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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 73 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官問楊岳橋否決財案「莊嚴承諾」是否「用完即棄」 鄭達鴻：環境有變未必要實踐
+- 彭卓棋稱想於內地營商、曾被笑「大灣棋」 官：想告知法庭你不反政府、不反共？
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（26日）踏入審訊第73天。前公民黨區議員鄭達鴻今在盤問下重申，不認同黨無差別否決預算案的立場，而他從無向黨或選民透露有意申豁免跟黨立場投票。法官問及，時任公民黨黨魁楊岳橋曾提及否決預算案是「莊嚴承諾」，但對鄭達鴻來說是否「用完即棄」？鄭稱是「選舉嘅承諾」，又指《國安法》生效後實際環境改變，黨亦「盡量做一啲事情令到自己成個主張係合法」，環境有變時不一定要實踐承諾。
+
+法官追問政綱提及罷免特首如何合法，又指《基本法》雖賦予權力，但不代表可以任意或無差別使用，鄭重申是要求特首就社運問責。此外，鄭今亦表示與區諾軒不算好友，法官問為何區會在獄中寫信給鄭，且明顯是向他提供法律意見，鄭表示不清楚。鄭今完成7天作供，續由下一名被告彭卓棋作供。
+
+#### 鄭同意從無向黨或選民透露有意申豁免 認不容易但郭榮鏗投票前始申請亦成功
+
+鄭達鴻今續接受控方盤問，他確認，他於初選提名表格的政綱、公民黨街站、Facebook 專頁帖文、初選論壇、7月初派發的選舉單張等，均曾提及以否決預算案爭取五大訴求。主控萬德豪指鄭回覆選舉主任提問時亦沒提不會否決預算案，惟法官李運騰指若當時選舉主任沒這樣問，鄭便不會這樣答，陳慶偉亦指他們知道鄭的回覆，萬指會留待陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+鄭盤問下續同意，從沒告知黨他不會跟隨黨立場，亦從沒告知選民或黨，他有意於否決預算案時申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票，及若被逼否決財案會退黨。法官陳仲衡問，以鄭當時在論壇、街站和 Facebook 上的發言，他當時認為申請豁免機制會容易嗎？鄭稱不會，因為進入選舉期就要跟隨黨立場，但指郭榮鏗就任命終院首席法官張舉能的議案申請豁免時，「都係喺（2020年）6月投票嗰一刻之前先講。」
+
+陳仲衡即指，控方早前已指出郭榮鏗和鄭達鴻的分別，即鄭於參選前已有意申請該機制，但郭並不是。鄭指認為無分別，因在3月25日記者會楊岳橋稱會否決任命首席法官的議案時，郭榮鏗「正正喺（楊岳橋）隔離」。李運騰指楊是談及下一個任期的事，鄭同意，但指從郭榮鏗最終贊成該議案的理由，「佢係從根本地就算有35+、冇35+，喺（2020年）7月前甚至喺9月之後，佢都係不會反對（首席法官任命議案）。」翻查資料，郭榮鏗當時就議案投贊成票，其他公民黨員則投棄權票。
+
+#### 官問楊岳橋「莊嚴承諾」否決財案是否「用完即棄」 鄭稱屬「選舉承諾」
+
+李運騰續問，楊岳橋曾兩次提及否決預算案是「莊嚴承諾」，但對鄭達鴻來說，這個莊嚴承諾是「用完即棄（used and dumped）」、視乎情況才實踐的？陳志全微笑。鄭指「我會認為嗰個係一個選舉嘅承諾」，而且6月30日《國安法》生效後，「其實實際環境都改變咗，個黨都盡量做一啲事情令到自己成個主張係合法」。李追問，即「莊嚴承諾」其實不是一個承諾，若環境有變，不一定要實踐？鄭答「係」。
+
+陳慶偉續指，鄭稱公民黨在《國安法》生效後嘗試令主張看來合法，換另一個角度，其實也是令主張看來「不是不合法」？鄭回應：「我會認為佢事實上，或者睇落都係令到成個黨嘅立場係合法。」
+
+#### 官質疑不能無差別用權罷免特首 鄭重申要求行政長官為社運問責
+
+陳慶偉續問，政綱提及罷免時任特首林鄭月娥，如何看來合法？鄭重申是根據《基本法》第73條的條文。陳指，「但你也要有理由才能用第73條，不能只是說想用就用。你可能有《基本法》賦予的權力，但不代表可以任意（arbitrarily）或無差別地（indiscriminately）用那個權力。」鄭同意，解釋因此動用第73條的理由，就是「要求行政長官為社會運動問責」。
+
+陳指簡言之即是回應五大訴求，並指經修訂的政綱仍離不開五大訴求，只是無明確表明否決預算案，而是用其他字眼避免《國安法》風險。鄭重申，「五大訴求係嗰陣時好多人嘅訴求」，但新政綱「唔淨止係五大訴求」，亦有提及為港人爭取便利。
+
+#### 官質疑控方重複發問 鄭稱採納最溫和立場從無提否決一切議案
+
+萬德豪其後再指，公民黨曾作莊嚴承諾否決預算案迫政府回應五大訴求，而鄭代表黨參選卻稱無意否決預算案，是對選民的背叛，他是否同意。惟法官陳慶偉在萬發問時多次稱「yes, next」，並指認為鄭已答過很多次，就是會視乎實際情況，而該承諾只是當時採用的「政治語言」。
+
+萬再指，鄭曾稱需要黨支持參選、亦望獲得黨支持，陳慶偉打斷說重複發問並沒有意義，「我們不是陪審團，我們會看證據」，陳仲衡亦着萬德豪直接問問題，指他們對證據已很熟悉。
+
+萬最後指，無論黨立場如何，鄭為獲得黨支持參選，均會跟隨黨立場？鄭稱「我會跟隨黨我認為係合法嘅立場」。陳仲衡問他就35+有否偏離黨立場，鄭表示7月前黨立場「最少係否決財政預算案」，「有啲其他人講否決一切議案，但我從來都會揀最溫和嘅立場去 adopt，冇講過否決一切。」
+
+#### 鄭否認與其他被告串謀顛覆國家政權 重申視乎實際情況審視財案
+
+萬最後指，鄭與本案其他被告串謀取得立會過半，無差別否決預算案以迫使政府回應五大訴求，意圖顛覆國家政權，鄭一律不同意。陳仲衡追問，鄭當時是否認為「無差別」否決預算案是合法？鄭答「係」，但他個人不同意，亦不同意當時黨的立場和口徑，亦認為成功取得立會過半是「非常不可能」。
+
+陳續指，而若成功取得過半，鄭便會打算「跳船」，申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票或退黨？鄭稱「我會睇實際情況」，重申「無論如何，財政預算案都必然會做出來，冇人會阻止佢，所以去到嗰一刻有一份咁嘅嘢出咗嚟，我冇可能唔睇，再去作出衡量」。
+
+#### 鄭稱15助理可登入電腦、無印象看過彭卓棋單張 靠助理搜資料擬「論壇天書」
+
+辯方資深大律師潘熙其後進行覆問。就控方早前以鄭達鴻辦公室手提電腦內搜得的彭卓棋單張發問，鄭表示初選期間自己及助理也可登入電腦，而當時他共有7名全職及8名實習助理，延伸庭有被告聞後嘩然。鄭指自己無為意電腦內有該單張的檔案，亦不知誰人將檔案存入。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+法官陳仲衡指，但鄭競選期間應閱讀及了解其他候選人的選舉政綱。鄭表示應該要，但實際操作上，會由其助理及選舉經理閱讀，再為他制定（formulate）「論壇天書」，他不記得有否看過彭的單張，助理亦沒為他簡報過其他人政綱。李運騰追問，故鄭在辯論時不知道其他人的政綱？鄭解釋其助理及選舉經理就搜集到的資料，製造有機會攻擊或防守的位置，他會閱讀相關資料，但事實上無可能確認知道所有人的問題。
+
+潘熙其後展示「論壇天書」，顯示就「攻擊」一欄下列有其他候選人的名字，包括彭卓棋，鄭確認是一些有機會問彭的問題，「我都係跟返本論壇天書畀我嘅資料」就其立場準備回應。
+
+#### 鄭稱與區諾軒不算好友僅工作關係 不清楚為何區獄中寫信給他
+
+潘熙其後展示同一電腦搜得、彭卓棋與區諾軒有關港島投4票的對話截圖，鄭確認是區諾軒傳給他的截圖。法官陳慶偉問鄭達鴻是否區諾軒的好友（good pal），鄭稱「不算是，只有工作關係」。陳慶偉追問，那為何區諾軒會在獄中寫信給鄭，而且明顯是在提供法律意見，林卓廷等發笑。鄭表示不清楚，同意法官指他是「突然（out of the blue）」收到信件，而他在2021年1月6日被捕後從來沒有與區諾軒以書信聯絡。
+
+#### 鄭同意與鄒家成就共識理解不同 但認為無需問區諾軒有關提名表格共識及目的
+
+另在陳慶偉提問下，鄭表示以其理解，港島區協調會僅達成6點共識，但不包括運用否決權。陳續指，但鄒家成於「墨落無悔」表明「協調會議已取得共識的共同綱領」，明顯地運用否決權是其中一項共識，鄭指他當時不知道亦不同意。
+
+陳慶偉續指，提名表格列明「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導的協調會議共識，包括民主派35+公民投票計劃及其目標」，但似乎鄭認為的共識，與鄒家成指的共識有別，鄭同意。陳慶偉問，那他有否問區諾軒何謂共識和目標？鄭稱沒有，對方亦無向他解釋。
+
+陳續問，兩個共識明顯不同，為何鄭沒有查詢？鄭解釋，「因為我好清晰港島區嘅共識就係嗰六點。」陳再問，鄭是否無視鄒及公民黨的說法，只單純依賴自己的理解？鄭表示「靠我出席協調會議嗰陣時嘅理解」，又同意要致電或傳訊息予區諾軒查詢並不困難，但認為沒有這個需要。
+
+#### 鄭稱議員可用《立法會（權力及特權）條例》權力 要求調查警察濫權濫捕
+
+此外，法官李運騰早前質疑，公民黨一方面要求調查，但尚未有結果已倡議彈劾，鄭指是據《基本法》第73條賦予的權力提出。潘熙今引第73條條文：「如立法會全體議員的四分之一聯合動議，指控行政長官有嚴重違法或瀆職行為而不辭職，經立法會通過進行調查，立法會可委托終審法院首席法官負責組成獨立的調查委員會，並擔任主席。調查委員會負責進行調查，並向立法會提出報告。如該調查委員會認為有足夠證據構成上述指控，立法會以全體議員三分之二多數通過，可提出彈劾案，報請中央人民政府決定。」鄭確認是指上述權力。
+
+至於新政綱提到「全力調查及追究警隊濫權及濫暴罪行」，潘熙問這方面的調查權力有何法律基礎，鄭表示以其理解，其中一個途徑也是運用第73條，而立法會亦有調查權，但他忘記是哪一條文。潘熙遂問是否與第382章《立法會（權力及特權）條例》有關，遭陳仲衡打斷問：「你是否將答案餵給證人？（“You are feeding the witness with the answer?”）」，最後鄭主動補充：「Powers and Privileges Ordinance（權力及特權條例）係立法會議員經常想使用嘅一樣嘢。」
+
+#### 鄭達鴻完成7天作供 楊雪盈無辯方案情
+
+潘熙覆問時，亦再重複陳仲衡的問題，問鄭當時是否認為容易申請豁免跟黨立場投票。鄭稱當選前不認為可行，但當選後「當大家都係立法會議員，喺同一個 level ground（水平）底下，我就有機會可以申請成功」。惟陳仲衡指這並非他的問題，指鄭當選前無權就預算案投票，根本無需申請該機制。
+
+潘熙一度問鄭達鴻是否誤解了法官問題，陳仲衡指潘熙若打算問，風險自負。潘熙休庭後，表示沒有進一步問題，亦不會傳召其他證人。鄭達鴻完成作供，從證人席後方取回背包，微笑步回被告欄。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈（左）
+
+代表楊雪盈的大律師表示，楊不會作供，亦不會傳召辯方證人。代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀稱彭擬作供，審訊下午續。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（26日）踏入審訊第73天。前南區區議員彭卓棋今午開始作供，指自己大學時創業，2017年成立「香港青年創業聯盟」，曾辦活動推廣粵港澳大灣區創業；其名下公司亦曾在內地註冊19個商標，直言大灣區創業優惠和機遇較香港大，想在內地做生意，又自言初選期間曾「畀人笑我係『大灣棋』」。法官李運騰指，彭似乎想告知法庭他並非反政府和反對共產黨，彭回應望法庭全面知道其心路歷程。
+
+彭又表示，參選立法會的初心，是望在政策層面推動香港青年創業，而他當選後不會無差別否決預算案。彭又表示，於2020年3月在前灣仔區議員李永財邀請下，首次與戴耀廷和區諾軒見面談及初選，並在法官追問下指視自己為泛民主派，而「我喺5月、6月嗰時就視自己為本土派」。
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱喜愛中國文化及時事 中文中史獲5**、大學修政治及歷史
+
+鄭達鴻今早完成7天作供，下午由同參選港島區初選、時任南區區議員的彭卓棋作供，他身穿西裝、以基督教宣誓，由辯方大律師盧敏儀主問。彭表示於1994年出生，上周二（20日）剛過29歲生日。就其教育程度，盧敏儀展示彭的中學文憑試成績單，多名被告發笑和議論紛紛，彭表示：「我喺中學時代比較鍾意中國文化同時事，亦都多謝母校嘅栽培，我喺中文、中國歷史同通識教育有幸攞到5**」，余慧明掩嘴發笑。
+
+彭供稱，中學畢業後入讀香港大學社會科學系，主修政治及公共行政，副修歷史，現正於中文大學修讀行政人員工商管理碩士課程（EMBA）。彭指自己於大三開始創業，做補習社、賣衫和市場推廣；畢業不久與港大同學「膽粗粗試吓搞香港自己嘅品牌」，2017年參與年宵售出全部產品，「我當時都同今日一樣，我相信香港嘅品牌係可以嘅。」
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 彭稱2017年成立「香港青年創業聯盟」 推廣大灣區創業
+
+彭卓棋續於2017年6月15日成立「香港青年創業聯盟」，為該公司的董事，於初選期間亦有營運。他解釋聯盟的宗旨，是望團結一批對營商或創業有興趣的青年人，並會舉行講座和創業比賽；亦會在社交平台宣傳創業資訊，「特別係粵港澳大灣區」，因當時很多年青人對創業非常有興趣，但不知如何創業，「而大灣區係一個選項。」
+
+辯方展示聯盟 Instagram 帳戶一則2018年的帖文，提及「財政預算案 點幫你？」，並介紹寬免企業登記費的計劃。彭解釋很多時預算案會有政府資助的「糖果」，但營商人士並不知道，故望作宣傳讓商界善用。
+
+法官陳仲衡一度問，其公司屬於哪個功能界別？彭指當時無想過，因「我唔係話一啲搵到好多錢嘅營商者」。陳澄清不是問他會否參選，而是問其選民身份，彭回答「唔係好清楚」，指成為功能界別選民有很多要求及門檻，但其公司業務並非要「搵錢、營商」，性質為非牟利公司。
+
+#### 彭稱初選期間被笑是「大灣棋」、但亦獲邀任民政局資助活動導師
+
+被問外界對彭卓棋在「香港青年創業聯盟」工作的評價，彭指「有認同亦有批評」，解釋「當時我選初選嘅期間，畀人笑我係『大灣棋』」，陳志全等發笑。彭指其工作「亦都有讚賞嘅」，辯方續展示多張聯盟的活動相片、海報及獎狀，彭指他2018或19年曾獲邀任民政事務局資助的「18區公民教育活動資助計劃」工作坊的導師；亦曾邀澳門大學創業學會來港交流，促進兩地年青人對大灣區創業的合作，並曾在香港城市大學和浸會大學辦講座，進行大灣區創業分享。
+
+#### 彭公司曾於內地註冊19商標 望獲政府資助在內地做生意
+
+辯方後展示彭名下公司於2020年4至9月，在中國內地註冊的19個商標註冊證，彭確認共花約6萬至7萬元人民幣申請，解釋「創業一定要係商標行先」、商標是做品牌的「命根」，而他推廣大灣區創業，要「自己走一次流程」才有說服力向會員示範如何申請；其生意與預算案也有關係，望能透過獲得商標註冊，申請由預算案撥款的企業支援計劃「BUD專項基金」。
+
+法官陳慶偉關注，註冊證顯示商標由「黑木」公司申請，問彭有否實際做生意。彭指有，指公司於他2016年讀書時已創立，會賣衫、幫人做市場推廣和設計等，將一些品牌放在獨有平台賣廣告，如「KOL business」，在2017至2018年每個月約有十多二十萬收入，亦有報稅。
+
+#### 官問是否想表示不反政府不反共 彭稱想法庭全面知其「心路歷程」
+
+李運騰續問，彭卓棋的生意是否主要在大灣區？彭稱「未係，想係」，指其生意當時主要在香港，但想擴至大灣區，「坦白講，大灣區創業嘅優惠同機遇係比香港大嘅」；並解釋要去內地發展就要得到政府資助，而「條件就係畀政府見到你有呢一啲嘅傾向或者計劃打算去內地發展」。李問，所以彭當時是否真心（sincerely）想在內地做生意？彭稱：「係⋯⋯係想喺內地做生意嘅。」
+
+李運騰續攤手笑指，彭談及上述所有的原因，是想告知法庭他不反政府、不反共？彭答「我想全面啲畀法庭知道我個心路歷程，我都知道係⋯⋯」，惟李運騰打斷並着辯方加快主問進度，指上述全部只是背景，盧敏儀表示明白，稱被告讓法庭知道其心路歷程屬重要。
+
+而就彭卓棋在初選提名表格填上職業為「企業家」和「區議員」，彭笑言當時雖並非很成功的創業家，但相信「創業家精神」。
+
+#### 彭稱參選因想推廣香港青年創業、不論崗位想入政府實踐 不會無差別否決
+
+彭卓棋於2019年當選南區（赤柱及石澳）區議員，於2020年1月開始任期。彭表示，他當選區議員後已有心競逐立法會，因「發覺好多區議會嘅問題唔可以喺區議會嘅層面解決」，「一定要拎上立法會先可以傾到」，如赤柱塞車問題牽涉整個港島區的路政規劃；另一方面，彭指他參選的「初心」是望在立法會推動香港青年創業，因在政策層面才可大範圍推廣，形容是其「夢想」，「想喺立法會層次體現。」李運騰指彭於同年6月報名參與初選，關注他任區議員多久後有此念頭，彭指「唔係好耐，好短時間㗎咋」。
+
+盧敏儀問，那彭若當選，推廣香港品牌和生意會否影響他如何考慮財政預算案？彭稱會，指會留意預算案相關資助的金額、門檻和申請程序，「有一籃子考慮。」盧再問，若初選是有關無差別否決預算案，彭會同意嗎？彭稱「我唔會不予區別嘅，我會一併考慮（財案內容與優劣）」。
+
+被問其志向是否不限於做生意，彭重提法官關注他何時有意參選立會，解釋準確而言他是想入政府的單位實踐理念，不論是立法會議員或任何部門，總之需要有個位置讓他將抱負發展。辯方續展示彭2019年初就政府「青年委員自薦計劃」的自薦短片，彭自薦加入博物館諮詢委員會。彭指自己2018和2019年連續兩年申請該計劃均失敗，盧敏儀問他在該次失敗有何經歷，彭稱：「接受囉，只能夠，繼續努力去增值自己。因為人哋唔收得你，一定有原因嘅」，林卓廷發出笑聲。
+
+#### 彭稱曾跨黨派倡石澳石礦場建大型水上活動中心 獲施政報告接納
+
+辯方續就彭卓棋的區議員工作發問，並展示彭的政綱單張和區議會紀錄等。彭表示，區議會雖是諮詢架構，但也有撥款權，區議員有權就地區小型工程撥款及社區參與撥款決定如何運用。彭就任時亦曾提出要維修情人橋、巴士站和卜公碼頭，指需與政府部門磋商，涉很多「據理力爭」的過程，但該些項目均在他被捕後得以落實；他亦曾支持政府和區議會各出60萬讓低收入家庭兒童課外閱讀，及政府防疫基金擴至中小企和增聘人手公布檢疫數字等。
+
+此外，彭卓棋亦曾任南區經濟、發展及規劃事務委員會副主席，司馬文則是主席，彭指該委員會負責收集民情讓政府官員審視，若獲採納會在施政報告或預算案推行。彭續指，當時許多南區居民因疫情失業，故想到利用南區的「品牌特色」，即「優美嘅海洋啦，山啦」，進行經濟活動舒緩短期失業情況；而當時石澳石礦場丟空已久，他遂與南區區議員跨黨派提議程，建議政府興建大型水上活動中心，「咁樣就唔會浪費咗呢個大咕窿。」
+
+
+▲ 已復修的石澳石礦場的航空照片
+
+彭形容該議案「係我當時好開心嘅一個議案」，他一當選後每兩三星期都會「努力諗點樣去做」，約見相關政府部門、建立互信；而教他「好深刻」的是特首於2020年施政報告第111段接納他們的意見，「都感謝政府接納我哋嘅建議，喺施政報告度體現」。被問當時考慮什麼，彭稱是「對市民有冇好處啦，或者幫到社會」，並指初選沒有改變他對區議會議案的支持。彭並指他參加初選後，司馬文從來沒有說他不是為該規劃事務委員會利益行事，亦沒反對他任副主席。
+
+#### 彭稱視自己為泛民主派 於5至6月則視為本土派
+
+就彭卓棋參與初選的經過，他指自己第一次和戴耀廷和區諾軒見面，是大約於2020年3月、協調會議舉行前，於李永財議員辦事處與李一同和二人見面，解釋當時他想參選立法會，並從李永財口中得知區及戴想與有意競選立法會的潛在候選人見面，於是出席。
+
+法官陳仲衡即指，但區及戴只想見泛民主派候選人，並非所有候選人；彭回答指，因此其實是李永財直接邀請自己出席，而李亦有興趣參選立法會，提議「不如一齊去聽吓」。陳仲衡追問，那彭是否視自己為泛民主派？彭表示「都可以」，經追問下才回答「係」。
+
+李運騰問，那彭會否形容自己為本土派？彭起初回答「當時我未正式真係選擇去選立法會⋯⋯」，惟李打斷並重複問題，彭才回答：「我喺5月、6月嗰時就視自己為本土派。」
+
+#### 彭稱3月與戴耀廷區諾軒首見面 無透露有意出選惟認有討論初選投票方式
+
+就會面內容，陳慶偉問彭當時有否告知兩人自己有意參選，彭稱當時「未表露有意定或無意，因為我想聽吓佢哋講乜」。陳續引區諾軒證供，指彭當時關注初選使用電子或紙張投票，問彭若沒透露對參選感興趣，又為何會談及相關議題？彭同意有說過，指若他決定參選，「電子投票對我係有利嘅」，但「嗰時我未決定心志一定會參加，因為選立法會要好多資源」。
+
+陳慶偉追問，投票牽涉較多支出，而進行民意調查的支出則較少？彭同意並補充指，雖然他沒在席上表露一定會出選，但他答應與戴及區見面，「可能都係某種程度上暗示我會出選。」
+
+#### 彭稱獲李永財邀請出席首次港島協調會 後獲區諾軒戴耀廷電話號碼
+
+李運騰問，是否因彭卓棋出席了首次會面，故獲邀出席首次港島區協調會議？彭同意，並指是獲李永財邀請出席協調會，解釋與戴見面後，曾與李討論若真的參選，兩人應該合作，因此最後彭名單上有不同人。彭在法官追問下，指李沒有政治聯繫，但有一個社區組織。
