From a3431e31c134947e0267c4bde50a5bd78a15e435 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Sat, 6 Jul 2024 02:37:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x2a Jul.06 --- .../_hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.md | 54 ++++ .../_hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.md | 294 ++++++++++++++++++ ...4-06-06-euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report.md | 94 ++++++ .../2024-06-10-algorithmic-stability.md | 187 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 629 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-06-10-algorithmic-stability.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1561cdeb --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : No Silver Bullets +author: Matthew Savill +date : 2024-06-03 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/MSdbJSv.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Removing Constraints on Support to Ukraine" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Removing restrictions on the use of weapons supplied to Ukraine by international partners will help Ukraine’s defence against Russia, but it is not a war-winning move on its own._ + + + +Overnight on 30 May, media reporting claimed that US President Joe Biden had apparently relaxed restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. This followed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky voicing his frustration at the continued existence of such limitations. The issue has been given extra relevance by Russian forces based in Belgorod launching a new operation around Kharkiv, and has been taken up by the NATO Secretary-General and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Journalists and analysts have been left to parse the meaning and phrasing of every (ambiguous) sentence uttered by Western politicians on the subject. + + +### Current Ukrainian Operations and Existing Constraints + +The start point, on which everyone seems to be in agreement, is that it is both legitimate and legal for Ukraine to attack military targets on Russian territory. It is defending itself against a Russian attack and can respond under Article 51 of the UN Charter, having been engaged in an International Armed Conflict since 2014. Provided it acts in accordance with International Humanitarian Law, it has a wide range of targets from which to choose, including oil and fuel production facilities which, while they may have a civilian function, are also contributing to the Russian war machine – so-called “dual use facilities”. Added to this would be the airbases for long-range Russian bombers that have been launching strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and other civilian targets; military production facilities; ammunition dumps and storage facilities for other materiel; and a variety of military bases including the Russian ports for the Black Sea Fleet. + +The suggestion of caveats first appeared with the provision of sophisticated and mostly longer-range weapons that arrived in mid-2022 and early 2023, from multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) like the US HIMARS and UK M270, to cruise missiles like the UK Storm Shadow and French SCALP. Biden stated at the time that HIMARS would not be used against targets in Russia, and it later emerged that technical alterations had been made to ensure this was not possible. Meanwhile, UK statements on the use of Storm Shadow heavily emphasised its use inside Ukraine (including areas illegally annexed by Russia, like Crimea), mirroring apparent restrictions on the use of UK M270. The overriding concern in these early debates was the risk of escalation involved in any Russian response to the provision of more sophisticated and more threatening weapons. + +___`Removing restrictions on HIMARS and other MLRS systems, as well as Ukrainian artillery firing Western-supplied ammunition, would allow Ukraine to strike massing Russian forces and conduct counter-battery fire against artillery situated just over the border`___ + +That debate continues to rage, with the benefit of two years’ observations on Russian rhetoric and actions, including strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets and growing suggestions of a Russian sabotage campaign inside Europe. But alongside the serious consideration of managing this escalation (or calling Russia’s bluff) should be a discussion on the military utility of – and possible targets for – such weapons. Ukraine is already running a deep strike campaign using drones against a range of targets, occasionally hitting Moscow itself, but more frequently striking refineries and production facilities. These attacks reduce supplies going directly to Russian forces, and also cut revenue used to fund the war. In addition, a campaign against bomber airfields has destroyed both long-range bombers and smaller fighter-bombers. Some of these attacks have used drones and have taken place at extreme ranges of over 1,000 miles, but there also appears to be an element of infiltration and ground sabotage against bases and rail links, including some over 3,000 miles from Ukraine. Finally, Ukraine’s use of both air and maritime drones against the Black Sea Fleet has sunk a number of ships and even threatened the port at Novorossiysk. What, then, would other weapons add? + + +### The Value of Deep Strike + +The answer is that the types of targets and the defences around them work against the drone programme. First, the drones used by Ukraine tend to be slow and have limited payloads. They use sheer numbers to get through to targets, and although they have very long ranges – it can be hard, especially in the face of Russian air defences – to get sufficient numbers through to cause major and long-lasting damage, especially against hardened targets or those under cover. Flight time can vary, but for long-distance targets is sufficient to give the Russians early warning, which necessitates Ukrainian mass or much closer (and riskier) infiltration operations. For the long-distance and relatively predictable targets, this may be enough, but Ukraine needs firepower that it can bring to bear rapidly and with little warning. This is where ATACMS – with multiple variants – comes into play, and it could provide a valuable weapon for striking airbases hosting both fighter-bombers and attack helicopters, as well as rear-area logistics and ammunition dumps. Depending on which variants have been provided, both cluster and unitary warheads have ranges of up to 190 miles, providing a threat to static locations, such as in Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk and maybe even Lipetsk oblasts. + +Longer-range air defence systems could also play a role, albeit with some significant risks involved. Russian bombers mostly launch their cruise missiles within Russian airspace, so the launching aircraft are outside the ranges of systems like IRIS-T (15 miles) or point defence like Starstreak (5 miles). The same is true of some aircraft launching glide bombs, which are currently being used to devastating effect both on civilian areas and Ukrainian forces on the front line. Some can be released from 25 miles away; in the north this can be done from Russia. They are almost impossible to intercept, and this can only be achieved at great cost with expensive missiles used for multiple incoming bombs. Ideally, launch aircraft would be caught on the ground, but as a fallback, a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system like Patriot – with a range of around 100 miles (depending on the target) – could be pushed closer to the front line to shoot down Russian aircraft before release. So-called “SAMbushes” involve removing launchers from around infrastructure and putting them at greater risk of attack, but pose a challenge to Russian aircraft which currently fire from airspace where they believe themselves to be safe. There is some doubt over the extent to which this represents a “strike” on Russian “territory”, but media reporting suggests there has been disquiet over the use of German systems, which at least indicates the expectation of some kind of existing constraint. + +The new development which raises the question of a potentially unintended constraint being rendered nonsensical by changes on the ground is the Russian assault towards Kharkiv and the massing of forces over the border from Sumy. Up until now, the “close” fight has largely been conducted unambiguously on Ukrainian territory. In the case of Kharkiv, the proximity to the border means that Russian assault forces have been able to mass and assemble inside Belgorod, and artillery fire from within Russia can reach Ukrainian forces along the front. Removing restrictions on “standard” HIMARS and other MLRS systems, as well as standard Ukrainian tube artillery firing Western-supplied 152mm and 155mm ammunition, would allow the Ukrainians to at least strike massing Russian forces and conduct counter-battery fire against artillery situated just over the border. In the case of HIMARS it would allow the Ukrainians to out-range the equivalent Russian guns (although reporting has indicated there is effective Russian interference with guided projectiles). + +___`The lesson of the past 18 months is that the deep battle complements fighting close-in and along the front line, but is not a substitute for it`___ + +Perhaps surprising by their absence from this priority list are the Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles. While these would be useful for arms dumps, command locations and logistics targets with protection against drones, their (publicly-acknowledged) range of around 160 miles means that the launch point for the Ukrainian aircraft carrying them comes uncomfortably close to Russian air defences if the target is deep within Russia. For this reason, both have been used on targets much closer to the front line, including in and around Crimea. The provision of German Taurus, with a slightly larger warhead and a range up around 300 miles, could make striking deeper targets in Russia much more feasible, or bring additional firepower to bear on targets further south around Crimea, including the Kerch Bridge, where Russian air defences have already been degraded. + + +### Keeping the Russians Guessing + +It is worth concluding with an acknowledgement of the military benefits of ambiguity and what a change in policy would not achieve. The public Western position around the use of such weapons has been hugely variable; UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron, for example, did not explicitly say UK-supplied weapons could be used in Russia, and many of the recent statements of support have been generic. Beyond the question of escalation management, it would be prudent to keep Russia guessing about what sophisticated weapons may or may not be used against its forces, because this poses dilemmas about what mix of air defence systems to deploy and what level of dispersal or early-warning systems may be necessary. We can assume that Storm Shadow (for example) has not yet been fired against a Russian target as no components have emerged from debris, but the potential exists if the right tone is struck. It may also be the case that, behind the scenes, some constraints have already been lifted. At sea, the UK has retrospectively claimed credit for the use of maritime drones against the Black Sea Fleet. Given the UK’s role, alongside others, in providing support to Ukrainian drone programmes, it is possible that a number of countries have already provided components for weapons that have struck Russian targets. The ambiguity over this support not only evades questions of escalation, but also provides few clues for Russia that would allow it to prepare countermeasures until after such weapons can be used. + + +### Larger Challenges Remain + +At the same time, caution should be taken not to see a change in policy as a panacea for Ukraine’s current challenges. The successful campaign against Russian energy infrastructure has not forced Russia to reassess its campaign overall. The long-range bomber force has had to disperse and has reduced its strike capabilities, but has not ended attacks on civilian infrastructure. The decimation of the Black Sea Fleet has reopened exports from Odesa, but made little contribution to the ability of 2023’s counteroffensive to retake lost territory. And strikes on arms dumps behind the front lines and sabotage within Russia have reduced the flow of materiel going to the Russian army, but not to the extent that it has had to fall back. The lesson of the past 18 months is that the deep battle complements fighting close-in and along the front line, but is not a substitute for it. Striking forces across the border from Kharkiv will provide some immediate relief to Ukrainian forces and be of significant tactical benefit; in doctrinal terms, this is a “close battle” that happens to straddle the border with Russia. Overall, the challenges for Ukraine in 2024 and potential answers remain the same as before this decision: resupply of equipment and ammunition, recruitment and training of personnel, and effective defences to prevent or slow down Russian ground advances. Deep strike is not a silver bullet. + +--- + +__Matthew Savill__ is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, focussing on developments and trends in modern conflict, and the use of force in the 21st Century. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..730fd3e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.md @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Framing Sanctions +author: Balázs Gyimesi +date : 2024-06-04 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/c6T4Uth.