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【香港保衛戰當年今日・十八】

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diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index 8b3a0c6d..21f8ca6b 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-01-06T10:34:38+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.36 © MMXXIV黎智英《蘋果日報》案開審2023-12-18T12:00:00+08:002023-12-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/trial-for-jimmy-lai-case-of-apple-daily-started<h4 id="黎智英案開審-市民捱冷通宵排隊-過百警員法院外佈防">黎智英案開審 市民捱冷通宵排隊 過百警員法院外佈防</h4> +Jekyll2024-01-08T20:18:57+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.36 © MMXXIV黎智英《蘋果日報》案開審2023-12-18T12:00:00+08:002023-12-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/trial-for-jimmy-lai-case-of-apple-daily-started<h4 id="黎智英案開審-市民捱冷通宵排隊-過百警員法院外佈防">黎智英案開審 市民捱冷通宵排隊 過百警員法院外佈防</h4> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index c84f1ac6..283f069c 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-01-06T10:34:38+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.36 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-01-08T20:18:57+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.36 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index 12da1828..3274b9de 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-01-06T10:34:38+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.36 © MMXXIV西兰公国2023-10-18T12:00:00+08:002023-10-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/BrentShen-a1_l-the-principality-of-sealand<p>西兰公国(Sealand),是世界上最早建立的微国家(Micronation)。</p> +Jekyll2024-01-08T20:18:57+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.36 © MMXXIV西兰公国2023-10-18T12:00:00+08:002023-10-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/BrentShen-a1_l-the-principality-of-sealand<p>西兰公国(Sealand),是世界上最早建立的微国家(Micronation)。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index 0bb0a89e..5e1b5e4e 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,8648 +1,7729 @@ -Jekyll2024-01-06T10:34:38+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.36 © MMXXIVUkraine Can, But…2023-12-27T12:00:00+08:002023-12-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraine-can-but<p><em>By finally delivering on their promises, Kyiv’s European allies will find the benefits extend to them, too.</em></p> +Jekyll2024-01-08T20:18:57+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.36 © MMXXIV【黎智英案・審訊第六日】2024-01-04T12:00:00+08:002024-01-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-6<ul> + <li>控方:黎智英受訪稱不會離開 留港直至最後一日 被捕後稱「坐監都揀呢條路」</li> + <li>控方:黎智英倡「支爆」 經中間人指示李宇軒及「攬炒巴」國際游說促制裁中港</li> +</ul> <excerpt /> -<p>Here is one fact that sums up the gap between the promises that Kyiv’s European partners have made to Ukraine and the reality. In March 2023, the EU made the historic decision to deliver a million artillery shells to Ukraine within 12 months. But the number that has actually been sent is closer to 300,000. For all the rhetorical commitments to support Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s invasion “for as long as it takes”, Europe has largely failed.</p> - -<p>The price of this complacency is already being paid in Ukrainian blood. According to the armed forces of Ukraine, over the summer of 2023, Ukraine was firing up to 7,000 artillery shells a day and managed to degrade Russia’s logistics and artillery to the point where Russia was firing about 5,000 rounds a day. Today, the Ukrainians are struggling to fire 2,000 rounds daily, while Russian artillery is reaching about 10,000. Artillery isn’t everything, but the disparity speaks to Ukraine’s relative shortage of materiel, evident in other areas such as the number of drones it can field.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rKNgM5y.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Russia is likely to be able to fire about 5m rounds at Ukraine in 2024, based on its mobilised defence production, supply from Iran and North Korea, and remaining stocks. Despite the flippant observation – often made by European officials – that Russia’s economy is the same size as that of Italy, the Kremlin is producing more shells than all of Nato. Meanwhile, Ukraine is unlikely to see any significant increase in supply for some months. This will cede the initiative to the Russians. The Kremlin believes it can win by 2026, and so Putin is in no mood to negotiate or back down.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(4日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第6日審訊。控方繼續開案陳詞,指國安法生效後,黎智英持續在專欄撰文及在 Twitter 發文,稱推行國安法會導致中國被國際圍堵,又表態支持美國推行《香港避風港法案》和《香港人自由和選擇法》。黎接受外媒採訪時稱:「我將會留在這裡直至最後一日⋯⋯直至我不能再留或我們陣營的人全部被捕或離去。」如果他離開會令自己蒙羞,也會令《蘋果日報》名譽受損。黎於2020年8月10日被拘捕,他獲釋後,《蘋果日報》隨即以頭版報導黎智英稱:「坐監都揀呢條路。」</p> -<p>It does not have to be like this. Earlier this month, the Estonian Ministry of Defence published a white paper detailing the levels of military equipment required to make Ukraine’s defence sustainable and for it to pursue the liberation of the occupied territories by 2025. The Estonians costed the requirements, showing they were well within the bounds of possibility. The issue is not money, but competence in delivery. If the steps to implement these measures are not taken, Ukraine will lose.</p> +<h4 id="控方國安法生效後-黎智英續撰文提制裁">控方:國安法生效後 黎智英續撰文提制裁</h4> -<p>Ensuring Russia’s defeat in Ukraine is feasible, but it requires some important steps. First, Ukraine will need a steady supply of weapons to be able to blunt Russian attacks over the first half of 2024. This will require plenty of US support, but also increasing supply from European Nato members, whose backing will be critical as the US election looms in November. Many of the munitions provided since the beginning of the war were purchased from the international market or drawn from stockpiles, and investment in European production has been slow. But as stocks run out, sustaining Ukraine’s war effort depends critically on increasing Europe’s manufacturing capacity.</p> +<p>控方繼續開案陳詞,指《國安法》生效之後,黎智英持續利用《蘋果日報》作為平台發布煽動文章,美化及鼓吹示威者的違法行為,又請求外國勢力向中港官員實施制裁。在2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日期間,《蘋果》發布了合共85篇煽動刊物,其中31篇含有請求外國勢力向中港官員實施制裁、封鎖或其他敵對措施的內容。</p> -<p>Second, it is essential that Ukraine corrects the mistakes that led to its failed counteroffensive in 2023. Improving the training of its troops must be the top priority. During the second world war, British forces considered 22 weeks of infantry training the minimum before a soldier was ready to join a unit, where they would then carry out collective training as part of a battalion. Ukrainian troops are lucky to get five weeks of training, while collective training is rarely carried out above the scale of the company. European Nato must expand and extend the training support provided in order to give Ukrainian units a wider tactical repertoire, and more importantly expand the scale at which the army can command and synchronise operations.</p> +<p>其中黎智英在專欄「成敗樂一笑」所撰寫的文章,涉及請求外國制裁的內容,包括:</p> -<p>Persistent inflation and economic shocks, like the disruption to global shipping from Houthi missile attacks in the Bab al-Mandab, mean that among European countries, making a long-term economic commitment to Ukraine will be a domestic political challenge. But that is to ignore its potential upsides. Investment in defence production, rather than relying on purchases from abroad, comes with significant levels of domestic industrial investment and with the potential for expenditure to be recovered through increased tax receipts.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>《有種回力鏢……自插心臟》(2020年7月26日):黎稱國安法生效後,會損害中國經濟及引來國際圍堵。黎又指美國會有強烈反制措施,以及制裁和懲罰。</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>《繼續打壓香港 還是以身報國?》(2020年9月27日):黎形容國安法是中央殘暴和惡毒的手段去打壓香港人追求民主自由</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>《台灣也要感謝黨》(2020年10月11日):黎稱若日本、澳洲和西方國家向中國實施科技禁運及制裁,中國的經濟和科技發展將會停滯,而台灣能獲得好處,又指國家領導人習近平是自大及獨裁</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>《天下圍中 拜登騎虎難下》(2020年11月29日):黎呼籲拜登政府不要採取「多邊主義」外交手段,若果拜登政府不繼續上一任總統特朗普的「對中國不妥協」政策,台灣的形勢將會惡化</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>There are good security reasons to invest in domestic production, too. A failure to do so now could leave European leaders needing to deter a fully mobilised Russia without stockpiles or the capacity to replenish them. Meanwhile, a simultaneous escalation in the Indo-Pacific in 2025 could cause the US to shift a range of critical military capabilities – aerial refuelling, logistics, air defences – to deter China, leaving Europe significantly exposed.</p> +<h4 id="控方黎被捕獲釋後-蘋果頭版報導坐監都揀呢條路">控方:黎被捕獲釋後 蘋果頭版報導「坐監都揀呢條路」</h4> -<p>For Ukraine, the immediate future is one of several months of hard fighting without critical resources, while endeavouring to regenerate the combat power that was expended over 2023. But Europe can determine what the second half of 2024 and indeed 2025 will look like. This is a war that can be won. The recent successful strike on the Russian landing ship Novocherkassk in harbour, protected by layers of Russian defences, shows how Ukraine can make effective use of the equipment that it is supplied with. But European security must not be squandered by more complacency.</p> +<p>黎智英於2020年8月10日被警方國安處拘捕,其後獲得警方擔保。8月13日,《蘋果日報》頭版報導黎智英稱:「坐監都揀呢條路」,並引述黎稱:「將來瞓喺監獄,whatever,我都係會揀呢條路。」報章另發布報導引述黎稱「手銬都不能侮辱我」。</p> -<hr /> +<p>控方提到,黎於2020年12月還柙後,來監獄探訪的人包括張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、馮偉光、張志偉。《蘋果日報》仍繼續運作,而黎則繼續給予指示。</p> -<p><strong>Jack Watling</strong> is a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).</p>Jack WatlingBy finally delivering on their promises, Kyiv’s European allies will find the benefits extend to them, too.【黎智英案・審訊第三日】2023-12-22T12:00:00+08:002023-12-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-3<ul> - <li>官裁煽動刊物罪非逾時檢控 去信法庭「提出告發」未等黎智英上庭 已屬啟動程序</li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MRpnfLP.png" alt="image02" /></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>控方又提到,楊清奇負責聯絡《蘋果》不同專欄作者,包括李怡,亦曾安排區家麟撰稿,而區的文章亦構成部份煽動內容。黎亦曾介紹日本籍的作者替《蘋果》撰文。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MU9Mlh9.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<h4 id="黎受訪稱不會離開-否則令自己蒙羞">黎受訪稱「不會離開」 否則令自己蒙羞</h4> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(22日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第3日審訊。就辯方所提出的串謀煽動刊物罪逾時檢控爭議,3名《國安法》指定法官作出裁決,指法庭在檢控期限屆滿10日之前收到控方通知擬加控罪,所以認為不存在逾時檢控的情況,因此駁回辯方申請,換言之控方就煽動刊物罪的檢控仍然有效。案件押後至明年1月2日續審,屆時黎將庭上答辯,之後控方將讀出開案陳詞。押後期間黎繼續還柙。</p> +<p>控方指,黎智英在2020年7月1日接受《霍士新聞》(Fox News)訪問,提到香港或不再是金融中心(financial hub),當中譴責《國安法》和中共,又指會在香港留到最後一刻。庭上播放片段,黎提到《國安法》內文比最壞的想像更差,港人之間溝通要變得非常小心,又批評《國安法》凌駕立法會、取代法治和《基本法》,令做生意的人無法受到保障,難以維持香港的金融地位。被問到是否害怕被捕,黎指「我不擔心,因為我不能擔心,如果我擔心就不能做或講任何事情」。</p> -<p>76歲的黎智英由3名懲教人員帶往被告欄應訊,近日氣溫降至只有10度或以下,黎亦穿上深藍色厚褸,並戴上灰色頸巾。他透過耳機聽取判決時表現平靜。</p> +<p>至於會否離港,他則堅決表示不會:「我將會留在這裡直至最後一日(“I’m going to stay until the last day.”)⋯⋯直至我不能再留或我們陣營的人全部被捕或離去。不,我不能離開,如果我離開,我令自己蒙羞,我令《蘋果日報》名譽受損,我也損害民主運動的團結。(“Until I can’t stay or everybody in our camp is either arrested or gone. I can’t go away, if I go away, I disgrace myself, I discredit Apple Daily, I also undermine the solidarity of the democratic movement.”)」被問到他曾被捕數次,所涉罪名或能判終身監禁,黎指他不知道將會發生什麼,「但當政府不尊重法律,你不會知道紅線在哪。」</p> -<h4 id="黎智英稱煽動刊物控罪逾時檢控期限應由串謀首天起計帶上法庭加控才算啟動檢控">黎智英稱煽動刊物控罪逾時檢控:期限應由串謀首天起計、帶上法庭加控才算啟動檢控</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QVW9KWK.png" alt="image03" /></p> -<p>黎智英尚未正式就各項控罪答辯,在審訊首天,控辯雙方先處理法律爭議。黎的法律代表、資深大律師彭耀鴻指「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪逾時檢控,法庭無權處理。3名《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰及李素蘭頒下書面裁決,駁回辯方申請。</p> +<p>播放片段期間,黎智英專注望向前方螢幕,一度輕輕搖頭。</p> -<p>據判詞,黎智英在2021年12月13日被控3項罪名,包括兩項《國安法》控罪及一項串謀妨礙司法公正罪。控方在同日去信西九法院,表示有意申請新增「煽動刊物」控罪,而西九法院裁判官翌日收悉信件及相關文件,副本亦送達黎的法律代表。至12月28日的提訊日,控方申請加控,而黎的代表律師並未有提出反對。</p> +<h4 id="控方黎twitter發文支持美推行法案及制裁-獲特朗普讚勇敢受寵若驚">控方:黎Twitter發文支持美推行法案及制裁 獲特朗普讚勇敢受寵若驚</h4> -<p>辯方指檢控期限應由串謀犯罪首日起計算6個月,即2019年10月1日便屆滿;即使辯方接受檢控期限由串謀犯罪的最後一天起計6個月,控方也需要在2021年12月24日或之前提出檢控,可是黎智英在12月28日才被帶上法庭加控,超出了期限4日。</p> +<p>控方亦展示多則 Twitter 帖文。2020年7月15日,黎智英轉載美國駐港澳領事館關於民主派初選的聲明,黎標註(Tag)時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧及美國駐港澳領事館的 Twitter,感謝他們對香港人的支持,又稱國際間發聲及採取行動防範中共打壓自由,是前所未有的重要。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tNrNm97.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻(左)、大律師 Marc Corlett(右)</p> +<p>2020年7月17日,黎智英在 Twitter 發文指《香港避風港法案》(Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act)和《香港人自由和選擇法》(Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act)是逆權運動的重要資源,向所有前美國政府及國務院職員致敬。</p> -<p>控方則稱「串謀」屬持續的罪行,被告在2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》結束營運期間,持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物,可視為同一犯罪計劃,檢控期限應由「串謀」結束當天、而非被告首次犯法起計。此外,控方稱他們於2021年12月13日向法庭表示有意加控,已屬「開始」檢控,故控方檢控並無逾時。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“#HongKong #SafeHarborAct and #PeoplesFreedomandChoiceAct are good wherewithals to our resistance movement. Salute all former CGs and State Dept staff for caring about this place we call home.” — 黎智英 Twitter</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="判決檢控期限應由最後一日起計算">判決:檢控期限應由最後一日起計算</h4> +<p>2020年7月23日,黎智英 Twitter 發文指年輕人是爭取自由運動的中流砥柱,但他們危在旦夕,而英國推行BNO簽證新政策作為香港人的「救生艇」。</p> -<p>判決指,不接受辯方稱檢控期限由首天串謀起計,因為控方現時指控黎不只一次串謀犯罪,與一次性的串謀罪行並不相同,所以被告完成首天串謀犯罪之後,串謀協議仍然存在(still be very much alive),直至串謀完結當天,控罪並不會「過時」(stale)。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“This is urgent and necessary. Our young people are the backbone of our freedom movement. They’re in the most danger. U.K. launches lifeboat for Hongkongers with focus on younger generation with new BN(O) visa.” — 黎智英 Twitter</p> +</blockquote> -<p>判決指,只要控方有足夠證據證明有一個串謀協議貫穿整個控罪時段,那麼檢控期限便應由串謀的最後一天才開始計算,不會對被告帶來不公。就本案而言,法官裁定檢控期限應由2021年6月24日起計6個月,因此於2021年12月24日才屆滿。</p> +<p>同日黎智英再發文,指美國應對尋求庇護的香港年輕人寬大,因他們為了爭取自由失去很多(“The US should be lenient for young #HKers seeking asylum. They suffered a lot fighting for #HongKong’s freedom.”),並轉載《蘋果》英文新聞,標題指《國安法》生效後,辦理移民美國的律師稱有關政治庇護的查詢驟增。(“Political asylum inquiries surge after national security law: US immigration lawyer”)</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gRtGNy8.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 2021年6月24日,《蘋果日報》發刊最後一份報章。</p> +<p>2020年8月21日,黎智英 Twitter 引述《蘋果》報導指時任美國總統特朗普稱呼黎作勇敢的人,他感到受寵若驚,但他還未夠勇敢去對抗習近平,他只是為香港和台灣站出來。</p> -<h4 id="官條文引入提出檢控是為統一字眼-原意非改變條文內容">官:條文引入「提出」檢控是為統一字眼 原意非改變條文內容</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>“President @realDonaldTrump calls me a brave man. I am flattered. But I am not brave enough to stand against the whole world like #Xi. I only #StandWithHongKong #StandwithTaiwan” — 黎智英 Twitter</p> +</blockquote> -<p>《刑事罪行》條例第11(1)條規定,煽動控罪的檢控,「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行。」第11(2)條亦規定,未經律政司司長書面同意,不得就煽動控罪提出檢控。沒有爭議條文目的是要確保相關檢控及時,而不會起訴「過時」的罪行。上述兩項條文首次寫進煽動罪條例以及生效是1938年9月2日。至1972年12月31日,煽動罪條例合併入《刑事罪行條例》,經修訂後成為第11(1)及(2)條,而「提出檢控」中的「提出(instituted)」此時首次出現。</p> +<p>2020年9月17日,黎智英 Twitter 稱,當美國等聯合一起實施制裁,中共同伙便會無處躲避,他們的資產亦無處可藏,並需為迫害香港人而承受後果。</p> -<p>判決指,從上述過程可以推論,立法機關之所以在《刑事罪行條例》中引入「提出(instituted)」一詞,原意是對於所有需要首席檢察官(Attorney General)同意而檢控的罪行統一用字,而不是有意改變條文內容。直至1997年香港主權移交,條文中的「首席檢察官」修訂為「律政司司長」,除此之外便沒有任何其他修訂。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“When America and the rest of the free world are aligned and put in place the sanctions, CCP’s accomplices have nowhere to turn, and their assets have nowhere to hide. Their evil deeds persecuting of HKers will have consequences.” — 黎智英 Twitter</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="官當控方提出告發檢控程序便算開始">官:當控方「提出告發」檢控程序便算開始</h4> +<p>2020年12月1日,黎轉載《蘋果》英文新聞指林鄭因被美國制裁而家中堆放大量現金,黎稱拜登政府應令協助中共的人付上責任,制裁措施可挫他們的士氣,即使只為他們帶來少許不便,也是有效用。</p> -<p>判決指,沒有爭議「煽動罪」是可公訴的罪行(indictable offence),受《裁判官條例》第三部管轄,考慮《裁判官條例》第8及27條有關「申訴」或「告發」的字眼,法官認為不論在公訴程序或簡易程序中,當控方「提出告發(laying of an information)」,檢控程序便算是開始,而毋須等到被告人出庭應訊或帶上法庭才算開始。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“Biden administration should know that by making those abetting CCP repression personally accountable the measures can frustrate their morale of evil doing, thus will be effective even the measures may seem inconveniences in small ways.” — 黎智英 Twitter</p> +</blockquote> -<p>根據《裁判官條例》第2條的定義,「告發(information)」意思包括「控告」。而第75(1)條規定「任何指稱有人犯了可公訴罪行的申訴或告發,均須以書面提出,並須載有或包含有指稱已犯罪行的陳述,以及為提供有關該項罪行性質的合理資料的所需詳情。」</p> +<p>審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。</p> -<p>就本案而言,法官認為西九法院裁判官在2021年12月14日收妥控方的信件、控罪詳情及相關文件後,毫無疑問地已充份地構成「提出告發」,符合第75(1)條的要求。而控方一旦提出了告發,便毋須做額外功夫,檢控程序已算是啟動。(“The information once so laid, no more was required of the prosecutor and the prosecution had ‘begun’.”)</p> +<p>黎智英的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師 Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。</p> -<p>當控方提出告發後,裁判官可以發出拘捕令把被告人帶上法庭,或簽發傳票要求被告人自行到庭應訊,不論是哪一種的上庭方式,它們只是為了被告能被帶到裁判官席前的程序,是法庭的事務,與控方無關。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mI8apHw.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻(右)、大律師 Marc Corlett(左)</p> -<p>判決指,雖然《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)及(2)條分別使用「開始(begun)」及「提出(instituted)」,字眼不同,但是兩者均指向相同的東西。判決又提到,兩項條文目的是保障被告人,若果立法機關有意賦予兩詞不同意思,理應提供兩詞各自的釋義。</p> +<p>控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。</p> -<h4 id="倘被告留院或不在港-致未能及時檢控-法官不接受辯方稱不應受審">倘被告留院或不在港 致未能及時檢控 法官不接受辯方稱不應受審</h4> +<p>同案8名被告:前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華,早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,現正還柙,等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。</p> -<p>判決又指,辯方堅稱只有當被告人上庭應訊及面對控罪時,檢控程序才算啟動,會導致令人驚訝(surprising)的結果。法官曾在庭上問及,若然被告人留院、不在香港或潛逃,以致未能趕及在檢控期限之內上庭應訊呢?辯方則回答在如此情況下,被告人便不應就控罪受審,因他未能在檢控期限屆滿之前上庭。法官表示不接受辯方說法,因這不是立法原意。</p> +<p>首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指,黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司,於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日(包括首尾兩日),在香港與其他人一同串謀,請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/D33tRay.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 黎智英</p> +<p>另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間,與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀,請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員,實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。</p> -<p>判決指,第11(1)及(2)條處理檢控程序的不同範疇,第11(2)條從控方角度出發,即提出告發者,並聚焦檢控須經律政司司長同意,以免濫用程序;第11(1)條則從法庭作為接收告發者的角度出發,以確保控方乃及時檢控。</p> +<p>「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指,黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日(包括首尾兩日),在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物,具意圖:</p> -<p>總括而言,法官認為西九法庭於2021年12月14日,即檢控期限10日之前,已收妥控方通知及有關煽動控罪的資料,故此檢控並沒有超出期限,遂駁回辯方的申請。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛</p> +</blockquote> -<p>被告為:黎智英(76歲)、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項</p> +</blockquote> -<p>審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛</p> +</blockquote> -<p>黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛</p> +</blockquote> -<p>控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>e) 煽惑他人使用暴力</p> +</blockquote> -<p>同案8名被告:前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華,早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,現正還柙,等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。</p> +</blockquote> -<hr /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/o2QDsJn.png" alt="image05" /></p> -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導官裁煽動刊物罪非逾時檢控 去信法庭「提出告發」未等黎智英上庭 已屬啟動程序【黎智英案・審訊第二日】2023-12-19T12:00:00+08:002023-12-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-2<ul> - <li>控方指黎智英持續串謀、無逾時檢控 官周五頒判決</li> -</ul> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(4日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第6日審訊。控方續開案陳詞,就涉及李宇軒、陳梓華和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人的「串謀勾結外國勢力」控罪,控方指黎智英為主腦和金主,透過陳梓華作為「中間人」,向李宇軒和劉祖廸傳達指示,以「重光團隊(SWHK)」作平台,請求外國對中港實施制裁或敵對行動。當中黎智英曾在台灣向陳梓華和劉祖廸等人解釋其「支爆」計劃,並提出進行國際游說,令港府同意其議程、甚至推翻中共,李宇軒等人負責執行。而落實策略包括全球登報和眾籌;以「美國線」、「英國線」和「日本線」與當地政治人物接觸和聯繫,游說制裁中港;及發布制裁名單等。其中黎曾為全球登報墊支約500萬港元,並資助外國政治人物來港監察區選。</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="控方陳梓華經李柱銘認識黎智英助手指示李宇軒加入攬炒團隊">控方:陳梓華經李柱銘認識黎智英助手、指示李宇軒加入「攬炒團隊」</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eOV0D6a.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>控方今續讀出就黎智英與李宇軒等人,串謀勾結外國勢力罪行的開案陳詞。控方指稱,黎智英與李宇軒、陳梓華、Mark Simon、劉祖廸,及英國保守黨人權委員會委員裴倫德(Luke de Pulford)、日本眾議院議員菅野志櫻里、及英國金融家比爾布勞德(Bill Browder),串謀請求英、美、日及歐洲等國,對中港政府實施制裁或採取敵對行動,包括停止與香港的司法互助及或引渡協議、向香港停售武器、限制中港貿易,並以「重光團隊(Stand with Hong Kong Fight for Freedom,簡稱 SWHK)」作平台促進串謀。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,踏入審訊第2天。黎智英一方昨爭議控方加控煽動罪屬逾時檢控,法庭無權處理,辯方今補充指,煽動罪設6個月的檢控時限是平衡公眾利益,以盡快制止煽動刊物發布,強調控方應及時檢控。控方則指,串謀屬持續的罪行,被告在案發兩年間持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物,可視為同一犯罪計劃,檢控期限應由串謀結束當天、而非被告首次犯法起計;而控方向法庭表示有意加控已屬「開始」檢控,故控方檢控並無逾時。法官聽畢陳詞後,押至本周五就法律爭議頒下裁決,料控方同日將不會讀出開案陳詞。</p> +<p>控方指,2019年6月反修例運動期間,陳梓華在 Telegram 群組「G20」得悉有示威者欲尋求黎智英資助進行「全球登報」,以尋求外國對中港政府施壓。陳其後嘗試透過李柱銘接觸黎智英,並獲介紹認識黎的助手 Mark Simon,Simon 轉告黎支持計劃,願預留500萬港元作廣告開支,事後需還款。</p> -<p>身穿淺藍色恤衫、灰色西裝褸的黎智英,今步入法庭時向旁聽席微笑揮手和點頭,其妻子和兩名子女也有到庭,女兒向黎飛吻,黎亦微笑回以飛吻。有旁聽人士高呼「撐住!頂住!」,司法機構職員及保安人員立即阻止稱:「保持安靜!」</p> +<p>陳梓華遂聯絡群組成員之一的李宇軒,表示自己是黎智英的「中間人」,並要求李在G20峰會時組織全球登報,促使外國向港府施壓;陳並於2019年7月指示李加入「攬炒團隊」為核心成員,李和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸其後負責團隊運作,並透過陳接收黎智英和 Mark Simon 的指示。</p> -<p>辯方昨爭議,控方前年加控黎智英串謀刊印煽動刊物罪時,已超出煽動罪6個月的檢控時限,法庭無司法管轄權審理;亦認為就《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條列明煽動罪檢控「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行」,當中「開始(begun)」一詞是立法時特意選用,只有在控方把被告帶上法庭加控才算「開始」進行檢控,而控方於2021年12月13日去信通知法庭有意加控,並不算「開始」檢控,控方仍然超出檢控時限。</p> +<p>2019年7月,陳梓華首次與黎智英會面,同場還有李柱銘,飯局上黎智英指示陳透過 Mark Simon 接觸他,又着陳向激進示威者轉達訊息,指他們應採用較溫和的手段以爭取國際支持。同年8月,李宇軒和劉祖廸等人成立「重光團隊(SWHK)」,目的是請求外國制裁中港政府和介入警暴。</p> -<h4 id="辯方檢控時限為確保盡快制止煽動作為平衡公眾利益-無對控方不公">辯方:檢控時限為確保盡快制止煽動作為、平衡公眾利益 無對控方不公</h4> +<h4 id="控方黎智英為主腦金主-陳梓華為中間人-李宇軒執行指示">控方:黎智英為主腦、金主 陳梓華為中間人 李宇軒執行指示</h4> -<p>代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻今重申,控方單單去信法庭「提出告發(laying any information)」並不算是「開始」檢控,解釋煽動條例立法時確保需保障基本權利,因此設有嚴格的6個月檢控時限,亦列明須律政司司長的同意才能提出檢控。</p> +<p>就各人角色,控方指黎智英為主腦和金主,負責「最高指揮」;Mark Simon 是黎的代理人,直接向黎匯報和負責執行其指示,及審理財政援助的申請,黎本人會批核大額財政,Mark Simon 則負責較低金額。</p> -<p>彭亦認為,檢控時限無對控方造成不公,指當有人發布煽動刊物,為了公眾利益,應盡快檢控來制止刊物發布,並讓公眾知悉哪些刊物不應發布;而若控方認為煽動罪不足以反映刑責,望以串謀罪檢控,亦可於6個月的時限內進行。彭強調,控方應及時檢控,不能什麼也不做,等到數年後才因時限已過、無法以煽動罪檢控,而改用串謀罪檢控;又指檢控時限雖或令一些人逃過法網,但相關「不公」是條文所固有,立法者制定時已平衡公眾利益。</p> +<p>至於陳梓華是中間人,直接從黎智英或透過 Mark Simon 接收黎的指示,再傳達予李宇軒和劉祖廸,並與外媒聯絡放置廣告;李和劉則為團隊對外核心成員,按黎智英或 Mark Simon 經陳梓華的指示,指揮其他團隊成員,李並曾在眾籌前預付登報的費用。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FtSrYyr.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻(中)、大律師 Marc Corlett(右)</p> +<p>而 SWHK 則自2019年8月起被用作平台實施串謀,透過社交媒體上的政治宣傳、發布文章、與外國政治人物或社運人士聯繫,請求外國對中港實施制裁、封鎖或其他敵對行為。</p> -<p>代表3間《蘋果日報》相關公司的大律師王國豪,採納彭的陳詞,同意3間公司被帶上法庭加控才算「開始」檢控,並補充3間公司於2022年2月10日才被正式加控串謀發布煽動刊物罪,比黎智英遲兩個月。</p> +<h4 id="控方黎在台與攬炒巴等會面談支爆-促制裁甚至推翻中共">控方:黎在台與「攬炒巴」等會面談「支爆」 促制裁甚至推翻中共</h4> -<h4 id="控方被告持續串謀分開檢控屬荒謬">控方:被告持續串謀、分開檢控屬「荒謬」</h4> +<p>控方續指,2020年1月,黎智英指示 Mark Simon 安排與陳梓華、劉祖廸和一名林姓女示威者在其台灣陽明山寓所會面,會上黎解釋其「支爆」計劃,即透過造成中國行政及經濟動盪令中國政府倒台,並解釋國際游說的4個階段:</p> -<p>就辯方主張檢控時限應由被告首次完成犯罪、即2019年4月1日發布首篇煽動刊物起計算,副刑事檢控專員周天行回應,串謀是持續的罪行(continuing offence),而本案串謀協議歷時多於兩年,被告並非僅在案發首天發布一篇煽動刊物,而是於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》結束營運期間,持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物,因此檢控時限應由串謀最後一天、即6月24日起計算。而本案所涉行為性質相似、互相關聯,故可被視為同一個犯罪計劃(criminal enterprise)。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>(i)令外國知悉香港發生什麼事;</p> +</blockquote> -<p>周又指,即使只是發布一篇煽動刊物,但若能持續被公眾瀏覽,串謀時期亦應由刊物首次出現至其下架為止;並認為辯方稱應分開檢控每項串謀行為的說法荒謬,直言會令案件變得支離破碎(fragmented),無法反映整體罪行的嚴重性。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>(ii)呼籲外國政府關注和譴責港府;</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="控方法庭收到提控已屬開始檢控若須親帶上庭令控罪難實行">控方:法庭收到提控已屬「開始」檢控、若須親帶上庭令控罪難實行</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>(iii)會見外國官員並將他們想法帶回香港;</p> +</blockquote> -<p>而對辯方爭議將黎智英帶上法庭加控才算「開始」進行檢控,周天行則認為法庭收到有關控罪的告發(laying information),即控方於12月13日去信法庭指有意加控,已算是「開始」檢控,解釋《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條中的「開始」,與《裁判官條例》第26條的「提出告發」,用字不同但意思一樣。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>(iv)會見外國政治顧問,以影響其政府對華政策,促使對香港及中國實施制裁,令港府同意其議程,甚至推翻中共。</p> +</blockquote> -<p>根據《裁判官條例》第26條,無規定時效的罪行須於6個月內「作出申訴或提出告發」。惟法官李運騰指,《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條正規定了煽動罪的檢控時限,因此第26條不適用;又指制訂第11(1)條時,第26條已存在,若兩項條文效果一樣,為何還有需要制訂第11(1)條?又指控方詮釋會令第11(1)條變得多餘。周天行同意兩條法例字眼不一,但認為只是字眼上的改變,實際意思是一樣;並指若須將被告帶上法庭才算「開始」檢控,會令控罪難以實行(impracticable),因被告或潛逃和無法聯絡。</p> +<p>何俊仁和李永達其後亦加入該會面。此外,黎智英亦安排陳梓華、李宇軒和女示威者在台灣會見施明德,讓施分享抗爭的經驗。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VBtF4VI.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行(左)、高級檢控官 陳穎琛(右)</p> +<p>控方指,各人其後討論如何執行黎的「支爆」計劃,當中陳梓華負責聯絡抗爭相關人士,李宇軒繼續國際游說及建立國際網絡,劉祖廸扮演精神領袖宣揚「攬炒」。至2020年5月,Mark Simon 與陳梓華會面重申4階段國際游說;黎智英於同年6月與陳會面,指示他繼續進行國際游說,又邀請陳到壹傳媒大樓會面,強調《蘋果日報》英文版的重要性。</p> -<h4 id="周五頒判決-料不會同日讀出開案陳詞">周五頒判決 料不會同日讀出開案陳詞</h4> +<h4 id="控方李宇軒被捕後-mark-simon曾稱運作不受影響">控方:李宇軒被捕後 Mark Simon曾稱運作不受影響</h4> -<p>彭耀鴻回應時重申,《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條比《裁判官條例》第26條較遲制訂,若「開始」檢控等同「提出告發」,則會令《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條變得毫無用處,故兩者必然有分別。彭亦重申檢控時限應由被告首次犯罪起計。</p> +<p>控方並指,《國安法》生效後,陳梓華和 Mark Simon 繼續保持聯絡,而李宇軒於2020年8月被捕後,Simon 告知陳梓華 SWHK 的運作不會受影響,因他們有 Plan B,就是讓劉祖廸到美國演講宣揚「攬炒」理念,並繼續要求美國制裁中港政府。同年10月,陳梓華被以「協助罪犯罪」被捕並獲保釋,Simon 仍鼓勵他繼續國際游說,又稱會向他提供協助,包括安排他到美國。</p> -<p>雙方陳詞完畢,法官杜麗冰表示需時考慮,將於周五(22日)頒下裁決,並認為不會在當天讀出開案陳詞。法官李運騰亦補充,控方開案陳詞或受裁決結果影響,不方便於當天開始讀出。</p> +<h4 id="控方黎智英指示李宇軒3次全球登報墊支約510萬">控方:黎智英指示李宇軒3次全球登報、墊支約510萬</h4> -<p>黎智英於中午1時由俗稱「鐵甲威龍」的囚車送走,警方電單車及私家車護送囚車離開,現場亦有反恐特勤隊警員持槍戒備。</p> +<p>控方續指,黎智英等人採取不同策略勾結外國勢力,包括全球登報和眾籌、建立國際網絡、及發布文章、新聞稿和制裁報告等。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l9HmHiF.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 黎智英的囚車駛離法院,多名警員戒備。</p> +<p>就全球登報及眾籌,控方指,李宇軒在黎智英及 Mark Simon 經陳梓華指示下,於2019年6、7、8月分別組織3次全球登報,在美、加、英、日及台等多地報章刊登文章,呼籲譴責中國、香港政府和香港警察,並促請對中港實施制裁。其中加拿大《環球郵報》〈Stand With Hong Kong Until Dawn〉,提到望加政府承認香港警察犯下反人類罪行,實施制裁和禁向香港售武;美國《紐約時報》〈Catch Hong Kong As We Fall〉,則促美方停止賣彈藥予香港警察並通過《香港人權及民主法案》。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/U9vlpr5.png" alt="image05" /></p> +<p>為支付相關費用,李宇軒及陳梓華等人發起3次眾籌,分別籌得約700萬港元、30萬英鎊(約310萬港元)及183萬美元(約1,440萬港元),即共約2,450萬港元。控方並指黎智英透過 Mark Simon 提供財政支持,其中第一次登報開支約600萬港元,黎和 Simon 透過二人持有的公司 LAIS Hotel Properties Limited 及力高顧問,墊支156萬港元給至少5份報章;李宇軒其後在8月初將156萬港元轉帳到台灣的查德威有限公司償還黎,以避免黎的身分曝光。</p> -<h4 id="記者採訪一度遭司法機構職員阻止-後新聞主任澄清屬誤會">記者採訪一度遭司法機構職員阻止 後新聞主任澄清屬誤會</h4> +<p>Mark Simon 亦協助處理眾籌款項,就第二次全球登報,Mark Simon 將眾籌的約310萬港元,存入《蘋果日報》專欄作者 Jack Henry Hazlewood 的英國戶口,再轉帳給李宇軒。就第三次全球登報,Mark Simon 將眾籌資金存入其美國戶口,再存入他成立的信託基金「The Project Hong Kong Trust」,再透過基金將約320萬港元存入李宇軒戶口;LAIS Hotel 及力高亦向6份報章支付354萬港元,包括向《日本經濟新聞》支付約147萬港元。庭上展示 WhatsApp 訊息,Mark Simon 曾表示已獲歸還所有就國際廣告支付的款項(“all monies that were used for the international ad campaign are now back with us”)。</p> -<p>今早西九龍法院外警力較昨日稍微減少,但仍有至少60名警員在場戒備,每輛進入法院的汽車同樣須接受檢查,有部分車主及乘客須下車及打開車尾箱。</p> +<p>法官李運騰一度問及,控方展示 Mark Simon 的 WhatsApp 訊息,是否依賴該些訊息的真實性,周天行回應視乎情況,指部分訊息有銀行紀錄支持。惟李運騰指即使如此,該些訊息仍屬「傳聞證供」,控方不能以此證明 Simon 訊息所說為真,周天行終稱只會用以證黎智英犯案時的心態。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5rDxVOG.png" alt="image06" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/u9Q9qOq.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 周天行</p> -<p>另外,記者欲於法院大樓地下採訪排隊市民時,遭掛上司法機構證件的職員阻止,指今早獲指示該處不得進行採訪。記者追問下,職員稱會邀請「新聞官」向記者解釋,其後3名警民關係科警員到場,向記者指相關安排是法院的「house rule(場地規則)」、是管理的政策,要「尊重返」,又指警方本身無權入法院執法,但被司法機構職員邀請入內。</p> +<h4 id="控方黎智英資助辦展覽及組織選舉監察團轉讓公司予陳梓華作回報">控方:黎智英資助辦展覽及組織選舉監察團、轉讓公司予陳梓華作回報</h4> -<p>司法機構新聞主任到場了解後,向記者澄清法院並無相關「house rule」,純粹誤會,又指職員是擔心擾亂秩序,故溝通上「多咗啲」、「誤會咗」,記者可與人聊天採訪,只是不得進行拍攝。</p> +<p>控方續指,黎智英亦為其他宣傳提供財政支持,包括2019年8月,Mark Simon 轉帳3萬元予陳梓華,由李予信協助籌辦報紙展覽;10月黎智英再轉帳14.41萬元予陳,組織其他報紙展覽和街站;11月 Mark Simon 轉帳50萬元予李宇軒組織「選舉監察團」,邀請外國政治人物來港監察區議會選舉。2020年1月,黎智英亦將一所在英屬維爾京群島註冊的公司「LACOCK」轉讓予陳梓華,包括股權、董事及銀行戶口的簽署人,作為陳提供協助的回報。</p> -<p>審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及Marc Corlett。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。</p> +<p>此外,黎智英和 Mark Simon 亦透過陳梓華,批准李宇軒免費使用《蘋果日報》就鄧小平簽署《中英聯合聲明》的版權相片;《蘋果日報》亦在重要版面刊登第三次全球登報的詳情。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YDgfIpE.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 警方國安處總警司 李桂華</p> +<p>控方續指,眾籌的資金同時用作 SWHK 營運開支及作國際游說工作,及邀請英國國會議員 Bob Seely 於2019年8月來港觀察反修例運動。而由於眾籌資金用畢,劉祖廸於2020年5月提出進行第4次眾籌,團隊於8月籌得170萬美元(約1,320萬港元),並存放在由 Mark Simon 設立和控制的「the Project Hong Kong Trust」,並按其指示將有關款項用於國際游說工作。</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="控方黎指示分美英日3線-李宇軒向美議員展警彈藥游說警暴">控方:黎指示分美、英、日3線 李宇軒向美議員展警彈藥游說警暴</h4> -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導控方指黎智英持續串謀、無逾時檢控 官周五頒判決NATO To Protect Undersea2023-12-19T12:00:00+08:002023-12-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/nato-to-protect-undersea<p><em>NATO is not ready to mitigate increasingly prevalent Russian aggression against European critical undersea infrastructure (CUI).</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Despite its depleted ground forces and strained military industrial base, Russian hybrid tactics remains the most pressing threat to CUI in northern Europe. Despite its current limitations, NATO is the primary actor capable of deterring and preventing hybrid attacks on its allies and has expedited its approach to CUI protection by establishing new organizations to that aim. At the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit, allies agreed to establish the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), which focuses on preparing for, deterring, and defending against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics. To help NATO planners and staff at the new center conceptualize and prioritize their efforts, this issue brief provides immediate and long-term recommendations to set the new center up for success.</em></p> +<p>除了全球登報,控方亦指 SWHK 被用作平台以建立國際網絡爭取外國支持,及向中港施壓。在2019年10至11月,團隊資助香港大專學生在日內瓦、柏林、巴黎、倫敦及華盛頓會見外國政治人物,游說他們支持反修例示威;同年11月發起「選舉監察團」,邀請19名外國政治人物來港監察區議會選舉,期間李宇軒與 Lord Alton、Luke de Pulford、陳方安生和李柱銘會面,擴展網絡。</p> -<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="-️-hong-kong-electoral-observation-mission">📣 🗳️ Hong Kong Electoral Observation Mission</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>NATO is not prepared to defend its allies’ critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) from increasingly prevalent Russian hybrid tactics. The recent Balticconnector pipeline incident highlighted the risk of deliberate damage to CUI across Europe. It follows last year’s Nord Stream pipeline explosions, among other incidents, and bears the hallmarks of sabotage. Europe’s expansive and growing network of undersea infrastructure will remain vulnerable to attacks aimed at disrupting transatlantic cohesion and economic activity, undermining Western support for Ukraine, and shaping potential future military operations.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>We are very pleased to welcome the following independent observers of the 2019 District Council Election! Thank you for being witnesses for Hong Kong!#HongKongEOM #HongKongProtests #StandwithHK pic.twitter.com/v9WIeyShko — Fight For Freedom. Stand With Hong Kong. 重光團隊 (@Stand_with_HK) November 23, 2019</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Threats to undersea infrastructure are not new. In 2016 U.S. vice admiral James Foggo and Alarik Fritz warned of a “fourth battle of the Atlantic,” which included threats to “underwater infrastructure — such as oil rigs and telecommunications cables.” In 2017 the UK chief of the defence staff went public with previously classified Russian threats to undersea cables that posed a “new risk to our way of life,” while member of the UK Parliament Rishi Sunak (now UK prime minister) demanded enhanced protection of undersea data cables. Yet the Nord Stream incident has catalyzed a new focus in Europe on CUI resilience, including national, multinational, and institutional efforts through NATO and the European Union. Notably, this included the launch of a new NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure at the Vilnius summit in July 2023.</p> +<p>而為促進串謀,及在黎智英指示下,陳梓華、李宇軒及劉祖廸等人與美國、英國及日本的政治人物接觸和持續聯繫,並稱之為「美國線」、「英國線」與「日本線」。「美國線」方面,黎智英同意 Mark Simon 於2019年9月安排李宇軒與潛在美國總統參選人、參議員斯科特 Rick Scott、其助手 Scott Sciretta 及美國領事職員 Alan Brinker 會面,李透過展示277粒警方使用過的彈藥,就「警暴」進行游說,陳梓華並曾指示李宇軒隱藏「資助人(backers)」黎和 Simon 的身分。</p> -<p>This issue brief examines NATO’s role in protecting CUI in more detail. It proceeds in four parts: It begins by assessing the threat “seascape” for CUI in northern Europe, including how the threat might evolve and how Europe has responded so far. The paper then turns to NATO’s approach to date, summarizing the key NATO initiatives related to CUI protection. The third part looks in more detail at the challenge of protecting CUI, proposing a basic framework to help understand the vast problem space. The final section draws on this framework to develop several immediate and longer-term recommendations to help planners in NATO’s new center prioritize their efforts.</p> +<p>同年12月,李宇軒到美國與「香港民主委員會」創辦人、朱耀明兒子朱牧民及美國參議員 Rick Scott、Todd Young 和 Ted Cruz 會面,陳梓華提醒李把握機會建立美國網絡並游說制裁中港政府。</p> -<h3 id="the-evolution-of-threats-to-undersea-infrastructure-in-northern-europe">THE EVOLUTION OF THREATS TO UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE IN NORTHERN EUROPE</h3> +<h4 id="控方陳方安生邀李宇軒與英領事等會面李協助ipac工作">控方:陳方安生邀李宇軒與英領事等會面、李協助IPAC工作</h4> -<p>The war in Ukraine has radically altered the threat landscape across Europe, particularly in the north. As the alliance remains focused on supporting Ukraine and shoring up its eastern flank, Sweden’s and Finland’s membership bids will provide new opportunities to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic and Arctic regions. But recent examples of CUI interference highlight vulnerabilities that will not be easily remedied. The sabotage of two Nord Stream pipelines off the Danish island of Bornholm in September 2022 forced European governments to grapple with their limited ability to deter and defend against hybrid tactics in the undersea domain. Recent damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline and a data cable between Finland and Estonia in October 2023 from a ship’s anchor is suspected as being deliberate, although attribution has not yet been declared.</p> +<p>「英國線」方面,2019年12月,黎智英安排陳梓華於倫敦與「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯 Benedict Rogers 會面;同月在陳方安生邀請下,李宇軒參與時任英國駐港領事 Andrew Heyn 舉辦的飯局,席間除陳方安生外,李柱銘、郭榮鏗和莫乃光均有出席。至2020年1或2月,陳方安生再邀陳梓華和李宇軒在其辦公室會面,就對示威的看法交流意見。</p> -<p>In this context, the main focus of critical maritime infrastructure debates has shifted from emphasis on terrorism and cyber threats toward the increasing frequency and efficacy of hybrid tactics. The aim of hybrid tactics is to cause significant damage to an adversary while operating below the threshold of detection, attribution, and response — and in so doing blur the conceptual lines between conflict and peace. The issue is compounded in the maritime realm by several conceptual and practical challenges, mainly related to poor definitions highly dependent on moral or political choices, a unique geophysical space, and the multitude of potential threats.</p> +<p>同年5月,英國保守黨人權委員會委員裴倫德向李宇軒提出,有意成立「對華政策跨國議會聯盟(IPAC)」,成員包括對中國採強硬立場的各國議員,以爭取落實制裁中港政府的政策。Mark Simon 指示 SWHK 應加入 IPAC,SWHK 遂於2020年6月在裴倫德招募下加入 IPAC 秘書處。</p> -<p>Russian hybrid tactics represent the most pressing threat to CUI in northern Europe. Russia’s war against Ukraine has debilitated its ground forces and strained its military industrial base. Experts estimate it will take the Kremlin five to ten years to reconstitute its military. Meanwhile, however, Russia’s power projection capabilities in northern Europe — through naval, air, and missile bases in Kaliningrad and its Northern Fleet of submarines on the Kola Peninsula — have scarcely been depleted. In fact, while the Russian navy is underfunded and a large part of its fleet comprises Soviet legacy platforms, its underwater capacity continues to grow. In particular, Russia’s submarine program remains a priority amid other military budget cuts, exemplified by the Kremlin’s authorization of 13 new nuclear and conventional submarines since 2014. In broader terms, Russia’s ability to target critical infrastructure short of war and impose economic costs to deter external intervention in regional conflicts is an important component to Moscow’s doctrine and thinking on escalation management.</p> +<p>同年7月,李宇軒向裴倫德建議游說英、美、日、德國、西班牙、意大利等多個國家,停止與香港的司法互助或逃犯引渡協議;其後在黎智英和 Mark Simon 指示下,陳梓華建議李宇軒繼續協助 IPAC 的工作,負責網站編輯及發布文章。</p> -<p>However, even in the absence of a broader Russia-NATO conflict, hybrid tactics have been a staple in the Kremlin’s toolbox in Europe for years. As the Kremlin views itself in perpetual conflict with the West, hybrid tactics are instrumental to challenging NATO without resorting to conventional military means. Russia has likely targeted critical infrastructure throughout Europe at an increased frequency since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the undersea domain, Russia appears committed to mapping and threatening European energy and communications infrastructure, particularly strategically important Norwegian gas pipelines and fiber-optic cables.</p> +<h4 id="控方李宇軒向日議員交制裁草案協助翻譯推立法">控方:李宇軒向日議員交制裁草案、協助翻譯推立法</h4> -<p>The Nord Stream attacks resulted in a flurry of initiatives to bolster Europe’s CUI. The European Union has updated its maritime strategy to better address evolving threats and adopted an expanded directive on CUI resilience, and the EU-NATO Task Force on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure was launched in January and reported its findings in June. The EU Hybrid Toolbox, including the Hybrid Fusion Cell and new Hybrid Rapid Response Teams, support member states and NATO to detect, deter, and respond to threats. More recently, the 10-nation Joint Expeditionary Force ( JEF) agreed to focus on protecting CUI in its new vision and deployed a maritime task force in response to the Balticconnector incident to deter further attacks. Bilateral examples include the recent UK-Norway strategic partnership on undersea threats. Many nations have also expanded their ability to monitor and protect undersea infrastructure: France recently announced a new seabed warfare strategy and investments in ocean floor defense, and the United Kingdom has set up a Centre for Seabed Mapping and earmarked two new Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance (MROS) vessels to serve primarily as subsea protection ships.</p> +<p>「日本線」方面,李宇軒於2020年1月至4月,向3名日本眾議院議員提交有關「馬格尼茨基式」制裁的草案,並將 IPAC 的會議紀錄翻譯成日文,以協助菅野志櫻里推動《馬格尼茨基人權法案》立法。李又與裴倫德等人討論 SWHK 可如何協助 IPAC 和由日本議員組成的「對中政策相關國會議員聯盟(JPAC)」,其中 Bill Browder 和菅野志櫻里原擬會面討論該法案,但該視像會議終因李宇軒被捕而未成事。</p> -<h3 id="protecting-critical-undersea-infrastructure-a-new-focus-for-nato">PROTECTING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE: A NEW FOCUS FOR NATO</h3> +<p>控方並指,李宇軒在黎智英透過 Mark Simon 和陳梓華的指示下,執行和管理 SWHK 的事務,與外國政治人物建立網絡、進行國際游說,請求外國制裁中國;負責 SWHK 會計紀錄,批出團隊活動開支;亦負責編輯 SWHK 的網頁。</p> -<p>While many stakeholders have increased their efforts to protect CUI, NATO remains the lead actor when it comes to deterring and preventing conventional and hybrid attacks on allies. NATO’s role in protecting CUI is grounded in its founding principles, such as Articles 2 and 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which call for the strengthening of free institutions, economic collaboration, and growing resilience to attack. At the 2023 Vilnius summit, allies reiterated that hybrid operations against the alliance could meet the threshold of armed attack and trigger Article 5, NATO’s collective defense guarantee.</p> +<h4 id="控方swhk發布多篇文章籲制裁致函外國政府促停引渡協議">控方:SWHK發布多篇文章籲制裁、致函外國政府促停引渡協議</h4> -<h4 id="the-value-of-nato">THE VALUE OF NATO</h4> +<p>控方另指,在黎智英及 Mark Simon 透過陳梓華指示下,李宇軒本人或透過 SWHK,發布一系列文章、新聞稿和制裁名單,以促請制裁。其中2019年12月,SWHK 發布一份與香港大專學界國際事務代表團制作,針對144名中港官員的制裁名單;2020年7月1日,SWHK 發布題為〈Darkness is descending on freedom and democracy in Hong Kong, a leading global campaigning organisation has warned〉的新聞稿,譴責《國安法》頒布,並呼籲英政府急切考慮對中國及香港實施馬格尼茨基式制裁、及撤銷與香港的引渡協議,並對中國國企如華為施加限制。同年7月17日,SWHK 致函捷克、愛爾蘭及葡萄牙政府,促請她們終止與香港的引渡協議,3封信於李的電腦搜得。</p> -<p>Today, the functioning of allied civil society and the prosperity of member states depends on the extensive network of CUI across the Euro-Atlantic. NATO is critical to its protection for several reasons.</p> +<p>7月期間,SWHK 亦多次在 Twitter 轉發外國政治人物的帖文,如轉發美國議員帖文,感謝他們投票通過《香港自治法案》;轉發 Bill Browder 帖文呼籲制裁中港官員;轉發美國白宮帖文,感謝美國取消香港「特別待遇」和對中國施加關稅;及轉發羅冠聰帖文,促請國際社會對前特首和選舉主任進行制裁等。</p> -<p>First, Russia — the primary threat — has the intent and capability, and it maximizes its opportunity to threaten allied CUI across NATO’s area of operational responsibility. Moreover, the destruction, disruption, or tapping of CUI could be the precursor to conflict through attempting to sever military and government communications. Second, the protection of CUI is part of NATO’s defense and deterrence posture across the Euro-Atlantic. As hybrid attacks on CUI may meet the threshold for armed attack, NATO must be heavily invested in their protection to ensure it can act decisively.</p> +<p>SWHK亦曾於7至8月發布數篇文章,包括〈The destruction of the democratic process in Hong Kong〉,呼籲美國對中港進行制裁,並於2021年1月發布由數個海外組織聯署的聲明,促請美政府啟動「救生艇」政策及英國政府實施對中港制裁。</p> -<p>Third, CUI spans NATO’s entire area of operational responsibility, so maintaining seamless situational awareness across the whole network is a challenge far too large for individual nations. Fourth, the challenge of protecting CUI will increasingly rely on technological solutions, and NATO possesses the financial heft and mechanisms to develop and scale these. Finally, there are complex political, legal, and technical considerations for the effective protection of CUI, and seams between national permissions and restrictions can create frictions best managed at the NATO level.</p> +<h4 id="控方稱黎智英2013至2020年期間-向民主派課金逾9千萬元">控方稱黎智英2013至2020年期間 向民主派課金逾9千萬元</h4> -<h4 id="natos-approach">NATO’S APPROACH</h4> +<p>就資金流向,控方指在2013年7月至2020年7月期間,黎智英共86次轉帳予 Mark Simon,款項達1億1,860萬元。其中9,326萬元再被分配給不同民主派人士及政黨。此外,黎智英於2019年10月18日指示 Mark Simon,將25,819.15元美金(即港幣約202,163.94元)捐給「香港監察」。</p> -<p>NATO has been both proactive and reactive to CUI threats. In broad terms, NATO protects CUI in three ways. First, all of NATO’s forces contribute to the alliance’s Defence and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), which coheres all activity by region and domain. Many capabilities that contribute to CUI protection also contribute to wider deterrence activities, including standing naval and mine countermeasures groups and CUI-focused exercises.</p> +<p>稅務局的資料顯示在2013至2020年期間,Mark Simon 報稱為壹傳媒動畫公司的職員,年薪為110至120萬元。在2020至2021年期間,Mark Simon 亦報稱為力高顧問有限公司的商業經理。</p> -<p>Second, NATO assets detect threats through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and space and cyber assets to gain and maintain situational awareness. Moreover, NATO can develop and scale new technologies to increase detection coverage, such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) pilot challenges, which include a focus on energy resilience and sensing and surveillance. The alliance’s new Digital Ocean Concept was endorsed in October 2023 to increase collective visibility of oceans, including</p> +<h4 id="李宇軒被捕後獲警方擔保-惟其後被內地水警截獲-終移交回港">李宇軒被捕後獲警方擔保 惟其後被內地水警截獲 終移交回港</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>the creation of a global scale network of sensors, from sea bed to space, to better predict, identify, classify and combat threats. It envisages maritime domain awareness, subsea sensors, unmanned surface vessels, drones and satellites, and exploits AI [artificial intelligence], big data, and autonomous systems, alongside conventional assets.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>就各被告的被捕情況,控方指,李宇軒於2020年8月10日被警方以「勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」、「無牌管有槍械或彈藥」、「藏有可作非法用途的工具」及「洗黑錢」罪拘捕。8月12日李獲警方擔保,惟須交出護照等旅遊證件及不得離港,並須於同年9月1日到警署報到。</p> -<p>Third, NATO has a range of response options once an incident or attack occurs, including counter hybrid support teams, the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Very High Readiness Task Force (VJTF), and ad hoc force deployments, such as the enhanced maritime patrol and mine hunter deployments in the Baltic Sea. National missions and regional frameworks outside of NATO command structures can also bolster deterrence against threats to CUI, including the JEF and the aforementioned EU initiatives.</p> +<p>惟8月23日李乘船非法闖入中國水域時被內地水警拘捕。至2021年3月22日,李從中國被移交至香港警方。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oQzj8nb.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: European Institutions Relevant for Protecting CUI.</strong> Source: Authors’ compilation.</em></p> +<h4 id="陳梓華2021年2月還柙至今-劉祖廸和mark-simon於2020年離港">陳梓華2021年2月還柙至今 劉祖廸和Mark Simon於2020年離港</h4> -<h4 id="natos-new-centers">NATO’S NEW CENTERS</h4> +<p>至於陳梓華於2020年10月10日被警方以「協助罪犯」罪名拘捕,其後獲警方擔保。同年10至11月,Mark Simon 向陳說自己可能會因國安法罪名而被捕,但鼓勵陳繼續國際游說工作,Mark Simon 並向陳保證黎智英及他會提供一切協助,包括提供逃往美國的路線。</p> -<p>In response to recent incidents in the Baltic Sea, NATO has expedited its approach to CUI protection by establishing two new organizations. In February 2023 the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell was created at NATO headquarters. The rationale was to coordinate allied activity; bring military and civilian stakeholders together by facilitating engagement with private industry, which owns much of the infrastructure; and better protect CUI through jointly detecting and responding to threats. This new cell will be instrumental in building coordination across all the organizations, policies, and capabilities identified in Table 1 both within and external to NATO.</p> +<p>至2021年2月15日,陳再度被警方以「勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪拘捕,其後一直還柙至今。</p> -<p>Then, at the July 2023 Vilnius summit, allies agreed to establish the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM). This new center focuses on</p> +<p>至於劉祖廸和 Mark Simon,則分別於2020年1月5日及4月18日經出境關口離開香港。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies . . . to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors. . . . NATO stands ready to support Allies if and when requested.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>黎智英於2020年8月10日首次被捕。其後於9月1日,黎進行警誡錄影會面,警員向他展示部份專欄文章,他承認作者是自己。黎亦承認 Twitter 帳戶屬於他持有及使用。</p> -<p>The center arrives at a crucial time for NATO as both new threats to CUI and new initiatives to deal with them proliferate across the alliance and beyond. To help NATO planners and staff at the new center conceptualize and prioritize their efforts, the next section considers in more detail the problem of protecting CUI.</p> +<h4 id="控方3法案通過立法-42名官員被制裁">控方:3法案通過立法 42名官員被制裁</h4> -<h3 id="understanding-threats-to-critical-undersea-infrastructure-a-conceptual-framework">UNDERSTANDING THREATS TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK</h3> +<p>控方最後指,在涉案時段,外國推行不同法案及政策,以制裁中港官員、限制貿易和出入口,以及延長港人外國居留期限等。包括2019年6月13日,《香港人權及民主法案》(The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act)在美國眾議院審議,並於同年11月27日獲時任美國總統特朗普簽署立法。2020年6月30日,美國議員提出《香港避風港法案》(Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act),相關立法程序仍在進行中。</p> -<p>This section develops a basic framework for thinking about protecting CUI. The purpose is to help NATO planners — particularly those in the new center — to understand the vast problem space and prioritize some initial efforts over others. The following section draws on this framework to develop several recommendations. The four elements of the framework for protecting CUI are outlined below.</p> +<p>2020年7月14日特朗普正式簽署《香港自治法》(Hong Kong Autonomy Act)。法案授權美國政府制裁有份損害香港自治的中國及香港官員、機構或企業。同日,特朗普簽署《香港正常化總統行政命令》(President’s Executive Order 13936 on Hong Kong Normalization),暫緩或取消對香港的部份特別待遇,以及授權美政府實施制裁措施。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Infrastructure type:</strong> What counts as CUI? Which parts are most critical or most vulnerable?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Threat type:</strong> What are the main threats to undersea CUI?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Tasks:</strong> What is NATO’s role in protecting CUI?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Geography:</strong> Where should limited resources be prioritized and focused across the Euro-Atlantic area?</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>2021年6月30日,美國有議員提出《香港人自由和選擇法》(Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act),要求為合資格的港人提供臨時庇護和難民身份,以及其他有關移居美國的措施,相關立法程序仍在進行中。</p> -<h4 id="1-infrastructure-type">1. INFRASTRUCTURE TYPE</h4> +<p>2020年8月至2021年7月期間,美國向42名中央及香港特區政府官員實施制裁。</p> -<p>Maritime infrastructure is vital to basic societal functions such as trade, food and energy supplies, security and defense, communications, transport, tourism, and environmental management. The most important infrastructure is usually considered “critical,” meaning without it, society could not function for long. But critical infrastructure differs between nations given that some economies depend on fishing or tourism while others rely more on maritime trade, energy infrastructure, or data cables. What counts as CUI, therefore, is often more of a political decision than a technical one. There is no one-size-fits-all definition: it depends on the nation and region in question.</p> +<p>2020年8月11日,美國政府宣布由同年9月25日起,從香港進口美國的產品須註明原產地是「中國」,而不能標示「香港」。2020年8月19日,美國國務院宣布終止與香港簽署的三項雙邊協議,包括逃犯的移交、被判刑人士的移交、豁免國際船運利得稅。</p> -<p>Maritime infrastructure is often categorized by sector. One classification system lists five types: transport, energy, communication, fishing, and marine ecosystems. Of these, four have substantial elements of underwater infrastructure. Above-water transport is often precluded, while commercial submersibles — such as remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) or autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) used in pipeline maintenance — are considered part of the energy infrastructure they serve.</p> +<p>此外,約於2020年11月9日,英國、愛爾蘭、澳洲、紐西蘭等9個國家分別暫緩與香港之間的逃犯移交協議。</p> -<p>Maritime infrastructure security policies traditionally focus on maritime transport (e.g., ports) and energy (e.g., gas and oil infrastructure) over other types. However, the infrastructure picture is changing rapidly. Undersea cable projects have proliferated in recent years, while offshore renewable energy technologies like wind and tidal systems will increase to help nations meet global carbon emissions targets. Future proliferation of AUVs — driven by new oil and gas exploration, military applications, reduced manufacturing costs, and improvements in AI and automation technology — could present both new types of CUI under the category of transport and new threats. As the recent NATO-EU task force on critical infrastructure summarizes,</p> +<p>控方指,香港城市大學法律學院教授、梁美芬丈夫王貴國會以美國法律和國際經濟法的專家身份出庭作供,講述制裁及封鎖措施的法律效力,包括影響、後果及時效等。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>These challenges are compounded for undersea energy infrastructure, which is extensive and more difficult to survey and protect. Moreover, the network of undersea energy infrastructure in the Euro-Atlantic area is expected to grow as offshore energy platforms become more numerous.</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="下周一續審-料將讀出同意事實">下周一續審 料將讀出同意事實</h4> -<p>Meanwhile, fishing and marine ecosystems are increasingly important to some nations as fishing stocks decrease and marine habitats are degraded by pollution and the effects of climate change.</p> +<p>控方讀畢179頁的開案陳詞,表示原預計傳召60名證人,但可減至31人,並望減至30人以下。控方亦將讀出同意事實,但望法庭給予時間與辯方商討,以視乎可否同意更多事實。案件下周一(8日)續審,將讀出同意事實。</p> -<p>Beyond rapid change, there are several challenges associated with coordinating CUI protection, including interdependence, the physical characteristics of the subsea domain, and the complex, transnational nature of undersea infrastructure. Meanwhile, fishing and marine ecosystems are increasingly important to some nations as fishing stocks decrease and marine habitats are degraded by pollution and the effects of climate change. This suggests a key challenge for NATO will be prioritizing between CUI sectors, which are critical to different NATO allies. This assessment will be driven to some extent by the next element of the framework: the threat picture.</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="2-threat">2. THREAT</h4> +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導控方:黎智英受訪稱不會離開 留港直至最後一日 被捕後稱「坐監都揀呢條路」 控方:黎智英倡「支爆」 經中間人指示李宇軒及「攬炒巴」國際游說促制裁中港【黎智英案・審訊第五日】2024-01-03T12:00:00+08:002024-01-03T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-5<ul> + <li>控方:黎智英籲下屬勿針對特朗普 指示Mark Simon邀彭斯和蓬佩奧訂閱英文版</li> +</ul> -<p>Although most definitions of critical infrastructure depend on how vital it is to the functioning of society, in practice governments tend to designate infrastructure as critical if it is vulnerable to harm. While pipeline sabotage has driven the headlines, the range of threats to CUI is much broader. The threat picture has also changed in recent years.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Maritime security threats have been driven by the rise of terrorism, international piracy, human trafficking, and the “blue economy,” defined by the World Bank as “the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and ocean ecosystem health.” Protection of maritime and undersea infrastructure has typically focused on physical attacks from terrorism and blue crime (i.e., transnational organized crime at sea). However, the threat environment has changed markedly over the last decade — and drastically since 2022. After invading Ukraine, Russia became “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security,” according to NATO’s new Strategic Concept — a threat that includes the ability to “target our civilian and military infrastructure.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mLxOlOK.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>NATO’s new concept also points to hybrid threats to critical infrastructure and reaffirms their inclusion under Article 5. The maritime domain has been viewed as particularly vulnerable to hybrid threats. Attacks on underwater infrastructure have been a particular concern. Recent events appear to confirm these fears, with several incidents such as the Nord Stream pipeline explosions in the Baltic Sea or severed subsea cables near Svalbard that appear to follow the hybrid playbook of deniable attacks on undersea infrastructure. These incidents highlight the difficulty of dealing with ambiguous hybrid threats, which are difficult to distinguish from accidental damage. For example, around 70 percent of undersea cable faults are caused by fishing vessels or ship anchors, alongside natural causes or even shark bites.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(3日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第5日審訊。控方繼續開案陳詞,指黎智英在美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 的建議下,指示下屬設立蘋果英文版,目的是爭取外國人的支持,以尋求外力向中央及香港政府實施制裁。黎又指示國際組同事不要針對特朗普,因蘋果靠特朗普政府的支持「保命」。當黃之鋒表示不認同蘋果發起的「一人一信救香港」行動,黎則向陳沛敏表示不同意黃,現時任何有助於香港的方法都應該採用,因已沒有其他方法對付中共。控方又指黎於2020年5月開設了個人 Twitter 帳戶,以圖增加影響力打「國際線」,列出黎智英所追蹤的外國政治人物及機構,遭法官質疑控方想反映什麼。</p> -<p>Hybrid aggressors can also use the cover of fishing, private, or research vessels, which are difficult to track. The rapid proliferation of AUVs will exacerbate the problem. Specialized vessels for the task also exist, such as Russia’s dedicated fleet of submarines, designed for infrastructure sabotage and manned by the Russian navy and the Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research (GUGI). Research vessels operated by GUGI are suspected of mapping networks of undersea infrastructure across Europe.</p> +<h4 id="控方黎智英fcc演講獲蘋果報導-另指示下屬訪問彭定康">控方:黎智英FCC演講獲蘋果報導 另指示下屬訪問彭定康</h4> -<p>For all these reasons, many assessments suggest a new era of hybrid threats is emerging and poses “a particular challenge” to protecting undersea infrastructure. As the NATO-EU task force puts it, “The seabed is a field of growing strategic importance, due to increasing reliance on undersea infrastructure and the particular challenges in protecting it from hybrid threats and physical damage.”</p> +<p>控方昨日開案陳詞提到,黎智英對《蘋果日報》的日常運作有完全的控制權,他會給予指示其他同案被告,是串謀犯罪的「主腦」。控方今天繼續開案陳詞,就發布煽動刊物罪,控方指2019年4月,黎智英指示張劍虹訪問「銅鑼灣書店」前店長林榮基,希望報導能有效地引發市民上街反送中。黎智英亦吩咐張想想如何推動更多人參與遊行,並向張轉發訊息,顯示黎早前請求「香港監察」創辦人 Benedict Rogers 聯絡前港督彭定康,採訪其對反送中的評論,後來相關報導於2019年4月28日刊出。</p> -<h4 id="3-tasks">3. TASKS</h4> +<p>2019年5月21日,黎智英在外國記者協會場合發表演講,後來《蘋果日報》報導演講內容,題為〈送中惡法 黎智英:修例後香港玩完 FCC演講斥林鄭非常邪惡〉。</p> -<p>The final element of the framework comprises the tasks and missions NATO may have to carry out to protect CUI. The most important role, short of war, is deterrence, which holds the promise of avoiding armed attacks altogether. Beyond deterrence, military forces perform a wide range of roles relevant to protecting CUI.</p> +<h4 id="控方反送中運動開始後-蘋果報導及黎智英專欄文章煽動對政府仇恨">控方:反送中運動開始後 蘋果報導及黎智英專欄文章煽動對政府仇恨</h4> -<p>One example is counterpiracy. During Operation Ocean Shield — NATO’s contribution to international efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa during 2008–16 — the role of NATO forces spanned surveillance, interdiction, escort, and deterrence. Cooperation with international bodies and the private sector was also vital to mission success, which contributed to the cessation of attacks after 2012.</p> +<p>控方指,2019年6月9日的反修例大遊行標誌著「社會騷動」的開始。雖然政府其後宣布暫緩以至撤回修例草案,但暴力示威浪潮持續。在這社會背景下,《蘋果日報》發布不同內容,包括針對中央政府及香港特區政府的煽動性陳述、呼籲市民參與示威、宣揚對警察的憎恨、提倡透過非法、暴力及「攬炒」手段來對抗中央及特區政府。</p> -<p>Another relevant example is protecting national infrastructure. The U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Plan outlines threats to national infrastructure and a framework of missions to protect them. These are divided into two tasks: counterthreat missions and preparedness missions.</p> +<p>控方列出31篇從2019年6月15日至2020年1月26日期間發布的文章,指稱它們具煽動性:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Counterthreat missions identify and counter threats and hazards: identify, deter, detect, disrupt, and prepare.</p> + <p>〈和變勇 「是政權,逼我進化」〉:控方指稱文章意圖激起市民對中央政府及香港特區政府的憎恨</p> </li> <li> - <p>Preparedness missions reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate the consequences of damage: prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, recover.</p> + <p>〈天下制裁集會 今勢逼爆遮打〉:控方引述內容「2020年才過了不足20天,林鄭月娥政府已經急不及待要『推動』逆權運動另一浪高潮。民政事務專員擅離職守架空區議會、警察喬裝市民濫捕公眾場所拍照少年、監警會借故延遲提交報告……種種事端都有意無意為刻下看似已緩和的民怨重新撥火。民間集會團隊呼籲港人今日再集結,向國際社會展示民意,冀求各國政府向迫害港人的香港官員與警察落實制裁措施。」控方指稱文章意圖激起市民對中央政府及香港特區政府的憎恨</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>〈社會專題:自己手足自己救〉</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>〈屠龍隊邊緣呼喚 全民勇武/三罷〉:文章提到「隊名『層龍,對抗警察是家常便飯,有人試過被警棍打穿頭,亦有人遭橡膠子彈爆頭險死,但他們明白不是每個人都有這種勇氣。」控方指文章意圖引起對警方的仇恨</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>〈港鐵大搜捕 釀元朗恐襲2.0 速龍無差別毆打市民〉</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>廣告〈誰殺死他她他和她……〉</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>廣告〈一次過變黑又得 逐漸變黑又得 黑晒!〉</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>〈攬炒巴×G20 團隊 眾籌1,400萬連登13國賣廣告 推爆警暴〉:控方指稱文章意圖提倡透過非法、暴力及「攬炒」手段來對抗中央及特區政府</p> </li> </ul> -<p>More broadly, several existing frameworks for countering hybrid threats may be applied to protecting CUI. NATO’s strategy is to “prepare, deter, defend,” while the European Union’s approach is based on “awareness, resilience, and response.” Another framework is proposed by the 14-nation Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC): “detect, deter, and respond.” This framework is used to examine NATO’s role in protecting CUI regarding all three functions below.</p> - -<h4 id="detect">DETECT</h4> - -<p>Countering any threat requires first detecting and identifying it. Detection is even more important for hybrid threats, which rely on deniability or ambiguity to delay, complicate, or prevent reprisal. However, the variety and complexity of hybrid threats make detection challenging.</p> - -<p>For protecting CUI, the main focus is on enhancing maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA systems are “one of the core solutions in maritime security” but are focused on civil transport, fishing, and leisure. To rectify this, a 2018 report by CSIS advocates a renewed focus on undersea MDA to combat hybrid threats. Specific recommendations include establishing dedicated analytic centers (with teams focused on hybrid threats), training courses, a common classified data picture, and an operational framework that integrates surface and subsurface sensors. Another recent analysis recommends closing gaps in the surveillance of small boats, leisure craft, and underwater vehicles through “investments in new underwater sensors and drones which can enhance the overall picture of the domain.” The recent EU-NATO Task Force also recommends enhancing “maritime situational awareness.”</p> - -<p>One detection challenge is that malign activity often appears, by design, as an accident, whereas some suspected attacks could actually be accidents (most damage to cables and pipelines is accidental). This means NATO does not have the luxury of ignoring apparent accidents. Here, a conceptual distinction between monitoring (known threats) and discovering (new, unknown threats) can help establish situational awareness and distinguish signal from noise in the realm of detection. This task is also well suited to advances in AI and machine learning.</p> - -<h4 id="deter">DETER</h4> - -<p>Deterring hybrid threats to CUI is difficult but not impossible. The most promising strategy is deterrence by denial, which reduces the prospects of successful attack by hardening the target and strengthening resilience to damage. Denial in this context comprises two functions: prevention and resilience (see Figure 3). Preventing attacks is part of NATO’s core business and is achieved through a combination of detection (see above) and physical presence. For example, NATO’s Cold War deterrence strategy of basing substantial “shield forces” in central Europe was designed to physically prevent a Soviet attack.</p> +<p>控方又指,從2019年6月15日至2020年1月16日,黎智英透過其個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」發表評論文章,旨在煽動市民對中央、特區政府和警察的仇恨。</p> -<p>Resilience measures are designed to help CUI systems withstand or quickly recover from any damage sustained. Much of this amounts to good practice in the design and management of critical infrastructure systems. Such measures are therefore generally low cost and less reliant on detecting threats; best practices for resilience are based on understanding and mitigating one’s own vulnerabilities, regardless of whether they have been targeted. This is why resilience measures have become foundational to counter hybrid strategies. However, resilience building is a long-term strategy that will take years to deliver given the vast size and complexity of Euro-Atlantic CUI.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>〈我們堅持下去,才有希望〉</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>〈反極權 台灣更不用怕〉:控方引文「中共可怕的地方是,把人當成是純綷被物質驅使的動物,而不是有靈性和精神面貌的人。」、「在中共金錢萬能的思維世界裡,自由如糞土,人民只是極權機器中的螺絲,最後只會令他們在這資訊開放的時代無地自容。」</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>〈2020 和勇繼續一起撐下去〉:黎在文中稱2020年元旦與李柱銘及何俊仁參與遊行,途中見到有一名年約14至15歲的少女大叫「黑警死全家」、「香港差佬,X你老母」。黎向何說:「有這樣的後生,我哋冇得輸。」黎續指,不知道「裝修」滙豐銀行的,是否「我們的勇武手足」,但打爆中國人壽店舖玻璃的兩名黑衣人便十分可疑,現場有人質疑二人是喬裝警員。</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>〈捍道德抗極權 全球人人有責〉</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="respond">RESPOND</h4> +<p>2019年7月2日,黎智英指示陳沛敏報導示威者七一佔領立法會事件,以引起市民對年輕示威者的同情和支持。同年7月19日,黎智英向陳沛敏轉述 Benedict Rogers 的要求,轉述美國眾議員 Ted Yoho 有意投稿。同年10月,黎智英與美國眾議院議長佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi)會面後,黎要求陳訪問她。</p> -<p>Moreover, resilience is not a strategy on its own; deterrence by punishment also has a role. When it comes to punishing low-level aggression, celerity beats severity most of the time, putting a premium on credible response options that can be deployed quickly and reliably. These measures may not threaten vital interests but merely assure an aggressor will always face some costs for threatening CUI, however minor. This means simple measures such as enhanced presence or surveillance around key sites can work to deliver what has been referred to as “deterrence by detection.” More creative measures also play a role, such as attribution disclosure, legal interventions, or targeted sanctions (e.g., against implicated vessels, companies, or individuals).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mBfn9PG.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 林文宗(左)、陳沛敏(右)</p> -<p>That credible responses are required suggests the utility of a preapproved playbook to counter hybrid threats to CUI. Too often such measures are ad hoc or post hoc, or not sufficiently tailored to the specific demands of protecting CUI. If military forces are part of the response (e.g., to provide surveillance or bolster presence), then a forward, flexible posture is required to ensure force elements are in the area of responsibility or held at high readiness to deploy to quickly generate effects.</p> +<h4 id="控方疫情爆發後-蘋果持續煽動">控方:疫情爆發後 蘋果持續煽動</h4> -<p>It is important to note that given the limited resources of allies, any increase in demand to protect CUI will likely require trade-offs with other tasks and missions. Any contribution to protecting CUI is important but not all-important. NATO’s unique role — and the focus of the strategic concept — remains deterring armed attack above the threshold of war, not protecting against all forms of hybrid aggression. Protecting CUI should therefore not be overemphasized in NATO’s overall posture or capability development at the expense of conventional deterrence and defense.</p> +<p>2020年1月底開始,新冠肺炎在香港爆發,令示威活動暫時沉寂,但《蘋果日報》持續發布內容,針對中央政府及香港特區政府的煽動性陳述、宣揚對警察的憎恨,以及提倡透過非法及暴力的手段來對抗中央及特區政府。</p> -<h4 id="4-geography">4. GEOGRAPHY</h4> +<ul> + <li>〈擬用反恐例 控爆炸品案 鄧炳強學新疆鐵腕壓抗爭〉:控方指內容有意煽動對警察的仇恨,以及提倡使用不守法及暴力手段。</li> +</ul> -<p>The final element of the framework is geography. NATO is named after an ocean: the North Atlantic. But the alliance’s undersea infrastructure picture is more complex. NATO’s maritime areas of responsibility comprise the following:</p> +<p>控方另指黎智英5篇專欄文章含煽動內容:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>High North region (including the Norwegian Sea, Greenland Sea, Barents Sea, and Arctic Ocean)</p> + <p>〈現代人不是西方文明機制外生存的動物〉</p> </li> <li> - <p>Baltic Sea</p> + <p>〈武漢瘟疫 中共喪鐘〉:「肺炎疫情在中共維穩大前提下,謊言泛濫真相模糊,層層官僚架構層層謊言重疊,肺炎災情有多深重,就是中共也不知道。謊言治國不講誠信難服眾,習帝靠的是極權操控,絕對扼殺人民資訊自由,把人民變成盲從的羊群,管治便乾脆脷落。」、「習帝的極權控制了所有資訊,連拍電影現在也找不到題材了。」、「人民噤聲,政府霸道,惡毒病菌肆虐橫行,受苦的最後是人民。」</p> </li> <li> - <p>North Atlantic (including the North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, and Bay of Biscay)</p> + <p>〈我們最光輝的時刻〉</p> </li> <li> - <p>Mediterranean Sea (east and west)</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Black Sea</p> + <p>〈專橫暴政打壓 我們氣魄不滅〉:「今日我們明知有事,中共打到嚟必然大清算大清洗,清算不聽話的人,清洗英國殖民地遺留下來保護港人自由的法治和機制,把香港人變成任由習帝擺佈的奴才,因此我們會繼續起來抗爭到底,希望趁習帝內外危機四伏,和慘遭武漢肺炎瘟疫人命摧殘和經濟淪陷後,各國尤其美國向中國責難及局部制裁,迫使中共不敢太明目張膽,暫時克制對香港的迫害」</p> </li> <li> - <p>North Pacific Ocean</p> + <p>〈無賴在摧毀香港法治〉</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Within these areas, the seascape of undersea infrastructure is extensive and complex. Figures 1–2 show the extent of underwater energy infrastructure (Figure 1) and subsea data cables (Figure 2) across Europe.</p> +<h4 id="控方在美國國務院前資深顧問建議下-黎智英指示設蘋果英文版">控方:在美國國務院前資深顧問建議下 黎智英指示設蘋果英文版</h4> -<p>While data cables are uniformly spread across the Euro-Atlantic area, the picture is different for energy infrastructure, which is concentrated in northern Europe — namely the North Atlantic (North Sea) and High North (Norwegian Sea). This supply is critical to Europe: in the second quarter of 2023, the European Union imported 44.3 percent of its natural gas (in gaseous state) from Norway and 17.8 percent from the United Kingdom. That 16.5 percent was from Algeria (through three subsea Mediterranean pipelines) also shows the importance of energy infrastructure in southern Europe. This could increase in the future with new projects (such as the EastMed pipeline) and new gas field discoveries as Europe diversifies away from Russian supply. Offshore wind energy infrastructure (along with subsea electrical cables) is also concentrated in northern Europe but present in significant amounts across Europe. Such infrastructure is also expanding quickly: under the European Green Deal, for example, offshore wind energy will expand over 25 times by 2030.</p> +<p>控方指2020年5月,有傳媒報導人大打算在香港實施《國安法》,其時黎智英已開始從事針對中央的敵對活動,支持或提出請求外國勢力向中央及特區政府實施制裁或封鎖。早於同年4月,美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 電郵向黎智英提議設英文版,黎智英便指示下屬設立《蘋果日報》英文版,以尋求外力向中央及香港政府實施制裁。</p> -<p>However, any judgment about prioritizing NATO’s efforts to protect CUI in one region cannot rely on the density of infrastructure alone because all undersea infrastructure is proportionately important to each ally. In addition to including the views of all allies, any assessment must combine geography with the other elements of the framework. This task is explored in the final section of this brief.</p> +<p>控方展示黎智英與 Christian Whiton 之間的對話,後者在2020年4月17日指設立《蘋果日報》英文版在政治上有好處。4月19日,Mark Simon 向黎指英文版原意是好,但可能不符成本效益。</p> -<h3 id="recommendations-winning-the-fourth-battle-of-the-atlantic">RECOMMENDATIONS: WINNING THE FOURTH BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC</h3> +<h4 id="群組對話顯示黎稱不需做平衡報導-指示應集中保衛香港的聲音">群組對話顯示黎稱不需做平衡報導 指示應集中「保衛香港的聲音」</h4> -<p>The staff at NATO’s new Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure do not have the luxury of pondering future threats. NATO’s CUI is under attack right now. This situation may worsen as Russia tries to undermine Western support for Ukraine and cheaper, more advanced AUVs enable a wider range of actors to pose a threat. As Foggo, the former commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Allied Joint Force Command Naples, puts it: “the fourth battle of the Atlantic is underway.” Like its predecessors, this battle is “a struggle between Russian forces that probe for weakness, and US and NATO anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces that protect and deter. Just like in the Cold War, the stakes are high.”</p> +<p>至2020年5月10日,黎智英創立 WhatsApp 群組「English news」,其他成員包括張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、馮偉光及張志偉。他們其後討論英文版的運作方式,黎提出請求美國政治領袖去訂閱,以得到他們的支持(“By enlisting foreign leaders to subscribe to us is enlisting their support.”)。</p> -<p>NATO and its new center must therefore act quickly. The final section provides a series of recommendations for NATO planners to conceptualize and prioritize their efforts in the coming years. The recommendations comprise two parts. The first is a general assessment of initial priorities for protecting CUI based on the four-part framework developed above. The second builds on this broad assessment to propose more specific and immediate actions.</p> +<p>黎強調不需全面地向外國人展示香港的不同政治派別,只需要聚焦在「蘋果日報觀點,即黃營的一般觀點」。(“We only concentrate in our Apple Daily HK view, a general view of the yellow side.”) 黎又指不需要做平衡報導,因保衛香港的聲音需要被世界聽見。(“We are not trying to strike a balance but the point of view of the people on the side of protecting HK. This is the voice the world wants to know.”)直至黎智英被拘捕之前,該群組一直有持續運作。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Q63FfXa.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Undersea Energy Infrastructure in Northern Europe.</strong> Source: Data from <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/atlas/maritime_atlas/">“European Atlas of the Seas,” European Commission</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="黎智英指示mark-simon邀請彭斯和蓬佩奧等人訂閱蘋果英文版">黎智英指示Mark Simon邀請彭斯和蓬佩奧等人訂閱蘋果英文版</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/r6J7v97.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Undersea Data Cables in Europe.</strong> Source: Data from <a href="https://www.submarinecablemap.com/">“Submarine Cable Map,” TeleGeography</a>.</em></p> +<p>黎智英亦與 Mark Simon 討論,黎指引入英文版可吸引美國人及其他外國人支持,遂指示 Mark Simon 協助宣傳,以及邀請時任美國副總統彭斯和時任國務卿蓬佩奧訂閱。黎其後表示聽聞有一些撰稿人不想再替《南華早報》寫文章,提議可邀請他們供稿予蘋果英文版,籲 Mark Simon 聯絡南華早報前總編輯 Mark Clifford 商討。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/C61OqXa.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: A Framework for Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure.</strong> Source: Authors’ assessment.</em></p> +<p>黎其後指出,英文版除了讓支持反修例運動的美國人有方法訂閱蘋果之外,若果彭斯(Mike Pence)、蓬佩奧(Mike Pompeo)和共和黨參議員 Marco Rubio 等外國官員都訂閱的話,可在政治上保護到蘋果,因蘋果現時是中聯辦的針對目標,而外國支持是黎的關注點。黎決定英文版每天發布約10至12篇報導、專題和評論文章,另加8至10篇關於中國內地的文章,目標對象是美國讀者,希望打破《南華早報》的壟斷。</p> -<h4 id="general-assessment-of-initial-priorities-for-protecting-cui">GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF INITIAL PRIORITIES FOR PROTECTING CUI</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>Jimmy Lai is a Champion of Freedom &amp; I was honored to welcome him to the White House in 2019. Today, he sits in prison for his support of Democracy in Hong Kong &amp; @VoCommunism rightly awarded him their Highest Honor for his Courageous Commitment to Freedom. God Bless Jimmy Lai.🇺🇸 pic.twitter.com/oU69TSkex2 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) June 11, 2021</p> +</blockquote> -<p>This section presents a general indicative assessment of NATO’s role in protecting CUI based on the framework discussed in Figure 3. The shaded area suggests where NATO’s initial focus should be for protecting CUI. This assessment is discussed in more detail below, starting with the prioritization criteria for each element.</p> +<p>黎智英亦向張劍虹提議在英文版加入台灣的報導,以吸引美國人的注意。張回覆:「老闆,一定需要的,中美大戰,台灣重要,必須要加的,謝謝」。</p> -<p><em>Infrastructure Type</em></p> +<h4 id="控方列黎智英twitter追蹤名單-官質疑可反映什麼">控方列黎智英Twitter追蹤名單 官質疑可反映什麼</h4> -<p>Undersea infrastructure may be prioritized for protection by considering the criticality to NATO allies and vulnerability to different threats. Doing so suggests NATO focus on protecting energy and communications infrastructure — the most critical infrastructure to many NATO allies, whose developed economies depend on either importing or exporting energy and transmitting data. Such infrastructure is also the most vulnerable to attack, as recent attacks on pipelines and undersea cables have demonstrated. If further prioritization is required, it should be driven by an analysis of resilience of energy infrastructure compared to data cables: although both are vital and vulnerable, some systems are more resilient and easier to reconfigure in the event of damage.</p> +<p>控方指在大約同一時間,黎於2020年5月開設了個人 Twitter 帳戶,以圖增加影響力打「國際線」。帖文不時標示美國、英國、日本及台灣的政治人物,與他們互相交流。而李兆富(Simon Lee)則負責管理黎的 Twitter 帳戶。</p> -<p>However, it is important to remember undersea infrastructure is much broader than pipelines and cables. Many NATO allies depend on fishing, the health of their marine ecosystems, and maritime security in the broadest sense. The rapid growth of AUVs may transform the transport sector, introducing new types of CUI and new threats. Most importantly, NATO’s approach to protecting CUI will need to incorporate the preferences of all allies.</p> +<p>控方列出黎智英 Twitter 帳戶追蹤的多名外國政治人物,包括時任美國副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧、Natan Sharansky、台灣領導人蔡英文、「香港監察」創辦人 Benedict Rogers、「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人兼執行董事 Luke de Pulford、「Fight for Freedom. Stand with Hong Kong. 重光團隊」、對華政策跨國議會聯盟、前香港大專學界國際事務代表團發言人邵嵐、美國國會及行政當局中國委員會、美國眾議院外交委員會、美軍前副參謀長 Jack Keane、美國參議員 Ted Cruz、《華爾街日報》編輯 Bill McGurn。</p> -<p><em>Threat</em></p> +<p>法官李運騰問到,控方列出黎追蹤的帳戶是想顯示什麼?控方代表周天行則指名單可顯示到黎的「聯繫」,李官指「聯繫」的意思可以很廣闊。周天行指可反映黎與上述人士在 Twitter 上有交流,以及犯案時的心思意念(state of mind),即黎是知悉自己在做什麼,並且有相關意圖。</p> -<p>Threats may be prioritized by considering the likelihood and consequences of an attack. With this in mind, NATO should focus on hybrid or gray zone threats to CUI, as these are the most likely threats in the near term. At the same time, the most dangerous threat to NATO allies remains the threat of armed attack on CUI as a prelude to aggression or during conflict.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英曾指示蘋果員工不要針對特朗普-因蘋果靠其支保命">黎智英曾指示蘋果員工不要針對特朗普 因蘋果靠其支「保命」</h4> -<p>Terrorism targeted at CUI remains a risk, and blue crime is ever present. But other bodies should take the lead (e.g., national police and coast guards, multinational maritime security frameworks), with NATO providing support only where necessary, as with combating large-scale piracy. NATO can contribute to awareness of accidental damage through MDA and crisis response to natural damage and disaster, but these tasks should not drive alliance force structure or posture.</p> +<p>同年5月25日,《蘋果》發布一篇文章題為〈打國際線 蘋果英文版免費試睇〉,內容表示香港的人權被中共侵犯,英文版可供國際的朋友認識香港的狀況。</p> -<p><em>Task</em></p> +<p>控方指,黎智英宣傳英文版時提及,多人訂閱不但可提供經濟上的支持,亦可保護《蘋果》免受政治打壓。黎智英又指示國際組同事「不要跟紐約時報及CNN針對川普,我們蘋果卻要靠川普政府支持保命」。</p> -<p>The role of NATO assets in protecting CUI may be prioritized by considering the importance of relevant tasks and their role in NATO’s Strategic Concept. Deterrence and defense is the alliance’s core task. Deterring armed aggression is NATO’s raison d’être and remains its most important task. However, NATO’s capacity to do this is dependent on its general deterrence posture and is not related to the specific problem of protecting CUI — so it is not considered a primary focus here (see Figure 3). Within the context of protecting CUI, NATO should focus on three primary tasks:</p> +<p>2020年6月16日,《蘋果》發布彭定康支持訂閱的宣傳短片,題為「彭定康拍片撐新聞自由:每日一蘋果全為你好」。黎智英其後指示張劍虹安排《蘋果》發起「一人一信救香港」,呼籲香港人寫信給時任美國總統特朗普,並提供書信範本及步驟。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Detect:</strong> NATO should focus on detecting threats to CUI, as detection is the foundation of deterrence and critical for removing the cloak of ambiguity around hybrid threats. Detection can be strengthened through enhanced MDA in priority regions. This may require increasing the persistent presence of forces and assets that can contribute to MDA in the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Deter by denial:</strong> NATO should also focus on strengthening deterrence by denial by improving the defenses that can prevent attacks in the first place. This may also require strengthening the persistent presence of allied forces in regions of concern to protect key sites, reassure vulnerable allies, and deter aggressors. Wider resilience measures can also strengthen denial, but these are judged to be a lower priority for NATO because much of this infrastructure is owned and operated by civilian enterprises, not amenable to military solutions, and already subject to extensive efforts by other actors more suited to boosting public and private sector resilience — such as the European Union.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Deter by punishment:</strong> Responses to imminent threats or attacks should prioritize speed and reliability over severity. In the context of deterring low-end hybrid threats (rather than high-end conventional threats) to CUI, this suggests the utility of maritime forces that are forward based in priority regions — or at least persistently present or rapidly deployable (i.e., held at high readiness). More broadly, existing NATO units such as countering hybrid threat teams also have a role to play in immediate incident response and recovery.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>黃之鋒對「一人一信救香港」持不同意見,並在社交媒體稱「冇理由叫人哋國家嘅總統SaveHK」。陳沛敏把相關帖文 WhatsApp 發送給黎,黎則回應他不同意黃的觀點,現時任何有助於香港的方法都應該採用,雖然他知道很多人不同意「一人一信救香港」行動,包括李柱銘,但唯一出路就是要勇敢起來,因已沒有其他方法對付中共。</p> -<p>However, although this assessment is focused on protecting allied CUI against hybrid threats, this should not unduly warp NATO’s force posture. Any trade-offs in posture, capability, or readiness to deal with hybrid threats should not come at the expense of the credibility of NATO’s ability to deal with — and thereby deter — armed aggression.</p> +<h4 id="控方國安法生效後-黎智英在網上直播對談節目談制裁">控方:國安法生效後 黎智英在網上直播對談節目談制裁</h4> -<p><em>Region</em></p> +<p>控方指,當《國安法》於2020年6月30日晚上11時生效,《蘋果》隨即發布一篇題為〈惡法生效 兩制蓋棺 泛民7.1繼續抗爭〉的新聞報導,實體報紙亦夾附一張海報,寫有「Fight For Freedom 為自由抗爭」。</p> -<p>Not all subregions within the Euro-Atlantic area are equal when it comes to protecting CUI. The extent of regional energy infrastructure, proximity to advanced Russian undersea capabilities, and track record of recent incidents (attacks and infrastructure mapping) suggest NATO should focus initially on the Baltic, North Atlantic, and High North regions. At the same time, NATO cannot afford to ignore other regions that are critical to allies and where Russian forces and other threats (such as terrorism and blue crime) are known to operate, including the Mediterranean and Black Sea region.</p> +<p>此時《蘋果》製作了新的網上直播節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」,首次播出時間為7月9日,題為「Live Q&amp;A with Jimmy Lai」,黎在節目中表示以後會每週播放,並對《國安法》作出批評。之後的集數則邀請不同人士與黎智英對談,包括南華早報及英文虎報前總編輯 Mark Clifford、前港督彭定康 Chris Patten、Benedict Rogers、Jack Keane、前美國外交官 Raymond Burghardt、美國前副國防部長 Paul Wolfowitz、Natan Sharansky、美國記者兼時評作家 Nicholas Kristof 等。</p> -<h4 id="specific-recommendations">SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>控方列舉黎智英在節目中的言論,並在庭上播放影片。黎以英語形容《國安法》生效後香港會「玩完」,若果美國取消香港特殊地位的話,意味關上中國通向世界的窗口,中國會更易接受美國的要求,因此黎支持美國取消香港特殊地位,因在國安法下特殊地位變得無意義。</p> -<p>The general assessment above, combined with the previous discussion of the four framework elements, suggests several more recommendations for NATO’s role in protecting CUI. These are divided into two parts: immediate actions that the new NATO center should implement quickly and longer-term approaches that are equally important but may take more time.</p> +<p>黎又指,歐洲國家應與美國聯合一起對付中國,制裁措施可以拖慢中國的通訊科技和晶片科技發展和研究,影響「華為」手機和中端科技(CTE)等企業。屆時台灣將會成為亞洲的科技樞紐,而中國則會逐漸衰退,最終使習近平讓步及立場軟化。</p> -<p><em>Immediate Recommendations</em></p> +<h4 id="控方指黎智英被捕後繼續辦節目-稱有機會被起訴勾結-籲海外人士繼續發聲">控方指黎智英被捕後繼續辦節目 稱有機會被起訴勾結 籲海外人士繼續發聲</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Establish a new Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) focused on protecting CUI.</strong> NATO’s four standing maritime groups are in high operational demand and none are focused on protecting CUI. Considering the growing threat, NATO should consider establishing an “SNMG3” to focus on protecting CUI in northern Europe, focused on the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and Norwegian Sea (the areas of highest CUI density). The JEF task group that is currently deployed is a good example but only temporary. The capabilities of the group should include submarines, anti-submarine warfare, maritime surveillance, and seabed mapping, with contributions from allies who specialize in this domain. The group would play a vital role in organizing and delivering the functions of detecting, deterring, and responding to attacks on CUI in priority regions described in this report.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Commission a CUI vulnerability triage.</strong> Any approach to enhancing resilience starts with a vulnerability assessment. An initial triage assessment of criticality versus vulnerability to a range of threats can help MARCOM and NATO direct limited resources to protecting and defending those assets most at risk. The initial assessment presented here forms a starting point, but NATO’s own assessment must consider all forms of infrastructure, threats, regions, and the preferences of all allies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Develop a fused MDA picture.</strong> A critical step in transforming MDA to improve detection and identification of threats to CUI will be fusing the existing intelligence picture across nations, the private and public sectors, and multinational and maritime domains (e.g., air, sea, subsea, space, and cyber). Assessing the highest-priority infrastructure and threats can help identify which ISR capabilities and combinations not currently available to MARCOM are necessary to rapidly attribute malign activity.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Produce regular CUI threat assessments.</strong> NATO already produces maritime threat assessments for governments and the commercial sector that focus on threats such as terrorism — for example, through the NATO Maritime Shipping Centre (MSC). These should either be expanded to include threats to CUI or be dedicated assessments that focus on nontraditional hybrid threats to CUI.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Clarify the role of NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell.</strong> The cell is based in NATO headquarters, but its wide remit — which includes industry and civil-military engagement, best practice, and technology — and senior leadership may overlap with the new MARCOM center. The coordination cell could perform the role the MSC did during Ocean Shield of protecting CUI, which will be even more important given CUI is mostly owned and operated by private companies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Implement a CUI exercise program.</strong> Exercises are a vital part of NATO’s deterrence and reassurance efforts and have been stepped up over the last year. Yet CUI exercises have been limited and focused on technology. A wider CUI exercise program using existing assets would deliver wider effects to deter adversaries and reassure allies and industry partners.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Update NATO’s maritime strategy.</strong> NATO’s maritime strategy is over 12 years old, does not mention Russia or China, and mentions undersea infrastructure only in passing. It needs updating to reflect the new threat environment and NATO’s new Strategic Concept — including a focus on protecting CUI. The new center should have a lead role in producing a new strategy — or at least a “Protecting CUI” annex.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>控方指,黎在2020年8月10日首次被拘捕,即使如此,黎在同月13日繼續舉行直播節目,並在 Twitter 稱「the show has to go on」。黎又在其後的節目中稱自己被捕一事顯示香港人正面對一個怎樣的政權,並批評香港政府隨意拘捕及是極權,猶如「俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭」。</p> -<p><em>Longer-Term Recommendations</em></p> +<p>在另一集節目,黎智英與 Benedict Rogers 對談時提到,他自己有機會被控告「勾結外國勢力」,所以海外人士的聲音變得重要,呼籲 Benedict Rogers 繼續堅持他的工作,並感謝他所做的工作,又形容國際社會是香港人的「救星」(savior)。</p> -<ul> +<p>2020年11月13日的節目中,前港督彭定康指中共是香港自由民主的威脅,如果想中國改變的話,要持續為香港勇敢走出來。有觀眾問國際社會可以做什麼,黎智英表示,民主派聲音將在立法會消失,意味國際社會可能再也聽不到香港的聲音,「香港可以講係喺窒息之中」,所以新聞很重要,可以令世界繼續留意香港並為香港發聲,「如果世界忘記咗我哋,就會好大鑊。」</p> + +<p>黎智英在另一次節目中強調,不可以向中國認輸,而他現時與不同外國人士交流,面對被起訴「勾結外國勢力」的風險,但他必須堅持及繼續手上的工作。黎又提到,很多人崇拜他,使他肩負很多責任,一方面感到責任重大,另一方面感到振奮,因他有這樣的身位去做如此美妙的工作(wonderful thing),沒有放棄的理由。</p> + +<h4 id="黎智英稱特朗普較難以捉摸-於中國而言比拜登更危險">黎智英稱特朗普較難以捉摸 於中國而言比拜登更「危險」</h4> + +<p>黎智英在其後的集數中指,制裁不會帶來最大的破壞,最大的破壞是中美對立局面導致開戰,若果中美之間開戰的話,會帶來不確定性,最終沒有人敢來中國投資。不過黎指,若果美國與亞洲國家愈走愈近,最後孤立中國的話,便會削弱中國應對戰爭的力量,所以他認為未來中美不會開戰。另一個黎認為不會開戰的原因,是若果開戰的話,外國將不會運送石油給中國,而中國並未準備好開戰。</p> + +<p>有聽眾問到海外人士在美國大選應怎樣做,黎智英則指對中國來說,特朗普(Donald Trump)比拜登(Joe Biden)更「危險」,因特朗普比較難以捉摸,認為他當選是很重要。黎在一集與彭定康對談時表示,對於拜登採取「多邊主義」外交手法並不抱希望,因各個國家對中國採取不同做法,導致削弱整體立場,籲拜登對中國強硬,又鼓勵海外人士游說外國官員。</p> + +<p>黎亦呼籲美國更多連繫太平洋亞洲,因他們是未來最大的經濟市場。就台灣局勢,黎形容美國是台灣的「國防後盾」(security backbone),無可避免地會提升軍事和經濟支援予台灣。</p> + +<p>案件明日續審,控方將繼續開案陳詞及播放「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」片段。</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導控方:黎智英籲下屬勿針對特朗普 指示Mark Simon邀彭斯和蓬佩奧訂閱英文版U.S.-India Relations In 20232024-01-02T12:00:00+08:002024-01-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/us-india-relations-in-2023<p><em>2023 was one of the more consequential years for U.S.-India relations — for both, positive and negative reasons. Poring through the numerous senior-level engagements and outcome documents, the relationship largely remains in the “agenda-setting mode”. However, as indicated by the types of engagements and frequency — one can expect concrete outcomes soon. Notably, China remains a driving imperative behind U.S.-India strategic and commercial relations.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>However, there were several tangible steps marking important shifts in U.S.-India relations. I have outlined five big events from the past year and underscored their larger implications. Additionally, I have also linked the work produced by the CSIS India Chair on the five subjects to provide additional detail. The events are not chronological but rather in the order of significance.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/L6R77xc.png" alt="image01" /></p> + +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>Develop a NATO CUI resilience strategy.</strong> Building on the vulnerability assessment, a longer-term effort that the new center could lead is developing a NATO CUI resilience strategy. This would meet NATO’s Strengthened Resilience Commitment and could inform (and be informed by) a NATO resilience planning process.</p> + <p><strong>GE Engine Deal, June 2023:</strong> General Electric and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited announced an agreement to co-produce the F-414 engine for India’s domestic “Tejas” light fighter. The two governments first announced plans to work towards co-production of jet engines in January 2015, but discussions soon died off.</p> + + <p><em>The Significance:</em> This agreement underscores growing U.S. trust in India, based on shared security concerns. Helping India improve defense production will also reduce India’s continued reliance on Russian-made defense equipment. This agreement also shows that ideas which may have failed a decade ago can be successfully revisited.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Adopt a NATO CUI preparedness goal.</strong> As part of a strengthened approach to CUI resilience, allies could commit to a NATO CUI preparedness goal to bolster national and pan-NATO approaches to preparing for attacks on CUI.</p> + <p><strong>Dropping WTO Disputes, June 2023:</strong> During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington in June, the two governments agreed to drop six outstanding disputes before the World Trade Organization. The seventh and final dispute was dropped during President Biden’s visit to India in September 2023.</p> + + <p><em>The Significance:</em> Trade policy remains one of the weakest areas of bilateral government engagement. While the two sides have made some progress in discussions over areas of strategically significant trade, general trade concerns fester. Utilizing leader-level summits to end disputes might be an “overkill,” but it shows growing recognition from both nations that improving commercial ties is crucial for the long-term sustainability of the relationship. However, as I noted in an earlier piece, despite the significance of the measures, a comprehensive framework akin to the Australian government’s 2018 India Economic Strategy would be momentous for bilateral commercial relationship.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Take a risk management approach.</strong> The sheer variety of threats to CUI and the number of potential targets require an approach that prioritizes and manages risk. Even better than a risk-centric strategy would be an uncertainty-centric approach that seeks robustness against a range of unknowable threats.</p> + <p><strong>Combined Maritime Force Bahrain, November 2023:</strong> While the American and Indian militaries regularly conduct exercises, there is a dearth of practical military cooperation. That changed at the India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in November, in Delhi when India announced it would join the 28-member “Combined Maritime Forces” naval partnership based in Bahrain.</p> + + <p><em>The Significance:</em> India’s membership of the CMF provides a new, regularized venue for U.S.-India interoperability training. We may soon witness more regular joint security missions in the Gulf to counter piracy, smuggling, and other illicit operations.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Develop a CUI attack response playbook.</strong> Effective deterrence against CUI attacks requires a credible and reliable set of measures to respond to threats or attacks on CUI. A counter-CUI playbook of military (and nonmilitary) response options would help. This playbook could also be the basis of a robust exercise program.</p> + <p><strong>New York Assassination Attempt Indictment, November 2023:</strong> As the year was nearing its close, U.S.-India relations were shook with the unsealing of an indictment in the Southern District of New York. The indictment alleged a plot outlining an Indian intelligence officer’s involvement in the attempted assassination of a Sikh separatist who is an American citizen. As this case moves ahead, there will likely be other closely watched moments that could alter the trajectory of U.S.-India ties</p> + + <p><em>The Significance:</em> American policy circles are already replete with critics of India’s recent record in areas like religious tolerance and human rights. While the Biden Administration has chosen — so far — to press ahead on cooperation, the assassination attempt further strengthens these critics and raises fundamental questions about the depth of our “shared values.” As noted by my colleague Katherine Hadda, the United States’ approach to focus on a specific Indian official rather than implicating the entire government is pragmatic. Most likely, reasonable action from India in response to these allegations will suffice to maintain the relationship’s momentum. However, the event adds uncertainty to the relationship. Other steps by the Modi government that shrink the civil society space can further move these currents.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Adopt a framework nation approach to regional CUI protection.</strong> A regional framework nation approach to protecting CUI could help tailor CUI protection to the differing concerns of regional allies. One example is the JEF, newly focused on protecting northern Europe’s CUI. Whatever the framework, any regional approach to protecting CUI should be directed by the alliance’s DDA concept, NATO’s guiding framework for all operations short of war, and align with new regional plans agreed at the Vilnius summit.</p> + <p><strong>Steep Drop in FDI:</strong> Media reports of significant investments by foreign technology firms into India engenders the feeling that “Make in India,” paired with increased trade pressure on China, has finally started to build momentum. However, the government of India’s own data proves otherwise. According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Monthly Bulletin data, India saw a 27 percent year-on-year drop in 12-month foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow (new equity) and a 43 percent drop in FDI inflow from the mid-2021 peak. World Bank data shows manufacturing stuck at around 13 percent of India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). One major potential investor, Foxconn, dropped its massive $20 billion chip venture with Vedanta this summer. However, there are some “green shoots” that foreign investment might finally be shifting back towards India — including a healthy $6.5 billion new equity inflow in October 2023.</p> + + <p><em>The Significance:</em> There are a multitude of reasons that the FDI into India has declined. First, there has been a significant slowdown in new reforms during the Modi government’s second term, as indicated by our own “India Reforms Scorecard.” Second, too few state governments are aggressively pursuing foreign investment. Third, regulatory shifts occur quite often. Finally, dozens of sectors still have foreign investment restrictions including both sectoral FDI caps as well as stringent operational regulations that only apply to foreign companies. U.S.-India cooperation on boosting Indian manufacturing will be mutually advantageous. For instance, my colleague Raymond Vickery, notes that the signing of the U.S.-India Memorandum of Understanding on Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation will allow the two countries to the identify complementary competencies, and prevent unrequited competition.</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<hr /> +<p>The coming year is replete with promises and pitfalls. National elections in both India and the United States could trigger shifts in foreign policy and economic policymaking. New revelations related to the attempted murder case in New York may provide new fuel to the relationship’s critics. Additionally, the United States’ and India’s differing approaches to the elections in Bangladesh will underscore geostrategic divisions.</p> -<p><strong>Sean Monaghan</strong> is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on NATO, European security, and defense. His career as a civil servant in the UK Ministry of Defence has focused on international defense policy, including NATO, the European Union, and the United States. In recent years, his work as a policy analyst has seen him contribute to the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review and lead multinational research projects.</p> +<p>However, we can expect the several workstreams outlined above to bear fruit. Senior-level engagements provide action-forcing events — with great urgency over time as China increases its dangerous activities across the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<p><strong>Otto Svendsen</strong> is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where he provides research and analysis on political, economic, and security developments in Europe.</p> +<p>In the words of the author Karl Schroeder, “Foresight is not about predicting the future, it’s about minimizing surprise”. We may not know every significant in 2024 that will influence the relationship, but the high level of dialogue between the United States and Indian governments is reason for cautious optimism.</p> -<p><strong>Mike Darrah</strong> is a military fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS. He is a commander and aviator in the U.S. Coast Guard and came to CSIS from Sector Humboldt Bay, where he served as deputy sector commander, overseeing all Coast Guard operations in the northern quarter of California.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>Ed Arnold</strong> is a research fellow with the International Security department at the Royal United Services Institute.</p>Sean Monaghan, et al.NATO is not ready to mitigate increasingly prevalent Russian aggression against European critical undersea infrastructure (CUI).【黎智英案・審訊第一日】2023-12-18T12:00:00+08:002023-12-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-1<ul> - <li>黎智英爭議串謀發布煽動刊物罪逾時檢控、涉新聞自由應寬鬆詮釋法例</li> +<p><strong>Richard Rossow</strong> is a senior adviser and holds the Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In this role, he helps frame and shape policies to promote greater business and economic engagement between the two countries, with a unique focus on tracking and engaging Indian states. He has been working on U.S.-India relations for over 25 years.</p>Richard M. Rossow2023 was one of the more consequential years for U.S.-India relations — for both, positive and negative reasons. Poring through the numerous senior-level engagements and outcome documents, the relationship largely remains in the “agenda-setting mode”. However, as indicated by the types of engagements and frequency — one can expect concrete outcomes soon. Notably, China remains a driving imperative behind U.S.-India strategic and commercial relations.【黎智英案・審訊第四日】2024-01-02T12:00:00+08:002024-01-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-4<ul> + <li>控方開案陳詞:黎智英為「主腦」 國安法生效前已著手聯絡及會面外國官員</li> + <li>控方指黎智英與李柱銘晤佩洛西 多次受訪稱需要外國向中國施壓制裁</li> </ul> <excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/N3aORzf.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/epA4qge.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(18日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)開審。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻,爭議控方前年加控串謀刊印煽動刊物罪時,超出了檢控時限4日,法庭沒有司法管轄權處理;又指本案涉及新聞自由等基本權利,應以較寬鬆的尺度詮釋法例,但對於控方應較嚴謹。至於控方指在檢控期限未屆滿前,曾去信通知法庭「有意」申請新增控罪,辯方則認為直至控方把黎智英帶上法庭加控,才算正式就該罪開始進行檢控。辯方明天將繼續陳詞。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(2日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第4日審訊。3名《國安法》指定法官上月裁定煽動刊物罪無逾時檢控後,黎今早庭上答辯,否認3項控罪。之後控方讀出開案陳詞,指黎智英是本案「主腦」,對《蘋果日報》的運作有完全的控制權,他曾指示下屬開設英文版,以圖尋求外國制裁中國及香港特區官員。控方又指黎在《國安法》生效之前,已開始與不同的外國官員及非政府組織人士聯絡、會面,尋求實施制裁、封鎖及敵對行動,至今共有42名中國及香港特區官員被制裁。</p> -<p>已還柙逾3年的黎智英,今身穿淺藍色恤衫、灰色西裝褸,被4名懲教人員帶進被告欄。黎身形明顯消瘦,但精神不俗,向旁聽席的家屬揮手、點頭,又微笑豎起拇指,天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君亦有站起身向黎揮手。黎於審訊期間戴上耳機輔助聆聽,神情專注,休庭時與女兒多次互相飛吻。</p> +<p>76歲的黎智英身穿白色恤衫、藍色西裝褸,由數名懲教人員帶往被告欄應訊,他面帶笑容、神情愉悅地與妻子及兒女打招呼。</p> -<p>被告為:黎智英(76歲)、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/w1uTRNc.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 黎妻 李韻琴</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/p65rndW.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 黎智英</p> +<h4 id="黎否認一項發布煽動刊物及兩項串謀勾結外國勢力罪-另一項勾結外力罪則存檔法庭">黎否認一項發布煽動刊物及兩項串謀勾結外國勢力罪 另一項勾結外力罪則存檔法庭</h4> -<p>黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及Marc Corlett。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。</p> +<p>在上月開審首天,辯方爭議串謀煽動刊物罪逾時檢控,3名《國安法》指定法官聽畢控辯雙方陳詞後,裁定法庭在檢控期限屆滿10日之前收到控方通知擬加控罪,所以認為不存在逾時檢控的情況,因此駁回辯方申請,換言之控方就煽動刊物罪的檢控仍然有效。今天辯方向法庭申請釐清相關裁決,指稱控罪時段應縮短至10日,即2021年6月14至24日,惟3名法官認為辯方是提出新理據並意圖重啟爭議,最終拒絕申請。</p> -<p>控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處高級警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。</p> +<p>接著4名被告在庭上答辯。黎智英否認一項「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物罪」及一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司派出一名代表,該人士代表3間公司同樣否認上述兩罪。</p> -<p>審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。</p> +<p>黎亦否認另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。他另面對的一項「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,控方則申請存檔於法庭,獲法庭批准。</p> -<p>黎智英的太太李韻琴、黎的3名子女,及天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君均坐在家屬席。</p> +<h4 id="控方形容黎為激進的政治人物-是案中主腦">控方形容黎為「激進的政治人物」 是案中主腦</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/w1eW6Ho.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 黎智英太太 李韻琴(左)、幼子 黎順恩(右)</p> +<p>控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作開案陳詞,指本案關於一名「激進的政治人物」,激起市民對中央及特區政府的憎恨,以及勾結外國勢力以對中國及香港特區實施制裁、封鎖及敵對行動,危害國家安全。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HO15qyg.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君</p> +<p>控方指,黎智英是3項控罪的主腦,並與政治倡議團體「Stand with Hong Kong, Fight for Freedom」一同串謀犯案。在案發時期,《蘋果日報》一共發布了161篇具煽動性文章,其中31篇在2020年7月1日《國安法》實施之後發布。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FEZLJ8i.jpg" alt="image05" /> -▲ 國安處高級警司 李桂華</p> +<p>控方指稱,早在《國安法》於2020年7月生效之前,黎智英已開始支持或提出請求外國勢力向中央及特區政府實施制裁或封鎖。據《蘋果日報》報導,黎智英於2019年7月與時任美國副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧及美國參議員等人會面,討論《逃犯條例》修訂,當黎被問到美國可以做什麼時,黎曾提出制裁中國及香港官員,讓他們知道有何後果。控方指,上述顯示《蘋果日報》被利用作為平台提倡制裁。</p> -<h4 id="媒體報導稱黎申請海外證人作供被拒-法官澄清沒有收到相關申請">媒體報導稱黎申請海外證人作供被拒 法官澄清沒有收到相關申請</h4> +<h4 id="控方指黎智英與多名外籍人士聯絡-導致42名中港官員受制裁">控方指黎智英與多名外籍人士聯絡 導致42名中港官員受制裁</h4> -<p>甫開庭,法官杜麗冰指,有見本地傳媒上周報導稱法庭拒絕被告申請海外證人以視像形式作供,特此澄清《刑事訴訟程序條例》規定,海外證人如要作供,須在案件交付至高院後42日之內提出申請,但本案並無任何人申請海外證人作供,也沒有任何申請要求延長42日期限。代表黎的資深大律師彭耀鴻及代表3間蘋果公司的大律師王國豪在庭上確認。</p> +<p>控方又指,從2020年7月1日《國安法》實施起,至2021年2月15日陳梓華被拘捕,黎與 Mark Simon 和陳梓華等人一同串謀勾結外國勢力。控方在庭上屏幕展示人物關係圖,其中 Mark Simon 是黎智英的私人助理,二人均在 WhatsApp 群組「DC Dems」及 Signal 群組「Jimmy Mark」。其他涉案人士包括前美國陸軍上將 Jack Keane、前美國國防部副部長 Paul Wolfowitz、前美國駐港澳總領事郭明瀚(James Cunningham)、「香港監察」創辦人 Benedict Rogers 及「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」行政總監 Luke de Pulford 等,控方指部份人加入上述兩個通訊群組,亦會與黎智英「一對一」聯絡及電郵。</p> -<h4 id="辯方爭議煽動刊物罪超出檢控時限-法庭無司法管轄權處理">辯方爭議煽動刊物罪超出檢控時限 法庭無司法管轄權處理</h4> +<p>控方指,事實上不同的制裁措施的確有實施,至今共有42名中國及香港特區官員被制裁,審訊期間將會傳召香港城市大學法律學院教授王貴國就此作供。</p> -<p>黎智英就控罪答辯之前,其代表資深大律師彭耀鴻先就「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪逾時檢控提出爭議。控方案情指稱黎智英與其他被告於2019年4月1日起,一同串謀發布煽動刊物,該串謀直至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》停運為止。</p> +<h4 id="控方指擬傳召4名前蘋果高層出庭作供-其中3名為同案被告">控方指擬傳召4名前蘋果高層出庭作供 其中3名為同案被告</h4> -<p>彭指,根據《刑事罪行條例》第11條,煽動控罪的檢控「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行」;而據《刑事罪行條例》第159D條,對於依據協議而犯下的串謀罪行,若果提出檢控的時限已經屆滿,便不能就該串謀罪行「提出法律程序」。</p> +<p>就煽動刊物和涉及蘋果高層的串謀勾結外國勢力罪,控方將會依賴同案被告張劍虹、陳沛敏、楊清奇,以及未被起訴的前營運總監兼行政總裁周達權的證供,以證明串謀犯罪協議的存在,以及相關串謀協議乃源自黎智英的指示。</p> -<p>彭續指,若果由串謀的首天2019年4月1日起計,檢控時限是同年10月1日;若法庭不接納,由最後一天2021年6月24日起計算,控方的檢控時限亦是同年12月24日。然而黎在12月28日的法庭聆訊上才被正式加控「煽動刊物」罪,已逾時4日。</p> +<p>控方邀請法庭考慮相關串謀是持續性的,亦邀請法庭考慮黎智英在2020年5月開設了個人 Twitter 帳戶,作為顯示意圖的「外顯行為(Overt act)」。此外,控方依賴22篇黎智英個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」的評論文章、一段訪問影片,以及24段網上直播節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」影片,題為「Live Q&amp;A with Jimmy Lai」。控方亦會依賴黎智英接受外國傳媒訪問及 Twitter 帖文。</p> -<p>彭指,逾時檢控的問題關乎法庭是否有司法管轄權處理控罪,若果超過檢控時限,法庭便沒有司法管轄權處理「煽動刊物」控罪,且本案涉及新聞自由等基本權利,應以較寬鬆的尺度詮釋法例,但對於控方應較嚴謹。</p> +<h4 id="控方黎智英指示開設英文版-以圖尋求外力制裁">控方:黎智英指示開設英文版 以圖尋求外力制裁</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/F4o5yub.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻(中)、大律師 關文渭(後)、大律師 Marc Corlett(右)</p> +<p>控方指,《蘋果日報》於1995年1月根據《本地報刊註冊條例》註冊,直至2021年6月24日停運之前,《蘋果日報》一直是香港廣泛流通的報紙,無論實體報紙還是網站均有影響力。《蘋果》亦開設社交媒體包括 Facebook、Twitter 和 YouTube 。</p> -<h4 id="法官質疑串謀屬持續-辯方指不能以此避過檢控時限">法官質疑串謀屬持續 辯方指不能以此避過檢控時限</h4> +<p>2020年5月25日,黎智英指示《蘋果》開設英文版,以圖尋求外力向中央及香港政府實施制裁,並發布了一篇文章題為「打國際線 蘋果英文版免費試睇」。</p> -<p>法官杜麗冰問及,若果串謀並非一次性,而是持續一系列的串謀呢?彭耀鴻回應,若果串謀罪行只是一次性,檢控時限便須由作出串謀的首天起開始計算。</p> +<h4 id="控方提及社長與總編輯等各人角色-黎智英對蘋果運作有完全控制權">控方提及社長與總編輯等各人角色 黎智英對《蘋果》運作有「完全控制權」</h4> -<p>法官李運騰亦指,本案被告是持續干犯一連串的罪行,若控方分成多項控罪提控,並如辯方所指運用相同的檢控時限,或會出現較早干犯的控罪超出檢控時限、而較遲干犯的控罪則在時限之內檢控的情況;又質疑後來加入串謀者便不能被控。彭耀鴻同意,但強調控方可分開檢控,亦須及時檢控,不能以串謀來繞過檢控時限。</p> +<p>就各人在案中角色,控方指黎智英為串謀犯罪的主腦,對《蘋果日報》的運作有完全的控制權,他會向編輯發出指示以執行日常運作。</p> -<p>法官李運騰又問及,若被告人不在香港,但在海外導致煽動刊物在香港發布,控方便未能趕在檢控限期內將他帶上法庭提控。彭耀鴻則指,同樣的檢控期限依然適用,被告人依然受到條例所規定的時限保護。</p> +<p>張劍虹於案發時為《蘋果日報》社長,負責公司的整體運作,以及報紙的出版及發行。陳沛敏則是副社長,是實體報紙日常運作的決策人,亦撰寫評論文章,刊於專欄「堆填生活」。羅偉光是《蘋果日報》的總編輯,負責編輯工作及擔任《蘋果》網上平台的決策人。而林文宗是執行總編輯。</p> -<h4 id="辯方帶上法庭加控始算開始進行檢控-控方仍違檢控時限">辯方:帶上法庭加控始算開始進行檢控 控方仍違檢控時限</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Lsv49xQ.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 張劍虹</p> -<p>而就控方於2021年12月13日曾去信法庭表示「有意」申請新增煽動刊物罪、黎智英於翌日獲悉,彭耀鴻認為控方當時並未將黎帶上法庭正式加控,至12月28日才正式加控,故即使採納12月24日為檢控期限,仍然超出檢控時限4天。</p> +<p>馮偉光是英文版網站的編輯,並會以筆名「盧峯」撰寫評論文章。楊清奇是《蘋果日報》的主筆,負責撰寫社論,以及尋找適合的時評作者供稿。楊自己亦以筆名「李平」撰寫評論文章。</p> -<p>彭解釋,《刑事罪行條例》第11條列明煽動罪須於6個月內「開始進行(begun)」檢控,是立法時特意選用的字眼,強調直至控方把黎智英帶上法庭加控,才算「開始進行」檢控,而非如控方據《裁判官條例》第26條所指,於12月13日去信表示有意加控,「作出申訴或提出告發(making any complaint or laying any information)」,便可視為已「開始進行」檢控。</p> +<p>控方指,黎智英作為「飯盒會」的主席,平日會與陳沛敏、張劍虹、羅偉光、林文宗及楊清奇一同討論《蘋果日報》及其網上平台的編採方向。黎亦撰寫評論文章,刊於其專欄「成敗樂一笑」。</p> -<p>根據《裁判官條例》第26條,若罪行無規定作出申訴或提出告發的時效,則「申訴或告發」須於6個月內作出或提出。彭認為,只有很少罪行會訂明檢控時限,若《刑事罪行條例》第11條已為煽動罪訂明檢控時限,則將兩條法例的字眼理解為同一意思,會令《刑事罪行條例》第11條變得完全多餘,故「開始進行」檢控必定指「作出申訴或提出告發」以外的意思。</p> +<h4 id="控方指simon-lee於海外管理黎的twitter帳戶">控方指Simon Lee於海外管理黎的Twitter帳戶</h4> -<p>案件明續審,彭耀鴻將繼續陳詞。</p> +<p>至於利世民(Simon Lee)則負責管理黎智英的Twitter 帳戶,黎的帳戶於2020年5月發布首則帖文,但《國安法》生效後,利已經停止管理黎的帳戶,直至他離港後再次恢復相關工作。</p> -<hr /> +<p>周達權案發時則為《蘋果日報》的營運總監,亦是壹傳媒管理服務有限公司的財務總裁。</p> -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英爭議串謀發布煽動刊物罪逾時檢控、涉新聞自由應寬鬆詮釋法例Getting On Track2023-12-18T12:00:00+08:002023-12-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/getting-on-track<p><em>The conflict in Ukraine has made it clear that missiles “are foundational to adversaries’ way of war.” Future missile threats, however, increasingly stress existing missile defenses, flying lower, faster, and on unpredictable trajectories. Most importantly, they are difficult to detect — defeating them will require elevated sensors, on aircraft or satellites, to track them at range.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>As the Department of Defense begins to deploy a space-based sensor constellation, Getting on Track unpacks the design tradeoffs involved and key pitfalls to avoid. Using advanced simulation tools, the authors underscore the necessity of diversifying satellite orbits, designing constellations for early, persistent coverage, and retaining requirements for fire-control-capable sensors.</em></p> +<p>審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。</p> -<h3 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h3> +<p>黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師 Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>A new, elevated sensor architecture is required to detect, identify, and track a spectrum of maneuvering missile threats with sufficient quality to support missile defense fire control. These threats combine high speeds, unpredictable, non-ballistic trajectories, and large raid sizes to stress legacy defense designs.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The future of missile defense and missile defeat will be contingent on the development, characteristics, and fielding timeline of this architecture. One cannot defend against what one cannot see.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>There is no such thing as a perfect sensor architecture design. Designing an elevated sensor architecture is rather an exercise in tradeoffs. Given this multiplicity of trades, architecture design is as much an art as a science. The application of this art to specific designs reflects various institutional and policy assumptions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Unpacking these tradeoffs and assumptions — making them explicit — can help policymakers, budgeteers, and system architects, and better inform the public discussion related to missile tracking and missile defense. Doing so is the purpose of this report. This report does not advocate a particular architecture, but instead elaborates these tradeoffs, identifies principles to inform future architectures, and highlights temptations to avoid.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>No single orbit or domain represents an optimal approach for missile defense sensing. Low (LEO), medium (MEO), geosynchronous (GEO), and highly elliptical orbits (HEO) each contribute varied advantages for coverage, schedule, cost, and resilience.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Proliferating space sensors in LEO is one way to improve resilience, assuming large numbers and low-cost replacement. It is not the only way. Reliance on a single orbital regime, or on any single approach to resilience, invites disruption. LEO constellations can be degraded by area- or domain-wide effects, including electronic attack, nuclear or radiological means, and the intentional generation of debris.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The Department of Defense’s recently updated plan to deploy a mixed-orbit missile tracking constellation is thus a welcome step for enhancing resilience. Sensor architectures should complicate adversary targeting by leveraging the unique benefits and drawbacks of multiple orbits and domains.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The deployment phasing of a sensor architecture is as critical as its final delivery date. Choices over orbital configurations not only affect final sensor coverage but how coverage develops over time. Sensor constellations optimized purely for coverage efficiencies do not necessarily generate persistent coverage until most elements are deployed. For nearer-term coverage, especially for the lower latitudes relevant to the Indo-Pacific and other theaters, policymakers should be attentive to the pacing of sensor fielding, not only the final product — graceful deployment as well as graceful degradation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>While a space-based sensor architecture is necessary for global missile tracking coverage, a suborbital underlay of airborne sensors could improve point or regional coverage, hedge against schedule or capability gaps of orbiting sensors, and enhance overall system-level survivability. Airborne sensors offer unique detection modalities and could support persistent, localized coverage unbounded by the predictability and rigidity of orbital mechanics.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Sensor fusion is a major and underappreciated source of schedule risk. Delays in developing sensor fusion software and infrastructure contributed significantly to past space program cost and schedule overruns. Further steps are needed to prioritize command and control and fusion algorithm development for larger satellite constellations and multiple sensor types.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Fire control-quality tracking must be a fundamental requirement for the emergent elevated sensing architecture. The technical requirements for fire control tracks are relative measures, contingent on the performance of other elements in the missile defense kill chain. Less stringent track data requirements would require interceptors with costlier, more capable seekers or more ability to maneuver to compensate for positional uncertainties. Conversely, more accurate sensor data would both improve the performance of existing systems and ease design requirements for future interceptors.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Infrared sensor performance is a function of the target’s signature and the sensor’s resolution, sensitivity, and field of view. Both wide- and medium-field-of-view sensors share promise for fire control-quality tracking. In recent years, Congress has prudently scrutinized and sustained efforts to deploy fire control sensors, including the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), which is slated to transfer from the Missile Defense Agency to the Space Force around 2026. Whatever the sensor configuration and type, it is imperative that fire control efforts cross the valley of death and deploy at scale.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Many of the technologies and programs to realize an elevated sensor architecture are in place, but a disciplined acquisition and systems engineering authority will be needed to align its many components. Policymakers must exert oversight to ensure schedule discipline, orbital and systems diversity, and continued attention to missile defense fire control requirements.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Acquiring this new elevated sensor architecture will be an exercise in avoiding certain temptations. These include temptations to optimize global coverage efficiencies at the expense of schedule and resilience, to consolidate assets into a single orbital regime, and to abdicate fire control requirements.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。</p> -<h3 id="the-elevated-sensing-imperative">The Elevated Sensing Imperative</h3> +<p>同案8名被告:前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華,早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,現正還柙,等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。</p> -<p>In this new missile age, adversaries and allies alike are acquiring a broad spectrum of standoff capabilities. New and emerging categories of weapons include hypersonic glide vehicles, scramjet cruise missiles, maneuvering reentry vehicles, and orbital bombardment systems. These and other advanced missiles have become “weapons of choice” for competitors, who are conceiving new means to evade legacy missile defenses and hold critical assets at risk. The sophistication, diversity, and number of missile threats continue to advance.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nA143k4.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 林文宗(左)、陳沛敏(右)</p> -<p>Conflicts in Ukraine and elsewhere have confirmed the centrality of missile strike and the corresponding need for missile defense. As part of a comprehensive approach, active missile defenses have become foundational to broad deterrence and defense goals. Today’s missile defense capabilities, however, are coming under increasing stress. Today’s spectrum of threats leverage high speeds, unpredictable maneuvers, and different trajectories to exploit gaps and seams in legacy missile defenses. New classes of hypersonic missiles, for instance, threaten to underfly the radar horizons of surface-based radars, leaving insufficient time for a defender to react (Figure 1). One cannot defend against what one cannot see.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FUFtEpX.png" alt="image05" /></p> -<p>Contending with these threats will require specific attention to modernizing the sensor architecture. The missile defense enterprise requires elevated sensors to detect, identify, and track them before and after launch. Compared to surface-based sensors, those on satellites or aircraft offer longer lines of sight for tracking hypersonic and other advanced missile systems. As such, the 2022 Missile Defense Review noted that space-based sensing will be “critical to any future integrated sensor network.”</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(2日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第4日審訊。控方早上開始作開案陳詞,指黎智英掌控《蘋果日報》的運作,為案中主腦,並且在《國安法》實施之前便著手聯絡外國官員。下午控方在庭上展示時任美國眾議院議長佩洛西 Twitter 截圖,顯示黎於2019年10月曾聯同民主黨創黨主席李柱銘一同見面。庭上播放多段黎智英接受採訪的片段,他提及香港反修例是「最後一戰」,非常需要「外國勢力」的支持,以改變中國乃至世界,又促請美國向中國實施制裁,「我相信特朗普是一個守信用的人」。控方亦展示黎與蘋果副社長陳沛敏的對話,二人曾討論制裁名單,並提及「賣港賊」字眼。</p> -<p>Elevated sensing has thus become an acquisition priority for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Through its component Space Development Agency (SDA) and Space Systems Command (SSC), the U.S. Space Force has invested billions to acquire space-based sensors for missile warning and tracking (Figure 3). The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), meanwhile, is prototyping space sensors for missile defense fire control — the process of guiding interceptors to an incoming threat (Figure 2). These and other stakeholders have advanced different visions for the future sensor architecture. The question now is how to reconcile and implement these visions, and on what timeline.</p> +<h4 id="控方籲法庭考慮社會騷亂背景-蘋果頭版籲上街">控方籲法庭考慮社會騷亂背景 蘋果頭版籲上街</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BfafdtU.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Radar Line of Sight Limitations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>控方邀請法庭採取司法認知(judicial notice),自2019年6月反修例運動開始,本港處於社會動亂及暴力事件頻繁發生的時期。在這段期間,《蘋果日報》刊登了題為《黎智英:倘修例傳媒冇得做》的文章。</p> -<h4 id="elevated-sensing-missions">Elevated Sensing Missions</h4> +<p>而在政府宣布暫緩修訂後,報紙頭版題為「惡法擬暫緩但不撤、遊行前夕、林鄭緩兵、明天照上街」。同年7月1日更有示威者闖入立法會大樓。政府其後於2019年9月4日宣布撤回修訂條例草案,報紙頭版則以「Freedom Summer」作為英語標題。</p> -<p>The DoD is developing satellite constellations to perform multiple sensing missions, including missile warning, missile tracking, and fire control (Table 1). These lines of effort include the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen OPIR) and Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking (RMW/MT) satellite constellations, which will recapitalize existing missile warning capabilities and track hypersonic and advanced missile threats throughout their trajectory, from birth to death.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WByBxsQ.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 2019年6月15日,林鄭月娥宣布暫緩《逃犯條例》修訂草案。</p> -<p>While significant work on next-generation missile warning satellites continues, such efforts are not discussed here in detail. This report is instead focused on efforts to develop space-based missile tracking capabilities, especially for fire control — activities traditionally performed with ground- and sea-based radars.</p> +<h4 id="控方庭上播片-稱黎智英多次與外國官員會面接受外媒訪問-談及制裁">控方庭上播片 稱黎智英多次與外國官員會面、接受外媒訪問 談及制裁</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9oEcYdk.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Missile Defense Space Assets.</strong> Source: Missile Defense Agency.</em></p> +<p>控方指,在《國安法》實施前,黎智英已多次與外國官員會談、接受外國媒體訪問以及在美國報紙撰寫文章。控方展示黎與美國、英國及台灣連繫的時間表,時間由2016年開始至2020年。控方亦在庭上播放8段黎智英與外國官員會談、接受外國或台灣媒體訪問的片段。</p> -<p>The United States currently relies on the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites to provide global missile warning — persistent notification of missile launches in support of strategic nuclear deterrence and other defense and intelligence missions. As contributors to the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Overhead Persistent Infrared Architecture (BOA), SBIRS and other sensors support the Missile Defense System (MDS) by providing early missile tracking data to cue its broader network of sensors. This initial detection sets the missile defense targeting process in motion, cueing a sophisticated network of ground and maritime radars to determine the positions, trajectories, and signatures of ballistic missiles.</p> +<p>控方接著簡述黎智英與外國官員等人的關係。於2019年7月9日,《蘋果》刊登文章《蓬佩奧晤黎智英》。同月,黎會見美國國家安全顧問博爾頓。黎其後在何俊仁主持的網台節目《細說中南海》擔任嘉賓。《蘋果》網站報導黎在節目中的言論,包括:「黑社會文化就是要讓人恐懼、用暴力打低對方,跟共產黨如出一轍」,又指控中央政府管治下的社會是「恐懼社會」而不是「自由社會」。對於721白衣人襲擊事件,黎亦表示:「今次恐襲必須交由國際機構如聯合國或英美等國家,作公開的獨立調查。」他其後稱:「反送中行動發展至今,越來越需要國際支持」,報導提及「(黎)早前與美國國務卿會面時,對方問他:『美國可以怎樣做?』」,黎認為美國可以實施制裁,令中國官員可以知道後果。</p> -<p>As incoming missiles continue to fly, the MDS synthesizes sensor measurement data into three-dimensional “tracks”: estimations of the missile’s position and trajectory. Different sensors deliver track information at different quality levels, with different degrees of latency and positional uncertainty, for different numbers of threat objects. These tracks must then be fused together into a single, trusted picture.</p> +<p>控方指,當美國在2019年8月開始提出《香港人權及民主法案》時,黎智英與香港民主委員會一同呼籲美國支持,並對香港及中國政府實施制裁。控方庭上展示時任美國眾議院議長佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi)的 Twitter 截圖,顯示2019年10月與黎智英和民主黨創黨主席李柱銘等人會面。影片顯示同年10月25日,黎與李柱銘出席時任美國副總統彭斯的專題演講,黎發言指,以人道方式解決香港問題是貿易戰的重要考慮。</p> -<p>It is one thing to know that some number of missiles have been launched and that they are headed in a general direction. It is another to know how many, where they will be at a given moment, and thus how to defeat them. Using sufficiently accurate tracking data, a missile defense system can develop a fire control solution, determining when to launch one or more interceptors, what trajectory the interceptors should travel, and other considerations for engaging the targets. “Fire control-quality” tracks are those with the position and time accuracy sufficient for a missile defense system to generate an intercept solution.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>So pleased to welcome Jimmy Lai, Martin Lee and Janet Pang to the U.S. Capitol. My full support and admiration goes to those who have taken to the streets week after week in non-violent protest to fight for democracy and the rule of law in #HongKong. pic.twitter.com/maeTwTR8eV — Nancy Pelosi (@SpeakerPelosi) October 22, 2019</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/n02uRIk.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Elevated Sensing Missions.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<h4 id="庭上展示黎智英與陳沛敏對話截圖-討論賣港賊制裁名單">庭上展示黎智英與陳沛敏對話截圖 討論「賣港賊」制裁名單</h4> -<p>The technical requirements for fire control-quality tracks are relative measures, contingent on the performance of other elements in the missile defense kill chain. Less stringent track data requirements would require interceptors with costlier, more capable seekers or more ability to maneuver to compensate for positional uncertainties. Conversely, more accurate sensor data would both improve the performance of existing systems and ease design requirements for future interceptors. General James Dickinson, commander of U.S. Space Command, recently noted that fire control-quality tracking “is going to determine the success or failure of whatever weapon system you’re employing to defeat that threat.” Realizing it is therefore “exceptionally important.”</p> +<p>於2019年10月及2020年3月,黎指示員工取消公司的「飯盒會」,因他需要出席由 Mark Simon 所安排的美國參議員會面。控方亦展示雙方合照。</p> -<p>While the functions of future missile defense engagements will remain similar to those of the past, the characteristics of several new classes of missile threats will impose new requirements for the sensing architecture. Surface-based tracking of new and emergent maneuvering missile threats remains both useful and necessary for the spectrum of missile threats, but it is insufficient for some of the newer types. Earth’s geometry limits surface-based radar from detecting and engaging lower-flying targets, including hypersonic weapons. Given these new threats, missile defenses require elevated sensors for the missile tracking mission, and to do so with more highly detailed, lower-latency trajectory estimations to support the fire control mission.</p> +<p>2020年5月,《壹傳媒》前副社長陳沛敏告知黎智英,政府或會提出《國安法》。黎及後於 Twitter 發文,附有一張政協委員手持「支持國安立法 護航一國兩制」橫額的圖片,並在帖文寫道:「美國政府是否應該將他們納入制裁名單?」,同時標籤「#MagnitskyAct (馬格尼茨基法)」。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">“Fire control-quality” tracks are those with the position and time accuracy sufficient for a missile defense system to generate an intercept solution.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>控方庭上展示黎智英與蘋果副社長陳沛敏之間的 WhatsApp 對話內容,當中顯示二人討論制裁名單,提及「賣港賊」字眼。黎智英又向陳提及,希望警察為他們所犯的罪行付上代價。</p> -<p>Achieving this vision will carry enormous challenges. The effective employment of fire control quality tracks will require new processing, networking, and sensor fusion capabilities to synthesize missile tracks and compute fire control solutions. Precise tracking furthermore demands attention to a wide variety of new threat signatures, the presence of background clutter, future countermeasures, and other challenges. Addressing these problems will be difficult, but it must be done.</p> +<p>控方另展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的通訊對話內容,顯示楊向黎報告再有多兩名作者可供稿給《蘋果日報》英文版。</p> -<p>Requirements for the future elevated sensor architecture are tightly coupled with every other aspect of the missile defense kill chain. Sensor design requirements drive interceptor design requirements — the schedule for one affects the schedule for the other. Sensor capability may therefore be compared to a locomotive that pulls other missile defense capabilities forward. In the words of Frank Turner, technical director of the Space Development Agency, “Schedule is king. The train is going to leave the station on time.”</p> +<h4 id="黎形容香港在新冷戰前線-籲美國以行動支持-包括派人來港">黎形容香港在「新冷戰」前線 籲美國以行動支持 包括派人來港</h4> + +<p>控方指2019年7月,黎智英與時任美國副總統彭斯及其他資深參議員會面。控方又展示 WhatsApp 對話截圖,顯示同年3月李柱銘和陳方安生與彭斯見面後,黎向李表示現在似乎是在美國華盛頓游說的好時機,因現時氣氛「反中」和支持抗爭,美國兩黨對中國的敵對行動是顯而易見的。</p> + +<p>另外,黎智英於2019年7月曾與「保衛民主基金會」的資深副主席 Johnathan Schanzer 進行現場對談。黎強調反修例是「最後一戰」,而香港人的反抗是道德力量的戰爭,又指美國政府是道德權威,其支持是有力量的武器,因此香港極需要美國支持,否則香港缺乏持續反抗的能力。黎形容「新冷戰」是關乎價值的鬥爭,而香港正在「前線」,他最後指,美國不能只說不做,同時亦要以行動支持香港人,包括派人員來港。</p> + +<h4 id="黎指有效方法是凍結中國官員戶口">黎指有效方法是凍結中國官員戶口</h4> + +<p>控方展示黎智英與 Mark Simon 之間的對話截圖,2019年7月 Mark Simon 轉述時任美國國務院高級顧問 Mary Kissel 的要求,指屆時黎與副總統彭斯會面時,可提出建議美國可就香港局勢採取什麼行動,包括制裁的時機及對象。</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="2023-national-defense-authorization-act"><code class="highlighter-rouge">2023 National Defense Authorization Act</code></h4> + <p>The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive &amp; an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy &amp; the rights &amp; autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020</p> </blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">“In carrying out the analysis of candidate fire control architectures, the Secretary of the Air Force shall ensure that the Director of the Space Warfighting Analysis Center of the Space Force, at a minimum, maintains the requirements needed for the missile defense command and control, battle management, and communications system to pass the needed quality data within the timelines needed for current and planned interceptor systems to support engagements of ballistic and hypersonic threats.”</code></em></p> +<p>黎智英另在 Signal 中向 Mark Simon 指,經深思熟慮後認為美國應該取消香港特殊地位,因為若美國與中國脫鉤,當香港這個唯一出路都關上後,便會逼使中國滿足美國的要求。</p> -<h4 id="unpacking-the-tradeoffs-art-and-science">Unpacking the Tradeoffs: Art and Science</h4> +<p>黎智英亦於2020年3月至7月與 Mark Simon 以電郵通訊,並提及最有效的方法是凍結中國官員的戶口,他們就會感到害怕。</p> -<p>There is no such thing as a perfect sensor architecture design. Designing an elevated sensor architecture is rather an exercise in tradeoffs. There are, for instance, a multiplicity of trades among orbital altitudes and inclinations, sensor phenomenologies, and other variables. Assumptions about future threats to the architecture influence final design configurations and standards for survivability and resilience. Decisions about schedule, or when certain capabilities are necessary, likewise affect technical requirements.</p> +<h4 id="黎於台灣節目稱外國支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去">黎於台灣節目稱:外國支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/d8SpAR0.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: SDA Tracking Layer Deployment.</strong> Source: Space Development Agency.</em></p> +<p>黎於2020年4月接受英國《金融時報》(Financial Times)訪問,談及唯一能阻止中國及拯救香港的就是國際力量。另於同年5月,黎接受台灣 YouTube 頻道《Yahoo TV 一起看》的節目「鄉民來衝康」訪問,他表示:「我很想美國影響我們⋯⋯我很想英國影響我們⋯⋯我很想外國影響我們⋯⋯他們的支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去的⋯⋯外國的勢力是現在我們非常需要⋯⋯讓我們撐下去的。」</p> -<p>Given this multiplicity of trades, architecture design is as much an art as a science. The application of this art in specific force designs reflects institutional and policy assumptions.</p> +<h4 id="黎多次接受英美媒體訪問-表示相信特朗普守信用會制裁中國">黎多次接受英美媒體訪問 表示:相信特朗普守信用、會制裁中國</h4> -<p>These system- and architecture-wide tradeoffs have been all too implicit in the public conversation about sensor architecture acquisition, presenting an oversight challenge. The number of considerations makes it difficult to define clear metrics for success, a challenge made more complex by the number of stakeholders involved and continual revisions made to their architectures. Clearer goalposts are needed to understand, align, and implement an acquisition strategy.</p> +<p>於2020年5月,黎智英接受美國媒體《福斯財經》(Fox Business)訪問,他其後在 Twitter 轉載有關片段。他在訪問中提到:「是時候改變中國,這樣才能改變世界⋯⋯除非中國改變,否則我們不會有和平。」他亦指美國可採用很多途徑逼使中國改變,包括凍結中國的戶口及其於美國的金錢,同時停止出口科技及電子產品到中國。</p> -<p>Unpacking these tradeoffs and assumptions — making them explicit — can help policymakers, budgeteers, and systems architects, and better inform the public discussion related to missile tracking and missile defense. Doing so is the purpose of this report. This report does not advocate a particular architecture but instead elaborates these tradeoffs, describes ongoing acquisition efforts, and identifies policy temptations to avoid. From these, three principles become relevant to the acquisition of a future architecture.</p> +<p>同月,黎接受美國《彭博》(Bloomberg)訪問,他建議美國總統特朗普向中國實施制裁,並引述特朗普稱若北京確實在香港實行《國安法》並摧毀法律,他會認真採取行動。黎接着指:「我相信特朗普是一個守信用的人,因此希望他會向中國實施制裁。」</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given this multiplicity of trades, architecture design is as much an art as a science.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>黎亦接受《BBC》訪問,再次促請特朗普對中國實施制裁,並解釋一旦《國安法》實施,將會是香港的「末日」,因未能保護在港商人,而香港亦不再是國際金融中心。</p> -<p>One principle is that <strong>an elevated sensor architecture should be diversified across multiple orbits and domains.</strong> Technological advancements in commercial space have generated enthusiasm for proliferated, commoditized low Earth orbit (LEO) constellations. Surviving a peer threat, however, will demand more. Proliferating space sensors in LEO is one way to improve resilience, assuming large numbers and low-cost replacement. It is not the only way. Reliance on a single orbital regime, or on any single approach to resilience, invites disruption. LEO constellations can be degraded by area- or domain-wide effects, including electronic attack, nuclear or radiological means, and the intentional generation of debris. For further altitude diversification, a suborbital underlay of airborne sensors could improve point or regional coverage, hedge against schedule or capability gaps of orbiting sensors, and enhance overall system-level survivability. As tempting as it may be to consolidate acquisition efforts to one orbital domain, a multi-orbit and multi-domain architecture is likely to be more survivable.</p> +<h4 id="黎籲撤銷中港官員子女在外地的學生簽證">黎籲撤銷中港官員子女在外地的學生簽證</h4> -<p>Another principle is that <strong>an elevated sensor architecture should deploy gracefully.</strong> The deployment phasing of a new sensor architecture is as critical as its final delivery date. Some constellation designs do not generate persistent coverage until nearly all elements are deployed. For nearer-term coverage, especially for the lower latitudes of the Indo-Pacific, policymakers should be attentive to the pacing of sensor fielding, not only the final product — graceful deployment as well as graceful degradation. Lower-inclined orbits or airborne assets may be useful for early coverage of critical areas. Sensor fusion is another major and underappreciated source of schedule risk. More must be done to accelerate development of software and ground systems to knit these pieces together. Schedule is king.</p> +<p>於2020年5月,黎撰寫文章表示:「我的 Twitter 帖文是否真的威脅到中國的國家安全?」他在文中呼籲,撤銷中國及香港政府官員子女在外地的學生簽證。</p> -<p>Finally, <strong>an elevated sensor architecture must deliver fire control-quality tracking to support active missile defense.</strong> Requirements for data quality should be developed in close connection with the characteristics and limitations of interceptors or other effectors. While much attention has been paid to developing elevated missile warning and missile tracking capabilities, Congress has prudently scrutinized and sustained efforts to deploy fire control sensors. Whether through the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), its derivatives, or some future wide-field-of-view sensor, it is necessary to accelerate and scale a fire control sensor network for the missile defense mission. In recent years, SDA has taken valuable additional steps to incorporate fire control sensors in its proliferated constellation. It is worth considering how to sustain this momentum and achieve fire control capability in the near term.</p> +<p>黎亦接受美國節目《Uncommon Knowledge with Peter Robinson》的訪問,他指需要美國協助制裁中國,而本港的特別貿易待遇不應被撤銷。</p> -<h4 id="modeling-the-problem">Modeling the Problem</h4> +<h4 id="黎表示若實施制裁-有機會即使立國安法也不會執行">黎表示若實施制裁 有機會即使立《國安法》也不會執行</h4> -<p>This report’s analysis is informed in large part by internal modeling and simulation conducted by the CSIS Missile Defense Project (MDP). The research team used ANSYS/AGI’s Systems Toolkit (STK) and Iroquois Systems/Lockheed Martin’s SMARTSet tools to model key tradeoffs in constellation design. Many of the images included resulted from optimization studies involving nearly a million simulations and numerous days of computing time. To speed this process, MDP acquired and assembled dedicated hardware to accelerate computing tasks. Further details on modeling and methodology are described in the appendix.</p> +<p>至2020年6月,黎智英接受《RFA 自由亞洲粵語》的訪問,他表示:「點都要抗爭,希望我哋有機會係美國、甚至歐洲其他國家支持下,我哋能夠保住法治同自由。」他又指:「而家中國處境唔係我哋覺得咁穩定⋯⋯李克強同習近平已經反晒面,你就知道佢哋下面嘅權鬥去到乜嘢地步」、「好緊要係外國盡量畀中國嘅壓力、制裁⋯⋯將中國專橫嘅做法阻擋住」。他認為外國若實施制裁,「有機會《國安法》就算立咗都唔會執行,或者執行都會將佢 water down(沖淡),唔會做到咁辣。」</p> -<p>The team modeled constellation and sensor design tradeoffs in STK’s synthetic environment. To visualize the infrared signatures pictured in the report, MDP leveraged the STK Electro-optical Infrared (EOIR) simulation module, creating a scenario (Figure 4) to investigate hypersonic tracking challenges. To construct the scene, the team created original 3D models of notional hypersonic weapons (Figures 5 and 7) and imported and processed National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) infrared terrain data (Figure 6).</p> +<h4 id="黎撰文指引渡惡法令大陸法律凌駕香港司法-並籲人參與遊行">黎撰文指引渡惡法令大陸法律凌駕香港司法 並籲人參與遊行</h4> -<p>Additionally, MDP performed optimization studies to assess how different constellation designs could impact sensor coverage. The research team conducted basic assessments of altitude, coverage, and custody against hypersonic targets using SMARTSet and performed more detailed analyses with STK’s Analyzer tool, which can automatically test and evaluate design possibilities. Many of these analyses revolved around constellation designs and their impact on sensor coverage; these are pictured throughout the report. The number of potential designs evaluated encompassed nearly one million simulation runs.</p> +<p>至於黎撰寫的文章方面,他在其專欄「成敗樂一笑」發表題為「請站出來保住最後防線」的文章,內容包括:「『引渡惡法』的作用,就像恐怖分子襲擊產生『可用性級聯』的效果,讓香港市民都被籠罩在恐慌的順民意識下,讓大陸無法無天的法律凌駕香港的司法制度。」他有提到:「修訂《逃犯條例》就是要摧毀『一國兩制』這個習帝的眼中釘⋯⋯『引渡惡法』就是讓中央的魔爪撕破《基本法》和一國兩制的最後防線。」他於文末呼籲:「請你們相信群眾的力量,加入今天反惡法的示威遊行吧!」</p> -<p>These studies are useful for describing the tradeoffs at play in acquiring an elevated sensor architecture. It is a low-fidelity modeling effort, and intentionally so — meant to illustrate high-level principles rather than prescribe specific designs. Scenarios were constructed to be generalizable and reproducible, and to demonstrate the relationship between changing sensor fields of view, inclinations, altitudes, and other variables. The constellations and sensors described herein are not presented as recommendations. They are meant to inform the conversation and draw out unexamined assumptions.</p> +<p>另一文章題為《諗移民定諗遊行》,內文指:『「逃犯條例」還可以隨時拉你鎖你,多神奇的權力,多神聖的地圖啊!」、「若我們人多勢眾站出來遊行⋯⋯」及「我們會去到盡,堅決抗爭到底的事實」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oQq3FYW.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Simulated Hypersonic Tracking Scenario.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>黎另在文章《為自己和下一代 阻擋香港沉淪》表示:「你要跟中共講法律,你從火星來的嗎?」、「修訂逃犯條例就是奪去香港的法治,拿住大陸那套陽光司法在港任拉任鎖肆虐橫行」、「香港無形中成為了集中營」、「若我們今天還有機會行出來發聲,卻袖手旁觀」。他最後呼籲:「請看前一步,六月九號花三小時,為自己和下一代留下阻擋公義沉淪的足跡。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1Tj1Wz9.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: 3D Model Used in Simulated Scenario.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<h4 id="黎要求將陳方安生與美國副總統彭斯會面的消息散播">黎要求將陳方安生與美國副總統彭斯會面的消息散播</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/8VznfMV.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: NASA Infrared Scene Data.</strong> A visualization of NASA VIIRS geodata, generated through Panoply with postprocessing applied. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with NASA data.</em></p> +<p>另外,黎於2019年3月通知《蘋果日報》的社長張劍虹,要求將陳方安生與副總統彭斯會面的消息散播開去,於是翌日的報紙以《彭斯晤陳太 關注港人權 學者:高規格接待向京施壓》為頭版標題。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ynNczwO.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: CSIS Hypersonic Vehicle Signature.</strong> An infrared view of the CSIS simulated hypersonic glide body, displaying temperature differentials across the upper and lower sides. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>同年4月,黎指示副社長陳沛敏訪問「銅鑼灣書店」前店長林榮基,翌日的報紙題為《送中例殺埋身 林榮基流亡台灣 臨別呼籲 守護香港明日上街》。</p> -<h3 id="sensor-tradeoffs">Sensor Tradeoffs</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nWIhhBw.png" alt="image07" /> +▲ 佩洛西(左)、林榮基(右)</p> -<p>Any discussion of design tradeoffs must begin with the sensors themselves. Constellation designs for missile tracking are constrained by the performance of their sensors, which must be able to distinguish the signatures of hypersonic and ballistic weapons and resolve their positions accurately.</p> +<p>控方開案陳詞未完,案件明日續審。</p> -<p>Although many approaches are possible, the United States has historically addressed the space-based missile sensing problem with infrared sensors, which passively detect the thermal signatures of threat missiles. Infrared and other electro-optical sensors can meet the demanding size, weight, and power requirements of space-based platforms and have continued to improve in resolution, sensitivity, and cost.</p> +<p>黎智英否認一項「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物罪」及一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司派出一名代表,該人士代表3間公司同樣否認上述兩罪。</p> -<p>While these technologies are mature, missile tracking and fire control with infrared sensors is more challenging than missile warning. Today’s geosynchronous missile warning sensors can detect the large, hot exhaust plumes of missiles as they launch but cannot provide detailed tracking information after this initial boost phase.</p> +<p>黎亦否認另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。他另面對的一項「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,控方則申請存檔於法庭,獲法庭批准。</p> -<p>Future missile tracking and fire control sensors must be capable of tracking hypersonic weapon signatures beyond the boost phase, where their infrared signatures diminish (Figure 8). Distinguishing a hypersonic heat signature against the Earth’s background has been likened to tracking “a slightly brighter candle in a sea of candles,” requiring extensive testing to validate.</p> +<p>首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指,黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司,於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日(包括首尾兩日),在香港與其他人一同串謀,請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zW3n0VR.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Hypersonic and Ballistic Signatures.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間,與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀,請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員,實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4Ud1slW.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Missile Signature Comparison and Detectability to SBIRS.</strong> Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> +<p>「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指,黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日(包括首尾兩日),在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物,具意圖:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HH0mocS.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Simulated Infrared View of Hypersonic Signature.</strong> An infrared sensor at a 1,000 km orbit images a hypersonic weapon located in the center of the frame. Given the sensor’s resolution, the missile is too dim to visually distinguish from surrounding objects (top). Detecting them requires computational processing, in this case by compositing multiple frames and computing the motion of pixels (center). An enlarged crop of the false-color image at center emphasizes the extracted hypersonic signature (bottom). Further details are available in the appendix. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tgJa8AM.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Surface Thermal Gradient of Space Shuttle Orbiter during Hypersonic Reentry.</strong> Thermal imaging simulations of the Space Shuttle orbiter display the considerable temperature discrepancies possible in hypersonic flight. Source: NASA.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="sensors-field-of-view-and-architecture">Sensors, Field of View, and Architecture</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛</p> +</blockquote> -<p>These and other factors affect the number and configuration of sensor platforms in an architecture. By flying lower than hypersonic and ballistic weapons, air-based sensors offer advantageous views of hot hypersonic weapons against cold space backdrops — but lack the extended sightlines of space-based sensors. Space sensor constellations, meanwhile, must be carefully optimized for a variety of factors, including solar exclusion (viewing angles where sunlight overwhelms the sensor), orbital dynamics, and other variables.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛</p> +</blockquote> -<p>An infrared sensor architecture must also be sized to ensure coverage by two sensors at once. Unlike with radar, a single infrared imaging sensor cannot resolve a target’s position in three dimensions. Two sensors — simultaneously viewing the target — are needed to triangulate a three-dimensional track of a missile’s altitude, position, and heading (Figure 12). Stereo (two-sensor) or greater tracking is a baseline requirement for infrared sensor constellations. Additional redundancy may be needed to account for survivability constraints, maintenance downtime, and other factors.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>e) 煽惑他人使用暴力</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nZfr7A6.png" alt="image13" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Depiction of Stereo Tracking.</strong> Source: Missile Defense Agency.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Most critically, each sensor’s FOR can affect the number of satellites necessary for a space-based sensing constellation. Sensors with a wide FOR can view a wider area of Earth’s surface, either by pivoting across a wide swath or by possessing a wide-angle optic (Figure 13). Even relatively minor changes in FOR can have considerable effects on coverage footprint and, consequently, the number of required satellites (Figure 14). For instance, a given 91-satellite constellation at 1,000 km can provide persistent global coverage with a 120-degree FOR but cannot do so with 110-degree or 100-degree FORs (Figures 16 and 17).</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Hq8Fqmt.png" alt="image14" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: Satellite Field of Regard.</strong> The three satellites visualized are in low Earth orbit (1,000 km) and have total sensor fields of regard of 100, 110, and 118 degrees, respectively. At this altitude, the curvature of the Earth limits increases in line of sight beyond 120 degrees. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導控方開案陳詞:黎智英為「主腦」 國安法生效前已著手聯絡及會面外國官員 控方指黎智英與李柱銘晤佩洛西 多次受訪稱需要外國向中國施壓制裁Ukraine Can, But…2023-12-27T12:00:00+08:002023-12-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraine-can-but<p><em>By finally delivering on their promises, Kyiv’s European allies will find the benefits extend to them, too.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HJGaQFZ.png" alt="image15" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: Field of Regard Footprints.</strong> Left to right: Altitude coverage footprints of 100-, 110-, and 118-degree fields of regard. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Selecting wider FORs reduces the number of satellites needed for coverage, but doing so imposes additional requirements on the sensor itself. For fixed sensors, increasing sensor FOR requires an increase in the sensor field of view (FOV), the angle of view immediately viewable by the sensor. In other words, fixed-sensor FOR and FOV are identical. The Space Development Agency’s Tracking Layer satellites leverage fixed sensors — its Tranche 0 satellites are required to possess a FOR/FOV of 70 to 110 degrees.</p> +<p>Here is one fact that sums up the gap between the promises that Kyiv’s European partners have made to Ukraine and the reality. In March 2023, the EU made the historic decision to deliver a million artillery shells to Ukraine within 12 months. But the number that has actually been sent is closer to 300,000. For all the rhetorical commitments to support Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s invasion “for as long as it takes”, Europe has largely failed.</p> -<p>A sensor’s FOR can be larger than its FOV if it is mechanically pointed (slewed) to view a wider area. This approach is technically mature and was leveraged in past efforts, such as in the Precision Tracking Space System and SBIRS missile-warning satellites (Figure 19). Mechanical slewing allows a narrower-FOV sensor to offer a large possible coverage — or access — footprint at the cost of mechanical complexity and challenges in managing vibration, pointing error, and slewing time. As these sensors cannot view every part of their FOR at once, they introduce additional considerations for tracking large numbers of targets in various regions: on which targets to view, in what order, and how rapidly to revisit them.</p> +<p>The price of this complacency is already being paid in Ukrainian blood. According to the armed forces of Ukraine, over the summer of 2023, Ukraine was firing up to 7,000 artillery shells a day and managed to degrade Russia’s logistics and artillery to the point where Russia was firing about 5,000 rounds a day. Today, the Ukrainians are struggling to fire 2,000 rounds daily, while Russian artillery is reaching about 10,000. Artillery isn’t everything, but the disparity speaks to Ukraine’s relative shortage of materiel, evident in other areas such as the number of drones it can field.</p> -<p>These tradeoffs — between fixed and slewing, wide and narrow — are important because changes in sensor FOV affect detection performance. Holding all factors equal, increasing a sensor’s FOV will increase its pixel footprint, as each pixel on the sensor’s focal plane array (FPA) corresponds to a wider swath of the Earth’s surface.</p> +<p>Russia is likely to be able to fire about 5m rounds at Ukraine in 2024, based on its mobilised defence production, supply from Iran and North Korea, and remaining stocks. Despite the flippant observation – often made by European officials – that Russia’s economy is the same size as that of Italy, the Kremlin is producing more shells than all of Nato. Meanwhile, Ukraine is unlikely to see any significant increase in supply for some months. This will cede the initiative to the Russians. The Kremlin believes it can win by 2026, and so Putin is in no mood to negotiate or back down.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qz7StYi.png" alt="image16" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: Pixel Footprint, Field of View, and Sensitivity Tradeoffs.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>It does not have to be like this. Earlier this month, the Estonian Ministry of Defence published a white paper detailing the levels of military equipment required to make Ukraine’s defence sustainable and for it to pursue the liberation of the occupied territories by 2025. The Estonians costed the requirements, showing they were well within the bounds of possibility. The issue is not money, but competence in delivery. If the steps to implement these measures are not taken, Ukraine will lose.</p> -<p>Larger pixel footprints, in turn, make it more challenging to track missile targets (Figure 14). Because hypersonic signatures are smaller than most sensor pixel footprints, their location becomes more difficult to distinguish as the pixel footprint expands (Figure 15). Moreover, larger pixel footprints increasingly “dilute” the brightness of the hypersonic signature with the signature of the surrounding terrain. The problem is akin to detecting a cup of boiling water poured into a swimming pool; a smaller pixel footprint is akin to detecting that same cup poured into a bucket. Holding all else equal, FOV influences performance and drives design decisions between slewed and fixed sensors.</p> +<p>Ensuring Russia’s defeat in Ukraine is feasible, but it requires some important steps. First, Ukraine will need a steady supply of weapons to be able to blunt Russian attacks over the first half of 2024. This will require plenty of US support, but also increasing supply from European Nato members, whose backing will be critical as the US election looms in November. Many of the munitions provided since the beginning of the war were purchased from the international market or drawn from stockpiles, and investment in European production has been slow. But as stocks run out, sustaining Ukraine’s war effort depends critically on increasing Europe’s manufacturing capacity.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/M0mKxjL.png" alt="image17" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: Field of Regard and Coverage: 100-, 110-, and 120-Degree Sensors.</strong> These three-dimensional views illustrate the stereo sensor coverage of a 91-satellite, 1,000 km altitude constellation. Stereo coverage, the minimum necessary, is depicted in yellow; red areas represent simultaneous coverage by eight or more satellites. A constellation design that is viable with 120-degree sensors (right) does not provide persistent coverage with 110-degree (center) or 100-degree (left). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>Second, it is essential that Ukraine corrects the mistakes that led to its failed counteroffensive in 2023. Improving the training of its troops must be the top priority. During the second world war, British forces considered 22 weeks of infantry training the minimum before a soldier was ready to join a unit, where they would then carry out collective training as part of a battalion. Ukrainian troops are lucky to get five weeks of training, while collective training is rarely carried out above the scale of the company. European Nato must expand and extend the training support provided in order to give Ukrainian units a wider tactical repertoire, and more importantly expand the scale at which the army can command and synchronise operations.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mJQIvDI.png" alt="image18" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 17: Field of Regard and Coverage: 100-, 110-, and 120-Degree Sensors.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>Persistent inflation and economic shocks, like the disruption to global shipping from Houthi missile attacks in the Bab al-Mandab, mean that among European countries, making a long-term economic commitment to Ukraine will be a domestic political challenge. But that is to ignore its potential upsides. Investment in defence production, rather than relying on purchases from abroad, comes with significant levels of domestic industrial investment and with the potential for expenditure to be recovered through increased tax receipts.</p> -<p>Sensors with either narrower FOVs or more pixels can minimize these pixel footprints, thereby improving detection performance. Developments in wide-field-of-view (WFOV) sensors have been driven by developments in large-format FPAs with higher pixel counts: infrared sensors with 4,000 pixel-by-4,000 pixel (4K), 6K, 8K, or higher resolutions (Figure 18). Space Systems Command’s testbed geosynchronous WFOV satellite, for instance, leverages a large-format FPA with a 4K resolution. Early Tranche 0 technical requirements call for fixed sensors with an objective FOV of roughly 110 degrees and a pixel footprint of under 1.5 km, necessitating large FPAs.</p> +<p>There are good security reasons to invest in domestic production, too. A failure to do so now could leave European leaders needing to deter a fully mobilised Russia without stockpiles or the capacity to replenish them. Meanwhile, a simultaneous escalation in the Indo-Pacific in 2025 could cause the US to shift a range of critical military capabilities – aerial refuelling, logistics, air defences – to deter China, leaving Europe significantly exposed.</p> -<p>The infrared sensor industry has continued to develop larger FPA formats, which allow the use of wider FOVs without performance compromise. But there may be some missions where WFOV, fixed-sensor approaches are challenging. The Missile Defense Agency’s HBTSS satellites, for instance, will use a mechanically slewed medium-FOV (MFOV) sensor to shrink pixel footprints and allow fine-grained, fire control-quality missile tracking. Choices between fixed WFOV and slewing MFOV sensors are dependent on the availability, maturity, and cost of these large-format FPAs. In the near term, smaller-format FPAs are available at larger quantities and lower cost.</p> +<p>For Ukraine, the immediate future is one of several months of hard fighting without critical resources, while endeavouring to regenerate the combat power that was expended over 2023. But Europe can determine what the second half of 2024 and indeed 2025 will look like. This is a war that can be won. The recent successful strike on the Russian landing ship Novocherkassk in harbour, protected by layers of Russian defences, shows how Ukraine can make effective use of the equipment that it is supplied with. But European security must not be squandered by more complacency.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/27KR6oE.png" alt="image19" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 18: Infrared Focal Plane Array Formats.</strong> Source: Raytheon Vision Systems.</em></p> +<hr /> -<p>The size and performance of a constellation thus depends on these interlocking choices: between fixed and slewing sensors, sensor FOV, FPA format, and other factors. Maximizing sensor FOR allows a designer to minimize the satellites necessary for coverage. Doing so demands fixed sensors with wider fields of view or slewing sensors with narrower ones. System architects must balance a complex set of variables, each of which influences nearly every other aspect of the system (Figure 20).</p> +<p><strong>Jack Watling</strong> is a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).</p>Jack WatlingBy finally delivering on their promises, Kyiv’s European allies will find the benefits extend to them, too.【黎智英案・審訊第三日】2023-12-22T12:00:00+08:002023-12-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-3<ul> + <li>官裁煽動刊物罪非逾時檢控 去信法庭「提出告發」未等黎智英上庭 已屬啟動程序</li> +</ul> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qhjYHFT.png" alt="image20" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 19: SBIRS Sensor Fields of View.</strong> Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> +<excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2968OV7.png" alt="image21" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 20: Relation of Design Parameters.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MU9Mlh9.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tRSbLyF.png" alt="image22" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 21: Progress in Large-Format Infrared Focal Plane Arrays.</strong> Source: Raytheon Vision Systems, via SPIE.</em></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(22日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第3日審訊。就辯方所提出的串謀煽動刊物罪逾時檢控爭議,3名《國安法》指定法官作出裁決,指法庭在檢控期限屆滿10日之前收到控方通知擬加控罪,所以認為不存在逾時檢控的情況,因此駁回辯方申請,換言之控方就煽動刊物罪的檢控仍然有效。案件押後至明年1月2日續審,屆時黎將庭上答辯,之後控方將讀出開案陳詞。押後期間黎繼續還柙。</p> -<h4 id="alternative-sensor-types">Alternative Sensor Types</h4> +<p>76歲的黎智英由3名懲教人員帶往被告欄應訊,近日氣溫降至只有10度或以下,黎亦穿上深藍色厚褸,並戴上灰色頸巾。他透過耳機聽取判決時表現平靜。</p> -<p>Infrared sensors are not the only means of tracking missiles from space. Hypersonic weapons emit unique signatures that can be exploited. Alternative sensor modalities, including hyperspectral and radiofrequency sensors, might therefore play important roles. A future sensor architecture could leverage multiple sensor types to track hypersonic and other advanced missile threats.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英稱煽動刊物控罪逾時檢控期限應由串謀首天起計帶上法庭加控才算啟動檢控">黎智英稱煽動刊物控罪逾時檢控:期限應由串謀首天起計、帶上法庭加控才算啟動檢控</h4> -<p>Hyperspectral or ultraviolet sensors, capable of viewing alternative bands of light, could be relevant for detecting hypersonic weapons’ novel signatures. In hypersonic flight, an object’s surface reacts with high-temperature airflow to release a wake of ions, gases, particles, and other chemical byproducts. These byproducts and their signatures might be detectable in infrared and alternative spectra (Figure 22). As with hypersonic defense, “the same characteristics that make hypersonic weapons attractive present the defender with new failure modes to exploit.”</p> +<p>黎智英尚未正式就各項控罪答辯,在審訊首天,控辯雙方先處理法律爭議。黎的法律代表、資深大律師彭耀鴻指「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪逾時檢控,法庭無權處理。3名《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰及李素蘭頒下書面裁決,駁回辯方申請。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Infrared sensors are not the only means of tracking missiles from space.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>據判詞,黎智英在2021年12月13日被控3項罪名,包括兩項《國安法》控罪及一項串謀妨礙司法公正罪。控方在同日去信西九法院,表示有意申請新增「煽動刊物」控罪,而西九法院裁判官翌日收悉信件及相關文件,副本亦送達黎的法律代表。至12月28日的提訊日,控方申請加控,而黎的代表律師並未有提出反對。</p> -<p>Radiofrequency sensors might offer further utility. Radar offers many advantages: its principles are well understood, it can propagate through complex weather conditions, and it can instantaneously gather target velocity data. Radars have become increasingly sophisticated and efficient; emerging multistatic and multiple-input, multiple-output (MIMO) radar technologies might offer additional utilities to the space-based hypersonic tracking problem. In addition to active methods, it may be possible to passively intercept radio emissions from data-linked missiles. The 2022 Missile Defense Review notably stated that global and persistent “space-based . . . radar . . . systems will be critical to any future integrated sensor network.”</p> +<p>辯方指檢控期限應由串謀犯罪首日起計算6個月,即2019年10月1日便屆滿;即使辯方接受檢控期限由串謀犯罪的最後一天起計6個月,控方也需要在2021年12月24日或之前提出檢控,可是黎智英在12月28日才被帶上法庭加控,超出了期限4日。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6FZzfOC.png" alt="image23" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 22: Booster Plume Signatures and Hypersonic Plasma.</strong> Solid rocket boosters used to launch hypersonic weapons generate detectable infrared (IR) and ultraviolet (UV) signatures. The simulated plume signature (top) represents a broad range of physical phenomena, including the hot gas flow from the booster, external hypersonic airflow, the combusted gas and alumina particles from the burning motor, and the phase change of alumina particles. A hypersonic weapon in its glide phase encounters similarly complex interactions, generating novel wake signatures. Plasmas generated around the hypersonic weapon surface, for instance, react with gas products and particles burned off the vehicle surface (bottom). The bottom image represents plasma formation around a Mach 16, 50 km altitude hypersonic shape. Source: Iain D. Boyd, H.T. Sears Memorial Professor and Director of Center for National Security Initiatives, University of Colorado, Boulder.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tNrNm97.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻(左)、大律師 Marc Corlett(右)</p> -<p>Finally, infrared and other types of electro-optical sensors have continued to improve. Infrared focal plane arrays, sensor readouts, and their cooling systems have become increasingly reliable and affordable; new developments might allow simplified configurations that do not require cryogenic cooling. Furthermore, the maturation of large-format infrared FPAs are allowing increases in FOV without corresponding resolution losses (Figure 21).</p> +<p>控方則稱「串謀」屬持續的罪行,被告在2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》結束營運期間,持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物,可視為同一犯罪計劃,檢控期限應由「串謀」結束當天、而非被告首次犯法起計。此外,控方稱他們於2021年12月13日向法庭表示有意加控,已屬「開始」檢控,故控方檢控並無逾時。</p> -<p>This report is scoped to the infrared sensors being acquired today. But hypersonic weapons present novel signatures, enabling new approaches to detection and tracking. Provided that sensor fusion challenges can be resolved, a future architecture should integrate advancements in infrared FPAs, multispectral and radiofrequency sensors, and other means. Combining these multiple types will allow greater persistence and capability if one type is degraded, whether from environmental conditions, enemy deception, or other means of signature reduction. While it may be possible to evade one part of the electromagnetic spectrum, it is harder to evade several of them.</p> +<h4 id="判決檢控期限應由最後一日起計算">判決:檢控期限應由最後一日起計算</h4> -<h3 id="orbital-tradeoffs">Orbital Tradeoffs</h3> +<p>判決指,不接受辯方稱檢控期限由首天串謀起計,因為控方現時指控黎不只一次串謀犯罪,與一次性的串謀罪行並不相同,所以被告完成首天串謀犯罪之後,串謀協議仍然存在(still be very much alive),直至串謀完結當天,控罪並不會「過時」(stale)。</p> -<p>Sensor performance influences the number of assets necessary to provide coverage, but there are other tradeoffs to consider. “No absolute rules” govern the design of an optimal constellation. It is possible to track hypersonic weapons from many orbits given the correct selection of sensor payloads. At the same time, better design points exist for meeting current and future threats.</p> +<p>判決指,只要控方有足夠證據證明有一個串謀協議貫穿整個控罪時段,那麼檢控期限便應由串謀的最後一天才開始計算,不會對被告帶來不公。就本案而言,法官裁定檢控期限應由2021年6月24日起計6個月,因此於2021年12月24日才屆滿。</p> -<p>This chapter reviews relevant orbits for missile sensing and identifies how they could be mixed to generate efficiencies. Basic changes in altitude and domain can impact every other aspect of performance. A more resilient constellation should mix orbits and domains in ways that maximize the advantages of each.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gRtGNy8.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 2021年6月24日,《蘋果日報》發刊最後一份報章。</p> -<h4 id="low-earth-orbit">Low Earth Orbit</h4> +<h4 id="官條文引入提出檢控是為統一字眼-原意非改變條文內容">官:條文引入「提出」檢控是為統一字眼 原意非改變條文內容</h4> -<p>Marked advances in space launch and satellite manufacturing have made low Earth orbits (LEO) increasingly popular for deploying satellite constellations. Legacy satellite programs often struggled with a “vicious circle between high reliability and high costs.” High unit costs incentivized the use of expensive components to prevent failure, and the use of expensive components contributed to high unit cost.</p> +<p>《刑事罪行》條例第11(1)條規定,煽動控罪的檢控,「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行。」第11(2)條亦規定,未經律政司司長書面同意,不得就煽動控罪提出檢控。沒有爭議條文目的是要確保相關檢控及時,而不會起訴「過時」的罪行。上述兩項條文首次寫進煽動罪條例以及生效是1938年9月2日。至1972年12月31日,煽動罪條例合併入《刑事罪行條例》,經修訂後成為第11(1)及(2)條,而「提出檢控」中的「提出(instituted)」此時首次出現。</p> -<p>Recent declines in launch cost have enabled a paradigm shift in constellation design (Figure 23). Commercial actors have broken vicious cost-reliability cycles by embracing rapid replenishment over exquisite designs. As it becomes more affordable to place satellites in orbit, it becomes possible to proliferate larger numbers of satellites, which in turn enables economies of scale in satellite manufacturing.</p> +<p>判決指,從上述過程可以推論,立法機關之所以在《刑事罪行條例》中引入「提出(instituted)」一詞,原意是對於所有需要首席檢察官(Attorney General)同意而檢控的罪行統一用字,而不是有意改變條文內容。直至1997年香港主權移交,條文中的「首席檢察官」修訂為「律政司司長」,除此之外便沒有任何其他修訂。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9lX9jcx.png" alt="image24" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 23: Declining Space Launch Costs.</strong> Note: Launch costs to LEO in inflation-adjusted FY 2021 dollars, sorted by launch vehicle (individual bubble). A bubble’s size corresponds to the number of successful orbital launches achieved by that vehicle as of December 31, 2019. Source: CSIS Aerospace Security Project.</em></p> +<h4 id="官當控方提出告發檢控程序便算開始">官:當控方「提出告發」檢控程序便算開始</h4> -<p>This shift has made LEO orbits increasingly popular for commercial applications. Of the over 6,700 satellites in orbit, over 80 percent now operate in the LEO regime, where their proximity to Earth suits them for high-resolution remote sensing and low-latency communications. This philosophy — a proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO) architecture — has informed recent approaches to national defense space systems.</p> +<p>判決指,沒有爭議「煽動罪」是可公訴的罪行(indictable offence),受《裁判官條例》第三部管轄,考慮《裁判官條例》第8及27條有關「申訴」或「告發」的字眼,法官認為不論在公訴程序或簡易程序中,當控方「提出告發(laying of an information)」,檢控程序便算是開始,而毋須等到被告人出庭應訊或帶上法庭才算開始。</p> -<p><em>EFFECTS OF PROXIMITY</em></p> +<p>根據《裁判官條例》第2條的定義,「告發(information)」意思包括「控告」。而第75(1)條規定「任何指稱有人犯了可公訴罪行的申訴或告發,均須以書面提出,並須載有或包含有指稱已犯罪行的陳述,以及為提供有關該項罪行性質的合理資料的所需詳情。」</p> -<p>The mathematics of proximity operate in favor of LEO satellite constellations. At LEO altitudes — between 400 and 2,000 km above Earth — even smaller sensors can provide high-resolution imagery of Earth’s surface. Further distances demand larger apertures; aperture limits the maximum resolution attainable by an infrared sensor (Figure 24). Holding other parameters constant, a sensor placed in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) requires an aperture several times larger to attain comparable resolution to one orbiting at 500 km.</p> +<p>就本案而言,法官認為西九法院裁判官在2021年12月14日收妥控方的信件、控罪詳情及相關文件後,毫無疑問地已充份地構成「提出告發」,符合第75(1)條的要求。而控方一旦提出了告發,便毋須做額外功夫,檢控程序已算是啟動。(“The information once so laid, no more was required of the prosecutor and the prosecution had ‘begun’.”)</p> -<p>Optical apertures are a significant driver of satellite cost. Smaller apertures are less costly to manufacture and can reduce the structural mass needed to ensure the vehicle withstands harsh shocks during launch. In turn, a reduction in satellite mass allows for lighter reaction wheels to orient the vehicle, lighter motors for keeping it in orbit, and correspondingly lower launch costs.</p> +<p>當控方提出告發後,裁判官可以發出拘捕令把被告人帶上法庭,或簽發傳票要求被告人自行到庭應訊,不論是哪一種的上庭方式,它們只是為了被告能被帶到裁判官席前的程序,是法庭的事務,與控方無關。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0552np1.png" alt="image25" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 24: Aperture Effects on Resolution.</strong> These images depict a hypersonic target viewed from GEO with an infrared sensor. Left: A view of the target with a notional extremely large aperture. Center: 60 cm aperture (center), and with 30 cm aperture (right). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>判決指,雖然《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)及(2)條分別使用「開始(begun)」及「提出(instituted)」,字眼不同,但是兩者均指向相同的東西。判決又提到,兩項條文目的是保障被告人,若果立法機關有意賦予兩詞不同意思,理應提供兩詞各自的釋義。</p> -<p>The proximity of LEO also presents several drawbacks. At these distances, the perceived motion between satellite, target, and background becomes more pronounced. This relative motion can introduce motion blur to the target picture. Sensors that take longer to collect light are more sensitive and more susceptible to motion blurring as the weapon and background move across the frame (Figure 25). Shorter collection (“integration”) times, meanwhile, can more effectively “freeze” fast-moving objects, but with a cost to sensitivity and detection range.</p> +<h4 id="倘被告留院或不在港-致未能及時檢控-法官不接受辯方稱不應受審">倘被告留院或不在港 致未能及時檢控 法官不接受辯方稱不應受審</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9Dpghby.png" alt="image26" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 25: Motion Blur and Jitter Effects.</strong> A static hypersonic weapon-sized target, imaged from low Earth orbit, with a 35 cm aperture, appears as a blurred point source for an infrared sensor (left). Center: The same target displays motion streaking when accounting for sensor integration time: in this case, for 10 milliseconds (center). This streak becomes blurred when accounting for additional sensor vibration and jitter (right). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>判決又指,辯方堅稱只有當被告人上庭應訊及面對控罪時,檢控程序才算啟動,會導致令人驚訝(surprising)的結果。法官曾在庭上問及,若然被告人留院、不在香港或潛逃,以致未能趕及在檢控期限之內上庭應訊呢?辯方則回答在如此情況下,被告人便不應就控罪受審,因他未能在檢控期限屆滿之前上庭。法官表示不接受辯方說法,因這不是立法原意。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZKoP8q8.png" alt="image27" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 26: Relative Motion and Dwell Time Comparison.</strong> Comparison of GEO (white), MEO (pink), and LEO (green) satellite motion. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/D33tRay.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 黎智英</p> -<p>Mitigating blur and jitter in infrared sensors involves a careful balancing act. Doing so requires FPAs with high sensitivities, readout circuits and image processors with higher data throughput, and algorithms tailored for target signatures with high relative motion. While feasible to overcome, the problem can be made easier by incorporating sensors in higher orbits or leveraging alternative phenomenologies.</p> +<p>判決指,第11(1)及(2)條處理檢控程序的不同範疇,第11(2)條從控方角度出發,即提出告發者,並聚焦檢控須經律政司司長同意,以免濫用程序;第11(1)條則從法庭作為接收告發者的角度出發,以確保控方乃及時檢控。</p> -<p>The closeness of LEO satellites also limits their coverage. Compared to satellites at higher altitudes, they possess shorter horizon-limited lines of sight and persist for less time over a given point on Earth’s surface (Figure 26). More satellites will be needed to ensure that two are continuously overhead. While it is possible to achieve infrequent coverage with a small number of satellites, it takes significant numbers to make that coverage persistent (Figures 27 and 28).</p> +<p>總括而言,法官認為西九法庭於2021年12月14日,即檢控期限10日之前,已收妥控方通知及有關煽動控罪的資料,故此檢控並沒有超出期限,遂駁回辯方的申請。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eMx8too.png" alt="image28" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 27: Notional 135-Satellite LEO Constellation (120-Degree Field of Regard).</strong> A constellation of 135 satellites at 1,000 km altitude with a 120-degree field of regard fixed sensor, sized for persistent global coverage. The coverage map depicts two (yellow) and eight or more (red) satellites in view. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>被告為:黎智英(76歲)、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NCE6dWN.png" alt="image29" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 28: Notional 312-Satellite LEO Constellation (110-Degree Field of Regard).</strong> A constellation at 1,000 km altitude with a 110-degree field of regard fixed sensor. The reduced coverage footprint of each satellite necessitates a larger number of satellites to achieve persistent, global stereo coverage. The coverage map depicts two (yellow) and eight or more (red) satellites in view. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。</p> -<p>A related consideration for LEO constellation design and cost is the higher replenishment rates required over their life cycle. Drag from the upper reaches of Earth’s atmosphere slows satellites in orbit, requiring more propulsion to maintain their station. At 600 km, the natural lifespan of a generic satellite orbit is approximately 15 years, but this falls dramatically to under one year at 400 km (Table 2). The Space Development Agency (SDA)’s Tracking Layer Tranche 0 satellites, for instance, have requirements for minimum operational lifetimes of four to five years, rather than the decades possible at higher orbits (Figure 29).</p> +<p>黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RDeKMcF.png" alt="image30" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Approximate Orbital Lifespan (King-Hele) of 0.01m2/kg Object with Average Solar Activity.</strong> Low Earth orbit lifespans differ significantly, especially at lower altitudes, with different propulsion and station-keeping systems, satellite size, density, drag, and solar activity levels. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project, with data adapted from Swiss Re Corporate Solutions, 2018.</em></p> +<p>控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。</p> -<p>Building a high replenishment cadence into a constellation’s life cycle is not entirely a disadvantage. The higher replenishment cadence of LEO constellations enables alternative philosophies to constellation design and the space industrial base. There is less need to overengineer for reliability, for instance, if a satellite’s lifespan is capped at five years. The consistent need for replenishment creates consistent demand for satellite production, keeping production lines hot, enabling economies of scale, and building a resilient defense industrial base.</p> +<p>同案8名被告:前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華,早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,現正還柙,等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xlFQGEG.png" alt="image31" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 29: Space Development Agency Planned Constellation Life Cycle.</strong> The number of satellites in orbit does not remain constant because as more are launched, others degrade. Satellites launched in FY 2024, for instance, begin to deorbit in FY 2029, causing fluctuations in the total figures. Further launches in FY 2029 and FY 2031 both expand and replenish the planned low Earth orbit constellation. Source: Space Development Agency.</em></p> +<hr /> -<p>High replenishment rates also permit new technologies to be “spiraled in” as older satellites deorbit. Long-lived satellites are often constructed with excess capability to ensure their relevance decades in the future; shorter-lived satellites can be designed as minimum viable products, intended for replacement as technologies and requirements evolve. Increased costs — in launching more satellites and more frequently replenishing them — must be balanced against the savings associated with agile development, manufacturing at scale, and lower relative launch costs compared to higher orbits.</p> +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導官裁煽動刊物罪非逾時檢控 去信法庭「提出告發」未等黎智英上庭 已屬啟動程序Euro SIFMANet Tbilisi Report2023-12-21T12:00:00+08:002023-12-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/euro-sifmanet-tbilisi-report<p><em>Discussions revealed the particular challenges that Georgia faces in implementing sanctions against Russia – and how its partners can help.</em></p> -<p><em>SYSTEMIC THREATS TO PROLIFERATED LOW EARTH ORBIT</em></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Technological advancements in commercial space have generated enthusiasm for pLEO constellations. In 2019, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin established SDA for the express purpose of acquiring such constellations. In recent years, pLEO has become the watchword of space sensor acquisition. It embraces the notion that quantity has a quality all its own, with resilience achieved through numerical proliferation, measured both by the number of satellites currently deployed and those that could be reconstituted. An effective pLEO architecture promises to invert the cost asymmetries of traditional counterspace operations; the potential to make it more costly to destroy LEO satellites than to launch them has informed the emphasis on pLEO in recent years.</p> +<p>Georgia, as a country which borders Russia and has ambitions to join the EU, is in a difficult geopolitical situation. The raft of sanctions that the EU and allies have imposed on Russia therefore raises serious questions for Tbilisi.</p> -<p>Adversary counterspace capabilities, however, should not be underestimated. A pLEO architecture provides resilience to certain kinds of counterspace threats but not others (Figure 30). Indeed, putting all one’s eggs in the LEO basket may incur risks: vulnerability to systemic threats that affect the entire orbital regime. “We don’t want to become so dependent or so vulnerable, potentially, in the pLEO,” General James Dickinson of U.S. Space Command has warned, “as opposed to having a diversification, where you have capabilities and different orbital regimes [to] rely on.”</p> +<p>As an EU candidate country, Georgia is expected to align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes the numerous restrictive measures imposed on Russia. However, with 20% of its territory – Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region or South Ossetia – under Russian occupation, Georgia faces the challenge of striking a balance. On the one hand, it has sympathy and solidarity with Ukraine given the Russian occupation. On the other, it wants to avoid actions that lead to further Russian aggression against Georgia.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bmZdG83.png" alt="image32" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 30: Counterspace Threats.</strong> Direct-ascent anti-satellite, co-orbital, and ground site attacks all can be difficult to scale against increasingly proliferated constellation designs. Nuclear effects and cyberattacks could paralyze large segments of proliferated constellations at once. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>In November 2023, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI, in collaboration with the Regional Institute of Security Studies (RISS), hosted a series of roundtable discussions in Tbilisi with Georgian authorities and representatives from the private sector and civil society. The aim of these discussions was to obtain insights into Georgia’s position on the international sanctions against Russia and the current Georgian efforts, within their national jurisdiction, to prevent circumvention and evasion. This engagement is part of the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.</p> -<p>These systemic threats — threats that exploit a failure mode common to the entire architecture — merit further consideration. Cyberattacks against a constellation’s control systems or nuclear detonations in space could disable many satellites at once. The growing density of space debris in LEO is an additional cause for concern, and one that is increasingly difficult to mitigate. Even if the cost of individual kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks exceeds the cost of launching additional LEO satellites, the debris generated from these engagements could make those orbits challenging to reconstitute. It is simpler to proliferate and reconstitute in LEO, but also potentially simpler to attack.</p> +<h3 id="georgias-approach-to-financial-sanctions-against-russia">Georgia’s Approach to Financial Sanctions Against Russia</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Putting all one’s eggs in the LEO basket may incur risks: vulnerability to systemic threats that affect the entire orbital regime.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>On 25 February 2022, the government of Georgia announced its decision not to implement international sanctions against Russia. However, in reality, Tbilisi’s approach to sanctions is far more complex. Alignment with the EU’s CFSP is important for Georgia’s EU candidacy status and the country’s connections to global markets and correspondent banking relations effectively mandate compliance with these restrictions. Under these conditions, without the introduction of any new laws in Georgia, the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) instructed the country’s financial sector to comply with the sanctions imposed by the US, the EU and the UK. To support compliance in the sector, the NBG has a dedicated anti-money laundering (AML) department that is liaising with banks on sanctions and conducts inspections in relation to sanctions against Russia.</p> -<p>Cyberattacks remain a persistent area threat for any distributed architecture, whether in LEO, medium Earth orbit (MEO), GEO, or highly elliptical orbit (HEO). Software to orchestrate so many satellites at once — for orbital maintenance, collision avoidance, data transport, and tasking — presents a large attack surface for potential intrusions. While difficult to characterize, cyberattacks represent a critical area threat and a major risk category for all national security satellite architectures.</p> +<p>A representative from the NBG highlighted that businesses in Georgia have boosted their resources dedicated to sanctions and are increasingly adopting programmes to check and identify sanctions issues. The NBG representative noted that they are aware of the complex rules and licences related to the monitoring of goods and services under restrictions, as well the cost of compliance for the private sector. Although businesses seek support from the NBG, Georgia’s central bank faces the challenge of responding to questions about foreign sanctions regimes over which it has no control, and no insight beyond what is on the relevant sanctions coalition websites. For this reason, the NBG intends to guide the private sector in the right direction but informs financial institutions that they must assess their own risks.</p> -<p>Less discussed are the area threats posed by nuclear explosions in space or at high altitudes (Figure 31). Nuclear explosions cause many immediate damaging effects: the pulse of thermal, x-ray, and other radiation can damage nearby satellites and blind their sensors.</p> +<p>A representative from Georgia’s Banking Association expressed its satisfaction with the performance of the banking sector on sanctions, due to the effectiveness of AML and sanctions procedures that the industry has in place. However, the participant noted that several banks operating in Georgia are part of regional banking groups in countries that are not implementing sanctions, such as Turkey, Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan. This creates risk. The Banking Association representative added that the services of VISA and Mastercard credit cards of Russian banks in Georgia had been suspended to comply with international sanctions.</p> -<p>An even greater concern, however, is nuclear pumping, a phenomenon where nuclear radiation lingers in the LEO environment (Figure 32). In LEO, Earth’s geomagnetic field would contain many of the charged particles emitted by a nuclear explosion; instead of radiating outward, these particles could spiral around the globe and damage large numbers of satellites. A 2002 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization analysis assessed that “a precursor high altitude nuclear burst could do significant damage to satellites,” with “pumped-up Van Allen belts [posing] a concern for satellite longevity” and “not well understood.”</p> +<p>A representative from the Bank of Georgia (BOG) also described its limited risk appetite for customers from Russia and transactions related to the country – these are now subject to enhanced due diligence procedures. The BOG, one of the main banks in Georgia with 2.5 million customers, is listed on the London Stock Exchange, so it is under the supervision of the UK Financial Conduct Authority and therefore is required to comply with UK (and wider international) sanctions against Russia. The BOG currently has two co-directors – one for general financial crime issues and another oversees the sanctions programmes – in its compliance department, as well as 80 employees in the “second line of defence”.</p> -<p>The radiation left in these belts could make it challenging to maintain and reconstitute a pLEO constellation. Indeed, while it is less costly to proliferate and reconstitute LEO constellations, more attention must be paid to these systemic threats.</p> +<p>Against this background, the number of suspicious transaction reports in Georgia has increased. Participants explained that the financial sector has expanded its criteria of high-risk activities to include: international transactions; transactions in US dollars; high-net-worth individuals; and jurisdictions under suspicion of facilitating sanctions evasion, among others. Georgia has taken significant steps to mitigate risks of breaching international sanctions, for example, the Tbilisi City Hall terminated the almost $50 million-contract for 44 subway cars for the Tbilisi Metro, that was agreed with the EU-sanctioned Russian company Metrovagonmash. However, private sector representatives noted that while businesses will not trade with a company that raises clear red flags, the emerging challenge is around companies that pose “yellow flags”. To ensure compliance in Georgia, correspondent banks now ask Georgian banks about their transaction monitoring systems, their automated alerts systems, the percentage of false alerts generated, the number of transactions rejected, and the resources allocated to effectively check these procedures.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LYvPV4j.png" alt="image33" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 31: High-Altitude Nuclear Tests.</strong> Far left: “Orange,” 3.9-megaton detonation at 43 km altitude; left: “Teak,” 3.8 megatons at 76.8 km altitude; center: “Kingfish”; right: “Checkmate”; and far right: “Starfish,” 1.4 megatons at 400 km altitude. Source: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="when-sanctions-come-home-the-case-of-otar-partskhaladze"><code class="highlighter-rouge">When Sanctions Come Home: The Case of Otar Partskhaladze</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/URSDGvp.png" alt="image34" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 32: Nuclear Pumping in Space.</strong> Radiation from nuclear detonations can become trapped in Earth’s geomagnetic field, affecting the longevity of satellites. Source: U.S. EMP Commission.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As many participants in the workshops noted, the topic of Russia sanctions is highly politicised. Nothing illustrates this more than the case of Georgian citizen, businessman and former prosecutor Otar Partskhaladze, who was sanctioned by the US in September 2023.</code></em></p> -<p>A third concern is the increasing population of satellites and debris in LEO. The growing popularity of these orbits have made it challenging to avoid collisions (Figure 33). Between December 2022 and May 2023, satellites in the commercial Starlink constellation performed over 25,000 collision-avoidance maneuvers, representing roughly half of the number of Starlink maneuvers since 2019. These debris fields could densify after a large-scale attack. Debris generated in just three ASAT missile tests account for 15 percent of tracked debris in LEO. While Starlink satellites orbit lower than planned national security LEO constellations, it is emblematic of a larger problem: growing debris fields could threaten future operations, forcing collision-avoidance maneuvers that consume fuel and disrupt coverage.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Partskhaladze and two companies of which he owned a majority were sanctioned for allegedly facilitating malign Russian influence in Georgia led by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), and personally profiting from his FSB connection</code></em></p> -<p>These systemic threats could be difficult to attribute or deter. Cyberattacks generate attribution challenges that complicate potential responses. Intentional debris generation can be deniable: a debris field, generated by a foreign kinetic ASAT test, could be justified as a peacetime operation but be as disruptive to operations as a direct, unambiguous attack. Adversaries might even detonate a nuclear device over their own territory under the pretense of a test. Chinese scientific organizations have reportedly begun to reassess similar options to counter U.S. satellite constellations. Despite the damage their effects could cause, these deniable, systemic threats challenge the United States’ ability to devise a proportional response.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In June 2023, in line with a change in the law that had been criticised by the IMF and other experts as damaging the NBG’s independence, a new governor was appointed. Following the designation of Partskhaladze, the newly appointed governor, Natia Turnava, issued an executive order that required a local court order before the assets of a Georgian national could be frozen under international sanctions. This overturned the NBG’s previous position that banks should implement Russia sanctions.</code></em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/30PrKUT.png" alt="image35" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 33: Orbital Debris.</strong> Note: A visualization of over 24,631 tracked objects in orbit. Active satellites imaged in green, inactive satellites imaged in gray. Red orbital rings at 1,000, 10,000, and 36,000 km altitudes. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from AGI and U.S. Space Force.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Among other implications of this decision, the IMF suspended its programme for Georgia over its concerns for the independence of the central bank.</code></em></p> -<p>It is therefore useful to examine other orbital regimes, including MEO and airborne domains, which could complement LEO’s advantages and help mitigate these vulnerabilities. A survivable sensor constellation would likely incorporate assets in multiple orbits, reducing the impact of such area-wide attacks.</p> +<p>Although Georgia’s financial sector has, in effect, complied with international sanctions, trade with Russia has continued to increase. This poses numerous challenges to tackling circumvention through Georgia. The following section looks more closely at the state of trade restrictions in Georgia and the related insights provided by participants at the workshops.</p> -<h4 id="medium-earth-orbit">Medium Earth Orbit</h4> +<h3 id="trade-restrictions-between-georgia-and-russia">Trade Restrictions Between Georgia and Russia</h3> -<p>Placing satellites in higher orbits can offer coverage and survivability advantages not achievable from LEO alone. Operating at higher altitudes allows each satellite to view a larger swath of Earth’s surface, reducing the numbers necessary for global coverage (Figures 34 and 35). MEO, a family of orbits between 2,000 and 35,999 km from Earth’s surface, offers several attractive design points for satellite constellations. By moving a satellite’s orbit from 1,000 to 10,000 km, for example, a satellite’s detection footprint against low-flying hypersonic targets is roughly quadrupled.</p> +<p>Russia is Georgia’s third-largest trade partner, with 11.1% of Georgian exports going to Russia. Georgia has clearly stated that it will not implement trade sanctions against Russia.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IvlwUlg.png" alt="image36" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 34: Satellites Needed for Geometric, Two-Satellite Global Coverage.</strong> This graphic illustrates the relationship between altitude and the theoretical minimum number of satellites required for stereo coverage. Operational constellations would require considerably greater numbers of satellites at every altitude when considering sensor field of regard, solar exclusion, maintenance, and power factors. Geometric coverage minimums were derived from CSIS parametric analysis. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>Still, Georgian authorities emphasised that Georgia is one of the main partners of the EU and the US in the region. While the combined EU market is Georgia’s main trade partner, the share is gradually decreasing. Georgian businesses understand the importance of the EU market and are motivated to increase their trade relations, but they require support from the EU to promote investment in the country to support trade decoupling from Russia.</p> -<p>These substantial gains in viewable area, and the slower relative motion of these satellites across Earth’s surface, have made these orbits useful for navigational satellites, where large numbers must be in view at once. The Global Positioning System (GPS), with roughly 31 satellites in a 20,000 km orbit, allows for every point on Earth to be reachable by four or more satellites.</p> +<p>Participants emphasised that the complexity of monitoring supply chains makes it futile for international partners to tackle circumvention unilaterally. Georgian authorities stressed the resources they are allocating to supporting international partners, prioritising the list of 45 high-priority items, and they find discussions on secondary sanctions frustrating. To facilitate compliance, authorities also highlighted their interest in obtaining consolidated sanctions lists from the international coalition, given the costs of monitoring all the lists independently.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MP3C6ic.png" alt="image37" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 35: Notional 15-Satellite MEO Constellation at 10,000 km.</strong> MEO satellite coverage, from stereo (yellow) to eight or more (red). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>According to participating authorities, since the beginning, Georgia conveyed to international partners that it would support their aims of preventing circumvention. Authorities noted that half of their capacity is currently focused on sanctions implementation, identifying banned EU goods bound for Russia and the parties involved in their trade. They also noted that the closure of trade borders with the EU via the Baltic states has led to a notable displacement of trade transit through Georgia.</p> -<p>MEO satellites represent only a small fraction of satellites currently in orbit. This is because of the high radiation levels in the MEO environment. Earth’s geomagnetic field traps high-energy particles from the Sun and other sources, creating several belts of elevated radiation. In some scenarios, dosages in this regime can exceed 50 rad daily, a dosage equivalent to roughly 16 abdominal CT scans. This harsh operating regime introduces challenges for constellation designers. While MEO represents a large set of possible orbits, most MEO constellations operate in a smaller number of “sweet spot” altitudes and inclinations, such as at 10,000 km, where radiation is lowest (Figure 36).</p> +<p>One side-effect of the introduction of international sanctions on Russia is that Georgia has become a regional re-export hub for used cars from the EU and the US. Both Brussels and Washington have demanded Georgia cease this trade with Russia. In August 2023, Georgia agreed to introduce this ban on the re-export of Western cars to Russia. However, participants at the workshop explained that this action has simply created another layer in the circumvention route. Georgia remains part of the supply chain, but cars are now first transported to Kazakhstan and are likely re-exported again to Russia, despite efforts to identify the real end-user. A further complication is the export of the spare car parts, given their dual-use nature. For their export, Customs requires official letters from manufactures on where these parts are going and how they will be used.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KBLqXEp.png" alt="image38" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 36: Radiation Fluxes on Orbit.</strong> Representative orbits at 1,000 km (LEO), 10,000 km (MEO), 20,000 km (MEO), and 36,000 km (GEO). The highest fluxes are indicated by red coloration. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from NASA.</em></p> +<p>More broadly, participants highlighted the circumvention challenge Georgia faces as a trading partner with the Eurasian Economic Union, a mechanism that Russia is increasingly using to obfuscate the destination of trade flows.</p> -<p>Without hardening, these fluxes can significantly degrade a satellite’s subsystems. The interaction of solar winds and free ions in this environment can charge spacecraft components and cause unintended electrical interference. High-energy particles can degrade coatings and solar panels on the spacecraft surface and damage electronics and detector arrays within a spacecraft (Figure 37). These issues remain a concern for national security satellite constellations; unexpected radiation levels impacted availability of satellites in the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), for instance, which orbited at high LEO altitudes of roughly 1,350 km.</p> +<p>Georgian authorities were concerned that the focus of sanctions discussions is dominated by financial integrity, neglecting the key role played by trade integrity, particularly when considering Georgia’s geographic location. Trade integrity requires a combination of export control capacity and trade transparency, which demands good customs communication channels between exporting and importing countries and capacity to monitor the supply chains. This system depends on the reporting information provided by the private sector, but businesses do not have the capacity to identify everything related to sanctions and thus information is incomplete. This is particularly true in the non-financial sector, which participants described as notably less experienced in sanctions implementation. Representatives from the private sector explained that while no meetings have been arranged with authorities to support sanctions implementation, a good cross-sector relationship exists whereby businesses can approach authorities to receive guidance and training when required.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iWIpReL.png" alt="image39" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 37: Effects of Increased Solar Radiation on Satellite Imaging Sensor.</strong> False-color image of the Sun taken by solar probe before (left) and (after) a solar radiation spike on October 28 and 29, 2003. Radiation can cause additional noise and false pixels to appear on imaging sensors, requiring specialized packaging and software to mitigate. Source: NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center Scientific Visualization Studio.</em></p> +<p>To improve its domestic controls, Georgia has received technical and capacity-building training from EU member states. The Ministry of Finance reported that as of 8 November 2023, Georgia had stopped 2,970 containers and denied 1,683 applications from companies to conduct operations related to goods and services subject to restrictions. As a small jurisdiction, the Georgian authorities see these numbers as a sign of success. However, they raised frustrations with the time it takes the EU or the US to respond to queries about trucks stopped at the border.</p> -<p>Additionally, radiation can disrupt a satellite’s control circuitry. Computer processors and memory degrade over time with exposure to radiation. In addition to this total-dose-induced damage, they are susceptible to single-event effects, where charged particles strike a logic gate or memory cell and change its state from one to zero (“bit flip”) or prevent it from switching altogether (“stuck bit”). These in turn can cause malfunctions or permanent damage. Mitigating this often requires dedicated circuitry and software to correct errors or specialized, radiation-hardened circuits, which are typically slower and more costly than commercial equivalents.</p> +<p>Georgian authorities at the roundtable also share the concern expressed by international partners regarding the involvement of Russia’s Federal Security Service (the FSB) in establishing front companies in third countries. Investigations into FSB-facilitated circumvention schemes are ongoing.</p> -<p>While challenging, these environments confer some survivability benefits. Their greater distance, relative to LEO, places them out of reach of some lower-tier ASAT weapons; attacking MEO assets with a direct-ascent weapon, for instance, would take a significantly larger missile and a substantially longer time. While still vulnerable to prompt nuclear effects, the MEO environment faces relatively less of a nuclear-pumping challenge — moreover, as MEO satellites must already be hardened to withstand elevated radiation, those costs can be amortized for mitigating nuclear effects.</p> +<p>The flow of land-based exports from Georgia to Russia – which some participants suggested might be complicated by the development of a north–south trade corridor between Iran and Russia – continues to attract international attention. However, Georgian authorities pointed to an overlooked yet significant challenge that they face: monitoring maritime transport.</p> -<p>The relative sparsity of the MEO environment, finally, can be conducive to monitoring co-orbital ASAT threats. Co-orbital weapons, placed into similar orbits as MEO satellites, are a common approach to kinetically attacking MEO and further orbits. With roughly 3 percent of spacecraft orbiting in MEO, it may be relatively easier to observe, distinguish, and counter suspicious behavior.</p> +<h3 id="the-challenges-of-maritime-trade">The Challenges of Maritime Trade</h3> -<h4 id="geosynchronous-and-highly-elliptical-orbits">Geosynchronous and Highly Elliptical Orbits</h4> +<p>Monitoring land-based trade is a complex and resource-consuming effort for Georgia. Detecting banned goods transported in trucks at the border with Russia and identifying the real end-user of the products is a challenging task. Alongside this task, Georgia also has access to the Black Sea and monitoring maritime trade entering and leaving its ports presents significant challenges.</p> -<p>Geosynchronous orbits, at roughly 36,000 km from Earth, require even fewer satellites to achieve persistent coverage. At this distance, satellites orbiting the equator stay effectively stationary over a fixed point on Earth’s surface, orbiting at the same rate as Earth turns. No other orbit can provide a similar level of persistence — at the cost of placing satellites at an extreme distance. Current and forthcoming missile warning satellites, including SBIRS and Next Gen OPIR, occupy these orbits, where persistent coverage is achievable with only a small number of assets.</p> +<p>Georgia’s Maritime Transport Agency is monitoring vessels and their cargo to prevent the circumvention of international sanctions. Representatives from the agency described the challenge that the small six-hour vessel inspection window poses. Authorities must operate within this period, and delays in obtaining the necessary answers from the beneficial owners of vessels can be problematic.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OKN1P9t.png" alt="image40" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 38: Depiction of the SBIRS and DSP Architecture.</strong> The Space Based Infrared System incorporates geosynchronous and highly elliptical polar satellites. GEO satellites offer latitudinal and longitudinal persistence by orbiting at the same rate that the Earth rotates. To maintain this persistence, the orbits must be close to the equator. A pair of polar satellites, meanwhile, can offer persistent coverage of at least one satellite over the poles. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>A representative of the Maritime Transport Agency explained that, between August and September 2022, several companies wanted to re-flag their vessels with the Georgian flag, but they were identified to be Russian so Georgia denied their requests. Still, a major challenge the Agency faces in this regard is the presence of vessels with flags from non-cooperative jurisdictions. Georgian authorities try to communicate with the reported beneficial owners in these jurisdictions – notably British Overseas Territories in the Caribbean – but often fail to establish contact.</p> -<p>Satellites in highly elliptical orbits offer similar advantages, offering persistent, staring coverage near Earth’s poles. In such orbits, satellites come within several hundred kilometers of Earth before swinging far into space, often tens of thousands of kilometers away. As a HEO satellite approaches the highest point in its orbit — the apogee — its velocity slows, allowing it to “hang” over a specific region for longer than the time spent at the lowest point, the perigee.</p> +<p>Georgia also faces a unique challenge on maritime trade through the ports of Russian-occupied Abkhazia. Georgia monitors trade through these ports but has no control over this activity. Georgian authorities track vessels in Abkhazia that involve suspicious beneficial owners and offshore jurisdictions and shares these reports with international partners. Authorities described how the vessels that Georgia tracks from Russia to Abkhazia go to Turkish ports to obfuscate their origin. By visiting Turkish ports, they can obtain the necessary papers to then access EU ports and thus circumvent sanctions. Georgian authorities expressed their dissatisfaction with the scarce support received from the EU and the US on this concern, a view consistent with their wider frustration on support received for implementing trade-related sanctions.</p> -<p>A minimum of two HEO satellites is necessary to provide continuous coverage of Earth’s high-latitude regions. When combined with equatorial GEO satellites, which offer persistence at most lower latitudes, only a few satellites become needed to provide whole-Earth coverage. The SBIRS missile warning constellation, for example, includes six GEO satellites to provide coverage of most latitudes, and two highly elliptical polar satellites to maintain custody of the North Pole and upper Northern Hemisphere (Figures 38 and 39).</p> +<h3 id="impact-of-russian-inflows-of-people-and-money-into-georgia">Impact of Russian Inflows (of People and Money) into Georgia</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/D5hdEAx.png" alt="image41" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 39: SBIRS-HEO Sensor View of a Boosting Rocket.</strong> Image degraded for declassification. Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> +<p>A final point emerged from the workshop on the unique challenge of geography and the resulting incoming flows of Russian citizens and investment. Participants noted that Georgia gets economic benefits from the increasing numbers of Russian citizens coming into the country and opening businesses. Tourism from Russian nationals has increased, and new Russian-owned businesses have opened in the country, notably in the IT industry. But participants also agreed that this presents security risks for Georgia. Real estate market prices in Georgia have doubled and participants described the IT industry as posing particular risks in terms of sanctions, given that these services are banned in the EU and US but can now operate from Georgia.</p> -<p>The extreme distances of these constellations introduce novel operational considerations. Much larger apertures are needed to image targets at high resolution. As such, it becomes challenging to perform more detailed sensing missions, including midcourse and boost-phase tracking. Radio signals and light can take up to 220 milliseconds to reach the sensor of a satellite in GEO.</p> +<p>Furthermore, while these booming economic sectors generate wealth in the country, participants were concerned about the negative impact their sudden departure would have on Georgia’s economy should they leave immediately the war is over. Moreover, participants added that these new businesses are competing with existing Georgian businesses, with resulting impacts on business opportunities and/or recruitment. One interesting observation related to Russian tourism is that Russian nationals are setting up tourist guides that Georgian authorities fear may be spreading pro-Russian propaganda as part of their service.</p> -<p>Launch costs for the requisite geostationary transfer orbits, moreover, are often double to triple the price of launches to LEO. GEO and polar satellites, designed with fuel to travel from such transfer orbits to their final positions, take longer to place on orbit, and often require larger structures. While fewer satellites are needed for coverage, each unit can become costly to produce.</p> +<p>Russia is a visibly divisive topic in Georgia, which, participants assert, is fuelled by mis/disinformation. Pro-Russian media pushes a narrative on the ineffectiveness of sanctions on the Russian economy and their negative impact on the sanctioning country’s population, while opposing media focuses on the scandal, noted earlier in this report, around the former prosecutor. Georgian media also focuses on how Georgia is economically dependent on trade with Russia and the aforementioned Russian inflows. These dependencies are made more acute by the lack of EU trade growth. Participants disagreed with these views and added that economic ties with Russia are not critical to Georgia’s economic security, having survived a direct war with Russia, although participants did share their concerns over Russia’s influence on Georgia’s critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>Systems in these higher orbits, however, can be more difficult to target with some ASAT weapons. It is expensive to acquire direct-ascent missiles capable of targeting systems in GEO; competitors have instead developed sophisticated co-orbital weapons capable of hiding and persisting in geosynchronous orbits. While the popularity of geosynchronous orbits makes it simpler to conceal co-orbital weapons systems, HEO systems, with their high speeds and fewer numbers, may be harder to attack.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<h4 id="airborne-architectures">Airborne Architectures</h4> +<p>The Georgian government chose not to implement sanctions against Russia and the lack of a relevant national law has provided an opportunity for it to make some questionable decisions (such as the case of Partskhaladze and the NBG). However, the insights provided by both public and private sector participants at the recent workshops reflect the solid efforts of the Georgian authorities to prevent circumvention and evasion from happening through its jurisdiction. In doing so, Georgian authorities face similar challenges to those found across EU member states. Participants agreed on the following list of recommendations to improve Georgia’s ability to support relevant elements of the international sanctions regime against Russia by tackling circumvention:</p> -<p>To be sure, the conversation about elevated sensors has thus far revolved around space-based platforms. This emphasis is understandable and indeed necessary for achieving persistent, global coverage. But airborne platforms may also have a role to play. The United States could risk a gap in capability if space constellations do not come online as scheduled or if other problems develop. Several factors counsel an exploration of airborne sensors for missile tracking.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Establish a dedicated government sanctions unit.</strong> While several departments and agencies consider sanctions, Georgia’s response would benefit from greater coordination that could be achieved by establishing a national sanctions coordination unit that can draw on relevant expertise from across the public and private sectors. This unit could also highlight where new legislation is needed to ensure the integrity of EU sanctions implementation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Promote trade transparency.</strong> Integrity and transparency are essential in trade. This must be supported by the quality and accessibility of data regarding beneficial ownership, as well as the availability of information-sharing channels to ensure a robust framework and facilitate investigations to enforce it.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Continue providing international support to Georgia.</strong> Georgian authorities appear committed to preventing the circumvention of international sanctions but, as in all jurisdictions implementing sanctions, the country requires substantial technical assistance support from international partners. The EU and its allies must ensure they provide sufficient and timely support to Georgia’s anti-circumvention efforts.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Simplify bureaucratic impediments for Georgia’s trade with the EU.</strong> Georgian economic operators should see the EU as an accessible market. Entering and initiating trade with the EU should not be a complicated process. Facilitating smooth trade between the two jurisdictions will see Georgia’s trade shift from Russia towards the EU. As a share, trade with Russia is currently increasing and trade with the EU is decreasing.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Invest in EU/US–Georgia trade relations.</strong> If Georgia is expected to further decouple from Russia, the EU and the US should encourage their businesses to invest in Georgia and expand trade links with the country. Participants explained that Georgian businesses understand that Russia is not a reliable partner, but if they are to reduce trade with Russia, they need to identify a sustainable alternative.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Airborne sensor platforms are mature and, despite their smaller coverage footprints, could generate persistent sensing capability in ways that spacecraft cannot, particularly for specific defended locations, such as the National Capital Region, Okinawa, or Guam. While limited to regional applications, airborne sensors could serve an interim system, backfilling coverage while a space constellation is deployed. Additionally, airborne sensors might serve as an underlay for space sensors, increasing coverage density in these critical regions.</p> +<p>The workshop discussions highlighted the challenges Georgia faces from both a trade and security perspective when considering the implementation of sanctions on Russia. While there is support for sanctions across the public and private sectors, Georgia clearly needs greater support in managing the related trade and security risks. The EU and allies must show that they understand Georgia’s security predicament. Russia’s intention to hold a referendum to annex the occupied territories in Georgia – as it did in Ukraine – can be reactivated any time, creating a sense of vulnerability in Georgia. Georgia is a strategic partner for the West in the region and thus its national interests, particularly related to trade, should be taken into consideration to foster heightened commitment to the implementation of sanctions on Russia.</p> -<p><em>OPPORTUNISM OR PERSISTENCE</em></p> +<hr /> -<p>There are two ways to conceptualize an airborne underlay: as an opportunistic, occasional capability, and as a persistent architecture. Several aircraft in service possess a residual capability to detect and track ballistic missiles opportunistically. In Desert Storm, for example, Air Force F-15s could occasionally detect Scud missile launches during their strike missions but lacked the weapons to engage them or the endurance to patrol for extended periods of time. More recently, in 2012, an F-35 was able to detect a NASA space launch in its initial phases using onboard infrared sensors at distances of up to 1,481 km.</p> +<p><strong>Tom Keatinge</strong> is the founding Director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI, where his research focuses on matters at the intersection of finance and security. He is also currently a specialist adviser on illicit finance to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ongoing enquiry.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tIWLcRJ.png" alt="image42" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 40: NASA ATREX Flight Even.</strong> Footage from the F-35 AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System infrared sensor. During the test, an F-35 tracked several multi-stage rockets with its radar and infrared sensors. Source: Northrop Grumman.</em></p> +<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime &amp; Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).</p>Tom Keatinge and Gonzalo SaizDiscussions revealed the particular challenges that Georgia faces in implementing sanctions against Russia – and how its partners can help.【黎智英案・審訊第二日】2023-12-19T12:00:00+08:002023-12-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-2<ul> + <li>控方指黎智英持續串謀、無逾時檢控 官周五頒判決</li> +</ul> -<p>An opportunistic approach might integrate these existing platforms into the Missile Defense System (MDS). Fifth-generation fighters, such as the F-35, have already demonstrated the ability to communicate fire control-quality tracking information to surface-based missile defenses (Figure 40). While such capabilities cannot persistently cover a defended region and may be called for other mission areas, more could be done to develop the doctrine and datalinks to weave existing sensor assets into the MDS.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>A more robust approach would be to incorporate a persistent airborne underlay for defending critical locations such as Guam. The systems needed for this mission would require long endurances and would ideally fly at higher altitudes than fighter aircraft, allowing for further lines of sight. Such aircraft, equipped with longer-range sensors, would maintain fixed orbits — or combat air patrols (CAPs) — over a position, with enough aircraft in inventory to maintain one or more aloft at any point in time.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eOV0D6a.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jO21eBb.png" alt="image43" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 41: Multispectral Target System.</strong> Source: Missile Defense Agency.</em></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,踏入審訊第2天。黎智英一方昨爭議控方加控煽動罪屬逾時檢控,法庭無權處理,辯方今補充指,煽動罪設6個月的檢控時限是平衡公眾利益,以盡快制止煽動刊物發布,強調控方應及時檢控。控方則指,串謀屬持續的罪行,被告在案發兩年間持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物,可視為同一犯罪計劃,檢控期限應由串謀結束當天、而非被告首次犯法起計;而控方向法庭表示有意加控已屬「開始」檢控,故控方檢控並無逾時。法官聽畢陳詞後,押至本周五就法律爭議頒下裁決,料控方同日將不會讀出開案陳詞。</p> -<p>Such elements have been a recurring feature of boost-phase missile defense designs but are relevant to many other missions, including hypersonic missile defense. Relevant airborne missile-tracking capabilities have already been demonstrated. Between 2015 and 2017, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) used a pair of multispectral-sensor-equipped MQ-9 uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) to track ballistic and cruise missiles (Figure 41). Flying at a 12.8 km altitude, the pair of aircraft tracked intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles from over 1,000 km away. An orbit of modestly persistent sensor aircraft — drones, high-altitude balloons, or others — could contribute to the defense of regional assets in concert with a space sensor system.</p> +<p>身穿淺藍色恤衫、灰色西裝褸的黎智英,今步入法庭時向旁聽席微笑揮手和點頭,其妻子和兩名子女也有到庭,女兒向黎飛吻,黎亦微笑回以飛吻。有旁聽人士高呼「撐住!頂住!」,司法機構職員及保安人員立即阻止稱:「保持安靜!」</p> -<p><em>SIZING A CONSTELLATION</em></p> +<p>辯方昨爭議,控方前年加控黎智英串謀刊印煽動刊物罪時,已超出煽動罪6個月的檢控時限,法庭無司法管轄權審理;亦認為就《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條列明煽動罪檢控「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行」,當中「開始(begun)」一詞是立法時特意選用,只有在控方把被告帶上法庭加控才算「開始」進行檢控,而控方於2021年12月13日去信通知法庭有意加控,並不算「開始」檢控,控方仍然超出檢控時限。</p> -<p>As with space architectures, designing a persistent airborne sensor layer is an inexact art with few absolute rules. Designers must reconcile the number of aircraft required, their individual cost and performance, the locations of possible CAPs, and the bases where aircraft are stored and maintained to construct a viable system.</p> +<h4 id="辯方檢控時限為確保盡快制止煽動作為平衡公眾利益-無對控方不公">辯方:檢控時限為確保盡快制止煽動作為、平衡公眾利益 無對控方不公</h4> -<p>Of these considerations, an aircraft’s operating altitude is especially critical. Higher-flying systems can offer further viewing horizons against low-flying targets and other sensing and survivability advantages. Hypersonic weapons flying at 20 km will enter a 15 km-altitude aircraft’s line of sight at 950 km — roughly 65 percent farther than a ground-based sensor (Figure 42). Moreover, high altitudes offer clearer atmospheric conditions for optical transmission, potentially easing the employment of infrared and other electro-optical sensors. Aircraft flying at altitudes above 10 km may also be difficult to engage with lower-tier surface-to-air missiles, offering survivability advantages.</p> +<p>代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻今重申,控方單單去信法庭「提出告發(laying any information)」並不算是「開始」檢控,解釋煽動條例立法時確保需保障基本權利,因此設有嚴格的6個月檢控時限,亦列明須律政司司長的同意才能提出檢控。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CTiGXhk.png" alt="image44" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 42: Detection Ranges of Surface and Airborne Sensors.</strong> Surface-based sensors (left) cannot detect low-flying targets at longer distances. Elevating the sensor altitude from sea level to a 15 km-altitude aircraft (right) allows for substantially increased viewable distance. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>彭亦認為,檢控時限無對控方造成不公,指當有人發布煽動刊物,為了公眾利益,應盡快檢控來制止刊物發布,並讓公眾知悉哪些刊物不應發布;而若控方認為煽動罪不足以反映刑責,望以串謀罪檢控,亦可於6個月的時限內進行。彭強調,控方應及時檢控,不能什麼也不做,等到數年後才因時限已過、無法以煽動罪檢控,而改用串謀罪檢控;又指檢控時限雖或令一些人逃過法網,但相關「不公」是條文所固有,立法者制定時已平衡公眾利益。</p> -<p>An equally important consideration is aircraft endurance. Long-endurance aircraft are critical to minimize the fleet size and other associated costs needed to maintain a CAP. High-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) aircraft, such as the RQ-4, and medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) aircraft, such as the MQ-9B, can offer endurances of over 24 hours, increasing the time spent on station or reducing requirements for aerial refueling. Prior analyses have estimated that roughly 3 to 4 MQ-9B aircraft could maintain a persistent CAP, with a force-level quantity of up to 17, including spares, needed to maintain three continuous CAPs for up to 270 days per year.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FtSrYyr.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻(中)、大律師 Marc Corlett(右)</p> -<p>Fleet size requirements are also affected by the location of airbases relative to CAP locations. The further the CAP is from an airbase, the longer each aircraft must spend transiting to the patrol region, reducing the fuel available to be on station. Transit time can dramatically increase the numbers required to maintain persistent coverage, holding other factors equal. Achieving the smallest fleet possible will require permissive basing and overflight requirements to minimize the flyout distances needed.</p> +<p>代表3間《蘋果日報》相關公司的大律師王國豪,採納彭的陳詞,同意3間公司被帶上法庭加控才算「開始」檢控,並補充3間公司於2022年2月10日才被正式加控串謀發布煽動刊物罪,比黎智英遲兩個月。</p> -<h4 id="finding-the-right-mix">Finding the Right Mix</h4> +<h4 id="控方被告持續串謀分開檢控屬荒謬">控方:被告持續串謀、分開檢控屬「荒謬」</h4> -<p>The Department of Defense is currently moving toward a multi-orbit architecture in LEO, MEO, GEO, and HEO. These developments acknowledge how efficiencies in some orbits offset inefficiencies in another.</p> +<p>就辯方主張檢控時限應由被告首次完成犯罪、即2019年4月1日發布首篇煽動刊物起計算,副刑事檢控專員周天行回應,串謀是持續的罪行(continuing offence),而本案串謀協議歷時多於兩年,被告並非僅在案發首天發布一篇煽動刊物,而是於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》結束營運期間,持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物,因此檢控時限應由串謀最後一天、即6月24日起計算。而本案所涉行為性質相似、互相關聯,故可被視為同一個犯罪計劃(criminal enterprise)。</p> -<p>LEO constellations benefit from proliferation and economies of scale but suffer challenges with persistence, orbital lifespan, and relative motion. MEO constellations offer more coverage and persistence but require potentially costlier satellites with larger apertures and radiation-hardened subsystems. GEO and HEO satellites provide unique coverage characteristics, requiring few satellites to selectively cover a given pole or longitude, but generate high unit costs and stringent reliability requirements. Airborne sensors can generate persistence unbounded by spacecraft orbital mechanics but have smaller detection footprints and require appropriate basing locations to operate.</p> +<p>周又指,即使只是發布一篇煽動刊物,但若能持續被公眾瀏覽,串謀時期亦應由刊物首次出現至其下架為止;並認為辯方稱應分開檢控每項串謀行為的說法荒謬,直言會令案件變得支離破碎(fragmented),無法反映整體罪行的嚴重性。</p> -<p>The models depicted herein highlight these tradeoffs and the possible benefits of leveraging hybrid architectures — constellations with multiple orbital altitudes. LEO constellations in efficient, highly inclined orbits, for example, tend to under-cover areas near the equator, including critical parts of the Indo-Pacific region. MEO assets, orbiting about the equator, could usefully complement these configurations.</p> +<h4 id="控方法庭收到提控已屬開始檢控若須親帶上庭令控罪難實行">控方:法庭收到提控已屬「開始」檢控、若須親帶上庭令控罪難實行</h4> -<p>A constellation designed for equatorial and mid-latitude coverage, by contrast, might be supplemented with HEO assets that could selectively cover the poles. A combination of assets in different orbital bands, with their different levels of relative motion and viewing angles, might ease the challenge of tracking hypersonic and ballistic targets, whose thermal signatures vary significantly based on background and sensor viewing angles.</p> +<p>而對辯方爭議將黎智英帶上法庭加控才算「開始」進行檢控,周天行則認為法庭收到有關控罪的告發(laying information),即控方於12月13日去信法庭指有意加控,已算是「開始」檢控,解釋《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條中的「開始」,與《裁判官條例》第26條的「提出告發」,用字不同但意思一樣。</p> -<p>Configurations combining multiple orbital altitudes can add resilience and scale without dramatically increasing the number of orbital planes necessary. These models are illustrative: they do not depict ideal constellation designs, nor do they depict the redundancies needed for survivability. They rather demonstrate how orbits could be mixed to cover priority regions more efficiently. As acknowledged by Michael Griffin, former undersecretary of defense for research and engineering and a leading proponent of proliferated low Earth orbit constellations, an effective architecture should be “as widely distributed [as possible] over many choices of orbital regimes.”</p> +<p>根據《裁判官條例》第26條,無規定時效的罪行須於6個月內「作出申訴或提出告發」。惟法官李運騰指,《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條正規定了煽動罪的檢控時限,因此第26條不適用;又指制訂第11(1)條時,第26條已存在,若兩項條文效果一樣,為何還有需要制訂第11(1)條?又指控方詮釋會令第11(1)條變得多餘。周天行同意兩條法例字眼不一,但認為只是字眼上的改變,實際意思是一樣;並指若須將被告帶上法庭才算「開始」檢控,會令控罪難以實行(impracticable),因被告或潛逃和無法聯絡。</p> -<p><em>ADDRESSING LEO INDO-PACIFIC COVERAGE</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VBtF4VI.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行(左)、高級檢控官 陳穎琛(右)</p> -<p>A high-inclination LEO constellation optimized for global coverage will produce the least coverage in latitudes near the equator. These latitudes, however, are most relevant for the Indo-Pacific theater. It is often more costly to add additional orbital planes (rings) than it is to add more satellites to a given orbital plane, as this requires separate launches to take place. One approach to enhance coverage of these latitudes could be to add a single equatorial orbital plane with eight satellites, at MEO (10,000 km) (Figure 43).</p> +<h4 id="周五頒判決-料不會同日讀出開案陳詞">周五頒判決 料不會同日讀出開案陳詞</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LGPt5oi.png" alt="image45" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 43: Combined Equatorial Constellation and Coverage (135 LEO, 8 MEO).</strong> This simulation depicts a mixed constellation of 135 LEO satellites at 1,000 km altitude and 8 MEO satellites at 10,000 km altitude. Right: Map of satellite coverage; yellow regions indicate two-satellite coverage, while red regions indicate eight-satellite coverage or greater. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>彭耀鴻回應時重申,《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條比《裁判官條例》第26條較遲制訂,若「開始」檢控等同「提出告發」,則會令《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條變得毫無用處,故兩者必然有分別。彭亦重申檢控時限應由被告首次犯罪起計。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TZOxNyA.png" alt="image46" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 44: Combined Equatorial Constellation and Coverage (36 LEO, 8 MEO).</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>雙方陳詞完畢,法官杜麗冰表示需時考慮,將於周五(22日)頒下裁決,並認為不會在當天讀出開案陳詞。法官李運騰亦補充,控方開案陳詞或受裁決結果影響,不方便於當天開始讀出。</p> -<p>A second illustrative design, with 36 LEO satellites and a single, 8-satellite MEO plane, puts this principle in sharper relief (Figure 44). MEO satellites are used exclusively to provide coverage to mid-latitudes, while a highly inclined LEO constellation provides persistent coverage of the higher latitudes and poles.</p> +<p>黎智英於中午1時由俗稱「鐵甲威龍」的囚車送走,警方電單車及私家車護送囚車離開,現場亦有反恐特勤隊警員持槍戒備。</p> -<p><em>SELECTIVE POLAR COVERAGE WITH HIGHLY ELLIPTICAL ORBIT</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l9HmHiF.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 黎智英的囚車駛離法院,多名警員戒備。</p> -<p>HEO satellites offer the unique ability to selectively cover a single pole; as most threats transit the Northern Hemisphere, it allows constellation designs that do not “waste” coverage. A constellation of four HEO satellites can provide persistent stereo coverage of the polar regions, useful for missile warning. A mixed constellation of eight MEO satellites in an equatorial orbit and four HEO satellites illustrates this selective coverage capability (Figure 45).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/U9vlpr5.png" alt="image05" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5KhEKdo.png" alt="image47" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 45: Combined Equatorial Constellation and Coverage (4 HEO, 8 MEO).</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<h4 id="記者採訪一度遭司法機構職員阻止-後新聞主任澄清屬誤會">記者採訪一度遭司法機構職員阻止 後新聞主任澄清屬誤會</h4> -<p><em>COMBINING LAYERS FOR RESILIENCE</em></p> +<p>今早西九龍法院外警力較昨日稍微減少,但仍有至少60名警員在場戒備,每輛進入法院的汽車同樣須接受檢查,有部分車主及乘客須下車及打開車尾箱。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Up95vt0.png" alt="image48" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 46: Combined Constellation and Coverage (4 HEO, 15 MEO, 70 LEO).</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5rDxVOG.png" alt="image06" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NItfbPU.png" alt="image49" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 47: Combined Constellation and Coverage (30 MEO, 135 LEO).</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>另外,記者欲於法院大樓地下採訪排隊市民時,遭掛上司法機構證件的職員阻止,指今早獲指示該處不得進行採訪。記者追問下,職員稱會邀請「新聞官」向記者解釋,其後3名警民關係科警員到場,向記者指相關安排是法院的「house rule(場地規則)」、是管理的政策,要「尊重返」,又指警方本身無權入法院執法,但被司法機構職員邀請入內。</p> -<p>Hybrid constellations can combine their coverage hotspots to increase emphasis on critical regions. A LEO constellation with lower inclinations can provide dense coverage of the Indo-Pacific region, while a smaller constellation of MEO and HEO assets can provide an additional layer of resilience and selective emphasis on the poles (Figure 46). Meanwhile, a dense constellation, combining a polar-region-heavy LEO constellation and an Indo-Pacific-weighted MEO constellation, achieves robust, uniform coverage with 165 satellites (Figure 47).</p> +<p>司法機構新聞主任到場了解後,向記者澄清法院並無相關「house rule」,純粹誤會,又指職員是擔心擾亂秩序,故溝通上「多咗啲」、「誤會咗」,記者可與人聊天採訪,只是不得進行拍攝。</p> -<h3 id="schedule-tradeoffs">Schedule Tradeoffs</h3> +<p>審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及Marc Corlett。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。</p> -<p>No single orbit presents an ideal set of launch costs, satellite configurations, and coverage for missile tracking and fire control. A sensor architecture design must optimize a large collection of intersecting variables, including sensor field of regard (FOR), altitude, inclination, and satellite unit cost, among others. Most attention has been paid to optimizing these elements to minimize the number of satellites needed for coverage, but there are other goals to consider. An architecture must also be optimized to meet useful schedules and to phase capability in ways relevant to the threat.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YDgfIpE.png" alt="image07" /> +▲ 警方國安處總警司 李桂華</p> -<p>Program schedule and capability phasing should receive more consideration in current acquisition efforts. Choices over orbital configurations not only affect final sensor coverage but how coverage develops over time. Two constellation designs that eventually produce identical coverage may not necessarily generate capability along the same timelines (Figure 48).</p> +<hr /> -<p>Indeed, capability may not come online in smooth or continuous increments. Many low Earth orbit (LEO) constellation designs, for instance, leverage multiple orbital planes with high inclinations — inclinations close to the poles — to provide regional and later, global coverage. These designs are optimized to minimize the number of satellites necessary for coverage and do not provide persistent coverage of lower latitudes until all orbital planes are deployed (Figures 49, 50, and 51). Notably, the Space Development Agency (SDA)’s early Tranche 0 and Tranche 1 LEO constellations are configured with high-inclination orbits. The cost of these high inclinations to capability phasing is not always made explicit.</p> +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導控方指黎智英持續串謀、無逾時檢控 官周五頒判決NATO To Protect Undersea2023-12-19T12:00:00+08:002023-12-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/nato-to-protect-undersea<p><em>NATO is not ready to mitigate increasingly prevalent Russian aggression against European critical undersea infrastructure (CUI).</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Despite its depleted ground forces and strained military industrial base, Russian hybrid tactics remains the most pressing threat to CUI in northern Europe. Despite its current limitations, NATO is the primary actor capable of deterring and preventing hybrid attacks on its allies and has expedited its approach to CUI protection by establishing new organizations to that aim. At the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit, allies agreed to establish the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), which focuses on preparing for, deterring, and defending against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics. To help NATO planners and staff at the new center conceptualize and prioritize their efforts, this issue brief provides immediate and long-term recommendations to set the new center up for success.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l2Ej1v9.png" alt="image50" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 48: Alternative Capability Phasing.</strong> Two space-based architectures (“A” and “B”) may deliver identical capability when completed but phase this capability on different timelines. Architecture B generates partial capability later but full capability earlier. These tradeoffs should be considered when contemplating two otherwise identical architectures. They should also impact considerations for secondary constellations or airborne underlays to fill gaps in capability phasing. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Choices over orbital configurations not only affect final sensor coverage but how coverage develops over time.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>NATO is not prepared to defend its allies’ critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) from increasingly prevalent Russian hybrid tactics. The recent Balticconnector pipeline incident highlighted the risk of deliberate damage to CUI across Europe. It follows last year’s Nord Stream pipeline explosions, among other incidents, and bears the hallmarks of sabotage. Europe’s expansive and growing network of undersea infrastructure will remain vulnerable to attacks aimed at disrupting transatlantic cohesion and economic activity, undermining Western support for Ukraine, and shaping potential future military operations.</p> -<p>As such, the structure of a constellation has implications for program schedule. LEO constellations of high-inclination satellites are efficient for generating global coverage with the fewest satellites. Other architectures, however, might generate persistent regional coverage sooner.</p> +<p>Threats to undersea infrastructure are not new. In 2016 U.S. vice admiral James Foggo and Alarik Fritz warned of a “fourth battle of the Atlantic,” which included threats to “underwater infrastructure — such as oil rigs and telecommunications cables.” In 2017 the UK chief of the defence staff went public with previously classified Russian threats to undersea cables that posed a “new risk to our way of life,” while member of the UK Parliament Rishi Sunak (now UK prime minister) demanded enhanced protection of undersea data cables. Yet the Nord Stream incident has catalyzed a new focus in Europe on CUI resilience, including national, multinational, and institutional efforts through NATO and the European Union. Notably, this included the launch of a new NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure at the Vilnius summit in July 2023.</p> -<p>Much has been said about the need for resilience against attack, or what is called “graceful degradation.” Less attention has been given to optimizing for “graceful deployment.” A constellation optimized purely for coverage efficiencies may well deliver capability unevenly, with relevant, persistent coverage only arriving near completion. Such a glidepath is arguably in tension with the incremental, spiral-development-focused philosophy of proliferated low Earth orbit constellation deployment.</p> +<p>This issue brief examines NATO’s role in protecting CUI in more detail. It proceeds in four parts: It begins by assessing the threat “seascape” for CUI in northern Europe, including how the threat might evolve and how Europe has responded so far. The paper then turns to NATO’s approach to date, summarizing the key NATO initiatives related to CUI protection. The third part looks in more detail at the challenge of protecting CUI, proposing a basic framework to help understand the vast problem space. The final section draws on this framework to develop several immediate and longer-term recommendations to help planners in NATO’s new center prioritize their efforts.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pRReC7y.png" alt="image51" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 49: High-Inclination Orbital Plane Persistence.</strong> LEO assets with high inclinations cannot persistently cover low-latitude regions over time (images shown in two-hour increments). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<h3 id="the-evolution-of-threats-to-undersea-infrastructure-in-northern-europe">THE EVOLUTION OF THREATS TO UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE IN NORTHERN EUROPE</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xzIf6bl.png" alt="image52" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 50: Low-Inclination Orbital Plane Persistence.</strong> LEO assets at lower inclinations can persistently cover near-equator regions at the expense of polar coverage. These tradeoffs ease with higher altitudes, including in MEO. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>The war in Ukraine has radically altered the threat landscape across Europe, particularly in the north. As the alliance remains focused on supporting Ukraine and shoring up its eastern flank, Sweden’s and Finland’s membership bids will provide new opportunities to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic and Arctic regions. But recent examples of CUI interference highlight vulnerabilities that will not be easily remedied. The sabotage of two Nord Stream pipelines off the Danish island of Bornholm in September 2022 forced European governments to grapple with their limited ability to deter and defend against hybrid tactics in the undersea domain. Recent damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline and a data cable between Finland and Estonia in October 2023 from a ship’s anchor is suspected as being deliberate, although attribution has not yet been declared.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9tLB62B.png" alt="image53" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 51: Half-Populated LEO Constellation.</strong> Highly inclined LEO constellations offer little persistent coverage of relevant equatorial regions. This LEO constellation of 36 satellites cannot offer persistent coverage until more orbital planes are added. Persistent equatorial coverage only emerges after the number of satellites is more than tripled. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>In this context, the main focus of critical maritime infrastructure debates has shifted from emphasis on terrorism and cyber threats toward the increasing frequency and efficacy of hybrid tactics. The aim of hybrid tactics is to cause significant damage to an adversary while operating below the threshold of detection, attribution, and response — and in so doing blur the conceptual lines between conflict and peace. The issue is compounded in the maritime realm by several conceptual and practical challenges, mainly related to poor definitions highly dependent on moral or political choices, a unique geophysical space, and the multitude of potential threats.</p> -<p>Besides the need to mitigate technical and security risks to a future constellation, capability phasing is a critical consideration for program-level risk. It is impossible to predict future supply chain bottlenecks, changes in budgetary priorities, or other factors that could hobble a constellation’s deployment. As such, architecture designs should be resilient to the risk of premature budget reductions or cancellation. Some constellation designs will not generate persistent coverage of meaningful regions should deployment be canceled halfway (Figure 52). It thus becomes crucial to consider which designs would offer meaningful coverage even when partially deployed.</p> +<p>Russian hybrid tactics represent the most pressing threat to CUI in northern Europe. Russia’s war against Ukraine has debilitated its ground forces and strained its military industrial base. Experts estimate it will take the Kremlin five to ten years to reconstitute its military. Meanwhile, however, Russia’s power projection capabilities in northern Europe — through naval, air, and missile bases in Kaliningrad and its Northern Fleet of submarines on the Kola Peninsula — have scarcely been depleted. In fact, while the Russian navy is underfunded and a large part of its fleet comprises Soviet legacy platforms, its underwater capacity continues to grow. In particular, Russia’s submarine program remains a priority amid other military budget cuts, exemplified by the Kremlin’s authorization of 13 new nuclear and conventional submarines since 2014. In broader terms, Russia’s ability to target critical infrastructure short of war and impose economic costs to deter external intervention in regional conflicts is an important component to Moscow’s doctrine and thinking on escalation management.</p> -<p>A constellation optimized for graceful deployment may entail the selection of alternative configurations and may require more satellites to achieve coverage. Such costs are nevertheless worth considering (Figure 52). A constellation optimized solely for long-term efficiencies incurs short-term risks. In addition to programmatic risks, they can tempt adversaries to accelerate the development of countermeasures, knowing that capability will only arrive at once at a single future maturation point. Partial capability can and should arrive earlier. Multiple avenues — lower-inclination orbits, regional airborne sensors, and others — exist for realizing them.</p> +<p>However, even in the absence of a broader Russia-NATO conflict, hybrid tactics have been a staple in the Kremlin’s toolbox in Europe for years. As the Kremlin views itself in perpetual conflict with the West, hybrid tactics are instrumental to challenging NATO without resorting to conventional military means. Russia has likely targeted critical infrastructure throughout Europe at an increased frequency since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the undersea domain, Russia appears committed to mapping and threatening European energy and communications infrastructure, particularly strategically important Norwegian gas pipelines and fiber-optic cables.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/r5QlqNx.png" alt="image54" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 52: Combining Constellations.</strong> Realizing global geometric coverage in two steps (right, center) can entail more satellites (40+26) than a constellation optimized for global coverage (49) (left). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>The Nord Stream attacks resulted in a flurry of initiatives to bolster Europe’s CUI. The European Union has updated its maritime strategy to better address evolving threats and adopted an expanded directive on CUI resilience, and the EU-NATO Task Force on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure was launched in January and reported its findings in June. The EU Hybrid Toolbox, including the Hybrid Fusion Cell and new Hybrid Rapid Response Teams, support member states and NATO to detect, deter, and respond to threats. More recently, the 10-nation Joint Expeditionary Force ( JEF) agreed to focus on protecting CUI in its new vision and deployed a maritime task force in response to the Balticconnector incident to deter further attacks. Bilateral examples include the recent UK-Norway strategic partnership on undersea threats. Many nations have also expanded their ability to monitor and protect undersea infrastructure: France recently announced a new seabed warfare strategy and investments in ocean floor defense, and the United Kingdom has set up a Centre for Seabed Mapping and earmarked two new Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance (MROS) vessels to serve primarily as subsea protection ships.</p> -<p>One avenue to graceful deployment could involve separating constellation deployment into multiple steps. For example, a LEO constellation could be designed as a hybrid architecture, deploying a low-inclination set of 70 satellites for regional coverage (Figure 53) before expanding to global coverage with a second set of 36 highly inclined sensors (Figure 54). While this could entail more satellites than higher-inclination alternatives, it delivers increments of coverage in two steps, achieving regional coverage much sooner.</p> +<h3 id="protecting-critical-undersea-infrastructure-a-new-focus-for-nato">PROTECTING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE: A NEW FOCUS FOR NATO</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yrR67It.png" alt="image55" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 53: Combining Low- and High-Inclination Constellations: Regional Coverage.</strong> A low-inclination constellation of 70 LEO satellites achieves persistent regional coverage; with the addition of 36 satellites (Figure 54), coverage can be expanded to a global scale, in two steps. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>While many stakeholders have increased their efforts to protect CUI, NATO remains the lead actor when it comes to deterring and preventing conventional and hybrid attacks on allies. NATO’s role in protecting CUI is grounded in its founding principles, such as Articles 2 and 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which call for the strengthening of free institutions, economic collaboration, and growing resilience to attack. At the 2023 Vilnius summit, allies reiterated that hybrid operations against the alliance could meet the threshold of armed attack and trigger Article 5, NATO’s collective defense guarantee.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/phBbRW2.png" alt="image56" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 54: Combining Low- and High-Inclination Constellations: Global Coverage.</strong> A high-inclination constellation of 36 satellites, used to expand to persistent global coverage. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<h4 id="the-value-of-nato">THE VALUE OF NATO</h4> -<p>Another method may be to deploy underlays, such as aircraft-based sensors, to backfill capability until a space constellation is deployed. Regardless of approach, there are many possible levers for smoothing capability deployment. Careful selection of phased constellations, or the deployment of airborne underlays and other assets, could produce coverage of relevant areas in shorter increments.</p> +<p>Today, the functioning of allied civil society and the prosperity of member states depends on the extensive network of CUI across the Euro-Atlantic. NATO is critical to its protection for several reasons.</p> -<p>Schedule and capability phasing deserve to be key factors in assessing this trade space. Recent requests presented by SDA imply increased attention to these problems. In a recent solicitation for new Tracking Layer LEO satellites, for instance, SDA requested potential solutions for constellations including mixes of higher and lower inclinations.</p> +<p>First, Russia — the primary threat — has the intent and capability, and it maximizes its opportunity to threaten allied CUI across NATO’s area of operational responsibility. Moreover, the destruction, disruption, or tapping of CUI could be the precursor to conflict through attempting to sever military and government communications. Second, the protection of CUI is part of NATO’s defense and deterrence posture across the Euro-Atlantic. As hybrid attacks on CUI may meet the threshold for armed attack, NATO must be heavily invested in their protection to ensure it can act decisively.</p> -<p>A design that deploys gracefully could offer useful capability even when incomplete. One that does not deploy gracefully will not deliver such benefits, despite any promise of future numerical efficiencies. If a geopolitical crisis occurs in the late 2020s, the United States will have to fight with the space sensor constellation that is fielded, not the complete architecture planned in the longer term.</p> +<p>Third, CUI spans NATO’s entire area of operational responsibility, so maintaining seamless situational awareness across the whole network is a challenge far too large for individual nations. Fourth, the challenge of protecting CUI will increasingly rely on technological solutions, and NATO possesses the financial heft and mechanisms to develop and scale these. Finally, there are complex political, legal, and technical considerations for the effective protection of CUI, and seams between national permissions and restrictions can create frictions best managed at the NATO level.</p> -<h3 id="an-emerging-architecture">An Emerging Architecture</h3> +<h4 id="natos-approach">NATO’S APPROACH</h4> -<p>These many sensor, orbital, and schedule tradeoffs are at play in the Department of Defense (DoD)’s ongoing space sensor acquisition effort. This chapter reviews the envisioned missions, programs, and budgets of the forthcoming architecture and considers what questions remain unresolved.</p> +<p>NATO has been both proactive and reactive to CUI threats. In broad terms, NATO protects CUI in three ways. First, all of NATO’s forces contribute to the alliance’s Defence and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), which coheres all activity by region and domain. Many capabilities that contribute to CUI protection also contribute to wider deterrence activities, including standing naval and mine countermeasures groups and CUI-focused exercises.</p> -<p>In fiscal year (FY) 2023, the DoD invested nearly $5 billion into acquiring overhead sensors for missile warning, tracking, and fire control (Figure 55). These efforts have been partly centralized under the Space Force organizational structure, with multiple programs of record underway for low (LEO), medium (MEO), geosynchronous (GEO), and highly elliptical (HEO) orbit sensor layers (Table 3). Under its Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) initiative, the Space Force will deploy two GEO (Next Generation GEO) and two HEO (Next Generation Polar) satellites, supplementing its Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellation for missile warning.</p> +<p>Second, NATO assets detect threats through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and space and cyber assets to gain and maintain situational awareness. Moreover, NATO can develop and scale new technologies to increase detection coverage, such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) pilot challenges, which include a focus on energy resilience and sensing and surveillance. The alliance’s new Digital Ocean Concept was endorsed in October 2023 to increase collective visibility of oceans, including</p> -<p>A second effort, designated Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking (RMW/MT), will incorporate a constellation of nine or more MEO satellites (RMW/MT-MEO) and a larger constellation of LEO satellites (RMW/MT-LEO) to perform both missile warning and missile tracking.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>the creation of a global scale network of sensors, from sea bed to space, to better predict, identify, classify and combat threats. It envisages maritime domain awareness, subsea sensors, unmanned surface vessels, drones and satellites, and exploits AI [artificial intelligence], big data, and autonomous systems, alongside conventional assets.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CUeP7As.png" alt="image57" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 55: Space-Based Missile Warning and Tracking Modernization by Orbit, 2018–2028.</strong> *Based on 2024 PB. Source: DoD Comptroller and CSIS Missile Defense Project analysis.</em></p> +<p>Third, NATO has a range of response options once an incident or attack occurs, including counter hybrid support teams, the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Very High Readiness Task Force (VJTF), and ad hoc force deployments, such as the enhanced maritime patrol and mine hunter deployments in the Baltic Sea. National missions and regional frameworks outside of NATO command structures can also bolster deterrence against threats to CUI, including the JEF and the aforementioned EU initiatives.</p> -<p>In parallel with the RMW/MT-LEO program, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has developed a prototype sensor, the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), capable of furnishing the “highly sensitive, low-latency, high quality of service” data needed for the more demanding missile defense fire control mission. The program will launch two prototype LEO satellites in late 2023, after which “responsibility for HBTSS operational fielding will be transferred to the US Space Force.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oQzj8nb.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: European Institutions Relevant for Protecting CUI.</strong> Source: Authors’ compilation.</em></p> -<p>For FY 2024, the Space Force requested $2.6 billion for Next Generation OPIR, including $720 million for Next Generation GEO, $1 billion for Next Generation Polar, $661 million for associated ground systems, $191 million for modernization initiatives, and $31 million for integration. Additionally, it requested $2.2 billion for RMW/MT, including $1.2 billion for its LEO constellation, $538 million for its MEO constellation, and $506 million for its associated ground systems. For HBTSS, MDA requested $69 million, with minimal funding planned after FY 2026 when program responsibility is transferred to the Space Force.</p> +<h4 id="natos-new-centers">NATO’S NEW CENTERS</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4QAS8ml.png" alt="image58" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: Selected OPIR Missile Sensing Initiatives.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<p>In response to recent incidents in the Baltic Sea, NATO has expedited its approach to CUI protection by establishing two new organizations. In February 2023 the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell was created at NATO headquarters. The rationale was to coordinate allied activity; bring military and civilian stakeholders together by facilitating engagement with private industry, which owns much of the infrastructure; and better protect CUI through jointly detecting and responding to threats. This new cell will be instrumental in building coordination across all the organizations, policies, and capabilities identified in Table 1 both within and external to NATO.</p> -<p>These newer investments represent a welcome shift in resources. In FY 2023, funding for missile warning, represented by the Next Generation OPIR portfolio, dwarfed investments in missile tracking, represented by RMW/MT (Figure 56). The DoD’s FY 2024 budget request, by contrast, dramatically expands investments in the LEO and MEO constellations needed for missile tracking while cutting Next Generation GEO, reducing its planned satellite purchases from three to two. With its cancellation of the seventh and eighth SBIRS and the third Next Generation OPIR satellites, the Space Force is pivoting away from an approach centered around geosynchronous missile warning satellites to one dominated by large constellations of missile tracking satellites in LEO and MEO.</p> +<p>Then, at the July 2023 Vilnius summit, allies agreed to establish the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM). This new center focuses on</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wnQzYuo.png" alt="image59" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 56: Space-Based Missile Warning and Missile Tracking Space Sensor Modernization by Mission, 2018–2028.</strong> *Based on 2024 PB. Source: DoD Comptroller and CSIS Missile Defense Project analysis.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies . . . to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors. . . . NATO stands ready to support Allies if and when requested.</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="next-generation-opir">Next Generation OPIR</h4> +<p>The center arrives at a crucial time for NATO as both new threats to CUI and new initiatives to deal with them proliferate across the alliance and beyond. To help NATO planners and staff at the new center conceptualize and prioritize their efforts, the next section considers in more detail the problem of protecting CUI.</p> -<p>Next Generation OPIR, including its Next Generation GEO and Polar components, formerly represented the largest segment of the DoD’s space sensing portfolio (Figure 57). Beyond recapitalizing space-based missile warning, whose associated SBIRS and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites entered service decades ago, these satellites will offer enhanced capabilities, tracking dimmer targets over wider areas. Combined with SBIRS, these satellites will be capable of detecting the hot plumes of missile launches, cueing relevant sensors, and informing national command authorities. They will supply data to critical interfaces, including the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Overhead Persistent Infrared Architecture (BOA) and Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITW/AA), a U.S. strategic nuclear warning system.</p> +<h3 id="understanding-threats-to-critical-undersea-infrastructure-a-conceptual-framework">UNDERSTANDING THREATS TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BkLOiF7.png" alt="image60" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 57: Space-Based Missile Warning Modernization by Type, 2018–2028.</strong> *Based on 2024 PB. Source: DoD Comptroller and CSIS Missile Defense Project analysis.</em></p> +<p>This section develops a basic framework for thinking about protecting CUI. The purpose is to help NATO planners — particularly those in the new center — to understand the vast problem space and prioritize some initial efforts over others. The following section draws on this framework to develop several recommendations. The four elements of the framework for protecting CUI are outlined below.</p> -<p>Between 2018 and 2021, the Space Force awarded $7.8 billion in contracts for the development and production of three Next Generation GEO satellites, with initial launches scheduled for 2025. Following a reorientation of priorities in late 2022, the Space Force plans to cut one Next Generation GEO satellite, launching the first in FY 2025 and the second in FY 2027. In FY 2024, the Space Force requested $719 million for the program, a considerable reduction from the $1.7 billion requested in FY 2023.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Infrastructure type:</strong> What counts as CUI? Which parts are most critical or most vulnerable?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Threat type:</strong> What are the main threats to undersea CUI?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Tasks:</strong> What is NATO’s role in protecting CUI?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Geography:</strong> Where should limited resources be prioritized and focused across the Euro-Atlantic area?</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>The first of two Next Generation Polar satellites, meanwhile, is scheduled for launch by FY 2028. These satellites, orbiting at higher inclinations, would provide continuous coverage of the Northern Hemisphere and North Pole, supplementing the two SBIRS-HEO satellites presently in orbit. The Space Force requested $1 billion for the program in FY 2024.</p> +<h4 id="1-infrastructure-type">1. INFRASTRUCTURE TYPE</h4> -<p>These satellites will pass sensor data to users through a new set of ground infrastructure, funded at $582 million in FY 2023. The Next Generation OPIR Ground component will incorporate the Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE), a system of software, ground terminals, and computers for mission management, data processing, telemetry, and command and control. Various components of FORGE are expected to come online through the late 2020s, with development for Next Generation GEO and Polar continuing through FY 2028. These efforts come in parallel with the Space Force’s Enterprise Ground System (EGS), a broader modernization of the organization’s ground systems software, and the Next Generation OPIR Interim Operations (NIO), a backup program to prevent FORGE delays from impacting Next Generation GEO launch schedules.</p> +<p>Maritime infrastructure is vital to basic societal functions such as trade, food and energy supplies, security and defense, communications, transport, tourism, and environmental management. The most important infrastructure is usually considered “critical,” meaning without it, society could not function for long. But critical infrastructure differs between nations given that some economies depend on fishing or tourism while others rely more on maritime trade, energy infrastructure, or data cables. What counts as CUI, therefore, is often more of a political decision than a technical one. There is no one-size-fits-all definition: it depends on the nation and region in question.</p> -<h4 id="resilient-missile-warningmissile-tracking--low-earth-orbit-proliferated-warfighter-space-architecture">Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking – Low Earth Orbit (Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture)</h4> +<p>Maritime infrastructure is often categorized by sector. One classification system lists five types: transport, energy, communication, fishing, and marine ecosystems. Of these, four have substantial elements of underwater infrastructure. Above-water transport is often precluded, while commercial submersibles — such as remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) or autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) used in pipeline maintenance — are considered part of the energy infrastructure they serve.</p> -<p>The RMW/MT program consolidates past efforts to develop a large constellation of LEO satellites and a smaller constellation of MEO satellites for missile tracking (Figure 58). As of 2023, this constellation would combine up to “135 LEO and 16 Space Force-developed MEO satellites working in concert through an integrated ground solution.” In 2023, Space Systems Command (SSC) was designated as the “lead end-to-end systems integrator” for the constellation. DoD then created a combined program office with SSC, the Space Development Agency (SDA), and MDA. It is likely that the architecture’s final configuration will change as prototype systems enter orbit.</p> +<p>Maritime infrastructure security policies traditionally focus on maritime transport (e.g., ports) and energy (e.g., gas and oil infrastructure) over other types. However, the infrastructure picture is changing rapidly. Undersea cable projects have proliferated in recent years, while offshore renewable energy technologies like wind and tidal systems will increase to help nations meet global carbon emissions targets. Future proliferation of AUVs — driven by new oil and gas exploration, military applications, reduced manufacturing costs, and improvements in AI and automation technology — could present both new types of CUI under the category of transport and new threats. As the recent NATO-EU task force on critical infrastructure summarizes,</p> -<p>RMW/MT’s LEO component consists of SDA’s Tracking Layer constellation, which aims to launch successive phases, called “tranches,” of LEO sensor satellites in two-year increments. The acquisition philosophy for the Tracking Layer apparently differs from past military space efforts; it is intended to demonstrate capability on commercial timelines and exploit commercial components and design philosophies, rather than fitting a traditional requirements generation process.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>These challenges are compounded for undersea energy infrastructure, which is extensive and more difficult to survey and protect. Moreover, the network of undersea energy infrastructure in the Euro-Atlantic area is expected to grow as offshore energy platforms become more numerous.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>SDA plans to acquire the Tracking Layer and a larger constellation of LEO communications and sensing satellites, the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA; formerly the National Defense Space Architecture, or NDSA), using this approach. The PWSA constellation will initially include four tranches of LEO satellites, labeled Tranches 0, 1, 2, and 3. Tranche 0 will include 20 Transport Layer satellites and eight Tracking Layer satellites, which host wide-field-of-view (WFOV) infrared sensors and orbit approximately 1,000 km from Earth (Figure 59). SDA launched the first 10 of its Tranche 0 satellites in April 2023, and the second launch concluded in September 2023.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, fishing and marine ecosystems are increasingly important to some nations as fishing stocks decrease and marine habitats are degraded by pollution and the effects of climate change.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xbVbWiG.png" alt="image61" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 58: Space-Based Missile Tracking Modernization by Program, 2018–2028.</strong> *Based on 2024 PB. Source: DoD Comptroller and CSIS Missile Defense Project analysis.</em></p> +<p>Beyond rapid change, there are several challenges associated with coordinating CUI protection, including interdependence, the physical characteristics of the subsea domain, and the complex, transnational nature of undersea infrastructure. Meanwhile, fishing and marine ecosystems are increasingly important to some nations as fishing stocks decrease and marine habitats are degraded by pollution and the effects of climate change. This suggests a key challenge for NATO will be prioritizing between CUI sectors, which are critical to different NATO allies. This assessment will be driven to some extent by the next element of the framework: the threat picture.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oghhlQR.png" alt="image62" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 59: SDA Tranche 0 Constellation.</strong> Source: Space Development Agency (top) and CSIS Missile Defense Project (bottom).</em></p> +<h4 id="2-threat">2. THREAT</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/g5oMZYN.png" alt="image63" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 60: SDA Tranche 1 Constellation.</strong> Source: Space Development Agency (top) and CSIS Missile Defense Project (bottom).</em></p> +<p>Although most definitions of critical infrastructure depend on how vital it is to the functioning of society, in practice governments tend to designate infrastructure as critical if it is vulnerable to harm. While pipeline sabotage has driven the headlines, the range of threats to CUI is much broader. The threat picture has also changed in recent years.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qK9BcHA.png" alt="image64" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 61: SDA Tranche 2 Constellation.</strong> Source: Space Development Agency (top) and CSIS Missile Defense Project (bottom).</em></p> +<p>Maritime security threats have been driven by the rise of terrorism, international piracy, human trafficking, and the “blue economy,” defined by the World Bank as “the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and ocean ecosystem health.” Protection of maritime and undersea infrastructure has typically focused on physical attacks from terrorism and blue crime (i.e., transnational organized crime at sea). However, the threat environment has changed markedly over the last decade — and drastically since 2022. After invading Ukraine, Russia became “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security,” according to NATO’s new Strategic Concept — a threat that includes the ability to “target our civilian and military infrastructure.”</p> -<p>Plans to develop the Tracking Layer have shifted as Space Force and SDA budgets and priorities evolve. A second tranche, Tranche 1, is scheduled to launch in 2025 and would include 39 satellites (35 tracking, 4 fire control) orbiting at 1,000 km in five polar orbital planes (Figure 60). When combined with the Tranche 0 Tracking Layer, these satellites would offer a “kernel” of global coverage to warfighters by late 2025. The constellation initially consisted of four orbital planes with seven Tracking Layer satellites each; a $250 million congressional add, approved in 2023, added a fifth plane “to increase global Missile Warning and Missile Tracking coverage in support of combatant commands to include INDOPACOM.”</p> +<p>NATO’s new concept also points to hybrid threats to critical infrastructure and reaffirms their inclusion under Article 5. The maritime domain has been viewed as particularly vulnerable to hybrid threats. Attacks on underwater infrastructure have been a particular concern. Recent events appear to confirm these fears, with several incidents such as the Nord Stream pipeline explosions in the Baltic Sea or severed subsea cables near Svalbard that appear to follow the hybrid playbook of deniable attacks on undersea infrastructure. These incidents highlight the difficulty of dealing with ambiguous hybrid threats, which are difficult to distinguish from accidental damage. For example, around 70 percent of undersea cable faults are caused by fishing vessels or ship anchors, alongside natural causes or even shark bites.</p> -<p>Additional tranches would launch in 2027 and beyond. Tranche 2 would add 54 or more satellites (48 tracking, 6 fire control) to provide “global, persistent” missile warning and missile tracking while demonstrating a limited fire control capability (Figures 61, 62, and 63). Unlike prior tranches, it would deploy three orbital planes to a higher inclination and three orbital planes to a lower inclination suited for Indo-Pacific regional coverage. Each plane would have nine satellites; eight with WFOV missile warning/missile tracking sensors and one with a missile defense-focused “Fire Control quality sensor.” The first plane would enter orbit in April 2027, and deployment would conclude by November 2027.</p> +<p>Hybrid aggressors can also use the cover of fishing, private, or research vessels, which are difficult to track. The rapid proliferation of AUVs will exacerbate the problem. Specialized vessels for the task also exist, such as Russia’s dedicated fleet of submarines, designed for infrastructure sabotage and manned by the Russian navy and the Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research (GUGI). Research vessels operated by GUGI are suspected of mapping networks of undersea infrastructure across Europe.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TUweCe1.png" alt="image65" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 62: SDA Tracking Layer Tranche 2 Coverage.</strong> Horizon-limited coverage footprint of Tranche 2 constellation, with pink indicators for fire control coverage. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from the Space Development Agency.</em></p> +<p>For all these reasons, many assessments suggest a new era of hybrid threats is emerging and poses “a particular challenge” to protecting undersea infrastructure. As the NATO-EU task force puts it, “The seabed is a field of growing strategic importance, due to increasing reliance on undersea infrastructure and the particular challenges in protecting it from hybrid threats and physical damage.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b2d4ajC.png" alt="image66" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 63: SDA Tracking Layer Tranche 1 and 2 Combined Coverage.</strong> Horizon-limited coverage footprint of combined Tranche 1 and 2 constellations, with pink indicators for fire control coverage. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from the Space Development Agency.</em></p> +<h4 id="3-tasks">3. TASKS</h4> -<p>Tranche 3 and beyond would increase the PWSA Tracking Layer’s density past 135 assets and incorporate newer satellite technologies. Given the intended five-year orbital lifespan of each satellite, these would expand upon and replace earlier tranches, enabling another set of technology insertions. While SDA has already defined requirements for earlier tranches, the eventual configuration of additions beyond Tranche 3 may vary considerably as satellites are put on orbit.</p> +<p>The final element of the framework comprises the tasks and missions NATO may have to carry out to protect CUI. The most important role, short of war, is deterrence, which holds the promise of avoiding armed attacks altogether. Beyond deterrence, military forces perform a wide range of roles relevant to protecting CUI.</p> -<h4 id="resilient-missile-warningmissile-tracking--medium-earth-orbit">Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking – Medium Earth Orbit</h4> +<p>One example is counterpiracy. During Operation Ocean Shield — NATO’s contribution to international efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa during 2008–16 — the role of NATO forces spanned surveillance, interdiction, escort, and deterrence. Cooperation with international bodies and the private sector was also vital to mission success, which contributed to the cessation of attacks after 2012.</p> -<p>After an initial push and pull between LEO- or MEO-only approaches, the Space Force has embarked on efforts to deploy a mixed constellation of LEO and MEO missile tracking satellites. The second leg of this mixed constellation, RMW/MT-MEO, will complement the LEO Tracking Layer with additional satellites in MEO. This attention to MEO represents an important philosophical shift toward hybrid architectures, with MEO particularly useful for assuring coverage of lower latitudes (Figures 44 and 45).</p> +<p>Another relevant example is protecting national infrastructure. The U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Plan outlines threats to national infrastructure and a framework of missions to protect them. These are divided into two tasks: counterthreat missions and preparedness missions.</p> -<p>In FY 2023, the Space Force expanded an exploratory effort to prototype MEO tracking satellites, MEO Track Custody (MTC), into a full-scale acquisition program integrated with the RMW/MT constellation. RMW/MT-MEO would acquire nine or more MEO satellites, at two orbital altitudes, to “pivot the Department of the Air Force’s (DAF) legacy missile warning force design to a more resilient multi-orbit approach.” In FY 2023, Congress appropriated $409 million toward the program — more than double the $139 million budget request. In FY 2024, the Space Force requested $538 million to support the accelerated MEO effort.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Counterthreat missions identify and counter threats and hazards: identify, deter, detect, disrupt, and prepare.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Preparedness missions reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate the consequences of damage: prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, recover.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VDzEIGd.png" alt="image67" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 64: SSC MEO Roadmap.</strong> Source: U.S. Space Systems Command.</em></p> +<p>More broadly, several existing frameworks for countering hybrid threats may be applied to protecting CUI. NATO’s strategy is to “prepare, deter, defend,” while the European Union’s approach is based on “awareness, resilience, and response.” Another framework is proposed by the 14-nation Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC): “detect, deter, and respond.” This framework is used to examine NATO’s role in protecting CUI regarding all three functions below.</p> -<p>Like SDA’s successive “tranches,” SSC will deploy MEO capabilities in a series of increments called “epochs.” Epoch 1, deploying in late 2026, will include satellites at two altitudes: a plane of six vehicles at a lower orbital altitude and three at a higher one. Successive epochs will likely include 18 or more satellites, with a possible total of 34 to 44 satellites when complete. By the launch of Epoch 3, the constellation will reportedly deliver persistent missile tracking coverage. These MEO satellites will leverage research performed under the earlier MTC effort, which by May 2021 had awarded early contracts for digital satellite prototypes. Program design review for one Epoch 1 satellite concluded in July 2023, and critical design review completed in November 2023.</p> +<h4 id="detect">DETECT</h4> -<p>This shift toward a LEO/MEO mixed constellation in FY 2024 follows significant congressional scrutiny. In July 2022, the House Armed Services Committee directed the chief of space operations to brief the committee on including “free, fair, and open competition within [the Space Force’s] acquisition plan” by January 2023. Following a $130 million congressional plus-up, the program office also moved to add the “third plane of Epoch 1 spacecraft . . . add[ing] additional acceleration funds in FY 2024 to . . . aggressively pursue additional Epoch 1 capabilities.”</p> +<p>Countering any threat requires first detecting and identifying it. Detection is even more important for hybrid threats, which rely on deniability or ambiguity to delay, complicate, or prevent reprisal. However, the variety and complexity of hybrid threats make detection challenging.</p> -<h4 id="hypersonic-and-ballistic-tracking-space-sensor">Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor</h4> +<p>For protecting CUI, the main focus is on enhancing maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA systems are “one of the core solutions in maritime security” but are focused on civil transport, fishing, and leisure. To rectify this, a 2018 report by CSIS advocates a renewed focus on undersea MDA to combat hybrid threats. Specific recommendations include establishing dedicated analytic centers (with teams focused on hybrid threats), training courses, a common classified data picture, and an operational framework that integrates surface and subsurface sensors. Another recent analysis recommends closing gaps in the surveillance of small boats, leisure craft, and underwater vehicles through “investments in new underwater sensors and drones which can enhance the overall picture of the domain.” The recent EU-NATO Task Force also recommends enhancing “maritime situational awareness.”</p> -<p>Among these several programs, HBTSS represents the DoD’s current effort to enable the fire control-quality tracking mission. HBTSS occupies a critical function in the forthcoming sensor ecosystem, aimed at providing the high-fidelity, low-latency tracking information needed to guide missile defense interceptors.</p> +<p>One detection challenge is that malign activity often appears, by design, as an accident, whereas some suspected attacks could actually be accidents (most damage to cables and pipelines is accidental). This means NATO does not have the luxury of ignoring apparent accidents. Here, a conceptual distinction between monitoring (known threats) and discovering (new, unknown threats) can help establish situational awareness and distinguish signal from noise in the realm of detection. This task is also well suited to advances in AI and machine learning.</p> -<p>MDA currently retains acquisition authority for HBTSS prototyping. Under the current timeline, MDA will prototype and launch a medium-field-of-view sensor to demonstrate fire control-quality tracking of hypersonic weapons. MDA began prototyping the sensor in 2018 and intends to launch two HBTSS-equipped satellite testbeds into orbit in late 2023 or early 2024. Following on-orbit test activities, “responsibility for HBTSS operational fielding will be transferred to the US Space Force and the MDA will continue the development of the next generation of space-based fire control sensors for missile defense.”</p> +<h4 id="deter">DETER</h4> -<p>The prototypes will be placed in orbits intended to “track test events in the INDOPACOM region” and would likely leverage a commercially supplied chassis, or bus, to host the HBTSS sensor. In 2021, Congress directed MDA to “achieve full operational employment” of the system by December 2023. On-orbit test activities are scheduled to continue through 2025, including support for Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) intercept tests in 2024 and 2025.</p> +<p>Deterring hybrid threats to CUI is difficult but not impossible. The most promising strategy is deterrence by denial, which reduces the prospects of successful attack by hardening the target and strengthening resilience to damage. Denial in this context comprises two functions: prevention and resilience (see Figure 3). Preventing attacks is part of NATO’s core business and is achieved through a combination of detection (see above) and physical presence. For example, NATO’s Cold War deterrence strategy of basing substantial “shield forces” in central Europe was designed to physically prevent a Soviet attack.</p> -<p>It remains unclear, however, how many HBTSS or HBTSS-derived payloads will eventually be fitted to SDA’s Tracking Layer constellation. While MDA requested $68 million for the program in FY 2023, funding is expected to decline after demonstration activities conclude and responsibility for fire control transfers to SSC and SDA. Following this transition, SDA aims to launch four HBTSS-derived sensor payloads as part of its Tranche 1 activities and an additional six fire control sensors in Tranche 2. Further developmental spirals, the priority accorded to the hypersonic defense mission, and SDA’s responsibilities for supporting missile defense, however, have not yet been publicly defined.</p> +<p>Resilience measures are designed to help CUI systems withstand or quickly recover from any damage sustained. Much of this amounts to good practice in the design and management of critical infrastructure systems. Such measures are therefore generally low cost and less reliant on detecting threats; best practices for resilience are based on understanding and mitigating one’s own vulnerabilities, regardless of whether they have been targeted. This is why resilience measures have become foundational to counter hybrid strategies. However, resilience building is a long-term strategy that will take years to deliver given the vast size and complexity of Euro-Atlantic CUI.</p> -<h4 id="seeking-alignment">Seeking Alignment</h4> +<h4 id="respond">RESPOND</h4> -<p>Several recent developments have been promising. The DoD has increasingly pivoted from an exclusively pLEO design to a mixed-orbit architecture with complementary LEO and MEO components. In contrast with earlier tranches, SDA’s Tranche 2 will now include assets at lower inclinations suited for earlier Indo-Pacific-region coverage. Moreover, the Space Force has signaled further investments in deploying fire control sensors on orbit, both in SDA Tranches 1 and 2.</p> +<p>Moreover, resilience is not a strategy on its own; deterrence by punishment also has a role. When it comes to punishing low-level aggression, celerity beats severity most of the time, putting a premium on credible response options that can be deployed quickly and reliably. These measures may not threaten vital interests but merely assure an aggressor will always face some costs for threatening CUI, however minor. This means simple measures such as enhanced presence or surveillance around key sites can work to deliver what has been referred to as “deterrence by detection.” More creative measures also play a role, such as attribution disclosure, legal interventions, or targeted sanctions (e.g., against implicated vessels, companies, or individuals).</p> -<p>Questions nevertheless remain over the configuration, schedule, and mission of the forthcoming architecture. It remains uncertain how effectively MDA fire control efforts will transition to SDA’s architecture and how the planned numbers of fire control satellites in PWSA support requirements for hypersonic defense. While Tranche 2 plans include three orbital planes at lower inclinations, it is uncertain how this could be expanded to assure persistent Indo-Pacific stereo coverage. Other questions — over what mix of LEO and MEO assets is optimal, how to phase deployments to cover the Indo-Pacific, what software is necessary to fuse information from so many sensors, and how to align ground systems acquisition with the fielding of satellites — are not yet resolved. The DoD has reached substantial technical milestones and pioneered innovative approaches to acquiring these systems. As one analyst has remarked, however, “there seems to be a lack of consensus on how quickly, and in what manner,” to proceed.</p> +<p>That credible responses are required suggests the utility of a preapproved playbook to counter hybrid threats to CUI. Too often such measures are ad hoc or post hoc, or not sufficiently tailored to the specific demands of protecting CUI. If military forces are part of the response (e.g., to provide surveillance or bolster presence), then a forward, flexible posture is required to ensure force elements are in the area of responsibility or held at high readiness to deploy to quickly generate effects.</p> -<h3 id="three-temptations">Three Temptations</h3> +<p>It is important to note that given the limited resources of allies, any increase in demand to protect CUI will likely require trade-offs with other tasks and missions. Any contribution to protecting CUI is important but not all-important. NATO’s unique role — and the focus of the strategic concept — remains deterring armed attack above the threshold of war, not protecting against all forms of hybrid aggression. Protecting CUI should therefore not be overemphasized in NATO’s overall posture or capability development at the expense of conventional deterrence and defense.</p> -<p>Both on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon, senior leaders have expressed the need to accelerate the fielding of sensors for hypersonic and ballistic missile defense. Doing so will require optimizing an entire system of systems — effectors; sensors; command, control, and communications systems; and the software that weaves them together. The greater challenge is not in constructing these individual parts but in aligning their deployment to deliver capability on relevant timelines.</p> +<h4 id="4-geography">4. GEOGRAPHY</h4> -<p>Realizing the necessary architecture will require attention to potential policy temptations and pitfalls. Policymakers may face temptations to abdicate the fire control mission, overoptimize for numerical efficiencies, or consolidate to single orbital regimes in the pursuit of savings and simplicity. Succumbing to these temptations would come at the cost of speed and resilience.</p> +<p>The final element of the framework is geography. NATO is named after an ocean: the North Atlantic. But the alliance’s undersea infrastructure picture is more complex. NATO’s maritime areas of responsibility comprise the following:</p> -<h4 id="temptation-to-abdicate">Temptation to Abdicate</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>High North region (including the Norwegian Sea, Greenland Sea, Barents Sea, and Arctic Ocean)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Baltic Sea</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>North Atlantic (including the North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, and Bay of Biscay)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Mediterranean Sea (east and west)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Black Sea</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>North Pacific Ocean</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>One temptation to avoid is to abdicate the missile defense fire control mission. While technically challenging, fire control-quality tracking is needed for hypersonic missile defense. As responsibility for fire control transfers from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to the Space Force, it could be tempting to postpone or deemphasize these difficult requirements.</p> +<p>Within these areas, the seascape of undersea infrastructure is extensive and complex. Figures 1–2 show the extent of underwater energy infrastructure (Figure 1) and subsea data cables (Figure 2) across Europe.</p> -<p>In other words, fire control should not be redefined as a reach goal. Combatant commands central to missile defense, including U.S. Space Command, have recognized the necessity of fire control and “strongly endorsed continuing work on systems such as . . . the MDA’s Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor.” Congress, moreover, had funded the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) and repeatedly kept it within MDA explicitly to ensure schedule discipline and applicability to missile defense. Whether or not HBTSS represents the eventual solution, fire control requirements should remain a defining feature of sensor architecture design.</p> +<p>While data cables are uniformly spread across the Euro-Atlantic area, the picture is different for energy infrastructure, which is concentrated in northern Europe — namely the North Atlantic (North Sea) and High North (Norwegian Sea). This supply is critical to Europe: in the second quarter of 2023, the European Union imported 44.3 percent of its natural gas (in gaseous state) from Norway and 17.8 percent from the United Kingdom. That 16.5 percent was from Algeria (through three subsea Mediterranean pipelines) also shows the importance of energy infrastructure in southern Europe. This could increase in the future with new projects (such as the EastMed pipeline) and new gas field discoveries as Europe diversifies away from Russian supply. Offshore wind energy infrastructure (along with subsea electrical cables) is also concentrated in northern Europe but present in significant amounts across Europe. Such infrastructure is also expanding quickly: under the European Green Deal, for example, offshore wind energy will expand over 25 times by 2030.</p> -<p>Realizing fire control requirements will be difficult but not impossible. “The ability to detect and track dim targets in a cluttered background . . . with the sensitivity necessary to support the [counter-] hypersonic kill chain” requires considerable investment to achieve. The mission demands low latencies and small pixel footprints, achievable either through dedicated medium-field-of-view (MFOV) systems cued by wide-field-of-view (WFOV) tracking sensors or high-resolution, fire control-capable WFOV sensors, pending the supply of larger-format focal planes. An ideal constellation might feature both, with responsive WFOV fire control sensors and an additional MFOV layer for tracking challenging targets.</p> +<p>However, any judgment about prioritizing NATO’s efforts to protect CUI in one region cannot rely on the density of infrastructure alone because all undersea infrastructure is proportionately important to each ally. In addition to including the views of all allies, any assessment must combine geography with the other elements of the framework. This task is explored in the final section of this brief.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Fire control should not be redefined as a reach goal.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="recommendations-winning-the-fourth-battle-of-the-atlantic">RECOMMENDATIONS: WINNING THE FOURTH BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC</h3> -<p>SDA’s commitments to deploying fire control sensors represent an important step in the right direction. Despite earlier uncertainties over their prioritization, recent plans suggest that SDA will deploy six fire control sensors in the Tranche 2 constellation, after MDA’s two-satellite HBTSS demonstration activities conclude. The relation of Tranche 2 fire control sensors to HBTSS remains publicly unclear.</p> +<p>The staff at NATO’s new Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure do not have the luxury of pondering future threats. NATO’s CUI is under attack right now. This situation may worsen as Russia tries to undermine Western support for Ukraine and cheaper, more advanced AUVs enable a wider range of actors to pose a threat. As Foggo, the former commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Allied Joint Force Command Naples, puts it: “the fourth battle of the Atlantic is underway.” Like its predecessors, this battle is “a struggle between Russian forces that probe for weakness, and US and NATO anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces that protect and deter. Just like in the Cold War, the stakes are high.”</p> -<p>The number of fire control tracking satellites planned, however, remains inadequate for providing persistent coverage, and the glidepath to transition from an HBTSS-based approach to a future fire control system appears uncertain. The six SDA fire control satellites planned to launch in 2027, for instance, will be valuable for demonstrating capability but insufficient for achieving persistent Indo-Pacific coverage. It is worth considering whether these efforts could be expanded; additional satellites at these inclinations could generate persistent coverage of the Indo-Pacific. Additional mid-inclination satellites would bolster deterrent capability in a critical period, coinciding with Beijing’s timeline to develop a Taiwan invasion capability by 2027. Even if such threats are delayed, these additional satellites could be held in reserve to reconstitute constellations as they deorbit or come under attack.</p> +<p>NATO and its new center must therefore act quickly. The final section provides a series of recommendations for NATO planners to conceptualize and prioritize their efforts in the coming years. The recommendations comprise two parts. The first is a general assessment of initial priorities for protecting CUI based on the four-part framework developed above. The second builds on this broad assessment to propose more specific and immediate actions.</p> -<p>Policymakers are right to question if the current approach is enough to support fire control for hypersonic and ballistic missile defense. While the Space Force has committed to “the development and demonstration of space technologies to deliver Missile Warning, Missile Tracking, and Missile Defense (MW/MT/MD) capabilities including advanced missile tracking and fire control,” it must go further to operationalize them.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Q63FfXa.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Undersea Energy Infrastructure in Northern Europe.</strong> Source: Data from <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/atlas/maritime_atlas/">“European Atlas of the Seas,” European Commission</a>.</em></p> -<p>Moreover, the previous, near-complete focus on proliferated low Earth orbit (LEO) sensors is worth reconsideration. Space Force efforts to explore fire control tracking from medium Earth orbit (MEO) sensors merit further study and potential acceleration. As discussed above, the MEO regime offers useful survivability, coverage, and schedule benefits, and deploying a MEO-based fire control layer could add useful resilience.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/r6J7v97.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Undersea Data Cables in Europe.</strong> Source: Data from <a href="https://www.submarinecablemap.com/">“Submarine Cable Map,” TeleGeography</a>.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pIqLTQG.png" alt="image68" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 65: Valleys of Death in Defense Acquisition.</strong> Source: U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/C61OqXa.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: A Framework for Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure.</strong> Source: Authors’ assessment.</em></p> -<p>The transfer of fire control tracking sensor programs from MDA to SDA represents an exercise in institutional trust. It will also be a test of recognizing the central relation between space and the future missile defense enterprise. Continued oversight will be essential, to ensure both that this transition effectively takes place and that fire control capability is achieved on schedule and at the necessary scale. It will require clear, high-level commitments from Pentagon leadership to allow these capabilities to cross the valley of death (Figure 65).</p> +<h4 id="general-assessment-of-initial-priorities-for-protecting-cui">GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF INITIAL PRIORITIES FOR PROTECTING CUI</h4> -<h4 id="temptation-to-overoptimize">Temptation to Overoptimize</h4> +<p>This section presents a general indicative assessment of NATO’s role in protecting CUI based on the framework discussed in Figure 3. The shaded area suggests where NATO’s initial focus should be for protecting CUI. This assessment is discussed in more detail below, starting with the prioritization criteria for each element.</p> -<p>A second set of policy temptations threatens deployment schedules. Fielding new technologies requires experimentation. It is difficult to fully characterize sensor performance without placing them on orbit; spiral development approaches, such as those employed by SDA, can enable the continual experimentation needed to refine these systems. Even when operationalized, an architecture should continue to evolve. A mantra from the Aegis community is to “build a little, test a little, learn a lot.”</p> +<p><em>Infrastructure Type</em></p> -<p>This experimentation must be connected to results. The future architecture must prioritize coverage of the lower latitudes for the Indo-Pacific region. This is not only a matter of scaling constellation sizes but of selecting a design that addresses priority regions earlier. It may be tempting to continue experimenting: to deploy endless technology demonstrations to design constellations optimized for global coverage on an ever-longer timeline.</p> +<p>Undersea infrastructure may be prioritized for protection by considering the criticality to NATO allies and vulnerability to different threats. Doing so suggests NATO focus on protecting energy and communications infrastructure — the most critical infrastructure to many NATO allies, whose developed economies depend on either importing or exporting energy and transmitting data. Such infrastructure is also the most vulnerable to attack, as recent attacks on pipelines and undersea cables have demonstrated. If further prioritization is required, it should be driven by an analysis of resilience of energy infrastructure compared to data cables: although both are vital and vulnerable, some systems are more resilient and easier to reconfigure in the event of damage.</p> -<p>Three means to resist this temptation include designing constellations for graceful deployment, leveraging airborne underlays, and accelerating ground and data infrastructure development. The treasure obligated for these development efforts could be in vain if capability arrives late to need.</p> +<p>However, it is important to remember undersea infrastructure is much broader than pipelines and cables. Many NATO allies depend on fishing, the health of their marine ecosystems, and maritime security in the broadest sense. The rapid growth of AUVs may transform the transport sector, introducing new types of CUI and new threats. Most importantly, NATO’s approach to protecting CUI will need to incorporate the preferences of all allies.</p> -<p><em>DEPLOY GRACEFULLY</em></p> +<p><em>Threat</em></p> -<p>Deployment phasing should define every requirement in a potential constellation. The forthcoming sensor architecture must prioritize persistent coverage of the Indo-Pacific region first and do so sooner. Amid theoretical debates over orbital planes, satellites, and coverage, it is important to ask when an architecture could generate persistent coverage of relevant regions, and when this might expand to global coverage. As emphasized previously, even if the final capabilities of two designs are identical, the way these capabilities phase in — how they deploy gracefully and which regions receive denser coverage — can differ.</p> +<p>Threats may be prioritized by considering the likelihood and consequences of an attack. With this in mind, NATO should focus on hybrid or gray zone threats to CUI, as these are the most likely threats in the near term. At the same time, the most dangerous threat to NATO allies remains the threat of armed attack on CUI as a prelude to aggression or during conflict.</p> -<p>These considerations should impact the orbital design of forthcoming constellations. High-inclination configurations, optimized for maximizing coverage efficiencies once fully populated, may generate minimal relevant coverage when only partially populated. The recent nods to lower-inclination orbits in Tranche 2 are an important step to moderate polar over-coverage. It is worth asking if it is enough.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AahXGVh.png" alt="image69" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 66: Regional and Global Coverage Definitions Investigated.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> - -<p><em>AN AIRBORNE UNDERLAY</em></p> - -<p>To this end, it will be crucial to examine alternatives for accelerating Indo-Pacific sensor coverage. A high-inclination LEO constellation will not generate persistent regional coverage for some time. But the immediate future fight is likely to be a regional fight (Figure 66). Airborne sensors might be useful for nearer-term regional tracking capability, defending critical assets including Okinawa or Guam.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="frank-turner-technical-director-space-development-agency">Frank Turner, Technical Director, Space Development Agency</h4> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>“Schedule is king. The train is going to leave the station on time.”</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Such approaches have been shown to be operationally viable. Architectures based on uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) have already been proposed for persistent, regional boost-phase missile defense missions, leveraging similar sensors needed for hypersonic tracking. MDA has previously demonstrated infrared missile tracking sensors on UAS, successfully tracking ballistic missiles in flight. In 2016 and 2021, the Navy and Army successfully integrated fighter-derived tracking information into missile defense tests.</p> - -<p>The DoD has already begun to use decommissioned RQ-4 drones to track hypersonic systems in flight tests. There is an even larger stock of existing UAS, slated for divestment, which could be leveraged. Many pieces of the puzzle are already in place.</p> - -<p>In the longer term, advances in airborne platform endurance, networking, stealth, and autonomy could enable alternative designs. Opportunistic missile tracking could be invigorated by multimission platforms tightly linked to missile defense fire control networks. New domain awareness systems could allow asset placements closer to suspected missile launch sites. Significant investments in lighter-than-air and ultra-long-endurance aircraft, combined with declines in infrared sensor size, weight, and power, could allow a proliferated architecture of smaller, lighter, and cheaper airborne sensors.</p> - -<p>Airborne systems offer different characteristics — flexibility, proximity, and survivability — to backstop and enhance a space-based missile tracking architecture. Introducing opportunistic or persistent airborne sensors increases the complexity of the missile defense problem for an adversary, forcing them to consider multiple domains from which their missiles could be tracked and engaged.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JZTNXyP.png" alt="image70" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 67: Airborne Sensors near Guam.</strong> A notional laydown of airborne sensors defending Guam, involving two surface-based sensor assets and three long-endurance UAS — two in a combat air patrol, and one transiting to replenish the orbit. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> - -<p>To be clear, these architectures are not without their limitations. Their comparatively low altitudes constrain their lines of sight compared to spacecraft and, like space architectures, would require fleets of multiple systems to achieve persistence. They are not invulnerable — both aircraft and their airbases can be attacked by aircraft, missiles, and drones if placed close enough to threat regions.</p> - -<p>As the DoD races ahead with space sensor acquisition, it is worth considering the roles airborne sensors might play in accelerating capability delivery to the Indo-Pacific (Figure 67). Persistent airborne sensors might relax schedule pressure on space systems and allow for designs that phase capability later. More critically, a diversity of assets in space and in the air — in different orbits and with different mixes of penetrating capability and persistence — generates more dilemmas for adversaries.</p> - -<p><em>REDUCING INTEGRATION RISKS</em></p> - -<p>Phasing capability earlier also demands more attention to the systems that allow them to interoperate. A constellation design will live and die by its data transport and integration. If history is any indication, the delivery of software and ground systems will be difficult, costly, and late. “What you don’t want to have,” General James Dickinson of U.S. Space Command warns, “is where you have outdated ground stations that can’t leverage the new capabilities on orbit.” The development of these systems was a substantial contributor to the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program’s early cost and schedule overruns; it is likely that ground system development, especially related to sensor fusion, will only mature after satellites have reached orbit. Both Congress and the DoD have roles to play in mitigating this risk.</p> - -<p>Fusing sensor outputs from air and space platforms in multiple orbital bands is no easy undertaking. Efforts to develop common ground systems for the forthcoming Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) and Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking (RMW/MT) constellations, for example, face considerable technical and schedule risk. A viable sensor fusion solution must correlate information from multiple sensors with different look angles, latencies, and uncertainties associated with their sensor returns to form a track. While some portion of this processing can be done on board satellites — “on the edge” — significant track correlation and fusion will likely initially take place on the ground (Figure 68).</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A constellation design will live and die by its data transport and integration.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>As of 2023, the DoD plans to manage the ground operations for RMW/MT through a combined program office including Space Systems Command (SSC), which will acquire the MEO component; SDA, which will acquire the Tracking Layer; and MDA, which retains considerable equities through HBTSS and the Missile Defense System (MDS). The ground components for each system are under development by different contractors and must interface with satellites from many vendors. Their software must correctly interface with the Next Generation OPIR Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE) infrastructure and be compliant with the broader Space Force Enterprise Ground System (EGS).</p> - -<p>Still in its initial iterations, RMW/MT and Next Generation OPIR constellations will leverage different data formats, requiring “translation” on the ground to be interoperable. The RMW/MT ground segment itself involves separate infrastructure for the LEO Tracking Layer, MEO constellation, and HBTSS, which come online on different timelines.</p> - -<p>The timelines for acquiring these translation capabilities will be tight. FORGE itself is expected to come online no earlier than 2025. A more comprehensive ability to command and control multiple types of satellites with a single protocol, EGS, is required to enter service before 2028. Responsibility for ensuring an integrated space architecture — such as by mandating common data standards and software development practices — has been dispersed across multiple program elements and offices. Despite clear road maps for launching large volumes of new satellites, no comprehensive plans have been publicized for fusing their large volumes of data.</p> - -<p>The DoD has only recently begun algorithm development to fuse two-dimensional sensor tracks from OPIR satellites. While it has demonstrated the performance of its sensors on the ground, sensor track fusion remains a substantial software challenge. As deployment of the Tranche 0 satellite constellation continues, the DoD must ensure that the sensor fusion approaches it leverages are scalable to larger quantities of satellites.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rppd0Jr.png" alt="image71" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 68: Data Transport Pathways.</strong> Data transport, fusion, and integration will be as important to space-based missile tracking as the sensors themselves. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> - -<p>It will be imperative to get ahead of these integration problems. How many hops must the data take between sensors, ground stations, and other data processing nodes? How long might each hop take? Which nodes will process the tracking data, which will fuse them, and which will deliver the finalized track to an effector? The various types and orbits of satellites being purchased should output common data formats that are usable across various ground assets. Moreover, the DoD should take steps to mitigate cases where fusion-related program elements lack clear organizational ownership — a substantial contributor to past schedule overruns.</p> - -<p>The pace of the threat, and the pace of ongoing launch schedules, is too fast to accommodate any potential delays in sensor fusion and ground system development. Moreover, the DoD cannot settle for uncertain assurances that, someday, satellites in different orbits and with different datalinks could be integrated down the road. It will not be enough to continually experiment with fusion approaches once the satellites reach orbit. To deploy a diverse, proliferated constellation, it is essential for the ground systems and software to arrive on time.</p> - -<h4 id="temptation-to-consolidate">Temptation to Consolidate</h4> - -<p>Finally, the future sensor architecture must be designed for conflict: it must be capable of surviving and reconstituting in highly contested environments. Achieving this will require an orbitally diverse constellation design that forces adversaries to develop many types of countermeasures. Policymakers should resist temptations to consolidate the sensor architecture into a single orbital regime.</p> - -<p>Multi-orbit capabilities are not duplicative. An architecture in multiple orbits and altitudes can generate unique efficiencies in coverage unachievable with single-altitude architectures — especially for the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, it will be critical to deploy diverse orbits to ensure resilience against growing counterspace threats.</p> - -<p>Amid future programmatic and budgetary pressures, it may be tempting to consolidate a sensor architecture to a single set of orbits in the low, medium, geosynchronous, or highly elliptical domains. In the past, the DoD has overly consolidated certain capabilities in a single orbital domain, such as GEO. That practice should not be repeated. The DoD’s pivot toward a multi-altitude sensor architecture is an important step in resisting this temptation.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="john-plumb-assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-space-policy">John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy</h4> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>“What we’re finding is that resilience has no end state.”</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Orbital diversity has become especially critical in view of the growing counterspace threat. Adversaries recognize the importance of space sensor architectures and are rapidly advancing their counterspace capabilities. In the past five years, they have conducted over 70 counterspace and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon tests, developmental demonstrations, and deployments (Figure 69). They are developing kinetic direct-ascent and co-orbital ASAT weapons, non-kinetic dazzlers, jammers, and cyberweapons, and have magnified natural threats to satellites, generating space debris through weapons testing. The increasing complexity of these threatens to outpace the United States’ acquisition of satellite constellations. This should be a central consideration not only in the construction of satellites, but in the design of an architecture.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EabU1NB.png" alt="image72" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 69: Counterspace Developments, Tests, and Deployments, 2006–2022.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from Aerospace Security Project.</em></p> - -<p>Different orbital regimes are vulnerable to different threat profiles. The LEO environment is easier to threaten but also easier to proliferate and reconstitute. MEO offers coverage and distance but with harsh radiation environments and challenging unit economics. GEO, meanwhile, is increasingly populated with adversary co-orbital capabilities but benefit from both distance and potential defensive capabilities — making them far from “juicy targets.” HEO regimes incorporate few assets but can be challenging to covertly engage with co-orbital weapons. No specific constellation design represents an ideal survivability profile.</p> - -<p>A survivable constellation should therefore seek to multiply adversary dilemmas, forcing them to attack multiple orbital layers with multiple, costly means of attack. Assuring coverage will demand the use of air and space assets, the reconstitution of constellations under attack, and carefully planned defensive operations (Figure 70). It should leverage multiple approaches to resilience (Table 4). It is not merely a matter of proliferating sensors, but of doing so in ways that introduce additional targeting challenges.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Rl7Bxjk.png" alt="image73" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: Approaches to Resilience.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from the Department of Defense.</em></p> - -<p>Different orbits are suited to different resilience pathways. Constellations optimized for smaller numbers of assets — in GEO, for instance — benefit from resilience approaches that protect individual assets: advanced radiation hardening and error-correcting circuitry; larger fuel loads or refueling systems to perform evasive maneuvers; and signature reduction, chaff, and decoy systems. While some protection methods, such as the deployment of defensive “bodyguard” satellites, are costly, they can introduce novel operational considerations for an adversary. But it is unaffordable to ensure a resilient architecture through asset-level protection alone.</p> - -<p>These approaches should be combined with constellations that leverage different resilience philosophies. Several proposed LEO constellations leverage proliferation to ensure survivability.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/si6JWLH.png" alt="image74" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 70: Mission Assurance Contributors.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from the Department of Defense.</em></p> - -<p>Dramatic drops in the cost of space launch have made it feasible to rapidly proliferate and reconstitute satellites — and to do so more cheaply than they can be shot down.</p> - -<p>Proliferation strategies are attractive for their potential to complicate adversary targeting and introduce new technology increments rapidly. Such satellites could be constructed to minimize unit cost, with lower reliability thresholds, commercial-grade electronics, and shorter orbital lifespans, to be replenished frequently with upgraded systems.</p> - -<p>Systemic threats, however, challenge efforts to achieve resilience through proliferation. A sustained counterspace campaign would likely generate large quantities of debris in crowded LEO orbits. Nuclear explosions in space could deny large swathes of the LEO environment. Cyberattacks remain an omnipresent area threat, both for proliferated and exquisite architectures. The threat posed by these area effects makes it more urgent to embrace multiple resilience strategies.</p> - -<p>Increasing the number of orbital regimes in the sensor architecture can enhance system-level resilience. Leveraging multiple orbital regimes complicates an adversary’s ability to exploit failure modes common to that orbit. LEO constellations benefit from large numbers, but their proximity to Earth makes them vulnerable to aforementioned area threats. MEO, GEO, and HEO constellations, meanwhile, might involve fewer assets with less provision for replenishment but are more difficult to engage with some directed-energy and direct-ascent weapons and potentially more economical to harden.</p> - -<p>More critically, a multi-orbit architecture can complicate adversary mission planning. Adversaries facing such an architecture would encounter challenges in synchronizing attacks. A direct-ascent or co-orbital attack on MEO or GEO assets may take substantially longer to execute compared to attacks on LEO. If attacks were launched simultaneously, the earlier disruption to LEO layers would give warning time for MEO and higher satellites to employ defensive maneuvers or other measures. If attacks were phased to strike multiple orbits at once, the long transit time of co-orbital weapons or missiles in GEO or HEO would offer warning time for defensive measures in MEO or LEO. A diverse architecture both creates targeting dilemmas and complicates tactical surprise.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="michael-griffin-under-secretary-of-defense-for-research-and-engineering-2018">Michael Griffin, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 2018</h4> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>“I don’t want to be in any one orbit. . . . I want us to be as widely distributed over as many choices of orbital regimes as we can effectively use, because I want to pose the adversary such a difficult problem that they’ll choose not to fight it.”</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The future sensor architecture cannot be a monoculture. Wartime scenarios are likely to include targeted attacks on individual satellites and area threats that threaten many. An architecture reliant on a single orbit and optimized for a single resilience philosophy will be simpler for adversaries to counter than a multi-layer approach, which presents dramatically different vulnerabilities. The increasing importance of space sensing makes it imperative to avoid so-called “common mode failures.” A future missile tracking constellation cannot only be proliferated, it must leverage a diversity of sensors to complicate adversary targeting.</p> - -<h3 id="staying-on-track">Staying on Track</h3> - -<p>Missiles are no longer niche weapons, they are weapons of choice. They have become “foundational to our adversaries’ way of war, and missile defense has become foundational to integrated deterrence and the defense of the nation.” The creation of a new elevated sensor architecture will be similarly foundational to the future missile defense enterprise.</p> - -<p>Over the last 40 years, seven successive presidential administrations have expressed support, at least on paper, for fielding a space sensor layer capable of providing not just missile warning but also high-quality tracking capabilities necessary to support the missile defense mission. To date, none has yet done so.</p> - -<p>That is now beginning to change. Substantial strides have been made toward a robust space sensing capability. That past vision has never been closer to realization than it is today. Breakthroughs in space launch, networking, and sensing technologies have created opportunities for realizing a robust elevated sensor architecture. Substantial institutional attention is now being paid across the U.S. national security enterprise, with significant investments to match. Recent emphasis on acquiring proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO) constellations was a good start, but contending with near peers will require much more. As emphasized by Assistant Secretary of Defense John Plumb, “Resilience is kind of a never-ending quest.” To achieve robust capability and mission assurance, the future sensor architecture must orbit in multiple altitudes and domains, prioritize designs that deploy sooner, and provide denser coverage of latitudes for the Indo-Pacific region.</p> - -<p>The necessary policy, programs, and institutions are in place. What is needed now is the oversight, resourcing, and systems engineering authority to make the future architecture resilient, timely, and capable. To be resilient, the future architecture must be orbitally diverse. To be timely, it must deploy capability with an eye to graceful deployment and to prioritizing lower-latitude coverage. Finally, it must deliver the quality of data necessary for missile defense — fire control-quality tracking.</p> - -<p>This long-awaited elevated sensor architecture will be achieved. When it is, its uses will extend well beyond missile warning, missile defense, and missile defeat. Indications, warnings, and attributions from these assets will bring clarity to decisionmakers in crisis situations and better inform and protect servicemembers in the field. Just as the Global Positioning System (GPS) has had countless commercial applications and the Defense Support Program missile warning constellations have benefited wildfire detection, new missions and use cases will emerge for these elevated sensors as well.</p> - -<p>The implications of space becoming a warfighting domain will not be fully understood for some time. It is, however, already clear that elevated sensing is critical for air and missile defense. As the number of exotic space threats continues to multiply, there is a risk of neglecting the seemingly pedestrian air and missile threats below. As tempting as it may be to deprioritize the missile defense mission, the requirement for fire control-quality tracking must not be abdicated. It must stay on track.</p> - -<h3 id="appendix">Appendix</h3> - -<p>This report used Systems Toolkit (STK), SMARTSet, and other simulation and visualization tools to inform its analysis. The modeling performed is notional and intended to illustrate concepts and tradeoffs involved with sensor architecture design. To better highlight these, the team constrained the parameters being investigated in its analysis. The design of an operational architecture would involve higher-fidelity modeling for cost, maintenance interval, solar activity, hardening, launch schedules and missile design, conjunction, link budgets, and many other parameters. In brief, these models are demonstrative, not prescriptive. They are not reference architectures but exhibits for the design tradeoffs involved.</p> - -<h4 id="sensor-level-analysis">Sensor-Level Analysis</h4> - -<p>The research team performed infrared sensor and signature analysis using STK’s Electro-optical Infrared (EOIR) module. Infrared background data was imported from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) gridded data sets and processed with Python and NASA Panoply software. The team modeled a notional hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) (Figure 4) with Autodesk Fusion 360 and applied temperature maps to vehicle surfaces in Blender, using open-source surface temperature estimates. These assets were then placed into the STK simulation environment (Figure 4).</p> - -<p>Tracking hypersonic signatures is challenging because hypersonic weapons are not often the brightest objects in the scene. These weapons often appear as a single, slightly brighter pixel in a 4,000-by-4,000 pixel, wide-field-of-view (WFOV) image; while detectable by machine, these raw images are difficult to interpret with the naked eye. The infrared images furnished in this report are specifically scoped and processed to make these challenges visible.</p> - -<p>Figure 10 illustrates challenges associated with isolating hypersonic signatures from background clutter. The series of images are derived from STK’s EOIR simulation suite and picture an HGV as seen from a low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite orbiting at 1000 km. The raw image (left) represents a “crop” of a potential WFOV sensor, with a resolution of 256-by-256 pixels and a per-pixel FOV of 450 microradians. The simulated sensor operates in the mid-wave infrared (MWIR) band, with a wavelength of between 3.5 and 5 microns. The band selected is illustrative; various bands in the short- and mid-wave regions present different advantages. Radiometric features, including noise equivalent irradiance, were minimized to the degree the HGV could be distinguished.</p> - -<p>The first image depicts the raw output of this sensor. Unlike with bright plumes in the boost phase, the pixel containing the hypersonic weapon is dim — it is not among the brightest in the scene and cannot be distinguished with the naked eye. The brightness difference caused by the hypersonic weapon cannot easily be resolved by observing a single frame.</p> - -<p>Visualizing the signature instead requires analysis of several frames with the hypersonic weapon in motion. By estimating the movement of each pixel across the frame, it is possible to filter the hypersonic weapon’s motion from other objects in the scene. The second image depicts the motion vectors of each pixel over 20 successive image frames, processed with the OpenCV library’s Farneback optical flow algorithm. The false-color image encodes the optical flow vector of each pixel with a separate color, depicting a color variation for the pixel containing the moving hypersonic weapon. The third image displays an enlarged version of this false-color image, with contrast adjustments applied to make the HGV pixel more visible.</p> - -<p>The resultant images are illustrative and do not depict operationally sensitive features of hypersonic tracking systems. An operational system would offer substantially greater performance headroom. Moreover, atmospheric conditions can substantially change the signature of a vehicle; these were left to the standard atmospheric and cloud models included with STK EOIR. Finally, the simulations did not use high-fidelity maps of the hypersonic vehicle’s surface temperatures. A real hypersonic weapon would have significant temperature gradients across its surface and generate a wake of superheated gas and plasma with unique infrared emissivity characteristics. A weapons engineering process would include these detailed parameters, but these are not necessary to illustrate the principles discussed.</p> - -<p>Figure 7 illustrates the thermal gradient on a hypersonic weapon’s surface. To make these characteristics visible to the reader, the HGV was imaged from an uncrewed aerial system (UAS) placed approximately 80 km away with a 256-pixel focal plane array (FPA), 35 cm aperture, and a tight, 0.01-degree total FOV. This is not representative of an operational system but best illustrates the concept being discussed.</p> - -<p>Similarly, Figure 25 is constructed to illustrate the effects of motion blur and sensor jitter. The sensor FPA is 256 pixels, with an 0.001-degree FOV, placing the HGV signature in the center of the image. The FPA has an integration time of 10 milliseconds and the final image includes this signature with an added 0.005mrad jitter. Figure 24 uses apertures of various sizes from geosynchronous orbits to illustrate how aperture affects sensor resolution. Again, sensor resolution and immediate field of view (IFOV) are left to generic parameters intended to highlight the impact of aperture size. The largest aperture is set to an arbitrarily large diameter of 10 m, while the two successive apertures, 60 cm and 30 cm, show the progression in resolution with smaller, more realistic diameters.</p> - -<h4 id="constellation-level-analysis">Constellation-Level Analysis</h4> - -<p>The research team also used STK to assess satellite constellation design tradeoffs. Constellation designs illustrated in the report were similarly selected to highlight design principles — inclination, orbital altitude, sensor FOV, and orbital configurations — and their impact on sensor coverage. Specifically, the report displays constellation designs evaluated for their two-satellite (stereo) coverage, which is necessary for missile tracking and fire control.</p> - -<p>Several visualizations directly depict real-life constellation designs. Figure 38 leverages data from the Space Force’s catalog of tracked space objects to define the orbits of Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites. The coverage figures depict the maximum coverage footprints possible from each satellite. The latest and final SBIRS satellite, SBIRS GEO-6, was not included in this visualization. Similarly, Figures 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 depict the Tranche 0, 1, and 2 constellation designs being contemplated.</p> - -<p>Other visualizations contain notional constellation designs produced through optimization studies. The project team leveraged various approaches to find configurations that minimized the number of satellites needed for stereo coverage of a given area. These studies also produced configurations of near-minimum constellation designs inspired by numbers publicly given for forthcoming constellations (Figure 27) (Tracking Layer, RMW/MT-MEO).</p> - -<p>These optimization studies draw from the considerable literature written on the subject. Many of the configurations investigated in these studies were Walker or modified Walker configurations with different parameters on inter-plane spacing. Walker constellations are a family of constellation designs that distribute satellites in equally spaced, equally inclined circular orbits. Such a design is attractive to mission designers because of the stability of their geometry: the forces that perturb satellite orbits (such as those associated with atmospheric drag, the non-uniform nature of Earth’s gravitational field, and the Sun and Moon’s gravity, among others) affect all satellites in the constellation approximately equally. This symmetric design allows satellite operators to plan similar station-keeping maneuvers for all satellites in the system, giving them approximately equal operational lifetimes. Walker configurations are common among operational position, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellite constellations, such as the European Space Agency’s Galileo satellite system. Other satellite constellations, such as the U.S. Space Force’s Global Positioning System (GPS) or Iridium Communication’s constellation, use adaptations of the Walker constellation design.</p> - -<p>Walker constellations can be described by six parameters: semi-major axis, the number of orbital planes, the number of satellites per plane, the relative phasing between satellites in adjacent planes, the spacing between planes, and the planes’ inclination. For circular orbits — which have an eccentricity of zero — the constellation can also be described by the orbiting altitudes of its satellites, which stays constant over the course of the satellites’ orbital period. The coverage of such a constellation is also affected by a seventh, eighth, and ninth parameter: the field of regard (FOR) of the sensor on board, requirements for stereo or greater coverage, and solar exclusion, which defines angles where a sensor’s view is degraded by the light of the Sun in the background.</p> - -<p>These parameters must be tuned to minimize the number of satellites needed for persistent stereo coverage: coverage by two or more satellites at once, at every point in time, in the relevant region of analysis. The study team primarily analyzed coverage of a global region and a smaller, Indo-Pacific-focused region between 15 degrees South and 55 degrees North latitude (Figure 66). To preserve the generalizability of the study, these analyses assumed a maximum possible FOR for each satellite constellation; higher-fidelity details of detection and characterization challenges are not addressed; and the results presented in the following two sections correspond only to line-of-sight coverage analysis.</p> - -<p>To evaluate possible designs, the research team leveraged STK’s Analyzer module to test millions of possible configurations for coverage. This analysis began with the construction of simplified, non-representative designs for every orbital altitude to exemplify the altitude trades at play (Figure 34).</p> - -<p>To construct this relationship, the study team used STK Analyzer’s Design of Experiments (DOE) tool to explore an entire swath of design possibilities. The model was simplified to assess simplified stereo coverage to minimize the computation time needed, with no constraints on solar exclusion. More detailed assessments, including constraints on sensor FOR, solar exclusion, and other factors, were performed for the other constellations visualized in this study.</p> - -<p>The DOE tool parametrically defines a series of Walker Delta constellations by systematically combining ranges of orbital altitudes, numbers of orbital planes, numbers of satellites per plane, and inclinations, evaluating their suitability for stereo coverage using user-determined “Coverage Definitions” and “Figures of Merit.” This study relied on a global coverage definition consisting of a grid of points, spaced by six degrees, positioned 20 km above the Earth’s surface. Under these definitions, coverage can be evaluated at each of the points in the coverage grid, which are separated from one another by six degrees in both latitude and longitude space.</p> - -<p>These studies defined successful stereo coverage by constellations’ ability to minimize average stereo coverage gap time to zero. That is, the number of seconds over a one-day study period — during which any point in the coverage region is observed by fewer than two satellites in the constellation — cannot be greater than zero. When satellite constellations achieve continuous stereo coverage for a particular region, this figure of merit requirement is satisfied.</p> - -<p>For each orbital altitude between 500 and 36,000 km, the team evaluated hundreds of thousands of permutations of Walker Delta constellations. Although many different constellation architectures satisfied the figure of merit requirement — as many overpopulated satellite constellations offer much denser coverage than what is required — only two constellations per altitude met this study’s definition for optimality: one that offers continuous stereo coverage while minimizing the total number of satellites in the system, and one that offers continuous stereo coverage while minimizing the total number of orbital planes in the system.</p> - -<p><img src="" alt="image75" />https://i.imgur.com/ZzOuARE.png -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 71: Solar Exclusion.</strong> As with handheld cameras, a space-based infrared camera angled close enough to the sun will encounter washout and flaring effects. This can inhibit the detection of dim targets. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> - -<p>Optimal constellations were identified algorithmically by first sorting the list of Walker Delta constellation permutations for each altitude by average stereo coverage gap times and removing those with non-zero times. This step eliminates those constellation architectures that fail to satisfy the figure of merit requirement. Next, the minimum total number of satellites and minimum total number of orbital planes of the remaining constellation architectures should be identified and noted. To identify the optimal constellation — minimizing the total number of satellites — the architectures with more than the minimum total number of satellites should be removed.</p> - -<p>In many cases, there is more than one constellation architecture in the filtered list that offers the minimum total number of satellites. To select a singular, unique architecture, the list was filtered to include only those architectures that also use the minimum number of orbital planes. This is because multiple launches are generally needed to populate multiple orbital planes. All else being equal, a constellation of many planes with fewer satellites per plane is more costly than a constellation of fewer planes with more satellites in each.</p> - -<p>Where needed, the list of remaining constellation architectures was sorted by inclination, and the design with the lowest inclination was labeled as most optimal, as less-inclined orbits generally correspond to lower launch costs. The process for identifying constellations that minimized the number of orbital planes is similar to the process described for minimizing the total number of satellites, but the list of architectures that satisfy the figure of merit requirement should first be filtered to only include those with the minimum number of orbital planes, then again filtered to only include those with the minimum number of total satellites — a reversal of the previously described order of operations.</p> - -<p>The resultant constellation configurations, and the total numbers of satellites they represent, were graphed using the Python Plotly library. The resultant figure (Figure 34) illustrates the results of this optimization study conducted for every altitude between 500 and 36,000 km at 50 km increments. The study team applied a minor smoothing function to interpolate between these increments and highlight the underlying relationship between altitude and the number of satellites required for coverage.</p> - -<p>An operational constellation configuration, however, must account for more detailed constraints on performance. Each satellite in a constellation can be assumed to encounter some time where their sensors may be unavailable, either during calibration or during periods where the Sun is sufficiently close to the sensor background (solar exclusion) (Figure 71). These can considerably increase the number of satellites required to develop a constellation design.</p> - -<p>As such, reference constellations, including Figures 16, 17, 27, 28, 35, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 52, 53, and 54, are optimized with constraints on solar exclusion. The total FOR of each sensor was modeled to provide the maximum footprint attainable. LEO reference constellations, all modeled at 1,000 km altitude, were conservatively modeled with a 30-degree solar exclusion parameter. MEO constellations, at 7,000 and 10,000 km altitudes, were modeled with a 16-degree solar exclusion parameter. This adds a 30-degree angle outside the sensor FOR where the presence of the Sun would inhibit sensor function. These figures are intentionally arbitrary and not reflective of operational systems.</p> - -<p>The larger number of parameters required different approaches for discovering optimal designs. Testing every possible configuration, as with the DOE studies informing Figure 34, required over 800,000 simulation runs to analyze. To discover designs for reference constellations, the research team leveraged STK Analyzer’s built-in genetic optimization suite to find minimum possible designs. The use of the NGSA-II optimization algorithm reflects common practice in other constellation optimization studies. Using NGSA-II, STK Analyzer could automatically explore and test possible combinations of inclination, planes, satellites per plane, and other parameters, measuring their resultant impacts on coverage. This approach minimized the number of simulation runs needed to discover the frontier of possible optimal configurations. Of these, the study team manually selected configurations that minimized the number of orbital planes necessary.</p> - -<p>This series of more detailed optimization studies formed the basis for several of the satellite configurations and mixes presented. The LEO orbital plane included in Figures 46, 51, 52, 53, and 54 represent the results of optimization studies performed for smaller coverage regions, of both the polar region above 55 degrees latitude and a regional, Indo-Pacific-focused band between -15 and 55 degrees latitude. Other configurations, such as Figure 28, demonstrate the significantly larger numbers of satellites needed when the per-satellite FOR is reduced. Combinations of “optimal” coverage layers were then devised from the basis of these studies. While these configurations do not represent the optimal configuration of an operational architecture, they demonstrate constellation designs that could reasonably exemplify the orbital tradeoffs at hand.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Masao Dahlgren</strong> is a fellow with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he writes on missile defense, space, and emerging technologies issues.</p> - -<p><strong>Tom Karako</strong> is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, where he arrived in 2014. His research focuses on national security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and public law.</p>Masao DahlgrenThe conflict in Ukraine has made it clear that missiles “are foundational to adversaries’ way of war.” Future missile threats, however, increasingly stress existing missile defenses, flying lower, faster, and on unpredictable trajectories. Most importantly, they are difficult to detect — defeating them will require elevated sensors, on aircraft or satellites, to track them at range.Profiting From Proliferation?2023-12-15T12:00:00+08:002023-12-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/profiting-from-proliferation<p><em>This paper examines North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, based on a review of Pyongyang’s recent technological advancements and developments in North Korea’s customer base. The authors assess the likelihood of North Korea selling its missile and nuclear technology onwards, and the kinds of technology that may be for sale and to whom.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>The September 2023 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un raised concerns over the possibility that Pyongyang may supply Moscow with arms to support its war of aggression in Ukraine. Subsequent reports of North Korean transfers of ammunition to Russia and unconfirmed intelligence of suspected ballistic missiles transfers solidified those concerns. While the fact of Russia – host to one of the world’s most capable military–industrial complexes – turning to North Korea for arms was shocking, it did not come as a surprise to those familiar with the latter’s long history of arms trading and missile proliferation activities.</p> - -<p>North Korea has exported missile technology since the 1980s and has, on several occasions, also transferred technology directly relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. Despite the introduction since 2006 of a progressively extensive sanctions regime against North Korea and its proliferation activity by the UN Security Council (UNSC), North Korean exports of missile and nuclear technology have persisted. Considering developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities in recent years, the range of technologies that Pyongyang may be able to offer potential customers has also expanded. These technological advances, combined with the expansion of the UNSC sanctions regime over the past two decades, as well as other recent developments – like North Korea’s apparently expanding military collaboration with Russia, Moscow’s increasing disregard for UN sanctions, and North Korea’s reopening after the Covid-19 pandemic – make a reassessment of North Korea’s missile and nuclear exports timely.</p> - -<p>This paper builds on existing literature on North Korea’s missile and nuclear proliferation, supplementing it with expert interviews and leveraging the emergence of new information and cases related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities and transfers over the past decade. The authors consider the potential for future missile and nuclear sales by Pyongyang, asking: how likely is North Korea to sell its missile and nuclear technology onwards, what technology may be for sale, and to whom? With a growing technological offering and a continuing need to generate hard currency, incentives for North Korea to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers persist. As well as North Korea’s more novel technologies potentially being for sale, Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses of older technology which it may be looking to sell off.</p> - -<p>However, despite clear supply-side drivers, there are a range of restraining factors that are likely to prevent an all-out onward proliferation bonanza emanating from North Korea. A variety of factors have whittled down the potential markets for these technologies, while the restrictive sanctions landscape and unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula have also worked to reduce opportunities for sales and increase the risks posed by interdiction. North Korean concerns over the possibility of its more advanced capabilities falling into adversary hands, thus potentially putting its own deterrent at risk, are also likely to temper its willingness to export such capabilities, despite the potentially high price tag that could be attached to them.</p> - -<p>The changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may, however, open new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea could give other countries the green light to accept North Korean arms, missiles and perhaps even nuclear technology. There remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UNSC sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.</p> - -<p>Building on the analysis of North Korea’s expanded technological offering, reduced customer base and other factors affecting export decisions – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. These recommendations are organised in two categories, which attempt to address the supply side of the problem – deterring, dissuading and encouraging North Korea to refrain from engaging in onward proliferation – as well as demand-side factors – by trying to reduce North Korea’s customer base.</p> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>In September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un travelled by armoured train to Russia’s far east to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kim’s visits to the Vostochny Cosmodrome and a fighter jet factory in Komsomolsk-on-Amur further raised existing concerns that the two countries were seeking to exchange military technology. Indeed, recent research has confirmed that hundreds of shipping containers, likely carrying ammunition, have been moved from North Korea to Russian military bases since the leaders’ meeting. The meeting was preceded two months earlier by the visit of Russian and Chinese delegations to North Korea to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, with officials from Moscow led by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. Russia and North Korea – both countries under extensive international sanctions and with acute military equipment needs – put on a strikingly united front. Notably, Shoigu was treated to a defence exhibition featuring many of North Korea’s newest weapons systems – including UAVs, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and even ICBMs. In November 2023, South Korean intelligence publicly shared its suspicions – otherwise unconfirmed – that North Korea may have already sent SRBMs to Russia.</p> - -<p>Pyongyang has long been an exporter of missile and nuclear technology; this has included exports of Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s, Scud SRBMs to a range of customers (largely in the Middle East) through the 1980s and 1990s, as well as nuclear reactor technology to Syria, and uranium hexafluoride gas to Libya in the early 2000s through the proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan (Boxes 1 and 2 summarise North Korea’s historical trade).</p> - -<p>North Korea’s exhibition of missiles to Shoigu is far from the only indicator that Pyongyang remains open for business to countries looking to procure missile and even nuclear technology. Reporting by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 Committee Panel of Experts (PoE) has noted that Pyongyang has engaged in missile cooperation with Iran and Syria as recently as 2020 and 2019, respectively. A 2020 documentary film of unclear veracity entitled The Mole also showed an actor – playing the part of a private arms dealer – venturing to Pyongyang undercover in 2017 and being offered a wide range of short- and even intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). While most of the handful of known nuclear technology transfers by North Korea date back two decades, the last publicly known case of North Korea offering nuclear-weapons-relevant materials on the open market – in that instance, the isotope lithium-6 – was uncovered just six years ago.</p> - -<p>North Korea has engaged in these transfers despite an expansive UNSC sanctions regime that prohibits most trade with the country, including a prohibition on trade with the country in missile and nuclear technology, and most types of arms, in place since 2006. Pyongyang’s advancements in its nuclear and missile capabilities have had an impact on what, how and to whom North Korea may sell its nuclear and missile technology in the future. Its experience in identifying customers and engaging in illicit trade under the international sanctions regime over the past two decades will also have influenced its patterns of onward proliferation.</p> - -<p>Developments in the international sanctions regime and North Korean missile and nuclear capabilities, as well as changing geopolitical dynamics, necessitate a re-examination of North Korean onward proliferation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has resulted in the widening of existing schisms in the international community, with countries opposing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on one side, and those that have supported Russia or remained ambivalent on the other. Those in the latter camp, which includes North Korea and Iran, appear to have found in Russia a willing trading and diplomatic partner as Moscow seeks to reduce its isolation. This study is thus particularly timely in light of the recent high-level meetings between Pyongyang and Moscow, and the more general apparent expansion of relations between the two countries, as well as other developments – such as the gradual reopening of North Korea’s borders following the Covid-19 pandemic, the expiry in October 2023 of the UN Security Council (UNSC) embargo on trade in nuclear-capable missile technology with Iran, and the expiry of UNSC proliferation-related targeted financial sanctions on Iran.</p> - -<p>The paper builds on existing academic literature, expert analysis and case studies relating to North Korea’s onward proliferation of nuclear and missile technology by considering how what is already known about North Korean transfers of nuclear and missile technology may have been – or may in the future be – impacted by some of the technological, economic and geopolitical developments outlined above and throughout the paper. Based on this analysis, the authors explore developments relevant to already-identified factors, as well as emerging ones, that shape whether Pyongyang may transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and what wares North Korea may transfer, and to which client states.</p> - -<h4 id="existing-literature">Existing Literature</h4> - -<p>While some previous work has considered North Korea’s onward proliferation, the literature is limited and much of it is more than a decade old. Much of the existing literature on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes has focused on developments in its nuclear and missile capabilities, Pyongyang’s revenue-raising efforts under sanctions, and its procurement of WMD and military technologies. More broadly, discussion of the threat posed by North Korea’s weapons programmes has focused on denuclearisation and (more recently) deterrence, rather than on the threat posed by onward proliferation.</p> - -<p>The most insightful and in-depth work on North Korea’s onward proliferation was published by Joshua Pollack. In 2011, Pollack examined North Korea’s missile sales and how these had changed since what he called the “Golden Age” of North Korean missile exports in the 1980s. Pollack observed that Pyongyang had shifted – with some exceptions – from supplying complete missile systems to transferring parts, materials and expertise instead. He also noted that North Korea was moving its focus towards cooperation in joint missile development and production with a smaller number of countries – particularly Iran and Syria – as opposed to transferring full missiles to a range of customers. Pollack argued that these shifts stemmed from market saturation for North Korea’s missile offerings as a result of past missile transfers and requirements for components and maintenance services from past customers. He also attributed this shift to a deprioritisation of ballistic missiles among some potential customers, particularly in the Middle East, in favour of Western-supplied piloted aircraft, cruise missiles and missile defence systems, and pressure from the US to curtail engagement with North Korea. As the authors outline in this paper, some analogous factors appear to be impacting on more recent supply and demand drivers in North Korea’s onward proliferation.</p> - -<p>Pollack also examined North Korea’s nuclear exports, arguing that Pyongyang seems to have prioritised technological exchange instead of currency generation in the limited number of known transfers of its nuclear technology. However, Pollack also argued that Pyongyang may seek to leverage its nuclear expertise and technology for revenue generation in the future. Naturally, his work relied on the data available to him over a decade ago; since then, additional cases and data points on North Korean missile and nuclear exports have afforded greater understanding. The present-day utility of other works in understanding the phenomenon of North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology has been even more limited by their age. Others studying North Korean onward proliferation have limited their study to discrete aspects, such as transfers to non-state actors, or China’s role.</p> - -<p>This paper has also benefited from research on adjacent topics such as North Korea’s arms exports and sanctions evasion networks. Notably, in her 2016 book, Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers in the Sanctions Era, Andrea Berger identified a range of factors driving demand for North Korean military goods, considering customers in three categories: “resilient” customers with deep political and military ties to Pyongyang, “reluctant” customers with few other options in terms of suppliers, and less committed “ad hoc” customers. Berger’s work highlights the unique nature and context of specific relationships and their developments, which has helped to inform some of the analysis in this paper. Others have considered the role of specific entities in North Korean proliferation activities and procurement networks. However, no study in the past decade has revisited the question of North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation activities.</p> - -<h4 id="key-arguments-research-methodology-and-structure">Key Arguments, Research Methodology and Structure</h4> - -<p>Given its growing technological offering and continuing need to generate hard currency, North Korea has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to other states. Surpluses created by technological advances may also be available for sale. However, despite clear incentives to proliferate, a range of factors that work to constrain North Korea’s sales are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. Many of these drivers and restraints, discussed in the literature, continue to shape North Korea’s onward proliferation activity.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, the changing geopolitical landscape – particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – may provide new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea may give other countries the green light to breach UN sanctions and accept North Korean arms, missile or even nuclear technology. There is a real risk that such developments could lead to a resurgence of the North Korean arms and missile export enterprise.</p> - -<p>In re-examining the topic and building on others’ work, the authors were able to consider a wider range of data, as new material has become available over the past decade. Part of the reason for limited research on North Korean onward proliferation is the methodological challenge inherent in the study of Pyongyang’s proliferation activities. The extreme opacity of the North Korean economy, its regime and policymaking process makes the country a challenging target for researchers. Like any other country, North Korea guards the details of its military programmes – including procurement, technological developments and exports – particularly closely, making the study of its nuclear and missile matters especially difficult. Partial data on specific cases most often becomes available with a significant time lag, following interdictions of technology, the discovery of major proliferation rings such as the AQ Khan network, or in reports on the movement of North Korean technicians to customer states.</p> - -<p>More data on North Korean missile and nuclear developments and transfers is available than ever before. The UNSCR 1718 PoE has produced almost 20 detailed public reports since it was established in 2009, rich in details on North Korea’s sanctions evasion activities and illicit networks. Pollack’s work was largely unable to benefit from this data, which has provided insights into North Korea’s missile relationships with Egypt, Iran and Syria, as well as its dual-use technology exports. Increased access to open source data by investigative journalists, think tank analysts and academics has also led to the proliferation of analysis on NorthKorean capabilities and sanctions evasion.</p> - -<p>The authors have supplemented the information available in public sources with 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with experts through video conferencing and in person in London between June and early August 2023. Interviewees included former government officials and former members of the UNSCR 1718 PoE, as well as academics and other researchers working on matters related to North Korea’s nuclear, missile and broader military programmes, North Korean domestic, economic and security policies, and broader Asian security issues. Interview questions were tailored to each expert’s respective area of knowledge, but broadly focused on North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes, proliferation activities and networks, domestic and foreign policies, and international efforts to counter North Korean proliferation. The interviews allowed the authors to gauge current views on the state of North Korea’s onward proliferation enterprise and to test hypotheses as they were developed over the course of the research.</p> - -<p>Given the methodological challenges in studying matters related to the North Korean missile and nuclear programmes, and the dearth of current data on the subject, interviewees often had to caveat their assessments, noting that they were based on limited data and assumptions and were thus speculative. Consequently, the authors extend the same disclaimer to the findings outlined in this paper. Nevertheless, common themes in interviewees’ assessments emerged and these were supported by further research, allowing the authors to confidently formulate their conclusions.</p> - -<p>The authors’ analysis is presented across two main chapters. Chapter I considers recent developments in North Korea’s technological offering and assesses which technologies may be of interest to customers. Chapter II outlines the likely factors influencing North Korean decision-making on whether to transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and how these may have evolved in recent years. The paper concludes with 10 recommendations to address supply of and demand for North Korean missile and nuclear technology.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-1-north-koreas-historical-missile-sales"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1: North Korea’s Historical Missile Sales</code></h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea has long acted as an exporter of ballistic missile technology – particularly SRBM systems. According to one estimate, North Korean supply made up around 40% of the ballistic missiles supplied to the developing world between 1987 and 2009; more than 500 missile systems in total.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The genesis of North Korea’s own missile programme was the transfer of Soviet-design Scud SRBMs from Egypt in the 1980s. North Korea in turn supplied the Scud system – and related components – to a wide range of customers, many based in the Middle East. This included Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and the UAE. North Korea also transferred Scud missile technology to Myanmar and Vietnam in East Asia.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Pyongyang transferred Nodong MRBMs, a scaled-up version of the Scud SRBM, to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s. Both states’ programmes have advanced far beyond this early North Korean assistance – as is the case for a number of North Korea’s earlier customers.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea has also transferred IRBM technology to Iran and has allegedly offered IRBMs to private arms dealers in the past.</code></em></p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-2-north-koreas-historical-nuclear-sales"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 2: North Korea’s Historical Nuclear Sales</code></h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The authors are aware of just four cases in the public domain of North Korean transfers of technology pertaining directly to nuclear weapons capabilities, from the 1990s to 2016.</code></em></p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Nuclear trigger technology to Pakistan.</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korean technicians assisted Pakistani weapons scientists in producing krytrons – components used to trigger a nuclear device – in the mid-1990s. This was part of a series of technological deals between the two states, with Pakistan receiving complete missiles and parts from North Korea, as well as North Korea receiving centrifuge technology, and its technicians training in Pakistani facilities.</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Uranium gas to Libya.</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In December 2003, after the revelation that Libya was purchasing a centrifuge enrichment plant from the AQ Khan proliferation network, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in the country were shown three mystery cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a uranium gas that is fed into the centrifuges during the enrichment process. US analysis of contamination on the outside of the cylinders showed that they had originated in North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre. The IAEA later stated that the 1.7-tonne shipment was the first of a larger planned series of transfers of 20 tonnes between North Korea and Libya brokered by Khan.</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">A reactor for Syria.</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea worked with Syria to construct a nuclear reactor near Al-Kibar in Syria between the late 1990s and 2007 (when the site was bombed by Israeli aircraft). The reactor – the most extensive example of North Korea’s nuclear exports in the public domain – was a smaller-scale version of North Korea’s 5-megawatt (MW) graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon. Intelligence reports suggested that the reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for one or two weapons annually, had it been fuelled or gone critical.</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Sale of thermonuclear weapon isotope online.</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In 2016, an open source investigation revealed an advertisement for lithium-6. Lithium-6 is an isotope that can be used in thermonuclear weapons – either directly, or by irradiating it in a reactor to produce tritium. The advert was posted openly on a business-to-business (B2B) website and listed a phone number linked to the North Korean embassy in Beijing.</code></em></p> - </li> -</ul> - -<h3 id="i-north-koreas-current-technological-offerings">I. North Korea’s Current Technological Offerings</h3> - -<p>North Korea has acquired and developed – and therefore could potentially export – a wide range of missile and nuclear technologies. This potential technological offering has expanded over the past decade as North Korea has advanced its missile and nuclear capabilities – both indigenously and through acquisition of technology from other countries. While the offering has expanded, the fundamental range of options for transfer has not changed, and includes everything from fuel cycle facilities and complete missile systems to capabilities for building these facilities, individual dual-use goods and components, as well as expertise relating to elements of missile production, and to the nuclear fuel cycle or to weaponisation. Table 1 summarises some of the main types of transfers North Korea could consider (there is evidence of past exports across all these categories, except for the transfer of complete nuclear warheads).</p> - -<p>North Korea’s developments in nuclear and missile technology over the past decade could have a dual effect on its supply of technology. First, newly developed capabilities – which are more attractive to a wider range of customers – could be transferred. Second, the replacement of older designs and systems with newer, higher-quality or more capable ones could create surpluses of older systems, goods and expertise that could be exported. These surplus items may be appealing to a different subset of customers – those with less ability to absorb technology, lower capability needs, limited budgets or perhaps similar older systems in need of spare parts or interoperable systems. At the same time, North Korea’s expanding catalogue of missile systems and nuclear capabilities raises the question of whether it could now consider a sub-set of this catalogue of technologies to be too strategically important for its own security for them to be transferred to customers abroad. These security concerns are explored further in Chapter II.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EeOPpc3.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: North Korea’s Potential Missile and Nuclear-Related Offerings.</strong> Source: Author generated.</em></p> - -<h4 id="missile-technology-offerings">Missile Technology Offerings</h4> - -<p>Historically, North Korea has mostly exported short-range, and sometimes medium-range, ballistic missiles. Could recent developments in its short-, medium- and longer-range ballistic missiles create new sales opportunities?</p> - -<p><em>Developments in SRBM and MRBM Capabilities</em></p> - -<p>North Korea has debuted a series of solid-fuelled SRBMs since 2018. Although the exact specifications of the systems – some of which have multiple variants – are unclear, they will likely replace the liquid-fuelled Scuds and Tochka-type systems in North Korea’s arsenal, and potentially also in its sales catalogue.</p> - -<p>North Korea first revealed the KN-23 solid-fuelled SRBM during a 2019 parade. Since then, several variants have been developed, including smaller shorter-range and larger longer-range versions. KN-23 variants have been developed for deployment on a variety of platforms, such as road mobile transportable erector launchers, underground silos, railcars, submarines and underwater silos. The KN-24 – another solid-fuelled SRBM, with a range of around 400 km – was also unveiled in 2019. A further 2019 debut, the KN-25, is a solid-fuelled system described in North Korean media as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher”. It has four launch tubes on each launcher, and a range of up to 380 km.</p> - -<p>These newer solid propellant missile systems could appeal to customers for several reasons. Beyond their quicker time to launch, solid-fuelled systems are easier to operate than liquid-fuelled ones (which require greater expertise for maintenance and handling of highly explosive, corrosive and toxic fuels). Older liquid-fuelled systems also require the procurement of a range of support vehicles and handling facilities – increasing the human and financial investment required. North Korea has also recently shown signs of exploring ampulisation technology – a set of measures to ensure maintenance of liquid-fuelled missiles in combat readiness for longer periods of time. This could both make a more appealing product, overcoming some of the shortcomings of liquid-fuelled systems, and see North Korea find ways to reduce the maintenance burden and investment required by customers for liquid-fuelled products.</p> - -<p><em>Developments in IRBM and ICBM Capabilities</em></p> - -<p>North Korean advances in missile technology that have received the most media attention relate to the country’s long-range systems, such as IRBMs and ICBMs. This includes the KN-17 IRBM, successfully tested in 2017; the KN-26 medium- range submarine-launched ballistic missile, successfully tested in 2019; the KN-28 (Hwasong-17) ICBM, successfully tested in 2022; and, most recently, the Hwasong-18. The latter, debuted in February 2023 and successfully tested in April, is North Korea’s first solid propellant ICBM – a significant development in its strategic capabilities.</p> - -<p>Some have suggested that Pyongyang may consider transferring some of its longer-range missile systems to customers abroad. Indeed, North Korea did transfer IRBMs to Iran, which were likely based on imported Soviet missile technology. However, the strategic significance of these systems to North Korea’s own defence – and the insights they could betray into North Korea’s technology (including the state of its missile capabilities and domestic production capability, or reliance on foreign components) – may disincentivise Pyongyang from transferring them to others. The strategic importance that North Korea places on its missile capabilities, as well as the limited opportunities for intelligence collection on these systems by external actors, may make Pyongyang sensitive about having these capabilities fall into the hands of an adversary. Similar considerations could be applied to the Hwasong-8 carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle, which – while being an SRBM – has strategic significance for Pyongyang that could make transfer less likely. Although, as some of the experts interviewed for this project noted, any missile technology might be for sale for the right price, and Pyongyang may not care about its technology being intercepted provided it has received payment from the customer. These competing security and economic considerations are discussed in more detail in Chapter II.</p> - -<p>The potential customer base for longer-range missile systems is also limited. There are few countries that would benefit from an ICBM capability (which suggests the need to hold at risk an adversary further than 5,500 km away) who have not already shown some interest in developing these systems domestically. The relationship between ICBMs and nuclear weapons, in which one technology often necessitates the development of the other to have strategic value, also reduces any potential customer base. Iran may be the most obvious exception, and would likely benefit from further collaboration with North Korea on long-range missile technology (albeit probably without the transfer of complete long-range missile systems), and is a case discussed further below and in Chapter II.</p> - -<p><em>Potential for Surplus Sales</em></p> - -<p>There is also a risk that North Korea may export surplus older systems, notably those based on liquid-fuelled Scud or Nodong technology that are likely being replaced (or may be in future) by newer solid-fuelled systems. North Korea used to frequently parade these missiles, but a system based on Scud or Nodong technology has not appeared in a parade since 2017. The KN-02, an early North Korean-manufactured version of the solid-fuelled Soviet OTR-21 Tochka missile, which was first unveiled in 2007, has also not been paraded since 2012.</p> - -<p>While it remains unclear how many newer systems North Korea has been able to deploy, the apparent phasing out of older missile models raises questions as to what might have happened to these older systems, and whether surpluses could be for sale. Arms marketing material of unclear veracity handed over in the 2020 undercover documentary film The Mole included Scud C and Nodong (marketed as Scud E) systems and supporting vehicles allegedly for sale, as well as a system described as “Tochika-U”, likely the KN-02.</p> - -<p>Surplus missile technology – including full missile systems, spare parts or components – may appeal to customers still operating Scud- or Tochka-type systems (see Table 2). However, this group of states is declining in size, with the returns of maintaining such aged technology diminishing, if not already non-existent – particularly if states have access to more modern options in the form of more advanced missiles or UAVs. The two states that received North Korean Nodong-type missiles in the 1990s, Iran and Pakistan, both indigenised the technology and have since progressed in their own programmes, although surplus Nodong-type systems could potentially be of interest to new customers.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ANTGa59.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: States Holding Scud and Tochka Technology.</strong> Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2023) and a survey of other open source information. Note: Current data is difficult to compile – but inclusion in this table suggests that there is either evidence these countries currently operate these systems, or little evidence to suggest that the capability has been retired.</em></p> - -<p>Surpluses created by the superseding of North Korea’s Scud fleet could lead to parts being available for sale. Evidence of North Korean trade in spare parts for these older systems, though, is dated. A 2013 shipment of Scud parts originating in North Korea, including connectors, relays, voltage circuit breakers and a barometric switch, was interdicted en route to Egypt from Beijing. North Korean markings were visible on two of the items – suggesting manufacture in North Korea. Egypt has continued to maintain and operate Scud systems, and it is not out of the question that more recent (and successful) shipments of spare parts and components have occurred.</p> - -<p>North Korea may have other uses for its surplus missiles besides sales – including recycling, cannibalising them for materials, parts or components, mothballing them for future contingencies, or launching them in provocations. The war in Ukraine may also yield lessons. As one interviewee pointed out, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the continued value of short-range systems on the battlefield, and this may lead North Korea to retain older systems in great numbers for future contingencies.</p> - -<p><em>Collaboration in Missile Development</em></p> - -<p>Due to the sanctions environment and an evolving customer base, North Korea’s missile proliferation behaviour has largely adapted from the shipment of full systems towards the provision of spare parts, materials and technical support. As an unnamed UN member state noted to the UN PoE in 2019, “Instead of exporting full missile systems, the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) is sending technicians to a buyer country and establishing a complete supply chain”, noting that this pattern had been seen in Egypt, Iran and Syria.</p> - -<p>Missile collaboration with Syria has been ongoing for many years. North Korean technicians were reportedly involved in the upgrade of the Scud D to create a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle in 2008. A delegation of Syrian engineers allegedly spent six years in North Korea from 2011 to 2017, and further exchanges took place around 2016, with a group of North Korean missile technicians staying on a Syrian airbase. North Korea has also supplied missile-related components to Syria as part of its collaboration with the country. Five containers of commercial items (many with applications in Scud missiles) originating in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Denmark, Japan and the US were seized by an unnamed state while being shipped to Syria from Dalian, China in 2014. The PoE also noted in 2015 and 2016 that a Syria-based official from North Korean arms exporter Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) imported ball bearings and fibre optic cables, as well as bringing in three North Korean technicians.</p> - -<p>North Korea’s missile collaboration with Iran has involved higher-end missile technology, given that Iran has a large (and expanding) missile industrial base and export capability of its own. Collaboration with Iran has not always been smooth sailing, with trust levels taking a significant hit after North Korea supplied the BM-25 Musudan IRBM, a missile with significant technical issues. US information suggests that over recent years there has been further collaboration on technology that is potentially of use in longer-range systems.</p> - -<p>A 2016 sanctions notice suggested that North Korean technicians were collaborating with Iranians on an “80-ton rocket booster” being developed by North Korea. The notice stated that Iranian technicians from liquid-fuel missile producer SHIG travelled to North Korea for this purpose and named individuals who had travelled to Pyongyang for “contract negotiations”. It also suggested that KOMID had made shipments of missile-related goods to Iran, including “valves, electronics and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles”. Further information on this collaboration was included in a 2021 UN PoE report, which noted that North Korea and Iran had “resumed cooperation on long-range missile development projects”, with the report focusing in particular on the development of a space launch vehicle (SLV). This collaboration included the “transfer of critical parts” and 13 North Koreans were named who had travelled to Iran to support KOMID’s work. The report also noted the high level at which such engagement was signed off within Iran, naming senior SHIG and Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) officials, and noting that the current director of AIO was a “key player in negotiations” when he had been the SHIG director.</p> - -<h4 id="nuclear-technology-offerings">Nuclear Technology Offerings</h4> - -<p>Short of the transfer of a complete warhead – something that all experts interviewed for this paper suggested was highly unlikely – there is a range of other nuclear-related technologies that North Korea could transfer. For instance, Pyongyang could sell nuclear material or isotopes, with a range of options short of weapons-usable fissile material. However – beyond the transfer of dual-use technologies with applications relevant to the production of nuclear weapons – the transfer of nuclear-weapons-relevant technology, nuclear material and other relevant isotopes was judged relatively unlikely by experts interviewed for this paper, for a number of reasons outlined further below. Nevertheless, previous North Korean transfers of nuclear technology – including reactor technology, nuclear materials, and even weaponisation technology (see Box 2) – suggest that the possibility for future transfers exists.</p> - -<p>While US government assessments have suggested that North Korea likely has an arsenal of “up to 60 nuclear warheads”, there are significant gaps in public knowledge about the state of its programme and stockpile. Early attention to North Korea’s nuclear programme focused on the plutonium aspects of the fuel cycle and the 5-MW reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre. While it was suspected that North Korea may have uranium enrichment capabilities, the plutonium programme was, for a long time, the only publicly known North Korean nuclear weapons pathway. This changed in 2010, when a US delegation, including former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker, was shown a centrifuge facility at Yongbyon. There have been no further public reports of foreign access to North Korea’s nuclear facilities since.</p> - -<p>Uncertainty persists regarding other potential enrichment facilities, the numbers and types of centrifuges North Korea may be deploying, and many other details about its uranium and plutonium fuel cycles and weaponisation processes. The limited number of recently seized shipments of goods or materials destined for North Korea’s centrifuge programme or other parts of the country’s nuclear weapons programme also restricts public understanding of the programme and how its recent development may have shaped North Korean nuclear wares available for sale.</p> - -<p><em>Reactor and Enrichment Technology</em></p> - -<p>Although North Korea has shown a willingness to transfer reactor technology in the past – namely, in its provision of assistance and materials for the construction of the Al-Kibar reactor in Syria – it would be incredibly risky for North Korea and any potential customers to engage in a further reactor construction project. Any such project would be relatively easy for foreign intelligence agencies to detect using a variety of human, signals and technical means. Reactors are large construction projects that are visible in open source satellite imagery. Even if the reactor being constructed were relatively small (as in the case of Al-Kibar), and even if most of the necessary physical materials could be sourced overseas, the development of such a structure would almost certainly be noticed by various national intelligence agencies, the IAEA or even open source analysts using commercially available satellite imagery, drawing significant scrutiny. As in the Al-Kibar case, other intelligence sources – such as human and signals intelligence – would likely reveal any North Korean involvement.</p> - -<p>Centrifuge enrichment technology perhaps offers greater opportunities for export, as demonstrated by the AQ Khan network’s sale of centrifuges and related technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya in the 1990s and 2000s. The transfer of centrifuge capabilities could range from a small number of machines with associated expertise to a full turnkey centrifuge facility, and could be harder to detect than the construction of a reactor, given that facilities can be constructed covertly underground and that they lack the distinctive visual signatures of a nuclear reactor. However, the construction or expansion of such facilities in past instances has also been monitored using open source satellite imagery in the context of North Korea, Iran and other states. Disassembled shipping – consisting of many shipments of largely benign-looking industrial goods and materials (as seen in some of Khan’s transfers of enrichment technology to Libya) – could also make detection difficult. However, greater awareness of the risks posed by the transfer of centrifuge technology among customs and intelligence agencies following the Khan case, as well as the enhanced ability of NGOs to collect and monitor data on illicit trade activity, could mean that multiple connected shipments would be detected more readily.</p> - -<p>Limited knowledge of North Korea’s centrifuge technology makes it difficult to assess whether it has old surplus centrifuge models it may want to sell and/or whether it possesses newer technologies that are more appealing to customers. During his 2010 visit, Hecker observed a facility with around 2,000 machines that appeared to be based on the Pakistani P-2 centrifuge model, and fabricatedwith rotors made from “alloys containing iron” according to one North Koreanengineer – interpreted by Hecker to mean maraging steel. As some analysts have noted, that North Korea is still operating these P-2 type machines is “an assumption that should be treated with caution”. Indeed, a paper published by a North Korean scientist indicates at least some interest in more advanced models of centrifuges. Taking the Iranian nuclear programme as a point of comparison, Tehran has developed multiple generations and models of centrifuges in a similar time span. It would be reasonable to assume that North Korea could have made comparable progress. However, the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the motivations behind it are different from those of North Korea: Iran is more focused on publicly displaying its technical capabilities and trying to create leverage in the context of diplomacy over its nuclear programme, while North Korea is likely focusing on improving the efficiency of its centrifuge technology to expand its fissile material stocks and nuclear arsenal, with no public communication aspect – at least for the time being.</p> - -<p>Movement towards more advanced models would suggest that North Korea has developed domestic advanced centrifuge production capabilities and may indicate that there are fewer chokepoints for the sub-technologies required for production. Full centrifuges (whether more or less advanced) or constituent dual-use technologies (discussed further below) could both appeal to customers. However, the extreme secrecy surrounding this aspect of North Korea’s programme would make the practicalities of marketing and sharing this technology difficult and risky for North Korea, as the interdiction of shipments could provide significant insights into Pyongyang’s programme. Development of more advanced centrifuges could also create surpluses of older machines and spare parts – items that Khan’s network tried to provide to Iran and Libya, with mixed success.</p> - -<p><em>Intangible Nuclear Transfers</em></p> - -<p>Beyond the transfer of tangible enrichment or reprocessing technologies, North Korea may seek to capitalise on the export of intangibles – that is, expertise, skills and design information relevant to nuclear weapons development. Such an offering could certainly be useful for states looking to develop aspects of a nuclear fuel cycle or move towards a nuclear weapons capability. Transfer of intangibles could accompany tangible transfers, as was the case in Syria when North Korea deployed experts and transferred technology to construct the Al-Kibar reactor. It could also involve North Korea aiding other states in solving specific technical challenges, such as North Korean technicians’ support to Pakistan in producing krytrons in the 1990s (see Box 2).</p> - -<p>The value of the different aspects of North Korea’s nuclear knowledge will ultimately be decided by Pyongyang’s prospective customers/partners, but the most useful and unique offering is likely to be North Korea’s tacit knowledge – the things that cannot easily be codified and transferred, and only learned by doing. This could include the experience of producing fissile materials through reactor operation and reprocessing, running an enrichment plant, or experience related to nuclear weapons design, testing and weaponisation (an even rarer area of expertise outside the nuclear weapons states). This sphere of knowledge might be of particular interest to Iran, a state that has mastered enrichment technology and may have an interest in pursuing a weapons capability in the future.</p> - -<h4 id="dual-use-technologies">Dual-Use Technologies</h4> - -<p>Given that the level of monitoring of North Korea’s borders has risen, and the transfer of full missile systems or other large missile and nuclear-related technology has thus become riskier, North Korea is likely to look to export more innocuous dual-use technologies and materials – those that have both civilian and military applications. While North Korea likely relies on imports for a large proportion of the higher-end items for its WMD and military programmes (the so-called “chokepoint” technologies), as its programme has advanced, Pyongyang has undoubtedly indigenised the production of some dual-use components and materials, and may look to capitalise on these production abilities and any surpluses through onward sales. It may also look to act as a broker, leveraging its procurement networks around the world to source dual-use goods for customers, either for use directly by the customer or by North Korean technicians assisting in missile- and nuclear-related manufacturing and development projects.</p> - -<p>While the transfer of dual-use items from North Korea would still violate UN sanctions, such transfers would be more inconspicuous than the movement of large missile and nuclear technologies. North Korean-manufactured goods could be laundered within the extensive legitimate global trade in dual-use technologies and would, if uncovered, be less politically contentious than full systems. Russian or Chinese markets provide extensive laundering opportunities which could be capitalised on with minimal risk, as Moscow and Beijing have historically turned a blind eye to North Korean sanctions violations. Online platforms – such as the Chinese B2B site used to market North Korean lithium-6 in 2016 (see Box 2) – could provide opportunities for the anonymous sale of technology, obfuscating obvious links to North Korea.</p> - -<p>There is precedent for North Korean transfers of dual-use goods to countries that had previously purchased North Korean missile technology. For example, PoE reports note the interdiction in 2010 of a shipment of aluminium alloy rods, copper bars and brass discs to Syria, with the products likely originating in North Korea. A shipment of North Korean-origin graphite cylinders was also interdicted in 2013 en route to Syria. North Korea has also previously marketed its dual-use machine tools overseas. In 2013, the UN listed Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation – North Korea’s main machine tool producer – for its involvement in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes. As researchers noted in 2014, the company attended a trade fair in Dandong, China in 2013 and marketed machine tools in China and Russia under the names of “Millim Technology Company” and “Koryo Technologies” (or “KORTEC”), respectively.</p> - -<h3 id="ii-evolving-factors-influencing-supply-and-demand">II. Evolving Factors Influencing Supply and Demand</h3> - -<p>While technological developments in North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes help dictate what may be available for sale, a range of political, economic and security factors also play an important role in influencing both demand for – and North Korean willingness to supply – these technologies. This chapter explores in more detail what is likely to motivate and restrict both North Korea and its potential customers when it comes to engaging in missile and nuclear technology transfers. While the need to generate revenue remains a strong motivator for Pyongyang, demand for its wares has been progressively waning. This decline is the result of several factors, namely, changing technological needs and greater supplier choice among Pyongyang’s customers, as well as concerns over the quality of North Korean goods and the risk of interdiction. The chapter also maps out the changing sanctions context, and how Russia’s arms purchases from North Korea could undermine the sanctions regime and risk a resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.</p> - -<h4 id="continued-need-for-revenue-generation">Continued Need for Revenue Generation</h4> - -<p>As in the past, revenue generation remains a key incentive for North Korean missile technology transfers. North Korea’s economic troubles long predate the UN sanctions regime, with the country repeatedly defaulting on debt repayments from the 1970s onwards. The imposition from 2006 of increasingly expansive UNSC sanctions on the country’s economy exacerbated existing economic challenges, while more recent sectoral sanctions introduced in 2016 and 2017, and the border closures stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic, have put North Korea in an especially precarious economic situation. States are prohibited from virtually all economic engagement with the country, leaving it cash-strapped and desperate to seek out and exploit economic opportunities.</p> - -<p>Precisely how much revenue North Korea has generated, or may be able to generate, through the sale of missiles or nuclear technology is challenging to ascertain. Public reporting on individual North Korean missile and nuclear transfers is extremely limited and very rarely includes data on the value of transactions. Furthermore, reported figures may not include estimates for the transfer of expertise, manufacturing facilities, or maintenance and support services. Some of the available figures unsurprisingly suggest that military transfers offer North Korea lucrative opportunities for revenue generation, with estimates – which are based on sources that are either unclear, dated and/or difficult to verify – citing figures in the hundreds of millions of US dollars.</p> - -<p>Some examples provide insights into the revenue raised from individual transfers,transactions or weapons systems. While comparing the prices offered for ballistic missile systems is extremely challenging, a review of the prices of North Korean conventional weapons offerings supports the hypothesis that North Korean systems are generally cheaper than the alternatives. The prices offered in the 2020 documentary The Mole, and to British arms dealer Michael Ranger in a deal around a decade ago, suggest that North Korean arms are often offered at a price below the market rate of equivalent systems. This has historically made North Korean arms appealing to customers, particularly in the developing world.</p> - -<p>The Mole saw marketing materials – including a price list for North Korean weapons systems – handed to an actor playing the role of an investor during a 2017 trip to Pyongyang. The price list included a cost breakdown for missiles with different types of warheads, launchers and associated handling vehicles. Missiles and vehicles were priced per unit and in quantities of five, three or two units. For example, Scud C missiles with high explosive warheads were offered for $2.795 million per unit, but sold in lots of five for $13.975 million, whereas Nodong missiles (termed Scud E for extended range) were offered for $4.94 million per unit and $24.7 million for five. While they are impossible to verify, such values are not outlandish compared to figures seen elsewhere. Sale of components and parts can also be lucrative: the PoE noted in 2015 and 2016 that a KOMID official based in Syria (with the rank of major general) shipped ball bearings and fibre optic cables, and brought in three North Korean technicians, earning over €100,000.</p> - -<p>North Korea could potentially leverage more sensitive nuclear transfers for extensive profits far above the market rate, especially in situations where the customer has no alternatives. Illicit procurement networks often see intermediaries monetise the risk by charging a premium, and North Korea could do this through selling goods it has either produced or procured, as part of a package for customers. Analysis of the cost of the UF 6 sold to Libya through the Khan network in the early 2000s suggests that the three cylinders of 1.7 tonnes were sold for $2 million, the equivalent of 40 times the then market rate. Similarly, transfer of North Korea’s more advanced missile systems (or, more likely, related technology) such as its IRBM, ICBM or newer hypersonic technologies may offer particularly lucrative opportunities for revenue generation. However, as mentioned, Pyongyang may be reluctant to transfer some of these higher-end technologies to avoid betraying the details of its advanced systems and production capabilities to adversaries.</p> - -<p>Despite the high risk, larger projects such as the construction of facilities could also garner significant sums. While of unclear veracity, media reporting from 2009 citing an Iranian defector and Israeli intelligence claimed that Iran financed Syria’s purchase of the Al-Kibar reactor from North Korea, paying Pyongyang between $1 billion and $2 billion for the project. The Khan network – and especially Khan’s Libya deal – saw the transfer of a 10,000-centrifuge plant for between $100 million and $200 million.</p> - -<p>North Korean arms sales have also been heavily shaped by the financial incentives of North Korean arms trading company representatives – essentially, the salespeople – working overseas. These representatives are often accredited as diplomats, work out of embassies, and are entrepreneurial in building relationships and exploiting opportunities. Indeed, they are compelled to be entrepreneurial: North Korea’s overseas missions, including embassies, are believed to be self-funding, tasked with raising funds to sustain themselves and the regime back in Pyongyang. While the financial driver at this working level may manifest itself through arms sales, decisions to sell missiles and nuclear technology are likely far more sensitive, and almost certainly are taken in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, North Korean operatives abroad are likely to be under pressure to identify revenue-generating opportunities to decision-makers in Pyongyang, which may include potential deals for the transfer of missile or even nuclear technology.</p> - -<p>There is also potential for North Korea to engage in barter trade as it has in the past, exchanging missile and nuclear technology, expertise and materials for other goods. Experts interviewed for this paper pointed to oil, grains and fertiliser as goods that North Korea may be especially interested in procuring in a barter arrangement. In the 2000s, the Myanmar government “gifted” rice to North Korea in exchange for “technical services and equipment”, which reportedly included conventional weapons. Recent reports have suggested that Moscow may offer Pyongyang food in exchange for munitions. Such barter arrangements allow North Korea to receive payment without needing to access the international financial system, while also accessing goods it is prohibited from (or may struggle in) procuring freely as a result of sanctions.</p> - -<p>Transfers of the full missile and nuclear systems that are likely to prove most lucrative to North Korea have become riskier and more challenging due to increased global awareness of UNSC sanctions on North Korea, improved interdiction capabilities and expanded open source scrutiny of the country’s trade activities. This led some of the experts interviewed to ask whether Pyongyang would continue to pursue missile and nuclear transfers, or shift to less risky and easier to move commodities for revenue generation. North Korea’s increasing exploitation of cryptocurrency is one example of an alternative yet highly lucrative revenue-generation line, with cryptocurrency hacks allegedly generating $1.7 billion for North Korea in 2022.</p> - -<p>Sales of more innocuous but still sanctioned goods and services – such as textiles or the export of construction labour and IT services – are also less risky sources of revenue. For instance, coal has historically been a major source of revenue for North Korea and has been directly linked to the financing of the country’s missile and nuclear programmes, although it may be seen by the broader international community as being less politically sensitive than trade in missile, nuclear or other military technology. However, North Korea’s desperate economic situation may mean that it does not have the luxury of choosing between revenue streams, and may instead require it to pursue all means available to raise funds.</p> - -<h4 id="opportunities-for-technology-barter">Opportunities for Technology Barter</h4> - -<p>One form of barter trade which may be particularly attractive to North Korea is the exchange of its missile- or nuclear-related expertise and capabilities for that of other states, or engagement in collaborative missile and nuclear technology development. As mentioned earlier, striking deals which benefit North Korea technologically has long been at the core of the country’s proliferation deal-making. As Pollack has noted in his work on North Korea’s nuclear trade:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>While the evidence is ambiguous, a careful examination suggests that many past transfers were actually done not for profit but in exchange for components or materials that benefited Pyongyang’s own nuclear program.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Of the three nuclear cases that Pollack examines (see the first three listed in Box 2), he noted that each potentially had a barter aspect to them. However, evidence is admittedly thin in places. For example, assisting Pakistan’s krytron development came after the transfer of centrifuge components, drawings and plans to North Korea; transfers of UF6 into the Khan network may have been repayment for Khan’s assistance to North Korea in producing it; and North Korea could potentially have benefited from plutonium produced in the Al-Kibar reactor.</p> - -<p>As Pyongyang continues to develop its missile and nuclear programmes, exchanging complementary expertise or working on new advances in collaboration with partners will remain an attractive option, albeit one that likely has less necessity and more limited returns than in the past, given North Korea’s own recent technological successes in its nuclear and missile programmes. Priority areas for North Korea’s missile development – and for potential collaboration opportunities – are likely to include items outlined in the five-year plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021. These include improvements in missile accuracy up to a range of 15,000 km, improvements in solid fuel propulsion for submarine-launched and ground-based ICBMs, military reconnaissance satellites, and R&amp;D in hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered submarines and UAVs.</p> - -<p>Given North Korea’s technological successes and the sanctions regime, there is now a smaller range of countries that could both offer technology the country could benefit from and, importantly, be willing to offer such technology in exchange for North Korean wares. An obvious candidate would be Iran, as it has made great leaps in its centrifuge and missile programmes over the past decade. One expert interviewed for the project also suggested that there may be room for cooperation between Iran and North Korea on hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia could be another candidate. Further North Korean arms transfers to Russia (potentially including ballistic missiles) could allow North Korea to request technology from Russia’s extensive WMD and other high-technology programmes – such as its space launch or submarine programmes – in return. Moscow’s willingness to provide such technologies, given its historical commitments to non-proliferation and its potential security concerns vis-à-vis a North Korea with more advanced missile and nuclear capabilities, are not a given, but recent engagement seems to suggest a potential willingness to cooperate (see Box 3).</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-3-war-in-ukraine-and-the-growing-north-korearussia-technology-transfer-axis"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 3: War in Ukraine and the Growing North Korea–Russia Technology Transfer Axis</code></h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Recent developments in North Korea’s relationship with Russia are concerning for the future of both non-proliferation efforts and the UN sanctions regime. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created a need for weaponry and materiel, as well as renewed efforts by an increasingly isolated Moscow to garner political support from a smaller range of allies and partners. Initial arms transfers of “infantry rockets and missiles” were allegedly made between North Korea and the Wagner Group in November 2022. More recently, research has suggested that hundreds of containers of weaponry – likely ammunition – have been transferred from North Korea to Russian military bases, while South Korean intelligence reported indications of North Korean ballistic missile transfers to Russia in early November 2023.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The potential for exchange of more advanced and strategically important technology is clear. In July 2023, Russian Defence Minister Shoigu was shown around an arms fair in Pyongyang by Kim Jong-un, where he viewed ICBMs, SRBMs, hypersonic missiles and UAVs. During Kim’s trip to Russia to meet Putin in September 2023, the Russian leader hosted his North Korean counterpart at Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome and noted North Korea’s interest in rocket and space technology. Media reports surrounding the meeting also suggested North Korea was interested in “advanced technology for satellites and nuclear-powered submarines”. Further details are yet to emerge. However, advances in missile technologies – including items identified in Pyongyang’s 2021 plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems – are also likely to be on North Korea’s wishlist for Moscow.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">With these breaches of the arms embargo and possible movement towards breaches on the prohibition on transfers of other technologies, the future of the UN sanctions regime – which in some senses has been on life support for several years – is precarious. In September 2023, around the time of Kim’s visit, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov noted that sanctions were “adopted in a completely different geopolitical situation” and accused Western states of “lies” over humanitarian support. If Russia, a UNSC permanent member, so blatantly violates sanctions and is seen to use North Korean arms or missile systems in Ukraine, it may lead other states to look to North Korea for arms, and could potentially open the floodgates for further North Korean arms and missile sales.</code></em></p> - -<h4 id="ideological-and-foreign-policy-considerations">Ideological and Foreign Policy Considerations</h4> - -<p>In the past, North Korea’s sales opportunities have been influenced – in part – by its broader foreign policy relationships and objectives, and vice versa. Pyongyang’s arms exports began during the Cold War, expanding significantly through the 1970s and 1980s, as North Korea built its military–industrial complex. Through its Cold War military sales, the country sought to demonstrate its commitment to the socialist cause, strengthen the capabilities of fellow members of the socialist bloc, and gain favour with Moscow and Beijing. Even during the Cold War, however, ideology was not the sole driver of North Korea’s military transfers, with the export of military technology and expertise being part of its broader efforts to consolidate relationships with developing countries around the world and compete with Seoul for influence.</p> - -<p>Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has continued to do business and conclude cooperation agreements in a range of fields with a variety of countries, with no indication of any discrimination on ideological grounds or links to any known direct North Korean security interests. Unlike Iran, which has been known to transfer missiles to its proxies across the Middle East, North Korea does not have similar relationships with proxies on whom it might rely to achieve certain security objectives, and thus be incentivised to transfer capabilities to.</p> - -<p>Recent geopolitical developments may create greater opportunities for North Korea to strengthen political ties through technology transfer. Russian arms purchases from, and growing engagement with, North Korea creates political benefits for Pyongyang. While new UN sanctions resolutions have been an unlikely prospect in recent years, with no agreement even on new entities to be added to the UN sanctions list, the relationship with Russia helps to bring North Korea out of its sanctions isolation. The apparent degradation of the international sanctions regime could also see a resurgence in what Berger describes as “reluctant” customers, as well as “ad hoc” ones. This could make other potential customers view relationships with North Korea involving arms transfers as acceptable, and could even give North Korea new opportunities to pursue such relationships alongside (and in support of) Russian activities in Africa, for example.</p> - -<p>In short, these recent developments mean that North Korea has more to play for in pursuing its international relationships and in using technology to that end. However, there is no indication that ideological sympathies or diplomatic priorities are going to be the only or even the primary driver of North Korean sales of military technology abroad – including missile and nuclear technology. Rather, these considerations will serve as a facilitator for, and an additional benefit from, Pyongyang’s illicit trade, which will still likely be driven by opportunism and the need for revenue generation.</p> - -<h4 id="sanctions-transfer-environment-and-risks-of-interdiction">Sanctions, Transfer Environment and Risks of Interdiction</h4> - -<p>The risk of interdiction, sanctions and other punitive measures is a major disincentivising factor for most countries when it comes to engaging in missile, nuclear and most other trade with North Korea. As such, North Korea’s biggest customers for arms and missile technologies today largely fall within what Berger describes as the “resilient” group. These are customers that continue to engage in business with Pyongyang despite UNSC sanctions, driven by longstanding political and military ties or else similarly under international arms embargoes or otherwise isolated. Iran, Syria and potentially Myanmar (see Box 4) clearly fit this profile, as countries that have little to lose politically by engaging with North Korea, have historical ties with Pyongyang (including in the sphere of military cooperation), and which are themselves isolated and limited in their weapons procurement options. The benefit (or necessity) of doing business with North Korea outweighs the risk of further sanctions or other reprimands for these countries from the US, the UN or others, as their economies are already subject to sanctions. However, the actual demand for North Korean longer-range missile and/or nuclear technology from these countries is likely to be tempered by some of the other factors outlined in this paper – including absence of need for these more strategic technologies, perceived unreliability of North Korea as a supplier, and the availability of similar options from other isolated suppliers.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-4-myanmar-a-relationship-renewed"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 4: Myanmar: A Relationship Renewed?</code></h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Myanmar is believed to have previously purchased ballistic missile technology from North Korea alongside a more extensive variety of other conventional weapons technology. However, the specifics of the transfers are opaque. In 2012, the US government noted that Myanmar had been a customer of North Korea’s missile programme, while a leaked Myanmar government report suggested that Burmese military representatives had visited a missile factory in North Korea capable of producing Scuds and likely Nodong missiles in 2008, alongside a range of other facilities in the country. A more recent, unconfirmed report notes that 20 North Korean missile technicians were in Myanmar until 2015, and – citing independent researchers based in the country – that missile cooperation has restarted between the two countries in the wake of the 2021 military coup.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Myanmar’s military regime has also been accused of nuclear weapons aspirations in the past, notably around 2010, centred around allegations by a defector who worked in Myanmar’s strategic industries – but these were largely discounted. Experts interviewed for this paper expressed scepticism that Myanmar would be interested in a nuclear weapons capability, noting the country’s pressing economic and internal security challenges. Past reports that Myanmar was interested in building a nuclear weapon have also been rejected by members of the US intelligence community and other experts. The fact that the Myanmar military’s primary concern is domestic armed insurgency also raises questions over the utility of procuring advanced missile capabilities or nuclear weapons technology from North Korea, although such capabilities could help the regime feel more secure against external invasion.</code></em></p> - -<p>Moving large physical shipments to and from North Korea covertly (see Box 5) has become markedly more difficult amid an improved understanding of common sanctions-evasion practices, and in light of the ability of governments and non-governmental organisations over the past decade to scrutinise North Korea’s airports, ports and border crossings using satellite imagery, trade and corporate data, and other investigative resources. The border closures caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (see Box 6) and resultant reductions in trade have also made recent movements of goods easier to detect. Increased monitoring and the potential for interdiction has therefore raised the risks of undertaking transfers of missile and nuclear goods, as well as deploying North Korean technicians, from North Korea itself. In contexts where interdiction was not possible previously, ships believed to be carrying suspicious cargo for Pyongyang have been pursued by naval vessels and forced to return to North Korea.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-5-evolving-means-of-transfer"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 5: Evolving Means of Transfer</code></h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Historically, transfers of North Korean missiles were undertaken by state-connected air freight and shipping fleets. In large part, a shift away from the more obvious state-connected modes of transport towards commercial shipping has been observed since the mid-2000s. A 2021 PoE report, however, notes that state-owned shipping companies have continued to play a role. According to one unnamed UN member state, KOMID – which has been called North Korea’s “primary arms dealer” and main exporter of missile technology – has reportedly cooperated with Iran’s SHIG on shipment logistics, engaging in “shipments to Iran, using vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and routinely operating non-stop voyages from one third country ports to Iran”.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Geography also determines the easiest shipment routes, with rail connections across the border between North Korea and Russia allegedly being used to move weapons to the Wagner Group in November 2022. Russia and China’s evolving stance on North Korean sanctions could make North Korea’s land borders important vectors for proliferation-sensitive exports. However, more recent arms transfers between North Korea and Russia seem to have involved initial shipments from the former to a Russian submarine base using Russian-flagged and military-connected cargo ships running a “shuttle” service with their automatic identification system (AIS) transponders turned off to avoid detection.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The challenging logistical environment will likely see North Korean proliferation networks continue to adapt. Pyongyang may seek to fulfil more of its contracts entirely outside its borders, establishing manufacturing facilities in client states – as it previously had in Namibia to produce conventional weapons, for example – or in third countries, and relying increasingly on the extensive procurement networks it has established, notably in China but also around the world, to source the necessary components and materials. There may also be fewer interdiction risks if North Korean exports continue to shift towards projects that combine tangible and intangible support. In these arrangements – as seen in missile relationships with Iran and Syria, and the Al-Kibar reactor project – North Korean operatives can procure goods for projects largely outside of North Korea, and exports from North Korea can be limited to specific goods and technicians.</code></em></p> - -<p>The constraint that the sanctions environment is currently imposing on North Korea is contingent to a significant degree on Russia and China’s future actions, with the evolution of North Korea’s growing relationship with Russia being pivotal. However, several interviewed experts noted that China’s willingness to turn a blind eye to North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation is not likely to be unlimited, especially in cases where developments affect China’s national security interests. Beijing is a signatory to a range of non-proliferation agreements and has its own security interests that may be undermined by North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology transfers. For example, China’s clear interest in avoiding instability on the Korean peninsula, and particularly any proliferation actions by North Korea that might elicit a response from the US and its allies, could potentially lead Beijing to exert pressure on Pyongyang to prevent it from engaging in such transfers. However, the degree of influence that Beijing has over Pyongyang’s onward proliferation decision-making calculus is likely limited. Some analysts have argued that China’s interest in maintaining stability in Pyongyang actually makes Beijing reticent about applying political or economic pressure, unless the risks of inaction outweigh the costs (for example, in the instance of potential North Korean nuclear warhead or fissile material transfers). Ultimately, the degree of direct coordination between Beijing and Pyongyang on sensitive matters such as missile and nuclear transfers – which would likely take place at the highest levels – is very difficult to ascertain.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-6-the-covid-19-pandemic"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 6: The Covid-19 Pandemic</code></h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea shut its borders to all passenger and commercial traffic at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. Satellite imagery in March 2020 showed North Korean ships being recalled to the country’s ports, while land crossings with China and Russia were closed and border fences, guard posts and patrol roads were reinforced and expanded. North Korea also stopped the rotation of diplomats from its missions abroad – as it likely also did with its missile and arms technicians and procurement operatives based overseas. The country, relatively isolated in normal times, closed itself off almost entirely from the rest of the world. In the second half of 2023, though, there were signs that the borders were starting to open up again. Movement through ports and land crossings increased, restrictions on some official travel eased in spring, and North Korean nationals abroad (including some workers) were allowed to return as of August 2023, with limited commercial flights restarting that same month.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is difficult to definitively assess the impact of these restrictions on North Korea’s procurement efforts and the onward transfer of missile and nuclear technology from the country. It is reasonable to assume that transfers slowed significantly between early 2020 and 2023. Several experts interviewed for this paper pointed to the pandemic restrictions as a reason why they were sceptical that North Korea was actively exporting missile and nuclear technology. However, North Korean technicians based overseas were also likely stuck abroad in customer states and unable to return home. As the country begins to open its borders and resume trade, missile and nuclear technology transfers may become more likely – particularly given recent North Korean efforts to exhibit its wares, and amid the further disintegration of the UN sanctions consensus. The restrictions on trade and travel since 2020 have also further exacerbated the economic situation within North Korea, creating further pressure to generate revenue or source critical supplies like food from abroad, which may further incentivise the sale of missile and/or nuclear technology.</code></em></p> - -<h4 id="security-concerns-over-advanced-deterrent-capabilities">Security Concerns Over Advanced Deterrent Capabilities</h4> - -<p>Security concerns, paired with the challenging transfer environment, will likely make North Korea carefully consider the transfer of certain particularly strategically important systems and technologies. These sensitivities are likely to stem from the risk that transferred technologies or information surrounding them may fall into enemy hands, with negative impacts for North Korea’s own nuclear deterrent. For example, North Korea’s adversaries could gain valuable information about North Korean capabilities from seized shipments of nuclear or missile technologies, related goods and materials, or even wreckage recovered from the battlefield. Intelligence can be derived from seized technologies, providing insights into manufacturing, supply chains and capabilities.