+
+彭續指，會面上沒有與戴耀廷及區諾軒交換電話號碼，但其後從不同途徑得到兩人號碼——其中區是南區前區議員和前民主黨成員，他相信在3月之後，在處理區議會事務時經一名民主黨黨員取得區的號碼；至於戴的號碼，則是戴6月中至尾成立協調會議的 WhatsApp 群組後，彭從通訊表找到。
+
+#### 彭稱無直接聯絡戴耀廷 所有初選訊息均透過李永財獲得
+
+在李運騰提問下，彭表示印象中3月26日至7月初選前曾出席3至4個港島協調會議。被問期間如何與其他參選人溝通，彭指李永財與區諾軒比較熟悉，「佢哋一齊踢波」，因此一般會由李直接找區；但區亦曾向他發 WhatsApp 訊息，即鄭達鴻作供時曾展示二人討論投票的截圖。李運騰問對話是否於5月左右發生，彭指無法臆測，因截圖寫着「今天」，但內容提及不可投全票、要投單票，故深信應是港島協調會議尾聲時區傳給他。
+
+彭最後指，於3月至7月期間沒有直接聯絡過戴耀廷，但曾經直接聯絡區諾軒，致電他請教如何處理南區區議會區務。李運騰問，彭有否與區討論初選事宜，彭指沒有，但在初選前區有一次曾約他吃飯，惟具體日期卻不記得。最後彭確認，有關初選及協調會議的訊息，全部都是透過李永財獲得。
+
+
+▲ 李永財（資料圖片）
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-27-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-74.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-27-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-74.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..97da778f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-27-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-74.md
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 74 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 彭卓棋認「扮黃」討好選民、提「攬炒」僅屬選舉語言 官問何不加入民建聯
+- 彭卓棋稱《國安法》後派爛單張以示放棄政綱 官質疑屬「抵抗」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（27日）踏入審訊第74天。前南區區議員彭卓棋繼續作供，表示參選初心是重振香港品牌，但當時社會氣氛「冇人理」，故為爭取「最黃」的初選選民支持，於選舉單張和政綱提及「攬炒」、「重組警隊」、「劣質的中國東江水」等激進的「選舉語言」。彭承認自己為討好選民「扮得比實際上更黃」，法官陳慶偉問他為何不加入民建聯，笑指該黨亦談大灣區發展，「你很適合民建聯」，多人大笑。彭指在當時氣氛，民建聯會輸，又承認自己當選區議員，是2019年社會氣氛的得益者。法官亦質疑，彭於政綱提及沒打算履行的承諾是當選民「盲」，彭稱相信選民「眼睛雪亮」，故最終他票數十分低。
+
+此外，彭稱他於被捕時始知「攬炒十步曲」由戴耀廷提出，戴無在協調會議提無差別否決，而他對否決權的理解一直是「可用可不用」，直言對不公義的議案，不論政治立場或有否35+，議員都應「秉行公義行事」。
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱無收過協調會議文件、不知6.9記者會
+
+前南區區議員彭卓棋今繼續作供，就協調會議，彭表示他從沒有從戴耀廷或任何人收過港島區協調機制初稿及協議文件，亦沒有從任何人得知文件上運用否決權的內容。彭亦確認，有出席初選前所有協調會議，討論過名單不可超過3個、用全票制投票、用電子票、決定辦初選而非民調等，但無討論過簽署任何協議。
+
+法官李運騰問，那彭卓棋知道戴耀廷於6月9日舉行的初選記者會嗎（會上戴稱毋須簽署協議）？彭答「我不知道」。李運騰驚訝問：「你不知道？」，彭指當時「決定咗積極考慮參選」，但未正式報名，又引鄭達鴻被搜得他與區諾軒的對話截圖，指區提過或於5月30日辦記者會，但他無收過有關6月9日記者會的訊息。
+
+
+▲ 2020年6月9日舉行的初選記者會（資料圖片）
+
+法官陳仲衡一度指，這是彭卓棋與區諾軒的對話，為何他聽起來如此「事不關己（aloof）」，要提及鄭達鴻，彭解釋因其電話已非由他掌管，「唔係好有印象啲對話」，故靠審訊文件夾回憶。
+
+#### 彭稱戴耀廷協調會議提否決權可用可不用、無提過無差別否決
+
+彭續指，首次港島區協調會議上，戴耀廷提及否決財政預算案是《基本法》的權力，之後司馬文就反對。法官陳慶偉追問，戴有說議員一定要否決預算案嗎？指戴應說過更激進（aggressive）的話，司馬文才會有此回應。
+
+彭指戴當時沒這樣提過，「個對話其實係好短」，司馬文反對後，戴就回應否決權「其實係可用可不用」，「即係政府做得唔好就用，政府做得好呢，就唔使用喇。」彭並在法官詢問下，表示開會前無看過任何戴耀廷有關否決預算案的文章，戴會上也沒提過無差別否決。
+
+#### 彭稱直至被捕始知「攬炒十步曲」由戴耀廷提出
+
+李運騰續問，彭卓棋決定參加初選前，有從任何途徑得知戴耀廷的「攬炒」概念嗎？彭稱「攬炒十步曲我係有聽過」，指首次接觸該字眼，是在他一份宣傳單張的設計初稿，但「我係淨係聽過『攬炒十步曲』呢幾個字」，他當時不知道誰提出、亦不知道十步曲的內容，「我係直至（2021年1月）去到警署被捕之後，警員展示《十步曲》嘅文章我先至知道。」
+
+#### 彭卓棋單張草稿列「攬炒十步曲」 彭稱由同事準備曾着刪去
+
+辯方續展示相關初稿，前面有彭卓棋自我簡介及與李永財、何致宏、陳衍冲和張嘉莉4人的相片，寫有「共同協調人民奪權 齊上齊落對抗極權」；背面則寫有「攬炒十步曲時間表」，詳列攬炒十步的時間和內容，並寫有「轉載自2020年4月28日蘋果日報戴耀廷專欄」。彭確認是首次看到「攬炒十步曲」字眼的來源，但當時無深究細節。
+
+彭指，當時指示一名兼職員工、選舉助理的朋友「小白」為他設計自我簡介單張，由彭提供自我簡介文字，其餘則由小白設計。彭形容，當時「我䁽到『攬炒十部曲』，我覺得關我咩事呢？」，並在法官追問下指沒問為何加入該部分，「我淨係同佢講話唔要嗰 part」，設計最終「冇出街」。法官李運騰追問彭有否與團隊其餘4人討論，彭指「冇，因為好早期已經 foul 咗啦」，並指他們也沒看過該份草稿。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 單張提否決權 彭稱同意但當時「未係好理解」該字眼
+
+彭卓棋最終派發的單張，設計與草稿相似，鄭達鴻電腦亦被搜得該張單張的相片。彭同意相信單張於5月中前已派發，因當時「積極考慮」參選。李運騰追問，積極到他甚至製作和發布選舉政綱，令其對手也獲得一份？彭指「其實唔係」，解釋單張僅屬「自我簡介」，而4月時團隊內部仍討論由他抑或李永財出選，最後決定由他出選。
+
+李運騰關注，經修改的單張仍寫有「提倡運用立法會權力，否決財政預算案，迫使當權者回應『五大訴求』」，問彭是否同意該字眼？彭承認「我哋最後都同意」，「但係嗰陣時未係好理解呢個字眼嘅，我哋未話好似而家案件咁細節，去到知道個法律點做嘅。」李運騰反問彭不是持有政治學的學位嗎？彭同意，並在法官追問下，指無印象單張印刷數量，也無相關紀錄，解釋是由同事跟進。
+
+#### 彭稱理解否決權是「可用可不用」、不論立場憑公義行事 稱被捕前無聽過「無差別」
+
+彭卓棋續確認，他簽署的「墨落無悔」、論壇發言、政綱等均有提及否決權。盧敏儀問，當時他如何理解否決預算案？彭稱「我一路嘅理解都係協調會講嘅『可用可不用』」。惟陳仲衡質疑彭從來沒有提及過，彭指他沒有直接用「可用可不用」，但政綱有提到「公義與不公義」的問題。
+
+辯方展示彭的政綱，寫有「背水重光」，印有張嘉莉、李永財、何致宏3人和另外兩人的相片，並列有6點政綱概要，彭確認該3人屬他最終參選名單。彭解釋雖沒提「可用可不用」，但他理解用和不用否決權，是視乎某個議案是否符合公義，與35+無關：「因為作為一個立法會議員，應該秉行公義行事，乜嘢立場都唔緊要」，「對一啲唔好嘅議案、不公義嘅議案，無論35+與否，民主派建制派也好，都應該係憑公義行事（運用否決權）。」
+
+陳慶偉指其政綱亦提及政府是「不公義政權」，彭稱是當時選舉的「誇張手法」，但認同政府「有啲位置係做得唔好」，政治和抗疫也與民意期望有落差，故「我都係會憑返我嘅良心同埋我認為啱嘅嘢去行事」，正如協調會議共識名單不可超過3人，「我都唔跟嘅。」
+
+盧敏儀續問，彭如何理解「無差別」，彭指「我係去到被捕之後，先至理解咩叫做無差別否決財政預算案」。陳仲衡指他被捕前有聽過「無差別」一詞嗎？彭稱「冇聽過」。
+
+#### 彭稱提「攬炒」屬選舉語言冀獲黃營選票、指列服務及創業經歷無人理
+
+法官李運騰問那彭有聽過「攬炒」嗎？彭稱有，指他無深究理解該字，但有在選舉單張「利用」該字眼。李運騰引彭政綱提及：「35+是選舉主軸，以議會抗爭攬炒迫使政府回應五大訴求，這是沒有妥協的空間」，彭確認稱，「當時我係用咗好多呢啲選舉語言，希望去爭取選民嘅支持」，並解釋因他報名初選後，「我先至慢慢意會到，我嘅競爭對手其實就係當時嘅民主派，因此我用咗好多呢啲激進嘅詞語，希望喺黃陣營可以攞到票。」
+
+彭續解釋，於4月左右，曾想過將以前創業及服務社會的例子放在選舉單張，「但係慢慢感受到社會氣氛，係冇人理嘅，所以我承認係用咗一個，今日睇返唔係好好嘅選舉策略。」李運騰問那是不是彭昨日提到的「心路歷程」？彭同意。陳仲衡續問，彭報名前，認為誰是他的競爭對手？彭稱當時沒有細想，但「我忽略咗初選嘅 target segment（目標選民），其實係最黃嘅一群」，「所以如果我講我自己創業嗰啲嘢，我相信係唔會有任何機會。」
+
+惟彭卓棋指，他也希望在選舉單張「加返啲真係我嘅初心」，故提及「重振香港品牌」、「進行19年免費教育」和「英語教學」等，又指「我本身係一個中文中學嘅學生，我用咗好多時間去學英文」，故望推行英中教育以全面提升香港年青人競爭力，「好似新加坡咁樣」，又強調「香港品牌係我一直嘅初心」。
+
+#### 官追問是否不想只任一屆議員 彭稱當時熱情相信、惟今不信
+
+陳慶偉續指，這是彭卓棋對選民的承諾？彭答「係一個賣點啦」。陳追問，彭並不打算兌現承諾？彭重申只能說是「一個推廣自己、我哋團隊嘅賣點啦」，但追問下指一旦當選，會「盡力爭取」。
+
+陳慶偉問，若彭在第一屆未能做到，會於第二屆繼續嗎？彭指「第二屆係會唔會選我都未知」，陳問他作為從政者，沒有長遠的願景？彭答「係要遠啲，但我要承認，當時我係短視咗」，但補充當時亦曾報名青年事務委員會自薦計劃，認為「立法會議員唔一定係唯一一個可以將我嘅初選或者理想實踐嘅地方」，惟陳打斷並追問他是否不只想任一屆議員，彭稱「當時我嗰熱情係相信呢一點嘅，但係今日我唔相信」。被告席的鄒家成微微張嘴。
+
+#### 官質疑不打算兌現承諾 彭認部分屬裝飾、選民眼睛雪亮故獲低票
+
+陳慶偉續質疑，彭一方面稱望實踐政綱，另一方面又指政綱內容是不真實。彭否認，強調就「香港本位經濟」、「教育自主化」、「資源發展」和「地方充權」4點，「係我真誠真心地相信去做」；至於「從一而終的抗爭派」和「重組警隊」兩點，是「當時社會氣氛選舉語言」。陳慶偉問，所以那兩點只是「裝飾（dress up your platform）」？彭同意，形容「當時嘅食客係好需要食呢啲嘢」。陳指若他是彭的選民，「我不會知道你哪些政綱為真」，彭表示「所以我個選舉策略導致我哋嗰票數係大敗」。
+
+李運騰其後再次問，如無意實踐上述兩點，為何在政綱提及，彭重申當時社會氣氛「都唔會睇你做啲乜嘢嘅倡議㗎啦，只係對於政府有啲咩不滿你就寫出嚟啦，我就寫出嚟啦」，直言「當時嘅氣氛係要講呢啲先至有機會贏囉」。
+
+彭又指他經常與跨黨派合作，「政治，係要溝通，但係選舉，係要情感，啫係要勾起人哋嘅情感，因為選舉嘅策略同做廣告一樣。」陳慶偉再追問他會否想連任，並繼續使用選舉語言，彭重申只是因應初選目標選民使用特定語言。陳問，「所以你假設你的選民是盲的？他們可以看到你做什麼，可以看到你的承諾」，彭答「我諗選民眼睛雪亮嘅，所以我咁低票」，鄒家成和余慧明等發笑。彭確認他初選排最後。
+
+#### 政綱提劣質「中國」東江水 官質疑看來引起憎恨 彭稱無深究
+
+陳慶偉亦關注，彭政綱提及「劣質的中國東江水」，彭解釋與其用錢淨化東江水，不如建海水化淡廠更貼合成本效益，但承認用「劣質」是「想突顯一啲選舉語言」。陳仲衡問但為何要用「中國」這個字？何桂藍和余慧明等微笑。彭答：「欸⋯我冇深究點解用『中國』呢個字眼」，並指「喺中國或者內地都可以形容係『中國』，或者大陸啦」。
+
+李運騰質疑，彭昨天指他積極鼓勵青年到大灣區創業，並不反內地政府；但到了選舉，又突然採用看來會引起對政府憎恨的語言，問他能否解釋其改變？彭重申「我係採納咗一個選舉策略」，因初選的目標選民是「深黃」，若要取得足夠選票一定要用選舉語言爭取認同。
+
+#### 彭卓棋同意為取悅選民「扮黃」 官問何不加入民建聯
+
+李運騰指他不明白，指初選並非必須，彭想參選大可直接參與正式選舉。彭回應，認為初選無論資源或規模都無正選般大壓力，是一個好的機會充當民調「試水溫」，可「試吓我哋嘅團隊攞唔攞到支持」。惟陳仲衡指，彭不是試水溫，而是將整個政治格調改變，彭承認有格調改變，重申當時慢慢意會到目標選民「原來係最黃嘅」，「平心而論，如果我仲講大灣區，我應該即刻畀人 foul 走咗。」李運騰問，所以彭為了取悅選民，便扮得比他實際上更黃（pretend yourself to be more yellow than you actually were）？彭答「係」。
+
+陳慶偉笑說，「那為何你不加入民建聯？」庭上多人發笑。彭表示：「因為喺嗰個選舉氣氛，DAB（民建聯）會輸。」陳續指，民建聯有協調機制、亦談及大灣區，「你很適合民建聯（“You fit right into DAB.”）」，林卓廷笑說「哇」，余慧明亦掩嘴發笑。彭答「都唔一定係」，因對一些主流建制派「我都未必完全同意晒佢哋」。
+
+陳慶偉續指，彭或不完全同意建制派，「但你完全不同意泛民主派」，彭承認當時是「雄心壯志」，指2019年的社會氣氛「造成咗好多未必有好多經驗嘅年青人素人出到嚟」，「我承認我係呢一個浪潮嘅得益者，佢畀我實踐我所想嘅，所以我喺區議會，我係努力建設。」彭說話時林卓廷和鄒家成一度嘆氣。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（27日）踏入審訊第74天。前南區區議員彭卓棋繼續作供，表示「墨落無悔」是「鬥黃嘅書」，當時簽署是因「簽咗就唔使畀人夾」；而論壇上提「敵人係共產黨」和不惜入議會「肢體抗爭」等，均屬爭取選民的選舉語言。法官質疑是否為達目的不擇手段，彭同意自己「唔啱」，重看論壇片段亦感「好尷尬」。彭又指自己是土生土長香港人、想香港好，故是本土派，並指「本土派」只是讓選民知道他的「標籤」。
+
+此外，彭供稱《國安法》前，團隊曾開會決定銷毀所有政綱，並於《國安法》後將撕掉政綱的選舉單張派發，亦曾要求民主動力將所有政綱移除，以表明已放棄所有政綱。法官質疑為何不於社交平台公開撤回，又稱彭卓棋於持有爛單張的相片握拳是意味「抵抗」，彭承認有「鬥」的心態，但稱當時認為採取的措施已經足夠。
+
+#### 彭稱簽「墨落」可免「畀人夾」 即使細看亦會簽因要「鬥黃」
+
+前南區區議員彭卓棋今繼續作供，彭今早承認選舉政綱提「攬炒」等屬「選舉語言」，以討好「最黃」的初選選民。辯方下午問及彭有簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明，彭稱當時不覺得「會運用」或「會積極運用」否決權有何分別，解釋簽署是因當時同事注意到聲明於 Facebook 流傳。彭指他有「睇過䁽過（聲明），但唔係好詳細」，留意到談及五大訴求和推動普選，而當時團隊認為「我哋如果唔簽呢份嘢呢，就一定會輸，簽嘅話起碼可以頂住，唔使畀人問咁多嘢」，他本人亦同意簽署，因「簽咗就唔使畀人夾」。
+
+彭續指，涉案後仔細看「墨落」便發現提及「共同綱領」，但港島並無「共同綱領」，「不過就算我有細睇，我要好坦白同法庭講，我都會簽，因為依一份係鬥黃嘅書嚟。」盧敏儀續問，彭簽「墨落」時，打算無差別否決預算案嗎？彭否認，指當時區議會工作如改建石澳石礦場等，及其選舉政綱如19年免費教育和重振香港品牌等，均需預算案通過，故即使其政綱「用好多呢啲唔係咁啱嘅言論」，但他當刻並沒有無差別的概念。
+
+#### 選舉論壇稱共產黨為敵人、不惜肢體抗爭 彭稱全屬選舉語言回看感尷尬
+
+彭卓棋同意，於初選論壇上亦運用了與選舉單張類似的選舉策略，讓人看來他相信他所說的話。李運騰指，認為彭事實上在論壇比其單張去得更盡（go further），不僅提否決預算案，更指「我哋嘅敵人就係共產黨」，「我哋入到議會不惜以肢體抗爭、癱瘓政府、否決財政預算案」等。
+
+彭承認當時有用該些字眼，重申「要爭取最黃嘅選民」，認為「呢一啲語言，會有助我喺初選贏」。李運騰問，所以他為達目的不擇手段（the end justifies the means）？彭稱「我認為係唔啱㗎呢啲」，但當刻他希望在黃色陣營內勝出，「但係而家我睇返，當然好尷尬啦。」
+
+法官陳仲衡問到，該段發言有多少代表彭的真實看法？彭說「我諗整段都係選舉語言嚟，除咗『我係彭卓棋港島團隊』之外」，庭上多人大笑。彭並稱，他後來才知道「以肢體抗爭其實係癱瘓唔到政府」，重申是想以此獲選民支持；又指論壇上曾想談及創業和香港品牌，「但係個主持 stop 咗我啦已經，啫係冇人有興趣知道我想做啲咩㗎啦。」
+
+#### 彭稱「想香港好」是為本土派 提入議會「肢體抗爭」屬無深究、不可傷人
+
+庭上遂展示論壇謄本，彭提及畢業後想創業，將香港品牌做好，但被打斷。彭同意當時是在解釋他為何是「本土派」，並指：「我係土生土長香港人，我想香港好，所以我係一個本土派。」陳仲衡問，所以任何在香港出生、想香港好的人，在他眼中都是本土派？彭同意，但指其實不重要，因就如將商品放在百貨公司貨架，「一定要有個標籤畀自己，唔係其實市民係唔會知你係邊個或者咩派別咁樣。」
+
+彭同意，標籤自己的目的同樣是為在初選勝出，並指當時本土派較流行，有很多本土音樂、市集和電影。陳仲衡質疑人們當時「鬥黃」是關乎向政府抗議，而不是關於本土音樂和市集，彭指他理解是有包括在內。
+
+彭再指，認為本土派也應捍衛香港核心價值，即自由、民主和法治。法官李運騰質疑，彭一方面說不惜議會肢體抗爭，一方面又稱核心價值是法治是有矛盾。彭指他沒提過會用暴力，亦無深究肢體抗爭「具體係乜嘢」，但認為「進行肢體抗爭嘅嘢都唔可以傷害到人」。李運騰指，這又是另一個例子，彭說出他不全然明白意思的字眼？彭承認有「唔啱」，但重申當時無深究。
+
+#### 彭稱《國安法》前撕毀政綱及要求民動移除政綱 確保犯法倡議不可公開
+
+彭卓棋續指，《國安法》6月30日生效前，曾於6月中與團隊開會討論會否「有機會中招」，但因「根本唔理解」、「根本冇呢個法律水平」判斷何謂合法，故「拗咗一輪」後決定將所有政綱銷毀，認為「嗰啲選舉語言都全部唔好要啦」。陳仲衡指彭只是破壞證據，而不是公開撤回其主張，彭解釋撕毀單張目的就是「放棄所有政綱提及嘅內容」、意味放棄主張；而他當時亦曾致電民主動力職員 Christy 要求將政綱全部移除，解釋因應《國安法》「我哋唔做任何有機會犯法嘅倡議」。
+
+陳仲衡多次質疑為何不公開於專頁說明，彭承認最好應立即在 Facebook 說清楚，但當時「冇諗過原來呢個都係一個 option」，認為他們在街上派「爛溶溶」的單張及通知民主動力已經足夠，指當時「基本上我哋係冇政綱去進行一個選舉」，而選民在票站和投票系統也可看到「冇晒嘢」。
+
+辯方續展示彭卓棋個人 Instagram 帳戶的相片，顯示彭與另外兩人手持撕毀的選舉單張，嚴肅面對鏡頭握拳。彭同意單張上其相片和名字仍完整，但撕毀了政綱和他的個人介紹，並指《國安法》通過後於街站派發，想讓人知道他是無政綱下參選。法官關注他有否口頭告知公眾他放棄了舊政綱，彭稱沒有，但很多人問「點解你張嘢爛嘅」，他則回應「我哋冇政綱」並指已「放棄政綱」。彭又指，與團隊花約兩日撕毀了很多份單張，以確保「一啲放棄咗嘅倡議同埋政綱，唔可以喺街上有」。
+
+#### 官關注相片表情和身體語言顯示「抵抗」、不喜歡《國安法》
+
+法官陳慶偉關注，相中三人均手握拳頭，有什麼意思？陳仲衡亦指張開手似乎更顯示他們放棄政綱。彭稱「我哋冇話夾埋係咩」，「我哋覺得拎住拳頭好似勁啲」，多人發笑。陳慶偉指是代表「抵抗（defiance）」，又指彭的表情看來不喜歡《國安法》。彭承認「係有一種『鬥』嘅心態喺度」，又指「我承認我對於《國安法》，係有一啲⋯⋯」，陳慶偉即指，「沒錯，所以你們面部表情和身體語言均有「抵抗」的意味。（“Exactly, that’s why there is this facial and body language of defiance.”）」
+