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "EU Strategic Communications to Support Sanctions Against Russia" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_This paper examines the question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values and appealing to the interests of third countries._ + + + +Diplomacy and strategic communications are key to making sanctions effective. Tackling the challenge of sanctions circumvention requires the cooperation of non-sanctioning (or third) countries, and sanctions diplomacy plays an important role in persuading them to cooperate. This paper offers a data-driven analysis of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions against Russia, showing that the EU relies mostly on addressing interests (such as EU accession and economic interests) and framing support for sanctions as economically or politically desirable for third countries. To a lesser degree, values also play a role in the EU’s outreach, mostly in relation to protecting the principles of international law. This is in line with EU foreign policy’s broader shift to focusing more on interests. + +On the issue of sanctions circumvention, EU sanctions diplomacy applies a “stick and carrot” approach to both warn third countries of the potential negative impact on their economies if they allow such activities, and praise the efforts of countries that pledge to tackle circumvention. This communication implies that becoming a platform for circumvention can lead to reputational damage, resulting in fewer investments. + +However, the EU takes a different communication approach towards EU candidates than towards other third countries. Regarding the wider set of third countries, the EU generally accepts their wish not to align on sanctions, and only aims to compel them to tackle circumvention. On the other hand, EU candidate countries are reminded of their commitment to align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy as part of the accession process, including alignment on sanctions. + +On values, the EU links cooperation on sanctions to defending the values of international law, offering third countries an opportunity to frame their support for sanctions as a way to help uphold the principles of international law, rather than framing them as explicit measures against Russia. + +The EU should focus on tracking policy developments in third countries, following their pledges to tackle circumvention, and adjust EU sanctions diplomacy accordingly. The EU should also resort more strongly to highlighting the requirement for EU candidate countries to align with sanctions. For other third countries, the EU should offer framings that highlight international norms and explore different options, such as environmental concerns surrounding Russia’s shadow fleet. + + +### Introduction + +Since February 2022, the EU and its allies have adopted a series of sanctions to respond to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. A key challenge of making these restrictive measures effective is the tackling of circumvention, as redirecting trade of sanctioned goods through third countries can diminish the impact of sanctions. However, beyond stricter enforcement within the EU, this also requires the cooperation of non-sanctioning countries, as taking action to hinder circumvention through their territory is their sovereign choice. + +The paper examines the following question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values (supporting sanctions to protect the values of international law) and appealing to third countries’ interests (such as EU accession and economic interests) in its strategic communications on sanctions. + +The EU has taken several steps to close loopholes and strengthen the role of sanctions diplomacy – in other words, diplomatic efforts “to persuade [third] countries to follow suit”. As the paper demonstrates, however, in the case of the EU, sanctions diplomacy has been used not only to persuade countries to follow suit, but also to incentivise third countries to address circumvention. + +The 12th sanctions package of the EU, adopted in December 2023, has strengthened its anti-circumvention measures, which were already put at the top of the agenda in the 11th sanctions package in June 2023. Furthermore, the 13th package, adopted in February 2024, listed several companies in third countries that have been involved in sanctions circumvention. The EU’s diplomatic efforts to tackle sanctions evasion have also been supported by the appointment of the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions (EU sanctions envoy) at the end of 2022. + +At the same time, several third countries have been expressing their reservations about and even opposition to sanctions. Latin American countries reportedly advocated for omitting mentions of support for Ukraine from the July 2023 EU-CELAC summit declaration. South Africa claimed sanctions against Russia were causing collateral damage to “bystander countries”. India has been denying criticisms that the country would be facilitating sanctions circumvention by reselling refined Russian oil. + +These developments underline the need for constructive dialogue between the sanctions senders and third countries. They also highlight the importance of the public element of the EU’s sanctions diplomacy, namely the EU’s strategic communications as a “goal-directed communication activity”. + +Research on the perceived challenges of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions has been relatively sparse. Nevertheless, existing literature contends that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have been driven by values rather than interests. This also led to the suggestion that the EU should reformulate its sanctions diplomacy “with more focus on the interests of states in joining the collective sanctions against Russia”. This paper argues that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have been focusing on interest-based arguments, in line with a shift towards highlighting interests in the EU’s foreign policy, as discussed in Chapter I. + +The paper is comprised of three chapters. Chapter I examines the role of sanctions diplomacy, the factors influencing third countries’ approaches to sanctions, and the EU’s shifting foreign policy, which form the context of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions. Chapter II breaks down the communications strategies of EU officials in relation to Russia sanctions using a data-driven approach including an expert survey and word frequency analysis. Chapter III interprets the results and examines how the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have balanced values- and interest-based communications in relation to the countries visited by the EU sanctions envoy. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations on how the EU can optimise its strategic communications on sanctions. + +#### Methodology + +The paper is based on a review of speeches, press conferences and interviews: strategic communications that create expectations ahead of meetings between the EU and third countries, and frame outcomes after such meetings. The paper analyses the communications outputs of two key EU representatives: the EU sanctions envoy, David O’Sullivan; and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (EU HR/VP) Josep Borrell. The analysis looked at EU communications issued between February and September 2023. + +The definitions of strategic communications and public diplomacy are not universally accepted. For Philip M Taylor, public diplomacy is one of the four pillars of strategic communications, while for Michael Vlahos, “public diplomacy” and “strategic communications” are synonymous. According to Guy J Golan and Sung-Un Yang, public diplomacy is the “management of communication” among diplomatic actors which have an objective of reaching foreign publics to promote national interest. However, for Nicholas J Cull, strategic communications is just one of many terms that describe what is essentially “conducting foreign policy by engaging foreign publics”. For Ali Fisher, strategic communications is the “telling” end of the spectrum of public diplomacy, messaging directly to foreign audiences. As this paper examines the EU’s direct messaging to foreign audiences through press releases, blogs and media interviews, it relies on Fisher’s definition, and employs the term “strategic communications”. + +Within the wider category of third countries targeted by strategic communications, the paper focuses on countries where the EU sanctions envoy has led negotiations. Within this group of countries, the paper examines six countries (out of nine) in which the EU sanctions envoy and third country officials communicated publicly around the negotiations: Armenia; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Serbia; and Uzbekistan. Three of the nine countries had to be omitted from the analysis as no public statements could be identified on the EU sanctions envoy’s visits to the following jurisdictions: Türkiye; Pakistan; and the UAE. + +The review relied on desk-based research to retrieve the relevant communications materials and compile an analysis of academic literature. In its analysis of communications of relevant EU officials, the paper relies as much as is feasible on direct quotes, and not on reporters’ interpretations or descriptions. This ensures that only the language directly attributable to the EU officials is analysed, with the exception of Armenia and Serbia, for which the analysis sources did not reveal direct quotes by the EU sanctions envoy; the paper therefore uses secondary sources. + +The paper introduces the typology of “values-based” and “interest-based” communications, building on international relations and public diplomacy literature. For the purposes of this paper, “interest-based” communications focus on appealing to strategic interests, including political, military, economic and trade. “Values-based” communications focus on culture, values and ideals (political, economic and social systems), which can create an enabling environment for national interests. + +The methodology is inspired by Gry Espedal and colleagues’ book on researching values, with a special focus on Arild Wæraas’s chapter on making values emerge from texts and Benedicte Maria Tveter Kivle and Gry Espedal’s chapter on identifying values through discourse analysis. Furthermore, Paul Baker provides valuable insights on employing frequency analysis and using occurrences in discourse analysis. The paper’s methodology builds on two key approaches: the term “frequency analysis” as used by Steven Louis Pike; and Francis A Beer, Barry J Balleck and Ricardo Real P Sousa’s classification of idealist and realist vocabulary. + +On the use of frequency analysis, Kathleen Ahrens found that “narrowly focused corpora are suitable for identifying different viewpoints through an examination of lexical frequency patterns”. Pike used frequency analysis to research the narrative-driven shifts in US public diplomacy messaging and strategy. According to Baker, discourse analysis can point to “patterns in language (both frequent and rare) which must then be interpreted in order to suggest the existence of discourses”. To identify the main framings used by the EU to compel third countries to cooperate on sanctions, the paper builds on a frequency analysis of terms (collocations) used in EU sanctions communications. + +For the main analysis, the author worked with 23 texts (10,921 words) published between February and September 2023 (see Annex). The texts were published online, on EU institutional websites, on governmental websites in Armenia and Serbia, and through media outlets in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. + +To mine the most often-used terms, the statistical programme “r” was used, which can be used to measure term and document frequency and the co-occurrence of words, among other things. This allows for the calculation of possible collocations, which, according to Andreas Niekler and Gregor Wiedemann, “comprise two (or more) semantically related [words] … which form a distinct new sense”. Two terms, if they occur “significantly more often as direct neighbours as expected by chance”, can be treated as collocations. + +The most-often used collocations were listed in a survey which asked respondents to assign each collocation a score from 1 (values-based) to 7 (interest-based), based on their perception. This Likert scale allowed respondents to express the nuances of the level to which they perceived that collocations were falling towards a more values-based approach (scores 1–3), or a more interest-based approach (scores 5–7), or whether the collocations were neither explicitly values- nor interest-based (score 4). + +The survey was completed during January 2024 by 15 members of the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), experts who have worked on sanctions within the framework of the network and focus on international relations studies. They represent think tanks from the UK and eight EU member states: Czechia; France; Germany; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; and Sweden. This covers perceptions from across different regions of the EU and the UK, thereby attempting to reflect geographic diversity. + +The survey presented the respondents with the topic of the paper, a description of the corpus and the definition of values- and interest-based communications as described above. + +#### Challenges and Limitations + +Key challenges for the research included the sample size of texts that could be analysed, as the sample is limited by the number of countries that the EU sanctions envoy has visited and where public communications were part of the envoy’s visit. Furthermore, sources being in the third countries’ languages posed a challenge, which was surmountable through the use of online translation tools, cross-checking against dictionaries and translation applications. + +Another challenge was developing a list of concepts to be used in the analysis to better understand the mode of communication (values-based or interest-based) employed by the EU in its sanctions diplomacy. The “coding” or classification through experts in the field of international relations from across the EU and the UK allowed for minimal cultural bias and an independent assessment of the terms employed in EU strategic communications. + + +### I. EU Sanctions Communications Towards Third Countries + +The EU has consistently used strategic communications as part of its sanctions diplomacy towards third countries, aimed at reinforcing its sanctions policy. This is critical, as “active non-cooperation by [third] countries can sabotage the effort by providing offsetting assistance to the targeted regime”. This shows that third countries’ positioning in the dispute between the sanctions sender (EU) and the target (Russia) is highly relevant for the efficacy of sanctions, with “multilateral” sanctions deemed more successful than “unilateral” sanctions. + +Strengthening sanctions diplomacy efforts, the EU appointed David O’Sullivan as sanctions envoy in December 2022. The role of sanctions diplomacy was further reinforced by the 11th package of sanctions, adopted on 23 June 2023, which set out a multi-step approach to tackling sanctions circumvention, starting with the strengthening of “bilateral and multilateral cooperation through diplomatic engagement with, and the provision of increased technical assistance to, the third countries in question”. + +If the first round of diplomatic efforts yields no results, the EU can employ targeted proportionate measures aimed solely at depriving Russia of strategic resources. If this approach still fails to deliver results, the EU pursues re-engagement with the relevant third country. However, if these diplomatic efforts to tackle circumvention still fall short, the EU can adopt exceptional last-resort measures, including the restriction of sale, supply, transfer or export of sensitive dual-use goods and technology to the third country. At the time of writing, the EU has not yet resorted to the use of such last-resort measures for a third country. + +#### EU Strategic Communications to Third Countries + +Going beyond tackling circumvention, the EU has also been attempting to incentivise certain third countries to align with its sanctions policies. Alignment has no legal definition, but in diplomacy, it is used to signal a third country’s public willingness to adopt sanctions similar to those of the EU. Between February and September 2023, the EU offered the opportunity for 14 non-EU countries to align with EU sanctions, and those which did were listed in declarations and statements issued by the EU HR/VP. While these declarations and statements are not legally binding, they offer a way for the EU to communicate the international support for its sanctions regime. + +_EU Candidate Countries, EEA Member Countries and Eastern Partnership Countries_ + +As sanctions form part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), candidate countries are formally required to progressively align with those sanctions, reaching full alignment prior to accession. This expectation of candidate countries was also expressed in the European Council conclusions of 24 June 2022. However, as the evidence shows, not all candidate countries have been aligning themselves with the EU sanctions regime. + +The EU’s attempts to see countries join its sanctions efforts are most successful in its immediate neighbourhood, specifically among certain EU candidate countries and European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The declarations and statements by the EU HR/VP on the “alignment of certain countries” show that from February 2022 to September 2023, EU candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Ukraine, and EEA members Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway have been consistently aligning themselves with EU sanctions. The candidate countries Georgia (potential candidate country until December 2023), Moldova (candidate country since June 2023) and Serbia were listed in certain declarations, while candidate country Türkiye and Eastern Partnership countries Armenia and Azerbaijan were not listed in any declarations regarding the alignment on sanctions against Russia between February 2022 and September 2023. + +_EU Partner Countries_ + +While certain regional