</p> - -<p>Examination of interdicted missiles, or wreckage recovered after their use, may yield insights into North Korea’s manufacturing capabilities or the specific types of technology that it is importing to develop its programmes. This could allow North Korea’s adversaries to better counter the country’s illicit supply chains. Nuclear forensic techniques could provide insights into North Korea’s fuel cycle if North Korean fissile material or contaminated goods were seized in transit. Intelligence gained through examination of seized or recovered goods can also be used to construct countermeasures. This is a particular concern with regard to more modern ballistic missiles that might yield insights to inform developments in missile defence capabilities and arrangements by the US or its partners such as South Korea and Japan. The transfer of certain newer systems unique to North Korea would also reduce the prospect of potential plausible deniability of Pyongyang’s involvement in the transfer.</p> - -<p>If North Korea is concerned about undermining its own security through transfers, this would lead to the development of two categories of systems. The first includes items that are core to North Korea’s security, and which would not be transferred: interviewees referred to these as the “crown jewels” or “top state secrets core to North Korea’s survivability”. This would include nuclear warheads and fissile material – which would be unlikely to be transferred for several reasons – as well as ICBMs and other missiles core to North Korea’s deterrent. The second category would include lower-level and older technology, which North Korea would be less concerned about transferring.</p> - -<p>Chapter I explored some of the surplus technologies that may fall into this second category and discussed several reasons why North Korea may not be willing to transfer all of its older systems. A few further considerations may also follow from this security thesis. Reluctance to export newer systems and reveal information could lead to the development of export variants for the new SRBMs. However, this would require significant upfront investment from Pyongyang or its customers, which would be challenging in an environment with limited cash flow – which is exactly the situation in which North Korea and many of its historical and potential customers find themselves. It is also possible that if the design information of certain systems is compromised (for example, after wreckage is recovered after a test, or following a hack of the manufacturers), the security rationales against wider transfer for that particular system may be undermined, if concerns about the compromise of strategically important information on certain North Korean capabilities is indeed a consideration.</p> - -<h4 id="changing-technologies-and-markets">Changing Technologies and Markets</h4> - -<p>Technological developments may also restrict demand for North Korea’s missile offerings. Chapter I outlined the remaining (but shrinking) market for the Scud-and Tochka-like technologies that North Korea may have in surplus. Indeed, due to its extensive history of Scud exports and – in some cases – related manufacturing capabilities, North Korea may have reduced its appeal as a supplier to some customers that managed to absorb the technology. However, in the present day, North Korea’s missile sales also have to compete with newer technologies and suppliers.</p> - -<p>For instance, militaries’ growing demand for UAVs is well documented. UAVs may be seen as a less expensive and more operationally appropriate system by some countries that would have previously sought short-range missiles. While UAV and SRBM capabilities differ significantly, including in their utility, the former may be well-suited – if not more desirable – for states without an active missile programme and in need of low-yield but high-precision capabilities to carry out limited and precise attacks in neighbouring countries or against factions on their own territories. UAVs are cheaper, more versatile, and easier to produce and transfer than ballistic missiles.</p> - -<p>North Korea has shown some advances in its UAV programme, with drones penetrating South Korean airspace in recent years, and two large novel UAV systems shown to Shoigu in Pyongyang in July 2023. However, Iran’s capabilities for producing and exporting these systems are more advanced: Iran has well-established UAV capabilities and has exported drones to partners in the region and further afield. Critically, Iranian UAVs have now been extensively battle-tested – not only by Iranian proxies in the Middle East but also on a large scale by Russian forces in Ukraine. As such, past customers of North Korean SRBMs may now look to Iran as a UAV supplier instead. As Pollack noted, the 1991 Gulf War helped to shape missile markets, reducing interest in North Korean products as cruise missiles played a prominent role. Russia’s war on Ukraine could also affect potential North Korean missile markets, although extensive UAV and missile use makes it difficult to establish possible lessons at this stage.</p> - -<p>Iran is also an established proliferator of missile technology, having exported missiles to proxies and partners in the Middle East. With the expiry of the UNSC embargo on nuclear-capable missiles and related technology trade with Iran in October 2023, Iran may seek to expand its customer base and thus pose competition for North Korea in securing new customers for its missile technology (although such trade with Iran is still sanctioned by the US, Europe and others).</p> - -<h4 id="claims-to-nuclear-responsibility">Claims to Nuclear Responsibility</h4> - -<p>A final restraining factor – albeit one with unclear salience – consists of the non-proliferation norms that emerged after 1945, and North Korea’s notion of nuclear responsibility. The UN sanctions regime imposed on North Korea was, in some sense, an embodiment of these norms. Since acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, North Korea has repeatedly referred to itself as a “responsible nuclear power”, including in the context of onward nuclear proliferation. These are likely efforts by Pyongyang to normalise itself as a legitimate nuclear power outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – akin to the status enjoyed by Pakistan and India.</p> - -<p>In an October 2006 statement, just days after North Korea’s first nuclear test and the subsequent UNSC resolution condemning it, North Korea’s foreign minister referred to the country as a “responsible nuclear weapons state [that] will never use nukes first and will not allow nuclear transfer”. These claims have most recently been codified in the September 2022 Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces (Section 10):</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, shall neither deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of other countries nor share them and not transfer nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned and weapon-grade nuclear substances.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Of course, the earnestness of these claims is unclear. By virtue of developing a nuclear weapons programme outside the recognised international non-proliferation framework – namely, the NPT – North Korea has already demonstrated its disregard for nuclear non-proliferation norms. Several experts interviewed for this paper also noted that North Korea has not offered any definition of what it means by “responsibility” in the nuclear non-proliferation context. However, the excerpt from the 2022 law could arguably be taken as a definition of what Pyongyang considers to be “responsible” behaviour by a nuclear power. Whether Pyongyang’s commitments can be taken at face value is debatable, but its past proliferation of nuclear technology after the 2006 statement should raise serious doubts. There is less of an international consensus regarding missile non-proliferation. North Korea has tended to deny allegations rather than make claims about responsibility when it comes to the transfer of missile systems.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h3> - -<p>With a growing technological offering and a persistent need to generate hard currency, North Korea still has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers. It now has a wider range of more advanced missile and nuclear technologies than ever before, some of which may be available for sale to interested buyers. Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses available for transfer, particularly Scud, Tochka and Nodong missiles, or even surplus or second-hand nuclear and dual-use technologies.</p> - -<p>Despite these clear supply-side drivers, though, a range of factors work to constrain North Korea’s sales – particularly on the demand side of the equation – and these are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. The potential markets and customers for North Korean missile technology have been whittled down by a variety of factors, including North Korea’s assistance to customers in indigenising the technology it has sold, the emergence of competitors such as Iran, and the development of newer and more appealing technologies – namely, UAVs, but potentially also other suppliers and systems in future. The sanctions landscape and the unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula also reduce sales opportunities and increase the risks of interdiction. Given Pyongyang’s recent technological advances, there may also now be only marginal returns on North Korean efforts to obtain technology for its own programmes through barter.</p> - -<p>Concerns about putting its own deterrent at risk are also likely to temper North Korea’s willingness to export more advanced capabilities, despite the potentially lucrative price tag that could be attached to them. Offering these systems for sale is far riskier than peddling the Scud or even the Nodong systems that were based on well-understood and frugal 1960s Soviet missile technology. Insights gained from interdicted systems or those recovered from the battlefield after leaving North Korean control could do harm to North Korea’s national security. The export of such systems would increase the chances of them falling into adversaries’ hands, despite minimal recent large interdictions of North Korean military shipments.</p> - -<p>In a continuation of some of the trends observed by Joshua Pollack in his work over a decade ago, the limited potential customer base, as well as a more challenging transfer environment, suggests that North Korea is most likely to continue engaging with established missile customers – those that Andrea Berger termed “resilient”, such as Iran or Syria. Future transfers are likely to involve dual-use components or intangible transfers of expertise rather than complete systems – because of limited demand and due to the greater chances of the latter being interdicted. North Korea’s extensive procurement networks outside its borders may also allow it to procure technology from third countries to transfer to customers, meaning that fewer direct shipments would be required. The ubiquity of largely anonymous online platforms may also help to identify potential customers and facilitate the sale of dual-use technology, despite the extensive international sanctions regime.</p> - -<p>At the same time, the changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine may bring new opportunities for North Korea. On the one hand, Pyongyang may benefit financially and technologically from technological exchanges with Russia. On the other, Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea and Moscow’s ability to veto further UNSC sanctions against Pyongyang or any of its future customers may give other countries the green light to accept North Korean missile and maybe even nuclear technology. The cover provided by Russia’s – and, to a less public extent, China’s – patronship of Pyongyang could lead to a significant change in North Korea’s fortunes as a supplier. Although only time will tell how the relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow develops, there remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UN sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.</p> - -<p>Building on the above analysis – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations, organised into two sets, to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. The first set concerns efforts to deter and dissuade Pyongyang from engaging in onward proliferation – that is, they address the supply side of the equation. The second set addresses the demand side, suggesting ways to reduce North Korea’s customer base. The recommendations call for an approach that relies both on diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang and on harder measures that signal a willingness to disrupt and punish violations of sanctions and international non-proliferation norms.</p> - -<h4 id="recommendations-for-addressing-supply-side-factors">Recommendations for Addressing Supply-Side Factors</h4> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 1: Clearly message and demonstrate commitments to interdict, learn from and exploit North Korean missile and nuclear transfers.</strong> A concern that North Korea is likely to have over the transfer of its missile and nuclear technology – particularly more advanced or strategically significant systems – is the potential for that technology to fall into the hands of Pyongyang’s adversaries. This concern should be validated and leveraged. The US, the UK and their partners need to continue prioritising efforts at interdicting North Korean shipments of weapons technology, as per their UNSC obligations – either in transit or at their destination (for instance, in Ukraine, should Russia procure and use North Korean missiles in the future). They must also make clear that the technology will be inspected, shared with North Korea’s adversaries and used to help develop effective countermeasures, including missile defence. Outreach should also continue to be conducted on the relevant UNSC resolutions and through informal networks such as the signatory states to the Proliferation Security Initiative “Statement of Interdiction Principles”.</p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 2: Bolster intelligence efforts, engage with allies and support open source researchers as force multipliers.</strong> Further bolstering intelligence collection to target potential North Korean procurement and export networks can help strengthen countermeasures across the board. The US, the UK, and Western and Asia-Pacific allies should ensure that the necessary processes are in place to allow for intelligence-sharing and collaboration in this sphere. They should ensure that new means to monitor potential intangible transfers (especially the movement of people such as technicians and engineers) are developed. This also includes greater exploitation of open source intelligence to further investigate North Korea’s relationships and monitor the internet for potential North Korean marketing of dual-use technologies on B2B websites. The lithium-6 and machine tool examples discussed above, as well as North Korea’s recent arms transfers to Russia, are all export or marketing activities that were uncovered by non-government researchers using open sources. Open source exploitation by non-governmental organisations can be a force multiplier when the intelligence community’s resources are stretched.</p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 3: Strengthen counter-proliferation-financing efforts to weaken the revenue-generating potential of North Korean missile and nuclear transfers.</strong> Revenue generation is likely to be North Korea’s key driver for engaging in onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology. Continuing to invest in efforts to prevent Pyongyang from receiving or moving funds can help weaken that incentive. While North Korea may receive some payment by way of barter trade (not involving the formal financial system), targeting financial flows can impact how lucrative Pyongyang believes its proliferation activities to be. This should include continued awareness-raising of international and multilateral sanctions on North Korea, of standards and best practices for countering proliferation financing (CPF), and of common sanctions-evasion methods. National governments and international organisations engaged on CPF issues should prioritise sharing best practices and resources – for instance, model CPF legislation or lists of entities suspected of supporting North Korean proliferation financing (even if these are not sanctioned). While there have so far not been any known cases of North Korea using cryptocurrency as payment for proliferation-related transactions, Pyongyang is clearly transitioning its activities to the online space and has engaged extensively in crypto theft for revenue generation. Ensuring that CPF efforts keep up with these adaptations will be critical.</p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 4: Include non-proliferation commitments in any nuclear negotiations with North Korea.</strong> Any future negotiations with North Korea on its nuclear programme should include commitments to international non-proliferation and nuclear security standards. Including an explicit commitment from North Korea to not transfer nuclear technology to other states – particularly with reference to the 2022 law on its policy on nuclear forces and clarifying North Korea’s definition of nuclear “responsibility” – as part of future negotiations could help positively reinforce any existing tendencies in Pyongyang to present itself as a responsible nuclear custodian. Such an approach, however, would require some level of recognition (even if tacit) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability – a proposition that is the subject of much debate within the expert community.</p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 5: Engage with China on preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation, including by highlighting implications for Chinese interests and security.</strong> China has been a key facilitator for North Korean sanctions-evasion activity and likely has at least some, albeit limited, influence on Pyongyang’s decision-making in relation to onward proliferation. Engaging with China on the issue may therefore yield some benefit, especially if Beijing can be convinced to curtail Pyongyang’s access to transhipment routes, as well as financial and corporate infrastructure. To be sure, the likelihood of this approach’s success is dubious, as Chinese interests and security concerns diverge significantly from those of the US, Europe and other East Asian countries concerned with North Korean proliferation. In fact, creating instability in certain parts of East Asia might be in China’s interest if such instability were to absorb US resources and attention. There may be potential to incentivise Chinese cooperation, including through appeals to Beijing’s desire to be seen as a responsible nuclear power, as well as through continued identification and sanctioning of Chinese entities involved in supporting North Korean sanctions evasion. Taking a transactional approach may be another possibility – linking US openness to addressing issues of Chinese concern with Chinese willingness to prevent – or at least not support – North Korean onward proliferation activity. However, the currently limited state of dialogue between the US and China, as well as other issues such as the tension over semiconductor export controls and the issue of Taiwan, will make having an impact in this regard challenging.</p> - -<h4 id="recommendations-for-addressing-demand-side-factors">Recommendations for Addressing Demand-Side Factors</h4> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 6: Double down on counter-proliferation messaging and support.</strong> If indications emerge that North Korea’s onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology is starting to ramp up again, the US and its partners should consider making a clear statement that buyers of North Korean arms, missiles or nuclear technology will be heavily punished with sanctions and other tools. This messaging should, among other things, make clear that states purchasing North Korean technology will be cut off from Western technology across the board, and that they will be made subject to unilateral sanctions and other measures. Messaging should also continue to include the broader implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea. A tailored approach should acknowledge that some states may not perceive engagement with North Korea as problematic – despite international prohibitions to this end – and may actually be sympathetic to supporting the growing camp of anti-Western countries, or may be ambivalent about condemning or countering the behaviour of these anti-Western countries. As such, providing incentives to these countries to comply with their international obligations – whether through appealing to their standing as responsible members of the international community or by offering economic or other support – may be necessary. A combined “carrot and stick” approach is likely to be most effective.</p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 7: Consider offering alternatives to North Korean missile technology.</strong> Following Recommendation 6, the US and its partners should consider offering alternative technologies or other incentives to potential customers when possible. Some states that seek to source missile capabilities from North Korea might do so because they lack – or cannot afford – alternative technologies or suppliers. As part of a targeted approach, the US and its allies should consider whether helping such states find alternative missile technology suppliers may be possible, without compounding the global proliferation problem or exacerbating situations of insecurity. Offering alternative sources of nuclear technology is, of course, a lot more problematic. In these instances, interested governments may be able to engage with countries on other strategic issues to identify drivers for the desire to acquire nuclear technology and identify possible solutions to addressing these concerns.</p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 8: Target demand-side countermeasures to specific customers and prioritise engagement with those that are most likely to be receptive.</strong> At the same time, the US and its partners should prioritise engagement with countries that are likely to be most receptive to being dissuaded from engaging in trade with Pyongyang, and tailor approaches to individual potential customers. Trying to prevent missile transfers between North Korea and states that have had long-term missile cooperation partnerships with Pyongyang or which are themselves already subject to sanctions – the likes of Iran and Syria – through diplomatic engagement or threats is unlikely to bear fruit. Offering alternative suppliers in these instances is also not an option.</p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 9: Make North Korea an unreliable supplier and technical partner.</strong> Countries interested in preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation should commit to efforts to making Pyongyang an untrustworthy supplier and partner for technical collaboration. As mentioned earlier in relation to Iranian reservations about the dependability of North Korean missile systems, sowing such mistrust can help discourage future purchases from – or collaboration with – Pyongyang. This should include increasing efforts to interdict shipments of weapons and materials, and could also include attempts to target North Korea’s procurement networks operating overseas, using some of the established extraterritorial tools targeted at customers’ programmes. Efforts could also be made to try to insert compromised technology into North Korea’s procure-to-supply networks, thus further undermining the credibility and reliability of North Korea as a supplier. Countries that are important suppliers of key technologies that North Korea may need for its missile and nuclear wares – namely, countries in North America, Europe and Asia – can play an important role in efforts to prevent North Korean procurement.</p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation 10: Carefully utilise unilateral counter-proliferation tools.</strong> While the current political dynamics on the UNSC will likely preclude any further UNSC sanctions against North Korea (or its facilitators or customers) in the foreseeable future, individual governments should continue to sanction North Korean and related entities that facilitate North Korean proliferation, or target them with other unilateral tools. While unilateral sanctions technically create no obligations for compliance by entities outside the relevant country’s jurisdiction, their appearance on sanctions lists will – or at least should – trigger adverse media and other compliance-screening measures at financial institutions or companies proactively seeking to comply with export controls. In the case of the US in particular, the importance of its financial sector and the US dollar to global markets means that many financial institutions around the world screen against US sanctions lists even if they are under no domestic obligation to comply with them. Such designations can also help facilitate open source investigations or the sanctioning of these entities in other jurisdictions. Use of other elements of the unilateral toolset developed and deployed by the US in recent years – which includes civil asset forfeiture as well as other targeted efforts against specific entities overseas – may also be appropriate in certain cases. However, application of these powerful tools should be considered on a case-by-case basis due to the risks of political blowback.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Daniel Salisbury</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.</p> - -<p><strong>Darya Dolzikova</strong> is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. Her research areas include the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, as well as other issues concerning nuclear technology and proliferation.</p>Daniel Salisbury and Darya DolzikovaThis paper examines North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, based on a review of Pyongyang’s recent technological advancements and developments in North Korea’s customer base. The authors assess the likelihood of North Korea selling its missile and nuclear technology onwards, and the kinds of technology that may be for sale and to whom.In Plain Sight2023-12-14T12:00:00+08:002023-12-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/in-plain-sight<p><em>An exclusive investigation conducted by RUSI, in partnership with Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR, reveals how one of Russia’s leading microelectronic distributors, Compel JSC, has imported massive volumes of Western microelectronics through Germany and Hong Kong since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Western governments enacted a sweeping array of sanctions, stringent export controls and other policy actions designed to stem the flow of critical technology – including drones, thermal cameras, industrial machinery, semiconductors and microelectronics – to the country’s armed forces and intelligence agencies. Faced with losing access to these essential supply lines, Russia adapted, rerouting trade flows through friendly jurisdictions and bordering countries, often using complex front-company networks to evade scrutiny.</p> - -<p>Almost overnight, countries with little history of microelectronics trade became hubs for Russia’s technology flows. For example, in 2022, Armenia’s microelectronics imports from the US and EU increased by over 500% and 200%, respectively, with most of these later re-exported to Russia. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s microelectronics exports to Russia increased from around $250,000 in 2021 to over $18 million in 2022.</p> - -<p>In other cases, Russia’s importers have appeared to hide in plain sight. Since the 2022 invasion, one of Russia’s largest microelectronics distributors – Compel JSC – seems to have continued moving tens of millions of dollars in critical components through the heart of Europe and Hong Kong.</p> - -<p>Data seen by RUSI, Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR confirms that Compel appears to have dozens of customers that are subject to sanctions for connections to Russia’s military-industrial complex. To date, however, Compel has only been sanctioned by the US and Ukraine.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TFCcXyv.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ COMPEL JSC, Moscow, Russia.</em></p> - -<blockquote> - <p>Compel JSC is one of Russia’s largest distributors of microelectronics, founded by Boris Rudyak in 1993. In July 2023, the US Treasury designated Compel for allegedly importing dual-use technology into Russia.</p> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>Compel appears to operate procurement networks abroad that are seemingly run by Russian nationals in Europe and East Asia who are intimately linked to the company.</p> -</blockquote> - -<h3 id="an-electronics-powerhouse">An Electronics Powerhouse</h3> - -<p>By the time the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time over the Kremlin on 25 December 1991, Boris Rudyak seems to have already had a long and storied career.</p> - -<p>Starting his professional journey as an apprentice at a vocational school in the Soviet Union’s first motor vehicle plant, Rudyak later found himself tending patients in a psychiatric hospital. As a resourceful man with many talents, he would later work for the fire brigade, as a watchman, as a cameraman, and even collecting nuts in a forest.</p> - -<p>Like many other Russians whose lives had been broadly defined by the stultifying Soviet system, Rudyak’s big break was to come shortly after its dissolution.</p> - -<p>Even before the Western-technology transfer control regime known as COCOM officially ended in 1994, Rudyak claims he was travelling to Singapore and stuffing suitcases with microelectronics for sale back home. In 1993, Rudyak officially registered Compel JSC, legitimately importing the sophisticated microelectronics that the Soviet Union was once forced to smuggle.</p> - -<p>Under Vladimir Putin’s reign, Russia’s GDP rose rapidly, buoyed by surging oil exports and the dizzying rise in global oil prices. The 2008 recession and corresponding collapse in prices, however, sent the Russian economy into a tailspin. In October 2009, Rudyak delivered a presentation explaining how the Russian electronics industry waxed and waned with the fluctuations of the global oil market. Following the precipitous oil price collapse, Rudyak claimed that Russia’s microelectronics market contracted by 40%, leaving over a third of the market dominated by military and security customers.</p> - -<p>Despite this market volatility, Compel’s Russian business seems to have thrived. From 2019 to 2021, the company imported a mean annual average of $32.2 million in microelectronics and related items. In the first seven months of 2023 alone, Compel imported approximately $29 million dollars’ worth of components.</p> - -<p>Following the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s microelectronics imports entered the crosshairs of regulators after thousands of Western-designed and manufactured components were found inside the country’s weapons platforms. As a result, many of the world’s largest microelectronic component manufacturers – including Analog Devices, Microchip Technology, Murata Manufacturing, Nexperia, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments – terminated sales into Russia, and many also prohibited their distributors from selling into the country.</p> - -<p>Seemingly undeterred, Compel continued importing thousands of shipments of components manufactured by Analog Devices, Microchip Technology, Murata Manufacturing, Nexperia, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments. Compel’s product catalogues seem to have removed a couple of these suppliers, including Texas Instruments, Analog Devices and STMicroelectronics, since the US sanctioned the Russian company.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CV378uy.jpg" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Compel catalogue, September 2022.</strong> Sources: Compel’s website, RUSI.</em></p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BcRDUq1.jpg" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Compel catalogue, December 2023.</strong> Sources: Compel’s website, RUSI.</em></p> - -<h3 id="where-do-they-come-from">Where Do They Come From?</h3> - -<p>While the number of suppliers to Compel has dwindled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Germany-based WWSemicon GmbH and Hong Kong-based Finder Technology continued shipping to Compel in 2023 and appear to have become the company’s largest suppliers, accounting for at least 65% of Compel’s imports since 2022.</p> - -<p>Russian trade data indicates that before February 2022, Compel’s largest suppliers were WWSemicon GmbH, Finder Technology Ltd and the now-dissolved Compel International Oy, a possible affiliate company of Compel based in Finland. From January 2019 to February 2022, 98% of Compel International Oy and WWSemicon’s exports and 83% of Finder Technology’s exports were destined for Compel and Beliv LLC, another Rudyak company.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ydijPBF.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Compel’s annual imports and suppliers from 2019 to 2023.</strong> Source: Data seen by RUSI, Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR.</em></p> - -<p>Compel’s suppliers diversified in the lead-up to the invasion, seeming to peak at 40 companies in 2021. However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the roster of suppliers shrunk drastically, with nearly all imports coming from only six companies. WWSemicon and Finder Technology were by far the largest, accounting for over 98% of imports.</p> - -<p>Despite trade records showing that WWSemicon continued exporting millions of dollars’ worth of components to Compel as recently as July 2023, representatives for WWSemicon told Nieuwsuur they had stopped shipments to the company “long ago”.</p> - -<p>As sanctions and export controls have complicated Russian procurement efforts, microelectronics have increasingly been routed through hubs such as Hong Kong. To restrict Russia’s access to critical technologies, the US and UK have sanctioned several Hong Kong companies for supplying Russia’s defence industry.</p> - -<p>Notably, in June and July 2023, Finder Technology shipped over $1.1 million in microelectronics to Compel under nine HS codes identified in May by the US as “high priority items” for Russian weapons systems. These HS codes cover several categories of critical microelectronics, including processors, field-programmable gate arrays, tantalum capacitors, ceramic capacitors, amplifiers and memory modules.</p> - -<p>Finder Technology did not respond when contacted by Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wSrGTDC.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ WWSEMICON GMBH, Munich, Germany.</em></p> - -<blockquote> - <p>From the outskirts of a residential neighbourhood in Munich, WWSemicon appears to have maintained exceptionally close ties with Compel for nearly 20 years.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5VKjpe7.jpg" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: WWSemicon’s connections to Compel.</strong> Sources: Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation, Russia’s Unified State Register of Legal Entities, Deutsches Unternehmens Register, Slovak Ministry of Justice’s Business Register, RUSI.</em></p> - -<h4 id="wwsemicon-gmbh">WWSemicon GmbH</h4> - -<p>While Boris Rudyak told Nieuwsuur that WWSemicon was “not part of the Compel network”, he claimed the companies engaged in “good business before the war”.</p> - -<p>However, an analysis of trade data, corporate documents, social media and other records indicates that Compel and WWSemicon have maintained exceptionally close ties for nearly 20 years.</p> - -<p>For example, WWSemicon was registered in 2005 by Russian nationals Oleg Shtots (AKA Alex Stotz) and Vladimir Avetisyan. Notably, Avetisyan is also the sole shareholder and general director of RBA-Management LLC in Russia, one of Compel’s founding shareholders.</p> - -<p>Almost two decades after WWSemicon was founded, the company is now owned by several former Compel employees, including Boris Rudyak’s daughter, who worked for Compel from 2007 to 2015.</p> - -<p>Another shareholder of the company listed their LinkedIn title as “lead developer” at Compel-SPB LLC – a company owned by Rudyak’s RBA-Group. Meanwhile, a third shareholder, who also manages the Slovakia-based WWSemicon branch, was referred to as Compel’s general director in 2021.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TQk7wIG.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ FINDER TECHNOLOGY LTD, Chai Wan, Hong Kong.</em></p> - -<blockquote> - <p>Overlooking the waterfront of a Hong Kong suburb, Finder Technology has shipped millions of dollars’ worth of components to Compel, including various high-priority items for Russian weapons systems.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Finder Technology was co-founded in April 2005 by the same person that founded WWSemicon in Germany, Oleg Shtots. Hong Kong registry documents from 2019 reveal that Shtots used both Russian and German passports, and that same year, he began using the name “Alex Stotz” on Finder Technology’s corporate documents. Corporate documents from 2023 for Finder Technology still list Shtots as the sole shareholder of the company.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3ZWnK5C.jpg" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Oleg Shtots using “Alex Stotz” on Hong Kong corporate documents.</strong> Source: Hong Kong Companies Registry.</em></p> - -<p>An email for Oleg Shtots listed on a Russian-language German employment forum appears in the URL of a public Google Calendar for an “Alex Stotz”. The calendar blocks off “Electronica”, a trade event in Munich, and contains departure dates of Compel from the event. It also includes meetings labelled “Boris” during one of several apparent trips to Moscow.</p> - -<p>As with WWSemicon, Finder Technology’s employee base seems to include individuals affiliated with Compel. Russian court records reveal that, in 2017, Avetisyan – WWSemicon’s co-founder – led Finder Technology’s legal representative’s office in Russia, and another employee’s LinkedIn account states that until March 2022, they were also a purchasing manager for Compel and two US-based companies, Rapid GCS Inc and Real Time Components (RTC) Inc.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DraAuf3.jpg" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Finder Technology’s connections to Compel.</strong> Sources: Arbitration lawsuits in “Court proceedings and legal acts of the Russian Federation online database”, Hong Kong Companies Registry, LinkedIn, Meta Platforms Inc, RUSI.</em></p> - -<h4 id="stateside-suppliers-pre-invasion-rapid-gcs-and-rtc">Stateside Suppliers Pre-invasion: Rapid GCS and RTC</h4> - -<p>While neither Rapid GCS nor RTC appears to have shipped to Russia since the 2022 invasion, both historically shipped millions of dollars in microelectronics and related components from Analog Devices, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments to Compel, Beliv and Dadjet LLC, the latter of which is also owned by Boris Rudyak. RTC’s shipments into Russia appear to have ceased in July 2020, but Rapid GCS continued its exports until February 2022 – the month of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p> - -<p>Both companies share a phone number and a New Jersey address, and Rapid GCS’s registered agent appears to operate an X account with the biography “Regional Purchasing Manager at Real Time Components (RTC/Compel)”.</p> - -<h3 id="where-do-they-go">Where Do They Go?</h3> - -<p>While many of Compel’s customers include commercial enterprises, data seen by RUSI, Nieuswsuur and ARD MONITOR reveals that the company has received thousands of payments from dozens of Russian companies sanctioned after the invasion began. Many of these companies have extensive links to the country’s defence industry.</p> - -<p>Several companies that were later sanctioned for being part of Russia’s defence industrial base made thousands of payments to Compel from January 2022 to January 2023, including:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>Testkomplekt LLC, which is sanctioned by the US, the UK, Switzerland and Ukraine. Testkomplekt is also a key microelectronics supplier for Radiopriborsnab LLC, which is ultimately owned by subsidiaries of Rostec, the Russian state-owned defence industrial conglomerate.</p> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>Staut LLC, which is sanctioned by the US and UK for supplying export-controlled technology to the Russian defence industry.</p> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>EuroMicroTech LLC (EMT), which is sanctioned by the US. EMT’s website features letters of gratitude for the “timely provision of items” from a Rostec subsidiary and a military facility founded in 2009 by the Russian Ministry of Defence.</p> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>NIIIT LLC (AKA RIIT Ltd), which is sanctioned by the US. One of NIIIT’s founders was Ostec Enterprises Ltd, a semiconductor supplier for several Russian defence entities, including an alleged manufacturer of Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.</p> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>Specialized Devices and Systems CJSC (SPS), which is sanctioned by Ukraine, Switzerland and, most recently, the EU for facilitating a Netherlands-based sanctions evasion operation. Nieuwsuur confirms that SPS lists several EU-sanctioned Rostec subsidiaries as customers, and other reports claim that SPS is licensed by Russia’s Federal Security Bureau to supply Rostec.</p> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>EKB Neva LLC, which is sanctioned by the US and Ukraine and certified by the Russian government to supply Russian military end-users. In 2020, EKB’s director was arrested for allegedly forging certificates of Western microelectronics imported for military use.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1DRQoNw.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Payments to Compel by sanctioned Russian customers, 2022.</strong> Sources: Data seen by RUSI, Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR, OpenSanctions, RUSI.</em></p> - -<h3 id="hiding-in-plain-sight">Hiding in Plain Sight</h3> - -<p>Like many of the companies that have continued to import microelectronics, components and technology into Russia following the 2022 invasion, Compel appears to have been forced to reroute trade flows through jurisdictions like Hong Kong.</p> - -<p>However, the movement of millions of dollars’ worth of components through Europe, even after the invasion, unfortunately highlights the ease with which some Russian companies have continued to procure technologies that could be used by the country’s military–industrial complex.</p> - -<p>As Russia faces the prospect of a protracted conflict in Ukraine, the Kremlin is increasingly gearing up its economy for war. The Russian finance minister left little room for interpretation about Moscow’s priorities when he said in October 2023 that “the main emphasis is on ensuring [Russia’s] victory – the army, defence capability, armed forces, fighters – everything needed for the front, everything needed for victory is in the budget”.</p> - -<p>Hence, with Russia diverting all possible financial and technical resources to support its war of aggression, Ukraine’s partners should ensure that Western technology and microelectronics are not in Russia’s arsenal.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>James Byrne</strong> is Director of the Open-Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) Research Group at RUSI.</p> - -<p><strong>Denys Karlovskyi</strong> is a Research Fellow with OSIA research group at RUSI.</p> - -<p><strong>Gary Somerville</strong> is a Research Fellow with OSIA Research Group at RUSI.</p>James Byrne, et al.An exclusive investigation conducted by RUSI, in partnership with Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR, reveals how one of Russia’s leading microelectronic distributors, Compel JSC, has imported massive volumes of Western microelectronics through Germany and Hong Kong since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.Euro SIFMANet Barna Report2023-12-14T12:00:00+08:002023-12-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/euro-sifmanet-barcelona-report<p><em>Participants discussed the key role that data plays in the success of sanctions.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>During the design of the sanctions packages imposed on Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the initial focus was on throwing the net as wide as possible. The aim was to impose restrictive measures on a broad range of financial and trade activities. However, following the early flurry of activity, attention has now shifted towards ensuring effective implementation and enforcement.</p> - -<p>Over nearly two years, the RUSI-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet) has highlighted the main structural challenges faced by EU member state national authorities, and businesses with sanctions responsibilities. It has also identified that all stakeholders – whether private sector actors seeking to improve their implementation or governments monitoring for circumvention and evasion – need better data. This would allow sanctions to be more effectively implemented, and circumvention and evasion more effectively tackled.</p> - -<p>To gain insights on this issue, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI hosted a roundtable discussion in Barcelona in November 2023, with the support of Dow Jones Risk &amp; Compliance. The event gathered sanctions experts from the public and private sectors across different European jurisdictions to explore, under the Chatham House rule, the role of data in strengthening the implementation and enforcement of sanctions. This engagement was part of SIFMANet’s activities supported by the National Endowment for Democracy, and along with a video filmed on the day, this report presents the main findings from the discussion.</p> - -<h3 id="the-need-for-data-to-support-sanctions-implementation">The Need for Data to Support Sanctions Implementation</h3> - -<p>Sanctions used to be an isolated task within the compliance departments of financial institutions, whose primary responsibility consisted of screening sanctions lists to check for individual and entity name matches with their client base and transaction activity.</p> - -<p>At the workshop, private sector representatives noted that this modus operandi started to change following the introduction in 2014 of sanctions against Russia, in response to the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. This programme introduced sector-specific sanctions, which for the first time required financial institutions – and others from the private sector such as oil services companies – to have a deeper understanding of their clients and, critically, their activities.</p> - -<p>This task demanded increased resources from these elements of the private sector, as well as their clients, to obtain and process data that was far more complex than merely checking for sanctions-list name matches. Fast forward to February 2022 and the sanctions that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion dramatically increased this burden and introduced complex sanctions compliance to a large number of economic operators that had never been exposed in this way before.</p> - -<p>As a result, businesses place significant demands on national competent authorities to assist with identifying where they require licences to continue their operations, but also information regarding possible entities engaged in sanctioned activities, something that is not yet widely available from the typical vendors of sanctions screening services.</p> - -<p>Participants from both governments and the private sector clearly articulated in the workshop that if sanctions are to be implemented effectively by the private sector, placed on the frontline by their governments, then a significant improvement in data is required. There was also strong agreement that banks should not be left to carry this burden on their own. Governments must clearly make those businesses engaging in trade exposed to sanctions aware of their responsibilities and must either have proper internal sanctions-monitoring controls or access to third-party tools that can provide them with the necessary compliance capacity.</p> - -<p>Given the purpose of the workshop was to focus specifically on data, the next section addresses specific tactical data that the private sector could leverage to improve its sanctions compliance, and how governments can use data to facilitate better private sector implementation.</p> - -<h3 id="what-data-is-helpful-for-implementing-sanctions">What Data is Helpful for Implementing Sanctions?</h3> - -<p>The use of data for improved sanctions effectiveness falls into two parts: data used to support implementation by EU member states’ banks and businesses; and data (mainly related to trade) used to identify sanctions circumvention.</p> - -<h4 id="improved-implementation">Improved Implementation</h4> - -<p>For banks and businesses operating in the EU, data plays two roles: first, it facilitates better identification of sanctioned individuals and their assets; and second, it clarifies where clients might be involved in restricted sectors or activities.</p> - -<p><em>Beneficial Ownership Registries</em></p> - -<p>Beneficial ownership registries are useful sources of data on companies and their ownership structure and related natural persons involved in them. However, both public and private sector participants noted that registers, if accessible, often do not hold the same type of information in each country, they do not always hold reliable and updated information, and they are at times only accessible in certain languages. In addition, some jurisdictions have business registries that require subscriptions and have limited financial intelligence on, for example, companies’ financial statements.</p> - -<p>Participants defined public access to beneficial ownership registers as a crucial element for sanctions implementation and they regarded the ruling from the November 2022 European Court of Justice as a new and troubling challenge. A representative from the Spanish Treasury explained that one of the goals of the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU is to harmonise information across EU registries.</p> - -<p><em>Client Documentation</em></p> - -<p>Given the lack of publicly available and machine-readable data, trying to map client activities involving Russia’s neighbouring countries and trading partners demands that the private sector devote substantial amounts of manual labour to check information submitted by clients on their transactions. Businesses hold the deepest knowledge of the sector in which they operate and of their own activities. So, the data they provide is essential. However, representatives from financial institutions noted that it is increasingly difficult to rely on information submitted by clients given that, as elaborated below, it may be subject to a lack of knowledge on the part of their clients or to obfuscation tactics used by those seeking to evade sanctions.</p> - -<p>Businesses are not only trading in goods subject to sanctions, but also technical services, and many do not know the extent of their sanctions obligations. An example shared by a participant described that providing crew members for a vessel carrying Russian oil could fall under EU prohibitions, but many businesses do not know this, and rely on financial institutions to inform them that such activity is prohibited.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, participants noted that they are increasingly holding conversations with clients regarding suspicions of document forgery. Financial institutions explained that the supporting information provided to justify the submitted documentation is often useful to confirm or reject their suspicions. But again, this work creates a significant extra burden on the financial institutions’ sanctions compliance community.</p> - -<p>To effectively manage their monitoring burden, many financial institutions are thus following a risk-based approach. If a financial institution sees a client trading with a third country with which it has maintained trade relations in the past, then it can lower manual effort. On the contrary, if the business relationship was recently established or has now shifted to include controlled goods, the financial institution will increase the manual work required to check the transactions.</p> - -<p>While financial institutions monitor clients across all sectors, key corporates may serve as the most useful and expert sources of data. These include shipping companies, logistics firms and airlines. These businesses hold the raw data required to check goods that banks do not have access to, such as the bill of lading, the itinerary of vessels or identity location spoofing. The top companies in these sectors are screening these elements, but with a lower level of scrutiny than banks would like them to for sanctions-compliance purposes.</p> - -<p>In sum, better data is required if the private sector is to be fully empowered to play its role on the frontline of sanctions implementation. As the complexity of sanctions has grown, the provision of and access to data has lagged. New tools need to be developed by those companies with expertise in providing data services; and governments need to provide access to additional sources of data that can enhance the effectiveness of the private sector.</p> - -<h4 id="identifying-circumvention">Identifying Circumvention</h4> - -<p>As well as facilitating improved implementation, data – particularly trade data – can be used by governments to identify changes in trade flows that may be indicative of emerging sanctions circumvention routes used by Russia to procure the key goods it requires for its military.</p> - -<p><em>Trade Data</em></p> - -<p>Public and private sector representatives acknowledged their initial positive assessment of the reported declines in their jurisdictions’ direct trade with Russia. This assessment changed once they identified the increasing exports – including of controlled and banned goods – to third countries regarded as high-risk for circumvention. This indicated that their trade with Russia continued, albeit indirectly. To properly observe and understand the specific transactions and flows, and the extent to which they represent sanctions circumvention, authorities and the private sector point to various data points to strengthen their sanctions compliance mechanisms.</p> - -<p>Participants noted the difficulty of proving that goods exported from a specific jurisdiction to a third country are then re-exported to Russia through generic import/export trade data. Sources such as UN COMTRADE – described as not particularly user-friendly – or national customs data can serve as a good guide to identify suspicious trade flows, but do not provide sufficiently deep insights. A participant provided a visual example in which a member state exported apples to a third country, and the third country exported apples to Russia. The flow of apples can be identified in the member state’s national customs data but unless the items are specifically identified, it is hard to prove that it is the self- same apples that enter Russia. Participants added that the customs data from Russia and certain third countries may be a useful starting point but cannot be trusted and often entail language translation complications.</p> - -<p>To compensate for this lack of clarity, tools such as Import/Export Genius provide transaction-level tracking data, identify where a product was produced, and to where it was shipped. Authorities and financial institutions can use this data to then query companies involved on whether sanctions are being breached. A key piece of information employed in trade is Harmonised System (HS) codes. These describe the nature of a product.</p> - -<p>HS codes differ across jurisdictions, as countries incorporate additional digits to the six-digit HS codes for further classification. For example, in the EU they are known as TARIC codes and in the US they are HTS codes. This creates divergences among HS codes, which authorities and businesses must understand. HS codes are particularly useful to screen for dual-use goods. However, participants highlighted that not all dual-use goods have HS codes. This a critical challenge as the technical descriptions of HS codes in regulations often create confusion, which increases cost of compliance for businesses that must manually check them.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, authorities and financial institutions have detected that some businesses will alter the HS codes of goods to pass them off as products not subject to prohibitions. This is related to the document forgery issue that is increasingly spotted by financial institutions in the information provided by clients. Participants explained that when a bank is financing trade through letters of credit, they will have more information on the operation than if the trade is conducted via “open account” through which their access to data is limited to just seeing the financial transaction. This makes it harder to spot irregularities. As one participant noted, “the task now consists of screening against information that is not there”.</p> - -<p>The collection of trade data is essential for the private sector to effectively implement sanctions and detect circumvention. However, trade data also plays a key role in the diplomatic efforts of authorities. The EU both requests trade data from third countries and also asks them to validate its own perspective on the third country’s trading activity, to assess their involvement in circumvention. Suspicious trade flows and confirmed circumvention activities identified through the aforementioned analysis of trade data by EU operators can be leveraged by authorities from sanctions-imposing countries to deter third countries from facilitating circumvention through their jurisdictions.</p> - -<p><em>Other Data</em></p> - -<p>Throughout the roundtable, participants also pointed to other data sources that would be useful for authorities and businesses to exploit and process to enhance their investigations and compliance systems.</p> - -<p>For example, for individual financial transactions, Business Identifier Codes (BIC) are well-known sources of data used for addressing SWIFT messages, routing business transactions and identifying business parties, but the screening of less common items can also provide valuable information. One such example is screening IP addresses that may help identify businesses operating in high-risk jurisdictions. IP addresses can be disguised through VPNs, but their usage can be detected and as a result trigger a red flag to demand enhanced due diligence. As private sector participants noted, screening IP addresses is an increasingly common practice by larger financial institutions and e-commerce firms to block transactions from sanctioned jurisdictions and/or flag transactions for further scrutiny. They noted that national competent authorities could enhance the effectiveness of private sector sanctions implementation by providing this information in sanctions designations as and when available.</p> - -<p>The need to leverage such additional data points to support sanctions implementation highlights the added complexity of the post-2022 regimes. Using these data sources to triangulate and identify evasion activity demands a considerable degree of manual work to check the entities involved and their activities. Yet, despite the resources required, going beyond basic due diligence and conducting open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis must now be a critical component of sanctions implementation.</p> - -<p>With regards to maritime transport, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) required by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)to locate vessels was also noted by both public and private sector participants as providing valuable data. Even though the AIS can be turned off, this should trigger a red flag in due diligence systems. AIS will also indicate changes in the draft of the vessel, which might reveal that transhipments took place due to a change in the vessel’s cargo. This can be complemented with the use of satellite imagery. Similarly, IMO identification numbers of designated vessels are key pieces of data that institutions should have at their disposal to monitor their activity such as reflagging or change of ownership.</p> - -<p>Private sector actors, particularly financial institutions that can afford to make such investments, are increasingly developing OSINT capabilities as they can provide invaluable data on clients, their partners and their activities. The information can be openly shared with authorities and other private institutions.</p> - -<h3 id="persisting-challenges">Persisting Challenges</h3> - -<p>While available circumvention routes are increasingly limited, participants noted that supply chains are getting more layered with complex multi-jurisdiction corporate structures and operators increasingly struggling to control what is happening along a particular route. The manual work required to effectively obtain and screen the necessary data is a cumbersome burden for the private sector and the task of identifying companies owned or controlled by sanctioned individuals in the supply chain is challenging. Ownership data is relatively straightforward when it is publicly available – which, as indicated above, is not always the case – but determining “control” is a more difficult task, given that the necessary information might not be public and the concept of “control” can be judgemental.</p> - -<p>In certain areas, participants explained that they face the challenge of combining contradictory datasets. For instance, when monitoring to confirm that a transaction was done below the oil price cap, both authorities and businesses must check data from shipping companies and customs pricing data, which do not always match. This intense screening is conducted for each individual transaction but if the goal is to disrupt the trade of oil or battlefield items before it happens, operators would need to develop foresight by identifying patterns and incorporate these mapping activities into their compliance procedures to anticipate potential evasion transaction.</p> - -<p>A further complication to these mapping efforts and the blocking of suspicious transactions is the decoupled nature of payment flows from their related trade flows. While payments are flowing between two jurisdictions, goods may be produced and transported from factories in third countries. For example, a Swedish entity can have a Dutch bank account, receive the payment from a shell company in Turkey, and ship controlled goods from Malaysia via a third country to Russia. Financial institutions emphasised that it is very challenging to block such transactions as they are often unaware of the trade flow connected with the payment, a trade flow involving countries outside the Western sanctions regime and thus not subject to local control. Furthermore, even if (in this case) the Turkish shell company is identified as facilitating sanctioned trade, a new shell company can easily be established in its place elsewhere with no transaction history.</p> - -<p>One possible way of addressing this challenge, raised by finance experts at the roundtable, is to identify pinch points in the payment flows, for example by making more use of SWIFT messaging data by mandating greater use of currently discretionary fields, to help illuminate payments related to circumvention.</p> - -<p>The increasing burden placed on the private sector led participants to express their concern over the lack of clarity regarding the extent of their compliance obligations to confirm there is no risk of sanctions violation or circumvention. They have significantly increased their sanctions-dedicated resources and tools but at some point they have to make a judgement as to how far their due diligence obligations extend. Participants explained that investigations had traditionally been limited to checking two levels of ownership, but recent investigations have gone down many more levels of ownership to identify the real individual controlling an entity. Private sector representatives added that this may clash with the expectations of regulators, which will also differ across the jurisdictions they operate in. Even minute differences will be immense for internationally operating institutions.</p> - -<p>A clear message from participants was that many businesses lack experience regarding the availability and use of the data sources discussed at the workshop. This often means they resort to third-party data providers and vendors. These services ease the burden on businesses, but authorities have raised concerns of an over-reliance on these services without understanding how the tools they provide work. Participating authorities explained that their inspections showed that many businesses do not properly detect the right matches after inputting the data provided into their systems, and some screening systems struggle with fuzzy searches with multiple options per identifier. These fuzzy searches are themselves the outcome of vast discrepancies across sanctions lists, further complicating compliance tasks.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, the heavy burden imposed on the private sector is met with a lack of incentives to actually comply with sanctions obligations. First, participants noted that HS codes are used for tax purposes, so businesses are not always interested in reporting them accurately. Furthermore, for intentional circumvention schemes, public and private sector representatives agreed that the consequences of breaching sanctions at the moment are not enough to deter violations, both in terms of low financial penalties but also low chances of detection.</p> - -<p>This is partly related to the insufficient level of information exchanged within the EU, a major impediment to sanctions investigations and enforcement. Currently, many investigations are crippled when a national competent authority requests information from a member state where sanctions violations are not yet criminalised. A participant suggested that to improve the sharing of data and avoid duplication, the EU needs a sanctions-related institution such as OLAF, which is currently the only agency that coordinates member states regarding imports and exports. Regional initiatives for enhanced information-sharing within the EU are happening in areas such as the Baltic states, but this should be happening across the EU.</p> - -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> - -<p>As one workshop participant noted, a key feature of the current sanctions regimes against Russia is that policymakers are expecting sanctions to achieve far more today than has been expected of sanctions regimes in the past, and governments’ messaging often seems to expect companies to screen transactions against non-existing data.</p> - -<p>A core pillar of the effectiveness of the current sanctions implementation and enforcement landscape is the availability, accessibility and quality of data. During the workshop, participants proposed a series of valuable sources of data for authorities and businesses to strengthen their investigations and compliance mechanisms. However, these data sources pose a series of challenges in themselves, which the EU must take measures to mitigate in order to improve the sanctions efforts across the public and private sectors. The importance of this is clear. Data can not only support better implementation of sanctions by EU member states and their financial institutions and businesses, it can also provide a strong basis from which to engage in dialogue with third countries that are vulnerable to – or indeed are already facilitating – sanctions circumvention.</p> - -<p>With a focus on how governments can support the private sector in achieving their goals, some specific recommendations emerged from the workshop.</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Clarity of obligations.</strong> Supervisors need to clarify what is required of the private sector. Too often requirements and expectations are ambiguous and lack specificity. Although ambiguity may be a means by which governments can ensure businesses do not merely restrict their compliance obligations to the bare minimum, the uncertainty faced in the private sector on whether they have done enough for a single transaction leads to inefficient responses, the investment of extensive (potentially unnecessary) resources and manual work, and economic costs.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhanced awareness in the private sector.</strong> Businesses must expand their understanding of the steps needed to conduct sanctions due diligence on clients, their trade partners, controlled products and sectoral risks. Governments must support this education process by providing briefings and access to new data sources that can facilitate sanctions implementation. As one participant noted, screening for “persons connected with Russia” is just not possible – or desirable; and placing the burden of policing businesses entirely on the banking sector is not efficient. Key industry sectors such as shipping and logistics must be made to feel equally responsible and empowered.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Harmonisation and consistency are key.</strong> Small inconsistencies in sanctions interpretations by authorities can have a significant impact on the private sector. For example, within the EU, the understanding of ownership and control differs across member states and, in consequence, guidance for businesses operating in several jurisdictions varies. Likewise, the quality and nature of information found in national beneficial ownership registers varies, is often not updated, is in different languages, and is not publicly available. Among the sanctions coalition, key identifiers such as HS codes also differ and alignment in this regard would facilitate the tasks of both authorities and the private sector. More broadly, the quality of trade data is lacking and should likewise be presented in a harmonised manner as much as possible.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Optimising use of trade data.</strong> First, trade data from EU member states can be trusted and should be the foundation of trade-related sanctions implementation. EU member state capacity in this field varies – development of an EU member state sanctions trade data expert working group could enhance the use of this data to identify EU-based weaknesses. Second, trade data should continue to be used to engage with third countries to ensure common understanding of the key items that are subject to restriction.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Improve EU-wide trade data sharing.</strong> The EU should create an EU sanctions-related information-sharing mechanism similar to OLAF to ensure consistent interpretation of sanctions (particularly related to trade).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Consolidation must continue.</strong> The consolidation of regulations is essential for businesses with insufficient experience to navigate complex EU legislation. Furthermore, a consolidated – and more closely aligned – list of sanctioned individuals and entities from the international sanctions coalition would facilitate the task of businesses that aim to be compliant across all regimes.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Make greater use of SWIFT data.</strong> Tackling circumvention trade flows would benefit from identifying pinch points in the flow of payments, for example by making more use of SWIFT messaging data by mandating greater use of currently discretionary fields, to help illuminate payments related to circumvention.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Technological advancements.</strong> The current level of manual work required to fulfil sanctions compliance obligations is an unsustainable burden on the private sector. Greater attention should be placed on developing tools that will facilitate the effective compliance of businesses. For example, a participant noted Singapore’s introduction of blockchain to track payments and trade.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>In sum, data – in all its forms – is emerging as a key tool in enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions implementation against Russia. Yet, the provision and availability of data by governments to the private sector has lagged the growth in complexity of sanctions. Accessible data has the potential to enhance the ability of financial institutions and businesses across the EU to be fully empowered to correctly identify entities, industry sectors, activities and specific goods that should be blocked. It can further assist with the identification of circumvention activity and underpin diplomatic engagement with third countries. The challenge ahead is to enhance the quality and accessibility of these data sources to ensure the impact needed to further restrict the funding and resourcing of the Russian military.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Tom Keatinge</strong> is the founding Director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI, where his research focuses on matters at the intersection of finance and security. He is also currently a specialist adviser on illicit finance to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ongoing enquiry.</p> - -<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime &amp; Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).</p>Tom Keatinge and Gonzalo SaizParticipants discussed the key role that data plays in the success of sanctions.Organised Cybercrime2023-12-13T12:00:00+08:002023-12-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/organised-cybercrime<p><em>This article traces the journey of the threat and response to cybercrime – specifically, ransomware, which has emerged as the most disruptive cyber threat to the UK’s national security and society today.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Over the last 10 years, cybercrime has entered the realm of national security. This shift has been driven by one type of cybercrime in particular – ransomware.</p> - -<p>Emerging from the Russian cyber-criminal ecosystem in the early 2010s, ransomware today is a highly disruptive form of cybercrime that encompasses a range of tactics and techniques designed to extort ransoms from individuals, businesses and even governments. Although cyber fraud likely affects more individual UK citizens on a personal level and generates greater economic losses, ransomware is a particularly acute threat to the UK because of its ability to cause harm to nationally important services – ranging from the ability of local councils to provide social care or ensure your bins are collected to the provision of essential healthcare services. Put simply, ransomware can (and does) ruin people’s lives.</p> - -<p>Ransomware has proven to be highly lucrative for many of the criminals that participate, with UK victims paying an average ransom payment of £1.6 million in 2023 according to one survey. Large profit margins have enabled ransomware operators to reinvest revenues, expand their capabilities, and largely stay ahead of cyber defenders and law enforcement. Although the National Crime Agency (NCA) and its international counterparts have had some tactical successes against the ransomware ecosystem, absent a major shift in the cost–benefit calculus of ransomware operators, the next 10 years of cybercrime will likely continue to be dominated by this pernicious form of offending.</p> - -<h3 id="the-evolution-of-ransomware-from-spray-and-pray-to-organised-cybercrime">The Evolution of Ransomware: From “Spray and Pray” to Organised Cybercrime</h3> - -<p>Although ransomware has existed in some form since the 1990s, it was largely non-viable as a profitable cybercrime until the emergence of cryptocurrency in the late 2010s, which enabled cybercriminals to monetise ransomware while maintaining a degree of anonymity. In 2013, ransomware was characterised by the so-called “spray and pray” model, which targeted a large number of individual users. These operations had low yields with uniformly priced ransoms for all victims.</p> - -<p>However, from 2016 onwards, ransomware began to evolve into the form that is dominant today. Ransomware operators moved away from the “spray and pray” model and started to focus on organisations rather than individuals, using tactics to deploy ransomware to thousands of computers within a single organisation to increase their leverage and therefore demand higher ransoms.</p> - -<p>In 2019, two important tactical modifications emerged that helped ransomware operators extort higher payments at greater scale. First, they became more purposeful in their victim selection. Some developed so-called “big game hunting” ransomware operations, which involves prioritising larger and therefore more lucrative victims; others focused on targeting critical services and organisations that rely on constant delivery of operations, such as healthcare providers.</p> - -<p>Second, the criminals behind the Maze ransomware operation started to steal as well as encrypt victims’ data. Other ransomware threat actors swiftly followed suit and over the last few years coercion tactics have continued to evolve, with dedicated data leak sites, leaks to journalists and harassment of employees and clients all employed as parts of efforts to make victims pay. A new cyber extortion collective made up mostly of English-speaking young men has even threatened physical violence against its victims. Our own research on ransomware harms, which is based on interviews with UK victims of ransomware, found examples of harassment of school children, healthcare patients and other vulnerable groups following ransomware incidents.</p> - -<p>Today, the ransomware ecosystem resembles something more like a professionalised industry than a ragtag network mostly active on dark web forums and marketplaces. This is not just because of the revenues generated by ransomware (which are believed to run into hundreds of millions of dollars for the most successful gangs), but also because of the growing levels of professionalisation that have developed within the ecosystem. The ransomware-as-a-service business model has enabled the specialisation of roles within ransomware operations, allowing ransomware developers to recruit affiliates who conduct operations for a cut of the profits. Ransomware is also supported by the broader cybercrime-as-a-service ecosystem, particularly services and marketplaces that specialise in obtaining and selling access to victim networks (known as initial access brokers) or monetising and laundering the proceeds of ransomware. The service-driven cyber-criminal economy enables ransomware threat actors to streamline their operations.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The reality for many ransomware victims is that government support is likely to be very limited, with the accessible response ecosystem largely privatised</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>In some cases, ransomware threat actors have developed structures more like legitimate businesses than traditional organised crime groups. The group behind the now defunct Conti ransomware operation, for instance, at one point employed between 65 and 100 salaried staff, with defined roles, HR staff and employment policies. The profitability of ransomware can make this extremely attractive, pulling more would-be cyber-criminals into the ecosystem. Ransomware therefore represents a form of organised crime that is in keeping with modern digital economies.</p> - -<p>Assessing the impact of ransomware on the UK specifically is challenging. Since 2019, 2,607 ransomware incidents have been reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). However, the ICO does not collect data or produce intelligence on the threat or financial impact of ransomware. Reporting to Action Fraud is believed to be considerably lower – the NCA assesses that less than 10% of ransomware incidents are reported to law enforcement. However, prominent attacks against UK businesses and critical national infrastructure providers emphasise the threat of ransomware to UK’s economy, national security and society. In 2023 alone, ransomware has disrupted the Royal Mail, one of the largest providers of outsourced services for the UK government, schools and an NHS Trust. A ransomware attack was also blamed for the permanent closure of one of the UK’s largest privately-owned logistics providers, KNP Logistics Groups.</p> - -<h3 id="a-daunting-21st-century-challenge">A Daunting 21st-Century Challenge</h3> - -<p>The emergence of contemporary organised cybercrime as a national security dilemma presents a serious challenge for the UK’s law enforcement community.</p> - -<p>This dilemma is exacerbated by a toxic combination of geopolitics and the double-edged sword presented by technological advancement. The concentration of ransomware operators in “permissive” jurisdictions with whom UK relations are relatively poor – most notably Russia – means that law enforcement’s capacity to arrest or interfere with many threat actors is limited. While a Russian cyber-criminal stated in an interview that their biggest concern was the prospect of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Western law enforcement collaboration, this seems unlikely to materialise at the time of writing. As recently emphasised by NCA Director-General Graeme Biggar at RUSI, serious and organised crime has become more global and sophisticated, straddling the “real” and “virtual” worlds. Ransomware is – unfortunately – a perfect illustration of this phenomenon.</p> - -<p>The UK’s approach to the ransomware dilemma can be described, in part, as characterised by pragmatism. This is not to be confused with defeatism. Where possible, the National Crime Agency has collaborated with international partners on arrests of ransomware operators and affiliates outside of Russia. The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has also recently joined forces with the US’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to sanction known ransomware operators, representing both a form of “naming and shaming” and an effort to limit specific cyber-criminals’ ability to monetise ransomware.</p> - -<p>Aligning with a pragmatic approach to “resiliency” that underpins the National Cyber Security Strategy, the UK’s public sector cyber response ecosystem has increasingly focused on reducing the ransomware threat and supporting victims. This ecosystem includes the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the NCA, Regional Organised Crime Units and local police. Victim support is triaged through the Incident Response Framework, with technical incident support tightly rationed and restricted to organisations with the greatest national security and economic impact. A number of victims may receive support in the form of incident response coordination and advice from NCSC and/or NCA liaisons.</p> - -<p>Nonetheless, the reality for many ransomware victims is that government support is likely to be very limited, with the accessible response ecosystem largely privatised. A ransomware victim organisation may, variously, draw upon the support of firms offering incident response, ransom negotiation, external counsel and public-relations management. Organisations either pay for these services themselves or draw on cyber insurance policies. However, the recent development that some sectors – including operators of critical national infrastructure – may be uninsurable by virtue of their sector should be cause for alarm.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given the absence of easy solutions, it is time to talk more actively about ransomware and organised cybercrime with the public at large</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The application of triaging and general reliance on private sector incident response services is a pragmatic approach amid current economic realities; it would be impossible for the current public-sector response ecosystem to scale sufficiently to serve as a “blue light” cyber response service. However, the quality of incident response matters. The NCSC’s assured cyber incident response schemes are a positive step toward promoting best practices to encourage optimum outcomes for victims of ransomware and other cyber incidents.</p> - -<h3 id="what-should-we-do-next">What Should We Do Next?</h3> - -<p>We write this with a degree of weariness. As active researchers in this space, we have talked, researched and written about ransomware for countless hours. Ransomware’s prominence as a cybercrime and national security threat means that this issue has consistently been at the forefront of our recent work. The UK government has also been actively talking about the issue, for instance, with the conducting of an internal “ransomware sprint”, the attendance of high-level meetings (and signing of agreements) with like-minded international partners, and the issuance of calls for evidence by Parliamentary Committees.</p> - -<p>However, given the absence of easy solutions, it is time to talk more actively about ransomware and organised cybercrime with the public at large. In a liberal democratic society, a serious societal-level threat merits mature and considered conversations in a range of accessible forums. Ransomware arguably first emerged into the UK-wide conscience in 2017, with the WannaCry ransomware attack’s impact on some NHS Trusts serving as a pronounced indication of ransomware’s capacity to disrupt core societal services. After extolling that everyone had a responsibility for cyber security, Jeremy Hunt and Theresa May were given a reprieve with Marcus Hutchin’s kill-switch. But arguably the first significant opportunity for a proper and sustained national conversation was bypassed. Likewise, pronounced disruptions at local levels – for instance, Hackney, Redcar and Cleveland, and Gloucester City councils – have not ushered in focused conversations at a national level.</p> - -<p>Such conversations could include more candid detail about the government’s place and role in the fight against this threat, in both preventative and reactive terms. Given financial and resource constraints, it is unlikely that the UK will significantly expand its technical response support for victims. But this should be conveyed to the public clearly and candidly. Recent RUSI research has highlighted a disconcerting degree of ambiguity and confusion among the public and ransomware victims about the role of government and law enforcement in this space.</p> - -<p>There is also the question of how the UK should employ offensive cyber capabilities against the ransomware ecosystem. At the launch of the UK National Cyber Force (NCF) in 2020, the UK government identified organised cyber-criminals as a potential target for offensive cyber operations. In 2022, then GCHQ Director Jeremy Fleming suggested that the NCF was now actively targeting ransomware threat actors. Given that UK intelligences agencies have been able to disrupt the online activities of international terrorist organisations – and publicly disclose elements of this interference – there is a case for more public debate about the purpose and effectiveness of these operations. However, as the US experience with using offensive cyber operations against ransomware has highlighted, such operations may have a limited effect while the business model remains intact, and should be seen as complementary rather than a replacement for a strategy that focuses on fundamentally changing the cost-benefit calculus of the perpetrators.</p> - -<p>The future trajectory of ransomware is not clear. Arguably, this form of organised cybercrime has not yet reached saturation point. While some ransomware operators have dispersed following law enforcement activity, others have emerged. Operators continue to diversify their strategies to put maximum pressure on victim organisations and adapt to improved cyber security practices among their targets (for instance, viable backups).</p> - -<p>In this context, further growth and evolution of this threat should be anticipated. While it is not possible to speculate precisely on how ransomware will evolve, the UK and like-minded partners should anticipate turbulence, continue to raise their cyber resilience, and focus on ways to make life much more difficult for the criminals that perpetuate it.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jIN7CBT.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Jamie MacColl</strong> is a Research Fellow in cyber threats and cyber security. His research interests include cyber security, the evolution of the cyber threat landscape, the role of emerging technologies in security and defence policy and the uses of history in policymaking. Current research projects focus on cyber insurance and cyber risks related to the Globalisation of Technology.</p> - -<p><strong>Gareth Mott</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI. His research interests include governance and cyberspace, the challenges (and promises) of peer-to-peer technologies, developments in the cyber risk landscape, and the evolution of cyber security strategies at micro and macro levels.</p>Jamie MacColl and Gareth MottThis article traces the journey of the threat and response to cybercrime – specifically, ransomware, which has emerged as the most disruptive cyber threat to the UK’s national security and society today.Heavy Armoured Forces2023-12-12T12:00:00+08:002023-12-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/heavy-armed-forces<p><em>Adaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>The British Army is likely to be called on to engage in high-intensity warfighting at some stage in the future, and must be able to do so credibly in order to contribute to NATO’s deterrent posture. Heavy armoured forces and main battle tanks will remain an important element of warfighting, and will therefore continue to occupy an important position in the British Army’s Order of Battle. There have been concerns about the vulnerability and survivability of main battle tanks on the contemporary battlefield, as well as the ability of lighter forces backed up by ISTAR capabilities and indirect fires to create difficult operational problems for the enemy in high-intensity warfighting. However, heavy armoured forces – through their substantial combat power – ensure that a force can remain mobile while in direct contact with enemy forces, and as such heavy armour still has a valuable role to play on the battlefields of the future.</p> - -<p>However, adaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility. Secondary requirements are numerous, and include better use of deception and decoys to counter improved enemy ISTAR capabilities, and the potential integration of uncrewed ground vehicles to add situational awareness and defensive capabilities without increasing vehicles’ weights (already problematically high). The British Army’s heavy armoured forces will also need to relearn old lessons about logistics, sustainment, vehicle recovery and the reconstitution of armoured formations that have suffered a significant level of battlefield attrition. Finally, crew expertise matters, and will – as always – be essential for keeping vehicles in working order on operations and minimising the need for the concentration of vulnerable elements of the support apparatus such as forward repair facilities. Investment in the British Army’s people should therefore not be overlooked in the heavy armour context.</p> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War is the largest conventional land war in Europe since 1945. The conflict has registered high losses – many at the hands of new weapons – among the main battle tank (MBT) fleets of both sides, and in this context a longstanding debate has regained prominence: what future does the MBT have on the battlefield or in the force structures of modern militaries? The debate has been one of the more controversial and divisive ones over the future of warfighting. Although tanks were pivotal to 20th century warfare, their utility was often questioned – even during the Cold War – in a way that the utility of other revolutionary technologies such as aviation and radio communications was not.</p> - -<p>Tanks were introduced in the First World War to reduce casualties and break the deadlock imposed by trench warfare, notably in the Battle of Cambrai in 1917. After experimentation and increasing adoption during the interwar period, the Second World War saw tanks become established as a mainstay in the European and North African theatres of operations. However, since 1945, their utility has routinely been questioned and discussed. Most – but not all – of these discussions have concluded that MBTs still retain utility, but nevertheless concerns (particularly about whether the role of tanks can survive when faced with new threats) are periodically revived by instances of high losses.</p> - -<p>This debate is hugely relevant to the UK defence establishment (and particularly the British Army) as it looks to overcome years of underinvestment in conventional capabilities. A major component of this paper, therefore, will be to identify the implications of the MBT’s changing role for the British Army’s force structure if it is to have the capability to fight on future battlefields. In 2022, Chief of the General Staff General Sir Patrick Sanders declared that Operation Mobilise – to deter Russian aggression in Europe – was to be the British Army’s priority. This will mean the acceleration of the Future Soldier modernisation programme, with the aim of restoring the British Army’s ability to conduct mobile combined arms warfare. While the strategy is explicit about having a positional character, this is because it is largely focused on deterrence and as such will involve posturing.</p> - -<p>However, for deterrence to work, it must be credible. Credibility requires not just a presentational force but the ability to warfight, and British warfighting doctrine is defined by the “manoeuvrist approach” – doctrinal terminology for manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre and heavy armoured forces – both heavy armoured combat vehicles classed as MBTs and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) or armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and the associated support and logistics vehicles and apparatus – are deeply interconnected. Heavy armoured forces are known for their ability to manoeuvre and for using their unique characteristics to maintain this ability, even against other heavy armoured forces, and have traditionally been able to remain mobile under heavy direct and indirect enemy fire, and to engage and destroy conventional ground forces (including other tanks). Heavy armoured forces, if they are well-trained and well-led, can also quickly reform after taking objectives, and then immediately exploit further opportunities to do the same again (although, as will be explored below, these characteristics are not absolute and may not be guaranteed in future). The key characteristics of heavy armoured forces can be summarised as mobility, firepower and protection – criteria against which individual vehicles are judged.</p> - -<p>These concerns about the continued viability of MBTs, coupled with the clear imperative for the British Army to retain its ability to credibly fight wars, provide the context for this study, which examines the fate of the MBT and heavy armoured forces within the British Army, based on a survey of the changes to combined arms warfare and of evolving British strategic policy. There is much at stake here: force structure changes and procurement decisions have long lead times and must be made early. Unpacking the debate about heavy armoured forces in sufficient depth to identify trade-offs and opportunities (and, indeed, dead-ends) is therefore essential if policymakers and military leaders are to reshape land forces so as to remain credible for future warfighting.</p> - -<p>This study frames issues in broad terms in order to be as accessible and useful as possible to international military practitioners, academics, policymakers and observers from outside the British defence establishment, but is UK-focused and, where appropriate, explores inherently technical issues. Chapter I covers British policy in the context of strategic warfighting requirements. Chapter II analyses the basics of combat power and the characteristics of MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles in order to provide a baseline understanding of/guide to the underlying issues. Chapter III covers the challenges to the continued utility of heavy armoured forces and discusses what adaptations should be made to ensure that they remain viable in the context of the changing threat landscape and operational environment. The paper concludes with recommendations for the way ahead.</p> - -<p>This is not an engineering study, and although engineering issues will be introduced or discussed where pertinent, some issues – for example, the adoption of remote turrets or rubberised tracks – may be left unaddressed where they do not have sufficient relevance for the tactical, operational or policy choices identified. As a primarily theoretical analysis of the nature of operations, the study relies on a mixture of approaches to address the questions outlined above: a survey of the existing literature; engagement with military practitioners; observations of military exercises; and fieldwork in relevant operational areas. Much of the utility of armour is reliant on enablers and supporting capabilities, as well as the coordination of different arms in combination: combined arms. Thus, parts of this study will discuss other systems, rather than focusing solely on tanks per se. This is essential, as the utility of MBTs/heavy armoured forces cannot be adequately addressed if that capability is examined in isolation. However, the primary focus will be MBTs, as the issues of combined arms integration and supporting capabilities are too broad to be addressed comprehensively here.</p> - -<p>As will be outlined in Chapter I, this study is predicated on credible conventional deterrence and thus the ability to warfight on land as an important pillar of security. Although this is current British policy, it is not a universally advocated strategy, and may justifiably be questioned. The key variables that determine the validity of conventional deterrence include to what degree an adversary’s activity is constrained by how it sees its options for escalation management, and whether it is actually deterred from crossing the threshold of conventional war. Only the latter question can be answered within the scope of this study, through the metric of credibility. Subordinate to this are questions of the flexibility of conventional forces. Arguably, conventional forces have utility across the spectrum of operations short of high-intensity war, and indeed it has sometimes even been argued that they are essential for these tasks due to the limited combat power of lighter forces. Consequently this study will, as a secondary consideration, also briefly touch on the dual-utility of heavy armoured forces for expeditionary and sub-threshold operations, as the strategic questions left unaddressed by this study indicate that it is essential that heavy forces whose primary application is high-intensity war should have secondary utility or be adaptable to other lower-intensity forms of competition and conflict. In more practical terms, the fact that the UK’s strategic imperatives and defence policy could change in the future means that these questions about utility, which affect force structure and procurement decisions for conventional forces, should not be omitted.</p> - -<p>One final baseline assumption for this study is that the future of armoured warfare should not be predicated on a less-capable adversary employing its forces poorly. Russia, the declared adversary and primary threat to NATO, is in the process of depleting its conventional forces, which have also proved themselves to have been presentational – investment was dedicated to impressive-looking technical capabilities, while basic practicalities were ignored. Catastrophic political decisions in the Kremlin, aside from the overall strategic blunder of launching a full-scale invasion in the first place, led to the prioritisation of equipment procurement over reforming the Russian armed forces’ system of logistics and sustainment, hierarchical command structure, training and education doctrine, and military culture. The failure to recognise the need for revolutionary organisational change has contributed to Russia’s military failures, but the extent of the self-created disaster in Ukraine will inevitably prompt reflection. Russia is likely to learn and rebuild its capabilities, while remaining an adversary and European security threat for the foreseeable future. This long-term threat should not be underestimated.</p> - -<h3 id="i-warfighting-as-a-component-of-british-defence-policy">I. Warfighting as a Component of British Defence Policy</h3> - -<p>Although warfighting has returned to prominence for the British defence establishment, the progressive reduction of Britain’s fleet of MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles over the past 14 years represents a cause for concern. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated that heavy armoured forces, which were deemed to include the Challenger 2 and Warrior IFV force, and the supporting AS90 self-propelled artillery and Titan and Trojan engineering vehicles, would be reduced in number, albeit with sufficient numbers retained for high-end warfighting and maintaining the possibility of regenerating these capabilities should the situation demand it. However, the Review was agnostic about the divisional force structure and only specified the retention of a division headquarters under which brigades might be commanded. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, meanwhile, committed explicitly to a warfighting division, stating that its ground combat component would comprise two armoured infantry battalions and two Strike Brigades. Although the armoured infantry brigades would continue to field Warrior and Challenger 2, the Strike Brigades, with their Ajax vehicles, indicated a shift towards comparatively lighter mechanised forces that would trade sheer combat power for increased strategic mobility.</p> - -<p>The 2021 Integrated Review likewise directed the British Army to become smaller and lighter. Former Chief of the General Staff General Sir Nick Carter considered competition – the constant use of a blend of military and non-military tools by the UK’s enemies and adversaries without breaching a threshold that might trigger a decisive military response – to be a higher priority than warfighting, and directed that concept/capability development and restructuring efforts should reflect this prioritisation. This approach flipped older assumptions that the Army’s warfighting functions served as an insurance policy to be held at readiness, with warfighting formations being able to adapt to lower-intensity conflicts if required. Although counterintuitive, there was a certain rationale to this, as well as plenty of historical evidence suggesting that capabilities developed for low-intensity conflict could prove not only useful but transformational for high-end warfighting.</p> - -<p>Despite this clear direction of travel, the aforementioned elements of British defence policy have received significant criticism, with repeated controversies over whether plans have been realistic or affordable. As for the higher strategic direction that such plans are intended to deliver against, the 2023 NATO Vilnius Summit did not include any detailed updates regarding the UK’s direct contribution to the Alliance, and Paul Cornish has noted that the recent Integrated Review Refresh included 22 sub-strategies, which therefore provides little guidance for subordinate parts of government about what to prioritise (given that resources and leverage are finite). While explicitly de-prioritising certain areas of policy can appear undiplomatic and incur a short-term political cost, the current failure to clearly prioritise has resulted in the members of the professional military community expressing increasingly divergent understandings of what is being asked of them. Some fundamental points about the Integrated Review therefore require examination. First and foremost, the Integrated Review Refresh, although it argues for a tilt, still privileges the Euro-Atlantic over the Indo-Pacific, and the land domain and Russia are seen as the most prominent arena and threat to the UK. In terms of alliances, NATO is “the highest priority”. While the Indo-Pacific and China receive a great deal of attention in their own right within the Integrated Review, this paper is redicated on the view that Indo-Pacific security is most efficiently supported by ensuring that European security is adequately addressed by European countries, such that lines of effort in the Indo-Pacific are not undermined by drawing excessively on the US capabilities required in that theatre.</p> - -<p>Even with regard to European security, the Defence Command Paper outlines other capabilities that will be grown as a matter of priority. This is a different approach from other members of NATO. The French Army, for example, is aiming to restore its ability to conduct armoured warfare at corps level, and while many French units are light- or medium-weight, the eventual replacement of the Leclerc with another more modern MBT remains a key French defence policy aspiration. The British Army will not experience the same regeneration for warfighting at scale, and its heavy armoured capabilities will not grow unless there is a fundamental shift in guidance; however, neither has the British Army been directed to shed this capability. The Future Soldier Guide issued in 2021 outlined the British Army’s warfighting division, 3rd Division, as containing two Armoured Brigade Combat Teams equipped with Ajax, an upgraded Challenger 3 and Boxer, and a Deep Recce Strike Brigade Combat Team equipped, after restructuring, with a mixture of guided multiple launch rocket system (GMLRS) and AS90 fires capabilities and Ajax and Jackal 2 for reconnaissance. And so although the structure and enabling capabilities of the British Army’s warfighting component are shifting, it is clear that the British Army will retain its heavy armoured forces, exemplified by the Challenger series of MBT, for warfighting: a rare scenario to be sure, but one at the core of why the UK maintains its armed forces in the first place.</p> - -<p>Despite the focus on warfighting, a competing priority that must be highlighted is that of expeditionary operations and limited conflict, and the role that heavy armoured forces can play in these contexts. The post-Cold War move away from conventional deterrence, during which heavy forces suffered from a degree of neglect, was part of a shifting paradigm that prompted a resurgence of interest in smaller conflicts dating back to Britain’s colonial era. During the Cold War, there had been divergent imperatives: on the one hand, to resource conventional deterrence between superpower-backed alliances; and, on the other, to fight small wars in distant expeditionary conflicts, often colonial in nature. Both scenarios involved superpower and ideological competition, but manifested very differently in terms of the lower stakes involved in the expeditionary conflicts (at least for the Soviet and NATO participants). Previously, the problem was conceived of as how to use lighter, more agile, more politically engaged expeditionary forces when militaries were prioritising heavier European warfighting forces that were based more on maintaining the peace through deterrence. The prospect of a major war between superpowers was a frightening one, but also a scenario that was more easily comprehended by the military units that were committed to it. The debate re-emerged, supposedly new but echoing the same considerations that previous generations had grappled with: conventional deterrence versus grey-zone competition, with the split between heavy and light forces predicated upon deployability and sustainment.</p> - -<p>Despite the traditional division of labour between heavy and light forces, therefore, a strong case has been made for the utility of heavy armoured forces even in such delicate missions as peace support. In positive contrast to the shortcomings of Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, for example, the Swedish-Danish-Norwegian heavy armoured battalion Nordbat 2 exemplified this utility in Bosnia in 1993 when it was able to provide decisive overmatch and retain freedom of movement, which in this case was essential to the UN mandate in their area of operations. Canadian forces, too, found Leopard 2 MBTs to be invaluable tactically in the Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaign, despite having envisioned being able to make do with the 17-tonne wheeled Light Armoured Vehicle III (LAV III).</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, arguments in favour of the continued use of heavy armour outside of high-end warfighting are likely to fall victim to the financial and logistical challenges associated with deploying and sustaining heavy armour. Even for the best-resourced militaries, heavy armour is likely to be an unaffordable luxury except when facing a peer or near-peer conventional force. Likewise, for all the strong arguments that can be made in favour of Nordbat 2’s deployment to Bosnia, it must be remembered that there were numerous peace support operations ongoing at the time, all of which could lay justifiable claim, on moral or humanitarian grounds, to receiving serious military resourcing from the international community. The realities of multiple conflicting demands and limited capacity mean that British heavy armoured forces will at best be committed sparingly to such future missions, if at all, as a secondary benefit of maintaining a warfighting force that might on occasion donate small force elements if able to do so. Their presence can help peacekeepers, policing missions, counterinsurgencies and stability operations to focus on their core missions more effectively (through tactical overmatch), thus removing the distraction of these missions getting bogged down in indecisive combat situations. This useful function of heavy armoured forces should not be overlooked.</p> - -<p>The broad utility of heavy armoured forces across the spectrum of conflict – both their utility in their primary role, and as a hedge against future sub-threshold contingencies should the acute requirement for conventional deterrence in Europe decline in the long term – means that, from one perspective, the argument in favour of MBTs is clear-cut. Yet sceptical arguments about MBTs generally point to technological changes that compromise the ability of heavy armoured vehicles to maintain one or more of their three traditional characteristics – mobility, firepower and protection. Many of these concerns are valid, particularly those relating to pervasive UAV ISTAR, networked headquarters and forces, and precision fires able to strike large numbers of targets far from the frontline, which bodes poorly for forces that are either slow, easy to detect or require a large logistics tail. In this conception of the future, lighter ground forces will be more viable through a reduced signature, more operational mobility, and through their reduced cost allowing them to be generated in larger numbers, offsetting the enemy’s ability to concentrate precision fires against an identifiable centre of mass. Implicit in this vision is that geographical concentration of forces in the attack will be difficult, meaning that units will have to fight dispersed for an increasing proportion of operations.</p> - -<p>As will be discussed in Chapter III, this hypothetical conception of the future is not unchallenged and its precise implications are disputed. Nevertheless, experimental evidence indicates that changes of one sort or another will be required for ground forces to remain effective, with experience from Ukraine suggesting that alternatives to dispersion are to “dig deep, or move fast”. All three of these alternatives will likely play a role during different phases of operations and campaigns, but dispersion looks set to remain the prevalent approach, and several resulting adaptations to force composition and structures would in theory create a survivable, viable warfighting force. But it would be one that lacked combat power in the direct fight – that is, when engaging an enemy force within direct line-of-sight using weapons systems organic to the units employing them (whether supported by enabling indirect capabilities or not). The conflicting imperatives to disperse or concentrate forces pose difficult dilemmas that have yet to be conclusively resolved. The resolution of these questions requires an examination of exactly what MBTs bring to high-end combined arms warfighting – and it is to this that we turn next.</p> - -<h3 id="ii-the-role-of-the-mbt-in-combined-arms-warfare">II. The Role of the MBT in Combined Arms Warfare</h3> - -<p>The theoretical underpinnings of combined arms warfare, though well established, are worth reiterating here. While heavy armoured forces have numerous applications, their primary purpose is warfighting – the application of violence in order to defeat an enemy. This requires combat power, traditionally understood to comprise three core elements: mobility; protection; and firepower. Firepower is sometimes referred to as lethality or offensive power. Mobility, protection and firepower have long been components of combat power in US Army doctrine, and provide a widely accepted theoretical framework. Leadership was sometimes considered to be an additional fourth component. In US doctrine, this model was expanded to eight components by 2017: “leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection”, a departure from the underlying principles that attempted to integrate disparate elements into the model. The result, at the risk of blurring what aspect of war was being described by the original model, nevertheless highlights the importance of supporting arms and integration.</p> - -<p>This model of combat power is not directly replicated in British doctrine, but, where combat power is euphemistically referenced in the British Army’s keystone ADP Land publication, it is seated within the physical component of fighting power. The tactical functions of a combined arms force provide the best analogue to US doctrine: these are command, intelligence, outreach, information activities, fires, manoeuvre, protection and sustainment, a valuable contrasting model in that it highlights the inevitable transition from warfighting to stability operations, even in the context of a warfighting campaign, in a way that US doctrine does not.</p> - -<p>Other academic models can also be useful. For example, operability has been hypothesised by Yoo, Park and Choi as an alternative fourth function of combat power when considering the original triangular framework at the platform level; the technical and tactical reasons for this will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. While operability might better be described as a cross-cutting attribute that helps deliver and sustain all forms of combat power, and the suggestion may be conceptually flawed, the importance of operability, logistics and sustainment should nevertheless be highlighted.</p> - -<p>Understanding warfighting and combat power in terms of the original triangular framework of mobility, protection and firepower is useful, as it encourages thinking about how a force should function overall and deliver the required effects when conducting operations in the land domain. In particular, the triangular model is useful for identifying the core trade-offs that are inherent to different types of force, whereas augmented versions of the model include elements – for example, leadership and command and control – that are applicable regardless of the type of force being assembled, and which therefore do not usefully illustrate the trade-offs between heavy armoured forces (built around MBTs) and other lighter formations. However, as will be discussed, integration of other elements is essential to ensure the viability of heavy armoured forces, and so should not be discounted.</p> - -<p>Ultimately, and regardless of which variation of the conceptual model of combat power is preferred, their value lies in countering the technological determinism that is prevalent in commentary on defence and security issues. While this determinism is often driven by an appreciation of technological capability, it can result in overestimations of the impact of technological change, or in a failure to understand the second- and third-order impacts of this change on other parts of a military system and on battlefield dynamics. All of the elements discussed above factor into effective combined arms warfare at some stage. Those forces that make warfighting their forte and can credibly fight wars at scale do so in large part due to combining arms, whereby a variety of different arms – artillery, infantry, armour, engineers, logistics, medical services and so on – act in concert. However, not all militaries can be considered combined arms forces, as this status is achieved only by mastering the simultaneous integration of capabilities to create the right synchronised effects to prevail in war, preferably decisively.</p> - -<h4 id="mobility-firepower-and-protection">Mobility, Firepower and Protection</h4> - -<p>Within this model, MBTs are not the only element of a force that delivers combat power. At a platform level, however, the original triangular concept of mobility, firepower and protection best encapsulates their value, for while they trade these characteristics off against each other (as does any type of platform), MBTs nevertheless embody all three in a unique, heightened manner. The way that armour operates at the platform level governs the broader tactical and operational dynamics when these vehicles are fielded at scale. A deeper understanding of armoured vehicles is therefore useful, as it explains why they have developed the characteristics that now typify them.</p> - -<p>MBTs developed their current format in the interwar period: a tracked hull with an engine; an independently rotating turret; and a main armament. By the end of the Second World War, this configuration had been almost universally refined to eliminate features such as hull-mounted machine guns and had standardised the MBT crew at either three personnel – commander, gunner and driver (if an autoloader is used to reload the main gun) or four (if an extra crew member is added to load the main gun manually). Apart from the driver, most MBTs have all other personnel located in the turret and turret basket assembly.</p> - -<p>Mobility is the most complex of the three characteristics that this configuration delivers. Although tracked vehicles are valued for their versatile mobility characteristics, MBTs and heavy armoured forces should not be described as the most mobile type of formation: rather, they are useful under certain circumstances. Physical terrain is not homogenous and so generalisations tend to be unreliable, and light infantry can of course move through and fight in almost any environment impassable to other forces if given sufficient time (the obvious example being primary jungle). Restrictive terrain has – perhaps erroneously – been deemed unsuitable for armoured forces. Tracked armoured vehicles can operate in most types of mountainous terrain except for alpine-like mountain ranges (where even light infantry would require technical rock-climbing skills to achieve full mobility) and the summit zones of interior and coastal mountain ranges. However, outside of these extreme instances, it is broadly correct to say that tracked vehicles – which in military terms largely mean heavy armoured forces – are the most tactically mobile.</p> - -<p>The technical reason for this is that the increased contact area of tracked vehicles’ running gear generally gives them lower ground pressure than their wheeled counterparts, thus providing improved thrust and traction (even if the tracked vehicles are in absolute terms far heavier). Theoretically, this improved traction will be less pronounced on loose or frictional soil (such as sand) than on cohesive soil (for example mud or clay), but in practical terms the difference is limited. Tracked vehicles are less likely to become bogged in or to slip, and can thus cross more difficult terrain than wheeled vehicles. Provided that ground is not so soft that vehicles start to sink, tracked armoured vehicles also have a significant advantage over light infantry, and if the ground is trafficable then their engine power means that they will be able to move much faster than dismounts.</p> - -<p>Aside from the power of the engine and the design of the drivetrain, a major limitation on the off-road mobility of individual vehicles is the shearing effect between the tracks (or wheels) and the terrain, which causes a loss of traction and hampers vehicles’ ability to cross ground. Shearing is most likely to occur on steep slopes; traversing slopes is significantly more difficult than heading directly up ascents and down descents, and the consequences of a failed traverse are more likely to involve a roll-over. With regard to clearance angles, the approach, departure and belly-clearance or ramp angles will also influence what obstacles a vehicle can climb over. While wheeled vehicles are also good at traversing slopes, tracks have the advantage of being comparatively resilient to small arms fire and fragmentation from artillery, which have a tendency to shred rubber tyres and immobilise wheeled vehicles. This allows tracked vehicles to retain mobility even in the midst of heavy fighting, although this comes at the cost of increased mechanical complexity, with implications over longer distances that will be discussed shortly.</p> - -<p>Hull shape and drivetrain design can give remarkable tactical mobility under the right circumstances. During the Korean War, British troops often marvelled at the ability of their Centurion MBTs to climb up slippery, muddy hills and to wade through flooded rice paddy fields. Unfortunately, this kind of ability involves inherent trade-offs, and different designs within the same vehicle class and formal tactical role can exhibit markedly different performance. For example, a low number of road wheels grants sufficient tactical mobility while being mechanically simple, but the resulting high ground pressure degrades the ability to operate on soft ground. Likewise, tracked armour is excellent in mountainous terrain up to a certain gradient, but where lighter tracked vehicles excel, heavier tracked armour might struggle, both because of tight mountain roads and generally constricted terrain, and due to the weight and ground pressure of the vehicles making steep slopes impossible to traverse. Most principles and techniques of off-road tactical mobility are transferable between wheeled and tracked vehicles, but tracked vehicles tend to be more forgiving. Nevertheless, reading the ground and how to move across it is a skill, and tanks must still be driven carefully. With professional and well-trained operators, heavy armoured vehicles can cross difficult ground quickly, and push through many obstacles, in a way that other forces cannot. Likewise, the mobility advantage does not necessarily make wheeled or heavy tracked armour more suited to manoeuvre. In forest, jungle or mountainous terrain, armour may be better employed positionally due to the requirement for slow, careful movement, or by leveraging its high level of firepower and protection when forcing an enemy from key terrain, with manoeuvre derived from the employment of light infantry. It is first and foremost the environment and context that determine how heavy armour is employed. The employment of armour to enable manoeuvre is a product of geography first, and of the characteristics of the vehicles second.</p> - -<p>Over long distances, wheeled forces may enjoy comparative advantage over heavy tracked armour if trafficable routes are available. Due to the simplicity of their running gear and drivetrains, wheeled vehicles require less maintenance and experience a far lower breakdown rate. They also require less fuel, and the reduced maintenance requirement in turn reduces the volume of spare parts, maintenance stores and recovery mechanics that need to accompany them. It has thus been argued that lighter wheeled vehicles provide better operational mobility when moving between positions, areas and objectives, an attribute that is written into the British Army’s Strike Concept. The truth is more complex: heavy armour is still able to move at pace over great operational distances, and can do so over worse ground, whereas wheeled armour, with its different mobility characteristics, remains competitive with its heavier counterparts at the operational level, depending on the environment.</p> - -<p>Issues of strategic mobility also need to be considered. When driving into theatre or to a forward assembly area, MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles are carried on heavy equipment transporters (HETs) for substantial parts of the journey to reduce wear and tear on the drivetrain and running gear. Long road moves are often associated with a high rate of breakdowns if heavy armoured forces need to drive without support from HETs, and those vehicles that do arrive will still incur a higher maintenance burden. MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles can technically be airlifted into a given theatre, but only the largest transport aircraft are able to carry them, and cannot transport them in large numbers. Thus for large armoured formations to arrive in theatre quickly, an unattainably vast strategic airlift capability would be needed, as otherwise such a move would be impossible within any reasonable timeframe due to the number of trips that would be required. Access to runways of sufficient dimensions (and paved to a standard to safely accept heavy transport aircraft) is also a limiting factor. Sealift is the most efficient method of moving MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles over long distances and between theatres, but this requires time and safe ports at which to offload vehicles (unless a specialised amphibious landing capability for heavy armoured vehicles is also factored in). Railway transport is also efficient, but involves similar bottlenecks to airlift, this time with regard to rolling stock and available railheads.</p> - -<p>All modes of long-distance transport for heavy vehicles still require practice if they are to be completed without unnecessary delays; no one should underestimate the inherent coordination challenge facing the combat units themselves, the logistics units supporting them and the organisations in charge of the infrastructure stemming from the distances involved and the transport volumes associated with large numbers of vehicles. Consequently, the threat posed by heavy armour is most credible when it is either forward-based or reserved for use within an operational distance of its home base. Nevertheless, it should be noted that deployment of heavy armoured forces is possible, and that medium armoured forces, particularly those built around tracked armoured vehicles (regardless of whether they are of a lighter weight) also incur many of the same costs and constraints.</p> - -<p>Protection is the one inherent attribute of heavy armoured forces that cannot be replicated by lighter combat vehicles. This protection traditionally came from large amounts of passive armour, either rolled homogenous steel or some form of composite material, which could deflect or absorb the energy from an incoming projectile. Passive armour can be angled, and is generally concentrated on the frontal aspect of vehicles in order to provide the best protection for the least weight. Some vehicles complement this arrangement with explosive reaction armour (ERA) blocks: boxes of explosives that detonate when struck with a sufficiently powerful projectile, dissipating the energy of the incoming projectile and reducing the likelihood of the armour being penetrated.</p> - -<p>Passive armour has increasingly been enhanced by active protection systems, which can be split into “hard kill” and “soft kill” systems. Hard-kill systems physically shoot down incoming projectiles. For example, Rheinmetall’s APS-Gen3 comprises short-range radars (which detect incoming projectiles on approach), electro-optical sensors (which locate projectiles immediately before impact) and an explosive countermeasure (which detonates to destroy the projectile) – this latter kinetic element could be described as a guided ERA block. Other systems, such as the Israeli-designed Trophy, fire their own shotgun-like munitions to intercept incoming projectiles. Soft kill systems are more diverse, and encompass any system that interrupts the guidance systems of incoming projectiles or the systems from which they are launched or guided. Retro-reflective detection, laser warning receivers and defensive electronic warfare systems all aid in the detection of anti-tank weapons attempting to target the vehicle. In terms of defeating the anti-tank systems themselves, lasers may be used to dazzle electro-optical sensors, while radio frequency jamming may serve to disrupt command signals between a missile and its launcher. While the technologies/methodologies of different soft-kill systems vary, they are for the most part only relevant to defeating guided systems. The promise – and limitations – of technological developments in this area will be discussed in the next chapter.</p> - -<p>In terms of firepower or lethality, modern MBTs remain one of the most potent platforms on the battlefield, particularly when focusing on direct line-of-sight or close-range engagements. This is due to the power of their main armament and their ability to carry other anti-tank weapons, all of which can quickly be brought to bear by virtue of being mounted in a stabilised turret. Jonathan House usefully split anti-tank weaponry into two categories – chemical energy weapons and kinetic energy weapons. This distinction remains valid and applies equally to weaponry mounted on MBTs, or on lighter vehicles, or carried by dismounted infantry. Chemical energy weapons typically equate to anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), although long-ranged precision fires and loitering munitions technically fit within this bracket; as these weapons are generally employed within the anti-tank role performed by other forces (with limited use by MBTs themselves), they will be discussed in Chapter 3. While MBTs do not have a monopoly on lethality, the size of MBTs as a platform means that carrying anti-tank weapons does not require them to forsake mobility.</p> - -<p>The kinetic energy weapons category essentially encompasses the main guns of MBTs, as self-propelled or towed anti-tank guns have been deemed tactically ineffective by most militaries, and man-portable anti-tank rifles are considered to be too low-powered to threaten all but the lightest modern armoured vehicles. Whether of Western or Russian design, MBT main guns now generally fire armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds, the core penetrator dart being made from either depleted uranium or tungsten. While other forms of munitions can be fired, other types of specialised anti-tank round such as high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) and high explosive squash head (HESH) are less effective against modern armour. If equipped with modern ammunition, the main gun remains a potent anti-armour weapon, with the added benefit of being comparatively light, quick to reload, and cheap.</p> - -<p>MBT main guns have long been stabilised, allowing them to fire accurately on the move. This remains a significant engineering challenge, putting established defence contractors who have mastered the manufacturing of stabilised guns at a distinct advantage to competitors. Most Western MBT main guns are of 120-mm calibre, which is the approximate maximum size for a main gun round that can be handled quickly by a human loader without mechanical assistance. Any significant increase in calibre would force Western heavy armour to swap the human loader for an autoloader: this would probably require the four-person crew of commander, gunner, loader and driver to be reduced by one, a move that is considered undesirable due to workflow issues both in the vehicle itself and in the field more generally. Were the fourth crew member to be retained alongside the autoloader, MBT turrets – which are already approaching practical size limits – would have to become even bigger. Given the trade-offs involved, and bar any unexpected technological advances in main gun technology, tank main guns are unlikely to significantly increase their lethality in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, they remain potent, especially when factoring in the weight and rate of fire that an MBT can employ from its stock of onboard ammunition.</p> - -<p>Overall, the ability of MBTs to quickly cross difficult terrain and obstacles, to quickly engage successive targets (including other MBTs) in their direct line-of-sight with a highly effective main gun, and their ability to absorb punishment and continue fighting unless targeted by dedicated anti-tank capabilities, make for a potent and flexible ground combat unit. While this comes at the cost of a higher logistics and sustainment framework to support them, MBTs’ sheer combat power makes them uniquely capable not only of destroying other heavy armoured forces (if employed correctly), but of maintaining momentum while doing so. They are particularly useful, if properly employed and enabled, for offensive operations transitioning to breakthrough-and-exploitation.</p> - -<p>In practical terms, breakthrough-and-exploitation corresponds to deep battle theory (or deep operations theory, in the parlance of its Soviet authors), which emerged in the run-up to the Second World War. This was an offensive doctrine centred on striking deep into an enemy’s rear areas following the penetration of its lines and then causing sufficient disruption to prevent an enemy from moving forces to effectively plug the hole in its lines or encircle the attacking forces. Breakthrough-and-exploitation is advantageous, if achieved, in that it can overrun rear areas, and is “designed to induce systemic collapse”. If momentum cannot be sustained, offensive operations may instead aim to bite and hold objectives and ground, a less ambitious but still valid approach to operational design. Of course, these concepts of operation date to the early- and mid-20th century, and the combined arms integration required for successful offensive operations of either kind will require adaptations to be made to force design, composition and structure. While many of these adaptations relate to the changing character of war and fall upon supporting arms, MBTs and the units fielding them must likewise embrace change to stay relevant.</p> - -<h3 id="iii-challenges-and-necessary-adaptations">III. Challenges and Necessary Adaptations</h3> - -<p>The challenges and necessary adaptations fall under several categories. Some relate to additions to the combined arms system, others to the integration of the component arms, and some to the MBTs at the core of heavy armoured forces. There are also two alternative force structures that in theory offer a warfighting capability with sufficient lethality to fight against heavy armoured forces: motorised or dismounted light forces equipped with ATGMs (but without the ability to fire them while mobile); and medium armoured forces. The utility of these alternative force structures for high-intensity warfighting is effectively a separate research question, as they are arguably in competition with heavy armoured forces. However, given that the question of their effectiveness against MBTs and heavy armoured forces overlaps with questions about the effectiveness of MBTs and heavy armoured force themselves, a brief overview is still required. More importantly, this overview encapsulates the technical challenges and adaptations required for MBTs due to the threat posed by ATGMs themselves. Armoured forces that fight on the move are mechanised, while those which fight by dismounting and working in conjunction with their infantry can be considered motorised; by this definition, for example, a Stryker brigade combat team is a motorised formation. These should be addressed as two separate but related structures, against which heavy armoured forces can be subjected to comparative assessment. Another major aspect to be addressed in depth relates to the support to and sustainment of MBT-equipped formations, an understudied area which is nevertheless fundamental to their viability. Finally, there are also issues of technological change at the platform level to be considered below.</p> - -<h4 id="pervasive-istarprecision-strike">Pervasive ISTAR/Precision Strike</h4> - -<p>A combination of pervasive ISTAR, command and control (C2) modernisation and strike capabilities through precision-guided munitions have been at the forefront of the debate about the changing character of warfare and the implications for military forces. One way that this should be countered is throug improved force protection, delivered by the adoption of new (or at least improved) capabilities and through restructuring combined arms formations. This issue has been covered extensively, and while the associated debates cannot be comprehensively re-examined in this paper, suffice to say that electronic warfare (EW), artillery and counterbattery capabilities, and short-range air defence (SHORAD) all play a role. The issue is in any case largely agnostic of force type – whether light and dismounted, or medium or heavy armoured: all force types must integrate the capabilities discussed and embrace change according to the evolving character of combined arms warfare. The one caveat is that, given that heavy armoured forces have a correspondingly larger logistics footprint and greater maintenance and support requirements than most other types of forces, they may prove particularly vulnerable to this changing battlefield dynamic if combined arms integration is not effective. There are several relevant issues to cover here.</p> - -<p>There are serious differences of opinion over the consequences of recent developments, including how to interpret the effectiveness and efficiency of C2 modernisation at moving information internally and the effectiveness of precision fires at fighting the deep battle. In the context of the difficult challenge that the deployment of uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) imposes on land forces, the debate surrounding the best way forward often loses sight of the fact that the pervasive ISTAR and precision fires complex offers quite narrow effects. Drones and precision fires face the same inherent boundaries that aviation encountered in previous eras: aviation could attack enemy forces and systems throughout the area from the frontline to the strategic deep, and have outsized effect in certain regards, but could not independently hold ground or control populations, nor have other persistent effects. Similarly, drones and precision fires, even though they constitute a distinct line of effort, are still effectively only enablers of other ground forces. What drones and precision fires have long promised – and are now able to achieve – is attrition of key capabilities, and potentially (if targeting is done properly) the degrading of the enemy military’s system of systems. Events such as Exercise Green Dagger, nested within the larger Exercise Warfighter 22, both of which took place in late October 2021, provide evidence about the potency of pervasive ISTAR, C2 modernisation and precision strike when a professional NATO force implements highly refined targeting procedures. In this instance, long-ranged precision fires cued on by a combination of UAV ISTAR and traditional forward reconnaissance patrols mauled participating ground forces, and while manoeuvre was possible during certain intervals, at other times ground combat formations that were identified while in unfavourable positions were heavily attrited, with few options available in response. Lighter ground forces experienced struggles of their own, with issues relating to attrition and a failure to maintain momentum in the close fight. Furthermore, although the impact of new technologies was concerning, it should be remembered that open desert environments provided ideal conditions for UAS, and the lopsided performance under these conditions would not necessarily be replicable in a different climate and in more complex terrain. Even in Ukraine’s Donbas region, characterised by open fields and limited cover, the extensive use of UAS – for all the changes it has wrought – has yet to prove decisive and has not pushed traditional ground combat capabilities from the battlefield.</p> - -<p>A further consideration concerns the emphasis placed on offensive capabilities without the same regard for their defensive counterparts. Following a 20-year period of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during which neither the air domain nor the electromagnetic spectrum was contested, even the exceptionally well-resourced US military has come to exhibit a mismatch between these different specialisations. While UAS and precision fires technology have been invested in and progressively refined, defensive EW, SHORAD and counter-UAS (CUAS) have received sporadic and comparatively limited attention. Of these, only CUAS has claimed a belated prominence in the discourse about the future of warfare. Forces rotating through iterations of exercises such as Warfighter are exploring how to address the issue, but the evidence suggests that, rather than this being an inherent offence–defence mismatch which favours new technologies, Western forces are simply playing catch-up and need to rebalance their capabilities and concepts of operations.</p> - -<p>One resultant avenue that is often forgotten is within the broad field of camouflage, concealment, deception and decoys (C2D2), where camouflage and concealment receive far more attention than deception and decoys. Part of this is because it is easier to build standardised technical solutions or procedures to implement camouflage and concealment. Deception, on the other hand, is situation-dependent, and requires intellectual investment and problem solving for every iteration. It is also difficult to do consistently and effectively in the absence of a nuanced understanding of the adversary’s procedures and mindset – understanding of enemy technical ISTAR capabilities alone will not suffice. Meanwhile, the cost of decoys can create disincentives to utilising them extensively in training, and there is also a risk that deception and decoys will draw too much resource and undermine the main effort. Depending on the type of decoys used, significant numbers of personnel might be needed to manage them, especially if decoy units and activities are to be convincing even when viewed with a variety of different sensors and detection capabilities. (As a basic example, an enemy might be convinced that a decoy vehicle is real when viewing it in the visual light spectrum, but its thermal signature or the lack of radio frequency activity could reveal it for what it is, meaning that an enemy with capable and diligent ISTAR specialists would likely not be deceived for long.) One solution might be to homogenise the appearance and signature of ground forces, containerising logistics, ensuring that vehicles appear as similar as possible, and adopting communications systems that disguise which nodes are of critical importance – mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) or mesh networks are a good example here, as this kind of disguise is an inherent feature of the way that they transfer data.</p> - -<p>Likewise, simulated formation-level activity in the electromagnetic spectrum may not stand up to scrutiny if cyber analysis reveals inconsistencies or a lack of concurrent activity in the social media space, as the pervasiveness of social media and the tendency of local inhabitants to naturally document any unusual activity happening in their vicinity means that such inconsistencies can be easily detected using open sources; such activity is hard to control, suppress or convincingly fabricate. Improving the D2 element of C2D2 is therefore a challenging proposition in terms of both resourcing and overall feasibility. Nevertheless, if turned into a dedicated line of effort and practised and refined on exercise, it may prove a powerful tool for creating uncertainty, slowing enemy decision-making, and causing the misallocation of enemy resources, all of which increase the survivability of ground forces.</p> - -<p>An alternative approach to force protection and C2D2 is that of counter-reconnaissance. Although counter-reconnaissance – prioritising offensive action against an enemy’s ISTAR rather than relying on passive or reactive force protection – is a longstanding concept, militaries have only partially adapted it in response to technological change. In an example that proves useful for illustrating both current challenges and potential solutions, in February 2020 the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division took part in Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 20-03, a computer-based simulation. The division found itself fighting a difficult initial shaping battle against enemy long-ranged precision fires and ISTAR assets due to attrition that these enemy capabilities were causing. Passive and reactive air defence deployed against UAS proved inadequate, and so the division approached the problem not as one of force protection but of prioritising the targeting and destruction of enemy ISTAR in order to break their kill chain. The 25th Infantry Division attempted to target different elements throughout the kill chain – the UAS themselves, dismounted forward observers, and UAS ground control stations, as the launchers for enemy indirect fires were assigned to corps-level assets. They had little success against UAS, downing some systems but being unable to destroy enough to have any overall effect. UAS ground control stations were identified as a more vulnerable element of the kill chain. The prioritisation of the counter-UAS battle, and the detection and collation of the enemy forces’ electronic and signals signature allowed the division to understand what effects they needed to apply and where, though the division’s own C2 processes proved insufficiently integrated to consistently destroy identified targets or render the enemy’s UAS network ineffective until the division could adapt and reorganise these processes. While this adaptation was taking place, the division’s ground manoeuvre elements had been badly attrited.</p> - -<p>While accepting the limitations of such simulations in terms of realism, even those as well-resourced and layered as Warfighter, and that the measures taken achieved only partial success within the duration of the exercise, nonetheless the division’s identification of the least successful line of effort (kinetic CUAS) and the most promising (aggressive counter-reconnaissance against enemy ground stations) provides a useful indicator of the direction that force restructuring and the reform of concepts of operation should take. Overall, for heavy armour to be survivable, combined arms formations need to be able, one way or another, to prevent an enemy from saturating the battlespace with UAS, disrupt or slow down the links between UAS sensors and the precision weapons to which they feed targeting information, and to retain the ability to deceive.</p> - -<h4 id="alternative-ground-combat-force-structures">Alternative Ground Combat Force Structures</h4> - -<p><em>ATGMs and Fighting Dismounted</em></p> - -<p>In the direct fight, increasingly capable ATGMs pose the most obvious threat to MBTs. While opposing MBTs can be armed with barrel-launched or tube-launched ATGMs, the fact that ATGMs do not rely on velocity means that they can be launched from a tube, and that in theory any light vehicle or dismounted soldier can thus be equipped with an effective anti-tank weapon. The technology continues to develop, and at present the lethality of modern systems such as Javelin, NLAW and Kornet is difficult for MBTs to counter directly. The most effective ATGMs, such as Javelin, have a top-attack function whereby the missile guides itself via an irregular trajectory to strike the weaker top armour of a targeted vehicle. Top-attack munitions also have the advantage of being difficult to counter with active protection systems (APS), as these must track and calculate the trajectory of the incoming missile in order to intercept it. However, ATGMs come at a high per unit cost, and top-attack munitions are the most expensive of all (and will require skilled operators until sensor and guidance technology improves). They are also bulky and heavy for dismounted infantry to carry, not to mention the difficulties of a dismounted unit carrying more than a handful of spare missiles with it, are slow to reload compared with the main gun of an MBT, and so have severe tactical constraints, even if they are more lethal in absolute terms. In a direct line-of-sight fight with MBTs and heavy armoured forces, the operators of ATGMs can be vulnerable, although if they are well-sited and implement good battlefield discipline to minimise their visual signature, they are very difficult to spot and can be used to conduct effective ambushes.</p> - -<p>ATGM use by lighter armoured forces bears consideration, as these forces can in theory conduct offensive operations. Here, it is worth differentiating between mounted and dismounted forces. The US experience is that any medium formation that requires dismounts for lethality will be difficult to manage because of the constant transition between mounted and dismounted tactics. The British experience of exercising dismounted ATGM-armed light cavalry forces in the anti-armour role resulted in similar conclusions. Such forces are versatile and effective in defensive operations but difficult to use for offensive purposes due to the time required to manoeuvre and deploy them. In order to attack a heavy armoured force, a medium armoured force without mobile anti-armour capabilities of sufficient lethality will generally need to move to within 3 km of the enemy, advance or infiltrate on foot, and engage with man-portable anti-armour weapons. If the medium motorised force is paired with more mobile anti-armour capabilities such as heavy armour of its own, these dismounts can operate in a targeting role, but this points to their being a complementary capability rather than a substitute.</p> - -<p>There are some advantages to motorised anti-armour capabilities. On operations in Afghanistan, without tracks and with a quiet engine, Strykers were found to be able to approach targets without being detected before deploying their dismounts. However, displacement and exfiltration is difficult in general, as is manoeuvre. If a medium motorised force is committed against a heavy armoured force, the sub-units that make contact with the enemy will lose momentum and the initiative, although they will be able to hold ground and retain lethal effectiveness.</p> - -<p>In complex terrain, medium motorised forces may fit operational needs. During the Battle of Irpin in the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukrainian infantry forces armed with ATGMs were not only lethal but also extremely mobile. However, the terrain around Irpin, Bucha and Hostomel is not conducive to armoured and mechanised mobility: the three suburbs are bounded by dense forest, and most of the open ground is part of the marshy floodplain around the Irpin and Bucha rivers, presenting a further obstacle. The village of Demydiv was one of many deliberately flooded to block Russian movement. The Russian Army did use light infantry in its attempts to manoeuvre away from the main roads, but these performed poorly. However, the battle was one of urban and forest fighting that heavily favoured the defender, and Ukrainian victory owed much to Russian planning failures – both factors being situational and not necessarily replicable.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, evidence from Ukraine suggests that fighting armoured forces is difficult and dangerous for ATGM-armed dismounted light infantry, even if they possess Javelin, one of the most effective and lethal systems currently available. If such forces are detected by enemy tank crews they become acutely vulnerable to the tank’s main armaments, which cause large numbers of casualties. The main gun of an MBT can also outrange all but the most capable of ATGMs, such as Javelin, and the evidence from Ukraine indicates that the addition of thermal shielding to Russian T90s could successfully reduce the effective range of Javelin to well within that of the vehicle’s main armament by making it harder for the command launch unit to lock on to targets.</p> - -<p>Ultimately, the presence of ATGMs on the battlefield puts pressure on armoured forces, and is driving changes to tank design (such as the adoption of APS), prompting weight increases – as will be discussed later. Conversely, the presence of armour requires the careful husbanding of anti-tank capabilities which would otherwise be useful for other tasks. For example, the British Milan ATGMs deployed in the Falklands War, which were used in an anti-fortification role and were critical to overcoming dug-in Argentine infantry and marines, would have been less available (if available at all) for those tasks had the British task force been simultaneously guarding against the threat of even a small Argentine armoured force. ATGMs pose a distinct threat, but cannot lay claim to having made the MBT obsolete.</p> - -<p><em>Medium Armoured Forces</em></p> - -<p>Medium tracked armoured forces require the briefest commentary, as they are most similar to the heavy armoured forces built around MBTs. They operate on the same principles, but are comparatively lighter, less protected and carry less firepower, and they have the same drawbacks (albeit to a lesser extent in some regards). RAND conducted a study of the utility of medium tracked armoured forces, and concluded that they performed well, and benefited significantly from strategic, operational and tactical mobility and a less burdensome logistics requirement, but also found that their reduced combat power resulted in less successful outcomes if they were deployed against competent heavy armoured forces. These outcomes could only be offset by either close air support and artillery dominance or by the opposing heavy armoured forces not being employed competently (and without combined arms integration of their own). This study factored in the use of ATGMs (both vehicle-mounted and carried by dismounts) by medium armoured forces. The history of US light and medium armoured forces in the Second World War, at the point when they encountered German heavy armoured forces with a significant combat power advantage in the direct fight, was not a happy one, and involved significant losses, an experience that still shapes current US thinking on the employment of MBTs. This has been termed the Sherman Dilemma, whereby a force adopts a less-capable combat vehicle with the expectation that combined arms integration will offset its disadvantages in the direct fight, only to discover that combined arms integration does not provide the expected benefits under actual operational conditions.</p> - -<p>The category of medium forces is quite a varied one. The US Army Stryker formations fit at the lower end of the category, at just over 16 tonnes; although the MGS variant was armed with 105-mm main gun, this made for a top-heavy and unstable vehicle (mechanical issues with the turret were also an issue), and this variant was eventually retired. Thus, Stryker formations remain reliant on ATGMs for lethality when engaging heavier forces. Meanwhile the British Army’s Ajax vehicles, which weigh 38 tonnes, occupy the upper end of the medium forces category. The dividing line between “medium” and “heavy” forces, in fact, is blurred, as many MBTs – particularly those of Soviet or Russian design – are considerably smaller and lighter than their Western equivalents: for example, the T90 weighs 48 tonnes, while the T72 weighs only 46 tonnes. An alternative framing might be that, given the obvious pressures on heavy armoured forces, that heavy armoured vehicles and MBTs, when they are employed, should perhaps be lighter in future. However, as will be discussed in the section on logistics, sustainment, recovery and reconstitution, adopting Soviet design principles to achieve this end would be unwise.</p> - -<p>In addition to their lesser logistical/sustainment requirements and increased deployability, medium armoured vehicles enjoy niche advantages over their heavy counterparts. Medium armoured vehicles with rapid-firing main armaments can generally hyper-elevate their guns compared with standard MBT designs, and therefore have a tactical advantage in urban, mountainous or complex terrain (noting the exception of the South Korean K2 Black Panther MBT, whose innovative suspension system allows the engagement of high- and low-angle targets)., However, when it comes to warfighting, the evidence suggests that medium armoured forces have consistently been at a disadvantage against heavy armoured forces, resulting in high losses when these two force types go head to head in the direct fight. Overall, these different force structure options are best seen as being complementary, rather than as substitutes for each other.</p> - -<h4 id="wheels-and-tracks">Wheels and Tracks</h4> - -<p>Wheels and tracks remain a recurring topic of discussion, and therefore should be briefly acknowledged. The discussion continues even though the dynamics, in themselves, are generally agreed. It has already been mentioned that more difficult terrain will generally be more easily traversed by tracked vehicles, whereas wheeled vehicles will have to move more carefully and be more selective about their route – or indeed may not be able to cross the same terrain at all if it is sufficiently difficult. The implication is that the choice of routes, tactical formations, and use of ground for cover involving both tracked and wheeled vehicles will force the formation to conform to the mobility capacity of the least capable vehicles. Alternatively, concepts of operation need to make allowances for a disjoint between the wheeled and tracked elements of the force, and accept them not operating entirely in tandem. Incidentally, different types of vehicle may also experience interoperability issues, even if they fit within the same category. For example, CVR(T), though extremely useful in Afghanistan and other theatres, suffered in the First Gulf War in large part because, on the advance in open terrain, it could not keep pace with the Challenger- and Warrior-equipped heavy armoured forces for which it was supposed to provide forward reconnaissance.</p> - -<p>Despite these challenges, wheels and tracks have often been forced to operate together out of necessity, as even the best-resourced militaries must go to war with the equipment they have available – and this sometimes involves integrating disparate platforms and units. Wheels and tracks can verifiably work together successfully. However, where it is economically feasible, states with heavy armoured forces have tried to maintain as much commonality or similarity of hull and drivetrain as possible within formations. This should remain an aspiration, if British Army vehicle fleets can be rationalised over time.</p> - -<h4 id="logistics-sustainment-recovery-and-reconstitution">Logistics, Sustainment, Recovery and Reconstitution</h4> - -<p>Micah Clark has argued that: “An experienced tank crew is the ultimate combat power multiplier for its ability to conduct field-expedient maintenance to unconventionally repair issues that would otherwise render a tank non-mission capable”.</p> +<p>Terrorism targeted at CUI remains a risk, and blue crime is ever present. But other bodies should take the lead (e.g., national police and coast guards, multinational maritime security frameworks), with NATO providing support only where necessary, as with combating large-scale piracy. NATO can contribute to awareness of accidental damage through MDA and crisis response to natural damage and disaster, but these tasks should not drive alliance force structure or posture.</p> -<p>Given the threat environment, MBTs need to remain mobile to avoid detection and targeting – but this creates dilemmas when factoring in the need to go static in order to conduct maintenance and repairs. Thorough preventative maintenance in garrison is a first step, but even with new vehicles, in good order, armoured forces require constant maintenance to keep them operational, and consume significant volumes of supplies. A squadron of MBTs requires a large amount of fuel, and heightened mobility will proportionally heighten the logistics burden for fuel resupply. Likewise, crews require rest, which the increased maintenance burden inherent in MBTs disrupts, further degrading operational tempo compared with simpler wheeled platforms.</p> +<p><em>Task</em></p> -<p>In addition to the key characteristics of protection, mobility and firepower that ground combat vehicles embody, Yoo, Park and Choi identified operability as the fourth key function. While the standing of operability as an equal consideration is open to debate, it is nonetheless important to highlight overall logistics and sustainment functions. Clark’s observation referenced above is often underappreciated, except by armoured personnel themselves, and “the often-overlooked operator’s perspective calls for the focus to fall on maintainability in the field over incremental upgrades to firepower and survivability”. Future MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles should be designed and constructed with modularity and repairability in mind, ensuring that as many repairs as possible can be completed on-site by the vehicle crews themselves, without having to recover the vehicle to a rear maintenance area or bring forward specialist repair crews; this dynamic is a much-overlooked – but critical – element in influencing heavy armour’s effectiveness.</p> +<p>The role of NATO assets in protecting CUI may be prioritized by considering the importance of relevant tasks and their role in NATO’s Strategic Concept. Deterrence and defense is the alliance’s core task. Deterring armed aggression is NATO’s raison d’être and remains its most important task. However, NATO’s capacity to do this is dependent on its general deterrence posture and is not related to the specific problem of protecting CUI — so it is not considered a primary focus here (see Figure 3). Within the context of protecting CUI, NATO should focus on three primary tasks:</p> -<p>Likewise, recovery of immobilised MBTs is challenging, especially under fire, requiring well-practised and properly-equipped recovery crews if it is to be effective, but it can allow technically killed vehicles to be rapidly returned to service if they can be withdrawn from enemy contact and evacuated to forward repair facilities. Delays to recovery operations in Afghanistan for damaged Stryker vehicles could fix units for 24 hours even when recovery vehicles were readily available. Units were forced to defend what proved a tempting target for insurgent attacks, showing that the challenges of recovering and repairing heavier vehicles in warfighting conditions should not be underestimated.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Detect:</strong> NATO should focus on detecting threats to CUI, as detection is the foundation of deterrence and critical for removing the cloak of ambiguity around hybrid threats. Detection can be strengthened through enhanced MDA in priority regions. This may require increasing the persistent presence of forces and assets that can contribute to MDA in the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Deter by denial:</strong> NATO should also focus on strengthening deterrence by denial by improving the defenses that can prevent attacks in the first place. This may also require strengthening the persistent presence of allied forces in regions of concern to protect key sites, reassure vulnerable allies, and deter aggressors. Wider resilience measures can also strengthen denial, but these are judged to be a lower priority for NATO because much of this infrastructure is owned and operated by civilian enterprises, not amenable to military solutions, and already subject to extensive efforts by other actors more suited to boosting public and private sector resilience — such as the European Union.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Deter by punishment:</strong> Responses to imminent threats or attacks should prioritize speed and reliability over severity. In the context of deterring low-end hybrid threats (rather than high-end conventional threats) to CUI, this suggests the utility of maritime forces that are forward based in priority regions — or at least persistently present or rapidly deployable (i.e., held at high readiness). More broadly, existing NATO units such as countering hybrid threat teams also have a role to play in immediate incident response and recovery.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The Second World War, although in many regards a dated case study, provides some critical lessons. In particular, the long duration of the war means that the multiple campaign seasons, large distances covered by advancing and retreating units, and the intensity of fighting (which resulted in high levels of tank loss) can provide useful insights into questions around the extended sustainment of heavy armoured forces in the face of attrition during warfighting campaigns, even if some fundamental differences can be identified with regard to contemporary scenarios (discussed below).</p> +<p>However, although this assessment is focused on protecting allied CUI against hybrid threats, this should not unduly warp NATO’s force posture. Any trade-offs in posture, capability, or readiness to deal with hybrid threats should not come at the expense of the credibility of NATO’s ability to deal with — and thereby deter — armed aggression.</p> -<p>The Soviet experience on the Eastern Front in the Second World War was that tanks might be knocked out, repaired and returned to service as many as four times during an operation. Tanks lost in a repairable state outnumbered those which were irrecoverable by two-to-one.</p> +<p><em>Region</em></p> -<p>Wartime and post-war Soviet research found that on average during an operation which lasted 15 to 20 days the overall tank loss rate was 82% of the starting strength, with 70% of the losses being repairable and 30% of the repairable losses due to non-battle reasons such a mechanical problems or getting stuck in a swamp.</p> +<p>Not all subregions within the Euro-Atlantic area are equal when it comes to protecting CUI. The extent of regional energy infrastructure, proximity to advanced Russian undersea capabilities, and track record of recent incidents (attacks and infrastructure mapping) suggest NATO should focus initially on the Baltic, North Atlantic, and High North regions. At the same time, NATO cannot afford to ignore other regions that are critical to allies and where Russian forces and other threats (such as terrorism and blue crime) are known to operate, including the Mediterranean and Black Sea region.</p> -<p>After approximately 20 days of constant operation, the Soviet Army found that the breakdown rate started to escalate dramatically, illustrating the importance of preventative maintenance. If Soviet forces lost ground, the rate of irrecoverable tank losses would increase dramatically as repairable tanks – and, in the worst-case scenario, tank repair facilities and recovered tanks undergoing repairs – were overrun and fell into German hands. Recovery and maintenance personnel organic to tank formations were invaluable: not only were they well-placed to quickly conduct repairs, but – if well-led – were likely to consider themselves an integral part of the team and perform better than centralised recovery and maintenance personnel based at higher or rear echelons; moreover, additional benefits were derived from their familiarity with specific vehicles. The importance of stocks of spare parts should not be underestimated, an oversight which plagued German forces in the Second World War, as a lack of spares could turn what should have been a quick repair job into a lengthier delay as tanks spent an extended period of time in the care of a maintenance unit, awaiting the necessary parts. Another flaw in the German operation was that cannibalisation of vehicles and inter-unit competition exacerbated the system’s deficiencies and meant that more damaged or broken-down tanks were unavailable than otherwise might have been the case. Interestingly, the experience of German tank crews was that, although they were trained to conduct basic repairs and could in theory assist the dedicated mechanics, in practice (when accompanying badly damaged tanks to rear echelon maintenance facilities) some crews had a tendency to interfere with the work of the maintenance personnel and generally make a hinderance of themselves unless other activities could be found to keep them occupied. Although this dynamic is at odds with the experience of well-trained modern crews, it is worth bearing in mind for unit commanders.</p> +<h4 id="specific-recommendations">SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> -<p>Gary Dickson’s distillation of the Soviet experience bears citing in full:</p> +<p>The general assessment above, combined with the previous discussion of the four framework elements, suggests several more recommendations for NATO’s role in protecting CUI. These are divided into two parts: immediate actions that the new NATO center should implement quickly and longer-term approaches that are equally important but may take more time.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The number of tanks in service at any one time during a battle was very dynamic. On the minus side tanks were being destroyed or damaged due to battle or non-battle reasons. On the plus side was only the ability of the repair units to put damaged tanks back into service. Therefore the pool of damaged tanks was a great asset to a tank unit as long as they could be repaired in a timely manner. This had several significant consequences:</p> -</blockquote> +<p><em>Immediate Recommendations</em></p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p>As long as repair units were able to repair all or most of the tanks which were damaged, a tank unit was able to maintain its strength, only slowly weakening due to irrecoverable losses and the time it took to repair tanks.</p> + <p><strong>Establish a new Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) focused on protecting CUI.</strong> NATO’s four standing maritime groups are in high operational demand and none are focused on protecting CUI. Considering the growing threat, NATO should consider establishing an “SNMG3” to focus on protecting CUI in northern Europe, focused on the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and Norwegian Sea (the areas of highest CUI density). The JEF task group that is currently deployed is a good example but only temporary. The capabilities of the group should include submarines, anti-submarine warfare, maritime surveillance, and seabed mapping, with contributions from allies who specialize in this domain. The group would play a vital role in organizing and delivering the functions of detecting, deterring, and responding to attacks on CUI in priority regions described in this report.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The faster a tank unit advanced, the farther behind the repair units lagged and the more time they had to spend moving to keep up. Both reduced the number of tanks which could be repaired.</p> + <p><strong>Commission a CUI vulnerability triage.</strong> Any approach to enhancing resilience starts with a vulnerability assessment. An initial triage assessment of criticality versus vulnerability to a range of threats can help MARCOM and NATO direct limited resources to protecting and defending those assets most at risk. The initial assessment presented here forms a starting point, but NATO’s own assessment must consider all forms of infrastructure, threats, regions, and the preferences of all allies.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Retreat was a potential disaster for the damaged tank pool. With a limited number of evacuation vehicles, most tanks had to be abandoned on the field, never to be repaired. Loss of the damaged tank pool resulted in a dramatic reduction in tank strength.</p> + <p><strong>Develop a fused MDA picture.</strong> A critical step in transforming MDA to improve detection and identification of threats to CUI will be fusing the existing intelligence picture across nations, the private and public sectors, and multinational and maritime domains (e.g., air, sea, subsea, space, and cyber). Assessing the highest-priority infrastructure and threats can help identify which ISR capabilities and combinations not currently available to MARCOM are necessary to rapidly attribute malign activity.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Operational pauses were critical and allowed repair units time to catch up and clear the backlog of tanks to be repaired. This, and the fact that it did not retreat and lose its damaged tank pool, is why the 5th Guards Tank Army was able to reconstitute itself after the battle at Prokhorovka.</p> + <p><strong>Produce regular CUI threat assessments.</strong> NATO already produces maritime threat assessments for governments and the commercial sector that focus on threats such as terrorism — for example, through the NATO Maritime Shipping Centre (MSC). These should either be expanded to include threats to CUI or be dedicated assessments that focus on nontraditional hybrid threats to CUI.</p> </li> -</ol> - -<p>Most of these points remain entirely valid for the modern employment of heavy armour.</p> - -<p>More recent experience complements these lessons. The South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Border War provides an interesting example of an armoured force operating at reach and lacking mass, which could neither rotate formations nor reconstitute them during operations. In Operation Hooper, as the majority of the SADF’s armoured strength had been assembled, SADF Ratel IFVs and Olifant MBTs could not be replaced and had to either forgo maintenance – sometimes for up to 800 hours of combat – or be refitted at the front by their sub-unit mechanics. Both wear and tear and combat damage aggregated, whittling away at the number of available vehicles, and those that did go into combat often did so in a degraded and less effective state. This contributed to the inability of the SADF to maintain operational momentum and reinforce or exploit successful offensives. Concurrently, Cuban airpower served to limit SADF frontline resupply and maintenance. In most regards frontline combat units were kept supplied, albeit austerely, or could make do without non-critical items. However, spare parts for artillery and armoured vehicles were the two areas in which the logistics problems could not be solved through improvisation, resulting in ever-reducing capability due to the importance of armoured and indirect fire support and the heavy maintenance burden imposed on the units in question by the high and sustained operational tempo.</p> - -<p>In terms of lessons learned from recent operations in Ukraine, the majority of Russian armour losses have still been the result of poor maintenance or logistics. In the case of the Ukrainian armed forces, the majority of repairs are carried out up to 300 km away from the frontlines in order to protect irreplaceable maintenance machinery and personnel from artillery fires. While the journey from the frontline to these facilities could be only five or six hours, an impressive feat of logistics in itself, this still constitutes a major endeavour. In the summer of 2022, Ukrainian tanks that had been destroyed on the battlefield, but recovered, were being repaired in Poland at a rate of 20–30 per month.</p> - -<p>This all has implications for the current and future operational contexts for Western forces: unless formations can be furnished with ample layered air defences or the enemy thoroughly blinded by counter-reconnaissance operations, the requirement to keep major maintenance hubs safe from as much of the enemy’s precision fires as possible will probably necessitate them being based far from the frontlines. This could make tank pools less vulnerable to overrun, but would also mean that the tank pool would not be able to reconstitute armoured units as responsively as might be desired given the greater geographical distance between them and the units deployed forward. This would also increase coordination challenges and reduce the benefits of repair units being associated with frontline formations (the echelon at which maintenance units should be held). As well as creating the traditional logistics problems, this would also entail the concentration of large numbers of vehicles under repair, creating a large signature that could be detected and targeted even if located deep in the rear. Forward repair units should therefore be structured, equipped and protected in such a way as to operate dispersed and avoid developing a backlog of tanks under repair, while investment in education, training and track miles in developing crew skills will be key determinants of their ability to keep vehicles operable, enabling many repairs to be completed without the assistance of mechanics or the need for a vehicle to be recovered.</p> - -<p>In terms of the scale at which forces operate, policymakers and senior leaders should understand that in order to credibly generate a warfighting capability at a given scale – be it battle group, brigade or division – a military will require sufficient depth to rotate it with a counterpart formation. Furthermore, avoiding spending on spare parts will amount to a false economy, and one that has in previous conflicts proved disastrous on operations. A sustainable supply of a large number of spare parts should be factored into procurement and fleet management decisions, otherwise a force may be exposed to excess attrition during warfighting and will accumulate an unnecessarily high level of permanently lost vehicles.</p> - -<h4 id="changes-to-tank-design">Changes to Tank Design</h4> - -<p>There are a number of changes to tank design that can be suggested, implemented either through modifications to existing vehicles or by including them in more comprehensive upgrade programmes. Unfortunately, some of these will prove impossible to implement even within the framework of the ongoing Challenger 3 upgrade, but these could still be made at a later date.</p> - -<p>MBTs and heavy armoured forces require better ISTAR capabilities, both within and beyond line-of-sight. Beyond line-of-sight, one capability that should be integrated into heavy armoured forces is UAS reconnaissance to assist with tactical-level detection (although this point is force type-agnostic – light and medium forces equally require this capability). Within direct line-of-sight, “see-through armour” (a type of augmented reality) is promising, although literally transparent armour is far enough away from being practicable to be discounted for the moment). See-through armour involves mounting high-resolution cameras on the outside of the vehicle and using software to merge their feeds together to give the crew an expanded view that eliminates blind spots, allowing them to look in different directions more quickly than is possible with traditional sights and viewports. Given that kinetic strikes against the vehicle’s armour will quickly damage or destroy cameras, the existing series of armoured viewports and optics should not be eliminated, but see-through armour capability would still reduce the chances of MBTs being successfully ambushed or blundering into ATGM-armed dismounts without warning (both scenarios that can reduce the advantages normally held by heavy armoured forces).</p> - -<p>Refining MBTs’ onboard optics and detection systems is another important avenue of improvement. Challenger 2 remains an impressive sensor platform, with both electro-optical and thermal optics able to identify targets beyond the effective range of direct fire anti-tank weapon systems if the crew actively scans the right arcs and areas. However, upgrading the range and fidelity of sensors and, more importantly, increasing their field of view is an obvious area for ongoing improvement, and one that private industry will continue to provide new commercial-off-the-shelf options for due to the wide applications.</p> - -<p>Detection systems operating outside of the visual light spectrum should also be considered, such as laser and radar warning receivers: it is already planned that Challenger 3 will be equipped with a laser warning receiver. As this type of system can only feed data to APS or provide immediate warning of an enemy contact, other forms of sensor may also prove useful in increasing situational awareness. Retro-reflective detectors, ground-moving target indicator (GMTI) radar and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) are all options that would provide advance warning of surveillance – although these come with constraints: passive retro-reflective detection seems unlikely to be able to distinguish scopes and sensors from coincidental backscatter and reflections from other sources, particularly in urban environments, and so an active laser emitter would probably be necessary bar any unexpected technological breakthrough. GMTI and SAR systems, meanwhile, would be best mounted on an antenna and thus might only be deployable when static; these systems would therefore not give passive protection at all times, but would provide the capability to periodically scan for threats, and would require a tactical pause or short halt to do so. Note the risk of the radar emissions being detected must be factored in when considering such options.</p> - -<p>This in turn raises questions about crew and commander workload and about the echelon level at which these systems could be integrated. While a retro-reflective detection scan produces near-instant results, outside of a headquarters setting GMTI data would require artificial intelligence (AI) support to even partially automate target classification – and even then the data would still require human analysis to filter out clutter and noise. These systems may therefore be inappropriate for platform-level integration. The commander of an unmodernised Challenger 2 already has a high cognitive burden when managing a tank crew and, in the case of sub-unit commanders, also has a troop or squadron to oversee. Maintaining situational awareness while closed down takes practice, given the limited fields of view and the fact that rotation of the turret where the commander is located is independent of the position and direction of travel of the hull – even before the designation of targets, issuing of other instructions, and communicating via radio inter- and intra-echelon are taken into consideration. In addition, space is at a premium in the turret given the battle management systems already in place. This situation is unlikely to change with the introduction of Challenger 3.</p> - -<p>When considering the adoption of extra systems, one caveat is that there is limited space available in the current Challenger 2 turret for additional battle management and situational awareness equipment. In order to prevent intended improvements being counterproductive for the crew operating the platform, it would be much more preferable to undertake a wholesale overhaul of the interior ergonomics and a thorough integration of new capabilities with existing ones, rather than incrementally add systems in a piecemeal manner. It would be a mistake to add systems that require a significant level of management by tank commanders; such systems should instead be operated either by attached specialists or handled an echelon above, with data passed down, using AI support to ensure that the cognitive effect on the tank commander is beneficial rather than overwhelming. There are also serious questions about whether these technologies could be added to MBTs without increasing their weight to an impractical level.</p> - -<p>With regard to the proposition that future MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles should be lighter, John Stone argued this exact point when he noted that, although the US and the UK adopted manoeuvre warfare as the core of their warfighting doctrine in the 1980s, their MBT designs were still rooted in the 1970s in terms of size, amount of armour, and weight (60–70 tonnes). In Stone’s view, the logistics tail made necessary by this misalignment of concepts of operations and vehicle design amounted to a bloating that directly impeded the very operational tempo and mobility that the vehicles were supposed to enable. Whether Stone was correct or not, MBTs certainly cannot afford to get any heavier than they are now. Once a tank weighs above approximately 80 tonnes, the engineering and design choices required to overcome increasing ground pressure result in vehicles that are useful only for niche tasks or which are simply impractical. Even at 70 tonnes, problems abound. The Department of Defense (DoD) and US Army have in the past been at odds over whether tests indicated that weight increases had compromised the Abrams M1A2 SEPv3 MBT’s ability to cross standard bridging equipment, be carried by Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS), and be recovered in the event of damage or breakdown. Nor does Challenger 2 enjoy the same cross-country mobility as its smaller forerunner, the Centurion. The current balance between weight and equipment requirements may be the best balance possible given the threat environment, but seeking further protection may prove counterproductive and mobility issues should not be exacerbated, as mobility too is critical to survivability, allowing tank crews to better use ground and avoid slow movement or being forced into remaining static.</p> - -<p>Despite the potential benefits of moving to lighter vehicles, Russian design principles for MBTs, which might be characterised as being design-optimised for ease of manufacture and extreme mechanical simplicity, are probably best avoided. As Michael Kofman recently highlighted, Western platforms, particularly armoured vehicles, have proven significantly more survivable than Russian-designed and -manufactured equivalents. Despite a similar vulnerability to being mission-killed, crews are far more likely to survive and vehicles are more likely to be recoverable and repairable. This results in forces that can be organically reconstituted far more easily.</p> - -<p>Ultimately, increased battlefield lethality might make it difficult to achieve improved survivability through passive or reactive protection. Technological developments in this area might offer some promise, but also involve limitations. For example, expectations of the benefits to be derived from countermeasures such as APS should be moderated. APS have a high power demand when they are active, and some vehicles cannot provide such power. Moreover APS, when active, also involve the use of radar guidance, generating an associated electromagnetic signature that in theory could assist enemy targeting. APS are also generally single-use or quickly expended, such that a moderate volume of incoming fire can overwhelm even an effective and reliable APS, leaving the vehicle in question reliant on its passive protection systems. APS technology may provide a layer of protection, but is no guarantee of survivability against a determined or well-armed enemy. They are most effective when heavy armoured forces can concentrate and quickly overwhelm an enemy, whether that enemy is equipped with heavy armour itself or is composed of lighter forces armed with anti-tank weapons. Improved ISTAR capabilities and situational awareness technologies, coupled with concepts of operations that prioritise counter-reconnaissance, may be the best way to ensure that the MBT remains a viable platform.</p> - -<h4 id="uncrewed-ground-vehicles-ugvs">Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs)</h4> - -<p>A final question is whether the role of the MBT can be performed by UGVs. Unfortunately for enthusiastic technologists, the answer is that the future MBT will not be able to operate uncrewed any time soon. A hypothetical head-to-head comparison with the MBT will serve to illustrate the shortcomings of UGVs. UGVs can be controlled remotely, or they can be autonomous. If they are controlled remotely, they rely on data links, which present a vector for attack – they can be hacked, or the signal can be disrupted. Alternatively, UGVs can be autonomous, but this presents its own problems – most importantly, the technology controlling the UGV’s autonomous performance must be mature and sophisticated enough for the vehicle to be useful. UGVs of both kinds will perform best if managed by human personnel nearby, and these personnel must be protected.</p> - -<p>Crewed MBTs do not suffer from any of these disadvantages. An armoured vehicle such as a modern MBT is extremely versatile: it can be employed with a great deal of precision, can operate independently for an extended period of time fulfilling a variety of different mission-sets, and can rapidly switch between these mission-sets, provided it has a well-trained and competent crew. For example, on a single patrol, an MBT crew could, if required, perform a variety of different combat missions with tactical flexibility, including patrolling, reconnaissance, attacking, and holding or defending ground. The crew can handle surrendered enemy combatants, provide limited on-the-spot humanitarian relief such as first aid or emergency supplies to civilians, and conduct maintenance on its vehicle, and do all of this independently in extremis. While an MBT and its crew are not optimised for many of these tasks, and might perform some of them poorly if unsupported or in an environment not conducive to them completing that task effectively, they could nevertheless turn their hand to different tasks as necessity dictated. This range of capabilities is a difficult standard for a UGV to match.</p> - -<p>There are, however, situations where the UGV concept can complement the use of MBTs. For instance, in tanks where the crew operates the turret remotely from inside the hull (Remote Weapons Stations, RWS) some elements of UGV technology could be leveraged, making the vehicle less vulnerable to enemy fire when taking hull-down positions. Crewed vehicles also provide useful platforms for mounting the infrastructure required to supervise UGVs and for stationing their human operators (albeit accepting that MBTs themselves currently suffer from internal space limitations, meaning that command and control of UGVs would probably have to be performed from supporting vehicles).</p> - -<p>There is some overlap between MBTs and UGVs in terms of their technology and the purposes for which they are deployed – especially when crewed tanks are fitted with systems that have elements of automation, such as improved sensors and situational awareness, and the off-boarding of hard-kill and soft-kill countermeasures. In this context it seems highly likely that UGVs will play a complementary role within heavy armoured forces rather than have a realistic prospect of replacing MBTs.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h3> - -<p>A heavy armoured force remains the best option for high-intensity warfighting due to its combat power. While it exhibits vulnerabilities, so do all types of force structure, and facing a heavy armoured force compels an enemy to make difficult choices and places the burden of operational planning upon it if it hopes to be successful. Nevertheless, if the British Army were called on to engage in high-intensity warfighting without a significant number of MBTs, it would still be viable. A smaller, lighter, more autonomous force backed up by critical enablers in the form of ISTAR capabilities and indirect fires could maintain a high degree of lethality and pose difficult operational problems for any enemy force. However, the integration of many of these critical enablers must happen at battlegroup level and above, due to the limited capacity of company headquarters (even if assisted by advanced C2 tools that allow capabilities to be delegated) and due to the expense and inefficiency of distributing such capabilities evenly across small units. This analysis of the implications of using lighter forces raises questions about the ability of sub-units to perform offensive operations effectively due to a lack of combat power. Moreover, a warfighting capability built around a core medium armoured force would struggle to achieve its likely operational objectives were it to come up against a capable combined arms enemy force built around MBTs and heavy armour. While a medium or light force might be cheaper at a platform level, as well as more numerous and more distributed, ground combat units would suffer in the close fight, in both material and human terms. Medium armoured and light forces would be better seen as complementary to heavy armoured forces, with different formations able to cover one another’s weaknesses and augment one another’s capabilities when necessary.</p> - -<p>The British Army faces several challenges in maximising the utility of its current armoured forces. They have suffered years of underinvestment, the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 having identified heavy armour as an area of low priority. Ambitions were set low, at:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>preserving the ability to reconstitute our levels of military capability in areas which are currently low priority, such as heavy armour – tanks – should international circumstances change. This means both holding in reserve certain sorts of equipment not needed for current operations and – importantly – maintaining core levels of training and experience among our personnel. This would provide us with the potential for expansion in the future.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>This approach has only recently begun to change amid decisions such as procuring Challenger 3 and Boxer, but many areas require investment. Consequently, there is a need to understand where resources and financial investment should be prioritised, since a complete, simultaneous overhaul of all the areas requiring modernisation is unrealistic. Critically, for heavy armour to be effective and survivable, the combined arms force as a whole needs to be able to conduct effective shaping of the battlespace to prevent saturation by enemy UAS and precision fires, and to be able to create sufficient uncertainty through deception that these enemy capabilities cannot target and attrit ground combat formations for decisive effect.</p> - -<p>Ensuring that heavy armoured units have sufficient track miles and collective field training to maintain expertise at armoured warfare is more important than any technological advance. The major determinants of whether heavy forces will prove viable given the pressures put on them will be training, skill, and, critically, motivation – that is, the human element, the moral component and the professionalism of the force, which will culminate in the continued ability to fight in a truly combined arms manner. However, beyond this, changes and adaptations are still required. At the sub-unit level, technological improvements can improve situational awareness and contribute to better tactical employment, but will have to be integrated in such a way as to not compromise the existing strengths of MBTs: off-boarding of capabilities on to support vehicles and UGVs may prove a fruitful avenue of adoption and experimentation. Future MBT designs would benefit from prioritising mechanical simplicity and repairability, and from prioritising the resilience of parts that cannot easily be repaired in the field. If weight reduction to improve mobility over difficult terrain is to be considered when modernising platforms, this should not extend to adopting Soviet design principles that trade away platform or crew survivability (although the British defence establishment is in any case unlikely to go down that route given the pattern of increasing vehicle weight and a healthy appreciation of their duty of care compared with the Russian Armed Forces). The Challenger 3 upgrade provides an opportunity to improve the design in line with at least some of the principles outlined in this paper. A critical enabler with regard to turning these recommendations into reality is an overhaul of MBTs’ interior ergonomics and the thorough integration of systems housed in the turret to ensure that crews benefit from technical improvements.</p> - -<p>The MBTs and other heavy armoured vehicles at the core of combined arms formations remain important for both warfighting and other operations, as their unmatched combat power in the close fight helps ensure that a force can remain mobile when necessary. However, the balance must be shifted away from protection and towards a greater emphasis on mobility. This encompasses both strategic and operational mobility, since mobility contributes to survivability. The success of MBTs in the Gulf War set high cultural expectations regarding the survivability and offensive lethality of MBTs and heavy armoured forces organised, equipped, trained and employed as per the Western/NATO model of the time. These expectations need to be recalibrated, as individual tanks are increasingly vulnerable on the battlefield; nonetheless, well-trained, competently led and adequately equipped heavy armoured formations, supported by the correct enabling capabilities, are mobile, lethal and exceedingly difficult to counter.</p> - -<p>Historical lessons about attrition in armoured warfare must also be relearned. Due to high maintenance requirements, crews may need to be rotated to prevent exhaustion and maintain a tempo of operations, and units may need to increase headcounts to ensure that some rotation is feasible. Heavy armoured forces need to get used to recovering and repairing damaged vehicles and replacing crew casualties as an inherent part of their operations. This also needs to be done in as dispersed a manner as possible in order to contend with an increasingly transparent battlefield and the threat of precision fires. It will be critical to maintain both recovery and repair units, as well as specialists, so that heavy armour can be quickly returned to its units after repair, with a particular emphasis on spare parts availability in the long term to ensure that vehicle losses do not translate into high rates of attrition.</p> + <li> + <p><strong>Clarify the role of NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell.</strong> The cell is based in NATO headquarters, but its wide remit — which includes industry and civil-military engagement, best practice, and technology — and senior leadership may overlap with the new MARCOM center. The coordination cell could perform the role the MSC did during Ocean Shield of protecting CUI, which will be even more important given CUI is mostly owned and operated by private companies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Implement a CUI exercise program.</strong> Exercises are a vital part of NATO’s deterrence and reassurance efforts and have been stepped up over the last year. Yet CUI exercises have been limited and focused on technology. A wider CUI exercise program using existing assets would deliver wider effects to deter adversaries and reassure allies and industry partners.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Update NATO’s maritime strategy.</strong> NATO’s maritime strategy is over 12 years old, does not mention Russia or China, and mentions undersea infrastructure only in passing. It needs updating to reflect the new threat environment and NATO’s new Strategic Concept — including a focus on protecting CUI. The new center should have a lead role in producing a new strategy — or at least a “Protecting CUI” annex.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Crew expertise in maintenance (both preventative and curative) is essential to reduce the burden on forward repair facilities run by dedicated mechanical engineers, and will also reduce the facilities’ detectable signature, offering them greater protection.</p> +<p><em>Longer-Term Recommendations</em></p> -<p>All of these measures will need to go hand-in-hand with investments in track miles and training time: the traditional qualitative superiority of the human element can make the difference between a viable and non-viable armoured capability.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Develop a NATO CUI resilience strategy.</strong> Building on the vulnerability assessment, a longer-term effort that the new center could lead is developing a NATO CUI resilience strategy. This would meet NATO’s Strengthened Resilience Commitment and could inform (and be informed by) a NATO resilience planning process.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Adopt a NATO CUI preparedness goal.</strong> As part of a strengthened approach to CUI resilience, allies could commit to a NATO CUI preparedness goal to bolster national and pan-NATO approaches to preparing for attacks on CUI.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Take a risk management approach.</strong> The sheer variety of threats to CUI and the number of potential targets require an approach that prioritizes and manages risk. Even better than a risk-centric strategy would be an uncertainty-centric approach that seeks robustness against a range of unknowable threats.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Develop a CUI attack response playbook.</strong> Effective deterrence against CUI attacks requires a credible and reliable set of measures to respond to threats or attacks on CUI. A counter-CUI playbook of military (and nonmilitary) response options would help. This playbook could also be the basis of a robust exercise program.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Adopt a framework nation approach to regional CUI protection.</strong> A regional framework nation approach to protecting CUI could help tailor CUI protection to the differing concerns of regional allies. One example is the JEF, newly focused on protecting northern Europe’s CUI. Whatever the framework, any regional approach to protecting CUI should be directed by the alliance’s DDA concept, NATO’s guiding framework for all operations short of war, and align with new regional plans agreed at the Vilnius summit.</p> + </li> +</ul> <hr /> -<p><strong>Nick Reynolds</strong> is the Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. His research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation.</p>Nick ReynoldsAdaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility.Comparing Conflicts In Gaza2023-12-12T12:00:00+08:002023-12-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/comparing-conflicts-in-gaza<p><em>With the outcome of the present confrontation between Israel and its opponents in Gaza remaining uncertain, a comparison with previous rounds of fighting may provide some insight into how events could develop.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Following the traumatic attack it experienced on 7 October 2023, Israel completely changed its strategy for dealing with Hamas from containing and deterring the group to trying to destroy it. There are several scenarios for what might happen next. To determine how the present war is most likely to develop, it is essential to examine previous confrontations in the Gaza Strip.</p> - -<p>Since it took over in Gaza in 2007, Hamas and other groups – mostly the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) – have engaged in a series of confrontations with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the two most significant of which were in 2008–2009 and in the summer of 2014. Other rounds of fighting were much smaller, such as those that occurred in November 2012, May 2021 and August 2022. Understanding the complexity and risks of the ongoing fighting in the Gaza Strip requires looking into the similarities and differences between previous confrontations and the current war.</p> - -<h3 id="victory-in-sight">Victory in Sight?</h3> - -<p>Israel fought several high-intensity wars with Arab states between 1948 and 1982. Since 1982, the IDF has confronted only Arab non-state actors (NSAs). In Lebanon, it fought Hizbullah in the 1980s and 1990s, and again in a major war in 2006. Since then, the IDF has confronted Hamas and other smaller Palestinian groups like the PIJ in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The main confrontations have taken place in Gaza, all of them ending in a tie – much to Israel’s frustration. Although Hamas and the PIJ are elusive, flexible and capable of putting up a tough fight, the IDF is still much stronger.</p> - -<p>During all of the previous confrontations, Israel hesitated on whether to try to destroy its foes due to various constraints and the negative implications of an all-out war in the Gaza Strip. Since destroying NSAs like Hamas is a tall order, Israel’s preferred method for containment and deterrence until now has been based on a strategy called ‘mowing the grass’. This meant that from time-to-time Israel had to degrade the military capabilities of its foes in the Gaza Strip by conducting a short and limited campaign.</p> +<p><strong>Sean Monaghan</strong> is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on NATO, European security, and defense. His career as a civil servant in the UK Ministry of Defence has focused on international defense policy, including NATO, the European Union, and the United States. In recent years, his work as a policy analyst has seen him contribute to the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review and lead multinational research projects.</p> -<p>The last confrontation before the current one, that of August 2022, was in a way different from other clashes in the Gaza Strip because Israel considered its outcome to be a victory. Yet in reality, it was a minimal success. On that occasion Israel confronted only the PIJ, which paid a price but still survived. Nevertheless, it seems that the results of that campaign boosted Israel’s confidence and, together with other steps it took to upgrade its defences around the Gaza Strip, convinced Israel that it was ready to deal with any hostilities that might break out on the border. Israel also assumed that Hamas would not seek war. On 7 October 2023, Israel paid dearly for its blunders.</p> +<p><strong>Otto Svendsen</strong> is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where he provides research and analysis on political, economic, and security developments in Europe.</p> -<p>Following the attack of 7 October, Israel concluded that it must revise its national security strategy. Such a highly important process should be carried out in a careful manner by methodically examining all the options. Yet Israel decided to go immediately on the attack, launching massive aerial bombardments followed by a large-scale land offensive. This made sense politically given that Israel received sympathy and, more importantly, support for its actions from the US, the UK and other Western powers. Yet it might lose some or even most of this support as the war progresses due to heavy casualties among the Palestinian population and the vast scale of destruction in the Gaza Strip.</p> +<p><strong>Mike Darrah</strong> is a military fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS. He is a commander and aviator in the U.S. Coast Guard and came to CSIS from Sector Humboldt Bay, where he served as deputy sector commander, overseeing all Coast Guard operations in the northern quarter of California.</p> -<p>In each of the former rounds of fighting, Israel stuck to its policy of pursuing a limited campaign due to the constraints and negative ramifications of a war in the Gaza Strip. Now, Israel has drastically changed its policy, even though the constraints remain and some of them have even become more acute. Israel does not want to govern the Gaza Strip, but it cannot ignore the poor conditions there. In previous confrontations, it avoided toppling Hamas’s rule, leaving it to continue running the Gaza Strip. Hamas has, of course, done an awful job; instead of investing in improving Gazans’ standard of living, it has focused on preparing to confront Israel. This has meant that infrastructure and services for the Palestinian population have sharply deteriorated in recent years, up to a point where the Gaza Strip is on the verge of collapse.</p> +<p><strong>Ed Arnold</strong> is a research fellow with the International Security department at the Royal United Services Institute.</p>Sean Monaghan, et al.NATO is not ready to mitigate increasingly prevalent Russian aggression against European critical undersea infrastructure (CUI).【黎智英案・審訊第一日】2023-12-18T12:00:00+08:002023-12-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-1<ul> + <li>黎智英爭議串謀發布煽動刊物罪逾時檢控、涉新聞自由應寬鬆詮釋法例</li> +</ul> -<p>As long as Hamas has been in charge there, this has mostly remained its problem, but now that the IDF has seized a large part of the Gaza Strip, it has also become Israel’s concern. The war, with all its destruction, will of course make the dire situation in Gaza much worse. Israel wants to take ‘overall security responsibility’ in the Gaza Strip, while hoping that others will handle civilian affairs there. It would ideally like another government to do this, but no state – not even any of Israel’s Arab neighbours – is willing to deal with the giant mess in the Gaza Strip. The most reasonable choice seems to be the Palestinian Authority (PA); yet in previous confrontations, Israel assumed that the PA would not be up to the task if it were to bring down Hamas’s regime. There is now even less chance of this because in recent years the PA has become weaker, making it less likely that it could go back to controlling the Gaza Strip.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Thousands of young men in the Gaza Strip who will struggle to find a job in the present circumstances may agree to fight for Hamas for lack of a better choice</code></em></strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/N3aORzf.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Another factor that has worsened in the last year is Israel’s internal stability, following a wave of protests against the government. While these have subsided since the war broke out, they could well erupt again later on. The current war in the Gaza Strip may also contribute to domestic instability, depending on its outcome – and a crisis inside Israel could make it harder to solve the huge problems in the Gaza Strip.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(18日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)開審。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻,爭議控方前年加控串謀刊印煽動刊物罪時,超出了檢控時限4日,法庭沒有司法管轄權處理;又指本案涉及新聞自由等基本權利,應以較寬鬆的尺度詮釋法例,但對於控方應較嚴謹。至於控方指在檢控期限未屆滿前,曾去信通知法庭「有意」申請新增控罪,辯方則認為直至控方把黎智英帶上法庭加控,才算正式就該罪開始進行檢控。辯方明天將繼續陳詞。</p> -<p>Since Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007, the group has had several confrontations with Israel. The two main ones were in the winter of 2008–2009, lasting 22 days, and in the summer of 2014, lasting for 50 days. Other campaigns included the one in May 2021, which went on for 12 days, and the one in August 2022, which lasted only three days. The current war might go on for several months. Israel has to be ready for this, on several levels.</p> +<p>已還柙逾3年的黎智英,今身穿淺藍色恤衫、灰色西裝褸,被4名懲教人員帶進被告欄。黎身形明顯消瘦,但精神不俗,向旁聽席的家屬揮手、點頭,又微笑豎起拇指,天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君亦有站起身向黎揮手。黎於審訊期間戴上耳機輔助聆聽,神情專注,休庭時與女兒多次互相飛吻。</p> -<p>Hamas’s leaders are ‘high on Israel’s target list’. On previous occasions, such as in 2004 and 2012, Israel has assassinated some of Hamas’s top leaders – yet the group not only survived those blows, but got stronger. Therefore, decapitating Hamas’s leadership now is unlikely to annihilate the group. It could even be counterproductive, because the new leaders might be more capable of fighting Israel.</p> +<p>被告為:黎智英(76歲)、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。</p> -<p>The IDF is also killing Hamas’s combatants, including senior figures like brigade and battalion commanders, in an effort to disrupt the group’s command and control. In the last major confrontation in the Gaza Strip in 2014, Hamas lost up to 1,000 combatants. During the present war it is absorbing many more casualties, but it could yet obtain new recruits. Iran will give Hamas money for this purpose, and thousands of young men in the Gaza Strip who will struggle to find a job in the present circumstances may agree to fight for Hamas for lack of a better choice. Others will doubtless join Hamas to avenge family members or friends lost during the war.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/p65rndW.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 黎智英</p> -<h3 id="military-factors">Military Factors</h3> +<p>黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及Marc Corlett。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。</p> -<p>Several factors made past confrontations easier for Israel, some of which are also relevant in the present conflict. The IDF has clear superiority over its foes in the Gaza Strip, enjoying major advantages in terms of firepower, manpower and technology. Yet it still has a tough task if it wishes to defeat Hamas, let alone destroy the group. This will be difficult because in previous confrontations in the Gaza Strip, the IDF was often able to exploit an element of surprise. The best-known example was at the start of the confrontation in December 2008, when the IDF launched an air raid that inflicted heavy casualties on Hamas. By contrast, on 7 October 2023, the IDF was taken completely by surprise, putting it in a state of shock and hindering its response. Although it subsequently recovered, its counterattack was obviously expected by Hamas, which was able to prepare accordingly. In this sense, the IDF will need to wait for a better opportunity if it wants to catch Hamas off-guard.</p> +<p>控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處高級警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。</p> -<p>In previous confrontations, the IDF was able to concentrate its efforts, such as deploying its best units on one front – that is, in the Gaza Strip. Now, however, the IDF has to secure its northern border with Lebanon and deal with clashes in the West Bank, even if the level of friction on those fronts is quite low. As long as there is no escalation in Lebanon, the IDF can focus its attention on the Gaza Strip.</p> +<p>審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。</p> -<p>Hamas and the PIJ have fired more than 9,000 rockets and missiles since the start of the current war. In previous confrontations they have fired fewer, but on this occasion the rockets and missiles are not the main threat to Israel. While they can still cause harm, almost all the Israeli losses from the present conflict resulted from the ground invasion into Israel on 7 October. The firing of missiles and rockets is mostly an act of defiance and terror, forcing Israeli civilians to run for cover. Many in Israel do not have proper shelters, although they do receive an alert – a process that has improved over the years. Israel’s famous air defence system, the Iron Dome, has once again proved to be very effective. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) is trying to suppress the firing of rockets as it has done in previous rounds of fighting, with ground forces now also participating in this task.</p> +<p>黎智英的太太李韻琴、黎的3名子女,及天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君均坐在家屬席。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Trying to defeat Hamas by assassinating its leadership and killing as many of its combatants as possible might not work</code></em></strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/w1eW6Ho.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 黎智英太太 李韻琴(左)、幼子 黎順恩(右)</p> -<p>During the confrontation in 2008–2009, the IDF cut the Gaza Strip in half. It has done the same in the current war, but the present Israeli operation has reached deeper inside the Strip, exposing the IDF’s lines of communication to ambushes. Still, it has taken this risk as part of a strategy to encircle and isolate Hamas’s positions. This large-scale manoeuvre has had an impact on Hamas and its performance. The group might lose control of the Gaza Strip, although it may yet avoid collapse.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HO15qyg.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君</p> -<p>The IDF avoided a major land offensive in previous rounds of fighting because of the fear of losses. Israel as a country is very sensitive to casualties, yet following the horrible events of 7 October, it is more willing to pay the price. The IDF is also striving to avoid harming the Arab population for moral and political reasons. In the current war, the fighting is more large-scale and intense, so unfortunately there is more collateral damage.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FEZLJ8i.jpg" alt="image05" /> +▲ 國安處高級警司 李桂華</p> -<p>The IDF recently called up over 350,000 reserves, mostly from the ground forces. This is Much more than in former confrontations, and serves to indicate how this war is different. Many of Israel’s reserves have not trained much if at all in recent years. The IDF is trying to fix this now by conducting exercises, but returning soldiers to top form takes time. There are also difficulties in providing enough equipment, such as body armour, for so many troops. This is hardly a surprise because before the war the IDF had based its level of build-up on recent confrontations in the Gaza Strip, assuming there would be more of the same. The strategy was to depend on the IAF and intelligence rather than on massed ground units. According to this concept, budgets were allocated to other areas at the expense of providing training, equipment and so on to a large part of the ground forces.</p> +<h4 id="媒體報導稱黎申請海外證人作供被拒-法官澄清沒有收到相關申請">媒體報導稱黎申請海外證人作供被拒 法官澄清沒有收到相關申請</h4> -<p>Another problem for the IDF is that the last time it fought an urban conflict in the Gaza Strip was in 2014. Since then, the IDF has conducted several operations in Gaza but without using ground forces, let alone penetrating the Strip by land. This lack of combat experience might have affected current operations, including their cost to the IDF. Nevertheless, the motivation of Israeli troops is high because they are convinced this war was forced on Israel and they want to make sure Hamas will not be able to conduct an attack like that of 7 October ever again.</p> +<p>甫開庭,法官杜麗冰指,有見本地傳媒上周報導稱法庭拒絕被告申請海外證人以視像形式作供,特此澄清《刑事訴訟程序條例》規定,海外證人如要作供,須在案件交付至高院後42日之內提出申請,但本案並無任何人申請海外證人作供,也沒有任何申請要求延長42日期限。代表黎的資深大律師彭耀鴻及代表3間蘋果公司的大律師王國豪在庭上確認。</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<h4 id="辯方爭議煽動刊物罪超出檢控時限-法庭無司法管轄權處理">辯方爭議煽動刊物罪超出檢控時限 法庭無司法管轄權處理</h4> -<p>Since 2008, Israel has engaged in several rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip with Hamas and the PIJ. Analysing these previous confrontations is crucial to understanding the current war. Almost all of the clashes that occurred from 2008 to 2022 ended in a tie, and some in Israel even saw them as a failure. Israel considered the last confrontation it had there, in August 2022, to be a success, which may have boosted its confidence too much. Now, following the terrible events of 7 October, Israel has drastically changed its strategy from containment to annihilating Hamas, but this is a tall order. The current war is costlier and longer than any previous confrontations. Trying to defeat Hamas by assassinating its leadership and killing as many of its combatants as possible might not work. Israel has to have realistic goals to begin with. It can inflict on Hamas the biggest blow it has ever suffered and topple its rule of the Gaza Strip. Yet, as in previous confrontations, Hamas as a movement might manage to hold on.</p> +<p>黎智英就控罪答辯之前,其代表資深大律師彭耀鴻先就「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪逾時檢控提出爭議。控方案情指稱黎智英與其他被告於2019年4月1日起,一同串謀發布煽動刊物,該串謀直至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》停運為止。</p> -<p>The IDF failed on 7 October 2023 in terms of its intelligence and readiness. Yet it has managed to recover and enjoys similar advantages to previous rounds of fighting, such as superiority in both firepower and technology. There is also high motivation among its troops, and the Iron Dome is proving itself once again. For the time being, the IDF can concentrate on one front, as in previous confrontations, although this might change. Unlike in the confrontation of 2008, however, the IDF does not enjoy the element of surprise. Other aspects unique to this confrontation include the mass mobilisation of reserves, with some troops not being well trained or equipped. A lack of combat experience in urban warfare is another challenge for the IDF, having relied on the IAF in former confrontations.</p> +<p>彭指,根據《刑事罪行條例》第11條,煽動控罪的檢控「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行」;而據《刑事罪行條例》第159D條,對於依據協議而犯下的串謀罪行,若果提出檢控的時限已經屆滿,便不能就該串謀罪行「提出法律程序」。</p> -<p>Overall, there is some similarity between the current war and previous confrontations, but there are also major differences. Israel must be aware of these in order to avoid crucial mistakes as it becomes more and more committed to this showdown.</p> +<p>彭續指,若果由串謀的首天2019年4月1日起計,檢控時限是同年10月1日;若法庭不接納,由最後一天2021年6月24日起計算,控方的檢控時限亦是同年12月24日。然而黎在12月28日的法庭聆訊上才被正式加控「煽動刊物」罪,已逾時4日。</p> -<hr /> +<p>彭指,逾時檢控的問題關乎法庭是否有司法管轄權處理控罪,若果超過檢控時限,法庭便沒有司法管轄權處理「煽動刊物」控罪,且本案涉及新聞自由等基本權利,應以較寬鬆的尺度詮釋法例,但對於控方應較嚴謹。</p> -<p><strong>Ehud Eilam</strong> has been dealing with and studying Israel’s national security for the last 35 years. He served in the Israeli military and later worked as a researcher for the Israeli Ministry of Defense.</p>Ehud EilamWith the outcome of the present confrontation between Israel and its opponents in Gaza remaining uncertain, a comparison with previous rounds of fighting may provide some insight into how events could develop.The Gulf And Gaza2023-12-11T12:00:00+08:002023-12-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-gulf-and-gaza<p><em>As Israel’s war in Gaza rages on, the Gulf Arab states continue to try to strike a balance between working to contain and end the violence and maintaining momentum for their respective national projects.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/F4o5yub.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻(中)、大律師 關文渭(後)、大律師 Marc Corlett(右)</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="法官質疑串謀屬持續-辯方指不能以此避過檢控時限">法官質疑串謀屬持續 辯方指不能以此避過檢控時限</h4> -<p>On 5 December, Qatar hosted the annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the regional grouping that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Inevitably, Israel’s ongoing war against Hamas in Gaza topped the agenda of the discussions between Gulf leaders, which were also attended by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰問及,若果串謀並非一次性,而是持續一系列的串謀呢?彭耀鴻回應,若果串謀罪行只是一次性,檢控時限便須由作出串謀的首天起開始計算。</p> -<p>The message from the summit was straightforward and unsurprising. The six Gulf monarchies called for “an immediate cessation of hostilities and Israeli military operations”, demanded “the release of civilian hostages and detainees”, and backed efforts to “revive the peace process in the Middle East” and “the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital” .</p> +<p>法官李運騰亦指,本案被告是持續干犯一連串的罪行,若控方分成多項控罪提控,並如辯方所指運用相同的檢控時限,或會出現較早干犯的控罪超出檢控時限、而較遲干犯的控罪則在時限之內檢控的情況;又質疑後來加入串謀者便不能被控。彭耀鴻同意,但強調控方可分開檢控,亦須及時檢控,不能以串謀來繞過檢控時限。</p> -<p>Besides the various agreements to adopt joint positions and work together – in areas going far beyond the war in Gaza, from efforts to remove trade barriers and collaborate on tourism, to shared commitments to investing in oil and gas as well as renewable energy – recorded in the lengthy 122-article final statement, the summit ultimately appeared to be intended to signal one thing above all: Gulf unity.</p> +<p>法官李運騰又問及,若被告人不在香港,但在海外導致煽動刊物在香港發布,控方便未能趕在檢控限期內將他帶上法庭提控。彭耀鴻則指,同樣的檢控期限依然適用,被告人依然受到條例所規定的時限保護。</p> -<h3 id="pragmatic-gulf-unity">Pragmatic Gulf Unity</h3> +<h4 id="辯方帶上法庭加控始算開始進行檢控-控方仍違檢控時限">辯方:帶上法庭加控始算開始進行檢控 控方仍違檢控時限</h4> -<p>Indeed, with the Middle East in the midst of a crisis defined by the long-standing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, it is perhaps easy to forget that until just three years ago, a deep fracture between the Gulf Arab states – specifically between Qatar (backed by Turkey) on one side, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other – was one of the defining features of regional instability. Today, things are different. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have become particularly close over the past year or two. Differences and intra-Gulf competition still persist, perhaps especially between Saudi Arabia and the UAE these days, but the overall mood is one of pragmatic alignment – certainly vis-à-vis the war in Gaza.</p> +<p>而就控方於2021年12月13日曾去信法庭表示「有意」申請新增煽動刊物罪、黎智英於翌日獲悉,彭耀鴻認為控方當時並未將黎帶上法庭正式加控,至12月28日才正式加控,故即使採納12月24日為檢控期限,仍然超出檢控時限4天。</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia has clearly assumed the mantle of regional leadership. It hosted an extraordinary Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh in November, notably with the attendance of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi; and Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has led a group of his counterparts from across the region on an international tour with stops in Beijing, Moscow and London, among others. Qatar has led mediation efforts with Hamas to facilitate the release of hostages, which resulted, for example, in the seven-day truce at the end of November. The UAE – which has the closest ties with Israel of all Gulf states – has remained quieter thus far, but it appears poised to play a key role whenever there is eventually a more permanent ceasefire in Gaza, precisely because it is probably the Arab country Israel trusts the most.</p> +<p>彭解釋,《刑事罪行條例》第11條列明煽動罪須於6個月內「開始進行(begun)」檢控,是立法時特意選用的字眼,強調直至控方把黎智英帶上法庭加控,才算「開始進行」檢控,而非如控方據《裁判官條例》第26條所指,於12月13日去信表示有意加控,「作出申訴或提出告發(making any complaint or laying any information)」,便可視為已「開始進行」檢控。</p> -<p>Crucially, Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi have thus far worked together and vocally endorsed each other’s efforts. They have looked to leverage their different relationships with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as across the region, rather than to compete with one another. The eventual question of helping to establish and strengthen a future Palestinian leadership could well bring intra-Gulf competition back to the fore, but for the moment at least, the three monarchies are clearly aligned in their view of the conflict.</p> +<p>根據《裁判官條例》第26條,若罪行無規定作出申訴或提出告發的時效,則「申訴或告發」須於6個月內作出或提出。彭認為,只有很少罪行會訂明檢控時限,若《刑事罪行條例》第11條已為煽動罪訂明檢控時限,則將兩條法例的字眼理解為同一意思,會令《刑事罪行條例》第11條變得完全多餘,故「開始進行」檢控必定指「作出申訴或提出告發」以外的意思。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are in very similar positions and share very similar interests with regard to the current crisis</code></em></strong></p> +<p>案件明續審,彭耀鴻將繼續陳詞。</p> -<p>All three were clearly horrified by Hamas’s 7 October attack. Saudi Arabia and especially the UAE have long been critical of, and even hostile towards, Hamas. Qatar has a different relationship with the group, hosting its political office in Doha in coordination with the US and the Israeli government, but it clearly also did not support the attack. However, what Israel has done since 7 October has, form the perspective of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha – and the wider region, for that matter – gone far beyond exercising a legitimate right to self-defence. In their view, Israel’s operation to go after Hamas has become a brutal all-out assault on the Palestinian people. The attempt by US President Joe Biden to equate Russia and Hamas as evil aggressors and Israel and Ukraine as victims worthy of support does not resonate in the Gulf (or indeed anywhere in the Arab world). Rather, if there is any relation between the wars in Ukraine and Gaza from the Arab perspective, it is between Ukrainian civilians and the Palestinian people.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="the-ongoing-quest-for-stability">The Ongoing Quest for Stability</h3> +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英爭議串謀發布煽動刊物罪逾時檢控、涉新聞自由應寬鬆詮釋法例Getting On Track2023-12-18T12:00:00+08:002023-12-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/getting-on-track<p><em>The conflict in Ukraine has made it clear that missiles “are foundational to adversaries’ way of war.” Future missile threats, however, increasingly stress existing missile defenses, flying lower, faster, and on unpredictable trajectories. Most importantly, they are difficult to detect — defeating them will require elevated sensors, on aircraft or satellites, to track them at range.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>As the Department of Defense begins to deploy a space-based sensor constellation, Getting on Track unpacks the design tradeoffs involved and key pitfalls to avoid. Using advanced simulation tools, the authors underscore the necessity of diversifying satellite orbits, designing constellations for early, persistent coverage, and retaining requirements for fire-control-capable sensors.</em></p> -<p>Ultimately, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are in very similar positions and share very similar interests with regard to the current crisis. While the war is taking up a lot of their bandwidth, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha are united in their determination to maintain the overall strategic course they were on before 7 October. All three are pursuing highly ambitious domestic agendas.</p> +<h3 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h3> -<p>In Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 – a root-and-branch transformation of the Kingdom – is the all-important North Star for all decision-making, including on foreign policy. The UAE wants to consolidate its position as the most dynamic regional power and a hub for global affairs; its hosting of the ongoing UN Climate Change Conference COP28 is illustrative of this. Qatar, meanwhile, is looking to build on the success of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, including by expanding its gas production capacity to solidify its status as the world’s most important exporter of liquified natural gas.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>A new, elevated sensor architecture is required to detect, identify, and track a spectrum of maneuvering missile threats with sufficient quality to support missile defense fire control. These threats combine high speeds, unpredictable, non-ballistic trajectories, and large raid sizes to stress legacy defense designs.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The future of missile defense and missile defeat will be contingent on the development, characteristics, and fielding timeline of this architecture. One cannot defend against what one cannot see.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>There is no such thing as a perfect sensor architecture design. Designing an elevated sensor architecture is rather an exercise in tradeoffs. Given this multiplicity of trades, architecture design is as much an art as a science. The application of this art to specific designs reflects various institutional and policy assumptions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Unpacking these tradeoffs and assumptions — making them explicit — can help policymakers, budgeteers, and system architects, and better inform the public discussion related to missile tracking and missile defense. Doing so is the purpose of this report. This report does not advocate a particular architecture, but instead elaborates these tradeoffs, identifies principles to inform future architectures, and highlights temptations to avoid.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>No single orbit or domain represents an optimal approach for missile defense sensing. Low (LEO), medium (MEO), geosynchronous (GEO), and highly elliptical orbits (HEO) each contribute varied advantages for coverage, schedule, cost, and resilience.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Proliferating space sensors in LEO is one way to improve resilience, assuming large numbers and low-cost replacement. It is not the only way. Reliance on a single orbital regime, or on any single approach to resilience, invites disruption. LEO constellations can be degraded by area- or domain-wide effects, including electronic attack, nuclear or radiological means, and the intentional generation of debris.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The Department of Defense’s recently updated plan to deploy a mixed-orbit missile tracking constellation is thus a welcome step for enhancing resilience. Sensor architectures should complicate adversary targeting by leveraging the unique benefits and drawbacks of multiple orbits and domains.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The deployment phasing of a sensor architecture is as critical as its final delivery date. Choices over orbital configurations not only affect final sensor coverage but how coverage develops over time. Sensor constellations optimized purely for coverage efficiencies do not necessarily generate persistent coverage until most elements are deployed. For nearer-term coverage, especially for the lower latitudes relevant to the Indo-Pacific and other theaters, policymakers should be attentive to the pacing of sensor fielding, not only the final product — graceful deployment as well as graceful degradation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>While a space-based sensor architecture is necessary for global missile tracking coverage, a suborbital underlay of airborne sensors could improve point or regional coverage, hedge against schedule or capability gaps of orbiting sensors, and enhance overall system-level survivability. Airborne sensors offer unique detection modalities and could support persistent, localized coverage unbounded by the predictability and rigidity of orbital mechanics.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Sensor fusion is a major and underappreciated source of schedule risk. Delays in developing sensor fusion software and infrastructure contributed significantly to past space program cost and schedule overruns. Further steps are needed to prioritize command and control and fusion algorithm development for larger satellite constellations and multiple sensor types.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Fire control-quality tracking must be a fundamental requirement for the emergent elevated sensing architecture. The technical requirements for fire control tracks are relative measures, contingent on the performance of other elements in the missile defense kill chain. Less stringent track data requirements would require interceptors with costlier, more capable seekers or more ability to maneuver to compensate for positional uncertainties. Conversely, more accurate sensor data would both improve the performance of existing systems and ease design requirements for future interceptors.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Infrared sensor performance is a function of the target’s signature and the sensor’s resolution, sensitivity, and field of view. Both wide- and medium-field-of-view sensors share promise for fire control-quality tracking. In recent years, Congress has prudently scrutinized and sustained efforts to deploy fire control sensors, including the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), which is slated to transfer from the Missile Defense Agency to the Space Force around 2026. Whatever the sensor configuration and type, it is imperative that fire control efforts cross the valley of death and deploy at scale.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Many of the technologies and programs to realize an elevated sensor architecture are in place, but a disciplined acquisition and systems engineering authority will be needed to align its many components. Policymakers must exert oversight to ensure schedule discipline, orbital and systems diversity, and continued attention to missile defense fire control requirements.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Acquiring this new elevated sensor architecture will be an exercise in avoiding certain temptations. These include temptations to optimize global coverage efficiencies at the expense of schedule and resilience, to consolidate assets into a single orbital regime, and to abdicate fire control requirements.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Critical to all of these ambitions is the maintenance of a modicum of stability in the wider region. In many ways, the war in Gaza erupted just as Gulf leaders felt like their regional strategy to de-escalate and reduce tensions wherever possible was working. Not only had they buried the hatchet of their intra-Gulf dispute, but they had also managed to steer their relations with Iran into calmer waters. In fact, in the effort to contain the war at least geographically, the new channel of communication between Riyadh and Tehran has undoubtedly been crucially important.</p> +<h3 id="the-elevated-sensing-imperative">The Elevated Sensing Imperative</h3> -<p>Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar remain worried about the violence in Gaza stoking regional instability, even if the spectre of a wider regional war can be kept at bay. While they are confident that they can manage popular anger about Israel’s conduct in Gaza at home, they are aware that their counterparts in Egypt and Jordan – two countries whose stability they regard as pivotal for the region – might have a harder time doing the same.</p> +<p>In this new missile age, adversaries and allies alike are acquiring a broad spectrum of standoff capabilities. New and emerging categories of weapons include hypersonic glide vehicles, scramjet cruise missiles, maneuvering reentry vehicles, and orbital bombardment systems. These and other advanced missiles have become “weapons of choice” for competitors, who are conceiving new means to evade legacy missile defenses and hold critical assets at risk. The sophistication, diversity, and number of missile threats continue to advance.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Gulf states have seen the US’s strong support for Israel as another sign that Washington’s strategy in the Middle East is out of step with the regional mood</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Conflicts in Ukraine and elsewhere have confirmed the centrality of missile strike and the corresponding need for missile defense. As part of a comprehensive approach, active missile defenses have become foundational to broad deterrence and defense goals. Today’s missile defense capabilities, however, are coming under increasing stress. Today’s spectrum of threats leverage high speeds, unpredictable maneuvers, and different trajectories to exploit gaps and seams in legacy missile defenses. New classes of hypersonic missiles, for instance, threaten to underfly the radar horizons of surface-based radars, leaving insufficient time for a defender to react (Figure 1). One cannot defend against what one cannot see.</p> -<p>Furthermore, even if Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha are feeling more confident about their ability to manage tensions with Tehran, they nevertheless see – and have always seen – a great risk in Iran’s ability to use the Palestinian cause and its claim to leadership of the resistance against Israel to shore up its regional position. The attacks on commercial ships supposedly linked to Israel by the Yemeni Houthis – one of Iran’s partners in the region – obviously worry Saudi Arabia, for example. For now, these activities are not directed at the Kingdom, but with the Red Sea central to Riyadh’s economic development plans, they clearly represent a long-term threat.</p> +<p>Contending with these threats will require specific attention to modernizing the sensor architecture. The missile defense enterprise requires elevated sensors to detect, identify, and track them before and after launch. Compared to surface-based sensors, those on satellites or aircraft offer longer lines of sight for tracking hypersonic and other advanced missile systems. As such, the 2022 Missile Defense Review noted that space-based sensing will be “critical to any future integrated sensor network.”</p> -<p>The Gulf states are therefore likely to continue to emphasise the need for pragmatism and de-escalation. They will try to protect the gains they have made in their relations with Iran, even if this proves to be an uphill battle. Similarly, they are unlikely to fundamentally change their approach towards Israel. The UAE has made it clear that it has no desire to give up what has been from its perspective a tremendously beneficial expanding relationship with Israel since the conclusion of the Abraham Accords in 2020. Saudi-Israeli normalisation may have become a more distant prospect due to the war, but it remains on the horizon. The strategic drivers behind normalisation, ranging from shared security interests vis-à-vis Iran to the promise of lucrative economic opportunities, remain unchanged. Even Qatar will continue to maintain its pragmatic arms-length relationship with Israel, not least because it is precisely its ability to talk to the Israeli government and security services, as well as to Hamas, that makes it such a valuable mediator and interlocutor, both in the current crisis and likely in the future too.</p> +<p>Elevated sensing has thus become an acquisition priority for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Through its component Space Development Agency (SDA) and Space Systems Command (SSC), the U.S. Space Force has invested billions to acquire space-based sensors for missile warning and tracking (Figure 3). The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), meanwhile, is prototyping space sensors for missile defense fire control — the process of guiding interceptors to an incoming threat (Figure 2). These and other stakeholders have advanced different visions for the future sensor architecture. The question now is how to reconcile and implement these visions, and on what timeline.</p> -<p>In their relations beyond the region, the Gulf states are also trying to stay the course. The war has re-emphasised the centrality of the US to regional security, as impressively illustrated by the extensive ramping-up of the US military presence in the immediate aftermath of the 7 October attack. At the same time, however, the Gulf states have also seen the US’s strong – and in their view uncritical – support for Israel as another sign that Washington’s strategy in the Middle East is out of step with the regional mood and their own priorities.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BfafdtU.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Radar Line of Sight Limitations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>They have therefore continued to express their conviction that the world – and the region with it – is moving towards a multipolar order, and have done what they can to make this a reality. This has included the Saudi-led foreign ministers delegation’s demonstrative choice to make Beijing the first stop of their tour to build international consensus around a call for a ceasefire in Gaza, regardless of the fact that China has shown very little ability or willingness to make any meaningful efforts to resolve the crisis. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia also fit into this pattern.</p> +<h4 id="elevated-sensing-missions">Elevated Sensing Missions</h4> -<p>In sum, it is very clear that the war in Gaza has made life harder for the Gulf Arab states. Leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha want to focus on developing their countries and claiming their places on the global stage, and they are determined not to let either the volatility of the region they happen to find themselves in or the unstable global environment prevent them from doing so. In this context, the war in Gaza is a setback, but not one that changes the overall strategic calculus in the Gulf.</p> +<p>The DoD is developing satellite constellations to perform multiple sensing missions, including missile warning, missile tracking, and fire control (Table 1). These lines of effort include the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen OPIR) and Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking (RMW/MT) satellite constellations, which will recapitalize existing missile warning capabilities and track hypersonic and advanced missile threats throughout their trajectory, from birth to death.</p> -<hr /> +<p>While significant work on next-generation missile warning satellites continues, such efforts are not discussed here in detail. This report is instead focused on efforts to develop space-based missile tracking capabilities, especially for fire control — activities traditionally performed with ground- and sea-based radars.</p> -<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East. He also co-leads the development and delivery of the RUSI Leadership Centre’s programme of executive education training courses, including for diplomats, military personnel, and security professionals from the Middle East and beyond.</p>Tobias BorckAs Israel’s war in Gaza rages on, the Gulf Arab states continue to try to strike a balance between working to contain and end the violence and maintaining momentum for their respective national projects.From The Ground Up2023-12-11T12:00:00+08:002023-12-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/from-the-ground-up<p><em>Experts examine two aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural recovery that are critical to increasing its food production and exports: demining farmland and restoring farmers’ access to fertilizers.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9oEcYdk.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Missile Defense Space Assets.</strong> Source: Missile Defense Agency.</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The United States currently relies on the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites to provide global missile warning — persistent notification of missile launches in support of strategic nuclear deterrence and other defense and intelligence missions. As contributors to the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Overhead Persistent Infrared Architecture (BOA), SBIRS and other sensors support the Missile Defense System (MDS) by providing early missile tracking data to cue its broader network of sensors. This initial detection sets the missile defense targeting process in motion, cueing a sophisticated network of ground and maritime radars to determine the positions, trajectories, and signatures of ballistic missiles.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>As incoming missiles continue to fly, the MDS synthesizes sensor measurement data into three-dimensional “tracks”: estimations of the missile’s position and trajectory. Different sensors deliver track information at different quality levels, with different degrees of latency and positional uncertainty, for different numbers of threat objects. These tracks must then be fused together into a single, trusted picture.</p> -<p>In the two decades leading up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Ukraine had become a major producer and exporter of numerous agricultural commodities. In the 2020–2021 harvest season — the last season unaffected by Russia’s full-scale invasion — Ukraine was the fifth-largest exporter of wheat, honey, and walnuts worldwide; the third-largest exporter of maize, barley, and rapeseed; and the world’s top exporter of sunflower oil, sunflower meal, and millet.</p> +<p>It is one thing to know that some number of missiles have been launched and that they are headed in a general direction. It is another to know how many, where they will be at a given moment, and thus how to defeat them. Using sufficiently accurate tracking data, a missile defense system can develop a fire control solution, determining when to launch one or more interceptors, what trajectory the interceptors should travel, and other considerations for engaging the targets. “Fire control-quality” tracks are those with the position and time accuracy sufficient for a missile defense system to generate an intercept solution.</p> -<p>Due to Russia’s intentional attacks on all aspects of Ukraine’s agriculture sector, and collateral damage from hostilities, Ukraine’s production and exports are diminished today from prewar levels. As of June 2023, the Kyiv School of Economics estimated that Ukraine’s agriculture sector had incurred $8.7 billion in direct damages to agricultural machinery, equipment, and storage facilities, as well as from stolen or damaged agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and seeds, and outputs, such as crops and livestock. The sector’s $40.3 billion losses represent farmers’ diminished incomes due to foregone production, lower selling prices for products, and higher operational costs across all stages of the agri-food value chain.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/n02uRIk.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Elevated Sensing Missions.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>The Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, published in February 2023 by the World Bank in partnership with Kyiv School of Economics, the Ukrainian government, the European Union, and the United Nations, provides the most thorough evaluation of the war’s consequences for Ukraine and the investments required to ensure its future prosperity. However, the continuous and comprehensive nature of Russia’s assault complicates any estimate of damage and needs. Following the report’s publication, further losses and damages resulted from Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 and its immediate intensification of attacks on agricultural export infrastructure along Ukraine’s Black Sea and Danube River coasts. Between July and October, 17 separate attacks on Ukraine’s ports, grain facilities, and civilian ships destroyed 300,000 metric tons of grain and further reduced the country’s export potential.</p> +<p>The technical requirements for fire control-quality tracks are relative measures, contingent on the performance of other elements in the missile defense kill chain. Less stringent track data requirements would require interceptors with costlier, more capable seekers or more ability to maneuver to compensate for positional uncertainties. Conversely, more accurate sensor data would both improve the performance of existing systems and ease design requirements for future interceptors. General James Dickinson, commander of U.S. Space Command, recently noted that fire control-quality tracking “is going to determine the success or failure of whatever weapon system you’re employing to defeat that threat.” Realizing it is therefore “exceptionally important.”</p> -<p>This destruction has resulted in a further downward spiral in Ukraine’s agricultural economy. Limited export routes have raised transportation costs and reduced the volume of goods farmers can sell, decreasing farmers’ incomes and eliminating profitability. While incomes have fallen, the costs of agricultural inputs have risen, and damage to farms and equipment imposes additional, heavy costs on farmers. As a result, many farmers are curtailing their activities and reducing the size of their harvests. And despite the Ukrainian government’s efforts to insulate agricultural workers from the draft, active war has drawn farmers to the battlefield, reducing the size of Ukraine’s agricultural labor force.</p> +<p>While the functions of future missile defense engagements will remain similar to those of the past, the characteristics of several new classes of missile threats will impose new requirements for the sensing architecture. Surface-based tracking of new and emergent maneuvering missile threats remains both useful and necessary for the spectrum of missile threats, but it is insufficient for some of the newer types. Earth’s geometry limits surface-based radar from detecting and engaging lower-flying targets, including hypersonic weapons. Given these new threats, missile defenses require elevated sensors for the missile tracking mission, and to do so with more highly detailed, lower-latency trajectory estimations to support the fire control mission.</p> -<p>In aggregate, this has significantly decreased Ukraine’s agricultural production and exports.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">“Fire control-quality” tracks are those with the position and time accuracy sufficient for a missile defense system to generate an intercept solution.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/czTj1Z5.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>Achieving this vision will carry enormous challenges. The effective employment of fire control quality tracks will require new processing, networking, and sensor fusion capabilities to synthesize missile tracks and compute fire control solutions. Precise tracking furthermore demands attention to a wide variety of new threat signatures, the presence of background clutter, future countermeasures, and other challenges. Addressing these problems will be difficult, but it must be done.</p> -<p>Still, in 2022, Ukraine managed to remain among the world’s top producers and exporters of corn, wheat, sunflower oil and seeds, and soybeans, due to the determination of Ukraine’s agricultural labor force, the commitment of Ukraine’s government, and support from numerous other partners, including governments, multilateral organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and research institutes. According to Kyiv School of Economics president Tymofiy Milovanov, efforts to rebuild Ukraine’s agricultural sector should continue even as conflict continues because it is unlikely there will be a “clear end to the war.” Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky established the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the War just two months after the full-scale invasion began, and the council continues to develop the Ukraine Recovery Plan in partnership with Ukrainian civil society institutions, partner governments, and international organizations and companies. The overarching goal of this work is not just to reconstruct Ukraine, but to build on the country’s reforms in recent years and transform Ukraine’s economy for the future.</p> +<p>Requirements for the future elevated sensor architecture are tightly coupled with every other aspect of the missile defense kill chain. Sensor design requirements drive interceptor design requirements — the schedule for one affects the schedule for the other. Sensor capability may therefore be compared to a locomotive that pulls other missile defense capabilities forward. In the words of Frank Turner, technical director of the Space Development Agency, “Schedule is king. The train is going to leave the station on time.”</p> -<p>The importance of investing in Ukraine’s agricultural sector is threefold: to bolster Ukraine’s economy in wartime, to restore its capacity as a major global food supplier, and to strengthen its position as a bulwark to Russia’s influence through its own agricultural exports. Rebuilding and transforming Ukraine’s agriculture sector will require coordinated investments in its soil, labor force, agricultural institutions, and infrastructure. Adequate and low-cost routes must be secured for Ukraine’s agricultural exports; damaged farm, storage, transportation, and port infrastructure must be rebuilt; destroyed and stolen equipment and goods must be replaced; farmlands must be demined, tested, and restored; farmers’ access to seeds, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs much be secured; and farmers’ needs for additional financing and training to continue agricultural activity must be met. Investments to address immediate needs and obstacles are ongoing, but even more immense challenges will require international attention in the coming decades, including demining waterways, namely the Black and Azov Seas, modernizing the country’s irrigation infrastructure, and addressing the repercussions of the Kakhovka dam collapse on surrounding ecosystems and agricultural livelihoods. This work will take place in the context of Ukraine’s 2024 farmland market reform and the country’s candidacy for membership in the European Union, which will necessitate further reforms to Ukraine’s agriculture sector.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="2023-national-defense-authorization-act"><code class="highlighter-rouge">2023 National Defense Authorization Act</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>This white paper focuses on two aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural reconstruction that are crucial to supporting transformation throughout the sector: demining Ukraine’s farmland and improving access to fertilizers in Ukraine. The information and insights included herein are the result of CSIS research, with input from numerous experts in Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. Information and policy recommendations regarding rebuilding other aspects of Ukraine’s agriculture sector can be found in other CSIS publications and will be the focus of future scholarship.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">“In carrying out the analysis of candidate fire control architectures, the Secretary of the Air Force shall ensure that the Director of the Space Warfighting Analysis Center of the Space Force, at a minimum, maintains the requirements needed for the missile defense command and control, battle management, and communications system to pass the needed quality data within the timelines needed for current and planned interceptor systems to support engagements of ballistic and hypersonic threats.”</code></em></p> -<h3 id="demining">Demining</h3> +<h4 id="unpacking-the-tradeoffs-art-and-science">Unpacking the Tradeoffs: Art and Science</h4> -<h4 id="the-scale-and-nature-of-landmine-use">The Scale and Nature of Landmine Use</h4> +<p>There is no such thing as a perfect sensor architecture design. Designing an elevated sensor architecture is rather an exercise in tradeoffs. There are, for instance, a multiplicity of trades among orbital altitudes and inclinations, sensor phenomenologies, and other variables. Assumptions about future threats to the architecture influence final design configurations and standards for survivability and resilience. Decisions about schedule, or when certain capabilities are necessary, likewise affect technical requirements.</p> -<p>Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a significant proportion of combat has been waged across farmland in Ukraine’s rural areas, compromising Ukraine’s agricultural economy. The nature of the war’s impacts on Ukraine’s farmland varies by locale. War-related damage to Ukraine’s farmland includes craters and other physical destruction from munitions attacks; possible chemical contamination from munitions, fuel spills, shell remnants, and human remains; and depressions from armed vehicle tracks. According to the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, Russian troops were firing between 40,000 and 60,000 shells at Ukrainian positions every day as of August 2022. Up to 20 percent of ammunition fired does not detonate, and Russian troops regularly place landmines in fields and forests. Among threats to Ukraine’s farmland, unexploded ordnance and the extensive placement of landmines remain widespread concerns.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/d8SpAR0.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: SDA Tracking Layer Deployment.</strong> Source: Space Development Agency.</em></p> -<p>A Reuters investigation into landmine use in Ukraine revealed “landmine contamination so vast it is most likely unprecedented in the 21st century,” with emplaced landmines numbering in the hundreds of thousands. By mid-2023, Ukraine had become the most mined country in the world, surpassing Afghanistan, Syria, Cambodia, and other countries in which landmines are a common feature of warfare. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, about 30 percent of Ukraine’s lands, or approximately 174,000 square kilometers (67,000 square miles), has been exposed to conflict and will require surveying and, if necessary, demining. According to Interfax, a further 13,500 square kilometers (over 5,200 square miles) of the Black Sea, Azov Sea, and Ukraine’s rivers and other inland bodies of water are potentially contaminated with landmines. Likewise, according to Human Rights Watch, the scale of landmine use in Ukraine has resulted in a “large, dispersed, and complex level of contamination that will threaten Ukrainian civilians and hinder recovery efforts for years to come.” One deminer (or “sapper”) is able to clear between 15 and 25 square meters per day, and given the current rate of progress, some estimate that complete demining of Ukrainian territory could take decades or even centuries.</p> +<p>Given this multiplicity of trades, architecture design is as much an art as a science. The application of this art in specific force designs reflects institutional and policy assumptions.</p> -<p>Antipersonnel mines and anti-vehicle mines have been used in the ongoing war, with at least 13 types of mines identified in Ukraine to date, according to Human Rights Watch, which are located in at least 11 regions across central and eastern Ukraine (see [map]). The preponderance of landmines in Ukraine have been emplaced by Russia, which is not a signatory to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty). Human Rights Watch has even identified in Ukraine several previously unseen Russian landmines produced as late as 2021, including antipersonnel mines. Though Ukraine is a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine has used antipersonnel mines in at least one location since Russia’s invasion, according to Human Rights Watch.</p> +<p>These system- and architecture-wide tradeoffs have been all too implicit in the public conversation about sensor architecture acquisition, presenting an oversight challenge. The number of considerations makes it difficult to define clear metrics for success, a challenge made more complex by the number of stakeholders involved and continual revisions made to their architectures. Clearer goalposts are needed to understand, align, and implement an acquisition strategy.</p> -<p>Landmines used in the war have been hand-emplaced, mechanically laid, scattered by truck-mounted projectors, and delivered by rocket. They include small, plastic-cased PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, which can be easily mistaken for harmless objects and overlooked by metal detectors; POM-3 anti-personnel mines, which can be scattered by air and detonated with mere vibrations, such as nearby footsteps; metal- and plastic-encased anti-vehicle mines, which can be buried in shallow holes and penetrate vehicles’ under-armor upon detonation; and PARM anti-vehicle mines, which can be placed above ground and fire a projectile into their target. Russian forces are also employing “Zemledelie” systems, which can remotely lay mines in areas as large as several football fields in short periods of time, creating minefields of varying complexities across Ukraine. The “Zemledelie” system, Russian for “agriculture,” was developed by the Russian company Rostec and was first observed in use in March 2022.</p> +<p>Unpacking these tradeoffs and assumptions — making them explicit — can help policymakers, budgeteers, and systems architects, and better inform the public discussion related to missile tracking and missile defense. Doing so is the purpose of this report. This report does not advocate a particular architecture but instead elaborates these tradeoffs, describes ongoing acquisition efforts, and identifies policy temptations to avoid. From these, three principles become relevant to the acquisition of a future architecture.</p> -<p>Both the extent of Russia’s mine placements and the use of mining technology innovations within Ukraine have resulted in mine contamination of enormous complexity, scale, and lethality. As of September 2023, 246 civilians (including 13 children) had been killed by explosive devices, and 521 civilians (including 53 children) had been injured across Ukraine.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given this multiplicity of trades, architecture design is as much an art as a science.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bGsCnWd.png" alt="image02" /></p> +<p>One principle is that <strong>an elevated sensor architecture should be diversified across multiple orbits and domains.</strong> Technological advancements in commercial space have generated enthusiasm for proliferated, commoditized low Earth orbit (LEO) constellations. Surviving a peer threat, however, will demand more. Proliferating space sensors in LEO is one way to improve resilience, assuming large numbers and low-cost replacement. It is not the only way. Reliance on a single orbital regime, or on any single approach to resilience, invites disruption. LEO constellations can be degraded by area- or domain-wide effects, including electronic attack, nuclear or radiological means, and the intentional generation of debris. For further altitude diversification, a suborbital underlay of airborne sensors could improve point or regional coverage, hedge against schedule or capability gaps of orbiting sensors, and enhance overall system-level survivability. As tempting as it may be to consolidate acquisition efforts to one orbital domain, a multi-orbit and multi-domain architecture is likely to be more survivable.</p> -<h3 id="ukrainian-government-efforts">Ukrainian Government Efforts</h3> +<p>Another principle is that <strong>an elevated sensor architecture should deploy gracefully.</strong> The deployment phasing of a new sensor architecture is as critical as its final delivery date. Some constellation designs do not generate persistent coverage until nearly all elements are deployed. For nearer-term coverage, especially for the lower latitudes of the Indo-Pacific, policymakers should be attentive to the pacing of sensor fielding, not only the final product — graceful deployment as well as graceful degradation. Lower-inclined orbits or airborne assets may be useful for early coverage of critical areas. Sensor fusion is another major and underappreciated source of schedule risk. More must be done to accelerate development of software and ground systems to knit these pieces together. Schedule is king.</p> -<p>While the war continues, the Ukrainian government’s assistance for demining efforts continues to evolve. The Ukrainian government was already supporting demining efforts in Ukraine when Russia invaded in February 2022; previously occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk had been subject to demining efforts since 2015, following Russia’s 2014 invasion. In November 2021, the Ukrainian government announced the creation of the National Mine Action Authority, an interagency group led by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence that is responsible for the development of national policy and plans for demining as well as coordination of all actors involved in demining.</p> +<p>Finally, <strong>an elevated sensor architecture must deliver fire control-quality tracking to support active missile defense.</strong> Requirements for data quality should be developed in close connection with the characteristics and limitations of interceptors or other effectors. While much attention has been paid to developing elevated missile warning and missile tracking capabilities, Congress has prudently scrutinized and sustained efforts to deploy fire control sensors. Whether through the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), its derivatives, or some future wide-field-of-view sensor, it is necessary to accelerate and scale a fire control sensor network for the missile defense mission. In recent years, SDA has taken valuable additional steps to incorporate fire control sensors in its proliferated constellation. It is worth considering how to sustain this momentum and achieve fire control capability in the near term.</p> -<p>Among Ukraine’s mined territory is a significant proportion of Ukraine’s farmland. The precise proportion of Ukraine’s farmland that has been contaminated by landmines is impossible to determine while hostilities continue. Estimates of Ukraine’s farmland exposed to landmines range from 470,000 hectares (or 1,814 square miles), according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, to 2.5 million hectares (or 9,652 square miles), according to Ukraine’s first deputy minister of agrarian policy and food. GLOBSEC estimates that 5 million hectares (or 19,305 square miles, approximately 15.2 percent) of Ukraine’s farmland are unsuitable for use due to landmines, contamination with explosive ordnance, and exposure to armed hostilities.</p> +<h4 id="modeling-the-problem">Modeling the Problem</h4> -<p>In March 2023, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence announced the creation of an Action Plan for Demining Agricultural Land to facilitate spring sowing and fall harvesting of crops in 2023 and after. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for ensuring implementation of the plan and coordination among Ukrainian and international partners. To expedite humanitarian demining nationwide, the Ukrainian government announced the formation of the Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining in June 2023, chaired by the Ministry of Economy, and the working group held its first meeting in September 2023, emphasizing the importance of creating a mine action strategy for Ukraine. Later in September 2023, Ukrainian prime minister Denis Shmyhal convened the first Demine Ukraine Forum among Ukrainian government representatives and international partners.</p> +<p>This report’s analysis is informed in large part by internal modeling and simulation conducted by the CSIS Missile Defense Project (MDP). The research team used ANSYS/AGI’s Systems Toolkit (STK) and Iroquois Systems/Lockheed Martin’s SMARTSet tools to model key tradeoffs in constellation design. Many of the images included resulted from optimization studies involving nearly a million simulations and numerous days of computing time. To speed this process, MDP acquired and assembled dedicated hardware to accelerate computing tasks. Further details on modeling and methodology are described in the appendix.</p> -<h3 id="humanitarian-demining">Humanitarian Demining</h3> +<p>The team modeled constellation and sensor design tradeoffs in STK’s synthetic environment. To visualize the infrared signatures pictured in the report, MDP leveraged the STK Electro-optical Infrared (EOIR) simulation module, creating a scenario (Figure 4) to investigate hypersonic tracking challenges. To construct the scene, the team created original 3D models of notional hypersonic weapons (Figures 5 and 7) and imported and processed National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) infrared terrain data (Figure 6).</p> -<p>The ultimate purpose of mine removal dictates the level of investment — of time and funding — in demining efforts. Swiftly clearing an area of mines in the course of combat or immediately thereafter is called military, combat, or operational demining. Operational demining is conducted by special military units or other emergency services and is intended to clear a path for the safe advance or retreat of troops. Though it may quickly return access to roads, residential buildings, or other areas of common use, it does not necessarily guarantee the safety of these areas.</p> +<p>Additionally, MDP performed optimization studies to assess how different constellation designs could impact sensor coverage. The research team conducted basic assessments of altitude, coverage, and custody against hypersonic targets using SMARTSet and performed more detailed analyses with STK’s Analyzer tool, which can automatically test and evaluate design possibilities. Many of these analyses revolved around constellation designs and their impact on sensor coverage; these are pictured throughout the report. The number of potential designs evaluated encompassed nearly one million simulation runs.</p> -<p>Humanitarian demining, by contrast, aims to “clear land so that civilians can return to their homes and their everyday routines without the threat of explosive hazards,” according to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Humanitarian demining involves numerous, resource-intensive steps, all of which are required to guarantee that an area has been thoroughly searched and cleared of explosives and is safe for use. Steps required for humanitarian demining include a non-technical survey of land, involving interviewing communities and reviewing records of conflicts; a technical survey, involving the use of equipment or animals to determine the boundaries of minefields; mine removal, most commonly through mine detonation; and certification that mine removal is complete and land is safe for use.</p> +<p>These studies are useful for describing the tradeoffs at play in acquiring an elevated sensor architecture. It is a low-fidelity modeling effort, and intentionally so — meant to illustrate high-level principles rather than prescribe specific designs. Scenarios were constructed to be generalizable and reproducible, and to demonstrate the relationship between changing sensor fields of view, inclinations, altitudes, and other variables. The constellations and sensors described herein are not presented as recommendations. They are meant to inform the conversation and draw out unexamined assumptions.</p> -<p>According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, humanitarian demining in Ukraine is presently carried out by 18 certified mine action operator organizations, including NGOs (e.g., the Danish Refugee Council, HALO Trust, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, the Norwegian People’s Aid, and DanChurchAid), companies (e.g., Demining Solutions, GK Group, and TetraTech), and Ukrainian entities (e.g., the Ukrainian Sappers Association, Ukrspecexport, and Ukroboronservice). Entities that wish to contribute to Ukraine’s demining efforts must complete a complex certification procedure before working as demining operators in Ukraine. In recognition of the need to expedite and streamline the certification process for demining operators, the State Emergency Service’s Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining launched an online portal for interested organizations to apply for certification and keep apprised of the application’s status. After obtaining certification to demine its own farmland across Ukraine, the Ukrainian company Nibulon has recognized the use of its expertise across Ukraine’s farmland broadly and will offer its services to farmers and to the state. As of September 2023, 30 additional organizations are awaiting certification, including 18 governmental operators from Ukraine’s State Emergency Service, State Transport Special Service, and armed forces.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oQq3FYW.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Simulated Hypersonic Tracking Scenario.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>At present, the Ukrainian government does not fund humanitarian demining services, so most farmers must pay for demining services themselves. At the Demine Ukraine Forum, Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko noted that Ukraine’s 2024 budget would include UAH 2.0 billion ($54.7 million) to partially compensate farmers for demining services. Minister Svyrydenko also announced the establishment of the Prozorro demining market, through which farmers are expected to select certified deminers. The Ukrainian government will compensate farmers for half the cost of demining through the Prozorro system, and the Ukrainian government is considering the best way to compensate farmers for demining costs borne before 2024. Ukraine’s state bank, “Ukragasbank,” has also launched a soft lending program to fund the demining of farmland within the framework of the “Affordable Loans at 5-7-9 percent” program, improving farmers’ access to demining financing and incentivizing farmers’ use of legal, certified demining operators.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1Tj1Wz9.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: 3D Model Used in Simulated Scenario.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<h3 id="progress-demining-ukraines-agricultural-land">Progress Demining Ukraine’s Agricultural Land</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/8VznfMV.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: NASA Infrared Scene Data.</strong> A visualization of NASA VIIRS geodata, generated through Panoply with postprocessing applied. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with NASA data.</em></p> -<p>Under the Ministry of Defence’s Action Plan for Demining Agricultural Land, the Ukrainian government specified 470,000 hectares of agricultural land in nine regions of Ukraine that would need to be surveyed and, if necessary, demined. These regions are where “the problem of contamination is most urgent and the clearing of agricultural land is most feasible,” according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence. In addition to the National Mine Action Authority, coordinated by the Ministry of Defence, Ukraine’s Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, coordinated by the Ministry of Economy, also supports humanitarian demining across Ukraine. In a press release from the Ministry of Economy in June 2023, the Ukrainian government noted that the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food would update the identification of territories that would need to be demined. According to the Ministry of Economy, 100,000 of the 470,000 hectares specified in the action plan had been cleared by June, and by the end of 2023, up to 165,000 hectares of land could be cleared for agricultural use.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ynNczwO.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: CSIS Hypersonic Vehicle Signature.</strong> An infrared view of the CSIS simulated hypersonic glide body, displaying temperature differentials across the upper and lower sides. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>The Ukrainian government has continued to publicize progress under the action plan. By September 2023, the Ukrainian government had surveyed 188,600 hectares of agricultural land under the plan, of which over 124,000 hectares will require clearance, including through humanitarian demining. By October 2023, the Ukrainian government had surveyed more than 225,000 hectares of agricultural land identified in the action plan and had returned 170,000 hectares to economic use. In addition to these periodic updates, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine publishes daily updates regarding its progress demining Ukrainian territories through a portal that is only accessible within Ukraine. Between the beginning of the invasion and November 14, 2023, 454,827 explosive objects and 2,892 kilograms of explosive substance have been defused, including 3,124 aerial bombs. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has also partnered with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining to maintain an interactive map of mine contamination across Ukraine.</p> +<h3 id="sensor-tradeoffs">Sensor Tradeoffs</h3> -<h3 id="ukraines-needs-and-international-support">Ukraine’s Needs and International Support</h3> +<p>Any discussion of design tradeoffs must begin with the sensors themselves. Constellation designs for missile tracking are constrained by the performance of their sensors, which must be able to distinguish the signatures of hypersonic and ballistic weapons and resolve their positions accurately.</p> -<p>Despite recent progress, the demining needs of the Ukrainian government remain staggering. As of February 2023, the cost of clearance of explosive ordnance across Ukraine was estimated at $37.6 billion, according to the Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment produced by the Kyiv School of Economics, the World Bank, the Ukrainian government, the European Union, and the United Nations. This estimate represents the significant investments needed in equipment, training, and salaries, including to expand the strategic planning and operational capacities of Ukraine’s demining forces.</p> +<p>Although many approaches are possible, the United States has historically addressed the space-based missile sensing problem with infrared sensors, which passively detect the thermal signatures of threat missiles. Infrared and other electro-optical sensors can meet the demanding size, weight, and power requirements of space-based platforms and have continued to improve in resolution, sensitivity, and cost.</p> -<p>Numerous countries, multilateral organizations, and NGOs have provided financial and other support for demining in Ukraine, including for the demining of agricultural land. In June 2023, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN World Food Programme (WFP) announced a joint plan to clear landmines and other explosive remnants of war from agricultural land, in collaboration with the Fondation Suisse de Déminage and with support from the UN Ukraine Humanitarian Fund and private donors. In July 2023, the Ukrainian government announced that numerous partners — including the United States, the European Union, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, Austria, Switzerland, South Korea, and the Howard Buffett Foundation — together had pledged $244 million for humanitarian demining clearance. In July 2023, South Korea pledged to provide demining equipment to Ukraine, and Japan has similarly offered technical assistance in 2023. In September 2023, the U.S. Department of State announced $90.5 million in humanitarian demining assistance to Ukraine, in addition to the $47.6 million the State Department had announced in September 2022 for a similar purpose. Croatia hosted the first International Donors’ Conference on Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine in October 2023, attracting representatives from more than 40 countries, and Switzerland, which announced over €100 million (approximately $107 million) for humanitarian demining in Ukraine in October 2023, will host the Second International Donors’ Conference on Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine in 2024.</p> +<p>While these technologies are mature, missile tracking and fire control with infrared sensors is more challenging than missile warning. Today’s geosynchronous missile warning sensors can detect the large, hot exhaust plumes of missiles as they launch but cannot provide detailed tracking information after this initial boost phase.</p> -<h3 id="the-reality-for-farmers">The Reality for Farmers</h3> +<p>Future missile tracking and fire control sensors must be capable of tracking hypersonic weapon signatures beyond the boost phase, where their infrared signatures diminish (Figure 8). Distinguishing a hypersonic heat signature against the Earth’s background has been likened to tracking “a slightly brighter candle in a sea of candles,” requiring extensive testing to validate.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Tmi3T4H.jpg" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ A farmer and a member of a demining team of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine carry an unexploded missile near the village of Hryhorivka, Zaporizhzhia region, on May 5, 2022.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zW3n0VR.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Hypersonic and Ballistic Signatures.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Despite the Ukrainian government’s recent progress on its Action Plan for Demining Agricultural Land and considerable support from international partners, many farmers face difficulties accessing humanitarian demining services. One licensed company, for example, is reported to have offered demining services to farmers for $200 per acre of farmland. Because the war has reduced harvests and incomes, and increased the costs of inputs, most farmers are unable to afford such prices. Furthermore, Ukraine’s byzantine bureaucracy can lead to long wait times for demining services. Duplication of services across ministries and the constant evolution of priorities and plans can lead to bottlenecks, which the Ukrainian government admits and is seeking to redress.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4Ud1slW.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Missile Signature Comparison and Detectability to SBIRS.</strong> Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> -<p>In the meantime, some farmers are resorting to conducting demining activities themselves. As one farmer reported to Foreign Policy, “At first we waited for the state to demine our fields. Then we understood it wouldn’t happen, so we decided to do it ourselves.” Three of this farmer’s employees scanned his farmland with handheld metal detectors, marking potential mines with flags. Another farmer operates a remote-controlled tractor, outfitted with panels stripped from Russian tanks, to scan his fields for landmines. One farmer in Kharkhiv explained the situation to local Ukrainian media (authors’ translation):</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HH0mocS.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Simulated Infrared View of Hypersonic Signature.</strong> An infrared sensor at a 1,000 km orbit images a hypersonic weapon located in the center of the frame. Given the sensor’s resolution, the missile is too dim to visually distinguish from surrounding objects (top). Detecting them requires computational processing, in this case by compositing multiple frames and computing the motion of pixels (center). An enlarged crop of the false-color image at center emphasizes the extracted hypersonic signature (bottom). Further details are available in the appendix. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <p>Out of 3,000 hectares, I have 1,000 hectares mined. I left the application for demining immediately after the de-occupation. The emergency department says that they will not clear the mines in the near future because they do not have time. We are now communicating with the neighboring farms to clear the fields [ourselves]. The situation with the neighbors is still worse, all their lands are “seeded” with explosives. We will look for a way out on our own, because today it is cheaper to buy a field than to demine it. We are considering the possibility of buying a drone that looks for mines or renting a special car. Otherwise, life will not return to our villages. . . . I need to clear the fields and sow crops this year.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tgJa8AM.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Surface Thermal Gradient of Space Shuttle Orbiter during Hypersonic Reentry.</strong> Thermal imaging simulations of the Space Shuttle orbiter display the considerable temperature discrepancies possible in hypersonic flight. Source: NASA.</em></p> -<p>In this context, many farmers opt to use the services of uncertified or “dark deminers,” who charge prices lower than certified deminers but who cannot guarantee that land they survey is clear of mines and safe for use. Among farmers who use dark demining services, accidents are reportedly common.</p> +<h4 id="sensors-field-of-view-and-architecture">Sensors, Field of View, and Architecture</h4> -<p>And among farmers in regions exposed to conflict, not only the presence but the fear of landmines can keep farmers from working their land, according to CSIS interviews. Kyiv School of Economics president Timofiy Milovanov characterized the current situation as two systems of demining at tension within Ukraine: the “legacy” system, whose adherence to international mine action standards renders it slow and expensive but best able to guarantee the safe clearance of lands, and the alternative system made up of Ukrainians that “have to work . . . [and] protect their children,” who “innovate right now, whether it’s certified or not.” Such demining “innovations” are borne from farmers’ need to continue agricultural activity for their livelihoods, but the risks of uncertified demining are severe. A farmer in Kherson who opted against planting in the face of mine contamination told Reuters, “I have no moral right to send workers to fields as it is dangerous for life.” CSIS interviews revealed the same tension between these two systems, with some Ukrainian entities advocating for equipping farmers with demining machines to expediate the process, and others insisting that farmers are not professional deminers and their participation in the process would risk lives and complicate the government’s coordination and planning.</p> +<p>These and other factors affect the number and configuration of sensor platforms in an architecture. By flying lower than hypersonic and ballistic weapons, air-based sensors offer advantageous views of hot hypersonic weapons against cold space backdrops — but lack the extended sightlines of space-based sensors. Space sensor constellations, meanwhile, must be carefully optimized for a variety of factors, including solar exclusion (viewing angles where sunlight overwhelms the sensor), orbital dynamics, and other variables.</p> -<p>The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that while overall production and export levels have fallen since Russia’s invasion, agricultural yields per acre have risen compared to last season for Ukraine’s major commodities, although the USDA estimates include crop production in Crimea and occupied territories, where Russia reaps the benefits of favorable harvests. For wheat, for example, yields are estimated at a 4.5 tons per hectare, up 17 percent from 2022 and 13 percent from the five-year average. This suggests that production losses are due primarily to reduced planting: the USDA estimates that harvested area has fallen 26 percent from the five-year average. In fact, farmland exposed to hostilities since February 2022 has left an impact visible from space, according to NASA’s Harvest program, which estimates that up to 2.8 million hectares (or over 10,800 square miles) of Ukraine’s agricultural land have been abandoned as a result of the war.</p> +<p>An infrared sensor architecture must also be sized to ensure coverage by two sensors at once. Unlike with radar, a single infrared imaging sensor cannot resolve a target’s position in three dimensions. Two sensors — simultaneously viewing the target — are needed to triangulate a three-dimensional track of a missile’s altitude, position, and heading (Figure 12). Stereo (two-sensor) or greater tracking is a baseline requirement for infrared sensor constellations. Additional redundancy may be needed to account for survivability constraints, maintenance downtime, and other factors.</p> -<h3 id="unique-considerations-for-agricultural-land">Unique Considerations for Agricultural Land</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nZfr7A6.png" alt="image13" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Depiction of Stereo Tracking.</strong> Source: Missile Defense Agency.</em></p> -<p>The presence, or even the fear, of landmines on agricultural land has affected farmers’ harvests across Ukraine. At the same time, the process of demining farmland could also depress agricultural yields, as some farmers may experience long-term impacts once their land has been demined. A report from the NGO Mine Action Review, with funding from the Norwegian, Canadian, and Swiss governments, details the numerous destructive effects of demining on soil. The most common machinery employed in demining is equipped with flails, tillers, and rollers, which can disrupt soil structure, accelerate soil erosion, and disrupt water, carbon, and nutrient cycles. While the most expedient and safest method of landmine disposal is through remote detonation, detonation generates a crater that displaces topsoil while compacting subsoil into the crater. Finally, the detonation of landmines can release toxic pollutants into soils and waterways, including from explosive substances as well as the breakdown of other munitions components. In Cambodia, for example, researchers found that the content of heavy metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and copper increased by 30 percent in soil in a 1-meter radius of the detonation point.</p> +<p>Most critically, each sensor’s FOR can affect the number of satellites necessary for a space-based sensing constellation. Sensors with a wide FOR can view a wider area of Earth’s surface, either by pivoting across a wide swath or by possessing a wide-angle optic (Figure 13). Even relatively minor changes in FOR can have considerable effects on coverage footprint and, consequently, the number of required satellites (Figure 14). For instance, a given 91-satellite constellation at 1,000 km can provide persistent global coverage with a 120-degree FOR but cannot do so with 110-degree or 100-degree FORs (Figures 16 and 17).</p> -<p>Mitigation measures for such effects of landmine detonation are unclear, and data on the environmental impacts of landmine detonation are limited. The extent to which the detonation of landmines could affect soil fertility and water quality in heavily mined territories has not been widely examined or reported. Only one international covenant, the International Mine Actions Standard 07.13, addresses the impacts of demining on agricultural land, stating that national authorities and mine action operators have the responsibility to “ensure that all mine action activities . . . are carried out in accordance with applicable legislation, safely, effectively and efficiently, but also in a way that minimises any adverse impact on people, wildlife, vegetation and other aspects of the environment.” The standard further specifies that mechanical clearance and bulk demolition, or the process of clearing land with machines designed to detonate ordnance, require greater oversight than other clearance methods given that “these processes have the ability to severely impact the environment.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Hq8Fqmt.png" alt="image14" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: Satellite Field of Regard.</strong> The three satellites visualized are in low Earth orbit (1,000 km) and have total sensor fields of regard of 100, 110, and 118 degrees, respectively. At this altitude, the curvature of the Earth limits increases in line of sight beyond 120 degrees. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GzdQD2W.jpg" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Employees of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine present to media the Ukraines first Armtrac 400 specialized mine clearance vehicle, purchased through the UNITED24 fundraising platform, near Kharkiv, on October 27, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HJGaQFZ.png" alt="image15" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: Field of Regard Footprints.</strong> Left to right: Altitude coverage footprints of 100-, 110-, and 118-degree fields of regard. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Although detonation carries risks for agricultural land, leaving landmines in the ground can also lead to chemical contamination as the munitions age and corrode. The leaching of hazardous chemicals into soil and groundwater can take anywhere from 10 to 90 years, but Ukraine’s farmland may experience pollution from buried ordnances sooner rather than later. Russia has reportedly used Soviet-era landmines against Ukraine, which would corrode faster than landmines produced more recently. Further, the characteristics of Ukraine’s fertile soils that enable plants to thrive also enable the soil to “cling on to a lot of these toxins following the war,” according to soil geomorphologist Joe Hupy.</p> +<p>Selecting wider FORs reduces the number of satellites needed for coverage, but doing so imposes additional requirements on the sensor itself. For fixed sensors, increasing sensor FOR requires an increase in the sensor field of view (FOV), the angle of view immediately viewable by the sensor. In other words, fixed-sensor FOR and FOV are identical. The Space Development Agency’s Tracking Layer satellites leverage fixed sensors — its Tranche 0 satellites are required to possess a FOR/FOV of 70 to 110 degrees.</p> -<p>Efforts to identify the impacts on agricultural soil and groundwater resulting from exploded ordnance, unexploded ordnance, and landmines have only just begun within Ukraine, and CSIS interviews with in-country experts and operators revealed that more investment, time, and resources are needed before these impacts can be accurately determined. The Ukrainian Researchers Society, FAO, and WFP have partnered to map munition craters, soil pollution, and the presence of “bombturbation,” or incidences of explosives cratering, compacting, displacing, and ejecting hazardous materials into soil. Their preliminary study of contamination in the Kharkiv Oblast using remote sensing and soil sample analysis shows that over 420,000 craters across roughly 655,072 hectares of arable land have resulted in over 1.3 million cubic meters of displaced soil, 4,214 hectares of bombturbated soil, and 28,286 hectares of potentially contaminated soil, with only 1.76 percent of assessed soils found to be contaminated with heavy metals. A CSIS interview with the FAO Ukraine office confirmed this level of contamination is not concerning for the safe consumption of crops, but rather for the potential of reduced agricultural production in the future.</p> +<p>A sensor’s FOR can be larger than its FOV if it is mechanically pointed (slewed) to view a wider area. This approach is technically mature and was leveraged in past efforts, such as in the Precision Tracking Space System and SBIRS missile-warning satellites (Figure 19). Mechanical slewing allows a narrower-FOV sensor to offer a large possible coverage — or access — footprint at the cost of mechanical complexity and challenges in managing vibration, pointing error, and slewing time. As these sensors cannot view every part of their FOR at once, they introduce additional considerations for tracking large numbers of targets in various regions: on which targets to view, in what order, and how rapidly to revisit them.</p> -<p>A collection of researchers across Ukraine, Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain have conducted a similar assessment within the Kharkiv Oblast, also finding that explosions on and within soil have damaged soil structure and released heavy metals into surrounding soils. The researchers note these findings are concluded from a minimal sample size that may not reflect the full extent of the war’s impacts on soils, especially given the limited access to areas of intense combat. These preliminary analyses are a significant step toward understanding the war’s effects on Ukrainian farmland, but offer an incomplete picture of what will be required to restore agricultural soil following the war’s conclusion. The scale of soil analysis required to determine the unique impacts of this war on Ukraine’s black soils will necessitate improved access to in-country soil testing facilities and greater investment in Ukraine’s remote sensing capabilities.</p> +<p>These tradeoffs — between fixed and slewing, wide and narrow — are important because changes in sensor FOV affect detection performance. Holding all factors equal, increasing a sensor’s FOV will increase its pixel footprint, as each pixel on the sensor’s focal plane array (FPA) corresponds to a wider swath of the Earth’s surface.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qz7StYi.png" alt="image16" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: Pixel Footprint, Field of View, and Sensitivity Tradeoffs.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>In October 2023, Ukraine’s minister of economy acknowledged, “Without demining, we will not be able to fully launch our economy. Mine clearance is therefore the starting point for the recovery of our country and its economy.” Significant progress against the challenge of demining Ukraine’s farmland is clear. At the same time, the scale of landmine contamination across Ukraine’s farmland and the importance of sustained agricultural activity to its economic recovery require unparalleled measures by the Ukrainian government along with support from international partners.</p> +<p>Larger pixel footprints, in turn, make it more challenging to track missile targets (Figure 14). Because hypersonic signatures are smaller than most sensor pixel footprints, their location becomes more difficult to distinguish as the pixel footprint expands (Figure 15). Moreover, larger pixel footprints increasingly “dilute” the brightness of the hypersonic signature with the signature of the surrounding terrain. The problem is akin to detecting a cup of boiling water poured into a swimming pool; a smaller pixel footprint is akin to detecting that same cup poured into a bucket. Holding all else equal, FOV influences performance and drives design decisions between slewed and fixed sensors.</p> -<p>Following is a description of ongoing best practices and additional steps needed to demine Ukraine’s farmland.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/M0mKxjL.png" alt="image17" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: Field of Regard and Coverage: 100-, 110-, and 120-Degree Sensors.</strong> These three-dimensional views illustrate the stereo sensor coverage of a 91-satellite, 1,000 km altitude constellation. Stereo coverage, the minimum necessary, is depicted in yellow; red areas represent simultaneous coverage by eight or more satellites. A constellation design that is viable with 120-degree sensors (right) does not provide persistent coverage with 110-degree (center) or 100-degree (left). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The Ukrainian government is prioritizing humanitarian demining at the highest levels, including by the leadership of the Ministries of Economy and Defence, as well as by the prime minister.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In the course of adapting demining services to the ongoing war, the Ukrainian government recognizes that inefficiencies remain and is attempting to expedite the provision of humanitarian demining services and reduce the cost to Ukraine’s farmers through the recently launched demining market on the Prozorro system and through soft loans to farmers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The Ukrainian government is also tracking the resources needed to demine Ukraine’s farmland, including demining equipment and training for deminers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The Action Plan for Demining Ukraine’s Agricultural Lands aims to synchronize humanitarian demining of Ukraine’s farmland, and the Ukrainian government is attempting to unify all Ukrainian government demining activities under a forthcoming mine action strategy, which the Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining is presently drafting.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>At the same time, the Ukrainian government should continue to take steps to reduce the prevalence of “dark demining” of Ukraine’s agricultural land and demining by farmers themselves, recognizing risks to the safety of farmers and other civilians.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Furthermore, the Ukrainian government is coordinating regularly with international partners to fill gaps and prevent overlaps in services, including through the International Donors’ Conference on Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Finally, the Ukrainian government and its partners appear to be aligning activities with UNMAS’s Five Pillars of Mine Action, including mine education, with Minister of Economy Svyrydenko recently emphasizing the need for a “nationwide awareness campaign to educate children from an early age about the dangers of explosive ordnance.”</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The complete humanitarian demining of Ukraine will require 10,000 sappers, necessitating an additional 7,000 deminers to supplement the 3,000 specialists working across the country today, according to Prime Minister Shmyhal. Funding for deminers’ training and salaries must be increased, with training for one sapper costing up to $6,000.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conducting non-technical surveys prior to other humanitarian demining procedures is the most cost-effective way to confirm the presence of landmine contamination and efficiently release non-contaminated land. In its action plan and national mine action strategy, the Ukrainian government should formalize the release of low- and no-risk land through non-technical surveys before conducting technical surveys in order to release more land for economic use as quickly as possible.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In completing non-technical surveys, technical surveys, and mine removal, sappers should have access to advanced demining technologies, including drones, ground-penetrating radar, and satellite imagery analysis enhanced by artificial intelligence, in order to expedite humanitarian demining and increase the safety of deminers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Ukraine should continue to invest in its capacity to manufacture advanced demining equipment locally.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In the face of the rapid evolution of Ukrainian government demining processes, the Ukrainian government should continue to clearly communicate the steps farmers must take to access certified demining services and receive compensation for them, including through the newly announced demining market under the Prozorro system.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The Ukrainian government and international partners should also attempt to reduce the cost to farmers of humanitarian demining of their agricultural land, recognizing that any costs borne by farmers will detract from investments in agricultural production, resulting in lower farmer incomes, production, and exports nationwide.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Given the urgent need for actionable information about the impacts of demining on agricultural land, and the fragility of the ecosystems on which agricultural activity depends, Ukraine’s government and international partners should invest in research on the impacts of demining agricultural land and disseminate best practices for demining Ukraine’s farmland to minimize impacts on soil fertility, water, and agricultural productivity. Such considerations and steps should be codified in plans for demining Ukraine’s farmland today and in the future, for the awareness of Ukrainian and international deminers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The Ukrainian government and partners should also increase the availability of soil testing to ensure the absence of chemical contamination and the safety of crops produced.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mJQIvDI.png" alt="image18" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 17: Field of Regard and Coverage: 100-, 110-, and 120-Degree Sensors.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <p>Humanitarian demining is more than just neutralizing mines or other explosive devices. It is about providing people with the opportunity to return to their homes and live safely. It’s about the recovery of the economy and the restoration of the country, and ultimately, about global food security.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Sensors with either narrower FOVs or more pixels can minimize these pixel footprints, thereby improving detection performance. Developments in wide-field-of-view (WFOV) sensors have been driven by developments in large-format FPAs with higher pixel counts: infrared sensors with 4,000 pixel-by-4,000 pixel (4K), 6K, 8K, or higher resolutions (Figure 18). Space Systems Command’s testbed geosynchronous WFOV satellite, for instance, leverages a large-format FPA with a 4K resolution. Early Tranche 0 technical requirements call for fixed sensors with an objective FOV of roughly 110 degrees and a pixel footprint of under 1.5 km, necessitating large FPAs.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="-vitalii-dankevych">— Vitalii Dankevych</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The infrared sensor industry has continued to develop larger FPA formats, which allow the use of wider FOVs without performance compromise. But there may be some missions where WFOV, fixed-sensor approaches are challenging. The Missile Defense Agency’s HBTSS satellites, for instance, will use a mechanically slewed medium-FOV (MFOV) sensor to shrink pixel footprints and allow fine-grained, fire control-quality missile tracking. Choices between fixed WFOV and slewing MFOV sensors are dependent on the availability, maturity, and cost of these large-format FPAs. In the near term, smaller-format FPAs are available at larger quantities and lower cost.</p> -<h3 id="fertilizer">Fertilizer</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/27KR6oE.png" alt="image19" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 18: Infrared Focal Plane Array Formats.</strong> Source: Raytheon Vision Systems.</em></p> -<p>Ukraine is endowed with uniquely fertile farmland. Nearly two-thirds of Ukraine’s total arable land is covered in black soils, a highly fertile soil type containing ideal clay content for plant growth and high quantities of organic matter, such as humus, and nutrients, including calcium, nitrogen, phosphates, and potassium. Ukraine’s wealth of fertile soil facilitated its rise as a major global food supplier, even as it applied less fertilizers per hectare compared to neighboring countries.</p> +<p>The size and performance of a constellation thus depends on these interlocking choices: between fixed and slewing sensors, sensor FOV, FPA format, and other factors. Maximizing sensor FOR allows a designer to minimize the satellites necessary for coverage. Doing so demands fixed sensors with wider fields of view or slewing sensors with narrower ones. System architects must balance a complex set of variables, each of which influences nearly every other aspect of the system (Figure 20).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/S3ILfmT.jpg" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ A farmer rides a floater truck spraying fertilizers on a farm in Kyiv on April 19, 2023.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qhjYHFT.png" alt="image20" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 19: SBIRS Sensor Fields of View.</strong> Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> -<p>While harvesting crops removes essential nutrients from soils, mineral fertilizers replace these nutrients for subsequent harvests. Ukraine’s major agricultural harvests require application of nitrogen, in the form of ammonia nitrate, urea, anhydrous ammonia, and other forms; phosphorus, in the form of diammonium phosphate, monoammonium phosphate, and other forms; and potassium or potassic fertilizer, in the form of potash. Worldwide, fertilizers have accounted for a large share of agricultural productivity growth over the past century.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2968OV7.png" alt="image21" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 20: Relation of Design Parameters.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<h3 id="impacts-of-russias-invasion-on-fertilizer-use-in-ukraine">Impacts of Russia’s Invasion on Fertilizer Use in Ukraine</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tRSbLyF.png" alt="image22" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 21: Progress in Large-Format Infrared Focal Plane Arrays.</strong> Source: Raytheon Vision Systems, via SPIE.</em></p> -<p>Ukraine’s increased agricultural production and exports over the past two decades are largely due to an increase in the use of fertilizers by Ukrainian farmers. Russia’s invasion has disrupted Ukrainian farmers’ ability to purchase and apply fertilizers since 2022. According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Ukrainian farmers applied 27.7 percent less fertilizer in 2022 than 2021, using roughly 20.8 million metric tons of mineral fertilizers in 2022 compared to 28.8 million metric tons in 2021, representing declines in the use of nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic fertilizers. Reductions continued into the 2022–2023 season: compared to average rates from 2018 to 2022, a March 2023 survey of 119 agricultural enterprises in Ukraine found that nitrogen application decreased by 16 percent for corn and wheat, 19 percent for sunflower, 21 percent for canola oil crops, and 24 percent for soybeans. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food shows that access has not improved as the country heads into its third growing season since Russia’s invasion: most Ukrainian farmers will be able to apply only half the fertilizers necessary for the 2024 harvest season, with only 10 percent of respondents fully equipped to meet their crops’ fertilizer needs.</p> +<h4 id="alternative-sensor-types">Alternative Sensor Types</h4> -<p>Insufficient fertilizer use impacts the quality and quantity of current and future harvests. According to the first deputy minister of Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, a decrease in fertilizer application by 30 percent or more can reduce yields by 50 percent. The consequences of reduced fertilizer application can vary from farm to farm, depending on the nutrients applied, the crops cultivated, the season’s soil and climatic conditions, and the practices farmers employ throughout the season. A farm’s history of crop cultivation also determines which nutrients are present in the soil at the time of planting and which nutrients need to be applied for a specific crop’s optimal yield. Excessive application of one or more types of nutrients can likewise impact the quality and quantity of an upcoming harvest. Fertilizer application is not a one-size-fits-all practice, and many agricultural enterprises seeking to reduce any adverse effects of excessive mineral fertilizer application rely on soil testing to tailor the nutrients applied to the specific needs of their soil. As Ukrainian farmers have faced difficulties accessing and affording a range of mineral fertilizers, they have resorted to applying whatever nutrients are available in their own stores or from local suppliers, often not within recommended timeframes, which may have long-term impacts on Ukraine’s soil.</p> +<p>Infrared sensors are not the only means of tracking missiles from space. Hypersonic weapons emit unique signatures that can be exploited. Alternative sensor modalities, including hyperspectral and radiofrequency sensors, might therefore play important roles. A future sensor architecture could leverage multiple sensor types to track hypersonic and other advanced missile threats.</p> -<h3 id="fertilizer-and-ukraines-agricultural-economy">Fertilizer and Ukraine’s Agricultural Economy</h3> +<p>Hyperspectral or ultraviolet sensors, capable of viewing alternative bands of light, could be relevant for detecting hypersonic weapons’ novel signatures. In hypersonic flight, an object’s surface reacts with high-temperature airflow to release a wake of ions, gases, particles, and other chemical byproducts. These byproducts and their signatures might be detectable in infrared and alternative spectra (Figure 22). As with hypersonic defense, “the same characteristics that make hypersonic weapons attractive present the defender with new failure modes to exploit.”</p> -<p>Access to fertilizer is necessary for the livelihoods of Ukraine’s farmers and for Ukraine’s agricultural output, two related but distinct facets of Ukraine’s agricultural economy. Across Ukraine, roughly 2.7 million people were engaged in agricultural activity in 2021, comprising 17.3 percent of Ukraine’s total labor force. Access to fertilizers is important to small-scale farmers (farmers cultivating less than 500 hectares), who operate 82.4 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural enterprises, as it is central to the prosperity of their farms. Access to fertilizers is critical for medium- and large-scale producers, who operate the remaining 17.6 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural enterprises and are responsible for the majority of Ukraine’s agricultural exports and export revenues: agricultural enterprises cultivating over 500 hectares of farmland made up nearly 80 percent of Ukraine’s cereal and legume crop production in 2022. Medium- and large-scale enterprises are better able to access and afford fertilizers than small-scale farmers: the 10 percent of agricultural enterprises surveyed by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food that can meet their crops’ fertilizer needs in 2024 are medium- or large-scale operations, with no surveyed small-scale farmers reporting that their fertilizer needs are met for the upcoming season.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Infrared sensors are not the only means of tracking missiles from space.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/62OPPqG.png" alt="image06" /></p> +<p>Radiofrequency sensors might offer further utility. Radar offers many advantages: its principles are well understood, it can propagate through complex weather conditions, and it can instantaneously gather target velocity data. Radars have become increasingly sophisticated and efficient; emerging multistatic and multiple-input, multiple-output (MIMO) radar technologies might offer additional utilities to the space-based hypersonic tracking problem. In addition to active methods, it may be possible to passively intercept radio emissions from data-linked missiles. The 2022 Missile Defense Review notably stated that global and persistent “space-based . . . radar . . . systems will be critical to any future integrated sensor network.”</p> -<p>As fertilizer prices remain high within Ukraine, Ukrainian farmers are adjusting their sowing plans to plant crops whose nutrient requirements they can meet with current fertilizer stores. Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food also observes farmers basing their plans on the needs of domestic markets as export routes remain limited, sowing their fields with more peas, barley, millet, and oats relative to prewar harvests. According to the FAO’s January–February 2023 survey, nearly 20 percent of small-scale farmers in Ukraine, defined by the FAO as cultivating 250 hectares or less, had stopped purchasing fertilizers due to high prices. Of the 1,927 agricultural enterprises interviewed by the FAO, 81 percent expressed a need for more fertilizers to continue agricultural activities. Ukrainian farmers, especially small- and medium-sized producers, have resorted to a barter system with input suppliers in which fertilizers are purchased with grains and agricultural products.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6FZzfOC.png" alt="image23" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 22: Booster Plume Signatures and Hypersonic Plasma.</strong> Solid rocket boosters used to launch hypersonic weapons generate detectable infrared (IR) and ultraviolet (UV) signatures. The simulated plume signature (top) represents a broad range of physical phenomena, including the hot gas flow from the booster, external hypersonic airflow, the combusted gas and alumina particles from the burning motor, and the phase change of alumina particles. A hypersonic weapon in its glide phase encounters similarly complex interactions, generating novel wake signatures. Plasmas generated around the hypersonic weapon surface, for instance, react with gas products and particles burned off the vehicle surface (bottom). The bottom image represents plasma formation around a Mach 16, 50 km altitude hypersonic shape. Source: Iain D. Boyd, H.T. Sears Memorial Professor and Director of Center for National Security Initiatives, University of Colorado, Boulder.</em></p> -<h3 id="factors-restricting-access-to-fertilizers-in-ukraine">Factors Restricting Access to Fertilizers in Ukraine</h3> +<p>Finally, infrared and other types of electro-optical sensors have continued to improve. Infrared focal plane arrays, sensor readouts, and their cooling systems have become increasingly reliable and affordable; new developments might allow simplified configurations that do not require cryogenic cooling. Furthermore, the maturation of large-format infrared FPAs are allowing increases in FOV without corresponding resolution losses (Figure 21).</p> -<p>Ukrainian farmers’ reduced access to fertilizer is due to numerous, concurrent shocks, including global fertilizer price spikes following Russia’s invasion, curtailed nitrogenous fertilizer production within Ukraine, and high logistics costs due to Russia’s obstruction of Ukraine’s primary trade routes.</p> +<p>This report is scoped to the infrared sensors being acquired today. But hypersonic weapons present novel signatures, enabling new approaches to detection and tracking. Provided that sensor fusion challenges can be resolved, a future architecture should integrate advancements in infrared FPAs, multispectral and radiofrequency sensors, and other means. Combining these multiple types will allow greater persistence and capability if one type is degraded, whether from environmental conditions, enemy deception, or other means of signature reduction. While it may be possible to evade one part of the electromagnetic spectrum, it is harder to evade several of them.</p> -<h4 id="global-price-spikes">Global Price Spikes</h4> +<h3 id="orbital-tradeoffs">Orbital Tradeoffs</h3> -<p>Despite carveouts for food and fertilizer exports, international sanctions on Russian and Belarusian banking, trade, and energy sectors have reduced the two countries’ share of the world’s fertilizer trade, estimated at 18 percent in 2020, triggering global price spikes for all mineral fertilizers. In Ukraine, farmers’ fertilizer stocks helped insulate them from initial fertilizer price spikes, but domestic prices rose by the fall of 2022 after farmers exhausted their fertilizer supplies. The implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2022 expanded agricultural exports, increasing farmers’ working capital — and increasing demand for fertilizers and other agricultural inputs. As farmers prepared for the spring 2023 sowing campaign, fertilizer prices increased. For example, prices for potassium nitrate, or saltpeter, rose from UAH 27,000 (roughly $750) per metric ton to UAH 37,000 (roughly $1,025) per metric ton from July to October 2022. By February 2023, farmers spent UAH 8,000–9,000 (roughly $220–250) for the nitrogenous fertilizers needed to cultivate just one hectare of corn, excluding additional costs for fuel, potassic and phosphatic fertilizers, and other inputs, compared to prewar prices of roughly UAH 6,000 (roughly $165).</p> +<p>Sensor performance influences the number of assets necessary to provide coverage, but there are other tradeoffs to consider. “No absolute rules” govern the design of an optimal constellation. It is possible to track hypersonic weapons from many orbits given the correct selection of sensor payloads. At the same time, better design points exist for meeting current and future threats.</p> -<p>In addition to disruptions in global fertilizer markets, energy price spikes affected global fertilizer prices in the months following Russia’s invasion. Global price spikes for natural gas and coal, key ingredients in the manufacturing of fertilizers, reduced fertilizer production capacity and added further upward pressure on fertilizer prices around the world. Europe’s fertilizer industry was hit especially hard as countries slashed imports of Russian natural gas, coal, and oil. High manufacturing costs forced plants to close across the region, reducing Europe’s overall fertilizer production by approximately 70 percent and its nitrogenous fertilizer production capacity by 50 to 60 percent in 2022. China’s ammonia production also contracted in response to high coal prices following Russia’s invasion. China’s October 2021 restrictions on fertilizer exports kept its 25 percent share of the global trade off global markets until December 2022, which pushed fertilizer prices even higher during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion.</p> +<p>This chapter reviews relevant orbits for missile sensing and identifies how they could be mixed to generate efficiencies. Basic changes in altitude and domain can impact every other aspect of performance. A more resilient constellation should mix orbits and domains in ways that maximize the advantages of each.</p> -<h4 id="reduced-domestic-production-of-nitrogenous-fertilizers">Reduced Domestic Production of Nitrogenous Fertilizers</h4> +<h4 id="low-earth-orbit">Low Earth Orbit</h4> -<p>Prior to Russia’s invasion, Ukraine produced enough nitrogenous fertilizer to meet over 70 percent of domestic demand. In 2021, domestic production exceeded 5.2 million metric tons, while Ukraine imported 1.4 million metric tons of nitrogenous fertilizers. After Russia’s invasion, only two of Ukraine’s five nitrogenous fertilizer factories remained operational, causing domestic production to fall by 78.3 percent to 1.1 million metric tons in 2022, and imports to triple to 4.3 million metric tons. By February 2023, the Cherkasy Azot and Rivneazot factories increased production capacity by 40 percent and 50 percent, respectively, but Ukrainian farmers still saw a shortage of mineral fertilizers, including nitrogenous fertilizers, ahead of the 2023 spring sowing campaign.</p> +<p>Marked advances in space launch and satellite manufacturing have made low Earth orbits (LEO) increasingly popular for deploying satellite constellations. Legacy satellite programs often struggled with a “vicious circle between high reliability and high costs.” High unit costs incentivized the use of expensive components to prevent failure, and the use of expensive components contributed to high unit cost.</p> -<h4 id="high-logistics-costs-due-to-obstructed-trade-routes">High Logistics Costs due to Obstructed Trade Routes</h4> +<p>Recent declines in launch cost have enabled a paradigm shift in constellation design (Figure 23). Commercial actors have broken vicious cost-reliability cycles by embracing rapid replenishment over exquisite designs. As it becomes more affordable to place satellites in orbit, it becomes possible to proliferate larger numbers of satellites, which in turn enables economies of scale in satellite manufacturing.</p> -<p>Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports obstructed trade routes that were previously responsible for over 90 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural exports and a majority of its fertilizer imports. This sudden lack of access to its primary, high-volume trade routes forced Ukrainian traders and agricultural enterprises to turn to road, rail, and river routes for fertilizer supplies from new sources. According to Ruslan Voytovych, the director and founder of Arus Trade, a fertilizer importer in Ukraine, his company’s shift to road transport routes significantly limited the volume of supplies he could import and raised delivery costs by 60 percent in the months following Russia’s invasion. Taras Ivashchenko, the head of Belor Ukraine, another Ukrainian fertilizer importer, found that the Danube River ports can only handle 30,000 to 40,000 metric tons of fertilizer imports per month, which is “almost nothing” for the Ukrainian market.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9lX9jcx.png" alt="image24" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 23: Declining Space Launch Costs.</strong> Note: Launch costs to LEO in inflation-adjusted FY 2021 dollars, sorted by launch vehicle (individual bubble). A bubble’s size corresponds to the number of successful orbital launches achieved by that vehicle as of December 31, 2019. Source: CSIS Aerospace Security Project.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3gx92PM.jpg" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ A fisherman walks on the banks of the Danube River near the port of Izmail, southwestern Ukraine, on July 27, 2023.</em></p> +<p>This shift has made LEO orbits increasingly popular for commercial applications. Of the over 6,700 satellites in orbit, over 80 percent now operate in the LEO regime, where their proximity to Earth suits them for high-resolution remote sensing and low-latency communications. This philosophy — a proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO) architecture — has informed recent approaches to national defense space systems.</p> -<h3 id="ukrainian-government-and-international-efforts-to-improve-access-to-fertilizers">Ukrainian Government and International Efforts to Improve Access to Fertilizers</h3> +<p><em>EFFECTS OF PROXIMITY</em></p> -<p>Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food has supported farmers’ applications for fertilizer aid through the State Agrarian Register and coordinated agricultural aid through this system, while Ukraine’s bilateral and multilateral partners have invested to improve Ukrainian farmers’ access to fertilizers. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched the AGRI-Ukraine initiative in July 2022 to help meet the needs of Ukrainian small- and medium-scale farmers for agricultural inputs, financing, improved export logistics and infrastructure, and capacity for drying, storing, and processing harvests. As of July 2023, USAID contributed $350 million, leveraged an additional $250 million from other donors and the private sector, and was seeking to leverage a further $250 million for the initiative. As of the time of publication, AGRI-Ukraine had provided 12,892 small-scale Ukrainian farmers (defined, in this case, as cultivating less than 500 hectares of farmland) with approximately 18,300 tons of complex and nitrogenous fertilizers for the 2023 spring and autumn campaigns. This September, the initiative announced a partnership with South Korea to deliver to Ukrainian farmers $5 million of fertilizers donated by South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</p> +<p>The mathematics of proximity operate in favor of LEO satellite constellations. At LEO altitudes — between 400 and 2,000 km above Earth — even smaller sensors can provide high-resolution imagery of Earth’s surface. Further distances demand larger apertures; aperture limits the maximum resolution attainable by an infrared sensor (Figure 24). Holding other parameters constant, a sensor placed in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) requires an aperture several times larger to attain comparable resolution to one orbiting at 500 km.</p> -<p>International agricultural aid packages have largely targeted the small- and medium-sized enterprises otherwise unable to sustain operation in wartime, but assistance also funnels through the Ukrainian government’s “Affordable Loans at 5-7-9 percent” program, which offers low-rate subsidized lending for agricultural enterprises of all sizes. Launched in early 2020, the program provides loans up to UAH 90.0 million (roughly $2.5 million), depending on the loan type and the enterprise’s size and activity. The program has received direct financing from the World Bank through USAID’s AGRI-Ukraine initiative and provided UAH 158.0 billion (nearly $4.4 billion) to agricultural enterprises through 40,509 loan agreements since February 2022. Combined with the FAO’s cash transfers, this assistance has enabled farmers to afford the purchase of fertilizers at elevated prices from in-country suppliers. According to CSIS interviews, Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food has encouraged partners to concentrate investments into this soft loan program over procuring and distributing in-kind fertilizer donations, as this financing concurrently empowers farmers to decide which inputs to prioritize purchasing and sustains business for Ukrainian fertilizer suppliers. Farmers in front-line oblasts, however, benefit more from in-kind fertilizer donations, as active conflict disrupts these farmers’ ability to obtain fertilizer on local markets.</p> +<p>Optical apertures are a significant driver of satellite cost. Smaller apertures are less costly to manufacture and can reduce the structural mass needed to ensure the vehicle withstands harsh shocks during launch. In turn, a reduction in satellite mass allows for lighter reaction wheels to orient the vehicle, lighter motors for keeping it in orbit, and correspondingly lower launch costs.</p> -<h3 id="securing-long-term-alternative-fertilizer-suppliers">Securing Long-Term Alternative Fertilizer Suppliers</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0552np1.png" alt="image25" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 24: Aperture Effects on Resolution.</strong> These images depict a hypersonic target viewed from GEO with an infrared sensor. Left: A view of the target with a notional extremely large aperture. Center: 60 cm aperture (center), and with 30 cm aperture (right). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Kmrg5en.png" alt="image08" /></p> +<p>The proximity of LEO also presents several drawbacks. At these distances, the perceived motion between satellite, target, and background becomes more pronounced. This relative motion can introduce motion blur to the target picture. Sensors that take longer to collect light are more sensitive and more susceptible to motion blurring as the weapon and background move across the frame (Figure 25). Shorter collection (“integration”) times, meanwhile, can more effectively “freeze” fast-moving objects, but with a cost to sensitivity and detection range.</p> -<p>Ukraine fertilizer imports were down significantly in 2022 compared to 2021, ranging from a decline of 65 percent for nitrogenous-based fertilizers to over 85 percent decline for potassic fertilizers. Historically, Russia and Belarus supplied fertilizer and fertilizer ingredients to Ukraine. While Ukraine instituted an embargo of Russian fertilizer imports in 2018 due to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Donbas and the Crimea annexation, it was still heavily dependent on Belarusian supplies when Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Over 2019–2021, Belarus alone accounted for 71 percent of Ukraine’s potash imports, 58 percent of its urea imports, and 41 percent of its complex fertilizers imports, or fertilizers containing all three nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic elements. With Belarusian imports essentially ending with Russia’s full-scale invasion in late February 2022, Ukraine relied on other trade partners such as Poland, Germany, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for its potash imports in 2022. As Ukraine’s trade relationships with two of the world’s largest fertilizers producers are now severed, the government of Ukraine and Ukrainian agricultural enterprises are struggling to identify alternative sources to fill the considerable supply gap left by foregone Russian and Belarusian imports.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9Dpghby.png" alt="image26" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 25: Motion Blur and Jitter Effects.</strong> A static hypersonic weapon-sized target, imaged from low Earth orbit, with a 35 cm aperture, appears as a blurred point source for an infrared sensor (left). Center: The same target displays motion streaking when accounting for sensor integration time: in this case, for 10 milliseconds (center). This streak becomes blurred when accounting for additional sensor vibration and jitter (right). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Ukraine faces different challenges accessing nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic fertilizers. Even with curtailed domestic production capacity, Ukraine can meet some of its domestic demand for nitrogenous fertilizers, and Ukraine’s trade partners can supply additional nitrogenous fertilizer as well as phosphatic fertilizers. However, securing alternative potash suppliers will remain a challenge for Ukraine’s agricultural enterprises. The global potash market is highly concentrated, with Russia and Belarus accounting for 41 percent of global potash trade in 2020. The world’s top producer of potash is Canada, with 39 percent of global market share, but transporting supplies from Canada to Ukraine would require long and costly freight shipments in addition to overland transport through Europe. This inherently expensive route introduces complex logistical issues and would likely only result in high potash prices on domestic Ukrainian markets if attempted. Kernel, Ukraine’s largest producer and exporter of vegetable oils, procured two vessels of complex fertilizers and potash from Morocco’s OCPGroup and Jordan’s Arab Potash Company in the summer of 2023. However, concerns remain as to whether these potential trade partners could supply enough potash to meet the significant needs of Ukrainian farmers, especially as food producers around the world are anticipating higher demand for potash in the coming decades. To meet domestic needs, Ukraine will likely have to turn to smaller potash producers that are closer to home, such as Germany, Israel, and Jordan.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZKoP8q8.png" alt="image27" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 26: Relative Motion and Dwell Time Comparison.</strong> Comparison of GEO (white), MEO (pink), and LEO (green) satellite motion. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dWMxBc0.png" alt="image09" /></p> +<p>Mitigating blur and jitter in infrared sensors involves a careful balancing act. Doing so requires FPAs with high sensitivities, readout circuits and image processors with higher data throughput, and algorithms tailored for target signatures with high relative motion. While feasible to overcome, the problem can be made easier by incorporating sensors in higher orbits or leveraging alternative phenomenologies.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations-1">Recommendations</h3> +<p>The closeness of LEO satellites also limits their coverage. Compared to satellites at higher altitudes, they possess shorter horizon-limited lines of sight and persist for less time over a given point on Earth’s surface (Figure 26). More satellites will be needed to ensure that two are continuously overhead. While it is possible to achieve infrequent coverage with a small number of satellites, it takes significant numbers to make that coverage persistent (Figures 27 and 28).</p> -<p>As the war continues to suppress agricultural production in Ukraine, the Ukrainian government continues to help improve Ukrainian producers’ access to fertilizer, and access to fertilizer remains a priority within support packages from Ukraine’s partners to its agricultural sector. This aid has been essential to maintaining Ukrainian agricultural production since February 2022. Nonetheless, the amount of assistance has been insufficient to meet farmers’ immediate needs, indicating the importance of additional efforts in this regard.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eMx8too.png" alt="image28" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 27: Notional 135-Satellite LEO Constellation (120-Degree Field of Regard).</strong> A constellation of 135 satellites at 1,000 km altitude with a 120-degree field of regard fixed sensor, sized for persistent global coverage. The coverage map depicts two (yellow) and eight or more (red) satellites in view. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Following is a description of ongoing best practices and additional steps needed to increase access to fertilizer.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NCE6dWN.png" alt="image29" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 28: Notional 312-Satellite LEO Constellation (110-Degree Field of Regard).</strong> A constellation at 1,000 km altitude with a 110-degree field of regard fixed sensor. The reduced coverage footprint of each satellite necessitates a larger number of satellites to achieve persistent, global stereo coverage. The coverage map depicts two (yellow) and eight or more (red) satellites in view. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Improved information about the specific fertilizer needs of Ukraine’s farmland, including through investing in both remote sensing and traditional laboratory soil-testing programs could enable farmers to purchase the right quantity of the right nutrients and inform the government’s projections for domestic fertilizer requirements.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Investment in Ukraine’s national infrastructure for geospatial data would enable high-quality, rapid soil analysis that could predict Ukraine’s fertilizer needs with greater accuracy.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>As international partners such as USAID, the FAO, and others continue to support Ukrainian farmers’ access to fertilizers, improved information sharing regarding the long-term plans for Ukraine’s fertilizer market would help partners align their assistance with the needs of Ukrainian farmers and fertilizer producers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>At the same time, Ukraine’s partners should support rebuilding Ukraine’s capacity to produce nitrogenous fertilizers domestically, restoring — or even exceeding — Ukraine’s prewar production capacity, which will require an uninterrupted supply of raw materials, particularly natural gas.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>As Ukraine rebuilds its capacity to produce fertilizers domestically, the Ukrainian government and partners should continue to calibrate assistance so as not to reduce demand for Ukrainian-produced fertilizers and fertilizers secured by domestic suppliers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Ukraine’s candidacy for membership in the European Union will necessitate further reforms to its agriculture sector and production standards as the European Union aims for climate neutrality by 2050. For instance, aligning with the European Union’s common agricultural policy requires Ukraine certify 3 percent of its total agricultural land as organic by 2030. As Ukraine and its partners work to secure sufficient mineral fertilizer suppliers to fill the gap left by foregone Russian and Belarusian imports, concurrently incentivizing increased use of organic fertilizers would help sustain production and soil fertility, as well as support the country’s path to EU integration.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Finally, international partners should support Ukraine’s efforts to secure long-term suppliers of fertilizer, especially potash, to replace foregone inputs from Belarus and Russia.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>A related consideration for LEO constellation design and cost is the higher replenishment rates required over their life cycle. Drag from the upper reaches of Earth’s atmosphere slows satellites in orbit, requiring more propulsion to maintain their station. At 600 km, the natural lifespan of a generic satellite orbit is approximately 15 years, but this falls dramatically to under one year at 400 km (Table 2). The Space Development Agency (SDA)’s Tracking Layer Tranche 0 satellites, for instance, have requirements for minimum operational lifetimes of four to five years, rather than the decades possible at higher orbits (Figure 29).</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RDeKMcF.png" alt="image30" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Approximate Orbital Lifespan (King-Hele) of 0.01m2/kg Object with Average Solar Activity.</strong> Low Earth orbit lifespans differ significantly, especially at lower altitudes, with different propulsion and station-keeping systems, satellite size, density, drag, and solar activity levels. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project, with data adapted from Swiss Re Corporate Solutions, 2018.</em></p> -<p>Ukraine’s agriculture sector has been a major front in Russia’s war since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. The systematic destruction of Ukraine’s farmland, agricultural equipment and infrastructure, and export capacity has contributed to a global food crisis that continues to affect millions around the world. For Ukraine to strengthen its economy to fend off Russia’s continued assault, restore its role as a major global food supplier, and maintain its counterweight to the influence Russia wields through its own agricultural exports, unprecedented support is necessary to restore Ukraine’s natural resources and transform its agricultural institutions, infrastructure, and labor force.</p> +<p>Building a high replenishment cadence into a constellation’s life cycle is not entirely a disadvantage. The higher replenishment cadence of LEO constellations enables alternative philosophies to constellation design and the space industrial base. There is less need to overengineer for reliability, for instance, if a satellite’s lifespan is capped at five years. The consistent need for replenishment creates consistent demand for satellite production, keeping production lines hot, enabling economies of scale, and building a resilient defense industrial base.</p> -<p>As urgent needs — related to agriculture and all sectors affected by the war — occupy the attention of Ukraine and its international partners, they should not lose focus on a resource central to Ukraine’s rise as a global agricultural powerhouse: its black soils. The focus of this report has been the safe and expeditious demining of Ukraine’s farmland and increasing farmers’ access to fertilizer. Essential to both endeavors is soil testing, which could both ensure the safety of agricultural land once it has been cleared of mines and help farmers determine the appropriate types and levels of fertilizer to apply to their land. Rebuilding Ukraine’s agriculture sector from the ground up must involve identifying the optimal set of soil testing methods for Ukraine’s agricultural soils and scaling up a national infrastructure for such testing within Ukraine in the face of numerous, concurrent challenges imposed by Russia’s war.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xlFQGEG.png" alt="image31" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 29: Space Development Agency Planned Constellation Life Cycle.</strong> The number of satellites in orbit does not remain constant because as more are launched, others degrade. Satellites launched in FY 2024, for instance, begin to deorbit in FY 2029, causing fluctuations in the total figures. Further launches in FY 2029 and FY 2031 both expand and replenish the planned low Earth orbit constellation. Source: Space Development Agency.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RpyCBPi.jpg" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ Farmers use combine harvesters to harvest a wheat field near the city of Bila Tserkva on August 4, 2023, in Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine.</em></p> +<p>High replenishment rates also permit new technologies to be “spiraled in” as older satellites deorbit. Long-lived satellites are often constructed with excess capability to ensure their relevance decades in the future; shorter-lived satellites can be designed as minimum viable products, intended for replacement as technologies and requirements evolve. Increased costs — in launching more satellites and more frequently replenishing them — must be balanced against the savings associated with agile development, manufacturing at scale, and lower relative launch costs compared to higher orbits.</p> -<hr /> +<p><em>SYSTEMIC THREATS TO PROLIFERATED LOW EARTH ORBIT</em></p> -<p><strong>Caitlin Welsh</strong> is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she analyzes the drivers and consequences of food and water insecurity around the world, including for U.S. national security. Her specific areas of focus include the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security and nutrition, food insecurity in the U.S. military, and the coherence between U.S. global water security policy and U.S. global food security policy.</p> +<p>Technological advancements in commercial space have generated enthusiasm for pLEO constellations. In 2019, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin established SDA for the express purpose of acquiring such constellations. In recent years, pLEO has become the watchword of space sensor acquisition. It embraces the notion that quantity has a quality all its own, with resilience achieved through numerical proliferation, measured both by the number of satellites currently deployed and those that could be reconstituted. An effective pLEO architecture promises to invert the cost asymmetries of traditional counterspace operations; the potential to make it more costly to destroy LEO satellites than to launch them has informed the emphasis on pLEO in recent years.</p> -<p><strong>Emma Dodd</strong> is a research associate for the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS, where she supports the program’s communication strategy and serves as the point of contact for research relating to the Russia-Ukraine War’s impact on global food security.</p> +<p>Adversary counterspace capabilities, however, should not be underestimated. A pLEO architecture provides resilience to certain kinds of counterspace threats but not others (Figure 30). Indeed, putting all one’s eggs in the LEO basket may incur risks: vulnerability to systemic threats that affect the entire orbital regime. “We don’t want to become so dependent or so vulnerable, potentially, in the pLEO,” General James Dickinson of U.S. Space Command has warned, “as opposed to having a diversification, where you have capabilities and different orbital regimes [to] rely on.”</p> -<p><strong>Vitalii Dankevych</strong> is dean of the Faculty of Law, Public Administration and National Security, at Polissia National University in Ukraine and a professor at the Department of International Economic Relations and European Integration.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bmZdG83.png" alt="image32" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 30: Counterspace Threats.</strong> Direct-ascent anti-satellite, co-orbital, and ground site attacks all can be difficult to scale against increasingly proliferated constellation designs. Nuclear effects and cyberattacks could paralyze large segments of proliferated constellations at once. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p><strong>Joe Glauber</strong> is a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and currently serves as interim secretary of the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS). He is also a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a non-resident senior adviser at CSIS.</p> +<p>These systemic threats — threats that exploit a failure mode common to the entire architecture — merit further consideration. Cyberattacks against a constellation’s control systems or nuclear detonations in space could disable many satellites at once. The growing density of space debris in LEO is an additional cause for concern, and one that is increasingly difficult to mitigate. Even if the cost of individual kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks exceeds the cost of launching additional LEO satellites, the debris generated from these engagements could make those orbits challenging to reconstitute. It is simpler to proliferate and reconstitute in LEO, but also potentially simpler to attack.</p> -<p><strong>Antonina Broyaka</strong> is an extension associate with the Department of Agricultural Economics at Kansas State University.</p>Caitlin Welsh, et al.Experts examine two aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural recovery that are critical to increasing its food production and exports: demining farmland and restoring farmers’ access to fertilizers.China In Gulf Energy Transition2023-12-11T12:00:00+08:002023-12-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-gulf-energy-transition<p><em>China has established itself as an essential partner in Gulf states’ energy transition, serving as an investor and developer in renewable energy projects. Western governments, however, have been reluctant to compete with Chinese enterprises in the region.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Putting all one’s eggs in the LEO basket may incur risks: vulnerability to systemic threats that affect the entire orbital regime.</code></em></strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Cyberattacks remain a persistent area threat for any distributed architecture, whether in LEO, medium Earth orbit (MEO), GEO, or highly elliptical orbit (HEO). Software to orchestrate so many satellites at once — for orbital maintenance, collision avoidance, data transport, and tasking — presents a large attack surface for potential intrusions. While difficult to characterize, cyberattacks represent a critical area threat and a major risk category for all national security satellite architectures.</p> -<h3 id="the-issue">The Issue</h3> +<p>Less discussed are the area threats posed by nuclear explosions in space or at high altitudes (Figure 31). Nuclear explosions cause many immediate damaging effects: the pulse of thermal, x-ray, and other radiation can damage nearby satellites and blind their sensors.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>After a sluggish start, Gulf states are getting serious about the energy transition.</strong> Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are embarking on a concerted effort to decarbonize their power grids and seek regional and international leadership roles in the new energy world.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>China has established itself as an essential partner in Gulf states’ energy transitions.</strong> China and Chinese companies have built on their ties with Gulf states in the oil and petrochemical sectors and have gradually transitioned to higher-value inputs in the renewables sector, becoming investors and coinvestors in Gulf states’ largest-scale solar and wind projects in the Middle East and beyond.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Western governments have been reluctant to compete head-to-head with Chinese enterprises in the renewables sector in the Gulf.</strong> The state capitalist landscape acts as a tacit barrier to entry to private Western firms and is more familiar to Chinese firms.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>An even greater concern, however, is nuclear pumping, a phenomenon where nuclear radiation lingers in the LEO environment (Figure 32). In LEO, Earth’s geomagnetic field would contain many of the charged particles emitted by a nuclear explosion; instead of radiating outward, these particles could spiral around the globe and damage large numbers of satellites. A 2002 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization analysis assessed that “a precursor high altitude nuclear burst could do significant damage to satellites,” with “pumped-up Van Allen belts [posing] a concern for satellite longevity” and “not well understood.”</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>The radiation left in these belts could make it challenging to maintain and reconstitute a pLEO constellation. Indeed, while it is less costly to proliferate and reconstitute LEO constellations, more attention must be paid to these systemic threats.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan do not enjoy strong economic ties. Uzbekistan does not even feature in Saudi Arabia’s top 100 trading partners. Yet, a Saudi state-owned developer, ACWA Power, recently broke ground on central Asia’s largest wind project as part of a planned $7.5 billion investment in Uzbekistan. But this project reveals more about the strength of Saudi-Chinese ties than it does about Uzbekistan. A Saudi company may be the lead developer, but a Chinese manufacturer made the wind turbines, a Chinese company is set to install them, and China’s 49 percent stake in ACWA’s portfolio company helped make it happen.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LYvPV4j.png" alt="image33" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 31: High-Altitude Nuclear Tests.</strong> Far left: “Orange,” 3.9-megaton detonation at 43 km altitude; left: “Teak,” 3.8 megatons at 76.8 km altitude; center: “Kingfish”; right: “Checkmate”; and far right: “Starfish,” 1.4 megatons at 400 km altitude. Source: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.</em></p> -<p>Globally, both China and Chinese companies are playing a central role in the energy transition. They are especially prominent in supply chains for renewables, providing critical components for wind, solar, and energy storage projects. China’s dominant position within these critical supply chains has raised alarm bells in the United States and European Union, with both resorting to muscular industrial policy to push back.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/URSDGvp.png" alt="image34" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 32: Nuclear Pumping in Space.</strong> Radiation from nuclear detonations can become trapped in Earth’s geomagnetic field, affecting the longevity of satellites. Source: U.S. EMP Commission.</em></p> -<p>But China has received a considerably warmer welcome in much of the Global South and in the Middle East especially. Chinese companies and capital have grown beyond their traditional role as suppliers of renewable energy components to become investors and project developers, building deeper economic ties with countries in the process. This expansion along the value chain is particularly visible in the Gulf, where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have entered into partnerships with their Chinese counterparts to codevelop large-scale renewable projects in the region and elsewhere in Asia and Africa.</p> +<p>A third concern is the increasing population of satellites and debris in LEO. The growing popularity of these orbits have made it challenging to avoid collisions (Figure 33). Between December 2022 and May 2023, satellites in the commercial Starlink constellation performed over 25,000 collision-avoidance maneuvers, representing roughly half of the number of Starlink maneuvers since 2019. These debris fields could densify after a large-scale attack. Debris generated in just three ASAT missile tests account for 15 percent of tracked debris in LEO. While Starlink satellites orbit lower than planned national security LEO constellations, it is emblematic of a larger problem: growing debris fields could threaten future operations, forcing collision-avoidance maneuvers that consume fuel and disrupt coverage.</p> -<p>This brief will map the growing economic relationship between China and the Gulf states in the context of the global energy transition and deepening geopolitical ties. Starting by tracing the roots of this relationship to older forms of cooperation on oil and gas, conventional power, and petrochemicals, the brief will demonstrate that the partnerships in renewable energy have strong precedents. It will then give an overview of the role of China and Chinese companies in the Gulf states’ nascent energy transition, before looking at emergent forms of cooperation outside of the region by SOEs from both sides.</p> +<p>These systemic threats could be difficult to attribute or deter. Cyberattacks generate attribution challenges that complicate potential responses. Intentional debris generation can be deniable: a debris field, generated by a foreign kinetic ASAT test, could be justified as a peacetime operation but be as disruptive to operations as a direct, unambiguous attack. Adversaries might even detonate a nuclear device over their own territory under the pretense of a test. Chinese scientific organizations have reportedly begun to reassess similar options to counter U.S. satellite constellations. Despite the damage their effects could cause, these deniable, systemic threats challenge the United States’ ability to devise a proportional response.</p> -<p>As Gulf states get serious about the energy transition, China and Chinese companies are emerging as essential partners. Gulf SOEs are eager to play leading roles in the next technological wave, as electric vehicles (EVs), energy storage, hydrogen, and carbon capture technologies take center stage. They see China as a leading player in each of these technology areas. Beyond the Middle East, Gulf states have identified a range of soft-power opportunities afforded by other states’ energy transitions, particularly in the Global South. China is a key partner to these states as well.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/30PrKUT.png" alt="image35" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 33: Orbital Debris.</strong> Note: A visualization of over 24,631 tracked objects in orbit. Active satellites imaged in green, inactive satellites imaged in gray. Red orbital rings at 1,000, 10,000, and 36,000 km altitudes. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from AGI and U.S. Space Force.</em></p> -<h3 id="the-gulf-states-begin-to-decarbonize">The Gulf States Begin to Decarbonize</h3> +<p>It is therefore useful to examine other orbital regimes, including MEO and airborne domains, which could complement LEO’s advantages and help mitigate these vulnerabilities. A survivable sensor constellation would likely incorporate assets in multiple orbits, reducing the impact of such area-wide attacks.</p> -<p>Gulf states are latecomers to the energy transition. In comparison to other major developing countries, they invested late in solar and wind and have lagged far behind. Comparing their investment in renewables with neighboring Jordan—also a monarchy with high levels of solar radiation but one with no oil—demonstrates how rentier states often move more slowly (Figure 1). The exception is the UAE, which leads the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in decarbonizing its power sector with solar and wind. In addition to the solar and wind captured in the chart below, its Barakah nuclear plant now contributes almost 25 percent of the country’s electricity.</p> +<h4 id="medium-earth-orbit">Medium Earth Orbit</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fRbSRRs.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Solar and Wind as Share of Total Capacity.</strong></em></p> +<p>Placing satellites in higher orbits can offer coverage and survivability advantages not achievable from LEO alone. Operating at higher altitudes allows each satellite to view a larger swath of Earth’s surface, reducing the numbers necessary for global coverage (Figures 34 and 35). MEO, a family of orbits between 2,000 and 35,999 km from Earth’s surface, offers several attractive design points for satellite constellations. By moving a satellite’s orbit from 1,000 to 10,000 km, for example, a satellite’s detection footprint against low-flying hypersonic targets is roughly quadrupled.</p> -<p>After a delayed start, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are clearly now embarking on a concerted effort to decarbonize their power grids, and they are developing wind and solar at a considerably faster pace than other members of the GCC (Figure 2). The differences between the approaches of these states are noteworthy and are not correlated with wealth within the group. Among the subgroup often referred to as “super rentiers,” consisting of Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, Kuwait is a laggard while the UAE is a leader. Although the rentier effect seems to explain the late transition start as a group, it does not explain the differences now emerging within it.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IvlwUlg.png" alt="image36" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 34: Satellites Needed for Geometric, Two-Satellite Global Coverage.</strong> This graphic illustrates the relationship between altitude and the theoretical minimum number of satellites required for stereo coverage. Operational constellations would require considerably greater numbers of satellites at every altitude when considering sensor field of regard, solar exclusion, maintenance, and power factors. Geometric coverage minimums were derived from CSIS parametric analysis. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JIf7o9P.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Renewables Development in the GCC (Capacity in MWp).</strong></em></p> +<p>These substantial gains in viewable area, and the slower relative motion of these satellites across Earth’s surface, have made these orbits useful for navigational satellites, where large numbers must be in view at once. The Global Positioning System (GPS), with roughly 31 satellites in a 20,000 km orbit, allows for every point on Earth to be reachable by four or more satellites.</p> -<h3 id="a-definitively-state-led-transition">A Definitively State-Led Transition</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MP3C6ic.png" alt="image37" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 35: Notional 15-Satellite MEO Constellation at 10,000 km.</strong> MEO satellite coverage, from stereo (yellow) to eight or more (red). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Saudi Arabia and the UAE are looking to assume regional and international leadership roles in the new energy world that is taking shape. The UAE’s hosting of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in 2023 is perhaps the most obvious example, but Saudi Arabia is also aiming to play a regional leadership role in combating climate change and recently launched the Middle East Green Initiative, a climate mitigation platform and reforestation program. This new posture within the climate and transition discourse represents a stark departure from the more cautious and sometimes obstructionist role played by these states in the past and demonstrates their aspirations as middle powers in the emergent multipolar international system.</p> +<p>MEO satellites represent only a small fraction of satellites currently in orbit. This is because of the high radiation levels in the MEO environment. Earth’s geomagnetic field traps high-energy particles from the Sun and other sources, creating several belts of elevated radiation. In some scenarios, dosages in this regime can exceed 50 rad daily, a dosage equivalent to roughly 16 abdominal CT scans. This harsh operating regime introduces challenges for constellation designers. While MEO represents a large set of possible orbits, most MEO constellations operate in a smaller number of “sweet spot” altitudes and inclinations, such as at 10,000 km, where radiation is lowest (Figure 36).</p> -<p>Having embarked on their domestic transitions late, Gulf states have had limited opportunities to carve out spaces for themselves in the value chain of renewable energy components, with efforts to establish solar module production facilities generally producing uncompetitive and disappointing results. Early investments by regional and national oil companies (NOCs) in solar technology providers, such as Petroleum Development Oman’s investment in Glasspoint and Saudi Aramco’s investment in the Japanese thin film producer Solar Frontier, failed to yield industrial policy outcomes or returns.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KBLqXEp.png" alt="image38" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 36: Radiation Fluxes on Orbit.</strong> Representative orbits at 1,000 km (LEO), 10,000 km (MEO), 20,000 km (MEO), and 36,000 km (GEO). The highest fluxes are indicated by red coloration. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from NASA.</em></p> -<p>However, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman are approaching the next phase of the transition with considerably more dynamism, marshaling sovereign wealth and directing resources from their NOCs in an attempt to lead the nascent hydrogen economy and carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technologies. These oil and gas states see their locations, renewable energy resource potential, and experience in conventional energy development as distinct advantages with these two sets of technologies.</p> +<p>Without hardening, these fluxes can significantly degrade a satellite’s subsystems. The interaction of solar winds and free ions in this environment can charge spacecraft components and cause unintended electrical interference. High-energy particles can degrade coatings and solar panels on the spacecraft surface and damage electronics and detector arrays within a spacecraft (Figure 37). These issues remain a concern for national security satellite constellations; unexpected radiation levels impacted availability of satellites in the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), for instance, which orbited at high LEO altitudes of roughly 1,350 km.</p> -<p>The UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s state-owned renewable power developers—Masdar and ACWA Power, respectively—have played a dominant role in the early stages of their countries’ energy transitions. The role of SOEs distinguishes their early transitions from other GCC states. Masdar and ACWA have developed the majority of completed projects in their home states; each is also the second most prominent developer in the neighboring state.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iWIpReL.png" alt="image39" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 37: Effects of Increased Solar Radiation on Satellite Imaging Sensor.</strong> False-color image of the Sun taken by solar probe before (left) and (after) a solar radiation spike on October 28 and 29, 2003. Radiation can cause additional noise and false pixels to appear on imaging sensors, requiring specialized packaging and software to mitigate. Source: NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center Scientific Visualization Studio.</em></p> -<p>The UAE and Saudi Arabia seem to have employed a national champions strategy, with these companies using their home markets to accumulate large portfolios of projects that qualify them to compete on the global stage. This distinctly state capitalist approach to power development separates the UAE and Saudi Arabia from their regional peers. Domestically focused sovereign wealth funds either created or acquired specialized developers—unrelated to the NOCs and legacy utility firms—to advance renewables. In contrast, Qatar and Kuwait have given renewables deployment mandates to the NOCs and their affiliates, with largely disappointing results. Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund has gone a step further in this state capitalist direction. The Public Investment Fund (PIF) announced that only 30 percent of its planned utility projects would be developed through a competitive tender process (its state-owned developer is still the largest winner of these tenders) and that it would directly develop the other 70 percent with partners of its choosing.</p> +<p>Additionally, radiation can disrupt a satellite’s control circuitry. Computer processors and memory degrade over time with exposure to radiation. In addition to this total-dose-induced damage, they are susceptible to single-event effects, where charged particles strike a logic gate or memory cell and change its state from one to zero (“bit flip”) or prevent it from switching altogether (“stuck bit”). These in turn can cause malfunctions or permanent damage. Mitigating this often requires dedicated circuitry and software to correct errors or specialized, radiation-hardened circuits, which are typically slower and more costly than commercial equivalents.</p> -<p>Navigating this state capitalist landscape, with astonishingly low prices at tenders (Figure 3), has proved too complex or unappealing for most Western firms. The inroads made by the French state-owned firm Électricité de France (EDF), which has built a portfolio of wind and solar projects in the region in partnership with Masdar, remains the exception. Chinese firms have also begun to make notable progress, first as component suppliers and contractors, but also more recently as developers.</p> +<p>While challenging, these environments confer some survivability benefits. Their greater distance, relative to LEO, places them out of reach of some lower-tier ASAT weapons; attacking MEO assets with a direct-ascent weapon, for instance, would take a significantly larger missile and a substantially longer time. While still vulnerable to prompt nuclear effects, the MEO environment faces relatively less of a nuclear-pumping challenge — moreover, as MEO satellites must already be hardened to withstand elevated radiation, those costs can be amortized for mitigating nuclear effects.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5A073TV.png" alt="image03" /></p> +<p>The relative sparsity of the MEO environment, finally, can be conducive to monitoring co-orbital ASAT threats. Co-orbital weapons, placed into similar orbits as MEO satellites, are a common approach to kinetically attacking MEO and further orbits. With roughly 3 percent of spacecraft orbiting in MEO, it may be relatively easier to observe, distinguish, and counter suspicious behavior.</p> -<h3 id="deepening-geopolitical-ties-between-china-and-the-gulf">Deepening Geopolitical Ties between China and the Gulf</h3> +<h4 id="geosynchronous-and-highly-elliptical-orbits">Geosynchronous and Highly Elliptical Orbits</h4> -<p>Underpinning this trend of deeper economic cooperation is a geopolitical context in which the Gulf states—having long expressed anxieties about U.S. commitment to the region—have adopted a more proactive foreign policy, courting China to secure a stronger position in the multipolar landscape taking shape. This strategy was strikingly evident when Saudi Arabia and Iran recently signed an agreement in Beijing to resume diplomatic ties six years after having closed their embassies. The symbolic value of the signing taking place in Beijing and the implicit role given to China as guarantor are more relevant than China’s actual role in facilitating the agreement. President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2022 also came with a flurry of deal announcements worth an estimated $30 billion. U.S. policymakers have increasingly scrutinized China’s investments and interest in the region in recent months. If Saudi Arabia is to receive the security guarantee it is seeking as part of an agreement, the administration is asking for an unwinding of these ties.</p> +<p>Geosynchronous orbits, at roughly 36,000 km from Earth, require even fewer satellites to achieve persistent coverage. At this distance, satellites orbiting the equator stay effectively stationary over a fixed point on Earth’s surface, orbiting at the same rate as Earth turns. No other orbit can provide a similar level of persistence — at the cost of placing satellites at an extreme distance. Current and forthcoming missile warning satellites, including SBIRS and Next Gen OPIR, occupy these orbits, where persistent coverage is achievable with only a small number of assets.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s recent ascension to the BRICS group (previously made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as part of an expanded 10-member organization is in many ways indicative of the tectonic shifts taking place in the international system. Of the original BRICS members, China played a crucial role in the effort to expand the group and include the two Gulf states (the new members, not coincidentally, were four of the five Middle Eastern states that have “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with China). It is too early to discern the practical effect of this development, but the UAE has already joined the group’s New Development Bank, and Saudi Arabia is expected to follow soon. This group is aiming to provide an institutional forum for a more depoliticized approach to development cooperation outside of the universe of Western institutions and the G7, whose relative economic clout has declined.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OKN1P9t.png" alt="image40" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 38: Depiction of the SBIRS and DSP Architecture.</strong> The Space Based Infrared System incorporates geosynchronous and highly elliptical polar satellites. GEO satellites offer latitudinal and longitudinal persistence by orbiting at the same rate that the Earth rotates. To maintain this persistence, the orbits must be close to the equator. A pair of polar satellites, meanwhile, can offer persistent coverage of at least one satellite over the poles. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<h3 id="chinese-gulf-conventional-power-ties">Chinese-Gulf Conventional Power Ties</h3> +<p>Satellites in highly elliptical orbits offer similar advantages, offering persistent, staring coverage near Earth’s poles. In such orbits, satellites come within several hundred kilometers of Earth before swinging far into space, often tens of thousands of kilometers away. As a HEO satellite approaches the highest point in its orbit — the apogee — its velocity slows, allowing it to “hang” over a specific region for longer than the time spent at the lowest point, the perigee.</p> -<p>China and the Gulf states have developed deep economic ties in the conventional energy and petrochemical sectors. Trade and investment patterns have slowly transitioned from transactional relationships based on the sale of energy one way and consumer goods the other to deeper ties involving joint ventures and large infrastructure projects.</p> +<p>A minimum of two HEO satellites is necessary to provide continuous coverage of Earth’s high-latitude regions. When combined with equatorial GEO satellites, which offer persistence at most lower latitudes, only a few satellites become needed to provide whole-Earth coverage. The SBIRS missile warning constellation, for example, includes six GEO satellites to provide coverage of most latitudes, and two highly elliptical polar satellites to maintain custody of the North Pole and upper Northern Hemisphere (Figures 38 and 39).</p> -<p>The focus on hydrocarbon trade between the Gulf and China obscures the depth of the relationship in the power, refining, and petrochemical sectors. Much attention is often given to the fact that China has become Saudi Arabia’s leading trade partner over the past two decades, with Saudi Arabia currently supplying about a fifth of China’s crude imports, with similar trends in the other Gulf states. But in a liquid market such as that of oil or gas, this trade does not necessarily lead to deeper economic ties. However, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the sector and joint ventures between state-owned firms do have the effect of deepening ties, locking companies into long-term investment cycles and facilitating the exchange of skills and talent.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/D5hdEAx.png" alt="image41" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 39: SBIRS-HEO Sensor View of a Boosting Rocket.</strong> Image degraded for declassification. Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> -<p>Saudi Aramco’s recent history reveals the gradual deepening of ties taking place between sets of SOEs from both sides. The first of these large projects was the establishment of the Yanbu Aramco Sinopec Refining Company (YASREF) in 2014, a joint venture between Saudi Aramco and the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) over a $10 billion refining facility on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast with a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day (b/d). The success of the venture clearly engendered trust and confidence on both sides, and the two countries subsequently announced a number of other projects. Notably, these include Saudi capital from Aramco and state-owned petrochemical giant SABIC flowing to greenfield and brownfield refining and petrochemical facilities along China’s coastline, and Chinese capital from its state-owned Silk Road Fund leading a consortium that acquired 49 percent of Aramco’s gas pipeline company in 2022.</p> +<p>The extreme distances of these constellations introduce novel operational considerations. Much larger apertures are needed to image targets at high resolution. As such, it becomes challenging to perform more detailed sensing missions, including midcourse and boost-phase tracking. Radio signals and light can take up to 220 milliseconds to reach the sensor of a satellite in GEO.</p> -<p>The UAE and Oman have also attracted Chinese energy contractors and FDI, including the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Company’s construction of the Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline in 2012, which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, through which 45 percent of China’s oil imports flow. Chinese SOEs have also directly invested in UAE offshore concessions over the past 10 years. ADNOC, Abu Dhabi’s national oil company, recently signed a framework agreement worth an estimated $12 billion with China’s Wanhua Chemical to codevelop downstream projects following a state visit by President Xi in 2019. This list of projects is long and continues to grow, both within the oil and gas sectors and in fields such as logistics and port infrastructure in particular. The picture that emerges is one of a deepening economic relationship with a strong understanding on both sides of how to cooperate on long-term and often risk-prone infrastructure projects.</p> +<p>Launch costs for the requisite geostationary transfer orbits, moreover, are often double to triple the price of launches to LEO. GEO and polar satellites, designed with fuel to travel from such transfer orbits to their final positions, take longer to place on orbit, and often require larger structures. While fewer satellites are needed for coverage, each unit can become costly to produce.</p> -<p>Gulf states and China share a state capitalist model of development typified by SOEs negotiating deals on both sides, and this similarity likely facilitates cooperation and the integration of national and corporate agendas in the deals that are reached. These SOEs are political actors first and economic actors second, so where political will exists for deals to be made, as there has been over the last five years, these firms tend to overcome the commercial hurdles.</p> +<p>Systems in these higher orbits, however, can be more difficult to target with some ASAT weapons. It is expensive to acquire direct-ascent missiles capable of targeting systems in GEO; competitors have instead developed sophisticated co-orbital weapons capable of hiding and persisting in geosynchronous orbits. While the popularity of geosynchronous orbits makes it simpler to conceal co-orbital weapons systems, HEO systems, with their high speeds and fewer numbers, may be harder to attack.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-centrality-in-the-gulf-energy-transition">China’s Centrality in the Gulf Energy Transition</h3> +<h4 id="airborne-architectures">Airborne Architectures</h4> -<p>China’s role in Gulf states’ energy transition mirrors trends in their broader economic relationship. The Chinese side has gradually transitioned to higher-value inputs, from component suppliers, to contractors, and finally to investors and coinvestors in the largest scale solar and wind projects.</p> +<p>To be sure, the conversation about elevated sensors has thus far revolved around space-based platforms. This emphasis is understandable and indeed necessary for achieving persistent, global coverage. But airborne platforms may also have a role to play. The United States could risk a gap in capability if space constellations do not come online as scheduled or if other problems develop. Several factors counsel an exploration of airborne sensors for missile tracking.</p> -<p>China’s dominance in clean energy supply chains is not unique to the Gulf. The top six solar module manufacturers globally by production value are all Chinese companies. Chinese companies also dominate a variety of other solar and wind components along the value chains. In markets that exhibit the rentier effect and a strong focus on achieving the lowest price at tender, states have tended to focus on importing the cheapest and most efficient components. These components nearly invariably come from China, even if that comes at the expense of effective industrial policy in the short term. This has meant that the Saudi and UAE markets have rapidly become important export markets for Chinese companies. Chinese contractors such as the China Energy Engineering Group and Shanghai Electric have also played an important role in building the first group of utility-scale projects, but with the entry of lower-cost Indian contracting firms, they now play a smaller role in that part of the value chain.</p> +<p>Airborne sensor platforms are mature and, despite their smaller coverage footprints, could generate persistent sensing capability in ways that spacecraft cannot, particularly for specific defended locations, such as the National Capital Region, Okinawa, or Guam. While limited to regional applications, airborne sensors could serve an interim system, backfilling coverage while a space constellation is deployed. Additionally, airborne sensors might serve as an underlay for space sensors, increasing coverage density in these critical regions.</p> -<p>China’s growing role as an investor and developer in solar projects, both at the utility and commercial scale and in greenfield and brownfield developments, is interesting. For the most part, Gulf states do not have an issue accessing capital or debt, and Gulf SOEs typically do most of the investing in this sector. But at the utility scale, module manufacturers such as Jinko Solar, the largest in the world, are leading consortiums that have won large solar tenders in Saudi Arabia. Chinese firms have captured much of the value chain in such projects; in this case, Jinko is the developer and module supplier, and a smaller percentage of expenditure—for cables, civil contracting, and understructures—is directed to local firms to satisfy local content requirements. Jinko also played a similar role in the 1.2 gigawatt-peak (GWp) Al Sweihan project in Abu Dhabi, which is one of the largest single-site photovoltaic (PV) projects in the world. Jinko codeveloped the project along with UAE state-owned developer Taqa and also supplied the modules. These two recent projects signal Chinese firms’ strong intention to play a role in all parts of the project development value chain in the Gulf.</p> +<p><em>OPPORTUNISM OR PERSISTENCE</em></p> -<p>However, the 2019 announcement that China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund had acquired 49 percent in ACWA Power Renewable Energy Holding (ACWA Power RenewCo) represents the clearest and most important signal of this deepening cooperation, as the company is one of Saudi Arabia’s main renewable energy project holding companies, with 1,668 megawatts (MW) of wind and solar assets in the UAE, South Africa, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. This larger transaction followed a series of one-off greenfield codevelopment deals between ACWA and the Silk Road Fund relating to one coal and two solar projects in the UAE. The growing partnership would prove to be a precursor to more international codevelopment in years to come.</p> +<p>There are two ways to conceptualize an airborne underlay: as an opportunistic, occasional capability, and as a persistent architecture. Several aircraft in service possess a residual capability to detect and track ballistic missiles opportunistically. In Desert Storm, for example, Air Force F-15s could occasionally detect Scud missile launches during their strike missions but lacked the weapons to engage them or the endurance to patrol for extended periods of time. More recently, in 2012, an F-35 was able to detect a NASA space launch in its initial phases using onboard infrared sensors at distances of up to 1,481 km.</p> -<p>As of October 2023, the total Chinese investment in ACWA projects has exceeded $10 billion. ACWA’s chair highlighted these developments during an address at a forum celebrating the 10-year anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative in October 2023. During the forum, ACWA signed seven new cooperation agreements with a host of Chinese SOEs and asserted its commitment to the Chinese market.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tIWLcRJ.png" alt="image42" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 40: NASA ATREX Flight Even.</strong> Footage from the F-35 AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System infrared sensor. During the test, an F-35 tracked several multi-stage rockets with its radar and infrared sensors. Source: Northrop Grumman.</em></p> -<p>Notable developments have also occurred at the commercial and industrial scale. In 2021, the China Three Gorges company, one of the largest state-owned power developers, acquired UAE-based Alcazar Energy. With a portfolio of only around 400 MW, this transaction is not interesting for its scale. Rather, it indicates a nuanced understanding of the market on the part of China Three Gorges because it bundled together a large group of smaller projects from markets across the MENA region—an indication that their risk appetite extends beyond cooperation with state-owned players on mega-projects. Unsurprisingly, the Silk Road Fund also played a role financing the transaction.</p> +<p>An opportunistic approach might integrate these existing platforms into the Missile Defense System (MDS). Fifth-generation fighters, such as the F-35, have already demonstrated the ability to communicate fire control-quality tracking information to surface-based missile defenses (Figure 40). While such capabilities cannot persistently cover a defended region and may be called for other mission areas, more could be done to develop the doctrine and datalinks to weave existing sensor assets into the MDS.</p> -<p>Another powerful indicator of the deepening economic cooperation between China and the Gulf on clean energy is the increased level of investment further upstream in the renewables value chain. As the United States and European Union have erected new trade barriers to slow the growth of Chinese companies in key sectors, the opposite trend seems to be unfolding in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have each established ambitious sets of industrial policies and have marshaled their sovereign wealth to attract joint venture partners to codevelop manufacturing facilities in their domestic markets. The most notable example of this trend is the announcement of a joint venture agreement between Saudi Arabia’s PIF and China’s Longi Solar, one of the world’s largest module manufacturers. Longi has since become the module supplier of preference on a series of mega-scale solar PV projects developed by the PIF. A similar agreement was also recently announced between the PIF and China’s Hon Hai Precision Industry Company (Foxconn) to codevelop an EV brand in Saudi Arabia called CEER, breaking ground on the project in 2023. The PIF has also built an assembly plant with the U.S. EV carmaker Lucid, after becoming its largest shareholder, and is set to begin operation in the third quarter of 2023.</p> +<p>A more robust approach would be to incorporate a persistent airborne underlay for defending critical locations such as Guam. The systems needed for this mission would require long endurances and would ideally fly at higher altitudes than fighter aircraft, allowing for further lines of sight. Such aircraft, equipped with longer-range sensors, would maintain fixed orbits — or combat air patrols (CAPs) — over a position, with enough aircraft in inventory to maintain one or more aloft at any point in time.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b2v93jI.jpg" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ The Dhafra Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Independent Power Producer (IPP) Project in the United Arab Emirates’ capital, Abu Dhabi.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jO21eBb.png" alt="image43" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 41: Multispectral Target System.</strong> Source: Missile Defense Agency.</em></p> -<p>Large developers from the United States and the United Kingdom are notably absent from the broader renewable landscape altogether, despite a growing appetite for investments in other developing markets in Asia and Latin America. An exception to this absence of Western firms is the large role played by French firms in the Gulf renewables landscape, particularly large state-owned firms EDF and Engie. Their success at winning public solar and wind tenders in the region, and building lasting partnerships with local developers, lends credence to the hypothesis that it is the shared feature of state ownership, nearly ubiquitous in Chinese, French, and Gulf firms operating in the sector, that is key to success. The statist nature of these firms permits access to lower-cost capital and cheaper debt and enables them to invest with longer time horizons than private firms, allowing them to target projects that have substantial soft-power or non-financial returns to their state ownership.</p> +<p>Such elements have been a recurring feature of boost-phase missile defense designs but are relevant to many other missions, including hypersonic missile defense. Relevant airborne missile-tracking capabilities have already been demonstrated. Between 2015 and 2017, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) used a pair of multispectral-sensor-equipped MQ-9 uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) to track ballistic and cruise missiles (Figure 41). Flying at a 12.8 km altitude, the pair of aircraft tracked intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles from over 1,000 km away. An orbit of modestly persistent sensor aircraft — drones, high-altitude balloons, or others — could contribute to the defense of regional assets in concert with a space sensor system.</p> -<h3 id="chinese-and-gulf-clean-energy-cooperation-beyond-the-middle-east">Chinese and Gulf Clean Energy Cooperation beyond the Middle East</h3> +<p><em>SIZING A CONSTELLATION</em></p> -<p>In addition to their deep cooperation in the Gulf, China and Gulf states are also increasing their economic cooperation elsewhere in the world. China and the Silk Road Fund’s acquisition of half of ACWA Power’s renewables portfolio company in 2019 gave the two state-owned companies shared exposure to a group of projects in South Africa, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. This type of engagement is qualitatively different from the type of FDI that preceded it and indicates a deeper level of cooperation and alignment. A number of other greenfield development agreements between the two parties followed this deal, most notably the 1.5 gigawatt (GW) Sirdarya combined cycle gas turbine facility in Uzbekistan and a $2.4 billion investment in three large wind projects spearheaded by ACWA totaling an additional 1.5 GW. These facilities, set to be completed in early 2024, are expected to meet up to a quarter of the country’s power needs. These investments have quickly made Saudi Arabia an important economic player in a former Soviet republic with which it previously shared only tenuous ties.</p> +<p>As with space architectures, designing a persistent airborne sensor layer is an inexact art with few absolute rules. Designers must reconcile the number of aircraft required, their individual cost and performance, the locations of possible CAPs, and the bases where aircraft are stored and maintained to construct a viable system.</p> -<p>Following the recent addition of the UAE and Saudi Arabia to BRICS, these types of engagements are likely to increase substantially, with the Gulf states gaining legitimacy and access to new markets by associating with China, a great power. China is also eager to strengthen partnerships with traditional U.S. allies in the region, and as budget constraints have slowed Belt and Road Initiative projects in recent years, China could increasingly look to Gulf financial sponsors to play a role in stalled development plans.</p> +<p>Of these considerations, an aircraft’s operating altitude is especially critical. Higher-flying systems can offer further viewing horizons against low-flying targets and other sensing and survivability advantages. Hypersonic weapons flying at 20 km will enter a 15 km-altitude aircraft’s line of sight at 950 km — roughly 65 percent farther than a ground-based sensor (Figure 42). Moreover, high altitudes offer clearer atmospheric conditions for optical transmission, potentially easing the employment of infrared and other electro-optical sensors. Aircraft flying at altitudes above 10 km may also be difficult to engage with lower-tier surface-to-air missiles, offering survivability advantages.</p> -<h3 id="western-responses">Western Responses</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CTiGXhk.png" alt="image44" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 42: Detection Ranges of Surface and Airborne Sensors.</strong> Surface-based sensors (left) cannot detect low-flying targets at longer distances. Elevating the sensor altitude from sea level to a 15 km-altitude aircraft (right) allows for substantially increased viewable distance. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>As noted above, Western governments generally have been reluctant to compete head-to-head with Chinese enterprises in the Gulf as the global energy transition unfolds. The major U.S. initiative in this field is the November 2022 UAE-US Partnership for Accelerating Clean Energy, which promises to “catalyze” $100 billion and deploy 100 GW of clean energy by 2035. What “catalyze” means exactly is unclear; other parts of the plan refer to “mobilizing,” but fundamental issues such as financing, control, and ownership are not spelled out. Partly, this omission is due to a different idea of the relationship between the government and private sector in Western societies. But it is also due to a Western preoccupation in the energy field with dividing the roles of asset owners, policymakers, and regulators. In the Gulf, these roles are often conflated in the interest of speed and agility. The strategy of Western firms is to precede construction with intensive studies on demand, economic viability, and environmental impacts; to stress safety; and to have diverse stakeholders evaluating technical and economic analysis, forecasting, simulation, communication, and management. China’s orientation to build things and get them online quickly is often very much more in tune with the instincts of Gulf governments.</p> +<p>An equally important consideration is aircraft endurance. Long-endurance aircraft are critical to minimize the fleet size and other associated costs needed to maintain a CAP. High-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) aircraft, such as the RQ-4, and medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) aircraft, such as the MQ-9B, can offer endurances of over 24 hours, increasing the time spent on station or reducing requirements for aerial refueling. Prior analyses have estimated that roughly 3 to 4 MQ-9B aircraft could maintain a persistent CAP, with a force-level quantity of up to 17, including spares, needed to maintain three continuous CAPs for up to 270 days per year.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Western governments generally have been reluctant to compete head-to-head with Chinese enterprises in the Gulf as the global energy transition unfolds.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Fleet size requirements are also affected by the location of airbases relative to CAP locations. The further the CAP is from an airbase, the longer each aircraft must spend transiting to the patrol region, reducing the fuel available to be on station. Transit time can dramatically increase the numbers required to maintain persistent coverage, holding other factors equal. Achieving the smallest fleet possible will require permissive basing and overflight requirements to minimize the flyout distances needed.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<h4 id="finding-the-right-mix">Finding the Right Mix</h4> -<p>The energy relationship between China and the Gulf states has evolved slowly from a relationship characterized by transactional trade to one that now includes large-scale reciprocal FDI in both conventional fossil fuel assets and increasingly in renewable energy assets that are the central pillars of the Gulf states’ energy transitions. A decade and a half of investment cooperation in the oil and gas sector afforded both sides opportunities to develop relationships and trust, which have been carried forward by a different set of state-owned firms into the renewables sector. China’s dominant position in the supply chain of both solar and wind projects has also amplified this trend. Moving beyond this pattern of reciprocal FDI in the energy sector, China and its Gulf partners have begun to develop projects jointly in other developing markets, signaling a further deepening of this economic relationship and growing alignment of economic and foreign policy priorities. Interestingly, the unique success of French state-owned firms among Western developers in this market strongly suggests that state ownership in a state capitalist landscape brings with it a set of advantages and perhaps acts as a tacit barrier to entry to other private Western firms.</p> +<p>The Department of Defense is currently moving toward a multi-orbit architecture in LEO, MEO, GEO, and HEO. These developments acknowledge how efficiencies in some orbits offset inefficiencies in another.</p> -<hr /> +<p>LEO constellations benefit from proliferation and economies of scale but suffer challenges with persistence, orbital lifespan, and relative motion. MEO constellations offer more coverage and persistence but require potentially costlier satellites with larger apertures and radiation-hardened subsystems. GEO and HEO satellites provide unique coverage characteristics, requiring few satellites to selectively cover a given pole or longitude, but generate high unit costs and stringent reliability requirements. Airborne sensors can generate persistence unbounded by spacecraft orbital mechanics but have smaller detection footprints and require appropriate basing locations to operate.</p> -<p><strong>Faris Al-Sulayman</strong> is a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>The models depicted herein highlight these tradeoffs and the possible benefits of leveraging hybrid architectures — constellations with multiple orbital altitudes. LEO constellations in efficient, highly inclined orbits, for example, tend to under-cover areas near the equator, including critical parts of the Indo-Pacific region. MEO assets, orbiting about the equator, could usefully complement these configurations.</p> -<p><strong>Jon B. Alterman</strong> is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at CSIS.</p>Faris Al-Sulayman and Jon B. AltermanChina has established itself as an essential partner in Gulf states’ energy transition, serving as an investor and developer in renewable energy projects. Western governments, however, have been reluctant to compete with Chinese enterprises in the region.Europe To Deter Russia2023-12-07T12:00:00+08:002023-12-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/europe-to-deter-russia<p><em>NATO’s European members must ramp up investment in ammunition production and focus military training and force structures against key mission sets to credibly deter Russia from exploiting a clash between the US and China in the late 2020s as an opportunity to break Article 5 in Europe.</em></p> +<p>A constellation designed for equatorial and mid-latitude coverage, by contrast, might be supplemented with HEO assets that could selectively cover the poles. A combination of assets in different orbital bands, with their different levels of relative motion and viewing angles, might ease the challenge of tracking hypersonic and ballistic targets, whose thermal signatures vary significantly based on background and sensor viewing angles.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Configurations combining multiple orbital altitudes can add resilience and scale without dramatically increasing the number of orbital planes necessary. These models are illustrative: they do not depict ideal constellation designs, nor do they depict the redundancies needed for survivability. They rather demonstrate how orbits could be mixed to cover priority regions more efficiently. As acknowledged by Michael Griffin, former undersecretary of defense for research and engineering and a leading proponent of proliferated low Earth orbit constellations, an effective architecture should be “as widely distributed [as possible] over many choices of orbital regimes.”</p> -<p>Throughout 2023, the UK and most NATO allies have been understandably preoccupied with the need to support Ukraine, tackling a range of economic and social challenges, and most recently the sudden explosion of violence in the Middle East. However, the number of acute short-term challenges has distracted political and public attention away from the rising danger of an even more serious conflict in the coming years. Put simply, Russia has now transitioned its economy onto a war footing; US production is not sufficient to replenish its own stockpiles and fulfil Ukraine’s needs; and European countries are trying to manage an increasingly dangerous situation from an unsustainable peacetime defence and industrial posture. This would not be such a serious risk were it not for the fact that the US military is increasingly facing a threat that it cannot overmatch from Chinese forces in the Indo-Pacific. NATO is currently heavily dependent on the US in a wide range of key areas – most notably the ability to roll back Russian ground-based air defences from the air, as well as ammunition resupply, tanker aircraft, command and control and satellite capabilities. In the event of a clash with China in the Indo-Pacific that removes the capacity for large-scale US military reinforcement and support elsewhere, Europe will be left vulnerable to concurrent military aggression by Russia.</p> +<p><em>ADDRESSING LEO INDO-PACIFIC COVERAGE</em></p> -<p>For much of the year, Russian forces in Ukraine have been suffering from significant shortages of vehicles, weapons and above all ammunition. However, from a low point in the spring, Russia’s military supply situation has been steadily improving. Its factories are standardising around fewer types of tanks, artillery howitzers and UAVs, resulting in steadily rising production figures. From around 40 long-range missiles per month at the start of the invasion, Russia is now producing more than 100 per month. Artillery ammunition production has almost doubled, and has recently been supplemented by over 1 million shells and hundreds of howitzers from North Korea. Factories have also been set up in Iran to add resilience and additional capacity to Russia’s rearmament drive after the vast losses in materiel and ammunition expenditure of the past 18 months of war.</p> +<p>A high-inclination LEO constellation optimized for global coverage will produce the least coverage in latitudes near the equator. These latitudes, however, are most relevant for the Indo-Pacific theater. It is often more costly to add additional orbital planes (rings) than it is to add more satellites to a given orbital plane, as this requires separate launches to take place. One approach to enhance coverage of these latitudes could be to add a single equatorial orbital plane with eight satellites, at MEO (10,000 km) (Figure 43).</p> -<p>Russia is settling down for a long war, aiming to grind down Ukraine and exhaust the capacity and will of its Western supporters to supply the vehicles, ammunition and weapons it needs to keep fighting successfully. Despite the huge expenditure this year, the Russian government has announced plans for a 68% increase in defence spending, to around 6.5% of GDP, next year. This will likely prove disastrous for the Russian economy in the very long term. However, those hoping that Russia’s current effort is unsustainable in the short term are likely to be disappointed; it is worth noting that for much of the Cold War, Soviet spending on defence was far higher than this – reaching 21% of GDP by 1985 – and still took decades to arguably bring about the collapse of the USSR. The Kremlin can leverage a formidable coercive information and security apparatus to maintain tight control over any forms of public or political dissent. What little disagreement is visible in Russian political and media circles is largely over how rather than whether to continue the war, with many critics calling for greater escalation or even direct conflict with NATO.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LGPt5oi.png" alt="image45" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 43: Combined Equatorial Constellation and Coverage (135 LEO, 8 MEO).</strong> This simulation depicts a mixed constellation of 135 LEO satellites at 1,000 km altitude and 8 MEO satellites at 10,000 km altitude. Right: Map of satellite coverage; yellow regions indicate two-satellite coverage, while red regions indicate eight-satellite coverage or greater. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Meanwhile, Europe has failed to make the necessary investments in increased industrial production capacity and defence spending. With the notable exception of Poland, many national commitments to significant additional defence spending have either not yet materialised or are not slated to take effect for several years. The most obvious example is Germany, which shortly after the Russian invasion made a public commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2024, in addition to a one-off €100 billion investment in revitalising Bundeswehr capabilities. However, only €1.5 billion from the fund had actually been spent by mid-2023, and the defence budget as a whole actually decreased slightly compared to 2022. The UK Defence plan following the Defence Command Paper refresh is already £16.9 billion short of projected planned expenditure over the coming 10 years. Even so, most of the one-off £5 billion boost granted in 2023 was allocated to long-term nuclear submarine and weapons programmes, with only £1.9 billion of it going towards munitions resupply and purchases for Ukraine over two years. The European Defence Agency’s multinational 155mm artillery procurement programme is a solid plan along the required lines, but has been glacially slow to set up compared with the pace at which Ukrainian requirements are outstripping supply capacity. The EDA programme is also still far from sufficient at its current scale to put Ukraine’s war effort on a sustainable footing for the immediately foreseeable future, let alone replenish Europe’s own defence stockpiles, which have been badly depleted.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TZOxNyA.png" alt="image46" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 44: Combined Equatorial Constellation and Coverage (36 LEO, 8 MEO).</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Despite growing political frustration in many Western countries at the rising costs and lack of decisive progress, there is no easy way out of this war. In post-Cold War counterinsurgency conflicts, Western expeditionary campaigns ultimately ended when a political decision was made in Washington and other capitals to make some form of messy compromise in exchange for a sufficient “peace” to withdraw. This is not possible with Russian aggression in Ukraine. Talk of Ukraine “having to enter negotiations” is dangerously misguided and naïve because it ignores the fact that Russian aims have hardened, but not changed. The Kremlin’s will to grind on can be seen in its clear preparations for a long war and continued offensive action despite suffering several hundred thousand soldiers killed or seriously wounded and more than 2,500 tanks visually confirmed destroyed or captured. This is not the behaviour of a regime that will accept any lasting end to its offensive war of choice if Western governments withhold military support to force Kyiv into making concessions for a negotiated ceasefire. In fact, such a betrayal of Ukraine would have quite the opposite effect, encouraging Putin’s regime to continue to fight in the belief of eventual victory. It would also send an incredibly dangerous message to both Russia and China about the West’s lack of will to fight, making it far harder to deter future aggression.</p> +<p>A second illustrative design, with 36 LEO satellites and a single, 8-satellite MEO plane, puts this principle in sharper relief (Figure 44). MEO satellites are used exclusively to provide coverage to mid-latitudes, while a highly inclined LEO constellation provides persistent coverage of the higher latitudes and poles.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The only way to end the war is to convince Russia that its prospects for military success will get worse over time, rather than better</code></em></strong></p> +<p><em>SELECTIVE POLAR COVERAGE WITH HIGHLY ELLIPTICAL ORBIT</em></p> -<p>If Ukraine is forced to negotiate a ceasefire, Russia would be in a strong position to demand retreats from key positions and the removal of Kyiv’s remaining military initiative as baseline concessions. Such a process would also fracture Western political unity – which has largely held up to this point – and break all trust between Ukraine and its Western partners, since it could only be forced by withholding desperately needed support. Russia would then most likely spend three to six months reorganising its currently weak logistics, training and force dispositions, and then restart offensive operations from a much stronger position. This was done repeatedly in Syria, where Russia and the Assad regime used ceasefire agreements to freeze the front when they needed an operational pause, and then relaunched offensives where and when it suited them best. Russia also reneged on the Russia–Chechnya Peace Treaty of 1997, signed following the stalemate of the First Chechen War, by reinvading Chechnya in 1999 with much better prepared forces and conquering the country in a brutal campaign that involved almost completely destroying the capital city of Grozny.</p> +<p>HEO satellites offer the unique ability to selectively cover a single pole; as most threats transit the Northern Hemisphere, it allows constellation designs that do not “waste” coverage. A constellation of four HEO satellites can provide persistent stereo coverage of the polar regions, useful for missile warning. A mixed constellation of eight MEO satellites in an equatorial orbit and four HEO satellites illustrates this selective coverage capability (Figure 45).</p> -<p>There are no concessions the West could force Kyiv to offer, or indeed offer itself, that are more valuable to the Kremlin than defeating Ukraine through its current strategy of resourcing a long war to exhaust Western support and grind down resistance by 2025 or 2026. States do not stop fighting when they think that they can win wars, especially after taking hundreds of thousands of casualties and seeing their previous aura of military power badly damaged internationally by initial poor performance. The only way to end the war is to convince Russia that its prospects for military success will get worse over time, rather than better. This requires investing in the large-scale defence industrial production needed to make Ukraine’s slow offensive progress sustainable. At that point, the Kremlin would have a strong incentive to negotiate a settlement that might conceivably hold, on something approaching acceptable terms for Ukraine.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5KhEKdo.png" alt="image47" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 45: Combined Equatorial Constellation and Coverage (4 HEO, 8 MEO).</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Russia is set on a course that will see its production of weapons, ammunition and new formations increase significantly over the coming 2–3 years. Depending on how successfully Western governments sustain the supplies that Ukraine needs to keep fighting effectively, this will either make future Ukrainian advances harder to achieve or potentially result in serious reverses to gains made so far. Either way, without major increases in European defence production and a focus on reorganising and training militaries to credibly roll back any future Russian aggression against Alliance territory, Russia will regenerate a capacity to directly threaten NATO faster than most political or even military planners appear to realise.</p> +<p><em>COMBINING LAYERS FOR RESILIENCE</em></p> -<p>Putin has repeatedly shown himself to be a strategic opportunist who will take huge military risks if he believes there is a quick and easy win to be had. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was itself predicated on the false assumption that Russia could quickly decapitate the Ukrainian government and impose a puppet state without major fighting. NATO must be capable of deterring Russian military aggression that might seek to take advantage of any perceived opportunity to seize symbolic areas of Alliance territory and challenge Article 5 without effective military recourse in the coming years.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Up95vt0.png" alt="image48" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 46: Combined Constellation and Coverage (4 HEO, 15 MEO, 70 LEO).</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Unfortunately, the Chinese military is growing faster and increasing its capabilities more quickly than most thought possible even five years ago. Developments in very long-range anti-ship and anti-tanker/AWACS aircraft missile systems are particularly problematic for key US military capabilities across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, many of the US technical answers to some of these problems – such as the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter, Collaborative Combat Aircraft and the new B-21 Raider bomber – will not be available until 2029 or 2030 at a useful scale. The upshot is that the maximum period of risk of the Chinese military attempting to blockade or invade Taiwan or key disputed territories in the South or East China Seas is likely to be 2026–2028. Very problematic Chinese capabilities will be largely mature and fielded, but many of the US answers will not be ready yet. In the event of a dangerous standoff or an actual military conflict in the Indo-Pacific during this period, therefore, the US will be heavily stretched to meet its own commitments and Allied needs in that theatre. It is likely that EUCOM and CENTCOM would have to transfer assets to INDOPACOM in such a scenario, and Europe certainly could not count on rapid reinforcement at scale in the event of a concurrent Russian attack on NATO territory.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NItfbPU.png" alt="image49" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 47: Combined Constellation and Coverage (30 MEO, 135 LEO).</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The costs of successfully deterring a well armed and amoral adversary pale in comparison to the unimaginable costs of even a successful defensive war once it has begun</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Hybrid constellations can combine their coverage hotspots to increase emphasis on critical regions. A LEO constellation with lower inclinations can provide dense coverage of the Indo-Pacific region, while a smaller constellation of MEO and HEO assets can provide an additional layer of resilience and selective emphasis on the poles (Figure 46). Meanwhile, a dense constellation, combining a polar-region-heavy LEO constellation and an Indo-Pacific-weighted MEO constellation, achieves robust, uniform coverage with 165 satellites (Figure 47).</p> -<p>Any analysis attempting to argue that the military threat from either China in the Indo-Pacific or from Russia in Europe should be prioritised as the more likely misses a fundamental point. China has a strong interest in supporting Russia to ensure it remains a serious military threat in Europe that splits US and Western attention. More importantly, the only likely scenario in which Russia might directly attack a European NATO country is during a concurrent standoff or actual conflict that leaves US forces largely fixed in the Indo-Pacific. In the event of such a military confrontation with China in the mid-to-late 2020s, Russia will have a strong incentive to take a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to break NATO while the US cannot reinforce Europe effectively. By 2026–2028, Russia’s industry will have been at full-scale military production for years, allowing it to rebuild its increasingly battle-hardened forces.