+陳慶偉又一度問，該相片獲61人讚好，「他們喜歡你什麼？（“What did they like you about?”）你的拳頭？你的姿勢？」身旁的陳仲衡探頭向陳慶偉說，不認為彭能回答。彭續指，他不能代表61人回答，但有很多原因會按讚，陳慶偉續着他不用再回應，並拿出一張白紙，即場撕開再晃動展示，說「你可以這樣做」，庭上傳來笑聲。彭重申當時認為已足夠，「我真係冇諗過咁樣做」，亦否認是刻意顯得含糊（ambiguous）。
+
+#### 彭否認「對抗極權」是反抗中央政府 稱屬流行選舉用語「冇諗過有機會犯法」
+
+辯方續展示另一張彭卓棋派發撕毀的單張的相片，上寫有「背水 重光」。在法官陳仲衡詢問下，彭解釋背水是「背水一戰」，「其實屆屆都背水一戰嘅」，想營造「快啲投票」、「好緊急」的氣氛；至於「重光」不是解「liberation」，而是「重拾光輝」，指他望香港可重拾過去光輝，如在「亞洲四小龍」可「做返第一」。
+
+至於另一份被搜得、屬其團隊何志宏的文件，提及彭是「年青堅定抗爭派聲音」，彭同意都算是政治語言，但不一定是不真實（untrue），解釋因「抗爭」也可以指在法律框架下「據理力爭」，同意自己算是「年青抗爭派」。
+
+辯方最後展示一份「請柬」，彭解釋因派了撕爛的單張後有很多人查詢，於是「整一張好睇啲」但無政綱的單張，「咁啲人就唔使問我嘢啦」，亦認為公眾已得知他們的轉變。陳慶偉指，彭稱《國安法》後不望違法，但單張上提及「對抗極權」，是反對中央政府？彭否認，重申是「當時好流行」的選舉用語，「今日睇返冇諗過呢句都有機會犯法」，同意當時口號無實質含意，並非針對中央或香港政府、或民建聯。
+
+陳慶偉指，彭的政綱亦提到「香港喺最黑刻嘅時刻」，彭回應「今日係香港最黑暗嘅一日」是競選常用語言，很多時選舉街站都會稱「今日好黑暗，快啲投我啦」。旁聽席的劉慧卿發笑。陳慶偉指認為是前英國首相邱吉爾所說，案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Next Generation Reactions
+author: Heather Williams, et al.
+date : 2023-06-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/JLTTnNM.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Fragile Balance of Terror: Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report collects opinions on The Fragile Balance of Terror, from the next generation of policy, technical, and operational nuclear professionals at the Project on Nuclear Issues._
+
+
+
+### The Fragile Balance of Terror and Nuclear Uncertainty
+_By Heather Williams_
+
+The Fragile Balance of Terror, edited by Vipin Narang and Scott Sagan, outlines the rising nuclear risks associated with arms racing between the United States, Russia, and China; crisis escalation; and nuclear proliferation. It paints the picture of an evolving and potentially destabilizing nuclear balance. At the outset, Narang and Sagan offer a harrowing observation: “We are unprepared for it.” The Fragile Balance of Terror includes analyses of multipolar deterrence, the impact of social media on crisis escalation, nuclear survivability, and command and control, among many others.
+
+As a follow-on to The Fragile Balance of Terror, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies invited eight early- and mid-career experts to offer their reflections on the volume’s chapters and conclusions. These rising voices outline a landscape of uncertainty that they will confront throughout their careers. Their reflections are succinct and insightful, and they point to specific trends contributing to nuclear uncertainty that raise challenging questions for policymakers and scholars alike. While much of the nuclear policy community is focused on the challenges of a return to great power competition and how to deter two peer competitors while reassuring allies, as these next generation experts highlight, The Fragile Balance of Terror is a timely reminder of the wider nuclear landscape and the new complexities of nuclear deterrence.
+
+This reaction series points to three interrelated trends that will shape the future nuclear landscape. First, newer nuclear actors feature prominently in The Fragile Balance of Terror and in these reflection pieces. For the most part, the authors agree that these smaller regional nuclear actors will undermine strategic stability and increase nuclear risks, although over time this may be less of a concern. Jamie Kwong captures Caitlin Talmadge’s two-tiered approach to nuclear competition at both the great power and regional levels, which will complicate – and potentially undermine – both arms control and extended deterrence and assurance efforts. These regional actors may value nuclear weapons differently than the Cold War superpowers or contemporary great powers; Doreen Horschig describes newer nuclear actors as valuing “political gains of prestige-bestowing displays . . . over the increased reliability of their forces” in her analysis of Jeffrey Lewis and Ankit Panda’s chapter, and suggests that over time deterrence could become stronger as new nuclear programs become more sophisticated. Conversely, Jessica Link notes the uncertainty around nuclear learning among new nuclear actors, cautioning that we should not assume they will “inevitably fall into these stable deterrence patterns,” in her analysis of Mark Bell and Nicholas Miller’s chapter.
+
+A second theme of the reaction series is the importance of the information domain and new pressures on nuclear decisionmaking. One of these new pressures relates to perceptions of counterforce, whereby new technologies may or may not undermine nuclear survivability. Lachlan MacKenzie’s exploration of Christopher Clary’s chapter captures the debate about counterforce amid arms racing and technological innovation and points to important policy challenges for nuclear decisionmaking, including during crises. MacKenzie, like Clary, comes to a potentially optimistic assessment, whereby “strategic stability is more durable than many appreciate.” An additional pressure on nuclear decisionmaking will be the credibility of information. Melissa Chan’s reaction essay points to the “ever-widening gaps of knowledge” due to new nuclear actors, new technologies, and poisoning of the information domain. In reacting to Narang and Heather Williams’s chapter, Suzanne Claeys observes, “In a nuclear-tinged crisis, disinformation on social media platforms could cause unintended escalation (due to increased ambiguity), impact decisionmaking processes, and amplify nationalism, resulting in stronger public pressure for escalation.” Decisionmaking resilience and the credibility of information is a wider challenge not just for crises, but also for intelligence and analysis, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) being increasingly vulnerable to poisoning with implications for analysis, as captured by Joseph Rodgers’s reaction to Amy Zegart’s chapter.
+
+A final trend the authors identify is the role of psychology in nuclear uncertainty, particularly the rise of personality regimes and populism. Psychology and perception are an inherent theme in The Fragile Balance of Terror, including in how scholars and practitioners perceive adversary capabilities, but also in how adversaries might perceive U.S. capabilities and behaviors. Jessica Link’s essay, for example, points to the recent U.S. ban on anti-satellite weapons testing as one example of risk reduction efforts and a way for the United States to signal its responsible intentions and influence others’ perceptions. The psychological challenges of deterrence are not wholly new, but one emerging contemporary challenge is the rise of populist leaders and “personalist regimes,” the subject of McDermott’s chapter in The Fragile Balance of Terror. In his analysis of the chapter, Nicholas Adamopoulos captures potentially shifting strategic values in personalist regimes, such as “protection of status” and “demonstrations of strength and resolve.” Populist leaders may also have different decisionmaking structures, “valuing loyalty over competence” in their advisers. This should be a concern not only for the United States in engaging its adversaries but also in how others perceive U.S. leadership and nuclear decisionmaking.
+
+This volume should be read as a snapshot of what the next generation of nuclear leaders have identified as their challenges. These are the issues they expect to confront in their careers. It speaks not only to rising nuclear risks and uncertainty, but also to the need for continued scholarship into new nuclear actors, nuclear decisionmaking, and personalist regimes, along with the importance of knowledge transfer and community building among nuclear experts. The Fragile Balance of Terror is the start of that much longer conversation.
+
+
+### Response to “Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era”
+_By Jamie Kwong_
+
+Caitlin Talmadge opens The Fragile Balance of Terror by presenting a framework for policymakers and experts alike to conceptualize the new nuclear age. She characterizes this as an era of interrelated nuclear competitions at the great power and regional levels. No longer defined and bound by the bipolar Cold War era, these competitions are indicative of changing relationships among a larger set of nuclear actors. Talmadge explores how this “two-tiered, multi-actor nuclear world” may play out in peacetime or in crisis by drawing on historical vignettes that bring a concerning dose of reality to her forecasting.
+
+In addition to effectively explaining and exploring these dynamics, Talmadge makes three important contributions. First, her chapter helps to address a key set of policy questions: What will deterrence look like in the new nuclear age? Will this emerging era of multiple, overlapping nuclear competitions present new risks? And how will different sets of nuclear competitors interact? Talmadge makes a strong case that deterrence will become inherently more complex and difficult to navigate in this emerging era. On the one hand, the potential for an opportunistic third actor to take advantage of a dyadic conflict – what Talmadge dubs the “postwar predation problem” – may inform nuclear states’ decision calculus and bolster rational deterrence, that is, discourage states from deliberately escalating and instead incentivize restraint.