partners of the EU are not invited to join the declarations on alignment, they still communicate their adherence to the sanctions policy on Russia. Switzerland, for example, has issued its own announcements on its alignment with EU sanctions packages, without joining the EU HR/VP’s declarations. In the case of the 10th sanctions package, this “room for manoeuvre” was used in the Swiss Federal Council’s announcement to highlight that while the country was implementing the package, it also “introduce[d] a new means of safeguarding Swiss economic interests in specific cases”. + +For third countries, the alignment with EU sanctions depends both on a political evaluation of adopting the sanctions as a national foreign policy measure and on the political consequences of expressing public support for the EU’s sanctions regime. + +#### Factors Influencing Third Countries’ Approaches to EU Sanctions + +This section examines the factors that third countries take into consideration when deciding whether to support sanctions regimes. This can offer valuable insights into the factors that can also determine the success of the EU’s sanctions communications towards third countries. + +Research for this paper demonstrates that the economic links between the third country and the sanctioned country play a key role. For countries with close economic ties to Russia, sanctions present high costs and incentives to bust sanctions and provide indirect access to the sanctioned economy. Countries that are more economically dependent on Russia could therefore have limited means to implement sanctions, especially where social and economic groups have vested financial interests in continuing trade with the sanctioned country and lobby against sanctions implementation. Similarly, countries close to Russia in a vulnerable financial situation may fear economic disruption from the implementation of sanctions. Furthermore, the geopolitical orientation of third countries can also influence their decision on whether to support sanctions regimes. Another approach has been to look at the role of commercial and other actors in third countries, as “sanctions imposed against a target can make trade more profitable for a third party, presenting commercial opportunities”. + +The case of Georgia showcases the interplay of several elements of the factors described above. The country did not decide to adhere to the sanctions against Russia, but introduced certain restrictive measures, particularly in the financial sphere. For Georgia, Russia is the third-largest trade partner, and the EU’s share, while it is still the main trade partner, is decreasing. The circumvention challenge in Georgia is further complicated due to its trade with the Eurasian Economic Union, which is used by Russia to conceal the destination of trade flows. Furthermore, Georgia is economically benefiting from the inflow of Russian citizens and capital to the country. These factors, among others, contribute to Georgia’s complex approach to sanctions. + +Given the efforts of the EU to incentivise third countries to join its sanctions policies and the considerations influencing third countries’ choice of whether to support sanctions, it is important to analyse the type of goals EU sanctions diplomacy can attempt to achieve. Returning to the challenge of tackling circumvention, another avenue is for the EU to incentivise third countries to commit to tackling evasion through their territory, without asking them to align themselves with the EU’s sanctions regime. + +#### The EU’s Shifting Foreign Policy and Strategic Communications + +Understanding the EU’s approach to foreign policy and strategic communications is fundamental for a more comprehensive study of the EU’s sanctions policy. The EU’s foreign policy has been analysed, to a limited extent, through the prism of discourse analysis, finding that its foreign policy and identity are articulated by referencing liberal values. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union presents these as the values that the Union is meant to defend and further internationally. + +On the role of the EU’s public diplomacy and strategic communications, it has been noted that while the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be key to helping “ethical Europe” grow, it should also provide a keen sense of strategic direction and interests. The EU has been described in the literature as a “normative power”, as it “was constructed on a normative basis, [which] predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics”. However, the 2016 EU Global Strategy set out the “principled pragmatism” approach, which considers the combination of interests and values as a guiding principle of the EU’s external action. The focus on interests was reinforced in the 2022 EU Strategic Compass, in which Borrell stated that the EU has to learn lessons from recent crises, including “finally getting serious about threats to our strategic interests that we have been aware of but not always acted upon”. The shift in the EU’s strategic communications to interests is also in line with the view of Allan Rosas, who highlighted that “sanctions should not be seen as value imperialism … as the Union is taking them to pursue not only its values but also its interests”. + + +### II. Expert Perception of EU Sanctions Communications on the Values-Interest Spectrum + +To better understand the role of the EU’s sanctions communications as a foreign policy tool, the paper assesses them along the values-interests spectrum. To this purpose, the paper examined the speeches, interviews and other communications outputs of the EU sanctions envoy and the EU HR/VP from February to September 2023. + +Analysis of the communications led to identifying the most frequently used pairings of two words in communications outputs, or “collocations”. Using the statistical programme “r”, the analysis computed 395 collocations using the “quanteda.textstats” package. + +The programme identifies collocation candidates based on the co-occurrence of patterns of words. The programme takes out the most frequently used word fillers or “stop words”, including “of”, “to” and “but”, which therefore do not appear in the 395 collocations that were computed. Of those, 116 collocations occurred three or more times and 279 collocations occurred two times across the 23 texts analysed. To focus only on collocations that occur a significant number of times across the 23 texts, the paper does not consider the 279 collocations that occurred only twice in EU communications. This process led to the reduction of the number of collocations to 25 and four synonyms. + +Next in the analysis, the collocations were to be categorised on the values-interest spectrum. Respondents completed the survey asking them to assign each collocation a score from 1 (values-based) to 7 (interest-based) based on their perception, reflecting the subjective judgement of each anonymous respondent. The responses were recorded anonymously and exported to Excel. The analysis used the rounded median of the responses to avoid the result being skewed by outliers. Table 1 shows the rounded median of the survey’s ratings and the number of times the collocation occurred in the 23 texts analysed. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/VXJyJ3D.png) +_▲ Table 1: Most-Often Used Collocations in EU Sanctions Communications_ + +For a better understanding of where the collocations lie on the values-interest spectrum, the results are summarised in Figure 1. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/l2NVZzq.png) +_▲ Figure 1: Collocations on the Values-Interest Spectrum_ + +Figure 1 plots both the number and the occurrence of collocations in each of the seven categories along the values-interest spectrum, ranging from strongly values-based to strongly interest-based. The number of collocations (dots) shows how many of the terms were perceived to fall into each of the seven categories by the expert respondents to the survey. The occurrence of collocations falling into each category (bars) shows how many times the terms appeared across the analysed texts. + +Figure 1 demonstrates that interest-based collocations occurred significantly more often (91 times in total, including both weakly and moderately interest-based collocations) than values-based terms (17 times in total, including both weakly and moderately values-based collocations) or terms that were perceived as neither values- nor interest-based (16 times). The 11 moderately interest-based collocations occurred 60 times across the 23 texts analysed, making them the most commonly occurring terms. + +The results of analysis demonstrate that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions strongly rely on interest-based terms. However, values and particularly the norms of international law also play a role in its communications – this is examined in more detail in Chapter III. Furthermore, the EU also employs terms that are neither values- not interest-based among the most-occurred terms in the analysed communications. + + +### III. The Balance Between Values- and Interest-Based EU Communications on Sanctions + +The results of the survey demonstrate the complexity of the EU’s sanctions diplomacy. While collocations that are perceived as interest-based by experts occur more often in quotes by O’Sullivan and Borrell, the use of values-based communication adds a nuance to the picture and raises the following questions. How are the collocations used in EU communications? How can they be interpreted in the context of the EU officials’ declarations? What do they divulge about the EU’s sanctions diplomacy? + +#### Preventing Circumvention: Targeting Third Countries’ Interests + +Collocations related to circumvention and evasion have a central importance in EU sanctions diplomacy, playing a particular role in conveying a message targeting the interests of third countries. The EU is warning third countries that allowing their territories to be used for circumvention could damage their economies. Conversely, third countries’ efforts to tackle circumvention are met with praise in EU communications, setting a clear expectation for third countries. The circumvention- and evasion-related collocations were perceived to be moderately interest-based by the expert respondents to the survey, further confirming the role of these expressions in appealing to the interests of both the EU and third countries. + +“Platform [for] circumvention” was a particularly often used expression, with 10 occurrences. It was used to point out a threat and underline how becoming a platform for circumvention would go against the interest of third countries. O’Sullivan underlined the importance of the reputational damage that ensues when a country is proven to be a platform for sanctions circumvention, noting that “it will have a chilling effect on the companies of other countries. They no longer want to work with a country that helps them circumvent sanctions”. This was a clear message to third countries, highlighting the fact that allowing for circumvention will damage their investment prospects. In Georgia, the government’s efforts were highlighted by O’Sullivan in June 2023, who noted that the “Georgian authorities are taking very seriously the issue of not allowing this country to be used as a platform for circumvention”, noting that the country has put in place export-controlling measures on the most sensitive battlefield products. + +Addressing the challenge of “platform [for] circumvention” was also used to describe the very focus of the mission of O’Sullivan, who declared that “cooperating and engaging in a dialogue with third countries that could be used as a platform for circumvention is vital”. The expression was also used when describing the expectation of EU sanctions diplomacy, with O’Sullivan declaring about third countries that “what they usually say is that they don’t want to align with EU sanctions, but at the same time they don’t wish to be a platform for circumvention or evasion of sanctions, and therefore they will cooperate with us in trying to prevent that”. However, there are differences between the expectations towards EU candidate countries and non-candidate countries, as demonstrated below. + +Similarly, the expressions “circumvent sanctions” and “circumvention [of] sanctions” occurred exceptionally often in EU sanctions communications – in total, 13 times in the texts analysed – and those expressions were perceived as moderately interest-based. They fulfilled a similar role to the expression “platform [for] circumvention” in EU communications, warning of the negative impact of allowing circumvention, and praising efforts to tackle it. O’Sullivan focused on the former when he declared that “we are particularly concerned if there’s any circumvention of the sanctions on these [battlefield] products. This has led us to visit a range of countries in the last few months”. In Uzbekistan, for example, O’Sullivan used circumvention in the context of commending the country’s assurances on being against having its territory used for sanctions circumvention, while “respect[ing] Uzbekistan’s desire to remain neutral [in Russia’s war against Ukraine]”. + +The two expressions linked to evasion, “sanction evasion” and “evade sanction”, occurred seven times in total, placing them among the most-often used collocations in the analysed texts. They were used in the same way as expressions mentioning circumvention, focusing on warning and praising third countries. O’Sullivan highlighted that “our legal powers now enable us to sanction an entity in a non-EU country that is aiding a European company to evade sanctions”. As a positive assessment, he underlined that, for Georgia, “there are various ways in which people can try to evade sanctions, whether that’s at customs points or false declarations. And the Georgian authorities have put in place, as I say very impressive measures of trying to monitor this and make sure that it doesn’t happen”. + +#### Beyond Tackling Circumvention: Addressing Implementation and Alignment + +EU communications addressed the options beyond tackling circumvention through third countries, including the questions of implementation, adoption and alignment on sanctions. These play an especially important role in the difference between the EU’s communications towards EU candidate countries and its communication towards other third countries. EU candidate countries are formally required to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP, which includes sanctions. A full alignment on sanctions needs to be reached prior to accession. This provides the EU with a tool to use regarding EU candidate countries to appeal to their political and economic interests in pursuing the EU accession process successfully. + +EU sanctions communications used three key collocations to describe how far countries potentially could go in supporting EU sanctions. On one hand, these expressions offered a way to remind EU candidate countries of their commitments. On the other, they offered a way to demonstrate that in most third countries, the EU is not asking for alignment, but only for help in tackling circumvention. These can be seen as a “compromise offer” by the EU to non-candidate countries, highlighting that while it could ask for more efforts, it is accepting tackling circumvention as a commendable policy. + +The terms used for communicating these interests are the weakly interest-based terms “implement sanctions”, along with its synonym “sanctions implementation” (among the most-used terms, occurred eight times) and “impose sanctions” (six times) and the moderately interest-based term “align sanctions” (four times). + +Speaking about his country visits, O’Sullivan highlighted that in the cases of EU candidate countries, “the context is always different of course in … Serbia and Türkiye … candidates for accession to the European Union, so there is actually potentially an obligation on them to align with our sanctions”. In the same statement, he also underlined that non-candidate countries, such as