From 8b06a49708ad4fd08d95b836413bbbd991b64891 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 07:57:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x18 Jan.12 --- .../_hkers/2022-12-02-the-taiwan-long-game.md | 117 +++++ .../_hkers/2022-12-19-from-freeze-to-seize.md | 251 +++++++++ .../2022-12-23-malign-interference-in-sea.md | 491 ++++++++++++++++++ .../2022-12-29-russias-new-winter-war.md | 80 +++ 4 files changed, 939 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-02-the-taiwan-long-game.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-19-from-freeze-to-seize.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-23-malign-interference-in-sea.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-29-russias-new-winter-war.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-02-the-taiwan-long-game.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-02-the-taiwan-long-game.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d7ae5da --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-02-the-taiwan-long-game.md @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : The Taiwan Long Game +author: Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass +date : 2022-12-02 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/AZHZDoj.png +#image_caption: "" +description: "The Taiwan Long Game: Why the Best Solution Is No Solution" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_For 70 years, China and the United States have managed to avoid disaster over Taiwan. But a consensus is forming in U.S. policy circles that this peace may not last much longer._ _Many analysts and policymakers now argue that the United States must use all its military power to prepare for war with China in the Taiwan Strait. In October 2022, Mike Gilday, the head of the U.S. Navy, warned that China might be preparing to invade Taiwan before 2024. Members of Congress, including Democratic Representative Seth Moulton and Republican Representative Mike Gallagher, have echoed Gilday’s sentiment._ + +There are sound rationales for the United States to focus on defending Taiwan. The U.S. military is bound by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to maintain the capacity to resist the use of force or coercion against Taiwan. Washington also has strong strategic, economic, and moral reasons to stand firm on behalf of the island. As a leading democracy in the heart of Asia, Taiwan sits at the core of global value chains. Its security is a fundamental interest for the United States. + +Ultimately, however, Washington faces a strategic problem with a defense component, not a military problem with a military solution. The more the United States narrows its focus to military fixes, the greater the risk to its own interests, as well as to those of its allies and Taiwan itself. War games held in the Pentagon and in Washington think tanks, meanwhile, risk diverting focus from the sharpest near-term threats and challenges that Beijing presents. + +The sole metric on which U.S. policy should be judged is whether it helps preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait — not whether it solves the question of Taiwan once and for all or keeps Taiwan permanently in the United States’ camp. Once viewed this way, the real aim becomes clear: to convince leaders in Beijing and Taipei that time is on their side, forestalling conflict. Everything the United States does should be geared toward that goal. + +To preserve peace, the United States must understand what drives China’s anxiety, ensure that Chinese President Xi Jinping is not backed into a corner, and convince Beijing that unification belongs to a distant future. It must also develop a more nuanced understanding of Beijing’s current calculus, one that moves beyond the simplistic and inaccurate speculation that Xi is accelerating plans to invade Taiwan. Support for Taiwan should bolster not only the island’s security but also its resilience and prosperity. Assisting Taiwan will also require new U.S. investments in tools that benefit the island beyond the military realm, including a more holistic deterrence strategy to deal with Beijing’s coercive gray-zone tactics. Critics may contend that this approach sidesteps the hard questions at the root of the confrontation, but that is precisely the point: sometimes, the best policy is to avoid bringing intractable challenges to a head and kick the can down the road instead. + + +### Sea Change + +In the final years of the 1945–49 Chinese Civil War, the losing Nationalists retreated to Taiwan, establishing a mutual defense treaty with the United States in 1954. In 1979, however, Washington severed those ties so it could normalize relations with Beijing. Since then, the United States has worked to keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait by blocking the two actions that could lead to outright conflict: a declaration of independence by Taipei and forced unification by Beijing. At times, the United States has reined in Taiwan when it feared the island was tacking too close to independence. In 2003, President George W. Bush stood next to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and publicly opposed “comments and actions” proposed by Taipei that the United States saw as destabilizing. At other times, the United States has flexed its military muscle in front of Beijing, as it did during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, when U.S. President Bill Clinton sent an aircraft carrier to the waters off Taiwan in response to a series of Chinese missile tests. + +Also important to the U.S. approach have been statements of reassurance. To Taiwan, the United States has made a formal commitment under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to “preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations” with Taiwan and to provide the island “arms of a defensive character.” To Beijing, the United States has consistently stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence, including in its 2022 National Security Strategy. The goal was to create space for Beijing and Taipei to either indefinitely postpone conflict or reach some sort of political resolution. + +For decades, this approach worked well, thanks to three factors. First, the United States maintained a big lead over China when it came to military power, which discouraged Beijing from using conventional force to substantially alter cross-strait relations. Second, China was focused primarily on its own economic development and integration into the global economy, allowing the Taiwan issue to stay on the back burner. Third, the United States dexterously dealt with challenges to cross-strait stability, whether they originated in Taipei or Beijing, thereby tamping down any embers that could ignite a conflict. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/47Mv1hM.jpg) +▲ Celebrating National Day, Taipei, Taiwan, October 2022 + +Over at least the past decade, however, all three of these factors have evolved dramatically. Perhaps the most obvious change is that China’s military has vastly expanded its capabilities, owing to decades of rising investments and reforms. In 1995, as the United States sailed the USS Nimitz toward the Taiwan Strait, all the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could do was watch in indignation. Since then, the power differential between the two militaries has narrowed significantly, especially in the waters off China’s shoreline. Beijing can now easily strike targets in the waters and airspace around Taiwan, hit U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the region, hobble American assets in space, and threaten U.S. military bases in the western Pacific, including those in Guam and Japan. Because the PLA has little real-world combat experience, its precise effectiveness remains to be seen. Even so, its impressive force-projection capabilities have already given Beijing confidence that in the event of conflict, it could seriously damage the United States’ and Taiwan’s forces operating around Taiwan. + +Alongside China’s military upgrades, Beijing is now more willing than ever to tangle with the United States and others in pursuit of its broader ambitions. Xi himself has accumulated greater power than his recent predecessors, and he appears to be more risk-tolerant when it comes to Taiwan. + +Finally, the United States has abandoned any pretense of acting as a principled arbiter committed to preserving the status quo and allowing the two sides to come to their own peaceful settlement. The United States’ focus has shifted to countering the threat China poses to Taiwan. Reflecting this shift, U.S. President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan in a cross-strait conflict. + + +### Ready, Set, Invade? + +Driving this change in U.S. policy is a growing chorus arguing that Xi has decided to launch an invasion or enforce a blockade of Taiwan in the near future. In 2021, Admiral Philip Davidson, then the head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, predicted that Beijing might move against Taiwan “in the next six years.” That same year, the political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro likewise contended, in Foreign Affairs, that “there have been disturbing signals that Beijing is reconsidering its peaceful approach and contemplating armed unification.” In August 2022, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby wrote, also in Foreign Affairs, that the United States must prepare for an imminent war over Taiwan. All these analyses base their judgments on China’s expanding military capabilities. But they fail to grapple with the reasons why China has not used force against Taiwan, given that it already outmatches the island in military strength. + +For its part, Beijing has stuck to the message that cross-strait relations are moving in the right direction. China’s leaders continue to tell their people that time is on their side and that the balance of power is increasingly tilting toward Beijing. In his speech at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing in October 2022, Xi declared that “peaceful reunification” remains the “best way to realize reunification across the Taiwan Strait,” and that Beijing has “maintained the initiative and the ability to steer in cross-strait relations.” + +Yet at the same time, Beijing believes that the United States has all but abandoned its “one China” policy, in which Washington acknowledges China’s position that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of it. Instead, in the eyes of Beijing, the United States has begun using Taiwan as a tool to weaken and divide China. Taiwan’s internal political trends have amplified China’s anxieties. The historically pro-Beijing Kuomintang Party has been marginalized, while the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party has consolidated power. Meanwhile, public opinion in Taiwan has soured on Beijing’s preferred formula for political reconciliation, the “one country, two systems” policy, in which China rules over Taiwan but allows Taipei some room to govern itself economically and administratively. Taiwan’s public became especially skeptical of the idea beginning in 2020, when Beijing abrogated its promise to provide Hong Kong a “high degree of autonomy” until 2047 by imposing a hard-line national security law. In high-level pronouncements, Beijing has reiterated that “time and momentum” are on its side. But beneath public projections of confidence, China’s leaders likely understand that their “one country, two systems” formula has no purchase in Taiwan and that public opinion trends on the island run against their vision of greater cross-strait integration. + +Taipei has its own sense of urgency, driven by concerns over Beijing’s growing military might and the ongoing worry that U.S. support might diminish if Washington’s attention shifts elsewhere or Americans turn against overseas commitments. The new refrain from the administration of Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen — “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” — is both a genuine reflection of Taipei’s worries about Chinese aggression and an attempt to galvanize support that will extend beyond the current geopolitical upheaval. In other words, the one thing that Beijing, Taipei, and Washington seem to agree on is that time is working against them. + +> The United States must avoid backing China into a corner. + +This sense of urgency is to some extent grounded in fact. Beijing does have a clear and long-held ambition to annex Taiwan and has openly threatened to use military force if it concludes that the door to peaceful unification has been closed. Beijing’s protestations that the United States is no longer adhering to understandings on Taiwan are, in some cases, accurate. And for its part, Taipei is right to worry that Beijing is laying the groundwork to suffocate or seize Taiwan. But American anxieties have been intensified by sloppy analysis, including assertions that China could take advantage of the United States’ distraction in Ukraine to seize Taiwan by force or that China is operating along a fixed timeline toward military conquest. The first of these examples has been disproved by reality. The second reflects a misreading of China’s strategy. + +In fact, there is no conclusive evidence that China is operating on a fixed timeline to seize Taiwan, and the heightened worry in Washington is driven primarily by China’s growing military capabilities rather than any indication that Xi is preparing to attack the island. According to Bill Burns, the director of the CIA, Xi has instructed his military to be prepared for conflict by 2027, and he has declared that progress on unification with Taiwan is a requirement for fulfilling the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” for which he set 2049 as the target date. But any timeline that has a target date nearly three decades in the future is little more than aspirational. Xi, like leaders everywhere, would prefer to preserve his freedom of action on matters of war and peace and not lock himself into plans from which he cannot escape. China’s leadership appears to be spending profligately to secure the option of a military solution to the Taiwan problem, and the United States and Taiwan must not be complacent. By the same token, however, it would be wrong to conclude that the future is foretold and that conflict is inescapable. + +Fixating on invasion scenarios pushes U.S. policymakers to develop solutions to the wrong near-term threats. Defense officials prefer to prepare for blockades and invasions because such scenarios line up most favorably with American capabilities and are the easiest to conceptualize and plan for. Yet it is worth recalling that Chinese leaders in the past have chosen options other than military occupation to achieve their objectives, such as building artificial islands in the South China Sea and using lawfare in Hong Kong. Indeed, Taiwan has been defending itself against a wide variety of Chinese gray-zone attacks for years, including cyberattacks, meddling in Taiwan’s electoral politics, and military exercises meant to undermine the island’s confidence in its own defenses and the credibility of U.S. support. China’s response to U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan underlines China’s efforts to erode Taiwan’s psychological confidence in its self-defense. After the visit, Beijing lobbed missiles over Taiwan for the first time, conducted unprecedented air operations across the Taiwan Strait median line, and simulated a blockade of Taiwan’s main ports. + +Although the military threat against Taiwan is real, it is not the onl — or most proximate — challenge the island faces. By focusing narrowly on military problems at the expense of other threats to Taiwan, the United States risks making two serious mistakes: first, overcompensating in ways that do more to escalate tensions than deter conflict; and second, losing sight of broader strategic problems that it is more likely to confront. Beijing is already choking Taiwan’s links to the rest of the world and attempting to persuade the people of Taiwan that their only option for avoiding devastation is to sue for peace on Beijing’s terms. This is not a future hypothetical. It is already an everyday reality. And by hyping the threat of a Chinese invasion, U.S. analysts and officials are unintentionally doing the CCP’s work for it by stoking fears in Taiwan. They are also sending signals to global companies and investors that operating in and around Taiwan brings with it a high risk of being caught in a military conflict. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/gIUxQRQ.jpg) +▲ Demonstrating in support of Pelosi’s visit, Taipei, Taiwan, August 2022 + +Another mistake is to presume conflict is unavoidable. By doing so, the United States and Taiwan bind themselves to preparing in every way possible for the impending conflict, precipitating the very outcomes they seek to prevent. If the United States backs China into a corner, for example, by permanently stationing military personnel on Taiwan or making another formal mutual defense commitment with Taipei, Chinese leaders might feel the weight of nationalist pressure and take drastic actions that could devastate the island. + +Moreover, unilaterally risking a war with the United States over Taiwan would not mesh with Xi’s grand strategy. His vision is to restore China as a leading power on the world stage and to transform China into, as he puts it, a “modern socialist nation.” The imperatives of seizing Taiwan on the one hand and asserting global leadership on the other are thus in direct tension. Any conflict over Taiwan would be catastrophic for China’s future. If Beijing moves militarily on Taiwan, it will alert the rest of the region to China’s comfort with waging war to achieve its objectives, likely triggering other Asian countries to arm and cohere to prevent Chinese domination. Invading Taiwan would also jeopardize Beijing’s access to global finance, data, and markets — ruinous for a country dependent on imports of oil, food, and semiconductors. + +Even assuming Beijing could successfully invade and hold Taiwan, China would then face countless problems. Taiwan’s economy would be in tatters, including its globally invaluable semiconductor industry. Untold civilians would be dead or injured, and those who survived the initial conflict would be violently hostile to the invading military power. Beijing would likely face unprecedented diplomatic blowback and sanctions. Conflict just off China’s eastern shoreline would incapacitate one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors, bringing with it disastrous consequences for China’s own export-driven economy. And of course, by invading Taiwan, China would be inviting military engagement with the United States and perhaps other regional powers, including Japan. This would be the very definition of a Pyrrhic victory. + +These realities deter China from actively considering an invasion. Xi, like all his predecessors, wants to be the leader who finally annexes Taiwan. But for more than 70 years, Beijing has concluded that the cost of an invasion remains too high, and this explains why China has instead relied largely on economic inducements, and more recently, gray-zone coercions. Far from having a well-thought-out plan to achieve unification, Beijing is, in fact, stuck in a strategic cul-de-sac. After Beijing trampled on Hong Kong’s autonomy, no one can believe that China will solve the crisis in the strait through a policy of “one country, two systems.” China’s hope that the gravitational pull of its economy would be enough to bring Taipei to the negotiating table has likewise been dashed, a victim of both Taiwan’s economic success and Xi’s economic mismanagement. + +An invasion of Taiwan doesn’t solve any of these problems. Xi would risk it only if he believed that he had no other options. And there are no signs that he is anywhere close to drawing such a conclusion. The United States should try to keep it this way. None of Xi’s speeches resemble the menacing ones that Russian President Vladimir Putin gave in the run-up to his invasion of Ukraine. It is impossible to rule out the chance that Xi might miscalculate or blunder into a conflict. But his statements and behavior do not indicate that he would act so recklessly. + + +### Hold Your Forces + +Even if Xi is not yet considering forced unification, the United States must still project sure-footedness in its ability to protect its interests in the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, military decisions must not be allowed to define the United States’ overall approach, as many analysts and policymakers are effectively suggesting they should. The inescapable reality is that no additional increment of U.S. military power that is deployable in the next five years will fundamentally alter the military balance. The United States must rely on statecraft and a broader array of tools to make clear to Beijing the high price of using force to compel unification. + +The ultimate goal of a sustainable Taiwan policy should be to preserve peace and stability, with a focus on elongating Beijing’s time horizon such that it sees unification as a “some day” scenario. The United States must especially avoid backing Xi into a corner, preventing a situation in which he no longer treats Taiwan as a long-term objective but as an impending crisis. This different approach would entail an uncomfortable shift in mindset for many analysts and policymakers, who see the United States and China as locked in an inevitable showdown and view any consideration of Beijing’s sensitivities to be a dangerous concession. + +This is not to say that the goal of U.S. policy should be to avoid angering Beijing. There is no evidence that diminished U.S. support for Taiwan would reduce China’s eagerness to absorb the island, which is elemental to the founding narrative of the CCP. But this reality means that the United States should bolster Taiwan’s prosperity, security, and resilience in ways that don’t gratuitously antagonize its powerful neighbor ruled by an increasingly nationalistic leader. + +U.S. support should be dedicated to fortifying Taiwan’s capacity to withstand the full range of pressures the island already contends with from China: cyber, economic, informational, diplomatic, and military. But critically, the United States must be disciplined in declining Taiwan’s requests to provide symbols of sovereignty, such as renaming Taiwan’s diplomatic office in the United States, which would aggravate Beijing without improving security in the Taiwan Strait. Similarly, congressional delegations should be geared toward advancing specific objectives to ensure that benefits exceed costs. The United States should channel its support for Taiwan into areas that concretely address vulnerabilities, such as by helping Taiwan diversify trade flows, acquire asymmetric defensive weapons systems, and stockpile food, fuel, medicine, and munitions that it would need in a crisis. It is a comforting illusion that the solution to cross-strait tensions lies in simply strengthening the military capabilities of Taiwan and the United States such that Beijing decides that it must stand aside and let Taiwan go its own way. In reality, Beijing would not sit idly by as the defense capabilities of the United States and Taiwan grow ever stronger. Indeed, the demonstration of U.S. naval power during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis had the unintended consequence of provoking a wave of new PLA investments that have eroded U.S. military dominance. Current efforts by Taipei or Washington to prepare for military conflict should account for the PLA’s predictable reaction. + +> The very idea that “strategic clarity” is “clear” is a myth. + +Any approach to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait must begin with understanding how deeply political the issue of Taiwan is for China. It is noteworthy that the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis and the recent spike in tensions over Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan were driven by issues of high political visibility — not by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or efforts to back Taipei in international organizations or initiatives to strengthen bilateral economic ties. The lesson is that the United States has more room to concretely support Taiwan when it focuses on substance rather than publicly undercutting Beijing’s core domestic narrative that China is making progress toward unification. Chinese authorities will inevitably grumble about quieter efforts, such as expanding defense dialogues between the United States and Taiwan, but these remain below the threshold of public embarrassment for Beijing. + +Accordingly, U.S. actions should both meaningfully support Taiwan and give Xi domestic space to proclaim that a path remains open to eventual unification. Examples of such efforts include deepening coordination between the United States and Taiwan on supply chain resilience, diversifying Taiwan’s trade through negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement, strengthening public health coordination, making more asymmetric defensive weapons available to Taiwan, and pooling resources to accelerate innovations on emerging technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence applications. All such efforts would strengthen Taiwan’s capacity to provide for the health, safety, and prosperity of its people without publicly challenging Beijing’s narrative of eventual