民主派，沒有人能成功參選，林卓廷說「吓」。
+
+陳慶偉續指，辯方可直接向楊指出其案情，即政府有一個秘密議程（secret agenda），要DQ所有民主派參選人，Beel 指他會這樣做。不過陳仲衡指楊蕙心只曾向4人發信，與 Beel 稱所有人都會被DQ的說法不同；Beel 回應據楊的供詞，是因選舉押後一切才停止。法官指那是另一議題並下令休庭。
+
+休庭後，陳慶偉指 Beel 提到政府DQ所有民主派的秘密議程，「我認為不僅問得太遠，更是完全誤導（completely misleading）。」李運騰亦指 Beel 的說法與何的同意事實稱33名參選被告中，只有9人被DQ不符。Beel 重申由於選舉延期，大部分被告的資格尚未確定，李運騰指那是揣測，陳慶偉亦着 Beel 只問相關的問題，不要以誤導的方式指出案情。
+
+何桂藍此時走近被告欄，法官向 Beel 指其當事人似乎有話想說。Beel 索取指示後轉述何稱，「秘密議程」的說法並非由辯方提出，而是由法官提出。陳慶偉指他的確有用該字眼，但 Beel 當時也同意。何繞着手並一度搖頭，再步回座位。
+
+#### 楊指何桂藍就問題一回覆已清晰顯示非真心誠意擁護《基本法》 故無需考慮問題二
+
+Beel 其後再展示楊蕙心DQ何桂藍的信件，問她為何說明DQ理由時沒提及問題二。問題二是問何6月發表「墨落無悔」聲明書，呼籲公開簽聲明「會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫特首回應五大訴求」，是否代表除非政府回應訴求，否則她會聯同其他議員否決所有政府法案及財政預算案。何回應「否」，並指自己將按《基本法》及《立法會條例》等履行議員職務。
+
+楊解釋，當時是想何提供資料讓她考慮是否有真實客觀意圖擁護《基本法》和效忠特區，而何就問題一的回覆已非常清晰顯示，她不支持政府根據「一國兩制」方針履行維護國安的憲制責任，因此楊信納何並非真心誠意擁護《基本法》。
+
+楊並指，何就問題二的回覆「非常之簡短」，若要確立其意圖便要請她進一步提供資料，但由於問題一的答案已「好明顯印證咗我就住呢方面嗰個疑慮」，認為若再追問只是浪費時間，也不會影響其結論，故沒追問。
+
+#### 楊指不能單憑在FB說話、沒考慮仔細解釋下判定意圖
+
+李運騰關注，若參選人就問題二答「是」，會有什麼後果，楊指會令她信納參選人有意聯同他人為了推行政治訴求而濫用《基本法》賦予立法會的權力。Beel 問是否如任何人持有該聲明的立場就會被DQ？楊不同意，指因此要向何發信提問，清晰了解其真實意圖，因她不能單憑她在 Facebook 的說話、沒考慮她仔細解釋下判定她沒有此客觀意圖。
+
+#### 楊確認新東曾DQ三人 其餘5人提名未完成處理
+
+就被DQ的參選人數量，Beel 展示楊今年1月的供詞，提及有8名來自新界東的參選被告，包括劉頴匡、何桂藍、楊岳橋、陳志全、范國威、林卓廷、鄒家成和馮達浚。李運騰關注馮達浚並不屬新東，劉偉聰指馮轉為報名新界東。
+
+楊確認，她曾向劉頴匡、何桂藍、楊岳橋和陳志全4人發信查詢，最終DQ頭3人，而陳的提名則處理中（pending）；至於後4人，楊指因選舉中止運作，故未就他們的提名是否有效作出決定，也未向他們發信查詢，指他們應較遲交提名表格，有部分表格甚至未完成初步審核。
+
+#### 被問有否考慮陳志全其他場合發言 楊稱只掌握「墨落無悔」聲明
+
+其後由代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉盤問。楊同意，於7月22日收到陳志全的提名表格，5日後向陳發信，要求他翌日5時前回覆；至於另外收信的何桂藍、劉頴匡及楊岳橋3人，楊蕙心同於22日收到提名表格，3日後發信，3人翌日回覆，並於30日獲截提名無效。而選舉提名期於7月31日下午5時截止，政府同日晚上約8時半宣布立法會選舉延期。
+
+楊同意，當時尚未就陳志全的提名作出決定，而她只曾就「墨落無悔」聲明向陳發問，關注他是否有意無差別否決政府議案及預算案，同意這是唯一一份她掌握的文件令她有此疑慮。
+
+馬問，楊當時有否考慮陳在其他場合如記者會、選舉論壇的發言，楊指她有留意到，但「我當時掌握嘅呢只係呢份文件」，並未參考其他場合或詳細研究陳的言論。她又指其他場合言論均由第三者或媒體傳達，未必很準確表述其意向，加上她沒辦法將參選人所有言論「全部睇晒」才提問，故認為「倚仗參選人第一身所作嘅聲明係最直接同最準確」。
+
+#### 楊指不會考慮參選人往績 指主要視乎對信件回覆
+
+馬維騉其後展示陳的回覆，提及「我會沿用過去八年任期內的嚴謹態度，處理未來的財政預算案」。楊指知道一些陳的往績，但不是全程留意他在立法會的言行。被問決定參選資格時會否考慮往績，楊指不會，指她主要都是看陳就她提問和相關議題的回覆。馬問為何不考慮往績，楊未有正面回應，僅引上述句子指這是陳所聲稱的往績，「喺咁嘅基礎之下，我都冇任何理由要因為呢樣嘢而覺得佢冇呢個真實意圖去符合（擁護《基本法》的要求）」，並指就要否取消陳的資格「我未作到呢個結論」。
+
+陳回應中亦提及，從來沒有說過會否決政府所有法案及議案，又指若政府願意訂立落實真普選的法案、全民退休保障條例、性傾向及性別認同歧視條例和同性伴侶法案等，「本人定必投票支持。」被問該部分是否也與往績有關，楊指不肯定，因這是假設的情況，惟相關法案並沒有出現過。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全（資料圖片）
+
+控方沒有覆問，楊作供完畢後由便衣警員護送離開。警員一度阻止記者跟隨楊進入升降機，楊其後疑乘車離去。
+
+案件明早續審，控方將續傳召證物鏈相關警員。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-16-are-european-navies-ready.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-16-are-european-navies-ready.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Are European Navies Ready?
+author: Mathieu Droin, et al.
+date : 2023-05-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/78W618X.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Are European Navies Ready to Navigate an Ever More Contested Maritime Domain?"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Faced with increasing threats in the maritime domain, European navies are plagued by fragmentation and decades of underinvestment. What would it take to make them fit for current and future challenges?_
+
+
+
+### Executive Summary
+
+This report is part of the CSIS project Transforming European Defense. The goal of the project is to leverage the strengths of CSIS in political-military analysis and defense industry engagement to create a plan of action to rationalize European defense. It will develop specific recommendations for European policymakers to reduce inefficiencies and seek creative joint endeavors for European security. The project also develops recommendations for actionable initiatives that U.S. policymakers can engage with and push European allies to implement. This project thus seeks to impact policy on both sides of the Atlantic.
+
+Although the war in Ukraine has put the emphasis on land warfare and the importance of controlling the skies, the naval dimension should not be overlooked. Strategic competitors’ fleets are growing in numbers, in tonnage, and in sophistication, and they increasingly contest maritime borders as well as international laws and customs applicable to the maritime domain. Faced with overlapping challenges, European navies are plagued by a number of issues such as poor availability of assets, lack of combat readiness, aging platforms, fragmentation, and insufficient coordination. This report outlines the main threats and challenges that Europeans face at sea and details the gaps in capabilities before providing recommendations for how to fill those gaps.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+As the Cold War became history, so did the prospect of conventional conflict at sea against a peer competitor — or so most Western capitals believed. The post–Cold War peace dividend ushered in decades of dwindling investment in naval capabilities and a refocus on low-end missions for Western nations. This contrasted with a massive naval investment by yet-to-become rivals, China and Russia. As Europeans awaken to a new era of strategic competition, they now face a highly threatening maritime environment.
+
+Strategic competitors’ fleets are growing in numbers, in tonnage, and in sophistication; further, there is a proliferation of advanced missiles, sensors, and autonomous weapons, along with the application of disruptive technologies such as cyber and artificial intelligence (AI). A more assertive China is now at the helm of one of the largest navies in the world. The war in Ukraine has so far left Russia’s naval capabilities largely untouched. In addition to a buildup of capabilities, strategic competitors increasingly contest maritime borders as well as international laws and customs applicable to the maritime domain. Once unfathomable, modern naval warfare is now not so distant or unlikely of a prospect.
+
+Although the war in Ukraine has put the emphasis on land warfare and the importance of controlling the skies, the naval dimension should not be overlooked. In the first weeks of the conflict, Russia quickly moved to block Ukrainian ports, laid sea mines, deployed its nuclear submarines, and effectively launched Kalibr missile strikes from the sea. Subsequent missile, drone, and autonomous vessel attacks by Ukraine on Russian forces — as well as decisions by Turkey to restrict access to the Bosporus Strait and the Dardanelles — have considerably hampered Russian maneuvers, showing the importance of controlling key choke points.
+
+Europe has an economy equivalent in size to the United States or China, and its members combined have the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the world. More than 75 percent of European imports enter by sea and 99 percent of its data is provided through undersea cables, while Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. Europe is therefore a global economic power with immense interest in maintaining free and open seas and respect for international maritime laws and norms, whether in the Indo-Pacific, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, or the Arctic.
+
+Yet maritime security is now affected by challenges of increasing diversity and intensity. Unfortunately, the state of European navies is largely consistent with the broader state of European defense. Europe’s navies have suffered underinvestment for years, if not decades. The European naval landscape amounts to patchy, isolated, and often unconcerted national efforts. European navies are plagued by a number of issues such as poor availability of assets, lack of combat readiness, aging platforms, fragmentation, and insufficient coordination. Should a scenario of high-intensity warfare arise, European navies would likely be underequipped and underprepared.
+
+As shown by the EU Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept, Europeans are aware of the need to step up to this new strategic environment. Additionally, navies continue to play a vital diplomatic role, whether in the form of ship visits, naval exercises, or freedom of navigation operations. These activities send important messages to allies and partners — as well as to adversaries — about Europe’s strength, its dependability, and its resolve. Conversely, Europe’s lack of naval capacity means that Europe struggles to ensure the necessary level of presence at sea, undercutting its broader diplomatic standing. As Europe focuses on rebuilding its armies and air forces for a Russia contingency, it cannot neglect the naval domain.
+
+But maintaining a strong naval capacity is a resource-intensive effort, and it comes at a time when every segment of Europe’s militaries calls for renewed investments, putting strain on still limited budgets.
+
+European navies are facing several dilemmas. They must deal simultaneously with increased security threats along their shores and the need to increase their presence further away in order to protect sea lines of communication, their key interests, and the interests of their partners abroad, all of which can take them very far from their territory. Currently, due to its shrinking naval capacity, Europe has difficulties ensuring a permanent presence at sea in critical areas, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. It must invest in high-end capabilities to stand up to key competitors, but European countries also cannot afford to relinquish their assets for coast guard functions or neglect daily issues that can disrupt their vital supplies or could result in humanitarian catastrophe. There is a danger, as focus goes to rebuilding Europe’s armies, air forces, and missile defense capacities, that European navies will be deprived of investment.
+
+In this context, this report explores ways to rationalize efforts to adapt European navies to this new and fast-evolving environment.