+
+On the other hand, the interrelated nature of both great power and regional nuclear rivalries increases the risk of misperception, arms racing, accidental or unauthorized use, and inadvertent escalation – risks that outweigh the marginal benefits of bolstering deterrence. Central here is recognizing that decisions made in both peacetime and crisis will not remain insular to a single competitive relationship. The impact of those decisions – including diverging interpretations of intent – will be felt beyond the competition at hand, as a result of an emerging feedback loop between these different competitive groupings. In a crisis, the effects of a nuclear signaling feedback loop between different sets of competitors could plausibly draw in additional actors or even prompt a concurrent and exacerbating conflict, only making de-escalation harder. In short, a world of more and interrelated nuclear rivalries will make for an increasingly dynamic, difficult, and dangerous deterrence landscape.
+
+Second, Talmadge’s chapter highlights the implications of this world for arms control and extended deterrence. Because states will have to account for multiple nuclear competitors, it is unlikely they will agree to arms limitations with one competitor that may thwart their capabilities vis-à-vis additional competitors. While universal arms control remains unlikely, these conditions will challenge the prospect for future arms control agreements. Even worse, the need to ensure that arsenals are equipped to respond to multiple threats not only disincentivizes arms control but also incentivizes arms racing. These dynamics are already playing out at the great power level, with important implications for U.S. nuclear policy. The United States, China, and Russia have seeded a new arms race through their extensive modernization campaigns. China in particular appears to be expanding its arsenal at a rapid pace. Growing U.S. concerns about China’s nuclear expansion, in turn, will likely challenge efforts to negotiate a U.S.-Russian follow-on agreement to New START – even beyond the challenges posed by Russia’s recent suspension of the treaty. Without an agreement in place, the United States could face an unrestrained arms race with two peer competitors.
+
+These pressures are intensified by extended deterrence relationships that have historically posed challenges to arms control efforts. The need for a patron to assure its allies of a credible security commitment – and also to convince their adversaries that it is ready and willing to follow through on that commitment – favors larger and highly capable arsenals. This is particularly pertinent in the U.S. context, as the United States has extended deterrence commitments with allies in multiple regions. Calls for greater assurance will only become more pressing as nuclear competitions continue to heat up. South Korea and Japan, for example, are already seeking greater U.S. assurances in the face of North Korea’s advancing arsenal – developments which are, in turn, being closely monitored by China. To make matters more complicated, a world with more nuclear competitors may drive some nonnuclear states to seek their own nuclear weapons to counter growing threats. If its historical nonproliferation efforts are any indicator, the United States might try to mitigate this proliferation pressure by forging new extended deterrence relationships – only amplifying these challenges, and thus making arms control prospects even dimmer, in the process.
+
+Finally, Talmadge lays out a pressing agenda for this new nuclear age. How should scholars adapt – or entirely rethink – deterrence theories for this multi-actor era of interrelated nuclear rivalries? How must assumptions based on a bipolar Cold War order change? What are the implications of these changes in terms of escalation pathways and risks? How does this vary in big power versus regional contexts, or in nuclear dyads versus nuclear trios? How should policymakers advance arms control and mitigate arms racing dynamics? How must these efforts differ from their bilateral precedents, and how can allies effectively contribute to these efforts? How will feedback loops between distinct competitive relationships challenge the ways in which states conduct deterrence? What are the risks of an increasingly interconnected deterrence landscape and how can they be mitigated?
+
+The Fragile Balance of Terror helps to scope and present some initial answers to these critical questions, making it required reading for practitioners and experts in the nuclear field. Talmadge’s chapter in particular makes an invaluable contribution, providing a common framework for understanding and approaching this emerging landscape – a foundational step to ensuring that the nuclear community is adequately prepared to navigate and manage deterrence in the new nuclear age.
+
+
+### Response to “Psychology, Leaders, and New Deterrence Dilemmas”
+_By Nicholas Adamopoulos_
+
+While nuclear states today feature a wide variety of regime types, the vast majority of them have a degree of institutional strength capable of checking the leader’s ability to exercise complete control over their nuclear arsenal. North Korea could be considered the exception to this description, and thus it provides a glimpse into the rather bleak picture that Rose McDermott paints about deterring nuclear-armed states with personalist regimes in her chapter “Psychology, Leaders, and New Deterrence Dilemmas.”
+
+McDermott highlights three features of personalist regimes that will complicate efforts to deter them from nuclear threats or use: (1) few, if any, organizational constraints on leaders; (2) the resultant ease with which psychological mechanisms and individual pathologies can influence decisionmaking; and (3) the inability of personalist leaders to learn from previous mistakes. Taken together, these three aspects of personalist regimes raise substantial deterrence challenges, as these regimes will behave less predictably in crises and may conceptualize the risk and reward of nuclear brinksmanship differently than their democratic counterparts.
+
+The concept of state survival is central to deterrence thinking: state survival is presumably the highest priority of actors in deterrence games; therefore, the rationality of all subsequent decisions is judged with the pursuit of that goal in mind. McDermott’s characterization of personalist regimes sheds light on how different understandings of what constitutes survival for such leaders may make deterring them in crises extremely difficult. While democratic leaders tend to see themselves as responsible temporary shepherds of a collection of institutions, and therefore define survival as the continuity of these mechanisms, survival for personalist leaders is far more personal. Threats to their power are more likely to be perceived as existential threats to the state, and therefore decisions are made with personal survival in mind. This leads to personalist leaders valuing loyalty over competence when choosing advisory staff, which in turn threatens their ability to act coherently and learn from previous mistakes, again increasing the potential for rapid escalation in crisis.
+
+There is a similar discrepancy in how the established nuclear powers and potential personalist nuclear states view nuclear weapons as a symbol of, and tool for, achieving status. Personalistic leaders will be more risk-tolerant when protecting their international status, as losing it risks overthrow from within. Protection of status is more likely to be considered an existential consideration in personalist regimes – again making them far less predictable in crises and more likely to manipulate risk to demonstrate resolve. In turn, strategies of deterrence designed to threaten state resources will likely be less persuasive to personalist leaders, as they value demonstrations of strength and resolve above all and are less beholden to constituencies that may be put at risk during periods of international brinksmanship.
+
+Central to McDermott’s argument is the notion that leader behavior is the result of personal preferences expressed within a particular organizational context, and that the new challenge to deterrence comes from leaders who possess certain mercurial tendencies but lack the institutional guardrails that can course-correct them toward more predictable behavior. McDermott provides some initial thinking on how to manage future adversaries that fit this bill in the form of psychological advisors that could provide recommendations for dealing with the personalities of such leaders. While this might drastically improve insight into adversary thinking and lend a degree of stability to crisis situations, it poses interesting questions for the future of U.S. deterrence planning. How can the United States maintain a coherent deterrence strategy if it must also be carefully tailored to manage the individual pathologies of adversary leaders? While bilateral relationships may be relatively straightforward, states learn a great deal from interactions between their adversaries and third parties; and as McDermott points out, personalist regimes are particularly bad at learning due to their valuation of loyalty over competence in advisory circles. This may lead to personalistic leaders drawing incorrect conclusions about U.S. resolve or intent while observing third-party interactions, increasing the likelihood for miscalculation in crises. The United States will therefore be faced with a difficult balancing act between maintaining coherence and clarity in its communicated deterrence strategy while tailoring it to match individual leader psychological profiles.
+
+McDermott concludes with perhaps the most important lesson for future policymakers and strategists: the likelihood that this could happen at home. While democratic institutions are by far the regime type best suited to counter the negative traits of personalistic leaders, these protections are not ironclad. Institutions can be crippled or co-opted by a handful of well-placed individuals, allowing the same personal pathologies to run free in leaders of nominally democratic regimes. While deterring nuclear saber-rattling from personalist regimes with weak institutional constraints will be a challenge worth dedicating serious intellectual resources to, considerable time and effort is needed to ensure such leaders are appropriately constrained in democratic regimes as well.
+
+In the future, strategists should factor leadership psychology into their deterrence planning, as one-size-fits-all deterrence strategies may be just as likely to provoke as they are to deter in the face of nuclear-armed personalist regimes. At the same time, while nuclear proliferation to new personalist regimes is a problem worth considering in the near future, it is not a certainty, and intense effort should be focused on preventing those regimes from acquiring a nuclear capability. Finally, faced with a potentially much less stable nuclear future, the United States and its allies should make great efforts to ensure that all nuclear powers retain strong institutional guardrails surrounding nuclear use and look for ways to incentivize nondemocratic nuclear powers to invest in similarly restrictive measures.
+
+
+### Response to “Thermonuclear Twitter?”
+_By Suzanne Claeys_
+
+“Thermonuclear Twitter?” by Vipin Narang and Heather Williams examines the role of social media platforms during crises, particularly ones involving one or more nuclear powers. The chapter analyzes three case studies – the 2019 India-Pakistan crisis, the 2018 Hawaii missile alert, and the 2017 U.S. Forces Korea evacuation order from the Korean Peninsula – to explore whether and how social media affects crisis dynamics. The chapter makes three important contributions to current literature and policy implications related to social media and crisis dynamics.
+
+First, Narang and Williams address key policy questions: How do social media platforms affect crises, particularly between nuclear-armed states? Do social media platforms trigger crises and increase escalation, or do they just serve as noise without fundamentally affecting crisis dynamics? And do different platforms affect dynamics in different ways?
+
+These questions have become more relevant as people – including world leaders – flock to social media to receive and disseminate information. Today, social media has increased the interconnectivity of the world’s population, with limited restrictions on content, leading to questions and concerns about the ways in which social media can and should be leveraged in crises, especially by political leaders. Similar to the advent of the 24/7 news cycle, social media – especially open platforms – increases public pressure on governments to respond to events in real time. However, the breadth of users on social media means that decisionmakers can also be reached in real time and might fall victim to disinformation online.
+
+A close examination of the three case studies finds that although social media platforms may not independently cause crises or escalation, they can add complexity to the broader information environment. However, social media platforms are not monolithic, and different platforms create different effects depending on platform properties, crisis properties, and audience properties.
+
+Second, “Thermonuclear Twitter?” highlights policy implications for the growing reliance on social media platforms, especially as a means of information sharing. World leaders and organizations are using social media as a form of communication and signaling, but if those profiles are hijacked by hackers or malicious actors during a crisis, it creates potentially very escalatory scenarios regarding the chain of command. Should all statements made on social media by a world leader be considered an official order or policy? The chapter does not have a concrete answer to this question, but the question itself raises concerns about the use of social media for signaling purposes.
+
+Moreover, if social media can be a source of escalation, should governments shut it down during a crisis? The answer is complicated, but shutting social media down during crises may increase disinformation and rumors while also potentially removing pathways for de-escalation. Although all social media platforms have become vehicles for disinformation, Narang and Williams find that open platforms, like Twitter, will generally provide more accurate information while closed platforms, like WhatsApp, will generally reinforce mis- and disinformation.
+
+Overall, social media platforms create complexity and increase information velocity in a nuclear-tinged crisis. The speed at which information is spread and the vast audiences that can be reached through social media mean that today, both the public and policymakers are subject to the same disinformation campaigns. In a nuclear-tinged crisis, disinformation on social media platforms could cause unintended escalation (due to increased ambiguity), impact decisionmaking processes, and amplify nationalism, resulting in stronger public pressure for escalation. However, platform properties, crisis properties, and audience properties will all impact the situation, creating unpredictable outcomes – some escalatory and some de-escalatory. In preparing for future crises, decisionmakers will need to consider the role that different social media platforms could play and leverage them accordingly.
+
+Finally, Narang and Williams note that research at the nexus of social media and crisis escalation treats social media as a monolith or focuses on a single platform, with no differentiation. Moreover, social media literature does not distinguish between shorter versus longer crises. This raises several important questions and lines of effort for future scholarship: How should researchers disaggregate the effects on crises of different social media platforms? How should the public, as well as state leaders, interpret social media posts by U.S. policymakers? Are there different interpretations depending on which social media platform is used? How much impact does information on social media actually have on the decisionmaking process? And how should social media platforms be used during crises?
+
+“Thermonuclear Twitter?” offers a novel approach to research on the topic by disaggregating types of platforms, crises, and audiences to create a more granular approach. Narang and Williams’ main finding is that different social media platforms will have varied volume, accuracy, and speed of information, which in turn create distinct pathways for escalation or de-escalation during crises. These findings and continued scholarship on the nexus between social media platforms and crisis dynamics will be increasingly important as more people turn to social media for news and information.
+
+In addition to implications for future scholarship, Narang and Williams’s findings have policy implications, specifically related to the ways in which the U.S. government should interact with social media companies and disinformation in future nuclear-tinged crises. Today, content moderation is not required of social media companies, but there is an international push to hold companies more accountable for the information on their platforms. The different characteristics of platforms could require different levels of moderation and interaction between social media companies and the government. It seems, based on the chapter’s findings, that closed platforms present more of a risk for the U.S. government during a crisis, as they often enforce already held beliefs, creating echo chambers and resistance to contrary views. To counter future disinformation, the U.S. government should focus on engaging key stakeholders (including social media companies), putting out coherent messaging on social media platforms, and building societal resilience to disinformation via digital literacy initiatives.
+
+
+### Response to “Understanding New Nuclear Threats: The Open Source Intelligence Revolution?”
+_By Joseph Rodgers_
+
+“The Open-Source Intelligence Revolution” by Amy Zegart examines the emergence of a community of nongovernmental analysts in nuclear policy that will have a profound impact on the way that governmental intelligence analysts conduct their work. Zegart explores the benefits and costs of this emerging network of analysts (referred to as OSINT) and poses questions about how to best regulate this network to maximize beneficial uses and mitigate the detrimental impact of bad analysis in the public domain.
+
+Zegart broadly defines open-source analysts to include virtually all experts and hobbyists outside of government. Some OSINT analysts are former government employees, while others have little or no technical or government experience. This community includes corporations, journalists, academics, interested amateurs, and policy wonks. Zegart notes that currently, this “US-led ecosystem serves the country’s national interests well. But the future is likely to bring more players from more countries with less expertise, less responsibility, and less connectivity” to the United States and its allies.
+
+The network that spans the nongovernmental ecosystem utilizes a variety of tools and technologies to analyze developments in nuclear policy. Zegart largely focuses on the use of newly available commercial satellite imagery, but OSINT analysts also use machine learning, social media, computer modeling, crowdsourcing, and metadata to examine nonproliferation and arms control.
+
+The creation of this network of nongovernmental analysts will have a significant impact on the day-to-day operations of the intelligence community. OSINT is by nature public, and OSINT analysts are publishing their findings in newspapers and media outlets that policymakers and journalists see every day. Publications in the news may distract government intelligence analysts. Zegart notes that “the more time intelligence officials spend going over what they already know, the less time they spend on what they do not.”
+
+OSINT may unintentionally get analysis wrong, polluting the information ecosystem with disinformation that appears to be backed by credible evidence. There are numerous instances where OSINT analysts produced false news reports backed by misinterpreted satellite imagery analysis. Zegart notes one such example in 2001, when an OSINT analyst claimed to have information about Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program, including an alleged covert nuclear test in 1989. In this new information environment, intelligence agencies are increasingly focusing their efforts to serve as what Zegart calls “verifiers of last resort,” assessing whether OSINT analysis is correct.
+
+While some OSINT analysts can draw wrong conclusions, the crowdsourced nature of this network of nongovernmental analysts means it can self-correct. For example, Phillip Karber and a group of Georgetown students claimed that China had constructed tunnels holding up to 3,000 hidden nuclear weapons in 2011. Other OSINT analysts reassessed the images and found serious analytical errors.
+
+That said, it is also worth noting that U.S. government intelligence itself is not always correct. Zegart notes that several academic analyses of the U.S. intelligence community have found that the track record for assessing foreign nuclear weapons programs has been poor and has tended toward overestimation.
+
+While OSINT poses significant challenges, there are also several opportunities there for U.S. intelligence agencies. Within the military and intelligence community, evaluating information and publicly releasing data is a bureaucratic process that can be slow and cumbersome, and Zegart notes that the “classified environment is designed to induce caution and confidence in analysis, but it moves at a slower pace.” One benefit of OSINT is that it can be produced publicly at a rapid rate. OSINT analysis can provide support for claims or can debunk government lies; for example, analysts at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies have repeatedly used open-source information to question North Korean claims about missile development and nuclear testing.
+
+One potential avenue for future scholarship is to look at other fields outside of the nuclear community for lessons. Numerous other disciplines have grappled with questions of data-rich environments and emerging actors. There may be useful frameworks for understanding these developments in other fields, such as systems theory or the study of technology. Policymakers should consider how to best regulate this new development to maximize benefits while minimizing the disruptive potential of OSINT to detract from the intelligence community’s vital missions.
+
+Policymakers could also consider enacting small-scale changes to improve OSINT’s standards, such as lowering restrictions on the resolution of commercially available satellite imagery. Currently, it is not legal to purchase satellite imagery that was captured at less than 25 centimeters resolution. On a larger scale, the U.S. government should consider how to foster the development of standards and best practices for OSINT. Where possible, publicly sharing best practices from intelligence agencies or holding publicly available government-sponsored workshops to train OSINT analysts could show that the United States is a leader in promoting the democratization of these technologies.
+
+The most important takeaway from this new era is that intelligence agencies are no longer the only players in the nuclear threat assessment landscape. For better and worse, these changes are inevitable, and getting ahead of the curve is the responsible course of action.
+
+
+### Response to “How Much Is Enough? Revisiting Nuclear Reliability, Deterrence, and Preventative War”
+_By Doreen Horschig_
+
+In contrast to the old nuclear states, new ones such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea tend to value the political gains of prestige-bestowing displays – including nuclear explosions, missile flight tests, and other military exercises – over the increased reliability of their forces. This relegates technical considerations to the periphery, as Jeffrey Lewis and Ankit Panda explain in their chapter, “How Much Is Enough? Revisiting Nuclear Reliability, Deterrence, and Preventive War.” They argue that new nuclear states have seemingly internalized the dramatic effects of nuclear weapons early in their development, even if their deterrent effects possess low levels of credibility. In other words, they perceive enoughness – their self-determined technical and political threshold in accomplishing their nuclear deterrence objectives – differently than the old nuclear states.