unification. + +In addition, the United States must back its policy with a credible military posture in the Indo-Pacific, placing greater emphasis on small, dispersed weapons systems in the region and making larger investments in long-range antisurface and antiship missile systems. Such investments could bolster the United States’ ability to deny China opportunities to secure quick military gains on Taiwan. And if the United States sends weapons in a low-key manner, it will frustrate Beijing but leave little room for China to justify the use of force as an appropriate response. In other words, the United States should do more and say less. + +The United States should also resist viewing the Taiwan problem as a contest between authoritarianism and democracy, as some officials in Taipei have urged. Such a framework is understandable, especially in the wake of Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine. It is easier to convince Americans of the value of a safe and prosperous Taiwan when contrasting its liberal democratic identity with Beijing’s deepening autocratic slide. Yet this approach misdiagnoses the problem. The growing challenge to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait stems not from the nature of China’s political system — which has always been deeply illiberal and unapologetically Leninist — but from its increasing ability to project power, combined with the consolidation of power around Xi. + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/G8XGSYK.jpg) +▲ Footage of PLA military exercises, Beijing, August 2022 + +Perhaps more troubling, this approach boxes Washington in. If the United States paints cross-strait relations with bright ideological lines, it will hinder U.S. policymakers in making nuanced choices in gray areas. As American game theorist Thomas Schelling demonstrated, deterring an adversary requires a blend of credible threats and credible assurances. The assurance requires convincing Beijing that if it refrains from using force, then the United States will hold off on supporting Taiwan’s independence. When U.S. policy on Taiwan becomes infused with ideology, the credibility of American assurances diminishes, and the United States’ willingness to offer assurances to China becomes proscribed. Taking Beijing’s concerns into consideration may not fit the hawkish Zeitgeist in Washington, but this type of strategic empathy is imperative for anticipating an opponent’s calculus and decision-making. + +Framing tensions as an ideological struggle risks backing China into a corner, too, because it feeds Beijing’s anxieties that the United States will stand in permanent opposition to any type of resolution to the Taiwan problem. This, in turn, might lead Beijing to conclude that its only choice is to exploit its military strength to override the United States’ opposition and forcibly subsume the island, even at significant economic and political cost. Any Chinese leader would consider Taiwan’s escape from China’s grasp an existential loss. Biden’s comments in September 2022 that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if China were to launch an “unprecedented attack” have again sharpened the debate on whether U.S. policy is shifting toward a clearer articulation of when and how it would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. Yet this debate over “strategic clarity” is a distraction. For one thing, the Chinese military already assumes that the United States would intervene if China were to launch an all-out invasion, so from Beijing’s perspective, U.S. involvement is already factored into military plans. Moreover, in the absence of a mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan, which is not on the table, there is no binding requirement for Washington to intervene, even if a president has suggested that it should do so. What’s more, an outright and unprovoked invasion by the PLA is the least likely scenario the United States will encounter, and so the way in which the United States responds to Beijing’s aggression would inevitably depend on the specific circumstances of a Chinese attack. In this sense, the very idea that “strategic clarity” is “clear” is a myth. + +More important than rehashing a decades-old debate over strategic clarity is to focus on how the United States’ “one China” policy should be adapted to meet the new and pressing challenges presented by a vastly more powerful and aggressive China. Simply stating that U.S. policy has not shifted, as the White House did following Biden’s remarks, rings hollow to Beijing and to any honest observer of U.S. policy over the past six years. + + +### Balancing Act + +Rather than perpetuate the fiction of constancy, the United States should tell the truth: its decisions are guided by a determination to keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait, and if Beijing intensifies pressure on Taipei, Washington will adjust its posture accordingly. And the United States should pledge that it will do the same if Taiwan pursues symbolic steps that erode cross-strait conditions. Such an approach would recognize that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is dynamic, not fixed. It would recognize Beijing’s agency in either sustaining or undermining peace. Washington should make it clear that if Beijing or Taipei upsets stability in the strait, it would seek to reestablish the equilibrium. But for such an approach to work, the actions and intentions of the United States must be clear, and its commitment to this equilibrium must be credible. + +The United States should be firm and consistent in declaring that it will accept any resolution to cross-strait tensions that is reached peacefully and in accordance with the views of Taiwan’s people. If Xi wants to find a peaceful path to unification, which he and other Chinese leaders still stress is their preference, then he must sell this option to Taiwan’s public. The truth is that such a reconciliation may not come for decades, if ever. But it is nonetheless worth pursuing a peace that allows Taiwan to grow and prosper in a stable regional environment, even if such a goal does not have the sense of finality that many American analysts and policymakers crave. + +After half a decade of deterioration, the U.S.-Chinese relationship stands at the edge of crisis. Bilateral frictions have moved from trade to technology and, now, to the threat of direct military confrontation. To be sure, Beijing’s threats toward Taiwan are the fundamental cause of the tensions across the strait. But this blunt fact only serves to highlight just how vital it is for the United States to act with foresight, resolve, and dexterity. A direct confrontation between the United States and China would wreak devastation for generations. Success will be measured by each day that the people of Taiwan continue to live in safety and prosperity and enjoy political autonomy. The fundamental objectives of American efforts must be to preserve peace and stability, strengthen Taiwan’s confidence in its future, and credibly demonstrate to Beijing that now is not the time to force a violent confrontation. Achieving these objectives requires elongating timelines, not bringing an intractable challenge to a head. Wise statecraft, more than military strength, offers the best path to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. + +--- + +__JUDE BLANCHETTE__ is Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author of China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong. + +__RYAN HASS__ is a Senior Fellow, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and Michael H. Armacost Chair in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. From 2013 to 2017, he served as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the U.S. National Security Council. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-19-from-freeze-to-seize.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-19-from-freeze-to-seize.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..61b4c618 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-19-from-freeze-to-seize.md @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : From Freeze To Seize +author: Maria Nizzero +date : 2022-12-19 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/bw5Qlgf.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Assessing International Asset Recovery Mechanisms and the “Freeze to Seize” Dilemma: Recommendations for Building a UK Response" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_A virtual roundtable on International Asset Recovery Mechanisms and the “Freeze to Seize” Dilemma was held with international asset recovery experts in September 2022. It aimed at examining additional potential avenues to improve the UK’s ability to move from temporary sanctions-based asset freezes to permanent asset deprivation using human rights-compliant and proportionate tools._ + + + +The imposition of sanctions against the oligarchs which followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered an intensive policy conversation about the potential to move from temporary sanctions-based asset freezes to permanent asset confiscation, as policymakers seek to achieve two goals simultaneously: + +- ensuring that individuals linked to the Kremlin are held accountable for Russia’s aggression... + +- …and for their alleged historical corruption. + +While the ultimate origins of oligarchs’ assets may lie in historical bribery, corruption and patronage, linking sanctioned assets to historical acts of corruption presents challenges that the UK’s asset recovery mechanisms have yet to overcome. + +Recognising the limited impact of existing powers under the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) against more clearly evidenced corruption proceeds, and the complexities of gathering evidence to the necessary standard of proof, in 2022, research was conducted to identify possible alternative asset recovery mechanisms that would achieve permanent confiscation of such assets, without trumping due process and human-rights and rule-of-law protections. + +As part of this project, a series of RUSI Commentaries were published in [April](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/freeze-seize-dealing-oligarchs-assets-uk), [June](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/freeze-seize-creativity-and-nuance-needed) and [October](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/freeze-seize-how-uk-can-break-deadlock-asset-recovery) 2022, as well as a RUSI Emerging Insights paper. + +The research team also held a Virtual Roundtable on International Asset Recovery Mechanisms and the “Freeze to Seize” Dilemma with international asset recovery experts in September 2022. The roundtable aimed at examining additional potential avenues to improve the UK’s ability to move, where a suitable case presents itself, from temporary sanctions-based asset freezes to permanent asset deprivation using human rights-compliant and proportionate tools. + +The following is a summary of the views that the different experts shared in this regard, drawing in particular on lessons provided by existing international models. + + +### Summary Viewpoints From the Roundtable Discussion + +#### Question 1: What are the potential routes to amend UK legislation in order to move from “freeze” to “seize”? + +__Viewpoint 1: Amending existing civil confiscation laws is a meaningful starting point for the UK, but individual cases must be considered on a case-by-case basis given the need for proportionality.__ + +Participants agreed that any future model needs to include appropriate human rights safeguards, particularly surrounding Article 1, Protocol 1 (A1/P1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects the right to property and according to which any interference must be justified as a proportionate means of pursuing a legitimate aim in the public interest, and Article 6(1), the right to a fair trial – which clashes with sanctions provisions due to the lack of independent judicial oversight of the designation process. + +According to participants, the civil confiscation route provides a sound basis for confiscating proceeds of kleptocracy. Given the expediency with which measures much be taken, it was generally agreed that amending the UK’s existing legislation for civil recovery ([Part 5 of POCA 2002](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/part/5)), as opposed to establishing an entirely new regime, should be the focus of efforts. This also has the benefit of drawing on the significant extent to which Part 5 of POCA has been tested in the courts from an A1/P1 perspective. + +Some participants raised the importance of being clear in legislation about the basis on which individuals are being deprived of their assets. For example, the current legislative provisions relate to assets of unlawful origin, which may not be a viable route in this context given the difficulty in obtaining evidence from overseas. + +Participants suggested that amendments to [Section 242 of POCA](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/section/242) to provide a broader definition of “unlawful conduct” may be a way forward. This could include: + +- Assets obtained through political patronage; and/or + +- Assets which may be made available to support a hostile regime. + +Such an amendment may overcome challenges of lawfulness of the investigation. However, cases will need to demonstrate proportionality, which will need to be judged on a case-by-case basis. + +#### Question 2: Can sanctions evasion be used as the starting point for confiscation? + +__Viewpoint 2: Sanctions evasion offences have limited reach given they will only capture the specific proceeds of the evasion itself.__ + +Participants indicated that cases have indeed been brought forward in the United States against sanctioned individuals on the basis of [sanctions evasion](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-oligarch-oleg-vladimirovich-deripaska-and-associates-indicted-sanctions-evasion-and). The European Commission has also looked at [ways to criminalise the evasion of EU sanctions](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_22_7373). + +As proving underlying corruption is too challenging, the strategy should therefore be aimed at finding a criminal offence of sanctions evasion as a starting point for asset confiscation. Sanctions evasion is a relatively easy offence to prove and thus participants agreed that it provides a good practical starting point. + +Participants stressed that the UK should be investing in investigating sanctions evasion offences, especially through the newly established [Combating Kleptocracy Cell](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-takes-landmark-steps-to-further-clamp-down-on-dirty-money). + +However, given the proportionality test, a range of participants agreed that this approach is only likely to address a limited proportion of the sanctioned individual’s assets, namely the direct proceeds of the sanctions evasion, and is thus likely to be a minor solution in the “freeze to seize” debate. + +#### Question 3: Is there a role for administrative, government-ordered asset forfeiture? + +__Viewpoint 3: Administrative, government-issued forfeiture orders are unlikely to stand up to challenges in the courts and may risk diluting the meaning and impact of the wider sanctions regime.__ + +The roundtable considered confiscation proceedings stemming from a sanctions designation, an example of which is provided by recent [amendments to Canadian legislation](https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/s-14.5/index.html). These allow for the Canadian government to directly issue an order seeking permanent asset forfeiture if it assesses that an individual presents a “grave breach of international security”. + +The legislation has not been tested in court and the bar to be reached for making an order is not clear. Canadian legal professionals participating in the roundtable have argued that this approach is likely to face substantial challenge in the courts and may be unconstitutional. + +A number of participants also agreed that this was not an appropriate approach for the UK. There was general consensus among participants at the roundtable that sanctions are a political tool that seeks behaviour change. Using them as the basis for eventual asset deprivation risks diluting their purpose and meaning. + +#### Question 4: Is there a role for reverse burden of proof or rebuttable presumptions? + +__Viewpoint 4: Full reverse burden offences in a range of jurisdictions have been proved human-rights compliant and may be a useful component of future UK amendments seeking to deal with the freeze to seize challenge.__ + +Participants at the roundtable referred to a range of reverse burden/rebuttable presumption-based models, including the following: + +- New Zealand is [discussing](https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_126022/criminal-proceeds-recovery-amendment-bill) adopting full reverse burden at the point of asset freeze, which places the burden on the respondent to explain the lawful basis of any frozen property to the satisfaction of the court, otherwise there is a presumption of recoverability. + +- In 2013, a law in France created a presumption of money laundering according to which “the property or income is presumed to be the direct or indirect proceeds of a crime or offence if the material, legal or financial conditions of the investment, concealment or conversion operation have no other justification than to conceal the origin or beneficial owner of such property or income” ([French Criminal Code Article 324-1-1](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000028285954)). Following this rebuttable presumption, the burden of proof no longer rests on the prosecution but on the defendant, who must demonstrate that the operation fulfils a licit purpose. As reported by the French [Court of Cassation](https://navacelle.law/the-french-supreme-court-confirms-its-position-on-the-presumption-of-money-laundering/), applying the presumption of money laundering does not require the characterisation of the predicate offence. + +- Illicit enrichment offences such as the ones in [Western Australia](https://www.legislation.wa.gov.au/legislation/statutes.nsf/main_mrtitle_231_homepage.html) and other mechanisms targeting unexplained wealth (e.g., in [Switzerland](https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2016/322/en)) generally rely on reverse burden mechanisms and have been adopted in a range of jurisdictions to good effect. + +#### Question 5: What about organised crime-based asset confiscation models? + +__Viewpoint 5: Categorising kleptocracy as an organised crime may provide another avenue to overcome some of the challenges inherent in asset confiscation linked to the proceeds of kleptocracy and political patronage, by negating the need to make an express link between individual assets and specific criminality.__ + +Examples discussed at the roundtable include the [US Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18/part1/chapter96&edition=prelim) model and the Italian [Anti-Mafia Code](https://www.altalex.com/documents/codici-altalex/2014/07/24/codice-antimafia-edizione-giugno-2014), which use the organised criminality and/or societal impacts of specific groups and individuals as the starting point for confiscation proceedings. + +The benefit of such approaches is that they negate the need to link individual assets to specific criminality; rather, they create a presumption that wealth obtained by the individual is the proceeds of crime. + +The challenge in the courts may be around the proportionality of individual cases. In Italian legislation, participants made an express link to societal harms to overcome such challenges and may offer a useful blueprint. + +#### Question 6: Could confiscation be linked to national security? + +__Viewpoint 6: Using national security/societal danger as the basis for confiscation in isolation risks conflicts between national security and foreign policy goals.__ + +Participants referred to the option of models which use the status of the individual, rather than the status or provenance of the assets, as the basis for confiscation. + +An example discussed in this regard is the Swiss [Foreign Illicit Assets Act](https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2016/322/en) (FIIA), which may order an asset freeze in anticipation of initiating proceedings for the confiscation of assets if these “have been made subject to a provisional seizure order within the framework of international legal assistance proceedings in criminal matters instigated at the request of the country of origin … the country of origin is unable to satisfy the requirements for mutual legal assistance owing to the total or substantial collapse, or the impairment, of its judicial system (failure of state structures) [and] the safeguarding of Switzerland’s interests requires the freezing of the assets.” + +However, using diffuse concepts such as national security as a basis for confiscation could lead to highly politicised outcomes, unintended consequences, conflicts between prosecutors and government, and significant tensions between criminal justice and foreign policy goals. + +#### Question 7: Is there a role for fugitive disentitlement provisions? + +__Viewpoint 7: Fugitive disentitlement provisions may have a particular use in cases where a viable criminal case has been identified, but the offender remains overseas and/or extradition is not possible.__ + +The roundtable raised the potential of mirroring US-style “[fugitive disentitlement provisions](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2466)” to prevent defendants who have absconded from the jurisdiction from using the resources of the court to defend a civil case. + +While likely only to cover a limited number of cases, participants agreed that such provisions would provide a potentially useful additional tool within the asset confiscation arsenal. + + +### What Next? + +Developing legislative mechanisms to facilitate the permanent confiscation of kleptocratic proceeds is a challenge that goes well beyond the UK. However, other jurisdictions’ existing asset recovery mechanisms provide some useful lessons at the legislative level that, coupled with appropriate resourcing and expertise, could lead to a refined whole-of-a-system approach to the recovery of proceeds of kleptocracy in the UK. + + +## Dealing with Oligarchs’ Assets in the UK + +_Maria Nizzero, 13 April 2022_ + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/j9kvsh6.jpg) + +_`Having frozen the assets of Russia’s wealthy elite, seizing those assets will be far more difficult.