+
+
+### Threats in the Maritime Domain
+
+_Increasingly Intense and Diverse_
+
+While strategic competition on and below the seas is shaping maritime security, lower-end issues such as piracy, migration, and organized crime at sea have not disappeared — quite the contrary. These challenges are compounded by the effects of climate change and overfishing, which have evolved into the top concerns in some areas.
+
+#### Strategic Competition at Sea
+
+Powers aspiring to contest the world order are investing massively in their navies, equipping their warships with more diverse, advanced, and complex combat systems to gain a capability edge. They simultaneously call into question the laws, rules, and practices applicable to the maritime domain. The increased propensity for uninhibited aggression in sea lines of communication vital for Europe has been underlined by naval “incidents” such as the Iranian attacks on tankers in the Gulf in 2019 or some tense encounters in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
+
+__RUSSIA__
+
+The Kremlin has long sought to counterbalance the perceived superiority of its peers in terms of tonnage, number of ships, and force projection capabilities. The navy of the Russian Federation (Voyenno-morskoiflot, VMF) has developed highly capable submarines (such as the recently commissioned Project 08851 Yasen-M SSGN and Project 955A Borey-A SSBN) and powerful offensive missile systems with nuclear-tipped torpedo capability. Although it lost its Black Sea flagship — the Slava-class surface ship Moskva — two months into the conflict in Ukraine (the first destruction of a major warship in combat since the British frigate Sheffield during the Falklands war 40 years ago), the VMF is the only corps of the Russian armed forces that remains largely untouched by the war in Ukraine.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: The Russian Threat Axis.__ Note: The threat axis (defined by the red dashed lines) show the routes that NATO and the European Union will need to monitor for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This will provide critical warnings and indicators of Russia’s maritime activities. Source: Authors’ research and analysis._
+
+Moreover, it plans significant additions in the coming years, as it is working on the Surrogate-W unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) and on modernizing the fleet’s anti-ship missile capabilities through a process known as “Kalibrisation”: the widespread equipment of 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles on a variety of vessels. This adds to the 3M22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missile, which is still in development and allegedly capable of Mach 9 speeds with a 1,000 km range.
+
+The VMF is therefore set to evolve as the most critical naval threat to Europeans, with its ability to pose strategic dilemmas, to employ an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, and to eventually engage in naval warfare with significant symmetric and asymmetric assets. However, it is unclear whether Russia will be able to maintain its modernization plans. Russia will likely prioritize the war in Ukraine, limiting the availability of certain assets like missiles. Its defense industries might also struggle to access or replace Western parts and components critical to its naval modernization.
+
+__CHINA__
+
+China has built a modern navy at great speed and now operates the largest navy in the world (in terms of number of ships, not tonnage, in which it remains second to the United States). Contrary to Europeans, the investment in modern capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army Navy has been underway for more than 25 years. It now possesses three aircraft carriers and has been moving rapidly to fill a gap in amphibious capability.
+
+According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the overall battle force of China’s navy is expected to grow to 400 ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030 (compared to 290 for the United States by 2030), along with 5 aircraft carriers and 10 ballistic missile subs. China’s military modernization effort is aimed at asserting Chinese claims in what Beijing perceives as its hinterland: Taiwan and near-seas regions, particularly the South China Sea. This alone has the potential to affect Europeans, as it would give China leverage over key sea lanes of communication — 30 percent of global trade goes through the South China Sea.
+
+Challenges posed by China are not limited to the Indo-Pacific. Beijing is also developing vessels capable of sailing far from its shores (a “blue-water navy”). It established in 2017 its first overseas military base in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa. It simultaneously invests in dual-use infrastructures on key sea lanes of communication along its Belt and Road Initiative and in important ports in Europe (Piraeus, Hamburg), potentially developing facilities that China can use to conduct activities running counter to European interests (from espionage to navigation disruptions). Chinese navy ships are also conducting an increasing number of operations in the waters surrounding Europe, including the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea.
+
+__NORTH KOREA, IRAN, AND OTHERS__
+
+Other countries overtly challenge the international rules-based order and have also invested in their naval capabilities. The North Korean navy is tied to the nuclear program via Kim Jong-un’s personalized push for a submarine-based second-strike capability. It maintains one of the world’s largest submarine fleets, with estimates ranging from between 60 and 80 vessels, although these are mostly coastal and aging. It cooperates actively with China — notably because the navy plays a preeminent role in fishing, a sector in which Beijing’s interests are enmeshed with those of the Korean peninsula. The Islamic Republic of Iran has embraced a hybrid strategy combining conventional naval power — including capability buildup, such as the delivery of its Shahid Soleimani catamaran missile corvette in 2022 — and asymmetric warfare through thousands of heavily armed speedboats or sabotage activities against commercial vessels or offshore energy infrastructures. It has also instituted joint drills with Russia in the northern Indian Ocean.
+
+__KEY CHOKE POINTS__
+
+Strategic competition at sea is also defined to a large extent by the ability to control critical sea lines of communication and key choke points. Control of the Bosporous Strait is a major asset: for example, during the war in Ukraine, Turkey implemented Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention, restricting warships from accessing the Black Sea. In this regard, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz are major Achilles’ heels for European countries, especially as rivals and competitors are trying to get footholds in the northern Indian Ocean, through which transits half of the value of the trade between the European Union and Asia. This underlines the importance of relations with countries such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
+
+The regional situation in the eastern Mediterranean is also extremely volatile, with competing claims over resources and EEZs opposing all littoral countries (Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Libya). Although there have been some diplomatic breakthroughs — such as the agreement between Lebanon and Israel through U.S.-led, French-supported efforts — the majority of maritime boundaries in this region are not demarcated, and those that have been agreed bilaterally are contested by other countries in the area. Renewed tensions could therefore arise, as the situation frustrates the exploration, exploitation, and commercialization potential deriving from the substantial hydrocarbon resources present in this part of the world.
+
+Turkey, although a NATO ally, has repeatedly provoked diplomatic or security incidents in recent years with other European allies and EU members in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has a revisionist vision of its own maritime environment, encapsulated in its Mavi Vatan (“Blue Homeland”) doctrine developed by admirals of Turkey’s navy. It lays claims on a continental plateau and EEZs that are also claimed by Cyprus and Greece; this is exemplified by the agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord in 2019 to establish a common maritime border, encroaching on Greece’s claimed EEZ. The matter is compounded by the large presence of hydrocarbons in disputed areas, leading Turkey to conduct illegal exploration and drilling — in which operating ships are escorted by Turkish military vessels — as part of a broader pattern of aggressive and assertive behavior at sea to advance its interests.
+
+With new routes and economic opportunities arising from the receding of Arctic ice, the High North is also set to be increasingly disputed. Russia released a new Maritime Doctrine in July 2022 that presents the region as its most important focus, pledging to protect its waters “by all means.” This includes the introduction of new missile capabilities for its Northern Fleet, an increasing number of exercises, and the buildup of the largest icebreakers fleet, some of which are Kalibr-capable. Russia’s combined A2/AD and new offensive capabilities increase the vulnerability of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and expose neighboring Arctic countries such as Norway or Finland. In any NATO-Russia conflict, protecting this sea lane — and therefore the maritime link between North America and Europe — will be vital to the alliance.
+
+Europeans also have increasing stakes in the Indo-Pacific, as the region is key for the future of Europe’s prosperity and security. Some countries have direct interests in the region, such as France through its overseas territories and its permanent military bases in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans; others are less directly concerned but acknowledge it as the epicenter of strategic and systemic competition as well as the top priority for their key ally, the United States.
+
+
+_▲ Soldiers of the Naval Special Forces Command take part in a boarding demonstration on board a frigate during the inaugural visit of the German defence minister to the German navy (Deutsche Marine) at the naval base in Eckernförde, northern Germany, on February 21, 2023._
+
+Recent years have seen an unprecedented concentration of European warships in the region, including from “non-usual suspects” such as Germany with its Bayern frigate historical voyage across the region or the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate Evertsen in support of the UK-led Carrier Strike Group in 2021. The geographical immensity of the area and an array of further challenges will represent a litmus test for European assets’ availability and projectability. As emphasized by the simultaneous, uncoordinated announcement of the AUKUS security partnership and the EU Indo-Pacific strategy on September 15, 2021, there are strategic dilemmas for European countries between aligning on U.S. interests and policies in the region or charting an alternative, autonomous path.
+
+__NON-STATE FACTORS__
+
+In the meantime, piracy and criminality at sea (armed robbery, kidnapping of seafarers, bunkering, etc.) have not disappeared. Hotspots and methods are constantly evolving: while the northern Indian Ocean was the main nest of piracy in the 2010s, notably off the coasts of Somalia, the numbers of attacks has constantly decreased in the region (from 200 in 2011 to only a handful in recent years) with the aid of European action through EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta, which began in 2008. The new piracy hotbed in the past few years has been the Gulf of Guinea, while high rates of criminality at sea remain in areas such as the Caribbean or the Malacca Strait.
+
+Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, largely driven by Chinese and Asian demand that induces fisheries to look for resources further afield, is also an increasing source of tensions. By depleting fish stocks, it can have a dramatic impact for some local communities that heavily rely on products from the sea for their daily needs (such as those in the Gulf of Guinea, the southern Indian Ocean, or Southeast Asia).
+
+Illegal migrations by sea, human trafficking, and smuggling also take a heavy toll: First, in human lives, with deaths in the thousands each year on migrants’ routes to Europe (over 3,000 in 2021). Second, by mobilizing important assets, as well as human and financial resources. Third, because migration disputes can divide Europe and create unease over how to handle the issue, as shown by recurring tensions between France and the United Kingdom over English Channel crossings or between Italy and France over migration rescue operations at sea.
+
+Increasingly, climate change transforms maritime spaces and is a threat multiplier. If climate adaptation and coastal protection efforts fail by 2100, approximately 48 percent of the world’s land area, 52 percent of the global population, and 46 percent of global socioeconomic infrastructures and activities are at risk of flooding. It also results in a growing number of natural disasters, requiring navies to invest in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief assets and operational knowledge.
+
+Finally, critical infrastructures at sea are increasingly targeted, as part of hybrid attacks aiming at harming European interests while remaining under the threshold that could trigger a collective response from NATO or the European Union. Energy platforms or undersea cables that are key to the European economy are particularly vulnerable, as shown by the sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines or the mysterious rupture of submarine fiber-optic cables near France and the United Kingdom.
+
+These challenges and threats are increasingly severe and diverse, and tackling them all at once is an immense task that creates some dilemmas for European navies. First, they must choose between giving priority to high-end or low-end capacities. Second, there is a tension between focusing on protecting Europe’s shores and surroundings and venturing further away, be it to actively protect key sea lines of communication, to defend the rules-based order, or to appear as credible security providers for partners.
+
+This report argues that European countries do not have the luxury to choose their threats. They should therefore seek ways to rationalize their collective efforts and capitalize on each other’s assets, as well as those of their partners.
+
+
+### The European “Naval Landscape”
+
+_Turning the Tide_
+
+Between 2000 and 2020, European navies retired a third of their main surface combatants (frigates and destroyers), bringing the fleets to their smallest size in recent history. European countries are now reinvesting, with a view to high-intensity warfare at sea. This includes investments in surface combatants, amphibious vessels, and submarines (see Table 1 below), but it also involves boosting their capacity for logistics, surveillance, and long-range strike.