+
+Lewis and Panda’s chapter explores how political and military leaders in new nuclear states claim a nuclear force capable of sufficiently deterring aggression. It also provides a timeline of states’ nuclear developments, presents the rationale for respective levels of weaponization, and explains when adversaries accept other capable nuclear forces, while unpacking the requirements for deterrence between both sides. Lastly, the chapter explores what mechanisms are at play if two states perceive their own capabilities and those of their opponents differently. A state’s perception of enoughness often has little to do with the adversary’s reasoning about its capabilities, suggesting an inherent risk of misperceptions and misunderstandings that need to be addressed by policymakers.
+
+There are five specific implications of the chapter’s findings for international security. First, if domestic political calculations matter more than technical ones to leaders in nuclear states, there is room for error in building and testing nuclear materials. When technical considerations are of secondary importance, this can lead to major accidents during weapons displays. The humanitarian and environmental effects of such mishaps would likely be hidden given the opacity of nuclear programs, several of which have personalist leaders with little interest in publicizing errors.
+
+Second, the chapter explains that enoughness should be understood through the perception of the states themselves. This poses the broader implication that decisionmaking in foreign policy should circumvent mirrored thinking and similar cognitive biases. Instead, policymakers should comprehend the opponent’s perspective and mode of reasoning. Pyongyang does not rationalize nuclear developments in the same way Washington did. Hence, policymakers cannot use Cold War thinking to understand new nuclear states, as these do not determine their enoughness using the same quantitative and qualitative metrics of the old nuclear states. However, if decisions are driven by internal pressures, it is extremely challenging to understand North Korea’s domestic political situation.
+
+Third, when a new nuclear state prioritizes political gains, meaningful arms control agreements can be difficult to achieve. New states may be less willing to engage in negotiations or agree to restrictions on their nuclear programs, which makes nuclear risk reduction more difficult. For example, Pyongyang’s refusal to comply with international inspections and verification measures impedes any monitoring of its nuclear activities to ensure compliance. This poses significant challenges for arms control efforts in the region.
+
+A fourth implication is heightened regional tensions. If new nuclear states engage in frequent displays of their nuclear capabilities for “dramatic effects,” it can create a sense of mistrust among others in the region. For example, Pakistan felt validated in its nuclear pursuit after India’s 1974 nuclear explosion. Adversaries may interpret these displays as threats and risk arms races to develop their own nuclear capabilities for countering the perceived threat. This dynamic is also visible between India and Pakistan with their 1998 nuclear tests, which led to escalatory tensions and increased concerns about regional stability. Similarly, North Korea’s displays of its nuclear and missile programs have led to an expanded military presence, joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea, and elevated concerns about the possibility of a nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula. These dynamics increase the risk of regional arms races, exacerbate tensions, and amplify the risk of conflict, both conventional and nuclear.
+
+Lastly, the chapter implies that deterrence is at its weakest in the early stages of a state’s nuclear program, whether it values political or technical factors. An important pillar of robust nuclear deterrence is a secure second-strike capability, through which two nuclear states refrain from attacking each other. Yet, early-stage programs tend to have uncertain retaliatory capabilities, according to Lewis and Panda. The gap between a state’s perceptions and its opponent’s perceptions of its nuclear capabilities could differ significantly, presenting a challenge for strong deterrence. Policymakers should aim to understand an opponent’s perception of its nuclear capabilities to address this challenge to deterrence.
+
+A subsequent, encouraging lesson is that deterrence ultimately becomes stronger as new nuclear programs become more sophisticated. The authors pose that new nuclear states evolve their conceptions of enoughness and eventually begin behaving like the preexisting nuclear powers, engaging with the security dilemma of attaining advantage and assuring survivability. Hence, if policymakers can get through an initial period of instability, a stronger form of deterrence will emerge. This is closely related to the concept of nuclear learning, which suggests that there will be more stability as new states learn that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence, as discussed in Chapter 8. However, Bell and Miller argue that this theory is weak and that new nuclear states are unlikely to adapt restrained nuclear policies like the old nuclear powers.
+
+Several key questions for future scholarship emerge. For one, in what circumstances does deterrence theory change? In other words, if the decision to expand nuclear arsenals derives primarily from domestic political calculations, how does it change the strategy of deterrence and engagement with nuclear adversaries? Traditionally, the strength of deterrence is measured by technical benchmarks, but posture and doctrine are seemingly as important – if not more so. Future scholarship should explore if deterrence remains robust despite less tangible political benchmarks.
+
+Another thought-provoking question is whether it is in the international community’s interest if new nuclear states test their capabilities. If their technical benchmarks are not tested and verified as with prior nuclear powers, deterrence may weaken in this new global order. On the other hand, testing capabilities would not only incur international costs and violate global norms but also raise tensions with adversaries and have environmental effects. Given this unequal treatment, new nuclear states may feel permitted to test because of the inherent injustice of the nuclear order.
+
+A last case-specific question that derives from the Lewis and Panda chapter is how North Korea’s nuclear program will change. According to the authors, it has shifted from latency to a rudimentary, unreliable nuclear deterrent to an operational force. Given the ongoing discussion of a possible South Korean nuclear deterrent, will Pyongyang move beyond simple operationality? And if so, what might this shift look like with regard to modernization and nuclear strategy?
+
+The balance of terror described in the book is fragile and highly sensitive to changes in states’ technical capabilities. However, according to Lewis and Panda, the experience of new nuclear states suggests that the nuclear balance does not lie on technical considerations but on political ones. This contrasts with much of the academic and policy writing surrounding these issues and emphasizes a need for policymakers to reconsider how deterrence is conventionally understood and applied.
+
+
+### Response to “Survivability in the New Era of Counterforce”
+_By Lachlan MacKenzie_
+
+In his chapter, “Survivability in the New Era of Counterforce,” Christopher Clary challenges experts’ assertions – namely those of Keir Leiber and Daryl Press – that the world has entered a new era of counterforce, in which protecting nuclear arsenals against attack is significantly more difficult. Clary argues that states refrained from employing counterforce attacks during past periods of highly questionable force survivability and that, while developments in sensing and strike technology have introduced new vulnerabilities for nuclear forces, technological advancement is unlikely to generate greater instability than in previous crises. Specifically, Clary suggests that, while hardening may now have less value for survivability, force mobility can still generate significant uncertainty for counterforce targeters. Clary further asserts that there is a large degree of asymmetry in the competition between counterforce “hiders and finders.” While wealthier nuclear powers will need to spend heavily to develop sensing and strike capabilities that could enable counterforce, smaller nuclear states will need only an “arms jog” to preserve the security of their forces. Nonetheless, smaller states’ reactive measures could have serious ramifications for strategic stability.
+
+Clary’s finding that counterforce is no easier today than in past eras has at least two significant implications for international security. First, it indicates that U.S. leaders will continue to contend with mutually assured destruction (MAD) as an inescapable condition in competition with its principal nuclear adversaries. Despite significant investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and prompt strike capabilities, the United States, like all nuclear powers, will remain unable to unilaterally eliminate the threat posed by other states’ nuclear forces. Second, Clary’s work suggests that strategic stability is more durable than many appreciate. Weaker nuclear powers – with the possible exception of North Korea – should not be overly concerned about falling victim to counterforce. Minimal investment on the part of Russia, China, and Pakistan will ensure that counterforce remains an unappealing option for U.S. and Indian leaders. Russian investments in novel nuclear delivery systems and the massive ongoing expansion of the Chinese nuclear force – sometimes assessed as responses to U.S. missile defense developments and related concerns about counterforce vulnerability – may therefore be unnecessary for the maintenance of strategic stability. To the extent that counterforce fears drive these modernization efforts, they could reflect misunderstanding on the part of foreign leaders about the technical feasibility of counterforce.
+
+Clary’s discussion of states’ possible responses to the development of new counterforce-enabling capabilities also raises an important question for U.S. policymakers: Does the continued pursuit of nuclear primacy serve U.S. interests when that pursuit is unlikely to mitigate challenges posed by mutual vulnerability and may provoke destabilizing responses from adversaries? As a case in point, do the advantages that new ISR and strike capabilities provide to conventional forces outweigh the risks that might result from U.S. adversaries expanding and dispersing their nuclear forces, or potentially moving to launch-on-warning postures (possible responses that Clary identifies)? U.S. policymakers should carefully weigh the strategic benefits of new technologies against their potentially destabilizing impacts. When possible, it may make sense to tailor investments in ISR and prompt strike capabilities to maximize the conventional advantages that these capabilities confer, while minimizing their counterforce applications – and thereby forestalling adversaries’ dangerous reactions.
+
+Finally, Clary’s work raises three key questions for future research about the factors that might influence a leader’s decision to pursue counterforce. First, how do the leaders of nuclear-armed states assess the military feasibility of counterforce? While Clary makes a compelling argument that nuclear forces will remain survivable despite ongoing technological changes, Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization and expansion programs indicate that the leaders of those states may believe otherwise. Understanding what the leaders of nuclear-armed states believe about counterforce vulnerability and why they hold those beliefs is crucial for understanding counterforce temptations, since leaders will ultimately make policy based on their perceptions – rather than on the reality – of counterforce feasibility.
+
+Second, how do factors other than the chances of military success – such as considerations about third-party intervention, the difficulties of dealing with a target state after a nuclear strike, or global perceptions – influence a leader’s counterforce deliberations? Clary and other experts focus on military feasibility as the key determinant of whether states will pursue counterforce. In the Sino-Soviet case of 1969, however, non-military factors appear to have been decisive in deterring Soviet counterforce strikes, so is scholars’ focus on military feasibility well-placed? Developing an understanding of the full range of factors that influence a leader’s decisionmaking is crucial for understanding the circumstances under which a state might employ counterforce strikes.
+
+Third, how does a leader’s psychology influence the chances that a state will pursue counterforce? While leaders refrained from launching counterforce strikes during past crises, could events have played out differently had a more arrogant, paranoid, or vengeful leader been in command? Previous studies on the viability of counterforce have largely ignored personality and psychology. As leadership psychology gains increasing recognition as an important determinant of strategic stability, it will be important to examine how psychology and personality interact with counterforce temptations.
+
+Clary’s chapter contributes new thinking to the counterforce debate, carries significant implications for international security and U.S. policy, and raises a number of important questions for follow-on research. Exploring these questions will be vital for developing a fuller understanding of counterforce temptations, especially as states invest in modernizing and expanding their nuclear forces and as tensions between nuclear powers – most notably the United States, Russia, and China – continue to escalate.
+
+
+### Response to “The Fulcrum of Fragility: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers”
+_By Melissa Chan_
+
+In their chapter, Giles David Arceneaux and Peter D. Feaver highlight a fundamental dilemma of possessing nuclear weapons: nuclear weapons should always be ready and secure to resist preemptive or decapitating efforts and should never be launched without authorization. Nuclear command and control (NC2) arrangements are designed to address this dilemma.
+
+Arceneaux and Feaver explain that early NC2 theories from the post–Cold War era were mostly accurate for regional nuclear powers. The theories predicted that regional NC2 could vary based on geostrategic context, political and material constraints, and learning derived from the U.S. and Soviet experiences, which is all true. However, regional nuclear powers are forced to make tradeoffs – not previously made by the two superpowers – between the resilience and reliability of their arsenal and its safety and security. To increase readiness and response time for deployment, political leaders must sacrifice administrative oversight and recognize the value of delegating decisionmaking to lower-level military commanders. In contrast, efforts to increase arsenal reliability jeopardize arsenal safety due to the increased likelihood of unauthorized or accidental use. The authors also argue that all nuclear states must ultimately defer to military operators for delivering a nuclear strike, although political leaders may initiate it. Their new framework for understanding NC2 asks when the delegation occurs with respect to a crisis: in peacetime, early in a crisis, or late in a crisis. The authors introduce three distinct NC2 styles with inherent policy implications.
+
+First, delegative control systems authorize nuclear use – including physical assets control – to lower-level military operators during peacetime, though not typically with use-control technologies such as permissive action links (PALs) and their equivalents. The authors present one challenge to this: it enables the military to launch a nuclear strike under any conditions for the sake of arsenal readiness. To avoid decisionmaking mishaps in governing the nuclear arsenal, the military has to reinforce standard operating procedures for nuclear codes, prevent divergence in the chain of command, and anticipate threats with an objective mentality. During a crisis, the military is closer to initiating a nuclear strike and more prone to using nuclear weapons to resolve conflicts whenever they see fit.
+
+Second, assertive control systems promote resilience against unauthorized nuclear use by deferring to a centralized authority in a crisis. This includes deeper political control with PALs or equivalents to dissect administrative control and physical possession with limited military influence. Arceneaux and Feaver explain that this strategy increases decisionmaking time and delays the reassembly of warheads and delivery platforms to initiate a nuclear strike, rendering arsenals – especially ground-based missile systems – vulnerable to decapitation. Even with time-related vulnerabilities, there are opportunities to fill the assembly time required by occupying the adversary’s attention with nonnuclear and face-saving tactics, such as diplomacy and alliance building. The time needed for deployment can allow optimal collaborative moments for building trust, calling off a nuclear strike entirely, and de-escalating a crisis.
+
+Finally, conditional control systems are a mixed approach, because delegation powers lie with a centralized authority during peacetime but are then transferred to military operators early in a crisis. The authors highlight three implications: (1) rapid assembly and nuclear weapons readiness can signal malign intent to an adversary and further increase escalation; (2) rapid transfer of delegation powers can weaken political oversight and increase chances of a political-military conflict while political leaders attempt to de-escalate a crisis; and (3) the fast decentralization process may convince adversaries of intended first use, along with any other misperceptions.
+
+From these three approaches, Arceneaux and Feaver explore three arguments for explaining regional NC2. A state’s external threat environment creates “use them or lose them” pressures that encourage a preemptive strike. Nuclear threats tend to produce delegative control because of increased urgency for rapid use, especially in states with small arsenals, inferior conventional capabilities, limited geographic depth, and nuclear adversaries. However, the authors explain that this argument fails to explain assertive control in states facing nuclear threats, such as China and India, and persistent delegative control within the United Kingdom and France. Observing an adversary’s external threat environment is more doable but more prone to accelerating crises due to the existing likelihood of nuclear use.
+
+The strategic rationale of the arsenal is derived from first-use or late-use nuclear strategies that shape NC2. Arceneaux and Feaver explain the nuclear postures of China (assured retaliation), France (first use), South Africa (late use), and India (late use), but they note the unexpected first-use strategy held by Pakistan (excluding delegation powers to the military during peacetime) and the United Kingdom’s persistent delegative control despite their late-use doctrine. This argument illustrates discrepancies, but understanding regional nuclear doctrines can help determine the next move in a crisis.
+
+The domestic political environment pertains to civil-military relations, including political and military interests, domestic instability, and regime survival. The authors mention the United Kingdom’s entire history of military involvement in nuclear decisionmaking due to limited bureaucratic barriers, China’s domestic instability after the Cultural Revolution, South Africa’s apartheid regime, and India’s exclusion of the military in nuclear issues. However, they note that this argument does not predict how strong military influences in Israel and South Africa did not lead to assertive control and how domestically stable states like the United Kingdom retained delegative control even when external threats subsided. Regional domestic politics can be considered the least understood, especially in authoritarian regimes, because of a lack of transparency and understanding of different societies.
+
+The simplified Cold War–era framework through which the nuclear community has been approaching NC2 needs to evolve on a case-by-case basis for understanding new nuclear powers. The limited knowledge of NC2 systems is further disrupted by new technologies like social media, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence. Each form complicates the always/never dilemma and opens additional pathways for crisis escalation and nuclear use related to disinformation, technical controls, and nuclear use authorization and decentralization processes. With greater uncertainty about the intentions and capabilities of new nuclear powers, how should the United States modernize its NC2 system to address the additional caveats that come with the technological age while learning how new nuclear powers govern their own NC2 systems?
+
+In an era of numerous nuclear states, there is a clear need to rethink ways for strengthening strategic stability to reinforce de-escalation tactics with adversaries during a crisis. New nuclear powers have opted for more flexible NC2 styles, making their behaviors more unpredictable. With recent events including Russia’s suspension of New START and rejection of obligatory inspections, North Korea’s cadence of missile tests, and China’s reacting to U.S. diplomatic visits by threatening Taiwan’s sovereignty, the urgency of creatively strengthening strategic stability coincides with ever-widening gaps of knowledge as all nuclear states navigate the international security order in the age of advancing technologies. This is further exacerbated by the noticeable lack of technological studies in the strategic studies community.
+
+In the event of nuclear use, the fallout includes ramifications to climate change, global health, the international economy, and humanitarian crises. To prevent this, knowing the ins and outs of command and control systems in regional nuclear powers is the first step to reinforcing deterrence, strengthening strategic stability, and preventing nuclear use in a conflict. Some challenges in pursuit of this goal include a closed “us versus them” outlook when rationalizing adversarial behaviors, new nuclear states pursuing destabilizing NC2 features, and advancing technologies corrupting scholars’ limited understanding of regional nuclear powers’ doctrines.
+
+
+### Response to “The Limits of Nuclear Learning in the New Nuclear Age”
+_By Jessica Link_
+
+In their chapter, “The Limits of Nuclear Learning in the New Nuclear Age,” Mark Bell and Nicholas Miller challenge core assumptions of the nuclear learning argument, which posits that the behaviors of nuclear-armed states become more stable over time as they learn from nuclear interactions and crises. Proponents of nuclear learning assume that stable deterrence dynamics emerge after a period of learning.
+
+While Bell and Miller acknowledge that some nuclear learning can occur, they push back against the assumption that it is an inevitable, automatic path to stable deterrence relationships. The authors highlight several weaknesses in the nuclear learning argument. First, states are “poor learners” that face several institutional barriers to identifying and understanding the correct lessons. Moreover, states might struggle to implement what they have learned into the domestic institutions responsible for nuclear stewardship. Second, states may learn the wrong lessons that encourage destabilizing behavior, especially if they emerge from a situation in which destabilizing behavior paid strategic dividends. Finally, dynamics between nuclear-armed states are not necessarily conducive to positive nuclear learning. Interactions between nuclear-armed adversaries are marked by skepticism about the intent behind stabilizing actions, thus undermining their impact. Some states might also intentionally exploit their adversary’s stabilizing measures to gain an advantage.
+
+Nuclear learning will only become more difficult in the coming decades given increasingly complex deterrence dynamics, weakened crisis stability, horizontal and vertical proliferation of emerging technologies that “increasingly facilitate aggressive, counterforce-oriented nuclear postures,” and higher levels of nuclear secrecy, particularly by potential proliferators. Considering this, Bell and Miller’s chapter makes several valuable contributions to international security policy and scholarship.