</p> +<h3 id="schedule-tradeoffs">Schedule Tradeoffs</h3> -<p>To deter this concurrent threat, European countries – including the UK – must urgently invest in significantly increasing production capacity for the artillery ammunition, spare parts and air defence missiles required to keep Ukraine in the fight while also refilling their own dangerously depleted stockpiles. European air forces, in particular, must also rapidly procure specialised weapons and dedicate serious aircrew training time and focus to developing high-end suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) capabilities. Currently these reside almost exclusively among US air arms. The credible capacity to roll back Russian conventional forces in Europe relies on achieving air superiority, since NATO’s European powers lack the recruitment capacity or funding to field the scale and quality of ground forces and land-based firepower needed to beat Russia without it. To avoid being extremely vulnerable when or if US rapid reinforcement is unlikely, European air forces must be able to collectively destroy the Russian SAM systems that currently would make air superiority over contested Alliance territory impossible to achieve without a major US SEAD/DEAD campaign.</p> +<p>No single orbit presents an ideal set of launch costs, satellite configurations, and coverage for missile tracking and fire control. A sensor architecture design must optimize a large collection of intersecting variables, including sensor field of regard (FOR), altitude, inclination, and satellite unit cost, among others. Most attention has been paid to optimizing these elements to minimize the number of satellites needed for coverage, but there are other goals to consider. An architecture must also be optimized to meet useful schedules and to phase capability in ways relevant to the threat.</p> -<p>Investing at scale in munitions and weapons production will require real political leadership, not least the courage and eloquence to explain to publics unused to genuine military threats why such investment is necessary at a time when so many other public services are desperately short of money. However, Ukraine illustrates vividly that the costs of successfully deterring a well armed and amoral adversary pale in comparison to the unimaginable costs of even a successful defensive war once it has begun. History suggests that few start wars that they believe will be long or difficult, but many long and difficult wars are started because one side believes the other cannot prevent a quick victory. Thus, the immediate target need not be the full capability to immediately fight and win a long war with Russia. Rather, it must be putting Ukraine’s defence on a sustainable footing and simultaneously rebuilding Western ammunition and equipment stockpiles, as well as the SEAD/DEAD capacity needed to convince Russia it could not achieve a quick and easy landgrab in Europe if the US and China were to come to blows.</p> +<p>Program schedule and capability phasing should receive more consideration in current acquisition efforts. Choices over orbital configurations not only affect final sensor coverage but how coverage develops over time. Two constellation designs that eventually produce identical coverage may not necessarily generate capability along the same timelines (Figure 48).</p> -<p>It takes years for investment in Defence to bear fruit, and so even if the necessary investments are made in short order, there will be a significant lag before seeing results in frontline forces. This renders a danger that is potentially only a few years away – practically around the corner in defence planning terms. To quote Winston Churchill on the urgency of rearmament in the House of Commons in 1936: “Will there be time to put our defences in order… or will the awful words ‘too late’ be recorded?”.</p> +<p>Indeed, capability may not come online in smooth or continuous increments. Many low Earth orbit (LEO) constellation designs, for instance, leverage multiple orbital planes with high inclinations — inclinations close to the poles — to provide regional and later, global coverage. These designs are optimized to minimize the number of satellites necessary for coverage and do not provide persistent coverage of lower latitudes until all orbital planes are deployed (Figures 49, 50, and 51). Notably, the Space Development Agency (SDA)’s early Tranche 0 and Tranche 1 LEO constellations are configured with high-inclination orbits. The cost of these high inclinations to capability phasing is not always made explicit.</p> -<hr /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l2Ej1v9.png" alt="image50" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 48: Alternative Capability Phasing.</strong> Two space-based architectures (“A” and “B”) may deliver identical capability when completed but phase this capability on different timelines. Architecture B generates partial capability later but full capability earlier. These tradeoffs should be considered when contemplating two otherwise identical architectures. They should also impact considerations for secondary constellations or airborne underlays to fill gaps in capability phasing. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p><strong>Justin Bronk</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI, and the Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. His particular areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, the air war during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology.</p>Justin BronkNATO’s European members must ramp up investment in ammunition production and focus military training and force structures against key mission sets to credibly deter Russia from exploiting a clash between the US and China in the late 2020s as an opportunity to break Article 5 in Europe.【初選47人案・審訊第 118 日】2023-12-04T12:00:00+08:002023-12-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-118<ul> - <li>辯方指「非法手段」應限「武力」相關 官關注普通法原則是否適用《國安法》</li> - <li>何桂藍結案:控方將政治問題變刑事、議員只向選民問責法庭不應干預</li> -</ul> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Choices over orbital configurations not only affect final sensor coverage but how coverage develops over time.</code></em></strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>As such, the structure of a constellation has implications for program schedule. LEO constellations of high-inclination satellites are efficient for generating global coverage with the fewest satellites. Other architectures, however, might generate persistent regional coverage sooner.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/o3zthmf.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>Much has been said about the need for resilience against attack, or what is called “graceful degradation.” Less attention has been given to optimizing for “graceful deployment.” A constellation optimized purely for coverage efficiencies may well deliver capability unevenly, with relevant, persistent coverage only arriving near completion. Such a glidepath is arguably in tension with the incremental, spiral-development-focused philosophy of proliferated low Earth orbit constellation deployment.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(4日)踏入審訊第118天。代表李予信的大律師關文渭進行結案陳詞,就被告被控「以威脅使用武力或其他非法手段」顛覆國家政權,關認為根據普通法下的詮釋原則,「非法手段」應只指涉與「實質脅迫與強迫(physical coercion and compulsion)」相關的手段,否則定義會太闊。法官問如有人用電腦病毒攻擊政府系統,是否不涉顛覆罪下的「非法手段」,辯方同意,但指這或涉恐怖活動罪,而即使《國安法》或出現漏洞,也應由立法機關而非法庭去填補。法官亦關注,《國安法》由中央草擬,為何辯方認為普通法原則適用,關引終院案例指《國安法》須與本港法律並行。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pRReC7y.png" alt="image51" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 49: High-Inclination Orbital Plane Persistence.</strong> LEO assets with high inclinations cannot persistently cover low-latitude regions over time (images shown in two-hour increments). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>此外,關指李予信無轉發「墨落無悔」聲明、論壇無提否決預算案,而公民黨非本案「共謀者」,控方不能將黨的行為歸咎李。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xzIf6bl.png" alt="image52" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 50: Low-Inclination Orbital Plane Persistence.</strong> LEO assets at lower inclinations can persistently cover near-equator regions at the expense of polar coverage. These tradeoffs ease with higher altitudes, including in MEO. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4onBltY.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 李予信</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9tLB62B.png" alt="image53" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 51: Half-Populated LEO Constellation.</strong> Highly inclined LEO constellations offer little persistent coverage of relevant equatorial regions. This LEO constellation of 36 satellites cannot offer persistent coverage until more orbital planes are added. Persistent equatorial coverage only emerges after the number of satellites is more than tripled. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<h4 id="辯方應以同類原則詮釋其他非法手段僅涉物理脅迫">辯方:應以「同類原則」詮釋、「其他非法手段」僅涉物理脅迫</h4> +<p>Besides the need to mitigate technical and security risks to a future constellation, capability phasing is a critical consideration for program-level risk. It is impossible to predict future supply chain bottlenecks, changes in budgetary priorities, or other factors that could hobble a constellation’s deployment. As such, architecture designs should be resilient to the risk of premature budget reductions or cancellation. Some constellation designs will not generate persistent coverage of meaningful regions should deployment be canceled halfway (Figure 52). It thus becomes crucial to consider which designs would offer meaningful coverage even when partially deployed.</p> -<p>案件今踏入結案陳詞第3日,控方上周就控罪中的「非法手段」作法律陳詞,指不限於刑事罪行及武力相關行為,議員濫用職權和違反職責也屬非法。代表李予信的大律師關文渭今代表其中13名被告作出回應。</p> +<p>A constellation optimized for graceful deployment may entail the selection of alternative configurations and may require more satellites to achieve coverage. Such costs are nevertheless worth considering (Figure 52). A constellation optimized solely for long-term efficiencies incurs short-term risks. In addition to programmatic risks, they can tempt adversaries to accelerate the development of countermeasures, knowing that capability will only arrive at once at a single future maturation point. Partial capability can and should arrive earlier. Multiple avenues — lower-inclination orbits, regional airborne sensors, and others — exist for realizing them.</p> -<p>關文渭表示,就《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權罪下,「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」犯案的條文,應以「同類原則(ejusdem generis)」(即列出具體事物的前句如跟隨一個概括性字眼,後者所指事物應受前述類別所限)詮釋,當中「以武力、威脅使用武力」均涉「實質脅迫與強迫(physical coercion and compulsion)」,因此「其他非法手段」也應受此類別所限,只涉「實質脅迫與強迫」的相關行為,包括刑事恐嚇及刑事損壞。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/r5QlqNx.png" alt="image54" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 52: Combining Constellations.</strong> Realizing global geometric coverage in two steps (right, center) can entail more satellites (40+26) than a constellation optimized for global coverage (49) (left). Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<h4 id="官問用病毒攻擊是否不涉非法手段-辯方同意但指涉恐怖活動">官問用病毒攻擊是否不涉非法手段 辯方同意但指涉恐怖活動</h4> +<p>One avenue to graceful deployment could involve separating constellation deployment into multiple steps. For example, a LEO constellation could be designed as a hybrid architecture, deploying a low-inclination set of 70 satellites for regional coverage (Figure 53) before expanding to global coverage with a second set of 36 highly inclined sensors (Figure 54). While this could entail more satellites than higher-inclination alternatives, it delivers increments of coverage in two steps, achieving regional coverage much sooner.</p> -<p>關並指,在22條下,如有意圖顛覆,相關手段便是非法。法官李運騰續問,那如某人有意圖顛覆,但手段不涉武力是否便不違法?關指視乎其行為是否涉「物理脅迫與強迫」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yrR67It.png" alt="image55" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 53: Combining Low- and High-Inclination Constellations: Regional Coverage.</strong> A low-inclination constellation of 70 LEO satellites achieves persistent regional coverage; with the addition of 36 satellites (Figure 54), coverage can be expanded to a global scale, in two steps. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>法官陳慶偉續舉例,若以電腦病毒攻擊政府電腦系統,令行政立法和司法機關無法運作,又或釋放新冠病毒作生化或化學攻擊,也不屬辯方所指的「非法手段」,不會觸犯顛覆國家政權罪?關同意,但指這樣或干犯恐怖活動罪,仍受《國安法》所規限。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/phBbRW2.png" alt="image56" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 54: Combining Low- and High-Inclination Constellations: Global Coverage.</strong> A high-inclination constellation of 36 satellites, used to expand to persistent global coverage. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<h4 id="辯方國安法或有漏洞但非法庭責任填補">辯方:《國安法》或有漏洞但非法庭責任填補</h4> +<p>Another method may be to deploy underlays, such as aircraft-based sensors, to backfill capability until a space constellation is deployed. Regardless of approach, there are many possible levers for smoothing capability deployment. Careful selection of phased constellations, or the deployment of airborne underlays and other assets, could produce coverage of relevant areas in shorter increments.</p> -<p>李運騰續指,但恐怖活動罪旨在保障市民及財產,顛覆罪則保障政治制度,若辯方所言正確,《國安法》或會出現漏洞。關同意,但指法庭的責任不是要填補漏洞,這是立法機關的責任,若法庭這樣做有濫用司法權力的風險。</p> +<p>Schedule and capability phasing deserve to be key factors in assessing this trade space. Recent requests presented by SDA imply increased attention to these problems. In a recent solicitation for new Tracking Layer LEO satellites, for instance, SDA requested potential solutions for constellations including mixes of higher and lower inclinations.</p> -<h4 id="辯方條文每字皆有意思不冗贅列武力為限非法手段意思">辯方:條文每字皆有意思不冗贅、列「武力」為限「非法手段」意思</h4> +<p>A design that deploys gracefully could offer useful capability even when incomplete. One that does not deploy gracefully will not deliver such benefits, despite any promise of future numerical efficiencies. If a geopolitical crisis occurs in the late 2020s, the United States will have to fight with the space sensor constellation that is fielded, not the complete architecture planned in the longer term.</p> -<p>關文渭亦不認同控方所指,《國安法》目的是將所有可能危害國安的罪行都刑事化,強調人大常委制訂《國安法》條文的每隻字都有意思,不會以很多字眼表達同一意思;而假如條文針對任何非法手段,則毋須再冗贅地列出「以武力、威脅使用武力」。因此列出相關字眼,是讓人以「同類原則」理解何謂「其他非法手段」,將其意思限制為只涉武力。</p> +<h3 id="an-emerging-architecture">An Emerging Architecture</h3> -<p>關並指,中國《刑法》無就「顛覆」定義,但「顛覆」一般指推翻政府權力及法律所制訂的制度,而這很少能透過非武力手段達致。而人大常委立法時已列出「嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞中央或香港特區政權機關依法履行職能」等,擴闊「顛覆」的意思,故條文應同時會包含限制,即只限與武力相關的非法手段,以免意思過闊(over-breadth)。</p> +<p>These many sensor, orbital, and schedule tradeoffs are at play in the Department of Defense (DoD)’s ongoing space sensor acquisition effort. This chapter reviews the envisioned missions, programs, and budgets of the forthcoming architecture and considers what questions remain unresolved.</p> -<h4 id="官關注普通法原則或不適用國安法-辯方須與本港法律並行">官關注普通法原則或不適用《國安法》 辯方:須與本港法律並行</h4> +<p>In fiscal year (FY) 2023, the DoD invested nearly $5 billion into acquiring overhead sensors for missile warning, tracking, and fire control (Figure 55). These efforts have been partly centralized under the Space Force organizational structure, with multiple programs of record underway for low (LEO), medium (MEO), geosynchronous (GEO), and highly elliptical (HEO) orbit sensor layers (Table 3). Under its Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) initiative, the Space Force will deploy two GEO (Next Generation GEO) and two HEO (Next Generation Polar) satellites, supplementing its Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellation for missile warning.</p> -<p>陳慶偉續問,「同類原則」乃普通法詮釋原則,但《國安法》是由「北方」(中央)草擬(drafted up in the North),為何辯方認為會適用?關引終審法院就呂世瑜案的判詞,指《國安法》須與本港法律並行(work in tandem)。李運騰指,該判詞亦指詮釋《國安法》時應考慮與維護國安有關的全國性法律,惟關回應相關法例非常簡短,無列明任何手段或是否涉武力,因此《國安法》22條特別提到「以武力、威脅使用武力」的非法手段就很能反映問題(very telling)。</p> +<p>A second effort, designated Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking (RMW/MT), will incorporate a constellation of nine or more MEO satellites (RMW/MT-MEO) and a larger constellation of LEO satellites (RMW/MT-LEO) to perform both missile warning and missile tracking.</p> -<p>陳慶偉續指,《國安法》第一條提及《國安法》立法目的,或隱含「同類原則」不適用(implied exclusion)。關同意《國安法》是因2019年社會事件而訂立,但引人大常委副委員長王晨2020年5月22日就《國安法》的講話,提到立法背景是「反中亂港勢力」破壞香港社會秩序,毀損公共設施及癱瘓政府和立法會運作等,而當時在議會內有武力阻礙議會運作,不知道人大常委立法時是否欲針對該些行為。關強調,法庭必須肯定該講話排除「同類原則」的應用,才能指隱含「同類原則」不適用。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CUeP7As.png" alt="image57" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 55: Space-Based Missile Warning and Tracking Modernization by Orbit, 2018–2028.</strong> *Based on 2024 PB. Source: DoD Comptroller and CSIS Missile Defense Project analysis.</em></p> -<h4 id="辯方如非法手段可擴至民事過失太闊十分危險">辯方:如非法手段可擴至民事過失太闊、十分危險</h4> +<p>In parallel with the RMW/MT-LEO program, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has developed a prototype sensor, the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), capable of furnishing the “highly sensitive, low-latency, high quality of service” data needed for the more demanding missile defense fire control mission. The program will launch two prototype LEO satellites in late 2023, after which “responsibility for HBTSS operational fielding will be transferred to the US Space Force.”</p> -<p>就「非法手段」的界線,關文渭認為,若民事過失如侵入土地和誹謗也可被視為「非法手段」會十分危險。李運騰問,若該人作出相關行為時有意圖顛覆,「為什麼不可以?」關回應,那便會令條文定義「非常廣闊、太過廣闊(very wide, too wide)」。李運騰則指,《國安法》的嚴苛,某程度上是被控罪須證被告意圖顛覆的條件,而有所減輕。</p> +<p>For FY 2024, the Space Force requested $2.6 billion for Next Generation OPIR, including $720 million for Next Generation GEO, $1 billion for Next Generation Polar, $661 million for associated ground systems, $191 million for modernization initiatives, and $31 million for integration. Additionally, it requested $2.2 billion for RMW/MT, including $1.2 billion for its LEO constellation, $538 million for its MEO constellation, and $506 million for its associated ground systems. For HBTSS, MDA requested $69 million, with minimal funding planned after FY 2026 when program responsibility is transferred to the Space Force.</p> -<h4 id="辯方被告否決目的為迫政府回應五大訴求基本法無禁止">辯方:被告否決目的為迫政府回應五大訴求、《基本法》無禁止</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4QAS8ml.png" alt="image58" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: Selected OPIR Missile Sensing Initiatives.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<p>關續指,重點並非「非法手段」是否只限刑事罪行,而是基於預算案內容以外的原因否決是否合法。而控方的主張是議員若考慮預算案以外的原因而否決,便屬不考慮議案內容和優劣的「無差別」否決,屬「非法」。但關指,本案有無法抗拒的證據顯示,被告否決目的是迫政府回應五大訴求。</p> +<p>These newer investments represent a welcome shift in resources. In FY 2023, funding for missile warning, represented by the Next Generation OPIR portfolio, dwarfed investments in missile tracking, represented by RMW/MT (Figure 56). The DoD’s FY 2024 budget request, by contrast, dramatically expands investments in the LEO and MEO constellations needed for missile tracking while cutting Next Generation GEO, reducing its planned satellite purchases from three to two. With its cancellation of the seventh and eighth SBIRS and the third Next Generation OPIR satellites, the Space Force is pivoting away from an approach centered around geosynchronous missile warning satellites to one dominated by large constellations of missile tracking satellites in LEO and MEO.</p> -<p>法官陳仲衡即問,迫政府回應五大訴求豈不是被告的藉口,因他們知道不可能達到?關指根據各方陳詞,若說被告只是以五大訴求作為掩飾是有悖常理。關續重申,除非法律禁止,否則個人可以做任何事情,而法例沒有列明議員投票時應該或不應該考慮什麼;法例只列明要根據政府提案「審核、通過財政預算」,故如被告審視預算案後發現沒有五大訴求的內容而否決,也不能說他們沒有審視過預算案。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wnQzYuo.png" alt="image59" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 56: Space-Based Missile Warning and Missile Tracking Space Sensor Modernization by Mission, 2018–2028.</strong> *Based on 2024 PB. Source: DoD Comptroller and CSIS Missile Defense Project analysis.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qDEQHbM.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 代表李予信的大律師 關文渭</p> +<h4 id="next-generation-opir">Next Generation OPIR</h4> -<h4 id="辯方李予信或於案發前已退出參與">辯方:李予信或於案發前已退出參與</h4> +<p>Next Generation OPIR, including its Next Generation GEO and Polar components, formerly represented the largest segment of the DoD’s space sensing portfolio (Figure 57). Beyond recapitalizing space-based missile warning, whose associated SBIRS and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites entered service decades ago, these satellites will offer enhanced capabilities, tracking dimmer targets over wider areas. Combined with SBIRS, these satellites will be capable of detecting the hot plumes of missile launches, cueing relevant sensors, and informing national command authorities. They will supply data to critical interfaces, including the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Overhead Persistent Infrared Architecture (BOA) and Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITW/AA), a U.S. strategic nuclear warning system.</p> -<p>至於就李予信的案情,關文渭指李沒有參與過超級區議會的協調會議,雖有出席3月25日公民黨記者會,但沒有轉發過黨6月簽署「墨落無悔」的帖文。而就李提到否決權的選舉單張,關指是在《國安法》前印發,並於6月30日晚收回,李於《國安法》後短時間已印製沒有提到否決權的新單張。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BkLOiF7.png" alt="image60" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 57: Space-Based Missile Warning Modernization by Type, 2018–2028.</strong> *Based on 2024 PB. Source: DoD Comptroller and CSIS Missile Defense Project analysis.</em></p> -<p>就李的選舉論壇筆記提到否決預算案,關文渭指在7月4日、即《國安法》生效後數日的超區選舉論壇上,李從沒有提過否決預算案,大部分其他參與者包括鄺俊宇和涂謹申也沒有提過;而黨友鄭達鴻雖在6月19日街站提到否決預算案,但那是《國安法》前的事,至7月12日的街站無公民黨成員再提過。辯方認為就李是否在案發時間(2020年7月1日)前已退出(withdraw)參與有疑點。</p> +<p>Between 2018 and 2021, the Space Force awarded $7.8 billion in contracts for the development and production of three Next Generation GEO satellites, with initial launches scheduled for 2025. Following a reorientation of priorities in late 2022, the Space Force plans to cut one Next Generation GEO satellite, launching the first in FY 2025 and the second in FY 2027. In FY 2024, the Space Force requested $719 million for the program, a considerable reduction from the $1.7 billion requested in FY 2023.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dbYYCeY.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 鄭達鴻(中)</p> +<p>The first of two Next Generation Polar satellites, meanwhile, is scheduled for launch by FY 2028. These satellites, orbiting at higher inclinations, would provide continuous coverage of the Northern Hemisphere and North Pole, supplementing the two SBIRS-HEO satellites presently in orbit. The Space Force requested $1 billion for the program in FY 2024.</p> -<h4 id="辯方不應將黨行為歸咎黨員">辯方:不應將黨行為歸咎黨員</h4> +<p>These satellites will pass sensor data to users through a new set of ground infrastructure, funded at $582 million in FY 2023. The Next Generation OPIR Ground component will incorporate the Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE), a system of software, ground terminals, and computers for mission management, data processing, telemetry, and command and control. Various components of FORGE are expected to come online through the late 2020s, with development for Next Generation GEO and Polar continuing through FY 2028. These efforts come in parallel with the Space Force’s Enterprise Ground System (EGS), a broader modernization of the organization’s ground systems software, and the Next Generation OPIR Interim Operations (NIO), a backup program to prevent FORGE delays from impacting Next Generation GEO launch schedules.</p> -<p>關續指,除去以上所有證據,控方指控只餘李予信的公民黨黨員身分。惟關引案例強調,單以政治連繫定罪屬危險,公民黨無被指為「共謀者」之一,不能將黨的言行歸咎黨員,而是視乎被告的個別言行。</p> +<h4 id="resilient-missile-warningmissile-tracking--low-earth-orbit-proliferated-warfighter-space-architecture">Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking – Low Earth Orbit (Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture)</h4> -<p>就李有份拍攝、楊岳橋提到否決預算案的初選宣傳片段,關稱是於《國安法》前拍攝,由黨所剪輯和發布,只是黨的行為而非李的行為;而李初選落敗後報名港島地區直選,但那從不是組織者協議的目標。關最後指,李的供詞沒有動搖,如法庭認為他所言是正確或可能正確,應讓他脫罪。</p> +<p>The RMW/MT program consolidates past efforts to develop a large constellation of LEO satellites and a smaller constellation of MEO satellites for missile tracking (Figure 58). As of 2023, this constellation would combine up to “135 LEO and 16 Space Force-developed MEO satellites working in concert through an integrated ground solution.” In 2023, Space Systems Command (SSC) was designated as the “lead end-to-end systems integrator” for the constellation. DoD then created a combined program office with SSC, the Space Development Agency (SDA), and MDA. It is likely that the architecture’s final configuration will change as prototype systems enter orbit.</p> -<p>關文渭陳詞完畢後,續由代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 進行結案陳詞。</p> +<p>RMW/MT’s LEO component consists of SDA’s Tracking Layer constellation, which aims to launch successive phases, called “tranches,” of LEO sensor satellites in two-year increments. The acquisition philosophy for the Tracking Layer apparently differs from past military space efforts; it is intended to demonstrate capability on commercial timelines and exploit commercial components and design philosophies, rather than fitting a traditional requirements generation process.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/27yfFmq.png" alt="image05" /></p> +<p>SDA plans to acquire the Tracking Layer and a larger constellation of LEO communications and sensing satellites, the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA; formerly the National Defense Space Architecture, or NDSA), using this approach. The PWSA constellation will initially include four tranches of LEO satellites, labeled Tranches 0, 1, 2, and 3. Tranche 0 will include 20 Transport Layer satellites and eight Tracking Layer satellites, which host wide-field-of-view (WFOV) infrared sensors and orbit approximately 1,000 km from Earth (Figure 59). SDA launched the first 10 of its Tranche 0 satellites in April 2023, and the second launch concluded in September 2023.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(4日)踏入審訊第118天。所有被告的代表律師完成結案陳詞,正式結束118天的審訊,法官料約3至4個月後裁決,但不能作出保證。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xbVbWiG.png" alt="image61" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 58: Space-Based Missile Tracking Modernization by Program, 2018–2028.</strong> *Based on 2024 PB. Source: DoD Comptroller and CSIS Missile Defense Project analysis.</em></p> -<p>本案指控被告以「非法手段」無差別否決預算案,意圖顛覆國家政權,控方指濫用議員職權亦屬「非法手段」。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 今陳詞指,《基本法》無規定議員應如何投票和說明何謂濫權,議員只是向選民問責,議員投票不是法律問題、是政治問題,不應由法庭裁定他們有否恰當履行職責。Beel又指,何桂藍早料會被DQ、亦認為35+不可能,故不可能意圖做出她根本知道不可能的事;而何並非要無差別否決,而是望審核預算案,即使政府回應五大訴求但財案有不公她也會反對。Beel 又指,本案整個串謀公開進行,無人相信當時所做是違法;而控方是將政治問題變成刑事罪行問題,本案案情在任何其他普通法管轄區均不會構成顛覆,而是被視為「尋常政治」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oghhlQR.png" alt="image62" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 59: SDA Tranche 0 Constellation.</strong> Source: Space Development Agency (top) and CSIS Missile Defense Project (bottom).</em></p> -<h4 id="辯方指顛覆條文模糊23條草案可助理解-官稱不相關">辯方指「顛覆」條文模糊23條草案可助理解 官稱不相關</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/g5oMZYN.png" alt="image63" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 60: SDA Tranche 1 Constellation.</strong> Source: Space Development Agency (top) and CSIS Missile Defense Project (bottom).</em></p> -<p>代表李予信的大律師關文渭今早陳詞完畢,最後由代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 陳詞。Beel 指,根據《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權罪,被告必須「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」作出22條下的4項行為,並同時有顛覆國家政權的意圖才能入罪。惟 Beel 指條文模糊(vague),沒有訂明何謂「顛覆」和「非法手段」,提出應以2003年就《基本法》23條立法的草案去理解立法原意,當中顛覆條文包括「推翻中央人民政府」。惟法官李運騰質疑,該條例從無通過,只是本地立法機關的立法原意,但本案要處理的是人大常委的立法原意,兩者截然不同,不認為與案有關。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qK9BcHA.png" alt="image64" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 61: SDA Tranche 2 Constellation.</strong> Source: Space Development Agency (top) and CSIS Missile Defense Project (bottom).</em></p> -<p>Beel 指,《國安法》同樣無列明「國家政權」定義,李運騰提議以內地法律理解,惟 Beel 指內地法律指涉中央政府,但香港不是國家。李運騰續指香港政府也是行使中央所授予的權力,惟 Beel 指無證據顯示被告推翻香港政府。法官陳慶偉續引控方呈交、由清華大學法學院教授王振民等編著的《香港特別行政區維護國家安全法讀本》,指有提到就國家政權的解釋,又指「國家政權的概念是我們所不熟悉(not known to us),是內地法律制度所熟悉」,Beel 無進一步補充。</p> +<p>Plans to develop the Tracking Layer have shifted as Space Force and SDA budgets and priorities evolve. A second tranche, Tranche 1, is scheduled to launch in 2025 and would include 39 satellites (35 tracking, 4 fire control) orbiting at 1,000 km in five polar orbital planes (Figure 60). When combined with the Tranche 0 Tracking Layer, these satellites would offer a “kernel” of global coverage to warfighters by late 2025. The constellation initially consisted of four orbital planes with seven Tracking Layer satellites each; a $250 million congressional add, approved in 2023, added a fifth plane “to increase global Missile Warning and Missile Tracking coverage in support of combatant commands to include INDOPACOM.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HpKshpd.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel</p> +<p>Additional tranches would launch in 2027 and beyond. Tranche 2 would add 54 or more satellites (48 tracking, 6 fire control) to provide “global, persistent” missile warning and missile tracking while demonstrating a limited fire control capability (Figures 61, 62, and 63). Unlike prior tranches, it would deploy three orbital planes to a higher inclination and three orbital planes to a lower inclination suited for Indo-Pacific regional coverage. Each plane would have nine satellites; eight with WFOV missile warning/missile tracking sensors and one with a missile defense-focused “Fire Control quality sensor.” The first plane would enter orbit in April 2027, and deployment would conclude by November 2027.</p> -<h4 id="辯方非法手段應限刑事罪行法例不清晰被告不知投反對會否犯罪">辯方:「非法手段」應限刑事罪行、法例不清晰被告不知投反對會否犯罪</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TUweCe1.png" alt="image65" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 62: SDA Tracking Layer Tranche 2 Coverage.</strong> Horizon-limited coverage footprint of Tranche 2 constellation, with pink indicators for fire control coverage. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from the Space Development Agency.</em></p> -<p>就「非法手段」的定義,Beel 同意應以「同類原則」詮釋,而法庭如不接納只限與武力相關,亦應限於刑事罪行,否則便會令法律不清晰,公眾難以分辨何謂合法和非法行為,有違普通法傳統及法治精神。Beel 並指,若說「非法手段」不限於刑事罪行,是「矛盾修辭(oxymoron)」,因控方是指「你可以透過不犯法去犯法(“You can commit a crime by not commiting a crime.”)」;李運騰回應但控方仍須證明被告意圖顛覆國家政權。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b2d4ajC.png" alt="image66" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 63: SDA Tracking Layer Tranche 1 and 2 Combined Coverage.</strong> Horizon-limited coverage footprint of combined Tranche 1 and 2 constellations, with pink indicators for fire control coverage. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from the Space Development Agency.</em></p> -<p>Beel 續解釋,被告達成協議時,應知道其行為將會構成刑事罪行才能入罪。李運騰問,即他們犯案前要獲得一個法律學位?Beel 否認,指對法律無知不是辯解理由,但法律應是公眾可理解。法官遂舉串謀打劫銀行的例子,指被告的參與行為可能是合法,如只是負責「睇水」或擔任司機,但若知道串謀的目的並同意參與便可構成罪行,並問此情況下控方還要證明被告知道打劫銀行是刑事罪行嗎?Beel 指不需要,因被告可從法例知道其行為是刑事罪行。</p> +<p>Tranche 3 and beyond would increase the PWSA Tracking Layer’s density past 135 assets and incorporate newer satellite technologies. Given the intended five-year orbital lifespan of each satellite, these would expand upon and replace earlier tranches, enabling another set of technology insertions. While SDA has already defined requirements for earlier tranches, the eventual configuration of additions beyond Tranche 3 may vary considerably as satellites are put on orbit.</p> -<p>李運騰即說,《國安法》於6月30日通過,每人也可以閱讀條文。但 Beel 強調當中就「非法手段」定義不清晰,被告不能知道就預算案投反對票會否構成罪行,強調若法例無明文規定為犯罪行為,法庭不得加以定罪。</p> +<h4 id="resilient-missile-warningmissile-tracking--medium-earth-orbit">Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking – Medium Earth Orbit</h4> -<h4 id="辯方法例無說明何謂濫權議員向選民問責法庭不應干預">辯方:法例無說明何謂濫權、議員向選民問責法庭不應干預</h4> +<p>After an initial push and pull between LEO- or MEO-only approaches, the Space Force has embarked on efforts to deploy a mixed constellation of LEO and MEO missile tracking satellites. The second leg of this mixed constellation, RMW/MT-MEO, will complement the LEO Tracking Layer with additional satellites in MEO. This attention to MEO represents an important philosophical shift toward hybrid architectures, with MEO particularly useful for assuring coverage of lower latitudes (Figures 44 and 45).</p> -<p>而就控罪指被告旨在濫用當選後根據《基本法》第73條受託的職權(包括「根據政府的提案,審核、通過財政預算」),Beel 指條文只是列明立法會而非議員有的權力,且該權力是可用可不用。李運騰即指,議會獲賦予權力不代表可被濫用,但 Beel 反問「什麼是濫用?」,指《基本法》無規定議員在投票時有什麼職責、也沒有說明何謂濫權,控方亦無相關專家或案例支持,質疑是「空洞的論點」;又指這「不是法律問題,是政治問題」,反問「如何就議員有否恰當審核議案立法?審核是什麼意思?要去到什麼程度才足夠?」</p> +<p>In FY 2023, the Space Force expanded an exploratory effort to prototype MEO tracking satellites, MEO Track Custody (MTC), into a full-scale acquisition program integrated with the RMW/MT constellation. RMW/MT-MEO would acquire nine or more MEO satellites, at two orbital altitudes, to “pivot the Department of the Air Force’s (DAF) legacy missile warning force design to a more resilient multi-orbit approach.” In FY 2023, Congress appropriated $409 million toward the program — more than double the $139 million budget request. In FY 2024, the Space Force requested $538 million to support the accelerated MEO effort.</p> -<p>Beel 續引何桂藍證供,指預算案有議員無法審核的部分,如「基本工程基金」和現時已撥款130億的國安開支,議員不是不想審核,而是無法審核。而終審法院就梁國雄案的判詞,指法庭不應干預立法會內部事務,Beel 指議員如何投票沒有法律規定,是立法會內部程序問題,不是法律問題;而議員如何投票最終是向選民問責,不應由法庭裁定議員有否恰當履行職責。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VDzEIGd.png" alt="image67" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 64: SSC MEO Roadmap.</strong> Source: U.S. Space Systems Command.</em></p> -<p>Beel 又指,控方是將純粹政治議題變成刑事罪行問題,但本案案情在任何其他普通法管轄區並不會構成顛覆罪,而是會被視為尋常政治(normal politics)。法庭在本案應考慮普通法原則,而非政治考慮。</p> +<p>Like SDA’s successive “tranches,” SSC will deploy MEO capabilities in a series of increments called “epochs.” Epoch 1, deploying in late 2026, will include satellites at two altitudes: a plane of six vehicles at a lower orbital altitude and three at a higher one. Successive epochs will likely include 18 or more satellites, with a possible total of 34 to 44 satellites when complete. By the launch of Epoch 3, the constellation will reportedly deliver persistent missile tracking coverage. These MEO satellites will leverage research performed under the earlier MTC effort, which by May 2021 had awarded early contracts for digital satellite prototypes. Program design review for one Epoch 1 satellite concluded in July 2023, and critical design review completed in November 2023.</p> -<h4 id="辯方不應接納被告涉公職人員行為失當無人可迫特首解散立會及下台">辯方:不應接納被告涉公職人員行為失當、無人可迫特首解散立會及下台</h4> +<p>This shift toward a LEO/MEO mixed constellation in FY 2024 follows significant congressional scrutiny. In July 2022, the House Armed Services Committee directed the chief of space operations to brief the committee on including “free, fair, and open competition within [the Space Force’s] acquisition plan” by January 2023. Following a $130 million congressional plus-up, the program office also moved to add the “third plane of Epoch 1 spacecraft . . . add[ing] additional acceleration funds in FY 2024 to . . . aggressively pursue additional Epoch 1 capabilities.”</p> -<p>Beel 亦質疑控方於本案改變立場,由指控被告濫用73條的職權,移向指控沒有效忠《基本法》及香港特區。惟 Beel 強調,效忠香港特區不是效忠香港政府,立法會由人民選出,議員是對人民有義務(beholden),人民是特區的一部分。Beel 亦指控方在共謀者原則的法律爭議時,才首次提出被告《國安法》前或涉「公職人員行為失當」罪,但不被接納,現時將此論點「起死回生」,法庭也不應接納。</p> +<h4 id="hypersonic-and-ballistic-tracking-space-sensor">Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor</h4> -<p>而就本案指控被告否決預算案後導致特首解散立法會及下台,Beel 強調,根據《基本法》,特首有權不解散立法會,即使解散也不會癱瘓政府,因可申請臨時撥款,亦無人可迫特首下台,除非特首提交相同預算案並被否決。而且據基本法起草委員譚耀宗指,《基本法》50至51條機制原意是讓選民決定特首或議會哪方合理,Beel 反問:「如法例容許,又怎會構成阻撓和破壞政府履行職能?」,指否決致特首下台是《基本法》提供的程序,不可能是憲政危機。</p> +<p>Among these several programs, HBTSS represents the DoD’s current effort to enable the fire control-quality tracking mission. HBTSS occupies a critical function in the forthcoming sensor ecosystem, aimed at providing the high-fidelity, low-latency tracking information needed to guide missile defense interceptors.</p> -<h4 id="辯方何桂藍早料會被dq不可能意圖做出協議行為">辯方:何桂藍早料會被DQ、不可能意圖做出協議行為</h4> +<p>MDA currently retains acquisition authority for HBTSS prototyping. Under the current timeline, MDA will prototype and launch a medium-field-of-view sensor to demonstrate fire control-quality tracking of hypersonic weapons. MDA began prototyping the sensor in 2018 and intends to launch two HBTSS-equipped satellite testbeds into orbit in late 2023 or early 2024. Following on-orbit test activities, “responsibility for HBTSS operational fielding will be transferred to the US Space Force and the MDA will continue the development of the next generation of space-based fire control sensors for missile defense.”</p> -<p>就何桂藍的案情,Beel 指沒有足夠證據證明有涉案串謀協議,即使有,何桂藍亦非協議一分子,沒有意圖無差別否決預算案和顛覆國家政權。而何的證供令人耳目一新(refreshing)、誠實、毫無歉意(unapologetic)和直接,沒有提出藉口,其證供可信,望法庭採納。</p> +<p>The prototypes will be placed in orbits intended to “track test events in the INDOPACOM region” and would likely leverage a commercially supplied chassis, or bus, to host the HBTSS sensor. In 2021, Congress directed MDA to “achieve full operational employment” of the system by December 2023. On-orbit test activities are scheduled to continue through 2025, including support for Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) intercept tests in 2024 and 2025.</p> -<p>Beel 並指,無論是控方證人區諾軒和何桂藍均認為民主派取得35+不可能,何於5月《國安法》訂立後已知她本人會被DQ,不可能當選和行使其權力,其後亦確實如此發生,「她如何能意圖做一些她知道做不到的事?」</p> +<p>It remains unclear, however, how many HBTSS or HBTSS-derived payloads will eventually be fitted to SDA’s Tracking Layer constellation. While MDA requested $68 million for the program in FY 2023, funding is expected to decline after demonstration activities conclude and responsibility for fire control transfers to SSC and SDA. Following this transition, SDA aims to launch four HBTSS-derived sensor payloads as part of its Tranche 1 activities and an additional six fire control sensors in Tranche 2. Further developmental spirals, the priority accorded to the hypersonic defense mission, and SDA’s responsibilities for supporting missile defense, however, have not yet been publicly defined.</p> -<p>Beel 同意,串謀的不可能並非辯護理由,但舉例如有人在協議謀殺另一人前,已知道那人已死了,則根本不可能意圖殺他、亦不可能串謀罪成;而本案中何亦知道不可能做到涉案行為,亦因此無意圖這樣做,她參選只是想取得高投票率,其串謀罪不應成立。</p> +<h4 id="seeking-alignment">Seeking Alignment</h4> -<h4 id="辯方何桂藍望審核預算案非無差別否決決定與五大訴求無關">辯方:何桂藍望審核預算案非無差別否決、決定與五大訴求無關</h4> +<p>Several recent developments have been promising. The DoD has increasingly pivoted from an exclusively pLEO design to a mixed-orbit architecture with complementary LEO and MEO components. In contrast with earlier tranches, SDA’s Tranche 2 will now include assets at lower inclinations suited for earlier Indo-Pacific-region coverage. Moreover, the Space Force has signaled further investments in deploying fire control sensors on orbit, both in SDA Tranches 1 and 2.</p> -<p>而若法庭不接納,Beel 亦提出何桂藍並無參與控方所指控的任何協議,指預算案需經歷兩三個月的審議階段,而何清楚說明若預算案有無法審核的部分,其預設立場便是投反對票,除非政府說服她投贊成;她亦會指出議案問題並提修正案。</p> +<p>Questions nevertheless remain over the configuration, schedule, and mission of the forthcoming architecture. It remains uncertain how effectively MDA fire control efforts will transition to SDA’s architecture and how the planned numbers of fire control satellites in PWSA support requirements for hypersonic defense. While Tranche 2 plans include three orbital planes at lower inclinations, it is uncertain how this could be expanded to assure persistent Indo-Pacific stereo coverage. Other questions — over what mix of LEO and MEO assets is optimal, how to phase deployments to cover the Indo-Pacific, what software is necessary to fuse information from so many sensors, and how to align ground systems acquisition with the fielding of satellites — are not yet resolved. The DoD has reached substantial technical milestones and pioneered innovative approaches to acquiring these systems. As one analyst has remarked, however, “there seems to be a lack of consensus on how quickly, and in what manner,” to proceed.</p> -<p>Beel 指,何明顯並非「無差別」否決,其目的是要審核預算案,找出其弊端,而她無直接提倡五大訴求或否決預算案,其立場亦與五大訴求無關,因即使政府回應五大訴求,但預算案有不公她也會投反對。Beel 亦指,何簽署「墨落無悔」只是讓選民看到她敢於運用《基本法》賦予的權力,是個人對聲明的回應,但不是簽署協議。</p> +<h3 id="three-temptations">Three Temptations</h3> -<h4 id="辯方何桂藍僅望推動民主化向政府問責無協議無差別否決財案">辯方:何桂藍僅望推動民主化向政府問責、無協議無差別否決財案</h4> +<p>Both on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon, senior leaders have expressed the need to accelerate the fielding of sensors for hypersonic and ballistic missile defense. Doing so will require optimizing an entire system of systems — effectors; sensors; command, control, and communications systems; and the software that weaves them together. The greater challenge is not in constructing these individual parts but in aligning their deployment to deliver capability on relevant timelines.</p> -<p>Beel 最後指,本案串謀與其他任何串謀不同,整個協調過程是公開,無人相信他們當時所做的是違法、也沒有任何要隱瞞,何桂藍亦希望公眾知道事情如何發生,以在投票時作出知情的選擇。而否決預算案的議題一開始只是次要問題(side issue),因所有人都知道他們有權對預算案投下反對票;只是在得悉提到否決或會被DQ時才開始關注,但人們當時也非關注會干犯刑事罪行,因如何桂藍所說,她從無想過「撳個反對掣」也會被捕。</p> +<p>Realizing the necessary architecture will require attention to potential policy temptations and pitfalls. Policymakers may face temptations to abdicate the fire control mission, overoptimize for numerical efficiencies, or consolidate to single orbital regimes in the pursuit of savings and simplicity. Succumbing to these temptations would come at the cost of speed and resilience.</p> -<p>Beel 續指,本案純粹關乎被告對政府的挑戰,就如譚耀宗及時任中聯辦主任駱惠寧都提過民主派若立會過半,是中央所不容許,2020年選舉制度「完善」後直選議席亦大幅減少,控方是將政治問題變成成刑事罪行問題。Beel 指,何桂藍議程清晰,就是推動民主化,尋求將功能失常的立法會改革,以向政府問責,但從無協議無差別否決預算案。即使法庭認為有,Beel 亦重申無法律規定如何投票、不認為無差別否決是違法,議員只是向其選民問責,應判何桂藍無罪。</p> +<h4 id="temptation-to-abdicate">Temptation to Abdicate</h4> -<h4 id="官約3至4個月後裁決-但不能保證">官:約3至4個月後裁決 但不能保證</h4> +<p>One temptation to avoid is to abdicate the missile defense fire control mission. While technically challenging, fire control-quality tracking is needed for hypersonic missile defense. As responsibility for fire control transfers from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to the Space Force, it could be tempting to postpone or deemphasize these difficult requirements.</p> -<p>Beel 陳詞完畢後,所有辯方律師均完成陳詞,正式完結由今年2月6日開審、長達118天的審訊。法官陳慶偉表示,與另外兩名法官其後都要審理其他案件,不清楚需時多久作出裁決,但會盡快處理,料需約3至4個月,但強調不能作出保證,一有裁決會盡快通知各方。</p> +<p>In other words, fire control should not be redefined as a reach goal. Combatant commands central to missile defense, including U.S. Space Command, have recognized the necessity of fire control and “strongly endorsed continuing work on systems such as . . . the MDA’s Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor.” Congress, moreover, had funded the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) and repeatedly kept it within MDA explicitly to ensure schedule discipline and applicability to missile defense. Whether or not HBTSS represents the eventual solution, fire control requirements should remain a defining feature of sensor architecture design.</p> -<p>大律師關文渭另為保釋被告申請撤銷宵禁令,控方反對,法官最終批准所有被告撤宵禁令。散庭時,各被告與旁聽人士揮手道別。</p> +<p>Realizing fire control requirements will be difficult but not impossible. “The ability to detect and track dim targets in a cluttered background . . . with the sensitivity necessary to support the [counter-] hypersonic kill chain” requires considerable investment to achieve. The mission demands low latencies and small pixel footprints, achievable either through dedicated medium-field-of-view (MFOV) systems cued by wide-field-of-view (WFOV) tracking sensors or high-resolution, fire control-capable WFOV sensors, pending the supply of larger-format focal planes. An ideal constellation might feature both, with responsive WFOV fire control sensors and an additional MFOV layer for tracking challenging targets.</p> -<p>本案不認罪的16人,包括鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、李予信、余慧明及吳政亨。其中何桂藍、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、余慧明及吳政亨6人不獲准保釋,分別還柙逾26至33個月,其餘10人獲准保釋。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Fire control should not be redefined as a reach goal.</code></em></strong></p> -<hr /> +<p>SDA’s commitments to deploying fire control sensors represent an important step in the right direction. Despite earlier uncertainties over their prioritization, recent plans suggest that SDA will deploy six fire control sensors in the Tranche 2 constellation, after MDA’s two-satellite HBTSS demonstration activities conclude. The relation of Tranche 2 fire control sensors to HBTSS remains publicly unclear.</p> -<p>案件編號:HCCC69/2022</p>獨媒報導辯方指「非法手段」應限「武力」相關 官關注普通法原則是否適用《國安法》 何桂藍結案:控方將政治問題變刑事、議員只向選民問責法庭不應干預Too Fast, Too Furious?2023-12-04T12:00:00+08:002023-12-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/too-fast-too-furious<p><em>What can countries learn from recent experiments in adopting cryptocurrency as a legal tender?</em></p> +<p>The number of fire control tracking satellites planned, however, remains inadequate for providing persistent coverage, and the glidepath to transition from an HBTSS-based approach to a future fire control system appears uncertain. The six SDA fire control satellites planned to launch in 2027, for instance, will be valuable for demonstrating capability but insufficient for achieving persistent Indo-Pacific coverage. It is worth considering whether these efforts could be expanded; additional satellites at these inclinations could generate persistent coverage of the Indo-Pacific. Additional mid-inclination satellites would bolster deterrent capability in a critical period, coinciding with Beijing’s timeline to develop a Taiwan invasion capability by 2027. Even if such threats are delayed, these additional satellites could be held in reserve to reconstitute constellations as they deorbit or come under attack.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Policymakers are right to question if the current approach is enough to support fire control for hypersonic and ballistic missile defense. While the Space Force has committed to “the development and demonstration of space technologies to deliver Missile Warning, Missile Tracking, and Missile Defense (MW/MT/MD) capabilities including advanced missile tracking and fire control,” it must go further to operationalize them.</p> -<p>Currently, only a handful of countries have decided to adopt cryptocurrency as a legal tender, most prominently among them El Salvador and the Central African Republic (CAR). While attracted by the potential economic and monetary incentives that this move has to offer, both countries have faced significant implementation challenges, threatening to undermine their objectives and any foreseeable economic benefits.</p> +<p>Moreover, the previous, near-complete focus on proliferated low Earth orbit (LEO) sensors is worth reconsideration. Space Force efforts to explore fire control tracking from medium Earth orbit (MEO) sensors merit further study and potential acceleration. As discussed above, the MEO regime offers useful survivability, coverage, and schedule benefits, and deploying a MEO-based fire control layer could add useful resilience.</p> -<p>As more countries – and developing economies in particular – have begun to consider integrating cryptocurrency into their national financial systems, these experiments highlight that adopting cryptocurrency as a national legal tender necessitates a certain level of preparedness, including appropriate infrastructure, public education, building trust and – last but not least – the establishment of robust financial crime prevention measures.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pIqLTQG.png" alt="image68" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 65: Valleys of Death in Defense Acquisition.</strong> Source: U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<h3 id="two-routes">Two Routes</h3> +<p>The transfer of fire control tracking sensor programs from MDA to SDA represents an exercise in institutional trust. It will also be a test of recognizing the central relation between space and the future missile defense enterprise. Continued oversight will be essential, to ensure both that this transition effectively takes place and that fire control capability is achieved on schedule and at the necessary scale. It will require clear, high-level commitments from Pentagon leadership to allow these capabilities to cross the valley of death (Figure 65).</p> -<p>While El Salvador and the CAR sought to adopt cryptocurrency for similar reasons, their national experiences have been quite different.</p> +<h4 id="temptation-to-overoptimize">Temptation to Overoptimize</h4> -<p>El Salvador took the step of adopting Bitcoin as legal tender in 2021, with the goal of increasing investment and assisting citizens that lack access to traditional financial services. Initially, to integrate Bitcoin into its economy, the country contracted third-party companies to develop centralised cryptocurrency wallets known as “Chivo Wallets” and cryptocurrency ATMs. This government-funded project allows citizens to transfer funds quickly through the use of the “lightning network” – a solution that increased the speed of Bitcoin transactions – and without commission fees.</p> +<p>A second set of policy temptations threatens deployment schedules. Fielding new technologies requires experimentation. It is difficult to fully characterize sensor performance without placing them on orbit; spiral development approaches, such as those employed by SDA, can enable the continual experimentation needed to refine these systems. Even when operationalized, an architecture should continue to evolve. A mantra from the Aegis community is to “build a little, test a little, learn a lot.”</p> -<p>The CAR moved to adopt Bitcoin in April 2022, but the government reversed its decision when the Constitutional Court declared the proposal unlawful a month after it was introduced. After this reversal, the government took a different route and created a partially Bitcoin-backed cryptocurrency, known as the Sango Coin, to be introduced in phases. The first phase would allow the public to buy into the crypto-backed currency, while the subsequent phases would allow the use of the currency for certain government services, like purchasing citizenship, e-residency and land. The CAR’s Constitutional Court ultimately rejected a scheme that would have allowed foreign investors to acquire citizenship for $60,000 worth of Sango Coins or a 250 square metre plot for $10,000 worth of Sango Coins, ruling that nationality cannot be priced in a market and that residency requires physical presence in the country.</p> +<p>This experimentation must be connected to results. The future architecture must prioritize coverage of the lower latitudes for the Indo-Pacific region. This is not only a matter of scaling constellation sizes but of selecting a design that addresses priority regions earlier. It may be tempting to continue experimenting: to deploy endless technology demonstrations to design constellations optimized for global coverage on an ever-longer timeline.</p> -<p>At the onset of the project, the coin also promoted the tokenisation of natural resources within the country. Despite the project not initially gaining traction, as of July 2023, the CAR National Assembly revisited the concept and passed a law allowing the tokenisation of land and natural resources.</p> +<p>Three means to resist this temptation include designing constellations for graceful deployment, leveraging airborne underlays, and accelerating ground and data infrastructure development. The treasure obligated for these development efforts could be in vain if capability arrives late to need.</p> -<h3 id="same-motives-different-challenges">Same Motives, Different Challenges?</h3> +<p><em>DEPLOY GRACEFULLY</em></p> -<p>The countries’ respective political leaders generally cited the potential economic benefits as their underlying rationale for promoting cryptocurrency as a national legal tender. Both countries regard this as an innovative solution to economic stagnation, poor revenue and foreign direct investment, and a reliance on third country-backed currencies. In the CAR, for example, its national currency – the CFA Franc – is backed by France and pegged to the Euro, with several restrictions in place, such as keeping 50% of the CAR’s foreign assets with the French Treasury. Some saw the CAR’s interest in cryptocurrencies as a political move away from France in an effort to lessen reliance.</p> +<p>Deployment phasing should define every requirement in a potential constellation. The forthcoming sensor architecture must prioritize persistent coverage of the Indo-Pacific region first and do so sooner. Amid theoretical debates over orbital planes, satellites, and coverage, it is important to ask when an architecture could generate persistent coverage of relevant regions, and when this might expand to global coverage. As emphasized previously, even if the final capabilities of two designs are identical, the way these capabilities phase in — how they deploy gracefully and which regions receive denser coverage — can differ.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Both El Salvador and the Central African Republic suffer from a lack of appropriate infrastructure to fully realise the adoption of crypto</code></em></strong></p> +<p>These considerations should impact the orbital design of forthcoming constellations. High-inclination configurations, optimized for maximizing coverage efficiencies once fully populated, may generate minimal relevant coverage when only partially populated. The recent nods to lower-inclination orbits in Tranche 2 are an important step to moderate polar over-coverage. It is worth asking if it is enough.</p> -<p>But in addition to these legitimate economic concerns, both El Salvador and the CAR faced stark challenges in adopting cryptocurrency as a legal tender.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AahXGVh.png" alt="image69" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 66: Regional and Global Coverage Definitions Investigated.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Firstly, both countries suffer from a lack of appropriate infrastructure to fully realise the adoption of crypto. For instance, in El Salvador, 40% of the population lacks access to the internet, a critical factor for allowing the cryptocurrency industry to flourish. Fewer than 60% of those who had internet access and mobile phones downloaded Chivo Wallet, and only 20% continued to use it. Also, according to estimates, 40% of all downloads occurred when it was launched in September 2021, and virtually no downloads took place in 2022. Meanwhile, in the CAR, according to 2021 estimates, only 11.4% of the country’s population has internet access, the electricity supply is patchy and unreliable, and mobile phone usage is low.</p> +<p><em>AN AIRBORNE UNDERLAY</em></p> -<p>Software reliability and cyber security safeguards have also become an issue for El Salvador. When the Bitcoin software first went online in the country, it struggled to verify the identity of its users. The public’s scepticism was exacerbated when hackers were able to create accounts and withdraw the $30 in Bitcoin that the country was offering to its citizens.</p> +<p>To this end, it will be crucial to examine alternatives for accelerating Indo-Pacific sensor coverage. A high-inclination LEO constellation will not generate persistent regional coverage for some time. But the immediate future fight is likely to be a regional fight (Figure 66). Airborne sensors might be useful for nearer-term regional tracking capability, defending critical assets including Okinawa or Guam.</p> -<p>Secondly, transparency has been a persistent problem. The president of El Salvador’s tweets, for example, have been the only source of information enabling the public to know the amount of Bitcoin that the government has bought or sold. Similarly, the CAR declared that a Treasury-maintained partial Bitcoin reserve would support the Sango Coin, although little information about the related technicalities has been made available to the general public. Consequently, public trust in these initiatives has been low. There have also been allegations that in the case of the CAR, adopting cryptocurrency would provide a convenient avenue for Russia to evade Western sanctions, given its close ties with the country.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="frank-turner-technical-director-space-development-agency">Frank Turner, Technical Director, Space Development Agency</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Thirdly, appropriate regulatory and legal regimes were not in place prior to the introduction of a government-sponsored cryptocurrency application. The lack of anti-financial crime measures, like Know Your Customer and transaction monitoring, presented a major risk of increased illicit financial flows, especially when converting cryptocurrency to fiat currency – a risk that could also spread beyond the country’s borders. In the CAR, experts conveyed their concerns over the increased risk of financial crime due to the adoption of Bitcoin, which would ultimately impact other countries in the region.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“Schedule is king. The train is going to leave the station on time.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">What is clear is that adopting cryptocurrency as legal tender requires a certain amount of readiness in terms of digital infrastructure, transparency and accountability</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Such approaches have been shown to be operationally viable. Architectures based on uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) have already been proposed for persistent, regional boost-phase missile defense missions, leveraging similar sensors needed for hypersonic tracking. MDA has previously demonstrated infrared missile tracking sensors on UAS, successfully tracking ballistic missiles in flight. In 2016 and 2021, the Navy and Army successfully integrated fighter-derived tracking information into missile defense tests.</p> -<p>Finally, in addition to low transparency, the price volatility of Bitcoin has raised eyebrows as to whether or not these initiatives are truly worthwhile. Even though Bitcoin’s price volatility appears to be a better alternative for some countries than hyperinflation, El Salvador’s inflation rates are rather low, raising doubts about the effort. Besides, securing convertibility is a tough procedure with Bitcoin’s price fluctuation. Given that the adoption of Bitcoin as legal tender in El Salvador is entirely sponsored by public funds via a trust, there is a major risk that the trust’s resources will be drained if the price of Bitcoin declines. According to estimates of the reported amount of Bitcoin purchased by El Salvador, the country has lost approximately $56 million as of June 2022. The IMF has proposed that El Salvador should support the trust through new resources or debt issuance to ensure financial stability and convertibility.</p> +<p>The DoD has already begun to use decommissioned RQ-4 drones to track hypersonic systems in flight tests. There is an even larger stock of existing UAS, slated for divestment, which could be leveraged. Many pieces of the puzzle are already in place.</p> -<h3 id="important-planning-for-future-initiatives">Important Planning for Future Initiatives</h3> +<p>In the longer term, advances in airborne platform endurance, networking, stealth, and autonomy could enable alternative designs. Opportunistic missile tracking could be invigorated by multimission platforms tightly linked to missile defense fire control networks. New domain awareness systems could allow asset placements closer to suspected missile launch sites. Significant investments in lighter-than-air and ultra-long-endurance aircraft, combined with declines in infrared sensor size, weight, and power, could allow a proliferated architecture of smaller, lighter, and cheaper airborne sensors.</p> -<p>What is clear from the El Salvador and CAR experiments is that adopting cryptocurrency as legal tender requires a certain amount of readiness in terms of digital infrastructure, transparency and accountability. The most fundamental requirement is physical infrastructure. Countries must be prepared to ensure that the majority of the population has access to reliable electricity, the internet and smartphones.</p> +<p>Airborne systems offer different characteristics — flexibility, proximity, and survivability — to backstop and enhance a space-based missile tracking architecture. Introducing opportunistic or persistent airborne sensors increases the complexity of the missile defense problem for an adversary, forcing them to consider multiple domains from which their missiles could be tracked and engaged.</p> -<p>Firstly, transparency is key. There should be a continuous process of informing the public through official channels about advancements, Bitcoin reserves and other related topics. This should translate into teaching the public how to use crypto, as well as education on the financial risks that cryptocurrencies pose. One notable example is that El Salvador’s Ministry of Education intends to introduce a curriculum centred around Bitcoin in schools beginning in 2024.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JZTNXyP.png" alt="image70" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 67: Airborne Sensors near Guam.</strong> A notional laydown of airborne sensors defending Guam, involving two surface-based sensor assets and three long-endurance UAS — two in a combat air patrol, and one transiting to replenish the orbit. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Secondly, countries also need a robust regulatory framework in place to reduce the risk of financial crime. Without proper implementation of cyber security procedures and anti-money laundering (AML) measures around government-funded cryptocurrency applications, there is inherently a higher risk of criminal exploitation. There is already a steady threat of cryptocurrency businesses being hacked. When government funds are involved, this draws more attention from both regular users and criminals alike, and the threat only increases.</p> +<p>To be clear, these architectures are not without their limitations. Their comparatively low altitudes constrain their lines of sight compared to spacecraft and, like space architectures, would require fleets of multiple systems to achieve persistence. They are not invulnerable — both aircraft and their airbases can be attacked by aircraft, missiles, and drones if placed close enough to threat regions.</p> -<p>Ultimately, countries thinking about taking the same path would be remiss to ignore these lessons. While the adoption of cryptocurrency as legal tender may have advantages, problems such as a lack of trust, transparency and accountability, as well as the absence of appropriate infrastructure and robust financial crime prevention measures, may hinder the realisation of the desired economic benefits of cryptocurrency.</p> +<p>As the DoD races ahead with space sensor acquisition, it is worth considering the roles airborne sensors might play in accelerating capability delivery to the Indo-Pacific (Figure 67). Persistent airborne sensors might relax schedule pressure on space systems and allow for designs that phase capability later. More critically, a diversity of assets in space and in the air — in different orbits and with different mixes of penetrating capability and persistence — generates more dilemmas for adversaries.</p> -<hr /> +<p><em>REDUCING INTEGRATION RISKS</em></p> -<p><strong>Fatima Alsancak</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI focusing on countering proliferation financing.</p>Fatima AlsancakWhat can countries learn from recent experiments in adopting cryptocurrency as a legal tender?【初選47人案・審訊第 117 日】2023-11-30T12:00:00+08:002023-11-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-117<ul> - <li>辯方質疑控方詮釋「非法手段」無邊無際 僅搬《國安法》「尚方寶劍」</li> -</ul> +<p>Phasing capability earlier also demands more attention to the systems that allow them to interoperate. A constellation design will live and die by its data transport and integration. If history is any indication, the delivery of software and ground systems will be difficult, costly, and late. “What you don’t want to have,” General James Dickinson of U.S. Space Command warns, “is where you have outdated ground stations that can’t leverage the new capabilities on orbit.” The development of these systems was a substantial contributor to the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program’s early cost and schedule overruns; it is likely that ground system development, especially related to sensor fusion, will only mature after satellites have reached orbit. Both Congress and the DoD have roles to play in mitigating this risk.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Fusing sensor outputs from air and space platforms in multiple orbital bands is no easy undertaking. Efforts to develop common ground systems for the forthcoming Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) and Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking (RMW/MT) constellations, for example, face considerable technical and schedule risk. A viable sensor fusion solution must correlate information from multiple sensors with different look angles, latencies, and uncertainties associated with their sensor returns to form a track. While some portion of this processing can be done on board satellites — “on the edge” — significant track correlation and fusion will likely initially take place on the ground (Figure 68).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uIM39qS.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A constellation design will live and die by its data transport and integration.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(30日)踏入審訊第117天,辯方續進行結案陳詞。代表鄭達鴻及梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙指,《基本法》已預想否決預算案的情況和應對,難以想像會被視為空前憲政危機和政治不穩,被告根據《基本法》行事不大可能意圖顛覆國家政權。而兩人均認為「35+」不可能,無意圖參與串謀,當中鄭會審視財案優劣投票,梁過往則因沒有全民退保而否決,但與他人無協議亦無意圖顛覆。</p> +<p>As of 2023, the DoD plans to manage the ground operations for RMW/MT through a combined program office including Space Systems Command (SSC), which will acquire the MEO component; SDA, which will acquire the Tracking Layer; and MDA, which retains considerable equities through HBTSS and the Missile Defense System (MDS). The ground components for each system are under development by different contractors and must interface with satellites from many vendors. Their software must correctly interface with the Next Generation OPIR Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE) infrastructure and be compliant with the broader Space Force Enterprise Ground System (EGS).</p> -<p>而對控方稱被告以「非法手段」顛覆政權不限於刑事罪行、亦涵蓋濫用議員職權,代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑質疑該詮釋「無邊無際」、欠案例支持,只是搬出《國安法》這把「尚方寶劍」;代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉亦指違反職責不能構成「非法」,法律亦無明文規定議員不可不按議案優劣否決。此外,鄒家成一方指他發起「墨落無悔」僅表達對戴耀廷毋須簽協議的失望,並非協議,也從無主張推翻中國政府;柯耀林一方則指他簽「墨落」是受政治環境所迫。案件下周一續審,辯方將繼續進行結案陳詞。</p> +<p>Still in its initial iterations, RMW/MT and Next Generation OPIR constellations will leverage different data formats, requiring “translation” on the ground to be interoperable. The RMW/MT ground segment itself involves separate infrastructure for the LEO Tracking Layer, MEO constellation, and HBTSS, which come online on different timelines.</p> -<h4 id="辯方被告知無可能取得35無意圖作出串謀協議">辯方:被告知無可能取得35+、無意圖作出串謀協議</h4> +<p>The timelines for acquiring these translation capabilities will be tight. FORGE itself is expected to come online no earlier than 2025. A more comprehensive ability to command and control multiple types of satellites with a single protocol, EGS, is required to enter service before 2028. Responsibility for ensuring an integrated space architecture — such as by mandating common data standards and software development practices — has been dispersed across multiple program elements and offices. Despite clear road maps for launching large volumes of new satellites, no comprehensive plans have been publicized for fusing their large volumes of data.</p> -<p>代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙今先進行結案陳詞,表示就二人所屬的香港島和新界東選區,控方未能毫無合理疑點證明參與者有達成協議;而即使有協議達成,協議文件提到「會運用」或「會積極運用」否決權亦是為參與者提供彈性,不代表一定要否決預算案。</p> +<p>The DoD has only recently begun algorithm development to fuse two-dimensional sensor tracks from OPIR satellites. While it has demonstrated the performance of its sensors on the ground, sensor track fusion remains a substantial software challenge. As deployment of the Tranche 0 satellite constellation continues, the DoD must ensure that the sensor fusion approaches it leverages are scalable to larger quantities of satellites.</p> -<p>潘續指,就算被告的協議存在,控方亦未能毫無合理疑點證明二人有意圖作出涉案協議行為、是串謀一分子,而可作此推論的證據,包括被告知道民主派無可能在立法會取得35+議席。李運騰即引案例指就算被告認為串謀不會成功,但執行串謀計劃仍屬有罪,潘同意,但重申二人並無此意圖實踐。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rppd0Jr.png" alt="image71" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 68: Data Transport Pathways.</strong> Data transport, fusion, and integration will be as important to space-based missile tracking as the sensors themselves. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<h4 id="辯方基本法已預想否決機制不大可能以此顛覆國家政權">辯方:《基本法》已預想否決機制、不大可能以此顛覆國家政權</h4> +<p>It will be imperative to get ahead of these integration problems. How many hops must the data take between sensors, ground stations, and other data processing nodes? How long might each hop take? Which nodes will process the tracking data, which will fuse them, and which will deliver the finalized track to an effector? The various types and orbits of satellites being purchased should output common data formats that are usable across various ground assets. Moreover, the DoD should take steps to mitigate cases where fusion-related program elements lack clear organizational ownership — a substantial contributor to past schedule overruns.</p> -<p>潘又指,《基本法》第50至52條已預想(envisage)否決預算案後的政治情況及應對機制(兩次否決致解散立法會及特首下台),難以想像會被視為「空前憲政危機」和「政治不穩」,若被告只是做《基本法》所容許的事,不大可能是意圖參與涉案串謀和顛覆國家政權;而《基本法》亦列明即使否決預算案,特首也可申請臨時撥款、政府仍可運作,案中無證據顯示被告意圖連此撥款也否決。</p> +<p>The pace of the threat, and the pace of ongoing launch schedules, is too fast to accommodate any potential delays in sensor fusion and ground system development. Moreover, the DoD cannot settle for uncertain assurances that, someday, satellites in different orbits and with different datalinks could be integrated down the road. It will not be enough to continually experiment with fusion approaches once the satellites reach orbit. To deploy a diverse, proliferated constellation, it is essential for the ground systems and software to arrive on time.</p> -<p>惟法官李運騰質疑,臨時撥款有別於財政預算案,難道不會嚴重干擾政府執行職能?潘熙回應不需說到這麼遠,強調《基本法》由人大落實,不大可能根據《基本法》來顛覆國家政權,就二人是否意圖顛覆存有合理疑點。</p> +<h4 id="temptation-to-consolidate">Temptation to Consolidate</h4> -<h4 id="辯方鄭達鴻會視乎預算案優劣投票很可能與黨有不同立場">辯方:鄭達鴻會視乎預算案優劣投票、很可能與黨有不同立場</h4> +<p>Finally, the future sensor architecture must be designed for conflict: it must be capable of surviving and reconstituting in highly contested environments. Achieving this will require an orbitally diverse constellation design that forces adversaries to develop many types of countermeasures. Policymakers should resist temptations to consolidate the sensor architecture into a single orbital regime.</p> -<p>針對兩名被告,潘熙指鄭達鴻案發時是關注民生和草根的區議員,真誠信相政府是理性,會與議員磋商,而鄭會視乎預算案優劣及政府抛出橄欖枝的程度決定如何投票,即使政府不回應五大訴求,他也可能投贊成。潘又強調,對鄭而言,五大訴求與其他港人的合法訴求均是他想要達到的目標(end),而不是用來顛覆的手段(means)。</p> +<p>Multi-orbit capabilities are not duplicative. An architecture in multiple orbits and altitudes can generate unique efficiencies in coverage unachievable with single-altitude architectures — especially for the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, it will be critical to deploy diverse orbits to ensure resilience against growing counterspace threats.</p> -<p>潘又指,鄭的立場很大可能與公民黨不同,他供稱黨內權力不平衡、他不能改變黨政策。而公民黨盡力遵守《國安法》,於《國安法》生效前召開會議,並改用「無字政綱」等,鄭作為法律學生,真誠相信《基本法》機制是讓行政與立法會機關互相制衡,若不是本案,原本會坐在其旁邊幫忙處理案件。</p> +<p>Amid future programmatic and budgetary pressures, it may be tempting to consolidate a sensor architecture to a single set of orbits in the low, medium, geosynchronous, or highly elliptical domains. In the past, the DoD has overly consolidated certain capabilities in a single orbital domain, such as GEO. That practice should not be repeated. The DoD’s pivot toward a multi-altitude sensor architecture is an important step in resisting this temptation.</p> -<p>此外,辯方指港島協調文件指每名選民可投4票,與最終共識投1票不同,就提到運用否決權的該文件是否最終協議有疑點,鄭亦沒有收到。</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="john-plumb-assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-space-policy">John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yyIwNwT.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 鄭達鴻</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“What we’re finding is that resilience has no end state.”</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="辯方社民連不同意政治攬炒">辯方:社民連不同意「政治攬炒」</h4> +<p>Orbital diversity has become especially critical in view of the growing counterspace threat. Adversaries recognize the importance of space sensor architectures and are rapidly advancing their counterspace capabilities. In the past five years, they have conducted over 70 counterspace and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon tests, developmental demonstrations, and deployments (Figure 69). They are developing kinetic direct-ascent and co-orbital ASAT weapons, non-kinetic dazzlers, jammers, and cyberweapons, and have magnified natural threats to satellites, generating space debris through weapons testing. The increasing complexity of these threatens to outpace the United States’ acquisition of satellite constellations. This should be a central consideration not only in the construction of satellites, but in the design of an architecture.</p> -<p>至於梁國雄,潘指控方證據非常薄弱,當中以社民連6月的〈社會民主連線回應當前香港政治形勢變化的決議文〉指控他會無差別否決預算案,潘指文章表明不同意「政治攬炒」,反而是利用「具有憲制認許,合法合憲的權力機構」的「全面否決權」發揮制衡,亦表明只是否決「惡法和不義撥款」,非無差別否決。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EabU1NB.png" alt="image72" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 69: Counterspace Developments, Tests, and Deployments, 2006–2022.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from Aerospace Security Project.</em></p> -<h4 id="辯方梁國雄因無全民退保否決與他人無協議">辯方:梁國雄因無全民退保否決、與他人無協議</h4> +<p>Different orbital regimes are vulnerable to different threat profiles. The LEO environment is easier to threaten but also easier to proliferate and reconstitute. MEO offers coverage and distance but with harsh radiation environments and challenging unit economics. GEO, meanwhile, is increasingly populated with adversary co-orbital capabilities but benefit from both distance and potential defensive capabilities — making them far from “juicy targets.” HEO regimes incorporate few assets but can be challenging to covertly engage with co-orbital weapons. No specific constellation design represents an ideal survivability profile.</p> -<p>法官李運騰問到,梁國雄曾在選舉論壇提及沒有簽署「墨落無悔」,因「睇到佢係重複返35+嗰個初衷嘅啫」,又指自己做多年議員「年年都」否決,似乎梁明知否決預算案是「35+」的初衷仍參與。潘熙強調應審視所有證據、不能斷章取義,梁並無簽署「墨落」。</p> +<p>A survivable constellation should therefore seek to multiply adversary dilemmas, forcing them to attack multiple orbital layers with multiple, costly means of attack. Assuring coverage will demand the use of air and space assets, the reconstitution of constellations under attack, and carefully planned defensive operations (Figure 70). It should leverage multiple approaches to resilience (Table 4). It is not merely a matter of proliferating sensors, but of doing so in ways that introduce additional targeting challenges.</p> -<p>法官陳慶偉亦指梁以往都否決,不代表他在2020年這樣做就是正確。潘熙同意,但強調梁並非無差別否決作「攬炒」,只因沒有全民退保的民生議題而否決,同意法官李運騰指,即使其行為與其他人相似,但他否決是另有原因,與其他人沒有協議,也沒意圖顛覆。法官陳慶偉一度問,既然如此,那梁為何參與初選?又指戴耀廷在初選文件列明要認同五大訴求才能參選。潘重申,沒有證據梁為何參與初選,而參選亦不代表會否決預算案。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Rl7Bxjk.png" alt="image73" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: Approaches to Resilience.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from the Department of Defense.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Soo0PGw.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 梁國雄</p> +<p>Different orbits are suited to different resilience pathways. Constellations optimized for smaller numbers of assets — in GEO, for instance — benefit from resilience approaches that protect individual assets: advanced radiation hardening and error-correcting circuitry; larger fuel loads or refueling systems to perform evasive maneuvers; and signature reduction, chaff, and decoy systems. While some protection methods, such as the deployment of defensive “bodyguard” satellites, are costly, they can introduce novel operational considerations for an adversary. But it is unaffordable to ensure a resilient architecture through asset-level protection alone.</p> -<h4 id="劉偉聰及施德來無口頭補充">劉偉聰及施德來無口頭補充</h4> +<p>These approaches should be combined with constellations that leverage different resilience philosophies. Several proposed LEO constellations leverage proliferation to ensure survivability.</p> -<p>自行代表的大律師劉偉聰及代表施德來的大律師黃廷光,均表示會採納書面陳詞,沒有口頭補充。至於代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel,表示會同時回應事實和法律爭議,法官陳慶偉指 Beel 昨申請押後處理法律陳詞,問他會否想留待最後進行,Beel 同意。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/si6JWLH.png" alt="image74" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 70: Mission Assurance Contributors.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project with data from the Department of Defense.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CKG03fr.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel</p> +<p>Dramatic drops in the cost of space launch have made it feasible to rapidly proliferate and reconstitute satellites — and to do so more cheaply than they can be shot down.</p> -<h4 id="辯方違反職責遠不至於非法">辯方:「違反職責」遠不至於「非法」</h4> +<p>Proliferation strategies are attractive for their potential to complicate adversary targeting and introduce new technology increments rapidly. Such satellites could be constructed to minimize unit cost, with lower reliability thresholds, commercial-grade electronics, and shorter orbital lifespans, to be replenished frequently with upgraded systems.</p> -<p>至於代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉,強調控方須就所有控罪詳情舉證,又指難以理解,為何否決預算案導致解散立法會和特首下台這個由《基本法》提供的機制會是「非法」。</p> +<p>Systemic threats, however, challenge efforts to achieve resilience through proliferation. A sustained counterspace campaign would likely generate large quantities of debris in crowded LEO orbits. Nuclear explosions in space could deny large swathes of the LEO environment. Cyberattacks remain an omnipresent area threat, both for proliferated and exquisite architectures. The threat posed by these area effects makes it more urgent to embrace multiple resilience strategies.</p> -<p>針對「非法手段」的爭議,控方昨表示不一定涉刑事罪行,同意只是「違反議員職責(breach of duty)」也可入罪。潘熙表示「非法手段」必然指涉刑事罪行,馬維騉亦舉例,若有大律師完全無視專業守則、無法勝任並破壞行業的名聲,他的確是違反專業守則訂明的職責,但不能說其行為是「非法」;而就法官陳慶偉昨舉例若在民事審訊因其中一方是朋友而裁定他勝訴,其裁決也是非法,馬則指法官的裁決可能是不公或會被推翻,但同樣遠遠不至於「非法」。</p> +<p>Increasing the number of orbital regimes in the sensor architecture can enhance system-level resilience. Leveraging multiple orbital regimes complicates an adversary’s ability to exploit failure modes common to that orbit. LEO constellations benefit from large numbers, but their proximity to Earth makes them vulnerable to aforementioned area threats. MEO, GEO, and HEO constellations, meanwhile, might involve fewer assets with less provision for replenishment but are more difficult to engage with some directed-energy and direct-ascent weapons and potentially more economical to harden.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fxQl2Do.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 陳志全</p> +<p>More critically, a multi-orbit architecture can complicate adversary mission planning. Adversaries facing such an architecture would encounter challenges in synchronizing attacks. A direct-ascent or co-orbital attack on MEO or GEO assets may take substantially longer to execute compared to attacks on LEO. If attacks were launched simultaneously, the earlier disruption to LEO layers would give warning time for MEO and higher satellites to employ defensive maneuvers or other measures. If attacks were phased to strike multiple orbits at once, the long transit time of co-orbital weapons or missiles in GEO or HEO would offer warning time for defensive measures in MEO or LEO. A diverse architecture both creates targeting dilemmas and complicates tactical surprise.</p> -<h4 id="辯方法律無明文規定不可不按議案優劣否決控方須另證顛覆意圖">辯方:法律無明文規定不可不按議案優劣否決、控方須另證顛覆意圖</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="michael-griffin-under-secretary-of-defense-for-research-and-engineering-2018">Michael Griffin, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 2018</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>法官陳仲衡指,但本案關乎沒有履行《基本法》下的議員職責。馬同意,但指刑事法律的基本原則,是除非法律禁止,否則個人可以做任何事情。而法律上列明議員職責,但沒有明文規定議員不可以不根據議案優劣來否決任何議案,強調控方所指違反《基本法》下的議員職責本身並不能構成非法手段(“A breach of duty cannot per se amount to unlawful means.”)。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“I don’t want to be in any one orbit. . . . I want us to be as widely distributed over as many choices of orbital regimes as we can effectively use, because I want to pose the adversary such a difficult problem that they’ll choose not to fight it.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>馬亦指,控方指被告無差別否決預算案構成顛覆的說法,不可能正確,強調除了證明被告意圖無差別否決預算案,控方亦須另外證明被告意圖顛覆國家政權,否則就會是「循環論證」。馬最後指,陳曾任認真盡責的議員8年,望法庭考慮他有良好品格,其證供有可信性。</p> +<p>The future sensor architecture cannot be a monoculture. Wartime scenarios are likely to include targeted attacks on individual satellites and area threats that threaten many. An architecture reliant on a single orbit and optimized for a single resilience philosophy will be simpler for adversaries to counter than a multi-layer approach, which presents dramatically different vulnerabilities. The increasing importance of space sensing makes it imperative to avoid so-called “common mode failures.” A future missile tracking constellation cannot only be proliferated, it must leverage a diversity of sensors to complicate adversary targeting.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SSXCQXF.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 代表陳志全的大律師 馬維騉(右)</p> +<h3 id="staying-on-track">Staying on Track</h3> -<h4 id="辯方墨落無悔非協議僅表達對戴耀廷失望">辯方:「墨落無悔」非協議、僅表達對戴耀廷失望</h4> +<p>Missiles are no longer niche weapons, they are weapons of choice. They have become “foundational to our adversaries’ way of war, and missile defense has become foundational to integrated deterrence and the defense of the nation.” The creation of a new elevated sensor architecture will be similarly foundational to the future missile defense enterprise.</p> -<p>代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑則表示,不同人就否決有不同看法和願景,無證據顯示就否決有達成廣泛共識。法官李運騰指,但鄒家成作為「墨落無悔」發起人,至少與其他兩名發起人有協議,陳世傑回應即使3人就否決有協議,也並非本案所指的串謀協議,亦無證據顯示他同意「無差別」否決。</p> +<p>Over the last 40 years, seven successive presidential administrations have expressed support, at least on paper, for fielding a space sensor layer capable of providing not just missile warning but also high-quality tracking capabilities necessary to support the missile defense mission. To date, none has yet done so.</p> -<p>陳又指,「墨落無悔」只是被告表達對戴耀廷毋須簽署協議的失望與情緒(frustration and sentiment),簽署者只是抱有相同情感,但並非達成協議;而聲明只是呼籲不要投沒有抗爭意志的參選人,當中提到否決預算案但沒有提及「無差別」否決。</p> +<p>That is now beginning to change. Substantial strides have been made toward a robust space sensing capability. That past vision has never been closer to realization than it is today. Breakthroughs in space launch, networking, and sensing technologies have created opportunities for realizing a robust elevated sensor architecture. Substantial institutional attention is now being paid across the U.S. national security enterprise, with significant investments to match. Recent emphasis on acquiring proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO) constellations was a good start, but contending with near peers will require much more. As emphasized by Assistant Secretary of Defense John Plumb, “Resilience is kind of a never-ending quest.” To achieve robust capability and mission assurance, the future sensor architecture must orbit in multiple altitudes and domains, prioritize designs that deploy sooner, and provide denser coverage of latitudes for the Indo-Pacific region.</p> -<h4 id="辯方鄒家成從無主張推翻中國政府僅想利用立法會改善制度">辯方:鄒家成從無主張推翻中國政府、僅想利用立法會改善制度</h4> +<p>The necessary policy, programs, and institutions are in place. What is needed now is the oversight, resourcing, and systems engineering authority to make the future architecture resilient, timely, and capable. To be resilient, the future architecture must be orbitally diverse. To be timely, it must deploy capability with an eye to graceful deployment and to prioritizing lower-latitude coverage. Finally, it must deliver the quality of data necessary for missile defense — fire control-quality tracking.</p> -<p>陳續指,區諾軒稱35+的初心是為取得立會過半,獲取更大的議價能力,這亦是各被告認知和參與初選的原因,惟戴耀廷卻試將其看法加諸其他人身上不果。而鄒家成從沒表示有意圖推翻中國政府,其主要關注只是推動本土主義和香港人優先,特首下台和癱瘓立法會也對他沒有意義,因特首永遠都可有替代人選,而鄒是想利用立法會來改變腐敗不公的制度,想作出「改善」。</p> +<p>This long-awaited elevated sensor architecture will be achieved. When it is, its uses will extend well beyond missile warning, missile defense, and missile defeat. Indications, warnings, and attributions from these assets will bring clarity to decisionmakers in crisis situations and better inform and protect servicemembers in the field. Just as the Global Positioning System (GPS) has had countless commercial applications and the Defense Support Program missile warning constellations have benefited wildfire detection, new missions and use cases will emerge for these elevated sensors as well.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZUByqss.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 代表鄒家成的大律師 陳世傑</p> +<p>The implications of space becoming a warfighting domain will not be fully understood for some time. It is, however, already clear that elevated sensing is critical for air and missile defense. As the number of exotic space threats continues to multiply, there is a risk of neglecting the seemingly pedestrian air and missile threats below. As tempting as it may be to deprioritize the missile defense mission, the requirement for fire control-quality tracking must not be abdicated. It must stay on track.</p> -<h4 id="辯方控方就非法手段詮釋欠案例支持僅搬出國安法此尚方寶劍">辯方:控方就「非法手段」詮釋欠案例支持、僅搬出《國安法》此「尚方寶劍」</h4> +<h3 id="appendix">Appendix</h3> -<p>就法律爭議,陳指「非法手段」應指涉刑事罪行,並形容控方就「非法手段」的定義無邊無際(no boundary),不限於刑事罪行、不止於民事過失,幾乎任何事情都可以是「非法」。陳反問,就控方主張只是濫用議員職權就屬「非法」,「我們有案例和法例支持嗎?沒有」,「控方只是聲稱因為我們在處理《國安法》案件,這是《國安法》,這是尚方寶劍,所以法庭要這樣解讀。」</p> +<p>This report used Systems Toolkit (STK), SMARTSet, and other simulation and visualization tools to inform its analysis. The modeling performed is notional and intended to illustrate concepts and tradeoffs involved with sensor architecture design. To better highlight these, the team constrained the parameters being investigated in its analysis. The design of an operational architecture would involve higher-fidelity modeling for cost, maintenance interval, solar activity, hardening, launch schedules and missile design, conjunction, link budgets, and many other parameters. In brief, these models are demonstrative, not prescriptive. They are not reference architectures but exhibits for the design tradeoffs involved.</p> -<p>陳又引終審法院就呂世瑜案的判詞,指對《國安法》的理解要與本地法律並行(in tandem with),故即使是國安案件,也不代表不應考慮海外案例。陳總結,認為被告沒有協議、沒有意圖顛覆、控方亦無法證明被告無差別否決。</p> +<h4 id="sensor-level-analysis">Sensor-Level Analysis</h4> -<h4 id="辯方柯耀林參選為試水溫非無差別否決">辯方:柯耀林參選為「試水溫」非無差別否決</h4> +<p>The research team performed infrared sensor and signature analysis using STK’s Electro-optical Infrared (EOIR) module. Infrared background data was imported from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) gridded data sets and processed with Python and NASA Panoply software. The team modeled a notional hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) (Figure 4) with Autodesk Fusion 360 and applied temperature maps to vehicle surfaces in Blender, using open-source surface temperature estimates. These assets were then placed into the STK simulation environment (Figure 4).</p> -<p>代表柯耀林的大律師葉海琅表示,針對柯的證據非常薄弱,其選舉經理供稱他參加初選只是為了「試水溫」,以測試有否足夠支持度參與正式立法會選舉,而非要無差別否決預算案。法官陳仲衡問,柯在法庭外向其選舉經理作出的陳述(out-of-court statement)有何證據價值,葉指選舉經理與柯一起進行競選工程,有身位解釋柯參選原因。</p> +<p>Tracking hypersonic signatures is challenging because hypersonic weapons are not often the brightest objects in the scene. These weapons often appear as a single, slightly brighter pixel in a 4,000-by-4,000 pixel, wide-field-of-view (WFOV) image; while detectable by machine, these raw images are difficult to interpret with the naked eye. The infrared images furnished in this report are specifically scoped and processed to make these challenges visible.</p> -<p>葉續指,柯的政綱無提及否決預算案,集中民生議題,而他是區政聯盟區議員,其支持是靠社區議題而非激進政治理念,他提出的教育和經濟等政綱亦需政府預算案支持。葉又指,就其參選宣言提到「暴政不斷利用惡法」等,均是「政治修辭」,形容當時香港的政治氣氛下有大規模反政府示威,作為泛民「起碼要以某種形式」顯示對政府的反對,但不能證明柯有串謀無差別否決。</p> +<p>Figure 10 illustrates challenges associated with isolating hypersonic signatures from background clutter. The series of images are derived from STK’s EOIR simulation suite and picture an HGV as seen from a low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite orbiting at 1000 km. The raw image (left) represents a “crop” of a potential WFOV sensor, with a resolution of 256-by-256 pixels and a per-pixel FOV of 450 microradians. The simulated sensor operates in the mid-wave infrared (MWIR) band, with a wavelength of between 3.5 and 5 microns. The band selected is illustrative; various bands in the short- and mid-wave regions present different advantages. Radiometric features, including noise equivalent irradiance, were minimized to the degree the HGV could be distinguished.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9O7dmOp.png" alt="image08" /> -▲ 柯耀林</p> +<p>The first image depicts the raw output of this sensor. Unlike with bright plumes in the boost phase, the pixel containing the hypersonic weapon is dim — it is not among the brightest in the scene and cannot be distinguished with the naked eye. The brightness difference caused by the hypersonic weapon cannot easily be resolved by observing a single frame.</p> -<h4 id="辯方柯耀林簽墨落受政治環境所迫">辯方:柯耀林簽「墨落」受政治環境所迫</h4> +<p>Visualizing the signature instead requires analysis of several frames with the hypersonic weapon in motion. By estimating the movement of each pixel across the frame, it is possible to filter the hypersonic weapon’s motion from other objects in the scene. The second image depicts the motion vectors of each pixel over 20 successive image frames, processed with the OpenCV library’s Farneback optical flow algorithm. The false-color image encodes the optical flow vector of each pixel with a separate color, depicting a color variation for the pixel containing the moving hypersonic weapon. The third image displays an enlarged version of this false-color image, with contrast adjustments applied to make the HGV pixel more visible.</p> -<p>至於柯簽署「墨落無悔」,葉指其 WhatsApp 紀錄顯示他簽署並非因他同意當中內容,只因其他候選人已簽署,他不想顯得保守,是受政治環境所迫、以免落後於對手,強調不能以此證明他參與串謀。法官陳慶偉一度問,柯是否向選民作出虛假陳述、是說出「半真半假的話(half-truth)」?葉重申他正進行競選,最重要是就柯參與初選目的有疑點。</p> +<p>The resultant images are illustrative and do not depict operationally sensitive features of hypersonic tracking systems. An operational system would offer substantially greater performance headroom. Moreover, atmospheric conditions can substantially change the signature of a vehicle; these were left to the standard atmospheric and cloud models included with STK EOIR. Finally, the simulations did not use high-fidelity maps of the hypersonic vehicle’s surface temperatures. A real hypersonic weapon would have significant temperature gradients across its surface and generate a wake of superheated gas and plasma with unique infrared emissivity characteristics. A weapons engineering process would include these detailed parameters, but these are not necessary to illustrate the principles discussed.</p> -<p>柯耀林一方陳詞完畢,尚餘代表李予信的大律師關文渭及代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel。關文渭指需時準備回應控方法律爭議的聯合陳詞,望申請於周一前呈交,周二開庭處理。陳慶偉拒絕,指示於周一呈交及開庭處理,Beel 同日亦會進行陳詞。案件周一(12月4日)續審。</p> +<p>Figure 7 illustrates the thermal gradient on a hypersonic weapon’s surface. To make these characteristics visible to the reader, the HGV was imaged from an uncrewed aerial system (UAS) placed approximately 80 km away with a 256-pixel focal plane array (FPA), 35 cm aperture, and a tight, 0.01-degree total FOV. This is not representative of an operational system but best illustrates the concept being discussed.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9yogwm9.png" alt="image09" /> -▲ 李予信</p> +<p>Similarly, Figure 25 is constructed to illustrate the effects of motion blur and sensor jitter. The sensor FPA is 256 pixels, with an 0.001-degree FOV, placing the HGV signature in the center of the image. The FPA has an integration time of 10 milliseconds and the final image includes this signature with an added 0.005mrad jitter. Figure 24 uses apertures of various sizes from geosynchronous orbits to illustrate how aperture affects sensor resolution. Again, sensor resolution and immediate field of view (IFOV) are left to generic parameters intended to highlight the impact of aperture size. The largest aperture is set to an arbitrarily large diameter of 10 m, while the two successive apertures, 60 cm and 30 cm, show the progression in resolution with smaller, more realistic diameters.</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="constellation-level-analysis">Constellation-Level Analysis</h4> -<p>案件編號:HCCC69/2022</p>獨媒報導辯方質疑控方詮釋「非法手段」無邊無際 僅搬《國安法》「尚方寶劍」【初選47人案・審訊第 116 日】2023-11-29T12:00:00+08:002023-11-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-116<ul> - <li>控方結案陳詞指濫用議員職權亦屬「非法手段」 官料3至4個月後裁決</li> - <li>辯方指被告僅追求《基本法》所承諾雙普選、望政權問責 不應構成顛覆</li> -</ul> +<p>The research team also used STK to assess satellite constellation design tradeoffs. Constellation designs illustrated in the report were similarly selected to highlight design principles — inclination, orbital altitude, sensor FOV, and orbital configurations — and their impact on sensor coverage. Specifically, the report displays constellation designs evaluated for their two-satellite (stereo) coverage, which is necessary for missile tracking and fire control.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Several visualizations directly depict real-life constellation designs. Figure 38 leverages data from the Space Force’s catalog of tracked space objects to define the orbits of Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites. The coverage figures depict the maximum coverage footprints possible from each satellite. The latest and final SBIRS satellite, SBIRS GEO-6, was not included in this visualization. Similarly, Figures 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 depict the Tranche 0, 1, and 2 constellation designs being contemplated.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nOpzexw.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>Other visualizations contain notional constellation designs produced through optimization studies. The project team leveraged various approaches to find configurations that minimized the number of satellites needed for stereo coverage of a given area. These studies also produced configurations of near-minimum constellation designs inspired by numbers publicly given for forthcoming constellations (Figure 27) (Tracking Layer, RMW/MT-MEO).</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(29日)踏入審訊第116天,控辯雙方進行口頭結案陳詞。控方就法律爭議陳詞,就被告被控串謀以「威脅使用武力或其他非法手段」顛覆國家政權,控方認為《國安法》原意為防範任何危害國安的行為,「其他非法手段」不限與武力相關、亦不一定涉刑事罪行,被告無差別否決預算案,濫用《基本法》下的議員職權亦屬「非法」;又指今時今日對抗政權無需「暴力革命」,散播謠言也能危害國安,若狹窄詮釋控罪定義會違立法原意。控方亦認為毋須證明被告知道其行為是非法也可入罪。法官陳慶偉預料本案會在3至4個月後裁決。</p> +<p>These optimization studies draw from the considerable literature written on the subject. Many of the configurations investigated in these studies were Walker or modified Walker configurations with different parameters on inter-plane spacing. Walker constellations are a family of constellation designs that distribute satellites in equally spaced, equally inclined circular orbits. Such a design is attractive to mission designers because of the stability of their geometry: the forces that perturb satellite orbits (such as those associated with atmospheric drag, the non-uniform nature of Earth’s gravitational field, and the Sun and Moon’s gravity, among others) affect all satellites in the constellation approximately equally. This symmetric design allows satellite operators to plan similar station-keeping maneuvers for all satellites in the system, giving them approximately equal operational lifetimes. Walker configurations are common among operational position, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellite constellations, such as the European Space Agency’s Galileo satellite system. Other satellite constellations, such as the U.S. Space Force’s Global Positioning System (GPS) or Iridium Communication’s constellation, use adaptations of the Walker constellation design.</p> -<h4 id="事隔3個月開庭-旁聽親友向被告揮手">事隔3個月開庭 旁聽親友向被告揮手</h4> +<p>Walker constellations can be described by six parameters: semi-major axis, the number of orbital planes, the number of satellites per plane, the relative phasing between satellites in adjacent planes, the spacing between planes, and the planes’ inclination. For circular orbits — which have an eccentricity of zero — the constellation can also be described by the orbiting altitudes of its satellites, which stays constant over the course of the satellites’ orbital period. The coverage of such a constellation is also affected by a seventh, eighth, and ninth parameter: the field of regard (FOR) of the sensor on board, requirements for stereo or greater coverage, and solar exclusion, which defines angles where a sensor’s view is degraded by the light of the Sun in the background.</p> -<p>今天是初選案事隔3個月後再開庭,法院外有約10名軍裝警和傳媒聯絡隊戒備,「王婆婆」王鳳瑤則揮動英國旗,及舉起「Free 47 Free all 立即釋放所有政治犯」的紙牌。</p> +<p>These parameters must be tuned to minimize the number of satellites needed for persistent stereo coverage: coverage by two or more satellites at once, at every point in time, in the relevant region of analysis. The study team primarily analyzed coverage of a global region and a smaller, Indo-Pacific-focused region between 15 degrees South and 55 degrees North latitude (Figure 66). To preserve the generalizability of the study, these analyses assumed a maximum possible FOR for each satellite constellation; higher-fidelity details of detection and characterization challenges are not addressed; and the results presented in the following two sections correspond only to line-of-sight coverage analysis.</p> -<p>還柙被告步入法庭時,旁聽親友向他們揮手,有人向身穿深啡長褸、樽領灰色毛衣的鄒家成說:「靚仔咗喎!」,鄒露齒微笑,吳政亨亦與旁聽席打手勢溝通。有份代表認罪被告的資深大律師李志喜和大律師吳靄儀亦坐在延伸庭律師席。</p> +<p>To evaluate possible designs, the research team leveraged STK’s Analyzer module to test millions of possible configurations for coverage. This analysis began with the construction of simplified, non-representative designs for every orbital altitude to exemplify the altitude trades at play (Figure 34).</p> -<h4 id="辯方其他非法手段應與武力相關-控方不必然涉武力">辯方:「其他非法手段」應與武力相關 控方:不必然涉武力</h4> +<p>To construct this relationship, the study team used STK Analyzer’s Design of Experiments (DOE) tool to explore an entire swath of design possibilities. The model was simplified to assess simplified stereo coverage to minimize the computation time needed, with no constraints on solar exclusion. More detailed assessments, including constraints on sensor FOR, solar exclusion, and other factors, were performed for the other constellations visualized in this study.</p> -<p>控辯雙方早前提交結案陳詞,部分被告亦就法律觀點作聯合陳詞,控方今就法律陳詞作出回應,而辯方獲准於下周一(12月4日)前提交書面陳詞回應。</p> +<p>The DOE tool parametrically defines a series of Walker Delta constellations by systematically combining ranges of orbital altitudes, numbers of orbital planes, numbers of satellites per plane, and inclinations, evaluating their suitability for stereo coverage using user-determined “Coverage Definitions” and “Figures of Merit.” This study relied on a global coverage definition consisting of a grid of points, spaced by six degrees, positioned 20 km above the Earth’s surface. Under these definitions, coverage can be evaluated at each of the points in the coverage grid, which are separated from one another by six degrees in both latitude and longitude space.</p> -<p>《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權罪,列明任何人組織、策劃、實施或參與實施「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段(other unlawful means)」,旨在顛覆國家政權行為即屬犯罪。辯方爭議「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」一句應以「同類原則(ejusdem generis)」詮釋,由於前句為「武力、威脅使用武力」,故「其他非法手段」應只指涉與武力相關的手段。副刑事檢控專員萬德豪反駁,詮釋條文時應全面考慮立法脈絡和目的,而《國安法》目的為防範、制止和懲治任何危害國安的行為和活動,以有效維護國家安全,當中無限於武力手段。</p> +<p>These studies defined successful stereo coverage by constellations’ ability to minimize average stereo coverage gap time to zero. That is, the number of seconds over a one-day study period — during which any point in the coverage region is observed by fewer than two satellites in the constellation — cannot be greater than zero. When satellite constellations achieve continuous stereo coverage for a particular region, this figure of merit requirement is satisfied.</p> -<p>對辯方比較分裂國家罪及顛覆國家政權罪條文用字,前者提到「不論是否使用武力或者以武力相威脅,即屬犯罪」,認為前者才指明非武力手段,後者並沒有。萬德豪反駁兩者寫法不同,指顛覆政權條文中「武力、威脅使用武力」為一個類別,「其他非法手段」則為另一個類別,前者與武力有關,後者則為武力以外的其他非法手段,立法者使用此較概括(general)的字眼,是為了更有效維護國家安全。法官李運騰問,控方立場是辯方詮釋不合理,因會收窄條文用途,有違《國安法》立法原意?萬德豪同意。</p> +<p>For each orbital altitude between 500 and 36,000 km, the team evaluated hundreds of thousands of permutations of Walker Delta constellations. Although many different constellation architectures satisfied the figure of merit requirement — as many overpopulated satellite constellations offer much denser coverage than what is required — only two constellations per altitude met this study’s definition for optimality: one that offers continuous stereo coverage while minimizing the total number of satellites in the system, and one that offers continuous stereo coverage while minimizing the total number of orbital planes in the system.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UYrWxdG.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 副刑事檢控專員 萬德豪</p> +<p><img src="" alt="image75" />https://i.imgur.com/ZzOuARE.png +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 71: Solar Exclusion.</strong> As with handheld cameras, a space-based infrared camera angled close enough to the sun will encounter washout and flaring effects. This can inhibit the detection of dim targets. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<h4 id="控方對抗政府無需暴力散播謠言也可危害國安">控方:對抗政府無需暴力、散播謠言也可危害國安</h4> +<p>Optimal constellations were identified algorithmically by first sorting the list of Walker Delta constellation permutations for each altitude by average stereo coverage gap times and removing those with non-zero times. This step eliminates those constellation architectures that fail to satisfy the figure of merit requirement. Next, the minimum total number of satellites and minimum total number of orbital planes of the remaining constellation architectures should be identified and noted. To identify the optimal constellation — minimizing the total number of satellites — the architectures with more than the minimum total number of satellites should be removed.</p> -<p>李運騰續指,留意到顛覆罪條文主要針對政治制度及政府履行職能,而恐怖活動罪則針對公眾安全及財產,並指理解要破壞後者必然涉及暴力,但破壞前者是否未必涉及暴力?萬德豪同意,指顛覆罪條文旨在保障政治制度和政府機關,若將破壞相關制度的手段限制為武力是不合理;又指以往一般認為需以「暴力革命」對抗政權,但在21世紀的今天,環境完全不同,要對抗政權不一定需要暴力,而社交媒體令資訊傳播變得容易和方便,人們可利用這些渠道達到危害國家安全的目的,散播謠言也能對政權和政府架構造成影響,狹窄詮釋條文是不正確和不恰當。</p> +<p>In many cases, there is more than one constellation architecture in the filtered list that offers the minimum total number of satellites. To select a singular, unique architecture, the list was filtered to include only those architectures that also use the minimum number of orbital planes. This is because multiple launches are generally needed to populate multiple orbital planes. All else being equal, a constellation of many planes with fewer satellites per plane is more costly than a constellation of fewer planes with more satellites in each.</p> -<h4 id="控方非法手段不限於刑事罪行-被告違議員職責亦屬非法">控方:「非法手段」不限於刑事罪行 被告違議員職責亦屬非法</h4> +<p>Where needed, the list of remaining constellation architectures was sorted by inclination, and the design with the lowest inclination was labeled as most optimal, as less-inclined orbits generally correspond to lower launch costs. The process for identifying constellations that minimized the number of orbital planes is similar to the process described for minimizing the total number of satellites, but the list of architectures that satisfy the figure of merit requirement should first be filtered to only include those with the minimum number of orbital planes, then again filtered to only include those with the minimum number of total satellites — a reversal of the previously described order of operations.</p> -<p>至於辯方爭議「非法手段」須限於「刑事罪行」(criminal offence),控方不同意,指根據字典,「非法」不止限於「干犯刑事罪行」,又指《國安法》理應是有力有效的法律,若條文難以執行、須先證被告干犯刑事罪行,「製作這樣的法律有什麼意義?」法官李運騰指,辯方或反駁此為顯示罪行的嚴重性,因可囚終身,萬德豪重申考慮立法目的,條文字眼應採用較闊而非較窄的理解。</p> +<p>The resultant constellation configurations, and the total numbers of satellites they represent, were graphed using the Python Plotly library. The resultant figure (Figure 34) illustrates the results of this optimization study conducted for every altitude between 500 and 36,000 km at 50 km increments. The study team applied a minor smoothing function to interpolate between these increments and highlight the underlying relationship between altitude and the number of satellites required for coverage.</p> -<p>萬德豪續指,「非法」可分為兩個層面,首先就刑事罪行層面,本案被告宣誓擁護《基本法》及效忠香港特區,但最終串謀無差別否決預算案,便可能干犯發假誓或串謀公職人員行為失當;而若法庭不接納,控方亦認為應考慮被告對《基本法》的「態度」,指被告濫用議員職權也屬「非法」,因他們沒有擁護《基本法》及效忠特區,違反(breach)《基本法》下的議員職責及《基本法》的核心原則。</p> +<p>An operational constellation configuration, however, must account for more detailed constraints on performance. Each satellite in a constellation can be assumed to encounter some time where their sensors may be unavailable, either during calibration or during periods where the Sun is sufficiently close to the sensor background (solar exclusion) (Figure 71). These can considerably increase the number of satellites required to develop a constellation design.</p> -<p>法官陳慶偉一度問,若在一宗民事訴訟中理應由原告勝出,但法官因與被告相熟而判他勝訴,那其動機是否濫用職權,令其判決非法?萬德豪同意。</p> +<p>As such, reference constellations, including Figures 16, 17, 27, 28, 35, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 52, 53, and 54, are optimized with constraints on solar exclusion. The total FOR of each sensor was modeled to provide the maximum footprint attainable. LEO reference constellations, all modeled at 1,000 km altitude, were conservatively modeled with a 30-degree solar exclusion parameter. MEO constellations, at 7,000 and 10,000 km altitudes, were modeled with a 16-degree solar exclusion parameter. This adds a 30-degree angle outside the sensor FOR where the presence of the Sun would inhibit sensor function. These figures are intentionally arbitrary and not reflective of operational systems.</p> -<p>而就辯方援引海外案例指被告是運用憲制權力否決預算案,萬德豪指該案例亦強調議員並非橡皮圖章,投票前須審視議案,與本案的無差別否決不同。法官李運騰則指,其他地區是主權國家,與香港情況很不同,在其他地方合法的事情在香港未必合法,不能直接套用香港。</p> +<p>The larger number of parameters required different approaches for discovering optimal designs. Testing every possible configuration, as with the DOE studies informing Figure 34, required over 800,000 simulation runs to analyze. To discover designs for reference constellations, the research team leveraged STK Analyzer’s built-in genetic optimization suite to find minimum possible designs. The use of the NGSA-II optimization algorithm reflects common practice in other constellation optimization studies. Using NGSA-II, STK Analyzer could automatically explore and test possible combinations of inclination, planes, satellites per plane, and other parameters, measuring their resultant impacts on coverage. This approach minimized the number of simulation runs needed to discover the frontier of possible optimal configurations. Of these, the study team manually selected configurations that minimized the number of orbital planes necessary.</p> -<h4 id="控方毋須證被告知道行為犯法亦可入罪">控方:毋須證被告知道行為犯法亦可入罪</h4> +<p>This series of more detailed optimization studies formed the basis for several of the satellite configurations and mixes presented. The LEO orbital plane included in Figures 46, 51, 52, 53, and 54 represent the results of optimization studies performed for smaller coverage regions, of both the polar region above 55 degrees latitude and a regional, Indo-Pacific-focused band between -15 and 55 degrees latitude. Other configurations, such as Figure 28, demonstrate the significantly larger numbers of satellites needed when the per-satellite FOR is reduced. Combinations of “optimal” coverage layers were then devised from the basis of these studies. While these configurations do not represent the optimal configuration of an operational architecture, they demonstrate constellation designs that could reasonably exemplify the orbital tradeoffs at hand.</p> -<p>最後就辯方爭議,控方須證明被告犯案時知道所作行為是非法,而被告相信其行為不違法可構成合理辯解。控方回應,「非法」一詞並不涉任何精神意念元素(mental elements),只是用來形容被告的「犯罪行為(actus reus)」而非「犯罪意圖(mens rea)」,因此「無論被告是否相信其行為是合法,也沒有關係」。</p> +<hr /> -<p>法官李運騰指,本案並非「嚴格法律責任」(strict liability)的罪行(即沒有犯罪意圖也可入罪),控方須證被告有意圖顛覆國家政權。控方同意,但舉例就誤殺罪,終院亦裁定被告是否知道所作行為是非法並不重要,認為相同邏輯可應用在本案。</p> +<p><strong>Masao Dahlgren</strong> is a fellow with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he writes on missile defense, space, and emerging technologies issues.</p> -<h4 id="控方有足夠證據吳政亨與各被告涉同一串謀">控方:有足夠證據吳政亨與各被告涉同一串謀</h4> +<p><strong>Tom Karako</strong> is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, where he arrived in 2014. His research focuses on national security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and public law.</p>Masao DahlgrenThe conflict in Ukraine has made it clear that missiles “are foundational to adversaries’ way of war.” Future missile threats, however, increasingly stress existing missile defenses, flying lower, faster, and on unpredictable trajectories. Most importantly, they are difficult to detect — defeating them will require elevated sensors, on aircraft or satellites, to track them at range.Profiting From Proliferation?2023-12-15T12:00:00+08:002023-12-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/profiting-from-proliferation<p><em>This paper examines North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, based on a review of Pyongyang’s recent technological advancements and developments in North Korea’s customer base. The authors assess the likelihood of North Korea selling its missile and nuclear technology onwards, and the kinds of technology that may be for sale and to whom.</em></p> -<p>李運騰續提及,發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨一方主張,就算吳與戴耀廷有協議,也並非本案指控的協議,又指除了戴耀廷外,其他被告均不認識吳政亨,即使區諾軒和趙家賢亦不認為他是計劃一分子。萬德豪指共謀者不一定要互相認識,強調有足夠證據推論吳政亨與所有其他被告涉同一串謀。</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="官料約3至4個月後裁決">官料約3至4個月後裁決</h4> +<p>The September 2023 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un raised concerns over the possibility that Pyongyang may supply Moscow with arms to support its war of aggression in Ukraine. Subsequent reports of North Korean transfers of ammunition to Russia and unconfirmed intelligence of suspected ballistic missiles transfers solidified those concerns. While the fact of Russia – host to one of the world’s most capable military–industrial complexes – turning to North Korea for arms was shocking, it did not come as a surprise to those familiar with the latter’s long history of arms trading and missile proliferation activities.</p> -<p>控方陳詞完畢,就案情的陳詞則依賴書面陳詞。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 其後申請押後至周五就法律觀點回應,但法官陳慶偉認為沒有需要,指可先聽取就事實方面的陳詞;又指法官李運騰將處理另一宗案件(《蘋果日報》案12月18日開審,料審期83天),而他和法官陳仲衡於2024年亦有其他案件要處理。Beel 問及裁決的大約時間,陳慶偉估計約在3至4個月後。</p> +<p>North Korea has exported missile technology since the 1980s and has, on several occasions, also transferred technology directly relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. Despite the introduction since 2006 of a progressively extensive sanctions regime against North Korea and its proliferation activity by the UN Security Council (UNSC), North Korean exports of missile and nuclear technology have persisted. Considering developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities in recent years, the range of technologies that Pyongyang may be able to offer potential customers has also expanded. These technological advances, combined with the expansion of the UNSC sanctions regime over the past two decades, as well as other recent developments – like North Korea’s apparently expanding military collaboration with Russia, Moscow’s increasing disregard for UN sanctions, and North Korea’s reopening after the Covid-19 pandemic – make a reassessment of North Korea’s missile and nuclear exports timely.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DbDoTF8.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel</p> +<p>This paper builds on existing literature on North Korea’s missile and nuclear proliferation, supplementing it with expert interviews and leveraging the emergence of new information and cases related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities and transfers over the past decade. The authors consider the potential for future missile and nuclear sales by Pyongyang, asking: how likely is North Korea to sell its missile and nuclear technology onwards, what technology may be for sale, and to whom? With a growing technological offering and a continuing need to generate hard currency, incentives for North Korea to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers persist. As well as North Korea’s more novel technologies potentially being for sale, Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses of older technology which it may be looking to sell off.</p> -<p>辯方續進行結案陳詞。</p> +<p>However, despite clear supply-side drivers, there are a range of restraining factors that are likely to prevent an all-out onward proliferation bonanza emanating from North Korea. A variety of factors have whittled down the potential markets for these technologies, while the restrictive sanctions landscape and unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula have also worked to reduce opportunities for sales and increase the risks posed by interdiction. North Korean concerns over the possibility of its more advanced capabilities falling into adversary hands, thus potentially putting its own deterrent at risk, are also likely to temper its willingness to export such capabilities, despite the potentially high price tag that could be attached to them.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kDICuF4.png" alt="image04" /></p> +<p>The changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may, however, open new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea could give other countries the green light to accept North Korean arms, missiles and perhaps even nuclear technology. There remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UNSC sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(29日)踏入審訊第116天,辯方進行結案陳詞。代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘表示,本案要在香港的獨特背景下審視,當中爭取雙普選是《基本法》的莊嚴承諾,而案發時香港已回歸23年,爭取普選之路也已持續23年,「35+計劃」是其中一部分;兩人從無提倡顛覆政府機關和推翻憲制秩序,只是相信香港的制度,尋求向政權問責和追求《基本法》承諾的雙普選,「那不可能是顛覆」、「不應是顛覆」,望法庭判處二人無罪。石亦指,發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨只是熱心協助戴耀廷的「粉絲」,與戴無就初選後行為有協議;而余慧明雖表明有意否決預算案爭取五大訴求,但無與他人協議一起否決。</p> +<p>Building on the analysis of North Korea’s expanded technological offering, reduced customer base and other factors affecting export decisions – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. These recommendations are organised in two categories, which attempt to address the supply side of the problem – deterring, dissuading and encouraging North Korea to refrain from engaging in onward proliferation – as well as demand-side factors – by trying to reduce North Korea’s customer base.</p> -<p>林卓廷和黃碧雲一方則指二人無簽「墨落無悔」,無足夠證據顯示二人同意無差別否決;何啟明一方稱他簽署「墨落」不代表一定會否決;楊雪盈一方亦指她從無表明無差別否決預算案。</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IWZ263q.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 楊雪盈</p> +<p>In September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un travelled by armoured train to Russia’s far east to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kim’s visits to the Vostochny Cosmodrome and a fighter jet factory in Komsomolsk-on-Amur further raised existing concerns that the two countries were seeking to exchange military technology. Indeed, recent research has confirmed that hundreds of shipping containers, likely carrying ammunition, have been moved from North Korea to Russian military bases since the leaders’ meeting. The meeting was preceded two months earlier by the visit of Russian and Chinese delegations to North Korea to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, with officials from Moscow led by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. Russia and North Korea – both countries under extensive international sanctions and with acute military equipment needs – put on a strikingly united front. Notably, Shoigu was treated to a defence exhibition featuring many of North Korea’s newest weapons systems – including UAVs, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and even ICBMs. In November 2023, South Korean intelligence publicly shared its suspicions – otherwise unconfirmed – that North Korea may have already sent SRBMs to Russia.</p> -<h4 id="辯方吳政亨不關心35後的事與戴耀廷無就當選後行為有協議">辯方:吳政亨不關心35+後的事、與戴耀廷無就當選後行為有協議</h4> +<p>Pyongyang has long been an exporter of missile and nuclear technology; this has included exports of Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s, Scud SRBMs to a range of customers (largely in the Middle East) through the 1980s and 1990s, as well as nuclear reactor technology to Syria, and uranium hexafluoride gas to Libya in the early 2000s through the proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan (Boxes 1 and 2 summarise North Korea’s historical trade).</p> -<p>控方今早就法律爭議陳詞完畢,續由辯方陳詞。代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘表示,二人情況較其他被告「獨特(unique)」,發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨沒有參選;余慧明雖參選衞生服務界,但沒有參與任何協調會議。</p> +<p>North Korea’s exhibition of missiles to Shoigu is far from the only indicator that Pyongyang remains open for business to countries looking to procure missile and even nuclear technology. Reporting by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 Committee Panel of Experts (PoE) has noted that Pyongyang has engaged in missile cooperation with Iran and Syria as recently as 2020 and 2019, respectively. A 2020 documentary film of unclear veracity entitled The Mole also showed an actor – playing the part of a private arms dealer – venturing to Pyongyang undercover in 2017 and being offered a wide range of short- and even intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). While most of the handful of known nuclear technology transfers by North Korea date back two decades, the last publicly known case of North Korea offering nuclear-weapons-relevant materials on the open market – in that instance, the isotope lithium-6 – was uncovered just six years ago.</p> -<p>石書銘指,若說吳政亨與戴耀廷有任何協議,只是限於「三投三不投」計劃及就初選投票日提供協助,而非本案指控與其他被告的串謀協議,因二人無討論過初選後的事,及勝選者入立會後會做什麼;又指從吳的受訪錄音及電郵紀錄,他只是關心如何取得35+,不關心取得35+後的事,他亦曾指在「攬炒書」(「墨落無悔」)和初選之間只能擇其一,會寧願「初選成事先」。</p> +<p>North Korea has engaged in these transfers despite an expansive UNSC sanctions regime that prohibits most trade with the country, including a prohibition on trade with the country in missile and nuclear technology, and most types of arms, in place since 2006. Pyongyang’s advancements in its nuclear and missile capabilities have had an impact on what, how and to whom North Korea may sell its nuclear and missile technology in the future. Its experience in identifying customers and engaging in illicit trade under the international sanctions regime over the past two decades will also have influenced its patterns of onward proliferation.</p> -<h4 id="辯方吳政亨僅熱心提供協助的粉絲對否決預算案無立場">辯方:吳政亨僅熱心提供協助的「粉絲」、對否決預算案無立場</h4> +<p>Developments in the international sanctions regime and North Korean missile and nuclear capabilities, as well as changing geopolitical dynamics, necessitate a re-examination of North Korean onward proliferation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has resulted in the widening of existing schisms in the international community, with countries opposing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on one side, and those that have supported Russia or remained ambivalent on the other. Those in the latter camp, which includes North Korea and Iran, appear to have found in Russia a willing trading and diplomatic partner as Moscow seeks to reduce its isolation. This study is thus particularly timely in light of the recent high-level meetings between Pyongyang and Moscow, and the more general apparent expansion of relations between the two countries, as well as other developments – such as the gradual reopening of North Korea’s borders following the Covid-19 pandemic, the expiry in October 2023 of the UN Security Council (UNSC) embargo on trade in nuclear-capable missile technology with Iran, and the expiry of UNSC proliferation-related targeted financial sanctions on Iran.</p> -<p>石書銘強調,若控方案情推到最高,也只能推論吳政亨對戴耀廷辦初選知情、與戴就35+的重要性意見一致,但就如何達成35+、議席分配及有否約束力等,二人沒有協議。石又指,吳與戴的 WhatsApp 對話並沒有提過否決預算案,而吳似是戴的「粉絲」、熱心提供協助,但戴的態度較為冷淡;對控方指二人關係密切,石指吳2016年只是戴耀廷「雷動計劃」的其中一名參與義工,與共謀者相距甚遠,該距離直至本案發生仍未跨越。</p> +<p>The paper builds on existing academic literature, expert analysis and case studies relating to North Korea’s onward proliferation of nuclear and missile technology by considering how what is already known about North Korean transfers of nuclear and missile technology may have been – or may in the future be – impacted by some of the technological, economic and geopolitical developments outlined above and throughout the paper. Based on this analysis, the authors explore developments relevant to already-identified factors, as well as emerging ones, that shape whether Pyongyang may transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and what wares North Korea may transfer, and to which client states.</p> -<p>石強調,吳於本案僅為「輔助」(auxiliary)角色,屬旁觀者,他嘗試呼籲公眾支持初選,但不代表支持否決預算案;又指區諾軒和趙家賢均不認識吳,趙更稱吳的計劃與他和民主動力籌辦的初選無關。石亦重申,吳無論在《國安法》前後均對否決預算案沒有立場,認為首要是爭取35+,細節之後再傾,亦曾提過望「三投三不投」就否決的議題保持中立。</p> +<h4 id="existing-literature">Existing Literature</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/i02Gi9z.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 吳政亨</p> +<p>While some previous work has considered North Korea’s onward proliferation, the literature is limited and much of it is more than a decade old. Much of the existing literature on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes has focused on developments in its nuclear and missile capabilities, Pyongyang’s revenue-raising efforts under sanctions, and its procurement of WMD and military technologies. More broadly, discussion of the threat posed by North Korea’s weapons programmes has focused on denuclearisation and (more recently) deterrence, rather than on the threat posed by onward proliferation.</p> -<h4 id="辯方余慧明無與他人協議否決預算案與政府有談判空間">辯方:余慧明無與他人協議否決預算案、與政府有談判空間</h4> +<p>The most insightful and in-depth work on North Korea’s onward proliferation was published by Joshua Pollack. In 2011, Pollack examined North Korea’s missile sales and how these had changed since what he called the “Golden Age” of North Korean missile exports in the 1980s. Pollack observed that Pyongyang had shifted – with some exceptions – from supplying complete missile systems to transferring parts, materials and expertise instead. He also noted that North Korea was moving its focus towards cooperation in joint missile development and production with a smaller number of countries – particularly Iran and Syria – as opposed to transferring full missiles to a range of customers. Pollack argued that these shifts stemmed from market saturation for North Korea’s missile offerings as a result of past missile transfers and requirements for components and maintenance services from past customers. He also attributed this shift to a deprioritisation of ballistic missiles among some potential customers, particularly in the Middle East, in favour of Western-supplied piloted aircraft, cruise missiles and missile defence systems, and pressure from the US to curtail engagement with North Korea. As the authors outline in this paper, some analogous factors appear to be impacting on more recent supply and demand drivers in North Korea’s onward proliferation.</p> -<p>至於余慧明,石書銘指她沒有參與地區直選、無參選任何協調會議和論壇,而雖然她表明有意否決預算案來爭取五大訴求,但一直獨自行事,不代表會與其他參與者一起否決預算案,亦沒有與其他地區參選人討論和達成協議一起否決。</p> +<p>Pollack also examined North Korea’s nuclear exports, arguing that Pyongyang seems to have prioritised technological exchange instead of currency generation in the limited number of known transfers of its nuclear technology. However, Pollack also argued that Pyongyang may seek to leverage its nuclear expertise and technology for revenue generation in the future. Naturally, his work relied on the data available to him over a decade ago; since then, additional cases and data points on North Korean missile and nuclear exports have afforded greater understanding. The present-day utility of other works in understanding the phenomenon of North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology has been even more limited by their age. Others studying North Korean onward proliferation have limited their study to discrete aspects, such as transfers to non-state actors, or China’s role.</p> -<p>法官李運騰指,但余也有參與初選、簽署「墨落無悔」、競選材料提及否決預算案,是否可推論她是串謀一分子?石指可作此推論,但並非唯一無可抗拒推論,又指余簽署「墨落」只因同意當中兩點,而聲明中提到的共識及替補機制與她無關。</p> +<p>This paper has also benefited from research on adjacent topics such as North Korea’s arms exports and sanctions evasion networks. Notably, in her 2016 book, Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers in the Sanctions Era, Andrea Berger identified a range of factors driving demand for North Korean military goods, considering customers in three categories: “resilient” customers with deep political and military ties to Pyongyang, “reluctant” customers with few other options in terms of suppliers, and less committed “ad hoc” customers. Berger’s work highlights the unique nature and context of specific relationships and their developments, which has helped to inform some of the analysis in this paper. Others have considered the role of specific entities in North Korean proliferation activities and procurement networks. However, no study in the past decade has revisited the question of North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation activities.</p> -<p>石又指,無從知道政府會如何回應五大訴求、或余入立會後會如何投票,形容這是一個「政治的情況」,並非簡單的「yes or no」,永遠都有「互相讓步(give and take)」;而就余在罷工的經驗,顯然她認為與政府有談判空間,而非不能妥協、要無差別否決。</p> +<h4 id="key-arguments-research-methodology-and-structure">Key Arguments, Research Methodology and Structure</h4> -<p>石又指,余雖看似「幼稚」的政治素人,但也明白五大訴求不能全部即時實現,否決只是談判策略;而余認為雙普選最重要,若政府未能提供普選時間表才會否決。</p> +<p>Given its growing technological offering and continuing need to generate hard currency, North Korea has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to other states. Surpluses created by technological advances may also be available for sale. However, despite clear incentives to proliferate, a range of factors that work to constrain North Korea’s sales are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. Many of these drivers and restraints, discussed in the literature, continue to shape North Korea’s onward proliferation activity.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tnjo1KX.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 余慧明</p> +<p>Furthermore, the changing geopolitical landscape – particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – may provide new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea may give other countries the green light to breach UN sanctions and accept North Korean arms, missile or even nuclear technology. There is a real risk that such developments could lead to a resurgence of the North Korean arms and missile export enterprise.</p> -<h4 id="辯方被告只是追求落實基本法承諾的雙普選-不能是顛覆">辯方:被告只是追求落實《基本法》承諾的雙普選 不能是顛覆</h4> +<p>In re-examining the topic and building on others’ work, the authors were able to consider a wider range of data, as new material has become available over the past decade. Part of the reason for limited research on North Korean onward proliferation is the methodological challenge inherent in the study of Pyongyang’s proliferation activities. The extreme opacity of the North Korean economy, its regime and policymaking process makes the country a challenging target for researchers. Like any other country, North Korea guards the details of its military programmes – including procurement, technological developments and exports – particularly closely, making the study of its nuclear and missile matters especially difficult. Partial data on specific cases most often becomes available with a significant time lag, following interdictions of technology, the discovery of major proliferation rings such as the AQ Khan network, or in reports on the movement of North Korean technicians to customer states.</p> -<p>石書銘最後總結指,區諾軒也認同整個『35+計劃』是香港爭取普選之路的一部分,而本案要在香港的獨特背景下審視——本案發生時,香港已回歸中國23年,按照《基本法》承諾爭取普選之路也已持續23年。而吳政亨和余慧明均從無提倡流血衝突、並非尋求顛覆政府機關、也不是要推翻憲制秩序。</p> +<p>More data on North Korean missile and nuclear developments and transfers is available than ever before. The UNSCR 1718 PoE has produced almost 20 detailed public reports since it was established in 2009, rich in details on North Korea’s sanctions evasion activities and illicit networks. Pollack’s work was largely unable to benefit from this data, which has provided insights into North Korea’s missile relationships with Egypt, Iran and Syria, as well as its dual-use technology exports. Increased access to open source data by investigative journalists, think tank analysts and academics has also led to the proliferation of analysis on NorthKorean capabilities and sanctions evasion.</p> -<p>石強調,二人只是信賴一個在《基本法》實施、香港回歸中國時所許下的莊嚴承諾,「對我們的制度、法律框架和憲制秩序有信心」。歸根究底,他們只不過是尋求向政權問責、想根據憲制帶來政策改變、想追求《基本法》承諾的雙普選,「那不可能是顛覆(that cannot be subversive)」,「那不應是顛覆(that should not be subversive)」,請求法庭判處二人無罪。</p> +<p>The authors have supplemented the information available in public sources with 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with experts through video conferencing and in person in London between June and early August 2023. Interviewees included former government officials and former members of the UNSCR 1718 PoE, as well as academics and other researchers working on matters related to North Korea’s nuclear, missile and broader military programmes, North Korean domestic, economic and security policies, and broader Asian security issues. Interview questions were tailored to each expert’s respective area of knowledge, but broadly focused on North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes, proliferation activities and networks, domestic and foreign policies, and international efforts to counter North Korean proliferation. The interviews allowed the authors to gauge current views on the state of North Korea’s onward proliferation enterprise and to test hypotheses as they were developed over the course of the research.</p> -<h4 id="辯方林卓廷黃碧雲無簽墨落黃受壓下仍稱有需要才用憲制權力">辯方:林卓廷黃碧雲無簽「墨落」、黃受壓下仍稱有需要才用憲制權力</h4> +<p>Given the methodological challenges in studying matters related to the North Korean missile and nuclear programmes, and the dearth of current data on the subject, interviewees often had to caveat their assessments, noting that they were based on limited data and assumptions and were thus speculative. Consequently, the authors extend the same disclaimer to the findings outlined in this paper. Nevertheless, common themes in interviewees’ assessments emerged and these were supported by further research, allowing the authors to confidently formulate their conclusions.</p> -<p>代表林卓廷和黃碧雲的大律師沈士文則表示,沒有足夠證據顯示二人同意無差別否決預算案,二人只是同意參與初選,但政綱無提及否決預算案,其選區無就無差別否決達成共識,而二人沒有簽署「墨落無悔」,亦無證據顯示他們知道和支持「墨落」。沈指,控方唯一餘下指控二人的證據,分別是黃碧雲的初選論壇發言,及從林卓廷搜得的初選論壇筆記,而他已於陳詞分析相關證據的比重,不再重複。</p> +<p>The authors’ analysis is presented across two main chapters. Chapter I considers recent developments in North Korea’s technological offering and assesses which technologies may be of interest to customers. Chapter II outlines the likely factors influencing North Korean decision-making on whether to transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and how these may have evolved in recent years. The paper concludes with 10 recommendations to address supply of and demand for North Korean missile and nuclear technology.</p> -<p>法官李運騰關注,黃碧雲在選舉論壇提到「我哋係會用盡憲制裡面所有權力同埋手段去爭取五大訴求,如果否決財政預算案能夠促成呢樣野,我哋一定會做」。沈指黃提到運用憲制權力,是呼應提名表格上有關擁護《基本法》及效忠特區的條款;而黃當時被較激進的參選人「夾(corner)」,但即使受壓仍向選民承諾,是在有需要時運用《基本法》賦予的憲制權力,與控方指她濫權否決財案相反。</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-1-north-koreas-historical-missile-sales"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1: North Korea’s Historical Missile Sales</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6UvxnHm.png" alt="image08" /> -▲ 黃碧雲</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea has long acted as an exporter of ballistic missile technology – particularly SRBM systems. According to one estimate, North Korean supply made up around 40% of the ballistic missiles supplied to the developing world between 1987 and 2009; more than 500 missile systems in total.</code></em></p> -<h4 id="辯方楊雪盈從無提否決預算案非其他候選人靈童">辯方:楊雪盈從無提否決預算案、非其他候選人「靈童」</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The genesis of North Korea’s own missile programme was the transfer of Soviet-design Scud SRBMs from Egypt in the 1980s. North Korea in turn supplied the Scud system – and related components – to a wide range of customers, many based in the Middle East. This included Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and the UAE. North Korea also transferred Scud missile technology to Myanmar and Vietnam in East Asia.</code></em></p> -<p>代表楊雪盈的大律師張耀良表示,楊案發時只曾任區議員約5年,熱心服務社區,法庭應整體考慮其背景推論其意圖。雖然她初選落敗仍報名立法會選舉,但並非受其他候選人指派代為參選的「靈童」,而是顯示她不按協議自行行事。而區諾軒曾指楊無就否決預算案表達意見、趙家賢稱就戴耀廷提否決預算案,楊曾向他指「咪由佢講吓先囉」,都可顯示其心態。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Pyongyang transferred Nodong MRBMs, a scaled-up version of the Scud SRBM, to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s. Both states’ programmes have advanced far beyond this early North Korean assistance – as is the case for a number of North Korea’s earlier customers.</code></em></p> -<p>張耀良又指,楊雪盈只是想參與立法會選舉,雖其名字出現在「墨落無悔」,但只是出現在他人 Facebook 而非其個人 Facebook,無證據顯示她同意簽署。而楊雖有出席7月9日初選記者會,但發言不足一分鐘亦沒有內容;就法官李運騰提到其參選宣言稱要達成立會過半,「令政府正面回應五大訴求」,該文亦只是從辦公室電腦搜得,她從沒有發布。李運騰一度指這可證她對計劃的認知(knowledge),惟張強調,有此認知不代表楊同意。</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea has also transferred IRBM technology to Iran and has allegedly offered IRBMs to private arms dealers in the past.</code></em></p> -<p>張又指,楊不曾在論壇提及無差別否決預算案,亦從無提及中央政府等,她不關注五大訴求和否決預算案,反而想爭取撥款,針對她的證據非常有限,應判處無罪。</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-2-north-koreas-historical-nuclear-sales"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 2: North Korea’s Historical Nuclear Sales</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="辯方何啟明只知初選目的爭立會過半簽墨落不代表必否決">辯方:何啟明只知初選目的爭立會過半、簽「墨落」不代表必否決</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The authors are aware of just four cases in the public domain of North Korean transfers of technology pertaining directly to nuclear weapons capabilities, from the 1990s to 2016.</code></em></p> -<p>代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀表示會依賴書面陳詞,沒有口頭補充。至於代表何啟明的大律師阮偉明則指,何只是知道初選目的是爭取立會過半,不包括無差別否決預算案;而雖然他沒有如岑子杰般在會議表明反對否決權,但沉默不代表支持。</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Nuclear trigger technology to Pakistan.</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korean technicians assisted Pakistani weapons scientists in producing krytrons – components used to trigger a nuclear device – in the mid-1990s. This was part of a series of technological deals between the two states, with Pakistan receiving complete missiles and parts from North Korea, as well as North Korea receiving centrifuge technology, and its technicians training in Pakistani facilities.</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Uranium gas to Libya.</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In December 2003, after the revelation that Libya was purchasing a centrifuge enrichment plant from the AQ Khan proliferation network, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in the country were shown three mystery cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a uranium gas that is fed into the centrifuges during the enrichment process. US analysis of contamination on the outside of the cylinders showed that they had originated in North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre. The IAEA later stated that the 1.7-tonne shipment was the first of a larger planned series of transfers of 20 tonnes between North Korea and Libya brokered by Khan.</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">A reactor for Syria.</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea worked with Syria to construct a nuclear reactor near Al-Kibar in Syria between the late 1990s and 2007 (when the site was bombed by Israeli aircraft). The reactor – the most extensive example of North Korea’s nuclear exports in the public domain – was a smaller-scale version of North Korea’s 5-megawatt (MW) graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon. Intelligence reports suggested that the reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for one or two weapons annually, had it been fuelled or gone critical.</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Sale of thermonuclear weapon isotope online.</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In 2016, an open source investigation revealed an advertisement for lithium-6. Lithium-6 is an isotope that can be used in thermonuclear weapons – either directly, or by irradiating it in a reactor to produce tritium. The advert was posted openly on a business-to-business (B2B) website and listed a phone number linked to the North Korean embassy in Beijing.</code></em></p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>阮偉明又指,何從沒有在論壇提及否決預算案,而其帖文提到「警暴橫行欺壓市民,公帑絕不能有一分一毫再落入惡貫滿盈的警隊手上」,亦不是否決所有撥款,而是反對撥款增加裝備。而就何簽署「墨落」,阮強調,何同意向政府施壓要求回應五大訴求,但不代表他一定會否決,因他理解該權力是可用可不用,亦無證據顯示他同意無論政府是否回應五大訴求都無差別否決預算案。</p> +<h3 id="i-north-koreas-current-technological-offerings">I. North Korea’s Current Technological Offerings</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EtadfIR.png" alt="image09" /> -▲ 何啟明</p> +<p>North Korea has acquired and developed – and therefore could potentially export – a wide range of missile and nuclear technologies. This potential technological offering has expanded over the past decade as North Korea has advanced its missile and nuclear capabilities – both indigenously and through acquisition of technology from other countries. While the offering has expanded, the fundamental range of options for transfer has not changed, and includes everything from fuel cycle facilities and complete missile systems to capabilities for building these facilities, individual dual-use goods and components, as well as expertise relating to elements of missile production, and to the nuclear fuel cycle or to weaponisation. Table 1 summarises some of the main types of transfers North Korea could consider (there is evidence of past exports across all these categories, except for the transfer of complete nuclear warheads).</p> -<p>7名被告完成就事實爭議的陳詞,其餘辯方代表明續陳詞。</p> +<p>North Korea’s developments in nuclear and missile technology over the past decade could have a dual effect on its supply of technology. First, newly developed capabilities – which are more attractive to a wider range of customers – could be transferred. Second, the replacement of older designs and systems with newer, higher-quality or more capable ones could create surpluses of older systems, goods and expertise that could be exported. These surplus items may be appealing to a different subset of customers – those with less ability to absorb technology, lower capability needs, limited budgets or perhaps similar older systems in need of spare parts or interoperable systems. At the same time, North Korea’s expanding catalogue of missile systems and nuclear capabilities raises the question of whether it could now consider a sub-set of this catalogue of technologies to be too strategically important for its own security for them to be transferred to customers abroad. These security concerns are explored further in Chapter II.</p> -<hr /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EeOPpc3.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: North Korea’s Potential Missile and Nuclear-Related Offerings.</strong> Source: Author generated.</em></p> -<p>案件編號:HCCC69/2022</p>獨媒報導控方結案陳詞指濫用議員職權亦屬「非法手段」 官料3至4個月後裁決 辯方指被告僅追求《基本法》所承諾雙普選、望政權問責 不應構成顛覆Indo-Pacific Divergence2023-11-28T12:00:00+08:002023-11-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/indo-pacific-divergence<p><em>This Policy Brief seeks to explore how key partners in the Indo-Pacific have perceived and responded to recent Western efforts in the region.</em></p> +<h4 id="missile-technology-offerings">Missile Technology Offerings</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>Historically, North Korea has mostly exported short-range, and sometimes medium-range, ballistic missiles. Could recent developments in its short-, medium- and longer-range ballistic missiles create new sales opportunities?</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p><em>Developments in SRBM and MRBM Capabilities</em></p> -<p>Much has been written about the enhanced Indo-Pacific strategies of the US, Canada and their European partners, as they have fleshed out their respective approaches in a series of important policy documents. But there has been far less research on how governments in the Indo-Pacific view the rhetorical and real-word implications of intensified Western engagement. As part of an ongoing RUSI–Chatham House project on transatlantic cooperation, this Policy Brief seeks to explore how key partners in the Indo-Pacific have perceived and responded to recent North American and European efforts in the region. To what extent do Indo-Pacific countries view these as part of a concerted transatlantic or Western approach, and how would such an approach accord with their interests?</p> +<p>North Korea has debuted a series of solid-fuelled SRBMs since 2018. Although the exact specifications of the systems – some of which have multiple variants – are unclear, they will likely replace the liquid-fuelled Scuds and Tochka-type systems in North Korea’s arsenal, and potentially also in its sales catalogue.</p> -<p>Rather than offering a comprehensive study of such a large region, this brief focuses on the perspectives of a selection of Indo-Pacific states that transatlantic governments have identified as priority partners in shaping the future regional order. This includes an inner ring of US allies that have most openly embraced the renewed transatlantic interest in the region, and tougher stances toward China: Japan; Australia; and South Korea. It also includes an outer ring of mostly non-aligned partners that have been more circumspect, welcoming enhanced diplomatic engagement, but raising concerns about the long-term commitment of the transatlantic powers, and the risk that more robust China policies could inflame tensions with Beijing, rather than bringing balance to the region. This group includes India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines.</p> +<p>North Korea first revealed the KN-23 solid-fuelled SRBM during a 2019 parade. Since then, several variants have been developed, including smaller shorter-range and larger longer-range versions. KN-23 variants have been developed for deployment on a variety of platforms, such as road mobile transportable erector launchers, underground silos, railcars, submarines and underwater silos. The KN-24 – another solid-fuelled SRBM, with a range of around 400 km – was also unveiled in 2019. A further 2019 debut, the KN-25, is a solid-fuelled system described in North Korean media as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher”. It has four launch tubes on each launcher, and a range of up to 380 km.</p> -<p>These groups are not, of course, uniform in their attitudes, which tend to differ across different issues, as is to be expected when dealing with broad geographical spaces such as the Indo-Pacific and transatlantic regions.</p> +<p>These newer solid propellant missile systems could appeal to customers for several reasons. Beyond their quicker time to launch, solid-fuelled systems are easier to operate than liquid-fuelled ones (which require greater expertise for maintenance and handling of highly explosive, corrosive and toxic fuels). Older liquid-fuelled systems also require the procurement of a range of support vehicles and handling facilities – increasing the human and financial investment required. North Korea has also recently shown signs of exploring ampulisation technology – a set of measures to ensure maintenance of liquid-fuelled missiles in combat readiness for longer periods of time. This could both make a more appealing product, overcoming some of the shortcomings of liquid-fuelled systems, and see North Korea find ways to reduce the maintenance burden and investment required by customers for liquid-fuelled products.</p> -<p>This Policy Brief draws on interviews with senior government officials and experts, as well as a review of open-source data on national security priorities. Interviews took place in Hanoi, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, London, New York City, Singapore, Washington, DC and other locations between October 2022 and August 2023. The brief does not consider China’s approach to the Indo-Pacific strategies of transatlantic partners in the brief, because these strategies are broadly targeted at China, rather than considering China a partner in the execution of transatlantic policy.</p> +<p><em>Developments in IRBM and ICBM Capabilities</em></p> -<h3 id="the-inner-ring-australia-japan-and-south-korea">The Inner Ring: Australia, Japan and South Korea</h3> +<p>North Korean advances in missile technology that have received the most media attention relate to the country’s long-range systems, such as IRBMs and ICBMs. This includes the KN-17 IRBM, successfully tested in 2017; the KN-26 medium- range submarine-launched ballistic missile, successfully tested in 2019; the KN-28 (Hwasong-17) ICBM, successfully tested in 2022; and, most recently, the Hwasong-18. The latter, debuted in February 2023 and successfully tested in April, is North Korea’s first solid propellant ICBM – a significant development in its strategic capabilities.</p> -<p>The US’s closest regional allies – Japan, Australia and South Korea – have been the strongest supporters of intensified regional engagement from transatlantic partners, actively seeking to encourage and shape their involvement, across security, economics, technology and other contested domains. While there are differences of tone and emphasis, this crucial trio broadly shares the analytical framework through which the US and Europe see the Indo-Pacific. Further, the transatlantic partners and this trio share some overarching regional objectives, such as: balancing China’s rising power and assertiveness; pursuing economic de-risking vis-à-vis China; and providing developing economies in Asia with diplomatic and economic options that can boost their resilience. Over the past couple of years, officials from these three countries have expanded and deepened their conversations with North American and European counterparts as they explore areas in which they can learn from one another and, ultimately, better coordinate policies where there are substantial areas of overlap.</p> +<p>Some have suggested that Pyongyang may consider transferring some of its longer-range missile systems to customers abroad. Indeed, North Korea did transfer IRBMs to Iran, which were likely based on imported Soviet missile technology. However, the strategic significance of these systems to North Korea’s own defence – and the insights they could betray into North Korea’s technology (including the state of its missile capabilities and domestic production capability, or reliance on foreign components) – may disincentivise Pyongyang from transferring them to others. The strategic importance that North Korea places on its missile capabilities, as well as the limited opportunities for intelligence collection on these systems by external actors, may make Pyongyang sensitive about having these capabilities fall into the hands of an adversary. Similar considerations could be applied to the Hwasong-8 carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle, which – while being an SRBM – has strategic significance for Pyongyang that could make transfer less likely. Although, as some of the experts interviewed for this project noted, any missile technology might be for sale for the right price, and Pyongyang may not care about its technology being intercepted provided it has received payment from the customer. These competing security and economic considerations are discussed in more detail in Chapter II.</p> -<p>Japan and Australia are most closely aligned with the US and Europe. Tokyo and Canberra share transatlantic concerns about the rise of China and its increasing assertiveness: from Beijing’s defence modernisation and deployment of military capabilities to its use of economic coercion, disinformation and other tools of interference beneath the threshold of armed conflict, and its ambition to reshape the international order. New South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has brought his country closer to the positions of Australia and Japan, with his government publishing its own Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2022, and distancing itself from the concerns of his predecessor, Moon Jae-in. But the Yoon administration’s National Security Strategy, published in June 2023, frames the challenge as being the “intensification of US–China strategic competition”, in contrast to how Japan, Australia and transatlantic partners frame China itself as the chief challenge. The concluding statement of the Camp David trilateral summit between the leaders of the US, Japan and South Korea in August 2023 was markedly more restrained in its discussion of China than the final communiqué of the May 2023 summit of the G7, which includes Japan and key transatlantic governments, but not South Korea.</p> +<p>The potential customer base for longer-range missile systems is also limited. There are few countries that would benefit from an ICBM capability (which suggests the need to hold at risk an adversary further than 5,500 km away) who have not already shown some interest in developing these systems domestically. The relationship between ICBMs and nuclear weapons, in which one technology often necessitates the development of the other to have strategic value, also reduces any potential customer base. Iran may be the most obvious exception, and would likely benefit from further collaboration with North Korea on long-range missile technology (albeit probably without the transfer of complete long-range missile systems), and is a case discussed further below and in Chapter II.</p> -<p>While officials and policy experts interviewed from Australia, Japan and South Korea generally did not view their partnerships with the US and Europe through an explicitly transatlantic lens, they universally welcomed increased efforts to discuss shared objectives and work towards better policy coordination in the region. This is happening across a range of overlapping platforms and issues, mirroring the complex arrangements through which the US and Europe are trying to better work together in the region. This reflects US efforts to build a “latticework” of alliances and partnerships that are “more flexible, ad hoc, more political than legal, sometimes more temporary than permanent”.</p> +<p><em>Potential for Surplus Sales</em></p> -<p>On economics, the US, Europe and Japan are seeking to build a common approach and manage competitive differences over industrial policy through the G7. Neither Australia nor South Korea is a G7 member but, under the rubric of “G7+”, they were both invited to the Hiroshima summit in May 2023, alongside the leaders of Brazil, Comoros, Cook Islands, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. Outside of summits, European and North American officials are also engaging with their Australian, Japanese and South Korean counterparts in much more frequent discussions and dialogues about the economic and technological challenges presented by China, and how to ensure development assistance and infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific is more effective.</p> +<p>There is also a risk that North Korea may export surplus older systems, notably those based on liquid-fuelled Scud or Nodong technology that are likely being replaced (or may be in future) by newer solid-fuelled systems. North Korea used to frequently parade these missiles, but a system based on Scud or Nodong technology has not appeared in a parade since 2017. The KN-02, an early North Korean-manufactured version of the solid-fuelled Soviet OTR-21 Tochka missile, which was first unveiled in 2007, has also not been paraded since 2012.</p> -<p>On traditional security, Japan, Australia and South Korea are increasing their engagement with NATO, participating in a NATO summit for the first time in June 2022, and again in 2023. It should be acknowledged, however, that this is in part a response to the war in Ukraine, as well as being a result of transatlantic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. In a show of less-than-perfect transatlantic cooperation, the proposal for a regional liaison office in Tokyo that might have supported a coordinated response to shared security challenges was opposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. Ben Wallace, the then British defence secretary, seemed to support the proposal in comments made in Singapore in June 2023 but, in a subsequent interview, he expressed understanding for the French position and concern about NATO “mission creep” to the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, the bilateral “tailored partnership programmes” that Japan and South Korea signed with NATO in 2023 suggest there is agreement across the Alliance on the rising importance of Asian partnerships.</p> +<p>While it remains unclear how many newer systems North Korea has been able to deploy, the apparent phasing out of older missile models raises questions as to what might have happened to these older systems, and whether surpluses could be for sale. Arms marketing material of unclear veracity handed over in the 2020 undercover documentary film The Mole included Scud C and Nodong (marketed as Scud E) systems and supporting vehicles allegedly for sale, as well as a system described as “Tochika-U”, likely the KN-02.</p> -<p>While there is no intention to build a comprehensive, synthesised approach to the Indo-Pacific, Australia, Japan and South Korea are all looking to push their cooperation with North America and Europe to a new level through a web of overlapping platforms and priorities anchored in the US alliance system. Japan, Australia and the US are seeking to coordinate their security and economic cooperation with one another and India through the “Quad”. Australia, the UK and the US are deepening their military-to-military and military–industrial engagement through AUKUS. And, despite the historical tribulations of Japan–South Korea relations, both governments have pledged to strengthen trilateral cooperation with the US across traditional security, economic security and other regional issues.</p> +<p>Surplus missile technology – including full missile systems, spare parts or components – may appeal to customers still operating Scud- or Tochka-type systems (see Table 2). However, this group of states is declining in size, with the returns of maintaining such aged technology diminishing, if not already non-existent – particularly if states have access to more modern options in the form of more advanced missiles or UAVs. The two states that received North Korean Nodong-type missiles in the 1990s, Iran and Pakistan, both indigenised the technology and have since progressed in their own programmes, although surplus Nodong-type systems could potentially be of interest to new customers.</p> -<h3 id="challenges-in-the-outer-ring-india-indonesia-singapore-vietnam-and-the-philippines">Challenges in the Outer Ring: India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ANTGa59.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: States Holding Scud and Tochka Technology.</strong> Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2023) and a survey of other open source information. Note: Current data is difficult to compile – but inclusion in this table suggests that there is either evidence these countries currently operate these systems, or little evidence to suggest that the capability has been retired.</em></p> -<p>Beyond the core trio, five other important states in the Indo-Pacific – India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines – have taken a more selective and transactional approach to enhanced transatlantic engagement in the region. This reflects the fact that, aside from the Philippines, none of these states is a formal military ally of the US, and all have distinctive traditions of foreign policy independence. Aside from Singapore, they are developing economies with leaderships that are under pressure to deliver growth and jobs. According to the sources interviewed for this brief, these five countries want the US and its transatlantic allies to help maintain a stable balance of power in the region, but they also fear that the intensity of Washington’s competition with China could be a destabilising force.</p> +<p>Surpluses created by the superseding of North Korea’s Scud fleet could lead to parts being available for sale. Evidence of North Korean trade in spare parts for these older systems, though, is dated. A 2013 shipment of Scud parts originating in North Korea, including connectors, relays, voltage circuit breakers and a barometric switch, was interdicted en route to Egypt from Beijing. North Korean markings were visible on two of the items – suggesting manufacture in North Korea. Egypt has continued to maintain and operate Scud systems, and it is not out of the question that more recent (and successful) shipments of spare parts and components have occurred.</p> -<p>Transatlantic partners’ economic engagement looks particularly disjointed to those in this circle. Unwilling for domestic political reasons to offer market access, the US is pursuing instead a vague Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The five countries discussed here are all participating in early IPEF negotiations, but regional officials say it is too early to tell whether these talks can deliver an economic benefit. The UK is seeking bilateral trade deals, and has acceded to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam, but not the US, which pulled out of a predecessor agreement in 2017, or the EU. Meanwhile, the EU’s Global Gateway and the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment remain nascent initiatives, with regional officials sceptical about their ability to deliver tangible, rapid benefits.</p> +<p>North Korea may have other uses for its surplus missiles besides sales – including recycling, cannibalising them for materials, parts or components, mothballing them for future contingencies, or launching them in provocations. The war in Ukraine may also yield lessons. As one interviewee pointed out, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the continued value of short-range systems on the battlefield, and this may lead North Korea to retain older systems in great numbers for future contingencies.</p> -<p>One further key challenge is the Indo-Pacific concept itself. Although many advocates of the Indo-Pacific framing see it as a way to embrace a bigger regional role for India, India’s own view of the Indo-Pacific does not tally neatly with those of the US and Europe. The reinvigorated Quad is often painted as a balancing coalition against China, but Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stipulated that India “does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country”. India’s own initiatives for the region, such as the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and the Indian Ocean vision of “Security and Growth for All in the Region”, are framed in inclusive terms, as is ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, there is growing consensus in India about the need for a tougher approach to Beijing, in the aftermath of the flare-up of tensions along its border with China.</p> +<p><em>Collaboration in Missile Development</em></p> -<p>India has also stepped up its engagement with specific transatlantic countries, including the US, the UK and France. However, India’s maintenance of its historical relationship with Russia, despite the invasion of Ukraine, is a reminder that – as is the case within the transatlantic community – not all Indo-Pacific countries will accept Manichean framings of the region as an arena for a battle of democracies versus autocracies.</p> +<p>Due to the sanctions environment and an evolving customer base, North Korea’s missile proliferation behaviour has largely adapted from the shipment of full systems towards the provision of spare parts, materials and technical support. As an unnamed UN member state noted to the UN PoE in 2019, “Instead of exporting full missile systems, the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) is sending technicians to a buyer country and establishing a complete supply chain”, noting that this pattern had been seen in Egypt, Iran and Syria.</p> -<p>There is yet more divergence when it comes to Southeast Asia. Officials and policy experts in that region welcome many aspects of Western plans for the Indo-Pacific, but have concerns that the hardening US approach to China, in particular, may antagonise rather than deter Beijing, and that new frameworks and institutions such as the Quad may bypass or undermine the region’s existing ASEAN-anchored architecture. ASEAN member states are concerned with maintaining “ASEAN centrality” in countries’ approaches to the Indo-Pacific, noting that this is the “underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the … region”. In other words, they would prefer that ASEAN institutions and platforms are the vehicles through which partners implement their Indo-Pacific strategies.</p> +<p>Missile collaboration with Syria has been ongoing for many years. North Korean technicians were reportedly involved in the upgrade of the Scud D to create a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle in 2008. A delegation of Syrian engineers allegedly spent six years in North Korea from 2011 to 2017, and further exchanges took place around 2016, with a group of North Korean missile technicians staying on a Syrian airbase. North Korea has also supplied missile-related components to Syria as part of its collaboration with the country. Five containers of commercial items (many with applications in Scud missiles) originating in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Denmark, Japan and the US were seized by an unnamed state while being shipped to Syria from Dalian, China in 2014. The PoE also noted in 2015 and 2016 that a Syria-based official from North Korean arms exporter Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) imported ball bearings and fibre optic cables, as well as bringing in three North Korean technicians.</p> -<p>New Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, who took office in June 2022, has shed the anti-American approach of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte, and is intensifying security cooperation with Washington as China increases the pressure on the Philippines in disputed parts of the South China Sea. But other governments in this outer ring remain concerned that the US and its transatlantic allies are too heavily focused on competing with, if not containing, China. Key officials and policy experts in Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam fear that the US and European governments could unnecessarily antagonise Beijing, prompting an escalatory spiral that will cost their region much more than it will the Euro-Atlantic. Numerous Southeast Asian officials indicated that Western government narratives that criticised China’s infrastructure investments and framed competition with Beijing as that between democracy and autocracy had fallen flat. However, it should be noted that this has not caused Singapore and Vietnam to hesitate in improving their military ties with the US.</p> +<p>North Korea’s missile collaboration with Iran has involved higher-end missile technology, given that Iran has a large (and expanding) missile industrial base and export capability of its own. Collaboration with Iran has not always been smooth sailing, with trust levels taking a significant hit after North Korea supplied the BM-25 Musudan IRBM, a missile with significant technical issues. US information suggests that over recent years there has been further collaboration on technology that is potentially of use in longer-range systems.</p> -<p>Many officials and policy experts expressed a dual fear that the US might abandon the region if US politics turns further inward, and also that it might become too aggressive toward China, which could trigger a potentially devastating conflict in the Indo-Pacific. These perceptions about likely trajectories in US policy also colour expectations among regional partners about what Europe will do, due to the widely held belief that European policy toward the Indo-Pacific largely tracks that of its premier security guarantor, the US.</p> +<p>A 2016 sanctions notice suggested that North Korean technicians were collaborating with Iranians on an “80-ton rocket booster” being developed by North Korea. The notice stated that Iranian technicians from liquid-fuel missile producer SHIG travelled to North Korea for this purpose and named individuals who had travelled to Pyongyang for “contract negotiations”. It also suggested that KOMID had made shipments of missile-related goods to Iran, including “valves, electronics and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles”. Further information on this collaboration was included in a 2021 UN PoE report, which noted that North Korea and Iran had “resumed cooperation on long-range missile development projects”, with the report focusing in particular on the development of a space launch vehicle (SLV). This collaboration included the “transfer of critical parts” and 13 North Koreans were named who had travelled to Iran to support KOMID’s work. The report also noted the high level at which such engagement was signed off within Iran, naming senior SHIG and Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) officials, and noting that the current director of AIO was a “key player in negotiations” when he had been the SHIG director.</p> -<p>In communicating their various Indo-Pacific approaches, the US and European governments have tended to stress like-mindedness as a basis for working with a broad array of regional partners, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. Yet those governments have diverse views on the Indo-Pacific, and do not view their engagement in the region through a “transatlantic” lens.</p> +<h4 id="nuclear-technology-offerings">Nuclear Technology Offerings</h4> -<p>Although the US and Europe have put economic security, shared prosperity and resilient supply chains at the heart of their various Indo-Pacific strategies and documents, regional partners expressed concern about the brewing discord between the US and its allies over landmark economic and technological policies. The UK and the EU have warned that the US Inflation Reduction Act, which offers billions of dollars in green subsidies to US companies, could curb competition. Japan and South Korea share these concerns. While the US and the EU have set up a Trade and Technology Council to promote shared rules and norms in this vital emerging domain, they are also pursuing different approaches to the regulation and promotion of the technology sector. Further, recent trips to Beijing by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, European Council President Charles Michel and French President Macron have stirred US fears that its European allies might be softening their approach to China, in the hope of avoiding costly decoupling, and of maintaining or even expanding economic benefits as the Chinese economy comes back to life after Beijing’s abandonment of its zero-Covid strategy.</p> +<p>Short of the transfer of a complete warhead – something that all experts interviewed for this paper suggested was highly unlikely – there is a range of other nuclear-related technologies that North Korea could transfer. For instance, Pyongyang could sell nuclear material or isotopes, with a range of options short of weapons-usable fissile material. However – beyond the transfer of dual-use technologies with applications relevant to the production of nuclear weapons – the transfer of nuclear-weapons-relevant technology, nuclear material and other relevant isotopes was judged relatively unlikely by experts interviewed for this paper, for a number of reasons outlined further below. Nevertheless, previous North Korean transfers of nuclear technology – including reactor technology, nuclear materials, and even weaponisation technology (see Box 2) – suggest that the possibility for future transfers exists.</p> -<p>Unsurprisingly, countries in the Indo-Pacific do not view the Euro-Atlantic region as an integrated monolithic actor and, according to interviewees, the term “transatlantic” generally holds little meaning across the Indo-Pacific. While the slew of recently published Indo-Pacific strategies and documents has raised awareness of the diplomatic energy that European and North Atlantic countries are directing toward the Indo-Pacific, countries in the region draw different conclusions on how best to work with transatlantic partners.</p> +<p>While US government assessments have suggested that North Korea likely has an arsenal of “up to 60 nuclear warheads”, there are significant gaps in public knowledge about the state of its programme and stockpile. Early attention to North Korea’s nuclear programme focused on the plutonium aspects of the fuel cycle and the 5-MW reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre. While it was suspected that North Korea may have uranium enrichment capabilities, the plutonium programme was, for a long time, the only publicly known North Korean nuclear weapons pathway. This changed in 2010, when a US delegation, including former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker, was shown a centrifuge facility at Yongbyon. There have been no further public reports of foreign access to North Korea’s nuclear facilities since.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Uncertainty persists regarding other potential enrichment facilities, the numbers and types of centrifuges North Korea may be deploying, and many other details about its uranium and plutonium fuel cycles and weaponisation processes. The limited number of recently seized shipments of goods or materials destined for North Korea’s centrifuge programme or other parts of the country’s nuclear weapons programme also restricts public understanding of the programme and how its recent development may have shaped North Korean nuclear wares available for sale.</p> -<p>Australia, Japan and South Korea form a core of partners that are truly like-minded from a transatlantic point of view on many, although not all, issues. Beyond these core partners, degrees of like-mindedness are more limited. Vietnam and India share US and European concerns about China’s growing military might, and want transatlantic partners to help provide a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. However, their divergent views on the war in Ukraine or on Russia’s role are not only a product of dependence on Moscow for military hardware and technology. In the case of India – but perhaps also more widely – this also reflects a welcoming of the opportunities that multipolarity offers for realising greater strategic autonomy.</p> +<p><em>Reactor and Enrichment Technology</em></p> -<p>US and European officials need to get better at accepting and navigating these complexities, rather than wishing them away. Just as they will need to engage with governments in the Indo-Pacific as partners in their own right and not simply as participants in a US–China struggle, they will also need their Indo-Pacific partners to be much more honest with them about their qualms and differences in opinion and national interest. While these conversations might not be easy, transatlantic partners can help by better coordinating their engagement with key Indo-Pacific partners, at diplomatic posts in the region as well as in national capitals. US and European diplomats are already coordinating on an ad hoc basis across the Indo-Pacific, but they can and should be better joined up with discussions at headquarters.</p> +<p>Although North Korea has shown a willingness to transfer reactor technology in the past – namely, in its provision of assistance and materials for the construction of the Al-Kibar reactor in Syria – it would be incredibly risky for North Korea and any potential customers to engage in a further reactor construction project. Any such project would be relatively easy for foreign intelligence agencies to detect using a variety of human, signals and technical means. Reactors are large construction projects that are visible in open source satellite imagery. Even if the reactor being constructed were relatively small (as in the case of Al-Kibar), and even if most of the necessary physical materials could be sourced overseas, the development of such a structure would almost certainly be noticed by various national intelligence agencies, the IAEA or even open source analysts using commercially available satellite imagery, drawing significant scrutiny. As in the Al-Kibar case, other intelligence sources – such as human and signals intelligence – would likely reveal any North Korean involvement.</p> -<p>From the perspective of Indo-Pacific partners, relationships with the US and Europe will be shaped to a great extent by the trajectory of China’s relationships with them and with the West. The core group of US allies in the region – Australia, Japan and South Korea – are largely comfortable with tougher US and European policy toward China, although there are concerns about the harder-edged rhetoric coming out of the US Congress. Across the rest of the region, there is much more ambivalence.</p> +<p>Centrifuge enrichment technology perhaps offers greater opportunities for export, as demonstrated by the AQ Khan network’s sale of centrifuges and related technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya in the 1990s and 2000s. The transfer of centrifuge capabilities could range from a small number of machines with associated expertise to a full turnkey centrifuge facility, and could be harder to detect than the construction of a reactor, given that facilities can be constructed covertly underground and that they lack the distinctive visual signatures of a nuclear reactor. However, the construction or expansion of such facilities in past instances has also been monitored using open source satellite imagery in the context of North Korea, Iran and other states. Disassembled shipping – consisting of many shipments of largely benign-looking industrial goods and materials (as seen in some of Khan’s transfers of enrichment technology to Libya) – could also make detection difficult. However, greater awareness of the risks posed by the transfer of centrifuge technology among customs and intelligence agencies following the Khan case, as well as the enhanced ability of NGOs to collect and monitor data on illicit trade activity, could mean that multiple connected shipments would be detected more readily.</p> -<p>There are, ultimately, two overarching challenges. First, the US and Europe will need to find the right balance between enhancing security relationships with allies and their closest partners, and helping other regional countries to tackle the economic and non-traditional security issues that they face. Second, while transatlantic states are not seen as a monolithic actor in the region, they can improve their reputations, and the effectiveness of their engagement, if they better coordinate their efforts in the Indo-Pacific, and avoid duplicating them. This will require more candid conversations between transatlantic countries and Indo-Pacific countries. The US and Europe will need to listen more and encourage Indo-Pacific partners to speak up honestly, to ensure that their various Indo-Pacific strategies and approaches can be refined and adjusted as they are implemented.</p> +<p>Limited knowledge of North Korea’s centrifuge technology makes it difficult to assess whether it has old surplus centrifuge models it may want to sell and/or whether it possesses newer technologies that are more appealing to customers. During his 2010 visit, Hecker observed a facility with around 2,000 machines that appeared to be based on the Pakistani P-2 centrifuge model, and fabricatedwith rotors made from “alloys containing iron” according to one North Koreanengineer – interpreted by Hecker to mean maraging steel. As some analysts have noted, that North Korea is still operating these P-2 type machines is “an assumption that should be treated with caution”. Indeed, a paper published by a North Korean scientist indicates at least some interest in more advanced models of centrifuges. Taking the Iranian nuclear programme as a point of comparison, Tehran has developed multiple generations and models of centrifuges in a similar time span. It would be reasonable to assume that North Korea could have made comparable progress. However, the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the motivations behind it are different from those of North Korea: Iran is more focused on publicly displaying its technical capabilities and trying to create leverage in the context of diplomacy over its nuclear programme, while North Korea is likely focusing on improving the efficiency of its centrifuge technology to expand its fissile material stocks and nuclear arsenal, with no public communication aspect – at least for the time being.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Movement towards more advanced models would suggest that North Korea has developed domestic advanced centrifuge production capabilities and may indicate that there are fewer chokepoints for the sub-technologies required for production. Full centrifuges (whether more or less advanced) or constituent dual-use technologies (discussed further below) could both appeal to customers. However, the extreme secrecy surrounding this aspect of North Korea’s programme would make the practicalities of marketing and sharing this technology difficult and risky for North Korea, as the interdiction of shipments could provide significant insights into Pyongyang’s programme. Development of more advanced centrifuges could also create surpluses of older machines and spare parts – items that Khan’s network tried to provide to Iran and Libya, with mixed success.</p> -<p><strong>Ben Bland</strong> is the director of the Asia-Pacific programme at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition.</p> +<p><em>Intangible Nuclear Transfers</em></p> -<p><strong>Veerle Nouwens</strong> was previously Senior Research Fellow at the International Security Studies Department, focusing on geopolitical relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Her research interests include China’s foreign policy, cross-strait relations, maritime security and ASEAN.</p> +<p>Beyond the transfer of tangible enrichment or reprocessing technologies, North Korea may seek to capitalise on the export of intangibles – that is, expertise, skills and design information relevant to nuclear weapons development. Such an offering could certainly be useful for states looking to develop aspects of a nuclear fuel cycle or move towards a nuclear weapons capability. Transfer of intangibles could accompany tangible transfers, as was the case in Syria when North Korea deployed experts and transferred technology to construct the Al-Kibar reactor. It could also involve North Korea aiding other states in solving specific technical challenges, such as North Korean technicians’ support to Pakistan in producing krytrons in the 1990s (see Box 2).</p> -<p><strong>Philip Shetler-Jones</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security team at RUSI. His current research is concentrated on Indo-Pacific security. His recent publications have focused on the defence policy of Japan, attitudes of China to NATO, and narratives about the defence of Taiwan.</p>Ben Bland, et al.This Policy Brief seeks to explore how key partners in the Indo-Pacific have perceived and responded to recent Western efforts in the region.European Security Transformed2023-11-24T12:00:00+08:002023-11-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/european-security-transformed<p><em>The European security in transformation is starting to settle into new patterns, accelerated by Russia’s war on Ukraine, as new actors and groupings emerge. For the UK, this shifting landscape creates both challenges and leadership opportunities as it heads towards its next general election.</em></p> +<p>The value of the different aspects of North Korea’s nuclear knowledge will ultimately be decided by Pyongyang’s prospective customers/partners, but the most useful and unique offering is likely to be North Korea’s tacit knowledge – the things that cannot easily be codified and transferred, and only learned by doing. This could include the experience of producing fissile materials through reactor operation and reprocessing, running an enrichment plant, or experience related to nuclear weapons design, testing and weaponisation (an even rarer area of expertise outside the nuclear weapons states). This sphere of knowledge might be of particular interest to Iran, a state that has mastered enrichment technology and may have an interest in pursuing a weapons capability in the future.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="dual-use-technologies">Dual-Use Technologies</h4> -<p>In autumn 2021 we argued that the continent’s security was at an inflection point. We foresaw a coming transformation, driven by either a strategic shock or an aggregation of more modest changes. In fact, both have happened simultaneously: the trauma of Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has accelerated and deepened multiple other security developments.</p> +<p>Given that the level of monitoring of North Korea’s borders has risen, and the transfer of full missile systems or other large missile and nuclear-related technology has thus become riskier, North Korea is likely to look to export more innocuous dual-use technologies and materials – those that have both civilian and military applications. While North Korea likely relies on imports for a large proportion of the higher-end items for its WMD and military programmes (the so-called “chokepoint” technologies), as its programme has advanced, Pyongyang has undoubtedly indigenised the production of some dual-use components and materials, and may look to capitalise on these production abilities and any surpluses through onward sales. It may also look to act as a broker, leveraging its procurement networks around the world to source dual-use goods for customers, either for use directly by the customer or by North Korean technicians assisting in missile- and nuclear-related manufacturing and development projects.</p> -<h3 id="whats-new">What’s New?</h3> +<p>While the transfer of dual-use items from North Korea would still violate UN sanctions, such transfers would be more inconspicuous than the movement of large missile and nuclear technologies. North Korean-manufactured goods could be laundered within the extensive legitimate global trade in dual-use technologies and would, if uncovered, be less politically contentious than full systems. Russian or Chinese markets provide extensive laundering opportunities which could be capitalised on with minimal risk, as Moscow and Beijing have historically turned a blind eye to North Korean sanctions violations. Online platforms – such as the Chinese B2B site used to market North Korean lithium-6 in 2016 (see Box 2) – could provide opportunities for the anonymous sale of technology, obfuscating obvious links to North Korea.</p> -<p>The past two years have witnessed marked changes in the European security landscape. First, state-on-state war has returned on a scale that Europe has not experienced since 1945. Ukraine’s extraordinary resistance and resilience, backed by slow but increasingly steady support from the West, has made sure that it will survive, bloodied but unbowed. The war is also transforming Ukraine into a powerful regional security actor that is now central rather than peripheral to European security, and it is set to play a pivotal role in future Euro-Atlantic security arrangements.</p> +<p>There is precedent for North Korean transfers of dual-use goods to countries that had previously purchased North Korean missile technology. For example, PoE reports note the interdiction in 2010 of a shipment of aluminium alloy rods, copper bars and brass discs to Syria, with the products likely originating in North Korea. A shipment of North Korean-origin graphite cylinders was also interdicted in 2013 en route to Syria. North Korea has also previously marketed its dual-use machine tools overseas. In 2013, the UN listed Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation – North Korea’s main machine tool producer – for its involvement in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes. As researchers noted in 2014, the company attended a trade fair in Dandong, China in 2013 and marketed machine tools in China and Russia under the names of “Millim Technology Company” and “Koryo Technologies” (or “KORTEC”), respectively.</p> -<p>Second, we have seen a re-focused NATO. Its 2022 Strategic Concept was clear, if late, in identifying Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to peace and security. NATO plans, deployments and exercises have pivoted towards addressing the Russian threat in all domains. Finland has become a NATO member in rapid time, and Sweden is now on the path to entry. Neither event was on anyone’s immediate radar in October 2021. These developments will have a positive impact on the Alliance, making it stronger, more coherent and more European.</p> +<h3 id="ii-evolving-factors-influencing-supply-and-demand">II. Evolving Factors Influencing Supply and Demand</h3> -<p>Third, new actors and groups have emerged. In October 2021 we commented that European security was no longer driven only by the “big three” (France, Germany and the UK), and that other countries were growing in influence and in their willingness to set the agenda, with support for Ukraine already becoming a unifying factor. This trend has accelerated, encompassing not just Ukraine and Finland, but also Poland – now a US security partner of choice – and Turkey.</p> +<p>While technological developments in North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes help dictate what may be available for sale, a range of political, economic and security factors also play an important role in influencing both demand for – and North Korean willingness to supply – these technologies. This chapter explores in more detail what is likely to motivate and restrict both North Korea and its potential customers when it comes to engaging in missile and nuclear technology transfers. While the need to generate revenue remains a strong motivator for Pyongyang, demand for its wares has been progressively waning. This decline is the result of several factors, namely, changing technological needs and greater supplier choice among Pyongyang’s customers, as well as concerns over the quality of North Korean goods and the risk of interdiction. The chapter also maps out the changing sanctions context, and how Russia’s arms purchases from North Korea could undermine the sanctions regime and risk a resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.</p> -<p>Moreover, it’s not just the big countries driving change. Denmark and the Netherlands have led on providing F-16 aircraft for Ukraine, while the former donated all its Caesar self-propelled howitzers. The Baltic states lead support for Ukraine when measured by percentage of GDP. And Lithuania has been vocal in calling out Chinese coercive practices, withdrawn from China’s “17+1” arrangement with Central and Eastern Europe and published an independent Indo-Pacific strategy.</p> +<h4 id="continued-need-for-revenue-generation">Continued Need for Revenue Generation</h4> -<p>Fourth, the EU is assuming a more prominent role. Russia’s initial diplomatic focus on the US and NATO has had to pivot more towards the EU, with sanctions becoming a significant lever in responding to Russian aggression. The EU now provides military support to Ukraine via the EU Peace Facility, which has had to increase its financial ceiling to meet demand. This would have been totally inconceivable two years ago.</p> +<p>As in the past, revenue generation remains a key incentive for North Korean missile technology transfers. North Korea’s economic troubles long predate the UN sanctions regime, with the country repeatedly defaulting on debt repayments from the 1970s onwards. The imposition from 2006 of increasingly expansive UNSC sanctions on the country’s economy exacerbated existing economic challenges, while more recent sectoral sanctions introduced in 2016 and 2017, and the border closures stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic, have put North Korea in an especially precarious economic situation. States are prohibited from virtually all economic engagement with the country, leaving it cash-strapped and desperate to seek out and exploit economic opportunities.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US continues to underpin European security, providing the lion’s share of support to Ukraine and NATO as well as overall defence spending</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Precisely how much revenue North Korea has generated, or may be able to generate, through the sale of missiles or nuclear technology is challenging to ascertain. Public reporting on individual North Korean missile and nuclear transfers is extremely limited and very rarely includes data on the value of transactions. Furthermore, reported figures may not include estimates for the transfer of expertise, manufacturing facilities, or maintenance and support services. Some of the available figures unsurprisingly suggest that military transfers offer North Korea lucrative opportunities for revenue generation, with estimates – which are based on sources that are either unclear, dated and/or difficult to verify – citing figures in the hundreds of millions of US dollars.</p> -<p>Finally, the security focus has shifted north, south and east. Unresolved and frozen conflicts are thawing, including in the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus, with the capacity of NATO and the EU to project stability uncertain. The war in Israel and Gaza constitutes a security emergency on Europe’s doorstep with the potential to spread, sow dissension and give Russia an opportunity to meddle and distract from its disastrous war in Ukraine. The collapse of French-led military missions in the Sahel has offered another opportunity for Russia to extend its influence.</p> +<p>Some examples provide insights into the revenue raised from individual transfers,transactions or weapons systems. While comparing the prices offered for ballistic missile systems is extremely challenging, a review of the prices of North Korean conventional weapons offerings supports the hypothesis that North Korean systems are generally cheaper than the alternatives. The prices offered in the 2020 documentary The Mole, and to British arms dealer Michael Ranger in a deal around a decade ago, suggest that North Korean arms are often offered at a price below the market rate of equivalent systems. This has historically made North Korean arms appealing to customers, particularly in the developing world.</p> -<h3 id="-and-whats-not-changed">… and What’s Not Changed?</h3> +<p>The Mole saw marketing materials – including a price list for North Korean weapons systems – handed to an actor playing the role of an investor during a 2017 trip to Pyongyang. The price list included a cost breakdown for missiles with different types of warheads, launchers and associated handling vehicles. Missiles and vehicles were priced per unit and in quantities of five, three or two units. For example, Scud C missiles with high explosive warheads were offered for $2.795 million per unit, but sold in lots of five for $13.975 million, whereas Nodong missiles (termed Scud E for extended range) were offered for $4.94 million per unit and $24.7 million for five. While they are impossible to verify, such values are not outlandish compared to figures seen elsewhere. Sale of components and parts can also be lucrative: the PoE noted in 2015 and 2016 that a KOMID official based in Syria (with the rank of major general) shipped ball bearings and fibre optic cables, and brought in three North Korean technicians, earning over €100,000.</p> -<p>There are several continuities. First, Russian aggression. Russia’s 2022 re-invasion of Ukraine was not an isolated trauma but the most severe in a decades-long succession of Russian violence, including Chechnya in the early 2000s, Georgia in 2008, Crimea and Donbas in 2014, Syria in 2015, chemical weapons use on UK soil in 2006 and 2018, and the attack on the Vrbětice ammunition warehouse in Czechia in 2014.</p> +<p>North Korea could potentially leverage more sensitive nuclear transfers for extensive profits far above the market rate, especially in situations where the customer has no alternatives. Illicit procurement networks often see intermediaries monetise the risk by charging a premium, and North Korea could do this through selling goods it has either produced or procured, as part of a package for customers. Analysis of the cost of the UF 6 sold to Libya through the Khan network in the early 2000s suggests that the three cylinders of 1.7 tonnes were sold for $2 million, the equivalent of 40 times the then market rate. Similarly, transfer of North Korea’s more advanced missile systems (or, more likely, related technology) such as its IRBM, ICBM or newer hypersonic technologies may offer particularly lucrative opportunities for revenue generation. However, as mentioned, Pyongyang may be reluctant to transfer some of these higher-end technologies to avoid betraying the details of its advanced systems and production capabilities to adversaries.</p> -<p>Second, Western defence burden-sharing remains imbalanced. The US continues to underpin European security, providing the lion’s share of support to Ukraine and NATO as well as overall defence spending. Europe collectively has been catching up on military support to Ukraine, but the nature, volume and timing of US capabilities has made the greatest difference. Moreover, while European defence spending has increased at the highest rate since the end of the Cold War, there are still disagreements on what to spend it on. Therefore, the gap in overall numbers does not take into account the actual capability gap – especially on critical enablers, including intelligence, command and control, logistics and the adoption of new technologies.</p> +<p>Despite the high risk, larger projects such as the construction of facilities could also garner significant sums. While of unclear veracity, media reporting from 2009 citing an Iranian defector and Israeli intelligence claimed that Iran financed Syria’s purchase of the Al-Kibar reactor from North Korea, paying Pyongyang between $1 billion and $2 billion for the project. The Khan network – and especially Khan’s Libya deal – saw the transfer of a 10,000-centrifuge plant for between $100 million and $200 million.</p> -<p>Third, and closely linked, Western defence industrial production remains insufficient to match the threat. Even for those European countries where there has been some increase in defence spending, it has not yet made much impact on defence industrial production. Moreover, this is not just a European and Ukrainian challenge as global events increase the demand for higher and sustained industrial production.</p> +<p>North Korean arms sales have also been heavily shaped by the financial incentives of North Korean arms trading company representatives – essentially, the salespeople – working overseas. These representatives are often accredited as diplomats, work out of embassies, and are entrepreneurial in building relationships and exploiting opportunities. Indeed, they are compelled to be entrepreneurial: North Korea’s overseas missions, including embassies, are believed to be self-funding, tasked with raising funds to sustain themselves and the regime back in Pyongyang. While the financial driver at this working level may manifest itself through arms sales, decisions to sell missiles and nuclear technology are likely far more sensitive, and almost certainly are taken in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, North Korean operatives abroad are likely to be under pressure to identify revenue-generating opportunities to decision-makers in Pyongyang, which may include potential deals for the transfer of missile or even nuclear technology.</p> -<p>Fourth, the existing cooperative Euro-Atlantic security structures are no longer fit for purpose, including a near-total erosion of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures that previously constrained Russia. The 7 November statement that NATO allies would suspend the operation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty following Russia’s withdrawal acknowledges the depressing reality. Western capitals need to think creatively about new arrangements, including how to keep the US engaged.</p> +<p>There is also potential for North Korea to engage in barter trade as it has in the past, exchanging missile and nuclear technology, expertise and materials for other goods. Experts interviewed for this paper pointed to oil, grains and fertiliser as goods that North Korea may be especially interested in procuring in a barter arrangement. In the 2000s, the Myanmar government “gifted” rice to North Korea in exchange for “technical services and equipment”, which reportedly included conventional weapons. Recent reports have suggested that Moscow may offer Pyongyang food in exchange for munitions. Such barter arrangements allow North Korea to receive payment without needing to access the international financial system, while also accessing goods it is prohibited from (or may struggle in) procuring freely as a result of sanctions.</p> -<h3 id="britain-returns">Britain Returns!</h3> +<p>Transfers of the full missile and nuclear systems that are likely to prove most lucrative to North Korea have become riskier and more challenging due to increased global awareness of UNSC sanctions on North Korea, improved interdiction capabilities and expanded open source scrutiny of the country’s trade activities. This led some of the experts interviewed to ask whether Pyongyang would continue to pursue missile and nuclear transfers, or shift to less risky and easier to move commodities for revenue generation. North Korea’s increasing exploitation of cryptocurrency is one example of an alternative yet highly lucrative revenue-generation line, with cryptocurrency hacks allegedly generating $1.7 billion for North Korea in 2022.</p> -<p>The Integrated Review Refresh (IRR) of March 2023 represented a sober update of UK strategy. Although it emphasised working alongside allies and partners in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, it reaffirmed the primacy of the Euro-Atlantic area for the UK’s security interests, to be bolstered by a reinvigoration of its European relationships.</p> +<p>Sales of more innocuous but still sanctioned goods and services – such as textiles or the export of construction labour and IT services – are also less risky sources of revenue. For instance, coal has historically been a major source of revenue for North Korea and has been directly linked to the financing of the country’s missile and nuclear programmes, although it may be seen by the broader international community as being less politically sensitive than trade in missile, nuclear or other military technology. However, North Korea’s desperate economic situation may mean that it does not have the luxury of choosing between revenue streams, and may instead require it to pursue all means available to raise funds.</p> -<p>Two years ago, these were in a mess. Post-Brexit, UK ministers had opted not to pursue closer ties with EU external initiatives or operations. The announcement in September 2021 of the AUKUS (Australia–UK–US) defence pact had provoked an angry response from France, at the same time as allies were coming to terms with the US-led withdrawal from Afghanistan.</p> +<h4 id="opportunities-for-technology-barter">Opportunities for Technology Barter</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A potential future UK–EU defence and security deal could be far more ambitious than simple third-party UK participation in EU security initiatives</code></em></strong></p> +<p>One form of barter trade which may be particularly attractive to North Korea is the exchange of its missile- or nuclear-related expertise and capabilities for that of other states, or engagement in collaborative missile and nuclear technology development. As mentioned earlier, striking deals which benefit North Korea technologically has long been at the core of the country’s proliferation deal-making. As Pollack has noted in his work on North Korea’s nuclear trade:</p> -<p>The UK has now inched towards a more pragmatic relationship with the EU. The February 2023 Windsor Framework unlocked the possibility of closer security and defence cooperation, initially in cyber security and counterterrorism, and the UK joined the EU military mobility project. These steps proceeded alongside close practical cooperation on Russia sanctions. In a worsening security environment, a potential future UK–EU defence and security deal could be far more ambitious than simple third-party UK participation in EU security initiatives.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>While the evidence is ambiguous, a careful examination suggests that many past transfers were actually done not for profit but in exchange for components or materials that benefited Pyongyang’s own nuclear program.</p> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="new-opportunities-and-challenges-for-the-uk">New Opportunities and Challenges for the UK</h3> +<p>Of the three nuclear cases that Pollack examines (see the first three listed in Box 2), he noted that each potentially had a barter aspect to them. However, evidence is admittedly thin in places. For example, assisting Pakistan’s krytron development came after the transfer of centrifuge components, drawings and plans to North Korea; transfers of UF6 into the Khan network may have been repayment for Khan’s assistance to North Korea in producing it; and North Korea could potentially have benefited from plutonium produced in the Al-Kibar reactor.</p> -<p>The transformation of European security is still unfolding, but the current constellation creates special challenges for the UK, considering that it is a leading European member of NATO and the Joint Expeditionary Force but now sits outside the EU, and given how invested it is in its new defence partnership with Ukraine and its long-standing security relationship with the US. Each of these carries uncertainty.</p> +<p>As Pyongyang continues to develop its missile and nuclear programmes, exchanging complementary expertise or working on new advances in collaboration with partners will remain an attractive option, albeit one that likely has less necessity and more limited returns than in the past, given North Korea’s own recent technological successes in its nuclear and missile programmes. Priority areas for North Korea’s missile development – and for potential collaboration opportunities – are likely to include items outlined in the five-year plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021. These include improvements in missile accuracy up to a range of 15,000 km, improvements in solid fuel propulsion for submarine-launched and ground-based ICBMs, military reconnaissance satellites, and R&amp;D in hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered submarines and UAVs.</p> -<p>First, and most importantly, there is the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The UK and other European states increased support to Ukraine in 2023 alongside rising expectations of a Ukrainian military breakthrough. But winter is now upon us, and the ground war is likely to slow ahead of fresh fighting in spring 2024. With a static strategic frontline, external calls for Ukraine to reach an accommodation with Russia may grow. Yet the UK committed itself in the IRR to “supporting Ukraine to reassert its sovereignty and denying Russia any strategic benefit from its invasion”. It therefore appears bound to continue to advocate the Ukrainian cause and ensure that it has the capabilities to sustain combat operations to liberate its territory.</p> +<p>Given North Korea’s technological successes and the sanctions regime, there is now a smaller range of countries that could both offer technology the country could benefit from and, importantly, be willing to offer such technology in exchange for North Korean wares. An obvious candidate would be Iran, as it has made great leaps in its centrifuge and missile programmes over the past decade. One expert interviewed for the project also suggested that there may be room for cooperation between Iran and North Korea on hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia could be another candidate. Further North Korean arms transfers to Russia (potentially including ballistic missiles) could allow North Korea to request technology from Russia’s extensive WMD and other high-technology programmes – such as its space launch or submarine programmes – in return. Moscow’s willingness to provide such technologies, given its historical commitments to non-proliferation and its potential security concerns vis-à-vis a North Korea with more advanced missile and nuclear capabilities, are not a given, but recent engagement seems to suggest a potential willingness to cooperate (see Box 3).</p> -<p>Second, 2024 will be a decisive year for US focus and commitment. Washington will host the next NATO Summit in July, and the Alliance will mark the 75th anniversary of the signing of the Washington Treaty in April. These events will take place against a complex US domestic political background, including Congress’s uncertain appetite for support to Ukraine and the prospect of a second Trump presidency that could be even more challenging for US allies than the first one.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-3-war-in-ukraine-and-the-growing-north-korearussia-technology-transfer-axis"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 3: War in Ukraine and the Growing North Korea–Russia Technology Transfer Axis</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The current UK government and opposition both stress their Atlanticism. But, with the US having security priorities elsewhere and an unpredictable presidential election ahead, the UK must work harder, alongside European allies, to keep the Euro-Atlantic security community together. Such a leaning into Europe would be welcome in Washington. Strangely, therefore, the best way for the UK to sustain its Atlanticist objectives may be to do more with its European neighbours.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Recent developments in North Korea’s relationship with Russia are concerning for the future of both non-proliferation efforts and the UN sanctions regime. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created a need for weaponry and materiel, as well as renewed efforts by an increasingly isolated Moscow to garner political support from a smaller range of allies and partners. Initial arms transfers of “infantry rockets and missiles” were allegedly made between North Korea and the Wagner Group in November 2022. More recently, research has suggested that hundreds of containers of weaponry – likely ammunition – have been transferred from North Korea to Russian military bases, while South Korean intelligence reported indications of North Korean ballistic missile transfers to Russia in early November 2023.</code></em></p> -<p>One thing is certain: Europe’s security transformation is far from over.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The potential for exchange of more advanced and strategically important technology is clear. In July 2023, Russian Defence Minister Shoigu was shown around an arms fair in Pyongyang by Kim Jong-un, where he viewed ICBMs, SRBMs, hypersonic missiles and UAVs. During Kim’s trip to Russia to meet Putin in September 2023, the Russian leader hosted his North Korean counterpart at Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome and noted North Korea’s interest in rocket and space technology. Media reports surrounding the meeting also suggested North Korea was interested in “advanced technology for satellites and nuclear-powered submarines”. Further details are yet to emerge. However, advances in missile technologies – including items identified in Pyongyang’s 2021 plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems – are also likely to be on North Korea’s wishlist for Moscow.</code></em></p> -<hr /> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">With these breaches of the arms embargo and possible movement towards breaches on the prohibition on transfers of other technologies, the future of the UN sanctions regime – which in some senses has been on life support for several years – is precarious. In September 2023, around the time of Kim’s visit, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov noted that sanctions were “adopted in a completely different geopolitical situation” and accused Western states of “lies” over humanitarian support. If Russia, a UNSC permanent member, so blatantly violates sanctions and is seen to use North Korean arms or missile systems in Ukraine, it may lead other states to look to North Korea for arms, and could potentially open the floodgates for further North Korean arms and missile sales.</code></em></p> -<p><strong>Ed Arnold</strong> is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on the transformation of European security following Russia’s war on Ukraine. Specifically, he covers the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the security of northern Europe, and the UK contribution to European security through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force, and other fora.</p> +<h4 id="ideological-and-foreign-policy-considerations">Ideological and Foreign Policy Considerations</h4> -<p><strong>Peter Jones</strong> served in the British Diplomatic Service for over thirty years, retiring from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in 2021. Peter was Chief Operating Officer and Director-General at the then Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) from 2017 to 2020, up to its merger with the Department for International Development.</p>Ed Arnold and Peter JonesThe European security in transformation is starting to settle into new patterns, accelerated by Russia’s war on Ukraine, as new actors and groupings emerge. For the UK, this shifting landscape creates both challenges and leadership opportunities as it heads towards its next general election.N. Korea’s Sanctions-Busting2023-11-22T12:00:00+08:002023-11-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/north-koreas-sanctions-busting<p><em>Pyongyang’s alleged decision to close around a quarter of its overseas missions reflects both the evolving sanctions-busting landscape and more concerning rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.</em></p> +<p>In the past, North Korea’s sales opportunities have been influenced – in part – by its broader foreign policy relationships and objectives, and vice versa. Pyongyang’s arms exports began during the Cold War, expanding significantly through the 1970s and 1980s, as North Korea built its military–industrial complex. Through its Cold War military sales, the country sought to demonstrate its commitment to the socialist cause, strengthen the capabilities of fellow members of the socialist bloc, and gain favour with Moscow and Beijing. Even during the Cold War, however, ideology was not the sole driver of North Korea’s military transfers, with the export of military technology and expertise being part of its broader efforts to consolidate relationships with developing countries around the world and compete with Seoul for influence.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has continued to do business and conclude cooperation agreements in a range of fields with a variety of countries, with no indication of any discrimination on ideological grounds or links to any known direct North Korean security interests. Unlike Iran, which has been known to transfer missiles to its proxies across the Middle East, North Korea does not have similar relationships with proxies on whom it might rely to achieve certain security objectives, and thus be incentivised to transfer capabilities to.</p> -<p>Recently, signs have emerged that North Korea will shrink its diplomatic network. Outposts in Angola, Hong Kong, Spain and Uganda are among “as many as a dozen” missions – a quarter of North Korea’s network of around 50 – that are allegedly slated for closure. As well as assuming more traditional diplomatic functions, North Korea’s missions have played a wider range of roles in support of the country’s national interests, and have grown in importance as Pyongyang struggles with economic isolation and the extensive UN sanctions regime.</p> +<p>Recent geopolitical developments may create greater opportunities for North Korea to strengthen political ties through technology transfer. Russian arms purchases from, and growing engagement with, North Korea creates political benefits for Pyongyang. While new UN sanctions resolutions have been an unlikely prospect in recent years, with no agreement even on new entities to be added to the UN sanctions list, the relationship with Russia helps to bring North Korea out of its sanctions isolation. The apparent degradation of the international sanctions regime could also see a resurgence in what Berger describes as “reluctant” customers, as well as “ad hoc” ones. This could make other potential customers view relationships with North Korea involving arms transfers as acceptable, and could even give North Korea new opportunities to pursue such relationships alongside (and in support of) Russian activities in Africa, for example.</p> -<p>As I outlined in a RUSI report published last year, North Korea’s embassies, consulates, trade offices and representative missions to international organisations – and the diplomats and intelligence officers that reside there – have played key roles in procuring technology for, and funding, Pyongyang’s nuclear, missile and military programmes. The closure of these missions likely reflects both a tactical-level evolution in North Korea’s sanctions-busting efforts as well as shifting geopolitical realities, with more strategic-level implications for the UN sanctions regime.</p> +<p>In short, these recent developments mean that North Korea has more to play for in pursuing its international relationships and in using technology to that end. However, there is no indication that ideological sympathies or diplomatic priorities are going to be the only or even the primary driver of North Korean sales of military technology abroad – including missile and nuclear technology. Rather, these considerations will serve as a facilitator for, and an additional benefit from, Pyongyang’s illicit trade, which will still likely be driven by opportunism and the need for revenue generation.</p> -<h3 id="from-the-missions-to-the-missiles">From the Missions to the Missiles</h3> +<h4 id="sanctions-transfer-environment-and-risks-of-interdiction">Sanctions, Transfer Environment and Risks of Interdiction</h4> -<p>North Korea’s missions have been key nodes in its sanctions-busting efforts, providing the skeleton of a near-global presence that has been used extensively to undertake and support operations. These sanctions-busting roles have fallen into three main categories. First, the missions and the diplomats stationed there are involved in revenue-raising and – given that the revenue raised likely benefits North Korea’s weapons programmes – “proliferation financing”.</p> +<p>The risk of interdiction, sanctions and other punitive measures is a major disincentivising factor for most countries when it comes to engaging in missile, nuclear and most other trade with North Korea. As such, North Korea’s biggest customers for arms and missile technologies today largely fall within what Berger describes as the “resilient” group. These are customers that continue to engage in business with Pyongyang despite UNSC sanctions, driven by longstanding political and military ties or else similarly under international arms embargoes or otherwise isolated. Iran, Syria and potentially Myanmar (see Box 4) clearly fit this profile, as countries that have little to lose politically by engaging with North Korea, have historical ties with Pyongyang (including in the sphere of military cooperation), and which are themselves isolated and limited in their weapons procurement options. The benefit (or necessity) of doing business with North Korea outweighs the risk of further sanctions or other reprimands for these countries from the US, the UN or others, as their economies are already subject to sanctions. However, the actual demand for North Korean longer-range missile and/or nuclear technology from these countries is likely to be tempered by some of the other factors outlined in this paper – including absence of need for these more strategic technologies, perceived unreliability of North Korea as a supplier, and the availability of similar options from other isolated suppliers.</p> -<p>This has included trade in sanctioned commodities, with diplomats supporting sanctioned coal and vanadium exports. Diplomats have also run overseas businesses and raised revenue by leasing diplomatic real estate or even by abusing diplomatic alcohol allowances. One of the most prevalent revenue-raising activities for North Korea has been arms sales. Representatives of North Korea’s arms-dealing entities have frequently been accredited as diplomats.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-4-myanmar-a-relationship-renewed"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 4: Myanmar: A Relationship Renewed?</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Second, Pyongyang’s diplomats have acted as buyers, procuring a wide range of sanctioned goods for import to North Korea. Most concerningly, embassies and diplomatic networks have long procured technology for the country’s weapons programmes, with the embassies in Beijing, Berlin and Moscow being particularly active in this regard. In Moscow, a member of the Office of the Commercial Counsellor – a diplomat named O Yong Ho – sought to procure a range of goods for North Korea’s missile programmes, including aramid fibre, manufacturing equipment, a spinning nozzle, chemicals and stainless steel used in missile fuel production and the construction of submarine hulls. In 2018, a senior German intelligence official noted that the embassy in Berlin had been repeatedly used to acquire missile and nuclear-related technologies, many of which were so-called dual-use technologies of utility in civil and weapons programmes.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Myanmar is believed to have previously purchased ballistic missile technology from North Korea alongside a more extensive variety of other conventional weapons technology. However, the specifics of the transfers are opaque. In 2012, the US government noted that Myanmar had been a customer of North Korea’s missile programme, while a leaked Myanmar government report suggested that Burmese military representatives had visited a missile factory in North Korea capable of producing Scuds and likely Nodong missiles in 2008, alongside a range of other facilities in the country. A more recent, unconfirmed report notes that 20 North Korean missile technicians were in Myanmar until 2015, and – citing independent researchers based in the country – that missile cooperation has restarted between the two countries in the wake of the 2021 military coup.</code></em></p> -<p>Diplomats have also been involved in the procurement of intangible technologies – sensitive knowledge, information and even weapons designs. In 2011, representatives from North Korea’s Belarus Trade Office were caught in a sting operation seeking sensitive missile-related information in Ukraine. Additionally, in 2019, O Yong Ho procured CAD drawings for a Russian cruise missile. Diplomatic procurement efforts also involve much more benign goods – sanctioned luxury items and other commodities – which are scarce in North Korea and help maintain the court economy.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Myanmar’s military regime has also been accused of nuclear weapons aspirations in the past, notably around 2010, centred around allegations by a defector who worked in Myanmar’s strategic industries – but these were largely discounted. Experts interviewed for this paper expressed scepticism that Myanmar would be interested in a nuclear weapons capability, noting the country’s pressing economic and internal security challenges. Past reports that Myanmar was interested in building a nuclear weapon have also been rejected by members of the US intelligence community and other experts. The fact that the Myanmar military’s primary concern is domestic armed insurgency also raises questions over the utility of procuring advanced missile capabilities or nuclear weapons technology from North Korea, although such capabilities could help the regime feel more secure against external invasion.</code></em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea’s missions have been key nodes in its sanctions-busting efforts, providing the skeleton of a near-global presence that has been used to undertake and support operations</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Moving large physical shipments to and from North Korea covertly (see Box 5) has become markedly more difficult amid an improved understanding of common sanctions-evasion practices, and in light of the ability of governments and non-governmental organisations over the past decade to scrutinise North Korea’s airports, ports and border crossings using satellite imagery, trade and corporate data, and other investigative resources. The border closures caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (see Box 6) and resultant reductions in trade have also made recent movements of goods easier to detect. Increased monitoring and the potential for interdiction has therefore raised the risks of undertaking transfers of missile and nuclear goods, as well as deploying North Korean technicians, from North Korea itself. In contexts where interdiction was not possible previously, ships believed to be carrying suspicious cargo for Pyongyang have been pursued by naval vessels and forced to return to North Korea.</p> -<p>Third, the missions and their occupants have provided support to North Korea’s overseas business networks through providing use of bank accounts, hosting banking representatives, moving funds and even providing logistical support. As the UN Panel of Experts that monitors North Korea sanctions implementation noted in a 2017 report, Pyongyang’s missions “open accounts that, in effect, perform the services that a financial institution would”. Elsewhere, diplomats have smuggled gold and precious metals as a means of moving funds. Missions have also been closely connected to North Korea’s shipping networks.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-5-evolving-means-of-transfer"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 5: Evolving Means of Transfer</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="missions-slated-for-closure">Missions Slated for Closure</h3> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Historically, transfers of North Korean missiles were undertaken by state-connected air freight and shipping fleets. In large part, a shift away from the more obvious state-connected modes of transport towards commercial shipping has been observed since the mid-2000s. A 2021 PoE report, however, notes that state-owned shipping companies have continued to play a role. According to one unnamed UN member state, KOMID – which has been called North Korea’s “primary arms dealer” and main exporter of missile technology – has reportedly cooperated with Iran’s SHIG on shipment logistics, engaging in “shipments to Iran, using vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and routinely operating non-stop voyages from one third country ports to Iran”.</code></em></p> -<p>Personnel based at two of the missions slated for closure – those in Angola and Uganda –have been heavily involved in sanctioned activities. More recently, North Korea’s relationship with Angola – which dates to the early 1970s – has seen the embassy in Luanda host Pyongyang’s arms dealers. Two diplomats, who were concurrently acting as representatives of North Korean arms dealer Green Pine Associated Corporation, travelled from Angola to Sri Lanka multiple times to discuss Pyongyang’s refurbishment of naval patrol vessels between 2014 and 2016. One of these Green Pine representatives concurrently negotiated contracts, sourced parts and oversaw the refurbishment of the Angolan navy’s own patrol boats. North Korean business in the country also went beyond military equipment. The UN-sanctioned entity Mansudae Overseas Projects undertook 56 construction projects in Angola up until 2015, including the mausoleum that holds the remains of the country’s first president.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Geography also determines the easiest shipment routes, with rail connections across the border between North Korea and Russia allegedly being used to move weapons to the Wagner Group in November 2022. Russia and China’s evolving stance on North Korean sanctions could make North Korea’s land borders important vectors for proliferation-sensitive exports. However, more recent arms transfers between North Korea and Russia seem to have involved initial shipments from the former to a Russian submarine base using Russian-flagged and military-connected cargo ships running a “shuttle” service with their automatic identification system (AIS) transponders turned off to avoid detection.</code></em></p> -<p>According to the UN Panel, a Military Attaché and diplomats based at the embassy in Kampala, Uganda, oversaw North Korean training of Ugandan air force pilots, technicians and police between 2017 and 2018. Showcasing how North Korean diplomats operate transnationally, the Attaché – a Colonel in the Korean People’s Army – was described in correspondence as the representative of the North Korean armed forces in “Uganda and East Africa” and offered neighbouring South Sudan “Presidential Guard and special forces training” and “tank crew training” while based in Kampala.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The challenging logistical environment will likely see North Korean proliferation networks continue to adapt. Pyongyang may seek to fulfil more of its contracts entirely outside its borders, establishing manufacturing facilities in client states – as it previously had in Namibia to produce conventional weapons, for example – or in third countries, and relying increasingly on the extensive procurement networks it has established, notably in China but also around the world, to source the necessary components and materials. There may also be fewer interdiction risks if North Korean exports continue to shift towards projects that combine tangible and intangible support. In these arrangements – as seen in missile relationships with Iran and Syria, and the Al-Kibar reactor project – North Korean operatives can procure goods for projects largely outside of North Korea, and exports from North Korea can be limited to specific goods and technicians.</code></em></p> -<p>There is less evidence of sanctions-busting activities by the North Korean Consulate in Hong Kong, a third mission which currently looks slated for closure. However, the axis between the city and Macau has seen significant North Korean connections over the years. North Korea long sought to open a trade office in Hong Kong and to commence Air Koryo flights to the city while it was under British rule and prior to the Consulate opening in 1998. More recently, as research by RUSI’s OSIA research group has noted, Hong Kong and businesses there have been a crucial node in the networks undertaking illegal oil shipments to North Korea. The role of Hong Kong businesses in selling high-end chips as part of Russia’s illicit supply chains for military electronics also suggests that North Korea could usefully shop in the city.</p> +<p>The constraint that the sanctions environment is currently imposing on North Korea is contingent to a significant degree on Russia and China’s future actions, with the evolution of North Korea’s growing relationship with Russia being pivotal. However, several interviewed experts noted that China’s willingness to turn a blind eye to North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation is not likely to be unlimited, especially in cases where developments affect China’s national security interests. Beijing is a signatory to a range of non-proliferation agreements and has its own security interests that may be undermined by North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology transfers. For example, China’s clear interest in avoiding instability on the Korean peninsula, and particularly any proliferation actions by North Korea that might elicit a response from the US and its allies, could potentially lead Beijing to exert pressure on Pyongyang to prevent it from engaging in such transfers. However, the degree of influence that Beijing has over Pyongyang’s onward proliferation decision-making calculus is likely limited. Some analysts have argued that China’s interest in maintaining stability in Pyongyang actually makes Beijing reticent about applying political or economic pressure, unless the risks of inaction outweigh the costs (for example, in the instance of potential North Korean nuclear warhead or fissile material transfers). Ultimately, the degree of direct coordination between Beijing and Pyongyang on sensitive matters such as missile and nuclear transfers – which would likely take place at the highest levels – is very difficult to ascertain.</p> -<h3 id="adaptation-in-north-koreas-networks">Adaptation in North Korea’s Networks</h3> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-6-the-covid-19-pandemic"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 6: The Covid-19 Pandemic</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Given the range of sanctions-busting activities that North Korean embassies have conducted, the closure of as many as a dozen missions at once is surprising. These steps come as Pyongyang is reopening to the world following nearly three years of Covid-19-induced border closures. They showcase adaptation in North Korea’s sanctions-busting networks in real time – a result of several shaping factors.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea shut its borders to all passenger and commercial traffic at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. Satellite imagery in March 2020 showed North Korean ships being recalled to the country’s ports, while land crossings with China and Russia were closed and border fences, guard posts and patrol roads were reinforced and expanded. North Korea also stopped the rotation of diplomats from its missions abroad – as it likely also did with its missile and arms technicians and procurement operatives based overseas. The country, relatively isolated in normal times, closed itself off almost entirely from the rest of the world. In the second half of 2023, though, there were signs that the borders were starting to open up again. Movement through ports and land crossings increased, restrictions on some official travel eased in spring, and North Korean nationals abroad (including some workers) were allowed to return as of August 2023, with limited commercial flights restarting that same month.</code></em></p> -<p>The decision may have a cost-saving rationale. North Korea’s missions are allegedly self-financing, raising hard currency to cover their own operations and sending all surpluses back to Pyongyang. Perhaps these specific missions are not as profitable as they once were. Indeed, both the Angolan and Ugandan governments have taken steps to reduce their connections to North Korea since the mid-2010s. In early 2020, Angola repatriated almost 300 North Korean workers, many of them working in the medical sector. Uganda allegedly cut military ties with Pyongyang around 2016, but subsequent reports suggest cooperation continued past that date.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is difficult to definitively assess the impact of these restrictions on North Korea’s procurement efforts and the onward transfer of missile and nuclear technology from the country. It is reasonable to assume that transfers slowed significantly between early 2020 and 2023. Several experts interviewed for this paper pointed to the pandemic restrictions as a reason why they were sceptical that North Korea was actively exporting missile and nuclear technology. However, North Korean technicians based overseas were also likely stuck abroad in customer states and unable to return home. As the country begins to open its borders and resume trade, missile and nuclear technology transfers may become more likely – particularly given recent North Korean efforts to exhibit its wares, and amid the further disintegration of the UN sanctions consensus. The restrictions on trade and travel since 2020 have also further exacerbated the economic situation within North Korea, creating further pressure to generate revenue or source critical supplies like food from abroad, which may further incentivise the sale of missile and/or nuclear technology.</code></em></p> -<p>Other diplomatic missions and actors can likely pick up the slack when these missions close, and potentially in a more cost-effective way. Nearby remaining missions may be designated by Pyongyang to provide coverage for business activities in these jurisdictions, just as the mission in Rome will provide diplomatic coverage in Spain following the closure of the mission in Madrid. North Korea’s diplomatic arms dealers in Africa already operate across borders, and representatives may be tasked to widen their remit.</p> +<h4 id="security-concerns-over-advanced-deterrent-capabilities">Security Concerns Over Advanced Deterrent Capabilities</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The open violation of the sanctions on Pyongyang by Russia could have a serious knock-on effect for the sanctions regime more broadly</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Security concerns, paired with the challenging transfer environment, will likely make North Korea carefully consider the transfer of certain particularly strategically important systems and technologies. These sensitivities are likely to stem from the risk that transferred technologies or information surrounding them may fall into enemy hands, with negative impacts for North Korea’s own nuclear deterrent. For example, North Korea’s adversaries could gain valuable information about North Korean capabilities from seized shipments of nuclear or missile technologies, related goods and materials, or even wreckage recovered from the battlefield. Intelligence can be derived from seized technologies, providing insights into manufacturing, supply chains and capabilities.</p> -<p>Other actors – those without diplomatic accreditation – may also pick up the slack. Indeed, diplomats may have a declining importance in North Korea’s sanctions-busting. Previously, as states around the world became hostile to North Korean business activities, diplomatic networks became more important. Diplomats had several “competitive advantages” over private individuals, largely stemming from the immunities and privileges afforded by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Diplomats cannot be arrested, and diplomatic properties and vehicles cannot be searched.</p> +<p>Examination of interdicted missiles, or wreckage recovered after their use, may yield insights into North Korea’s manufacturing capabilities or the specific types of technology that it is importing to develop its programmes. This could allow North Korea’s adversaries to better counter the country’s illicit supply chains. Nuclear forensic techniques could provide insights into North Korea’s fuel cycle if North Korean fissile material or contaminated goods were seized in transit. Intelligence gained through examination of seized or recovered goods can also be used to construct countermeasures. This is a particular concern with regard to more modern ballistic missiles that might yield insights to inform developments in missile defence capabilities and arrangements by the US or its partners such as South Korea and Japan. The transfer of certain newer systems unique to North Korea would also reduce the prospect of potential plausible deniability of Pyongyang’s involvement in the transfer.</p> -<p>However, efforts to recognise and address diplomatic sanctions-busting have intensified since 2016. Despite far-from-universal sanctions implementation, North Korea’s missions now likely attract interest from South Korean, Western and other intelligence agencies around the world. The use of local or third-country nationals, or indeed third-country passports obtained by North Koreans, could provide Pyongyang with less obvious means of conducting business than using diplomatic cover.</p> +<p>If North Korea is concerned about undermining its own security through transfers, this would lead to the development of two categories of systems. The first includes items that are core to North Korea’s security, and which would not be transferred: interviewees referred to these as the “crown jewels” or “top state secrets core to North Korea’s survivability”. This would include nuclear warheads and fissile material – which would be unlikely to be transferred for several reasons – as well as ICBMs and other missiles core to North Korea’s deterrent. The second category would include lower-level and older technology, which North Korea would be less concerned about transferring.</p> -<p>Concurrently, newer sanctions-busting opportunities are likely more profitable than those facilitated by the missions. Although Pyongyang is not in a position to be picky over its revenue streams, the $1.7 billion of cryptocurrency stolen by North Korea-linked hackers in 2022, and the millions that can be gained remotely through IT outsourcing, likely far eclipse the amounts that can be generated by small-scale arms sales or construction contracts in sub-Saharan Africa.</p> +<p>Chapter I explored some of the surplus technologies that may fall into this second category and discussed several reasons why North Korea may not be willing to transfer all of its older systems. A few further considerations may also follow from this security thesis. Reluctance to export newer systems and reveal information could lead to the development of export variants for the new SRBMs. However, this would require significant upfront investment from Pyongyang or its customers, which would be challenging in an environment with limited cash flow – which is exactly the situation in which North Korea and many of its historical and potential customers find themselves. It is also possible that if the design information of certain systems is compromised (for example, after wreckage is recovered after a test, or following a hack of the manufacturers), the security rationales against wider transfer for that particular system may be undermined, if concerns about the compromise of strategically important information on certain North Korean capabilities is indeed a consideration.</p> -<p>Indeed, recent geopolitical shifts may also provide more bountiful opportunities. North Korea’s normalising relationship with Russia, its alleged transfer of hundreds of containers of weaponry to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine, and the potential for other commercial opportunities may see North Korea’s diplomacy and energy more focused on this relationship. The open violation of the sanctions on Pyongyang by Russia – a UN Security Council permanent member which voted for the measures – could have a serious knock-on effect for the sanctions regime more broadly and its implementation around the world.</p> +<h4 id="changing-technologies-and-markets">Changing Technologies and Markets</h4> -<h3 id="tactical-adaptation-and-strategic-gloom">Tactical Adaptation and Strategic Gloom</h3> +<p>Technological developments may also restrict demand for North Korea’s missile offerings. Chapter I outlined the remaining (but shrinking) market for the Scud-and Tochka-like technologies that North Korea may have in surplus. Indeed, due to its extensive history of Scud exports and – in some cases – related manufacturing capabilities, North Korea may have reduced its appeal as a supplier to some customers that managed to absorb the technology. However, in the present day, North Korea’s missile sales also have to compete with newer technologies and suppliers.</p> -<p>Beyond their overt diplomatic function, North Korea’s missions and diplomats are persistent participants in – and coordinators holding together – the dark sanctions-busting economy that has kept the Kim regime afloat through almost two decades of sanctions.</p> +<p>For instance, militaries’ growing demand for UAVs is well documented. UAVs may be seen as a less expensive and more operationally appropriate system by some countries that would have previously sought short-range missiles. While UAV and SRBM capabilities differ significantly, including in their utility, the former may be well-suited – if not more desirable – for states without an active missile programme and in need of low-yield but high-precision capabilities to carry out limited and precise attacks in neighbouring countries or against factions on their own territories. UAVs are cheaper, more versatile, and easier to produce and transfer than ballistic missiles.</p> -<p>North Korea’s closure of many its missions reflects both tactical and strategic-level developments. The closures represent the tactical adaptation of North Korea’s networks, with the missions in question likely not as profitable as they used to be, and with new and more “remote-working” sanctions-busting operations perhaps proving more lucrative.</p> +<p>North Korea has shown some advances in its UAV programme, with drones penetrating South Korean airspace in recent years, and two large novel UAV systems shown to Shoigu in Pyongyang in July 2023. However, Iran’s capabilities for producing and exporting these systems are more advanced: Iran has well-established UAV capabilities and has exported drones to partners in the region and further afield. Critically, Iranian UAVs have now been extensively battle-tested – not only by Iranian proxies in the Middle East but also on a large scale by Russian forces in Ukraine. As such, past customers of North Korean SRBMs may now look to Iran as a UAV supplier instead. As Pollack noted, the 1991 Gulf War helped to shape missile markets, reducing interest in North Korean products as cruise missiles played a prominent role. Russia’s war on Ukraine could also affect potential North Korean missile markets, although extensive UAV and missile use makes it difficult to establish possible lessons at this stage.</p> -<p>However, strategic-level developments – notably Russia’s willingness to re-engage with North Korea – also help to account for Pyongyang’s declining need for these assets. The economic benefits of Russia’s arms purchases and broader re-engagement could far surpass the meagre revenue that can be raised through the missions slated for closure. Concerningly, this shift – and North Korea’s changing diplomatic priorities – also reflects a gloomy outlook for the UN sanctions regime.</p> +<p>Iran is also an established proliferator of missile technology, having exported missiles to proxies and partners in the Middle East. With the expiry of the UNSC embargo on nuclear-capable missiles and related technology trade with Iran in October 2023, Iran may seek to expand its customer base and thus pose competition for North Korea in securing new customers for its missile technology (although such trade with Iran is still sanctioned by the US, Europe and others).</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="claims-to-nuclear-responsibility">Claims to Nuclear Responsibility</h4> -<p><strong>Daniel Salisbury</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.</p>Daniel SalisburyPyongyang’s alleged decision to close around a quarter of its overseas missions reflects both the evolving sanctions-busting landscape and more concerning rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.“Sewage Of The Cold War”2023-11-21T12:00:00+08:002023-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sewage-of-the-cold-war<p><em>Although China’s views on NATO have fluctuated since the early days of the Cold War, Beijing’s recent statements on the alliance have sharpened.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This report argues that they amount to a “rhetorical attack” on the alliance’s legitimacy that can potentially undermine trust among its Asia-Pacific partners and, more broadly, confidence in Western ideas of collective security. The report offers recommendations for investments NATO should make in understanding, tracking, and countering Chinese narratives about the alliance.</em></p> +<p>A final restraining factor – albeit one with unclear salience – consists of the non-proliferation norms that emerged after 1945, and North Korea’s notion of nuclear responsibility. The UN sanctions regime imposed on North Korea was, in some sense, an embodiment of these norms. Since acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, North Korea has repeatedly referred to itself as a “responsible nuclear power”, including in the context of onward nuclear proliferation. These are likely efforts by Pyongyang to normalise itself as a legitimate nuclear power outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – akin to the status enjoyed by Pakistan and India.</p> -<h3 id="summary">Summary</h3> +<p>In an October 2006 statement, just days after North Korea’s first nuclear test and the subsequent UNSC resolution condemning it, North Korea’s foreign minister referred to the country as a “responsible nuclear weapons state [that] will never use nukes first and will not allow nuclear transfer”. These claims have most recently been codified in the September 2022 Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces (Section 10):</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Sino-NATO relations have oscillated between adversary and ally.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Since 2019, Beijing’s communications on NATO have sharpened in ways that amount to a rhetorical attack on the alliance. This shift has coincided with intensified Sino-US competition, Chinese concerns about multilateral security associations in Asia, and closer Sino-Russia relations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>China’s recent critiques of NATO contend that the organization is an obsolete artifact of the Cold War and a belligerent force that undermines regional peace and stability. China’s rhetoric also portrays NATO’s partnerships as an illegitimate intrusion into the Asia-Pacific region.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Although the audience for China’s narrative on NATO may be as much domestic as foreign, if the message is not countered, it could undermine the alliance’s efforts to sustain and develop Indo-Pacific partnerships and erode support for alliances with the United States more generally.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>NATO should, therefore, make proportionate investments to equip itself with mechanisms for monitoring, analyzing, and responding to China’s rhetorical attacks.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<blockquote> + <p>The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, shall neither deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of other countries nor share them and not transfer nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned and weapon-grade nuclear substances.</p> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Of course, the earnestness of these claims is unclear. By virtue of developing a nuclear weapons programme outside the recognised international non-proliferation framework – namely, the NPT – North Korea has already demonstrated its disregard for nuclear non-proliferation norms. Several experts interviewed for this paper also noted that North Korea has not offered any definition of what it means by “responsibility” in the nuclear non-proliferation context. However, the excerpt from the 2022 law could arguably be taken as a definition of what Pyongyang considers to be “responsible” behaviour by a nuclear power. Whether Pyongyang’s commitments can be taken at face value is debatable, but its past proliferation of nuclear technology after the 2006 statement should raise serious doubts. There is less of an international consensus regarding missile non-proliferation. North Korea has tended to deny allegations rather than make claims about responsibility when it comes to the transfer of missile systems.</p> -<p>Relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and NATO — the military alliance of 31 European and North American nations initially formed to defend against Soviet aggression — have dropped to their lowest point since the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Simultaneously, the combination of intensified Sino-US competition, increased NATO attention to the PRC, Chinese concerns about multilateral security associations in Asia, and closer Sino-Russia relations have made Chinese attitudes toward NATO more relevant than ever. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the PRC’s communications on NATO have sharpened in ways that amount to a rhetorical attack on the alliance’s legitimacy. And with this rhetoric becoming increasingly hostile, it has the potential to undermine NATO partnerships and relationships not just in the Euro-Atlantic but also in the Indo-Pacific. This suggests a greater need to invest in countering negative narratives to the extent that they can potentially hurt the alliance — with priority given to specific messages and audiences and to relationships with partners in the Asia-Pacific region.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h3> -<p>The PRC’s ambitions and policies — particularly those viewed as “challenges” to the interests, security, and values of the NATO alliance in its 2022 Strategic Concept — are attracting much attention. But what the PRC says about NATO also deserves thoughtful consideration. Although Sino-NATO relations have fluctuated, alternating between opposition and alignment since early in the Cold War, Beijing’s harsh narratives on NATO have recently become more pronounced. On the eve of the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, an editorial in the Global Times, a daily tabloid affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, used vivid language to warn against closer NATO relations with Asia-Pacific partners: “It’s an extremely unwise choice for any Asia-Pacific country and is bound to damage that country’s strategic trust with China, inevitably leading to consequences. . . . The sewage of the Cold War cannot be allowed to flow into the Pacific Ocean.”</p> +<p>With a growing technological offering and a persistent need to generate hard currency, North Korea still has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers. It now has a wider range of more advanced missile and nuclear technologies than ever before, some of which may be available for sale to interested buyers. Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses available for transfer, particularly Scud, Tochka and Nodong missiles, or even surplus or second-hand nuclear and dual-use technologies.</p> -<p>NATO should seek to understand, track, and counter such PRC narratives about the alliance for several reasons: first, these narratives can damage perceptions of NATO by its members and its partners, especially Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea (also known informally as the Asia-Pacific Four, or AP4); second, undermining trust in NATO is a proxy for undermining the principles of collective self-defense and collective security that underpin international security more widely; and third, for the United States and its bilateral allies in the Asia-Pacific region, attacks on NATO are an indirect way of attacking any alliance with the United States.</p> +<p>Despite these clear supply-side drivers, though, a range of factors work to constrain North Korea’s sales – particularly on the demand side of the equation – and these are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. The potential markets and customers for North Korean missile technology have been whittled down by a variety of factors, including North Korea’s assistance to customers in indigenising the technology it has sold, the emergence of competitors such as Iran, and the development of newer and more appealing technologies – namely, UAVs, but potentially also other suppliers and systems in future. The sanctions landscape and the unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula also reduce sales opportunities and increase the risks of interdiction. Given Pyongyang’s recent technological advances, there may also now be only marginal returns on North Korean efforts to obtain technology for its own programmes through barter.</p> -<p>This report examines the PRC’s attitudes toward NATO over time, with a focus on the 2020–2021 period following the debut of NATO’s official statements on the PRC and the periods following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the release of NATO’s Strategic Concept (which articulates a new position on China). The report reviews Chinese perceptions of NATO and identifies the main themes of contemporary Chinese discourse on the alliance. It then considers the intended audiences of PRC hostile narratives before turning to the strengths and vulnerabilities of NATO vis-à-vis these narratives. The report concludes with practical recommendations for the alliance.</p> +<p>Concerns about putting its own deterrent at risk are also likely to temper North Korea’s willingness to export more advanced capabilities, despite the potentially lucrative price tag that could be attached to them. Offering these systems for sale is far riskier than peddling the Scud or even the Nodong systems that were based on well-understood and frugal 1960s Soviet missile technology. Insights gained from interdicted systems or those recovered from the battlefield after leaving North Korean control could do harm to North Korea’s national security. The export of such systems would increase the chances of them falling into adversaries’ hands, despite minimal recent large interdictions of North Korean military shipments.</p> -<h3 id="sino-nato-relations-over-time">Sino-NATO Relations over Time</h3> +<p>In a continuation of some of the trends observed by Joshua Pollack in his work over a decade ago, the limited potential customer base, as well as a more challenging transfer environment, suggests that North Korea is most likely to continue engaging with established missile customers – those that Andrea Berger termed “resilient”, such as Iran or Syria. Future transfers are likely to involve dual-use components or intangible transfers of expertise rather than complete systems – because of limited demand and due to the greater chances of the latter being interdicted. North Korea’s extensive procurement networks outside its borders may also allow it to procure technology from third countries to transfer to customers, meaning that fewer direct shipments would be required. The ubiquity of largely anonymous online platforms may also help to identify potential customers and facilitate the sale of dual-use technology, despite the extensive international sanctions regime.</p> -<p>Since 1949, Sino-NATO relations have fluctuated “between adversary to ally and back again.” Five distinct periods can be identified. After the initial period of early Cold War antipathy, a second period, beginning in 1972, saw China making “an active diplomatic effort to persuade Western European leaders to strengthen NATO” as a way of drawing Soviet strength away from its borders.</p> +<p>At the same time, the changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine may bring new opportunities for North Korea. On the one hand, Pyongyang may benefit financially and technologically from technological exchanges with Russia. On the other, Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea and Moscow’s ability to veto further UNSC sanctions against Pyongyang or any of its future customers may give other countries the green light to accept North Korean missile and maybe even nuclear technology. The cover provided by Russia’s – and, to a less public extent, China’s – patronship of Pyongyang could lead to a significant change in North Korea’s fortunes as a supplier. Although only time will tell how the relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow develops, there remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UN sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.</p> -<p>However, the third period saw NATO cast in a new and dangerous light when a NATO bomb struck China’s embassy in Belgrade during the air campaign of the 1999 Kosovo war, resulting in the deaths of three Chinese nationals. The unfortunate accident had a strong, formative effect on the reputation of NATO in China that persists to this day. Official registration of protest over the bombing was accompanied by state-sanctioned expressions of anger against NATO — involving days of street demonstrations in several major Chinese cities — and the issuance of a rare government statement. On the day of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a PRC foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters that “NATO still owes the Chinese people a debt of blood.”</p> +<p>Building on the above analysis – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations, organised into two sets, to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. The first set concerns efforts to deter and dissuade Pyongyang from engaging in onward proliferation – that is, they address the supply side of the equation. The second set addresses the demand side, suggesting ways to reduce North Korea’s customer base. The recommendations call for an approach that relies both on diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang and on harder measures that signal a willingness to disrupt and punish violations of sanctions and international non-proliferation norms.</p> -<p>The fourth period, following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and NATO’s mission to Afghanistan, was relatively benign despite the PRC’s opposition to NATO expansion and the Balkan interventions. The Afghanistan mission brought NATO to China’s borders, yet Beijing appeared to view the mission positively, whether out of genuine optimism that it would address the threat of Islamist terrorism or as a way of casting some legitimacy on its own counter-terrorism policies in its far western regions. In testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in April 2012, China expert Christina Lin pointed to a series of positive exchanges:</p> +<h4 id="recommendations-for-addressing-supply-side-factors">Recommendations for Addressing Supply-Side Factors</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>In 2002, the Chinese ambassador in Brussels visited NATO headquarters with then SecGen Lord Robertson and explored ways for engagements, particularly in Afghanistan. . . . Following the visit of the Director General of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to NATO Headquarters in 2007, the political dialogue on [the] senior staff level [took] place on a rather regular basis. In May 2007, NATO Military Committee Chairman General Ray Henault expressed that in addition to political relations, NATO wants to establish direct ‘military-to-military’ relations with Chinese armed forces and shake off the embassy-bombing shadow.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Recommendation 1: Clearly message and demonstrate commitments to interdict, learn from and exploit North Korean missile and nuclear transfers.</strong> A concern that North Korea is likely to have over the transfer of its missile and nuclear technology – particularly more advanced or strategically significant systems – is the potential for that technology to fall into the hands of Pyongyang’s adversaries. This concern should be validated and leveraged. The US, the UK and their partners need to continue prioritising efforts at interdicting North Korean shipments of weapons technology, as per their UNSC obligations – either in transit or at their destination (for instance, in Ukraine, should Russia procure and use North Korean missiles in the future). They must also make clear that the technology will be inspected, shared with North Korea’s adversaries and used to help develop effective countermeasures, including missile defence. Outreach should also continue to be conducted on the relevant UNSC resolutions and through informal networks such as the signatory states to the Proliferation Security Initiative “Statement of Interdiction Principles”.</p> -<p>In 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy began cooperating with NATO navies on counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. And in 2011, the Global Times — known for its hawkish views on Chinese foreign policy — published a positive opinion piece about cooperation between NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation 2: Bolster intelligence efforts, engage with allies and support open source researchers as force multipliers.</strong> Further bolstering intelligence collection to target potential North Korean procurement and export networks can help strengthen countermeasures across the board. The US, the UK, and Western and Asia-Pacific allies should ensure that the necessary processes are in place to allow for intelligence-sharing and collaboration in this sphere. They should ensure that new means to monitor potential intangible transfers (especially the movement of people such as technicians and engineers) are developed. This also includes greater exploitation of open source intelligence to further investigate North Korea’s relationships and monitor the internet for potential North Korean marketing of dual-use technologies on B2B websites. The lithium-6 and machine tool examples discussed above, as well as North Korea’s recent arms transfers to Russia, are all export or marketing activities that were uncovered by non-government researchers using open sources. Open source exploitation by non-governmental organisations can be a force multiplier when the intelligence community’s resources are stretched.</p> -<p>The fifth (and current) period of Sino-NATO relations began in 2019. During this period, Beijing’s attitude toward NATO seems to have been formed in considerable part by the deterioration in both US-China and Europe-China relations over the preceding few years. The first time the significance of China’s rise appeared in an official NATO statement was in December 2019; the London Declaration, issued at the NATO Leaders Meeting, stated that Beijing’s “growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges.” Almost a year later, a report entitled “NATO 2030: United for a New Era,” produced by an independent panel of experts appointed by the NATO secretary general, identified China as a “systemic rival” and recommended that NATO “continue efforts to build resilience and counter cyber attacks and disinformation that originate in China.” At their June 2021 summit meeting in Brussels, alliance leaders reiterated and expanded on earlier statements: “China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance. . . . China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation 3: Strengthen counter-proliferation-financing efforts to weaken the revenue-generating potential of North Korean missile and nuclear transfers.</strong> Revenue generation is likely to be North Korea’s key driver for engaging in onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology. Continuing to invest in efforts to prevent Pyongyang from receiving or moving funds can help weaken that incentive. While North Korea may receive some payment by way of barter trade (not involving the formal financial system), targeting financial flows can impact how lucrative Pyongyang believes its proliferation activities to be. This should include continued awareness-raising of international and multilateral sanctions on North Korea, of standards and best practices for countering proliferation financing (CPF), and of common sanctions-evasion methods. National governments and international organisations engaged on CPF issues should prioritise sharing best practices and resources – for instance, model CPF legislation or lists of entities suspected of supporting North Korean proliferation financing (even if these are not sanctioned). While there have so far not been any known cases of North Korea using cryptocurrency as payment for proliferation-related transactions, Pyongyang is clearly transitioning its activities to the online space and has engaged extensively in crypto theft for revenue generation. Ensuring that CPF efforts keep up with these adaptations will be critical.</p> -<p>Perhaps the biggest perceived affront to China has been its treatment in NATO’s Strategic Concept, a long-term strategy and planning document that was revised significantly in 2022 from its previous 2010 version. The document more clearly puts China and NATO in opposing positions: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our [NATO’s] interests, security and values.” The PRC is mainly covered in paragraphs 13 and 14. Paragraph 13 defines the problem:</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation 4: Include non-proliferation commitments in any nuclear negotiations with North Korea.</strong> Any future negotiations with North Korea on its nuclear programme should include commitments to international non-proliferation and nuclear security standards. Including an explicit commitment from North Korea to not transfer nuclear technology to other states – particularly with reference to the 2022 law on its policy on nuclear forces and clarifying North Korea’s definition of nuclear “responsibility” – as part of future negotiations could help positively reinforce any existing tendencies in Pyongyang to present itself as a responsible nuclear custodian. Such an approach, however, would require some level of recognition (even if tacit) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability – a proposition that is the subject of much debate within the expert community.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC’s malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Recommendation 5: Engage with China on preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation, including by highlighting implications for Chinese interests and security.</strong> China has been a key facilitator for North Korean sanctions-evasion activity and likely has at least some, albeit limited, influence on Pyongyang’s decision-making in relation to onward proliferation. Engaging with China on the issue may therefore yield some benefit, especially if Beijing can be convinced to curtail Pyongyang’s access to transhipment routes, as well as financial and corporate infrastructure. To be sure, the likelihood of this approach’s success is dubious, as Chinese interests and security concerns diverge significantly from those of the US, Europe and other East Asian countries concerned with North Korean proliferation. In fact, creating instability in certain parts of East Asia might be in China’s interest if such instability were to absorb US resources and attention. There may be potential to incentivise Chinese cooperation, including through appeals to Beijing’s desire to be seen as a responsible nuclear power, as well as through continued identification and sanctioning of Chinese entities involved in supporting North Korean sanctions evasion. Taking a transactional approach may be another possibility – linking US openness to addressing issues of Chinese concern with Chinese willingness to prevent – or at least not support – North Korean onward proliferation activity. However, the currently limited state of dialogue between the US and China, as well as other issues such as the tension over semiconductor export controls and the issue of Taiwan, will make having an impact in this regard challenging.</p> -<p>Paragraph 14 lists the actions NATO plans to take:</p> +<h4 id="recommendations-for-addressing-demand-side-factors">Recommendations for Addressing Demand-Side Factors</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests. We will work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies. We will boost our shared awareness, enhance our resilience and preparedness, and protect against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Recommendation 6: Double down on counter-proliferation messaging and support.</strong> If indications emerge that North Korea’s onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology is starting to ramp up again, the US and its partners should consider making a clear statement that buyers of North Korean arms, missiles or nuclear technology will be heavily punished with sanctions and other tools. This messaging should, among other things, make clear that states purchasing North Korean technology will be cut off from Western technology across the board, and that they will be made subject to unilateral sanctions and other measures. Messaging should also continue to include the broader implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea. A tailored approach should acknowledge that some states may not perceive engagement with North Korea as problematic – despite international prohibitions to this end – and may actually be sympathetic to supporting the growing camp of anti-Western countries, or may be ambivalent about condemning or countering the behaviour of these anti-Western countries. As such, providing incentives to these countries to comply with their international obligations – whether through appealing to their standing as responsible members of the international community or by offering economic or other support – may be necessary. A combined “carrot and stick” approach is likely to be most effective.</p> -<p>All of this said, regardless of the period of relations, Chinese and NATO interests have at times aligned, proving that the relationship is not inherently antagonistic. Nor have China and NATO necessarily paid significant attention to one another over time. Aside from the Belgrade bombing, as Filip Šebok and Richard Q. Turcsányi noted in a paper for the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, NATO hardly featured in the PRC’s official communications until recently: “There were only 18 direct mentions of NATO in regular press conferences of [the] Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2002 and 2020 — compared to 21 mentions of the Czech Republic, over 200 of Germany, and almost 5,000 of the US.”</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation 7: Consider offering alternatives to North Korean missile technology.</strong> Following Recommendation 6, the US and its partners should consider offering alternative technologies or other incentives to potential customers when possible. Some states that seek to source missile capabilities from North Korea might do so because they lack – or cannot afford – alternative technologies or suppliers. As part of a targeted approach, the US and its allies should consider whether helping such states find alternative missile technology suppliers may be possible, without compounding the global proliferation problem or exacerbating situations of insecurity. Offering alternative sources of nuclear technology is, of course, a lot more problematic. In these instances, interested governments may be able to engage with countries on other strategic issues to identify drivers for the desire to acquire nuclear technology and identify possible solutions to addressing these concerns.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-perceptions-and-discourse">China’s Perceptions and Discourse</h3> +<p><strong>Recommendation 8: Target demand-side countermeasures to specific customers and prioritise engagement with those that are most likely to be receptive.</strong> At the same time, the US and its partners should prioritise engagement with countries that are likely to be most receptive to being dissuaded from engaging in trade with Pyongyang, and tailor approaches to individual potential customers. Trying to prevent missile transfers between North Korea and states that have had long-term missile cooperation partnerships with Pyongyang or which are themselves already subject to sanctions – the likes of Iran and Syria – through diplomatic engagement or threats is unlikely to bear fruit. Offering alternative suppliers in these instances is also not an option.</p> -<p>Before analyzing what China has been saying about NATO in the last several years, it is worth exploring some of the perceptions behind Beijing’s rhetoric. According to a summary of a 2021 dialogue organized by the US-based Center for Strategic Decision Research and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (closely affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), Chinese perceptions could be roughly summarized as follows:</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation 9: Make North Korea an unreliable supplier and technical partner.</strong> Countries interested in preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation should commit to efforts to making Pyongyang an untrustworthy supplier and partner for technical collaboration. As mentioned earlier in relation to Iranian reservations about the dependability of North Korean missile systems, sowing such mistrust can help discourage future purchases from – or collaboration with – Pyongyang. This should include increasing efforts to interdict shipments of weapons and materials, and could also include attempts to target North Korea’s procurement networks operating overseas, using some of the established extraterritorial tools targeted at customers’ programmes. Efforts could also be made to try to insert compromised technology into North Korea’s procure-to-supply networks, thus further undermining the credibility and reliability of North Korea as a supplier. Countries that are important suppliers of key technologies that North Korea may need for its missile and nuclear wares – namely, countries in North America, Europe and Asia – can play an important role in efforts to prevent North Korean procurement.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>NATO is a Cold War organization that needs a threat to survive, and China is a convenient scapegoat. China’s military modernization gives NATO a pretext for higher military spending.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The United States dominates NATO and seeks to use it to turn Europeans, who are politically divided and militarily uneven, against China and to transition NATO from a regional to a global alliance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Western initiatives are nothing but attempts to prevent China’s rise in terms of strategic capability. The United States has been criticizing China and applying double standards on its development of new hypersonic missiles, intermediate missiles, stealth aircraft, battlefield robotics, and cyber and space weapons, even as the United States and its allies are developing the same capabilities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The West’s claims of security vulnerabilities and Chinese state interference are invoked for protectionist reasons and to give Western companies an unfair market advantage.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The United States and its allies are violating principles of state sovereignty and non-interference by condemning China and imposing sanctions on it for its internal behavior in, for example, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>China’s rise, along with the emergence of other major powers, means that the Western-dominated multilateral system is obsolete and Western power will be reduced. Unwilling to accept this, the West has tried to revitalize the G-7 (an economic and political forum for advanced countries) by adding Australia, India, South Africa, and South Korea; and tries to use the Quad (a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and NATO global outreach to contain China’s legitimate rise. This effort is destabilizing global politics by dividing the world into new Cold War blocs.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Recommendation 10: Carefully utilise unilateral counter-proliferation tools.</strong> While the current political dynamics on the UNSC will likely preclude any further UNSC sanctions against North Korea (or its facilitators or customers) in the foreseeable future, individual governments should continue to sanction North Korean and related entities that facilitate North Korean proliferation, or target them with other unilateral tools. While unilateral sanctions technically create no obligations for compliance by entities outside the relevant country’s jurisdiction, their appearance on sanctions lists will – or at least should – trigger adverse media and other compliance-screening measures at financial institutions or companies proactively seeking to comply with export controls. In the case of the US in particular, the importance of its financial sector and the US dollar to global markets means that many financial institutions around the world screen against US sanctions lists even if they are under no domestic obligation to comply with them. Such designations can also help facilitate open source investigations or the sanctioning of these entities in other jurisdictions. Use of other elements of the unilateral toolset developed and deployed by the US in recent years – which includes civil asset forfeiture as well as other targeted efforts against specific entities overseas – may also be appropriate in certain cases. However, application of these powerful tools should be considered on a case-by-case basis due to the risks of political blowback.</p> -<p>These perceptions both underlie PRC discourse on NATO and reflect the broad thrust of PRC foreign and security policy — which essentially opposes a US-led order that appears bent on containing China and instead seeks a new world order that facilitates acceptance of and respect for China’s leadership status.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="obsolescence-belligerence-illegitimacy">Obsolescence, Belligerence, Illegitimacy</h3> +<p><strong>Daniel Salisbury</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.</p> -<p>China’s underlying perceptions and declared foreign policy ambitions have coalesced in an overarching narrative that can be roughly summed up as follows: Although China is the future (ergo the West is the past), American primacy is threatened by China’s inevitable rise, and so the United States uses all means at its disposal — including alliances like NATO — to hype a China threat and contain China’s rise. In determining how to respond to this broad narrative, it helps to break down the elements of China’s messaging and discourse on NATO into three main categories: obsolescence, belligerence, and illegitimacy.</p> +<p><strong>Darya Dolzikova</strong> is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. Her research areas include the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, as well as other issues concerning nuclear technology and proliferation.</p>Daniel Salisbury and Darya DolzikovaThis paper examines North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, based on a review of Pyongyang’s recent technological advancements and developments in North Korea’s customer base. The authors assess the likelihood of North Korea selling its missile and nuclear technology onwards, and the kinds of technology that may be for sale and to whom.In Plain Sight2023-12-14T12:00:00+08:002023-12-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/in-plain-sight<p><em>An exclusive investigation conducted by RUSI, in partnership with Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR, reveals how one of Russia’s leading microelectronic distributors, Compel JSC, has imported massive volumes of Western microelectronics through Germany and Hong Kong since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</em></p> -<h4 id="obsolescence-cold-war-thinking">OBSOLESCENCE: COLD WAR THINKING</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>The PRC’s narrative of Western decline serves to support the domestic legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and gain external acceptance for China’s overseas power projection. In Beijing’s view, NATO is an emblem of Western decline and is attached to outmoded concepts and institutions, including, for example, so-called Cold War thinking. As Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian put it in April 2022, “NATO was born out of the Cold War and should have long become a past tense.” This interweaving of NATO with established PRC foreign policy narratives became even more evident in the remarks made by China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun. At a UN Security Council briefing on Ukraine in June 2022, Zhang stated, “The Cold War ended a long time ago, It is necessary for NATO to reconsider its own positioning and its responsibilities, completely abandon the Cold-War mentality that is based on bloc confrontation, and strive to build a balanced, effective, and sustainable European security framework in line with the principle of indivisible security.”</p> +<p>Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Western governments enacted a sweeping array of sanctions, stringent export controls and other policy actions designed to stem the flow of critical technology – including drones, thermal cameras, industrial machinery, semiconductors and microelectronics – to the country’s armed forces and intelligence agencies. Faced with losing access to these essential supply lines, Russia adapted, rerouting trade flows through friendly jurisdictions and bordering countries, often using complex front-company networks to evade scrutiny.</p> -<p>Beijing views obsolete thinking as afflicting NATO’s whole conceptual mindset, which, in turn, shapes its approach to China. In remarks in June 2022, the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the European Union stated that “NATO’s so-called Strategic Concept, filled with Cold war thinking and ideological bias, is maliciously attacking and smearing China. We firmly oppose it.”</p> +<p>Almost overnight, countries with little history of microelectronics trade became hubs for Russia’s technology flows. For example, in 2022, Armenia’s microelectronics imports from the US and EU increased by over 500% and 200%, respectively, with most of these later re-exported to Russia. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s microelectronics exports to Russia increased from around $250,000 in 2021 to over $18 million in 2022.</p> -<p>These examples suggest that China objects to NATO’s perceived embodiment of two institutional and structural aspects of Cold War thinking: bloc formation and confrontation. The theme of illegitimate collective defense alliances and minilaterals (small groups of countries collaborating to achieve shared goals) is connected to the broader Chinese discourse on resisting attempts to contain the PRC. Beijing’s statements on the international order emphasize the centrality of the UN Security Council and imply that multilateral alliances based on the right of collective self-defense somehow lack legitimacy, despite the fact that Article 51 of the UN charter specifically validates the right of collective defense. As noted by the spokesperson of China’s mission to the EU, “NATO claims itself to be a defensive organization that upholds the rules-based international order, but it has bypassed the UN Security Council and waged wars against sovereign states, creating huge casualties and leaving tens of millions displaced.”</p> +<p>In other cases, Russia’s importers have appeared to hide in plain sight. Since the 2022 invasion, one of Russia’s largest microelectronics distributors – Compel JSC – seems to have continued moving tens of millions of dollars in critical components through the heart of Europe and Hong Kong.</p> -<p>Also implying a Western attachment to obsolete thinking, the PRC has talked of a needed evolution of security concepts from “absolute” security to “indivisible” security. In April 2022, General Secretary Xi Jinping highlighted the concept of indivisible security — the idea that no country should strengthen its own security at the expense of others — as a distinguishing feature in his proposed Global Security Initiative: “We should uphold the principle of indivisibility of security, build a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture, and oppose the building of national security on the basis of insecurity in other countries.” According to the official concept paper published in February 2023, the initiative “aims to eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, encourage joint international efforts to bring more stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era, and promote durable peace and development in the world.”</p> +<p>Data seen by RUSI, Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR confirms that Compel appears to have dozens of customers that are subject to sanctions for connections to Russia’s military-industrial complex. To date, however, Compel has only been sanctioned by the US and Ukraine.</p> -<p>Beijing is essentially touting a superior security order that will supersede the current, US-led order. Again, China asserts that, as an institution founded on collective defense, NATO has not been heeding the principle underlying the concept of indivisible security. (The Kremlin, incidentally, has also promoted this principle in the context of earlier European security cooperation agreements.) In remarks made on separate occasions, spokesperson Zhao and UN ambassador Zhang have issued the following warnings:</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TFCcXyv.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ COMPEL JSC, Moscow, Russia.</em></p> <blockquote> - <p>NATO must immediately . . . renounce its blind faith in military might and misguided practice of seeking absolute security, halt the dangerous attempt to destabilize Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and act in the interest of security and stability in Europe and beyond.</p> + <p>Compel JSC is one of Russia’s largest distributors of microelectronics, founded by Boris Rudyak in 1993. In July 2023, the US Treasury designated Compel for allegedly importing dual-use technology into Russia.</p> </blockquote> <blockquote> - <p>The Ukraine crisis has once again sounded alarm for the world. Security is indivisible. A blind faith in the position of strength, the expansion of military alliance, and the pursuit of one’s own security at the expense of the insecurity of other countries will inevitably lead to security dilemmas.</p> + <p>Compel appears to operate procurement networks abroad that are seemingly run by Russian nationals in Europe and East Asia who are intimately linked to the company.</p> </blockquote> -<p>The wider global economic disruption to energy, food, and fertilizer prices resulting from Russia’s war against Ukraine created another opportunity for the PRC to portray “United States-led Western countries” (in other words, NATO members) as irresponsible in pursuing their own security at the expense of others. A June 2022 article in the China Daily, owned by the Chinese Communist Party, contended that “United States-led Western countries were more busy sending shipments of lethal weapons to Ukraine and have imposed sanctions on Russia, risking the prolonged continuation of the conflict but leaving the world to foot the bill. Food prices have reached an all-time high, as Russian and Ukrainian grain exports are hindered by port disruptions and Western sanctions.”</p> +<h3 id="an-electronics-powerhouse">An Electronics Powerhouse</h3> -<p>In response to consolidation of the European security order around NATO membership, Beijing seems intent on undermining alliance solidarity by implying that membership or partnership with NATO is somehow incompatible with good relations with the PRC. In a statement following the announcement of Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership, spokesperson Zhao hinted at the damage NATO membership can cause countries’ bilateral relations with the PRC: “Finland’s application to NATO will bring new factor to bilateral ties with China.”</p> +<p>By the time the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time over the Kremlin on 25 December 1991, Boris Rudyak seems to have already had a long and storied career.</p> -<h4 id="belligerence-stirring-up-trouble">BELLIGERENCE: STIRRING UP TROUBLE</h4> +<p>Starting his professional journey as an apprentice at a vocational school in the Soviet Union’s first motor vehicle plant, Rudyak later found himself tending patients in a psychiatric hospital. As a resourceful man with many talents, he would later work for the fire brigade, as a watchman, as a cameraman, and even collecting nuts in a forest.</p> -<p>In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Sino-Russian rapprochement began to change NATO’s attitude toward the PRC; at the same time, Beijing’s and Moscow’s narratives about NATO began to converge. On February 4, 2022, in a joint statement released when President Vladimir Putin was visiting Beijing, China and Russia signaled their opposition to further NATO expansion. Over the summer of 2022, the PRC’s messaging about the war emphasized elements of its critical stance toward NATO; moreover, its messages aligned with the Russian narrative that Washington was “the initiator and main instigator of the Ukrainian crisis.”</p> +<p>Like many other Russians whose lives had been broadly defined by the stultifying Soviet system, Rudyak’s big break was to come shortly after its dissolution.</p> -<p>In late June, inclusion of the AP4 countries in the NATO summit in Madrid prompted the PRC to portray the alliance as a source of danger for Asian security and as evidence of a developing Asian NATO. At a UN Security Council briefing on June 28, Zhang stated, “We firmly oppose certain elements clamoring for NATO’s involvement in the Asia Pacific, or an Asia Pacific version of NATO on the back of military alliances. The long-outdated Cold War script must never be re-enacted in the Asia Pacific. The kind of turmoil and conflict that are affecting parts of the world must not be allowed to happen in the Asia Pacific.”</p> +<p>Even before the Western-technology transfer control regime known as COCOM officially ended in 1994, Rudyak claims he was travelling to Singapore and stuffing suitcases with microelectronics for sale back home. In 1993, Rudyak officially registered Compel JSC, legitimately importing the sophisticated microelectronics that the Soviet Union was once forced to smuggle.</p> -<p>In a related statement, the PRC highlighted the long peace the Asia-Pacific region has experienced since the end of the Indo-China conflicts in the late 1970s and implied that Asian problems should be addressed by Asian actors. At a press conference on June 30, Zhao asserted, “The Asia-Pacific is one of the most peaceful and stable regions in the world and a promising land for cooperation and development. Any attempt to undermine its peace and stability and sabotage regional solidarity and cooperation will be unanimously rejected by the people in China and the rest of the Asia-Pacific.”</p> +<p>Under Vladimir Putin’s reign, Russia’s GDP rose rapidly, buoyed by surging oil exports and the dizzying rise in global oil prices. The 2008 recession and corresponding collapse in prices, however, sent the Russian economy into a tailspin. In October 2009, Rudyak delivered a presentation explaining how the Russian electronics industry waxed and waned with the fluctuations of the global oil market. Following the precipitous oil price collapse, Rudyak claimed that Russia’s microelectronics market contracted by 40%, leaving over a third of the market dominated by military and security customers.</p> -<p>By contrasting NATO’s supposed inherently aggressive character (and associating that with insecurity in Europe) with the idealized peace of Asia, China was subtly reinforcing its centrality in the region and making the case that NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific represents a threat to regional security. Also in late June, the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the EU said, “The Strategic Concept claims that other countries pose challenges, but it is NATO that is creating problems around the world. . . . Who’s challenging global security and undermining world peace? Are there any wars or conflicts over the years where NATO is not involved?”</p> +<p>Despite this market volatility, Compel’s Russian business seems to have thrived. From 2019 to 2021, the company imported a mean annual average of $32.2 million in microelectronics and related items. In the first seven months of 2023 alone, Compel imported approximately $29 million dollars’ worth of components.</p> -<h4 id="illegitimacy-bloc-formation-and-intrusion">ILLEGITIMACY: BLOC FORMATION AND INTRUSION</h4> +<p>Following the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s microelectronics imports entered the crosshairs of regulators after thousands of Western-designed and manufactured components were found inside the country’s weapons platforms. As a result, many of the world’s largest microelectronic component manufacturers – including Analog Devices, Microchip Technology, Murata Manufacturing, Nexperia, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments – terminated sales into Russia, and many also prohibited their distributors from selling into the country.</p> -<p>China’s main attack on NATO’s legitimacy is based on structural and geographic objections. The structural critique implies that blocs or even collective security alliances are inherently contrary to a just, democratic, and stable international order. The geographic critique implies that NATO is overstepping its bounds and entering a region where it has no right to be. Both lines are sometimes used in combination, as the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the EU did when saying, “NATO claims that its defense zone will not go beyond the North Atlantic, but it has flexed its muscle in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years and sought to stir up bloc confrontation here, as it has done in Europe.”</p> +<p>Seemingly undeterred, Compel continued importing thousands of shipments of components manufactured by Analog Devices, Microchip Technology, Murata Manufacturing, Nexperia, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments. Compel’s product catalogues seem to have removed a couple of these suppliers, including Texas Instruments, Analog Devices and STMicroelectronics, since the US sanctioned the Russian company.</p> -<p>NATO’s current interest in the Indo-Pacific makes it a convenient emblem of a trend emerging in the Asian security structure that worries China: defense minilateralism. Until recently, the US-led security order in the region took a hub-and-spoke form, with an array of bilateral alliances connecting the United States to Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. However, these alliances have started to be overlaid with a latticework of new minilateral structures, some linking groups of Asian nations and others linking Asian, European, and North American countries. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to a speech by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in June 2022 with the following statement:</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CV378uy.jpg" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Compel catalogue, September 2022.</strong> Sources: Compel’s website, RUSI.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <p>The US administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is self-contradictory: the US claims to promote the region’s “freedom and openness” as its goal, while in reality co-opting with allies to forge a “five-four-three-two-one” formation made up of the Five Eyes, the Quad, AUKUS, bilateral alliances and IPEF, forming exclusive “small circles” and forcing countries in the region to take sides. AUKUS helps Australia build nuclear-powered submarines and develops hypersonic weapons, pushing up the risk for a regional arms race. Under the pretext of fighting illegal fishing and keeping supply chains resilient, the Quad has vigorously pursued military cooperation and intelligence sharing. The US has also encouraged NATO’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific. These are all attempts to materialize an “Asia-Pacific version of NATO” and promote “integrated deterrence” against China.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BcRDUq1.jpg" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Compel catalogue, December 2023.</strong> Sources: Compel’s website, RUSI.</em></p> -<p>The PRC’s lumping together of other groupings and NATO seems aimed at delegitimizing not just collective security in the strict sense but any association of defense cooperation or collaboration, in particular those led by or including the United States. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release from February 2023 on the potential of political settlement of the Ukraine crisis asserted that “the security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs.” Beijing has even claimed that the United States wants to use NATO for “harming Europe.” The implication is that countries that ally with the United States are somehow either vassals or allowing themselves to be brainwashed or both. Perhaps because China perceives a lack of agency among smaller states, Beijing presumes what it sees as its own regional leadership would be an acceptable alternative to so-called US hegemony.</p> +<h3 id="where-do-they-come-from">Where Do They Come From?</h3> -<p>The PRC insinuates geographic illegitimacy by arguing that an organization based on North Atlantic security is an alien intruder in the Asian region. The fact that the PRC held military exercises alongside Russia in the Euro-Atlantic in recent years, in the Mediterranean in 2015, and the Baltic region in 2017 has not prevented Beijing from criticizing NATO for “inserting itself” in Asia-Pacific affairs. As Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin asserted, “NATO, a military organisation in the North Atlantic, has in recent years come to the Asia-Pacific region to throw its weight around and stir up conflicts. . . . NATO has messed up Europe. Is it now trying to mess up the Asia-Pacific and even the world?”</p> +<p>While the number of suppliers to Compel has dwindled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Germany-based WWSemicon GmbH and Hong Kong-based Finder Technology continued shipping to Compel in 2023 and appear to have become the company’s largest suppliers, accounting for at least 65% of Compel’s imports since 2022.</p> -<p>The warning is not just directed at NATO itself, but also at NATO’s partners and others in the region. The Global Times editorial published just before NATO leaders met in Madrid in July 2022 made this abundantly clear. In addition to warning that “catering to NATO’s Asia-Pacificization is tantamount to inviting wolves into the house,” the editorial declared that doing so was “bound to damage [countries’] strategic trust with China.”</p> +<p>Russian trade data indicates that before February 2022, Compel’s largest suppliers were WWSemicon GmbH, Finder Technology Ltd and the now-dissolved Compel International Oy, a possible affiliate company of Compel based in Finland. From January 2019 to February 2022, 98% of Compel International Oy and WWSemicon’s exports and 83% of Finder Technology’s exports were destined for Compel and Beliv LLC, another Rudyak company.</p> -<p>Beijing’s narrative logic — which connects interference by non-Asians in regional security with the deliberate stirring up of tensions and propensity for war — reached its high point in the implication of an Asian NATO: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, “The US pushes NATO to insert itself in Asia-Pacific affairs, fan the ‘China threat’ narrative in the bloc’s new strategic concept, and include in its Madrid Summit such US allies in the Asia-Pacific as Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, in a bid to build an ‘Asia-Pacific version of NATO,’ which would disrupt security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” The use of scare quotes around “Asia-Pacific version of NATO” serves not only to cast doubt on the idea itself but also to give a misleading impression as to its origin. Neither NATO nor the United States has expressed an ambition to create an Asian NATO; in fact, they have made many statements to the contrary, clearly indicating that no such move is desired or intended. The idea of an Asian NATO is almost exclusively one that emanates, unconsciously or by design, from Chinese discourse.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ydijPBF.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Compel’s annual imports and suppliers from 2019 to 2023.</strong> Source: Data seen by RUSI, Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR.</em></p> -<h3 id="chinas-audiences">China’s Audiences</h3> +<p>Compel’s suppliers diversified in the lead-up to the invasion, seeming to peak at 40 companies in 2021. However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the roster of suppliers shrunk drastically, with nearly all imports coming from only six companies. WWSemicon and Finder Technology were by far the largest, accounting for over 98% of imports.</p> -<p>Estimating the danger that PRC narratives pose to NATO requires some understanding of the target audiences. This section identifies audiences from Beijing’s likely perspective, assesses the effects on these audiences from NATO’s likely perspective, and weighs the importance of these effects.</p> +<p>Despite trade records showing that WWSemicon continued exporting millions of dollars’ worth of components to Compel as recently as July 2023, representatives for WWSemicon told Nieuwsuur they had stopped shipments to the company “long ago”.</p> -<h4 id="speaking-to-those-at-home-and-abroad">SPEAKING TO THOSE AT HOME AND ABROAD</h4> +<p>As sanctions and export controls have complicated Russian procurement efforts, microelectronics have increasingly been routed through hubs such as Hong Kong. To restrict Russia’s access to critical technologies, the US and UK have sanctioned several Hong Kong companies for supplying Russia’s defence industry.</p> -<p>The wider world is not necessarily the PRC’s primary audience. Research suggests that the domestic audience is more important for China. As Šebok and Turcsányi stated in their NATO background paper, “Chinese actors try to follow its leaders’ instructions and wishes, and the Party overall is motivated by a desire to increase legitimacy vis-à-vis the Chinese domestic audience. These factors are increasingly contributing to the uncompromising posture of Chinese diplomacy abroad.” This is consistent with the larger pattern of PRC security policy and resource allocation, which suggests that internal threats to state security and the position of the PRC are higher priorities than foreign threats to the country. The message that outside powers are containing China and ganging up to prevent its rise is becoming more salient as internal questions inevitably arise about how many of China’s economic difficulties might be the result of choices by the current Communist Party leadership.</p> +<p>Notably, in June and July 2023, Finder Technology shipped over $1.1 million in microelectronics to Compel under nine HS codes identified in May by the US as “high priority items” for Russian weapons systems. These HS codes cover several categories of critical microelectronics, including processors, field-programmable gate arrays, tantalum capacitors, ceramic capacitors, amplifiers and memory modules.</p> -<p>The second audience is likely China’s partners, particularly Russia. Despite the negative impact Russia’s war has had on PRC interests (including food price inflation and exposing double standards on questions of national sovereignty), Beijing remains reluctant to appear as an unreliable friend. For Russia, there are potential benefits from reciprocal support on issues where their interests align. Writing presciently two decades ago, international security expert Richard Weitz observed that</p> +<p>Finder Technology did not respond when contacted by Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wSrGTDC.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ WWSEMICON GMBH, Munich, Germany.</em></p> <blockquote> - <p>from Moscow’s perspective, periodically joining Beijing to denounce U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation elicits, at minimal cost, Chinese declarations against NATO enlargement and other Western policies the Russian government opposes. The appearance of an embryonic Russian-Chinese united front toward Japan also encourages Tokyo to moderate its claims of sovereignty over the Russian-occupied southern islands of the Kurile chain — Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri, known in Japan as the “Northern Territories.</p> + <p>From the outskirts of a residential neighbourhood in Munich, WWSemicon appears to have maintained exceptionally close ties with Compel for nearly 20 years.</p> </blockquote> -<p>Considering Japan has been, as Weitz notes, the target of three treaties between Moscow and Beijing (in 1896, 1924, and 1950), it must be discomforting for Tokyo to observe how “Chinese officials have expressed renewed support for Russia’s position on the Kurile issue.” Russia and Japan both claim sovereignty over the southern chain of the Kuril Islands. Moscow seized them during World War II, but Tokyo views them as Japan’s “Northern Territories.” Given Russia’s current weakened state due to the war with Ukraine and China’s support, Japan may be concerned about Chinese influence over any Moscow-Tokyo negotiations. Ironically, the more Sino-Russian relations align, the clearer it becomes for Asian and Euro-Atlantic partners that they share common security interests.</p> - -<p>The remaining international audience is probably next in terms of importance, particularly the broad segment sometimes described as the “Global South” or the “new nonaligned.” China claims moral leadership over this group of countries (albeit a role contested by India) and seeks to cultivate in this group a worldview that supports its strategic preferences on points such as countering American hegemony. Recent analysis suggests that Beijing invests heavily in messaging to African audiences and Arabic- and Spanish-speaking audiences, and the efforts have been relatively successful.</p> - -<h4 id="where-chinas-audiences-and-natos-interests-intersect">WHERE CHINA’S AUDIENCES AND NATO’S INTERESTS INTERSECT</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5VKjpe7.jpg" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: WWSemicon’s connections to Compel.</strong> Sources: Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation, Russia’s Unified State Register of Legal Entities, Deutsches Unternehmens Register, Slovak Ministry of Justice’s Business Register, RUSI.</em></p> -<p>Although the PRC seems to be giving more attention recently to reaching audiences abroad, when it comes to Euro-Atlantic audiences, its current approach to communications does not appear to be doing much to prevent a general trend of rising suspicion and hostility toward China. From NATO’s perspective, this wider world — particularly those regions where NATO seeks to sustain or develop its global partnerships — is the more important audience. It is when those partnerships happen to be in the Asia-Pacific that PRC narratives seem to come into the most direct conflict with NATO interests. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao has warned, albeit in reference to European enlargement, that “we advise relevant countries to exercise caution when developing relations with NATO.”</p> +<h4 id="wwsemicon-gmbh">WWSemicon GmbH</h4> -<p>This message may be aimed at impacting support for existing frameworks like the AP4, but also at impeding potentially wider NATO partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. Some commentators suggest that “what China is really addressing is Southeast Asia and the broader region, and ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] in particular.” India’s preference for nonalignment may not be conducive to implementing the recommendation of the NATO 2030 report that “NATO should begin internal discussions about a possible future partnership with India,” but sooner or later, a NATO more oriented to the challenge of China will naturally look to partner in some form with India.</p> +<p>While Boris Rudyak told Nieuwsuur that WWSemicon was “not part of the Compel network”, he claimed the companies engaged in “good business before the war”.</p> -<p>From NATO’s perspective, the international audiences most relevant are likely existing and potential Indo-Pacific partners, especially segments of their public and elite who are sympathetic to the anti-imperialistic, anti-Western, and anti-American elements of PRC narratives. These audiences’ opinions have the potential to limit or reduce the willingness of states in the region to work with NATO and its partners.</p> +<p>However, an analysis of trade data, corporate documents, social media and other records indicates that Compel and WWSemicon have maintained exceptionally close ties for nearly 20 years.</p> -<p>The question of how much impact PRC narratives have had to date on regional attitudes toward NATO is hard to judge, not least because it is difficult to find relevant studies or tracking efforts. For NATO policymakers concerned about Asia-Pacific partnerships, this might be a blind spot worth looking into.</p> +<p>For example, WWSemicon was registered in 2005 by Russian nationals Oleg Shtots (AKA Alex Stotz) and Vladimir Avetisyan. Notably, Avetisyan is also the sole shareholder and general director of RBA-Management LLC in Russia, one of Compel’s founding shareholders.</p> -<h3 id="natos-vulnerability">NATO’s Vulnerability</h3> +<p>Almost two decades after WWSemicon was founded, the company is now owned by several former Compel employees, including Boris Rudyak’s daughter, who worked for Compel from 2007 to 2015.</p> -<p>An obvious NATO vulnerability with respect to PRC narratives is the diversity of views on China within the alliance. NATO allies were able to agree on language about China in the 2022 Strategic Concept, but as the 2022 US National Security Strategy acknowledges, “Allies and partners may have distinct perspectives on the PRC.” For instance, President Joe Biden has repeatedly voiced the United States’ commitment to defending Taiwan if it is attacked, but no other NATO ally has come close to saying this. Also, while the National Security Strategy stresses the need for supply chains that are less dependent on Chinese industry, German chancellor Olaf Scholz conveyed a different message by visiting China with a group of business leaders in November 2022 — the first G-7 leader to visit the country in three years.</p> +<p>Another shareholder of the company listed their LinkedIn title as “lead developer” at Compel-SPB LLC – a company owned by Rudyak’s RBA-Group. Meanwhile, a third shareholder, who also manages the Slovakia-based WWSemicon branch, was referred to as Compel’s general director in 2021.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, France has long expressed its wish “to champion a third path in the Indo-Pacific.” In September 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron said, “We must also assert Europe’s independence in the confrontation between China and the United States. . . . We are not willing to have a strategy of confrontation with China in the Indo-Pacific. . . . We do not believe that alliances that have been established to deal with certain opposing interests should extend to the Indo-Pacific.” (Like German chancellor Scholz, President Macron also visited China, in April 2023, with a contingent of business leaders.) The French National Strategic Review 2022 makes it clear that “France is working to strengthen the European pillar of the [NATO] Alliance in a pragmatic approach to its role, which rules out an extension to other geographical areas and in particular the Indo-Pacific.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TQk7wIG.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ FINDER TECHNOLOGY LTD, Chai Wan, Hong Kong.</em></p> -<p>In sum, these different viewpoints indicate a lack of cohesion on China policy among NATO members; and this makes it easier for the PRC to argue that the United States is driving allies into opposition with China against the will and interests of policymakers or sections of their societies who would naturally prefer cooperative relations with Beijing.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Overlooking the waterfront of a Hong Kong suburb, Finder Technology has shipped millions of dollars’ worth of components to Compel, including various high-priority items for Russian weapons systems.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>It is unclear whether NATO gives adequate attention to the power of PRC narratives, despite the recommendation of the NATO 2030 report to “enhance its understanding of China’s capabilities, activities, and intentions that affect Euro-Atlantic security, with a clear-eyed understanding of risk, threat, and opportunity.” If NATO officials monitor Chinese discourse, the outputs are not publicized. Any desire to shape narratives in the region does not appear to be matched by funding or capabilities. NATO communication seems to be mostly aimed at internal audiences, with only limited material designed for and directed at Asian partner audiences, let alone Chinese audiences. Although the inclusion of China in NATO’s Strategic Concept is significant, some observers may have expected a more pointed or operationally focused treatment of the PRC. Indeed, little remains of the practical proposals put forward in the NATO 2030 report. This makes one question whether the alliance has been too slow to act on the recommendation that “NATO must devote much more time, political resources, and action to the security challenges posed by China.”</p> +<p>Finder Technology was co-founded in April 2005 by the same person that founded WWSemicon in Germany, Oleg Shtots. Hong Kong registry documents from 2019 reveal that Shtots used both Russian and German passports, and that same year, he began using the name “Alex Stotz” on Finder Technology’s corporate documents. Corporate documents from 2023 for Finder Technology still list Shtots as the sole shareholder of the company.</p> -<p>NATO’s communication in response to the PRC’s actions toward existing or potential NATO partners is not always consistent. As the scholar Jeffrey Michaels noted, NATO has expressed support for partners like Japan and South Korea with regard to their troubles with China and North Korea, but NATO “remained silent” when soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army killed Indian soldiers on their Himalayan frontier in 2020. A NATO communications policy might consider how such instances offer an opportunity to more proactively counter PRC narratives.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3ZWnK5C.jpg" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Oleg Shtots using “Alex Stotz” on Hong Kong corporate documents.</strong> Source: Hong Kong Companies Registry.</em></p> -<p>Understandably, at this moment, NATO investment in strategic communications concentrates on Russia. However, it does not appear that the balance of strategic communications resources has been adjusted to make progress on the NATO 2030 report’s recommendations related to the PRC and to respond to the increasing alignment between Moscow and Beijing.</p> +<p>An email for Oleg Shtots listed on a Russian-language German employment forum appears in the URL of a public Google Calendar for an “Alex Stotz”. The calendar blocks off “Electronica”, a trade event in Munich, and contains departure dates of Compel from the event. It also includes meetings labelled “Boris” during one of several apparent trips to Moscow.</p> -<h3 id="limitations-of-chinas-narratives">Limitations of China’s Narratives</h3> +<p>As with WWSemicon, Finder Technology’s employee base seems to include individuals affiliated with Compel. Russian court records reveal that, in 2017, Avetisyan – WWSemicon’s co-founder – led Finder Technology’s legal representative’s office in Russia, and another employee’s LinkedIn account states that until March 2022, they were also a purchasing manager for Compel and two US-based companies, Rapid GCS Inc and Real Time Components (RTC) Inc.</p> -<p>PRC narratives about NATO have their limitations and vulnerabilities, too. Despite the suggestion in the Global Times editorial that “Washington’s strategic will is increasingly coercing and is kidnapping NATO,” the lengthening list of problems in PRC-Europe relations — the causes for which are independent of the US-PRC relationship — make Beijing’s narrative that NATO is merely a tool of American control over Europe harder to sustain. This is evidenced by the demise of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. After the EU imposed sanctions on China over the human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region in China’s northwest in March 2021, Beijing imposed sanctions on EU bodies, European Parliament members, and even think tank researchers.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DraAuf3.jpg" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Finder Technology’s connections to Compel.</strong> Sources: Arbitration lawsuits in “Court proceedings and legal acts of the Russian Federation online database”, Hong Kong Companies Registry, LinkedIn, Meta Platforms Inc, RUSI.</em></p> -<p>The PRC’s barely muted backing of Putin’s war in Ukraine has only clarified the dangers of Chinese foreign policy for Europeans. Beijing’s moves to cement the Sino-Russian bond have a retro look that appears to contradict the taunt that America and NATO are the ones mired in a “Cold War mentality.” The more PRC messages attack NATO, the more they remind their audiences that Beijing is aligned with Moscow. Beijing and Moscow’s “without limits” friendship and the PRC’s consistent parroting of Kremlin talking points throughout the conflict have damaged China’s relations with many countries in the EU. And the PRC’s refusal to condemn the invasion has surely called into question its commitment to the principles of noninterference, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for national sovereignty.</p> +<h4 id="stateside-suppliers-pre-invasion-rapid-gcs-and-rtc">Stateside Suppliers Pre-invasion: Rapid GCS and RTC</h4> -<p>As Ukraine succeeded in pushing back against Russia’s “special military operation” later in 2022, Beijing’s closeness to Moscow exposed some of the flaws in the logic of China’s strategic communications on NATO. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s flagrant violation of national sovereignty may be a liability in terms of Beijing’s attempts to pose as a champion of peace and international law and UN Charter principles. As Putin switched strategy from regime change to forcible annexation, siding with Russia continued to put the PRC in an ever-diminishing minority in the UN General Assembly, as demonstrated by the October 12 vote on Russia’s annexation of parts of Ukraine — 143 members voted to condemn, 5 voted against, and 35 abstained (including China). If Russia’s war runs into further difficulties, Beijing’s embarrassment is likely to increase. Meanwhile, if NATO allies continue to appear to be alleviating the causes of worldwide repercussions of the war (price rises and shortages of food, fuel, and fertilizer), China will find it increasingly hard to convince the world that it can offer a superior model of security.</p> +<p>While neither Rapid GCS nor RTC appears to have shipped to Russia since the 2022 invasion, both historically shipped millions of dollars in microelectronics and related components from Analog Devices, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments to Compel, Beliv and Dadjet LLC, the latter of which is also owned by Boris Rudyak. RTC’s shipments into Russia appear to have ceased in July 2020, but Rapid GCS continued its exports until February 2022 – the month of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p> -<h3 id="thinking-ahead-and-recommendations">Thinking Ahead and Recommendations</h3> +<p>Both companies share a phone number and a New Jersey address, and Rapid GCS’s registered agent appears to operate an X account with the biography “Regional Purchasing Manager at Real Time Components (RTC/Compel)”.</p> -<p>NATO’s Strategic Concept expresses concern about the resilience of its allies against PRC actions that could undermine the coherence and strength of their societies, economies, and democratic institutions. NATO’s recent research suggests that the most efficient long-term strategy for dealing with PRC narratives “is to bolster the societal resilience of NATO member states and concentrate on shaping their own strategic narratives, which must transcend mere reactions to Chinese actions and offer alternative positive visions.” While the idea of offering alternative positive visions is sound, the alliance should look beyond the resilience of allies and take steps to better understand and, if necessary, neutralize sources of damage to the alliance inflicted via NATO’s partners and partnerships. The success of the Chinese narrative that the inherent right of collective self-defense and the organizations that uphold that right are illegitimate would represent not just a defeat for the principles NATO stands for but also a more general danger for global peace and stability.</p> +<h3 id="where-do-they-go">Where Do They Go?</h3> -<p>In addition, NATO should pay close attention to the effects of PRC narratives on the perceptions of Chinese citizens. Failure to do so would be shortsighted. It is not self-evident that the perceptions of the Chinese audience are either accurately represented by the messages of the PRC or beyond the influence of outside actors, including NATO’s own strategic communications. Although Sino-NATO relations are at a low today, channels for influence are not entirely foreclosed. On September 22, 2022, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg discussed Russia’s war against Ukraine during talks with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. In February 2023, talks between NATO and PRC counterparts restarted after a pause that seemed to have been caused mainly by COVID-related restrictions. Chinese leadership can and will change eventually. NATO should take a long view and use the channels it still has with Chinese officials — and perhaps in a more limited way with ordinary Chinese people — to prepare for a day when the pendulum swings back in a positive direction.</p> +<p>While many of Compel’s customers include commercial enterprises, data seen by RUSI, Nieuswsuur and ARD MONITOR reveals that the company has received thousands of payments from dozens of Russian companies sanctioned after the invasion began. Many of these companies have extensive links to the country’s defence industry.</p> -<p>When it comes to external messages, PRC narratives smear NATO largely as a means of blackening the reputation of the United States and undermining strategically inconvenient norms like the inherent right to collective self-defense, including by China’s neighbors but also by countries in the Global South. The following recommendations therefore focus on that wider audience, where NATO has more immediate interests and influence.</p> +<p>Several companies that were later sanctioned for being part of Russia’s defence industrial base made thousands of payments to Compel from January 2022 to January 2023, including:</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>NATO should commission a mechanism for analysis, with support from Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic specialists, to estimate the level of threat emanating from Russian and PRC strategic communications in order to guide the allocation of resources toward countering narratives that undermine or attack NATO in each case. The mechanism should dynamically track trends in PRC strategic communications related to NATO. The scope of tracking should go beyond covering the objectives and methods of PRC narratives by measuring the impact and results of PRC communications, based on differentiated audience analysis. Cooperation between the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and nascent counterparts in Asian partner nations may be leveraged to support such a mechanism. Collection of relevant information could be facilitated not just by NATO’s strategic partners in the region, such as the AP4, but also by other friends and partners whose populations are also important targets of influence (for example, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>After gaining a better understanding through the above measures, NATO should develop a strategic communications strategy that covers the Indo-Pacific, in consultation with the AP4 and other regional partners.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>NATO should explore efforts to influence opinion in China about the alliance.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<blockquote> + <p>Testkomplekt LLC, which is sanctioned by the US, the UK, Switzerland and Ukraine. Testkomplekt is also a key microelectronics supplier for Radiopriborsnab LLC, which is ultimately owned by subsidiaries of Rostec, the Russian state-owned defence industrial conglomerate.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>While proposing a NATO communications policy for Asia is beyond the scope of this report, it is possible to suggest some messages that NATO should consider communicating to China and the region more broadly. Some are predicated on a determination of what the alliance wants to accomplish in the Indo-Pacific. The alliance’s objective in the region has not been clearly spelled out. Unlike the European Union and several Euro-Atlantic and Asian nations (for example, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, and Japan), NATO has only produced a two-paragraph China policy (in the 2022 Strategic Concept), not an Indo-Pacific strategy.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Staut LLC, which is sanctioned by the US and UK for supplying export-controlled technology to the Russian defence industry.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Notwithstanding the lack of an overarching strategy document, one major theme of a NATO communications strategy for the Indo-Pacific would likely be upholding the inherent right of states to collective self-defense. This right is a particularly important element of protection for smaller states against aggressive hegemony. Notably, this right exists for all states, not just UN members. It is logical that larger or stronger states seeking to intimidate and bully smaller states would try to attack this right or criticize states that are attempting to activate it by forming alliances or looser political or security associations. Steps should be taken to ensure that Russia and China do not succeed in drawing support to the argument that indivisible security effectively delegitimizes moves to put the right into practice.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>EuroMicroTech LLC (EMT), which is sanctioned by the US. EMT’s website features letters of gratitude for the “timely provision of items” from a Rostec subsidiary and a military facility founded in 2009 by the Russian Ministry of Defence.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The PRC’s painting of “ganging up” or bloc formation as unnatural and illegitimate aims to discredit a long-standing right under international law that predates the UN Charter. This suggests a hegemonic mindset, which is ironic, considering one of China’s lines of attack against NATO is that it is a thinly veiled hegemonic project by the United States. When it comes to the Asian audience, themes of anti-hegemony and the sovereign equality of small states to larger states enjoy popular support, particularly among populations raised on a postcolonial narrative of national liberation.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>NIIIT LLC (AKA RIIT Ltd), which is sanctioned by the US. One of NIIIT’s founders was Ostec Enterprises Ltd, a semiconductor supplier for several Russian defence entities, including an alleged manufacturer of Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Finally, it may be possible to flip the PRC’s narratives by talking about the alliance more from the experience and perspective of smaller allies — for whom the right of collective self-defense offers the best protection against a large and periodically predatory neighbor. In particular, flipping the narrative about NATO might work best if the message about why the alliance continues to exist and why it seeks common cause with partners around the globe comes from more recent members, such as the Baltic states and central European nations, instead of the larger, longer- term allies.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Specialized Devices and Systems CJSC (SPS), which is sanctioned by Ukraine, Switzerland and, most recently, the EU for facilitating a Netherlands-based sanctions evasion operation. Nieuwsuur confirms that SPS lists several EU-sanctioned Rostec subsidiaries as customers, and other reports claim that SPS is licensed by Russia’s Federal Security Bureau to supply Rostec.</p> +</blockquote> -<hr /> +<blockquote> + <p>EKB Neva LLC, which is sanctioned by the US and Ukraine and certified by the Russian government to supply Russian military end-users. In 2020, EKB’s director was arrested for allegedly forging certificates of Western microelectronics imported for military use.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Philip Shetler-Jones</strong> is a senior research fellow at the International Security Studies Department of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, where he focuses on geopolitical relations in the Indo-Pacific region. Previously, he served as an officer in the UK Royal Marine Commandos; held positions at the United Nations and the European Union; and consulted for NATO, the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe, the UK Ministry of Defence, and Chatham House.</p>Philip Shetler-JonesAlthough China’s views on NATO have fluctuated since the early days of the Cold War, Beijing’s recent statements on the alliance have sharpened.Eight Commonsense Actions2023-11-21T12:00:00+08:002023-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/eight-commonsense-actions<p><em>Today, there is a shared sense of vulnerability and a shared resolve across political divides to better protect the United States and the world against the accidental release of biological agents (biosafety), deliberate misuse of biological agents (biosecurity), and naturally occurring spillover of dangerous pathogens.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Biosafety and biosecurity are critically important areas where individual freedom, ethics, scientific progress, and national security converge. As biological research and discovery accelerate at an unprecedented pace, they generate new risks that must be managed responsibly. The CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security’s Working Group on R&amp;D Innovation advocates select, commonsense actions to strengthen U.S. and global biosafety and biosecurity: clarify U.S. policies and policy leadership within the White House; increase financial and diplomatic investments; update the rules around synthetic products and viral discovery work; and invest in research on basic lab protections and the new risks of artificial intelligence. Together, these timely, affordable steps can attract broad political support and promote a safer, more secure, and more innovative global bioeconomy.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1DRQoNw.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Payments to Compel by sanctioned Russian customers, 2022.</strong> Sources: Data seen by RUSI, Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR, OpenSanctions, RUSI.</em></p> -<p>Biosafety and biosecurity have become more urgent U.S. priorities in the post-Covid era, tied to U.S. national security interests. They have been visibly elevated in U.S. security doctrines, structured around the risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that arise at home and abroad.</p> +<h3 id="hiding-in-plain-sight">Hiding in Plain Sight</h3> -<p>For decades, the United States has been in a conventional arms race. Now, that race also focuses intensely on biotechnology that could bring major benefits but, in the hands of nefarious actors, also could cause enormous harm. An alarm has sounded, in part due to heightened awareness of the remarkable speed of scientific and technological changes that are unfolding, including the advance of converging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI). Furthermore, high-containment laboratories are rapidly expanding around the world, including in low- and middle-income countries — a process that has accelerated dramatically in the post-Covid moment. The sudden proliferation of facilities elevates risks and the demands for improved training, standards, and systems of detection and oversight. Advanced science is now conducted by a highly diverse set of individuals and organizations, including militaries, large biopharmaceutical firms, and countless start-ups that operate quite independent of government. A widely underappreciated dimension is the massive scale of illegal and legal cross-border wildlife trade, often linked with illicit networks transiting people, drugs, and finances. Together, these trends lower the barriers for bad actors to access potentially dangerous biological knowledge.</p> +<p>Like many of the companies that have continued to import microelectronics, components and technology into Russia following the 2022 invasion, Compel appears to have been forced to reroute trade flows through jurisdictions like Hong Kong.</p> -<p>In mid-2023, the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security’s Working Group on R&amp;D Innovation concluded that biosafety and biosecurity should be a priority focus of its efforts for the balance of the year. To that end, five highly productive working group meetings were held between July and early October 2023 (see appendix for details).</p> +<p>However, the movement of millions of dollars’ worth of components through Europe, even after the invasion, unfortunately highlights the ease with which some Russian companies have continued to procure technologies that could be used by the country’s military–industrial complex.</p> -<p>Important policy reviews are underway within the U.S. government to carefully reassess the evolving threat environment. There is debate over what should be the new balance required between controlling risk and promoting gains in the life sciences that will improve and save lives. There is an urgency to better understand the strengths and vulnerabilities of U.S. biosafety and biosecurity approaches and to rethink how to overcome vexing implementation and coordination challenges across a fragmented government and a complex interface among the U.S. government, industry, foundations, partner governments, nongovernmental groups, and international institutions. Policymakers are also debating what communications capabilities are required to effectively reach U.S. citizens and all entities working in the health security research and development (R&amp;D) community in an age of pervasive mis- and disinformation.</p> +<p>As Russia faces the prospect of a protracted conflict in Ukraine, the Kremlin is increasingly gearing up its economy for war. The Russian finance minister left little room for interpretation about Moscow’s priorities when he said in October 2023 that “the main emphasis is on ensuring [Russia’s] victory – the army, defence capability, armed forces, fighters – everything needed for the front, everything needed for victory is in the budget”.</p> -<p>Two important questions remain unanswered: First, who is mandated to set policy and ensure authoritative leadership, including effective coordination and oversight across the U.S. government and with partners outside government, including international partners? Second, will the U.S. government augment staff and programs across multiple departments and agencies with adequate, sustained budgets to ensure they have an effective, sustained capability to implement policy? Far too often, as seen at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and elsewhere, unfunded mandates in the critical areas of biosafety and biosecurity remain so weakly staffed and financed that they create only the appearance, and not the reality, of seriously meeting emerging challenges.</p> +<p>Hence, with Russia diverting all possible financial and technical resources to support its war of aggression, Ukraine’s partners should ensure that Western technology and microelectronics are not in Russia’s arsenal.</p> -<p>Through its deliberations, the working group has engaged with U.S. government experts, industry leaders, international organizations, and other stakeholders to weigh this question: What concrete actions can and should the U.S. government undertake in the coming few months to strengthen U.S. and global biosafety and biosecurity?</p> +<hr /> -<p>Below are eight commonsense actions proposed by the working group that attempt to answer this question. Many imply an increase in staff, programs, and budgets, but in the larger picture these are modest investments. None are excessive or unaffordable. An expedited costing exercise is an important next step.</p> +<p><strong>James Byrne</strong> is Director of the Open-Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) Research Group at RUSI.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>What concrete actions can and should the U.S. government undertake in the coming few months to strengthen U.S. and global biosafety and biosecurity?</p> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Denys Karlovskyi</strong> is a Research Fellow with OSIA research group at RUSI.</p> -<p>These eight actions can attract political support across the aisle and from industry, foundations, and other partners. They will have meaningful impacts in preventing and mitigating future accidental or deliberate biological events and strengthen approaches aimed at controlling naturally occurring pathogens. No less important, they will clarify who in the White House is in charge of setting national policy and how sustainable implementation capacity will be established and funded across the U.S. government over the long term. Several pending pieces of legislation provide opportunities to advance these actions, such as the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA), the Medical Supply Chain Resiliency Act, and the Pioneering Antimicrobial Subscriptions to End Upsurging Resistance (PASTEUR) Act.</p> +<p><strong>Gary Somerville</strong> is a Research Fellow with OSIA Research Group at RUSI.</p>James Byrne, et al.An exclusive investigation conducted by RUSI, in partnership with Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR, reveals how one of Russia’s leading microelectronic distributors, Compel JSC, has imported massive volumes of Western microelectronics through Germany and Hong Kong since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.Euro SIFMANet Barna Report2023-12-14T12:00:00+08:002023-12-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/euro-sifmanet-barcelona-report<p><em>Participants discussed the key role that data plays in the success of sanctions.</em></p> -<p>If carried forward through consistent high-level political leadership, these pragmatic reforms hold the promise of generating momentum and common purpose. If successful, they will open the way for deeper structural changes in U.S. policy that will position the United States to continue in its role as a responsible leader in advancing a safe, secure, and innovative global bioeconomy for decades to come.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="action-1-the-white-house-should-finish-the-job-on-time-of-updating-and-integrating-the-us-potential-pandemic-pathogen-care-and-oversight-p3c0-policy-and-dual-use-research-of-concern-durc-policy">Action 1: The White House should finish the job on time of updating and integrating the U.S. Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3C0) Policy and Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC) Policy.</h4> +<p>During the design of the sanctions packages imposed on Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the initial focus was on throwing the net as wide as possible. The aim was to impose restrictive measures on a broad range of financial and trade activities. However, following the early flurry of activity, attention has now shifted towards ensuring effective implementation and enforcement.</p> -<p>Updated, strengthened, and unified guidelines for research on enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPPs) are overdue. Combining the two policies is a sound idea. These policies should be consistent with the impressive early 2023 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity recommendations, take account of the extensive subsequent consultations that have been held, and reflect the valuable input received from the request for information issued by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy in October 2023. As mandated by Congress, this process is meant to be completed by the end of 2023. Hewing as close to that timeline as possible will be consequential in demonstrating resolve.</p> +<p>Over nearly two years, the RUSI-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet) has highlighted the main structural challenges faced by EU member state national authorities, and businesses with sanctions responsibilities. It has also identified that all stakeholders – whether private sector actors seeking to improve their implementation or governments monitoring for circumvention and evasion – need better data. This would allow sanctions to be more effectively implemented, and circumvention and evasion more effectively tackled.</p> -<h4 id="action-2-the-national-security-advisor-should-designate-a-lead-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-policy-from-either--or-as-a-shared-responsibility-of--the-national-security-council-nsc-directorate-for-health-security-and-biodefense-or-the-new-white-house-office-of-pandemic-preparedness-and-response-policy-oppr">Action 2: The national security advisor should designate a lead on biosafety and biosecurity policy from either — or as a shared responsibility of — the National Security Council (NSC) Directorate for Health Security and Biodefense or the new White House Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy (OPPR).</h4> +<p>To gain insights on this issue, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI hosted a roundtable discussion in Barcelona in November 2023, with the support of Dow Jones Risk &amp; Compliance. The event gathered sanctions experts from the public and private sectors across different European jurisdictions to explore, under the Chatham House rule, the role of data in strengthening the implementation and enforcement of sanctions. This engagement was part of SIFMANet’s activities supported by the National Endowment for Democracy, and along with a video filmed on the day, this report presents the main findings from the discussion.</p> -<p>At present, it is unclear to many expert observers who is mandated to lead on U.S. policy on biosafety and biosecurity — a refrain heard repeatedly across the CSIS bipartisan alliance working group meetings. To some degree, this reflects that White House policy on biosecurity and biosafety is not managed or communicated effectively across the U.S. government or to external partners. The mission of transforming U.S. pandemic preparedness and biodefense capabilities should be managed with the seriousness of purpose, commitment, and accountability of the Apollo program.</p> +<h3 id="the-need-for-data-to-support-sanctions-implementation">The Need for Data to Support Sanctions Implementation</h3> -<p>OPPR was created to make major contributions in several areas of health security; it is still positioned to do so as long as the White House builds it consistent with the authority, spirit, and vision of the originating legislation. Both the NSC directorate and OPPR need to ensure that there are an adequate number of expert staff to carry out the expanded agenda laid out here.</p> +<p>Sanctions used to be an isolated task within the compliance departments of financial institutions, whose primary responsibility consisted of screening sanctions lists to check for individual and entity name matches with their client base and transaction activity.</p> -<p>The White House, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and departments and agencies, can and should complete a horizon-scanning exercise and clearly define a hierarchy of risks that identifies and explains the most significant threats for the nation and the world. What are the uncontrollable potential pandemic pathogens and the broad societal implications of greatest concern? How should the United States prioritize those pathogens that pose the greatest societal risks while recognizing new, presently unknown threats likely to emerge?</p> +<p>At the workshop, private sector representatives noted that this modus operandi started to change following the introduction in 2014 of sanctions against Russia, in response to the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. This programme introduced sector-specific sanctions, which for the first time required financial institutions – and others from the private sector such as oil services companies – to have a deeper understanding of their clients and, critically, their activities.</p> -<p>The White House, working with ODNI and other partners, can and should be responsible for iteratively assessing the threat landscape, accounting for scientific and technological changes along with the reemergence of dangerous pathogens and arrival of new infectious disease threats. A special effort should be made to strengthen U.S. biosecurity intelligence capabilities. The White House is uniquely positioned to direct new capabilities that not only reduce the highest-priority risks but are also beneficial in addressing other bacterial and fungal threats, including drug-resistant pathogens.</p> +<p>This task demanded increased resources from these elements of the private sector, as well as their clients, to obtain and process data that was far more complex than merely checking for sanctions-list name matches. Fast forward to February 2022 and the sanctions that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion dramatically increased this burden and introduced complex sanctions compliance to a large number of economic operators that had never been exposed in this way before.</p> -<p>The White House should work with senior-level, designated, visible counterparts at HHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), and other agencies to harmonize the special capabilities of different departments, prioritize investments, and eliminate redundancies. A subgoal should be to review existing layered biosafety and biosecurity protections with the aim of eliminating those that are ineffectual and elevating those that most effectively address priority risks across life sciences research, biotechnology development, and biomanufacturing activities.</p> +<p>As a result, businesses place significant demands on national competent authorities to assist with identifying where they require licences to continue their operations, but also information regarding possible entities engaged in sanctioned activities, something that is not yet widely available from the typical vendors of sanctions screening services.</p> -<p>The White House is best positioned to drive and integrate the capabilities of the security sector — including its ability to analyze signals and manage massive volumes of data — with the health and biological domains. These efforts should also be coordinated with industry and academic partners in support of the U.S. National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan and the vision to create medical countermeasures (MCMs) for all potential pandemic pathogens. It should conduct periodic exercises to evaluate U.S. pandemic preparedness, including preparedness for deliberate and accidental outbreaks, by deploying national capabilities, including rapid product development.</p> +<p>Participants from both governments and the private sector clearly articulated in the workshop that if sanctions are to be implemented effectively by the private sector, placed on the frontline by their governments, then a significant improvement in data is required. There was also strong agreement that banks should not be left to carry this burden on their own. Governments must clearly make those businesses engaging in trade exposed to sanctions aware of their responsibilities and must either have proper internal sanctions-monitoring controls or access to third-party tools that can provide them with the necessary compliance capacity.</p> -<h4 id="action-3-the-us-government-should-mandate-universal-screening-of-dna-synthesis-orders-and-create-incentives-to-make-implementation-achievable-it-should-also-extend-the-voluntary-research-norm-of-know-your-customer-beyond-dna-products-to-all-private-sector-biotech-providers-of-goods-and-services">Action 3: The U.S. government should mandate universal screening of DNA synthesis orders and create incentives to make implementation achievable. It should also extend the voluntary research norm of “know your customer” beyond DNA products to all private sector biotech providers of goods and services.</h4> +<p>Given the purpose of the workshop was to focus specifically on data, the next section addresses specific tactical data that the private sector could leverage to improve its sanctions compliance, and how governments can use data to facilitate better private sector implementation.</p> -<p>The U.S. government needs to strengthen oversight of and safeguards for DNA synthesis providers, particularly as new benchtop synthesis technologies evolve and become far more readily accessible outside of major laboratories. Private industry is reportedly asking for mandated screening of DNA synthesis orders to ensure responsible actors are not financially penalized for implementing safeguards of their own volition.</p> +<h3 id="what-data-is-helpful-for-implementing-sanctions">What Data is Helpful for Implementing Sanctions?</h3> -<p>In the Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, President Joseph Biden directed the U.S. government to establish a framework to encourage providers of synthetic DNA to screen orders for potential national security risks. The government will engage with industry partners to refine best practices for technical implementation, clarify reporting mechanisms, and encourage voluntary compliance. It will also mandate compliance for companies that receive federal funding. This important step by the White House should be strengthened through additional legislative action.</p> +<p>The use of data for improved sanctions effectiveness falls into two parts: data used to support implementation by EU member states’ banks and businesses; and data (mainly related to trade) used to identify sanctions circumvention.</p> -<p>Various other incentives for private sector biotech, such as financial offsets or tax incentives, particularly for those who do not receive government grants and contracts, could help expedite the transition by making compliance with such regulatory standards financially viable for DNA providers. Other forms of active support could be valuable, such as improving training on the responsibilities of industry for biosecurity and establishing an advice center to assist in adjudication of orders that have an ambiguous biosecurity risk.</p> +<h4 id="improved-implementation">Improved Implementation</h4> -<p>The U.S. government should expand the guidance that biotech companies “know your customer” to all biotech industry providers of goods and services, including those that create custom molecules, modify strains, and allow for the outsourcing of key lab work. Such companies provide critical scientific resources and knowledge for their downstream customers and therefore serve as important control points to guard against misuse.</p> +<p>For banks and businesses operating in the EU, data plays two roles: first, it facilitates better identification of sanctioned individuals and their assets; and second, it clarifies where clients might be involved in restricted sectors or activities.</p> -<h4 id="action-4-all-federal-government-investments-and-grants-in-infectious-disease-research-on-potential-pandemic-pathogens--in-the-united-states-and-internationally--should-require-a-dedicated-and-integrated-investment-in-biosafety-and-biosecurity-safeguards-including-applied-research-and-innovation-by-design">Action 4: All federal government investments and grants in infectious disease research on potential pandemic pathogens — in the United States and internationally — should require a dedicated and integrated investment in biosafety and biosecurity safeguards, including applied research and innovation by design.</h4> +<p><em>Beneficial Ownership Registries</em></p> -<p>HHS should designate a visible, active, senior-level lead who is responsible for integrating biosecurity and biosafety investments into grants and contracts for life sciences research, biotechnology development, and biomanufacturing, in accordance with Section 9 of the Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy.</p> +<p>Beneficial ownership registries are useful sources of data on companies and their ownership structure and related natural persons involved in them. However, both public and private sector participants noted that registers, if accessible, often do not hold the same type of information in each country, they do not always hold reliable and updated information, and they are at times only accessible in certain languages. In addition, some jurisdictions have business registries that require subscriptions and have limited financial intelligence on, for example, companies’ financial statements.</p> -<p>This is an essential step if new norms and standards for biosafety and biosecurity are to be adopted and routinized, if a biosafety and biosecurity innovation ecosystem is to be created, and if a skilled biosafety and biosecurity discipline is to be established. Investments in biosafety and biosecurity research and innovation can also help keep pace with emerging biological risks associated with rapid technological advances by developing effective safeguards and risk management tools. This goal could be realized if a modest percentage (1–4 percent) of the research grants from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and other U.S. government agencies on infectious diseases in the viral families with pandemic potential is dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity, with research and risk assessment built into the initial proposal design. In addition, there should be a separate pool of funding to conduct biosafety research, which could include wet lab work involving pathogens as well as work outside containment settings involving the physical sciences, the life sciences, the social sciences, and human systems research. These investments will deepen the grasp of what it takes to create reproducibility, identify recurrent mistakes, increase efficiency, and move toward embracing a bold target of no lab-linked uncontrolled outbreaks of potential pandemic pathogens.</p> +<p>Participants defined public access to beneficial ownership registers as a crucial element for sanctions implementation and they regarded the ruling from the November 2022 European Court of Justice as a new and troubling challenge. A representative from the Spanish Treasury explained that one of the goals of the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU is to harmonise information across EU registries.</p> -<p>These same requirements should also be built into U.S. global research funding on potential pandemic pathogens, including Pandemic Fund grantmaking, and into the operations of executive agencies carrying out infectious disease work. International norm-setting organizations including the World Health Organization (WHO), the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), and the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS) will play an important role. This approach may be modeled, in part, on how the Human Genome Project built in funding for ethical considerations and how the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have pressed for research projects to take account of ethical, legal, and societal implications.</p> +<p><em>Client Documentation</em></p> -<h4 id="action-5-the-us-government-should-pursue-a-far-more-muscular-diplomacy-to-secure-biosafety-and-biosecurity-safeguards-globally">Action 5: The U.S. government should pursue a far more muscular diplomacy to secure biosafety and biosecurity safeguards globally.</h4> +<p>Given the lack of publicly available and machine-readable data, trying to map client activities involving Russia’s neighbouring countries and trading partners demands that the private sector devote substantial amounts of manual labour to check information submitted by clients on their transactions. Businesses hold the deepest knowledge of the sector in which they operate and of their own activities. So, the data they provide is essential. However, representatives from financial institutions noted that it is increasingly difficult to rely on information submitted by clients given that, as elaborated below, it may be subject to a lack of knowledge on the part of their clients or to obfuscation tactics used by those seeking to evade sanctions.</p> -<p>In every area of U.S. domestic policy in biosafety and biosecurity, there should be a conscious and deliberate effort to explain how innovations tie to U.S. diplomacy to strengthen capabilities with external partners. U.S. domestic policy is often developed with little regard for the global context, yet it is frequently, in practice, a de facto baseline for the world. U.S. global programs cannot be treated as an add-on; rather, the U.S. approach to advancing biosecurity and biosafety must be seen as an integral component of a strategy that can be implemented in a wide range of resource-rich and resource-limited settings. The demand for U.S. technical expertise, best practices, and training is rising steeply as middle-income countries in particular invest in an exceedingly swift expansion of high-containment laboratories. Building effective partnerships across the range of areas detailed below requires sustained outreach and engagement; a commitment to equity, access, technology transfer, and strengthening of local and regional capabilities; a belief in combining bilateral and multilateral strategies; and an upgraded communications capability to combat mis- and disinformation against U.S. programs and affirm and promote responsible scientific research.</p> +<p>Businesses are not only trading in goods subject to sanctions, but also technical services, and many do not know the extent of their sanctions obligations. An example shared by a participant described that providing crew members for a vessel carrying Russian oil could fall under EU prohibitions, but many businesses do not know this, and rely on financial institutions to inform them that such activity is prohibited.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>U.S. global programs cannot be treated as an add-on; rather, the U.S. approach to advancing biosecurity and biosafety must be seen as an integral component of a strategy that can be implemented in a wide range of resource-rich and resource-limited settings.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Furthermore, participants noted that they are increasingly holding conversations with clients regarding suspicions of document forgery. Financial institutions explained that the supporting information provided to justify the submitted documentation is often useful to confirm or reject their suspicions. But again, this work creates a significant extra burden on the financial institutions’ sanctions compliance community.</p> -<p>A U.S. diplomacy of expanded U.S. global investments in biosafety and biosecurity will strengthen bilateral partnerships and global norms and standards. As several U.S. government agencies and programs already conduct work in these areas, the challenge now becomes how to create far more coherence, vitality, and visible unity of effort through both the newly launched Department of State Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, particularly the Division of Select Agents and Toxins program; the HHS Office of Global Affairs; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the DOD Biological Threat Reduction Program, among others.</p> +<p>To effectively manage their monitoring burden, many financial institutions are thus following a risk-based approach. If a financial institution sees a client trading with a third country with which it has maintained trade relations in the past, then it can lower manual effort. On the contrary, if the business relationship was recently established or has now shifted to include controlled goods, the financial institution will increase the manual work required to check the transactions.</p> -<p>U.S. diplomacy should prioritize the following activities:</p> +<p>While financial institutions monitor clients across all sectors, key corporates may serve as the most useful and expert sources of data. These include shipping companies, logistics firms and airlines. These businesses hold the raw data required to check goods that banks do not have access to, such as the bill of lading, the itinerary of vessels or identity location spoofing. The top companies in these sectors are screening these elements, but with a lower level of scrutiny than banks would like them to for sanctions-compliance purposes.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><em>Require biosecurity and biosafety investments as integral components across U.S. global health and health security policies and programs</em>, especially those providing laboratory, surveillance, and workforce capacity to combat infectious disease threats. This work to strengthen and build capacity and standards, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, is critical to sustain, detect, and respond to naturally occurring threats.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Invest in multilateral institutions</em> to strengthen routine and emergency biosafety and biosecurity efforts and reduce vulnerabilities outside U.S. borders. Activities should include investment in the WHO and close support for the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, including the Biological Weapons Convention.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Engage systematically with China and the G20 on biosafety and biosecurity norms.</em> No credible U.S. global strategy can ignore China. That said, this goal will require careful, incremental bilateral efforts to address key challenges and involve navigating existing tensions with China and the deep hostility toward China in the United States. The United States will also need to cultivate a coalition of like-minded global partners, including across the G20, and work with other regional partners — including Singapore, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia — and multilateral institutions to test what pressure points and forms of engagement with China would be most fruitful. The November 15 meeting between President Biden and Chinese president Xi Jinping in San Francisco and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Week that followed may create new opportunities for dialogues in 2024 on biosafety and biosecurity, including under the auspices of new talks on the risk associated with AI. Those possibilities should be systematically tested.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>In sum, better data is required if the private sector is to be fully empowered to play its role on the frontline of sanctions implementation. As the complexity of sanctions has grown, the provision of and access to data has lagged. New tools need to be developed by those companies with expertise in providing data services; and governments need to provide access to additional sources of data that can enhance the effectiveness of the private sector.</p> -<p>The United States should also engage with and support promising new lines of international work in biosafety and biosecurity as they evolve, define the gaps they will fill, and demonstrate concrete returns. Two nascent developments are of particular note:</p> +<h4 id="identifying-circumvention">Identifying Circumvention</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p><em>The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)</em> is working to leverage its laboratory, manufacturing, and preclinical animal model research networks in partner countries to catalyze responsible capacity building with a focus in the Global South. Through U.S. support to CEPI’s vision to develop MCMs for all potential pandemic pathogens, it will be important to ensure that biosecurity and biosafety investments are integrated as explicit priorities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>IBBIS</em> aims to provide tools and best practices to biotech industry, academia, funders, governments, and other global stakeholders to improve biosecurity and biosafety by safeguarding the tools of modern bioscience and biotechnology. Although IBBIS will be a nongovernmental organization, it will potentially advance key U.S. biosecurity and biosafety goals and raise the bar globally. Support for IBBIS should include using U.S. diplomatic convening power and technical expertise to build international political support for the organization and its work. Under the management of IBBIS, a bio funders’ compact with philanthropic and other private donors could be valuable in strengthening norms and incentives for compliance with biosecurity best practices.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>As well as facilitating improved implementation, data – particularly trade data – can be used by governments to identify changes in trade flows that may be indicative of emerging sanctions circumvention routes used by Russia to procure the key goods it requires for its military.</p> -<h4 id="action-6-create-rules-of-the-road-for-us-supported-viral-discovery-work">Action 6: Create rules of the road for U.S.-supported viral discovery work.</h4> +<p><em>Trade Data</em></p> -<p>Both U.S. civilian and military institutions have funded field research in remote settings, often in bat caves, to search for new viruses with pandemic potential. But while research on naturally occurring pathogens remains critical, much more careful U.S. guidance is needed in the form of enforceable and effective rules to assess, permit, and fund this type of work. Clearer standards are needed to weigh the possible scientific benefits, identify the potential dangers, determine whether those risks can be mitigated, and judge whether the work can be pursued responsibly. Protocols should be established for field research and sampling before specimens reach the lab. Once new pathogens are discovered, there should be clearer guidance around the personal protective equipment (PPE) standards required and the biosafety level appropriate to handle such unknown, novel risks. Guidance could also be developed for communities on how to avoid interactions that could lead to zoonotic spillover.</p> +<p>Public and private sector representatives acknowledged their initial positive assessment of the reported declines in their jurisdictions’ direct trade with Russia. This assessment changed once they identified the increasing exports – including of controlled and banned goods – to third countries regarded as high-risk for circumvention. This indicated that their trade with Russia continued, albeit indirectly. To properly observe and understand the specific transactions and flows, and the extent to which they represent sanctions circumvention, authorities and the private sector point to various data points to strengthen their sanctions compliance mechanisms.</p> -<p>In the post-Covid era, funders and scientists have turned away from funding research on potentially dangerous viruses to a significant degree, in part out of fear of accusations of lab leaks. New, more effective rules will be an essential element in sustaining responsible future research and should be developed based on consultation with experts inside and outside government to ensure standards are reasonable, evidence-based, and not subject to political interference.</p> +<p>Participants noted the difficulty of proving that goods exported from a specific jurisdiction to a third country are then re-exported to Russia through generic import/export trade data. Sources such as UN COMTRADE – described as not particularly user-friendly – or national customs data can serve as a good guide to identify suspicious trade flows, but do not provide sufficiently deep insights. A participant provided a visual example in which a member state exported apples to a third country, and the third country exported apples to Russia. The flow of apples can be identified in the member state’s national customs data but unless the items are specifically identified, it is hard to prove that it is the self- same apples that enter Russia. Participants added that the customs data from Russia and certain third countries may be a useful starting point but cannot be trusted and often entail language translation complications.</p> -<h4 id="action-7-invest-in-research-on-a-rolling-iterative-basis-on-the-risks-of-ai-convergence-with-biotechnologies">Action 7: Invest in research on a rolling, iterative basis on the risks of AI convergence with biotechnologies.</h4> +<p>To compensate for this lack of clarity, tools such as Import/Export Genius provide transaction-level tracking data, identify where a product was produced, and to where it was shipped. Authorities and financial institutions can use this data to then query companies involved on whether sanctions are being breached. A key piece of information employed in trade is Harmonised System (HS) codes. These describe the nature of a product.</p> -<p>U.S. civilian and military agencies should invest in an ambitious research agenda to assess the dual-use risks posed by AI-enabled bio design tools, consider what steps will effectively prevent large language models (LLMs) from lowering knowledge barriers to the misuse of biology, monitor ongoing developments in AI-enabled automation of life sciences research, and establish preemptive guardrails to protect data and advance norms and standards for these technologies. This research should be done on an ongoing basis to keep pace with technological advances and identify emerging risks.</p> +<p>HS codes differ across jurisdictions, as countries incorporate additional digits to the six-digit HS codes for further classification. For example, in the EU they are known as TARIC codes and in the US they are HTS codes. This creates divergences among HS codes, which authorities and businesses must understand. HS codes are particularly useful to screen for dual-use goods. However, participants highlighted that not all dual-use goods have HS codes. This a critical challenge as the technical descriptions of HS codes in regulations often create confusion, which increases cost of compliance for businesses that must manually check them.</p> -<p>Many of these research priorities are articulated in the new White House executive order on AI, which initiates several reviews on both how AI could increase biosecurity risks and how it could benefit biological discovery and public health. The order directs a variety of agencies and departments to develop guidance and benchmarks for auditing future AI capabilities, including red-teaming and evaluating dual-use models, and for protecting U.S. government biological data, elevating responsibility for implementation to a new cabinet-level White House AI council. It also eases the pathways for AI professionals to join the federal government, which will be critical to ensure that agencies have the staff capacity to monitor advancing capabilities and, when needed, institute new guidance, safeguards, and regulations in an agile way. The executive order recognizes the international nature of these threats and commits the United States to working with other nations to ensure technologies are safe, secure, trustworthy, and interoperable. Partner nations echoed these collaborative intentions at the 2023 AI Safety Summit in the United Kingdom, in the resulting Bletchley Declaration, and in related efforts by the G7 and the United Nations.</p> +<p>Furthermore, authorities and financial institutions have detected that some businesses will alter the HS codes of goods to pass them off as products not subject to prohibitions. This is related to the document forgery issue that is increasingly spotted by financial institutions in the information provided by clients. Participants explained that when a bank is financing trade through letters of credit, they will have more information on the operation than if the trade is conducted via “open account” through which their access to data is limited to just seeing the financial transaction. This makes it harder to spot irregularities. As one participant noted, “the task now consists of screening against information that is not there”.</p> -<p>The U.S. government should make clear it will work only with LLM developers who are dedicated to producing safe and secure models — for instance, those who agreed to voluntary commitments with the White House earlier in 2023. It should also support efforts within the science community to establish and implement principles to guide responsible use of AI technologies in biomolecular design.</p> +<p>The collection of trade data is essential for the private sector to effectively implement sanctions and detect circumvention. However, trade data also plays a key role in the diplomatic efforts of authorities. The EU both requests trade data from third countries and also asks them to validate its own perspective on the third country’s trading activity, to assess their involvement in circumvention. Suspicious trade flows and confirmed circumvention activities identified through the aforementioned analysis of trade data by EU operators can be leveraged by authorities from sanctions-imposing countries to deter third countries from facilitating circumvention through their jurisdictions.</p> -<h4 id="action-8-research-and-update-basic-laboratory-protections-including-fit-for-purpose-ppe-and-workforce-training">Action 8: Research and update basic laboratory protections, including fit-for-purpose PPE and workforce training.</h4> +<p><em>Other Data</em></p> -<p>The U.S. government should invest in research and demonstration pilots focused on innovative, fit-for-purpose PPE that is better adapted to the diverse healthcare workforce. Actions should include encouraging the uptake of reusable PPE, which has been shown to lower infection rates and increase productivity; adapting the standard for health worker PPE to follow designs for women; creating designs that accommodate religious headwear, beards, and the faces of people of color; and providing workforce training. There should also be a focus on ensuring a warm manufacturing base, options for rapid expansion of domestic production and distribution in the event of an emergency, and improved monitoring of logistics chains of raw materials.</p> +<p>Throughout the roundtable, participants also pointed to other data sources that would be useful for authorities and businesses to exploit and process to enhance their investigations and compliance systems.</p> -<p>In the United States, organizations that engage in research on potential pandemic pathogens should have established relationships with regional or national medical centers equipped to provide full-spectrum diagnostic and treatment capabilities and biocontainment in the event of accidental pathogen exposure. This would be a critical step outside the lab to prevent further community spread. Regional relationships could be established through the National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center.</p> +<p>For example, for individual financial transactions, Business Identifier Codes (BIC) are well-known sources of data used for addressing SWIFT messages, routing business transactions and identifying business parties, but the screening of less common items can also provide valuable information. One such example is screening IP addresses that may help identify businesses operating in high-risk jurisdictions. IP addresses can be disguised through VPNs, but their usage can be detected and as a result trigger a red flag to demand enhanced due diligence. As private sector participants noted, screening IP addresses is an increasingly common practice by larger financial institutions and e-commerce firms to block transactions from sanctioned jurisdictions and/or flag transactions for further scrutiny. They noted that national competent authorities could enhance the effectiveness of private sector sanctions implementation by providing this information in sanctions designations as and when available.</p> -<h3 id="a-moment-of-opportunity">A Moment of Opportunity</h3> +<p>The need to leverage such additional data points to support sanctions implementation highlights the added complexity of the post-2022 regimes. Using these data sources to triangulate and identify evasion activity demands a considerable degree of manual work to check the entities involved and their activities. Yet, despite the resources required, going beyond basic due diligence and conducting open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis must now be a critical component of sanctions implementation.</p> -<p>In the post-Covid moment, the eight commonsense actions proposed by the CSIS bipartisan alliance lay out a realistic vision for achieving concerted progress in reducing the risks of biological accidents and misuse of dangerous biological agents while providing a safe path for continued research on naturally occurring infectious disease threats. These eminently pragmatic steps are affordable and need not be unduly burdensome, and they will enhance the protection of Americans and others who are vulnerable today. But that protection will only be realized with sufficient political will and a sustained commitment to building adequate staff and programs. An expedited costing exercise is an important next step.</p> +<p>With regards to maritime transport, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) required by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)to locate vessels was also noted by both public and private sector participants as providing valuable data. Even though the AIS can be turned off, this should trigger a red flag in due diligence systems. AIS will also indicate changes in the draft of the vessel, which might reveal that transhipments took place due to a change in the vessel’s cargo. This can be complemented with the use of satellite imagery. Similarly, IMO identification numbers of designated vessels are key pieces of data that institutions should have at their disposal to monitor their activity such as reflagging or change of ownership.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>These eminently pragmatic steps are affordable and need not be unduly burdensome, and they will enhance the protection of Americans and others who are vulnerable today.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Private sector actors, particularly financial institutions that can afford to make such investments, are increasingly developing OSINT capabilities as they can provide invaluable data on clients, their partners and their activities. The information can be openly shared with authorities and other private institutions.</p> -<p>At their core, these commonsense actions will address two vexing gaps. They will clarify who at the White House is mandated to set national policy and ensure authoritative leadership, including effective coordination and oversight across the government and with partners outside government. They will also enhance the U.S. government’s capability to implement policies in the many diverse departments and agencies that require stronger biosafety and biosecurity approaches.</p> +<h3 id="persisting-challenges">Persisting Challenges</h3> -<p>If carried forward, this package of actions could win support from diverse political perspectives and different institutional interests, deliver results that stir momentum, and open a pathway to U.S. leadership at home and abroad in creating a far safer and more predictable bioeconomy.</p> +<p>While available circumvention routes are increasingly limited, participants noted that supply chains are getting more layered with complex multi-jurisdiction corporate structures and operators increasingly struggling to control what is happening along a particular route. The manual work required to effectively obtain and screen the necessary data is a cumbersome burden for the private sector and the task of identifying companies owned or controlled by sanctioned individuals in the supply chain is challenging. Ownership data is relatively straightforward when it is publicly available – which, as indicated above, is not always the case – but determining “control” is a more difficult task, given that the necessary information might not be public and the concept of “control” can be judgemental.</p> -<hr /> +<p>In certain areas, participants explained that they face the challenge of combining contradictory datasets. For instance, when monitoring to confirm that a transaction was done below the oil price cap, both authorities and businesses must check data from shipping companies and customs pricing data, which do not always match. This intense screening is conducted for each individual transaction but if the goal is to disrupt the trade of oil or battlefield items before it happens, operators would need to develop foresight by identifying patterns and incorporate these mapping activities into their compliance procedures to anticipate potential evasion transaction.</p> -<p><strong>J. Stephen Morrison</strong> is a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and directs its Global Health Policy Center. Through several high-level commissions, he has shaped decisions in Congress and the administration on HIV/AIDS, reproductive health and gender equality, and health security, including pandemic preparedness. Currently, the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security is addressing critical post-Covid challenges.</p> +<p>A further complication to these mapping efforts and the blocking of suspicious transactions is the decoupled nature of payment flows from their related trade flows. While payments are flowing between two jurisdictions, goods may be produced and transported from factories in third countries. For example, a Swedish entity can have a Dutch bank account, receive the payment from a shell company in Turkey, and ship controlled goods from Malaysia via a third country to Russia. Financial institutions emphasised that it is very challenging to block such transactions as they are often unaware of the trade flow connected with the payment, a trade flow involving countries outside the Western sanctions regime and thus not subject to local control. Furthermore, even if (in this case) the Turkish shell company is identified as facilitating sanctioned trade, a new shell company can easily be established in its place elsewhere with no transaction history.</p> -<p><strong>Michaela Simoneau</strong> is an associate fellow for global health security with the Global Health Policy Center at CSIS. She manages the secretariat of the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security and formerly managed the secretariat of the CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security, both groups of senior experts charged with generating bipartisan recommendations to strengthen U.S. and global pandemic preparedness and response policy.</p>J. Stephen Morrison and Michaela SimoneauToday, there is a shared sense of vulnerability and a shared resolve across political divides to better protect the United States and the world against the accidental release of biological agents (biosafety), deliberate misuse of biological agents (biosecurity), and naturally occurring spillover of dangerous pathogens.Struggling, Not Crumbling2023-11-20T12:00:00+08:002023-11-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/struggling-not-crumbling<p><em>Notwithstanding its difficulties at the front in Ukraine and economic hardships at home, Russia continues to pursue AI and other emerging technologies in a bid to future-proof its armed forces. However, it faces several major hurdles to before it can reach its objective of achieving battlefield superiority in selected areas.</em></p> +<p>One possible way of addressing this challenge, raised by finance experts at the roundtable, is to identify pinch points in the payment flows, for example by making more use of SWIFT messaging data by mandating greater use of currently discretionary fields, to help illuminate payments related to circumvention.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The increasing burden placed on the private sector led participants to express their concern over the lack of clarity regarding the extent of their compliance obligations to confirm there is no risk of sanctions violation or circumvention. They have significantly increased their sanctions-dedicated resources and tools but at some point they have to make a judgement as to how far their due diligence obligations extend. Participants explained that investigations had traditionally been limited to checking two levels of ownership, but recent investigations have gone down many more levels of ownership to identify the real individual controlling an entity. Private sector representatives added that this may clash with the expectations of regulators, which will also differ across the jurisdictions they operate in. Even minute differences will be immense for internationally operating institutions.</p> -<p>Discussing Russia and high technology these days may seem counterintuitive given the images from Ukraine of the Russian army in disarray, in trenches, using primarily massive artillery rather than ultramodern weapons with a high degree of autonomy. Likewise, the typical Russian tendency for overblown rhetoric has created unrealistic expectations among the broader public of what Russia was ready to deliver on the battlefield. Yet, the war is also providing a testing ground for new weapons systems on both sides. Mounting troubles notwithstanding, Russia continues to prioritise AI and selected emerging and disruptive technology (EDT) programmes not merely despite, but because of the weakening of its conventional forces and the growing capability gap with the West.</p> +<p>A clear message from participants was that many businesses lack experience regarding the availability and use of the data sources discussed at the workshop. This often means they resort to third-party data providers and vendors. These services ease the burden on businesses, but authorities have raised concerns of an over-reliance on these services without understanding how the tools they provide work. Participating authorities explained that their inspections showed that many businesses do not properly detect the right matches after inputting the data provided into their systems, and some screening systems struggle with fuzzy searches with multiple options per identifier. These fuzzy searches are themselves the outcome of vast discrepancies across sanctions lists, further complicating compliance tasks.</p> -<h3 id="drivers-behind-russian-interest-in-ai">Drivers Behind Russian Interest in AI</h3> +<p>Furthermore, the heavy burden imposed on the private sector is met with a lack of incentives to actually comply with sanctions obligations. First, participants noted that HS codes are used for tax purposes, so businesses are not always interested in reporting them accurately. Furthermore, for intentional circumvention schemes, public and private sector representatives agreed that the consequences of breaching sanctions at the moment are not enough to deter violations, both in terms of low financial penalties but also low chances of detection.</p> -<p>There are a host of incentives driving the Russian political and military leadership’s continued focus on AI, despite the attention consumed by its war of aggression. AI is seen as a source both of potentially rapid military modernisation and of new vulnerabilities that enemies can exploit.</p> +<p>This is partly related to the insufficient level of information exchanged within the EU, a major impediment to sanctions investigations and enforcement. Currently, many investigations are crippled when a national competent authority requests information from a member state where sanctions violations are not yet criminalised. A participant suggested that to improve the sharing of data and avoid duplication, the EU needs a sanctions-related institution such as OLAF, which is currently the only agency that coordinates member states regarding imports and exports. Regional initiatives for enhanced information-sharing within the EU are happening in areas such as the Baltic states, but this should be happening across the EU.</p> -<p>When Russian authorities launched a large-scale military reform programme in 2008, they expressed the concern that it would be too time-consuming to catch up militarily with the West the traditional way. EDTs, conversely, seemed to offer a potentially rapid, non-linear pathway to narrow – if not close – the capability gap. This logic still applies. Moreover, given the growing asymmetry in conventional power due to Russia’s extensive personnel and material losses in Ukraine, this reasoning appears even more relevant today.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<p>The Russian authorities believe that trends such as the proliferation of autonomous and AI-enabled weapons systems and the convergence between human–machine learning, cyber and AI, coupled with novel operational concepts and force structures, will change the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement therein. Consequently, these developments seem to have the potential to undermine fundamental pillars of international security such as deterrence, arms control and strategic balance. Therefore, gaining or losing ground in the contest for cutting-edge military technology appears to have profound consequences for power distribution and Russia’s influence in the international system. Indeed, President Vladimir Putin has consistently spoken about technological development in existential terms: one either succeeds or they will be annihilated. In 2023, he compared AI development to the invention of the nuclear bomb – an event that fundamentally changed the course of history.</p> +<p>As one workshop participant noted, a key feature of the current sanctions regimes against Russia is that policymakers are expecting sanctions to achieve far more today than has been expected of sanctions regimes in the past, and governments’ messaging often seems to expect companies to screen transactions against non-existing data.</p> -<p>Furthermore, Putin and other central players anticipate that defence innovation – and AI in particular – will produce dual-use technology that can drive a nationwide economic growth. This is needed now more than ever given the weight of Western sanctions. The hope is that the domestic defence industry will be able to provide technological solutions that Russia can no longer get from abroad. As put by the head of the AI Department at the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), Vasilii Yelistratov, military-civilian transfer takes place in both directions. Likewise, German Gref, the CEO of Russia’s largest state-owned bank Sberbank and one of the key figures in Russian AI development, argues that the introduction of AI could increase Russia’s GDP by 1% by 2025. He has pointed to Sberbank’s increase in labour productivity as a result of implementing AI. Others are even more optimistic. In July 2023, Russia hosted its first Future Technologies Forum, where Putin promised to transition the whole national economy and governance system to a new management model based on AI and Big Data in order to boost labour productivity.</p> +<p>A core pillar of the effectiveness of the current sanctions implementation and enforcement landscape is the availability, accessibility and quality of data. During the workshop, participants proposed a series of valuable sources of data for authorities and businesses to strengthen their investigations and compliance mechanisms. However, these data sources pose a series of challenges in themselves, which the EU must take measures to mitigate in order to improve the sanctions efforts across the public and private sectors. The importance of this is clear. Data can not only support better implementation of sanctions by EU member states and their financial institutions and businesses, it can also provide a strong basis from which to engage in dialogue with third countries that are vulnerable to – or indeed are already facilitating – sanctions circumvention.</p> -<p>While these promises and benefits are yet to materialise, such statements and assessments clearly demonstrate the importance that Russian authorities attach to AI development, both for the future of the armed forces and the state as a whole.</p> +<p>With a focus on how governments can support the private sector in achieving their goals, some specific recommendations emerged from the workshop.</p> -<h3 id="how-is-russia-going-about-developing-ai">How is Russia Going About Developing AI?</h3> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Clarity of obligations.</strong> Supervisors need to clarify what is required of the private sector. Too often requirements and expectations are ambiguous and lack specificity. Although ambiguity may be a means by which governments can ensure businesses do not merely restrict their compliance obligations to the bare minimum, the uncertainty faced in the private sector on whether they have done enough for a single transaction leads to inefficient responses, the investment of extensive (potentially unnecessary) resources and manual work, and economic costs.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhanced awareness in the private sector.</strong> Businesses must expand their understanding of the steps needed to conduct sanctions due diligence on clients, their trade partners, controlled products and sectoral risks. Governments must support this education process by providing briefings and access to new data sources that can facilitate sanctions implementation. As one participant noted, screening for “persons connected with Russia” is just not possible – or desirable; and placing the burden of policing businesses entirely on the banking sector is not efficient. Key industry sectors such as shipping and logistics must be made to feel equally responsible and empowered.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Harmonisation and consistency are key.</strong> Small inconsistencies in sanctions interpretations by authorities can have a significant impact on the private sector. For example, within the EU, the understanding of ownership and control differs across member states and, in consequence, guidance for businesses operating in several jurisdictions varies. Likewise, the quality and nature of information found in national beneficial ownership registers varies, is often not updated, is in different languages, and is not publicly available. Among the sanctions coalition, key identifiers such as HS codes also differ and alignment in this regard would facilitate the tasks of both authorities and the private sector. More broadly, the quality of trade data is lacking and should likewise be presented in a harmonised manner as much as possible.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Optimising use of trade data.</strong> First, trade data from EU member states can be trusted and should be the foundation of trade-related sanctions implementation. EU member state capacity in this field varies – development of an EU member state sanctions trade data expert working group could enhance the use of this data to identify EU-based weaknesses. Second, trade data should continue to be used to engage with third countries to ensure common understanding of the key items that are subject to restriction.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Improve EU-wide trade data sharing.</strong> The EU should create an EU sanctions-related information-sharing mechanism similar to OLAF to ensure consistent interpretation of sanctions (particularly related to trade).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Consolidation must continue.</strong> The consolidation of regulations is essential for businesses with insufficient experience to navigate complex EU legislation. Furthermore, a consolidated – and more closely aligned – list of sanctioned individuals and entities from the international sanctions coalition would facilitate the task of businesses that aim to be compliant across all regimes.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Make greater use of SWIFT data.</strong> Tackling circumvention trade flows would benefit from identifying pinch points in the flow of payments, for example by making more use of SWIFT messaging data by mandating greater use of currently discretionary fields, to help illuminate payments related to circumvention.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Technological advancements.</strong> The current level of manual work required to fulfil sanctions compliance obligations is an unsustainable burden on the private sector. Greater attention should be placed on developing tools that will facilitate the effective compliance of businesses. For example, a participant noted Singapore’s introduction of blockchain to track payments and trade.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>The Russian approach to defence innovation is based on a traditional top-down, state-driven model, although with important modifications. The objective is to take advantage of the progress being made in the civilian sector by fostering civil-military cooperation. In this way, Russia aims to maximise the state’s access to talent, resources and ideas, thus shortening the time between the generation of an idea and its full implementation. This approach appears to partly emulate US military-civilian sector cooperation, as well as the Chinese model of military-civil fusion, connecting science and technology parks to the campuses of large military universities.</p> +<p>In sum, data – in all its forms – is emerging as a key tool in enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions implementation against Russia. Yet, the provision and availability of data by governments to the private sector has lagged the growth in complexity of sanctions. Accessible data has the potential to enhance the ability of financial institutions and businesses across the EU to be fully empowered to correctly identify entities, industry sectors, activities and specific goods that should be blocked. It can further assist with the identification of circumvention activity and underpin diplomatic engagement with third countries. The challenge ahead is to enhance the quality and accessibility of these data sources to ensure the impact needed to further restrict the funding and resourcing of the Russian military.</p> -<p>Defence R&amp;D infrastructure is centrally coordinated by the Russian MoD’s Main Directorate of Innovative Development (GUIR). To further strengthen the MoD’s role as an engine for AI implementation, a special AI department was created in 2021. GUIR’s role is to organise, coordinate and support innovation programmes. Russia’s defence R&amp;D infrastructure consists of several hundred research institutes, design bureaus and testing centres that conduct applied research for the needs of the armed forces and the defence industry. In addition, Russia has created a number of AI centres and laboratories at leading academic institutions, such as the Neural Networks and Deep Learning Lab at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; the Higher School of Economics; the Ivannikov Institute for System Programming of the Russian Academy of Sciences; the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology; and the National Centre for Cognitive Technologies at the Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics University in Saint Petersburg.</p> +<hr /> -<p>This ecosystem is supplemented with so called “radical innovation centres”, “technoparks” or “technocities” as generators of ideas and dual-use technologies. The Advanced Research Foundation (Fond perspektivnykh issledovanii), created in 2012, focuses on developing new and potentially disruptive dual-use technologies, such as unmanned vehicles (the Marker unmanned ground vehicle and the Udar unmanned tank); autonomous systems and automated decision-making; superconductors (Liman); additive technology of polymetallic products (Matritsa); autonomous deep-submergence vehicles (Vityaz-D); and ultra-thin materials for improving individual camouflage and protection (Tavolga).</p> +<p><strong>Tom Keatinge</strong> is the founding Director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI, where his research focuses on matters at the intersection of finance and security. He is also currently a specialist adviser on illicit finance to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ongoing enquiry.</p> -<p>Subsequently, in 2018 Russia established the Era Technopolis, which explicitly seeks to develop technology for the Russian armed forces in cooperation with the military-industrial complex and the civilian sector. Currently, there are more than 100 entities involved in cooperation with Era, including top arms manufacturers such as Kalashnikov, Sukhoi and Sozvezdie and dozens of civilian universities and research institutions, including the Kurchatov Institute – which hosts the largest interdisciplinary laboratory that has received a special role in Era, contributing to its management. The structure is supplemented with military scientific units (nauchnye roty), created first in 2013 on the basis of Russian military research and higher educational institutions. As of 2023, eight units are operating as part of Era within their specialised fields of expertise. Staffed by conscripts, Russia hopes that these units may also provide a recruiting ground, allowing it to retain specialists in the armed forces and defence industry.</p> +<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime &amp; Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).</p>Tom Keatinge and Gonzalo SaizParticipants discussed the key role that data plays in the success of sanctions.Organised Cybercrime2023-12-13T12:00:00+08:002023-12-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/organised-cybercrime<p><em>This article traces the journey of the threat and response to cybercrime – specifically, ransomware, which has emerged as the most disruptive cyber threat to the UK’s national security and society today.</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Among the top priorities is improving command, control, communication and decision-making with AI, seen as critical to gaining and maintaining information superiority</code></em></strong></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Era has a cluster of 16 prioritised development fields, including AI, pattern recognition, robotics, small spacecrafts, information security, energy sufficiency, nanotechnology, nanomaterials, information and telecommunication systems, information technology and computer science, hydrometeorological and geophysical support, hydroacoustic object detection systems, geographic information platforms for military use, weapons based on new physical principles, radiolocation and targeting for high-precision weapons, and automated control. As Deputy Head of ERA for Scientific and Educational Activities Andrey Morozov explained, AI technology is not so much a product in itself, but rather a foundation intersecting almost all of the military’s EDT programmes.</p> +<p>Over the last 10 years, cybercrime has entered the realm of national security. This shift has been driven by one type of cybercrime in particular – ransomware.</p> -<h3 id="what-are-russias-defence-ai-priorities">What are Russia’s Defence AI Priorities?</h3> +<p>Emerging from the Russian cyber-criminal ecosystem in the early 2010s, ransomware today is a highly disruptive form of cybercrime that encompasses a range of tactics and techniques designed to extort ransoms from individuals, businesses and even governments. Although cyber fraud likely affects more individual UK citizens on a personal level and generates greater economic losses, ransomware is a particularly acute threat to the UK because of its ability to cause harm to nationally important services – ranging from the ability of local councils to provide social care or ensure your bins are collected to the provision of essential healthcare services. Put simply, ransomware can (and does) ruin people’s lives.</p> -<p>Russia has a broad spectrum of programmes that are similar to those developed in the US and China, though they are usually smaller in scale. As of September 2022, GUIR has supported over 500 projects, 222 of which were planned for completion and implementation in 2022. Among the extensive list of projects, it is possible to discern several priority areas, including command, control, communication and decision-making; unmanned vehicles; nuclear and high-precision weapons; air defence, early warning, electronic warfare and space-based systems; and cyber and influence operations to shape the psychological domain.</p> +<p>Ransomware has proven to be highly lucrative for many of the criminals that participate, with UK victims paying an average ransom payment of £1.6 million in 2023 according to one survey. Large profit margins have enabled ransomware operators to reinvest revenues, expand their capabilities, and largely stay ahead of cyber defenders and law enforcement. Although the National Crime Agency (NCA) and its international counterparts have had some tactical successes against the ransomware ecosystem, absent a major shift in the cost–benefit calculus of ransomware operators, the next 10 years of cybercrime will likely continue to be dominated by this pernicious form of offending.</p> -<p>While the list of Russian AI-enabled projects is too extensive for this article, below are some examples that illustrate the areas of Russia’s particular interest in AI for defence applications.</p> +<h3 id="the-evolution-of-ransomware-from-spray-and-pray-to-organised-cybercrime">The Evolution of Ransomware: From “Spray and Pray” to Organised Cybercrime</h3> -<p>Among the top priorities is improving command, control, communication and decision-making with AI, seen as critical to gaining and maintaining information superiority. At a Defence Ministry Board meeting in December 2022, Putin called for the integration of AI technology at “all levels of decision-making” in the armed forces. The National Defence Management Centre, established in 2014 to provide the primary joint all-domain command and control structure, reportedly applies AI to support information collection, analysis and decision-making. Notably, Putin has referred to experiences from the battlefield in Ukraine, which in his assessment show that the most effective weapons systems are those that operate quickly and “almost in an automatic mode.”</p> +<p>Although ransomware has existed in some form since the 1990s, it was largely non-viable as a profitable cybercrime until the emergence of cryptocurrency in the late 2010s, which enabled cybercriminals to monetise ransomware while maintaining a degree of anonymity. In 2013, ransomware was characterised by the so-called “spray and pray” model, which targeted a large number of individual users. These operations had low yields with uniformly priced ransoms for all victims.</p> -<p>Unmanned systems, furthermore, stand out as a special priority for AI applications. Before the 2022 invasion, Russia had more than 100 types of unmanned vehicles for a broad spectrum of missions at different stages of research, development and deployment. Many have been tested in Syria and are currently being employed in Ukraine. One of them is the KUB-LA kamikaze drone. Its producer, ZALA Aero Group – a subsidiary of Kalashnikov – claims it is able to select and engage targets with the use of AI technology. Another example is the Lancet-3 loitering munition, also observed in Ukraine. According to the same producer, it is highly autonomous given the use of sensors that enable it to locate and destroy a target without human guidance, even being capable of returning to the operator if a target has not been found. Likewise, Russia is testing several Marker unmanned ground vehicles that aim to use AI-enabled object recognition, process data via neural network algorithms, and employ autonomous driving capabilities. It remains unclear at this stage whether these unmanned systems have been used in this way in Ukraine. More data will be needed to verify their actual capabilities. Nonetheless, these claims indicate the areas of interest and the level of ambition when it comes to AI applications.</p> +<p>However, from 2016 onwards, ransomware began to evolve into the form that is dominant today. Ransomware operators moved away from the “spray and pray” model and started to focus on organisations rather than individuals, using tactics to deploy ransomware to thousands of computers within a single organisation to increase their leverage and therefore demand higher ransoms.</p> -<p>According to the Russian authorities, AI and autonomous elements are also being applied in the guidance systems of other key weapons such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile. Yelistratov has claimed that AI is “present in all weapons, especially in high-precision ones”. Russia is also using such technology in experimental weapons systems, such as the Poseidon nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable unmanned underwater vehicle.</p> +<p>In 2019, two important tactical modifications emerged that helped ransomware operators extort higher payments at greater scale. First, they became more purposeful in their victim selection. Some developed so-called “big game hunting” ransomware operations, which involves prioritising larger and therefore more lucrative victims; others focused on targeting critical services and organisations that rely on constant delivery of operations, such as healthcare providers.</p> -<p>The Russian Aerospace Forces, created in 2015 to integrate defensive and offensive capabilities, have been developed to disrupt or degrade the foundations of US and NATO information technology-enabled warfare, including communications, space-based systems, critical networks and infrastructure that developed countries depend on. Despite claims in the first months of the war that Russia was not using electronic warfare in Ukraine, several systems have been confirmed to be operating in Ukraine, some of which allegedly employ AI. Among them is the RB109-A Bylina, which – according to Russian sources – uses AI to collect and prioritise large amounts of data to efficiently jam electronic signals. In June 2023, Russia reportedly used the S-350 Vityaz mobile surface-to-air defence missile system to shoot down a Ukrainian aircraft while operating in autonomous mode – that is, the system detected, tracked and destroyed a Ukrainian air target without human assistance. To verify such claims, more evidence will be necessary. There are plans to use the system to protect Moscow against Ukrainian drones from the end of 2023, which may provide additional information about the system’s actual capabilities.</p> +<p>Second, the criminals behind the Maze ransomware operation started to steal as well as encrypt victims’ data. Other ransomware threat actors swiftly followed suit and over the last few years coercion tactics have continued to evolve, with dedicated data leak sites, leaks to journalists and harassment of employees and clients all employed as parts of efforts to make victims pay. A new cyber extortion collective made up mostly of English-speaking young men has even threatened physical violence against its victims. Our own research on ransomware harms, which is based on interviews with UK victims of ransomware, found examples of harassment of school children, healthcare patients and other vulnerable groups following ransomware incidents.</p> -<h3 id="what-are-the-obstacles">What are the Obstacles?</h3> +<p>Today, the ransomware ecosystem resembles something more like a professionalised industry than a ragtag network mostly active on dark web forums and marketplaces. This is not just because of the revenues generated by ransomware (which are believed to run into hundreds of millions of dollars for the most successful gangs), but also because of the growing levels of professionalisation that have developed within the ecosystem. The ransomware-as-a-service business model has enabled the specialisation of roles within ransomware operations, allowing ransomware developers to recruit affiliates who conduct operations for a cut of the profits. Ransomware is also supported by the broader cybercrime-as-a-service ecosystem, particularly services and marketplaces that specialise in obtaining and selling access to victim networks (known as initial access brokers) or monetising and laundering the proceeds of ransomware. The service-driven cyber-criminal economy enables ransomware threat actors to streamline their operations.</p> -<p>The pace of Russian defence AI development varies; some programmes are more advanced than others. Generally, however, Russia lags behind its main competitors, the US and China.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The reality for many ransomware victims is that government support is likely to be very limited, with the accessible response ecosystem largely privatised</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Russia continues to struggle with long-standing structural problems, such as insufficient funding, extensive corruption, inefficient use of resources, poor quality control, low labour productivity across the economy, the reliance of the defence industry on state order, and preferential funding that undermines competition and innovation. Weak rule of law, deficient intellectual property rights, and heavy-handed bureaucratic control are other factors hampering innovation. The education system appears to no longer be a suitable foundation for hi-tech development, as the Soviet system once was. Despite taking a number of steps to improve interest in and the quality of science and IT education, Russia has also been sliding down the Global Innovation Index, going from 43rd place in 2016 to 47th in 2022.</p> +<p>In some cases, ransomware threat actors have developed structures more like legitimate businesses than traditional organised crime groups. The group behind the now defunct Conti ransomware operation, for instance, at one point employed between 65 and 100 salaried staff, with defined roles, HR staff and employment policies. The profitability of ransomware can make this extremely attractive, pulling more would-be cyber-criminals into the ecosystem. Ransomware therefore represents a form of organised crime that is in keeping with modern digital economies.</p> -<p>There are also doubts about the efficiency of the Russian defence innovation model itself. The cooperation framework managed by the Main Directorate for Innovation involves more than 1,200 entities including industrial parks, engineering centres, financial development institutions and leading universities and research institutes, and it is growing. One question is whether Russia’s extensive R&amp;D infrastructure can be successfully managed and coordinated centrally by the MoD, not least given widespread corruption.</p> +<p>Assessing the impact of ransomware on the UK specifically is challenging. Since 2019, 2,607 ransomware incidents have been reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). However, the ICO does not collect data or produce intelligence on the threat or financial impact of ransomware. Reporting to Action Fraud is believed to be considerably lower – the NCA assesses that less than 10% of ransomware incidents are reported to law enforcement. However, prominent attacks against UK businesses and critical national infrastructure providers emphasise the threat of ransomware to UK’s economy, national security and society. In 2023 alone, ransomware has disrupted the Royal Mail, one of the largest providers of outsourced services for the UK government, schools and an NHS Trust. A ransomware attack was also blamed for the permanent closure of one of the UK’s largest privately-owned logistics providers, KNP Logistics Groups.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Statements by Russian authorities indicate that the battlefield advantages provided by AI-enabled weapons systems and infrastructure are among the lessons Russia has been learning in Ukraine</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="a-daunting-21st-century-challenge">A Daunting 21st-Century Challenge</h3> -<p>These long-standing impediments are aggravated by the circumstantial constraints generated as a consequence of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Despite Russian authorities’ assurances about the benefits of sanctions in terms of reducing Russia’s dependence on Western technology such as microelectronics, Russia is now growing more reliant on third countries – notably China, which is filling Russia’s most pressing technology gaps. Sanctions are likely to have a long-standing impact on the Russian national economy and tech industry.</p> +<p>The emergence of contemporary organised cybercrime as a national security dilemma presents a serious challenge for the UK’s law enforcement community.</p> -<p>Thus far, however, Russia has been able – to some degree – to evade sanctions and exploit loopholes in the exports control regime, using illicit networks to smuggle key components to third countries, from where they can be shipped to Russia. As a result, for instance, Russia has managed not only to continue but to double missile and tank production compared to the numbers before February 2022. Likewise, in August 2023, the Moscow State University launched its new supercomputer, which is to be used for various AI and high-performance computing applications and for training large AI models.</p> +<p>This dilemma is exacerbated by a toxic combination of geopolitics and the double-edged sword presented by technological advancement. The concentration of ransomware operators in “permissive” jurisdictions with whom UK relations are relatively poor – most notably Russia – means that law enforcement’s capacity to arrest or interfere with many threat actors is limited. While a Russian cyber-criminal stated in an interview that their biggest concern was the prospect of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Western law enforcement collaboration, this seems unlikely to materialise at the time of writing. As recently emphasised by NCA Director-General Graeme Biggar at RUSI, serious and organised crime has become more global and sophisticated, straddling the “real” and “virtual” worlds. Ransomware is – unfortunately – a perfect illustration of this phenomenon.</p> -<p>That said, Russia is struggling with other pervasive problems, such as the long-standing decline in professional expertise in the defence sector. The country has witnessed a demographic decline over the past 30 years, further worsened by short life expectancy. The exodus of IT specialists, top scientists and university professors in the wake of the invasion and the high casualties on the battlefield are likely to aggravate the brain drain.</p> +<p>The UK’s approach to the ransomware dilemma can be described, in part, as characterised by pragmatism. This is not to be confused with defeatism. Where possible, the National Crime Agency has collaborated with international partners on arrests of ransomware operators and affiliates outside of Russia. The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has also recently joined forces with the US’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to sanction known ransomware operators, representing both a form of “naming and shaming” and an effort to limit specific cyber-criminals’ ability to monetise ransomware.</p> -<p>These problems are likely to impact the culture of defence innovation. On the one hand, the brain drain, economic hardships, and limited access to ideas from and cooperation with other countries may further undermine creativity and aggravate existing structural problems. On the other hand, the Russian leadership is determined to rebuild and modernise its ravaged armed forces, and aims to do so rapidly. This, together with the pressure to deliver technological solutions for immediate battlefield deployment, could accelerate the development of AI for defence applications. Statements by the Russian authorities, including Putin, clearly indicate that the battlefield advantages provided by AI-enabled weapons systems and infrastructure are among the lessons Russia has been learning in Ukraine.