+
+However, such capabilities are difficult to develop in the short term due to their technical complexity, long lead times to delivery, and costs. Each country strikes a balance between deploying low-end military capabilities for daily security tasks on the one hand and developing high-end war-fighting capabilities for worst-case scenarios on the other. The following section outlines an overview of priorities, and some capabilities, of the main European navies.
+
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Number of Assets of the Major European Navies in 2022.__ Source: Authors’ research and analysis based on data from the [International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2023 (London: Routledge, 2023)](https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance)._
+
+__THE ONLY TWO NUCLEAR, EXPEDITIONARY NAVIES ABLE TO ASSEMBLE COALITIONS: FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM__
+
+France and the United Kingdom are currently the two most important European navies — and they will remain so, considering their investment plans. Their navies share very similar features, being the only two operating nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines for nuclear deterrence and attack submarines able to launch conventionally armed land-attack cruise missiles. They have unique deployment capacity and experience among Europeans, sustained by the possession of overseas territories as well as a wide network of partner nations.
+
+Their strained bilateral relationship over Brexit — which, in the naval domain, culminated in the AUKUS episode which scrapped a monumental submarine deal between France and Australia — has stalled the cooperation between the two neighbors. There is hope, however, that announcements at the March 2023 summit between Emmanuel Macron and Rishi Sunak give new impetus to the relationship. The leaders pledged to fully harness the potential of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (a common deployable force that reached its full operational capacity in 2020) to move forward regarding the joint development of the future cruise/anti-ship weapons (FC/ASW) and to coordinate carriers’ deployments “to provide complementary and more persistent European presence in regions of shared interest.”
+
+__France:__ The French navy (Marine Nationale) is the only national maritime force besides that of the United States to operate a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, as well as the only European navy to include a catapult-equipped carrier. It has a significant surface combatant fleet, but its vessels are stretched thin over the second-largest EEZ in the world and multiple operational engagements.
+
+Key priorities for France include contributing to nuclear deterrence through its strategic submarine fleet and nuclear-capable embarked aircraft, protecting France’s sovereignty at sea and in its EEZ (mainly located in the Indo-Pacific), and maintaining power projection capabilities. The navy’s budget is dedicated to large-scale procurement programs such as the next-generation nuclear aircraft carrier to replace the Charles de Gaulle. Commissioning is expected in 2038 and is set to feature an angled light deck and up to three electromagnetic aircraft launch systems.
+
+France also plans the purchase of six Suffren-class Barracuda nuclear attack submarines (SSN) and five FTI medium-sized frigates, and it has recently received six of its eight — and last — European multi-mission frigates (FREMM). Overall, France is planning to have 15 frontline frigates and destroyers by 2030. France also plans to upgrade 18 maritime patrol aircraft (ATL2s) and three out of five La Fayette frigates. Several of France’s largest, most expensive procurement programs, such as the FC/ASW missile system and a new generation of strategic nuclear submarines, will not be delivered until after 2030.
+
+__The United Kingdom:__ London aims to meet its stated ambition of “restoring Britain’s position as the foremost naval power in Europe.” The Royal Navy calls for a doubling in shipbuilding investment over the next five years. The United Kingdom has the ambition to operate its two 65,000 metric ton carriers simultaneously and maintain the United Kingdom’s continuous deterrence posture at sea, increasing the number of deployments at sea by fifth-generation F-35 combat aircraft.
+
+In the surface fleet, the plan is to increase the frigate fleet from 19 to 24 by the mid-2030s with upgraded versions of the Type-31 and Type-32 frigates and Type-45 destroyer as well as a newly launched Type-26 frigate. The 2022 National Shipbuilding Strategy outlines a pipeline of close to 150 new naval and civil vessels over 30 years. While the United Kingdom plans to invest in a range of new weapons — including air- and sea-launched long-range, anti-ship cruise missiles — these will only enter service after 2030. The United Kingdom is also regenerating its fixed-wing maritime-patrol aircraft capability, essential to protect the nuclear deterrent. Through the AUKUS security partnership with the United States and Australia, the United Kingdom will help develop the SSN-AUKUS for Australia, which will be based upon their next-generation SSN design and will be built and deployed by both Australia and the United Kingdom. Building is expected to start before the end of this decade, for a delivery in the late 2030s.
+
+__WORLD-CLASS NAVIES: ITALY, GERMANY, SPAIN__
+
+__Italy:__ The Italian navy (Marina Militare) is one of the most important contributors to NATO and EU efforts in the Mediterranean Sea. The EUNAVFOR-MED Irini Operation is headquartered in Rome, while the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet is based in Naples. Italy operates the Cavour flagship with a carrier wing for F-35Bs, making it the only one in the European Union to have a carrier strike group equipped with fifth-generation aircraft. Below the surface, the backbone of the Italian navy is the four German-Italian Type-212A submarines.
+
+The Marina Militare is planning to acquire new combat systems that will increase its potential for naval warfare, starting with long-range strike capabilities in the form of cruise missiles fitted onto frigates, destroyers, and submarines. Among the navy’s most important priorities is to strengthen its anti-submarine capabilities, in view of the underwater environment becoming more congested in the Mediterranean. It has therefore ordered two U212 Near Future Submarines. The Multi-Year Programming Document for 2022–2024 also outlines the plans to launch de-risking studies for the two next-generation destroyers (dubbed DDX) to replace the navy’s two Durand de la Penne–class units by 2028. This is only if sufficient funding can be provided. According to the navy, the blurring of the domains’ boundaries requires a new concept for naval combat, which was outlined in some detail by the Future Combat Naval System 2035 in Multi-Domain Operations (FCNS 2035) concept. However, the Marina Militare remains in an early stage regarding sea-based unmanned platforms, as it operates only a modest number of small shipborne unmanned aerial vehicles.
+
+__Germany:__ While the post–World War II German navy has been mostly dedicated to the protection of German seas and NATO missions, it has recently extended its actions and ambitions, contributing to EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and sending frigates to the Indo-Pacific. Germany boasts the largest number of naval auxiliaries but is far behind the other major European navies in terms of combatant vessels.
+
+In the “Zeitenwende” context, the air force and land army will likely be given greater priority. Yet the German navy’s current defense plan includes major investments in new anti-submarine aircraft as well as more combat support ships, including frigates, five corvettes, two submarines, and mine-laying capabilities. Germany also plans to equip its frigates with anti-submarine warfare technologies. It has purchased submarines in partnership with Norway and it is pursuing a deal with India to jointly build six conventional submarines. Concerning its main weapons system, the navy is producing a replacement for its aging Harpoon stock: Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles. The navy is also working towards acquiring a submarine-based missile, while the so-called Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS) has been under development for many years.
+
+__Spain:__ Once world-straddling, Spain’s navy (Armada Española) is now modest in size and capabilities, and it very much depends on international operations to maintain its capacity to deploy overseas. It leads EU operation Atalanta, headquartered in Rota since 2019. In 2020, Spain joined the European Patrol Corvette project under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) scheme aimed at developing corvettes that can serve missions performed by offshore patrol boats and light frigates. In addition to the new Isaac Peral submarine class (S-81), the Spanish navy is expected to receive five F110-class multi-mission frigates by 2031. With looming budgets, however, Spain is likely to find it difficult to support its wide range of capabilities at current spending levels.
+
+__OTHER ROBUST EUROPEAN NAVIES: THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK, GREECE, NORWAY, PORTUGAL__
+
+__The Netherlands:__ The Netherlands will replace the aging Walrus-class submarines to maintain its high-demand submarine capability within NATO and the European Union. The Royal Netherlands Navy is also upgrading two of its four air defense and command frigates, which should be equipped with a new, more advanced surface-to-surface missile to replace the Harpoon. The Netherlands has also conducted national guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The country has an advanced domestic defense industry, including for naval ships.
+
+__Greece:__ Athens’ plans for its navy are mainly oriented by Turkey’s growing military posture in the Aegean Sea. The Greek government has approved a multibillion-dollar project to modernize the naval forces. This includes the purchase of three Belharra frigates. Greece has an extensive defense industry focused on the domestic market, capable of manufacturing and developing naval vessels.
+
+__Denmark:__ Denmark’s economy relies heavily on the seas and the country boasts the world’s largest container shipping company through the APM Maersk group. The Royal Danish Navy (Sørværnet) is notable for operating the Absalon-class support ship, which is unique for combining the features of a frigate and a landing platform dock. The Danish Ministry of Defence plans to strengthen by investing in new warships. The Iver Huitfeldt–class frigates (also known as the lead ship in the three-ship class of the Royal Danish Navy) have been upgraded with ballistic missile defense and integrated air and defense capabilities.44 In partnership with Finland, Denmark also seeks to improve future mine-laying solutions based on existing capabilities.
+
+__Norway:__ The Norwegian Fleet is composed of several types of vessels, including frigates, submarines, minesweepers, and service vessels. Some of the major project activities in the upcoming period are the replacement of the current ULA-class submarines with 212CD-class submarines in partnership with Germany and the order of additional Kongsberg fifth-generation naval missiles that represent the navy’s main weapon against surface ships.
+
+__Portugal:__ Maritime security is one of the key tasks of Portugal’s armed forces. The Portuguese navy (Marinha Portuguesa) aims to strengthen its means of surveillance by 2029, with the purchase of six new ocean patrol vessels in addition to the four that are already in service. The Portuguese navy has also launched a new drone mothership project, also known as a multifunctional naval platform.
+
+
+_▲ A German navy sailor approaches a Skjold-class ship from the Norwegian navy on June 6, 2022, as the ship participates in the BALTOPS 22 exercise in the Baltic Sea._
+
+__Sweden:__ Sweden has an active naval shipbuilding industry, able to produce conventional submarines. It has embraced amphibious capabilities for small-scale, special operations forces insertion.
+
+__THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO__
+
+The two main supranational organizations in charge of European security play a key role in supporting the synchronization and coordination of European navies’ agendas and strategies — a purpose they unevenly fulfill. As in other domains, the two organizations also face the issue of avoiding duplications and finding useful complementarities. They will also increasingly seek to be the prime venue to coordinate European involvement in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+__NATO,__ by virtue of its mission to defend the Euro-Atlantic area, is the designated venue to coordinate allied navies through its Maritime Command (MARCOM) headquartered in Northwood in the United Kingdom. NATO ensures a permanent presence at sea through its two multinational Standing Naval Maritime Groups (SNMG) and their two mine countermeasures equivalents (SNMCMG); it also plans major military exercises, such as Dynamic Manta, Dynamic Guard, and Dynamic Mongoose.
+
+In practice, however, since the end of the Cold War NATO has followed the general European movement toward low-end missions, launching its own counter-piracy effort in the Indian Ocean (Ocean Shield, 2009–2016) and maritime security operations in the Mediterranean (Operation Sea Guardian, launched in 2016 to take over from Operation Active Endeavour, which had been set up in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and is now largely moribund).
+
+The alliance is now trying to adapt to ongoing trends toward naval warfare, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. NATO has thus launched initiatives that focus on applying disruptive technologies in the maritime domain, such as the Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative to enhance the alliance’s capabilities, particularly in the areas of anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures.
+
+The European Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations (EUNAVFOR) along non-European shores, such as Atalanta in the Indian Ocean or Sophia (and then Irini) along the Libyan coastline. These have primarily been performing maritime security tasks, countering piracy, and conducting maritime surveillance assignments.