+
+First, Bell and Miller’s findings have important implications for the international security environment as states contend with a weakened nonproliferation regime, high global levels of nuclear latency, and a new set of states with heightened demand-side drivers for proliferation. Some U.S. nuclear strategy circles (albeit small ones) advance the idea of “nuclear optimism” in a way that excuses or tolerates future proliferation. For example, these advocates might openly flirt with the idea that proliferation by South Korea will lead to more stable deterrence dynamics in East Asia, particularly with North Korea. Under certain conditions, nuclear weapons deter aggression and create a stabilizing balance between adversaries. However, there is no guarantee that new nuclear actors will inevitably fall into these stable deterrence patterns.
+
+If anything, as Bell and Miller point out, future nuclear actors might face incentives to undertake risky and destabilizing behavior and steer their arsenals to meet aggressive counterforce requirements. As The Fragile Balance of Terror meticulously outlines, the new nuclear era is increasingly complicated, and risks of intentional and unintentional escalation are heightened. The destabilizing impact of future proliferation is unpredictable and nuclear learning is not guaranteed. To hedge against this uncertain future, U.S. policymakers must maintain a steadfast commitment to nonproliferation and strengthen extended deterrence commitments to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-armed states.
+
+Bell and Miller also address several key policy questions against the backdrop of an increasingly complex nuclear order and worsening proliferation landscape. Do new nuclear-armed states represent unique risks to stability, whereas established nuclear-armed states do not? Do recent proliferators that act in destabilizing ways, such as North Korea, pose long-term policy challenges or short-term problems that will naturally stabilize over time? Bell and Miller establish that the international community cannot expect states such as North Korea to naturally act within the bounds of stable deterrence dynamics after an initial period of learning. As such, North Korea might very well be a long-term policy challenge for the United States. Moreover, policymakers and scholars cannot assume that established nuclear-armed states will inevitably demonstrate responsible nuclear behavior. Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling in the context of its invasion of Ukraine – along with its willingness to allow strategic stability measures, such as arms control agreements and crisis communication mechanisms, to atrophy – clearly demonstrates that experienced nuclear-armed states might behave outside the bounds of stable deterrence dynamics despite decades of learning.
+
+U.S. policymakers should continue to seek stable deterrence relationships with other nuclear-armed states where possible – perhaps with more innovative approaches, such as engaging non-aligned movement (NAM) states to advocate for the adoption of globally beneficial stability measures by the United States, Russia, and China. However, knowing that U.S. efforts might fail since some states face incentives for destabilizing behavior, the United States should also be prepared to mitigate risks emanating from destabilizing nuclear-armed states. For example, unilateral moves to establish responsible behavior norms, such as the U.S. ban on anti-satellite weapons testing, as well as track 2 (backchannel) diplomacy, might provide valuable avenues for risk reduction when official multilateral efforts fail.
+
+Finally, this chapter poses critical considerations for future scholarship as Bell and Miller push back against the assumption that nuclear-armed states change their behavior in a progressive and normative way, rather than a “value-neutral” way. In other words, advocates of the nuclear learning argument assume that nuclear-armed states value stable deterrence patterns above other foreign policy objectives and, therefore, progressively change their behavior to that end. The authors, however, highlight that this is not always the case – not all nuclear-armed states value stable deterrence as it is defined in the United States. As a new nuclear era marked by unprecedented nuclear dynamics emerges, scholars must interrogate their assumptions about the nature of state behavior and its drivers in order to provide accurate scholarship. Looking at the nuclear learning argument within a value-neutral framework raises several questions in need of rigorous analysis: Under what conditions does nuclear learning yield positive impacts to stability versus negative impacts? What other factors might impact these outcomes? What qualities and characteristics of the stabilizing measure (i.e., permissive action links) itself make it more or less likely to be adopted by states? As the world enters into a new nuclear era, these questions might yield insights into how the international community can reinforce stability between nuclear-armed states.
+
+---
+
+__Heather Williams__ is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Jamie Kwong__ is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focuses on public opinion of nuclear weapons issues; threats climate change poses to nuclear weapons; and multilateral regimes including the P5 Process, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
+
+__Nicholas Adamopolous__ is a program manager and research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS, where he manages the CSIS PONI Nuclear Scholars initiative. His research focuses on the future of arms control, disinformation and crisis escalation, and alliance dynamics.
+
+__Suzanne Claeys__ is a former associate director and associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS, where she managed the CSIS European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues and research on the future of arms control in an era of strategic competition.
+
+__Joseph Rodgers__ is an associate director and associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.
+
+__Doreen Horschig__ is an associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.
+
+__Lachlan MacKenzie__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.
+
+__Melissa Chan__ is the program coordinator for Global Security and International Affairs at the American Academy.
+
+__Jessica Link__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-75.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-75.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 75 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官質疑論壇作出虛假陳述 彭卓棋指為「鬥黃」、今回看是「策略錯誤」
+- 彭卓棋稱無興趣理會民主派能否獲35+：我只關注自己攞唔攞到議席
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（28日）踏入審訊第75天。前南區區議員彭卓棋繼續作供，表示《國安法》後已放棄原有政綱，盡力避免犯法，「我認為當時我係安全，我唔覺得我會係犯法嘅人」；又指整個初選期間不知道「35+計劃」是有關無差別否決預算案，「墨落無悔」亦沒提及「無差別」，惟法官質疑他「捉字蝨」，指該字眼是於公訴書才首次出現。
+
+昨天承認「扮黃」的彭今亦確認，在選舉論壇上說他並不相信的事，重申「用呢啲語言先至有機會贏」。法官陳慶偉質疑他是與團隊串謀作出虛假陳述，彭一度稱「我哋嗰刻冇係想係欺騙選民」，後答「如果係咁樣嘅話，係囉」。彭承認當時「我係鬥黃嘅」，但坦言現時回看是「策略錯誤」和「自傲的代價」，「因此我今日喺度。」
+
+#### 彭稱單張提「對抗極權」僅口號、曾確認初選政綱無在票站展示
+
+前南區區議員彭卓棋今繼續作供。他昨供稱，因應《國安法》將選舉政綱撕毀並派發，以示放棄政綱，其後並派發名為「請柬」的單張。彭解釋，該「請柬」是想邀請選民投票，不稱為「政綱」是因「我哋已經放棄晒所有政綱」；並指《國安法》後將原有單張的「支持任何一位你屬意的參選人」，改為「支持『對抗極權，背水之戰』，彭卓棋港島團隊」，指「雖然係冇政綱，但係我哋依然想贏」。
+
+法官陳仲衡問「對抗極權」是什麼意思，彭稱「我認為政綱應該係要具體嘅，（但）呢個係一個口號」。陳再指，彭政綱提及的「19年免費教育」才更似一個口號多於具體計劃，彭指「嗰個係我真心想實踐出嚟嘅」，因很多大學生有很重的負擔。
+
+彭昨亦指，曾聯絡民主動力職員 Christy 將所有政綱移除。他今指初選投票首天曾載入投票系統，確認政綱被移除並作出截圖，庭上所示其政綱一欄空白；他亦曾到李永財辦事處票站，確認沒有展示他的政綱。陳仲衡問，就彭當時與民動職員的對話，書面證明不是更好？彭稱「冇諗過」，因相信口頭亦有效力。李運騰再問為何不公開撕毀單張，以達到最佳效果，彭重申沒有想過，認為派爛單張和通知民動刪政綱已足夠。
+
+#### 彭稱「以為自己好安全」、葉劉淑儀稱看不到初選違法
+
+李運騰問，那彭有沒有想過退出初選？彭稱：「我冇諗過，因為我以為自己好安全，如果用今日睇返嘅話」，李微笑指那將會由法庭裁定。盧敏儀再問，那彭當時是否已用盡所有方法避免觸犯《國安法》？彭稱「基本上我做盡咗㗎啦」。
+
+李運騰續問，彭作為「35+計劃」的參與者，曾否確保組織者沒有違法。彭重申當時「真係唔知道咩係犯法，咩係唔犯法」，「我只能夠確保我自己係唔犯法」，並指記得當時社會上一些「好有影響力嘅人士」包括葉劉淑儀，曾指「見唔到初選有咩違法」。李運騰指葉劉淑儀並非計劃的局內人，彭同意她並非運動的一部分，但相信是代表政府。陳仲衡追問，那葉劉淑儀有說「無差別」否決預算案是違法嗎？彭指「我冇睇到呢一句」。
+
+#### 彭稱曾閱讀《國安法》但「唔太睇得明」 重申放棄政綱下參選以為安全
+
+被問有否收過組織者稱初選不違法的訊息，彭指只是於7月14日從群組收到戴耀廷稱，公開訊息說35+目的是運用《基本法》權力包括否決預算案，令政府問責，「不提否決每一個議案，也不說癱瘓政府。」在法官追問下，彭指當時沒有問區諾軒，重申「嗰刻我真係認為自己係好安全」；又指他有讀《國安法》條文，「但我唔太睇得明最初版本」，他曾嘗試透過英語理解但找不到英文版。
+
+李運騰問，若他看不明白法律，會否令他更擔心觸犯法例？彭重申：「我當時真係唔覺得係咁樣，因為我覺得自己好安全」，又指他已「放棄政綱」，「我係一個空洞嘅情況下去選舉，我認為當時我係安全」，又指「我唔覺得我會係犯法嘅人囉」。
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱「墨落無悔」無提「無差別」否決 官着勿「捉字蝨」
+
+盧敏儀再問及，整個初選期間，彭是否知道35+計劃是關於無差別否決預算案？彭否認，亦不知道其他參與者有意無差別否決預算案。陳仲衡指因彭沒細看他簽署的「墨落無悔」，彭同意當時沒細看，但被捕後「睇返都好似冇『無差別』呢個字」。
+
+李運騰表示，不認為要太着重「無差別」一字，認為重點是有沒有人提過無論如何都會否決預算案以爭取政治目的，例如五大訴求，彭指沒聽過。李運騰問，所以彭是唯一一個提出否決預算案的人？陳慶偉亦問，即彭從來沒聽過否決預算案，否決是的主意？彭指當時有人提及，具體不記得是誰，「但好多人講。」
+
+陳慶偉指，戴耀廷在首次協調會議已提過，彭怎能說沒有概念、不記得？彭稱因他是被問及「無差別」的概念。陳慶偉指，不要管「無差別」，指該字眼從來沒有在任何文件出現，只是於公訴書上首次出現，「不要捉字蝨（play with the word）。」彭指，若並非針對「無差別」一字，協調會議有提過，亦有聽過其他參選人指會運用否決權爭取五大訴求。法官指彭自己在論壇亦有提過。
+
+#### 被問是否盡力避免違法 彭卓棋稱曾受BBC訪問提因不想違法遂放棄政綱
+
+盧敏儀其後向彭指，法官「有智慧又好心地（wisely and kindly）」向彭建議了一些避免違反《國安法》的方法。惟陳慶偉即指他們從沒有建議人們如何避免違《國安法》，李運騰亦指，他們只是提議彭可嘗試通知公眾他已改變的其他方法。盧敏儀續改問，考慮到各種通知公眾已改變政綱的方法，彭當時有否盡所能避免違法、符合法例和通知公眾？
+
+彭回應時主動提到，BBC曾訪問他為何單張「爛溶溶」，他回應「我唔想犯《國安法》，所以我放棄個政綱，同埋我唔想犯法同埋唔想被人DQ。」辯方續展示該篇訪問〈香港立法會選舉：民主派面對《國安法》與「不割席」的考驗〉，提及彭向BBC中文表示，「由於《國安法》含糊不清，不知道當局會怎樣利用《國安法》或其他理由去取消民主派人士的參選資格，他自己也在文宣物品上有所改動，相信選民會了解候選人的做法。」陳仲衡指段落只是顯示彭擔心被DQ，彭稱「唔止呢樣嘢」，重申曾告知記者因《國安法》故放棄政綱，亦擔心DQ。
+
+陳慶偉亦再次問，彭是否已盡力避免違法和通知公眾，彭稱「我認為真係已經做到最好喇」。李運騰補充，《國安法》下或沒列明「應盡的努力（due diligence）」為抗辯理由，但彭的相關證供或與他是否意圖顛覆國家政權相關。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 彭認刻意違港島名單不多於3人共識 稱盡力壯大團隊、「跟返個心去做」
+
+此外，彭卓棋確認港島區協調會議，就一張名單不得多於3人達成共識，但他報名初選時名單有4人，確認他不跟從共識行事：「因為我覺得立法會正選都冇呢一啲嘅限制，點解要限制我有幾個人呢？咁我就覺得，唔好理佢喇，我哋只要跟返我哋個心去做。」李運騰問有否想過民主動力會拒絕其申請，彭稱有想過，「但係我哋覺得跟返我哋個心去做先啱」，同意他當時刻意違反會議共識，因該規矩不利其勝算。
+
+陳仲衡問他當時以為可贏取多於一席？彭指「我當時冇咁天真認為我可以贏多一席，但係由於我哋係素人，我哋嘅知名度好低，我可以做嘅就係盡可能令我哋嘅團隊壯大」，陳仲衡問是為他自己的利益？彭指是為了團隊一起勝出，「因為若果我贏咗，呢一個嘅勝利佢哋都有份」，解釋因做立法會議員可以開聯合辦事處，他可合法地將政府資源與團隊成員分享。
+
+#### 官質疑彭串謀作出虛假陳述 彭認「鬥黃」用選舉語言 但並非想欺騙選民
+
+彭卓棋續確認，其團隊成員、前灣仔區議員張嘉莉也有出席論壇。李運騰問，彭是否真誠（honest）相信他在論壇上說的話？彭指「嗰啲係選舉語言囉」，陳仲衡着他直接答問題，李運騰亦指不認為需解釋何謂真誠相信。彭回應，「我諗未必喇」，重申他當時亦「唔係好理解」肢體抗爭不能癱瘓政府。李運騰着彭勿轉移話題，重申是問彭當時是否相信他說的話，彭指「我嗰陣時淨係諗，呢啲用語對我嘅選情有冇利」，李追問即是真實與否並不重要？陳慶偉亦問：「你所講嘅嘢係唔係你深信嘅嘢，係唔係一個正確嘅事實？」彭堅定答「唔係」，指張嘉莉亦同樣。
+
+陳慶偉續舉起手指指着彭說，「簡言之，即是你與團隊串謀向選民作出虛假陳述（conspire together to utter false statements to the voters）」，彭說「我哋嗰刻冇係想係欺騙選民」，陳說不是欺騙，而是串謀作出虛假陳述，彭放慢語速：「如果係咁樣嘅話，係囉」，旁聽席有人搖頭和發笑。
+
+盧敏儀問，彭一開始就有目的（set out）作出虛假陳述？彭稱「唔係咁樣」。陳仲衡續指，「但你知道你不是那麼黃，卻塑造自己成非常黃的候選人」，彭同意，指「因為我要用呢啲語言先至有機會贏」。陳追問他是刻意為之？彭答：「我哋係刻意係用選舉用語囉，但係我哋唔係想呃人嗰種態度出發。」
+
+陳仲衡再次問：「你想選民相信你很黃，但其實你不是？」彭答：「我覺得當時黃唔黃冇一個具體嘅定義，但係我係鬥黃嘅」，此時被告席的鄒家成笑着向旁聽席展示一張黃色紙。彭續同意法官指，他當時的選舉策略就是要取悅選民，以增加勝算，李運騰問，所以他當時認為取得初選入場券是最重要的考慮？彭答：「係，但一定要係法律嘅框架下進行」，又指若他並非立法會議員，「我心中所想實踐嘅理想，根本就冇可能達成。」
+
+#### 彭稱從無說要特首下台 現時回看「策略錯誤」
+
+盧敏儀最後問，若彭知道「35+計劃」是關於不理會預算案的內容和優劣也否決、迫使行政長官落台和顛覆國家政權，彭會同意嗎？彭一律說「不會」，並指他當時從來沒說過要特首下台。
+
+陳仲衡指，彭政綱的說法是只會否決不公義的議案，彭同意，陳再指但他也有說政府是不公義，彭稱是「誇張嘅選舉修飾」，但就他個人而言，則認為立法會議員不論立場「不可能違反公義」，「冇理由係會支持一啲不公義嘅財政預算案同法案。」李追問，但公義也包括向他人講述真心相信的事？彭同意，並重申「我當時用嘅呢一啲策略係錯誤嘅」。李問那他當時也是不公義地行事嗎？彭語氣略帶凝重：「而家睇返，呢個係我哋⋯⋯策略錯誤，同埋我哋嘅自傲啦，嘅代價。因此我今日喺度。」
+
+彭卓棋完成主問。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（28日）踏入審訊第75天。前南區區議員彭卓棋開始接受控方盤問，表示2020年3月與戴耀廷首會面討論初選時，無特別回應戴提出立會過半的目標，指自己「冇特別有興趣理會民主派係咪攞到35+議席」，「我只關注自己攞唔攞到議席」；而就戴協調會議上提否決權是「可用可不用，視乎政府做得好唔好」，彭稱雖戴無解釋何謂「好」，但當時「心中已經同意」，戴亦沒提要以否決權迫使政府回應五大訴求。
+
+彭又表示，因留意到有港島潛在候選人已簽署「墨落無悔」，故當時僅「䁽過」便簽，以免「輸陣勢」，但後同意自己是除發起人梁晃維外第一名簽署的港島參選人。彭亦指，「抗爭」可解作「據理力爭」，故自視為「抗爭派」，指該稱呼「既修辭亦都係有真誠形容」。法官反問政府若據理力爭是否也是「抗爭派」，彭稱分別是權在政府，議員要政府放權才能爭取。
+
+#### 彭稱不關注民主派過半僅關注自己議席、五大訴求「部分係」助晉身立會政治修辭
+
+彭卓棋早上完成主問，下午開始接受控方周天行盤問。就彭卓棋與戴耀廷和區諾軒於2020年3月的會面，彭稱戴耀廷會上提過會進行初選，目標令民主派「唔好浪費票源」，以達致立會過半，但否認控方指有提及運用否決權迫使政府回應五大訴求。他亦記得討論過初選應該用電子票，因電子票對他有利，但他對戴耀廷提立會過半「冇特別回應」。
+
+法官陳仲衡問，彭當時想民主派立會過半嗎？彭答「我想我可以攞到議席」，林卓廷和鄒家成露齒笑。陳着他直接回答問題，彭答：「我冇特別有興趣理會民主派係咪攞到35+嘅議席」。陳追問彭作為35+計劃的參與者，不關注泛民能否過半？彭再稱「我只關注自己攞唔攞到議席」。陳着彭不要逃避問題，又指判斷彭的可信性時，會考慮他的行為舉止。李運騰並指他不明白，若彭望入議會實踐政綱，只有他一票又如何能做到？彭稱會作提倡並說服其他議員同事。
+
+彭續在盤問下同意，有關注爭取五大訴求，指是當時社會對政府一些不滿意見，望政府能回應。周天行問他是否想五大訴求實現，彭指「如果可以達成嘅就可以達成」，但「最緊要」仍是達成立法會議員政綱的倡議。李運騰問，所以五大訴求對他而言只是幫他晉身立會的政治修辭（political rhetoric）？彭先稱「嗰陣時係好多人關注呢件事，我都有關注」，追問下稱「部分係」。
+
+彭稱無看過任何戴耀廷區諾軒35+帖文、對公民黨及戴耀廷記招不知情
+
+彭亦確認，案發期間沒看過戴耀廷和區諾軒與35+有關的任何一篇文章和 Facebook 帖文。李運騰指，彭於見面前並不私下認識戴耀廷，不會想了解他的政治立場和他是否可信嗎？彭稱雖不私下認識戴，但公眾層面上知道他是港大教授，「咁應該唔會係騙局或者呃人囉」，又指知道戴是民主派，涉佔領中環。
+