</p> +<p>Aligning with a pragmatic approach to “resiliency” that underpins the National Cyber Security Strategy, the UK’s public sector cyber response ecosystem has increasingly focused on reducing the ransomware threat and supporting victims. This ecosystem includes the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the NCA, Regional Organised Crime Units and local police. Victim support is triaged through the Incident Response Framework, with technical incident support tightly rationed and restricted to organisations with the greatest national security and economic impact. A number of victims may receive support in the form of incident response coordination and advice from NCSC and/or NCA liaisons.</p> -<h3 id="tentative-conclusions">Tentative Conclusions</h3> +<p>Nonetheless, the reality for many ransomware victims is that government support is likely to be very limited, with the accessible response ecosystem largely privatised. A ransomware victim organisation may, variously, draw upon the support of firms offering incident response, ransom negotiation, external counsel and public-relations management. Organisations either pay for these services themselves or draw on cyber insurance policies. However, the recent development that some sectors – including operators of critical national infrastructure – may be uninsurable by virtue of their sector should be cause for alarm.</p> -<p>The overall deployment of Russian AI-enabled systems indicates that Russian AI appears to be in the early stages of maturity. The primary focus is on incremental evolution: upgrading legacy systems – nuclear, strategic non-nuclear, and non-military methods and means of warfare – with new technologies. Russia is combining conventional warfare and platforms with innovative technological solutions, including AI in data analysis and decision support, loitering munitions, electronic warfare and communication analysis, and as a component in cyber warfare and information confrontation – to name but a few examples. Simultaneously, Russia is experimenting with selected “risky projects” and novel systems, materials and approaches to warfare that can potentially yield battlefield advantages – if not superiority – in selected areas.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given the absence of easy solutions, it is time to talk more actively about ransomware and organised cybercrime with the public at large</code></em></strong></p> -<p>One of the challenges in assessing Russian – and other countries’ – AI-enabled weapon systems is the difficulty of determining when full autonomy has actually been used in a lethal context, as opposed to declarations by authorities or producers that may have agendas other than speaking the truth (such as advertising systems to potential buyers, or portraying the army as ultramodern to impress domestic and international audiences). More data and cross-referencing will be needed to verify such claims. Still, these statements provide important information about the types of capabilities and capacities that the state is interested in and actively pursuing.</p> +<p>The application of triaging and general reliance on private sector incident response services is a pragmatic approach amid current economic realities; it would be impossible for the current public-sector response ecosystem to scale sufficiently to serve as a “blue light” cyber response service. However, the quality of incident response matters. The NCSC’s assured cyber incident response schemes are a positive step toward promoting best practices to encourage optimum outcomes for victims of ransomware and other cyber incidents.</p> -<p>The study of Russian defence AI development is further complicated by the ambiguity of the term “AI” in the Russian discourse. According to the official definition provided in the 2019 Russian AI Strategy, AI consists of “technological solutions capable of mimicking human cognition and performing intellectual tasks similarly to, or better than, humans”. The Russian definition distinguishes between “automation” (avtomatizatsiya) – that is, automated, remotely controlled and semi-autonomous weapons systems – and “intellectualisation” (intellektualizatsiya), corresponding to integrated machine learning and other sub-elements of AI technology. However, these terms are often used interchangeably – as are automation and autonomy – and without proper precision.</p> +<h3 id="what-should-we-do-next">What Should We Do Next?</h3> -<p>The extensive Russian failures during the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine are likely to prompt major reassessment and reforms in the Russian armed forces. It remains to be seen whether the experience will also result in a major push to accelerate defence innovation. In any case, the Russian regime is unequivocal about where its priorities lie: despite the deteriorating economic environment, falling living standards and the mounting cost of the war, Russia is doubling down on military spending. According to the draft state budget for 2024, the plan is to increase defence spending by 68% compared to the 2023 defence budget, constituting 6% of GDP.</p> +<p>We write this with a degree of weariness. As active researchers in this space, we have talked, researched and written about ransomware for countless hours. Ransomware’s prominence as a cybercrime and national security threat means that this issue has consistently been at the forefront of our recent work. The UK government has also been actively talking about the issue, for instance, with the conducting of an internal “ransomware sprint”, the attendance of high-level meetings (and signing of agreements) with like-minded international partners, and the issuance of calls for evidence by Parliamentary Committees.</p> -<p>It is yet to be seen whether Russia will follow through, and if so, to what extent its military organisation will be able to absorb the funding efficiently, and how much will be devoted to defence AI and R&amp;D. However, as Russia rebuilds its armed forces, it will not necessarily just reconstruct what has been lost in Ukraine. The lessons learned in this war will inform the selection of priorities for military modernisation. Moreover, as a swift miliary-build up in a linear fashion will be hindered by the constrained socioeconomic and industrial environment, AI will likely remain a top priority for selected applications in the pursuit of rapid gains in battlefield advantage.</p> +<p>However, given the absence of easy solutions, it is time to talk more actively about ransomware and organised cybercrime with the public at large. In a liberal democratic society, a serious societal-level threat merits mature and considered conversations in a range of accessible forums. Ransomware arguably first emerged into the UK-wide conscience in 2017, with the WannaCry ransomware attack’s impact on some NHS Trusts serving as a pronounced indication of ransomware’s capacity to disrupt core societal services. After extolling that everyone had a responsibility for cyber security, Jeremy Hunt and Theresa May were given a reprieve with Marcus Hutchin’s kill-switch. But arguably the first significant opportunity for a proper and sustained national conversation was bypassed. Likewise, pronounced disruptions at local levels – for instance, Hackney, Redcar and Cleveland, and Gloucester City councils – have not ushered in focused conversations at a national level.</p> -<p>General Vladimir Zarudnitskii, Head of the Russian Military Academy of the General Staff, is right in saying that the ability to adapt AI-enabled systems will have a major impact on the Russian armed forces and warfare in general. However, developing the technology is only the first of many hurdles that Russia has to surmount before it can claim success. To take advantage of AI and other EDTs, Russia has to not only harness technology itself, but also adapt concepts, doctrines, forces structures and recruitment patterns accordingly. The conflict in Ukraine, meanwhile, has exposed a high degree of institutional conservatism in the Russian military. There are indications, nonetheless, that the Russians are adapting, however slowly. To what extent the leadership will be able to draw the right conclusions and increase responsiveness to change across the military organisation under the conditions of an ongoing war remains to be seen. Russia’s symmetric and asymmetric responses will shed more light on the ability of its military to learn and apply lessons – or lack thereof.</p> +<p>Such conversations could include more candid detail about the government’s place and role in the fight against this threat, in both preventative and reactive terms. Given financial and resource constraints, it is unlikely that the UK will significantly expand its technical response support for victims. But this should be conveyed to the public clearly and candidly. Recent RUSI research has highlighted a disconcerting degree of ambiguity and confusion among the public and ransomware victims about the role of government and law enforcement in this space.</p> -<hr /> +<p>There is also the question of how the UK should employ offensive cyber capabilities against the ransomware ecosystem. At the launch of the UK National Cyber Force (NCF) in 2020, the UK government identified organised cyber-criminals as a potential target for offensive cyber operations. In 2022, then GCHQ Director Jeremy Fleming suggested that the NCF was now actively targeting ransomware threat actors. Given that UK intelligences agencies have been able to disrupt the online activities of international terrorist organisations – and publicly disclose elements of this interference – there is a case for more public debate about the purpose and effectiveness of these operations. However, as the US experience with using offensive cyber operations against ransomware has highlighted, such operations may have a limited effect while the business model remains intact, and should be seen as complementary rather than a replacement for a strategy that focuses on fundamentally changing the cost-benefit calculus of the perpetrators.</p> -<p><strong>Katarzyna Zysk</strong> is Professor of International Relations and Contemporary History at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.</p>Katarzyna ZyskNotwithstanding its difficulties at the front in Ukraine and economic hardships at home, Russia continues to pursue AI and other emerging technologies in a bid to future-proof its armed forces. However, it faces several major hurdles to before it can reach its objective of achieving battlefield superiority in selected areas.Submarine Diplomacy2023-11-17T12:00:00+08:002023-11-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/submarine-diplomacy<p><em>China is quietly deepening its influence along the Bay of Bengal, intimately linked to Beijing’s expanding overseas interests. Commercial satellite imagery reveals that China has made significant progress on a naval base it is constructing for Bangladesh’s military. The base houses a pair of submarines that Dhaka received from Beijing two years before ground broke at the facility. China has likewise transferred a submarine to neighboring Myanmar to aid the embattled military regime.</em></p> +<p>The future trajectory of ransomware is not clear. Arguably, this form of organised cybercrime has not yet reached saturation point. While some ransomware operators have dispersed following law enforcement activity, others have emerged. Operators continue to diversify their strategies to put maximum pressure on victim organisations and adapt to improved cyber security practices among their targets (for instance, viable backups).</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>In this context, further growth and evolution of this threat should be anticipated. While it is not possible to speculate precisely on how ransomware will evolve, the UK and like-minded partners should anticipate turbulence, continue to raise their cyber resilience, and focus on ways to make life much more difficult for the criminals that perpetuate it.</p> -<p>Beijing’s efforts to strengthen ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar are taking place amid growing geopolitical competition with India. As smaller powers in the region seek to shore up their military capabilities, India and China are striving to become the security provider of choice.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jIN7CBT.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> -<p>Over the past decade, China has increasingly filled that role. Since 2010, more than two-thirds of Bangladesh’s arms imports, and nearly half of Myanmar’s, have come from China.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Military-to-military exchanges also support China’s strategic objectives. Closer defense ties may help the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) secure access to logistics facilities needed to sustain future naval operations in the region. The U.S. Department of Defense includes both Bangladesh and Myanmar on its short list of locations where Beijing has likely considered establishing overseas military facilities.</p> +<p><strong>Jamie MacColl</strong> is a Research Fellow in cyber threats and cyber security. His research interests include cyber security, the evolution of the cyber threat landscape, the role of emerging technologies in security and defence policy and the uses of history in policymaking. Current research projects focus on cyber insurance and cyber risks related to the Globalisation of Technology.</p> -<p>Gaining a foothold in the Bay of Bengal would significantly level up the PLA’s ability to operate farther from China’s own shores and create new challenges for India, as well as the United States and its allies.</p> +<p><strong>Gareth Mott</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI. His research interests include governance and cyberspace, the challenges (and promises) of peer-to-peer technologies, developments in the cyber risk landscape, and the evolution of cyber security strategies at micro and macro levels.</p>Jamie MacColl and Gareth MottThis article traces the journey of the threat and response to cybercrime – specifically, ransomware, which has emerged as the most disruptive cyber threat to the UK’s national security and society today.Heavy Armoured Forces2023-12-12T12:00:00+08:002023-12-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/heavy-armed-forces<p><em>Adaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility.</em></p> -<h3 id="building-ties-in-bangladesh">Building Ties in Bangladesh</h3> +<excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wNb0mLm.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>The British Army is likely to be called on to engage in high-intensity warfighting at some stage in the future, and must be able to do so credibly in order to contribute to NATO’s deterrent posture. Heavy armoured forces and main battle tanks will remain an important element of warfighting, and will therefore continue to occupy an important position in the British Army’s Order of Battle. There have been concerns about the vulnerability and survivability of main battle tanks on the contemporary battlefield, as well as the ability of lighter forces backed up by ISTAR capabilities and indirect fires to create difficult operational problems for the enemy in high-intensity warfighting. However, heavy armoured forces – through their substantial combat power – ensure that a force can remain mobile while in direct contact with enemy forces, and as such heavy armour still has a valuable role to play on the battlefields of the future.</p> -<p>As a part of the Forces Goal 2030 initiative designed to modernize its military, Bangladesh ordered its first two submarines from China in 2013 for the bargain price of just $203 million. Both vessels are Type 035G diesel-electric attack submarines, a Ming-class variant first commissioned into the PLA Navy (PLAN) in 1990.</p> +<p>However, adaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility. Secondary requirements are numerous, and include better use of deception and decoys to counter improved enemy ISTAR capabilities, and the potential integration of uncrewed ground vehicles to add situational awareness and defensive capabilities without increasing vehicles’ weights (already problematically high). The British Army’s heavy armoured forces will also need to relearn old lessons about logistics, sustainment, vehicle recovery and the reconstitution of armoured formations that have suffered a significant level of battlefield attrition. Finally, crew expertise matters, and will – as always – be essential for keeping vehicles in working order on operations and minimising the need for the concentration of vulnerable elements of the support apparatus such as forward repair facilities. Investment in the British Army’s people should therefore not be overlooked in the heavy armour context.</p> -<p>China refitted and upgraded the two vessels before handing them over to Bangladesh in 2016, but their capabilities remain far behind modern attack submarines fielded by today’s leading navies.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Just one year after handing over the vessels, the giant Chinese state-owned defense contractor Poly Technologies secured a $1.2 billion contract with Bangladesh to build a new submarine support facility on the country’s southeastern coast.</p> +<p>The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War is the largest conventional land war in Europe since 1945. The conflict has registered high losses – many at the hands of new weapons – among the main battle tank (MBT) fleets of both sides, and in this context a longstanding debate has regained prominence: what future does the MBT have on the battlefield or in the force structures of modern militaries? The debate has been one of the more controversial and divisive ones over the future of warfighting. Although tanks were pivotal to 20th century warfare, their utility was often questioned – even during the Cold War – in a way that the utility of other revolutionary technologies such as aviation and radio communications was not.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xw4vYiA.jpg" alt="image02" /></p> +<p>Tanks were introduced in the First World War to reduce casualties and break the deadlock imposed by trench warfare, notably in the Battle of Cambrai in 1917. After experimentation and increasing adoption during the interwar period, the Second World War saw tanks become established as a mainstay in the European and North African theatres of operations. However, since 1945, their utility has routinely been questioned and discussed. Most – but not all – of these discussions have concluded that MBTs still retain utility, but nevertheless concerns (particularly about whether the role of tanks can survive when faced with new threats) are periodically revived by instances of high losses.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Work on the BNS Sheikh Hasina Naval Base kicked off in the summer of 2018. By 2020, Chinese builders had made significant progress in constructing the foundations of the 1.75 square kilometer facility.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>This debate is hugely relevant to the UK defence establishment (and particularly the British Army) as it looks to overcome years of underinvestment in conventional capabilities. A major component of this paper, therefore, will be to identify the implications of the MBT’s changing role for the British Army’s force structure if it is to have the capability to fight on future battlefields. In 2022, Chief of the General Staff General Sir Patrick Sanders declared that Operation Mobilise – to deter Russian aggression in Europe – was to be the British Army’s priority. This will mean the acceleration of the Future Soldier modernisation programme, with the aim of restoring the British Army’s ability to conduct mobile combined arms warfare. While the strategy is explicit about having a positional character, this is because it is largely focused on deterrence and as such will involve posturing.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IQCdJNm.jpg" alt="image03" /></p> +<p>However, for deterrence to work, it must be credible. Credibility requires not just a presentational force but the ability to warfight, and British warfighting doctrine is defined by the “manoeuvrist approach” – doctrinal terminology for manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre and heavy armoured forces – both heavy armoured combat vehicles classed as MBTs and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) or armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and the associated support and logistics vehicles and apparatus – are deeply interconnected. Heavy armoured forces are known for their ability to manoeuvre and for using their unique characteristics to maintain this ability, even against other heavy armoured forces, and have traditionally been able to remain mobile under heavy direct and indirect enemy fire, and to engage and destroy conventional ground forces (including other tanks). Heavy armoured forces, if they are well-trained and well-led, can also quickly reform after taking objectives, and then immediately exploit further opportunities to do the same again (although, as will be explored below, these characteristics are not absolute and may not be guaranteed in future). The key characteristics of heavy armoured forces can be summarised as mobility, firepower and protection – criteria against which individual vehicles are judged.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Bangladesh inaugurated the new facility in March 2023. The base’s namesake, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, praised the capabilities of the base, calling it “ultra-modern.” Several Chinese officials, including at least two senior PLAN officers, were present at the opening ceremony.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>These concerns about the continued viability of MBTs, coupled with the clear imperative for the British Army to retain its ability to credibly fight wars, provide the context for this study, which examines the fate of the MBT and heavy armoured forces within the British Army, based on a survey of the changes to combined arms warfare and of evolving British strategic policy. There is much at stake here: force structure changes and procurement decisions have long lead times and must be made early. Unpacking the debate about heavy armoured forces in sufficient depth to identify trade-offs and opportunities (and, indeed, dead-ends) is therefore essential if policymakers and military leaders are to reshape land forces so as to remain credible for future warfighting.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Satellite imagery from July 2023 shows that construction continues. Despite the ongoing work, Bangladesh has already stationed its Chinese-made submarines there.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>This study frames issues in broad terms in order to be as accessible and useful as possible to international military practitioners, academics, policymakers and observers from outside the British defence establishment, but is UK-focused and, where appropriate, explores inherently technical issues. Chapter I covers British policy in the context of strategic warfighting requirements. Chapter II analyses the basics of combat power and the characteristics of MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles in order to provide a baseline understanding of/guide to the underlying issues. Chapter III covers the challenges to the continued utility of heavy armoured forces and discusses what adaptations should be made to ensure that they remain viable in the context of the changing threat landscape and operational environment. The paper concludes with recommendations for the way ahead.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Once completed, the base will be capable of docking six submarines and eight warships simultaneously.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>This is not an engineering study, and although engineering issues will be introduced or discussed where pertinent, some issues – for example, the adoption of remote turrets or rubberised tracks – may be left unaddressed where they do not have sufficient relevance for the tactical, operational or policy choices identified. As a primarily theoretical analysis of the nature of operations, the study relies on a mixture of approaches to address the questions outlined above: a survey of the existing literature; engagement with military practitioners; observations of military exercises; and fieldwork in relevant operational areas. Much of the utility of armour is reliant on enablers and supporting capabilities, as well as the coordination of different arms in combination: combined arms. Thus, parts of this study will discuss other systems, rather than focusing solely on tanks per se. This is essential, as the utility of MBTs/heavy armoured forces cannot be adequately addressed if that capability is examined in isolation. However, the primary focus will be MBTs, as the issues of combined arms integration and supporting capabilities are too broad to be addressed comprehensively here.</p> -<p>China’s ties to the base may go well beyond its construction. A senior Bangladeshi official acknowledged that Chinese personnel would also be involved in training Bangladesh’s submariners on how to operate the submarines and the new base, although few details have been shared publicly.</p> +<p>As will be outlined in Chapter I, this study is predicated on credible conventional deterrence and thus the ability to warfight on land as an important pillar of security. Although this is current British policy, it is not a universally advocated strategy, and may justifiably be questioned. The key variables that determine the validity of conventional deterrence include to what degree an adversary’s activity is constrained by how it sees its options for escalation management, and whether it is actually deterred from crossing the threshold of conventional war. Only the latter question can be answered within the scope of this study, through the metric of credibility. Subordinate to this are questions of the flexibility of conventional forces. Arguably, conventional forces have utility across the spectrum of operations short of high-intensity war, and indeed it has sometimes even been argued that they are essential for these tasks due to the limited combat power of lighter forces. Consequently this study will, as a secondary consideration, also briefly touch on the dual-utility of heavy armoured forces for expeditionary and sub-threshold operations, as the strategic questions left unaddressed by this study indicate that it is essential that heavy forces whose primary application is high-intensity war should have secondary utility or be adaptable to other lower-intensity forms of competition and conflict. In more practical terms, the fact that the UK’s strategic imperatives and defence policy could change in the future means that these questions about utility, which affect force structure and procurement decisions for conventional forces, should not be omitted.</p> -<p>Additionally, in her remarks at the base’s opening, Prime Minister Hasina noted that the facility could be used as a service point for ships sailing in the Bay of Bengal—a potential signal that the PLAN may one day call at port there.</p> +<p>One final baseline assumption for this study is that the future of armoured warfare should not be predicated on a less-capable adversary employing its forces poorly. Russia, the declared adversary and primary threat to NATO, is in the process of depleting its conventional forces, which have also proved themselves to have been presentational – investment was dedicated to impressive-looking technical capabilities, while basic practicalities were ignored. Catastrophic political decisions in the Kremlin, aside from the overall strategic blunder of launching a full-scale invasion in the first place, led to the prioritisation of equipment procurement over reforming the Russian armed forces’ system of logistics and sustainment, hierarchical command structure, training and education doctrine, and military culture. The failure to recognise the need for revolutionary organisational change has contributed to Russia’s military failures, but the extent of the self-created disaster in Ukraine will inevitably prompt reflection. Russia is likely to learn and rebuild its capabilities, while remaining an adversary and European security threat for the foreseeable future. This long-term threat should not be underestimated.</p> -<p>In contrast with the media fanfare normally associated with China’s overseas infrastructure projects, official outlets have been conspicuously silent on the base. These hushed tones may be intended to avoid antagonizing India, where there are mounting concerns over China’s role in developing the military capabilities of its neighbors. Beijing may also be seeking to avoid stoking additional unease among the United States and its allies.</p> +<h3 id="i-warfighting-as-a-component-of-british-defence-policy">I. Warfighting as a Component of British Defence Policy</h3> -<p>For its part, Bangladesh has sought to balance its geopolitical relationships with both India and China. Even as it courts military support from China, the Bangladeshi military also conducts annual bilateral exercises with the Indian military, including most recently in October 2023. Nevertheless, as China endeavors to strengthen ties with Bangladesh, the PLAN may find it an increasingly receptive partner in the Bay of Bengal.</p> +<p>Although warfighting has returned to prominence for the British defence establishment, the progressive reduction of Britain’s fleet of MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles over the past 14 years represents a cause for concern. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated that heavy armoured forces, which were deemed to include the Challenger 2 and Warrior IFV force, and the supporting AS90 self-propelled artillery and Titan and Trojan engineering vehicles, would be reduced in number, albeit with sufficient numbers retained for high-end warfighting and maintaining the possibility of regenerating these capabilities should the situation demand it. However, the Review was agnostic about the divisional force structure and only specified the retention of a division headquarters under which brigades might be commanded. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, meanwhile, committed explicitly to a warfighting division, stating that its ground combat component would comprise two armoured infantry battalions and two Strike Brigades. Although the armoured infantry brigades would continue to field Warrior and Challenger 2, the Strike Brigades, with their Ajax vehicles, indicated a shift towards comparatively lighter mechanised forces that would trade sheer combat power for increased strategic mobility.</p> -<h3 id="making-waves-in-myanmar">Making Waves in Myanmar</h3> +<p>The 2021 Integrated Review likewise directed the British Army to become smaller and lighter. Former Chief of the General Staff General Sir Nick Carter considered competition – the constant use of a blend of military and non-military tools by the UK’s enemies and adversaries without breaching a threshold that might trigger a decisive military response – to be a higher priority than warfighting, and directed that concept/capability development and restructuring efforts should reflect this prioritisation. This approach flipped older assumptions that the Army’s warfighting functions served as an insurance policy to be held at readiness, with warfighting formations being able to adapt to lower-intensity conflicts if required. Although counterintuitive, there was a certain rationale to this, as well as plenty of historical evidence suggesting that capabilities developed for low-intensity conflict could prove not only useful but transformational for high-end warfighting.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LdE9Kco.png" alt="image04" /></p> +<p>Despite this clear direction of travel, the aforementioned elements of British defence policy have received significant criticism, with repeated controversies over whether plans have been realistic or affordable. As for the higher strategic direction that such plans are intended to deliver against, the 2023 NATO Vilnius Summit did not include any detailed updates regarding the UK’s direct contribution to the Alliance, and Paul Cornish has noted that the recent Integrated Review Refresh included 22 sub-strategies, which therefore provides little guidance for subordinate parts of government about what to prioritise (given that resources and leverage are finite). While explicitly de-prioritising certain areas of policy can appear undiplomatic and incur a short-term political cost, the current failure to clearly prioritise has resulted in the members of the professional military community expressing increasingly divergent understandings of what is being asked of them. Some fundamental points about the Integrated Review therefore require examination. First and foremost, the Integrated Review Refresh, although it argues for a tilt, still privileges the Euro-Atlantic over the Indo-Pacific, and the land domain and Russia are seen as the most prominent arena and threat to the UK. In terms of alliances, NATO is “the highest priority”. While the Indo-Pacific and China receive a great deal of attention in their own right within the Integrated Review, this paper is redicated on the view that Indo-Pacific security is most efficiently supported by ensuring that European security is adequately addressed by European countries, such that lines of effort in the Indo-Pacific are not undermined by drawing excessively on the US capabilities required in that theatre.</p> -<p>Further south along the bay’s coast, China appears to be pursuing a similar strategy in Myanmar. In 2021, it transferred a Type 035B (Ming-class) submarine to the Myanmar navy in a sign of support to the embattled military junta.</p> +<p>Even with regard to European security, the Defence Command Paper outlines other capabilities that will be grown as a matter of priority. This is a different approach from other members of NATO. The French Army, for example, is aiming to restore its ability to conduct armoured warfare at corps level, and while many French units are light- or medium-weight, the eventual replacement of the Leclerc with another more modern MBT remains a key French defence policy aspiration. The British Army will not experience the same regeneration for warfighting at scale, and its heavy armoured capabilities will not grow unless there is a fundamental shift in guidance; however, neither has the British Army been directed to shed this capability. The Future Soldier Guide issued in 2021 outlined the British Army’s warfighting division, 3rd Division, as containing two Armoured Brigade Combat Teams equipped with Ajax, an upgraded Challenger 3 and Boxer, and a Deep Recce Strike Brigade Combat Team equipped, after restructuring, with a mixture of guided multiple launch rocket system (GMLRS) and AS90 fires capabilities and Ajax and Jackal 2 for reconnaissance. And so although the structure and enabling capabilities of the British Army’s warfighting component are shifting, it is clear that the British Army will retain its heavy armoured forces, exemplified by the Challenger series of MBT, for warfighting: a rare scenario to be sure, but one at the core of why the UK maintains its armed forces in the first place.</p> -<p>The deal was shrouded in secrecy, but China may have provided the submarine for free in a bid to outcompete India’s efforts to gain influence there. Just one year prior, India gifted Myanmar’s then democratically elected transitional government a Russian-built Kilo-class submarine.</p> +<p>Despite the focus on warfighting, a competing priority that must be highlighted is that of expeditionary operations and limited conflict, and the role that heavy armoured forces can play in these contexts. The post-Cold War move away from conventional deterrence, during which heavy forces suffered from a degree of neglect, was part of a shifting paradigm that prompted a resurgence of interest in smaller conflicts dating back to Britain’s colonial era. During the Cold War, there had been divergent imperatives: on the one hand, to resource conventional deterrence between superpower-backed alliances; and, on the other, to fight small wars in distant expeditionary conflicts, often colonial in nature. Both scenarios involved superpower and ideological competition, but manifested very differently in terms of the lower stakes involved in the expeditionary conflicts (at least for the Soviet and NATO participants). Previously, the problem was conceived of as how to use lighter, more agile, more politically engaged expeditionary forces when militaries were prioritising heavier European warfighting forces that were based more on maintaining the peace through deterrence. The prospect of a major war between superpowers was a frightening one, but also a scenario that was more easily comprehended by the military units that were committed to it. The debate re-emerged, supposedly new but echoing the same considerations that previous generations had grappled with: conventional deterrence versus grey-zone competition, with the split between heavy and light forces predicated upon deployability and sustainment.</p> -<p>Media reports revealed that in 2022 Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw) docked its new Chinese-built submarine at the Thit Poke Taung Navy Base, which is strategically positioned on a stretch of land jutting into the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal. Satellite imagery from April 2023 provides a bird’s-eye view of the base, with the Chinese-made submarine clearly visible.</p> +<p>Despite the traditional division of labour between heavy and light forces, therefore, a strong case has been made for the utility of heavy armoured forces even in such delicate missions as peace support. In positive contrast to the shortcomings of Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, for example, the Swedish-Danish-Norwegian heavy armoured battalion Nordbat 2 exemplified this utility in Bosnia in 1993 when it was able to provide decisive overmatch and retain freedom of movement, which in this case was essential to the UN mandate in their area of operations. Canadian forces, too, found Leopard 2 MBTs to be invaluable tactically in the Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaign, despite having envisioned being able to make do with the 17-tonne wheeled Light Armoured Vehicle III (LAV III).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VlpJuYF.jpg" alt="image05" /></p> +<p>Nevertheless, arguments in favour of the continued use of heavy armour outside of high-end warfighting are likely to fall victim to the financial and logistical challenges associated with deploying and sustaining heavy armour. Even for the best-resourced militaries, heavy armour is likely to be an unaffordable luxury except when facing a peer or near-peer conventional force. Likewise, for all the strong arguments that can be made in favour of Nordbat 2’s deployment to Bosnia, it must be remembered that there were numerous peace support operations ongoing at the time, all of which could lay justifiable claim, on moral or humanitarian grounds, to receiving serious military resourcing from the international community. The realities of multiple conflicting demands and limited capacity mean that British heavy armoured forces will at best be committed sparingly to such future missions, if at all, as a secondary benefit of maintaining a warfighting force that might on occasion donate small force elements if able to do so. Their presence can help peacekeepers, policing missions, counterinsurgencies and stability operations to focus on their core missions more effectively (through tactical overmatch), thus removing the distraction of these missions getting bogged down in indecisive combat situations. This useful function of heavy armoured forces should not be overlooked.</p> -<p>The facility lies just 10 kilometers north of Kyaukpyu Port, which is home to one of China’s marquee infrastructure projects in the region. China invested billions of dollars into building liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil facilities and pipelines from Kyaukpyu Port to Yunnan Province in southern China.</p> +<p>The broad utility of heavy armoured forces across the spectrum of conflict – both their utility in their primary role, and as a hedge against future sub-threshold contingencies should the acute requirement for conventional deterrence in Europe decline in the long term – means that, from one perspective, the argument in favour of MBTs is clear-cut. Yet sceptical arguments about MBTs generally point to technological changes that compromise the ability of heavy armoured vehicles to maintain one or more of their three traditional characteristics – mobility, firepower and protection. Many of these concerns are valid, particularly those relating to pervasive UAV ISTAR, networked headquarters and forces, and precision fires able to strike large numbers of targets far from the frontline, which bodes poorly for forces that are either slow, easy to detect or require a large logistics tail. In this conception of the future, lighter ground forces will be more viable through a reduced signature, more operational mobility, and through their reduced cost allowing them to be generated in larger numbers, offsetting the enemy’s ability to concentrate precision fires against an identifiable centre of mass. Implicit in this vision is that geographical concentration of forces in the attack will be difficult, meaning that units will have to fight dispersed for an increasing proportion of operations.</p> -<p>The pipelines can reportedly carry some 12 billion cubic meters of gas and 22 million barrels of oil per year. These projects are aimed, in part, at reducing China’s dependence on the nearby Malacca Strait, a critical maritime chokepoint through which much of China’s energy imports flow.</p> +<p>As will be discussed in Chapter III, this hypothetical conception of the future is not unchallenged and its precise implications are disputed. Nevertheless, experimental evidence indicates that changes of one sort or another will be required for ground forces to remain effective, with experience from Ukraine suggesting that alternatives to dispersion are to “dig deep, or move fast”. All three of these alternatives will likely play a role during different phases of operations and campaigns, but dispersion looks set to remain the prevalent approach, and several resulting adaptations to force composition and structures would in theory create a survivable, viable warfighting force. But it would be one that lacked combat power in the direct fight – that is, when engaging an enemy force within direct line-of-sight using weapons systems organic to the units employing them (whether supported by enabling indirect capabilities or not). The conflicting imperatives to disperse or concentrate forces pose difficult dilemmas that have yet to be conclusively resolved. The resolution of these questions requires an examination of exactly what MBTs bring to high-end combined arms warfighting – and it is to this that we turn next.</p> -<p>Chinese state-owned firms CITIC and China Harbor Engineering Company are also seeking to develop a deepwater port and a special economic zone project at Kyaukpyu, in what Chinese state media have referred to as a “model project in China-Myanmar BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] cooperation.”</p> +<h3 id="ii-the-role-of-the-mbt-in-combined-arms-warfare">II. The Role of the MBT in Combined Arms Warfare</h3> -<p>The $7.3 billion project is expected to begin construction after an ongoing environmental assessment is complete. Much like other projects developed through China’s favored “Port-Park-City Model” (or Shekou Model, 蛇口模式), the entire zone will be under CITIC control for 50 years.</p> +<p>The theoretical underpinnings of combined arms warfare, though well established, are worth reiterating here. While heavy armoured forces have numerous applications, their primary purpose is warfighting – the application of violence in order to defeat an enemy. This requires combat power, traditionally understood to comprise three core elements: mobility; protection; and firepower. Firepower is sometimes referred to as lethality or offensive power. Mobility, protection and firepower have long been components of combat power in US Army doctrine, and provide a widely accepted theoretical framework. Leadership was sometimes considered to be an additional fourth component. In US doctrine, this model was expanded to eight components by 2017: “leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection”, a departure from the underlying principles that attempted to integrate disparate elements into the model. The result, at the risk of blurring what aspect of war was being described by the original model, nevertheless highlights the importance of supporting arms and integration.</p> -<p>Myanmar has long been sharply resistant to foreign interference in its domestic affairs. Yet the military regime’s increasing isolation and growing dependence on China for critical economic and political support has already magnified Beijing’s influence in Naypyidaw. As the PLAN extends its operations to safeguard China’s growing interests in the region, the Kyaukpyu Port or the nearby naval facility at Thit Poke Taung may prove to be attractive options to provide its vessels with logistical support.</p> +<p>This model of combat power is not directly replicated in British doctrine, but, where combat power is euphemistically referenced in the British Army’s keystone ADP Land publication, it is seated within the physical component of fighting power. The tactical functions of a combined arms force provide the best analogue to US doctrine: these are command, intelligence, outreach, information activities, fires, manoeuvre, protection and sustainment, a valuable contrasting model in that it highlights the inevitable transition from warfighting to stability operations, even in the context of a warfighting campaign, in a way that US doctrine does not.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Fosgug5.jpg" alt="image06" /></p> +<p>Other academic models can also be useful. For example, operability has been hypothesised by Yoo, Park and Choi as an alternative fourth function of combat power when considering the original triangular framework at the platform level; the technical and tactical reasons for this will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. While operability might better be described as a cross-cutting attribute that helps deliver and sustain all forms of combat power, and the suggestion may be conceptually flawed, the importance of operability, logistics and sustainment should nevertheless be highlighted.</p> -<p>Beijing’s efforts to court countries in the region through submarine diplomacy have not been without their failures.</p> +<p>Understanding warfighting and combat power in terms of the original triangular framework of mobility, protection and firepower is useful, as it encourages thinking about how a force should function overall and deliver the required effects when conducting operations in the land domain. In particular, the triangular model is useful for identifying the core trade-offs that are inherent to different types of force, whereas augmented versions of the model include elements – for example, leadership and command and control – that are applicable regardless of the type of force being assembled, and which therefore do not usefully illustrate the trade-offs between heavy armoured forces (built around MBTs) and other lighter formations. However, as will be discussed, integration of other elements is essential to ensure the viability of heavy armoured forces, and so should not be discounted.</p> -<p>In October 2023, officials in Thailand shelved a deal to purchase three Yuan-class S26T submarines from China. The purchase fell through after Germany refused to export the engines for the vessels to China, and Thailand rejected the option of substituting them with Chinese-made engines. The Thai government, which already paid a roughly $194 million installment on the submarines, is considering purchasing Chinese frigates instead.</p> +<p>Ultimately, and regardless of which variation of the conceptual model of combat power is preferred, their value lies in countering the technological determinism that is prevalent in commentary on defence and security issues. While this determinism is often driven by an appreciation of technological capability, it can result in overestimations of the impact of technological change, or in a failure to understand the second- and third-order impacts of this change on other parts of a military system and on battlefield dynamics. All of the elements discussed above factor into effective combined arms warfare at some stage. Those forces that make warfighting their forte and can credibly fight wars at scale do so in large part due to combining arms, whereby a variety of different arms – artillery, infantry, armour, engineers, logistics, medical services and so on – act in concert. However, not all militaries can be considered combined arms forces, as this status is achieved only by mastering the simultaneous integration of capabilities to create the right synchronised effects to prevail in war, preferably decisively.</p> -<p>Despite the setback, Beijing’s influence in the region continues to grow, heating up long-simmering anxieties in India. New Delhi has begun to push back against Beijing’s expanding influence by investing in its own naval forces and increasingly partnering with the United States on regional maritime security issues.</p> +<h4 id="mobility-firepower-and-protection">Mobility, Firepower and Protection</h4> -<p>China’s efforts could also pay off for the PLAN. Big-ticket arms sales and infrastructure projects may not inevitably or immediately translate into China setting up its own military facilities in the Bay of Bengal. Yet they could help pave the way for the PLAN to gain access to logistical facilities that it needs to operate with greater confidence in the region.</p> +<p>Within this model, MBTs are not the only element of a force that delivers combat power. At a platform level, however, the original triangular concept of mobility, firepower and protection best encapsulates their value, for while they trade these characteristics off against each other (as does any type of platform), MBTs nevertheless embody all three in a unique, heightened manner. The way that armour operates at the platform level governs the broader tactical and operational dynamics when these vehicles are fielded at scale. A deeper understanding of armoured vehicles is therefore useful, as it explains why they have developed the characteristics that now typify them.</p> -<p>China will likely proceed carefully, choosing to gradually deepen its foothold without crossing thresholds that could draw unwanted attention. As the PLAN becomes more entrenched in the Bay of Bengal, Washington and its partners should work in lockstep to maintain a free and open region and ensure that the risk of conflict is kept at bay.</p> +<p>MBTs developed their current format in the interwar period: a tracked hull with an engine; an independently rotating turret; and a main armament. By the end of the Second World War, this configuration had been almost universally refined to eliminate features such as hull-mounted machine guns and had standardised the MBT crew at either three personnel – commander, gunner and driver (if an autoloader is used to reload the main gun) or four (if an extra crew member is added to load the main gun manually). Apart from the driver, most MBTs have all other personnel located in the turret and turret basket assembly.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Mobility is the most complex of the three characteristics that this configuration delivers. Although tracked vehicles are valued for their versatile mobility characteristics, MBTs and heavy armoured forces should not be described as the most mobile type of formation: rather, they are useful under certain circumstances. Physical terrain is not homogenous and so generalisations tend to be unreliable, and light infantry can of course move through and fight in almost any environment impassable to other forces if given sufficient time (the obvious example being primary jungle). Restrictive terrain has – perhaps erroneously – been deemed unsuitable for armoured forces. Tracked armoured vehicles can operate in most types of mountainous terrain except for alpine-like mountain ranges (where even light infantry would require technical rock-climbing skills to achieve full mobility) and the summit zones of interior and coastal mountain ranges. However, outside of these extreme instances, it is broadly correct to say that tracked vehicles – which in military terms largely mean heavy armoured forces – are the most tactically mobile.</p> -<p><strong>Matthew P. Funaiole</strong> is vice president of iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation and senior fellow of China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He specializes in using data-driven research to unpack complex policy issues, specifically those related to Chinese foreign and security policy, cross-Strait relations, and maritime trade.</p> +<p>The technical reason for this is that the increased contact area of tracked vehicles’ running gear generally gives them lower ground pressure than their wheeled counterparts, thus providing improved thrust and traction (even if the tracked vehicles are in absolute terms far heavier). Theoretically, this improved traction will be less pronounced on loose or frictional soil (such as sand) than on cohesive soil (for example mud or clay), but in practical terms the difference is limited. Tracked vehicles are less likely to become bogged in or to slip, and can thus cross more difficult terrain than wheeled vehicles. Provided that ground is not so soft that vehicles start to sink, tracked armoured vehicles also have a significant advantage over light infantry, and if the ground is trafficable then their engine power means that they will be able to move much faster than dismounts.</p> -<p><strong>Brian Hart</strong> is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS, where he researches the evolving nature of Chinese power. His particular research interests include Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese military modernization, and U.S.-China technological competition.</p> +<p>Aside from the power of the engine and the design of the drivetrain, a major limitation on the off-road mobility of individual vehicles is the shearing effect between the tracks (or wheels) and the terrain, which causes a loss of traction and hampers vehicles’ ability to cross ground. Shearing is most likely to occur on steep slopes; traversing slopes is significantly more difficult than heading directly up ascents and down descents, and the consequences of a failed traverse are more likely to involve a roll-over. With regard to clearance angles, the approach, departure and belly-clearance or ramp angles will also influence what obstacles a vehicle can climb over. While wheeled vehicles are also good at traversing slopes, tracks have the advantage of being comparatively resilient to small arms fire and fragmentation from artillery, which have a tendency to shred rubber tyres and immobilise wheeled vehicles. This allows tracked vehicles to retain mobility even in the midst of heavy fighting, although this comes at the cost of increased mechanical complexity, with implications over longer distances that will be discussed shortly.</p> -<p><strong>Aidan Powers-Riggs</strong> is a research associate for China analysis with the iDeas Lab at CSIS, where he primarily supports the Hidden Reach special initiative.</p> +<p>Hull shape and drivetrain design can give remarkable tactical mobility under the right circumstances. During the Korean War, British troops often marvelled at the ability of their Centurion MBTs to climb up slippery, muddy hills and to wade through flooded rice paddy fields. Unfortunately, this kind of ability involves inherent trade-offs, and different designs within the same vehicle class and formal tactical role can exhibit markedly different performance. For example, a low number of road wheels grants sufficient tactical mobility while being mechanically simple, but the resulting high ground pressure degrades the ability to operate on soft ground. Likewise, tracked armour is excellent in mountainous terrain up to a certain gradient, but where lighter tracked vehicles excel, heavier tracked armour might struggle, both because of tight mountain roads and generally constricted terrain, and due to the weight and ground pressure of the vehicles making steep slopes impossible to traverse. Most principles and techniques of off-road tactical mobility are transferable between wheeled and tracked vehicles, but tracked vehicles tend to be more forgiving. Nevertheless, reading the ground and how to move across it is a skill, and tanks must still be driven carefully. With professional and well-trained operators, heavy armoured vehicles can cross difficult ground quickly, and push through many obstacles, in a way that other forces cannot. Likewise, the mobility advantage does not necessarily make wheeled or heavy tracked armour more suited to manoeuvre. In forest, jungle or mountainous terrain, armour may be better employed positionally due to the requirement for slow, careful movement, or by leveraging its high level of firepower and protection when forcing an enemy from key terrain, with manoeuvre derived from the employment of light infantry. It is first and foremost the environment and context that determine how heavy armour is employed. The employment of armour to enable manoeuvre is a product of geography first, and of the characteristics of the vehicles second.</p> -<p><strong>Jennifer Jun</strong> is a project manager and research associate for satellite imagery analysis with the iDeas Lab and the Korea Chair at CSIS.</p>Matthew P. Funaiole, et al.China is quietly deepening its influence along the Bay of Bengal, intimately linked to Beijing’s expanding overseas interests. Commercial satellite imagery reveals that China has made significant progress on a naval base it is constructing for Bangladesh’s military. The base houses a pair of submarines that Dhaka received from Beijing two years before ground broke at the facility. China has likewise transferred a submarine to neighboring Myanmar to aid the embattled military regime.New Energy Supply Chains2023-11-16T12:00:00+08:002023-11-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/new-energy-supply-chains<p><em>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused attention on energy supply chains and contributed to growing unease in the West about the fact that supply chains for the commodities necessary for the global energy transition are highly concentrated in China (or under Chinese control).</em></p> +<p>Over long distances, wheeled forces may enjoy comparative advantage over heavy tracked armour if trafficable routes are available. Due to the simplicity of their running gear and drivetrains, wheeled vehicles require less maintenance and experience a far lower breakdown rate. They also require less fuel, and the reduced maintenance requirement in turn reduces the volume of spare parts, maintenance stores and recovery mechanics that need to accompany them. It has thus been argued that lighter wheeled vehicles provide better operational mobility when moving between positions, areas and objectives, an attribute that is written into the British Army’s Strike Concept. The truth is more complex: heavy armour is still able to move at pace over great operational distances, and can do so over worse ground, whereas wheeled armour, with its different mobility characteristics, remains competitive with its heavier counterparts at the operational level, depending on the environment.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Issues of strategic mobility also need to be considered. When driving into theatre or to a forward assembly area, MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles are carried on heavy equipment transporters (HETs) for substantial parts of the journey to reduce wear and tear on the drivetrain and running gear. Long road moves are often associated with a high rate of breakdowns if heavy armoured forces need to drive without support from HETs, and those vehicles that do arrive will still incur a higher maintenance burden. MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles can technically be airlifted into a given theatre, but only the largest transport aircraft are able to carry them, and cannot transport them in large numbers. Thus for large armoured formations to arrive in theatre quickly, an unattainably vast strategic airlift capability would be needed, as otherwise such a move would be impossible within any reasonable timeframe due to the number of trips that would be required. Access to runways of sufficient dimensions (and paved to a standard to safely accept heavy transport aircraft) is also a limiting factor. Sealift is the most efficient method of moving MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles over long distances and between theatres, but this requires time and safe ports at which to offload vehicles (unless a specialised amphibious landing capability for heavy armoured vehicles is also factored in). Railway transport is also efficient, but involves similar bottlenecks to airlift, this time with regard to rolling stock and available railheads.</p> -<p>Concerns range from cyber security through to security of energy supply and economic security. The disruption to energy supply chains caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was felt mainly in terms of the physical supply of gas to Europe and the impact this had on the global market. In this context, this paper considers the implications of threats to the physical supply of some of the critical materials and products that the UK requires for its energy transition.</p> +<p>All modes of long-distance transport for heavy vehicles still require practice if they are to be completed without unnecessary delays; no one should underestimate the inherent coordination challenge facing the combat units themselves, the logistics units supporting them and the organisations in charge of the infrastructure stemming from the distances involved and the transport volumes associated with large numbers of vehicles. Consequently, the threat posed by heavy armour is most credible when it is either forward-based or reserved for use within an operational distance of its home base. Nevertheless, it should be noted that deployment of heavy armoured forces is possible, and that medium armoured forces, particularly those built around tracked armoured vehicles (regardless of whether they are of a lighter weight) also incur many of the same costs and constraints.</p> -<p>China has benefited from being an early mover in the processing of many minerals used in net zero technologies, as well as in the production of intermediate goods and, more recently, final goods. In some elements of the supply chain China has a near monopoly (80–100% market share): the rare earths used to manufacture the permanent magnets used in wind turbines and electric vehicles (EVs) are just one example; other examples are connected to the production of battery anodes, high-quality spherical graphite, and the processing of manganese (also used in batteries). In the production of solar photovoltaic modules, meanwhile, China has a near monopoly on the production of polysilicon, silicon wafers and silicon cells. Added to this are very high concentrations (60–80% market share) in many other elements of these supply chains.</p> +<p>Protection is the one inherent attribute of heavy armoured forces that cannot be replicated by lighter combat vehicles. This protection traditionally came from large amounts of passive armour, either rolled homogenous steel or some form of composite material, which could deflect or absorb the energy from an incoming projectile. Passive armour can be angled, and is generally concentrated on the frontal aspect of vehicles in order to provide the best protection for the least weight. Some vehicles complement this arrangement with explosive reaction armour (ERA) blocks: boxes of explosives that detonate when struck with a sufficiently powerful projectile, dissipating the energy of the incoming projectile and reducing the likelihood of the armour being penetrated.</p> -<p>In light of this dominance, this paper considers what risks China’s position in these supply chains poses to the physical supply of materials, components and final goods in the battery and EV, solar, wind and electricity grid supply chains, and whether China could deliberately leverage its position to impose costs on the UK. These risks are assessed according to whether they could affect the UK solely, a group of countries, or the entire market. The paper argues that risks to the UK specifically are currently limited by low levels of manufacturing of these technologies in the UK: because the UK typically imports final goods – where Chinese dominance is less pronounced – its direct dependence on Chinese suppliers is limited. However, the UK might still be an attractive target for largely symbolic measures intended to send political messages.</p> +<p>Passive armour has increasingly been enhanced by active protection systems, which can be split into “hard kill” and “soft kill” systems. Hard-kill systems physically shoot down incoming projectiles. For example, Rheinmetall’s APS-Gen3 comprises short-range radars (which detect incoming projectiles on approach), electro-optical sensors (which locate projectiles immediately before impact) and an explosive countermeasure (which detonates to destroy the projectile) – this latter kinetic element could be described as a guided ERA block. Other systems, such as the Israeli-designed Trophy, fire their own shotgun-like munitions to intercept incoming projectiles. Soft kill systems are more diverse, and encompass any system that interrupts the guidance systems of incoming projectiles or the systems from which they are launched or guided. Retro-reflective detection, laser warning receivers and defensive electronic warfare systems all aid in the detection of anti-tank weapons attempting to target the vehicle. In terms of defeating the anti-tank systems themselves, lasers may be used to dazzle electro-optical sensors, while radio frequency jamming may serve to disrupt command signals between a missile and its launcher. While the technologies/methodologies of different soft-kill systems vary, they are for the most part only relevant to defeating guided systems. The promise – and limitations – of technological developments in this area will be discussed in the next chapter.</p> -<p>The targeting of country groupings (such as NATO or the EU) by sanctions and counter-sanctions amid geopolitical tensions is potentially more dangerous for the UK. Market concentration in China is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, and alternative supply chains are unlikely to be sufficient to meet the demands of multiple countries. At the same time, protectionist industrial policies in the EU and the US may complicate future access to supply chains (which could become less dependent on China), while markets currently lack transparency and, in some cases, scale.</p> +<p>In terms of firepower or lethality, modern MBTs remain one of the most potent platforms on the battlefield, particularly when focusing on direct line-of-sight or close-range engagements. This is due to the power of their main armament and their ability to carry other anti-tank weapons, all of which can quickly be brought to bear by virtue of being mounted in a stabilised turret. Jonathan House usefully split anti-tank weaponry into two categories – chemical energy weapons and kinetic energy weapons. This distinction remains valid and applies equally to weaponry mounted on MBTs, or on lighter vehicles, or carried by dismounted infantry. Chemical energy weapons typically equate to anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), although long-ranged precision fires and loitering munitions technically fit within this bracket; as these weapons are generally employed within the anti-tank role performed by other forces (with limited use by MBTs themselves), they will be discussed in Chapter 3. While MBTs do not have a monopoly on lethality, the size of MBTs as a platform means that carrying anti-tank weapons does not require them to forsake mobility.</p> -<p>The biggest risk for the UK is shortages of critical minerals. Shortages are widely forecast, and China’s control of mineral processing and refining means it would play a central role in the allocation of scarce goods. Leveraging supply chains for political ends has historically been more effective in tight markets – the 1970s oil embargoes came during periods of tight supply – but China is more likely to allocate available supplies according to its own national economic interest. During the Covid-19 pandemic, high-volume contracts with Chinese companies were more likely to be honoured, and if this pattern were to be replicated it could mean that decisions about allocation were passed to companies, which would decide which of their domestic and international operations received scarce materials. However, China’s ban on Australian coal shows that where a security threat is perceived, Beijing will take action, even if it will cause damage to the Chinese economy.</p> +<p>The kinetic energy weapons category essentially encompasses the main guns of MBTs, as self-propelled or towed anti-tank guns have been deemed tactically ineffective by most militaries, and man-portable anti-tank rifles are considered to be too low-powered to threaten all but the lightest modern armoured vehicles. Whether of Western or Russian design, MBT main guns now generally fire armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds, the core penetrator dart being made from either depleted uranium or tungsten. While other forms of munitions can be fired, other types of specialised anti-tank round such as high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) and high explosive squash head (HESH) are less effective against modern armour. If equipped with modern ammunition, the main gun remains a potent anti-armour weapon, with the added benefit of being comparatively light, quick to reload, and cheap.</p> -<p>There are also risks in terms of defence and international relations. Access to technology for the military is likely to be similar to that for the civilian economy for the time being, with net zero technologies currently most likely to be used for military logistics or for housing/bases. The most immediate risks relate to the secure operation of technologies, but these tend to be associated with cyber risks, which are not covered in this paper. The increased importance of critical minerals as commodities may change geopolitical dynamics and in some cases result in domestic and regional instability, influencing where the military is deployed. In the longer term, there are questions about whether China’s industrial power and growing technological advantage in net zero will be leveraged to create advantages for its own military capability.</p> +<p>MBT main guns have long been stabilised, allowing them to fire accurately on the move. This remains a significant engineering challenge, putting established defence contractors who have mastered the manufacturing of stabilised guns at a distinct advantage to competitors. Most Western MBT main guns are of 120-mm calibre, which is the approximate maximum size for a main gun round that can be handled quickly by a human loader without mechanical assistance. Any significant increase in calibre would force Western heavy armour to swap the human loader for an autoloader: this would probably require the four-person crew of commander, gunner, loader and driver to be reduced by one, a move that is considered undesirable due to workflow issues both in the vehicle itself and in the field more generally. Were the fourth crew member to be retained alongside the autoloader, MBT turrets – which are already approaching practical size limits – would have to become even bigger. Given the trade-offs involved, and bar any unexpected technological advances in main gun technology, tank main guns are unlikely to significantly increase their lethality in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, they remain potent, especially when factoring in the weight and rate of fire that an MBT can employ from its stock of onboard ammunition.</p> -<p>Finally, China’s role as the paramount – and in some cases only – investor in and purchaser of mineral ores will clearly be significant for its global influence. China’s role in producer countries, as well as its trading practices, will be important in shaping the character of the global market, with long-term implications for the UK’s defence and security policies.</p> +<p>Overall, the ability of MBTs to quickly cross difficult terrain and obstacles, to quickly engage successive targets (including other MBTs) in their direct line-of-sight with a highly effective main gun, and their ability to absorb punishment and continue fighting unless targeted by dedicated anti-tank capabilities, make for a potent and flexible ground combat unit. While this comes at the cost of a higher logistics and sustainment framework to support them, MBTs’ sheer combat power makes them uniquely capable not only of destroying other heavy armoured forces (if employed correctly), but of maintaining momentum while doing so. They are particularly useful, if properly employed and enabled, for offensive operations transitioning to breakthrough-and-exploitation.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>In practical terms, breakthrough-and-exploitation corresponds to deep battle theory (or deep operations theory, in the parlance of its Soviet authors), which emerged in the run-up to the Second World War. This was an offensive doctrine centred on striking deep into an enemy’s rear areas following the penetration of its lines and then causing sufficient disruption to prevent an enemy from moving forces to effectively plug the hole in its lines or encircle the attacking forces. Breakthrough-and-exploitation is advantageous, if achieved, in that it can overrun rear areas, and is “designed to induce systemic collapse”. If momentum cannot be sustained, offensive operations may instead aim to bite and hold objectives and ground, a less ambitious but still valid approach to operational design. Of course, these concepts of operation date to the early- and mid-20th century, and the combined arms integration required for successful offensive operations of either kind will require adaptations to be made to force design, composition and structure. While many of these adaptations relate to the changing character of war and fall upon supporting arms, MBTs and the units fielding them must likewise embrace change to stay relevant.</p> -<p>China is central to the new energy supply chains required for the decarbonisation of the global economy. It is a large investor in the mining of numerous critical materials and metals both domestically and abroad and, more significantly, the manufacture of critical energy-related components is heavily concentrated in China, meaning that many of the mined ores are sent there for processing. As a result, China is central to the production of wind turbines, solar photovoltaics (PV), permanent magnets, batteries and electric vehicles. As the energy transition unfolds and electrification gathers pace, demand for these materials and end products is set to increase. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that a concerted effort to reach the Paris Agreement goals (climate stabilisation at “well below 2°C global temperature rise”) would mean a quadrupling of mineral requirements for clean energy technologies by 2040. An even faster transition, to hit net zero globally by 2050, would require six times more critical mineral inputs in 2040 than in 2020. However, investment so far is falling short of what the world is forecast to need.</p> +<h3 id="iii-challenges-and-necessary-adaptations">III. Challenges and Necessary Adaptations</h3> -<p>The UK’s own net zero plans imply large increases in domestic demand for critical minerals and end products, as well as greater reliance on complex supply chains. Rapid growth requires stable markets and resilient supply chains, but events over the past few years have highlighted that stability is not guaranteed. The lack of investment in minerals globally suggests that shortages will occur and that costs will rise. In the past, increased pressure on mineral supplies has led to increased investment but, given the time lag for bringing on new supplies, price volatility has also ensued. Similar challenges related to the supply of new materials could delay the energy transition and raise the associated costs. Although cost increases and delays also spur technological innovations, net zero targets are approaching rapidly, meaning that new infrastructure and equipment need to be sourced and deployed. In this context, the UK government must balance the need to move quickly with decarbonisation against the cost and availability of materials and potential security risks from immature and concentrated supply chains.</p> +<p>The challenges and necessary adaptations fall under several categories. Some relate to additions to the combined arms system, others to the integration of the component arms, and some to the MBTs at the core of heavy armoured forces. There are also two alternative force structures that in theory offer a warfighting capability with sufficient lethality to fight against heavy armoured forces: motorised or dismounted light forces equipped with ATGMs (but without the ability to fire them while mobile); and medium armoured forces. The utility of these alternative force structures for high-intensity warfighting is effectively a separate research question, as they are arguably in competition with heavy armoured forces. However, given that the question of their effectiveness against MBTs and heavy armoured forces overlaps with questions about the effectiveness of MBTs and heavy armoured force themselves, a brief overview is still required. More importantly, this overview encapsulates the technical challenges and adaptations required for MBTs due to the threat posed by ATGMs themselves. Armoured forces that fight on the move are mechanised, while those which fight by dismounting and working in conjunction with their infantry can be considered motorised; by this definition, for example, a Stryker brigade combat team is a motorised formation. These should be addressed as two separate but related structures, against which heavy armoured forces can be subjected to comparative assessment. Another major aspect to be addressed in depth relates to the support to and sustainment of MBT-equipped formations, an understudied area which is nevertheless fundamental to their viability. Finally, there are also issues of technological change at the platform level to be considered below.</p> -<p>Concerns about the availability of minerals and metals are compounded by China’s central role in both mining and processing. The Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have highlighted the risks associated with market concentration and “just-in-time” supply chain strategies. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic led to longer lead times and higher costs for supplies of manufactured goods from China. Lockdowns, combined with factory accidents and floods in China, reduced the availability of polysilicon, the starting material for wafers in solar cells, and as China produced 80% of the world’s supplies in 2020, prices rose by 350%. Some residential solar developers reported that, for the first time, their growth was constrained by the availability of equipment, rather than by sales.</p> +<h4 id="pervasive-istarprecision-strike">Pervasive ISTAR/Precision Strike</h4> -<p>Meanwhile, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and gas supply disruptions, energy security has become a top policy priority for many governments. Russia’s dominance in European gas supplies emphasised the risk of reliance on a single large supplier, creating alarm about China’s dominance in the provision of key materials and components for the energy transition. And, in the context of worsening US–China relations, many Western governments and companies are looking to de-risk their China exposure.</p> +<p>A combination of pervasive ISTAR, command and control (C2) modernisation and strike capabilities through precision-guided munitions have been at the forefront of the debate about the changing character of warfare and the implications for military forces. One way that this should be countered is throug improved force protection, delivered by the adoption of new (or at least improved) capabilities and through restructuring combined arms formations. This issue has been covered extensively, and while the associated debates cannot be comprehensively re-examined in this paper, suffice to say that electronic warfare (EW), artillery and counterbattery capabilities, and short-range air defence (SHORAD) all play a role. The issue is in any case largely agnostic of force type – whether light and dismounted, or medium or heavy armoured: all force types must integrate the capabilities discussed and embrace change according to the evolving character of combined arms warfare. The one caveat is that, given that heavy armoured forces have a correspondingly larger logistics footprint and greater maintenance and support requirements than most other types of forces, they may prove particularly vulnerable to this changing battlefield dynamic if combined arms integration is not effective. There are several relevant issues to cover here.</p> -<p>Government policies aimed at diversifying supply sources and processing facilities are critical, given the need for more materials and end products. But it is important to recognise that, even as China’s share of these processes falls, it will remain central to many energy supply chains. It is important that the UK, which currently has limited production capacity, understands the complexity of new energy supply chains, the risks associated with China’s dominance, and the various implications of diversifying, decoupling or de-risking them. Excluding China completely from the UK’s new energy supply chains is unrealistic and would be counterproductive for the UK’s net zero targets.</p> +<p>There are serious differences of opinion over the consequences of recent developments, including how to interpret the effectiveness and efficiency of C2 modernisation at moving information internally and the effectiveness of precision fires at fighting the deep battle. In the context of the difficult challenge that the deployment of uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) imposes on land forces, the debate surrounding the best way forward often loses sight of the fact that the pervasive ISTAR and precision fires complex offers quite narrow effects. Drones and precision fires face the same inherent boundaries that aviation encountered in previous eras: aviation could attack enemy forces and systems throughout the area from the frontline to the strategic deep, and have outsized effect in certain regards, but could not independently hold ground or control populations, nor have other persistent effects. Similarly, drones and precision fires, even though they constitute a distinct line of effort, are still effectively only enablers of other ground forces. What drones and precision fires have long promised – and are now able to achieve – is attrition of key capabilities, and potentially (if targeting is done properly) the degrading of the enemy military’s system of systems. Events such as Exercise Green Dagger, nested within the larger Exercise Warfighter 22, both of which took place in late October 2021, provide evidence about the potency of pervasive ISTAR, C2 modernisation and precision strike when a professional NATO force implements highly refined targeting procedures. In this instance, long-ranged precision fires cued on by a combination of UAV ISTAR and traditional forward reconnaissance patrols mauled participating ground forces, and while manoeuvre was possible during certain intervals, at other times ground combat formations that were identified while in unfavourable positions were heavily attrited, with few options available in response. Lighter ground forces experienced struggles of their own, with issues relating to attrition and a failure to maintain momentum in the close fight. Furthermore, although the impact of new technologies was concerning, it should be remembered that open desert environments provided ideal conditions for UAS, and the lopsided performance under these conditions would not necessarily be replicable in a different climate and in more complex terrain. Even in Ukraine’s Donbas region, characterised by open fields and limited cover, the extensive use of UAS – for all the changes it has wrought – has yet to prove decisive and has not pushed traditional ground combat capabilities from the battlefield.</p> -<p>Every strategy to diversify new energy supply chains needs to be seen in the context of the broader UK–China bilateral economic relationship, which topped £100 billion in the 12 months to the end of Q1 2023. New energy supply chains are only a small part of this relationship, which raises the question of whether there are risks specific to these supply chains that warrant targeted treatment, what these are, and how mitigation strategies fit into this much larger economic relationship.</p> +<p>A further consideration concerns the emphasis placed on offensive capabilities without the same regard for their defensive counterparts. Following a 20-year period of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during which neither the air domain nor the electromagnetic spectrum was contested, even the exceptionally well-resourced US military has come to exhibit a mismatch between these different specialisations. While UAS and precision fires technology have been invested in and progressively refined, defensive EW, SHORAD and counter-UAS (CUAS) have received sporadic and comparatively limited attention. Of these, only CUAS has claimed a belated prominence in the discourse about the future of warfare. Forces rotating through iterations of exercises such as Warfighter are exploring how to address the issue, but the evidence suggests that, rather than this being an inherent offence–defence mismatch which favours new technologies, Western forces are simply playing catch-up and need to rebalance their capabilities and concepts of operations.</p> -<p>Numerous studies have analysed different demand scenarios for critical materials and minerals, as well as the supply gap, and have described China’s dominance. But they do not assess how this dominance impacts the UK. This paper aims to fill that gap and asks: how has China become the dominant actor in new energy supply chains; and can China use its dominance in net zero energy supply chains to penalise the UK because of its policy choices? The paper argues that it will be very difficult for China to target the UK directly, given the complexity of the relevant supply chains. Any export controls or embargoes that China imposed on the UK would impact many other consumer countries equally. Similarly, the UK would not be insulated from any bottlenecks or breakdowns in these supply chains, impacting its ability to meet its net zero targets.</p> +<p>One resultant avenue that is often forgotten is within the broad field of camouflage, concealment, deception and decoys (C2D2), where camouflage and concealment receive far more attention than deception and decoys. Part of this is because it is easier to build standardised technical solutions or procedures to implement camouflage and concealment. Deception, on the other hand, is situation-dependent, and requires intellectual investment and problem solving for every iteration. It is also difficult to do consistently and effectively in the absence of a nuanced understanding of the adversary’s procedures and mindset – understanding of enemy technical ISTAR capabilities alone will not suffice. Meanwhile, the cost of decoys can create disincentives to utilising them extensively in training, and there is also a risk that deception and decoys will draw too much resource and undermine the main effort. Depending on the type of decoys used, significant numbers of personnel might be needed to manage them, especially if decoy units and activities are to be convincing even when viewed with a variety of different sensors and detection capabilities. (As a basic example, an enemy might be convinced that a decoy vehicle is real when viewing it in the visual light spectrum, but its thermal signature or the lack of radio frequency activity could reveal it for what it is, meaning that an enemy with capable and diligent ISTAR specialists would likely not be deceived for long.) One solution might be to homogenise the appearance and signature of ground forces, containerising logistics, ensuring that vehicles appear as similar as possible, and adopting communications systems that disguise which nodes are of critical importance – mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) or mesh networks are a good example here, as this kind of disguise is an inherent feature of the way that they transfer data.</p> -<p>That said, China’s centrality across the entire value chain raises questions for the UK’s foreign and defence policies, as well as for its industrial and economic policy. These challenges need to be understood and assessed rationally. While this paper argues that it would be very difficult for China to target the UK specifically using new energy supply chains, it also seeks to highlight the different risks associated with market concentration in China.</p> +<p>Likewise, simulated formation-level activity in the electromagnetic spectrum may not stand up to scrutiny if cyber analysis reveals inconsistencies or a lack of concurrent activity in the social media space, as the pervasiveness of social media and the tendency of local inhabitants to naturally document any unusual activity happening in their vicinity means that such inconsistencies can be easily detected using open sources; such activity is hard to control, suppress or convincingly fabricate. Improving the D2 element of C2D2 is therefore a challenging proposition in terms of both resourcing and overall feasibility. Nevertheless, if turned into a dedicated line of effort and practised and refined on exercise, it may prove a powerful tool for creating uncertainty, slowing enemy decision-making, and causing the misallocation of enemy resources, all of which increase the survivability of ground forces.</p> -<p>This paper is by no means a comprehensive assessment of all these risks and their various international ramifications. Further research and discussion are needed to advance the conversation, but a fact-based foundation is the important first step, and that is what this paper seeks to offer. Similarly, the paper does not assess cyber threats or environmental, social and governance concerns, which represent different categories of risk best covered in separate discussions.</p> +<p>An alternative approach to force protection and C2D2 is that of counter-reconnaissance. Although counter-reconnaissance – prioritising offensive action against an enemy’s ISTAR rather than relying on passive or reactive force protection – is a longstanding concept, militaries have only partially adapted it in response to technological change. In an example that proves useful for illustrating both current challenges and potential solutions, in February 2020 the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division took part in Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 20-03, a computer-based simulation. The division found itself fighting a difficult initial shaping battle against enemy long-ranged precision fires and ISTAR assets due to attrition that these enemy capabilities were causing. Passive and reactive air defence deployed against UAS proved inadequate, and so the division approached the problem not as one of force protection but of prioritising the targeting and destruction of enemy ISTAR in order to break their kill chain. The 25th Infantry Division attempted to target different elements throughout the kill chain – the UAS themselves, dismounted forward observers, and UAS ground control stations, as the launchers for enemy indirect fires were assigned to corps-level assets. They had little success against UAS, downing some systems but being unable to destroy enough to have any overall effect. UAS ground control stations were identified as a more vulnerable element of the kill chain. The prioritisation of the counter-UAS battle, and the detection and collation of the enemy forces’ electronic and signals signature allowed the division to understand what effects they needed to apply and where, though the division’s own C2 processes proved insufficiently integrated to consistently destroy identified targets or render the enemy’s UAS network ineffective until the division could adapt and reorganise these processes. While this adaptation was taking place, the division’s ground manoeuvre elements had been badly attrited.</p> -<p>The paper is based on publicly available sources in the English and Chinese languages. Quantitative data is drawn principally from a combination of official publications of national governments and international organisations, and industry and consultancy reports. A key challenge was the lack of consistency in the data between different sources, which is why the quantitative data on China’s share of global supply chain is presented as percentage bands rather than as precise percentages. Sources for qualitative information include policy documents and analyses produced by national governments and international organisations, consultancy and think tank reports, academic papers and online press articles. Finally, this paper is also informed by a closed research event hosted by RUSI, which involved officials from UK government departments, industry figures and think tank representatives.</p> +<p>While accepting the limitations of such simulations in terms of realism, even those as well-resourced and layered as Warfighter, and that the measures taken achieved only partial success within the duration of the exercise, nonetheless the division’s identification of the least successful line of effort (kinetic CUAS) and the most promising (aggressive counter-reconnaissance against enemy ground stations) provides a useful indicator of the direction that force restructuring and the reform of concepts of operation should take. Overall, for heavy armour to be survivable, combined arms formations need to be able, one way or another, to prevent an enemy from saturating the battlespace with UAS, disrupt or slow down the links between UAS sensors and the precision weapons to which they feed targeting information, and to retain the ability to deceive.</p> -<h4 id="structure">Structure</h4> +<h4 id="alternative-ground-combat-force-structures">Alternative Ground Combat Force Structures</h4> -<p>The paper is organised as follows: the first chapter briefly discusses Chinese government policies as they relate to net zero supply chains; the second chapter covers the UK’s need for low-carbon energy infrastructure; and the third chapter outlines areas of Chinese dominance in net zero supply chains. The fourth and final chapter offers a preliminary analysis of the risks in order to guide thinking about the scale and nature of the challenge – identifying foreign policy, defence and economic risks to the UK associated with China’s control over net zero supply chains – before offering some preliminary observations and suggestions for further research.</p> +<p><em>ATGMs and Fighting Dismounted</em></p> -<h3 id="i-chinese-government-policy-and-supply-chain-dominance">I. Chinese Government Policy and Supply Chain Dominance</h3> +<p>In the direct fight, increasingly capable ATGMs pose the most obvious threat to MBTs. While opposing MBTs can be armed with barrel-launched or tube-launched ATGMs, the fact that ATGMs do not rely on velocity means that they can be launched from a tube, and that in theory any light vehicle or dismounted soldier can thus be equipped with an effective anti-tank weapon. The technology continues to develop, and at present the lethality of modern systems such as Javelin, NLAW and Kornet is difficult for MBTs to counter directly. The most effective ATGMs, such as Javelin, have a top-attack function whereby the missile guides itself via an irregular trajectory to strike the weaker top armour of a targeted vehicle. Top-attack munitions also have the advantage of being difficult to counter with active protection systems (APS), as these must track and calculate the trajectory of the incoming missile in order to intercept it. However, ATGMs come at a high per unit cost, and top-attack munitions are the most expensive of all (and will require skilled operators until sensor and guidance technology improves). They are also bulky and heavy for dismounted infantry to carry, not to mention the difficulties of a dismounted unit carrying more than a handful of spare missiles with it, are slow to reload compared with the main gun of an MBT, and so have severe tactical constraints, even if they are more lethal in absolute terms. In a direct line-of-sight fight with MBTs and heavy armoured forces, the operators of ATGMs can be vulnerable, although if they are well-sited and implement good battlefield discipline to minimise their visual signature, they are very difficult to spot and can be used to conduct effective ambushes.</p> -<p>China does not have a critical materials strategy per se, but its dominance in new energy supply chains emanates from a combination of early moves into various industrial applications (rare earths, batteries, solar PV and, to a lesser degree, wind turbines) via central and local government support accompanied by low labour, land and electricity costs. Compounded by the Chinese government’s concerns about energy security, industrial policies have aimed to advance electrification as a means of limiting imports of fossil fuels, mainly through the development of electric vehicles (EVs). While the battery and EV sector developed differently from solar PV and wind turbines (as discussed below), they benefited from similar industrial policies and from the government’s ability to support long-term goals. As such, signals from central government indicating that these were priority industries led to preferential policies for manufacturing, as well as financial support for innovation and (at times) for infrastructure and deployment. In addition, the low input costs that attracted foreign investors were combined with obligations to partner with Chinese firms, which then led to technology transfers.</p> +<p>ATGM use by lighter armoured forces bears consideration, as these forces can in theory conduct offensive operations. Here, it is worth differentiating between mounted and dismounted forces. The US experience is that any medium formation that requires dismounts for lethality will be difficult to manage because of the constant transition between mounted and dismounted tactics. The British experience of exercising dismounted ATGM-armed light cavalry forces in the anti-armour role resulted in similar conclusions. Such forces are versatile and effective in defensive operations but difficult to use for offensive purposes due to the time required to manoeuvre and deploy them. In order to attack a heavy armoured force, a medium armoured force without mobile anti-armour capabilities of sufficient lethality will generally need to move to within 3 km of the enemy, advance or infiltrate on foot, and engage with man-portable anti-armour weapons. If the medium motorised force is paired with more mobile anti-armour capabilities such as heavy armour of its own, these dismounts can operate in a targeting role, but this points to their being a complementary capability rather than a substitute.</p> -<p>As these industries developed and scaled up in China, the state also supported outbound investments in mining, with varying degrees of success, and with substantial variation in corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices. The incentives shifted from focusing on one part of the supply chain to targeting integrated supply chains and, as these industrial activities expanded, to supporting industries and the pools of experienced labour which formed around them. Development of the industries was economically, rather than geopolitically, driven, with China seeking markets where it might gain a competitive advantage in order to generate employment and industrial growth. China’s solar PV development was initially conceived as an export-oriented industry to benefit from feed-in tariffs in countries such as Germany. That said, the Chinese government already recognised in the late 1980s that the availability of critical resources (such as rare earths) offered it a strategic advantage. Deng Xiaoping is reported to have remarked that while “the Middle East has oil, China has rare earths”.</p> +<p>There are some advantages to motorised anti-armour capabilities. On operations in Afghanistan, without tracks and with a quiet engine, Strykers were found to be able to approach targets without being detected before deploying their dismounts. However, displacement and exfiltration is difficult in general, as is manoeuvre. If a medium motorised force is committed against a heavy armoured force, the sub-units that make contact with the enemy will lose momentum and the initiative, although they will be able to hold ground and retain lethal effectiveness.</p> -<p>Preferential policies differed among the supply chains and varied depending on the availability of mineral resources in China. In rare earths, for instance, where China has abundant resources, policies to support mining and processing date back to the 1970s, while foreign investments were confined to joint ventures in the 1990s. From that point, policies focused on limiting exports and encouraging Chinese companies to develop high-end products and devices, while also aiming to limit illegal mining and exports (which had severe environmental and health impacts in China, and which depressed prices domestically).</p> +<p>In complex terrain, medium motorised forces may fit operational needs. During the Battle of Irpin in the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukrainian infantry forces armed with ATGMs were not only lethal but also extremely mobile. However, the terrain around Irpin, Bucha and Hostomel is not conducive to armoured and mechanised mobility: the three suburbs are bounded by dense forest, and most of the open ground is part of the marshy floodplain around the Irpin and Bucha rivers, presenting a further obstacle. The village of Demydiv was one of many deliberately flooded to block Russian movement. The Russian Army did use light infantry in its attempts to manoeuvre away from the main roads, but these performed poorly. However, the battle was one of urban and forest fighting that heavily favoured the defender, and Ukrainian victory owed much to Russian planning failures – both factors being situational and not necessarily replicable.</p> -<p>The EV industry in China was born from a desire to foster industrial development and technological upgrading while also reducing the country’s dependence on oil imports. The government adopted supportive industrial policies for EV manufacturing, sales and charging infrastructure, offering tax incentives and subsidies for innovation and R&amp;D as early as the mid-2000s. Much like the situation with rare earths, government policies that made foreign investments appealing were accompanied by cheap input costs, with the quid pro quo of partnering with Chinese car and battery makers. In 2012, as part of the 12th Five-Year Plan, the government issued the “Energy Saving and New Energy Automobile Industry Development Plan (2012–2020)” aimed at developing EV science and technology. The “Made in China 2025” plan, issued in 2015, introduced the development of the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry as a national strategy and, more broadly, encouraged new energy industries such as renewables. This built on the “Strategic Emerging Industries” initiative that was announced in 2006, but broadened it out from a focus on technical innovation to encompass the entire manufacturing process.</p> +<p>Furthermore, evidence from Ukraine suggests that fighting armoured forces is difficult and dangerous for ATGM-armed dismounted light infantry, even if they possess Javelin, one of the most effective and lethal systems currently available. If such forces are detected by enemy tank crews they become acutely vulnerable to the tank’s main armaments, which cause large numbers of casualties. The main gun of an MBT can also outrange all but the most capable of ATGMs, such as Javelin, and the evidence from Ukraine indicates that the addition of thermal shielding to Russian T90s could successfully reduce the effective range of Javelin to well within that of the vehicle’s main armament by making it harder for the command launch unit to lock on to targets.</p> -<p>Over this period, government departments introduced various plans to guide the development of the NEV industry, encouraging the creation of an ecosystem to support these industries. Government policies focused on innovation in EVs and batteries, as well as on encouraging both production and sales of EVs and infrastructure build-out. In 2021, policy guidance also looked to address the use of EV battery packs in other applications after their removal from EVs, including as part of China’s long-term plan to develop smart networks and to achieve vehicle-to-grid integration. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s 12th Five-Year Plan for the nonferrous metals sector noted that priority would be given to developing China’s overseas presence. Chinese banks have therefore supported Chinese miners in their efforts to acquire ownership interests in mines and processing facilities in Africa, Australia, Europe, North America and South America, and in signing offtake agreements with operating mines.</p> +<p>Ultimately, the presence of ATGMs on the battlefield puts pressure on armoured forces, and is driving changes to tank design (such as the adoption of APS), prompting weight increases – as will be discussed later. Conversely, the presence of armour requires the careful husbanding of anti-tank capabilities which would otherwise be useful for other tasks. For example, the British Milan ATGMs deployed in the Falklands War, which were used in an anti-fortification role and were critical to overcoming dug-in Argentine infantry and marines, would have been less available (if available at all) for those tasks had the British task force been simultaneously guarding against the threat of even a small Argentine armoured force. ATGMs pose a distinct threat, but cannot lay claim to having made the MBT obsolete.</p> -<p>As the domestic EV market grew, government policies facilitated and prioritised the development of an integrated battery and EV supply chain. To be sure, some developments, including e-bikes and a burgeoning solar heating industry, have emerged in China due to innovations by local companies that saw new demand emerging, even though they were not formally encouraged (some were even discouraged, as in the case of e-bikes). This is important to note, because not all of China’s initiatives are led and directed by the government, nor are they perfectly implemented. When discussing China, it is important to note that there is a difference between central government’s policy framing on the one hand, and corporate activities and behaviours on the other.</p> +<p><em>Medium Armoured Forces</em></p> -<p>Nonetheless, the state-led industrial policy framework has been a key contributor to China’s dominance in these industries of the future. Some of the attributes seen in the EV sector also supported the development of China’s solar industry: manufacturers benefited from local government support such as land concessions, tax benefits, less expensive operating environments and, in some cases, even direct investment. The central government contributed by directing state financing to these projects and even helped to catalyse cost declines in input materials like polysilicon. However, when polysilicon prices plummeted (due to a fall in demand as trade restrictions were imposed on Chinese solar exports, combined with the existence of large stocks of polysilicon) local governments provided further support to shield these industries. That said, solar PV, unlike other industries, did not begin life as a domestic industry. Chinese firms first entered PV module manufacturing through technology acquisition, before gradually succeeding in building their competitiveness and technological capabilities throughout the supply chains, as they saw new opportunities for growth, as well as via local interactive learning networks.</p> +<p>Medium tracked armoured forces require the briefest commentary, as they are most similar to the heavy armoured forces built around MBTs. They operate on the same principles, but are comparatively lighter, less protected and carry less firepower, and they have the same drawbacks (albeit to a lesser extent in some regards). RAND conducted a study of the utility of medium tracked armoured forces, and concluded that they performed well, and benefited significantly from strategic, operational and tactical mobility and a less burdensome logistics requirement, but also found that their reduced combat power resulted in less successful outcomes if they were deployed against competent heavy armoured forces. These outcomes could only be offset by either close air support and artillery dominance or by the opposing heavy armoured forces not being employed competently (and without combined arms integration of their own). This study factored in the use of ATGMs (both vehicle-mounted and carried by dismounts) by medium armoured forces. The history of US light and medium armoured forces in the Second World War, at the point when they encountered German heavy armoured forces with a significant combat power advantage in the direct fight, was not a happy one, and involved significant losses, an experience that still shapes current US thinking on the employment of MBTs. This has been termed the Sherman Dilemma, whereby a force adopts a less-capable combat vehicle with the expectation that combined arms integration will offset its disadvantages in the direct fight, only to discover that combined arms integration does not provide the expected benefits under actual operational conditions.</p> -<p>In a somewhat similar vein, the Chinese government has, since the early stage of wind energy development, focused on establishing a domestic wind industry supply chain, initially by financing investments in small wind farms, and through the development of wind projects as early as the 1980s. Foreign expertise was then brought in, but joint ventures were designed to include substantial local content requirements (later abolished). In addition to policies that stimulated renewable R&amp;D and equipment manufacturing, the government also introduced pricing policies to support the integration of renewable energy.</p> +<p>The category of medium forces is quite a varied one. The US Army Stryker formations fit at the lower end of the category, at just over 16 tonnes; although the MGS variant was armed with 105-mm main gun, this made for a top-heavy and unstable vehicle (mechanical issues with the turret were also an issue), and this variant was eventually retired. Thus, Stryker formations remain reliant on ATGMs for lethality when engaging heavier forces. Meanwhile the British Army’s Ajax vehicles, which weigh 38 tonnes, occupy the upper end of the medium forces category. The dividing line between “medium” and “heavy” forces, in fact, is blurred, as many MBTs – particularly those of Soviet or Russian design – are considerably smaller and lighter than their Western equivalents: for example, the T90 weighs 48 tonnes, while the T72 weighs only 46 tonnes. An alternative framing might be that, given the obvious pressures on heavy armoured forces, that heavy armoured vehicles and MBTs, when they are employed, should perhaps be lighter in future. However, as will be discussed in the section on logistics, sustainment, recovery and reconstitution, adopting Soviet design principles to achieve this end would be unwise.</p> -<p>Industrial policies in support of manufacturing, innovation and deployment have had unintended consequences from the Chinese government’s perspective – among them subsidy fraud, illegal mining and negative environmental impacts – while incentive structures have evolved to deal with regulatory gaps, financial stress along the supply chains and other challenges. Notwithstanding the challenges, these policies have, over time, allowed China to become a critical and low-cost supplier of new energy materials.</p> +<p>In addition to their lesser logistical/sustainment requirements and increased deployability, medium armoured vehicles enjoy niche advantages over their heavy counterparts. Medium armoured vehicles with rapid-firing main armaments can generally hyper-elevate their guns compared with standard MBT designs, and therefore have a tactical advantage in urban, mountainous or complex terrain (noting the exception of the South Korean K2 Black Panther MBT, whose innovative suspension system allows the engagement of high- and low-angle targets)., However, when it comes to warfighting, the evidence suggests that medium armoured forces have consistently been at a disadvantage against heavy armoured forces, resulting in high losses when these two force types go head to head in the direct fight. Overall, these different force structure options are best seen as being complementary, rather than as substitutes for each other.</p> -<p>In addition to industrial and innovation policies, the Chinese government regulates the mining of critical materials and their processing. China’s 2016 National Plan for Mineral Resources classifies the country’s mineral resources as “strategic”, “advantageous”, “protected”, or “strategic emerging industry” minerals. China does not have a critical minerals list akin to those in place in the US or the EU. For the different categories of minerals, the plan identifies where China needs to encourage exploration of minerals in short supply, regulate the amount of minerals defined as “advantageous”, cut production of minerals with excess capacity, and ensure the supply of minerals in strategic emerging industries. The plan identifies three broad categories:</p> +<h4 id="wheels-and-tracks">Wheels and Tracks</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Energy minerals – oil, gas, shale gas, coal, coal-bed methane and uranium.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Metallic minerals – iron, chromium, copper, aluminium, gold, nickel, tungsten, tin, molybdenum, antimony, cobalt, lithium, rare earths and zirconium.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Non-metallic minerals – phosphorus, potash, crystalline graphite and fluorite.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Wheels and tracks remain a recurring topic of discussion, and therefore should be briefly acknowledged. The discussion continues even though the dynamics, in themselves, are generally agreed. It has already been mentioned that more difficult terrain will generally be more easily traversed by tracked vehicles, whereas wheeled vehicles will have to move more carefully and be more selective about their route – or indeed may not be able to cross the same terrain at all if it is sufficiently difficult. The implication is that the choice of routes, tactical formations, and use of ground for cover involving both tracked and wheeled vehicles will force the formation to conform to the mobility capacity of the least capable vehicles. Alternatively, concepts of operation need to make allowances for a disjoint between the wheeled and tracked elements of the force, and accept them not operating entirely in tandem. Incidentally, different types of vehicle may also experience interoperability issues, even if they fit within the same category. For example, CVR(T), though extremely useful in Afghanistan and other theatres, suffered in the First Gulf War in large part because, on the advance in open terrain, it could not keep pace with the Challenger- and Warrior-equipped heavy armoured forces for which it was supposed to provide forward reconnaissance.</p> -<p>This list includes metals and minerals that are not on developed economies’ lists of critical materials, but it also excludes a number of materials often cited by developed economies as “critical” (such as vanadium, tellurium, niobium and others that are used in hydrogen, solar PV or wind turbines). And while advanced manufacturing economies with a high dependency on imported raw materials include supply risk as a key parameter when categorising their lists of materials, Chinese assessments of “strategic minerals” use a broader, more flexible set of criteria, in which some “strategic minerals” are subject to supply risk and others are not. Indeed, according to China’s Geological Survey, the category of “advantageous minerals” includes rare earths and tungsten, and refers to minerals for which China has a domestic resource advantage relative to other countries, allowing it to control or influence global markets.</p> +<p>Despite these challenges, wheels and tracks have often been forced to operate together out of necessity, as even the best-resourced militaries must go to war with the equipment they have available – and this sometimes involves integrating disparate platforms and units. Wheels and tracks can verifiably work together successfully. However, where it is economically feasible, states with heavy armoured forces have tried to maintain as much commonality or similarity of hull and drivetrain as possible within formations. This should remain an aspiration, if British Army vehicle fleets can be rationalised over time.</p> -<h3 id="ii-demand-for-low-carbon-energy-infrastructure-in-the-uk">II. Demand for Low-Carbon Energy Infrastructure in the UK</h3> +<h4 id="logistics-sustainment-recovery-and-reconstitution">Logistics, Sustainment, Recovery and Reconstitution</h4> -<p>In its 2023 analysis, the UK’s National Grid estimated that the national electricity supply would treble by 2035, through both domestic generation and imports. This would involve a massive increase in different forms of infrastructure (see Table 1).</p> +<p>Micah Clark has argued that: “An experienced tank crew is the ultimate combat power multiplier for its ability to conduct field-expedient maintenance to unconventionally repair issues that would otherwise render a tank non-mission capable”.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/u78vM9M.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: National Grid (2023) Projections to 2035 for England and Wales.</strong> Source: National Grid ESO, “Bridging the Gap to Net Zero”, March 2023.</em></p> +<p>Given the threat environment, MBTs need to remain mobile to avoid detection and targeting – but this creates dilemmas when factoring in the need to go static in order to conduct maintenance and repairs. Thorough preventative maintenance in garrison is a first step, but even with new vehicles, in good order, armoured forces require constant maintenance to keep them operational, and consume significant volumes of supplies. A squadron of MBTs requires a large amount of fuel, and heightened mobility will proportionally heighten the logistics burden for fuel resupply. Likewise, crews require rest, which the increased maintenance burden inherent in MBTs disrupts, further degrading operational tempo compared with simpler wheeled platforms.</p> -<p>Concurrent global growth in demand will put great pressure on international supply chains. Mining companies in particular face a range of challenges, including high exploration and production costs, environmental and social concerns, access to capital and shortages of skilled labour. Currently, investments in both the mining of new minerals and processing capacity are falling short of estimated demand, notwithstanding the different demand outlooks and uncertainties around the impact of new technologies. The IEA, for instance, notes that “in a scenario consistent with climate goals, expected supply from existing mines and projects under construction is estimated to meet only half of projected lithium and cobalt requirements and 80% of copper needs by 2030”. Thus, if investment in new mine capacity is not accelerated, the pace of the energy transition will be constrained.</p> +<p>In addition to the key characteristics of protection, mobility and firepower that ground combat vehicles embody, Yoo, Park and Choi identified operability as the fourth key function. While the standing of operability as an equal consideration is open to debate, it is nonetheless important to highlight overall logistics and sustainment functions. Clark’s observation referenced above is often underappreciated, except by armoured personnel themselves, and “the often-overlooked operator’s perspective calls for the focus to fall on maintainability in the field over incremental upgrades to firepower and survivability”. Future MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles should be designed and constructed with modularity and repairability in mind, ensuring that as many repairs as possible can be completed on-site by the vehicle crews themselves, without having to recover the vehicle to a rear maintenance area or bring forward specialist repair crews; this dynamic is a much-overlooked – but critical – element in influencing heavy armour’s effectiveness.</p> -<p>This raises a number of issues for the UK. First, its ability to meet its net zero goals will depend on the availability of new energy supplies. Meanwhile, the UK’s industrial and economic competitiveness will be closely linked to energy costs. Some military systems also use critical materials, and, while the quantities of these are relatively small, they require high-purity, high-value materials. Finally, supply disruptions, however limited, could reduce the UK’s ability to use renewable technology to meet its climate goals, as well as constrain its freedom of action.</p> +<p>Likewise, recovery of immobilised MBTs is challenging, especially under fire, requiring well-practised and properly-equipped recovery crews if it is to be effective, but it can allow technically killed vehicles to be rapidly returned to service if they can be withdrawn from enemy contact and evacuated to forward repair facilities. Delays to recovery operations in Afghanistan for damaged Stryker vehicles could fix units for 24 hours even when recovery vehicles were readily available. Units were forced to defend what proved a tempting target for insurgent attacks, showing that the challenges of recovering and repairing heavier vehicles in warfighting conditions should not be underestimated.</p> -<p>To date the UK has relied on markets to satisfy its needs and, where effective and efficient markets exist, government policies suggest this will remain the case. The UK government recognised in its 2022 Critical Minerals Strategy that many critical mineral markets are “incomplete”, having inadequate data and transparency. The Critical Minerals Intelligence Centre was established at the British Geological Survey in July 2022, and the government has committed to convening a dialogue with industry, and to using multilateral engagement to promote market development. But establishing concrete policies to secure necessary supplies will be challenging without an industrial strategy to provide guidance on UK demand for critical minerals at the various stages of the supply chain.</p> +<p>The Second World War, although in many regards a dated case study, provides some critical lessons. In particular, the long duration of the war means that the multiple campaign seasons, large distances covered by advancing and retreating units, and the intensity of fighting (which resulted in high levels of tank loss) can provide useful insights into questions around the extended sustainment of heavy armoured forces in the face of attrition during warfighting campaigns, even if some fundamental differences can be identified with regard to contemporary scenarios (discussed below).</p> -<p>The efforts of the UK and its allies to build out new energy supply chains are likely to involve a lengthy process – one from which China cannot be excluded, at least in the near term. While policy papers do not articulate what level of reliance on China is acceptable to the UK and its allies, the decoupling (now de-risking) narratives indicate that there will be an attempt to rapidly reduce dependence on China. In the US, for instance, the Inflation Reduction Act provides a range of tax credits, as the country seeks to encourage the sourcing of battery materials domestically, or from partner countries with which the US has free trade agreements. From 2025 onwards, EV batteries will only be eligible for US purchase subsidies if they do not contain any critical minerals that were extracted, processed or recycled by a “foreign entity of concern” – including China. Similarly, the European Commission’s proposal for a new Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) aims to achieve a high degree of self-sufficiency by 2030. According to the CRMA, EU capacity should reach at least 10% of domestic demand for mining and extraction and at least 40% for processing and refining, in a bid to address overreliance on China’s supply chains. The European Raw Materials Alliance, announced in September 2020 as part of the European Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials, focuses on developing sustainable and responsible supply chains for critical raw materials and fostering partnerships with resource-rich countries other than China.</p> +<p>The Soviet experience on the Eastern Front in the Second World War was that tanks might be knocked out, repaired and returned to service as many as four times during an operation. Tanks lost in a repairable state outnumbered those which were irrecoverable by two-to-one.</p> -<p>Before the paper goes on to discuss the implications of this for UK security, the next chapter offers a brief overview of key net zero supply chains and their complexity.</p> +<p>Wartime and post-war Soviet research found that on average during an operation which lasted 15 to 20 days the overall tank loss rate was 82% of the starting strength, with 70% of the losses being repairable and 30% of the repairable losses due to non-battle reasons such a mechanical problems or getting stuck in a swamp.</p> -<h3 id="iii-chinas-dominance-of-new-energy-supply-chains">III. China’s Dominance of New Energy Supply Chains</h3> +<p>After approximately 20 days of constant operation, the Soviet Army found that the breakdown rate started to escalate dramatically, illustrating the importance of preventative maintenance. If Soviet forces lost ground, the rate of irrecoverable tank losses would increase dramatically as repairable tanks – and, in the worst-case scenario, tank repair facilities and recovered tanks undergoing repairs – were overrun and fell into German hands. Recovery and maintenance personnel organic to tank formations were invaluable: not only were they well-placed to quickly conduct repairs, but – if well-led – were likely to consider themselves an integral part of the team and perform better than centralised recovery and maintenance personnel based at higher or rear echelons; moreover, additional benefits were derived from their familiarity with specific vehicles. The importance of stocks of spare parts should not be underestimated, an oversight which plagued German forces in the Second World War, as a lack of spares could turn what should have been a quick repair job into a lengthier delay as tanks spent an extended period of time in the care of a maintenance unit, awaiting the necessary parts. Another flaw in the German operation was that cannibalisation of vehicles and inter-unit competition exacerbated the system’s deficiencies and meant that more damaged or broken-down tanks were unavailable than otherwise might have been the case. Interestingly, the experience of German tank crews was that, although they were trained to conduct basic repairs and could in theory assist the dedicated mechanics, in practice (when accompanying badly damaged tanks to rear echelon maintenance facilities) some crews had a tendency to interfere with the work of the maintenance personnel and generally make a hinderance of themselves unless other activities could be found to keep them occupied. Although this dynamic is at odds with the experience of well-trained modern crews, it is worth bearing in mind for unit commanders.</p> -<h4 id="supply-chain-components">Supply Chain Components</h4> +<p>Gary Dickson’s distillation of the Soviet experience bears citing in full:</p> -<p>Supply chains for low-carbon energy technologies have several stages and involve many different countries. A supply chain may comprise as many as six steps:</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The number of tanks in service at any one time during a battle was very dynamic. On the minus side tanks were being destroyed or damaged due to battle or non-battle reasons. On the plus side was only the ability of the repair units to put damaged tanks back into service. Therefore the pool of damaged tanks was a great asset to a tank unit as long as they could be repaired in a timely manner. This had several significant consequences:</p> +</blockquote> <ol> <li> - <p>Extraction and beneficiation of mineral ores.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Processing and refining of the ores to produce metals.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Further processing to produce the required alloys or chemical compounds.</p> + <p>As long as repair units were able to repair all or most of the tanks which were damaged, a tank unit was able to maintain its strength, only slowly weakening due to irrecoverable losses and the time it took to repair tanks.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Manufacture of individual components.</p> + <p>The faster a tank unit advanced, the farther behind the repair units lagged and the more time they had to spend moving to keep up. Both reduced the number of tanks which could be repaired.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Manufacture of intermediate products from these components.</p> + <p>Retreat was a potential disaster for the damaged tank pool. With a limited number of evacuation vehicles, most tanks had to be abandoned on the field, never to be repaired. Loss of the damaged tank pool resulted in a dramatic reduction in tank strength.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Assembly of final product.</p> + <p>Operational pauses were critical and allowed repair units time to catch up and clear the backlog of tanks to be repaired. This, and the fact that it did not retreat and lose its damaged tank pool, is why the 5th Guards Tank Army was able to reconstitute itself after the battle at Prokhorovka.</p> </li> </ol> -<p>In principle, each step can be carried out in a different country. But China, as discussed below, has built a strong position that spans steps one to five in several important supply chains. The basis of this strength lies in China’s dominance of the extraction and, to an even greater extent, processing of certain critical minerals.</p> +<p>Most of these points remain entirely valid for the modern employment of heavy armour.</p> -<p><strong>What are Critical Minerals?</strong></p> +<p>More recent experience complements these lessons. The South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Border War provides an interesting example of an armoured force operating at reach and lacking mass, which could neither rotate formations nor reconstitute them during operations. In Operation Hooper, as the majority of the SADF’s armoured strength had been assembled, SADF Ratel IFVs and Olifant MBTs could not be replaced and had to either forgo maintenance – sometimes for up to 800 hours of combat – or be refitted at the front by their sub-unit mechanics. Both wear and tear and combat damage aggregated, whittling away at the number of available vehicles, and those that did go into combat often did so in a degraded and less effective state. This contributed to the inability of the SADF to maintain operational momentum and reinforce or exploit successful offensives. Concurrently, Cuban airpower served to limit SADF frontline resupply and maintenance. In most regards frontline combat units were kept supplied, albeit austerely, or could make do without non-critical items. However, spare parts for artillery and armoured vehicles were the two areas in which the logistics problems could not be solved through improvisation, resulting in ever-reducing capability due to the importance of armoured and indirect fire support and the heavy maintenance burden imposed on the units in question by the high and sustained operational tempo.</p> -<p>The criticality of a specific mineral is generally assessed on the basis of the risk of interruption to supply and on the economic or security importance to the importing nation or region of such a disruption. One factor that contributes to the assessment of supply risk is the market concentration of the production of a mineral ore or refined metal. Most assessments do not consider the geographic concentration of primary mineral ore resources, as these are – in most cases – abundant and geographically widespread. However, the known high-quality accumulations tend to be geographically concentrated, though future exploration may yield some new high-grade deposits.</p> +<p>In terms of lessons learned from recent operations in Ukraine, the majority of Russian armour losses have still been the result of poor maintenance or logistics. In the case of the Ukrainian armed forces, the majority of repairs are carried out up to 300 km away from the frontlines in order to protect irreplaceable maintenance machinery and personnel from artillery fires. While the journey from the frontline to these facilities could be only five or six hours, an impressive feat of logistics in itself, this still constitutes a major endeavour. In the summer of 2022, Ukrainian tanks that had been destroyed on the battlefield, but recovered, were being repaired in Poland at a rate of 20–30 per month.</p> -<p>The principal focus of such criticality assessments is the mineral inputs required to produce advanced technologies, notably in the low-carbon and defence industries. Assessments carried out by different organisations result in different lists of critical minerals. This is due to a combination of differing geographic scope and economic/security concerns, as well as different methodologies. This study draws on four such assessments, conducted respectively by: the US Department of the Interior; the IEA; the British Geological Survey; and the European Commission.</p> +<p>This all has implications for the current and future operational contexts for Western forces: unless formations can be furnished with ample layered air defences or the enemy thoroughly blinded by counter-reconnaissance operations, the requirement to keep major maintenance hubs safe from as much of the enemy’s precision fires as possible will probably necessitate them being based far from the frontlines. This could make tank pools less vulnerable to overrun, but would also mean that the tank pool would not be able to reconstitute armoured units as responsively as might be desired given the greater geographical distance between them and the units deployed forward. This would also increase coordination challenges and reduce the benefits of repair units being associated with frontline formations (the echelon at which maintenance units should be held). As well as creating the traditional logistics problems, this would also entail the concentration of large numbers of vehicles under repair, creating a large signature that could be detected and targeted even if located deep in the rear. Forward repair units should therefore be structured, equipped and protected in such a way as to operate dispersed and avoid developing a backlog of tanks under repair, while investment in education, training and track miles in developing crew skills will be key determinants of their ability to keep vehicles operable, enabling many repairs to be completed without the assistance of mechanics or the need for a vehicle to be recovered.</p> -<p>The minerals identified as critical by one or more of these assessments, and which are inputs to low-carbon energy technologies, are listed in Table 2.</p> +<p>In terms of the scale at which forces operate, policymakers and senior leaders should understand that in order to credibly generate a warfighting capability at a given scale – be it battle group, brigade or division – a military will require sufficient depth to rotate it with a counterpart formation. Furthermore, avoiding spending on spare parts will amount to a false economy, and one that has in previous conflicts proved disastrous on operations. A sustainable supply of a large number of spare parts should be factored into procurement and fleet management decisions, otherwise a force may be exposed to excess attrition during warfighting and will accumulate an unnecessarily high level of permanently lost vehicles.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EPBI78A.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Critical Minerals Relevant to Low-Carbon Energy Technologies.</strong> Sources: <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-24/pdf/2022-04027.pdf">US Department of the Interior, “2022 Final List of Critical Minerals”, Federal Register (Vol. 87, No. 37, 24 February 2022)</a>, p. 10,381; IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, May 2021; Paul Lusty et al., UK Criticality Assessment of Technology Critical Minerals and Metals, British Geological Survey, CR/21/120 (Keyworth: British Geological Survey, 2021); Silvia Bobba et al., Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU: A Foresight Study (Brussels: European Commission, 2020).</em></p> +<h4 id="changes-to-tank-design">Changes to Tank Design</h4> -<p>The growing demand for clean energy technologies will sharply accelerate the demand for some of these critical minerals. Table 3 summarises the IEA’s estimates for this growth to 2040.</p> +<p>There are a number of changes to tank design that can be suggested, implemented either through modifications to existing vehicles or by including them in more comprehensive upgrade programmes. Unfortunately, some of these will prove impossible to implement even within the framework of the ongoing Challenger 3 upgrade, but these could still be made at a later date.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BfZxfiw.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: Estimated Growth in Demand for Selected Critical Minerals and Share of Clean Energy Technologies in Total Demand.</strong> Notes: 1. STEPS and SDS refer respectively to the IEA’s “Stated Policies” and “Sustainable Development” scenarios. 2. * refers to neodymium only. Source: IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”.</em></p> +<p>MBTs and heavy armoured forces require better ISTAR capabilities, both within and beyond line-of-sight. Beyond line-of-sight, one capability that should be integrated into heavy armoured forces is UAS reconnaissance to assist with tactical-level detection (although this point is force type-agnostic – light and medium forces equally require this capability). Within direct line-of-sight, “see-through armour” (a type of augmented reality) is promising, although literally transparent armour is far enough away from being practicable to be discounted for the moment). See-through armour involves mounting high-resolution cameras on the outside of the vehicle and using software to merge their feeds together to give the crew an expanded view that eliminates blind spots, allowing them to look in different directions more quickly than is possible with traditional sights and viewports. Given that kinetic strikes against the vehicle’s armour will quickly damage or destroy cameras, the existing series of armoured viewports and optics should not be eliminated, but see-through armour capability would still reduce the chances of MBTs being successfully ambushed or blundering into ATGM-armed dismounts without warning (both scenarios that can reduce the advantages normally held by heavy armoured forces).</p> -<p>It is clear that China holds a significant or strong global position in the extraction and/or processing of a large number of the minerals listed in Table 2. In most cases, China’s global share of processing is significantly larger than that of ore extraction, as China imports large quantities of ore for domestic processing. The strength of China’s position is enhanced by its growing involvement in mining and mineral processing overseas (Table 4). The scale of overseas investment in this sector accelerated in the first half of 2023, with a focus on nickel, lithium and copper. The countries that host Chinese mining companies will play a growing role in the global energy transition.</p> +<p>Refining MBTs’ onboard optics and detection systems is another important avenue of improvement. Challenger 2 remains an impressive sensor platform, with both electro-optical and thermal optics able to identify targets beyond the effective range of direct fire anti-tank weapon systems if the crew actively scans the right arcs and areas. However, upgrading the range and fidelity of sensors and, more importantly, increasing their field of view is an obvious area for ongoing improvement, and one that private industry will continue to provide new commercial-off-the-shelf options for due to the wide applications.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PFNtRA7.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: Examples of Countries Where China is Deeply Involved in Critical Minerals.</strong> Note: PGMs = platinum group metals. Sources: Christoph Nedopil Wang, “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”; Chen Aizhu and Fransiska Nangoy, “Shandong Nanshan May Expand Indonesia Site into $6 bln Aluminium Complex”, Reuters, 15 May 2023; Saliou Samb, “China to Loan Guinea $20 Billion to Secure Aluminium Ore”, Reuters, 6 September 2023; James Attwood and Leonardo Lara, “China’s BYD Takes Next Steps on $290 Million Lithium Project in Chile”, Bloomberg, 3 July 2023; Jonathan Gilbert and James Attwood, “China’s Zijin is in Talks with Argentina to Turn Lithium into Battery Cathode”, Bloomberg, 10 July 2023; Thomas Graham, “Bolivia’s Dream of a Lithium Future Plays out on High-Altitude Salt Flats”, The Guardian, 25 January 2023; “Gabon, CITIC to Mine 26 Mln T Manganese Resource”, Reuters, 23 October 2010; Harry Dempsey, “Indonesia Emerges as World’s Second-Largest Cobalt Producer”, Financial Times, 9 May 2023; Yudith Ho and Eko Listiyorini, “Chinese Companies are Flocking to Indonesia for its Nickel”, Bloomberg, 15 December 2022; Harry Dempsey and Leslie Hook, “China Set to Tighten Grip over Global Cobalt Supply as Price Hits 32-Month Low”, Financial Times, 13 March 2023; Simon Mundy, “China Enters South African Platinum Sector”, Financial Times, 18 December 2010.</em></p> +<p>Detection systems operating outside of the visual light spectrum should also be considered, such as laser and radar warning receivers: it is already planned that Challenger 3 will be equipped with a laser warning receiver. As this type of system can only feed data to APS or provide immediate warning of an enemy contact, other forms of sensor may also prove useful in increasing situational awareness. Retro-reflective detectors, ground-moving target indicator (GMTI) radar and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) are all options that would provide advance warning of surveillance – although these come with constraints: passive retro-reflective detection seems unlikely to be able to distinguish scopes and sensors from coincidental backscatter and reflections from other sources, particularly in urban environments, and so an active laser emitter would probably be necessary bar any unexpected technological breakthrough. GMTI and SAR systems, meanwhile, would be best mounted on an antenna and thus might only be deployable when static; these systems would therefore not give passive protection at all times, but would provide the capability to periodically scan for threats, and would require a tactical pause or short halt to do so. Note the risk of the radar emissions being detected must be factored in when considering such options.</p> -<p>The UK has no significant mining production of the critical minerals identified by the British Geological Survey, but prospective areas for mineral extraction do exist in the UK, notably for lithium in Cornwall. Whether extraction of any of these deposits can be brought to a significant scale by 2035 is an open question, not least due to social and environmental concerns. Likewise, the UK’s processing capacity for these minerals is very limited. Nevertheless, the UK is home to a number of international mining companies that could, in principle, supply some of the required minerals. Recycling is often seen as having more potential in the UK, but in a rapidly growing market, recycled materials originating in the UK will lag behind demand significantly.</p> +<p>This in turn raises questions about crew and commander workload and about the echelon level at which these systems could be integrated. While a retro-reflective detection scan produces near-instant results, outside of a headquarters setting GMTI data would require artificial intelligence (AI) support to even partially automate target classification – and even then the data would still require human analysis to filter out clutter and noise. These systems may therefore be inappropriate for platform-level integration. The commander of an unmodernised Challenger 2 already has a high cognitive burden when managing a tank crew and, in the case of sub-unit commanders, also has a troop or squadron to oversee. Maintaining situational awareness while closed down takes practice, given the limited fields of view and the fact that rotation of the turret where the commander is located is independent of the position and direction of travel of the hull – even before the designation of targets, issuing of other instructions, and communicating via radio inter- and intra-echelon are taken into consideration. In addition, space is at a premium in the turret given the battle management systems already in place. This situation is unlikely to change with the introduction of Challenger 3.</p> -<p>Below is a more detailed look at some of the other key supply chain components that will need to be addressed in any shift away from Chinese dominance.</p> +<p>When considering the adoption of extra systems, one caveat is that there is limited space available in the current Challenger 2 turret for additional battle management and situational awareness equipment. In order to prevent intended improvements being counterproductive for the crew operating the platform, it would be much more preferable to undertake a wholesale overhaul of the interior ergonomics and a thorough integration of new capabilities with existing ones, rather than incrementally add systems in a piecemeal manner. It would be a mistake to add systems that require a significant level of management by tank commanders; such systems should instead be operated either by attached specialists or handled an echelon above, with data passed down, using AI support to ensure that the cognitive effect on the tank commander is beneficial rather than overwhelming. There are also serious questions about whether these technologies could be added to MBTs without increasing their weight to an impractical level.</p> -<p><strong>Batteries and EVs</strong></p> +<p>With regard to the proposition that future MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles should be lighter, John Stone argued this exact point when he noted that, although the US and the UK adopted manoeuvre warfare as the core of their warfighting doctrine in the 1980s, their MBT designs were still rooted in the 1970s in terms of size, amount of armour, and weight (60–70 tonnes). In Stone’s view, the logistics tail made necessary by this misalignment of concepts of operations and vehicle design amounted to a bloating that directly impeded the very operational tempo and mobility that the vehicles were supposed to enable. Whether Stone was correct or not, MBTs certainly cannot afford to get any heavier than they are now. Once a tank weighs above approximately 80 tonnes, the engineering and design choices required to overcome increasing ground pressure result in vehicles that are useful only for niche tasks or which are simply impractical. Even at 70 tonnes, problems abound. The Department of Defense (DoD) and US Army have in the past been at odds over whether tests indicated that weight increases had compromised the Abrams M1A2 SEPv3 MBT’s ability to cross standard bridging equipment, be carried by Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS), and be recovered in the event of damage or breakdown. Nor does Challenger 2 enjoy the same cross-country mobility as its smaller forerunner, the Centurion. The current balance between weight and equipment requirements may be the best balance possible given the threat environment, but seeking further protection may prove counterproductive and mobility issues should not be exacerbated, as mobility too is critical to survivability, allowing tank crews to better use ground and avoid slow movement or being forced into remaining static.</p> -<p>Lithium-ion batteries are the most commonly used form of energy storage for electric and hybrid motor vehicles and are also used for household and grid electricity storage. Their key components are anodes, cathodes and electrolytes. Lithium is the most important metal in this context, as it provides the electrolyte as well as most forms of cathode. The chemistry of the cathode and anode varies, and this results in six main types of lithium-ion battery:</p> +<p>Despite the potential benefits of moving to lighter vehicles, Russian design principles for MBTs, which might be characterised as being design-optimised for ease of manufacture and extreme mechanical simplicity, are probably best avoided. As Michael Kofman recently highlighted, Western platforms, particularly armoured vehicles, have proven significantly more survivable than Russian-designed and -manufactured equivalents. Despite a similar vulnerability to being mission-killed, crews are far more likely to survive and vehicles are more likely to be recoverable and repairable. This results in forces that can be organically reconstituted far more easily.</p> -<ul> - <li>NMC: Lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide.</li> - <li>NCA: Lithium nickel cobalt aluminium oxide.</li> - <li>LCO: Lithium cobalt oxide.</li> - <li>LFP: Lithium iron phosphate.</li> - <li>LMO: Lithium manganese oxide.</li> - <li>LTO: Lithium titanate.</li> -</ul> +<p>Ultimately, increased battlefield lethality might make it difficult to achieve improved survivability through passive or reactive protection. Technological developments in this area might offer some promise, but also involve limitations. For example, expectations of the benefits to be derived from countermeasures such as APS should be moderated. APS have a high power demand when they are active, and some vehicles cannot provide such power. Moreover APS, when active, also involve the use of radar guidance, generating an associated electromagnetic signature that in theory could assist enemy targeting. APS are also generally single-use or quickly expended, such that a moderate volume of incoming fire can overwhelm even an effective and reliable APS, leaving the vehicle in question reliant on its passive protection systems. APS technology may provide a layer of protection, but is no guarantee of survivability against a determined or well-armed enemy. They are most effective when heavy armoured forces can concentrate and quickly overwhelm an enemy, whether that enemy is equipped with heavy armour itself or is composed of lighter forces armed with anti-tank weapons. Improved ISTAR capabilities and situational awareness technologies, coupled with concepts of operations that prioritise counter-reconnaissance, may be the best way to ensure that the MBT remains a viable platform.</p> + +<h4 id="uncrewed-ground-vehicles-ugvs">Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs)</h4> + +<p>A final question is whether the role of the MBT can be performed by UGVs. Unfortunately for enthusiastic technologists, the answer is that the future MBT will not be able to operate uncrewed any time soon. A hypothetical head-to-head comparison with the MBT will serve to illustrate the shortcomings of UGVs. UGVs can be controlled remotely, or they can be autonomous. If they are controlled remotely, they rely on data links, which present a vector for attack – they can be hacked, or the signal can be disrupted. Alternatively, UGVs can be autonomous, but this presents its own problems – most importantly, the technology controlling the UGV’s autonomous performance must be mature and sophisticated enough for the vehicle to be useful. UGVs of both kinds will perform best if managed by human personnel nearby, and these personnel must be protected.</p> + +<p>Crewed MBTs do not suffer from any of these disadvantages. An armoured vehicle such as a modern MBT is extremely versatile: it can be employed with a great deal of precision, can operate independently for an extended period of time fulfilling a variety of different mission-sets, and can rapidly switch between these mission-sets, provided it has a well-trained and competent crew. For example, on a single patrol, an MBT crew could, if required, perform a variety of different combat missions with tactical flexibility, including patrolling, reconnaissance, attacking, and holding or defending ground. The crew can handle surrendered enemy combatants, provide limited on-the-spot humanitarian relief such as first aid or emergency supplies to civilians, and conduct maintenance on its vehicle, and do all of this independently in extremis. While an MBT and its crew are not optimised for many of these tasks, and might perform some of them poorly if unsupported or in an environment not conducive to them completing that task effectively, they could nevertheless turn their hand to different tasks as necessity dictated. This range of capabilities is a difficult standard for a UGV to match.</p> -<p>The composition of the cathode is the main differentiator between these battery types. The anode is commonly composed of graphite, either natural or synthetic (manufactured from hydrocarbons). The main exception is the LTO battery, which uses lithium titanate for the anode. Tin and niobium are likely to be used in the future to increase the energy density of the anode.</p> +<p>There are, however, situations where the UGV concept can complement the use of MBTs. For instance, in tanks where the crew operates the turret remotely from inside the hull (Remote Weapons Stations, RWS) some elements of UGV technology could be leveraged, making the vehicle less vulnerable to enemy fire when taking hull-down positions. Crewed vehicles also provide useful platforms for mounting the infrastructure required to supervise UGVs and for stationing their human operators (albeit accepting that MBTs themselves currently suffer from internal space limitations, meaning that command and control of UGVs would probably have to be performed from supporting vehicles).</p> -<p>Table 5 illustrates in simplified form the supply chain for lithium-ion batteries, from raw material (in the form of ore) through to final battery assembly. This shows that China’s strong position in mineral ore extraction only applies to natural graphite and silicon. In contrast, China has built a strong – and even dominant – position in mineral processing and in the refining of domestic and imported ores, the manufacture of anodes, cathodes and electrolytes, and in the manufacture of the lithium-ion cells that go into the final battery pack. The import of beneficiated ores from overseas through bilateral offtake agreements has been key to this success (see Table 4). Chinese mining companies have enhanced this advantage through their overseas investments, notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for cobalt, in Latin America for lithium and in Indonesia for nickel, in some cases supporting not only mining but in-country refining and processing.</p> +<p>There is some overlap between MBTs and UGVs in terms of their technology and the purposes for which they are deployed – especially when crewed tanks are fitted with systems that have elements of automation, such as improved sensors and situational awareness, and the off-boarding of hard-kill and soft-kill countermeasures. In this context it seems highly likely that UGVs will play a complementary role within heavy armoured forces rather than have a realistic prospect of replacing MBTs.</p> -<p>Ongoing technological advances are likely to achieve two things. The first involves cost and efficiency improvements for existing lithium-ion chemistries, which could reduce the unit requirement for critical minerals. The second is the development of entirely new designs that could radically reduce or even obviate the need for critical minerals: these potential designs include solid state batteries, redox flow batteries, sodium-ion and iron-air chemistries, and supercapacitors. Japanese firms have been leading these innovations, but companies from South Korea, the US, China and Europe are also contributing. These advances are not currently being pursued at scale by the UK, but should they be developed and deployed rapidly it remains to be seen whether they could materially change the UK’s demand outlook by 2035.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h3> -<p>In 2022, only 6% of the UK’s EVs were produced domestically, and even now direct exposure to the Chinese supply chain – which is most dominant in refining, components and intermediate products (see Table 5) – is limited. Some 47% of the UK’s battery EVs were imported from the EU in 2022, up from 44% in 2019, followed by China at 32%, up from 2% in 2019. Sales of Chinese EVs in the UK and EU are growing. Moreover, Chinese companies already manufacture batteries in Europe (which are consequently not subject to tariffs), and this capacity could rise to 322 gigawatt hours per year (GWh/yr) by 2031. Chinese car manufacturers will also look to start production in Europe.</p> +<p>A heavy armoured force remains the best option for high-intensity warfighting due to its combat power. While it exhibits vulnerabilities, so do all types of force structure, and facing a heavy armoured force compels an enemy to make difficult choices and places the burden of operational planning upon it if it hopes to be successful. Nevertheless, if the British Army were called on to engage in high-intensity warfighting without a significant number of MBTs, it would still be viable. A smaller, lighter, more autonomous force backed up by critical enablers in the form of ISTAR capabilities and indirect fires could maintain a high degree of lethality and pose difficult operational problems for any enemy force. However, the integration of many of these critical enablers must happen at battlegroup level and above, due to the limited capacity of company headquarters (even if assisted by advanced C2 tools that allow capabilities to be delegated) and due to the expense and inefficiency of distributing such capabilities evenly across small units. This analysis of the implications of using lighter forces raises questions about the ability of sub-units to perform offensive operations effectively due to a lack of combat power. Moreover, a warfighting capability built around a core medium armoured force would struggle to achieve its likely operational objectives were it to come up against a capable combined arms enemy force built around MBTs and heavy armour. While a medium or light force might be cheaper at a platform level, as well as more numerous and more distributed, ground combat units would suffer in the close fight, in both material and human terms. Medium armoured and light forces would be better seen as complementary to heavy armoured forces, with different formations able to cover one another’s weaknesses and augment one another’s capabilities when necessary.</p> -<p>As of August 2023, the UK hosts two operating lithium-ion battery plants:</p> +<p>The British Army faces several challenges in maximising the utility of its current armoured forces. They have suffered years of underinvestment, the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 having identified heavy armour as an area of low priority. Ambitions were set low, at:</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Envision–AESC’s LMO plant in Sunderland, with a capacity of 1.9 GWh/yr and plans to expand to 11 GWh/yr by 2024 and 35 GWh/yr by 2030.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>AMTE’s lithium-ion battery plant in Thurso, with a capacity of 0.5 GWh/yr.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<blockquote> + <p>preserving the ability to reconstitute our levels of military capability in areas which are currently low priority, such as heavy armour – tanks – should international circumstances change. This means both holding in reserve certain sorts of equipment not needed for current operations and – importantly – maintaining core levels of training and experience among our personnel. This would provide us with the potential for expansion in the future.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>On 18 July 2023, it was announced that Tata had committed to building a 40 GWh/yr plant in Somerset. Other potential gigafactories in Coventry and Dundee have yet to be confirmed.</p> +<p>This approach has only recently begun to change amid decisions such as procuring Challenger 3 and Boxer, but many areas require investment. Consequently, there is a need to understand where resources and financial investment should be prioritised, since a complete, simultaneous overhaul of all the areas requiring modernisation is unrealistic. Critically, for heavy armour to be effective and survivable, the combined arms force as a whole needs to be able to conduct effective shaping of the battlespace to prevent saturation by enemy UAS and precision fires, and to be able to create sufficient uncertainty through deception that these enemy capabilities cannot target and attrit ground combat formations for decisive effect.</p> -<p>According to the Faraday Institution, the UK’s manufacturing capacity could, based on current plans, reach a combined 57 GWh/yr by 2030. That falls short of the UK’s estimated requirement of 100 GWh/yr of battery supplies (or gigafactories) to meet demand for batteries for private cars, commercial vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, buses, micromobility and grid storage by 2030, the date at which the UK had intended to end the sale of fully internal combustion engine vehicles and vans, which was delayed to 2035 in September 2023. By 2040, that demand could rise to nearly 200 GWh/yr. According to data from UK Trade Info, the UK currently relies on China for 42% of its lithium-ion battery packs.</p> +<p>Ensuring that heavy armoured units have sufficient track miles and collective field training to maintain expertise at armoured warfare is more important than any technological advance. The major determinants of whether heavy forces will prove viable given the pressures put on them will be training, skill, and, critically, motivation – that is, the human element, the moral component and the professionalism of the force, which will culminate in the continued ability to fight in a truly combined arms manner. However, beyond this, changes and adaptations are still required. At the sub-unit level, technological improvements can improve situational awareness and contribute to better tactical employment, but will have to be integrated in such a way as to not compromise the existing strengths of MBTs: off-boarding of capabilities on to support vehicles and UGVs may prove a fruitful avenue of adoption and experimentation. Future MBT designs would benefit from prioritising mechanical simplicity and repairability, and from prioritising the resilience of parts that cannot easily be repaired in the field. If weight reduction to improve mobility over difficult terrain is to be considered when modernising platforms, this should not extend to adopting Soviet design principles that trade away platform or crew survivability (although the British defence establishment is in any case unlikely to go down that route given the pattern of increasing vehicle weight and a healthy appreciation of their duty of care compared with the Russian Armed Forces). The Challenger 3 upgrade provides an opportunity to improve the design in line with at least some of the principles outlined in this paper. A critical enabler with regard to turning these recommendations into reality is an overhaul of MBTs’ interior ergonomics and the thorough integration of systems housed in the turret to ensure that crews benefit from technical improvements.</p> -<p>It is unclear whether the UK can become an attractive destination for battery makers in the future given the limited nature of UK incentives (at least compared to support schemes rolled out in the EU and the US) and due to uncertainty about future trading rules with the EU. Lithium mining locally could help attract battery makers, but lithium mining tends to take years to scale up. Even if the UK did increase its battery manufacturing capabilities, it would need to attract both auto assemblers and battery makers – which would likely be Japanese, South Korean or Chinese – or to support local companies in the face of strong international competition.</p> +<p>The MBTs and other heavy armoured vehicles at the core of combined arms formations remain important for both warfighting and other operations, as their unmatched combat power in the close fight helps ensure that a force can remain mobile when necessary. However, the balance must be shifted away from protection and towards a greater emphasis on mobility. This encompasses both strategic and operational mobility, since mobility contributes to survivability. The success of MBTs in the Gulf War set high cultural expectations regarding the survivability and offensive lethality of MBTs and heavy armoured forces organised, equipped, trained and employed as per the Western/NATO model of the time. These expectations need to be recalibrated, as individual tanks are increasingly vulnerable on the battlefield; nonetheless, well-trained, competently led and adequately equipped heavy armoured formations, supported by the correct enabling capabilities, are mobile, lethal and exceedingly difficult to counter.</p> -<p>Assuming that the UK will not be able to meet all its battery and EV requirements domestically, it will continue to import both batteries and EVs from Europe and China, with Chinese EVs and batteries looking likely to be more cost competitive than their European counterparts. With more gigafactories opening up in Europe, the UK will be able to diversify its battery and EV imports, but will remain dependent on a limited number of producers who, in turn, will remain reliant on Chinese components and minerals (see Table 5).</p> +<p>Historical lessons about attrition in armoured warfare must also be relearned. Due to high maintenance requirements, crews may need to be rotated to prevent exhaustion and maintain a tempo of operations, and units may need to increase headcounts to ensure that some rotation is feasible. Heavy armoured forces need to get used to recovering and repairing damaged vehicles and replacing crew casualties as an inherent part of their operations. This also needs to be done in as dispersed a manner as possible in order to contend with an increasingly transparent battlefield and the threat of precision fires. It will be critical to maintain both recovery and repair units, as well as specialists, so that heavy armour can be quickly returned to its units after repair, with a particular emphasis on spare parts availability in the long term to ensure that vehicle losses do not translate into high rates of attrition.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2SCmO3K.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 5: China’s Involvement in the Supply Chain for Lithium-Ion Batteries.</strong> Notes: 1. Italics indicate estimated share of Chinese production once overseas projects are included. 2. C* = natural graphite. 3. C** = high-quality spherical graphite. 4. metals in brackets are likely to be used in the future. Sources: <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/publications/mineral-commodity-summaries-2023">US Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023”, 31 January 2023</a>; IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”; Lusty et al., “UK Criticality Assessment of Technology Critical Minerals and Metals”; Bobba et al., “Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU: A Foresight Study”; <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/the-state-of-clean-technology-manufacturing">IEA, “The State of Clean Technology Manufacturing”, May 2023</a>; <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023">IEA, “Energy Technology Perspectives 2023”</a>; Heejin Kim and Gabrielle Coppola, “Chinese Firms are Seeking Korean Partners to Skirt US EV Rules”, Bloomberg, 30 July 2023.</em></p> +<p>Crew expertise in maintenance (both preventative and curative) is essential to reduce the burden on forward repair facilities run by dedicated mechanical engineers, and will also reduce the facilities’ detectable signature, offering them greater protection.</p> -<p><strong>Wind Power Plants</strong></p> +<p>All of these measures will need to go hand-in-hand with investments in track miles and training time: the traditional qualitative superiority of the human element can make the difference between a viable and non-viable armoured capability.</p> -<p>Large, modern wind turbines place significant demands on material supply to maximise their energy output and strength. The respective key components are permanent magnets for the generators and steel for the tower, nacelle and other parts of the turbine. Permanent magnets are also essential components of the traction motors in EVs. The most commonly used form of permanent magnet in wind turbines is the NdFeB magnet (neodymium iron boron), whose production requires neodymium, along with other rare earth metals such as dysprosium and praseodymium. China extracts around 70% of the world’s rare earth metal ores (see Table 6). Moreover, China is responsible for around 90% of the global output of rare earth metals through its longstanding dominance of rare earth ore processing and refining. China has taken advantage of this strength to build manufacturing capacity that now provides nearly 90% of the world’s supply of NdFeB magnets.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Most of the other critical minerals shown in Table 6 are additives to steel (manganese, chromium, molybdenum, nickel, niobium) or inputs to other turbine components. As is the case in battery materials, China has a strong mineral processing industry that allows it to import ores to produce refined metals. This has given the country a dominant position in the supply of refined manganese and relatively strong positions in aluminium, copper and molybdenum.</p> +<p><strong>Nick Reynolds</strong> is the Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. His research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation.</p>Nick ReynoldsAdaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility.Comparing Conflicts In Gaza2023-12-12T12:00:00+08:002023-12-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/comparing-conflicts-in-gaza<p><em>With the outcome of the present confrontation between Israel and its opponents in Gaza remaining uncertain, a comparison with previous rounds of fighting may provide some insight into how events could develop.</em></p> -<p>These foundations in the production of permanent magnets and in metallurgical industries have given China the basis for achieving a large share of global production of key components such as generators, gearboxes, blades and nacelles.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>In 2022, the UK had over 14 GW of offshore wind. Half of the UK’s renewable energy comes from wind, and by 2030, offshore wind will supply a third of the country’s electricity. In its 2022 Energy Security Strategy, the government scaled up its plans for wind to reach 50 GW by 2030, compared to a 40 GW target previously, including up to 5 GW of innovative floating wind. RenewableUK, the country’s renewable trade body, estimates that the pipeline of projects either under construction or highly likely to start construction is on track to exceed this 50 GW target.</p> +<p>Following the traumatic attack it experienced on 7 October 2023, Israel completely changed its strategy for dealing with Hamas from containing and deterring the group to trying to destroy it. There are several scenarios for what might happen next. To determine how the present war is most likely to develop, it is essential to examine previous confrontations in the Gaza Strip.</p> -<p>The UK hosts plants that manufacture wind turbine blades and towers, but it imports most of the other components. While some of these components can be manufactured in Europe, most of the generators will rely on permanent magnets from China, and even manufacturers of permanent magnets outside China may still be reliant on rare earth metals supplied by China. To address this supply risk, manufacturers are finding ways to reduce or change the mix of rare earth metals in NdFeB magnets, and research is underway to develop entirely new technologies.</p> +<p>Since it took over in Gaza in 2007, Hamas and other groups – mostly the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) – have engaged in a series of confrontations with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the two most significant of which were in 2008–2009 and in the summer of 2014. Other rounds of fighting were much smaller, such as those that occurred in November 2012, May 2021 and August 2022. Understanding the complexity and risks of the ongoing fighting in the Gaza Strip requires looking into the similarities and differences between previous confrontations and the current war.</p> -<p>However, the likelihood that these developments will substantially reduce the need for rare earth metals or dramatically change China’s centrality in the near term – even as its share of these components falls – is low. This is because of the scale and cost competitiveness of the Chinese industry compared to competitors, and the concentration of the refining of most other rare earths and metals in China.</p> +<h3 id="victory-in-sight">Victory in Sight?</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CMKGas0.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 6: China’s Involvement in the Supply Chain for Wind Turbines.</strong> Note: Italics indicate estimated share of Chinese production once overseas projects are included. Sources: US Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023”; IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”; Lusty et al., “UK Criticality Assessment of Technology Critical Minerals and Metals”; Bobba et al., “Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU: A Foresight Study”; IEA, “The State of Clean Technology Manufacturing”; IEA, “Energy Technology Perspectives 2023”.</em></p> +<p>Israel fought several high-intensity wars with Arab states between 1948 and 1982. Since 1982, the IDF has confronted only Arab non-state actors (NSAs). In Lebanon, it fought Hizbullah in the 1980s and 1990s, and again in a major war in 2006. Since then, the IDF has confronted Hamas and other smaller Palestinian groups like the PIJ in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The main confrontations have taken place in Gaza, all of them ending in a tie – much to Israel’s frustration. Although Hamas and the PIJ are elusive, flexible and capable of putting up a tough fight, the IDF is still much stronger.</p> -<p><strong>Solar PV Modules</strong></p> +<p>During all of the previous confrontations, Israel hesitated on whether to try to destroy its foes due to various constraints and the negative implications of an all-out war in the Gaza Strip. Since destroying NSAs like Hamas is a tall order, Israel’s preferred method for containment and deterrence until now has been based on a strategy called ‘mowing the grass’. This meant that from time-to-time Israel had to degrade the military capabilities of its foes in the Gaza Strip by conducting a short and limited campaign.</p> -<p>The majority of PV cells are manufactured from silicon, generally in polycrystalline form. Polycrystalline silicon cells also require germanium and borates. China’s key strength lies in the production of polycrystalline silicon (see Table 7). The country’s domestic manufacturing capacity has grown in recent years, allowing China’s share of global output of polycrystalline silicon to reach 89% in 2022 and the quantity of imports to decline. On this basis, China has achieved almost total dominance (around 95%) in the supply of silicon wafers and a very strong position (around 85%) in the supply for silicon cells. It also makes more than 70% of the world’s solar PV modules.</p> +<p>The last confrontation before the current one, that of August 2022, was in a way different from other clashes in the Gaza Strip because Israel considered its outcome to be a victory. Yet in reality, it was a minimal success. On that occasion Israel confronted only the PIJ, which paid a price but still survived. Nevertheless, it seems that the results of that campaign boosted Israel’s confidence and, together with other steps it took to upgrade its defences around the Gaza Strip, convinced Israel that it was ready to deal with any hostilities that might break out on the border. Israel also assumed that Hamas would not seek war. On 7 October 2023, Israel paid dearly for its blunders.</p> -<p>China is also a dominant supplier of germanium, a by-product of zinc ore processing, and has a strong position in the production of metals such as copper, aluminium, lead and tin that are necessary components of solar PV panels.</p> +<p>Following the attack of 7 October, Israel concluded that it must revise its national security strategy. Such a highly important process should be carried out in a careful manner by methodically examining all the options. Yet Israel decided to go immediately on the attack, launching massive aerial bombardments followed by a large-scale land offensive. This made sense politically given that Israel received sympathy and, more importantly, support for its actions from the US, the UK and other Western powers. Yet it might lose some or even most of this support as the war progresses due to heavy casualties among the Palestinian population and the vast scale of destruction in the Gaza Strip.</p> -<p>Other technologies in this sphere include cadmium telluride (CdTe) and copper indium gallium selenide (CIGS) cells. Table 7 shows that China has a moderately strong position in the production of tellurium, indium, cadmium and molybdenum, as well as a dominant position in gallium. All of these metals are produced as by-products of other processes, and their availability depends in part on the production of ores containing other minerals and on the processing of these ores to recover the by-products. Future technological options for solar PV include gallium arsenide and amorphous silicon cells.</p> +<p>In each of the former rounds of fighting, Israel stuck to its policy of pursuing a limited campaign due to the constraints and negative ramifications of a war in the Gaza Strip. Now, Israel has drastically changed its policy, even though the constraints remain and some of them have even become more acute. Israel does not want to govern the Gaza Strip, but it cannot ignore the poor conditions there. In previous confrontations, it avoided toppling Hamas’s rule, leaving it to continue running the Gaza Strip. Hamas has, of course, done an awful job; instead of investing in improving Gazans’ standard of living, it has focused on preparing to confront Israel. This has meant that infrastructure and services for the Palestinian population have sharply deteriorated in recent years, up to a point where the Gaza Strip is on the verge of collapse.</p> -<p>The UK lacks manufacturing at scale of polycrystalline silicon, silicon wafers and cells, and cells based on other technologies. Facilities for such production are thin on the ground: Power Roll has opened a plant in Durham to manufacture flexible solar film using perovskite technology, and while Oxford PV has developed perovskite-on-silicon cell technology, its factory is in Germany and the company has stated that it is reluctant to build the next factory in the UK due to the lack of incentives. A number of companies in the UK manufacture solar PV modules from imported cells, such as UKSOL, UK Solar Power, Sharp and GB Sol, but imports of modules from China remain significant. For example, up to 40% of UK solar farms were built with Chinese modules in 2021. The supply chains for these modules allegedly involve forced labour in Xinjiang, where the production of polysilicon is concentrated, meaning that companies sourcing panels already face an ethical, reputational and compliance challenge.</p> +<p>As long as Hamas has been in charge there, this has mostly remained its problem, but now that the IDF has seized a large part of the Gaza Strip, it has also become Israel’s concern. The war, with all its destruction, will of course make the dire situation in Gaza much worse. Israel wants to take ‘overall security responsibility’ in the Gaza Strip, while hoping that others will handle civilian affairs there. It would ideally like another government to do this, but no state – not even any of Israel’s Arab neighbours – is willing to deal with the giant mess in the Gaza Strip. The most reasonable choice seems to be the Palestinian Authority (PA); yet in previous confrontations, Israel assumed that the PA would not be up to the task if it were to bring down Hamas’s regime. There is now even less chance of this because in recent years the PA has become weaker, making it less likely that it could go back to controlling the Gaza Strip.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WWknnnH.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 7: China’s Involvement in the Supply Chain for Solar PV.</strong> Notes: 1. Metals in brackets are those needed for CdTe and CIGS cells. 2. Italics indicate estimated share of Chinese production once overseas projects are included. Sources: US Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023”; IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”; Lusty et al., “UK Criticality Assessment of Technology Critical Minerals and Metals”; Bobba et al., “Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU: A Foresight Study”; IEA, “The State of Clean Technology Manufacturing”; IEA, “Energy Technology Perspectives 2023”.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Thousands of young men in the Gaza Strip who will struggle to find a job in the present circumstances may agree to fight for Hamas for lack of a better choice</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Electricity Grids</strong></p> +<p>Another factor that has worsened in the last year is Israel’s internal stability, following a wave of protests against the government. While these have subsided since the war broke out, they could well erupt again later on. The current war in the Gaza Strip may also contribute to domestic instability, depending on its outcome – and a crisis inside Israel could make it harder to solve the huge problems in the Gaza Strip.</p> -<p>The principal metals required for transmission lines and transformers are copper, aluminium, zinc and cadmium, along with iron. None of these metals were considered critical for the UK by the British Geological Survey, although China accounts for between 40% and 60% of some of these metals, and aluminium is considered critical by the EU and the US. The supply of critical minerals such as gallium and germanium for microchips – or the supply of microchips themselves – could increase in significance if China becomes a dominant global supplier.</p> +<p>Since Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007, the group has had several confrontations with Israel. The two main ones were in the winter of 2008–2009, lasting 22 days, and in the summer of 2014, lasting for 50 days. Other campaigns included the one in May 2021, which went on for 12 days, and the one in August 2022, which lasted only three days. The current war might go on for several months. Israel has to be ready for this, on several levels.</p> -<p>Rather than raw materials, the main China-related vulnerability for UK electricity grids may be cyber security (not considered in detail in this paper). The IEA estimates that by 2025 there will be 30–40 billion devices linked to electricity grids across the world, and that any of these could be used to attack the grid. This is a major security challenge, and will require governments and companies to act in concert to ensure the resilience of power systems – a process that cannot be discussed in detail here. Instead, the broader responses from government and industry to China’s dominance in the sphere of raw materials are considered.</p> +<p>Hamas’s leaders are ‘high on Israel’s target list’. On previous occasions, such as in 2004 and 2012, Israel has assassinated some of Hamas’s top leaders – yet the group not only survived those blows, but got stronger. Therefore, decapitating Hamas’s leadership now is unlikely to annihilate the group. It could even be counterproductive, because the new leaders might be more capable of fighting Israel.</p> -<h4 id="government-and-corporate-responses">Government and Corporate Responses</h4> +<p>The IDF is also killing Hamas’s combatants, including senior figures like brigade and battalion commanders, in an effort to disrupt the group’s command and control. In the last major confrontation in the Gaza Strip in 2014, Hamas lost up to 1,000 combatants. During the present war it is absorbing many more casualties, but it could yet obtain new recruits. Iran will give Hamas money for this purpose, and thousands of young men in the Gaza Strip who will struggle to find a job in the present circumstances may agree to fight for Hamas for lack of a better choice. Others will doubtless join Hamas to avenge family members or friends lost during the war.</p> -<p>A combination of deteriorating relations with China and rising demand for the minerals that are critical to the low-carbon transition has led governments and companies from industrialised countries to take steps to reduce their reliance on China for these minerals. Government actions include imposing import restrictions, incentivising domestic investment and production, stockpiling, and building partnerships with other countries. An additional priority is R&amp;D to develop alternatives to the currently used minerals so as to enhance the efficiency of their use and expand recycling.</p> +<h3 id="military-factors">Military Factors</h3> -<p>The US government has been among the most active in seeking to decouple from China in this regard, including through the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which supports investment and guides procurement along the full length of the supply chain. Resource-rich Australia and Canada are also supporting investment in mining and processing, while in 2023 the EU published its draft Critical Raw Materials Act, which includes 2030 targets for mineral extraction, processing and recycling, as well as limiting over-dependence on a single third country. At the same time, the EU published a draft of the Net-Zero Industry Act, which aims to scale up the manufacturing of new energy technologies in Europe.</p> +<p>Several factors made past confrontations easier for Israel, some of which are also relevant in the present conflict. The IDF has clear superiority over its foes in the Gaza Strip, enjoying major advantages in terms of firepower, manpower and technology. Yet it still has a tough task if it wishes to defeat Hamas, let alone destroy the group. This will be difficult because in previous confrontations in the Gaza Strip, the IDF was often able to exploit an element of surprise. The best-known example was at the start of the confrontation in December 2008, when the IDF launched an air raid that inflicted heavy casualties on Hamas. By contrast, on 7 October 2023, the IDF was taken completely by surprise, putting it in a state of shock and hindering its response. Although it subsequently recovered, its counterattack was obviously expected by Hamas, which was able to prepare accordingly. In this sense, the IDF will need to wait for a better opportunity if it wants to catch Hamas off-guard.</p> -<p>Realising that international cooperation was needed, the US led the establishment of the Minerals Security Partnership in June 2022 to “bolster critical mineral supply chains essential for the clean energy transition”. The first meeting in September 2022 was attended by official partners Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Sweden, the UK, the US and the EU. Mineral-rich countries such as Argentina, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia also attended.</p> +<p>In previous confrontations, the IDF was able to concentrate its efforts, such as deploying its best units on one front – that is, in the Gaza Strip. Now, however, the IDF has to secure its northern border with Lebanon and deal with clashes in the West Bank, even if the level of friction on those fronts is quite low. As long as there is no escalation in Lebanon, the IDF can focus its attention on the Gaza Strip.</p> -<p>In addition to the construction of new mines and processing plants outside China, two trends in particular may help reduce dependence on China. The first is reducing or obviating the need for critical minerals in key technologies. Such measures would include the development of sodium-ion batteries for EVs and permanent magnets free of REEs, as well as increasing the efficiency of use and recycling of the materials. However, the time needed to scale up these innovations is uncertain, and China itself may still play a leading role in these technologies. The second trend involves the increasing level of support being given to promote the domestic production of renewable energy equipment and EVs in the US and Europe, which will bolster the growing capacity to process and refine metal ores.</p> +<p>Hamas and the PIJ have fired more than 9,000 rockets and missiles since the start of the current war. In previous confrontations they have fired fewer, but on this occasion the rockets and missiles are not the main threat to Israel. While they can still cause harm, almost all the Israeli losses from the present conflict resulted from the ground invasion into Israel on 7 October. The firing of missiles and rockets is mostly an act of defiance and terror, forcing Israeli civilians to run for cover. Many in Israel do not have proper shelters, although they do receive an alert – a process that has improved over the years. Israel’s famous air defence system, the Iron Dome, has once again proved to be very effective. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) is trying to suppress the firing of rockets as it has done in previous rounds of fighting, with ground forces now also participating in this task.</p> -<p>Taken together, these moves mark a potential turning point in international policies to address Chinese dominance in the mining and processing of critical minerals. However, the impact of these measures is likely to be modest over the period to 2035, given the time needed to commission new mines and processing plants and to scale up the use of new technological solutions, not least due to environmental and social concerns, as well as the energy and water requirements of these processes. In light of this, it is important to consider how China could leverage its dominance in these critical supply chains, and what the implications of such leverage could be.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Trying to defeat Hamas by assassinating its leadership and killing as many of its combatants as possible might not work</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="iv-what-threat-does-chinas-dominance-pose-to-the-uk">IV. What Threat Does China’s Dominance Pose to the UK?</h3> +<p>During the confrontation in 2008–2009, the IDF cut the Gaza Strip in half. It has done the same in the current war, but the present Israeli operation has reached deeper inside the Strip, exposing the IDF’s lines of communication to ambushes. Still, it has taken this risk as part of a strategy to encircle and isolate Hamas’s positions. This large-scale manoeuvre has had an impact on Hamas and its performance. The group might lose control of the Gaza Strip, although it may yet avoid collapse.</p> -<p>This chapter sets out a preliminary analysis of the risks posed to the UK by China’s domination of new energy supply chains. It assesses the extent to which the UK is at risk of being singled out as a target, whether it is more vulnerable to being targeted as part of a broader regional- or alliance-level bloc, and the extent to which it is vulnerable to disruptions to the global market. It ends with a discussion of other risks relating to international relations and defence that the UK should consider in parallel with the China-related risks.</p> +<p>The IDF avoided a major land offensive in previous rounds of fighting because of the fear of losses. Israel as a country is very sensitive to casualties, yet following the horrible events of 7 October, it is more willing to pay the price. The IDF is also striving to avoid harming the Arab population for moral and political reasons. In the current war, the fighting is more large-scale and intense, so unfortunately there is more collateral damage.</p> -<p>Global energy supply chains are important tools for soft power and greyzone contestation. China’s role in new energy supply chains is already an important factor in great power politics – and the importance of this influence will only increase. The US’s Inflation Reduction Act denies subsidies to EV producers that are dependent on Chinese materials on grounds of security, and not for diversification or industrial reasons, as discussed earlier. Furthermore, supply-chain organisation, both in terms of the location of different activities and in terms of market relationships, may be a significant source of tension and instability. Dependence on digital technologies for the operation of some new energy technologies also raises questions about their use in defence and by the diplomatic and security services.</p> +<p>The IDF recently called up over 350,000 reserves, mostly from the ground forces. This is Much more than in former confrontations, and serves to indicate how this war is different. Many of Israel’s reserves have not trained much if at all in recent years. The IDF is trying to fix this now by conducting exercises, but returning soldiers to top form takes time. There are also difficulties in providing enough equipment, such as body armour, for so many troops. This is hardly a surprise because before the war the IDF had based its level of build-up on recent confrontations in the Gaza Strip, assuming there would be more of the same. The strategy was to depend on the IAF and intelligence rather than on massed ground units. According to this concept, budgets were allocated to other areas at the expense of providing training, equipment and so on to a large part of the ground forces.</p> -<p>The risks posed by China’s role in the supply chain must be understood alongside other international developments in the energy industry, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and industrial strategy in the US and the EU. This chapter will offer some initial analysis before recommending useful avenues for further research, and preliminary observations on how the UK might consider its security posture with regard to China and net zero.</p> +<p>Another problem for the IDF is that the last time it fought an urban conflict in the Gaza Strip was in 2014. Since then, the IDF has conducted several operations in Gaza but without using ground forces, let alone penetrating the Strip by land. This lack of combat experience might have affected current operations, including their cost to the IDF. Nevertheless, the motivation of Israeli troops is high because they are convinced this war was forced on Israel and they want to make sure Hamas will not be able to conduct an attack like that of 7 October ever again.</p> -<p>At the outset, it should be noted that the character of the risk from net zero supply chains is fundamentally different from that of fossil fuel supply chains. Disruption to fossil fuel supply chains has immediate and widespread consequences which can be catastrophic for society, the economy and defence. Net zero systems are not primarily based on fuel supply, but most commonly on electricity infrastructure. This makes them by default more resilient to supply chain disruption. Delays and temporary price escalation in new energy supply chains would not have an immediate appreciable impact on energy production or consumption in the UK. That said, prolonged disruption would negatively impact the UK’s ability to meet its net zero targets and its climate action, and could impact energy security in a situation where electricity demand was increasing rapidly and equipment for generation or grid storage could not be sourced. Put simply, the short-term risk to physical energy supply in the UK from China is much less than from fossil fuel markets.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<h4 id="could-the-uk-be-individually-targeted">Could the UK be Individually Targeted?</h4> +<p>Since 2008, Israel has engaged in several rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip with Hamas and the PIJ. Analysing these previous confrontations is crucial to understanding the current war. Almost all of the clashes that occurred from 2008 to 2022 ended in a tie, and some in Israel even saw them as a failure. Israel considered the last confrontation it had there, in August 2022, to be a success, which may have boosted its confidence too much. Now, following the terrible events of 7 October, Israel has drastically changed its strategy from containment to annihilating Hamas, but this is a tall order. The current war is costlier and longer than any previous confrontations. Trying to defeat Hamas by assassinating its leadership and killing as many of its combatants as possible might not work. Israel has to have realistic goals to begin with. It can inflict on Hamas the biggest blow it has ever suffered and topple its rule of the Gaza Strip. Yet, as in previous confrontations, Hamas as a movement might manage to hold on.</p> -<p>In recent years, China has demonstrated a willingness to leverage the export of critical materials and technologies to achieve domestic and international political objectives, and as a response to sanctions. In 2010, as part of the government’s efforts to clamp down on illegal mining and trade of REEs within China, and coinciding with a fishing dispute with Japan, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce increased the tax imposed on exports of rare earth ores, oxides and compounds, introduced an export tax on end products, and tightened production quotas. These strategies resulted in a reduction of the share of production being exported, from 90% in 2000 to 20% by 2012. While exports to Japan fell, flows to other countries – including Australia and the UK – also declined. The imposition of these export restrictions in 2010 has become the poster child for concerns about China weaponising its dominance in critical materials.</p> +<p>The IDF failed on 7 October 2023 in terms of its intelligence and readiness. Yet it has managed to recover and enjoys similar advantages to previous rounds of fighting, such as superiority in both firepower and technology. There is also high motivation among its troops, and the Iron Dome is proving itself once again. For the time being, the IDF can concentrate on one front, as in previous confrontations, although this might change. Unlike in the confrontation of 2008, however, the IDF does not enjoy the element of surprise. Other aspects unique to this confrontation include the mass mobilisation of reserves, with some troops not being well trained or equipped. A lack of combat experience in urban warfare is another challenge for the IDF, having relied on the IAF in former confrontations.</p> -<p>More recently, China announced export controls on gallium and germanium in response to US, Japanese and Dutch export controls on semiconductor chips. China is the world’s top supplier of these two metals, which are used to make semiconductors, solar panels and fibre optics. In July 2023, citing national security concerns, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that all exporters of these products must apply for export licences for dual-use items and technologies starting on 1 August 2023. Obtaining the licences can take up to two months, and it is unclear how many will ultimately be issued. The sharp limitation of such export licences by Beijing would give additional impetus to diversification efforts in importing countries, but could also give rise to a wave of illegal production and exports from China, as was the case with rare earths in the past. The timing of the announcement suggests that the ban is a political signal more than an attempt at economic coercion, but the line between the two is dangerously blurred. The announcement of the export restrictions led to higher prices and a rush to stockpile but also, as was the case in 2010, to a diversification of supplies and processing away from China.</p> +<p>Overall, there is some similarity between the current war and previous confrontations, but there are also major differences. Israel must be aware of these in order to avoid crucial mistakes as it becomes more and more committed to this showdown.</p> -<p>Although sanctions and export bans could weaken China’s position in the long term, by accelerating this diversification, China has nonetheless used these tools in response to actions that it perceives as aggressive. China is therefore only likely to manipulate new energy supply chains against the UK in the face of perceived aggression from the UK against Beijing. Indeed, there is currently no indication that China is more likely to use new energy supply chains than any other supply chain in this way, when it can leverage instead either high levels of concentration or high levels of foreign-owned manufacturing in China. In the case of gallium and germanium, restrictions were carefully calibrated in response to restrictions on the sale of defence-related semiconductor chips to China, where gallium and germanium are important inputs. Consequently, other materials with dual military and energy-technology uses appear most likely to be caught in the crossfire of any future trade restrictions. China could constrain parts of net zero supply chains in response to UK policies perceived as hostile to China, but at this juncture, net zero supplies appear unlikely to be the subject of export controls other than in reciprocation.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The exposure of the UK to export controls varies considerably depending on the commodity or product, and is determined more by UK demand than by Chinese dominance. Only limited data is publicly available for detailed trade between the UK and China: the UK does not publish any figures, and data from China is limited. What data is available shows that in areas that are more critical for net zero the UK is not necessarily heavily dependent on direct supply from China: for example, China’s exports of copper to the UK were worth only $145 million in 2022 and nickel exports only $11 million. Aluminium trade was much more extensive, being worth $2 billion. Net zero technologies make up only a small proportion of UK demand for aluminium, but the metal has wider importance for net zero as a lightweight alternative to steel used to improve efficiency, particular for automotives and buildings.</p> +<p><strong>Ehud Eilam</strong> has been dealing with and studying Israel’s national security for the last 35 years. He served in the Israeli military and later worked as a researcher for the Israeli Ministry of Defense.</p>Ehud EilamWith the outcome of the present confrontation between Israel and its opponents in Gaza remaining uncertain, a comparison with previous rounds of fighting may provide some insight into how events could develop.The Gulf And Gaza2023-12-11T12:00:00+08:002023-12-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-gulf-and-gaza<p><em>As Israel’s war in Gaza rages on, the Gulf Arab states continue to try to strike a balance between working to contain and end the violence and maintaining momentum for their respective national projects.</em></p> -<p>The imposition of export controls by China would ultimately limit Beijing’s dominance over time and affect its reputation as a reliable supplier, just as infrastructure bottlenecks have already expedited trading partners’ efforts to diversify supply chains (as seen during the Covid-19 pandemic). Additional restrictions would only accelerate these trends. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has already prompted a rethink by governments and international companies that are dependent on China, with many taking action to diversify. This shift emanates from rising tensions between the US and China and from concerns about decoupling, as well as worries about a military conflict between China and the US (and any potential sanctions that could ensue).</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Manufacturers are already looking to diversify production to other low-cost countries – a move also incentivised by rising wage and other input costs in China – at the same time as flagship programmes such as the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Net-Zero Industry Act provide new incentives. This reinforces the well-established principle that countries that lose their reputation as reliable suppliers can incur serious economic penalties in the long run. For now, China is unlikely to engage in direct sanctions against the UK, but should it seek to retaliate against UK policies (or in the event of a broader conflict with the UK or the West), China’s control over net zero supply chains offers it considerable leverage over all consumers, including the UK. The short-term impact would be more limited than disruption to the supply of fossil fuels, but would still put pressure on the UK economy and its ability to meet its net zero targets. Using economic coercion would also impact Chinese companies, and the Chinese economy would incur large costs too, especially given the growing importance of new energy exports compared with other exporting sectors.</p> +<p>On 5 December, Qatar hosted the annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the regional grouping that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Inevitably, Israel’s ongoing war against Hamas in Gaza topped the agenda of the discussions between Gulf leaders, which were also attended by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.</p> -<p>From the UK perspective, efforts to diversify production and supplies should at least partially mitigate China’s ability to individually target the UK in many areas over the medium term. Moreover, UK demand for materials is small by global standards, and will remain so. This means that the development of relatively limited international supply chains, independent of China, would likely be sufficient to rebalance the global market should export controls specifically target the UK. Such a scenario would see production that is not under China’s control redirected to the UK, with China-influenced supply chains redirected to fill the gap, albeit at a cost.</p> +<p>The message from the summit was straightforward and unsurprising. The six Gulf monarchies called for “an immediate cessation of hostilities and Israeli military operations”, demanded “the release of civilian hostages and detainees”, and backed efforts to “revive the peace process in the Middle East” and “the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital” .</p> -<p>Currently, the UK’s limited manufacturing capacity shields it from the impact of any potential cut-off by China: taking wind energy as an example, China’s dominance in permanent magnets is unlikely to be an effective sanction, as the UK does not directly import magnets but instead imports generators using those magnets from multinational companies in third countries. However, the threat should not be underestimated, particularly as the UK aspires to increase its manufacture of net zero equipment. The further the UK moves up the supply chain, the closer it moves to direct dependence on Chinese suppliers. But as domestic industrialisation will take time, new supply chains are likely to develop in tandem, particularly given strong government support for alternative supply chains within the EU and the US. Indeed, the UK will require more localisation of supply chains in order for its automotive production to qualify for tariff-free trade with Europe.</p> +<p>Besides the various agreements to adopt joint positions and work together – in areas going far beyond the war in Gaza, from efforts to remove trade barriers and collaborate on tourism, to shared commitments to investing in oil and gas as well as renewable energy – recorded in the lengthy 122-article final statement, the summit ultimately appeared to be intended to signal one thing above all: Gulf unity.</p> -<p>While China’s ability to coerce the UK is therefore limited, any supply shortages (due to retaliatory measures, blockades or export controls imposed by China for a variety of reasons) will likely impact three main categories of new energy industries – the automotive sector, electricity generators, and UK companies with manufacturing operations in China.</p> +<h3 id="pragmatic-gulf-unity">Pragmatic Gulf Unity</h3> -<p>In the automotive sector, the UK government is likely to aim to maintain existing production capacity by converting it to EVs. China’s dominance in battery minerals as well as anodes, cathodes, electrolytes and lithium-ion packs, coupled with the apparent requirement for battery production for automotive manufacturers to be located in the UK, suggests that UK automotive companies will be directly dependent on Chinese suppliers. This would increase the overall vulnerability to restrictions targeting the UK.</p> +<p>Indeed, with the Middle East in the midst of a crisis defined by the long-standing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, it is perhaps easy to forget that until just three years ago, a deep fracture between the Gulf Arab states – specifically between Qatar (backed by Turkey) on one side, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other – was one of the defining features of regional instability. Today, things are different. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have become particularly close over the past year or two. Differences and intra-Gulf competition still persist, perhaps especially between Saudi Arabia and the UAE these days, but the overall mood is one of pragmatic alignment – certainly vis-à-vis the war in Gaza.</p> -<p>As discussed above, China is actively investing in manufacturing capacity in Europe. In situations such as mineral shortages, this could make the European manufacturing base more resilient, as Chinese companies might maintain supply to their own operations, potentially at the expense of other customers. However, during a major confrontation, Chinese-owned automotive capacity – assuming it would cease to operate – could prove a liability, because of the potential impact of interrupting production.</p> +<p>Saudi Arabia has clearly assumed the mantle of regional leadership. It hosted an extraordinary Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh in November, notably with the attendance of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi; and Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has led a group of his counterparts from across the region on an international tour with stops in Beijing, Moscow and London, among others. Qatar has led mediation efforts with Hamas to facilitate the release of hostages, which resulted, for example, in the seven-day truce at the end of November. The UAE – which has the closest ties with Israel of all Gulf states – has remained quieter thus far, but it appears poised to play a key role whenever there is eventually a more permanent ceasefire in Gaza, precisely because it is probably the Arab country Israel trusts the most.</p> -<p>The second group of entities that might be vulnerable to export controls targeting the UK consists of large-scale electricity generation project developers, where original equipment manufacturer (OEM) warranties are typically required to finance the purchase of key equipment, and where operations and maintenance may be dependent on the OEM for supply of spare parts and technical support.</p> +<p>Crucially, Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi have thus far worked together and vocally endorsed each other’s efforts. They have looked to leverage their different relationships with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as across the region, rather than to compete with one another. The eventual question of helping to establish and strengthen a future Palestinian leadership could well bring intra-Gulf competition back to the fore, but for the moment at least, the three monarchies are clearly aligned in their view of the conflict.</p> -<p>With many power plants relying on spare parts from China in the event of a breakdown, there may be some risk to their ongoing operation should access to spare parts and OEM expertise be restricted for an extended period of time. A more detailed assessment of exposure and scale may be beneficial in this case to determine whether risk is limited to power plant owners and operators, or whether it might threaten the security of electricity supply – but this assessment is not attempted here.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are in very similar positions and share very similar interests with regard to the current crisis</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The third group vulnerable to sanction is made up of UK companies that have manufacturing operations in China. China’s unique industrial ecosystem means that many UK technology companies manufacture equipment in the country, covering everything from smart meters to EVs and EV chargers. These companies are perhaps the most susceptible to intervention by the Chinese government, since small companies (such as these typically are) can be targeted by domestic legislation which, without risking significant international escalation, still sends a strong political message to Western governments, while big companies are able to pressure home governments to compromise in order to protect their businesses.</p> +<p>All three were clearly horrified by Hamas’s 7 October attack. Saudi Arabia and especially the UAE have long been critical of, and even hostile towards, Hamas. Qatar has a different relationship with the group, hosting its political office in Doha in coordination with the US and the Israeli government, but it clearly also did not support the attack. However, what Israel has done since 7 October has, form the perspective of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha – and the wider region, for that matter – gone far beyond exercising a legitimate right to self-defence. In their view, Israel’s operation to go after Hamas has become a brutal all-out assault on the Palestinian people. The attempt by US President Joe Biden to equate Russia and Hamas as evil aggressors and Israel and Ukraine as victims worthy of support does not resonate in the Gulf (or indeed anywhere in the Arab world). Rather, if there is any relation between the wars in Ukraine and Gaza from the Arab perspective, it is between Ukrainian civilians and the Palestinian people.</p> -<p>Looking beyond these three vulnerable groups, it is likely that Brexit has reduced the potential cost to China of taking action specifically against the UK (as opposed to against Europe more broadly), and this might increase the likelihood of symbolic action being taken against the UK alone in order to send a message to the wider European community. Targeting an individual member of the EU with export control measures would mean targeting the entire bloc, with potentially significant repercussions for China. The UK, by contrast, might be individually targeted, causing relatively little short-term economic damage to Chinese companies while still making a strong political statement.</p> +<h3 id="the-ongoing-quest-for-stability">The Ongoing Quest for Stability</h3> -<p>For now, the threat of export controls targeting the UK alone appears to be limited. This is because direct UK consumption of China-dominated materials is very limited, due to the lack of manufacturing of net zero technologies in the UK and because alternative sources of supply will emerge over the medium term sufficient to meet UK demand. However, because of the likely scale of future UK demand, particularly as battery production for EVs grows ahead of 2030, more government planning may be advisable to ensure that alternative supply chains are being developed, in the UK and globally, at sufficient scale to keep up with demand. Moreover, protectionist penalties incorporated into industrial legislation in the US and the EU may make supply chains less fungible, and could limit the extent to which the UK can benefit from new supply chains.</p> +<p>Ultimately, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are in very similar positions and share very similar interests with regard to the current crisis. While the war is taking up a lot of their bandwidth, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha are united in their determination to maintain the overall strategic course they were on before 7 October. All three are pursuing highly ambitious domestic agendas.</p> -<h4 id="regional-vulnerability">Regional Vulnerability</h4> +<p>In Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 – a root-and-branch transformation of the Kingdom – is the all-important North Star for all decision-making, including on foreign policy. The UAE wants to consolidate its position as the most dynamic regional power and a hub for global affairs; its hosting of the ongoing UN Climate Change Conference COP28 is illustrative of this. Qatar, meanwhile, is looking to build on the success of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, including by expanding its gas production capacity to solidify its status as the world’s most important exporter of liquified natural gas.</p> -<p>The analysis above suggests that, if the UK alone were to be targeted by Chinese export controls, the impact under current conditions might be limited by low demand for intermediate products and diverse markets for final goods; and that such action taken in the future would also be limited in impact due to the emergence, over time, of alternative supply chains. This should insulate UK foreign policy somewhat from possible Chinese coercion using new energy supply chains.</p> +<p>Critical to all of these ambitions is the maintenance of a modicum of stability in the wider region. In many ways, the war in Gaza erupted just as Gulf leaders felt like their regional strategy to de-escalate and reduce tensions wherever possible was working. Not only had they buried the hatchet of their intra-Gulf dispute, but they had also managed to steer their relations with Iran into calmer waters. In fact, in the effort to contain the war at least geographically, the new channel of communication between Riyadh and Tehran has undoubtedly been crucially important.</p> -<p>However, any confrontation with China over an issue such as the sovereignty of Taiwan would mean the UK facing China as part of a bloc, which could result in retaliatory measures from Beijing that targeted groups of countries. As a member of NATO, Five Eyes, and a group of likeminded nations opposed to Beijing’s aggressive expansionism in China’s immediate neighbourhood, the UK is exposed to geopolitical escalation involving sanctions and counter-sanctions against its allies. The 2022 energy crisis showed the extent to which regional disruption magnifies risks in concentrated markets, since global markets areunable to readjust to meet demand without generating very high prices. It also highlighted the interconnected nature of markets: even though the UK does not import gas directly from Russia, it was not insulated from higher gas prices.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar remain worried about the violence in Gaza stoking regional instability, even if the spectre of a wider regional war can be kept at bay. While they are confident that they can manage popular anger about Israel’s conduct in Gaza at home, they are aware that their counterparts in Egypt and Jordan – two countries whose stability they regard as pivotal for the region – might have a harder time doing the same.</p> -<p>Again, the automotive sector might be the most immediately affected in the event of multinational action against China, as lack of access to Chinese supply chains would have an immediate impact on the UK economy. If the UK were targeted individually, it is likely that alternative supply chains would be available, whereas these alternatives are unlikely to be sufficient to sustain industries in the UK and the EU or the US concurrently in the event of multinational action. This kind of impact is currently hypothetical, as the UK does not yet produce a significant volume of EVs, but as the production of internal combustion engines is scaled back across the Western world, the potential for disruption grows significantly. That said, the ability to extend the life of the existing vehicle stock and the likely continued use of fossil fuel-powered heavy goods vehicles beyond 2030 means that any impact on the wider economy would likely be limited.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Gulf states have seen the US’s strong support for Israel as another sign that Washington’s strategy in the Middle East is out of step with the regional mood</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Export controls affecting whole regions would undoubtedly put UK climate targets in jeopardy. As the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated, sudden price inflation or delayed availability of key components for renewable power projects could result in delays and project cancellations. If supply-chain concentrations are not addressed, they could become an energy security challenge over time: the energy transition is set to result in a rapid increase in electricity demand from decarbonised sectors such as heating and vehicle transportation. This demand is not likely to be met by additional fossil fuel capacity, leaving the UK reliant on a steady supply of renewable electricity generation equipment to meet demand. For grid stability and to meet peak demand, the expansion of variable renewable capacity will also require substantial additions of flexible battery capacity. Furthermore, as fossil fuel plants are retired, non-renewable back-up options may become less available to increase output during periods of tight supply, while relying on fossil fuel plants for more of the time will leave less in reserve for emergencies.</p> +<p>Furthermore, even if Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha are feeling more confident about their ability to manage tensions with Tehran, they nevertheless see – and have always seen – a great risk in Iran’s ability to use the Palestinian cause and its claim to leadership of the resistance against Israel to shore up its regional position. The attacks on commercial ships supposedly linked to Israel by the Yemeni Houthis – one of Iran’s partners in the region – obviously worry Saudi Arabia, for example. For now, these activities are not directed at the Kingdom, but with the Red Sea central to Riyadh’s economic development plans, they clearly represent a long-term threat.</p> -<p>National Grid ESO estimates that the UK will need anywhere between 13 GW/44 GWh and 31 GW/118 GWh storage capacity by 2030, up from 3 GW/29 GWh in 2022. Energy security is linked to the UK’s ability to extend the electricity network and to deploy smart technologies whose supply chains currently depend on China. If the ramping up of mutually dependent net zero elements of the grid does not proceed in step with the retirement of fossil fuel infrastructure, energy security issues could emerge.</p> +<p>The Gulf states are therefore likely to continue to emphasise the need for pragmatism and de-escalation. They will try to protect the gains they have made in their relations with Iran, even if this proves to be an uphill battle. Similarly, they are unlikely to fundamentally change their approach towards Israel. The UAE has made it clear that it has no desire to give up what has been from its perspective a tremendously beneficial expanding relationship with Israel since the conclusion of the Abraham Accords in 2020. Saudi-Israeli normalisation may have become a more distant prospect due to the war, but it remains on the horizon. The strategic drivers behind normalisation, ranging from shared security interests vis-à-vis Iran to the promise of lucrative economic opportunities, remain unchanged. Even Qatar will continue to maintain its pragmatic arms-length relationship with Israel, not least because it is precisely its ability to talk to the Israeli government and security services, as well as to Hamas, that makes it such a valuable mediator and interlocutor, both in the current crisis and likely in the future too.</p> -<p>In this context, the timing of any export controls would be critical. The UK will be most vulnerable while dependencies on China remain high and as investment in fossil fuel infrastructure becomes minimal and some assets are permanently retired. The duration of any disruption would also be important, with a short period of export controls unlikely to have a significant impact on citizens, as existing technologies would continue to operate and new projects would only be delayed by temporary price spikes and shortages. An extended period of export controls lasting years – not at all inconceivable in the history of modern sanctions – would pose a more severe energy security challenge.</p> +<p>In their relations beyond the region, the Gulf states are also trying to stay the course. The war has re-emphasised the centrality of the US to regional security, as impressively illustrated by the extensive ramping-up of the US military presence in the immediate aftermath of the 7 October attack. At the same time, however, the Gulf states have also seen the US’s strong – and in their view uncritical – support for Israel as another sign that Washington’s strategy in the Middle East is out of step with the regional mood and their own priorities.</p> -<p>These questions about the UK’s vulnerabilities have led to some debate about whether net zero targets jeopardise UK security. But the reality is that trying to slow the energy transition risks worsening energy security challenges.69 Reliance on fossil fuels, coupled with price volatility, creates risks and vulnerabilities, whereas renewable electricity offers secure and affordable supplies – assuming prices continue to fall. A slower transition extends the period during which parallel infrastructures must be maintained, at increasingly high costs, and during which assets intended for retirement see reduced investment and decreasing performance, increasing the risk of unplanned outages and failures. Furthermore, many aspects of the energy transition – such as EV adoption – have a momentum of their own. Creating uncertainty about whether infrastructure will be available on time to meet demand by attempting to slow the adoption of net zero technologies may simply result in inadequate infrastructure due to insufficient investment. Ultimately investors will take their own view on likely demand, and if additional redundancy is desired it will need additional financial incentives.</p> +<p>They have therefore continued to express their conviction that the world – and the region with it – is moving towards a multipolar order, and have done what they can to make this a reality. This has included the Saudi-led foreign ministers delegation’s demonstrative choice to make Beijing the first stop of their tour to build international consensus around a call for a ceasefire in Gaza, regardless of the fact that China has shown very little ability or willingness to make any meaningful efforts to resolve the crisis. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia also fit into this pattern.</p> -<h4 id="global-exposure">Global Exposure</h4> +<p>In sum, it is very clear that the war in Gaza has made life harder for the Gulf Arab states. Leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha want to focus on developing their countries and claiming their places on the global stage, and they are determined not to let either the volatility of the region they happen to find themselves in or the unstable global environment prevent them from doing so. In this context, the war in Gaza is a setback, but not one that changes the overall strategic calculus in the Gulf.</p> -<p>The most significant sources of vulnerability the UK faces in terms of China-dominated new energy supply chains are undoubtedly those that have an impact on the global market. These include non-political events such as natural disasters and pandemics, common to all concentrated markets, as well as market risks that are already highly likely, such as shortages of key minerals. In its base case analysis, based on current policies, McKinsey estimates that by 2030, some eight out of 14 minerals essential for net zero technologies will have shortages of more than 10% of demand, with two facing shortages of more than 50%. In a scenario where commitments are achieved, all but two minerals face shortages of more than 10%. Primary production is already largely committed over this period, meaning that forecasts are relatively certain to be realised if demand increases at the expected rate. Recycling might be expedited to reduce shortages, with primary production increases possible over the longer term, but recycling policy and implementation of critical minerals strategy in the UK remains limited.</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/z7JZnFt.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 8: UK New Energy Technology Demand and Forecast Supply Adequacy for Related Critical Minerals with High Levels of Chinese Control.</strong> Projected 2030 mineral supply and demand imbalance figures are based on the current trajectory base case laid out in Patricia Bingoto et al., “The Net-Zero Materials Transition”. Sources for other information in the table: Faraday Institution, “UK Electric Vehicle and Battery Production Potential to 2040”; <a href="https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nationalgrideso.com%2Fdocument%2F283061%2Fdownload&amp;wdOrigin=BROWSELINK">National Grid ESO, “Future Energy Scenarios 2023 Data Workbook”, July 2023</a>; <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1096248/electricity-networks-strategic-framework-appendix-1-electricity-networks-modelling.pdf">Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, “Appendix I: Electricity Networks Modelling”, August 2022</a>.</em></p> +<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East. He also co-leads the development and delivery of the RUSI Leadership Centre’s programme of executive education training courses, including for diplomats, military personnel, and security professionals from the Middle East and beyond.</p>Tobias BorckAs Israel’s war in Gaza rages on, the Gulf Arab states continue to try to strike a balance between working to contain and end the violence and maintaining momentum for their respective national projects.From The Ground Up2023-12-11T12:00:00+08:002023-12-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/from-the-ground-up<p><em>Experts examine two aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural recovery that are critical to increasing its food production and exports: demining farmland and restoring farmers’ access to fertilizers.</em></p> -<p>Shortages could create allocation problems for China of the kind that are common to all major producers during tight markets. If shortages cause production to fall significantly below global demand, China will have to decide which markets to serve first, and it is probable that the domestic market will be prioritised. This behaviour is common for most producers – for example, oil exports were banned in the US between 1975 and 2015, and some Australian states have legislation allowing export bans under some circumstances. Disruption in battery supply chains during the Covid-19 pandemic tended to result in contracts with the largest volumes and biggest customers being honoured. This would favour larger EV manufacturers, which are then likely to prioritise between their assets across countries according to commercial strategy.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>With shortages looming, investments in mining by Chinese companies should generally be welcomed and not seen as a threat. Indeed, growing Chinese investment in mining and its increasing share of the market reflects the lack of activity among other actors. While China is working to secure upstream mineral supplies, the UK and other countries around the world are failing to move at sufficient pace to encourage additional sources of supply and incentivise processing capacity outside China. The more important question over the longer term is whether Chinese investments will support the development of a liquid and fungible market. Evidence from sectors such as LNG, which were initially entirely bilaterally contracted, suggests that more actively traded markets are likely to emerge as the number of producing countries proliferates, but this can take a long time. This may not be relevant for some of the speciality minerals that are required in very small quantities, and where stockpiling may be a better solution, but the availability of traded markets in larger commodities can mitigate the impact of supply outages.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>The extent of China’s dominance of supply chains and the likely persistence of this position for at least the next decade means that UK-based companies will be exposed to sharp tactics and aggressive competition. Aggressive price competition is a periodic feature of commodity markets, and marginal producers tend to be casualties of this dynamic. For example, aggressive competition between Saudi Arabia and Russia for oil market share in 2020 put sufficient pressure on US shale oil producers for then-president Donald Trump to call for OPEC to reduce production and increase prices. In another example, a flood of Chinese steel onto global markets in the mid-2010s as Chinese domestic demand slowed and spare capacity became available resulted in bankruptcies and protectionism across the rest of the world. China has the capacity in many areas of the supply chain to pressurise competitors, but over the next decade this is likely to be mitigated for mining upstream and midstream by shortages, which make sharp commercial tactics much less effective (as all additional capacity will be utilised). As discussed earlier, the situation for manufacturers dependent on scarce Chinese supplies will be different, and state support for underutilised gigafactories is expected by some in the industry.</p> +<p>In the two decades leading up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Ukraine had become a major producer and exporter of numerous agricultural commodities. In the 2020–2021 harvest season — the last season unaffected by Russia’s full-scale invasion — Ukraine was the fifth-largest exporter of wheat, honey, and walnuts worldwide; the third-largest exporter of maize, barley, and rapeseed; and the world’s top exporter of sunflower oil, sunflower meal, and millet.</p> -<h4 id="defence">Defence</h4> +<p>Due to Russia’s intentional attacks on all aspects of Ukraine’s agriculture sector, and collateral damage from hostilities, Ukraine’s production and exports are diminished today from prewar levels. As of June 2023, the Kyiv School of Economics estimated that Ukraine’s agriculture sector had incurred $8.7 billion in direct damages to agricultural machinery, equipment, and storage facilities, as well as from stolen or damaged agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and seeds, and outputs, such as crops and livestock. The sector’s $40.3 billion losses represent farmers’ diminished incomes due to foregone production, lower selling prices for products, and higher operational costs across all stages of the agri-food value chain.</p> -<p>Growing demand for critical minerals is prompting questions from defence analysts within and outside government. Three questions appear particularly pressing:</p> +<p>The Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, published in February 2023 by the World Bank in partnership with Kyiv School of Economics, the Ukrainian government, the European Union, and the United Nations, provides the most thorough evaluation of the war’s consequences for Ukraine and the investments required to ensure its future prosperity. However, the continuous and comprehensive nature of Russia’s assault complicates any estimate of damage and needs. Following the report’s publication, further losses and damages resulted from Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 and its immediate intensification of attacks on agricultural export infrastructure along Ukraine’s Black Sea and Danube River coasts. Between July and October, 17 separate attacks on Ukraine’s ports, grain facilities, and civilian ships destroyed 300,000 metric tons of grain and further reduced the country’s export potential.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>How secure are defence and security supply chains, and how secure will they continue to be?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How secure is the use of net zero technologies by the military and security services?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How will changing demand patterns for minerals affect where the military is called upon to deploy?</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>This destruction has resulted in a further downward spiral in Ukraine’s agricultural economy. Limited export routes have raised transportation costs and reduced the volume of goods farmers can sell, decreasing farmers’ incomes and eliminating profitability. While incomes have fallen, the costs of agricultural inputs have risen, and damage to farms and equipment imposes additional, heavy costs on farmers. As a result, many farmers are curtailing their activities and reducing the size of their harvests. And despite the Ukrainian government’s efforts to insulate agricultural workers from the draft, active war has drawn farmers to the battlefield, reducing the size of Ukraine’s agricultural labor force.</p> -<p>The research for this paper suggests that the risks stemming from China’s role in supply chains affecting access to new energy technologies for military purposes are likely to be similar to those affecting civilian applications: over the next decade, military net zero technologies are likely to use similar materials and components to civilian technologies. Land mobility may be one of the main drivers of demand, which, while deployed in different formats, will likely use the same underlying battery materials and technologies as civilian EVs. The same is true of renewable or hybrid mini-grids deployed at military bases. Targeting military usage specifically would therefore be very difficult to do without targeting the entire civilian supply chain. That said, large-scale military procurements might be vulnerable to delays should aggressive corporate tactics be adopted, which could have implications for military capability by extending the use of outdated equipment.</p> +<p>In aggregate, this has significantly decreased Ukraine’s agricultural production and exports.</p> -<p>Secure operation of net zero technologies is the critical area for military and security services. China already bars EVs from sensitive sites over fears that data could be misappropriated. There are similar fears in Western security services and militaries about how easily the movement of EVs used in covert operations might be tracked. While Chinese-made vehicles may pose a particular risk, this is a concern for all EVs, which tend to transfer large amounts of data on vehicle movement and usage. But the issue is not limited to EVs, with all vehicles being increasingly dependent on software and sending usage data to manufacturers.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/czTj1Z5.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>The question of how demand for critical minerals might affect the location of conflicts around the world is an important one, although largely beyond the scope of this paper. China does play a significant role as the primary offtaker of mining for net zero resources internationally. The way that China chooses to behave with respect to the interests of other countries seeking access to mines creates risks, such as ensuring access to logistics and infrastructure, allocation of promising concessions, and contest for political influence should tensions between China and other major mineral consumers escalate. Similarly, opaque contractual structures create uncertainty about the degree of liability of sometimes fragile governments. Externalities from poor mining practices can be a significant source of instability and are by no means limited to Chinese interests, but they highlight the need for more engagement by international and multilateral institutions with miners on best practice and market reform.</p> +<p>Still, in 2022, Ukraine managed to remain among the world’s top producers and exporters of corn, wheat, sunflower oil and seeds, and soybeans, due to the determination of Ukraine’s agricultural labor force, the commitment of Ukraine’s government, and support from numerous other partners, including governments, multilateral organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and research institutes. According to Kyiv School of Economics president Tymofiy Milovanov, efforts to rebuild Ukraine’s agricultural sector should continue even as conflict continues because it is unlikely there will be a “clear end to the war.” Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky established the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the War just two months after the full-scale invasion began, and the council continues to develop the Ukraine Recovery Plan in partnership with Ukrainian civil society institutions, partner governments, and international organizations and companies. The overarching goal of this work is not just to reconstruct Ukraine, but to build on the country’s reforms in recent years and transform Ukraine’s economy for the future.</p> -<p>A longer-term question that may not be receiving sufficient attention is what the impact might be should China leverage its industrial and, increasingly, technological advantage in net zero technologies for military purposes. Net zero technologies are still at an early stage in their innovation trajectories, and are receiving much more R&amp;D investment globally than conventional technologies. In many areas, they may ultimately outperform fossil fuel technologies, in terms of both cost and capability, particularly in logistics. It is not yet clear what scope there is for major technological breakthroughs in China to impact relative military advantage, particularly with respect to China’s neighbours. Such innovations might ultimately affect many areas – from the relative efficiency of Chinese industrial defence production and cheaper logistics with superior capability, potentially through to battlefield advantages from developments in areas such as sheet metals and electric drones – and will have their origins in a superior industrial–technological ecosystem.</p> +<p>The importance of investing in Ukraine’s agricultural sector is threefold: to bolster Ukraine’s economy in wartime, to restore its capacity as a major global food supplier, and to strengthen its position as a bulwark to Russia’s influence through its own agricultural exports. Rebuilding and transforming Ukraine’s agriculture sector will require coordinated investments in its soil, labor force, agricultural institutions, and infrastructure. Adequate and low-cost routes must be secured for Ukraine’s agricultural exports; damaged farm, storage, transportation, and port infrastructure must be rebuilt; destroyed and stolen equipment and goods must be replaced; farmlands must be demined, tested, and restored; farmers’ access to seeds, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs much be secured; and farmers’ needs for additional financing and training to continue agricultural activity must be met. Investments to address immediate needs and obstacles are ongoing, but even more immense challenges will require international attention in the coming decades, including demining waterways, namely the Black and Azov Seas, modernizing the country’s irrigation infrastructure, and addressing the repercussions of the Kakhovka dam collapse on surrounding ecosystems and agricultural livelihoods. This work will take place in the context of Ukraine’s 2024 farmland market reform and the country’s candidacy for membership in the European Union, which will necessitate further reforms to Ukraine’s agriculture sector.</p> -<p>There is no doubt that China’s influence in new energy supply chains will expand its already significant global footprint. Similarly, China’s higher risk tolerance compared to many Western actors, combined with companies’ willingness to operate with razor-thin margins, will further enhance Beijing’s control over new energy mineral resources. As seen in other areas, China’s economic and commercial presence in a wide range of producer countries also aids Beijing’s efforts to garner backing in multilateral bodies and global institutions in support of China’s position on a given issue. To be sure, Chinese companies operating abroad have a mixed track record in terms of their ESG practices, and have suffered pushback from host countries. China’s growing global footprint and fear of decoupling with the West is already leading it to rally developing countries to reduce the West’s influence. On a bilateral basis too, China’s involvement in producer countries could have implications for broader UK foreign policy goals. The extent of this influence will, however, depend on the degree of support China is offering, how it is perceived in host countries, and how alternative influences are perceived. The UK should review its foreign policy approaches in this context too. China’s foreign policy is closely linked to new energy supply chains, but is not defined by it. At the same time, foreign policy initiatives can support commercial and strategic objectives, including expanding and deepening China’s dominance of net zero supply chains. These interconnections deserve further research and analysis.</p> +<p>This white paper focuses on two aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural reconstruction that are crucial to supporting transformation throughout the sector: demining Ukraine’s farmland and improving access to fertilizers in Ukraine. The information and insights included herein are the result of CSIS research, with input from numerous experts in Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. Information and policy recommendations regarding rebuilding other aspects of Ukraine’s agriculture sector can be found in other CSIS publications and will be the focus of future scholarship.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<h3 id="demining">Demining</h3> -<p>China holds dominant or strong positions along several global supply chains for the clean energy products that are critical to the net zero energy transition in the UK and elsewhere. Examples include lithium-ion batteries, wind turbines and solar PV modules. China’s strength in this regard encompasses the extraction of raw mineral ores, through the processing and refining of the ores to produce the final metals, to the manufacture of intermediate and final products. China’s dominance is particularly pronounced in the processing and refining of ores. Significant quantities of some of these ores are imported to China from overseas, often from mines in which Chinese companies hold a significant or majority share, or with which they have secured offtake agreements.</p> +<h4 id="the-scale-and-nature-of-landmine-use">The Scale and Nature of Landmine Use</h4> -<p><strong>Scale of dominance:</strong> In lithium-ion battery supply chains, for example, China is responsible for more than 80% of global supplies of spherical graphite and refined manganese, and of anodes and electrolytes. For wind turbines, it controls more than 80% of refined rare earth metals and manganese, as well as NdFeB magnets. Finally, in solar PV modules, it accounts for more than 80% of refined germanium, polysilicon, wafers and silicon cells. Elsewhere in these supply chains, China is responsible for more than 60% of global output, pointing to very high degrees of market concentration.</p> +<p>Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a significant proportion of combat has been waged across farmland in Ukraine’s rural areas, compromising Ukraine’s agricultural economy. The nature of the war’s impacts on Ukraine’s farmland varies by locale. War-related damage to Ukraine’s farmland includes craters and other physical destruction from munitions attacks; possible chemical contamination from munitions, fuel spills, shell remnants, and human remains; and depressions from armed vehicle tracks. According to the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, Russian troops were firing between 40,000 and 60,000 shells at Ukrainian positions every day as of August 2022. Up to 20 percent of ammunition fired does not detonate, and Russian troops regularly place landmines in fields and forests. Among threats to Ukraine’s farmland, unexploded ordnance and the extensive placement of landmines remain widespread concerns.</p> -<p><strong>Processing and refining:</strong> Chinese dominance pivots on its control of the processing and refining of minerals. This rests on economies of scale built up over many years, government financial incentives, and on an increasingly strong stock of intellectual property. Chinese companies’ importance in upstream mining is further reinforced by control of the midstream, but also by a relatively high degree of risk tolerance, which backstops upstream mining investments, ensuring access to the highest-value parts of the supply chain. This position will not be usurped over the next decade, and potentially will only be to a limited extent in the decade afterwards. Any inroads into reducing Chinese market share willcrequire heavy public investment and protection from dumping and aggressive state-backed competition.</p> +<p>A Reuters investigation into landmine use in Ukraine revealed “landmine contamination so vast it is most likely unprecedented in the 21st century,” with emplaced landmines numbering in the hundreds of thousands. By mid-2023, Ukraine had become the most mined country in the world, surpassing Afghanistan, Syria, Cambodia, and other countries in which landmines are a common feature of warfare. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, about 30 percent of Ukraine’s lands, or approximately 174,000 square kilometers (67,000 square miles), has been exposed to conflict and will require surveying and, if necessary, demining. According to Interfax, a further 13,500 square kilometers (over 5,200 square miles) of the Black Sea, Azov Sea, and Ukraine’s rivers and other inland bodies of water are potentially contaminated with landmines. Likewise, according to Human Rights Watch, the scale of landmine use in Ukraine has resulted in a “large, dispersed, and complex level of contamination that will threaten Ukrainian civilians and hinder recovery efforts for years to come.” One deminer (or “sapper”) is able to clear between 15 and 25 square meters per day, and given the current rate of progress, some estimate that complete demining of Ukrainian territory could take decades or even centuries.</p> -<p><strong>Potential leverage:</strong> China could potentially exploit its strength for coercive purposes: it is already using export quotas and administrative processes to complicate access to supplies of gallium and germanium, as well as graphite, which in turn has impacted costs. Arguably, infrastructure bottlenecks in China during the Covid-19 pandemic or outages due to floods and power cuts have had a more material impact on the cost and availability of new energy supplies to date. Going forward, the lack of critical materials will also have an inflationary effect on new energy supply chains. Market concentration in China will clearly give it commercial advantages, but the extent to which Beijing will use it for geopolitical leverage remains uncertain. For now, Beijing is more likely to use its leverage in response to perceived aggression – but this could change over time.</p> +<p>Antipersonnel mines and anti-vehicle mines have been used in the ongoing war, with at least 13 types of mines identified in Ukraine to date, according to Human Rights Watch, which are located in at least 11 regions across central and eastern Ukraine (see [map]). The preponderance of landmines in Ukraine have been emplaced by Russia, which is not a signatory to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty). Human Rights Watch has even identified in Ukraine several previously unseen Russian landmines produced as late as 2021, including antipersonnel mines. Though Ukraine is a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine has used antipersonnel mines in at least one location since Russia’s invasion, according to Human Rights Watch.</p> -<p>Comparisons to Russia’s importance in terms of gas supplies have been made frequently since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, there are important distinctions to be made. First, Russia accounted for 40% of European gas supplies before the invasion, whereas market concentration in China is vastly more significant. Second, the impact of an oil or gas outage is different to curtailment of sales of critical materials or components. A direct oil or gas shortage imposes costs on a country’s economy and can limit activity in certain sectors if no alternatives are available; shortages of critical materials, on the other hand, do not cripple economic activity immediately. Third, given the existence of fungible traded markets for oil and gas, supply outages can be mitigated at a cost, which in turn has implications for the entire global economy. Even though the UK does not import Russian pipeline gas, the impact of higher gas prices was also felt in the UK. Equivalent market mechanisms for critical materials are nascent or immature, making it harder to offset shortages. Overall, supply outages for materials and components have a longer-term inflationary impact and risk slowing the energy transition. A simple comparison to oil and gas is not enough. The risks associated with market concentration for new energy supply chains must therefore be assessed more holistically, as should the trade-offs associated with de-risking or decoupling from China.</p> +<p>Landmines used in the war have been hand-emplaced, mechanically laid, scattered by truck-mounted projectors, and delivered by rocket. They include small, plastic-cased PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, which can be easily mistaken for harmless objects and overlooked by metal detectors; POM-3 anti-personnel mines, which can be scattered by air and detonated with mere vibrations, such as nearby footsteps; metal- and plastic-encased anti-vehicle mines, which can be buried in shallow holes and penetrate vehicles’ under-armor upon detonation; and PARM anti-vehicle mines, which can be placed above ground and fire a projectile into their target. Russian forces are also employing “Zemledelie” systems, which can remotely lay mines in areas as large as several football fields in short periods of time, creating minefields of varying complexities across Ukraine. The “Zemledelie” system, Russian for “agriculture,” was developed by the Russian company Rostec and was first observed in use in March 2022.</p> -<p><strong>Risks to the UK:</strong> The coercive risk for the UK is related to the degree of separation between the stage of the supply chain dominated by China and the stage at which UK consumers enter the market. The likelihood that China would be able to target the UK exclusively is small, as the UK today is principally an importer of final or near-final products. As the UK’s capacity to manufacture these products grows, its vulnerability to Chinese coercion increases, and will require a diversification of supply chains. However, even with more diverse supply chains, the UK’s access to materials and components (as well as their cost) would be determined by industrial policy choices made in the EU and the US. Conversely, given the wider tensions between China and the West, any action taken by China to restrict exports of clean energy metals and products would more likely impact the UK, the EU and the US together in response to a perceived provocation, either economic or military. If prolonged, such an embargo would have a profound impact on the UK’s low-carbon transition (alongside other economies’ transitions), but only a modest effect on the wider economy. The greatest risk for the UK stems from events that have a global impact. These could arise from a natural disaster or pandemic, or from a general shortage of critical materials that forces China to prioritise its domestic market.</p> +<p>Both the extent of Russia’s mine placements and the use of mining technology innovations within Ukraine have resulted in mine contamination of enormous complexity, scale, and lethality. As of September 2023, 246 civilians (including 13 children) had been killed by explosive devices, and 521 civilians (including 53 children) had been injured across Ukraine.</p> -<p><strong>Battery supply chains:</strong> The UK is likely to be most heavily exposed to China’s dominance in battery supply chains. This is because China is dominant across most elements of the battery supply chain, and UK automotive manufacturers and the UK electricity grid are expected to rapidly increase demand for batteries. Wind is another area of concern, but the concerns are currently mitigated by a degree of separation between Chinese suppliers and UK users. Nuclear power is not discussed in this paper, but is another supply chain where China is increasingly influential.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bGsCnWd.png" alt="image02" /></p> -<p><strong>China’s political/economic calculus:</strong> China’s ability to leverage its position in net zero supply chains for political ends should be neither overstated nor underestimated. The reason it should not be overstated is because China could use other supply chains to impose coercive pressure on the UK: the total value of UK trade with China in the year to end Q1 2023 was £107.5 billion, with £69.5 billion of imports. China was the UK’s fourth-largest trade partner over this period. This shows that, in circumstances that might give rise to a serious ratcheting up of pressure on UK–Chinese trade, the UK would have much more immediate concerns than net zero supply chains. The reason that China’s ability to leverage its dominance should not be underestimated is that the relatively limited (but symbolically important) role of net zero technologies – as well as China’s unusual dominance in those industries – might make them a useful target should China wish to make a political statement. This paper shows that there may be ways for China to use net zero supply chains in this way without provoking a major escalation.</p> +<h3 id="ukrainian-government-efforts">Ukrainian Government Efforts</h3> -<p><strong>Military considerations:</strong> The risks to new energy technologies for military purposes stemming from China’s role in supply chains are likely to be similar to those facing the wider population. However, in a time of actual or potential shortage the military could be vulnerable to aggressive corporate strategies and, meanwhile, the military faces the same data security risks as civilian users of Chinese equipment. The extent to which China will be able to use its technological and manufacturing strengths in net zero products to yield military advantage is not clear. In contrast, China’s growing international sales and investment in net zero minerals and products is already boosting its soft power in ways that will impact the UK’s foreign policy goals.</p> +<p>While the war continues, the Ukrainian government’s assistance for demining efforts continues to evolve. The Ukrainian government was already supporting demining efforts in Ukraine when Russia invaded in February 2022; previously occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk had been subject to demining efforts since 2015, following Russia’s 2014 invasion. In November 2021, the Ukrainian government announced the creation of the National Mine Action Authority, an interagency group led by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence that is responsible for the development of national policy and plans for demining as well as coordination of all actors involved in demining.</p> -<p><strong>Risk mitigation:</strong> Mitigating China-centred risks will require action across the entire supply chain: accelerating investments in upstream mining developments, diversification of processing and refining, and recycling of critical minerals and materials. International efforts should aim to engage all actors, including China, to align objectives as far as possible towards the development of open markets which will ultimately benefit everyone, at least economically. Involving China directly in UK projects may mitigate some risks related to shortages, but may also hamper longer-term efforts to develop alternative supply chains that are fully independent of China, and so a mixed approach might be optimal.</p> +<p>Among Ukraine’s mined territory is a significant proportion of Ukraine’s farmland. The precise proportion of Ukraine’s farmland that has been contaminated by landmines is impossible to determine while hostilities continue. Estimates of Ukraine’s farmland exposed to landmines range from 470,000 hectares (or 1,814 square miles), according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, to 2.5 million hectares (or 9,652 square miles), according to Ukraine’s first deputy minister of agrarian policy and food. GLOBSEC estimates that 5 million hectares (or 19,305 square miles, approximately 15.2 percent) of Ukraine’s farmland are unsuitable for use due to landmines, contamination with explosive ordnance, and exposure to armed hostilities.</p> -<p><strong>The fallacy of delay:</strong> Risks related to China are not likely to be significantly reduced by delays to the transition to net zero. Energy security during the transition is most closely associated with delay and uncertainty as systems are simultaneously scaled up, ramped down, or repurposed. Abandoning national targets would simply increase uncertainty about government commitment to putting in place the infrastructure that will underpin future energy security.</p> +<p>In March 2023, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence announced the creation of an Action Plan for Demining Agricultural Land to facilitate spring sowing and fall harvesting of crops in 2023 and after. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for ensuring implementation of the plan and coordination among Ukrainian and international partners. To expedite humanitarian demining nationwide, the Ukrainian government announced the formation of the Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining in June 2023, chaired by the Ministry of Economy, and the working group held its first meeting in September 2023, emphasizing the importance of creating a mine action strategy for Ukraine. Later in September 2023, Ukrainian prime minister Denis Shmyhal convened the first Demine Ukraine Forum among Ukrainian government representatives and international partners.</p> -<p><strong>Research needs:</strong> Internally consistent public data is not available on China’s market position in most minerals and products, with multiple reputable sources giving significantly different figures. Better publicly available data on the following issues would help improve analysis of:</p> +<h3 id="humanitarian-demining">Humanitarian Demining</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p>China’s domestic extraction capacity for critical minerals.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>China’s domestic processing capacity and annual output of critical minerals.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Capacity and annual output of critical mineral mines and processing plants outside China that involve Chinese investment.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Data around prices of critical minerals and materials.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Details of China’s international trade (import and export) in critical mineral ores and refined metals, including routes through third countries (in terms of quantity and value).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Detailed information on China’s international trade in intermediate and final products of net zero energy technologies, including routes through third countries and products manufactured by Chinese companies in third countries (in terms of quantity and value).</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The ultimate purpose of mine removal dictates the level of investment — of time and funding — in demining efforts. Swiftly clearing an area of mines in the course of combat or immediately thereafter is called military, combat, or operational demining. Operational demining is conducted by special military units or other emergency services and is intended to clear a path for the safe advance or retreat of troops. Though it may quickly return access to roads, residential buildings, or other areas of common use, it does not necessarily guarantee the safety of these areas.</p> -<p>Countries do not need to be close allies to be close trading partners. Political or ideological alignment is similarly non-essential. China is deeply embedded in new energy supply chains and its long and steady cultivation of these industries has been essential for the progress made towards reducing the cost of new energy technologies worldwide. Despite some risks, the UK should not seek to exclude China from its supply chains. Instead, the country should seek to communicate effectively with China about the need for diverse supply chains as a point of principle for robust markets and to make the case clearly that this is both in the UK and China’s interests. Bigger, more reliable markets will result in a larger and more diverse client base for China and more supply chains for large-scale new energy technology consumers in the UK and allied countries.</p> +<p>Humanitarian demining, by contrast, aims to “clear land so that civilians can return to their homes and their everyday routines without the threat of explosive hazards,” according to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Humanitarian demining involves numerous, resource-intensive steps, all of which are required to guarantee that an area has been thoroughly searched and cleared of explosives and is safe for use. Steps required for humanitarian demining include a non-technical survey of land, involving interviewing communities and reviewing records of conflicts; a technical survey, involving the use of equipment or animals to determine the boundaries of minefields; mine removal, most commonly through mine detonation; and certification that mine removal is complete and land is safe for use.</p> -<p>In its domestic policy, the UK should aim to encourage consumers to invest in diversity at all stages of the supply chain, without seeking to exclude China from any of them. Likely shortages in critical minerals offer an opportunity to do this as more mining and refining capacity will probably be required, some of which might usefully be located outside China.</p> +<p>According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, humanitarian demining in Ukraine is presently carried out by 18 certified mine action operator organizations, including NGOs (e.g., the Danish Refugee Council, HALO Trust, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, the Norwegian People’s Aid, and DanChurchAid), companies (e.g., Demining Solutions, GK Group, and TetraTech), and Ukrainian entities (e.g., the Ukrainian Sappers Association, Ukrspecexport, and Ukroboronservice). Entities that wish to contribute to Ukraine’s demining efforts must complete a complex certification procedure before working as demining operators in Ukraine. In recognition of the need to expedite and streamline the certification process for demining operators, the State Emergency Service’s Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining launched an online portal for interested organizations to apply for certification and keep apprised of the application’s status. After obtaining certification to demine its own farmland across Ukraine, the Ukrainian company Nibulon has recognized the use of its expertise across Ukraine’s farmland broadly and will offer its services to farmers and to the state. As of September 2023, 30 additional organizations are awaiting certification, including 18 governmental operators from Ukraine’s State Emergency Service, State Transport Special Service, and armed forces.</p> -<hr /> +<p>At present, the Ukrainian government does not fund humanitarian demining services, so most farmers must pay for demining services themselves. At the Demine Ukraine Forum, Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko noted that Ukraine’s 2024 budget would include UAH 2.0 billion ($54.7 million) to partially compensate farmers for demining services. Minister Svyrydenko also announced the establishment of the Prozorro demining market, through which farmers are expected to select certified deminers. The Ukrainian government will compensate farmers for half the cost of demining through the Prozorro system, and the Ukrainian government is considering the best way to compensate farmers for demining costs borne before 2024. Ukraine’s state bank, “Ukragasbank,” has also launched a soft lending program to fund the demining of farmland within the framework of the “Affordable Loans at 5-7-9 percent” program, improving farmers’ access to demining financing and incentivizing farmers’ use of legal, certified demining operators.</p> -<p><strong>Michal Meidan</strong> is Head of China Energy Research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES). Before joining OIES in July 2019, she headed cross-commodity China research at Energy Aspects. Prior to that, she headed China Matters, an independent research consultancy providing analysis on the politics of energy in China.</p> +<h3 id="progress-demining-ukraines-agricultural-land">Progress Demining Ukraine’s Agricultural Land</h3> -<p><strong>Philip Andrews-Speed</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the OIES. He has more than forty years’ experience in the field of energy and resources, starting his career as mineral and petroleum exploration geologist before moving into the field of energy and resource governance.</p> +<p>Under the Ministry of Defence’s Action Plan for Demining Agricultural Land, the Ukrainian government specified 470,000 hectares of agricultural land in nine regions of Ukraine that would need to be surveyed and, if necessary, demined. These regions are where “the problem of contamination is most urgent and the clearing of agricultural land is most feasible,” according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence. In addition to the National Mine Action Authority, coordinated by the Ministry of Defence, Ukraine’s Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, coordinated by the Ministry of Economy, also supports humanitarian demining across Ukraine. In a press release from the Ministry of Economy in June 2023, the Ukrainian government noted that the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food would update the identification of territories that would need to be demined. According to the Ministry of Economy, 100,000 of the 470,000 hectares specified in the action plan had been cleared by June, and by the end of 2023, up to 165,000 hectares of land could be cleared for agricultural use.</p> -<p><strong>Dan Marks</strong> is a Research Fellow in energy security at the Royal United Services Institute. His research focuses on national security dimensions of the energy transition in the United Kingdom and internationally.</p>Michal Meidan, et al.Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused attention on energy supply chains and contributed to growing unease in the West about the fact that supply chains for the commodities necessary for the global energy transition are highly concentrated in China (or under Chinese control).ESG Applied To Mining2023-11-16T12:00:00+08:002023-11-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/esg-to-mining<p><em>As demand for minerals increases to achieve an energy transition, companies, regulators, and end users will need to assess the entire mine-to-market value chain to ensure that all firms are incentivized to adhere to best practices.</em></p> +<p>The Ukrainian government has continued to publicize progress under the action plan. By September 2023, the Ukrainian government had surveyed 188,600 hectares of agricultural land under the plan, of which over 124,000 hectares will require clearance, including through humanitarian demining. By October 2023, the Ukrainian government had surveyed more than 225,000 hectares of agricultural land identified in the action plan and had returned 170,000 hectares to economic use. In addition to these periodic updates, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine publishes daily updates regarding its progress demining Ukrainian territories through a portal that is only accessible within Ukraine. Between the beginning of the invasion and November 14, 2023, 454,827 explosive objects and 2,892 kilograms of explosive substance have been defused, including 3,124 aerial bombs. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has also partnered with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining to maintain an interactive map of mine contamination across Ukraine.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="ukraines-needs-and-international-support">Ukraine’s Needs and International Support</h3> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Despite recent progress, the demining needs of the Ukrainian government remain staggering. As of February 2023, the cost of clearance of explosive ordnance across Ukraine was estimated at $37.6 billion, according to the Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment produced by the Kyiv School of Economics, the World Bank, the Ukrainian government, the European Union, and the United Nations. This estimate represents the significant investments needed in equipment, training, and salaries, including to expand the strategic planning and operational capacities of Ukraine’s demining forces.</p> -<p>Critical minerals have become strategic inputs for a successful clean energy transition, as well as for economic development and national security. A future powered by low-carbon energy sources and protected by a technologically advanced military is one that will be heavily dependent on minerals. As such, demand for minerals is expected to grow over the coming decades, and mining will become a central theme in international development discourse.</p> +<p>Numerous countries, multilateral organizations, and NGOs have provided financial and other support for demining in Ukraine, including for the demining of agricultural land. In June 2023, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN World Food Programme (WFP) announced a joint plan to clear landmines and other explosive remnants of war from agricultural land, in collaboration with the Fondation Suisse de Déminage and with support from the UN Ukraine Humanitarian Fund and private donors. In July 2023, the Ukrainian government announced that numerous partners — including the United States, the European Union, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, Austria, Switzerland, South Korea, and the Howard Buffett Foundation — together had pledged $244 million for humanitarian demining clearance. In July 2023, South Korea pledged to provide demining equipment to Ukraine, and Japan has similarly offered technical assistance in 2023. In September 2023, the U.S. Department of State announced $90.5 million in humanitarian demining assistance to Ukraine, in addition to the $47.6 million the State Department had announced in September 2022 for a similar purpose. Croatia hosted the first International Donors’ Conference on Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine in October 2023, attracting representatives from more than 40 countries, and Switzerland, which announced over €100 million (approximately $107 million) for humanitarian demining in Ukraine in October 2023, will host the Second International Donors’ Conference on Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine in 2024.</p> -<p>According to different clean energy scenarios modeled by the International Energy Agency, the demand for each of the five most important critical minerals (i.e., lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, and neodymium) will likely increase between 1.5 and 7 times by 2030. Meeting this rising demand will require scaling existing operations and developing hundreds of new projects.</p> +<h3 id="the-reality-for-farmers">The Reality for Farmers</h3> -<p>To this end, Latin America — which holds considerable reserves of copper and lithium, supplying 40 and 35 percent to the global market, respectively — has attracted significant investments in mining. Between 13 and 19 percent of foreign direct investment in the region has gone to the mining sector. Unfortunately, many of the mining projects have been associated with environmental destruction, corruption, dubious economic returns, and the unfair distribution of benefits. According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the region has the most mining-related socioeconomic conflicts worldwide.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Tmi3T4H.jpg" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ A farmer and a member of a demining team of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine carry an unexploded missile near the village of Hryhorivka, Zaporizhzhia region, on May 5, 2022.</em></p> + +<p>Despite the Ukrainian government’s recent progress on its Action Plan for Demining Agricultural Land and considerable support from international partners, many farmers face difficulties accessing humanitarian demining services. One licensed company, for example, is reported to have offered demining services to farmers for $200 per acre of farmland. Because the war has reduced harvests and incomes, and increased the costs of inputs, most farmers are unable to afford such prices. Furthermore, Ukraine’s byzantine bureaucracy can lead to long wait times for demining services. Duplication of services across ministries and the constant evolution of priorities and plans can lead to bottlenecks, which the Ukrainian government admits and is seeking to redress.</p> + +<p>In the meantime, some farmers are resorting to conducting demining activities themselves. As one farmer reported to Foreign Policy, “At first we waited for the state to demine our fields. Then we understood it wouldn’t happen, so we decided to do it ourselves.” Three of this farmer’s employees scanned his farmland with handheld metal detectors, marking potential mines with flags. Another farmer operates a remote-controlled tractor, outfitted with panels stripped from Russian tanks, to scan his fields for landmines. One farmer in Kharkhiv explained the situation to local Ukrainian media (authors’ translation):</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>Out of 3,000 hectares, I have 1,000 hectares mined. I left the application for demining immediately after the de-occupation. The emergency department says that they will not clear the mines in the near future because they do not have time. We are now communicating with the neighboring farms to clear the fields [ourselves]. The situation with the neighbors is still worse, all their lands are “seeded” with explosives. We will look for a way out on our own, because today it is cheaper to buy a field than to demine it. We are considering the possibility of buying a drone that looks for mines or renting a special car. Otherwise, life will not return to our villages. . . . I need to clear the fields and sow crops this year.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Many of these minerals are found in areas that are environmentally sensitive, with important biodiversity and sources of water. Closing the gap in mineral demand will have to be carried out in a manner that empowers local communities around the mines and does not exploit natural resources. As the race to secure critical minerals continues, there should be careful consideration of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns.</p> +<p>In this context, many farmers opt to use the services of uncertified or “dark deminers,” who charge prices lower than certified deminers but who cannot guarantee that land they survey is clear of mines and safe for use. Among farmers who use dark demining services, accidents are reportedly common.</p> -<h3 id="the-importance-of-esg-standards-in-mining">The Importance of ESG Standards in Mining</h3> +<p>And among farmers in regions exposed to conflict, not only the presence but the fear of landmines can keep farmers from working their land, according to CSIS interviews. Kyiv School of Economics president Timofiy Milovanov characterized the current situation as two systems of demining at tension within Ukraine: the “legacy” system, whose adherence to international mine action standards renders it slow and expensive but best able to guarantee the safe clearance of lands, and the alternative system made up of Ukrainians that “have to work . . . [and] protect their children,” who “innovate right now, whether it’s certified or not.” Such demining “innovations” are borne from farmers’ need to continue agricultural activity for their livelihoods, but the risks of uncertified demining are severe. A farmer in Kherson who opted against planting in the face of mine contamination told Reuters, “I have no moral right to send workers to fields as it is dangerous for life.” CSIS interviews revealed the same tension between these two systems, with some Ukrainian entities advocating for equipping farmers with demining machines to expediate the process, and others insisting that farmers are not professional deminers and their participation in the process would risk lives and complicate the government’s coordination and planning.</p> -<p>The international community has developed an assortment of toolkits and guides to inform projects. The Group of Twenty, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund offer resources that detail how to avoid disputes, build trust, and properly secure access to essential resources. The private sector has also developed their own guidelines. For instance, the International Council on Mining and Metal has released many practical resources to help the industry in this area. The principles observed throughout such products strongly emphasize upstream planning, good governance, and enabling conditions. These same elements stress the importance of positively impacting environmental, social, and economic outcomes.</p> +<p>The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that while overall production and export levels have fallen since Russia’s invasion, agricultural yields per acre have risen compared to last season for Ukraine’s major commodities, although the USDA estimates include crop production in Crimea and occupied territories, where Russia reaps the benefits of favorable harvests. For wheat, for example, yields are estimated at a 4.5 tons per hectare, up 17 percent from 2022 and 13 percent from the five-year average. This suggests that production losses are due primarily to reduced planting: the USDA estimates that harvested area has fallen 26 percent from the five-year average. In fact, farmland exposed to hostilities since February 2022 has left an impact visible from space, according to NASA’s Harvest program, which estimates that up to 2.8 million hectares (or over 10,800 square miles) of Ukraine’s agricultural land have been abandoned as a result of the war.</p> -<p>Applying best practices is not merely a nicety but a cost-saving endeavor. When there is a failure to adopt advisable practices, there is a greater potential for costly conflict. A 2014 study by the University of Queensland’s Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining attempted to quantify the cost of conflict with local communities. One case study saw an estimated $20 million loss in net present value for every week of delayed production. Consulting with local communities early on and incorporating best practices throughout the mining process can mitigate these risks.</p> +<h3 id="unique-considerations-for-agricultural-land">Unique Considerations for Agricultural Land</h3> -<p>One positive development is the June 2022 announcement of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), an initiative by Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union to increase mineral production. Its goal is “to promote responsible growth across the critical minerals sector via a shared commitment to high [ESG] standards; sustainability; and shared prosperity.” The MSP will be an important conduit to bolster mineral supply chains in a manner that meets high ESG standards. However, implementing these high standards will require the efforts of both the public and private sectors.</p> +<p>The presence, or even the fear, of landmines on agricultural land has affected farmers’ harvests across Ukraine. At the same time, the process of demining farmland could also depress agricultural yields, as some farmers may experience long-term impacts once their land has been demined. A report from the NGO Mine Action Review, with funding from the Norwegian, Canadian, and Swiss governments, details the numerous destructive effects of demining on soil. The most common machinery employed in demining is equipped with flails, tillers, and rollers, which can disrupt soil structure, accelerate soil erosion, and disrupt water, carbon, and nutrient cycles. While the most expedient and safest method of landmine disposal is through remote detonation, detonation generates a crater that displaces topsoil while compacting subsoil into the crater. Finally, the detonation of landmines can release toxic pollutants into soils and waterways, including from explosive substances as well as the breakdown of other munitions components. In Cambodia, for example, researchers found that the content of heavy metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and copper increased by 30 percent in soil in a 1-meter radius of the detonation point.</p> -<h3 id="sources-of-conflict-in-mining-operations">Sources of Conflict in Mining Operations</h3> +<p>Mitigation measures for such effects of landmine detonation are unclear, and data on the environmental impacts of landmine detonation are limited. The extent to which the detonation of landmines could affect soil fertility and water quality in heavily mined territories has not been widely examined or reported. Only one international covenant, the International Mine Actions Standard 07.13, addresses the impacts of demining on agricultural land, stating that national authorities and mine action operators have the responsibility to “ensure that all mine action activities . . . are carried out in accordance with applicable legislation, safely, effectively and efficiently, but also in a way that minimises any adverse impact on people, wildlife, vegetation and other aspects of the environment.” The standard further specifies that mechanical clearance and bulk demolition, or the process of clearing land with machines designed to detonate ordnance, require greater oversight than other clearance methods given that “these processes have the ability to severely impact the environment.”</p> -<p>The conflict surrounding mining projects primarily derives from insufficient consultation with affected communities, the inequitable distribution of socioeconomic benefits, and environmental objections (see Box 1). The communities that live near mineral deposits are often poor and experience their own a set of unique socioeconomic problems. A report by the Inter-American Development Bank cites “deficient planning” as a consistent source of setbacks for mining projects.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GzdQD2W.jpg" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Employees of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine present to media the Ukraines first Armtrac 400 specialized mine clearance vehicle, purchased through the UNITED24 fundraising platform, near Kharkiv, on October 27, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</em></p> -<p>There are several typical stages in the mining value chain: exploration, extraction, processing, transportation, and sales. Ideally, closure and remediation conclude the mining lifecycle. Conflict, malpractice, and missed opportunities can occur at any point in the minerals value chain, so thoughtful planning is necessary at each stage to account for all potential issues.</p> +<p>Although detonation carries risks for agricultural land, leaving landmines in the ground can also lead to chemical contamination as the munitions age and corrode. The leaching of hazardous chemicals into soil and groundwater can take anywhere from 10 to 90 years, but Ukraine’s farmland may experience pollution from buried ordnances sooner rather than later. Russia has reportedly used Soviet-era landmines against Ukraine, which would corrode faster than landmines produced more recently. Further, the characteristics of Ukraine’s fertile soils that enable plants to thrive also enable the soil to “cling on to a lot of these toxins following the war,” according to soil geomorphologist Joe Hupy.</p> -<p>Having clear and detailed ESG standards is insufficient to protect Indigenous groups and the environment. Without the participation of both the public and private sector, conflicts will continue to arise throughout the value chain, costing both the mining companies and the local communities affected by their actions. The enforcement of these principles cannot be the sole responsibility of the mining company; commercial pressure and empowered regulators also have their roles in leveraging mining as a development tool.</p> +<p>Efforts to identify the impacts on agricultural soil and groundwater resulting from exploded ordnance, unexploded ordnance, and landmines have only just begun within Ukraine, and CSIS interviews with in-country experts and operators revealed that more investment, time, and resources are needed before these impacts can be accurately determined. The Ukrainian Researchers Society, FAO, and WFP have partnered to map munition craters, soil pollution, and the presence of “bombturbation,” or incidences of explosives cratering, compacting, displacing, and ejecting hazardous materials into soil. Their preliminary study of contamination in the Kharkiv Oblast using remote sensing and soil sample analysis shows that over 420,000 craters across roughly 655,072 hectares of arable land have resulted in over 1.3 million cubic meters of displaced soil, 4,214 hectares of bombturbated soil, and 28,286 hectares of potentially contaminated soil, with only 1.76 percent of assessed soils found to be contaminated with heavy metals. A CSIS interview with the FAO Ukraine office confirmed this level of contamination is not concerning for the safe consumption of crops, but rather for the potential of reduced agricultural production in the future.</p> -<p>Institutional capacity, which varies widely, determines the degree to which suggested or required practices are administered. Regional and local governments tend to lack the technical capacity, personnel, and budgetary resources to effectively address illegal activity and provide adequate land governance, law enforcement, and public services. In many instances, the process of land titling and registration at the subnational level is not well defined, leading to land grabs and clashes with local communities and Indigenous people. Often, areas that are delimited for Indigenous ethnic groups and natural parks are not safeguarded. This is partly because laws and governing principles are typically created at the federal level, not in the municipalities charged with enforcing the law.</p> +<p>A collection of researchers across Ukraine, Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain have conducted a similar assessment within the Kharkiv Oblast, also finding that explosions on and within soil have damaged soil structure and released heavy metals into surrounding soils. The researchers note these findings are concluded from a minimal sample size that may not reflect the full extent of the war’s impacts on soils, especially given the limited access to areas of intense combat. These preliminary analyses are a significant step toward understanding the war’s effects on Ukrainian farmland, but offer an incomplete picture of what will be required to restore agricultural soil following the war’s conclusion. The scale of soil analysis required to determine the unique impacts of this war on Ukraine’s black soils will necessitate improved access to in-country soil testing facilities and greater investment in Ukraine’s remote sensing capabilities.</p> -<p>Due to a lack of institutional capacity, local governments are often unequipped to enforce laws or combat illegal mining. This creates a low-risk environment that enables legal mining entities not to adhere to espoused ESG guidelines and encourages illegal mining activity (any such activity that takes place without receiving state permission, such as land rights or exploration permits). This has resulted in illegal mining into protected areas and the displacement of Indigenous people in many regions. For example, Interpol found that Bolivia and Colombia are major sources of illegal gold, while Ecuador, Panama, and Peru are both sources and processing centers for illegally extracted ores. Illegal mining is highly associated with transnational criminal activity, as well as with human rights violations, environmental degradation, and corruption. Like many illicit activities that exist where rule of law or enforcement capacity is weak, it is a symptom of inadequate governing authority and a lack of alternate employment opportunities.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<p>Abandoned or improperly closed mines are attractive to illegal mining operations. Proper closure protocols have not always been common practice and remain underutilized. Nearly a quarter of jurisdictions globally do not require mine closure plans, according to a 2019–2020 survey conducted by the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and Sustainable Development. Only 45 percent of the IGF member governments that responded to the survey require companies to provide adequate financial assurance for rehabilitation and other closure costs. Failure to effectively manage a post-mining transition can result in unnecessary, lasting damage to local communities and the environment around them.</p> +<p>In October 2023, Ukraine’s minister of economy acknowledged, “Without demining, we will not be able to fully launch our economy. Mine clearance is therefore the starting point for the recovery of our country and its economy.” Significant progress against the challenge of demining Ukraine’s farmland is clear. At the same time, the scale of landmine contamination across Ukraine’s farmland and the importance of sustained agricultural activity to its economic recovery require unparalleled measures by the Ukrainian government along with support from international partners.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-studies"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Studies</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Following is a description of ongoing best practices and additional steps needed to demine Ukraine’s farmland.</p> <ul> <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Rio Blanco, located in the lower Andes of Peru, is owned by Hong Kong’s Junefield Mineral Resources and the Hunan Gold Corporation. The mine has faced criticism for ramping up production despite expert warnings that such endeavors could release heavy metals and increase the risk of acid drainage from the mine to local water sources.</code></em></p> + <p>The Ukrainian government is prioritizing humanitarian demining at the highest levels, including by the leadership of the Ministries of Economy and Defence, as well as by the prime minister.</p> </li> <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Mirador and San Carlos Panantza copper mines, located in the Ecuadorian Amazon, have become infamous for the tensions between the Chinese mining consortium CRCC-Tongguan and the local Indigenous community. Natural sites around the mines are ceremonially significant to the Shuar Arutam people, who have grown increasingly frustrated by the mine’s misuse of sacred areas in the Arutam region. The Ecuadorian Constitutional Court found in September 2022 that the Shuar were not sufficiently consulted before Chinese investors opened the San Carlos Panantza mine, thereby delaying its opening. In response to criticism, Chinese investors have tried to co-opt local leaders, avoid cultural and environmental guardrails, and force residents to relocate. According to a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, CRCC-Tongguan worked to turn Ecuadorian national elites against the Shuar and employed divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities.</code></em></p> + <p>In the course of adapting demining services to the ongoing war, the Ukrainian government recognizes that inefficiencies remain and is attempting to expedite the provision of humanitarian demining services and reduce the cost to Ukraine’s farmers through the recently launched demining market on the Prozorro system and through soft loans to farmers.</p> </li> <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Brazil’s Juruti Mine, run by Alcoa World Alumina, has been assessed as having 700 million metric tons of bauxite, the raw material used to make aluminum. To address its environmental impact, the Juruti Mine has put forward a biodiversity action plan that aims to make mining operations carbon-neutral by 2030 via offsetting the land used for mining each year by an equal acreage of rehabilitated land. Alcoa partnered with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to explore how to best contribute to biodiversity. The Juruti mine is also employing a new reforestation method called nucleation to replenish destroyed fauna. In their efforts, they are mindfully creating non-timber forest jobs, such as harvesting Brazil nuts or cultivating honey, as well as developing small-scale farming projects for locals.</code></em></p> + <p>The Ukrainian government is also tracking the resources needed to demine Ukraine’s farmland, including demining equipment and training for deminers.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The Action Plan for Demining Ukraine’s Agricultural Lands aims to synchronize humanitarian demining of Ukraine’s farmland, and the Ukrainian government is attempting to unify all Ukrainian government demining activities under a forthcoming mine action strategy, which the Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining is presently drafting.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>At the same time, the Ukrainian government should continue to take steps to reduce the prevalence of “dark demining” of Ukraine’s agricultural land and demining by farmers themselves, recognizing risks to the safety of farmers and other civilians.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Furthermore, the Ukrainian government is coordinating regularly with international partners to fill gaps and prevent overlaps in services, including through the International Donors’ Conference on Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Finally, the Ukrainian government and its partners appear to be aligning activities with UNMAS’s Five Pillars of Mine Action, including mine education, with Minister of Economy Svyrydenko recently emphasizing the need for a “nationwide awareness campaign to educate children from an early age about the dangers of explosive ordnance.”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The complete humanitarian demining of Ukraine will require 10,000 sappers, necessitating an additional 7,000 deminers to supplement the 3,000 specialists working across the country today, according to Prime Minister Shmyhal. Funding for deminers’ training and salaries must be increased, with training for one sapper costing up to $6,000.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Conducting non-technical surveys prior to other humanitarian demining procedures is the most cost-effective way to confirm the presence of landmine contamination and efficiently release non-contaminated land. In its action plan and national mine action strategy, the Ukrainian government should formalize the release of low- and no-risk land through non-technical surveys before conducting technical surveys in order to release more land for economic use as quickly as possible.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In completing non-technical surveys, technical surveys, and mine removal, sappers should have access to advanced demining technologies, including drones, ground-penetrating radar, and satellite imagery analysis enhanced by artificial intelligence, in order to expedite humanitarian demining and increase the safety of deminers.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Ukraine should continue to invest in its capacity to manufacture advanced demining equipment locally.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In the face of the rapid evolution of Ukrainian government demining processes, the Ukrainian government should continue to clearly communicate the steps farmers must take to access certified demining services and receive compensation for them, including through the newly announced demining market under the Prozorro system.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The Ukrainian government and international partners should also attempt to reduce the cost to farmers of humanitarian demining of their agricultural land, recognizing that any costs borne by farmers will detract from investments in agricultural production, resulting in lower farmer incomes, production, and exports nationwide.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Given the urgent need for actionable information about the impacts of demining on agricultural land, and the fragility of the ecosystems on which agricultural activity depends, Ukraine’s government and international partners should invest in research on the impacts of demining agricultural land and disseminate best practices for demining Ukraine’s farmland to minimize impacts on soil fertility, water, and agricultural productivity. Such considerations and steps should be codified in plans for demining Ukraine’s farmland today and in the future, for the awareness of Ukrainian and international deminers.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The Ukrainian government and partners should also increase the availability of soil testing to ensure the absence of chemical contamination and the safety of crops produced.</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="great-power-competition-in-mining">Great Power Competition in Mining</h3> - -<p>Political leaders in Latin America are eager to unlock the potential of their natural resources, even if it means awarding bids to China’s state-controlled mining operations. China has experienced undeniable success in the region. According to the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker, 21 percent of the $148.9 billion Chinese entities invested in Latin American and Caribbean countries between 2005 and 2022 was in the mining and metals sector. In January 2023, a consortium of the Chinese firms, Contemporary Amperex Technology, Guangdong Brunp Recycling Technology, and CMOC Group, won the rights to extract Bolivia’s lithium deposits. The $1 billion investment is estimated to yield 50,000 metric tons of battery-grade lithium carbonate per year. Moreover, China has invested over $10 billion in Peru’s mining industry and now owns two of Peru’s five largest copper mines.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Humanitarian demining is more than just neutralizing mines or other explosive devices. It is about providing people with the opportunity to return to their homes and live safely. It’s about the recovery of the economy and the restoration of the country, and ultimately, about global food security.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>China’s mining advancements in Latin and South America should concern environmentalists and humanitarians as much as it worries national security policymakers. Chinese companies frequently fail to conduct adequate environmental impact assessments or consult with local Indigenous communities. A 2023 report presented to the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights documented 14 cases in Latin America where Chinese companies committed environmental destruction or violated human rights. Western firms are certainly not all without incidents and controversies, but none of the top ESG performers, according to trade publication Mining Technology, are of Chinese origin. Western firms are ESG leaders in the industry and should continue innovating and implementing towards that end to better offer alternatives to Chinese investments.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="-vitalii-dankevych">— Vitalii Dankevych</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>U.S. companies are competing against Chinese state-subsidized companies that do not adhere to the more stringent ESG standards or anticorruption requirements Western firms must abide by. Though Chinese regulators are working to standardize corporate ESG disclosure reporting, the Guidance for Enterprise ESG Disclosure that took effect in June 2022 mostly requires data reporting and complying with (often weak) local regulations. Rather than doing the minimum required by the host country, U.S. companies usually maintain high standards wherever they operate. Western firms are more likely to incorporate community engagement and consultation, while Chinese firms had 23 allegations of insufficient consultation from January 2021 to December 2022. It was not until May 2023 that the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals &amp; Chemicals Importers &amp; Exporters (CCCMC), launched a pilot consultation mechanism. It is in U.S. companies’ interest to build the capacity of local governments, which would give these companies a comparative advantage over Chinese state-subsidized firms. The United States cannot make China’s offers less financially attractive for host nations. A level playing field will never be achieved so long as there is the possibility of a firm underbidding others by cutting corners on ESG best practices. Navigating the stakeholder landscape to achieve this will require collaboration among government officials, corporations, and local communities.</p> +<h3 id="fertilizer">Fertilizer</h3> -<p>Additionally, in instances where companies do not self-regulate, government authorities could develop traceability programs. Accessibility leads to transparency, which improves adherence to best practices. While traceability is not a substitute for good governance and strong rule of law, increasing transparency does support and improve governance. Western companies and the U.S. government cannot do due diligence if knowledge of relevant supply chains is lacking. Moreover, as global consumers and investors become increasingly conscious of ESG goals, companies that demonstrate their dedication to these principles can attract more capital. Traceability may give consumers and end users the information needed to shape the market in a way that rewards ESG best practices even when host countries lack the capacity to do so.</p> +<p>Ukraine is endowed with uniquely fertile farmland. Nearly two-thirds of Ukraine’s total arable land is covered in black soils, a highly fertile soil type containing ideal clay content for plant growth and high quantities of organic matter, such as humus, and nutrients, including calcium, nitrogen, phosphates, and potassium. Ukraine’s wealth of fertile soil facilitated its rise as a major global food supplier, even as it applied less fertilizers per hectare compared to neighboring countries.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/S3ILfmT.jpg" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ A farmer rides a floater truck spraying fertilizers on a farm in Kyiv on April 19, 2023.</em></p> -<p>Implementing ESG best practices will make the Latin American region more stable and prosperous. The sooner such practices are well established, with all stakeholders in the mining value chain adhering to them, the less exploitation and environmental conflict there will be. In this regard, U.S.-based companies should view responsible mining and the implementation of ESG standards not as a burden, but as a selling point. Fortunately, many firms already share this perspective, and aim high by going beyond the minimum standards. Yet there is still work to be done throughout the entire mine-to-market value chain to enhance the comparative advantage of firms that are ESG-conscious. Companies, regulators, and end users need to collaborate to continue moving in the right direction.</p> +<p>While harvesting crops removes essential nutrients from soils, mineral fertilizers replace these nutrients for subsequent harvests. Ukraine’s major agricultural harvests require application of nitrogen, in the form of ammonia nitrate, urea, anhydrous ammonia, and other forms; phosphorus, in the form of diammonium phosphate, monoammonium phosphate, and other forms; and potassium or potassic fertilizer, in the form of potash. Worldwide, fertilizers have accounted for a large share of agricultural productivity growth over the past century.</p> -<hr /> +<h3 id="impacts-of-russias-invasion-on-fertilizer-use-in-ukraine">Impacts of Russia’s Invasion on Fertilizer Use in Ukraine</h3> -<p><strong>Romina Bandura</strong> is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development and the Project on U.S. Leadership in Development at CSIS. Her current research focuses on the future of work in developing countries and the United States’ economic engagement in the developing world. She has also conducted extensive research on enhancing the reach and impact of the Multilateral Development Bank system.</p> +<p>Ukraine’s increased agricultural production and exports over the past two decades are largely due to an increase in the use of fertilizers by Ukrainian farmers. Russia’s invasion has disrupted Ukrainian farmers’ ability to purchase and apply fertilizers since 2022. According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Ukrainian farmers applied 27.7 percent less fertilizer in 2022 than 2021, using roughly 20.8 million metric tons of mineral fertilizers in 2022 compared to 28.8 million metric tons in 2021, representing declines in the use of nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic fertilizers. Reductions continued into the 2022–2023 season: compared to average rates from 2018 to 2022, a March 2023 survey of 119 agricultural enterprises in Ukraine found that nitrogen application decreased by 16 percent for corn and wheat, 19 percent for sunflower, 21 percent for canola oil crops, and 24 percent for soybeans. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food shows that access has not improved as the country heads into its third growing season since Russia’s invasion: most Ukrainian farmers will be able to apply only half the fertilizers necessary for the 2024 harvest season, with only 10 percent of respondents fully equipped to meet their crops’ fertilizer needs.</p> -<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) at CSIS. In this role, he supports the team’s research agenda, business development opportunities, and event coordination.</p>Romina Bandura and Austin HardmanAs demand for minerals increases to achieve an energy transition, companies, regulators, and end users will need to assess the entire mine-to-market value chain to ensure that all firms are incentivized to adhere to best practices.Red Lines And Red Crosses2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/red-lines-and-red-crosses<p><em>International law fails to protect healthcare facilities in armed conflict. They need specific protection from harm.</em></p> +<p>Insufficient fertilizer use impacts the quality and quantity of current and future harvests. According to the first deputy minister of Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, a decrease in fertilizer application by 30 percent or more can reduce yields by 50 percent. The consequences of reduced fertilizer application can vary from farm to farm, depending on the nutrients applied, the crops cultivated, the season’s soil and climatic conditions, and the practices farmers employ throughout the season. A farm’s history of crop cultivation also determines which nutrients are present in the soil at the time of planting and which nutrients need to be applied for a specific crop’s optimal yield. Excessive application of one or more types of nutrients can likewise impact the quality and quantity of an upcoming harvest. Fertilizer application is not a one-size-fits-all practice, and many agricultural enterprises seeking to reduce any adverse effects of excessive mineral fertilizer application rely on soil testing to tailor the nutrients applied to the specific needs of their soil. As Ukrainian farmers have faced difficulties accessing and affording a range of mineral fertilizers, they have resorted to applying whatever nutrients are available in their own stores or from local suppliers, often not within recommended timeframes, which may have long-term impacts on Ukraine’s soil.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="fertilizer-and-ukraines-agricultural-economy">Fertilizer and Ukraine’s Agricultural Economy</h3> -<p>If there is one thing that the whole world could be said to have agreed on and united around, surely it is International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as encapsulated in the Geneva Conventions. They were signed by every single state, a feat only replicated a handful of times, mostly around another world-unifying issue: climate change. Even the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Chemical Weapons Convention have not reached that milestone.</p> +<p>Access to fertilizer is necessary for the livelihoods of Ukraine’s farmers and for Ukraine’s agricultural output, two related but distinct facets of Ukraine’s agricultural economy. Across Ukraine, roughly 2.7 million people were engaged in agricultural activity in 2021, comprising 17.3 percent of Ukraine’s total labor force. Access to fertilizers is important to small-scale farmers (farmers cultivating less than 500 hectares), who operate 82.4 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural enterprises, as it is central to the prosperity of their farms. Access to fertilizers is critical for medium- and large-scale producers, who operate the remaining 17.6 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural enterprises and are responsible for the majority of Ukraine’s agricultural exports and export revenues: agricultural enterprises cultivating over 500 hectares of farmland made up nearly 80 percent of Ukraine’s cereal and legume crop production in 2022. Medium- and large-scale enterprises are better able to access and afford fertilizers than small-scale farmers: the 10 percent of agricultural enterprises surveyed by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food that can meet their crops’ fertilizer needs in 2024 are medium- or large-scale operations, with no surveyed small-scale farmers reporting that their fertilizer needs are met for the upcoming season.</p> -<p>Yet, despite this universal rejection of attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure – especially, in the context of this Commentary, hospitals and healthcare workers – they occur daily. The World Health Organization monitors the extent of the problem, and at the time of writing, its dashboard stands at 855 attacks in 18 countries this year. This is almost certainly a gross underestimate, and only paints a broad-brush picture – while documenting 1,180 such attacks in Ukraine since January 2022, it does not convey that 190 of those facilities were completely destroyed. The vast majority of these attacks are intentional. During a period of analysis of attacks in Syria, 22% of all infrastructure damaged was healthcare-related, compared with only 3% for schools. This has led some to assert that the Red Cross is now the “Dread Cross” – a target rather than a protection – and that protecting hospitals requires a different approach.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/62OPPqG.png" alt="image06" /></p> -<p>An important question is whether this is a problem for the international community at all. After all, the Geneva Conventions do not rule out an attack on a hospital. The law itself is simple – hospitals are protected – but this is caveated by “provided they are not military objectives”. The Conventions do not define all the circumstances in which hospitals lose their protection, but the International Committee of the Red Cross commentaries give illustrations: combatants setting up a firing position there; storing ammunition; sheltering troops; or using it as a “human shield”. This last is especially problematic. It is the nature of hospitals, when surrounded by fighting, to occupy a liminal space; they serve the health needs of anyone in need. Critically, they also have no power to reject combatants – so they can lose their protection because of an action over which they have no agency. This is something that current legal frameworks struggle to manage. Even when there are prosecutions, they are rarely successful. Indeed, some argue that focusing on accountability for war crimes through International Criminal Law may even be weakening some elements of the harder-to-prove IHL.</p> +<p>As fertilizer prices remain high within Ukraine, Ukrainian farmers are adjusting their sowing plans to plant crops whose nutrient requirements they can meet with current fertilizer stores. Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food also observes farmers basing their plans on the needs of domestic markets as export routes remain limited, sowing their fields with more peas, barley, millet, and oats relative to prewar harvests. According to the FAO’s January–February 2023 survey, nearly 20 percent of small-scale farmers in Ukraine, defined by the FAO as cultivating 250 hectares or less, had stopped purchasing fertilizers due to high prices. Of the 1,927 agricultural enterprises interviewed by the FAO, 81 percent expressed a need for more fertilizers to continue agricultural activities. Ukrainian farmers, especially small- and medium-sized producers, have resorted to a barter system with input suppliers in which fertilizers are purchased with grains and agricultural products.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Indeed, some argue that focusing on accountability for war crimes through International Criminal Law may even be weakening some elements of the harder-to-prove International Humanitarian Law</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="factors-restricting-access-to-fertilizers-in-ukraine">Factors Restricting Access to Fertilizers in Ukraine</h3> -<p>Consider also the realities of military necessity. Close quarters fighting to rid a hospital of a prepared enemy force will be extremely challenging and costs many soldiers’ lives. It may significantly slow an advance (that may itself be time critical). It may allow the enemy to escape, regroup and attack elsewhere. These specific dangers may be overcome by a heavy bombardment that simply destroys the facility – but they are not the only relevant risks. The tactical advantage of an overwhelming attack comes with long-term operational and strategic costs that may be far greater.</p> +<p>Ukrainian farmers’ reduced access to fertilizer is due to numerous, concurrent shocks, including global fertilizer price spikes following Russia’s invasion, curtailed nitrogenous fertilizer production within Ukraine, and high logistics costs due to Russia’s obstruction of Ukraine’s primary trade routes.</p> -<p>The commander may legally strike the hospital that has lost its protection only if the military advantage achieved will outweigh the expected collateral damage. But how well-informed are commanders about the extent of that collateral damage? They know of course that it will involve civilian casualties, as hospitals in conflict-affected areas are typically overcrowded with the most vulnerable sections of society, seeking either treatment or refuge. There will also be the staff tending to them. These represent the direct harm of the attack. But is that it? Hospitals take years to build, require enormous resources to stock, and replacement staff for those who have been killed, injured or driven away by the violence take time to train or recruit. The health economy loses a critical node and so, for years after, those who seek care may not be able to access it effectively. People will sicken and die from perfectly treatable conditions, for lack of ongoing management of their long-term health conditions and for loss of capacity to treat their new ones. This is the indirect harm and it is vast; for every one killed by the attack itself, at least 11 die of these indirect harms. The groups most affected by both are the children, women, elderly and ill – the same groups least able to flee to access healthcare elsewhere.</p> +<h4 id="global-price-spikes">Global Price Spikes</h4> -<p>There are other costs that are harder to quantify, but militarily may be even more apposite. It could conceivably be the best military solution, if the objective is to win the war, but it makes no sense at all if the objective is to win the peace. Victory achieved by destroying the capacity or will of the enemy to continue the fight only brings negative peace: the absence of fighting. It rarely lasts, because the capacity and will to fight can be regrown. As US counterinsurgency doctrine notes, “Kill[ing] 5 insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 50 more, and loss of local support”. The rubble of a hospital is guaranteed to alienate the population, engendering a lasting sense of grievance that will fuel the will to fight again. Positive peace, where the factions share a sense of social justice such that neither wants nor needs to fight, is far more likely to persist. Access to healthcare is a key component of positive peace. If the commander knew that cumulative harms and grievance resulting from the hospital attack would also inspire their enemy to rise up again in five years and attack them even harder, would they still call in an airstrike? Or would they take the harder option and target the enemy at close quarters?</p> +<p>Despite carveouts for food and fertilizer exports, international sanctions on Russian and Belarusian banking, trade, and energy sectors have reduced the two countries’ share of the world’s fertilizer trade, estimated at 18 percent in 2020, triggering global price spikes for all mineral fertilizers. In Ukraine, farmers’ fertilizer stocks helped insulate them from initial fertilizer price spikes, but domestic prices rose by the fall of 2022 after farmers exhausted their fertilizer supplies. The implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2022 expanded agricultural exports, increasing farmers’ working capital — and increasing demand for fertilizers and other agricultural inputs. As farmers prepared for the spring 2023 sowing campaign, fertilizer prices increased. For example, prices for potassium nitrate, or saltpeter, rose from UAH 27,000 (roughly $750) per metric ton to UAH 37,000 (roughly $1,025) per metric ton from July to October 2022. By February 2023, farmers spent UAH 8,000–9,000 (roughly $220–250) for the nitrogenous fertilizers needed to cultivate just one hectare of corn, excluding additional costs for fuel, potassic and phosphatic fertilizers, and other inputs, compared to prewar prices of roughly UAH 6,000 (roughly $165).</p> -<p>Can you still bomb a hospital, while somehow mitigating these problems? We often hear that IHL-compliant warnings are given to evacuate areas before they are attacked. The reality is that this is a normally a facade. A UK hospital, such as the one in which the author works, could undoubtedly be evacuated completely – for example if there was a major fire – but patients would come to harm. New patients would die waiting for ambulances, as frontline vehicles were diverted to moving existing patients. The frail or critically ill may well die from interruption of their care. The entire regional health system would have to slash routine and emergency care to cope, which would severely degrade it for weeks or months. And all of this in a stable, developed, interoperable health system. If it were the only functioning hospital in a region, where would the patients go? If the ambulance system were weak and overwhelmed by conflict casualties, who would move them? For a significant number, these notifications will simply give advance warning of their death – either in the hospital, or without adequate care nearby. No one should ever believe that you can bomb a hospital in a way that does not have extensive, enduring impacts on the population served by it.</p> +<p>In addition to disruptions in global fertilizer markets, energy price spikes affected global fertilizer prices in the months following Russia’s invasion. Global price spikes for natural gas and coal, key ingredients in the manufacturing of fertilizers, reduced fertilizer production capacity and added further upward pressure on fertilizer prices around the world. Europe’s fertilizer industry was hit especially hard as countries slashed imports of Russian natural gas, coal, and oil. High manufacturing costs forced plants to close across the region, reducing Europe’s overall fertilizer production by approximately 70 percent and its nitrogenous fertilizer production capacity by 50 to 60 percent in 2022. China’s ammonia production also contracted in response to high coal prices following Russia’s invasion. China’s October 2021 restrictions on fertilizer exports kept its 25 percent share of the global trade off global markets until December 2022, which pushed fertilizer prices even higher during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Nor is this simply about influencing tactical decision-making. Degrading the health of a population has international consequences too</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="reduced-domestic-production-of-nitrogenous-fertilizers">Reduced Domestic Production of Nitrogenous Fertilizers</h4> -<p>Nor is this simply about influencing tactical decision-making. Degrading the health of a population has international consequences too. People who are unsafe and cannot access basic services will try to move. Mass refugee flows negatively impact health and stability in surrounding countries and so are generally detrimental to the interests of the wider international community.</p> +<p>Prior to Russia’s invasion, Ukraine produced enough nitrogenous fertilizer to meet over 70 percent of domestic demand. In 2021, domestic production exceeded 5.2 million metric tons, while Ukraine imported 1.4 million metric tons of nitrogenous fertilizers. After Russia’s invasion, only two of Ukraine’s five nitrogenous fertilizer factories remained operational, causing domestic production to fall by 78.3 percent to 1.1 million metric tons in 2022, and imports to triple to 4.3 million metric tons. By February 2023, the Cherkasy Azot and Rivneazot factories increased production capacity by 40 percent and 50 percent, respectively, but Ukrainian farmers still saw a shortage of mineral fertilizers, including nitrogenous fertilizers, ahead of the 2023 spring sowing campaign.</p> -<p>Ironically, it may be the approach of the international community that lies at the root of this problem. Evaluation of the ICRC Healthcare in Danger project suggests progress against its objectives of engagement, preparation and legislation; this is not a failure of advocacy on the part of such organisations. Nor is it (generally) the result of malfunctioning munitions, or human error. As then Médecins Sans Frontières International President Joanne Liu told the UN Security Council in 2016:</p> +<h4 id="high-logistics-costs-due-to-obstructed-trade-routes">High Logistics Costs due to Obstructed Trade Routes</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>On the third of May, this council unanimously passed Resolution 2286. You, the Council Members, pledged to protect civilians and the medical services they need to survive. You passed the resolution in the wake of the obliteration of Al Quds Hospital, in Aleppo by the Syrian government and its allies … Five months later, the resolution has plainly failed to change anything on the ground. This failure reflects a lack of political will.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports obstructed trade routes that were previously responsible for over 90 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural exports and a majority of its fertilizer imports. This sudden lack of access to its primary, high-volume trade routes forced Ukrainian traders and agricultural enterprises to turn to road, rail, and river routes for fertilizer supplies from new sources. According to Ruslan Voytovych, the director and founder of Arus Trade, a fertilizer importer in Ukraine, his company’s shift to road transport routes significantly limited the volume of supplies he could import and raised delivery costs by 60 percent in the months following Russia’s invasion. Taras Ivashchenko, the head of Belor Ukraine, another Ukrainian fertilizer importer, found that the Danube River ports can only handle 30,000 to 40,000 metric tons of fertilizer imports per month, which is “almost nothing” for the Ukrainian market.</p> -<p>Accepting international laws that allow commanders to determine military necessity for themselves, using ill-informed collateral risk assessments to decide what is subjectively proportionate, may be facilitating attacks on healthcare rather than stopping them. Increasingly it seems more likely to be used as a framework for the subsequent justification of an attack, than as a protection to prevent one.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3gx92PM.jpg" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ A fisherman walks on the banks of the Danube River near the port of Izmail, southwestern Ukraine, on July 27, 2023.</em></p> -<p>So as conflicts affecting healthcare rage in 18 countries this year, what can be done to break this pattern? First, the international community can acknowledge the reality: healthcare is openly attacked during wars, and IHL does not currently offer meaningful protection to hospitals in high intensity conflict. Then it can ask how that can be changed. Perhaps the clue to one simple measure lies in the Chemical Weapons Convention, itself so close to complete international agreement. There are some weapons that must not be used. An additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions could, at the stroke of a pen, simply preclude the use of explosive weapons on hospitals. Hospitals could still be targeted if there was military necessity – and their use as command posts or ammunition dumps could still justify that – but it would have to be done by small arms, and line of sight. It would be bloody, but it would be the blood of combatants, not civilians. The infrastructure would remain, to treat the population afterwards. The staff will be alive to undertake their duties. Perhaps most importantly, it would not harden the will of the entire population against the attackers; it would leave space for lasting peace, rather than sowing the seeds of the next generation of conflict.</p> +<h3 id="ukrainian-government-and-international-efforts-to-improve-access-to-fertilizers">Ukrainian Government and International Efforts to Improve Access to Fertilizers</h3> -<hr /> +<p>Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food has supported farmers’ applications for fertilizer aid through the State Agrarian Register and coordinated agricultural aid through this system, while Ukraine’s bilateral and multilateral partners have invested to improve Ukrainian farmers’ access to fertilizers. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched the AGRI-Ukraine initiative in July 2022 to help meet the needs of Ukrainian small- and medium-scale farmers for agricultural inputs, financing, improved export logistics and infrastructure, and capacity for drying, storing, and processing harvests. As of July 2023, USAID contributed $350 million, leveraged an additional $250 million from other donors and the private sector, and was seeking to leverage a further $250 million for the initiative. As of the time of publication, AGRI-Ukraine had provided 12,892 small-scale Ukrainian farmers (defined, in this case, as cultivating less than 500 hectares of farmland) with approximately 18,300 tons of complex and nitrogenous fertilizers for the 2023 spring and autumn campaigns. This September, the initiative announced a partnership with South Korea to deliver to Ukrainian farmers $5 million of fertilizers donated by South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</p> -<p><strong>Si Horne</strong> is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. An Army Emergency Medicine doctor, he has supported operations in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and South Sudan as well as serving as the Emergency Medicine lead for the Army.</p>Si HorneInternational law fails to protect healthcare facilities in armed conflict. They need specific protection from harm.On Critical Minerals2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/on-critical-minerals<p><em>This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks.</em></p> +<p>International agricultural aid packages have largely targeted the small- and medium-sized enterprises otherwise unable to sustain operation in wartime, but assistance also funnels through the Ukrainian government’s “Affordable Loans at 5-7-9 percent” program, which offers low-rate subsidized lending for agricultural enterprises of all sizes. Launched in early 2020, the program provides loans up to UAH 90.0 million (roughly $2.5 million), depending on the loan type and the enterprise’s size and activity. The program has received direct financing from the World Bank through USAID’s AGRI-Ukraine initiative and provided UAH 158.0 billion (nearly $4.4 billion) to agricultural enterprises through 40,509 loan agreements since February 2022. Combined with the FAO’s cash transfers, this assistance has enabled farmers to afford the purchase of fertilizers at elevated prices from in-country suppliers. According to CSIS interviews, Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food has encouraged partners to concentrate investments into this soft loan program over procuring and distributing in-kind fertilizer donations, as this financing concurrently empowers farmers to decide which inputs to prioritize purchasing and sustains business for Ukrainian fertilizer suppliers. Farmers in front-line oblasts, however, benefit more from in-kind fertilizer donations, as active conflict disrupts these farmers’ ability to obtain fertilizer on local markets.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="securing-long-term-alternative-fertilizer-suppliers">Securing Long-Term Alternative Fertilizer Suppliers</h3> -<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Kmrg5en.png" alt="image08" /></p> -<p>Critical minerals are broadly defined as minerals that are of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security and are also subject to serious risks relating to the security of their supply. This paper uses the term “critical minerals” broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that this is not a fixed list, and that a country’s specific assessment will affect whether a mineral is considered critical.</p> +<p>Ukraine fertilizer imports were down significantly in 2022 compared to 2021, ranging from a decline of 65 percent for nitrogenous-based fertilizers to over 85 percent decline for potassic fertilizers. Historically, Russia and Belarus supplied fertilizer and fertilizer ingredients to Ukraine. While Ukraine instituted an embargo of Russian fertilizer imports in 2018 due to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Donbas and the Crimea annexation, it was still heavily dependent on Belarusian supplies when Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Over 2019–2021, Belarus alone accounted for 71 percent of Ukraine’s potash imports, 58 percent of its urea imports, and 41 percent of its complex fertilizers imports, or fertilizers containing all three nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic elements. With Belarusian imports essentially ending with Russia’s full-scale invasion in late February 2022, Ukraine relied on other trade partners such as Poland, Germany, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for its potash imports in 2022. As Ukraine’s trade relationships with two of the world’s largest fertilizers producers are now severed, the government of Ukraine and Ukrainian agricultural enterprises are struggling to identify alternative sources to fill the considerable supply gap left by foregone Russian and Belarusian imports.</p> -<p>A dramatically increased supply of these minerals will be vital for the net zero transition – both in the UK and internationally – and to meet the target to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, set at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Conference in 2015.</p> +<p>Ukraine faces different challenges accessing nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic fertilizers. Even with curtailed domestic production capacity, Ukraine can meet some of its domestic demand for nitrogenous fertilizers, and Ukraine’s trade partners can supply additional nitrogenous fertilizer as well as phosphatic fertilizers. However, securing alternative potash suppliers will remain a challenge for Ukraine’s agricultural enterprises. The global potash market is highly concentrated, with Russia and Belarus accounting for 41 percent of global potash trade in 2020. The world’s top producer of potash is Canada, with 39 percent of global market share, but transporting supplies from Canada to Ukraine would require long and costly freight shipments in addition to overland transport through Europe. This inherently expensive route introduces complex logistical issues and would likely only result in high potash prices on domestic Ukrainian markets if attempted. Kernel, Ukraine’s largest producer and exporter of vegetable oils, procured two vessels of complex fertilizers and potash from Morocco’s OCPGroup and Jordan’s Arab Potash Company in the summer of 2023. However, concerns remain as to whether these potential trade partners could supply enough potash to meet the significant needs of Ukrainian farmers, especially as food producers around the world are anticipating higher demand for potash in the coming decades. To meet domestic needs, Ukraine will likely have to turn to smaller potash producers that are closer to home, such as Germany, Israel, and Jordan.</p> -<p>Yet the extraction of critical minerals poses various environmental and human security risks, many of which pose a threat to the net zero transition, in the UK and globally. This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks. It identifies key environmental risks as including the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, pollution, soil degradation, water scarcity and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks identified include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses, labour exploitation, crime, conflict and corruption. Where mining takes place on or near Indigenous lands, both environmental and human security risks are found to disproportionately affect already-disenfranchised communities.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dWMxBc0.png" alt="image09" /></p> -<p>While a number of these risks are well established, there is a potential for burgeoning demand for critical minerals to accelerate potential harms. Such harms can occur in situations where rising demand pushes governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; where new extractive operations open up in countries without mining histories, which lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; where harmful boom–bust cycles of extractive activity occur due to ongoing technological advances; and where a race to secure supplies of critical minerals exacerbates competition and geopolitical tensions.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations-1">Recommendations</h3> -<p>If the mining sector fails to address these risks as demand booms, public opinion across source and supply countries might turn against the net zero transition as the harms are perceived to outweigh the benefits. It is crucial that the UK leverages its unique position as an international trade, financial and mining hub to help the international community mitigate the risks posed in this regard.</p> +<p>As the war continues to suppress agricultural production in Ukraine, the Ukrainian government continues to help improve Ukrainian producers’ access to fertilizer, and access to fertilizer remains a priority within support packages from Ukraine’s partners to its agricultural sector. This aid has been essential to maintaining Ukrainian agricultural production since February 2022. Nonetheless, the amount of assistance has been insufficient to meet farmers’ immediate needs, indicating the importance of additional efforts in this regard.</p> -<p>Based on the findings of this research, the authors suggest the following ways forward for consideration by the UK government, many of which are also applicable to other governments in the Global North:</p> +<p>Following is a description of ongoing best practices and additional steps needed to increase access to fertilizer.</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures, Science-Based Targets for Nature, Global Reporting Initiative and other similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.</p> + <p>Improved information about the specific fertilizer needs of Ukraine’s farmland, including through investing in both remote sensing and traditional laboratory soil-testing programs could enable farmers to purchase the right quantity of the right nutrients and inform the government’s projections for domestic fertilizer requirements.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Develop an updated industrial strategy on critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.</p> + <p>Investment in Ukraine’s national infrastructure for geospatial data would enable high-quality, rapid soil analysis that could predict Ukraine’s fertilizer needs with greater accuracy.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the “levelling up” agenda.</p> + <p>As international partners such as USAID, the FAO, and others continue to support Ukrainian farmers’ access to fertilizers, improved information sharing regarding the long-term plans for Ukraine’s fertilizer market would help partners align their assistance with the needs of Ukrainian farmers and fertilizer producers.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.</p> + <p>At the same time, Ukraine’s partners should support rebuilding Ukraine’s capacity to produce nitrogenous fertilizers domestically, restoring — or even exceeding — Ukraine’s prewar production capacity, which will require an uninterrupted supply of raw materials, particularly natural gas.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.</p> + <p>As Ukraine rebuilds its capacity to produce fertilizers domestically, the Ukrainian government and partners should continue to calibrate assistance so as not to reduce demand for Ukrainian-produced fertilizers and fertilizers secured by domestic suppliers.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks. This could involve providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation. Such regulation should improve the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries, in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.</p> + <p>Ukraine’s candidacy for membership in the European Union will necessitate further reforms to its agriculture sector and production standards as the European Union aims for climate neutrality by 2050. For instance, aligning with the European Union’s common agricultural policy requires Ukraine certify 3 percent of its total agricultural land as organic by 2030. As Ukraine and its partners work to secure sufficient mineral fertilizer suppliers to fill the gap left by foregone Russian and Belarusian imports, concurrently incentivizing increased use of organic fertilizers would help sustain production and soil fertility, as well as support the country’s path to EU integration.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises the pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth, and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources.</p> + <p>Finally, international partners should support Ukraine’s efforts to secure long-term suppliers of fertilizer, especially potash, to replace foregone inputs from Belarus and Russia.</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>The UK, alongside many other countries, has committed to bringing the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050. These commitments rely on the transition from an energy sector reliant on fossil fuels to one dominated by net zero or green technologies, particularly renewables. This transition depends on securing reliable supplies of critical minerals.</p> +<p>Ukraine’s agriculture sector has been a major front in Russia’s war since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. The systematic destruction of Ukraine’s farmland, agricultural equipment and infrastructure, and export capacity has contributed to a global food crisis that continues to affect millions around the world. For Ukraine to strengthen its economy to fend off Russia’s continued assault, restore its role as a major global food supplier, and maintain its counterweight to the influence Russia wields through its own agricultural exports, unprecedented support is necessary to restore Ukraine’s natural resources and transform its agricultural institutions, infrastructure, and labor force.</p> -<p>The route to doing so is far from clear. To meet global decarbonisation commitments, an unprecedented scaling up of critical mineral production is required. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), by 2040 at least 30 times as much lithium, nickel and other key minerals could be required by the electric car and battery storage industries to meet global climate targets. In terms of rare earth elements (REEs), global demand is expected to expand by 300%–700% by 2040. In this context, demand for many critical minerals is set to outstrip supply, putting net zero targets at risk.</p> +<p>As urgent needs — related to agriculture and all sectors affected by the war — occupy the attention of Ukraine and its international partners, they should not lose focus on a resource central to Ukraine’s rise as a global agricultural powerhouse: its black soils. The focus of this report has been the safe and expeditious demining of Ukraine’s farmland and increasing farmers’ access to fertilizer. Essential to both endeavors is soil testing, which could both ensure the safety of agricultural land once it has been cleared of mines and help farmers determine the appropriate types and levels of fertilizer to apply to their land. Rebuilding Ukraine’s agriculture sector from the ground up must involve identifying the optimal set of soil testing methods for Ukraine’s agricultural soils and scaling up a national infrastructure for such testing within Ukraine in the face of numerous, concurrent challenges imposed by Russia’s war.</p> -<p>Increasing extraction of critical minerals is therefore key, but is also set to have wide-ranging implications and present an array of environmental and human security risks of its own. Some of these risks are already recognised, while others are on the horizon. Of crucial relevance is the fact that critical mineral extraction is currently highly concentrated in a handful of countries and regions and that some of the key mineral-rich countries are fragile and conflict-affected states, or those with weak state capacity and high levels of corruption. Effective policies which actively account for these changing dynamics and address these risks are, therefore, crucial.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RpyCBPi.jpg" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ Farmers use combine harvesters to harvest a wheat field near the city of Bila Tserkva on August 4, 2023, in Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine.</em></p> -<p>From the UK perspective, adequately addressing these risks is essential both to mitigating the harms caused and securing sustainable supply chains, and to safeguarding the UK’s reputation on the global stage. The UK government has branded itself as a “clean energy superpower” and, as a global trade and financial hub, is home to some of the most prominent and profitable mining companies, as well as the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), of which the majority of large-scale mining companies are members. The UK is therefore in a unique position to galvanise action on environmental and human security risks relating to critical mineral extraction and to champion a just global energy transition.</p> +<hr /> -<p>This paper examines existing and emergent environmental and human security risks associated with accelerating critical mineral extraction, and the options available to address these risks from a UK perspective. Specifically, this paper addresses three research questions:</p> +<p><strong>Caitlin Welsh</strong> is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she analyzes the drivers and consequences of food and water insecurity around the world, including for U.S. national security. Her specific areas of focus include the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security and nutrition, food insecurity in the U.S. military, and the coherence between U.S. global water security policy and U.S. global food security policy.</p> -<ol> +<p><strong>Emma Dodd</strong> is a research associate for the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS, where she supports the program’s communication strategy and serves as the point of contact for research relating to the Russia-Ukraine War’s impact on global food security.</p> + +<p><strong>Vitalii Dankevych</strong> is dean of the Faculty of Law, Public Administration and National Security, at Polissia National University in Ukraine and a professor at the Department of International Economic Relations and European Integration.</p> + +<p><strong>Joe Glauber</strong> is a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and currently serves as interim secretary of the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS). He is also a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a non-resident senior adviser at CSIS.</p> + +<p><strong>Antonina Broyaka</strong> is an extension associate with the Department of Agricultural Economics at Kansas State University.</p>Caitlin Welsh, et al.Experts examine two aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural recovery that are critical to increasing its food production and exports: demining farmland and restoring farmers’ access to fertilizers.China In Gulf Energy Transition2023-12-11T12:00:00+08:002023-12-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-gulf-energy-transition<p><em>China has established itself as an essential partner in Gulf states’ energy transition, serving as an investor and developer in renewable energy projects. Western governments, however, have been reluctant to compete with Chinese enterprises in the region.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<h3 id="the-issue">The Issue</h3> + +<ul> <li> - <p>What environmental and human security risks are associated with critical mineral extraction?</p> + <p><strong>After a sluggish start, Gulf states are getting serious about the energy transition.</strong> Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are embarking on a concerted effort to decarbonize their power grids and seek regional and international leadership roles in the new energy world.</p> </li> <li> - <p>How will rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition impact these risks?</p> + <p><strong>China has established itself as an essential partner in Gulf states’ energy transitions.</strong> China and Chinese companies have built on their ties with Gulf states in the oil and petrochemical sectors and have gradually transitioned to higher-value inputs in the renewables sector, becoming investors and coinvestors in Gulf states’ largest-scale solar and wind projects in the Middle East and beyond.</p> </li> <li> - <p>What options exist for the UK to address these risks?</p> + <p><strong>Western governments have been reluctant to compete head-to-head with Chinese enterprises in the renewables sector in the Gulf.</strong> The state capitalist landscape acts as a tacit barrier to entry to private Western firms and is more familiar to Chinese firms.</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<p>The overarching goal is to identify the key environmental and human security risks associated with the net zero transition and provide decision-makers in the mining sector and policy community with the knowledge they need to anticipate and more effectively mitigate these risks.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>It should be noted that there is currently no standard, internationally recognised definition of a critical mineral. Critical minerals are broadly understood as minerals of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security that are also subject to serious risks relating to their security of supply. In the UK, critical minerals are defined according to “economic vulnerability and supply risk”, which are caused by “combinations of factors including but not limited to rapid demand growth, high concentration of supply chains in particular countries, or high levels of price volatility”. Which minerals are defined as critical differs by country and varies over time. The UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy, for example, currently defines a cohort of 18 minerals with high criticality for the UK, as well as outlining a “watchlist” of five minerals deemed to be increasing in criticality. This paper therefore uses the term “critical minerals” broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that there is no fixed list, that minerals considered critical differ according to countries’ specific assessments, and that minerals such as copper and aluminium that are currently not considered critical are also vital for the net zero transition.</p> +<p>Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan do not enjoy strong economic ties. Uzbekistan does not even feature in Saudi Arabia’s top 100 trading partners. Yet, a Saudi state-owned developer, ACWA Power, recently broke ground on central Asia’s largest wind project as part of a planned $7.5 billion investment in Uzbekistan. But this project reveals more about the strength of Saudi-Chinese ties than it does about Uzbekistan. A Saudi company may be the lead developer, but a Chinese manufacturer made the wind turbines, a Chinese company is set to install them, and China’s 49 percent stake in ACWA’s portfolio company helped make it happen.</p> -<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> +<p>Globally, both China and Chinese companies are playing a central role in the energy transition. They are especially prominent in supply chains for renewables, providing critical components for wind, solar, and energy storage projects. China’s dominant position within these critical supply chains has raised alarm bells in the United States and European Union, with both resorting to muscular industrial policy to push back.</p> + +<p>But China has received a considerably warmer welcome in much of the Global South and in the Middle East especially. Chinese companies and capital have grown beyond their traditional role as suppliers of renewable energy components to become investors and project developers, building deeper economic ties with countries in the process. This expansion along the value chain is particularly visible in the Gulf, where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have entered into partnerships with their Chinese counterparts to codevelop large-scale renewable projects in the region and elsewhere in Asia and Africa.</p> + +<p>This brief will map the growing economic relationship between China and the Gulf states in the context of the global energy transition and deepening geopolitical ties. Starting by tracing the roots of this relationship to older forms of cooperation on oil and gas, conventional power, and petrochemicals, the brief will demonstrate that the partnerships in renewable energy have strong precedents. It will then give an overview of the role of China and Chinese companies in the Gulf states’ nascent energy transition, before looking at emergent forms of cooperation outside of the region by SOEs from both sides.</p> + +<p>As Gulf states get serious about the energy transition, China and Chinese companies are emerging as essential partners. Gulf SOEs are eager to play leading roles in the next technological wave, as electric vehicles (EVs), energy storage, hydrogen, and carbon capture technologies take center stage. They see China as a leading player in each of these technology areas. Beyond the Middle East, Gulf states have identified a range of soft-power opportunities afforded by other states’ energy transitions, particularly in the Global South. China is a key partner to these states as well.</p> + +<h3 id="the-gulf-states-begin-to-decarbonize">The Gulf States Begin to Decarbonize</h3> + +<p>Gulf states are latecomers to the energy transition. In comparison to other major developing countries, they invested late in solar and wind and have lagged far behind. Comparing their investment in renewables with neighboring Jordan—also a monarchy with high levels of solar radiation but one with no oil—demonstrates how rentier states often move more slowly (Figure 1). The exception is the UAE, which leads the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in decarbonizing its power sector with solar and wind. In addition to the solar and wind captured in the chart below, its Barakah nuclear plant now contributes almost 25 percent of the country’s electricity.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fRbSRRs.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Solar and Wind as Share of Total Capacity.</strong></em></p> + +<p>After a delayed start, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are clearly now embarking on a concerted effort to decarbonize their power grids, and they are developing wind and solar at a considerably faster pace than other members of the GCC (Figure 2). The differences between the approaches of these states are noteworthy and are not correlated with wealth within the group. Among the subgroup often referred to as “super rentiers,” consisting of Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, Kuwait is a laggard while the UAE is a leader. Although the rentier effect seems to explain the late transition start as a group, it does not explain the differences now emerging within it.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JIf7o9P.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Renewables Development in the GCC (Capacity in MWp).</strong></em></p> + +<h3 id="a-definitively-state-led-transition">A Definitively State-Led Transition</h3> + +<p>Saudi Arabia and the UAE are looking to assume regional and international leadership roles in the new energy world that is taking shape. The UAE’s hosting of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in 2023 is perhaps the most obvious example, but Saudi Arabia is also aiming to play a regional leadership role in combating climate change and recently launched the Middle East Green Initiative, a climate mitigation platform and reforestation program. This new posture within the climate and transition discourse represents a stark departure from the more cautious and sometimes obstructionist role played by these states in the past and demonstrates their aspirations as middle powers in the emergent multipolar international system.</p> + +<p>Having embarked on their domestic transitions late, Gulf states have had limited opportunities to carve out spaces for themselves in the value chain of renewable energy components, with efforts to establish solar module production facilities generally producing uncompetitive and disappointing results. Early investments by regional and national oil companies (NOCs) in solar technology providers, such as Petroleum Development Oman’s investment in Glasspoint and Saudi Aramco’s investment in the Japanese thin film producer Solar Frontier, failed to yield industrial policy outcomes or returns.</p> + +<p>However, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman are approaching the next phase of the transition with considerably more dynamism, marshaling sovereign wealth and directing resources from their NOCs in an attempt to lead the nascent hydrogen economy and carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technologies. These oil and gas states see their locations, renewable energy resource potential, and experience in conventional energy development as distinct advantages with these two sets of technologies.</p> + +<p>The UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s state-owned renewable power developers—Masdar and ACWA Power, respectively—have played a dominant role in the early stages of their countries’ energy transitions. The role of SOEs distinguishes their early transitions from other GCC states. Masdar and ACWA have developed the majority of completed projects in their home states; each is also the second most prominent developer in the neighboring state.</p> + +<p>The UAE and Saudi Arabia seem to have employed a national champions strategy, with these companies using their home markets to accumulate large portfolios of projects that qualify them to compete on the global stage. This distinctly state capitalist approach to power development separates the UAE and Saudi Arabia from their regional peers. Domestically focused sovereign wealth funds either created or acquired specialized developers—unrelated to the NOCs and legacy utility firms—to advance renewables. In contrast, Qatar and Kuwait have given renewables deployment mandates to the NOCs and their affiliates, with largely disappointing results. Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund has gone a step further in this state capitalist direction. The Public Investment Fund (PIF) announced that only 30 percent of its planned utility projects would be developed through a competitive tender process (its state-owned developer is still the largest winner of these tenders) and that it would directly develop the other 70 percent with partners of its choosing.</p> + +<p>Navigating this state capitalist landscape, with astonishingly low prices at tenders (Figure 3), has proved too complex or unappealing for most Western firms. The inroads made by the French state-owned firm Électricité de France (EDF), which has built a portfolio of wind and solar projects in the region in partnership with Masdar, remains the exception. Chinese firms have also begun to make notable progress, first as component suppliers and contractors, but also more recently as developers.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5A073TV.png" alt="image03" /></p> + +<h3 id="deepening-geopolitical-ties-between-china-and-the-gulf">Deepening Geopolitical Ties between China and the Gulf</h3> + +<p>Underpinning this trend of deeper economic cooperation is a geopolitical context in which the Gulf states—having long expressed anxieties about U.S. commitment to the region—have adopted a more proactive foreign policy, courting China to secure a stronger position in the multipolar landscape taking shape. This strategy was strikingly evident when Saudi Arabia and Iran recently signed an agreement in Beijing to resume diplomatic ties six years after having closed their embassies. The symbolic value of the signing taking place in Beijing and the implicit role given to China as guarantor are more relevant than China’s actual role in facilitating the agreement. President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2022 also came with a flurry of deal announcements worth an estimated $30 billion. U.S. policymakers have increasingly scrutinized China’s investments and interest in the region in recent months. If Saudi Arabia is to receive the security guarantee it is seeking as part of an agreement, the administration is asking for an unwinding of these ties.</p> + +<p>Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s recent ascension to the BRICS group (previously made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as part of an expanded 10-member organization is in many ways indicative of the tectonic shifts taking place in the international system. Of the original BRICS members, China played a crucial role in the effort to expand the group and include the two Gulf states (the new members, not coincidentally, were four of the five Middle Eastern states that have “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with China). It is too early to discern the practical effect of this development, but the UAE has already joined the group’s New Development Bank, and Saudi Arabia is expected to follow soon. This group is aiming to provide an institutional forum for a more depoliticized approach to development cooperation outside of the universe of Western institutions and the G7, whose relative economic clout has declined.</p> + +<h3 id="chinese-gulf-conventional-power-ties">Chinese-Gulf Conventional Power Ties</h3> + +<p>China and the Gulf states have developed deep economic ties in the conventional energy and petrochemical sectors. Trade and investment patterns have slowly transitioned from transactional relationships based on the sale of energy one way and consumer goods the other to deeper ties involving joint ventures and large infrastructure projects.</p> + +<p>The focus on hydrocarbon trade between the Gulf and China obscures the depth of the relationship in the power, refining, and petrochemical sectors. Much attention is often given to the fact that China has become Saudi Arabia’s leading trade partner over the past two decades, with Saudi Arabia currently supplying about a fifth of China’s crude imports, with similar trends in the other Gulf states. But in a liquid market such as that of oil or gas, this trade does not necessarily lead to deeper economic ties. However, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the sector and joint ventures between state-owned firms do have the effect of deepening ties, locking companies into long-term investment cycles and facilitating the exchange of skills and talent.</p> + +<p>Saudi Aramco’s recent history reveals the gradual deepening of ties taking place between sets of SOEs from both sides. The first of these large projects was the establishment of the Yanbu Aramco Sinopec Refining Company (YASREF) in 2014, a joint venture between Saudi Aramco and the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) over a $10 billion refining facility on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast with a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day (b/d). The success of the venture clearly engendered trust and confidence on both sides, and the two countries subsequently announced a number of other projects. Notably, these include Saudi capital from Aramco and state-owned petrochemical giant SABIC flowing to greenfield and brownfield refining and petrochemical facilities along China’s coastline, and Chinese capital from its state-owned Silk Road Fund leading a consortium that acquired 49 percent of Aramco’s gas pipeline company in 2022.</p> + +<p>The UAE and Oman have also attracted Chinese energy contractors and FDI, including the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Company’s construction of the Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline in 2012, which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, through which 45 percent of China’s oil imports flow. Chinese SOEs have also directly invested in UAE offshore concessions over the past 10 years. ADNOC, Abu Dhabi’s national oil company, recently signed a framework agreement worth an estimated $12 billion with China’s Wanhua Chemical to codevelop downstream projects following a state visit by President Xi in 2019. This list of projects is long and continues to grow, both within the oil and gas sectors and in fields such as logistics and port infrastructure in particular. The picture that emerges is one of a deepening economic relationship with a strong understanding on both sides of how to cooperate on long-term and often risk-prone infrastructure projects.</p> + +<p>Gulf states and China share a state capitalist model of development typified by SOEs negotiating deals on both sides, and this similarity likely facilitates cooperation and the integration of national and corporate agendas in the deals that are reached. These SOEs are political actors first and economic actors second, so where political will exists for deals to be made, as there has been over the last five years, these firms tend to overcome the commercial hurdles.</p> -<p>The research for this paper was conducted between May and August 2023 and is based on analysis of primary and secondary data, including a rigorous review of open-source literature, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, and the organisation of a virtual validation workshop.</p> +<h3 id="chinas-centrality-in-the-gulf-energy-transition">China’s Centrality in the Gulf Energy Transition</h3> -<p>First, the authors conducted a review of the literature to assess existing knowledge of the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction. The review covered peer-reviewed academic research, policy briefs, articles and blogs by recognised experts, reports by NGOs, government documents and evaluations. Standard review search strings were used with defined inclusion criteria covering relevance and credibility, with focused searches of Google and Google Scholar conducted using combinations of selected keywords.</p> +<p>China’s role in Gulf states’ energy transition mirrors trends in their broader economic relationship. The Chinese side has gradually transitioned to higher-value inputs, from component suppliers, to contractors, and finally to investors and coinvestors in the largest scale solar and wind projects.</p> -<p>Following this, the authors conducted semi-structured interviews with 22 participants from industry associations, government agencies, mining companies, NGOs and other parts of the private sector, as well as investigative journalists and academics, drawing on expert knowledge from a variety of sectors to target gaps identified in the existing literature. Interviewees were based in the UK, the US, Australia, Germany, Denmark, Chile and Sri Lanka, providing international and UK-specific expertise. Interviewees were selected based on their knowledge of the topic, with a snowball sampling method used to identify additional respondents. Questions were tailored to interviewees’ roles, responsibilities and expertise, with the aim of supplementing a lack of detailed published research with first-hand knowledge and experience. All interviews have been anonymised and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed. The interview stage formed the foundation of the research, with non-academic literature used to validate and supplement findings from the interviews, where peer-reviewed research was unavailable.</p> +<p>China’s dominance in clean energy supply chains is not unique to the Gulf. The top six solar module manufacturers globally by production value are all Chinese companies. Chinese companies also dominate a variety of other solar and wind components along the value chains. In markets that exhibit the rentier effect and a strong focus on achieving the lowest price at tender, states have tended to focus on importing the cheapest and most efficient components. These components nearly invariably come from China, even if that comes at the expense of effective industrial policy in the short term. This has meant that the Saudi and UAE markets have rapidly become important export markets for Chinese companies. Chinese contractors such as the China Energy Engineering Group and Shanghai Electric have also played an important role in building the first group of utility-scale projects, but with the entry of lower-cost Indian contracting firms, they now play a smaller role in that part of the value chain.</p> -<p>Last, findings were presented and analysed at a virtual workshop held on 15 August 2023, attended by 10 representatives of industry associations, government agencies, NGOs and the private sector, as well as investigative journalists and academics. Written feedback was provided by three additional representatives. The workshop was designed to allow discussion of key findings, as a validation exercise to strengthen the rigour of the research.</p> +<p>China’s growing role as an investor and developer in solar projects, both at the utility and commercial scale and in greenfield and brownfield developments, is interesting. For the most part, Gulf states do not have an issue accessing capital or debt, and Gulf SOEs typically do most of the investing in this sector. But at the utility scale, module manufacturers such as Jinko Solar, the largest in the world, are leading consortiums that have won large solar tenders in Saudi Arabia. Chinese firms have captured much of the value chain in such projects; in this case, Jinko is the developer and module supplier, and a smaller percentage of expenditure—for cables, civil contracting, and understructures—is directed to local firms to satisfy local content requirements. Jinko also played a similar role in the 1.2 gigawatt-peak (GWp) Al Sweihan project in Abu Dhabi, which is one of the largest single-site photovoltaic (PV) projects in the world. Jinko codeveloped the project along with UAE state-owned developer Taqa and also supplied the modules. These two recent projects signal Chinese firms’ strong intention to play a role in all parts of the project development value chain in the Gulf.</p> -<h4 id="limitations-and-scope">Limitations and Scope</h4> +<p>However, the 2019 announcement that China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund had acquired 49 percent in ACWA Power Renewable Energy Holding (ACWA Power RenewCo) represents the clearest and most important signal of this deepening cooperation, as the company is one of Saudi Arabia’s main renewable energy project holding companies, with 1,668 megawatts (MW) of wind and solar assets in the UAE, South Africa, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. This larger transaction followed a series of one-off greenfield codevelopment deals between ACWA and the Silk Road Fund relating to one coal and two solar projects in the UAE. The growing partnership would prove to be a precursor to more international codevelopment in years to come.</p> -<p>The research design has several limitations. The first relates to the inability, within the available timeframe, to provide a detailed analysis of the risks relating to each individual critical mineral. Second, although interviewees were selected for their extensive experience on the topic, a degree of subjectivity is inevitable. This paper recognises that an interviewee’s understanding of the risks is shaped by their specific expertise, potentially leading them to perceive certain risks as more significant than others. Wherever possible, respondents’ views were corroborated by a published source or other respondent data.</p> +<p>As of October 2023, the total Chinese investment in ACWA projects has exceeded $10 billion. ACWA’s chair highlighted these developments during an address at a forum celebrating the 10-year anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative in October 2023. During the forum, ACWA signed seven new cooperation agreements with a host of Chinese SOEs and asserted its commitment to the Chinese market.</p> -<p>The third relates to the emerging nature of many of the risks identified, meaning there is limited peer-reviewed research available. Non-academic literature was used to validate and supplement findings from the interviews, where peer-reviewed research was unavailable. Equally, given that primary research for this paper comprises a limited number of semi-structured interviews, the findings can only be viewed as preliminary, with further research needed in the immediate future.</p> +<p>Notable developments have also occurred at the commercial and industrial scale. In 2021, the China Three Gorges company, one of the largest state-owned power developers, acquired UAE-based Alcazar Energy. With a portfolio of only around 400 MW, this transaction is not interesting for its scale. Rather, it indicates a nuanced understanding of the market on the part of China Three Gorges because it bundled together a large group of smaller projects from markets across the MENA region—an indication that their risk appetite extends beyond cooperation with state-owned players on mega-projects. Unsurprisingly, the Silk Road Fund also played a role financing the transaction.</p> -<p>Finally, this research focuses specifically on the risks relating to critical mineral extraction. The authors acknowledge that critical mineral processing and Chinese dominance in this area is an important part of the wider discussion on securing net zero supply chains, but examining this is beyond the scope of this paper.</p> +<p>Another powerful indicator of the deepening economic cooperation between China and the Gulf on clean energy is the increased level of investment further upstream in the renewables value chain. As the United States and European Union have erected new trade barriers to slow the growth of Chinese companies in key sectors, the opposite trend seems to be unfolding in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have each established ambitious sets of industrial policies and have marshaled their sovereign wealth to attract joint venture partners to codevelop manufacturing facilities in their domestic markets. The most notable example of this trend is the announcement of a joint venture agreement between Saudi Arabia’s PIF and China’s Longi Solar, one of the world’s largest module manufacturers. Longi has since become the module supplier of preference on a series of mega-scale solar PV projects developed by the PIF. A similar agreement was also recently announced between the PIF and China’s Hon Hai Precision Industry Company (Foxconn) to codevelop an EV brand in Saudi Arabia called CEER, breaking ground on the project in 2023. The PIF has also built an assembly plant with the U.S. EV carmaker Lucid, after becoming its largest shareholder, and is set to begin operation in the third quarter of 2023.</p> -<h4 id="structure">Structure</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b2v93jI.jpg" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ The Dhafra Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Independent Power Producer (IPP) Project in the United Arab Emirates’ capital, Abu Dhabi.</em></p> -<p>Analysis of the findings is organised into three chapters. Chapter I provides a brief overview of existing and clearly recognised environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction. Chapter II builds on this to explore how changing patterns of demand triggered by the net zero transition are set to impact these risks. Chapter III considers the options available to address these risks from a UK perspective. The conclusion draws together the findings and presents a series of recommendations.</p> +<p>Large developers from the United States and the United Kingdom are notably absent from the broader renewable landscape altogether, despite a growing appetite for investments in other developing markets in Asia and Latin America. An exception to this absence of Western firms is the large role played by French firms in the Gulf renewables landscape, particularly large state-owned firms EDF and Engie. Their success at winning public solar and wind tenders in the region, and building lasting partnerships with local developers, lends credence to the hypothesis that it is the shared feature of state ownership, nearly ubiquitous in Chinese, French, and Gulf firms operating in the sector, that is key to success. The statist nature of these firms permits access to lower-cost capital and cheaper debt and enables them to invest with longer time horizons than private firms, allowing them to target projects that have substantial soft-power or non-financial returns to their state ownership.</p> -<h3 id="i-existing-risks-linked-to-critical-mineral-extraction">I. Existing Risks Linked to Critical Mineral Extraction</h3> +<h3 id="chinese-and-gulf-clean-energy-cooperation-beyond-the-middle-east">Chinese and Gulf Clean Energy Cooperation beyond the Middle East</h3> -<p>The environmental and human security risks linked to critical mineral extraction are not unique in and of themselves, with many associated with wider mining activities. Yet with exponential growth in demand for minerals for the net zero transition and the expected acceleration in critical mineral mining activities, these risks stand to intensify. This chapter provides a brief overview of existing, acknowledged risks linked to critical mineral extraction, which will serve as a foundation for subsequent chapters.</p> +<p>In addition to their deep cooperation in the Gulf, China and Gulf states are also increasing their economic cooperation elsewhere in the world. China and the Silk Road Fund’s acquisition of half of ACWA Power’s renewables portfolio company in 2019 gave the two state-owned companies shared exposure to a group of projects in South Africa, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. This type of engagement is qualitatively different from the type of FDI that preceded it and indicates a deeper level of cooperation and alignment. A number of other greenfield development agreements between the two parties followed this deal, most notably the 1.5 gigawatt (GW) Sirdarya combined cycle gas turbine facility in Uzbekistan and a $2.4 billion investment in three large wind projects spearheaded by ACWA totaling an additional 1.5 GW. These facilities, set to be completed in early 2024, are expected to meet up to a quarter of the country’s power needs. These investments have quickly made Saudi Arabia an important economic player in a former Soviet republic with which it previously shared only tenuous ties.</p> -<h4 id="environmental-risks">Environmental Risks</h4> +<p>Following the recent addition of the UAE and Saudi Arabia to BRICS, these types of engagements are likely to increase substantially, with the Gulf states gaining legitimacy and access to new markets by associating with China, a great power. China is also eager to strengthen partnerships with traditional U.S. allies in the region, and as budget constraints have slowed Belt and Road Initiative projects in recent years, China could increasingly look to Gulf financial sponsors to play a role in stalled development plans.</p> -<p>Critical mineral reserves are often located in remote, high-integrity, biodiversity-rich locations (see Figure 1), with their extraction posing direct risks to the environment. Many of these harms occur at the mine site itself, both through mineral extraction and the development of the required infrastructure to support it. Mining requires land use change, frequently resulting in deforestation and biodiversity loss. Around 1,600 mining operations are in key biodiversity areas and a further 2,000 in protected areas. In the context of critical minerals, 80% of cobalt and 54% of nickel are sourced from areas where biodiversity is at risk. The infrastructure required to support mining activities also presents environmental challenges. Crucially, the construction and maintenance of roads, ports, railway tracks and power lines can impact the wider landscape, often leading to further deforestation and habitat fragmentation. With the growth in demand for critical minerals, these risks could escalate in key locations.</p> +<h3 id="western-responses">Western Responses</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/werslUT.png" alt="image01" /> -<em><strong>Figure 1: Selected Countries and Harms Associated with Mineral Mining for the Net Zero Transition.</strong> Source: Map adapted by the authors from Nat Lowrey, “A Material Transition: Exploring Supply and Demand Solutions for Renewable Energy Minerals”, War on Want, March 2021. Adapted with kind permission from War on Want.</em></p> +<p>As noted above, Western governments generally have been reluctant to compete head-to-head with Chinese enterprises in the Gulf as the global energy transition unfolds. The major U.S. initiative in this field is the November 2022 UAE-US Partnership for Accelerating Clean Energy, which promises to “catalyze” $100 billion and deploy 100 GW of clean energy by 2035. What “catalyze” means exactly is unclear; other parts of the plan refer to “mobilizing,” but fundamental issues such as financing, control, and ownership are not spelled out. Partly, this omission is due to a different idea of the relationship between the government and private sector in Western societies. But it is also due to a Western preoccupation in the energy field with dividing the roles of asset owners, policymakers, and regulators. In the Gulf, these roles are often conflated in the interest of speed and agility. The strategy of Western firms is to precede construction with intensive studies on demand, economic viability, and environmental impacts; to stress safety; and to have diverse stakeholders evaluating technical and economic analysis, forecasting, simulation, communication, and management. China’s orientation to build things and get them online quickly is often very much more in tune with the instincts of Gulf governments.</p> -<p>Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the world’s largest deposits of minerals essential to the net zero transition, including cobalt, graphite, lithium, nickel and REEs. An expanding rate of extraction of these minerals could exacerbate existing environmental problems. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, from 2010–20, the African continent witnessed the greatest annual rate of net forest loss of any region in the world. While some of this is attributed to agriculture and commercial logging, mining also played a key role; a 2022 study showed that mining was a significant direct driver of deforestation in Ghana and an indirect driver of deforestation in Gabon and Zambia. Given that Africa is home to significant reserves of manganese, platinum, cobalt and graphite, increased mining activity for critical minerals risks exacerbating deforestation in the region.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Western governments generally have been reluctant to compete head-to-head with Chinese enterprises in the Gulf as the global energy transition unfolds.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Similar risks have been highlighted in other regions. In a prominent example, Indonesia has seen rapid expansion in mining activity targeting nickel and cobalt, which are commonly extracted together. This is negatively impacting both inland tropical forests and coastal mangrove forests – causing particular damage, in view of their high carbon storage capacities. Similar concerns have been raised in relation to critical mineral extraction in the Pacific Islands and Latin America. However, it is important to put these risks into a wider perspective. With any change of land use comes a degree of habitat degradation, with mines currently occupying just 1% of Earth’s land surface, whereas agriculture accounts for 38%.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>However, environmental risks linked to critical mineral and indeed all forms of mining go beyond those related to the direct footprint of a mine site itself. Risks relating to air, water and other forms of pollution are present in all stages of mine development, from pre-feasibility and feasibility to construction, operation, maintenance and closure of any mine. These risks apply in the extraction of critical minerals just as in the extraction of other major metals not currently deemed critical, such as gold, iron ore and copper. Separating the valuable fraction of mined material results in potentially hazardous waste. This includes waste rock, comprising the rocks removed to access the target mineral, and tailings, which are fine-grained waste from the crushing and processing of an ore. Such waste often contains dangerous levels of heavy metals, chemicals and radioactive components, and risks contaminating the local environment during storage or disposal. Other waste materials generated during the extraction process – for example, acidic waste water during lithium extraction (see Box 1) – also present a risk. Here, it is important to emphasise that the risk of pollution extends beyond the lifecycle of the mine, after closure. Mine abandonment, decommission and repurposing also create risks from the release of contaminants into the environment. Indirect environmental risks linked to critical mineral mining also derive from the water-intensive nature of much of this activity, which can lead to water shortages and water table depletion, threatening both species and habitats (see Box 1).</p> +<p>The energy relationship between China and the Gulf states has evolved slowly from a relationship characterized by transactional trade to one that now includes large-scale reciprocal FDI in both conventional fossil fuel assets and increasingly in renewable energy assets that are the central pillars of the Gulf states’ energy transitions. A decade and a half of investment cooperation in the oil and gas sector afforded both sides opportunities to develop relationships and trust, which have been carried forward by a different set of state-owned firms into the renewables sector. China’s dominant position in the supply chain of both solar and wind projects has also amplified this trend. Moving beyond this pattern of reciprocal FDI in the energy sector, China and its Gulf partners have begun to develop projects jointly in other developing markets, signaling a further deepening of this economic relationship and growing alignment of economic and foreign policy priorities. Interestingly, the unique success of French state-owned firms among Western developers in this market strongly suggests that state ownership in a state capitalist landscape brings with it a set of advantages and perhaps acts as a tacit barrier to entry to other private Western firms.</p> -<p>Finally, the power used in extracting critical minerals itself contributes to global carbon emissions, although carbon emitted at the extraction stage of the supply chain is likely to be significantly lower than that emitted during the processing stages. Innovation is taking place in this area, with a fully electric mine in operation in Canada and mining companies investing in renewable power to support remote sites.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Understanding these existing environmental risks is vital as critical mineral extraction accelerates to meet global decarbonisation commitments. As explored in Chapter II, the dynamics and context surrounding such extraction activity are likely to change as fluctuating demand for specific minerals reshapes and intensifies many of the risks we face today.</p> +<p><strong>Faris Al-Sulayman</strong> is a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C.</p> -<h4 id="human-rights-abuses">Human Rights Abuses</h4> +<p><strong>Jon B. Alterman</strong> is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at CSIS.</p>Faris Al-Sulayman and Jon B. AltermanChina has established itself as an essential partner in Gulf states’ energy transition, serving as an investor and developer in renewable energy projects. Western governments, however, have been reluctant to compete with Chinese enterprises in the region.Europe To Deter Russia2023-12-07T12:00:00+08:002023-12-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/europe-to-deter-russia<p><em>NATO’s European members must ramp up investment in ammunition production and focus military training and force structures against key mission sets to credibly deter Russia from exploiting a clash between the US and China in the late 2020s as an opportunity to break Article 5 in Europe.</em></p> -<p>Human security risks associated with the extractive industry are also well established. In the context of critical minerals, these risks are clearly seen in cases such as artisanal cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – a country holding 75% of the world’s currently identified cobalt reserves, 15–20% of which is estimated to be mined artisanally. Here, artisanal cobalt miners face the threat of being beaten, tortured or killed by state and private security services. Poor working conditions present further risks, where artisanal miners work with no or insufficient personal protective equipment, ventilation or healthcare. Child labour is also a concern. Estimates of the number of children working in the DRC’s cobalt sector range from 4,500 to 40,000, some of whom are as young as six. Such child labour ranges from children helping their parents at weekends to those working as indentured servants. Despite attempts to formalise artisanal mining in the DRC, a range of studies highlight the limitations of bureaucratic formalisation in countries such as the DRC, where miners may lack the “resources and skills to participate effectively” in these processes.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Beyond the DRC, child labour is reported in numerous other critical mineral extraction operations (see Figure 1), including tantalum supply chains in Mozambique, Burundi and Rwanda. Nickel mining in Guatemala has been linked to cases of murder, sexual violence and forced displacement, while mining for REEs in Myanmar has also been associated with wide-ranging human rights abuses. Abuses are commonly targeted at artisanal miners, labourers and local communities, provoking local-level conflict and community resistance, with resistance at times interrupting critical mineral mining operations’ ability to operate effectively.</p> +<p>Throughout 2023, the UK and most NATO allies have been understandably preoccupied with the need to support Ukraine, tackling a range of economic and social challenges, and most recently the sudden explosion of violence in the Middle East. However, the number of acute short-term challenges has distracted political and public attention away from the rising danger of an even more serious conflict in the coming years. Put simply, Russia has now transitioned its economy onto a war footing; US production is not sufficient to replenish its own stockpiles and fulfil Ukraine’s needs; and European countries are trying to manage an increasingly dangerous situation from an unsustainable peacetime defence and industrial posture. This would not be such a serious risk were it not for the fact that the US military is increasingly facing a threat that it cannot overmatch from Chinese forces in the Indo-Pacific. NATO is currently heavily dependent on the US in a wide range of key areas – most notably the ability to roll back Russian ground-based air defences from the air, as well as ammunition resupply, tanker aircraft, command and control and satellite capabilities. In the event of a clash with China in the Indo-Pacific that removes the capacity for large-scale US military reinforcement and support elsewhere, Europe will be left vulnerable to concurrent military aggression by Russia.</p> -<p>Further cases of weak enforcement of labour rights in relation to critical mineral mining can be seen in artisanal mining of cobalt and tin, as well as in the mining and processing of nickel. Such risks may be exacerbated as mining moves to previously untapped regions rich in critical minerals, particularly those with a track record of human and labour rights abuses. Saudi Arabia, for example, has untapped critical mineral reserves worth about $1.3 trillion, but a very poor track record in relation to human and labour rights. In January 2023, the UK announced its intention to deepen collaboration on critical minerals with Saudi Arabia, as part of its “plan to build partnerships around these vital resources across the world”. Human rights standards must be a key consideration in any future collaboration, and such partnerships are an opportunity for the UK to engage bilaterally and use its diplomatic and financial position to ensure human rights standards are upheld in critical mineral supply chains.</p> +<p>For much of the year, Russian forces in Ukraine have been suffering from significant shortages of vehicles, weapons and above all ammunition. However, from a low point in the spring, Russia’s military supply situation has been steadily improving. Its factories are standardising around fewer types of tanks, artillery howitzers and UAVs, resulting in steadily rising production figures. From around 40 long-range missiles per month at the start of the invasion, Russia is now producing more than 100 per month. Artillery ammunition production has almost doubled, and has recently been supplemented by over 1 million shells and hundreds of howitzers from North Korea. Factories have also been set up in Iran to add resilience and additional capacity to Russia’s rearmament drive after the vast losses in materiel and ammunition expenditure of the past 18 months of war.</p> -<p>As in the case of environmental risks, concerns relating to human rights and labour abuses in the critical minerals sector are not necessarily fundamentally different from those linked to the wider mining sector. However, contextual vulnerabilities – particularly in light of the high demand driving increased mining for critical minerals in areas with weak governance and/or no history of mineral extraction – could raise the risk of human rights abuses and exploitation, as discussed further in Chapter II.</p> +<p>Russia is settling down for a long war, aiming to grind down Ukraine and exhaust the capacity and will of its Western supporters to supply the vehicles, ammunition and weapons it needs to keep fighting successfully. Despite the huge expenditure this year, the Russian government has announced plans for a 68% increase in defence spending, to around 6.5% of GDP, next year. This will likely prove disastrous for the Russian economy in the very long term. However, those hoping that Russia’s current effort is unsustainable in the short term are likely to be disappointed; it is worth noting that for much of the Cold War, Soviet spending on defence was far higher than this – reaching 21% of GDP by 1985 – and still took decades to arguably bring about the collapse of the USSR. The Kremlin can leverage a formidable coercive information and security apparatus to maintain tight control over any forms of public or political dissent. What little disagreement is visible in Russian political and media circles is largely over how rather than whether to continue the war, with many critics calling for greater escalation or even direct conflict with NATO.</p> -<h4 id="corruption-crime-and-conflict">Corruption, Crime and Conflict</h4> +<p>Meanwhile, Europe has failed to make the necessary investments in increased industrial production capacity and defence spending. With the notable exception of Poland, many national commitments to significant additional defence spending have either not yet materialised or are not slated to take effect for several years. The most obvious example is Germany, which shortly after the Russian invasion made a public commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2024, in addition to a one-off €100 billion investment in revitalising Bundeswehr capabilities. However, only €1.5 billion from the fund had actually been spent by mid-2023, and the defence budget as a whole actually decreased slightly compared to 2022. The UK Defence plan following the Defence Command Paper refresh is already £16.9 billion short of projected planned expenditure over the coming 10 years. Even so, most of the one-off £5 billion boost granted in 2023 was allocated to long-term nuclear submarine and weapons programmes, with only £1.9 billion of it going towards munitions resupply and purchases for Ukraine over two years. The European Defence Agency’s multinational 155mm artillery procurement programme is a solid plan along the required lines, but has been glacially slow to set up compared with the pace at which Ukrainian requirements are outstripping supply capacity. The EDA programme is also still far from sufficient at its current scale to put Ukraine’s war effort on a sustainable footing for the immediately foreseeable future, let alone replenish Europe’s own defence stockpiles, which have been badly depleted.</p> -<p>Corruption in the extractive sector is widespread. In 2016, the OECD claimed that one in five cases of transnational bribery were linked to the extractive sector. High-profile cases involving mining and commodities giants such as Glencore illustrate the extent of the issue; in November 2022, for example, Glencore was ordered to pay £281 million in penalties after a Serious Fraud Office investigation revealed it had paid $29 million in bribes for preferential access to oil in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and South Sudan. Meanwhile, in Nigeria alone, an estimated $400 billion in oil revenues has been lost to corruption since 1960.</p> +<p>Despite growing political frustration in many Western countries at the rising costs and lack of decisive progress, there is no easy way out of this war. In post-Cold War counterinsurgency conflicts, Western expeditionary campaigns ultimately ended when a political decision was made in Washington and other capitals to make some form of messy compromise in exchange for a sufficient “peace” to withdraw. This is not possible with Russian aggression in Ukraine. Talk of Ukraine “having to enter negotiations” is dangerously misguided and naïve because it ignores the fact that Russian aims have hardened, but not changed. The Kremlin’s will to grind on can be seen in its clear preparations for a long war and continued offensive action despite suffering several hundred thousand soldiers killed or seriously wounded and more than 2,500 tanks visually confirmed destroyed or captured. This is not the behaviour of a regime that will accept any lasting end to its offensive war of choice if Western governments withhold military support to force Kyiv into making concessions for a negotiated ceasefire. In fact, such a betrayal of Ukraine would have quite the opposite effect, encouraging Putin’s regime to continue to fight in the belief of eventual victory. It would also send an incredibly dangerous message to both Russia and China about the West’s lack of will to fight, making it far harder to deter future aggression.</p> -<p>Similar trends are emerging in relation to critical minerals. In June 2022, court auditors in the DRC pointed to over $400 million in missing tax advances and loans that state mining company Gecamines said it had paid to the national treasury. Gecamines holds minority stakes in several of the world’s largest copper and cobalt projects, both of which are key minerals for the net zero transition.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The only way to end the war is to convince Russia that its prospects for military success will get worse over time, rather than better</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In this context, a range of NGOs have raised the alarm over vulnerabilities to corruption in relation to critical mineral extraction specifically, and the potential for this to derail the energy transition. Key concerns here relate to the location of most current critical mineral reserves in a small number of developing and middle-income states, many characterised by weak governance, high levels of corruption and legacies of fragility and conflict. Here, recent research has flagged the risk of clean energy minerals being used for trade-based money laundering, and the risk that close links between politically exposed persons and commodity trading more broadly could implicate supply chains themselves in conflict finance. Meanwhile, artisanal and small-scale miners are flagged as potentially suffering high levels of exposure, particularly in cross-border mining hotspots. As noted in a 2022 report by Maha Rafi Atal, Stephanie Trapnell and Dieter Zinnbauer, “given the race for newer and more efficient clean energy technologies, there is an ongoing risk that weakly regulated mining is exploited for illicit profit, which may involve not only corruption, but also human trafficking and human rights abuses”.</p> +<p>If Ukraine is forced to negotiate a ceasefire, Russia would be in a strong position to demand retreats from key positions and the removal of Kyiv’s remaining military initiative as baseline concessions. Such a process would also fracture Western political unity – which has largely held up to this point – and break all trust between Ukraine and its Western partners, since it could only be forced by withholding desperately needed support. Russia would then most likely spend three to six months reorganising its currently weak logistics, training and force dispositions, and then restart offensive operations from a much stronger position. This was done repeatedly in Syria, where Russia and the Assad regime used ceasefire agreements to freeze the front when they needed an operational pause, and then relaunched offensives where and when it suited them best. Russia also reneged on the Russia–Chechnya Peace Treaty of 1997, signed following the stalemate of the First Chechen War, by reinvading Chechnya in 1999 with much better prepared forces and conquering the country in a brutal campaign that involved almost completely destroying the capital city of Grozny.</p> -<p>Efforts to tackle corruption must be central to discussions on supply chains, as critical mineral extraction presents a key revenue-generating opportunity for many states, with critical minerals comprising between 4% and 7% of mining revenue. As Liesbet Gregoir and Karel van Acker remind us, corruption, tax avoidance and government effectiveness “influence the potential of benefits returning to local communities”, which can in itself impact community support for mining projects, undermining supply chain security. Given the need to trade with these mineral-rich countries to achieve net zero, tackling corruption in critical mineral supply chains is crucial.</p> +<p>There are no concessions the West could force Kyiv to offer, or indeed offer itself, that are more valuable to the Kremlin than defeating Ukraine through its current strategy of resourcing a long war to exhaust Western support and grind down resistance by 2025 or 2026. States do not stop fighting when they think that they can win wars, especially after taking hundreds of thousands of casualties and seeing their previous aura of military power badly damaged internationally by initial poor performance. The only way to end the war is to convince Russia that its prospects for military success will get worse over time, rather than better. This requires investing in the large-scale defence industrial production needed to make Ukraine’s slow offensive progress sustainable. At that point, the Kremlin would have a strong incentive to negotiate a settlement that might conceivably hold, on something approaching acceptable terms for Ukraine.</p> -<p>Wider links to criminality and conflict traverse extractive industries and are well documented in relation to gold and diamond mining, but they also play out in the context of critical minerals. Organised criminal activity around the supply and trafficking of REEs has been reported in China, with authorities seizing multi-tonne consignments of REEs worth millions of dollars that were being illegally smuggled out of the country. In 2022, an AP investigation flagged the role of military-linked militias in human rights abuses linked to REE mining in Myanmar, with militias enforcing control in key areas and demanding a cut of the profits generated. Critical mineral-linked criminality is also prevalent in other regions; in 2022, a Chinese national was jailed in Nigeria after attempting to smuggle 25 tonnes of lithium-containing lepidolite out of the country. Lithium deposits in Mexico have similarly been reported to be at risk of criminal exploitation. Intersecting with critical human rights risks, this activity often leaves local communities at the mercy of profit-chasing criminal groups, enhancing their vulnerability to violence, displacement, extortion and labour exploitation.</p> +<p>Russia is set on a course that will see its production of weapons, ammunition and new formations increase significantly over the coming 2–3 years. Depending on how successfully Western governments sustain the supplies that Ukraine needs to keep fighting effectively, this will either make future Ukrainian advances harder to achieve or potentially result in serious reverses to gains made so far. Either way, without major increases in European defence production and a focus on reorganising and training militaries to credibly roll back any future Russian aggression against Alliance territory, Russia will regenerate a capacity to directly threaten NATO faster than most political or even military planners appear to realise.</p> -<p>These points relate closely to risks around conflict financing. Just as gold, diamonds and gemstones are known to have been used to fund armed groups in key source countries globally, critical minerals are similarly associated with such activity. In Africa’s Great Lakes region, prominently, 3T mining (tin, tungsten and tantalum) has been linked to the operations of non-state armed groups and conflict financing, prompting the passage of associated conflict minerals legislation, including the EU’s 2021 Conflict Minerals Regulation. Here, interviewees expressed concern that the critical minerals boom could trigger new forms of localised conflict, especially in the case of extraction via artisanal and small-scale mining.</p> +<p>Putin has repeatedly shown himself to be a strategic opportunist who will take huge military risks if he believes there is a quick and easy win to be had. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was itself predicated on the false assumption that Russia could quickly decapitate the Ukrainian government and impose a puppet state without major fighting. NATO must be capable of deterring Russian military aggression that might seek to take advantage of any perceived opportunity to seize symbolic areas of Alliance territory and challenge Article 5 without effective military recourse in the coming years.</p> -<p>On this point, it is important to note that critical minerals are generally less transportable than gold or diamonds and must be moved at much higher volumes to generate profits, limiting the appeal for many localised armed groups and criminal actors. Despite this, interviewees expressed concern about the risk of local-level conflict and criminal extortion. Meanwhile, the potential for critical minerals to support improved infrastructure and supplement existing revenues in supply countries is unlikely to mitigate in full the potential emergence of a new “resource curse”, unless more is done to address the human and environmental security risks highlighted in this paper, the impacts of which are felt most keenly at a local level. Indeed, localised tensions are known to be exacerbated by encroachment on community territory, human rights violations and environmental degradation associated with critical mineral mining, as seen in relation to lithium mining in Chile and nickel mining in Indonesia.</p> +<p>Unfortunately, the Chinese military is growing faster and increasing its capabilities more quickly than most thought possible even five years ago. Developments in very long-range anti-ship and anti-tanker/AWACS aircraft missile systems are particularly problematic for key US military capabilities across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, many of the US technical answers to some of these problems – such as the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter, Collaborative Combat Aircraft and the new B-21 Raider bomber – will not be available until 2029 or 2030 at a useful scale. The upshot is that the maximum period of risk of the Chinese military attempting to blockade or invade Taiwan or key disputed territories in the South or East China Seas is likely to be 2026–2028. Very problematic Chinese capabilities will be largely mature and fielded, but many of the US answers will not be ready yet. In the event of a dangerous standoff or an actual military conflict in the Indo-Pacific during this period, therefore, the US will be heavily stretched to meet its own commitments and Allied needs in that theatre. It is likely that EUCOM and CENTCOM would have to transfer assets to INDOPACOM in such a scenario, and Europe certainly could not count on rapid reinforcement at scale in the event of a concurrent Russian attack on NATO territory.</p> -<p>These corruption, crime and conflict risks are likely to be exacerbated in the context of burgeoning demand for critical minerals and in the global rush to secure supply chains. With mineral-rich countries and mining companies looking to capitalise, this could serve to both deepen the impact of existing human and environmental security risks and jeopardise the transition to net zero as community resistance, local-level conflict and criminality impact the ability of mining companies to operate, undermining reliable supplies. Opportunities to mitigate these risks are discussed further in Chapter III.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The costs of successfully deterring a well armed and amoral adversary pale in comparison to the unimaginable costs of even a successful defensive war once it has begun</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="indigenous-rights">Indigenous Rights</h4> +<p>Any analysis attempting to argue that the military threat from either China in the Indo-Pacific or from Russia in Europe should be prioritised as the more likely misses a fundamental point. China has a strong interest in supporting Russia to ensure it remains a serious military threat in Europe that splits US and Western attention. More importantly, the only likely scenario in which Russia might directly attack a European NATO country is during a concurrent standoff or actual conflict that leaves US forces largely fixed in the Indo-Pacific. In the event of such a military confrontation with China in the mid-to-late 2020s, Russia will have a strong incentive to take a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to break NATO while the US cannot reinforce Europe effectively. By 2026–2028, Russia’s industry will have been at full-scale military production for years, allowing it to rebuild its increasingly battle-hardened forces.</p> -<p>As indicated above, the brunt of many environmental and human security risks related to critical mineral extraction is borne by local communities. Indigenous communities are known to be particularly impacted: a recent study found that 54% of critical mineral mining projects are located on or near Indigenous land. In many cases, this puts Indigenous communities on the frontline of the effects of critical mineral extraction. While consultation is required, the standard of consent is not yet industry standard, with the ICMM specifying that members should “work towards obtaining consent of Indigenous Peoples” rather than requiring that they obtain it. Where resistance occurs, Indigenous Peoples have been subject to abuses including forced displacement, sexual violence, torture and murder. Mining has also been linked to the murder of land and environmental rights defenders in countries such as the Philippines, Mexico, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador.</p> +<p>To deter this concurrent threat, European countries – including the UK – must urgently invest in significantly increasing production capacity for the artillery ammunition, spare parts and air defence missiles required to keep Ukraine in the fight while also refilling their own dangerously depleted stockpiles. European air forces, in particular, must also rapidly procure specialised weapons and dedicate serious aircrew training time and focus to developing high-end suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) capabilities. Currently these reside almost exclusively among US air arms. The credible capacity to roll back Russian conventional forces in Europe relies on achieving air superiority, since NATO’s European powers lack the recruitment capacity or funding to field the scale and quality of ground forces and land-based firepower needed to beat Russia without it. To avoid being extremely vulnerable when or if US rapid reinforcement is unlikely, European air forces must be able to collectively destroy the Russian SAM systems that currently would make air superiority over contested Alliance territory impossible to achieve without a major US SEAD/DEAD campaign.</p> -<p>Even when not directly subject to abuse, Indigenous Peoples face indirect harms. Deforestation for nickel mining in Indonesia risks destroying the way of life of the nomadic O Hongana Manyawa tribe; water depletion from lithium mining in Chile continues to impact Indigenous ways of life; and nickel mining in Guatemala has destroyed natural resources vital to the livelihoods of many Indigenous Peoples. These are just a few examples of how critical mineral extraction is impacting Indigenous communities. With an absence of standards to ensure that Indigenous communities both consent to and benefit from mining activities, both Indigenous rights and land could be sacrificed in the name of the net zero transition. This outcome can be avoided if the risks identified here are properly addressed. Some possible ways forward are outlined in Chapter III.</p> +<p>Investing at scale in munitions and weapons production will require real political leadership, not least the courage and eloquence to explain to publics unused to genuine military threats why such investment is necessary at a time when so many other public services are desperately short of money. However, Ukraine illustrates vividly that the costs of successfully deterring a well armed and amoral adversary pale in comparison to the unimaginable costs of even a successful defensive war once it has begun. History suggests that few start wars that they believe will be long or difficult, but many long and difficult wars are started because one side believes the other cannot prevent a quick victory. Thus, the immediate target need not be the full capability to immediately fight and win a long war with Russia. Rather, it must be putting Ukraine’s defence on a sustainable footing and simultaneously rebuilding Western ammunition and equipment stockpiles, as well as the SEAD/DEAD capacity needed to convince Russia it could not achieve a quick and easy landgrab in Europe if the US and China were to come to blows.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-1-the-lithium-triangle-water-scarcity-and-biodiversity-loss"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1: The Lithium Triangle, Water Scarcity and Biodiversity Loss</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>It takes years for investment in Defence to bear fruit, and so even if the necessary investments are made in short order, there will be a significant lag before seeing results in frontline forces. This renders a danger that is potentially only a few years away – practically around the corner in defence planning terms. To quote Winston Churchill on the urgency of rearmament in the House of Commons in 1936: “Will there be time to put our defences in order… or will the awful words ‘too late’ be recorded?”.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Lithium is a key component in lithium-ion batteries and is widely used in the batteries that power electric vehicles, smart devices, renewable power plants and other key technologies. With net zero targets fuelling skyrocketing demand for lithium, this demand is being met by a surge in extraction in countries such as Chile – the world’s second-largest lithium producer.