countries in central Asia or certain countries in the Caucasus, have no obligation to align with EU sanctions. This point was repeated by Borrell in September 2023, noting that “we expect our partner countries and, in particular those who aspire to become members, to align with our foreign policy decisions”. + +The EU’s relationship with candidate and potential candidate countries demonstrates that the issues of implementation, adoption and alignment on sanctions can be used to appeal to EU candidate countries’ interests on joining the EU. It also allows the EU to express disapproval of certain policies, including engaging with sanctioned entities. In September 2023, Borrell noted that the EU regretted the Georgian government’s decision to resume flights to and from Russia and allow sanctioned individuals to enter the country, highlighting that “these decisions go against EU’s policy and international efforts to isolate Russia internationally due to its illegal war”. + +#### Naming the War: Stopping Russia’s War Machine + +The EU has countered Moscow’s continuous refusal to call the war in Ukraine by its name, referring to it as a “special military operation”, by clearly referencing “the war” and Russia’s “war machine” in its communications. The terms “war machine” and “invasion [of] Ukraine” were perceived as neither values- nor interest-based and are therefore seen as more descriptive expressions by the expert respondents to the survey. However, the importance of these terms is signalled by the number of times they occurred (“war machine” seven times and “invasion [of] Ukraine” six). They offer a clear way for the EU to steer third countries towards using the same framing. + +The expression “war machine” was primarily used to describe the “Russian war machine” as a concept. It was employed to underline that most third countries do not wish to contribute to fuelling the Russian war machine, while remaining neutral in the conflict. In general, the aim of the EU’s restrictive measures is described in terms of “crippling Russia’s war machine”, targeting both the material and financial means of the Kremlin. + +Mentioning the “invasion [of] Ukraine” fulfilled a similar role in the EU’s sanctions diplomacy. While “war machine” was used in relation to the aim of sanctions, “invasion [of] Ukraine” was used in the context of describing the reason for the sanctions being put in place. O’Sullivan noted that the EU’s most important message is that “we oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”. + +#### Appealing to Values: The Role of International Law + +While the results of the analysis show that the EU predominantly communicated by addressing interests, its sanctions diplomacy also contains an important element of values-based communications, focusing primarily on international law. Three values-based collocations, “UN Charter”, “war crime” and “international law”, were used to appeal to the values of international law. These terms were used both to remind third countries of the importance of upholding these principles and to praise third countries’ cooperation by specifically referring to international law. By linking the cooperation on sanctions to international norms, the EU offers an opportunity for third countries to frame any support for tackling circumvention as a positive effort to strengthen the norms of international law. This can be an attractive framing for third countries that have close geopolitical or economic ties to Russia and might be reluctant to communicate cooperating on these measures explicitly as steps against Moscow. + +Borrell noted that he “appreciated the ‘principled position of Kazakhstan based on respect for the UN Charter and the territorial integrity of all UN members, including Ukraine’”. He also highlighted that the EU is asking “all countries … to stand on the side of the principles and values of the UN charter and international law”. This demonstrates the EU’s expectation of third countries to support its sanctions efforts not only because it is in their economic interest, as the use of circumvention-related expressions shows above, but also because it is essential for upholding the norms and values of international law. + +Underlining this approach, O’Sullivan summarised the EU’s message as “we believe that Putin’s actions are completely contrary to the UN charter, it is a war crime” and noted that “in the case of Russia, we are dealing with a particularly egregious breach of international law”. Similarly, Borrell noted that “what is happening in Ukraine is a blatant violation of the UN Charter and the international rules-based order”. + +“Support Ukraine” and its synonym “Ukraine support” were perceived as the most strongly values-based terms among the 25 collocations analysed, with six occurrences in total. The term was primarily used to express that the EU is “supporting Ukraine, and we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes”, framing it as a goal of the EU’s sanctions policy, linking the support for the EU’s sanctions to supporting Ukraine. This can differ from the approach of highlighting international law, as it links the support for sanctions more explicitly to supporting Ukraine, not just international law in general. + + +### Conclusion + +EU strategic communications on sanctions rely heavily on addressing economic and political interests. As the results of the data-driven analysis show, the most-often occurring terms in EU communications are perceived to target political and economic interests. Only a minority of terms appeals to values, mostly related to international law. + +The paper’s use of data analytics and an expert survey on perceptions offer a unique contribution to the discussion on EU sanctions communications, allowing for a more structured analysis along the values-interest spectrum. This data-driven approach provides a more informed understanding of EU communications and formulates more targeted and evidence-based recommendations on how to improve EU sanctions diplomacy. + +The paper presents the following findings and recommendations to EU policymakers and diplomats. + +> #### 1. EU sanctions communications overwhelmingly rely on appealing to interests. + +The EU tends to frame support for tackling sanctions circumvention as an economic interest of third countries. It employs a “stick-and-carrot” approach – the stick is a warning to third countries of the potential negative economic consequences and reputational damage of allowing circumvention, which can lead to fewer investments, while the carrot is the EU’s praise of the efforts of third countries which pledge to tackle circumvention through their territory, which can help bolster their reputation. + +__Recommendation: The EU should hold third countries to their promises.__ + +The “carrot” of positive reputation through the EU’s praise can only be credible if the EU revises its communications consistently. As the EU can strengthen third countries’ reputations by praising their efforts, the EU also needs to withdraw its praise in public communications when third countries do not enact effective and enforceable policies. The EU needs to adapt this communication by expressing either continued praise if third countries indeed implement and enforce the announced anti-circumvention policies or change course and highlight shortcomings when the announced policies do not become reality or are not enforced. + +__Recommendation: The EU should not fear using its economic power to compel countries to tackle sanctions circumvention.__ + +The EU needs to continue warning countries of the negative impact of allowing sanctions circumvention and use the designation of third country companies as a credible threat. The “stick” of warning third countries of the consequences of allowing circumvention only works if the negative impact is demonstrated credibly, including through the listing of third country companies that facilitate sanctions circumvention. + +> #### 2. The EU communicates different expectations for EU candidate countries and other third countries. + +Countries on the path to join the EU are formally required to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP, including sanctions, reaching full alignment prior to accession. This expectation is expressed in references to imposing, implementing and aligning with EU sanctions communications, which are among the most-often used terms. Non-candidate countries have no obligation to align with the EU’s sanctions regime, and consequently, the EU communicates their efforts to address circumvention as a sufficient policy step. + +__Recommendation: The EU should continue to use accession as a motivation for EU candidate countries to ensure they align with EU sanctions against Russia.__ + +The EU should make more explicit reference to the accession process in its communications to make EU candidate countries move forward with their alignment on sanctions against Russia. The communications around accession negotiations and other meetings of EU officials with EU candidate countries should be used as a platform to remind EU candidate countries of the clear incentive to adopt EU sanctions and signal their commitment to the accession process. This needs to be highlighted in public communications in the candidate countries, informing the public of this requirement. + +> #### 3. The EU uses the referencing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in EU sanctions diplomacy as a tool to counter Russia’s narrative in third countries. + +The EU uses the referencing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in neither a values-based nor interest-based manner. However, it can serve as a tool to counter Russian narratives in third countries which have a high degree of political and economic ties to Russia. + +__Recommendation: The EU should continue to use all available forums to counter Russia’s narratives, including press conferences and other public statements from the EU sanctions envoy.__ + +The EU sanctions envoy regularly visits countries with different degrees of ties to Russia, where the EU’s messages might not get the desired visibility. These visits can offer an opportunity to highlight the EU’s narrative and counter Russia’s disinformation. By giving interviews and being featured in the press, EU officials can create more visibility for the EU’s narratives in third countries, therefore the EU sanctions envoy and other officials should use all channels at their disposal to engage with the media during their in-country visits. + +> #### 4. While values play a less important role than interests in the EU’s sanctions communications, the communications employ a valuable framing tool related to international law. + +The EU addresses values mainly by referring to international law and linking the support for sanctions to strengthening these values. The EU HR/VP has explicitly commended the “principled position of Kazakhstan based on respect for the UN Charter” and, in this context, acknowledged Kazakhstan’s “efforts to ensure its territory is not used to circumvent European and international sanctions against Russia”, which demonstrates the impact of values in EU strategic communications. + +__Recommendation: The EU should continue to use the values of international law in its strategic communications, which would help third countries to frame their efforts against circumvention.__ + +The EU should reinforce its focus on the values of the UN Charter as it can offer an opportunity to third countries to frame their anti-circumvention policies as a contribution to upholding the principles of international law. This could be especially useful in third countries that have close geopolitical or economic ties with Russia. In these countries, a framing referring to strengthening international law might be more attractive than a more explicit framing of anti-circumvention policies as measures directed against Russia. + +> #### 5. EU sanctions communications could explore an environmental framing. + +There are certain dimensions that were not addressed in EU strategic sanctions communications analysed for this paper, including Russia’s “shadow fleet”, mostly made up of uninsured old ships that transport oil to evade the oil price cap. The shadow fleet therefore presents a real environmental threat that could affect any of the littoral countries along the fleet’s routes. + +__Recommendation: The EU should explore referencing the environmental threat posed by Russia’s sanctions circumvention by sea in its strategic communications.__ + +This would offer another incentive for third countries to support the EU’s sanctions efforts by tackling circumvention. Similar to the values of international law, environmental framing would allow third countries to frame their efforts to collaborate on tackling sanctions circumvention as a response to environmental concerns, rather than a measure directed more explicitly against Russia. + + +### Annex: Sources Used for the Main Analysis + +1. [European Commission, “Statement by EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan on the First Sanctions Coordinators Forum”, 23 February 2023](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-eu-sanctions-envoy-david-osullivan-first-sanctions-coordinators-forum-2023-02-23_en). + +2. [European Commission, “David O’Sullivan: Interview with Newly Appointed International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions”, 28 February 2023](https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/fisma/items/778510/en). + +3. [Jakob Hanke Vela and Barbara Moens, “EU’s new Sanctions Envoy Shifts Focus to Enforcement”, Politico, 1 March 2023](https://www.politico.eu/article/eus-new-sanctions-envoy-set-to-fight-sanction-cirvumvention/). + +4. [EU Watch, “‘Russia Sanctions will Remain in Place for a Long Time’: EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan”, 6 March 2023](https://www.euwatch.be/russia-sanctions-will-remain-in-place-for-a-long-time/). + +5. [Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “EU Envoy: Sanctions Should not Cause Deterioration of Relations with Kyrgyzstan”, 24 KG, 28 March 2023](https://24.kg/english/261840_EU_Envoy_Sanctions_should_not_cause_deterioration_of_relations_with_Kyrgyzstan/). + +6. [Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “Import of Goods from EU to Kyrgyzstan Increases by 300 Percent”, 24 KG, 28 March 2023](https://24.kg/english/261838_Import_of_goods_from_EU_to_Kyrgyzstan_increases_by_300_percent/). + +7. [Marianna Mkrtchyan, “Date of EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan’s Visit to Armenia not yet Known”, ArmInfo, 29 March 2023](https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=75406&lang=3). + +8. [Zhania Urankaeva, “Kazakhstan will not face Sanctions for Partnership with Russia and Putin – EU Special Representative”, 24 April 2023](https://kz.kursiv.media/2023-04-24/zhnr-putin/). + +9. [Ulysmedia, “ЕО өкілі қай жағдайда Қазақстанға санкциялар салынуы мүмкін екенін айтты” (“The Representative of the EU said in Which Case Sanctions may be Imposed on Kazakhstan”), 24 April 2023](https://qaz.ulysmedia.kz/news/5897-eo-okili-kai-zhagdaida-kazakstanga-sanktsiialar-salynuy-mumkin-ekenin-aitty/). Author translation. + +10. [Aibarshyn Akhmetkali, “EU Begin Talks with Kazakhstan to Prevent Re-Export of Sanctioned Goods to Russia”, Astana Times, 25 April 2023](https://astanatimes.com/2023/04/eu-begin-talks-with-kazakhstan-to-prevent-re-export-of-sanctioned-goods-to-russia/). + +11. [KazTag, “Kazakhstan will not fall Under Secondary Sanctions Due to Putin’s Visit”, 25 April 2023](https://kaztag.kz/en/news/kazakhstan-will-not-fall-under-secondary-sanctions-due-to-putin-s-visit-eu). + +12. [Gazeta.uz, “‘We are Grateful Uzbekistan is Against Having its Territory used to Circumvent the Sanctions’ – EU Special Envoy”, 28 April 2023](https://www.gazeta.uz/en/2023/04/28/sanctions/). + +13. [Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, “Transcript of Press Point of the EU Sanctions Envoy, Mr. David O’Sullivan”, 28 June 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/transcript-press-point-eu-sanctions-envoy-mr-david-o’sullivan_en?s=221). + +14. [Mared Gwyn Jones, “Third Countries now Making it ‘More Difficult’ for Russia to Acquire Sanctioned Goods – EU Envoy”, Euronews, 4 July 2023](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/07/04/third-countries-now-making-it-more-difficult-for-russia-to-acquire-sanctioned-goods-eu-env). + +15. [European Commission, “EU Finance Podcast: The One About the EU Sanctions Envoy”, 26 July 2023](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-finance-podcast-future-finance/eu-finance-podcast-one-about-eu-sanctions-envoy_en). + +16. [Josep Borrell, “The War on Ukraine, Partnerships, Non-alignment and International Law”, EEAS, 1 February 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/war-ukraine-partnerships-non-alignment-and-international-law_en). + +17. [JAMnews, “European Union Calls on Georgia to Join Sanctions Against Russia in Aviation Sector”, 12 May 2023](https://jam-news.net/aviation-sanctions-against-russia/). + +18. [EurActiv, “EU Acknowledges Kazakhstan’s Efforts to Curb Russia Sanction Circumvention”, 16 May 2023](https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/news/eu-acknowledges-kazakhstans-efforts-to-curb-russia-sanction-circumvention/). + +19. [Josep Borrell, “Some Clarifications on the Circumvention of EU Sanctions Against Russia”, EEAS, 19 May 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/some-clarifications-circumvention-eu-sanctions-against-russia_en). + +20. [Bojana Zimonjić Jelisavac, “Serbia not a Platform for Circumventing EU Sanctions, Says the Prime Minister”, EurActiv, 12 May 2023](https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-not-a-platform-for-circumventing-eu-sanctions-says-the-prime-minister/). + +21. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, “Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Mnatsakan Safaryan with David O’Sullivan, the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions”, 24 May 2023](https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/05/24/eu_san/12023). + +22. [Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, “Interview with Josep Borrell, EU High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission”, 7 September 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/interview-josep-borrell-eu-high-representative-european-union-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy_en). + +23. [EEAS, “Georgia: Press Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell After Meeting with Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili”, 8 September 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-press-remarks-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-after-meeting-prime-minister_en). + +--- + +__Balázs Gyimesi__ is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b7db9929 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report.md @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Euro SIFMANet CPH Report +author: Olivia Allison +date : 2024-06-06 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/BvVCDB6.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Copenhagen Report" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Discussions held in Copenhagen in March 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark._ + + + +In late March 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, with the support of Copenhagen-based policy centre Think Tank EUROPA, hosted a roundtable in Copenhagen. The roundtable, along with a series of one-on-one meetings, discussed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark. None of the discussions in the event are attributable. + +The gatherings included representatives from national authorities with sanctions-related competences, as well as sanctions and compliance experts from financial institutions and Danish industrial groups, compliance experts from leading law firms, representatives from the industry group Danish Shipping, and other advisers. These included, among others, representatives from the Danish Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs; the Danish Customs Agency (DCA); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (MFA); the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority; the National Special Crime Unit; and other relevant agencies. This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFS-led European Sanctions and the Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy. + + +### Denmark’s Decentralised Sanctions Implementation + +The roundtable began with a discussion of the division of authority and responsibility for sanctions in Denmark, and the significant adaptations required since 2022. + +The conversation considered Denmark’s preparedness for the Russia sanctions following the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) fourth round of mutual evaluations, the scope of which included implementation of targeted financial sanctions. Denmark’s mutual evaluation report was concluded in 2017 and its subsequent follow-up process ended in 2021, which a government representative at the roundtable said had helped the country to prepare for expanded sanctions. They noted that Denmark was evaluated as “partially compliant” for Recommendation 7 related to targeted financial sanctions for proliferation financing, but was upgraded to “largely compliant” in the follow-up report in 2021. Addressing these gaps had, a representative said, helped the country’s preparations, but it had not been possible to prepare fully for the sanctioning of a country with which the EU as a whole had such significant economic ties, compared to jurisdictions that are subject to sanctions regimes covered by the FATF Standards and have been for a long time. + +Denmark has more than 25 authorities with some role in or oversight of sanctions responsibility – relatively higher than other member states where SIFMANet has held similar roundtables. The MFA is the authority with overall responsibility for coordinating the sanctions policy of the Danish government. Since 2022, the Danish “EU-Special Committee on Sanctions” and taskforces have expanded to include additional government bodies, ranging from utilities to cultural ministries. Government representatives highlighted the enhanced coordination that had been put into practice in Denmark. Steps included the establishment of a central sanctions coordinator team, vested in a newly established economic security unit in the MFA, and new intra-governmental procedures, as well as a governmental taskforce to counter circumvention, with participation from relevant national Danish authorities. + +Although government representatives said that this coordination between a wider group had improved effectiveness, dividing responsibility for implementation and guidance across numerous national competent authorities may also increase the risk of fragmentation in approach. This was underscored by comments from private sector participants, who said that there had been “inter-agency problems on who’s responsible for what”. One participant said that some questions had “circled for some time” as a result. + + +### Lacking National Guidance on EU Regulations + +One source of frustration expressed by private sector participants at the roundtable was the Danish government’s reluctance to interpret European law and regulations or provide answers to specific questions, given that the debate had taken place in Brussels. One participant said that while interpretation of Danish law would take into account written remarks about the law, no such written remarks are provided for EU law and, they said, “we can only look at what the law says”. This representative also said the Danish government’s role was to provide guidance, “not counselling”. Other government representatives said they had provided as much guidance as possible, but that the scale of requests had been unprecedented. + +Private sector participants were frustrated with this position. They agreed that they found the EU FAQs helpful, but insisted these should be expanded further. While they appreciated the guidance that had been shared by the Danish government, they said it was both too limited and too slow. One representative of a Danish maritime industry group said that they had sent 75 to 100 requests to Danish authorities and had not yet received a clear response. Another participant, from a law firm, said the process was time-consuming and that it “can be difficult to get answers”. + +In addition to this, some participants said that, over time, they had stopped seeking formal clarification on the sanctions, because of concerns about privacy in the event of freedom of information requests being made to the government. One participant said they preferred to liaise through informal discussions. A business association representative also said companies had stopped seeking clarification on other matters for fear of receiving an answer that blocked a particular transaction. Overall, some private sector participants expressed their frustration that their community continued to have more experience and expertise in sanctions implementation than the public sector. + + +### Private Sector Information Sharing + +Despite these obstacles, a business association representative said there was an overall positive public–private dialogue, and a general perception that Danish business wants to do right thing. Participants from both public and private sectors reiterated several times the importance of trust in the business environment, and a government representative said they were highly aware of companies’ willingness to comply, as well as the public support for their doing so. + +Another positive aspect highlighted was sharing information within the private sector, with more experienced companies sharing tools and information with smaller businesses, in order to support their compliance with the regulations. This was seen as an important support for business, given the “huge gap in compliance readiness” that a business association representative noticed among smaller companies. One participant from a multinational company said this information-sharing practice had been much more widespread in Denmark than in other European member states, an assertion supported by SIFMANet visits to other EU member states. + +Government-led efforts include not only the establishment of sanctions taskforces among authorities, but also substantial outreach to the private sector. This outreach included a notification that Danish authorities sent to over 1,500 companies containing information on their sanctions obligations and encouraging them to get in touch and ask for support. In addition, the Danish Business Authority has sent out targeted letters in relation to circumvention, including compliance guidance, to approximately 200 economic operators. Danish authorities had an existing relationship with obliged entities, but the government decided to engage with all companies, given the expansive nature of the Russia sanctions regime. + + +### Misalignment Between Banks and Corporates + +Representatives from the corporate sector, including industrial and shipping companies, expressed frustration with the banking sector, which they said had taken an overly narrow approach to allowing certain transactions – beyond what was required by the law. One participant said it was as if “every taxi driver had to ask clients what they were doing before accepting their fare”. A bank representative said the requirement to comply on the product side had fundamentally changed how financial institutions approach sanctions risk, while another participant said that they now viewed certain types of business activities as high risk, where these would not have been before 2022. + +Another participant, from a business association, said that several of their members had completed all compliance steps required for a certain transaction, but the banks had still refused to allow it. However, a representative from a bank said that non-US companies “need to step up”. They referred to the risks highlighted in the December 2023 amendments to US Executive Order 14024, which strengthened the US’ ability to sanction financial institutions facilitating and funding supplies to the Russian military–industrial complex. + +At the same time, representatives from corporates also acknowledged that there was a lack of regulation of that sector, compared to the financial industry. There is no specific “know your customer” requirement for much of Danish industry, which meant that it was challenging to convince boards to allocate resources to sanctions compliance. Meanwhile, banks now demand more compliance procedures, and have higher standards for their corporate clients. + +Additionally, participants from both banks and corporates cited a perception that the strictness of their compliance was harming their competitiveness compared to their European peers. They said this was a “significant” concern. Representatives of the shipping industry said that the country as a whole was now a “risk-poor environment”, with many shipping companies taking overly conservative approaches to international business, resulting in a negative impact on both that industry and the business environment overall. + +One area that was highlighted several times was product classification. Given the dominance of the shipping and trade sectors in Denmark, classification was a significant issue, with participants highlighting the difficulties of getting a classification on tariff codes from customs and a dual-use designation decision. Some participants agreed that there continued to be public sector resourcing issues relating to the EU sanctions over the critical goods and technologies listed under Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014. However, another participant mentioned that the DCA can provide Binding Tariff Information decisions. + + +### Enforcement and the Shadow of the Dan-Bunkering Case + +The discussion then turned to the topic of enforcement, and numerous participants referred to the case of Dan-Bunkering, which was prosecuted in Denmark in 2021 for shipping $101 million in jet fuel to Syria from Kaliningrad. This case was seen by several participants as a model of enforcement. However, a representative of a business association said this represented a specific case, in which a business “wilfully turned a blind eye” to government guidance. In this way, they said, the Dan-Bunkering case was not representative of Danish business practices. Nevertheless, the experience clearly cast a shadow across public and private sector alike. + +Procedural questions of how investigations were initiated were also discussed, with prosecutors highlighting that many cases began with administrative infractions, escalating into cooperation between police and competent authorities. This procedure, another government representative said, had been set up after the Dan-Bunkering case, which had provided many opportunities to clarify procedures. + +A representative from the Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs said many investigations began with the relevant Danish authority conducting a review of the news media for negative reports or requesting documents from exporters to identify suspicious information. This information was then evaluated for potential indications of misconduct before the authority decided whether to escalate the matter to police (and potentially onwards to prosecutors). Since 2022, Danish authorities have evaluated 140 potential breaches, they said, and there were around 40 open cases. So far, six matters had been reported to police. At the same time, a customs representative said there were other steps before any potential breaches were reported, including a hearing on customs declarations, and so there was “a lot of enforcement going on behind the scenes” before any case is reported. + +Participants said these statistics highlighted the difficulty of comparing enforcement between different EU member states, with no centralised reporting of enforcement from the