`_ + +The war in Ukraine has seen an unprecedented response in terms of the economic retaliation rolled out against Russia. Alongside a basket of sanctions aimed at debilitating the Russian economy, Western governments have heavily targeted oligarchs’ assets, leaving no villa or superyacht untouched. However, sanctions-based asset freezes are a tool of foreign policy, and the assets cannot stay frozen in limbo forever: they must eventually be confiscated, or unfrozen. There is a risk, if Russian President Vladimir Putin demands that sanctions measures are dropped as a condition for ending hostilities, or if the oligarchs win their appeals against sanctions, that the assets will simply be unfrozen. + +It appears from UK government rhetoric that the policy intention is to find a fast solution to move from “freeze” to “seize”. However, the tools currently available under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) make gathering the necessary evidence on oligarchs’ assets, and having it stand up in court, hard to achieve. Given this challenge, it is tempting to seek a “shortcut” fix, but in its haste, the government must be cautious not to create precedent for more draconian measures in the future. Any action the government decides to take needs to balance the policy intention that “crime shouldn’t pay” with respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and be capable of standing the test of time. + +#### Desperate Measures for Desperate Times? + +Uncertainty regarding the outcome of the war and the drive to make an example of oligarchs, while showing that something is being done to put pressure on Russia, have led to some extreme proposals by the government, such as seizing oligarchs’ properties and using them to temporarily house Ukrainian refugees. While attractive in political terms, this approach falls short when assessed against the rule of law. Property rights and legal due process should be respected regardless of whether these individuals are oligarchs. Ignoring these principles would invite comparison with the autocracies we are supposedly standing against. + +Many of these proposals are more political theatre than reality. However, they reveal a general lack of understanding of what sanctions can and cannot do. In the current crisis, sanctions have been used against those that benefit from or support the Russian government. If ministers want to deprive oligarchs of their assets, they will need to use different mechanisms to seize and confiscate them to achieve their desired outcome – mechanisms that require separate, lengthier legal proceedings, and which need to meet specific requirements regarding the nature of the assets and the way in which they were generated. + +Thus, recovery of oligarchs’ assets will prove to be a much harder task than simply sanctioning them, and will require appropriate tools to be available. To many, the most obvious solution is deploying the much-vaunted Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO). However, UWOs have previously fallen short and, although the Economic Crime Act has addressed some of their limitations – namely by expanding the definition of a UWO subject and placing a cap on the costs to which law enforcement could be subject should they be unsuccessful in their bid – they are still not straightforward to operationalise. + +On top of the complexities presented by the use of UWOs, oligarch assets give rise to additional problems. Notably, the criminality and corruption at the root of this wealth are historical, meaning it was amassed decades ago and has been laundered into legitimate businesses so many times that, by the time the money is used to buy a house in Kensington, it is difficult to prove it was tainted in the first place. Additionally, these assets are often well-hidden behind complex structures, complicating the task of identifying the real owner for law enforcement, as recent attempted detentions of superyachts have shown. These issues, coupled with the investigative nature of UWOs – which requires a separate civil proceeding to be commenced for a recovery order and adds another step to an already lengthy process – still represent unresolved obstacles that render UWOs unlikely to meet the requirements needed for effectively dealing with kleptocratic assets. + +#### Alternative Means for Asset Recovery + +Given the challenge ahead, what alternatives exist? + +As a first option, a full reverse burden of proof as to the origin of the assets could be introduced, modelled on examples such as the Swiss Law on Asset Recovery. Should an oligarch fail to demonstrate the lawfulness of their wealth, this tool would allow for the confiscation of frozen assets without the need to commence a separate civil proceeding – a step that has contributed to the disappointing use of UWOs so far. However, it would likely still be relatively easy for foreign kleptocrats to “prove” the legitimacy of their wealth, given the time that has elapsed since it was first “earned”. + +A similar option would be adopting an Irish model, through which property is frozen based on “belief evidence” and is subsequently forfeited if it appears to the court that a person is in possession or control of property that constitutes – directly or indirectly – proceeds of crime. Part of the success of the Irish system stems from the resourcing provided to its Criminal Assets Bureau, something the UK has not traditionally been willing to consider. This mechanism has also not traditionally dealt with cases involving politically exposed persons, bringing into question its effectiveness when applied against oligarchs. + +A third option to consider is the concept of “criminality by association”, found in racketeering legislation in Italy and the US. In the US case, the general test is whether the defendant knew about the criminal nature of a conspiracy of which they were part, not that they agreed to a specific predicate offence. If applied to oligarchs, the key point would be proving they knew and understood the corrupt nature of the Russian regime with which they are associated, in the same way a mafia member would. For this to work, a close connection between the oligarchs and the regime needs to be established, as well as the kleptocratic nature of the Russian government. However, the latter would require the UK government to list Russia as a kleptocracy – something that is likely to be undesirable from a diplomatic standpoint. + +#### No Easy Answer + +Although current tools may prove ineffective in these unique circumstances, it may be possible for the government to develop new legislation to move from “freeze” to “seize” while respecting due process, providing the precise circumstances justifying confiscation are carefully set out. + +Along with ensuring proportionality and respect for human rights and the rule of law, policymakers should also carefully consider the primary purpose of this asset confiscation. Is it a step that is felt necessary to persuade Putin to stop waging war against Ukraine, and to disincentivise other countries (like China) from carrying out similar acts of aggression, or is it because the oligarchs’ wealth was illicitly acquired in the first place? + +If the latter, the line between the role of sanctions and the role of asset confiscation must not be blurred in the way it has been thus far. More importantly, any measure taken today should be designed to stand the test of time, so that it can be used in the future against criminally acquired assets from other unpalatable regimes and in support of other sanctions, such as those targeting corruption or human rights abuses. The government should aim to develop asset recovery mechanisms that are capable of targeting dirty money, whatever its origin may be. After all, the “London laundromat” was a national security issue long before the war in Ukraine, and will continue to be a threat long after. + + +## Creativity and Nuance is Needed + +_Tom Keatinge and Maria Nizzero, 7 June 2022_ + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/nnOb5d4.jpg) + +_`Political rhetoric on sanctioned Russian asset seizure is being replaced by concrete proposals. A long legal road lies ahead.`_ + +As Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine passes 100 days, and as the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia-related assets continues, the debate surrounding what to do with these frozen assets is still high on the political agenda. + +In recent weeks, the political rhetoric has become more moderated, and the process has entered a new stage, with the US, Canada and the EU all bringing forward proposals that are semantically different, but share the same goal: seizing Russia-related assets within the rule of law. + +#### What’s on the Table, and What’s Not + +There is currently a lively debate on the different mechanisms that might be employed to achieve the intended policy goal of seizing sanctioned assets – assets that, despite being frozen, remain the property of their original owner, be that an oligarch or the Russian Central Bank, and where a connection with criminality remains, thus far, undetermined. + +In late April, the US opened the way, by proposing a comprehensive legislative package “to hold the Russian government and Russian oligarchs accountable for President Putin’s war against Ukraine”. The proposal considers establishing new authorities for the forfeiture of property linked to Russian kleptocracy, while setting up mechanisms that would allow the government to use the proceeds to support Ukraine. Among the most relevant elements of this package is the forfeiture of property used to facilitate the evasion of sanctions, and the inclusion of this offence in the definition of “racketeering activity” in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. The legislative package also creates a new criminal offence making it unlawful for any person to “knowingly or intentionally possess proceeds directly obtained from corrupt dealings with the Russian government”. + +Around the same time, Canada dusted off a previous proposal aimed at allowing Canadian courts “to take the frozen assets of foreign officials whose mis-rule creates forced displacement and other humanitarian needs”. The Frozen Assets Repurposing Act, originally drafted with the primary purpose of assisting the humanitarian needs of those forcibly displaced, essentially foresees new powers to seize and sell assets of sanctioned Russian oligarchs while repurposing the proceeds to rebuild Ukraine. + +The European Commission has also followed suit, presenting in late May a new Directive on Asset Recovery and Confiscation. The proposal seeks to modernise EU rules on asset recovery through a series of measures, including an Asset Recovery and Management Office with the powers to trace and identify criminal assets, ensure that frozen property does not lose value, and enable its sale. The proposal also allows the confiscation of assets obtained from a wider set of crimes, all linked to some form of organised criminality. Like the US proposal, the directive would make sanctions evasion a crime across the EU, triggering the potential to enforce seizure procedures. This is a significant step, considering that only 12 EU member states currently treat evasion as a crime, while in 13 more it is either an administrative or a criminal offence, and two other member states only treat it as an administrative offence. + +In contrast, thus far, the UK has yet to make the transition from political theatre over the topic to a more informed debate. + +#### Creativity (and Nuance) Needed + +These proposals include a few common themes. First, the current stance is to approach recovering the assets of oligarchs from an organised crime/racketeering standpoint, with little consideration given to securing reparations from the largest source of assets, the Central Bank of Russia. Both the US and EU packages include proposals aimed at expanding their current initiatives against organised crime. + +In particular, even though the EU proposal has been advertised as providing new rules aimed at confiscating sanctioned Russian assets, the full text of the proposed directive reveals that its primary target is organised crime in general, and that the Russian oligarchs are just affected by proxy. Thus, operationalising the Directive would require establishing a link between oligarch assets and organised crime. The proposed Directive has an Italian flavour. This is unsurprising as the Italian Anti-Mafia Code’s asset recovery mechanisms, albeit not perfect, have been put forward as a palatable option upon which to build tools that could help solve the puzzle of how to seize oligarchs’ assets. + +Second, sanctions evasion is receiving more attention from policymakers as a possible route to seizure. In the US, existing laws related to sanctions evasion and money laundering have already been creatively deployed to seize the Tango, a yacht belonging to sanctioned oligarch Viktor Vekselberg, via civil forfeiture. + +A final theme concerns asset return and repurposing. While still uncertain on how to effectively seize sanctioned Russian assets, the US and Canadian proposals already discuss their use once forfeited, and propose repurposing them for the reconstruction of Ukraine. This gives rise to a discussion over whom the recovered money should be returned to. The purpose of asset recovery is to return funds to victims and the country from which they were originally stolen. However, in the case of the oligarchs’ wealth, which was originally accumulated decades ago following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “rightful” owners are, indeed, the Russian people (who might not agree with the Kremlin’s actions). While attractive and warranted, using the oligarchs’ money to help reconstruct Ukraine – rather than returning it to the original Russian victims – may not be in line with current asset recovery norms, requiring further legal exploration. A different matter would be compensating Ukraine with the money derived from penalties linked to sanctions evasion – a totally acceptable option that would achieve two goals simultaneously (ensuring that crime doesn’t pay, and that Ukraine’s reconstruction is supported). + +#### Sanctions are Easier Said Than Done + +The current proposals highlight the complications of using administrative tools (sanctions) to achieve criminal justice outcomes (asset recovery). While progress is being made, and experts are becoming more optimistic about the possibility of holding Russian kleptocrats accountable, there is a long road ahead which will require careful drafting of legal frameworks that can be used should another “kleptocracy crisis” hit. + +Compounding the objective complexity of designing appropriate legal mechanisms, at a time when Western allies are seeking to build support for Ukraine around the world, whatever solution is brought forward is likely to invite comparison with the autocracies the West supposedly stands against. There is also a considerable risk that a court might invalidate these mechanisms under challenge, thus handing Russia a propaganda win. + +Furthermore, the current focus on seizing assets which are potentially the proceeds of historical crime from oligarchs ignores the greatest source of reparations for Ukraine, the assets of the Russian government, held primarily in the Central Bank of Russia’s frozen accounts in the West. Focusing on this dimension might yield a more profitable return. + +While the emphasis on seizing oligarch assets is politically appealing, there is a long legal road ahead as considerable creativity will be needed to ensure that whatever results is sufficiently robust to withstand scrutiny from a range of legal, moral and human rights perspectives. + + +## How the UK Can Break the Deadlock on Asset Recovery + +_Maria Nizzero, 10 October 2022_ + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/cGdi2tF.jpg) + +_`While the UK continues to impose sanctions, it is lagging behind allies in developing its approach to the recovery of ill-gotten assets.`_ + +At the end of September, members of the Russian Elites, Proxies and Oligarchs (REPO) Taskforce convened to discuss initiatives to tailor “already robust asset forfeiture tools and maximize the impact of … joint work on Russian elites”. Participants from G7 countries, plus Australia, debated legislative efforts and several proposals – including some already discussed in a previous commentary by this author – with a key focus on expanding definitions of racketeering to include sanctions evasion as well as a trigger for property forfeiture. + +In the UK, gone are the days of ministers posing in front of detained yachts or proposing to seize oligarchs’ villas to house Ukrainian refugees. Despite continuing to sanction individuals for their support for Russia’s aggression – the UK has so far sanctioned over 1,200 Russian individuals – and a couple of parliamentary debates on the matter, it has been months since the last attempt to freeze (and seize and confiscate) oligarch assets. This inaction is indicative of two elements: the persistent confusion among UK policymakers surrounding the ultimate goal of confiscating Russian sanctioned assets, and the inadequacy of the UK’s asset recovery frameworks when faced with this task. + +#### Time to Refocus + +Countries in the Western alliance are grappling to develop legislation that enables asset confiscation while adhering to the rule of law, a process that has produced a number of different approaches. Sanctions evasion offences are likely to have limited reach as a starting point for asset forfeiture, given that they would only capture the specific proceeds of the evasion itself. The seizure of the yacht Amadea is a case in point. As such, this approach is likely to be only a minor solution in the “freeze to seize” debate. + +The REPO Taskforce has made it clear that the goal of recovery initiatives should be to hold “Russian elites and their cronies” accountable “for their complicity in Putin’s illegal invasion”. In the US, this has translated into cases being brought forward on loosely related grounds, including violation of bank fraud, money laundering, and sanction statutes. + +Canada has taken a different approach, where new legislation will allow the government to directly issue an Order seeking permanent asset forfeiture based on individuals who risk a “grave breach of international security”. This type of administrative, government-issued forfeiture order, however, is unlikely to stand up to challenges in the courts and may risk diluting the meaning and impact of the wider sanctions regime. + +A common thread uniting these initiatives is the attempt to bypass the stumbling block of proving the underlying corruption of the oligarchs, a process that is too challenging, slow and time-consuming. This legal creativity seeks to deliver the short-term goal of constraining the oligarchs and responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It does not, however, tackle the bigger issue of kleptocracy. + +In the first commentary of this series, the author highlighted the need for policymakers to “carefully consider the primary purpose of this asset confiscation”. Without identifying such a purpose or the characteristics of the property to be confiscated, recovery efforts will be confused, disjointed and likely to fail. A choice is needed, one that the UK is yet to make: while some MPs would like confiscation efforts to tackle the UK’s dirty money problem, others firmly believe they should be linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Given the limitations highlighted above, and the threat that dirty money poses to national security, a long-sighted strategy aimed at tackling corrupt proceeds would be more advisable. However, no strategy can be brought forward until its ultimate goal is decided. + +#### Tweaking the Law + +Once the ultimate goal of asset confiscation is clear, it is possible to look at ways to recalibrate the current legislation to include provisions that target oligarch assets. If the goal is to go after kleptocracy, it is clear that the current provisions are simply not capable of overcoming the hurdle of procuring evidence from overseas and proving the oligarchs’ underlying corruption. + +Potential amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) to provide a broader definition of “unlawful conduct” may be a way forward. These could include, for instance, “assets obtained through political patronage”, or “assets which may be made available to support a hostile regime”. Full reverse burden offences have also been proved human-rights compliant in a range of jurisdictions and may be a useful component of future amendments. As explained in a previous commentary, categorising kleptocracy as organised crime may also provide another avenue to overcome some of the challenges inherent in asset confiscation. + +#### A Matter of Resources + +Intention and legislation aside, much of the inaction in the UK results from law enforcement’s ability to go after the assets in question. A recent investigation found that £700 million worth of luxury homes linked to sanctioned oligarchs have not been flagged for asset freezes. This is due not only to the ongoing role of offshore secrecy jurisdictions, but also to law enforcement’s current lack of specialism and resources to go after these assets. How is it even possible to talk about moving from freeze to seize if the assets are not frozen in the first place? + +Law enforcement agencies are also confronted with sanctioned individuals’ appeals. In UK courts, the first major sanctions evasion case sees a Russian billionaire requesting that two Account Freezing Orders are overturned because of the “chaotic and unprincipled approach” of the National Crime Agency (NCA). A setback in this case could seriously affect future efforts in this area, in much the same way as the Baker case did with Unexplained Wealth Orders. To obviate these challenges, the NCA needs enough time and resources to trace assets and provide evidence to bring watertight cases to court. This means ensuring a funding stream that is long-term and increasing in order to face the growing threat posed by illicit finance – something that has so far been lacking. + +#### Late to the Party … Ready to Dance? + +The UK is still far from being successful in freezing, seizing and confiscating the assets of sanctioned Russian oligarchs, but can of course catch up. + +Firstly, it is important that the UK government finally makes up its mind on the ultimate goal of asset confiscation. Granted that linking asset confiscation to the actions in Ukraine is not the recommended option, it is still possible to target hostile regimes and their associates on the basis of kleptocracy or national security interests. Secondly, once decided, changes in legislation that are meaningful and respectful of human rights and due process are needed. Lastly, resourcing and specialism need to be prioritised to tip the balance in favour of law enforcement agencies. It is now time to refocus, recalibrate and resource: only in this way will it be possible to turn sanctions-based asset freezes into asset recovery opportunities. + +--- + +__Maria Nizzero__ is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI. Her research examines the UK economic crime landscape, asset recovery, with a focus on sanctioned frozen assets and proceeds of kleptocracy, and the foreign policy dimension of illicit finance, including active financial measures. Prior to joining RUSI in 2021, Maria worked for a London-based agency specialising in financial crime and previously for financial news company Dow Jones. She holds a LLM in Criminology and Criminal Justice Policy from the University of Barcelona, and a MA in International Relations from the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-23-malign-interference-in-sea.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-23-malign-interference-in-sea.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64465278 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-23-malign-interference-in-sea.md @@ -0,0 +1,491 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Malign Interference In SEA +author: Veerle Nouwens, Alexander Neill, et al. +date : 2022-12-23 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/bRnUhpJ.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Malign Interference in Southeast Asia: Understanding and Mitigating Economic and Political Interference and Information Operations" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_This paper provides a succinct macro-survey of Southeast Asian countries’ understanding of and experiences with foreign state interference, given that strategic competition is increasingly taking place in the ‘grey zone’ and between states, with an end to pursuing national strategic interests without resorting to war._ + + + +The increasing wariness of governments in Australia, the US and the UK over potential foreign state interference by countries like Russia and China in their domestic affairs has sparked a greater examination of the tactics and objectives of malign state actors. However, the debate over this challenge is unclear in other parts of the world. + +Malign interference can be characterised as activity that takes place through covert means that obfuscate the role of the state directing the activity, not in conformity to national law, is conducted through coercive means, or seeks to create confusion amongst a population through disinformation efforts. The paper also briefly discusses the concept of ‘sharp power’, which best captures the unique nature of the threat of political interference – namely, co-optation of key decision-makers, influencers and thought leaders for the purpose of internalising, advocating for or advancing the interests of foreign authoritarian powers. + +Across Southeast Asia, a region of strategic interest to authoritarian and democratic countries alike for its economic dynamism and strategic location, public debate and academic engagement on the question of foreign state interference is limited. This is likely due to political sensitivities over whether governments are seen to be sufficiently addressing the challenge and, where it concerns China, whether they could be seen as taking sides in the wider geopolitical tension between China and the US. Discussion around domestic actor malign interference, for example through disinformation on social media platforms, is somewhat easier, as seen in the case study chapters. + +Given the sensitivity of the subject of state interference, this paper primarily relies on open source material, supplemented by interviews with key policymakers and experts in Southeast Asia under rules of non-attribution. The paper analyses the main vectors of malign foreign influence across key Southeast Asian states, as well as the region’s geopolitical relevance to authoritarian foreign states potentially interested in conducting interference for political objectives. The combination of these three factors affects their vulnerability to malign foreign influence. While this paper cannot address the challenge of foreign state interference in its entirety or map each country’s specific experience in depth, it seeks to offer a starting point for further research and discussions. The paper provides brief policy recommendations as a basis for this. It goes without saying that any long-term solution should be anchored in a systematic recognition of the agency of Southeast Asian states in light of their decades-long struggle for autonomy and national development. However, given the international challenge of foreign state interference, this paper highlights a few ways in which partner countries who are seeking to mitigate their own domestic experiences of the challenge can work with Southeast Asian countries to share lessons learned and exchange issues on risk mitigation. These are: + +- Continue support for local media and civil society. + +- Offer alternatives where investment is needed in the region. + +- Increase information exchange on malign interference. + +- Help develop risk mitigation strategies in the region. + + +### Introduction + +The intensification of strategic competition among states is increasingly taking place in the ‘grey zone’ between acceptable state activity and interference, with the aim of pursuing national strategic interests without resorting to war. States by nature seek to influence one another to protect their interests; this is entirely legitimate when the state-led activity