+彭續確認，有出席3月26日的首次港島區協調會議，但對同日早上戴耀廷等召開的立會過半記者會，以及前一日的公民黨記者會均不知情。李運騰問，協調會議有人談及早上舉行的記者會嗎？彭稱「印象中冇」。
+
+#### 彭稱協調會無反對用否決權 指司馬文說法有道理惟不記得理據
+
+彭卓棋早前供稱，戴耀廷於首次會議提及運用《基本法》權力否決預算案，司馬文反對。彭指他當時無表達任何反對，「因為我覺得司馬文嘅講法有道理，戴耀廷嘅答法都有道理，可用可唔用，我覺得兩個都冇錯。」
+
+陳慶偉問，司馬文反對的理據是什麼？彭稱不記得。陳仲衡即指但彭剛說司馬文有道理，陳慶偉亦指若戴耀廷只是說否決權可用可不用，看不到司馬文為何會反對。彭說「真係唔記得」，陳慶偉問二人均屬經濟、發展及規劃事務委員會，會否與此有關？彭稱「以我認識嘅司馬文，應該都係同經濟有關係」，但強調因相隔太久故記不清楚。
+
+彭在盤問下表示，與司馬文是同事，但沒有討論他為何反對否決預算案，也無討論過「35+計劃」，但補充司馬文曾問他能否提名自己參選立法會「區議會（第一）」界別，確認與初選無關，他初選時亦沒有問司馬文取提名。
+
+
+▲ 司馬文
+
+#### 彭指戴耀廷稱政府做得好可不用否決權 認無解釋何謂「好」但心中已同意
+
+周天行續指，彭曾提及若預算案包括他的政綱倡議，便不會否決，若這些事項真是他所關注，他會在會上反對戴耀廷？彭重申，因當時戴提及否決權是「可用可不用，視乎政府做得好唔好」。李運騰問戴有否解釋何謂「做得好」和有否提要政府回應「五大訴求」，彭指沒有，重申戴只稱政府「做得好，你咪唔使用囉」。但彭後在陳仲衡追問下，指戴耀廷會上傳閱的「35+計劃」文件亦提及凡認同「五大訴求，缺一不可」便可參與協調，他當時讀過並同意該條文。
+
+法官和控方其後追問彭當時為何無反對。李運騰指不同人對何謂「好」都會不同的看法，再問戴有否提到何謂「好」？彭稱沒有，他亦沒有問，「因為好同唔好我心中有個答案。」周天行追問，戴提到否決權可用可不用，彭擔心否決權會被運用嗎？彭答沒有，並指「每個立法會議員運行佢嘅權力，佢一定有佢嘅原因」。李運騰追問，但若預算案包括對彭的選區有利的項目，他會擔心被否決嗎？彭稱「我會擔心嘅，但係人哋嘅意志係乜嘢，我冇辦法去左右」，並指若其他人想否決他認為是好的預算案，「咁我諗我會盡力說服佢唔好咁做，如果唔得都冇計。」
+
+李運騰追問，若就何時用或不用否決權達成共識是否更理想，彭重申會上已提及「政府做得好就唔用（否決權）」，他「心中已經同意咗」；但他相信若會上提及「點樣都一定要用（否決權）」，「咁我應該會出聲啦。」
+
+周天行其後再指出控方案情，指戴耀廷於首次會議提及積極運用《基本法》權力否決預算案，迫使政府回應五大訴求，彭答「同意」。法官李運騰指問題有點長，不想對彭不公，指無爭議首次會議提否決權，但問題重點是後句，即戴有否提用否決權迫政府回應五大訴求，彭答：「抱歉法官啱啱我有啲攰，我係不同意嘅，啱啱聽返清楚，多謝法官幫我釐清。」
+
+
+▲ 周天行
+
+#### 彭稱單張「對抗極權」口號等為同事自行加上 官稱令彭看來「超黃」
+
+控方續展示彭卓棋列有「攬炒十步曲時間表」的選舉單張草稿，彭卓棋昨供稱指示同事小白設計，惟「䁽到」提及「攬炒十步曲」便着他刪除，他亦沒有派發該版本單張。陳仲衡關注，該頁最上方提及「協調方案 我們支持有約束力初選」，並寫有「參與初選＞宣傳＞初選投票＞落定出選人」，問彭當時無反對？彭稱當時沒細看，「冇特別贊成或反對」，現在看則認為「都冇乜問題」。
+
+法官關注小白的背景，彭解釋是由選舉助理介紹，約20至30歲，「應該冇讀過大學」。陳仲衡質疑彭知道小白的學歷，卻不知其名字？彭指當時沒問過，解釋正式參選前人手很緊張，需解決宣傳問題，「我要嘅就係製成品，過程我唔係好在意。」
+
+控方續追問為何要求刪去「攬炒十步曲」的部分，彭重申是與指示不符，因當初他僅提供並指示小白設計其自我指介和團隊照片，但「攬炒」一詞「都唔係我提出」。彭在法官追問下亦指，單張上「共同協調人民奪權，齊上齊落對抗極權」的口號，及提到民主派「35+」願景是否決預算案迫使當權者回應五大訴求，還有「然而，具體執行會是如何？我們又在爭取立會過半的同時，會提出甚麼倡議？」的問題，均是小白在他沒要求下自行加上。
+
+陳慶偉即高聲說，「但小白是對你好（doing you good），透過加上這些部分，你看來非常非常黃！（very very yellow!）」、「超黃！（“Super yellow!”）」，林卓廷、黃碧雲和楊雪盈等發笑。彭重申，當時指令是製作自我簡介單張「畀人認識先」。陳慶偉問當時沒需要顯得更黃？彭指當時「冇理解呢一個」。
+
+#### 彭稱「逼當權者重新立約，讓香港人抉擇未來」為當時理解的「35+」
+
+控方展示最終派出的單張，彭指當中的口號由「人民奪權」改為「人民掌權」，「對抗極權」改為「對抗暴政」，並同意採納了小白所寫關於民主派「35+」願景的段落和就立會過半具體執行如何等問題。彭指其自我簡介亦有回答該問題，引述「議會抗爭、司法抗爭、街頭抗爭逼使當權者重新立約，讓香港人抉擇未來」，指是他當時理解的「35+」。李運騰指是口號多於倡議？彭終同意是政治修辭。
+
+#### 彭稱見港島候選人已簽「墨落」遂簽署
+
+就彭卓棋簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明，他昨稱認為是「鬥黃嘅書」，「䁽過」便簽署，因「簽咗就唔使畀人夾」。陳仲衡今問為何僅「䁽一眼」，彭稱因當時第一眼留意有誰簽署，「我留意到已經有港島區嘅潛在候選人簽咗」，確認是梁晃維，又指「如果唔簽，就會輸陣勢」，重申是「鬥黃嘅書」。
+
+李運騰問，彭當時知道「墨落」是由聯署名單頭三位的鄒家成、張可森和梁晃維發起嗎？彭指當時未知。李運騰續指，除發起人外，彭卓棋實是第一位簽署的港島參選人，彭起初稱「不肯定」，李續讀出第四位起的簽署者：黃子悅、劉頴匡、朱凱廸、岑敖暉和何桂藍，指他們無一是港島參選人，之後就到彭卓棋，彭稱「咁應該係喇唔好意思」。
+
+#### 彭稱自視「抗爭派」 解釋為「據理力爭」 官問政府也可是「抗爭派」？
+
+彭卓棋發布「墨落無悔」的帖文，亦附有一張他站着、表情嚴肅的相片，上寫有「抗爭派立場聲明書」。陳仲衡問，彭花時間設計圖片，也不花時間讀聲明內容？彭稱「因為我哋 make 咗個決定（簽署），咁就得喇」，同意簽署後也沒有看聲明。彭續同意，自視為抗爭派，李運騰問是真誠的形容抑或政治修辭？彭答「既修辭亦都係有真誠形容」，解釋理解「抗爭」是「據理力爭」，認為要爭取政綱提及的措施。
+
+陳仲衡指，所以政府若「據理力爭」也會是「抗爭派」？彭指只能說他是以此形容自己，「但係唔同嘅係，權，喺政府度，我哋，即係我哋嘅團隊，想爭取啲嘢嘅話，係要佢哋放一啲權同意先至可以咁做。」李運騰問這是否35+的目的，彭同意是做立法會議員的目的，又同意自己是會講政治語言的抗爭派。陳慶偉問，所以彭卓棋立場並沒有改變？指彭一開始在選舉單張有笑，但在該相片的表情似乎很嚴肅，問為何有此改變。彭稱「就係因為個選舉策略喇，就係當時用一啲嚴肅嘅相，都要忍笑」，鄒家成忍不住發笑。
+
+陳仲衡問，即看似嚴肅但內心發笑？彭答，「我唔係心裡面笑緊，但係要影一啲相要嚴肅，但又要好認真，係要一啲時間」，鄒家成再大笑。彭並指，該相片非特意為「墨落無悔」而拍攝，但挑選了以往嚴肅的相片。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻一方指彭卓棋亦有收到區諾軒私函
+
+此外，代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的大狀陳曉妍盤問彭卓棋，指出第三或第四次港島區協調會議，曾討論簽署「贏咗先有得選，輸咗冇得選」的協議，彭稱印象中沒有。陳又指，在2023年2月控方披露的未被使用材料中，有一封為區諾軒寫給彭卓棋的私人信件，問區諾軒是否曾寫信給彭。
+
+彭稱「有寫信」但沒印象是何時，並確認是被捕之後。法官陳仲衡質疑，辯方應問區諾軒而非彭卓棋，李運騰亦質疑，辯方於盤問區諾軒時沒有提出，做法不妥當，有可能要重召證人。陳解釋，因鄭達鴻接受盤問時，曾被問他是否區諾軒的好友故收到區來信，但辯方想提出區也有向其他人發信。
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-76.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-76.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..60df6206
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-76.md
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 76 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 彭卓棋稱《國安法》後放棄政綱「已做盡」：真係萬估不到都係會出事
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（29日）踏入審訊第76天。彭卓棋繼續接受盤問，表示不知道初選組織者於《國安法》生效後舉辦記者會的內容，亦沒看過戴耀廷談初選合法性的文章，解釋當時已撕毀政綱和通知民主動力移除政綱，已「做盡咗」，雖不知《國安法》具體法律含意，但「我放棄政綱，我真係萬估不到，都係會出事」。控方質疑，彭要求移除政綱不等於撤回政治主張；法官亦質疑，彭只於 IG 發布手持爛單張的相片，無法顯示他放棄政綱，彭回應：「其實 po 一張爛嘢⋯⋯明眼人都知我哋縮咗㗎喇。」
+
+此外，控方今引述彭於論壇提「昂首拒默沉，吶喊聲響透」，指是《願榮光歸香港》歌詞，法官李運騰聞言稱「我從來沒聽過那首歌」。彭又自言，初選後「成績實在太難睇」、「市民唔鍾意我哋」，並否認意圖顛覆國家政權：「初選期間我都繼續搞大灣區嘅商標，咁樣係矛盾嘅。」彭今完成4天作供。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱直至被捕後始「逐字細睇」墨落無悔聲明 理解否決權是「可用可不用」
+
+彭卓棋今繼續接受主控周天行盤問。就「墨落無悔」聲明書，彭稱其同事應於2020年6月10日得知並告訴他，他於同日簽署。法官陳仲衡問彭與競選團隊有否 WhatsApp 群組，彭答有，陳問可否看群組內容，惟法官陳慶偉即着休庭5分鐘。再開庭後陳仲衡改問彭是以 WhatsApp 或是口頭與同事溝通，彭指就此聲明不記得，同事只是問他「簽唔簽」，而他只是有「䁽過第一點」和見到有「梁晃維」的名字，他直至被捕後「先至逐字細睇」。
+
+周天行問「墨落無悔」聲明內容是否初選協調會議的內容，彭重申「當時冇細睇」，但他「䁽過第一點」，即會運用否決權迫使行政長官回應五大訴求，理解是「可用可不用」。彭續指，港島區並沒有任何「共同綱領」，而他得知梁晃維是港島的潛在參選人，因梁也有出席協調會議。
+
+#### 控方播梁晃維論壇談「墨落」片段 彭不同意當時已知聲明內容來自港島協調會
+
+周天行續播放梁晃維在論壇的片段，被問及為何發起「墨落無悔」，彭指：「因為我哋就係知道，我哋有啲人可能即使今日喺個初選嗰度協調咗，初選會嘅內容係冇人知道，淨係得戴耀廷教授同所有參與呢次初選會嘅人先知道，咁其實任何人如果佢背叛佢嘅承諾，根本係冇人能夠保證⋯⋯我就覺得既然大家都認同呢啲概念，咁點解唔能夠真係做一個公開承諾呢？」
+
+周天行指，梁提及「墨落無悔」是初選協調會議的內容，彭稱「依個係佢嘅講法」。周又指梁稱所有參與協調的人都知道，惟陳慶偉着問下一條問題。李運騰並指，認為控方就另一人的發言要求證人評論並非妥當的盤問方式，即使梁真的這樣說過而彭沒有提出反對，也不能幫助辯方案情。
+
+周天行指重點是彭卓棋在場，想顯示他當時已知道「墨落無悔」的內容。陳慶偉不耐煩問有何需要問，指他們都知道彭卓棋和梁晃維也在場，李運騰亦指彭當時有權保持沉默，不一定要提出反駁。周改為向彭指出，初選論壇時彭一定已知道「墨落無悔」是來自港島協調會議的內容，李運騰並補充控方意思是雖然彭簽署時沒細看，但因論壇上有討論「墨落無悔」，故彭會知道聲明的內容。彭不同意，亦指論壇前沒有看聲明作準備。
+
+#### 控方指彭卓棋論壇提《願榮光》歌詞 官稱無聽過、質疑與案無關
+
+周天行其後再引彭卓棋的開場白，提及「昂首拒默沉，吶喊聲響透，盼自由歸於這裏」，指是《願榮光歸香港》的歌詞。李運騰質疑相關性，又指他沒為意這是《願榮光》歌詞，「我從來沒聽過那首歌」。周解釋是與反修例示威相關，陳慶偉指他們並非審理該示威是否合法。周再解釋是以顯示當時背景，惟陳慶偉指對背景沒興趣。
+
+#### 彭稱無深究何謂「肢體抗爭」 認說出自己也不明白的話
+
+李運騰續關注，彭該段發言提到「我哋入到議會不惜以肢體抗爭」，但昨又稱會在法律框架下實踐志向，他如何沒有暴力地進行肢體抗爭？彭重申「當時我冇深究呢個字具體係點樣做」，又指是「當時都幾流行嘅說法」，是「選舉語言」。李笑問，所以彭是說自己也不明白的東西？（“You are speaking things without knowing what you are saying?”），彭稱「呢個當時係唔啱，但真係我當時嘅情況，因為而家我睇返，以肢體抗爭係不能夠癱瘓到政府」。
+
+彭其後再指，上述發言除了「大家好我係港島區彭卓棋團隊」外，均屬「選舉語言」。陳仲衡指若然如此，該段發言不會讓其潛在參選人更了解他？彭答「當時我哋以為係有用囉」，認為可助他取得議席。控方指，該段發言是彭打算當選後做的事，彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭稱無關注戴耀廷初選後發言 指已放棄政綱「真係萬估不到都係會出事」
+
+控方其後就《國安法》實施後初選記者會和戴耀廷帖文發問。彭表示，知悉7月6日初選組織者召記者會，但沒看過亦沒有嘗試了解，「我認為應該關注返自己個選舉。」李運騰指，但彭因關注初選合法性才撕毀選舉單張，為何不嘗試了解戴在會上的發言？彭指因他撕毀單張和通知民主動力移除政綱後，「雖然我明白未必做得最好，我係做盡咗之後，我放咗心」，「當時我真係有信心係冇事嘅。」
+
+陳仲衡指但彭說過不了解《國安法》條文，而戴是法律系教授，彭回應：「我係唔知道《國安法》嘅具體法律含意當然，我放棄政綱，我真係萬估不到，都係會出事。」彭亦指，沒看過戴翌日於《蘋果日報》的〈民主派35+初選會否觸犯國安法〉一文，重申：「我做晒所有防範措施，我嘅警戒心經已係完全係好放心。」
+
+#### 彭稱無開啟戴耀廷帖文、無興趣曾國衞發言 稱專注拉票「冇認為需要睇」
+
+彭卓棋續確認，7月9日於港島區群組收到戴耀廷發出一條連結，但「我冇撳入去睇」，不知道是戴對時任政制及內地事務局局長曾國衞稱初選或違法的回應之 Facebook 帖文。彭在追問下，指不知道曾國衞當天的發言，但從新聞知道葉劉淑儀稱初選不犯法的言論是回應曾國衞。
+
+李追問他對葉劉淑儀的話有興趣，卻非曾國衞的話？彭指「我當時冇認為需要去睇」，「嗰陣時我專注係做返我嘅拉票囉」，又指「就算佢（葉劉）唔講，我都主觀地以為自己冇事」，因他於7月9日前已做盡所有措施，「葉劉淑儀又令我更加放心。」
+
+戴耀廷於7月9日召初選記者會，多名初選候選人均有出席。彭稱知道有該記者會，其團隊的李永財和張嘉莉亦有出席，但他與何志宏決定不去。彭指他不知道會上內容，亦沒有問，因沒興趣，只是在二人出席前「我千叮萬囑佢哋，唔好亂講嘢」，李永財着他「放心」。
+
+#### 控方質疑刪政綱不等於撤回主張 彭：冇政綱，即係放棄政綱
+
+控方續問及彭卓棋應對《國安法》的做法，質疑公眾不會得知他放棄政綱。就彭卓棋要求民動於投票系統移除政綱，周天行指移除政綱並不等於撤回政治主張，只是系統上看不到政綱。彭不同意，指「冇政綱，即係放棄政綱，唔係掩藏任何嘢」。周天行再指若選民不打開投票系統，便不會知道彭移除了政綱，彭不同意，重申他在街上也有派發撕爛的政綱，但同意法官指若沒看過其原有單張，不會知道被撕走的內容。
+
+李運騰一度關注，彭派發單張時有否提及放棄了政綱。彭稱雖然不能逐字覆述，但當時「我心態係放棄政綱，因此變成空白」，其後確認他有向查詢者表示已放棄政綱。
+
+#### 控方質疑彭受訪無提擔心違《國安法》、仍保留「墨落無悔」無要求刪論壇片
+
+彭昨亦指曾接受BBC訪問，稱不想犯《國安法》故放棄政綱，報導提及彭卓棋「由於《國安法》含糊不清，不知道當局會怎樣利用《國安法》或其他理由去取消民主派人士的參選資格，他自己也在文宣物品上有所改動。」
+
+周天行質疑彭無提及擔心違反《國安法》。彭稱「有提及，係不清楚、含糊囉」，並指「佢冇寫出嚟」，但他有告訴記者。周問他在訪問刊出後有否向記者查詢？彭稱沒有，亦「唔知道個記者點解咁樣報」。周再指，若人們沒有看到這篇文章，不會知道彭政綱有變？彭同意，但重申「我相信唔係唯一一個方法知道我嘅情況」。
+
+周天行續質疑，彭稱已盡力讓公眾知道他放棄政綱，但卻沒有在 Facebook 公布，又指彭發布的「墨落無悔」聲明於6月30日後仍保留，至初選前亦沒有要求組織者移除選舉論壇的片段，彭均同意。彭亦同意，於7月6日後派發名為「請柬」的單張，但單張上無提放棄政綱。
+
+#### 相片見手持爛單張 官質疑彭卓棋IG若為私人 如何助告知公眾已放棄政綱
+
+就派發撕爛的單張，辯方早前展示彭卓棋 Instagram 的相片，顯示彭與競選團隊李永財和何致宏同手持撕毀的選舉單張，嚴肅面對鏡頭緊握拳頭。控方問該帳戶是公開抑或私人，彭稱「現在係 private，當時係 public」，但頓了頓改稱「抱歉，當時係咪 public 唔記得」。
+
+李運騰即質疑，彭曾稱嘗試以該相片顯示他已放棄政綱，若帳戶是私人的，如何能幫助他告知公眾？彭稱「我私人嘅意思係朋友之間嘅分享」，惟李再問：「若只是限於朋友分享，如何能告知公眾？」彭望住螢幕約10秒後稱，「或者咁講，我搣完（單張）同埋通知咗民動之後，我就認為夠喇。」李追問，即彭不打算透過該相片告知公眾？彭答「都唔係，因為擺得上 IG，就預咗係公開」。
+
+李運騰續指需要彭的幫助，指「我們不用 Instagram，我們屬於老一代人，我們甚至不用 Facebook，我們不用社交媒體」，問彭若不是其朋友能否看到相片。彭指他可翻查自己呈交的審訊文件夾，看看宣傳時有否提及其帳戶，並即場翻閱文件。李運騰指可留待覆問處理，彭並確認該相片有出現於其公開的 Facebook。
+
+#### 官質疑相片不能傳達放棄政綱意思 彭：明眼人都知我哋縮咗
+
+陳慶偉續主動提到，該相片只有3名男子手持撕爛的單張、沒有任何解釋，可有不同解讀，例如代表彭已透過撕爛政綱，「擺脫了女性成員」，變成「全男班（macho team）」；又指若他不認識彭，可能完全不知道相片的意思，而他若認識彭，或會理解彭的團隊減至3人，港島區初選名單限制亦正正是3人。陳續指問題是，單單發布該相片，並不能傳達彭放棄政綱或擔心違反《國安法》的訊息。
+
+彭思考一會後指拍照時，其團隊的張嘉莉沒出席。陳慶偉指那不是他的問題，李運騰亦指問題是該照片可有不同解讀，公眾或不知道彭想說什麼。彭再說「我諗依張相都⋯⋯我當時認為可能⋯⋯應該咁講，sorry」，陳慶偉問是否認為已足夠表達訊息，彭同意，並補充：「其實 po 一張爛嘢，po 呢張相出嚟，明眼人都知我哋縮咗㗎喇。」
+
+惟陳慶偉質疑是視乎讀者理解，直言「我看不到你退縮。有些東西是撕爛了，但實際上無人知道你『縮』了什麼」。彭答「抱歉答唔到」，重申「我以為足夠喇」。陳再說，尤其是彭在相片握緊拳頭，「你在縮什麼？不縮什麼？無人會知道！」彭僅表示：「當時攝影師話擺啲有型啲嘅甫士。」周天行終指，彭有時間發布帖文和準備新單張，卻沒時間公布已放棄政綱？陳慶偉指彭已回答他已盡力。
+
+#### 控方質疑彭有意實踐初選承諾 彭稱《國安法》後已放棄、初選成績「太難睇」
+
+控方其後展示彭卓棋2020年10月至2021年8月的區議會工作報告，顯示報告兩個項目時有「兌現選舉承諾，promise made, promise kept」的蓋章。周天行問，彭立志入立會服務港人，並於區議會努力工作裝備自己，而彭參與初選試水溫，因知道落敗就不能參與立法會選舉？彭回答時提到，他的夢想是推動青年創業，「立法會只不過係一個平台」，而他初選落敗後未必會再參選：「因為我當時初選之後，個成績實在太難睇，得3%都唔夠，就要承擔責任，市民唔鍾意我哋。」
+
+彭在李運騰追問下同意，作為區議員，認為兌現選舉承諾是重要，因此在工作報告提及自己的成績，以向選民展示他有兌現承諾。周天行問，因此彭在初選作出的承諾，不只是政治語言？彭重申，政綱中「香港本位經濟」、「教育自主化」等四點「係我深信嘅」，而「從一而終的抗爭派」和「重組警隊」兩點則為「選舉語言」。
+
+周天行續向彭指出，他有意實踐初選作出的承諾。彭答：「七一（《國安法》生效）之後放棄咗，連同選舉語言。但係講青年創業到今日都冇變過。」周終指，彭於案發期間，與其他被告同意取得立會過半後無差別否決預算案，迫使政府回應五大訴求，彭不同意。周再指彭意圖顛覆國家政權，彭表示不同意，指「初選期間，我都繼續搞大灣區嘅商標，咁樣係矛盾嘅」。控方表示完成盤問。
+
+#### 辯方展示2021年帖文 官質疑無法證案發時帳戶為公開 反問為何要相信彭
+
+就彭卓棋2020年7月的 Instagram 帳戶是否公開，大律師盧敏儀於覆問時展示2021年2月19日「赤石號」專頁提及彭工作旳帖文，當中寫有彭的 Instagram 帳號。彭指該帖文於他被起訴前發布，而他2021年3月獲法庭保釋後，擔心可能違反保釋條件故關掉 Facebook 專頁，並將 Instagram 轉為私人，故肯定2020年7月時其帳戶是公開。
+
+陳慶偉多次質疑，以該2021年的帖文如何能推斷2020年的情況，「告訴我你的邏輯」，盧敏儀亦問有否客觀證據顯示帳戶於2020年7月公開。彭答「我記得係啦」，強調其 Instagram「一路以嚟都係 public」，直至被正式控告。陳慶偉指，彭今早才告知法庭不肯定當時是公開或私人，正因為他的答案，才引來這一連串問題。彭說：「我⋯而家係肯定嘅。」陳慶偉問：「為何我現在要相信你？（“Why should I believe you now?”）」，並指似乎彭只是從個人記憶回答。
+
+#### 官問為何初選落敗仍保留「連儂牆」 彭稱無特別意思
+
+陳慶偉續指，彭稱於初選成績「太難睇」，即他即使用了政治語言，對其選民也沒有效果，彭同意。陳續指，而初選後他就無需使用該些政治語言，可以回復「真我」（“... return to your true self?”），彭答「都係」。陳續要求展示彭2021年1月6日被捕當天的辦公室照片，問既然彭於初選落敗、又無需再使用政治語言，為何仍保留「連儂牆」？彭答「我冇特別意思係點解唔拎走」。盧敏儀追問，牆上沒有違反《國安法》的東西？彭答「唔會有」。
+
+彭完成3天作供，案件明不開庭，下周一（7月3日）續審，料由何啟明作供。
+
+
+▲ 此外，立法會議員謝偉俊今午亦有到庭旁聽，坐於家屬席。他庭外向記者確認，其律師行代表本案被告彭卓棋、區諾軒和鍾錦麟。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-30-euro-sifmanet-madrid-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-30-euro-sifmanet-madrid-report.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Euro SIFMANet Madrid Report
+author: Gonzalo Saiz
+date : 2023-06-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/PESqwbL.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Madrid Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Participants from both the public and private sectors voiced confidence in their abilities to implement sanctions but the Spanish government needs to work harder in providing support._
+
+
+
+The Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI convened a roundtable in Madrid in late May 2023, to discuss the state of the implementation of sanctions in Spain. The event is part of the series of in-country engagements through the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (Euro SIFMANet). The roundtable, held under the Chatham House Rule, gathered Spanish representatives from major financial institutions and relevant authorities including the Spanish Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defence. This report summarises the main findings of the discussion related to Spain’s experience of sanctions on Russia since February 2022.
+
+
+### Sanctions Implementation in Spain
+
+The roundtable opened with a description of Spain’s progress on implementing sanctions at a national level. Participants started by pointing to the positive assessment of Spain’s anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2014. The FATF rated highly both Spain’s AML/CFT controls and the understanding of the private sector in enforcing them. Participants argued that a robust AML/CFT regime can facilitate more effective implementation of sanctions, given the importance of transaction and client monitoring systems of financial institutions for monitoring sanctions breaches and ensuring sanctions compliance of their clients.
+