EU’s Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. A participant from a business association said these figures were also likely to be much higher than the number of actual criminal cases, since many issues related to goods that were unintentionally misdeclared, due to the aforementioned classification difficulties, rather than deliberate evasion or circumvention. + +To this point from the business association, the customs representative responded that, in the majority of cases relating to possible breaches of import and export prohibitions, the DCA will go through several steps ahead of any potential filing of a police report. This includes a consultation process with the responsible party (usually the declarer), in which they are informed that the customs declaration is in possible breach of sanctions. The party will then be able to provide documentation for potential misdeclarations, so that the declaration can be corrected. Only if the responsible party is unable or unwilling to provide sufficient documentation that their goods are not in violation of sanctions will a police report be filed. Therefore, they argued, the figure is unlikely to be inflated by “unintentional misdeclarations” and similar declaration-related mistakes. + +Finally, participants discussed Denmark’s criminal enforcement regime for sanctions breaches, which requires proof of negligence or intent. Some participants found Denmark to have relatively high standards for criminal enforcement, and advocated for civil enforcement or other mechanisms with lower standards for deployment. Private sector representatives added that they would welcome a civil enforcement regime in Denmark, as this would allow voluntary self-disclosures and more dialogue between the public and private sectors, allowing companies to “come clean” if they have inadvertently breached sanctions. + +However, other participants said that widening enforcement action could damage the collaborative and cooperative nature of the public–private dialogue as well as the dialogue between private sector actors. They instead urged the government to publish findings from its investigations and reviews, even those that do not reach the standards for a criminal prosecution, as these would allow companies to learn from issues other entities have faced. + + +### Conclusion + +Danish authorities and the private sector clearly reiterated their commitment to implementing and enforcing sanctions within Denmark at this roundtable. One particularly positive aspect of this was the commitment to information sharing in the private sector, both within business associations and between peers within industry. The roundtable discussions also demonstrated open and frank dialogue regarding the need for more guidance and support from the public sector, and authorities’ receptivity to these messages. + +The government’s ability to provide guidance and clear responses to queries appeared to be hampered by the spread of sanctions implementation responsibility across a large number of national competent authorities, to the degree that private sector actors complained of questions “circling” among various agencies. + +Further, the Danish authorities’ limitation on providing guidance on EU regulation, beyond what is stated in the wording and FAQs as adopted in Brussels, also poses practical difficulties and raised frustration within the private sector. Business representatives urged the government to share more information on its interpretations, including potentially on anonymised determinations by customs and other authorities in pre-enforcement investigations and analyses. + +Discussions also highlighted the potential gap in enforcement for sanctions breaches that occur due to conduct that falls below Denmark’s criminal standard. This may create a gap between Danish enforcement practice and that of other member states. At the same time, Danish business perceived its own practice as overly compliant, in comparison to other EU member states, raising concerns about Denmark’s competitiveness. Further alignment with other member states would address such concerns. + +In sum, like many EU member states, Denmark has discovered that the key to successful sanctions implementation starts with coordination across the wide range of agencies and departments that find themselves involved in the Russia sanctions regime. It has also discovered that investment in relations with the private sector – the frontline of implementation – is critical if the country is to play its part in restricting the funding, and particularly the resourcing, of Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine. + +--- + +__Olivia Allison__ is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-10-algorithmic-stability.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-10-algorithmic-stability.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b1d9213a --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-10-algorithmic-stability.md @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Algorithmic Stability +author: Benjamin Jensen, et al. +date : 2024-06-10 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/tH65t62.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "How AI Could Shape the Future of Deterrence" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation._ + + + +### In the future… + +- __States will integrate artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) into their national security enterprises to gain decision advantages over their rivals.__ The question will not be if a web of algorithms extends across the military, intelligence community, and foreign policy decisionmaking institutions, but how lines of code interact with the human clash of wills at the heart of strategy. + +- __New technology will change the character but not the nature of statecraft and strategy.__ States will still combine diplomacy, economic coercion, and influence campaigns with threats of military force to signal rivals and reassure allies. Human decisionmaking, while augmented by algorithms, remains central to strategy formation and crisis management. + +- __Information about AI/ML capabilities will influence how states manage escalation.__ Escalation risks will continue to emerge from how warfighting changes the balance of information available to update models and support human decisionmaking. Intelligence gaps on adversary algorithms increase the likelihood of escalation but only once states have crossed the Rubicon and fight beneath the nuclear threshold. + + +### Introduction + +How will the adoption of AI/ML across a state’s national security enterprise affect crisis decisionmaking? For example, what would the Cuban Missile Crisis look like at machine speed? + +Beyond current policy debates, congressional testimony, new strategies, and a drive to identify, test, and evaluate standards, there is a fundamental question of how computer algorithms will shape crisis interactions between nuclear powers. Further, will refined AI/ML models pull people back from the brink or push them over the edge during crises that are as much about fear and emotion as they are rational decisionmaking? How will humans and machines interact during a crisis between nuclear powers? + +_`This edition of On Future War uses a series of wargames as an experiment to analyze how players with 10 or more years of national security experience approach crisis decisionmaking given variable levels of knowledge about a rival great power’s level of AI/ML integration across its national security enterprise.`_ + +To answer this question, the CSIS Futures Lab held a series of crisis simulations in early 2023 analyzing how AI/ML will shape the future of deterrence. The games — designed as a randomized control trial — explored human uncertainty regarding a rival great power’s level of AI/ML integration and how this factor affected strategic stability during a crisis. + +Two major findings emerged. First, across the simulations, varying levels of AI/ML capabilities had no observable effect on strategy and a general trend of trying to combine multiple instruments of power when responding to a crisis. While data science and the use of AI/ML to augment statecraft will almost certainly be a defining feature of the near future, there appear to be constants of strategy that will survive the emergence of such new technologies. Diplomacy, economic coercion, and influence campaigns will survive even as machines collect and process more information and help shape national security decisionmaking. AI/ML will augment but not fundamentally change strategy. That said, there is an urgent need to start training national security professionals to understand what AI/ML is and is not, as well as how it can support human decisionmaking during foreign policy crises. + +Second, how nations fight in the shadow of nuclear weapons will change as states selectively target the battle networks of their rivals. Even though the perceived risk of escalation is not likely to be affected by the balance of AI/ML capabilities, the criteria used to select flexible response options will change. States will need to balance countering adversary algorithms with ensuring that they do not blind an adversary and risk triggering a “dead-hand” — a fast and automated system developed by the Soviet Union to launch nuclear weapons — escalation spiral. This need to strike the right balance in military targeting will put a new premium on intelligence collection that maps how rival states employ AI/ML capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It could also change how states approach arms control, with a new emphasis on understanding where and how AI/ML capabilities augment crisis decisionmaking. + + +### Deterrence, Battle Networks, and AI/ML + +Modern deterrence literature focuses on how states bargain, short of war, through threats and commitments. These signals change how each side calculates the costs and benefits of going to war, implying that the less information each side has about the balance of capabilities and resolve, the harder it becomes to encourage restraint. Signaling and communication play a central role in how states seek to manipulate risk to deny an adversary an advantage, including incentives for seeking a fait accompli by military force. Even literature that stresses the psychological and cultural antecedents that shape how foreign policy leaders approach crisis diplomacy share this emphasis on the central role of information. Rational calculations break down based on past information (i.e., how beliefs shape expectations) and flawed weighting (e.g., bias and prospect theory). + +In modern military planning and operations, information is managed through battle networks. The ability to conduct long-range precision strikes and track adversary troop movements all rests on aggregating and analyzing data. This logic is a foundation for the Coalition Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) network, which is designed to push and pull data across distributed networks of sensors and shooters connected by faster communication, processing, and decision layers informed by AI/ML. The network is the new theory of victory at the center of the new Joint Warfighting Concept, which prioritizes synchronizing multidomain effects in time and space. For this reason, information is now a key component of military power and, by proxy, a state’s ability to bargain with a rival. The more information a state can process, assisted by algorithms, the more likely it is to identify windows of opportunity and risk as well as align ends, ways, and means to gain a relative advantage. + +Yet, most of the emerging literature on AI/ML and the future of war focuses more on risk and ethical considerations than bargaining advantages. First, multiple accounts claim that AI/ML will create new risks, including “flash wars,” and are likely to produce destabilizing effects along multiple vectors. The thinking goes that the new era of great power competition will be marked by an “indelicate balance of terror” as Russia, China, and the United States race to acquire technological game changers. To the extent that AI/ML alters military power, it could affect how states perceive the balance of power. As perceptions about power and influence change, it could trigger inadvertent escalation risks. Inside the bureaucracy, defense planners could rely on brittle and black-boxed AI/ML recommendations that create new forms of strategic instability. At the tactical level, the speed of autonomous weapons systems could lead to inadvertent escalation while also undermining signaling commitment during a crisis. + +There are two issues with these claims. First, arguments about the destabilizing role of AI/ML have yet to be explored beyond literature reviews, alternative scenarios, and illustrative wargames designed more for gaining perspective than for evaluating strategy. In other words, hypotheses about risk and escalation have not been tested. Second, accounts about emerging technology and inadvertent escalation often discount the role of increased information in reducing tensions. To the extent that algorithms applied across a battle network help reduce uncertainty, they are likely to support deterrence. You can never lift the fog of war, but you can make weather forecasts and describe what is known, unknown, and unknowable. This alternative logic sits at the foundation of the “wargame as an experiment” the CSIS Futures Lab constructed to analyze how AI/ML could affect strategic stability. + + +### Would You Like to Play a Game? + +In 2023, the CSIS Futures Lab conducted two tabletop exercises exploring a crisis scenario involving AI/ML’s effect on strategic decisionmaking. The tabletop exercise focused on a crisis involving a third-party state between two rivals, each of which had nuclear weapons and a second-strike capability. The rival states in the exercise were abstracted to remove bias about current rivalries that define the international system, thus reducing, but not eliminating, the risk of confounding factors skewing gameplay. As a result, players made choices about how to respond to a crisis and which elements of a rival state’s battle network (i.e., CJADC2) to target. The games consisted of 29 individual players, each with over 10 years of national security experience. + +> #### `The Game` + +- _`Two tabletop exercises analyzing how players develop flexible deterrent and flexible response options during a crisis between rival nuclear states`_ + +- _`Fake scenario to reduce bias`_ + +- _`Players all had at least 10 years of national security experience`_ + +- _`Players randomly assigned into different treatment groups`_ + +- _`Three rounds of crisis interactions, moving from competition to the early stages of a military conflict`_ + +The game design adapted an earlier tabletop exercise used to study modern competition and cyber escalation dynamics known as Corcyra. This game put players in a fictional scenario involving a crisis standoff between two nuclear rivals: Green State and Purple State over a small state, Orange State. Green State and Orange State are treaty allies. Purple State and Orange State have a maritime territorial dispute. Players, assuming the role of Green State, make decisions about the best mix of flexible deterrent (competition) and flexible response options as the crisis unfolds. The game scenario — involving a territorial dispute, enduring rivalry, and alliance networks — built in dynamics associated with escalation to focus on low-probability, high-consequence foreign policy events. The use of fake countries seeks to make players less likely to introduce bias in the results based on prior beliefs about current powers such as the United States and China. + +Unknown to the players, Purple State’s moves and decisions were predetermined to walk players up the escalation ladder, a technique known in the wargame community as a 1.5-sided design. This game design captures the uncertainty and interactive complexity (i.e., reaction, counteraction) of two-sided games but better supports capturing and coding observations about player preferences and assessments of risks and opportunities. Applied to Corcyra, a 1.5-sided game design enabled the CSIS Futures Lab to collect data on how players made decisions about competition and conventional conflict in the shadow of nuclear weapons. + +As the game proceeded, players were randomly assigned into two different treatment groups and led into different rooms with a facilitator. Each group was given an identical game packet that included an overview of the crisis and military balance between Green State and Purple State as well as the standing policy objectives for Green State to deter Purple State’s actions against its treaty allies while limiting the risk of a broader war (i.e., extended general deterrent). The only difference between the two groups was in the intelligence estimate of the extent of Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities in relation to Green State. As seen in Table 1, this difference meant that everything was constant (e.g., military balance, policy objectives, and Purple State’s actions across the game) except for the knowledge the players received about their rival’s level of AI/ML capabilities. This design reflects a factorial vignette survey, controlling for whether AI/ML capability is known or unknown. + +Over the course of the game, each group (i.e., Treatment A and B) responded to a set of adversary escalation vignettes. Unknown to the participants was that each subsequent move would see their rival escalate and move up the escalation ladder to ensure a more dynamic interplay between current decisionmaking and maintaining sufficient forces and options for future interactions. The design also ensured that players were forced to confront the threat of conventional strikes on the nuclear enterprise and the limited use of nuclear weapons in a counterforce role. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/V6FPvbW.png) +_▲ Table 1: Excerpts from the Corcyra Game Packets_ + +The first round of the game dealt with flexible deterrent options and crisis response. Afterwards, each group received a brief about a crisis — between their treaty ally (Orange State) and nuclear rival (Purple State) — and each player (Green State) was asked to craft a response using multiple instruments of power (e.g., diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) by picking three options from a menu of 24 preapproved flexible deterrent options. Each instrument of power had six response options based on the implied level of escalation. This design allowed the CSIS Futures Lab to see if varying levels of AI/ML capabilities had an effect on how players approached competition and campaigning as part of a larger deterrent posture. Specifically, it allowed the research team to test how the capability affected overall competition strategy and escalation dynamics. + +The second round began with a limited military strike by Purple State on Orange State. Players were briefed that Purple State conducted a series of limited strikes on an airfield and naval base in Orange State. Orange State intercepted 50 percent of the cruise missiles in the attack, but the remaining 20 — fired from a mix of Purple State aircraft and naval warships — damaged an Orange State frigate, downed two maritime patrol aircraft, and destroyed an ammunition depot. Initial reports suggested that as many as 20 Orange State military personnel were killed in action, with another 30 wounded. There were also four Green State military advisers working on the base at the time who were killed in the attack. The attacks coincided with widespread reports of global positioning system (GPS) denial, jamming, and cyber intrusions in both Orange State and Green State. Purple State said the attack was limited to the military facility Orange State had used in past provocations, but it vows broader attacks if Orange State or Green State responds. In this manner, Purple State’s conventional military response reflected core concepts in modern military theory about multidomain operations, joint firepower strikes, and sixth-generation warfare. + +After receiving this intelligence update, players were asked to nominate flexible response options. First, the players had to recommend which of the military responses from the menu of 24 options they recommended in response to a limited military strike by Purple State on Orange State. Players also had to specify which layer of Purple State’s battle network they wanted to affect through their recommended response: sensing, processing, communicating, decision, or effectors. This game design limited the range of options open to players to support statistical analysis and comparison between the two treatments. + +The third round examined if players adjusted their military response options to conventional strikes on their nuclear enterprise. Players were briefed that Purple State conducted a series of conventional strikes against Orange State and Green State. In Orange State, the strikes targeted major military facilities and even the Orange State leadership (both military and civilian) with a mix of cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and special operations forces (SOF) raids. The attacks included striking Green State intelligence satellites and major early-warning radars as well as key airfields where Green State keeps the majority of its strike and bomber aircraft squadrons. The mass precision conventional strikes — launched largely by a mix of long-range strike and bomber aircraft and submarines — also targeted key port facilities in Green State used to reload vertical launch cells and support Green State submarine forces. Orange State lost over 30 percent of its military combat power and 50 percent of its civilian critical infrastructure related to water treatment, energy, and telecommunications. Its leaders survived the decapitation strikes but are enacting continuity of government protocols. Green State has suffered 10 percent attrition in its air and naval forces. Purple State has threatened that it may be forced to expand strikes, to include using nuclear weapons, if Green State conducts additional military strikes. + + +### What the Game Revealed about the Future of Deterrence + +#### Flexible Deterrent Options + +Throughout the game, each player had three options from any category (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, or economic) to choose. Table 2 summarizes how frequently each player selected flexible response options linked to different instruments of power during the initial crisis response (i.e., Round 1). Analyzing these choices provides a window into how players with at least 10 years of national security experience approached the “ways” of crisis management toward the “end” of reestablishing deterrence. If AI/ML is inherently more escalation prone, one would expect to see a statistically significant difference between the treatments. + +There was no statistically significant difference between the two treatments. The balance of AI/ML capabilities did not alter how players approached their competitive strategy and crisis management. Across the treatments, players developed an integrated approach, often choosing multiple instruments of power to pressure their rival, as opposed to focusing on a strictly military response. No player in either treatment used only a singular instrument of power, such as only responding with military options. On the contrary, over 60 percent of players in each treatment selected multiple instruments of power. In other words, the level of AI/ML capabilities between rivals did not directly alter early-stage crisis response and the development of flexible deterrent options designed to stabilize the situation and reestablish deterrence. This finding runs contrary to perspectives that see AI/ML as inherently escalatory and risk prone. While AI/ML will augment multiple analytical processes from the tactical to the strategic level, national security leaders will still make critical decisions and seek ways to slow down and manage a crisis. The risk is likely more in how people interact with algorithms during a crisis than in the use of data science and machine learning to analyze information and intelligence. AI/ML does not pose risks on its own. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/WhstiFg.png) +_▲ Table 2: Selected Deterrent Options_ + +During discussions in Round 1 for Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known), players focused more on strategy as it relates to shaping human decisionmaking. In the first round, participants were divided over whether Purple State’s actions were hostile or not but conceded that Purple State was attempting to signal that Green State’s actions in the region were unwarranted. Of note, this focus on signaling was more about human intention than algorithmic assessments. The players generally saw the crisis as about human leaders in rival states seeking advantage through national security bureaucracies augmented by AI/ML capabilities. In their discussions, humans were in the loop and focused on finding ways to de-escalate the crisis without signaling weakness. The discussion was less about how algorithms might skew information and more about how to have direct communication and clear messages passed through diplomats to other human leaders. + +This logic drove the players to focus on developing the situation through diplomatic outreach while increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the region. Although participants agreed upon the utility of diplomacy as a response to the crisis, they diverged in their opinion on whether the efforts should publicly call for de-escalation or privately use third parties or influence campaigns to warn Purple State’s elites about further escalation. Group members widely supported increasing ISR assets in the region to provide early warning of future Purple State military deployments and increase protection of friendly communications and intelligence-collection assets. Additionally, group members sought to privately share intelligence with allies in the region. Again, AI/ML was less a focal point than a method to gain better situational awareness and identify the best mechanisms for crisis communication with the rival state (i.e., private, public, or third-party). People, more than machines, were central to crisis management. + +Where AI/ML did enter the discussion was with respect to how the rival battle networks with high degrees of automation could misperceive the deployment of additional ISR capabilities during a crisis. Although participants strongly believed that this action was essential, they recognized the possibility that Purple State’s AI/ML augmented strategic warning systems may not be able to interpret the difference between signaling resolve or deliberate escalation. At the same time, they thought the direct communication channels should augment this risk and that most algorithmic applications analyzing the deployment of ISR assets would be more probabilistic than deterministic, thinking in terms of conditional probabilities about escalation risks rather than jumping to the conclusion that war was imminent. + +Put differently, since all AI/ML is based on learning patterns from data or rules-based logic, the underlying patterns of past ISR deployments would likely make the system — even absent a human — unlikely to predict a low-probability event (i.e., war) when there are other more common options associated with a ubiquitous event such as increasing intelligence. If anything, the reverse would be more likely. Since wars and even militarized crises are rare events, an AI/ML algorithm — depending on the training data and parameters — would treat them as such absent human intervention. This does not mean there is a zero probability of “flash wars” and misreading the situation. Rather, the point is that given the low number of wars and militarized crises between states, there are few patterns, and there will almost certainly be a human in the loop. No senior national security leader is likely to cede all decisionmaking to an algorithm in a crisis. + +Treatment B saw a similar discussion between players that focused on using multiple instruments of power and identifying de-escalation opportunities. Of note, it also saw more diplomatic outreach, with players wanting to ensure they could cut through the uncertainty about Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities through direct and indirect diplomatic engagements and crisis communication. In Treatment B, concern about the strengths and limitations of an unknown AI/ML capability in Purple State had a significant impact on group decisionmaking. Group members desired a mutual understanding of Green State and Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities, believing that greater clarity over the balance and use of AI/ML capabilities between rivals would lead to stability, rather than the current instability they faced. + +This focus led participants to recommend deploying ISR capabilities to identify how and if Purple State was using AI-assisted ISR that might misread their intentions. Some players expressed concern about whether the use of ISR would undermine their efforts at de-escalation. Players suggested that if Purple State detected increased deployment of collection and early-warning assets, they would feel pressured to deploy military forces to prevent the appearance of a capability gap. + +Ultimately, players believed that deploying additional ISR was worth the potential escalation risk because it was essential to analyze adversary actions as they unfolded. These groups sought to combine diplomatic, flexible deterrent options such as third-party mediation and redeployment of naval and aviation assets away from Purple State to signal a desire to de-escalate. In other words, national security professionals wanted to ensure there was a check on algorithmic reasoning during a crisis and were willing to deploy assets to that end and even slow down operations to buy time and space for diplomacy and clear signaling. + +This reasoning runs counter to claims that AI triggers a security dilemma that leads to inadvertent escalation. In international relations, a security dilemma is a situation where efforts by one state to increase its security cause rival states to experience more insecurity. The concept is used to explain why states find themselves pulled into arms races, crisis escalation, and war. The security dilemma can become especially acute based, among other things, on new technologies that make it difficult to assess whether offensive or defensive military capabilities create strategic advantage. As a result, one would expect to see the emergence of AI/ML capabilities trigger a security dilemma and inadvertent escalation. Rival states would opt for more severe crisis response options in their selection of flexible deterrent options. + +Yet, this dynamic did not emerge in the crisis simulations based on player discussions and statistical analysis. Players could select from a menu of 24 crisis response options varying by magnitude across each of the instruments of power. Using this magnitude, the CSIS Futures Lab could analyze whether there was more or less coercive pressure applied across the treatments. As can be seen in Table 3, there was no statistically significant difference in the magnitudes across the two treatments. The balance of AI/ML capabilities did not affect how rival states approached crisis management and competitive strategy. Based on discussions, players searched for ways to escape the security dilemma through diplomatic outreach and intelligence across both treatments. + +While the average escalation level between the two treatments is not different, there appear to be inverse preferences for weak signaling and crisis probing that players adopted to manage crisis escalation. Table 3 below shows the levels of escalation magnitude, ranging from 1 (“low”) to 6 (“high”), that players opted for when they selected diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of power