</code></em></p> +<hr /> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The “Lithium Triangle” on the borders of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia, for example, is a region rich in lithium deposits. Within this, roughly a quarter of deposits lie beneath the Salar de Atacama salt flats in northern Chile. Often known as the Atacama Desert, this is one of the driest places on earth, with average annual precipitation of 1 mm. Access to water is limited, with available sources vital for local communities and their livelihoods, as well as local flora and fauna. Yet the mining of lithium in this region is increasingly serving to consume, contaminate and divert the scarce water resources available.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Justin Bronk</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI, and the Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. His particular areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, the air war during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology.</p>Justin BronkNATO’s European members must ramp up investment in ammunition production and focus military training and force structures against key mission sets to credibly deter Russia from exploiting a clash between the US and China in the late 2020s as an opportunity to break Article 5 in Europe.【初選47人案・審訊第 118 日】2023-12-04T12:00:00+08:002023-12-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-118<ul> + <li>辯方指「非法手段」應限「武力」相關 官關注普通法原則是否適用《國安法》</li> + <li>何桂藍結案:控方將政治問題變刑事、議員只向選民問責法庭不應干預</li> +</ul> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Estimates suggest up to two million litres of saline groundwater (commonly known as brine) are needed to produce one tonne of lithium, with brine extraction the dominant method used – in which brine is extracted, concentrated in large evaporation pools and treated with sodium carbonate. Brine typically has a salt content higher than seawater and is therefore regulated separately from water. Brine is neither potable nor suitable for agricultural use. Beatriz Bustos-Gallardo, Gavin Bridge and Manuel Prieto note that “this distinction allows firms to frame brine pumping as an action independent from freshwater extraction, and claim it has no effect on the hydrogeological or ecological balance of the basin”. Yet research indicates that increased groundwater extraction for the lithium industry has contributed to water deficit in the Salar de Atacama, with the amount of water pumped out of the region increasing by 21% between 2000 and 2015.</code></em></p> +<excerpt /> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Concerns over the lithium industry’s contribution to water scarcity in the region have exacerbated tensions across local communities already facing the fallout from scarce rainfall and high rates of evaporation due to climate change. Meanwhile, key water sources that remain available for humans, livestock and crop irrigation have been contaminated by waste products of lithium extraction operations. In this context, many communities now rely on tankers delivering water. And while this situation has been triggered by expanding electric vehicle production at a global level, electric vehicles remain a rarity in Chile itself, highlighting the unequal distribution of harms and benefits in relation to critical minerals.</code></em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/o3zthmf.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Beyond these human impacts, lithium extraction is contributing to damage to the Atacama Desert’s unique biodiversity. The Laguna Santa Rosa Wetland, for example, is shrinking as a result of water scarcity, threatening the area’s 53 endemic species, 17 of which are classified as endangered. Other vulnerable species are also disappearing from the Atacama region, which is experiencing a significant reduction in plant cover, specifically algarrobo trees. Meanwhile, evaporation pools used in the extraction process are highly damaging to many bird species – flamingos in particular are misled by the large bodies of contaminated water.</code></em></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(4日)踏入審訊第118天。代表李予信的大律師關文渭進行結案陳詞,就被告被控「以威脅使用武力或其他非法手段」顛覆國家政權,關認為根據普通法下的詮釋原則,「非法手段」應只指涉與「實質脅迫與強迫(physical coercion and compulsion)」相關的手段,否則定義會太闊。法官問如有人用電腦病毒攻擊政府系統,是否不涉顛覆罪下的「非法手段」,辯方同意,但指這或涉恐怖活動罪,而即使《國安法》或出現漏洞,也應由立法機關而非法庭去填補。法官亦關注,《國安法》由中央草擬,為何辯方認為普通法原則適用,關引終院案例指《國安法》須與本港法律並行。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To meet global demand for lithium, the companies already operating in the Atacama salt flats have increased their activities, while companies not yet present are also showing interest in the region’s reserves. Chile is, however, in the process of reassessing its relationship with the environment. A new constitution that could have significantly affected the country’s extractive industries was rejected in a referendum in 2022. However, efforts to rewrite the constitution continue, with hopes among some that a new constitution will be accepted this year, which could have consequences for how extractive industries are able to operate in the country.</code></em></p> +<p>此外,關指李予信無轉發「墨落無悔」聲明、論壇無提否決預算案,而公民黨非本案「共謀者」,控方不能將黨的行為歸咎李。</p> -<p><em>Main source: Ingrid Garces and Gabriel Alvarez, “Water Mining and Extractivism of the Salar de Atacama, Chile”, WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment (Vol. 245, 2020), pp. 189–99.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4onBltY.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 李予信</p> -<h3 id="ii-elevated-demand-and-rising-risks">II. Elevated Demand and Rising Risks</h3> +<h4 id="辯方應以同類原則詮釋其他非法手段僅涉物理脅迫">辯方:應以「同類原則」詮釋、「其他非法手段」僅涉物理脅迫</h4> -<p>As highlighted in Chapter I, some of the key human and environmental security risks relating to critical mineral extraction align closely with those associated with the extractives sector at large. However, the forecasted boom in demand presents particular risks – many of which are under-acknowledged and understudied, and which will require specific mitigations. Indeed, as countries accelerate efforts to reach net zero, a massive uplift in critical mineral mining will be required to meet skyrocketing demand. Critical mineral demand for the production of electric vehicles, for example, is expected to increase almost 300 times between 2020 and 2050, to meet the IEA net zero scenario.</p> +<p>案件今踏入結案陳詞第3日,控方上周就控罪中的「非法手段」作法律陳詞,指不限於刑事罪行及武力相關行為,議員濫用職權和違反職責也屬非法。代表李予信的大律師關文渭今代表其中13名被告作出回應。</p> -<p>In recognition of this, key consumer countries have been working to refine their strategic approach to securing critical mineral supply chains. These efforts can be seen in the US Critical Materials Strategy, the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, among others. However, few of these strategies adequately account for the particular environmental and human security risks likely to be presented as critical mineral extraction is scaled up. Nor has there been extensive research focused on the emergent risks across source countries in the face of unprecedented global demand. This chapter draws on both the limited existing literature and data from semi-structured interviews to harness current cross-sectoral knowledge on what can be anticipated in this regard.</p> +<p>關文渭表示,就《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權罪下,「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」犯案的條文,應以「同類原則(ejusdem generis)」(即列出具體事物的前句如跟隨一個概括性字眼,後者所指事物應受前述類別所限)詮釋,當中「以武力、威脅使用武力」均涉「實質脅迫與強迫(physical coercion and compulsion)」,因此「其他非法手段」也應受此類別所限,只涉「實質脅迫與強迫」的相關行為,包括刑事恐嚇及刑事損壞。</p> -<h4 id="fast-tracking-and-corner-cutting">Fast-Tracking and Corner-Cutting</h4> +<h4 id="官問用病毒攻擊是否不涉非法手段-辯方同意但指涉恐怖活動">官問用病毒攻擊是否不涉非法手段 辯方同意但指涉恐怖活動</h4> -<p>Interviewees flagged that corner-cutting in the process of authorising mine permits is a key issue. This issue is especially acute given unprecedented demand – and the resulting competition likely to be created between countries seeking rapidly to secure supplies. Where such corner-cutting takes place, this will likely see an erosion of processes designed to limit the damage done by mining, including community engagement, the securing of prior informed consent that is given freely, and the undertaking of comprehensive social and environmental impact assessments.</p> +<p>關並指,在22條下,如有意圖顛覆,相關手段便是非法。法官李運騰續問,那如某人有意圖顛覆,但手段不涉武力是否便不違法?關指視乎其行為是否涉「物理脅迫與強迫」。</p> -<p>Currently, it takes between 10 and 20 years, depending on the context, to undertake the relevant assessments and obtain approvals required for a new mine. However, given the need for the energy transition to occur at speed, there is incentive for governments and companies to accelerate the process, which may motivate corner-cutting. The incentives to cut corners are likely to be higher in countries with high levels of corruption and low levels of government capacity, where the mine development process will be subject to lower levels of regulatory oversight. At a local level, corner-cutting is highly likely to exacerbate the human and environmental security risks outlined above, with local communities forced to absorb potential negative impacts resulting from time pressures on the energy transition.</p> +<p>法官陳慶偉續舉例,若以電腦病毒攻擊政府電腦系統,令行政立法和司法機關無法運作,又或釋放新冠病毒作生化或化學攻擊,也不屬辯方所指的「非法手段」,不會觸犯顛覆國家政權罪?關同意,但指這樣或干犯恐怖活動罪,仍受《國安法》所規限。</p> -<p>In some contexts, these pressures – combined with burgeoning critical mineral demand – may also motivate governments to remove some of the “red tape” that provides important protections for the environment, communities and workers, to increase production and attract investment. Such fast-tracking is already taking place, with incentives provided and regulatory requirements relaxed in countries such as the US, Australia, Brazil, Peru, the Philippines and South Africa.</p> +<h4 id="辯方國安法或有漏洞但非法庭責任填補">辯方:《國安法》或有漏洞但非法庭責任填補</h4> -<p>In the US, for example, the Thacker Pass lithium mine in Nevada is one of a number of critical mineral mines fast-tracked through approval processes in light of the “strategic” value of the support provided both to economic recovery and the expanding lithium-ion battery market. Its development has occurred despite the objections of Native American tribes, who claimed that they had not been properly consulted during the approval process, and who went on to launch legal action to challenge the mine’s approval.</p> +<p>李運騰續指,但恐怖活動罪旨在保障市民及財產,顛覆罪則保障政治制度,若辯方所言正確,《國安法》或會出現漏洞。關同意,但指法庭的責任不是要填補漏洞,這是立法機關的責任,若法庭這樣做有濫用司法權力的風險。</p> -<p>In Indonesia, the government’s efforts to increase foreign investment – including in nickel mining and processing – have had stark consequences. Specifically, in 2022, after more than two years of constitutional and legal challenges, the government of Joko Widodo passed the controversial Omnibus Law, revising over 70 existing laws, with the aim of removing red tape, improving the investment climate and creating jobs. The law has been extensively criticised for weakening protection for workers and the environment; of specific interest for this paper is the law’s requirement that only investments considered high risk must conduct an environmental impact study, replacing wider requirements under previous legislation.</p> +<h4 id="辯方條文每字皆有意思不冗贅列武力為限非法手段意思">辯方:條文每字皆有意思不冗贅、列「武力」為限「非法手段」意思</h4> -<p>The move is likely to exacerbate existing environmental and human security issues relating to critical minerals. While Indonesian nickel production doubled between 2020 and 2022 and has continued to rise since, numerous cases have been reported of workers losing their lives and suffering serious health conditions, with thousands of hectares of rainforest destroyed and water and land polluted, at great cost to local communities and Indigenous populations. The Indonesian case highlights some of the risks associated with the critical mineral boom, with such dynamics likely to play out in many more cases as demand continues to increase. Ultimately, there is a risk of fast-tracking mines, cutting regulatory corners and removing red tape occurring at the cost of workers, local communities and the environment.</p> +<p>關文渭亦不認同控方所指,《國安法》目的是將所有可能危害國安的罪行都刑事化,強調人大常委制訂《國安法》條文的每隻字都有意思,不會以很多字眼表達同一意思;而假如條文針對任何非法手段,則毋須再冗贅地列出「以武力、威脅使用武力」。因此列出相關字眼,是讓人以「同類原則」理解何謂「其他非法手段」,將其意思限制為只涉武力。</p> -<h4 id="exploring-new-mineral-rich-regions">Exploring New Mineral-Rich Regions</h4> +<p>關並指,中國《刑法》無就「顛覆」定義,但「顛覆」一般指推翻政府權力及法律所制訂的制度,而這很少能透過非武力手段達致。而人大常委立法時已列出「嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞中央或香港特區政權機關依法履行職能」等,擴闊「顛覆」的意思,故條文應同時會包含限制,即只限與武力相關的非法手段,以免意思過闊(over-breadth)。</p> -<p>Many of these concerns surrounding fast-tracking and corner-cutting are likely to be exacerbated in regions with unexplored critical mineral reserves, particularly in locations with no history of mineral mining. Such areas without previous experience of mining activity are likely to have lower levels of infrastructure, human population and activity in general, and are likely to have higher ecological integrity. Once a given mineral becomes more valuable, a higher incentive to build key infrastructure to extract that mineral is likely to have a significant impact on previously intact ecosystems.</p> +<h4 id="官關注普通法原則或不適用國安法-辯方須與本港法律並行">官關注普通法原則或不適用《國安法》 辯方:須與本港法律並行</h4> -<p>Meanwhile, in these locations, the minimal presence of industry to date is likely to be matched with underdeveloped governance and regulatory frameworks for mining activity. In the absence of mandatory social and environmental impact assessments, requirements to undertake community engagement or seek a social licence to operate, the likelihood of environmental and human security risks occurring rises. Increasing global demand for critical minerals intensifies these concerns, incentivising fast-paced mineral exploration and the identification of new reserves in countries without histories of large-scale mining or in areas beyond national jurisdiction (see Box 2).</p> +<p>陳慶偉續問,「同類原則」乃普通法詮釋原則,但《國安法》是由「北方」(中央)草擬(drafted up in the North),為何辯方認為會適用?關引終審法院就呂世瑜案的判詞,指《國安法》須與本港法律並行(work in tandem)。李運騰指,該判詞亦指詮釋《國安法》時應考慮與維護國安有關的全國性法律,惟關回應相關法例非常簡短,無列明任何手段或是否涉武力,因此《國安法》22條特別提到「以武力、威脅使用武力」的非法手段就很能反映問題(very telling)。</p> -<p>In 2012, for example, discoveries of mineral deposits in Malawi – a country with minimal prior history of mining – made it Africa’s largest source of REEs at that time. Those discoveries then mandated a rapid updating of the country’s Mining Act, a need to establish wider legal and institutional frameworks and, in the words of the then Minister of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment Cassim Chilumpha, a “crash program to train mining engineers, legal experts in mining and other related fields in the sector”. With many of the mines recently becoming operational, the contribution of mining to Malawi’s GDP is projected to increase from 1% to 6% by the end of 2023. Yet during the exploration phase and establishment of the mines and related infrastructure, the government has faced criticism for forcibly evicting villagers from their homes and for risking food and water security. Corruption has meant that Malawi has struggled to effectively address these issues, resulting in a situation where some local communities have denounced the mining sector and the lack of consultation, amid warnings that the country’s mining boom “will not necessarily translate into benefits for affected communities”.</p> +<p>陳慶偉續指,《國安法》第一條提及《國安法》立法目的,或隱含「同類原則」不適用(implied exclusion)。關同意《國安法》是因2019年社會事件而訂立,但引人大常委副委員長王晨2020年5月22日就《國安法》的講話,提到立法背景是「反中亂港勢力」破壞香港社會秩序,毀損公共設施及癱瘓政府和立法會運作等,而當時在議會內有武力阻礙議會運作,不知道人大常委立法時是否欲針對該些行為。關強調,法庭必須肯定該講話排除「同類原則」的應用,才能指隱含「同類原則」不適用。</p> -<p>Concerns surrounding the Malawian experience extend to other countries in Africa, with low levels of exploration meaning that the full potential of the continent’s REEs reserves remains undetermined. As in the case of Malawi, there is concern over the initiation of potential extraction activities – of REEs and other critical minerals – in countries with high levels of corruption, weak governance and limited state capacity, where environmental protections and labour rights are likely to be weak or poorly enforced. Similar concern has been raised over the Middle East’s vast, undeveloped critical mineral resources, and the poor environmental and human rights record of many countries in that region. In locations with limited infrastructure, meanwhile, interviewees flagged further risks associated with the rapid development of infrastructure in new mining regions, noting the potential to facilitate the incursion of new licit and illicit industries, triggering further potential social and environmental harms.</p> +<h4 id="辯方如非法手段可擴至民事過失太闊十分危險">辯方:如非法手段可擴至民事過失太闊、十分危險</h4> -<h4 id="boom-and-bust">Boom and Bust</h4> +<p>就「非法手段」的界線,關文渭認為,若民事過失如侵入土地和誹謗也可被視為「非法手段」會十分危險。李運騰問,若該人作出相關行為時有意圖顛覆,「為什麼不可以?」關回應,那便會令條文定義「非常廣闊、太過廣闊(very wide, too wide)」。李運騰則指,《國安法》的嚴苛,某程度上是被控罪須證被告意圖顛覆的條件,而有所減輕。</p> -<p>Beyond those risks attributed to sudden mining booms in newly identified critical mineral-rich regions, there is growing concern around the implications of boom–bust cycles arising from the net zero transition. In the face of a sustained drive to advance green technologies and reduce the demand these exert on critical mineral supplies, future technological innovations and circular economies could rapidly and unexpectedly reduce demand for certain minerals.</p> +<h4 id="辯方被告否決目的為迫政府回應五大訴求基本法無禁止">辯方:被告否決目的為迫政府回應五大訴求、《基本法》無禁止</h4> -<p>Beyond the inevitable disruption caused by a rapid scaling up and down of demand, interviewees emphasised the potential consequences in contexts where there is a lack of experience in properly closing mines at both the government and industry levels, with sudden, poorly managed mine closures presenting a range of environmental and human security risks. At the environmental level, storage of tailings (the waste products of mining and mineral processing) requires management long after a mine has ceased operating and, if not managed correctly, can have devastating environmental consequences. The 2015 Samarco Dam failure demonstrated the potential impact of the failure of tailings disposal dams. The incident resulted in a “tidal wave” of mining waste washing across the Brazilian landscape in what is considered Brazil’s worst environmental disaster. Although relating to iron ore – rather than critical minerals – the case illustrates the potential dangers arising should extraction activities unexpectedly wind down and tailings storage be mismanaged. Meanwhile, the adequate rehabilitation of mine sites, including reversal of the land use change that occurs with the establishment of a mine, is also a concern in the case of rapid boom–bust cycles. There are few examples globally of mine sites having been appropriately rehabilitated. That said, the majority of modern large-scale mines remain in operation, and mining companies increasingly have to provide financial assurance for mine rehabilitation to prevent mines being abandoned in the case of bankruptcy or similar events.</p> +<p>關續指,重點並非「非法手段」是否只限刑事罪行,而是基於預算案內容以外的原因否決是否合法。而控方的主張是議員若考慮預算案以外的原因而否決,便屬不考慮議案內容和優劣的「無差別」否決,屬「非法」。但關指,本案有無法抗拒的證據顯示,被告否決目的是迫政府回應五大訴求。</p> -<p>At the human security level, beyond the health risks associated with scenarios such as those outlined above, there is also the question of social rehabilitation. Mining companies’ social licence to operate often rests on the benefits that mining activities purport to bring to local communities in the form of revenue and improved infrastructure. Historically, in a range of cases, closures of mines have led to communities abandoning settlements, leaving “ghost towns” in their wake. Although there are few examples relating to critical minerals specifically, the collapse of the diamond mining industry in the town of Kolmanskop in Namibia and the closure of platinum mining in Atok, Limpopo in South Africa are two wider examples.</p> +<p>法官陳仲衡即問,迫政府回應五大訴求豈不是被告的藉口,因他們知道不可能達到?關指根據各方陳詞,若說被告只是以五大訴求作為掩飾是有悖常理。關續重申,除非法律禁止,否則個人可以做任何事情,而法例沒有列明議員投票時應該或不應該考慮什麼;法例只列明要根據政府提案「審核、通過財政預算」,故如被告審視預算案後發現沒有五大訴求的內容而否決,也不能說他們沒有審視過預算案。</p> -<h4 id="increasing-geopolitical-competition">Increasing Geopolitical Competition</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qDEQHbM.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 代表李予信的大律師 關文渭</p> -<p>Many of the aforementioned issues risk exacerbating the geopolitical tensions associated with the critical minerals boom. Indeed, some commentators have warned of the potential for critical minerals to spark a “new arms race” or a “new Cold War”, especially given the role of the defence sector in driving critical mineral demand and, notably, the US decision to use wartime powers to secure critical mineral supply chains. The 1950 Defense Production Act gives the US president the power to “shape national defense preparedness programs and to take appropriate steps to maintain and enhance the domestic industrial base”. The act was expanded in 2022 by President Joe Biden to support production of net zero technologies, and again in 2023 to facilitate funding for projects related to the production of minerals such as lithium, REEs and tantalum.</p> +<h4 id="辯方李予信或於案發前已退出參與">辯方:李予信或於案發前已退出參與</h4> -<p>Competition over critical minerals could also exacerbate tensions between great powers in the context of China’s dominant role in a range of critical mineral supply chains. While China’s dominance in the context of critical mineral processing is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to note that China also has significant critical mineral reserves, which are subject to the same risks as those highlighted in this paper. China is the largest importer of lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese, has significant reserves of lead, selenium, tellurium, tin, zinc, graphite, lithium and titanium, and dominates lithium battery production. The country also dominates REE supply chains, accounting for 70% of global rare earth ore extraction and 90% of rare earth ore processing, following decades of state investment, export controls, cheap labour and low environmental standards.</p> +<p>至於就李予信的案情,關文渭指李沒有參與過超級區議會的協調會議,雖有出席3月25日公民黨記者會,但沒有轉發過黨6月簽署「墨落無悔」的帖文。而就李提到否決權的選舉單張,關指是在《國安法》前印發,並於6月30日晚收回,李於《國安法》後短時間已印製沒有提到否決權的新單張。</p> -<p>In this context, the US and its allies are increasingly looking to secure their own supplies to minimise potential supply chain vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, an international environment characterised by growing contestation over critical minerals, among other factors, could see mineral-rich source countries rendered increasingly vulnerable to great power meddling. Such a scenario – whether real or imagined – has already played out in Bolivia in 2019, when former president Evo Morales accused the US of orchestrating a coup to ensure access to Bolivia’s lithium reserves. Investigative journalism website Declassified has made similar allegations against the UK.</p> +<p>就李的選舉論壇筆記提到否決預算案,關文渭指在7月4日、即《國安法》生效後數日的超區選舉論壇上,李從沒有提過否決預算案,大部分其他參與者包括鄺俊宇和涂謹申也沒有提過;而黨友鄭達鴻雖在6月19日街站提到否決預算案,但那是《國安法》前的事,至7月12日的街站無公民黨成員再提過。辯方認為就李是否在案發時間(2020年7月1日)前已退出(withdraw)參與有疑點。</p> -<p>Yet the likelihood of intensified great power competition over critical minerals is debated. Some commentators cite critical minerals’ relative abundance and recyclability, and the fact that, unlike with oil and gas, a break in constant supply is unlikely to spark immediate crisis. In this context, critical mineral competition is arguably unlikely, alone, to act as an impetus for all-out war. However, this does not rule out intensified competition, tension and violence at the local level – a scenario potentially amplified by the unequal burden of critical mineral demand from the Global North and countries such as China on source countries in the Global South, and the resultant environmental and social impacts on communities largely concentrated there.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dbYYCeY.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 鄭達鴻(中)</p> -<p>In this context of geopolitical competition it is important to note that the UK’s position has been weakened since leaving the EU. UK allies – such as the US and EU – are competing with both hostile states and allied states for access to critical minerals. The UK may struggle to leverage negotiating power following withdrawal from the EU and more work is needed to establish how the UK will address these geopolitical concerns.</p> +<h4 id="辯方不應將黨行為歸咎黨員">辯方:不應將黨行為歸咎黨員</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-2-deep-sea-mining-case-study"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 2: Deep-Sea Mining Case Study</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>關續指,除去以上所有證據,控方指控只餘李予信的公民黨黨員身分。惟關引案例強調,單以政治連繫定罪屬危險,公民黨無被指為「共謀者」之一,不能將黨的言行歸咎黨員,而是視乎被告的個別言行。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Over millennia, deposits of critical minerals such as manganese, nickel and cobalt have built up in nodules on the ocean floor, thousands of metres below sea level. Deep-sea mining, proponents argue, is a means of sourcing critical minerals “responsibly, ethically, and with a minimal emissions load on the planet”, reducing the need for land-based mining and enabling countries such as the US to decrease their dependence on imported minerals. However, others caution that deep-sea mining may risk the destruction of deep-sea ecosystems (of which we have little understanding), and cause widespread pollution, the decimation of fish stocks and the disruption of deep-sea carbon storage. The lack of scientific data on the harms and benefits has prompted several countries to call for a moratorium on deep-sea mining.</code></em></p> +<p>就李有份拍攝、楊岳橋提到否決預算案的初選宣傳片段,關稱是於《國安法》前拍攝,由黨所剪輯和發布,只是黨的行為而非李的行為;而李初選落敗後報名港島地區直選,但那從不是組織者協議的目標。關最後指,李的供詞沒有動搖,如法庭認為他所言是正確或可能正確,應讓他脫罪。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Crucially, deep-sea mining would largely take place in international waters, raising crucial legislative and regulatory questions. While the International Seabed Authority (ISA) will ultimately decide whether deep-sea mining goes ahead, decision-making has been delayed until 2025 after Costa Rica, Chile and France insisted that no permits be granted until a stronger regulatory landscape had been established. In the meantime, the ISA has issued contracts for exploratory work; as of November 2022, China held five of the 30 contracts issued.</code></em></p> +<p>關文渭陳詞完畢後,續由代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 進行結案陳詞。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Should such activity go ahead, this “new potential extractive frontier” could have major geopolitical ramifications. China appears to be leading the race: as well as holding the greatest number of deep-sea mining exploration contracts, it has made funding for research in this area a national security and economic priority. Other issues arise from the fact that the US is not an ISA member state and is currently engaged in drafting parallel legislation. As well as limiting the US’s ability to influence global policy on deep-sea mining, this position also potentially disincentivises other countries to comply with theISA.</code></em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/27yfFmq.png" alt="image05" /></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Deep-sea mining in international waters throws up other issues of relevance, at times involving overlaps with other key areas, such as fisheries. Norway, for example, plans to deep-sea mine an area the size of Germany on its continental shelf, most of which lies outside Norway’s exclusive economic zone, potentially infringing UK fishing rights. Key parts of the seafood industry have called for a pause in deep-sea mining plans, as recent research has established that tropical tuna fishing grounds in the Pacific are likely to overlap with areas licensed for deep-sea mining. This, in turn, could impact coastal communities reliant on fishing, resulting in loss of livelihoods and community displacement, among other harmful impacts.</code></em></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(4日)踏入審訊第118天。所有被告的代表律師完成結案陳詞,正式結束118天的審訊,法官料約3至4個月後裁決,但不能作出保證。</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">More broadly, fundamental questions relevant to the ISA’s 2025 decision remain unanswered. As yet, the consequences of deep-sea mining of critical minerals for marine biodiversity and ecosystems are unquantified, while responsibility and payment of any compensation is yet to be determined. Additionally, as with much terrestrial mining, the equitable sharing of the benefits of such mining in international waters is far from uaranteed.</code></em></p> +<p>本案指控被告以「非法手段」無差別否決預算案,意圖顛覆國家政權,控方指濫用議員職權亦屬「非法手段」。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 今陳詞指,《基本法》無規定議員應如何投票和說明何謂濫權,議員只是向選民問責,議員投票不是法律問題、是政治問題,不應由法庭裁定他們有否恰當履行職責。Beel又指,何桂藍早料會被DQ、亦認為35+不可能,故不可能意圖做出她根本知道不可能的事;而何並非要無差別否決,而是望審核預算案,即使政府回應五大訴求但財案有不公她也會反對。Beel 又指,本案整個串謀公開進行,無人相信當時所做是違法;而控方是將政治問題變成刑事罪行問題,本案案情在任何其他普通法管轄區均不會構成顛覆,而是被視為「尋常政治」。</p> -<h3 id="iii-the-road-ahead">III. The Road Ahead</h3> +<h4 id="辯方指顛覆條文模糊23條草案可助理解-官稱不相關">辯方指「顛覆」條文模糊23條草案可助理解 官稱不相關</h4> -<p>With the world’s attention on the net zero transition and with critical minerals playing a pivotal role in this transition, the international community – and the UK as a key financial and mining hub – has a unique opportunity to address the environmental and human security risks arising. As many of the risks identified are not unique to critical mineral mining, there are already a range of known options available. However, the rapid acceleration of critical mineral extraction could intensify existing challenges, necessitating a fundamental rethink of how to apply interventions and embrace emerging options in this space. This chapter uses both the limited available literature on this topic and data drawn from semi-structured interviews designed to gather insights from across a range of sectors, to consider the options available.</p> +<p>代表李予信的大律師關文渭今早陳詞完畢,最後由代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 陳詞。Beel 指,根據《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權罪,被告必須「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」作出22條下的4項行為,並同時有顛覆國家政權的意圖才能入罪。惟 Beel 指條文模糊(vague),沒有訂明何謂「顛覆」和「非法手段」,提出應以2003年就《基本法》23條立法的草案去理解立法原意,當中顛覆條文包括「推翻中央人民政府」。惟法官李運騰質疑,該條例從無通過,只是本地立法機關的立法原意,但本案要處理的是人大常委的立法原意,兩者截然不同,不認為與案有關。</p> -<h4 id="a-governance-rethink">A Governance Rethink</h4> +<p>Beel 指,《國安法》同樣無列明「國家政權」定義,李運騰提議以內地法律理解,惟 Beel 指內地法律指涉中央政府,但香港不是國家。李運騰續指香港政府也是行使中央所授予的權力,惟 Beel 指無證據顯示被告推翻香港政府。法官陳慶偉續引控方呈交、由清華大學法學院教授王振民等編著的《香港特別行政區維護國家安全法讀本》,指有提到就國家政權的解釋,又指「國家政權的概念是我們所不熟悉(not known to us),是內地法律制度所熟悉」,Beel 無進一步補充。</p> -<p>In considering options to mitigate the environmental and human security risks outlined in this paper, interviewees stressed that a vast and complex regulatory landscape exists for mining companies, with country-level regulation often out of date and therefore lagging far behind best practice. Mining in the US, for example, is regulated by an 1872 mining law, despite new technological advancements and improved awareness of mining’s impacts. Outdated laws related to mineral extraction often fail to address the complexities and scale of modern-day mining and related harms, leaving mining companies to navigate a complex regulatory landscape.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HpKshpd.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel</p> -<p>Numerous guidelines exist detailing best practice for companies and countries in relation to prior informed consent that is freely given, environmental protection, transparency and traceability, community engagement and other elements of due diligence designed to mitigate environmental and social harms. However, the majority of these standards are voluntary, meaning that they are inconsistently and often inadequately adopted across the sector. Both large-scale and smaller mining companies often do not apply best practice, as financial considerations are often prioritised. This situation is especially likely where mining occurs in countries with a weak regulatory environment.</p> +<h4 id="辯方非法手段應限刑事罪行法例不清晰被告不知投反對會否犯罪">辯方:「非法手段」應限刑事罪行、法例不清晰被告不知投反對會否犯罪</h4> -<p>A concerted effort is needed to address this regulatory shortfall. First, best practice, such as International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 6 and practice aligned with science-based targets for nature (SBTN), should, as much as possible, be reflected in national regulations in relevant source countries. Second, improved consumer requirements are needed for standards around the production of critical minerals (as in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products). Third, capacity of producer countries must be improved to apply regulation and best practice, with technical assistance provided to this end. Development assistance should also be provided to mineral-rich jurisdictions to establish appropriate in-country regulations and build capacity to implement such regulation effectively. An example of an impactful technical assistance initiative working to improve the mainstreaming of biodiversity into development and infrastructure practice can be seen in the Conservation, Mitigation and Biodiversity Offsets (COMBO) programme, with more initiatives of this type required.</p> +<p>就「非法手段」的定義,Beel 同意應以「同類原則」詮釋,而法庭如不接納只限與武力相關,亦應限於刑事罪行,否則便會令法律不清晰,公眾難以分辨何謂合法和非法行為,有違普通法傳統及法治精神。Beel 並指,若說「非法手段」不限於刑事罪行,是「矛盾修辭(oxymoron)」,因控方是指「你可以透過不犯法去犯法(“You can commit a crime by not commiting a crime.”)」;李運騰回應但控方仍須證明被告意圖顛覆國家政權。</p> -<p>Improved practice and outcomes following mine development are likely to be stronger if these initiatives are led by governments and civil society, with sectoral initiatives often not aiming for the highest standards, given the need to integrate the views of many parts of industry. Business must be consulted, but should not necessarily be the sole source of information. The mining sector does, however, have an important role to play in applying regulation to achieve positive outcomes, particularly through initiatives such as the ICMM and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). These bodies have helped catalyse best practice across the industry and engage mining companies and other stakeholders to address the risks associated with the extractive sector. Innovations in mining also demonstrate the possibilities for progress, such as fully electric mines and the sequestration of carbon in tailings, but governments need to identify opportunities to support this work, rather than allowing the initiatives to remain voluntary. The investor community, meanwhile, has a crucial role to play, through initiatives such as the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures (TNFD), and should set targets and report against them to ensure positive outcomes following mine development.</p> +<p>Beel 續解釋,被告達成協議時,應知道其行為將會構成刑事罪行才能入罪。李運騰問,即他們犯案前要獲得一個法律學位?Beel 否認,指對法律無知不是辯解理由,但法律應是公眾可理解。法官遂舉串謀打劫銀行的例子,指被告的參與行為可能是合法,如只是負責「睇水」或擔任司機,但若知道串謀的目的並同意參與便可構成罪行,並問此情況下控方還要證明被告知道打劫銀行是刑事罪行嗎?Beel 指不需要,因被告可從法例知道其行為是刑事罪行。</p> -<h4 id="the-role-of-the-uk">The Role of the UK</h4> +<p>李運騰即說,《國安法》於6月30日通過,每人也可以閱讀條文。但 Beel 強調當中就「非法手段」定義不清晰,被告不能知道就預算案投反對票會否構成罪行,強調若法例無明文規定為犯罪行為,法庭不得加以定罪。</p> -<p>The UK can play an important role in leading many of these efforts. The UK government has branded itself as a “clean energy superpower” and a leader in “the race towards net zero”, alongside a range of biodiversity commitments. The UK is also uniquely positioned to facilitate action in this area given its role as a global trade, commodities and financial hub. Beyond this, the country is a mining hub, with many of the most prominent and profitable mining companies registered in the UK, and it is also home to industry organisations such as the ICMM.</p> +<h4 id="辯方法例無說明何謂濫權議員向選民問責法庭不應干預">辯方:法例無說明何謂濫權、議員向選民問責法庭不應干預</h4> -<p>The UK government should use its unique position in this field to convene regulatory and wider stakeholder communities, ensuring cross-sector buy-in, for example, through the TNFD and SBTN and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The UK should also use its financial and diplomatic position to enter bilateral partnership discussions with governments, while using its convening power to bring stakeholders together to identify and apply meaningful multilateral solutions. The Forest, Agriculture and Commodity Trade (FACT) dialogue, for example, could act as a model for bringing together countries to discuss how to address critical mineral-related risks, recognising the global scale of the challenge and the need for involvement from supply and demand countries across both the Global North and the Global South. In these ways, the UK can impactfully support integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector of mining. While the mining industry is aware of the need to make fundamental changes, and certain companies have made significant progress in key areas, industry-wide change is unlikely unless governments, consumers and investors across society demand it.</p> +<p>而就控罪指被告旨在濫用當選後根據《基本法》第73條受託的職權(包括「根據政府的提案,審核、通過財政預算」),Beel 指條文只是列明立法會而非議員有的權力,且該權力是可用可不用。李運騰即指,議會獲賦予權力不代表可被濫用,但 Beel 反問「什麼是濫用?」,指《基本法》無規定議員在投票時有什麼職責、也沒有說明何謂濫權,控方亦無相關專家或案例支持,質疑是「空洞的論點」;又指這「不是法律問題,是政治問題」,反問「如何就議員有否恰當審核議案立法?審核是什麼意思?要去到什麼程度才足夠?」</p> -<p>Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, the UK – along with other consumer countries – should also review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains (even as waste). This would reduce waste and improve resilience in supply chains through the creation of an internal market. Interviewees criticised the UK’s current approach as being one of pursuing key net zero milestones in the wrong order, highlighting that the UK currently has a Critical Minerals Strategy but no targeted industrial strategy relating specifically to this area, effectively rendering the former strategy toothless. They also emphasised that there has been limited progress on ensuring that the Critical Minerals Strategy promotes environmental, social and governance standards, with individuals at the verification workshop calling for the government to urgently prioritise and take action on this. Establishing industry priorities in this space before securing critical mineral supply chains will be key to ensuring that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply. This may be done by establishing which industries should be prioritised in times of shortage: for example, energy, healthcare and transport.</p> +<p>Beel 續引何桂藍證供,指預算案有議員無法審核的部分,如「基本工程基金」和現時已撥款130億的國安開支,議員不是不想審核,而是無法審核。而終審法院就梁國雄案的判詞,指法庭不應干預立法會內部事務,Beel 指議員如何投票沒有法律規定,是立法會內部程序問題,不是法律問題;而議員如何投票最終是向選民問責,不應由法庭裁定議員有否恰當履行職責。</p> -<p>Broadening opportunities for sourcing, aside from extraction via new mines, should also be a future priority. Critical mineral recycling and extended producer responsibility would help minimise many of the risks discussed in this paper, and help in moving towards a circular economy. Currently, 0.5% of lithium and 0.2% of REEs are recycled globally, rising to 32% for cobalt and 60% for nickel. While recycling is not a short-term solution, as time is needed to build the necessary infrastructure, scientists estimate that with optimum recycling the US could meet 30%–40% of anticipated demand for critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and graphite through recycling. The IEA estimates that recycling could meet 10% of global demand – with the benefits of recycling much higher for countries that have already embraced clean energy technologies. Given the pressures that increased demand will put on critical mineral supply chains in the coming years, investment in the necessary recycling infrastructure should be prioritised.</p> +<p>Beel 又指,控方是將純粹政治議題變成刑事罪行問題,但本案案情在任何其他普通法管轄區並不會構成顛覆罪,而是會被視為尋常政治(normal politics)。法庭在本案應考慮普通法原則,而非政治考慮。</p> -<p>Disposable e-cigarettes (vapes) highlight the need for forward-thinking, circular-economy-driven policies. The UK currently throws away 1.3 million disposable vapes every week, amounting to more than 65 million a year. The vapes that currently go to landfill each year contain lithium-ion batteries that contain enough lithium, if recycled, to produce 1,200 electric vehicle batteries. The IEA has warned of lithium shortages as soon as 2025, with lithium recycling a key avenue to securing supplies. While the recycling of lithium could currently only take place on a small scale, its value as an industry would grow exponentially as more lithium stock enters the economy. Given the potential of lithium recycling from products such as disposable vapes and the UK’s projected future lithium needs, policymakers should prioritise establishing infrastructure for critical mineral recycling, and recycling more broadly. To date, domestic progress has been slow. However, the UK’s first industrial-scale lithium-ion battery recycling facility received clearance to operate in 2023 with a forecasted processing capacity of up to 22,000 tonnes of lithium-ion batteries per year. Yet more needs to be done to reform waste management processes that do not maximise wider opportunities to recover critical minerals. Extended producer responsibility would also help prevent waste at the scale seen in the case of disposable vapes.</p> +<h4 id="辯方不應接納被告涉公職人員行為失當無人可迫特首解散立會及下台">辯方:不應接納被告涉公職人員行為失當、無人可迫特首解散立會及下台</h4> -<p>The UK has regulations in place to encourage recovery, reuse and recycling of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) and will consult on this in relation to critical minerals in 2023, as well as carrying out an assessment to consider the “circularity of critical minerals in the UK today as a baseline for future work”. However, other work in this area has recently been delayed, such as the extended producer responsibility scheme for packaging, with new rules to ensure packaging producers pay for the cost of recycling their packaging deferred from October 2024 to 2025. Experience of this type raises concerns that proactive steps to support the recycling and reuse of critical minerals could face the same hurdles. Meanwhile, disposable vape producers have already been criticised for not complying with EEE regulations, highlighting the ease with which manufacturers of other critical mineral-based products might avoid compliance.</p> +<p>Beel 亦質疑控方於本案改變立場,由指控被告濫用73條的職權,移向指控沒有效忠《基本法》及香港特區。惟 Beel 強調,效忠香港特區不是效忠香港政府,立法會由人民選出,議員是對人民有義務(beholden),人民是特區的一部分。Beel 亦指控方在共謀者原則的法律爭議時,才首次提出被告《國安法》前或涉「公職人員行為失當」罪,但不被接納,現時將此論點「起死回生」,法庭也不應接納。</p> -<p>Given the urgency of the net zero transition, the government should prioritise and fast-track relevant policy initiatives, looking at all options to upscale the UK’s recycling capabilities. At the same time, it should work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, the right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible. The government should also work with manufacturers to reduce the critical mineral footprint in products, using the power of taxation where possible. Car manufacturers, for example, are increasing production of electric SUVs but these need larger batteries, and therefore more minerals and energy, than smaller electric vehicles. In response to this, Norway recently began taxing electric vehicles over a certain weight, a move designed to motivate car manufacturers to be more efficient with their mineral usage. These measures would all serve to reduce demand for critical minerals, thereby helping to secure supply for the industries that most need them. As well as helping to secure critical mineral supply chains, improved domestic recycling has the potential to create jobs and support UK economic growth.</p> +<p>而就本案指控被告否決預算案後導致特首解散立法會及下台,Beel 強調,根據《基本法》,特首有權不解散立法會,即使解散也不會癱瘓政府,因可申請臨時撥款,亦無人可迫特首下台,除非特首提交相同預算案並被否決。而且據基本法起草委員譚耀宗指,《基本法》50至51條機制原意是讓選民決定特首或議會哪方合理,Beel 反問:「如法例容許,又怎會構成阻撓和破壞政府履行職能?」,指否決致特首下台是《基本法》提供的程序,不可能是憲政危機。</p> -<h4 id="social-awareness-and-public-engagement">Social Awareness and Public Engagement</h4> +<h4 id="辯方何桂藍早料會被dq不可能意圖做出協議行為">辯方:何桂藍早料會被DQ、不可能意圖做出協議行為</h4> -<p>To drive many of the necessary changes, attention to societal-level narratives is also required. Currently, the discourse on the renewable energy sector that critical minerals fuel is supportive: in 2022, polling published by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy showed that 88% of people in the UK support using renewable energy. Meanwhile, polling data by Ipsos and the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations showed that in October 2022, the majority of people in the UK continued to support most net zero policies, including electric vehicle subsidies, among others.</p> +<p>就何桂藍的案情,Beel 指沒有足夠證據證明有涉案串謀協議,即使有,何桂藍亦非協議一分子,沒有意圖無差別否決預算案和顛覆國家政權。而何的證供令人耳目一新(refreshing)、誠實、毫無歉意(unapologetic)和直接,沒有提出藉口,其證供可信,望法庭採納。</p> -<p>However, as this paper has highlighted, critical mineral mining is associated with a number of environmental and human security risks. If these are left unmitigated, it could reduce support for the net zero transition both domestically and internationally. Given the benefits that critical minerals can bring to both net zero goals and local economies, interviewees stressed that efforts to garner widespread societal support are fundamental. The empowerment of local communities where mining is taking place and, more widely, of consumers of technology containing critical minerals are both key to ensuring public support for critical mineral mining, and can help facilitate a just transition to net zero.</p> +<p>Beel 並指,無論是控方證人區諾軒和何桂藍均認為民主派取得35+不可能,何於5月《國安法》訂立後已知她本人會被DQ,不可能當選和行使其權力,其後亦確實如此發生,「她如何能意圖做一些她知道做不到的事?」</p> -<p>Community engagement and trust building are key to ensuring mining companies’ social licence to operate and that local communities are partners and beneficiaries of the mineral extraction process. This paper has highlighted the local harms that can occur. However, there are a few examples of mining companies actively prioritising community engagement and ensuring meaningful community oversight of mining activity and the associated benefits.</p> +<p>Beel 同意,串謀的不可能並非辯護理由,但舉例如有人在協議謀殺另一人前,已知道那人已死了,則根本不可能意圖殺他、亦不可能串謀罪成;而本案中何亦知道不可能做到涉案行為,亦因此無意圖這樣做,她參選只是想取得高投票率,其串謀罪不應成立。</p> -<p>Mining company Cameco, for example, engaged the English River First Nation (ERFN) in Canada as a partner in a uranium mining project and undertook several years of discussions before a collaborative agreement was signed in 2013 to formalise ERFN’s share of the mine’s benefits. The agreement set out Cameco’s obligations to workforce and business development, community investment and engagement and environmental stewardship, and committed to regular communications between the two parties to ensure mutual benefit, thereby sustaining “high levels of trust” built on “transparency and collaboration”.</p> +<h4 id="辯方何桂藍望審核預算案非無差別否決決定與五大訴求無關">辯方:何桂藍望審核預算案非無差別否決、決定與五大訴求無關</h4> -<p>Similarly, lithium mining company Sales de Jujuy has been praised for “fostering mutually beneficial and understanding partnerships with localities” in Argentina and the Alaskan Red Dog Mine has brought “lasting and significant” benefits to local Indigenous communities, though these are “modest” in the context of the mine’s overall operations and profit.</p> +<p>而若法庭不接納,Beel 亦提出何桂藍並無參與控方所指控的任何協議,指預算案需經歷兩三個月的審議階段,而何清楚說明若預算案有無法審核的部分,其預設立場便是投反對票,除非政府說服她投贊成;她亦會指出議案問題並提修正案。</p> -<p>The impact of community engagement and trust building can also be seen in the UK context. Cornish Lithium has proactively engaged with the local community, organising community engagement events and Q&amp;A sessions and launching a community fund to contribute to local clubs, charities and activity groups. This has helped to secure broad support, although concerns about the environmental impact and the potential for wealth from Cornwall’s lithium to be amassed elsewhere remain. In contrast, Cornish Tin Limited’s plans to explore for and extract tin, lithium, tungsten and other metals from the Wheal Vor tin mine have met local opposition, with a local newspaper noting that “there has yet to be a full public meeting where [locals’] questions can be put to Cornish Tin”. According to the British Geological Survey, areas of the UK from the Highlands to southwest England have the right geology for critical mineral mining, including of lithium. Meanwhile, the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy puts emphasis on growing domestic capabilities along the supply chain, which includes domestic mining. Garnering community support for onshore mining through community engagement is, therefore, crucial.</p> +<p>Beel 指,何明顯並非「無差別」否決,其目的是要審核預算案,找出其弊端,而她無直接提倡五大訴求或否決預算案,其立場亦與五大訴求無關,因即使政府回應五大訴求,但預算案有不公她也會投反對。Beel 亦指,何簽署「墨落無悔」只是讓選民看到她敢於運用《基本法》賦予的權力,是個人對聲明的回應,但不是簽署協議。</p> -<p>While examples of mining companies actively engaging with communities are encouraging, this kind of best practice remains largely voluntary and is not the industry norm across companies or geographies. For this reason, governments should demand best practice on community engagement from companies operating in their territory, with the Global North supporting supply countries in the Global South to demand the same.</p> +<h4 id="辯方何桂藍僅望推動民主化向政府問責無協議無差別否決財案">辯方:何桂藍僅望推動民主化向政府問責、無協議無差別否決財案</h4> -<p>Another key element is community empowerment to demand the local distribution of benefits. The potential for success in this area can be seen in the case of the Shetland Community Benefit Fund, an independent cooperative of local communities which is actively engaging with renewable energy companies to ensure that Shetland’s communities “benefit from commercial renewable energy developments in the islands”. Similarly, Community Power Cornwall calls for “the ownership and integration of renewable energy technologies into everyday lives and settings”, and develops community-owned renewable energy installations.</p> +<p>Beel 最後指,本案串謀與其他任何串謀不同,整個協調過程是公開,無人相信他們當時所做的是違法、也沒有任何要隱瞞,何桂藍亦希望公眾知道事情如何發生,以在投票時作出知情的選擇。而否決預算案的議題一開始只是次要問題(side issue),因所有人都知道他們有權對預算案投下反對票;只是在得悉提到否決或會被DQ時才開始關注,但人們當時也非關注會干犯刑事罪行,因如何桂藍所說,她從無想過「撳個反對掣」也會被捕。</p> -<p>This, in turn, links to the need for better public understanding and education on mining more broadly. Public awareness of the risks associated with critical mineral mining is key to driving progress on the consumer and investor requirements that are ultimately how a sector – and the governments that regulate the sector in producer countries – will be motivated to make change. Greater public understanding will empower communities to engage with the mining industry in an informed manner. Additionally, public understanding of the importance of critical minerals for the net zero transition will help to boost support for mining projects and reduce demand by ensuring consumers are more mindful about products that contain critical minerals. Equally, such understanding is likely to increase support for circular economy measures to reduce demand, such as design-to-recycle and the right to repair.</p> +<p>Beel 續指,本案純粹關乎被告對政府的挑戰,就如譚耀宗及時任中聯辦主任駱惠寧都提過民主派若立會過半,是中央所不容許,2020年選舉制度「完善」後直選議席亦大幅減少,控方是將政治問題變成成刑事罪行問題。Beel 指,何桂藍議程清晰,就是推動民主化,尋求將功能失常的立法會改革,以向政府問責,但從無協議無差別否決預算案。即使法庭認為有,Beel 亦重申無法律規定如何投票、不認為無差別否決是違法,議員只是向其選民問責,應判何桂藍無罪。</p> -<p>Facilitating forums at which mining companies and local communities engage should be a UK priority, to ensure the economic and social viability of plans to mine critical minerals domestically. Internationally, cross-sector, multi-stakeholder coalitions can help to empower local communities whose views are often overlooked in the interests of mining companies, while promoting best practice across the critical mineral mining sector. Examples of this already exist, such as the Fair Cobalt Alliance and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which can act as models to replicate.</p> +<h4 id="官約3至4個月後裁決-但不能保證">官:約3至4個月後裁決 但不能保證</h4> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Beel 陳詞完畢後,所有辯方律師均完成陳詞,正式完結由今年2月6日開審、長達118天的審訊。法官陳慶偉表示,與另外兩名法官其後都要審理其他案件,不清楚需時多久作出裁決,但會盡快處理,料需約3至4個月,但強調不能作出保證,一有裁決會盡快通知各方。</p> -<p>Critical minerals are essential for the net zero transition and for meeting the target set at the UNFCCC Paris Conference in 2015 to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Because of this, demand for these minerals is set to grow rapidly: the IEA projects that up to 28 million tonnes of minerals for green technology will be needed in 2040 – a significant increase from the 7 million tonnes currently mined each year.</p> +<p>大律師關文渭另為保釋被告申請撤銷宵禁令,控方反對,法官最終批准所有被告撤宵禁令。散庭時,各被告與旁聽人士揮手道別。</p> -<p>While their potential benefit is significant, this paper has explored the risks associated with critical minerals mining, covering both environmental and human security. At an environmental level, the paper finds key risks to include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, water scarcity, soil erosion, pollution and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses and labour exploitation, crime, corruption and conflict. These issues often intersect, with the biggest impact often felt by local communities, including Indigenous communities on or near whose land mineral reserves may be located.</p> +<p>本案不認罪的16人,包括鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、李予信、余慧明及吳政亨。其中何桂藍、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、余慧明及吳政亨6人不獲准保釋,分別還柙逾26至33個月,其餘10人獲准保釋。</p> -<p>While many of these risks are already established, this paper highlights the potential for skyrocketing demand for critical minerals to accelerate these harms. This may occur where burgeoning demand incentivises governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; mandates the opening up of new mining frontiers in countries without histories of extractive operations that lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; exacerbates boom–bust cycles of extractive activity; and increases geopolitical competition.</p> +<hr /> -<p>These risks have very real consequences for the communities and environment they impact. However, the international community – and the UK as a key financial, trade and mining hub – has a range of opportunities to address the risks and minimise the damage associated with critical mineral extraction for the net zero transition. With the world’s attention on the energy transition, there is a prime opportunity to rethink the current approach and embrace emerging opportunities. Some of these opportunities are not novel in and of themselves but they do require a concerted, strengthened effort to achieve.</p> +<p>案件編號:HCCC69/2022</p>獨媒報導辯方指「非法手段」應限「武力」相關 官關注普通法原則是否適用《國安法》 何桂藍結案:控方將政治問題變刑事、議員只向選民問責法庭不應干預Too Fast, Too Furious?2023-12-04T12:00:00+08:002023-12-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/too-fast-too-furious<p><em>What can countries learn from recent experiments in adopting cryptocurrency as a legal tender?</em></p> -<p>Given the high-level focus of this research, this paper does not seek to make context-specific recommendations to address the challenges ahead. However, drawing on research findings, it offers the following overarching recommendations for potential ways forward for key stakeholders to consider. These recommendations are tailored to the UK specifically, in light of the country’s unique positioning to facilitate action in this area, as an international trade and financial hub and a mining hub in which many of the most prominent mining companies are registered. To effectively leverage this position to ensure a just transition to net zero and ensure that the actions and investments required attract long-term public legitimacy, the UK government should consider the benefits of the following, many of which are also applicable to other countries in the Global North:</p> +<excerpt /> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the TNFD, the SBTN, the GRI and similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop an updated industrial strategy for critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the “levelling up” agenda.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks, providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation which improves the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world – such as natural capital assessments through which we can better understand, measure and value human interdependencies with nature, and plan more sustainable management of natural resources – and wellbeing economics. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Currently, only a handful of countries have decided to adopt cryptocurrency as a legal tender, most prominently among them El Salvador and the Central African Republic (CAR). While attracted by the potential economic and monetary incentives that this move has to offer, both countries have faced significant implementation challenges, threatening to undermine their objectives and any foreseeable economic benefits.</p> -<hr /> +<p>As more countries – and developing economies in particular – have begun to consider integrating cryptocurrency into their national financial systems, these experiments highlight that adopting cryptocurrency as a national legal tender necessitates a certain level of preparedness, including appropriate infrastructure, public education, building trust and – last but not least – the establishment of robust financial crime prevention measures.</p> -<p><strong>Genevieve Kotarska</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at RUSI. Her research focuses on the community-level impacts of organised crime and terrorism and illicit trades such as drug, firearms and people trafficking.</p> +<h3 id="two-routes">Two Routes</h3> -<p><strong>Lauren Young</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at RUSI with expertise in wildlife crime and conservation.</p>Genevieve Kotarska and Lauren YoungThis paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks.Countering Small UAS2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/countering-small-uncrewed-aerial-systems<p><em>This report examines the threat of small drones on the modern battlefield, and the various kinetic and non-kinetic defenses available to defeat them.</em></p> +<p>While El Salvador and the CAR sought to adopt cryptocurrency for similar reasons, their national experiences have been quite different.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>El Salvador took the step of adopting Bitcoin as legal tender in 2021, with the goal of increasing investment and assisting citizens that lack access to traditional financial services. Initially, to integrate Bitcoin into its economy, the country contracted third-party companies to develop centralised cryptocurrency wallets known as “Chivo Wallets” and cryptocurrency ATMs. This government-funded project allows citizens to transfer funds quickly through the use of the “lightning network” – a solution that increased the speed of Bitcoin transactions – and without commission fees.</p> -<h3 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h3> +<p>The CAR moved to adopt Bitcoin in April 2022, but the government reversed its decision when the Constitutional Court declared the proposal unlawful a month after it was introduced. After this reversal, the government took a different route and created a partially Bitcoin-backed cryptocurrency, known as the Sango Coin, to be introduced in phases. The first phase would allow the public to buy into the crypto-backed currency, while the subsequent phases would allow the use of the currency for certain government services, like purchasing citizenship, e-residency and land. The CAR’s Constitutional Court ultimately rejected a scheme that would have allowed foreign investors to acquire citizenship for $60,000 worth of Sango Coins or a 250 square metre plot for $10,000 worth of Sango Coins, ruling that nationality cannot be priced in a market and that residency requires physical presence in the country.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>For years, air defense has been the domain of specialized units and niche capabilities under conditions of air superiority. That era is no more, and the entire joint force must now look up. Small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) pose a significant threat, exhibiting multi-mission capabilities, minimal signatures, wide proliferation, low costs, and ground force utility. The common use of sUAS today amplifies other trends in modern warfare, including further complicating the airspace, saturating battlefields with more reconnaissance and strike assets, and expanding support for precision strike complexes. Their introduction is comparable to that of mortars and anti-tank missiles in the degree for which they have and will continue to push ground forces to adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The mission and capabilities to counter sUAS (C-sUAS) should be shared across numerous unit types, including air defense, maneuver, support, and sustainment. The high demand and low density of air defense formations requires that air defenders and non-specialists work together as part of a combined arms for air defense (CAFAD) approach. The central question today, however, is the specific division of labor among the air defense and non-air defense units, as well as the authorities delegated to these groups. In general, C-sUAS planners have borrowed the distinction between “area” and “point” defense whereby traditional air defenders manage larger systems such as high-energy lasers and long-range kinetic interceptors for area defense, while maneuver forces use point defenses such as guns, nets, and handheld platforms.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>U.S. C-sUAS acquisition processes require updating to keep pace with evolving threats. The Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) was stood up to coordinate C-sUAS doctrine, organization, and training across the joint force. Congressional and Department of Defense (DoD) leadership should consider modifications to JCO’s authorities and relation to service acquisition agencies to improve the requirements process and acquisition timelines.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Air defense has multiple meanings and connotations, especially in terms of service-specific terminology. As a mission, air defense destroys, nullifies, or reduces the effectiveness of enemy attacks by aerial platforms. Defined organizationally, it connotes force structure responsibilities, such as the Army’s Air Defense Artillery branch, or specific units manned, trained, and equipped to detect, track, and defeat aerial threats in specified sectors or altitudes. Because sUAS represent a distributed challenge to the entire joint force, C-sUAS operations cannot be confined to a single unit or specialization. C-sUAS developers, planners, and operators must overcome organizational silos.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities are available to defeat sUAS. Over the past several years, the DoD has fielded a range of electronic attack and kinetic systems in support of joint and service urgent needs requests. Each of these tools have unique strengths and weaknesses in regard to survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and defended area.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The institutionalization and propagation of C-sUAS capability will require developments across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Training and capacity requirements will take priority over capability improvements over the next few years. New doctrine should specify the division of labor between air defense and non-air defense specialists, as well as the specific sensors, command and control, and effectors that they can operate. The policy, strategy, budget, and programmatic decisions made at this stage will carry enormous consequences for the field.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>At the onset of the project, the coin also promoted the tokenisation of natural resources within the country. Despite the project not initially gaining traction, as of July 2023, the CAR National Assembly revisited the concept and passed a law allowing the tokenisation of land and natural resources.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<h3 id="same-motives-different-challenges">Same Motives, Different Challenges?</h3> -<p>Over the past decade, sUAS have become a core capability on the modern battlefield. Many are commercially sourced, easy to deploy, hard to detect, and highly proliferated. State and nonstate actors alike use them around the world in major conflicts, gray zone and criminal activities, and targeted killings. Technological advances in sUAS optics and sensor miniaturization have made them increasingly versatile as a primary reconnaissance tool, including for targeting for larger artillery and missile strikes. sUAS will continue to present a serious threat to military targets and civilian population centers.</p> +<p>The countries’ respective political leaders generally cited the potential economic benefits as their underlying rationale for promoting cryptocurrency as a national legal tender. Both countries regard this as an innovative solution to economic stagnation, poor revenue and foreign direct investment, and a reliance on third country-backed currencies. In the CAR, for example, its national currency – the CFA Franc – is backed by France and pegged to the Euro, with several restrictions in place, such as keeping 50% of the CAR’s foreign assets with the French Treasury. Some saw the CAR’s interest in cryptocurrencies as a political move away from France in an effort to lessen reliance.</p> -<p>Numerous studies have highlighted the sUAS threat. A few have reviewed C-sUAS platforms and capabilities. Yet to date, there appears to be no public-facing report that assesses C-sUAS history, strategy, and programs, across the DOTMLPF. This report tries to fill that gap from the perspective of the U.S. military.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Both El Salvador and the Central African Republic suffer from a lack of appropriate infrastructure to fully realise the adoption of crypto</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The C-sUAS mission is a challenging one. The threat is cheap and plentiful, whereas defenses are still emerging and bring significantly higher costs. Attribution can be difficult, complicating deterrence through retaliation. It remains unclear whether the active defense solutions currently in development will become programs of record; if investments in time, money, and personnel will continue to support this mission; and how well the multiple services involved can coordinate on developing and deploying their active defenses. While the U.S. Army is the lead service for developing joint doctrine, requirements, materiel, and training, the C-sUAS mission is not and must not be limited to one service, branch, or specialization. It is a concern for the entire joint force.</p> +<p>But in addition to these legitimate economic concerns, both El Salvador and the CAR faced stark challenges in adopting cryptocurrency as a legal tender.</p> -<p>Air defense has continually evolved to meet new threats and challenges, from surveillance balloons to bomber aircraft to ballistic and cruise missiles. The threats have gotten smaller, harder to detect, and more sophisticated over time. At numerous moments along the way, a given threat will be deemed unstoppable — until, of course, defenses evolve to prove that assumption incorrect. C-sUAS represents the next chapter for the evolution of the air defense mission.</p> +<p>Firstly, both countries suffer from a lack of appropriate infrastructure to fully realise the adoption of crypto. For instance, in El Salvador, 40% of the population lacks access to the internet, a critical factor for allowing the cryptocurrency industry to flourish. Fewer than 60% of those who had internet access and mobile phones downloaded Chivo Wallet, and only 20% continued to use it. Also, according to estimates, 40% of all downloads occurred when it was launched in September 2021, and virtually no downloads took place in 2022. Meanwhile, in the CAR, according to 2021 estimates, only 11.4% of the country’s population has internet access, the electricity supply is patchy and unreliable, and mobile phone usage is low.</p> -<p>Fortunately, the DoD today recognizes the importance of C-sUAS. Nearly a decade ago, ISIS militants began using commercial quadcopters effectively in battle. In January 2020, the DoD established the JCO to rapidly prototype, test, demonstrate, and field new defenses. More recently, the Biden administration’s 2022 Missile Defense Review included C-UAS as a component of the defense against “missile-related” threats.</p> +<p>Software reliability and cyber security safeguards have also become an issue for El Salvador. When the Bitcoin software first went online in the country, it struggled to verify the identity of its users. The public’s scepticism was exacerbated when hackers were able to create accounts and withdraw the $30 in Bitcoin that the country was offering to its citizens.</p> -<p>With doctrine, organizations, materiel, training, and other issues under debate today, the United States and its allies face a critical period with sUAS and C-sUAS. High levels of sUAS proliferation, little to no regulatory oversight, and improved capabilities, technologies, and integration all converge to create an environment in which the U.S. military must respond to a rapidly evolving threat. Contributors to these conversations must understand the threat and its likely evolution, the defenses available and in development today, and the principles that should guide their application. For better or worse, the policies and institutions developed today will last for years to come.</p> +<p>Secondly, transparency has been a persistent problem. The president of El Salvador’s tweets, for example, have been the only source of information enabling the public to know the amount of Bitcoin that the government has bought or sold. Similarly, the CAR declared that a Treasury-maintained partial Bitcoin reserve would support the Sango Coin, although little information about the related technicalities has been made available to the general public. Consequently, public trust in these initiatives has been low. There have also been allegations that in the case of the CAR, adopting cryptocurrency would provide a convenient avenue for Russia to evade Western sanctions, given its close ties with the country.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6ElHChK.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Drone Evolution.</strong> Source: U.S. Army and Wikimedia Commons.</em></p> +<p>Thirdly, appropriate regulatory and legal regimes were not in place prior to the introduction of a government-sponsored cryptocurrency application. The lack of anti-financial crime measures, like Know Your Customer and transaction monitoring, presented a major risk of increased illicit financial flows, especially when converting cryptocurrency to fiat currency – a risk that could also spread beyond the country’s borders. In the CAR, experts conveyed their concerns over the increased risk of financial crime due to the adoption of Bitcoin, which would ultimately impact other countries in the region.</p> -<h4 id="research-scope-and-objectives">Research Scope and Objectives</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">What is clear is that adopting cryptocurrency as legal tender requires a certain amount of readiness in terms of digital infrastructure, transparency and accountability</code></em></strong></p> -<p>This report discusses current C-sUAS defenses used to detect and defeat small drones. It serves as a guide for understanding and evaluating C-sUAS solutions, both to inform policymakers by providing principles for future developments in this field, and to inform the public on a key defense issue for which there is a gap in the open-source literature. The report explores the trade-offs among various C-sUAS sensor and effector types but does not advocate for any particular solution set. It also does not address sUAS counterproliferation and regulation efforts, offensive “left-of-launch” strikes, camouflage, deception, signature management, nor other topics related to but not centered on active defense. Furthermore, it does not address specific operational or tactical issues, such as UAS notification procedures or how U.S. personnel should coordinate intercept engagements with allies. These processes are better addressed by U.S. military leaders as they update their related doctrine and standard operating procedures.</p> +<p>Finally, in addition to low transparency, the price volatility of Bitcoin has raised eyebrows as to whether or not these initiatives are truly worthwhile. Even though Bitcoin’s price volatility appears to be a better alternative for some countries than hyperinflation, El Salvador’s inflation rates are rather low, raising doubts about the effort. Besides, securing convertibility is a tough procedure with Bitcoin’s price fluctuation. Given that the adoption of Bitcoin as legal tender in El Salvador is entirely sponsored by public funds via a trust, there is a major risk that the trust’s resources will be drained if the price of Bitcoin declines. According to estimates of the reported amount of Bitcoin purchased by El Salvador, the country has lost approximately $56 million as of June 2022. The IMF has proposed that El Salvador should support the trust through new resources or debt issuance to ensure financial stability and convertibility.</p> -<p>The study focuses closely on C-sUAS for the DoD, as primarily operated by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. There are several other U.S. stakeholders in this field, including the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Aviation Administration. The C-sUAS requirements, regulations, and resources differ among these groups.</p> +<h3 id="important-planning-for-future-initiatives">Important Planning for Future Initiatives</h3> -<p>This report uses the broad definition of air defense, which is to detect, track, and defeat aerial threats. It does not use the U.S. military’s organizational-specific definition of air defense as Air Defense Artillery or other groups specifically trained and equipped to detect, track, and defeat sophisticated air threats in large, specified sectors. sUAS break down the military’s typical distinction between air defense and force protection through their small size, wide proliferation, and flight patterns. C-sUAS will be a necessary part of both air defense and force protection, although there will be differing levels of operational expertise between trained air defenders and other military personnel.</p> +<p>What is clear from the El Salvador and CAR experiments is that adopting cryptocurrency as legal tender requires a certain amount of readiness in terms of digital infrastructure, transparency and accountability. The most fundamental requirement is physical infrastructure. Countries must be prepared to ensure that the majority of the population has access to reliable electricity, the internet and smartphones.</p> -<p>The report has three sections. The first section aims to provide a brief analysis of the sUAS threat. It highlights common missions and capabilities through operational case studies and examines why sUAS have proliferated so quickly in recent years.</p> +<p>Firstly, transparency is key. There should be a continuous process of informing the public through official channels about advancements, Bitcoin reserves and other related topics. This should translate into teaching the public how to use crypto, as well as education on the financial risks that cryptocurrencies pose. One notable example is that El Salvador’s Ministry of Education intends to introduce a curriculum centred around Bitcoin in schools beginning in 2024.</p> -<p>The second section reviews the ways and means to detect and defeat sUAS. This technology backgrounder broadly covers the sensors, C2, and effectors available today. This section reviews platforms that the DoD is pursuing and confirms the feasibility of C-sUAS technologies.</p> +<p>Secondly, countries also need a robust regulatory framework in place to reduce the risk of financial crime. Without proper implementation of cyber security procedures and anti-money laundering (AML) measures around government-funded cryptocurrency applications, there is inherently a higher risk of criminal exploitation. There is already a steady threat of cryptocurrency businesses being hacked. When government funds are involved, this draws more attention from both regular users and criminals alike, and the threat only increases.</p> -<p>The third and final section lays out the U.S. C-sUAS development path from urgent need, to refinement, to institutionalization. As C-sUAS becomes institutionalized, there are opportunities and potential pitfalls across the DOTMLPF. The C-sUAS enterprise still faces unresolved questions regarding political authorities for C-sUAS stakeholders, personnel responsibilities, and acquisition policies to enable rapid development and procurement.</p> +<p>Ultimately, countries thinking about taking the same path would be remiss to ignore these lessons. While the adoption of cryptocurrency as legal tender may have advantages, problems such as a lack of trust, transparency and accountability, as well as the absence of appropriate infrastructure and robust financial crime prevention measures, may hinder the realisation of the desired economic benefits of cryptocurrency.</p> -<h3 id="the-suas-threat">The sUAS Threat</h3> +<hr /> -<p><em>sUAS pose a significant threat due to their multi-mission capabilities, minimal signatures, wide proliferation, low costs, and ground force utility.</em></p> +<p><strong>Fatima Alsancak</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI focusing on countering proliferation financing.</p>Fatima AlsancakWhat can countries learn from recent experiments in adopting cryptocurrency as a legal tender?【初選47人案・審訊第 117 日】2023-11-30T12:00:00+08:002023-11-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-117<ul> + <li>辯方質疑控方詮釋「非法手段」無邊無際 僅搬《國安法》「尚方寶劍」</li> +</ul> -<p>In late December 2022, Russia launched a massive assault against Ukrainian infrastructure targeting multiple key regions including Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa. The first wave of attacks was conducted with cheap Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. Ukrainian air force officials believe Russia used the drones to overwhelm air defenses before sending cruise missiles in a second wave of attacks. These attacks left several regions without power, including major cities such as Lviv and Kyiv. This incident was just one among many in a months-long strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure in the hopes of demoralizing the public and leaving them without heating during the winter months.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Today, sUAS are widely recognized as a ubiquitous, mature, and lethal part of the modern aerial threat spectrum. Their use in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is just one of many cases that have occurred over the past decade. Operators can attack adversaries with sUAS by dropping bombs or using the drone as a loitering munition in “kamikaze” suicide attacks. They can also conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions to collect information on an adversary’s position or activities. Modern sUAS sensors and data links can connect to larger kill chains or be used to find and fix targets for artillery and other precision-guided munitions. sUAS can conduct these missions while being difficult to detect and defeat with current air defenses.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uIM39qS.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Modern air and missile defenses are ill-suited to counter low-flying, slow, and small UAS. Following U.S. divestment from short-range air defense in the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. military has been challenged to respond to enemy sUAS. Other states have faced similar issues. In 2016, Israel fired two $3 million PAC-2 interceptors and scrambled a fighter aircraft in a failed attempt to shoot down a sUAS from Syria that had violated Israeli airspace. In its conflict with Yemen’s Houthis, Saudi Arabia used fighter aircraft to patrol the border and shoot down drones worth a few hundred dollars with $2 million air-to-air missiles. These responses are enormously costly and wasteful over longer military campaigns.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(30日)踏入審訊第117天,辯方續進行結案陳詞。代表鄭達鴻及梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙指,《基本法》已預想否決預算案的情況和應對,難以想像會被視為空前憲政危機和政治不穩,被告根據《基本法》行事不大可能意圖顛覆國家政權。而兩人均認為「35+」不可能,無意圖參與串謀,當中鄭會審視財案優劣投票,梁過往則因沒有全民退保而否決,但與他人無協議亦無意圖顛覆。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Lk80k5D.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Ukrainian Service Member Fires Rifle at Drone.</strong> Position near Bakhmut on March 20, 2023.</em></p> +<p>而對控方稱被告以「非法手段」顛覆政權不限於刑事罪行、亦涵蓋濫用議員職權,代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑質疑該詮釋「無邊無際」、欠案例支持,只是搬出《國安法》這把「尚方寶劍」;代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉亦指違反職責不能構成「非法」,法律亦無明文規定議員不可不按議案優劣否決。此外,鄒家成一方指他發起「墨落無悔」僅表達對戴耀廷毋須簽協議的失望,並非協議,也從無主張推翻中國政府;柯耀林一方則指他簽「墨落」是受政治環境所迫。案件下周一續審,辯方將繼續進行結案陳詞。</p> -<p>The lack of active C-sUAS opens a gap in modern air defense that combatants around the world are exploiting. There is no substitute. The complement to active C-sUAS — passive defense — is important but insufficient. The United States cannot harden all of its military bases against sUAS, and force distribution is ineffective against the large quantity and low costs of sUAS. The United States and its partners therefore must develop active and integrated defenses to mitigate these risks.</p> +<h4 id="辯方被告知無可能取得35無意圖作出串謀協議">辯方:被告知無可能取得35+、無意圖作出串謀協議</h4> -<h4 id="defining-suas">Defining sUAS</h4> +<p>代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙今先進行結案陳詞,表示就二人所屬的香港島和新界東選區,控方未能毫無合理疑點證明參與者有達成協議;而即使有協議達成,協議文件提到「會運用」或「會積極運用」否決權亦是為參與者提供彈性,不代表一定要否決預算案。</p> -<p>sUAS are a specific category of drones. This categorization, however, varies across countries and organizations, with two key taxonomies outlined by the United States and NATO. The DoD divides UAS into five categories based on their weight, speed, and altitude ceilings, with the “small” category comprising Groups 1, 2, and 3. Despite its designation as “small,” Group 3 UAS can still be quite large at up to 600 kg. NATO offers a slightly different categorization, with sUAS falling under its Class 1 and 2 categories.</p> +<p>潘續指,就算被告的協議存在,控方亦未能毫無合理疑點證明二人有意圖作出涉案協議行為、是串謀一分子,而可作此推論的證據,包括被告知道民主派無可能在立法會取得35+議席。李運騰即引案例指就算被告認為串謀不會成功,但執行串謀計劃仍屬有罪,潘同意,但重申二人並無此意圖實踐。</p> -<p>UAS categorization is further complicated by capability overlap with munitions. For example, the Iranian-made Shahed-136 is generally categorized as a Group 3 UAS, but it often operates as a one-way attack munition. The unique nature of the Shahed-136 thus cannot be simply captured by looking at a categorization that is determined solely on weight, speed, and altitude ceilings. The U.S. Tomahawk missile, specifically Block 4 and 5 variants, likewise blurs the line between UAS and missile. These variants offer loitering capabilities, but due to their one-way strike mission, they are not categorized as a UAS. The UAS spectrum is undoubtedly messy but attempts at distinguishing these threats — like all air threats — are still useful for defenders to quickly characterize capabilities.</p> +<h4 id="辯方基本法已預想否決機制不大可能以此顛覆國家政權">辯方:《基本法》已預想否決機制、不大可能以此顛覆國家政權</h4> -<p>This report applies the U.S. classification model of “sUAS” as encompassing Groups 1, 2, and 3.</p> +<p>潘又指,《基本法》第50至52條已預想(envisage)否決預算案後的政治情況及應對機制(兩次否決致解散立法會及特首下台),難以想像會被視為「空前憲政危機」和「政治不穩」,若被告只是做《基本法》所容許的事,不大可能是意圖參與涉案串謀和顛覆國家政權;而《基本法》亦列明即使否決預算案,特首也可申請臨時撥款、政府仍可運作,案中無證據顯示被告意圖連此撥款也否決。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Nyxc0l4.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: U.S. UAS Classification.</strong> Source: Classifications from U.S. Army; images from Russian Ministry of Defense and Wikimedia Commons.</em></p> +<p>惟法官李運騰質疑,臨時撥款有別於財政預算案,難道不會嚴重干擾政府執行職能?潘熙回應不需說到這麼遠,強調《基本法》由人大落實,不大可能根據《基本法》來顛覆國家政權,就二人是否意圖顛覆存有合理疑點。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IuPGWWl.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: NATO UAS Classification.</strong> Source: Classifications from NATO; images from Vulcan UAS, Elbit Systems, Wikimedia Commons, and U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<h4 id="辯方鄭達鴻會視乎預算案優劣投票很可能與黨有不同立場">辯方:鄭達鴻會視乎預算案優劣投票、很可能與黨有不同立場</h4> -<p>sUAS have several advantages over larger aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed:</p> +<p>針對兩名被告,潘熙指鄭達鴻案發時是關注民生和草根的區議員,真誠信相政府是理性,會與議員磋商,而鄭會視乎預算案優劣及政府抛出橄欖枝的程度決定如何投票,即使政府不回應五大訴求,他也可能投贊成。潘又強調,對鄭而言,五大訴求與其他港人的合法訴求均是他想要達到的目標(end),而不是用來顛覆的手段(means)。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Lower cost:</strong> sUAS are relatively inexpensive compared to larger aircraft. This is true even when platforms are not quite “consumable” aircraft that operators will only use on a single mission.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Low training burdens:</strong> sUAS operators can learn their basic tradecraft in hours, and only one person is needed to operate a drone. On the other hand, it takes months to years to train pilots on large aircraft — including uncrewed platforms such as the MQ-9. A single platform may require over 100 personnel for operations and maintenance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Minimal infrastructure requirements:</strong> Unlike larger aircraft, sUAS do not require extensive infrastructure to deploy such as long runways, secure and complicated data links, or expensive maintenance equipment.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Gray zone applications:</strong> Combatants frequently employ sUAS to decrease the perceived political costs and escalation risks resulting from operations and potential shootdowns as compared to larger, inhabited aircraft. The low-cost of sUAS, minimized risk to operators (on the ground rather than in the cockpit), and difficulty of attribution make sUAS a useful tool for gray zone operations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Unique capabilities in modern warfare:</strong> sUAS can perform an increasing number of air missions at lower cost than large, crewed aircraft. Small loitering munitions offer the ability to scan large swaths of territory and quickly strike targets of interest. Medium- and high-altitude long endurance (MALE/HALE) drones will continue to play an important role in counterterrorism missions, but they appear less effective in symmetric, conventional conflicts. Looking to the future, sUAS swarms may also provide a cost-effective means to saturate an adversary’s air defenses.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>潘又指,鄭的立場很大可能與公民黨不同,他供稱黨內權力不平衡、他不能改變黨政策。而公民黨盡力遵守《國安法》,於《國安法》生效前召開會議,並改用「無字政綱」等,鄭作為法律學生,真誠相信《基本法》機制是讓行政與立法會機關互相制衡,若不是本案,原本會坐在其旁邊幫忙處理案件。</p> -<p>To be sure, sUAS also have critical disadvantages over larger aircraft.</p> +<p>此外,辯方指港島協調文件指每名選民可投4票,與最終共識投1票不同,就提到運用否決權的該文件是否最終協議有疑點,鄭亦沒有收到。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Limited payload capacity:</strong> sUAS are unable to carry heavier, more capable sensors or explosives.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Limited flight duration and range:</strong> Commercial sUAS can perhaps fly around 8 km at the high end. Military sUAS may feature extended ranges, but they will not approach large aircraft ranges.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Limited operating conditions:</strong> Compared to larger aircraft or missiles, sUAS are more susceptible to wind and adverse weather conditions, as well as a greater diversity of active defenses. Ukraine, for example, is reportedly losing around 10,000 sUAS per month against Russia.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yyIwNwT.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 鄭達鴻</p> -<h4 id="suas-missions-and-history">sUAS Missions and History</h4> +<h4 id="辯方社民連不同意政治攬炒">辯方:社民連不同意「政治攬炒」</h4> -<p>sUAS can complete the same missions as manned aircraft. Over the past decade, military operators have used sUAS for six primary missions:</p> +<p>至於梁國雄,潘指控方證據非常薄弱,當中以社民連6月的〈社會民主連線回應當前香港政治形勢變化的決議文〉指控他會無差別否決預算案,潘指文章表明不同意「政治攬炒」,反而是利用「具有憲制認許,合法合憲的權力機構」的「全面否決權」發揮制衡,亦表明只是否決「惡法和不義撥款」,非無差別否決。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Attack operations:</strong> Strikes on people and things with bombs, missiles, or suicide attacks</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:</strong> Providing “eyes in the sky” for military planning and operations</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Targeting:</strong> Finding and sharing target location with other strike assets, such as artillery</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Battle damage assessment:</strong> Confirming the results of an attack</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Harassment:</strong> Creating confusion and alarm with drone incursions, possibly including small attacks</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Propaganda:</strong> Showing off military platforms and operations to improve military and civilian morale</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="辯方梁國雄因無全民退保否決與他人無協議">辯方:梁國雄因無全民退保否決、與他人無協議</h4> -<p>Attack operations, ISR, and targeting missions are the most common, as clearly shown in the Russia-Ukraine war. Both sides have used sUAS to search for enemy combatants and either target them directly or pass their location to other strike assets such as artillery to fire upon their position. Ukrainian soldiers have used the U.S. Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost UAS, for example, to directly target Russian tanks and personnel. Early failures in the war also prompted Russia to quickly increase the use of stand-off weaponry, including indigenous and foreign-made sUAS such as the Lancet-3 and Shahed-136, respectively. In general, the Russia-Ukraine war highlights how sUAS have enabled complex, integrated air attack through the wide proliferation of sensors. As others have warned about the modern battlefield, “What can be seen can be hit, and what can be hit can be destroyed.”</p> +<p>法官李運騰問到,梁國雄曾在選舉論壇提及沒有簽署「墨落無悔」,因「睇到佢係重複返35+嗰個初衷嘅啫」,又指自己做多年議員「年年都」否決,似乎梁明知否決預算案是「35+」的初衷仍參與。潘熙強調應審視所有證據、不能斷章取義,梁並無簽署「墨落」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0bCZjBn.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Ukrainian Drone Minesweeper.</strong> UAS operators use drones for various missions outside of the six described above. Here a Ukrainian volunteer controls the flight of a drone carrying a metal detector to search for mines near the town of Derhachi, Kharkiv region, on October 1, 2023.</em></p> +<p>法官陳慶偉亦指梁以往都否決,不代表他在2020年這樣做就是正確。潘熙同意,但強調梁並非無差別否決作「攬炒」,只因沒有全民退保的民生議題而否決,同意法官李運騰指,即使其行為與其他人相似,但他否決是另有原因,與其他人沒有協議,也沒意圖顛覆。法官陳慶偉一度問,既然如此,那梁為何參與初選?又指戴耀廷在初選文件列明要認同五大訴求才能參選。潘重申,沒有證據梁為何參與初選,而參選亦不代表會否決預算案。</p> -<p>Attack operations also include strikes on infrastructure and economic targets. In September 2019, Iran launched 18 sUAS and seven missiles to attack Saudi Arabian oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. The strike successfully evaded Saudi air defenses, including the U.S. Patriot, German Skyguard, and French Crotale, and struck their targets, leading Saudi Arabia to temporarily cut oil production by around 50 percent. In Ukraine, Russia has launched Iranian-made suicide drones to strike power grids.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Soo0PGw.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 梁國雄</p> -<p>sUAS-based assassination attempts — and successes — have also rocked several countries. In August 2018, a small insurgency group in Venezuela used a bomb-laden drone in a failed assassination attempt against President Nicolás Maduro. In January 2019, the Houthis in Yemen used a Qasef-1 UAS to assassinate senior Yemeni military officials. More recently in November 2021, Iranian-backed militias attempted to assassinate Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi after pro-Iran political groups had faced disappointing results in the elections.</p> +<h4 id="劉偉聰及施德來無口頭補充">劉偉聰及施德來無口頭補充</h4> -<p>Harassment and propaganda operations are also common. ISIS fighters made extensive use of commercial quadcopters and fixed-wing drones for surveillance, propaganda, and small but demoralizing tactical strikes. In January 2017, despite having a limited sUAS arsenal, the group formally announced a new drone unit known as “Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahideen.” In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan used its drone fleet to record video of its strikes against Armenian tanks and soldiers, replaying footage across the country and internationally. Iranian-backed groups have frequently launched sUAS and rocket attacks to harass U.S. embassies, businesses, and military personnel across the Middle East, which has occasionally led to counterattacks and rising escalation concerns.</p> +<p>自行代表的大律師劉偉聰及代表施德來的大律師黃廷光,均表示會採納書面陳詞,沒有口頭補充。至於代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel,表示會同時回應事實和法律爭議,法官陳慶偉指 Beel 昨申請押後處理法律陳詞,問他會否想留待最後進行,Beel 同意。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QiQp1yk.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: Select sUAS Combat Deployments.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CKG03fr.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel</p> -<h4 id="global-proliferation">Global Proliferation</h4> +<h4 id="辯方違反職責遠不至於非法">辯方:「違反職責」遠不至於「非法」</h4> -<p>sUAS have spread globally over the past decade due to the technology’s dual use for both military and civilian applications. In addition to the military missions listed in the previous section, sUAS are used in various civilian activities, including filmmaking, law enforcement, emergency response, agriculture, delivery, and the protection of commercial facilities. Once sUAS technology advanced enough to become viable for these use cases, the commercial market boomed, which in turn has further fueled sUAS technology developments, facilitated the rise of commercial drone manufacturers, and created a massive, largely unregulated supply of these aircraft.</p> +<p>至於代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉,強調控方須就所有控罪詳情舉證,又指難以理解,為何否決預算案導致解散立法會和特首下台這個由《基本法》提供的機制會是「非法」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HWK8KYf.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: The Path to sUAS Proliferation.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>針對「非法手段」的爭議,控方昨表示不一定涉刑事罪行,同意只是「違反議員職責(breach of duty)」也可入罪。潘熙表示「非法手段」必然指涉刑事罪行,馬維騉亦舉例,若有大律師完全無視專業守則、無法勝任並破壞行業的名聲,他的確是違反專業守則訂明的職責,但不能說其行為是「非法」;而就法官陳慶偉昨舉例若在民事審訊因其中一方是朋友而裁定他勝訴,其裁決也是非法,馬則指法官的裁決可能是不公或會被推翻,但同樣遠遠不至於「非法」。</p> -<p>Before the sUAS commercialization boom of the mid-2010s, manufacturers created moderately priced units with relatively rudimentary capabilities. The first remote-controlled drone to incorporate Wi-Fi, Parrot’s A.R. Drone, was released in 2010 and cost a modest $299 but had a battery life of only 12 minutes. Three years later Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI), the current commercial manufacturing titan in China, released its first drone, the Phantom 1, which sold for $379. This model featured an internal GPS but had a flight time of less than 10 minutes and a communication distance of only 1 km. Today, the cost of commercial sUAS has increased, typically ranging from $500 to $10,000, but new models offer significantly improved capabilities. DJI’s bestselling Mavic 3, which costs $2,049, offers 46 minutes of flight time, omnidirectional obstacle sensing, and a transmission range of 15 km at 1080p resolution. The cost-to-flight-time ratio between these DJI models increased by 17.5 percent, but the capabilities provided by the Mavic 3 opened the door to hundreds of commercial and hobbyist applications.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fxQl2Do.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 陳志全</p> -<p>China has since seized the sUAS market, with DJI accounting for over 60 percent of the market share for commercial sUAS in 2021. While market projections for commercial drones vary slightly, there is strong consensus that the market is thriving and shows no signs of slowing down, as exemplified by revenue of $2.7 billion in 2020 and a projected intake of $21.7 billion by 2030.</p> +<h4 id="辯方法律無明文規定不可不按議案優劣否決控方須另證顛覆意圖">辯方:法律無明文規定不可不按議案優劣否決、控方須另證顛覆意圖</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2bH8Vrn.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: DJI Development.</strong> Source: DJI.</em></p> +<p>法官陳仲衡指,但本案關乎沒有履行《基本法》下的議員職責。馬同意,但指刑事法律的基本原則,是除非法律禁止,否則個人可以做任何事情。而法律上列明議員職責,但沒有明文規定議員不可以不根據議案優劣來否決任何議案,強調控方所指違反《基本法》下的議員職責本身並不能構成非法手段(“A breach of duty cannot per se amount to unlawful means.”)。</p> -<p>The commercial drone sector has driven technological advances, rather than these advances trickling down from military UAS. This growth has mostly been spurred on by the smartphone industry. Radio-controlled aircraft moved from using petrol engines to electric motors and the lithium batteries used in modern smartphones. With internal combustion engines prone to excessive vibration, electric motors have become increasingly popular, particularly for sUAS. Critically, the extensive lithium battery market has allowed operators to choose battery packs that fit their desired performance, flight time, and endurance without massive price increases. The recent interest in and testing of UAS-compatible lithium-sulfur batteries may offer an even cheaper option in the coming years. The leveraging of existing high-speed cellular networks has also allowed for broader UAS accessibility and lower associated costs. Overall, as one expert aptly explained, “Drones have really been riding the smartphone revolution.”</p> +<p>馬亦指,控方指被告無差別否決預算案構成顛覆的說法,不可能正確,強調除了證明被告意圖無差別否決預算案,控方亦須另外證明被告意圖顛覆國家政權,否則就會是「循環論證」。馬最後指,陳曾任認真盡責的議員8年,望法庭考慮他有良好品格,其證供有可信性。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YeeeAKp.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Agricultural Drones.</strong> A Kenya Airways employee controls a drone as it spreads fertilizer over a tea farm at Kipkebe Tea Estate in Musereita on October 21, 2022.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SSXCQXF.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 代表陳志全的大律師 馬維騉(右)</p> -<p>The military sUAS market has similarly increased in size and platform diversity over the last decade. There is limited reporting specifically on sUAS market trends, but the wider military UAS market features many Groups 2 and 3 platforms and shows clear signs of rapid expansion. Between 2011 and 2021, the military UAS market grew by nearly $10 billion, from $1.7 billion to $11.6 billion. As commercial markets and systems proliferated, indigenous military programs also promptly appeared, offering to enhance and counter the new technological capabilities available. An October 2020 study estimated that 102 countries possessed an active drone program compared to an estimated 60 countries in 2010. Additionally, of the reported 171 active military drone models in 2019, roughly 143 were sUAS. Militaries have also successfully harnessed the cheap and easy-to-use format of commercial systems while increasing the reliability and security needed for military operations.</p> +<h4 id="辯方墨落無悔非協議僅表達對戴耀廷失望">辯方:「墨落無悔」非協議、僅表達對戴耀廷失望</h4> -<p>The general utility of sUAS reinforce their proliferation. Russia has imported the Iranian Shahed-136 in large numbers to support its operations in Ukraine while also relying on domestic systems such as the Orlan-10. Prior to its operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan procured large numbers of Israeli sUAS, which Azerbaijani operators used effectively against Armenian combatants. Growing normalization of sUAS as tools of war points toward a shifting military landscape in which sUAS will regularly be relied upon in order to achieve mission success.</p> +<p>代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑則表示,不同人就否決有不同看法和願景,無證據顯示就否決有達成廣泛共識。法官李運騰指,但鄒家成作為「墨落無悔」發起人,至少與其他兩名發起人有協議,陳世傑回應即使3人就否決有協議,也並非本案所指的串謀協議,亦無證據顯示他同意「無差別」否決。</p> -<p>Given the wide commercial and civilian applications of sUAS, international regulatory efforts to stem sUAS proliferation have fallen short. In October 2016, 53 nations, including the United States, issued a joint declaration that attempted to start the process of building a basic framework for international UAS standards, but it failed to spur meaningful action. A framework demanding sUAS buyers and sellers to comply to specific obligations had the potential to hinder exports and create strains with legitimate trading partners. In addition, China’s absence from the declaration inhibited its possibility of success from the start. Having taken control of a significant share of the global UAS market, Beijing was, and continues to be, unlikely to allow any regulation that negatively affects its exports.</p> +<p>陳又指,「墨落無悔」只是被告表達對戴耀廷毋須簽署協議的失望與情緒(frustration and sentiment),簽署者只是抱有相同情感,但並非達成協議;而聲明只是呼籲不要投沒有抗爭意志的參選人,當中提到否決預算案但沒有提及「無差別」否決。</p> -<p>Even if a regulatory body were established, it is unclear how helpful it would be in removing sUAS from modern battlefields. Clear rules for manufacturers or regulations on military sUAS transfers would not decrease the wide availability of commercial drones or components of these systems, which can easily be adapted for military use even by non-state actors. According to a 2018 West Point report, ISIS displayed overall diversification within its commercial drone supply chain. For the nine quadcopters associated with ISIS operations, engineers built the final units after acquiring various components from seven retailers in five different countries. ISIS’s piecemeal production of UAS is also not an isolated practice. The Houthis in Yemen follow a similar pattern. For example, the Sammad-pattern UAS engine originated in Germany before making its way to Israel, then Iran, and eventually into the hands of Houthi engineers in Yemen. Given this substantial supply of cheap components spread across multiple business sectors, and the ease with which it crosses international borders, increasing regulations around sUAS is unlikely to stem proliferation and use.</p> +<h4 id="辯方鄒家成從無主張推翻中國政府僅想利用立法會改善制度">辯方:鄒家成從無主張推翻中國政府、僅想利用立法會改善制度</h4> -<p>As sUAS continue to develop and improve upon existing capabilities within the civilian and commercial markets, potential applications have continued to grow. There is little chance of putting the genie back in the bottle. The United States and its allies must develop active defenses to address these highly proliferated systems and deploy them as required based on expected risks and vulnerabilities.</p> +<p>陳續指,區諾軒稱35+的初心是為取得立會過半,獲取更大的議價能力,這亦是各被告認知和參與初選的原因,惟戴耀廷卻試將其看法加諸其他人身上不果。而鄒家成從沒表示有意圖推翻中國政府,其主要關注只是推動本土主義和香港人優先,特首下台和癱瘓立法會也對他沒有意義,因特首永遠都可有替代人選,而鄒是想利用立法會來改變腐敗不公的制度,想作出「改善」。</p> -<h4 id="future-threats">Future Threats</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZUByqss.png" alt="image07" /> +▲ 代表鄒家成的大律師 陳世傑</p> -<p>Technological developments over the next few years will further empower sUAS. The rise of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) is perhaps the most common concern. As the JCO warned in their 2021 report: “The impending integration of artificial intelligence with autonomous sUAS will introduce yet another dramatic change to the character of warfare.” Software is already enabling rapid leaps in UAS autonomy. As one CSIS report explains:</p> +<h4 id="辯方控方就非法手段詮釋欠案例支持僅搬出國安法此尚方寶劍">辯方:控方就「非法手段」詮釋欠案例支持、僅搬出《國安法》此「尚方寶劍」</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>Traditional software is sufficient to deliver a high degree of autonomy for some military applications. For example, the Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) Harpy is a decades-old uncrewed drone that IAI openly acknowledges is an autonomous weapon. When in autonomous mode, the Harpy loiters over a given region for up to nine hours, waiting to detect electromagnetic emissions consistent with an onboard library of enemy radar, homes in on the emissions source (usually enemy air defense radar), and attacks. No human in the loop is required.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>就法律爭議,陳指「非法手段」應指涉刑事罪行,並形容控方就「非法手段」的定義無邊無際(no boundary),不限於刑事罪行、不止於民事過失,幾乎任何事情都可以是「非法」。陳反問,就控方主張只是濫用議員職權就屬「非法」,「我們有案例和法例支持嗎?沒有」,「控方只是聲稱因為我們在處理《國安法》案件,這是《國安法》,這是尚方寶劍,所以法庭要這樣解讀。」</p> -<p>As these autonomous capabilities proliferate further, defenders will be forced to pivot away from detect and defeat platforms based on radio frequency (RF).</p> +<p>陳又引終審法院就呂世瑜案的判詞,指對《國安法》的理解要與本地法律並行(in tandem with),故即使是國安案件,也不代表不應考慮海外案例。陳總結,認為被告沒有協議、沒有意圖顛覆、控方亦無法證明被告無差別否決。</p> -<p>Advances in AI/ML may also enable sUAS swarms. These are large, coordinated, and at least semi-autonomous group operations; thus far, there have been few if any attacks that fit this strict definition. Yet even small, human-controlled group attacks have proven capable. The 2019 Houthi attack on two Saudi Aramco oil facilities only employed 10 drones but still degraded business operations for some time. Commercial drone shows have operated with more than 3,000 drones. Once mass drone swarm technology is established, it will be an increasingly difficult threat to intercept. In those cases, the best options for defenders may be “left-of-launch” strikes on C2 nodes and ground control stations associated with the attack.</p> +<h4 id="辯方柯耀林參選為試水溫非無差別否決">辯方:柯耀林參選為「試水溫」非無差別否決</h4> -<p>Adversary sUAS may increasingly communicate through cell towers, making RF-based detect and defeat difficult. Under this environment, defenses would need to differentiate between sUAS communications and regular cellular transmissions. Even if sensors can adapt, RF-based defeat would then need to degrade those communications without disrupting cellular transmissions using those same frequencies. As JCO director Sean Gainey explained in 2022, sUAS operators are “building in redundancy in these systems where if you cut off something, they can fall back on something else.”</p> +<p>代表柯耀林的大律師葉海琅表示,針對柯的證據非常薄弱,其選舉經理供稱他參加初選只是為了「試水溫」,以測試有否足夠支持度參與正式立法會選舉,而非要無差別否決預算案。法官陳仲衡問,柯在法庭外向其選舉經理作出的陳述(out-of-court statement)有何證據價值,葉指選舉經理與柯一起進行競選工程,有身位解釋柯參選原因。</p> -<p>Lastly, U.S. policymakers must also prepare for creative sUAS use in the battlefield. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, for example, Azerbaijan reportedly modified older aircraft to function uncrewed and used these aircraft to draw fire and locate Armenian air defenses. Russia has used similar tactics in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russian operators have also developed tactics such as piloting near buildings to exploit sensor blind spots, launching UAS away from operator locations to avoid counterattacks, and spoofing Ukrainian defenses to falsely register a large number of UAS and ground control stations. UAS operators have enormous freedom of action and can adapt tactics quickly, whereas defenders typically do not have such flexibility.</p> +<p>葉續指,柯的政綱無提及否決預算案,集中民生議題,而他是區政聯盟區議員,其支持是靠社區議題而非激進政治理念,他提出的教育和經濟等政綱亦需政府預算案支持。葉又指,就其參選宣言提到「暴政不斷利用惡法」等,均是「政治修辭」,形容當時香港的政治氣氛下有大規模反政府示威,作為泛民「起碼要以某種形式」顯示對政府的反對,但不能證明柯有串謀無差別否決。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1CmCB1k.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Drones in Formation.</strong> South Korea’s military drones fly in formation during a South Korea–U.S. joint military drill at Seungjin Fire Training Field in Pocheon on May 25, 2023.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9O7dmOp.png" alt="image08" /> +▲ 柯耀林</p> -<h3 id="detecting-and-defeating-suas">Detecting and Defeating sUAS</h3> +<h4 id="辯方柯耀林簽墨落受政治環境所迫">辯方:柯耀林簽「墨落」受政治環境所迫</h4> -<p><em>A variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities are available to defeat sUAS. Each of these tools have unique strengths and weaknesses in regard to survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and defended area.</em></p> +<p>至於柯簽署「墨落無悔」,葉指其 WhatsApp 紀錄顯示他簽署並非因他同意當中內容,只因其他候選人已簽署,他不想顯得保守,是受政治環境所迫、以免落後於對手,強調不能以此證明他參與串謀。法官陳慶偉一度問,柯是否向選民作出虛假陳述、是說出「半真半假的話(half-truth)」?葉重申他正進行競選,最重要是就柯參與初選目的有疑點。</p> -<p>sUAS pose unique challenges to air defense. They exploit gaps in sensing because they are small and fly low. They also exploit cost asymmetries — they are usually cheap and numerous, while air defense interceptors are not. They even exploit the way air defense is organized by equipping individual combatants to achieve tactical and strategic effects, while the United States and its allies mostly deploy air defense at the company level or higher.</p> +<p>柯耀林一方陳詞完畢,尚餘代表李予信的大律師關文渭及代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel。關文渭指需時準備回應控方法律爭議的聯合陳詞,望申請於周一前呈交,周二開庭處理。陳慶偉拒絕,指示於周一呈交及開庭處理,Beel 同日亦會進行陳詞。案件周一(12月4日)續審。</p> -<p>Despite these differences across size, flight, costs, and quantities, the overall air defense kill chain is essentially the same. Air defense — as defined broadly — means detecting and defeating airborne threats flying from surface to space. That process can be illustrated in various ways, as shown in Table 5. The sensors, effectors, and C2 platforms involved in this kill chain all have unique characteristics that determine their effectiveness and where they are deployed, as shown in Table 6.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9yogwm9.png" alt="image09" /> +▲ 李予信</p> -<p>The following sections define the sensor, effector, and C2 missions, and explore different C-sUAS modalities, their respective strengths and weaknesses, and example platforms for each.</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/liqIcPz.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 5: The Air Defense Kill Chain.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>案件編號:HCCC69/2022</p>獨媒報導辯方質疑控方詮釋「非法手段」無邊無際 僅搬《國安法》「尚方寶劍」【初選47人案・審訊第 116 日】2023-11-29T12:00:00+08:002023-11-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-116<ul> + <li>控方結案陳詞指濫用議員職權亦屬「非法手段」 官料3至4個月後裁決</li> + <li>辯方指被告僅追求《基本法》所承諾雙普選、望政權問責 不應構成顛覆</li> +</ul> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/A0srXW1.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 6: C-sUAS Platform Considerations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="sensors">Sensors</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nOpzexw.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Radar has long been the primary sensor used to detect and track aerial threats. The traditional approach leverages wide-area surveillance radars and highly focused tracking radars to respectively detect and track incoming aircraft and ballistic missiles. Detecting sUAS in this way, however, is hard. As mentioned earlier, sUAS typically fly below typical air defense radar coverage. Perhaps even more problematic is their slow speeds and small profile, which combined creates a very limited radar signature for detection and tracking.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(29日)踏入審訊第116天,控辯雙方進行口頭結案陳詞。控方就法律爭議陳詞,就被告被控串謀以「威脅使用武力或其他非法手段」顛覆國家政權,控方認為《國安法》原意為防範任何危害國安的行為,「其他非法手段」不限與武力相關、亦不一定涉刑事罪行,被告無差別否決預算案,濫用《基本法》下的議員職權亦屬「非法」;又指今時今日對抗政權無需「暴力革命」,散播謠言也能危害國安,若狹窄詮釋控罪定義會違立法原意。控方亦認為毋須證明被告知道其行為是非法也可入罪。法官陳慶偉預料本案會在3至4個月後裁決。</p> -<p>This is not to say that active radar does not work against sUAS. Active radar remains one of the predominant means for detecting sUAS at longer ranges as compared to other sensor modalities. Radar is also more capable under adverse weather conditions and less sensitive to countermeasures compared to other sensors. Radars, however, can be large, heavy, and power intensive, thereby reducing mobility unless mounted on a vehicle. They also emit a signature that can be easily detected, making the operator’s location vulnerable to attack. Radars also must be optimized to see smaller objects, thus reducing their detection range.</p> +<h4 id="事隔3個月開庭-旁聽親友向被告揮手">事隔3個月開庭 旁聽親友向被告揮手</h4> -<p>Another common method to detect sUAS today is electronic surveillance measures, also known as passive radio frequency. This detection method allows defenders to identify the wireless signals used to control the UAS. Some passive RF capabilities show the location of both the sUAS and the operator. As one Department of Homeland Security report explains, C-sUAS may “use libraries of known UAS radio signatures and compare detected signals to those in the library in order to classify or identify UAS.” These sensors listen to sUAS communications via control stations, satellites, cell towers, or drone relays. A key concern with passive RF, however, is that sUAS are moving away from RF control, making current detection and defeat capabilities obsolete.</p> +<p>今天是初選案事隔3個月後再開庭,法院外有約10名軍裝警和傳媒聯絡隊戒備,「王婆婆」王鳳瑤則揮動英國旗,及舉起「Free 47 Free all 立即釋放所有政治犯」的紙牌。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3FjZUp7.png" alt="image13" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: RADA Radar.</strong> Source: DRS.</em></p> +<p>還柙被告步入法庭時,旁聽親友向他們揮手,有人向身穿深啡長褸、樽領灰色毛衣的鄒家成說:「靚仔咗喎!」,鄒露齒微笑,吳政亨亦與旁聽席打手勢溝通。有份代表認罪被告的資深大律師李志喜和大律師吳靄儀亦坐在延伸庭律師席。</p> -<p>Due to the detection liability of radar, C-sUAS designers often seek to combine RF detection and radars within a single platform. The FS-LIDS (Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System) is an example of a system supported by the JCO that incorporates both detection methods. The multi-layer detection capabilities of FS-LIDS allow operators to better conduct countermeasures that align with the given target and environment. However, a combination of sensors is not a necessity. EnforceAir is another JCO-supported system that uses RF for both detection and defeat. Nevertheless, sUAS operators can adapt to RF sensors. In July 2022, for example, a British defense firm developed a laser-controlled drone that will be undetectable by current RF sensors. Suicide drones, also known as one-way attack munitions or loitering munitions, may use an onboard inertial navigation system to allow sUAS to operate without alerting RF sensors. Russia has extensively used the Iranian Shahed-136 drone as a loitering munition in attacks on Ukraine.</p> +<h4 id="辯方其他非法手段應與武力相關-控方不必然涉武力">辯方:「其他非法手段」應與武力相關 控方:不必然涉武力</h4> -<p>Other sensor modalities include electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), and acoustic sensors to detect a target by its visual, heat, or sound signatures, respectively. These sensors are helpful in providing additional confirmation of a nearby sUAS threat but are rarely used as a standalone sensor. EO, IR, and acoustic sensors have very limited operational ranges. For example, the EnforceAir’s RF sensor has a radius of approximately 3 km, while the Discovair G2 acoustic sensor has an estimated range of 500 m. Additionally, potential countermeasures are fairly simple, including, for example, flooding a battlefield with noise that degrades acoustic sensor capabilities. For these reasons, EO, IR, and acoustic sensors are often used in combination with active or passive radar to provide a more effective, layered detection capability.</p> +<p>控辯雙方早前提交結案陳詞,部分被告亦就法律觀點作聯合陳詞,控方今就法律陳詞作出回應,而辯方獲准於下周一(12月4日)前提交書面陳詞回應。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MXZiIVC.png" alt="image14" /> -<img src="https://i.imgur.com/RArqeqf.png" alt="image15" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 7: C-sUAS Sensor Strengths and Weaknesses.</strong> Source: Characteristics from Department of Homeland Security; images from SRC Technologies, U.S. Department of Defense, Squarehead Technologies, and D-Fend Solutions.</em></p> +<p>《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權罪,列明任何人組織、策劃、實施或參與實施「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段(other unlawful means)」,旨在顛覆國家政權行為即屬犯罪。辯方爭議「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」一句應以「同類原則(ejusdem generis)」詮釋,由於前句為「武力、威脅使用武力」,故「其他非法手段」應只指涉與武力相關的手段。副刑事檢控專員萬德豪反駁,詮釋條文時應全面考慮立法脈絡和目的,而《國安法》目的為防範、制止和懲治任何危害國安的行為和活動,以有效維護國家安全,當中無限於武力手段。</p> -<h4 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h4> +<p>對辯方比較分裂國家罪及顛覆國家政權罪條文用字,前者提到「不論是否使用武力或者以武力相威脅,即屬犯罪」,認為前者才指明非武力手段,後者並沒有。萬德豪反駁兩者寫法不同,指顛覆政權條文中「武力、威脅使用武力」為一個類別,「其他非法手段」則為另一個類別,前者與武力有關,後者則為武力以外的其他非法手段,立法者使用此較概括(general)的字眼,是為了更有效維護國家安全。法官李運騰問,控方立場是辯方詮釋不合理,因會收窄條文用途,有違《國安法》立法原意?萬德豪同意。</p> -<p>Command and control (C2) is a critical element of C-sUAS operations, as it is for all air defense. Broadly speaking, C2 is the “exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.” A fundamental element of C-sUAS C2 is the centralized development of operational procedures that will enable decentralized execution of C-sUAS operations. Execution of the C-sUAS mission, in the near term, will be localized to the threatened asset or unit, and engagement authority will rest with the local commander and possibly junior leaders, who will make decisions based on the predefined rules of engagement. These tasks include integrating sensor data (from sources such as radar, cameras, and direction finders), classifying and identifying incoming threats, and transmitting this information among sensors and shooters to queue up responses. C2 operations require the creation of a common operational picture and share that intelligence with all relevant stakeholders.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UYrWxdG.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 副刑事檢控專員 萬德豪</p> -<p>While detecting sUAS presents the most commonly identified challenge, as previously discussed, sUAS also present a significant identification challenge. Over the near term, identification will depend more on context or procedures than specific Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems that confirm an sUAS’s affiliation. As a Joint Staff report explains, many U.S. UAS “do not have IFF capability and are similar or identical to threat [UAS].” C-sUAS rules of engagement (ROE) will therefore depend on the operational environment and threat intelligence, with ROE able to tighten or loosen as necessary. Future C-sUAS platforms may feature improved non-cooperative threat recognition capabilities, but for now ROE will determine whether defenders can shoot at incoming sUAS rather than pursue the identification of the object.</p> +<h4 id="控方對抗政府無需暴力散播謠言也可危害國安">控方:對抗政府無需暴力、散播謠言也可危害國安</h4> -<p>C2 for C-sUAS has improved significantly over the past few years, becoming increasingly open and interoperable. In July 2020, the DoD designated the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) system as the interim C2 system for C-sUAS. The FAAD C2 system provides a single integrated air picture that combines a suite of sensors, effectors, and other C2 systems given operational requirements. JCO director Sean Gainey noted the superiority of the FAAD C2 compared to alternatives, specifically noting its fire control capabilities. The rapidly evolving C-sUAS threat requires C2 development to build upon FAAD C2’s successes. The ultimate goal, in the eyes of Gainey and the JCO writ large, is to create an “open architecture standard based C2 system” that can be configured according to specific threat analysis.</p> +<p>李運騰續指,留意到顛覆罪條文主要針對政治制度及政府履行職能,而恐怖活動罪則針對公眾安全及財產,並指理解要破壞後者必然涉及暴力,但破壞前者是否未必涉及暴力?萬德豪同意,指顛覆罪條文旨在保障政治制度和政府機關,若將破壞相關制度的手段限制為武力是不合理;又指以往一般認為需以「暴力革命」對抗政權,但在21世紀的今天,環境完全不同,要對抗政權不一定需要暴力,而社交媒體令資訊傳播變得容易和方便,人們可利用這些渠道達到危害國家安全的目的,散播謠言也能對政權和政府架構造成影響,狹窄詮釋條文是不正確和不恰當。</p> -<p>The current functions of FAAD C2 thus reveal the baseline of JCO C2 development. Currently FAAD C2 is hosted on a SRNC-17 laptop computer and Dell 7212 tablet computer, emphasizing the need for portable command functions. The extensive integration with sensors and communication systems also highlights the need for mature joint operation potential. FAAD C2 is deployed and integrated with 25 sensors, including AN/MPG-64 Sentinel and Ku-band Radio Frequency System (KuRFS) radars, and five communications systems, including Link 16 and Joint Range Extension Application Protocol.</p> +<h4 id="控方非法手段不限於刑事罪行-被告違議員職責亦屬非法">控方:「非法手段」不限於刑事罪行 被告違議員職責亦屬非法</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/90FhqAk.png" alt="image16" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: The LIDS Family.</strong> The LIDS family of systems uses a range of passive and active sensors to detect, track, and identify UAS and non-hostile aircraft. Source: U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center.</em></p> +<p>至於辯方爭議「非法手段」須限於「刑事罪行」(criminal offence),控方不同意,指根據字典,「非法」不止限於「干犯刑事罪行」,又指《國安法》理應是有力有效的法律,若條文難以執行、須先證被告干犯刑事罪行,「製作這樣的法律有什麼意義?」法官李運騰指,辯方或反駁此為顯示罪行的嚴重性,因可囚終身,萬德豪重申考慮立法目的,條文字眼應採用較闊而非較窄的理解。</p> -<h4 id="effectors">Effectors</h4> +<p>萬德豪續指,「非法」可分為兩個層面,首先就刑事罪行層面,本案被告宣誓擁護《基本法》及效忠香港特區,但最終串謀無差別否決預算案,便可能干犯發假誓或串謀公職人員行為失當;而若法庭不接納,控方亦認為應考慮被告對《基本法》的「態度」,指被告濫用議員職權也屬「非法」,因他們沒有擁護《基本法》及效忠特區,違反(breach)《基本法》下的議員職責及《基本法》的核心原則。</p> -<p>The DoD has developed a variety of kinetic, directed energy, and RF-based defenses against sUAS. These tools all come with their own strengths and weaknesses. As is constantly repeated in the C-sUAS community, there is no “silver bullet” effector to defeat these threats.</p> +<p>法官陳慶偉一度問,若在一宗民事訴訟中理應由原告勝出,但法官因與被告相熟而判他勝訴,那其動機是否濫用職權,令其判決非法?萬德豪同意。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TVlS7Uy.png" alt="image17" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 8: Example C-sUAS Effectors by Defeat Mechanism and Basing.</strong> Note: Many systems listed here feature multiple deployment configurations and effectors. This table is illustrative and not comprehensive, intended to show the range of C-sUAS on the market. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>而就辯方援引海外案例指被告是運用憲制權力否決預算案,萬德豪指該案例亦強調議員並非橡皮圖章,投票前須審視議案,與本案的無差別否決不同。法官李運騰則指,其他地區是主權國家,與香港情況很不同,在其他地方合法的事情在香港未必合法,不能直接套用香港。</p> -<p>Kinetic defenses include guns, nets, ropes, collision drones, missiles with proximity-fuse warheads, as well as more creative solutions such as falcons and strings of streamers to tangle propellers. Kinetic defenses typically employ mature technologies, offer the highest probability of kill for any single UAS, and allow significant range of intercept. Their weaknesses include vulnerability to sUAS swarms, given their focus on defeating individual drones. They also may be inappropriate for use in populated areas where intercept shrapnel may fall on people or property.</p> +<h4 id="控方毋須證被告知道行為犯法亦可入罪">控方:毋須證被告知道行為犯法亦可入罪</h4> -<p>The DoD has invested in several kinetic effectors. The Coyote system is one of the primary interim solutions today. There are several extant configurations which may be characterized as a missile or drone, with a jet-engine to accelerate the system out of its launcher, and fins that support its loitering capability. The original Coyote entered demonstration testing in 2016 and employed a kinetic effect through collision or the nearby explosion of the unit’s warhead. According to its FY 2024 budget, the Army procured over 1,200 Coyote interceptors between 2022 and 2023.</p> +<p>最後就辯方爭議,控方須證明被告犯案時知道所作行為是非法,而被告相信其行為不違法可構成合理辯解。控方回應,「非法」一詞並不涉任何精神意念元素(mental elements),只是用來形容被告的「犯罪行為(actus reus)」而非「犯罪意圖(mens rea)」,因此「無論被告是否相信其行為是合法,也沒有關係」。</p> -<p>The United States has steadily improved upon C-sUAS cost asymmetries. Given the proliferation of suicide drones such as the Iranian Shahed-136, which costs roughly $20,000–50,000 per unit, using missile interceptors that cost two to eight times as much is deeply inefficient. Instead, there has been a rise of cheaper alternatives such as anti-aircraft guns for C-sUAS, commonly known as “flak.” Ukraine, for example, has procured Germany’s Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, which can shoot down sUAS with a range of around 5 km, as well as the older Soviet ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun. The DoD has also invested in an anti-drone “strings of streamers” system and is pushing the system into a program of record. These older, simpler technologies have proven effective against sUAS threats.</p> +<p>法官李運騰指,本案並非「嚴格法律責任」(strict liability)的罪行(即沒有犯罪意圖也可入罪),控方須證被告有意圖顛覆國家政權。控方同意,但舉例就誤殺罪,終院亦裁定被告是否知道所作行為是非法並不重要,認為相同邏輯可應用在本案。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lqETAoX.png" alt="image18" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Coyote Testing.</strong> Source: Raytheon.</em></p> +<h4 id="控方有足夠證據吳政亨與各被告涉同一串謀">控方:有足夠證據吳政亨與各被告涉同一串謀</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4L0qBZ1.png" alt="image19" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Leonidas Pod HPM.</strong> Source: Epirus.</em></p> +<p>李運騰續提及,發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨一方主張,就算吳與戴耀廷有協議,也並非本案指控的協議,又指除了戴耀廷外,其他被告均不認識吳政亨,即使區諾軒和趙家賢亦不認為他是計劃一分子。萬德豪指共謀者不一定要互相認識,強調有足夠證據推論吳政亨與所有其他被告涉同一串謀。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CCuI1ii.png" alt="image20" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Leonidas Ground-Based HPM.</strong> Source: Epirus, Inc.</em></p> +<h4 id="官料約3至4個月後裁決">官料約3至4個月後裁決</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CbqXyz8.png" alt="image21" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Dronebuster Training at the Baghdad Embassy Compound in Iraq.</strong> Source: U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<p>控方陳詞完畢,就案情的陳詞則依賴書面陳詞。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 其後申請押後至周五就法律觀點回應,但法官陳慶偉認為沒有需要,指可先聽取就事實方面的陳詞;又指法官李運騰將處理另一宗案件(《蘋果日報》案12月18日開審,料審期83天),而他和法官陳仲衡於2024年亦有其他案件要處理。Beel 問及裁決的大約時間,陳慶偉估計約在3至4個月後。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jns5dsC.png" alt="image22" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: L–MADIS Training.</strong> Source: U.S. Marine Corps.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DbDoTF8.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IQBUOVw.png" alt="image23" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: High-Energy Laser Weapon Testing.</strong> Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> +<p>辯方續進行結案陳詞。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/636C7g5.png" alt="image24" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 9: C-sUAS Effector Modality Strengths and Weaknesses.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project, images from Anduril and U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kDICuF4.png" alt="image04" /></p> -<p>The DoD has invested significantly in directed energy (DE) weapons, including on high-energy laser (HEL) and high-power microwave (HPM) systems capable of defeating sUAS. Lasers are cheap per shot, have large (so-called “unlimited”) magazines, and operate at the speed of light. However, they are technologically immature, expensive to build relative to other solutions, and offer limited line-of-sight ranges. In 2014, the U.S. Navy fielded the first operational directed energy weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), aboard the USS Ponce (LPD-15). The ODIN and HELIOS systems are in development today. A variety of specifically anti-drone laser systems are now being developed as well, including the Athena and HELWS MRZR.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選,被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪,16人不認罪,今(29日)踏入審訊第116天,辯方進行結案陳詞。代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘表示,本案要在香港的獨特背景下審視,當中爭取雙普選是《基本法》的莊嚴承諾,而案發時香港已回歸23年,爭取普選之路也已持續23年,「35+計劃」是其中一部分;兩人從無提倡顛覆政府機關和推翻憲制秩序,只是相信香港的制度,尋求向政權問責和追求《基本法》承諾的雙普選,「那不可能是顛覆」、「不應是顛覆」,望法庭判處二人無罪。石亦指,發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨只是熱心協助戴耀廷的「粉絲」,與戴無就初選後行為有協議;而余慧明雖表明有意否決預算案爭取五大訴求,但無與他人協議一起否決。</p> -<p>HPMs are another effector type. They are cheap per shot fired, technologically mature, and particularly effective against sUAS swarms with their potentially wide area of effect. However, future sUAS may harden against HPMs, although this would significantly raise their development costs and potentially lead to engineering difficulties.</p> +<p>林卓廷和黃碧雲一方則指二人無簽「墨落無悔」,無足夠證據顯示二人同意無差別否決;何啟明一方稱他簽署「墨落」不代表一定會否決;楊雪盈一方亦指她從無表明無差別否決預算案。</p> -<p>The Army plans to equip the Leonidas as its primary HPM for indirect fires protection. Unlike other C-sUAS defenses that disable one drone at a time, Leonidas was engineered to kill swarms of Group 1 and 2 UAS, as demonstrated in several U.S. Army test events. The Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) recently awarded a $66.1 million contract for Leonidas prototypes. Although HPMs have traditionally been based on larger platforms because of their large energy requirements, new technological developments are allowing for expanded basing options. The Leonidas Pod, for example, is a mobile, compact drone-based prototype that builds upon the ground-based system to offer relatively cheap, air-based C-sUAS.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IWZ263q.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 楊雪盈</p> -<p>Directed energy can be an effective C-sUAS tool. However, DE systems may encounter operational difficulties in complex and heavily congested environments, given the potential collateral damage to friendly forces and assets. Environmental factors such as poor weather or smoke in the atmosphere can also degrade their efficacy. Furthermore, training requirements for directed energy platforms may be intensive. As one analyst explains, an operator’s limited interaction time with an incoming UAS threat means that they must be well trained to deploy it effectively.</p> +<h4 id="辯方吳政亨不關心35後的事與戴耀廷無就當選後行為有協議">辯方:吳政亨不關心35+後的事、與戴耀廷無就當選後行為有協議</h4> -<p>The last defeat modality is RF, through jamming or spoofing the drone’s communications link. Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing — misleading its GPS — means that the operator can tell the drone that north is south, and west is east. Jamming, conversely, means disrupting communications between the drone and its operator and is simpler to perform. Although RF-based defenses are powerful, operators must be aware of environmental effects potentially impacting nearby commercial or otherwise friendly aircraft. RF-based defenses also do not affect autonomous or otherwise non-communicative UAS. Lastly, spoofing and jamming require defensive emissions, which may increase the risk that an adversary can geolocate defensive positions.</p> +<p>控方今早就法律爭議陳詞完畢,續由辯方陳詞。代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘表示,二人情況較其他被告「獨特(unique)」,發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨沒有參選;余慧明雖參選衞生服務界,但沒有參與任何協調會議。</p> -<p>RF-based defenses have become increasingly popular over the last decade and operate as fixed, mounted, and handheld systems. In June 2020, six of eight systems selected to represent the JCO’s interim C-sUAS capabilities utilized RF defeat: FS-LIDS, L-MADIS, CORIAN, NINJA, MEDUSA, and Dronebuster. The Dronebuster is a handheld line-of-sight system weighing roughly four pounds, which allows for easy infantry and squad-level usage. Jamming capabilities also vary depending on the system; the Dronebuster Block 3 offers 45 minutes of jamming, whereas the updated Dronebuster SNA offers three hours of continuous jamming.</p> +<p>石書銘指,若說吳政亨與戴耀廷有任何協議,只是限於「三投三不投」計劃及就初選投票日提供協助,而非本案指控與其他被告的串謀協議,因二人無討論過初選後的事,及勝選者入立會後會做什麼;又指從吳的受訪錄音及電郵紀錄,他只是關心如何取得35+,不關心取得35+後的事,他亦曾指在「攬炒書」(「墨落無悔」)和初選之間只能擇其一,會寧願「初選成事先」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y5ZZ2HB.png" alt="image25" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 10: Select C-sUAS Operations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<h4 id="辯方吳政亨僅熱心提供協助的粉絲對否決預算案無立場">辯方:吳政亨僅熱心提供協助的「粉絲」、對否決預算案無立場</h4> -<h4 id="a-diverse-solution-set">A Diverse Solution Set</h4> +<p>石書銘強調,若控方案情推到最高,也只能推論吳政亨對戴耀廷辦初選知情、與戴就35+的重要性意見一致,但就如何達成35+、議席分配及有否約束力等,二人沒有協議。石又指,吳與戴的 WhatsApp 對話並沒有提過否決預算案,而吳似是戴的「粉絲」、熱心提供協助,但戴的態度較為冷淡;對控方指二人關係密切,石指吳2016年只是戴耀廷「雷動計劃」的其中一名參與義工,與共謀者相距甚遠,該距離直至本案發生仍未跨越。</p> -<p>There are many different types of sensors, effectors, C2, and basing options for the C-sUAS mission. There is no single mix-and-match that serves as a universal solution to defeat sUAS threats. Rather, investment in a wide variety of sensors, effectors, and basing options is essential to ensure that the U.S. military is equipped to address the diverse set of threats posed by UAS. As JCO director Sean Gainey has explained, “There must be layers of systems to address the threat of UAS. It has to be a system of systems. It is a holistic approach.”</p> +<p>石強調,吳於本案僅為「輔助」(auxiliary)角色,屬旁觀者,他嘗試呼籲公眾支持初選,但不代表支持否決預算案;又指區諾軒和趙家賢均不認識吳,趙更稱吳的計劃與他和民主動力籌辦的初選無關。石亦重申,吳無論在《國安法》前後均對否決預算案沒有立場,認為首要是爭取35+,細節之後再傾,亦曾提過望「三投三不投」就否決的議題保持中立。</p> -<p>Sensors and effectors of various sorts have their own unique strengths and weaknesses. Kinetic effectors may be more reliable to take down any individual UAS threat — especially those that are bigger and faster. Non-kinetic effectors such as HPMs, on the other hand, can more effectively counter large UAS swarms.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/i02Gi9z.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 吳政亨</p> -<p>Trade-offs likewise impact sensors. Active radar allows operators to detect threats at greater ranges but may give away their positions. Passive RF sensors allow operators to remain stealthy and are therefore the better option for dismounted, forward-deployed units. Yet passive RF sensors cannot detect pre-programmed UAS that do not communicate with their operator, which is becoming more prevalent on the battlefield. One-way attack drones, for example, have become common in Russian attacks against Ukrainian civil infrastructure. Overinvestment in one defense modality may leave defenders vulnerable in certain attack scenarios.</p> +<h4 id="辯方余慧明無與他人協議否決預算案與政府有談判空間">辯方:余慧明無與他人協議否決預算案、與政府有談判空間</h4> -<p>The need for diversity is likewise true in basing options. The right solution for a fixed site is different than that of a maneuver unit. A mobile defender may forsake having a range of effectors to remain small, light, and nimble so that they can shoot on the move. Fixed-site defenders, however, face adversaries that can plan sophisticated, large-scale attacks at various altitudes using a variety of missiles and UAS. Their defenses therefore require longer-range radars and effectors. Again, there is no one-size-fits-all material solution.</p> +<p>至於余慧明,石書銘指她沒有參與地區直選、無參選任何協調會議和論壇,而雖然她表明有意否決預算案來爭取五大訴求,但一直獨自行事,不代表會與其他參與者一起否決預算案,亦沒有與其他地區參選人討論和達成協議一起否決。</p> -<h3 id="the-current-path">The Current Path</h3> +<p>法官李運騰指,但余也有參與初選、簽署「墨落無悔」、競選材料提及否決預算案,是否可推論她是串謀一分子?石指可作此推論,但並非唯一無可抗拒推論,又指余簽署「墨落」只因同意當中兩點,而聲明中提到的共識及替補機制與她無關。</p> -<p><em>As senior leaders institutionalize the C-sUAS enterprise across the DOTMLPF, they must address critical gaps in training and personnel requirements.</em></p> +<p>石又指,無從知道政府會如何回應五大訴求、或余入立會後會如何投票,形容這是一個「政治的情況」,並非簡單的「yes or no」,永遠都有「互相讓步(give and take)」;而就余在罷工的經驗,顯然她認為與政府有談判空間,而非不能妥協、要無差別否決。</p> -<p>U.S. efforts to develop effective C-sUAS operators and platforms can be loosely categorized in three stages: urgent need, refinement, and institutionalization. The United States is entering the third stage today, which will be the most difficult. It will require buy-in from the military services and clarity of roles throughout the defense establishment. The following sections define these stages, provide a historical overview of U.S. activities, and review what the United States must do to achieve institutionalization in the C-sUAS enterprise.</p> +<p>石又指,余雖看似「幼稚」的政治素人,但也明白五大訴求不能全部即時實現,否決只是談判策略;而余認為雙普選最重要,若政府未能提供普選時間表才會否決。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eyLA6p3.png" alt="image26" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 11: Air and Missile Threat Matrix.</strong> Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tnjo1KX.png" alt="image07" /> +▲ 余慧明</p> -<h4 id="urgent-need">Urgent Need</h4> +<h4 id="辯方被告只是追求落實基本法承諾的雙普選-不能是顛覆">辯方:被告只是追求落實《基本法》承諾的雙普選 不能是顛覆</h4> -<p>The U.S. response to C-sUAS has transpired in three stages. The first was urgent need. In 2016, ISIS captured large swaths of territory in both Iraq and Syria. They were among the first non-state actors to use small commercial quadcopters, which they employed effectively in battles against U.S.-supported Iraqi forces. There were few C-sUAS defenses in theater or readily deployable at the time. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) leadership issued an urgent requirement for defenses, prompting the DoD to quickly transfer a variety of commercial off-the-shelf C-sUAS platforms.</p> +<p>石書銘最後總結指,區諾軒也認同整個『35+計劃』是香港爭取普選之路的一部分,而本案要在香港的獨特背景下審視——本案發生時,香港已回歸中國23年,按照《基本法》承諾爭取普選之路也已持續23年。而吳政亨和余慧明均從無提倡流血衝突、並非尋求顛覆政府機關、也不是要推翻憲制秩序。</p> -<p>In 2016, the United States lacked cheaper, efficient effectors to use against cheap and plentiful sUAS. This lack was a consequence of wide divestment in Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) by the Army and Marine Corps in the 1990s and early 2000s. Both services were focused on the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan and Iraq and therefore chose to cut Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units in favor of more mission-critical maneuver forces. Military leadership believed that the U.S. Air Force would provide sufficient defensive counterair capabilities to maintain air superiority and protect ground forces. Military leadership did not consider the threat of UAS and cruise missiles as viable, near-term threats to U.S. military operations. This trend was not uniquely American; most NATO nations also weakened their air defense capabilities over the last two decades.</p> +<p>石強調,二人只是信賴一個在《基本法》實施、香港回歸中國時所許下的莊嚴承諾,「對我們的制度、法律框架和憲制秩序有信心」。歸根究底,他們只不過是尋求向政權問責、想根據憲制帶來政策改變、想追求《基本法》承諾的雙普選,「那不可能是顛覆(that cannot be subversive)」,「那不應是顛覆(that should not be subversive)」,請求法庭判處二人無罪。</p> -<p>Yet with the new threat clearly in sight, Congress has quickly committed funds to procure defenses. This step is highlighted by a significant surge in the DoD’s FY 2017–FY 2019 procurement and research, development, testing, and evaluation spending for C-sUAS. While the DoD achieved an interim solution in months, it fully satisfied the C-sUAS Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) two years later in FY 2019. The initial JUON effort successfully committed defenses to provide an “interim standalone capability” to defend 89 CENTCOM sites against Groups 1 and 2 UAS.</p> +<h4 id="辯方林卓廷黃碧雲無簽墨落黃受壓下仍稱有需要才用憲制權力">辯方:林卓廷黃碧雲無簽「墨落」、黃受壓下仍稱有需要才用憲制權力</h4> -<p>Given the active threat to U.S. allied forces, the selection of defense systems was understandably fast paced. According to Barry J. Pike in 2018, then program executive officer for missiles and space, the C-sUAS budget was placed “in the same office as our Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar project because they do know how to go fast. . . . Within 60 days a requirement was generated and within another 60 days, we had materiel in theatre. . . . We fielded more than 270 different kinds of systems [for C-sUAS].” A consequence of this quick delivery, however, was the minimal effort placed on the typical acquisition processes for programs of record and the DOTMLPF process. The massive quantity of C-sUAS platforms was deemed necessary at the time but would require the next stage in the C-sUAS response to consolidate these programs into a manageable portfolio.</p> +<p>代表林卓廷和黃碧雲的大律師沈士文則表示,沒有足夠證據顯示二人同意無差別否決預算案,二人只是同意參與初選,但政綱無提及否決預算案,其選區無就無差別否決達成共識,而二人沒有簽署「墨落無悔」,亦無證據顯示他們知道和支持「墨落」。沈指,控方唯一餘下指控二人的證據,分別是黃碧雲的初選論壇發言,及從林卓廷搜得的初選論壇筆記,而他已於陳詞分析相關證據的比重,不再重複。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/liVRhk2.png" alt="image27" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: Iranian-Made Kamikaze Drone.</strong> Remnants of Iranian-made kamikaze drone used by Houthi forces against Saudi Arabia.</em></p> +<p>法官李運騰關注,黃碧雲在選舉論壇提到「我哋係會用盡憲制裡面所有權力同埋手段去爭取五大訴求,如果否決財政預算案能夠促成呢樣野,我哋一定會做」。沈指黃提到運用憲制權力,是呼應提名表格上有關擁護《基本法》及效忠特區的條款;而黃當時被較激進的參選人「夾(corner)」,但即使受壓仍向選民承諾,是在有需要時運用《基本法》賦予的憲制權力,與控方指她濫權否決財案相反。</p> -<h4 id="refinement">Refinement</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6UvxnHm.png" alt="image08" /> +▲ 黃碧雲</p> -<p>The second stage in the U.S. response was one of refinement, during which the United States developed a more focused C-sUAS portfolio that was operationally effective and logistically sustainable. It included a diversity of sensors and effectors to cover the full threat spectrum. To fulfill this mission, in November 2019, the U.S. secretary of defense designated the Army as the lead service for C-sUAS; soon thereafter, the Army created the JCO to lead this effort. The JCO also helps the Army think through deployment strategies and align resources for C-sUAS. Recent budget justifications highlight this phase shift. The FY 2022 budget request noted the C-sUAS transition from a JUON to formal programming, with requirements specified under the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum 078-20. Also in FY 2022, the Army expanded the threat to include Group 3 UAS and designated a unique line-item number for C-sUAS. This move marked a symbolic emphasis on C-sUAS as a standalone program.</p> +<h4 id="辯方楊雪盈從無提否決預算案非其他候選人靈童">辯方:楊雪盈從無提否決預算案、非其他候選人「靈童」</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tboBblc.png" alt="image28" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: C-sUAS Milestones.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>代表楊雪盈的大律師張耀良表示,楊案發時只曾任區議員約5年,熱心服務社區,法庭應整體考慮其背景推論其意圖。雖然她初選落敗仍報名立法會選舉,但並非受其他候選人指派代為參選的「靈童」,而是顯示她不按協議自行行事。而區諾軒曾指楊無就否決預算案表達意見、趙家賢稱就戴耀廷提否決預算案,楊曾向他指「咪由佢講吓先囉」,都可顯示其心態。</p> -<h4 id="institutionalization">Institutionalization</h4> +<p>張耀良又指,楊雪盈只是想參與立法會選舉,雖其名字出現在「墨落無悔」,但只是出現在他人 Facebook 而非其個人 Facebook,無證據顯示她同意簽署。而楊雖有出席7月9日初選記者會,但發言不足一分鐘亦沒有內容;就法官李運騰提到其參選宣言稱要達成立會過半,「令政府正面回應五大訴求」,該文亦只是從辦公室電腦搜得,她從沒有發布。李運騰一度指這可證她對計劃的認知(knowledge),惟張強調,有此認知不代表楊同意。</p> -<p>The third and final stage is institutionalization, during which the United States must fill critical gaps across the DOTMLPF construct. The central question here is about how to apply air defense principles and institutionalize these capabilities to non-air defenders. The challenge is developing DOTMLPF solutions across the force to air defense and non-air defense units alike.</p> +<p>張又指,楊不曾在論壇提及無差別否決預算案,亦從無提及中央政府等,她不關注五大訴求和否決預算案,反而想爭取撥款,針對她的證據非常有限,應判處無罪。</p> -<p>The military services will play a larger role in the institutionalization phase. Questions remain as to whether they will accept systems supported by the JCO or develop their own unique platforms more suited for their specific needs, as well as how such needs will be prioritized against other service needs. Major policy, strategy, budget, and programmatic decisions will be made that will carry enormous consequences for the field.</p> +<h4 id="辯方何啟明只知初選目的爭立會過半簽墨落不代表必否決">辯方:何啟明只知初選目的爭立會過半、簽「墨落」不代表必否決</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BhP0kFp.png" alt="image29" /> -<img src="https://i.imgur.com/l9ZyhZs.png" alt="image30" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 12: DOTMLPF Plans and Potential Pitfalls.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense; DOTMLPF definitions from U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<p>代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀表示會依賴書面陳詞,沒有口頭補充。至於代表何啟明的大律師阮偉明則指,何只是知道初選目的是爭取立會過半,不包括無差別否決預算案;而雖然他沒有如岑子杰般在會議表明反對否決權,但沉默不代表支持。</p> -<p><strong>DOCTRINE</strong></p> +<p>阮偉明又指,何從沒有在論壇提及否決預算案,而其帖文提到「警暴橫行欺壓市民,公帑絕不能有一分一毫再落入惡貫滿盈的警隊手上」,亦不是否決所有撥款,而是反對撥款增加裝備。而就何簽署「墨落」,阮強調,何同意向政府施壓要求回應五大訴求,但不代表他一定會否決,因他理解該權力是可用可不用,亦無證據顯示他同意無論政府是否回應五大訴求都無差別否決預算案。</p> -<p>C-sUAS doctrine has improved significantly over the last decade. The DoD began developing C-sUAS tactics, techniques, and procedures over the late 2010s as the sUAS threat proliferated. The Army released three central documents during this period. The first was the 2016 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-01.8, Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense. ATP 3-01.8 provides guidance on how combined arms forces can protect themselves from air attacks, including UAS threats.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EtadfIR.png" alt="image09" /> +▲ 何啟明</p> -<p>The second central doctrine publication was the 2017 ATP 3-01.81, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques. This report provides defense planning, training guidance, and regional threat preparations for sUAS threats. It highlights basic issues such as identifying specific UAS threats and potential responses based on the operational environment, enemy capabilities, and tactics. It also offers some specific combined arms unit training recommendations.</p> +<p>7名被告完成就事實爭議的陳詞,其餘辯方代表明續陳詞。</p> -<p>The third major doctrine publication was the 2020 Army Field Manual (FM) 3-01, U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. FM 3-01 incorporates details on the specific UAS threats and C-UAS techniques and offers some of the clearest guidance on countering sUAS to date. The report provides air defenders with established rules of engagement, along with guidance on the specific altitude, speed, and actions needed to determine whether a UAS is indeed a threat. Defensive measures are also explained down to the force level and divided by type, such as maneuver, aviation, special operating forces, field artillery, and intelligence (see Table 13). This clarified roles and responsibilities among the branches.</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cAWOVuN.png" alt="image31" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 13: Army C-sUAS Doctrine.</strong> Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> +<p>案件編號:HCCC69/2022</p>獨媒報導控方結案陳詞指濫用議員職權亦屬「非法手段」 官料3至4個月後裁決 辯方指被告僅追求《基本法》所承諾雙普選、望政權問責 不應構成顛覆Indo-Pacific Divergence2023-11-28T12:00:00+08:002023-11-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/indo-pacific-divergence<p><em>This Policy Brief seeks to explore how key partners in the Indo-Pacific have perceived and responded to recent Western efforts in the region.</em></p> -<p>The primary concern is that doctrine is not often shared, embraced, or applied appropriately in operations or materiel development. One possible factor contributing to these issues is the lack of joint doctrine. Recognizing this underdevelopment, the 2018 Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, called for more detailed UAS procedures on joint threat detection, identification, and engagement. Since then, however, progress has been slow. For example, in its section on C-sUAS, the 2021 update to JP 3-30 Joint Air Operations, only noted the complexities of defeating sUAS and the need to distinguish between friendly and enemy sUAS. It failed to provide the kind of detail laid out in Army doctrine. Furthermore, now that the JCO has down-selected its primary C-sUAS sensors, C2, and effectors, a new joint publication could include specific C-sUAS platforms and operations to provide more clarity to service members.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The DoD must invest in future thinking to keep doctrine fresh as new challenges arise. This requires investing in internal and external leadership across the C-sUAS enterprise. The JCO — or another central authority — can coordinate and invest in this work and disseminate its findings. This may be done through joint military-academic dialogues, wargames, conflict simulations, and open-source intelligence collection and analysis on sUAS technologies and operations. The joint efforts of the military, academia, and defense industry can support the further evolution of doctrine at the pace required.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><strong>ORGANIZATION</strong></p> +<p>Much has been written about the enhanced Indo-Pacific strategies of the US, Canada and their European partners, as they have fleshed out their respective approaches in a series of important policy documents. But there has been far less research on how governments in the Indo-Pacific view the rhetorical and real-word implications of intensified Western engagement. As part of an ongoing RUSI–Chatham House project on transatlantic cooperation, this Policy Brief seeks to explore how key partners in the Indo-Pacific have perceived and responded to recent North American and European efforts in the region. To what extent do Indo-Pacific countries view these as part of a concerted transatlantic or Western approach, and how would such an approach accord with their interests?</p> -<p>The primary task of the military services is to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to the combatant commanders. In light of this goal, how will the services organize units or forces to perform the C-sUAS mission? Will the force structure for dedicated air defense forces within each service increase or will mission responsibility for the current forces merely expand? Will the services define a partitioning of mission responsibility between dedicated air defense forces and all other units and equip each accordingly?</p> +<p>Rather than offering a comprehensive study of such a large region, this brief focuses on the perspectives of a selection of Indo-Pacific states that transatlantic governments have identified as priority partners in shaping the future regional order. This includes an inner ring of US allies that have most openly embraced the renewed transatlantic interest in the region, and tougher stances toward China: Japan; Australia; and South Korea. It also includes an outer ring of mostly non-aligned partners that have been more circumspect, welcoming enhanced diplomatic engagement, but raising concerns about the long-term commitment of the transatlantic powers, and the risk that more robust China policies could inflame tensions with Beijing, rather than bringing balance to the region. This group includes India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines.</p> -<p>Clearly, the C-sUAS mission mandates an increase in dedicated air defense force structure across the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, but the mission also requires an all-of-force approach to defeating the UAS threat. Dedicated and non-dedicated air defense units must be prepared to perform active defense tasks and apply passive defense techniques to counter the UAS threat. The allocation of C-sUAS capability should align to mission responsibility, and the complexity of the materiel solutions, given the operational context they are applied in, should inform whether the capability requires a dedicated air defense crew or a non-dedicated operator. The concept of a CAFAD approach, across all services, should not be lost as the DoD organizes for this mission set.</p> +<p>These groups are not, of course, uniform in their attitudes, which tend to differ across different issues, as is to be expected when dealing with broad geographical spaces such as the Indo-Pacific and transatlantic regions.</p> -<p>Likewise, given the breadth and scope of the UAS challenge, the DoD should not lose sight of the fact that a single office to coordinate and guide development of C-sUAS capabilities might be of value. Since January 2020, the JCO has served as the central C-sUAS coordinator in the DoD, focused on establishing joint training, developing joint doctrine, and synchronizing joint materiel development. Because there is no one-size-fits-all for C-sUAS across the services, the JCO has promoted service-specific materiel and policy development while still working to reduce disparate and redundant investment, as is its mission. As a result, the DoD avoided investing in a larger number of platforms, greater redundancy among existing platforms, and increased maintenance, training, and logistics.</p> +<p>This Policy Brief draws on interviews with senior government officials and experts, as well as a review of open-source data on national security priorities. Interviews took place in Hanoi, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, London, New York City, Singapore, Washington, DC and other locations between October 2022 and August 2023. The brief does not consider China’s approach to the Indo-Pacific strategies of transatlantic partners in the brief, because these strategies are broadly targeted at China, rather than considering China a partner in the execution of transatlantic policy.</p> -<p>Yet the consensus model for C-sUAS may need to evolve over time. The current requirement for wide, cross-service consensus over C-sUAS investment could inhibit future transformation of the air defense enterprise to meet the threat. In the spectrum between development led by an all-powerful JCO on one end, and the Army and Marine Corps completely in charge of their own disparate plans on the other, today’s acquisition enterprise may lean too far toward the latter camp. Congress and DoD leadership should reexamine JCO authorities and relation to service acquisition agencies to improve the requirements process and acquisition timelines. This could mean empowering the JCO with an authority requirement recognized by the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) that is broad enough to be effective for immediate C-sUAS needs. This would need to be done, however, in coordination with service leadership to satisfy unique service requirements and avoid overlapping too much with other requirement generation bodies, such as the Army Futures Command Air and Missile Defense Cross-Functional Team (AMD CFT), which perhaps could focus more on longer-term C-sUAS requirements.</p> +<h3 id="the-inner-ring-australia-japan-and-south-korea">The Inner Ring: Australia, Japan and South Korea</h3> -<p>Outside of acquisition authorities, an empowered JCO might also lead C-sUAS coordination among the United States and its allies. The U.S. military spends significant resources to train and integrate its air defenses with allies and partners. These efforts have made joint operations safer and more effective in many theaters. In the C-sUAS arena, however, sales and joint partnerships are slow, and allies appear to rely mostly on RF sense and defeat platforms. Few NATO allies, for example, have invested in active defenses and instead appear to rely on passive defense, counterattacks, and general deterrence. As U.S. partners recognize the increasing sUAS threat — especially in light of Russia-Ukraine fighting today — the JCO can engage in dialogue and workshops to support U.S. exports, co-development, and joint training opportunities.</p> +<p>The US’s closest regional allies – Japan, Australia and South Korea – have been the strongest supporters of intensified regional engagement from transatlantic partners, actively seeking to encourage and shape their involvement, across security, economics, technology and other contested domains. While there are differences of tone and emphasis, this crucial trio broadly shares the analytical framework through which the US and Europe see the Indo-Pacific. Further, the transatlantic partners and this trio share some overarching regional objectives, such as: balancing China’s rising power and assertiveness; pursuing economic de-risking vis-à-vis China; and providing developing economies in Asia with diplomatic and economic options that can boost their resilience. Over the past couple of years, officials from these three countries have expanded and deepened their conversations with North American and European counterparts as they explore areas in which they can learn from one another and, ultimately, better coordinate policies where there are substantial areas of overlap.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Dk84IOk.png" alt="image32" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 17: JCO Demonstration at Yuma Proving Ground.</strong> Industry and military officials attended the first JCO demonstration in April 2021 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, where the focus was on low-collateral effects interceptors (LCEI) systems.</em></p> +<p>Japan and Australia are most closely aligned with the US and Europe. Tokyo and Canberra share transatlantic concerns about the rise of China and its increasing assertiveness: from Beijing’s defence modernisation and deployment of military capabilities to its use of economic coercion, disinformation and other tools of interference beneath the threshold of armed conflict, and its ambition to reshape the international order. New South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has brought his country closer to the positions of Australia and Japan, with his government publishing its own Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2022, and distancing itself from the concerns of his predecessor, Moon Jae-in. But the Yoon administration’s National Security Strategy, published in June 2023, frames the challenge as being the “intensification of US–China strategic competition”, in contrast to how Japan, Australia and transatlantic partners frame China itself as the chief challenge. The concluding statement of the Camp David trilateral summit between the leaders of the US, Japan and South Korea in August 2023 was markedly more restrained in its discussion of China than the final communiqué of the May 2023 summit of the G7, which includes Japan and key transatlantic governments, but not South Korea.</p> -<p><strong>TRAINING</strong></p> +<p>While officials and policy experts interviewed from Australia, Japan and South Korea generally did not view their partnerships with the US and Europe through an explicitly transatlantic lens, they universally welcomed increased efforts to discuss shared objectives and work towards better policy coordination in the region. This is happening across a range of overlapping platforms and issues, mirroring the complex arrangements through which the US and Europe are trying to better work together in the region. This reflects US efforts to build a “latticework” of alliances and partnerships that are “more flexible, ad hoc, more political than legal, sometimes more temporary than permanent”.</p> -<p>Training is an urgent need across the joint force. The need for C-sUAS is on course to become ubiquitous for fixed and maneuver formations, necessitating a wide distribution and variety of training. As the JCO has affirmed, air defense specialists will continue to manage UAS threats for Groups 3 through 5, but the DoD should prepare all units to counter Groups 1 and 2. Commanders at all levels should incorporate C-sUAS in training exercises. Basic training must be simple enough to teach in a short window but comprehensive enough to cover this threat spectrum.</p> +<p>On economics, the US, Europe and Japan are seeking to build a common approach and manage competitive differences over industrial policy through the G7. Neither Australia nor South Korea is a G7 member but, under the rubric of “G7+”, they were both invited to the Hiroshima summit in May 2023, alongside the leaders of Brazil, Comoros, Cook Islands, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. Outside of summits, European and North American officials are also engaging with their Australian, Japanese and South Korean counterparts in much more frequent discussions and dialogues about the economic and technological challenges presented by China, and how to ensure development assistance and infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific is more effective.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="us-army-master-sergeant">U.S. Army master sergeant</h4> - <p>“You’re giving us $10 billion worth of capabilities and $10 of training.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>On traditional security, Japan, Australia and South Korea are increasing their engagement with NATO, participating in a NATO summit for the first time in June 2022, and again in 2023. It should be acknowledged, however, that this is in part a response to the war in Ukraine, as well as being a result of transatlantic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. In a show of less-than-perfect transatlantic cooperation, the proposal for a regional liaison office in Tokyo that might have supported a coordinated response to shared security challenges was opposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. Ben Wallace, the then British defence secretary, seemed to support the proposal in comments made in Singapore in June 2023 but, in a subsequent interview, he expressed understanding for the French position and concern about NATO “mission creep” to the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, the bilateral “tailored partnership programmes” that Japan and South Korea signed with NATO in 2023 suggest there is agreement across the Alliance on the rising importance of Asian partnerships.</p> -<p>There are currently four Joint Knowledge Online training modules that cover basic C-sUAS awareness, system familiarization, installation of C-sUAS activities, and C-sUAS tactics, techniques, and procedures. These short, functional training courses are useful for familiarizing military personnel with sUAS threats and basic countermeasures.</p> +<p>While there is no intention to build a comprehensive, synthesised approach to the Indo-Pacific, Australia, Japan and South Korea are all looking to push their cooperation with North America and Europe to a new level through a web of overlapping platforms and priorities anchored in the US alliance system. Japan, Australia and the US are seeking to coordinate their security and economic cooperation with one another and India through the “Quad”. Australia, the UK and the US are deepening their military-to-military and military–industrial engagement through AUKUS. And, despite the historical tribulations of Japan–South Korea relations, both governments have pledged to strengthen trilateral cooperation with the US across traditional security, economic security and other regional issues.</p> -<p>A more comprehensive training program currently takes place at the C-sUAS Academy in Yuma, Arizona. It offers a two-week course, set to expand into a three-week class by FY 2025. The class is offered across the services and U.S. government, including Secret Service agents. The Army also administers a “master trainer” course specifically for sUAS. Conducted at the Maneuver Center of Excellence in Fort Moore, Georgia, the training course certifies students with Group 1 UAS through a clear program of instruction which includes training on ground control stations, mission planning, simulations, orientation flights, and proficiency flight evaluations. The upcoming Joint C-sUAS University (JCU) at the Fires Center of Excellence in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, discussed further in the “Facilities” subsection below, may consider building upon both training courses.</p> +<h3 id="challenges-in-the-outer-ring-india-indonesia-singapore-vietnam-and-the-philippines">Challenges in the Outer Ring: India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines</h3> -<p>In FY 2024, the JCU will offer two courses — an operator and a planner course — each lasting two weeks. The operator course will provide service members with an additional skill identifier and consist of threat analysis, service specific engagement, and layered defense, with a capstone in detecting and defeating adversary drones. The planner course will consist of layered defense, coordination of airspace, joint strategic management, and C-sUAS planning and system integration, with a capstone in planning and executing a Course of Action (COA) to detect and defeat red air threats (single/swarming).</p> +<p>Beyond the core trio, five other important states in the Indo-Pacific – India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines – have taken a more selective and transactional approach to enhanced transatlantic engagement in the region. This reflects the fact that, aside from the Philippines, none of these states is a formal military ally of the US, and all have distinctive traditions of foreign policy independence. Aside from Singapore, they are developing economies with leaderships that are under pressure to deliver growth and jobs. According to the sources interviewed for this brief, these five countries want the US and its transatlantic allies to help maintain a stable balance of power in the region, but they also fear that the intensity of Washington’s competition with China could be a destabilising force.</p> -<p>The DoD and JCO have prioritized training in recent years. Since April 2021, the JCO, RCCTO, and services have hosted industry demonstrations twice a year to “evaluate emerging technologies that close gaps, inform requirements, and promote innovation.” This joins the service-focused exercises which have increasingly incorporated C-sUAS, as shown in the table below.</p> +<p>Transatlantic partners’ economic engagement looks particularly disjointed to those in this circle. Unwilling for domestic political reasons to offer market access, the US is pursuing instead a vague Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The five countries discussed here are all participating in early IPEF negotiations, but regional officials say it is too early to tell whether these talks can deliver an economic benefit. The UK is seeking bilateral trade deals, and has acceded to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam, but not the US, which pulled out of a predecessor agreement in 2017, or the EU. Meanwhile, the EU’s Global Gateway and the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment remain nascent initiatives, with regional officials sceptical about their ability to deliver tangible, rapid benefits.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b8FojWd.png" alt="image33" /> -<img src="https://i.imgur.com/43kg8Mq.png" alt="image34" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 14: Major U.S. C-sUAS Training and Development.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>One further key challenge is the Indo-Pacific concept itself. Although many advocates of the Indo-Pacific framing see it as a way to embrace a bigger regional role for India, India’s own view of the Indo-Pacific does not tally neatly with those of the US and Europe. The reinvigorated Quad is often painted as a balancing coalition against China, but Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stipulated that India “does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country”. India’s own initiatives for the region, such as the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and the Indian Ocean vision of “Security and Growth for All in the Region”, are framed in inclusive terms, as is ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, there is growing consensus in India about the need for a tougher approach to Beijing, in the aftermath of the flare-up of tensions along its border with China.</p> -<p>Lessons from the field — especially in Ukraine — highlight how quickly the sUAS threat and tactics are evolving in real time. The lack of designated training ranges that have standing C-sUAS authorities to operate within CONUS airspace hinders the ability of DoD to train on new equipment and stress test the validity of new TTPs. Resources such as the Joint C-UAS Center of Excellence and the Joint C-UAS University (JCU) are being stood up to address such gaps in training knowledge across the joint force and act as a clearing house for C-sUAS TTPs. Ultimately, range location issues and reduced live training opportunities will hinder efforts to build readiness, particularly for directed energy systems.</p> +<p>India has also stepped up its engagement with specific transatlantic countries, including the US, the UK and France. However, India’s maintenance of its historical relationship with Russia, despite the invasion of Ukraine, is a reminder that – as is the case within the transatlantic community – not all Indo-Pacific countries will accept Manichean framings of the region as an arena for a battle of democracies versus autocracies.</p> -<p><em>Materiel</em></p> +<p>There is yet more divergence when it comes to Southeast Asia. Officials and policy experts in that region welcome many aspects of Western plans for the Indo-Pacific, but have concerns that the hardening US approach to China, in particular, may antagonise rather than deter Beijing, and that new frameworks and institutions such as the Quad may bypass or undermine the region’s existing ASEAN-anchored architecture. ASEAN member states are concerned with maintaining “ASEAN centrality” in countries’ approaches to the Indo-Pacific, noting that this is the “underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the … region”. In other words, they would prefer that ASEAN institutions and platforms are the vehicles through which partners implement their Indo-Pacific strategies.</p> -<p>C-sUAS materiel development was addressed in Chapter 2 of this report. In short, materiel development should feature a diverse solution set informed by formation requirements for fixed or mobile defenses. Today’s platforms focus primarily on fixed requirements, as requested by CENTCOM and available at the time. Yet as the maneuver force sees the need for C-sUAS across regions, the DoD will need to shift focus toward mobile and maneuver capabilities.</p> +<p>New Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, who took office in June 2022, has shed the anti-American approach of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte, and is intensifying security cooperation with Washington as China increases the pressure on the Philippines in disputed parts of the South China Sea. But other governments in this outer ring remain concerned that the US and its transatlantic allies are too heavily focused on competing with, if not containing, China. Key officials and policy experts in Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam fear that the US and European governments could unnecessarily antagonise Beijing, prompting an escalatory spiral that will cost their region much more than it will the Euro-Atlantic. Numerous Southeast Asian officials indicated that Western government narratives that criticised China’s infrastructure investments and framed competition with Beijing as that between democracy and autocracy had fallen flat. However, it should be noted that this has not caused Singapore and Vietnam to hesitate in improving their military ties with the US.</p> -<p><em>Leadership and Education</em></p> +<p>Many officials and policy experts expressed a dual fear that the US might abandon the region if US politics turns further inward, and also that it might become too aggressive toward China, which could trigger a potentially devastating conflict in the Indo-Pacific. These perceptions about likely trajectories in US policy also colour expectations among regional partners about what Europe will do, due to the widely held belief that European policy toward the Indo-Pacific largely tracks that of its premier security guarantor, the US.</p> -<p>Professional leadership development — from squad leaders to flag officers — must be a priority to ensure doctrine and training are effectively implemented. C-sUAS leaders across air defense, maneuver, support, and sustainment teams will help drive operational planning and training across the force and at the various echelons they lead. These leaders can also help identify and respond to sUAS development trends and adversary capabilities and construct new TTPs in line with emerging technologies. The DoD is building C-sUAS leaders through the several training programs listed above in the “Training” section.</p> +<p>In communicating their various Indo-Pacific approaches, the US and European governments have tended to stress like-mindedness as a basis for working with a broad array of regional partners, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. Yet those governments have diverse views on the Indo-Pacific, and do not view their engagement in the region through a “transatlantic” lens.</p> -<p><em>Personnel</em></p> +<p>Although the US and Europe have put economic security, shared prosperity and resilient supply chains at the heart of their various Indo-Pacific strategies and documents, regional partners expressed concern about the brewing discord between the US and its allies over landmark economic and technological policies. The UK and the EU have warned that the US Inflation Reduction Act, which offers billions of dollars in green subsidies to US companies, could curb competition. Japan and South Korea share these concerns. While the US and the EU have set up a Trade and Technology Council to promote shared rules and norms in this vital emerging domain, they are also pursuing different approaches to the regulation and promotion of the technology sector. Further, recent trips to Beijing by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, European Council President Charles Michel and French President Macron have stirred US fears that its European allies might be softening their approach to China, in the hope of avoiding costly decoupling, and of maintaining or even expanding economic benefits as the Chinese economy comes back to life after Beijing’s abandonment of its zero-Covid strategy.</p> -<p>The C-sUAS mission must be shared across air defense and all other combat, combat support, and combat service support activities. The high demand and low density of air defense formations requires that air defenders and non-specialists work together as part of a CAFAD approach. The central question today, however, is the specific division of labor among the air defense and non-air defense units. Table 15 below lays out three models to illustrate the terms of this debate. On one end is the “Specialized” model, in which the C-sUAS mission is largely taken on by air defenders. On the other end, the “Universal” model posits a framework in which all units are trained for C-sUAS. The “Specialized” and “Universal” models are extremes for illustrative purposes — no one advocates for these purist frameworks. U.S. defense officials are developing an appropriate middle path, labeled here as “Hybrid,” which will incorporate elements from both sides. The degree of specialization versus universalization, however, remains to be determined.</p> +<p>Unsurprisingly, countries in the Indo-Pacific do not view the Euro-Atlantic region as an integrated monolithic actor and, according to interviewees, the term “transatlantic” generally holds little meaning across the Indo-Pacific. While the slew of recently published Indo-Pacific strategies and documents has raised awareness of the diplomatic energy that European and North Atlantic countries are directing toward the Indo-Pacific, countries in the region draw different conclusions on how best to work with transatlantic partners.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yftfLmJ.png" alt="image35" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 15: C-sUAS Operator Frameworks.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Under the hybrid model, C-sUAS planners have borrowed the distinction between “area” and “point” defense whereby air defenders manage larger systems such as high-energy lasers and long-range kinetic interceptors for “area” defense, while other forces use “point” defenses such as guns, nets, and handheld platforms. Maneuver and forward-deployed forces should be able to detect and classify Groups 1 and 2 and, if unable to intercept themselves, at least “relay alert information on locations, altitudes, and time” critical to ground force protection and the possible defeat of enemy UAS. The JCO’s investments suggest an emphasis on CAFAD. Handheld jammers, targeting enhancers, the smart shooter, and other smaller platforms have left this pathway open for the joint force across all units.</p> +<p>Australia, Japan and South Korea form a core of partners that are truly like-minded from a transatlantic point of view on many, although not all, issues. Beyond these core partners, degrees of like-mindedness are more limited. Vietnam and India share US and European concerns about China’s growing military might, and want transatlantic partners to help provide a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. However, their divergent views on the war in Ukraine or on Russia’s role are not only a product of dependence on Moscow for military hardware and technology. In the case of India – but perhaps also more widely – this also reflects a welcoming of the opportunities that multipolarity offers for realising greater strategic autonomy.</p> -<p>The hybrid model posits that the C-sUAS mission in non-ADA units is a force protection task, akin to chemical defense operations. All personnel have a responsibility to perform self-protection chemical defense tasks, and select personnel are trained to employ chemical defense equipment, such as chemical detection kits or alarms. Under the C-sUAS construct, all personnel must be able to engage an sUAS with their assigned or unit organic weapons, and select personnel will be trained to employ C-sUAS weapons.</p> +<p>US and European officials need to get better at accepting and navigating these complexities, rather than wishing them away. Just as they will need to engage with governments in the Indo-Pacific as partners in their own right and not simply as participants in a US–China struggle, they will also need their Indo-Pacific partners to be much more honest with them about their qualms and differences in opinion and national interest. While these conversations might not be easy, transatlantic partners can help by better coordinating their engagement with key Indo-Pacific partners, at diplomatic posts in the region as well as in national capitals. US and European diplomats are already coordinating on an ad hoc basis across the Indo-Pacific, but they can and should be better joined up with discussions at headquarters.</p> -<p>Questions over specific platforms, specializations, and authorities, however, are still up for debate. Should the infantry operate M-LIDS as a divisional level asset, or should this type of platform be forward deployed at the company level? How much training does a soldier need to fire a Coyote missile? Should the Army significantly expand SHORAD units as the Marine Corps has done by tripling the size of the Low Altitude Air Defense Marines community? And how can ground forces deconflict with the Air Force and allied air forces in a timely, effective manner? The DoD needs to answer these questions to fully institutionalize the C-sUAS enterprise. Doing so will allow staff to better understand how C-sUAS formations will work across services and branches, as well as how to plan against sUAS threats.</p> +<p>From the perspective of Indo-Pacific partners, relationships with the US and Europe will be shaped to a great extent by the trajectory of China’s relationships with them and with the West. The core group of US allies in the region – Australia, Japan and South Korea – are largely comfortable with tougher US and European policy toward China, although there are concerns about the harder-edged rhetoric coming out of the US Congress. Across the rest of the region, there is much more ambivalence.</p> -<p><em>Facilities</em></p> +<p>There are, ultimately, two overarching challenges. First, the US and Europe will need to find the right balance between enhancing security relationships with allies and their closest partners, and helping other regional countries to tackle the economic and non-traditional security issues that they face. Second, while transatlantic states are not seen as a monolithic actor in the region, they can improve their reputations, and the effectiveness of their engagement, if they better coordinate their efforts in the Indo-Pacific, and avoid duplicating them. This will require more candid conversations between transatlantic countries and Indo-Pacific countries. The US and Europe will need to listen more and encourage Indo-Pacific partners to speak up honestly, to ensure that their various Indo-Pacific strategies and approaches can be refined and adjusted as they are implemented.</p> -<p>The Army’s plans for facility development are underway. Previous C-sUAS training operations were conducted out of Yuma Proving Ground and lasted roughly two weeks. Despite this training and other branch-specific programs, the JCO found a lack of institutionalized C-UAS training, with one senior Air Force officer noting, “There are currently no joint linkages or commonality to counter UAS training across the department. . . . The average soldier, airman, or Marine lacks adequate counter UAS training.” To improve the military’s C-sUAS capabilities and create a permanent training installation, the Fires Center of Excellence in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is building a Joint C-sUAS University (JCU), which is scheduled to reach initial operation in the first quarter of FY 2024. The academy will provide a common core program of instruction, joint TTPs, and updated doctrine.113 The center will also provide the C-sUAS community with additional space and equipment to conduct research, test, and train.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The JCU’s location at Fort Sill is understandable but suggests a larger role for air defenders over the maneuver force for C-sUAS training. Will this truly be a joint center for all branches, or will the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) at Fort Moore, Georgia, develop its own C-sUAS doctrine to inform mobile and maneuver C-sUAS requirements? Furthermore, while most C-sUAS specialists will likely be Army soldiers, the Army-centric location may also discourage Marines from joining. These concerns can be managed as long as the JCU recruits from across the services and branches upon its opening in FY 2024.</p> +<p><strong>Ben Bland</strong> is the director of the Asia-Pacific programme at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wDZ4BJA.png" alt="image36" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 18: Preparing RQ-7B Shadow for Flight.</strong> Oklahoma Army National Guard soldiers and contractors prepare an RQ-7B Shadow for flight at Fort Sill. Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> +<p><strong>Veerle Nouwens</strong> was previously Senior Research Fellow at the International Security Studies Department, focusing on geopolitical relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Her research interests include China’s foreign policy, cross-strait relations, maritime security and ASEAN.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p><strong>Philip Shetler-Jones</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security team at RUSI. His current research is concentrated on Indo-Pacific security. His recent publications have focused on the defence policy of Japan, attitudes of China to NATO, and narratives about the defence of Taiwan.</p>Ben Bland, et al.This Policy Brief seeks to explore how key partners in the Indo-Pacific have perceived and responded to recent Western efforts in the region.European Security Transformed2023-11-24T12:00:00+08:002023-11-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/european-security-transformed<p><em>The European security in transformation is starting to settle into new patterns, accelerated by Russia’s war on Ukraine, as new actors and groupings emerge. For the UK, this shifting landscape creates both challenges and leadership opportunities as it heads towards its next general election.</em></p> -<p>The sUAS threat is here to stay. These systems offer multi-mission capabilities, at low cost, and with minimal signatures. They are widely available through commercial industry and their utility has been demonstrated in numerous conflicts around the world, from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to Azerbaijan and Armenia’s conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, to the Yemen civil war. Given these factors, sUAS technology will continue to evolve and proliferate.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>As such, C-sUAS has become a critical part of modern air defense. That criticality, however, does not mean that the joint force is ready for the challenge. Today’s air and missile defense systems and structures were not designed to counter numerous, low-flying, small uncrewed systems. sUAS exploit gaps in sensor coverage and cost asymmetries against expensive interceptors. The belief that aerial threats would be countered by U.S. air forces or the ballistic missile defense force may have been true at one point, but drone technology evolved far faster than most thought possible. The U.S. divestment of SHORAD left the DoD without tools and personnel that may have more easily adapted to the sUAS threat, although the proliferation and sophistication seen today calls for more than the SHORAD of yesteryear.</p> +<p>In autumn 2021 we argued that the continent’s security was at an inflection point. We foresaw a coming transformation, driven by either a strategic shock or an aggregation of more modest changes. In fact, both have happened simultaneously: the trauma of Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has accelerated and deepened multiple other security developments.</p> -<p>Fortunately, there is a diverse mix of sensors, effectors, and C2 systems that can detect, track, identify, and defeat sUAS. The DoD is investing in a variety of kinetic, electronic, and RF-based defenses to counter sUAS threats. These tools have their respective strengths and weaknesses affecting such factors as survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and total defended area. Defense budgets here are limited, but the JCO has down-selected across a wide array of C-sUAS platforms to improve economies of scale in production, logistics, and training.</p> +<h3 id="whats-new">What’s New?</h3> -<p>The institutionalization of C-sUAS will require developments across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Capability development remains necessary for the long term, but as the JCO has emphasized, the urgent need today is for training and capacity. New doctrine should specify the division of labor between air defense and non-air defense specialists, as well as the specific sensors, C2, and effectors that they can operate. C-sUAS leaders will need to tackle these and various other challenges, with their decisions today shaping the field for years to come.</p> +<p>The past two years have witnessed marked changes in the European security landscape. First, state-on-state war has returned on a scale that Europe has not experienced since 1945. Ukraine’s extraordinary resistance and resilience, backed by slow but increasingly steady support from the West, has made sure that it will survive, bloodied but unbowed. The war is also transforming Ukraine into a powerful regional security actor that is now central rather than peripheral to European security, and it is set to play a pivotal role in future Euro-Atlantic security arrangements.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Second, we have seen a re-focused NATO. Its 2022 Strategic Concept was clear, if late, in identifying Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to peace and security. NATO plans, deployments and exercises have pivoted towards addressing the Russian threat in all domains. Finland has become a NATO member in rapid time, and Sweden is now on the path to entry. Neither event was on anyone’s immediate radar in October 2021. These developments will have a positive impact on the Alliance, making it stronger, more coherent and more European.</p> -<p><strong>Shaan Shaikh</strong> is a fellow with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on missile proliferation, unmanned aerial systems, air defense, and non-state actors. He is also managing editor of the CSIS website Missile Threat, an online clearinghouse for information and analysis on missile and missile defense systems. Prior to joining CSIS, he worked at the U.S. Department of Defense and the Syria Institute. He is currently a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and received his BA from Tufts University.</p> +<p>Third, new actors and groups have emerged. In October 2021 we commented that European security was no longer driven only by the “big three” (France, Germany and the UK), and that other countries were growing in influence and in their willingness to set the agenda, with support for Ukraine already becoming a unifying factor. This trend has accelerated, encompassing not just Ukraine and Finland, but also Poland – now a US security partner of choice – and Turkey.</p> -<p><strong>Thomas Karako</strong> is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, where he arrived in 2014. His research focuses on national security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and public law. In 2010–2011, he was an American Political Science Association congressional fellow, working with the professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on U.S. strategic forces policy, nonproliferation, and NATO. Dr. Karako is also currently a fellow with the Institute for Politics and Strategy of Carnegie Mellon University.</p> +<p>Moreover, it’s not just the big countries driving change. Denmark and the Netherlands have led on providing F-16 aircraft for Ukraine, while the former donated all its Caesar self-propelled howitzers. The Baltic states lead support for Ukraine when measured by percentage of GDP. And Lithuania has been vocal in calling out Chinese coercive practices, withdrawn from China’s “17+1” arrangement with Central and Eastern Europe and published an independent Indo-Pacific strategy.</p> -<p><strong>Michelle McLoughlin</strong> is a former intern with the CSIS Missile Defense Project. She is currently a graduate student at American University’s School of International Service and holds a BA in international relations from the University of San Diego.</p>Shaan Shaikh, et al.This report examines the threat of small drones on the modern battlefield, and the various kinetic and non-kinetic defenses available to defeat them.And You Are?2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/and-you-are<p><em>British military exercise, Salisbury Plain Training Area, England, 2016: Our convoy set off from its departure point in the dead of night.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The six vehicles, carrying soldiers and air defense missile launchers, made their way slowly through wooded areas, across fields, and down rural tracks, looking to avoid detection by the enemy. Progress was slow. Vehicles got bogged down on more than one occasion, and we struggled to navigate using night vision equipment whilst trying to relate paper maps to the silhouettes of hills and trees. After several hours, we arrived at the battlegroup headquarters to which we were assigned. I headed into the building that had been requisitioned as the operations room. I approached the battle captain and introduced myself, but it quickly became apparent that we were not expected nor were we particularly welcome. There ensued an uphill battle for our capability to be understood, protected, and deployed appropriately in order to prevent the position being destroyed by enemy aircraft. Relationships had to be built, favors pulled, and compromises reached to make any progress.</em></p> +<p>Fourth, the EU is assuming a more prominent role. Russia’s initial diplomatic focus on the US and NATO has had to pivot more towards the EU, with sanctions becoming a significant lever in responding to Russian aggression. The EU now provides military support to Ukraine via the EU Peace Facility, which has had to increase its financial ceiling to meet demand. This would have been totally inconceivable two years ago.</p> -<p>Armed forces are divided entities by design. They are first split by domain — land, air, sea. The army, navy, and air force are then divided again by function. The enterprise is built on having separate capabilities such as armor, infantry, artillery, signallers, logisticians, and engineers all come together in times of conflict. Units are further dislocated by space, spread around a country and overseas. As a result, forces often do not “know themselves” as well as they should. Moreover, human frailties such as accidents and losses exacerbate the problem.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US continues to underpin European security, providing the lion’s share of support to Ukraine and NATO as well as overall defence spending</code></em></strong></p> -<p>As our exercise showed, internal organizational friction reduces operational effectiveness and is often invisible in measures of force readiness. The British Army provides a particularly stark example where these functional divisions are exacerbated by historical norms and fissures. Other forces can learn from our experience, using rigorous and regular collective training to reduce the impact of friction.</p> +<p>Finally, the security focus has shifted north, south and east. Unresolved and frozen conflicts are thawing, including in the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus, with the capacity of NATO and the EU to project stability uncertain. The war in Israel and Gaza constitutes a security emergency on Europe’s doorstep with the potential to spread, sow dissension and give Russia an opportunity to meddle and distract from its disastrous war in Ukraine. The collapse of French-led military missions in the Sahel has offered another opportunity for Russia to extend its influence.</p> -<h3 id="finding-friction">Finding Friction</h3> +<h3 id="-and-whats-not-changed">… and What’s Not Changed?</h3> -<p>Analysis of military capability often focuses on headline metrics: numbers of tanks, howitzers, and soldiers. The strength of armies is often portrayed as a function of their size, with some minor modifications for the modernity of the systems at play. Forces the world over hold parades, flyovers, and demonstrations to show off this metric to allies and adversaries alike. This was certainly the case regarding Russia prior to February 2022. But the war in Ukraine demonstrated the importance of other considerations, such as the will to fight and the ability of commanders to combine capabilities and sequence them appropriately in time and space. However, there are also more ambiguous frictions that can prevent forces from reaching their potential. As shown in the anecdote above, which took place in a real training exercise, organizational realities must be considered when attempting to analyze the true abilities of a fighting force.</p> +<p>There are several continuities. First, Russian aggression. Russia’s 2022 re-invasion of Ukraine was not an isolated trauma but the most severe in a decades-long succession of Russian violence, including Chechnya in the early 2000s, Georgia in 2008, Crimea and Donbas in 2014, Syria in 2015, chemical weapons use on UK soil in 2006 and 2018, and the attack on the Vrbětice ammunition warehouse in Czechia in 2014.</p> -<p>Many commentators were surprised by the Russian armed forces’ apparent inability to seize key objectives in Ukraine after the invasion in 2022. Subsequent examination has revealed that a layer of friction existed below the normal threshold of analysis — Russian soldiers had been using out-of-date maps as well as inadequate food and antiquated rifles. Moreover, command and control was confused, information was kept from soldiers, and orders failed to account for developments on the ground. Such revelations were seized upon by Western analysts and practitioners as evidence that the Russian war machine was a laughing stock. However, such hubris is unwise, and forces should take time to inflect to ensure they do not suffer from a similar sort of rot.</p> +<p>Second, Western defence burden-sharing remains imbalanced. The US continues to underpin European security, providing the lion’s share of support to Ukraine and NATO as well as overall defence spending. Europe collectively has been catching up on military support to Ukraine, but the nature, volume and timing of US capabilities has made the greatest difference. Moreover, while European defence spending has increased at the highest rate since the end of the Cold War, there are still disagreements on what to spend it on. Therefore, the gap in overall numbers does not take into account the actual capability gap – especially on critical enablers, including intelligence, command and control, logistics and the adoption of new technologies.</p> -<h3 id="do-i-know-you">Do I Know You?</h3> +<p>Third, and closely linked, Western defence industrial production remains insufficient to match the threat. Even for those European countries where there has been some increase in defence spending, it has not yet made much impact on defence industrial production. Moreover, this is not just a European and Ukrainian challenge as global events increase the demand for higher and sustained industrial production.</p> -<p>The British Army, like most military forces, moves its personnel around the country regularly. Each force does this differently, but it is common for soldiers and officers to change positions every two to three years. This may be upon promotion, or on a more general rotation. As a result, there is a constant churn of personnel through units and formation headquarters. Some people will have been there for two years, others two months, and some two days. Sometimes it is unavoidable for whole command teams to depart at once, although this is avoided where possible. Consequently, expertise in planning and executing missions waxes and wanes.</p> +<p>Fourth, the existing cooperative Euro-Atlantic security structures are no longer fit for purpose, including a near-total erosion of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures that previously constrained Russia. The 7 November statement that NATO allies would suspend the operation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty following Russia’s withdrawal acknowledges the depressing reality. Western capitals need to think creatively about new arrangements, including how to keep the US engaged.</p> -<p>Indeed, while armies will have centralized, accepted planning processes, individual formations often put their own spin on things, producing their own templates and products. As a result, on arrival in a formation, new personnel will have to learn how to slot in. It is not uncommon for formations to hold an annual series of “crawl, walk, run” planning exercises to bring new staff up to speed with its processes. Ideally, these align with readiness timelines, but conflict may well fail to respect neat operational readiness mechanisms, especially when resources are scarce as they are in many NATO militaries.</p> +<h3 id="britain-returns">Britain Returns!</h3> -<p>In the United Kingdom, related units are often not located together. It may surprise nonpractitioners to learn that in many cases, units that are expected to deploy together, often at very short notice, are not based together and indeed are sometimes separated by hundreds of miles. As a result, there is an immediate barrier to building relationships and working together. Time spent together builds familiarity. It should not be underestimated how much easier it is to work with people you have a rapport with. This becomes even more critical in times of high pressure and fatigue.</p> +<p>The Integrated Review Refresh (IRR) of March 2023 represented a sober update of UK strategy. Although it emphasised working alongside allies and partners in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, it reaffirmed the primacy of the Euro-Atlantic area for the UK’s security interests, to be bolstered by a reinvigoration of its European relationships.</p> -<p>When commanders may not know some of the people in their staff, this immediately leads to a reduction in performance. Moreover, familiarity with capabilities may be lacking. Battlegroup commanders may be given a fire group of air defense missile launchers having never laid eyes on them before and may not know the first thing about their use. It is then up to a young troop commander to bridge the gap in understanding. In some cases, this is easy. In others, the battalion commander may be reluctant to take advice from an unknown junior officer, or even fail to realize they are in the headquarters at all.</p> +<p>Two years ago, these were in a mess. Post-Brexit, UK ministers had opted not to pursue closer ties with EU external initiatives or operations. The announcement in September 2021 of the AUKUS (Australia–UK–US) defence pact had provoked an angry response from France, at the same time as allies were coming to terms with the US-led withdrawal from Afghanistan.</p> -<p>Military tribalism may also be deleterious to performance. Military forces are broken down into units with different capabilities that are often defined by their historic and lived experience. Different parts of the force often have their own colloquialisms. Some soldiers look down on those who do not have a particular qualification badge or who have not served with a particular unit and even have specific deprecatory terms for outsiders. In operational theaters, these problems become more acute as formations change shape as time moves on. Operational realities such as casualties or demands for capabilities with higher priority elsewhere will keep formations in flux, further exacerbating the issue.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A potential future UK–EU defence and security deal could be far more ambitious than simple third-party UK participation in EU security initiatives</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="accidents-happen">Accidents Happen</h3> +<p>The UK has now inched towards a more pragmatic relationship with the EU. The February 2023 Windsor Framework unlocked the possibility of closer security and defence cooperation, initially in cyber security and counterterrorism, and the UK joined the EU military mobility project. These steps proceeded alongside close practical cooperation on Russia sanctions. In a worsening security environment, a potential future UK–EU defence and security deal could be far more ambitious than simple third-party UK participation in EU security initiatives.</p> -<p>Other frictions exist as well. Whilst some might seem minor, they form part of the complex picture that affects how forces perform on the battlefield. For example, despite lots of training and attempts at mitigation, soldiers crash their vehicles an awful lot, both in exercises and on operations. This, in fact, is one of the highest causes of casualties in military forces worldwide. Operating heavy machinery in convoys in the dark or conducting complex maneuvers in urban and wooded areas is hard — really hard. Vehicles get stuck, make a wrong turn, and in the worst cases overturn or collide with a friendly vehicle.</p> +<h3 id="new-opportunities-and-challenges-for-the-uk">New Opportunities and Challenges for the UK</h3> -<p>Soldiers also lose things as well as themselves. Weapons, night vision equipment, and even vehicles go missing. Operational imperatives will determine how much time is spent trying to recover them. These sorts of frictions are not accounted for in most planning cycles. This friction also captures last-minute demands on soldiers, including the simple act of battling the military bureaucracy to reach an outcome. Military forces are a mix of analogue and digital processes, in which archaic structures are wrestling with modernity. Obtaining a vehicle, rations, or place to train can be so complex and protracted as to be impracticable among a host of competing priorities.</p> +<p>The transformation of European security is still unfolding, but the current constellation creates special challenges for the UK, considering that it is a leading European member of NATO and the Joint Expeditionary Force but now sits outside the EU, and given how invested it is in its new defence partnership with Ukraine and its long-standing security relationship with the US. Each of these carries uncertainty.</p> -<p>When added together, the totality of these seemingly minor frictions means that the capability of a military to defeat an enemy is much more nuanced than might be reflected by numbers or the latest technology. A complex cocktail of personal relationships, ability, and willingness contributes to the effectiveness of a force in the field.</p> +<p>First, and most importantly, there is the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The UK and other European states increased support to Ukraine in 2023 alongside rising expectations of a Ukrainian military breakthrough. But winter is now upon us, and the ground war is likely to slow ahead of fresh fighting in spring 2024. With a static strategic frontline, external calls for Ukraine to reach an accommodation with Russia may grow. Yet the UK committed itself in the IRR to “supporting Ukraine to reassert its sovereignty and denying Russia any strategic benefit from its invasion”. It therefore appears bound to continue to advocate the Ukrainian cause and ensure that it has the capabilities to sustain combat operations to liberate its territory.</p> -<h3 id="what-to-do-about-it">What to Do About It?</h3> +<p>Second, 2024 will be a decisive year for US focus and commitment. Washington will host the next NATO Summit in July, and the Alliance will mark the 75th anniversary of the signing of the Washington Treaty in April. These events will take place against a complex US domestic political background, including Congress’s uncertain appetite for support to Ukraine and the prospect of a second Trump presidency that could be even more challenging for US allies than the first one.</p> -<p>The solution? Train. Train lots, and train well. Aside from delivering on operations, the second most important task for armies and the other services is to prepare and train for those operations. British military training takes place at a number of levels. First, soldiers must be able to administer themselves in the field and be able to fire their personal weapon accurately and use basic communications equipment. Second, they must be able to operate their core equipment, which might be a vehicle, heavy weapon, missile system, or radar. Third, they need to operate that equipment in concert with other capabilities in pursuit of an aim or objective. This collective training is difficult and expensive to execute effectively, but is absolutely critical to achieving commonality. Units may also be stuck performing other duties such as vehicle maintenance and distracted by an assortment of other demands, from online training to hosting visitors to filling out paperwork.</p> +<p>The current UK government and opposition both stress their Atlanticism. But, with the US having security priorities elsewhere and an unpredictable presidential election ahead, the UK must work harder, alongside European allies, to keep the Euro-Atlantic security community together. Such a leaning into Europe would be welcome in Washington. Strangely, therefore, the best way for the UK to sustain its Atlanticist objectives may be to do more with its European neighbours.</p> -<p>William F. Owen, editor of Military Strategy magazine, argues that formations should train in the field for 90 days a year. Currently, however formations might be lucky to get 30 days of combined training in a year. And often, that combined training is also an assessment of some sort, which can detract from being able to take time to fully integrate and assimilate the various personnel and capabilities involved.</p> +<p>One thing is certain: Europe’s security transformation is far from over.</p> -<p>There are, as ever, frictions associated with such an aim. Some specialist units are passed between larger formations as there are not enough to go around. This means they could potentially end up spending a much longer time in the field, which would have ramifications on morale and retention. Prioritizing their time between supporting formations, their own force development, and time to recuperate requires a pragmatic approach by commanders. Inverting the normal practice of specialists travelling to the associated formation and instead being visited by them to share knowledge would reduce the burden on the minority. This also substantiates the point made previously about being unable to forge strong relationships. However, the intent is a good one. Time spent together builds familiarity with capabilities, which in turn means more favorability — those capabilities will be employed effectively and in concert with the rest of the formation offering competitive advantage.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Issues surrounding the locations of units, and how far they are from the formations they work with, are more difficult. Bases have finite capacities and may simply be unable to house the totality of those who would deploy with them. Sometimes there are infrastructure limitations as to what can be stored where — for example, not every base has the requisite facilities to store sensitive items like missiles. What’s more, armies often try to balance their presence around the country to help with recruitment and enable people to stay where their families are based. Likewise, the problem of career movement is difficult to solve. British career structures are built upon movement and promotion, moving from jobs requiring different skill sets with different profiles. Staying in one place can count against people when trying to achieve the next rank if a high-profile job exists elsewhere.</p> +<p><strong>Ed Arnold</strong> is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on the transformation of European security following Russia’s war on Ukraine. Specifically, he covers the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the security of northern Europe, and the UK contribution to European security through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force, and other fora.</p> -<h3 id="remaining-challenges">Remaining Challenges</h3> +<p><strong>Peter Jones</strong> served in the British Diplomatic Service for over thirty years, retiring from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in 2021. Peter was Chief Operating Officer and Director-General at the then Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) from 2017 to 2020, up to its merger with the Department for International Development.</p>Ed Arnold and Peter JonesThe European security in transformation is starting to settle into new patterns, accelerated by Russia’s war on Ukraine, as new actors and groupings emerge. For the UK, this shifting landscape creates both challenges and leadership opportunities as it heads towards its next general election.N. Korea’s Sanctions-Busting2023-11-22T12:00:00+08:002023-11-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/north-koreas-sanctions-busting<p><em>Pyongyang’s alleged decision to close around a quarter of its overseas missions reflects both the evolving sanctions-busting landscape and more concerning rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.</em></p> -<p>Dealing with the subject of internal organizational friction is problematic on two fronts. First, it is difficult to quantify. It is nuanced and uneven across forces. There is no firm methodology by which to analyze a commander’s grasp on all the capabilities under their command, nor how good the relationships are between the battalion’s core and its attachments. Commanders do get put through their paces on validation exercises, but the marking criteria concern objectives like bridge crossings and assaults. Moreover, many exercises today are simulated, which further dilutes interactions between individuals.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Second, the topic does not make for good reading. Forces like to assume that soldiers are professional enough to put aside any personal or professional differences in order to complete an objective. This is often true, but not always. It is hard for a commander to admit that some of their soldiers are rude to other troops because they wear a different badge or have not completed a certain qualification. However ridiculous it seems, some readers will find this awfully familiar, and some will be guilty of it themselves.</p> +<p>Recently, signs have emerged that North Korea will shrink its diplomatic network. Outposts in Angola, Hong Kong, Spain and Uganda are among “as many as a dozen” missions – a quarter of North Korea’s network of around 50 – that are allegedly slated for closure. As well as assuming more traditional diplomatic functions, North Korea’s missions have played a wider range of roles in support of the country’s national interests, and have grown in importance as Pyongyang struggles with economic isolation and the extensive UN sanctions regime.</p> -<p>This makes it all the more important to remember that, when assessing the readiness of a military, what you cannot see is of great importance. While some of this invisible friction is baked into military culture, time spent physically training together can dramatically reduce it. Combined arms training, which builds relationships, trust, and skills, will transfer directly into operational advantage.</p> +<p>As I outlined in a RUSI report published last year, North Korea’s embassies, consulates, trade offices and representative missions to international organisations – and the diplomats and intelligence officers that reside there – have played key roles in procuring technology for, and funding, Pyongyang’s nuclear, missile and military programmes. The closure of these missions likely reflects both a tactical-level evolution in North Korea’s sanctions-busting efforts as well as shifting geopolitical realities, with more strategic-level implications for the UN sanctions regime.</p> -<hr /> +<h3 id="from-the-missions-to-the-missiles">From the Missions to the Missiles</h3> -<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Patrick HintonBritish military exercise, Salisbury Plain Training Area, England, 2016: Our convoy set off from its departure point in the dead of night.Track and Disrupt2023-11-10T12:00:00+08:002023-11-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/track-and-disrupt<p><em>Efforts to align third countries with sanctions against Russia will only succeed when the private networks facilitating circumvention are understood and countered.</em></p> +<p>North Korea’s missions have been key nodes in its sanctions-busting efforts, providing the skeleton of a near-global presence that has been used extensively to undertake and support operations. These sanctions-busting roles have fallen into three main categories. First, the missions and the diplomats stationed there are involved in revenue-raising and – given that the revenue raised likely benefits North Korea’s weapons programmes – “proliferation financing”.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>This has included trade in sanctioned commodities, with diplomats supporting sanctioned coal and vanadium exports. Diplomats have also run overseas businesses and raised revenue by leasing diplomatic real estate or even by abusing diplomatic alcohol allowances. One of the most prevalent revenue-raising activities for North Korea has been arms sales. Representatives of North Korea’s arms-dealing entities have frequently been accredited as diplomats.</p> -<p>Sanctions regimes have continued to expand in scope since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, aiming to asphyxiate Russia’s financial and military capabilities to wage war. The EU alone has passed 11 packages to date, each building on the last. These packages are paired with efforts to restrict circumvention, along with a forthcoming EU directive criminalising sanctions evasion.</p> +<p>Second, Pyongyang’s diplomats have acted as buyers, procuring a wide range of sanctioned goods for import to North Korea. Most concerningly, embassies and diplomatic networks have long procured technology for the country’s weapons programmes, with the embassies in Beijing, Berlin and Moscow being particularly active in this regard. In Moscow, a member of the Office of the Commercial Counsellor – a diplomat named O Yong Ho – sought to procure a range of goods for North Korea’s missile programmes, including aramid fibre, manufacturing equipment, a spinning nozzle, chemicals and stainless steel used in missile fuel production and the construction of submarine hulls. In 2018, a senior German intelligence official noted that the embassy in Berlin had been repeatedly used to acquire missile and nuclear-related technologies, many of which were so-called dual-use technologies of utility in civil and weapons programmes.</p> -<p>The unprecedented sanctions against Russia have highlighted the importance of third countries – those countries that are neither the target of sanctions nor adopters of sanctions against Russia/Belarus (and thus are not legally bound by sanctions). Such third countries make up a majority of the world and are therefore an important factor in determining whether sanctions are ultimately effective. Put simply, if third countries provide circumvention routes or substitutes for the goods and services that sanctions aim to curtail, then the sanctions will be weakened or fail.</p> +<p>Diplomats have also been involved in the procurement of intangible technologies – sensitive knowledge, information and even weapons designs. In 2011, representatives from North Korea’s Belarus Trade Office were caught in a sting operation seeking sensitive missile-related information in Ukraine. Additionally, in 2019, O Yong Ho procured CAD drawings for a Russian cruise missile. Diplomatic procurement efforts also involve much more benign goods – sanctioned luxury items and other commodities – which are scarce in North Korea and help maintain the court economy.</p> -<p>The trade in dual-use goods is one of five categories of sanctions evasion and avoidance covered by recent analysis undertaken by RUSI as part of the Serious and Organised Crime Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) programme, and provides a particularly salient example of the role of third countries. Numerous reports have publicised cases of manufacturers deliberately or inadvertently shipping important military and technological components from sanctions-imposing countries to intermediaries in third countries that then ship them onward to military end-users in Russia and Belarus.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea’s missions have been key nodes in its sanctions-busting efforts, providing the skeleton of a near-global presence that has been used to undertake and support operations</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="tracking-sanctions-evasion-networks-in-third-countries">Tracking Sanctions-Evasion Networks in Third Countries</h3> +<p>Third, the missions and their occupants have provided support to North Korea’s overseas business networks through providing use of bank accounts, hosting banking representatives, moving funds and even providing logistical support. As the UN Panel of Experts that monitors North Korea sanctions implementation noted in a 2017 report, Pyongyang’s missions “open accounts that, in effect, perform the services that a financial institution would”. Elsewhere, diplomats have smuggled gold and precious metals as a means of moving funds. Missions have also been closely connected to North Korea’s shipping networks.</p> -<p>Our recent SOC ACE report categorised five types of sanctions evasion critical to funding and supplying Russia’s military-industrial complex: financial services, company incorporation, dual-use and military goods, exports of sanctioned Russian commodities, and oil smuggling. All of these operate primarily in the private sector and rely on third countries’ lax enforcement of – or deliberate refusal to implement –sanctions.</p> +<h3 id="missions-slated-for-closure">Missions Slated for Closure</h3> -<p>In the case of countries not imposing sanctions, many commentators have bemoaned the whack-a-mole problem: company incorporation is so easy that sanctioning a person or a company will just cause another to appear in its place. Behind all of these seemingly random companies, however, is a Russian or affiliated individual(s) directing a network, often associated with Russia’s Federal Security Service. In many cases, investigators have identified links between the Russian military-industrial complex and newly incorporated companies with low public profiles – and these wider networks are often based in or linked to manufacturers, banks and other businesses in sanctions-imposing countries.</p> +<p>Personnel based at two of the missions slated for closure – those in Angola and Uganda –have been heavily involved in sanctioned activities. More recently, North Korea’s relationship with Angola – which dates to the early 1970s – has seen the embassy in Luanda host Pyongyang’s arms dealers. Two diplomats, who were concurrently acting as representatives of North Korean arms dealer Green Pine Associated Corporation, travelled from Angola to Sri Lanka multiple times to discuss Pyongyang’s refurbishment of naval patrol vessels between 2014 and 2016. One of these Green Pine representatives concurrently negotiated contracts, sourced parts and oversaw the refurbishment of the Angolan navy’s own patrol boats. North Korean business in the country also went beyond military equipment. The UN-sanctioned entity Mansudae Overseas Projects undertook 56 construction projects in Angola up until 2015, including the mausoleum that holds the remains of the country’s first president.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If third countries provide circumvention routes or substitutes for the goods and services that sanctions aim to curtail, then the sanctions will be weakened or fail</code></em></strong></p> +<p>According to the UN Panel, a Military Attaché and diplomats based at the embassy in Kampala, Uganda, oversaw North Korean training of Ugandan air force pilots, technicians and police between 2017 and 2018. Showcasing how North Korean diplomats operate transnationally, the Attaché – a Colonel in the Korean People’s Army – was described in correspondence as the representative of the North Korean armed forces in “Uganda and East Africa” and offered neighbouring South Sudan “Presidential Guard and special forces training” and “tank crew training” while based in Kampala.</p> -<p>These thousands of companies are often not random or spontaneous creations, but directed by the Russian military-industrial base. They consist of networks of individuals and companies directing this support and supply business, along with intermediary companies and the shipping and logistics firms that facilitate the circumvention trade. Gathering the data necessary to map these networks is critical, as is understanding which government stakeholders are linked to these networks, in order to support diplomatic engagement to disrupt this trade in third countries.</p> +<p>There is less evidence of sanctions-busting activities by the North Korean Consulate in Hong Kong, a third mission which currently looks slated for closure. However, the axis between the city and Macau has seen significant North Korean connections over the years. North Korea long sought to open a trade office in Hong Kong and to commence Air Koryo flights to the city while it was under British rule and prior to the Consulate opening in 1998. More recently, as research by RUSI’s OSIA research group has noted, Hong Kong and businesses there have been a crucial node in the networks undertaking illegal oil shipments to North Korea. The role of Hong Kong businesses in selling high-end chips as part of Russia’s illicit supply chains for military electronics also suggests that North Korea could usefully shop in the city.</p> -<p>Some third countries are already introducing their own control systems to monitor the re-export of goods to Russia, such as Kazakhstan’s online tool to track the entire supply chain “from border to border”. However, governments and private businesses in these countries would benefit from this specific data collection and mapping approach to mitigate their exposure to opaque sanctions evasion networks and thus avoid getting caught in the crosshairs of US or EU sanctions.</p> +<h3 id="adaptation-in-north-koreas-networks">Adaptation in North Korea’s Networks</h3> -<h3 id="building-capacity-in-allied-countries">Building Capacity in Allied Countries</h3> +<p>Given the range of sanctions-busting activities that North Korean embassies have conducted, the closure of as many as a dozen missions at once is surprising. These steps come as Pyongyang is reopening to the world following nearly three years of Covid-19-induced border closures. They showcase adaptation in North Korea’s sanctions-busting networks in real time – a result of several shaping factors.</p> -<p>Notwithstanding the role of third countries, allied countries that have imposed sanctions also contribute to circumvention. Many of the microelectronic components still feeding Russia’s military systems are Western-made yet continue to reach Russia, mostly due to a combination of a lack of enforcement capacity and the deliberate obfuscation of end-users through third-party intermediaries by the global networks supplying Russia.</p> +<p>The decision may have a cost-saving rationale. North Korea’s missions are allegedly self-financing, raising hard currency to cover their own operations and sending all surpluses back to Pyongyang. Perhaps these specific missions are not as profitable as they once were. Indeed, both the Angolan and Ugandan governments have taken steps to reduce their connections to North Korea since the mid-2010s. In early 2020, Angola repatriated almost 300 North Korean workers, many of them working in the medical sector. Uganda allegedly cut military ties with Pyongyang around 2016, but subsequent reports suggest cooperation continued past that date.</p> -<p>Over 30 countries representing more than half the global economy have announced sanctions and export controls targeting Russia, but the findings of the RUSI-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet) point to a series of challenges that sanctions-imposing countries consistently face.</p> +<p>Other diplomatic missions and actors can likely pick up the slack when these missions close, and potentially in a more cost-effective way. Nearby remaining missions may be designated by Pyongyang to provide coverage for business activities in these jurisdictions, just as the mission in Rome will provide diplomatic coverage in Spain following the closure of the mission in Madrid. North Korea’s diplomatic arms dealers in Africa already operate across borders, and representatives may be tasked to widen their remit.</p> -<p>Prior to February 2022, many members of the sanctions coalition had very limited exposure to sanctions, and they are now scrambling to overhaul their national frameworks. In the EU, several member states are trying to determine the competent authorities and their responsibilities towards what is repeatedly called the “unprecedented” scale of sanctions against Russia. Both private- and public-sector actors have struggled to implement and enforce the sanctions, meaning that even countries with strong political will struggle to detect and interrupt sanctions evasion that might involve – or even start in – their own jurisdiction.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The open violation of the sanctions on Pyongyang by Russia could have a serious knock-on effect for the sanctions regime more broadly</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Truly disrupting third-country sanctions circumvention requires a better understanding of the wider networks enabling this activity</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Other actors – those without diplomatic accreditation – may also pick up the slack. Indeed, diplomats may have a declining importance in North Korea’s sanctions-busting. Previously, as states around the world became hostile to North Korean business activities, diplomatic networks became more important. Diplomats had several “competitive advantages” over private individuals, largely stemming from the immunities and privileges afforded by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Diplomats cannot be arrested, and diplomatic properties and vehicles cannot be searched.</p> -<p>With unclear responsibilities, scarce resources and a lack of expertise, private-sector operators face an uphill battle to tackle the already intricate task of detecting and countering circumvention, muddled by the involvement of complex multi-jurisdictional schemes often involving third countries.</p> +<p>However, efforts to recognise and address diplomatic sanctions-busting have intensified since 2016. Despite far-from-universal sanctions implementation, North Korea’s missions now likely attract interest from South Korean, Western and other intelligence agencies around the world. The use of local or third-country nationals, or indeed third-country passports obtained by North Koreans, could provide Pyongyang with less obvious means of conducting business than using diplomatic cover.</p> -<p>The coalition of sanctions-imposing countries could also be strengthened by more consistent intelligence-sharing to disrupt cross-border global sanctions evasion networks, and by improved harmonisation in the interpretation of sanctions (including among EU member states). This leads to cases where authorities from different member states disagree on whether measures should be taken against an entity that one or the other understands to be in breach of sanctions. Moreover, the violation and circumvention of sanctions is not criminalised in all members of the sanctions coalition – notably in EU member states. This means that even if these practices are already taking place within their jurisdiction, authorities cannot initiate investigations and disrupt the networks involved. The upcoming EU directive to criminalise these practices will aim to remedy this, but this adjustment is long overdue.</p> +<p>Concurrently, newer sanctions-busting opportunities are likely more profitable than those facilitated by the missions. Although Pyongyang is not in a position to be picky over its revenue streams, the $1.7 billion of cryptocurrency stolen by North Korea-linked hackers in 2022, and the millions that can be gained remotely through IT outsourcing, likely far eclipse the amounts that can be generated by small-scale arms sales or construction contracts in sub-Saharan Africa.</p> -<h3 id="disrupting-global-sanctions-evasion-networks">Disrupting Global Sanctions-Evasion Networks</h3> +<p>Indeed, recent geopolitical shifts may also provide more bountiful opportunities. North Korea’s normalising relationship with Russia, its alleged transfer of hundreds of containers of weaponry to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine, and the potential for other commercial opportunities may see North Korea’s diplomacy and energy more focused on this relationship. The open violation of the sanctions on Pyongyang by Russia – a UN Security Council permanent member which voted for the measures – could have a serious knock-on effect for the sanctions regime more broadly and its implementation around the world.</p> -<p>Truly disrupting third-country sanctions circumvention requires a better understanding of the wider networks enabling this activity, from banks and corporate service providers to shipping and logistics networks. Taking this wider view will likely generate new levers for pressure, including cutting the financial ties of the enablers supporting this trade. Further, applying a network focus should also reveal links between private-sector actors and the governments of third countries.</p> +<h3 id="tactical-adaptation-and-strategic-gloom">Tactical Adaptation and Strategic Gloom</h3> -<p>In sum, efforts to tackle evasion should combine diplomatic engagement with third countries, focused on a network-centric approach, with a tightening of domestic efforts to disrupt sanctions circumvention at source. It is thus key that sanctions-imposing countries harmonise and improve their national frameworks as well, including better coordination and information-sharing across the coalition. Sanctions-evasion networks operate as global enterprises, and sanctions-imposing countries must do the same to render them ineffective.</p> +<p>Beyond their overt diplomatic function, North Korea’s missions and diplomats are persistent participants in – and coordinators holding together – the dark sanctions-busting economy that has kept the Kim regime afloat through almost two decades of sanctions.</p> -<hr /> +<p>North Korea’s closure of many its missions reflects both tactical and strategic-level developments. The closures represent the tactical adaptation of North Korea’s networks, with the missions in question likely not as profitable as they used to be, and with new and more “remote-working” sanctions-busting operations perhaps proving more lucrative.</p> -<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is currently working as an independent consultant, following a role as a Senior Managing Director at the boutique investigations consultancy K2 Integrity. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex, international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies, and international financial institutions (IFIs).</p> +<p>However, strategic-level developments – notably Russia’s willingness to re-engage with North Korea – also help to account for Pyongyang’s declining need for these assets. The economic benefits of Russia’s arms purchases and broader re-engagement could far surpass the meagre revenue that can be raised through the missions slated for closure. Concerningly, this shift – and North Korea’s changing diplomatic priorities – also reflects a gloomy outlook for the UN sanctions regime.</p> -<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime &amp; Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).</p>Olivia Allison and Gonzalo SaizEfforts to align third countries with sanctions against Russia will only succeed when the private networks facilitating circumvention are understood and countered.The Securitisation Of Energy2023-11-09T12:00:00+08:002023-11-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-securitisation-of-energy<p><em>Understanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security.</em></p> +<hr /> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Daniel Salisbury</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.</p>Daniel SalisburyPyongyang’s alleged decision to close around a quarter of its overseas missions reflects both the evolving sanctions-busting landscape and more concerning rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.“Sewage Of The Cold War”2023-11-21T12:00:00+08:002023-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sewage-of-the-cold-war<p><em>Although China’s views on NATO have fluctuated since the early days of the Cold War, Beijing’s recent statements on the alliance have sharpened.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This report argues that they amount to a “rhetorical attack” on the alliance’s legitimacy that can potentially undermine trust among its Asia-Pacific partners and, more broadly, confidence in Western ideas of collective security. The report offers recommendations for investments NATO should make in understanding, tracking, and countering Chinese narratives about the alliance.</em></p> -<p>This paper examines how Russia’s energy policy has interacted with its foreign and defence policies since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The key findings are:</p> +<h3 id="summary">Summary</h3> <ul> <li> - <p>Russia perceives any restriction of its access to and exploitation of oil and gas markets both within Russia and abroad as a serious security threat. Restriction could either be through international sanctions that prevent Russia from accessing deep-water oil deposits, or the international climate change agenda that calls for a reduction on oil and gas production.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>As a major oil and gas producer, Russia considers the hydrocarbons industry to be a key part of its political economy and therefore its national security. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s role as an energy provider – or sense of international responsibility to its clients – was thought to keep some of its behaviour in check, even as Russia had in the past wielded its energy supplies to extract political concessions from some of its former Soviet neighbours. Ultimately, Russia’s security goals in Ukraine overtook any of this responsibility, which has framed much of the debate around Russia’s future as a declining energy power in Europe.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russia’s understanding of energy security is bound up in the country’s sovereignty, and with strategic competition with other states over resources. Ensuring security of demand and continued access to resources are part of Russia’s national security framework and even its national identity.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The war has increased the urgency for Russia to seek out alternative alliances and structures with China and Iran. In recent years, Russia has established its own energy forums with partners such as Saudi Arabia and some African states – work which has become more pressing since the war began and Russia’s energy relations with the West have been significantly reduced.</p> + <p>Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Sino-NATO relations have oscillated between adversary and ally.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Russia claims that the West is seeking to undermine it through its dominance of energy resources, and that international forums, such as the UN, are prejudiced against Russia’s national interests. Russia also conflates energy with politicking, maintaining that Western efforts to cap its production prices or curtail nuclear energy use are part of a campaign to undermine Russian values and assert a neoliberal agenda.</p> + <p>Since 2019, Beijing’s communications on NATO have sharpened in ways that amount to a rhetorical attack on the alliance. This shift has coincided with intensified Sino-US competition, Chinese concerns about multilateral security associations in Asia, and closer Sino-Russia relations.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The war has intensified Moscow’s need to identify new export destinations, with rail and pipeline networks that were previously in train accelerated. But to do so, particularly towards the Indo-Pacific region, Russia must link up its oil and gas reserves with maritime and rail infrastructure. This includes new terminals along the Northern Sea Route that can process liquefied natural gas, coal and oil and updating port infrastructure, as well as new ice-class vessels for exports.</p> + <p>China’s recent critiques of NATO contend that the organization is an obsolete artifact of the Cold War and a belligerent force that undermines regional peace and stability. China’s rhetoric also portrays NATO’s partnerships as an illegitimate intrusion into the Asia-Pacific region.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Investments in the North–South Corridor via Iran have also gained traction since the war began, particularly to export oil and deliver on some of the practical elements of Russia’s foreign policy, by bringing Iran and India closer to its economic network. Russia has also identified specific development zones in the Arctic that are rich in hydrocarbons or have access to the sea.</p> + <p>Although the audience for China’s narrative on NATO may be as much domestic as foreign, if the message is not countered, it could undermine the alliance’s efforts to sustain and develop Indo-Pacific partnerships and erode support for alliances with the United States more generally.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Prior to the war, Gazprom’s monopoly in Europe had been unchallenged, but this is not the case in Asia, where it faces rival Novatek – this infighting may impact Russia’s ability to expand its energy plans in China. The Power of Siberia 2 pipeline contract with China, as yet to be signed, would give Gazprom a future role in Asia.</p> + <p>NATO should, therefore, make proportionate investments to equip itself with mechanisms for monitoring, analyzing, and responding to China’s rhetorical attacks.</p> </li> +</ul> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>Relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and NATO — the military alliance of 31 European and North American nations initially formed to defend against Soviet aggression — have dropped to their lowest point since the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Simultaneously, the combination of intensified Sino-US competition, increased NATO attention to the PRC, Chinese concerns about multilateral security associations in Asia, and closer Sino-Russia relations have made Chinese attitudes toward NATO more relevant than ever. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the PRC’s communications on NATO have sharpened in ways that amount to a rhetorical attack on the alliance’s legitimacy. And with this rhetoric becoming increasingly hostile, it has the potential to undermine NATO partnerships and relationships not just in the Euro-Atlantic but also in the Indo-Pacific. This suggests a greater need to invest in countering negative narratives to the extent that they can potentially hurt the alliance — with priority given to specific messages and audiences and to relationships with partners in the Asia-Pacific region.</p> + +<p>The PRC’s ambitions and policies — particularly those viewed as “challenges” to the interests, security, and values of the NATO alliance in its 2022 Strategic Concept — are attracting much attention. But what the PRC says about NATO also deserves thoughtful consideration. Although Sino-NATO relations have fluctuated, alternating between opposition and alignment since early in the Cold War, Beijing’s harsh narratives on NATO have recently become more pronounced. On the eve of the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, an editorial in the Global Times, a daily tabloid affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, used vivid language to warn against closer NATO relations with Asia-Pacific partners: “It’s an extremely unwise choice for any Asia-Pacific country and is bound to damage that country’s strategic trust with China, inevitably leading to consequences. . . . The sewage of the Cold War cannot be allowed to flow into the Pacific Ocean.”</p> + +<p>NATO should seek to understand, track, and counter such PRC narratives about the alliance for several reasons: first, these narratives can damage perceptions of NATO by its members and its partners, especially Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea (also known informally as the Asia-Pacific Four, or AP4); second, undermining trust in NATO is a proxy for undermining the principles of collective self-defense and collective security that underpin international security more widely; and third, for the United States and its bilateral allies in the Asia-Pacific region, attacks on NATO are an indirect way of attacking any alliance with the United States.</p> + +<p>This report examines the PRC’s attitudes toward NATO over time, with a focus on the 2020–2021 period following the debut of NATO’s official statements on the PRC and the periods following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the release of NATO’s Strategic Concept (which articulates a new position on China). The report reviews Chinese perceptions of NATO and identifies the main themes of contemporary Chinese discourse on the alliance. It then considers the intended audiences of PRC hostile narratives before turning to the strengths and vulnerabilities of NATO vis-à-vis these narratives. The report concludes with practical recommendations for the alliance.</p> + +<h3 id="sino-nato-relations-over-time">Sino-NATO Relations over Time</h3> + +<p>Since 1949, Sino-NATO relations have fluctuated “between adversary to ally and back again.” Five distinct periods can be identified. After the initial period of early Cold War antipathy, a second period, beginning in 1972, saw China making “an active diplomatic effort to persuade Western European leaders to strengthen NATO” as a way of drawing Soviet strength away from its borders.</p> + +<p>However, the third period saw NATO cast in a new and dangerous light when a NATO bomb struck China’s embassy in Belgrade during the air campaign of the 1999 Kosovo war, resulting in the deaths of three Chinese nationals. The unfortunate accident had a strong, formative effect on the reputation of NATO in China that persists to this day. Official registration of protest over the bombing was accompanied by state-sanctioned expressions of anger against NATO — involving days of street demonstrations in several major Chinese cities — and the issuance of a rare government statement. On the day of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a PRC foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters that “NATO still owes the Chinese people a debt of blood.”</p> + +<p>The fourth period, following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and NATO’s mission to Afghanistan, was relatively benign despite the PRC’s opposition to NATO expansion and the Balkan interventions. The Afghanistan mission brought NATO to China’s borders, yet Beijing appeared to view the mission positively, whether out of genuine optimism that it would address the threat of Islamist terrorism or as a way of casting some legitimacy on its own counter-terrorism policies in its far western regions. In testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in April 2012, China expert Christina Lin pointed to a series of positive exchanges:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>In 2002, the Chinese ambassador in Brussels visited NATO headquarters with then SecGen Lord Robertson and explored ways for engagements, particularly in Afghanistan. . . . Following the visit of the Director General of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to NATO Headquarters in 2007, the political dialogue on [the] senior staff level [took] place on a rather regular basis. In May 2007, NATO Military Committee Chairman General Ray Henault expressed that in addition to political relations, NATO wants to establish direct ‘military-to-military’ relations with Chinese armed forces and shake off the embassy-bombing shadow.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>In 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy began cooperating with NATO navies on counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. And in 2011, the Global Times — known for its hawkish views on Chinese foreign policy — published a positive opinion piece about cooperation between NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.</p> + +<p>The fifth (and current) period of Sino-NATO relations began in 2019. During this period, Beijing’s attitude toward NATO seems to have been formed in considerable part by the deterioration in both US-China and Europe-China relations over the preceding few years. The first time the significance of China’s rise appeared in an official NATO statement was in December 2019; the London Declaration, issued at the NATO Leaders Meeting, stated that Beijing’s “growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges.” Almost a year later, a report entitled “NATO 2030: United for a New Era,” produced by an independent panel of experts appointed by the NATO secretary general, identified China as a “systemic rival” and recommended that NATO “continue efforts to build resilience and counter cyber attacks and disinformation that originate in China.” At their June 2021 summit meeting in Brussels, alliance leaders reiterated and expanded on earlier statements: “China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance. . . . China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”</p> + +<p>Perhaps the biggest perceived affront to China has been its treatment in NATO’s Strategic Concept, a long-term strategy and planning document that was revised significantly in 2022 from its previous 2010 version. The document more clearly puts China and NATO in opposing positions: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our [NATO’s] interests, security and values.” The PRC is mainly covered in paragraphs 13 and 14. Paragraph 13 defines the problem:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC’s malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>Paragraph 14 lists the actions NATO plans to take:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests. We will work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies. We will boost our shared awareness, enhance our resilience and preparedness, and protect against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>All of this said, regardless of the period of relations, Chinese and NATO interests have at times aligned, proving that the relationship is not inherently antagonistic. Nor have China and NATO necessarily paid significant attention to one another over time. Aside from the Belgrade bombing, as Filip Šebok and Richard Q. Turcsányi noted in a paper for the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, NATO hardly featured in the PRC’s official communications until recently: “There were only 18 direct mentions of NATO in regular press conferences of [the] Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2002 and 2020 — compared to 21 mentions of the Czech Republic, over 200 of Germany, and almost 5,000 of the US.”</p> + +<h3 id="chinas-perceptions-and-discourse">China’s Perceptions and Discourse</h3> + +<p>Before analyzing what China has been saying about NATO in the last several years, it is worth exploring some of the perceptions behind Beijing’s rhetoric. According to a summary of a 2021 dialogue organized by the US-based Center for Strategic Decision Research and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (closely affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), Chinese perceptions could be roughly summarized as follows:</p> + +<ul> <li> - <p>Russia tends to use international platforms like the UN to further its own national interests or ensure it has a stake in the conversation, rather than in pursuit of a common cause. Since the war began, Russia’s ability to interact with other (especially Western) states has been restricted.</p> + <p>NATO is a Cold War organization that needs a threat to survive, and China is a convenient scapegoat. China’s military modernization gives NATO a pretext for higher military spending.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Since the war began, Russia and Saudi Arabia’s coordination through OPEC+ has been more pressing. Riyadh has not aligned itself with the Western consensus on Ukraine, nor has it introduced sanctions on Russia. But the war has caused a decline in global energy prices, and there are frictions between Russia and Saudi Arabia over Russia’s refusal to publish its oil export figures. Riyadh suspects that Moscow continues to export significant volumes of oil despite their price agreements, but the former has not criticised this and, since the war began, has invested in Russian companies like Gazprom.</p> + <p>The United States dominates NATO and seeks to use it to turn Europeans, who are politically divided and militarily uneven, against China and to transition NATO from a regional to a global alliance.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Russia is highly affected by climate change, but also banks on its status as a commodities producer to retain its international position. This inconsistency informs its strategic policymaking on the environment, as well as its behaviour in international forums related to climate change. Moscow often objects to international climate change efforts because it prioritises Russia’s national security, not the security implications that can stem from climate issues. While climate change can affect Russia’s national security, it is described as an issue that threatens Russia’s economic development, requiring technological or practical solutions, not adjustment to the extractive industries. Russia also views warming Arctic seas as more of an opportunity to improve access to shipping lanes than a crisis.</p> + <p>Western initiatives are nothing but attempts to prevent China’s rise in terms of strategic capability. The United States has been criticizing China and applying double standards on its development of new hypersonic missiles, intermediate missiles, stealth aircraft, battlefield robotics, and cyber and space weapons, even as the United States and its allies are developing the same capabilities.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Russia views the Western-led climate change movement as an agenda seeking to undermine Russia and its interests in the extractive industries. Moscow’s installing of former intelligence officials in posts concerned with environmental security highlights the crossover in the Kremlin’s mindset between the environment and national security.</p> + <p>The West’s claims of security vulnerabilities and Chinese state interference are invoked for protectionist reasons and to give Western companies an unfair market advantage.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Since the war, many environmental links between Russia and the West have been severed. Moreover, there is little international oversight of Russia’s major drilling projects or their environmental impact, and legislation that restricts ecological activism has been tightened. Most Western-led NGOs dedicated to the environment have been shut down.</p> + <p>The United States and its allies are violating principles of state sovereignty and non-interference by condemning China and imposing sanctions on it for its internal behavior in, for example, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Ultimately, even if the UK can decouple from Russian oil, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means Russia’s behaviour as a hydrocarbon superpower can still impact the UK’s energy security. Russia views external attempts to cap oil prices as a dangerous precedent that could be extended to other areas of the Russian economy and Russian values. This indicates that Moscow interprets international economic and pragmatic decisions as a direct attack on Russian sovereignty.</p> + <p>China’s rise, along with the emergence of other major powers, means that the Western-dominated multilateral system is obsolete and Western power will be reduced. Unwilling to accept this, the West has tried to revitalize the G-7 (an economic and political forum for advanced countries) by adding Australia, India, South Africa, and South Korea; and tries to use the Quad (a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and NATO global outreach to contain China’s legitimate rise. This effort is destabilizing global politics by dividing the world into new Cold War blocs.</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>These perceptions both underlie PRC discourse on NATO and reflect the broad thrust of PRC foreign and security policy — which essentially opposes a US-led order that appears bent on containing China and instead seeks a new world order that facilitates acceptance of and respect for China’s leadership status.</p> -<p>This paper analyses Russia’s energy policy and the way this interacts with the country’s foreign and defence policies. The paper is part of RUSI’s UK National Security and the Net Zero Transition project and is published alongside a paper that focuses on the links between Saudi Arabia’s energy policy and its foreign and security policy behaviour. Together, these two papers analyse how Russia and Saudi Arabia – which aside from the US are the world’s leading oil exporters – approach their roles as energy superpowers, how their energy-related decision-making has evolved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and how their foreign policies and conduct in international forums, including on climate change and other major global issues, will continue to have global implications.</p> +<h3 id="obsolescence-belligerence-illegitimacy">Obsolescence, Belligerence, Illegitimacy</h3> -<p>As oil and gas prices were already elevated in 2021 following the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia was able to exploit them in Europe in order to drive up prices before it invaded Ukraine. This returned the link between energy and geopolitics, and in particular the question of energy security, to the fore. The war has demonstrated that energy and geopolitics cannot be separated, and has increased the need to determine how major fossil fuel producers think about their international roles.</p> +<p>China’s underlying perceptions and declared foreign policy ambitions have coalesced in an overarching narrative that can be roughly summed up as follows: Although China is the future (ergo the West is the past), American primacy is threatened by China’s inevitable rise, and so the United States uses all means at its disposal — including alliances like NATO — to hype a China threat and contain China’s rise. In determining how to respond to this broad narrative, it helps to break down the elements of China’s messaging and discourse on NATO into three main categories: obsolescence, belligerence, and illegitimacy.</p> -<p>While there are many definitions of energy security, for the purposes of this paper, energy security of states is considered to be both a practical issue of supply access and pricing, and a geopolitical issue that relates to foreign policy behaviour in the energy sector. For states that are net importers of energy, as the UK and most of Europe are, security of oil and gas supply is often equated with diversification. This includes diversification away from fossil fuels, an increasingly potent driver of energy policy across Europe. But while hydrocarbons are required to generate electricity and to fuel industries, diversification of supply also means securing access to oil and gas from sufficiently diverse sources that no single disruption leads to sudden shortages or price disruption.</p> +<h4 id="obsolescence-cold-war-thinking">OBSOLESCENCE: COLD WAR THINKING</h4> -<p>Before the Ukraine war, some European states relied, to varying degrees, on imports from Russia, one of the world’s top oil and gas producers and exporters. The war has prompted many European states to reduce and ideally end imports from Russia by 2027 in order to deprive Moscow of revenue and reduce Russia’s leverage over Europe. While the EU has made some progress on this, reductions in gas volumes in particular were also due in part to the Kremlin’s actions, including Moscow’s suspension of gas via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, and a March 2022 presidential decree that demanded payment for gas in roubles from countries involved in the EU’s “unfriendly actions” towards Russia.</p> +<p>The PRC’s narrative of Western decline serves to support the domestic legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and gain external acceptance for China’s overseas power projection. In Beijing’s view, NATO is an emblem of Western decline and is attached to outmoded concepts and institutions, including, for example, so-called Cold War thinking. As Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian put it in April 2022, “NATO was born out of the Cold War and should have long become a past tense.” This interweaving of NATO with established PRC foreign policy narratives became even more evident in the remarks made by China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun. At a UN Security Council briefing on Ukraine in June 2022, Zhang stated, “The Cold War ended a long time ago, It is necessary for NATO to reconsider its own positioning and its responsibilities, completely abandon the Cold-War mentality that is based on bloc confrontation, and strive to build a balanced, effective, and sustainable European security framework in line with the principle of indivisible security.”</p> -<p>The UK has been comparatively less affected by this dynamic; in 2021, only 9% of the UK’s oil and 4% of its gas imports came from Russia, and by January 2023 this had been brought to zero. But while replacing Russian supply was not the UK’s key concern, due to its reliance on natural gas, it was hit just as hard as its European partners by the surge in oil and gas prices sparked by the war. The UK is exposed not just to disruptions to the flows of the oil and gas that it imports directly, but also to the global flows of hydrocarbons.</p> +<p>Beijing views obsolete thinking as afflicting NATO’s whole conceptual mindset, which, in turn, shapes its approach to China. In remarks in June 2022, the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the European Union stated that “NATO’s so-called Strategic Concept, filled with Cold war thinking and ideological bias, is maliciously attacking and smearing China. We firmly oppose it.”</p> -<p>As the war continues into its second year, although oil prices have somewhat stabilised, there has been a renewed focus by the West on the behaviour of the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), most notably Saudi Arabia, and a group of major producers, including Russia, that have aligned their oil policies with those of OPEC since 2016 through the OPEC+ framework. Every decision by the grouping to adjust production quotas, especially the significant cuts announced in October 2022 and June 2023, has been scrutinised by Western analysts for its economic and political motives.</p> +<p>These examples suggest that China objects to NATO’s perceived embodiment of two institutional and structural aspects of Cold War thinking: bloc formation and confrontation. The theme of illegitimate collective defense alliances and minilaterals (small groups of countries collaborating to achieve shared goals) is connected to the broader Chinese discourse on resisting attempts to contain the PRC. Beijing’s statements on the international order emphasize the centrality of the UN Security Council and imply that multilateral alliances based on the right of collective self-defense somehow lack legitimacy, despite the fact that Article 51 of the UN charter specifically validates the right of collective defense. As noted by the spokesperson of China’s mission to the EU, “NATO claims itself to be a defensive organization that upholds the rules-based international order, but it has bypassed the UN Security Council and waged wars against sovereign states, creating huge casualties and leaving tens of millions displaced.”</p> -<p>Moreover, the serious fracturing of the relationship between Russia and the West as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has meant that Russia’s behaviour as a major hydrocarbon producer, both in its export dealings and more generally in international forums for discussing these issues, has been particularly difficult to engage with. This is particularly the case where, as in Russia, governments control the energy industry. As a major emitter of greenhouse gases, Russia’s behaviour around climate change issues adds another dimension to this.</p> +<p>Also implying a Western attachment to obsolete thinking, the PRC has talked of a needed evolution of security concepts from “absolute” security to “indivisible” security. In April 2022, General Secretary Xi Jinping highlighted the concept of indivisible security — the idea that no country should strengthen its own security at the expense of others — as a distinguishing feature in his proposed Global Security Initiative: “We should uphold the principle of indivisibility of security, build a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture, and oppose the building of national security on the basis of insecurity in other countries.” According to the official concept paper published in February 2023, the initiative “aims to eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, encourage joint international efforts to bring more stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era, and promote durable peace and development in the world.”</p> -<p>Given the importance of understanding how major producers behave, this paper examines how Russia sees and exercises the international roles afforded to it by its energy resources. The paper analyses three key issues: how hydrocarbons and their export relate to Russia’s perceptions of itself and its place in the world; the extent to which Russia’s energy policies are securitised and how they are linked to Russia’s domestic and foreign policies; and how Russia relates its status as a hydrocarbon exporter to notions of environmental security and international climate action efforts. As the paper will show, Russian definitions and understanding of environmental security and where this presents a national security threat widely diverge from Western understandings. Moscow tends to frame risks stemming from climate change, such as flooding, as something to be countered by technological or financial solutions, rather than addressing core issues, such as Russia’s continued extraction of hydrocarbons, as contributions to the initial problem.</p> +<p>Beijing is essentially touting a superior security order that will supersede the current, US-led order. Again, China asserts that, as an institution founded on collective defense, NATO has not been heeding the principle underlying the concept of indivisible security. (The Kremlin, incidentally, has also promoted this principle in the context of earlier European security cooperation agreements.) In remarks made on separate occasions, spokesperson Zhao and UN ambassador Zhang have issued the following warnings:</p> -<p>Understanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is therefore essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security, and where some of Moscow’s red lines might be.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>NATO must immediately . . . renounce its blind faith in military might and misguided practice of seeking absolute security, halt the dangerous attempt to destabilize Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and act in the interest of security and stability in Europe and beyond.</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="methodology-and-structure">Methodology and Structure</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>The Ukraine crisis has once again sounded alarm for the world. Security is indivisible. A blind faith in the position of strength, the expansion of military alliance, and the pursuit of one’s own security at the expense of the insecurity of other countries will inevitably lead to security dilemmas.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The paper is divided into three chapters. The first focuses on Russia’s foreign policy decision-making in energy since it invaded Ukraine, and some of the factional disagreements between powerful energy companies which impact the Kremlin’s ability to put forth a coherent energy strategy. The second chapter discusses Russia’s engagement in OPEC+, highlighting its marriage of convenience with Saudi Arabia around oil prices and the future trajectory of this bilateral cooperation. The third chapter examines Russia’s approach to environmental security and discusses the divergences of opinion between Russia and the West over how to approach the threat of climate change.</p> +<p>The wider global economic disruption to energy, food, and fertilizer prices resulting from Russia’s war against Ukraine created another opportunity for the PRC to portray “United States-led Western countries” (in other words, NATO members) as irresponsible in pursuing their own security at the expense of others. A June 2022 article in the China Daily, owned by the Chinese Communist Party, contended that “United States-led Western countries were more busy sending shipments of lethal weapons to Ukraine and have imposed sanctions on Russia, risking the prolonged continuation of the conflict but leaving the world to foot the bill. Food prices have reached an all-time high, as Russian and Ukrainian grain exports are hindered by port disruptions and Western sanctions.”</p> -<p>This paper is based on a review of open-source journals, books and public statements from officials in Russia, using local-language sources where possible, to piece together Russia’s current and historical views on energy security, focusing on the 2022 invasion but also grounding the analysis in recent historical literature. In addition, the paper offers a targeted review of Russia’s energy strategies and other important official documents such as its national security and Arctic strategies, as well as documents that govern its environmental policies and its engagement with the hydrocarbons industry, in order to understand better the gaps between Russia’s official foreign policy documents and its actions.</p> +<p>In response to consolidation of the European security order around NATO membership, Beijing seems intent on undermining alliance solidarity by implying that membership or partnership with NATO is somehow incompatible with good relations with the PRC. In a statement following the announcement of Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership, spokesperson Zhao hinted at the damage NATO membership can cause countries’ bilateral relations with the PRC: “Finland’s application to NATO will bring new factor to bilateral ties with China.”</p> -<h3 id="i-russia-reimagining-the-globe">I. Russia: Reimagining the Globe</h3> +<h4 id="belligerence-stirring-up-trouble">BELLIGERENCE: STIRRING UP TROUBLE</h4> -<p>For Russia, its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the impact of that invasion on global prices have accelerated the competition between it and the West over traditional oil and gas markets, a process that has been under way for more than a decade. It is less the changing oil prices themselves and more the potential restriction of Russia’s access to and exploitation of these markets – both domestically within Russia and abroad, variously through instruments such as international sanctions that prevent Russia from accessing deep-water oil deposits, or the international climate change agenda that calls for a reduction in oil and gas production – that Russia views as a serious security threat. This securitisation of energy policies is the lens through which Russia’s own energy policymaking is seen from Moscow.</p> +<p>In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Sino-Russian rapprochement began to change NATO’s attitude toward the PRC; at the same time, Beijing’s and Moscow’s narratives about NATO began to converge. On February 4, 2022, in a joint statement released when President Vladimir Putin was visiting Beijing, China and Russia signaled their opposition to further NATO expansion. Over the summer of 2022, the PRC’s messaging about the war emphasized elements of its critical stance toward NATO; moreover, its messages aligned with the Russian narrative that Washington was “the initiator and main instigator of the Ukrainian crisis.”</p> -<p>Russia is a major oil and gas producer, with its oil output in 2021 making up 14% of the world’s total supply. In 2021, its revenues from oil and natural gas made up 45% of its annual budget. Its energy companies are also major employers within Russia, supporting the livelihoods of over two million people, and the importance of these industries is enshrined in Russian law. According to a 2008 law, key industries such as defence and oil and gas are considered by the Kremlin to be “strategic sectors” – cornerstones of the economy upon which Russia’s political economy and therefore its national security rests. Foreign investment in these sectors is heavily restricted, extra state scrutiny is exerted over them, and they are prioritised at the expense of other, less lucrative sectors such as healthcare and education.</p> +<p>In late June, inclusion of the AP4 countries in the NATO summit in Madrid prompted the PRC to portray the alliance as a source of danger for Asian security and as evidence of a developing Asian NATO. At a UN Security Council briefing on June 28, Zhang stated, “We firmly oppose certain elements clamoring for NATO’s involvement in the Asia Pacific, or an Asia Pacific version of NATO on the back of military alliances. The long-outdated Cold War script must never be re-enacted in the Asia Pacific. The kind of turmoil and conflict that are affecting parts of the world must not be allowed to happen in the Asia Pacific.”</p> -<p>Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Western view of Russia’s role as an energy provider was a rather paradoxical mixture of business pragmatism and political interventionism. Before the 2022 invasion, Russia’s status as a major petro-state and its consequent sense of responsibility to its clients, particularly in Europe, were viewed by some Western analysts as one of the guarantors that could keep Russia’s international behaviour in check – but there was also broad acknowledgement that Russia was capable of and had used its supplies to extract political concessions from former Soviet neighbours such as Georgia (in 2006) and Ukraine (in 2009). In the end, Russia’s security goals in Ukraine overtook any desire for Russia to cast itself as a reliable energy supplier, and this has framed much of the current debate around Russia’s future as a declining energy power in Europe. However, what this has overlooked from a policy (rather than an energy) perspective is that for Moscow, energy supply is only part of the security picture.</p> +<p>In a related statement, the PRC highlighted the long peace the Asia-Pacific region has experienced since the end of the Indo-China conflicts in the late 1970s and implied that Asian problems should be addressed by Asian actors. At a press conference on June 30, Zhao asserted, “The Asia-Pacific is one of the most peaceful and stable regions in the world and a promising land for cooperation and development. Any attempt to undermine its peace and stability and sabotage regional solidarity and cooperation will be unanimously rejected by the people in China and the rest of the Asia-Pacific.”</p> -<h4 id="moscows-securitisation-of-energy--ensuring-russian-sovereignty">Moscow’s Securitisation of Energy – Ensuring Russian Sovereignty</h4> +<p>By contrasting NATO’s supposed inherently aggressive character (and associating that with insecurity in Europe) with the idealized peace of Asia, China was subtly reinforcing its centrality in the region and making the case that NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific represents a threat to regional security. Also in late June, the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the EU said, “The Strategic Concept claims that other countries pose challenges, but it is NATO that is creating problems around the world. . . . Who’s challenging global security and undermining world peace? Are there any wars or conflicts over the years where NATO is not involved?”</p> -<p>Most states view energy security as a serious issue; many governments have influence over their nations’ energy sectors and in a lot of these, the energy sector tends to be dominated by large projects and the relatively small number of companies controlling them. What makes Russia’s approach to energy security particularly Russian is the way that energy and the country’s very sovereignty are bound up with strategic competition with other countries over resources.</p> +<h4 id="illegitimacy-bloc-formation-and-intrusion">ILLEGITIMACY: BLOC FORMATION AND INTRUSION</h4> -<p>Security of demand and continued access to oil and gas markets are key tenets of Russia’s national security framework, and of its national identity. Moscow’s perception of itself as a great power is largely based on a combination of its military might, its nuclear capabilities and its continued ability to produce and export significant volumes of natural resources. Although President Putin has not specifically referred to Russia as an “energy superpower”, it is clear Moscow views its prominence on the international stage and its ability (or as Moscow sees it, its right) to have a significant stake in foreign affairs as bound up with its natural resource wealth.</p> +<p>China’s main attack on NATO’s legitimacy is based on structural and geographic objections. The structural critique implies that blocs or even collective security alliances are inherently contrary to a just, democratic, and stable international order. The geographic critique implies that NATO is overstepping its bounds and entering a region where it has no right to be. Both lines are sometimes used in combination, as the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the EU did when saying, “NATO claims that its defense zone will not go beyond the North Atlantic, but it has flexed its muscle in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years and sought to stir up bloc confrontation here, as it has done in Europe.”</p> -<p>From the Kremlin’s perspective, attempts to stymie Russia’s continued role as a natural resource producer – be it through sanctions or competition with other states over access to resources in the Arctic – are all a serious threat to Russia’s existence. Sanctions introduced on Russia’s hydrocarbons industry by Europe, the US and other allies since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 tended to target technology related to Arctic, deep-water exploration and onshore tight oil extraction, but ultimately they had little impact on Russia’s onshore deposits in western and eastern Siberia, which make up the bulk of its production in the short term.</p> +<p>NATO’s current interest in the Indo-Pacific makes it a convenient emblem of a trend emerging in the Asian security structure that worries China: defense minilateralism. Until recently, the US-led security order in the region took a hub-and-spoke form, with an array of bilateral alliances connecting the United States to Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. However, these alliances have started to be overlaid with a latticework of new minilateral structures, some linking groups of Asian nations and others linking Asian, European, and North American countries. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to a speech by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in June 2022 with the following statement:</p> -<p>Against this backdrop, and particularly since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has embarked on a strategic and practical reorientation of both its trade and foreign policy alliances. This reorientation sees Russia reimagining the globe and Moscow’s place within it.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The US administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is self-contradictory: the US claims to promote the region’s “freedom and openness” as its goal, while in reality co-opting with allies to forge a “five-four-three-two-one” formation made up of the Five Eyes, the Quad, AUKUS, bilateral alliances and IPEF, forming exclusive “small circles” and forcing countries in the region to take sides. AUKUS helps Australia build nuclear-powered submarines and develops hypersonic weapons, pushing up the risk for a regional arms race. Under the pretext of fighting illegal fishing and keeping supply chains resilient, the Quad has vigorously pursued military cooperation and intelligence sharing. The US has also encouraged NATO’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific. These are all attempts to materialize an “Asia-Pacific version of NATO” and promote “integrated deterrence” against China.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Russia’s latest foreign policy strategy – its first major policy document published since the war began – envisages Russia and its allies China and India united at the centre of a grand Greater Eurasian Partnership, pitted against the hegemonic (and allegedly declining) West. This perception frames Moscow as being at the heart of decision-making, with nascent relationships with middle powers such as Iran forming an important economic basis of the alliance. Although much has been made of the significant gap between Russia’s strategic planning and its practical ability to deliver on these goals, what this perception does show is Russia’s intention to restructure the globe on its own terms and to place Moscow at the hub of global decision-making. This is important, because it clearly delineates who and what Russia sees as a threat to its sovereignty. Its foreign policy document makes clear that it respects the sovereignty of powers such as India and China, while remaining mistrustful of and distant from the so-called “Anglo-Saxon world”, a derisive and archaic term that Moscow uses to refer to the UK and some other European states. However, it is not clear that China and India buy into Moscow’s version of the world, especially with framings that conceptualise Russia as the driver and leader of their international positions.</p> +<p>The PRC’s lumping together of other groupings and NATO seems aimed at delegitimizing not just collective security in the strict sense but any association of defense cooperation or collaboration, in particular those led by or including the United States. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release from February 2023 on the potential of political settlement of the Ukraine crisis asserted that “the security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs.” Beijing has even claimed that the United States wants to use NATO for “harming Europe.” The implication is that countries that ally with the United States are somehow either vassals or allowing themselves to be brainwashed or both. Perhaps because China perceives a lack of agency among smaller states, Beijing presumes what it sees as its own regional leadership would be an acceptable alternative to so-called US hegemony.</p> -<p>Russia’s foreign policy approach pivots its vision towards a new alliance arrayed directly against the “collective West” (in Russia’s mindset, mostly made up of the EU, NATO member states and the US), which is depicted as a failed example of imposed democracy. This clash of civilisations that Russia is articulating is laying the groundwork for serious frictions between the West, Russia and the rest of Russia’s allies, particularly over energy and access to available resources.</p> +<p>The PRC insinuates geographic illegitimacy by arguing that an organization based on North Atlantic security is an alien intruder in the Asian region. The fact that the PRC held military exercises alongside Russia in the Euro-Atlantic in recent years, in the Mediterranean in 2015, and the Baltic region in 2017 has not prevented Beijing from criticizing NATO for “inserting itself” in Asia-Pacific affairs. As Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin asserted, “NATO, a military organisation in the North Atlantic, has in recent years come to the Asia-Pacific region to throw its weight around and stir up conflicts. . . . NATO has messed up Europe. Is it now trying to mess up the Asia-Pacific and even the world?”</p> -<p>The war has also exacerbated a growing tendency on the part of Russia to seek out alternative structures such as BRICS – an economic grouping consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in order to promote its way of looking at the world. In this vein, since 2017, Russia has established its own energy forums with trusted partners – including Saudi Arabia and many African states – with the aim of reframing energy issues on its own terms. One such forum, in 2022, was notable for its assertion that Europe’s longstanding policy of moving away from Russian gas was a failed attempt to weaken Russia, linked to the energy crisis – with no acknowledgement of Russia’s own role in that crisis.</p> +<p>The warning is not just directed at NATO itself, but also at NATO’s partners and others in the region. The Global Times editorial published just before NATO leaders met in Madrid in July 2022 made this abundantly clear. In addition to warning that “catering to NATO’s Asia-Pacificization is tantamount to inviting wolves into the house,” the editorial declared that doing so was “bound to damage [countries’] strategic trust with China.”</p> -<p>Russia’s perception is that the West is seeking to undermine Russia through its dominance of energy resources, and that international forums such as the UN Security Council are prejudiced against Russia and its national interests. There is also a widespread belief among the Kremlin leadership that certain efforts by the West – for example, to cap oil production prices or curtail the use of nuclear energy, or for the US to deliver gas to Europe in order to replace Russia – are part of an attempt to undermine Russian traditional values and exert a neoliberal political agenda. Moscow’s understanding of the West’s actions in the energy sector has been framed in increasingly negative terms over the past decade, reflecting not only the highly securitised way in which Moscow views any external intervention in what it perceives to be its energy affairs, but also its own misconceptions about the West. It also reflects that Moscow has little concept of the importance of climate change issues in shaping global energy policies and prefers to frame climate change as a Western conspiracy designed to undermine Russia’s interests.</p> +<p>Beijing’s narrative logic — which connects interference by non-Asians in regional security with the deliberate stirring up of tensions and propensity for war — reached its high point in the implication of an Asian NATO: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, “The US pushes NATO to insert itself in Asia-Pacific affairs, fan the ‘China threat’ narrative in the bloc’s new strategic concept, and include in its Madrid Summit such US allies in the Asia-Pacific as Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, in a bid to build an ‘Asia-Pacific version of NATO,’ which would disrupt security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” The use of scare quotes around “Asia-Pacific version of NATO” serves not only to cast doubt on the idea itself but also to give a misleading impression as to its origin. Neither NATO nor the United States has expressed an ambition to create an Asian NATO; in fact, they have made many statements to the contrary, clearly indicating that no such move is desired or intended. The idea of an Asian NATO is almost exclusively one that emanates, unconsciously or by design, from Chinese discourse.</p> -<p>While many of these foreign policy relationships were in train before the war, Russia’s invasion has accelerated Moscow’s need to identify new energy export destinations and to reduce its reliance on imported foreign technology. Although Russia’s so-called “pivot to the East” has already been a long-term trend for at least the past decade, with some rail and pipeline infrastructure build to support it, the programme has recently been accelerated because Russia has few other options. To do this, however, Russia must link up its oil and gas reserves with its maritime and rail infrastructure in order to reorientate its export structures and maintain its own energy security. Whether realistic or not, Putin maintained in mid-2022 that by 2025, Russia intends for 80% of its energy industry’s equipment to be domestically manufactured, to ensure that oil production remains high and to reduce external sanctions risks.</p> +<h3 id="chinas-audiences">China’s Audiences</h3> -<p>Some of these plans for domestic reliance, and new ways of seeing the globe, are evident from Russia’s other strategic planning documents that govern the energy sector, some of which were written before the war.</p> +<p>Estimating the danger that PRC narratives pose to NATO requires some understanding of the target audiences. This section identifies audiences from Beijing’s likely perspective, assesses the effects on these audiences from NATO’s likely perspective, and weighs the importance of these effects.</p> -<h4 id="moscows-shifting-self-perception">Moscow’s Shifting Self-Perception</h4> +<h4 id="speaking-to-those-at-home-and-abroad">SPEAKING TO THOSE AT HOME AND ABROAD</h4> -<p>This shift in Moscow’s approach to energy security can be seen from two of the most important documents that govern the country’s energy sector: its Energy Strategy (ES) and its National Security Strategy (NSS).</p> +<p>The wider world is not necessarily the PRC’s primary audience. Research suggests that the domestic audience is more important for China. As Šebok and Turcsányi stated in their NATO background paper, “Chinese actors try to follow its leaders’ instructions and wishes, and the Party overall is motivated by a desire to increase legitimacy vis-à-vis the Chinese domestic audience. These factors are increasingly contributing to the uncompromising posture of Chinese diplomacy abroad.” This is consistent with the larger pattern of PRC security policy and resource allocation, which suggests that internal threats to state security and the position of the PRC are higher priorities than foreign threats to the country. The message that outside powers are containing China and ganging up to prevent its rise is becoming more salient as internal questions inevitably arise about how many of China’s economic difficulties might be the result of choices by the current Communist Party leadership.</p> -<p>Russia’s previous NSSs had only briefly mentioned energy in an environmental context, but in the 2021 strategy, the most recent, it is noted as something that permeates all aspects of security and Russian life: ensuring heating, as something to be protected alongside the defence industries and nuclear power plants, and as a major factor in Russia’s economic security. The increasing securitisation of energy means that Russia views external attempts at reform, as well as geopolitical competition over important energy markets, as a threat to Russia’s sovereignty, and will respond with what it views as appropriate force.</p> +<p>The second audience is likely China’s partners, particularly Russia. Despite the negative impact Russia’s war has had on PRC interests (including food price inflation and exposing double standards on questions of national sovereignty), Beijing remains reluctant to appear as an unreliable friend. For Russia, there are potential benefits from reciprocal support on issues where their interests align. Writing presciently two decades ago, international security expert Richard Weitz observed that</p> -<p>Russia’s current ES (ES-35) was approved in 2020 by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and runs up to 2035. Irrespective of its sparse mention in the NSS, Moscow has long viewed energy as a part of its national security, given the significant contribution of hydrocarbons to the federal budget, and the ES-35 makes it clear that any restriction on Russia’s production and sale of oil, gas and coal would be considered a security threat. The ES-35 is a strategy for safeguarding the oil and gas industry, and there is little attempt to diversify away from reliance on fossil fuels. Extraction and exports are priorities – the strategy aims to launch five major oil projects in the Arctic and 21 projects to extract raw materials such as gold and coal, alongside a significant increase in resource production from liquefied natural gas (LNG), which Russia aims to increase from 8.6 million tonnes in 2018 to 91 million tonnes by 2035. The boost to LNG production will necessitate an increase in infrastructure to support it, which the ES-35 outlines for the Russian Arctic and Far Eastern regions; these plans are supported and governed by other strategic documents.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>from Moscow’s perspective, periodically joining Beijing to denounce U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation elicits, at minimal cost, Chinese declarations against NATO enlargement and other Western policies the Russian government opposes. The appearance of an embryonic Russian-Chinese united front toward Japan also encourages Tokyo to moderate its claims of sovereignty over the Russian-occupied southern islands of the Kurile chain — Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri, known in Japan as the “Northern Territories.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>There have been three key developments since the war began that have demonstrated most clearly Russia’s changing view of itself and its place in the world as an energy producer and supplier. First, in August 2022, Prime Minister Mishustin approved an updated plan for the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a trade route that runs across the top of the Russian Arctic. Among other measures, the plans include construction of three new terminals to process LNG, oil and coal, as well as updating existing port infrastructure in the Far East to accommodate an increase in capacity. With plans to construct new ice-class vessels capable of traversing the NSR, not only is Russia preparing to increase the production and export of raw materials, but it is also attempting to better link up its land and maritime infrastructure, and is using this physical infrastructure to assert its dominance over the maritime domain.</p> +<p>Considering Japan has been, as Weitz notes, the target of three treaties between Moscow and Beijing (in 1896, 1924, and 1950), it must be discomforting for Tokyo to observe how “Chinese officials have expressed renewed support for Russia’s position on the Kurile issue.” Russia and Japan both claim sovereignty over the southern chain of the Kuril Islands. Moscow seized them during World War II, but Tokyo views them as Japan’s “Northern Territories.” Given Russia’s current weakened state due to the war with Ukraine and China’s support, Japan may be concerned about Chinese influence over any Moscow-Tokyo negotiations. Ironically, the more Sino-Russian relations align, the clearer it becomes for Asian and Euro-Atlantic partners that they share common security interests.</p> -<p>But as ever with many of Russia’s so-called “mega-projects”, there are few feasibility studies available to determine whether investing in these often-politicised projects will ultimately add value to the Russian economy, or even whether ports will be able to accept sufficient planned increases in traffic to make investments worthwhile. Indeed, following a South Korean feasibility study on expanding Russia’s small Far Eastern Slavyanka port in 2018, ultimately the project never came to pass and, since the war began, many foreign investment projects have been halted. Other considerations relating to major projects like these, such as environmental impacts or the effect on local Indigenous populations, are rarely taken into account.</p> +<p>The remaining international audience is probably next in terms of importance, particularly the broad segment sometimes described as the “Global South” or the “new nonaligned.” China claims moral leadership over this group of countries (albeit a role contested by India) and seeks to cultivate in this group a worldview that supports its strategic preferences on points such as countering American hegemony. Recent analysis suggests that Beijing invests heavily in messaging to African audiences and Arabic- and Spanish-speaking audiences, and the efforts have been relatively successful.</p> -<p>Second, as part of the development of the NSR, Russia is pursuing important infrastructure projects with allies such as Iran to resurrect the North–South Corridor. This is a railway development project linking Russia to the Indian Ocean via Iran that has been repeatedly shelved over the past two decades, but which has gained new impetus since the war. Plans include linking up ports along the NSR with land and sea routes south of Russia across the Caspian Sea to northern parts of Iran, a grandiose project of a kind that, as the history of Soviet-style planning has evidenced, rarely delivers on its objectives. While it is still incomplete and there are numerous political and infrastructure obstacles to overcome, the North–South Corridor is nevertheless part of Russia’s longer-term plan to export goods, including its oil, through these new land and sea networks. There is substantive investment in it already: as of 2022, Russia had committed $13 billion to different projects as part of the scheme. The North–South Corridor links up roads, rail and maritime infrastructure across multiple countries, and is an attempt by Moscow to deliver on some of the practical elements of its planned foreign policy, bringing countries such as India and Iran more closely into Russia’s economic network.</p> +<h4 id="where-chinas-audiences-and-natos-interests-intersect">WHERE CHINA’S AUDIENCES AND NATO’S INTERESTS INTERSECT</h4> -<p>A third key aspect of Russia’s reimagining of the globe that has been accelerated since the war began can be seen in its Arctic strategy up to 2035, and in Moscow’s changing perception of the NSR. Unlike its predecessors, the current strategy has identified specific development zones – which will receive greater Kremlin attention and financing – that are either rich in mineral resources such as hydrocarbons, or have access to the sea. This highlights Russia’s dual priorities of resource extraction and export in the Arctic, and is a further example of its strategic linkages between the land and maritime domains. Amid a downturn in relations with the West, over the past few years, there has been a noticeable shift in perceptions of the NSR within Russia, from viewing it as a potential international route capable of linking up Europe and Asia to instead seeing it as a useful route specifically for Russian companies to deliver energy resources to their own global markets. This refocusing on ensuring Russia’s dominance of sea routes is likely a precursor to further attempts to exert control over the maritime domain, with likely a concomitant increase in Russia’s projection of sovereignty over parts of the NSR that are considered international waters.</p> +<p>Although the PRC seems to be giving more attention recently to reaching audiences abroad, when it comes to Euro-Atlantic audiences, its current approach to communications does not appear to be doing much to prevent a general trend of rising suspicion and hostility toward China. From NATO’s perspective, this wider world — particularly those regions where NATO seeks to sustain or develop its global partnerships — is the more important audience. It is when those partnerships happen to be in the Asia-Pacific that PRC narratives seem to come into the most direct conflict with NATO interests. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao has warned, albeit in reference to European enlargement, that “we advise relevant countries to exercise caution when developing relations with NATO.”</p> -<h4 id="how-united-is-russias-energy-decision-making">How United is Russia’s Energy Decision-Making?</h4> +<p>This message may be aimed at impacting support for existing frameworks like the AP4, but also at impeding potentially wider NATO partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. Some commentators suggest that “what China is really addressing is Southeast Asia and the broader region, and ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] in particular.” India’s preference for nonalignment may not be conducive to implementing the recommendation of the NATO 2030 report that “NATO should begin internal discussions about a possible future partnership with India,” but sooner or later, a NATO more oriented to the challenge of China will naturally look to partner in some form with India.</p> + +<p>From NATO’s perspective, the international audiences most relevant are likely existing and potential Indo-Pacific partners, especially segments of their public and elite who are sympathetic to the anti-imperialistic, anti-Western, and anti-American elements of PRC narratives. These audiences’ opinions have the potential to limit or reduce the willingness of states in the region to work with NATO and its partners.</p> + +<p>The question of how much impact PRC narratives have had to date on regional attitudes toward NATO is hard to judge, not least because it is difficult to find relevant studies or tracking efforts. For NATO policymakers concerned about Asia-Pacific partnerships, this might be a blind spot worth looking into.</p> + +<h3 id="natos-vulnerability">NATO’s Vulnerability</h3> + +<p>An obvious NATO vulnerability with respect to PRC narratives is the diversity of views on China within the alliance. NATO allies were able to agree on language about China in the 2022 Strategic Concept, but as the 2022 US National Security Strategy acknowledges, “Allies and partners may have distinct perspectives on the PRC.” For instance, President Joe Biden has repeatedly voiced the United States’ commitment to defending Taiwan if it is attacked, but no other NATO ally has come close to saying this. Also, while the National Security Strategy stresses the need for supply chains that are less dependent on Chinese industry, German chancellor Olaf Scholz conveyed a different message by visiting China with a group of business leaders in November 2022 — the first G-7 leader to visit the country in three years.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, France has long expressed its wish “to champion a third path in the Indo-Pacific.” In September 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron said, “We must also assert Europe’s independence in the confrontation between China and the United States. . . . We are not willing to have a strategy of confrontation with China in the Indo-Pacific. . . . We do not believe that alliances that have been established to deal with certain opposing interests should extend to the Indo-Pacific.” (Like German chancellor Scholz, President Macron also visited China, in April 2023, with a contingent of business leaders.) The French National Strategic Review 2022 makes it clear that “France is working to strengthen the European pillar of the [NATO] Alliance in a pragmatic approach to its role, which rules out an extension to other geographical areas and in particular the Indo-Pacific.”</p> + +<p>In sum, these different viewpoints indicate a lack of cohesion on China policy among NATO members; and this makes it easier for the PRC to argue that the United States is driving allies into opposition with China against the will and interests of policymakers or sections of their societies who would naturally prefer cooperative relations with Beijing.</p> + +<p>It is unclear whether NATO gives adequate attention to the power of PRC narratives, despite the recommendation of the NATO 2030 report to “enhance its understanding of China’s capabilities, activities, and intentions that affect Euro-Atlantic security, with a clear-eyed understanding of risk, threat, and opportunity.” If NATO officials monitor Chinese discourse, the outputs are not publicized. Any desire to shape narratives in the region does not appear to be matched by funding or capabilities. NATO communication seems to be mostly aimed at internal audiences, with only limited material designed for and directed at Asian partner audiences, let alone Chinese audiences. Although the inclusion of China in NATO’s Strategic Concept is significant, some observers may have expected a more pointed or operationally focused treatment of the PRC. Indeed, little remains of the practical proposals put forward in the NATO 2030 report. This makes one question whether the alliance has been too slow to act on the recommendation that “NATO must devote much more time, political resources, and action to the security challenges posed by China.”</p> + +<p>NATO’s communication in response to the PRC’s actions toward existing or potential NATO partners is not always consistent. As the scholar Jeffrey Michaels noted, NATO has expressed support for partners like Japan and South Korea with regard to their troubles with China and North Korea, but NATO “remained silent” when soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army killed Indian soldiers on their Himalayan frontier in 2020. A NATO communications policy might consider how such instances offer an opportunity to more proactively counter PRC narratives.</p> + +<p>Understandably, at this moment, NATO investment in strategic communications concentrates on Russia. However, it does not appear that the balance of strategic communications resources has been adjusted to make progress on the NATO 2030 report’s recommendations related to the PRC and to respond to the increasing alignment between Moscow and Beijing.</p> + +<h3 id="limitations-of-chinas-narratives">Limitations of China’s Narratives</h3> + +<p>PRC narratives about NATO have their limitations and vulnerabilities, too. Despite the suggestion in the Global Times editorial that “Washington’s strategic will is increasingly coercing and is kidnapping NATO,” the lengthening list of problems in PRC-Europe relations — the causes for which are independent of the US-PRC relationship — make Beijing’s narrative that NATO is merely a tool of American control over Europe harder to sustain. This is evidenced by the demise of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. After the EU imposed sanctions on China over the human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region in China’s northwest in March 2021, Beijing imposed sanctions on EU bodies, European Parliament members, and even think tank researchers.</p> + +<p>The PRC’s barely muted backing of Putin’s war in Ukraine has only clarified the dangers of Chinese foreign policy for Europeans. Beijing’s moves to cement the Sino-Russian bond have a retro look that appears to contradict the taunt that America and NATO are the ones mired in a “Cold War mentality.” The more PRC messages attack NATO, the more they remind their audiences that Beijing is aligned with Moscow. Beijing and Moscow’s “without limits” friendship and the PRC’s consistent parroting of Kremlin talking points throughout the conflict have damaged China’s relations with many countries in the EU. And the PRC’s refusal to condemn the invasion has surely called into question its commitment to the principles of noninterference, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for national sovereignty.</p> + +<p>As Ukraine succeeded in pushing back against Russia’s “special military operation” later in 2022, Beijing’s closeness to Moscow exposed some of the flaws in the logic of China’s strategic communications on NATO. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s flagrant violation of national sovereignty may be a liability in terms of Beijing’s attempts to pose as a champion of peace and international law and UN Charter principles. As Putin switched strategy from regime change to forcible annexation, siding with Russia continued to put the PRC in an ever-diminishing minority in the UN General Assembly, as demonstrated by the October 12 vote on Russia’s annexation of parts of Ukraine — 143 members voted to condemn, 5 voted against, and 35 abstained (including China). If Russia’s war runs into further difficulties, Beijing’s embarrassment is likely to increase. Meanwhile, if NATO allies continue to appear to be alleviating the causes of worldwide repercussions of the war (price rises and shortages of food, fuel, and fertilizer), China will find it increasingly hard to convince the world that it can offer a superior model of security.</p> + +<h3 id="thinking-ahead-and-recommendations">Thinking Ahead and Recommendations</h3> -<p>Russia’s ability to use its position as a major oil and gas supplier on the international stage in exchange for influence, political concessions or access to other resources, or to project its regime survival, is often viewed – both by Moscow and the West – as its most effective foreign policy asset. But while Russia’s energy diplomacy tends to be viewed as a political tool it can wield at will, Russia’s energy strategy is dominated by often-competing approaches, which means that it has occasionally been forced into cooperation with foreign partners to ensure that it retains its position as global producer. As its energy relationship with the West declines, Russia will likely be obliged to cooperate with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, which does not necessarily put it in a position of strength.</p> +<p>NATO’s Strategic Concept expresses concern about the resilience of its allies against PRC actions that could undermine the coherence and strength of their societies, economies, and democratic institutions. NATO’s recent research suggests that the most efficient long-term strategy for dealing with PRC narratives “is to bolster the societal resilience of NATO member states and concentrate on shaping their own strategic narratives, which must transcend mere reactions to Chinese actions and offer alternative positive visions.” While the idea of offering alternative positive visions is sound, the alliance should look beyond the resilience of allies and take steps to better understand and, if necessary, neutralize sources of damage to the alliance inflicted via NATO’s partners and partnerships. The success of the Chinese narrative that the inherent right of collective self-defense and the organizations that uphold that right are illegitimate would represent not just a defeat for the principles NATO stands for but also a more general danger for global peace and stability.</p> -<p>There are multiple competing interests within Russia’s energy sector, with conflicts between the country’s official strategies and the vested interests of individuals and their coteries who are driving these industries forward, and this makes Russia’s energy approach inherently flawed.</p> +<p>In addition, NATO should pay close attention to the effects of PRC narratives on the perceptions of Chinese citizens. Failure to do so would be shortsighted. It is not self-evident that the perceptions of the Chinese audience are either accurately represented by the messages of the PRC or beyond the influence of outside actors, including NATO’s own strategic communications. Although Sino-NATO relations are at a low today, channels for influence are not entirely foreclosed. On September 22, 2022, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg discussed Russia’s war against Ukraine during talks with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. In February 2023, talks between NATO and PRC counterparts restarted after a pause that seemed to have been caused mainly by COVID-related restrictions. Chinese leadership can and will change eventually. NATO should take a long view and use the channels it still has with Chinese officials — and perhaps in a more limited way with ordinary Chinese people — to prepare for a day when the pendulum swings back in a positive direction.</p> -<p>Russia’s energy market is dominated by Gazprom (headed by Alexei Miller) and Rosneft (under Igor Sechin), two major oil and gas producers that are in turn technically overseen by the Kremlin. These industries are subject to a series of vested interests that include personal financial concerns, political demands and corrupt practices, all of which make it challenging to determine Russia’s true energy “strategy”. Gazprom is also a sprawling and influential conglomerate that includes financing (through Gazprombank), oil (Gazprom Neft is Russia’s fourth-largest oil company) and the media (Gazprom-Media owns several television channels). These companies employ a relatively large segment of Russian society, with just under half a million people as of 2019.</p> +<p>When it comes to external messages, PRC narratives smear NATO largely as a means of blackening the reputation of the United States and undermining strategically inconvenient norms like the inherent right to collective self-defense, including by China’s neighbors but also by countries in the Global South. The following recommendations therefore focus on that wider audience, where NATO has more immediate interests and influence.</p> -<p>Companies like Gazprom and Rosneft are under state control, but operationally, they both function without significant government interference, as long as this does not directly contradict stated Kremlin foreign or domestic policy goals. Rosneft and Gazprom have also successfully resisted some directives from the Kremlin – government plans in 2013 to try to privatise the oil and gas industry were met with strong pushback from Gazprom, Rosneft and others, such as major bank Sberbank, until they were eventually halted. That said, there is also an important degree of self-censorship within Gazprom and Rosneft, which still tend to act within the Kremlin’s agenda without being compelled to do so.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>NATO should commission a mechanism for analysis, with support from Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic specialists, to estimate the level of threat emanating from Russian and PRC strategic communications in order to guide the allocation of resources toward countering narratives that undermine or attack NATO in each case. The mechanism should dynamically track trends in PRC strategic communications related to NATO. The scope of tracking should go beyond covering the objectives and methods of PRC narratives by measuring the impact and results of PRC communications, based on differentiated audience analysis. Cooperation between the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and nascent counterparts in Asian partner nations may be leveraged to support such a mechanism. Collection of relevant information could be facilitated not just by NATO’s strategic partners in the region, such as the AP4, but also by other friends and partners whose populations are also important targets of influence (for example, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>After gaining a better understanding through the above measures, NATO should develop a strategic communications strategy that covers the Indo-Pacific, in consultation with the AP4 and other regional partners.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>NATO should explore efforts to influence opinion in China about the alliance.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Despite its relative operational autonomy, in a strategic sense, Gazprom has for years been at the heart of many of Russia’s foreign policy strategies, especially in Europe, where dependency on Russian gas was of political significance, via the (now defunct) Nord Stream pipelines. But while Gazprom’s monopoly has been relatively unchallenged in Europe, this is not so in Russia’s dealings with Asia. There, Gazprom’s greatest rival is the privately owned Novatek, which is absorbing significant amounts of market share amid Russia’s energy reorientation to China, through the Yamal LNG project. Novatek and Rosneft were permitted by the Russian government to participate in LNG exports in 2013, with the view that Gazprom’s monopoly was holding Russia back from becoming a major player in the gas sector.</p> +<p>While proposing a NATO communications policy for Asia is beyond the scope of this report, it is possible to suggest some messages that NATO should consider communicating to China and the region more broadly. Some are predicated on a determination of what the alliance wants to accomplish in the Indo-Pacific. The alliance’s objective in the region has not been clearly spelled out. Unlike the European Union and several Euro-Atlantic and Asian nations (for example, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, and Japan), NATO has only produced a two-paragraph China policy (in the 2022 Strategic Concept), not an Indo-Pacific strategy.</p> -<p>New trade deals with China such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, discussed amid much fanfare between Putin and President Xi Jinping in March 2023 (but as yet unsigned), give Gazprom a nascent role in Asia, although construction of that pipeline would not begin until 2024 at the earliest, and would not come online until 2029, even if it were to run to schedule. Since 2014, Rosneft has also sought to challenge Gazprom’s monopoly and gain access to the Power of Siberia pipeline, and has been inching into the gas market over the past decade by acquiring the rights to develop its own gas deposits in Russia. In 2023, Putin appeared to have agreed to Rosneft’s demand, maintaining that its gas reserves from its fields in Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk could be used to supply the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, and instructing Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak to act as arbiter between Gazprom and Rosneft as they worked out the details. As Europe moves away from its reliance on Russian energy, Gazprom may well be forced into ever-greater direct competition with other companies such as Novatek and Rosneft for market share.</p> +<p>Notwithstanding the lack of an overarching strategy document, one major theme of a NATO communications strategy for the Indo-Pacific would likely be upholding the inherent right of states to collective self-defense. This right is a particularly important element of protection for smaller states against aggressive hegemony. Notably, this right exists for all states, not just UN members. It is logical that larger or stronger states seeking to intimidate and bully smaller states would try to attack this right or criticize states that are attempting to activate it by forming alliances or looser political or security associations. Steps should be taken to ensure that Russia and China do not succeed in drawing support to the argument that indivisible security effectively delegitimizes moves to put the right into practice.</p> -<p>Competition between Sechin and Miller – with Putin acting as the ultimate arbiter – makes it a challenge for Russia’s energy industry to make long-term plans, with political interference and self-interest often trumping financial expedience. Occasionally, their arguments spill over into the public domain, such as over which company contributes more taxes to the federal budget. Rivalry between Gazprom and Rosneft can be occasionally disruptive and can stymie progress on major projects. The two companies were embroiled in widely publicised litigation proceedings against each other in 2015–16, over Rosneft’s attempts to gain access to the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project in the Far East, an appeal which Gazprom ultimately lost in the Supreme Court. However, competition like this tends to be more about defending turf than about actual views on Russia’s foreign policy or national interests, which are still inherently decided at the Kremlin level.</p> +<p>The PRC’s painting of “ganging up” or bloc formation as unnatural and illegitimate aims to discredit a long-standing right under international law that predates the UN Charter. This suggests a hegemonic mindset, which is ironic, considering one of China’s lines of attack against NATO is that it is a thinly veiled hegemonic project by the United States. When it comes to the Asian audience, themes of anti-hegemony and the sovereign equality of small states to larger states enjoy popular support, particularly among populations raised on a postcolonial narrative of national liberation.</p> -<p>Given these features of Putin’s decision-making process, Russia’s energy policy approach has never been particularly coherent, and there have always been groups that prioritise how much money can be extracted from Russia’s natural resources, juxtaposed with internal critics of Russia’s sprawling infrastructure projects – such as expensive symbolic bridges – whose economic returns are negligible and which tend to serve political goals. While important foreign policy decisions remain the purview of the Kremlin, infighting within the oil and gas industry has repercussions for Russia’s efficiency and ability to project its image as an extractives “superpower” abroad. This is a longstanding issue that was a challenge for the Kremlin prior to the war, but as competition over new markets in the Indo-Pacific region grows, internal competition between Russia’s energy companies is also likely to increase.</p> +<p>Finally, it may be possible to flip the PRC’s narratives by talking about the alliance more from the experience and perspective of smaller allies — for whom the right of collective self-defense offers the best protection against a large and periodically predatory neighbor. In particular, flipping the narrative about NATO might work best if the message about why the alliance continues to exist and why it seeks common cause with partners around the globe comes from more recent members, such as the Baltic states and central European nations, instead of the larger, longer- term allies.</p> -<h3 id="ii-russias-involvement-in-opec">II. Russia’s Involvement in OPEC+</h3> +<hr /> -<p>Russia tends to use international platforms either as a means to further its own national interests or to ensure that it has a stake in the conversation, rather than in pursuit of a common cause. Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s ability to interact with other, particularly Western, states in multinational forums has been increasingly restricted, and an international arrest warrant for Putin has posed another logistical challenge to face-to-face engagement. Russia’s behaviour in the OPEC+ grouping, which is designed to influence global oil pricing, is still in service of its national interests, but must be carefully balanced with its desire to maintain a strong bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia – the two countries in combination sell 20% of oil used globally.</p> +<p><strong>Philip Shetler-Jones</strong> is a senior research fellow at the International Security Studies Department of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, where he focuses on geopolitical relations in the Indo-Pacific region. Previously, he served as an officer in the UK Royal Marine Commandos; held positions at the United Nations and the European Union; and consulted for NATO, the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe, the UK Ministry of Defence, and Chatham House.</p>Philip Shetler-JonesAlthough China’s views on NATO have fluctuated since the early days of the Cold War, Beijing’s recent statements on the alliance have sharpened.Eight Commonsense Actions2023-11-21T12:00:00+08:002023-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/eight-commonsense-actions<p><em>Today, there is a shared sense of vulnerability and a shared resolve across political divides to better protect the United States and the world against the accidental release of biological agents (biosafety), deliberate misuse of biological agents (biosecurity), and naturally occurring spillover of dangerous pathogens.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Biosafety and biosecurity are critically important areas where individual freedom, ethics, scientific progress, and national security converge. As biological research and discovery accelerate at an unprecedented pace, they generate new risks that must be managed responsibly. The CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security’s Working Group on R&amp;D Innovation advocates select, commonsense actions to strengthen U.S. and global biosafety and biosecurity: clarify U.S. policies and policy leadership within the White House; increase financial and diplomatic investments; update the rules around synthetic products and viral discovery work; and invest in research on basic lab protections and the new risks of artificial intelligence. Together, these timely, affordable steps can attract broad political support and promote a safer, more secure, and more innovative global bioeconomy.</em></p> -<p>Russia and Saudi Arabia’s energy policies – and by extension their foreign policies – are often conflated due to their shared leadership of the OPEC+ grouping. Yet the Russian–Saudi partnership is more of a marriage of convenience than an expression of a wider strategic alignment. The basis of the relationship is that both countries support the stabilisation of oil prices while simultaneously ensuring high export revenues.</p> +<p>Biosafety and biosecurity have become more urgent U.S. priorities in the post-Covid era, tied to U.S. national security interests. They have been visibly elevated in U.S. security doctrines, structured around the risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that arise at home and abroad.</p> -<p>In this vein, OPEC+ was formed in 2016 in response to the disruption of the global oil market caused by the US shale revolution. By increasing the number of countries coordinating their production levels, the cartel was able to influence the supply side of the market and stabilise international oil prices – but the potential brittleness of the alliance was demonstrated in the price war between Moscow and Riyadh in March and April 2020. As the global economy shut down with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, leading oil prices to fall, Russia refused to go along with Saudi-proposed production cuts, seeing an opportunity to deal a blow to the US shale industry. Saudi Arabia, though also not necessarily opposed to hurting shale producers, ramped up production in order to deliberately push down prices even further and thereby forced Moscow to relent.</p> +<p>For decades, the United States has been in a conventional arms race. Now, that race also focuses intensely on biotechnology that could bring major benefits but, in the hands of nefarious actors, also could cause enormous harm. An alarm has sounded, in part due to heightened awareness of the remarkable speed of scientific and technological changes that are unfolding, including the advance of converging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI). Furthermore, high-containment laboratories are rapidly expanding around the world, including in low- and middle-income countries — a process that has accelerated dramatically in the post-Covid moment. The sudden proliferation of facilities elevates risks and the demands for improved training, standards, and systems of detection and oversight. Advanced science is now conducted by a highly diverse set of individuals and organizations, including militaries, large biopharmaceutical firms, and countless start-ups that operate quite independent of government. A widely underappreciated dimension is the massive scale of illegal and legal cross-border wildlife trade, often linked with illicit networks transiting people, drugs, and finances. Together, these trends lower the barriers for bad actors to access potentially dangerous biological knowledge.</p> -<p>Officially, OPEC+ coordination has been less contentious since February 2022. Russia has some leverage over Iran (an OPEC member), which Saudi Arabia lacks, and Saudi Arabia’s insistence on continuing to work with Russia in the grouping despite protestations from the US and elsewhere can be seen as an indication of how much more importance Riyadh apportions to its ability to influence the oil market (especially at a time of heightened volatility) than to maintaining a harmonious rapport with Washington. Moscow also recognises that collaboration with Riyadh will be critical to ensure supply management, even as it continues to delay production cuts.</p> +<p>In mid-2023, the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security’s Working Group on R&amp;D Innovation concluded that biosafety and biosecurity should be a priority focus of its efforts for the balance of the year. To that end, five highly productive working group meetings were held between July and early October 2023 (see appendix for details).</p> -<p>Russia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has become more of a pressing issue since the onset of the Ukraine war. Riyadh has chosen not to align itself with the Western consensus on the war and has not introduced sanctions on Russia, nor condemned the war. The announcement at the August 2023 BRICS summit that Saudi Arabia would be joining the grouping – with some caveats – could boost the economic potential of the bloc and offer a further channel to deepen bilateral ties, including offering new sources of sanctions evasion for Russia. There is also nascent bilateral cooperation over joint investment funds to support Russian agriculture and oil production equipment, and few high-profile projects have been announced, although the Saudi side has been much less vocal about its willingness to invest within Russia.</p> +<p>Important policy reviews are underway within the U.S. government to carefully reassess the evolving threat environment. There is debate over what should be the new balance required between controlling risk and promoting gains in the life sciences that will improve and save lives. There is an urgency to better understand the strengths and vulnerabilities of U.S. biosafety and biosecurity approaches and to rethink how to overcome vexing implementation and coordination challenges across a fragmented government and a complex interface among the U.S. government, industry, foundations, partner governments, nongovernmental groups, and international institutions. Policymakers are also debating what communications capabilities are required to effectively reach U.S. citizens and all entities working in the health security research and development (R&amp;D) community in an age of pervasive mis- and disinformation.</p> -<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has altered its position on the OPEC grouping somewhat. In search of clients and new export markets for its oil, Russia has been prepared to accept lower prices to sell its oil and maintain production, offering cut-price deals to its allies China and India in a bid to drum up funds for the war. There are also frictions over Russia’s secrecy around its figures – it does not disclose how many barrels of oil it exports, and Saudi Arabia is suspicious that Russia has continued to export significant volumes, undercutting former price agreements.</p> +<p>Two important questions remain unanswered: First, who is mandated to set policy and ensure authoritative leadership, including effective coordination and oversight across the U.S. government and with partners outside government, including international partners? Second, will the U.S. government augment staff and programs across multiple departments and agencies with adequate, sustained budgets to ensure they have an effective, sustained capability to implement policy? Far too often, as seen at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and elsewhere, unfunded mandates in the critical areas of biosafety and biosecurity remain so weakly staffed and financed that they create only the appearance, and not the reality, of seriously meeting emerging challenges.</p> -<p>For now, Saudi Arabia has not criticised Russia’s decisions to sell at a discount or publicly spoken out against its data secrecy, given the two countries’ common interest in maintaining oil prices at a level that can shore up their state budgets. Russia also has significant reason to keep the Kingdom on side – major Saudi companies invested more than $500 million in Gazprom, Rosneft and major oil producer Lukoil just after the war began and Western sanctions were introduced. Since the onset of the war, however, Russia has been on the back foot; it has few major international players it can call on as partners, and the relationship with Riyadh, which may start to demand more of Russia, is an important one.</p> +<p>Through its deliberations, the working group has engaged with U.S. government experts, industry leaders, international organizations, and other stakeholders to weigh this question: What concrete actions can and should the U.S. government undertake in the coming few months to strengthen U.S. and global biosafety and biosecurity?</p> -<h3 id="iii-russias-environmental-paradox">III. Russia’s Environmental Paradox</h3> +<p>Below are eight commonsense actions proposed by the working group that attempt to answer this question. Many imply an increase in staff, programs, and budgets, but in the larger picture these are modest investments. None are excessive or unaffordable. An expedited costing exercise is an important next step.</p> -<p>One of Russia’s many strategic paradoxes is that it is a country highly affected by climate change, but banks on its status as a producer of commodities to retain its international position. This inconsistency informs its strategic policymaking on the environment, and its behaviour in international forums around climate change.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>What concrete actions can and should the U.S. government undertake in the coming few months to strengthen U.S. and global biosafety and biosecurity?</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The Kremlin has never been particularly concerned by environmental security, and many of its actions have been reactive to environmental disasters that occur on its territory, rather than preventative. The ES-35 specifically frames international climate change policies as a hindrance to Russia’s own energy security development, even if it simultaneously acknowledges the theoretical importance of reducing carbon emissions. Similar inconsistencies can be found in Russia’s Arctic strategy, which notes the security threat of warming seas such as flooding in coastal areas and the melting of permafrost, but still pushes high production of fossil fuels and the mining of extractives. Globally, Russia is the fourth-largest greenhouse gas emitter, after China, the US and India, and is responsible for 7% of the world’s CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, Putin has been derisive about Europe’s green energy approach, maintaining that the energy crisis in Europe is in fact due to Europe’s investment in wind farms that cannot make up for a reduction in fossil fuels.</p> +<p>These eight actions can attract political support across the aisle and from industry, foundations, and other partners. They will have meaningful impacts in preventing and mitigating future accidental or deliberate biological events and strengthen approaches aimed at controlling naturally occurring pathogens. No less important, they will clarify who in the White House is in charge of setting national policy and how sustainable implementation capacity will be established and funded across the U.S. government over the long term. Several pending pieces of legislation provide opportunities to advance these actions, such as the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA), the Medical Supply Chain Resiliency Act, and the Pioneering Antimicrobial Subscriptions to End Upsurging Resistance (PASTEUR) Act.</p> -<p>In international forums, Russia often objects to proposals to improve global environmental security. While this can appear bullish and self-interested, it is also partly due to different understandings of security: Russia’s longstanding concept of environmental security prioritises the security of the nation as the key concern, rather than the security implications that can stem from environmental problems, and includes a collective historical view that the natural environment holds no intrinsic value in its own right. Climate change is seen as something that affects Russia’s national security (including defence), but it is framed in strategic documents as a threat to Russia’s economic development that calls for practical solutions, rather than any adjustment to the extractive industries. Russia also tends to approach issues such as warming Arctic seas not as a crisis but as an economic opportunity that will improve access to new shipping lanes and offer a boost to the Russian export industry. Some Russian academics have disputed this prevailing analysis, maintaining that the impact of climate change in the country will probably not be a net positive overall, but their views are unlikely to be influential in altering the Kremlin’s longstanding policies.</p> +<p>If carried forward through consistent high-level political leadership, these pragmatic reforms hold the promise of generating momentum and common purpose. If successful, they will open the way for deeper structural changes in U.S. policy that will position the United States to continue in its role as a responsible leader in advancing a safe, secure, and innovative global bioeconomy for decades to come.</p> -<p>Russia has tried to separate environmental security into two issues: the first is the economic damage to the country caused by climate change that Russia aims to mitigate, chiefly through technological interventions or improved investment, while the second is what Russia perceives as a Western-led agenda, under the guise of environmental activism, to undermine Russian institutions. Russia has suggested at the UN Security Council that environmental security issues are a ruse for external military interventions in countries rich in natural resources (perhaps referring to the African continent) and has framed this as a threat to Russia’s interests in the extractive industries. Ultimately, Russia views most international attempts to warn against the dangers of climate change and fossil fuel reliance as a further threat to Russian sovereignty.</p> +<h4 id="action-1-the-white-house-should-finish-the-job-on-time-of-updating-and-integrating-the-us-potential-pandemic-pathogen-care-and-oversight-p3c0-policy-and-dual-use-research-of-concern-durc-policy">Action 1: The White House should finish the job on time of updating and integrating the U.S. Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3C0) Policy and Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC) Policy.</h4> -<p>Within Russia, important figures traditionally from the defence or security services have increasingly been appointed to lead on environmental issues. In 2016, Sergei Ivanov, a former minister of defence (2001–07) and KGB officer in the Foreign Intelligence Service, was appointed the president’s special representative on the environment and transport. Ivanov oversees environmental protection, as well as the development of the Far Eastern regions and streamlining infrastructure to support businesses; he is also an important member of Russia’s powerful Security Council and a longstanding Putin ally. While his precise role is unclear, his positioning indicates the crossover in the Kremlin’s mindset between the environment and national security.</p> +<p>Updated, strengthened, and unified guidelines for research on enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPPs) are overdue. Combining the two policies is a sound idea. These policies should be consistent with the impressive early 2023 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity recommendations, take account of the extensive subsequent consultations that have been held, and reflect the valuable input received from the request for information issued by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy in October 2023. As mandated by Congress, this process is meant to be completed by the end of 2023. Hewing as close to that timeline as possible will be consequential in demonstrating resolve.</p> -<p>In terms of its foreign policy, Moscow’s securitisation of the environment means that it is rarely cooperative on internationally led climate change issues. On the UN Security Council, Russia pays lip service to climate action but favours the status quo, tending to use the platform to ensure that it has a place at the table and to promote its economic (extractives) interests, rather than with a view to safeguarding the environment. In principle, Russia is a signatory to UN-led efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the Kremlin does not publish figures about its oil and gas production rates and only offers broad public statements about production cuts, which makes it a challenge to determine how compliant (or not) it may be. It has also been criticised internationally for its gutting of environmental policies that would have otherwise worked to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, by refusing to introduce quotas or penalties on greenhouse gas emitters.</p> +<h4 id="action-2-the-national-security-advisor-should-designate-a-lead-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-policy-from-either--or-as-a-shared-responsibility-of--the-national-security-council-nsc-directorate-for-health-security-and-biodefense-or-the-new-white-house-office-of-pandemic-preparedness-and-response-policy-oppr">Action 2: The national security advisor should designate a lead on biosafety and biosecurity policy from either — or as a shared responsibility of — the National Security Council (NSC) Directorate for Health Security and Biodefense or the new White House Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy (OPPR).</h4> -<p>This approach is unlikely to change, largely due to the presence of powerful business lobbying groups who work on behalf of the oil and gas industry, such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Rossiskiy soyuz promyshlennikov i predprinimateley, RSPP), whose coordination council is co-chaired by Putin’s youngest daughter, giving the RSPP a direct line to the Kremlin. The RSPP extensively lobbies against any proposed bills that could reduce the oil and gas industry’s ability to extract resources in environmentally protected areas, and it is rarely opposed by the Kremlin.</p> +<p>At present, it is unclear to many expert observers who is mandated to lead on U.S. policy on biosafety and biosecurity — a refrain heard repeatedly across the CSIS bipartisan alliance working group meetings. To some degree, this reflects that White House policy on biosecurity and biosafety is not managed or communicated effectively across the U.S. government or to external partners. The mission of transforming U.S. pandemic preparedness and biodefense capabilities should be managed with the seriousness of purpose, commitment, and accountability of the Apollo program.</p> -<p>Perhaps most concerningly, since the onset of the war, many environmental links between Russia and the West have been severed, and there is little international oversight of major drilling projects in Russia and the permanent impact that these could have on protected environments, especially in more isolated parts of the Russian Arctic. Legislation within Russia that restricts ecological activism has also tightened since the war, reflective of a broader repressive legal environment targeting institutions with a perceived Western-led agenda. For example, in March 2023, the Worldwide Fund for Nature was branded as a “foreign agent” – this inclusion on the foreign agents list by Russia’s Federal Security Service comes with an implication of espionage and suggests that the organisation receives funding from murky sources abroad, seeking to undermine Russia. Many organisations on the list have ceased to function under pressure from the security services, and as a result there is a risk that there will be even less external oversight of resource extraction.</p> +<p>OPPR was created to make major contributions in several areas of health security; it is still positioned to do so as long as the White House builds it consistent with the authority, spirit, and vision of the originating legislation. Both the NSC directorate and OPPR need to ensure that there are an adequate number of expert staff to carry out the expanded agenda laid out here.</p> -<p>Russia’s understanding of threats to the environment has close links to its understanding of threats to its hydrocarbons industry, as well as to the personal interests of the ruling elites (including Putin) and the central role that energy resources play in Russia’s international policies, all of which are bound up with ideas of Russian sovereignty. Any attempts by the international community to further an agenda that restricts Russia’s continued extraction of hydrocarbons, its export of them to new and existing markets, and the construction of infrastructure on land and at sea to support this, are framed as part of a security threat to which Moscow will respond harshly.</p> +<p>The White House, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and departments and agencies, can and should complete a horizon-scanning exercise and clearly define a hierarchy of risks that identifies and explains the most significant threats for the nation and the world. What are the uncontrollable potential pandemic pathogens and the broad societal implications of greatest concern? How should the United States prioritize those pathogens that pose the greatest societal risks while recognizing new, presently unknown threats likely to emerge?</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-where-moscows-red-lines-are">Conclusion: Where Moscow’s Red Lines are</h3> +<p>The White House, working with ODNI and other partners, can and should be responsible for iteratively assessing the threat landscape, accounting for scientific and technological changes along with the reemergence of dangerous pathogens and arrival of new infectious disease threats. A special effort should be made to strengthen U.S. biosecurity intelligence capabilities. The White House is uniquely positioned to direct new capabilities that not only reduce the highest-priority risks but are also beneficial in addressing other bacterial and fungal threats, including drug-resistant pathogens.</p> -<p>Given Russia’s ability to have an impact on global oil and gas prices, the UK and its European allies will need to try to understand, react to and – where possible – influence the way in which Russia approaches its role in energy markets and in international forums. Even if the UK were to entirely decouple from Russian oil, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means that Russia’s behaviour as a hydrocarbon superpower still has the ability to substantially alter the UK’s energy security. Although diplomatic relations with countries such as Russia may have been all but severed, Russia’s actions matter, whether through decisions on oil production, its global positioning and attempts to reconfigure the world order, or its divergent understandings of what energy and environmental security mean.</p> +<p>The White House should work with senior-level, designated, visible counterparts at HHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), and other agencies to harmonize the special capabilities of different departments, prioritize investments, and eliminate redundancies. A subgoal should be to review existing layered biosafety and biosecurity protections with the aim of eliminating those that are ineffectual and elevating those that most effectively address priority risks across life sciences research, biotechnology development, and biomanufacturing activities.</p> -<p>Russia’s approach since the onset of the Ukraine war has been to expand its foreign policy partnerships with allies such as China, India and Iran; to invest in the land and maritime infrastructure to support its political goals as well as its extractive efforts; and to seek alternative clients for its oil and gas, while maintaining high production. While its energy strategy may be at times incoherent and pulled in multiple directions due to the many vested interests involved, there is a clear sense of some of Moscow’s red lines when it comes to its understanding of energy security and its intent to maintain the extraction and export of hydrocarbons to fuel its economy. Just as debates around oil price caps and moves to reduce carbon emissions are seen as an unwelcome Western intervention, similarly, attempts by the international community to involve Russia in the climate change debate are viewed by Moscow as another security threat to Russia’s sovereignty, and an attempt to impose Western values on a country now forging its own path eastwards.</p> +<p>The White House is best positioned to drive and integrate the capabilities of the security sector — including its ability to analyze signals and manage massive volumes of data — with the health and biological domains. These efforts should also be coordinated with industry and academic partners in support of the U.S. National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan and the vision to create medical countermeasures (MCMs) for all potential pandemic pathogens. It should conduct periodic exercises to evaluate U.S. pandemic preparedness, including preparedness for deliberate and accidental outbreaks, by deploying national capabilities, including rapid product development.</p> -<p>Moreover, Russia and Saudi Arabia – and other oil producers – regard Western enthusiasm to impose energy-related sanctions on Russia, particularly the price cap, as a dangerous precedent for political intervention in the oil market. Putin himself has been vocal about the limitations of the cap, maintaining that there is a risk of mission creep (i.e., that oil price caps could be extended to other sectors of the Russian economy, and indeed to any other country in the world), and has framed this as another attempt by the West to undermine the Russian economy and its “values”. This is a further indication of how Moscow continues to view what other countries frame as economic and pragmatic decisions as a direct attack on Russian sovereignty, and it means that Moscow’s responses to these proposals are likely to appear disproportionate or couched in national security terms.</p> +<h4 id="action-3-the-us-government-should-mandate-universal-screening-of-dna-synthesis-orders-and-create-incentives-to-make-implementation-achievable-it-should-also-extend-the-voluntary-research-norm-of-know-your-customer-beyond-dna-products-to-all-private-sector-biotech-providers-of-goods-and-services">Action 3: The U.S. government should mandate universal screening of DNA synthesis orders and create incentives to make implementation achievable. It should also extend the voluntary research norm of “know your customer” beyond DNA products to all private sector biotech providers of goods and services.</h4> -<p>Ultimately, Russia is pursuing a fundamentally revisionist international project to reconfigure the global order on its own terms, and it is willing to deploy the political capital and revenues derived from its hydrocarbon might to further this project. For there to be any united action around climate change, the UK and Europe must pay closer attention to the foreign and security policies of major hydrocarbon producers like Russia, in order to understand the roots of some of the international implications resulting from their actions.</p> +<p>The U.S. government needs to strengthen oversight of and safeguards for DNA synthesis providers, particularly as new benchtop synthesis technologies evolve and become far more readily accessible outside of major laboratories. Private industry is reportedly asking for mandated screening of DNA synthesis orders to ensure responsible actors are not financially penalized for implementing safeguards of their own volition.</p> -<hr /> +<p>In the Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, President Joseph Biden directed the U.S. government to establish a framework to encourage providers of synthetic DNA to screen orders for potential national security risks. The government will engage with industry partners to refine best practices for technical implementation, clarify reporting mechanisms, and encourage voluntary compliance. It will also mandate compliance for companies that receive federal funding. This important step by the White House should be strengthened through additional legislative action.</p> -<p><strong>Emily Ferris</strong> is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in Russian domestic politics. Emily has a particular interest in Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure including its railways, road and port systems, and the role this plays in advancing Russia’s political ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as deployed in conflict zones such as Ukraine. She also researches domestic political administrations in Russia’s Far East, and Russia’s military and political relationship with Belarus.</p>Emily FerrisUnderstanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security.Principles For UK–CN Strategy2023-11-08T12:00:00+08:002023-11-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/principles-for-uk-china-strategy<p><em>China poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”, according to the UK’s March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>While stopping short of labelling China a “threat”, this is a marked shift from the “golden era” of UK–China relations heralded during Xi Jinping’s 2015 visit to the UK.</em></p> +<p>Various other incentives for private sector biotech, such as financial offsets or tax incentives, particularly for those who do not receive government grants and contracts, could help expedite the transition by making compliance with such regulatory standards financially viable for DNA providers. Other forms of active support could be valuable, such as improving training on the responsibilities of industry for biosecurity and establishing an advice center to assist in adjudication of orders that have an ambiguous biosecurity risk.</p> -<p>Such a shift in assessment requires a commensurate response. This Policy Brief reviews the government’s response to China to date and examines criticisms of its approach, including calls to publish an “unclassified version of its China Strategy”. Rather than detail specific policy recommendations or argue in broad-brush terms for a more hawkish or dovish stance, the brief proposes six principles for a more dynamic and broadly based – and so more effective – China strategy. It argues that, while publishing a strategy document may aid communication, there are more important things to be done.</p> +<p>The U.S. government should expand the guidance that biotech companies “know your customer” to all biotech industry providers of goods and services, including those that create custom molecules, modify strains, and allow for the outsourcing of key lab work. Such companies provide critical scientific resources and knowledge for their downstream customers and therefore serve as important control points to guard against misuse.</p> -<h3 id="changes-after-the-golden-era">Changes After the “Golden Era”</h3> +<h4 id="action-4-all-federal-government-investments-and-grants-in-infectious-disease-research-on-potential-pandemic-pathogens--in-the-united-states-and-internationally--should-require-a-dedicated-and-integrated-investment-in-biosafety-and-biosecurity-safeguards-including-applied-research-and-innovation-by-design">Action 4: All federal government investments and grants in infectious disease research on potential pandemic pathogens — in the United States and internationally — should require a dedicated and integrated investment in biosafety and biosecurity safeguards, including applied research and innovation by design.</h4> -<p>Much has changed since 2015. Notwithstanding current travails, China’s economy has grown by nearly 50% in real terms and accounts for a larger share of global trade. The country’s ambitions in new technologies have become more widely understood and borne some fruit, notably in renewable energy and electric vehicles. President Xi has focused on self-reliance at home, emphasising national security and the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party, while becoming more active on the world stage. Last year, NATO concluded that China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values”. The US’s ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, said last year that US–China relations might be at their “lowest moment” since Nixon’s 1972 China visit. Tensions over Taiwan have risen sharply.</p> +<p>HHS should designate a visible, active, senior-level lead who is responsible for integrating biosecurity and biosafety investments into grants and contracts for life sciences research, biotechnology development, and biomanufacturing, in accordance with Section 9 of the Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy.</p> -<p>Throughout this, trade with China has grown. In the 12 months to March 2023, China was the UK’s fourth-largest trading partner, though the UK ran a £38 billion trade deficit. 1 Questions of security and values, always present in the China policy debate, have however come strongly to the fore. China’s imposition and subsequent interpretation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law have caused widespread outrage. Detailed reporting of China’s human rights abuses against the Xinjiang Uyghurs gained media attention and stirred parliamentary debate and opposition. The government has identified China as a significant source of cyber attacks on UK interests, with increased activity and disinformation campaigns during the Covid-19 pandemic. The recent China report from Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) concluded that “China’s size, ambition and capability have enabled it to successfully penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy”. Additionally, China’s initial slow Covid response and its refusal to allow a full WHO investigation have damaged trust. Its stance on Ukraine has further sharpened concerns. And, while the UK has been the leading destination for Chinese direct investment into Europe since 2000, activity has recently fallen away sharply.</p> +<p>This is an essential step if new norms and standards for biosafety and biosecurity are to be adopted and routinized, if a biosafety and biosecurity innovation ecosystem is to be created, and if a skilled biosafety and biosecurity discipline is to be established. Investments in biosafety and biosecurity research and innovation can also help keep pace with emerging biological risks associated with rapid technological advances by developing effective safeguards and risk management tools. This goal could be realized if a modest percentage (1–4 percent) of the research grants from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and other U.S. government agencies on infectious diseases in the viral families with pandemic potential is dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity, with research and risk assessment built into the initial proposal design. In addition, there should be a separate pool of funding to conduct biosafety research, which could include wet lab work involving pathogens as well as work outside containment settings involving the physical sciences, the life sciences, the social sciences, and human systems research. These investments will deepen the grasp of what it takes to create reproducibility, identify recurrent mistakes, increase efficiency, and move toward embracing a bold target of no lab-linked uncontrolled outbreaks of potential pandemic pathogens.</p> -<h3 id="policy-changes">Policy Changes</h3> +<p>These same requirements should also be built into U.S. global research funding on potential pandemic pathogens, including Pandemic Fund grantmaking, and into the operations of executive agencies carrying out infectious disease work. International norm-setting organizations including the World Health Organization (WHO), the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), and the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS) will play an important role. This approach may be modeled, in part, on how the Human Genome Project built in funding for ethical considerations and how the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have pressed for research projects to take account of ethical, legal, and societal implications.</p> -<p>The UK government has taken action on numerous fronts. In 2020, the Johnson-led government reversed the decision to allow the purchase of Huawei’s 5G technology following a reassessment of security risks and political pressure from the Trump administration. Chinese involvement in the UK’s nuclear power programme came under renewed scrutiny, leading to a buyout of China’s interest in the Sizewell C project. The Hong Kong British National (Overseas) visa scheme has enabled close to 130,000 Hong Kong nationals to move to the UK. The 2021 National Security and Investment Act introduced a tighter screening process for foreign investment into key sectors. The 2023 National Security Act established a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. This year also saw announcements of a Critical Minerals Strategy refresh, the National Protective Security Authority and an Economic Deterrence Initiative. Nonetheless, when security is not an issue, the UK remains “open for business from China”. There are also policies, urged by some backbench MPs, that the government has not pursued. It has not declared Chinese actions in Xinjiang to be a genocide and has not followed the US in sanctioning Hong Kong officials.</p> +<h4 id="action-5-the-us-government-should-pursue-a-far-more-muscular-diplomacy-to-secure-biosafety-and-biosecurity-safeguards-globally">Action 5: The U.S. government should pursue a far more muscular diplomacy to secure biosafety and biosecurity safeguards globally.</h4> -<p>Consistent with the Integrated Review’s “tilt to the Indo-Pacific”, the UK has been active in the region. A carrier strike group was deployed there in 2021 for the first time since 1997, and will return in 2025. The UK is the first non-regional member of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. It has been active in helping formulate stronger G7 and NATO positions on China, and has shaped and joined new minilateral partnerships including the AUKUS agreement, the Global Combat Air Programme and the Mineral Security Partnership. The sanctioning of Xinjiang officials was announced in coordination with the US, Canada and the EU.</p> +<p>In every area of U.S. domestic policy in biosafety and biosecurity, there should be a conscious and deliberate effort to explain how innovations tie to U.S. diplomacy to strengthen capabilities with external partners. U.S. domestic policy is often developed with little regard for the global context, yet it is frequently, in practice, a de facto baseline for the world. U.S. global programs cannot be treated as an add-on; rather, the U.S. approach to advancing biosecurity and biosafety must be seen as an integral component of a strategy that can be implemented in a wide range of resource-rich and resource-limited settings. The demand for U.S. technical expertise, best practices, and training is rising steeply as middle-income countries in particular invest in an exceedingly swift expansion of high-containment laboratories. Building effective partnerships across the range of areas detailed below requires sustained outreach and engagement; a commitment to equity, access, technology transfer, and strengthening of local and regional capabilities; a belief in combining bilateral and multilateral strategies; and an upgraded communications capability to combat mis- and disinformation against U.S. programs and affirm and promote responsible scientific research.</p> -<h3 id="is-this-a-strategy">Is This a Strategy?</h3> +<blockquote> + <p>U.S. global programs cannot be treated as an add-on; rather, the U.S. approach to advancing biosecurity and biosafety must be seen as an integral component of a strategy that can be implemented in a wide range of resource-rich and resource-limited settings.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Throughout all this, many have called on the government to publish a China strategy. In 2019, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) called for “a single, detailed public document defining the UK’s China strategy … [to] be published by the end of 2020”. In 2021, the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee entitled its report “The UK and China’s Security and Trade Relationship: A Strategic Void”.</p> +<p>A U.S. diplomacy of expanded U.S. global investments in biosafety and biosecurity will strengthen bilateral partnerships and global norms and standards. As several U.S. government agencies and programs already conduct work in these areas, the challenge now becomes how to create far more coherence, vitality, and visible unity of effort through both the newly launched Department of State Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, particularly the Division of Select Agents and Toxins program; the HHS Office of Global Affairs; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the DOD Biological Threat Reduction Program, among others.</p> -<p>This year has seen progress. The Refresh summarised the UK’s approach to China with three pillars: Protect/Align/Engage:</p> +<p>U.S. diplomacy should prioritize the following activities:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Protect the UK through enhancing security measures in critical national infrastructure, supply chains, democratic freedoms and science and technology.</p> + <p><em>Require biosecurity and biosafety investments as integral components across U.S. global health and health security policies and programs</em>, especially those providing laboratory, surveillance, and workforce capacity to combat infectious disease threats. This work to strengthen and build capacity and standards, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, is critical to sustain, detect, and respond to naturally occurring threats.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Align with “core allies and a broader group of partners” to deepen cooperation.</p> + <p><em>Invest in multilateral institutions</em> to strengthen routine and emergency biosafety and biosecurity efforts and reduce vulnerabilities outside U.S. borders. Activities should include investment in the WHO and close support for the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, including the Biological Weapons Convention.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Engage with China directly and multilaterally so as to “where possible cooperate on global challenges” and secure a “positive trade and investment relationship”, while “avoiding dependencies … and protecting our national security”.</p> + <p><em>Engage systematically with China and the G20 on biosafety and biosecurity norms.</em> No credible U.S. global strategy can ignore China. That said, this goal will require careful, incremental bilateral efforts to address key challenges and involve navigating existing tensions with China and the deep hostility toward China in the United States. The United States will also need to cultivate a coalition of like-minded global partners, including across the G20, and work with other regional partners — including Singapore, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia — and multilateral institutions to test what pressure points and forms of engagement with China would be most fruitful. The November 15 meeting between President Biden and Chinese president Xi Jinping in San Francisco and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Week that followed may create new opportunities for dialogues in 2024 on biosafety and biosecurity, including under the auspices of new talks on the risk associated with AI. Those possibilities should be systematically tested.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>In April, Foreign Secretary James Cleverly expanded on this in a speech, “Our Position on China”, arguing that “we must engage with China where necessary and be unflinchingly realistic about its authoritarianism”. Cleverly’s August visit to Beijing drew on the same position. The prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has described the approach as “robust pragmatism”, while also calling China “the biggest challenge of our age to global security and prosperity” after the May G7 meeting.</p> +<p>The United States should also engage with and support promising new lines of international work in biosafety and biosecurity as they evolve, define the gaps they will fill, and demonstrate concrete returns. Two nascent developments are of particular note:</p> -<p>No detailed China paper has been published, however – nothing similar to Germany’s recently published China strategy. In August, the FAC called again for an “unclassified China strategy”. Charles Parton, a long-time China analyst, has described the lack of a clearly communicated China strategy as the “panda in the room”.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><em>The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)</em> is working to leverage its laboratory, manufacturing, and preclinical animal model research networks in partner countries to catalyze responsible capacity building with a focus in the Global South. Through U.S. support to CEPI’s vision to develop MCMs for all potential pandemic pathogens, it will be important to ensure that biosecurity and biosafety investments are integrated as explicit priorities.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em>IBBIS</em> aims to provide tools and best practices to biotech industry, academia, funders, governments, and other global stakeholders to improve biosecurity and biosafety by safeguarding the tools of modern bioscience and biotechnology. Although IBBIS will be a nongovernmental organization, it will potentially advance key U.S. biosecurity and biosafety goals and raise the bar globally. Support for IBBIS should include using U.S. diplomatic convening power and technical expertise to build international political support for the organization and its work. Under the management of IBBIS, a bio funders’ compact with philanthropic and other private donors could be valuable in strengthening norms and incentives for compliance with biosecurity best practices.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="pressures-for-greater-clarity">Pressures for Greater Clarity</h3> +<h4 id="action-6-create-rules-of-the-road-for-us-supported-viral-discovery-work">Action 6: Create rules of the road for U.S.-supported viral discovery work.</h4> -<p>The government’s approach can be criticised from three angles. First, that the “three pillars” strategy does not amount to an appropriate or even coherent course of action. Second, that it lacks specifics and glosses over trade-offs. Third, that publishing a detailed China strategy brings benefits greater than any associated costs.</p> +<p>Both U.S. civilian and military institutions have funded field research in remote settings, often in bat caves, to search for new viruses with pandemic potential. But while research on naturally occurring pathogens remains critical, much more careful U.S. guidance is needed in the form of enforceable and effective rules to assess, permit, and fund this type of work. Clearer standards are needed to weigh the possible scientific benefits, identify the potential dangers, determine whether those risks can be mitigated, and judge whether the work can be pursued responsibly. Protocols should be established for field research and sampling before specimens reach the lab. Once new pathogens are discovered, there should be clearer guidance around the personal protective equipment (PPE) standards required and the biosafety level appropriate to handle such unknown, novel risks. Guidance could also be developed for communities on how to avoid interactions that could lead to zoonotic spillover.</p> -<p>Protect/Align/Engage implicitly rejects alternative strategies of large-scale decoupling or unquestioning engagement. Some simply disagree with this approach, seeing it as riddled with contradictions. A three-pillar framing is not, however, unique to the UK. It reflects the “complicated and sophisticated” nature of relations with the world’s second-largest economy. The US speaks of “invest, align, compete”, following US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s earlier description of the US–China relationship as “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, adversarial when it must be”. The EU has described China as a negotiating partner, economic competitor and systemic rival. China also mostly pursues a similar approach, while at times strategically choosing to reject it. In 2021, foreign minister Wang Yi stated that “China–U.S. cooperation on climate change cannot be divorced from the overall situation of China–U.S. relations”. With Australia and Lithuania, China has linked disagreements on Taiwan and Covid-19 with economic relations. The UK does also need a response to such situations.</p> +<p>In the post-Covid era, funders and scientists have turned away from funding research on potentially dangerous viruses to a significant degree, in part out of fear of accusations of lab leaks. New, more effective rules will be an essential element in sustaining responsible future research and should be developed based on consultation with experts inside and outside government to ensure standards are reasonable, evidence-based, and not subject to political interference.</p> -<p>The lack of focus on trade-offs is a more compelling criticism. The approach smacks of “cakeism”, promising to secure all the benefits and address all the negatives that China presents, while ducking value judgements and tough choices on priorities.</p> +<h4 id="action-7-invest-in-research-on-a-rolling-iterative-basis-on-the-risks-of-ai-convergence-with-biotechnologies">Action 7: Invest in research on a rolling, iterative basis on the risks of AI convergence with biotechnologies.</h4> -<p>For instance, the UK is to engage China on climate matters, and China leads in renewable energy. So what is the stance on sourcing solar panels from Xinjiang given well-documented reports of forced labour and its likely presence in UK supply chains? Does reliance on China reflect successful engagement, an unacceptable breach of our values, or a security risk? Universities benefit financially and intellectually from Chinese students and research collaborations, while facing risks of revenue dependence, challenge to academic freedoms and leakage of sensitive research. How should the UK navigate this? University leaders need better guidance based on the government’s assessment of trade-offs and priorities.</p> +<p>U.S. civilian and military agencies should invest in an ambitious research agenda to assess the dual-use risks posed by AI-enabled bio design tools, consider what steps will effectively prevent large language models (LLMs) from lowering knowledge barriers to the misuse of biology, monitor ongoing developments in AI-enabled automation of life sciences research, and establish preemptive guardrails to protect data and advance norms and standards for these technologies. This research should be done on an ongoing basis to keep pace with technological advances and identify emerging risks.</p> -<p>Finally, a more detailed China strategy could be published, but the benefits need to exceed the costs. The ISC’s China report states that as of 2019, “the National Security Council (NSC) owns and creates [government] policy on China”, which is then set out in a six-pillar “China Framework”. Even the names of three of these pillars are redacted. The related China National Strategy Implementation Group seeks to avoid a “binary prosperity vs. security” approach. So trade-offs are considered, but there is no external communication of how this is done.</p> +<p>Many of these research priorities are articulated in the new White House executive order on AI, which initiates several reviews on both how AI could increase biosecurity risks and how it could benefit biological discovery and public health. The order directs a variety of agencies and departments to develop guidance and benchmarks for auditing future AI capabilities, including red-teaming and evaluating dual-use models, and for protecting U.S. government biological data, elevating responsibility for implementation to a new cabinet-level White House AI council. It also eases the pathways for AI professionals to join the federal government, which will be critical to ensure that agencies have the staff capacity to monitor advancing capabilities and, when needed, institute new guidance, safeguards, and regulations in an agile way. The executive order recognizes the international nature of these threats and commits the United States to working with other nations to ensure technologies are safe, secure, trustworthy, and interoperable. Partner nations echoed these collaborative intentions at the 2023 AI Safety Summit in the United Kingdom, in the resulting Bletchley Declaration, and in related efforts by the G7 and the United Nations.</p> -<p>Publishing would provide a better basis for debate, challenge and holding the government to account, and also provide clearer guidance to those making China-related decisions. The only previous China policy paper, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s “The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement” (2009), stated that “this document is intended to begin a broader conversation”.</p> +<p>The U.S. government should make clear it will work only with LLM developers who are dedicated to producing safe and secure models — for instance, those who agreed to voluntary commitments with the White House earlier in 2023. It should also support efforts within the science community to establish and implement principles to guide responsible use of AI technologies in biomolecular design.</p> -<p>The argument is finely balanced, however. By their nature, elements of the China strategy need to remain confidential, not least from Beijing. Discussion and challenge of a redacted strategy paper can skew debate. Any published paper serves more to communicate a narrative than to describe a government’s full strategy. And decision-makers often need more sector-specific guidance than a single paper can communicate. A published strategy paper is no panacea.</p> +<h4 id="action-8-research-and-update-basic-laboratory-protections-including-fit-for-purpose-ppe-and-workforce-training">Action 8: Research and update basic laboratory protections, including fit-for-purpose PPE and workforce training.</h4> -<h3 id="six-principles-for-a-more-dynamic-and-effective-ukchina-strategy">Six Principles for a More Dynamic and Effective UK–China Strategy</h3> +<p>The U.S. government should invest in research and demonstration pilots focused on innovative, fit-for-purpose PPE that is better adapted to the diverse healthcare workforce. Actions should include encouraging the uptake of reusable PPE, which has been shown to lower infection rates and increase productivity; adapting the standard for health worker PPE to follow designs for women; creating designs that accommodate religious headwear, beards, and the faces of people of color; and providing workforce training. There should also be a focus on ensuring a warm manufacturing base, options for rapid expansion of domestic production and distribution in the event of an emergency, and improved monitoring of logistics chains of raw materials.</p> -<p>Implementation of the right China strategy, itself made up of a myriad of China-related decisions, is more important than a single paper. Keeping in mind the following six principles will help formulate a more dynamic and effective China strategy for the UK.</p> +<p>In the United States, organizations that engage in research on potential pandemic pathogens should have established relationships with regional or national medical centers equipped to provide full-spectrum diagnostic and treatment capabilities and biocontainment in the event of accidental pathogen exposure. This would be a critical step outside the lab to prevent further community spread. Regional relationships could be established through the National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center.</p> -<h4 id="1-strategy-should-be-more-than-a-document">1. Strategy should be more than a document.</h4> +<h3 id="a-moment-of-opportunity">A Moment of Opportunity</h3> -<p>“Strategy” is a popular word, yet one used by different people with different meanings. At heart, it is about making choices to achieve defined objectives or outcomes and then putting in place the required resources to realise them. Roger Martin, a leading business strategy academic, writes that “strategy is choice. Strategy is not a long planning document”. While those implementing need to understand the strategy, no company publishes its strategy in full on its website. Nor does any country. Important elements are confidential, shared on a need-to-know basis.</p> +<p>In the post-Covid moment, the eight commonsense actions proposed by the CSIS bipartisan alliance lay out a realistic vision for achieving concerted progress in reducing the risks of biological accidents and misuse of dangerous biological agents while providing a safe path for continued research on naturally occurring infectious disease threats. These eminently pragmatic steps are affordable and need not be unduly burdensome, and they will enhance the protection of Americans and others who are vulnerable today. But that protection will only be realized with sufficient political will and a sustained commitment to building adequate staff and programs. An expedited costing exercise is an important next step.</p> -<p>Strategy is dynamic and iterative, rather than static and one-time. It considers and addresses multiple, changing contingencies. In today’s world, decisions are made in changing, uncertain circumstances based on imperfect information. China and the UK’s allies alike react and adapt to the choices made by others.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>These eminently pragmatic steps are affordable and need not be unduly burdensome, and they will enhance the protection of Americans and others who are vulnerable today.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>This means that a detailed set of actions, decided centrally, fixed and then communicated to others to implement, is unlikely to succeed. Rather, many different people need to make decisions that together amount to a strategy. This is, in the words of management scholar Henry Mintzberg, “emergent strategy”. At times, this can be hard to distinguish from a contradictory “muddling through” and no overall strategy. This does not, however, make the approach any less valid. Determining which elements of the China strategy should be centrally determined – and which not – is an important matter of judgement.</p> +<p>At their core, these commonsense actions will address two vexing gaps. They will clarify who at the White House is mandated to set national policy and ensure authoritative leadership, including effective coordination and oversight across the government and with partners outside government. They will also enhance the U.S. government’s capability to implement policies in the many diverse departments and agencies that require stronger biosafety and biosecurity approaches.</p> -<h4 id="2-strategy-should-be-explicit-about-whose-behaviours-need-to-change--or-stay-the-same--in-order-to-bring-about-specific-outcomes">2. Strategy should be explicit about whose behaviours need to change – or stay the same – in order to bring about specific outcomes.</h4> +<p>If carried forward, this package of actions could win support from diverse political perspectives and different institutional interests, deliver results that stir momentum, and open a pathway to U.S. leadership at home and abroad in creating a far safer and more predictable bioeconomy.</p> -<p>Good strategy is clear on both desired outcomes and the behaviours – continuing or changed – needed to bring them about. The current UK government seeks “a positive trade and investment relationship” with China. But it is does not explain what this statement really means, or what needs to happen for this to occur. By contrast, the 2009 China “Framework for Engagement” did contain very detailed targeted outcomes. However, this document contained few specifics about how they might be achieved. The current UK–China strategy would benefit from greater clarity on both aspects.</p> +<hr /> -<p>It is much easier for the UK government to affect behaviours at home than in China, or even in “like-minded countries”. A China strategy must take much of what China does as a given. It should then determine how best to change what happens in the UK, while taking account of how China (and others) might act in response. Government can change behaviours at home by banning or mandating certain activities, or by changing incentives and providing better information to those who then decide for themselves. Which approach makes sense, and where, is at the heart of a clear China strategy. Clearer communication of the government’s perspective on this would allow others to make better decisions on China matters.</p> +<p><strong>J. Stephen Morrison</strong> is a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and directs its Global Health Policy Center. Through several high-level commissions, he has shaped decisions in Congress and the administration on HIV/AIDS, reproductive health and gender equality, and health security, including pandemic preparedness. Currently, the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security is addressing critical post-Covid challenges.</p> -<p>For Lawrence Freedman, strategy is the “art of creating power”. China’s economy is five times larger than the UK’s, and its population 20 times as large. The Integrated Review recognises that if the UK is to influence the choices of Chinese decision-makers, it needs to gain scale through working with others – hence recent extensive collaboration through the G7, NATO and other fora. Here too, however, the UK’s ability to change behaviour is shaped by what others choose. US policy plays an especially critical role, both regarding its own stance on China and its appetite to act in coordination with allies or alone. If US policy becomes significantly more or less hawkish, the options for the UK’s China strategy also shift: US policy on Taiwan shapes any role that the UK might play. China’s reaction to the UK’s choices also depends partly on how the British approach compares with those of other major countries. French President Emmanuel Macron’s April visit to Beijing yielded commercial contracts, while Rishi Sunak has yet to meet President Xi.</p> +<p><strong>Michaela Simoneau</strong> is an associate fellow for global health security with the Global Health Policy Center at CSIS. She manages the secretariat of the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security and formerly managed the secretariat of the CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security, both groups of senior experts charged with generating bipartisan recommendations to strengthen U.S. and global pandemic preparedness and response policy.</p>J. Stephen Morrison and Michaela SimoneauToday, there is a shared sense of vulnerability and a shared resolve across political divides to better protect the United States and the world against the accidental release of biological agents (biosafety), deliberate misuse of biological agents (biosecurity), and naturally occurring spillover of dangerous pathogens.Struggling, Not Crumbling2023-11-20T12:00:00+08:002023-11-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/struggling-not-crumbling<p><em>Notwithstanding its difficulties at the front in Ukraine and economic hardships at home, Russia continues to pursue AI and other emerging technologies in a bid to future-proof its armed forces. However, it faces several major hurdles to before it can reach its objective of achieving battlefield superiority in selected areas.</em></p> -<h4 id="3-a-china-strategy-is-for-the-whole-uk-not-just-for-government">3. A China strategy is for the whole UK, not just for government.</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>In developing the strategy, the simple term “UK China strategy” merits unpacking and definition. It is about more than the bilateral relationship. Abroad, the UK encounters China in its relations with every country and in multilateral organisations. At home, China is not just a matter for government. Thousands, perhaps, millions, of people take decisions where China plays a role – from supplier selection to deciding how to protect open academic discussion in universities. Equally, while China is important, it is not everything: there are many other topics that matter to the UK. Still, many major decisions have an important China component without being decisions “about China”.</p> +<p>Discussing Russia and high technology these days may seem counterintuitive given the images from Ukraine of the Russian army in disarray, in trenches, using primarily massive artillery rather than ultramodern weapons with a high degree of autonomy. Likewise, the typical Russian tendency for overblown rhetoric has created unrealistic expectations among the broader public of what Russia was ready to deliver on the battlefield. Yet, the war is also providing a testing ground for new weapons systems on both sides. Mounting troubles notwithstanding, Russia continues to prioritise AI and selected emerging and disruptive technology (EDT) programmes not merely despite, but because of the weakening of its conventional forces and the growing capability gap with the West.</p> -<p>This breadth is important because China is often described as taking a “whole-of-state” approach to its affairs, whereby the Party’s dominant role removes any meaningful distinction between government and private actors. The ISC report discusses the security risks that this poses to British interests. In its most extreme formulation, the term significantly overestimates the Party’s coordination and cohesion across a country of 1.4 billion people, but the risks cannot be ignored.</p> +<h3 id="drivers-behind-russian-interest-in-ai">Drivers Behind Russian Interest in AI</h3> -<p>The UK must formulate an appropriate response that meets the challenge, while preserving our distinctive democratic strengths and diversity of opinion, not seeking to ape the controlling approach of the Chinese party-state. The UK government itself needs a “whole-of-government” approach that consistently integrates considerations of economics, security and values into decision-making. But also needed is a China strategy for the UK as a whole, which clarifies where government should make and mandate China-related decisions, and where others are better placed to do so.</p> +<p>There are a host of incentives driving the Russian political and military leadership’s continued focus on AI, despite the attention consumed by its war of aggression. AI is seen as a source both of potentially rapid military modernisation and of new vulnerabilities that enemies can exploit.</p> -<h4 id="4-those-who-make-the-decisions-need-to-be-well-informed">4. Those who make the decisions need to be well-informed.</h4> +<p>When Russian authorities launched a large-scale military reform programme in 2008, they expressed the concern that it would be too time-consuming to catch up militarily with the West the traditional way. EDTs, conversely, seemed to offer a potentially rapid, non-linear pathway to narrow – if not close – the capability gap. This logic still applies. Moreover, given the growing asymmetry in conventional power due to Russia’s extensive personnel and material losses in Ukraine, this reasoning appears even more relevant today.</p> -<p>The UK will make better decisions on China when those making the decisions know more about China, about how it sees the world, about others’ experience of dealing with China, and about how China in turn reacts. China is unfamiliar, opaque, multifaceted and fast-changing. Good decisions draw on knowledge and experience rather than on misconceptions, guesswork and stereotypes. Yet a 2021 Higher Education Policy Institute report highlighted that there is a “lack of knowledge and understanding [about China] that would enable actors in the private and public spheres to craft the answers that are needed”. The Integrated Review committed to “invest in enhanced China-facing capabilities, through which we will develop a better understanding of China and its people”.</p> +<p>The Russian authorities believe that trends such as the proliferation of autonomous and AI-enabled weapons systems and the convergence between human–machine learning, cyber and AI, coupled with novel operational concepts and force structures, will change the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement therein. Consequently, these developments seem to have the potential to undermine fundamental pillars of international security such as deterrence, arms control and strategic balance. Therefore, gaining or losing ground in the contest for cutting-edge military technology appears to have profound consequences for power distribution and Russia’s influence in the international system. Indeed, President Vladimir Putin has consistently spoken about technological development in existential terms: one either succeeds or they will be annihilated. In 2023, he compared AI development to the invention of the nuclear bomb – an event that fundamentally changed the course of history.</p> -<p>Three aspects merit greater attention. Firstly, there is a need to define the scope and nature of “China capabilities” that would help different decision-makers in and out of government. This should include practical experience, such as contract negotiations, as much as academic and policy knowledge. Second, many, if not most, people who make decisions with a China dimension will not be, and will not need to be, China experts. They must, however, know enough to make good decisions and be able to access expert knowledge as needed. The government can help facilitate this access. Finally, there is scope to draw more systematically on the experience of others. The Chinese diaspora in the UK offers a broad range of useful perspectives. The UK can learn more from how other countries manage their own complex China relationships, such as Japan and Australia.</p> +<p>Furthermore, Putin and other central players anticipate that defence innovation – and AI in particular – will produce dual-use technology that can drive a nationwide economic growth. This is needed now more than ever given the weight of Western sanctions. The hope is that the domestic defence industry will be able to provide technological solutions that Russia can no longer get from abroad. As put by the head of the AI Department at the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), Vasilii Yelistratov, military-civilian transfer takes place in both directions. Likewise, German Gref, the CEO of Russia’s largest state-owned bank Sberbank and one of the key figures in Russian AI development, argues that the introduction of AI could increase Russia’s GDP by 1% by 2025. He has pointed to Sberbank’s increase in labour productivity as a result of implementing AI. Others are even more optimistic. In July 2023, Russia hosted its first Future Technologies Forum, where Putin promised to transition the whole national economy and governance system to a new management model based on AI and Big Data in order to boost labour productivity.</p> -<h4 id="5-strategy-without-resourcing-and-implementation-is-just-wish-making">5. Strategy without resourcing and implementation is just wish-making.</h4> +<p>While these promises and benefits are yet to materialise, such statements and assessments clearly demonstrate the importance that Russian authorities attach to AI development, both for the future of the armed forces and the state as a whole.</p> -<p>Strategies often fail. Plans are written but not implemented. Successful strategies require objectives grounded in reality, supported with the right resourcing and organisational structures; clear responsibilities and accountabilities; incentives and sanctions to encourage action; and durable leadership commitment that adapts in the face of changing circumstances.</p> +<h3 id="how-is-russia-going-about-developing-ai">How is Russia Going About Developing AI?</h3> -<p>For the UK in relation to China, these conditions do not currently appear to be in place. The ISC China report found that “the slow speed at which strategies, and policies, are developed and implemented … leaves a lot to be desired”. It also rightly highlighted the need for longer-term planning and resource commitments. This in turn requires sufficient cross-party consensus for commitments to last through changes of government.</p> +<p>The Russian approach to defence innovation is based on a traditional top-down, state-driven model, although with important modifications. The objective is to take advantage of the progress being made in the civilian sector by fostering civil-military cooperation. In this way, Russia aims to maximise the state’s access to talent, resources and ideas, thus shortening the time between the generation of an idea and its full implementation. This approach appears to partly emulate US military-civilian sector cooperation, as well as the Chinese model of military-civil fusion, connecting science and technology parks to the campuses of large military universities.</p> -<p>Resourcing for China has increased. In March, the government announced a doubling in 2024/25 of funding for its China Capabilities Programme. Richard Moore, head of the Secret Intelligence Service, recently stated that “we now devote more resources to China than anywhere else, reflecting China’s increasing global significance”. This is likely not enough, though limited public information makes it hard to judge. Indeed, there are good strategic arguments for not revealing publicly the resource levels behind some initiatives.</p> +<p>Defence R&amp;D infrastructure is centrally coordinated by the Russian MoD’s Main Directorate of Innovative Development (GUIR). To further strengthen the MoD’s role as an engine for AI implementation, a special AI department was created in 2021. GUIR’s role is to organise, coordinate and support innovation programmes. Russia’s defence R&amp;D infrastructure consists of several hundred research institutes, design bureaus and testing centres that conduct applied research for the needs of the armed forces and the defence industry. In addition, Russia has created a number of AI centres and laboratories at leading academic institutions, such as the Neural Networks and Deep Learning Lab at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; the Higher School of Economics; the Ivannikov Institute for System Programming of the Russian Academy of Sciences; the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology; and the National Centre for Cognitive Technologies at the Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics University in Saint Petersburg.</p> -<p>However, it is not a question of money alone. Improving coordination, communication and alignment across government remains a big task. This is as much as question of leadership focus and organisational effectiveness as resource levels per se.</p> +<p>This ecosystem is supplemented with so called “radical innovation centres”, “technoparks” or “technocities” as generators of ideas and dual-use technologies. The Advanced Research Foundation (Fond perspektivnykh issledovanii), created in 2012, focuses on developing new and potentially disruptive dual-use technologies, such as unmanned vehicles (the Marker unmanned ground vehicle and the Udar unmanned tank); autonomous systems and automated decision-making; superconductors (Liman); additive technology of polymetallic products (Matritsa); autonomous deep-submergence vehicles (Vityaz-D); and ultra-thin materials for improving individual camouflage and protection (Tavolga).</p> -<p>Internationally, too, increased resources are needed. China is much more active on the global stage, putting increased time and effort into advancing its agenda in multilateral institutions and offering financial support to countries in the Global South in particular. There is increased contention and competition. Here, cooperation with others allows for burden-sharing, whether in addressing China’s efforts in the UN to redefine human rights or the implications of increased financial development assistance in the Pacific Islands. But more resources – both time and money – are needed if strategy is to be more than rhetoric.</p> +<p>Subsequently, in 2018 Russia established the Era Technopolis, which explicitly seeks to develop technology for the Russian armed forces in cooperation with the military-industrial complex and the civilian sector. Currently, there are more than 100 entities involved in cooperation with Era, including top arms manufacturers such as Kalashnikov, Sukhoi and Sozvezdie and dozens of civilian universities and research institutions, including the Kurchatov Institute – which hosts the largest interdisciplinary laboratory that has received a special role in Era, contributing to its management. The structure is supplemented with military scientific units (nauchnye roty), created first in 2013 on the basis of Russian military research and higher educational institutions. As of 2023, eight units are operating as part of Era within their specialised fields of expertise. Staffed by conscripts, Russia hopes that these units may also provide a recruiting ground, allowing it to retain specialists in the armed forces and defence industry.</p> -<h4 id="6-strategy-requires-learning-and-adaptation">6. Strategy requires learning and adaptation.</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Among the top priorities is improving command, control, communication and decision-making with AI, seen as critical to gaining and maintaining information superiority</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Strategy is not static. Broad objectives may remain constant, but prioritisation, detailed outcomes and how to achieve them will change. Strategy will also change, based on which policies work and which do not. As such, any detailed China strategy paper may quickly date. Strategy must learn and adapt rapidly to changed assessments and circumstances. It must these days consider a China with strong digital capabilities, but large structural economic problems, in a world of AI, rather than a high-growth China excelling in physical infrastructure.</p> +<p>Era has a cluster of 16 prioritised development fields, including AI, pattern recognition, robotics, small spacecrafts, information security, energy sufficiency, nanotechnology, nanomaterials, information and telecommunication systems, information technology and computer science, hydrometeorological and geophysical support, hydroacoustic object detection systems, geographic information platforms for military use, weapons based on new physical principles, radiolocation and targeting for high-precision weapons, and automated control. As Deputy Head of ERA for Scientific and Educational Activities Andrey Morozov explained, AI technology is not so much a product in itself, but rather a foundation intersecting almost all of the military’s EDT programmes.</p> -<p>Much of this learning will inevitably happen behind closed doors. However, external review and reflection – in parliament, in expert groups and in the broader community – is important too. A published China strategy can help anchor this debate, but it must not become a fixed baseline pursued for its own sake while the world changes.</p> +<h3 id="what-are-russias-defence-ai-priorities">What are Russia’s Defence AI Priorities?</h3> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Russia has a broad spectrum of programmes that are similar to those developed in the US and China, though they are usually smaller in scale. As of September 2022, GUIR has supported over 500 projects, 222 of which were planned for completion and implementation in 2022. Among the extensive list of projects, it is possible to discern several priority areas, including command, control, communication and decision-making; unmanned vehicles; nuclear and high-precision weapons; air defence, early warning, electronic warfare and space-based systems; and cyber and influence operations to shape the psychological domain.</p> -<p>China indeed has “implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”. While the government has made substantial progress on its approach to this challenge, more needs to be done.</p> +<p>While the list of Russian AI-enabled projects is too extensive for this article, below are some examples that illustrate the areas of Russia’s particular interest in AI for defence applications.</p> -<p>What matters more than having a strategy paper is a host of decisions in different domains, followed by resourcing, implementation and review. Reasonable people can disagree on what being “clear-eyed” about China means in practice. This is not the work of government alone, even where China pursues its own “whole-of-state” approach. Across the UK, better awareness is needed, both of the opportunities and the risks that China presents. This will allow people to strike the right balance between risk and return – and also determine where, on certain matters of security and values, there is no balance to be struck, and economic benefits must take a backseat. But without increased resources – both time and money – a better China strategy will remain an expression of hope rather than reality.</p> +<p>Among the top priorities is improving command, control, communication and decision-making with AI, seen as critical to gaining and maintaining information superiority. At a Defence Ministry Board meeting in December 2022, Putin called for the integration of AI technology at “all levels of decision-making” in the armed forces. The National Defence Management Centre, established in 2014 to provide the primary joint all-domain command and control structure, reportedly applies AI to support information collection, analysis and decision-making. Notably, Putin has referred to experiences from the battlefield in Ukraine, which in his assessment show that the most effective weapons systems are those that operate quickly and “almost in an automatic mode.”</p> -<hr /> +<p>Unmanned systems, furthermore, stand out as a special priority for AI applications. Before the 2022 invasion, Russia had more than 100 types of unmanned vehicles for a broad spectrum of missions at different stages of research, development and deployment. Many have been tested in Syria and are currently being employed in Ukraine. One of them is the KUB-LA kamikaze drone. Its producer, ZALA Aero Group – a subsidiary of Kalashnikov – claims it is able to select and engage targets with the use of AI technology. Another example is the Lancet-3 loitering munition, also observed in Ukraine. According to the same producer, it is highly autonomous given the use of sensors that enable it to locate and destroy a target without human guidance, even being capable of returning to the operator if a target has not been found. Likewise, Russia is testing several Marker unmanned ground vehicles that aim to use AI-enabled object recognition, process data via neural network algorithms, and employ autonomous driving capabilities. It remains unclear at this stage whether these unmanned systems have been used in this way in Ukraine. More data will be needed to verify their actual capabilities. Nonetheless, these claims indicate the areas of interest and the level of ambition when it comes to AI applications.</p> -<p><strong>Andrew Cainey</strong> is a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI and the founding director of the UK National Committee on China. He has lived and worked for most of the past twenty-five years in China, Korea and Singapore advising businesses and governments, having first visited China in 1981. His particular areas of focus relate to China’s development, its growing role and influence across Asia and globally and the intersection of economic prosperity, technology and national security.</p>Andrew CaineyChina poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”, according to the UK’s March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh.Written Evidence2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/written-evidence<p><em>The Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the European Union’s (EU) ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Specifically, the war unveiled the role of the European Commission as a policy entrepreneur which is enhancing its competences in security and defence through the usage of a “market-security nexus”. As defence cooperation gets increasingly framed by the EU in terms of economic efficiency and resilience, it might be difficult for London to ignore the gravitational pull of EU market and legislation in the long term. However, EU efforts in regulating the defence market are still nascent, and there are still both room and value for the UK to engage in this process. This submission is divided into three sections addressing the Terms of Reference (ToRs) 1, 3 and 5, respectively. Lastly, it concludes with a policy recommendations section suggesting specific avenues for defence cooperation within existing EU frameworks.</em></p> +<p>According to the Russian authorities, AI and autonomous elements are also being applied in the guidance systems of other key weapons such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile. Yelistratov has claimed that AI is “present in all weapons, especially in high-precision ones”. Russia is also using such technology in experimental weapons systems, such as the Poseidon nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable unmanned underwater vehicle.</p> -<h3 id="section-1">Section 1</h3> +<p>The Russian Aerospace Forces, created in 2015 to integrate defensive and offensive capabilities, have been developed to disrupt or degrade the foundations of US and NATO information technology-enabled warfare, including communications, space-based systems, critical networks and infrastructure that developed countries depend on. Despite claims in the first months of the war that Russia was not using electronic warfare in Ukraine, several systems have been confirmed to be operating in Ukraine, some of which allegedly employ AI. Among them is the RB109-A Bylina, which – according to Russian sources – uses AI to collect and prioritise large amounts of data to efficiently jam electronic signals. In June 2023, Russia reportedly used the S-350 Vityaz mobile surface-to-air defence missile system to shoot down a Ukrainian aircraft while operating in autonomous mode – that is, the system detected, tracked and destroyed a Ukrainian air target without human assistance. To verify such claims, more evidence will be necessary. There are plans to use the system to protect Moscow against Ukrainian drones from the end of 2023, which may provide additional information about the system’s actual capabilities.</p> -<h4 id="11-to-what-extent-does-the-eus-response-represent-a-departure-from-its-previous-approach-to-foreign-and-security-policy-is-this-likely-to-be-a-durable-shift">1.1 To what extent does the EU’s response represent a departure from its previous approach to foreign and security policy? Is this likely to be a durable shift?</h4> +<h3 id="what-are-the-obstacles">What are the Obstacles?</h3> -<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine seemed to have prompted a “whatever it takes” moment in EU defence, with novel initiatives particularly at the defence industrial level, a remit supranational institutions have historically struggled to regulate. The war urged the Commission to mobilise a new bureaucracy to advance proposals on how to utilise the EU’s defence industrial tools in the context of war. This effort culminated in:</p> +<p>The pace of Russian defence AI development varies; some programmes are more advanced than others. Generally, however, Russia lags behind its main competitors, the US and China.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The provision of military assistance via the European Peace Facility (EPF) and consequent growth of this instrument from €5.7 billion in 2021 to €12 billion in June 2023. The funds have been employed to repay EU member states for their contributions of weaponry to Ukraine and to collectively procure one million rounds of ammunition for Ukraine.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In June of 2023, the Council and the Parliament achieved an initial accord on the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), a €300 million initiative designed to encourage member states to collaboratively acquire urgently required military equipment.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In July of 2023, the EU formally endorsed the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), a €500 million program aimed at assisting companies in increasing their capacity for producing ammunition.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Russia continues to struggle with long-standing structural problems, such as insufficient funding, extensive corruption, inefficient use of resources, poor quality control, low labour productivity across the economy, the reliance of the defence industry on state order, and preferential funding that undermines competition and innovation. Weak rule of law, deficient intellectual property rights, and heavy-handed bureaucratic control are other factors hampering innovation. The education system appears to no longer be a suitable foundation for hi-tech development, as the Soviet system once was. Despite taking a number of steps to improve interest in and the quality of science and IT education, Russia has also been sliding down the Global Innovation Index, going from 43rd place in 2016 to 47th in 2022.</p> -<p>It is true that by advancing these initiatives the EU broke with past taboos and challenged the notion of Normative Power Europe (the oxymoronic use of the European Peace Facility as a weapons supply tool is a case in point). However, the pursuit of an enhanced role in the defence industrial field has been done consistently with what the EU does best: harnessing its regulatory and budgetary powers to increase Member States’ coordination in times of crisis. The European Commission is well-known for its policy activism and for framing issues towards its field of competencies. Thus, while it is certainly a novelty to observe this extent of EU action at the defence industrial level, the modalities through which increased supranational action was achieved in this remit are consistent with the EU’s modus operandi.</p> +<p>There are also doubts about the efficiency of the Russian defence innovation model itself. The cooperation framework managed by the Main Directorate for Innovation involves more than 1,200 entities including industrial parks, engineering centres, financial development institutions and leading universities and research institutes, and it is growing. One question is whether Russia’s extensive R&amp;D infrastructure can be successfully managed and coordinated centrally by the MoD, not least given widespread corruption.</p> -<p>A market power by design, the EU’s value proposition for the European defence after the invasion of Ukraine has mostly been a financial one. However, albeit noteworthy, financial incentives might not be enough to get European member states to cooperate on a more regular and frictionless basis in a policy domain characterised by competition and protectionism. Even if states concede to financial incentives and decide to cooperate, international arms collaboration means that the problem is shared but not necessarily reduced: the pie may become bigger, but the problem of who gets the largest slice persists. A financial incentives-based approach should not be dismissed, but a parallel conversation is needed. One which discusses the governance structures that can best accommodate multinational endeavours in the inherently competitive European defence industrial base. This conversation should recognise that defence partnerships should be built on states’ core strengths, organised along two dimensions: industrial and technological expertise, and value for money. This mere focus on “financial carrots” might lead to a less durable shift than originally expected, and European ambitions on joint procurement of capabilities might soon reach a stalling point.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Statements by Russian authorities indicate that the battlefield advantages provided by AI-enabled weapons systems and infrastructure are among the lessons Russia has been learning in Ukraine</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In terms of member states’ consensus on how to respond to future crises, it is important to note that the invasion of Ukraine was perceived as an existential matter for the EU. Consequently, one must be cautiously optimistic in expecting the same level of coherence in other foreign policy and security issues. Unequivocal US support and leadership as well as moral clarity about right and wrong in the Ukrainian context were also key enablers for a cohesive European response. However, not all foreign policy challenges present these characteristics. In fact, most of them don’t. See, for instance, the recent war in Gaza which left member-states deeply divided on how best to respond.</p> +<p>These long-standing impediments are aggravated by the circumstantial constraints generated as a consequence of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Despite Russian authorities’ assurances about the benefits of sanctions in terms of reducing Russia’s dependence on Western technology such as microelectronics, Russia is now growing more reliant on third countries – notably China, which is filling Russia’s most pressing technology gaps. Sanctions are likely to have a long-standing impact on the Russian national economy and tech industry.</p> -<h4 id="12-what-implications-if-any-does-the-eus-response-to-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-have-for-the-uk-eu-relationship-in-foreign-defence-and-security-policy">1.2 What implications, if any, does the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have for the UK-EU relationship in foreign, defence and security policy?</h4> +<p>Thus far, however, Russia has been able – to some degree – to evade sanctions and exploit loopholes in the exports control regime, using illicit networks to smuggle key components to third countries, from where they can be shipped to Russia. As a result, for instance, Russia has managed not only to continue but to double missile and tank production compared to the numbers before February 2022. Likewise, in August 2023, the Moscow State University launched its new supercomputer, which is to be used for various AI and high-performance computing applications and for training large AI models.</p> -<p>As explained above, the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the EU’s ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field. Since the Lisbon Treaty, there has been a debate about the shift towards more national or less European-oriented foreign and security policies in Europe. Recent developments, however, suggest a potential new phase resembling a process where Brussels gains more influence in this policy domain. The Commission has taken on the role of a policy entrepreneur, aiming to boost its political aspirations and significance. Specifically, it has seized on the opportunity of advancing EU policy in the area of common defence procurement. Yet, it has only done so with the express consent and direct tasking of the European Council. This dynamic is essential to understand the new policy developments, which are guided by both the supranational and intergovernmental levels.</p> +<p>That said, Russia is struggling with other pervasive problems, such as the long-standing decline in professional expertise in the defence sector. The country has witnessed a demographic decline over the past 30 years, further worsened by short life expectancy. The exodus of IT specialists, top scientists and university professors in the wake of the invasion and the high casualties on the battlefield are likely to aggravate the brain drain.</p> -<p>Thus, it is true that the supranational level gained unprecedented importance the security and defence field, but this relevance was granted and tasked by the member states. As a result, the supranational and intergovernmental levels will continue to operate in tandem, one serving the other when necessary. Consensus will remain difficult to achieve vis-à-vis challenges that are perceived as less existential, and member states will resort to more or less “usage of Europe” according to the scale and perceived importance of the security challenge. Therefore, it is likely for a “Europe of different speed” scenario to materialise, with the Commission building coalitions and cooperating with member states that share its integrative approach. This could translate into pan-European defence projects scaling down and leaving room for smaller groupings and “coalitions of the willing”. Selectivity and differentiation can be introduced into existing institutional structures or patterns of cooperation in order to overcome political hurdles, bring about greater efficiencies, or accommodate diversity. This would have positive implications for the UK, as it could potentially entail more agile frameworks of cooperation and a new approach to like-minded non-EU partners.</p> +<p>These problems are likely to impact the culture of defence innovation. On the one hand, the brain drain, economic hardships, and limited access to ideas from and cooperation with other countries may further undermine creativity and aggravate existing structural problems. On the other hand, the Russian leadership is determined to rebuild and modernise its ravaged armed forces, and aims to do so rapidly. This, together with the pressure to deliver technological solutions for immediate battlefield deployment, could accelerate the development of AI for defence applications. Statements by the Russian authorities, including Putin, clearly indicate that the battlefield advantages provided by AI-enabled weapons systems and infrastructure are among the lessons Russia has been learning in Ukraine.</p> -<p>So far, the war did not substantially change how the EU approaches and categorises its third-country partners. The EU Strategic Compass has a promising rhetoric in its partnerships chapter. Yet, besides merely listing who the key partners are, the document falls short in operationalising each specific partnership and in detailing how each partner is instrumental to achieve the EU’s foreign policy objectives. Each partnership should involve a tailor-made component to ensure that each is best suited to achieving a specific goal. Yet, the EU has long been reluctant to tailor its partnership agreements. Instead, it has generally favoured deals that are scalable and applicable to sets of countries rather than to individual states. This is because of several reasons such as the risk of the creating of in- and out-groups and a resulting decline in intra-EU cohesion; lowest-common-denominator problems in integration as member states opt-out of specific policies; moral hazard as laggards fall further behind; vulnerability to the interests of non-EU members alongside legitimacy problems in third countries; and increased complexity within the EU system.</p> +<h3 id="tentative-conclusions">Tentative Conclusions</h3> -<p>A prolonged conflict in Ukraine and new complex security challenges are likely to change this approach. The EU and its member states must establish mutually beneficial connections with nations upon which they rely strategically or wish to establish strategic interdependence. However, this time, reliance solely on market forces is insufficient: deliberate choices must be made regarding new and unavoidable dependencies, not simply accepting those imposed by market forces or competing entities. European leaders must tactically structure their partnerships to strengthen their ability to make decisions and foster stronger bonds among partners, both within and beyond their borders. This new process of partnering will see the UK as the most natural ally.</p> +<p>The overall deployment of Russian AI-enabled systems indicates that Russian AI appears to be in the early stages of maturity. The primary focus is on incremental evolution: upgrading legacy systems – nuclear, strategic non-nuclear, and non-military methods and means of warfare – with new technologies. Russia is combining conventional warfare and platforms with innovative technological solutions, including AI in data analysis and decision support, loitering munitions, electronic warfare and communication analysis, and as a component in cyber warfare and information confrontation – to name but a few examples. Simultaneously, Russia is experimenting with selected “risky projects” and novel systems, materials and approaches to warfare that can potentially yield battlefield advantages – if not superiority – in selected areas.</p> -<h3 id="section-2">Section 2</h3> +<p>One of the challenges in assessing Russian – and other countries’ – AI-enabled weapon systems is the difficulty of determining when full autonomy has actually been used in a lethal context, as opposed to declarations by authorities or producers that may have agendas other than speaking the truth (such as advertising systems to potential buyers, or portraying the army as ultramodern to impress domestic and international audiences). More data and cross-referencing will be needed to verify such claims. Still, these statements provide important information about the types of capabilities and capacities that the state is interested in and actively pursuing.</p> -<h4 id="21-is-there-a-need-for-greater-coordination-and-cooperation-between-the-eu-and-the-uk-on-defence-policy-if-so-what-sorts-of-cooperation-should-be-prioritised">2.1 Is there a need for greater coordination and cooperation between the EU and the UK on defence policy? If so, what sorts of cooperation should be prioritised?