+Participants did acknowledge that the FATF highlighted some deficiencies regarding Spain’s capabilities to implement sanctions. These weaknesses were related to significant delays in transposing new designated entities into national sanctions lists, the lack of clear channels or procedures for directly receiving foreign requests to take freezing actions, and not having proposed or made any designations. The FATF found these deficiencies to persist in its follow-up assessment in 2019. With this in mind, one representative from the public sector agreed that Spain does not have a framework that is as well-developed to implement financial sanctions as it could have, notably for identifying where a designated individual has control over an entity and for establishing ultimate beneficial ownership of companies.
+
+Within this framework, responsibilities for sanctions implementation are distributed among various national competent authorities. Notwithstanding their varying individual responsibilities, public authorities at the roundtable acknowledged that they all also rely on the private sector to provide information on the ownership and control of entities by designated individuals. Furthermore, Spain has not adopted a leadership role among member states in the negotiation of sanctions against Russia and has proposed only a few designations, usually in conjunction with other countries. Since February 2022, in contrast to other EU member states, Spain has not passed any new legislation to facilitate the implementation of sanctions at the national level, except for an amendment to allow the freezing of unregistered assets. Some participants felt this absence leaves gaps that need addressing.
+
+Despite these shortcomings, discussants pointed to several factors that contribute to Spain’s compliance with sanctions. First, a representative from the Spanish FIU emphasised that Spain has a good track record in implementing financial sanctions, mainly due to the experience with sanctions imposed against Iran since 2010. Second, in contrast to many other European banks, Spanish financial institutions have a record free of major scandals or fines for breaching sanctions, which participants attributed, in part, to their limited exposure to the Middle East compared with other international banks, but also to strong internal policies. Third, Spain has voluntarily chosen to comply with both EU and US sanctions for a number of years. In this regard, representatives from financial institutions at the roundtable added that while they noted Ukraine’s domestic sanctions list, to avoid overcompliance and de-risking, they restricted their sanctions actions to those entities designated by the US and the EU – all of which are also on Ukraine’s list.
+
+Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has significantly impacted financial institutions. While many required sanctions controls are already in place, the cross-border ownership structure of large Spanish banks has required them to maintain wide-ranging oversight. Representatives from these institutions explained that they have reinforced their sanctions compliance programmes, and some have developed tools to facilitate the implementation of sanctions. An example of this is an internal website that provides staff with updates on regulatory guidance and relevant articles on sanctions.
+
+The Spanish private sector demonstrates great understanding and commitment to effectively implement sanctions. However, there was a consensus among participants regarding the unique challenges posed by the sanctions regime against Russia, in contrast to those the EU has previously implemented, which will be discussed in the next section.
+
+
+### Challenges in Spain
+
+Having addressed the context of Spain’s capacity to implement sanctions, the discussion turned to the challenges the public and private sectors face when implementing the sanctions regime against Russia.
+
+As identified by participants, a particular challenge posed by the sanctions regime against Russia is the complexity of trade sanctions. A significant aspect of this challenge is the division between financial and commercial flows. While the latter relies on Customs for enforcement, financial institutions also play an important role as they contribute by sharing intelligence on the involved actors, jurisdictions and other relevant elements such as payments related to restricted goods.
+
+The impact of the Russian invasion has further complicated the task of enforcing sanctions, escalating from dealing with a limited number of cases to thousands of hits and increased exposure. This has heightened the risk of unintended supply chain disruption, for example in relation to food supplies. To mitigate this risk, participants welcomed the introduction of “firewalls”. The European Commission recently issued guidelines regarding firewalls that allow entities trading in agricultural and food products controlled by a designated individual to continue operating under supervision while their assets are frozen. This facilitates sanctions implementation and reduces the risk of business closures and the subsequent consequences to supply chains, business viability and staff employment.
+
+Lack of harmonisation and alignment among member states was also identified as an issue. For example, if a bank in one member state identifies an entity connected to a sanctioned individual, a different interpretation in another member state could allow transactions to be structured to take advantage of this difference in interpretation. In such instances, participants observed that the private sector often unfairly bears the blame and may become subject to litigation. The lack of centralised mapping of entities owned or controlled by sanctioned individuals at the EU level was noted as a particular shortcoming. Currently, the private sector in each jurisdiction undertakes this mapping endeavour, and authorities rely on it, but there was a consensus on the need for centralisation within the EU.
+
+One result of this divergence and lack of common criteria is that some member states have individually introduced their own sanctions lists. A representative from the public sector added that the lack of harmonisation in sanctioning entities also reflects commercial competition among member states. To this end, implementing sanctions in a harmonised manner would be instrumental to effectively enforce sanctions and participants recommended that the existing voluntary nature of the European Commission’s guidance and the lack of enforcement by many member states need to be addressed.
+
+Central to this issue is the complexity of the “control” criteria and determining ownership. Participants noted that the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control follows an easier and more straightforward system in this regard, as it does not have the EU’s concept of control and relies on simple percentage rules and provides clear guidance. On the other hand, the EU frequently changes its criteria on this term and has modified its FAQs, making it challenging to implement the criteria in a consistent manner. For this reason, participants agreed that some of the sanctions and guidance put forth by the European Commission should be revisited to assess the usefulness and impact. On a similar note, representatives from the banking sector pointed to the €100,000 limit on deposits as a measure worth reconsidering, as it can be easily evaded and overcomplicates payment processes.
+
+These challenges give rise to major concerns for representatives from both public and private sectors, namely overcompliance and de-risking. The aim of the sanctions regime is not to refuse all transactions related to Russia beyond what is mandated, but to limit the financing and resourcing of the war through targeting specific sectors and individuals. Participants have experienced a substantial increase in their sanctions workload, and many banks lack the resources to monitor all Russia-related transactions, leading them to opt for broad actions such as ending their Russia-related activities and thus overcomplying with sanctions. Financial institutions are concerned about false hits and the difficulty in achieving a high level of efficiency, often resulting in a failure to focus on the real designated individuals.
+
+In sum, participants argued that to achieve greater effectiveness, governments need to work harder to support the implementation work of the private sector, which led to the following concluding recommendations.
+
+
+### Recommendations
+
+Spain’s stakeholders in charge of implementation of sanctions voiced confidence in their understanding and experience. While Spain has not been a vocal player in the field of sanctions, the country will take over the Presidency of the Council of the EU in July 2023, placing a spotlight on the country’s sanctions capabilities and leadership. In their commitment to achieve an effective sanctions regime and overcome the identified challenges, participants put forth a series of recommendations that could inform the Presidency’s upcoming agenda.
+
+1. __Centralised mapping of entities under the ownership or control of designated individuals, with EU-wide guidance and harmonisation.__ The mapping efforts are currently the responsibility of the private sector and there is a need for an EU-level approach to list the entities under the control of designated individuals and a comprehensive European-wide guidance that ensures the information reaches the key operators implementing sanctions across the EU and is implemented in a uniform manner.
+
+2. __Promote the introduction of “firewalls”.__ Allowing a company to operate under supervision despite being controlled by a sanctioned individual would make sanctions more sustainable. This approach would prevent the complete devaluation of a company’s assets, which is not beneficial for either the state or the owner. An added benefit would be the shifting of responsibility from banks to the company itself to adhere to agreed controls. Currently, banks are obliged to request licences on behalf of the company. The introduction of general licences and firewalls would facilitate more agile sanctions that do not harm sectors such as fertilisers and food supplies.
+
+3. __Criminalisation of sanctions violations.__ While trade sanctions evasion can be considered contraband, financial sanctions evasion has not yet been criminalised in Spain and the European directive mandating it has not yet entered into force. Given that many countries lack the capacity to conduct investigations into sanctions breaches with the same tools as with criminal offences, criminalising sanctions evasion has become a necessary and overdue step.
+
+4. __Strengthen the information-sharing loop.__ The private sector is a key provider of financial intelligence but continues to lack sufficient feedback on the usefulness and outcomes of the information reported to the authorities. Guidance is being provided but enhancing this feedback loop would help prevent evasion.
+
+5. __Clarity on the extraterritoriality of sanctions.__ Although the EU holds that there will be no extraterritorial application of sanctions, indications in FAQs and upcoming packages suggest otherwise. This creates uncertainty as to the exact application of the mandate.
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+6. __Sanctions should not be viewed separately from anti-money laundering efforts.__ Even if the ultimate beneficial ownership of an entity by a sanctioned individual is only 25%, there may still be concerns about working with such entities. The focus should be on beneficial ownership transparency, and adequate resources should be allocated to mitigate the challenges the private sector faces in obtaining this information.
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+7. __Reassess the sanctions imposed.__ The effectiveness and utility of certain sanctions have not been thoroughly assessed and should be revisited. The complications brought by the lack of clarity regarding the control criteria and rules such as the restriction on deposits over €100,000 were a recurring theme at the roundtable. In consequence, many businesses seek to achieve compliance through de-risking and overcompliance.
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+__Gonzalo Saiz__ is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime & Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).