+
+The European Union adopted its first EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan in 2014. The 2022 Strategic Compass puts EU maritime security, joint capability development, and interoperability high on the agenda. The development of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity reaction force of up to 5,000 troops should include maritime components. The Strategic Compass also commits EU countries to expanding the European Union’s Coordinated Maritime Presence concept, designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas that are key to European interests. A pilot project has been tested in the Gulf of Guinea and is now fully operational. Consistent with the European Union’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which commits to “a meaningful European naval presence” in the region, member states have agreed to implement a second Coordinated Maritime Presence in the northern Indian Ocean.
+
+The Strategic Compass also commissioned an update of the 2014 EU Maritime Security Strategy, complemented by an Action Plan, published in March 2023. It commits the European Union to stepping up its action under six strategic objectives: activities at sea, including through naval exercises; partnerships, including deepening EU-NATO cooperation; a leading role on maritime domain awareness; managing risks and threats; boosting capabilities; and education and training.
+
+In order to support joint capability development, the European Union (through its member states) has sought to foster naval cooperation by means of PESCO and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence. Initial financing is coming from the European Defence Fund as a means to lower development, construction, and maintenance costs while helping the development of harmonized standards. It is in this framework that the project to develop a European Patrol Corvette by 2030 has been agreed upon. Led by Italy, with the participation of France, Greece, and Spain, the project is set to deliver the first “EU-developed” vessel of its kind. Other PESCO projects also aim at developing technologies for the maritime domain. These include the Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System, coordinated by Portugal, along with the project led by Belgium in cooperation with several other smaller navies for delivering semi-autonomous and autonomous underwater, surface, and aerial technologies for mine countermeasures.
+
+Table 2 tallies the numbers of combatant vessels available to major powers, as well as to supranational groups.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 2: Tally of Combatant Vessels among Major International Powers and Groupings.__ Note: This includes Australia, India, and Japan. Source: Author’s research and analysis based on data from IISS, The Military Balance 2023._
+
+__OBSTACLE: SCARCE INDUSTRIAL AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION__
+
+The naval shipbuilding industry, with more than a dozen shipyards, is still one of the few defense sectors in Europe that has not undergone any major consolidation in recent decades. Industrial cooperation has proven challenging for Europeans eager to defend and promote their national defense industrial base. Each of the large shipbuilding countries has its own industrial champion, often partly owned by the state. Shipyards are usually large employers that generate a high return for the local economies. Disputes over the lead shipyard or difficulties in reconciling national requirements have therefore hampered several projects.
+
+Apart from PESCO, joint investments, procurement, and projects remain scarce. Europeans operate 29 different types of frigates and destroyers (compared to four in the United States) and 45 different offshore patrol vessels. There are only a few examples of successful integration, mostly between neighboring countries:
+
+- __France and Italy:__ In 1992, the two countries launched the Horizon program, which led to the development and construction of nearly identical advanced destroyers for the French and Italian navies, allowing for a high degree of interoperability. They further agreed in 2002 to jointly develop the FREMM, which has become a competitive ship for exports. They also cooperated in the design of the Vulcano and Jacques Chevallier classes of fleet-replenishment oilers. In late 2019, the two national champions, Italy’s Fincantieri and France’s Naval Group, created their joint venture Naviris, which leads the European Patrol Corvette consortium.
+
+- __Belgium and the Netherlands:__ The countries established a joint naval staff, based on the BeNeSam agreements, signed as early as 1948 and strengthened in 1995. They both operate the same Karel Doorman–type frigates and decided in 2018 to jointly build 24 vessels (including two frigates), worth €4 billion. They also agreed with Denmark to establish a joint command for their special forces.
+
+- __The United Kingdom and France:__ In addition to the ongoing FC/ASW project, the two countries have jointly developed the anti-ship missile Sea Venom through European missile manufacturer MBDA.
+
+Other significant bilateral projects include the construction by German TKMS of six Type-212CD submarines, of which four will be delivered to Norway before 2030, integrating missiles from the joint venture between TKMS and Norwegian Kongsberg. The Volcano long-range ammunition developed by Italian Leonardo and German Diehl can also be mentioned.
+
+The few multilateral examples include the Tripartite or Eridan mine countermeasure vessels developed by Belgium, France, and the Netherlands in the 1970s. Additionally, the small navies of the three Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — have established a joint naval unit, BALTRON, with small bases in each country.
+
+At the operational level, the European Union and NATO favor interoperability through their standing groups, operations, exercises, and joint drills. Beyond the European Union and NATO, however, some naval coalitions have been formed on an ad hoc basis. This is the case of the Joint Expeditionary Force ( JEF) assembled by the United Kingdom and based on an agreement with nine other European nations. Another example is the French-initiated European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz project. Aimed at ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Gulf, it brings together seven other EU countries and is headquartered in Abu Dhabi, UAE. France also launched the European Intervention Initiative in 2018 in order to foster common strategic culture and develop the ability to jointly deploy quickly in case of crises.
+
+Finally, some navies sponsor exercises that usefully put increasing emphasis on high-end and naval warfare, such as the French-led Polaris or Italian-led Mare Aperto. It is worth noting that even though this level of integration between various national navies remains unparalleled when compared to other continents, it is yet insufficient to present a united and fully interoperable European force in case of high intensity conflict at sea.
+
+
+### Critical Capability Gaps
+
+Many Western European nations are investing in “high-end,” technologically advanced maritime equipment. While these capabilities are important, emerging adversarial cyber and space tactics make European states vulnerable. Traditional maritime assets and “low-end” proven capabilities will be critical in the event of conflict. Additionally, these assets will be able to conduct routine law enforcement at sea — operations such as anti-piracy, anti-trafficking, search and rescue, and sea lane and EEZ patrols — while also providing warnings and indicators to counter malign actions such as tampering with seabed infrastructure or potential gray zone operations.
+
+Europe has a broad technological competence and high capability in the integration of complex technological knowledge areas such as sensors, propulsion, electronics, weapons systems, protection technology, and lightweight construction. But due to their tardy awakening to the risk of renewed naval warfare, European navies are lagging in a certain number of critical capabilities and systems.
+
+__Anti-submarine Warfare:__ NATO and the European Union need to ensure their anti-submarine warfare capabilities are ready to deter and deny any threat from a peer competitor. Investment in submarines is essential to control the undersea domain, to stand up to the acute Russian threat, and to have the ability to deploy to the Indo-Pacific theater to address the China pacing threat. The United Kingdom is making that investment with the Astute-class submarine, but others need to follow suit to have a critical mass at the European level.
+
+The industrial potential to increase undersea capabilities exists, as seven nations have historical roots in submarine production: France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Spain. France is the only European country to master the technology to build nuclear submarines but refuses to export such submarines for non-proliferation reasons. Industrial support and additional port facilities capable of offering maintenance can provide a much-needed strategic edge and control of the maritime environment.
+
+In parallel, investments need to be made in undersea monitoring capabilities, following the model of the U.S. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) network by placing hydrophone nets near critical infrastructure on the seabed. These networks, coupled with coordinated submarine, surface, and aircraft capable of combined ASW, can be instrumental. The United States will also need to share these warnings and indicators through intelligence centers that contribute to NATO and EU maritime domain awareness.
+
+__Uninhabited Vehicles:__ In the war in Ukraine, uninhabited aircraft have proven effective on both sides of the battlefield. Expanding this capability in the maritime environment will bridge the gap between the high-end and low-end equipment. Air, surface, and undersea vehicles not only can bring kinetic effects but more importantly provide essential targeting and intelligence. As naval combat maneuvers will be increasingly “uncrewed,” uninhabited vehicles are likely to serve as linchpins for systems integration, including in terms of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, or directed energy weapons.
+
+With few exceptions (the United Kingdom, France), national investments and PESCO projects are not enough to sustain competition with Europe’s main rivals.
+
+__Missiles:__ The Ukraine war has revealed the critical importance of munitions stockpiles. According to Jeremy Stöhs, after years of downscaling, navies retain only a limited number of frigates and destroyers designed for air-defense tasks. These warships are comparatively lightly armed and lack the necessary number of battle force missiles and corresponding vertical launch systems (VLS) cells to conduct and sustain high-end naval operations effectively.
+
+__Seabed Warfare:__ The seabed is critical to the European economy and way of life. NATO and the European Union therefore need to ensure that adversaries do not disrupt the free flow of commerce, energy, and data. Pipelines have already proven a target, but information-sharing networks or communications cables could be next. Admiral James Stavridis, former supreme allied commander of NATO, succinctly captured this resource war at sea: “There is now a vast critical infrastructure at sea, yet the United States and its allies have done precious little to prepare to defend it, including honing offensive skills to create real deterrence in the mind of any potential attacker.”
+
+The infrastructure, training, and equipment required to adequately defend this vital network will take years to develop. While Russia has the same problems, it has already started to fortify its energy assets in the Baltic Sea and High North. NATO and the European Union do not carry the same threat to Russian undersea assets that Russia poses to NATO due to the alliance’s respect for the international rules-based order. Russia has been suspected of tampering with seabed lines of communication for years, especially at the transatlantic node that leads into France’s naval base in Brest. Creating redundancy in these vital lines of communication is one investment that could prove effective, especially with the increased accessibility of the Artic. For NATO, investment needs to happen immediately, with clearly defined tripwires across alliances and partnerships.
+
+__Technological Innovation:__ Emerging and disruptive technologies have received considerable attention in the military planning of revisionist powers such as Russia and China, including quantum technology, hypersonic and conventional missiles, and directed energy weapons. The ideal modern warship should be equipped with a great number of cutting-edge sensors, countermeasures, and weapons that increase both its offensive and defensive capabilities, while relying on an advanced combat management system able to manage all systems and the incoming data — and to be connected to an integrated network.
+
+__Mine Countermeasures:__ The use of mines is a tool that leverages uncertainty to deter an adversary with minimal assets. Russia has the largest quantity of mines of any nation — approximately 250,000 munitions — and knows that its Western competitors are bound by a prohibition against the use of mines. Russia would likely attempt to mine the shores of NATO allies in advance of an offensive operation. The alliance must be ready to immediately clear those waters and needs to invest in demining capability to ensure that freedom of navigation is maintained throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.
+
+The accession of Finland and Sweden into the alliance will bring two highly capable military forces into NATO, whose strengths include mining and demining capabilities. The Gulf of Finland is a strategic sea lane for Russia into St. Petersburg and a strategic area for contested EEZ operations. Finland, alongside the alliance, will defend those waters and can contain the Russian naval and civilian vessels in port through offensive mining.
+
+__Amphibious Readiness:__ There is little recent familiarity of amphibious deployments among European navies. However, approximately 40 percent of the world’s population, or nearly 2.4 billion people, reside within 100 km of coasts, which will likely increase the needs for deployments.
+
+__Human Resources:__ A widespread issue among European navies is the lack of manpower needed to adequately operate and crew some of their current capabilities, or the ones they are investing in. This can have severe operational impacts as it can constitute an important hurdle to deployment. There is an acute need to plug gaps in terms of numbers and skills, through both recruitment campaigns and training.
+
+
+_▲ SNMG 1 takes part in Norwegian exercise ARCTIC DOLPHIN 2023._
+
+
+### Recommendations
+
+The above elements show that the European navies need to accelerate and expand their efforts, adapt to a rapidly changing environment, and be further rationalized and integrated. This last section lays out recommendations related to capabilities, tools, and governance, and it concludes by looking at what the United States could do to support these needed evolutions. This section purposely does not tackle geographical priorities, since the authors assume that European navies should in any event aim to have a global reach due to the rapidly changing security environment and the interconnectedness of challenges and threats.