</h4> +<p>The study of Russian defence AI development is further complicated by the ambiguity of the term “AI” in the Russian discourse. According to the official definition provided in the 2019 Russian AI Strategy, AI consists of “technological solutions capable of mimicking human cognition and performing intellectual tasks similarly to, or better than, humans”. The Russian definition distinguishes between “automation” (avtomatizatsiya) – that is, automated, remotely controlled and semi-autonomous weapons systems – and “intellectualisation” (intellektualizatsiya), corresponding to integrated machine learning and other sub-elements of AI technology. However, these terms are often used interchangeably – as are automation and autonomy – and without proper precision.</p> -<p>British participation in European defence matters to the EU because of London’s historical security commitment to the region and its twin status as one of Europe’s two major military powers as well as its most advanced weapons manufacturer. Similarly, the EU’s increased regulation of the defence market as well as making more funding available at the supranational level (particularly for R&amp;D, where the UK is lagging behind) should prompt an interest from the UK in being part of the conversation. Thus, increased cooperation is indeed desirable from both sides.</p> +<p>The extensive Russian failures during the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine are likely to prompt major reassessment and reforms in the Russian armed forces. It remains to be seen whether the experience will also result in a major push to accelerate defence innovation. In any case, the Russian regime is unequivocal about where its priorities lie: despite the deteriorating economic environment, falling living standards and the mounting cost of the war, Russia is doubling down on military spending. According to the draft state budget for 2024, the plan is to increase defence spending by 68% compared to the 2023 defence budget, constituting 6% of GDP.</p> -<p>However, cooperation for the sake of cooperation has rarely proved successful and there are still a set of restrictions for non-EU countries wishing to join EU-led defence initiatives. The level of integration with the EU Single Market decides the viability of defence cooperation with the EU initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), ASAP and EDIRPA and most initiatives. Thus, the UK should prioritise cooperation under institutions and frameworks that are less underpinned by a “play as you pay” rationale. Namely:</p> +<p>It is yet to be seen whether Russia will follow through, and if so, to what extent its military organisation will be able to absorb the funding efficiently, and how much will be devoted to defence AI and R&amp;D. However, as Russia rebuilds its armed forces, it will not necessarily just reconstruct what has been lost in Ukraine. The lessons learned in this war will inform the selection of priorities for military modernisation. Moreover, as a swift miliary-build up in a linear fashion will be hindered by the constrained socioeconomic and industrial environment, AI will likely remain a top priority for selected applications in the pursuit of rapid gains in battlefield advantage.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>European Defence Agency (EDA): Conditions for third party involvement with the EDA are outlined in Article 23 of the Council Decision establishing the Agency. These rules allow for interaction, project partnerships, and voluntary personnel contributions, but they do not confer voting rights or automatic invitation to any meeting, in particular steering board meetings. Third country involvement with the EDA is also unlikely to automatically favour permanent access into the European defence ecosystem. When it comes to liaising with third parties, the primary role of the EDA is getting third states in line with what member states are doing. Driven by the principles of added value, mutual benefit and reciprocity, the EDA simply matches states’ capabilities there where possible and necessary. In this sense, the Administrative Arrangements signed with the EDA are to be understood as a license to unlock ad-hoc, project-based cooperation rather than an unrestricted entry ticket to the EU defence theme park. However, given the importance of the EDA as an information exchange platform, involvement with this agency can contribute to the strengthening of ties between participating actors.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>European Peace Facility (EPF): This is an off-budget instrument that supports military and defence actions in the pursuit of CSDP objectives. For now, the EPF is outside the general budget, yet it functions in parallel to the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF 2021-2027). This allowed member states to establish a total budget for the EPF over a seven-year period, as well as agreeing on yearly spending limits. By tying the EPF to negotiations for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), member states determined the financial allocations for the EPF within a larger discussion on how much they wanted to allocate to EU external actions overall. Previous experience with the Athena Mechanism (which served as a precursor to the EPF, along with the African Peace Facility) suggested that arrangements for participation from non-EU countries could be arranged. In fact, it would be unwise for the EU to prohibit contributions from like-minded countries, especially those with whom it has established agreements. Under the financial rules outlined in the Council Decision for Athena, non-EU countries (such as those in the EEA, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Chile, Mexico) were indeed permitted to participate in the mechanism, though without voting rights in its decision-making process. The European Peace Facility operates under similar principles but allows third countries to have a say in ensuring that their voluntary contributions are utilised according to agreed upon terms. Article 30 of the EPF Council Decision states that contributions from third parties require prior approval from the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC). The EPF’s own committee can then authorize the administrative handling of the financial contribution, which may be designated for specific actions or operations. The specific purpose of the voluntary contribution is outlined in the administrative arrangement with the respective third party. The administrator of the Facility Committee is responsible for ensuring that the management of voluntary contributions adheres to the relevant administrative arrangements. They are obligated to provide each contributor, either directly or through the applicable operation commander, with pertinent information regarding the handling of the voluntary contribution as outlined in the relevant administrative arrangement. This allows a third country to monitor how its financial contribution is utilised. This is key for the UK and presents a good mechanism for a more transactional, ad-hoc and supervised engagement.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>PESCO: In the field of security and defence, scholarship has singled out PESCO as a framework embodying high levels of differentiation in its very design. PESCO exhibits not only selectivity in membership but also project-based clustering and patterns of differentiated cooperation that result in external differentiation through the engagement of third countries, differentiation in the relationship with third countries, and a complex division of labour vis-à-vis non-EU institutions, including NATO, and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). As a result, PESCO provides the best framework for the UK to cherry pick the level of integration of the project, the number of partners and the type of activities. When it comes to cooperation formats, history shows that the most successful cooperative-development programmes have few partners and a clear leader, thus the UK should look at PESCO projects that have these characteristics.</p> +<p>General Vladimir Zarudnitskii, Head of the Russian Military Academy of the General Staff, is right in saying that the ability to adapt AI-enabled systems will have a major impact on the Russian armed forces and warfare in general. However, developing the technology is only the first of many hurdles that Russia has to surmount before it can claim success. To take advantage of AI and other EDTs, Russia has to not only harness technology itself, but also adapt concepts, doctrines, forces structures and recruitment patterns accordingly. The conflict in Ukraine, meanwhile, has exposed a high degree of institutional conservatism in the Russian military. There are indications, nonetheless, that the Russians are adapting, however slowly. To what extent the leadership will be able to draw the right conclusions and increase responsiveness to change across the military organisation under the conditions of an ongoing war remains to be seen. Russia’s symmetric and asymmetric responses will shed more light on the ability of its military to learn and apply lessons – or lack thereof.</p> - <p>Third party involvement with PESCO starts with a formal request initiated by the third country applicant. Importantly, the request should be initiated by a country’s government and not by its legal entity, or defence company, as is the case with EDF. The request should be submitted to the coordinator(s) of the PESCO project in question (i.e. to the member states, not to an EU institution). It needs to contain detailed information on the reasons for participating in the project and the scope and form of the proposed participation. Finally, the request must substantiate the fulfilment of a set of conditions, laid out in Article 3 of the Conclusions.</p> +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Katarzyna Zysk</strong> is Professor of International Relations and Contemporary History at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.</p>Katarzyna ZyskNotwithstanding its difficulties at the front in Ukraine and economic hardships at home, Russia continues to pursue AI and other emerging technologies in a bid to future-proof its armed forces. However, it faces several major hurdles to before it can reach its objective of achieving battlefield superiority in selected areas.Submarine Diplomacy2023-11-17T12:00:00+08:002023-11-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/submarine-diplomacy<p><em>China is quietly deepening its influence along the Bay of Bengal, intimately linked to Beijing’s expanding overseas interests. Commercial satellite imagery reveals that China has made significant progress on a naval base it is constructing for Bangladesh’s military. The base houses a pair of submarines that Dhaka received from Beijing two years before ground broke at the facility. China has likewise transferred a submarine to neighboring Myanmar to aid the embattled military regime.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> - <p>They consist of four key requirements. Firstly, the third country must share the values on which the EU is founded as well as the overall objectives of the Union’s CFSP laid out in article 21(2) TEU. Secondly, it must provide substantial added value to the PESCO project in question. Here, substantial value is loosely defined by the EU, thereby providing significant room for manoeuvre for the applicants to make their case. As a rule of thumb, the applicant’s contribution to the project must be complementary to those offered by the rest of the participating member states, for example by providing technical expertise or additional capabilities including operational or financial support. The EU does not set any specific threshold or measurement for complementarity. Thirdly, it is important that the third state’s participation does not imply the creation of dependencies for the EU. This point is particularly contentious when it comes to allowing participation from powerful third countries such as the US, but it is advantageous for smaller states with niche capabilities. Lastly, the applicant state must have a Security of Information Agreement with the EU and an Administrative Arrangement with EDA. The third country’s application making these arguments will then be assessed by the project’s participating members who will unanimously decide on whether or not to include the third country. Once the participating members have approved the request, they will inform the High Representative and the European Council of its decision. Only following the Council’s green light, can an invitation to join the project be made to the third state. If the invitation is accepted, an Administrative Arrangement is negotiated outlining contributions and modes of engagement. A template for such an administrative arrangement between project members and third states can be found on the last page of the Council Decision establishing conditions for third-party involvement in PESCO.</p> +<p>Beijing’s efforts to strengthen ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar are taking place amid growing geopolitical competition with India. As smaller powers in the region seek to shore up their military capabilities, India and China are striving to become the security provider of choice.</p> - <p>Much of the detail on third country participation will be in an Administrative Agreement, thus leaving an important element of uncertainty. This also includes specific rules regarding the project’s intellectual property. As a general rule, the PESCO consortium retains full control of all the project’s intellectual property, but it seems plausible that specific rules could be formulated in the agreement. One last interesting aspect is that the Decision specifies a separate set of rules for countries (i.e., third-party states) and defence industry companies (i.e., third-party entities) in the modality of joining PESCO projects. For now, the main difference is that third-party states have been eligible to join since the conclusion of the agreement (November 2020), whereas companies must wait until 2026. Lastly, the entanglement between PESCO and the EDF needs to be addressed and, specifically, the controversies around the EDF’s PESCO bonus. EDF regulation maintains that an action developed in the context of a PESCO project can benefit from a funding increase of an additional 10%. This, however, is only valid for EU member states or associated countries. Under no circumstances can a third country succeed in using PESCO participation as a shortcut to access EDF money.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Bilateral and minilateral cooperation outside EU structures: Conscious of the challenges of collaborative projects, European states have continued to collaborate along bilateral and minilateral lines. The proliferation of such arrangements has often been seen as one of the underlying causes behind the fragmentation and duplication of European defence efforts. However, there is limited appreciation of the conductive power of these modes of engagement, and of how the existence of lower-level, smaller-format collaborations can then spill over to the multilateral level. For instance, when the EU established PESCO in 2017, much of the project-based clustering was based on existing bilateral and minilateral defence initiatives between states outside the supranational umbrella, which were then incorporated into the EU’s defence and security architecture. As such, these more ad-hoc types of cooperation should not necessarily be seen as antagonising to multilateral efforts happening at the EU or NATO levels.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Over the past decade, China has increasingly filled that role. Since 2010, more than two-thirds of Bangladesh’s arms imports, and nearly half of Myanmar’s, have come from China.</p> -<h4 id="22-the-communiqué-issued-following-the-nato-heads-of-state-and-government-summit-in-july-2023-stated-that-for-the-strategic-partnership-between-nato-and-the-eu-non-eu-allies-fullest-involvement-in-eu-defence-efforts-is-essential-and-looked-forward-to-mutual-steps-representing-tangible-progress-in-this-area-to-support-a-strengthened-strategic-partnership-as-a-non-eu-member-of-nato-what-steps-if-any-should-the-uk-take-to-give-effect-to-this">2.2 The communiqué issued following the NATO Heads of State and Government summit in July 2023 stated that for “the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in EU defence efforts is essential” and looked forward to “mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership”. As a non-EU Member of NATO what steps, if any, should the UK take to give effect to this?</h4> +<p>Military-to-military exchanges also support China’s strategic objectives. Closer defense ties may help the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) secure access to logistics facilities needed to sustain future naval operations in the region. The U.S. Department of Defense includes both Bangladesh and Myanmar on its short list of locations where Beijing has likely considered establishing overseas military facilities.</p> -<p>The UK should recognise that EU defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden- sharing and that they are not envisaged as competing with NATO. The UK should continue to engage in those EU projects that are particularly important to the Alliance. It has already done so, though to a limited extent. Joining PESCO’s Military Mobility project is a glaring example. Improving military mobility in Europe has long been one of the flagship areas for EU–NATO cooperation. Indeed, it represents one of those spaces in which the EU and NATO complement each other. Namely, while NATO is able to plan and calculate the military’s needs for transport across Europe, the EU has the legal and regulatory weight to streamline processes as well as available funds and programmes on cross-border mobility. PESCO’s military mobility project epitomises a case where EU action supports NATO efforts and, as such, London’s decision to join was perfectly aligned with UK government policy. As a NATO but non-EU member the UK should continue to prioritise initiatives that are in support of the Alliance. Participation in such projects should be easier to sell domestically, can serve as an initial steppingstone to normalise the relationship, and might have a conductive power towards further engagement.</p> +<p>Gaining a foothold in the Bay of Bengal would significantly level up the PLA’s ability to operate farther from China’s own shores and create new challenges for India, as well as the United States and its allies.</p> -<h3 id="section-3">Section 3</h3> +<h3 id="building-ties-in-bangladesh">Building Ties in Bangladesh</h3> -<h4 id="31-some-experts-have-identified-a-more-geopolitical-eu-that-is-more-assertive-in-its-role-as-a-foreign-policy-and-security-actor-following-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-do-you-agree-with-this-assessment-if-so-what-implications-does-it-have-for-the-uk">3.1 Some experts have identified a more “geopolitical” EU that is more assertive in its role as a foreign policy and security actor following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what implications does it have for the UK?</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wNb0mLm.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>The EU suffers from the legacy of separating the exclusive competence for the EU to act in the sphere of trade from the more limited competence to develop a foreign policy. This stark separation has been slowly eroding since the EU Global Strategy of 2016, and the war in Ukraine has accelerated this process. Specifically, the war (and the pandemic before it) sped up the emergence of the Commission as a geopolitical actor and the securitisation of those areas that fall under EU competencies to a greater extent than defence such as, for instance, energy, economic security and supply chain resilience.</p> +<p>As a part of the Forces Goal 2030 initiative designed to modernize its military, Bangladesh ordered its first two submarines from China in 2013 for the bargain price of just $203 million. Both vessels are Type 035G diesel-electric attack submarines, a Ming-class variant first commissioned into the PLA Navy (PLAN) in 1990.</p> -<p>The Single Market experience continues to permeate every aspect of EU policymaking and, since the beginning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Commission has tried to enhance its competences within the traditional intergovernmental policy domain of security and defence through the usage of a “market-security nexus”. The sustained war in Ukraine exposed a European industrial resilience problem, and joint defence procurement became to be understood as crucial in making a decisive impact on the future competitiveness of Community industries in the internal market. By framing a traditional intergovernmental problem through a market resilience lens, the Commission managed to get members states to seek supranational solutions and to accept innovative proposals. For instance, the Commission’s shift in approach and understanding of Article 41.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) can be considered quite ground-breaking. Until recently, the idea of using the Union budget for defence procurement was unimaginable. The Commission is therefore using crises to act as a policy entrepreneur to further enhance its political ambitions and to suggest innovative solutions.</p> +<p>China refitted and upgraded the two vessels before handing them over to Bangladesh in 2016, but their capabilities remain far behind modern attack submarines fielded by today’s leading navies.</p> -<p>This dynamic has important implications for the UK. As defence cooperation gets increasingly perceived through the lenses of economic efficiency and resilience, it might be difficult for London to ignore the gravitational pull of EU market and legislation. The enhanced role of the Commission in security and defence is likely to increase the EU’s capacity to shape behaviour externally through “milieu shaping”. As a result, it is important for the UK to be involved in the restructuring of the European defence market. In fact, for nations or companies that didn’t participate in this process from the beginning, joining later would pose significant difficulties.</p> +<p>Just one year after handing over the vessels, the giant Chinese state-owned defense contractor Poly Technologies secured a $1.2 billion contract with Bangladesh to build a new submarine support facility on the country’s southeastern coast.</p> -<h3 id="section-4-recommendations">Section 4: Recommendations</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xw4vYiA.jpg" alt="image02" /></p> -<p>The UK and the EU are natural partners and, as highlighted throughout this contribution, there is mutual benefit in further cooperation. As EU member states delegate more authority to the supranational level in the field of security and defence, it might get increasingly difficult for the UK to ignore the gravitational pull of the EU in the process of the restructuring of the European defence market. However, this process has only just started and there is value for the UK to engage in it relatively early on. When it comes to the modalities for such engagement, the ball is largely in the UK’s court. British policymakers should recognise that closer post-Brexit cooperation with EU institutions is an iterative process, and therefore subject to change as lessons are being learnt and as the context evolves. Ultimately, scalability and proportionality infuse the EU’s approach to partnerships. As such, EU eagerness to effectively explore and legally spell out advanced forms of security cooperation with the UK will much depend on the latter’s willingness to commit itself to cooperation in the first place. Opportunities exist:</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Work on the BNS Sheikh Hasina Naval Base kicked off in the summer of 2018. By 2020, Chinese builders had made significant progress in constructing the foundations of the 1.75 square kilometer facility.</p> +</blockquote> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The first step for bringing more coherence to UK-EU cooperation would be signing an Administrative Arrangement with the EDA. As studies have shown, the latter scenario could facilitate increased interaction between representatives from the UK and the EU, potentially creating opportunities for greater involvement of Britain in EU initiatives where the EDA plays a part. There is no “one size fits all” Administrative Arrangement for third countries, and each one is negotiated separately and on an ad hoc basis. Specifically, the agreement will stipulate rights and responsibilities for the UK as well as introducing a review mechanism to periodically assess whether the UK is meeting those obligations. It is important to demystify it, however. Signing an Administrative Arrangement with the EU is not a political step towards strengthening relationships with the bloc. It should be understood as a licence to unlock ad hoc, project-based cooperation that is intended to fully respect the signatory’s national sovereignty.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The UK should explore further involvement in PESCO beyond the Military Mobility project, which does not entail research and development activities. Participating in a PESCO capability development project could serve as a means for the UK to explore the extent to which third countries can engage in EU capability development initiatives, and to observe how the existing regulations regarding intellectual property and export controls are applied in practice. If the EU demonstrated a willingness to interpret its regulations in a flexible manner, it would open the door for greater UK involvement in both PESCO and, potentially, the EDF. As previous studies suggested, participating in a PESCO capability development project presents an opportunity for the UK to explore the limits of third-party engagement in EU capability development mechanisms. It allows the UK to assess the practical interpretation of existing regulations concerning intellectual property and export controls. If the EU demonstrates flexibility in its rule interpretation, it could open doors for the UK to engage more closely in both PESCO and the EDF. Cooperating under the PESCO umbrella has changed the way member states communicate with each other in addition to providing access to key documents and information and facilitating the creation of personal links among the member states’ representatives. As such, PESCO might represent a valuable socialisation forum as well as being a trust-building exercise.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Lastly, bilateral cooperation with European states remains vital as, for instance, the Lancaster House treaties with France have already demonstrated. The UK will need to address European partners individually as much as collectively.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IQCdJNm.jpg" alt="image03" /></p> -<hr /> +<blockquote> + <p>Bangladesh inaugurated the new facility in March 2023. The base’s namesake, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, praised the capabilities of the base, calling it “ultra-modern.” Several Chinese officials, including at least two senior PLAN officers, were present at the opening ceremony.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Isabella Antinozzi</strong> is a Research Analyst in the Defence, Industries and Society Research Group at RUSI.</p>Isabella AntinozziThe Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the European Union’s (EU) ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field.Two Wars, One Denominator2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/two-wars-one-denominator<p><em>As the war in Gaza distracts the West from its support for Ukraine, Russia is seeking to exploit the situation by positioning itself as a reasonable broker that has the ear of both Israel and Hamas.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>Satellite imagery from July 2023 shows that construction continues. Despite the ongoing work, Bangladesh has already stationed its Chinese-made submarines there.</p> +</blockquote> -<excerpt /> +<blockquote> + <p>Once completed, the base will be capable of docking six submarines and eight warships simultaneously.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The two wars currently dominating the agenda – the Ukraine war and the Israel–Gaza conflict – have one common denominator: Russia. While the causes and aims of the two conflicts are incomparable, Russia has nevertheless sought to ensure that it remains at the heart of the action. But its intentions and management of its different relationships in the Middle East are rather more complex.</p> +<p>China’s ties to the base may go well beyond its construction. A senior Bangladeshi official acknowledged that Chinese personnel would also be involved in training Bangladesh’s submariners on how to operate the submarines and the new base, although few details have been shared publicly.</p> -<p>While Russia’s ties with Israel have fluctuated over the years, they have strengthened since the Soviet Union’s collapse. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s ambiguous response has strained their relationship. These difficulties were brought to the fore recently on 29 October: in a series of unsettling events, a flight from Tel Aviv landing in the southern Russian city of Makhachkala (Dagestan) was forced to evacuate its passengers due to a rioting mob expressing support for the Palestinian cause and seeking to attack Israelis and Jews.</p> +<p>Additionally, in her remarks at the base’s opening, Prime Minister Hasina noted that the facility could be used as a service point for ships sailing in the Bay of Bengal—a potential signal that the PLAN may one day call at port there.</p> -<p>The Kremlin’s response varied from initial prevarication by the security services (who did not regain control over the airport for several hours), blaming the West for the demonstrations and accusing Ukrainian forces of fomenting the civil unrest (with no evidential links between them), to holding a major meeting to discuss the antisemitic event and promising to detain those responsible. None of this filled either the Jewish community across Russia or Israel with much confidence, and Russia’s attempts to involve itself in Israel’s war are unlikely to be well-received in Jerusalem.</p> +<p>In contrast with the media fanfare normally associated with China’s overseas infrastructure projects, official outlets have been conspicuously silent on the base. These hushed tones may be intended to avoid antagonizing India, where there are mounting concerns over China’s role in developing the military capabilities of its neighbors. Beijing may also be seeking to avoid stoking additional unease among the United States and its allies.</p> -<h3 id="russia-israel-ties">Russia-Israel Ties</h3> +<p>For its part, Bangladesh has sought to balance its geopolitical relationships with both India and China. Even as it courts military support from China, the Bangladeshi military also conducts annual bilateral exercises with the Indian military, including most recently in October 2023. Nevertheless, as China endeavors to strengthen ties with Bangladesh, the PLAN may find it an increasingly receptive partner in the Bay of Bengal.</p> -<p>While Russia and Israel’s relationship over Syria and deconfliction in the country’s airspace is part of the bilateral picture, as Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has moved further to the right, Israel has sought to forge alliances with countries that have not been traditional Western allies, including India and Hungary as well as Russia.</p> +<h3 id="making-waves-in-myanmar">Making Waves in Myanmar</h3> -<p>However, upon Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel took an unclear position, raising hackles in both Kyiv and Moscow. Israel did not fall behind the Western consensus and has not sanctioned Russia, but nor has it offered military assistance to Ukraine. Israel did accept several thousand Ukrainian refugees, but there was intense debate within Israel about whether to cap their entry, alongside accusations that the refugees’ social and medical benefits had expired and not been renewed. Israel did offer humanitarian aid to Kyiv, and has nominally professed support for Ukrainian independence. But the Canadian parliament’s lauding in September of a Ukrainian Second World War veteran who served in a Nazi unit prompted criticism from Israel, reinvigorating the debate about Ukraine’s contentious role and attitude towards Jews during the war.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LdE9Kco.png" alt="image04" /></p> -<p>Russia itself has a long history of institutionalised antisemitism, pogroms and demonisation of the Jewish community. Although antisemitism and racially aggravated assaults have never been eradicated from Russian society, President Vladimir Putin has made his position on Russian Jewry clear, and has long lent support to the large Jewish community in Moscow, including the commemoration of Jews killed during the Holocaust. He has been lauded for this by representatives of the Jewish community – particularly Rabbi Berel Lazar, one of two claimants to the title of Chief Rabbi of Moscow.</p> +<p>Further south along the bay’s coast, China appears to be pursuing a similar strategy in Myanmar. In 2021, it transferred a Type 035B (Ming-class) submarine to the Myanmar navy in a sign of support to the embattled military junta.</p> -<p>Putin considers the leaders of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim faiths in Russia to be important allies and a broader part of Russia’s identity as a multicultural nation, and meets with them frequently – although his relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church runs much deeper. Lazar has also walked a careful line between advocating for his community and ensuring that Putin remains onside, which has included a degree of neutrality on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and ambiguity around his views of the Russian government’s actions.</p> +<p>The deal was shrouded in secrecy, but China may have provided the submarine for free in a bid to outcompete India’s efforts to gain influence there. Just one year prior, India gifted Myanmar’s then democratically elected transitional government a Russian-built Kilo-class submarine.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The message of Russia-as-peacemaker serves a useful role in the Kremlin’s quest for legitimacy and power projection in the Middle East</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Media reports revealed that in 2022 Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw) docked its new Chinese-built submarine at the Thit Poke Taung Navy Base, which is strategically positioned on a stretch of land jutting into the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal. Satellite imagery from April 2023 provides a bird’s-eye view of the base, with the Chinese-made submarine clearly visible.</p> -<p>The events in Dagestan have particular resonance for Russia’s Jewish communities, which have an historical connection to the North Caucasus. While only a few hundred families may remain in Dagestan, the local Jewish population – known as the Mountain Jews – used to be spread across trade routes over the entire Caucasus region, including Chechnya, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. With their own distinct language, culture and traditions, thousands of the Mountain Jewish community were killed during the Holocaust, and while some remained, most relocated to Moscow or larger cities after the war, with others emigrating to Israel or the US after 1991.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VlpJuYF.jpg" alt="image05" /></p> -<p>Since the Israel–Gaza war began, there has been a surge in violent antisemitic demonstrations across Russia’s North Caucasus, demanding the expulsion of local Jews and attacking a Jewish cultural centre. Given the region’s history, the Dagestan riots have been likened to the pogroms of the past, which sought to uproot well-established Jewish communities.</p> +<p>The facility lies just 10 kilometers north of Kyaukpyu Port, which is home to one of China’s marquee infrastructure projects in the region. China invested billions of dollars into building liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil facilities and pipelines from Kyaukpyu Port to Yunnan Province in southern China.</p> -<p>But the messaging from the Kremlin has been unclear. Rabbi Lazar met with Putin to discuss the demonstrations, alongside Patriarch Kirill and the Grand Mufti Tadzhuddin. But the Kremlin’s Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, has criticised as Israel’s warning against its citizens travelling to the North Caucasus as “anti-Russian”, in part to downplay the extent of the riots. It appears that Russia is still trying to play both sides of this conflict.</p> +<p>The pipelines can reportedly carry some 12 billion cubic meters of gas and 22 million barrels of oil per year. These projects are aimed, in part, at reducing China’s dependence on the nearby Malacca Strait, a critical maritime chokepoint through which much of China’s energy imports flow.</p> -<h3 id="israels-war-russias-gain">Israel’s War, Russia’s Gain</h3> +<p>Chinese state-owned firms CITIC and China Harbor Engineering Company are also seeking to develop a deepwater port and a special economic zone project at Kyaukpyu, in what Chinese state media have referred to as a “model project in China-Myanmar BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] cooperation.”</p> -<p>Despite its attempts to involve itself in this war and to present an image of a mediator with the ear of both Israel and Hamas, in truth, Moscow has neither. The narrative, however, is useful for Russia in several key ways.</p> +<p>The $7.3 billion project is expected to begin construction after an ongoing environmental assessment is complete. Much like other projects developed through China’s favored “Port-Park-City Model” (or Shekou Model, 蛇口模式), the entire zone will be under CITIC control for 50 years.</p> -<p>First, Russia is attempting to position itself as a reasonable broker appealing for calm, which Hamas has lauded. Although few in the West are willing to buy this line, Russia will use its positioning as a future bargaining chip in its war against Ukraine, to demonstrate that it is capable of debate, mediation and politicking. There is also the added bonus for Russia that another war dominating the news cycle has pushed the Russia–Ukraine conflict further down the West’s political agenda.</p> +<p>Myanmar has long been sharply resistant to foreign interference in its domestic affairs. Yet the military regime’s increasing isolation and growing dependence on China for critical economic and political support has already magnified Beijing’s influence in Naypyidaw. As the PLAN extends its operations to safeguard China’s growing interests in the region, the Kyaukpyu Port or the nearby naval facility at Thit Poke Taung may prove to be attractive options to provide its vessels with logistical support.</p> -<p>Second, the message of Russia-as-peacemaker serves a useful role in the Kremlin’s quest for legitimacy and power projection in the Middle East. In its bid for allies, and to fulfil its foreign policy directives of deepening engagement in the MENA region (what it refers to as the “Islamic world”), Russia is contrasting itself with the “colonial West” and its troubled history of intervention in the region. By wading into Israel’s long-standing conflict with the Palestinians, which Russia has never before successfully mediated, Putin is seeking to carve out a role as an alternative to the US-dominated negotiations between the warring parties. The message is: where the US has tried and failed, Russia will succeed. Putin’s first public statement on the war ascribed blame to the US, maintaining that this was an example of the failure of its Middle East policies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Fosgug5.jpg" alt="image06" /></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia is not particularly able to influence Hamas, nor is there any credible proof that it has provided funding or arms to it</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Beijing’s efforts to court countries in the region through submarine diplomacy have not been without their failures.</p> -<p>Third, Russia has much to gain from the US’s financial distraction by the Israel–Gaza war. The recent US House of Representatives’ agreement to pass $14.3 billion worth of military aid to Israel was dominated by the Republicans, including an increasingly noisy faction that has long argued for the cessation or at least capping of US military aid to Ukraine. In its current format, the bill is likely to be vetoed – President Joe Biden has made clear that he would like to see broader spending on aid packages that include Ukraine, and the Democrats control the Senate – but it points to a broader bipartisan split within the US political system that Russia is keen to take advantage of in order to limit military aid to Ukraine. While Putin is likely anticipating that the US presidential elections in November 2024 will be a watershed moment for the provision of aid to Ukraine, the Israel–Gaza war has offered another unexpected opportunity to vicariously weaken Ukraine.</p> +<p>In October 2023, officials in Thailand shelved a deal to purchase three Yuan-class S26T submarines from China. The purchase fell through after Germany refused to export the engines for the vessels to China, and Thailand rejected the option of substituting them with Chinese-made engines. The Thai government, which already paid a roughly $194 million installment on the submarines, is considering purchasing Chinese frigates instead.</p> -<h3 id="whose-ear-does-russia-have">Whose Ear Does Russia Have?</h3> +<p>Despite the setback, Beijing’s influence in the region continues to grow, heating up long-simmering anxieties in India. New Delhi has begun to push back against Beijing’s expanding influence by investing in its own naval forces and increasingly partnering with the United States on regional maritime security issues.</p> -<p>In reality, Russia’s ability to impact on the Israel–Gaza conflict is limited. Much has been made of Russia’s hosting of Hamas delegations before and during the war, prompting Israel to summon the Russian ambassador for an explanation.</p> +<p>China’s efforts could also pay off for the PLAN. Big-ticket arms sales and infrastructure projects may not inevitably or immediately translate into China setting up its own military facilities in the Bay of Bengal. Yet they could help pave the way for the PLAN to gain access to logistical facilities that it needs to operate with greater confidence in the region.</p> -<p>But Russia is not particularly able to influence Hamas, nor is there any credible proof that it has provided funding or arms to it. Russia during the Soviet period paid lip service to the Palestinian cause and aligned itself nominally with their right to self-determination, but following the collapse of the USSR, it prioritised ties with Israel. It did condemn Hamas’s terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but has not designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation, and the group’s victory in Gaza’s 2006 parliamentary elections prompted Russia to recognise it as a political entity. Since 2007, Russia’s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs has held meetings with the Hamas leadership, including hosting the former leader of Hamas’s Politburo, Khaled Meshal, in Moscow.</p> +<p>China will likely proceed carefully, choosing to gradually deepen its foothold without crossing thresholds that could draw unwanted attention. As the PLAN becomes more entrenched in the Bay of Bengal, Washington and its partners should work in lockstep to maintain a free and open region and ensure that the risk of conflict is kept at bay.</p> -<p>Russia has now claimed that its hosting of Hamas delegations is an opportunity to discuss the hostages – at least eight Russian citizens are thought to be held in Gaza. But this is unlikely to be the focus of the talks, and Hamas’s comments after the meeting suggest that the discussion included broader topics, such as Russia’s political views on Israel. Although there is evidence that at least 16 Russian nationals were killed in the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October, those Russians who have taken up Israeli citizenship (and in Moscow’s thinking effectively left the motherland) are not likely to be viewed as a precious commodity by Moscow. Russia’s disregard for human life (including civilian), as seen from its actions thus far in the Ukraine war and in many of its other campaigns, means the return of a handful of its citizens is unlikely to be the true driving force behind these well-staged meetings.</p> +<hr /> -<p>But Putin has also been deliberate with the choreography. He has not met Hamas leaders in person and has allowed Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and presidential representative on the Middle East, to take the lead, which at least in Moscow’s eyes puts some creative distance between the Russian and Hamas leaderships. Putin himself has chosen his words carefully, maintaining that while Russia does not proscribe Hamas as a terrorist organisation, that does not mean Russia agrees with its actions. This is unlikely to be because of Moscow’s considered application of terminology – the Russian government readily brands other groups that it considers to be true enemies, such as its domestic opposition, Ukrainian nationalists and the Islamic State, as terrorists. It is more likely that Moscow believes this distinction leaves the door open for it to engage more freely with both Israel and Hamas.</p> +<p><strong>Matthew P. Funaiole</strong> is vice president of iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation and senior fellow of China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He specializes in using data-driven research to unpack complex policy issues, specifically those related to Chinese foreign and security policy, cross-Strait relations, and maritime trade.</p> -<p>However, Moscow is also aware that terrorism presents a real threat. It has experienced domestic terrorism multiple times before, from insurgency in Chechnya to links in the North Caucasus to the Islamic State, which sought to build its own caliphate in the south of Russia following Russia’s involvement in Syria in 2015. Putin is aware that overly stoking the Israel–Gaza war in favour of either side risks widening the conflict – as has already partly occurred – into a regional war whose spillover could ultimately impact on Russia itself. In Russian, the Middle East is referred to as the blizhny vostok – the Near East – and so Russia will not forget that its geographical proximity to the region makes it vulnerable to any seismic changes.</p> +<p><strong>Brian Hart</strong> is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS, where he researches the evolving nature of Chinese power. His particular research interests include Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese military modernization, and U.S.-China technological competition.</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong>Aidan Powers-Riggs</strong> is a research associate for China analysis with the iDeas Lab at CSIS, where he primarily supports the Hidden Reach special initiative.</p> -<p><strong>Emily Ferris</strong> is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in Russian domestic politics. Emily has a particular interest in Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure including its railways, road and port systems, and the role this plays in advancing Russia’s political ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as deployed in conflict zones such as Ukraine. She also researches domestic political administrations in Russia’s Far East, and Russia’s military and political relationship with Belarus.</p>Emily FerrisAs the war in Gaza distracts the West from its support for Ukraine, Russia is seeking to exploit the situation by positioning itself as a reasonable broker that has the ear of both Israel and Hamas.The Kingdom Of Oil2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-kingdom-of-oil<p><em>Saudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.</em></p> +<p><strong>Jennifer Jun</strong> is a project manager and research associate for satellite imagery analysis with the iDeas Lab and the Korea Chair at CSIS.</p>Matthew P. Funaiole, et al.China is quietly deepening its influence along the Bay of Bengal, intimately linked to Beijing’s expanding overseas interests. Commercial satellite imagery reveals that China has made significant progress on a naval base it is constructing for Bangladesh’s military. The base houses a pair of submarines that Dhaka received from Beijing two years before ground broke at the facility. China has likewise transferred a submarine to neighboring Myanmar to aid the embattled military regime.New Energy Supply Chains2023-11-16T12:00:00+08:002023-11-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/new-energy-supply-chains<p><em>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused attention on energy supply chains and contributed to growing unease in the West about the fact that supply chains for the commodities necessary for the global energy transition are highly concentrated in China (or under Chinese control).</em></p> <excerpt /> -<p>Saudi Arabia is widely regarded as the world’s most important oil exporter. Through its own production and as the de facto leader of OPEC and OPEC+, Saudi Arabia can have more influence over international oil markets than most other producers – even countries that do not directly import Saudi oil are therefore affected by Saudi oil policy. In light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and as energy security has become a top priority for Western governments, the UK and others across Europe and beyond have turned to Saudi Arabia, calling for it to increase production in order to bring down global oil prices.</p> - -<p>Oil revenues have historically fuelled Saudi Arabia’s social contract, and they are now the indispensable source of funding for the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 reform agenda. Although the Saudi Vision 2030 reform agenda ultimately aims at diversifying the Saudi economy, income from oil exports remains the all-important enabler of Saudi Arabia’s political and socioeconomic development in the absence of sufficient foreign direct investment.</p> +<p>Concerns range from cyber security through to security of energy supply and economic security. The disruption to energy supply chains caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was felt mainly in terms of the physical supply of gas to Europe and the impact this had on the global market. In this context, this paper considers the implications of threats to the physical supply of some of the critical materials and products that the UK requires for its energy transition.</p> -<p>This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and how it interacts with the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign and security policies. The following is a summary of the paper’s findings:</p> +<p>China has benefited from being an early mover in the processing of many minerals used in net zero technologies, as well as in the production of intermediate goods and, more recently, final goods. In some elements of the supply chain China has a near monopoly (80–100% market share): the rare earths used to manufacture the permanent magnets used in wind turbines and electric vehicles (EVs) are just one example; other examples are connected to the production of battery anodes, high-quality spherical graphite, and the processing of manganese (also used in batteries). In the production of solar photovoltaic modules, meanwhile, China has a near monopoly on the production of polysilicon, silicon wafers and silicon cells. Added to this are very high concentrations (60–80% market share) in many other elements of these supply chains.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Saudi Arabia’s central role in global oil markets is a key source of the Kingdom’s geopolitical power and importance (in addition to its status as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites). Oil has shaped Saudi Arabia’s foreign relations. Most notably, it has facilitated its bilateral relation with the US. For most of the post-1945 era, Saudi Arabia–US relations have been encapsulated in an oil-for-security pact – Saudi Arabia sought to influence international oil markets in line with US interests, while the US provided the Kingdom with political, defence and security support.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In recent years, Saudi Arabia has adopted a “Saudi First” approach. This does not constitute a wholesale overhaul of Saudi oil policy and overall foreign political orientation, but rather reflects a reordering of the Kingdom’s strategic priorities that results in Saudi policies that are less directly aligned with US interests. The “Saudi First” approach is driven by a focus on the Vision 2030 reform agenda; a perception that the US is less willing and able to guarantee the Kingdom’s security; an assessment that the US’s “shale revolution” has made international oil markets more competitive and volatile; and a conclusion that global economic shifts, especially the emergence of China as the most important buyer of Saudi oil, necessitate the building of more extensive relations with non-Western powers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Saudi Arabia’s partnership with Russia, manifested in the two countries’ joint leadership of OPEC+, is best understood as a marriage of convenience. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, OPEC+ increases its ability to influence international oil markets by extending OPEC’s coordination of production quotas to more producing countries. Riyadh opposes oil-related sanctions on Russia as destabilising interventions in the market. However, Saudi–Russian relations have been far from straightforward, and there is scope for future disagreements to emerge, including over competition for market share in Asia.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Both climate change and climate action – specifically pressure for the decarbonisation of the global economy – constitute a major challenge for Saudi Arabia. In recent years, the Kingdom’s approach towards international climate action has shifted from mostly resisting decarbonisation efforts to trying to actively shape the international debate while still advocating for the continued importance of fossil fuels. This also includes beginning attempts to capitalise on potential opportunities in the global energy transition.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Saudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>In light of this dominance, this paper considers what risks China’s position in these supply chains poses to the physical supply of materials, components and final goods in the battery and EV, solar, wind and electricity grid supply chains, and whether China could deliberately leverage its position to impose costs on the UK. These risks are assessed according to whether they could affect the UK solely, a group of countries, or the entire market. The paper argues that risks to the UK specifically are currently limited by low levels of manufacturing of these technologies in the UK: because the UK typically imports final goods – where Chinese dominance is less pronounced – its direct dependence on Chinese suppliers is limited. However, the UK might still be an attractive target for largely symbolic measures intended to send political messages.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>The targeting of country groupings (such as NATO or the EU) by sanctions and counter-sanctions amid geopolitical tensions is potentially more dangerous for the UK. Market concentration in China is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, and alternative supply chains are unlikely to be sufficient to meet the demands of multiple countries. At the same time, protectionist industrial policies in the EU and the US may complicate future access to supply chains (which could become less dependent on China), while markets currently lack transparency and, in some cases, scale.</p> -<p>In the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the spike in international oil and gas prices that followed, the subject of energy security and the link between energy and geopolitics has jumped to the top of the agenda for governments around the world, including the UK. As part of this shift, policymakers in London, other European capitals and beyond have naturally turned their attention to Saudi Arabia. The question of how much oil Saudi Arabia produces and why – that is, identifying the economic and political drivers behind the country’s oil-related decisions – has become infused with renewed importance.</p> +<p>The biggest risk for the UK is shortages of critical minerals. Shortages are widely forecast, and China’s control of mineral processing and refining means it would play a central role in the allocation of scarce goods. Leveraging supply chains for political ends has historically been more effective in tight markets – the 1970s oil embargoes came during periods of tight supply – but China is more likely to allocate available supplies according to its own national economic interest. During the Covid-19 pandemic, high-volume contracts with Chinese companies were more likely to be honoured, and if this pattern were to be replicated it could mean that decisions about allocation were passed to companies, which would decide which of their domestic and international operations received scarce materials. However, China’s ban on Australian coal shows that where a security threat is perceived, Beijing will take action, even if it will cause damage to the Chinese economy.</p> -<p>This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and how it interacts with the country’s domestic and foreign/security policies. The paper forms part of RUSI’s UK National Security and the Net Zero Transition project and is published alongside a paper that focuses on the linkages between Russia’s energy policies and its foreign/security policy behaviour. Together, the two papers examine how Saudi Arabia and Russia – which, along with the US, are the world’s leading oil exporters, being jointly responsible for around 20% of global production – approach their roles as energy superpowers; how their energy-related decision-making has evolved in recent decades and in light of the Ukraine war; and how their foreign policies and conduct in international forums, including on climate change and other major global issues, will continue to have global implications. It should be noted that this paper was drafted prior to the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and the subsequent war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza (still ongoing at the time of this paper’s publication). The analysis in the paper is therefore not reflective of the impact of conflict on regional dynamics, or on Saudi Arabia’s oil and foreign policy.</p> +<p>There are also risks in terms of defence and international relations. Access to technology for the military is likely to be similar to that for the civilian economy for the time being, with net zero technologies currently most likely to be used for military logistics or for housing/bases. The most immediate risks relate to the secure operation of technologies, but these tend to be associated with cyber risks, which are not covered in this paper. The increased importance of critical minerals as commodities may change geopolitical dynamics and in some cases result in domestic and regional instability, influencing where the military is deployed. In the longer term, there are questions about whether China’s industrial power and growing technological advantage in net zero will be leveraged to create advantages for its own military capability.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia has rarely been out of the international spotlight in recent years. From the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, to the efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear programme, Saudi Arabia has been a key stakeholder – and active participant – in many of the conflicts and geopolitical issues that have occupied the centre of UK (and European) foreign and security policies over the past decade. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government agents in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 led many Western governments to seek to distance themselves politically from the Kingdom; then-presidential candidate Joe Biden vowed to treat it as a “pariah”. But Russia’s war against Ukraine has not just changed the European and global security environment: it has also contributed to a shift in the debate about Saudi Arabia.</p> +<p>Finally, China’s role as the paramount – and in some cases only – investor in and purchaser of mineral ores will clearly be significant for its global influence. China’s role in producer countries, as well as its trading practices, will be important in shaping the character of the global market, with long-term implications for the UK’s defence and security policies.</p> -<p>Since the start of the invasion, Western leaders, including US President Biden, then-prime minister Boris Johnson (and other UK ministers), French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have travelled to Saudi Arabia for talks with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Energy – specifically, the hope that Saudi Arabia would increase oil production in order to bring down international prices – was a key driver behind this diplomatic re-engagement with Riyadh. Since early 2022, Saudi Arabia’s every move – on oil especially, but also with regard to its ongoing friendly relations with Russia, its efforts to expand ties with China, and its various diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East region – has been scrutinised by policymakers in London and across Europe, as well as in the Western media.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>This renewed focus on Saudi oil policy by the UK and its European partners is not only – and for many countries not even primarily – driven by the need or desire to buy more Saudi crude. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a diversification race, as European states scramble to reduce (and ideally end) hydrocarbon imports from Russia in order to deprive Moscow of revenue and reduce its leverage over them. Germany, for example, received 31% of its oil and 60% of its gas from Russia in 2021. The UK was comparatively less affected by this dynamic: in 2021, only 9% of the UK’s oil and 4% of its gas imports came from Russia, and by January 2023 this had been reduced to zero. Saudi oil exports to Europe have increased since February 2022, but much of the gap in European oil supplies has been filled by crude from Norway, the US, West Africa and other Middle Eastern producers.</p> +<p>China is central to the new energy supply chains required for the decarbonisation of the global economy. It is a large investor in the mining of numerous critical materials and metals both domestically and abroad and, more significantly, the manufacture of critical energy-related components is heavily concentrated in China, meaning that many of the mined ores are sent there for processing. As a result, China is central to the production of wind turbines, solar photovoltaics (PV), permanent magnets, batteries and electric vehicles. As the energy transition unfolds and electrification gathers pace, demand for these materials and end products is set to increase. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that a concerted effort to reach the Paris Agreement goals (climate stabilisation at “well below 2°C global temperature rise”) would mean a quadrupling of mineral requirements for clean energy technologies by 2040. An even faster transition, to hit net zero globally by 2050, would require six times more critical mineral inputs in 2040 than in 2020. However, investment so far is falling short of what the world is forecast to need.</p> -<p>Yet, regardless of how the UK and its European partners replaced imports from Russia, they all felt the impact of the surge in oil and gas prices sparked by Moscow’s war. In the 12 months leading up to the invasion, the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil increased from just over $63 in February 2021 to over $92, driven, among other factors, by the recovery of the world economy from the Covid-19 pandemic. Prices for natural gas were on a similar trajectory. But Russia’s war sent prices soaring even higher – Brent reached $119 per barrel in early June 2022. As the conflict has continued into its second year, oil prices have returned to pre-war levels, but towards the end of 2023 they remained in the $85–$95 range, significantly higher than they were in most of the previous decade. Ultimately, in the context of globalised energy markets, the UK is not only exposed to disruptions to its direct oil imports, but also to flows and prices of hydrocarbons everywhere around the world. And few players have as much influence over the flows of globally traded oil as Saudi Arabia.</p> +<p>The UK’s own net zero plans imply large increases in domestic demand for critical minerals and end products, as well as greater reliance on complex supply chains. Rapid growth requires stable markets and resilient supply chains, but events over the past few years have highlighted that stability is not guaranteed. The lack of investment in minerals globally suggests that shortages will occur and that costs will rise. In the past, increased pressure on mineral supplies has led to increased investment but, given the time lag for bringing on new supplies, price volatility has also ensued. Similar challenges related to the supply of new materials could delay the energy transition and raise the associated costs. Although cost increases and delays also spur technological innovations, net zero targets are approaching rapidly, meaning that new infrastructure and equipment need to be sourced and deployed. In this context, the UK government must balance the need to move quickly with decarbonisation against the cost and availability of materials and potential security risks from immature and concentrated supply chains.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia is an oil superpower. It holds the second largest proven oil reserves in the world after Venezuela, and its national oil company Saudi Aramco is one of the largest companies in the world – and by far the most profitable. Having established itself as the world’s swing producer, it has invested in maintaining a level of production capacity that has been – and is currently – significantly higher than its actual production, giving it the unique ability to both decrease and increase output.</p> +<p>Concerns about the availability of minerals and metals are compounded by China’s central role in both mining and processing. The Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have highlighted the risks associated with market concentration and “just-in-time” supply chain strategies. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic led to longer lead times and higher costs for supplies of manufactured goods from China. Lockdowns, combined with factory accidents and floods in China, reduced the availability of polysilicon, the starting material for wafers in solar cells, and as China produced 80% of the world’s supplies in 2020, prices rose by 350%. Some residential solar developers reported that, for the first time, their growth was constrained by the availability of equipment, rather than by sales.</p> -<p>Moreover, besides itself accounting for up to 12 million barrels per day – or roughly 10% – of global production capacity, Saudi Arabia is also the de facto leader of OPEC and co-leader of OPEC+, alongside Russia. OPEC accounted for around 36% of global production in 2022 (and 80.4% of global reserves), while OPEC+, which was formed in 2016 and includes nine other non-OPEC producers besides Russia, accounted for around 59%. OPEC+ decisions to adjust production quotas, including for example the significant cuts announced in October 2022 and June 2023, tend to be understood – by governments and the media around the world – as reflecting, to a significant degree, Saudi Arabia’s decision-making, albeit within the context of bargaining with the grouping’s other members.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and gas supply disruptions, energy security has become a top policy priority for many governments. Russia’s dominance in European gas supplies emphasised the risk of reliance on a single large supplier, creating alarm about China’s dominance in the provision of key materials and components for the energy transition. And, in the context of worsening US–China relations, many Western governments and companies are looking to de-risk their China exposure.</p> -<p>In addition to Saudi Arabia’s role in influencing day-to-day global oil prices, the Kingdom’s wider geopolitical posture and behaviour are increasingly a focus for UK and European policymakers. The Kingdom’s regional foreign policy continues to affect regional stability in the Middle East, which, in turn, has implications for UK and European security; and its positioning vis-à-vis the US (and the wider West), Russia and China, and the Global South, are seen as indicators of the posture and direction other countries in the Middle East might adopt in a changing global order. Further, as a hydrocarbon superpower, Saudi Arabia is clearly a major stakeholder in international efforts to combat climate change and decarbonise the global economy.</p> +<p>Government policies aimed at diversifying supply sources and processing facilities are critical, given the need for more materials and end products. But it is important to recognise that, even as China’s share of these processes falls, it will remain central to many energy supply chains. It is important that the UK, which currently has limited production capacity, understands the complexity of new energy supply chains, the risks associated with China’s dominance, and the various implications of diversifying, decoupling or de-risking them. Excluding China completely from the UK’s new energy supply chains is unrealistic and would be counterproductive for the UK’s net zero targets.</p> -<h4 id="structure-and-methodology">Structure and Methodology</h4> +<p>Every strategy to diversify new energy supply chains needs to be seen in the context of the broader UK–China bilateral economic relationship, which topped £100 billion in the 12 months to the end of Q1 2023. New energy supply chains are only a small part of this relationship, which raises the question of whether there are risks specific to these supply chains that warrant targeted treatment, what these are, and how mitigation strategies fit into this much larger economic relationship.</p> -<p>This paper is divided into three chapters. The first examines Saudi Arabia’s relationship with oil, and traces how revenues from crude exports have shaped – and continue to shape – the Kingdom’s social contract, including their envisaged role and importance in the government’s root-and-branch political, economic and social reform agenda, Vision 2030. The second chapter looks at the linkages between oil and Saudi Arabia’s national security and foreign policy, including within the context of OPEC+. The final chapter focuses on how Saudi Arabia is navigating the dual challenges of climate change and climate action.</p> +<p>Numerous studies have analysed different demand scenarios for critical materials and minerals, as well as the supply gap, and have described China’s dominance. But they do not assess how this dominance impacts the UK. This paper aims to fill that gap and asks: how has China become the dominant actor in new energy supply chains; and can China use its dominance in net zero energy supply chains to penalise the UK because of its policy choices? The paper argues that it will be very difficult for China to target the UK directly, given the complexity of the relevant supply chains. Any export controls or embargoes that China imposed on the UK would impact many other consumer countries equally. Similarly, the UK would not be insulated from any bottlenecks or breakdowns in these supply chains, impacting its ability to meet its net zero targets.</p> -<p>The paper argues that Saudi Arabia continues to see itself as the crucial stabiliser of the international oil market. However, its leadership’s ambitious political and socioeconomic domestic agenda, along with its perception of the changing international environment (and its vision for the Kingdom’s role therein) has led to a reorganisation of priorities. The outcome of this is a more unapologetically self-interested and less obviously Western-aligned energy and foreign policy.</p> +<p>That said, China’s centrality across the entire value chain raises questions for the UK’s foreign and defence policies, as well as for its industrial and economic policy. These challenges need to be understood and assessed rationally. While this paper argues that it would be very difficult for China to target the UK specifically using new energy supply chains, it also seeks to highlight the different risks associated with market concentration in China.</p> -<p>The paper is primarily based on desk-based research, consulting open source journals, books, statements from Saudi officials and media reporting. It also draws on 15 supplementary interviews conducted by the author, and more informal engagement with subject matter experts and officials in the Gulf, the UK, Europe and the US, including during two visits to Saudi Arabia in 2023.</p> +<p>This paper is by no means a comprehensive assessment of all these risks and their various international ramifications. Further research and discussion are needed to advance the conversation, but a fact-based foundation is the important first step, and that is what this paper seeks to offer. Similarly, the paper does not assess cyber threats or environmental, social and governance concerns, which represent different categories of risk best covered in separate discussions.</p> -<h3 id="i-a-kingdom-built-on-oil">I. A Kingdom Built on Oil</h3> +<p>The paper is based on publicly available sources in the English and Chinese languages. Quantitative data is drawn principally from a combination of official publications of national governments and international organisations, and industry and consultancy reports. A key challenge was the lack of consistency in the data between different sources, which is why the quantitative data on China’s share of global supply chain is presented as percentage bands rather than as precise percentages. Sources for qualitative information include policy documents and analyses produced by national governments and international organisations, consultancy and think tank reports, academic papers and online press articles. Finally, this paper is also informed by a closed research event hosted by RUSI, which involved officials from UK government departments, industry figures and think tank representatives.</p> -<p>In many ways, Saudi Arabia has been defined by, and was built on, its oil wealth – the country has developed symbiotically with its oil industry, which has fuelled the global economy for most of the past century.</p> +<h4 id="structure">Structure</h4> -<p>Initially, it was US oil companies that first struck oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938 and established the country’s oil export infrastructure. Having secured the concession for Saudi oil at a bargain price, these companies also built much of Saudi Arabia’s early infrastructure so as to maintain good relations with the king and his government as the scale of the Kingdom’s resource wealth became more apparent. Through the 1960s and 1970s, however, the Saudi state gradually moved to take control: by 1976 it had taken full ownership of Aramco – the Arabian American Oil Company, established in 1944 by Standard Oil of California (today’s Chevron) and the Texas Company (Texaco, now part of Chevron). In 1988, the state finally created the Saudi Arabian Oil Company to take over all of Aramco’s assets, including its name – by which Saudi Arabia’s national oil company is still known today.</p> +<p>The paper is organised as follows: the first chapter briefly discusses Chinese government policies as they relate to net zero supply chains; the second chapter covers the UK’s need for low-carbon energy infrastructure; and the third chapter outlines areas of Chinese dominance in net zero supply chains. The fourth and final chapter offers a preliminary analysis of the risks in order to guide thinking about the scale and nature of the challenge – identifying foreign policy, defence and economic risks to the UK associated with China’s control over net zero supply chains – before offering some preliminary observations and suggestions for further research.</p> -<h4 id="oil-islam-and-the-social-contract">Oil, Islam and the Social Contract</h4> +<h3 id="i-chinese-government-policy-and-supply-chain-dominance">I. Chinese Government Policy and Supply Chain Dominance</h3> -<p>Oil and the revenues from its export are a key foundation for Saudi Arabia’s political and socioeconomic development model and for the social contract between the ruling Al-Saud family and the population. It is the income from oil exports, rather than money raised through taxation, that has paid for the Kingdom’s modern infrastructure, the formation of its state institutions, and the extensive package of services and cradle-to-grave welfare benefits they have traditionally delivered to Saudi citizens. It has also paid for large quantities of modern Western military hardware, and for a foreign policy that has, as one of its main tools, the ability to provide financial and material support to partners and allies in the Middle East region and beyond (discussed in more detail in the next section).</p> +<p>China does not have a critical materials strategy per se, but its dominance in new energy supply chains emanates from a combination of early moves into various industrial applications (rare earths, batteries, solar PV and, to a lesser degree, wind turbines) via central and local government support accompanied by low labour, land and electricity costs. Compounded by the Chinese government’s concerns about energy security, industrial policies have aimed to advance electrification as a means of limiting imports of fossil fuels, mainly through the development of electric vehicles (EVs). While the battery and EV sector developed differently from solar PV and wind turbines (as discussed below), they benefited from similar industrial policies and from the government’s ability to support long-term goals. As such, signals from central government indicating that these were priority industries led to preferential policies for manufacturing, as well as financial support for innovation and (at times) for infrastructure and deployment. In addition, the low input costs that attracted foreign investors were combined with obligations to partner with Chinese firms, which then led to technology transfers.</p> -<p>Traditionally, oil has also been an important factor in the relationship between the Saudi government (and general state apparatus) and the Kingdom’s conservative religious establishment. Long before the discovery of oil, Islam was a central source of legitimacy and identity for the Al-Saud and their Kingdom (and its previous iterations). Saudi monarchs have derived power and status from their role as the political masters of Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina; except for King Khalid (ruled 1975–82), all Saudi monarchs since King Faisal (ruled 1964–75) have assumed the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques as their primary honorific. Domestically, religion provided the ideational link between the ruling family and its subjects, with clerics holding positions as crucial intermediaries. For decades, Saudi domestic politics and foreign policy have both been dominated by competing pressures from this powerful constituency; and from the Kingdom’s integration into a rapidly globalising and, for a long time, US/Western-dominated world. Oil revenues gave the Saudi leadership the means to navigate this space.</p> +<p>As these industries developed and scaled up in China, the state also supported outbound investments in mining, with varying degrees of success, and with substantial variation in corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices. The incentives shifted from focusing on one part of the supply chain to targeting integrated supply chains and, as these industrial activities expanded, to supporting industries and the pools of experienced labour which formed around them. Development of the industries was economically, rather than geopolitically, driven, with China seeking markets where it might gain a competitive advantage in order to generate employment and industrial growth. China’s solar PV development was initially conceived as an export-oriented industry to benefit from feed-in tariffs in countries such as Germany. That said, the Chinese government already recognised in the late 1980s that the availability of critical resources (such as rare earths) offered it a strategic advantage. Deng Xiaoping is reported to have remarked that while “the Middle East has oil, China has rare earths”.</p> -<p>With the 1973 oil embargo, Saudi Arabia tried to use its oil-based geopolitical weight to affect the great regional cause of the time, the Arab and Palestinian struggle against Israel (which had an obvious religious dimension). Previous embargoes in the contexts of the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Six-Day War had been ineffectual, but the 1973 embargo was accompanied by a 25% cut in OPEC production that sent oil prices skyrocketing. The embargo largely failed to achieve its immediate political objective of curbing Western support for Israel, but it effectively announced Saudi Arabia’s arrival on the global stage as a power to be reckoned with, and one that the US and its Western allies resolved it would be best to maintain close relations with. Domestically, the resulting oil revenue windfall fuelled an urbanisation and modernisation boom.</p> +<p>Preferential policies differed among the supply chains and varied depending on the availability of mineral resources in China. In rare earths, for instance, where China has abundant resources, policies to support mining and processing date back to the 1970s, while foreign investments were confined to joint ventures in the 1990s. From that point, policies focused on limiting exports and encouraging Chinese companies to develop high-end products and devices, while also aiming to limit illegal mining and exports (which had severe environmental and health impacts in China, and which depressed prices domestically).</p> -<p>But by the 1980s, the dual shocks of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamic extremists, both in 1979, led to a course correction. The Saudi leadership doubled down on religious conservatism by diverting oil-derived state funds to be spent in line with the priorities of the clerical establishment. Internationally, Saudi Arabia walked a tightrope between relying on the US and other Western partners for its defence and security needs and taking on the mantle of leadership for the Arab and Islamic worlds (with particular responsibility for related political and religious causes). The Kingdom turned to Washington to protect it from the fallout of the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s and from Iraq’s subsequent expansionist ambitions (which led it to try to annex Kuwait in 1990); and it worked closely with the US to support the mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. But Saudi Arabia also invested heavily in internationally focused Islamic institutions such as the Muslim World League, the University of Madinah and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, all of which were regarded as promoting the conservative views of the Kingdom’s religious establishment.</p> +<p>The EV industry in China was born from a desire to foster industrial development and technological upgrading while also reducing the country’s dependence on oil imports. The government adopted supportive industrial policies for EV manufacturing, sales and charging infrastructure, offering tax incentives and subsidies for innovation and R&amp;D as early as the mid-2000s. Much like the situation with rare earths, government policies that made foreign investments appealing were accompanied by cheap input costs, with the quid pro quo of partnering with Chinese car and battery makers. In 2012, as part of the 12th Five-Year Plan, the government issued the “Energy Saving and New Energy Automobile Industry Development Plan (2012–2020)” aimed at developing EV science and technology. The “Made in China 2025” plan, issued in 2015, introduced the development of the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry as a national strategy and, more broadly, encouraged new energy industries such as renewables. This built on the “Strategic Emerging Industries” initiative that was announced in 2006, but broadened it out from a focus on technical innovation to encompass the entire manufacturing process.</p> -<h4 id="the-vision-2030-revolution">The Vision 2030 Revolution</h4> +<p>Over this period, government departments introduced various plans to guide the development of the NEV industry, encouraging the creation of an ecosystem to support these industries. Government policies focused on innovation in EVs and batteries, as well as on encouraging both production and sales of EVs and infrastructure build-out. In 2021, policy guidance also looked to address the use of EV battery packs in other applications after their removal from EVs, including as part of China’s long-term plan to develop smart networks and to achieve vehicle-to-grid integration. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s 12th Five-Year Plan for the nonferrous metals sector noted that priority would be given to developing China’s overseas presence. Chinese banks have therefore supported Chinese miners in their efforts to acquire ownership interests in mines and processing facilities in Africa, Australia, Europe, North America and South America, and in signing offtake agreements with operating mines.</p> -<p>Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia’s approach – including to oil-related decision-making and to how it defines its international role – has changed: subtly in some regards, but more dramatically in others. King Salman (who ascended to the throne in 2015) and especially his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, have made their Vision 2030 the North Star of their domestic and foreign policy. They have radically disempowered the Kingdom’s clerical establishment; declared economic development and diversification to be the primary national objectives; and adopted a more unapologetically self-interested and assertive international posture.</p> +<p>As the domestic EV market grew, government policies facilitated and prioritised the development of an integrated battery and EV supply chain. To be sure, some developments, including e-bikes and a burgeoning solar heating industry, have emerged in China due to innovations by local companies that saw new demand emerging, even though they were not formally encouraged (some were even discouraged, as in the case of e-bikes). This is important to note, because not all of China’s initiatives are led and directed by the government, nor are they perfectly implemented. When discussing China, it is important to note that there is a difference between central government’s policy framing on the one hand, and corporate activities and behaviours on the other.</p> -<p>Economic diversification – the idea of reducing the economy’s dependence on oil exports – has long been on the Saudi agenda, at least in theory. In practice, however, very little progress has been made over the decades, with efforts to diversify essentially fluctuating inversely to international oil prices: when prices were low, diversification was in; when prices were high, it dropped down the list of priorities. Vision 2030 appears to have altered this dynamic: a number of path-breaking economic reforms have already been implemented; the government seems to be serious about curbing some aspects of the oil-financed cradle-to-grave welfare state; and there is an intense flurry of activity across the Kingdom to build and invest in new commercial sectors (for example an entertainment industry) and various mega projects (including, most prominently, the Red Sea city NEOM).</p> +<p>Nonetheless, the state-led industrial policy framework has been a key contributor to China’s dominance in these industries of the future. Some of the attributes seen in the EV sector also supported the development of China’s solar industry: manufacturers benefited from local government support such as land concessions, tax benefits, less expensive operating environments and, in some cases, even direct investment. The central government contributed by directing state financing to these projects and even helped to catalyse cost declines in input materials like polysilicon. However, when polysilicon prices plummeted (due to a fall in demand as trade restrictions were imposed on Chinese solar exports, combined with the existence of large stocks of polysilicon) local governments provided further support to shield these industries. That said, solar PV, unlike other industries, did not begin life as a domestic industry. Chinese firms first entered PV module manufacturing through technology acquisition, before gradually succeeding in building their competitiveness and technological capabilities throughout the supply chains, as they saw new opportunities for growth, as well as via local interactive learning networks.</p> -<p>However, all these efforts remain inextricably linked to oil. In the absence of sufficient foreign direct investment, oil revenues are the most important source of funding for everything the government is trying to achieve. Through a set of centralising political reforms, Saudi Aramco and the Saudi oil industry have been put in the service of enabling Vision 2030. Key steps in this regard have included: the creation of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, chaired by Mohammed bin Salman, to streamline all decision-making related to Vision 2030, which effectively encompasses all domestic and economic policy fields; the sale of almost 2% of Saudi Aramco in an initial public offering in 2019 and the transfers of two 4% stakes in Saudi Aramco to the Kingdom’s Public Investment Fund in 2022 and 2023, respectively; and the restructuring and rebranding of the Ministry of Energy, which oversees Saudi Aramco. In 2019, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was split up to create the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources. The energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, son of the king, half-brother of the Crown Prince and the first member of the royal family in this ministerial position, has worked to give his ministry a new brand identity, stressing that its focus is on energy writ large, rather than oil alone. He has also presided over Saudi Aramco’s expansion to become a more integrated oil company by investing in both upstream production and downstream means of value generation such as refining capacity and petrochemical production.</p> +<p>In a somewhat similar vein, the Chinese government has, since the early stage of wind energy development, focused on establishing a domestic wind industry supply chain, initially by financing investments in small wind farms, and through the development of wind projects as early as the 1980s. Foreign expertise was then brought in, but joint ventures were designed to include substantial local content requirements (later abolished). In addition to policies that stimulated renewable R&amp;D and equipment manufacturing, the government also introduced pricing policies to support the integration of renewable energy.</p> -<p>Economic diversification is the central mantra of Vision 2030, which has itself become the defining feature of Saudi Arabia’s domestic politics and national agenda. To commit to this, Saudi Arabia must maintain oil prices at a relatively high level. In the long run, the government hopes that Vision 2030 – and its successors – can modify or replace the old social contract in the Kingdom. While Islam will remain one of the most important features of Saudi identity, the government has felt confident enough about its modernisation agenda’s attractiveness to the population to dismantle the religious establishment as a political force in the Kingdom. Yet, throughout all of this, the Saudi leadership remains aware that the production and export of oil remains the all-important enabler of their Kingdom’s political and socioeconomic development.</p> +<p>Industrial policies in support of manufacturing, innovation and deployment have had unintended consequences from the Chinese government’s perspective – among them subsidy fraud, illegal mining and negative environmental impacts – while incentive structures have evolved to deal with regulatory gaps, financial stress along the supply chains and other challenges. Notwithstanding the challenges, these policies have, over time, allowed China to become a critical and low-cost supplier of new energy materials.</p> -<h3 id="ii-oil-security-and-power">II. Oil, Security and Power</h3> +<p>In addition to industrial and innovation policies, the Chinese government regulates the mining of critical materials and their processing. China’s 2016 National Plan for Mineral Resources classifies the country’s mineral resources as “strategic”, “advantageous”, “protected”, or “strategic emerging industry” minerals. China does not have a critical minerals list akin to those in place in the US or the EU. For the different categories of minerals, the plan identifies where China needs to encourage exploration of minerals in short supply, regulate the amount of minerals defined as “advantageous”, cut production of minerals with excess capacity, and ensure the supply of minerals in strategic emerging industries. The plan identifies three broad categories:</p> -<p>For Saudi Arabia, there has always been a direct connection between its oil industry (and status as a world-leading oil producer) and the country’s national security. As outlined above, oil has been and remains the foundation for the Saudi economy and the social contract between the Saudi state and its people; as such, it is inseparable from domestic political stability and security. In terms of foreign affairs, oil has similarly been at the heart of the Kingdom’s most important bilateral relationships, most obviously the one with the US. At the same time, its oil and derived wealth have also been a key source of Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical weight, influence and power on the global stage.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Energy minerals – oil, gas, shale gas, coal, coal-bed methane and uranium.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Metallic minerals – iron, chromium, copper, aluminium, gold, nickel, tungsten, tin, molybdenum, antimony, cobalt, lithium, rare earths and zirconium.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Non-metallic minerals – phosphorus, potash, crystalline graphite and fluorite.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="the-oil-for-security-era">The Oil-for-Security Era</h4> +<p>This list includes metals and minerals that are not on developed economies’ lists of critical materials, but it also excludes a number of materials often cited by developed economies as “critical” (such as vanadium, tellurium, niobium and others that are used in hydrogen, solar PV or wind turbines). And while advanced manufacturing economies with a high dependency on imported raw materials include supply risk as a key parameter when categorising their lists of materials, Chinese assessments of “strategic minerals” use a broader, more flexible set of criteria, in which some “strategic minerals” are subject to supply risk and others are not. Indeed, according to China’s Geological Survey, the category of “advantageous minerals” includes rare earths and tungsten, and refers to minerals for which China has a domestic resource advantage relative to other countries, allowing it to control or influence global markets.</p> -<p>For most of the past century, the link between Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and its foreign, defence and security policy has been most obviously apparent in its relationship with the US. The February 1945 meeting between King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud and US President Franklin D Roosevelt on the USS Quincy, during which the two men forged the oil-for-security bargain around which bilateral relations between Riyadh and Washington have revolved ever since, is part of the folklore of modern Middle East politics. The Carter Doctrine, proclaimed in 1980, made the US’s commitment to the security of the Gulf region – and therefore also to Saudi Arabia – even more explicit, clarifying that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”. President Jimmy Carter also emphasised that the US would expect “the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East” in these efforts to ensure the uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbons from the Gulf to international markets. Although the Doctrine was initially formulated with the Soviet Union in mind as the threatening “outside force”, the US-led campaign to liberate Kuwait and protect Saudi Arabia from potential further Iraqi aggression in 1990–91 was arguably its most tangible manifestation.</p> +<h3 id="ii-demand-for-low-carbon-energy-infrastructure-in-the-uk">II. Demand for Low-Carbon Energy Infrastructure in the UK</h3> -<p>Saudi Arabia has generally held up its side of the bargain. Except for the US position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which precipitated the 1973 embargo and production cut described earlier, Saudi Arabia was generally committed to accommodating the US’s interest in maintaining the steady flow of affordable oil to fuel the American economy and, ultimately, the global economy. Energy expert Daniel Yergin has described Saudi Arabia as being akin to the “central bank of world oil”. Saudi Arabia was never under the illusion that it alone – or any other producer or consumer – could ultimately control the highly dynamic international oil market. On several occasions, the decisions to adjust production failed to have their intended effect, either because of miscalculation or because of geopolitical and global economic developments that had much greater impact on energy markets. But in principle at least, Saudi Arabia – through its position at the helm of OPEC, and embracing its status as the great swing producer capable of quickly increasing or decreasing its output – sought to contain oil price fluctuations as much as it could.</p> +<p>In its 2023 analysis, the UK’s National Grid estimated that the national electricity supply would treble by 2035, through both domestic generation and imports. This would involve a massive increase in different forms of infrastructure (see Table 1).</p> -<p>These efforts to bring a degree of balance to the international oil market were shaped by more than the desire to retain US favour. Most obviously, Saudi Arabia needed to sell oil to sustain its domestic economy and social contract. That meant, and still means, trying to keep prices high enough to cover its government budget – often referred to as the “break-even price” – and stable enough to allow a degree of planning security. Yet Saudi Arabia also made a conscious effort to prevent prices from climbing too high. Although higher prices would translate to higher revenues for the Saudi state (at least as an immediate consequence), the Kingdom has long urged moderation, lest overly high energy costs slow the global economy and eventually dampen demand or provide additional incentives for the development of alternative energy sources.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/u78vM9M.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: National Grid (2023) Projections to 2035 for England and Wales.</strong> Source: National Grid ESO, “Bridging the Gap to Net Zero”, March 2023.</em></p> -<p>In sum, Saudi Arabia has traditionally understood its hydrocarbon wealth as giving it special responsibilities that went far beyond those an ordinary state might have to its people, instead extending to the health of the global economy. In this context, it also regarded US commitments to Gulf security as being about more than the preservation of the Kingdom’s own national security. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the oil-for-security bargain was not just a bilateral pact serving the interests of two countries, but a critical component of the post-Second World War global order – with the Kingdom as the world’s pivotal energy provider.</p> +<p>Concurrent global growth in demand will put great pressure on international supply chains. Mining companies in particular face a range of challenges, including high exploration and production costs, environmental and social concerns, access to capital and shortages of skilled labour. Currently, investments in both the mining of new minerals and processing capacity are falling short of estimated demand, notwithstanding the different demand outlooks and uncertainties around the impact of new technologies. The IEA, for instance, notes that “in a scenario consistent with climate goals, expected supply from existing mines and projects under construction is estimated to meet only half of projected lithium and cobalt requirements and 80% of copper needs by 2030”. Thus, if investment in new mine capacity is not accelerated, the pace of the energy transition will be constrained.</p> -<h4 id="the-emergence-of-a-saudi-first-approach">The Emergence of a “Saudi First” Approach</h4> +<p>This raises a number of issues for the UK. First, its ability to meet its net zero goals will depend on the availability of new energy supplies. Meanwhile, the UK’s industrial and economic competitiveness will be closely linked to energy costs. Some military systems also use critical materials, and, while the quantities of these are relatively small, they require high-purity, high-value materials. Finally, supply disruptions, however limited, could reduce the UK’s ability to use renewable technology to meet its climate goals, as well as constrain its freedom of action.</p> -<p>In June 2023, after announcing another major production cut, Saudi energy minister Abdulaziz bin Salman declared that the Kingdom and its partners within OPEC and OPEC+ would “do whatever is necessary to bring stability to this market”. He explained that the decision was based on projections of weak global demand in the context of a slow global economy. This was Saudi Arabia playing its traditional role as balancer. The minister and other Saudi leaders made the same arguments to justify the other two recent production cuts, in October 2022 and April 2023. Yet, in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent spike in energy prices, all three announcements attracted vocal criticism. Many observers suggested that the cuts represent a change in Saudi policy, arguing that instead of acting as the pro-Western oil central banker of yesteryear, the Kingdom had adopted a more resource-nationalist “Saudi First” approach aimed at keeping prices elevated, and potentially even favouring OPEC+ member Russia’s interests over those of the US and other Western countries.</p> +<p>To date the UK has relied on markets to satisfy its needs and, where effective and efficient markets exist, government policies suggest this will remain the case. The UK government recognised in its 2022 Critical Minerals Strategy that many critical mineral markets are “incomplete”, having inadequate data and transparency. The Critical Minerals Intelligence Centre was established at the British Geological Survey in July 2022, and the government has committed to convening a dialogue with industry, and to using multilateral engagement to promote market development. But establishing concrete policies to secure necessary supplies will be challenging without an industrial strategy to provide guidance on UK demand for critical minerals at the various stages of the supply chain.</p> -<p>Assertions that there has been a wholesale overhaul of Saudi oil policy and overall foreign political orientation go too far, but it is true that there has been a change in what the Kingdom regards as its main strategic priorities and how it believes it can best achieve them. The shift in Saudi domestic politics described above, encapsulated in the proclamation of Vision 2030 as the Kingdom’s all-encompassing national development roadmap, also finds expression in how Saudi leaders approach oil export decisions, and in Saudi foreign policy more generally. As noted earlier, the need to fund the long list of socioeconomic reforms and development projects represents a renewed incentive to maximise oil revenues. Whereas in the past Saudi leaders might have looked to find a balance between their financial needs and their strategic alignment with the US, the pursuit of Vision 2030 now trumps all other considerations. From decisions on oil production and the willingness to work closely with Russia to coordinate outputs across OPEC+, through the agreement to normalise relations with Iran under the auspices of China, to the re-engagement with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime – if Saudi Arabia believes that an action serves Vision 2030, it is prepared to act in a way that might prompt criticism or opposition from Washington and elsewhere.</p> +<p>The efforts of the UK and its allies to build out new energy supply chains are likely to involve a lengthy process – one from which China cannot be excluded, at least in the near term. While policy papers do not articulate what level of reliance on China is acceptable to the UK and its allies, the decoupling (now de-risking) narratives indicate that there will be an attempt to rapidly reduce dependence on China. In the US, for instance, the Inflation Reduction Act provides a range of tax credits, as the country seeks to encourage the sourcing of battery materials domestically, or from partner countries with which the US has free trade agreements. From 2025 onwards, EV batteries will only be eligible for US purchase subsidies if they do not contain any critical minerals that were extracted, processed or recycled by a “foreign entity of concern” – including China. Similarly, the European Commission’s proposal for a new Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) aims to achieve a high degree of self-sufficiency by 2030. According to the CRMA, EU capacity should reach at least 10% of domestic demand for mining and extraction and at least 40% for processing and refining, in a bid to address overreliance on China’s supply chains. The European Raw Materials Alliance, announced in September 2020 as part of the European Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials, focuses on developing sustainable and responsible supply chains for critical raw materials and fostering partnerships with resource-rich countries other than China.</p> -<p>This approach is shaped by Saudi Arabia’s perception of key trends in the global environment that have serious implications for its national security. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia has lost confidence in the US’s willingness to hold up its side of the old oil-for-security bargain. Saudi Arabia is aware that the US, with its extensive basing infrastructure and thousands of deployed troops, remains the single most powerful military power in the Gulf region. The Kingdom does not believe that any other external power – not China, not Russia – is prepared (or able) to take over the role the US has played in upholding maritime security in the region, and it is still looking to purchase weapons from the US (and European partners) to strengthen its defence capabilities. Yet, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the US commitment not just to be present in the region, but to exercise power and to do so in line with the Kingdom’s conception of regional security and stability, has eroded over the past two decades.</p> +<p>Before the paper goes on to discuss the implications of this for UK security, the next chapter offers a brief overview of key net zero supply chains and their complexity.</p> -<p>According to Riyadh, the George W Bush administration dismissed Saudi Arabia’s warnings that regime change in Iraq would unleash regional instability; Riyadh also holds that the Obama administration allowed the regional order to unravel further by abandoning the Mubarak regime in Egypt, not intervening decisively against the Assad regime in Syria and ignoring regional concerns in negotiating the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran; finally, Riyadh’s view is that the Biden administration never attempted to hide its dislike of the Kingdom. Even the Trump administration, which had initially appeared to be more responsive to Saudi concerns, did nothing when Iran attacked Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais on 14 September 2019. This was a watershed moment for Saudi Arabia: from the Kingdom’s perspective, there could hardly be a more obvious reneging on the oil-for-security bargain than a non-response to an attack that took more than 5 million barrels per day – roughly half of Saudi production – offline.</p> +<h3 id="iii-chinas-dominance-of-new-energy-supply-chains">III. China’s Dominance of New Energy Supply Chains</h3> -<p>As well as being prompted by the changes the Kingdom perceived in its bilateral relations with the US, recent shifts in Saudi Arabia’s oil-related decision-making and foreign policy have also been a response to how the Kingdom has experienced developments in the US’s energy industry over the past decade. From Riyadh’s perspective, the shale oil and gas revolution in the US has dramatically altered the dynamics of international markets, rapidly increasing overall global production capacity (affecting international prices) and turning the US into a net exporter of hydrocarbons (and therefore a competitor for market share). Moreover, the shale revolution has increased price volatility, partly because shale production has shorter timelines than traditional extraction projects, which contributes to more fluctuations in supply levels, and partly because the companies involved in the US oil industry are mostly private entities operating outside the constraints of the kind of production quotas that Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members have long used to exert influence over the global market.</p> +<h4 id="supply-chain-components">Supply Chain Components</h4> -<p>In fact, Saudi Arabia has regarded recent US government decision-making related to the management of international energy markets as hypocritical and wilfully destabilising. In its view, Washington has refused to rein in the US oil industry to prevent the oversupply of the market (though this is arguably hardly possible, as the US oil industry is mostly privately owned and therefore not subject to government-set quotas), and then turned to Saudi Arabia to call for production cuts when prices fell so low as to threaten the viability of US oil companies. The most obvious example of the latter pattern was President Trump’s appeal to Saudi Arabia and Russia to end their price war in April 2020. Moreover, Saudi Arabia feels that the actions the US and other Western governments have taken to deal with the increase in prices since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and to try to target Russian energy exports through sanctions, have equated to precisely the kind of politicisation of energy policy that the Kingdom has been accused of. Riyadh regards the substantial release from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserves since February 2022, and the US–European attempt to impose a price cap on Russian oil, as blatant and politically motivated manipulations of the market.</p> +<p>Supply chains for low-carbon energy technologies have several stages and involve many different countries. A supply chain may comprise as many as six steps:</p> -<p>The overall result, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, is a more competitive and volatile market in which the Kingdom is still expected to (and indeed wants to) maintain a degree of balance and stability, while others – the US government and US energy companies in particular – take no such responsibility. The decision to expand the coordination of production levels beyond OPEC by creating the OPEC+ grouping with Russia, and Riyadh’s insistence on continuing to work with Moscow after February 2022, despite intense criticism from the West, has been a key element of how Saudi Arabia has tried to respond to these new dynamics. This is discussed in more detail below.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Extraction and beneficiation of mineral ores.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Processing and refining of the ores to produce metals.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Further processing to produce the required alloys or chemical compounds.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Manufacture of individual components.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Manufacture of intermediate products from these components.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Assembly of final product.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>A third, related, key driver of changes in Saudi Arabia’s international positioning, including as an energy producer, is the Kingdom’s understanding of the ongoing shifts in the global political and economic order. Long before the shale revolution in the US, the West’s importance as a customer of Saudi – and Middle Eastern – hydrocarbons had declined significantly; as of 2021, the vast majority of Saudi crude exports went to Asia (250.4 million tonnes, with only 72.8 million tonnes going to non-Asian countries; China alone accounted for 87.6 million tonnes). Renewed European interest in Middle Eastern oil and gas following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not changed the fact that Saudi Arabia (and most other hydrocarbon producers) continue to see markets in Asia as their main priorities and future growth areas. The Western approach to climate change and the energy transition, discussed in the next section, is an important factor in this calculus. Ultimately, Saudi Arabia judges that while the US and the West are still important, including for its defence and the success of its Vision 2030, it is in the Kingdom’s interest to diversify its international relations, not least by forging closer relations with its most important oil customer, China. In Riyadh’s view, this does not imply that it has to position itself against the US, but it does mean that it is determined to resist pressure to conform with what it regards as an emerging Western with-us-or-against-us attitude vis-à-vis Beijing (or Moscow).</p> +<p>In principle, each step can be carried out in a different country. But China, as discussed below, has built a strong position that spans steps one to five in several important supply chains. The basis of this strength lies in China’s dominance of the extraction and, to an even greater extent, processing of certain critical minerals.</p> -<p>The notion that Saudi Arabia has adopted a “Saudi First” approach in recent years is somewhat misleading, in that it suggests that the Kingdom’s foreign policy and decisions on oil exports were previously guided by anything other than what Saudi leaders regarded as their – and their country’s – interests. During the oil-for-security era, Saudi Arabia generally determined that its interests were best served by aligning itself as closely as possible with the US, including in how it exercised its role as an oil exporter committed to stabilising and moderating international prices as much as possible. Indeed, Ibrahim Al-Muhanna, a long-time adviser in the Saudi Ministry of Energy, suggests that Saudi leaders were even prepared to occasionally accommodate requests from US politicians to try to nudge energy prices downwards to help with US election campaigns. Over the past decade, and most obviously since the rise to power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the proclamation of his Vision 2030, Riyadh’s calculations have changed. The perceived unreliability of the US as a security provider, changes in the global balance of power and the need to fund Vision 2030 are key factors driving an approach that is less US-centric and more focused on maintaining a higher level of prices if possible.</p> +<p><strong>What are Critical Minerals?</strong></p> -<h4 id="saudi-arabia-and-the-opec-connection-with-russia">Saudi Arabia and the OPEC+ Connection with Russia</h4> +<p>The criticality of a specific mineral is generally assessed on the basis of the risk of interruption to supply and on the economic or security importance to the importing nation or region of such a disruption. One factor that contributes to the assessment of supply risk is the market concentration of the production of a mineral ore or refined metal. Most assessments do not consider the geographic concentration of primary mineral ore resources, as these are – in most cases – abundant and geographically widespread. However, the known high-quality accumulations tend to be geographically concentrated, though future exploration may yield some new high-grade deposits.</p> -<p>The Saudi–Russian partnership, manifested in the countries’ joint leadership of the OPEC+ grouping, is best understood as a marriage of convenience, rather than an expression of a wider strategic alignment – certainly not one that even approaches the importance of the Kingdom’s relationship with the US, or with China, for that matter. OPEC+ was formed in 2016 in response to the disruption to the global oil market caused by the US shale revolution. By increasing the number of countries coordinating production levels, the members of OPEC+ sought to expand their ability to control the supply side of the market and thereby regain a more substantial ability to influence and stabilise international prices. By themselves, Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members accounted for around 36% of global production; bringing Russia and nine other producers into the fold increased that share to 59%.</p> +<p>The principal focus of such criticality assessments is the mineral inputs required to produce advanced technologies, notably in the low-carbon and defence industries. Assessments carried out by different organisations result in different lists of critical minerals. This is due to a combination of differing geographic scope and economic/security concerns, as well as different methodologies. This study draws on four such assessments, conducted respectively by: the US Department of the Interior; the IEA; the British Geological Survey; and the European Commission.</p> -<p>The strategy worked, at least to an extent. OPEC+’s supply-side interventions in themselves were not enough to control international oil prices, but they generally succeeded in reducing market volatility. However, the brittleness of the alliance was demonstrated in the price war between Moscow and Riyadh in March and April 2020. As the global economy shut down with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, prompting oil prices to fall, Russia – seeing an opportunity to deal a blow to the US shale industry – refused to go along with Saudi-proposed production cuts. Saudi Arabia, though not necessarily opposed to hurting shale producers, opted for a show of force vis-à-vis Russia. It ramped up production to deliberately push prices down even further so as to force Moscow to relent. It took an intervention from the Trump administration in Washington to convince Saudi Arabia and Russia to return to cooperating with one another, ultimately brokering an unprecedented 10 million barrels per day cut by OPEC+ members in April 2020.</p> +<p>The minerals identified as critical by one or more of these assessments, and which are inputs to low-carbon energy technologies, are listed in Table 2.</p> -<p>In the years since, and thus far unperturbed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, OPEC+ coordination has been much less fractious. Many of the grouping’s members have struggled to fulfil even their reduced production quotas, and there has been persistent speculation that the UAE – after Saudi Arabia and Russia, one of the most important members of the alliance – could consider leaving OPEC in order to more independently and immediately monetise its expanding production capacity. Overall, however, OPEC+ and the Riyadh–Moscow relationship at its apex have held together, even in the face of significant Western political pressure on Saudi Arabia after February 2022. From the Kingdom’s perspective, the expanded supply-side market influence that Russia brings to OPEC+ remains highly valuable; Riyadh may also judge that Moscow can exert a degree of leverage over Iran, an OPEC member with at least the potential capacity to substantially affect global supply even as it remains hamstrung by US sanctions. However, this aspect could become less important to Riyadh, as its own relations with Tehran have become more constructive following the March 2023 Beijing Agreement.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EPBI78A.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Critical Minerals Relevant to Low-Carbon Energy Technologies.</strong> Sources: <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-24/pdf/2022-04027.pdf">US Department of the Interior, “2022 Final List of Critical Minerals”, Federal Register (Vol. 87, No. 37, 24 February 2022)</a>, p. 10,381; IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, May 2021; Paul Lusty et al., UK Criticality Assessment of Technology Critical Minerals and Metals, British Geological Survey, CR/21/120 (Keyworth: British Geological Survey, 2021); Silvia Bobba et al., Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU: A Foresight Study (Brussels: European Commission, 2020).</em></p> -<p>It is also important to note that the Saudi–Russian bilateral relationship extends beyond oil. Ever since King Salman’s unprecedented visit to Russia in 2017, the two countries have worked on expanding economic cooperation more generally, including with discussions about joint investments in Russia’s agriculture and energy sectors, for example – though Saudi Arabia has generally been less vocal about these plans than Russia. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has at least reluctantly appreciated Russia’s return to the Middle East as a security actor over the past decade. It did not like Russia’s intervention on the side of the Assad regime in Syria in 2015, at a time when the Kingdom was still committed to an opposition victory in Damascus, but from Riyadh’s perspective Russia was also prepared to stand by its partners in the region, reliably and consistently oppose all forms of destabilising regime-change efforts in the region, and refrain from criticising the Kingdom; all in marked contrast to the US, whose commitment to regional stability seemed less certain, as discussed above.</p> +<p>The growing demand for clean energy technologies will sharply accelerate the demand for some of these critical minerals. Table 3 summarises the IEA’s estimates for this growth to 2040.</p> -<p>As Russia’s war against Ukraine goes on, and particularly if Russia’s economy suffers further and its military struggles continue, Saudi Arabia’s belief in the usefulness of the non-energy components of the bilateral relationship could be eroded. Even then, though, energy and the two countries’ shared leadership of OPEC+ remain powerful connectors, as does the fact that Saudi Arabia is uncomfortable with some of the geopolitical developments surrounding the war. As previously mentioned, Riyadh has been vocal in its opposition to some of the Western sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, particularly the attempt to impose a price cap on Russian exports. Saudi Arabia worries that this could set a precedent for politically motivated interventions in global energy markets by buyers of hydrocarbons that could one day affect the exports of other producers too. Indeed, the Kingdom’s unwillingness to pick sides between the West and Russia goes beyond energy – and Russia, for that matter. In an increasingly competitive and polarised global environment, Saudi Arabia is determined not to be forced to choose between West and East, insisting that it will chart its own path in a multipolar – not bipolar – future world order.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BfZxfiw.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: Estimated Growth in Demand for Selected Critical Minerals and Share of Clean Energy Technologies in Total Demand.</strong> Notes: 1. STEPS and SDS refer respectively to the IEA’s “Stated Policies” and “Sustainable Development” scenarios. 2. * refers to neodymium only. Source: IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”.</em></p> -<p>But Saudi–Russian cooperation within OPEC+ may not continue forever. The 2020 price war showed that Riyadh is prepared to turn against Russia when it sees its own interests threatened. Russia’s expanding market share in Asia, as it sells its crude at discounted prices to major consumers like China and India, could fuel discord, particularly if Saudi Arabia were to see its own market share in Asia – the continent it sees as the centre of gravity for future exports – become affected. For the moment, Saudi Aramco appears to be managing this risk, not least by buying up Russian crude and selling it on (Saudi Aramco is not just the largest oil producer in the world, but also a leading oil trader). Still, the “Saudi First” approach, the primacy of pursuing its own interests, applies just as much to its cooperation with Russia and other OPEC+ members as it does to its response to Western calls for changes to the Kingdom’s policies.</p> +<p>It is clear that China holds a significant or strong global position in the extraction and/or processing of a large number of the minerals listed in Table 2. In most cases, China’s global share of processing is significantly larger than that of ore extraction, as China imports large quantities of ore for domestic processing. The strength of China’s position is enhanced by its growing involvement in mining and mineral processing overseas (Table 4). The scale of overseas investment in this sector accelerated in the first half of 2023, with a focus on nickel, lithium and copper. The countries that host Chinese mining companies will play a growing role in the global energy transition.</p> -<h3 id="iii-between-climate-change-and-climate-action">III. Between Climate Change and Climate Action</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PFNtRA7.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: Examples of Countries Where China is Deeply Involved in Critical Minerals.</strong> Note: PGMs = platinum group metals. Sources: Christoph Nedopil Wang, “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”; Chen Aizhu and Fransiska Nangoy, “Shandong Nanshan May Expand Indonesia Site into $6 bln Aluminium Complex”, Reuters, 15 May 2023; Saliou Samb, “China to Loan Guinea $20 Billion to Secure Aluminium Ore”, Reuters, 6 September 2023; James Attwood and Leonardo Lara, “China’s BYD Takes Next Steps on $290 Million Lithium Project in Chile”, Bloomberg, 3 July 2023; Jonathan Gilbert and James Attwood, “China’s Zijin is in Talks with Argentina to Turn Lithium into Battery Cathode”, Bloomberg, 10 July 2023; Thomas Graham, “Bolivia’s Dream of a Lithium Future Plays out on High-Altitude Salt Flats”, The Guardian, 25 January 2023; “Gabon, CITIC to Mine 26 Mln T Manganese Resource”, Reuters, 23 October 2010; Harry Dempsey, “Indonesia Emerges as World’s Second-Largest Cobalt Producer”, Financial Times, 9 May 2023; Yudith Ho and Eko Listiyorini, “Chinese Companies are Flocking to Indonesia for its Nickel”, Bloomberg, 15 December 2022; Harry Dempsey and Leslie Hook, “China Set to Tighten Grip over Global Cobalt Supply as Price Hits 32-Month Low”, Financial Times, 13 March 2023; Simon Mundy, “China Enters South African Platinum Sector”, Financial Times, 18 December 2010.</em></p> -<p>Saudi Arabia’s evolving oil-related decision-making and foreign policy must also be understood in the context of the dual challenge that climate change and climate action pose to the Kingdom. In the past, Saudi Arabia has generally approached the climate debate from a defensive position. Given the centrality of its oil industry to its political and socioeconomic development model, it has, like Russia, long regarded international (and especially Western) calls to decarbonise the world economy and limit – and eventually end – the extraction of fossil fuels as a near-existential threat. Until the diversification of Saudi Arabia’s economy progresses further than it has to date, oil exports will remain strategically indispensable for the Kingdom.</p> +<p>The UK has no significant mining production of the critical minerals identified by the British Geological Survey, but prospective areas for mineral extraction do exist in the UK, notably for lithium in Cornwall. Whether extraction of any of these deposits can be brought to a significant scale by 2035 is an open question, not least due to social and environmental concerns. Likewise, the UK’s processing capacity for these minerals is very limited. Nevertheless, the UK is home to a number of international mining companies that could, in principle, supply some of the required minerals. Recycling is often seen as having more potential in the UK, but in a rapidly growing market, recycled materials originating in the UK will lag behind demand significantly.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, Riyadh has changed its tone somewhat in recent years. In 2021, it announced 2060 as its target to reach net zero emissions and announced the Saudi Green Initiative and the Middle East Green Initiative to accelerate climate-and sustainability-related development efforts in the Kingdom and the region, respectively. Critical observers have dismissed such announcements as efforts at “greenwashing”, but this analysis is too simplistic. Besides an obvious interest in preserving the future viability of oil as an energy source and its own status as a leading producer, three key factors appear to be shaping Saudi Arabia’s changing position.</p> +<p>Below is a more detailed look at some of the other key supply chain components that will need to be addressed in any shift away from Chinese dominance.</p> -<p>Firstly, there is a growing recognition that climate change poses a significant physical threat to Saudi Arabia itself. Together with the wider Middle East region, the Arabian Peninsula is among the parts of the world where the effects of climate change – particularly rising temperatures and more unpredictable weather patterns, including extreme weather events – have already been acutely felt. Climate change and environmental security may not yet be regarded as being on a par with the threat that anti-hydrocarbon climate action represents, but they are becoming more important in the Kingdom’s calculations.</p> +<p><strong>Batteries and EVs</strong></p> -<p>Secondly, over the past decade the Saudi government has grown increasingly aware of the need to rein in unsustainable domestic energy consumption. Improving energy efficiency and investing in renewable energy generation are seen as being necessary to reduce emissions and prevent ever more Saudi oil from being diverted to the domestic market rather than being exported to generate revenues.</p> +<p>Lithium-ion batteries are the most commonly used form of energy storage for electric and hybrid motor vehicles and are also used for household and grid electricity storage. Their key components are anodes, cathodes and electrolytes. Lithium is the most important metal in this context, as it provides the electrolyte as well as most forms of cathode. The chemistry of the cathode and anode varies, and this results in six main types of lithium-ion battery:</p> -<p>Finally, Saudi Arabia also sees opportunities in the global energy transition. The feasibility of hydrogen (and its derivatives) becoming a commodity that will eventually be traded like oil may still be unclear, just as the export of solar- and wind-generated electricity remains limited by infrastructure constraints, but Saudi Arabia is confident that if/when technological barriers are overcome it is in a prime position to be a major player in both fields. This belief is reinforced by the self-perception and self-confidence that Saudi Arabia has always been an energy power and therefore “gets” energy – whether derived from hydrocarbons or otherwise.</p> +<ul> + <li>NMC: Lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide.</li> + <li>NCA: Lithium nickel cobalt aluminium oxide.</li> + <li>LCO: Lithium cobalt oxide.</li> + <li>LFP: Lithium iron phosphate.</li> + <li>LMO: Lithium manganese oxide.</li> + <li>LTO: Lithium titanate.</li> +</ul> -<p>Saudi Arabia has resolved that it must become a more active participant in the international climate debate. How exactly it intends to do so remains to be seen, but the basic contours of its approach are already emerging. Saudi Arabia (and its fellow OPEC oil producers, including COP28 host the UAE) will likely push back against any efforts to make the total phasing out of hydrocarbons an internationally agreed climate action objective. Riyadh will argue for an inclusive approach to the global energy transition that leaves no-one behind, including hydrocarbon exporters; and it will present itself as the producer capable of providing the cheapest and most emission-efficient oil, and as the one that might even eventually produce carbon-free oil once carbon capture and storage, which Saudi Aramco is investing considerable resources in, are achieved. At the same time, Saudi Arabia will also likely expand its hydrogen- and renewables-related efforts, not to curry favour with international audiences but to capitalise on potential economic opportunities. Within the context of the international climate change/climate action debate, Saudi Arabia will remain a defender of hydrocarbons and resist calls for their complete phasing out.</p> +<p>The composition of the cathode is the main differentiator between these battery types. The anode is commonly composed of graphite, either natural or synthetic (manufactured from hydrocarbons). The main exception is the LTO battery, which uses lithium titanate for the anode. Tin and niobium are likely to be used in the future to increase the energy density of the anode.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Table 5 illustrates in simplified form the supply chain for lithium-ion batteries, from raw material (in the form of ore) through to final battery assembly. This shows that China’s strong position in mineral ore extraction only applies to natural graphite and silicon. In contrast, China has built a strong – and even dominant – position in mineral processing and in the refining of domestic and imported ores, the manufacture of anodes, cathodes and electrolytes, and in the manufacture of the lithium-ion cells that go into the final battery pack. The import of beneficiated ores from overseas through bilateral offtake agreements has been key to this success (see Table 4). Chinese mining companies have enhanced this advantage through their overseas investments, notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for cobalt, in Latin America for lithium and in Indonesia for nickel, in some cases supporting not only mining but in-country refining and processing.</p> -<p>Among Western policymakers and in international media outlets, the notion of “the oil weapon” is arguably more closely associated with Saudi Arabia than with any other country. The 1973 oil embargo has become almost legendary, and many remember the Kingdom’s price war with Russia in March and April 2020. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to ramp up oil production in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and its subsequent decisions to repeatedly cut production, all in the face of loud Western protestations, have fuelled debate about the extent to which Riyadh might use its influence over oil markets in ways that are antithetical to Western interests. Other foreign policy moves, both within the Middle East region and towards engaging more closely with Moscow and Beijing, have spurred further speculation about Saudi Arabia moving away from – and perhaps even against – its traditional Western partners. Yet, as this paper shows, much of this speculation is exaggerated and, if anything, reflects an overly Western-centric assessment that fails to understand how Saudi Arabia sees itself and its position in the changing global environment.</p> +<p>Ongoing technological advances are likely to achieve two things. The first involves cost and efficiency improvements for existing lithium-ion chemistries, which could reduce the unit requirement for critical minerals. The second is the development of entirely new designs that could radically reduce or even obviate the need for critical minerals: these potential designs include solid state batteries, redox flow batteries, sodium-ion and iron-air chemistries, and supercapacitors. Japanese firms have been leading these innovations, but companies from South Korea, the US, China and Europe are also contributing. These advances are not currently being pursued at scale by the UK, but should they be developed and deployed rapidly it remains to be seen whether they could materially change the UK’s demand outlook by 2035.</p> -<p>For Saudi Arabia, whose economic fortunes and international status will likely remain inextricably linked to its world-leading oil industry, the health and relative stability of the international oil market is of utmost strategic importance. Its commitment to Vision 2030, the new all-important North Star of the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign policy, means that Saudi Arabia needs to try to keep oil prices at a relatively high level, if at all possible. Within the context of the international climate change/climate action debate, Saudi Arabia will remain a defender of hydrocarbons and resist calls for their complete phase-out. At the same time, it feels that both its economic and security needs require it to diversify its international relations beyond its traditional reliance on the US and the wider West, even if that means forging relations with countries that Washington or European capitals consider to be beyond the pale.</p> +<p>In 2022, only 6% of the UK’s EVs were produced domestically, and even now direct exposure to the Chinese supply chain – which is most dominant in refining, components and intermediate products (see Table 5) – is limited. Some 47% of the UK’s battery EVs were imported from the EU in 2022, up from 44% in 2019, followed by China at 32%, up from 2% in 2019. Sales of Chinese EVs in the UK and EU are growing. Moreover, Chinese companies already manufacture batteries in Europe (which are consequently not subject to tariffs), and this capacity could rise to 322 gigawatt hours per year (GWh/yr) by 2031. Chinese car manufacturers will also look to start production in Europe.</p> -<p>Yet, with all that said, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, for all its transformational intent, is ultimately the development agenda of a status quo power. The Vision 2030 agenda has been constructed in the context of an international environment in which the international rules-based order is upheld sufficiently to prevent any conflict that would have catastrophic implications for the Saudi or global economies. It is built on the principles of globalisation and requires the Kingdom to build relations with everyone, West and East. Riyadh may try to intervene in the oil market to secure its interests, but is not, and is unlikely to become, a revisionist power – even as it cooperates with revisionists like Russia.</p> +<p>As of August 2023, the UK hosts two operating lithium-ion battery plants:</p> -<p>This has important implications for the UK and its partners in Europe and beyond. Even if the UK were never to import a single barrel of Saudi oil again, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means the behaviour of the hydrocarbon superpower that is Saudi Arabia will substantially impact on the UK’s energy security, including the prices consumers pay to operate their cars or heat their homes. Moreover, the Kingdom’s calculations vis-à-vis its relations with Russia and China will have consequences for the changing global order that the UK too will have to navigate; and Saudi Arabia’s decision-making regarding climate change will significantly shape this global debate and struggle, in which the UK remains committed to playing a leading role.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Envision–AESC’s LMO plant in Sunderland, with a capacity of 1.9 GWh/yr and plans to expand to 11 GWh/yr by 2024 and 35 GWh/yr by 2030.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>AMTE’s lithium-ion battery plant in Thurso, with a capacity of 0.5 GWh/yr.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>UK–Saudi relations have deep roots, are multifaceted, and have grown in importance in recent years – according to statements from London. However, to maintain this relationship and perhaps even have some degree of influence on Saudi Arabia in areas that matter to the UK – from energy, through geopolitics, to climate change – policymakers must continuously refine and update their understanding of – and moreover take seriously – Saudi Arabia’s own strategic calculus. For the foreseeable future, the key to this is likely to be how confident the Kingdom feels about the success of its domestic transformation project.</p> +<p>On 18 July 2023, it was announced that Tata had committed to building a 40 GWh/yr plant in Somerset. Other potential gigafactories in Coventry and Dundee have yet to be confirmed.</p> -<hr /> +<p>According to the Faraday Institution, the UK’s manufacturing capacity could, based on current plans, reach a combined 57 GWh/yr by 2030. That falls short of the UK’s estimated requirement of 100 GWh/yr of battery supplies (or gigafactories) to meet demand for batteries for private cars, commercial vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, buses, micromobility and grid storage by 2030, the date at which the UK had intended to end the sale of fully internal combustion engine vehicles and vans, which was delayed to 2035 in September 2023. By 2040, that demand could rise to nearly 200 GWh/yr. According to data from UK Trade Info, the UK currently relies on China for 42% of its lithium-ion battery packs.</p> -<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East.</p>Tobias BorckSaudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.AI-Generated Lies And Truth2023-11-02T12:00:00+08:002023-11-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-generated-lies-and-truth<p><em>How does the technology aid fake news and narratives – particularly in the run-up to 2024 for elections in many Western democracies?</em></p> +<p>It is unclear whether the UK can become an attractive destination for battery makers in the future given the limited nature of UK incentives (at least compared to support schemes rolled out in the EU and the US) and due to uncertainty about future trading rules with the EU. Lithium mining locally could help attract battery makers, but lithium mining tends to take years to scale up. Even if the UK did increase its battery manufacturing capabilities, it would need to attract both auto assemblers and battery makers – which would likely be Japanese, South Korean or Chinese – or to support local companies in the face of strong international competition.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Assuming that the UK will not be able to meet all its battery and EV requirements domestically, it will continue to import both batteries and EVs from Europe and China, with Chinese EVs and batteries looking likely to be more cost competitive than their European counterparts. With more gigafactories opening up in Europe, the UK will be able to diversify its battery and EV imports, but will remain dependent on a limited number of producers who, in turn, will remain reliant on Chinese components and minerals (see Table 5).</p> -<p>In July 2017, researchers at the University of Washington used AI to make a convincing video of former President Barack Obama giving a speech that he never gave. At the time it seemed novel, but perhaps nothing more consequential than a hacker’s parlour trick. Sadly, it heralded rapid advancements in the realm of synthetic media that few could have predicted. AI experts now estimate that nearly 90% of all online media content may be synthetically generated by 2026. For the first time in the history of digital media, realistic fake content is now cheaper and faster to create than reality, and the consequences for national security as well as civil society are simultaneously both alarming and hard to fathom.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2SCmO3K.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 5: China’s Involvement in the Supply Chain for Lithium-Ion Batteries.</strong> Notes: 1. Italics indicate estimated share of Chinese production once overseas projects are included. 2. C* = natural graphite. 3. C** = high-quality spherical graphite. 4. metals in brackets are likely to be used in the future. Sources: <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/publications/mineral-commodity-summaries-2023">US Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023”, 31 January 2023</a>; IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”; Lusty et al., “UK Criticality Assessment of Technology Critical Minerals and Metals”; Bobba et al., “Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU: A Foresight Study”; <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/the-state-of-clean-technology-manufacturing">IEA, “The State of Clean Technology Manufacturing”, May 2023</a>; <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023">IEA, “Energy Technology Perspectives 2023”</a>; Heejin Kim and Gabrielle Coppola, “Chinese Firms are Seeking Korean Partners to Skirt US EV Rules”, Bloomberg, 30 July 2023.</em></p> -<p>The real impact that fake content can have is staggering. In May 2023, investor confidence was shaken amid social media-fuelled reports of a potential terrorist attack near the Pentagon, and the US stock market slid considerably. In that case, the image was easy to debunk, and investor confidence rapidly returned. Repeat the event with a more sophisticated set of tools, however, such as a fake presidential speech and a coordinated influence campaign to spread the lie across many social media platforms, and the results could have been far more dramatic than a stock dip. Indeed, synthetic hoaxes are now seen as an important driver of international events. Prior to the Russian reinvasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, the US revealed a Russian plot to spread deepfake content (media created or manipulated synthetically with the help of AI) as a pretext for the invasion.</p> +<p><strong>Wind Power Plants</strong></p> -<p>The case of Russia can also be used to illustrate the threat to civil society: that people can believe anything or, caught in the miasma of competing narratives online, simply choose to opt out and believe nothing at all. As journalist Peter Pomerantsev points out in his excellent book Nothing is True and Everything is Possible, authoritarian governments such as Russia increase their power when their citizens are confused and disoriented. In the West, a lack of confidence that anything can be true is a problem for a great many reasons, not least because trust in government is at historic lows at the same time as governments are moving their public-facing communications online, and especially to social media. Consider a public safety scenario in which a governor issues an emergency evacuation order in advance of a powerful hurricane, or a public health official gives a warning about a quickly spreading pandemic. Could these important warnings be identified by a majority of people as belonging to the 10% of truth remaining on the internet, or would they be dismissed by citizens in danger as fake news, a political hoax, or even a prank? What can be done? Rooting out fake news and combatting automated propaganda is an important contribution to societal resilience, but we must look ahead to the next challenges as well.</p> +<p>Large, modern wind turbines place significant demands on material supply to maximise their energy output and strength. The respective key components are permanent magnets for the generators and steel for the tower, nacelle and other parts of the turbine. Permanent magnets are also essential components of the traction motors in EVs. The most commonly used form of permanent magnet in wind turbines is the NdFeB magnet (neodymium iron boron), whose production requires neodymium, along with other rare earth metals such as dysprosium and praseodymium. China extracts around 70% of the world’s rare earth metal ores (see Table 6). Moreover, China is responsible for around 90% of the global output of rare earth metals through its longstanding dominance of rare earth ore processing and refining. China has taken advantage of this strength to build manufacturing capacity that now provides nearly 90% of the world’s supply of NdFeB magnets.</p> -<p>The current solutions to address mis- and disinformation are not up to the task. We can’t count the number of times we have advised students, policymakers and the general public to combat mis- and disinformation on the internet by thinking critically, being skeptical and not reflexively reposting content without fact checking. That recipe is now incomplete. It is clear that the scale of the problem requires technological solutions too, and organisations around the world are investing in ways to quickly identify fake media. However, as technology continues to progress, this problem will soon be reversed, and the hunt for fake media will need to be replaced with verification of truth. In other words, instead of trying to weed out what is fake, we will need to identify ways to validate a truth among lies. This would involve a radical reframing of both the problem and potential solutions.</p> +<p>Most of the other critical minerals shown in Table 6 are additives to steel (manganese, chromium, molybdenum, nickel, niobium) or inputs to other turbine components. As is the case in battery materials, China has a strong mineral processing industry that allows it to import ores to produce refined metals. This has given the country a dominant position in the supply of refined manganese and relatively strong positions in aluminium, copper and molybdenum.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For the first time in the history of digital media, realistic fake content is now cheaper and faster to create than reality</code></em></strong></p> +<p>These foundations in the production of permanent magnets and in metallurgical industries have given China the basis for achieving a large share of global production of key components such as generators, gearboxes, blades and nacelles.</p> -<p>Currently, social media platforms (and users themselves) are scrambling to tag and label inauthentic content. Soon this will be akin to using an umbrella to block individual raindrops during a monsoon. TikTok, for instance – like most social media companies – has policies requiring labelling synthetic media, but a recent report from misinformation monitor NewsGuard found the implementation of TikTok’s policy wanting. Likewise, fact-checking organisations are already struggling to keep up with the amount of disinformation online. By 2026, their backlog of digital nonsense will keep them busily debunking falsehoods far into the distant future. Turning the status quo equation on its head means that instead of identifying fake news polluting a stream of otherwise legitimate content, we must realise that the stream will soon be the lies, and the truth will need to be plucked out.</p> +<p>In 2022, the UK had over 14 GW of offshore wind. Half of the UK’s renewable energy comes from wind, and by 2030, offshore wind will supply a third of the country’s electricity. In its 2022 Energy Security Strategy, the government scaled up its plans for wind to reach 50 GW by 2030, compared to a 40 GW target previously, including up to 5 GW of innovative floating wind. RenewableUK, the country’s renewable trade body, estimates that the pipeline of projects either under construction or highly likely to start construction is on track to exceed this 50 GW target.</p> -<p>It is worth noting some antecedents. In the early 2000s, tools such as Photoshop allowed individuals to edit photos more quickly, and social media made it easier to reach a wide audience. In 2008, Iran digitally altered a photograph of rocket launchers to remove one that – rather embarrassingly – failed to fire, with the intent of making itself appear more powerful and capable than it really was. Still, Photoshop was not scalable and could not create fake media from scratch. It had to start with a truth. In the past few years, though, critical advances in generative AI (computer algorithms capable of generating new media from text prompts) are increasing the threat of what has been called an information apocalypse. As with all technological advancements, these developments have been rapidly democratised over time. Now anyone can produce their own high-quality disinformation with algorithms that are already freely available online. Through programs such as FaceSwap, it is straightforward to convincingly put a face on another body. There is no putting this genie back in the bottle, and no amount of ethical use manifestos published by developers is going to trammel such technology.</p> +<p>The UK hosts plants that manufacture wind turbine blades and towers, but it imports most of the other components. While some of these components can be manufactured in Europe, most of the generators will rely on permanent magnets from China, and even manufacturers of permanent magnets outside China may still be reliant on rare earth metals supplied by China. To address this supply risk, manufacturers are finding ways to reduce or change the mix of rare earth metals in NdFeB magnets, and research is underway to develop entirely new technologies.</p> -<p>The AI genie continues to amaze, and regulators (much less university professors) simply can’t keep up. Before November 2022, when ChatGPT was released, the idea of a computer writing a college-level essay in seconds would have been seen as science fiction. This was a revolutionary step up from tools that could, at best, fix grammar and punctuation. At the same time, software that could create images from text, such as DALL-E and Midjourney, became available to the public. These image generation tools could, with a simple prompt that required no technical knowledge, create 1,000 hyper-realistic photos before a human could develop one. At first, critics of the technology pointed out inaccuracies in the deepfake content, hoping perhaps in vain that the rationality of the human brain was still superior to the computer. In March 2023, the Washington Post published an article providing readers with tips on how to identify deepfakes. One of the examples was to “look at the hands”, since early generative AI tools struggled with making realistic human hands. That same month, however, another article was published by the same newspaper titled “AI can draw hands now”. Trying to identify deepfakes by looking for visual mistakes is a losing strategy. According to a report published by the NSA, FBI and CISA, attempts to detect deepfakes post-production are a cat-and-mouse game where the manipulator has the upper hand – not to mention that people want to see what they already want to believe, which is the primary reason that “cheap fakes” are just as dangerous as deepfakes. Confirmation bias means that people don’t need much convincing to see what they want to see. The pair are a toxic brew.</p> +<p>However, the likelihood that these developments will substantially reduce the need for rare earth metals or dramatically change China’s centrality in the near term – even as its share of these components falls – is low. This is because of the scale and cost competitiveness of the Chinese industry compared to competitors, and the concentration of the refining of most other rare earths and metals in China.</p> -<p>According to DeepMedia, a company contracted by the US Department of Defense to help detect synthetic media, the amount of deepfakes has tripled in 2023 compared to 2022. How do people know what to believe and trust? If the deepfake is just as realistic as a photo taken by a professional camera, how do organisations prove authenticity? For each photo taken by a journalist, thousands of equally realistic fakes could be made and distributed. This article aims to highlight that very recent technological advances are leading to a perfect content storm, where lies are far cheaper to produce than truths, but just as convincing. The spread of deepfakes is creating an environment of mistrust. A July 2023 report published by members of Purdue University’s Department of Political Science argued that an increase in the amount of fake content makes it easier for someone to challenge the validity of something that is actually true. They called this the Liar’s Dividend. As media becomes saturated with manipulated images and videos, it becomes harder to identify what is trustworthy. Being able to prove that something is fake loses its value when most of the content is synthetic already. The greater and more critical challenge is validating what is true.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CMKGas0.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 6: China’s Involvement in the Supply Chain for Wind Turbines.</strong> Note: Italics indicate estimated share of Chinese production once overseas projects are included. Sources: US Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023”; IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”; Lusty et al., “UK Criticality Assessment of Technology Critical Minerals and Metals”; Bobba et al., “Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU: A Foresight Study”; IEA, “The State of Clean Technology Manufacturing”; IEA, “Energy Technology Perspectives 2023”.</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As media becomes saturated with manipulated images and videos, it becomes harder to identify what is trustworthy</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Solar PV Modules</strong></p> -<p>The problem of labelling media content as trustworthy is complicated. As deepfakes become increasingly sophisticated, it will become nearly impossible for individuals – even those trained to look for peculiarities – to distinguish real from fake. As a result, organisations will need to lean more heavily on technical solutions to label and verify media. Why is it also difficult, though, for computers to tell the difference between a photo taken by a camera and a deepfake created by AI? All digital media is, at a technical level, just a file on a computer. Comprised of 1s and 0s, this file is displayed on a screen to a person. The computer has no notion of fake or real. This problem has many similarities with the art world and the challenge of proving that a painting was made by a famous artist and not a copycat. For every real Picasso, there may be 1,000 replicas. Museums and galleries do not waste their limited resources trying to prove the inauthenticity of the copies, though; they focus on validating and maintaining the truth through a concept called provenance. Provenance is the recorded origin and history required for a piece of art to provide viewers with trust and confidence in its authenticity. Even if the methodologies are different for the digital world, it may prove a useful model for seeking and identifying authenticity instead of forever debunking fakes.</p> +<p>The majority of PV cells are manufactured from silicon, generally in polycrystalline form. Polycrystalline silicon cells also require germanium and borates. China’s key strength lies in the production of polycrystalline silicon (see Table 7). The country’s domestic manufacturing capacity has grown in recent years, allowing China’s share of global output of polycrystalline silicon to reach 89% in 2022 and the quantity of imports to decline. On this basis, China has achieved almost total dominance (around 95%) in the supply of silicon wafers and a very strong position (around 85%) in the supply for silicon cells. It also makes more than 70% of the world’s solar PV modules.</p> -<p>The cyber security field already uses capabilities such as encryption and hashing to verify passwords and protect digital communications, but these need to be applied to media in a way that is easily understood and trusted by content consumers with limited technical backgrounds. Organisations such as the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) are working to use cryptographic asset hashing to serve as digital provenance online. This project aims to provide a tamper-proof way to validate the origin of images and videos, even while they are shared across social media and news platforms. The CAI aims to meet the technical standards developed by the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, released in 2022. While these efforts are heading in the right direction, they are not foolproof, and depend heavily on an increased socio-technical understanding of digital media. Additionally, allowing organisations to manage the trustworthiness of media comes with its own concerns. Totalitarian governments will no doubt develop their own “Content Authenticity Initiatives” to self-validate what they want to be believed.</p> +<p>China is also a dominant supplier of germanium, a by-product of zinc ore processing, and has a strong position in the production of metals such as copper, aluminium, lead and tin that are necessary components of solar PV panels.</p> -<p>Deepfakes are still a young technology. While they have not single-handedly disrupted an election as some might have feared, their use is increasing, and the technology is advancing rapidly. While most deepfakes are currently images or altered videos, the ability to create whole new scenes from a prompt is already here. With the 2024 US presidential election approaching, deepfakes and other “fake news” will likely be on the minds of both candidates and voters. Former CEO of Alphabet Eric Schmidt has warned that mis- and disinformation, through the use of AI in particular, could lead to chaos in the 2024 election. The solution is both technical, by shifting from identifying deepfakes to validating truths, and societal, through technical education and media literacy. For decades, people were taught to trust their senses. Now, seeing and hearing can no longer be believing.</p> +<p>Other technologies in this sphere include cadmium telluride (CdTe) and copper indium gallium selenide (CIGS) cells. Table 7 shows that China has a moderately strong position in the production of tellurium, indium, cadmium and molybdenum, as well as a dominant position in gallium. All of these metals are produced as by-products of other processes, and their availability depends in part on the production of ores containing other minerals and on the processing of these ores to recover the by-products. Future technological options for solar PV include gallium arsenide and amorphous silicon cells.</p> -<hr /> +<p>The UK lacks manufacturing at scale of polycrystalline silicon, silicon wafers and cells, and cells based on other technologies. Facilities for such production are thin on the ground: Power Roll has opened a plant in Durham to manufacture flexible solar film using perovskite technology, and while Oxford PV has developed perovskite-on-silicon cell technology, its factory is in Germany and the company has stated that it is reluctant to build the next factory in the UK due to the lack of incentives. A number of companies in the UK manufacture solar PV modules from imported cells, such as UKSOL, UK Solar Power, Sharp and GB Sol, but imports of modules from China remain significant. For example, up to 40% of UK solar farms were built with Chinese modules in 2021. The supply chains for these modules allegedly involve forced labour in Xinjiang, where the production of polysilicon is concentrated, meaning that companies sourcing panels already face an ethical, reputational and compliance challenge.</p> -<p><strong>David Gioe</strong> is a British Academy Global Professor and Visiting Professor of Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is also an associate professor of history at the US Military Academy and a history fellow for its Army Cyber Institute.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WWknnnH.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 7: China’s Involvement in the Supply Chain for Solar PV.</strong> Notes: 1. Metals in brackets are those needed for CdTe and CIGS cells. 2. Italics indicate estimated share of Chinese production once overseas projects are included. Sources: US Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023”; IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”; Lusty et al., “UK Criticality Assessment of Technology Critical Minerals and Metals”; Bobba et al., “Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU: A Foresight Study”; IEA, “The State of Clean Technology Manufacturing”; IEA, “Energy Technology Perspectives 2023”.</em></p> -<p><strong>Alexander Molnar</strong> is an Active-Duty US Army cyber officer with multiple overseas deployments, including support to special operations. He holds a BS from the US Military Academy and an MS from the Georgia Institute of Technology.</p>David Gioe and Alexander MolnarHow does the technology aid fake news and narratives – particularly in the run-up to 2024 for elections in many Western democracies?Israel’s Gaza Problem2023-11-01T12:00:00+08:002023-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/israels-gaza-problem<p><em>Following the 7 October attack by Hamas, Israel has determined to destroy the terrorist group controlling Gaza once and for all. The question is not just whether or not it will succeed, but what its plan is for the day after.</em></p> +<p><strong>Electricity Grids</strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The principal metals required for transmission lines and transformers are copper, aluminium, zinc and cadmium, along with iron. None of these metals were considered critical for the UK by the British Geological Survey, although China accounts for between 40% and 60% of some of these metals, and aluminium is considered critical by the EU and the US. The supply of critical minerals such as gallium and germanium for microchips – or the supply of microchips themselves – could increase in significance if China becomes a dominant global supplier.</p> -<p>The 7 October attack by Hamas, the worst act of terrorism against Israel since the state’s founding in 1948, was unprecedented in its scale and scope. With more than 1,400 people killed, most of them civilians, the attack has forced the Israeli political establishment to embrace options – like a ground invasion of Gaza – that were previously viewed as extreme. The Israeli intelligence community will no doubt conduct an after-action review to determine how Hamas could have planned and executed such an operation without being noticed. But at this stage, current operational planning is the priority. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have spent the past three weeks engaging in a ferocious air campaign against targets in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, with 6,000 bombs dropped by the Israeli Air Force in the first six days of the counterattack. Israel’s borders with Gaza are sealed, fuel imports have been cut off and Israeli ground forces are making initial forays toward Gaza City to destroy Hamas’s network of tunnels. Around 360,000 reservists have been sent to the front, Israel’s largest mobilisation since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.</p> +<p>Rather than raw materials, the main China-related vulnerability for UK electricity grids may be cyber security (not considered in detail in this paper). The IEA estimates that by 2025 there will be 30–40 billion devices linked to electricity grids across the world, and that any of these could be used to attack the grid. This is a major security challenge, and will require governments and companies to act in concert to ensure the resilience of power systems – a process that cannot be discussed in detail here. Instead, the broader responses from government and industry to China’s dominance in the sphere of raw materials are considered.</p> -<p>As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared on 27 October, the IDF aims to “completely defeat the murderous enemy and guarantee our existence”. Lofty objectives indeed – but two obvious questions need to be asked and answered. First, is it possible to destroy Hamas? And second, who governs Gaza after Hamas is routed?</p> +<h4 id="government-and-corporate-responses">Government and Corporate Responses</h4> -<h3 id="before-7-october-a-strange-paradigm-between-israel-and-hamas">Before 7 October: A Strange Paradigm Between Israel and Hamas</h3> +<p>A combination of deteriorating relations with China and rising demand for the minerals that are critical to the low-carbon transition has led governments and companies from industrialised countries to take steps to reduce their reliance on China for these minerals. Government actions include imposing import restrictions, incentivising domestic investment and production, stockpiling, and building partnerships with other countries. An additional priority is R&amp;D to develop alternatives to the currently used minerals so as to enhance the efficiency of their use and expand recycling.</p> -<p>Before the 7 October attack, Israel and Hamas had a violent – albeit predictable – arrangement with one another. While Israel’s past wars with Hamas (2008–2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021) were sparked by unique local and regional circumstances, Israel’s objective was always the same: degrade Hamas’s military capacity and restore a sense of deterrence to the Israel–Gaza border region. While Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Operation Protective Edge (2014) included a ground component, Israel largely relied on air power to destroy as much of Hamas’s rocket factories, tunnel network and leadership as it could. Ground engagements inside Gaza lasted for a short period of time; the longest Israeli ground campaign, during Operation Protective Edge, lasted about three weeks.</p> +<p>The US government has been among the most active in seeking to decouple from China in this regard, including through the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which supports investment and guides procurement along the full length of the supply chain. Resource-rich Australia and Canada are also supporting investment in mining and processing, while in 2023 the EU published its draft Critical Raw Materials Act, which includes 2030 targets for mineral extraction, processing and recycling, as well as limiting over-dependence on a single third country. At the same time, the EU published a draft of the Net-Zero Industry Act, which aims to scale up the manufacturing of new energy technologies in Europe.</p> -<p>In the end, all of these wars concluded with Israel and Hamas negotiating a ceasefire through intermediaries. The terms were straightforward: quiet in exchange for quiet. Over time, Israel and Hamas settled into a mutually acceptable informal arrangement, whereby the Israelis would permit certain economic concessions to induce Hamas to maintain calm. Three months after the 2021 Israel–Hamas war ended with yet another ceasefire, Israel agreed to allow Qatar to channel $10 million a month into Gaza through the UN for the benefit of 100,000 Gazan families. Commercial incentives, such as the re-opening of the Abu Karam crossing, the approval of thousands of permits for Gazans to work in Israel and the periodic expansion of the Gaza fishing zone, were used to keep Hamas wedded to the agreement. This carrot came with a stick in the form of airstrikes and economic pressure whenever Palestinian militant groups broke the terms.</p> +<p>Realising that international cooperation was needed, the US led the establishment of the Minerals Security Partnership in June 2022 to “bolster critical mineral supply chains essential for the clean energy transition”. The first meeting in September 2022 was attended by official partners Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Sweden, the UK, the US and the EU. Mineral-rich countries such as Argentina, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia also attended.</p> -<p>Israel and Hamas are sworn enemies, yet in a strange way they have also depended on one another. Although the Israelis have refused to deal with Hamas directly, Israeli Prime Ministers Benjamin Netanyahu, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid have all counted on Hamas to restrain the even more extremist Palestinian groups located in the enclave. Until now, Hamas controlling Gaza and serving as the territory’s de-facto government has been deemed more pliable than disorder. Hamas, in turn, has relied on Israel to ensure that the much-needed cash from Qatar flowed into Gaza and that Palestinians could access the necessary permits to work in Israel.</p> +<p>In addition to the construction of new mines and processing plants outside China, two trends in particular may help reduce dependence on China. The first is reducing or obviating the need for critical minerals in key technologies. Such measures would include the development of sodium-ion batteries for EVs and permanent magnets free of REEs, as well as increasing the efficiency of use and recycling of the materials. However, the time needed to scale up these innovations is uncertain, and China itself may still play a leading role in these technologies. The second trend involves the increasing level of support being given to promote the domestic production of renewable energy equipment and EVs in the US and Europe, which will bolster the growing capacity to process and refine metal ores.</p> -<h3 id="israel-ditches-the-old-playbook-but-can-it-succeed">Israel Ditches the Old Playbook, but Can It Succeed?</h3> +<p>Taken together, these moves mark a potential turning point in international policies to address Chinese dominance in the mining and processing of critical minerals. However, the impact of these measures is likely to be modest over the period to 2035, given the time needed to commission new mines and processing plants and to scale up the use of new technological solutions, not least due to environmental and social concerns, as well as the energy and water requirements of these processes. In light of this, it is important to consider how China could leverage its dominance in these critical supply chains, and what the implications of such leverage could be.</p> -<p>The previous arrangements between Israel and Hamas worked well enough – until they didn’t. Whatever mutual understanding the two had is now gone after Hamas’s 7 October attack, which was of such barbarity that resurrecting the old paradigm is no longer possible. Whereas successive Israeli governments were content with degrading Hamas’s military structure to buy a few more years of relative stability, it appears the current government will not accept anything less than Hamas’s eradication. Senior Israeli officials have stressed that the ongoing campaign will be longer, tougher and more comprehensive than those in the past. “Our responsibility now is to enter Gaza, go to the places where Hamas organises, operates, plans and launches”, Israel Defense Forces Chief of the General Staff Herzi Halevi told Haaretz on 15 October. “To hit them severely everywhere, every commander, every operative, and to destroy infrastructure. In one word – to win”.</p> +<h3 id="iv-what-threat-does-chinas-dominance-pose-to-the-uk">IV. What Threat Does China’s Dominance Pose to the UK?</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Hamas is as much an idea as it is a coherent military entity. Even if Israel manages to destroy the military entity – no sure thing – the idea will survive</code></em></strong></p> +<p>This chapter sets out a preliminary analysis of the risks posed to the UK by China’s domination of new energy supply chains. It assesses the extent to which the UK is at risk of being singled out as a target, whether it is more vulnerable to being targeted as part of a broader regional- or alliance-level bloc, and the extent to which it is vulnerable to disruptions to the global market. It ends with a discussion of other risks relating to international relations and defence that the UK should consider in parallel with the China-related risks.</p> -<p>The billion-dollar question is whether this can be accomplished. Destroying a terrorist organisation isn’t impossible, but it’s a difficult endeavour nonetheless. It’s even more difficult if military force is one’s preferred tool. Data analysis by the Rand Corporation finds that only 7% of terrorist groups since 1968 have been terminated through the use of military force. In contrast, 43% of terrorist groups ended when their members joined the political process (think of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the Irish Republican Army and the African National Congress). While it’s true that Hamas did participate in the Palestinian political process in 2006, winning legislative elections that year, it’s also true that Hamas’s already limited interest in democratic participation likely evaporated when the West and Israel refused to accept the results. Given the current situation, it is hard to imagine that Israel would allow Hamas to become a legitimate political actor, even if the group wanted to transition into electoral politics. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, in the 17th year of a four-year term, would also likely balk at the prospect; the last thing he needs when his approval ratings are in the toilet is more competition.</p> +<p>Global energy supply chains are important tools for soft power and greyzone contestation. China’s role in new energy supply chains is already an important factor in great power politics – and the importance of this influence will only increase. The US’s Inflation Reduction Act denies subsidies to EV producers that are dependent on Chinese materials on grounds of security, and not for diversification or industrial reasons, as discussed earlier. Furthermore, supply-chain organisation, both in terms of the location of different activities and in terms of market relationships, may be a significant source of tension and instability. Dependence on digital technologies for the operation of some new energy technologies also raises questions about their use in defence and by the diplomatic and security services.</p> -<p>So far, Israel has relied on force. At the time of writing, at least 13 Hamas officials, financiers and security officials have been killed, including Asem Abu Rakaba, a top commander of the 7 October operation. More will inevitably be wiped out in the weeks ahead. But as terrorism researchers have shown, terrorist groups – particularly those with a hierarchal structure – have an ability to replace commanders and leaders quickly. Israel has killed countless Hamas commanders over the last quarter-century, yet the organisation was still able to generate revenue, build an arsenal and perpetrate the worst terrorist attack since 9/11.</p> +<p>The risks posed by China’s role in the supply chain must be understood alongside other international developments in the energy industry, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and industrial strategy in the US and the EU. This chapter will offer some initial analysis before recommending useful avenues for further research, and preliminary observations on how the UK might consider its security posture with regard to China and net zero.</p> -<p>It should also be noted that Hamas is not just a terrorist group; it’s a social movement embedded in the Palestinian arena. The organisation is as much an idea as it is a coherent military entity. Even if Israel manages to destroy the military entity – no sure thing – the idea will survive. The Israeli military operation, and the thousands of Palestinian civilian casualties that will likely result from fighting in a highly populated area, is likely to generate the next round of recruits for Hamas and other like-minded groups like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.</p> +<p>At the outset, it should be noted that the character of the risk from net zero supply chains is fundamentally different from that of fossil fuel supply chains. Disruption to fossil fuel supply chains has immediate and widespread consequences which can be catastrophic for society, the economy and defence. Net zero systems are not primarily based on fuel supply, but most commonly on electricity infrastructure. This makes them by default more resilient to supply chain disruption. Delays and temporary price escalation in new energy supply chains would not have an immediate appreciable impact on energy production or consumption in the UK. That said, prolonged disruption would negatively impact the UK’s ability to meet its net zero targets and its climate action, and could impact energy security in a situation where electricity demand was increasing rapidly and equipment for generation or grid storage could not be sourced. Put simply, the short-term risk to physical energy supply in the UK from China is much less than from fossil fuel markets.</p> -<h3 id="does-israel-have-a-day-after-plan">Does Israel Have a “Day After” Plan?</h3> +<h4 id="could-the-uk-be-individually-targeted">Could the UK be Individually Targeted?</h4> -<p>Israel’s military objective is clear: destroy Hamas. What it plans to do after this objective is achieved is open for debate. The options for any post-Hamas governing arrangement in Gaza range from bad to worse. Gaza was in a precarious position before the war began, and is undergoing an even deeper socioeconomic catastrophe today. Roughly one-third of residential buildings have been damaged or destroyed over the last two weeks. More than 80% of Gazans are living in poverty and approximately 62% of Gaza’s youth were unemployed last year, according to UN statistics. Mass power outages are a fact of life, and the healthcare system is plagued by supply shortages.</p> +<p>In recent years, China has demonstrated a willingness to leverage the export of critical materials and technologies to achieve domestic and international political objectives, and as a response to sanctions. In 2010, as part of the government’s efforts to clamp down on illegal mining and trade of REEs within China, and coinciding with a fishing dispute with Japan, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce increased the tax imposed on exports of rare earth ores, oxides and compounds, introduced an export tax on end products, and tightened production quotas. These strategies resulted in a reduction of the share of production being exported, from 90% in 2000 to 20% by 2012. While exports to Japan fell, flows to other countries – including Australia and the UK – also declined. The imposition of these export restrictions in 2010 has become the poster child for concerns about China weaponising its dominance in critical materials.</p> -<p>Who is going to fix this mess? Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid has suggested bringing in the Palestinian Authority (PA) after hostilities cease. Yet in the 30th year of its existence, the PA has lost the trust of the very people it was meant to govern. The old men running it, Abbas included, are increasingly out of touch with the people they are supposed to represent. They’re viewed at best as a bunch of incompetents, and at worst as enablers of Israel’s occupation. Repeated Israeli raids in the West Bank over the last year, which the PA has been powerless to stop, are clear evidence of Abbas’s ineptitude in the minds of many Palestinians. Some parts of the West Bank – such as the Jenin refugee camp – are no-go areas for the Palestinian security forces and have essentially been handed over to smaller armed groups who hold no allegiance to the traditional Palestinian factions. In March, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 52% of Palestinians believed the interests of the Palestinian people would be best served by the PA’s dissolution. For those between the ages of 18 and 22, the figure goes up to 59%. If the PA can’t function properly in the limited areas of the West Bank it nominally controls, the probability it would do any better in Gaza – which has been devoid of PA influence since 2007 – is slim to none.</p> +<p>More recently, China announced export controls on gallium and germanium in response to US, Japanese and Dutch export controls on semiconductor chips. China is the world’s top supplier of these two metals, which are used to make semiconductors, solar panels and fibre optics. In July 2023, citing national security concerns, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that all exporters of these products must apply for export licences for dual-use items and technologies starting on 1 August 2023. Obtaining the licences can take up to two months, and it is unclear how many will ultimately be issued. The sharp limitation of such export licences by Beijing would give additional impetus to diversification efforts in importing countries, but could also give rise to a wave of illegal production and exports from China, as was the case with rare earths in the past. The timing of the announcement suggests that the ban is a political signal more than an attempt at economic coercion, but the line between the two is dangerously blurred. The announcement of the export restrictions led to higher prices and a rush to stockpile but also, as was the case in 2010, to a diversification of supplies and processing away from China.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Israel’s military objective is clear: destroy Hamas. What it plans to do after this objective is achieved is open for debate</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Although sanctions and export bans could weaken China’s position in the long term, by accelerating this diversification, China has nonetheless used these tools in response to actions that it perceives as aggressive. China is therefore only likely to manipulate new energy supply chains against the UK in the face of perceived aggression from the UK against Beijing. Indeed, there is currently no indication that China is more likely to use new energy supply chains than any other supply chain in this way, when it can leverage instead either high levels of concentration or high levels of foreign-owned manufacturing in China. In the case of gallium and germanium, restrictions were carefully calibrated in response to restrictions on the sale of defence-related semiconductor chips to China, where gallium and germanium are important inputs. Consequently, other materials with dual military and energy-technology uses appear most likely to be caught in the crossfire of any future trade restrictions. China could constrain parts of net zero supply chains in response to UK policies perceived as hostile to China, but at this juncture, net zero supplies appear unlikely to be the subject of export controls other than in reciprocation.</p> -<p>Some have suggested an interim Gaza administration run by the UN and Arab states. On the surface, this sounds plausible. UN agencies are well entrenched in Gaza, having run schools and delivered social services to Gazans since well before Hamas’s takeover in 2007. The Gulf states could help finance the UN’s efforts.</p> +<p>The exposure of the UK to export controls varies considerably depending on the commodity or product, and is determined more by UK demand than by Chinese dominance. Only limited data is publicly available for detailed trade between the UK and China: the UK does not publish any figures, and data from China is limited. What data is available shows that in areas that are more critical for net zero the UK is not necessarily heavily dependent on direct supply from China: for example, China’s exports of copper to the UK were worth only $145 million in 2022 and nickel exports only $11 million. Aluminium trade was much more extensive, being worth $2 billion. Net zero technologies make up only a small proportion of UK demand for aluminium, but the metal has wider importance for net zero as a lightweight alternative to steel used to improve efficiency, particular for automotives and buildings.</p> -<p>Even so, Arab states might not be willing to serve as Gaza’s white knight for a number of reasons. First, Arab leaders don’t want to be portrayed as cleaning up Israel’s mess or making Israel’s job easier in any way, shape or form. Palestinian statehood aspirations may have gone down a few notches on the list of priorities, but Arab governments can’t afford to ignore the issue’s strong salience among their publics. According to the 2022 Arab Opinion Index, organised by the Arab Center Washington DC, 76% of respondents thought the Palestinian cause was a concern for all Arabs, not just Palestinians.</p> +<p>The imposition of export controls by China would ultimately limit Beijing’s dominance over time and affect its reputation as a reliable supplier, just as infrastructure bottlenecks have already expedited trading partners’ efforts to diversify supply chains (as seen during the Covid-19 pandemic). Additional restrictions would only accelerate these trends. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has already prompted a rethink by governments and international companies that are dependent on China, with many taking action to diversify. This shift emanates from rising tensions between the US and China and from concerns about decoupling, as well as worries about a military conflict between China and the US (and any potential sanctions that could ensue).</p> -<p>Israel could adopt a strategy of detachment once major combat operations are over by withdrawing its forces; strengthening land, sea and air restrictions over Gaza; and treating the enclave as a security issue. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s vague concept of establishing a “new security reality” for Gaza seems to hint in this direction. Israel, however, has been implementing such a strategy for the last 16 years, while neglecting the substantive political disagreements underlying the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.</p> +<p>Manufacturers are already looking to diversify production to other low-cost countries – a move also incentivised by rising wage and other input costs in China – at the same time as flagship programmes such as the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Net-Zero Industry Act provide new incentives. This reinforces the well-established principle that countries that lose their reputation as reliable suppliers can incur serious economic penalties in the long run. For now, China is unlikely to engage in direct sanctions against the UK, but should it seek to retaliate against UK policies (or in the event of a broader conflict with the UK or the West), China’s control over net zero supply chains offers it considerable leverage over all consumers, including the UK. The short-term impact would be more limited than disruption to the supply of fossil fuels, but would still put pressure on the UK economy and its ability to meet its net zero targets. Using economic coercion would also impact Chinese companies, and the Chinese economy would incur large costs too, especially given the growing importance of new energy exports compared with other exporting sectors.</p> -<p>By far the worst option on the table for Israel is a full re-occupation of the enclave, a feat that even Ariel Sharon – one of Israel’s most hardline prime ministers – wasn’t interested in. US President Joe Biden has said an Israeli reoccupation of Gaza would be “a big mistake”. The Israeli government would likely agree; policing 2.3 million Palestinians – the same people forced to flee their homes in part due to Israeli airstrikes – and administering their affairs would be the definition of a thankless task.</p> +<p>From the UK perspective, efforts to diversify production and supplies should at least partially mitigate China’s ability to individually target the UK in many areas over the medium term. Moreover, UK demand for materials is small by global standards, and will remain so. This means that the development of relatively limited international supply chains, independent of China, would likely be sufficient to rebalance the global market should export controls specifically target the UK. Such a scenario would see production that is not under China’s control redirected to the UK, with China-influenced supply chains redirected to fill the gap, albeit at a cost.</p> -<h3 id="unanswered-questions-linger-as-israel-prepares-for-a-long-war">Unanswered Questions Linger as Israel Prepares for a Long War</h3> +<p>Currently, the UK’s limited manufacturing capacity shields it from the impact of any potential cut-off by China: taking wind energy as an example, China’s dominance in permanent magnets is unlikely to be an effective sanction, as the UK does not directly import magnets but instead imports generators using those magnets from multinational companies in third countries. However, the threat should not be underestimated, particularly as the UK aspires to increase its manufacture of net zero equipment. The further the UK moves up the supply chain, the closer it moves to direct dependence on Chinese suppliers. But as domestic industrialisation will take time, new supply chains are likely to develop in tandem, particularly given strong government support for alternative supply chains within the EU and the US. Indeed, the UK will require more localisation of supply chains in order for its automotive production to qualify for tariff-free trade with Europe.</p> -<p>Much like the US before the war in Afghanistan, Israel is committed to vanquishing its opponents through the force of arms. The US experience in Afghanistan, however, is instructive for Israel. US objectives were clear and measurable early on – destroy Al-Qa’ida and overthrow the Taliban regime – only for the US to slip into the herculean task of building an Afghan state from the ground up. US casualties mounted, about $2 trillion of US taxpayer money was spent, and US troops were put into a position of defending a corruption-plagued Afghan administration that was incapable of governing. With Israel on the verge of mounting its largest ground offensive since the 1982 invasion of Beirut, Israeli policymakers have a responsibility to ask the very same questions US policymakers failed to ask more than two decades ago.</p> +<p>While China’s ability to coerce the UK is therefore limited, any supply shortages (due to retaliatory measures, blockades or export controls imposed by China for a variety of reasons) will likely impact three main categories of new energy industries – the automotive sector, electricity generators, and UK companies with manufacturing operations in China.</p> -<hr /> +<p>In the automotive sector, the UK government is likely to aim to maintain existing production capacity by converting it to EVs. China’s dominance in battery minerals as well as anodes, cathodes, electrolytes and lithium-ion packs, coupled with the apparent requirement for battery production for automotive manufacturers to be located in the UK, suggests that UK automotive companies will be directly dependent on Chinese suppliers. This would increase the overall vulnerability to restrictions targeting the UK.</p> -<p><strong>Daniel R DePetris</strong> is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.</p>Daniel R DePetrisFollowing the 7 October attack by Hamas, Israel has determined to destroy the terrorist group controlling Gaza once and for all. The question is not just whether or not it will succeed, but what its plan is for the day after.The Lost European Vision2023-10-31T12:00:00+08:002023-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-lost-european-vision<p><em>Drawing insights from defense experts across NATO members, the study highlights the evolving European defense landscape, emphasizing security of supply concerns and the balance between national and EU initiatives. The report underscores pivotal forthcoming decisions in Europe’s defense amidst changing geopolitical dynamics.</em></p> +<p>As discussed above, China is actively investing in manufacturing capacity in Europe. In situations such as mineral shortages, this could make the European manufacturing base more resilient, as Chinese companies might maintain supply to their own operations, potentially at the expense of other customers. However, during a major confrontation, Chinese-owned automotive capacity – assuming it would cease to operate – could prove a liability, because of the potential impact of interrupting production.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The second group of entities that might be vulnerable to export controls targeting the UK consists of large-scale electricity generation project developers, where original equipment manufacturer (OEM) warranties are typically required to finance the purchase of key equipment, and where operations and maintenance may be dependent on the OEM for supply of spare parts and technical support.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>With many power plants relying on spare parts from China in the event of a breakdown, there may be some risk to their ongoing operation should access to spare parts and OEM expertise be restricted for an extended period of time. A more detailed assessment of exposure and scale may be beneficial in this case to determine whether risk is limited to power plant owners and operators, or whether it might threaten the security of electricity supply – but this assessment is not attempted here.</p> -<p>Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has caused a dramatic shift in the European security landscape, and European defense is now entering a new era. DGAP has initiated a project to provide a comprehensive analysis of the changes in the European defense sector triggered by the Russian attack.</p> +<p>The third group vulnerable to sanction is made up of UK companies that have manufacturing operations in China. China’s unique industrial ecosystem means that many UK technology companies manufacture equipment in the country, covering everything from smart meters to EVs and EV chargers. These companies are perhaps the most susceptible to intervention by the Chinese government, since small companies (such as these typically are) can be targeted by domestic legislation which, without risking significant international escalation, still sends a strong political message to Western governments, while big companies are able to pressure home governments to compromise in order to protect their businesses.</p> -<p>During the first phase of the project, carried out in cooperation with the Friedrich-Naumann-Foun-dation, the analysis concentrated on changes in the perception of the defense environment and their implications for the future military order and defense cooperation.</p> +<p>Looking beyond these three vulnerable groups, it is likely that Brexit has reduced the potential cost to China of taking action specifically against the UK (as opposed to against Europe more broadly), and this might increase the likelihood of symbolic action being taken against the UK alone in order to send a message to the wider European community. Targeting an individual member of the EU with export control measures would mean targeting the entire bloc, with potentially significant repercussions for China. The UK, by contrast, might be individually targeted, causing relatively little short-term economic damage to Chinese companies while still making a strong political statement.</p> -<p>The second phase of the EDINA (European Defense in A New Age) project focuses on the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in the new era of European defense. It highlights the impact of the Russian aggression on Europe’s defense industry and analyzes the structural drivers and constraints that influence the future trajectory of the continent’s industrial base.</p> +<p>For now, the threat of export controls targeting the UK alone appears to be limited. This is because direct UK consumption of China-dominated materials is very limited, due to the lack of manufacturing of net zero technologies in the UK and because alternative sources of supply will emerge over the medium term sufficient to meet UK demand. However, because of the likely scale of future UK demand, particularly as battery production for EVs grows ahead of 2030, more government planning may be advisable to ensure that alternative supply chains are being developed, in the UK and globally, at sufficient scale to keep up with demand. Moreover, protectionist penalties incorporated into industrial legislation in the US and the EU may make supply chains less fungible, and could limit the extent to which the UK can benefit from new supply chains.</p> -<p>The data base was generated in a similar way to the first phase of the EDINA project. In May and July 2023, DGAP brought together defense experts from European NATO members (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Greece, Türkiye, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria) for two workshops (physical and online) to discuss the current situation and future development of the EDTIB. Prior to the workshops, the experts were asked to prepare country reports as their input to the discussions. The reports allowed to sketch out the industrial landscape in Europe and provided valuable insights into different positions on defense industrial cooperation, dependencies, and structural problems regarding the EDTIB. The reports were based on the following questionnaire:</p> +<h4 id="regional-vulnerability">Regional Vulnerability</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Industries/ RTO: What are current strengths in production and technologies (top 5-7 companies, revenue, employees, current major projects (timelines), role in the supply chain/product portfolio, cooperation partners, involvement in European projects)?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How does your country assess the impact of cooperation, dependencies (import/export) and competition among Europeans but also vis-à-vis the United States and Asia on the future ability of the armaments sector to deliver needed output (quantity/quality)?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Future Avenues: How will the national DTIB evolve over the next decade? What are important trigger points for such a development?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The analysis above suggests that, if the UK alone were to be targeted by Chinese export controls, the impact under current conditions might be limited by low demand for intermediate products and diverse markets for final goods; and that such action taken in the future would also be limited in impact due to the emergence, over time, of alternative supply chains. This should insulate UK foreign policy somewhat from possible Chinese coercion using new energy supply chains.</p> -<p>After the workshop, the authors had the opportunity to update their reports in the light of the discussions. For this publication, they were then slightly edited to meet grammatical and spelling standards. Any opinions expressed in the reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).</p> +<p>However, any confrontation with China over an issue such as the sovereignty of Taiwan would mean the UK facing China as part of a bloc, which could result in retaliatory measures from Beijing that targeted groups of countries. As a member of NATO, Five Eyes, and a group of likeminded nations opposed to Beijing’s aggressive expansionism in China’s immediate neighbourhood, the UK is exposed to geopolitical escalation involving sanctions and counter-sanctions against its allies. The 2022 energy crisis showed the extent to which regional disruption magnifies risks in concentrated markets, since global markets areunable to readjust to meet demand without generating very high prices. It also highlighted the interconnected nature of markets: even though the UK does not import gas directly from Russia, it was not insulated from higher gas prices.</p> -<p>This project report starts with a presentation of key findings from the workshop and country reports. This section also presents the research team’s analysis of the current situation, a forecast of likely developments, and suggestions for measures to be taken to push the EDTIB forward. This executive summary is followed by the country reports.</p> +<p>Again, the automotive sector might be the most immediately affected in the event of multinational action against China, as lack of access to Chinese supply chains would have an immediate impact on the UK economy. If the UK were targeted individually, it is likely that alternative supply chains would be available, whereas these alternatives are unlikely to be sufficient to sustain industries in the UK and the EU or the US concurrently in the event of multinational action. This kind of impact is currently hypothetical, as the UK does not yet produce a significant volume of EVs, but as the production of internal combustion engines is scaled back across the Western world, the potential for disruption grows significantly. That said, the ability to extend the life of the existing vehicle stock and the likely continued use of fossil fuel-powered heavy goods vehicles beyond 2030 means that any impact on the wider economy would likely be limited.</p> -<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> +<p>Export controls affecting whole regions would undoubtedly put UK climate targets in jeopardy. As the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated, sudden price inflation or delayed availability of key components for renewable power projects could result in delays and project cancellations. If supply-chain concentrations are not addressed, they could become an energy security challenge over time: the energy transition is set to result in a rapid increase in electricity demand from decarbonised sectors such as heating and vehicle transportation. This demand is not likely to be met by additional fossil fuel capacity, leaving the UK reliant on a steady supply of renewable electricity generation equipment to meet demand. For grid stability and to meet peak demand, the expansion of variable renewable capacity will also require substantial additions of flexible battery capacity. Furthermore, as fossil fuel plants are retired, non-renewable back-up options may become less available to increase output during periods of tight supply, while relying on fossil fuel plants for more of the time will leave less in reserve for emergencies.</p> -<p>Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 marks the beginning of a new era in European security, and Europe’s response to the Russian aggression will shape the development of the European defense technological and industrial base (EDTIB) for decades to come. At the same time, there are important economic and political factors influencing the continent’s defense industrial development. Against this background, this report outlines the most likely development scenario for the European industrial base. It also describes the options open to European governments and the EU to maintain a highly capable defense industry and address current shortcomings.</p> +<p>National Grid ESO estimates that the UK will need anywhere between 13 GW/44 GWh and 31 GW/118 GWh storage capacity by 2030, up from 3 GW/29 GWh in 2022. Energy security is linked to the UK’s ability to extend the electricity network and to deploy smart technologies whose supply chains currently depend on China. If the ramping up of mutually dependent net zero elements of the grid does not proceed in step with the retirement of fossil fuel infrastructure, energy security issues could emerge.</p> -<h4 id="a-snapshot-of-the-european-defense-landscape">A Snapshot of the European Defense Landscape</h4> +<p>In this context, the timing of any export controls would be critical. The UK will be most vulnerable while dependencies on China remain high and as investment in fossil fuel infrastructure becomes minimal and some assets are permanently retired. The duration of any disruption would also be important, with a short period of export controls unlikely to have a significant impact on citizens, as existing technologies would continue to operate and new projects would only be delayed by temporary price spikes and shortages. An extended period of export controls lasting years – not at all inconceivable in the history of modern sanctions – would pose a more severe energy security challenge.</p> -<p>Europe’s defense industry produces the full range of conventional capabilities needed by its armed forces. However, this capacity comes with significant dependencies: On the one hand, given the many years of insufficient national demand, manufacturers have become increasingly dependent on exports to countries outside of the EU and NATO to maintain their skills and production lines. On the other hand, the economization of defense, meaning a growing pressure on prices, has created significant import dependencies on raw materials and key components like semi-conductors. Both elements are now coming under scrutiny as security of supply is becoming a key concern for European nations and their armed forces.</p> +<p>These questions about the UK’s vulnerabilities have led to some debate about whether net zero targets jeopardise UK security. But the reality is that trying to slow the energy transition risks worsening energy security challenges.69 Reliance on fossil fuels, coupled with price volatility, creates risks and vulnerabilities, whereas renewable electricity offers secure and affordable supplies – assuming prices continue to fall. A slower transition extends the period during which parallel infrastructures must be maintained, at increasingly high costs, and during which assets intended for retirement see reduced investment and decreasing performance, increasing the risk of unplanned outages and failures. Furthermore, many aspects of the energy transition – such as EV adoption – have a momentum of their own. Creating uncertainty about whether infrastructure will be available on time to meet demand by attempting to slow the adoption of net zero technologies may simply result in inadequate infrastructure due to insufficient investment. Ultimately investors will take their own view on likely demand, and if additional redundancy is desired it will need additional financial incentives.</p> -<p>The EDTIB reaches far beyond the EU and its member states. Despite EU initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and lately the European Peace Facility, the lion share of defense industrial investment undertaken by EU member states takes place outside the EU framework. Also, countries outside the EU – the United Kingdom as a defense industrial heavy weight as well as Norway and Türkiye – add significantly to the landscape, be it through cooperation or competition. At the same time, non-European companies have become part of the continent’s defense industrial ecosystem by contributing components or whole systems. This applies especially to the US industry but is also true for manufacturers for instance from South Korea.</p> +<h4 id="global-exposure">Global Exposure</h4> -<p>Moreover, despite more than two decades of working toward closer cooperation in development and procurement within the EU, the EDTIB is still shaped by national choices taken decades ago – especially in the aftermath of the Cold War. These decisions were not primarily driven by defense considerations but influenced by broader domestic economic policies and philosophies, including on state ownership of defense companies. Thus, every country has its own story regarding its defense industrial base and ambitions. Eastern and central European countries had to address an extra challenge: Integration into NATO meant that their industries had to adapt to new standards for equipment and interoperability. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, they also lost their supply basis and economic links. As a result, many companies ceased production or concentrated on the maintenance of legacy equipment or exports to former Soviet states and export destinations of Soviet-made weapon systems.</p> +<p>The most significant sources of vulnerability the UK faces in terms of China-dominated new energy supply chains are undoubtedly those that have an impact on the global market. These include non-political events such as natural disasters and pandemics, common to all concentrated markets, as well as market risks that are already highly likely, such as shortages of key minerals. In its base case analysis, based on current policies, McKinsey estimates that by 2030, some eight out of 14 minerals essential for net zero technologies will have shortages of more than 10% of demand, with two facing shortages of more than 50%. In a scenario where commitments are achieved, all but two minerals face shortages of more than 10%. Primary production is already largely committed over this period, meaning that forecasts are relatively certain to be realised if demand increases at the expected rate. Recycling might be expedited to reduce shortages, with primary production increases possible over the longer term, but recycling policy and implementation of critical minerals strategy in the UK remains limited.</p> -<p>This brief look at recent history underlines the importance of the upcoming decisions for the EDTIB. Europe is entering a new historical phase. The Russian war of aggression is the key impulse that has put security of supply for the armed forces at the top of the political agenda. European countries, whether big or small, now realize the cost of their dependence on global supply chains. Their governments share an aspiration to generate security of supply nationally. But their understanding of what that entails differs significantly. In some cases, countries limit their definition of the supplies they consider essential at the national level to fairly basic elements like ammunition and maintenance. In other cases, governments strive to keep their country’s technological edge regarding components or entire weapon systems. On a broader scale, the choices to be made indicate that the armed forces may require a new mix of quantity and quality.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/z7JZnFt.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 8: UK New Energy Technology Demand and Forecast Supply Adequacy for Related Critical Minerals with High Levels of Chinese Control.</strong> Projected 2030 mineral supply and demand imbalance figures are based on the current trajectory base case laid out in Patricia Bingoto et al., “The Net-Zero Materials Transition”. Sources for other information in the table: Faraday Institution, “UK Electric Vehicle and Battery Production Potential to 2040”; <a href="https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nationalgrideso.com%2Fdocument%2F283061%2Fdownload&amp;wdOrigin=BROWSELINK">National Grid ESO, “Future Energy Scenarios 2023 Data Workbook”, July 2023</a>; <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1096248/electricity-networks-strategic-framework-appendix-1-electricity-networks-modelling.pdf">Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, “Appendix I: Electricity Networks Modelling”, August 2022</a>.</em></p> -<p>Clearly, not every aspiration and every demand can be supplied nationally, resulting in a trade-off bet-ween ambition and feasibility that could open a path to cooperation. Current practice seems to reflect a pragmatic approach: While countries see their national basis as an indispensable core of their defense efforts, they also maintain their engagement in EU or multinational cooperation. Whether this is a legacy practice or a conscious choice will become clear when economic and financial pressures force tougher decisions on the future path of the defense industrial base.</p> +<p>Shortages could create allocation problems for China of the kind that are common to all major producers during tight markets. If shortages cause production to fall significantly below global demand, China will have to decide which markets to serve first, and it is probable that the domestic market will be prioritised. This behaviour is common for most producers – for example, oil exports were banned in the US between 1975 and 2015, and some Australian states have legislation allowing export bans under some circumstances. Disruption in battery supply chains during the Covid-19 pandemic tended to result in contracts with the largest volumes and biggest customers being honoured. This would favour larger EV manufacturers, which are then likely to prioritise between their assets across countries according to commercial strategy.</p> -<h4 id="the-start-of-a-new-era">The Start of a New Era</h4> +<p>With shortages looming, investments in mining by Chinese companies should generally be welcomed and not seen as a threat. Indeed, growing Chinese investment in mining and its increasing share of the market reflects the lack of activity among other actors. While China is working to secure upstream mineral supplies, the UK and other countries around the world are failing to move at sufficient pace to encourage additional sources of supply and incentivise processing capacity outside China. The more important question over the longer term is whether Chinese investments will support the development of a liquid and fungible market. Evidence from sectors such as LNG, which were initially entirely bilaterally contracted, suggests that more actively traded markets are likely to emerge as the number of producing countries proliferates, but this can take a long time. This may not be relevant for some of the speciality minerals that are required in very small quantities, and where stockpiling may be a better solution, but the availability of traded markets in larger commodities can mitigate the impact of supply outages.</p> -<p>There are three main factors that will shape the development of the EDTIB in this new era: The first is the transformation of the security environment, in particular through the dramatic changes brought about by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Governments’ responses to the war have a direct impact on the defense industry and shape the expectations of companies in the sector. The second element consists of the economic interests of states and major defense companies. Both types of actors shape markets, trade, and production chains through their preferences. As preferences have not significantly changed, neither has the general direction of the EDTIB. As a result, economic preferences act as structural barriers to the fundamental change that the development of the security factors would call for. Third, there are the political visions of European integration, both in defense and in overall politics. They should be seen as an underlying long-term factor. The near absence of a discourse about more EU cooperation among EU member states seems to indicate that there is not much appetite to give the EU a larger role.</p> +<p>The extent of China’s dominance of supply chains and the likely persistence of this position for at least the next decade means that UK-based companies will be exposed to sharp tactics and aggressive competition. Aggressive price competition is a periodic feature of commodity markets, and marginal producers tend to be casualties of this dynamic. For example, aggressive competition between Saudi Arabia and Russia for oil market share in 2020 put sufficient pressure on US shale oil producers for then-president Donald Trump to call for OPEC to reduce production and increase prices. In another example, a flood of Chinese steel onto global markets in the mid-2010s as Chinese domestic demand slowed and spare capacity became available resulted in bankruptcies and protectionism across the rest of the world. China has the capacity in many areas of the supply chain to pressurise competitors, but over the next decade this is likely to be mitigated for mining upstream and midstream by shortages, which make sharp commercial tactics much less effective (as all additional capacity will be utilised). As discussed earlier, the situation for manufacturers dependent on scarce Chinese supplies will be different, and state support for underutilised gigafactories is expected by some in the industry.</p> -<p><strong>Security Concerns as a Momentum for Change</strong></p> +<h4 id="defence">Defence</h4> -<p>The current situation of Europe’s defense industries is primarily shaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine. The conflict has brought security interests to the forefront of politicians’ minds when considering defense decisions.</p> +<p>Growing demand for critical minerals is prompting questions from defence analysts within and outside government. Three questions appear particularly pressing:</p> -<p>Arguably the most important consequence affecting the EDTIB is a significant increase in demand for military equipment. On the one hand, this is due to the massive amount of armaments that Europe is delivering to Ukraine (already worth more than €36 billion, including deliveries from EU institutions). As many countries do not have large reserves of materiel and ammunition, stocks depleted by deliveries to Ukraine need to be replenished. On the other hand, many European governments have realized that their past efforts were not sufficient to ensure a credible deterrence posture. Decades of austerity and underfunding have left major European players with “bonsai armies” that are no longer able to defend their territories in the event of a Russian attack. This leaves Europe extremely vulnerable. European governments are now making efforts to reverse this trend and close existing capability gaps. Several major modernization programs have been launched, and major procurement decisions have been taken, such as Germany’s purchase of F-35 fighter jets from the United States. To underpin this new level of ambition, many countries have significantly increased their defense spending. Poland’s increase of the GDP share devoted to defense to four percent and Germany’s creation of a €100 billion special fund stand out.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>How secure are defence and security supply chains, and how secure will they continue to be?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How secure is the use of net zero technologies by the military and security services?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How will changing demand patterns for minerals affect where the military is called upon to deploy?</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>As a result, the overall size of the market has increased and is set to increase further. European governments now all agree that Ukraine will need support for the foreseeable future, as there appears to be little hope for peace any time soon. With security concerns undiminished, defense will continue to be a high priority across the continent, creating an energizing momentum for European defense contractors.</p> +<p>The research for this paper suggests that the risks stemming from China’s role in supply chains affecting access to new energy technologies for military purposes are likely to be similar to those affecting civilian applications: over the next decade, military net zero technologies are likely to use similar materials and components to civilian technologies. Land mobility may be one of the main drivers of demand, which, while deployed in different formats, will likely use the same underlying battery materials and technologies as civilian EVs. The same is true of renewable or hybrid mini-grids deployed at military bases. Targeting military usage specifically would therefore be very difficult to do without targeting the entire civilian supply chain. That said, large-scale military procurements might be vulnerable to delays should aggressive corporate tactics be adopted, which could have implications for military capability by extending the use of outdated equipment.</p> -<p>Currently, however, the EDTIB is not able to meet wartime demands. It successfully adapted to decades of peace, maintaining high profits despite relatively low levels of defense spending, but it lost the capacity to scale up production for wartime needs. Traditional European manufacturers will be able to partially absorb the new demand by establishing new production capacities, but this will not be sufficient either in terms of volume or of speed. Hence, third countries will benefit. Although the United States is an obvious alternative for supplies and US companies are certain to secure more contracts from Europe, American industry experiences similar bottleneck problems due to high demand.</p> +<p>Secure operation of net zero technologies is the critical area for military and security services. China already bars EVs from sensitive sites over fears that data could be misappropriated. There are similar fears in Western security services and militaries about how easily the movement of EVs used in covert operations might be tracked. While Chinese-made vehicles may pose a particular risk, this is a concern for all EVs, which tend to transfer large amounts of data on vehicle movement and usage. But the issue is not limited to EVs, with all vehicles being increasingly dependent on software and sending usage data to manufacturers.</p> -<p>Other players such as South Korea and Türkiye are ready to step in. South Korea has recently won major contracts from Poland for K2 battle tanks and artillery ammunition and is establishing partnerships with other European countries as well (e.g., Romania). Türkiye also looks prepared to take on a greater role. Its Bayraktar drones have proved their worth in several conflicts, including the war in Ukraine. The Turkish DTIB has benefitted from high levels of domestic defense spending, which has allowed the sector to modernize and grow. Several Turkish companies appear ready to become serious competitors to their western and northern European peers.</p> +<p>The question of how demand for critical minerals might affect the location of conflicts around the world is an important one, although largely beyond the scope of this paper. China does play a significant role as the primary offtaker of mining for net zero resources internationally. The way that China chooses to behave with respect to the interests of other countries seeking access to mines creates risks, such as ensuring access to logistics and infrastructure, allocation of promising concessions, and contest for political influence should tensions between China and other major mineral consumers escalate. Similarly, opaque contractual structures create uncertainty about the degree of liability of sometimes fragile governments. Externalities from poor mining practices can be a significant source of instability and are by no means limited to Chinese interests, but they highlight the need for more engagement by international and multilateral institutions with miners on best practice and market reform.</p> -<p>The war in Ukraine and the threat of further Russian aggression have given new urgency to efforts to fill capability gaps. Governments are prioritizing speed in new procurement programs. As a result, imports and off-the-shelf procurement are becoming more important. Since this usually means buying from non-European third countries (rather than setting up joint European development programs), there is a new momentum for European defense industrial cooperation. Even strong supporters of European cooperation have opted for imports, as demonstrated by Germany’s decision to buy F-35 fighters as nuclear carriers. This has caused friction in Franco-German relations, with France, a strong supporter of European cooperation, expressing disappointment over the German decision.</p> +<p>A longer-term question that may not be receiving sufficient attention is what the impact might be should China leverage its industrial and, increasingly, technological advantage in net zero technologies for military purposes. Net zero technologies are still at an early stage in their innovation trajectories, and are receiving much more R&amp;D investment globally than conventional technologies. In many areas, they may ultimately outperform fossil fuel technologies, in terms of both cost and capability, particularly in logistics. It is not yet clear what scope there is for major technological breakthroughs in China to impact relative military advantage, particularly with respect to China’s neighbours. Such innovations might ultimately affect many areas – from the relative efficiency of Chinese industrial defence production and cheaper logistics with superior capability, potentially through to battlefield advantages from developments in areas such as sheet metals and electric drones – and will have their origins in a superior industrial–technological ecosystem.</p> -<p>In central and eastern Europe, defense industry partnerships and purchasing decisions are driven by the desire to keep the United States as the main regional security guarantor, which means that central and eastern European states prefer to buy American rather than European. This is facilitated by the fact that eastern European industries rarely play a role in major European development or procurement programs. As a result, central and eastern European countries do not benefit economically from buying European materiel or from engaging in joint development. Their tendency toward purchasing US equipment could be reinforced as security pressures remain high, speed in deliveries seem more important than ever, and NATO’s position as the bedrock of European security is strengthened.</p> +<p>There is no doubt that China’s influence in new energy supply chains will expand its already significant global footprint. Similarly, China’s higher risk tolerance compared to many Western actors, combined with companies’ willingness to operate with razor-thin margins, will further enhance Beijing’s control over new energy mineral resources. As seen in other areas, China’s economic and commercial presence in a wide range of producer countries also aids Beijing’s efforts to garner backing in multilateral bodies and global institutions in support of China’s position on a given issue. To be sure, Chinese companies operating abroad have a mixed track record in terms of their ESG practices, and have suffered pushback from host countries. China’s growing global footprint and fear of decoupling with the West is already leading it to rally developing countries to reduce the West’s influence. On a bilateral basis too, China’s involvement in producer countries could have implications for broader UK foreign policy goals. The extent of this influence will, however, depend on the degree of support China is offering, how it is perceived in host countries, and how alternative influences are perceived. The UK should review its foreign policy approaches in this context too. China’s foreign policy is closely linked to new energy supply chains, but is not defined by it. At the same time, foreign policy initiatives can support commercial and strategic objectives, including expanding and deepening China’s dominance of net zero supply chains. These interconnections deserve further research and analysis.</p> -<p>The outbreak of a major war in Europe also has consequences for the force structure of European militaries. There is a new focus on quantity. Major wars require more mass and deeper reserves and stocks than the external interventions that were the focus of the last two decades. Does this mean that Europe will focus less on innovation and that the EDTIB could fall behind in terms of technology? So far, this looks unlikely. Militaries and governments have defined requirements, and therefore innovation, years in advance, which means that for the next generation of systems, the innovation that industry needs to deliver has already been determined. Europe currently anticipates the production of cutting-edge technologies. However, there is a growing gap between current procurement plans and newly expressed demand in terms of volume. A new balance needs to be struck between mass production of current state of the art systems and high-end platforms designed to be built in smaller numbers.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Governments are increasingly aware of the importance of ensuring security of supply. Their ambition spans from spare parts and maintenance via components to entire platforms. As a result, central and eastern European countries are investing in building up their domestic industries to become more independent. While smaller industries (e.g., in Bulgaria and Romania) are trying to secure a share of the maintenance business, others aim to participate in the manufacturing process itself and benefit from technology transfers. Poland is a good example of a government with both the ambition and the funds to develop a strong industrial base. Poland and similarly ambitious players with sufficient financial resources will be able to continue their growth path and play a greater role in the EDTIB. But while they can become more independent from imports, including from their European partners, it is unlikely that they will turn into serious competitors to Europe’s top producers.</p> +<p>China holds dominant or strong positions along several global supply chains for the clean energy products that are critical to the net zero energy transition in the UK and elsewhere. Examples include lithium-ion batteries, wind turbines and solar PV modules. China’s strength in this regard encompasses the extraction of raw mineral ores, through the processing and refining of the ores to produce the final metals, to the manufacture of intermediate and final products. China’s dominance is particularly pronounced in the processing and refining of ores. Significant quantities of some of these ores are imported to China from overseas, often from mines in which Chinese companies hold a significant or majority share, or with which they have secured offtake agreements.</p> -<p>A key issue for the future EDTIB is the sustainability of the increase in defense spending. Building a defense technological and industrial base capable of meeting the new level of ambition requires a sustained high level of defense spending to keep funds from being diverted to other government functions in the event of an economic downturn or a reappraisal of policy priorities. Most European governments seem to understand that defense spending must be sustainable to produce results. They are not only willing to maintain their budgets at the current high level but also envisage further increases in the near future. With security pressures expected to remain high, defense will remain a priority across the continent. As a result, the defense market will continue to grow.</p> +<p><strong>Scale of dominance:</strong> In lithium-ion battery supply chains, for example, China is responsible for more than 80% of global supplies of spherical graphite and refined manganese, and of anodes and electrolytes. For wind turbines, it controls more than 80% of refined rare earth metals and manganese, as well as NdFeB magnets. Finally, in solar PV modules, it accounts for more than 80% of refined germanium, polysilicon, wafers and silicon cells. Elsewhere in these supply chains, China is responsible for more than 60% of global output, pointing to very high degrees of market concentration.</p> -<p><strong>Economic Interests as a Barrier to Change</strong></p> +<p><strong>Processing and refining:</strong> Chinese dominance pivots on its control of the processing and refining of minerals. This rests on economies of scale built up over many years, government financial incentives, and on an increasingly strong stock of intellectual property. Chinese companies’ importance in upstream mining is further reinforced by control of the midstream, but also by a relatively high degree of risk tolerance, which backstops upstream mining investments, ensuring access to the highest-value parts of the supply chain. This position will not be usurped over the next decade, and potentially will only be to a limited extent in the decade afterwards. Any inroads into reducing Chinese market share willcrequire heavy public investment and protection from dumping and aggressive state-backed competition.</p> -<p>Although security considerations currently drive the general direction of defense policy in Europe, there are economic trends and considerations that strongly influence the development of the EDTIB. In peacetime, they were arguably more dominant, but even now, no government will take decisions that go against its economic and industrial interests, which are to nurture national arms producers. Any analysis of the defense sector therefore needs to take the industry’s political economy into account. Governments may claim that they are acting in the spirit of European integration or that their motives are exclusively security related, but that is rarely the case. All, even small countries, have bold ambitions for using the additional money and demand to boost their national DTIBs. All envisage to evolve from the current size and product portfolio of the national companies to the next level. Moreover, all countries assessed are keen to boost exports, based on strategies drawn up by the government or the industrial players. They either want to enter foreign markets or expand their role there.</p> +<p><strong>Potential leverage:</strong> China could potentially exploit its strength for coercive purposes: it is already using export quotas and administrative processes to complicate access to supplies of gallium and germanium, as well as graphite, which in turn has impacted costs. Arguably, infrastructure bottlenecks in China during the Covid-19 pandemic or outages due to floods and power cuts have had a more material impact on the cost and availability of new energy supplies to date. Going forward, the lack of critical materials will also have an inflationary effect on new energy supply chains. Market concentration in China will clearly give it commercial advantages, but the extent to which Beijing will use it for geopolitical leverage remains uncertain. For now, Beijing is more likely to use its leverage in response to perceived aggression – but this could change over time.</p> -<p>What differs is the character of these industries, especially the role they play in the production chain. A striking feature of the EDTIB is the heterogeneity of the national industries it comprises. They can be categorized into four different spheres: core industries, traditional mid-sized industries, rising stars, and industries at the periphery.</p> +<p>Comparisons to Russia’s importance in terms of gas supplies have been made frequently since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, there are important distinctions to be made. First, Russia accounted for 40% of European gas supplies before the invasion, whereas market concentration in China is vastly more significant. Second, the impact of an oil or gas outage is different to curtailment of sales of critical materials or components. A direct oil or gas shortage imposes costs on a country’s economy and can limit activity in certain sectors if no alternatives are available; shortages of critical materials, on the other hand, do not cripple economic activity immediately. Third, given the existence of fungible traded markets for oil and gas, supply outages can be mitigated at a cost, which in turn has implications for the entire global economy. Even though the UK does not import Russian pipeline gas, the impact of higher gas prices was also felt in the UK. Equivalent market mechanisms for critical materials are nascent or immature, making it harder to offset shortages. Overall, supply outages for materials and components have a longer-term inflationary impact and risk slowing the energy transition. A simple comparison to oil and gas is not enough. The risks associated with market concentration for new energy supply chains must therefore be assessed more holistically, as should the trade-offs associated with de-risking or decoupling from China.</p> -<p>The European defense industrial core is situated in western Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK), where strong industrial bases capable of producing almost the entire portfolio of weapon systems across all domains have been developed and maintained. Their industries are the largest in Europe, producing technologically advanced products that are highly competitive. While all of them also have a strong export profile, a high proportion of the equipment they produce gets purchased by the armed forces of their home countries. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK are home to several of the top 100 defense companies. All the major pan-European defense companies are at least partly owned by stakeholders from these countries, and direct state involvement is not uncommon. The core countries also lead major European development programs such as Eurofighter, A400M, Tornado, and more recently Tempest and FCAS. With the exception of the UK, all are strong supporters of EU initiatives such as PESCO and the EDF.</p> +<p><strong>Risks to the UK:</strong> The coercive risk for the UK is related to the degree of separation between the stage of the supply chain dominated by China and the stage at which UK consumers enter the market. The likelihood that China would be able to target the UK exclusively is small, as the UK today is principally an importer of final or near-final products. As the UK’s capacity to manufacture these products grows, its vulnerability to Chinese coercion increases, and will require a diversification of supply chains. However, even with more diverse supply chains, the UK’s access to materials and components (as well as their cost) would be determined by industrial policy choices made in the EU and the US. Conversely, given the wider tensions between China and the West, any action taken by China to restrict exports of clean energy metals and products would more likely impact the UK, the EU and the US together in response to a perceived provocation, either economic or military. If prolonged, such an embargo would have a profound impact on the UK’s low-carbon transition (alongside other economies’ transitions), but only a modest effect on the wider economy. The greatest risk for the UK stems from events that have a global impact. These could arise from a natural disaster or pandemic, or from a general shortage of critical materials that forces China to prioritise its domestic market.</p> -<p>Countries such as Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Greece are home to some traditional mid-sized industries. They participate in European joint development programs for complex weapon systems without being able to lead them – the naval sector gradually becoming an exception. These countries are heavily dependent on imports from both Europe and the United States.</p> +<p><strong>Battery supply chains:</strong> The UK is likely to be most heavily exposed to China’s dominance in battery supply chains. This is because China is dominant across most elements of the battery supply chain, and UK automotive manufacturers and the UK electricity grid are expected to rapidly increase demand for batteries. Wind is another area of concern, but the concerns are currently mitigated by a degree of separation between Chinese suppliers and UK users. Nuclear power is not discussed in this paper, but is another supply chain where China is increasingly influential.</p> -<p>Some smaller manufacturers (or traditionally less important producers for the EDTIB) have embarked on ambitious growth trajectories. Companies in Poland and Türkiye have already achieved remarkable technological developments that set them apart from their regional peers. Türkiye’s industry, in particular, has undergone a major transformation in recent years. Turkish companies have achieved a leading position in the UAV market and moved to the forefront of technology in sectors that include turbojet engines and ballistic missiles. By some measures, Hungary can also be counted into this group, as there is considerable momentum with top tier producers opening facilities in the central European state. These countries are rising stars and can be expected to play a greater role in the future of the EDTIB.</p> +<p><strong>China’s political/economic calculus:</strong> China’s ability to leverage its position in net zero supply chains for political ends should be neither overstated nor underestimated. The reason it should not be overstated is because China could use other supply chains to impose coercive pressure on the UK: the total value of UK trade with China in the year to end Q1 2023 was £107.5 billion, with £69.5 billion of imports. China was the UK’s fourth-largest trade partner over this period. This shows that, in circumstances that might give rise to a serious ratcheting up of pressure on UK–Chinese trade, the UK would have much more immediate concerns than net zero supply chains. The reason that China’s ability to leverage its dominance should not be underestimated is that the relatively limited (but symbolically important) role of net zero technologies – as well as China’s unusual dominance in those industries – might make them a useful target should China wish to make a political statement. This paper shows that there may be ways for China to use net zero supply chains in this way without provoking a major escalation.</p> -<p>Finally, there are countries with only small or niche industries. They constitute the periphery. This group consists mainly of former Warsaw Pact countries such as Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Bulgaria. While they can be competitive in niche sectors, their companies lack the overall technological edge to compete with the European core (let alone the United States). They have few or no system integrators. Most companies focus on component production and maintenance.</p> +<p><strong>Military considerations:</strong> The risks to new energy technologies for military purposes stemming from China’s role in supply chains are likely to be similar to those facing the wider population. However, in a time of actual or potential shortage the military could be vulnerable to aggressive corporate strategies and, meanwhile, the military faces the same data security risks as civilian users of Chinese equipment. The extent to which China will be able to use its technological and manufacturing strengths in net zero products to yield military advantage is not clear. In contrast, China’s growing international sales and investment in net zero minerals and products is already boosting its soft power in ways that will impact the UK’s foreign policy goals.</p> -<p>After the end of the Cold War, the state-owned industries of the periphery were partly privatized. As demand for standard Warsaw Pact components plummeted, they underwent a period of transition and reform which significantly weakened their DTIBs. NATO integration was another challenge, as many companies were unable to produce according to NATO standards and therefore could not be integrated into European supply chains. This means that in the periphery, the modernization of domestic armed forces does not necessarily lead to new orders for national DTIBs.</p> +<p><strong>Risk mitigation:</strong> Mitigating China-centred risks will require action across the entire supply chain: accelerating investments in upstream mining developments, diversification of processing and refining, and recycling of critical minerals and materials. International efforts should aim to engage all actors, including China, to align objectives as far as possible towards the development of open markets which will ultimately benefit everyone, at least economically. Involving China directly in UK projects may mitigate some risks related to shortages, but may also hamper longer-term efforts to develop alternative supply chains that are fully independent of China, and so a mixed approach might be optimal.</p> -<p>The differences in industrial portfolios translate into different approaches to industrial policy and procurement. Two approaches can be identified: a capability-driven approach and an industry-driven approach. The dividing line runs, broadly speaking, between western and eastern Europe, and between the core and traditional mid-sized industries on the one side and the rising stars and the periphery on the other. This is due to fundamental differences which are unlikely to change much over the coming decades.</p> +<p><strong>The fallacy of delay:</strong> Risks related to China are not likely to be significantly reduced by delays to the transition to net zero. Energy security during the transition is most closely associated with delay and uncertainty as systems are simultaneously scaled up, ramped down, or repurposed. Abandoning national targets would simply increase uncertainty about government commitment to putting in place the infrastructure that will underpin future energy security.</p> -<p>Central and eastern European states tend to emphasize capability development over industrial interests (capability-driven approach) to address the security pressure resulting from their geographical proximity to Russia. Of course, they also take their domestic industrial base into account when establishing industrial partnerships. They will attempt to secure small work shares for their domestic companies, especially in maintenance (to be able to operate independently), and seek to benefit from technology transfers. All in all, however, they prioritize operational readiness and capability development over industrial gains. In terms of cooperation, they favor US products over participation in European development projects, which are notorious for cost overruns and delays. Third-country imports and off-the-shelf purchases (which often go hand in hand) are seen as less costly and more efficient than European co-development.</p> +<p><strong>Research needs:</strong> Internally consistent public data is not available on China’s market position in most minerals and products, with multiple reputable sources giving significantly different figures. Better publicly available data on the following issues would help improve analysis of:</p> -<p>This tendency is reinforced by the fact that their industries are not in a position to contribute significantly to European projects. In some cases, they were even actively excluded from such projects as when Poland’s request to participate in the MGCS was rejected by Germany and France. As a result, rising star and peripheral countries see little or no economic benefit in participating in major European development programs. They are increasingly open to forging new partnerships with non-European producers such as South Korea if these promise rapid delivery and participation in maintenance (and sometimes even production).</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>China’s domestic extraction capacity for critical minerals.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>China’s domestic processing capacity and annual output of critical minerals.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Capacity and annual output of critical mineral mines and processing plants outside China that involve Chinese investment.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Data around prices of critical minerals and materials.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Details of China’s international trade (import and export) in critical mineral ores and refined metals, including routes through third countries (in terms of quantity and value).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Detailed information on China’s international trade in intermediate and final products of net zero energy technologies, including routes through third countries and products manufactured by Chinese companies in third countries (in terms of quantity and value).</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Western and northern European core countries and countries with a traditional mid-sized industry take a different approach. When they take purchasing decisions, they accord at least the same priority, of not more, to the interests of their domestic industries than to their military needs. Governments try to get their domestic producers involved as much as possible when awarding contracts. As a result, their industries focus more on producing high-end systems that are competitive on the world market than on operational readiness.</p> +<p>Countries do not need to be close allies to be close trading partners. Political or ideological alignment is similarly non-essential. China is deeply embedded in new energy supply chains and its long and steady cultivation of these industries has been essential for the progress made towards reducing the cost of new energy technologies worldwide. Despite some risks, the UK should not seek to exclude China from its supply chains. Instead, the country should seek to communicate effectively with China about the need for diverse supply chains as a point of principle for robust markets and to make the case clearly that this is both in the UK and China’s interests. Bigger, more reliable markets will result in a larger and more diverse client base for China and more supply chains for large-scale new energy technology consumers in the UK and allied countries.</p> -<p>At the same time, governments realize that the technological complexity of modern armaments systems means that a purely national production is no longer possible. In this situation, western and northern European countries (especially the industrial core) prefer joint European development programs to non-European imports because the former benefit their domestic producers more. This approach is very much in line with the concept of European strategic autonomy, which basically calls for all major platforms to be produced by European companies in Europe.</p> +<p>In its domestic policy, the UK should aim to encourage consumers to invest in diversity at all stages of the supply chain, without seeking to exclude China from any of them. Likely shortages in critical minerals offer an opportunity to do this as more mining and refining capacity will probably be required, some of which might usefully be located outside China.</p> -<p>Yet that same rationale does not make joint projects run smoothly. Even when working together, core countries are wary of their economic competitors both inside and outside Europe. This causes problems of co-ordination in European development programs and can lead to the exclusion of potential competitors and the duplication of projects just to ensure a greater share of work for domestic companies (as in the case of Tempest and FCAS).</p> +<hr /> -<p>The core (and thus the EDTIB in general) is also marked by an element of risk aversion on the part of large companies, which is turning into an obstacle to innovation. There is not enough private investment to provide funds for research and development (R&amp;D). In contrast to other sectors of the economy, innovation in defense is largely state-funded, which makes companies reluctant to use their own funds, as they know that eventually the government will pay for technological development.</p> +<p><strong>Michal Meidan</strong> is Head of China Energy Research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES). Before joining OIES in July 2019, she headed cross-commodity China research at Energy Aspects. Prior to that, she headed China Matters, an independent research consultancy providing analysis on the politics of energy in China.</p> -<p>In addition, major arms producers have been reluctant to ramp up production following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In part, this can be explained by ambivalent signals from governments about the sustainability of long-term financing. If companies are uncertain whether an investment will pay off in the medium and long term, they will be reluctant to make it. However, such investments would be crucial for production to meet wartime demand even if not all production capacity is used in peacetime. There seems to be a conflict between the security interests of states (i.e., creating enough capacity to ramp up production in wartime) and the economic interests of firms (avoiding overcapacity to maximize profits).</p> +<p><strong>Philip Andrews-Speed</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the OIES. He has more than forty years’ experience in the field of energy and resources, starting his career as mineral and petroleum exploration geologist before moving into the field of energy and resource governance.</p> -<p><strong>The Absence of Political Visions</strong></p> +<p><strong>Dan Marks</strong> is a Research Fellow in energy security at the Royal United Services Institute. His research focuses on national security dimensions of the energy transition in the United Kingdom and internationally.</p>Michal Meidan, et al.Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused attention on energy supply chains and contributed to growing unease in the West about the fact that supply chains for the commodities necessary for the global energy transition are highly concentrated in China (or under Chinese control).ESG Applied To Mining2023-11-16T12:00:00+08:002023-11-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/esg-to-mining<p><em>As demand for minerals increases to achieve an energy transition, companies, regulators, and end users will need to assess the entire mine-to-market value chain to ensure that all firms are incentivized to adhere to best practices.</em></p> -<p>Political visions are key to the long-term future of the EDTIB because they create coherence with regard to key design features, such as procurement and cooperation strategies. Even more importantly, they help generate a coherent idea of the vision that a European industry should serve and therefore the shape it should take.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The most influential vision of the last decade has been that of European strategic autonomy. The concept was prominently introduced through the EU’s Global Strategy, in which the EU outlined its ambition to become a more credible security and defense actor. A key element of strategic autonomy is the development of an integrated European defense industrial base capable of producing major weapon systems in Europe. According to this concept, the EDTIB should be able to provide European armed forces with all the weapons they need without having to rely on the United States or other third countries. In short, EU countries should buy European equipment from European producers. In domains where EU countries currently lack capabilities, they should set up joint development programs. The proponents of strategic autonomy see a self-sufficient EDTIB as vital to strengthening Europe’s security of supply and thus boosting its geopolitical weight in systemic competition.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>However, the pursuit of strategic autonomy is by no means an undisputed vision. First, there is a debate about which countries the EU should cooperate with. Some governments, including those that are part of the core, wish to allow third countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States to participate in EU-funded programs. Others want to restrict access to EU funds to the European continent and EU countries.</p> +<p>Critical minerals have become strategic inputs for a successful clean energy transition, as well as for economic development and national security. A future powered by low-carbon energy sources and protected by a technologically advanced military is one that will be heavily dependent on minerals. As such, demand for minerals is expected to grow over the coming decades, and mining will become a central theme in international development discourse.</p> -<p>Second, many peripheral and rising countries within the EU do not consider European strategic autonomy a priority, mainly because they do not see the benefit of it. On the contrary, they suspect that core countries with industries at the cutting edge of technology are pursuing their own interests under the guise of a supposedly impartial vision. As it happens, the strongest supporters of the concept of European strategic autonomy are the countries best positioned to benefit economically from European development projects.</p> +<p>According to different clean energy scenarios modeled by the International Energy Agency, the demand for each of the five most important critical minerals (i.e., lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, and neodymium) will likely increase between 1.5 and 7 times by 2030. Meeting this rising demand will require scaling existing operations and developing hundreds of new projects.</p> -<p>Another factor weighing against the concept of strategic autonomy concerns the difficulties associated with joint European development programs in the past. Projects such as the NH90 helicopter, the A400M aircraft, or the Eurofighter were notorious for cost overruns, delays, and a failure to deliver the initially promised benefits in terms of economies of scale and military interoperability.</p> +<p>To this end, Latin America — which holds considerable reserves of copper and lithium, supplying 40 and 35 percent to the global market, respectively — has attracted significant investments in mining. Between 13 and 19 percent of foreign direct investment in the region has gone to the mining sector. Unfortunately, many of the mining projects have been associated with environmental destruction, corruption, dubious economic returns, and the unfair distribution of benefits. According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the region has the most mining-related socioeconomic conflicts worldwide.</p> -<p>Finally, attitudes regarding the future of European integration differ within Europe. Countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the UK are keen to uphold their national autonomy, which also has implications for the defense sector.</p> +<p>Many of these minerals are found in areas that are environmentally sensitive, with important biodiversity and sources of water. Closing the gap in mineral demand will have to be carried out in a manner that empowers local communities around the mines and does not exploit natural resources. As the race to secure critical minerals continues, there should be careful consideration of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns.</p> -<p>As a result, there is no consistent common vision or idea of what the EDTIB should look like in terms of regional distribution, production portfolio, rules for exports, or cooperation partners. Nor is there any consensus on how much Europe should import or which degree of autonomy it should aim to achieve.</p> +<h3 id="the-importance-of-esg-standards-in-mining">The Importance of ESG Standards in Mining</h3> -<p>This does not mean, however, that there is no common ground. The EU has established a number of instruments for facilitating joint arms development that are widely regarded as successful, notably the EDF. Although these instruments lack clarity, coherence, and compatibility with NATO processes, most governments agree that such EU policies will be crucial for the future development of the EDTIB.</p> +<p>The international community has developed an assortment of toolkits and guides to inform projects. The Group of Twenty, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund offer resources that detail how to avoid disputes, build trust, and properly secure access to essential resources. The private sector has also developed their own guidelines. For instance, the International Council on Mining and Metal has released many practical resources to help the industry in this area. The principles observed throughout such products strongly emphasize upstream planning, good governance, and enabling conditions. These same elements stress the importance of positively impacting environmental, social, and economic outcomes.</p> -<h4 id="how-will-the-edtib-develop">How Will the EDTIB Develop?</h4> +<p>Applying best practices is not merely a nicety but a cost-saving endeavor. When there is a failure to adopt advisable practices, there is a greater potential for costly conflict. A 2014 study by the University of Queensland’s Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining attempted to quantify the cost of conflict with local communities. One case study saw an estimated $20 million loss in net present value for every week of delayed production. Consulting with local communities early on and incorporating best practices throughout the mining process can mitigate these risks.</p> -<p>The analysis presented above suggests that absent major political initiatives, there will be no major changes to the basic design of the EDTIB in the new era of European defense. Instead, business will be conducted as usual. That is, the European core will continue to produce state-of-the-art capabilities that provide a degree of political and operational autonomy from the United States. The periphery will seek to reduce its dependence, including on its European allies, while maintaining an ambivalent attitude toward European cooperation and European strategic autonomy.</p> +<p>One positive development is the June 2022 announcement of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), an initiative by Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union to increase mineral production. Its goal is “to promote responsible growth across the critical minerals sector via a shared commitment to high [ESG] standards; sustainability; and shared prosperity.” The MSP will be an important conduit to bolster mineral supply chains in a manner that meets high ESG standards. However, implementing these high standards will require the efforts of both the public and private sectors.</p> -<p>Although the increase in budgets may revive parts of the defense sector and generate some momentum for defense companies, there are few signs of improved coherence and coordination. Currently, there is no momentum for closer defense industrial cooperation in Europe, nor do waves of consolidation seem likely in the foreseeable future. While small-scale mergers are possible, there appears to be nothing major on the horizon. The overall industrial structure will remain unchanged.</p> +<h3 id="sources-of-conflict-in-mining-operations">Sources of Conflict in Mining Operations</h3> -<p>Regional and economic divides will persist, as will the wide differences over sourcing and cooperation. However, there will be opportunities for more ad-hoc, country-to-country, and sectoral cooperation formats such as the European Sky Shield initiative. But there will be no grand design, no coherent European vision of how to coordinate and drive the EDTIB.</p> +<p>The conflict surrounding mining projects primarily derives from insufficient consultation with affected communities, the inequitable distribution of socioeconomic benefits, and environmental objections (see Box 1). The communities that live near mineral deposits are often poor and experience their own a set of unique socioeconomic problems. A report by the Inter-American Development Bank cites “deficient planning” as a consistent source of setbacks for mining projects.</p> -<p>The sources of change are the rising stars and the non-European suppliers. The main players to watch are South Korea, Poland, and Türkiye. The United States is a traditional European supplier already. Its share in Europe may increase but without larger industrial relevance to the American DTIB.</p> +<p>There are several typical stages in the mining value chain: exploration, extraction, processing, transportation, and sales. Ideally, closure and remediation conclude the mining lifecycle. Conflict, malpractice, and missed opportunities can occur at any point in the minerals value chain, so thoughtful planning is necessary at each stage to account for all potential issues.</p> -<p>Some mid-sized and smaller European players will continue to grow and increase their role. But there will be no major shift in the industrial balance of power. The industrial core will continue to determine the development of the EDTIB. The fundamental power asymmetry will remain, with all its consequences for European cooperation and coordination.</p> +<p>Having clear and detailed ESG standards is insufficient to protect Indigenous groups and the environment. Without the participation of both the public and private sector, conflicts will continue to arise throughout the value chain, costing both the mining companies and the local communities affected by their actions. The enforcement of these principles cannot be the sole responsibility of the mining company; commercial pressure and empowered regulators also have their roles in leveraging mining as a development tool.</p> -<p>What are the game changers that could shift this trajectory? If European countries were to agree large multilateral programs with sufficient funding to generate major technological advances, new champions and pan-European companies could emerge, which would transform the industrial landscape. Another game changer could be a reform of EU policies to harmonize existing instruments and shape a consistent development path for the EDTIB.</p> +<p>Institutional capacity, which varies widely, determines the degree to which suggested or required practices are administered. Regional and local governments tend to lack the technical capacity, personnel, and budgetary resources to effectively address illegal activity and provide adequate land governance, law enforcement, and public services. In many instances, the process of land titling and registration at the subnational level is not well defined, leading to land grabs and clashes with local communities and Indigenous people. Often, areas that are delimited for Indigenous ethnic groups and natural parks are not safeguarded. This is partly because laws and governing principles are typically created at the federal level, not in the municipalities charged with enforcing the law.</p> -<h4 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h4> +<p>Due to a lack of institutional capacity, local governments are often unequipped to enforce laws or combat illegal mining. This creates a low-risk environment that enables legal mining entities not to adhere to espoused ESG guidelines and encourages illegal mining activity (any such activity that takes place without receiving state permission, such as land rights or exploration permits). This has resulted in illegal mining into protected areas and the displacement of Indigenous people in many regions. For example, Interpol found that Bolivia and Colombia are major sources of illegal gold, while Ecuador, Panama, and Peru are both sources and processing centers for illegally extracted ores. Illegal mining is highly associated with transnational criminal activity, as well as with human rights violations, environmental degradation, and corruption. Like many illicit activities that exist where rule of law or enforcement capacity is weak, it is a symptom of inadequate governing authority and a lack of alternate employment opportunities.</p> -<p>Given the most likely scenario for the future development of the EDTIB, what can the EU and member state governments do to influence the trajectory of the defense sector and produce a better outcome? The following section sets out which actions can be taken to make the EDTIB more coherent and capable.</p> +<p>Abandoned or improperly closed mines are attractive to illegal mining operations. Proper closure protocols have not always been common practice and remain underutilized. Nearly a quarter of jurisdictions globally do not require mine closure plans, according to a 2019–2020 survey conducted by the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and Sustainable Development. Only 45 percent of the IGF member governments that responded to the survey require companies to provide adequate financial assurance for rehabilitation and other closure costs. Failure to effectively manage a post-mining transition can result in unnecessary, lasting damage to local communities and the environment around them.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Regard the EDTIB as a strategic asset: Europe needs to equip the EDTIB to meet both its short and long-term needs. It should regard the EDTIB as a strategic asset, which includes finding answers to questions such as:</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-studies"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Studies</code></h4> +</blockquote> - <ul> - <li> - <p>How can “bonsai industries” be rebuilt to meet European demand?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What can governments do to enhance the development of defense technologies and avoid being overtaken by competitors such as China?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How can governments make the best use of a wide range of instruments, including political control over the sector? Since the defense industry is vital for national and European security, there is no doubt that political intervention in the market and the exercise of political control over market players can be justified.</p> - </li> - </ul> - </li> +<ul> <li> - <p>Establish a mechanism for building up stocks: In response to the current shortage of ammunition and materiel, European government should pass legally binding requirements to ensure that the EDTIB has sufficient depth in terms of industrial capacity to be able to equip European militaries in a war scenario. They should also provide for sufficient reserves of ammunition and other critical goods. The design of such a system could be inspired by Cold War arrangements.</p> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Rio Blanco, located in the lower Andes of Peru, is owned by Hong Kong’s Junefield Mineral Resources and the Hunan Gold Corporation. The mine has faced criticism for ramping up production despite expert warnings that such endeavors could release heavy metals and increase the risk of acid drainage from the mine to local water sources.</code></em></p> </li> <li> - <p>Secure funding: To stay at the cutting edge of technology, the EU and its member states must make the necessary funding available, particularly for R&amp;D. This means that funding must be sustainable, which will also attract more private investment. Governments need to be able to credibly tell defense companies that the current increases in defense spending and the new level of ambition for European defense are more than a blip. Doing so would send a message to shareholders and owners that investing into the development of new weaponry carries a low risk and that investments will pay off.</p> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Mirador and San Carlos Panantza copper mines, located in the Ecuadorian Amazon, have become infamous for the tensions between the Chinese mining consortium CRCC-Tongguan and the local Indigenous community. Natural sites around the mines are ceremonially significant to the Shuar Arutam people, who have grown increasingly frustrated by the mine’s misuse of sacred areas in the Arutam region. The Ecuadorian Constitutional Court found in September 2022 that the Shuar were not sufficiently consulted before Chinese investors opened the San Carlos Panantza mine, thereby delaying its opening. In response to criticism, Chinese investors have tried to co-opt local leaders, avoid cultural and environmental guardrails, and force residents to relocate. According to a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, CRCC-Tongguan worked to turn Ecuadorian national elites against the Shuar and employed divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities.</code></em></p> </li> <li> - <p>Set up major European development programs: Involving as many European countries as possible in major multilateral development programs is the most effective way to boost the technological development of the EDTIB. Such programs ensure that sufficient financial resources are pooled to produce the high-end capabilities needed to remain competitive. At the same time, they create economies of scale and increase interoperability, which is a decisive military advantage.</p> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Brazil’s Juruti Mine, run by Alcoa World Alumina, has been assessed as having 700 million metric tons of bauxite, the raw material used to make aluminum. To address its environmental impact, the Juruti Mine has put forward a biodiversity action plan that aims to make mining operations carbon-neutral by 2030 via offsetting the land used for mining each year by an equal acreage of rehabilitated land. Alcoa partnered with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to explore how to best contribute to biodiversity. The Juruti mine is also employing a new reforestation method called nucleation to replenish destroyed fauna. In their efforts, they are mindfully creating non-timber forest jobs, such as harvesting Brazil nuts or cultivating honey, as well as developing small-scale farming projects for locals.</code></em></p> </li> - <li> - <p>Develop a strategy to deal with third countries: As third countries become more important as arms suppliers, European governments should develop a common approach toward them. To this end, they need to decide:</p> +</ul> - <ul> - <li> - <p>Who should be allowed to participate in EDF and PESCO projects and thus benefit from EU funds? This concerns primarily the United Kingdom and the United States but potentially also Indo-Pacific partners such as Australia or Japan.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How much should US companies operating in Europe be allowed to contribute to European projects? What share would make it possible for them to add value without compromising European autonomy?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How should Europe deal with Türkiye and South Korea? As partners? As competitors? Each categorization has different policy implications.</p> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li> - <p>Europe must also find solutions to the underlying problems of the EDTIB’s economic structure and the lack of a common political vision. A first step would be a comprehensive review of EU policies to assess which have proved useful and which have not. An important issue for discussion would be to reexamine the European Commission’s approach to competition and consolidation in the defense sector. Before the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, consolidation was seen as beneficial because it reduced overcapacity, pooled technological knowledge, and created synergies. Some effects, however, have proved problematic. As players left the market or merged and overcapacity was reduced, the EDTIB was unable to ramp up production quickly enough to meet current demand. This shows that a certain amount of industrial overcapacity is probably necessary to be able to scale up production in a war scenario.</p> +<h3 id="great-power-competition-in-mining">Great Power Competition in Mining</h3> - <p>Another side-effect of consolidation is the concentration of market power in the hands of a small number of European system integrators. In some sectors, this has led to quasi-oligopolistic market structures, with all the negative effects associated with such a concentration of economic power. Paradoxically, the EU’s emphasis on competition has in some cases led to a reduction in competition as consolidation increased.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Align EU and NATO defense industrial frameworks: A better fit is needed between NATO instruments, such as the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and NATO standards, and the EU industrial framework and, more generally, the EDTIB, to reduce duplication and create synergies. This is one of the few aspects on which there is almost complete consensus among European governments. Eastern European countries in particular stress that EU initiatives should not be realized at the expense of NATO frameworks.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reduce regional imbalances: A major structural obstacle to greater coherence and coordination in the EDTIB consists of regional imbalances between core countries on the one side and mid-sized countries and the periphery on the other side in terms of industrial capacity and technological advantage. The EU – and especially the industrial core – must find ways to make participation in joint European development programs attractive to central and eastern European countries. This will most likely mean the transfer of knowledge and some part of the production. Such a step requires a willingness on the part of core governments and companies to support industrial development in central and eastern Europe even at the expense of some of their domestic profits. This is the price to be paid for greater coherence, coordination, and involvement of peripheral and mid-sized industries. A good starting point could be to use the additional funds becoming available from rising defense budgets to build production facilities in mid-sized and peripheral countries and integrate them into European supply chains.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Establish a secondary market for used and modernized equipment: Smaller countries with fewer financial resources are calling for the establishment of a secondary market to help modernize their armed forces and meet NATO standards in a cost-effective manner.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Address structural dependencies: Europe has become dependent on imports of raw materials, alloys, and components such as semiconductors, mainly from Asia. Given the systemic competition between Western countries and China, security of supply will be a key issue. Europe’s dependence should be addressed.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Deal with other challenges and structural barriers at the national level:</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>Political leaders in Latin America are eager to unlock the potential of their natural resources, even if it means awarding bids to China’s state-controlled mining operations. China has experienced undeniable success in the region. According to the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker, 21 percent of the $148.9 billion Chinese entities invested in Latin American and Caribbean countries between 2005 and 2022 was in the mining and metals sector. In January 2023, a consortium of the Chinese firms, Contemporary Amperex Technology, Guangdong Brunp Recycling Technology, and CMOC Group, won the rights to extract Bolivia’s lithium deposits. The $1 billion investment is estimated to yield 50,000 metric tons of battery-grade lithium carbonate per year. Moreover, China has invested over $10 billion in Peru’s mining industry and now owns two of Peru’s five largest copper mines.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Reduce Bureaucracy: Slow and complex procurement processes are a major obstacle in countries across Europe. Eliminating some of the influence of vested interests on the production process will help to speed up procurement decisions. As procurement processes differ from country to country, this is mostly a task for national governments.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Create the necessary legal environment and defense ecosystem: Some eastern European states have laws which ban the government from supporting and guiding the development of their domestic DTIBs. Yet the production of high-end capabilities requires a comprehensive defense ecosystem with a highly skilled workforce and a sophisticated R&amp;D network, including public research centers. Building such a network across Europe and enabling smaller countries to participate will be crucial.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Stabilize funding: Another challenge is the lack of binding long-term fiscal legislation that guarantees funding on a multi-year basis. Spain, Italy, and Germany are major players that lack multi-year budget allocations. Companies are discouraged from investing because they cannot be certain that sufficient funds will be available to complete a project. Defense budgets must be approved annually, which means they are subject to change every year. This contradicts the logic of large procurement and development programs which tend to run for several years.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>China’s mining advancements in Latin and South America should concern environmentalists and humanitarians as much as it worries national security policymakers. Chinese companies frequently fail to conduct adequate environmental impact assessments or consult with local Indigenous communities. A 2023 report presented to the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights documented 14 cases in Latin America where Chinese companies committed environmental destruction or violated human rights. Western firms are certainly not all without incidents and controversies, but none of the top ESG performers, according to trade publication Mining Technology, are of Chinese origin. Western firms are ESG leaders in the industry and should continue innovating and implementing towards that end to better offer alternatives to Chinese investments.</p> -<p>For the future of Europe’s defense technological and industrial base, it is crucial that the additional public resources invested in defense translate into higher operational readiness of the armed forces and more industrial capacity. This analysis suggests that major reforms are needed to advance the development of the European defense sector. With new funds available, there may be a window of opportunity for change – not necessarily for a fundamental transformation of the sector but certainly to address some of the shortcomings of today’s EDTIB.</p> +<p>U.S. companies are competing against Chinese state-subsidized companies that do not adhere to the more stringent ESG standards or anticorruption requirements Western firms must abide by. Though Chinese regulators are working to standardize corporate ESG disclosure reporting, the Guidance for Enterprise ESG Disclosure that took effect in June 2022 mostly requires data reporting and complying with (often weak) local regulations. Rather than doing the minimum required by the host country, U.S. companies usually maintain high standards wherever they operate. Western firms are more likely to incorporate community engagement and consultation, while Chinese firms had 23 allegations of insufficient consultation from January 2021 to December 2022. It was not until May 2023 that the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals &amp; Chemicals Importers &amp; Exporters (CCCMC), launched a pilot consultation mechanism. It is in U.S. companies’ interest to build the capacity of local governments, which would give these companies a comparative advantage over Chinese state-subsidized firms. The United States cannot make China’s offers less financially attractive for host nations. A level playing field will never be achieved so long as there is the possibility of a firm underbidding others by cutting corners on ESG best practices. Navigating the stakeholder landscape to achieve this will require collaboration among government officials, corporations, and local communities.</p> + +<p>Additionally, in instances where companies do not self-regulate, government authorities could develop traceability programs. Accessibility leads to transparency, which improves adherence to best practices. While traceability is not a substitute for good governance and strong rule of law, increasing transparency does support and improve governance. Western companies and the U.S. government cannot do due diligence if knowledge of relevant supply chains is lacking. Moreover, as global consumers and investors become increasingly conscious of ESG goals, companies that demonstrate their dedication to these principles can attract more capital. Traceability may give consumers and end users the information needed to shape the market in a way that rewards ESG best practices even when host countries lack the capacity to do so.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>Implementing ESG best practices will make the Latin American region more stable and prosperous. The sooner such practices are well established, with all stakeholders in the mining value chain adhering to them, the less exploitation and environmental conflict there will be. In this regard, U.S.-based companies should view responsible mining and the implementation of ESG standards not as a burden, but as a selling point. Fortunately, many firms already share this perspective, and aim high by going beyond the minimum standards. Yet there is still work to be done throughout the entire mine-to-market value chain to enhance the comparative advantage of firms that are ESG-conscious. Companies, regulators, and end users need to collaborate to continue moving in the right direction.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Christian Mölling</strong> is deputy director of the DGAP Research Institute and head of the Center for Security and Defense.</p> +<p><strong>Romina Bandura</strong> is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development and the Project on U.S. Leadership in Development at CSIS. Her current research focuses on the future of work in developing countries and the United States’ economic engagement in the developing world. She has also conducted extensive research on enhancing the reach and impact of the Multilateral Development Bank system.</p> -<p><strong>Sören Hellmonds</strong> is a freelance scientist.</p>Christian Mölling and Sören HellmondsDrawing insights from defense experts across NATO members, the study highlights the evolving European defense landscape, emphasizing security of supply concerns and the balance between national and EU initiatives. The report underscores pivotal forthcoming decisions in Europe’s defense amidst changing geopolitical dynamics.Treading A Fine Line2023-10-30T12:00:00+08:002023-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/treading-a-fine-line<p><em>After initial speculation around its involvement in the Hamas attacks, Iran is coming under increasing pressure over how to respond to the conflict.</em></p> +<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) at CSIS. In this role, he supports the team’s research agenda, business development opportunities, and event coordination.</p>Romina Bandura and Austin HardmanAs demand for minerals increases to achieve an energy transition, companies, regulators, and end users will need to assess the entire mine-to-market value chain to ensure that all firms are incentivized to adhere to best practices.Red Lines And Red Crosses2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/red-lines-and-red-crosses<p><em>International law fails to protect healthcare facilities in armed conflict. They need specific protection from harm.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<p>From the moment Hamas attacked Israel, Iran has been extremely vocal, praising the assault and warning Israel and the US of reprisals for military action. However, while initially seen as a beneficiary of the events, the pressure on Iran is now starting to mount.</p> +<p>If there is one thing that the whole world could be said to have agreed on and united around, surely it is International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as encapsulated in the Geneva Conventions. They were signed by every single state, a feat only replicated a handful of times, mostly around another world-unifying issue: climate change. Even the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Chemical Weapons Convention have not reached that milestone.</p> -<p>After the events of 7 October there was immediate speculation over Iranian involvement, with evidence soon surfacing of meetings between Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas. Iran has long viewed Israel as its greatest regional threat, and vice versa. Israel has been involved in a number of successful security operations against Iran, while the Islamic Republic does not recognise the State of Israel. In 2005, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad famously gave a speech that was translated as saying Israel “should be wiped off the map”.</p> +<p>Yet, despite this universal rejection of attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure – especially, in the context of this Commentary, hospitals and healthcare workers – they occur daily. The World Health Organization monitors the extent of the problem, and at the time of writing, its dashboard stands at 855 attacks in 18 countries this year. This is almost certainly a gross underestimate, and only paints a broad-brush picture – while documenting 1,180 such attacks in Ukraine since January 2022, it does not convey that 190 of those facilities were completely destroyed. The vast majority of these attacks are intentional. During a period of analysis of attacks in Syria, 22% of all infrastructure damaged was healthcare-related, compared with only 3% for schools. This has led some to assert that the Red Cross is now the “Dread Cross” – a target rather than a protection – and that protecting hospitals requires a different approach.</p> -<p>In addition, the Islamic Republic has made supporting Palestinians a key pillar of its foreign policy. As a result, Hamas has long been backed by Tehran, both for its cause and as part of a network of groups across the Middle East that forms an “axis of resistance” against the US, Israel and its allies. Consequently, over many years, Iran has provided funding, equipment and expertise to help Hamas develop its capabilities.</p> +<p>An important question is whether this is a problem for the international community at all. After all, the Geneva Conventions do not rule out an attack on a hospital. The law itself is simple – hospitals are protected – but this is caveated by “provided they are not military objectives”. The Conventions do not define all the circumstances in which hospitals lose their protection, but the International Committee of the Red Cross commentaries give illustrations: combatants setting up a firing position there; storing ammunition; sheltering troops; or using it as a “human shield”. This last is especially problematic. It is the nature of hospitals, when surrounded by fighting, to occupy a liminal space; they serve the health needs of anyone in need. Critically, they also have no power to reject combatants – so they can lose their protection because of an action over which they have no agency. This is something that current legal frameworks struggle to manage. Even when there are prosecutions, they are rarely successful. Indeed, some argue that focusing on accountability for war crimes through International Criminal Law may even be weakening some elements of the harder-to-prove IHL.</p> -<h3 id="iran-initially-a-beneficiary-of-the-war">Iran, Initially a Beneficiary of the War</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Indeed, some argue that focusing on accountability for war crimes through International Criminal Law may even be weakening some elements of the harder-to-prove International Humanitarian Law</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Part of the immediate rationale for Iranian involvement in the attack was that Iran could be seen as a beneficiary of the horrific events. Firstly, Hamas had shattered the illusion of the invincibility of Iran’s archnemesis. In recent years, Israel’s military and intelligence capability, along with its vast defence spending and veil of protection from the sophisticated Iron Dome missile defence system, had created the idea of an unbeatable foe. However, the events of 7 October exposed a number of Israeli weaknesses which have been celebrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have used the events in their own propaganda to place further doubt on Israeli capability and to boost their own morale.</p> +<p>Consider also the realities of military necessity. Close quarters fighting to rid a hospital of a prepared enemy force will be extremely challenging and costs many soldiers’ lives. It may significantly slow an advance (that may itself be time critical). It may allow the enemy to escape, regroup and attack elsewhere. These specific dangers may be overcome by a heavy bombardment that simply destroys the facility – but they are not the only relevant risks. The tactical advantage of an overwhelming attack comes with long-term operational and strategic costs that may be far greater.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Iran will not want to risk any major escalation that would force a decision about direct military involvement</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The commander may legally strike the hospital that has lost its protection only if the military advantage achieved will outweigh the expected collateral damage. But how well-informed are commanders about the extent of that collateral damage? They know of course that it will involve civilian casualties, as hospitals in conflict-affected areas are typically overcrowded with the most vulnerable sections of society, seeking either treatment or refuge. There will also be the staff tending to them. These represent the direct harm of the attack. But is that it? Hospitals take years to build, require enormous resources to stock, and replacement staff for those who have been killed, injured or driven away by the violence take time to train or recruit. The health economy loses a critical node and so, for years after, those who seek care may not be able to access it effectively. People will sicken and die from perfectly treatable conditions, for lack of ongoing management of their long-term health conditions and for loss of capacity to treat their new ones. This is the indirect harm and it is vast; for every one killed by the attack itself, at least 11 die of these indirect harms. The groups most affected by both are the children, women, elderly and ill – the same groups least able to flee to access healthcare elsewhere.</p> -<p>Secondly, the events have diverted attention away from Iran’s borders. As the region had begun to look increasingly peaceful, there was a further focus on Iran’s rising nuclear threat, human rights record, and destabilising activities across the Middle East. However, effort and resources have now been refocused towards the west of the region. Last week, for example, the expiration of UN sanctions on Iranian ballistic missiles went largely unreported.</p> +<p>There are other costs that are harder to quantify, but militarily may be even more apposite. It could conceivably be the best military solution, if the objective is to win the war, but it makes no sense at all if the objective is to win the peace. Victory achieved by destroying the capacity or will of the enemy to continue the fight only brings negative peace: the absence of fighting. It rarely lasts, because the capacity and will to fight can be regrown. As US counterinsurgency doctrine notes, “Kill[ing] 5 insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 50 more, and loss of local support”. The rubble of a hospital is guaranteed to alienate the population, engendering a lasting sense of grievance that will fuel the will to fight again. Positive peace, where the factions share a sense of social justice such that neither wants nor needs to fight, is far more likely to persist. Access to healthcare is a key component of positive peace. If the commander knew that cumulative harms and grievance resulting from the hospital attack would also inspire their enemy to rise up again in five years and attack them even harder, would they still call in an airstrike? Or would they take the harder option and target the enemy at close quarters?</p> -<p>Thirdly, the attacks have put a halt to any normalisation negotiations between Iran’s archenemy Israel and its regional rival Saudi Arabia. Israel has been slowly building up relations with its neighbours, culminating in the 2020 Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain. More recently, conversations have been progressing with Saudi Arabia, with which Iran made its own deal to restore relations earlier this year. However, reigniting the conflict between Israel and Palestinians has caused a snapback reaction by some Arab states and has temporarily derailed Israeli-Saudi negotiations. All Arab countries have issued statements condemning Israeli airstrikes, and the King of Jordan even cancelled a meeting with US President Joe Biden and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas in protest against Israeli military activities.</p> +<p>Can you still bomb a hospital, while somehow mitigating these problems? We often hear that IHL-compliant warnings are given to evacuate areas before they are attacked. The reality is that this is a normally a facade. A UK hospital, such as the one in which the author works, could undoubtedly be evacuated completely – for example if there was a major fire – but patients would come to harm. New patients would die waiting for ambulances, as frontline vehicles were diverted to moving existing patients. The frail or critically ill may well die from interruption of their care. The entire regional health system would have to slash routine and emergency care to cope, which would severely degrade it for weeks or months. And all of this in a stable, developed, interoperable health system. If it were the only functioning hospital in a region, where would the patients go? If the ambulance system were weak and overwhelmed by conflict casualties, who would move them? For a significant number, these notifications will simply give advance warning of their death – either in the hospital, or without adequate care nearby. No one should ever believe that you can bomb a hospital in a way that does not have extensive, enduring impacts on the population served by it.</p> -<h3 id="the-rising-pressure-on-tehran">The Rising Pressure on Tehran</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Nor is this simply about influencing tactical decision-making. Degrading the health of a population has international consequences too</code></em></strong></p> -<p>However, despite the original speculation around Iranian involvement in the Hamas attacks and the initial benefits to Iran, Tehran quickly denied any participation, and the US has since declared there to be no evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the events of 7 October. Furthermore, as the conflict progresses, Iranian officials are coming under increasing pressure. In particular, Iran needs to demonstrate ongoing support for its Hamas and Hizbullah allies, but will find it ever more difficult to provide weaponry, both as logistics become more challenging in the conflict zones and because of the balancing act between arming these – and other – groups, honouring arms deals with Russia, and maintaining its own defensive capabilities and military arsenal.</p> +<p>Nor is this simply about influencing tactical decision-making. Degrading the health of a population has international consequences too. People who are unsafe and cannot access basic services will try to move. Mass refugee flows negatively impact health and stability in surrounding countries and so are generally detrimental to the interests of the wider international community.</p> -<p>Iran will also not want to risk any major escalation that would force a decision about direct military involvement. Iran’s strategy has always been to provide “forward defence” through its proxy groups and to follow a policy of maximum tactical flexibility, with provocation that hovers on the threshold of confrontation without spilling into outright war. However, if the war spreads, the Islamic Republic’s options and flexibility will rapidly decrease, and as tensions rise, so does the risk that provocative activity will lead to miscalculation and escalation.</p> +<p>Ironically, it may be the approach of the international community that lies at the root of this problem. Evaluation of the ICRC Healthcare in Danger project suggests progress against its objectives of engagement, preparation and legislation; this is not a failure of advocacy on the part of such organisations. Nor is it (generally) the result of malfunctioning munitions, or human error. As then Médecins Sans Frontières International President Joanne Liu told the UN Security Council in 2016:</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While the destruction of Hamas would significantly weaken Iran’s regional strategy, supporting Hamas in the long term may prove even more costly</code></em></strong></p> +<blockquote> + <p>On the third of May, this council unanimously passed Resolution 2286. You, the Council Members, pledged to protect civilians and the medical services they need to survive. You passed the resolution in the wake of the obliteration of Al Quds Hospital, in Aleppo by the Syrian government and its allies … Five months later, the resolution has plainly failed to change anything on the ground. This failure reflects a lack of political will.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Finally, Iranian focus on the Israel–Hamas war will cause further tensions domestically. The country has seen significant unrest in recent months, with the public more concerned about Iran’s flailing economy, returning social restrictions and crackdowns on protests. In particular, anti-government protests have regularly featured the chant “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. I sacrifice my life for Iran” in response to concerns over the use of government funds to support Hamas and Hizbullah, so Iranian focus in this area is likely to cause further unrest.</p> +<p>Accepting international laws that allow commanders to determine military necessity for themselves, using ill-informed collateral risk assessments to decide what is subjectively proportionate, may be facilitating attacks on healthcare rather than stopping them. Increasingly it seems more likely to be used as a framework for the subsequent justification of an attack, than as a protection to prevent one.</p> -<p>As a result, Iran has some difficult decisions to make over the coming weeks and months. While the pressure around Iranian nuclear activity and Israel’s normalisation of its regional relations may have somewhat reduced, this is only temporary. In addition, while the destruction of Hamas would significantly weaken Iran’s regional strategy, supporting Hamas in the long term may prove even more costly.</p> +<p>So as conflicts affecting healthcare rage in 18 countries this year, what can be done to break this pattern? First, the international community can acknowledge the reality: healthcare is openly attacked during wars, and IHL does not currently offer meaningful protection to hospitals in high intensity conflict. Then it can ask how that can be changed. Perhaps the clue to one simple measure lies in the Chemical Weapons Convention, itself so close to complete international agreement. There are some weapons that must not be used. An additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions could, at the stroke of a pen, simply preclude the use of explosive weapons on hospitals. Hospitals could still be targeted if there was military necessity – and their use as command posts or ammunition dumps could still justify that – but it would have to be done by small arms, and line of sight. It would be bloody, but it would be the blood of combatants, not civilians. The infrastructure would remain, to treat the population afterwards. The staff will be alive to undertake their duties. Perhaps most importantly, it would not harden the will of the entire population against the attackers; it would leave space for lasting peace, rather than sowing the seeds of the next generation of conflict.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Louise Kettle</strong> is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Nottingham. Her research is focused on Britain’s foreign and security relationship with the Middle East across the twentieth century and up to the present day. Her current research is examining British-Iranian relations.</p>Louise KettleAfter initial speculation around its involvement in the Hamas attacks, Iran is coming under increasing pressure over how to respond to the conflict.Goodbye Mr Chips?2023-10-30T12:00:00+08:002023-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/goodbye-mr-chips<p><em>Better practices are needed to improve the effectiveness of defence training.</em></p> +<p><strong>Si Horne</strong> is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. An Army Emergency Medicine doctor, he has supported operations in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and South Sudan as well as serving as the Emergency Medicine lead for the Army.</p>Si HorneInternational law fails to protect healthcare facilities in armed conflict. They need specific protection from harm.On Critical Minerals2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/on-critical-minerals<p><em>This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<p>Training is crucial for enabling UK Defence to deliver operational success, and broadens the potential talent pool by allowing Defence to recruit people who can develop the necessary skills, rather than simply competing for pre-trained talent (which often is in short supply). The breadth and scale of military training is significant, with a clear management process – the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) – in which requirement-setters identify training needs that are passed to delivery authorities, who design and deliver the training; the requirement-setters then review the training to ensure that it provides what is needed. While this sets a structured framework for training, there are challenges Defence must overcome to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its training system. These challenges exist across several areas: culture; system governance; processes; training delivery; the wider learning environment; and workforce capacity.</p> +<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> -<p>Pockets of good practice exist in Defence, and much could be gained from sharing these more widely, but lessons should also be learned from training practice outside Defence. This paper identifies improvements in four key areas to help modernise Defence training and prepare the armed forces for the challenges to come:</p> +<p>Critical minerals are broadly defined as minerals that are of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security and are also subject to serious risks relating to the security of their supply. This paper uses the term “critical minerals” broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that this is not a fixed list, and that a country’s specific assessment will affect whether a mineral is considered critical.</p> + +<p>A dramatically increased supply of these minerals will be vital for the net zero transition – both in the UK and internationally – and to meet the target to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, set at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Conference in 2015.</p> + +<p>Yet the extraction of critical minerals poses various environmental and human security risks, many of which pose a threat to the net zero transition, in the UK and globally. This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks. It identifies key environmental risks as including the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, pollution, soil degradation, water scarcity and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks identified include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses, labour exploitation, crime, conflict and corruption. Where mining takes place on or near Indigenous lands, both environmental and human security risks are found to disproportionately affect already-disenfranchised communities.</p> + +<p>While a number of these risks are well established, there is a potential for burgeoning demand for critical minerals to accelerate potential harms. Such harms can occur in situations where rising demand pushes governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; where new extractive operations open up in countries without mining histories, which lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; where harmful boom–bust cycles of extractive activity occur due to ongoing technological advances; and where a race to secure supplies of critical minerals exacerbates competition and geopolitical tensions.</p> + +<p>If the mining sector fails to address these risks as demand booms, public opinion across source and supply countries might turn against the net zero transition as the harms are perceived to outweigh the benefits. It is crucial that the UK leverages its unique position as an international trade, financial and mining hub to help the international community mitigate the risks posed in this regard.</p> + +<p>Based on the findings of this research, the authors suggest the following ways forward for consideration by the UK government, many of which are also applicable to other governments in the Global North:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Upskilling the whole training workforce by improving the training given to any personnel engaged in training others (“train the trainer”).</p> + <p>Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures, Science-Based Targets for Nature, Global Reporting Initiative and other similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Improving training delivery through more personalised “learning journeys”, active learning and greater use of technology.</p> + <p>Develop an updated industrial strategy on critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.</p> </li> <li> - <p>A better understanding of Defence training as a system and as a crucial component of military capability via clearer lines of accountability, better use of data, and mechanisms allowing training to be more responsive to changing individual and organisational needs.</p> + <p>Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the “levelling up” agenda.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Partnering with external organisations that can complement Defence’s skillset by supplying adult education (andragogical) expertise.</p> + <p>Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks. This could involve providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation. Such regulation should improve the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries, in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises the pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth, and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources.</p> </li> </ul> <h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Recent defence and security reviews have identified a strategic context wherein armed forces face a “more contested and volatile world”. Simultaneously, rapid advances in technology have changed the way armed forces operate and mean that Defence must constantly refresh its skills base by bringing in new talent and, increasingly, reskilling and repurposing its existing talent. The Integrated Operating Concept and the Haythornthwaite Review corroborated this, highlighting the importance of people in providing the “adaptive edge”. The Defence Command Paper Refresh stated that Defence would “better target our training and education … to upskill those that we recruit and … those already in our workforce”, with “skills at the heart of the way we access, plan and manage our workforce”. Attracting and retaining the necessary talent, however, is challenging, with more people leaving the forces than are joining.</p> - -<p>Although the armed forces have shrunk substantially since the Cold War and represent a relatively small draw on the overall UK population, not all people are eligible – for example on health, lifestyle (drugs) or fitness grounds – or indeed willing to join. And so, while the UK population is growing in absolute terms, this growth is largely driven by migration and by increases in groups from which the military struggles to recruit. Moreover, the armed forces’ nationality requirements mean they must compete with other employers for UK domestic talent. This is not unique to the UK; there are global shortages of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) skills, and Defence is in a “war for talent” against more flexible and adaptable commercial employers.</p> - -<p>Noting the demands of new technology and forms of warfare, the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) 2019 Defence People Strategy identified the challenges of a changing labour market and workforce expectations: in a world where more people may not commit to lengthy, linear careers, but instead choose to zig-zag in and out of professions and employers over longer working lives, Defence’s traditional people model will struggle; and while the totality of the Defence offer, including pay, must be competitive, Defence cannot win the war for talent fighting on salary alone, and nor should it try to, given wider affordability challenges. Greater flexibility in accessing talent developed and employed in other parts of the “whole force”, including industry, would help mitigate the risk. However, without the freedom to pay full commercial salaries and differentiate pay across the workforce to target the skills that are in short supply (potentially at the expense of those whose skills are less in demand), the availability of extensive learning and development opportunities is and remains crucial for ensuring the armed forces have access to the skills they need.</p> +<p>The UK, alongside many other countries, has committed to bringing the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050. These commitments rely on the transition from an energy sector reliant on fossil fuels to one dominated by net zero or green technologies, particularly renewables. This transition depends on securing reliable supplies of critical minerals.</p> -<p>Moreover, the recruiting pool is widened because Defence can recruit untrained personnel and provide them with the right skills, although retaining these skilled people is a different challenge. More broadly, the nation benefits when trained personnel leave the forces to join the wider economy, as such people have valuable technical, leadership and management skills. This also enables social mobility. As digital technologies develop, these kinds of human skills are likely to be in greater demand for honing the uniquely human contribution to human–machine teams. Like digital expertise, these skills are expected to be in short supply, and are often harder to develop.</p> +<p>The route to doing so is far from clear. To meet global decarbonisation commitments, an unprecedented scaling up of critical mineral production is required. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), by 2040 at least 30 times as much lithium, nickel and other key minerals could be required by the electric car and battery storage industries to meet global climate targets. In terms of rare earth elements (REEs), global demand is expected to expand by 300%–700% by 2040. In this context, demand for many critical minerals is set to outstrip supply, putting net zero targets at risk.</p> -<p>Learning and development is also highly attractive to young people, especially those from ethnic minority backgrounds, so an improved approach to training, including allowing more personalised learning journeys, could broaden Defence’s appeal as an employer. Meanwhile, greater flexibility and a focus on skills-based training could open up new career pathways for those already in Defence, aiding retention, but this must be accompanied by improvements to the learning environment so that it better reflects a contemporary learner’s expectations. Far from being an overhead or a luxury, therefore, learning and development is a vital tool for ensuring that the armed forces have the skills to deliver in the “more contested and volatile world” described by the Integrated Review Refresh 2023. The Haythornthwaite Review identified that more agile approaches to training were needed, drawing on digital delivery, but did not conduct “a detailed analysis of what training is needed”.</p> +<p>Increasing extraction of critical minerals is therefore key, but is also set to have wide-ranging implications and present an array of environmental and human security risks of its own. Some of these risks are already recognised, while others are on the horizon. Of crucial relevance is the fact that critical mineral extraction is currently highly concentrated in a handful of countries and regions and that some of the key mineral-rich countries are fragile and conflict-affected states, or those with weak state capacity and high levels of corruption. Effective policies which actively account for these changing dynamics and address these risks are, therefore, crucial.</p> -<h4 id="scope">Scope</h4> +<p>From the UK perspective, adequately addressing these risks is essential both to mitigating the harms caused and securing sustainable supply chains, and to safeguarding the UK’s reputation on the global stage. The UK government has branded itself as a “clean energy superpower” and, as a global trade and financial hub, is home to some of the most prominent and profitable mining companies, as well as the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), of which the majority of large-scale mining companies are members. The UK is therefore in a unique position to galvanise action on environmental and human security risks relating to critical mineral extraction and to champion a just global energy transition.</p> -<p>This paper complements the defence and security reviews by examining how individual training and education – rather than that delivered to units (collective training) – should change to deliver more effectively the skilled workforce that Defence needs. While this paper focuses on learning and development for individual members of the armed forces, many lessons also apply to the civil service, although the breadth and depth of learning and development offered differ substantially.</p> +<p>This paper examines existing and emergent environmental and human security risks associated with accelerating critical mineral extraction, and the options available to address these risks from a UK perspective. Specifically, this paper addresses three research questions:</p> -<p>This paper first describes the framework within which the armed forces conduct their training, before identifying six challenges constraining the current system’s ability to maximise the value of Defence training and education. Then, drawing on examples of good practice inside and outside Defence, the paper concludes by highlighting how Defence training might be improved for greater efficiency and/or improved effectiveness of the already significant investment UK Defence makes in its people. The paper’s findings are based on both primary and secondary research conducted over five months, involving 32 structured interviews with people managing, delivering or supporting individual training and education: these people range across UK Defence, international armed forces, academia and training providers. The paper also draws on literature dealing with good learning and development practice.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>What environmental and human security risks are associated with critical mineral extraction?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How will rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition impact these risks?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What options exist for the UK to address these risks?</p> + </li> +</ol> -<h3 id="i-defence-training-framework">I. Defence Training Framework</h3> +<p>The overarching goal is to identify the key environmental and human security risks associated with the net zero transition and provide decision-makers in the mining sector and policy community with the knowledge they need to anticipate and more effectively mitigate these risks.</p> -<p>The British armed services are consistently in the top 10 of UK apprenticeship providers, with 24,800 people undertaking their apprenticeships in 2022. In 2023, the British Army was the top UK apprenticeship provider, with the Royal Navy third and Royal Air Force seventh. Its breadth of employment is huge too, with a uniformed and civilian workforce of over 200,000, ranging from relatively low skilled manual labour through to cyber experts and nuclear scientists. The Services describe 242 different roles on their websites, and civil service roles add even more. These disparate trades, some of which are unique to Defence – such as combat roles – come with specific training burdens. Despite the evident scale of training and its associated investment, the MoD cannot provide a definitive figure of how many people are in training at any one time, or the cost. Indeed, there appears to be no consistent definition of, or systematic data on, training costs.</p> +<p>It should be noted that there is currently no standard, internationally recognised definition of a critical mineral. Critical minerals are broadly understood as minerals of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security that are also subject to serious risks relating to their security of supply. In the UK, critical minerals are defined according to “economic vulnerability and supply risk”, which are caused by “combinations of factors including but not limited to rapid demand growth, high concentration of supply chains in particular countries, or high levels of price volatility”. Which minerals are defined as critical differs by country and varies over time. The UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy, for example, currently defines a cohort of 18 minerals with high criticality for the UK, as well as outlining a “watchlist” of five minerals deemed to be increasing in criticality. This paper therefore uses the term “critical minerals” broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that there is no fixed list, that minerals considered critical differ according to countries’ specific assessments, and that minerals such as copper and aluminium that are currently not considered critical are also vital for the net zero transition.</p> -<h4 id="types-of-training">Types of Training</h4> +<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> -<p>Defence divides training into “individual” and “collective” categories. Individual training concerns the knowledge, skills, behaviour and attitudes of the individual. Beyond this, collective training aims to develop units and formations in order for them to function as cohesive entities. While the Chief of Defence People (CDP) is the owner of the process for individual training, collective training responsibility sits with the individual Services, and with Strategic Command. The bridge between the two types of training is a crucial one, where the historically linear progression of individual courses followed by progressive collective training needs to be reconsidered given the smaller workforce, faster-changing skills and ever-increasing demands on forces held at readiness.</p> +<p>The research for this paper was conducted between May and August 2023 and is based on analysis of primary and secondary data, including a rigorous review of open-source literature, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, and the organisation of a virtual validation workshop.</p> -<h4 id="individual-training--phases">Individual Training – Phases</h4> +<p>First, the authors conducted a review of the literature to assess existing knowledge of the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction. The review covered peer-reviewed academic research, policy briefs, articles and blogs by recognised experts, reports by NGOs, government documents and evaluations. Standard review search strings were used with defined inclusion criteria covering relevance and credibility, with focused searches of Google and Google Scholar conducted using combinations of selected keywords.</p> -<p>While much of the forces’ technical training happens in Joint schools, Service-specific training still abounds, especially in the early stages of an individual’s career. Even in “Joint” schools, many courses are exclusively “single Service”, reflecting that Service’s specific needs and different career structures. The MoD identifies three phases of training:</p> +<p>Following this, the authors conducted semi-structured interviews with 22 participants from industry associations, government agencies, mining companies, NGOs and other parts of the private sector, as well as investigative journalists and academics, drawing on expert knowledge from a variety of sectors to target gaps identified in the existing literature. Interviewees were based in the UK, the US, Australia, Germany, Denmark, Chile and Sri Lanka, providing international and UK-specific expertise. Interviewees were selected based on their knowledge of the topic, with a snowball sampling method used to identify additional respondents. Questions were tailored to interviewees’ roles, responsibilities and expertise, with the aim of supplementing a lack of detailed published research with first-hand knowledge and experience. All interviews have been anonymised and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed. The interview stage formed the foundation of the research, with non-academic literature used to validate and supplement findings from the interviews, where peer-reviewed research was unavailable.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Phase One training is synonymous with basic training: how the armed forces turn civilians into military personnel. It is delivered on a single Service basis, with separate schools and programmes for officers and non-commissioned personnel. For regulars, these are often lengthy residential programmes delivered at central locations, although course duration differs by Service. For reserves, the training is usually shorter and conducted regionally or at their home unit.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Phase Two provides initial specialist training, where individuals are trained for their specialisation. The content and duration of the training depends on the role. Courses are mostly bespoke to each Service, even where they are run in Joint schools. Some non-commissioned personnel complete Phase One and Phase Two training, usually with some additional workplace training, in just under a year. More demanding roles require longer courses, and often gaps between courses (for example, engineer or pilot roles can require many years before they become “productive”).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Phase Three covers all individual training and education after completing Phase Two. It includes further professional and general management training linked to promotion and career development, and broader Professional Defence and Security Education (PDSE). Further professional training is generally delivered within the single Service systems that delivered Phase Two training. Promotion-based command, leadership and management training is routinely provided by the individual’s Service (for example, non-commissioned officer and officer promotion courses). PDSE is delivered either by single Services (intermediate command and staff courses) or as Joint training (advanced and higher command and staff courses and Royal College of Defence Studies). There are also sponsored places for personnel to study, full time or part time, at civilian universities. Phase Three courses range from a few days to over a year. Most courses result from a specific requirement of a Service person’s career.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Last, findings were presented and analysed at a virtual workshop held on 15 August 2023, attended by 10 representatives of industry associations, government agencies, NGOs and the private sector, as well as investigative journalists and academics. Written feedback was provided by three additional representatives. The workshop was designed to allow discussion of key findings, as a validation exercise to strengthen the rigour of the research.</p> -<p>Separately, individuals must complete annual mandatory training to achieve central competencies such as data protection, heat illness training, the law of armed conflict and unacceptable behaviours awareness. These are mostly delivered online and can be as short as 30 minutes.</p> +<h4 id="limitations-and-scope">Limitations and Scope</h4> -<h4 id="individual-training--governance">Individual Training – Governance</h4> +<p>The research design has several limitations. The first relates to the inability, within the available timeframe, to provide a detailed analysis of the risks relating to each individual critical mineral. Second, although interviewees were selected for their extensive experience on the topic, a degree of subjectivity is inevitable. This paper recognises that an interviewee’s understanding of the risks is shaped by their specific expertise, potentially leading them to perceive certain risks as more significant than others. Wherever possible, respondents’ views were corroborated by a published source or other respondent data.</p> -<p>Almost all Defence training is governed by the “Joint Service Publication (JSP) 822: Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education”. A comprehensive document (679 pages), it describes the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT), covering the analysis, design, delivery and assurance of training (see Figure 1). Assurance consists of: internal validation (InVal) – did the training deliver the syllabus?; and external validation (ExVal) – did the training achieve what was intended?</p> +<p>The third relates to the emerging nature of many of the risks identified, meaning there is limited peer-reviewed research available. Non-academic literature was used to validate and supplement findings from the interviews, where peer-reviewed research was unavailable. Equally, given that primary research for this paper comprises a limited number of semi-structured interviews, the findings can only be viewed as preliminary, with further research needed in the immediate future.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T5RYsLf.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Elements of DSAT.</strong> Source: MoD, “Joint Service Publication 822: Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education: Volume 1”, last updated September 2022, p. 7.</em></p> +<p>Finally, this research focuses specifically on the risks relating to critical mineral extraction. The authors acknowledge that critical mineral processing and Chinese dominance in this area is an important part of the wider discussion on securing net zero supply chains, but examining this is beyond the scope of this paper.</p> -<p>DSAT involves three main actors:</p> +<h4 id="structure">Structure</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Training Requirements Authority (TRA): responsible for defining the high-level training need (content and numbers to be trained) and ExVal. Generally, these authorities sit within the Commands, although CDP is the TRA for some joint training.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Training Delivery Authority (TDA): responsible for training design, delivery (which can be outsourced) and InVal.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Training Provider: the school or unit conducting the training.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Analysis of the findings is organised into three chapters. Chapter I provides a brief overview of existing and clearly recognised environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction. Chapter II builds on this to explore how changing patterns of demand triggered by the net zero transition are set to impact these risks. Chapter III considers the options available to address these risks from a UK perspective. The conclusion draws together the findings and presents a series of recommendations.</p> -<h4 id="training-challenges">Training Challenges</h4> +<h3 id="i-existing-risks-linked-to-critical-mineral-extraction">I. Existing Risks Linked to Critical Mineral Extraction</h3> -<p>Defence gives learning and development an impressive priority and level of resourcing. Because Defence is a contingent capability, training becomes the substitute for war, as well as the preparation for it. Between operations, training is the organisation’s purpose, while also contributing to the effective management of the Defence enterprise in peacetime. Consequently, Defence invests more in learning and development than most employers. Its investment in senior leadership is exceptional, with individuals likely to have spent well over a year in fully funded formal education. However, the current training system often struggles to meet the demands placed on it in terms of the need for greater agility in a more heavily committed force whose skills need replacing more often. Six challenges are identified below, but they are not universal: examples disproving the points can be found, but on balance there are more examples proving the need for modernisation across culture, system governance, process, training delivery, learning environment and workforce.</p> +<p>The environmental and human security risks linked to critical mineral extraction are not unique in and of themselves, with many associated with wider mining activities. Yet with exponential growth in demand for minerals for the net zero transition and the expected acceleration in critical mineral mining activities, these risks stand to intensify. This chapter provides a brief overview of existing, acknowledged risks linked to critical mineral extraction, which will serve as a foundation for subsequent chapters.</p> -<p><strong>Culture</strong></p> +<h4 id="environmental-risks">Environmental Risks</h4> -<p>Defence invests heavily in training, and the different Defence training cultures share some – broadly common – constraining characteristics:</p> +<p>Critical mineral reserves are often located in remote, high-integrity, biodiversity-rich locations (see Figure 1), with their extraction posing direct risks to the environment. Many of these harms occur at the mine site itself, both through mineral extraction and the development of the required infrastructure to support it. Mining requires land use change, frequently resulting in deforestation and biodiversity loss. Around 1,600 mining operations are in key biodiversity areas and a further 2,000 in protected areas. In the context of critical minerals, 80% of cobalt and 54% of nickel are sourced from areas where biodiversity is at risk. The infrastructure required to support mining activities also presents environmental challenges. Crucially, the construction and maintenance of roads, ports, railway tracks and power lines can impact the wider landscape, often leading to further deforestation and habitat fragmentation. With the growth in demand for critical minerals, these risks could escalate in key locations.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Mechanistic.</strong> Training is largely mechanistic in nature, being part of an industrial machine that frontloads training early in a career, with later interventions taking place as people pass through career gates (such as promotions or postings). This drives an approach that generally takes little account of prior learning or the need for individual learning journeys. This kind of approach suits static environments where the skills required remain predictable over lengthy careers. However, the pace of technological change and the rapidly fluctuating demand for skills mean that frontloaded training models supporting rigid career siloes are ill-suited to today’s Defence environment. A more fluid/organic approach to talent development is needed: one that gives individuals more agency in “whole life” learning.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Talent definition.</strong> Another cultural challenge is Defence’s limited conception of “talent”, which is too often synonymous with those rising to the most senior ranks. Much of the PDSE offer is concentrated on this particular talent pool, where the value of higher courses is often seen as being in the act of being selected rather than in the learning itself, because selection confirms individuals are in the “talent pool”. A broader definition of talent covers anyone “who can make a significant contribution to organisational performance”. Democratising access to learning and development would capture more of Defence’s talent and improve productivity.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Train to pass.</strong> Linked to the way in which Defence conceives “talent” is how that conception shapes training design and delivery. Often, this produces training that is seen as a bar to be cleared or as a badge of honour for those succeeding, rather than creating programmes that seek to help people pass. The wastage rates from Royal Marines and Army Phase One training are typically 40–60% and 30% respectively, which is expensive in terms of recruitment capacity and wasteful of human talent – a problem Defence is looking to address. Wastage also impacts disproportionately on certain groups; for example, women are twice as likely to receive a musculoskeletal injury during Army basic training (Phase One) and be discharged. The redeployment to other roles of those who fail mitigates the impact of the current culture, but it might be better to orient training around a philosophy that aims to help people reach the required standard.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Accreditation.</strong> The MoD has invested in improving the recognition of Defence-provided training and education, but has done less well in recognising learning gained elsewhere. People often have the skills Defence needs, but, because these skills were acquired elsewhere, must still undertake lengthy Defence-provided courses. While this is also true of regulars, it has a greater impact on reserves, whose civilian employment may overlap with their military role. A culture of greater openness to learning and expertise gained elsewhere, including through pre-course learning assessments that allow people to skip modules they already understand, could enhance efficiency and effectiveness. This might also enhance motivation and retention since the time and effort expended in gaining skills, knowledge and expertise would be properly recognised.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/werslUT.png" alt="image01" /> +<em><strong>Figure 1: Selected Countries and Harms Associated with Mineral Mining for the Net Zero Transition.</strong> Source: Map adapted by the authors from Nat Lowrey, “A Material Transition: Exploring Supply and Demand Solutions for Renewable Energy Minerals”, War on Want, March 2021. Adapted with kind permission from War on Want.</em></p> -<p><strong>System Governance</strong></p> +<p>Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the world’s largest deposits of minerals essential to the net zero transition, including cobalt, graphite, lithium, nickel and REEs. An expanding rate of extraction of these minerals could exacerbate existing environmental problems. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, from 2010–20, the African continent witnessed the greatest annual rate of net forest loss of any region in the world. While some of this is attributed to agriculture and commercial logging, mining also played a key role; a 2022 study showed that mining was a significant direct driver of deforestation in Ghana and an indirect driver of deforestation in Gabon and Zambia. Given that Africa is home to significant reserves of manganese, platinum, cobalt and graphite, increased mining activity for critical minerals risks exacerbating deforestation in the region.</p> -<p>Inevitably, managing delivery against Defence’s diverse training needs, delivered by a diffuse set of actors, requires breaking the whole training system into manageable chunks. However, doing so means that Defence lacks a view of the whole system, there being no single place where training strategy, training and operational risk and governance align. This means that training can become stovepiped, with the outcomes of one training element not aligned to the inputs of later courses. At one level this is reflected in the separation of the collective and individual training elements, which fragments the system for delivering forces that, collectively, can “defeat the King’s enemies”. For example, training of future commanders at most Phase One officer academies and the Joint Services Command and Staff College is done at an individual level, with relatively little involvement of the groups such officers are being trained to lead. Involving these groups would have benefits, but may be impractical at scale given the bureaucratic challenges of trying to align multiple programmes (all of different length).</p> +<p>Similar risks have been highlighted in other regions. In a prominent example, Indonesia has seen rapid expansion in mining activity targeting nickel and cobalt, which are commonly extracted together. This is negatively impacting both inland tropical forests and coastal mangrove forests – causing particular damage, in view of their high carbon storage capacities. Similar concerns have been raised in relation to critical mineral extraction in the Pacific Islands and Latin America. However, it is important to put these risks into a wider perspective. With any change of land use comes a degree of habitat degradation, with mines currently occupying just 1% of Earth’s land surface, whereas agriculture accounts for 38%.</p> -<p><strong>Fragmentation.</strong> Another problem associated with separating individual and collective training is that the feedback loop between operational need and individual training can be weak. In this context, the Army has introduced the Battlecraft Syllabus to help close the gap between the output of individual training and the input standard for collective training. There are also other positive signs, with Director Land Warfare trialling new approaches that bridge individual and collective training, allowing them to be conducted in parallel, and with feedback mechanisms permitting each to shape the conduct of the other for greatest effect. In the Royal Navy, meanwhile, Project Selborne is represented at the Navy’s Senior Management Board, alongside representatives of those delivering collective training.</p> +<p>However, environmental risks linked to critical mineral and indeed all forms of mining go beyond those related to the direct footprint of a mine site itself. Risks relating to air, water and other forms of pollution are present in all stages of mine development, from pre-feasibility and feasibility to construction, operation, maintenance and closure of any mine. These risks apply in the extraction of critical minerals just as in the extraction of other major metals not currently deemed critical, such as gold, iron ore and copper. Separating the valuable fraction of mined material results in potentially hazardous waste. This includes waste rock, comprising the rocks removed to access the target mineral, and tailings, which are fine-grained waste from the crushing and processing of an ore. Such waste often contains dangerous levels of heavy metals, chemicals and radioactive components, and risks contaminating the local environment during storage or disposal. Other waste materials generated during the extraction process – for example, acidic waste water during lithium extraction (see Box 1) – also present a risk. Here, it is important to emphasise that the risk of pollution extends beyond the lifecycle of the mine, after closure. Mine abandonment, decommission and repurposing also create risks from the release of contaminants into the environment. Indirect environmental risks linked to critical mineral mining also derive from the water-intensive nature of much of this activity, which can lead to water shortages and water table depletion, threatening both species and habitats (see Box 1).</p> -<p><strong>Risk transference.</strong> Even within individual training, the lack of a “whole system” view causes problems. Training can become viewed and assessed in its own terms, and not as part of achieving something larger – that is, the ability to deliver an operational output. Consequently, questions of effectiveness and efficiency can become self-referential and drive perverse outcomes, for example where course lengths are cut to reduce costs, with the training gap then passed to the frontline, which is not resourced to close the gap effectively. The RAF’s Project Socrates has reduced the time in residential training by over 32% since 2015, with more responsibility for training passed to the frontline – for apprenticeships, this can amount to as much as 70% of the learning. Perhaps the most extreme example was the RAF Personnel Branch training course: there was no classroom-based Phase Two training, and students went straight to their units and learned on the job. Material was provided remotely by the Personnel Administration Training Wing in the Defence College of Logistics, Policing and Administration. Consequently, units that had previously received fully trained individuals faced an additional training burden, while lacking the resources to absorb that burden or the skills to conduct the on-the-job training required. Moreover, trainees’ jobs were not redesigned to allow untrained job holders to balance output and learning. The TRA recognised the risks of this approach, and a hybrid course was developed, combining four weeks of classroom training (40% of the previous classroom time) with online learning undertaken at units. In this case the vulnerabilities were noted, but this pattern of reducing the time spent in training schools is a recurring feature of Defence’s “modernisation” attempts that often merely move the risk elsewhere.</p> +<p>Finally, the power used in extracting critical minerals itself contributes to global carbon emissions, although carbon emitted at the extraction stage of the supply chain is likely to be significantly lower than that emitted during the processing stages. Innovation is taking place in this area, with a fully electric mine in operation in Canada and mining companies investing in renewable power to support remote sites.</p> -<p><strong>New requirements.</strong> The reverse problem also exists, with higher demand for new generic education subjects to be added to programmes to raise awareness of particular areas, most notably in Phase One training and PDSE. Interviewees for this paper highlighted constant pressure to add more training modules to courses – for example, mandatory equality, diversity and inclusion, cyber, data protection and space awareness training. While each module may be relatively short, adding a one-hour annual mandatory training package represents the equivalent of 114 people’s output each year, and the new Space Foundation Course for new Service personnel is eight hours long. Regardless of the individual merit of any mandatory training – and all have a Defence “sponsor” to champion the topic – elements are often added to already busy syllabuses without other material being cut to make room. In the absence of a single owner of the whole system, and given the limited (at best) understanding of direct and lost-opportunity costs, the growth of mandatory training has been relatively unchecked at system level; although Defence has now instituted a 1* board to review mandatory training.</p> +<p>Understanding these existing environmental risks is vital as critical mineral extraction accelerates to meet global decarbonisation commitments. As explored in Chapter II, the dynamics and context surrounding such extraction activity are likely to change as fluctuating demand for specific minerals reshapes and intensifies many of the risks we face today.</p> -<p>One weakness in the current training system, therefore, relates to developing people and organisations with the ability to see the complete system (of which training forms a part) and to see how the Training Line of Development impacts on, and is impacted by, other Defence Lines of Development (DLODs). For example, catering contracts specify mealtimes that prevent out-of-hours lessons at Phase One training establishments. A system view might mitigate some of the challenges to training modernisation where it only focuses on a narrow aspect of the system and not the whole. As one interviewee put it, Defence is “trying to transform using a system and people designed to manage evolutionary development [and] from which much of the capacity has been cut”.</p> +<h4 id="human-rights-abuses">Human Rights Abuses</h4> -<p><strong>Process</strong></p> +<p>Human security risks associated with the extractive industry are also well established. In the context of critical minerals, these risks are clearly seen in cases such as artisanal cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – a country holding 75% of the world’s currently identified cobalt reserves, 15–20% of which is estimated to be mined artisanally. Here, artisanal cobalt miners face the threat of being beaten, tortured or killed by state and private security services. Poor working conditions present further risks, where artisanal miners work with no or insufficient personal protective equipment, ventilation or healthcare. Child labour is also a concern. Estimates of the number of children working in the DRC’s cobalt sector range from 4,500 to 40,000, some of whom are as young as six. Such child labour ranges from children helping their parents at weekends to those working as indentured servants. Despite attempts to formalise artisanal mining in the DRC, a range of studies highlight the limitations of bureaucratic formalisation in countries such as the DRC, where miners may lack the “resources and skills to participate effectively” in these processes.</p> -<p>The DSAT framework, and the way in which Defence enters into contracts with training partners, present two challenges:</p> +<p>Beyond the DRC, child labour is reported in numerous other critical mineral extraction operations (see Figure 1), including tantalum supply chains in Mozambique, Burundi and Rwanda. Nickel mining in Guatemala has been linked to cases of murder, sexual violence and forced displacement, while mining for REEs in Myanmar has also been associated with wide-ranging human rights abuses. Abuses are commonly targeted at artisanal miners, labourers and local communities, provoking local-level conflict and community resistance, with resistance at times interrupting critical mineral mining operations’ ability to operate effectively.</p> -<p><em>DSAT</em></p> +<p>Further cases of weak enforcement of labour rights in relation to critical mineral mining can be seen in artisanal mining of cobalt and tin, as well as in the mining and processing of nickel. Such risks may be exacerbated as mining moves to previously untapped regions rich in critical minerals, particularly those with a track record of human and labour rights abuses. Saudi Arabia, for example, has untapped critical mineral reserves worth about $1.3 trillion, but a very poor track record in relation to human and labour rights. In January 2023, the UK announced its intention to deepen collaboration on critical minerals with Saudi Arabia, as part of its “plan to build partnerships around these vital resources across the world”. Human rights standards must be a key consideration in any future collaboration, and such partnerships are an opportunity for the UK to engage bilaterally and use its diplomatic and financial position to ensure human rights standards are upheld in critical mineral supply chains.</p> -<p>DSAT (and other valid training models) have the same basic elements: analysing the need; determining how to train; delivering the training; and operating feedback mechanisms. DSAT’s problem is that in practice it is neither well understood nor properly implemented, and consequently it is slow and overly bureaucratic. This is primarily a resourcing issue: when the Services are short of personnel, training schools are not the top priority when assigning staff, and consequently there are not enough people managing the DSAT process. Moreover, DSAT is complicated. Although JSP 822 has been made more accessible, its 679 pages (of which 235 relate to individual training) are impenetrable to all but those with time to read it carefully. Indeed, there are companies specialising in providing consultancy services for DSAT, including training needs analysis and course design, to supplement the expertise inside the Defence establishment. Finally, the turnover of military personnel makes it difficult to build expertise that might enable shortcuts to be employed or judgements made about the risks and benefits of deviating from the process while abiding by the policy’s spirit (even if straying from its formal stipulations).</p> +<p>As in the case of environmental risks, concerns relating to human rights and labour abuses in the critical minerals sector are not necessarily fundamentally different from those linked to the wider mining sector. However, contextual vulnerabilities – particularly in light of the high demand driving increased mining for critical minerals in areas with weak governance and/or no history of mineral extraction – could raise the risk of human rights abuses and exploitation, as discussed further in Chapter II.</p> -<p>DSAT is cyclical, but cycling through it is often slow. In many cases, ExVal occurs every five years, which, given the speed at which battlefield realities are changing – as shown by the Ukraine conflict, for example – is too infrequent. For an organisation that aspires to be agile and adaptive, this represents a significant weakness. Such evaluation need not take so long: during the Iraq operation (from 2003), the review process concerning counter-improvised explosive devices was achieved within days. While this kind of rapid learning is not necessary for all skills, the ability to incorporate new knowledge – even that acquired by other institutions – more quickly into the training system will be vital if the armed forces are to compete in a world in which technology (and warfare) advances rapidly.</p> +<h4 id="corruption-crime-and-conflict">Corruption, Crime and Conflict</h4> -<p>The separation of requirement-definition (under the TRA) and delivery (under the TDA) ensures that training delivery is assessed against the organisation’s needs, allowing deliverers to focus on how learning is best enabled. This generally works well when delivery sits within the same Service as the requirement-setter and end user. It is, however, less effective where end users have weaker organisational relationships with the TDA (such as different chains of command) or for generic Defence requirements separate from an individual’s core task. In these circumstances, there can be a disconnect: users and/or TRAs can demand things the TDA cannot deliver, or TDAs can prioritise what they are able to teach – or can afford to teach – rather than what is actually needed. For example, the advanced command and staff course (ACSC) prioritises “staff skills” more than “command”. Whether ACSC would be better placed educating joint command rather than teaching more process-oriented planning skills is worthy of consideration. Meanwhile, in Army HQ, the absence of a TRA function has seen the Land Warfare Centre, a TDA, drive training requirements from the bottom up.</p> +<p>Corruption in the extractive sector is widespread. In 2016, the OECD claimed that one in five cases of transnational bribery were linked to the extractive sector. High-profile cases involving mining and commodities giants such as Glencore illustrate the extent of the issue; in November 2022, for example, Glencore was ordered to pay £281 million in penalties after a Serious Fraud Office investigation revealed it had paid $29 million in bribes for preferential access to oil in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and South Sudan. Meanwhile, in Nigeria alone, an estimated $400 billion in oil revenues has been lost to corruption since 1960.</p> -<p>Management of the training pipeline is often overly bureaucratic. The statements of training requirement (SOTR) and training task (SOTT) are important tools connecting inflow (recruitment) to training and managing the capacity in the training system. As with other parts of DSAT, the concept is good, but often unresponsive in practice. Interviewees reported that it took two to three years to change the SOTR/SOTT through formal routes, a process often mediated by strategic workforce planning models (which in many cases reflected the previous year’s task, with some allowance for under-delivery, either because people were not recruited or they did not complete their training). The consequence of this is that the pipeline slows down and people have to wait longer than is strictly necessary before they are trained.</p> +<p>Similar trends are emerging in relation to critical minerals. In June 2022, court auditors in the DRC pointed to over $400 million in missing tax advances and loans that state mining company Gecamines said it had paid to the national treasury. Gecamines holds minority stakes in several of the world’s largest copper and cobalt projects, both of which are key minerals for the net zero transition.</p> -<p>While DSAT can work well, it is better suited to more static environments where requirements are recognisable because the technology and its use are familiar. In dynamic and transformative environments – where the principle of linear progression does not apply – it is difficult to identify a training need. Emerging technology in particular poses problems, because TRAs may struggle to define requirements in a fast-moving landscape. To mitigate this challenge, training objectives can be defined very broadly to give TDAs the freedom to iterate their training, but commercial staff might struggle to agree to contracts if Defence cannot formally articulate needs that it does not yet fully understand.</p> +<p>In this context, a range of NGOs have raised the alarm over vulnerabilities to corruption in relation to critical mineral extraction specifically, and the potential for this to derail the energy transition. Key concerns here relate to the location of most current critical mineral reserves in a small number of developing and middle-income states, many characterised by weak governance, high levels of corruption and legacies of fragility and conflict. Here, recent research has flagged the risk of clean energy minerals being used for trade-based money laundering, and the risk that close links between politically exposed persons and commodity trading more broadly could implicate supply chains themselves in conflict finance. Meanwhile, artisanal and small-scale miners are flagged as potentially suffering high levels of exposure, particularly in cross-border mining hotspots. As noted in a 2022 report by Maha Rafi Atal, Stephanie Trapnell and Dieter Zinnbauer, “given the race for newer and more efficient clean energy technologies, there is an ongoing risk that weakly regulated mining is exploited for illicit profit, which may involve not only corruption, but also human trafficking and human rights abuses”.</p> -<p><em>Contracting</em></p> +<p>Efforts to tackle corruption must be central to discussions on supply chains, as critical mineral extraction presents a key revenue-generating opportunity for many states, with critical minerals comprising between 4% and 7% of mining revenue. As Liesbet Gregoir and Karel van Acker remind us, corruption, tax avoidance and government effectiveness “influence the potential of benefits returning to local communities”, which can in itself impact community support for mining projects, undermining supply chain security. Given the need to trade with these mineral-rich countries to achieve net zero, tackling corruption in critical mineral supply chains is crucial.</p> -<p>Contracting with commercial training providers helps to ensure Defence has the requisite andragogical (adult learning) skills in the workforce and can inject fresh ideas into training. However, the contracting process is slow, and contracting for services suffers from many of the same challenges as contracting for equipment. For example, SimCentric has developed a computer-based simulation for weapons handling that reduces lessons from 16 hours to 45 minutes, and which has improved pass rates from 68% to 98%. However, its introduction has been constrained by contractual processes and the absence of a holistic training strategy that guides the balance between live and synthetic, or in-person and online, learning. Even multi-year contracts are often tightly specified, and focused on inputs rather than outputs or outcomes, which limits scope for flexibility/adaptability, although there are notable exceptions in the Royal Navy and Army.</p> +<p>Wider links to criminality and conflict traverse extractive industries and are well documented in relation to gold and diamond mining, but they also play out in the context of critical minerals. Organised criminal activity around the supply and trafficking of REEs has been reported in China, with authorities seizing multi-tonne consignments of REEs worth millions of dollars that were being illegally smuggled out of the country. In 2022, an AP investigation flagged the role of military-linked militias in human rights abuses linked to REE mining in Myanmar, with militias enforcing control in key areas and demanding a cut of the profits generated. Critical mineral-linked criminality is also prevalent in other regions; in 2022, a Chinese national was jailed in Nigeria after attempting to smuggle 25 tonnes of lithium-containing lepidolite out of the country. Lithium deposits in Mexico have similarly been reported to be at risk of criminal exploitation. Intersecting with critical human rights risks, this activity often leaves local communities at the mercy of profit-chasing criminal groups, enhancing their vulnerability to violence, displacement, extortion and labour exploitation.</p> -<p>This context makes it difficult to form the kinds of partnerships that would bring most value by harnessing the complementary talents of the MoD (context and subject expertise) and contractors (learning styles and technology). Holding contractors to account for the number of classroom hours, for example, actively disincentivises forms of training that could shorten courses or which involve different means of delivery that could be more effective. Hence, contractors are effectively disincentivised from adopting innovative ways of delivering training that would reduce contact time. Moreover, by over-specifying requirements such as practical training areas and equipment, Defence either makes little use of expensive infrastructure/equipment (for example, 19% classroom utilisation at Lichfield), or has to update training equipment regularly (which can be difficult, because it often has a lower priority than operational equipment). Further education colleges, typically less generously resourced, make more efficient use of their facilities by focusing on generic training aimed at general principles and how to apply them to different situations, rather than Defence’s more workplace-specific learning approach.</p> +<p>These points relate closely to risks around conflict financing. Just as gold, diamonds and gemstones are known to have been used to fund armed groups in key source countries globally, critical minerals are similarly associated with such activity. In Africa’s Great Lakes region, prominently, 3T mining (tin, tungsten and tantalum) has been linked to the operations of non-state armed groups and conflict financing, prompting the passage of associated conflict minerals legislation, including the EU’s 2021 Conflict Minerals Regulation. Here, interviewees expressed concern that the critical minerals boom could trigger new forms of localised conflict, especially in the case of extraction via artisanal and small-scale mining.</p> -<p>The over-specification of requirements also tends to drive transactional rather than relational approaches to the task. Multi-year contracts are likely to be more effective when managed by partners rather than where one side holds the other to account for pre-specified deliverables. Evidence of the negative effect of more transactional positions can be seen in the difficulties unit commanders have in sharing information with their contractors, even where they are keen to do so.</p> +<p>On this point, it is important to note that critical minerals are generally less transportable than gold or diamonds and must be moved at much higher volumes to generate profits, limiting the appeal for many localised armed groups and criminal actors. Despite this, interviewees expressed concern about the risk of local-level conflict and criminal extortion. Meanwhile, the potential for critical minerals to support improved infrastructure and supplement existing revenues in supply countries is unlikely to mitigate in full the potential emergence of a new “resource curse”, unless more is done to address the human and environmental security risks highlighted in this paper, the impacts of which are felt most keenly at a local level. Indeed, localised tensions are known to be exacerbated by encroachment on community territory, human rights violations and environmental degradation associated with critical mineral mining, as seen in relation to lithium mining in Chile and nickel mining in Indonesia.</p> -<p><strong>Delivery</strong></p> +<p>These corruption, crime and conflict risks are likely to be exacerbated in the context of burgeoning demand for critical minerals and in the global rush to secure supply chains. With mineral-rich countries and mining companies looking to capitalise, this could serve to both deepen the impact of existing human and environmental security risks and jeopardise the transition to net zero as community resistance, local-level conflict and criminality impact the ability of mining companies to operate, undermining reliable supplies. Opportunities to mitigate these risks are discussed further in Chapter III.</p> -<p>Much Defence training is delivered in person, as part of lengthy programmes that remove people from the frontline. The trigger for training is often less to do with an individual’s needs and more because a career gate has been reached – a promotion or a posting. While these are reasonable grounds to suggest training interventions are warranted, Defence’s industrial approach, where trainees are processed largely without regard to their existing skills or knowledge, lacks flexibility. It prioritises neatness of planning – common start and end dates, simpler instructor scheduling and so on – over training needs. It is also increasingly out of step with shifts in strategic workforce planning, talent management, and learning and development towards skills-based approaches that link training to skills rather than roles/jobs. The skills-based approach allows personalised training that accommodates individual’s pre-existing skills and avoids unnecessary training. The emerging Defence Talent and Army Skills Frameworks could provide the basis for the transition to a skills-based model.</p> +<h4 id="indigenous-rights">Indigenous Rights</h4> -<p>The didactic nature of much Defence training was repeatedly highlighted in the interviews conducted for this paper: that is, instructors leading students through the learning. This approach also means lessons often focus on facts and concepts rather than on the higher-level objectives described in Bloom’s revised taxonomy, reducing the return on training in comparison to those that provide a more active and social learning experience. Pockets of good practice do exist, such as the “flipped classroom” approach at the Royal School of Military Engineering (RSME) at Minley, but elsewhere lessons often transfer knowledge from instructors to students who are largely passive recipients. This is often a function of lesson design, instructor experience and classroom layout that reflects historical teaching environments, albeit with electronic rather than chalk boards. “Reflective learning” is often driven out by the desire to be more “efficient”, either forcing students to extend their learning days in order to reflect and make sense of what they have been taught, or restricting the learning to facts that can be taught easily but which are not fully contextualised or understood.</p> +<p>As indicated above, the brunt of many environmental and human security risks related to critical mineral extraction is borne by local communities. Indigenous communities are known to be particularly impacted: a recent study found that 54% of critical mineral mining projects are located on or near Indigenous land. In many cases, this puts Indigenous communities on the frontline of the effects of critical mineral extraction. While consultation is required, the standard of consent is not yet industry standard, with the ICMM specifying that members should “work towards obtaining consent of Indigenous Peoples” rather than requiring that they obtain it. Where resistance occurs, Indigenous Peoples have been subject to abuses including forced displacement, sexual violence, torture and murder. Mining has also been linked to the murder of land and environmental rights defenders in countries such as the Philippines, Mexico, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador.</p> -<p>In a move accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic, Defence is making more use of remote learning. However, interviewees expressed concern that Defence was facing “remote learning fatigue”, which could make the otherwise admirable investment in learning and development demotivating. This may not be true for the reserves, where more online learning and shorter residential training might be better suited to the time that Reservists can commit. But Reserve units lack the connectivity and expertise to deliver Reserve training, and moving too much training online at the expense of in-person delivery also risks creating a sense of isolation that weakens the Reservist’s attachment to their unit. A balanced, system-level view is needed.</p> +<p>Even when not directly subject to abuse, Indigenous Peoples face indirect harms. Deforestation for nickel mining in Indonesia risks destroying the way of life of the nomadic O Hongana Manyawa tribe; water depletion from lithium mining in Chile continues to impact Indigenous ways of life; and nickel mining in Guatemala has destroyed natural resources vital to the livelihoods of many Indigenous Peoples. These are just a few examples of how critical mineral extraction is impacting Indigenous communities. With an absence of standards to ensure that Indigenous communities both consent to and benefit from mining activities, both Indigenous rights and land could be sacrificed in the name of the net zero transition. This outcome can be avoided if the risks identified here are properly addressed. Some possible ways forward are outlined in Chapter III.</p> -<p><strong>Learning Environment</strong></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-1-the-lithium-triangle-water-scarcity-and-biodiversity-loss"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1: The Lithium Triangle, Water Scarcity and Biodiversity Loss</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>An effective learning environment requires appropriate furniture, lighting, temperature, air quality, ventilation, ICT infrastructure, connectivity and adaptable classrooms, as well as support facilities such as accommodation and catering. A critical purpose behind the Defence Training Review was to enable investment in infrastructure by reducing the size of the Defence training estate, but the quality of the learning environments in Defence varies greatly. New environments purpose-built for the Defence Academy and at Worthy Down contrast with older sites where classrooms and facilities are poor, and students cannot get a hot shower. While progress has been made, with 1,600 hectares (2%) of the built estate disposed of between 2015 and 2021 to fund improvements elsewhere, the training estate still struggles to provide the appropriate infrastructure (such as flexible classrooms and WiFi in accommodation areas) that is essential for maximising the benefits of new technology.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Lithium is a key component in lithium-ion batteries and is widely used in the batteries that power electric vehicles, smart devices, renewable power plants and other key technologies. With net zero targets fuelling skyrocketing demand for lithium, this demand is being met by a surge in extraction in countries such as Chile – the world’s second-largest lithium producer.</code></em></p> -<p>Conversely, parts of the estate are so lean that the training system lacks surge capacity. Even for training regular personnel, it is taut; training just 70 Ukrainian engineers in the UK required stopping some Phase Three training. If the UK were required to surge train reserves to enable the regular Army to deploy, capacity would be lacking. In addition, reserves struggle to access courses, training areas and ranges, while contracts for support facilities on bases often mean that there is a reduced service at weekends when reservists are able to train.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The “Lithium Triangle” on the borders of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia, for example, is a region rich in lithium deposits. Within this, roughly a quarter of deposits lie beneath the Salar de Atacama salt flats in northern Chile. Often known as the Atacama Desert, this is one of the driest places on earth, with average annual precipitation of 1 mm. Access to water is limited, with available sources vital for local communities and their livelihoods, as well as local flora and fauna. Yet the mining of lithium in this region is increasingly serving to consume, contaminate and divert the scarce water resources available.</code></em></p> -<p><strong>Workforce</strong></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Estimates suggest up to two million litres of saline groundwater (commonly known as brine) are needed to produce one tonne of lithium, with brine extraction the dominant method used – in which brine is extracted, concentrated in large evaporation pools and treated with sodium carbonate. Brine typically has a salt content higher than seawater and is therefore regulated separately from water. Brine is neither potable nor suitable for agricultural use. Beatriz Bustos-Gallardo, Gavin Bridge and Manuel Prieto note that “this distinction allows firms to frame brine pumping as an action independent from freshwater extraction, and claim it has no effect on the hydrogeological or ecological balance of the basin”. Yet research indicates that increased groundwater extraction for the lithium industry has contributed to water deficit in the Salar de Atacama, with the amount of water pumped out of the region increasing by 21% between 2000 and 2015.</code></em></p> -<p>While military instructors are experts in their subject, they often lack the andragogical skills to most effectively communicate their expertise. Instructors are typically selected for their technical competence and subsequently trained as instructors under the Defence Trainer Competency Framework. This Level 3 programme runs over the first 12 months of the instructor’s appointment. So while Defence instructors are up to date in their subject matter expertise – a challenge for many civilian colleges – they have a low level of proficiency in supporting learning. In comparison, further education teachers require undergraduate or postgraduate teaching qualifications (Level 6 or 7), or a Level 5 teaching apprenticeship.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Concerns over the lithium industry’s contribution to water scarcity in the region have exacerbated tensions across local communities already facing the fallout from scarce rainfall and high rates of evaporation due to climate change. Meanwhile, key water sources that remain available for humans, livestock and crop irrigation have been contaminated by waste products of lithium extraction operations. In this context, many communities now rely on tankers delivering water. And while this situation has been triggered by expanding electric vehicle production at a global level, electric vehicles remain a rarity in Chile itself, highlighting the unequal distribution of harms and benefits in relation to critical minerals.</code></em></p> -<p>It is not just instructors who lack deep knowledge and skills. TRAs and training support staff such as course designers and those developing training materials receive little training. Analysing and determining how best to close training gaps, and knowing what learning technology is available and how it can be best employed are not easy, but these skills are often assumed to be acquired through osmosis or with limited formal interventions (for example, the Defence Online Learning Course, for those responsible for developing online learning, lasts two days). Moreover, the lack of training for those people managing training means that they are often unfamiliar with the DSAT process and can default to slavish adherence to the letter of the process rather than deviating from the formal rules to achieve its intended purpose where necessary.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Beyond these human impacts, lithium extraction is contributing to damage to the Atacama Desert’s unique biodiversity. The Laguna Santa Rosa Wetland, for example, is shrinking as a result of water scarcity, threatening the area’s 53 endemic species, 17 of which are classified as endangered. Other vulnerable species are also disappearing from the Atacama region, which is experiencing a significant reduction in plant cover, specifically algarrobo trees. Meanwhile, evaporation pools used in the extraction process are highly damaging to many bird species – flamingos in particular are misled by the large bodies of contaminated water.</code></em></p> -<h3 id="ii-modernisation-opportunities">II. Modernisation Opportunities</h3> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To meet global demand for lithium, the companies already operating in the Atacama salt flats have increased their activities, while companies not yet present are also showing interest in the region’s reserves. Chile is, however, in the process of reassessing its relationship with the environment. A new constitution that could have significantly affected the country’s extractive industries was rejected in a referendum in 2022. However, efforts to rewrite the constitution continue, with hopes among some that a new constitution will be accepted this year, which could have consequences for how extractive industries are able to operate in the country.</code></em></p> -<p>The process of modernising Defence training is continuous, and we must start by acknowledging where training is done well. Good practice exists, which can and should be shared. While Defence’s formal training structures help ensure learning and development happen systematically – in ways that many commercial employers are unable to replicate – the structure also brings constraints, leading to somewhat rigid, industrial approaches. A teacher from the Victorian age would find much that was familiar in Defence training – much more than they would find in more dynamic contemporary higher education settings. Defence training needs to become more digitally relevant, but this does not mean merely replacing classrooms with online learning – both modes of learning have their place, but effective distributed learning needs to be resourced and enabled, including changing the organisational culture to enable individuals to undertake self-education. This paper identifies four areas for modernisation: people; delivery; building knowledge of the system; and partnering.</p> +<p><em>Main source: Ingrid Garces and Gabriel Alvarez, “Water Mining and Extractivism of the Salar de Atacama, Chile”, WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment (Vol. 245, 2020), pp. 189–99.</em></p> -<h4 id="people">People</h4> +<h3 id="ii-elevated-demand-and-rising-risks">II. Elevated Demand and Rising Risks</h3> -<p>Arguably the single biggest contribution to modernising Defence training could be achieved by upskilling those engaged in the management, oversight, support and delivery of training materials. Good practice exists in the Royal Navy and at RSME Chatham (where contractors have invested in upskilling Defence’s instructional staff to Level 4 qualifications, beyond the level provided by Defence), and the Defence Academy has supported its staff in gaining higher qualifications. Naval educators are also given membership of the Society of Education and Training, and significant effort is put into online support and coaching to enable their development. But the people involved in designing training programmes, as well as those doing training needs analysis, deciding on training methods and designing materials, would all benefit from having their skills supplemented, and from continuing professional development. Selection for training duties should take account of the soft skills needed for effective andragogy, not merely technical expertise or command authority.</p> +<p>As highlighted in Chapter I, some of the key human and environmental security risks relating to critical mineral extraction align closely with those associated with the extractives sector at large. However, the forecasted boom in demand presents particular risks – many of which are under-acknowledged and understudied, and which will require specific mitigations. Indeed, as countries accelerate efforts to reach net zero, a massive uplift in critical mineral mining will be required to meet skyrocketing demand. Critical mineral demand for the production of electric vehicles, for example, is expected to increase almost 300 times between 2020 and 2050, to meet the IEA net zero scenario.</p> -<p>The constant churn in the Defence training workforce, with individuals changing every two to three years, is also problematic. Longer tours that build greater andragogic expertise, or the creation of a cadre undertaking repeated tours in learning and development (with instruction as a career anchor) could help mitigate other risks in the system and allow the investment made in upskilling to be used for longer periods. But this should be done without compromising the up-to-date operational knowledge that Defence instructors provide their students.</p> +<p>In recognition of this, key consumer countries have been working to refine their strategic approach to securing critical mineral supply chains. These efforts can be seen in the US Critical Materials Strategy, the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, among others. However, few of these strategies adequately account for the particular environmental and human security risks likely to be presented as critical mineral extraction is scaled up. Nor has there been extensive research focused on the emergent risks across source countries in the face of unprecedented global demand. This chapter draws on both the limited existing literature and data from semi-structured interviews to harness current cross-sectoral knowledge on what can be anticipated in this regard.</p> -<p>Defence also needs to ensure that there are enough staff to operate the training system, which may mean raising the priority of many of the posts. Some efficiencies could be found by reducing duplication of effort, for example using centres of excellence for common material that is produced once and used many times. The Defence Academy’s Education and Research Department, which produces common content modules for many courses, could potentially improve productivity in this regard, but needs to be allowed to prioritise its main programme.</p> +<h4 id="fast-tracking-and-corner-cutting">Fast-Tracking and Corner-Cutting</h4> -<p>Increased use of online learning could expand capacity in the training system while utilising fewer dedicated training staff, but this would place new burdens on course designers and the frontline. Line managers and others involved in facilitating unit learning would need preparation for their new responsibilities, and jobs would need to be redesigned to reflect that jobholders are not fully trained and need time and space to learn in the role.</p> +<p>Interviewees flagged that corner-cutting in the process of authorising mine permits is a key issue. This issue is especially acute given unprecedented demand – and the resulting competition likely to be created between countries seeking rapidly to secure supplies. Where such corner-cutting takes place, this will likely see an erosion of processes designed to limit the damage done by mining, including community engagement, the securing of prior informed consent that is given freely, and the undertaking of comprehensive social and environmental impact assessments.</p> -<p>Taking a whole force view and combining operationally current and upskilled Defence instructors with commercial partners possessing deep training expertise enhances the value of both groups. The contractors for the Royal Navy (Selborne) and the Army (Holdfast) have a greater responsibility for training management than elsewhere, providing training supervisors and managers, and design and governance functions, that supplement the military instructor’s recent frontline experience. They also act as intelligent customers promoting good practice from outside Defence. Working in partnership also helps protect capacity in the training system, preventing key posts being left unfilled when shortages of Defence personnel necessitate deploying military personnel to higher priority tasks. However, the partners need to be able to share information, be free to adapt training quickly by cycling through the DSAT process faster when necessary, and be able to adopt modern learning practices – all of which require trust between the parties.</p> +<p>Currently, it takes between 10 and 20 years, depending on the context, to undertake the relevant assessments and obtain approvals required for a new mine. However, given the need for the energy transition to occur at speed, there is incentive for governments and companies to accelerate the process, which may motivate corner-cutting. The incentives to cut corners are likely to be higher in countries with high levels of corruption and low levels of government capacity, where the mine development process will be subject to lower levels of regulatory oversight. At a local level, corner-cutting is highly likely to exacerbate the human and environmental security risks outlined above, with local communities forced to absorb potential negative impacts resulting from time pressures on the energy transition.</p> -<h4 id="delivery">Delivery</h4> +<p>In some contexts, these pressures – combined with burgeoning critical mineral demand – may also motivate governments to remove some of the “red tape” that provides important protections for the environment, communities and workers, to increase production and attract investment. Such fast-tracking is already taking place, with incentives provided and regulatory requirements relaxed in countries such as the US, Australia, Brazil, Peru, the Philippines and South Africa.</p> -<p>Learning is a fundamentally social activity, so classroom-based training will remain crucial, even as Defence becomes more digitally oriented. Given increased skills, training designers and instructors will be able to make lessons more active and less didactic, and thus engage students in higher levels of learning such as analysis, evaluation or creation. Investing in instructor development can move classroom learning up the pyramid of Bloom’s taxonomy, supporting collective reflection and social learning. Combined with online learning, these approaches could enhance learning outcomes as well as shorten residential programmes (where appropriate), democratise access and support reserves.</p> +<p>In the US, for example, the Thacker Pass lithium mine in Nevada is one of a number of critical mineral mines fast-tracked through approval processes in light of the “strategic” value of the support provided both to economic recovery and the expanding lithium-ion battery market. Its development has occurred despite the objections of Native American tribes, who claimed that they had not been properly consulted during the approval process, and who went on to launch legal action to challenge the mine’s approval.</p> -<p>A revised culture of learning that recognised that individuals might follow different paths based on their prior learning/experience (such as RSME’s fixed mastery/variable time approach), underpinned by better accreditation of non-Defence training, would enable faster – and more personalised – progression through training. A routine part of course design should be to identify shortcuts through the syllabus, allowing people demonstrating existing competence to avoid lessons that have no learning value for them. This move towards a more organic process requires acceptance that students would have different learning journeys. It might also allow training and trainees to contribute to the frontline more directly, with training outputs focused on benefiting users – for example, by conducting engineering training at units whose equipment needs repairing, rather than instructors “breaking” equipment for students to fix before it is broken again for the next class. It could also open the way for fortuitous course combination, where compatible programmes coincide and can allow collaborative learning; for example, the Fire and Rescue College, wherever possible, combines the Incident Command Course with firefighter development courses. Currently, however, this approach might be challenging for Defence’s preference for training standardisation.</p> +<p>In Indonesia, the government’s efforts to increase foreign investment – including in nickel mining and processing – have had stark consequences. Specifically, in 2022, after more than two years of constitutional and legal challenges, the government of Joko Widodo passed the controversial Omnibus Law, revising over 70 existing laws, with the aim of removing red tape, improving the investment climate and creating jobs. The law has been extensively criticised for weakening protection for workers and the environment; of specific interest for this paper is the law’s requirement that only investments considered high risk must conduct an environmental impact study, replacing wider requirements under previous legislation.</p> -<p>Accepting that individuals may have different learning paths requires both a cultural shift by Defence and a solid foundation in the basics for the students. Experience at the BT telecoms group shows that training on every variant of a given technology can be rendered unnecessary if students have a strong foundation in the core principles and are then given access to technology that can provide specific online instruction, through access to videos showing how a particular task can be completed. A greater focus on universal principles and a reduced emphasis on the particular could also make the training estate more efficient by allowing the flexible use of space that was previously dedicated exclusively to one particular purpose. This could also address the endemic issue whereby training struggles to keep pace with frontline capabilities (a situation that is likely to get worse as Defence embraces the idea of “spiral development” on the frontline).</p> +<p>The move is likely to exacerbate existing environmental and human security issues relating to critical minerals. While Indonesian nickel production doubled between 2020 and 2022 and has continued to rise since, numerous cases have been reported of workers losing their lives and suffering serious health conditions, with thousands of hectares of rainforest destroyed and water and land polluted, at great cost to local communities and Indigenous populations. The Indonesian case highlights some of the risks associated with the critical mineral boom, with such dynamics likely to play out in many more cases as demand continues to increase. Ultimately, there is a risk of fast-tracking mines, cutting regulatory corners and removing red tape occurring at the cost of workers, local communities and the environment.</p> -<p>Two elements that could contribute to enabling a shift towards more effective training delivery are technology and individual learning.</p> +<h4 id="exploring-new-mineral-rich-regions">Exploring New Mineral-Rich Regions</h4> -<p><strong>Technology</strong></p> +<p>Many of these concerns surrounding fast-tracking and corner-cutting are likely to be exacerbated in regions with unexplored critical mineral reserves, particularly in locations with no history of mineral mining. Such areas without previous experience of mining activity are likely to have lower levels of infrastructure, human population and activity in general, and are likely to have higher ecological integrity. Once a given mineral becomes more valuable, a higher incentive to build key infrastructure to extract that mineral is likely to have a significant impact on previously intact ecosystems.</p> -<p>Coupled with the use of learning technologies, such as AI-enabled online learning and virtual reality (VR), more blended approaches better suited to personalised learning journeys could be enabled. AI-enabled content could respond to student inputs, guiding them through online courses, while VR could support forces sent to the frontline without a training stock, or allow those on the frontline to learn before equipment arrives on which they have not been trained. These technologies require investment in the enabling infrastructure to create an open architecture to support technology-agnostic learning systems that allow students to use their own devices for accessing unclassified materials.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, in these locations, the minimal presence of industry to date is likely to be matched with underdeveloped governance and regulatory frameworks for mining activity. In the absence of mandatory social and environmental impact assessments, requirements to undertake community engagement or seek a social licence to operate, the likelihood of environmental and human security risks occurring rises. Increasing global demand for critical minerals intensifies these concerns, incentivising fast-paced mineral exploration and the identification of new reserves in countries without histories of large-scale mining or in areas beyond national jurisdiction (see Box 2).</p> -<p><strong>Individual Learning</strong></p> +<p>In 2012, for example, discoveries of mineral deposits in Malawi – a country with minimal prior history of mining – made it Africa’s largest source of REEs at that time. Those discoveries then mandated a rapid updating of the country’s Mining Act, a need to establish wider legal and institutional frameworks and, in the words of the then Minister of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment Cassim Chilumpha, a “crash program to train mining engineers, legal experts in mining and other related fields in the sector”. With many of the mines recently becoming operational, the contribution of mining to Malawi’s GDP is projected to increase from 1% to 6% by the end of 2023. Yet during the exploration phase and establishment of the mines and related infrastructure, the government has faced criticism for forcibly evicting villagers from their homes and for risking food and water security. Corruption has meant that Malawi has struggled to effectively address these issues, resulting in a situation where some local communities have denounced the mining sector and the lack of consultation, amid warnings that the country’s mining boom “will not necessarily translate into benefits for affected communities”.</p> -<p>Delivery is built on the foundation of a high quality learning environment. Such an environment should embody a greater willingness to allow self-directed learning (without automatically resulting in pressure to reduce course lengths) and widen access to content, not merely for those that trigger an entitlement (a role-based approach) but for encouraging those who wish to own their personal and professional development. Helping students to learn how to think (rather than what to think) by combining more student reflection time with classroom discussions focused on higher-value learning outcomes would add value to both Defence and the students.</p> +<p>Concerns surrounding the Malawian experience extend to other countries in Africa, with low levels of exploration meaning that the full potential of the continent’s REEs reserves remains undetermined. As in the case of Malawi, there is concern over the initiation of potential extraction activities – of REEs and other critical minerals – in countries with high levels of corruption, weak governance and limited state capacity, where environmental protections and labour rights are likely to be weak or poorly enforced. Similar concern has been raised over the Middle East’s vast, undeveloped critical mineral resources, and the poor environmental and human rights record of many countries in that region. In locations with limited infrastructure, meanwhile, interviewees flagged further risks associated with the rapid development of infrastructure in new mining regions, noting the potential to facilitate the incursion of new licit and illicit industries, triggering further potential social and environmental harms.</p> -<h4 id="building-knowledge-of-the-system">Building Knowledge of the System</h4> +<h4 id="boom-and-bust">Boom and Bust</h4> -<p>The training of individuals sits within wider force-generation and HR systems. Steps are being taken to improve connections and feedback loops between individual and collective training, but it is too early to judge the success of these initiatives. A high-level strategy that considers individual training, setting the framework for thinking about in-person and remote learning, simulation, use of AI (including generative AI) and establishing agreed definitions of technology and data would help. This might also acknowledge the limitations of the DSAT process in practice and encourage a more dynamic model – one that accepts more risk against standardised training outputs by being willing to exploit emerging opportunities that add greater value, either to the students or to the frontline. For example, using trainees to repair equipment at frontline units, or allowing courses to train together when they coincide, even if that is not the same on every occasion.</p> +<p>Beyond those risks attributed to sudden mining booms in newly identified critical mineral-rich regions, there is growing concern around the implications of boom–bust cycles arising from the net zero transition. In the face of a sustained drive to advance green technologies and reduce the demand these exert on critical mineral supplies, future technological innovations and circular economies could rapidly and unexpectedly reduce demand for certain minerals.</p> -<p>It might also encourage closer relationships between TRAs and TDAs, with either the requirement responsibilities siting within the delivery authority, or placing a small TRA team to work alongside the TDA. This would enable the delivery organisations to become centres of expertise at the leading edge of thinking about how skills are employed and forging stronger relationships with the frontline, doctrine centres and allies. TDAs, therefore, would seek out improvements and propose changes to requirements, rather than wait for often overstretched TRAs to identify new requirements. The alignment of many of these functions under Director Land Warfare in the Army could be a useful test case for this approach.</p> +<p>Beyond the inevitable disruption caused by a rapid scaling up and down of demand, interviewees emphasised the potential consequences in contexts where there is a lack of experience in properly closing mines at both the government and industry levels, with sudden, poorly managed mine closures presenting a range of environmental and human security risks. At the environmental level, storage of tailings (the waste products of mining and mineral processing) requires management long after a mine has ceased operating and, if not managed correctly, can have devastating environmental consequences. The 2015 Samarco Dam failure demonstrated the potential impact of the failure of tailings disposal dams. The incident resulted in a “tidal wave” of mining waste washing across the Brazilian landscape in what is considered Brazil’s worst environmental disaster. Although relating to iron ore – rather than critical minerals – the case illustrates the potential dangers arising should extraction activities unexpectedly wind down and tailings storage be mismanaged. Meanwhile, the adequate rehabilitation of mine sites, including reversal of the land use change that occurs with the establishment of a mine, is also a concern in the case of rapid boom–bust cycles. There are few examples globally of mine sites having been appropriately rehabilitated. That said, the majority of modern large-scale mines remain in operation, and mining companies increasingly have to provide financial assurance for mine rehabilitation to prevent mines being abandoned in the case of bankruptcy or similar events.</p> -<p>Beyond training, the overall HR ecosystem is less integrated, with often cumbersome processes hindering connections between strategic workforce planning, recruitment, training and career management. The mechanical SOTR/SOTT process that connects recruitment and training remains challenging, although early results from Project Selborne’s use of AI through its new schedule optimisation engine allow an immediate digital recasting of the SOTR/SOTT plans when the situation changes or a new operational requirement is introduced.</p> +<p>At the human security level, beyond the health risks associated with scenarios such as those outlined above, there is also the question of social rehabilitation. Mining companies’ social licence to operate often rests on the benefits that mining activities purport to bring to local communities in the form of revenue and improved infrastructure. Historically, in a range of cases, closures of mines have led to communities abandoning settlements, leaving “ghost towns” in their wake. Although there are few examples relating to critical minerals specifically, the collapse of the diamond mining industry in the town of Kolmanskop in Namibia and the closure of platinum mining in Atok, Limpopo in South Africa are two wider examples.</p> -<p>A necessary foundation for the modernisation of training is to improve the quality and flow of data across the training schools, across the Commands between Joint TDAs and Service TRAs (through strengthened Customer Executive Boards), and between the MoD and contractors. Doing so – as Ofsted has regularly demanded in its inspection of training establishments – would inform choices and improve management of a more fluid system. It would also permit technology to mitigate the need for human experts that are difficult to find, and could offer a more dynamic approach to recruitment and training that reduces wastage.</p> +<h4 id="increasing-geopolitical-competition">Increasing Geopolitical Competition</h4> -<p>The simplification of DSAT is welcomed, but must be accompanied by upskilling and the resetting of risk tolerance, or Defence will merely be adding new process to reduce the chance of errors by those not steeped in it. Another important change would be for the knowledge, skills, experience and behaviours that individuals require to be mapped to organisational needs (and therefore shape the training and learning designed to fulfil those requirements). The Pan-Defence Skills Framework could help in this regard. Defence also needs to systematise the good work it did in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic when, moving rapidly, it embraced changes that under normal circumstances would have taken a long time to implement. While commendable, these changes now often exist as exceptions to the usual system, and need to be made “normal”.</p> +<p>Many of the aforementioned issues risk exacerbating the geopolitical tensions associated with the critical minerals boom. Indeed, some commentators have warned of the potential for critical minerals to spark a “new arms race” or a “new Cold War”, especially given the role of the defence sector in driving critical mineral demand and, notably, the US decision to use wartime powers to secure critical mineral supply chains. The 1950 Defense Production Act gives the US president the power to “shape national defense preparedness programs and to take appropriate steps to maintain and enhance the domestic industrial base”. The act was expanded in 2022 by President Joe Biden to support production of net zero technologies, and again in 2023 to facilitate funding for projects related to the production of minerals such as lithium, REEs and tantalum.</p> -<h4 id="partnering">Partnering</h4> +<p>Competition over critical minerals could also exacerbate tensions between great powers in the context of China’s dominant role in a range of critical mineral supply chains. While China’s dominance in the context of critical mineral processing is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to note that China also has significant critical mineral reserves, which are subject to the same risks as those highlighted in this paper. China is the largest importer of lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese, has significant reserves of lead, selenium, tellurium, tin, zinc, graphite, lithium and titanium, and dominates lithium battery production. The country also dominates REE supply chains, accounting for 70% of global rare earth ore extraction and 90% of rare earth ore processing, following decades of state investment, export controls, cheap labour and low environmental standards.</p> -<p>A whole force approach to learning and development is paying dividends in some areas of Defence, where, as Haythornthwaite hoped, the complementary skills of Defence and contractor personnel mitigate risks, enhance outputs and help Defence remain at the cutting edge of training. However, best practice needs to be shared more widely, and more sophisticated arrangements are needed in the training system as much as they are in procurement.</p> +<p>In this context, the US and its allies are increasingly looking to secure their own supplies to minimise potential supply chain vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, an international environment characterised by growing contestation over critical minerals, among other factors, could see mineral-rich source countries rendered increasingly vulnerable to great power meddling. Such a scenario – whether real or imagined – has already played out in Bolivia in 2019, when former president Evo Morales accused the US of orchestrating a coup to ensure access to Bolivia’s lithium reserves. Investigative journalism website Declassified has made similar allegations against the UK.</p> -<p>Just as Defence’s skills requirements are not static, neither are the science of learning nor learning technologies. Commercial requirements in contracts spanning over 20 years that specify inputs cannot take account of changing andragogical practice, technologies or even system capacity. More partnership-focused models, such as those at the Defence Academy and Royal Navy, offer significant advantages, especially where they include funded requirements for training innovation and allow the partner to maximise the use of the infrastructure, such as the Holdfast contract at RSME. For example, Project Selborne’s eight output-based key performance indicators drive effective partnership behaviours aligned to the Royal Navy’s strategic goals, where sharing people creates a single workforce (civilian and military) that contributes to the sense of shared endeavour and priorities. More broadly, however, Defence must recognise that external learning expertise is valuable, and be more realistic about its own uniqueness.</p> +<p>Yet the likelihood of intensified great power competition over critical minerals is debated. Some commentators cite critical minerals’ relative abundance and recyclability, and the fact that, unlike with oil and gas, a break in constant supply is unlikely to spark immediate crisis. In this context, critical mineral competition is arguably unlikely, alone, to act as an impetus for all-out war. However, this does not rule out intensified competition, tension and violence at the local level – a scenario potentially amplified by the unequal burden of critical mineral demand from the Global North and countries such as China on source countries in the Global South, and the resultant environmental and social impacts on communities largely concentrated there.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>In this context of geopolitical competition it is important to note that the UK’s position has been weakened since leaving the EU. UK allies – such as the US and EU – are competing with both hostile states and allied states for access to critical minerals. The UK may struggle to leverage negotiating power following withdrawal from the EU and more work is needed to establish how the UK will address these geopolitical concerns.</p> -<p>The skills challenge in Defence is becoming more acute, with traditional roles becoming more complex and new technologies requiring new skills. Moreover, in looking for recruits that possess these skills, Defence is competing directly with employers who have greater flexibility to pay market rates. The extensive training organisation Defence operates is a vital tool for ensuring sustained delivery of its operational outputs. This organisation is a great strength, and an attractive part of the Defence offer to its people, being more systematic and structured than that of most employers.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-2-deep-sea-mining-case-study"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 2: Deep-Sea Mining Case Study</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>However, this training system is expensive, and requires modernisation to help it meet the challenges it faces.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Over millennia, deposits of critical minerals such as manganese, nickel and cobalt have built up in nodules on the ocean floor, thousands of metres below sea level. Deep-sea mining, proponents argue, is a means of sourcing critical minerals “responsibly, ethically, and with a minimal emissions load on the planet”, reducing the need for land-based mining and enabling countries such as the US to decrease their dependence on imported minerals. However, others caution that deep-sea mining may risk the destruction of deep-sea ecosystems (of which we have little understanding), and cause widespread pollution, the decimation of fish stocks and the disruption of deep-sea carbon storage. The lack of scientific data on the harms and benefits has prompted several countries to call for a moratorium on deep-sea mining.</code></em></p> -<p>Foremost among the challenges is one of culture. The traditional conception of training in Defence is an “industrial” one, where people are raw materials fed into a process that homogenises them via the delivery of standardised training, largely regardless of individual needs. This rather mechanistic approach was effective when skills and careers were static, but is less suited to the rapidly-evolving environments that Defence operates in today. The lack of a “system view”, in which an individual’s training is situated within a broader ecosystem, has hindered modernisation attempts and resulted in risk being displaced rather than removed.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Crucially, deep-sea mining would largely take place in international waters, raising crucial legislative and regulatory questions. While the International Seabed Authority (ISA) will ultimately decide whether deep-sea mining goes ahead, decision-making has been delayed until 2025 after Costa Rica, Chile and France insisted that no permits be granted until a stronger regulatory landscape had been established. In the meantime, the ISA has issued contracts for exploratory work; as of November 2022, China held five of the 30 contracts issued.</code></em></p> -<p>The second challenge is that although the DSAT process that shapes the development of training is conceptually sound, the failure to resource it properly in practice means that it struggles to deliver, while the process by which Defence contracts for training partners also creates problems.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Should such activity go ahead, this “new potential extractive frontier” could have major geopolitical ramifications. China appears to be leading the race: as well as holding the greatest number of deep-sea mining exploration contracts, it has made funding for research in this area a national security and economic priority. Other issues arise from the fact that the US is not an ISA member state and is currently engaged in drafting parallel legislation. As well as limiting the US’s ability to influence global policy on deep-sea mining, this position also potentially disincentivises other countries to comply with theISA.</code></em></p> -<p>Thirdly, training delivery has failed to keep pace with advances in the understanding of andragogy, often as a result of how the Defence training workforce is itself resourced, trained and employed.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Deep-sea mining in international waters throws up other issues of relevance, at times involving overlaps with other key areas, such as fisheries. Norway, for example, plans to deep-sea mine an area the size of Germany on its continental shelf, most of which lies outside Norway’s exclusive economic zone, potentially infringing UK fishing rights. Key parts of the seafood industry have called for a pause in deep-sea mining plans, as recent research has established that tropical tuna fishing grounds in the Pacific are likely to overlap with areas licensed for deep-sea mining. This, in turn, could impact coastal communities reliant on fishing, resulting in loss of livelihoods and community displacement, among other harmful impacts.</code></em></p> -<p>The final challenge is that many of the essential enablers underpinning the learning environment are missing, including the data, infrastructure and capacity needed to manage fluctuating demand.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">More broadly, fundamental questions relevant to the ISA’s 2025 decision remain unanswered. As yet, the consequences of deep-sea mining of critical minerals for marine biodiversity and ecosystems are unquantified, while responsibility and payment of any compensation is yet to be determined. Additionally, as with much terrestrial mining, the equitable sharing of the benefits of such mining in international waters is far from uaranteed.</code></em></p> -<p>Responding to these challenges is complex, but must involve sharing existing good practice, as well as incorporating the lessons that can be learned from others. Key elements of any response would include:</p> +<h3 id="iii-the-road-ahead">III. The Road Ahead</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Upskilling the Defence training workforce – not just instructors, but staff across the training system, including TRAs, training managers and designers, and those validating the learning.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Adopting a less mechanistic, more organic approach to delivery – one that facilitates unique individual journeys through the training system, gives more power to learners, and provides the right learning environment, enabled by modern learning technology.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Building a stronger understanding of the systems within which training sits, including the individual/collective training continuum, and better use of training data and its connection with recruitment and career management, which is how Defence applies the skills people have learned. The shift also needs to normalise the (impressive) response to the Covid-19 pandemic that often stands out as an exception to the standard approach.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Building stronger partnerships with providers who can complement the strengths Defence instructors bring to the training system (their up-to-date operational knowledge and ability to contextualise the learning) through a stronger understanding of andragogy and best practice outside Defence.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>With the world’s attention on the net zero transition and with critical minerals playing a pivotal role in this transition, the international community – and the UK as a key financial and mining hub – has a unique opportunity to address the environmental and human security risks arising. As many of the risks identified are not unique to critical mineral mining, there are already a range of known options available. However, the rapid acceleration of critical mineral extraction could intensify existing challenges, necessitating a fundamental rethink of how to apply interventions and embrace emerging options in this space. This chapter uses both the limited available literature on this topic and data drawn from semi-structured interviews designed to gather insights from across a range of sectors, to consider the options available.</p> -<p>The key strength of Defence’s training organisation – its highly structured approach – also makes it relatively rigid, and thus less able to react to rapidly changing needs. Modifying the structure to make it more flexible – rather than abandoning it – offers the best way forward, but success will only be possible if training modernisation is considered within its broader contexts, taking a “whole system” approach that considers the effects of changes in one part of the system on the other parts. Without this broader understanding, training modernisation could merely transfer risk elsewhere rather than remove it.