takes place transparently and within legal means, but it becomes malign interference when the activity takes place through covert means which obfuscate the role of the state directing the activity, is not in conformity with national law, is conducted through coercive means, or seeks to create confusion for a population through disinformation efforts. + +Liberal democracies are increasingly becoming aware of this grey zone threat. The UK and allies such as the US and Australia have increasingly revealed malign interference activity within their borders and have attributed it to Iran, Russia and China, to varying extents. Authoritarian regimes engaged in strategic competition below the threshold of outright war, such as Iran, Russia and China, seek to weaken democratic systems through economic interference, information operations and political influence. While investigative journalism, academic research and institutional checks and balances have exposed a range of activities in these countries and have driven further enquiry, it is not clear to what extent malign interference activity is taking place outside of Europe and specific countries, such as Australia and the US, where the issue of malign interference has been politically and publicly explored as a serious challenge to national security. + +Close allies and partners such as the UK, US and Australia are seeking to engage more strategically in the Indo-Pacific and specifically Southeast Asia, as laid out in their various national strategies, policy documents and official statements. While there are many reasons for this, including economic opportunity, one common security concern is potential growing Chinese influence and interference, through both legitimate and illegitimate means, and the challenge that this presents to their interests. These countries’ engagement in the region includes upholding shared principles such as economic sustainability, free trade based on equal access, and democratic principles of transparency and good governance. + +This paper is not able to encompass the entirety of types of interference, nor does it purport to comprehensively cover all potential political, economic and informational interference activities. For the purposes of this study, the paper will examine a few case studies in Southeast Asia in terms of the following potential avenues for interference: + +- Informational: including attempts to use social media or other platforms to advance pro-hostile-state messaging or narratives, as well as hostile states seeking to influence local media communities in order to advance their narratives. It includes, for example, activities of foreign diplomatic missions and their proxies, as well as overseas associations, aimed at manipulating national media outlets and social media platforms through the deliberate propagation of falsehoods. + +- Political: influential communities, subversive actors. This includes efforts to become involved in local politics or influential communities, or with local communities of any ethnicity. + +- Economic: purchase of or investment in sensitive critical national infrastructure (CNI), defined as infrastructure that is either critical to national GDP or is in a sensitive area such as telecommunications or national defence. + +Given the focus of Western liberal states on Southeast Asia as part of their Indo-Pacific strategies, this paper seeks to understand whether malign interference activity by authoritarian states across the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) is seen as a destabilising threat to national security. It seeks to better understand the current level of debate in Southeast Asia on influence versus interference as a foreign policy tool, and will examine to what extent malign interference activity by authoritarian states is taking place in the region and what the responses have been to any existing or potential malign interference. It will focus primarily on China as the largest actor in Southeast Asia, but will also discuss Iran, Russia and North Korea as authoritarian regimes whose activities are of concern to liberal democracies like the UK, US and Australia. + +The paper offers examples of activity of concern, highlights potential vulnerabilities and strengths, and aims to underscore regional responses to and perspectives on this global challenge. One main finding is that the political sensitivity around malign interference activities in this region means that the debate on this topic in Southeast Asia is less prominent publicly than, for example, it is in Australia, the US or Europe. This is a particularly sensitive topic due to the debate over national security and whether governments are responding sufficiently to threats, as well as the fact that debates around China are by their very nature difficult in the region, as countries actively seek not to take sides in what is seen as a geopolitical competition between the US and Southeast Asia’s top trading partner. This limits the willingness of individuals, irrespective of sector, to discuss such topics openly, while academic debate seems likewise limited. Discussion around domestic actor malign interference, particularly with regard to disinformation, remains a serious challenge in the region, as discussed in the case study chapters. + +The methodology employed in the research for this paper has chiefly consisted of desk-based open source research, as well as semi-structured interviews for the purpose of supplementing research findings and engaging with specific experts on influence and interference activities in the region. For the purposes of the regional overview chapter, 15 interviews on the three types of potential interference activities that this paper examines were conducted with experts from and based in the region. Interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, and as such any information used is non-attributable. + +Chapter I presents a regional overview of all 10 focus countries. The subsequent three chapters, one on each area vulnerable to malign interference activity, were authored by experts based in Southeast Asia and selected for their expertise in the areas they explore. In Chapter II, Benjamin Ang defines what constitutes information operations and hostile actions and explores the countermeasures put in place by the governments of Malaysia and Singapore. In Chapter III, Richard Javad Heydarian assesses the potential vulnerability to ‘sharp power’ as a form of political interference in the region. In Chapter IV, Ryan Clarke explores the debate around potential economic interference in Southeast Asia by China, focusing specifically on the example of Chinese investment in high-speed rail in Malaysia, Laos and Thailand as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region. Clarke examines, in particular, the potentially political nature of infrastructure investment. The paper concludes with a summary of the key findings of the regional overview and subsequent thematic chapters, and presents policy recommendations for the UK and partners inside and outside Southeast Asia seeking to support countries in the region to mitigate the challenge of malign interference activities by states. While this study ultimately focuses on China in particular, it is not able to delve into whether other countries are engaged in similar interference activities; there is therefore a need for further research in this area. + + +## Regional Overview + +Current scholarly and think tank literature on the question of malign interference by state actors in the 10 ASEAN member states is limited, particularly when pertaining to specific analyses of economic interference, political interference and information operations. The limited public engagement on these topics is equally reflected in the number of experts in Southeast Asia specialising in malign interference by states. In some countries, such as Laos, it would appear that there is no in-country expertise on the subject, while in others requests for expert interviews were met with a muted response. + +This lack of academic engagement and public debate seems to negatively impact the baseline understanding of the subject, as seen in a confusion as to what constitutes influence and interference, and what differentiates one from the other. Without a firm understanding of the theoretical concepts involved, explorations of the subject within a national context risk drawing incorrect conclusions. This chapter first defines the concepts of influence versus interference before exploring the extent of academic and expert debate on malign interference by states in each of the 10 focus countries in Southeast Asia. + + +### Interference or Influence? + +‘Influence’ can be understood as legitimate action that involves public, ‘above board’ activities. ‘Interference’ is illegitimate or illicit action, encompassing, for example, activities that are covert, coercive or corrupt, including cyber attacks and disinformation operations. These are malign when they seek to harm or go against the interests of the state they are targeting. Former CIA director John Brennan, rebutting claims by former president Donald Trump that China had attempted to interfere with the 2018 US midterm elections, made such a distinction. In 2017, then-prime minister of Australia Malcolm Turnbull, in a speech introducing new legislative amendments on espionage and foreign interference, specified that activities in support of foreign governments are not illegal unless they are ‘covert, coercive or corrupt’, making the distinction between ‘legitimate influence and unacceptable interference’. However, previously legal means of exerting influence, such as political funding, are now only considered legitimate if they are transparent, as the Australian Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Public Register and associated legislation seeks to ensure. + +In literature and policy on the topic, the distinction is generally less sharp. Indeed, Adam Henschke, Matthew Sussex and Courteney O’Connor suggest that creating a distinction between foreign influence and foreign interference is ‘unhelpful outside a strict regulatory context’ because both can be used to undermine democratic processes. They note that hostile actors can exploit ‘grey spaces between legal influence and illegal interference’ and adapt in ways that provide them with plausible deniability. For instance, these authors do not categorise disinformation in election campaigns or longer-term propaganda and lobbying efforts as interference, as they are not illegal; instead, they point to activities such as corruption or tampering with election results as examples of interference. Both, however, are damaging. Making a similar point, Alex Joske highlights the risks of disaggregating activity under China’s United Front system, noting the importance of considering the impact of the consolidated effort rather than assessing activities in isolation. + +This serves to emphasise the lack of common definitions of foreign influence and foreign interference, as well as the challenge of finding a widely accepted distinction between the two terms. Kristine Berzina and Etienne Soula note that such ambiguity ‘can delay or complicate lawmakers’ initiatives and muddy civil society’s efforts to build awareness and rally opposition against incursions into democratic processes’. While acknowledging the risks of creating a definition that is too broad and may thus curb freedom of expression, too narrow so as to exclude certain activities, or too focused on tactics and consequently not flexible enough to adapt to evolving technologies, they propose that the core criteria in determining whether an activity constitutes interference should be intent and transparency. Michael N Schmitt characterises ‘intervention’ as activities that impact matters otherwise left to the sole discretion of the state, such as the ‘choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy’, and distinguishes it from influence by pointing to the involvement of coercion. + +In the Australian context, Katherine Mansted argues that given the emerging grey zone between acceptable state-based activity and interference, it may be useful ‘to move policy frameworks and public discourse beyond a binary divide between “influence” and “interference” and instead to think of foreign influence along a continuum of risk’. The measures she proposes include updating legislation to capture influence activities that may be ‘precursors’ to foreign interference, such as data collection, surveillance and media ownership. Writing about Chinese influence and interference in the UK, Charles Parton proposes a spectrum from ‘acceptable influence activities, through unwanted but tolerable interference, to unacceptable interference against which action is required’. Andrew Chubb has written extensively on China’s overseas political activities in the UK and Australia, and explores this in greater detail. Using case studies from both the UK and Australia, Chubb stresses the need to recognise the differences between issues of national security, human rights and academic freedom, and offers recommendations for what targeted responses might look like. + +The Australian government clearly outlines the distinction between foreign influence and interference, describing the former as activities ‘conducted in an open and transparent manner’ that ‘contribute positively to public debate’ and the latter as activities that are ‘coercive, corrupting, deceptive, [and] clandestine’ and that are ‘contrary to Australia’s sovereignty, values and national interests’. The Canadian government appears to use the terms interchangeably. The US does not articulate a distinction between foreign influence and foreign interference, but clearly defines the latter in the context of elections in an executive order entitled ‘Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election’, signed by then-president Donald Trump in 2018 and extended by President Joe Biden in September 2021. The order defines foreign interference as ‘covert, fraudulent, deceptive, or unlawful actions ... undertaken with the purpose or effect of influencing, undermining confidence in, or altering the result or reported result of, the election, or undermining public confidence in election processes or institutions’. However, the FBI refers to activities that seem to fall under foreign interference according to the above definition as ‘foreign influence’. + + +### Key Findings + +This regional overview focuses specifically on instances of interference by authoritarian state actors. Interviewees and other sources did not always clearly differentiate between influence and interference, and over the course of this review, conflation between the two terms in Southeast Asia was prevalent. Overwhelmingly, China arose most frequently when discussing sources of potential state-led or state-directed interference. Mention of Russia was only made on three occasions, and in two of these instances (from Myanmar and Vietnam) the relationship should be interpreted as benign. Iran is also viewed as a benign actor in at least two countries. As seen in the following country-specific overviews, there is clearly a distinct paucity of research and publications about malign interference activities by states across Southeast Asia, and the only significant work on this subject, with the exception of Singapore, has been undertaken extra-regionally. + +In Brunei, there are no publicly avowed examples of disinformation campaigns and no discourse about interference among public intellectuals. There are, however, concerns harboured within the Bruneian establishment over hidden debt, compromise of public health data, and elite capture. Proprietary interviews with regional security specialists reveal growing concerns that China is increasingly aggressively pursuing its elite capture strategy in order to secure exclusive rights to Brunei’s enormous onshore and offshore oil and natural gas reserves. One prominent method consists of offering free shares and other economic interests in Chinese companies that would be involved. These incentives span the entire spectrum of a project, from shares in the drilling equipment company to shares in the company that is involved in retail distribution in China. As these are Chinese corporate entities, their shareholding structures and other relevant data are deemed to be state secrets under China’s relevant law, thereby shielding any Bruneian officials from scrutiny. + +Cambodia and Laos, as states close to China and in line with the authoritarian nature of their regimes, are so penetrated by Chinese geopolitical interests that there is no obvious domestic discourse on malign interference activity by the authoritarian states under examination in this paper. Approaches made to public intellectuals were met with a limited response. There are, however, a handful of dissidents and opponents to the regime who have written on the subject of foreign political interference. + +In Cambodia, China has increasingly sought to position itself as a ‘no questions asked’ provider of dual-use infrastructure investment, especially in port/maritime facilities such as the recent Ream Naval Base. Sources in the financial services industry note that China appears to view Cambodia in a similar light as Laos and therefore as readily available for elite capture. China is also actively incentivising key government officials to execute Mekong-origin water-sharing agreements that are not in Cambodia’s long-term interests by (similar to the methods used in Brunei) offering shares and other considerations in Chinese companies that are involved in Mekong water management projects. + +In Laos, Chinese law enforcement has significantly increased its presence, extending extra-territorial control, particularly in casino zones on the border with China. Similar to Cambodia, financial industry sources note that China has been able to negotiate Mekong-origin water-sharing terms that disproportionately favour China by actively exerting influence on parties representing the Laotian side. In particular, the construction of new dams in Laos with heavy investment by China has prompted concern over Laos’ debt burden. + +In Indonesia, there appears to be awareness of, and research on, Chinese and Russian cyber operations aimed at interfering in the 2019 Indonesian election. The Chinese digital footprint is so large and pervasive in Indonesia that Jakarta’s exposure to interference in the digital domain is significant. + +Interviews with experts and some reporting on the subject reveal an attempt by Chinese state-backed cyber units or Chinese companies to control and/or manipulate telecommunications providers, as well as allegedly censoring material critical of China in acquired Indonesian news aggregator app Baca Berita. Analysis of the methods and technologies used by these Chinese cyber operators suggests some links to China’s People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force. + +Equally, in the Philippines, there is a well-documented debate about China’s investment in the country’s CNI, including the power grid and the telecommunications sector. In 2019, media reports cited concerns over the installation of China Telecom infrastructure on Philippines military bases through a deal struck with Filipino-Chinese tycoon Denis Uy. In the run-up to presidential elections in 2022 there appeared to be lively but sensitive debate about the potential for Chinese interference, but no specific allegations have been made since the elections were held. + +Interviews with financial industry executives have noted a strategy of ‘elite capture by proxy’ in the Philippines, whereby Chinese state interests were being furthered without attracting attention. Other notable research on the Philippines includes work on Chinese disinformation on social media and China’s CNI investment there. + +There is an awareness of China’s ability to interfere in Malaysia, but there are few well-documented cases of outright interference. There may be concerns over disinformation campaigns concerning vaccine diplomacy and human rights violations against the Uyghur population in China. Elite capture appears to be a favoured approach by Beijing in the country. + +Given the security situation in Myanmar, no public intellectuals in the country are currently contactable. One interview with a Myanmar expert in the region suggests that interference and disinformation operations are active on two fronts: China’s ability to penetrate Myanmar’s digital ecosystem and to leverage its support of ethnic armed groups; and Russia’s efforts to assist the Burmese government in psychological operations and disinformation campaigns. Further literature includes discussion of the Chinese presence in Myanmar and China’s proposed railways through Southeast Asia. + +Singapore is a regional centre of expertise on the methodologies of hostile state actors, interference and disinformation operations, especially following the country’s recently introduced Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA). There is little discourse on the specifics of how Singapore’s Chinese-speaking community may have been penetrated by China. + +Given the large embedded and wealthy ethnic Chinese population in Thailand, Chinese cultural and economic penetration of the country is overt. The Thai establishment may, however, be concerned over encroachment on Thai sovereignty through large Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Regional security experts also note that there is growing concern over the fact that China is increasingly attempting to acquire controlling equity stakes in leading Thai media outlets. + +Vietnam takes a robust approach to online disinformation campaigns by China and has a long history of tackling Chinese attempts at interference. There is a concern about hidden debt and closely guarded relationships within the business elites of both countries. As the Vietnamese information environment is not presently conducive to Thai-style information operations, a more coercive, direct influence approach has been observed by one industry executive interviewed. + + +## Malign Actor Interference in Southeast Asia: Information Operations and What Constitutes ‘Hostile Action’ + +_Benjamin Ang_ + +There is a spectrum of information operations in Southeast Asia. At one end there are open and legitimate operations, which are generally acceptable to states, while at the other are hostile, deceptive and illegitimate operations by malign actors, which are generally considered as foreign interference that is not acceptable to the target states. For the purposes of this chapter, ‘malign actors’ refers to entities that carry out the latter operations, and ‘target states’ refers to states where such actions are taking place. + +These malign actors include both foreign and domestic entities, with different objectives in the target state: + +- Businesses, which may be seeking to discourage government regulation or attempting to circumvent existing laws. + +- NGOs, which may be seeking to change the policies of the target state for ideological or political reasons. + +- Religious groups, which may be seeking to change the society in the target state or to radicalise believers. + +- Loosely organised groups sharing the same ideology, which may be seeking to change society or ways of thinking in the target state. + +- States, which may be seeking to disrupt the foreign policy of the target state or to destabilise the target state for strategic reasons. + +- Domestic malign actors pose a challenge, especially in Southeast Asia, because it can be unclear where to draw the line between hostile action and legitimate political action, especially when viewed from a Western perspective of free speech and human rights. + + +### Definition: Information Operations and ‘Hostile Action’ + +To first examine foreign information operations, this research refers to the framework proposed in the 2022 S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) policy report, ‘Cases of Foreign Interference in Asia’. This framework is shown in Figure 1. In the figure, the actions encircled in green are generally acceptable to states, while those encircled in red are generally not acceptable to Southeast Asian states. + +In the RSIS framework, ‘influence’ is the ability to shape the preferences of others using ‘information’ and/or ‘interference’. ‘Soft power’ is a well-accepted form of influence through appeal and attraction, which includes non-coercive means like culture, political values, foreign policies, public diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign aid, civic action, economic reconstruction and development, film, TV, books, and other media, economic ties, trade, business, and open ties with educational institutions and think tanks. + +Information is another form of influence. Most Southeast Asian states accept information that spreads through open means, including media syndication (for example, foreign TV shows such as Game of Thrones are popular in Southeast Asia), media ownership (for example, foreign-owned TV channels such as CNN, Fox News, CCTV and CGTN are widely watched in Southeast Asia), open advertisement campaigns (for example, advertisements for foreign businesses like McDonalds are common in local Southeast Asian newspapers), op-eds where authorship is transparent (such as commentaries written by foreigners and published in local newspapers), and public statements (for example, by foreign diplomats or business leaders), with ‘hostile intent’ to disrupt their politics and policies deliberately, covertly and deceptively. For example, Singapore has described such actions as a ‘live and serious threat for Singapore’ and refers to them as ‘hostile information campaigns’ (HICs). This term is also used by some European scholars to describe Russian activities in hybrid warfare. There is no official or statutory definition in Singapore, but HICs usually describes covert or coordinated attempts by malign actors to penetrate different segments and levels of society to create and spread information that will manipulate public sentiment and harm national interests. This chapter uses the term ‘HICs’ to refer to information operations that are hostile actions. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/6XiNqYR.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: RSIS Framework for Influence, Information and Interference.__ Source: [Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul Rahman et al., ‘Cases of Foreign Interference in Asia’, RSIS Policy Report, 26 March 2020](https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/cases-of-foreign-interference-in-asia/), p. 8._ + +In contrast, Southeast Asian states will not tolerate ‘information operations’ that are undertaken Interference, as defined in the RSIS framework, is the other unacceptable means of influence exerted by malign actors, where the malign actor acts (with or without information operations) with hostile intent to disrupt the politics and policies of the target state deliberately, covertly and deceptively. These actions include covert funding (bribes) or coercion (blackmail) of politicians and political parties, government officials, influential people and business groups, NGOs and activists, academics, and educational institutions. Accusations of foreign interference in elections have been made in Malaysia and the Philippines, but lie beyond the scope of this chapter. + +These definitions, particularly the element of covert action to disrupt states, can be applied to several recent reports on China’s growing influence in Southeast Asian media, highlighting that China’s Xinhua News Agency has established content exchange deals with many Southeast Asian news services and that Chinese chambers of commerce have sponsored trips for journalists. These actions would not fall within the RSIS definition of HICs because they are public, not covert, and they seek to create a positive view of China, not to harm the target states. Southeast Asian states do not appear to be raising alarms over these actions and note that Western news agencies and businesses also do the same. However, if any malign actor were to carry out similar actions covertly, the response might be different. + + +### Measuring the Volume of Hostile Information Campaigns + +HICs can obscure themselves by employing different media and channels to address different segments of society. Sometimes the target state may detect unusual activity during times of tension between states, which the target state then attributes to HICs. + +For example, when Singapore and Malaysia were disputing maritime and airspace issues in 2018, Singapore noticed a ‘curious spike’ in online comments critical of Singapore on social media, using anonymous accounts, and instances where ‘avatar accounts’ (that is, accounts whose profile photos do not show the user’s face) accounted for about 40% of comments on the social media pages of alternative media. While Singapore described this as an HIC, it did not attribute the action to any state. However, the minister for home affairs noted in Parliament in 2019 that when states are in conflict, one can use an HIC to destabilise the other. For the purposes of this chapter, these actions appear to constitute an HIC because they are covert and coordinated actions (anonymous accounts) aimed at manipulating sentiment against the interests of the target state (turning Singaporean public sentiment against the country’s position on maritime and airspace rights). + +Singapore considers HICs such a ‘live and serious threat’ that it convened a Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods in 2018, with public oral representations from 65 individuals and organisations. This event culminated in a 176-page report which found that Singapore ‘has been and will continue to be a target of hostile information campaigns’ which attack the country’s national security, racial harmony, democratic processes, social cohesion and trust in public institutions. Singapore has since passed legislation against deliberate online falsehoods (Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act) and foreign interference (FICA). + + +### Cases of Hostile Information Campaigns + +While various Southeast Asian states have detected, or at least strongly suspected, cases of HICs, there is no published research measuring the impact of these campaigns. There are no published datasets that contain data which is observable, replicable and verifiable. These criteria would be necessary for measuring impact, for example using a model like the Breakout Scale from Brookings, which measures impact based on whether information remains on one platform or travels across multiple platforms, and whether it remains in one community or is spread through many communities. However, this requires data-gathering and analytics capabilities that are either lacking in Southeast Asian states or are only available to state intelligence services and are kept classified. + +This is a global issue, as empirical research on the impacts of such operations, such as altering beliefs, changing voting behaviour or inspiring political violence, is still limited and is focused on Western countries and their platforms. However, since some of the known studies show that targeted information operations can lead to increased political violence in settings of conflict or civil unrest, the threat posed by such operations cannot be dismissed. + +Further research is needed, especially in Southeast Asian states, to measure the impact of these operations. This will require funding, access to data, cross-disciplinary cooperation and, above all, the political will to drive these factors. + +__Singapore__ + +Leading up to the introduction of legislation against HICs, Singapore has highlighted several instances of information operations conducted by foreign malign actors. Some of these are decades old, and they do not involve China, Russia, Iran or North Korea, but, importantly, they do illustrate that Singapore does not welcome foreign interference from either east or west. + +In 1964, a Singaporean businessman received a substantial loan from high-ranking officials of a communist intelligence service based in Hong Kong to establish the Eastern Sun, an English-language daily newspaper in Singapore, giving these officials access to the press in Singapore. The businessman confessed and the paper closed with the resignation of the editorial staff. This fits the definition of an HIC because it was a covert action (the loan was private) to manipulate sentiment against the target state’s interests (Singapore was fighting communism at the time). + +In 1971, Singapore revoked the licence of the Singapore Herald for spreading misinformation to work up feelings against Singapore’s compulsory military service policy, and expelled three foreign journalists working for the newspaper. One of the paper’s primary investors was Donald Stephens, then Malaysian high commissioner to Australia. This also fits the definition of an HIC because it was a coordinated action to manipulate sentiment against the target state’s interests (Singapore was building its defence force at the time). + +A Hoover Institution report, China’s Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance, has observed that in 2016, when Singapore became ASEAN country coordinator, Chinese diplomats called on Singapore to manage ASEAN’s discussion on South China Sea issues, while messages began to appear on social media that appeared to ‘instil a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability and desirability of a Chinese identity for multiracial Singapore and to get Singaporeans – and not just Chinese Singaporeans – to pressure the government to align Singapore’s national interests with China’s interests’. These messages have not been attributed to any actor, but the report notes that they ‘resemble arguments made in the Chinese media, in particular the Global Times’. + +Already mentioned is the more recent 2018 spike in social media comments critical of Singapore at a time when neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore were in the midst of maritime and airspace disputes. The comments covered not only maritime and airspace, but also traffic jams at land checkpoints. + +__Malaysia__ + +Malaysia has also alleged HICs without using the same terminology, but the circumstances are murky. This section draws on the work of Gulizar Haciyakupoglu to analyse the allegations. In 2018, the government urged foreign press to stop circulating ‘fake news’ that might damage then-prime minister Najib Razak’s campaign for the 14th general election. The news reports alleged that millions of US dollars misappropriated from deposits in 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a government-owned investment fund, had gone into Najib’s personal account. However, a subsequent post-election criminal investigation of Najib has shown that the reports may have been accurate, and not an HIC. In any event, this does not exactly fit the definition of an HIC because the news stories were public and not covert or coordinated. + +Throughout the 2018 election campaign, leading politicians accused rival party members of inviting foreign interference or receiving foreign funding or support. Without substantiation or evidence, these appear to have been attempts at discrediting rivals and deflecting from real issues, rather than actual instances of foreign interference or HICs. + +This is not to say that there is no real threat of foreign HICs in Malaysia. The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) found that in the same election, Twitter bots (automated inauthentic accounts used to artificially inflate numbers of engagements online and manipulate public opinion) with Cyrillic names were responsible for two hashtag campaigns, #SayNOtoPH and #KalahkanPakatan (Defeat Pakatan). DFRLab suggested that the bots were generated by Russian-speaking ‘bot herders’ on behalf of the then-ruling National Front (Barisan Nasional) party or its supporters, so it remains in question whether the malign actors ultimately responsible for the campaign were foreign or domestic. In any event, this action could fit the definition of an HIC because it was a covert action (by artificial accounts) to manipulate public sentiment, arguably against the interests of the target state (to keep an allegedly corrupt government in power). + +__The Philippines__ + +In 2020, Facebook announced that it had removed two networks for violating its policy against ‘foreign or government interference’ that consists of ‘coordinated inauthentic behaviour’ (multiple fake accounts sharing similar information to manipulate public opinion). One of these networks originated from individuals in Fujian, China, and the other from the Philippines. + +The first network, with 155 accounts, 11 pages, nine groups and six Instagram accounts, originated in China and focused on the Philippines and Southeast Asia. It supported Chinese naval activity in the South China Sea, then-president Rodrigo Duterte, and the potential run of Duterte’s daughter for the 2022 presidential election, and criticised Rappler, a media outlet that is a vocal opponent of the president. Graphika Labs analysed the dataset and noted that its other content reflected Chinese messaging on issues such as the Hong Kong protests, Taiwan’s independence and the Covid-19 pandemic. + +This campaign is interesting because it only spent $60 on advertising, it could not be conclusively attributed to a state actor and, importantly, it supported the ruling government and criticised its opponents. The target state would not be inclined to label this as an HIC because the action, although covert and coordinated (inauthentic accounts), was arguably not against the interests of the target state (nor the ruling government). + +The second network of coordinated inauthentic behaviour originated in the Philippines and focused on domestic political issues for domestic audiences. + +__Indonesia and Myanmar__ + +The Malaysian and Philippines examples illustrate an inconvenient reality of information operations in Southeast Asia: domestic malign actors account for most of the reported cases, and in some cases governments are accused of being the sources of domestic disinformation. + +Allegations of foreign interference or foreign information operations are used as election tactics to discredit rivals, or to suppress criticism of government policies and politicians, or to dismiss opposing views of any sort. + +In Indonesia, observers have reported on ‘cyber troops’ (groups tasked with manipulating public opinion online on behalf of political parties or the government) that overlap with ideologically motivated groups and social media influencers supporting the same causes. The cyber troops’ activities include micro-targeting messages and ‘trolling’ (harassing) opponents and journalists. Both major opposing parties in the recent elections are reported to have employed ‘buzzers’ and ‘micro-celebrities’ to run multiple fake accounts to share political narratives for their respective parties. One information campaign in 2016 targeted the then governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as Ahok), and resulted in hundreds of thousands protesting on the streets of Jakarta. + +In the 2020 Myanmar elections, politicians and the military are alleged to have spread rumours, misinformation and disinformation through social media, print media and word of mouth to target political opponents and minority groups. The extremist Ma Ba Tha movement is alleged to have used disinformation campaigns targeting the then-ruling National League for Democracy party, then-state counsellor of Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi, and Rohingya/Muslims. + +This came after the tragic inter-ethnic conflict in Myanmar in 2017, where the UN recognised that elements of the Myanmar army had committed genocide and ethnic cleansing against the Muslim Rohingya minority, fuelled in large part by hate speech and disinformation that had been spreading from at least 2014 to 2017 on Facebook, often through accounts and pages controlled by the Myanmar army. + +The Indonesia and Myanmar cases could be described as HICs because they were covert actions (fake accounts) or coordinated actions (pages controlled by the Myanmar army) aimed at manipulating sentiment against the interests of the target state (inciting unrest or violence against certain groups), even though the malign actor may have been the ruling government. + + +### Ideological Groups + +Southeast Asian states also face information operations from malign actors who are loosely organised but share a common ideology or belief that can be dangerous when it morphs into extremism. This includes Hindu extremists, Muslim extremists and Buddhist extremists, who spread hate speech through social media, leading to lynching and other forms of violence. It also includes ‘anti-vaxxers’ spreading Covid-19 misinformation during the pandemic, which is seriously undermining public health efforts in Southeast Asian states. The prominent anti-vaxxer groups in Southeast Asia appear to be domestic and not controlled by foreign malign actors, although they draw much of their material from foreign sources. Are these groups malign actors, victims of deception, ‘useful idiots’ or some combination thereof? Did they seek out the foreign information, or was it pushed to them? If a foreign state is responsible for creating or promoting Covid-19 misinformation in the first place (as Russia and China have both been accused of), does this make the foreign state ultimately responsible as the malign actor, even if the affected state was not a direct target? All these questions merit investigation and further research. + + +### Government Countermeasures and Reactions + +The countermeasures that governments in Southeast Asia have taken against information operations include: + +- Promoting public education, digital literacy and critical thinking: Singapore has launched initiatives for students, young adults and senior citizens, such as the Better Internet Campaign (which aims to help students become responsible and ethical users of the internet) and the National Library Board’s SURE (Source, Understand, Research, Evaluate) programme (which trains individuals to identify fake news). + +- Passing legislation against spreading misinformation or disinformation: Singapore has passed the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (POFMA), and Malaysia passed the Anti-Fake News Act, though the latter was subsequently repealed. + +- Working with social media platforms: YouTube has taken down videos containing false claims about vaccination by an anti-vaccination group based in Singapore called Healing the Divide. This action was praised by Singapore’s Ministry of Health. + +- Providing clear communications, especially to counter falsehoods: Singapore health authorities use a multi-channel communication strategy to share Covid-19 information and policies, including press conferences by the Multi-Ministry Taskforce, print media, TV, and dedicated Telegram channels and WhatsApp groups. + +- Fact-checking: The Singaporean and Malaysian governments do this with their Factually and Sebenarnya websites, respectively. The weakness of this approach is that people who believe in conspiracy theories are unlikely to believe government fact checks, and people generally may not trust fact checks that appear to be partisan. + + +### Focus on Legislation as a Countermeasure + +Under POFMA, the government can issue ‘correction directions’ that require social media platforms to display correction notices to their users in Singapore, next to the information or post that is labelled as an online falsehood. Since the start of the global pandemic, Singapore has issued several correction directions under POFMA against Facebook, Twitter and media company SPH magazines over false claims about Covid-19. These corrections were generally welcomed by the public. + +However, during the 2020 general election, the authorities issued correction directions about certain comments made by opposition politicians, some of which were critical of the government. This raised fears that POFMA was being used to silence criticism of the government. One scholar suggests that POFMA could diminish public trust in this way, citing the ruling government’s diminished performance in the 2020 general election as an indication of a fall in public trust. + +Singapore also passed FICA in 2021, to prevent foreign entities from using HICs and local proxies (called ‘politically significant persons’ in the Act) to interfere in Singapore’s politics, including acts of foreign interference ‘by covert means using electronic communications’. The minister for law clarified in Parliament that FICA did not apply to Singaporeans acting of their own accord, foreigners who made open, attributable comments, or foreign political observers and commentators. Rather, it would cover instances where a foreign state (or its proxies) covertly offers a local politician or journalist incentives to influence what they say in public. + +It has been suggested that some other Southeast Asian governments are less likely to use legislation against disinformation campaigns since Malaysia repealed its Anti-Fake News Act in 2018 and the Philippines did not pass its proposed law against fake news. + +However, laws against disinformation or fake news are clearly being used by other Southeast Asian governments, such as Vietnam’s Cyber Security Law (which covers false information on social media) and Indonesia’s Information and Electronic Transactions Act. Prosecutions have been made in Thailand and Indonesia for allegedly spreading false information about Covid-19, and even in Malaysia, a journalist has been arrested for her social media posts on the subject. The speed of these actions and gaps in government accountability have raised fears from local critics and Western observers that Southeast Asian governments might use the pandemic as an excuse to suppress unfavourable content. + + +### Government as the Threat Actor + +Governments in Southeast Asia have a special dilemma in responding to information operations, because they are often accused of being perpetrators in the first place, as discussed above. Existing legislation is seen as already infringing on freedom of expression, and government actions are seen as another way to suppress dissent. + +In this environment, the burden has fallen on non-governmental fact-checking efforts instead, such as the Thai News Agency’s Sure and Share Center and Indonesia’s Fakta atau Hoax (Fact or Hoax) and Mafindo projects. In Myanmar, civil society organisations such Panzagar, Myanmar ICT for Development Organisation, the Myanmar Tech Accountability Network and Phandeeyar work to mitigate social media risks, running anti-hate speech campaigns and fact-checking propaganda emails. In the Philippines, the Rappler media organisation reports on the spread of government propaganda on social media, as well as misogyny, human rights violations, and corruption in government. In response, the government has accused Rappler and its editor, Nobel Prize laureate Maria Ressa, of spreading disinformation and has levied criminal charges, including a conviction for cyber libel. + + +### Conclusion + +From this brief survey of information operations in Southeast Asia, it can be seen that hostile actions can be carried out by domestic entities, including political parties and even the ruling government, with no discernible support from overseas. While the impact on the public is no less negative – polarisation, mutual distrust, spread of dangerous false information – the domestic source makes countermeasures difficult, especially where the government is suspected of using such measures to stifle legitimate free speech, or where trust in government is already low. + +A comprehensive set of countermeasures must then come from a whole-of-society effort, since Southeast Asian governments cannot provide them alone. Journalists, fact-checkers, NGOs, educators, governments, social media platforms, influential persons and ordinary citizens all have different parts to play. At the same time, however, these entities may be contesting each other for the information space or may have opposing ideas of what information is acceptable or not. It remains to be seen whether they will be able to put aside their differences and cooperate enough to counter the hostile information operations coming from malign actors. + + +## Asia’s Soft Underbelly: Co-optation, Corrosive Interference and Chaotic Governance in Southeast Asia + +_Richard Javad Heydarian_ + +When Canberra announced the scrapping of its conventional submarine deal with France upon the announcement of the AUKUS (Australia–UK–US) security partnership, there was predictable outrage in Paris and, by extension, across the EU. However, arguably the most bizarre response to the AUKUS deal came from the least expected quarters. In theory, Southeast Asian countries should have welcomed the enhancement of a US-led ‘integrated deterrence’ strategy against China. ASEAN has proven largely ineffectual in constraining Chinese coercion in the South China Sea, for example, where Beijing has rapidly expanded its military and paramilitary footprint. Southeast Asian states would be beneficiaries of a more proactive Australian defence role across the Indo-Pacific, and any Australian nuclear-powered submarine would almost certainly be deployed to the South China Sea under the auspices of AUKUS in the coming decades. Yet, shortly after the AUKUS announcement, key ASEAN members turned into vocal naysayers, largely echoing Beijing’s narrative. + +The region’s largest country, Indonesia, quickly stated that it was ‘deeply concerned over the continuing arms race and power projection in the region’ without mentioning China’s rapidly expanding naval presence in the area, well into Indonesia’s waters in the North Natuna Sea. Malaysia, recently at the receiving end of Chinese harassment within its exclusive economic zones in the southern portions of the South China Sea, turned the whole affair into a test of loyalty to Beijing. Kuala Lumpur accused the AUKUS alliance of stoking tensions by ‘openly regard[ing] China as a possible enemy’. Malaysia’s defence minister, Hishammuddin Hussein, during a parliamentary inquiry, announced a surprise short working trip to Beijing in order to understand Beijing’s views on AUKUS. Vietnam and Singapore made largely oblique statements, falling short of an open endorsement. Responses from US treaty allies in the region were far from reassuring; having tilted closer to China in recent years, Thailand, for example, proved unreliable, and in the Philippines, there were contradicting messages from then-president Rodrigo Duterte and his foreign secretary, Teodoro Locsin. + +Acrimony over AUKUS has revealed three important characteristics of Southeast Asian states. First, the episode laid bare long-simmering geopolitical fault lines in Southeast Asia amid continuing Sino-American rivalry. Regional states have very divergent threat perceptions, including what represents a ‘hostile’ foreign state actor. Most Southeast