+
+#### Capacities: Robustness and Flexibility
+
+__Aim for the higher end:__ The diversification and intensification of challenges at sea call for increased investment in capabilities that will help Europeans cope with the whole spectrum of warfare. When pondering prioritization, this report suggests giving the priority to the higher end, for the following reasons:
+
+- Of all the threats identified, “strategic competition” and the ensuing risk of modern naval warfare is the most “capacity intensive” and the one that can have the biggest impact on European navies. To sustain competition, European countries need to be able to have a deterrent presence at sea, and — if needed — to combat and ultimately prevail. High-end capabilities are what strategic competitors will look at when strategizing their approach to Europe.
+
+- High-end equipped vessels are inherently multipurpose and can carry out several tasks. They are therefore fit for various kinds of security environments. In peacetime, they can serve as deterrent; be used for training, exercises, or routine maritime security operations; and easily switch to combat mode if required. Vessels dedicated to lower-end missions do not have this reversibility.
+
+- Higher intensity does not necessarily mean higher concentration. There is indeed a risk in concentrating budgets into high-end combat forces: that European navies become even smaller in numbers than they already are. To conjugate robustness and flexibility, modern European capabilities should be easily dispersible, stealthy, and agile.
+
+__Do not underestimate mass:__ Facing the proliferation of combat capabilities coming from competitors and rivals, it is essential that Europeans be able to assemble a robust and deterrent presence in different geopolitical hotspots simultaneously if needed. To concomitantly deploy sufficiently robust groupings in order to efficiently defend their interests in a multi-theater conflict, Europeans need to have a critical mass of available assets — with their partners when possible, but also on their own when necessary.
+
+__Foster multi-domain approach and modularity:__ Naval warfare touches perhaps more physical domains than any other kind of warfare, as it extends from space, through the air, onto the sea surface, underwater, and down to the seabed, not to mention the coastal areas that are stage to amphibious operations. As suggested by Jeremy Stöhs: “Defense planners should consider fusing together sea-, air-, land- and space-based sensors (including unmanned platforms) to establish more comprehensive C2 and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) arrangements that allow joint, multinational forces to perform the full array of naval missions.” This multi-domain approach should be tested through training and exercises.
+
+Modularity should continue to grow to easily switch between mission sets by bringing on or off compartmentalized capability, such as mission payload kits for specific threats (anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR], air defense, and mine warfare, to name a few). “Bolt on, bolt off” capabilities could be created. For instance, with the changing ISR landscape, different nations can work at the speed of technology to field cutting-edge signals and intelligence-gathering mission systems. Interoperable systems that link into a variety of vessels can increase domain awareness — future capabilities could even see advanced weapons systems with the bolt on, bolt off design — advancing the concepts of containerized vertical launch capabilities but avoiding the legal minefield of making maritime vessels combatants. Modularity and the bolt on, bolt off concept come with their own risks. Primarily, in a contested environment, vessels may lack the ability to utilize facilities capable of changing payload kits. The second risk is that these concepts may not work for legacy platforms, likely requiring time and investment to field.
+
+__Beef up shore-based defense:__ Russian and Chinese examples show an emphasis on land-based A2/AD to advance and secure interests in the maritime domain. As some Black Sea and Scandinavian states are already demonstrating, defense planners should enhance land-based aviation, anti-ship missiles, and coastal-defense missile systems (similar to those responsible for the sinking of the Moskva); sensors (including space-based assets); and cyber capabilities to secure European shores. This particularly applies to smaller states (the Western Balkans or the Baltic states, for instance), which should leverage the potential of AI, semi-autonomous and fully autonomous systems, and other disruptive technologies to deny adversaries sea control.
+
+__Get serious about industrial consolidation:__ Europeans remain highly dependent on the United States for high-end capabilities, sensors, and logistical support. Although it is less a problem to be dependent on an ally than on potential rivals, Europeans first need to take their share of NATO’s combined effort to maintain a competitive edge. Additionally, in case of changes in trade and industry strategies from the United States, they need to be able to produce and procure their own equipment. This requires multiplying bilateral and multilateral cooperation. One key line of effort should be the integration and interoperability of unmanned assets through a “systems of systems,” which will be crucial in future operations.
+
+__Make full use of EU instruments:__ The PESCO framework, although still a fledgling project, has already shown its added value — such as with the European Patrol Corvette. This potential should be fully harnessed, especially when EU funds allocated to defense projects such as the recent European Defence Fund and the upcoming European Defence Investment Program are fully available, and hopefully significant enough to drive technological progress forward. New projects in the aforementioned “critical capability gaps” could be prioritized.
+
+This also applies to projects aimed at enhancing European readiness. As suggested by Daniel Fiott, a specific project could be dedicated to amphibious forces, “linking to existing and future [PESCO] projects such as ‘co-basing,’ amphibious assault ships, precision-guided munitions, high-speed craft, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and air power capacities.”
+
+__Build a European submarine:__ Building on the experience of the European Patrol Corvette, Europeans should step up their ambition and consider the joint development of new critical capabilities, such as submarines. The following options could be envisioned:
+
+- _A high-end, European-made and EU-funded, new class of submarines._ Industrial powers with a history of cooperation and national know-how on submarines could apply to existing (European Defence Fund) and upcoming (European Defence Investment Program) EU funds and think about the development of new capacities that could become flagships for European defense.
+
+- _An “AUKUS-like” partnership with a key Indo-Pacific partner._ France and Italy could perhaps harness the close ties they developed respectively with India, including in the provision or development of critical capabilities (e.g., Rafale jet fighters, existing cooperation on submarines between Paris and New Delhi) to develop trilateral security partnerships comprising of an ambitious and meaningful industrial project.
+
+- _An effort to fill intra-European gaps._ Countries with industrial capacities (Germany, for instance, with the Netherlands or Norway) could build coastal submarines fitted for the member states deprived of such capacities, such as the Baltic states.
+
+#### Governance and Institutional Support
+
+__Think of an overarching coordinating structure:__ Inspired by the Maritime Areas of Interest Coordination Cell of the EU Coordinated Maritime Presences, a light structure could be established to bring together European countries’ naval staff, along with representatives of NATO and the European Union, in order to coordinate deployments, engage in operational planning, or conduct exercises. It would allow the UK navy to participate in a European organization, and it would also be open for Cyprus and Turkey to join as long as they do not impose restrictions on other members. This body’s main aim would be to synchronize and deconflict respective efforts, with a view to ensuring a consistent and coordinated European presence at sea. Down the road, such a structure could evolve to bring closer doctrines, tactics, and strategic thinking more broadly.
+
+__Expand information fusion:__ Maritime situational awareness is a key enabler for European navies. Integration is underway through the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) project, which is a technical solution that allows dialogue between maritime information systems and is provided to 18 member states plus Norway and the United Kingdom. Building on this effort, Europeans should aim at a comprehensive and performative shared platform able to integrate upcoming technological innovations.
+
+__Enhance political-military approach:__ Deployment strategies should be more concerted between defense and foreign affairs ministries to maximize their strategic effect. This applies at the national level, as well as for bilateral or multilateral efforts, such as the commitment by France and the United Kingdom during the March 2023 bilateral summit to coordinate their carriers’ deployments.
+
+__Maximize effects through partnerships:__ Investing in navy-to-navy partnerships can prove highly beneficial to Europeans for several reasons. As European nations will struggle to significantly expand their global presence at sea in the short to medium term, engaging in operational cooperation is paramount to develop interoperability, to offset the European absence in certain regions, and ultimately to build new coalitions to tackle shared challenges.
+
+In parallel, European navies still have a lot of expertise to share and should emerge as the key partners of major regional powers, especially those who are wary of too close cooperation with the United States and are being courted by China and Russia — such as Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Indonesia, or Malaysia. Finally, building sound and confident relationships with countries along key sea lines of communication, such as Egypt, the UAE, India, and Singapore, can prove instrumental to providing against potential disruption attempts.
+
+#### What the United States Can and Should Do to Help
+
+The United States remains the centerpiece of NATO’s maritime forces. It therefore has a pivotal role to play in leading by example and increasing European navies’ joint warfighting readiness. It should at the same time encourage European navies to be more responsible and more credible on their own, to make sure that they are able to do their share in defending the international rules-based order everywhere on the planet. Recently, the U.S. Navy used the Italian FREMM design to invest in the new Constellation-class guided-missile frigate (FFG 62), modifying it to meet U.S. standards and navigating congressional restrictions on utilizing U.S. manufactured frigates. Despite the balance struck, this $5.5 billion contract in collaboration with a foreign ally strengthens the bond between countries, may increase interoperability, and shows other nations that filling critical capability gaps in a timely, cost effective way can outweigh national interests. In the future, that message and encouragement across NATO and the European Union will be critical to ensure that defense spending in European nations remains at a level that can support broader objectives.
+
+
+_▲ Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) 1 kicks off annual NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) exercise Dynamic Guard off the coast of Bergen, Norway, February 20, 2023._
+
+---
+
+__Mathieu Droin__ is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on transatlantic European security and defense. Prior to joining CSIS, Mr. Droin served as deputy head of the strategic affairs unit at the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MFA), where his work focused on NATO, EU Common Security and Defence Policy, and maritime security issues.
+
+__Courtney “Stiles” Herdt__ is an active-duty naval officer and current military fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and United States Naval Institute (USNI). He reported to CSIS as a federal executive fellow after his successful command tour, leading the world-famous Swamp Foxes of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron Seven Four (HSM-74) through two deployments as part of Carrier Air Wing Three and the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group.