</p> +<h4 id="a-governance-rethink">A Governance Rethink</h4> -<hr /> +<p>In considering options to mitigate the environmental and human security risks outlined in this paper, interviewees stressed that a vast and complex regulatory landscape exists for mining companies, with country-level regulation often out of date and therefore lagging far behind best practice. Mining in the US, for example, is regulated by an 1872 mining law, despite new technological advancements and improved awareness of mining’s impacts. Outdated laws related to mineral extraction often fail to address the complexities and scale of modern-day mining and related harms, leaving mining companies to navigate a complex regulatory landscape.</p> -<p><strong>Paul O’Neill</strong> is Director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His research interests cover national security strategy, NATO, and organisational aspects of Defence and security, including organisational design, human resources, professional military education and decision-making.He is a CBE, Companion of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, and a member of the UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team.</p> +<p>Numerous guidelines exist detailing best practice for companies and countries in relation to prior informed consent that is freely given, environmental protection, transparency and traceability, community engagement and other elements of due diligence designed to mitigate environmental and social harms. However, the majority of these standards are voluntary, meaning that they are inconsistently and often inadequately adopted across the sector. Both large-scale and smaller mining companies often do not apply best practice, as financial considerations are often prioritised. This situation is especially likely where mining occurs in countries with a weak regulatory environment.</p> -<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Paul O’Neill and Patrick HintonBetter practices are needed to improve the effectiveness of defence training.Uncrewed Ground Systems2023-10-26T12:00:00+08:002023-10-26T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uncrewed-ground-systems<p><em>Military experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) is happening apace. Bomb disposal robots have been in service with armed forces for decades. Now, systems with greater capabilities and autonomy are being developed and tested.</em></p> +<p>A concerted effort is needed to address this regulatory shortfall. First, best practice, such as International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 6 and practice aligned with science-based targets for nature (SBTN), should, as much as possible, be reflected in national regulations in relevant source countries. Second, improved consumer requirements are needed for standards around the production of critical minerals (as in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products). Third, capacity of producer countries must be improved to apply regulation and best practice, with technical assistance provided to this end. Development assistance should also be provided to mineral-rich jurisdictions to establish appropriate in-country regulations and build capacity to implement such regulation effectively. An example of an impactful technical assistance initiative working to improve the mainstreaming of biodiversity into development and infrastructure practice can be seen in the Conservation, Mitigation and Biodiversity Offsets (COMBO) programme, with more initiatives of this type required.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Improved practice and outcomes following mine development are likely to be stronger if these initiatives are led by governments and civil society, with sectoral initiatives often not aiming for the highest standards, given the need to integrate the views of many parts of industry. Business must be consulted, but should not necessarily be the sole source of information. The mining sector does, however, have an important role to play in applying regulation to achieve positive outcomes, particularly through initiatives such as the ICMM and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). These bodies have helped catalyse best practice across the industry and engage mining companies and other stakeholders to address the risks associated with the extractive sector. Innovations in mining also demonstrate the possibilities for progress, such as fully electric mines and the sequestration of carbon in tailings, but governments need to identify opportunities to support this work, rather than allowing the initiatives to remain voluntary. The investor community, meanwhile, has a crucial role to play, through initiatives such as the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures (TNFD), and should set targets and report against them to ensure positive outcomes following mine development.</p> -<p>Potential uses include carrying cargo, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, chemical-agent detection, communications and fire support. However, the gap between ideal uses and present technical capability is significant. The delivery of systems to where they will be used, the realistic uses once there and the machines’ interactions with soldiers have frequently been underexamined but are crucial to how UGS will form part of land forces and offer genuine operational advantage. The technical limitations of UGS must be reflected in how they are task-organised within land forces. Due consideration must be given to how UGS will move around the battlefield, as it will often not be by their own steam. Maintenance and repair of UGS will require new training courses and a close relationship with industrial partners.</p> +<h4 id="the-role-of-the-uk">The Role of the UK</h4> -<p>The principal conclusion to draw is that UGS will require significant support from their human counterparts. Moreover, cognitive burden on operators must be considered and managed. Systems move slowly, and the difficulty of navigating in complex terrain means they are not suited to some of the tasks for which they have been proposed, such as dismounted close combat in complex terrain. It is important to involve as many soldiers as possible in experimentation, and expose them to UGS early and often. This can be achieved by employing UGS in those areas with the highest throughput of soldiers, such as firing ranges and exercise areas, and making use of simulation. In addition, initial training should include education and demonstrations of UGS for new recruits. This will help build familiarity, favourability and trust in these systems.</p> +<p>The UK can play an important role in leading many of these efforts. The UK government has branded itself as a “clean energy superpower” and a leader in “the race towards net zero”, alongside a range of biodiversity commitments. The UK is also uniquely positioned to facilitate action in this area given its role as a global trade, commodities and financial hub. Beyond this, the country is a mining hub, with many of the most prominent and profitable mining companies registered in the UK, and it is also home to industry organisations such as the ICMM.</p> -<p>The potential of human–machine teams is significant, but hype should not disguise the limitations of UGS and the difficulty of integrating new technology into established structures.</p> +<p>The UK government should use its unique position in this field to convene regulatory and wider stakeholder communities, ensuring cross-sector buy-in, for example, through the TNFD and SBTN and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The UK should also use its financial and diplomatic position to enter bilateral partnership discussions with governments, while using its convening power to bring stakeholders together to identify and apply meaningful multilateral solutions. The Forest, Agriculture and Commodity Trade (FACT) dialogue, for example, could act as a model for bringing together countries to discuss how to address critical mineral-related risks, recognising the global scale of the challenge and the need for involvement from supply and demand countries across both the Global North and the Global South. In these ways, the UK can impactfully support integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector of mining. While the mining industry is aware of the need to make fundamental changes, and certain companies have made significant progress in key areas, industry-wide change is unlikely unless governments, consumers and investors across society demand it.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, the UK – along with other consumer countries – should also review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains (even as waste). This would reduce waste and improve resilience in supply chains through the creation of an internal market. Interviewees criticised the UK’s current approach as being one of pursuing key net zero milestones in the wrong order, highlighting that the UK currently has a Critical Minerals Strategy but no targeted industrial strategy relating specifically to this area, effectively rendering the former strategy toothless. They also emphasised that there has been limited progress on ensuring that the Critical Minerals Strategy promotes environmental, social and governance standards, with individuals at the verification workshop calling for the government to urgently prioritise and take action on this. Establishing industry priorities in this space before securing critical mineral supply chains will be key to ensuring that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply. This may be done by establishing which industries should be prioritised in times of shortage: for example, energy, healthcare and transport.</p> -<h4 id="context">Context</h4> +<p>Broadening opportunities for sourcing, aside from extraction via new mines, should also be a future priority. Critical mineral recycling and extended producer responsibility would help minimise many of the risks discussed in this paper, and help in moving towards a circular economy. Currently, 0.5% of lithium and 0.2% of REEs are recycled globally, rising to 32% for cobalt and 60% for nickel. While recycling is not a short-term solution, as time is needed to build the necessary infrastructure, scientists estimate that with optimum recycling the US could meet 30%–40% of anticipated demand for critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and graphite through recycling. The IEA estimates that recycling could meet 10% of global demand – with the benefits of recycling much higher for countries that have already embraced clean energy technologies. Given the pressures that increased demand will put on critical mineral supply chains in the coming years, investment in the necessary recycling infrastructure should be prioritised.</p> -<p>The presence of robots on the battlefield is central in today’s military discourse. A recent British Army recruiting advert showed soldiers operating in close combat alongside humanoid and wheeled robots. A former head of the British armed forces has stated that in the 2030s, the Army could comprise 90,000 soldiers and 30,000 robots. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a recent interview that “you’re going to see significant portions of armies and navies and air forces that will be robotic”. There is a significant jump from where forces are now to this envisioned state. Experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) in military forces is gaining pace. Many forces are running trials with a variety of systems. Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) are far more mature in their journey and lessons can be drawn across to their land-based brethren. Similar to UAS, it is believed that UGS will provide competitive advantage to land forces in several ways. UGS have the potential to support logistics and reconnaissance missions, as well as the ability to be armed with remote weapon systems to provide additional firepower to manoeuvre units. They can remove soldiers from harm’s way and increase mass, which underpins fighting power. However, there are substantial technological hurdles and organisational realities which need to be overcome before UGS are seamlessly integrated into military forces and become a force multiplier. The simple existence of such systems is not enough to transform warfare or generate competitive advantage for a force. It is not clear that any military force has integrated UGS at scale except for bomb disposal robots. These basic UGS have been part of military arsenals for decades, but the current zeitgeist is focused on those systems with a degree of autonomy which can unlock operational effectiveness above that seen on battlefields today.</p> +<p>Disposable e-cigarettes (vapes) highlight the need for forward-thinking, circular-economy-driven policies. The UK currently throws away 1.3 million disposable vapes every week, amounting to more than 65 million a year. The vapes that currently go to landfill each year contain lithium-ion batteries that contain enough lithium, if recycled, to produce 1,200 electric vehicle batteries. The IEA has warned of lithium shortages as soon as 2025, with lithium recycling a key avenue to securing supplies. While the recycling of lithium could currently only take place on a small scale, its value as an industry would grow exponentially as more lithium stock enters the economy. Given the potential of lithium recycling from products such as disposable vapes and the UK’s projected future lithium needs, policymakers should prioritise establishing infrastructure for critical mineral recycling, and recycling more broadly. To date, domestic progress has been slow. However, the UK’s first industrial-scale lithium-ion battery recycling facility received clearance to operate in 2023 with a forecasted processing capacity of up to 22,000 tonnes of lithium-ion batteries per year. Yet more needs to be done to reform waste management processes that do not maximise wider opportunities to recover critical minerals. Extended producer responsibility would also help prevent waste at the scale seen in the case of disposable vapes.</p> -<p>This paper answers three research questions focused on the integration of UGS into light land forces at the tactical level. The first concerns how UGS can be usefully employed in tactical land formations with their technical limitations and tactical realities considered. The second relates to how they get to the fight in the first place: organisation, movement and sustainment of UGS around battlefield echelons must be considered, and this is much less examined in the literature than is their use in frontline combat. The third involves how military forces can ensure that UGS are put to good use by their soldiers. Preparing soldiers to form part of human–machine teams must be a deliberate act, using training and education to build trust and understanding. The paper focuses on developments in the British and US militaries, but lessons can be drawn more widely.</p> +<p>The UK has regulations in place to encourage recovery, reuse and recycling of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) and will consult on this in relation to critical minerals in 2023, as well as carrying out an assessment to consider the “circularity of critical minerals in the UK today as a baseline for future work”. However, other work in this area has recently been delayed, such as the extended producer responsibility scheme for packaging, with new rules to ensure packaging producers pay for the cost of recycling their packaging deferred from October 2024 to 2025. Experience of this type raises concerns that proactive steps to support the recycling and reuse of critical minerals could face the same hurdles. Meanwhile, disposable vape producers have already been criticised for not complying with EEE regulations, highlighting the ease with which manufacturers of other critical mineral-based products might avoid compliance.</p> -<p>Light land forces have been chosen as the focus for discussion, although employment considerations can be extrapolated to other parts of the force. Light infantry operate with minimal vehicular support, although they may be supported by vehicles such as quad bikes. They have the critical task of closing with the enemy at close quarters and seizing ground in complex terrain. These troops are laden with all the equipment required to operate for days at a time, including weapons, ammunition, rations, water, radios, batteries and more. As a result, they may have much to gain from the advent of UGS.</p> +<p>Given the urgency of the net zero transition, the government should prioritise and fast-track relevant policy initiatives, looking at all options to upscale the UK’s recycling capabilities. At the same time, it should work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, the right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible. The government should also work with manufacturers to reduce the critical mineral footprint in products, using the power of taxation where possible. Car manufacturers, for example, are increasing production of electric SUVs but these need larger batteries, and therefore more minerals and energy, than smaller electric vehicles. In response to this, Norway recently began taxing electric vehicles over a certain weight, a move designed to motivate car manufacturers to be more efficient with their mineral usage. These measures would all serve to reduce demand for critical minerals, thereby helping to secure supply for the industries that most need them. As well as helping to secure critical mineral supply chains, improved domestic recycling has the potential to create jobs and support UK economic growth.</p> -<p>This variety of potential uses means that UGS offer great potential utility to armed forces. However, their development, introduction and scaling across armies requires careful consideration, the totality of which is not immediately obvious. Considerations are set out below to outline how military procurement professionals and concept developers might conceive the introduction of UGS into the force.</p> +<h4 id="social-awareness-and-public-engagement">Social Awareness and Public Engagement</h4> -<h4 id="structure">Structure</h4> +<p>To drive many of the necessary changes, attention to societal-level narratives is also required. Currently, the discourse on the renewable energy sector that critical minerals fuel is supportive: in 2022, polling published by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy showed that 88% of people in the UK support using renewable energy. Meanwhile, polling data by Ipsos and the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations showed that in October 2022, the majority of people in the UK continued to support most net zero policies, including electric vehicle subsidies, among others.</p> -<p>After setting out its methodology, the paper outlines the principal characteristics of UGS. These are the basis of their numerous uses and the foundation of their strengths and limitations. The drivers behind UGS development – including reducing risk, increasing mass, and the ability to increase advantage through human–machine teams – are noted. Next, the state of the art of UGS is shown, demonstrating the numerous use cases which are developing in forces around the world. With this foundation set out, the bulk of the paper then offers several areas of investigation and recommendations for military forces. The first concerns how such systems might be employed at the tactical level. The second is how UGS can be moved around the battlefield and where they might be assigned organisationally. Third, means by which to socialise UGS within a force, improve education and foster trust are offered. These areas are often sidelined by discussion of experiments or capabilities, without due thought to the various interdependencies and whole-force considerations.</p> +<p>However, as this paper has highlighted, critical mineral mining is associated with a number of environmental and human security risks. If these are left unmitigated, it could reduce support for the net zero transition both domestically and internationally. Given the benefits that critical minerals can bring to both net zero goals and local economies, interviewees stressed that efforts to garner widespread societal support are fundamental. The empowerment of local communities where mining is taking place and, more widely, of consumers of technology containing critical minerals are both key to ensuring public support for critical mineral mining, and can help facilitate a just transition to net zero.</p> -<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> +<p>Community engagement and trust building are key to ensuring mining companies’ social licence to operate and that local communities are partners and beneficiaries of the mineral extraction process. This paper has highlighted the local harms that can occur. However, there are a few examples of mining companies actively prioritising community engagement and ensuring meaningful community oversight of mining activity and the associated benefits.</p> -<p>This paper is founded on both primary and secondary research. First, the author has conducted consultations with both practitioners and analysts, aimed at discussing their experience with UGS and associated technology. He has also deployed on and visited military exercises, such as Project Convergence 22. The author is a serving military officer and has extensive experience of and a professional background in the employment of robotics and autonomous systems (RAS). He has spent time with industry, looking at both hardware and software. A literature review of academic articles, news media and military press releases has also been conducted.</p> +<p>Mining company Cameco, for example, engaged the English River First Nation (ERFN) in Canada as a partner in a uranium mining project and undertook several years of discussions before a collaborative agreement was signed in 2013 to formalise ERFN’s share of the mine’s benefits. The agreement set out Cameco’s obligations to workforce and business development, community investment and engagement and environmental stewardship, and committed to regular communications between the two parties to ensure mutual benefit, thereby sustaining “high levels of trust” built on “transparency and collaboration”.</p> -<p>The author has also attended conferences with military personnel examining UGS. Existing research and expertise on the organisational impact of UGS is limited compared with that on their aerial counterparts. The literature is either very technical with an academic focus, or less analytical, mainly comprising news articles and manufacturer comment. Moreover, the paucity of information in the public domain about military UGS has also imposed a limitation on this research. Attempting to describe a future state is inherently difficult, but the assumptions and considerations laid out in this paper are grounded in reality, and draw on practical knowledge of both RAS and military organisational processes and structure.</p> +<p>Similarly, lithium mining company Sales de Jujuy has been praised for “fostering mutually beneficial and understanding partnerships with localities” in Argentina and the Alaskan Red Dog Mine has brought “lasting and significant” benefits to local Indigenous communities, though these are “modest” in the context of the mine’s overall operations and profit.</p> -<h3 id="i-what-are-ugs">I. What are UGS?</h3> +<p>The impact of community engagement and trust building can also be seen in the UK context. Cornish Lithium has proactively engaged with the local community, organising community engagement events and Q&amp;A sessions and launching a community fund to contribute to local clubs, charities and activity groups. This has helped to secure broad support, although concerns about the environmental impact and the potential for wealth from Cornwall’s lithium to be amassed elsewhere remain. In contrast, Cornish Tin Limited’s plans to explore for and extract tin, lithium, tungsten and other metals from the Wheal Vor tin mine have met local opposition, with a local newspaper noting that “there has yet to be a full public meeting where [locals’] questions can be put to Cornish Tin”. According to the British Geological Survey, areas of the UK from the Highlands to southwest England have the right geology for critical mineral mining, including of lithium. Meanwhile, the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy puts emphasis on growing domestic capabilities along the supply chain, which includes domestic mining. Garnering community support for onshore mining through community engagement is, therefore, crucial.</p> -<p>UGS are vehicles or static platforms that operate on land without a human crew inside, although some systems can be optionally uncrewed. UGS can be as small as shoeboxes and even thrown by users. Others are as large as historically crewed vehicles, weighing many tonnes. They may or may not be armoured. UGS may be wheeled, tracked, have legs or a combination of the three. Each type of drivetrain has its advantages and disadvantages. Wheels are good for speed and manoeuvrability on even surfaces, are lightweight and are simple to replace. They are, however, vulnerable to shrapnel damage and punctures. Tracks are useful for offroad manoeuvrability and offer good traction over rough terrain. However, they are generally slower than wheels and are also complex to refit if they become dislodged. UGS with legs, such as the Boston Dynamics Spot, can tackle obstacles such as stairs and climb very steep slopes, and can also move laterally. Wheeled and tracked vehicles are faster over most surfaces, however.</p> +<p>While examples of mining companies actively engaging with communities are encouraging, this kind of best practice remains largely voluntary and is not the industry norm across companies or geographies. For this reason, governments should demand best practice on community engagement from companies operating in their territory, with the Global North supporting supply countries in the Global South to demand the same.</p> -<p>UGS exist on a spectrum of control. They may be operated by a soldier holding a wired controller or a remote control while within line of sight. Examples include mine clearance systems and bomb disposal robots. Teleoperation adds a level of complexity, in which the operator relies on the UGS’ cameras and sensors to make sense of surroundings and controls them from a distance. UGS with levels of automaticity or automation are more complex still. Within this category, there remains significant variety. It is necessary to stress that a system being uncrewed does not mean it is autonomous. The Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) framework is one toolset with which to understand UGS’ autonomous capability. Autonomy can be understood as a system’s “own ability of integrated sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting/executing, to achieve its goals as assigned”. Systems with high levels of autonomy are rare. More commonly, UGS have a leader–follower function whereby the vehicle will follow another crewed vehicle or a human commander. Increasing levels of autonomy then allow some UGS to follow waypoints given by a human operator and avoid obstacles while following a given route or exploring a designated area. Some systems may have the capability to act with conditional automation, whereby an operator can take control in certain circumstances, such as if the UGS cannot figure out how to manoeuvre around a certain obstacle. UGS that have the capability to act independently of an operator’s instructions and make a series of linked “decisions” in pursuit of an end objective are scarce. And that end objective will have been given by a human operator, which again means that the system is not fully autonomous. The necessity of human input is a golden thread in this research. Supervision of many systems still requires soldiers to be at least monitoring, and perhaps solely focused on, the UGS, rather than free to conduct other tasks.</p> +<p>Another key element is community empowerment to demand the local distribution of benefits. The potential for success in this area can be seen in the case of the Shetland Community Benefit Fund, an independent cooperative of local communities which is actively engaging with renewable energy companies to ensure that Shetland’s communities “benefit from commercial renewable energy developments in the islands”. Similarly, Community Power Cornwall calls for “the ownership and integration of renewable energy technologies into everyday lives and settings”, and develops community-owned renewable energy installations.</p> -<p>Systems also differ by use, which is examined in detail in later chapters. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that any remote weapons systems associated with UGS will have a human in the loop throughout for decision-making, retaining meaningful control, and providing authorisation for any engagement. This is in line with British defence policy.</p> +<p>This, in turn, links to the need for better public understanding and education on mining more broadly. Public awareness of the risks associated with critical mineral mining is key to driving progress on the consumer and investor requirements that are ultimately how a sector – and the governments that regulate the sector in producer countries – will be motivated to make change. Greater public understanding will empower communities to engage with the mining industry in an informed manner. Additionally, public understanding of the importance of critical minerals for the net zero transition will help to boost support for mining projects and reduce demand by ensuring consumers are more mindful about products that contain critical minerals. Equally, such understanding is likely to increase support for circular economy measures to reduce demand, such as design-to-recycle and the right to repair.</p> -<h4 id="sensors">Sensors</h4> +<p>Facilitating forums at which mining companies and local communities engage should be a UK priority, to ensure the economic and social viability of plans to mine critical minerals domestically. Internationally, cross-sector, multi-stakeholder coalitions can help to empower local communities whose views are often overlooked in the interests of mining companies, while promoting best practice across the critical mineral mining sector. Examples of this already exist, such as the Fair Cobalt Alliance and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which can act as models to replicate.</p> -<p>The simplest remotely operated UGS may have no sensors, as the human operator is expected to be close by. An example might be an excavator. Systems such as bomb disposal robots have cameras that allow the operator a close-up view from the system, and allow the manipulation of the target object with the operator at a safe distance. As systems gain autonomous functions, a suite of sensors can be expected, including LIDAR, RADAR, GPS and cameras. LIDAR and RADAR help the UGS make a 3D map of their surroundings, which is then used for routing and obstacle avoidance. Ultrasonic sensors may be mounted on the sides of the vehicle to detect objects very close up. In civilian applications, these are used to help autonomous vehicles park. Video cameras are used to detect humans or animals, as well as to make sense of traffic lights and signage. Video cameras are also able to pick up more nuances than LIDAR and RADAR, including hand gestures and traffic cones. GPS helps the system situate itself within the wider geography of the area and aids a system to stay on course when navigating a waypoint route or searching an area for reconnaissance purposes. UGS may also have an inertial measurement unit to give an additional indication of the direction and velocity in which the system is moving. This information can complement that of GPS, and is useful when GPS signals are weak, such as when moving through urban areas or tunnels, or during bad weather. Developments in this area are fast moving, and new sensors and combinations are being experimented with. Given this, commenting categorically is difficult, but suffice to say UGS use sensors to make sense of their surroundings.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<h4 id="software">Software</h4> +<p>Critical minerals are essential for the net zero transition and for meeting the target set at the UNFCCC Paris Conference in 2015 to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Because of this, demand for these minerals is set to grow rapidly: the IEA projects that up to 28 million tonnes of minerals for green technology will be needed in 2040 – a significant increase from the 7 million tonnes currently mined each year.</p> -<p>Software must then make sense of all the inputs described above. The UGS’ use, the environment they will operate in and their level of autonomy determine the complexity of the software. The software uses the sensors to make sense of where the UGS are, what is around them and, in some cases, what might happen next in the case of people and vehicles in close proximity, and what to do if a particular circumstance presents itself, such as another vehicle moving into the systems’ path. Software will use this information to plan UGS’ next move before moving. The systems may take their external environment and plan against a library of scenarios on which they have been previously trained. The software must fuse information from the various sensors to form one combined understanding of the environment, using a variety of filter mechanisms. Software architectures differ from system to system and in complexity. UGS may also have target recognition capability that can spot armoured vehicles and movement on the horizon, which can be fed to commanders for subsequent decisions and actions.</p> +<p>While their potential benefit is significant, this paper has explored the risks associated with critical minerals mining, covering both environmental and human security. At an environmental level, the paper finds key risks to include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, water scarcity, soil erosion, pollution and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses and labour exploitation, crime, corruption and conflict. These issues often intersect, with the biggest impact often felt by local communities, including Indigenous communities on or near whose land mineral reserves may be located.</p> -<h4 id="power">Power</h4> +<p>While many of these risks are already established, this paper highlights the potential for skyrocketing demand for critical minerals to accelerate these harms. This may occur where burgeoning demand incentivises governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; mandates the opening up of new mining frontiers in countries without histories of extractive operations that lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; exacerbates boom–bust cycles of extractive activity; and increases geopolitical competition.</p> -<p>Smaller UGS are usually battery powered, with larger systems using a combustion engine or hybrid diesel–electric power train. Each has benefits and limitations. Electric systems are near-silent to run and produce a low heat signature. However, battery life is often limited, and requires extensive management, of replacing batteries and charging them. Systems using diesel or petrol are easier to fold into existing military logistic chains as they are already geared to provide fuel to current fleets. However, they have a significant noise and heat signature, which can make them vulnerable in an era of persistent ISR capability.</p> +<p>These risks have very real consequences for the communities and environment they impact. However, the international community – and the UK as a key financial, trade and mining hub – has a range of opportunities to address the risks and minimise the damage associated with critical mineral extraction for the net zero transition. With the world’s attention on the energy transition, there is a prime opportunity to rethink the current approach and embrace emerging opportunities. Some of these opportunities are not novel in and of themselves but they do require a concerted, strengthened effort to achieve.</p> -<h4 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h4> +<p>Given the high-level focus of this research, this paper does not seek to make context-specific recommendations to address the challenges ahead. However, drawing on research findings, it offers the following overarching recommendations for potential ways forward for key stakeholders to consider. These recommendations are tailored to the UK specifically, in light of the country’s unique positioning to facilitate action in this area, as an international trade and financial hub and a mining hub in which many of the most prominent mining companies are registered. To effectively leverage this position to ensure a just transition to net zero and ensure that the actions and investments required attract long-term public legitimacy, the UK government should consider the benefits of the following, many of which are also applicable to other countries in the Global North:</p> -<p>Despite the connotations of autonomy, UGS must in practice remain connected to their human operators. This could be to give the UGS instructions on where to go next, or to execute a particular command. Or it might be to relay information back to the operator, such as a potential target. Data processing may take place at the edge, depending on the size of the platform, or packets of data will be sent for processing elsewhere. UGS will place demands on the existing combat radio network, and this must be planned for. There also exists opportunity for adversary action in jamming or spoofing systems. UGS may be able to carry out tasks without being connected to the network, before reconnecting when necessary, which will increase their survivability.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the TNFD, the SBTN, the GRI and similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop an updated industrial strategy for critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the “levelling up” agenda.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks, providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation which improves the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world – such as natural capital assessments through which we can better understand, measure and value human interdependencies with nature, and plan more sustainable management of natural resources – and wellbeing economics. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="ii-what-are-the-purported-benefits-of-ugs-to-tactical-land-forces">II. What are the Purported Benefits of UGS to Tactical Land Forces?</h3> +<hr /> -<p>The drivers for the development of military UGS are numerous, and are broken down below.</p> +<p><strong>Genevieve Kotarska</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at RUSI. Her research focuses on the community-level impacts of organised crime and terrorism and illicit trades such as drug, firearms and people trafficking.</p> -<h4 id="risk">Risk</h4> +<p><strong>Lauren Young</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at RUSI with expertise in wildlife crime and conservation.</p>Genevieve Kotarska and Lauren YoungThis paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks.Countering Small UAS2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/countering-small-uncrewed-aerial-systems<p><em>This report examines the threat of small drones on the modern battlefield, and the various kinetic and non-kinetic defenses available to defeat them.</em></p> -<p>Using uncrewed systems in place of crewed vehicles can reduce risk to personnel. Soldiers can be kept further back from the line of contact and can avoid a number of dull and dangerous tasks that up to now have been the responsibility of humans.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="mass">Mass</h4> +<h3 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h3> -<p>Uncrewed systems allow the generation of additional mass above that which can be formed through an army’s physical workforce size. A future scenario might see one soldier controlling a suite of UGS, which could increase the area over which a unit has sight, influence and, potentially, control.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>For years, air defense has been the domain of specialized units and niche capabilities under conditions of air superiority. That era is no more, and the entire joint force must now look up. Small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) pose a significant threat, exhibiting multi-mission capabilities, minimal signatures, wide proliferation, low costs, and ground force utility. The common use of sUAS today amplifies other trends in modern warfare, including further complicating the airspace, saturating battlefields with more reconnaissance and strike assets, and expanding support for precision strike complexes. Their introduction is comparable to that of mortars and anti-tank missiles in the degree for which they have and will continue to push ground forces to adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The mission and capabilities to counter sUAS (C-sUAS) should be shared across numerous unit types, including air defense, maneuver, support, and sustainment. The high demand and low density of air defense formations requires that air defenders and non-specialists work together as part of a combined arms for air defense (CAFAD) approach. The central question today, however, is the specific division of labor among the air defense and non-air defense units, as well as the authorities delegated to these groups. In general, C-sUAS planners have borrowed the distinction between “area” and “point” defense whereby traditional air defenders manage larger systems such as high-energy lasers and long-range kinetic interceptors for area defense, while maneuver forces use point defenses such as guns, nets, and handheld platforms.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>U.S. C-sUAS acquisition processes require updating to keep pace with evolving threats. The Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) was stood up to coordinate C-sUAS doctrine, organization, and training across the joint force. Congressional and Department of Defense (DoD) leadership should consider modifications to JCO’s authorities and relation to service acquisition agencies to improve the requirements process and acquisition timelines.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Air defense has multiple meanings and connotations, especially in terms of service-specific terminology. As a mission, air defense destroys, nullifies, or reduces the effectiveness of enemy attacks by aerial platforms. Defined organizationally, it connotes force structure responsibilities, such as the Army’s Air Defense Artillery branch, or specific units manned, trained, and equipped to detect, track, and defeat aerial threats in specified sectors or altitudes. Because sUAS represent a distributed challenge to the entire joint force, C-sUAS operations cannot be confined to a single unit or specialization. C-sUAS developers, planners, and operators must overcome organizational silos.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities are available to defeat sUAS. Over the past several years, the DoD has fielded a range of electronic attack and kinetic systems in support of joint and service urgent needs requests. Each of these tools have unique strengths and weaknesses in regard to survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and defended area.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The institutionalization and propagation of C-sUAS capability will require developments across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Training and capacity requirements will take priority over capability improvements over the next few years. New doctrine should specify the division of labor between air defense and non-air defense specialists, as well as the specific sensors, command and control, and effectors that they can operate. The policy, strategy, budget, and programmatic decisions made at this stage will carry enormous consequences for the field.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="situational-awareness">Situational Awareness</h4> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>UGS equipped with sensors such as cameras and radar can help commanders get a firmer sense of the battlespace. UAS have proven very effective in this area, and UGS can add additional capabilities, such as navigating through those places less accessible to UAS.</p> +<p>Over the past decade, sUAS have become a core capability on the modern battlefield. Many are commercially sourced, easy to deploy, hard to detect, and highly proliferated. State and nonstate actors alike use them around the world in major conflicts, gray zone and criminal activities, and targeted killings. Technological advances in sUAS optics and sensor miniaturization have made them increasingly versatile as a primary reconnaissance tool, including for targeting for larger artillery and missile strikes. sUAS will continue to present a serious threat to military targets and civilian population centers.</p> -<h4 id="burden-reduction">Burden Reduction</h4> +<p>Numerous studies have highlighted the sUAS threat. A few have reviewed C-sUAS platforms and capabilities. Yet to date, there appears to be no public-facing report that assesses C-sUAS history, strategy, and programs, across the DOTMLPF. This report tries to fill that gap from the perspective of the U.S. military.</p> -<p>UGS can carry equipment that currently burdens soldiers. This allows soldiers to move more quickly and with less effort. This is important when soldiers have become loaded with equipment – in the pursuit of protection, reducing their ability to fight.</p> +<p>The C-sUAS mission is a challenging one. The threat is cheap and plentiful, whereas defenses are still emerging and bring significantly higher costs. Attribution can be difficult, complicating deterrence through retaliation. It remains unclear whether the active defense solutions currently in development will become programs of record; if investments in time, money, and personnel will continue to support this mission; and how well the multiple services involved can coordinate on developing and deploying their active defenses. While the U.S. Army is the lead service for developing joint doctrine, requirements, materiel, and training, the C-sUAS mission is not and must not be limited to one service, branch, or specialization. It is a concern for the entire joint force.</p> -<h4 id="humanmachine-teaming-hmt">Human–Machine Teaming (HMT)</h4> +<p>Air defense has continually evolved to meet new threats and challenges, from surveillance balloons to bomber aircraft to ballistic and cruise missiles. The threats have gotten smaller, harder to detect, and more sophisticated over time. At numerous moments along the way, a given threat will be deemed unstoppable — until, of course, defenses evolve to prove that assumption incorrect. C-sUAS represents the next chapter for the evolution of the air defense mission.</p> -<p>In the popular imagination, machines replace people in their roles entirely. However, this is not how military forces are conceiving of the near to medium horizon. Instead, the optimum balance between soldier and robot is key. HMT makes use of the comparative advantages inherent to humans and machines respectively. Humans do the tasks they are best suited to, and robots do those they are best at. The British Army, for example, envisages that humans will remain the core part of HMT for some time to come. The Army framework sees increasing machine involvement over time. In the immediate future, RAS-enhanced teams will see machines used in a transactional manner, as tools. These teams are limited by the current levels of autonomy and human levels of trust. This phase sees machines used to increase performance in human-led tasks. Later, trust and technology develop to enable RAS-integrated teams in which humans cede more control to machines whose autonomous capabilities have improved. Here, humans and machines perform tasks that result in a combined outcome. Finally, RAS-supervised teams are envisaged in which machines can outperform humans and humans retain a supervisory role to keep meaningful control.</p> +<p>Fortunately, the DoD today recognizes the importance of C-sUAS. Nearly a decade ago, ISIS militants began using commercial quadcopters effectively in battle. In January 2020, the DoD established the JCO to rapidly prototype, test, demonstrate, and field new defenses. More recently, the Biden administration’s 2022 Missile Defense Review included C-UAS as a component of the defense against “missile-related” threats.</p> -<p>This framework is particular to the British experience, but a similar gradient is noted in other forces. For example, the US Army’s RAS strategy notes three likely epochs of development. The first lasted from 2017 to 2020, when the Army matured concepts and initiated programmes to look at increasing situational awareness, lightening the load on soldiers and improving sustainment. The second epoch, from 2021 to 2030, aims at improvements including achieving automated convoy operations and removing soldiers from lead vehicles. In the far term, from 2031 to 2040, the first era of automated systems will be replaced, and see new organisational designs and fully integrated autonomous systems, which work in concert to achieve the task.</p> +<p>With doctrine, organizations, materiel, training, and other issues under debate today, the United States and its allies face a critical period with sUAS and C-sUAS. High levels of sUAS proliferation, little to no regulatory oversight, and improved capabilities, technologies, and integration all converge to create an environment in which the U.S. military must respond to a rapidly evolving threat. Contributors to these conversations must understand the threat and its likely evolution, the defenses available and in development today, and the principles that should guide their application. For better or worse, the policies and institutions developed today will last for years to come.</p> -<p>It is not the case that simply adding systems is the answer to providing mass in armed forces. Depending on levels of autonomy and the requirement of a task, soldiers can only manage so many responsibilities. If an uncrewed ground system is remote controlled without any level of autonomy, the ratio will be one to one, or even worse. It has been noted on some experiments that it takes three soldiers to adequately manage one uncrewed ground system. A one to two ratio would see one soldier jump between systems to operate them. Systems with more autonomy are less burdensome on the operator, and soldiers can then manage more systems at once. Cognitive overload is a crucial consideration when building a force structure that includes UGS. There are only so many screens or notifications a soldier can make sense of. There are also more practical considerations that do not generally make it into discussions of HMT at the policy level. On Project Convergence 22, a US military experimentation exercise, a US Army officer spoke of the difficulty for a junior soldier of sitting in the back of a moving Bradley armoured fighting vehicle while trying to manage uncrewed systems on a tablet computer. They quickly became overwhelmed. This might be because the uncrewed systems required inputs or verification from an operator, or it might be because the information and intelligence being sent from the systems was difficult to digest. Simply sitting in an armoured vehicle on the move is not a comfortable experience. Adding additional cognitive load may be problematic. Ergonomic issues such as motion sickness are an important consideration. Some soldiers may cope better than others. Seemingly minor additional tasks may have significant repercussions for combat effectiveness. This speaks to the importance of allowing soldiers to get used to working with such systems, and being aware of their own abilities and those of the systems.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6ElHChK.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Drone Evolution.</strong> Source: U.S. Army and Wikimedia Commons.</em></p> -<p>Having outlined the foundational concepts of military UGS, the potential individual tasks of such systems can be investigated, the subject of the next chapter.</p> +<h4 id="research-scope-and-objectives">Research Scope and Objectives</h4> -<h3 id="iii-what-are-the-potential-uses-of-ugs">III. What are the Potential Uses of UGS?</h3> +<p>This report discusses current C-sUAS defenses used to detect and defeat small drones. It serves as a guide for understanding and evaluating C-sUAS solutions, both to inform policymakers by providing principles for future developments in this field, and to inform the public on a key defense issue for which there is a gap in the open-source literature. The report explores the trade-offs among various C-sUAS sensor and effector types but does not advocate for any particular solution set. It also does not address sUAS counterproliferation and regulation efforts, offensive “left-of-launch” strikes, camouflage, deception, signature management, nor other topics related to but not centered on active defense. Furthermore, it does not address specific operational or tactical issues, such as UAS notification procedures or how U.S. personnel should coordinate intercept engagements with allies. These processes are better addressed by U.S. military leaders as they update their related doctrine and standard operating procedures.</p> -<p>UGS have several proposed uses for military forces, some of which are more obvious than others. These are identified here as potential uses, while subsequent chapters tackle the realities of their employment, whether such uses are realistic, and the implications for the force.</p> +<p>The study focuses closely on C-sUAS for the DoD, as primarily operated by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. There are several other U.S. stakeholders in this field, including the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Aviation Administration. The C-sUAS requirements, regulations, and resources differ among these groups.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="load-carriage">Load Carriage</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>This report uses the broad definition of air defense, which is to detect, track, and defeat aerial threats. It does not use the U.S. military’s organizational-specific definition of air defense as Air Defense Artillery or other groups specifically trained and equipped to detect, track, and defeat sophisticated air threats in large, specified sectors. sUAS break down the military’s typical distinction between air defense and force protection through their small size, wide proliferation, and flight patterns. C-sUAS will be a necessary part of both air defense and force protection, although there will be differing levels of operational expertise between trained air defenders and other military personnel.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gmq8bpj.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>Figure 1: UGS with Cargo Basket</em></p> +<p>The report has three sections. The first section aims to provide a brief analysis of the sUAS threat. It highlights common missions and capabilities through operational case studies and examines why sUAS have proliferated so quickly in recent years.</p> -<p>Load carriage is the principal identified task for UGS at today’s stage of development. This might be carrying personal equipment such as bergens, rations and ammunition, or platoon and company equipment such as ladders or beaching equipment. UGS might also be equipped with stretchers to enable casualties to be extracted from danger areas. Casualty evacuations are a particularly strenuous activity for soldiers. Being able to use UGS instead has multiple benefits. It allows soldiers to preserve energy in close combat, where fatigue can lead to poor decisions and further casualties. It also keeps soldiers free to complete the task at hand, such as winning a firefight. Another related use for UGS is for broader logistic purposes, especially in the dangerous “last mile” delivering supplies to frontline locations.</p> +<p>The second section reviews the ways and means to detect and defeat sUAS. This technology backgrounder broadly covers the sensors, C2, and effectors available today. This section reviews platforms that the DoD is pursuing and confirms the feasibility of C-sUAS technologies.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="communication-node">Communication Node</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The third and final section lays out the U.S. C-sUAS development path from urgent need, to refinement, to institutionalization. As C-sUAS becomes institutionalized, there are opportunities and potential pitfalls across the DOTMLPF. The C-sUAS enterprise still faces unresolved questions regarding political authorities for C-sUAS stakeholders, personnel responsibilities, and acquisition policies to enable rapid development and procurement.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wU9Neva.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>Figure 2: UGS Fitted with Radio Equipment</em></p> +<h3 id="the-suas-threat">The sUAS Threat</h3> -<p>UGS could carry a unit’s radios, which can be very heavy and slow to move. They may also carry electronic countermeasure and electronic warfare systems, which can be used to prevent explosive devices detonating, or to disable enemy UAS. Equally, there are times when soldiers must be detached to form a rebroadcasting or retransmission service if radio waves are blocked by terrain or another barrier. This allows units and headquarters to communicate with one another. This task might be completed by a UGS with a communications equipment fit.</p> +<p><em>sUAS pose a significant threat due to their multi-mission capabilities, minimal signatures, wide proliferation, low costs, and ground force utility.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="surveillance-and-reconnaissance">Surveillance and Reconnaissance</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>In late December 2022, Russia launched a massive assault against Ukrainian infrastructure targeting multiple key regions including Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa. The first wave of attacks was conducted with cheap Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. Ukrainian air force officials believe Russia used the drones to overwhelm air defenses before sending cruise missiles in a second wave of attacks. These attacks left several regions without power, including major cities such as Lviv and Kyiv. This incident was just one among many in a months-long strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure in the hopes of demoralizing the public and leaving them without heating during the winter months.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JgewS6X.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>Figure 3: UGS Fitted with Cameras and Sensors for Surveillance and Reconnaissance</em></p> +<p>Today, sUAS are widely recognized as a ubiquitous, mature, and lethal part of the modern aerial threat spectrum. Their use in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is just one of many cases that have occurred over the past decade. Operators can attack adversaries with sUAS by dropping bombs or using the drone as a loitering munition in “kamikaze” suicide attacks. They can also conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions to collect information on an adversary’s position or activities. Modern sUAS sensors and data links can connect to larger kill chains or be used to find and fix targets for artillery and other precision-guided munitions. sUAS can conduct these missions while being difficult to detect and defeat with current air defenses.</p> -<p>UGS can be equipped with sensors that can scan the area for potential threats. Software can categorise objects in the UGS’ field of view and identify points of interest, both static and mobile. These can then be passed to commanders for further investigation and potential targeting. Another use of UGS is as a reconnaissance screen moving ahead of dismounted or mounted recce soldiers. Or they might be employed in a static or roving function around unit locations or bases.</p> +<p>Modern air and missile defenses are ill-suited to counter low-flying, slow, and small UAS. Following U.S. divestment from short-range air defense in the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. military has been challenged to respond to enemy sUAS. Other states have faced similar issues. In 2016, Israel fired two $3 million PAC-2 interceptors and scrambled a fighter aircraft in a failed attempt to shoot down a sUAS from Syria that had violated Israeli airspace. In its conflict with Yemen’s Houthis, Saudi Arabia used fighter aircraft to patrol the border and shoot down drones worth a few hundred dollars with $2 million air-to-air missiles. These responses are enormously costly and wasteful over longer military campaigns.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="chemical-biological-radiological-andor-nuclear-cbrn-sensing">Chemical, Biological, Radiological and/or Nuclear (CBRN) Sensing</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Lk80k5D.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Ukrainian Service Member Fires Rifle at Drone.</strong> Position near Bakhmut on March 20, 2023.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/08amkD9.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>Figure 4: UGS Fitted with CBRN Sensors</em></p> +<p>The lack of active C-sUAS opens a gap in modern air defense that combatants around the world are exploiting. There is no substitute. The complement to active C-sUAS — passive defense — is important but insufficient. The United States cannot harden all of its military bases against sUAS, and force distribution is ineffective against the large quantity and low costs of sUAS. The United States and its partners therefore must develop active and integrated defenses to mitigate these risks.</p> -<p>UGS can provide a sensor capability for CBRN threats. UGS with appropriate sensors could be sent to locations of potential attacks. Equally, they could remain with troops and carry sensor equipment that had previously to be carried by soldiers.</p> +<h4 id="defining-suas">Defining sUAS</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="armed">Armed</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>sUAS are a specific category of drones. This categorization, however, varies across countries and organizations, with two key taxonomies outlined by the United States and NATO. The DoD divides UAS into five categories based on their weight, speed, and altitude ceilings, with the “small” category comprising Groups 1, 2, and 3. Despite its designation as “small,” Group 3 UAS can still be quite large at up to 600 kg. NATO offers a slightly different categorization, with sUAS falling under its Class 1 and 2 categories.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1t109C8.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>Figure 5: UGS with Remote Weapon Station</em></p> +<p>UAS categorization is further complicated by capability overlap with munitions. For example, the Iranian-made Shahed-136 is generally categorized as a Group 3 UAS, but it often operates as a one-way attack munition. The unique nature of the Shahed-136 thus cannot be simply captured by looking at a categorization that is determined solely on weight, speed, and altitude ceilings. The U.S. Tomahawk missile, specifically Block 4 and 5 variants, likewise blurs the line between UAS and missile. These variants offer loitering capabilities, but due to their one-way strike mission, they are not categorized as a UAS. The UAS spectrum is undoubtedly messy but attempts at distinguishing these threats — like all air threats — are still useful for defenders to quickly characterize capabilities.</p> -<p>UGS can be armed with remote weapon stations. Remote weapons are in mainstream use on crewed armoured vehicles today. Their benefit is that they allow the weapon to be fired by operators from inside the vehicle without a soldier having to be exposed in a cupola. Cameras mounted on the system allow the operator to aim the system and maintain control. Such systems, for example the Kongsberg Protector, can be mounted on UGS and operated remotely by offset troops. Such weapons might be used as sentry devices or in a fire-support capacity. Another potential use for UGS is as mobile landmines, a technique that has been adopted by the Ukrainian armed forces fighting Russia.</p> +<p>This report applies the U.S. classification model of “sUAS” as encompassing Groups 1, 2, and 3.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="engineering">Engineering</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Nyxc0l4.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: U.S. UAS Classification.</strong> Source: Classifications from U.S. Army; images from Russian Ministry of Defense and Wikimedia Commons.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5QtdHuJ.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>Figure 6: UGS Fitted with Mine Clearing Capability</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IuPGWWl.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: NATO UAS Classification.</strong> Source: Classifications from NATO; images from Vulcan UAS, Elbit Systems, Wikimedia Commons, and U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<p>Military engineering includes the breaching of obstacles, demining and providing plant for trench digging. This is currently done by hand, or by soldiers using excavators. The civilian mining industry is a world leader in uncrewed technology and uncrewed diggers are in common use. UGS with a digging capability could set up a defensive position with much less human input than is currently required.</p> +<p>sUAS have several advantages over larger aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed:</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="deception">Deception</h4> -</blockquote> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Lower cost:</strong> sUAS are relatively inexpensive compared to larger aircraft. This is true even when platforms are not quite “consumable” aircraft that operators will only use on a single mission.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Low training burdens:</strong> sUAS operators can learn their basic tradecraft in hours, and only one person is needed to operate a drone. On the other hand, it takes months to years to train pilots on large aircraft — including uncrewed platforms such as the MQ-9. A single platform may require over 100 personnel for operations and maintenance.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Minimal infrastructure requirements:</strong> Unlike larger aircraft, sUAS do not require extensive infrastructure to deploy such as long runways, secure and complicated data links, or expensive maintenance equipment.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Gray zone applications:</strong> Combatants frequently employ sUAS to decrease the perceived political costs and escalation risks resulting from operations and potential shootdowns as compared to larger, inhabited aircraft. The low-cost of sUAS, minimized risk to operators (on the ground rather than in the cockpit), and difficulty of attribution make sUAS a useful tool for gray zone operations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Unique capabilities in modern warfare:</strong> sUAS can perform an increasing number of air missions at lower cost than large, crewed aircraft. Small loitering munitions offer the ability to scan large swaths of territory and quickly strike targets of interest. Medium- and high-altitude long endurance (MALE/HALE) drones will continue to play an important role in counterterrorism missions, but they appear less effective in symmetric, conventional conflicts. Looking to the future, sUAS swarms may also provide a cost-effective means to saturate an adversary’s air defenses.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cWatkzP.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>Figure 7: UGS Fitted with Emitters for Deception</em></p> +<p>To be sure, sUAS also have critical disadvantages over larger aircraft.</p> -<p>UGS might also be employed to provide deception capability. This could be in the form of “fake” vehicles or groupings, or they can be used for deception using the electromagnetic spectrum. Such systems deliberately radiate to mislead the enemy. UGS equipped with a radio system and antennae can be used to draw enemy resource and disguise intentions and dispositions.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Limited payload capacity:</strong> sUAS are unable to carry heavier, more capable sensors or explosives.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Limited flight duration and range:</strong> Commercial sUAS can perhaps fly around 8 km at the high end. Military sUAS may feature extended ranges, but they will not approach large aircraft ranges.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Limited operating conditions:</strong> Compared to larger aircraft or missiles, sUAS are more susceptible to wind and adverse weather conditions, as well as a greater diversity of active defenses. Ukraine, for example, is reportedly losing around 10,000 sUAS per month against Russia.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>UGS may be multirole and capable of carrying out more than one of these tasks at a time, or of switching between them. Moreover, UGS should not be considered in isolation. There are also UGS built as mobile launch pads for UAS, such as the THeMIS Observe, which is an example of using the two technologies in concert. Military strategy requires conducting the orchestra of military capability in the most suitable way possible. UGS should be used for those tasks where they offer a competitive advantage. They should not be the answer before the question has been asked. There is always a danger of pursuing technological innovation for its own sake, especially in times when commitments outstrip resource – which is a place in which many forces find themselves. This friction has been recognised as problematic in military forces in the past, and has at times resulted in poor decisions.</p> +<h4 id="suas-missions-and-history">sUAS Missions and History</h4> -<p>Having introduced UGS and their proposed military uses, this paper moves in the next chapter to answer three questions:</p> +<p>sUAS can complete the same missions as manned aircraft. Over the past decade, military operators have used sUAS for six primary missions:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>How can UGS realistically be employed today and in the immediate future, with technological limitations and tactical realities taken into consideration?</p> + <p><strong>Attack operations:</strong> Strikes on people and things with bombs, missiles, or suicide attacks</p> </li> <li> - <p>How are UGS task-organised and how do they move around the battlespace?</p> + <p><strong>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:</strong> Providing “eyes in the sky” for military planning and operations</p> </li> <li> - <p>What is the best way to ensure that soldiers use UGS as intended?</p> + <p><strong>Targeting:</strong> Finding and sharing target location with other strike assets, such as artillery</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Battle damage assessment:</strong> Confirming the results of an attack</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Harassment:</strong> Creating confusion and alarm with drone incursions, possibly including small attacks</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Propaganda:</strong> Showing off military platforms and operations to improve military and civilian morale</p> </li> </ul> -<p>The soldier must remain central to these efforts. The uses outlined above broadly represent attempts to do away with human input where possible. However, UGS are built to support soldiers in their endeavours, and it is soldiers who will enable them to do this. The relationship is key, and the focus should remain on the human, as demonstrated below.</p> - -<h3 id="iv-considerations-for-ugs-support-to-light-manoeuvre-forces">IV. Considerations for UGS Support to Light Manoeuvre Forces</h3> - -<h4 id="gently-does-it">Gently Does it</h4> - -<p>UGS lack manoeuvrability in close or complex terrain. This must be a central consideration for their employment in tactical formations. Their ability to troubleshoot when faced with obstacles is currently far below that of humans. When moving autonomously, UGS must make sense of their surroundings to plot a clear path. Navigating obstacles using sensors alone is incredibly difficult. A study using the TAERO optionally crewed wheeled system found that “it is possible to effectively implement autonomous mode up to a speed of 2.8 m/s in an unstructured environment”. Advertised maximum speeds for UGS far exceed that which would be possible in complex terrain. This pattern is seen in numerous trials and reports, in which soldiers outpace their robotic counterparts. This finding is further corroborated by wargames and testing. The civilian transport sector is yet to make autonomous vehicles a viable offering despite billions of dollars and years of research and development. This is also in spite of a relatively robust framework within which they must work. Road networks have defined edges, junctions and rules. The latter are not always followed, of course, and autonomous vehicles on roads must try to account for the actions of other road users, which cannot always be predicted. The problem becomes more difficult when extrapolated to military UGS. Normal road networks are a simpler environment than a battlefield, where smoke, debris, adversarial activity, and disturbed earth make for a much more complex picture, with fewer established norms. Water hazards are illustrative here. Water’s surface is highly refracted, meaning it looks different depending on the view angle, the surrounding area and the weather. In wet weather, determining what is simply a slick surface versus a puddle versus something deeper is difficult for sensors and computers.</p> - -<p>The vision of autonomous land systems moving around the battlefield with abandon is currently fantasy. Most systems that are advertised as, or considered to be, autonomous or AI-enabled are much more limited in their capacities. As noted above, uncrewed does not mean autonomous. For example, the Milrem Robotics THeMIS is one of the more advanced and developed platforms on the market, with buy-in from several European countries. It can be teleoperated and can complete waypoint navigation as given by an operator. At the time of writing, a “follow the leader” capability is still in development, as is the ability to swarm. Teleoperation is usually conducted using a line-of-sight antenna. As such it is limited by terrain and range. In the case of the THeMIS, the line-of-sight range for control is up to 1,500 metres. This central limitation is clarified when overlaid with the proposed tasks of UGS outlined above.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="combat">Combat</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZLb65dQ.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>Figure 8: UGS as Fire Support</em></p> - -<p>Dismounted close combat is an inherently complex business. It involves rapid decisions, movement, adaptation to constantly changing dynamics, and the most intimate of command and control, communication and logistic interactions. As a result, such activity will remain the realm of humans. UGS are far from being able to close with and kill the enemy on an objective. There are simply too many variables for systems to manage coherently, and the systems’ vulnerabilities too many.</p> +<p>Attack operations, ISR, and targeting missions are the most common, as clearly shown in the Russia-Ukraine war. Both sides have used sUAS to search for enemy combatants and either target them directly or pass their location to other strike assets such as artillery to fire upon their position. Ukrainian soldiers have used the U.S. Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost UAS, for example, to directly target Russian tanks and personnel. Early failures in the war also prompted Russia to quickly increase the use of stand-off weaponry, including indigenous and foreign-made sUAS such as the Lancet-3 and Shahed-136, respectively. In general, the Russia-Ukraine war highlights how sUAS have enabled complex, integrated air attack through the wide proliferation of sensors. As others have warned about the modern battlefield, “What can be seen can be hit, and what can be hit can be destroyed.”</p> -<p>However, AI-enabled systems can add value by accurately sensing and categorising objects in their field of view, providing important information to the commander. Sensors and their respective algorithms can distinguish between types of vehicles, military and civilian, with great accuracy. One study showed a 97.25% to 99.5% detection rate at 2,000–5,000 metres, both during the day and at night. Another, using different methods, achieved accuracy of above 85%. The fact that these systems are not achieving 100% accuracy is not a reason for alarm. People are fallible and contend with issues of eyesight, optics, climate and fatigue when engaging in combat. For UGS, these figures will only improve with time and access to labelled datasets, which will in turn grow as the proliferation of UGS continues.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0bCZjBn.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Ukrainian Drone Minesweeper.</strong> UAS operators use drones for various missions outside of the six described above. Here a Ukrainian volunteer controls the flight of a drone carrying a metal detector to search for mines near the town of Derhachi, Kharkiv region, on October 1, 2023.</em></p> -<p>In the current state of development, armed UGS are probably better placed to provide supporting fires. This task would traditionally be done with a fire support section set off to a flank while another section carried out the assault. Supporting deliberate offensive action lends itself to the use of UGS, as the terrain can be analysed by commanders ahead of time. In this scenario, armed UGS are likely less suited to ad hoc offensive action and instead must be used deliberately. The idea of robots facing off against other robots while humans sit in a command bunker watching the action unfold is misleading. Placing three armed UGS in a fire support position with a human in the loop for engagement authority, and soldiers adhering to battlespace management boundaries, is a more realistic application, balancing well understood norms with novel technology. Equally, static defence tasks such as an anti-tank screen might be envisaged. This matches UGS’ and soldiers’ relative strengths.</p> +<p>Attack operations also include strikes on infrastructure and economic targets. In September 2019, Iran launched 18 sUAS and seven missiles to attack Saudi Arabian oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. The strike successfully evaded Saudi air defenses, including the U.S. Patriot, German Skyguard, and French Crotale, and struck their targets, leading Saudi Arabia to temporarily cut oil production by around 50 percent. In Ukraine, Russia has launched Iranian-made suicide drones to strike power grids.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="supply">Supply</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>sUAS-based assassination attempts — and successes — have also rocked several countries. In August 2018, a small insurgency group in Venezuela used a bomb-laden drone in a failed assassination attempt against President Nicolás Maduro. In January 2019, the Houthis in Yemen used a Qasef-1 UAS to assassinate senior Yemeni military officials. More recently in November 2021, Iranian-backed militias attempted to assassinate Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi after pro-Iran political groups had faced disappointing results in the elections.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Huo8mjk.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>Figure 9: UGS for Supply</em></p> +<p>Harassment and propaganda operations are also common. ISIS fighters made extensive use of commercial quadcopters and fixed-wing drones for surveillance, propaganda, and small but demoralizing tactical strikes. In January 2017, despite having a limited sUAS arsenal, the group formally announced a new drone unit known as “Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahideen.” In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan used its drone fleet to record video of its strikes against Armenian tanks and soldiers, replaying footage across the country and internationally. Iranian-backed groups have frequently launched sUAS and rocket attacks to harass U.S. embassies, businesses, and military personnel across the Middle East, which has occasionally led to counterattacks and rising escalation concerns.</p> -<p>Resupply is one of the more mature tasks for UGS, and this is one where most experimentation has been completed. At the larger scale, platoons of uncrewed heavy goods vehicles might be led by a crewed lead vehicle for logistic missions in rear areas. The logistic and movement constraints outlined mean that the use of UGS in rear areas is the place to focus attention. However, due to risk to personnel, current research focuses on autonomous “last mile” resupply. In fact, rear areas are also now vulnerable, in the face of persistent ISR and precision strike. There is, therefore, value in fielding UGS in these areas, where tasks and wayfinding are often more simple than using main supply routes. Fielding UGS here would also allow data collection, which is crucial for system improvement.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QiQp1yk.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: Select sUAS Combat Deployments.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Currently, it is likely that a human would still be involved in these tasks, providing a lead element to be followed, either on foot or in a crewed vehicle. However, UGS would still be useful, as logistic patrols are a significant burden on forces. Reducing crew requirements to free up soldiers to do other tasks is an important contribution of UGS. The urban environment provides an avenue through which UGS could be employed further forward, as moving between buildings leaves soldiers vulnerable.</p> +<h4 id="global-proliferation">Global Proliferation</h4> -<p>That said, a slow-moving UGS would be an easy target for enemy troops. There is a tension at the heart of the proposed use of UGS for burden carriage in combat scenarios. The dismounted troops who have the most to gain from having a system carry their equipment are also those who need to be able to move rapidly through complex terrain such as forests and urban environments. Smaller vehicles may be more agile, but they cannot carry that much equipment. While UGS could reduce what soldiers are carrying, they would add friction if they were unable to keep up in tactical movement in complex terrain due to technical limitations. There may be scope for these systems to follow units a tactical bound behind, but there is a risk that they could get stuck. This then becomes an additional constraint and planning consideration for commanders. Therefore, it is sensible for UGS to remain with companies or the battlegroup echelons, where movement will be more deliberate.</p> +<p>sUAS have spread globally over the past decade due to the technology’s dual use for both military and civilian applications. In addition to the military missions listed in the previous section, sUAS are used in various civilian activities, including filmmaking, law enforcement, emergency response, agriculture, delivery, and the protection of commercial facilities. Once sUAS technology advanced enough to become viable for these use cases, the commercial market boomed, which in turn has further fueled sUAS technology developments, facilitated the rise of commercial drone manufacturers, and created a massive, largely unregulated supply of these aircraft.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="reconnaissance">Reconnaissance</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HWK8KYf.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: The Path to sUAS Proliferation.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yjaWpdm.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>Figure 10: UGS in “Stay-Behind” Reconnaissance Function</em></p> +<p>Before the sUAS commercialization boom of the mid-2010s, manufacturers created moderately priced units with relatively rudimentary capabilities. The first remote-controlled drone to incorporate Wi-Fi, Parrot’s A.R. Drone, was released in 2010 and cost a modest $299 but had a battery life of only 12 minutes. Three years later Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI), the current commercial manufacturing titan in China, released its first drone, the Phantom 1, which sold for $379. This model featured an internal GPS but had a flight time of less than 10 minutes and a communication distance of only 1 km. Today, the cost of commercial sUAS has increased, typically ranging from $500 to $10,000, but new models offer significantly improved capabilities. DJI’s bestselling Mavic 3, which costs $2,049, offers 46 minutes of flight time, omnidirectional obstacle sensing, and a transmission range of 15 km at 1080p resolution. The cost-to-flight-time ratio between these DJI models increased by 17.5 percent, but the capabilities provided by the Mavic 3 opened the door to hundreds of commercial and hobbyist applications.</p> -<p>Employing UGS in a reconnaissance capacity would see lines of robots moving in front of the traditional human recce screen. At present, soldiers move ahead of the formation’s main body looking to spot the enemy before the enemy spots them. This enables shaping activity and for deliberate targeting by indirect fires to take place, which is preferable to having to react on someone else’s terms. Recce is also risky. Recce units are generally small, detached from the larger mass of their formation and susceptible to interdiction by the enemy, which is in turn looking to achieve the same effect in reverse.</p> +<p>China has since seized the sUAS market, with DJI accounting for over 60 percent of the market share for commercial sUAS in 2021. While market projections for commercial drones vary slightly, there is strong consensus that the market is thriving and shows no signs of slowing down, as exemplified by revenue of $2.7 billion in 2020 and a projected intake of $21.7 billion by 2030.</p> -<p>A concept proposed in the US supports deploying a forward line of RAS, thereby reducing risk to personnel. A forward line of sensors can probe positions for enemy activity, and potentially force them to unmask. This could be by moving and giving off a signature, be it heat or electromagnetic, or by engaging the UGS, which also gives away their position. However, the limitations discussed above demonstrate that this vision is a long way off for UGS. The use of UGS in this way would slow manoeuvre units to a crawl, making them susceptible to targeting from enemy fires. In addition, there would be significant burden in trying to manage their movement and make sense of their data. This task is best left to UAS. UGS with this function are best suited to static, and perhaps predesignated, roving sentry tasks, where they can support soldiers to maintain situational awareness over an area. A situation where UGS could be used as a “stay behind” capability as friendly troops withdraw is a more suitable use case, and more palatable than using soldiers in what is a very risky activity. Leaving UGS to identify the movement of enemy troops and vehicles and alert friendly forces plays to their strengths in image recognition. It also has the advantage of freeing up recce troops for additional tasks.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2bH8Vrn.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: DJI Development.</strong> Source: DJI.</em></p> -<p>The considerations for deployment in these three areas can be mapped across to the other potential tasks outlined earlier in the paper. Those tasks that require high levels of mobility remain under the purview of UAS. CBRN threat monitoring and radio rebroadcasting can be achieved by UAS, although there may be times when UGS are better suited to the tactical situation. This chapter has considered the technological limitations associated with various types of UGS, and has applied these to tactical formations. The next chapter looks at the enabling activities needed to ensure that UGS are in the right place in working order.</p> +<p>The commercial drone sector has driven technological advances, rather than these advances trickling down from military UAS. This growth has mostly been spurred on by the smartphone industry. Radio-controlled aircraft moved from using petrol engines to electric motors and the lithium batteries used in modern smartphones. With internal combustion engines prone to excessive vibration, electric motors have become increasingly popular, particularly for sUAS. Critically, the extensive lithium battery market has allowed operators to choose battery packs that fit their desired performance, flight time, and endurance without massive price increases. The recent interest in and testing of UAS-compatible lithium-sulfur batteries may offer an even cheaper option in the coming years. The leveraging of existing high-speed cellular networks has also allowed for broader UAS accessibility and lower associated costs. Overall, as one expert aptly explained, “Drones have really been riding the smartphone revolution.”</p> -<h3 id="v-how-do-ugs-get-to-and-stay-in-the-fight">V. How Do UGS Get to, and Stay in, the Fight?</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YeeeAKp.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Agricultural Drones.</strong> A Kenya Airways employee controls a drone as it spreads fertilizer over a tea farm at Kipkebe Tea Estate in Musereita on October 21, 2022.</em></p> -<p>Military logistics have been brought into sharp relief by the war in Ukraine. The true potential of UGS can only be unlocked if they are in the right place at the right time for the right task. Like other military equipment, UGS will need to be transported to the area of operations. The size and ability of the system will determine how this might happen. Factoring UGS into future lift capability, on land, at sea and in the air, is important for planners. Military lift capacity is a limiting factor to the success of deployments. Every system that is transported takes up space that cannot be used by another piece of equipment. The military benefit in theatre must therefore be clear. Units and formations are responsible for devising field equipment tables for the kit they need in theatre to do their job while deployed. UGS will feature in these considerations going forward. There is little capacity for superfluous equipment. Larger armoured systems such as the Milrem Type-X, a 12-tonne uncrewed system equipped with 50-mm cannon to support main battle tanks, or the 10-tonne General Dynamics TRX, will need dedicated logistic support. Larger vehicles are moved by aircraft or low-loader trucks and ferries. In the near term, all these options require human crew, emphasising the reliance of UGS on people. Smaller systems such as the Milrem THeMIS, which is the size of a small car, can be towed behind a parent vehicle until they are required. That parent vehicle will need to meet specific towing requirements, such as height of hitch. In the case of the THeMIS, the speed at which it can be towed is three times as fast as it can move itself – 80 km per hour, rather than 20 km per hour. Moving UGS from an initial railhead, port or airfield to the area in which they will be employed must be planned for in detail.</p> +<p>The military sUAS market has similarly increased in size and platform diversity over the last decade. There is limited reporting specifically on sUAS market trends, but the wider military UAS market features many Groups 2 and 3 platforms and shows clear signs of rapid expansion. Between 2011 and 2021, the military UAS market grew by nearly $10 billion, from $1.7 billion to $11.6 billion. As commercial markets and systems proliferated, indigenous military programs also promptly appeared, offering to enhance and counter the new technological capabilities available. An October 2020 study estimated that 102 countries possessed an active drone program compared to an estimated 60 countries in 2010. Additionally, of the reported 171 active military drone models in 2019, roughly 143 were sUAS. Militaries have also successfully harnessed the cheap and easy-to-use format of commercial systems while increasing the reliability and security needed for military operations.</p> -<p>The totality of the system must be considered, including power supply. If the UGS are battery powered, how and where are these batteries charged, and who does the charging? Which echelon should be burdened with the charging capability? Battery technology is relatively nascent, and stamina remains low. On battery power, the THeMIS has a runtime of just one and a half hours. In hybrid mode, using its diesel engine, it has a runtime of 15 hours. Low-level battery management for existing equipment such as radios already requires planning and demands electricity, which may be provided by the mains, generators or other vehicles.</p> +<p>The general utility of sUAS reinforce their proliferation. Russia has imported the Iranian Shahed-136 in large numbers to support its operations in Ukraine while also relying on domestic systems such as the Orlan-10. Prior to its operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan procured large numbers of Israeli sUAS, which Azerbaijani operators used effectively against Armenian combatants. Growing normalization of sUAS as tools of war points toward a shifting military landscape in which sUAS will regularly be relied upon in order to achieve mission success.</p> -<p>Another consideration for UGS is where repair and battery charging take place. In the case of crewed vehicles, the crew can fix small errors and conduct simple repair jobs. For instance, great pride is taken by tank and artillery howitzer crews in their ability to fix a track if one becomes dislodged. UGS will not have the luxury of an on-hand repair crew. This means that resource must be dedicated to recovering systems once broken. Repair functions in military forces have become eroded in recent times, as systems have become more complex and manufacturers retain the right to repair. The ability to repair equipment and keep it on the battlefield has been shown to be crucial in the conflict in Ukraine. For instance, a third of Ukraine’s howitzers are out of service for repair at any one time. Repairing technical equipment is often left to contractors rather than completed in place, even for well-established capabilities that are in service. Sensors and computer systems, no matter the platform on which they sit, are vulnerable, despite ruggedisation by the manufacturers. Holding UGS back several bounds until they are used for a discrete task before being recovered will allow more sustained repair operations than can be offered at lower formations.</p> +<p>Given the wide commercial and civilian applications of sUAS, international regulatory efforts to stem sUAS proliferation have fallen short. In October 2016, 53 nations, including the United States, issued a joint declaration that attempted to start the process of building a basic framework for international UAS standards, but it failed to spur meaningful action. A framework demanding sUAS buyers and sellers to comply to specific obligations had the potential to hinder exports and create strains with legitimate trading partners. In addition, China’s absence from the declaration inhibited its possibility of success from the start. Having taken control of a significant share of the global UAS market, Beijing was, and continues to be, unlikely to allow any regulation that negatively affects its exports.</p> -<p>Managing demand for UGS by frontline units is another concern for planners. As in the case of UAS earlier in their development, demand for their support far outstrips UGS supply. It is still the case that larger and more capable UAS are held at divisional or corps level and assigned to discrete tasks depending on a commander’s decision. Specific recommendations for UGS are difficult to outline without firm knowledge of the types and numbers of systems to be procured. They will likely be a scarce resource for some time. However, forces should be wary of putting manoeuvre units in permanent possession of larger, more capable UGS. If soldiers are having to consider what their UGS are doing instead of fighting the enemy, then the systems have been misemployed. Tactical units should bid for UGS support as they currently do for aircraft. In this framework, bids for support from aircraft are submitted while formations are planning for future operations. The demand for aircraft for offensive support, moving people or cargo, or providing reconnaissance and surveillance, generally outstrips supply, as platforms are scarce. To that end, units make bids for capability, and a central cell determines who gets what and when. This generally works on a rolling 72-hour time horizon tied to the operational area’s planning cycles.</p> +<p>Even if a regulatory body were established, it is unclear how helpful it would be in removing sUAS from modern battlefields. Clear rules for manufacturers or regulations on military sUAS transfers would not decrease the wide availability of commercial drones or components of these systems, which can easily be adapted for military use even by non-state actors. According to a 2018 West Point report, ISIS displayed overall diversification within its commercial drone supply chain. For the nine quadcopters associated with ISIS operations, engineers built the final units after acquiring various components from seven retailers in five different countries. ISIS’s piecemeal production of UAS is also not an isolated practice. The Houthis in Yemen follow a similar pattern. For example, the Sammad-pattern UAS engine originated in Germany before making its way to Israel, then Iran, and eventually into the hands of Houthi engineers in Yemen. Given this substantial supply of cheap components spread across multiple business sectors, and the ease with which it crosses international borders, increasing regulations around sUAS is unlikely to stem proliferation and use.</p> -<p>Currently, formations bid for a primary and secondary asset to provide support. The primary would be ideal, but may be tasked elsewhere, so a second, different asset should also be identified. In this case, with UGS in their infancy, the secondary course of action should employ established capabilities. This will mitigate against undue reliance on UGS while the capability is nascent.</p> +<p>As sUAS continue to develop and improve upon existing capabilities within the civilian and commercial markets, potential applications have continued to grow. There is little chance of putting the genie back in the bottle. The United States and its allies must develop active defenses to address these highly proliferated systems and deploy them as required based on expected risks and vulnerabilities.</p> -<h4 id="network">Network</h4> +<h4 id="future-threats">Future Threats</h4> -<p>It is not just the physical systems that need to be in place. UGS with a reconnaissance or surveillance function need to be able to relay that information back to commanders, using a robust communications network. That network may also need to permit some UGS to pass information among themselves, either to corroborate a potential target if more than one system can “see” it, or to help them avoid obstacles. Equally, commanders may need to issue instructions to the UGS for a task. The electromagnetic spectrum is not an unlimited resource, and different capabilities must be deconflicted. Radars may interfere with aircraft if their systems operate within the same band. The network needs to remain available and have enough capacity to pass information around. This is the focus of major experiments, such as the Project Convergence series, in which a resilient network is identified as a “backbone” to enable large amounts of data to be passed around. This is easier said than done. Militaries use a host of different communication systems and bearers, from radios through to satellites. The network needs to have low latency, be efficient in its use of bandwidth, and be secure from enemy interference. All additional interactions with these networks provide adversaries with opportunities to interfere. They may look to jam or spoof UGS. Robust countermeasures will need to be in place, or UGS will suffer in the same way UAS have in Ukraine, with 10,000 systems lost a month. What is more, the network needs to be interoperable with those of allies and partner forces. Importantly, it is likely that the network will be provided by a different company, or set of companies, than those who have built the UGS. A variety of bearers, data links and data standards make interoperability very complex. In a contested network space, prioritisation of the information being transmitted is important.</p> +<p>Technological developments over the next few years will further empower sUAS. The rise of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) is perhaps the most common concern. As the JCO warned in their 2021 report: “The impending integration of artificial intelligence with autonomous sUAS will introduce yet another dramatic change to the character of warfare.” Software is already enabling rapid leaps in UAS autonomy. As one CSIS report explains:</p> -<h4 id="adversary-activity">Adversary Activity</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>Traditional software is sufficient to deliver a high degree of autonomy for some military applications. For example, the Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) Harpy is a decades-old uncrewed drone that IAI openly acknowledges is an autonomous weapon. When in autonomous mode, the Harpy loiters over a given region for up to nine hours, waiting to detect electromagnetic emissions consistent with an onboard library of enemy radar, homes in on the emissions source (usually enemy air defense radar), and attacks. No human in the loop is required.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>While providing opportunity for friendly forces, the proliferation of UGS also provides options for the adversary. This might include jamming GPS or seizing control of systems using electronic warfare means. Systems with automated navigation and reconnaissance capabilities are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks on their software. Here, machine learning and AI models can be “attacked” by objects in the physical environment, where an input specifically designed by an adversary can cause a system to act in an unamenable way. An understanding of a system’s software architecture and logics can allow an adversary to confuse a system and reduce its effectiveness, or deduce the information on which it has been trained. Researchers tricked an autonomous vehicle into misidentifying a stop sign as a 45 miles per hour sign, a mistake that could have had catastrophic consequences. Subtly altered images that look normal to humans can fool AI. In one study, a 3D-printed model of a turtle was specifically designed to trick a computer into thinking it was a rifle, which it did at every angle it was presented to the camera. Such activity is worrying in relation to sensors that seek out targets in a given area, as there are rules of engagement in which possession of a rifle might allow targeting. This shows the importance of maintaining meaningful human control in such systems. Adversarial activity is also troublesome in relation to more benign UGS with logistic functions that may be convinced to stop or get trapped maliciously by adversary action.</p> +<p>As these autonomous capabilities proliferate further, defenders will be forced to pivot away from detect and defeat platforms based on radio frequency (RF).</p> -<p>This said, the ability for real-world adversarial attacks to be successful is limited. The complexity of defeating multiple sensors in the physical world outside a research environment is a significant barrier, and may simply make such attacks uneconomical. Some of the ability to counter adversary activity will be built into systems by developers. However, military users who are alive to the threat will be better able to manage it, which raises the importance of awareness and understanding, discussed in the next section.</p> +<p>Advances in AI/ML may also enable sUAS swarms. These are large, coordinated, and at least semi-autonomous group operations; thus far, there have been few if any attacks that fit this strict definition. Yet even small, human-controlled group attacks have proven capable. The 2019 Houthi attack on two Saudi Aramco oil facilities only employed 10 drones but still degraded business operations for some time. Commercial drone shows have operated with more than 3,000 drones. Once mass drone swarm technology is established, it will be an increasingly difficult threat to intercept. In those cases, the best options for defenders may be “left-of-launch” strikes on C2 nodes and ground control stations associated with the attack.</p> -<h4 id="force-design">Force Design</h4> +<p>Adversary sUAS may increasingly communicate through cell towers, making RF-based detect and defeat difficult. Under this environment, defenses would need to differentiate between sUAS communications and regular cellular transmissions. Even if sensors can adapt, RF-based defeat would then need to degrade those communications without disrupting cellular transmissions using those same frequencies. As JCO director Sean Gainey explained in 2022, sUAS operators are “building in redundancy in these systems where if you cut off something, they can fall back on something else.”</p> -<p>Force structures will look different as UGS become more prevalent. Maintaining the same force structure and simply adding UGS on top will not maximise advantage. One frequent claim is that robots will replace soldiers in some cases. However, it is unlikely that this will be a zero-sum relationship, in which more robots can lead to forces having fewer soldiers. The British Army is experimenting with how force structures might change via its Experimentation and Trials Group, and initiatives such as the Phalanx platoon, which has reimagined the traditional platoon structure for when more uncrewed assets are integrated. In the near to mid-term, a rebalancing of forces into support functions may be required, as the example below demonstrates.</p> +<p>Lastly, U.S. policymakers must also prepare for creative sUAS use in the battlefield. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, for example, Azerbaijan reportedly modified older aircraft to function uncrewed and used these aircraft to draw fire and locate Armenian air defenses. Russia has used similar tactics in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russian operators have also developed tactics such as piloting near buildings to exploit sensor blind spots, launching UAS away from operator locations to avoid counterattacks, and spoofing Ukrainian defenses to falsely register a large number of UAS and ground control stations. UAS operators have enormous freedom of action and can adapt tactics quickly, whereas defenders typically do not have such flexibility.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="force-design-lessons-from-uas"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Force Design Lessons from UAS</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1CmCB1k.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Drones in Formation.</strong> South Korea’s military drones fly in formation during a South Korea–U.S. joint military drill at Seungjin Fire Training Field in Pocheon on May 25, 2023.</em></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">One must look at the whole uncrewed ecosystem to see the interdependencies and how an army with many uncrewed systems might look. The best real examples today involve UAS, as the more mature capability. The British Army’s Watchkeeper is a fixed-wing surveillance UAS. It measures six by ten metres and weighs 450 kg, requiring a runway to operate. It operates on a line of sight data link with an endurance of around 14 hours and a range of 150 km. While it has no pilot inside the aircraft, the personnel and logistic tail is significant. The aircraft is operated by two pilots in a ground control station, with a third required at times. A nuance here is that military pilots can only have an eight-hour duty period, which includes flight planning. Given this, for Watchkeeper to be used at full capacity, two or even three sets of pilots are required. Watchkeeper does not have the ability to taxi and does not have ground brakes, as a weight saving measure, increasing endurance. To this end, it employs a groundcrew of seven to ten people, depending on experience levels and instructor requirements. The groundcrew tow the aircraft to the take off point and run pre-take off computer scripts alongside the pilots in the ground control station. They also set up the cable system that is used to recover the aircraft on landing. Away from the runway sits an engineering detachment of around 20 people. It conducts routine maintenance on the aircraft and keeps it airworthy. It also constructs and dismantles the aircraft when it is loaded into shipping containers for transport. It is supported by two field service representatives from the aircraft’s manufacturer. These people provide technical support and a link back to industry, which can provide in-depth technical support when needed. In addition, a command and flight operations staff of between five and ten people manages the sorties and liaises with wider airfield stakeholders. It manages the risk profile of the aircraft’s flights and provides the wider support wrap to the soldiers in the detachment.</code></em></p> +<h3 id="detecting-and-defeating-suas">Detecting and Defeating sUAS</h3> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In this case, one uncrewed system requires a wider staff of over 40 people for it to operate in a benign environment on an established operational airfield. What is more, the infrastructure required to store, transport and maintain the aircraft is a significant footprint.</code></em></p> +<p><em>A variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities are available to defeat sUAS. Each of these tools have unique strengths and weaknesses in regard to survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and defended area.</em></p> -<p>While exact roles and ratios may vary, this example is indicative of the challenge of employing uncrewed systems. While such systems technically remove soldiers from a frontline task, the tail of necessary support will likely be extensive, at least in the short to medium term. For example, the key enabler for UGS is the availability of engineers to keep systems running. New technical trades focused on computer-systems engineering will be needed. Software changes rapidly, and it is likely that the burden of keeping engineers up to date with latest developments will be considerable. In turn, this will mean new courses will need to be designed, with an important question being: who would be the right authority to design such courses? These courses will then need to be run from a base, requiring accommodation, classrooms and hangars. The integration of UGS fundamentally changes the size and shape of the force using them.</p> +<p>sUAS pose unique challenges to air defense. They exploit gaps in sensing because they are small and fly low. They also exploit cost asymmetries — they are usually cheap and numerous, while air defense interceptors are not. They even exploit the way air defense is organized by equipping individual combatants to achieve tactical and strategic effects, while the United States and its allies mostly deploy air defense at the company level or higher.</p> -<p>This section has made it clear that humans will be the key enabler for UGS – they will move them around the battlefield, they will fix them and they will manage them, at least in the near to medium term. Thus, while it is seemingly logical to focus on technology, it is the soldier who will unlock that technology’s potential, and indeed use it as they see fit, which will be discussed in the next chapter.</p> +<p>Despite these differences across size, flight, costs, and quantities, the overall air defense kill chain is essentially the same. Air defense — as defined broadly — means detecting and defeating airborne threats flying from surface to space. That process can be illustrated in various ways, as shown in Table 5. The sensors, effectors, and C2 platforms involved in this kill chain all have unique characteristics that determine their effectiveness and where they are deployed, as shown in Table 6.</p> -<h3 id="vi-how-to-make-sure-soldiers-use-them">VI. How to Make Sure Soldiers Use Them</h3> +<p>The following sections define the sensor, effector, and C2 missions, and explore different C-sUAS modalities, their respective strengths and weaknesses, and example platforms for each.</p> -<p>Integrating new technologies into a force is difficult and should not be considered on a solely technical basis. Scaling the use of UGS across a land force is a deliberate organisational change programme. This chapter examines the role of experimentation, training and trust on the route to successful HMT. Actual future users of UGS, not the abstractions of experimentation, must be front and centre in these endeavours.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/liqIcPz.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 5: The Air Defense Kill Chain.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>It is a mistake to assume that soldiers use equipment given to them in the way intended by designers. One trial saw soldiers continually overload a UGS, as its capacity was not enough for their needs. This led to the system overheating. At the other end of the scale, it should not be assumed that soldiers will use UGS at all. A host of factors interact to determine how soldiers use the kit they are issued. These might include previous experience, who trained them and when they were trained. One example here is personal load-carrying equipment. The British Army brought in a new type of body armour and load-carrying equipment – Virtus. However, many soldiers opted to keep using their old equipment, as it better suited their purposes. They could carry all their equipment, they knew where everything went, and it had worked so far in their career.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/A0srXW1.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 6: C-sUAS Platform Considerations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<h4 id="experimentation">Experimentation</h4> +<h4 id="sensors">Sensors</h4> -<p>Experimentation is important for understanding the utility of new capability. New technologies are generally examined and researched for a broad use case. Then they will be handed over to troops for a pilot programme, before potentially being rolled out more widely. For all the talk of the importance of such technology in future warfighting, there is little evidence that forces have started to integrate UGS on a regular and even basis. Many soldiers are not being exposed to uncrewed technologies, even if forces may think they are. UGS integration is vulnerable to becoming stuck in an experimental purgatory, on a small scale that disenfranchises the rest of the force. An order from the Dutch Army Command to a single officer was to “just get started and explore the possibilities” of RAS. While an admirable aspiration, this is too tentative. Experimentation often takes place with a limited audience for practical reasons of scale. However, this small scale can have a deleterious effect on the success of the experiment. US Major General James Dubik refers to this increase in scale as “expanding the experimental ground”. Simulation may offer one route to democratising the experimentation process. Bohemia Interactive’s “virtual battlespace” simulation software, in use with the British military, has integrated several of the UGS discussed in this paper, for example the THeMIS. Terminals are widely available throughout the British defence estate and accessible to troops, should they be given the time to make use of them. With simulation, there is less reliance on access to physical systems, of which there are not many. Simulations allow soldiers to test approaches and witness the strengths and weaknesses of the UGS outlined above, confirming appropriate use cases. It is, however, difficult to say yet how this will impact the integration of UGS into the force, or actual future use.</p> +<p>Radar has long been the primary sensor used to detect and track aerial threats. The traditional approach leverages wide-area surveillance radars and highly focused tracking radars to respectively detect and track incoming aircraft and ballistic missiles. Detecting sUAS in this way, however, is hard. As mentioned earlier, sUAS typically fly below typical air defense radar coverage. Perhaps even more problematic is their slow speeds and small profile, which combined creates a very limited radar signature for detection and tracking.</p> -<p>Another difficulty in experimentation and novel procurement is the military’s propensity to replace like with like. As a result of this propensity, force structures look very similar to how they did 50 years ago. There is difficulty in identifying truly disruptive innovations because they do not look like what the organisation is currently doing. This limits organisations’ openness to the truly disruptive potential of UGS. Indeed, the discussion above itself adds UGS to existing structures, techniques and tactics. It may be the case that using entirely novel tactics may be the way to gain competitive advantage. This is where extensive experimentation with many members of the force should be considered. Giving soldiers the freedom to troubleshoot and use the system without preordained norms may lead to unexpected and beneficial findings.</p> +<p>This is not to say that active radar does not work against sUAS. Active radar remains one of the predominant means for detecting sUAS at longer ranges as compared to other sensor modalities. Radar is also more capable under adverse weather conditions and less sensitive to countermeasures compared to other sensors. Radars, however, can be large, heavy, and power intensive, thereby reducing mobility unless mounted on a vehicle. They also emit a signature that can be easily detected, making the operator’s location vulnerable to attack. Radars also must be optimized to see smaller objects, thus reducing their detection range.</p> -<p>Timelines for the introduction of UGS into land forces are tentative. The British Army’s RAS strategy uses horizons stretching out to 2035 for the integration of RAS, despite them having been part of force structures for decades already. Making use of corporate knowledge developed in the UAS world can help ease the frictions of integrating UGS. The US military’s timeline is more assured, but progress towards its ambitions is uncertain. The Project Convergence series of experiments led by the US hopes to merge capabilities between partner nations in the pursuit of effective integration and increased lethality.</p> +<p>Another common method to detect sUAS today is electronic surveillance measures, also known as passive radio frequency. This detection method allows defenders to identify the wireless signals used to control the UAS. Some passive RF capabilities show the location of both the sUAS and the operator. As one Department of Homeland Security report explains, C-sUAS may “use libraries of known UAS radio signatures and compare detected signals to those in the library in order to classify or identify UAS.” These sensors listen to sUAS communications via control stations, satellites, cell towers, or drone relays. A key concern with passive RF, however, is that sUAS are moving away from RF control, making current detection and defeat capabilities obsolete.</p> -<p>Lethargy is common in military decision-making, and it is important that UGS do not fall into the trap that so often ensnares military procurement. The phenomenon whereby innovative technologies receive government funding but fail to make it into the hands of warfighters is known as the “Valley of Death”. Indeed, it appears that with AI being perceived as a potential silver bullet for many military issues, and RAS and UGS being the physical embodiment of that technology, militaries are having to hedge and spread their bets over a wide variety of initiatives. For example, the UK’s Defence and Security Accelerator has awarded more than £180 million to 1,065 different projects, an average of just £169,000 per serial. This is slightly less than the annual capitation rate of a single software engineer with the professional background and resources to develop this technology meaningfully. Increasing focus on those capabilities that show potential for the use cases described above is a potential route to success. Signalling commitment to the cause and allowing industry to plan accordingly is a key output of any RAS and UGS strategy. Indeed, the extended period of experimentation seen so far that has not led to serious expansion may in fact signal to industry to disinvest from research and development of UGS.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3FjZUp7.png" alt="image13" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: RADA Radar.</strong> Source: DRS.</em></p> -<p>The buy-in of top-level leadership is also crucial to successfully instigating change in an organisation. In the case of military experimentation, there can be a propensity for general officers to only attend “distinguished visitors’ days”, which are designed specifically for show, providing an element of innovation theatre. These sessions involve orchestrated demonstrations to show best-case scenarios. They also often take place at the end of an exercise period, in which frictions and realities have been found and then solved or worked around. Multiple rehearsals take place and minute details are agreed on by the deliverers. Such opportunities give industry representatives access to senior officers, and will often be identified as a career-enhancing event for the organisers. This can lead to true frictions being masked, and often means that the generals who hold authority for novel equipment programmes do not have an accurate and holistic picture of the state of play. Moreover, the tendency of armed forces personnel to move roles every two to three years means that only a general, rather than deep, level of understanding can be achieved. In a fast-moving technological environment, this is inimical to progress.</p> +<p>Due to the detection liability of radar, C-sUAS designers often seek to combine RF detection and radars within a single platform. The FS-LIDS (Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System) is an example of a system supported by the JCO that incorporates both detection methods. The multi-layer detection capabilities of FS-LIDS allow operators to better conduct countermeasures that align with the given target and environment. However, a combination of sensors is not a necessity. EnforceAir is another JCO-supported system that uses RF for both detection and defeat. Nevertheless, sUAS operators can adapt to RF sensors. In July 2022, for example, a British defense firm developed a laser-controlled drone that will be undetectable by current RF sensors. Suicide drones, also known as one-way attack munitions or loitering munitions, may use an onboard inertial navigation system to allow sUAS to operate without alerting RF sensors. Russia has extensively used the Iranian Shahed-136 drone as a loitering munition in attacks on Ukraine.</p> -<h4 id="trust">Trust</h4> +<p>Other sensor modalities include electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), and acoustic sensors to detect a target by its visual, heat, or sound signatures, respectively. These sensors are helpful in providing additional confirmation of a nearby sUAS threat but are rarely used as a standalone sensor. EO, IR, and acoustic sensors have very limited operational ranges. For example, the EnforceAir’s RF sensor has a radius of approximately 3 km, while the Discovair G2 acoustic sensor has an estimated range of 500 m. Additionally, potential countermeasures are fairly simple, including, for example, flooding a battlefield with noise that degrades acoustic sensor capabilities. For these reasons, EO, IR, and acoustic sensors are often used in combination with active or passive radar to provide a more effective, layered detection capability.</p> -<p>A significant barrier to successful integration of UGS is trust. The desired human–technology relationship is often framed in terms of trust. This suggests there will always be some level of uncertainty about the workings of such systems, including UGS with some degree of autonomous function. Definitions of trust are numerous, and it is not feasible to give a full review of definitions here. One usable and well-cited definition of trust is, “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”. To get their full utility, soldiers must embrace these systems and trust them to complete a task. Another conception is that trust in AI-related technology is a contractual one. A system can be considered trustworthy if it can maintain the contract made with a human operator. That is, the system will carry out the given task.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MXZiIVC.png" alt="image14" /> +<img src="https://i.imgur.com/RArqeqf.png" alt="image15" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 7: C-sUAS Sensor Strengths and Weaknesses.</strong> Source: Characteristics from Department of Homeland Security; images from SRC Technologies, U.S. Department of Defense, Squarehead Technologies, and D-Fend Solutions.</em></p> -<p>Computer models that allow some level of autonomous activity are necessarily complex. There is a lack of transparency in many machine learning and AI models. When working with another soldier, it is possible to ask them why they made a decision, and person-to-person interaction is a norm with which all are familiar. This becomes more difficult with a “black box” scenario, where the decision-making process is opaque and not fully understood by the user. Trust is built slowly, but lost rapidly in the face of failure. Unless a system is fully explicable, a sceptical soldier is unable to query UGS as to why they want to act or have acted in a particular way. The military has many examples where lack of trust would cause a breakdown in operational effectiveness. The most obvious is a targeting system where a machine alerts a human operator to the potential presence of the enemy. Scepticism rather than over-trusting here is preferable, where a soldier checks the information before potentially suggesting an engagement through appropriate means. A more nuanced example would be the willingness of soldiers to load injured comrades on to UGS tasked with moving the casualties back to an aid post or hospital. The soldiers may think they could get there faster, and they might well be right. One study showed soldiers opting to manually control a UGV rather than trusting it to follow waypoints or a leader.</p> +<h4 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h4> -<p>Many studies of autonomous systems are focused on the ethics and practice of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Moreover, this discussion is often happening between civilian commentators. There has been much less research on the importance of various design features to active-duty service people. One study found a direct friction between maintaining meaningful control and understanding on the one hand, and maintaining the increased operational tempo that uncrewed and autonomous systems are hoped to unlock, on the other. Soldiers need to be able to rapidly verify a system’s suggestions and decisions without having to work through the entire evidence body, which would render the system moot. To that end, Jai Galliott and Austin Wyatt suggest that confidence measures in observations by UGS should be accessible to soldiers. Such measures would not be infallible, because of the technical reasons and potential for adversarial action discussed above. Therefore, a secondary suggestion by respondents to the study cited above was for systems to have a means of both simply describing their planned actions and of confirming that UGS have “understood” their operator’s commands. It would be worthwhile to consult a wide user base on this issue, rather than only people who happen to be in small experimental units, which may be more by luck than judgement.</p> +<p>Command and control (C2) is a critical element of C-sUAS operations, as it is for all air defense. Broadly speaking, C2 is the “exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.” A fundamental element of C-sUAS C2 is the centralized development of operational procedures that will enable decentralized execution of C-sUAS operations. Execution of the C-sUAS mission, in the near term, will be localized to the threatened asset or unit, and engagement authority will rest with the local commander and possibly junior leaders, who will make decisions based on the predefined rules of engagement. These tasks include integrating sensor data (from sources such as radar, cameras, and direction finders), classifying and identifying incoming threats, and transmitting this information among sensors and shooters to queue up responses. C2 operations require the creation of a common operational picture and share that intelligence with all relevant stakeholders.</p> -<p>Equally, there is a fear of over-trust. Overestimating the ability of UGS will lead equally to an inefficient allocation of resources. This makes the process of integration and education throughout the force all the more important. Trust in automated systems has led to accidents in both conflict situations and commercial aviation. In Kuwait in 2003, a US Patriot detachment shot down a British Tornado, killing both pilots. The Patriot crew had acted on indicators given by the system’s computer. The best way to build trust is to develop understanding, which is the subject of the next section.</p> +<p>While detecting sUAS presents the most commonly identified challenge, as previously discussed, sUAS also present a significant identification challenge. Over the near term, identification will depend more on context or procedures than specific Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems that confirm an sUAS’s affiliation. As a Joint Staff report explains, many U.S. UAS “do not have IFF capability and are similar or identical to threat [UAS].” C-sUAS rules of engagement (ROE) will therefore depend on the operational environment and threat intelligence, with ROE able to tighten or loosen as necessary. Future C-sUAS platforms may feature improved non-cooperative threat recognition capabilities, but for now ROE will determine whether defenders can shoot at incoming sUAS rather than pursue the identification of the object.</p> -<h4 id="socialisation">Socialisation</h4> +<p>C2 for C-sUAS has improved significantly over the past few years, becoming increasingly open and interoperable. In July 2020, the DoD designated the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) system as the interim C2 system for C-sUAS. The FAAD C2 system provides a single integrated air picture that combines a suite of sensors, effectors, and other C2 systems given operational requirements. JCO director Sean Gainey noted the superiority of the FAAD C2 compared to alternatives, specifically noting its fire control capabilities. The rapidly evolving C-sUAS threat requires C2 development to build upon FAAD C2’s successes. The ultimate goal, in the eyes of Gainey and the JCO writ large, is to create an “open architecture standard based C2 system” that can be configured according to specific threat analysis.</p> -<p>As UGS proliferate, it is important for as many soldiers as possible to be exposed to them early in a safe manner. This is crucial to building the trust that is a precursor to success in HMT. Familiarity breeds trust, but military forces are poor at introducing soldiers to capabilities that are not their core system. Familiarity can also build favourability, whereby soldiers and commanders are willing to lean on these capabilities when planning operations. Such favourability is not a given. The more that soldiers are exposed to UGS, in whatever guise, the better they will understand them and the more likely they are to become ambassadors. As noted above, building trust is crucial to the full integration of UGS. Importantly, it is recognised that trust will not be developed solely by developers improving software outcomes over time. Instead, most gaps in trust “won’t be solved by code but by conversation”.</p> +<p>The current functions of FAAD C2 thus reveal the baseline of JCO C2 development. Currently FAAD C2 is hosted on a SRNC-17 laptop computer and Dell 7212 tablet computer, emphasizing the need for portable command functions. The extensive integration with sensors and communication systems also highlights the need for mature joint operation potential. FAAD C2 is deployed and integrated with 25 sensors, including AN/MPG-64 Sentinel and Ku-band Radio Frequency System (KuRFS) radars, and five communications systems, including Link 16 and Joint Range Extension Application Protocol.</p> -<p>This conversation might take place in several ways. The crucial step is to safely move UGS from being only in the hands of experimenters into those areas which see a large throughput of troops. These are most likely to be training establishments, both for initial training and for later tactical training. The first way is during military training and education. If military forces are not including modules on UGS in basic training, they should do so immediately. This might be as simple as a classroom discussion or presentation. Better still would be a physical demonstration using UGS. This could be a short session where a UGS’ capability is demonstrated to soldiers under training. The seemingly small act of having a trainee lie on a stretcher mounted to a UGS and travel a short distance would have manifest training benefits. As mentioned above, there is also an opportunity for simulation to play a role in widening the population of troops with exposure to UGS.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/90FhqAk.png" alt="image16" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: The LIDS Family.</strong> The LIDS family of systems uses a range of passive and active sensors to detect, track, and identify UAS and non-hostile aircraft. Source: U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center.</em></p> -<p>The second area for consideration would be training areas and firing ranges. Large numbers of troops who have gone through basic training pass through these facilities each year. Forces undergoing range work could integrate a serial using a UGS. This could include UGS with a remote weapon system providing overhead fire, a task currently done by soldiers. This would build trust and understanding and increase the audience exposed to such systems. Equally, many range serials involve a simulated casualty evacuation. A “casualty” will be designated by the training staff, and the soldiers will have to give first aid and use a stretcher to evacuate the soldier to a safe area. An uncrewed ground system with a stretcher could be in place on the range and used to show its utility and allow soldiers to interact with novel systems. Pitting a human team against an uncrewed ground system would begin to show soldiers and commanders where and how UGS can be most usefully employed – they do not necessarily need to learn this from an instructional leaflet produced by a faraway department. Instead, troops would be enfranchised by direct experience. These activities would also create additional data for the manufacturer about usage and failure rates.</p> +<h4 id="effectors">Effectors</h4> -<h4 id="siloes">Siloes</h4> +<p>The DoD has developed a variety of kinetic, directed energy, and RF-based defenses against sUAS. These tools all come with their own strengths and weaknesses. As is constantly repeated in the C-sUAS community, there is no “silver bullet” effector to defeat these threats.</p> -<p>State defence enterprises are large organisations. They consist of tens of thousands or more personnel. There are central departments or ministries and single services, as well as research laboratories such as the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency. Both the US and the UK have directorates dedicated to scanning the future and identifying concepts and capabilities that might be brought into forces. UGS are such a capability. It is not uncommon for people within defence ministries or the single services to not be aware of complementary activity that is taking place elsewhere within the organisation. This is a significant friction, and it prevents progress. In the UK, for example, DSTL, the Ministry of Defence Head Office and the Army Futures Directorate, which owns the HMT programme, all explore UGS. In addition, commercially, Defence Equipment and Support leads the procurement and delivery of UGS into the force. There is also the Experimentation and Trials Group, which leads experimentation with UGS. Moreover, there is a series of defence technology accelerators and innovation hubs. This list does not take into account the bulk of Army personnel who will become the users of UGS. These people should be the focus of UGS implementation. Within this large cohort, there will be a mixture of experience, aptitude and interest in UGS. If this community could be successfully tapped and exploited, there would be significant additional capacity to enhance the integration of UGS into land forces.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TVlS7Uy.png" alt="image17" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 8: Example C-sUAS Effectors by Defeat Mechanism and Basing.</strong> Note: Many systems listed here feature multiple deployment configurations and effectors. This table is illustrative and not comprehensive, intended to show the range of C-sUAS on the market. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>With such a wide breadth of activity, it is difficult to know who, if anyone, fully understands the totality of UGS research and development. Equally, within forces themselves, understanding of other units’ capabilities is often not well understood even when they are well established. Formations regularly organise briefing days so that staff can be informed of what is available to them during planning. Internal communications on this subject should be a central effort, to ensure coherence and a clear path to actual use, rather than a succession of experiments that remain in the trials arena.</p> +<p>Kinetic defenses include guns, nets, ropes, collision drones, missiles with proximity-fuse warheads, as well as more creative solutions such as falcons and strings of streamers to tangle propellers. Kinetic defenses typically employ mature technologies, offer the highest probability of kill for any single UAS, and allow significant range of intercept. Their weaknesses include vulnerability to sUAS swarms, given their focus on defeating individual drones. They also may be inappropriate for use in populated areas where intercept shrapnel may fall on people or property.</p> -<p>Experimentation is important, but it should not be limited to small numbers of soldiers. Instead, exposure should be wide and varied to make use of the diversity of thought and talent available. The building of trust in robotic systems must be deliberate, through exposure early on in careers and regular, good-quality education. There must be a concerted effort to break down siloes in defence establishments so that best practice and knowledge can be better shared. The common theme is giving primacy to the future users of these systems as quickly as possible and at scale.</p> +<p>The DoD has invested in several kinetic effectors. The Coyote system is one of the primary interim solutions today. There are several extant configurations which may be characterized as a missile or drone, with a jet-engine to accelerate the system out of its launcher, and fins that support its loitering capability. The original Coyote entered demonstration testing in 2016 and employed a kinetic effect through collision or the nearby explosion of the unit’s warhead. According to its FY 2024 budget, the Army procured over 1,200 Coyote interceptors between 2022 and 2023.</p> -<h3 id="vii-recommendations-for-ugs-integration">VII. Recommendations for UGS Integration</h3> +<p>The United States has steadily improved upon C-sUAS cost asymmetries. Given the proliferation of suicide drones such as the Iranian Shahed-136, which costs roughly $20,000–50,000 per unit, using missile interceptors that cost two to eight times as much is deeply inefficient. Instead, there has been a rise of cheaper alternatives such as anti-aircraft guns for C-sUAS, commonly known as “flak.” Ukraine, for example, has procured Germany’s Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, which can shoot down sUAS with a range of around 5 km, as well as the older Soviet ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun. The DoD has also invested in an anti-drone “strings of streamers” system and is pushing the system into a program of record. These older, simpler technologies have proven effective against sUAS threats.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Role and management:</strong> Due to current technical limitations, UGS should be employed in standoff roles and in rear areas, where there is a dividend for their use. Treating larger UGS like aircraft whose support can be bid for will allow supply and demand to be managed, as well as keeping UGS from burdening low-level formations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Force design:</strong> The extra demand UGS will place on engineers and enablers (the invisible tail) needs to be baked into force planning now. The management of UGS may, in fact, require more soldiers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Logistic burden:</strong> The transport and storage of UGS, and battery management, must be planned for in detail, accepting that it cannot simply be added on to existing commitments, which would further stretch scarce resource. This will ensure the force-wide implications of new technology are catered for adequately.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Education:</strong> Education and training related to UGS should be implemented now, while experimentation is ongoing, rather than waiting until systems are formally brought into service. Basic training should include education on UGS now, even in a basic form, to begin to build trust and familiarity, easing the integration of UGS at scale.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Experimentation:</strong> UGS trials should be integrated into those areas with a significant throughput of soldiers, such as firing ranges. Moreover, it should be ensured that the totality of UGS experimentation and activity is understood by decision-makers and those conducting the experimentation, and that leaders maintain engagement with projects throughout the life cycle, rather than at the beginning and end. Clear ownership of the whole ecosystem is vital, while encouraging bottom-up engagement will create a user base ready to make best use of UGS.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lqETAoX.png" alt="image18" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Coyote Testing.</strong> Source: Raytheon.</em></p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4L0qBZ1.png" alt="image19" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Leonidas Pod HPM.</strong> Source: Epirus.</em></p> -<p>This paper has discussed UGS and the considerations for successfully integrating these systems into military forces. It has described the physical and software components of such systems, and how they are anticipated to be used by military forces in the near and further future. Having established the state of the art, the paper discussed three questions.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CCuI1ii.png" alt="image20" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Leonidas Ground-Based HPM.</strong> Source: Epirus, Inc.</em></p> -<p>First, how will UGS be used once they have been deployed? Systems with high levels of autonomous capability remain rare. Thus, most systems are remotely controlled or teleoperated from a distance. Potential benefits abound, such as enabling soldiers to stay out of harm’s way, and increasing the envelope over which they have sight and potentially control. UGS are not ready to manoeuvre in close combat, their movement is limited by the sheer number of variables, and humans retain the upper hand by some way. Equally, full autonomous navigation is possible, but systems move so slowly as to be potentially deleterious to their main functions, such as load carriage for manoeuvre troops.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CbqXyz8.png" alt="image21" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Dronebuster Training at the Baghdad Embassy Compound in Iraq.</strong> Source: U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<p>Second, how will UGS get to, and stay in, the fight? Some UGS can be carried by soldiers, while others will need to be towed or transported to where they are needed. They will also then require collecting and moving onward to repair and maintenance before further use. A secondary effect of this is that UGS will have a significant logistic tail, at least in the short to medium term. This will lead to an increase in human enablers supporting UGS.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jns5dsC.png" alt="image22" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: L–MADIS Training.</strong> Source: U.S. Marine Corps.</em></p> -<p>Third, how can soldiers be encouraged to make proper use of UGS? It is not a given that soldiers will adopt systems in the way originally envisaged by their designers, or even by military procurement officers and decision-makers. Familiarisation is key to building trust. If soldiers believe they can do a particular job better, they will follow that route. Given this, it is also important not to force the integration of UGS that do not add value to the HMT. Integrating UGS into basic training and those areas with a high throughput of soldiers will rapidly help socialise the use of UGS.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IQBUOVw.png" alt="image23" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: High-Energy Laser Weapon Testing.</strong> Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> -<p>All these themes are interlinked and there are dependencies between them all. They must be considered by planners who have a firm view of the totality of the enterprise. Moving from experimentation to a capability integrated into field forces is no mean feat, and requires energy and direction from senior leadership. Somewhat ironically, it appears that the most sensible approach when considering the integration of uncrewed systems is to focus on the human.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/636C7g5.png" alt="image24" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 9: C-sUAS Effector Modality Strengths and Weaknesses.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project, images from Anduril and U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>The DoD has invested significantly in directed energy (DE) weapons, including on high-energy laser (HEL) and high-power microwave (HPM) systems capable of defeating sUAS. Lasers are cheap per shot, have large (so-called “unlimited”) magazines, and operate at the speed of light. However, they are technologically immature, expensive to build relative to other solutions, and offer limited line-of-sight ranges. In 2014, the U.S. Navy fielded the first operational directed energy weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), aboard the USS Ponce (LPD-15). The ODIN and HELIOS systems are in development today. A variety of specifically anti-drone laser systems are now being developed as well, including the Athena and HELWS MRZR.</p> -<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Patrick HintonMilitary experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) is happening apace. Bomb disposal robots have been in service with armed forces for decades. Now, systems with greater capabilities and autonomy are being developed and tested.Taliban’s Campaign Against IS2023-10-25T12:00:00+08:002023-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/talibans-campaign-against-islamic-state<p><em>This paper examines the strategies employed by the Taliban in response to the threat posed by the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) in 2021–22.</em></p> +<p>HPMs are another effector type. They are cheap per shot fired, technologically mature, and particularly effective against sUAS swarms with their potentially wide area of effect. However, future sUAS may harden against HPMs, although this would significantly raise their development costs and potentially lead to engineering difficulties.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The Army plans to equip the Leonidas as its primary HPM for indirect fires protection. Unlike other C-sUAS defenses that disable one drone at a time, Leonidas was engineered to kill swarms of Group 1 and 2 UAS, as demonstrated in several U.S. Army test events. The Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) recently awarded a $66.1 million contract for Leonidas prototypes. Although HPMs have traditionally been based on larger platforms because of their large energy requirements, new technological developments are allowing for expanded basing options. The Leonidas Pod, for example, is a mobile, compact drone-based prototype that builds upon the ground-based system to offer relatively cheap, air-based C-sUAS.</p> -<p>Despite a recent decline, the Islamic State (IS), and its South Asian branch IS-K, remains one of the most resilient terrorist organisations on the planet – as recent reports of it planning attacks in Turkey and Europe show. Research carried out in late 2021 to mid-2022 with Taliban and IS members shows that IS-K represented a serious challenge for the Taliban in Afghanistan in this period. While they initially dismissed the threat from IS-K, the Taliban soon developed capabilities to confront it – these capabilities, and IS-K’s responses to them, are the subject of this paper.</p> +<p>Directed energy can be an effective C-sUAS tool. However, DE systems may encounter operational difficulties in complex and heavily congested environments, given the potential collateral damage to friendly forces and assets. Environmental factors such as poor weather or smoke in the atmosphere can also degrade their efficacy. Furthermore, training requirements for directed energy platforms may be intensive. As one analyst explains, an operator’s limited interaction time with an incoming UAS threat means that they must be well trained to deploy it effectively.</p> -<p>The paper outlines five key counter-IS techniques that the Taliban adopted after August 2021: indiscriminate repression; selective repression; choking-off tactics; reconciliation deals; and elite bargaining.</p> +<p>The last defeat modality is RF, through jamming or spoofing the drone’s communications link. Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing — misleading its GPS — means that the operator can tell the drone that north is south, and west is east. Jamming, conversely, means disrupting communications between the drone and its operator and is simpler to perform. Although RF-based defenses are powerful, operators must be aware of environmental effects potentially impacting nearby commercial or otherwise friendly aircraft. RF-based defenses also do not affect autonomous or otherwise non-communicative UAS. Lastly, spoofing and jamming require defensive emissions, which may increase the risk that an adversary can geolocate defensive positions.</p> -<p>While their initial response was to indulge in indiscriminate repression, the Taliban gradually moved towards an approach focused on selective repression, with the aim of leaving the local communities in areas of IS-K activity relatively untouched. They also considerably improved their intelligence capabilities in this period. By the second half of 2022, the Taliban had succeeded in destroying enough IS-K cells and blocking enough of the group’s funding to drive down its activities and contain the threat. The Taliban also experimented with reconciliation and reintegration, and managed to persuade a few hundred IS-K members in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province to surrender, contributing decisively to the dismantling of most of IS-K’s organisation there.</p> +<p>RF-based defenses have become increasingly popular over the last decade and operate as fixed, mounted, and handheld systems. In June 2020, six of eight systems selected to represent the JCO’s interim C-sUAS capabilities utilized RF defeat: FS-LIDS, L-MADIS, CORIAN, NINJA, MEDUSA, and Dronebuster. The Dronebuster is a handheld line-of-sight system weighing roughly four pounds, which allows for easy infantry and squad-level usage. Jamming capabilities also vary depending on the system; the Dronebuster Block 3 offers 45 minutes of jamming, whereas the updated Dronebuster SNA offers three hours of continuous jamming.</p> -<p>However, there were also significant flaws in the Taliban’s approach. This paper finds that their selective approach to tackling IS-K struggled to find firm footing in the absence of a solid system of the rule of law and of external oversight. The Taliban’s leadership appear to be struggling to figure out how to ensure that the lower layers of their security apparatus follow orders to avoid arbitrary violence. The paper further shows how the Taliban have failed to follow through with their initially promising reconciliation and reintegration efforts.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y5ZZ2HB.png" alt="image25" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 10: Select C-sUAS Operations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>For its part, IS-K showed remarkable organisational resilience in response to the rising tide of the Taliban’s counterterrorism efforts. The group transformed itself into an underground organisation, relinquishing all its bases and moving most of its assets to northern Afghanistan. With this approach, and true to the reputation of its founding organisation, IS, IS-K in Afghanistan managed to survive, even when faced with potentially existential challenges, such as a crackdown on its financial hub in Turkey. IS-K has come increasingly to rely on online activities, including for recruitment.</p> +<h4 id="a-diverse-solution-set">A Diverse Solution Set</h4> -<p>The Taliban learned faster than most observers expected them to in response to the challenge of IS-K, and scored significant successes. The longer-term prospects of their counter-IS efforts, however, remain dependent on IS-K continuing to struggle financially, because the drivers of mobilisation into its Afghan ranks remain largely unaddressed.</p> +<p>There are many different types of sensors, effectors, C2, and basing options for the C-sUAS mission. There is no single mix-and-match that serves as a universal solution to defeat sUAS threats. Rather, investment in a wide variety of sensors, effectors, and basing options is essential to ensure that the U.S. military is equipped to address the diverse set of threats posed by UAS. As JCO director Sean Gainey has explained, “There must be layers of systems to address the threat of UAS. It has to be a system of systems. It is a holistic approach.”</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Sensors and effectors of various sorts have their own unique strengths and weaknesses. Kinetic effectors may be more reliable to take down any individual UAS threat — especially those that are bigger and faster. Non-kinetic effectors such as HPMs, on the other hand, can more effectively counter large UAS swarms.</p> -<p>The Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021. As practitioners of insurgent warfare, they had to start learning almost overnight ways of doing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, especially against what emerged as their main challenger, the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K). Their early efforts have been characterised as “brutal” and “ineffective”. Others have stated a belief that that the Emirate would not be able to successfully tackle IS-K on its own. As this paper will show, the Taliban initially relied largely on ruthless tactics. However, as shown in a 2023 paper by this author, despite the (very limited) financial means and human resources available, in subsequent months the Taliban’s approach has not been exclusively brutal and at the same time was quite effective, at least in the short term. Indeed, the Taliban, widely seen during their “jihad” (2002–21) as a force of nature, were in reality even then already displaying considerable organisational skills.</p> +<p>Trade-offs likewise impact sensors. Active radar allows operators to detect threats at greater ranges but may give away their positions. Passive RF sensors allow operators to remain stealthy and are therefore the better option for dismounted, forward-deployed units. Yet passive RF sensors cannot detect pre-programmed UAS that do not communicate with their operator, which is becoming more prevalent on the battlefield. One-way attack drones, for example, have become common in Russian attacks against Ukrainian civil infrastructure. Overinvestment in one defense modality may leave defenders vulnerable in certain attack scenarios.</p> -<p>This empirical research paper forms part of the EU-funded STRIVE Afghanistan project, and aims to further discuss and analyse how the Taliban applied their organisational capital to countering IS-K. The guiding questions that this paper seeks to answer are: how did the Taliban structure their post-August 2021 counter-IS mix of tactics, how successful were these in fighting IS-K, how did IS-K adapt, and did the Taliban try to achieve long-term stability, seeking non-kinetic approaches and reducing reliance on violence? Since the Taliban do not frame their counter-IS effort with reference to the Western understanding of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the author will also avoid referring to such terminologies, and will instead examine their specific tactics. As noted in a rare study of non-Western responses to terrorism, Western theorisations of terrorism and counterterrorism might not be very useful in analysing such efforts by non-Western states and actors.</p> +<p>The need for diversity is likewise true in basing options. The right solution for a fixed site is different than that of a maneuver unit. A mobile defender may forsake having a range of effectors to remain small, light, and nimble so that they can shoot on the move. Fixed-site defenders, however, face adversaries that can plan sophisticated, large-scale attacks at various altitudes using a variety of missiles and UAS. Their defenses therefore require longer-range radars and effectors. Again, there is no one-size-fits-all material solution.</p> -<p>The discussion focuses on how, after August 2021, the Taliban practised violent repression, both indiscriminately, against people not directly involved in the armed opposition, and selectively, against active insurgents. It also covers how the Taliban have tried to choke off the armed opposition, denying it access to population, supply routes and financial flows. The paper finally looks at whether there may be signs of awareness among the new Taliban elite that their long-term self-interest might be better served by developing reconciliation programmes of some kind, or by reaching some elite bargain.</p> +<h3 id="the-current-path">The Current Path</h3> -<p>There are not many large-scale counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts that have altogether eschewed all forms of ruthless violence, so analysing a “counter” effort requires some careful qualifications. The first useful distinction here is between selective and indiscriminate violence. A regime that focuses its violence on its enemies can deliver a clear message that those who challenge it will meet a terrible fate, while political quietism (accepting the status quo without resistance) is rewarded. Encouraging quietism while targeting “extremists” (defined as anti-ruling system elements) should therefore be a winning approach, even if utterly violent. The question that follows, then, is why ruling elites should be concerned about achieving anything more than an efficient (selective) repression. This is a pertinent question especially where a violent conflict has already taken off. At that point, some form of repression can no longer be avoided. Following a long-term pattern of indiscriminate violence makes non-violent alternatives hard to buy into for any opponent. However, even choosing selective violence does not necessarily make non-violent alternatives easy to pursue. Different actors within any government will each make their own assessments on where the boundary between violent extremists and quietists may lie, resulting in divisions within a state apparatus and a ruling elite.</p> +<p><em>As senior leaders institutionalize the C-sUAS enterprise across the DOTMLPF, they must address critical gaps in training and personnel requirements.</em></p> -<p>Another important distinction is that violent repression may or may not be accompanied by efforts to negotiate local reintegration deals, with the collaboration of local elites. Such deals are often deemed to be a more effective long-term way of stabilising a polity than relying solely on violence, not least because they can potentially create bonds between ruling and local elites, eventually resulting in the latter gaining sufficient leverage with the centre to effectively constrain its use of arbitrary power. Similarly, repression can also be accompanied by elite bargaining, that is, power sharing.</p> +<p>U.S. efforts to develop effective C-sUAS operators and platforms can be loosely categorized in three stages: urgent need, refinement, and institutionalization. The United States is entering the third stage today, which will be the most difficult. It will require buy-in from the military services and clarity of roles throughout the defense establishment. The following sections define these stages, provide a historical overview of U.S. activities, and review what the United States must do to achieve institutionalization in the C-sUAS enterprise.</p> -<p>There are also ways of choking off armed opposition with no political concessions and no negotiations, without using extreme violence. Large-scale military deployments, for example, which, in the presence of adequate levels of manpower, can be achieved without reliance on indiscriminate use of firepower, can result in the capture of territory and assertion of control over the population, reducing or denying the ability of the opposition to recruit new members, access sanctuaries, train and transfer supplies. In other words, the aim of such large operations need not be to destroy the enemy, but can be to choke it off. An even better example of choking-off tactics is financial disruption, where violence plays a very small part. These tactics are particularly appealing to ruling elites, but are not necessarily within their reach. It takes an army considerably superior to the opposing forces to monopolise control over territory and population, and it takes a sophisticated intelligence apparatus to block financial flows towards the armed opposition. Moreover, choking-off tactics can be a protracted affair and even an inconclusive one, depending on the skill of the opponents. An armed opposition could continue operating under more adverse conditions even with little or no access to the wider population, and new channels for transferring cash to rebels can always be devised by creative sanctions busters.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eyLA6p3.png" alt="image26" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 11: Air and Missile Threat Matrix.</strong> Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> -<p>This is a reason for ruling elites not to write off political tactics completely. There are other reasons as well for not writing off local reintegration deals and elite bargains. One possible incentive to invest in reconciliation or an elite bargain is the awareness within the ranks of the ruling elite that ruthless repressions, even when efficient in the short term, do not successfully remove the roots of opposition, but instead allow it to resurface generations later, or even sooner, leaving the state vulnerable. Another possible incentive is that repressions can drag on inconclusively and go through critical phases, with the final outcome being uncertain and involving a high cost to the ruling elites. In such contexts, softer alternatives to ruthless repression can gain traction.</p> +<h4 id="urgent-need">Urgent Need</h4> -<p>This paper is comprised of three chapters. The first examines the state of IS-K and the type of threat it presented to the Taliban as they took power, and how the Taliban assessed that threat. The second chapter discusses in detail how the Taliban sought to meet the IS-K challenge, examining each tactic in turn: indiscriminate repression; selective repression; choking-off tactics; local reconciliation and reintegration; and elite bargaining. The third and final chapter examines IS-K’s response to the Taliban.</p> +<p>The U.S. response to C-sUAS has transpired in three stages. The first was urgent need. In 2016, ISIS captured large swaths of territory in both Iraq and Syria. They were among the first non-state actors to use small commercial quadcopters, which they employed effectively in battles against U.S.-supported Iraqi forces. There were few C-sUAS defenses in theater or readily deployable at the time. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) leadership issued an urgent requirement for defenses, prompting the DoD to quickly transfer a variety of commercial off-the-shelf C-sUAS platforms.</p> -<p>To protect sources, neither the names of the interviewees nor their exact roles in their organisations have been disclosed. IS-K interviewees are classified as either “commanders” (leaders of a tactical group of five to 30 men) or “cadres” (district and provincial-level leaders, or managers of support departments such as logistics or finance, among others).</p> +<p>In 2016, the United States lacked cheaper, efficient effectors to use against cheap and plentiful sUAS. This lack was a consequence of wide divestment in Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) by the Army and Marine Corps in the 1990s and early 2000s. Both services were focused on the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan and Iraq and therefore chose to cut Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units in favor of more mission-critical maneuver forces. Military leadership believed that the U.S. Air Force would provide sufficient defensive counterair capabilities to maintain air superiority and protect ground forces. Military leadership did not consider the threat of UAS and cruise missiles as viable, near-term threats to U.S. military operations. This trend was not uniquely American; most NATO nations also weakened their air defense capabilities over the last two decades.</p> -<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> +<p>Yet with the new threat clearly in sight, Congress has quickly committed funds to procure defenses. This step is highlighted by a significant surge in the DoD’s FY 2017–FY 2019 procurement and research, development, testing, and evaluation spending for C-sUAS. While the DoD achieved an interim solution in months, it fully satisfied the C-sUAS Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) two years later in FY 2019. The initial JUON effort successfully committed defenses to provide an “interim standalone capability” to defend 89 CENTCOM sites against Groups 1 and 2 UAS.</p> -<p>With the Taliban–IS-K conflict still under way, any findings of this paper can be only partial and preliminary. There are also clear limitations to the research methodology adopted: research was by necessity limited to oral sources, with limited support from news reports and policy-oriented analysis – which are also often partial – and no access to primary written sources, such as the Emirate’s records, or of course to any internal IS-K documents.</p> +<p>Given the active threat to U.S. allied forces, the selection of defense systems was understandably fast paced. According to Barry J. Pike in 2018, then program executive officer for missiles and space, the C-sUAS budget was placed “in the same office as our Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar project because they do know how to go fast. . . . Within 60 days a requirement was generated and within another 60 days, we had materiel in theatre. . . . We fielded more than 270 different kinds of systems [for C-sUAS].” A consequence of this quick delivery, however, was the minimal effort placed on the typical acquisition processes for programs of record and the DOTMLPF process. The massive quantity of C-sUAS platforms was deemed necessary at the time but would require the next stage in the C-sUAS response to consolidate these programs into a manageable portfolio.</p> -<p>Researching this topic required a number of methodological compromises given that conducting primary research in a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is extremely difficult. IS-K recruiters and members were, of course, the most difficult to speak to, primarily because they have increasingly been in hiding. As a result, the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete and follow-up on specific themes was often not possible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this. However, it should be noted that when reached and given a proper introduction by a third party, such as a relative, friend, colleague or respected individual, even members of IS-K proved quite talkative. This should not be a surprise, as the literature shows that members of violent extremist organisations are typically proud of being members and often brag about their own activities, even when they are supposed to be operating deep underground, as in Europe. The risk faced by this type of research is therefore not one of not obtaining access. There are other risks, however: that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstating their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading sources to provide prejudiced information about rival organisations. Mitigation measures are discussed below.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/liVRhk2.png" alt="image27" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: Iranian-Made Kamikaze Drone.</strong> Remnants of Iranian-made kamikaze drone used by Houthi forces against Saudi Arabia.</em></p> -<p>Taliban officials were quite prudent in their answers, but thanks to their internal tensions and differences, Taliban interviewees were also quite often willing to discuss embarrassing details and to acknowledge limitations in their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Taliban interviewees were often dismissive of the IS-K threat and overstated the progress made in countering that threat, while IS-K sources did the exact opposite. This was expected, and it was dealt with by interviewing multiple sources within both the Taliban and IS-K, and by spreading the research effort over 20 months, allowing for the time-testing of responses. This was particularly important and useful as it provided validation points for the reliability of the different sources. For example, initialTaliban dismissals of IS-K were proved wrong, as were IS-K’s triumphalist assumptions made in early 2022. The data points provided by sources could only be assessed against one another over time, as in the case of claims about IS-K moving to northern Afghanistan.</p> +<h4 id="refinement">Refinement</h4> -<p>While the author takes into account the literature relevant to the topic and the period, this paper relies mainly on empirical data collected through interviews. It is based on a series of 54 interviews, carried out between August 2021 and April 2023. Multiple interviews on both sides of the conflict and with non-aligned individuals, such as elders, clerics, former IS-K members and <em>hawala</em> traders, allowed for greater cross-referencing opportunities. The details are provided in the table below.</p> +<p>The second stage in the U.S. response was one of refinement, during which the United States developed a more focused C-sUAS portfolio that was operationally effective and logistically sustainable. It included a diversity of sensors and effectors to cover the full threat spectrum. To fulfill this mission, in November 2019, the U.S. secretary of defense designated the Army as the lead service for C-sUAS; soon thereafter, the Army created the JCO to lead this effort. The JCO also helps the Army think through deployment strategies and align resources for C-sUAS. Recent budget justifications highlight this phase shift. The FY 2022 budget request noted the C-sUAS transition from a JUON to formal programming, with requirements specified under the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum 078-20. Also in FY 2022, the Army expanded the threat to include Group 3 UAS and designated a unique line-item number for C-sUAS. This move marked a symbolic emphasis on C-sUAS as a standalone program.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wddBWob.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Breakdown of Interviews.</strong> Source: Author generated.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tboBblc.png" alt="image28" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: C-sUAS Milestones.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>The research methodology was a hybrid of investigative journalistic and ethnographic interviewing. The questionnaires were adapted to each interviewee; there were, in fact, 54 different questionnaires. Questions evolved as knowledge of ongoing trends and developments expanded.</p> +<h4 id="institutionalization">Institutionalization</h4> -<p>The interviews were commissioned to three Afghan researchers in local languages (Pashto, Dari and Uzbek) and took place mostly in Afghanistan, with some interviews taking place in Pakistan. Two of the researchers were members of the Salafi community, a fact that facilitated access to IS-K sources and reduced risk to researchers to acceptable levels. All of the researchers had a background in journalism and/or research, had participated in previous research projects with a similar typology of interviewees, had been trained to undertake research with a similar methodology, and had contacts or personal/family relations with Taliban and/or IS-K members, which proved crucial in reaching out and gaining access to interviewees.</p> +<p>The third and final stage is institutionalization, during which the United States must fill critical gaps across the DOTMLPF construct. The central question here is about how to apply air defense principles and institutionalize these capabilities to non-air defenders. The challenge is developing DOTMLPF solutions across the force to air defense and non-air defense units alike.</p> -<p>The risk that respondents might use the interviews to influence external observers or to misrepresent the facts was assumed from the start as a precautionary measure. This risk was mitigated by using different types of interviewees – such as members of either the Taliban or IS-K, elders of local communities where IS-K operates, clerics and traders – who represented contrasting points of view; by interviewing individuals separately and without them being aware of other interviews taking place; and by inserting questions to which the answer was already known, to verify responses. It proved particularly helpful to present interviewees with information gathered from other sources, such as local elders saying that IS-K members were struggling financially, and ask them to comment. Most IS-K sources could not avoid some degree of openness about apparently negative developments concerning IS-K. Public-domain sources, such as media reports and analytical studies, were also used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees. The researchers chosen did not know one another, to avoid the risk of researcher collusion to manipulate the content of interviews, for example by inventing content to produce whatever they might have believed the project team wanted to hear. This is always a risk when interviews are carried out by field researchers while the project is being managed remotely. The field researchers were also informed that the purpose of the effort was simply to ascertain facts, and that there was no premium placed on specific findings. Finally, the data collected was validated as much as possible via consultations with independent experts and government and international organisations monitoring developments in Afghanistan, who, given the sensitivity of the topic, asked to remain anonymous.</p> +<p>The military services will play a larger role in the institutionalization phase. Questions remain as to whether they will accept systems supported by the JCO or develop their own unique platforms more suited for their specific needs, as well as how such needs will be prioritized against other service needs. Major policy, strategy, budget, and programmatic decisions will be made that will carry enormous consequences for the field.</p> -<p>The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in an open-access publication, the type of which was not specified. The interviews were carried out in part face to face and in part over the phone – some interviewees were in locations that were difficult to access. All the interviews have been anonymised and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BhP0kFp.png" alt="image29" /> +<img src="https://i.imgur.com/l9ZyhZs.png" alt="image30" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 12: DOTMLPF Plans and Potential Pitfalls.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense; DOTMLPF definitions from U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<h3 id="i-the-taliban-and-is-k-sources-of-enmity">I. The Taliban and IS-K: Sources of Enmity</h3> +<p><strong>DOCTRINE</strong></p> -<p>The conflict between the Taliban and IS-K did not start in 2021. There was tension between IS-K and the Taliban from the moment IS-K was launched in January 2015. By May 2015, the two organisations were at war, competing over territory, but also over the loyalty of hardened jihadists, be they Afghans, Pakistanis, Central Asians or others. The elements most influenced by the global jihadist agenda were those most likely to be attracted by IS-K, even if its Salafist profile discouraged many who would otherwise have been interested. Several hundred members of the Taliban defected to IS-K, contributing much ill feeling. The fighting, mostly concentrated in Kajaki and Zabul (southern Afghanistan), Nangarhar and Kunar (eastern Afghanistan) and Darzab (northwestern Afghanistan), continued throughout the 2015–21 period and led sometimes to atrocities.</p> +<p>C-sUAS doctrine has improved significantly over the last decade. The DoD began developing C-sUAS tactics, techniques, and procedures over the late 2010s as the sUAS threat proliferated. The Army released three central documents during this period. The first was the 2016 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-01.8, Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense. ATP 3-01.8 provides guidance on how combined arms forces can protect themselves from air attacks, including UAS threats.</p> -<p>In those years, the two rival insurgent organisations had their columns of fighters clashing in a kind of semi-regular warfare. The better-disciplined IS-K had an edge against poorly trained local Taliban militias in 2015–18, but the tables turned in 2019–20, when the Taliban started deploying their crack units against IS-K’s strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. After that and until August 2021, IS-K stayed away from confronting the Taliban head on and sought safety in more remote parts of the east, counting on the fact that the Taliban were still primarily busy fighting the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.</p> +<p>The second central doctrine publication was the 2017 ATP 3-01.81, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques. This report provides defense planning, training guidance, and regional threat preparations for sUAS threats. It highlights basic issues such as identifying specific UAS threats and potential responses based on the operational environment, enemy capabilities, and tactics. It also offers some specific combined arms unit training recommendations.</p> -<p>For some time after the violence between the two organisations started in May 2015, IS-K did not produce much propaganda. It was only in more recent years that IS-K set up a large-scale propaganda campaign against the Taliban, challenging their credentials, both as a jihadist group and their religious credentials, especially what IS-K saw as their lax implementation of Islamic law. Friction between adherents of Salafism, a purist form of Islamic fundamentalism, and Hanafis – Deobandis in particular, but also Sufis – helped to feed the conflict. Although the Deobandis are described as being influenced by Salafism, Salafis see them as practitioners of an impure form of Islam. This is even truer of Sufis. Although IS-K initially downplayed its Salafi–jihadist ideology in the hope of attracting a wider range of supporters, after its appearance in 2015, it gradually took on an increasingly hardline Salafi character. The Taliban, on the other hand, became more and more diverse over time, incorporating, in particular, many members from a Muslim Brotherhood background, while the top leadership remained predominantly Deobandi-influenced, with a strong influence of Sufism as well. While a significant number of Salafis joined the Taliban’s jihad between 2003 and 2015, after 2015, most were attracted to IS-K.</p> +<p>The third major doctrine publication was the 2020 Army Field Manual (FM) 3-01, U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. FM 3-01 incorporates details on the specific UAS threats and C-UAS techniques and offers some of the clearest guidance on countering sUAS to date. The report provides air defenders with established rules of engagement, along with guidance on the specific altitude, speed, and actions needed to determine whether a UAS is indeed a threat. Defensive measures are also explained down to the force level and divided by type, such as maneuver, aviation, special operating forces, field artillery, and intelligence (see Table 13). This clarified roles and responsibilities among the branches.</p> -<h3 id="ii-sizing-up-the-is-k-challenge-in-2021">II. Sizing Up the IS-K Challenge in 2021</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cAWOVuN.png" alt="image31" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 13: Army C-sUAS Doctrine.</strong> Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> -<h4 id="is-ks-manpower">IS-K’s Manpower</h4> +<p>The primary concern is that doctrine is not often shared, embraced, or applied appropriately in operations or materiel development. One possible factor contributing to these issues is the lack of joint doctrine. Recognizing this underdevelopment, the 2018 Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, called for more detailed UAS procedures on joint threat detection, identification, and engagement. Since then, however, progress has been slow. For example, in its section on C-sUAS, the 2021 update to JP 3-30 Joint Air Operations, only noted the complexities of defeating sUAS and the need to distinguish between friendly and enemy sUAS. It failed to provide the kind of detail laid out in Army doctrine. Furthermore, now that the JCO has down-selected its primary C-sUAS sensors, C2, and effectors, a new joint publication could include specific C-sUAS platforms and operations to provide more clarity to service members.</p> -<p>The extent to which IS-K represented a challenge to those in power in Afghanistan, be they the previous regime or the Taliban, has long been a topic of discussion. The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, for example, which relies on assessment provided by member states, has provided constantly fluctuating numbers over time. According to IS-K’s own internal sources, IS-K leaders had at their disposal in July 2021 a force of up to 8,000 men. Of these:</p> +<p>The DoD must invest in future thinking to keep doctrine fresh as new challenges arise. This requires investing in internal and external leadership across the C-sUAS enterprise. The JCO — or another central authority — can coordinate and invest in this work and disseminate its findings. This may be done through joint military-academic dialogues, wargames, conflict simulations, and open-source intelligence collection and analysis on sUAS technologies and operations. The joint efforts of the military, academia, and defense industry can support the further evolution of doctrine at the pace required.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Just over 1,100 were in Pakistan.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The remaining force was mostly concentrated in eastern Afghanistan (Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan), where some 3,700 IS-K members included the bulk of its combat force, some village militias and much of its administrative structure, handling finances and logistics, keeping track of recruitment, making appointments and deciding transfers, planning training and indoctrination, and other tasks. From this area, moving back and forth to and from Pakistan was easy due to the porosity of the nearby border.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The other important concentration was in the northeast, largely in Badakhshan, with almost 1,200 members in that region. This second concentration included well-trained combat forces and some administrative facilities, but was not very active militarily during this period, and instead sought to keep a low profile in central Badakhshan, chiefly in the Khastak valley.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Apart from a few hundred IS-K prison escapees, en route to the east, the rest of the force of IS-K (some 1,300–1,400 men) was at this point mainly spread around the south, the southeast, the region surrounding Kabul, the west, and in the main cities, where it operated underground, recruiting or organising terrorist attacks in urban areas. In several provinces, such as Kapisa, Logar, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika and Khost, IS-K only had a thin layer of some tens of members, tasked with recruitment, intelligence gathering and preparing the ground for expansion in the future.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><strong>ORGANIZATION</strong></p> -<p>These figures are largely comparable with those provided by the intelligence services of member states to the UN, which put the membership of IS-K at 4,000 for the latter part of 2021. The figures collated by the UN monitoring committee likely relate to the more visible component of IS-K, that is, full-time fighters based in Afghanistan. As detailed by IS-K sources, of the numbers quoted above, around two-thirds (some 4,600) were fighters based in Afghanistan. A proportion of these were essentially village militias (hence quite invisible to external observers), and a few hundred members of terrorist hit teams.</p> +<p>The primary task of the military services is to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to the combatant commanders. In light of this goal, how will the services organize units or forces to perform the C-sUAS mission? Will the force structure for dedicated air defense forces within each service increase or will mission responsibility for the current forces merely expand? Will the services define a partitioning of mission responsibility between dedicated air defense forces and all other units and equip each accordingly?</p> -<p>IS-K sources were claiming mass defections from Taliban ranks in the early months following the fall of Kabul. Such defections would be surprising in light of the morale issues affecting IS-K at that time (see below), and indeed this appears to have been a massively inflated claim. When asked about defections from the Taliban to IS-K after August 2021, IS-K sources had little concrete information to offer and could only cite five lower-level Taliban commanders in Kunar, three in Nangarhar and one in Khost who defected to IS-K. One source in the Emirate’s local apparatus acknowledged that defections from the ranks of the Taliban to IS-K did take place in the early post-takeover months, but had been limited in numbers. The most important defection to be confirmed, at least by local sources, was that of commander Mansoor Hesar with five sub-commanders and 70 fighters in Nangarhar in late August 2021. Another source within the Taliban confirmed only that in the early days post-takeover, two Taliban commanders from Dur Baba and Hisarak defected to IS-K: Mullah Yakub and <em>a’lim</em> Shamsi. Overall, there were few defections (especially when the total manpower of the Taliban is considered), and they added little to IS-K strength and included no high-profile individuals, thus offering little with which the IS-K propaganda machine could work.</p> +<p>Clearly, the C-sUAS mission mandates an increase in dedicated air defense force structure across the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, but the mission also requires an all-of-force approach to defeating the UAS threat. Dedicated and non-dedicated air defense units must be prepared to perform active defense tasks and apply passive defense techniques to counter the UAS threat. The allocation of C-sUAS capability should align to mission responsibility, and the complexity of the materiel solutions, given the operational context they are applied in, should inform whether the capability requires a dedicated air defense crew or a non-dedicated operator. The concept of a CAFAD approach, across all services, should not be lost as the DoD organizes for this mission set.</p> -<h4 id="is-ks-finances">IS-K’s Finances</h4> +<p>Likewise, given the breadth and scope of the UAS challenge, the DoD should not lose sight of the fact that a single office to coordinate and guide development of C-sUAS capabilities might be of value. Since January 2020, the JCO has served as the central C-sUAS coordinator in the DoD, focused on establishing joint training, developing joint doctrine, and synchronizing joint materiel development. Because there is no one-size-fits-all for C-sUAS across the services, the JCO has promoted service-specific materiel and policy development while still working to reduce disparate and redundant investment, as is its mission. As a result, the DoD avoided investing in a larger number of platforms, greater redundancy among existing platforms, and increased maintenance, training, and logistics.</p> -<p>IS-K’s efforts in this period seem to have been marred by financial shortcomings. Sources suggest that the group’s finance operations were badly mismanaged in late 2021 to early 2022. During this period, however, and in line with Taliban allegations, IS-K sources claimed connections with elements of Pakistan’s army and intelligence, translating into logistical help and support for IS-K’s efforts to raise money from “Islamic charities” in Pakistan. It has not, however, been possible to verify these claims.</p> +<p>Yet the consensus model for C-sUAS may need to evolve over time. The current requirement for wide, cross-service consensus over C-sUAS investment could inhibit future transformation of the air defense enterprise to meet the threat. In the spectrum between development led by an all-powerful JCO on one end, and the Army and Marine Corps completely in charge of their own disparate plans on the other, today’s acquisition enterprise may lean too far toward the latter camp. Congress and DoD leadership should reexamine JCO authorities and relation to service acquisition agencies to improve the requirements process and acquisition timelines. This could mean empowering the JCO with an authority requirement recognized by the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) that is broad enough to be effective for immediate C-sUAS needs. This would need to be done, however, in coordination with service leadership to satisfy unique service requirements and avoid overlapping too much with other requirement generation bodies, such as the Army Futures Command Air and Missile Defense Cross-Functional Team (AMD CFT), which perhaps could focus more on longer-term C-sUAS requirements.</p> -<h4 id="is-k-morale">IS-K Morale</h4> +<p>Outside of acquisition authorities, an empowered JCO might also lead C-sUAS coordination among the United States and its allies. The U.S. military spends significant resources to train and integrate its air defenses with allies and partners. These efforts have made joint operations safer and more effective in many theaters. In the C-sUAS arena, however, sales and joint partnerships are slow, and allies appear to rely mostly on RF sense and defeat platforms. Few NATO allies, for example, have invested in active defenses and instead appear to rely on passive defense, counterattacks, and general deterrence. As U.S. partners recognize the increasing sUAS threat — especially in light of Russia-Ukraine fighting today — the JCO can engage in dialogue and workshops to support U.S. exports, co-development, and joint training opportunities.</p> -<p>When the Taliban took over, the idea of giving up the fight was reportedly widespread within the ranks of IS-K. Nearly all of the seven former IS-K members interviewed stated that they had been attracted to IS-K to fight “American crusaders”, not the Taliban. This could have contributed to a decline in morale after August 2021 – although respondents might also have wanted to downplay any hatred for the Taliban that they might have harboured. The Taliban also benefited from war weariness in the country, including within the Salafi community. Even elders critical of the Taliban expressed happiness that the fighting had stopped. The defeats that the Taliban inflicted on IS-K in 2019–20 had also left a mark. A further indicator of low morale was the refusal of many detained members of IS-K to rejoin the group after Afghanistan’s prisons were emptied in the chaotic final days of the Islamic Republic. IS-K sources at the time claimed that thousands of escapees from government prisons had rejoined their ranks after the chaos of August 2021. It is clear, however, that, contrary to these claims, many did not rejoin at all, but went into hiding, trying to stay clear of both IS-K and the Taliban (see below on the lack of impact of escapees on IS-K’s strength). It may be added that all former members were reportedly aware that they could contact IS-K via Telegram to rejoin, but many did not take this opportunity. Taliban officials interviewed by the International Crisis Group quantified the escapees who rejoined IS-K in the “hundreds”, rather than in the thousands alleged by some sources.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Dk84IOk.png" alt="image32" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 17: JCO Demonstration at Yuma Proving Ground.</strong> Industry and military officials attended the first JCO demonstration in April 2021 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, where the focus was on low-collateral effects interceptors (LCEI) systems.</em></p> -<h4 id="how-the-taliban-assessed-is-k">How the Taliban Assessed IS-K</h4> +<p><strong>TRAINING</strong></p> -<p>The Taliban’s initial neglect of the threat represented by IS-K was not due to any form of tolerance. Many senior Taliban viewed IS-K as a proxy organisation, established or manipulated by the security services of the previous regime and/or by those of neighbouring and regional countries, Pakistan in particular, with the intent of splitting the insurgency and undermining the Taliban. The Taliban thought that, with the previous regime gone and the war won, IS-K would be critically weakened by the disappearance of a critical source of support. Moreover, the Taliban’s belief was that IS-K lacked a mass base:</p> +<p>Training is an urgent need across the joint force. The need for C-sUAS is on course to become ubiquitous for fixed and maneuver formations, necessitating a wide distribution and variety of training. As the JCO has affirmed, air defense specialists will continue to manage UAS threats for Groups 3 through 5, but the DoD should prepare all units to counter Groups 1 and 2. Commanders at all levels should incorporate C-sUAS in training exercises. Basic training must be simple enough to teach in a short window but comprehensive enough to cover this threat spectrum.</p> <blockquote> - <p>The problem is the Salafi ulema and mullahs, who inoculate the seed of hypocrisy and a very negative view of Hanafism in their Salafi followers … With the normal Salafi villagers, who don’t have any connection with Daesh [IS-K] and with the [Salafi] ulema, [the Taliban’s] relations are very good.</p> + <h4 id="us-army-master-sergeant">U.S. Army master sergeant</h4> + <p>“You’re giving us $10 billion worth of capabilities and $10 of training.”</p> </blockquote> -<p>There was also a belief that people had joined IS-K because of the salaries it was able to pay, thanks to generous funding from foreign supporters.</p> +<p>There are currently four Joint Knowledge Online training modules that cover basic C-sUAS awareness, system familiarization, installation of C-sUAS activities, and C-sUAS tactics, techniques, and procedures. These short, functional training courses are useful for familiarizing military personnel with sUAS threats and basic countermeasures.</p> -<p>The Taliban leadership, therefore, initially tended to underestimate the threat represented by IS-K. At the same time, while IS-K was not perceived as a strategic threat in August 2021, it was nonetheless considered a resolutely hostile and irreconcilable organisation of <em>“khawarij”</em>, against which the officials of the Emirate were ordered to take “aggressive and serious” action.</p> +<p>A more comprehensive training program currently takes place at the C-sUAS Academy in Yuma, Arizona. It offers a two-week course, set to expand into a three-week class by FY 2025. The class is offered across the services and U.S. government, including Secret Service agents. The Army also administers a “master trainer” course specifically for sUAS. Conducted at the Maneuver Center of Excellence in Fort Moore, Georgia, the training course certifies students with Group 1 UAS through a clear program of instruction which includes training on ground control stations, mission planning, simulations, orientation flights, and proficiency flight evaluations. The upcoming Joint C-sUAS University (JCU) at the Fires Center of Excellence in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, discussed further in the “Facilities” subsection below, may consider building upon both training courses.</p> -<h3 id="iii-the-talibans-counter-is-effort">III. The Taliban’s Counter-IS Effort</h3> +<p>In FY 2024, the JCU will offer two courses — an operator and a planner course — each lasting two weeks. The operator course will provide service members with an additional skill identifier and consist of threat analysis, service specific engagement, and layered defense, with a capstone in detecting and defeating adversary drones. The planner course will consist of layered defense, coordination of airspace, joint strategic management, and C-sUAS planning and system integration, with a capstone in planning and executing a Course of Action (COA) to detect and defeat red air threats (single/swarming).</p> -<p>This chapter will discuss the five key counter-IS techniques that the Taliban adopted after August 2021, as outlined in the Introduction: indiscriminate repression; selective repression; choking-off tactics; reconciliation deals; and elite bargaining.</p> +<p>The DoD and JCO have prioritized training in recent years. Since April 2021, the JCO, RCCTO, and services have hosted industry demonstrations twice a year to “evaluate emerging technologies that close gaps, inform requirements, and promote innovation.” This joins the service-focused exercises which have increasingly incorporated C-sUAS, as shown in the table below.</p> -<h4 id="indiscriminate-repression">Indiscriminate Repression</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b8FojWd.png" alt="image33" /> +<img src="https://i.imgur.com/43kg8Mq.png" alt="image34" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 14: Major U.S. C-sUAS Training and Development.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>The Taliban have in the past argued that indiscriminate revenge-taking and repression on the part of Afghan and US security forces in 2001–04 drove many into the ranks of the insurgency. These views were supported by the elders of insurgency-affected areas. Perhaps because very few local Taliban officials were active with the organisation in those years, they seem oblivious today to the obvious lessons that should have been derived from that experience. Indeed, some Taliban officials have sought to undermine IS-K by trying to crush its supporting networks and milieus. Many Taliban cadres had been fighting IS-K before, and had developed a deep hatred for the organisation, which emerges from virtually all the interviews that the research team carried out. Some also harboured a strong hostility towards the Salafi community, from which they knew the bulk of IS-K’s Afghan members came. Some Taliban equated the Salafi community with IS-K. The fact that the Taliban had experienced serious friction with Salafis since the expansion of their insurgency to the east in 2008–09 helped to strengthen these negative views.</p> +<p>Lessons from the field — especially in Ukraine — highlight how quickly the sUAS threat and tactics are evolving in real time. The lack of designated training ranges that have standing C-sUAS authorities to operate within CONUS airspace hinders the ability of DoD to train on new equipment and stress test the validity of new TTPs. Resources such as the Joint C-UAS Center of Excellence and the Joint C-UAS University (JCU) are being stood up to address such gaps in training knowledge across the joint force and act as a clearing house for C-sUAS TTPs. Ultimately, range location issues and reduced live training opportunities will hinder efforts to build readiness, particularly for directed energy systems.</p> -<p>In some cases, indiscriminate repression was a standalone tactic. The best example of this approach in the early wave of post-takeover repression was Kunar’s governor, Haji Usman Turabi, who epitomised the tendency to conflate Salafism and IS-K. Turabi is nowadays acknowledged by members of the Taliban to be “ideologically against Salafism” and to have “killed several Salafi mullahs”. Turabi believed he knew where the main areas of support for IS-K were, and moved to crush local supporting networks and to shut down Salafi madrasas and mosques. All this led to outrage against him, and the Salafi ulema sent a delegation to Kabul to complain.</p> +<p><em>Materiel</em></p> -<p>In other cases, indiscriminate repression was coordinated with other counter-IS tactics. While attempting to undermine IS-K operations in Jalalabad, which was a key centre of IS-K’s campaign of urban terrorism, the Taliban targeted IS-K underground networks and sympathising milieus in Nangarhar. This campaign was initially very violent. A cadre who gained notoriety here for his ruthless approach to IS-K was Dr Bashir, who became head of the Taliban’s intelligence services, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), for Nangarhar province in September 2021, and served in that position throughout 2022. Bashir shut down most of the Salafi madrasas and mosques of Nangarhar. Under Bashir’s leadership, the Taliban in Nangarhar adopted a proactive approach, with large-scale operations and extensive house-by-house searches, detaining many. Many extrajudicial executions of suspects took place under his tenure. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported 59 confirmed executions of IS-K suspects, mostly in Nangarhar during October to November 2021. Human Rights Watch indicates that more than 100 suspects were killed between August 2021 and April 2022 in Nangarhar. Salafi community leaders confirmed in February 2022 that in October to November around 100 members of the community were killed in this wave of violence, mostly in Nangarhar. Among them were senior Salafi preachers. Others fled or went into hiding.</p> +<p>C-sUAS materiel development was addressed in Chapter 2 of this report. In short, materiel development should feature a diverse solution set informed by formation requirements for fixed or mobile defenses. Today’s platforms focus primarily on fixed requirements, as requested by CENTCOM and available at the time. Yet as the maneuver force sees the need for C-sUAS across regions, the DoD will need to shift focus toward mobile and maneuver capabilities.</p> -<p>It seems clear that Bashir was orchestrating much of the violence, seemingly with the intent of intimidating IS-K support networks and the surrounding milieus – perhaps even the entire Salafi community – into negotiating deals with the Emirate that would guarantee them security in exchange for cutting off relations with IS-K. This approach has similarities with what some of the strongmen of the previous regime had been doing, such as Abdul Raziq in Kandahar, who managed to force local Taliban to negotiate with him after years of relentless and extreme pressure. The Taliban’s reconciliation effort is discussed more fully below.</p> +<p><em>Leadership and Education</em></p> -<h4 id="selective-repression">Selective Repression</h4> +<p>Professional leadership development — from squad leaders to flag officers — must be a priority to ensure doctrine and training are effectively implemented. C-sUAS leaders across air defense, maneuver, support, and sustainment teams will help drive operational planning and training across the force and at the various echelons they lead. These leaders can also help identify and respond to sUAS development trends and adversary capabilities and construct new TTPs in line with emerging technologies. The DoD is building C-sUAS leaders through the several training programs listed above in the “Training” section.</p> -<p>The outrage noted above in relation to Haji Usman Turabi’s indiscriminate repression in Kunar led to the Emirate’s authorities deciding to sack him and appoint in his stead Mawlavi Qasim, from Logar, who had served as shadow governor of Kunar during the Taliban’s insurgency (2002–21). Qasim was not popular in Kunar, where the local Taliban base demanded that a local Talib be appointed governor. He appears to have been chosen by Kabul because of his readiness to comply with their request that he avoid unnecessarily antagonising the Salafis, hence transitioning towards more selective repression. The Emirate’s leadership went ahead, even as a very unhappy Turabi threatened to split from the Taliban with his followers.</p> +<p><em>Personnel</em></p> -<p>Turabi’s removal suggests that the leadership in Kabul was seriously concerned about the reaction of the Salafi ulema. However, transitioning towards selective repression was never going to be a smooth path. Even if indiscriminate repression lessened after 2021, much damage had been done, as the repression entrenched the sense in the Salafi community that the new regime posed a critical threat to the community.</p> +<p>The C-sUAS mission must be shared across air defense and all other combat, combat support, and combat service support activities. The high demand and low density of air defense formations requires that air defenders and non-specialists work together as part of a CAFAD approach. The central question today, however, is the specific division of labor among the air defense and non-air defense units. Table 15 below lays out three models to illustrate the terms of this debate. On one end is the “Specialized” model, in which the C-sUAS mission is largely taken on by air defenders. On the other end, the “Universal” model posits a framework in which all units are trained for C-sUAS. The “Specialized” and “Universal” models are extremes for illustrative purposes — no one advocates for these purist frameworks. U.S. defense officials are developing an appropriate middle path, labeled here as “Hybrid,” which will incorporate elements from both sides. The degree of specialization versus universalization, however, remains to be determined.</p> -<p>Moreover, the new policy of selective repression that followed Turabi’s dismissal was not particularly popular with Taliban officials. Within the Taliban ranks there was denial that indiscriminate abuse had taken place. In the words of a police officer:</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yftfLmJ.png" alt="image35" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 15: C-sUAS Operator Frameworks.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <p>The Islamic Emirate always told the normal Salafi villagers [that is, not associated with IS-K] that it doesn’t have any problem with their sect, unless they support the enemy of Afghanistan, the Daesh <em>khawarij</em> … Those Salafi people arrested or killed by the Taliban, they had some kind of connection and relation with the Daesh <em>khawarij</em>.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Under the hybrid model, C-sUAS planners have borrowed the distinction between “area” and “point” defense whereby air defenders manage larger systems such as high-energy lasers and long-range kinetic interceptors for “area” defense, while other forces use “point” defenses such as guns, nets, and handheld platforms. Maneuver and forward-deployed forces should be able to detect and classify Groups 1 and 2 and, if unable to intercept themselves, at least “relay alert information on locations, altitudes, and time” critical to ground force protection and the possible defeat of enemy UAS. The JCO’s investments suggest an emphasis on CAFAD. Handheld jammers, targeting enhancers, the smart shooter, and other smaller platforms have left this pathway open for the joint force across all units.</p> -<p>Even looking forward, doubts persisted that the new policy was appropriate. One GDI officer commented: “I have doubts [about some of the Salafi ulema and mullahs], but we cannot take any kind of action because I don’t have proof … the Taliban leadership in Kabul is trying not to create problems for Salafi ulema and elders in Kunar”.</p> +<p>The hybrid model posits that the C-sUAS mission in non-ADA units is a force protection task, akin to chemical defense operations. All personnel have a responsibility to perform self-protection chemical defense tasks, and select personnel are trained to employ chemical defense equipment, such as chemical detection kits or alarms. Under the C-sUAS construct, all personnel must be able to engage an sUAS with their assigned or unit organic weapons, and select personnel will be trained to employ C-sUAS weapons.</p> -<p>Some other officials were more explicit in their criticism. As one police officer commented, “The ideologies of Salafi and Daesh are the same, then why they shouldn’t support Daesh?”, implying that the entire Salafi community was a security threat. This officer advocated the closure of all Salafi madrasas and schools and criticised what he viewed as the Emirate’s soft approach, dictated by the fear of driving more Salafis into the arms of IS-K.</p> +<p>Questions over specific platforms, specializations, and authorities, however, are still up for debate. Should the infantry operate M-LIDS as a divisional level asset, or should this type of platform be forward deployed at the company level? How much training does a soldier need to fire a Coyote missile? Should the Army significantly expand SHORAD units as the Marine Corps has done by tripling the size of the Low Altitude Air Defense Marines community? And how can ground forces deconflict with the Air Force and allied air forces in a timely, effective manner? The DoD needs to answer these questions to fully institutionalize the C-sUAS enterprise. Doing so will allow staff to better understand how C-sUAS formations will work across services and branches, as well as how to plan against sUAS threats.</p> -<p>Indeed, surrendering IS-K members did warn the Taliban to avoid antagonising the Salafi community, on the grounds that doing so would drive members towards IS-K. Despite this, outside Kunar, Taliban officials continued closing Salafi mosques and madrasas and detaining Salafis, affecting the entire Salafi community. At the end of 2022, Salafi sources alleged that the Taliban had decided to take over Salafi madrasas in southeastern Afghanistan (that is, installing Hanafi principals to run them and replacing many teachers and professors); in universities, teachers accused of being Salafis were dismissed. Taliban and IS-K sources both confirmed these actions. In December 2022, according to Salafi sources, the Taliban took partial control of a madrasa in the Shuhada district of Badakhshan, and in early February 2023, a large-scale Taliban crackdown in Badakhshan led to raids on three local Salafi madrasas and bans on Friday prayers in 10 mosques.</p> +<p><em>Facilities</em></p> -<p>The quantitative and qualitative growth of the Taliban’s GDI was inevitably going to be instrumental in the implementation of the new directives and in making repression more selective. From the start, rather than investing in protecting every possible target from IS-K attacks, the Taliban opted to focus on infiltrating IS-K cells in and around the cities. Given the limited resources available (the entire annual 2022/23 state budget being just above $2.63 billion, or 48% of what it had been in 2020), this appears to have been a sound approach. As a result, a major focus of the Taliban’s effort throughout 2022 was the expansion and consolidation of the GDI’s network of informers throughout the IS-K-affected area. During 2022–23, the Taliban were able to carry out multiple successful raids on IS-K cells, mostly in Kabul, but also in other cities. Dr Bashir was credited with quickly setting up a vast network of informers and spies in the villages and in Jalalabad, which led to the destruction of numerous IS-K cells. The impact appears to have been obvious, as attacks stopped, although other techniques, such as local negotiations and the targeting of supporting networks, were also used (see below). On social media, IS-K repeatedly warned its members about the Taliban infiltrating its ranks, implicitly acknowledging its difficulties.</p> +<p>The Army’s plans for facility development are underway. Previous C-sUAS training operations were conducted out of Yuma Proving Ground and lasted roughly two weeks. Despite this training and other branch-specific programs, the JCO found a lack of institutionalized C-UAS training, with one senior Air Force officer noting, “There are currently no joint linkages or commonality to counter UAS training across the department. . . . The average soldier, airman, or Marine lacks adequate counter UAS training.” To improve the military’s C-sUAS capabilities and create a permanent training installation, the Fires Center of Excellence in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is building a Joint C-sUAS University (JCU), which is scheduled to reach initial operation in the first quarter of FY 2024. The academy will provide a common core program of instruction, joint TTPs, and updated doctrine.113 The center will also provide the C-sUAS community with additional space and equipment to conduct research, test, and train.</p> -<p>However, there was some obvious evidence of the GDI’s networks being slow to reach areas where IS-K had not originally been expected to operate. One example is a rocket attack from Hayratan into Uzbekistan on 5 July 2022. This was carried out by three Nangarhari members of IS-K, who were able to hide in a safe house in Mazar-i Sharif for seven months. These outsiders should have attracted the attention of the GDI; the fact that they did not highlights how Taliban intelligence gathering in mid-2022 was still weak in this area.</p> +<p>The JCU’s location at Fort Sill is understandable but suggests a larger role for air defenders over the maneuver force for C-sUAS training. Will this truly be a joint center for all branches, or will the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) at Fort Moore, Georgia, develop its own C-sUAS doctrine to inform mobile and maneuver C-sUAS requirements? Furthermore, while most C-sUAS specialists will likely be Army soldiers, the Army-centric location may also discourage Marines from joining. These concerns can be managed as long as the JCU recruits from across the services and branches upon its opening in FY 2024.</p> -<p>Another necessary tool for a full transition towards selective repression is the establishment of a functional system of the rule of law. When the Taliban authorities claimed to “have proof” of mosques and madrasas supporting IS-K, including confessions from surrendering IS-K members, such allegations were disputed by Salafi advocates. The Taliban disregarded the advocates’ complaints: “There were some complaints from some Salafi ulema regarding the banning of their madrasas and mosques, but we don’t care”, said one source. In reality, the standards of proof were quite low. A source in the Kunar GDI implicitly acknowledged this: “In Kunar province we have warned Salafi followers that if the Islamic Emirate had a small doubt about any madrasa or mosque spreading propaganda about Daesh, we would close it and will inflict a heavy punishment on the madrasa’s principal or on the mosque’s imam”.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wDZ4BJA.png" alt="image36" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 18: Preparing RQ-7B Shadow for Flight.</strong> Oklahoma Army National Guard soldiers and contractors prepare an RQ-7B Shadow for flight at Fort Sill. Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> -<p>The low standards of proof predictably resulted in the crackdown continuing on and off, even if not as dramatically as before. At least, the excesses of the Nangarhar death squads of October and November 2021 were not repeated on a comparable scale in 2022.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<h4 id="choking-off-tactics">Choking-Off Tactics</h4> +<p>The sUAS threat is here to stay. These systems offer multi-mission capabilities, at low cost, and with minimal signatures. They are widely available through commercial industry and their utility has been demonstrated in numerous conflicts around the world, from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to Azerbaijan and Armenia’s conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, to the Yemen civil war. Given these factors, sUAS technology will continue to evolve and proliferate.</p> -<p>In addition to repression, another key approach taken by the Taliban to countering IS-K in recent years has been choking-off tactics. Typical examples of such tactics include cutting off an insurgency’s supply lines, or the financial flows supporting it, or its access to the population. The Taliban should have been familiar with this: one of the major debates between Kabul and Washington in 2006–21 was over the US’ inability or unwillingness to force Pakistan to cut the supply lines of the Taliban. That failure, many argued, made the war unwinnable.</p> +<p>As such, C-sUAS has become a critical part of modern air defense. That criticality, however, does not mean that the joint force is ready for the challenge. Today’s air and missile defense systems and structures were not designed to counter numerous, low-flying, small uncrewed systems. sUAS exploit gaps in sensor coverage and cost asymmetries against expensive interceptors. The belief that aerial threats would be countered by U.S. air forces or the ballistic missile defense force may have been true at one point, but drone technology evolved far faster than most thought possible. The U.S. divestment of SHORAD left the DoD without tools and personnel that may have more easily adapted to the sUAS threat, although the proliferation and sophistication seen today calls for more than the SHORAD of yesteryear.</p> -<p>While it would have made sense for the Taliban to destroy IS-K’s bases in the far east of Afghanistan in order to disrupt the group’s ability to maintain its influence in eastern Afghanistan, they had limited manpower available as they were taking over the Afghan state in the summer of 2021, with just some 70,000 men in their mobile units as of September 2021. The Taliban’s Emirate had to concentrate thousands of its best troops in Panjshir from early September 2021, where it faced the resistance of local militias and remnants of the previous regime’s armed forces, gathered into the first new armed opposition group to rise after the regime change, the National Resistance Forces. Thousands more troops were busy securing the cities and sealing the border with Tajikistan. The scarcity of manpower in this period is highlighted by the fact that in the months following the takeover, there was only a very thin layer of Taliban armed forces present in most rural areas. In the average district, the Taliban were only able to deploy 20 to 30 men, who guarded district-centre facilities and carried out occasional patrols, riding motorbikes on the roads. They were rarely seen in the villages. While a process did begin of Taliban supporters, reserves, sympathisers and relatives of Taliban members joining the Emirate’s armed forces, it took several months to absorb these untrained or poorly trained individuals into the forces. Moreover, plans for the security sector were initially quite modest, as the Emirate’s leadership decided to keep the size of its armed forces relatively small, for several reasons:</p> +<p>Fortunately, there is a diverse mix of sensors, effectors, and C2 systems that can detect, track, identify, and defeat sUAS. The DoD is investing in a variety of kinetic, electronic, and RF-based defenses to counter sUAS threats. These tools have their respective strengths and weaknesses affecting such factors as survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and total defended area. Defense budgets here are limited, but the JCO has down-selected across a wide array of C-sUAS platforms to improve economies of scale in production, logistics, and training.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The easy victory obtained by the Taliban in Panjshir in September.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The fact that IS-K was viewed as a marginal actor due to its low profile (see “How the Taliban Assessed IS-K”, above).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The positive attitude shown to the new regime by all neighbouring countries, except for Tajikistan (which was hosting the National Resistance Forces), was making it hard for armed opposition groups to find a safe haven and external support.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The limited fiscal base of the Emirate.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The institutionalization of C-sUAS will require developments across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Capability development remains necessary for the long term, but as the JCO has emphasized, the urgent need today is for training and capacity. New doctrine should specify the division of labor between air defense and non-air defense specialists, as well as the specific sensors, C2, and effectors that they can operate. C-sUAS leaders will need to tackle these and various other challenges, with their decisions today shaping the field for years to come.</p> -<p>Indeed, Taliban sources circulated the news that the new army would be small, with as few as 40,000 men in combat units and another 20,000 in support and administrative roles. The police force was planned to be 40,000–60,000 men, of whom some 5,000 would be in a special force called Badri 313. These plans soon changed, however, and by January 2022 the Emirate had upgraded its plans for the army and police, overseeing a gradual expansion of the army towards a target of at least 150,000 men. It seems likely that the resumption of IS-K activities in the cities and in the east contributed significantly to this decision.</p> +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Shaan Shaikh</strong> is a fellow with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on missile proliferation, unmanned aerial systems, air defense, and non-state actors. He is also managing editor of the CSIS website Missile Threat, an online clearinghouse for information and analysis on missile and missile defense systems. Prior to joining CSIS, he worked at the U.S. Department of Defense and the Syria Institute. He is currently a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and received his BA from Tufts University.</p> -<p>The Taliban therefore delayed launching any large operation in the east. They seem to have understood that large military sweeps without the ability to hold territory afterwards are pointless, if not counterproductive – possibly as a result of having observed the failure of such tactics when used against themselves before August 2021. By March 2022, the Taliban were finally able to launch their first relatively large operation in Kunar, with the intent of forcing IS-K to fight for its bases. Initially, they seem to have thought that by threatening the few fixed bases IS-K had in the far east, they would force IS-K to stand and fight, and inflict major losses. According to a local Taliban source, before August 2021, IS-K had access to “every district of Kunar” and had “very active military bases and training centres”. But the insurgents avoided contact, leaving their bases behind and pulling deeper and deeper into the upper valleys. A Salafi <em>a’lim</em> (religious scholar) offered a similar assessment for Dangam district, saying that IS-K had controlled about 30% of the territory before the Taliban takeover, but that most IS-K members moved out after August 2021. The GDI expected to need another military operation, even deeper into the valleys, to “finish IS-K off”. By April 2022, however, the Taliban realised that IS-K had given up its last vestiges of territorial control in Kunar without a fight.</p> +<p><strong>Thomas Karako</strong> is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, where he arrived in 2014. His research focuses on national security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and public law. In 2010–2011, he was an American Political Science Association congressional fellow, working with the professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on U.S. strategic forces policy, nonproliferation, and NATO. Dr. Karako is also currently a fellow with the Institute for Politics and Strategy of Carnegie Mellon University.</p> -<p>Whether or not this was initially part of their plans, the Taliban considered that they had achieved an important objective: although IS-K tactics made it impossible for the Taliban to eliminate the group, asserting control over territory and population would still allow them to choke off IS-K. A Taliban cadre in Kunar said in April 2022 that IS-K’s opportunities to approach potential recruits had been greatly reduced, as it had been forced to go underground and to downscale operations.</p> +<p><strong>Michelle McLoughlin</strong> is a former intern with the CSIS Missile Defense Project. She is currently a graduate student at American University’s School of International Service and holds a BA in international relations from the University of San Diego.</p>Shaan Shaikh, et al.This report examines the threat of small drones on the modern battlefield, and the various kinetic and non-kinetic defenses available to defeat them.And You Are?2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/and-you-are<p><em>British military exercise, Salisbury Plain Training Area, England, 2016: Our convoy set off from its departure point in the dead of night.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The six vehicles, carrying soldiers and air defense missile launchers, made their way slowly through wooded areas, across fields, and down rural tracks, looking to avoid detection by the enemy. Progress was slow. Vehicles got bogged down on more than one occasion, and we struggled to navigate using night vision equipment whilst trying to relate paper maps to the silhouettes of hills and trees. After several hours, we arrived at the battlegroup headquarters to which we were assigned. I headed into the building that had been requisitioned as the operations room. I approached the battle captain and introduced myself, but it quickly became apparent that we were not expected nor were we particularly welcome. There ensued an uphill battle for our capability to be understood, protected, and deployed appropriately in order to prevent the position being destroyed by enemy aircraft. Relationships had to be built, favors pulled, and compromises reached to make any progress.</em></p> -<p>The Taliban’s pervasive presence on the ground also allowed the GDI to improve its mapping of IS-K’s presence countrywide. By March 2023, for example, the Taliban claimed to fully know where IS-K cells were operating in Kunar. This choking-off tactic therefore also contributed to enabling more selective repression.</p> +<p>Armed forces are divided entities by design. They are first split by domain — land, air, sea. The army, navy, and air force are then divided again by function. The enterprise is built on having separate capabilities such as armor, infantry, artillery, signallers, logisticians, and engineers all come together in times of conflict. Units are further dislocated by space, spread around a country and overseas. As a result, forces often do not “know themselves” as well as they should. Moreover, human frailties such as accidents and losses exacerbate the problem.</p> -<p>The other main choking-off tactic used by the Taliban against IS-K was financial disruption. <em>Hawala</em> traders were saying in late 2021 and early 2022 that Taliban authorities (the GDI, but also the National Bank) were increasing pressure on them. At that time, the Taliban had not yet worked out how to effectively block <em>hawala</em> traders from transferring money for IS-K (or any other hostile actor), and so relied on intimidation and implementing existing rules for registering transactions – woefully ignored under the previous regime – to achieve impact. Visits from Taliban patrols served as reminders of the danger of cooperating with IS-K. While these tactics could not completely stop the flow of cash for IS-K from Turkey (where the main financial hub of IS-K was located), they do not seem to have been pointless. IS-K sources reported that by September 2022, IS-K could only rely on a very limited number of <em>hawala</em> traders and a few smugglers who were taking cash for IS-K from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Later in the year, financial transfers were complicated further by a Turkish government crackdown on IS-K networks in Turkey. It is not clear whether the Turkish crackdown was the result of intelligence provided by the GDI, or of the Emirate’s “diplomatic” engagement. In any case, as an IS-K source acknowledged, the group’s expansion into the north was insufficiently funded as a result.</p> +<p>As our exercise showed, internal organizational friction reduces operational effectiveness and is often invisible in measures of force readiness. The British Army provides a particularly stark example where these functional divisions are exacerbated by historical norms and fissures. Other forces can learn from our experience, using rigorous and regular collective training to reduce the impact of friction.</p> -<p>These efforts appear to have had some impact. One IS-K source claimed in May 2022 that earlier financial flow problems had been fixed, but there was evidence to the contrary. Salaries paid to frontline fighters, at $235 per month in 2022, were lower than in 2015–16, when they were reportedly as high as $600. Although the central leadership of IS continued to promise massive funding increases for the future, in 2022, according to one of IS-K’s financial cadres, it cut the IS-K budget to its lowest level ever.</p> +<h3 id="finding-friction">Finding Friction</h3> -<h4 id="the-talibans-reconciliation-deals">The Taliban’s Reconciliation Deals</h4> +<p>Analysis of military capability often focuses on headline metrics: numbers of tanks, howitzers, and soldiers. The strength of armies is often portrayed as a function of their size, with some minor modifications for the modernity of the systems at play. Forces the world over hold parades, flyovers, and demonstrations to show off this metric to allies and adversaries alike. This was certainly the case regarding Russia prior to February 2022. But the war in Ukraine demonstrated the importance of other considerations, such as the will to fight and the ability of commanders to combine capabilities and sequence them appropriately in time and space. However, there are also more ambiguous frictions that can prevent forces from reaching their potential. As shown in the anecdote above, which took place in a real training exercise, organizational realities must be considered when attempting to analyze the true abilities of a fighting force.</p> -<p>As noted above, Dr Bashir was not simply interested in wreaking havoc in IS-K-supporting networks and milieus. Having gained a position of strength through his crackdown, Bashir moved forward with local negotiations with community elders to undermine the rival organisation. The Taliban had themselves been subject to reconciliation efforts to co-opt some of their ranks when they were fighting their “jihad”, although it is not clear what they made of these efforts, which were in any case poorly implemented by the Afghan government of the day. Bashir is now seen by Taliban officials as having been a “very active chief for Nangarhar GDI department” and as having had a “very good connection with villagers and elders in every village and district of Nangarhar province”.</p> +<p>Many commentators were surprised by the Russian armed forces’ apparent inability to seize key objectives in Ukraine after the invasion in 2022. Subsequent examination has revealed that a layer of friction existed below the normal threshold of analysis — Russian soldiers had been using out-of-date maps as well as inadequate food and antiquated rifles. Moreover, command and control was confused, information was kept from soldiers, and orders failed to account for developments on the ground. Such revelations were seized upon by Western analysts and practitioners as evidence that the Russian war machine was a laughing stock. However, such hubris is unwise, and forces should take time to inflect to ensure they do not suffer from a similar sort of rot.</p> -<p>The Taliban were probably aware of the role played by Salafi elders in the recruitment of IS-K members, or perhaps presumed such a role, based on their own experience as insurgents. Several surrendered IS-K members acknowledged that many Salafi elders in Nangarhar had previously encouraged villagers to join IS-K. IS-K teams had regular meetings with elders, encouraging them to mobilise villagers. There was reportedly a high level of pressure on individual members of IS-K to invite friends, relatives and neighbours into the group. It was standard practice for Salafi village elders supporting IS-K to be trusted to introduce new members without the standard additional vetting. “Joining Daesh at that time was very easy; it only needed one telephone request”. Individual recruits, on the other hand, were still scrutinised much more seriously, according to a former IS-K member who was recruited via social media.</p> +<h3 id="do-i-know-you">Do I Know You?</h3> -<p>Dr Bashir relied on an initially small number of Salafi elders willing to cooperate, and on several Hanafi elders who had connections with some IS-K members or lived in areas affected by the IS-K presence. Former IS-K sources confirm the role of the elders in negotiating their surrender. In the words of one, “When we decided to surrender to the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate, again we used the local elders to negotiate and mediate our surrendering with Dr Bashir”. The GDI arranged for the surrendering IS-K members and their community elders to guarantee under oath that they would not rejoin IS-K or in any way oppose the Emirate. The elders agreed to take responsibility and inform the Emirate’s authorities of any violations.</p> +<p>The British Army, like most military forces, moves its personnel around the country regularly. Each force does this differently, but it is common for soldiers and officers to change positions every two to three years. This may be upon promotion, or on a more general rotation. As a result, there is a constant churn of personnel through units and formation headquarters. Some people will have been there for two years, others two months, and some two days. Sometimes it is unavoidable for whole command teams to depart at once, although this is avoided where possible. Consequently, expertise in planning and executing missions waxes and wanes.</p> -<p>On the basis of Dr Bashir’s exploratory efforts in 2021, the GDI and other components of the Taliban’s security apparatus established communication with community elders. The village elders were tasked by the Taliban GDI with negotiating the surrender of any Salafi elder with whom they came into contact. The Taliban identified useful contacts among the elders, and the district governor or the chief of police regularly visited them, as often as weekly or fortnightly.</p> +<p>Indeed, while armies will have centralized, accepted planning processes, individual formations often put their own spin on things, producing their own templates and products. As a result, on arrival in a formation, new personnel will have to learn how to slot in. It is not uncommon for formations to hold an annual series of “crawl, walk, run” planning exercises to bring new staff up to speed with its processes. Ideally, these align with readiness timelines, but conflict may well fail to respect neat operational readiness mechanisms, especially when resources are scarce as they are in many NATO militaries.</p> -<p>The official claim is that in 2021–22 some 500 IS-K members (commanders, fighters, recruiters, support elements and sympathisers) from Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman surrendered as a result of Bashir’s combination of ruthless repression and negotiations with the community elders. This figure is likely to be somewhat inflated. One of the surrendering IS-K member noted that “there were lots of people among those 70 who surrendered who were not Daesh members; I didn’t recognise many of them”. A source in the Taliban’s provincial administration acknowledged that some Salafi elders, anxious to please the new regime, convinced some members of the community to pose as IS-K members and “surrender”. This was discovered later by the GDI but, overall, the elders-focused effort was still rated highly successful. A police source estimated that 60% of those surrendering were IS-K members from eastern Afghanistan and 40% were civilian supporters. Even a source hostile to the Taliban supported a positive assessment of the campaign, acknowledging that in a single village in Sorkhrod, three IS-K members surrendered to the Taliban. Various ex-IS-K interviewees confirmed having surrendered as part of large groups of IS-K members.</p> +<p>In the United Kingdom, related units are often not located together. It may surprise nonpractitioners to learn that in many cases, units that are expected to deploy together, often at very short notice, are not based together and indeed are sometimes separated by hundreds of miles. As a result, there is an immediate barrier to building relationships and working together. Time spent together builds familiarity. It should not be underestimated how much easier it is to work with people you have a rapport with. This becomes even more critical in times of high pressure and fatigue.</p> -<p>The majority surrendered because of agreements between the GDI and community elders, but some surrendered directly to the GDI, after Bashir managed to reach out to them in the districts and convince them that surrendering was the best option for them. Bashir’s argument to these IS-K members was that it was not in the Salafi community’s interest to have another war, which would be fought ruthlessly by the Taliban, including in their villages.</p> +<p>When commanders may not know some of the people in their staff, this immediately leads to a reduction in performance. Moreover, familiarity with capabilities may be lacking. Battlegroup commanders may be given a fire group of air defense missile launchers having never laid eyes on them before and may not know the first thing about their use. It is then up to a young troop commander to bridge the gap in understanding. In some cases, this is easy. In others, the battalion commander may be reluctant to take advice from an unknown junior officer, or even fail to realize they are in the headquarters at all.</p> -<p>With a much reduced IS-K ability to threaten waverers, due to the group’s weakness on the ground, the path was clear for the Taliban to expand their tactics of negotiating deals with community elders to Kunar province. Indeed, to some extent during 2022 the stream of surrendering IS-K members, which had started in Nangarhar in autumn 2021, spread to Kunar. Here too, the Taliban sought the cooperation of the community elders to convince IS-K members to lay down arms. Some Salafi ulema were also involved. Although the surrenders were fewer than in the neighbouring province, the “tens of Daesh members” who surrendered to the Taliban as a result of the mediation of the elders represented a warning to IS-K. The formula adopted was the same as in Nangarhar, with surrendering members taking an oath never to rejoin IS-K and the elders guaranteeing for them. As in Nangarhar, some IS-K members in Kunar reached out directly to the GDI to negotiate their surrender.</p> +<p>Military tribalism may also be deleterious to performance. Military forces are broken down into units with different capabilities that are often defined by their historic and lived experience. Different parts of the force often have their own colloquialisms. Some soldiers look down on those who do not have a particular qualification badge or who have not served with a particular unit and even have specific deprecatory terms for outsiders. In operational theaters, these problems become more acute as formations change shape as time moves on. Operational realities such as casualties or demands for capabilities with higher priority elsewhere will keep formations in flux, further exacerbating the issue.</p> -<p>At the same time, the Taliban continued their local negotiations with elders in Nangarhar. The flow of surrenders therefore continued in 2022. The last group to surrender in 2022 was composed of some 70 members from Nangarhar, who defected in the autumn. As of January 2023, the Taliban believed that 90% of the IS-K structure in Nangarhar had been wiped out; the Taliban were aware of the existence of some IS-K cells, but deemed them too weak to launch attacks. It is difficult to say whether the Taliban’s estimate was correct, but undoubtedly IS-K had taken a big hit in Nangarhar.</p> +<h3 id="accidents-happen">Accidents Happen</h3> -<p>Those who laid down weapons sometimes reported being treated decently by the Taliban; others reported not being treated very well, with Taliban and pro-Taliban villagers looking down on them. Still, they appreciated that they could live with their families, even if most of them had had to relocate to avoid IS-K retaliation. There were complaints about being required to report to the police station every week or two, and not being allowed to move around without permission. Surrendered IS-K members also complained that the Taliban were not implementing their side of the deal – specifically, giving financial support to those who had surrendered. One of those interviewed noted that this would make it hard for the Taliban to convince more to surrender. Another complaint was that those who stayed in the districts did not feel safe from IS-K.</p> +<p>Other frictions exist as well. Whilst some might seem minor, they form part of the complex picture that affects how forces perform on the battlefield. For example, despite lots of training and attempts at mitigation, soldiers crash their vehicles an awful lot, both in exercises and on operations. This, in fact, is one of the highest causes of casualties in military forces worldwide. Operating heavy machinery in convoys in the dark or conducting complex maneuvers in urban and wooded areas is hard — really hard. Vehicles get stuck, make a wrong turn, and in the worst cases overturn or collide with a friendly vehicle.</p> -<p>The fact that madrasas and some mosques were still closed also upset the reconciled IS-K members, in part because the surrender agreements included a clause about reopening them. Reportedly, the surrendering IS-K members had been promised government jobs, the freedom to live anywhere in the country and the receipt of cash payments for six months. In practice, no cash was paid (although some food and some benefits in kind such as blankets were provided), and the surrendering men were only allowed to choose to live in their own community or in the district centre. Some surrendered IS-K members hinted that the reason why surrenders have slowed down was to be found in the violation or non-implementation of these agreements.</p> +<p>Soldiers also lose things as well as themselves. Weapons, night vision equipment, and even vehicles go missing. Operational imperatives will determine how much time is spent trying to recover them. These sorts of frictions are not accounted for in most planning cycles. This friction also captures last-minute demands on soldiers, including the simple act of battling the military bureaucracy to reach an outcome. Military forces are a mix of analogue and digital processes, in which archaic structures are wrestling with modernity. Obtaining a vehicle, rations, or place to train can be so complex and protracted as to be impracticable among a host of competing priorities.</p> -<h4 id="elite-bargaining-with-the-salafi-ulema">Elite Bargaining with the Salafi Ulema</h4> +<p>When added together, the totality of these seemingly minor frictions means that the capability of a military to defeat an enemy is much more nuanced than might be reflected by numbers or the latest technology. A complex cocktail of personal relationships, ability, and willingness contributes to the effectiveness of a force in the field.</p> -<p>In 2020–21, the Taliban did not show much faith in the opportunities offered by intra-Afghan talks, nor were their counterparts in Kabul able to pursue those talks with any degree of effectiveness. Instead, the Taliban sought to co-opt local and regional elites associated with the government of the Islamic Republic. It is probably in a similar spirit and informed by this experience that the Taliban approached the prospect of negotiations for resolving the conflict with IS-K. The Taliban were well aware of the links between IS-K and much of the Salafi clergy. Support from Salafi communities in the east and northeast had proved essential for IS-K to be able to put down roots there. Many Salafi preachers were recruiting for IS-K in this period, as sources within the community admit, and Salafi madrasas and schools in Kabul were sending numerous recruits to IS-K. Much of the Salafi youth joined during this phase. For the Taliban, driving a wedge between IS-K and the Salafi community, from which the former draws most of its support base, must have seemed an attractive opportunity.</p> +<h3 id="what-to-do-about-it">What to Do About It?</h3> -<p>A group of Salafi ulema had already sought an understanding with the Taliban in 2020, as IS-K was losing ground quite fast in the east. A delegation of senior Salafi ulema, led by one of the most senior figures, Sheikh Abdul Aziz, met the Taliban’s emir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, and other senior Taliban in 2020, offering support to the Taliban in exchange for the cessation of violence and reprisals against civilians. The Emirate’s authorities again welcomed delegations of Salafi ulema in Kabul in 2021, reconfirming the agreement with the Salafi ulema and reissuing orders that the Salafis should not be targeted. After that, attacks and harassment of the Salafis reduced, even if some Taliban commanders continued behaving with hostility towards Salafis.</p> +<p>The solution? Train. Train lots, and train well. Aside from delivering on operations, the second most important task for armies and the other services is to prepare and train for those operations. British military training takes place at a number of levels. First, soldiers must be able to administer themselves in the field and be able to fire their personal weapon accurately and use basic communications equipment. Second, they must be able to operate their core equipment, which might be a vehicle, heavy weapon, missile system, or radar. Third, they need to operate that equipment in concert with other capabilities in pursuit of an aim or objective. This collective training is difficult and expensive to execute effectively, but is absolutely critical to achieving commonality. Units may also be stuck performing other duties such as vehicle maintenance and distracted by an assortment of other demands, from online training to hosting visitors to filling out paperwork.</p> -<p>However, the terms of the agreement were that the Taliban would not allow the Salafi preachers to proselytise, and the madrasas that had been shut on grounds that they had been recruiting for IS-K remained closed. Only the mosques were reopened. Moreover, some senior clerics, accused of links to IS-K, remained in prison: Sheikh Bilal Irfan; Sheikh Qari Muzamil; Sheikh Sardar Wali; Sheikh Jawid; and Delawar Mansur. The Salafi ulema interpreted the closure of the madrasas as temporary and expected that after some time the community could return to its quietist stance, which had in the past (before 2015) been the predominant position among Afghan Salafis.</p> +<p>William F. Owen, editor of Military Strategy magazine, argues that formations should train in the field for 90 days a year. Currently, however formations might be lucky to get 30 days of combined training in a year. And often, that combined training is also an assessment of some sort, which can detract from being able to take time to fully integrate and assimilate the various personnel and capabilities involved.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, even after the second agreement in 2021 many “hot-headed” young members of the community stayed with IS-K. One of the Salafi ulema pledging allegiance to the Emirate admitted in a private interview that the Salafi clerics remain opposed to Hanafi Islam, but that they did not think IS-K stood a chance against the Taliban, and that it was not in the interest of the community to fight. These clerics, however, did not have control over the youth who were still with IS-K.</p> +<p>There are, as ever, frictions associated with such an aim. Some specialist units are passed between larger formations as there are not enough to go around. This means they could potentially end up spending a much longer time in the field, which would have ramifications on morale and retention. Prioritizing their time between supporting formations, their own force development, and time to recuperate requires a pragmatic approach by commanders. Inverting the normal practice of specialists travelling to the associated formation and instead being visited by them to share knowledge would reduce the burden on the minority. This also substantiates the point made previously about being unable to forge strong relationships. However, the intent is a good one. Time spent together builds familiarity with capabilities, which in turn means more favorability — those capabilities will be employed effectively and in concert with the rest of the formation offering competitive advantage.</p> -<p>On the other side, among the Taliban and the Hanafi ulema, there were voices of moderation, especially among the ulema, who were even willing to tolerate Salafi proselytising – generously funded from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – on the grounds that otherwise the Salafis would continue being driven towards IS-K. An imam in Jalalabad expressed what might be defined as the midway solution preferred by the Taliban’s leadership, as discussed above: avoid identifying all Salafis as linked to IS-K; leave the Salafis alone; but ban them from proselytising. His words reflected angst about the seemingly unstoppable spread of Salafism: “I am living among Salafi scholars and followers; they are becoming bigger and bigger every day, they have very good financial sources in Saudi Arabia and several other Arab countries … to expand their activities”.</p> +<p>Issues surrounding the locations of units, and how far they are from the formations they work with, are more difficult. Bases have finite capacities and may simply be unable to house the totality of those who would deploy with them. Sometimes there are infrastructure limitations as to what can be stored where — for example, not every base has the requisite facilities to store sensitive items like missiles. What’s more, armies often try to balance their presence around the country to help with recruitment and enable people to stay where their families are based. Likewise, the problem of career movement is difficult to solve. British career structures are built upon movement and promotion, moving from jobs requiring different skill sets with different profiles. Staying in one place can count against people when trying to achieve the next rank if a high-profile job exists elsewhere.</p> -<p>But the 2021 agreement was also opposed by many among the Taliban and the Hanafi ulema. There are many hardliners. Former Kunar governor Turabi embodied the hardline stance: repression without local reconciliation efforts. Although this approach was not effective and was opposed in Kabul, within the GDI’s ranks, Turabi still had supporters in early 2023, who argued for a crackdown on supporting networks and milieus on the grounds that the safe haven they offered was essential for IS-K operations.</p> +<h3 id="remaining-challenges">Remaining Challenges</h3> -<p>A common view among Hanafi ulema is that while there are quietist Salafis in Afghanistan who have not embraced the militant Salafism of IS-K, the popularity of IS-K among Salafis is not only due to a defensive reaction on the part of the community. They believe that jihadist Salafism has been spreading through the community. Because of this, many Hanafi ulema have been sceptical about the decision of a number of high-profile Salafi clerics to seek an understanding with the Taliban, believing it to be only a tactical decision to buy time.</p> +<p>Dealing with the subject of internal organizational friction is problematic on two fronts. First, it is difficult to quantify. It is nuanced and uneven across forces. There is no firm methodology by which to analyze a commander’s grasp on all the capabilities under their command, nor how good the relationships are between the battalion’s core and its attachments. Commanders do get put through their paces on validation exercises, but the marking criteria concern objectives like bridge crossings and assaults. Moreover, many exercises today are simulated, which further dilutes interactions between individuals.</p> -<p>As a result of polarised views within the Taliban and among the Hanafi ulema, the policies of the Emirate concerning the Salafis have continued to fluctuate and vary from province to province, as discussed above. As a result, relations with the Salafi community have remained tense. Kunar received special treatment, with the Taliban’s leadership making clear that especially in Kunar, the GDI should only act against Salafi madrasas and mosques in the presence of solid evidence. The new policy of “working hard to give respect and value to our Salafi brothers and trying our best to finish the dispute between Taliban and Salafi” was introduced after Turabi’s dismissal, according to a source in the provincial administration. The decision was made at the top: “Taliban local leaderships have been told by our leaders in Kabul to keep a good behaviour with Salafi members in Kunar”. There was an at least partial acknowledgement that “one of the reasons why Daesh in Afghanistan became active and somewhat powerful is that some Taliban carried out aggressive acts against the Salafis in Kunar and Nangarhar”. Former IS-K members confirmed that negotiations with Salafi elders and the ulema led to the reopening in 2022 of all mosques and of the Salafi madrasa, except two, which stayed closed due to their connection to IS-K.</p> +<p>Second, the topic does not make for good reading. Forces like to assume that soldiers are professional enough to put aside any personal or professional differences in order to complete an objective. This is often true, but not always. It is hard for a commander to admit that some of their soldiers are rude to other troops because they wear a different badge or have not completed a certain qualification. However ridiculous it seems, some readers will find this awfully familiar, and some will be guilty of it themselves.</p> -<p>Despite this “special treatment”, a Salafi <em>a’lim</em> estimated in April 2023 that the community in Kunar was split between those who have functional relations with the Taliban and those who are hostile. One Salafi elder estimated that in his district of Dangam, 30% of the Salafi community was on friendly terms with the Taliban and the remaining 70% had tensions. It did not help that the Salafis remained marginalised in Kunar even in early 2023, as all the provincial officials were Hanafi, with only a few rank-and-file Taliban from the Salafi community. The Taliban have regular meetings with the district <em>shura</em> (council) and occasional meetings with the village <em>shuras</em>, but no Salafis were included in the district <em>shura</em> or in at least some of the village <em>shuras</em>. Hence, a Salafi elder complained that “the Taliban don’t want to hear too many complaints from the Salafis, nor their views”. Clearly, while attempting to defuse tension, the Taliban seemed to have no intention of moving towards an elite bargain.</p> +<p>This makes it all the more important to remember that, when assessing the readiness of a military, what you cannot see is of great importance. While some of this invisible friction is baked into military culture, time spent physically training together can dramatically reduce it. Combined arms training, which builds relationships, trust, and skills, will transfer directly into operational advantage.</p> -<p>Even Taliban sources acknowledge that friction between Salafis and Hanafis has persisted. For example, throughout 2022–23, the Taliban were insisting that all imams wish a long life to the Taliban’s amir (or “head of state”), Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, during Friday prayers; the Salafi ulema in Kunar refused to comply. This refusal did not lead to a new crackdown, but it shows that the Salafi ulema were not entirely committed to supporting the Emirate, despite their pledge. The Taliban had offered them a safety guarantee as subjects of the Emirate, but it appeared that the Salafis wanted an elite bargain, that is, at least a share of power and influence. As a result, the Taliban’s engagement with the Salafi ulema went cold towards the end of 2022. After two or three meetings during 2021–22, meetings stopped, and Taliban officials took the view that the Salafi ulema were not willing to fully implement their part of the deal and that several of them were still supporting IS-K.</p> +<hr /> -<p>There appears to have been no talk at any stage of incorporating significant numbers of Salafi clerics into the ulema councils at the provincial and national levels, which would have been a major step towards an elite bargain with Salafi elites.</p> +<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Patrick HintonBritish military exercise, Salisbury Plain Training Area, England, 2016: Our convoy set off from its departure point in the dead of night.Track and Disrupt2023-11-10T12:00:00+08:002023-11-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/track-and-disrupt<p><em>Efforts to align third countries with sanctions against Russia will only succeed when the private networks facilitating circumvention are understood and countered.</em></p> -<h3 id="iv-is-ks-response-to-the-talibans-tactics">IV. IS-K’s Response to the Taliban’s Tactics</h3> +<excerpt /> -<p>While the Taliban’s efforts posed major challenges to IS-K, not all the techniques discussed above were threatening or, indeed, were perceived as such. IS-K does not appear to have been concerned about indiscriminate repression against its supporting milieus, and its only apparent reaction was intensifying efforts to present itself as the defender of the Salafi community. Its focus was instead on responding to the Taliban’s choking-off effort, especially their campaign to take full control of territory and population.</p> +<p>Sanctions regimes have continued to expand in scope since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, aiming to asphyxiate Russia’s financial and military capabilities to wage war. The EU alone has passed 11 packages to date, each building on the last. These packages are paired with efforts to restrict circumvention, along with a forthcoming EU directive criminalising sanctions evasion.</p> -<h4 id="the-response-to-choking-off-tactics">The Response to Choking-Off Tactics</h4> +<p>The unprecedented sanctions against Russia have highlighted the importance of third countries – those countries that are neither the target of sanctions nor adopters of sanctions against Russia/Belarus (and thus are not legally bound by sanctions). Such third countries make up a majority of the world and are therefore an important factor in determining whether sanctions are ultimately effective. Put simply, if third countries provide circumvention routes or substitutes for the goods and services that sanctions aim to curtail, then the sanctions will be weakened or fail.</p> -<p>Even if the Taliban were not, immediately after their takeover, in a position to organise a major military campaign in the far east of Afghanistan (Kunar and Nuristan), IS-K clearly understood the potential threat this would represent. By the time the Taliban took over in August 2021, IS-K had long opted out of a direct confrontation with them, after it had emerged in 2019–20 that its forces could not stand up to the Taliban on an open battlefield. This perception of a major threat from a Taliban assault on IS-K bases in the far east only increased after August 2021, given that the Taliban were at that point no longer busy fighting the forces of the previous regime. IS-K soon relinquished the residual territorial control it still had (see the discussion of choking-off tactics above). The group appears to have hoped to delay the expected Taliban onslaught in the east, or to make it unsustainable by waging a guerrilla war against the Taliban forces deployed there, forcing them to divert forces – while at the same time mitigating the impact of choke-off tactics by reducing the number of non-local members (who were harder to hide and more difficult to support) and creating an extensive underground network.</p> +<p>The trade in dual-use goods is one of five categories of sanctions evasion and avoidance covered by recent analysis undertaken by RUSI as part of the Serious and Organised Crime Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) programme, and provides a particularly salient example of the role of third countries. Numerous reports have publicised cases of manufacturers deliberately or inadvertently shipping important military and technological components from sanctions-imposing countries to intermediaries in third countries that then ship them onward to military end-users in Russia and Belarus.</p> -<p><strong>Delay and Diversion</strong></p> +<h3 id="tracking-sanctions-evasion-networks-in-third-countries">Tracking Sanctions-Evasion Networks in Third Countries</h3> -<p>While seeking to retain control over parts of Kunar and Nuristan, IS-K largely switched to asymmetric tactics, such as intensified urban terrorism, hit-and- run raids, ambushes and mines. These efforts produced few results initially, and IS-K’s leaders (the leader of IS-K and the military council) had to keep thinking of new strategies. A plan for sending cells to cities where IS-K was not yet active, such as Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i Sharif, was hatched in spring 2021 – that is, before the Taliban took power – although it was not fully implemented until August 2021.</p> +<p>Our recent SOC ACE report categorised five types of sanctions evasion critical to funding and supplying Russia’s military-industrial complex: financial services, company incorporation, dual-use and military goods, exports of sanctioned Russian commodities, and oil smuggling. All of these operate primarily in the private sector and rely on third countries’ lax enforcement of – or deliberate refusal to implement –sanctions.</p> -<p>Essentially, the IS-K leadership decided to keep the Taliban busy by going on the offensive in the cities, calculating that by risking a few tens of cells it could force the Taliban to commit tens of thousands to guarding the cities. The campaign started somewhat slowly, due to the limited capabilities of existing IS-K underground networks in Kabul and Jalalabad.</p> +<p>In the case of countries not imposing sanctions, many commentators have bemoaned the whack-a-mole problem: company incorporation is so easy that sanctioning a person or a company will just cause another to appear in its place. Behind all of these seemingly random companies, however, is a Russian or affiliated individual(s) directing a network, often associated with Russia’s Federal Security Service. In many cases, investigators have identified links between the Russian military-industrial complex and newly incorporated companies with low public profiles – and these wider networks are often based in or linked to manufacturers, banks and other businesses in sanctions-imposing countries.</p> -<p>During the last five months of 2021, IS-K was able to increase the number of its large terrorist attacks in Kabul to five, from two in the first half of 2021. Urban guerrilla actions also continued in Jalalabad after a short lull, opening up with a series of six bomb attacks in September, followed by some months of urban guerrilla warfare against members of the Taliban. Taliban sources described the situation in Jalalabad at that time as “daily IS-K attacks”.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If third countries provide circumvention routes or substitutes for the goods and services that sanctions aim to curtail, then the sanctions will be weakened or fail</code></em></strong></p> -<p>At the same time, during the chaotic power transition of summer 2021, IS-K was able to transfer multiple cells to the cities, which reinforced its presence in Kabul and Jalalabad but also allowed it to expand its terrorist campaign to cities previously unaffected by this campaign. Cells were thus established in Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i Sharif, Charikar, Kunduz, Faizabad and Gulbahar. Among the cells were recruiting teams which targeted, in particular, university campuses. As a result, while IS-K was able to intensify its campaign of terrorist attacks in the cities, it was also hoping that the new urban underground structure would become self-sustainable. An IS-K source acknowledged that the group exploited the chaotic period of the Taliban’s takeover to send more of its cells into the cities. He explained that “because different groups of Taliban entered Jalalabad city and other cities of Afghanistan from the mountains and the districts, it was very difficult for the Taliban … to distinguish between Daesh and Taliban members there”.</p> +<p>These thousands of companies are often not random or spontaneous creations, but directed by the Russian military-industrial base. They consist of networks of individuals and companies directing this support and supply business, along with intermediary companies and the shipping and logistics firms that facilitate the circumvention trade. Gathering the data necessary to map these networks is critical, as is understanding which government stakeholders are linked to these networks, in order to support diplomatic engagement to disrupt this trade in third countries.</p> -<p>An IS-K source estimated in early 2022 that the Kabul city contingent, following years of decline, had climbed back up to 300 members, in two separate structures – one aimed at preparing and carrying out attacks, and the other at recruiting and propaganda operations. There seemed to be a real opportunity for catching the new regime off guard, with the Taliban still surprised to find themselves in power and dealing with multiple crises in their efforts to keep the Afghan state afloat. While the Taliban were known to be more than a match for IS-K in a conventional fight, IS-K hoped that the Taliban’s lack of experience in counterterrorism would allow several hundred terrorists to cause havoc in the cities, as even Taliban officials confirmed to the International Crisis Group that this was the case.</p> +<p>Some third countries are already introducing their own control systems to monitor the re-export of goods to Russia, such as Kazakhstan’s online tool to track the entire supply chain “from border to border”. However, governments and private businesses in these countries would benefit from this specific data collection and mapping approach to mitigate their exposure to opaque sanctions evasion networks and thus avoid getting caught in the crosshairs of US or EU sanctions.</p> -<p>Aside from its intensity, in terms of target selection the campaign of terrorist attacks in Kabul was a continuation of IS-K’s earlier campaign against the previous government. The targets of the new phase of the campaign were also religious minorities, such as the Sikhs and, most of all, the Shia community. Aside from forcing the Taliban to divert forces away from the east, the primary intent seems to have been to create chaos in the cities, turning the sizeable Shia community against the Taliban (for their failure to protect it) and exposing the incompetence of the new regime, especially in urban security. In spring 2022, the High Council of IS-K decided, in the context of some fine-tuning of its strategic plan, to further reinforce the focus on terrorism in the main cities, targeting the Shia community via a wide selection of very soft targets, such as schools and mosques. Protecting so many potential targets would have required the Taliban to commit significant human resources, to the detriment of the wider counter-IS effort.</p> +<h3 id="building-capacity-in-allied-countries">Building Capacity in Allied Countries</h3> -<p>Operationally, IS-K’s campaign in 2022 produced some visible results. According to a respondent, IS-K’s “research and inquiry” department, which undertakes analysis for the leadership, produced in June 2022 an internal report indicating that in the spring of 2022, IS-K had achieved the highest number of “highlight” (that is, headline-making) attacks and military activities in three years. Impartial data collection shows that the pace of bomb attacks peaked above 10 per month in April–July 2022, but started declining in the latter part of that year, to between three and six per month (see Figure 1). This might have been due to increasingly effective Taliban counterterrorism. However, it is also likely that relocation from the far east had largely been completed, and that IS-K downscaled terrorist attacks in Kabul to a more sustainable level.</p> +<p>Notwithstanding the role of third countries, allied countries that have imposed sanctions also contribute to circumvention. Many of the microelectronic components still feeding Russia’s military systems are Western-made yet continue to reach Russia, mostly due to a combination of a lack of enforcement capacity and the deliberate obfuscation of end-users through third-party intermediaries by the global networks supplying Russia.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Rf6GAx2.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: IS-K Activity and Taliban Counterterrorism Operations, 2022–23.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.afghanwitness.org/reports/taliban-continue-raids-against-iskp-in-may%2C-claim-killing-of-deputy-governor-in-kabul">Afghan Witness, “Taliban Continue Raids Against ISKP in May, Claim Killing of Deputy Governor in Kabul”, 1 June 2023</a>. In the figure, “Arrests” and “Clashes/Raid” refer to Taliban operations against IS-K. Reproduced with permission.</em></p> +<p>Over 30 countries representing more than half the global economy have announced sanctions and export controls targeting Russia, but the findings of the RUSI-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet) point to a series of challenges that sanctions-imposing countries consistently face.</p> -<p><strong>Mitigation</strong></p> +<p>Prior to February 2022, many members of the sanctions coalition had very limited exposure to sanctions, and they are now scrambling to overhaul their national frameworks. In the EU, several member states are trying to determine the competent authorities and their responsibilities towards what is repeatedly called the “unprecedented” scale of sanctions against Russia. Both private- and public-sector actors have struggled to implement and enforce the sanctions, meaning that even countries with strong political will struggle to detect and interrupt sanctions evasion that might involve – or even start in – their own jurisdiction.</p> -<p>To lessen the need for supplies inside Afghanistan and also being increasingly unable to protect non-Afghan members, in late 2021 and early 2022, IS-K moved more of its Pakistani members across the border. Taliban sources too noted the disappearance of not only Pakistanis but also Central Asians, Chechens and other non-Afghans from the east, and assumed they too had crossed the border.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Truly disrupting third-country sanctions circumvention requires a better understanding of the wider networks enabling this activity</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The process of evacuating the bases in the east took eight months; even for some time after this a substantial number of IS-K members, especially leadership and administrative cadres, were hiding in caves and other secret locations, while their relocation was being arranged. The permanent bases were replaced during 2022 by an underground infrastructure, not only in Kunar but also in parts of Nangarhar, with secret cells established in Achin, Naziyan, Lal Pur, Pachir wa Agam, Bati Kot, Mohmand Dara and Jalalabad city. Even as the Taliban kept destroying its cells in Jalalabad, IS-K was able to maintain a presence there. Local elders confirmed the disappearance of obvious signs of IS-K presence, but believed that the group maintained secret cells. In January 2023, a source in the Taliban’s administration stated that IS-K’s presence in Nangarhar consisted of some IS-K cells in Jalalabad and one to two cells each in some districts, such as Achin and Naziyan. As of March 2023, the police estimated that there were 16 IS-K cells in Jalalabad, based on the confessions of detainees, but the cells operated independently and tracking them down was difficult.</p> +<p>With unclear responsibilities, scarce resources and a lack of expertise, private-sector operators face an uphill battle to tackle the already intricate task of detecting and countering circumvention, muddled by the involvement of complex multi-jurisdictional schemes often involving third countries.</p> -<p>Parallel to the move underground, IS-K also sought to adopt a mobile infrastructure to support the small, dispersed cells, a process that continued throughout 2022. A year after the spring 2022 strategic shift was decided, one IS-K source described as an accomplished fact a new, leaner and more mobile infrastructure that had replaced the old fixed bases:</p> +<p>The coalition of sanctions-imposing countries could also be strengthened by more consistent intelligence-sharing to disrupt cross-border global sanctions evasion networks, and by improved harmonisation in the interpretation of sanctions (including among EU member states). This leads to cases where authorities from different member states disagree on whether measures should be taken against an entity that one or the other understands to be in breach of sanctions. Moreover, the violation and circumvention of sanctions is not criminalised in all members of the sanctions coalition – notably in EU member states. This means that even if these practices are already taking place within their jurisdiction, authorities cannot initiate investigations and disrupt the networks involved. The upcoming EU directive to criminalise these practices will aim to remedy this, but this adjustment is long overdue.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Daesh has training centres and lots of secret cells and secret military bases in Kunar province, but they are changing their locations all the time. Daesh is on the move – its training centre, military bases [and] secret cells are all moving and changing every three or four months. When a member of Daesh is arrested by the Taliban or surrenders, Daesh immediately finds out where these guys were trained, which posts or secret cells they were assigned to, then it changes the locations.</p> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="disrupting-global-sanctions-evasion-networks">Disrupting Global Sanctions-Evasion Networks</h3> -<p>Taliban sources confirmed that IS-K was moving people to the northeast and north and even claimed that the collapse of IS-K activities in Nangarhar was in part due to IS-K moving out.</p> +<p>Truly disrupting third-country sanctions circumvention requires a better understanding of the wider networks enabling this activity, from banks and corporate service providers to shipping and logistics networks. Taking this wider view will likely generate new levers for pressure, including cutting the financial ties of the enablers supporting this trade. Further, applying a network focus should also reveal links between private-sector actors and the governments of third countries.</p> -<p>While IS-K implemented these mitigating actions quickly, it remains the case that they were not enough to prevent the group’s operations from being constrained. IS-K’s messaging to its members did not mention the coming downgrade of the east, for good reasons. It appears to have been a difficult decision to take, given that a large majority of the group’s Afghan members were from the east and had families there. As of early 2022, IS-K sources were still adamant that they would soon go on the offensive, that their bases in the east were safe and that they had enough manpower to defeat the Taliban in the east. The rationale for having IS-K’s main bases in eastern Afghanistan (Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan) was still being promulgated by IS-K sources at least until mid-2022: “there are many Salafi people and madrasas in these provinces and most of the followers of Salafism are supporting IS-K”. It took until 2023 for IS-K sources to begin showing awareness and acceptance of the fact that IS-K had given up any ambition to hold territory, at least in the short and medium term.</p> +<p>In sum, efforts to tackle evasion should combine diplomatic engagement with third countries, focused on a network-centric approach, with a tightening of domestic efforts to disrupt sanctions circumvention at source. It is thus key that sanctions-imposing countries harmonise and improve their national frameworks as well, including better coordination and information-sharing across the coalition. Sanctions-evasion networks operate as global enterprises, and sanctions-imposing countries must do the same to render them ineffective.</p> -<p>The constraints that the transition placed on IS-K’s operations are evident when we look at its guerrilla operations in the east. While the transition was ongoing, IS-K, remarkably, sought to keep waging a guerrilla war in eastern Afghanistan. The guerrilla campaign was always limited in scope, affecting only the provinces of Kunar and, to a lesser extent, Nangarhar. Guerrilla activities intensified from late summer 2021, especially in Ghaziabad, Naray and Shegal. Though these mostly consisted of small hit-and-run attacks on Taliban posts and small ambushes, they were beginning to annoy the Taliban. In spring 2022, the High Council of IS-K, while deciding to intensify the terrorist campaign in the cities, also confirmed the decision to continuing the guerrilla war against the Taliban, where possible. However, the new structure left behind in the east proved unable or unwilling to support a steady insurgency there. IS-K guerrilla attacks in Nangarhar remained especially rare. One of the last few recorded attacks was in February 2022, an ambush in Achin which killed two members of the Taliban.</p> +<hr /> -<p>In Kunar, the picture was similar. In one of the worst incidents, a convoy was ambushed in Shegal and “several Taliban fighters were martyred”. In Dangam in Kunar, some lingering IS-K presence continued in the forested area, without much military activity. Those remaining were local members, reportedly being kept in reserve and perhaps supporting the planning of attacks elsewhere. Most IS-K members had reportedly moved to northeastern and northern Afghanistan (see below). This is likely to have affected the pace of guerrilla operations in the east, not only because of lower numbers, but also because to local members the option of lying low and hiding was more likely to seem viable than it would to their foreign and out-of-area comrades. As the presence of non-local fighters dried out, the level of guerrilla activity declined further. An independent assessment found that IS-K was able to sustain the number of guerrilla attacks at between five and 10 per month during the first half of 2022. The numbers, however, collapsed to between two and five in the second half of the year (see Figure 1, where guerrilla attacks are listed under the category “Gun”).</p> +<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is currently working as an independent consultant, following a role as a Senior Managing Director at the boutique investigations consultancy K2 Integrity. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex, international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies, and international financial institutions (IFIs).</p> -<p>IS-K also tried to adapt in response to the Taliban’s financial disruption operations. Confronted with the news that IS-K networks in Turkey had taken a major hit, IS-K sources indicated that the organisation coped successfully, reactivating its old financial hub in the UAE, where the abundance of Afghan <em>hawala</em> traders would make it easier to find complicit ones. The source had to acknowledge that there was a bottleneck at the receiving end, in Afghanistan, as <em>hawala</em> traders were wary of getting caught. He tried hard to present an optimistic picture, noting that other ways of transferring money, through complicit businesses based in Turkey and through flights between Istanbul and Kabul, with the help of some personnel at Kabul’s airport, were being tested. One of his colleagues also suggested that the financial strangulation of IS-K was lessening as of December 2022–January 2023.</p> +<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime &amp; Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).</p>Olivia Allison and Gonzalo SaizEfforts to align third countries with sanctions against Russia will only succeed when the private networks facilitating circumvention are understood and countered.The Securitisation Of Energy2023-11-09T12:00:00+08:002023-11-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-securitisation-of-energy<p><em>Understanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security.</em></p> -<h4 id="the-response-to-the-reconciliation-and-reintegration-deals">The Response to the Reconciliation and Reintegration Deals</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>The other main concern for IS-K appears to have been about countering the Taliban’s local reconciliation and reintegration efforts, which had the support of some Salafi elders in the villages (see discussion above). The group appears to have seen this as the biggest medium-term threat. IS-K started in 2021–22 to bring pressure on the elders not to facilitate negotiations between IS-K members and the Taliban. One surrendering member heard from villagers that “Daesh is trying a lot to undermine this process. Several elders who were secretly facilitating the negotiations and connecting IS-K members with the Taliban for their surrender have been threatened”.</p> +<p>This paper examines how Russia’s energy policy has interacted with its foreign and defence policies since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The key findings are:</p> -<p>Others who surrendered confirmed the same, adding that threats consisted of death threats and threats to burn down the homes of anybody making deals. One of the surrendered members claimed he and two fellow former comrades in arms received threats from IS-K; the group, he said, threatened to “set fire to my house and throw me into the blaze”. Two elders of his village, who had helped the Taliban, he said, were also threatened, and as a result stopped being involved in negotiating surrenders. One even reported that nine surrendered IS-K members ended up rejoining IS-K in Nangarhar, although it is not clear whether this was because of the threats or because of the poor Taliban implementation of the deals. IS-K also increased counter-intelligence efforts among its own ranks. These countermeasures were deemed to be effective by a number of former IS-K members, who believed that surrenders were diminishing or even ceasing. This suggests that IS-K feared the reconciliation/reintegration plans much more than it did indiscriminate repression.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Russia perceives any restriction of its access to and exploitation of oil and gas markets both within Russia and abroad as a serious security threat. Restriction could either be through international sanctions that prevent Russia from accessing deep-water oil deposits, or the international climate change agenda that calls for a reduction on oil and gas production.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>As a major oil and gas producer, Russia considers the hydrocarbons industry to be a key part of its political economy and therefore its national security. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s role as an energy provider – or sense of international responsibility to its clients – was thought to keep some of its behaviour in check, even as Russia had in the past wielded its energy supplies to extract political concessions from some of its former Soviet neighbours. Ultimately, Russia’s security goals in Ukraine overtook any of this responsibility, which has framed much of the debate around Russia’s future as a declining energy power in Europe.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia’s understanding of energy security is bound up in the country’s sovereignty, and with strategic competition with other states over resources. Ensuring security of demand and continued access to resources are part of Russia’s national security framework and even its national identity.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The war has increased the urgency for Russia to seek out alternative alliances and structures with China and Iran. In recent years, Russia has established its own energy forums with partners such as Saudi Arabia and some African states – work which has become more pressing since the war began and Russia’s energy relations with the West have been significantly reduced.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia claims that the West is seeking to undermine it through its dominance of energy resources, and that international forums, such as the UN, are prejudiced against Russia’s national interests. Russia also conflates energy with politicking, maintaining that Western efforts to cap its production prices or curtail nuclear energy use are part of a campaign to undermine Russian values and assert a neoliberal agenda.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The war has intensified Moscow’s need to identify new export destinations, with rail and pipeline networks that were previously in train accelerated. But to do so, particularly towards the Indo-Pacific region, Russia must link up its oil and gas reserves with maritime and rail infrastructure. This includes new terminals along the Northern Sea Route that can process liquefied natural gas, coal and oil and updating port infrastructure, as well as new ice-class vessels for exports.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Investments in the North–South Corridor via Iran have also gained traction since the war began, particularly to export oil and deliver on some of the practical elements of Russia’s foreign policy, by bringing Iran and India closer to its economic network. Russia has also identified specific development zones in the Arctic that are rich in hydrocarbons or have access to the sea.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Prior to the war, Gazprom’s monopoly in Europe had been unchallenged, but this is not the case in Asia, where it faces rival Novatek – this infighting may impact Russia’s ability to expand its energy plans in China. The Power of Siberia 2 pipeline contract with China, as yet to be signed, would give Gazprom a future role in Asia.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia tends to use international platforms like the UN to further its own national interests or ensure it has a stake in the conversation, rather than in pursuit of a common cause. Since the war began, Russia’s ability to interact with other (especially Western) states has been restricted.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Since the war began, Russia and Saudi Arabia’s coordination through OPEC+ has been more pressing. Riyadh has not aligned itself with the Western consensus on Ukraine, nor has it introduced sanctions on Russia. But the war has caused a decline in global energy prices, and there are frictions between Russia and Saudi Arabia over Russia’s refusal to publish its oil export figures. Riyadh suspects that Moscow continues to export significant volumes of oil despite their price agreements, but the former has not criticised this and, since the war began, has invested in Russian companies like Gazprom.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia is highly affected by climate change, but also banks on its status as a commodities producer to retain its international position. This inconsistency informs its strategic policymaking on the environment, as well as its behaviour in international forums related to climate change. Moscow often objects to international climate change efforts because it prioritises Russia’s national security, not the security implications that can stem from climate issues. While climate change can affect Russia’s national security, it is described as an issue that threatens Russia’s economic development, requiring technological or practical solutions, not adjustment to the extractive industries. Russia also views warming Arctic seas as more of an opportunity to improve access to shipping lanes than a crisis.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia views the Western-led climate change movement as an agenda seeking to undermine Russia and its interests in the extractive industries. Moscow’s installing of former intelligence officials in posts concerned with environmental security highlights the crossover in the Kremlin’s mindset between the environment and national security.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Since the war, many environmental links between Russia and the West have been severed. Moreover, there is little international oversight of Russia’s major drilling projects or their environmental impact, and legislation that restricts ecological activism has been tightened. Most Western-led NGOs dedicated to the environment have been shut down.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Ultimately, even if the UK can decouple from Russian oil, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means Russia’s behaviour as a hydrocarbon superpower can still impact the UK’s energy security. Russia views external attempts to cap oil prices as a dangerous precedent that could be extended to other areas of the Russian economy and Russian values. This indicates that Moscow interprets international economic and pragmatic decisions as a direct attack on Russian sovereignty.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="the-response-to-the-talibans-tentative-elite-bargaining">The Response to the Taliban’s Tentative Elite Bargaining</h4> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Because of the lack of Taliban success in negotiating with the Salafi ulema, IS-K may not have considered a response to their negotiations with the Salafi ulema a priority – although it is likely that it brought pressure to bear on the Salafi ulema to stay away from the Taliban. IS-K’s short campaign of attacks on pro-Taliban clerics in the summer of 2022 might also have been intended to provoke Taliban retaliation against Salafi clerics and spoil the Taliban’s discussions with them. The killing of Rahman Ansari in Herat in September 2022 might have been a warning as well, as Ansari was a Salafi preacher who had pledged loyalty to the Taliban. IS-K did not claim the killing. The campaign was abandoned in autumn, probably as it was becoming clear that IS-K did not need to be concerned about Taliban negotiations with the Salafi ulema.</p> +<p>This paper analyses Russia’s energy policy and the way this interacts with the country’s foreign and defence policies. The paper is part of RUSI’s UK National Security and the Net Zero Transition project and is published alongside a paper that focuses on the links between Saudi Arabia’s energy policy and its foreign and security policy behaviour. Together, these two papers analyse how Russia and Saudi Arabia – which aside from the US are the world’s leading oil exporters – approach their roles as energy superpowers, how their energy-related decision-making has evolved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and how their foreign policies and conduct in international forums, including on climate change and other major global issues, will continue to have global implications.</p> -<h4 id="is-k-counterattacks">IS-K Counterattacks</h4> +<p>As oil and gas prices were already elevated in 2021 following the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia was able to exploit them in Europe in order to drive up prices before it invaded Ukraine. This returned the link between energy and geopolitics, and in particular the question of energy security, to the fore. The war has demonstrated that energy and geopolitics cannot be separated, and has increased the need to determine how major fossil fuel producers think about their international roles.</p> -<p>While IS-K sought to counter Taliban tactics or at least to limit the damage, its leadership also decided to try re-seizing the long-lost initiative by striking the Taliban where it felt they were more vulnerable. The urban terrorism campaign, discussed above, was more of a diversion than a counter-offensive. Instead, IS-K appears to have placed its hopes for turning around the situation in its expansion in the north. Plans to expand recruitment in the north started in mid-2020 (after an earlier aborted effort in 2017–18). Small numbers of Afghan Pashtuns and even Pakistanis were also sent north. After 2021, these efforts were strengthened, and even moving the IS-K headquarters there in the future was considered.</p> +<p>While there are many definitions of energy security, for the purposes of this paper, energy security of states is considered to be both a practical issue of supply access and pricing, and a geopolitical issue that relates to foreign policy behaviour in the energy sector. For states that are net importers of energy, as the UK and most of Europe are, security of oil and gas supply is often equated with diversification. This includes diversification away from fossil fuels, an increasingly potent driver of energy policy across Europe. But while hydrocarbons are required to generate electricity and to fuel industries, diversification of supply also means securing access to oil and gas from sufficiently diverse sources that no single disruption leads to sudden shortages or price disruption.</p> -<p>In mid-2022, the IS-K leadership was reportedly still in Kunar, but the new phase of the transfer to the north had been initiated a few months earlier. The movement of people and assets to the north and northeast continued, as both a Taliban police officer and a local elder confirmed. IS-K sources talked up the migration with the claim that it was about taking jihad to Central Asia. IS-K sources spoke about training centres being established in Badakhshan, Kunduz and Jawzjan, with plans to open one in Balkh. As IS-K also dramatically expanded its social media activities, it began releasing significant quantities of propaganda, such as statements and pamphlets in Uzbekistani, Tajikistani and Uyghur, in order to support its claims of imminent expansion into Central Asia.</p> +<p>Before the Ukraine war, some European states relied, to varying degrees, on imports from Russia, one of the world’s top oil and gas producers and exporters. The war has prompted many European states to reduce and ideally end imports from Russia by 2027 in order to deprive Moscow of revenue and reduce Russia’s leverage over Europe. While the EU has made some progress on this, reductions in gas volumes in particular were also due in part to the Kremlin’s actions, including Moscow’s suspension of gas via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, and a March 2022 presidential decree that demanded payment for gas in roubles from countries involved in the EU’s “unfriendly actions” towards Russia.</p> -<p>IS-K seems to have had expectations of rapid expansion into Faryab and the northwest in spring 2022, exploiting intra-Taliban friction. More generally, it is clear that one of the main reasons for the shift in focus northwards was the hope for major defections from the ranks of the Taliban there. That did not happen on any significant scale. When asked for details, an IS-K source could only provide modest defection figures for the entire August 2021 to mid-2022 period: “a few commanders in the north”, with some more in talks as of mid-2022.</p> +<p>The UK has been comparatively less affected by this dynamic; in 2021, only 9% of the UK’s oil and 4% of its gas imports came from Russia, and by January 2023 this had been brought to zero. But while replacing Russian supply was not the UK’s key concern, due to its reliance on natural gas, it was hit just as hard as its European partners by the surge in oil and gas prices sparked by the war. The UK is exposed not just to disruptions to the flows of the oil and gas that it imports directly, but also to the global flows of hydrocarbons.</p> -<p>Another aspect of IS-K’s “counter-offensive” was to make up for the group’s limited achievements with media-focused symbolic attacks, such as rocket attacks from Afghan territory on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which caused no damage but won high-profile exposure in the media. An important part of IS-K’s strategy was integrating its military and propaganda campaigns. Graphic details of the terrorist campaign were used by IS-K social media propaganda to project an image of strength and power that was out of all proportion with the reality. Overall, the leadership of IS-K succeeded fairly well in hiding the extent of its difficulties. The regional and world media, as well as policymakers, continued to portray it as a highly threatening organisation, even though its military achievements were almost negligible.</p> +<p>As the war continues into its second year, although oil prices have somewhat stabilised, there has been a renewed focus by the West on the behaviour of the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), most notably Saudi Arabia, and a group of major producers, including Russia, that have aligned their oil policies with those of OPEC since 2016 through the OPEC+ framework. Every decision by the grouping to adjust production quotas, especially the significant cuts announced in October 2022 and June 2023, has been scrutinised by Western analysts for its economic and political motives.</p> -<p>Although it is difficult to measure how IS-K members and sympathisers reacted to this propaganda, it is clear that one of the intents was to shore up the morale of increasingly dispersed members and convince them that the jihad was succeeding. IS-K tried to diminish the Taliban’s achievements and to stimulate feelings of revenge, for example by claiming that the Taliban had deliberately killed family members of IS-K members during their raids on city cells.</p> +<p>Moreover, the serious fracturing of the relationship between Russia and the West as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has meant that Russia’s behaviour as a major hydrocarbon producer, both in its export dealings and more generally in international forums for discussing these issues, has been particularly difficult to engage with. This is particularly the case where, as in Russia, governments control the energy industry. As a major emitter of greenhouse gases, Russia’s behaviour around climate change issues adds another dimension to this.</p> -<p>Initially the Taliban were taken aback by the dramatically expanded output of IS-K’s rather slick propaganda. The GDI responded by targeting IS-K activism on social media, exploiting the recruitment efforts of IS-K to infiltrate its own agents, and succeeding in capturing some online activists. It also managed to seize control of some accounts linked to IS-K, and to develop more effective counter-propaganda. A key theme of Taliban propaganda, distributed through the regime’s media as well as on social media, was to portray IS-K as heretics. A pro-Taliban <em>a’lim</em> argued that IS-K members “should be treated like <em>khawarij</em> [heretics] and their Sharia sentences should be hanging or beheading”. Another <em>a’lim</em> argued that IS-K members “are all <em>khawarij</em>” and that the doctrine is clear that under Islamic law, the punishment for this is death. Overall, however, at the end of 2022 online propaganda was the only domain in which IS-K dominated.</p> +<p>Given the importance of understanding how major producers behave, this paper examines how Russia sees and exercises the international roles afforded to it by its energy resources. The paper analyses three key issues: how hydrocarbons and their export relate to Russia’s perceptions of itself and its place in the world; the extent to which Russia’s energy policies are securitised and how they are linked to Russia’s domestic and foreign policies; and how Russia relates its status as a hydrocarbon exporter to notions of environmental security and international climate action efforts. As the paper will show, Russian definitions and understanding of environmental security and where this presents a national security threat widely diverge from Western understandings. Moscow tends to frame risks stemming from climate change, such as flooding, as something to be countered by technological or financial solutions, rather than addressing core issues, such as Russia’s continued extraction of hydrocarbons, as contributions to the initial problem.</p> -<h4 id="the-overall-impact-on-is-k-in-202122">The Overall Impact on IS-K in 2021–22</h4> +<p>Understanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is therefore essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security, and where some of Moscow’s red lines might be.</p> -<p>Although IS-K propaganda continually claimed that its numbers were rising, when asked for details, sources provided numbers that in fact showed that the group’s size had remained fairly stable in 2021–22, at just under 8,000 men in total. Most of these in June 2022 were already claimed to be in the north/northeast, according to a source who was himself about to be transferred there from the east.</p> +<h4 id="methodology-and-structure">Methodology and Structure</h4> -<p>IS-K sources and propaganda also claimed that recruitment was strong in 2022. When challenged for figures, two IS-K sources provided roughly consistent figures: total new recruitment into IS-K was estimated at 150–200 per month in mid-2022. The main sources of recruits were still identified as “Salafi madrasas, schools, mosques [and] scholars”. As noted elsewhere, IS-K recruitment in universities can be estimated in the low hundreds per year. Overall, these figures seem relatively modest, considering that IS-K was taking losses and suffering defections, and they are consistent with a substantial stagnation in IS-K’s strength during this period.</p> +<p>The paper is divided into three chapters. The first focuses on Russia’s foreign policy decision-making in energy since it invaded Ukraine, and some of the factional disagreements between powerful energy companies which impact the Kremlin’s ability to put forth a coherent energy strategy. The second chapter discusses Russia’s engagement in OPEC+, highlighting its marriage of convenience with Saudi Arabia around oil prices and the future trajectory of this bilateral cooperation. The third chapter examines Russia’s approach to environmental security and discusses the divergences of opinion between Russia and the West over how to approach the threat of climate change.</p> -<p>In sum, IS-K was able to preserve its manpower and appears to have tailored the level and character of its activities to its ability to recruit and, presumably, spend. During this period, however, the Taliban were rapidly expanding their manpower. IS-K’s transition to a fully underground structure had been fairly smooth, with diversions proving rather successful in distracting the Taliban for some months. It is, however, clear that the group had not been able to seize back the initiative and that its financial difficulties seemed to be worsening.</p> +<p>This paper is based on a review of open-source journals, books and public statements from officials in Russia, using local-language sources where possible, to piece together Russia’s current and historical views on energy security, focusing on the 2022 invasion but also grounding the analysis in recent historical literature. In addition, the paper offers a targeted review of Russia’s energy strategies and other important official documents such as its national security and Arctic strategies, as well as documents that govern its environmental policies and its engagement with the hydrocarbons industry, in order to understand better the gaps between Russia’s official foreign policy documents and its actions.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<h3 id="i-russia-reimagining-the-globe">I. Russia: Reimagining the Globe</h3> -<p>How did the Taliban structure their post-August 2021 mix of tactics for countering IS-K? And how successful were these in fighting the group? Selective violence quickly became the default choice of Taliban policymakers. Identifying the boundaries between extremists, supporting milieus and “quietists” was, however, always contentious. It should also be noted that the Taliban appear to have purposely used bursts of indiscriminate violence to warn hostile populations of what an all-out war with the Emirate would mean for them, and to intimidate them into submission. An aspect of the Taliban’s counter-IS effort that emerges clearly from this paper is that repression, even indiscriminate repression, and reconciliation deals were seen as functional to each other: the stick and the carrot. The new state had to show that it meant business, and that it was able to impose intolerable suffering on the Salafi community if it refused to collaborate.</p> +<p>For Russia, its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the impact of that invasion on global prices have accelerated the competition between it and the West over traditional oil and gas markets, a process that has been under way for more than a decade. It is less the changing oil prices themselves and more the potential restriction of Russia’s access to and exploitation of these markets – both domestically within Russia and abroad, variously through instruments such as international sanctions that prevent Russia from accessing deep-water oil deposits, or the international climate change agenda that calls for a reduction in oil and gas production – that Russia views as a serious security threat. This securitisation of energy policies is the lens through which Russia’s own energy policymaking is seen from Moscow.</p> -<p>IS-K’s leadership appears to have underestimated the ability of the Taliban to adapt quickly. Taliban intelligence, despite some obvious limitations, was able to quickly establish a wide and thick network of informers. As insurgents, the Taliban had had a well-developed intelligence network, and they adapted this; they also seem to have prioritised investment in their intelligence agency. Given IS’s reputation for ruthlessness, it was easy for them to obtain the cooperation of bystanders. At the national leadership level, there seems to have been an understanding of the risk of getting trapped in a cycle of violence, and there were interventions to contain the excesses of provincial officials, especially as the new security apparatus consolidated. The Taliban showed their ability to adapt by developing the sophisticated means to make selective repression viable, for example through setting up social media infiltration teams. Still, when selective repression proved difficult to implement because of insufficient intelligence, local Taliban officials usually had no qualms about reverting to indiscriminate violence, even if the scale never approached the main wave of violence of autumn 2021. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Taliban failed to apply the rule of law to counter-IS efforts. The system remained prone to abuse even from the standpoint of Islamic law, and avoiding excesses was always dependent on interventions from the higher leadership levels.</p> +<p>Russia is a major oil and gas producer, with its oil output in 2021 making up 14% of the world’s total supply. In 2021, its revenues from oil and natural gas made up 45% of its annual budget. Its energy companies are also major employers within Russia, supporting the livelihoods of over two million people, and the importance of these industries is enshrined in Russian law. According to a 2008 law, key industries such as defence and oil and gas are considered by the Kremlin to be “strategic sectors” – cornerstones of the economy upon which Russia’s political economy and therefore its national security rests. Foreign investment in these sectors is heavily restricted, extra state scrutiny is exerted over them, and they are prioritised at the expense of other, less lucrative sectors such as healthcare and education.</p> -<p>The Taliban also tentatively began working at local reconciliation deals with Salafi communities, but the effort was weakly supported by Kabul and, as of early 2023, it was poorly followed up. National-level talks with the Salafi ulema helped the Taliban shift away from indiscriminate violence, but did not lead to any progress towards an elite bargain. The Taliban were offering peace to the Salafis as subjects of the Emirate, but the Salafi ulema were seeking inclusion.</p> +<p>Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Western view of Russia’s role as an energy provider was a rather paradoxical mixture of business pragmatism and political interventionism. Before the 2022 invasion, Russia’s status as a major petro-state and its consequent sense of responsibility to its clients, particularly in Europe, were viewed by some Western analysts as one of the guarantors that could keep Russia’s international behaviour in check – but there was also broad acknowledgement that Russia was capable of and had used its supplies to extract political concessions from former Soviet neighbours such as Georgia (in 2006) and Ukraine (in 2009). In the end, Russia’s security goals in Ukraine overtook any desire for Russia to cast itself as a reliable energy supplier, and this has framed much of the current debate around Russia’s future as a declining energy power in Europe. However, what this has overlooked from a policy (rather than an energy) perspective is that for Moscow, energy supply is only part of the security picture.</p> -<p>Where the Taliban were most effective was with choking-off tactics, constraining the ability of IS-K to recruit, resupply and keep money coming in. They waited until they had sufficient manpower available before mounting large-scale military sweeps, to be able to hold the ground afterwards. If they had been engaging in ineffective sweeps, as the previous regime had, they would have alienated the population for no gain.</p> +<h4 id="moscows-securitisation-of-energy--ensuring-russian-sovereignty">Moscow’s Securitisation of Energy – Ensuring Russian Sovereignty</h4> -<p>A pertinent question is how much of the Taliban’s counter-IS effort has derived from their previous experience as insurgents. While none of the sources directly commented on this point, it seems likely that their reluctance to engage in big military sweeps might derive from having experienced the ineffectiveness of such tactics when they were on the receiving end of them before August 2021. Similarly, having had to recruit new insurgents for 20 years, the Taliban seem well aware of the greater difficulties that an insurgent organisation faces when it lacks territorial control. The Taliban furthermore always argued that the indiscriminate revenge-taking and repression practised by Afghan and US security forces in 2001–04 drove many into their ranks, enabling them to start their insurgency. In the current case, however, they have struggled to implement a coherent policy of selective repression, showing perhaps that learning lessons could well be disrupted by the emotional legacy of a long war. Another example of how hatred for the enemy gets in the way of rational policymaking is the Taliban’s failure to follow up on their good start on reconciliation and reintegration.</p> +<p>Most states view energy security as a serious issue; many governments have influence over their nations’ energy sectors and in a lot of these, the energy sector tends to be dominated by large projects and the relatively small number of companies controlling them. What makes Russia’s approach to energy security particularly Russian is the way that energy and the country’s very sovereignty are bound up with strategic competition with other countries over resources.</p> -<p>IS-K undoubtedly proved a resilient organisation after August 2021. Despite facing morale and financial issues, it focused on an urban strategy while trying to strengthen its positions in northern Afghanistan. Militarily speaking, it did not mount a serious threat to the Taliban. The leadership opted to spare its fighters, soon even giving up early attempts to wage a guerrilla war in the east. IS-K tried instead to keep the Taliban busy guarding the cities against a massive wave of urban terrorism, while at the same time expecting its efforts to establish itself firmly in the north to be bearing fruit in the medium term. Time, however, was not on IS-K’s side, and the group’s financial difficulties only increased during 2022.</p> +<p>Security of demand and continued access to oil and gas markets are key tenets of Russia’s national security framework, and of its national identity. Moscow’s perception of itself as a great power is largely based on a combination of its military might, its nuclear capabilities and its continued ability to produce and export significant volumes of natural resources. Although President Putin has not specifically referred to Russia as an “energy superpower”, it is clear Moscow views its prominence on the international stage and its ability (or as Moscow sees it, its right) to have a significant stake in foreign affairs as bound up with its natural resource wealth.</p> -<p>IS-K appeared to be in a corner by the end of 2022 and early 2023, in good part due to Taliban efforts to counter it. The organisation was surviving by keeping a very low profile, but this meant limited recruitment opportunities and, importantly, far too little fundraising inside Afghanistan. The dependence on money coming from abroad was increasingly proving a liability during 2022. Without financial resources, IS-K was not well positioned to exploit the Taliban’s remaining vulnerability: the fact that the Salafi community, while in general acknowledging a reduction of the pressure exercised by the Emirate, still feels oppressed and very pessimistic about its future under the new regime.</p> +<p>From the Kremlin’s perspective, attempts to stymie Russia’s continued role as a natural resource producer – be it through sanctions or competition with other states over access to resources in the Arctic – are all a serious threat to Russia’s existence. Sanctions introduced on Russia’s hydrocarbons industry by Europe, the US and other allies since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 tended to target technology related to Arctic, deep-water exploration and onshore tight oil extraction, but ultimately they had little impact on Russia’s onshore deposits in western and eastern Siberia, which make up the bulk of its production in the short term.</p> -<p>It seems clear that IS-K was very vulnerable to the reconciliation efforts deployed by the Taliban, and that a decisive defeat of the organisation could have been achieved if the Taliban had followed through and implemented their reconciliation packages consistently. Instead, as the IS-K threat appeared to be receding in the second half of 2022 and Taliban self-confidence grew, reconciliation efforts lost steam, despite evidence suggesting that this was the most effective path. It was assumed that defectors would easily reintegrate with the help of the community elders, who, however, received no support from the Emirate. The main reasons for this appear to have been animosity against IS-K within the Taliban’s ranks, fuelled by the considerable amount of blood spilled; resentment over the allocation of scarce financial resources to paying reconciled opponents; and the failure to make significant progress towards a wider elite bargain involving Salafi elites.</p> +<p>Against this backdrop, and particularly since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has embarked on a strategic and practical reorientation of both its trade and foreign policy alliances. This reorientation sees Russia reimagining the globe and Moscow’s place within it.</p> -<p>Time will tell if the failed reconciliation process is going to be a great missed opportunity for the Taliban. IS-K’s financial weakness could lead to its terminal decline without much Taliban effort, of course, but financial difficulties could still be reversed in the future, in which case the Taliban might regret having neglected their promising reconciliation efforts. While the strong foreign component of IS-K is clearly not susceptible to being enticed to reintegrate, IS-K nowadays needs Afghan participation more than ever – it cannot rely on Pakistanis for dispersed underground operations in cities and villages. If the Taliban were able to substantially cut into IS-K’s approximately 3,000 Afghan members, the group’s viability as an insurgent organisation in Afghanistan would be comprehensively undermined.</p> +<p>Russia’s latest foreign policy strategy – its first major policy document published since the war began – envisages Russia and its allies China and India united at the centre of a grand Greater Eurasian Partnership, pitted against the hegemonic (and allegedly declining) West. This perception frames Moscow as being at the heart of decision-making, with nascent relationships with middle powers such as Iran forming an important economic basis of the alliance. Although much has been made of the significant gap between Russia’s strategic planning and its practical ability to deliver on these goals, what this perception does show is Russia’s intention to restructure the globe on its own terms and to place Moscow at the hub of global decision-making. This is important, because it clearly delineates who and what Russia sees as a threat to its sovereignty. Its foreign policy document makes clear that it respects the sovereignty of powers such as India and China, while remaining mistrustful of and distant from the so-called “Anglo-Saxon world”, a derisive and archaic term that Moscow uses to refer to the UK and some other European states. However, it is not clear that China and India buy into Moscow’s version of the world, especially with framings that conceptualise Russia as the driver and leader of their international positions.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Russia’s foreign policy approach pivots its vision towards a new alliance arrayed directly against the “collective West” (in Russia’s mindset, mostly made up of the EU, NATO member states and the US), which is depicted as a failed example of imposed democracy. This clash of civilisations that Russia is articulating is laying the groundwork for serious frictions between the West, Russia and the rest of Russia’s allies, particularly over energy and access to available resources.</p> -<p><strong>Antonio Giustozzi</strong> is the senior research fellow at RUSI in the Terrorism and Conflict research group. He has been working in and on Afghanistan in various respects since the 1990s and has published extensively on the conflict and specifically the Taliban and the Islamic State. His main research interests are global jihadism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the security sector, state-building and insurgencies. He is currently project director for Strive Afghanistan, which is pioneering new P/CVE approaches. He is also associated with the LSE (South Asia Centre) and was previously associated with War Studies at KCL.</p>Antonio GiustozziThis paper examines the strategies employed by the Taliban in response to the threat posed by the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) in 2021–22.Blockchain For Democracies2023-10-25T12:00:00+08:002023-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/blockchain-for-democracies<p><em>In a world increasingly overflowing with data, blockchain is neither a panacea nor solely an instrument of cryptocurrencies but rather a tool that offers intriguing applications to support democratic governance, including in Ukraine.</em></p> +<p>The war has also exacerbated a growing tendency on the part of Russia to seek out alternative structures such as BRICS – an economic grouping consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in order to promote its way of looking at the world. In this vein, since 2017, Russia has established its own energy forums with trusted partners – including Saudi Arabia and many African states – with the aim of reframing energy issues on its own terms. One such forum, in 2022, was notable for its assertion that Europe’s longstanding policy of moving away from Russian gas was a failed attempt to weaken Russia, linked to the energy crisis – with no acknowledgement of Russia’s own role in that crisis.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Russia’s perception is that the West is seeking to undermine Russia through its dominance of energy resources, and that international forums such as the UN Security Council are prejudiced against Russia and its national interests. There is also a widespread belief among the Kremlin leadership that certain efforts by the West – for example, to cap oil production prices or curtail the use of nuclear energy, or for the US to deliver gas to Europe in order to replace Russia – are part of an attempt to undermine Russian traditional values and exert a neoliberal political agenda. Moscow’s understanding of the West’s actions in the energy sector has been framed in increasingly negative terms over the past decade, reflecting not only the highly securitised way in which Moscow views any external intervention in what it perceives to be its energy affairs, but also its own misconceptions about the West. It also reflects that Moscow has little concept of the importance of climate change issues in shaping global energy policies and prefers to frame climate change as a Western conspiracy designed to undermine Russia’s interests.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>While many of these foreign policy relationships were in train before the war, Russia’s invasion has accelerated Moscow’s need to identify new energy export destinations and to reduce its reliance on imported foreign technology. Although Russia’s so-called “pivot to the East” has already been a long-term trend for at least the past decade, with some rail and pipeline infrastructure build to support it, the programme has recently been accelerated because Russia has few other options. To do this, however, Russia must link up its oil and gas reserves with its maritime and rail infrastructure in order to reorientate its export structures and maintain its own energy security. Whether realistic or not, Putin maintained in mid-2022 that by 2025, Russia intends for 80% of its energy industry’s equipment to be domestically manufactured, to ensure that oil production remains high and to reduce external sanctions risks.</p> -<p>Rapid technological change has led to a global deluge of data. Certain aspects of shared information — authenticity, verification, speed, and integrity — are key to good governance and to helping democracies deliver for their citizens. Blockchain and other types of distributed ledger technology (DLT) offer potential benefits that institutions and governments can leverage in various ways to support democratic governance. Blockchain’s increasing use for identity management, land rights, citizen representation, the tracking of goods and services, and other uses necessitates deeper and broader understanding by U.S. foreign policy stakeholders. Given that U.S. foreign policy prioritizes strengthening democratic governance around the world, including through more inclusive access to services and greater transparency, accountability, and integrity in the public sphere, U.S. policymakers must seriously grapple with the opportunities and challenges associated with the increased integration of blockchain technology. Ukraine’s embrace of digitization and use cases for blockchain offer helpful insights into how and in which contexts this technology may be applied.</p> +<p>Some of these plans for domestic reliance, and new ways of seeing the globe, are evident from Russia’s other strategic planning documents that govern the energy sector, some of which were written before the war.</p> -<p>Whenever there is a lack of transparency in elections, government transactions, bureaucratic systems, and media, there is an opportunity for corruption to ensue, diluting citizens’ trust in democratic institutions. Certain technological advancements can potentially be a valuable tool for increasing the transparency and accountability of democracies. One such innovative tool is blockchain, a form of DLT that allows a group of users to cooperatively maintain a record of transactions.</p> +<h4 id="moscows-shifting-self-perception">Moscow’s Shifting Self-Perception</h4> -<p>Blockchain is often associated with the use case of cryptocurrency, but it can be applied to other domains to track both tangible and intangible goods and transactions. Blockchain is a form of tamper-resistant DLT that ensures that all transactions are recorded and validated. This technology achieves extraordinary levels of data integrity for information once it is loaded into the shared ledger. Essentially, the movement or transfer of anything of value can be logged and verified, instilling trust and confidence by raising the costs of malicious activity during that process. This opens the technology to a wide range of applications. Within governance and democratic strengthening efforts, blockchain has recently been introduced in various places to increase government accountability, combat misinformation, reduce costs and the mishandling of data, and quickly trace financial transactions.</p> +<p>This shift in Moscow’s approach to energy security can be seen from two of the most important documents that govern the country’s energy sector: its Energy Strategy (ES) and its National Security Strategy (NSS).</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-1-what-is-blockchain"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1: What Is Blockchain?</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Russia’s previous NSSs had only briefly mentioned energy in an environmental context, but in the 2021 strategy, the most recent, it is noted as something that permeates all aspects of security and Russian life: ensuring heating, as something to be protected alongside the defence industries and nuclear power plants, and as a major factor in Russia’s economic security. The increasing securitisation of energy means that Russia views external attempts at reform, as well as geopolitical competition over important energy markets, as a threat to Russia’s sovereignty, and will respond with what it views as appropriate force.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Distributed ledger technology (DLT) describes a category of technologies that enables the storage of data within and transfer between multiple data stores. Network participants share this ledger of transactions, allowing for synchronized data recording with no central storage hub. Instead, peer-to-peer transmission takes place, recording the same information across many devices. The “ledger” is stored across multiple locations and is visible to all parties.</code></em></p> +<p>Russia’s current ES (ES-35) was approved in 2020 by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and runs up to 2035. Irrespective of its sparse mention in the NSS, Moscow has long viewed energy as a part of its national security, given the significant contribution of hydrocarbons to the federal budget, and the ES-35 makes it clear that any restriction on Russia’s production and sale of oil, gas and coal would be considered a security threat. The ES-35 is a strategy for safeguarding the oil and gas industry, and there is little attempt to diversify away from reliance on fossil fuels. Extraction and exports are priorities – the strategy aims to launch five major oil projects in the Arctic and 21 projects to extract raw materials such as gold and coal, alongside a significant increase in resource production from liquefied natural gas (LNG), which Russia aims to increase from 8.6 million tonnes in 2018 to 91 million tonnes by 2035. The boost to LNG production will necessitate an increase in infrastructure to support it, which the ES-35 outlines for the Russian Arctic and Far Eastern regions; these plans are supported and governed by other strategic documents.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Blockchain is not singular in design. It can be classified into different types based on which access and governance models are used. The two main categories are private and public blockchains. Private blockchains restrict access to a specific group of participants, while public blockchains allow anyone to join, build, and use applications on the network. Within each of these categories, there are also permissioned and permissionless blockchains. Permissioned blockchains require participants to have explicit permission to host infrastructure and validate network transactions, whereas permissionless blockchains allow anyone to be a validator.</code></em></p> +<p>There have been three key developments since the war began that have demonstrated most clearly Russia’s changing view of itself and its place in the world as an energy producer and supplier. First, in August 2022, Prime Minister Mishustin approved an updated plan for the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a trade route that runs across the top of the Russian Arctic. Among other measures, the plans include construction of three new terminals to process LNG, oil and coal, as well as updating existing port infrastructure in the Far East to accommodate an increase in capacity. With plans to construct new ice-class vessels capable of traversing the NSR, not only is Russia preparing to increase the production and export of raw materials, but it is also attempting to better link up its land and maritime infrastructure, and is using this physical infrastructure to assert its dominance over the maritime domain.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Blockchains that are public and permissioned offer several advantages. They can provide high performance and scalability, processing thousands of transactions per second, and can ensure fast and secure transaction finality. Permissioned governance that provides security, efficiency, and visibility into who is involved in decisionmaking processes and network operation can be combined with public accessibility to all citizens, making the technology a compelling choice for many applications.</code></em></p> +<p>But as ever with many of Russia’s so-called “mega-projects”, there are few feasibility studies available to determine whether investing in these often-politicised projects will ultimately add value to the Russian economy, or even whether ports will be able to accept sufficient planned increases in traffic to make investments worthwhile. Indeed, following a South Korean feasibility study on expanding Russia’s small Far Eastern Slavyanka port in 2018, ultimately the project never came to pass and, since the war began, many foreign investment projects have been halted. Other considerations relating to major projects like these, such as environmental impacts or the effect on local Indigenous populations, are rarely taken into account.</p> -<p>While blockchain and DLT have the capability to help address global challenges and strengthen democratic institutions, the innovative applications of blockchain are still in early stages and not fully understood by key stakeholders in Washington. The United States and its strategic partners must assess and play a role in shaping the next innovative applications of blockchain technology before the opportunity passes. In some respects, China is already possibly years ahead of the United States and many other countries in applying this rapidly evolving technology. Users of the digitized Chinese yuan number over 120 million in China (although conflicting reporting creates some doubt about how widely this currency is actually being used). To create a regulatory and policy environment in which the implementation of DLT strengthens democracy without compromising privacy or muzzling technological innovation, policymakers need a comprehensive understanding of the opportunities as well as the limitations on where and how this technology can be most readily and helpfully adopted. The strategic application of blockchain technology in certain scenarios can enhance trust and better protect information, but implementers must also be mindful of the technology’s shortcomings and challenges.</p> +<p>Second, as part of the development of the NSR, Russia is pursuing important infrastructure projects with allies such as Iran to resurrect the North–South Corridor. This is a railway development project linking Russia to the Indian Ocean via Iran that has been repeatedly shelved over the past two decades, but which has gained new impetus since the war. Plans include linking up ports along the NSR with land and sea routes south of Russia across the Caspian Sea to northern parts of Iran, a grandiose project of a kind that, as the history of Soviet-style planning has evidenced, rarely delivers on its objectives. While it is still incomplete and there are numerous political and infrastructure obstacles to overcome, the North–South Corridor is nevertheless part of Russia’s longer-term plan to export goods, including its oil, through these new land and sea networks. There is substantive investment in it already: as of 2022, Russia had committed $13 billion to different projects as part of the scheme. The North–South Corridor links up roads, rail and maritime infrastructure across multiple countries, and is an attempt by Moscow to deliver on some of the practical elements of its planned foreign policy, bringing countries such as India and Iran more closely into Russia’s economic network.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its strategic partners must assess and play a role in shaping the next innovative applications of blockchain technology before the opportunity passes.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>A third key aspect of Russia’s reimagining of the globe that has been accelerated since the war began can be seen in its Arctic strategy up to 2035, and in Moscow’s changing perception of the NSR. Unlike its predecessors, the current strategy has identified specific development zones – which will receive greater Kremlin attention and financing – that are either rich in mineral resources such as hydrocarbons, or have access to the sea. This highlights Russia’s dual priorities of resource extraction and export in the Arctic, and is a further example of its strategic linkages between the land and maritime domains. Amid a downturn in relations with the West, over the past few years, there has been a noticeable shift in perceptions of the NSR within Russia, from viewing it as a potential international route capable of linking up Europe and Asia to instead seeing it as a useful route specifically for Russian companies to deliver energy resources to their own global markets. This refocusing on ensuring Russia’s dominance of sea routes is likely a precursor to further attempts to exert control over the maritime domain, with likely a concomitant increase in Russia’s projection of sovereignty over parts of the NSR that are considered international waters.</p> -<h3 id="blockchain-and-democracy">Blockchain and Democracy</h3> +<h4 id="how-united-is-russias-energy-decision-making">How United is Russia’s Energy Decision-Making?</h4> -<p>Democratic backsliding around the world should be a concern for democracies everywhere. Democracy is in a worldwide recession in terms of both quality and prevalence, the causes of which are contested. The cornerstones of flourishing democracies, however, are widely agreed upon and include free and fair elections; a free press; individual rights; economic, political, and religious freedom; and a rule of law equally applied. Governments and societies grappling with how best to support and strengthen democracies should assess how technologies such as blockchain can be applied as practical tools to uphold these foundational principles. The applications may vary considerably, as demonstrated by the following non-exhaustive examples.</p> +<p>Russia’s ability to use its position as a major oil and gas supplier on the international stage in exchange for influence, political concessions or access to other resources, or to project its regime survival, is often viewed – both by Moscow and the West – as its most effective foreign policy asset. But while Russia’s energy diplomacy tends to be viewed as a political tool it can wield at will, Russia’s energy strategy is dominated by often-competing approaches, which means that it has occasionally been forced into cooperation with foreign partners to ensure that it retains its position as global producer. As its energy relationship with the West declines, Russia will likely be obliged to cooperate with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, which does not necessarily put it in a position of strength.</p> -<h4 id="protecting-digitized-government-documents">PROTECTING DIGITIZED GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS</h4> +<p>There are multiple competing interests within Russia’s energy sector, with conflicts between the country’s official strategies and the vested interests of individuals and their coteries who are driving these industries forward, and this makes Russia’s energy approach inherently flawed.</p> -<p>Identity is inextricably intertwined with democracy. There are clear incentives for all governments, democratic or otherwise, to provide their citizens with means of unique identification, such as for the delivery of key services and benefits. Democracies have a special interest in ensuring individuals’ identities are protected so that the rights and privileges guaranteed to those individuals can be preserved. For example, government-issued identification is a key ingredient for voting, a core democratic responsibility. Likewise, passports assign unique “international standard serial numbers” which allow customs officials to quickly verify identity and citizenship as well as which travel privileges may apply to an individual. Government agencies such as the U.S. Social Security Administration assign identifiers to help administer medical benefits, financial aid, and other social services and benefits.</p> +<p>Russia’s energy market is dominated by Gazprom (headed by Alexei Miller) and Rosneft (under Igor Sechin), two major oil and gas producers that are in turn technically overseen by the Kremlin. These industries are subject to a series of vested interests that include personal financial concerns, political demands and corrupt practices, all of which make it challenging to determine Russia’s true energy “strategy”. Gazprom is also a sprawling and influential conglomerate that includes financing (through Gazprombank), oil (Gazprom Neft is Russia’s fourth-largest oil company) and the media (Gazprom-Media owns several television channels). These companies employ a relatively large segment of Russian society, with just under half a million people as of 2019.</p> -<p>Worldwide, nearly 1 billion people have no proof of legal identity and are excluded from services and the formal economy. Digital identity can serve to close this “identity gap” by helping deliver immutable and easily accessible identification to those lacking verifiable identity documents, as well as by strengthening the resiliency of existing paper identification. During natural disasters, conflicts, and other crises, citizens may not have the time or ability to grab their paper government documentation, which is necessary to freely move and receive services. DLT’s ability to safely guard such digitized information could alleviate the difficulty of attempting to verify a person’s identity during hectic scenarios in which physical documents are destroyed or inaccessible. Governments could be better equipped to manage refugee crises and natural disasters and administer standard social services, while individuals could have more control of their data. An important factor in realizing this vision entails working toward applications of digital identity systems that empower people rather than surveil and exclude them.</p> +<p>Companies like Gazprom and Rosneft are under state control, but operationally, they both function without significant government interference, as long as this does not directly contradict stated Kremlin foreign or domestic policy goals. Rosneft and Gazprom have also successfully resisted some directives from the Kremlin – government plans in 2013 to try to privatise the oil and gas industry were met with strong pushback from Gazprom, Rosneft and others, such as major bank Sberbank, until they were eventually halted. That said, there is also an important degree of self-censorship within Gazprom and Rosneft, which still tend to act within the Kremlin’s agenda without being compelled to do so.</p> -<h4 id="securing-land-registration">SECURING LAND REGISTRATION</h4> +<p>Despite its relative operational autonomy, in a strategic sense, Gazprom has for years been at the heart of many of Russia’s foreign policy strategies, especially in Europe, where dependency on Russian gas was of political significance, via the (now defunct) Nord Stream pipelines. But while Gazprom’s monopoly has been relatively unchallenged in Europe, this is not so in Russia’s dealings with Asia. There, Gazprom’s greatest rival is the privately owned Novatek, which is absorbing significant amounts of market share amid Russia’s energy reorientation to China, through the Yamal LNG project. Novatek and Rosneft were permitted by the Russian government to participate in LNG exports in 2013, with the view that Gazprom’s monopoly was holding Russia back from becoming a major player in the gas sector.</p> -<p>Land title registries track the ownership of land and property for a given region. The efficient registration of land is an essential component of ensuring property rights, a backbone of any free society. Land registration poses another set of government records for which an agency could maintain a blockchain to improve efficiency and ensure the quality of data storage and transfers. Some countries are already experiencing positive results from deploying DLT in the land registration process. For Georgia, the collapse of the Soviet Union and persistent corruption during early independence caused many property disputes. In response, Georgia was an early adopter of blockchain-based land registration, registering more than 1.5 million land titles in 2018. The Georgian government was able to provide citizens with digital certificates, legitimizing ownership with a timestamp and other cryptographic proof in under three minutes. Importantly, blockchain may help streamline the land registration process, but oversight is still critical to ensure the initial integrity of the data.</p> +<p>New trade deals with China such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, discussed amid much fanfare between Putin and President Xi Jinping in March 2023 (but as yet unsigned), give Gazprom a nascent role in Asia, although construction of that pipeline would not begin until 2024 at the earliest, and would not come online until 2029, even if it were to run to schedule. Since 2014, Rosneft has also sought to challenge Gazprom’s monopoly and gain access to the Power of Siberia pipeline, and has been inching into the gas market over the past decade by acquiring the rights to develop its own gas deposits in Russia. In 2023, Putin appeared to have agreed to Rosneft’s demand, maintaining that its gas reserves from its fields in Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk could be used to supply the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, and instructing Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak to act as arbiter between Gazprom and Rosneft as they worked out the details. As Europe moves away from its reliance on Russian energy, Gazprom may well be forced into ever-greater direct competition with other companies such as Novatek and Rosneft for market share.</p> -<p>Similar technology can be applied to other asset registrations and government services. For example, the private sector uses blockchain technology to track the shipment of goods and monitor supply chains. Likewise, government agencies have the potential to reduce labor costs and waste by incorporating blockchain in some types of foreign aid delivery and monitoring, the tracking of welfare funds, and the registration of voters, vehicles, and intellectual property.</p> +<p>Competition between Sechin and Miller – with Putin acting as the ultimate arbiter – makes it a challenge for Russia’s energy industry to make long-term plans, with political interference and self-interest often trumping financial expedience. Occasionally, their arguments spill over into the public domain, such as over which company contributes more taxes to the federal budget. Rivalry between Gazprom and Rosneft can be occasionally disruptive and can stymie progress on major projects. The two companies were embroiled in widely publicised litigation proceedings against each other in 2015–16, over Rosneft’s attempts to gain access to the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project in the Far East, an appeal which Gazprom ultimately lost in the Supreme Court. However, competition like this tends to be more about defending turf than about actual views on Russia’s foreign policy or national interests, which are still inherently decided at the Kremlin level.</p> -<h4 id="facilitating-fast-and-direct-financial-transfers-and-other-economic-applications">FACILITATING FAST AND DIRECT FINANCIAL TRANSFERS AND OTHER ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS</h4> +<p>Given these features of Putin’s decision-making process, Russia’s energy policy approach has never been particularly coherent, and there have always been groups that prioritise how much money can be extracted from Russia’s natural resources, juxtaposed with internal critics of Russia’s sprawling infrastructure projects – such as expensive symbolic bridges – whose economic returns are negligible and which tend to serve political goals. While important foreign policy decisions remain the purview of the Kremlin, infighting within the oil and gas industry has repercussions for Russia’s efficiency and ability to project its image as an extractives “superpower” abroad. This is a longstanding issue that was a challenge for the Kremlin prior to the war, but as competition over new markets in the Indo-Pacific region grows, internal competition between Russia’s energy companies is also likely to increase.</p> -<p>The financial services industry is already advancing applications of blockchain technology. Blockchain’s peer-to-peer system has enabled the excision of some intermediaries, instantaneous processing, and the elimination of fees when sending money anywhere in the world. Blockchain technology is not a digital currency, but it is highly associated with digital currencies because decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin function using blockchain.</p> +<h3 id="ii-russias-involvement-in-opec">II. Russia’s Involvement in OPEC+</h3> -<p>Yet cryptocurrency is only a small subset of how blockchain can be and is being used by governments and financial institutions globally. For example, stablecoins, as the name suggests, attempt to provide a stable value by pegging their worth to a real-world “reference” asset such as the U.S. dollar. They can be used to pay for goods and services while benefiting from the low transaction costs of some blockchains. Blockchain technology has also induced the majority of the world’s governments to actively explore managing their national currencies by incorporating central bank digital currencies, with China, Sweden, and others actively exploring their use.</p> +<p>Russia tends to use international platforms either as a means to further its own national interests or to ensure that it has a stake in the conversation, rather than in pursuit of a common cause. Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s ability to interact with other, particularly Western, states in multinational forums has been increasingly restricted, and an international arrest warrant for Putin has posed another logistical challenge to face-to-face engagement. Russia’s behaviour in the OPEC+ grouping, which is designed to influence global oil pricing, is still in service of its national interests, but must be carefully balanced with its desire to maintain a strong bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia – the two countries in combination sell 20% of oil used globally.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Cryptocurrency is only a small subset of how blockchain can be and is being used by governments and financial institutions globally.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Russia and Saudi Arabia’s energy policies – and by extension their foreign policies – are often conflated due to their shared leadership of the OPEC+ grouping. Yet the Russian–Saudi partnership is more of a marriage of convenience than an expression of a wider strategic alignment. The basis of the relationship is that both countries support the stabilisation of oil prices while simultaneously ensuring high export revenues.</p> -<p>There are also other applications for blockchain in the realm of financial inclusion. Pilot projects in the Global South are looking into how blockchain can be used to issue insurance policies, administer payouts to farmers, close credit gaps, and provide a way to save for those who do not have a savings account. For example, moving money is often made expensive due to bank fees. Leaf, a Rwandan-based project, uses blockchain to enable money transfers without banking fees. The Leaf wallet uses the public Stellar blockchain to help people send, save, and transfer money directly from their mobile phone without the need for personal banking history or in-depth financial literacy. Likewise, smart contracts are being used to carry out insurance agreements with African farmers to protect their livelihoods during extreme weather. If a predetermined amount of rain is recorded within 24 hours in the insured farmer’s region, which can result in destruction of crops, the farmer will receive an automated payment. Blockchain technology is increasingly being incorporated into specific finance-related applications while also helping to create global networks of interoperable financial systems.</p> +<p>In this vein, OPEC+ was formed in 2016 in response to the disruption of the global oil market caused by the US shale revolution. By increasing the number of countries coordinating their production levels, the cartel was able to influence the supply side of the market and stabilise international oil prices – but the potential brittleness of the alliance was demonstrated in the price war between Moscow and Riyadh in March and April 2020. As the global economy shut down with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, leading oil prices to fall, Russia refused to go along with Saudi-proposed production cuts, seeing an opportunity to deal a blow to the US shale industry. Saudi Arabia, though also not necessarily opposed to hurting shale producers, ramped up production in order to deliberately push down prices even further and thereby forced Moscow to relent.</p> -<h4 id="contending-with-a-proliferation-of-deepfakes">CONTENDING WITH A PROLIFERATION OF DEEPFAKES</h4> +<p>Officially, OPEC+ coordination has been less contentious since February 2022. Russia has some leverage over Iran (an OPEC member), which Saudi Arabia lacks, and Saudi Arabia’s insistence on continuing to work with Russia in the grouping despite protestations from the US and elsewhere can be seen as an indication of how much more importance Riyadh apportions to its ability to influence the oil market (especially at a time of heightened volatility) than to maintaining a harmonious rapport with Washington. Moscow also recognises that collaboration with Riyadh will be critical to ensure supply management, even as it continues to delay production cuts.</p> -<p>In a rapidly approaching future with generative artificial intelligence and pervasive deepfake technology, it will be imperative for both governments and private consumers of information to be able to discern what is credible. In many respects, this eventuality has already arrived. The health of democracies is uniquely reliant on an informed citizenry. The intentional dissemination of false information, such as propaganda from authoritarian nations and extremist organizations, often aims to obfuscate reality. The need for verifiable information and data is additionally intensified amid the fog of war, when manipulative information operations are pervasive and the accuracy of situational understanding can be a matter of life and death.</p> +<p>Russia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has become more of a pressing issue since the onset of the Ukraine war. Riyadh has chosen not to align itself with the Western consensus on the war and has not introduced sanctions on Russia, nor condemned the war. The announcement at the August 2023 BRICS summit that Saudi Arabia would be joining the grouping – with some caveats – could boost the economic potential of the bloc and offer a further channel to deepen bilateral ties, including offering new sources of sanctions evasion for Russia. There is also nascent bilateral cooperation over joint investment funds to support Russian agriculture and oil production equipment, and few high-profile projects have been announced, although the Saudi side has been much less vocal about its willingness to invest within Russia.</p> -<p>The use of emerging technologies by state actors for strategic disinformation campaigns is a national security issue. For this reason, the United States adopted its first federal laws related to deepfakes in 2019. The FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required a report on the weaponization of deepfake technology by foreign entities and established a competition with a $5 million prize to stimulate research on machine-manipulated media. Such efforts are not preventative but merely raise awareness of the issue at hand. Beyond increasing awareness, InterAction’s Disinformation Toolkit 2.0 notes how some internationally focused organizations are exposing disinformation campaigns, conducting forensic analyses, coordinating with technology companies, providing digital literacy training, and collaborating with global policymakers. This landscape of mounting policy attention and analysis related to disinformation and deepfakes shapes the context in which applications of blockchain technology are finding their footing.</p> +<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has altered its position on the OPEC grouping somewhat. In search of clients and new export markets for its oil, Russia has been prepared to accept lower prices to sell its oil and maintain production, offering cut-price deals to its allies China and India in a bid to drum up funds for the war. There are also frictions over Russia’s secrecy around its figures – it does not disclose how many barrels of oil it exports, and Saudi Arabia is suspicious that Russia has continued to export significant volumes, undercutting former price agreements.</p> -<p>DLT may offer opportunities to counteract the nefarious aims of certain categories of deepfakes. The Starling Lab for Data Integrity is experimenting with innovative applications of blockchain technology and decentralized systems of storage to bolster trust in digital media. The persistence and safety of digital ledgers support the creation of more trustworthy digital assets where details are corroborated by independent third parties acting as notaries public. Decentralized storage pools can guarantee the safekeeping of information for the long term.</p> +<p>For now, Saudi Arabia has not criticised Russia’s decisions to sell at a discount or publicly spoken out against its data secrecy, given the two countries’ common interest in maintaining oil prices at a level that can shore up their state budgets. Russia also has significant reason to keep the Kingdom on side – major Saudi companies invested more than $500 million in Gazprom, Rosneft and major oil producer Lukoil just after the war began and Western sanctions were introduced. Since the onset of the war, however, Russia has been on the back foot; it has few major international players it can call on as partners, and the relationship with Riyadh, which may start to demand more of Russia, is an important one.</p> -<p>News agencies are beginning to explore applications for DLT to better record their reporting and make data, such as the location and date of photographs, permanently accessible. Reuters, for example, has partnered with Canon to develop a professional camera and in-house workflow for photojournalists that freezes and stamps the pixels of a picture the moment a photo is snapped and then registers the photo and corresponding details onto a public blockchain. Especially considering Russia’s propaganda campaigns against Ukraine, blockchain’s potential to verify what information has been altered could be instrumental as authoritarians increasingly deploy gray zone tactics that rely on manipulating the information environment. This verification of alterations only applies to information once it has been stored in a blockchain and cannot account for manipulation prior to that point.</p> +<h3 id="iii-russias-environmental-paradox">III. Russia’s Environmental Paradox</h3> -<h4 id="advancing-justice-and-the-rule-of-law">ADVANCING JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW</h4> +<p>One of Russia’s many strategic paradoxes is that it is a country highly affected by climate change, but banks on its status as a producer of commodities to retain its international position. This inconsistency informs its strategic policymaking on the environment, and its behaviour in international forums around climate change.</p> -<p>A transparent judicial system is key to the rule of law that undergirds functioning democracies. DLT’s capturing, storing, and verifying of data could be used to better manage court judgments, warrants, and criminal histories. Researchers are exploring blockchain’s ability to corroborate data on several systems as a tool for preserving evidence. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice proposed using DLT to preserve and protect mass quantities of body camera footage to be used in court. Similar applications could be useful for international courts and other human rights watchdogs.</p> +<p>The Kremlin has never been particularly concerned by environmental security, and many of its actions have been reactive to environmental disasters that occur on its territory, rather than preventative. The ES-35 specifically frames international climate change policies as a hindrance to Russia’s own energy security development, even if it simultaneously acknowledges the theoretical importance of reducing carbon emissions. Similar inconsistencies can be found in Russia’s Arctic strategy, which notes the security threat of warming seas such as flooding in coastal areas and the melting of permafrost, but still pushes high production of fossil fuels and the mining of extractives. Globally, Russia is the fourth-largest greenhouse gas emitter, after China, the US and India, and is responsible for 7% of the world’s CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, Putin has been derisive about Europe’s green energy approach, maintaining that the energy crisis in Europe is in fact due to Europe’s investment in wind farms that cannot make up for a reduction in fossil fuels.</p> -<p>The recent hacking of the computer systems of the International Criminal Court (ICC) raises concerns over the safety of centrally located data that could later be used to prosecute the most serious of crimes. The use of blockchain to store and verify data related to war crimes and atrocities aims to assist the courts by providing more trusted and tamper-resistant data for associated proceedings. Governments or other entities seeking to achieve accountability for large-scale human right abuses or wartime atrocities for the purposes of transitional justice may particularly benefit from the use of blockchain to ensure evidence has not been manipulated and to support chain of custody for documentation of abuse.</p> +<p>In international forums, Russia often objects to proposals to improve global environmental security. While this can appear bullish and self-interested, it is also partly due to different understandings of security: Russia’s longstanding concept of environmental security prioritises the security of the nation as the key concern, rather than the security implications that can stem from environmental problems, and includes a collective historical view that the natural environment holds no intrinsic value in its own right. Climate change is seen as something that affects Russia’s national security (including defence), but it is framed in strategic documents as a threat to Russia’s economic development that calls for practical solutions, rather than any adjustment to the extractive industries. Russia also tends to approach issues such as warming Arctic seas not as a crisis but as an economic opportunity that will improve access to new shipping lanes and offer a boost to the Russian export industry. Some Russian academics have disputed this prevailing analysis, maintaining that the impact of climate change in the country will probably not be a net positive overall, but their views are unlikely to be influential in altering the Kremlin’s longstanding policies.</p> -<p>Additionally, “smart contracts,” which automate transactions once the coded conditions are met, could help judicial systems by minimizing disputes, alleviating stress on courts, and making business and government services more efficient.</p> +<p>Russia has tried to separate environmental security into two issues: the first is the economic damage to the country caused by climate change that Russia aims to mitigate, chiefly through technological interventions or improved investment, while the second is what Russia perceives as a Western-led agenda, under the guise of environmental activism, to undermine Russian institutions. Russia has suggested at the UN Security Council that environmental security issues are a ruse for external military interventions in countries rich in natural resources (perhaps referring to the African continent) and has framed this as a threat to Russia’s interests in the extractive industries. Ultimately, Russia views most international attempts to warn against the dangers of climate change and fossil fuel reliance as a further threat to Russian sovereignty.</p> -<h4 id="elevating-citizen-representation-and-voice">ELEVATING CITIZEN REPRESENTATION AND VOICE</h4> +<p>Within Russia, important figures traditionally from the defence or security services have increasingly been appointed to lead on environmental issues. In 2016, Sergei Ivanov, a former minister of defence (2001–07) and KGB officer in the Foreign Intelligence Service, was appointed the president’s special representative on the environment and transport. Ivanov oversees environmental protection, as well as the development of the Far Eastern regions and streamlining infrastructure to support businesses; he is also an important member of Russia’s powerful Security Council and a longstanding Putin ally. While his precise role is unclear, his positioning indicates the crossover in the Kremlin’s mindset between the environment and national security.</p> -<p>According to a 2021 CSIS report, blockchain-based voting systems hold some potential benefits for securing elections, though they also present a range of risks. Generally speaking, blockchain could reduce the risk of election tampering, as such a system would require the collusion of multiple major entities to alter recorded ballots. There may also be potential for the use of blockchain to further augment trust in mobile and internet voting, which can, in turn, result in greater turnout and reduce voter error. Blockchain-backed e-voting could additionally enhance the physical safety of voters and remove certain types of voter coercion associated with in-person polling, although coercion in private settings can also pose a significant problem. Election transparency may be another benefit, as civil society groups could monitor the election results if granted access to the blockchain network and armed with the requisite technical knowledge to understand it. The transparency associated with blockchains also needs to be balanced with privacy rights associated with voters’ abilities to keep their individual voting selection secret. Further possible advantages include stronger resiliency against network disruptions compared to other internet voting schemes, more secure voter registries, and timely election night reporting systems.</p> +<p>In terms of its foreign policy, Moscow’s securitisation of the environment means that it is rarely cooperative on internationally led climate change issues. On the UN Security Council, Russia pays lip service to climate action but favours the status quo, tending to use the platform to ensure that it has a place at the table and to promote its economic (extractives) interests, rather than with a view to safeguarding the environment. In principle, Russia is a signatory to UN-led efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the Kremlin does not publish figures about its oil and gas production rates and only offers broad public statements about production cuts, which makes it a challenge to determine how compliant (or not) it may be. It has also been criticised internationally for its gutting of environmental policies that would have otherwise worked to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, by refusing to introduce quotas or penalties on greenhouse gas emitters.</p> -<p>While there have not been many pilot projects related to blockchain voting, the Voatz mobile blockchain voting system, used during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections in West Virginia, for example, may have contributed to higher voter turnout on the scale of 3 to 5 percentage points. However, other studies have demonstrated the opposite. For example, in Belgium a similar pilot project resulted in a slightly negative effect on voter turnout. As uses of blockchain expand, there is also increased attention to theoretical applications of blockchain to voting. For example, the concept of liquid democracy, a modern and flexible approach to direct democracy with implications for referendums, voting proxies, and mass-scale voting, could be propelled by blockchain to help verify that votes cast are the same as votes counted.</p> +<p>This approach is unlikely to change, largely due to the presence of powerful business lobbying groups who work on behalf of the oil and gas industry, such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Rossiskiy soyuz promyshlennikov i predprinimateley, RSPP), whose coordination council is co-chaired by Putin’s youngest daughter, giving the RSPP a direct line to the Kremlin. The RSPP extensively lobbies against any proposed bills that could reduce the oil and gas industry’s ability to extract resources in environmentally protected areas, and it is rarely opposed by the Kremlin.</p> -<p>One key challenge is that although blockchain may help with the prevention of some ballot tampering, election systems and platforms are still dependent on other hardware and software that may make them vulnerable to exploitation that is difficult or even impossible to control. Therefore, at a fundamental level, blockchain is not a silver bullet for solving the insecurity of online voting.</p> +<p>Perhaps most concerningly, since the onset of the war, many environmental links between Russia and the West have been severed, and there is little international oversight of major drilling projects in Russia and the permanent impact that these could have on protected environments, especially in more isolated parts of the Russian Arctic. Legislation within Russia that restricts ecological activism has also tightened since the war, reflective of a broader repressive legal environment targeting institutions with a perceived Western-led agenda. For example, in March 2023, the Worldwide Fund for Nature was branded as a “foreign agent” – this inclusion on the foreign agents list by Russia’s Federal Security Service comes with an implication of espionage and suggests that the organisation receives funding from murky sources abroad, seeking to undermine Russia. Many organisations on the list have ceased to function under pressure from the security services, and as a result there is a risk that there will be even less external oversight of resource extraction.</p> -<h3 id="the-ukrainian-context">The Ukrainian Context</h3> +<p>Russia’s understanding of threats to the environment has close links to its understanding of threats to its hydrocarbons industry, as well as to the personal interests of the ruling elites (including Putin) and the central role that energy resources play in Russia’s international policies, all of which are bound up with ideas of Russian sovereignty. Any attempts by the international community to further an agenda that restricts Russia’s continued extraction of hydrocarbons, its export of them to new and existing markets, and the construction of infrastructure on land and at sea to support this, are framed as part of a security threat to which Moscow will respond harshly.</p> -<p>Ukraine, sitting at the cutting edge of the digital revolution, offers a unique context that is experimenting in the digital and blockchain space.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-where-moscows-red-lines-are">Conclusion: Where Moscow’s Red Lines are</h3> -<h4 id="technological-readiness">TECHNOLOGICAL READINESS</h4> +<p>Given Russia’s ability to have an impact on global oil and gas prices, the UK and its European allies will need to try to understand, react to and – where possible – influence the way in which Russia approaches its role in energy markets and in international forums. Even if the UK were to entirely decouple from Russian oil, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means that Russia’s behaviour as a hydrocarbon superpower still has the ability to substantially alter the UK’s energy security. Although diplomatic relations with countries such as Russia may have been all but severed, Russia’s actions matter, whether through decisions on oil production, its global positioning and attempts to reconfigure the world order, or its divergent understandings of what energy and environmental security mean.</p> -<p>Ukraine’s information and communications technology (ICT) industry was immensely successful before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, with some dubbing it the “emerging tiger of Europe.” In fact, despite challenges posed by the war, it is the only sector of the Ukrainian economy that has grown amid the conflict, exhibiting growing export volumes from 2021 to 2022. The Ukrainian government has also proactively not drafted IT workers as soldiers and has extended tax breaks to small and medium-sized businesses in the industry. These measures have allowed ICT businesses to stay solvent and continue operating and exporting services. The challenges Ukraine is facing are in many ways unique, but this also means that it can serve as a breeding ground for unique innovations. Equipped with over 200,000 skilled IT workers and the demand for creative solutions due to the war, Ukraine is primed to rapidly test technologies.</p> +<p>Russia’s approach since the onset of the Ukraine war has been to expand its foreign policy partnerships with allies such as China, India and Iran; to invest in the land and maritime infrastructure to support its political goals as well as its extractive efforts; and to seek alternative clients for its oil and gas, while maintaining high production. While its energy strategy may be at times incoherent and pulled in multiple directions due to the many vested interests involved, there is a clear sense of some of Moscow’s red lines when it comes to its understanding of energy security and its intent to maintain the extraction and export of hydrocarbons to fuel its economy. Just as debates around oil price caps and moves to reduce carbon emissions are seen as an unwelcome Western intervention, similarly, attempts by the international community to involve Russia in the climate change debate are viewed by Moscow as another security threat to Russia’s sovereignty, and an attempt to impose Western values on a country now forging its own path eastwards.</p> -<p>Ukraine demonstrated its technological adaptability with the embrace of cryptocurrency in early fundraising efforts when banks lacked liquidity following Russia’s full-scale invasion. MoneyGram halted payments to Ukraine until it could confirm its banking partners in the country were operational. The Ukrainian government, ranked fourth globally for cryptocurrency adoption, began publicly soliciting cryptocurrency donations online days after the invasion. Cryptocurrency’s capability to facilitate transactions instantly across borders was attractive for the nation as it entered total war. At least 20 million dollars in cryptocurrency were deposited directly to the Ukrainian government in the first months of the war.</p> +<p>Moreover, Russia and Saudi Arabia – and other oil producers – regard Western enthusiasm to impose energy-related sanctions on Russia, particularly the price cap, as a dangerous precedent for political intervention in the oil market. Putin himself has been vocal about the limitations of the cap, maintaining that there is a risk of mission creep (i.e., that oil price caps could be extended to other sectors of the Russian economy, and indeed to any other country in the world), and has framed this as another attempt by the West to undermine the Russian economy and its “values”. This is a further indication of how Moscow continues to view what other countries frame as economic and pragmatic decisions as a direct attack on Russian sovereignty, and it means that Moscow’s responses to these proposals are likely to appear disproportionate or couched in national security terms.</p> -<p>Ukraine had more mobile phone subscriptions than people in 2020, but the war has damaged the digital infrastructure necessary for mobile subscriptions to be operable. Since Russia’s invasion, more than 4,000 Ukrainian telecommunication stations have been seized or destroyed and over 60,000 kilometers of fiber-optic lines have been compromised. The restoration of many lost towers can be attributed to the bravery of Ukrainian telecommunication workers. The public-private partnership between the Department of Defense and SpaceX’s Starlink has enabled battlefield communications at the cost of approximately $20 million per month. Without investments in digital infrastructure, all digital solutions, including those involving blockchain, are futile.</p> +<p>Ultimately, Russia is pursuing a fundamentally revisionist international project to reconfigure the global order on its own terms, and it is willing to deploy the political capital and revenues derived from its hydrocarbon might to further this project. For there to be any united action around climate change, the UK and Europe must pay closer attention to the foreign and security policies of major hydrocarbon producers like Russia, in order to understand the roots of some of the international implications resulting from their actions.</p> -<h4 id="commitment-to-digitization">COMMITMENT TO DIGITIZATION</h4> +<hr /> -<p>Digitization is synonymous with resiliency, a characteristic often ascribed to Ukraine in its battle against Russia. Prior to the war, Ukraine committed to going paperless in September 2021 with a bill prohibiting officials from requiring paper documents. The bill was the latest advancement in digitization following the successful experimentation with electronic identification cards and international passports by the application Diia. Ukraine had issued nearly a million biometric travel passports to Ukrainian citizens in the Russian-controlled Donbas region before the war. Diia, a premier government application used by half of Ukraine’s population, offers an expanding list of digital documents, including identification cards, driver’s licenses, and Covid-19 vaccination certificates. In a unique blend of entertainment and education, Diia has trained almost 1.5 million citizens in digital skills through over 90 free-to-access educational series based on European standards. Given the wartime reliance on social services, digitization efforts have accelerated since the war’s outbreak. Kostiantyn Koshelenko, deputy minister of social policy for digital transformation, recently expressed his commitment to making government services more resilient and client oriented. Applying to be a candidate for child adoption, for example, is now an online government service in Ukraine. The Ministry of Digital Transformation’s mission to “move 100% of government services online” is a core element of Ukraine’s war strategy and a key ingredient for large-scale utilization of blockchain-enabled applications.</p> +<p><strong>Emily Ferris</strong> is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in Russian domestic politics. Emily has a particular interest in Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure including its railways, road and port systems, and the role this plays in advancing Russia’s political ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as deployed in conflict zones such as Ukraine. She also researches domestic political administrations in Russia’s Far East, and Russia’s military and political relationship with Belarus.</p>Emily FerrisUnderstanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security.Principles For UK–CN Strategy2023-11-08T12:00:00+08:002023-11-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/principles-for-uk-china-strategy<p><em>China poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”, according to the UK’s March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>While stopping short of labelling China a “threat”, this is a marked shift from the “golden era” of UK–China relations heralded during Xi Jinping’s 2015 visit to the UK.</em></p> -<h4 id="applications-of-blockchain">APPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN</h4> +<p>Such a shift in assessment requires a commensurate response. This Policy Brief reviews the government’s response to China to date and examines criticisms of its approach, including calls to publish an “unclassified version of its China Strategy”. Rather than detail specific policy recommendations or argue in broad-brush terms for a more hawkish or dovish stance, the brief proposes six principles for a more dynamic and broadly based – and so more effective – China strategy. It argues that, while publishing a strategy document may aid communication, there are more important things to be done.</p> -<p>Supported by a government that has trumpeted digitization as critical to the country’s future, Ukraine and its partners have combined blockchain technology and photogrammetry to counter disinformation and to document and preserve evidence of Russian war crimes. E-Enemy, for example, is a government-built app that allows users to photograph and geolocate any attacks, thereby providing a first-person perspective of atrocities for posterity and eliminating the potency of deepfakes. War crimes investigators can then “hash” data on war crimes, thereby enabling future prosecution of these heinous acts. Starling Lab, a joint Stanford University–USC Shoah Foundation research center, in partnership with social enterprise Hala Systems, has been preserving possible evidence of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine via a cryptographic dossier. The aforementioned hacking of the ICC combined with Russia’s espionage efforts to covertly infiltrate the court hint at the urgent need to ensure greater protection for evidence of war crimes.</p> +<h3 id="changes-after-the-golden-era">Changes After the “Golden Era”</h3> -<p>Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky himself has noted the importance of digitizing all accounting of military supplies, an effort that could potentially benefit from blockchain technology. Furthermore, the UN Refugee Agency was awarded the Best Impact Project Award during the 2023 Paris Blockchain Week for a pilot project in Ukraine where it used blockchain to provide financial assistance to displaced people; this assistance could be converted into cash and used for rent, food, utilities, and medical expenses.</p> +<p>Much has changed since 2015. Notwithstanding current travails, China’s economy has grown by nearly 50% in real terms and accounts for a larger share of global trade. The country’s ambitions in new technologies have become more widely understood and borne some fruit, notably in renewable energy and electric vehicles. President Xi has focused on self-reliance at home, emphasising national security and the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party, while becoming more active on the world stage. Last year, NATO concluded that China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values”. The US’s ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, said last year that US–China relations might be at their “lowest moment” since Nixon’s 1972 China visit. Tensions over Taiwan have risen sharply.</p> -<h4 id="property-registration-and-blockchain">PROPERTY REGISTRATION AND BLOCKCHAIN</h4> +<p>Throughout this, trade with China has grown. In the 12 months to March 2023, China was the UK’s fourth-largest trading partner, though the UK ran a £38 billion trade deficit. 1 Questions of security and values, always present in the China policy debate, have however come strongly to the fore. China’s imposition and subsequent interpretation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law have caused widespread outrage. Detailed reporting of China’s human rights abuses against the Xinjiang Uyghurs gained media attention and stirred parliamentary debate and opposition. The government has identified China as a significant source of cyber attacks on UK interests, with increased activity and disinformation campaigns during the Covid-19 pandemic. The recent China report from Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) concluded that “China’s size, ambition and capability have enabled it to successfully penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy”. Additionally, China’s initial slow Covid response and its refusal to allow a full WHO investigation have damaged trust. Its stance on Ukraine has further sharpened concerns. And, while the UK has been the leading destination for Chinese direct investment into Europe since 2000, activity has recently fallen away sharply.</p> -<p>Digital solutions for Ukraine’s economic modernization and resilience go beyond the more obvious war effort. Some of the first Ukrainian pilot projects using blockchain were electronic land auctions. In May 2017, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine formally agreed to implement blockchain to help manage the State Register of Property Rights on Real Estate as well as the System of Electronic Trading in Arrested Property. A complaint of foreign investors is that land ownership is still not a possibility in Ukraine given current laws. Legal reform is needed to change this reality, and there is an argument that Kyiv should amend its laws to inspire foreign investors to participate in the country’s economic recovery. This demand may incentivize the Ukrainian government to further explore incorporating blockchain technology in land registration.</p> +<h3 id="policy-changes">Policy Changes</h3> -<h3 id="additional-considerations-and-challenges">Additional Considerations and Challenges</h3> +<p>The UK government has taken action on numerous fronts. In 2020, the Johnson-led government reversed the decision to allow the purchase of Huawei’s 5G technology following a reassessment of security risks and political pressure from the Trump administration. Chinese involvement in the UK’s nuclear power programme came under renewed scrutiny, leading to a buyout of China’s interest in the Sizewell C project. The Hong Kong British National (Overseas) visa scheme has enabled close to 130,000 Hong Kong nationals to move to the UK. The 2021 National Security and Investment Act introduced a tighter screening process for foreign investment into key sectors. The 2023 National Security Act established a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. This year also saw announcements of a Critical Minerals Strategy refresh, the National Protective Security Authority and an Economic Deterrence Initiative. Nonetheless, when security is not an issue, the UK remains “open for business from China”. There are also policies, urged by some backbench MPs, that the government has not pursued. It has not declared Chinese actions in Xinjiang to be a genocide and has not followed the US in sanctioning Hong Kong officials.</p> -<p>Despite the benefits of blockchain for advancing democratic institutions, the technology is clearly a neutral tool and can be used by good actors as well as malign ones. There are some underlying concerns regarding the risks that DLT systems pose for democracy.</p> +<p>Consistent with the Integrated Review’s “tilt to the Indo-Pacific”, the UK has been active in the region. A carrier strike group was deployed there in 2021 for the first time since 1997, and will return in 2025. The UK is the first non-regional member of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. It has been active in helping formulate stronger G7 and NATO positions on China, and has shaped and joined new minilateral partnerships including the AUKUS agreement, the Global Combat Air Programme and the Mineral Security Partnership. The sanctioning of Xinjiang officials was announced in coordination with the US, Canada and the EU.</p> -<h4 id="malign-foreign-activity">MALIGN FOREIGN ACTIVITY</h4> +<h3 id="is-this-a-strategy">Is This a Strategy?</h3> -<p>Foreign actors are known to use blockchain technology for adversarial activity against the United States and its partners. For example, Russia has attempted to use the anonymity associated with some cryptocurrencies to bypass sanctions. The terrorist organization Hamas and two other militant groups — Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah — have also used cryptocurrency to evade sanctions in order to raise funds for their notorious terrorist attacks. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad raised more than $100 million via cryptocurrency between August 2021 and June 2023.</p> +<p>Throughout all this, many have called on the government to publish a China strategy. In 2019, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) called for “a single, detailed public document defining the UK’s China strategy … [to] be published by the end of 2020”. In 2021, the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee entitled its report “The UK and China’s Security and Trade Relationship: A Strategic Void”.</p> -<p>It is not clear, however, how much longer cryptocurrency will be thought of as a safe haven for illicit behavior since Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are more traceable than other forms of payment. Investigators have been able to quickly identify and prosecute criminal activity through logged cryptocurrency transactions. For example, within days of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned two senior Hamas officials along with cryptocurrency exchange Buy Cash Money and Money Transfer Company, as well as six other individuals involved in the financial operation to fund terrorism. Additionally, the arrest of the perpetrators behind the 2016 Bitfinex hack, in which 119,754 bitcoins were stolen, was only possible, in large part, thanks to the immutable ledger that undergirds Bitcoin. (It is important to note, however, that blockchain’s traceability is irrelevant without oversight.)</p> +<p>This year has seen progress. The Refresh summarised the UK’s approach to China with three pillars: Protect/Align/Engage:</p> -<h4 id="accessibility">ACCESSIBILITY</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Protect the UK through enhancing security measures in critical national infrastructure, supply chains, democratic freedoms and science and technology.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Align with “core allies and a broader group of partners” to deepen cooperation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Engage with China directly and multilaterally so as to “where possible cooperate on global challenges” and secure a “positive trade and investment relationship”, while “avoiding dependencies … and protecting our national security”.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The accessibility of blockchain technology to the public is also a concern. Whether due to lack of technological familiarity, high expenses, or lack of the necessary equipment to facilitate participation, many communities across the globe are not in a position to use blockchain, which in turn limits democratic participation via DLT systems. Citizens need smartphones and reliable internet access to participate. Digital literacy is another aspect of the divide preventing massive rollout of blockchain-backed government solutions, as technology often faces obstacles to adoption and may be cumbersome, particularly for those who lack digital skills. Tech companies and government entities should collaborate to ensure that such tools are accessible and user friendly. The barrier of entry for users must be lowered before scaling is possible.</p> +<p>In April, Foreign Secretary James Cleverly expanded on this in a speech, “Our Position on China”, arguing that “we must engage with China where necessary and be unflinchingly realistic about its authoritarianism”. Cleverly’s August visit to Beijing drew on the same position. The prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has described the approach as “robust pragmatism”, while also calling China “the biggest challenge of our age to global security and prosperity” after the May G7 meeting.</p> -<h4 id="lack-of-accountability-and-selective-data">LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND SELECTIVE DATA</h4> +<p>No detailed China paper has been published, however – nothing similar to Germany’s recently published China strategy. In August, the FAC called again for an “unclassified China strategy”. Charles Parton, a long-time China analyst, has described the lack of a clearly communicated China strategy as the “panda in the room”.</p> -<p>Without proper reform, blockchain runs the risk of merely reinforcing the status quo. What prevents corrupt regimes from allowing only state-approved, potentially faulty information to be entered onto a blockchain? Is blockchain the next tool to be used by oppressive regimes to fabricate transparent democracy? For example, since 2018, China has permitted the use of blockchain-stored evidence in the country’s courts, which may actually be a worrying development given the fact that China, an authoritarian regime, can be very selective with which data to store.</p> +<h3 id="pressures-for-greater-clarity">Pressures for Greater Clarity</h3> -<h4 id="energy-consumption">ENERGY CONSUMPTION</h4> +<p>The government’s approach can be criticised from three angles. First, that the “three pillars” strategy does not amount to an appropriate or even coherent course of action. Second, that it lacks specifics and glosses over trade-offs. Third, that publishing a detailed China strategy brings benefits greater than any associated costs.</p> -<p>Blockchain technology traditionally has had a reputation of being highly energy intensive. Though there has been some progress on this front — and the high energy use is mainly attributed to cryptocurrency — there remain environmental concerns regarding the technology due to its carbon footprint as well as the affordability of energy in specific communities. However, there is hope that the technology will become more efficient, based on analysis showing that with different technological design options, digital currencies can be configured in a manner that is more energy efficient than popular current payment systems like credit and debit cards.</p> +<p>Protect/Align/Engage implicitly rejects alternative strategies of large-scale decoupling or unquestioning engagement. Some simply disagree with this approach, seeing it as riddled with contradictions. A three-pillar framing is not, however, unique to the UK. It reflects the “complicated and sophisticated” nature of relations with the world’s second-largest economy. The US speaks of “invest, align, compete”, following US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s earlier description of the US–China relationship as “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, adversarial when it must be”. The EU has described China as a negotiating partner, economic competitor and systemic rival. China also mostly pursues a similar approach, while at times strategically choosing to reject it. In 2021, foreign minister Wang Yi stated that “China–U.S. cooperation on climate change cannot be divorced from the overall situation of China–U.S. relations”. With Australia and Lithuania, China has linked disagreements on Taiwan and Covid-19 with economic relations. The UK does also need a response to such situations.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>The lack of focus on trade-offs is a more compelling criticism. The approach smacks of “cakeism”, promising to secure all the benefits and address all the negatives that China presents, while ducking value judgements and tough choices on priorities.</p> -<p>As the world increasingly overflows with data, U.S. policymakers should consider how to best utilize blockchain and other types of DLT to support democratic governance, including identity management, land rights, and the tracking of goods and services. If U.S. lawmakers do not take greater steps to shape the policy and regulatory environment for blockchain-related activity, there is also a risk of damage to U.S. competitiveness. Policymakers should explore new ways democracies can preserve and advance their principles while more efficiently delivering basic government services. At the same time, blockchain must be viewed neither as a panacea nor as solely an instrument of cryptocurrencies. It is a tool that offers intriguing applications for social and governmental progress.</p> +<p>For instance, the UK is to engage China on climate matters, and China leads in renewable energy. So what is the stance on sourcing solar panels from Xinjiang given well-documented reports of forced labour and its likely presence in UK supply chains? Does reliance on China reflect successful engagement, an unacceptable breach of our values, or a security risk? Universities benefit financially and intellectually from Chinese students and research collaborations, while facing risks of revenue dependence, challenge to academic freedoms and leakage of sensitive research. How should the UK navigate this? University leaders need better guidance based on the government’s assessment of trade-offs and priorities.</p> -<p>Before proceeding with policy decisions related to blockchain technology, Congress should be equipped with knowledge of how exactly the technology can be applied (or misapplied), and make sure that the populations who are meant to benefit from these technologies are also fluent in their use and have access to the necessary digital public infrastructure. This will allow lawmakers to create a broader system and approach in dealing with DLT so that its benefits can be instrumentalized in service of democratic governance.</p> +<p>Finally, a more detailed China strategy could be published, but the benefits need to exceed the costs. The ISC’s China report states that as of 2019, “the National Security Council (NSC) owns and creates [government] policy on China”, which is then set out in a six-pillar “China Framework”. Even the names of three of these pillars are redacted. The related China National Strategy Implementation Group seeks to avoid a “binary prosperity vs. security” approach. So trade-offs are considered, but there is no external communication of how this is done.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Publishing would provide a better basis for debate, challenge and holding the government to account, and also provide clearer guidance to those making China-related decisions. The only previous China policy paper, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s “The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement” (2009), stated that “this document is intended to begin a broader conversation”.</p> -<p><strong>Noam Unger</strong> is the director of the Sustainable Development and Resilience Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development.</p> +<p>The argument is finely balanced, however. By their nature, elements of the China strategy need to remain confidential, not least from Beijing. Discussion and challenge of a redacted strategy paper can skew debate. Any published paper serves more to communicate a narrative than to describe a government’s full strategy. And decision-makers often need more sector-specific guidance than a single paper can communicate. A published strategy paper is no panacea.</p> -<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) at CSIS. In this role, he supports the team’s research agenda, business development opportunities, and event coordination.</p> +<h3 id="six-principles-for-a-more-dynamic-and-effective-ukchina-strategy">Six Principles for a More Dynamic and Effective UK–China Strategy</h3> -<p><strong>Ilya Timtchenko</strong> is an intern with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Noam Unger, et al.In a world increasingly overflowing with data, blockchain is neither a panacea nor solely an instrument of cryptocurrencies but rather a tool that offers intriguing applications to support democratic governance, including in Ukraine.CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission2023-10-23T12:00:00+08:002023-10-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/cisas-evolving-.gov-mission<p><em>This report delves into critical cybersecurity issues and offers insightful analysis for policymakers and the public.</em></p> +<p>Implementation of the right China strategy, itself made up of a myriad of China-related decisions, is more important than a single paper. Keeping in mind the following six principles will help formulate a more dynamic and effective China strategy for the UK.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="1-strategy-should-be-more-than-a-document">1. Strategy should be more than a document.</h4> -<h3 id="foreword">Foreword</h3> +<p>“Strategy” is a popular word, yet one used by different people with different meanings. At heart, it is about making choices to achieve defined objectives or outcomes and then putting in place the required resources to realise them. Roger Martin, a leading business strategy academic, writes that “strategy is choice. Strategy is not a long planning document”. While those implementing need to understand the strategy, no company publishes its strategy in full on its website. Nor does any country. Important elements are confidential, shared on a need-to-know basis.</p> -<p>This project is about service. It brings together a unique mix of public and private sector voices that cut across industries, political parties, and generations. There are lawyers, soldiers, professors, law enforcement professionals, and former senior appointees and intelligence officers. This diverse group is held together by a commitment to securing cyberspace as a public common where people from all walks of life can prosper.</p> +<p>Strategy is dynamic and iterative, rather than static and one-time. It considers and addresses multiple, changing contingencies. In today’s world, decisions are made in changing, uncertain circumstances based on imperfect information. China and the UK’s allies alike react and adapt to the choices made by others.</p> -<p>The members of the task force and research team see twenty-first-century service as helping democratic governments protect the right of free people to exchange goods and ideas through digital networks. Economic, social, and political worlds exist within cyberspace, and the U.S. government has a special obligation to protect them all. These same networks also form key pathways for the provision of the public goods and services that support modern life.</p> +<p>This means that a detailed set of actions, decided centrally, fixed and then communicated to others to implement, is unlikely to succeed. Rather, many different people need to make decisions that together amount to a strategy. This is, in the words of management scholar Henry Mintzberg, “emergent strategy”. At times, this can be hard to distinguish from a contradictory “muddling through” and no overall strategy. This does not, however, make the approach any less valid. Determining which elements of the China strategy should be centrally determined – and which not – is an important matter of judgement.</p> -<p>Over 100 agencies comprising the federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) rely on cyberspace to execute their critical functions. That means that over 330 million people in the United States rely on cyberspace for more than social media. They rely on it for basic services such as food and housing assistance. They rely on it for processing student loans. They rely on it for registering patents and starting new businesses. And they rely on it for supporting research labs that are working on new vaccines and clean energy breakthroughs.</p> +<h4 id="2-strategy-should-be-explicit-about-whose-behaviours-need-to-change--or-stay-the-same--in-order-to-bring-about-specific-outcomes">2. Strategy should be explicit about whose behaviours need to change – or stay the same – in order to bring about specific outcomes.</h4> -<p>A commitment to help develop new strategies for securing cyberspace is what brought the members of this project’s task force and research team together. Many have worked on finding ways to balance liberty and security in cyberspace since the 1990s. In 2019, members worked to shape the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act and the creation of the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC). Those core members served on the CSC and CSC 2.0 and developed a total of 116 recommendations. Many of these recommendations have either already been implemented, such as the creation of the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD), or are nearing implementation.</p> +<p>Good strategy is clear on both desired outcomes and the behaviours – continuing or changed – needed to bring them about. The current UK government seeks “a positive trade and investment relationship” with China. But it is does not explain what this statement really means, or what needs to happen for this to occur. By contrast, the 2009 China “Framework for Engagement” did contain very detailed targeted outcomes. However, this document contained few specifics about how they might be achieved. The current UK–China strategy would benefit from greater clarity on both aspects.</p> -<p>Still, the job was not finished. In 2022, Cory Simpson — the former lead for helping the CSC think about future and emerging threats — started a dialogue with a network of businesses and senior U.S. government officials on the challenge of securing the FCEB agencies. Based on the new offices and laws recommended by the CSC and ultimately implemented by Congress and the executive branch, along with key executive orders such as May 2021’s Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity and the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, there was significant momentum to protect the provision of public goods. At the same time, daily new reports of massive data breaches, ransomware attacks, and threats of using cyberspace to hold Americans hostage during a conflict with China have revealed the magnitude of the challenge ahead. As the CEO and founder of Gray Space Strategies, a strategic advisory firm, Simpson heard from both government officials and private sector firms that they still felt vulnerable.</p> +<p>It is much easier for the UK government to affect behaviours at home than in China, or even in “like-minded countries”. A China strategy must take much of what China does as a given. It should then determine how best to change what happens in the UK, while taking account of how China (and others) might act in response. Government can change behaviours at home by banning or mandating certain activities, or by changing incentives and providing better information to those who then decide for themselves. Which approach makes sense, and where, is at the heart of a clear China strategy. Clearer communication of the government’s perspective on this would allow others to make better decisions on China matters.</p> -<p>This dialogue prompted him to work with Booz Allen Hamilton to reimagine federal network security and resilience. With its support, Gray Space Strategies hired a network of academic and policy researchers to study the balance of threats to federal networks outside of defense and intelligence agencies. The team conducted interviews and mapped out the history of cybersecurity initiatives. As part of this larger research effort, Gray Space Strategies reached out to Solarium alumni at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and sponsored the creation of an independent task force that led to this study.</p> +<p>For Lawrence Freedman, strategy is the “art of creating power”. China’s economy is five times larger than the UK’s, and its population 20 times as large. The Integrated Review recognises that if the UK is to influence the choices of Chinese decision-makers, it needs to gain scale through working with others – hence recent extensive collaboration through the G7, NATO and other fora. Here too, however, the UK’s ability to change behaviour is shaped by what others choose. US policy plays an especially critical role, both regarding its own stance on China and its appetite to act in coordination with allies or alone. If US policy becomes significantly more or less hawkish, the options for the UK’s China strategy also shift: US policy on Taiwan shapes any role that the UK might play. China’s reaction to the UK’s choices also depends partly on how the British approach compares with those of other major countries. French President Emmanuel Macron’s April visit to Beijing yielded commercial contracts, while Rishi Sunak has yet to meet President Xi.</p> -<p>The net result is in the following pages. The task force and research team built on the work of Gray Space Strategies and conducted over 30 interviews with a mix of federal and private sector chief information security officers (CISOs) and other technical and policy professionals who work every day behind the scenes to deliver public and private goods through cyberspace. Based on these interviews and baseline research, the research team developed a tabletop exercise to illuminate future threats almost certain to challenge FCEB agencies in the near future. Through six expert tabletop exercise sessions held in the summer of 2023 and a parallel online version with 1,000 members of the U.S. general public, the research team was able to see how both experts and the populace see future threats and assess the capability and capacity of the U.S. government to secure cyberspace.</p> +<h4 id="3-a-china-strategy-is-for-the-whole-uk-not-just-for-government">3. A China strategy is for the whole UK, not just for government.</h4> -<p>What the task force and research team found is that increasing resources is necessary to meeting the challenge at hand, but it is insufficient. The U.S. government has increased funding for cybersecurity and created new agencies and authorities but still struggles with resourcing strategies that align budgets against risks. The good news is that new initiatives and funding are extending the ability of key players in the federal government to secure the FCEB landscape. The bad news is that processes and procedures still need to catch up to create unity of effort. And time is not on the United States’ side.</p> +<p>In developing the strategy, the simple term “UK China strategy” merits unpacking and definition. It is about more than the bilateral relationship. Abroad, the UK encounters China in its relations with every country and in multilateral organisations. At home, China is not just a matter for government. Thousands, perhaps, millions, of people take decisions where China plays a role – from supplier selection to deciding how to protect open academic discussion in universities. Equally, while China is important, it is not everything: there are many other topics that matter to the UK. Still, many major decisions have an important China component without being decisions “about China”.</p> -<p>Adversaries see better returns from attacking the United States through cyberspace relative to the cost and risk of a more direct confrontation. Perversely, it is easier for them to target critical infrastructure and the basic goods and services offered by the U.S. federal government than it is to shut down the Pentagon or hunt spies online. There is an increasing chance that a major geopolitical crisis becomes a form for digital hostage-taking, with authoritarian states seeking to disrupt FCEB agencies as a way of signaling the risks of escalation to U.S. politicians and the public. This logic flips decades of strategy on its head and makes countervalue targeting — holding innocent civilians at risk — the preferred gambit for authoritarians. The old logic of focusing on counterforce targeting and narrowing hostilities to military forces to preserve space for diplomacy and avoid a broader war may be starting to crumble.</p> +<p>This breadth is important because China is often described as taking a “whole-of-state” approach to its affairs, whereby the Party’s dominant role removes any meaningful distinction between government and private actors. The ISC report discusses the security risks that this poses to British interests. In its most extreme formulation, the term significantly overestimates the Party’s coordination and cohesion across a country of 1.4 billion people, but the risks cannot be ignored.</p> -<p>In other words, cybersecurity is not just about force reassurance and protecting defense and intelligence assets during a crisis. It comes down to people. Denying adversaries the ability to hold Americans hostage in cyberspace is now a core national interest. Unlike traditional threats, this denial strategy is not owned by generals and appointees in the Pentagon. It is coordinated by the ONCD and executed by a mix of federal agencies and private sector companies still working to align their priorities and budgets to secure cyberspace.</p> +<p>The UK must formulate an appropriate response that meets the challenge, while preserving our distinctive democratic strengths and diversity of opinion, not seeking to ape the controlling approach of the Chinese party-state. The UK government itself needs a “whole-of-government” approach that consistently integrates considerations of economics, security and values into decision-making. But also needed is a China strategy for the UK as a whole, which clarifies where government should make and mandate China-related decisions, and where others are better placed to do so.</p> -<p>At the center of this strategy is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and its evolving mission to make civilian government networks (i.e., .gov websites) more secure and resilient. New funding and authorities envision continuous diagnostics and mitigation (CDM) applications standing watch across the .gov ecosystem. These guards are extensions of a complex web of agencies, including the National Institute of Standards (NIST), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the ONCD, all working to coordinate security priorities, technology standards, and budget submissions. On the ground, each FCEB agency has a chief information security officer (CISO) constantly negotiating with their agency leadership about imposing cyber hygiene measures and gauging how much money to dedicate to purchasing approved CDM applications and other cybersecurity efforts. Put simply, each of these agencies has to budget both for defending against national security risks and for their statutory requirements to provide unique goods and services. They face rising costs and uneasy choices given the labyrinth of new resources and authorities coming online. In other words, they need help.</p> +<h4 id="4-those-who-make-the-decisions-need-to-be-well-informed">4. Those who make the decisions need to be well-informed.</h4> -<p>And service starts with helping those most in need. In the pages that follow, the task force and research team offer a list of recommendations intended to start a broader dialogue between the branches of government and the U.S. people about how best to defend cyberspace. The report is intended to serve as the start of a dialogue about how to best align ends, ways, and means. The strength of a democracy is its willingness to solve problems in the public square through debate. It is the task force’s hope that the recommendations below contribute to ongoing discussions around how CISA in particular can play a useful role in securing cyberspace.</p> +<p>The UK will make better decisions on China when those making the decisions know more about China, about how it sees the world, about others’ experience of dealing with China, and about how China in turn reacts. China is unfamiliar, opaque, multifaceted and fast-changing. Good decisions draw on knowledge and experience rather than on misconceptions, guesswork and stereotypes. Yet a 2021 Higher Education Policy Institute report highlighted that there is a “lack of knowledge and understanding [about China] that would enable actors in the private and public spheres to craft the answers that are needed”. The Integrated Review committed to “invest in enhanced China-facing capabilities, through which we will develop a better understanding of China and its people”.</p> -<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> +<p>Three aspects merit greater attention. Firstly, there is a need to define the scope and nature of “China capabilities” that would help different decision-makers in and out of government. This should include practical experience, such as contract negotiations, as much as academic and policy knowledge. Second, many, if not most, people who make decisions with a China dimension will not be, and will not need to be, China experts. They must, however, know enough to make good decisions and be able to access expert knowledge as needed. The government can help facilitate this access. Finally, there is scope to draw more systematically on the experience of others. The Chinese diaspora in the UK offers a broad range of useful perspectives. The UK can learn more from how other countries manage their own complex China relationships, such as Japan and Australia.</p> -<p>Over the last 40 years, the United States has made progress in securing cyberspace, but its federal networks remain vulnerable to attacks by state and non-state actors. Malign actors can hold the United States hostage by disrupting the ability of the federal government to provide basic services and public goods the country relies on for everything from food to economic growth to cutting-edge research. Beyond the battlefield, the “.gov” — federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agency — networks remain a critical requirement for American prosperity as well as a crucial vulnerability. Absent renewed efforts to secure these networks, the United States will remain at risk of cost imposition and political warfare in cyberspace.</p> +<h4 id="5-strategy-without-resourcing-and-implementation-is-just-wish-making">5. Strategy without resourcing and implementation is just wish-making.</h4> -<p>To address this challenge, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) formed a task force of former senior appointees, cybersecurity experts, and private sector chief information security officers (CISOs) to study the past, present, and future of securing the .gov. After a six-month study that involved interviews with federal and private sector CISOs, six tabletop exercises, and a survey of 1,000 members of the general U.S. public, CSIS found that resources alone were insufficient to address the magnitude of the challenge. The U.S. government needs better planning frameworks and coordination mechanisms to work across the diverse mix of agencies within the federal executive branch. Actors such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) play a leading role but need to find ways to better leverage existing authorities to coordinate resources and risk management across over 100 federal executive agencies. As long as these agencies maintain separate budgets and personnel for managing cybersecurity, it creates inherent planning and coordination challenges. While new reporting requirements and capabilities are coming online, for continuous diagnostics and mitigation (CDM) and threat hunt, the mission to secure the .gov is not finished. Planning and new response frameworks will need to follow that enable a more robust and fully staffed CISA to work alongside the CISOs in over 100 federal executive agencies to safeguard American prosperity. This long-term planning must include coordinated budgets and strategy with agencies and other key actors such as the Office of Management of Budget (OMB) and the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) alongside synchronizing incident response across the whole of government.