Asian countries, with the possible exceptions of Vietnam and the Philippines, do not openly describe China’s expanding military capabilities as a national security threat. Neither is Russia seen as a national security threat – in fact, Russia has become the largest arms supplier to the region amid burgeoning strategic and defence ties with not only traditional partners such as Vietnam and Myanmar, but also Indonesia, Malaysia and potentially even the Philippines. In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Singapore was the only regional state to impose sanctions on Moscow; the key regional states of Vietnam and the Philippines even expressed their commitment to maintaining robust defence ties with Moscow amid a new barrage of Western sanctions on Russia. + +Despite frequent warnings by regional commentators, hardly a single Southeast Asian country has officially identified Russia or China as a potential source of foreign interference, including during regular elections across the region. In fact, democratic countries such as the Philippines have witnessed a rapid increase in the number of local journalists, especially those from state-affiliated media and non-mainstream outlets, as well as influencers, especially those accused of buttressing pro-government ‘troll farms’, receiving ‘training’ during official visits to Beijing or Moscow. In 2017, party-to-party cooperation also took place between the then-ruling party in the Philippines (Partido Demokratiko Pilipino – Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban)) and its counterparts in Russia and China. The party has also signed a cooperation agreement with North Korea’s Workers’ Party of Korea. Southeast Asian countries, notwithstanding their compliance with relevant UN-backed sanctions against Pyongyang, have continued engagement with North Korea despite the assassination of Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia in February 2017. + +In Southeast Asian countries where religious extremism is a major concern, security experts and military officials appear to be preoccupied with the influence of US partners such as Saudi Arabia. Notwithstanding outbursts of sectarianism in neighbouring (Sunni-majority) Malaysia and Indonesia, especially against Muslim minority groups, both Southeast Asian countries have maintained largely constructive relations with Shia-majority Iran throughout the years. + +AUKUS has revealed the reluctance of regional states to directly criticise China. No ASEAN member has dared to criticise Beijing for its recent alleged hypersonic missile tests, expanding stockpile of nuclear warheads, and growing fleet of nuclear submarines. Furthermore, AUKUS has exposed deficiencies in coherent strategic thinking, institutional strength and political conviction among key Southeast Asian states. In the Philippines, the Duterte administration struggled to form a single position, as multiple top officials adopted radically divergent positions on AUKUS. It is precisely the brittleness of governance structures across the region, with the notable exceptions of Singapore and Vietnam, that has made Southeast Asia particularly vulnerable to foreign corrosive influence and political co-optation. Winston Churchill once described Italy as the ‘soft underbelly’ of the axis powers. The same can be said about key US partners across Southeast Asia, which have openly courted warmer relations with authoritarian powers, namely China and Russia. + + +### Varieties of Vulnerabilities + +In terms of vulnerabilities to malign interference from external actors, Southeast Asia falls across a relatively wide spectrum. After all, regional states have differential agency in terms of insulating their core political institutions from predatory interference. Southeast Asia is a region of immense geopolitical potential and economic dynamism; it is also arguably the world’s most diverse region in terms of levels of economic development and types of government and political regimes, as well as population size and territorial expanse. The core Southeast Asian states – the ‘ASEAN-6’ countries – have consistently enjoyed relatively high rankings in various international competitiveness indices. In the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015, for instance, Singapore ranked second in the world, with Malaysia (20th), Thailand (31st), Indonesia (34th), the Philippines (52nd) and Vietnam (68th) performing relatively well among 144 countries. The ASEAN-6 were also among the more competitive nations in the Global Innovation Index 2020, where Singapore ranked eighth among 131 countries, followed by Malaysia (33rd), Vietnam (42nd), Thailand (44th) and the Philippines (50th). + +This economic dynamism, however, obfuscates institutional vulnerabilities across much of the region. A cursory look at key indicators of governance reveals unaccountable governance, corruption, weak institutional checks and balances, and democratic deficit. Southeast Asian states universally rank poorly in various indices such as the Press Freedom Index, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports, the Democracy Index and, with the notable exception of Singapore, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Not one ASEAN country is considered to be a ‘fully deepened’ democracy by experts, with Indonesia, which enjoys the region’s freest political regime, classified as a ‘flawed democracy’ in the Democracy Index and as ‘partly free’ by Freedom House. + +Arguably, only Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines can be classified as ‘minimalist-procedural’ democracies, given their record of relatively competitive elections in recent years. But even when a more relativistic ‘varieties of democracy’ approach is adopted, all three countries rank poorly in terms of press freedom, corruption and robustness of institutional checks and balances. In both the Philippines and Indonesia, meanwhile, patterns of authoritarian populism and patronage politics have persisted in recent years, further eroding the institutional foundations of ASEAN’s fledgling democracies. + +Conceptually and politically, the line between (legitimate) influence and malign interference is often unclear and hard to pin down. In practice, vectors of influence comprise grey-zone tactics providing plausible deniability to malign actors as well as their overseas clients. Thus, this chapter focuses in particular on what political scientist Christopher Walker has described as ‘sharp power’: a unique attribute of authoritarian superpowers, which seek to project their influence internationally, with the objectives of limiting free expression, spreading confusion and distorting the political environment within democracies. Beyond targeting fledgling and established democracies, authoritarian superpowers can deploy a variety of means – from bribery to intimidation and disinformation – to co-opt and corrode vectors of power and decision-making in target countries, including spheres of mainstream as well as social media, civil society, and the broader business community, in addition to state institutions, political figures and political parties. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/oycOfMW.png) +_▲ __Figure 2: Vulnerability to Sharp Power in ASEAN Countries.___ + +As Joseph Nye argues, ‘Beijing and Moscow have spent tens of billions of dollars to shape public perceptions and behaviour around the world’ through the systematic deployment of ‘tools new and old that exploit the asymmetry of openness between their own restrictive systems and democratic societies’. In particular, sharp power can come in the form of ‘the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes’, harking back to the Cold War era of ‘manipulation of ideas, political perceptions, and electoral processes’. + +To assess vulnerability to sharp power as a form of foreign interference by overseas actors, Southeast Asian countries can be divided along two axes: vulnerability based on the level of strategic autonomy and institutional checks and balances (against corruption and co-optation); and geopolitical relevance (to foreign actors). Thus, Southeast Asian nations can be roughly classified into four types: low-to-medium geopolitical relevance with high vulnerability (Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia); high geopolitical relevance with low vulnerability (Vietnam and Singapore); medium geopolitical relevance and medium vulnerability (Thailand and Brunei); and high geopolitical relevance and medium-to-high vulnerability (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) (see Figure 2). + + +### ASEAN Vulnerability to Sharp Power and Foreign State Actors + +When it comes to vulnerability to malign foreign interference, some countries are more equal than others. Regionally, Singapore has proactively pushed back against suspected interference operations by China. One big area of concern for Singapore, which has developed robust defence cooperation with the US and other major Western powers in recent years, is the potential emergence of a pro-Beijing ‘fifth column’ in the Chinese-majority city state. China set off alarm bells when its Overseas Chinese Affairs Office was incorporated into the United Front Work Department, thus raising concerns over more active efforts by Beijing to co-opt communities of Chinese descent overseas. As veteran Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan openly warned at a public conference in 2018, ‘[the] very point of [the ongoing] United Front work is to blur the distinction between the domestic and international and promote the [Chinese Communist Party (CCP)]’s interests wherever it may be, domestic or international’. + +Officially, China maintains a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of its neighbouring countries. However, President Xi Jinping effectively contradicted that position when he began blurring the distinction between huaren (ethnic Chinese of all nationalities) and huaqiao (overseas Chinese citizens) by declaring that the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation requires the joint efforts of the Chinese sons and daughters at home and abroad. In effect, Xi has embraced 60 million huaqiao, many of whom are spread across the Southeast Asian countries of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, as demographic extensions of a greater China. + +According to a study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Singaporean universities have had the highest level of research and academic collaboration with Chinese counterparts affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) compared to any other country in the region. Meanwhile, a study by the Jamestown Foundation has found that China has used seemingly innocuous front organisations, including business groups, for disinformation campaigns, including the narrative of a ‘greater China’, which is extremely sensitive in a city state where three-quarters of the population is of Chinese ancestry. + +Singapore has responded to sharp power and foreign interference threats in a variety of ways. Intent on reiterating its ‘Chinese’ identity distinct from that of China, the country went as far as to build the $110-million Singapore Chinese Cultural Centre, which serves as a clear rejection of Xi’s vision. It has also crafted strict regulations for social media platforms. In a national statement at the adoption of its third Universal Periodic Review in 2021, Singapore’s permanent representative to the UN Office in Geneva described such measures as a matter of national security: ‘Our concern lies with the use of coordinated, deceptive methods by hostile foreign actors to manipulate our political discourse and disrupt our society.’ + +Vietnam has staked its legitimacy on resisting Chinese influence in addition to providing stability and economic growth, and has had a proactive approach to mitigating interference by hostile foreign actors. Vietnam has consciously tried to minimise its institutional linkages and webs of interdependence with China, including in the realm of higher education. Vietnam’s national security doctrine and its trade–industrial policy are primarily shaped by an abiding commitment to reducing dependence on and vulnerability to China. The same cannot be said about three other, highly geopolitically relevant Southeast Asian countries. + +The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia may find the stricter measures adopted by Singapore and Vietnam problematic for their own political systems. Even the historically authoritarian Malaysia, which adopted a more liberal direction following the game-changing 2018 elections, had to amend its notorious Internal Security Act in 2012. Former Malaysian prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin also promised to amend the successor Prevention of Crime Act 1959 and the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 to further reduce abuses by security officials. + +Although far from champions of democracy and press freedom, contemporary governments in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia are bound to face both institutional and public resistance should they adopt strict regulation of the media landscape as do Singapore or Vietnam. All three countries also lack the nimble state security apparatus and surveillance regimes that undergird public governance in proactive Southeast Asian states such as Singapore and Vietnam. + +Overall, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia are vulnerable to manipulation and corrosive influence from hostile foreign actors on multiple levels. Specifically, sharp power operations in these key Southeast Asian countries function along three vectors: social media, influencers and disinformation; corrosive capital; and leadership targeting. + + +### Social Media, Influencers and Disinformation + +In all three countries, but especially in the Philippines, social media platforms have increasingly transmogrified into vast pools of disinformation. As Ressa warned years ago, Facebook, in particular, has rapidly turned into the unwitting enabler of authoritarian populists, far-right revisionists and conspiracy theorists, with devastating impacts on public discourse and democratic politics. Over the past five years, certain ‘bloggers’ and social media influencers, some with millions of followers, have emerged as the primary arbiters of political discourse in places such as the Philippines. Indeed, the Philippines has become a global ‘troll farm’ hub, as elements within the country’s massive business process outsourcing industry as well as advertising agencies join the lucrative trade in political disinformation. + +When it comes to political co-optation and influence operations, two particularly troubling patterns have emerged. First, major influencers have become a conduit for state-backed propaganda, both domestic and foreign. During the Covid-19 pandemic, for instance, multiple high-profile influencers and bloggers began spreading and reinforcing the Chinese embassy’s talking points in the Philippines. A similar pattern has emerged with respect to other contentious issues, including China’s claims in the South China Sea and the insurrection in Hong Kong. At times, it has become difficult to distinguish between the key arguments of political bloggers, who have a very limited grasp of international law, and the narratives of senior diplomats and officials from overseas. + +Second, social media platforms, especially Facebook, publicly flagged up to 150 China-based accounts in 2020, which were allegedly engaged in ‘coordinated inauthentic behaviour’, including hosting fake accounts that pushed for the victory of a specific China-leaning ticket in the 2022 presidential elections in the Philippines. + +__Corrosive Capital__ + +The second vector of sharp power is corrosive capital, which has a significant impact on already fragile government institutions in host countries. Unlike legitimate business, corrosive capital serves the specific geopolitical ends of hostile foreign actors. One potential conduit for foreign interference activities, therefore, is through ostensibly ‘private’ investments, especially in sectors that are highly prone to illicit activities. + +Under the Philippines’ Beijing-friendly former president Rodrigo Duterte, for instance, there was a boom in online Chinese-run casinos, officially known as Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs). Despite Duterte’s supposed opposition to the gambling industry, the Philippines’ licensing fees topped $150 million in 2019, with total revenues reaching $4 billion. The industry, however, is plagued by reports of institutionalised bribery, widespread tax evasion, human and drug trafficking, money laundering and even kidnapping in recent years. On multiple occasions, Duterte has rejected calls by Chinese authorities to ban the POGOs due to their association with the criminal underworld and their negative effect on anti-gambling regulations in mainland China. Since the Philippine authorities themselves admit that POGOs are notorious perpetrators of tax evasion, critics claim that top government officials are likely the personal beneficiaries of illicit transactions with the Chinese operators. The problem is even more severe in places such as Cambodia, northern regions of Laos, and Myanmar’s porous borders with China, where mainlander criminal gangs effectively run whole towns, if not sub-regions. + +In the Philippines, concern over online casinos also has direct and serious national security implications. For instance, Senator Panfilo Lacson, a former general and head of the Philippine Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, has warned that, drawing on military intelligence sources, up to 3,000 members of the PLA could be embedded among Chinese POGOs as part of a large-scale ‘immersion mission’. During a shootout incident between two Chinese citizens suspected of involvement in POGOs, a PLA military ID was reportedly discovered by Philippine authorities. Senator Richard Gordon, meanwhile, has warned of ‘infiltration’ by Chinese security agencies, claiming that POGOs have been involved in suspicious transactions valuing up to $150 million, part of which may have been used to fund ‘fifth column’ operations in the country. + +Even former national security adviser Hermogenes Esperon and former defence secretary Delfin Lorenzana have warned of potential interference activities among Chinese POGO workers clustered around sensitive locations such as military installations, including Camp Aguinaldo, which hosts Department of National Defense offices and the Philippine Army; the Philippine National Police headquarters at Camp Crame; and the Philippine Air Force and Navy headquarters. As Lorenzana put it, ‘When you already see many people [at the POGOs], who are always there ... it’s very easy for all these [Chinese] people to perhaps shift their activities to spying’, since ‘[the POGOs] are near [military facilities]’. The seamless expansion of POGOs, and their clustering around key military bases in Metro Manila, has raised concerns over either lack of proper oversight or, worse, co-optation of key agencies in charge of ensuring that the Chinese online casinos do not pose a national security threat. + +__Leadership Targeting__ + +The third, and potentially most problematic, vector of sharp power is interference operations targeting top decision-makers, either directly or via their proxies. Traditionally, co-optation can take place through large-scale bribery, especially during elections, or kompromat (extortion through compromising material). Less well-resourced hostile foreign actors may adopt more surgical measures which directly target key decision-makers, but for wealthier hostile foreign actors, co-optation can take place through seemingly legitimate and mutually beneficial agreements. + +When it comes to China’s BRI, much has been written about the potential for ‘debt trap’ – drowning host countries in unsustainable debt amid corrupt infrastructure deals. But the potentially corrosive impact of big-ticket infrastructure projects is far more subtle and multifarious, especially in larger and more advanced Southeast Asian economies. In places such as Laos or Cambodia, for instance, China has managed to achieve decisive influence by becoming the dominant source of investments and aid by far, thus consolidating Beijing’s ability to shape the strategic policies of these smaller Southeast Asian states. + +In the Philippines and Indonesia, the picture is far more complicated. On the one hand, there is the risk of ‘pledge trap’ – luring elected leaders in key Southeast Asian countries through pledges of (rather than realised) large-scale investments, which tend to generate positive headlines at home. In the Philippines, Duterte adopted a largely obsequious position on the South China Sea disputes in exchange for (still unrealised) Chinese investment pledges. Until recently, in Indonesia, President Joko Widodo adopted strategic patience regarding maritime disputes with China and, crucially, tried to water down good governance regulations and de-fang anti-corruption agencies to expedite infrastructure development. Even more dramatic is the case of Malaysia, where former prime minister Najib Razak largely relied on large-scale Chinese capital and investments to boost the country’s finances and his flailing political career amid the massive 1MDB corruption scandal. + +Hostile foreign powers can also influence host countries by cultivating strong relations with key interlocutors or officials in charge of important state agencies. Over the past few years, China has backed large economic projects in Indonesia. Some experts have noted the potential role played by key officials in facilitating these projects and greater bilateral economic ties, although others point towards greater agency and directives of government in attracting, in the case of Indonesia, foreign direct investment from a range of countries, including China. Similar questions have been raised with regard to the sudden mushrooming of Chinese private and public investment initiatives across strategic locations such as Subic, Clark, Sangley and Palawan in the Philippines – areas that are close to key naval and air-force facilities that face the contested South China Sea. + +Alarm bells were also raised when a former top Filipino general, who would later move to Duterte’s cabinet, allowed a China Telecom-backed and equipped company, Dito Telecommunity, which is owned by Uy, to install communications infrastructure within Philippine bases. The US had earlier warned that such activities could jeopardise bilateral intelligence and defence cooperation. Ultimately, however, one of the biggest concerns in fragile democracies such as the Philippines and Indonesia is the emergence of ‘Manchurian candidates’ during vital elections, including for the presidency, thanks to the high cost of election campaigns, minimal supervision over election financing, and limited ability to monitor and deter disinformation efforts by hostile foreign powers. + + +### Conclusion + +Overall, Southeast Asian countries fall along a wide spectrum of vulnerabilities, depending on their institutional coherence, geopolitical relevance and political regimes. While all have equally been targets of malign foreign interference, some have exercised more agency and institutional resilience than others. Regional states tend to also have diverse, and at times divergent, threat perceptions regarding authoritarian superpowers. What is clear is that hostile foreign actors can and have deployed a variety of tools to exploit a wide range of vulnerabilities across key Southeast Asian countries. + +Thus, any nuanced policy response, either by targeted nations or in tandem with like-minded allies and external powers, should balance comprehensiveness in addressing a full range of vulnerabilities with targeted measures. Targeted responses include timely interventions and policy countermeasures against the most nefarious vectors of malign interference by hostile foreign actors. This is an indispensable step towards enhancing the overall resilience of pivotal Southeast Asian countries, especially amid the intensified assertiveness of authoritarian powers in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, any long-term solution should be anchored in a systematic recognition of the agency of Southeast Asian states given their decades-long struggle for autonomy and national development. + +Moving forward, the threat of hostile interference should be addressed on four important fronts. The first is to spotlight the issue through raising public awareness, mobilising civil society groups and enhancing multilateral information sharing on malign foreign influence. In extreme cases, independent international inquiry, if not sanctions, against compromised political figures can also be considered. Second, states should pursue capacity-building efforts through providing technical assistance to and enhancing the mandate of key government agencies tasked with countering interference operations. Third, regulation plays an important role in countering political interference and should focus on tightening legislation against and lawful surveillance of foreign-backed disinformation campaigns. Finally, alternative approaches could include the establishment of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral cooperative mechanisms by like-minded international partners to reduce Southeast Asian countries’ dependence on critical infrastructure investment from malign foreign actors. + + +## Malign Economic Activity: Chinese