+
+__Gabriella Bolstad__ is a former Stuart Center visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. She is a researcher at the Fritdjof Nansens Institutt, where she conducts research on U.S. foreign policy, Norwegian security, and defense policy, and transatlantic relations. She has prior work experience at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Yangon, and the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Oslo.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-58.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-58.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 58 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-05-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方確認傳畢證人 押5.29就共謀者原則作法律陳詞 拘捕警認不知何謂「攬炒十步」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（16日）踏入審訊第58天。控方應何桂藍一方要求傳召警員盤問，其中拘捕何的警員曾向何指，有理由相信她參加初選目的在進入立會否決預算案，迫使特首辭職，以達成戴耀廷在《蘋果日報》及各大媒體提倡的「攬炒香港十步曲計劃」，惟同意當時沒有獲發戴的「攬炒十步」文章，亦不知道「攬炒十步」說什麼。此外，3名國安警供稱曾按提交物料令分別從《立場新聞》、《獨立媒體》和《蘋果日報》公司接收初選廣告相關文件，惟有警員承認沒看過該提交物料令，對相關資料也不清楚。
+
+控方確認已傳召所有證人，案件押至本月29日續審，以待控辯雙方呈交有關「共謀者原則」的法律陳詞，何桂藍一方亦會爭議匿名證人片段的呈堂性。法官李運騰指《國安法》沒有追溯力，關注共謀者原則是否適用於《國安法》生效前的言行、及後來加入串謀的被告，辯方透露將提交聯合書面陳詞。
+
+#### 國安警稱從《立場》前總編接收「提交物料令」資料 涉民動廣告 惟認無看過提交令
+
+代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀甫開庭表示，上周確診的彭今早已轉為陰性，彭於正庭與其他被告同坐。至於施德來則仍在延伸庭就坐。
+
+控方今應辯方要求傳召5名警員接受盤問，其中3人均與警方於2020年12月24日獲高院簽發提交物料令，要求《獨立媒體》、《立場新聞》和《蘋果日報》公司交出資料有關。其中偵緝警員13344黎啟東於2011年加入警隊，自2020年7月駐守國安處，供稱於2021年2月10日獲指示到警察總部，從《立場新聞》時任總編輯鍾沛權接收一份關於民主動力在《立場》投放廣告的20多頁文件，包括 WhatsApp 對話紀錄、電郵記錄和單據。黎其後與鍾簽收，並要求他就提交物料令落口供，但鍾拒絕。
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 問，該份提交物料令是否於2020年12月24日獲得，黎稱「唔好意思我冇呢方面嘅資料啊當時」，並指他沒見過該提交物料令，不知是何時發給《立場》，也不知警方發出後有否與《立場》溝通，亦不清楚為何指明要提交自2020年6月9日起至12月24日的資料。
+
+#### 國安警稱從《獨立媒體》及《蘋果日報》接收資料 有警認不清楚提交物料令資料
+
+至於偵緝警員12131王錫輝，於2010年加入警隊，自2020年7月駐守國安處。他同意於2021年2月25日，有律師樓文員為《蘋果日報》和壹傳媒向他按提交物料令交出文件和一隻DVD，內含約200頁文件，包括吳政亨的「三投三不投」頭版廣告和初選投票日的網上廣告。
+
+在 Beel 盤問下，黃指「有關提交物料令嘅資料，其實我係唔清楚嘅」，指他僅於當天早上獲指示於相關時間到灣仔警署接收文件，事前「我係唔知道自己會收到咩文件，但知道同35+初選案件有關」。
+
+至於偵緝警員12381梁晉榮，於2010年加入警隊，自2020年7月駐守國安處，並獲委任為本案調查警員。他確認2021年1月12日在警察總部，接收由獨立媒體董事黃俊邦按提交物料令交出的12頁資料。與上兩名警員不同，作為本案調查警員的梁，盤問下指看過該提交物料令，知道是同年1月6日向獨立媒體發出，但不清楚為何列明要取得自2020年6月9日起的資料，指「呢個唔係我考慮範圍」。
+
+#### 國安警稱從圖書館及報刊辦 搜2019年6月至2020年8月戴耀廷報章文章
+
+梁晉榮亦負責取得和保存戴耀廷在報章發表的文章。梁表示於2021年4月8日，警員12656從公共圖書館借來276份從2019年6月至2020年8月的《蘋果日報》，他檢視後選取47份包含戴耀廷發表的文章，進行影印和掃描，其中19篇為控方證物；梁同年4月15日再從電影、報刊及物品辦事處取得一篇《蘋果日報》和兩篇《明報》的文章，包括〈35+已超額完成〉及〈中共對港的戰略及戰術〉。他確認上述文章與他理解戴就35+的概念相符。
+
+Beel 問到，梁搜證時有否特定的文章列表，抑或只是搜尋戴耀廷的文章。梁指沒有特定列表，而是知道戴會於網上發文，亦相信他會在《蘋果日報》或《明報》刊登，故到報刊辦和公共圖書館，按2019年的年中到年尾至2020年初選舉行的時限搜尋。
+
+Beel 指，除了文章作者顯示為「戴耀廷」，梁並不知道戴實際上是文章作者。梁同意「冇辦法確認」，但認為戴在 Facebook 和記者會的發言，與他文章言論是「大致吻合」。法官陳仲衡問，他是否察覺戴曾投訴《蘋果日報》或《明報》發表冒用他名字的文章，梁指沒有，並指「好多時佢（戴）Facebook 都轉載返呢啲文章」。
+
+#### 國安警指因有藍剔故信是何桂藍FB 官質疑盤問意義 辯方稱獲指示要求嚴格舉證
+
+餘下兩人涉何桂藍的案情。其中警長5820梁樂文負責網上蒐證，他2006年加入警隊，自2020年7月駐守國安處，2021年1月升為警長。梁供稱，由於何桂藍是35+初選的其中一個參選人，故在「Google」搜尋「何桂藍」，何的 Facebook 專頁「何桂藍 Gwyneth Ho」為第一個結果，他進入後以「鄧奇」的帳戶將與初選有關的帖文截圖，包括「墨落無悔」聲明、何宣傳謝票的街站和轉發她在《洛杉磯時報》的文章，均於2020年8月截圖。法官陳慶偉一度問Beel 是否挑戰以上證供，Beel 回應他獲指示要求控方嚴格舉證（put to straight proof）。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel
+
+在 Beel 盤問下，梁確認就何桂藍而言，只就此 Facebook 專頁截圖。被問截圖準則，梁指與35+初選案相關就有需要；至於如何得知確實是何的專頁，梁指因看到何的名字後有藍剔，故有理由相信是何使用的帳號。他在法官追問下亦指，對何公開表達的想法「大概有少少認知」，而何的帖文與之吻合，他亦比對過何的相片與專頁吻合。
+
+Beel 完成盤問後，陳慶偉指老實說看不到挑戰相關證供的意義。Beel 指不爭議該些證供本身，只是獲當事人指示就相關證供要求嚴格舉證。法官李運騰指明白他的難處，但若何桂藍其後選擇作供，她也會被問到相關 Facebook 帖文，Beel 重申只是嘗試跟隨當事人指示，他不爭議證物的真確性（authenticity）。陳慶偉指相信 Beel 已向何講述挑戰這些證供的後果。
+
+#### 警拘捕時指初選目的在達成戴耀廷攬炒十步曲計劃 惟認無獲發文章亦不知是說什麼
+
+負責拘捕何桂藍的偵緝警員18834黃柏烽其後作供，他2014年加入警隊，2021年1月6日駐守新界北總區反黑組。在 Beel 盤問下，他同意當天早上獲警長羅振威（音譯）訓示，稍後會就一宗顛覆國家政權案進行拘捕行動，並按照羅手上文件的內容去進行拘捕，涉及要向被捕人說的話及拘捕原因。黃指當時由探員1080負責處理證物，印象中獲口頭指示要檢取電子儀器，其他則沒印象。
+
+Beel 續引述黃的口供，指他拘捕時曾向何桂藍表示：「我而家拉你，罪名係顛覆國家政權罪。因為我有理由相信你喺2020年期間參選一個名為『35+公民投票』嘅初選活動，選出35名或以上初選勝出者，進入立法會議會，目的在於否決政府嘅任何財政預算案或議案，從而迫使行政長官辭職。呢一個行為，在於達成戴耀廷在《蘋果日報》及各大媒體上所提倡嘅『攬炒香港十步曲』計劃，旨在嚴重干擾、阻撓及破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能。」
+
+黃同意，進行拘捕時獲發有上述內容的文件，Beel 問除此之外，他當時還有其他與「攬炒十步」有關的文件嗎？李運騰追問，他當時有否獲提供該「攬炒十步」文章？黃指沒有。Beel 追問，「你當時是否知道這（「攬炒十步」）是關於什麼？（“At that time did you understand what that matter is about?”）」，陳慶偉亦糾正翻譯問：「嗰陣時你知唔知講緊乜嘢嘢？」黃答：「唔知道。」Beel 問，因此若何桂藍問到，他也不能回答？黃同意，亦同意他要請示上級才能回答，不過何桂藍當時沒有問。Beel 表示已完成盤問。
+
+#### 吳政亨與控方達成新一份同意事實 指曾以「李伯盧」網名於連登發帖
+
+此外，代表吳政亨的大律師石書銘指吳與控方達成新一份同意事實，望能節省傳召兩名證人的時間。庭上讀出該份同意事實，提及吳2021年1月被捕後被警員11632檢取手機，內有與戴耀廷的 WhatsApp 紀錄；而吳的 Instagram 帳號為「@LEEBAKLOU」，與「@legcopetition」相關，吳並曾以「李伯盧」網名於2020年7月17日在連登討論區發表帖文「N之内係正選 N之外係後備 就係咁簡單」。
+
+#### 控方確認已傳所有證人 尚餘共謀者原則及證人X片段呈堂性爭議
+
+控方確認已傳召所有證人，並指目前有新一份同意事實。陳慶偉問還有多少份，控方指尚有一份在傳閱，法官着該兩份稍後再一同讀出。
+
+主控周天行確認，控方案情將完結，但此前尚要處理「共謀者原則（co-conspirator’s rule）」的法律爭議，以及 Trevor Beel 就證人X錄影和錄音檔案呈堂性的爭議。控辯雙方同意，就 Beel 的呈堂性爭議，他會於下周一（22日）提交書面陳詞，控方於周四（25日）書面回應；至於共謀者原則的爭議，控方同於22日提交書面陳詞，辯方於25日書面回應，並於5月29日開庭進行法律爭議，預計同日處理剩餘的同意事實。
+
+陳慶偉一度指，在29日前他們可休息，Beel 指他們會在工作而非休息，李運騰則笑說法庭有其他事務要處理，沒有餘裕放長假。
+
+#### 官關注共謀者原則是否適用於《國安法》前言行及後來加入的被告
+
+代表林卓廷和黃碧雲的大律師沈士文其後表示，辯方團隊正在協調，將就共謀者原則為法庭提供一份聯合書面陳詞，主要法律理據是《國安法》只在2020年7月1日生效，沒有追溯力；個別被告亦會針對其案情提交陳詞。根據該原則，各共謀者的言行均可用來指證所有被告，而控方早前指並非本案被告的蔡澤鴻、黎敬輝和郭榮鏗均是本案共謀者。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲
+
+法官李運騰指理解《國安法》並無追溯力，而本案爭議點是共謀者在《國安法》2020年6月30日生效前的言行，是否可納為共謀者原則下的證據。沈回應將就此引用16個案例，並重申《國安法》無追溯力，問題是普通法下的共謀者原則會否被《國安法》所影響。
+
+李運騰續指，假設共謀者原則適用，尚要考慮被告在加入串謀前，其他共謀者所作的言行能否用來指證他，因被告於不同時間加入串謀。沈回應，不少案例均支持原先共謀者的言行並不會影響後來加入的人。陳慶偉最後指，就共謀者原則做決定後，辯方才可說明是否要求毋須答辯。
+
+案件押至5月29日續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-17-smallpox-eradication.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-17-smallpox-eradication.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Smallpox Eradication
+author: Nellie Bristol
+date : 2023-05-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/gFTXwVd.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A Model for Global Cooperation"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This brief for the “Advancing Collaboration in an Era of Strategic Competition” project explores the motivations and mechanisms behind U.S.-Soviet coordination on smallpox eradication, drawing lessons for how rivals can approach collaboration on issues of shared concern._
+
+
+
+### The Issue
+
+_In order to explore the specific methods and approaches that can advance U.S.-China collaboration on matters of shared concern, the project Advancing Collaboration in an Era of Strategic Competition, a joint initiative between CSIS and the Brookings Institution, is examining a series of historical case studies that demonstrate past instances of cooperation among geostrategic rivals. This inaugural case study examines the motivations and mechanisms of joint U.S.-Soviet efforts in smallpox eradication in the 1960s and 1970s. Even during the Cold War, it argues, the two opposing powers found ways to jointly advance the eradication effort thanks to three critical factors: the facilitating role of the World Health Organization (WHO), the fact that smallpox eradication aligned with the individual interests of each superpower, and the ability of health experts and practitioners to work in relative independence of political forces._
+
+Eradicating a human disease is an enormously complex, daunting task. Of the seven attempts so far, only the campaign against smallpox — certified as eradicated in late 1979 — has succeeded. The story is even more remarkable as the effort was led by two global superpowers engaged in their most pitched competition for the hearts and minds of countries around the world. Yet, even though the Cold War prevented collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union in its early years, it then became a major driver for smallpox eradication as the two countries sought to engage in practical applications of détente while demonstrating their respective strengths on the world stage. Smallpox eradication represented a common goal that served both countries’ domestic interests in eliminating imported smallpox cases. It also allowed the United States to embrace international cooperation as a counter to reputational damages from the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union to showcase its disease control successes. Further, the program facilitated the rivals’ continued competition for influence in developing countries while pursuing their shared faith in medicine and science as an engine of social and economic progress.