to signal their rival and shape the crisis. Lower magnitude signals (1) — which were predominantly diplomatic and intelligence activities — were more than twice as likely in Treatment A (10) than in B (4). Players assessed that AI/ML-enabled battle networks would detect weak signals and help support a defensive posture while searching for a crisis off-ramp. Inversely, in Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown), players adopted more of probing strategy using mid-range signaling (i.e., level 3 escalation magnitude) to test adversary capabilities and resolve. In Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known), only 36 percent (14) of the responses fell in this range while Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown) saw 60 percent (23). This finding implies that the balance of knowledge about AI/ML capabilities could alter escalation dynamics in the future. + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/R2zmJge.png) +_▲ Table 3: Contingency Table Escalation Magnitude_ + + +### Battle Networks + +During the second round, players found themselves confronting a series of limited strikes by a rival state. In the third round, the situation escalated to theater-wide conventional strikes to evaluate how players shifted their military strategy. In these rounds, players recommended how best to attack their rival state’s battle network in terms of the optimal layer to target: sensor, communications, processing, decision, or effects. If the balance of AI/ML capabilities affects military operations, one would expect to see targeting differences across the treatments. + +Yet,there was no statistically significant difference across the treatments in relation to battle network targeting preferences. As seen in the contingency table below, targeting preferences varied across the treatments, but not as much as expected. In treatments where AI/ML capabilities were known and balanced, players preferred to try and target the processing and decisionmaking layers in an effort to deny the other side tempo and a decisionmaking advantage. + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/9dBT491.png) +_▲ Table 4: Battle Network Targeting Preferences_ + +Player discussions drew out the logic behind the difference. When AI/ML was known, players discussed how targeting the decision layer could be a pathway to slow down a crisis and give humans a chance to respond and degrade the ability of a rival to retaliate at machine speed. At the same time, they wanted to limit targeting the processing layer. Players discussed how this layer, which consists of large data hubs, is a new form of critical infrastructure that is often co-located with energy and telecommunications infrastructure to support powering computers and distributing information. Hitting this layer could pull a rival state deeper into an escalation spiral due to concerns about civilian deaths and counter-value targeting. As a result, they discussed how best to target the decision layer, including introducing new forms of flexible deterrent and response options designed to spoof and confuse AI/ML applications that help senior leaders analyze a crisis. The goal was to gain an information advantage and use it for leverage without triggering inadvertent escalation. + +When AI/ML was unknown, participants opted to target effectors (e.g., conventional weapons) because it was assessed as the highest payoff target given uncertainty about adversary decisionmaking capabilities. In the absence of knowledge about the depth of AI/ML in a rival state’s battle network, players opted to change the correlation of forces in terms of neutralizing military capabilities capable of launching a retaliatory strike. Although players debated the use of cyber capabilities to degrade Purple State’s military capabilities, players wanted a kinetic strike because it was a visible signal, could be quickly executed, and could target a limited range of proportional targets to demonstrate resolve to the international community without significant escalation risk. This insight impliesaneed to rethink aspects of military targeting in an era almost certain to be defined by increasingly sophisticated AI/ML applications supporting crisis decisionmaking. + + +### Escalation Risks + +Despite valid concerns about AI/ML and nuclear escalation, there were no statistically significant differences between the treatments in relation to how players assessed the risk. This finding is based on comparing assessments of nuclear escalation risks for Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known) and B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown). In each round, players selected how likely their flexible response option was to trigger nuclear escalation by picking a number from 1 to 6 with the following values: (1) no risk, (2) risk of limited conventional military confrontation, (3) risk of conventional strikes to degrade nuclear enterprise, (4) risk of limited nuclear attack, (5) risk of large-scale nuclear attack against nuclear enterprise, and (6) risk of large-scale nuclear attack against civilian targets. + +In Round 2, when players had to recommend a flexible military response option to counter a rival state, there was no statistically significant difference in their risk assessment. In both games, players assessed the risk as a rival state responding with nonnuclear, limited conventional retaliatory strikes. When AI/ML capabilities were unknown, it created a unique discussion about escalation dynamics. Some players expressed concern that targeting the communication layer in a battle network could lead bad algorithms to get even worse. Absent new information, a rival state’s AI/ML models would be more prone to provide bad or at least outdated advice. + +In Round 3, when players had to respond to widespread conventional military strikes, there was also no statistically significant difference in players’ risk assessment. Across both treatments, players saw an increased risk of a retaliatory conventional strike on their nuclear enterprise. When AI/ML capabilities were known, players expressed more concern about a limited nuclear strike and how to best understand the algorithms their rival integrated across the national security enterprise at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. More than technological advantage, players assessed that the key to understanding future AI/ML escalation risks during a nuclear crisis rests in mapping how algorithms inform decisionmaking at echelon. This requirement to understand the range of AI/ML systems augmenting a national security enterprise creates entirely new intelligence requirements critical to early warning and arms control. + +There was a statistically significant difference between the treatments with respect to conventional escalation. This finding (Table 5 below) is based on comparing which military response option players opted for in Round 3 in response to widespread conventional strikes. Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known) players took a more measured response and conducted limited strikes on their rival’s military designed to manage escalation risk. During game discussions, players brought up the idea that they were signaling both the rival human leaders and their algorithms, trying to preserve the possibility of an off-ramp. Alternatively, in Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown), players took a more aggressive, decisive response but still beneath the nuclear threshold. The findings are more nuanced than what the numbers tell. During the counteraction phase, participants were united in their belief that Green and Purple States were now in a state of war. All players assessed Purple State as “hostile” and considered “crisis escalation imminent.” Since players knew crisis escalation was imminent, they struggled to find an effective response that would signal resolve and commitment to their treaty ally Orange State that would not trigger strategic escalation. Treatment B players argued that “escalating to de-escalate” would be the most viable strategy to ensure a crisis would not lead to greater hostilities. For Treatment B, unknown AI/ML capabilities meant that Green State players were aware of the existence of Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities, yet they did not understand how these systems were being integrated into their decisionmaking process. The “escalate to de-escalate” approach of the Treatment B players was designed to offset the intelligence asymmetry gap with a stronger conventional military response. This finding suggests that a priority intelligence requirement in future crises will be the depth and extent of AI/ML systems across a rival state’s national security enterprise and operational battle networks. It also suggests a possible new form of inadvertent escalation risk associated with testing a rival’s capabilities to reduce uncertainty. This finding has significant implications for thinking about the future of arms control and how to approach national intelligence requirement generation optimized for an algorithmic future. + +![image05](https://i.imgur.com/ZavCLuX.png) +_▲ Table 5: Contingency Table for Military FRO Preferences_ + + +### Policy Recommendations + +The findings from these crisis simulations point to recommendations that the United States and its network of partners and allies should consider as they build interoperable battle networks where AI/ML supports decisionmaking at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. + +__1. Embrace experimentation and an agile mindset.__ + +The national security community needs to stop worrying about Skynet, alongside other technology-related threat inflation, and start building applications that help people navigate the massive volume of information that is already overwhelming staff and decisionmakers during a crisis. There is a need for more experiments designed to calibrate how best to integrate AI/ML into national security decisionmaking that build on established efforts such as the Global Information Dominance Exercise (GIDE). These exercises connect combatant commands and test their ability to work along a seamless battle network moderated by AI/ML (i.e., human-on-the-loop) during a crisis and the transition to conflict. Each GIDE helps the larger Department of Defense think about how to support modern campaigning consistent with emerging doctrine, including the Joint Warfighting Concept and Joint Concept for Competing. + +The United States needs to expand the GIDE series and examine crisis response from an interagency and coalition perspective. These experiments should map how different executive agencies — from the Department of State to the Department of the Treasury — approach crisis management, with an eye toward enabling better decisionmaking through aggregating and analyzing data. Starting simple with a clear understanding of how each agency approaches flexible deterrent options and how these options are evaluated in the National Security Council will provide insight into where and how to best augment strategy formation and crisis response. + +__2. Engage in campaign analysis.__ + +A constant in war is the fight for information and how commanders employ reconnaissance and security operations alongside collecting intelligence to gain situational awareness, anticipate change, and seek advantage. That fight for information will take place along complex battle networks managed by AI/ML applications, creating a need for new concepts of maneuver, security, and surprise. How a state protects its battle network while degrading its rivals could well become the true decisive operation for a future campaign and an entirely new form of schwerpunkt. + +The Department of Defense needs to expand modern campaign analysis to explore how to fight a network. These studies should combine historical campaign insights with wargames, modeling, and strategic analysis, with an eye toward balancing military advantage with escalation dynamics. The studies should evaluate existing processes such as joint planning and joint targeting methodologies to see if they are still viable in campaigns characterized by competing battle networks. It is highly likely that the net result will be new processes and methods that both accelerate tempo and keep a careful eye on escalation risks. + +__3. From open skies to open algorithms, start a broader dialogue about twenty-first-century arms control.__ + +Finally, there is a need to start thinking about what arms control looks like in the AI era. Managing weapons inventory may prove less valuable to the future of deterrence than establishing norms, regimes, and treaties governing military actions that target the decision and processing layers of modern battle networks in rival nuclear states. + +In a crisis where software at echelon is searching for efficiencies to accelerate decisionmaking, there is a risk that senior leaders find themselves pulled into escalation traps. This pull could be accelerated by attacks on key systems associated with early warning and intelligence. The sooner states work together to map the risks and build in commonly understood guardrails, the lower the probability of inadvertent or accidental escalation between nuclear rivals. These efforts should include Track 2 and Track 3 tabletop exercises and dialogues that inform how rival states approach crisis management. For example, it would be better to have officials from the United States and China discuss how multi-domain strike networks and automation affect escalation dynamics before a crisis in the Taiwan Strait rather than after. + + +### Conclusion + +Since the use of AI/ML capabilities in national security is almost certain to increase in the coming years, there needs to be a larger debate about if and how any information technology augments strategic and military decisionmaking. The stakes are too high to walk blindly into the future. + +As a result, the national security community needs to accelerate its experimentation with how to integrate AI/ML into modern battle networks, with an eye toward better understanding crisis decisionmaking, campaigning, and arms control. It is not enough to optimize joint targeting and how fast the military can sense, make sense, and gain an advantage. The new world will require rethinking military staff organizations little changed since Napoleon and legacy national security bureaucratic design and planning processes. It will require thinking about how best to support human decisionmaking given a flood of information still subject to uncertainty, fog, and friction. + +Despite the findings here that AI/ML is as likely to play a stabilizing role as it is a destabilizing role, there is a still a risk that the world’s nuclear states inadvertently code their way to Armageddon. As a result, it is important to challenge the findings and acknowledge the limitations of the study. First, the observations are still limited and could be subject to confounding effects caused by age, gender, and each player’s type of national security experience. Future efforts should increase the full range of participants. Second, the results need more observations to analyze not just the balance of known versus unknown AI/ML capabilities, but also if risk perception and escalation change based on a larger number of treatments addressing different AI/ML levels (e.g., “no AI/ML capability,” “more AI/ML capability,” etc.). Last, experts tend to get things wrong and may not see change. Future research should open the experiment up to a wider range of participants and compare how perceptions in the general public compare to those of experts. In the ideal case, these games would also involve more non-U.S. players. + +--- + +__Benjamin Jensen__ is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting in the Marine Corps University. + +__Yasir Atalan__ is an associate data fellow in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a PhD candidate at American University. + +__Jose M. Macias III__ is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.