High-Speed Rail Projects in Laos, Thailand and Malaysia + +_Ryan Clarke_ + +Malign economic activity is distinct from traditional forms of commerce, investment and capital market activity in that commercial considerations, such as project viability or investment return schedules, represent only secondary considerations. Malign economic activity often still seeks profit, but simultaneously can meet broader strategic goals or geopolitical intent to the detriment of the targeted country or organisation. + +China is a significant economic actor in Southeast Asia through its BRI, with the high-speed rail projects in Laos, Thailand and Malaysia highly visible examples. While not problematic in and of themselves, these three case studies provide rich examples of how such economic investments can carry unanticipated consequences to varying extents, such as elite capture, debt structures and the opportunity to exert influence over key national transportation infrastructure or leverage it for other strategic and political ends, as well as engage in corrupt activities that weaken good governance. In very extreme cases foreign states could acquire infrastructure assets, although this has proven so far to rarely occur. + +The nature of Chinese infrastructure investment is complicated by the complexity of the Chinese system, in which BRI investments can be directed from the central government by provincial governments, state-owned banks, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or even private companies. The almost ubiquitous presence of the CCP across industries and sectors in China, as well as questions of the Chinese government’s ultimate ambition for regional influence and power, means that commercial projects may carry strategic opportunities for the Chinese government or may indirectly be guided by it. Chinese SOEs are subject to the vagaries of global market competition but can ultimately serve as tools of the CCP with regard to geo-economic gambits such as the BRI or where the party deems that its geopolitical core interests are being challenged. The management of Chinese SOEs since 2012 has seen a transformation towards a ‘modern state-owned enterprise system with Chinese characteristics’, in which Party leadership is institutionalised through Party groups and Party committees who to varying extents can appoint senior management and participate in setting the company’s strategic direction. This morphing of the Party with the business also counts to a certain extent for joint ventures, particularly if it employs three or more Party members. + + +### BRI Infrastructure: Projects with Strategic Intent? + +A substantial number of BRI projects are concentrated around China’s Asian periphery, especially in Southeast Asia. As a 2021 AidData study of over 13,000 BRI projects shows, some include loan structures that exceed a country’s financial ability for repayment, leading to unforeseen debt or the prospect of commercial non-viability. A March 2018 Centre for Global Development policy paper asserted that eight BRI signatory countries were at high risk of debt distress due to BRI loans and were facing debt-to-GDP ratios beyond 50%, with 40% of external debt owed to China. This is not necessarily due to Chinese government-instructed deception or ‘obfuscation traps’. Nevertheless, what appears to be a strategy of co-optation of elites through opaque means is problematic in that it carries the potential to create a politically favourable environment in which potential Chinese government interests can be more easily pursued. A further consideration to bear in mind when considering Chinese infrastructure investment is that in smaller, less developed countries, Chinese investments and aid can surpass those of other actors, affording it a more visible presence and greater political influence. + +The BRI is unique in its size (roughly $47 billion allocated, based on the most recent available data of 2020), its geographic scope (covering 138 countries) and its strategic ambition. A 2020 Council on Foreign Relations report quoted investment bank Morgan Stanley’s prediction that China’s overall BRI spending could reach $1.2–$1.3 trillion by 2027. While the exact figures remain contested, the BRI likely exceeds any competing efforts by other non-democratic states such as North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia or Russia, either in the Asia-Pacific or globally, in terms of human and material resources, capital, and market access. + +__Connectivity Versus Indebtedness: The New Laos–China High-Speed Railway and Hambantota Port__ + +In early December 2021, Laos launched a 414-km electrified high-speed railway running between the capital Vientiane and the town of Boten on the Laos–China border. Travelling to the Chinese border now takes less than four hours, compared to 15 hours by car, and costs $33 for a second-class seat. The line heads 600 km north to the capital of China’s Yunnan province, Kunming, linking the landlocked mountainous country of Laos to China’s key southwestern BRI hub. This $6-billion project (equivalent to one-third of Laos’ GDP) is backed by China as part of its BRI and is described as a lynchpin of deepening ties between the two countries. + +This project was marketed as a transformative opportunity for Laos to gain access to the Chinese market for agricultural and other exports while also developing a domestic tourism sector to accommodate Chinese travellers. Key details of the deal have not been made public, and no substantial degree of transparency is likely to be witnessed in the future. There have also been no open source discussions within Laos, in English or Laotian, regarding the overall cost-benefit ratio of this project. + +However, the China–Laos high-speed rail project is not a Chinese equity investment, grant or any other structure that would generate high-value jobs or the positive diffusion of benefits that are traditionally associated with CNI projects. This project’s loan structure suggests that it is deliberately designed to extract maximum financial benefit from Laos while also simultaneously undermining Vientiane’s already fragile sovereignty. While there are some differences, the China–Laos railway includes key elements from China’s now-infamous Hambantota Port project in Sri Lanka, which ultimately saw China take control after the Sri Lankan government defaulted on high-interest loans. Various studies and commentaries have debated the Sri Lankan case. Some have shown that the Sri Lankan government bears a great degree of responsibility for the loans it agreed with China and that domestic agency should be given greater consideration in the assessment of whether China is at fault for the state of Sri Lanka’s economic collapse. Ultimately, both sides likely played a part – indeed, interviews with experts in the financial sector have highlighted some problematic aspects of China’s engagement on negotiating these deals. + +One interviewee indicated that the Chinese SOEs and funders may view the Hambantota Port as a successful deal, of which elements could be replicated in other key countries, such as in Southeast Asia. Chinese lending banks have demonstrated a high level of investment in developing least-developed countries that have found it challenging to access funding from other sources such as other governments and international capital markets, and have high structural unemployment rates. For countries like Sri Lanka and Laos, China thus offers a source of funding for infrastructure when financing cannot be accessed elsewhere. + +According to one report, the average loan from an official Chinese creditor carries an interest rate of over 4% with an average repayment period of less than 10 years, while the average of an OECD creditor carries an interest rate of on average 1% and an average repayment period of 28 years. According to one interviewee in the financial sector, the high interest rates are positioned as the ‘price’ for the Chinese developer deploying its end-to-end capabilities to the country in question, while other experts note that China is successful in demanding higher interest rates due to its willingness to take on risks that other lenders will not. + +Beyond high interest loans, there are also concerns around corruption and bribery in BRI projects, owing not least to a lack of transparency in the infrastructure project agreements. Two financial industry executives interviewed made reference to seemingly corrupt business practices involving obfuscated financial incentivisation in some BRI projects, while a third financial industry executive noted preferential treatment in the formation of holding companies and other corporate vehicles. However, publicly available information remains scarce and requires further investigation. If true, such practices would be deeply problematic and further add to the concerns over the lack of transparency of BRI projects and impact on good governance. + +There are concerns that these problematic practices have been replicated in other BRI projects since, including for example in the case of Laos. According to a financial industry executive based in the region, specific state-owned banking executives were brought back in to structure and execute the railway deal. These bank personnel were advised to replicate their previously successful deal elements while also ‘learning from previous mistakes’. The concern is therefore that, given the opacity of these deals, China may have the option to exert sovereign control over the Laos–China railway and any other land- or rail-related facilities included in the final agreement. + +__Thailand: Failure to Replicate and Strategic Pushback__ + +Thailand was offered similar high interest rates as Laos had in 2016 for the extension of its high-speed railway from Laos to Bangkok. The Chinese terms of high interest rates, development rights along and on either side of the railway, as well as the right to work for Chinese engineers in Thailand were rejected by the State Railway of Thailand and Ministry of Finance and caused widespread offence across Thai leadership and corporate circles as they were interpreted as China viewing Thailand and Laos as undifferentiated and subservient countries to China, with then Thai Transport Minister Arkhom Termpittayapaisth remarking in 2016 that ‘Thailand is not the same as Laos’. While the Thai government still maintains an interest in developing high-speed rail within Thailand and regionally, one interviewee suggested that the Thai government has begun to multi-source for potential alternative partners to avoid being too dependent on China. + +According to one regionally based investigative journalist, Thailand’s search for balance could have further downstream impacts on Chinese investment projects, such as the Chinese-proposed arms manufacturing facility in Udon Thani, of which there have been few updates since its announcement in 2017, and a naval shipyard in Sattahip, both of which would be co-located with facilities that are used by US forces. + +However, while Thailand is seeking to strike a balance, and choosing sides between the two major powers is not an appealing policy option, as is the case for other Southeast Asian states, Thailand has its own complicated history with the US following the 2014 coup and concerns over democratic backsliding. + +The China–Laos high-speed rail project has also further accelerated awareness and concerns regarding a range of activities by the CCP’s United Front in Thailand. The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), an organ directly subordinate to the CCP Central Committee, focuses its work on targeting governments, including in Southeast Asia, to exert political and economic influence and sometimes malign interference. In particular, there is now an enhanced focus on and investigation into United Front-funded Confucius Institutes in Thailand, specifically regarding why there are more of these institutes in Thailand than in the rest of Southeast Asia combined. + +Sources have noted that Thailand’s US treaty ally status is what is likely driving the CCP’s strong focus and multifaceted approach in both the economic and information domains. Indeed, this could be seen as a part of a wider attempt to weaken the US hub-and-spoke alliance system in Asia, which Beijing views with suspicion as part of a US attempt to exert ‘all-round containment’ of China, as foreign minister Wang Yi has termed it, notwithstanding Thailand’s own objectives in its relationship with China and the US. Thailand could therefore present an opportunity for undue influence and interference through, for example, elite capture within a key American ally in Asia by using high-speed rail under the BRI front. 169 However, the problematic nature of China’s dealings in both Laos and Sri Lanka, combined with Beijing’s offensive offer to Thailand, appears to have undermined these efforts, at least temporarily. + +__Malaysia’s East Coast Rail Link Project: BRI-Driven Strategic Envelopment__ + +Chinese funds were a core component of the 1MBD scandal, as has been demonstrated over the course of the multiple investigations and successful prosecutions of a range of individuals who were involved. Former Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak and a select group of individuals around him had effectively bankrupted the publicly financed 1MBD national development fund through a range of corrupt activities, most of which occurred outside Malaysia. As the scale and scope of these activities expanded to a level where they could no longer be hidden, particularly when in 2015 1MDb missed a loan repayment of around US $550 million, the government of Malaysia was pressured to set up a special taskforce to investigate why and the United States Department of Justice files a civil suit in 2016. Some sources note that Najib received an offer from China to recapitalise the drained 1MDB account to cover up his previous activities. + +In exchange for this, Najib allegedly granted Chinese SOEs privileged rights and access to a range of existing Malaysian port, energy and other infrastructure assets. Leading real-estate industry analysts noted that Chinese property developers were also given prime real estate at highly discounted rates in the southernmost Malaysian state of Johor, directly across from Singapore. + +Given Malaysia’s parliamentary form of government and reasonably open press, information regarding these events became widespread and prompted outrage across the country. + +When confronted with these developments, Najib claimed he was misled by financial advisers. While some analysts have attributed this to his lack of perceptiveness, others question whether he felt bolstered by the alleged Chinese backing. It is noteworthy that one of the key conspirators in the 1MBD corruption scandal, Malaysian citizen Jho Low, continues to reside in China despite being wanted by the Malaysian government for questioning while also being subject to an Interpol Red Notice. + +What Najib had not counted on was former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad coming out of a long retirement to run for the post again. According to one executive interviewed, this development also represented an intelligence failure on the Chinese investors’ side, as Mahathir was assessed to be a senior adviser and retired statesman but not someone who would actively seek office again. Sources note that Mahathir’s re-election in 2018 caused distress among Malaysian and Chinese investors involved in the infrastructure deals and 1MDB. + + +### Conclusion + +Chinese BRI-driven activity in Laos, Thailand and Malaysia indicates that Chinese actors, ranging from state-owned companies to state-owned banks, and by association the Chinese government, have leveraged BRI high-speed rail projects for economic gain through a range of corrupt and predatory activities. To a certain extent, strategic leverage appears to have been sought through elite capture in particular. + +The Chinese government and affiliated SOEs are likely to pursue further BRI engagements in Malaysia, Thailand, Laos and other key Southeast Asian countries through continued pursuit of BRI projects and positive incentives, with potential negative consequences for good governance at the national level if transparency and scrutiny are lacking. However, there is also the potential for resistance, especially in countries that have electoral politics and somewhat free media and information environments. Malaysia presents a clear case in point. + +Further investigation should be conducted on whether cyber operations have increased in existing target countries that have proven resistant, such as Malaysia and Thailand. This would help shine a light on whether a range of both incentives and coercive measures are used in target countries, and could indicate a more concerted state-led effort on the part of the Chinese state, and lend greater credit to the idea that some BRI projects are not simply commercial engagements. + + +## Key Findings and Policy Recommendations + +This paper has examined the debate on influence versus malign interference in Southeast Asia and has outlined some case study examples of interference in the region that highlight the modus operandi of authoritarian regimes, particularly China, in the economic, political and information domains. It has also explored the question of whether governments in the region have implemented or strengthened risk mitigation strategies as a result of interference within their borders. This chapter highlights four broad trends that can be seen throughout the case studies and the regional overview, and offers concluding policy recommendations for the UK and its partners with regard to strengthening national resilience in Southeast Asia. + +__1. Interpretations of Malign States and Hostile Activity Differ__ + +As seen throughout the various case studies, countries in Southeast Asia differ in their interpretation of what constitutes a hostile action. There is overarching agreement that interference is different from influence, which is defined as soft power. More menacing is covert interference in a state’s sovereignty and decision-making, although the extent to which actions are viewed as interference versus influence is not aligned across the region. The case studies have shown that deep links between political elites, ethnic demographics and vulnerabilities in institutional resilience through, for example, corruption, complicate how states respond to foreign actors. + +So too are there differences on the question of which states are considered to be engaging in ‘malign’ behaviour. The geographic and demographic particularities and close bilateral partnerships of specific Southeast Asian states shape the prism through which foreign countries are viewed. This is not unsurprising or unreasonable – for European countries and close liberal democratic partners more generally, the staunch differences in foreign and domestic policy of countries like Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, North Korea and China pose direct and indirect challenges to European perspectives of the rules-based international order and the principles upon which it is built. The geographical proximity of Russia and Iran, for example, poses a direct danger to European security in the continent’s own territory or its periphery. This distinction is not as stark in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the concept of a state with ‘malign intent’ is viewed somewhat differently, with examples focusing more on challenging behaviour than intent, due to political sensitivity around risking being seen as choosing sides in what is ultimately considered a geopolitical competition between the US and China. + +The geopolitical pressures that Southeast Asian states face are not identical and thus shape each country’s view of which states are viewed as malign actors in the region. While there are some concerns around Saudi Arabia and Iran, these are limited to relevant states such as Indonesia and Malaysia. As Richard Javad Heydarian notes, Russia’s status as the largest source of defence sales for certain countries may play a role in how this actor is viewed in Southeast Asia. While Chinese examples of interference exist across the region, the geopolitical and economic realities that Southeast Asian states must contend with hamper public discussion of the challenges that Beijing presents. + +__2. The Current Level of Analysis of Malign Interference is Low Across the Region__ + +As the regional overview and case studies show, Southeast Asian open source information on interference in the economic, political and information domains is limited where foreign state activity is concerned. Often, these themes are addressed by investigative journalists, but few public studies by experts in the region itself have examined them in detail. This is despite the much stronger focus on overt interference in the region, such as in the maritime domain, around the South China Sea issue. However, even the South China Sea disputes and regional security developments, such as the announcement of AUKUS, have elicited ambivalent responses that seek to avoid directly criticising Beijing. + +The literature review and associated interviews as summarised in the regional overview showed four particular trends across the region: elite capture and hidden debt in Southeast Asia; online interference in election campaigns; investment in digital CNI; and Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy in selected states. However, issues of potential covert interference, such as through economic investment, elite capture or information operations, appear too sensitive to discuss publicly. This could be because of the difficulty in confirming state attribution of interference, or because of the political sensitivities of the offending and target states in question. Indeed, interviewees for this paper who have offered details on potential interference by foreign states have only spoken on the condition of anonymity. + +There are, however, some specific hubs of analysis in the region, which include the RSIS Centre of Excellence for National Security in Singapore, and in the private sector, Mandiant and Recorded Future, which have established regional centres of expertise. + +__3. Chinese Interference is Seen Across the Region in the Three Themes__ + +While this paper has sought to explore case studies of foreign interference in Southeast Asia by four distinct authoritarian regimes, the case studies have overwhelmingly featured China. This could be for a variety of reasons. One is the comparatively weaker and smaller presence of Iran, Russia and North Korea in seeking influence through interference in domestic affairs in Southeast Asia, and their priority of focusing on other regions and national security interests. It could also be, as noted earlier, that actors like Russia are not necessarily seen as nefarious actors in the region. China’s extensive engagement in Southeast Asia and desire for influence in its surrounding environment is well appreciated by countries in the region, and prominent case studies thus tend to more naturally revolve around China. Indeed, interference connected to Chinese state-linked actors was seen across the three themes under examination in this paper (information operations, political interference and economic interference). + +This is particularly prominent in discussions around Chinese economic investment and elite capture, which appear to go hand in hand in the case study chapters. These investments are being made along the BRI, but also in states where China may be seeking to achieve additional objectives, such as diminishing the influence of the US in treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines. + +There is also some evidence of Chinese and Russian cyber operations targeting Indonesia’s presidential elections in 2019. Indeed, China’s investment in CNI such as telecommunications in the region has created a particular vulnerability, with several countries in the region facing cyber attacks and media interference. + +__4. Greater Countermeasures to Mitigate Risks are Required__ + +The UK, Europe, the US and other like-minded partners have strengthened their risk mitigation regimes to protect critical industries, heighten investment screening regimes, and prevent foreign interference in politics and the media. + +This has not occurred to a similar extent in Southeast Asia, despite obvious strategic interests in the region from actors like China and activity taking place in the economic, political and information domains. There are notable exceptions, however – as seen in the chapter case studies, some countries in the region have responded with some mitigation efforts. These include Singapore, which introduced FICA in 2021, and Malaysia, through its focus on cyber security and various national security laws. + + +### Recommendations + +As they look for opportunities for deeper engagement in and with countries in the Indo-Pacific, the UK and partners could increase engagement in the region in several ways. This paper offers the following four recommendations. + +__Recommendation 1: Continue Support for Local Media and Civil Society__ + +One immediate area for engagement that has emerged from this paper, although not entirely new, is the importance of supporting local media and civil society, and the fundamental role that investigative journalism and local engagement have played in exposing elite capture and corruption, as well as covert interference in the economic and information domains. + +Given the worrying trend of democratic backsliding in Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines, the limits placed on the press in other Southeast Asian countries, and China’s offer of media training to journalists in the region, this should be a continued policy priority for the UK and partners. It should include media training to aspiring journalists in the region, but as has been pointed out, any such assistance must be made transparently and should be understood to be highly sensitive in certain countries in Southeast Asia. + +__Recommendation 2: Offer Alternatives Where Investment is Needed in the Region__ + +Another area in which the UK and other partners have already highlighted the need for increased engagement is infrastructure initiatives. While this is not purported to be in response to China specifically, the language around principles of sustainable infrastructure based on high environmental standards, fair financial arrangements and transparency in project contracting underscores the concerns around Chinese investments. + +However, infrastructure investment can be a slow and complex process. Given the heightened interest in Southeast Asia, the UK and like-minded liberal democratic partners would do well to engage in joint needs assessments in consultation with governments in the region, particularly around the area of CNI. Further investment and engagement through groupings like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the G20 (through standard-setting), the Blue Dot Network and the EU Global Gateway should be pursued. The unwitting exposure of Western financial institutions to liabilities associated with the BRI in Southeast Asia should also be examined. + +__Recommendation 3: Increase Information Exchange on Malign Interference__ + +The UK and partners inside and outside Southeast Asia should consider exchanging information with one another on malign interference to help build a better threat picture of specific vulnerabilities and trends in targeting. As this information is likely highly sensitive and to various extents classified, the UK, for example, might consider, in trusted government-to-government settings, sharing information on observable trends, rather than specific detailed accounts or attribution to specific actors. This would help reinforce the global response to the challenge of malign interference and help shed light on whether observable trends are replicated in different geographical locations and specific contexts. Given that governments are understandably reactive and malign actors are more easily able to change tactics, this would also help governments shorten response times and address vulnerabilities in a timelier manner. + +__Recommendation 4: Help Develop Risk Mitigation Strategies in the Region__ + +The UK, Europe and other partners have strengthened existing legislative regimes and crafted new ones to counter malign interference within their borders. These may not be best practice, but they represent examples that could be tailored to meet the specificities of Southeast Asian countries when it comes to legislation on cyber security, disinformation, investment screening and foreign interference. + +Specific areas that are underdeveloped in Southeast Asia include cyber security and investment screening. On the latter, Southeast Asian countries have been liberalising foreign direct investment regimes since the 1990s as part of their development models. However, given increasing awareness of risk, investment screening mechanisms that protect national security (for example, on CNI, data and resources) may be required. Other reports have recommended that these be along the lines of OECD standards, even if not identical to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States regime or other regimes of developed countries. Foreign interference laws are another area that could be strengthened, with Singapore having strengthened its legislation in 2021. + +The UK and partners in the transatlantic community, as well as the Indo-Pacific, should consider sharing experiences and legislative countermeasures in Track 1 and Track 2 settings. However, the unique and distinct environments of all 10 ASEAN member states should be taken into consideration here, with an understanding that there will not be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to countermeasures. Furthermore, as has been discussed in this paper, there is the added complexity of criticisms in Southeast Asian countries that legislation which is meant to protect national security has also been used for domestic political ends by ruling governments. Given the UK’s new Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN announced in early August 2021, and the launch of the ASEAN–UK Digital Innovation Partnership the following month, there may be an opportunity for the UK and other ASEAN partners to launch a programme of engagement focusing on best practice in mitigating malign activity and specifically hostile information campaigns in the digital space across Southeast Asia. + +The UK in particular could also sponsor fellowships for higher-level and executive-level training on hybrid warfare and hybrid threats or courses at institutions like the Oxford Changing Character of War Centre, the European Centre for Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, think tanks, or private sector institutions working on cyber security, whether in Europe or the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, none of these recommendations can be employed individually; rather, they should form the arms of a multifaceted strategy of regional engagement. + +--- + +__Veerle Nouwens__ is a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security Studies Department at RUSI, focusing on geopolitical relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Her research interests include China’s foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, maritime security and ASEAN. Veerle holds an MPhil in Modern Chinese Studies from the University of Oxford, a Master’s in International Relations and Diplomacy from Leiden University and a BA in International Relations from Macquarie University. + +__Alexander Neill__ is the Executive Director of Alexander Neill Consulting. Prior to this, Alex gained experience in the government and think tank sectors, including as the Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia Pacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Senior Research Fellow for Asia Studies at RUSI. Alex is a Chinese linguist and expert, and focuses on security and defence issues in the Asia-Pacific region. + +__Benjamin Ang__ is Senior Fellow and Deputy Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at RSIS in Singapore, where he leads CENS’s Cyber and Homeland Defence Programme, which explores policy issues around international cyber norms, cyber threats, strategic communications and disinformation, law enforcement technology and cybercrime, smart city cyber issues, and national security issues in disruptive technology. Benjamin graduated from NUS Law School and has an MBA and MS-MIS from Boston University. He also serves on the executive committee of the Internet Society Singapore Chapter. + +__Ryan Clarke__ is Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. His career has spanned defence and intelligence technology, investment banking, biodefence, strategic R&D, strategic assessments and emergency response. Ryan graduated with a PhD in International Politics from the University of Cambridge, has an MA in International Relations from Bond University, and a BA (Summa Cum Laude) from the University of Dayton. + +__Richard Javad Heydarian__ is an Asia-based academic, policy advisor and columnist for the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and author of The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt Against Elite Democracy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Global Struggle for Mastery (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) and China’s New Empire (Melbourne University Press, forthcoming). He was previously assistant professor of political science at De La Salle University and Ateneo De Manila University in Manila, adviser at the Philippine Congress, and research fellow at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-29-russias-new-winter-war.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-29-russias-new-winter-war.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a85f0650 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-29-russias-new-winter-war.md @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Russia’s New Winter War +author: Antony Beevor +date : 2022-12-29 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/Nu7m0Mf.png +#image_caption: "" +description: "Russia’s New Winter War: Could Putin Go the Way of Napoleon and Hitler?" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_One of Russia’s greatest military victories came with the coldest European winter in 500 years._ _At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Tsar Peter the Great struggled to repel the formidable forces of Charles XII of Sweden, advancing on Moscow. Then came the Great Frost of 1708–9. Birds were said to have frozen in midflight and dropped dead to the ground. Charles’s army of more than 40,000 men soon lost half its strength from exposure and starvation. In an attempt to escape the cold, the Swedish king led the remnants of his army south into Ukraine to join the Cossack leader, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, and his forces. But the damage was done. The following summer, Peter’s Russian army routed Charles’s weakened forces at the Battle of Poltava, bringing an end to Sweden’s empire and its designs on Russia._ + +The Swedes were neither the first nor the last European army to suffer the ravages of “General Winter” on Russia’s frontiers. Exacerbated by the vast expanse of the Eurasian landmass, winter fighting there has often proved to be the downfall of great armies. For centuries, this phenomenon has often worked to Russia’s advantage, as a succession of powerful militaries have succumbed to inadequate equipment, deficient supply lines, and poor preparation. But as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine enters the harshest months of the year, there are many indications that this time it may be Russia, rather than its adversary, that suffers the worst consequences. + + +### His Empire for a Horse + +Europe’s best-known winter defeat in Russia came in 1812 — just over a century after the Battle of Poltava — when Napoleon’s Grande Armée retreated from Moscow. Russia’s scorched-earth tactics, which left the French with no food or shelter along the line of withdrawal, made the effect even more deadly. Yet the greatest casualties had occurred earlier. + +The Grande Armée had been almost half a million strong when it crossed the River Neman, the frontier between Prussia and Russia, in June 1812. But it soon lost a third of its strength from summer heat, disease, hunger, and exhaustion as the emperor forced his men on toward Moscow. Although the retreat into Russia’s expanse was unintended at first, Tsar Alexander I’s commanders soon realized the advantage. They kept withdrawing east and did not make a stand until General Mikhail Kutuzov was ordered to halt Napoleon at Borodino, 75 miles west of Moscow. The battle proved a costly victory for the French, even though it enabled them to enter Moscow unopposed. + +But it was the approaching winter that proved fatal for the invaders. Napoleon wasted five weeks in Moscow expecting the tsar to come to terms. When the Grande Armée finally started to withdraw to central Europe on October 19, the soldiers were still wearing their summer uniforms. They had also lost their baggage trains and could expect little food along the way. Their greatest deficiency was in cavalry to hold off marauding Cossacks. The shaggy Cossack ponies were accustomed to the winter blizzards, which began a month later, while the last of the chargers and draft horses from western Europe collapsed from the cold and lack of forage. Starving soldiers hacked off their meat even before they were dead. Desertion or surrender was far from a guarantee of survival. Avenging Cossacks waited to skewer enemy soldiers on their long lances; Russian peasants simply slaughtered them with scythes. By early December, Napoleon feared a coup d’état during his absence, and, abandoning his army, headed for Paris before his frozen men could reach safety. By this point, his forces had suffered nearly 400,000 casualties, and he had lost his reputation for invincibility on the battlefield. + +Less well known, although perhaps equally significant, was the way Russia won. Despite having lost 200,000 of its own men, Russia’s military leadership was far less concerned about casualties than was Napoleon. Russian officers still treated their peasant soldiers as little better than serfs (and serfdom would not be abolished in Russia for another 50 years). This lack of interest in soldiers’ well-being — and the casual attitude to massive losses through so-called meat-grinder tactics — are apparent in Putin’s army in Ukraine today. + + +### Red Terror, White Frost + +Another half century later, in World War I, the attitude of Russia’s military authorities had barely changed. Their men were expendable. Trench life for the rank and file along the eastern front that ran through Belorussia, Galicia, and Romania from 1915 to 1917 was an inhuman experience. And many resented that officers retired each night to the warmth and relative comfort of peasant log huts behind the front. + +“Having dug themselves into the ground,” the Russian writer and anti-tsarist Maxim Gorky observed of the enlisted men, “they live in rain and snow, in filth, in cramped conditions; they are being worn out by disease and eaten by vermin; they live like beasts.” Many lacked boots and had to resort to bast shoes made from birch bark. Stations for treating the wounded at the front were almost as primitive as they had been in the Crimean War. This reality was in cruel contrast to the photographs of the tsarina and her grand duchess daughters immaculately dressed as nurses before the February 1917 revolution. + +Winter conditions in the Russian Civil War (1917–­21) were even worse. The most pitiful victims were the civilian refugees fleeing the Bolshevik onslaught, or what became known as the Red Terror. During the winter of 1919, the collapse of Admiral Kolchak’s White Russian armies in Siberia produced terrible scenes along the jammed Trans-Siberian Railroad. Aristocrats, middle-class families, and anti-Bolsheviks of all backgrounds were trying to escape to Vladivostok in the Russian Far East to avoid capture by the Communist Red Army, which was advancing from the Urals. + +> In World War I, many Russians lacked boots and had to resort to shoes made of birch bark. + +By mid-December of that year, the Reds caught up with the tail of the line and took the southern Siberian city and industrial hub of Novo-Nikolaevsk (present-day Novosibirsk), along with numerous trains still blocked there. The city itself was in the grip of a typhus epidemic. All horses, carts, and sledges available had already been taken, so the desperate set out on foot, not knowing that farther ahead in Krasnoyarsk cases had reached more than 30,000. + +“A mass retreat is one of the saddest and most despairing sights in the world,” Captain Brian Horrocks, a British officer in the Allied intervention in Russia, wrote. “The sick just fell down and died in the snow.” He was horrified by the squalid conditions faced even by those refugees who had managed to find a place in packed cattle wagons. Most wagons lacked any heating as temperatures dropped to as low as minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit. “The thing which impressed me most was the fortitude with which the women, many of them reared in luxury, were facing their hopeless future,” he wrote. “The menfolk were much more given to self-pity.” Kolchak’s staff officers were by then drinking themselves into oblivion. + +As White Russian, Czech, and Polish commanders argued bitterly over priority for their troop trains, starving and frozen refugees were dying at an alarming rate. One officer wrote that trains at some Siberian stations were unloading hundreds of bodies of people who had died from cold and disease. “These bodies were stacked up at the stations like so much cordwood,” another officer wrote. “Those who remained alive never talked, never thought of anything save how they might escape death and get farther and farther away from the Bolsheviks.” + +In the northern Caucasus, known for its blazing summer heat, winter could sometimes produce drops in temperature of more than 22 degrees Fahrenheit in less than an hour. In February 1920, General Dmitry Pavlov’s cavalry divisions were caught in the open by a sudden blizzard. Pavlov “lost half of his horses which froze in the steppe,” the Red Army high command noted. But the human losses were far worse. “We left behind in the steppe thousands of men frozen to death, and the blizzard buried them,” a Cossack officer recounted. Those who survived did so by huddling against their horses. Pavlov, who had ignored warnings of the possible change in the weather, suffered severe frostbite himself. + + +### Stalin’s Ice Breakers + +By the twentieth century, winter conditions on the Eurasian landmass posed a growing threat not just to humans and horses but also to military weaponry. Sometimes this worked to Russia’s detriment. Despite its disproportionate strength and its massive expenditure of ammunition, the Soviet army failed to break Finnish resistance in the Winter War of 1939–40, following Stalin’s invasion of Finland. The Finns, proving themselves even better practitioners of winter tactics than their invaders, terrorized Red Army soldiers by day and night as their white-camouflaged ski troops launched surprise attacks from forests, then disappeared like ghosts. Their bravery and skill persuaded Stalin to accept Finland’s independence. But it also served as a lesson for the war to come. + +During the rapid military mechanization between the two world wars, the Soviet Union had created the largest tank force in the world. The Red Army at least learned that guns and engines needed special lubricants in extreme conditions. Such measures proved key in Stalin’s ability to block Hitler’s armies in front of Moscow in December 1941. Both the German army and the Luftwaffe were unprepared. They had to light fires under their vehicles and aircraft engines to defrost them. + +German soldiers referred bitterly to winter conditions as “weather for Russians.” They envied the Red Army’s winter uniforms, with white camouflage suits and padded cotton jackets, which were far more effective than German greatcoats. Russian military historians have attributed the comparatively low rate of frostbite and trench foot among Soviet forces to their old military practice of using layered linen foot bandages instead of socks. German soldiers also suffered more rapidly because their jackboots had steel studs that drained any warmth. In February 1943, when the remnants of Field Marshal Paulus’s Sixth Army finally surrendered at Stalingrad — the psychological turning point of World War II — more than 90,000 German prisoners limped out of the city on frost-ravaged feet. Yet their suffering had been caused less by cold than by Hitler’s orders to hold on there and the inability of German panzers with their narrow tracks to counterattack in the snow. + +General Winter also played a major role in the Red Army’s final victory in 1945. The great Soviet breakthrough in January, a charge from the River Vistula to the River Oder, depended on the weather. Russian forecasters had predicted “a strange winter,” with “heavy rain and wet snow” after the hard frosts of January. An order went out to repair boots. Stalin and the Red Army’s supreme command set January 12 as the start date for the offensive, so that the Soviets’ tank armies could take advantage of the deep-frozen ground before any thaw set in. Characteristically, Stalin falsely claimed that he had advanced the date from January 20 to take pressure off the Americans in the Ardennes. (U.S. forces had already halted the German offensive there just after Christmas.) In fact, there was another motive: Stalin wanted to control the bulk of Polish territory before he met U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta in the first week of February. + +> More than 90,000 German prisoners limped out of Stalingrad on frost-ravaged feet. + +Stalin’s commanders did not let him down. “Our tanks move faster than the trains to Berlin,” boasted the ebullient Colonel Iosif Gusakovsky. He had not bothered to wait for bridging equipment to reach the frontlines before attempting to cross the River Pilica. He simply ordered his leading tanks to smash the ice with gunfire, then to drive straight across the riverbed. The tanks, acting like icebreakers, pushed the ice aside “with a terrible thundering noise,” a terrifying experience for the poor drivers. The German eastern front in Poland collapsed under the armored onslaught, once again because the Soviet T-34’s broad tracks could cope with the ice and snow far better than any German panzer. + +After 1945, the Red Army’s achievements in winter warfare gave it a fearsome reputation in the West. It was not until the Soviet Union’s ill-planned invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 — the Warsaw Pact forces lacked maps, food supplies, and fuel — that Western analysts first began to suspect that they might have overestimated the Soviets’ warfighting abilities. + +Finally, in the 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet empire was marked by its doomed struggle to control Afghanistan, a terrain that made winter warfare impossible for conventional armies. Then, during the economic collapse in the 1990s, Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s government often proved unable to pay officers and soldiers alike and corruption became institutionalized. Conscripts were frequently on the edge of starvation because their rations were sold off; theft, bullying, and ill discipline became rampant. Spare parts from vehicles, as well as anything from fuel to light bulbs, boots, and especially any cold weather kit, disappeared onto the black market. + +Corruption became even worse following Russia’s chaotic invasion of Georgia in 2008. Putin began throwing money at the armed forces. The waste on prestige projects encouraged contractors and generals alike to pad their bank accounts. Little appears to have been done in reassessing military doctrine. The Russian idea of urban warfare had still not evolved from World War II, with their artillery, the “god of war,” smashing everything to rubble. This approach would continue during Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war from 2015. + +Yet Putin’s greatest triumph in Russian eyes was the covert seizure of Crimea the year before by infiltrating it with un-uniformed “little green men” from special forces. This was part of Putin’s angry reaction to the Maidan revolution in Kyiv, which forced his ally President Viktor Yanukovych to flee and led to the start of fighting in the Donbas region of Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine. + + +### Putin in Denial + +In February 2022, eight years later, Putin launched his “special military operation” in Ukraine. At the time, the vanguard was told to bring their parade uniforms ready to celebrate victory — one of the greatest examples of military hubris in history. Yet seven disastrous months later, when the Kremlin was finally forced to order a “partial mobilization” of the Russian population, it had to warn those called up that uniforms and equipment were in short supply. They would have to provide their own body armor and even ask their mothers and girlfriends for sanitary pads to use instead of field dressings. The lack of bandages is astonishing, especially now as winter intensifies, since they are vital to keep frost from entering open wounds. Adding to the dangers are mortar rounds hitting frozen ground: unlike soft mud, which absorbs most of the blast, frozen ground causes fragments to ricochet, in sometimes lethal ways. + +Putin’s new commander in chief in the south, General Sergei Surovikin, is determined to clamp down on attempts by some conscripts to avoid combat. Many have been resorting to the sabotage of fuel, weapons, and vehicles, to say nothing of self-inflicted wounds and desertion. Yet the Russian army’s long-standing structural problem — its shortage of experienced noncommissioned officers — has also led to a terrible record of maintaining weapons, equipment, and vehicles. These problems will become especially costly in winter with sensitive technology such as drones. + +As both sides enter a far more challenging season of fighting, the outcome will largely depend on morale and determination. While Russian troops curse their shortages and lack of hot food, Ukrainian troops are now benefiting from supplies of insulated camouflage suits, tents with stoves, and sleeping bags provided by Canada and the Nordic nations. Putin seems to be in denial about the state of his army and the way that General Winter will favor his opponents. He may also have made another mistake by concentrating his missiles against Ukraine’s energy network and its vulnerable civilian population. They will endure the greatest suffering, but there is little chance that they will break. + +--- + +__Antony Beevor__ is the author of Russia: Revolution and Civil War 1917–1921.