+
+Yet, without the binding force provided by the international system — in this case, the World Health Organization (WHO) — these impulses could not have been acted upon. As the public health arm of the United Nations system, the WHO provides a forum for multinational consideration of and response to common health threats at the ministerial level and through ongoing exchanges among medical and public health professionals. Further, it facilitates vital connections with local and national leaders and on-the-ground operational support that promotes health service access in the most underserved parts of the world. All of these assets came to bear in the achievement of smallpox eradication — considered one of the greatest public health successes in history.
+
+Although the world is very different than it was in the mid-1900s, the story of smallpox eradication provides an inspiring, practical example of how competing world powers can find common ground on common human challenges. Further, it illustrates the invaluable role of international organizations in facilitating cooperation. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and simultaneously confronts new global threats, including climate change and rapidly moving pandemics, human survival depends on universal commitment to international governance mechanisms that can bridge geopolitical rivalries and provide operating structures for effective action.
+
+
+### Eradication: An Audacious Goal
+
+The campaign against smallpox is the only successful instance of human disease eradication in history. To grasp the magnitude of the feat and the mechanisms required, it is important to understand what is meant by the term eradication, what is involved, and the challenges that have prevented other attempts from succeeding.
+
+Global disease eradication is defined as the “permanent reduction to zero” of worldwide infections caused by a specific agent “as a result of deliberate efforts.” The goal is not only to relieve humankind from a dreaded disease, but also to create a situation where intervention measures are no longer needed. This both reduces costs and eliminates potential adverse effects associated with disease control, such as rare but sometimes serious reactions to vaccination. For a human disease to be considered eradicable, it must meet specific criteria: it must have easily recognizable symptoms that are diagnosable across all geographies, infections must be limited to and transmitted only by humans, and it must be vaccine preventable or subject to elimination through other means.
+
+Only a handful of human diseases meet the criteria. Since smallpox was eradicated, the International Task Force for Disease Eradication has assessed more than 90 potential infectious diseases and concluded that seven others could be considered candidates: polio, Guinea worm disease, lymphatic filariasis, cysticercosis (tapeworm), mumps, measles, and rubella. (Recently, malaria has also reemerged as a topic, and the WHO has reinstated yaws eradication.) The criteria for an eradicable disease was developed through research and lessons learned from previous efforts. For example, malaria was the focus of intense eradication attempts during the early and mid-1900s, but its transmission via a nonhuman vector (mosquitoes) ultimately led to failure. Earlier attempts aimed at hookworm, yellow fever, and yaws also failed. A campaign to eradicate polio was initiated in 1988 with a hoped-for end date of 2000. Although the effort has reduced worldwide incidence of the disease by 99.9 percent, the program continues today, having now expended more than $18 billion toward the effort. Similarly, a Guinea worm eradication program overseen by the Carter Center has reduced the number of recorded cases to 13 in 2022. So, though most of these campaigns resulted in substantial (albeit sometimes fleeting) reductions in each of the diseases, only the smallpox campaign has been able to reach its ultimate goal.
+
+Although disease experts assert that “in theory if the right tools were available, all infectious diseases would be eradicable,” the endeavor is in fact not only technologically complex, but also in need of significant social, political, and financial commitments. Considerations include ensuring adequate resource mobilization from beginning to end without diverting those needed for other critical health priorities, strong political commitment from all parties, and identification of the disease as a control priority across a broad geography. Educational and advocacy campaigns are a critical part of a successful campaign, as eradication involves high short-term costs.
+
+Eradication requires ensuring that all people everywhere are no longer susceptible to the disease and thus involves reaching previously inaccessible populations in sometimes inhospitable terrain. Eradicators have employed donkeys, helicopters, boats, and motorcycles and traveled through jungles, over mountains, and through swamps. They have overcome civil wars, broken and inadequate equipment, vaccine refusal, and even targeted assassination of staff. Although many efforts face seemingly impossible odds, they also have their advantages. Eradication campaigns offer a clear, winnable objective; galvanize resources and attention for public health; and, if planned correctly, can produce longer-term health infrastructure enhancements. The smallpox eradication campaign, for example, led to the establishment of the WHO’s Expanded Program on Immunization, which strengthens immunization programs in resource-poor countries. Infrastructure used for the polio program has aided in health emergency response and broader disease surveillance, among other contributions.
+
+
+### Superpowers Collaborate to Eradicate an Ancient Scourge
+
+Smallpox afflicted — and often killed — millions of people throughout history. Historians estimate that as many as 300 million people died as a result of the disease in the twentieth century and millions more were left with deep scarring. An ancient scourge, smallpox was active from at least the fourteenth century BCE. Inoculation efforts against it first began in China as early as the 1500s. Englishman Edward Jenner developed the first vaccine in 1796 based on viral material from cowpox.
+
+An initiative for global smallpox eradication was first proposed at the World Health Assembly (WHA), the WHO’s governing body, in 1953. But it wasn’t until Soviet deputy minister of health Viktor Zhdanov brought a resolution in 1958 that the plan was approved. The Soviets saw the program as a way to take their own successful smallpox elimination program to the world stage while also protecting themselves from imported cases from neighboring countries. The proposal also served to push back on what they viewed as excessive U.S. influence at the WHO through advancement of a bold global health program. With its ability to visibly infect all of its victims, its lack of transmission among organisms other than humans, and the advent of modern immunization, smallpox met the criteria of an eradicable disease. Using a quote from Thomas Jefferson (“future nations will know by history only that the loathsome smallpox has existed”), Zhdanov argued that smallpox eradication could be achieved in five years if compulsory vaccinations were initiated in remaining endemic countries. To get the program started, Zhdanov offered 25 million doses of smallpox vaccine annually. The vaccine was freeze-dried — thus heat-stable and usable in a variety of climates without its integrity being compromised — making it a useful tool across the globe.
+
+At the time of Zhdanov’s proposal, widespread vaccination had already eliminated smallpox in North America and Europe, but cases were still occurring in South America, Asia, and Africa, and the disease killed two million people worldwide annually. Even countries with the disease largely under control were subject to outbreaks brought in by travelers from endemic countries.
+
+Although the Soviet proposal was accepted at the WHA, the move toward eradication was slow to get off the ground. The WHO was already deeply involved in a U.S.-supported global malaria eradication program that was not going well and would eventually sputter out. Malaria proved a much harder eradication target, as it involved eliminating large populations of disease-transmitting mosquitoes. Although the advent of the insecticide DDT made the prospect of eradication seem feasible, beating back the insect population to the levels required to eradicate the disease proved enduringly difficult.
+
+Impeding the establishment of the smallpox program was skepticism among some at the WHO about the feasibility of eradication overall, and of smallpox specifically, and concern for the organization’s reputation as the malaria program faltered. The WHO began studies on smallpox, standardized the vaccine in developing countries, and provided technical assistance, but its Smallpox Eradication Program initially received minimal funding and virtually no staff.
+
+The United States initially gave the program short shrift, viewing it as a Soviet initiative and concerned that it would compete with its own pet project: malaria eradication. Yet over time, as its foreign policy goals shifted, it changed its position. In 1967, the United States spearheaded what came to be called the Intensified Smallpox Eradication Program, backing it with financial and technical contributions, as well as personnel. With U.S. leadership and staff support from the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) — and bolstered with more than a billion doses of Soviet vaccine — the intensified program overcame multiple obstacles to record the final case of smallpox in 1977 and achieved official eradication certification in late 1979.
+
+Economist Scott Barrett describes smallpox eradication as “one of the greatest achievements of international cooperation — ever.” Although the United States and the Soviet Union drove the program, the WHO created a platform that allowed it to be truly global. Of the $64 million contributed in cash or in kind, $28 million came from 40 countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union, including a sizable allocation from Sweden. The United States provided more than 100 technical staff, but participants also included nationals from 73 different countries who worked closely with leaders and volunteers on the ground. Five countries — the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands — produced a step-by-step manual of standard production and testing procedures that ensured an effective vaccine was available worldwide, while researchers in multiple other countries contributed important findings to the effort.
+
+
+### The United States’ Long Pursuit of Disease Eradication
+
+The United States had long been perhaps the most ardent supporter of global disease eradication. The earliest campaigns were carried out by the Rockefeller Foundation, aimed at yellow fever and hookworm. Although both efforts failed, the image of saving the world from dreaded diseases remained incredibly attractive, especially as appropriate technologies proliferated in unison with U.S. global power after World War II. In the 1950s, the United States became a major financial and technical supporter of a WHO program to eradicate malaria, the organization’s largest undertaking at the time. The program reflected a U.S. penchant for technological fixes for social and medical problems and also served its geopolitical goals; much of the malaria campaign was focused on Southeast Asia, where the United States wanted to increase its influence as the Cold War progressed.
+
+Despite the disappointments of malaria eradication, and the concept of eradication falling out of favor in some quarters, public health officials at the CDC were eager to prove themselves internationally and had begun responding to disease outbreaks around the globe. Those forays were supported by the broader U.S. government, reflected in a 1963 statement from President Lyndon B. Johnson: “We have the knowledge to reduce the toll of many diseases,” he said, adding that the country should be using its resources and scientific insights “to avert millions of separate tragedies of needless death and suffering.” The CDC’s interest in confronting health issues worldwide meshed with broader U.S. foreign policy goals to support a remarkably successful CDC smallpox eradication and measles control program in Central and West Africa. Starting in 1967, hundreds of physicians and technical staff from the United States supported African countries’ smallpox vaccination programs — an effort that resulted in the elimination of the disease in 20 countries by 1970 and became the model for the global program.
+
+With the United States’ abundance of technological innovations — most visible in its space program — youthful idealism, and strong focus on internationalism, the early and mid-1960s were an optimistic and expansive period in U.S. history. Seeking to spread his vision of a U.S. society free of poverty and disease onto the global stage and anxious to bolster the country’s image as the Vietnam War dragged on, President Johnson envisioned a “Global Great Society” — an effort to promote advances in science, technology, and medicine as a cornerstone of worldwide economic development. U.S. support for smallpox eradication offered a relatively inexpensive opportunity to express that impulse. “As long as smallpox exists anywhere in the world, no country is safe from it. This dread disease spreads so rapidly, that even a single case creates the threat of epidemic. It is clear that every nation of the world, whether or not it has experienced smallpox in recent years, has a major stake in a worldwide eradication program,” Johnson said in announcing the program in May 1965. Building on smallpox successes in Africa, the United States offered dedicated funding toward smallpox eradication through the WHO and helped initiate the intensified campaign. The program was led by Donald A. Henderson, who had been instrumental to the U.S. smallpox success in Africa, and who retained his CDC salary while working at the WHO.
+
+In addition to aligning with U.S. foreign policy goals, smallpox eradication had appeal domestically. The United States was still spending $15–$20 million a year controlling smallpox with a vaccine that could have severe adverse effects. This meant that though the United States eventually spent $32 million on global eradication, the country still benefited in saved costs of domestic vaccination — and, globally, benefits outweighed costs by a ratio of 400-to-1. The campaign had domestic business appeal through a “buy American” approach and through potentially expanding U.S. markets. Activities funded through the United States Agency for International Development were required to use equipment and tools made in the United States. Additionally, the program supported U.S. aims of nurturing the health and stability of developing countries to create more purchasers of U.S. goods.
+
+By working the program through an international organization like the WHO, the United States could leverage its investments by attracting those of other nations, operate in potentially hostile areas under the auspices of the largely trusted WHO, and avoid perceptions of overstepping. “To carry out our own foreign policies under the aegis of the United Nations helps America directly, as we then get credit for practicing altruism instead of power politics,” UN ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said in 1957.
+
+
+### Russia’s History with Smallpox
+
+Smallpox had long been of particular concern for Russians, who lost millions to the disease throughout history. When an outbreak hit the aristocracy in the late 1700s, Catherine the Great arranged for inoculation of the nobility and championed widespread vaccination among the general population. Although deadly epidemics of the disease continued to occur cyclically, vaccination efforts continued and had a measurable effect: Between 1893 and 1898, smallpox incidence in European Russia was 7.4 per 10,000 people. It dropped to 4.4 per 10,000 by 1913.
+
+Even so, the disease remained a major concern at the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917. As a way to show its commitment to preventive healthcare, the Soviet government issued a decree in April 1919 instating compulsory smallpox vaccination for the entire population. The move had multiple motivations, from cultivating a healthy workforce to acting as a method for claiming superiority over czarist governments and capitalist Western countries. The Soviet Union continued improving the smallpox vaccine, including ramping up production of a freeze-dried version and ensuring widespread vaccination. Through these efforts, it eliminated the disease from within its borders by 1936.
+
+Seeking to translate the achievement to a global success — while also wanting to eliminate the hundreds of cases imported yearly from neighbors India and Pakistan — the Soviet Union pushed the WHO to initiate worldwide compulsory vaccinations in remaining endemic countries. Its contributions to the program included research, personnel, and the lion’s share of vaccines used — 1.4 billion vaccine doses between 1958 and 1979.
+
+
+### Smallpox Eradication and Cold War Politics
+
+The WHO ratified its constitution in 1948, just as the Cold War was beginning. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for influence among the world’s countries played a major role in the organization’s early years and in smallpox eradication. For example, in protest of what it viewed as disproportionate U.S. influence in the health organization (the United States was then and remains one of the WHO’s largest financial supporters), the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc countries dropped out of the organization in 1949. The nation returned in 1956 as Nikita Khrushchev came to power with a more cooperative international vision that promoted peaceful coexistence and friendly competition, ushering in the period of détente.
+
+The 1958 WHA marked the first Soviet appearance at the governing body since the Soviet Union’s reinstatement. Its global smallpox eradication proposal was a way to emphasize the nation’s reengagement with a bold move that would challenge U.S. influence at the organization and make its own mark on international health. Eager to welcome the Soviet Union back into the fold, delegates accepted the resolution.
+
+U.S. investment in international health programs, including smallpox eradication, was also largely driven by self-interest and Cold War politics. Johnson administration officials saw the programs as a way to highlight U.S. technological prowess and win “hearts and minds” in countries vulnerable to possible communist influence. As historians Marcos Cueto, Theodore M. Brown, and Elizabeth Fee suggested, “For U.S. policymakers, health work . . . seemed to provide an extraordinary opportunity to demonstrate the power of American technological expertise; to forge a link between health programs, modernization, and anticommunism; and to develop influence in newly independent developing countries.” As one administration official put it: “I leave aside all soft-spoken questions of humanity and brotherhood. I speak only of hardheaded self-interest. The best breeding place for communism is disease and poverty. If we are going to lead the free world in its fight against the bondage of communism, we have to do something about the health of these poor people.”
+
+Despite the Cold War rhetoric swirling above them, public health experts generally were left alone to focus on the humanitarian and technical aspects of eradication. Even though there were a variety of potential stress points between the two main supporters of the program, the sides were largely able to work out their differences quietly and effectively. For example, though Soviet leaders initially objected to having an American run the program, they later told director Henderson that they had checked him out and trusted his leadership. Historians credit Henderson’s doggedness and savvy diplomatic skills with keeping the program on track. When it was discovered that some of the Soviet vaccine doses were ineffective, for example, he was able to have quiet conversations with his counterparts in the Soviet Union and facilitate a resolution. When the Soviet Union wanted more of its officials hired onto the program, Henderson went to Moscow to help review candidates.
+
+Through approaches fostered and supported at the WHO, even while engaged in a pitched battle for influence across the globe, the Soviet Union and the United States were able to harness their domestic and geopolitical self-interests and their mutual interest in using science and technology to advance human development and produce a remarkable public health achievement.
+
+
+### WHO: The World’s Public Health Agency
+
+The WHO was a critical focal point for smallpox eradication and continues to play an essential role in global health. Understanding the organization’s purpose and structure helps illuminate the mechanisms by which the smallpox campaign advanced, and which continue to help address the world’s most pressing issues.
+
+As the directing and coordinating authority on global health for the UN system, the WHO’s primary purpose is to provide technical support to countries; establish global norms and standards for products and systems, such as pharmaceuticals and laboratory operations; and recognize and coordinate responses to health emergencies throughout the world. The WHO is governed by the WHA, an annual meeting of health ministers from the organization’s member states. Its executive board oversees implementation of WHA decisions, and the WHO secretariat runs day-to-day activities. Further technical support is provided by designated collaborating centers.
+
+Supporting the organization’s decisionmaking and technical tools are expert advisory panels made up of medical and public health professionals from around the world. These bodies facilitate a global network of professionals who develop relationships with each other independent of their countries’ geopolitics. Other key governance structures include six regional authorities, country offices, and field staff. Officials in these structures foster critical ongoing relationships with country leaders at the national and local levels and support on-the-ground operations.
+
+The smallpox eradication campaign depended on all of the WHO’s assets. Global disease eradication required buy-in from all countries, a commitment that could only be achieved through a UN organization like the WHO. The program required countries that had solid national immunization systems to muster the operational support and resources to eliminate smallpox from within their borders. Through the WHO, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries could provide strategic and technical aid, along with resources and vaccines, to countries that needed it. Other countries stepped up with research and laboratory resources coordinated by the international health organization. The WHO’s regional and country offices pitched in with operational structures and ongoing relationships with local and national leaders that helped countries facilitate widespread vaccination. The campaign benefited from a dedicated and focused staff equipped with the tools needed to succeed.
+
+Even though the WHO was able to marshal its resources toward the eradication of smallpox, it often struggles to meet the many expectations placed on it. While its complicated governance structure can get in its way, the organization also suffers from vast underfunding. Although expected to serve as the public health agency for the entire world, its current budget is about the same size as that of a large U.S. hospital and one-quarter that of the CDC. As it has from the beginning, it also inevitably finds itself embroiled in geopolitics, since it caters to the sensitivities of all nations. Recently, for example, as the Covid-19 pandemic spread, WHO staff attempted to pull additional case information from a reticent China while ensuring communications channels with Beijing remained as open as possible. The WHO was required to employ maximum diplomatic skills during the event but was judged to be too conciliatory and unduly positive about China’s Covid-19 response. The United States accused the WHO of being too “China-centric,” eventually leading to a temporary halt in U.S. funding to the organization.
+
+Despite its shortcomings, the WHO has proven indispensable throughout numerous outbreaks and health campaigns. In addition to its role in improving health services worldwide and providing data, support, and guidance in the face of health emergencies, it provides an irreplaceable forum for all countries to discuss common health concerns. While health ministers meet annually at the WHA, medical and public health professionals network regularly through the WHO via expert panels and other forums. Further, WHO regional and country offices provide ongoing support to the world’s poorest countries as they strive to strengthen health services. Under the WHO, experts from more advanced health systems are able to contribute to that effort while largely avoiding geopolitical tensions they would encounter if they acted bilaterally.
+
+Even though the United States in particular is a top bilateral contributor to international health, an effort as monumental and global as smallpox eradication could only have been shouldered under the auspices of the international system since it required universal buy-in, drew on the collective resources of a variety of contributors, and relied on an operational structure trusted in most parts of the world.
+
+Smallpox eradication was driven by U.S. and Soviet domestic and geopolitical self-interest and came at a point when both countries were seeking to showcase their scientific and medical prowess, as well as soften their images through international cooperation and humanitarianism. But achieving those goals, especially during the Cold War, would have been impossible without the international forum and coordinating unit provided by the WHO. As the historian Erez Manela has argued, “bridging the global East-West and North-South divides was crucial for the success of the [Smallpox Eradication Program], and here the WHO served as an indispensable forum. It provided an institutional framework for conceiving of disease control as a global problem, for coordinating a global campaign, and no less important, for taking credit for success that neither superpower would have wanted to cede to the other.”
+
+Indeed, of all the factors that came together to produce this monumental public health achievement, the WHO is still cited as the most critical factor. As the 1,460-page WHO-issued history of smallpox eradication argues: “The first and most important [factor for success] was the existence of an international organization through which a collective international policy could be expressed and which could call on governments and individuals in fostering and coordinating activities directed towards a common purpose.”
+
+
+### The International System Is Central to Tackling Global Challenges
+
+Through the WHO, and despite substantial bipolar global tensions, the world was able to come together to rid humankind of a deadly disease. The success was driven in large part by the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s ability to act on their domestic and geopolitical self-interests through the international system. The WHO served as a critical coordinating unit where countries could come together to provide collaborative leadership, strategic and technical guidance, resources, and operational support. Under the WHO brand, an international corps of health professionals was able to work toward a common goal in countries around the world, largely free from macropolitical forces.
+
+Although the WHO often struggles with its complex remit, it continues to serve as an irreplaceable forum in an increasingly interconnected and complex world. Yet, as a member state organization with no enforcement power, the WHO is only as strong as the financing and cooperative commitments it receives from national governments. Several efforts are currently under way to improve the WHO’s independence and strengthen country commitments to transparency and adherence to obligations related to global health security. These efforts must also navigate the bilateral dynamics between the United States and China within the WHO, as the politics of great power competition impact each country’s engagement with the organization.
+
+While the ultimate outcome of these efforts is uncertain, the health and economies of all countries depend on improved cooperation as increased population density, more animal-human contact, global travel, and climate change are resulting in a greater number of disease outbreaks and dangerous levels of environmental degradation. The scale and universality of these cross-border existential threats will require a renewed commitment to multilateral governance through the international system. Smallpox eradication can be a model as the world struggles to forge cooperative mechanisms to address today’s common challenges.
+
+---
+
+__Nellie Bristol__ is a senior associate with the CSIS Global Health Policy Center. She leads the Center’s work on efforts to repurpose polio eradication assets for long-term disease control and toward other global health priorities. In addition to an active working group convened to discuss eradication and transition as it relates to U.S. global health policy, she writes extensively on the issue and consults with other organizations focused on transition planning. She also writes about U.S. government relations with multilateral organizations, including the World Health Organization and the World Bank Group.
diff --git a/_config.yml b/_config.yml
index 34255b81..f275370f 100644
--- a/_config.yml
+++ b/_config.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
title: The Republic of Agora
-description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.27 © MMXXIII
+description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.28 © MMXXIII
baseurl: "/pen0" # the subpath of your site, e.g. /blog
url: "https://agorahub.github.io" # the hostname & protocol, e.g. http://example.com
google_analytics: 'UA-166928354-2' # agorahub-pen0
diff --git a/_data/archives.yml b/_data/archives.yml
index 65fa640b..1ab47bf9 100644
--- a/_data/archives.yml
+++ b/_data/archives.yml
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+- name: VOL.27
+ repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x1b
+ site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x1b
- name: VOL.26
repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x1a
site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x1a