</p> +<p>Strategies often fail. Plans are written but not implemented. Successful strategies require objectives grounded in reality, supported with the right resourcing and organisational structures; clear responsibilities and accountabilities; incentives and sanctions to encourage action; and durable leadership commitment that adapts in the face of changing circumstances.</p> -<p>Based on this study, the task force recommends changes to how the U.S. government resources cybersecurity, executes existing authorities, and creates opportunities and incentives to coordinate across over 100 federal executive agencies. Put bluntly, money is not enough to defend the .gov. The U.S. government needs to do a better job of planning, coordinating, and communicating the risks associated with cyberattacks against federal executive agencies. This will likely require consistent staffing at CISA and exploring new service models such as creating collaborative planning teams that deploy to help agencies develop cyber risk strategies and tailored dashboards to monitor their networks.</p> +<p>For the UK in relation to China, these conditions do not currently appear to be in place. The ISC China report found that “the slow speed at which strategies, and policies, are developed and implemented … leaves a lot to be desired”. It also rightly highlighted the need for longer-term planning and resource commitments. This in turn requires sufficient cross-party consensus for commitments to last through changes of government.</p> -<p>At the same time, the study surfaced ideas about a number of more contentious but important reforms that warrant further debate. First, the ability of the federal government to attract, train, and retain cybersecurity professionals is a national security issue. Until agencies such as CISA are fully staffed and the federal government has a larger cyber workforce, the ability to defend the .gov is diminished. Second, emerging capabilities like artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have the potential to revolutionize cyber defense but also to create new threat vectors. Agencies such as CISA will have to work alongside current AI/ML strategy efforts to ensure the .gov is ready for an entirely new character of cyberspace. Third, there could be a larger economy of scale to pooling cyber defense resources across federal agencies and creating a more centralized defensive strategy similar to the evolution of the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN). Finally, inflation has the potential to complicate resourcing for cybersecurity. Long-term planning efforts will have to ensure that there are mechanisms in place to adapt to sudden changes in prices associated with updating CDM and threat hunt capabilities.</p> +<p>Resourcing for China has increased. In March, the government announced a doubling in 2024/25 of funding for its China Capabilities Programme. Richard Moore, head of the Secret Intelligence Service, recently stated that “we now devote more resources to China than anywhere else, reflecting China’s increasing global significance”. This is likely not enough, though limited public information makes it hard to judge. Indeed, there are good strategic arguments for not revealing publicly the resource levels behind some initiatives.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>However, it is not a question of money alone. Improving coordination, communication and alignment across government remains a big task. This is as much as question of leadership focus and organisational effectiveness as resource levels per se.</p> -<p>Despite over 40 years of investments and initiatives by the U.S. federal government, cyberspace remains vulnerable. Every day brings small intrusions and insidious espionage campaigns designed to hide malware in networks, creating a dangerous complacency that risks the ability of the federal government to provide basic goods and services. Since no single attack has been a major catastrophe capable of competing with stories about war, inflation, public health, and climate change, headlines prove fickle. The money and data that are lost fail to shock the public. Every additional dollar authorized by Congress to protect the network is squeezed by competing requirements. Everyone moves on to the next attack more vulnerable than before.</p> +<p>Internationally, too, increased resources are needed. China is much more active on the global stage, putting increased time and effort into advancing its agenda in multilateral institutions and offering financial support to countries in the Global South in particular. There is increased contention and competition. Here, cooperation with others allows for burden-sharing, whether in addressing China’s efforts in the UN to redefine human rights or the implications of increased financial development assistance in the Pacific Islands. But more resources – both time and money – are needed if strategy is to be more than rhetoric.</p> -<p>This tragedy is perfectly encapsulated by the 2020 compromise of the SolarWinds software update, which reveals the promise and peril on the horizon as the U.S. government seeks to secure cyberspace for its citizens. In December 2020, cybersecurity firm FireEye detected a supply chain attack on SolarWinds’ Orion software. The “trojanized” (disguised) malware was unintentionally pushed out to approximately 18,000 federal and private sector clients during a routine software update. The attack hit nine federal agencies and over 100 private companies, embedding backdoors designed to exfiltrate data — and, in a future crisis, to launch crippling cyberattacks. Subsequent reporting estimated that the attackers — linked to Russian intelligence — likely had gained access as much as six months earlier. To put that in perspective, while the National Security Agency (NSA) and Cyber Command proclaimed success in defending forward during the 2020 presidential election and in disrupting Russian cyber capabilities, hackers connected to Moscow were launching one of the largest cyber espionage campaigns in modern history.</p> +<h4 id="6-strategy-requires-learning-and-adaptation">6. Strategy requires learning and adaptation.</h4> -<p>At the same time, the SolarWinds response showed the importance of creating a focal point for coordination between the federal executive branch and the private sector, highlighting why twenty-first-century security goes beyond the military and intelligence community. During the SolarWinds crisis, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) worked with FireEye and Microsoft — whose software infrastructure was targeted — to get electronic copies of infected servers. These copies helped the NSA and Cyber Command diagnose the extent of the malware infection.</p> +<p>Strategy is not static. Broad objectives may remain constant, but prioritisation, detailed outcomes and how to achieve them will change. Strategy will also change, based on which policies work and which do not. As such, any detailed China strategy paper may quickly date. Strategy must learn and adapt rapidly to changed assessments and circumstances. It must these days consider a China with strong digital capabilities, but large structural economic problems, in a world of AI, rather than a high-growth China excelling in physical infrastructure.</p> -<p>The crisis also illustrated the need to accelerate initiatives to secure soft targets across the 102 entities comprising FCEB agencies. In the wake of SolarWinds, CISA has worked to modernize EINSTEIN, a legacy network of sensors on the federal network; create a new Cyber Analytics and Data System; and enhance its Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program capabilities. These efforts consist of a mix of contracts worth over $400 million and a request for almost $500 million in the FY 2024 budget. Another effort was the American Rescue Plan Act, which included $650 million targeted at addressing FCEB agency weaknesses revealed in the SolarWinds and Microsoft exchange intrusions. These efforts are critical to counter evolving threat actors. SolarWinds took an indirect approach and bypassed the EINSTEIN sensors by compromising trusted third-party software.</p> +<p>Much of this learning will inevitably happen behind closed doors. However, external review and reflection – in parliament, in expert groups and in the broader community – is important too. A published China strategy can help anchor this debate, but it must not become a fixed baseline pursued for its own sake while the world changes.</p> -<p>Resources are necessary but insufficient to protect the over 100 agencies in the FCEB landscape. As seen in SolarWinds, CISA must align resources with strategy and coordinate with diverse stakeholders across the federal government and the private sector to enable entities, public and private, to manage their own risk. Strategy must align ends, ways, and means. Moreover, today’s federal cybersecurity has been shaped as much by the threat as by bureaucracy. As such, there is an urgent need to ensure that CISA’s security mission is aligned with new offices and authorities — residing in entities including the ONCD — and to overcome defunct dividing lines that characterize how the U.S. federal government buys technology and secures its networks through the various department and agency budget submissions.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Absent a renewed focus on organizational structures and processes within the federal government, the millions of dollars on the table to secure FCEBs will produce diminishing marginal returns. Each congressional dollar appropriated will not produce an equal dollar’s worth of security for U.S. citizens. The networks on which the public relies for everything from food and housing subsidies to business permits and patents will prove brittle. As seen with SolarWinds, great powers and other adversaries stand in the shadows ready to exploit the organizational vulnerability of the United States, not just its technical cyber vulnerabilities.</p> +<p>China indeed has “implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”. While the government has made substantial progress on its approach to this challenge, more needs to be done.</p> -<p>Consider the counterfactual: if the compromise of the SolarWinds software update had not been detected, what could Russia have done to deter U.S. support to Ukraine? The malware pushed to 18,000 federal and private sector networks could have used backdoors to corrupt data and even shut down systems. Commerce officials could have received false emails with the potential to temporarily distort financial markets. The theft of encrypted keys at the Department of the Treasury could have caused a loss of confidence, not just in financial markets but in the entire U.S. federal tax system. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration might have temporarily delayed transporting nuclear materials and operations at multiple national labs, essentially providing Moscow a nuclear signaling mechanism without an explosion. Department of State correspondence could have been used to mislead U.S. partners as to the nation’s willingness to support Ukraine, creating confusion and uncertainty that bought Moscow time to advance on the battlefield.</p> +<p>What matters more than having a strategy paper is a host of decisions in different domains, followed by resourcing, implementation and review. Reasonable people can disagree on what being “clear-eyed” about China means in practice. This is not the work of government alone, even where China pursues its own “whole-of-state” approach. Across the UK, better awareness is needed, both of the opportunities and the risks that China presents. This will allow people to strike the right balance between risk and return – and also determine where, on certain matters of security and values, there is no balance to be struck, and economic benefits must take a backseat. But without increased resources – both time and money – a better China strategy will remain an expression of hope rather than reality.</p> -<p>This counterfactual is not hyperbole. In May 2023, researchers discovered Volt Typhoon, a massive espionage campaign by the Chinese Communist Party to access critical infrastructure networks it could exploit in the event of a crisis with the United States. In addition to targeting U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific — home to thousands of service members and their families — the campaign looked for ways to delay troop movements, degrade communications, and cause economic disruption.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Military strategy has become fused with cybersecurity as states use cyberspace not just to target armed forces but to hold civilian populations hostage. This digital hostage taking renews the cruel logic of countervalue targeting and threatens to punish civilian infrastructure as a way of limiting an adversary’s military options (i.e., deterrence by punishment). Every rail line, airport, or seaport disabled has the potential to delay troop mobilization and create critical supply disruptions that risk public panic. Cyber tools can calibrate the pain, creating a risk strategy in which each vulnerability exploited becomes a signal and pressure for the target to back down or face worse consequences during a crisis. Elected officials in a democracy cannot afford to ignore their citizens, resulting in either capitulation or dangerous escalation spirals.</p> +<p><strong>Andrew Cainey</strong> is a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI and the founding director of the UK National Committee on China. He has lived and worked for most of the past twenty-five years in China, Korea and Singapore advising businesses and governments, having first visited China in 1981. His particular areas of focus relate to China’s development, its growing role and influence across Asia and globally and the intersection of economic prosperity, technology and national security.</p>Andrew CaineyChina poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”, according to the UK’s March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh.Written Evidence2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/written-evidence<p><em>The Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the European Union’s (EU) ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Specifically, the war unveiled the role of the European Commission as a policy entrepreneur which is enhancing its competences in security and defence through the usage of a “market-security nexus”. As defence cooperation gets increasingly framed by the EU in terms of economic efficiency and resilience, it might be difficult for London to ignore the gravitational pull of EU market and legislation in the long term. However, EU efforts in regulating the defence market are still nascent, and there are still both room and value for the UK to engage in this process. This submission is divided into three sections addressing the Terms of Reference (ToRs) 1, 3 and 5, respectively. Lastly, it concludes with a policy recommendations section suggesting specific avenues for defence cooperation within existing EU frameworks.</em></p> -<p>While the world has yet to see the full use of cyber operations along these lines during a war, states are developing new cyber strategies that integrate coercion, mis-, dis-, and malinformation, and other methods of endangering the modern connectivity the world relies on. The recent Chinese intrusions are a harbinger of a new age of cyber operations. To access networks in Guam, the hackers used internet-facing Fortiguard devices, which incorporate machine learning (ML) to detect and respond to malware. The operation involved using legitimate network credentials and network administrative tools to gain access and develop the ability to launch future attacks. In other words, the attacker used stealth to move with the terrain and find ways of bypassing sophisticated digital sentries.</p> +<h3 id="section-1">Section 1</h3> -<p>Even if states like Russia struggled to integrate cyber operations with its military operations in 2022, one should not assume the risk is gone. It is not just AI/ML and generative AI that create new threat vectors in cyberspace. The convergence of digital and critical infrastructure networks opens a new configuration of vulnerabilities across the 16 critical infrastructure sectors (see Figure 1). It is easy to imagine a different type of punishment campaign waged by Moscow that substitutes malware for cruise missiles to attack power plants and key rail lines. Similarly, Russia could have temporarily disabled gas pipelines with cyber operations, a tactic already demonstrated in Saudi Arabia by Iran in 2012.</p> +<h4 id="11-to-what-extent-does-the-eus-response-represent-a-departure-from-its-previous-approach-to-foreign-and-security-policy-is-this-likely-to-be-a-durable-shift">1.1 To what extent does the EU’s response represent a departure from its previous approach to foreign and security policy? Is this likely to be a durable shift?</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/J2ITFP1.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cyber Critical Infrastructure Targeting.</strong> Source: CSIS International Security Program research.</em></p> +<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine seemed to have prompted a “whatever it takes” moment in EU defence, with novel initiatives particularly at the defence industrial level, a remit supranational institutions have historically struggled to regulate. The war urged the Commission to mobilise a new bureaucracy to advance proposals on how to utilise the EU’s defence industrial tools in the context of war. This effort culminated in:</p> -<p>The number of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure appears to be on the rise. As seen in Figure 1, there is a troubling history of cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure that warrants careful consideration. Consider an alternative indirect approach in which a hacker enters through the FCEB agencies linked to these sectors. This is exactly what happened in 2017 when the WannaCry ransomware spread across the National Health Services in the United Kingdom. In other words, cyber operations targeting FCEB agencies could quickly pass through the federal government and spill over into the broader economy.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The provision of military assistance via the European Peace Facility (EPF) and consequent growth of this instrument from €5.7 billion in 2021 to €12 billion in June 2023. The funds have been employed to repay EU member states for their contributions of weaponry to Ukraine and to collectively procure one million rounds of ammunition for Ukraine.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In June of 2023, the Council and the Parliament achieved an initial accord on the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), a €300 million initiative designed to encourage member states to collaboratively acquire urgently required military equipment.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In July of 2023, the EU formally endorsed the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), a €500 million program aimed at assisting companies in increasing their capacity for producing ammunition.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Each new device added to a network can improve efficiency but also create emergent risk vectors that would have been unpredictable before its introduction. In 2015, critical flaws were discovered by third-party operational software that connected sensor data distributed across entities such as power plants, water treatment facilities, and pipelines. The flaw allowed attackers to execute random SQL statements on the system, in effect enabling hackers to tamper with data, elevate their administrative privileges for future attacks, and conduct denial-of-service attacks. In 2021, 14 of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the United States experienced ransomware attacks. This trend continued in 2022, with 140 percent growth in cyber operations targeting the industrial sector (i.e., critical manufacturing).</p> +<p>It is true that by advancing these initiatives the EU broke with past taboos and challenged the notion of Normative Power Europe (the oxymoronic use of the European Peace Facility as a weapons supply tool is a case in point). However, the pursuit of an enhanced role in the defence industrial field has been done consistently with what the EU does best: harnessing its regulatory and budgetary powers to increase Member States’ coordination in times of crisis. The European Commission is well-known for its policy activism and for framing issues towards its field of competencies. Thus, while it is certainly a novelty to observe this extent of EU action at the defence industrial level, the modalities through which increased supranational action was achieved in this remit are consistent with the EU’s modus operandi.</p> -<p>As the threat evolves, money alone is not enough to secure cyberspace. The government must adapt and create new ways and means of achieving this common end. This report is part of that effort. The following sections show how the past became the present, helping to frame the challenge facing the different bureaucratic structures and processes used by the federal government to secure non-defense and intelligence functions. Given this historical perspective, the report then pivots to look at the current state, including interviews with senior officials and tabletop exercises with a mix of experts and the general public to understand current threats and challenges. The output of these activities highlights likely futures and how the threat could evolve in the near future. Based on these insights, the report concludes with a list of recommendations on how to align new processes and authorities with resources to protect the resilience of the federal government in the information age.</p> +<p>A market power by design, the EU’s value proposition for the European defence after the invasion of Ukraine has mostly been a financial one. However, albeit noteworthy, financial incentives might not be enough to get European member states to cooperate on a more regular and frictionless basis in a policy domain characterised by competition and protectionism. Even if states concede to financial incentives and decide to cooperate, international arms collaboration means that the problem is shared but not necessarily reduced: the pie may become bigger, but the problem of who gets the largest slice persists. A financial incentives-based approach should not be dismissed, but a parallel conversation is needed. One which discusses the governance structures that can best accommodate multinational endeavours in the inherently competitive European defence industrial base. This conversation should recognise that defence partnerships should be built on states’ core strengths, organised along two dimensions: industrial and technological expertise, and value for money. This mere focus on “financial carrots” might lead to a less durable shift than originally expected, and European ambitions on joint procurement of capabilities might soon reach a stalling point.</p> -<h3 id="how-did-we-get-here">How Did We Get Here?</h3> +<p>In terms of member states’ consensus on how to respond to future crises, it is important to note that the invasion of Ukraine was perceived as an existential matter for the EU. Consequently, one must be cautiously optimistic in expecting the same level of coherence in other foreign policy and security issues. Unequivocal US support and leadership as well as moral clarity about right and wrong in the Ukrainian context were also key enablers for a cohesive European response. However, not all foreign policy challenges present these characteristics. In fact, most of them don’t. See, for instance, the recent war in Gaza which left member-states deeply divided on how best to respond.</p> -<p>New forms of communication tend to produce widespread change. As people exchange ideas in new ways, it leads to different social norms, economic revolutions, and challenges to prevailing governance frameworks. And despite modern attention spans, these changes often take a generation to manifest.</p> +<h4 id="12-what-implications-if-any-does-the-eus-response-to-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-have-for-the-uk-eu-relationship-in-foreign-defence-and-security-policy">1.2 What implications, if any, does the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have for the UK-EU relationship in foreign, defence and security policy?</h4> -<p>This truth is ever-present in the emergence of the internet and the distributed communications networks that have defined the first decades of the twenty-first century. These modes of communication created new challenges for governing institutions that were accustomed to providing public goods in ways that differed little from the twentieth century. This gap between change and governance created a tension at the core of the federal government.</p> +<p>As explained above, the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the EU’s ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field. Since the Lisbon Treaty, there has been a debate about the shift towards more national or less European-oriented foreign and security policies in Europe. Recent developments, however, suggest a potential new phase resembling a process where Brussels gains more influence in this policy domain. The Commission has taken on the role of a policy entrepreneur, aiming to boost its political aspirations and significance. Specifically, it has seized on the opportunity of advancing EU policy in the area of common defence procurement. Yet, it has only done so with the express consent and direct tasking of the European Council. This dynamic is essential to understand the new policy developments, which are guided by both the supranational and intergovernmental levels.</p> -<p>For decades, it has been increasingly acknowledged within Congress and the larger federal government that there need to be formal mechanisms governing the protection of federal networks. This section provides context for why and how perceptions around federal cybersecurity have evolved, as well as what that means for CISA’s mission today.</p> +<p>Thus, it is true that the supranational level gained unprecedented importance the security and defence field, but this relevance was granted and tasked by the member states. As a result, the supranational and intergovernmental levels will continue to operate in tandem, one serving the other when necessary. Consensus will remain difficult to achieve vis-à-vis challenges that are perceived as less existential, and member states will resort to more or less “usage of Europe” according to the scale and perceived importance of the security challenge. Therefore, it is likely for a “Europe of different speed” scenario to materialise, with the Commission building coalitions and cooperating with member states that share its integrative approach. This could translate into pan-European defence projects scaling down and leaving room for smaller groupings and “coalitions of the willing”. Selectivity and differentiation can be introduced into existing institutional structures or patterns of cooperation in order to overcome political hurdles, bring about greater efficiencies, or accommodate diversity. This would have positive implications for the UK, as it could potentially entail more agile frameworks of cooperation and a new approach to like-minded non-EU partners.</p> -<p>Seen from a historical perspective, federal cybersecurity has been shaped as much by threat as by bureaucracy. From its inception, the internet has seen a combustible mix of great powers and non-state actors competing to exploit network vulnerabilities and hunt the threats that always seem to be one step ahead of the defense. This digital game has strained existing bureaucratic structures and authorities, making it increasingly difficult to coordinate action across branches of government to protect not just cyberspace but the critical infrastructure that is increasingly reliant on modern connectivity to deliver public goods. These coordination challenges have created planning and budgeting dilemmas that agencies continue to grapple with today.</p> +<p>So far, the war did not substantially change how the EU approaches and categorises its third-country partners. The EU Strategic Compass has a promising rhetoric in its partnerships chapter. Yet, besides merely listing who the key partners are, the document falls short in operationalising each specific partnership and in detailing how each partner is instrumental to achieve the EU’s foreign policy objectives. Each partnership should involve a tailor-made component to ensure that each is best suited to achieving a specific goal. Yet, the EU has long been reluctant to tailor its partnership agreements. Instead, it has generally favoured deals that are scalable and applicable to sets of countries rather than to individual states. This is because of several reasons such as the risk of the creating of in- and out-groups and a resulting decline in intra-EU cohesion; lowest-common-denominator problems in integration as member states opt-out of specific policies; moral hazard as laggards fall further behind; vulnerability to the interests of non-EU members alongside legitimacy problems in third countries; and increased complexity within the EU system.</p> -<p>Looking ahead, federal cybersecurity should be about risk management that aligns to the threat and uses the structure and demands of the bureaucracy to the advantage (not detriment) of cyber defenses.</p> +<p>A prolonged conflict in Ukraine and new complex security challenges are likely to change this approach. The EU and its member states must establish mutually beneficial connections with nations upon which they rely strategically or wish to establish strategic interdependence. However, this time, reliance solely on market forces is insufficient: deliberate choices must be made regarding new and unavoidable dependencies, not simply accepting those imposed by market forces or competing entities. European leaders must tactically structure their partnerships to strengthen their ability to make decisions and foster stronger bonds among partners, both within and beyond their borders. This new process of partnering will see the UK as the most natural ally.</p> -<h4 id="major-incidents-cyber-strategies-and-legislative-action-pre-cisa">Major Incidents, Cyber Strategies, and Legislative Action Pre-CISA</h4> +<h3 id="section-2">Section 2</h3> -<p><strong>FROM BYTES TO RIGHTS: THE EMERGENCE OF CYBERSECURITY REGULATION</strong></p> +<h4 id="21-is-there-a-need-for-greater-coordination-and-cooperation-between-the-eu-and-the-uk-on-defence-policy-if-so-what-sorts-of-cooperation-should-be-prioritised">2.1 Is there a need for greater coordination and cooperation between the EU and the UK on defence policy? If so, what sorts of cooperation should be prioritised?</h4> -<p>Cybersecurity began in the 1970s when researcher Bob Thomas created a computer program called Creeper. Creeper was more an experiment in self-replicating programs than malware. It was designed to move between computers and leave a message. Fellow researcher Ray Tomlinson then wrote another program, Reaper, that moved across the early network logging out Creeper wherever it identified the program.</p> +<p>British participation in European defence matters to the EU because of London’s historical security commitment to the region and its twin status as one of Europe’s two major military powers as well as its most advanced weapons manufacturer. Similarly, the EU’s increased regulation of the defence market as well as making more funding available at the supranational level (particularly for R&amp;D, where the UK is lagging behind) should prompt an interest from the UK in being part of the conversation. Thus, increased cooperation is indeed desirable from both sides.</p> -<p><strong>Great power competition was part of the internet from its inception.</strong> By 1981, an independent U.S. federal agency, the National Science Foundation (NSF), had begun several initiatives, dubbed ARPANET, that built off the early internet experiment by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The ARPANET developed the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP) and set the stage for an NSF initiative connecting computers to create early networks. The NSF took on this role because the Department of Defense (DOD) “made it clear they did not want to run a national computer network that wasn’t directly related to defense work.” One critical NSF initiative was the Computer Science Research Network (CSNET). As the name implies, its goal was to connect computers across national university campuses together. The CSNET grew quickly, and by 1981 it merged with the Because It’s Time Network to include email and file transfers. However, the demand for networking grew quickly and set the stage a few years later for joining regional universities with regional supercomputers and the birth of the National Science Foundation Network. This critical accomplishment facilitated research, but it also increased opportunities for Cold War rivals such as the Soviet Union and China to conduct espionage on sensitive U.S. data.</p> +<p>However, cooperation for the sake of cooperation has rarely proved successful and there are still a set of restrictions for non-EU countries wishing to join EU-led defence initiatives. The level of integration with the EU Single Market decides the viability of defence cooperation with the EU initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), ASAP and EDIRPA and most initiatives. Thus, the UK should prioritise cooperation under institutions and frameworks that are less underpinned by a “play as you pay” rationale. Namely:</p> -<p>From the beginning, however, <strong>threats in cyberspace were not confined to state-based actors.</strong> In 1983, Wisconsin hackers known as the 414s, led by 17-year-old Neal Patrick, breached the computer defenses of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). LANL was established in 1943 to conduct research for the Manhattan Project and nuclear deterrence. After the FBI investigated the 414s, a congressional report on Mr. Patrick’s witness testimony to a U.S. House of Representative committee highlighted that “ironically . . . [the 414s] gave this new [LANL] account or file the code name ‘Joshua,’ repeating the access code used in the film ‘War Games.’” The intrusion into sensitive systems by Mr. Patrick and the 414s highlighted faults in safeguarding computer networks and might have inspired a separate breach in the mid-1980s by agents working for the Soviet Union.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>European Defence Agency (EDA): Conditions for third party involvement with the EDA are outlined in Article 23 of the Council Decision establishing the Agency. These rules allow for interaction, project partnerships, and voluntary personnel contributions, but they do not confer voting rights or automatic invitation to any meeting, in particular steering board meetings. Third country involvement with the EDA is also unlikely to automatically favour permanent access into the European defence ecosystem. When it comes to liaising with third parties, the primary role of the EDA is getting third states in line with what member states are doing. Driven by the principles of added value, mutual benefit and reciprocity, the EDA simply matches states’ capabilities there where possible and necessary. In this sense, the Administrative Arrangements signed with the EDA are to be understood as a license to unlock ad-hoc, project-based cooperation rather than an unrestricted entry ticket to the EU defence theme park. However, given the importance of the EDA as an information exchange platform, involvement with this agency can contribute to the strengthening of ties between participating actors.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>European Peace Facility (EPF): This is an off-budget instrument that supports military and defence actions in the pursuit of CSDP objectives. For now, the EPF is outside the general budget, yet it functions in parallel to the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF 2021-2027). This allowed member states to establish a total budget for the EPF over a seven-year period, as well as agreeing on yearly spending limits. By tying the EPF to negotiations for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), member states determined the financial allocations for the EPF within a larger discussion on how much they wanted to allocate to EU external actions overall. Previous experience with the Athena Mechanism (which served as a precursor to the EPF, along with the African Peace Facility) suggested that arrangements for participation from non-EU countries could be arranged. In fact, it would be unwise for the EU to prohibit contributions from like-minded countries, especially those with whom it has established agreements. Under the financial rules outlined in the Council Decision for Athena, non-EU countries (such as those in the EEA, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Chile, Mexico) were indeed permitted to participate in the mechanism, though without voting rights in its decision-making process. The European Peace Facility operates under similar principles but allows third countries to have a say in ensuring that their voluntary contributions are utilised according to agreed upon terms. Article 30 of the EPF Council Decision states that contributions from third parties require prior approval from the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC). The EPF’s own committee can then authorize the administrative handling of the financial contribution, which may be designated for specific actions or operations. The specific purpose of the voluntary contribution is outlined in the administrative arrangement with the respective third party. The administrator of the Facility Committee is responsible for ensuring that the management of voluntary contributions adheres to the relevant administrative arrangements. They are obligated to provide each contributor, either directly or through the applicable operation commander, with pertinent information regarding the handling of the voluntary contribution as outlined in the relevant administrative arrangement. This allows a third country to monitor how its financial contribution is utilised. This is key for the UK and presents a good mechanism for a more transactional, ad-hoc and supervised engagement.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>PESCO: In the field of security and defence, scholarship has singled out PESCO as a framework embodying high levels of differentiation in its very design. PESCO exhibits not only selectivity in membership but also project-based clustering and patterns of differentiated cooperation that result in external differentiation through the engagement of third countries, differentiation in the relationship with third countries, and a complex division of labour vis-à-vis non-EU institutions, including NATO, and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). As a result, PESCO provides the best framework for the UK to cherry pick the level of integration of the project, the number of partners and the type of activities. When it comes to cooperation formats, history shows that the most successful cooperative-development programmes have few partners and a clear leader, thus the UK should look at PESCO projects that have these characteristics.</p> -<p><strong>The concept of threat hunt and how best to continuously monitor and defend federal networks has been a central issue since the early days of connected networks.</strong> In 1986, computer managers at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) discovered a network breach. LBL was a university research facility that maintained unclassified research and information on its systems. A 24-year-old hacker based in West Germany penetrated the computer systems at LBL, searching files and emails with keywords such as “nuclear,” “Star Wars,” and “S.D.I. [Strategic Defense Initiative].” However, much to the bewilderment of the LBL team, they assessed that this hacker confused LBL with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a sister laboratory to LBL that conducted classified research. In this moment, the team decided to not deny and isolate the intrusion but rather to study it by tracing it back. They traced the intruder from multiple points, including a defense contractor in Virginia, a Navy data center, and other military and non-military centers. The LBL team further alerted and collaborated with the FBI to investigate and eventually charge Markus Hess in 1990 for selling the stolen data for $54,000 to the Soviet KGB. The character of connected networks enabled easy lateral movement for clever attacks.</p> + <p>Third party involvement with PESCO starts with a formal request initiated by the third country applicant. Importantly, the request should be initiated by a country’s government and not by its legal entity, or defence company, as is the case with EDF. The request should be submitted to the coordinator(s) of the PESCO project in question (i.e. to the member states, not to an EU institution). It needs to contain detailed information on the reasons for participating in the project and the scope and form of the proposed participation. Finally, the request must substantiate the fulfilment of a set of conditions, laid out in Article 3 of the Conclusions.</p> -<p>For policy practitioners in the cybersecurity field, securing computers was a process that started before the high-profile breaches in the 1980s. An early example is from 1972, when the DOD issued Directive 5200.28, “Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems,” in order to establish “uniform policy, security requirements, administrative controls, and technical measures to protect classified information.” This directive provided new types of authorities that were built on in 1982 with Directive 5215.1, “Computer Security Evaluation Center,” which established the center at the NSA.</p> + <p>They consist of four key requirements. Firstly, the third country must share the values on which the EU is founded as well as the overall objectives of the Union’s CFSP laid out in article 21(2) TEU. Secondly, it must provide substantial added value to the PESCO project in question. Here, substantial value is loosely defined by the EU, thereby providing significant room for manoeuvre for the applicants to make their case. As a rule of thumb, the applicant’s contribution to the project must be complementary to those offered by the rest of the participating member states, for example by providing technical expertise or additional capabilities including operational or financial support. The EU does not set any specific threshold or measurement for complementarity. Thirdly, it is important that the third state’s participation does not imply the creation of dependencies for the EU. This point is particularly contentious when it comes to allowing participation from powerful third countries such as the US, but it is advantageous for smaller states with niche capabilities. Lastly, the applicant state must have a Security of Information Agreement with the EU and an Administrative Arrangement with EDA. The third country’s application making these arguments will then be assessed by the project’s participating members who will unanimously decide on whether or not to include the third country. Once the participating members have approved the request, they will inform the High Representative and the European Council of its decision. Only following the Council’s green light, can an invitation to join the project be made to the third state. If the invitation is accepted, an Administrative Arrangement is negotiated outlining contributions and modes of engagement. A template for such an administrative arrangement between project members and third states can be found on the last page of the Council Decision establishing conditions for third-party involvement in PESCO.</p> -<p><strong>Planning and standards played a central role early in imagining how to secure networks of connected devices.</strong> The two directives mentioned above led to a series of trusted computer system evaluation books published by the DOD and NSA known as the “Rainbow Series,” deriving their name from the colorful covers they were issued in. The name also paralleled famous U.S. war plans from the interwar period. The rainbow books were an early attempt to establish standards to secure the DOD components. The most well-known iteration is the “orange book,” published initially in 1983, with a revised version in 1985 titled <em>Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria</em>.</p> + <p>Much of the detail on third country participation will be in an Administrative Agreement, thus leaving an important element of uncertainty. This also includes specific rules regarding the project’s intellectual property. As a general rule, the PESCO consortium retains full control of all the project’s intellectual property, but it seems plausible that specific rules could be formulated in the agreement. One last interesting aspect is that the Decision specifies a separate set of rules for countries (i.e., third-party states) and defence industry companies (i.e., third-party entities) in the modality of joining PESCO projects. For now, the main difference is that third-party states have been eligible to join since the conclusion of the agreement (November 2020), whereas companies must wait until 2026. Lastly, the entanglement between PESCO and the EDF needs to be addressed and, specifically, the controversies around the EDF’s PESCO bonus. EDF regulation maintains that an action developed in the context of a PESCO project can benefit from a funding increase of an additional 10%. This, however, is only valid for EU member states or associated countries. Under no circumstances can a third country succeed in using PESCO participation as a shortcut to access EDF money.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Bilateral and minilateral cooperation outside EU structures: Conscious of the challenges of collaborative projects, European states have continued to collaborate along bilateral and minilateral lines. The proliferation of such arrangements has often been seen as one of the underlying causes behind the fragmentation and duplication of European defence efforts. However, there is limited appreciation of the conductive power of these modes of engagement, and of how the existence of lower-level, smaller-format collaborations can then spill over to the multilateral level. For instance, when the EU established PESCO in 2017, much of the project-based clustering was based on existing bilateral and minilateral defence initiatives between states outside the supranational umbrella, which were then incorporated into the EU’s defence and security architecture. As such, these more ad-hoc types of cooperation should not necessarily be seen as antagonising to multilateral efforts happening at the EU or NATO levels.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The defense and intelligence communities were not alone in their efforts to secure computers. Picking up where its response to the 414s left off, Congress introduced a series of bills on computer crimes in the 1980s. Of the bills introduced, the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) encapsulated the majority of national efforts to prosecute unauthorized computer network access, codifying civil and criminal penalties and prohibitions against a variety of computer-related conduct and cybercrime. While not exclusively an anti-hacking law, it placed penalties for knowingly accessing a federal computer without authorization.</p> +<h4 id="22-the-communiqué-issued-following-the-nato-heads-of-state-and-government-summit-in-july-2023-stated-that-for-the-strategic-partnership-between-nato-and-the-eu-non-eu-allies-fullest-involvement-in-eu-defence-efforts-is-essential-and-looked-forward-to-mutual-steps-representing-tangible-progress-in-this-area-to-support-a-strengthened-strategic-partnership-as-a-non-eu-member-of-nato-what-steps-if-any-should-the-uk-take-to-give-effect-to-this">2.2 The communiqué issued following the NATO Heads of State and Government summit in July 2023 stated that for “the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in EU defence efforts is essential” and looked forward to “mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership”. As a non-EU Member of NATO what steps, if any, should the UK take to give effect to this?</h4> -<p>The first application of CFAA in criminal proceedings came two years later when a modified computer worm resulted in a widespread denial-of-service attack across thousands of computers. In 1988, a computer science student at Cornell University — the son of an NSA official — hacked the computer network at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and planted what became known as the Morris Worm. This worm did not damage or destroy files, but it quickly slowed down email communications, sometimes for days. While the breach and planting of the worm were at MIT, its fast spread across computer networks caused concern, as even military communications slowed. As the incident gathered speed and became public, the FBI investigated and eventually charged Robert T. Morris in 1991 for unauthorized access to protected computers. The Morris Worm became the first documented case of the CFAA federally prosecuting a hacker, and it highlighted the importance of protecting cyberspace for the nation.</p> +<p>The UK should recognise that EU defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden- sharing and that they are not envisaged as competing with NATO. The UK should continue to engage in those EU projects that are particularly important to the Alliance. It has already done so, though to a limited extent. Joining PESCO’s Military Mobility project is a glaring example. Improving military mobility in Europe has long been one of the flagship areas for EU–NATO cooperation. Indeed, it represents one of those spaces in which the EU and NATO complement each other. Namely, while NATO is able to plan and calculate the military’s needs for transport across Europe, the EU has the legal and regulatory weight to streamline processes as well as available funds and programmes on cross-border mobility. PESCO’s military mobility project epitomises a case where EU action supports NATO efforts and, as such, London’s decision to join was perfectly aligned with UK government policy. As a NATO but non-EU member the UK should continue to prioritise initiatives that are in support of the Alliance. Participation in such projects should be easier to sell domestically, can serve as an initial steppingstone to normalise the relationship, and might have a conductive power towards further engagement.</p> -<p><strong>THE GOVERNMENT BYTES BACK: LEGISLATIVE STRIDES IN CYBERSECURITY</strong></p> +<h3 id="section-3">Section 3</h3> -<p>Following the launch of the World Wide Web, Congress continued to work toward improving the resiliency of the federal networks, with a focus on information technology (IT). This came into light in 1995 with the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Information Technology Management Reform Act (Clinger-Cohen Act) of 1995. The Clinger-Cohen Act was a breakthrough for the federal enterprise because it mandated the creation of chief information officers (CIOs) across agencies. The Clinger-Cohen Act also directed agencies to focus on results using IT investment and streamlined procurement processes, detailing how agencies should approach the selection and management of IT projects. <strong>Coordinated action by the executive branch and Congress has been central to securing cyberspace for 40 years.</strong></p> +<h4 id="31-some-experts-have-identified-a-more-geopolitical-eu-that-is-more-assertive-in-its-role-as-a-foreign-policy-and-security-actor-following-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-do-you-agree-with-this-assessment-if-so-what-implications-does-it-have-for-the-uk">3.1 Some experts have identified a more “geopolitical” EU that is more assertive in its role as a foreign policy and security actor following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what implications does it have for the UK?</h4> -<p>Building on Congress’s actions and picking up the presidential pen in 1998, 10 years after the Morris Worm incident, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive NSC-63. Under the directive, the administration signaled its intent to safeguard cyber-based information systems in critical infrastructure. President Clinton presented five important actions: (1) set a national goal to protect critical infrastructure, (2) appoint agency liaisons to work with the private sector and foster public-private partnerships, (3) create a set of general guidelines, (4) issue structure and organization to federal agencies, and (5) task each agency to be responsible for protecting its own critical infrastructure. With the directive, Clinton assured the country that the United States would “take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.” <strong>Early on, federal officials saw the interdependencies between cyberspace and critical infrastructure and between cyber and physical security.</strong></p> +<p>The EU suffers from the legacy of separating the exclusive competence for the EU to act in the sphere of trade from the more limited competence to develop a foreign policy. This stark separation has been slowly eroding since the EU Global Strategy of 2016, and the war in Ukraine has accelerated this process. Specifically, the war (and the pandemic before it) sped up the emergence of the Commission as a geopolitical actor and the securitisation of those areas that fall under EU competencies to a greater extent than defence such as, for instance, energy, economic security and supply chain resilience.</p> -<p><strong>FROM TERROR TO TECHNOLOGY: THE POST-9/11 CYBERSECURITY OVERHAUL</strong></p> +<p>The Single Market experience continues to permeate every aspect of EU policymaking and, since the beginning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Commission has tried to enhance its competences within the traditional intergovernmental policy domain of security and defence through the usage of a “market-security nexus”. The sustained war in Ukraine exposed a European industrial resilience problem, and joint defence procurement became to be understood as crucial in making a decisive impact on the future competitiveness of Community industries in the internal market. By framing a traditional intergovernmental problem through a market resilience lens, the Commission managed to get members states to seek supranational solutions and to accept innovative proposals. For instance, the Commission’s shift in approach and understanding of Article 41.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) can be considered quite ground-breaking. Until recently, the idea of using the Union budget for defence procurement was unimaginable. The Commission is therefore using crises to act as a policy entrepreneur to further enhance its political ambitions and to suggest innovative solutions.</p> -<p>The very concept of security changed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The attacks not only sparked the war on terror but brought the passage of new legislation to safeguard the homeland. Under President George W. Bush, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act of 2001, which amended the CFAA and extended protections to federal computers located outside the United States. Further, the PATRIOT Act also included computers “used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security.” <strong>New threats showed the need for new authorities.</strong></p> +<p>This dynamic has important implications for the UK. As defence cooperation gets increasingly perceived through the lenses of economic efficiency and resilience, it might be difficult for London to ignore the gravitational pull of EU market and legislation. The enhanced role of the Commission in security and defence is likely to increase the EU’s capacity to shape behaviour externally through “milieu shaping”. As a result, it is important for the UK to be involved in the restructuring of the European defence market. In fact, for nations or companies that didn’t participate in this process from the beginning, joining later would pose significant difficulties.</p> -<p>In response to both the terrorist attacks and the growing reliance of the federal government on cyberspace, the George W. Bush administration, as a part of its larger Electronic Government (E-Gov) strategy, worked with Congress on the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). The legislation tasked agencies to “identify and provide information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from the unauthorized use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information systems.” Importantly, FISMA 2002 not only tasked FCEB agencies with planning out key aspects of their own “tactical-level cybersecurity actions,” but it also attempted to delineate roles between agencies that would support the FCEB agencies, with the OMB providing “strategic support,” the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) providing “operational support,” and the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) establishing standards and guidance. <strong>The number of agencies involved in coordinating cybersecurity was starting to eclipse the planning and budgeting frameworks in place to manage FCEB agencies.</strong></p> +<h3 id="section-4-recommendations">Section 4: Recommendations</h3> -<p>In response to these coordination challenges, the White House released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in February 2003. This strategy was developed in response to the September 11 attacks and set forth the U.S. government’s approach to broadly securing networks, reducing vulnerabilities, and minimizing damage from cyber incidents. It was a whole-of-society strategy, underscoring the importance of public and private entities prioritizing cybersecurity as a way to protect critical infrastructure and processes. With regard to federal entities, the strategy emphasized that the government should serve as a model, leading as early adopters for secure technologies and demonstrating best practices in cybersecurity. Further, the strategy mentioned the importance of developing and maintaining clear roles for federal security management. It cited the OMB’s FY 2002 report to Congress that identified ongoing government security gaps, including but not limited to a lack of attention from senior management, a lack of proper education and general awareness training, a lack of security performance metrics and measurements, and a lack of general ability to detect and share information on vulnerabilities.</p> +<p>The UK and the EU are natural partners and, as highlighted throughout this contribution, there is mutual benefit in further cooperation. As EU member states delegate more authority to the supranational level in the field of security and defence, it might get increasingly difficult for the UK to ignore the gravitational pull of the EU in the process of the restructuring of the European defence market. However, this process has only just started and there is value for the UK to engage in it relatively early on. When it comes to the modalities for such engagement, the ball is largely in the UK’s court. British policymakers should recognise that closer post-Brexit cooperation with EU institutions is an iterative process, and therefore subject to change as lessons are being learnt and as the context evolves. Ultimately, scalability and proportionality infuse the EU’s approach to partnerships. As such, EU eagerness to effectively explore and legally spell out advanced forms of security cooperation with the UK will much depend on the latter’s willingness to commit itself to cooperation in the first place. Opportunities exist:</p> -<p>The dawn of the twenty-first century saw the United States grappling with new forms of security that eclipsed Cold War–era notions of national security. The active participation of citizens and the provision of goods and services through critical infrastructure emerged as key components that required new thinking. To their credit, officials in the executive and legislative branches rose to the challenge; however, they struggled to achieve lasting results. In the roughly 20 years since the original FISMA and the Bush administration’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, major cyber incidents directly impacting the United States have forced the government to prioritize cybersecurity and reevaluate the very definition of national security. In other words, the proliferation of new networks in cyberspace alongside the acknowledgement that Americans were vulnerable at home drove the need for a new focal point to defend the United States beyond traditional defense, intelligence, and law enforcement considerations.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The first step for bringing more coherence to UK-EU cooperation would be signing an Administrative Arrangement with the EDA. As studies have shown, the latter scenario could facilitate increased interaction between representatives from the UK and the EU, potentially creating opportunities for greater involvement of Britain in EU initiatives where the EDA plays a part. There is no “one size fits all” Administrative Arrangement for third countries, and each one is negotiated separately and on an ad hoc basis. Specifically, the agreement will stipulate rights and responsibilities for the UK as well as introducing a review mechanism to periodically assess whether the UK is meeting those obligations. It is important to demystify it, however. Signing an Administrative Arrangement with the EU is not a political step towards strengthening relationships with the bloc. It should be understood as a licence to unlock ad hoc, project-based cooperation that is intended to fully respect the signatory’s national sovereignty.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The UK should explore further involvement in PESCO beyond the Military Mobility project, which does not entail research and development activities. Participating in a PESCO capability development project could serve as a means for the UK to explore the extent to which third countries can engage in EU capability development initiatives, and to observe how the existing regulations regarding intellectual property and export controls are applied in practice. If the EU demonstrated a willingness to interpret its regulations in a flexible manner, it would open the door for greater UK involvement in both PESCO and, potentially, the EDF. As previous studies suggested, participating in a PESCO capability development project presents an opportunity for the UK to explore the limits of third-party engagement in EU capability development mechanisms. It allows the UK to assess the practical interpretation of existing regulations concerning intellectual property and export controls. If the EU demonstrates flexibility in its rule interpretation, it could open doors for the UK to engage more closely in both PESCO and the EDF. Cooperating under the PESCO umbrella has changed the way member states communicate with each other in addition to providing access to key documents and information and facilitating the creation of personal links among the member states’ representatives. As such, PESCO might represent a valuable socialisation forum as well as being a trust-building exercise.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Lastly, bilateral cooperation with European states remains vital as, for instance, the Lancaster House treaties with France have already demonstrated. The UK will need to address European partners individually as much as collectively.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="the-emergence-of-cisa-over-three-administrations">The Emergence of CISA over Three Administrations</h4> +<hr /> -<p><strong>THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: PAVING THE WAY FOR CISA</strong></p> +<p><strong>Isabella Antinozzi</strong> is a Research Analyst in the Defence, Industries and Society Research Group at RUSI.</p>Isabella AntinozziThe Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the European Union’s (EU) ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field.Two Wars, One Denominator2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/two-wars-one-denominator<p><em>As the war in Gaza distracts the West from its support for Ukraine, Russia is seeking to exploit the situation by positioning itself as a reasonable broker that has the ear of both Israel and Hamas.</em></p> -<p>As a continuation and expansion of Bush-era cyber recommendations, the Obama administration and successive congresses struggled to find the best alignment of cyber and critical infrastructure protection within the newly created DHS. <strong>The optimal structures and processes for securing cyberspace remained elusive.</strong> Many of the initiatives built in 2007 realigned multiple agency portfolios on cyber and critical infrastructure — including defending FCEB agencies — under the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). Through such efforts, the Obama administration laid the foundation for what would eventually become CISA within the DHS.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>First, the administration conducted a 60-day review of the nation’s cyber policies and processes, culminating in the 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review. It then developed and published the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), detailing cybersecurity goals for agencies such as the OMB and DHS. The report was an outgrowth of the CNCI initiative launched by President Bush in National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23), which called for the federal government to “integrate many of its technical and organizational capabilities in order to better address sophisticated cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities.” It also built substantially upon the report of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th President, <em>Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency</em>. Of relevance to this study, President Obama’s CNCI report details initiatives such as the management of a Federal Enterprise Network with Trusted Internet Connections and the deployment of intrusion detection and prevention systems across the federal enterprise. In other words, <strong>policymakers have seen the importance of defending FCEB agencies and the .gov ecosystem for over 20 years but have struggled to align resources to achieve their ends.</strong></p> +<p>The two wars currently dominating the agenda – the Ukraine war and the Israel–Gaza conflict – have one common denominator: Russia. While the causes and aims of the two conflicts are incomparable, Russia has nevertheless sought to ensure that it remains at the heart of the action. But its intentions and management of its different relationships in the Middle East are rather more complex.</p> -<p>It was also during this time that the DHS started building and improving on a number of initiatives that have since become key services managed and delivered by CISA. For instance, in 2012, the DHS established the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program and rolled out EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated, which added inline blocking to existing EINSTEIN intrusion detection.</p> +<p>While Russia’s ties with Israel have fluctuated over the years, they have strengthened since the Soviet Union’s collapse. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s ambiguous response has strained their relationship. These difficulties were brought to the fore recently on 29 October: in a series of unsettling events, a flight from Tel Aviv landing in the southern Russian city of Makhachkala (Dagestan) was forced to evacuate its passengers due to a rioting mob expressing support for the Palestinian cause and seeking to attack Israelis and Jews.</p> -<p>Separately, after nearly a decade of FISMA 2002 guidelines, the Obama administration signed a new FISMA into law in 2014. In addition to updating and streamlining reporting requirements, the new FISMA further delineated roles and responsibilities in cybersecurity management by formally codifying the DHS’s role as the lead for implementing and overseeing FCEB agencies’ IT policies. The government saw a need to coordinate technology standards by getting policies aligned.</p> +<p>The Kremlin’s response varied from initial prevarication by the security services (who did not regain control over the airport for several hours), blaming the West for the demonstrations and accusing Ukrainian forces of fomenting the civil unrest (with no evidential links between them), to holding a major meeting to discuss the antisemitic event and promising to detain those responsible. None of this filled either the Jewish community across Russia or Israel with much confidence, and Russia’s attempts to involve itself in Israel’s war are unlikely to be well-received in Jerusalem.</p> -<p>Most importantly, it should be noted that it was during the final years of the Obama administration that the NPPD was able to develop the plans for the first new operational agency at the DHS since its founding. This plan was provided to Congress and became the basis for later establishing CISA. At the same time, it was clear that these initiatives were still failing to deliver what they promised: an integrated approach to cybersecurity and risk management across the federal government. As seen in the 2015 OMB hack, FCEB agencies were often late in submitting their cyber strategies and struggled to recruit and retain talent. This fact led some circles to call for moving cybersecurity out of the DHS and creating a standalone National Cyber Authority.</p> +<h3 id="russia-israel-ties">Russia-Israel Ties</h3> -<p><strong>THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: CONSOLIDATING AUTHORITIES AND RESOURCES</strong></p> +<p>While Russia and Israel’s relationship over Syria and deconfliction in the country’s airspace is part of the bilateral picture, as Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has moved further to the right, Israel has sought to forge alliances with countries that have not been traditional Western allies, including India and Hungary as well as Russia.</p> -<p>Efforts to align federal resources to secure cyberspace accelerated during the Trump administration. Building on President Trump’s Executive Order (EO) 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, the administration also released its National Cyber Strategy in September 2018 — the first official strategy since the Bush administration’s in 2003.</p> +<p>However, upon Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel took an unclear position, raising hackles in both Kyiv and Moscow. Israel did not fall behind the Western consensus and has not sanctioned Russia, but nor has it offered military assistance to Ukraine. Israel did accept several thousand Ukrainian refugees, but there was intense debate within Israel about whether to cap their entry, alongside accusations that the refugees’ social and medical benefits had expired and not been renewed. Israel did offer humanitarian aid to Kyiv, and has nominally professed support for Ukrainian independence. But the Canadian parliament’s lauding in September of a Ukrainian Second World War veteran who served in a Nazi unit prompted criticism from Israel, reinvigorating the debate about Ukraine’s contentious role and attitude towards Jews during the war.</p> -<p>A few months after the release of the 2018 cyber strategy, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Act was passed and signed into law, formally creating CISA. The creation of CISA isolated, consolidated, and elevated key functions of the DHS’s NPPD and related DHS initiatives. While the NPPD was already tasked with the majority of the DHS’s cyber responsibilities, this rebranding of the NPPD’s cyber offerings to CISA was more than just a way to consolidate efforts. The initiative also started a path toward greater unity of effort. CISA was empowered to carry out its cyber mission as part of DHS’s mandate to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, including federal civilian networks and mission-essential functions. <strong>The consolidation of resources and authorities can help elevate the mission, but its successful execution relies on buy-in from the clients — in this case, FCEB agencies.</strong> The question remained of how best to align resources with the new agency and ensure that it could work, with FCEB entities scattered across the departments outside of the DHS.</p> +<p>Russia itself has a long history of institutionalised antisemitism, pogroms and demonisation of the Jewish community. Although antisemitism and racially aggravated assaults have never been eradicated from Russian society, President Vladimir Putin has made his position on Russian Jewry clear, and has long lent support to the large Jewish community in Moscow, including the commemoration of Jews killed during the Holocaust. He has been lauded for this by representatives of the Jewish community – particularly Rabbi Berel Lazar, one of two claimants to the title of Chief Rabbi of Moscow.</p> -<p><strong>THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION: SUPPORTING AN EVOLVING CISA MISSION</strong></p> +<p>Putin considers the leaders of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim faiths in Russia to be important allies and a broader part of Russia’s identity as a multicultural nation, and meets with them frequently – although his relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church runs much deeper. Lazar has also walked a careful line between advocating for his community and ensuring that Putin remains onside, which has included a degree of neutrality on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and ambiguity around his views of the Russian government’s actions.</p> -<p>The Biden administration has continued to build on initiatives started under the Trump and Obama administrations. This continuity relates to the fact that many cybersecurity initiatives involve Congress as much as they do the executive branch. For example, in March 2020, the bipartisan U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission published its final report. Notably, two of its key recommendations were to (1) establish a Senate-confirmed national cyber director, and (2) strengthen CISA. Congress officially established and confirmed a national cyber director, Chris Inglis, in 2021. As one of its primary deliverables, the ONCD developed the Biden administration’s National Cybersecurity Strategy in March 2023. An implementation plan was further released in July 2023.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The message of Russia-as-peacemaker serves a useful role in the Kremlin’s quest for legitimacy and power projection in the Middle East</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The early years of the Biden administration also saw a lot of activity around EO 14028, Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, and a slew of other executive branch guidance documents supporting and reinforcing it. Of relevance to this report, EO 14028 directs federal government agencies to adopt zero trust architectures (ZTA), a move that has created a necessary — albeit arguably insufficient — role for CISA as the agency that can provide general guidance to FCEB agencies during their ZTA migration.</p> +<p>The events in Dagestan have particular resonance for Russia’s Jewish communities, which have an historical connection to the North Caucasus. While only a few hundred families may remain in Dagestan, the local Jewish population – known as the Mountain Jews – used to be spread across trade routes over the entire Caucasus region, including Chechnya, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. With their own distinct language, culture and traditions, thousands of the Mountain Jewish community were killed during the Holocaust, and while some remained, most relocated to Moscow or larger cities after the war, with others emigrating to Israel or the US after 1991.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FKJWHJf.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: U.S. Government Cybersecurity Timeline.</strong> Source: CSIS International Security Program.</em></p> +<p>Since the Israel–Gaza war began, there has been a surge in violent antisemitic demonstrations across Russia’s North Caucasus, demanding the expulsion of local Jews and attacking a Jewish cultural centre. Given the region’s history, the Dagestan riots have been likened to the pogroms of the past, which sought to uproot well-established Jewish communities.</p> -<p>In recent years, CISA received additional authorities and resources, the details of which are outlined later in this report. It should also be noted that Congress pushed for FISMA reform in 2022. If passed, the new legislation would have further enhanced CISA’s authorities. However, the legislation passed in the Senate but failed to do so in the House, leaving FISMA 2014 as the status quo. A bipartisan effort is underway to tackle FISMA reform again in 2023. The current bill tracks closely with provisions outlined in the 2022 version (see Recommendation 2.1 in this paper on a report to evaluate CISA’s current and future FCEB mission).</p> +<p>But the messaging from the Kremlin has been unclear. Rabbi Lazar met with Putin to discuss the demonstrations, alongside Patriarch Kirill and the Grand Mufti Tadzhuddin. But the Kremlin’s Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, has criticised as Israel’s warning against its citizens travelling to the North Caucasus as “anti-Russian”, in part to downplay the extent of the riots. It appears that Russia is still trying to play both sides of this conflict.</p> -<p><strong>In its next stage of growth, CISA needs to invest in and be supported by larger structural and cultural changes that allow the agency to more effectively work as a strategic partner with FCEB agencies to protect federal networks.</strong></p> +<h3 id="israels-war-russias-gain">Israel’s War, Russia’s Gain</h3> -<h4 id="the-past-is-prologue">The Past Is Prologue</h4> +<p>Despite its attempts to involve itself in this war and to present an image of a mediator with the ear of both Israel and Hamas, in truth, Moscow has neither. The narrative, however, is useful for Russia in several key ways.</p> -<p>While this section does not provide a comprehensive list of legislative proposals and actions, the selected events and documents represent flashpoints that drove efforts to protect federal networks. Collectively, these events and milestones also paved the way for CISA to assume its important role as the cybersecurity lead for FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>First, Russia is attempting to position itself as a reasonable broker appealing for calm, which Hamas has lauded. Although few in the West are willing to buy this line, Russia will use its positioning as a future bargaining chip in its war against Ukraine, to demonstrate that it is capable of debate, mediation and politicking. There is also the added bonus for Russia that another war dominating the news cycle has pushed the Russia–Ukraine conflict further down the West’s political agenda.</p> -<p><strong>The diffuse and evolving character of cyber threats makes it difficult to galvanize more definitive policy responses.</strong> To date, the United States has not experienced a “cyber 9/11” or a “cyber Pearl Harbor.” Instead, the nation has experienced a series of cyber incidents that, while not necessarily small, have captured public attention to a much lesser degree than terrorist attacks. The result is twofold. On one extreme, certain FCEB leaders do not fully appreciate how cyber threats can impact an agency’s ability to carry out its mission. On the other extreme, there are policymakers, government leaders, and experts who are overeager to plan for the big cyber incident on the horizon — sometimes at the expense of sufficiently planning for the immediate and persistent “smaller” attacks that, when taken together, can greatly undermine the government’s ability to deliver basic services to the American people.</p> +<p>Second, the message of Russia-as-peacemaker serves a useful role in the Kremlin’s quest for legitimacy and power projection in the Middle East. In its bid for allies, and to fulfil its foreign policy directives of deepening engagement in the MENA region (what it refers to as the “Islamic world”), Russia is contrasting itself with the “colonial West” and its troubled history of intervention in the region. By wading into Israel’s long-standing conflict with the Palestinians, which Russia has never before successfully mediated, Putin is seeking to carve out a role as an alternative to the US-dominated negotiations between the warring parties. The message is: where the US has tried and failed, Russia will succeed. Putin’s first public statement on the war ascribed blame to the US, maintaining that this was an example of the failure of its Middle East policies.</p> -<p>Encouragingly, the past four administrations — in partnership with Congress, the private sector, and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments — have taken great strides to positively elevate cybersecurity, underscore the importance of coordination and collaboration, and at least nod toward the importance of enhancing resilience. But as the threat landscape evolves, so too does the need to create new entities, develop new policies, and adopt new security outlooks and models. While this is generally a welcome trend, without proper coordination or harmonization it can resurface some of the issues identified 20 years ago, such as the need for clearer delineation of cyber leadership roles, and the need for a greater sense of urgency from department and agency leads.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia is not particularly able to influence Hamas, nor is there any credible proof that it has provided funding or arms to it</code></em></strong></p> -<p>With regard to CISA, it is unequivocally clear that the agency is the operational lead for FCEB cybersecurity, and there is general bipartisan support to enhance CISA’s ability to carry out that mission. Logistically, however, there remain a number of questions, including but not limited to: What does it mean for CISA to sufficiently protect an FCEB network? What entities, federal or otherwise, play a formal or informal role in helping CISA protect federal networks? And how much of the security burden should FCEB entities manage on their own versus handing off to CISA?</p> +<p>Third, Russia has much to gain from the US’s financial distraction by the Israel–Gaza war. The recent US House of Representatives’ agreement to pass $14.3 billion worth of military aid to Israel was dominated by the Republicans, including an increasingly noisy faction that has long argued for the cessation or at least capping of US military aid to Ukraine. In its current format, the bill is likely to be vetoed – President Joe Biden has made clear that he would like to see broader spending on aid packages that include Ukraine, and the Democrats control the Senate – but it points to a broader bipartisan split within the US political system that Russia is keen to take advantage of in order to limit military aid to Ukraine. While Putin is likely anticipating that the US presidential elections in November 2024 will be a watershed moment for the provision of aid to Ukraine, the Israel–Gaza war has offered another unexpected opportunity to vicariously weaken Ukraine.</p> -<p>In September 2022, CISA unveiled its Strategic Plan: 2023-2025 — the agency’s first since its creation in 2018 — and followed it up in August 2023 with its Strategic Plan: FY2024-2026. What immediately stands out is that CISA’s mission space is vast and that its role as the leader of FCEB cybersecurity is just one of many hats it wears as the nation’s cyber defense agency. <strong>Moving forward, it will be important that the executive and legislative branches continue to empower CISA in ways that responsibly grow its capabilities, authorities, and resources without overextending or compromising its ability to carry out its mission.</strong></p> +<h3 id="whose-ear-does-russia-have">Whose Ear Does Russia Have?</h3> -<h3 id="the-current-state">The Current State</h3> +<p>In reality, Russia’s ability to impact on the Israel–Gaza conflict is limited. Much has been made of Russia’s hosting of Hamas delegations before and during the war, prompting Israel to summon the Russian ambassador for an explanation.</p> -<p>Despite the generational struggle to secure FCEB agencies in cyberspace, there are signs of hope on the horizon. Consider the operations of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Amid all the excitement and chaos surrounding a non-cyber event, a lesser-known operation can be simultaneously underway: a CISA incident response exercise. While it is not ideal to run a network intrusion exercise, what the mission leaders at NASA understand well is that inconvenient times are precisely when an adversary is most likely to attack. Stress-testing responses during real, critical missions is the best way to assess preparedness and system resilience plans. Furthermore, the case shows the art of the possible: agency-level coordination and planning that takes advantage of CDM and threat hunt capabilities.</p> +<p>But Russia is not particularly able to influence Hamas, nor is there any credible proof that it has provided funding or arms to it. Russia during the Soviet period paid lip service to the Palestinian cause and aligned itself nominally with their right to self-determination, but following the collapse of the USSR, it prioritised ties with Israel. It did condemn Hamas’s terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but has not designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation, and the group’s victory in Gaza’s 2006 parliamentary elections prompted Russia to recognise it as a political entity. Since 2007, Russia’s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs has held meetings with the Hamas leadership, including hosting the former leader of Hamas’s Politburo, Khaled Meshal, in Moscow.</p> -<p>CISA’s cybersecurity services to FCEB agencies are varied. Some, such as its system monitoring and threat hunting initiatives, rely on CISA’s technical capabilities. Others, like its ability to run scenario exercises for FCEB entities, rely on the agency’s ability to leverage partnerships, relevant expertise, and guidance in ways that can support FCEB agencies’ individual plans to secure their respective networks. All require coordination and planning that align agency interests across a diverse set of stakeholders in the FCEB space.</p> +<p>Russia has now claimed that its hosting of Hamas delegations is an opportunity to discuss the hostages – at least eight Russian citizens are thought to be held in Gaza. But this is unlikely to be the focus of the talks, and Hamas’s comments after the meeting suggest that the discussion included broader topics, such as Russia’s political views on Israel. Although there is evidence that at least 16 Russian nationals were killed in the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October, those Russians who have taken up Israeli citizenship (and in Moscow’s thinking effectively left the motherland) are not likely to be viewed as a precious commodity by Moscow. Russia’s disregard for human life (including civilian), as seen from its actions thus far in the Ukraine war and in many of its other campaigns, means the return of a handful of its citizens is unlikely to be the true driving force behind these well-staged meetings.</p> -<p>These services have been met with varying degrees of tangible and perceived success. To properly assess current cyber services offered, it is important to evaluate how these initiatives have evolved in recent years and the ways in which FCEB entities actually interact with and utilize them. The non-mutually exclusive categories below underscore some of the primary cybersecurity services that CISA offers to FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>But Putin has also been deliberate with the choreography. He has not met Hamas leaders in person and has allowed Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and presidential representative on the Middle East, to take the lead, which at least in Moscow’s eyes puts some creative distance between the Russian and Hamas leaderships. Putin himself has chosen his words carefully, maintaining that while Russia does not proscribe Hamas as a terrorist organisation, that does not mean Russia agrees with its actions. This is unlikely to be because of Moscow’s considered application of terminology – the Russian government readily brands other groups that it considers to be true enemies, such as its domestic opposition, Ukrainian nationalists and the Islamic State, as terrorists. It is more likely that Moscow believes this distinction leaves the door open for it to engage more freely with both Israel and Hamas.</p> -<h4 id="risk-assessment-and-vulnerability-management-pre-incident">Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Management (Pre-incident)</h4> +<p>However, Moscow is also aware that terrorism presents a real threat. It has experienced domestic terrorism multiple times before, from insurgency in Chechnya to links in the North Caucasus to the Islamic State, which sought to build its own caliphate in the south of Russia following Russia’s involvement in Syria in 2015. Putin is aware that overly stoking the Israel–Gaza war in favour of either side risks widening the conflict – as has already partly occurred – into a regional war whose spillover could ultimately impact on Russia itself. In Russian, the Middle East is referred to as the blizhny vostok – the Near East – and so Russia will not forget that its geographical proximity to the region makes it vulnerable to any seismic changes.</p> -<p>Arguably some of CISA’s most important programs are those that help FCEB agencies gain greater visibility into their networks, allowing them to proactively identify and defend against bad actors on their systems. Over the next few years, this is one area where CISA looks to expand its capabilities, especially as adversaries grow more adept at circumventing traditional cyber defenses.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>Visibility and assessment tools can only be effective if they communicate with each other and can collectively provide an accurate, robust, and up-to-date picture of existing vulnerabilities.</strong> Since investments in pre-incident detection capabilities are rapidly growing, with the goal of providing more visibility for FCEB agencies and CISA, it is important to assess the state of current services and planned initiatives by asking the following: Are updates being clearly communicated to relevant industry and FCEB partners? Will there be any visibility gaps when moving from older to newer monitoring systems? And do planned activities integrate well with other services offered by CISA? While interviews with and public announcements from CISA representatives indicate that the agency is tracking these questions and looking for ways to facilitate smooth transitions, some outside stakeholders might need further convincing that CISA will not only prioritize data integration but also have the capabilities to do so in a seamless way.</p> +<p><strong>Emily Ferris</strong> is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in Russian domestic politics. Emily has a particular interest in Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure including its railways, road and port systems, and the role this plays in advancing Russia’s political ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as deployed in conflict zones such as Ukraine. She also researches domestic political administrations in Russia’s Far East, and Russia’s military and political relationship with Belarus.</p>Emily FerrisAs the war in Gaza distracts the West from its support for Ukraine, Russia is seeking to exploit the situation by positioning itself as a reasonable broker that has the ear of both Israel and Hamas.The Kingdom Of Oil2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-kingdom-of-oil<p><em>Saudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.</em></p> -<h4 id="from-einstein-to-cads">From EINSTEIN to CADS</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>In its <em>2022 Year in Review</em>, CISA noted that it will be sunsetting the legacy EINSTEIN program and building out newer capabilities in its place that are better able to monitor and detect network intrusions. It will be important for CISA to focus efforts on clearly communicating what aspects of EINSTEIN will continue, what will be improved, and what, if any, visibility or service gaps might arise during transition periods. <strong>The modernization of well-known, well-utilized capabilities like EINSTEIN should be clearly articulated to all stakeholders so as to not unintentionally create new areas of confusion.</strong></p> +<p>Saudi Arabia is widely regarded as the world’s most important oil exporter. Through its own production and as the de facto leader of OPEC and OPEC+, Saudi Arabia can have more influence over international oil markets than most other producers – even countries that do not directly import Saudi oil are therefore affected by Saudi oil policy. In light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and as energy security has become a top priority for Western governments, the UK and others across Europe and beyond have turned to Saudi Arabia, calling for it to increase production in order to bring down global oil prices.</p> -<p>CISA’s EINSTEIN program is an intrusion detection system that monitors traffic coming in and out of FCEB networks. The program was initially developed in 2004 by the U.S. Computer Readiness Team and consists of three phases: EINSTEIN 1, EINSTEIN 2, and EINSTEIN 3. Traditionally, FCEB agencies would enter partnership agreements with CISA that essentially allow it to install systems and sensors for collecting information on potential threats to the network. The program operated as an early warning system with “near real-time” awareness of potentially malicious cyber activity. Per an interviewed expert with deep knowledge of the evolution of the program, most FCEB agencies are only aware of the EINSTEIN sensors — the connection points. However, that is only 10 percent of EINSTEIN. There is a larger infrastructure behind the program that collects inputs from a number of other feeds to provide more robust information.</p> +<p>Oil revenues have historically fuelled Saudi Arabia’s social contract, and they are now the indispensable source of funding for the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 reform agenda. Although the Saudi Vision 2030 reform agenda ultimately aims at diversifying the Saudi economy, income from oil exports remains the all-important enabler of Saudi Arabia’s political and socioeconomic development in the absence of sufficient foreign direct investment.</p> -<p>The stated plan is for EINSTEIN’s “analytics, information sharing, and core infrastructure” capabilities to shift to CISA’s Cyber Analytic and Data Systems (CADS). This will allow CISA to “more rapidly analyze, correlate, and take action to address cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities before damaging intrusions occur.” The overarching concept is for CISA to be the center of FCEB and critical infrastructure threat intelligence, centralizing this data enables analytics that may identify individual events or the spread of events, which in turn will enable faster detection and notification. For FY 2023, CISA targeted $91 million of funding to keep its National Cybersecurity Protection System, which is known for its EINSTEIN set of capabilities. Of the $1.8 billion requested by CISA for FY 2024 efforts related to its FCEB mission, CISA is requesting approximately $425 million dollars specifically for CADS. EINSTEN 1 and EINSTEIN 2 capabilities will primarily be under the authority of the new CISA CADS team, while CISA’s Protective DNS and proposed Protective Email services will serve as a successor to EINSTEIN’s 3A capabilities. The Protective DNS service, distributed across various locations, blocks attempts to access potentially harmful online resources — such as domains or IP addresses — identified by threat data from commercial sources, governments, and agencies. It logs the associated DNS traffic for detailed analysis. Furthermore, this service complies with the mandate from DHS under Title 6 of the U.S. Code, Section 663, which emphasizes the need to detect and mitigate cyber threats in network traffic.</p> +<p>This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and how it interacts with the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign and security policies. The following is a summary of the paper’s findings:</p> -<p>Ultimately, the creation of CADS is also supposed to support the larger Joint Collaborative Environment (JCE), an “interoperable environment for sharing and fusing threat information, insights, and other relevant data” between and across public and private sectors. This initiative was first introduced by the CSC, and in recent months CISA has mentioned that it is actively working to build it out, despite no formal direction and funding from Congress (see Recommendation 1.2 on Congress authorizing and funding a JCE).</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Saudi Arabia’s central role in global oil markets is a key source of the Kingdom’s geopolitical power and importance (in addition to its status as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites). Oil has shaped Saudi Arabia’s foreign relations. Most notably, it has facilitated its bilateral relation with the US. For most of the post-1945 era, Saudi Arabia–US relations have been encapsulated in an oil-for-security pact – Saudi Arabia sought to influence international oil markets in line with US interests, while the US provided the Kingdom with political, defence and security support.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In recent years, Saudi Arabia has adopted a “Saudi First” approach. This does not constitute a wholesale overhaul of Saudi oil policy and overall foreign political orientation, but rather reflects a reordering of the Kingdom’s strategic priorities that results in Saudi policies that are less directly aligned with US interests. The “Saudi First” approach is driven by a focus on the Vision 2030 reform agenda; a perception that the US is less willing and able to guarantee the Kingdom’s security; an assessment that the US’s “shale revolution” has made international oil markets more competitive and volatile; and a conclusion that global economic shifts, especially the emergence of China as the most important buyer of Saudi oil, necessitate the building of more extensive relations with non-Western powers.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Saudi Arabia’s partnership with Russia, manifested in the two countries’ joint leadership of OPEC+, is best understood as a marriage of convenience. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, OPEC+ increases its ability to influence international oil markets by extending OPEC’s coordination of production quotas to more producing countries. Riyadh opposes oil-related sanctions on Russia as destabilising interventions in the market. However, Saudi–Russian relations have been far from straightforward, and there is scope for future disagreements to emerge, including over competition for market share in Asia.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Both climate change and climate action – specifically pressure for the decarbonisation of the global economy – constitute a major challenge for Saudi Arabia. In recent years, the Kingdom’s approach towards international climate action has shifted from mostly resisting decarbonisation efforts to trying to actively shape the international debate while still advocating for the continued importance of fossil fuels. This also includes beginning attempts to capitalise on potential opportunities in the global energy transition.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Saudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Given that a mix of programs is already underway, and that others are still up for approval and authorization, it will be incumbent on CISA to provide routine status updates of the transition progress from EINSTEIN to CADS and to offer possible workarounds for any delays.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="circia-powering-cads-with-the-right-kind-of-information"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CIRCIA: Powering CADS with the Right Kind of Information</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>In the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the spike in international oil and gas prices that followed, the subject of energy security and the link between energy and geopolitics has jumped to the top of the agenda for governments around the world, including the UK. As part of this shift, policymakers in London, other European capitals and beyond have naturally turned their attention to Saudi Arabia. The question of how much oil Saudi Arabia produces and why – that is, identifying the economic and political drivers behind the country’s oil-related decisions – has become infused with renewed importance.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A key part of CADS is ensuring that quality, comprehensive information is fed into the system. In March 2022, Congress passed the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA). For decades, when critical infrastructure facilities and FCEB agencies were victims of a cyber incident, they were not legally required to report the incident to the federal government. CIRCIA, among other things, tasks CISA to outline cyber incident reporting requirements for “covered entities.” CISA has until March 2024 to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and then 18 months to publish the Final Rule. Until this goes into effect, cyber incident reporting is still voluntary — though strongly encouraged — with industry providing feedback on the best way to structure reporting and deconflict with other requirements, including those of the Security and Exchange Commission.</code></em></p> +<p>This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and how it interacts with the country’s domestic and foreign/security policies. The paper forms part of RUSI’s UK National Security and the Net Zero Transition project and is published alongside a paper that focuses on the linkages between Russia’s energy policies and its foreign/security policy behaviour. Together, the two papers examine how Saudi Arabia and Russia – which, along with the US, are the world’s leading oil exporters, being jointly responsible for around 20% of global production – approach their roles as energy superpowers; how their energy-related decision-making has evolved in recent decades and in light of the Ukraine war; and how their foreign policies and conduct in international forums, including on climate change and other major global issues, will continue to have global implications. It should be noted that this paper was drafted prior to the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and the subsequent war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza (still ongoing at the time of this paper’s publication). The analysis in the paper is therefore not reflective of the impact of conflict on regional dynamics, or on Saudi Arabia’s oil and foreign policy.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To be successful, CISA needs to identify regulations that collect necessary information without placing undue burdens on reporting entities. It must also make sure that new regulations are harmonized with existing reporting requirements. Relevant to CADS, if CISA is able to structure reporting requirements in a way that goes beyond just notifying the authorities that an incident has occurred but that also captures the technical attributes of an attack, that information can be pulled into CADS at machine speed and provide greater visibility.</code></em></p> +<p>Saudi Arabia has rarely been out of the international spotlight in recent years. From the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, to the efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear programme, Saudi Arabia has been a key stakeholder – and active participant – in many of the conflicts and geopolitical issues that have occupied the centre of UK (and European) foreign and security policies over the past decade. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government agents in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 led many Western governments to seek to distance themselves politically from the Kingdom; then-presidential candidate Joe Biden vowed to treat it as a “pariah”. But Russia’s war against Ukraine has not just changed the European and global security environment: it has also contributed to a shift in the debate about Saudi Arabia.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">CIRCIA reporting requirements will bring critical event data into CADS and illuminate events from smaller companies that had not previously been engaged. This thwarts adversary efforts to attack smaller members of the supply chain in the hopes of remaining “below the radar” (see Recommendation 2.2 on reporting requirements).</code></em></p> +<p>Since the start of the invasion, Western leaders, including US President Biden, then-prime minister Boris Johnson (and other UK ministers), French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have travelled to Saudi Arabia for talks with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Energy – specifically, the hope that Saudi Arabia would increase oil production in order to bring down international prices – was a key driver behind this diplomatic re-engagement with Riyadh. Since early 2022, Saudi Arabia’s every move – on oil especially, but also with regard to its ongoing friendly relations with Russia, its efforts to expand ties with China, and its various diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East region – has been scrutinised by policymakers in London and across Europe, as well as in the Western media.</p> -<p>Increased investments in gathering and analyzing cyber data can increase FCEB network security. First, because the majority of internet traffic takes place on private sector networks, understanding the vulnerability landscape based on incident reporting serves as a form of early warning for the federal government. Investments in CADS that enable machine speed analysis of emerging vulnerabilities and the likelihood of exploitation by different actors empower agency CISOs to manage risk. To be effective, this new data-driven approach to risk analysis will need to ensure proper communication and coordination, as well as a historical inventory of vulnerabilities supporting longitudinal assessments.</p> +<p>This renewed focus on Saudi oil policy by the UK and its European partners is not only – and for many countries not even primarily – driven by the need or desire to buy more Saudi crude. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a diversification race, as European states scramble to reduce (and ideally end) hydrocarbon imports from Russia in order to deprive Moscow of revenue and reduce its leverage over them. Germany, for example, received 31% of its oil and 60% of its gas from Russia in 2021. The UK was comparatively less affected by this dynamic: in 2021, only 9% of the UK’s oil and 4% of its gas imports came from Russia, and by January 2023 this had been reduced to zero. Saudi oil exports to Europe have increased since February 2022, but much of the gap in European oil supplies has been filled by crude from Norway, the US, West Africa and other Middle Eastern producers.</p> -<p><strong>CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION (CDM) PROGRAM</strong></p> +<p>Yet, regardless of how the UK and its European partners replaced imports from Russia, they all felt the impact of the surge in oil and gas prices sparked by Moscow’s war. In the 12 months leading up to the invasion, the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil increased from just over $63 in February 2021 to over $92, driven, among other factors, by the recovery of the world economy from the Covid-19 pandemic. Prices for natural gas were on a similar trajectory. But Russia’s war sent prices soaring even higher – Brent reached $119 per barrel in early June 2022. As the conflict has continued into its second year, oil prices have returned to pre-war levels, but towards the end of 2023 they remained in the $85–$95 range, significantly higher than they were in most of the previous decade. Ultimately, in the context of globalised energy markets, the UK is not only exposed to disruptions to its direct oil imports, but also to flows and prices of hydrocarbons everywhere around the world. And few players have as much influence over the flows of globally traded oil as Saudi Arabia.</p> -<p>Increasing investments in the technical analysis of cyber vulnerabilities produces a library against which to monitor FCEB agencies. Along these lines, CISA has made the CDM program a central focus of its efforts to ramp up network defense. The Biden administration’s FY 2024 budget requests $408 million for CDM, an increase from the $292 million that was appropriated in FY 2022 and the $332 million appropriated in FY 2023. Per Michael Duffy, CISA’s associate director for capacity building, it is “the U.S. government’s cornerstone for proactive, coordinated, and agile cyber defense of the federal enterprise.” <strong>Given its critical role, it is essential not only that CDM efforts are sufficiently resourced in the coming years, but that there are plans in place for long-term funding so that FCEBs can continue to benefit from the CDM program without disrupting current services.</strong></p> +<p>Saudi Arabia is an oil superpower. It holds the second largest proven oil reserves in the world after Venezuela, and its national oil company Saudi Aramco is one of the largest companies in the world – and by far the most profitable. Having established itself as the world’s swing producer, it has invested in maintaining a level of production capacity that has been – and is currently – significantly higher than its actual production, giving it the unique ability to both decrease and increase output.</p> -<p>Whereas EINSTEIN provides perimeter defense, CISA’s CDM program works within FCEB networks to further enhance overall security. Developed in 2012, CDM provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and a user-friendly dashboard to FCEB agencies so that CISA can gain greater visibility into FCEB networks. Many of the core concepts within CDM date back to NIST guidance from 2011 and early experiments by the Department of State and Army Research Lab in support of DOD networks.</p> +<p>Moreover, besides itself accounting for up to 12 million barrels per day – or roughly 10% – of global production capacity, Saudi Arabia is also the de facto leader of OPEC and co-leader of OPEC+, alongside Russia. OPEC accounted for around 36% of global production in 2022 (and 80.4% of global reserves), while OPEC+, which was formed in 2016 and includes nine other non-OPEC producers besides Russia, accounted for around 59%. OPEC+ decisions to adjust production quotas, including for example the significant cuts announced in October 2022 and June 2023, tend to be understood – by governments and the media around the world – as reflecting, to a significant degree, Saudi Arabia’s decision-making, albeit within the context of bargaining with the grouping’s other members.</p> -<p>Overall, the CDM program engages technologies to identify and protect electronic assets, then displays the status on a dashboard, a bit like a running car will show the activity ranges of its components. It is complementary to EINSTEIN and CADS in that it provides the inner workings of a network while a program such as CADS analyzes perimeter activity for ingress and egress attempts.</p> +<p>In addition to Saudi Arabia’s role in influencing day-to-day global oil prices, the Kingdom’s wider geopolitical posture and behaviour are increasingly a focus for UK and European policymakers. The Kingdom’s regional foreign policy continues to affect regional stability in the Middle East, which, in turn, has implications for UK and European security; and its positioning vis-à-vis the US (and the wider West), Russia and China, and the Global South, are seen as indicators of the posture and direction other countries in the Middle East might adopt in a changing global order. Further, as a hydrocarbon superpower, Saudi Arabia is clearly a major stakeholder in international efforts to combat climate change and decarbonise the global economy.</p> -<p>The CDM program specifically offers five program areas: (1) a dashboard that receives, aggregates, and displays cyber health at the agency and federal level; (2) asset management to answer the question “What is on the network?”; (3) identity and access management to answer the question “Who is on the network?”; (4) network security management to answer the question “What is actually happening on the network?”; and (5) data protection management. The CDM program then uses data collected through its suite of tools to populate agency-level dashboards to 23 agencies, as well as a federal version. The agency dashboard is a data visualization tool that produces reports and alerts IT managers to critical cybersecurity risks. The federal dashboard provides a macro-level view that consolidates information from each agency-level dashboard for a better picture of cybersecurity health across all civilian agencies. Dashboards in turn become an important tool for visualizing and describing risk, a capability that can be further enhanced through migrating to a JCE and longitudinal analysis. The CDM program is an excellent tool for measuring compliance, but far beyond this, it dynamically measures security and risk, enabling a combination of best-in-class tools and metrics to determine success.</p> +<h4 id="structure-and-methodology">Structure and Methodology</h4> -<p>CISA advertises that CDM will directly help FCEB agencies by reducing agency threat surface, increasing visibility, improving response capabilities, and providing assistance more generally. CISA has also issued Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 23-01 which mandates regular, automated reporting to CDM for FCEB agencies. The impact of BOD 23-01 for CISA and FCEB agencies is significant: by mandating the automation of data, the gains are bidirectional. Where CISA gains further visibility into the federal enterprise, so do FCEB agencies, helping them both manage risk in their operations and tailor responses such as patching or threat hunting.</p> +<p>This paper is divided into three chapters. The first examines Saudi Arabia’s relationship with oil, and traces how revenues from crude exports have shaped – and continue to shape – the Kingdom’s social contract, including their envisaged role and importance in the government’s root-and-branch political, economic and social reform agenda, Vision 2030. The second chapter looks at the linkages between oil and Saudi Arabia’s national security and foreign policy, including within the context of OPEC+. The final chapter focuses on how Saudi Arabia is navigating the dual challenges of climate change and climate action.</p> -<p>With the new authorities granted to CISA in the FY 2021 NDAA, CISA no longer needs formal agreements to actively carry out threat hunting on FCEB networks. Acquiring those formal agreements consumed valuable time that delayed incident response. Even as recently as a few years ago, CISA had to heavily rely on voluntary security reports from FCEB agencies. Now, new authorities coupled with new endpoint technologies allow CISA to view and collect object-level data across FCEB networks and to produce instantaneous threat reports that match the pace of adversary activity. At the same time, the technical ability to hunt on an agency network does not usurp requirements for collaborative planning and risk discussions. While CISA is making technical strides, the area it needs to refine is how best to leverage network access and a common operating picture to support risk management across the FCEB landscape. <strong>Technology absent planning is subject to diminishing marginal returns</strong> (see Recommendation 1.1 on consistent funding streams).</p> +<p>The paper argues that Saudi Arabia continues to see itself as the crucial stabiliser of the international oil market. However, its leadership’s ambitious political and socioeconomic domestic agenda, along with its perception of the changing international environment (and its vision for the Kingdom’s role therein) has led to a reorganisation of priorities. The outcome of this is a more unapologetically self-interested and less obviously Western-aligned energy and foreign policy.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="two-is-better-than-one"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Two Is Better Than One</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The paper is primarily based on desk-based research, consulting open source journals, books, statements from Saudi officials and media reporting. It also draws on 15 supplementary interviews conducted by the author, and more informal engagement with subject matter experts and officials in the Gulf, the UK, Europe and the US, including during two visits to Saudi Arabia in 2023.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">CISA director Jen Easterly described the power of CADS and CDM in a congressional hearing as the following: “Together . . . these programs provide the technological foundation to secure and defend FCEB departments and agencies against advanced cyber threats. CDM enhances the overall security posture of FCEB networks by providing FCEB agencies and CISA’s operators with the capability to identify, prioritize, and address cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, including through the deployment of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), cloud security capabilities, and network security controls.”</code></em></p> +<h3 id="i-a-kingdom-built-on-oil">I. A Kingdom Built on Oil</h3> -<p>In many ways, CISA’s CDM program is good news. CISA reported in its FY 2023 Q2 update that 55 percent of federal agencies automatically report to CDM. This means they have already surpassed their goal of getting half of all agencies to automate reporting by the end of the fiscal year. Additionally, a 2022 MeriTalk survey of federal and industry stakeholders reported that 93 percent of respondents believed that CDM had improved federal cyber resilience in several ways, with 84 percent noting that CDM actively helped entities comply with EO 14028 requirements. These sentiments seem consistent with those of the experts interviewed for this project. However, in that same MeriTalk survey, only 28 percent of respondents gave CDM an A grade, with responses to other questions demonstrating a belief that CDM is a compliance-based activity (rather than a risk management activity) and that it has a way to go before it reaches its full potential (see Recommendation 2.7 on CDM after-action reviews).</p> +<p>In many ways, Saudi Arabia has been defined by, and was built on, its oil wealth – the country has developed symbiotically with its oil industry, which has fuelled the global economy for most of the past century.</p> -<p>The biggest problem, however, is that the CDM funding model is not ideal and that agencies have yet to develop a common risk planning framework tied to resources. Currently, CDM is structured so that CISA covers the initial cost of required tools for two years, after which the FCEB agencies are required to pay for their continued use and maintenance by themselves. There are reasonable concerns that some FCEB agencies are not able or willing to sufficiently budget for the continued use of these tools. Setting aside general inflation-related cost increases, FCEB agencies might not be appropriately factoring into their budget plans the outyear costs for CDM. Current and former CISOs interviewed by CSIS expressed that vendors are closely monitoring these deadlines and coming back to FCEB agencies with tools that are cheaper than the ones that agencies might currently be using but that are not necessarily as capable. As one expert noted, “there’s a lot of chum in the water,” and the situation is difficult for some FCEB agencies to navigate. There are major security concerns as well: CISA invests time and resources to help agencies integrate specific tools, so when those FCEB entities switch to alternatives, CISA might lose progress or visibility for a set period of time as those new tools are integrated into the network — assuming they are ever properly migrated to the CISA dashboard.</p> +<p>Initially, it was US oil companies that first struck oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938 and established the country’s oil export infrastructure. Having secured the concession for Saudi oil at a bargain price, these companies also built much of Saudi Arabia’s early infrastructure so as to maintain good relations with the king and his government as the scale of the Kingdom’s resource wealth became more apparent. Through the 1960s and 1970s, however, the Saudi state gradually moved to take control: by 1976 it had taken full ownership of Aramco – the Arabian American Oil Company, established in 1944 by Standard Oil of California (today’s Chevron) and the Texas Company (Texaco, now part of Chevron). In 1988, the state finally created the Saudi Arabian Oil Company to take over all of Aramco’s assets, including its name – by which Saudi Arabia’s national oil company is still known today.</p> -<p>CISA is in a difficult position. As one expert interviewee acknowledged, CISA is managing expectations and has been generous in its time and general efforts to stand up these programs with FCEB agencies. The general funding model is not ideal, but it also cannot provide guarantees of financial support beyond a set period of time.</p> +<h4 id="oil-islam-and-the-social-contract">Oil, Islam and the Social Contract</h4> -<p>The net result is that CDM has made strides in monitoring over half of the FCEB agencies, but the future is clouded by complex bureaucratic and budgeting questions. Even if an agency can resource CDM after the initial two-year window, it struggles to forecast how much it will cost and is confronted with a labyrinth of rules surrounding which congressionally approved budget vehicles and authorities it can use to essentially “buy” security (see Recommendation 1.1 on properly resourcing CDM). In other words, beyond CDM, CISA will need to develop planning frameworks that help align resources against risk assessments and competing budgetary requirements, alongside other actors such as the ONCD and OMB. The federal government cannot buy cybersecurity off-the-shelf products alone to solve the problem. It needs to revisit how it plans and manages resources related to securing networks across FCEB agencies (see Recommendation 2.9 on risks that accompany FCEB budget strategies) as well as how to create dashboards agencies can tailor to monitor their networks.</p> +<p>Oil and the revenues from its export are a key foundation for Saudi Arabia’s political and socioeconomic development model and for the social contract between the ruling Al-Saud family and the population. It is the income from oil exports, rather than money raised through taxation, that has paid for the Kingdom’s modern infrastructure, the formation of its state institutions, and the extensive package of services and cradle-to-grave welfare benefits they have traditionally delivered to Saudi citizens. It has also paid for large quantities of modern Western military hardware, and for a foreign policy that has, as one of its main tools, the ability to provide financial and material support to partners and allies in the Middle East region and beyond (discussed in more detail in the next section).</p> -<p>At the same time that NIST moved to standardize information security continuous monitoring, the cybersecurity community started to hypothesize a coming paradigm shift. Rather than being the “hunted,” constantly responding to threats after they turned into incidents on the defended network, the CISO would become the “hunter.” The concept relates to a practice in the early 2000s by U.S. Air Force personnel, who used the term “hunter-killer” to describe teams of cybersecurity experts conducting force protection on their networks. The term evolved to describe how senior cybersecurity experts would train new analysts by taking them on “hunting trips.” Many of these practices paralleled the rise of using more active red teams to test network defense, as well as a new focus on advanced persistent threats in the cybersecurity community to describe more robust government-sponsored threats.</p> +<p>Traditionally, oil has also been an important factor in the relationship between the Saudi government (and general state apparatus) and the Kingdom’s conservative religious establishment. Long before the discovery of oil, Islam was a central source of legitimacy and identity for the Al-Saud and their Kingdom (and its previous iterations). Saudi monarchs have derived power and status from their role as the political masters of Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina; except for King Khalid (ruled 1975–82), all Saudi monarchs since King Faisal (ruled 1964–75) have assumed the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques as their primary honorific. Domestically, religion provided the ideational link between the ruling family and its subjects, with clerics holding positions as crucial intermediaries. For decades, Saudi domestic politics and foreign policy have both been dominated by competing pressures from this powerful constituency; and from the Kingdom’s integration into a rapidly globalising and, for a long time, US/Western-dominated world. Oil revenues gave the Saudi leadership the means to navigate this space.</p> -<p>In practice, the move from CDM to threat hunt will likely involve more than just purchasing new software. From its origin, the practice involved a mix of red-teaming exercises that connected discrete events across a data sample on possible vulnerabilities. That is, similar to the process envisioned by the JCE, the process requires a repository of data — including common coding typologies such as MITRE ATT&amp;CK — to be effective, along with a mix of collaborative planning and exercises to emulate adversary actions. Threat hunting is as much a practice and an art as it is a technical science.</p> +<p>With the 1973 oil embargo, Saudi Arabia tried to use its oil-based geopolitical weight to affect the great regional cause of the time, the Arab and Palestinian struggle against Israel (which had an obvious religious dimension). Previous embargoes in the contexts of the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Six-Day War had been ineffectual, but the 1973 embargo was accompanied by a 25% cut in OPEC production that sent oil prices skyrocketing. The embargo largely failed to achieve its immediate political objective of curbing Western support for Israel, but it effectively announced Saudi Arabia’s arrival on the global stage as a power to be reckoned with, and one that the US and its Western allies resolved it would be best to maintain close relations with. Domestically, the resulting oil revenue windfall fuelled an urbanisation and modernisation boom.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="cdm-enables-the-hunt"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CDM Enables the Hunt</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>But by the 1980s, the dual shocks of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamic extremists, both in 1979, led to a course correction. The Saudi leadership doubled down on religious conservatism by diverting oil-derived state funds to be spent in line with the priorities of the clerical establishment. Internationally, Saudi Arabia walked a tightrope between relying on the US and other Western partners for its defence and security needs and taking on the mantle of leadership for the Arab and Islamic worlds (with particular responsibility for related political and religious causes). The Kingdom turned to Washington to protect it from the fallout of the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s and from Iraq’s subsequent expansionist ambitions (which led it to try to annex Kuwait in 1990); and it worked closely with the US to support the mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. But Saudi Arabia also invested heavily in internationally focused Islamic institutions such as the Muslim World League, the University of Madinah and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, all of which were regarded as promoting the conservative views of the Kingdom’s religious establishment.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">CISA is making progress on threat hunt and can accelerate it by serving as a central coordinator for threat hunt across FCEB agencies. For example, in March 2023, CISA released Decider, a collaborative tool designed to help agencies map risk using the MITRE ATT&amp;CK framework. The tool is an example of the need for a larger array of common planning and collaborative tools across the FCEB landscape, many of which need not originate in but should ultimately be coordinated by CISA. Along these lines, CISA worked with Sandia Labs to deploy to the Untitled Goose Tool in March 2023, which specializes in authenticating and analyzing data linked to cloud services.</code></em></p> +<h4 id="the-vision-2030-revolution">The Vision 2030 Revolution</h4> -<p><strong>FEDERAL CLOUD SECURITY</strong></p> +<p>Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia’s approach – including to oil-related decision-making and to how it defines its international role – has changed: subtly in some regards, but more dramatically in others. King Salman (who ascended to the throne in 2015) and especially his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, have made their Vision 2030 the North Star of their domestic and foreign policy. They have radically disempowered the Kingdom’s clerical establishment; declared economic development and diversification to be the primary national objectives; and adopted a more unapologetically self-interested and assertive international posture.</p> -<p>As more FCEB agencies rely on the cloud for their activities, it creates new vulnerabilities. To that end, EO 14028 directs CISA to support efforts to modernize security standards across the federal network. The resulting cloud strategy provides a shared understanding of security standards, configurations, and visibility requirements. <strong>But providing the framework is different than actively supporting the implementation of processes and technologies that FCEB agencies might adopt to comply with the guidance.</strong></p> +<p>Economic diversification – the idea of reducing the economy’s dependence on oil exports – has long been on the Saudi agenda, at least in theory. In practice, however, very little progress has been made over the decades, with efforts to diversify essentially fluctuating inversely to international oil prices: when prices were low, diversification was in; when prices were high, it dropped down the list of priorities. Vision 2030 appears to have altered this dynamic: a number of path-breaking economic reforms have already been implemented; the government seems to be serious about curbing some aspects of the oil-financed cradle-to-grave welfare state; and there is an intense flurry of activity across the Kingdom to build and invest in new commercial sectors (for example an entertainment industry) and various mega projects (including, most prominently, the Red Sea city NEOM).</p> -<p>This strategy works alongside the larger process involving NIST, the General Services Administration, the DOD, and the DHS to standardize approaches to securing cloud computing consistent with the original vision in FISMA 2002 and 2014. The goal is to balance rapid deployment of cloud computing with sufficient security standards and protocols. FCEB CISOs select from a list of approved software vendors (i.e., software-as-a-service) that as of the spring of 2023 totaled 300 cloud service offerings. The result is a calibrated, risk-based approach to secure cloud services adoption across the federal government by providing standards for cloud services and facilitating a partnership between the federal government and private industry. In addition to long-term cost saving, this approach is intended to save time for agencies and industry providers alike by having everyone operate off a shared security framework.</p> +<p>However, all these efforts remain inextricably linked to oil. In the absence of sufficient foreign direct investment, oil revenues are the most important source of funding for everything the government is trying to achieve. Through a set of centralising political reforms, Saudi Aramco and the Saudi oil industry have been put in the service of enabling Vision 2030. Key steps in this regard have included: the creation of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, chaired by Mohammed bin Salman, to streamline all decision-making related to Vision 2030, which effectively encompasses all domestic and economic policy fields; the sale of almost 2% of Saudi Aramco in an initial public offering in 2019 and the transfers of two 4% stakes in Saudi Aramco to the Kingdom’s Public Investment Fund in 2022 and 2023, respectively; and the restructuring and rebranding of the Ministry of Energy, which oversees Saudi Aramco. In 2019, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was split up to create the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources. The energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, son of the king, half-brother of the Crown Prince and the first member of the royal family in this ministerial position, has worked to give his ministry a new brand identity, stressing that its focus is on energy writ large, rather than oil alone. He has also presided over Saudi Aramco’s expansion to become a more integrated oil company by investing in both upstream production and downstream means of value generation such as refining capacity and petrochemical production.</p> -<p>CISA goes one step further by providing additional guidance to and support for FCEB agencies, advising them on how to actually adopt secure cloud products. Among its prominent initiatives, CISA has introduced the Extensive Visibility Reference Framework (eVRF) and the Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) project.</p> +<p>Economic diversification is the central mantra of Vision 2030, which has itself become the defining feature of Saudi Arabia’s domestic politics and national agenda. To commit to this, Saudi Arabia must maintain oil prices at a relatively high level. In the long run, the government hopes that Vision 2030 – and its successors – can modify or replace the old social contract in the Kingdom. While Islam will remain one of the most important features of Saudi identity, the government has felt confident enough about its modernisation agenda’s attractiveness to the population to dismantle the religious establishment as a political force in the Kingdom. Yet, throughout all of this, the Saudi leadership remains aware that the production and export of oil remains the all-important enabler of their Kingdom’s political and socioeconomic development.</p> -<p>SCuBA focuses on securing cloud business applications, providing security guidance through the SCuBA Technical Reference Architecture that is closely aligned with zero trust principles. This architecture offers context, standard views, and threat-based guidance for secure cloud business application deployments, and it aims to secure the cloud environments where federal information is created, shared, and stored. Agencies are expected to cooperate with CISA by implementing comprehensive logging and information-sharing capabilities for better visibility and response to cloud threats.</p> +<h3 id="ii-oil-security-and-power">II. Oil, Security and Power</h3> -<p>The architecture document, acting as the foundational guide for the SCuBA program, offers a vendor-agnostic approach to securing business applications, aligning with zero trust principles. The eVRF guidebook, on the other hand, helps organizations identify data visibility gaps and provides strategies to mitigate threats. eVRF encourages agencies to provide necessary data to CISA. The agency then evaluates the FCEB agencies’ visibility capabilities and helps integrate visibility concepts into their FCEB cyber practices.</p> +<p>For Saudi Arabia, there has always been a direct connection between its oil industry (and status as a world-leading oil producer) and the country’s national security. As outlined above, oil has been and remains the foundation for the Saudi economy and the social contract between the Saudi state and its people; as such, it is inseparable from domestic political stability and security. In terms of foreign affairs, oil has similarly been at the heart of the Kingdom’s most important bilateral relationships, most obviously the one with the US. At the same time, its oil and derived wealth have also been a key source of Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical weight, influence and power on the global stage.</p> -<p>What might be helpful moving forward is for CISA to assess how FCEB agencies are engaging with these materials. For example, are they actively being used to develop agency specific plans? Are they adequately filling information gaps that currently exist across FCEB agencies? And do FCEB entities require additional training aids or materials to better assist with implementation?</p> +<h4 id="the-oil-for-security-era">The Oil-for-Security Era</h4> -<p>These questions are all the more critical given recent audits of FedRAMP compliance across FCEB agencies and the announcement of forthcoming FedRAMP guidance that will address advancements in the cloud marketplace.</p> +<p>For most of the past century, the link between Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and its foreign, defence and security policy has been most obviously apparent in its relationship with the US. The February 1945 meeting between King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud and US President Franklin D Roosevelt on the USS Quincy, during which the two men forged the oil-for-security bargain around which bilateral relations between Riyadh and Washington have revolved ever since, is part of the folklore of modern Middle East politics. The Carter Doctrine, proclaimed in 1980, made the US’s commitment to the security of the Gulf region – and therefore also to Saudi Arabia – even more explicit, clarifying that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”. President Jimmy Carter also emphasised that the US would expect “the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East” in these efforts to ensure the uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbons from the Gulf to international markets. Although the Doctrine was initially formulated with the Soviet Union in mind as the threatening “outside force”, the US-led campaign to liberate Kuwait and protect Saudi Arabia from potential further Iraqi aggression in 1990–91 was arguably its most tangible manifestation.</p> -<h4 id="information-sharing">Information Sharing</h4> +<p>Saudi Arabia has generally held up its side of the bargain. Except for the US position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which precipitated the 1973 embargo and production cut described earlier, Saudi Arabia was generally committed to accommodating the US’s interest in maintaining the steady flow of affordable oil to fuel the American economy and, ultimately, the global economy. Energy expert Daniel Yergin has described Saudi Arabia as being akin to the “central bank of world oil”. Saudi Arabia was never under the illusion that it alone – or any other producer or consumer – could ultimately control the highly dynamic international oil market. On several occasions, the decisions to adjust production failed to have their intended effect, either because of miscalculation or because of geopolitical and global economic developments that had much greater impact on energy markets. But in principle at least, Saudi Arabia – through its position at the helm of OPEC, and embracing its status as the great swing producer capable of quickly increasing or decreasing its output – sought to contain oil price fluctuations as much as it could.</p> -<p>One of CISA’s value propositions in the federal government is its ability to engage with the private sector. What that means for FCEB agencies is that information-sharing programs hosted and facilitated by CISA valuably pull not only from other government entities but from a number of private sector organizations as well. The key aspects of information-sharing services that can be measured and evaluated include (1) quality of information, (2) timeliness of shared information and updates, (3) reach of information sharing, and (4) format of outputs. While CISA has made gains across these metrics through creating vulnerability catalogs and collaboration environments, it is struggling to keep up with the magnitude of the current cyber threat.</p> +<p>These efforts to bring a degree of balance to the international oil market were shaped by more than the desire to retain US favour. Most obviously, Saudi Arabia needed to sell oil to sustain its domestic economy and social contract. That meant, and still means, trying to keep prices high enough to cover its government budget – often referred to as the “break-even price” – and stable enough to allow a degree of planning security. Yet Saudi Arabia also made a conscious effort to prevent prices from climbing too high. Although higher prices would translate to higher revenues for the Saudi state (at least as an immediate consequence), the Kingdom has long urged moderation, lest overly high energy costs slow the global economy and eventually dampen demand or provide additional incentives for the development of alternative energy sources.</p> -<p>Another key value that CISA uniquely brings is the ability to create a ConOps, or an overall cyber threat picture, populated by real-time activity reports from across FCEB agencies and critical infrastructure. No other entity can do this — not even cybersecurity vendors — once critical infrastructure events are reported into CISA and CDM dashboards are lit up. This is a unique tool and a huge “shields up,” since cyber adversaries cannot assemble this picture. But the United States must follow the steps necessary to gain this advantage: creating the apparatus and expediting cooperation, reporting events, and disseminating threat intelligence back out to FCEB agencies and industry.</p> +<p>In sum, Saudi Arabia has traditionally understood its hydrocarbon wealth as giving it special responsibilities that went far beyond those an ordinary state might have to its people, instead extending to the health of the global economy. In this context, it also regarded US commitments to Gulf security as being about more than the preservation of the Kingdom’s own national security. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the oil-for-security bargain was not just a bilateral pact serving the interests of two countries, but a critical component of the post-Second World War global order – with the Kingdom as the world’s pivotal energy provider.</p> -<p><strong>KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES CATALOG</strong></p> +<h4 id="the-emergence-of-a-saudi-first-approach">The Emergence of a “Saudi First” Approach</h4> -<p>CISA’s BOD 22-01 mandates that FCEB agencies mitigate known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs) in their systems. The BOD established the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog to list computer Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures and require agencies to remediate vulnerabilities within specific deadlines — 15 calendar days for high or critical severity vulnerabilities and 30 calendar days for medium or low severity ones. Agencies are responsible for reviewing the catalog daily, notifying CISA of any barriers to compliance, and submitting regular status reports. The KEV catalog was mentioned in a number of interviews as a valuable CISA resource. Ongoing success will rely on continuing to receive and provide updates in a timely manner, as well as on FCEBs properly understanding how to act on and prioritize the information presented in the catalog.</p> +<p>In June 2023, after announcing another major production cut, Saudi energy minister Abdulaziz bin Salman declared that the Kingdom and its partners within OPEC and OPEC+ would “do whatever is necessary to bring stability to this market”. He explained that the decision was based on projections of weak global demand in the context of a slow global economy. This was Saudi Arabia playing its traditional role as balancer. The minister and other Saudi leaders made the same arguments to justify the other two recent production cuts, in October 2022 and April 2023. Yet, in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent spike in energy prices, all three announcements attracted vocal criticism. Many observers suggested that the cuts represent a change in Saudi policy, arguing that instead of acting as the pro-Western oil central banker of yesteryear, the Kingdom had adopted a more resource-nationalist “Saudi First” approach aimed at keeping prices elevated, and potentially even favouring OPEC+ member Russia’s interests over those of the US and other Western countries.</p> -<p>The KEV catalog recently reached 1,000 entries. Its intent is to help organizations prioritize vulnerability management efforts, with several major vendors integrating KEV data into automated vulnerability and patch management tools.</p> +<p>Assertions that there has been a wholesale overhaul of Saudi oil policy and overall foreign political orientation go too far, but it is true that there has been a change in what the Kingdom regards as its main strategic priorities and how it believes it can best achieve them. The shift in Saudi domestic politics described above, encapsulated in the proclamation of Vision 2030 as the Kingdom’s all-encompassing national development roadmap, also finds expression in how Saudi leaders approach oil export decisions, and in Saudi foreign policy more generally. As noted earlier, the need to fund the long list of socioeconomic reforms and development projects represents a renewed incentive to maximise oil revenues. Whereas in the past Saudi leaders might have looked to find a balance between their financial needs and their strategic alignment with the US, the pursuit of Vision 2030 now trumps all other considerations. From decisions on oil production and the willingness to work closely with Russia to coordinate outputs across OPEC+, through the agreement to normalise relations with Iran under the auspices of China, to the re-engagement with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime – if Saudi Arabia believes that an action serves Vision 2030, it is prepared to act in a way that might prompt criticism or opposition from Washington and elsewhere.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="binding-operational-directives"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Binding Operational Directives</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>This approach is shaped by Saudi Arabia’s perception of key trends in the global environment that have serious implications for its national security. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia has lost confidence in the US’s willingness to hold up its side of the old oil-for-security bargain. Saudi Arabia is aware that the US, with its extensive basing infrastructure and thousands of deployed troops, remains the single most powerful military power in the Gulf region. The Kingdom does not believe that any other external power – not China, not Russia – is prepared (or able) to take over the role the US has played in upholding maritime security in the region, and it is still looking to purchase weapons from the US (and European partners) to strengthen its defence capabilities. Yet, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the US commitment not just to be present in the region, but to exercise power and to do so in line with the Kingdom’s conception of regional security and stability, has eroded over the past two decades.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">From time to time, the DHS will issue Emergency Directives and Binding Operational Directives (BODs), compulsory mandates that direct departments and agencies to take certain actions that will help them safeguard their systems. The DHS is authorized to do this through CISA per FISMA. While this is not a CISA service per se, the development, rollout, and enforcement of BODs play a key role in supporting CISA’s larger federal network defense mission.</code></em></p> +<p>According to Riyadh, the George W Bush administration dismissed Saudi Arabia’s warnings that regime change in Iraq would unleash regional instability; Riyadh also holds that the Obama administration allowed the regional order to unravel further by abandoning the Mubarak regime in Egypt, not intervening decisively against the Assad regime in Syria and ignoring regional concerns in negotiating the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran; finally, Riyadh’s view is that the Biden administration never attempted to hide its dislike of the Kingdom. Even the Trump administration, which had initially appeared to be more responsive to Saudi concerns, did nothing when Iran attacked Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais on 14 September 2019. This was a watershed moment for Saudi Arabia: from the Kingdom’s perspective, there could hardly be a more obvious reneging on the oil-for-security bargain than a non-response to an attack that took more than 5 million barrels per day – roughly half of Saudi production – offline.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The following are some of the more recent and relevant BODs impacting FCEB network defense:</code></em></p> +<p>As well as being prompted by the changes the Kingdom perceived in its bilateral relations with the US, recent shifts in Saudi Arabia’s oil-related decision-making and foreign policy have also been a response to how the Kingdom has experienced developments in the US’s energy industry over the past decade. From Riyadh’s perspective, the shale oil and gas revolution in the US has dramatically altered the dynamics of international markets, rapidly increasing overall global production capacity (affecting international prices) and turning the US into a net exporter of hydrocarbons (and therefore a competitor for market share). Moreover, the shale revolution has increased price volatility, partly because shale production has shorter timelines than traditional extraction projects, which contributes to more fluctuations in supply levels, and partly because the companies involved in the US oil industry are mostly private entities operating outside the constraints of the kind of production quotas that Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members have long used to exert influence over the global market.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 23-02: “Mitigating the Risk from Internet-Exposed Management Interfaces”;</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 23-01: “Improving Asset Visibility and Vulnerability Detection on Federal Networks”;</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 22-01: “Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities”; and</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 18-02: “Securing High Value Assets.”</code></em></p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>In fact, Saudi Arabia has regarded recent US government decision-making related to the management of international energy markets as hypocritical and wilfully destabilising. In its view, Washington has refused to rein in the US oil industry to prevent the oversupply of the market (though this is arguably hardly possible, as the US oil industry is mostly privately owned and therefore not subject to government-set quotas), and then turned to Saudi Arabia to call for production cuts when prices fell so low as to threaten the viability of US oil companies. The most obvious example of the latter pattern was President Trump’s appeal to Saudi Arabia and Russia to end their price war in April 2020. Moreover, Saudi Arabia feels that the actions the US and other Western governments have taken to deal with the increase in prices since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and to try to target Russian energy exports through sanctions, have equated to precisely the kind of politicisation of energy policy that the Kingdom has been accused of. Riyadh regards the substantial release from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserves since February 2022, and the US–European attempt to impose a price cap on Russian oil, as blatant and politically motivated manipulations of the market.</p> -<p>Beyond general information about the vulnerabilities themselves, the KEV catalog also captures other important trends with implications for broader cybersecurity. For instance, over three-quarters of the updates in the KEV catalog relate to older vulnerabilities, suggesting the persistence of long-standing security risks across agencies. Likewise, it could also be that vulnerabilities may exist in the wild but have not been optimized to do harm. The inclusion of end-of-life systems, such as Windows Server 2008 and Windows 7, indicates that there are still many organizations utilizing legacy systems.</p> +<p>The overall result, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, is a more competitive and volatile market in which the Kingdom is still expected to (and indeed wants to) maintain a degree of balance and stability, while others – the US government and US energy companies in particular – take no such responsibility. The decision to expand the coordination of production levels beyond OPEC by creating the OPEC+ grouping with Russia, and Riyadh’s insistence on continuing to work with Moscow after February 2022, despite intense criticism from the West, has been a key element of how Saudi Arabia has tried to respond to these new dynamics. This is discussed in more detail below.</p> -<p>However, further review of the catalog reveals that it would sometimes take over a week after public disclosure for a vulnerability to be added to the catalog. The KEV catalog is not meant to serve as an early warning system. It is a problem that some entities perceive and use it that way.</p> +<p>A third, related, key driver of changes in Saudi Arabia’s international positioning, including as an energy producer, is the Kingdom’s understanding of the ongoing shifts in the global political and economic order. Long before the shale revolution in the US, the West’s importance as a customer of Saudi – and Middle Eastern – hydrocarbons had declined significantly; as of 2021, the vast majority of Saudi crude exports went to Asia (250.4 million tonnes, with only 72.8 million tonnes going to non-Asian countries; China alone accounted for 87.6 million tonnes). Renewed European interest in Middle Eastern oil and gas following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not changed the fact that Saudi Arabia (and most other hydrocarbon producers) continue to see markets in Asia as their main priorities and future growth areas. The Western approach to climate change and the energy transition, discussed in the next section, is an important factor in this calculus. Ultimately, Saudi Arabia judges that while the US and the West are still important, including for its defence and the success of its Vision 2030, it is in the Kingdom’s interest to diversify its international relations, not least by forging closer relations with its most important oil customer, China. In Riyadh’s view, this does not imply that it has to position itself against the US, but it does mean that it is determined to resist pressure to conform with what it regards as an emerging Western with-us-or-against-us attitude vis-à-vis Beijing (or Moscow).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CzhekAM.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities 2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog">“Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency</a>, accessed August 21, 2023.</em></p> +<p>The notion that Saudi Arabia has adopted a “Saudi First” approach in recent years is somewhat misleading, in that it suggests that the Kingdom’s foreign policy and decisions on oil exports were previously guided by anything other than what Saudi leaders regarded as their – and their country’s – interests. During the oil-for-security era, Saudi Arabia generally determined that its interests were best served by aligning itself as closely as possible with the US, including in how it exercised its role as an oil exporter committed to stabilising and moderating international prices as much as possible. Indeed, Ibrahim Al-Muhanna, a long-time adviser in the Saudi Ministry of Energy, suggests that Saudi leaders were even prepared to occasionally accommodate requests from US politicians to try to nudge energy prices downwards to help with US election campaigns. Over the past decade, and most obviously since the rise to power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the proclamation of his Vision 2030, Riyadh’s calculations have changed. The perceived unreliability of the US as a security provider, changes in the global balance of power and the need to fund Vision 2030 are key factors driving an approach that is less US-centric and more focused on maintaining a higher level of prices if possible.</p> -<p>Moreover, while the information from the KEV list is definitely useful, one of the interviewed federal experts noted that it would be even more helpful if the catalog clearly distinguished differences between the listed vulnerabilities. For example, if CISA pushes an updated list with 10 new entries, are there certain vulnerabilities that federal CISOs should be most concerned about and should address first? Are there others that are lower on the priority list? Moving forward, the catalog’s usefulness will be graded on its ability to update information in a relatively quick manner, while also clearly communicating to users how they should interpret and act on listed information.</p> +<h4 id="saudi-arabia-and-the-opec-connection-with-russia">Saudi Arabia and the OPEC+ Connection with Russia</h4> -<p><strong>JOINT CYBER DEFENSE COLLABORATIVE</strong></p> +<p>The Saudi–Russian partnership, manifested in the countries’ joint leadership of the OPEC+ grouping, is best understood as a marriage of convenience, rather than an expression of a wider strategic alignment – certainly not one that even approaches the importance of the Kingdom’s relationship with the US, or with China, for that matter. OPEC+ was formed in 2016 in response to the disruption to the global oil market caused by the US shale revolution. By increasing the number of countries coordinating production levels, the members of OPEC+ sought to expand their ability to control the supply side of the market and thereby regain a more substantial ability to influence and stabilise international prices. By themselves, Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members accounted for around 36% of global production; bringing Russia and nine other producers into the fold increased that share to 59%.</p> -<p>One of CISA’s most important roles is serving as a trusted hub for information sharing, but it has recently expanded to include more robust operational and planning collaboration across the public and private sectors. This role was formalized and expanded at the recommendation of the CSC, which emphasized the need for a Joint Cyber Planning Cell “under CISA to coordinate cybersecurity planning and readiness across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.” CISA has taken it further by establishing a Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC). In CISA director Jen Easterly’s view, JCDC is “more than just planning.” While the JCDC is still a work in progress, it would be helpful moving forward for there to be more clarity into the changing composition of the group and membership criteria, how it expects to formally coordinate with other information-sharing mechanisms, and what its envisioned role and expected interaction with FCEB agencies are. <strong>While the JCDC has experienced early successes, its ability to provide value in the future will rely on its ability to either scale up or manage a smaller representative group that is trusted as an authoritative coalition by a wide variety of sectors.</strong></p> +<p>The strategy worked, at least to an extent. OPEC+’s supply-side interventions in themselves were not enough to control international oil prices, but they generally succeeded in reducing market volatility. However, the brittleness of the alliance was demonstrated in the price war between Moscow and Riyadh in March and April 2020. As the global economy shut down with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, prompting oil prices to fall, Russia – seeing an opportunity to deal a blow to the US shale industry – refused to go along with Saudi-proposed production cuts. Saudi Arabia, though not necessarily opposed to hurting shale producers, opted for a show of force vis-à-vis Russia. It ramped up production to deliberately push prices down even further so as to force Moscow to relent. It took an intervention from the Trump administration in Washington to convince Saudi Arabia and Russia to return to cooperating with one another, ultimately brokering an unprecedented 10 million barrels per day cut by OPEC+ members in April 2020.</p> -<p>The ultimate goal of the JCDC is to create a common operating picture for federal agencies, industry experts, and critical infrastructure owners and operators so that they can more proactively hunt, plan for, and jointly respond to cyber threats. Just in the past year, CISA has broadened its focus to include industrial control systems expertise, increasing the diversity and strength of the JCDC’s capabilities. CISA is also collecting information from international sources, collaborating with over 150 partners worldwide to share cybersecurity data. Additionally, CISA has touted the JCDC’s response to the Log4Shell vulnerability and the cyber challenges that arose during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as successes.</p> +<p>In the years since, and thus far unperturbed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, OPEC+ coordination has been much less fractious. Many of the grouping’s members have struggled to fulfil even their reduced production quotas, and there has been persistent speculation that the UAE – after Saudi Arabia and Russia, one of the most important members of the alliance – could consider leaving OPEC in order to more independently and immediately monetise its expanding production capacity. Overall, however, OPEC+ and the Riyadh–Moscow relationship at its apex have held together, even in the face of significant Western political pressure on Saudi Arabia after February 2022. From the Kingdom’s perspective, the expanded supply-side market influence that Russia brings to OPEC+ remains highly valuable; Riyadh may also judge that Moscow can exert a degree of leverage over Iran, an OPEC member with at least the potential capacity to substantially affect global supply even as it remains hamstrung by US sanctions. However, this aspect could become less important to Riyadh, as its own relations with Tehran have become more constructive following the March 2023 Beijing Agreement.</p> -<p>Critics of the JCDC point to the office’s lack of a formal charter or clear membership criteria, which could potentially hinder future scalability and transparency. During this project’s expert interviews, for example, it was mentioned that the information flow, in all directions, is not happening fast enough.</p> +<p>It is also important to note that the Saudi–Russian bilateral relationship extends beyond oil. Ever since King Salman’s unprecedented visit to Russia in 2017, the two countries have worked on expanding economic cooperation more generally, including with discussions about joint investments in Russia’s agriculture and energy sectors, for example – though Saudi Arabia has generally been less vocal about these plans than Russia. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has at least reluctantly appreciated Russia’s return to the Middle East as a security actor over the past decade. It did not like Russia’s intervention on the side of the Assad regime in Syria in 2015, at a time when the Kingdom was still committed to an opposition victory in Damascus, but from Riyadh’s perspective Russia was also prepared to stand by its partners in the region, reliably and consistently oppose all forms of destabilising regime-change efforts in the region, and refrain from criticising the Kingdom; all in marked contrast to the US, whose commitment to regional stability seemed less certain, as discussed above.</p> -<p>Relatedly, there are questions about how effectively the JCDC can work in terms of long-term planning (not just during crisis mode) and how it plans to manage its growth in the coming years. Moving forward, it will also be important to see how the JCDC balances ease of reporting and information sharing with more formal concerns about liability. CISA has provided some initial guidance on its website, but there will likely be lingering concerns about liability protection in the absence of more formal assurances. Finally, while there are benefits to using certain commercial platforms for emergency communications, there will always be concerns about alternatives in case those channels are compromised in any way.</p> +<p>As Russia’s war against Ukraine goes on, and particularly if Russia’s economy suffers further and its military struggles continue, Saudi Arabia’s belief in the usefulness of the non-energy components of the bilateral relationship could be eroded. Even then, though, energy and the two countries’ shared leadership of OPEC+ remain powerful connectors, as does the fact that Saudi Arabia is uncomfortable with some of the geopolitical developments surrounding the war. As previously mentioned, Riyadh has been vocal in its opposition to some of the Western sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, particularly the attempt to impose a price cap on Russian exports. Saudi Arabia worries that this could set a precedent for politically motivated interventions in global energy markets by buyers of hydrocarbons that could one day affect the exports of other producers too. Indeed, the Kingdom’s unwillingness to pick sides between the West and Russia goes beyond energy – and Russia, for that matter. In an increasingly competitive and polarised global environment, Saudi Arabia is determined not to be forced to choose between West and East, insisting that it will chart its own path in a multipolar – not bipolar – future world order.</p> -<p>The JCDC will not be effective if everyone is a member, but identifying ways to make membership criteria intentional, representative, and relevant will be key, as will be finding ways to demonstrate the value add to FCEB agencies (see Recommendation 3.5 on the value add of the JCDC).</p> +<p>But Saudi–Russian cooperation within OPEC+ may not continue forever. The 2020 price war showed that Riyadh is prepared to turn against Russia when it sees its own interests threatened. Russia’s expanding market share in Asia, as it sells its crude at discounted prices to major consumers like China and India, could fuel discord, particularly if Saudi Arabia were to see its own market share in Asia – the continent it sees as the centre of gravity for future exports – become affected. For the moment, Saudi Aramco appears to be managing this risk, not least by buying up Russian crude and selling it on (Saudi Aramco is not just the largest oil producer in the world, but also a leading oil trader). Still, the “Saudi First” approach, the primacy of pursuing its own interests, applies just as much to its cooperation with Russia and other OPEC+ members as it does to its response to Western calls for changes to the Kingdom’s policies.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="co-pilots-cisa-and-cyber-commands-partnership-during-a-crisis"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Co-pilots: CISA and Cyber Command’s Partnership during a Crisis</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="iii-between-climate-change-and-climate-action">III. Between Climate Change and Climate Action</h3> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">During the 2023 RSA Conference, CISA executive assistant director for cybersecurity Eric Goldstein and Major General William Hartman, commander of the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), took the stage to provide an overview on how both entities ride side by side to defend the federal enterprise. They shared overlapping goals, with Goldstein emphasizing the desire to help increase costs on adversaries and signaling to actors that a “call to one is a call to all” so that partners overseas also take action — not just the United States. Complementing Goldstein’s overview, Hartman described the CNMF command as “foreign facing,” defending the homeland and supporting its allies, while highlighting that “no partner is more important than DHS CISA.” Both spoke to the level of collaboration they execute, working side by side through liaison officers at each other’s locations, from senior leaders down to individual analysts and operators. Hartman further elaborated that the CNMF is focused on two things: (1) what information does CISA have relevant to the DOD’s missions that might allow it to disrupt or prevent an attack on the homeland, and (2) what does the CNMF observe through operations in foreign space that can be shared back to CISA to protect the homeland?</code></em></p> +<p>Saudi Arabia’s evolving oil-related decision-making and foreign policy must also be understood in the context of the dual challenge that climate change and climate action pose to the Kingdom. In the past, Saudi Arabia has generally approached the climate debate from a defensive position. Given the centrality of its oil industry to its political and socioeconomic development model, it has, like Russia, long regarded international (and especially Western) calls to decarbonise the world economy and limit – and eventually end – the extraction of fossil fuels as a near-existential threat. Until the diversification of Saudi Arabia’s economy progresses further than it has to date, oil exports will remain strategically indispensable for the Kingdom.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The importance of the CISA-CNMF partnership proved decisive for bidirectional information sharing during some well-known incidents. The first was SolarWinds: within the hour that FireEye alerted the government, CISA and the DOD began to act. CISA rapidly identified nine FCEB agencies that were compromised. This was followed by incident response to understand the breath of intrusions, the payloads, and the artifacts left behind. Next, CISA extracted infected servers and sent data to the CNMF. On the side of the DOD and the CNMF, Major General Hartford stressed that gaining an image of compromised servers from CISA was invaluable. The CNMF used CISA’s server image for modeling to rehearse and exercise hunting skills, and in the span of a few days, the CNMF developed high-end capabilities to hunt the adversaries. At the same time, intelligence indicated that a foreign partner was compromised by the same actor, and the partner requested the assistance of the CNMF. The CNMF team then deployed overseas and almost immediately encountered adversary activity in their hunt-forward operation. The operation was a success and the CNMF collected novel malware from its encounter and moved to share it broadly.</code></em></p> +<p>Nevertheless, Riyadh has changed its tone somewhat in recent years. In 2021, it announced 2060 as its target to reach net zero emissions and announced the Saudi Green Initiative and the Middle East Green Initiative to accelerate climate-and sustainability-related development efforts in the Kingdom and the region, respectively. Critical observers have dismissed such announcements as efforts at “greenwashing”, but this analysis is too simplistic. Besides an obvious interest in preserving the future viability of oil as an energy source and its own status as a leading producer, three key factors appear to be shaping Saudi Arabia’s changing position.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Returning to the public campaign, CISA reviewed the tactics, techniques, and procedures using information that the CNMF brought back to share with the nine compromised FCEB agencies and more broadly. Thanks to this data, CISA then developed an eviction guide to make sure the malicious actors were out of systems. CISA not only worked with the CNMF but also with the NSA, Mandiant, and Microsoft, forming a united front across the .gov, .mil, and .com ecosystems to kick out the invaders. A united front across the multiple sectors helped lend confidence and credibility in the eviction guide and eased worries for both industry and FCEB agencies to arrive at an eviction point.</code></em></p> +<p>Firstly, there is a growing recognition that climate change poses a significant physical threat to Saudi Arabia itself. Together with the wider Middle East region, the Arabian Peninsula is among the parts of the world where the effects of climate change – particularly rising temperatures and more unpredictable weather patterns, including extreme weather events – have already been acutely felt. Climate change and environmental security may not yet be regarded as being on a par with the threat that anti-hydrocarbon climate action represents, but they are becoming more important in the Kingdom’s calculations.</p> -<h4 id="incident-response">Incident Response</h4> +<p>Secondly, over the past decade the Saudi government has grown increasingly aware of the need to rein in unsustainable domestic energy consumption. Improving energy efficiency and investing in renewable energy generation are seen as being necessary to reduce emissions and prevent ever more Saudi oil from being diverted to the domestic market rather than being exported to generate revenues.</p> -<p>During a number of interviews, experts noted that they had been the recipients of CISA’s incident response services or, at the very least, that they could understand why these services were an important part of CISA’s broader offerings. From providing general assistance to impacted FCEBs to actively coordinating with law enforcement on the investigative aspect, CISA is well positioned to deliver timely incident response guidance and immediate assistance.</p> +<p>Finally, Saudi Arabia also sees opportunities in the global energy transition. The feasibility of hydrogen (and its derivatives) becoming a commodity that will eventually be traded like oil may still be unclear, just as the export of solar- and wind-generated electricity remains limited by infrastructure constraints, but Saudi Arabia is confident that if/when technological barriers are overcome it is in a prime position to be a major player in both fields. This belief is reinforced by the self-perception and self-confidence that Saudi Arabia has always been an energy power and therefore “gets” energy – whether derived from hydrocarbons or otherwise.</p> -<p>Prompted by Section 6 of EO 14028, CISA published incident response and vulnerability response playbooks for FCEB agencies. Each playbook walks FCEB agencies through the life cycle of an incident, highlighting activities that can be done both during and pre- and post-crisis to ensure that information is collected and shared in a timely manner and that steps are taken to mitigate the incident’s effects. Additionally, CISA offers free incident response training for interested federal employees and contractors. But where CISA, by way of the DHS, becomes even more helpful is that it can engage in both asset response and threat response activities. Presidential Policy Directive 41 designates the DHS’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Center as lead for asset response. Separately, while the Department of Justice (DOJ) leads in threat response via its investigatory authorities, the DHS plays a critical supporting role in that process.</p> +<p>Saudi Arabia has resolved that it must become a more active participant in the international climate debate. How exactly it intends to do so remains to be seen, but the basic contours of its approach are already emerging. Saudi Arabia (and its fellow OPEC oil producers, including COP28 host the UAE) will likely push back against any efforts to make the total phasing out of hydrocarbons an internationally agreed climate action objective. Riyadh will argue for an inclusive approach to the global energy transition that leaves no-one behind, including hydrocarbon exporters; and it will present itself as the producer capable of providing the cheapest and most emission-efficient oil, and as the one that might even eventually produce carbon-free oil once carbon capture and storage, which Saudi Aramco is investing considerable resources in, are achieved. At the same time, Saudi Arabia will also likely expand its hydrogen- and renewables-related efforts, not to curry favour with international audiences but to capitalise on potential economic opportunities. Within the context of the international climate change/climate action debate, Saudi Arabia will remain a defender of hydrocarbons and resist calls for their complete phasing out.</p> -<p>Moving forward, CISA might consider more intentionally moving away from guidance that focuses on threats and vulnerabilities and instead look to address consequences more broadly. To the extent that these incident response trainings and pre-incident guidance documents can actively change how agencies think about recovery (and what, in fact, they need to recover from), that might help agencies in the long run. A good example for why the consequence-based approach should be intentionally considered is the Colonial Pipeline incident. Even though the ransomware attack was on Colonial Pipeline’s billing system, they had to shut down their entire operational technology (OT) out of concern that the attack was widespread. This suggests that anticipating cascading consequences — and even the public perception of a potential incident — should be more intentionally included in incident plans (see Recommendations 2.4 and 3.7 on revisiting mission-essential functions and promoting resilience, respectively).</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>As a general note to appropriators, while these services are considered valuable, CISA is woefully under-resourced for its incident response activities. These capabilities are not available to all and rely heavily on surge plans from other agencies and the National Guard if there is a large demand.</p> +<p>Among Western policymakers and in international media outlets, the notion of “the oil weapon” is arguably more closely associated with Saudi Arabia than with any other country. The 1973 oil embargo has become almost legendary, and many remember the Kingdom’s price war with Russia in March and April 2020. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to ramp up oil production in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and its subsequent decisions to repeatedly cut production, all in the face of loud Western protestations, have fuelled debate about the extent to which Riyadh might use its influence over oil markets in ways that are antithetical to Western interests. Other foreign policy moves, both within the Middle East region and towards engaging more closely with Moscow and Beijing, have spurred further speculation about Saudi Arabia moving away from – and perhaps even against – its traditional Western partners. Yet, as this paper shows, much of this speculation is exaggerated and, if anything, reflects an overly Western-centric assessment that fails to understand how Saudi Arabia sees itself and its position in the changing global environment.</p> -<h4 id="resilience-building">Resilience Building</h4> +<p>For Saudi Arabia, whose economic fortunes and international status will likely remain inextricably linked to its world-leading oil industry, the health and relative stability of the international oil market is of utmost strategic importance. Its commitment to Vision 2030, the new all-important North Star of the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign policy, means that Saudi Arabia needs to try to keep oil prices at a relatively high level, if at all possible. Within the context of the international climate change/climate action debate, Saudi Arabia will remain a defender of hydrocarbons and resist calls for their complete phase-out. At the same time, it feels that both its economic and security needs require it to diversify its international relations beyond its traditional reliance on the US and the wider West, even if that means forging relations with countries that Washington or European capitals consider to be beyond the pale.</p> -<p>As suggested in a recent CSIS study on federal government resilience, resilience can broadly be defined as “how well an individual, institution, or society can prepare for and respond to shocks to the system and endure, perhaps even thrive, under prolonged periods of stress.” Short of hardening systems, a number of the other initiatives listed above all contribute to CISA’s ability to help FCEB agencies maintain more secure networks and resilient postures overall. However, this study more narrowly categorizes resilience-building activities as those that help FCEB agencies plan for and start building toward long-term resilience. While resilience-building activities are often surpassed or overlooked in favor of activities that seem to focus on the short term or that yield immediate benefits, these operations are key to helping FCEB entities properly plan for future threats and challenges.</p> +<p>Yet, with all that said, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, for all its transformational intent, is ultimately the development agenda of a status quo power. The Vision 2030 agenda has been constructed in the context of an international environment in which the international rules-based order is upheld sufficiently to prevent any conflict that would have catastrophic implications for the Saudi or global economies. It is built on the principles of globalisation and requires the Kingdom to build relations with everyone, West and East. Riyadh may try to intervene in the oil market to secure its interests, but is not, and is unlikely to become, a revisionist power – even as it cooperates with revisionists like Russia.</p> -<h4 id="training-and-exercises">Training and Exercises</h4> +<p>This has important implications for the UK and its partners in Europe and beyond. Even if the UK were never to import a single barrel of Saudi oil again, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means the behaviour of the hydrocarbon superpower that is Saudi Arabia will substantially impact on the UK’s energy security, including the prices consumers pay to operate their cars or heat their homes. Moreover, the Kingdom’s calculations vis-à-vis its relations with Russia and China will have consequences for the changing global order that the UK too will have to navigate; and Saudi Arabia’s decision-making regarding climate change will significantly shape this global debate and struggle, in which the UK remains committed to playing a leading role.</p> -<p>The United States has invested vast amounts of taxpayer dollars into hardening, evolving, and improving cybersecurity across federal, SLTT, and private sector systems. In addition to investing in technologies and systems, it is just as important to invest in training and process. Similar to how U.S. schools simulate earthquake, fire, tornado, and active-shooter drills to train students and teachers for what they should do during a crisis, CISA simulates the discovery of and response to cyber incidents so relevant actors are proactively mapping out response plans. CISA’s premier exercise is Cyber Storm, where participating organizations are asked to execute strategic decisionmaking and practice interagency coordination to address an incident scenario.</p> +<p>UK–Saudi relations have deep roots, are multifaceted, and have grown in importance in recent years – according to statements from London. However, to maintain this relationship and perhaps even have some degree of influence on Saudi Arabia in areas that matter to the UK – from energy, through geopolitics, to climate change – policymakers must continuously refine and update their understanding of – and moreover take seriously – Saudi Arabia’s own strategic calculus. For the foreseeable future, the key to this is likely to be how confident the Kingdom feels about the success of its domestic transformation project.</p> -<p>Cyber Storm is a biannual exercise. The most recent one was held in March 2022 (Version VIII), and the next exercise will likely take place in the spring of 2024. Each exercise grows out of the previous one, in a sense building on institutional knowledge and key insights identified during the previous exercise. This process helps new and old players stay up to date on the current concerns and plan through industry best practices.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The latest exercise had a stated goal of “strengthening cybersecurity preparedness and response capabilities by exercising policies, processes, and procedures for identifying and responding to a multi-sector significant cyber incident impacting critical infrastructure.” The exercise included representatives from 100 private companies across 10 critical infrastructure sectors, 33 FCEB agencies, 9 states, and 15 countries. After running the exercise, the group identified shortcomings and areas needing greater clarity with regard to government policies. Ultimately, the exercise was successful in that it not only helped the different entities practice how they should collaborate and share information during a crisis (something that is routinely needed during an actual incident), but also demonstrated gaps that the government needs to address for future plans to be more effective.</p> +<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East.</p>Tobias BorckSaudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.AI-Generated Lies And Truth2023-11-02T12:00:00+08:002023-11-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-generated-lies-and-truth<p><em>How does the technology aid fake news and narratives – particularly in the run-up to 2024 for elections in many Western democracies?</em></p> -<p>Cyber Storm by itself is a tremendous project, but CISA also publishes general exercise information and encourages the general practice of hosting similar exercises. Whether as a host, facilitator, or participant, CISA should continue to invest in training FCEB agencies to conduct exercises on their own and promote these exercises as a way for agencies to, among other things, map out resilience and continuity of operational plans.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><strong>GENERAL GUIDANCE</strong></p> +<p>In July 2017, researchers at the University of Washington used AI to make a convincing video of former President Barack Obama giving a speech that he never gave. At the time it seemed novel, but perhaps nothing more consequential than a hacker’s parlour trick. Sadly, it heralded rapid advancements in the realm of synthetic media that few could have predicted. AI experts now estimate that nearly 90% of all online media content may be synthetically generated by 2026. For the first time in the history of digital media, realistic fake content is now cheaper and faster to create than reality, and the consequences for national security as well as civil society are simultaneously both alarming and hard to fathom.</p> -<p>In general, interviewed industry and FCEB experts seemed appreciative of CISA’s guidance documents (see Recommendation 3.8 on transparency guidance). The question then becomes whether it is CISA’s role to aid general guidance with additional support for implementation, or if that is something FCEB agencies should be expected to manage on their own or with the support and guidance of other entities.</p> +<p>The real impact that fake content can have is staggering. In May 2023, investor confidence was shaken amid social media-fuelled reports of a potential terrorist attack near the Pentagon, and the US stock market slid considerably. In that case, the image was easy to debunk, and investor confidence rapidly returned. Repeat the event with a more sophisticated set of tools, however, such as a fake presidential speech and a coordinated influence campaign to spread the lie across many social media platforms, and the results could have been far more dramatic than a stock dip. Indeed, synthetic hoaxes are now seen as an important driver of international events. Prior to the Russian reinvasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, the US revealed a Russian plot to spread deepfake content (media created or manipulated synthetically with the help of AI) as a pretext for the invasion.</p> -<p>CISA’s role as a general information resource for FCEB agencies cannot be overstated. In addition to some of the service-specific resources listed above, CISA recently published reference guides such as its <em>Cloud Security Technical Reference Architecture Guide and Zero Trust Maturity Model</em> — both representing the types of comprehensive guides that FCEB agencies can consult to support their respective agency plans to modernize and enhance security in the coming years.</p> +<p>The case of Russia can also be used to illustrate the threat to civil society: that people can believe anything or, caught in the miasma of competing narratives online, simply choose to opt out and believe nothing at all. As journalist Peter Pomerantsev points out in his excellent book Nothing is True and Everything is Possible, authoritarian governments such as Russia increase their power when their citizens are confused and disoriented. In the West, a lack of confidence that anything can be true is a problem for a great many reasons, not least because trust in government is at historic lows at the same time as governments are moving their public-facing communications online, and especially to social media. Consider a public safety scenario in which a governor issues an emergency evacuation order in advance of a powerful hurricane, or a public health official gives a warning about a quickly spreading pandemic. Could these important warnings be identified by a majority of people as belonging to the 10% of truth remaining on the internet, or would they be dismissed by citizens in danger as fake news, a political hoax, or even a prank? What can be done? Rooting out fake news and combatting automated propaganda is an important contribution to societal resilience, but we must look ahead to the next challenges as well.</p> -<p>During one particularly interesting interview, a federal CISO noted that CISA’s guidance documents are great but that it would be helpful if they could detail out a few subject matter experts to further assist FCEB agencies. For instance, the interviewee thought it would have been helpful for CISA to additionally assign a ZTA expert to the different FCEB agencies to help them with ZTA migration beyond just producing a document (see Recommendation 2.5 on CISA’s role with regard to FCEB ZTA migration).</p> +<p>The current solutions to address mis- and disinformation are not up to the task. We can’t count the number of times we have advised students, policymakers and the general public to combat mis- and disinformation on the internet by thinking critically, being skeptical and not reflexively reposting content without fact checking. That recipe is now incomplete. It is clear that the scale of the problem requires technological solutions too, and organisations around the world are investing in ways to quickly identify fake media. However, as technology continues to progress, this problem will soon be reversed, and the hunt for fake media will need to be replaced with verification of truth. In other words, instead of trying to weed out what is fake, we will need to identify ways to validate a truth among lies. This would involve a radical reframing of both the problem and potential solutions.</p> -<p>This suggestion raises a few questions. Does CISA have the capacity to offer this type of service? And if not, is it their job to find a way to do so given their role as the designated lead for federal network security? Put another way, what is the actual scope of CISA’s mission with regard to FCEB protection, and what are the implications for other entities that directly or indirectly play some role in securing or supporting the maintenance of federal networks?</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For the first time in the history of digital media, realistic fake content is now cheaper and faster to create than reality</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>POST-INCIDENT REVIEWS</strong></p> +<p>Currently, social media platforms (and users themselves) are scrambling to tag and label inauthentic content. Soon this will be akin to using an umbrella to block individual raindrops during a monsoon. TikTok, for instance – like most social media companies – has policies requiring labelling synthetic media, but a recent report from misinformation monitor NewsGuard found the implementation of TikTok’s policy wanting. Likewise, fact-checking organisations are already struggling to keep up with the amount of disinformation online. By 2026, their backlog of digital nonsense will keep them busily debunking falsehoods far into the distant future. Turning the status quo equation on its head means that instead of identifying fake news polluting a stream of otherwise legitimate content, we must realise that the stream will soon be the lies, and the truth will need to be plucked out.</p> -<p>The U.S. Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB) was established by EO 14028 after the SolarWinds incident, and its goal is to investigate significant cyber incidents and socialize lessons learned in the hopes of fortifying national cybersecurity efforts. While some critics have already been quick to call out the board for lack of efficacy, the board is still relatively new, and it is likely too early to fully assess the program.</p> +<p>It is worth noting some antecedents. In the early 2000s, tools such as Photoshop allowed individuals to edit photos more quickly, and social media made it easier to reach a wide audience. In 2008, Iran digitally altered a photograph of rocket launchers to remove one that – rather embarrassingly – failed to fire, with the intent of making itself appear more powerful and capable than it really was. Still, Photoshop was not scalable and could not create fake media from scratch. It had to start with a truth. In the past few years, though, critical advances in generative AI (computer algorithms capable of generating new media from text prompts) are increasing the threat of what has been called an information apocalypse. As with all technological advancements, these developments have been rapidly democratised over time. Now anyone can produce their own high-quality disinformation with algorithms that are already freely available online. Through programs such as FaceSwap, it is straightforward to convincingly put a face on another body. There is no putting this genie back in the bottle, and no amount of ethical use manifestos published by developers is going to trammel such technology.</p> -<p>The board comprises no more than 20 individuals appointed by the CISA director, and it studies and produces recommendations to the secretary of homeland security by way of the CISA director. To date, the CSRB has investigated the December 2021 disclosure of the Log4j vulnerability, one of the most serious software vulnerabilities in history, and attacks carried out by the Lapsus$ hacking group. DHS secretary Alejandro Mayorkas also recently announced that the CSRB will conduct a review of cloud service providers and their security practices, with a focus on the recent suspected Chinese intrusion into Microsoft Exchange Online.</p> +<p>The AI genie continues to amaze, and regulators (much less university professors) simply can’t keep up. Before November 2022, when ChatGPT was released, the idea of a computer writing a college-level essay in seconds would have been seen as science fiction. This was a revolutionary step up from tools that could, at best, fix grammar and punctuation. At the same time, software that could create images from text, such as DALL-E and Midjourney, became available to the public. These image generation tools could, with a simple prompt that required no technical knowledge, create 1,000 hyper-realistic photos before a human could develop one. At first, critics of the technology pointed out inaccuracies in the deepfake content, hoping perhaps in vain that the rationality of the human brain was still superior to the computer. In March 2023, the Washington Post published an article providing readers with tips on how to identify deepfakes. One of the examples was to “look at the hands”, since early generative AI tools struggled with making realistic human hands. That same month, however, another article was published by the same newspaper titled “AI can draw hands now”. Trying to identify deepfakes by looking for visual mistakes is a losing strategy. According to a report published by the NSA, FBI and CISA, attempts to detect deepfakes post-production are a cat-and-mouse game where the manipulator has the upper hand – not to mention that people want to see what they already want to believe, which is the primary reason that “cheap fakes” are just as dangerous as deepfakes. Confirmation bias means that people don’t need much convincing to see what they want to see. The pair are a toxic brew.</p> -<p>Critiques of the board include confidentiality issues, institutional factors such as a lack of full-time staff, budgetary constraints, and potential conflicts of interest. Additionally, there seems to be a reluctance to investigate incidents that are a few years old and a reticence to place blame on a single entity when warranted.</p> +<p>According to DeepMedia, a company contracted by the US Department of Defense to help detect synthetic media, the amount of deepfakes has tripled in 2023 compared to 2022. How do people know what to believe and trust? If the deepfake is just as realistic as a photo taken by a professional camera, how do organisations prove authenticity? For each photo taken by a journalist, thousands of equally realistic fakes could be made and distributed. This article aims to highlight that very recent technological advances are leading to a perfect content storm, where lies are far cheaper to produce than truths, but just as convincing. The spread of deepfakes is creating an environment of mistrust. A July 2023 report published by members of Purdue University’s Department of Political Science argued that an increase in the amount of fake content makes it easier for someone to challenge the validity of something that is actually true. They called this the Liar’s Dividend. As media becomes saturated with manipulated images and videos, it becomes harder to identify what is trustworthy. Being able to prove that something is fake loses its value when most of the content is synthetic already. The greater and more critical challenge is validating what is true.</p> -<p>As described, the CSRB can be a very useful tool and opportunity to generate meaningful recommendations. But as important as it is for the CSRB to move quickly with its investigations, incident selection is just as, if not more, important.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As media becomes saturated with manipulated images and videos, it becomes harder to identify what is trustworthy</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>SECURING .GOV DOMAINS</strong></p> +<p>The problem of labelling media content as trustworthy is complicated. As deepfakes become increasingly sophisticated, it will become nearly impossible for individuals – even those trained to look for peculiarities – to distinguish real from fake. As a result, organisations will need to lean more heavily on technical solutions to label and verify media. Why is it also difficult, though, for computers to tell the difference between a photo taken by a camera and a deepfake created by AI? All digital media is, at a technical level, just a file on a computer. Comprised of 1s and 0s, this file is displayed on a screen to a person. The computer has no notion of fake or real. This problem has many similarities with the art world and the challenge of proving that a painting was made by a famous artist and not a copycat. For every real Picasso, there may be 1,000 replicas. Museums and galleries do not waste their limited resources trying to prove the inauthenticity of the copies, though; they focus on validating and maintaining the truth through a concept called provenance. Provenance is the recorded origin and history required for a piece of art to provide viewers with trust and confidence in its authenticity. Even if the methodologies are different for the digital world, it may prove a useful model for seeking and identifying authenticity instead of forever debunking fakes.</p> -<p>For an agency to successfully execute its mission, it must cultivate a certain level of trust. It must operate with high levels of integrity and transparency. One of the most basic ways that FCEB agencies accomplish this is by having a consistently updated and well-managed public-facing website. For the past few years, CISA has taken on the role of protecting .gov domains — a role that might be underappreciated but is key to bridging trust between the public and FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>The cyber security field already uses capabilities such as encryption and hashing to verify passwords and protect digital communications, but these need to be applied to media in a way that is easily understood and trusted by content consumers with limited technical backgrounds. Organisations such as the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) are working to use cryptographic asset hashing to serve as digital provenance online. This project aims to provide a tamper-proof way to validate the origin of images and videos, even while they are shared across social media and news platforms. The CAI aims to meet the technical standards developed by the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, released in 2022. While these efforts are heading in the right direction, they are not foolproof, and depend heavily on an increased socio-technical understanding of digital media. Additionally, allowing organisations to manage the trustworthiness of media comes with its own concerns. Totalitarian governments will no doubt develop their own “Content Authenticity Initiatives” to self-validate what they want to be believed.</p> -<p>For 20 years, the General Services Administration managed the security of U.S. federal government internet domains. In December 2020, Congress passed the DOTGOV Act, which designated CISA as the new agency tasked with safeguarding .gov domains. The DOTGOV Act further specifies that .gov domain services will carry zero or negligible costs for “any Federal, State, local or territorial government operated or publicly controlled entity.” Agencies interested in registering a new domain must first secure an authorization letter and then submit their request through the online .gov registrar form. As the designated .gov manager, part of CISA’s job is to spearhead the registration of new domains, with final approval coming from the OMB. Separately, if an organization requires migrating services online, CISA is exploring using DHS grants to facilitate the process; this is in the design stages with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.</p> +<p>Deepfakes are still a young technology. While they have not single-handedly disrupted an election as some might have feared, their use is increasing, and the technology is advancing rapidly. While most deepfakes are currently images or altered videos, the ability to create whole new scenes from a prompt is already here. With the 2024 US presidential election approaching, deepfakes and other “fake news” will likely be on the minds of both candidates and voters. Former CEO of Alphabet Eric Schmidt has warned that mis- and disinformation, through the use of AI in particular, could lead to chaos in the 2024 election. The solution is both technical, by shifting from identifying deepfakes to validating truths, and societal, through technical education and media literacy. For decades, people were taught to trust their senses. Now, seeing and hearing can no longer be believing.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the goal of the DOTGOV Act is to ensure the confidentiality of, integrity of, and access to information on FCEB websites. As was noted in a February 2023 OMB memo, “When .gov domains are used for websites, people have greater confidence that the information on those sites is authoritative and trustworthy.” To ensure a seamless, transparent, and secure registration and management process, CISA has created a five-step new domain registration process and a domain security best practices guide.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Recommendations 5 and 6 in the domain security guide are particularly noteworthy. Step 5 is a recommendation to sign up for CISA’s free network and vulnerability scanning service called Cyber Hygiene. Cyber Hygiene provides regular reports that can help FCEB agencies secure internet-facing systems from weak configuration and known vulnerabilities. Notably, this program was highlighted as a frequently used service in a number of expert interviews.</p> +<p><strong>David Gioe</strong> is a British Academy Global Professor and Visiting Professor of Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is also an associate professor of history at the US Military Academy and a history fellow for its Army Cyber Institute.</p> -<p>Step 6 in the CISA best practices guide is for SLTT organizations to join the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The center is designated by CISA to serve as the cybersecurity information-sharing center for SLTT governments. Some of the services included with membership are access to 24/7 incident response and digital forensic services, IP monitoring, and cybersecurity tabletop exercises.</p> +<p><strong>Alexander Molnar</strong> is an Active-Duty US Army cyber officer with multiple overseas deployments, including support to special operations. He holds a BS from the US Military Academy and an MS from the Georgia Institute of Technology.</p>David Gioe and Alexander MolnarHow does the technology aid fake news and narratives – particularly in the run-up to 2024 for elections in many Western democracies?Israel’s Gaza Problem2023-11-01T12:00:00+08:002023-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/israels-gaza-problem<p><em>Following the 7 October attack by Hamas, Israel has determined to destroy the terrorist group controlling Gaza once and for all. The question is not just whether or not it will succeed, but what its plan is for the day after.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="cisa-cyber-supports-to-sltt-governments-the-private-sector-and-srmas"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CISA Cyber Supports to SLTT Governments, the Private Sector, and SRMAs</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<excerpt /> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The focus of this report is solely the cybersecurity services offered by CISA to FCEB agencies. However, CISA services are also widely offered to the private sector and SLTT governments as well. Beyond identifying best practices and possible common trends or grievances about how services are delivered to these different entities, it is important to acknowledge how the current system of distributed security management could ultimately impact an FCEB agency’s network security or its ability to fulfill its larger mission.</code></em></p> +<p>The 7 October attack by Hamas, the worst act of terrorism against Israel since the state’s founding in 1948, was unprecedented in its scale and scope. With more than 1,400 people killed, most of them civilians, the attack has forced the Israeli political establishment to embrace options – like a ground invasion of Gaza – that were previously viewed as extreme. The Israeli intelligence community will no doubt conduct an after-action review to determine how Hamas could have planned and executed such an operation without being noticed. But at this stage, current operational planning is the priority. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have spent the past three weeks engaging in a ferocious air campaign against targets in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, with 6,000 bombs dropped by the Israeli Air Force in the first six days of the counterattack. Israel’s borders with Gaza are sealed, fuel imports have been cut off and Israeli ground forces are making initial forays toward Gaza City to destroy Hamas’s network of tunnels. Around 360,000 reservists have been sent to the front, Israel’s largest mobilisation since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ultimately, even though an FCEB agency might seem “cyber secure,” there are lower-level entities that are resource-strapped but provide or deliver critical services in support of an FCEB agency’s larger mission. Cyber issues need to be prioritized by department and agency leads; attacks on smaller, vulnerable, critical nodes, even if they are not directly supervised by an FCEB agency, can still impact people’s perceptions of the larger organization.</code></em></p> +<p>As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared on 27 October, the IDF aims to “completely defeat the murderous enemy and guarantee our existence”. Lofty objectives indeed – but two obvious questions need to be asked and answered. First, is it possible to destroy Hamas? And second, who governs Gaza after Hamas is routed?</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A separate but related relationship that is not fully explored in this report is the one CISA has with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs). As one industry expert noted, the value of an SRMA is to “translate the good cyber advice into language and protocols that can be understood by [critical infrastructure] operators.” Per this expert, who represents a large entity in a critical industry, CISA has the depth of talent but needs to do more to reach out to stakeholders and encourage partnerships and solicit donations to plus up capabilities, among other activities. Relatedly, CISA should not spread itself thin — it should just be a clearing house and should rely on SRMAs for more support.</code></em></p> +<h3 id="before-7-october-a-strange-paradigm-between-israel-and-hamas">Before 7 October: A Strange Paradigm Between Israel and Hamas</h3> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Moving forward, one challenge for CISA will be to not only provide high levels of assistance and general guidance but to also strike the right balance between centralizing cyber risk (which could lead to cost savings, especially for smaller and medium-sized entities) and delegating out some tasks to other entities (such as some of the SRMAs) that might have greater expertise and reach in a given sector (see Recommendations 3.2 and 3.3 on coordination with SRMAs, information sharing and analysis centers, and others).</code></em></p> +<p>Before the 7 October attack, Israel and Hamas had a violent – albeit predictable – arrangement with one another. While Israel’s past wars with Hamas (2008–2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021) were sparked by unique local and regional circumstances, Israel’s objective was always the same: degrade Hamas’s military capacity and restore a sense of deterrence to the Israel–Gaza border region. While Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Operation Protective Edge (2014) included a ground component, Israel largely relied on air power to destroy as much of Hamas’s rocket factories, tunnel network and leadership as it could. Ground engagements inside Gaza lasted for a short period of time; the longest Israeli ground campaign, during Operation Protective Edge, lasted about three weeks.</p> -<h4 id="general-gaps">General Gaps</h4> +<p>In the end, all of these wars concluded with Israel and Hamas negotiating a ceasefire through intermediaries. The terms were straightforward: quiet in exchange for quiet. Over time, Israel and Hamas settled into a mutually acceptable informal arrangement, whereby the Israelis would permit certain economic concessions to induce Hamas to maintain calm. Three months after the 2021 Israel–Hamas war ended with yet another ceasefire, Israel agreed to allow Qatar to channel $10 million a month into Gaza through the UN for the benefit of 100,000 Gazan families. Commercial incentives, such as the re-opening of the Abu Karam crossing, the approval of thousands of permits for Gazans to work in Israel and the periodic expansion of the Gaza fishing zone, were used to keep Hamas wedded to the agreement. This carrot came with a stick in the form of airstrikes and economic pressure whenever Palestinian militant groups broke the terms.</p> -<p>According to the head of CISA’s Cybersecurity Division, Executive Assistant Director Eric Goldstein, FY 2021 legislation and EO 14028 shifted the cybersecurity landscape in two dramatic ways. First, new authorities and technologies allowed CISA to proactively engage in system monitoring and threat hunt, which has greatly enhanced CISA’s visibility into and across FCEB networks. Second, and by extension, CISA is now able to develop deeper relationships with the FCEB agencies that it serves. Whereas in its early years CISA’s relationship with departments and agencies was transactional, in Goldstein’s opinion there is a growing perception among the FCEB agencies that CISA is a partner that wants to help them achieve their security goals — and, for smaller and medium- sized FCEBs, actively take on the burden of managing more of their cybersecurity.</p> +<p>Israel and Hamas are sworn enemies, yet in a strange way they have also depended on one another. Although the Israelis have refused to deal with Hamas directly, Israeli Prime Ministers Benjamin Netanyahu, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid have all counted on Hamas to restrain the even more extremist Palestinian groups located in the enclave. Until now, Hamas controlling Gaza and serving as the territory’s de-facto government has been deemed more pliable than disorder. Hamas, in turn, has relied on Israel to ensure that the much-needed cash from Qatar flowed into Gaza and that Palestinians could access the necessary permits to work in Israel.</p> -<p>There is no doubt that in recent years, and especially since 2021, CISA has made great strides across several fronts to improve and expand cyber services to FCEB agencies. In fact, with a number of new initiatives and capabilities set to formally roll out in the coming years, it is hard to fully assess where CISA will be even a year or two from now. That said, in this time of growth there are real and perceived potential gaps in services or service quality that CISA and Congress should monitor and address. Aside from the service-specific issues that are listed in the sections above, there were some general trends identified in the expert interviews and discussions that warrant attention.</p> +<h3 id="israel-ditches-the-old-playbook-but-can-it-succeed">Israel Ditches the Old Playbook, but Can It Succeed?</h3> -<p><strong>CAPABILITIES</strong></p> +<p>The previous arrangements between Israel and Hamas worked well enough – until they didn’t. Whatever mutual understanding the two had is now gone after Hamas’s 7 October attack, which was of such barbarity that resurrecting the old paradigm is no longer possible. Whereas successive Israeli governments were content with degrading Hamas’s military structure to buy a few more years of relative stability, it appears the current government will not accept anything less than Hamas’s eradication. Senior Israeli officials have stressed that the ongoing campaign will be longer, tougher and more comprehensive than those in the past. “Our responsibility now is to enter Gaza, go to the places where Hamas organises, operates, plans and launches”, Israel Defense Forces Chief of the General Staff Herzi Halevi told Haaretz on 15 October. “To hit them severely everywhere, every commander, every operative, and to destroy infrastructure. In one word – to win”.</p> -<p>At a basic level, interviewed experts were eager to see if CISA capabilities could collect and detect intrusions at machine speed and if they could properly integrate inputs from their different services into single repositories to provide actionable intelligence. <strong>Modernization is not just about creating new technological solutions to address old problems. New tools have to integrate with preexisting tools and services to ensure there are no disruptions or visibility gaps.</strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Hamas is as much an idea as it is a coherent military entity. Even if Israel manages to destroy the military entity – no sure thing – the idea will survive</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Setting aside CISA’s actual capabilities (since they will be rolled out in the coming months and years), it is possible to assess general perceptions about these capabilities — namely, whether interviewees expect that CISA will be fully authorized and technically capable enough in the near future to actually perform activities such as advanced threat hunting and real-time information sharing, and whether it will have stronger, more reliable capabilities relative to other government or industry entities that could offer the same or better services.</p> +<p>The billion-dollar question is whether this can be accomplished. Destroying a terrorist organisation isn’t impossible, but it’s a difficult endeavour nonetheless. It’s even more difficult if military force is one’s preferred tool. Data analysis by the Rand Corporation finds that only 7% of terrorist groups since 1968 have been terminated through the use of military force. In contrast, 43% of terrorist groups ended when their members joined the political process (think of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the Irish Republican Army and the African National Congress). While it’s true that Hamas did participate in the Palestinian political process in 2006, winning legislative elections that year, it’s also true that Hamas’s already limited interest in democratic participation likely evaporated when the West and Israel refused to accept the results. Given the current situation, it is hard to imagine that Israel would allow Hamas to become a legitimate political actor, even if the group wanted to transition into electoral politics. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, in the 17th year of a four-year term, would also likely balk at the prospect; the last thing he needs when his approval ratings are in the toilet is more competition.</p> -<p>Among this project’s sample of interviewed experts, there seemed to be mixed levels of confidence in CISA’s technical capabilities. Some expressed doubt that CISA would be able to accomplish all of its stated goals in the immediate future, while others felt stronger confidence in other government entities’ technical capabilities.</p> +<p>So far, Israel has relied on force. At the time of writing, at least 13 Hamas officials, financiers and security officials have been killed, including Asem Abu Rakaba, a top commander of the 7 October operation. More will inevitably be wiped out in the weeks ahead. But as terrorism researchers have shown, terrorist groups – particularly those with a hierarchal structure – have an ability to replace commanders and leaders quickly. Israel has killed countless Hamas commanders over the last quarter-century, yet the organisation was still able to generate revenue, build an arsenal and perpetrate the worst terrorist attack since 9/11.</p> -<p>As one interviewee expressed, service providers should aim to have strong capabilities, but it might not always be prudent for them to maintain capabilities that far exceed those of the entities they are protecting or managing — in this case, the FCEB agencies. Instead, it is more important that CISA monitor and encourage FCEB entities to have baseline capabilities across federal networks to better facilitate coordination in detection and response.</p> +<p>It should also be noted that Hamas is not just a terrorist group; it’s a social movement embedded in the Palestinian arena. The organisation is as much an idea as it is a coherent military entity. Even if Israel manages to destroy the military entity – no sure thing – the idea will survive. The Israeli military operation, and the thousands of Palestinian civilian casualties that will likely result from fighting in a highly populated area, is likely to generate the next round of recruits for Hamas and other like-minded groups like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.</p> -<p>Finally, as well put by one of the interviewees, “CISA offers a wide variety of excellent services. But they are just that: individual services.” While there are indications that CISA is actively moving to prioritize service integration so that insights and information collected via different channels are essentially talking to each other, it is worth flagging that, at present, this is a notable gap (see Recommendation 3.6 on system integration).</p> +<h3 id="does-israel-have-a-day-after-plan">Does Israel Have a “Day After” Plan?</h3> -<p><strong>RESOURCES</strong></p> +<p>Israel’s military objective is clear: destroy Hamas. What it plans to do after this objective is achieved is open for debate. The options for any post-Hamas governing arrangement in Gaza range from bad to worse. Gaza was in a precarious position before the war began, and is undergoing an even deeper socioeconomic catastrophe today. Roughly one-third of residential buildings have been damaged or destroyed over the last two weeks. More than 80% of Gazans are living in poverty and approximately 62% of Gaza’s youth were unemployed last year, according to UN statistics. Mass power outages are a fact of life, and the healthcare system is plagued by supply shortages.</p> -<p>A few of the interviewed experts expressed variations of this sentiment: “It’s great that CISA offers free services. But are they always free?” Some programs require long-term tool maintenance costs over time that might not have been initially understood. Others occasionally place time-intensive burdens on FCEB personnel — an indirect and underappreciated cost. And some, while not initially including a financial burden, might ultimately require financial investments if CISA’s services uncover an issue that an FCEB agency needs to remedy. <strong>It is not just a question of if CISA is properly resourced to continue providing services to the FCEB agencies, but also one of whether the FCEB agencies are properly resourced to take advantage of and implement guidance offered by CISA.</strong></p> +<p>Who is going to fix this mess? Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid has suggested bringing in the Palestinian Authority (PA) after hostilities cease. Yet in the 30th year of its existence, the PA has lost the trust of the very people it was meant to govern. The old men running it, Abbas included, are increasingly out of touch with the people they are supposed to represent. They’re viewed at best as a bunch of incompetents, and at worst as enablers of Israel’s occupation. Repeated Israeli raids in the West Bank over the last year, which the PA has been powerless to stop, are clear evidence of Abbas’s ineptitude in the minds of many Palestinians. Some parts of the West Bank – such as the Jenin refugee camp – are no-go areas for the Palestinian security forces and have essentially been handed over to smaller armed groups who hold no allegiance to the traditional Palestinian factions. In March, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 52% of Palestinians believed the interests of the Palestinian people would be best served by the PA’s dissolution. For those between the ages of 18 and 22, the figure goes up to 59%. If the PA can’t function properly in the limited areas of the West Bank it nominally controls, the probability it would do any better in Gaza – which has been devoid of PA influence since 2007 – is slim to none.</p> -<p>The first concern stems from a larger question of what centralized cyber funding could look like for the federal government and what that might mean for FCEB agencies that are the recipients of funds. At present, and as was outlined in the CDM section of this report, there are questions about the long-term sustainability of tools, with some FCEB entities having a harder time affording the continued use of cyber tools into the future.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Israel’s military objective is clear: destroy Hamas. What it plans to do after this objective is achieved is open for debate</code></em></strong></p> -<p>At the CISA level, there is also the question of whether the agency is adequately funded to accomplish its intended mission. Recent fiscal trends indicate an escalating commitment from the federal government toward bolstering cyberspace defense. The DOD’s allocation of $13.5 billion for cyberspace activities in FY 2024 — a significant, 20.5 percent hike from FY 2023 — underscores this commitment. While this budget seeks to operationalize the zero trust framework and advance next-generation encryption solutions, it also emphasizes industry cybersecurity through the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program and the expansion of the CNMF teams. The integration of these solutions is pivotal, not just as a defense mechanism but as a proactive measure against ever-evolving cyber threats.</p> +<p>Some have suggested an interim Gaza administration run by the UN and Arab states. On the surface, this sounds plausible. UN agencies are well entrenched in Gaza, having run schools and delivered social services to Gazans since well before Hamas’s takeover in 2007. The Gulf states could help finance the UN’s efforts.</p> -<p>For FY 2024, CISA is requesting $3.1 billion, a 5 percent increase from its FY 2023 budget. Director Easterly testified that if the budget were to fall to 2022 levels (roughly $2.6 billion), then it would “put [CISA] back in a pre-SolarWinds world.” The agency has made great strides in recent years to increase its capabilities, and moving forward it will be interesting to see if CISA’s allocated budget will be fully utilized and what services will be impacted first by any funding shortfalls. It is crucial to delve deeper into these matters to ascertain whether the existing fiscal strategy aligns with evolving cyber defense imperatives (see Pillar 1 Recommendations: Resourcing toward Success).</p> +<p>Even so, Arab states might not be willing to serve as Gaza’s white knight for a number of reasons. First, Arab leaders don’t want to be portrayed as cleaning up Israel’s mess or making Israel’s job easier in any way, shape or form. Palestinian statehood aspirations may have gone down a few notches on the list of priorities, but Arab governments can’t afford to ignore the issue’s strong salience among their publics. According to the 2022 Arab Opinion Index, organised by the Arab Center Washington DC, 76% of respondents thought the Palestinian cause was a concern for all Arabs, not just Palestinians.</p> -<p>For Congress, it is also important to note that the CSIS research team conducted a public survey with 1,000 individuals from the general public. A statistically significant number of respondents indicated that they do not think the federal government currently spends enough money on federal cybersecurity. While CISA has received funding boosts in recent years, and funding alone will not necessarily guarantee increased security, there would likely be political support for upping the cyber budgets for CISA and the FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>Israel could adopt a strategy of detachment once major combat operations are over by withdrawing its forces; strengthening land, sea and air restrictions over Gaza; and treating the enclave as a security issue. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s vague concept of establishing a “new security reality” for Gaza seems to hint in this direction. Israel, however, has been implementing such a strategy for the last 16 years, while neglecting the substantive political disagreements underlying the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.</p> -<p><strong>AUTHORITIES</strong></p> +<p>By far the worst option on the table for Israel is a full re-occupation of the enclave, a feat that even Ariel Sharon – one of Israel’s most hardline prime ministers – wasn’t interested in. US President Joe Biden has said an Israeli reoccupation of Gaza would be “a big mistake”. The Israeli government would likely agree; policing 2.3 million Palestinians – the same people forced to flee their homes in part due to Israeli airstrikes – and administering their affairs would be the definition of a thankless task.</p> -<p>In a 2022 CSIS study on federal migration to ZTA and endpoint security, interviewees noted general confusion about who was leading strategic coordination of larger federal ZTA efforts. The research team attempted to map out the different federal roles, noting that a clearer division of labor needs to be communicated in order to properly measure progress and hold agencies accountable for different tasks.</p> +<h3 id="unanswered-questions-linger-as-israel-prepares-for-a-long-war">Unanswered Questions Linger as Israel Prepares for a Long War</h3> -<p>With regard to federal network security, CISA is the designated lead. However, in support of its larger network defense mission, other entities such as the ONCD, OMB, and NIST play key roles in providing overall coordination and general guidance. <strong>In order to successfully defend federal networks, CISA needs a clearer delineation of what its role does — and does not — entail.</strong></p> +<p>Much like the US before the war in Afghanistan, Israel is committed to vanquishing its opponents through the force of arms. The US experience in Afghanistan, however, is instructive for Israel. US objectives were clear and measurable early on – destroy Al-Qa’ida and overthrow the Taliban regime – only for the US to slip into the herculean task of building an Afghan state from the ground up. US casualties mounted, about $2 trillion of US taxpayer money was spent, and US troops were put into a position of defending a corruption-plagued Afghan administration that was incapable of governing. With Israel on the verge of mounting its largest ground offensive since the 1982 invasion of Beirut, Israeli policymakers have a responsibility to ask the very same questions US policymakers failed to ask more than two decades ago.</p> -<p>Chris Inglis, former national cyber director, described his role as the “coach,” with CISA serving as the “quarterback.” And in many ways, this relationship has worked well, with the ONCD sometimes advocating on CISA’s behalf at higher-level meetings where CISA might not currently have a seat at the table. Still, some industry and government experts expressed a need for more clarity in roles and responsibilities at all levels, not just with regard to CISA’s FCEB mission (see Pillar 2 Recommendations: Leveraging and Harmonizing Authorities).</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT: SHARED SERVICES</strong></p> +<p><strong>Daniel R DePetris</strong> is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.</p>Daniel R DePetrisFollowing the 7 October attack by Hamas, Israel has determined to destroy the terrorist group controlling Gaza once and for all. The question is not just whether or not it will succeed, but what its plan is for the day after.The Lost European Vision2023-10-31T12:00:00+08:002023-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-lost-european-vision<p><em>Drawing insights from defense experts across NATO members, the study highlights the evolving European defense landscape, emphasizing security of supply concerns and the balance between national and EU initiatives. The report underscores pivotal forthcoming decisions in Europe’s defense amidst changing geopolitical dynamics.</em></p> -<p>Separate from its formal authorities in managing FCEB network security, <strong>CISA also has to identify ways to exist and provide value in the larger ecosystem of shared service providers.</strong> In other words, can CISA play nicely with others and elevate, integrate, and coordinate with the other providers already in the field? The DOJ, for example, is officially designated by the OMB as a federal shared service provider. CISA has also indicated that the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Transportation are vetted shared federal service providers</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>In addition to deconflicting current service offerings, CISA needs to be mindful of newer entities that can offer complementary services to FCEB agencies. For example, the NSA’s Cyber Collaboration Center, one of the DOD’s officially designated service providers that specifically provides tailored services to entities in the defense industrial base, routinely consults with other DOD providers to ensure maximum coordination and no duplication of services. From CSIS’s research, it appears as though the level of coordination between CISA and non-FCEB protecting entities, such as DOD service providers, may not be as high as it could be. Fairly or not, CISA is now the central point for a number of managed services to FCEB agencies, and the burden falls on them to ensure they are in sync and sharing best practices and resources from other providers across industry and governments (see Recommendation 3.4 on coordinating with other shared service providers).</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><strong>RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT WITH FCEB AGENCIES</strong></p> +<p>Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has caused a dramatic shift in the European security landscape, and European defense is now entering a new era. DGAP has initiated a project to provide a comprehensive analysis of the changes in the European defense sector triggered by the Russian attack.</p> -<p>CISA is taking active steps to position itself as a “partner” to FCEB agencies, but that also means that it needs to be cognizant of unique FCEB missions when providing guidance and developing plans. <strong>CISA needs to be able to balance security concerns with FCEB agencies’ mandates to perform the tasks that are statutorily required of them.</strong></p> +<p>During the first phase of the project, carried out in cooperation with the Friedrich-Naumann-Foun-dation, the analysis concentrated on changes in the perception of the defense environment and their implications for the future military order and defense cooperation.</p> -<p>One concern identified by interviewees for this report is that an FCEB agency could use certain tools to prioritize security that would hurt or impact the entity’s mission in other ways. This issue is all the more important if the ease of use for some technologies or processes is key to an agency being able to perform essential parts of its mission. In the name of trying to encourage FCEB agencies to acquire “secure” technologies, products are pushed out that do not necessarily work in ways that are of maximum real use to the FCEB agencies. In other words, the emphasis on security sometimes does not properly balance considerations related to basic operations.</p> +<p>The second phase of the EDINA (European Defense in A New Age) project focuses on the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in the new era of European defense. It highlights the impact of the Russian aggression on Europe’s defense industry and analyzes the structural drivers and constraints that influence the future trajectory of the continent’s industrial base.</p> -<p>A related concern is the larger issue of FCEB agencies managing technology debt and dealing with legacy systems that are either integral to the department or agency or are logistically difficult to phase out. In theory, general guidance should be to either phase out or properly secure legacy systems. In specific instances where that might not be possible, CISA should be willing to work with FCEB agencies to identify alternate ways to secure the networks.</p> +<p>The data base was generated in a similar way to the first phase of the EDINA project. In May and July 2023, DGAP brought together defense experts from European NATO members (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Greece, Türkiye, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria) for two workshops (physical and online) to discuss the current situation and future development of the EDTIB. Prior to the workshops, the experts were asked to prepare country reports as their input to the discussions. The reports allowed to sketch out the industrial landscape in Europe and provided valuable insights into different positions on defense industrial cooperation, dependencies, and structural problems regarding the EDTIB. The reports were based on the following questionnaire:</p> -<p>CISA already advertises that its services do not operate with a one-size-fits-all mentality. CISA needs to take that one step further in creatively thinking through how it defines, measures, and communicates its actual security goals (see Recommendation 3.1 on CISA’s outreach strategy).</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Industries/ RTO: What are current strengths in production and technologies (top 5-7 companies, revenue, employees, current major projects (timelines), role in the supply chain/product portfolio, cooperation partners, involvement in European projects)?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How does your country assess the impact of cooperation, dependencies (import/export) and competition among Europeans but also vis-à-vis the United States and Asia on the future ability of the armaments sector to deliver needed output (quantity/quality)?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Future Avenues: How will the national DTIB evolve over the next decade? What are important trigger points for such a development?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>MEASURING PROGRESS AND SUCCESS</strong></p> +<p>After the workshop, the authors had the opportunity to update their reports in the light of the discussions. For this publication, they were then slightly edited to meet grammatical and spelling standards. Any opinions expressed in the reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).</p> -<p>It is not entirely fair to say that metrics for measuring progress in federal cybersecurity do not exist. For instance, in accordance with FISMA, CISA and the OMB are able to collect information to help them better assess how FCEB agencies are making progress in their plans to implement processes and technologies that enhance federal cybersecurity. Additionally, CISA has noted benchmarks for measuring the success of a number of their services in their latest strategic plan for 2024 to 2026. <strong>Having clearly defined metrics is essential. In the absence of such metrics, it will not only be difficult for Congress to conduct oversight and appropriate funds to grow certain programs, but it will also be difficult for FCEB agencies to justify spending time and resources to engage with these services. Additionally, metrics that fail to properly capture unique areas of progress between different types of FCEB agencies will also possibly create tensions between CISA and its FCEB clients.</strong></p> +<p>This project report starts with a presentation of key findings from the workshop and country reports. This section also presents the research team’s analysis of the current situation, a forecast of likely developments, and suggestions for measures to be taken to push the EDTIB forward. This executive summary is followed by the country reports.</p> -<p>CISA is also likely able to internally track FCEB progress based on the number of services used, the frequency of use, and reporting times, among other metrics. That said, one FCEB interviewee did make the point that CISA might need to be more discerning in how it measures FCEB progress. For instance, if a third-party contractor is failing to meet certain deadlines and performance goals, blame should be assigned to the contractor and not the FCEB agency. An industry interviewee made a similar point, noting that the “matrix of contractors” makes it difficult to see who or what is actually working, and who or what is falling short. The metrics are not necessarily capturing the people and how they can positively or negatively impact progress.</p> +<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> -<p>Finally, another gap is a lack of measures that can help the public and FCEB agencies measure the usefulness of CISA’s offered services. Beyond use numbers, what are other formal metrics to rank the success (or failures) of certain products and services? And can these be used to generate more buy-in for CISA services? (See Recommendation 2.6 on metrics and FCEB feedback.)</p> +<p>Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 marks the beginning of a new era in European security, and Europe’s response to the Russian aggression will shape the development of the European defense technological and industrial base (EDTIB) for decades to come. At the same time, there are important economic and political factors influencing the continent’s defense industrial development. Against this background, this report outlines the most likely development scenario for the European industrial base. It also describes the options open to European governments and the EU to maintain a highly capable defense industry and address current shortcomings.</p> -<p><strong>MISSION AND PURPOSE</strong></p> +<h4 id="a-snapshot-of-the-european-defense-landscape">A Snapshot of the European Defense Landscape</h4> -<p>At what stage is it CISA’s responsibility to ensure not only that it is providing resources to FCEB agencies but that all FCEB agencies are taking full advantage of CISA’s offered services? In interviews with government and industry experts, there seemed to be varying opinions on this. Some would argue that CISA is already doing a lot and that it is not its fault if some FCEB agencies are not devoting enough time to familiarizing themselves with CISA services. Others thought the burden should fall on CISA to articulate clearly and comprehensively the nature of its services and ensure that they are being widely used by FCEB agencies. This becomes especially true for small and medium entities that, at present, might not have the time or resources to fully prioritize cybersecurity, let alone understand the various aspects of CISA services.</p> +<p>Europe’s defense industry produces the full range of conventional capabilities needed by its armed forces. However, this capacity comes with significant dependencies: On the one hand, given the many years of insufficient national demand, manufacturers have become increasingly dependent on exports to countries outside of the EU and NATO to maintain their skills and production lines. On the other hand, the economization of defense, meaning a growing pressure on prices, has created significant import dependencies on raw materials and key components like semi-conductors. Both elements are now coming under scrutiny as security of supply is becoming a key concern for European nations and their armed forces.</p> -<p>Beyond the public relations consideration, there is a larger issue underpinning this question: <strong>In order to be the designated lead of FCEB network security, does CISA need to centrally manage cyber risk across the FCEB landscape?</strong> Or should it take a tailored approach, letting some departments and agencies responsibly manage their own cybersecurity while taking on the security burdens of smaller and medium-sized entities?</p> +<p>The EDTIB reaches far beyond the EU and its member states. Despite EU initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and lately the European Peace Facility, the lion share of defense industrial investment undertaken by EU member states takes place outside the EU framework. Also, countries outside the EU – the United Kingdom as a defense industrial heavy weight as well as Norway and Türkiye – add significantly to the landscape, be it through cooperation or competition. At the same time, non-European companies have become part of the continent’s defense industrial ecosystem by contributing components or whole systems. This applies especially to the US industry but is also true for manufacturers for instance from South Korea.</p> -<p>Per the 2023 National Cyber Strategy, “federal civilian agencies are responsible for managing and securing their own IT and OT systems,” and federal cybersecurity plans must balance an agency’s “individual authorities and capabilities . . . with the security benefits achieved through a collective approach to defense.” While it can be assumed that this language was developed in close consultation with CISA, it does potentially diverge from CISA’s future goals of being able to manage the security of entities that are unable to sufficiently do so themselves.</p> +<p>Moreover, despite more than two decades of working toward closer cooperation in development and procurement within the EU, the EDTIB is still shaped by national choices taken decades ago – especially in the aftermath of the Cold War. These decisions were not primarily driven by defense considerations but influenced by broader domestic economic policies and philosophies, including on state ownership of defense companies. Thus, every country has its own story regarding its defense industrial base and ambitions. Eastern and central European countries had to address an extra challenge: Integration into NATO meant that their industries had to adapt to new standards for equipment and interoperability. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, they also lost their supply basis and economic links. As a result, many companies ceased production or concentrated on the maintenance of legacy equipment or exports to former Soviet states and export destinations of Soviet-made weapon systems.</p> -<p>For any of the cyber services to be successful moving forward, there needs to be a clarity of mission and long-term purpose. At present, while CISA might operate internally with a clear understanding, its operations are potentially at odds with how others are perceiving CISA’s role, and that could impact its usefulness as it continues to evolve (see Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3 on CISA’s role, and FCEB leaders’ roles, in managing federal networks).</p> +<p>This brief look at recent history underlines the importance of the upcoming decisions for the EDTIB. Europe is entering a new historical phase. The Russian war of aggression is the key impulse that has put security of supply for the armed forces at the top of the political agenda. European countries, whether big or small, now realize the cost of their dependence on global supply chains. Their governments share an aspiration to generate security of supply nationally. But their understanding of what that entails differs significantly. In some cases, countries limit their definition of the supplies they consider essential at the national level to fairly basic elements like ammunition and maintenance. In other cases, governments strive to keep their country’s technological edge regarding components or entire weapon systems. On a broader scale, the choices to be made indicate that the armed forces may require a new mix of quantity and quality.</p> -<h3 id="future-threats-and-challenges-on-the-horizon">Future Threats and Challenges on the Horizon</h3> +<p>Clearly, not every aspiration and every demand can be supplied nationally, resulting in a trade-off bet-ween ambition and feasibility that could open a path to cooperation. Current practice seems to reflect a pragmatic approach: While countries see their national basis as an indispensable core of their defense efforts, they also maintain their engagement in EU or multinational cooperation. Whether this is a legacy practice or a conscious choice will become clear when economic and financial pressures force tougher decisions on the future path of the defense industrial base.</p> -<p>For this report, the CSIS research team studied the current state of CISA services in order to better appreciate and predict how these initiatives might fare against future threats and challenges. Assuming current trends continue, the team’s goal was to get a better sense of what CISA’s overall network defense posture might look like in the coming years in order to identify possible service gaps and necessary interventions that should be considered in the near future.</p> +<h4 id="the-start-of-a-new-era">The Start of a New Era</h4> -<p>The research team intentionally limited its scope of study to look at a time frame three to five years out. Instead of hypothesizing major incidents that could arise in the distant future, the research team asked experts and tabletop exercise participants to critically think about realistic threats on the horizon and predict how CISA’s maturing services might be able to address these scenarios.</p> +<p>There are three main factors that will shape the development of the EDTIB in this new era: The first is the transformation of the security environment, in particular through the dramatic changes brought about by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Governments’ responses to the war have a direct impact on the defense industry and shape the expectations of companies in the sector. The second element consists of the economic interests of states and major defense companies. Both types of actors shape markets, trade, and production chains through their preferences. As preferences have not significantly changed, neither has the general direction of the EDTIB. As a result, economic preferences act as structural barriers to the fundamental change that the development of the security factors would call for. Third, there are the political visions of European integration, both in defense and in overall politics. They should be seen as an underlying long-term factor. The near absence of a discourse about more EU cooperation among EU member states seems to indicate that there is not much appetite to give the EU a larger role.</p> -<p>There were some specific mentions of actual technologies adversaries could use that might evolve in the coming years and test the effectiveness of CISA services. However, the majority of comments seemed to emphasize that future threats and challenges to FCEB networks will come from the same or similar threat vectors as seen today, just at greater frequency and likely in combination with other attacks. The challenge for CISA and the U.S. government writ large is finding ways to prioritize and appropriately respond to these types of attacks over a sustained period of time. Additionally, if left unaddressed, ongoing coordination, communication, and resourcing challenges will hamper the collective abilities of CISA and FCEB agencies to effectively defend federal networks.</p> +<p><strong>Security Concerns as a Momentum for Change</strong></p> -<h4 id="reflections-from-expert-interviews">Reflections from Expert Interviews</h4> +<p>The current situation of Europe’s defense industries is primarily shaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine. The conflict has brought security interests to the forefront of politicians’ minds when considering defense decisions.</p> -<p>Between this research project and a related effort looking at federal cybersecurity budgets, CSIS researchers and affiliates conducted over 30 informational interviews to better understand threats and challenges to federal networks, as well as the state of CISA cybersecurity services offered to FCEB agencies. The following is an overview of the types of individuals that participated in the expert interviews (not including comments from the expert task force and other experts that shared perspectives during the tabletop exercises):</p> +<p>Arguably the most important consequence affecting the EDTIB is a significant increase in demand for military equipment. On the one hand, this is due to the massive amount of armaments that Europe is delivering to Ukraine (already worth more than €36 billion, including deliveries from EU institutions). As many countries do not have large reserves of materiel and ammunition, stocks depleted by deliveries to Ukraine need to be replenished. On the other hand, many European governments have realized that their past efforts were not sufficient to ensure a credible deterrence posture. Decades of austerity and underfunding have left major European players with “bonsai armies” that are no longer able to defend their territories in the event of a Russian attack. This leaves Europe extremely vulnerable. European governments are now making efforts to reverse this trend and close existing capability gaps. Several major modernization programs have been launched, and major procurement decisions have been taken, such as Germany’s purchase of F-35 fighter jets from the United States. To underpin this new level of ambition, many countries have significantly increased their defense spending. Poland’s increase of the GDP share devoted to defense to four percent and Germany’s creation of a €100 billion special fund stand out.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Seven FCEB CISOs and CIOs</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Twelve federal cybersecurity experts (including individuals representing shared service providers, the ONCD, and CISA)</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Eleven private sector CISOs, CIOs, and cybersecurity experts</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>As a result, the overall size of the market has increased and is set to increase further. European governments now all agree that Ukraine will need support for the foreseeable future, as there appears to be little hope for peace any time soon. With security concerns undiminished, defense will continue to be a high priority across the continent, creating an energizing momentum for European defense contractors.</p> -<p>These not-for-attribution interviews covered a range of topics, such as personal experiences with and perceptions of CISA’s current tools and services, resource allocation, formal and implied authorities, marketing strategies, and future threats and challenges.</p> +<p>Currently, however, the EDTIB is not able to meet wartime demands. It successfully adapted to decades of peace, maintaining high profits despite relatively low levels of defense spending, but it lost the capacity to scale up production for wartime needs. Traditional European manufacturers will be able to partially absorb the new demand by establishing new production capacities, but this will not be sufficient either in terms of volume or of speed. Hence, third countries will benefit. Although the United States is an obvious alternative for supplies and US companies are certain to secure more contracts from Europe, American industry experiences similar bottleneck problems due to high demand.</p> -<p>Ultimately, even though the interviewed experts represented different-sized public and private sector entities, the CSIS research team was able to capture some interesting trends and notable divergence points between the groups. While specific comments from the interviews helped inform the research team’s general research and are reflected throughout the report, this section summarizes some key trends observed across the different interviews.</p> +<p>Other players such as South Korea and Türkiye are ready to step in. South Korea has recently won major contracts from Poland for K2 battle tanks and artillery ammunition and is establishing partnerships with other European countries as well (e.g., Romania). Türkiye also looks prepared to take on a greater role. Its Bayraktar drones have proved their worth in several conflicts, including the war in Ukraine. The Turkish DTIB has benefitted from high levels of domestic defense spending, which has allowed the sector to modernize and grow. Several Turkish companies appear ready to become serious competitors to their western and northern European peers.</p> -<p><strong>HOW TO SPEND FUNDS</strong></p> +<p>The war in Ukraine and the threat of further Russian aggression have given new urgency to efforts to fill capability gaps. Governments are prioritizing speed in new procurement programs. As a result, imports and off-the-shelf procurement are becoming more important. Since this usually means buying from non-European third countries (rather than setting up joint European development programs), there is a new momentum for European defense industrial cooperation. Even strong supporters of European cooperation have opted for imports, as demonstrated by Germany’s decision to buy F-35 fighters as nuclear carriers. This has caused friction in Franco-German relations, with France, a strong supporter of European cooperation, expressing disappointment over the German decision.</p> -<p><strong>Invest in data and service integration for greater visibility.</strong> Across interviews, the most requested investment was for CISA to prioritize data integration between its different tools and services, especially with regard to information collected via CDM. The desired outcome is to optimize visibility for all FCEB agencies by mapping services back to systems and within risk management tools. Some interviewees also suggested the use of AI/ML to assist with data integration. The observed comments underscore that CISA should prioritize investing in and actually communicating updates on data integration and the use of AI/ML to support greater automation.</p> +<p>In central and eastern Europe, defense industry partnerships and purchasing decisions are driven by the desire to keep the United States as the main regional security guarantor, which means that central and eastern European states prefer to buy American rather than European. This is facilitated by the fact that eastern European industries rarely play a role in major European development or procurement programs. As a result, central and eastern European countries do not benefit economically from buying European materiel or from engaging in joint development. Their tendency toward purchasing US equipment could be reinforced as security pressures remain high, speed in deliveries seem more important than ever, and NATO’s position as the bedrock of European security is strengthened.</p> -<p><strong>Advocate for cyber investments on behalf of FCEB agencies.</strong> FCEB interviewees pointed out that there is a role for CISA (or other cyber departments and entities in the federal government) to help FCEB agencies make informed decisions about how to invest in new technologies. A big part of that is helping the CISOs, CIOs, and cyber experts make the case for why their departments and agencies need more cyber investments to enhance security.</p> +<p>The outbreak of a major war in Europe also has consequences for the force structure of European militaries. There is a new focus on quantity. Major wars require more mass and deeper reserves and stocks than the external interventions that were the focus of the last two decades. Does this mean that Europe will focus less on innovation and that the EDTIB could fall behind in terms of technology? So far, this looks unlikely. Militaries and governments have defined requirements, and therefore innovation, years in advance, which means that for the next generation of systems, the innovation that industry needs to deliver has already been determined. Europe currently anticipates the production of cutting-edge technologies. However, there is a growing gap between current procurement plans and newly expressed demand in terms of volume. A new balance needs to be struck between mass production of current state of the art systems and high-end platforms designed to be built in smaller numbers.</p> -<p>Some interviewees, for example, expressed the desire for CISA representatives to advocate on behalf of the FCEB agencies for the use of AI technologies in network defense or to invest in training programs that help FCEB agencies more easily adopt and incorporate future technologies. Another common observation was that CISA can use its platform to help FCEB entities justify and allocate funds for more and better cyber talent. Per one FCEB interviewee, the federal enterprise currently lacks an advocate on behalf of the FCEB agencies who could resource departments with the proper funding and workforce to manage network security.</p> +<p>Governments are increasingly aware of the importance of ensuring security of supply. Their ambition spans from spare parts and maintenance via components to entire platforms. As a result, central and eastern European countries are investing in building up their domestic industries to become more independent. While smaller industries (e.g., in Bulgaria and Romania) are trying to secure a share of the maintenance business, others aim to participate in the manufacturing process itself and benefit from technology transfers. Poland is a good example of a government with both the ambition and the funds to develop a strong industrial base. Poland and similarly ambitious players with sufficient financial resources will be able to continue their growth path and play a greater role in the EDTIB. But while they can become more independent from imports, including from their European partners, it is unlikely that they will turn into serious competitors to Europe’s top producers.</p> -<p><strong>Develop sustainable cybersecurity budgets.</strong> An important common theme observed across a number of interviews is that FCEB agencies, at varying levels, need support in securing and maintaining cybersecurity budgets over long periods of time. This was most commonly referenced in relation to the CDM program, where FCEB agencies were given subsidies to cover their tools for an initial two years but were then expected to fund the tools on their own once the initial funding expired (see CDM section of the report).</p> +<p>A key issue for the future EDTIB is the sustainability of the increase in defense spending. Building a defense technological and industrial base capable of meeting the new level of ambition requires a sustained high level of defense spending to keep funds from being diverted to other government functions in the event of an economic downturn or a reappraisal of policy priorities. Most European governments seem to understand that defense spending must be sustainable to produce results. They are not only willing to maintain their budgets at the current high level but also envisage further increases in the near future. With security pressures expected to remain high, defense will remain a priority across the continent. As a result, the defense market will continue to grow.</p> -<p>These budgets also need to account for inflation-related price increases, added labor costs for managing certain tools overtime, and unanticipated costs associated with patching and fixing certain tools periodically or as vulnerabilities are discovered.</p> +<p><strong>Economic Interests as a Barrier to Change</strong></p> -<p>While CISA’s role might not necessarily be to help FCEB agencies strategize their cyber budgets, and there were different thoughts on what type of funding model or models would be most appropriate for different types of tools and services, the larger point was that the current structure is not optimal for producing long-term security benefits (see Pillar 1 Recommendations: Resourcing toward Success).</p> +<p>Although security considerations currently drive the general direction of defense policy in Europe, there are economic trends and considerations that strongly influence the development of the EDTIB. In peacetime, they were arguably more dominant, but even now, no government will take decisions that go against its economic and industrial interests, which are to nurture national arms producers. Any analysis of the defense sector therefore needs to take the industry’s political economy into account. Governments may claim that they are acting in the spirit of European integration or that their motives are exclusively security related, but that is rarely the case. All, even small countries, have bold ambitions for using the additional money and demand to boost their national DTIBs. All envisage to evolve from the current size and product portfolio of the national companies to the next level. Moreover, all countries assessed are keen to boost exports, based on strategies drawn up by the government or the industrial players. They either want to enter foreign markets or expand their role there.</p> -<p><strong>AUTHORITIES: BALANCING THE BURDENS OF RISK AND ACCOUNTABILITY</strong></p> +<p>What differs is the character of these industries, especially the role they play in the production chain. A striking feature of the EDTIB is the heterogeneity of the national industries it comprises. They can be categorized into four different spheres: core industries, traditional mid-sized industries, rising stars, and industries at the periphery.</p> -<p>Arguably, the biggest discussion around authorities ultimately got back to <strong>who should be in charge of managing FCEB cyber risk and how that potentially impacts resourcing, information dissemination, general accountability, and related concerns.</strong> One interviewee described CISA’s FCEB mission as a challenge because the agency had to “work in a kitchen with too many cooks.” One extreme that was brought up was the idea for CISA to centralize management of FCEB IT infrastructure, backed with the funding and other resources to fully execute that mission. Pursuing this route would minimize the “cooks” to just one and centralize risk management at CISA. The alternative, alluded to by a number of experts, is for CISA to continue working as a partner in collaboration with FCEB agencies. Beyond general support via its official services, some interviewees expressed a desire to have CISA subject matter experts detailed to their respective FCEB agencies to assist with issues such as overcoming technical knowledge gaps and helping with ZTA migration.</p> +<p>The European defense industrial core is situated in western Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK), where strong industrial bases capable of producing almost the entire portfolio of weapon systems across all domains have been developed and maintained. Their industries are the largest in Europe, producing technologically advanced products that are highly competitive. While all of them also have a strong export profile, a high proportion of the equipment they produce gets purchased by the armed forces of their home countries. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK are home to several of the top 100 defense companies. All the major pan-European defense companies are at least partly owned by stakeholders from these countries, and direct state involvement is not uncommon. The core countries also lead major European development programs such as Eurofighter, A400M, Tornado, and more recently Tempest and FCAS. With the exception of the UK, all are strong supporters of EU initiatives such as PESCO and the EDF.</p> -<p>There are major cultural barriers to CISA becoming the sole manager of risk. And even if it could work through those issues with the FCEB agencies, it is not apparent that CISA currently has the ability to serve in this role in the near future. That said, this is a question that should be studied further, especially since there seem to be different ideas about what balance could yield optimal security outcomes (see Pillar 2 Recommendations: Leveraging and Harmonizing Authorities).</p> +<p>Countries such as Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Greece are home to some traditional mid-sized industries. They participate in European joint development programs for complex weapon systems without being able to lead them – the naval sector gradually becoming an exception. These countries are heavily dependent on imports from both Europe and the United States.</p> -<p><strong>COMMUNICATION AND ENGAGEMENT</strong></p> +<p>Some smaller manufacturers (or traditionally less important producers for the EDTIB) have embarked on ambitious growth trajectories. Companies in Poland and Türkiye have already achieved remarkable technological developments that set them apart from their regional peers. Türkiye’s industry, in particular, has undergone a major transformation in recent years. Turkish companies have achieved a leading position in the UAV market and moved to the forefront of technology in sectors that include turbojet engines and ballistic missiles. By some measures, Hungary can also be counted into this group, as there is considerable momentum with top tier producers opening facilities in the central European state. These countries are rising stars and can be expected to play a greater role in the future of the EDTIB.</p> -<p>While experts did note that CISA has been receptive to their comments and feedback, they still emphasized that for CISA to be successful it needs to prioritize persistent but coordinated engagement with FCEB agencies. This is especially important since interviewees also expressed that some FCEB agencies might not be fully aware of CISA’s complete slate of services offered or of the applications or value add in a sector-specific manner. One participant suggested that in addition to a general outreach campaign, a comprehensive, sector-specific service catalog might be helpful.</p> +<p>Finally, there are countries with only small or niche industries. They constitute the periphery. This group consists mainly of former Warsaw Pact countries such as Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Bulgaria. While they can be competitive in niche sectors, their companies lack the overall technological edge to compete with the European core (let alone the United States). They have few or no system integrators. Most companies focus on component production and maintenance.</p> -<p>Some of the non-FCEB experts emphasized that if CISA wants to ensure that new services are used and its authorities appreciated, it should be “knocking on the FCEBs’ doors,” sometimes multiple times, to explain the different services, authorities, and other aspects of its activities. The emphasis should be on the value these services can bring to a department or agency. One expert also made the point that CISA should systematically interview or survey its FCEB clients to identify specific demands for certain types of tools (if it does not do so already). This particular expert further argued that developing a proof of concept and proving its value through demonstrations and success stories will help secure more buy-in for new products and services (see Pillar 3 Recommendations: Enhancing Communication and Coordination with Key Stakeholders).</p> +<p>After the end of the Cold War, the state-owned industries of the periphery were partly privatized. As demand for standard Warsaw Pact components plummeted, they underwent a period of transition and reform which significantly weakened their DTIBs. NATO integration was another challenge, as many companies were unable to produce according to NATO standards and therefore could not be integrated into European supply chains. This means that in the periphery, the modernization of domestic armed forces does not necessarily lead to new orders for national DTIBs.</p> -<p><strong>THE FUTURE THREAT LANDSCAPE</strong></p> +<p>The differences in industrial portfolios translate into different approaches to industrial policy and procurement. Two approaches can be identified: a capability-driven approach and an industry-driven approach. The dividing line runs, broadly speaking, between western and eastern Europe, and between the core and traditional mid-sized industries on the one side and the rising stars and the periphery on the other. This is due to fundamental differences which are unlikely to change much over the coming decades.</p> -<p>Malware-as-a-service lowers the cost of entry for adversaries, and it is increasing noise for defenders. Interviewees believe that <strong>AI will further increase this noise, and FCEB agencies and CISA should develop and acquire tools that help automate their defenses and increase their ability to detect vulnerabilities</strong> (see Recommendation 1.4 on AI product pricing strategy). One interviewee attested that they are already finding ChatGPT-elevated malware, highlighting that a response to these types of threats is urgently needed today.</p> +<p>Central and eastern European states tend to emphasize capability development over industrial interests (capability-driven approach) to address the security pressure resulting from their geographical proximity to Russia. Of course, they also take their domestic industrial base into account when establishing industrial partnerships. They will attempt to secure small work shares for their domestic companies, especially in maintenance (to be able to operate independently), and seek to benefit from technology transfers. All in all, however, they prioritize operational readiness and capability development over industrial gains. In terms of cooperation, they favor US products over participation in European development projects, which are notorious for cost overruns and delays. Third-country imports and off-the-shelf purchases (which often go hand in hand) are seen as less costly and more efficient than European co-development.</p> -<p>A related point is that it is one thing to identify a threat, but it is another to <strong>fully understand the nature of a threat and, by extension, develop the appropriate countermeasures needed to address the situation.</strong> To tackle emerging threats, some interviewees and experts indicated that certain dangers, such as deepfakes, might not immediately appear to pose a threat to federal network security, but that reputational risks and attacks on individuals that manage key parts of an FCEB agency could have detrimental effects on its ability to carry out its mission. A common theme for the interviews was the need to get a better handle on today’s threats that could manifest with greater frequency as tomorrow’s problems.</p> +<p>This tendency is reinforced by the fact that their industries are not in a position to contribute significantly to European projects. In some cases, they were even actively excluded from such projects as when Poland’s request to participate in the MGCS was rejected by Germany and France. As a result, rising star and peripheral countries see little or no economic benefit in participating in major European development programs. They are increasingly open to forging new partnerships with non-European producers such as South Korea if these promise rapid delivery and participation in maintenance (and sometimes even production).</p> -<h4 id="reflections-from-tabletop-exercises-and-the-public-survey">Reflections from Tabletop Exercises and the Public Survey</h4> +<p>Western and northern European core countries and countries with a traditional mid-sized industry take a different approach. When they take purchasing decisions, they accord at least the same priority, of not more, to the interests of their domestic industries than to their military needs. Governments try to get their domestic producers involved as much as possible when awarding contracts. As a result, their industries focus more on producing high-end systems that are competitive on the world market than on operational readiness.</p> -<p>In addition to the interviews, CSIS researchers conducted tabletop exercises and an online survey experiment with the general public to capture how experts and the public think about the cyber threat landscape. The research team ran the tabletop exercise six times. In total, over 50 experts — academics and think tank thought leaders, federal and private sector CISOs, and other cybersecurity or national security experts from the federal and private sectors — participated in the exercises. Conducted in a virtual setting, these exercises delved deep into potential threats surrounding the 2024 U.S. elections. With the overarching scenario of adversaries targeting critical public services, from SNAP and farm loans to vital research endeavors, the exercises highlighted the vulnerabilities that could shake the core of U.S. society.</p> +<p>At the same time, governments realize that the technological complexity of modern armaments systems means that a purely national production is no longer possible. In this situation, western and northern European countries (especially the industrial core) prefer joint European development programs to non-European imports because the former benefit their domestic producers more. This approach is very much in line with the concept of European strategic autonomy, which basically calls for all major platforms to be produced by European companies in Europe.</p> -<p>The participants found themselves in the shoes of hackers advising the hypothetical company Veil Vector Technologies (VVT), strategizing cyberattacks on the public services overseen by the FCEB agencies. With a menu of cyberattacks at their disposal — ranging from the individually targeted deepfakes to more institutionally disruptive degrade attacks — participants were exposed to the multifaceted nature of cyber warfare.</p> +<p>Yet that same rationale does not make joint projects run smoothly. Even when working together, core countries are wary of their economic competitors both inside and outside Europe. This causes problems of co-ordination in European development programs and can lead to the exclusion of potential competitors and the duplication of projects just to ensure a greater share of work for domestic companies (as in the case of Tempest and FCAS).</p> -<p>Transitioning from offense to defense, in the next phase participants found themselves representing CISA. Tasked with designing countermeasures against the very strategies they had previously developed, they had to delve into CISA’s spectrum of services to assess which might alter adversary behavior. This transition served not just as a strategy assessment tool but also as a testament to the complex task of anticipating and countering cyber threats.</p> +<p>The core (and thus the EDTIB in general) is also marked by an element of risk aversion on the part of large companies, which is turning into an obstacle to innovation. There is not enough private investment to provide funds for research and development (R&amp;D). In contrast to other sectors of the economy, innovation in defense is largely state-funded, which makes companies reluctant to use their own funds, as they know that eventually the government will pay for technological development.</p> -<p>Separately, the CSIS research team adapted the expert exercise and developed a simplified online survey that could be pushed to the general public. The survey was conducted online via Prolific, with 1,000 participants, ensuring a demographic representation in line with the U.S. population. This careful juxtaposition between expert-driven decisions and those of the general public brought forth a nuanced understanding of cyber threat perceptions, potentially bridging the gap between theoretical strategies and their real-world implications.</p> +<p>In addition, major arms producers have been reluctant to ramp up production following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In part, this can be explained by ambivalent signals from governments about the sustainability of long-term financing. If companies are uncertain whether an investment will pay off in the medium and long term, they will be reluctant to make it. However, such investments would be crucial for production to meet wartime demand even if not all production capacity is used in peacetime. There seems to be a conflict between the security interests of states (i.e., creating enough capacity to ramp up production in wartime) and the economic interests of firms (avoiding overcapacity to maximize profits).</p> -<p>The multifaceted world of cybersecurity is in continuous flux, with threats originating from both state and non-state entities and ranging from traditional attacks to novel strategies such as deepfakes. Harmonizing insights from experts with public perceptions can pave the way for robust strategies, shaping a safer and more informed digital environment for all.</p> +<p><strong>The Absence of Political Visions</strong></p> -<p><strong>INSIGHTS FROM THE TABLETOP EXERCISES AND PUBLIC SURVEY</strong></p> +<p>Political visions are key to the long-term future of the EDTIB because they create coherence with regard to key design features, such as procurement and cooperation strategies. Even more importantly, they help generate a coherent idea of the vision that a European industry should serve and therefore the shape it should take.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Participant Profiles:</strong> The majority of expert participants came from the public and private sectors, supplemented by individuals from academia and think tanks. The public survey, on the other hand, captured U.S. demographic representation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Attacker Choices:</strong> As advisers to VVT, participants were first asked to select which nation-state would be requiring their services. In the second round of the game, the participants were asked to identify what type of non-state actor would require their services. In assessing global threats, experts and the public displayed a divergence in views — especially concerning Russia and China — with the former potentially relying on specialized intelligence and the latter influenced largely by media narratives. This divide extends to perceptions of North Korea, suggesting an information gap where public concerns might be media driven or anchored in broader geopolitical narratives. However, there is a notable alignment in perspectives on non-state threats, possibly due to uniform media portrayals or the transparent nature of such risks. The escalating public concern surrounding “lone wolf” actors underscores the growing recognition of their unpredictability in the digital age.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The most influential vision of the last decade has been that of European strategic autonomy. The concept was prominently introduced through the EU’s Global Strategy, in which the EU outlined its ambition to become a more credible security and defense actor. A key element of strategic autonomy is the development of an integrated European defense industrial base capable of producing major weapon systems in Europe. According to this concept, the EDTIB should be able to provide European armed forces with all the weapons they need without having to rely on the United States or other third countries. In short, EU countries should buy European equipment from European producers. In domains where EU countries currently lack capabilities, they should set up joint development programs. The proponents of strategic autonomy see a self-sufficient EDTIB as vital to strengthening Europe’s security of supply and thus boosting its geopolitical weight in systemic competition.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HRpsjJ0.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Attacker Choices.</strong></em></p> +<p>However, the pursuit of strategic autonomy is by no means an undisputed vision. First, there is a debate about which countries the EU should cooperate with. Some governments, including those that are part of the core, wish to allow third countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States to participate in EU-funded programs. Others want to restrict access to EU funds to the European continent and EU countries.</p> -<p>Participants were given three options of domains to target in the exercise:</p> +<p>Second, many peripheral and rising countries within the EU do not consider European strategic autonomy a priority, mainly because they do not see the benefit of it. On the contrary, they suspect that core countries with industries at the cutting edge of technology are pursuing their own interests under the guise of a supposedly impartial vision. As it happens, the strongest supporters of the concept of European strategic autonomy are the countries best positioned to benefit economically from European development projects.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Basic Needs:</strong> The deliberate targeting of critical societal elements — such as healthcare, financial systems, and government benefits — can lead to significant chaos. The ripple effect of an attack on these systems could cripple the daily lives of citizens, leading to public unrest, economic instability, and a significant downturn in public trust in institutions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Small and Medium Businesses:</strong> Often overlooked in the grand scheme of cybersecurity, small and medium businesses (SMBs) represent a soft target for adversaries. Due to frequently limited resources, their cybersecurity infrastructure may not be as fortified as larger entities. Their disruption could not only threaten the livelihoods of many but also create supply chain disturbances, causing economic strain and public mistrust toward market institutions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Science and Technology:</strong> Beyond just data breaches, the compromise of the science and technology sector could erode the foundation of factual, evidence-based decisionmaking in society. Misinformation or manipulated data could skew public opinion, lead to ill-informed policies, and erode trust in research institutions, thereby influencing democratic processes in subtle yet profound ways.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Another factor weighing against the concept of strategic autonomy concerns the difficulties associated with joint European development programs in the past. Projects such as the NH90 helicopter, the A400M aircraft, or the Eurofighter were notorious for cost overruns, delays, and a failure to deliver the initially promised benefits in terms of economies of scale and military interoperability.</p> -<p><strong>Participants prioritized going after basic needs over SMBs or science and technology.</strong> After selecting an attacker, participants were asked what types of services they were most interested in attacking (i.e., which services would most successfully undermine trust in U.S. institutions if attacked). For instance, participants who chose non-state actors gravitated toward attacks on basic needs (52 percent) over SMBs (37 percent), with science and technology being the least preferred target, at 10 percent (see Figure 5).</p> +<p>Finally, attitudes regarding the future of European integration differ within Europe. Countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the UK are keen to uphold their national autonomy, which also has implications for the defense sector.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZEEDkBS.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Distribution of Service Types by Rank (Non-state).</strong></em></p> +<p>As a result, there is no consistent common vision or idea of what the EDTIB should look like in terms of regional distribution, production portfolio, rules for exports, or cooperation partners. Nor is there any consensus on how much Europe should import or which degree of autonomy it should aim to achieve.</p> -<p><strong>Attack strategies varied depending on what type of service was being attacked.</strong> For instance, whether hacktivist or state-sponsored, there was consistency in strategies — basic needs and SMBs were targeted with “Disruption,” while science and technology was susceptible to “Espionage” (see Figure 6). Similar results were obtained from the public survey game (see Figure 7).</p> +<p>This does not mean, however, that there is no common ground. The EU has established a number of instruments for facilitating joint arms development that are widely regarded as successful, notably the EDF. Although these instruments lack clarity, coherence, and compatibility with NATO processes, most governments agree that such EU policies will be crucial for the future development of the EDTIB.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ULZclGI.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Expert Group Average Resource Distribution in Attack Types (Non-state Actors, State Actors).</strong></em></p> +<h4 id="how-will-the-edtib-develop">How Will the EDTIB Develop?</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/V7Xz2cW.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Public: Distribution of Attack Types.</strong></em></p> +<p>The analysis presented above suggests that absent major political initiatives, there will be no major changes to the basic design of the EDTIB in the new era of European defense. Instead, business will be conducted as usual. That is, the European core will continue to produce state-of-the-art capabilities that provide a degree of political and operational autonomy from the United States. The periphery will seek to reduce its dependence, including on its European allies, while maintaining an ambivalent attitude toward European cooperation and European strategic autonomy.</p> -<p><strong>Attack timing varied depending on if the actor was a state or non-state actor.</strong> When players chose state actors, 63 percent opted for a cyberattack strategy focused on future attacks, while 37 percent aimed for immediate results. In contrast, selecting non-state actors saw 56 percent of players planning for future attacks and 44 percent pursuing immediate outcomes. This underscores state actors’ heightened preference for longer-term cyber strategies compared to non-state actors. Additionally, public survey results closely aligned with this expert approach, yielding similar conclusions (see Table 2). There is a statistically significant difference in the attack strategy choices between state and non-state actors, determined by a chi-square test of independence.</p> +<p>Although the increase in budgets may revive parts of the defense sector and generate some momentum for defense companies, there are few signs of improved coherence and coordination. Currently, there is no momentum for closer defense industrial cooperation in Europe, nor do waves of consolidation seem likely in the foreseeable future. While small-scale mergers are possible, there appears to be nothing major on the horizon. The overall industrial structure will remain unchanged.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yiScA5z.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Comparison of Attack Strategy Choices between State and Non-state Actors (Public Survey).</strong></em></p> +<p>Regional and economic divides will persist, as will the wide differences over sourcing and cooperation. However, there will be opportunities for more ad-hoc, country-to-country, and sectoral cooperation formats such as the European Sky Shield initiative. But there will be no grand design, no coherent European vision of how to coordinate and drive the EDTIB.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="public-perception-of-us-cybersecurity-spending"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Public Perception of U.S. Cybersecurity Spending</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The sources of change are the rising stars and the non-European suppliers. The main players to watch are South Korea, Poland, and Türkiye. The United States is a traditional European supplier already. Its share in Europe may increase but without larger industrial relevance to the American DTIB.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The general public believes the federal government does not spend enough on cybersecurity. The public’s perception of governmental inadequacy in cybersecurity funding is significant. It implies a gap in public communication — where either the federal initiatives are not well publicized or their efforts are not resonating effectively with the general populace — or just a reminder that there is simply not enough money allocated for cybersecurity. This sentiment underscores the need for improved public relations efforts, clearer communication of cybersecurity endeavors, and potential reevaluation of budget allocations based on emerging threats.</code></em></p> +<p>Some mid-sized and smaller European players will continue to grow and increase their role. But there will be no major shift in the industrial balance of power. The industrial core will continue to determine the development of the EDTIB. The fundamental power asymmetry will remain, with all its consequences for European cooperation and coordination.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mNtTrDm.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: U.S. Funding Survey for Cybersecurity Spending.</strong></em></p> +<p>What are the game changers that could shift this trajectory? If European countries were to agree large multilateral programs with sufficient funding to generate major technological advances, new champions and pan-European companies could emerge, which would transform the industrial landscape. Another game changer could be a reform of EU policies to harmonize existing instruments and shape a consistent development path for the EDTIB.</p> -<p><strong>EMERGING THEMES FROM TABLETOP EXERCISE DISCUSSIONS</strong></p> +<h4 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h4> -<p>In light of the recent tabletop exercise discussions, several themes emerged regarding potential cyber threats targeting federal networks. These insights, gathered from expert deliberations, point to the evolving nature of the cyber landscape and the increasing sophistication of threat actors:</p> +<p>Given the most likely scenario for the future development of the EDTIB, what can the EU and member state governments do to influence the trajectory of the defense sector and produce a better outcome? The following section sets out which actions can be taken to make the EDTIB more coherent and capable.</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>Sophisticated State-Sponsored Attacks:</strong> Experts believe that state-sponsored attacks, particularly from adversaries such as Russia and China, are growing in complexity. Their focus seems to be on espionage and long-term presence within federal networks to gather intelligence and potentially influence policies.</p> + <p>Regard the EDTIB as a strategic asset: Europe needs to equip the EDTIB to meet both its short and long-term needs. It should regard the EDTIB as a strategic asset, which includes finding answers to questions such as:</p> + + <ul> + <li> + <p>How can “bonsai industries” be rebuilt to meet European demand?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What can governments do to enhance the development of defense technologies and avoid being overtaken by competitors such as China?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How can governments make the best use of a wide range of instruments, including political control over the sector? Since the defense industry is vital for national and European security, there is no doubt that political intervention in the market and the exercise of political control over market players can be justified.</p> + </li> + </ul> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Deepfakes and Misinformation:</strong> A significant concern raised is the potential use of deepfakes to spread misinformation. Such tactics could be employed to undermine trust in federal communications or to spread false narratives that serve the interests of external actors.</p> + <p>Establish a mechanism for building up stocks: In response to the current shortage of ammunition and materiel, European government should pass legally binding requirements to ensure that the EDTIB has sufficient depth in terms of industrial capacity to be able to equip European militaries in a war scenario. They should also provide for sufficient reserves of ammunition and other critical goods. The design of such a system could be inspired by Cold War arrangements.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Supply Chain Vulnerabilities:</strong> There is increasing awareness of vulnerabilities within the supply chains that serve federal networks. By compromising a single entity within the supply chain, threat actors can potentially gain access to a broader range of federal systems and data.</p> + <p>Secure funding: To stay at the cutting edge of technology, the EU and its member states must make the necessary funding available, particularly for R&amp;D. This means that funding must be sustainable, which will also attract more private investment. Governments need to be able to credibly tell defense companies that the current increases in defense spending and the new level of ambition for European defense are more than a blip. Doing so would send a message to shareholders and owners that investing into the development of new weaponry carries a low risk and that investments will pay off.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Erosion of Trust:</strong> One strategy identified involves eroding public trust in federal institutions. By creating disruptions or manipulating data, threat actors can shake the public’s confidence in government efficiency and reliability.</p> + <p>Set up major European development programs: Involving as many European countries as possible in major multilateral development programs is the most effective way to boost the technological development of the EDTIB. Such programs ensure that sufficient financial resources are pooled to produce the high-end capabilities needed to remain competitive. At the same time, they create economies of scale and increase interoperability, which is a decisive military advantage.</p> </li> -</ul> + <li> + <p>Develop a strategy to deal with third countries: As third countries become more important as arms suppliers, European governments should develop a common approach toward them. To this end, they need to decide:</p> -<p>Additionally, several themes emerged on how cybersecurity architecture can offset these future threats:</p> + <ul> + <li> + <p>Who should be allowed to participate in EDF and PESCO projects and thus benefit from EU funds? This concerns primarily the United Kingdom and the United States but potentially also Indo-Pacific partners such as Australia or Japan.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How much should US companies operating in Europe be allowed to contribute to European projects? What share would make it possible for them to add value without compromising European autonomy?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How should Europe deal with Türkiye and South Korea? As partners? As competitors? Each categorization has different policy implications.</p> + </li> + </ul> + </li> + <li> + <p>Europe must also find solutions to the underlying problems of the EDTIB’s economic structure and the lack of a common political vision. A first step would be a comprehensive review of EU policies to assess which have proved useful and which have not. An important issue for discussion would be to reexamine the European Commission’s approach to competition and consolidation in the defense sector. Before the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, consolidation was seen as beneficial because it reduced overcapacity, pooled technological knowledge, and created synergies. Some effects, however, have proved problematic. As players left the market or merged and overcapacity was reduced, the EDTIB was unable to ramp up production quickly enough to meet current demand. This shows that a certain amount of industrial overcapacity is probably necessary to be able to scale up production in a war scenario.</p> -<ul> + <p>Another side-effect of consolidation is the concentration of market power in the hands of a small number of European system integrators. In some sectors, this has led to quasi-oligopolistic market structures, with all the negative effects associated with such a concentration of economic power. Paradoxically, the EU’s emphasis on competition has in some cases led to a reduction in competition as consolidation increased.</p> + </li> <li> - <p><strong>Enhanced Monitoring and Threat Intelligence:</strong> Experts suggest that federal networks should invest in real-time monitoring and threat intelligence capabilities. By understanding the evolving threat landscape, federal entities can be better prepared to detect and respond to intrusions.</p> + <p>Align EU and NATO defense industrial frameworks: A better fit is needed between NATO instruments, such as the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and NATO standards, and the EU industrial framework and, more generally, the EDTIB, to reduce duplication and create synergies. This is one of the few aspects on which there is almost complete consensus among European governments. Eastern European countries in particular stress that EU initiatives should not be realized at the expense of NATO frameworks.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Robust Incident Response Protocols:</strong> In the event of a breach or cyber incident, having a well-defined and practiced response protocol can significantly reduce the potential damage. Rapid containment and mitigation should be the priority.</p> + <p>Reduce regional imbalances: A major structural obstacle to greater coherence and coordination in the EDTIB consists of regional imbalances between core countries on the one side and mid-sized countries and the periphery on the other side in terms of industrial capacity and technological advantage. The EU – and especially the industrial core – must find ways to make participation in joint European development programs attractive to central and eastern European countries. This will most likely mean the transfer of knowledge and some part of the production. Such a step requires a willingness on the part of core governments and companies to support industrial development in central and eastern Europe even at the expense of some of their domestic profits. This is the price to be paid for greater coherence, coordination, and involvement of peripheral and mid-sized industries. A good starting point could be to use the additional funds becoming available from rising defense budgets to build production facilities in mid-sized and peripheral countries and integrate them into European supply chains.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Supply Chain Security:</strong> Given the vulnerabilities in supply chains, experts recommend stricter security standards for all vendors serving federal networks. This includes regular security audits and ensuring that vendors comply with best practices.</p> + <p>Establish a secondary market for used and modernized equipment: Smaller countries with fewer financial resources are calling for the establishment of a secondary market to help modernize their armed forces and meet NATO standards in a cost-effective manner.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Public Awareness and Communication:</strong> Experts emphasize the importance of transparent communication with the public. By promptly addressing misinformation and clarifying federal stances, trust can be maintained and the impact of misinformation campaigns can be reduced.</p> + <p>Address structural dependencies: Europe has become dependent on imports of raw materials, alloys, and components such as semiconductors, mainly from Asia. Given the systemic competition between Western countries and China, security of supply will be a key issue. Europe’s dependence should be addressed.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Investment in Advanced Technologies:</strong> To keep up with sophisticated threat actors, experts advocate for continued investment in advanced cybersecurity technologies. This includes AI-driven threat detection, encrypted communications, and secure cloud infrastructures.</p> + <p>Deal with other challenges and structural barriers at the national level:</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>In conclusion, as the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve, federal networks face increasing challenges. However, by taking a proactive stance, understanding emerging threats, and investing in robust cybersecurity measures, federal entities can effectively safeguard their systems and data. The reflections from the tabletop exercises underscore the importance of continued dialogue, collaboration, and innovation in the realm of federal cybersecurity.</p> - -<h4 id="other-challenges">Other Challenges</h4> - -<p><strong>AI-ENABLED THREATS</strong></p> - -<p>Across the board, one of the immediate areas of concern for interviewed experts and tabletop exercise participants was AI-enabled threats and challenges, along with questions about whether the U.S. government’s defensive measures would be able to sufficiently detect and address these threats in real time.</p> - -<p>Promisingly, statements from CISA leaders demonstrate a perspective on AI that is forward looking, flexible, and practical. Plans were mentioned that not only think about how to help safeguard AI models that might be used for new tools and capabilities but also address how CISA can proactively benefit by using AI tools so it can keep pace with the threat landscape.</p> - -<p>The following are a few specific types of AI challenges that could impact FCEB agencies in the coming years, with an assessment of how CISA’s planned activities might address these challenges:</p> +</ol> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Synthetic Media and Disinformation:</strong> In recent years there has been growing public awareness about how AI-generated content can be used to spread mis- and disinformation. In a recent CSIS survey, when respondents were presented with a series of images and audio and video clips, they could only correctly identify what content was real versus what content was AI-generated roughly 50 percent of the time, which is basically flipping a coin.</p> - - <p>There are attempts by coalitions and individual industry actors to authenticate sources of online content, which is a step in the right direction. From CISA’s point of view, it becomes a question of whether it is its role to even be concerned about these types of threats. Whether or not CISA has the capabilities or capacity to deal with mis- and disinformation, let alone AI-generated mis- and disinformation, the core question is: Does its mission to protect FCEB networks even authorize it to engage in this area of work in the first place?</p> - - <p>The consulted experts were mixed. Some were unconcerned about AI’s actual impact on institutions, while some were very concerned about its direct and even indirect impact on certain aspects of FCEB agencies. Others expressed a concern but were unsure what role, if any, CISA should play in focusing on this threat.</p> - - <p>It is the CSIS research team’s belief that recent incidents (such as the story involving deepfakes of a DHS appointee in compromising situations) illustrate how these types of attacks might have low impacts to networks but can greatly damage personal reputations in ways that could influence an FCEB’s ability to deliver on its mission. Additionally, manipulated images might impact an FCEB agency’s ability to spread timely, reliable information if it is competing with inauthentic and misleading content. While at present CISA does not have a formal role in addressing this type of mis- and disinformation (with the exception of the election context), it might consider exploring some role, especially with regard to cyber-enabled mis-, dis-, and malinformation, since these types of attacks will likely continue in the coming years (see Recommendation 2.8 on CISA’s role in addressing mis- and disinformation).</p> + <p>Reduce Bureaucracy: Slow and complex procurement processes are a major obstacle in countries across Europe. Eliminating some of the influence of vested interests on the production process will help to speed up procurement decisions. As procurement processes differ from country to country, this is mostly a task for national governments.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Data Poisoning and Infiltration:</strong> Experts were keen to mention that CISA’s future successes will rely on its ability to detect and respond to situations at machine speed. Outside researchers should be able to better assess CISA’s ability to do this as it rolls out newer capabilities in the coming years. But aside from the capabilities themselves, there are general concerns about the ability of government and industry to safeguard the AI models used to develop these newer tools. An AI-enabled tool is only as effective as the model used to build it, and poisoned AI models could disrupt CISA’s ability to respond in certain situations. At an even more basic level, CISA and other entities ought to look at ways to address unintentional biases and other flawed information that could be used in developing these tools.</p> - - <p>A related concern is that adversaries can use AI tools to monitor patterns in CISA’s automated threat hunt and detection services and then use that to interfere with, avoid, or generally circumvent capabilities that are in place.</p> + <p>Create the necessary legal environment and defense ecosystem: Some eastern European states have laws which ban the government from supporting and guiding the development of their domestic DTIBs. Yet the production of high-end capabilities requires a comprehensive defense ecosystem with a highly skilled workforce and a sophisticated R&amp;D network, including public research centers. Building such a network across Europe and enabling smaller countries to participate will be crucial.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Stabilize funding: Another challenge is the lack of binding long-term fiscal legislation that guarantees funding on a multi-year basis. Spain, Italy, and Germany are major players that lack multi-year budget allocations. Companies are discouraged from investing because they cannot be certain that sufficient funds will be available to complete a project. Defense budgets must be approved annually, which means they are subject to change every year. This contradicts the logic of large procurement and development programs which tend to run for several years.</p> </li> </ul> -<p><strong>QUANTUM COMPUTING</strong></p> - -<p>The threat of quantum computing was not listed as an immediate area of concern, with experts noting that quantum-related threats will likely manifest in five to ten years as opposed to the closer timeframe this study is focusing on. However, CISA should still be prepared to defend against threats stemming from higher computational power.</p> +<p>For the future of Europe’s defense technological and industrial base, it is crucial that the additional public resources invested in defense translate into higher operational readiness of the armed forces and more industrial capacity. This analysis suggests that major reforms are needed to advance the development of the European defense sector. With new funds available, there may be a window of opportunity for change – not necessarily for a fundamental transformation of the sector but certainly to address some of the shortcomings of today’s EDTIB.</p> -<p>The most realistic possibility in the near term is adversaries relying on a “harvest now, decrypt later” strategy, whereby exfiltrated encrypted data is stored with the assumption that it can be decrypted by adversaries using post-quantum cryptography algorithms at some later point in time. It is a near-term area of concern only insofar as it further emphasizes the need for departments and agencies to operate with greater levels of resilience — in a way, it is less a matter of if your data will be stolen than when it will be stolen. Beyond any technical solutions, CISA is currently well positioned to provide stronger guidance on how FCEB agencies might concretely anticipate and address these types of situations.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>TODAY’S CHALLENGES, TOMORROW’S PROBLEMS</strong></p> +<p><strong>Christian Mölling</strong> is deputy director of the DGAP Research Institute and head of the Center for Security and Defense.</p> -<p>Despite the various possible threat vectors and new technologies that are projected to cause damage in the coming years, the overwhelming majority of experts consulted for this project — regardless of professional background — emphasized that they are most concerned about the ability of the U.S. government and industry to properly manage today’s challenges. In other words, the actual cost for adversaries to engage in attacks akin to the ones occurring today will be cheaper in the coming years, and for several reasons they are likely to be waged with greater frequency, which will naturally put a strain on the currently offered support services.</p> +<p><strong>Sören Hellmonds</strong> is a freelance scientist.</p>Christian Mölling and Sören HellmondsDrawing insights from defense experts across NATO members, the study highlights the evolving European defense landscape, emphasizing security of supply concerns and the balance between national and EU initiatives. The report underscores pivotal forthcoming decisions in Europe’s defense amidst changing geopolitical dynamics.Treading A Fine Line2023-10-30T12:00:00+08:002023-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/treading-a-fine-line<p><em>After initial speculation around its involvement in the Hamas attacks, Iran is coming under increasing pressure over how to respond to the conflict.</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Geopolitical Challenges:</strong> At the macro level, festering geopolitical tensions will increase the likelihood that foreign adversaries invest in and deploy cyberattacks that directly target U.S. government institutions. In July 2023, it was reported that suspected Chinese malware was detected across a number of military systems. While China is typically known for its espionage activities, this particular incident is concerning because it looks like the malware could be used to actively disrupt — as opposed to simply surveil — compromised systems.</p> +<excerpt /> - <p>This departure in China’s modus operandi is a general reminder that the threat landscape is changing, and it goes without saying that the strained relationships between the United States and known adversaries needs to be constantly reevaluated in risk assessments. At the operational level, this requires CISA and other entities tasked with a defensive cyber mission to map out all the ways in which these larger issues might manifest into seemingly low-level attacks.</p> +<p>From the moment Hamas attacked Israel, Iran has been extremely vocal, praising the assault and warning Israel and the US of reprisals for military action. However, while initially seen as a beneficiary of the events, the pressure on Iran is now starting to mount.</p> - <p>Stemming from this are supply chain risks and vulnerabilities, as well as the question of what explicit role, if any, CISA should take in managing these risks as related to the protection of federal networks.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Structural Challenges:</strong> Following the release of the 2020 CSC report, the commission’s cochair, Senator Angus King, repeatedly justified the recommendation for a national cyber director by saying it would give the government “one throat to choke” after a major incident. But it is now a few years in, and cyber authorities — and by extension the accountability mechanisms — are still dispersed. At one level, it is assumed that some variation of today’s issues around general coordination and role delineation might continue to plague the U.S. government in the coming years. Regarding CISA in particular and its role as the lead for network defense, there are promising signs that it has been establishing strong relationships with U.S. government partners and FCEB and non-FCEB entities alike. But it will be essential that CISA continues to push for more role clarity that can translate into greater overall clarity in reporting structures and ultimate responses, especially considering predicted future threat scenarios.</p> +<p>After the events of 7 October there was immediate speculation over Iranian involvement, with evidence soon surfacing of meetings between Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas. Iran has long viewed Israel as its greatest regional threat, and vice versa. Israel has been involved in a number of successful security operations against Iran, while the Islamic Republic does not recognise the State of Israel. In 2005, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad famously gave a speech that was translated as saying Israel “should be wiped off the map”.</p> - <p>What will be even more interesting in the near future is to see how CISA’s new initiatives actively manage the cyber risk of FCEB agencies, especially small and medium-sized ones. Paraphrasing the remarks of one FCEB interviewee, “all agencies think they are unique snowflakes, but at the end of the day, a hyper-tailored approach can only go so far, and there are certain consistent practices CISA can and must insist on.” With that being the case, it will be interesting to see how much of the security burden CISA takes on from FCEB agencies, how that compares between different agencies, and what the difference is between what CISA actually manages and what it aspires to manage.</p> +<p>In addition, the Islamic Republic has made supporting Palestinians a key pillar of its foreign policy. As a result, Hamas has long been backed by Tehran, both for its cause and as part of a network of groups across the Middle East that forms an “axis of resistance” against the US, Israel and its allies. Consequently, over many years, Iran has provided funding, equipment and expertise to help Hamas develop its capabilities.</p> - <p>Understanding this balance will be particularly important in light of many FCEB agencies transitioning and modernizing technologies in the name of enhancing cybersecurity. CISA will need to be particularly attuned to how efforts to rapidly meet certain U.S. government implementation deadlines might unintentionally create visibility gaps or introduce new vulnerabilities into FCEB systems. The challenge for CISA will be in how it decides to allow agencies to maintain independence in managing aspects such as technology debt from legacy systems, an issue that will be more pronounced in the coming years, while confidently executing its mission as the lead for federal network defense.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Workforce Challenges:</strong> In recent years, cyber workforce challenges have been closely examined and well documented. The private and public sectors alike have made plans to address staffing shortfalls. Notably, the ONCD recently published its National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy, which specifically outlines recommendations and opportunities for the federal government to attract and retain cyber talent more intentionally.</p> +<h3 id="iran-initially-a-beneficiary-of-the-war">Iran, Initially a Beneficiary of the War</h3> - <p>As a next step, the government needs to execute these proposed strategies and quickly fill vacancies. This is important not only for actual cyber entities such as CISA but across FCEB agencies as well. Especially if there is concern that future threats will be more persistent in nature, system resilience will rely on having a sustainable workforce that can also surge in capacity during a prolonged incident. As was observed by one of the interviewed industry leaders, “[the success of CISA services] is less about the CISA programs and more about people.” In other words, success depends on whether the FCEB agencies are well staffed with skilled experts that can take on these different challenges and whether they are coming in with a mindset conducive to working with CISA as a true partner.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Societal Challenges:</strong> During one of the convened tabletop exercises, an expert made the following point: the exercise assumes an adversary can effectively undermine trust in U.S. institutions, implying as a premise that people have trust in institutions in the first place.</p> +<p>Part of the immediate rationale for Iranian involvement in the attack was that Iran could be seen as a beneficiary of the horrific events. Firstly, Hamas had shattered the illusion of the invincibility of Iran’s archnemesis. In recent years, Israel’s military and intelligence capability, along with its vast defence spending and veil of protection from the sophisticated Iron Dome missile defence system, had created the idea of an unbeatable foe. However, the events of 7 October exposed a number of Israeli weaknesses which have been celebrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have used the events in their own propaganda to place further doubt on Israeli capability and to boost their own morale.</p> - <p>The polls are clear — Americans have been losing trust in democratic institutions for some time. Mis- and disinformation from foreign and domestic voices alike further exacerbate the situation by selectively promoting information that seemingly resonates with individuals’ legitimate grievances about these institutions. At present, the U.S. public generally does not have the societal resilience to deal with these threats.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Iran will not want to risk any major escalation that would force a decision about direct military involvement</code></em></strong></p> - <p>Moreover, the United States is a deeply polarized society, and today’s political climate makes it challenging for individuals and organizations to meaningfully discuss issues related to curbing mis-, dis-, and malinformation. The current state of affairs has arguably also chilled federal government entities, such as CISA, from exploring ways to meaningfully identify opportunities to address these threats. These societal vulnerabilities only increase concerns of attacks originating from insider threats, an ongoing issue that some of the consulted experts believe could be an even bigger problem in the next few years.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Secondly, the events have diverted attention away from Iran’s borders. As the region had begun to look increasingly peaceful, there was a further focus on Iran’s rising nuclear threat, human rights record, and destabilising activities across the Middle East. However, effort and resources have now been refocused towards the west of the region. Last week, for example, the expiration of UN sanctions on Iranian ballistic missiles went largely unreported.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p>Thirdly, the attacks have put a halt to any normalisation negotiations between Iran’s archenemy Israel and its regional rival Saudi Arabia. Israel has been slowly building up relations with its neighbours, culminating in the 2020 Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain. More recently, conversations have been progressing with Saudi Arabia, with which Iran made its own deal to restore relations earlier this year. However, reigniting the conflict between Israel and Palestinians has caused a snapback reaction by some Arab states and has temporarily derailed Israeli-Saudi negotiations. All Arab countries have issued statements condemning Israeli airstrikes, and the King of Jordan even cancelled a meeting with US President Joe Biden and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas in protest against Israeli military activities.</p> -<p>The federal government stands at a cybersecurity crossroads. In the coming years, CISA will greatly expand its offerings as the lead agency for non-defense and intelligence federal network security. At the same time, the scale, frequency, and intensity of cyberattacks against FCEB agencies are increasing. Both state and non-state actors see opportunities for holding the United States hostage through cyberspace. As a result, money is not enough to solve the problem. The United States needs to imagine new ways of coordinating proactive cyber defense and deterrence aligned with its emerging resources (i.e., means) that promote a change in how to think about network security and resilience.</p> +<h3 id="the-rising-pressure-on-tehran">The Rising Pressure on Tehran</h3> -<p>While it is premature to comment on some of CISA’s more recent technical capabilities (or soon to be released capabilities) for individual services, or its proposed backend analytic capability, this study highlights actions that Congress, FCEB agencies, and CISA can and must to do to streamline and clarify roles and responsibilities, manage perceptions, and establish clear communication channels in order to ensure that all stakeholders are best positioned to protect federal networks. Congress needs to be prepared to not only further define and scope CISA’s role in this space but also to provide appropriate oversight into new tools and capabilities that will be rapidly deployed to meet future threats and challenges. Setting aside service-specific recommendations, CISA will significantly benefit by connecting its services more clearly and directly to the needs of FCEB agencies. By showing the value it brings to FCEB agencies, at an affordable price point, CISA can deliver as a true partner in network security efforts. At the same time, FCEB agencies, while not monolithic, need to operate with a greater understanding of CISA’s role in defending federal networks today in order to align the role to their respective individual FCEB initiatives. This requires adequate funding to enable choices based on merit rather than cost. The national security of the United States requires a CISA that is not bound to the lowest bid.</p> +<p>However, despite the original speculation around Iranian involvement in the Hamas attacks and the initial benefits to Iran, Tehran quickly denied any participation, and the US has since declared there to be no evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the events of 7 October. Furthermore, as the conflict progresses, Iranian officials are coming under increasing pressure. In particular, Iran needs to demonstrate ongoing support for its Hamas and Hizbullah allies, but will find it ever more difficult to provide weaponry, both as logistics become more challenging in the conflict zones and because of the balancing act between arming these – and other – groups, honouring arms deals with Russia, and maintaining its own defensive capabilities and military arsenal.</p> -<h4 id="pillar-1-resourcing-toward-success">Pillar 1: Resourcing toward Success</h4> +<p>Iran will also not want to risk any major escalation that would force a decision about direct military involvement. Iran’s strategy has always been to provide “forward defence” through its proxy groups and to follow a policy of maximum tactical flexibility, with provocation that hovers on the threshold of confrontation without spilling into outright war. However, if the war spreads, the Islamic Republic’s options and flexibility will rapidly decrease, and as tensions rise, so does the risk that provocative activity will lead to miscalculation and escalation.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.1 (for Congress): Ensure consistent, coherent, and flexible funding streams for programs such as CDM.</em></strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While the destruction of Hamas would significantly weaken Iran’s regional strategy, supporting Hamas in the long term may prove even more costly</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Currently, the CDM program is structured as a centralized funding model, but only for a two-year period. On the one hand, there would be some benefits to Congress signaling an ongoing centralized funding approach to help ensure greater buy-in and continued use of the CDM program. In the current structure, FCEB agencies are prone to face budget constraints and might struggle when their CDM funding expires. This often leads to a piecemeal approach to tool selection and adoption, with agencies making independent decisions based on their individual budget limitations. This can potentially lead to operational disruptions, incomplete coverage, and inconsistent security postures across different agencies. Moreover, there is a case to be made that programs such as CDM provide a national security function on par with some defense-related programs, and as such, they require multiyear funding enabling enterprise agreements that reduce costs and lock in pricing. While this derails some vendor incentives and high margins, it helps democratize cybersecurity excellence.</p> +<p>Finally, Iranian focus on the Israel–Hamas war will cause further tensions domestically. The country has seen significant unrest in recent months, with the public more concerned about Iran’s flailing economy, returning social restrictions and crackdowns on protests. In particular, anti-government protests have regularly featured the chant “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. I sacrifice my life for Iran” in response to concerns over the use of government funds to support Hamas and Hizbullah, so Iranian focus in this area is likely to cause further unrest.</p> -<p>However, the reason Congress typically does not grant multiyear funding is because that allows it to provide oversight and make adjustments if certain allocations are not being properly spent. Additionally, if a funding cycle is too long, it could result in the calcification of certain tools and halt innovation. Multiyear funding can help reduce the influence of industry vendors aggressively trying to sell alternative products to FCEB agencies, but it can also unintentionally have the adverse effect of making FCEB agencies too complacent with tools that are already in use.</p> +<p>As a result, Iran has some difficult decisions to make over the coming weeks and months. While the pressure around Iranian nuclear activity and Israel’s normalisation of its regional relations may have somewhat reduced, this is only temporary. In addition, while the destruction of Hamas would significantly weaken Iran’s regional strategy, supporting Hamas in the long term may prove even more costly.</p> -<p>Ultimately, there are two goals: (1) to provide a more predictable landscape for FCEB agencies participating in the CDM program; and (2) to ensure there is sufficient funding to cover the inventory and security of devices as they evolve. A combination of a working capital funds system, or some flexibility for FCEB agencies to carry over unused funds from previous fiscal year appropriations, might ultimately help provide more consistent funding than what is currently afforded. If nothing else, it will help agencies align their budget requests relative to their cybersecurity risk assessments.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.2 (for Congress): Fund and formalize a Joint Collaborative Environment.</em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Louise Kettle</strong> is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Nottingham. Her research is focused on Britain’s foreign and security relationship with the Middle East across the twentieth century and up to the present day. Her current research is examining British-Iranian relations.</p>Louise KettleAfter initial speculation around its involvement in the Hamas attacks, Iran is coming under increasing pressure over how to respond to the conflict.Goodbye Mr Chips?2023-10-30T12:00:00+08:002023-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/goodbye-mr-chips<p><em>Better practices are needed to improve the effectiveness of defence training.</em></p> -<p>Congress can help catalyze the cybersecurity common operating landscape. As of July 2023, Congress has yet to authorize a JCE. However, recognizing the need for a “set of highways” that can move information easily between the public and private sectors, CISA has indicated that it will commence work with relevant agencies to start building the infrastructure for it. Congress should formally establish the JCE by law and then appropriate funds within the FCEB structure — and for the JCE specifically — so that CISA’s efforts can be scaled quickly and progress can be tracked and measured.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>This type of infrastructure is especially important given the numerous streams of both formal and informal communications stemming from different reporting requirements, and it is imperative that these streams to and from the public and private sectors are brought together in a meaningful way and are analyzed coherently, benefiting from shared insights rather than just shared information.</p> +<p>Training is crucial for enabling UK Defence to deliver operational success, and broadens the potential talent pool by allowing Defence to recruit people who can develop the necessary skills, rather than simply competing for pre-trained talent (which often is in short supply). The breadth and scale of military training is significant, with a clear management process – the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) – in which requirement-setters identify training needs that are passed to delivery authorities, who design and deliver the training; the requirement-setters then review the training to ensure that it provides what is needed. While this sets a structured framework for training, there are challenges Defence must overcome to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its training system. These challenges exist across several areas: culture; system governance; processes; training delivery; the wider learning environment; and workforce capacity.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.3 (for Congress): Fund an entity to collect, analyze, share, and adequately protect information about cyber statistics.</em></strong></p> +<p>Pockets of good practice exist in Defence, and much could be gained from sharing these more widely, but lessons should also be learned from training practice outside Defence. This paper identifies improvements in four key areas to help modernise Defence training and prepare the armed forces for the challenges to come:</p> -<p>CISA should be resourced to host — or assign a third party to host — an anonymized, publicly accessible repository of known incidents and vulnerabilities. The data should be hosted as an application program interface and presented on a public-facing dashboard so that CISA and other outside researchers can analyze the history of cyber incidents while also making projections based on past distributions. Preferably, this dashboard would include information from the public and private sectors so that researchers can have a full picture of the threat landscape. This entity would ideally be housed within and supported by the infrastructure of a larger JCE (see Recommendation 1.2 on funding a JCE).</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Upskilling the whole training workforce by improving the training given to any personnel engaged in training others (“train the trainer”).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Improving training delivery through more personalised “learning journeys”, active learning and greater use of technology.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A better understanding of Defence training as a system and as a crucial component of military capability via clearer lines of accountability, better use of data, and mechanisms allowing training to be more responsive to changing individual and organisational needs.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Partnering with external organisations that can complement Defence’s skillset by supplying adult education (andragogical) expertise.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>CISA should ensure that it supports agency-level analysis of pooled data alongside reporting at machine speed. CISA should help agencies understand how to tailor their dashboard so that they can better assess risk at the agency level. This could include collaborative planning teams that deploy from CISA to support the agencies most in need. It should also include building in capabilities to increase the speed of analysis and sharing best practices across agencies.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.4 (for CISA, the ONCD, the OMB, and Congress): Develop a strategy that locks in baseline prices for computing and storage resources for analytics, AI products, and related processing sold to FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> +<p>Recent defence and security reviews have identified a strategic context wherein armed forces face a “more contested and volatile world”. Simultaneously, rapid advances in technology have changed the way armed forces operate and mean that Defence must constantly refresh its skills base by bringing in new talent and, increasingly, reskilling and repurposing its existing talent. The Integrated Operating Concept and the Haythornthwaite Review corroborated this, highlighting the importance of people in providing the “adaptive edge”. The Defence Command Paper Refresh stated that Defence would “better target our training and education … to upskill those that we recruit and … those already in our workforce”, with “skills at the heart of the way we access, plan and manage our workforce”. Attracting and retaining the necessary talent, however, is challenging, with more people leaving the forces than are joining.</p> -<p>All signs indicate that CISA is exploring how it can use AI technologies, and engage AI companies of all sizes, to advance its mission. As a part of its AI strategy plans, the study team recommends that CISA include three important areas: (1) routine assessments that test the agency’s readiness to deal with AI threats, (2) talent development and upskilling of existing staff to manage AI systems effectively, and (3) coordination with other departments and agencies that are actively thinking of how to work with AI tools and address AI threats (e.g., the DOD’s generative AI and large language models task force, Task Force Lima).</p> +<p>Although the armed forces have shrunk substantially since the Cold War and represent a relatively small draw on the overall UK population, not all people are eligible – for example on health, lifestyle (drugs) or fitness grounds – or indeed willing to join. And so, while the UK population is growing in absolute terms, this growth is largely driven by migration and by increases in groups from which the military struggles to recruit. Moreover, the armed forces’ nationality requirements mean they must compete with other employers for UK domestic talent. This is not unique to the UK; there are global shortages of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) skills, and Defence is in a “war for talent” against more flexible and adaptable commercial employers.</p> -<p>But in addition to general plans about how CISA can deal with future AI threats, CISA, the ONCD, the OMB, and Congress should also be actively thinking about how to lock in certain contracts related to common AI tools that might be sold to FCEB agencies. This is uncharted territory, and in order for FCEBs to start proactively thinking about how these tools might fit into their budget, it would be helpful for relevant entities to put down some price points — or at the very least some general guidance — before market pressures drive up the anticipated prices of these tools.</p> +<p>Noting the demands of new technology and forms of warfare, the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) 2019 Defence People Strategy identified the challenges of a changing labour market and workforce expectations: in a world where more people may not commit to lengthy, linear careers, but instead choose to zig-zag in and out of professions and employers over longer working lives, Defence’s traditional people model will struggle; and while the totality of the Defence offer, including pay, must be competitive, Defence cannot win the war for talent fighting on salary alone, and nor should it try to, given wider affordability challenges. Greater flexibility in accessing talent developed and employed in other parts of the “whole force”, including industry, would help mitigate the risk. However, without the freedom to pay full commercial salaries and differentiate pay across the workforce to target the skills that are in short supply (potentially at the expense of those whose skills are less in demand), the availability of extensive learning and development opportunities is and remains crucial for ensuring the armed forces have access to the skills they need.</p> -<h4 id="pillar-2-leveraging-and-harmonizing-authorities">Pillar 2: Leveraging and Harmonizing Authorities</h4> +<p>Moreover, the recruiting pool is widened because Defence can recruit untrained personnel and provide them with the right skills, although retaining these skilled people is a different challenge. More broadly, the nation benefits when trained personnel leave the forces to join the wider economy, as such people have valuable technical, leadership and management skills. This also enables social mobility. As digital technologies develop, these kinds of human skills are likely to be in greater demand for honing the uniquely human contribution to human–machine teams. Like digital expertise, these skills are expected to be in short supply, and are often harder to develop.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.1 (for CISA): Commission an independent report, in coordination with the ONCD, OMB, and NIST, clearly articulating CISA’s roles and responsibilities as the lead for federal network defense.</em></strong></p> +<p>Learning and development is also highly attractive to young people, especially those from ethnic minority backgrounds, so an improved approach to training, including allowing more personalised learning journeys, could broaden Defence’s appeal as an employer. Meanwhile, greater flexibility and a focus on skills-based training could open up new career pathways for those already in Defence, aiding retention, but this must be accompanied by improvements to the learning environment so that it better reflects a contemporary learner’s expectations. Far from being an overhead or a luxury, therefore, learning and development is a vital tool for ensuring that the armed forces have the skills to deliver in the “more contested and volatile world” described by the Integrated Review Refresh 2023. The Haythornthwaite Review identified that more agile approaches to training were needed, drawing on digital delivery, but did not conduct “a detailed analysis of what training is needed”.</p> -<p>What does it mean to be the leader of federal network defense, and what are the formal roles that the ONCD, OMB (including federal CISOs), and NIST play in support of this mission? To help all entities involved better appreciate CISA’s role (and its possible limits), it would be helpful for CISA to clearly articulate its current role and what its role could be in the coming years with regard to its FCEB mission. This report should address the mission relative to existing resources and staffing models and identify any key gaps in CISA’s ability to secure the .gov with its current set of authorities and funding.</p> +<h4 id="scope">Scope</h4> -<p>Beyond analyzing CISA’s roles and limitations, CISA leadership should also clearly articulate who holds the burden of risk and accountability. If there are anticipated changes in the coming years — for instance, if CISA is tasked to manage more risk for certain FCEB agencies over others — that too should be explained with a plan for how that transition will take place. The 2023 FISMA reform legislation that is currently working its way through Congress is in part intended to help clarify the roles between these different entities.</p> +<p>This paper complements the defence and security reviews by examining how individual training and education – rather than that delivered to units (collective training) – should change to deliver more effectively the skilled workforce that Defence needs. While this paper focuses on learning and development for individual members of the armed forces, many lessons also apply to the civil service, although the breadth and depth of learning and development offered differ substantially.</p> -<p>There is a larger question here as to whether CISA should eventually move toward a model where it directly manages the entirety of the .gov landscape. There are definitely trade-offs: centralized management would hold CISA accountable for any issues with network security and likely will provide cost savings in the long run, but the counter is that CISA then becomes a central — if not single — point of failure. Further, that model would absolve FCEB leaders of responsibility for their own cyber health, even though they control resources and are responsible for all other aspects of security. Moreover, there are some immediate hurdles in that CISA’s current capabilities are nowhere near those required for such an effort. FCEB agencies are likely to resist this dramatic change. CISA should provide a report describing the pros and cons of this kind of approach, along with its preferred balance of responsibility and the types of roles it hopes to fulfill in the coming years.</p> +<p>This paper first describes the framework within which the armed forces conduct their training, before identifying six challenges constraining the current system’s ability to maximise the value of Defence training and education. Then, drawing on examples of good practice inside and outside Defence, the paper concludes by highlighting how Defence training might be improved for greater efficiency and/or improved effectiveness of the already significant investment UK Defence makes in its people. The paper’s findings are based on both primary and secondary research conducted over five months, involving 32 structured interviews with people managing, delivering or supporting individual training and education: these people range across UK Defence, international armed forces, academia and training providers. The paper also draws on literature dealing with good learning and development practice.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.2 (for Congress): Designate CISA as the agency to which U.S. government departments and agencies should report a major cyber incident.</em></strong></p> +<h3 id="i-defence-training-framework">I. Defence Training Framework</h3> -<p>Centralized reporting is an essential part of ensuring that all stakeholders have the necessary intelligence about a given incident. While different departments and agencies might still have roles related to certain aspects of the response (e.g., the FBI will maintain primary investigative authority), CISA can still be mandated as the lead entity to which FCEB agencies should report cyber incidents. A central reporting structure will aid in intelligence gathering and providing actionable information back out to the FCEB agencies, as well as their critical infrastructure partners, to include the NSA Cyber Collaboration Center.</p> +<p>The British armed services are consistently in the top 10 of UK apprenticeship providers, with 24,800 people undertaking their apprenticeships in 2022. In 2023, the British Army was the top UK apprenticeship provider, with the Royal Navy third and Royal Air Force seventh. Its breadth of employment is huge too, with a uniformed and civilian workforce of over 200,000, ranging from relatively low skilled manual labour through to cyber experts and nuclear scientists. The Services describe 242 different roles on their websites, and civil service roles add even more. These disparate trades, some of which are unique to Defence – such as combat roles – come with specific training burdens. Despite the evident scale of training and its associated investment, the MoD cannot provide a definitive figure of how many people are in training at any one time, or the cost. Indeed, there appears to be no consistent definition of, or systematic data on, training costs.</p> -<p>The Cyber Incident Reporting Council recently delivered a report to Congress outlining suggestions to align reporting requirements and proposing model language for private entities. The report highlights an often-overlooked basic principle that starts with defining “reportable cyber incidents” to establish a consistent definition; this definition should be adopted as a model, which also includes language to be amendable by CISA. Regarding FCEB reporting, there is merit in establishing a common definition for use across FCEB agencies. The next step is to organize reporting under a single, modular forum that captures sufficient data fields — while being amendable if FCEB agencies do not have the proper legal authorities to share but can still leverage such a forum. This will help reduce duplication in individual FCEB processes for reporting and remove additional resource burdens. It is then on CISA to prioritize and coordinate the dissemination of the incidents across relevant stakeholders.</p> +<h4 id="types-of-training">Types of Training</h4> -<p>There is also a need to harmonize federal information sharing and communication back to the private sector. CISA and the FBI need to create a plan to coordinate sharing information back to those who report. If the FBI uses information from CISA and has knowledge of the information originators or victims, the latter groups must be informed. Further, it should be made clear that reported cyber threat information in CIRCIA is shielded from use by other agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, as an investigation by such a body was not a stated purpose in the construction of CIRCIA. Done correctly, this data should be pooled and accessible in a dashboard that allows tailored data analytics across the FCEB space. This capability creates a requirement to ensure CISA has filled key billets in incident response, data analytics, and collaborative planning and risk management.</p> +<p>Defence divides training into “individual” and “collective” categories. Individual training concerns the knowledge, skills, behaviour and attitudes of the individual. Beyond this, collective training aims to develop units and formations in order for them to function as cohesive entities. While the Chief of Defence People (CDP) is the owner of the process for individual training, collective training responsibility sits with the individual Services, and with Strategic Command. The bridge between the two types of training is a crucial one, where the historically linear progression of individual courses followed by progressive collective training needs to be reconsidered given the smaller workforce, faster-changing skills and ever-increasing demands on forces held at readiness.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.3 (for FCEB agencies): Elevate conversations about cybersecurity and network security to leadership levels within the FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> +<h4 id="individual-training--phases">Individual Training – Phases</h4> -<p>Culturally, federal and private sector CISOs are asked to manage cybersecurity, while CEOs and FCEB leads are tasked with managing the larger entity and ensuring it is functioning properly and able to conduct mission-essential functions. Too often, leaders view these functions as separate, siloed tasks. However, there is a case to be made that today’s cyber threats challenge a business or an FCEB agency’s ability to carry out its basic functions. As such, one of two things (or preferably both) need to happen: (1) cybersecurity conversations need to be elevated to higher leadership levels within an FCEB agency, and (2) CISOs need to be empowered to better lead and manage cybersecurity as a core function of the organization. It should not just be the case that the CISO is the point person if there is an incident. Accountability needs to reside at higher levels within an FCEB agency, and that starts with elevating the importance of cybersecurity. Just like “enterprise security” has become a core tenet in the private sector — particularly the financial sector — that mindset needs to pervade FCEB agencies as well.</p> +<p>While much of the forces’ technical training happens in Joint schools, Service-specific training still abounds, especially in the early stages of an individual’s career. Even in “Joint” schools, many courses are exclusively “single Service”, reflecting that Service’s specific needs and different career structures. The MoD identifies three phases of training:</p> -<p>To support this effort, CISA should explore forming collaborative planning teams that support CISOs across the FCEB landscape. These planning teams could help with risk assessments, budget analysis, and how best to communicate cyber risks to agency leadership. Ensuring CISA has a large enough cyber workforce to support collaborative planning teams is a key component of defending the .gov.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Phase One training is synonymous with basic training: how the armed forces turn civilians into military personnel. It is delivered on a single Service basis, with separate schools and programmes for officers and non-commissioned personnel. For regulars, these are often lengthy residential programmes delivered at central locations, although course duration differs by Service. For reserves, the training is usually shorter and conducted regionally or at their home unit.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Phase Two provides initial specialist training, where individuals are trained for their specialisation. The content and duration of the training depends on the role. Courses are mostly bespoke to each Service, even where they are run in Joint schools. Some non-commissioned personnel complete Phase One and Phase Two training, usually with some additional workplace training, in just under a year. More demanding roles require longer courses, and often gaps between courses (for example, engineer or pilot roles can require many years before they become “productive”).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Phase Three covers all individual training and education after completing Phase Two. It includes further professional and general management training linked to promotion and career development, and broader Professional Defence and Security Education (PDSE). Further professional training is generally delivered within the single Service systems that delivered Phase Two training. Promotion-based command, leadership and management training is routinely provided by the individual’s Service (for example, non-commissioned officer and officer promotion courses). PDSE is delivered either by single Services (intermediate command and staff courses) or as Joint training (advanced and higher command and staff courses and Royal College of Defence Studies). There are also sponsored places for personnel to study, full time or part time, at civilian universities. Phase Three courses range from a few days to over a year. Most courses result from a specific requirement of a Service person’s career.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.4 (for CISA and Congress): Identify a more visible and practical role for CISA in FCEB ZTA implementation.</em></strong></p> +<p>Separately, individuals must complete annual mandatory training to achieve central competencies such as data protection, heat illness training, the law of armed conflict and unacceptable behaviours awareness. These are mostly delivered online and can be as short as 30 minutes.</p> -<p>When it comes to federal migration to ZTA, the OMB plays a guiding and assessing role, the National Security Council and the ONCD play coordinating roles, and CISA plays an enabling role. More than anything else, CISA provides general resource materials on issues such as best practices that can be used by FCEB agencies to aid in their migration efforts. But CISA could be tasked and resourced to provide more hands-on assistance with implementation.</p> +<h4 id="individual-training--governance">Individual Training – Governance</h4> -<p>Not to overextend CISA, but there is an opportunity for the agency to have some designated experts that can further elaborate on the points outlined in the ZTA guidance. Even if it is not possible to detail ZTA subject matter experts to the FCEB agencies, at a minimum CISA can identify outside contractors and experts that might be able to fill this advisory role. CISA can also work with outside groups to conduct studies on ZTA migration-related IT and OT disruptions and advise FCEB agencies on how to address these issues as they arise. Collaborative planning teams again provide a possible framework, with CISA deploying support to agencies as they manage the ZTA transition.</p> +<p>Almost all Defence training is governed by the “Joint Service Publication (JSP) 822: Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education”. A comprehensive document (679 pages), it describes the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT), covering the analysis, design, delivery and assurance of training (see Figure 1). Assurance consists of: internal validation (InVal) – did the training deliver the syllabus?; and external validation (ExVal) – did the training achieve what was intended?</p> -<p>An even more radical approach would be to fund CISA as a core aspect of their CDM next-generation approach to provide a centralized “Zero Trust Center of Excellence,” with close coordination with NIST and the OMB, to guide FCEB agencies along a zero trust architecture, roadmap, and implementation plan. While centralized, it should be tailored to the priorities and unique aspects of each agency or component. Again, collaborative planning teams — if sufficiently staffed — could play a critical role in supporting CISOs across the FCEB landscape. CISA collaborative planning teams could be deployed to agencies identified as needing assistance and bring with them expert insights on how best to implement new ZTA guidelines. In this line, CISA can establish a shared services environment similar to the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Thunderdome, where agencies that are not well resourced can access integrated capabilities to increase their zero trust maturity. Regardless of the approach, the transition will be complex. There is no master list of all federal systems online at any one time, and each agency will likely have varying rates of adding new systems and even cloud services that complicate implementation. This complexity is why CISA should analyze its current staffing levels and consider building collaborative planning teams.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T5RYsLf.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Elements of DSAT.</strong> Source: MoD, “Joint Service Publication 822: Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education: Volume 1”, last updated September 2022, p. 7.</em></p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.5 (for CISA and Congress): Develop tailored metrics to measure the progress and integration of new tools.</em></strong></p> +<p>DSAT involves three main actors:</p> -<p>As mentioned earlier in this report, there is a need for more creative metrics to measure actual progress with CISA’s cyber services to FCEB agencies. For CISA, the challenge is to identify internal metrics that can realistically show progress without unintentionally overburdening FCEB agencies, as well as to measure security outcomes more holistically than simple program outputs.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Training Requirements Authority (TRA): responsible for defining the high-level training need (content and numbers to be trained) and ExVal. Generally, these authorities sit within the Commands, although CDP is the TRA for some joint training.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Training Delivery Authority (TDA): responsible for training design, delivery (which can be outsourced) and InVal.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Training Provider: the school or unit conducting the training.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Moving forward, the metrics should focus on not only the progress of individual tools and processes (e.g., the progress of implementing the tools and separately measuring how these tools enhance cybersecurity), but also CISA’s ability to integrate new capabilities with preexisting tools. The more clearly defined the metrics, the easier it will be to hold CISA accountable for what it is uniquely authorized to accomplish.</p> +<h4 id="training-challenges">Training Challenges</h4> -<p>Moreover, as CISA collects feedback from FCEB agencies, the research team encourages it to formally leave space for narrative responses as to why certain FCEB agencies either have not met a certain goal or are actively not planning to, and how they plan to mitigate the risk in alternative ways. If certain metrics are focused on outcomes, FCEBs should be given room to more fully explain how they are meeting security goals in ways other than what is recommended or otherwise required by CISA.</p> +<p>Defence gives learning and development an impressive priority and level of resourcing. Because Defence is a contingent capability, training becomes the substitute for war, as well as the preparation for it. Between operations, training is the organisation’s purpose, while also contributing to the effective management of the Defence enterprise in peacetime. Consequently, Defence invests more in learning and development than most employers. Its investment in senior leadership is exceptional, with individuals likely to have spent well over a year in fully funded formal education. However, the current training system often struggles to meet the demands placed on it in terms of the need for greater agility in a more heavily committed force whose skills need replacing more often. Six challenges are identified below, but they are not universal: examples disproving the points can be found, but on balance there are more examples proving the need for modernisation across culture, system governance, process, training delivery, learning environment and workforce.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.6 (for CISA and Congress): Dedicate after-action reviews to better understand progress and issues related to CDM.</em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Culture</strong></p> -<p>Related to the need for better metrics in general, every interviewee had very specific but varied feedback on the CDM program, highlighting a need for a formal lessons-learned or after-action process and better metrics for measuring progress with CDM. With new project developments set to take place in the coming months and years, CISA (at the request of Congress) should be prepared to (1) highlight challenges with implementation, (2) outline results or the efficacy of CDM once implemented, and (3) propose realistic next steps for CDM as it relates to specific departments or agencies.</p> +<p>Defence invests heavily in training, and the different Defence training cultures share some – broadly common – constraining characteristics:</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.7 (for CISA): Identify a way to effectively engage in the mis- and disinformation discourse.</em></strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Mechanistic.</strong> Training is largely mechanistic in nature, being part of an industrial machine that frontloads training early in a career, with later interventions taking place as people pass through career gates (such as promotions or postings). This drives an approach that generally takes little account of prior learning or the need for individual learning journeys. This kind of approach suits static environments where the skills required remain predictable over lengthy careers. However, the pace of technological change and the rapidly fluctuating demand for skills mean that frontloaded training models supporting rigid career siloes are ill-suited to today’s Defence environment. A more fluid/organic approach to talent development is needed: one that gives individuals more agency in “whole life” learning.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Talent definition.</strong> Another cultural challenge is Defence’s limited conception of “talent”, which is too often synonymous with those rising to the most senior ranks. Much of the PDSE offer is concentrated on this particular talent pool, where the value of higher courses is often seen as being in the act of being selected rather than in the learning itself, because selection confirms individuals are in the “talent pool”. A broader definition of talent covers anyone “who can make a significant contribution to organisational performance”. Democratising access to learning and development would capture more of Defence’s talent and improve productivity.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Train to pass.</strong> Linked to the way in which Defence conceives “talent” is how that conception shapes training design and delivery. Often, this produces training that is seen as a bar to be cleared or as a badge of honour for those succeeding, rather than creating programmes that seek to help people pass. The wastage rates from Royal Marines and Army Phase One training are typically 40–60% and 30% respectively, which is expensive in terms of recruitment capacity and wasteful of human talent – a problem Defence is looking to address. Wastage also impacts disproportionately on certain groups; for example, women are twice as likely to receive a musculoskeletal injury during Army basic training (Phase One) and be discharged. The redeployment to other roles of those who fail mitigates the impact of the current culture, but it might be better to orient training around a philosophy that aims to help people reach the required standard.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Accreditation.</strong> The MoD has invested in improving the recognition of Defence-provided training and education, but has done less well in recognising learning gained elsewhere. People often have the skills Defence needs, but, because these skills were acquired elsewhere, must still undertake lengthy Defence-provided courses. While this is also true of regulars, it has a greater impact on reserves, whose civilian employment may overlap with their military role. A culture of greater openness to learning and expertise gained elsewhere, including through pre-course learning assessments that allow people to skip modules they already understand, could enhance efficiency and effectiveness. This might also enhance motivation and retention since the time and effort expended in gaining skills, knowledge and expertise would be properly recognised.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>For reasons outlined earlier in this study, the federal government has struggled to find a meaningful and appropriate role in addressing mis- and disinformation. Cyber operations can and have been used to further information operations that impact CISA’s mission. Elections come to mind as an immediate example, but there is also cyber-enabled disinformation that can lead to the sabotaging of electric and communications facilities, for example, or that undermine trust in public institutions and objective information put out by the federal government. At the same time, the issue can create a perception of government overreach that makes it difficult to create an objective policy debate around a core national security challenge.</p> +<p><strong>System Governance</strong></p> -<p>While this issue is larger than CISA, the agency has a role. As a first step, it might make sense for CISA, perhaps through the CSRB, to formally study recent incidents of high-profile cyber and cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns. The committee could then come back with a series of recommendations for how CISA and other entities might most appropriately be involved in understanding and addressing the risks that misinformation poses to CISA’s mission moving forward. As part of this effort, the CSRB may need subpoena authority.</p> +<p>Inevitably, managing delivery against Defence’s diverse training needs, delivered by a diffuse set of actors, requires breaking the whole training system into manageable chunks. However, doing so means that Defence lacks a view of the whole system, there being no single place where training strategy, training and operational risk and governance align. This means that training can become stovepiped, with the outcomes of one training element not aligned to the inputs of later courses. At one level this is reflected in the separation of the collective and individual training elements, which fragments the system for delivering forces that, collectively, can “defeat the King’s enemies”. For example, training of future commanders at most Phase One officer academies and the Joint Services Command and Staff College is done at an individual level, with relatively little involvement of the groups such officers are being trained to lead. Involving these groups would have benefits, but may be impractical at scale given the bureaucratic challenges of trying to align multiple programmes (all of different length).</p> -<p>Additionally, CISA should consider working with outside researchers to develop training exercises and workshops for FCEB employees that teach them about threats related to mobile device management and walk them through plans for addressing these issues. Most important is to ensure that federal agencies understand how mis- and disinformation, especially when enabled by cyber operations, have the potential to undermine the provision of public goods through cyberspace. These efforts will almost certainly include addressing computational propaganda designed to smear individuals and institutions.</p> +<p><strong>Fragmentation.</strong> Another problem associated with separating individual and collective training is that the feedback loop between operational need and individual training can be weak. In this context, the Army has introduced the Battlecraft Syllabus to help close the gap between the output of individual training and the input standard for collective training. There are also other positive signs, with Director Land Warfare trialling new approaches that bridge individual and collective training, allowing them to be conducted in parallel, and with feedback mechanisms permitting each to shape the conduct of the other for greatest effect. In the Royal Navy, meanwhile, Project Selborne is represented at the Navy’s Senior Management Board, alongside representatives of those delivering collective training.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.8 (for CISA): Develop risk strategies that accompany ONCD and OMB financial planning for the FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Risk transference.</strong> Even within individual training, the lack of a “whole system” view causes problems. Training can become viewed and assessed in its own terms, and not as part of achieving something larger – that is, the ability to deliver an operational output. Consequently, questions of effectiveness and efficiency can become self-referential and drive perverse outcomes, for example where course lengths are cut to reduce costs, with the training gap then passed to the frontline, which is not resourced to close the gap effectively. The RAF’s Project Socrates has reduced the time in residential training by over 32% since 2015, with more responsibility for training passed to the frontline – for apprenticeships, this can amount to as much as 70% of the learning. Perhaps the most extreme example was the RAF Personnel Branch training course: there was no classroom-based Phase Two training, and students went straight to their units and learned on the job. Material was provided remotely by the Personnel Administration Training Wing in the Defence College of Logistics, Policing and Administration. Consequently, units that had previously received fully trained individuals faced an additional training burden, while lacking the resources to absorb that burden or the skills to conduct the on-the-job training required. Moreover, trainees’ jobs were not redesigned to allow untrained job holders to balance output and learning. The TRA recognised the risks of this approach, and a hybrid course was developed, combining four weeks of classroom training (40% of the previous classroom time) with online learning undertaken at units. In this case the vulnerabilities were noted, but this pattern of reducing the time spent in training schools is a recurring feature of Defence’s “modernisation” attempts that often merely move the risk elsewhere.</p> -<p>In theory, FCEB cyber budgets are coordinated with the ONCD and OMB. But in the longer budget-approval process, essential line-item requests are deprioritized, underfunded, or completely stricken from the final budgets that are ultimately approved by FCEB leadership, the OMB, or Congress. To help federal CISOs and CIOs more effectively advocate for larger cyber budgets, CISA should consider developing risk profiles that accompany the budget plans. In a sense, these risk assessments would highlight what types of risk an FCEB agency might incur if certain tools or services were not adequately funded. Additionally, CISA, in partnership with FCEB entities, could map out how different types of tools might serve an agency’s larger security strategy and support its overall mission, as opposed to looking at tools as one-off fixes to address cyber concerns. Not only can these risk profiles be used to help FCEB agencies advocate for necessary funding, but they can also be used by the executive branch to compare different FCEB agencies.</p> +<p><strong>New requirements.</strong> The reverse problem also exists, with higher demand for new generic education subjects to be added to programmes to raise awareness of particular areas, most notably in Phase One training and PDSE. Interviewees for this paper highlighted constant pressure to add more training modules to courses – for example, mandatory equality, diversity and inclusion, cyber, data protection and space awareness training. While each module may be relatively short, adding a one-hour annual mandatory training package represents the equivalent of 114 people’s output each year, and the new Space Foundation Course for new Service personnel is eight hours long. Regardless of the individual merit of any mandatory training – and all have a Defence “sponsor” to champion the topic – elements are often added to already busy syllabuses without other material being cut to make room. In the absence of a single owner of the whole system, and given the limited (at best) understanding of direct and lost-opportunity costs, the growth of mandatory training has been relatively unchecked at system level; although Defence has now instituted a 1* board to review mandatory training.</p> -<p>The White House could consider some sort of ranking system whereby the leaders from low-scoring FCEB agencies have to meet periodically with a designated White House leader to explain (1) why their scores are so low, and (2) what plans they have in place to improve their risk score. Whatever method is adopted, it will have to incentivize CISOs from across the FCEB landscape to participate.</p> +<p>One weakness in the current training system, therefore, relates to developing people and organisations with the ability to see the complete system (of which training forms a part) and to see how the Training Line of Development impacts on, and is impacted by, other Defence Lines of Development (DLODs). For example, catering contracts specify mealtimes that prevent out-of-hours lessons at Phase One training establishments. A system view might mitigate some of the challenges to training modernisation where it only focuses on a narrow aspect of the system and not the whole. As one interviewee put it, Defence is “trying to transform using a system and people designed to manage evolutionary development [and] from which much of the capacity has been cut”.</p> -<p>Risk profiles should leverage the granular visibility that CDM has into agency enterprise in a way that is both (1) at object level, so that it can be tied to specific agency components and systems, and (2) near real time (i.e., machine speed) where possible. Second, these profiles can be linked together to provide actionable and contextualized risk recommendations at both the policy and algorithm level (i.e., CDM’s AWARE risk algorithm). Here again, CISA could deploy collaboration planning teams and experts to help agencies manage risk, including integrating their risk management strategies with tailored dashboards, ZTA implementation plans, and budget submissions.</p> +<p><strong>Process</strong></p> -<h4 id="pillar-3-enhancing-communication-and-coordination-with-key-stakeholders">Pillar 3: Enhancing Communication and Coordination with Key Stakeholders</h4> +<p>The DSAT framework, and the way in which Defence enters into contracts with training partners, present two challenges:</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.1 (for CISA): Develop a public campaign to promote CISA’s role as the lead for federal network defense.</em></strong></p> +<p><em>DSAT</em></p> -<p>As an agency, CISA has worked hard to establish a recognizable brand, particularly with the private sector. CISA has a very visible social media presence and can be lauded for putting out periodic updates (such as its first two strategic plans) on where it hopes to go in the coming years. However, there is room for CISA to be more coordinated in its marketing, especially with regard to services offered to FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>DSAT (and other valid training models) have the same basic elements: analysing the need; determining how to train; delivering the training; and operating feedback mechanisms. DSAT’s problem is that in practice it is neither well understood nor properly implemented, and consequently it is slow and overly bureaucratic. This is primarily a resourcing issue: when the Services are short of personnel, training schools are not the top priority when assigning staff, and consequently there are not enough people managing the DSAT process. Moreover, DSAT is complicated. Although JSP 822 has been made more accessible, its 679 pages (of which 235 relate to individual training) are impenetrable to all but those with time to read it carefully. Indeed, there are companies specialising in providing consultancy services for DSAT, including training needs analysis and course design, to supplement the expertise inside the Defence establishment. Finally, the turnover of military personnel makes it difficult to build expertise that might enable shortcuts to be employed or judgements made about the risks and benefits of deviating from the process while abiding by the policy’s spirit (even if straying from its formal stipulations).</p> -<p>From cleaning up its website (and deleting outdated content) to creating a more intentional rhythm for periodic updates with an updated service catalog specifically for FCEB agencies, CISA could benefit from simplifying its messaging. This will also be helpful for FCEB agencies to better understand the full suite of current CISA offerings.</p> +<p>DSAT is cyclical, but cycling through it is often slow. In many cases, ExVal occurs every five years, which, given the speed at which battlefield realities are changing – as shown by the Ukraine conflict, for example – is too infrequent. For an organisation that aspires to be agile and adaptive, this represents a significant weakness. Such evaluation need not take so long: during the Iraq operation (from 2003), the review process concerning counter-improvised explosive devices was achieved within days. While this kind of rapid learning is not necessary for all skills, the ability to incorporate new knowledge – even that acquired by other institutions – more quickly into the training system will be vital if the armed forces are to compete in a world in which technology (and warfare) advances rapidly.</p> -<p>Related to this, interviewees noted that some of CISA’s programs, such as CDM, could benefit from more positive communications about success stories and upward trending metrics. These stories can paint a picture that the process is working and that FCEB agencies would be well served by participating to the fullest extent possible.</p> +<p>The separation of requirement-definition (under the TRA) and delivery (under the TDA) ensures that training delivery is assessed against the organisation’s needs, allowing deliverers to focus on how learning is best enabled. This generally works well when delivery sits within the same Service as the requirement-setter and end user. It is, however, less effective where end users have weaker organisational relationships with the TDA (such as different chains of command) or for generic Defence requirements separate from an individual’s core task. In these circumstances, there can be a disconnect: users and/or TRAs can demand things the TDA cannot deliver, or TDAs can prioritise what they are able to teach – or can afford to teach – rather than what is actually needed. For example, the advanced command and staff course (ACSC) prioritises “staff skills” more than “command”. Whether ACSC would be better placed educating joint command rather than teaching more process-oriented planning skills is worthy of consideration. Meanwhile, in Army HQ, the absence of a TRA function has seen the Land Warfare Centre, a TDA, drive training requirements from the bottom up.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.2 (for CISA): Establish a framework for more consistent coordination with SRMAs, information sharing and analysis centers, and other activities with regard to FCEB protection.</em></strong></p> +<p>Management of the training pipeline is often overly bureaucratic. The statements of training requirement (SOTR) and training task (SOTT) are important tools connecting inflow (recruitment) to training and managing the capacity in the training system. As with other parts of DSAT, the concept is good, but often unresponsive in practice. Interviewees reported that it took two to three years to change the SOTR/SOTT through formal routes, a process often mediated by strategic workforce planning models (which in many cases reflected the previous year’s task, with some allowance for under-delivery, either because people were not recruited or they did not complete their training). The consequence of this is that the pipeline slows down and people have to wait longer than is strictly necessary before they are trained.</p> -<p>One of the comments that came up in private sector interviews is that there are networks and entities that already work with CISA in other capacities that can likely be more plugged-in to support CISA’s FCEB mission. While this might already be inherently baked into CISA’s plans, it might help for CISA to formally map out its existing stakeholders and clearly identify how each can specifically support CISA’s FCEB mission.</p> +<p>While DSAT can work well, it is better suited to more static environments where requirements are recognisable because the technology and its use are familiar. In dynamic and transformative environments – where the principle of linear progression does not apply – it is difficult to identify a training need. Emerging technology in particular poses problems, because TRAs may struggle to define requirements in a fast-moving landscape. To mitigate this challenge, training objectives can be defined very broadly to give TDAs the freedom to iterate their training, but commercial staff might struggle to agree to contracts if Defence cannot formally articulate needs that it does not yet fully understand.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.3 (for CISA): Provide sector-specific cybersecurity guidance, especially for low-security sectors with “soft targets.”</em></strong></p> +<p><em>Contracting</em></p> -<p>Gaps in CISA support across the 16 critical sectors and FCEB agencies exist not out of willfulness or lack of direction but due to inherent limitations driven by budget constraints, staff bandwidth, and talent availability. However, it is likely that CISA will continue to acquire, train, and retain talent and grow to meet the expanding cyber picture. What CISA could do in the short term is review the 16 critical infrastructure sectors on a triannual basis to assess and prioritize three to five “soft target” sectors. In this manner, at a minimum CISA will assist these sectors to improve their cyber resilience, conserving staff bandwidth and prioritizing the entities and agencies that need the most help. This tiered approach could help CISA defend the .gov while it grows its capabilities and talent. The approach also lends itself to generating and deploying collaborating planning teams that focus on integrating risk management with budgets and strategy at the agency level.</p> +<p>Contracting with commercial training providers helps to ensure Defence has the requisite andragogical (adult learning) skills in the workforce and can inject fresh ideas into training. However, the contracting process is slow, and contracting for services suffers from many of the same challenges as contracting for equipment. For example, SimCentric has developed a computer-based simulation for weapons handling that reduces lessons from 16 hours to 45 minutes, and which has improved pass rates from 68% to 98%. However, its introduction has been constrained by contractual processes and the absence of a holistic training strategy that guides the balance between live and synthetic, or in-person and online, learning. Even multi-year contracts are often tightly specified, and focused on inputs rather than outputs or outcomes, which limits scope for flexibility/adaptability, although there are notable exceptions in the Royal Navy and Army.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.4 (for CISA): Host a database of shared service offerings for FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> +<p>This context makes it difficult to form the kinds of partnerships that would bring most value by harnessing the complementary talents of the MoD (context and subject expertise) and contractors (learning styles and technology). Holding contractors to account for the number of classroom hours, for example, actively disincentivises forms of training that could shorten courses or which involve different means of delivery that could be more effective. Hence, contractors are effectively disincentivised from adopting innovative ways of delivering training that would reduce contact time. Moreover, by over-specifying requirements such as practical training areas and equipment, Defence either makes little use of expensive infrastructure/equipment (for example, 19% classroom utilisation at Lichfield), or has to update training equipment regularly (which can be difficult, because it often has a lower priority than operational equipment). Further education colleges, typically less generously resourced, make more efficient use of their facilities by focusing on generic training aimed at general principles and how to apply them to different situations, rather than Defence’s more workplace-specific learning approach.</p> -<p>CISA’s website already advertises cyber services offered by the Departments of Justice, Transportation, and Health and Human Services. It also mentions that there are efforts in progress aimed at vetting other services and providers that will be included on the website at a later date. Whether by CISA or some other entity, it should be a priority that one of the shared service providers manage a public database that clearly outlines which departments and agencies are current providers and what their specific offerings are.</p> +<p>The over-specification of requirements also tends to drive transactional rather than relational approaches to the task. Multi-year contracts are likely to be more effective when managed by partners rather than where one side holds the other to account for pre-specified deliverables. Evidence of the negative effect of more transactional positions can be seen in the difficulties unit commanders have in sharing information with their contractors, even where they are keen to do so.</p> -<p>CISA might even consider hosting an annual or biannual consortium of federal shared service providers to discuss best practices, share insights, and discuss current gaps, among other activities. Given CISA’s authorities and reach, the agency is in a strong position to host this sort of convening. This forum would also offer an opportunity to introduce agencies to collaborative planning teams or other services that CISA provides to support defending the .gov.</p> +<p><strong>Delivery</strong></p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.5 (for CISA): Explain the value add of the JCDC to FCEB agencies (separate from the value add for the private sector).</em></strong></p> +<p>Much Defence training is delivered in person, as part of lengthy programmes that remove people from the frontline. The trigger for training is often less to do with an individual’s needs and more because a career gate has been reached – a promotion or a posting. While these are reasonable grounds to suggest training interventions are warranted, Defence’s industrial approach, where trainees are processed largely without regard to their existing skills or knowledge, lacks flexibility. It prioritises neatness of planning – common start and end dates, simpler instructor scheduling and so on – over training needs. It is also increasingly out of step with shifts in strategic workforce planning, talent management, and learning and development towards skills-based approaches that link training to skills rather than roles/jobs. The skills-based approach allows personalised training that accommodates individual’s pre-existing skills and avoids unnecessary training. The emerging Defence Talent and Army Skills Frameworks could provide the basis for the transition to a skills-based model.</p> -<p>The JCDC continues to provide value for public and private entities alike and has already had some early successes. Moving forward, it could be helpful for FCEB agencies writ large to have clearer direction on the value that the JCDC can have for their respective agencies. Moreover, FCEB agencies should be more aware of which organizations comprise the JCDC, along with why and how their individual needs are being addressed by the select FCEB leaders represented in the group.</p> +<p>The didactic nature of much Defence training was repeatedly highlighted in the interviews conducted for this paper: that is, instructors leading students through the learning. This approach also means lessons often focus on facts and concepts rather than on the higher-level objectives described in Bloom’s revised taxonomy, reducing the return on training in comparison to those that provide a more active and social learning experience. Pockets of good practice do exist, such as the “flipped classroom” approach at the Royal School of Military Engineering (RSME) at Minley, but elsewhere lessons often transfer knowledge from instructors to students who are largely passive recipients. This is often a function of lesson design, instructor experience and classroom layout that reflects historical teaching environments, albeit with electronic rather than chalk boards. “Reflective learning” is often driven out by the desire to be more “efficient”, either forcing students to extend their learning days in order to reflect and make sense of what they have been taught, or restricting the learning to facts that can be taught easily but which are not fully contextualised or understood.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.6 (for CISA): Prioritize (and communicate) system integration when rolling out new capabilities and programs.</em></strong></p> +<p>In a move accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic, Defence is making more use of remote learning. However, interviewees expressed concern that Defence was facing “remote learning fatigue”, which could make the otherwise admirable investment in learning and development demotivating. This may not be true for the reserves, where more online learning and shorter residential training might be better suited to the time that Reservists can commit. But Reserve units lack the connectivity and expertise to deliver Reserve training, and moving too much training online at the expense of in-person delivery also risks creating a sense of isolation that weakens the Reservist’s attachment to their unit. A balanced, system-level view is needed.</p> -<p>One of the identified gaps in CISA’s services is that, at a minimum, there is an outside perception that CISA’s tools and services are distinct lines of effort. It is not clear that information and best practices are being consistently shared between platforms. In many ways, this a hard issue for CISA to address, especially given that some of the services offered predate CISA and might have previously operated under different parts of the DHS or other agencies altogether. In other words, when developed, some of these services were not intentionally designed to be integrated with other tools and services.</p> +<p><strong>Learning Environment</strong></p> -<p>CISA does appear to be actively trying to address this issue, notably by having CADS serve as a data repository that collects information from these various points. However, as CISA continues to make promises on scaling up, modernizing, and generally updating its capabilities, it needs to more intentionally map out and communicate how these lines of effort work within existing programs. The lack of such planning could lead to problems down the road, as well as potential visibility gaps.</p> +<p>An effective learning environment requires appropriate furniture, lighting, temperature, air quality, ventilation, ICT infrastructure, connectivity and adaptable classrooms, as well as support facilities such as accommodation and catering. A critical purpose behind the Defence Training Review was to enable investment in infrastructure by reducing the size of the Defence training estate, but the quality of the learning environments in Defence varies greatly. New environments purpose-built for the Defence Academy and at Worthy Down contrast with older sites where classrooms and facilities are poor, and students cannot get a hot shower. While progress has been made, with 1,600 hectares (2%) of the built estate disposed of between 2015 and 2021 to fund improvements elsewhere, the training estate still struggles to provide the appropriate infrastructure (such as flexible classrooms and WiFi in accommodation areas) that is essential for maximising the benefits of new technology.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.7 (for all): Operate with a clear understanding of what it means to have resilient networks and processes.</em></strong></p> +<p>Conversely, parts of the estate are so lean that the training system lacks surge capacity. Even for training regular personnel, it is taut; training just 70 Ukrainian engineers in the UK required stopping some Phase Three training. If the UK were required to surge train reserves to enable the regular Army to deploy, capacity would be lacking. In addition, reserves struggle to access courses, training areas and ranges, while contracts for support facilities on bases often mean that there is a reduced service at weekends when reservists are able to train.</p> -<p>Cybersecurity is an exercise in risk management, not risk elimination. While that might be something that CISA, some of the more cyber mature FCEB agencies, and federal CISOs are aware of, it is not a clearly understood concept across the board. In its larger public awareness campaigns, it is important that CISA not only call out the importance of resilience by name but actually define in practical terms what that means for an FCEB agency with regard to its federal network and processes.</p> +<p><strong>Workforce</strong></p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.8 (for CISA): Explicitly promote transparency as a way of achieving greater resilience.</em></strong></p> +<p>While military instructors are experts in their subject, they often lack the andragogical skills to most effectively communicate their expertise. Instructors are typically selected for their technical competence and subsequently trained as instructors under the Defence Trainer Competency Framework. This Level 3 programme runs over the first 12 months of the instructor’s appointment. So while Defence instructors are up to date in their subject matter expertise – a challenge for many civilian colleges – they have a low level of proficiency in supporting learning. In comparison, further education teachers require undergraduate or postgraduate teaching qualifications (Level 6 or 7), or a Level 5 teaching apprenticeship.</p> -<p>The ubiquity of data coupled with today’s advancements in cyber technology mean that it will be impossible for FCEB agencies, even after implementing all appropriate safeguards, to assume that sensitive information will not be compromised. With that in mind, CISA can use its platform to more intentionally — via guidance documents and planning manuals — tie the value of transparency to greater resilience for FCEB agencies. In other words, it can highlight why operating with transparency can provide greater resilience and result in less reliance on sensitive information.</p> +<p>It is not just instructors who lack deep knowledge and skills. TRAs and training support staff such as course designers and those developing training materials receive little training. Analysing and determining how best to close training gaps, and knowing what learning technology is available and how it can be best employed are not easy, but these skills are often assumed to be acquired through osmosis or with limited formal interventions (for example, the Defence Online Learning Course, for those responsible for developing online learning, lasts two days). Moreover, the lack of training for those people managing training means that they are often unfamiliar with the DSAT process and can default to slavish adherence to the letter of the process rather than deviating from the formal rules to achieve its intended purpose where necessary.</p> -<p>Beyond that, CISA can promote transparency across a number of other lines of effort: in incident reporting, in opening networks for outside researchers under careful bug bounty programs to find weaknesses, among the vendor community in coming forward with vulnerabilities in products, and between government and industry with regard to sharing vulnerabilities, among many other efforts.</p> +<h3 id="ii-modernisation-opportunities">II. Modernisation Opportunities</h3> -<p>Transparency, as it relates to cybersecurity, is not something FCEB agencies will necessarily invest in or prioritize, but CISA can lead the way in providing actionable recommendations for how to operate in this type of environment.</p> +<p>The process of modernising Defence training is continuous, and we must start by acknowledging where training is done well. Good practice exists, which can and should be shared. While Defence’s formal training structures help ensure learning and development happen systematically – in ways that many commercial employers are unable to replicate – the structure also brings constraints, leading to somewhat rigid, industrial approaches. A teacher from the Victorian age would find much that was familiar in Defence training – much more than they would find in more dynamic contemporary higher education settings. Defence training needs to become more digitally relevant, but this does not mean merely replacing classrooms with online learning – both modes of learning have their place, but effective distributed learning needs to be resourced and enabled, including changing the organisational culture to enable individuals to undertake self-education. This paper identifies four areas for modernisation: people; delivery; building knowledge of the system; and partnering.</p> -<h4 id="other-ideas">Other Ideas</h4> +<h4 id="people">People</h4> -<p>While the task force had broad agreement on the recommendations above, several other ideas emerged over the course of the study that either did not achieve consensus or were beyond the scope of the current effort. Below, the core research team captured the aspects most relevant to generating a larger dialogue about how to secure the .gov.</p> +<p>Arguably the single biggest contribution to modernising Defence training could be achieved by upskilling those engaged in the management, oversight, support and delivery of training materials. Good practice exists in the Royal Navy and at RSME Chatham (where contractors have invested in upskilling Defence’s instructional staff to Level 4 qualifications, beyond the level provided by Defence), and the Defence Academy has supported its staff in gaining higher qualifications. Naval educators are also given membership of the Society of Education and Training, and significant effort is put into online support and coaching to enable their development. But the people involved in designing training programmes, as well as those doing training needs analysis, deciding on training methods and designing materials, would all benefit from having their skills supplemented, and from continuing professional development. Selection for training duties should take account of the soft skills needed for effective andragogy, not merely technical expertise or command authority.</p> -<p><strong>WORKFORCE</strong></p> +<p>The constant churn in the Defence training workforce, with individuals changing every two to three years, is also problematic. Longer tours that build greater andragogic expertise, or the creation of a cadre undertaking repeated tours in learning and development (with instruction as a career anchor) could help mitigate other risks in the system and allow the investment made in upskilling to be used for longer periods. But this should be done without compromising the up-to-date operational knowledge that Defence instructors provide their students.</p> -<p>While progress is being made in the cyber workforce, it is not yet clear whether current efforts are sufficient, given enduring challenges associated with the issue. The new National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy (NCWES) is certainly a step in the right direction that looks at the problem holistically. The strategy acknowledges the need for hiring and pay flexibility, but it is not immediately clear how to create the type of incentive pay required to attract and retain talent, much less who should pay for additional personnel costs. Leaving over 100 federal agencies to pick up the tab risks creating “haves” and “have nots” because of internal budget challenges that accrue as they pay for approved CDM suites alongside expanded pay incentives for a cyber workforce.</p> +<p>Defence also needs to ensure that there are enough staff to operate the training system, which may mean raising the priority of many of the posts. Some efficiencies could be found by reducing duplication of effort, for example using centres of excellence for common material that is produced once and used many times. The Defence Academy’s Education and Research Department, which produces common content modules for many courses, could potentially improve productivity in this regard, but needs to be allowed to prioritise its main programme.</p> -<p>There are also significant communication issues associated with ensuring that current and prospective members of the cyber workforce understand which federal benefits they can take advantage of. According to the strategy, “in fiscal year 2019, only 320 IT Specialists out of the more than 84,000 eligible benefited from student loan repayments. As a second example, critical pay authority is currently available for 800 positions, and only 47 have been used (data provided by [the Office of Personnel Management]).” In addition, even when agencies grant additional authorizations to increase pay, the implementation can lag. According to the strategy, “the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General have been granted the authority (by sec. 401 of the Abolish Trafficking Reauthorization Act of 2022, Public L. No. 117-347, 136 Stat. 6199 (2023)) to provide increased incentive pay to DHS and Department of Justice employees identified as possessing cyber skills. As of this writing, these authorities have not yet been implemented.”</p> +<p>Increased use of online learning could expand capacity in the training system while utilising fewer dedicated training staff, but this would place new burdens on course designers and the frontline. Line managers and others involved in facilitating unit learning would need preparation for their new responsibilities, and jobs would need to be redesigned to reflect that jobholders are not fully trained and need time and space to learn in the role.</p> -<p>Resource challenges are also likely to confront expanding education opportunities. While the NCWES expands the number of universities offering cybersecurity education through NSF and NSA outreach programs, the resources do not match philanthropic efforts. For example, the Craig Newmark Foundation alone will invest more than the NSF, NIST, and Department of Labor on cybersecurity education and training through its $100 million Cyber Civil Defense Initiative.183 It is also not immediately clear how some lead agency efforts contribute to the vision as part of the NCWES. For example, CISA’s contribution to the effort was a Cyber Security Awareness Month initiative focused largely on media outreach. No amount of media outreach is likely to address the growing shortfall of IT professionals in the cyber workforce.</p> +<p>Taking a whole force view and combining operationally current and upskilled Defence instructors with commercial partners possessing deep training expertise enhances the value of both groups. The contractors for the Royal Navy (Selborne) and the Army (Holdfast) have a greater responsibility for training management than elsewhere, providing training supervisors and managers, and design and governance functions, that supplement the military instructor’s recent frontline experience. They also act as intelligent customers promoting good practice from outside Defence. Working in partnership also helps protect capacity in the training system, preventing key posts being left unfilled when shortages of Defence personnel necessitate deploying military personnel to higher priority tasks. However, the partners need to be able to share information, be free to adapt training quickly by cycling through the DSAT process faster when necessary, and be able to adopt modern learning practices – all of which require trust between the parties.</p> -<p><strong>INFLATION PROOFING</strong></p> +<h4 id="delivery">Delivery</h4> -<p>The entire congressional appropriations process struggles with the challenges posed by higher inflation. The same is true with cybersecurity, where vendors increase the costs of software and contractors increase labor costs. Therefore, the U.S. government — and especially Congress — needs to explore mechanisms for making FCEB agencies more resilient to inflation. Currently, only select mandatory entitlement programs are indexed to inflation. Congress should consider studying current dynamics around cyber funding, specifically how in some cases the projected costs for essential security tools and services might make it difficult for some FCEB agencies to consistently use those tools in the future. Congress should also be monitoring unforeseen operations and maintenance costs associated with managing or updating tools or services. While not possible for all tools, Congress should consider if there are unique circumstances or a specific set of services that should be indexed to inflation or what other mechanisms are available to address sudden cost spikes. If Congress does pursue this type of action, it should frequently revisit which tools and services qualify, so as to not unintentionally block the use of other tools that might perform better than those currently in use.</p> +<p>Learning is a fundamentally social activity, so classroom-based training will remain crucial, even as Defence becomes more digitally oriented. Given increased skills, training designers and instructors will be able to make lessons more active and less didactic, and thus engage students in higher levels of learning such as analysis, evaluation or creation. Investing in instructor development can move classroom learning up the pyramid of Bloom’s taxonomy, supporting collective reflection and social learning. Combined with online learning, these approaches could enhance learning outcomes as well as shorten residential programmes (where appropriate), democratise access and support reserves.</p> -<p><strong>PREPARING FOR AN ALGORITHMIC FUTURE</strong></p> +<p>A revised culture of learning that recognised that individuals might follow different paths based on their prior learning/experience (such as RSME’s fixed mastery/variable time approach), underpinned by better accreditation of non-Defence training, would enable faster – and more personalised – progression through training. A routine part of course design should be to identify shortcuts through the syllabus, allowing people demonstrating existing competence to avoid lessons that have no learning value for them. This move towards a more organic process requires acceptance that students would have different learning journeys. It might also allow training and trainees to contribute to the frontline more directly, with training outputs focused on benefiting users – for example, by conducting engineering training at units whose equipment needs repairing, rather than instructors “breaking” equipment for students to fix before it is broken again for the next class. It could also open the way for fortuitous course combination, where compatible programmes coincide and can allow collaborative learning; for example, the Fire and Rescue College, wherever possible, combines the Incident Command Course with firefighter development courses. Currently, however, this approach might be challenging for Defence’s preference for training standardisation.</p> -<p>Beyond pricing, there is a need for a larger set of standards guiding AI model assurance and testing as well as red teaming generative AI models, but this is outside the scope of the current report. The Biden administration is still in the process of developing a larger policy framework that will affect this evolving technology. For example, the Office of Science and Technology Policy has proposed a blueprint for an AI bill of rights. This initiative parallels multiple high-profile efforts, including the 2021 Federal Data Strategy, the 2021 National Security Commission on AI’s final report, the 2023 National Artificial Intelligence Research Resources task force report, and NIST’s AI Risk Management Framework.</p> +<p>Accepting that individuals may have different learning paths requires both a cultural shift by Defence and a solid foundation in the basics for the students. Experience at the BT telecoms group shows that training on every variant of a given technology can be rendered unnecessary if students have a strong foundation in the core principles and are then given access to technology that can provide specific online instruction, through access to videos showing how a particular task can be completed. A greater focus on universal principles and a reduced emphasis on the particular could also make the training estate more efficient by allowing the flexible use of space that was previously dedicated exclusively to one particular purpose. This could also address the endemic issue whereby training struggles to keep pace with frontline capabilities (a situation that is likely to get worse as Defence embraces the idea of “spiral development” on the frontline).</p> -<p>With respect to cyber defense, the most important output from these AI initiatives rests in technical standards for testing and evaluation. These standards will need to include red teaming generative AI models to combat misinformation and deepfakes as well as requirements for vendors selling AI-enabled threat hunt capabilities.</p> +<p>Two elements that could contribute to enabling a shift towards more effective training delivery are technology and individual learning.</p> -<p>Last, the standards must include more detailed requirements for cloud security. There is no AI without big data, and there is no big data without cloud computing. Failing to secure the cloud would create a back door into corrupting new AI/ML applications. At the same time, there is optimism that generative AI applications offer opportunities to enhance security.</p> +<p><strong>Technology</strong></p> -<p>Once broader federal and technical guidelines are established, CISA will likely need to develop an agency-wide AI strategy focused on limiting the ability of threat actors to hold the United States hostage in cyberspace using malware tailored by generate models. Securing the .gov domain space will require AI applications at multiple levels.</p> +<p>Coupled with the use of learning technologies, such as AI-enabled online learning and virtual reality (VR), more blended approaches better suited to personalised learning journeys could be enabled. AI-enabled content could respond to student inputs, guiding them through online courses, while VR could support forces sent to the frontline without a training stock, or allow those on the frontline to learn before equipment arrives on which they have not been trained. These technologies require investment in the enabling infrastructure to create an open architecture to support technology-agnostic learning systems that allow students to use their own devices for accessing unclassified materials.</p> -<p><strong>USING A JFHQ-DODIN MODEL TO FURTHER CENTRALIZE THE .GOV ECOSYSTEM</strong></p> +<p><strong>Individual Learning</strong></p> -<p>A more radical approach to securing the .gov space would be to centralize budgets, authorities, and operational response across the over 100 federal agencies that constitute it. This approach could, in principle, parallel how the DOD created new entities to defend its networks.</p> +<p>Delivery is built on the foundation of a high quality learning environment. Such an environment should embody a greater willingness to allow self-directed learning (without automatically resulting in pressure to reduce course lengths) and widen access to content, not merely for those that trigger an entitlement (a role-based approach) but for encouraging those who wish to own their personal and professional development. Helping students to learn how to think (rather than what to think) by combining more student reflection time with classroom discussions focused on higher-value learning outcomes would add value to both Defence and the students.</p> -<p>During the Obama administration, the DOD sought to better align its cyber capabilities, including protecting defense networks, building on over 10 years of Joint Task Forces and other command and control constructs. As part of this effort, the DOD created the Joint Force Headquarters - Department of Defense Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN) in 2014, based on earlier plans by U.S. Strategic Command.</p> +<h4 id="building-knowledge-of-the-system">Building Knowledge of the System</h4> -<p>The original concept of operations started from the premise that defense networks are contested battlespace that require centralized planning, control, and named operations (e.g., Operation Gladiator Phoenix, Operation Gladiator Shield) to defend the network. According to Admiral Mike Rogers, this construct also meant that JFHQ-DODIN could assume operational control of different cyber mission forces as part of its defense mission. In other words, the creation of a centralized task force to defend DOD networks was not just about budgets and authorities; it represented a planning and risk management framework.</p> +<p>The training of individuals sits within wider force-generation and HR systems. Steps are being taken to improve connections and feedback loops between individual and collective training, but it is too early to judge the success of these initiatives. A high-level strategy that considers individual training, setting the framework for thinking about in-person and remote learning, simulation, use of AI (including generative AI) and establishing agreed definitions of technology and data would help. This might also acknowledge the limitations of the DSAT process in practice and encourage a more dynamic model – one that accepts more risk against standardised training outputs by being willing to exploit emerging opportunities that add greater value, either to the students or to the frontline. For example, using trainees to repair equipment at frontline units, or allowing courses to train together when they coincide, even if that is not the same on every occasion.</p> -<p>Applied to CISA, the JFHQ-DODIN model implies a higher degree of centralization. Agencies would see reduced budgets and personnel if functions normally performed by the CISO were centralized and incident reporting, response, and risk management were performed across the network by federated teams under operational control of CISA. In some ways, this centralization is the natural evolution of the .gov top domain management started in 2021.</p> +<p>It might also encourage closer relationships between TRAs and TDAs, with either the requirement responsibilities siting within the delivery authority, or placing a small TRA team to work alongside the TDA. This would enable the delivery organisations to become centres of expertise at the leading edge of thinking about how skills are employed and forging stronger relationships with the frontline, doctrine centres and allies. TDAs, therefore, would seek out improvements and propose changes to requirements, rather than wait for often overstretched TRAs to identify new requirements. The alignment of many of these functions under Director Land Warfare in the Army could be a useful test case for this approach.</p> -<p>Yet the option is also not a panacea. The DOD still struggles to report and address cyber incidents, including in the defense industrial base. Centralizing budgets and authorities across over 100 federal agencies would take time, cause friction, and, despite increased visibility (i.e., CDM) and responsiveness (i.e., threat hunt), might not create cost savings.</p> +<p>Beyond training, the overall HR ecosystem is less integrated, with often cumbersome processes hindering connections between strategic workforce planning, recruitment, training and career management. The mechanical SOTR/SOTT process that connects recruitment and training remains challenging, although early results from Project Selborne’s use of AI through its new schedule optimisation engine allow an immediate digital recasting of the SOTR/SOTT plans when the situation changes or a new operational requirement is introduced.</p> -<p><strong>GETTING THIRD-PARTY RISK RIGHT</strong></p> +<p>A necessary foundation for the modernisation of training is to improve the quality and flow of data across the training schools, across the Commands between Joint TDAs and Service TRAs (through strengthened Customer Executive Boards), and between the MoD and contractors. Doing so – as Ofsted has regularly demanded in its inspection of training establishments – would inform choices and improve management of a more fluid system. It would also permit technology to mitigate the need for human experts that are difficult to find, and could offer a more dynamic approach to recruitment and training that reduces wastage.</p> -<p>In the near future, a large number of government services will transition to a cloud-based architecture. CISA’s recent guidelines for “security-by-design” and “security-by-default” linked to pillar three of the 2023 National Cyber Strategy offer a start but not an end to the effort to manage risk in the cloud. There will need to be additional studies and experiments to test how best to manage third-party risks during the cloud transition. Even the best defense still leaves holes dedicated attacks could exploit, and the cloud creates opportunities to capture and exploit a larger array of services. In addition, there will need to be renewed efforts to engage on “security-by-design” internationally through forums such as the International Technical Union. In the twenty-first century, standards are strategy. The best way to manage third-party risk will be to build in technical standards that make digital infrastructure harder to compromise.</p> +<p>The simplification of DSAT is welcomed, but must be accompanied by upskilling and the resetting of risk tolerance, or Defence will merely be adding new process to reduce the chance of errors by those not steeped in it. Another important change would be for the knowledge, skills, experience and behaviours that individuals require to be mapped to organisational needs (and therefore shape the training and learning designed to fulfil those requirements). The Pan-Defence Skills Framework could help in this regard. Defence also needs to systematise the good work it did in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic when, moving rapidly, it embraced changes that under normal circumstances would have taken a long time to implement. While commendable, these changes now often exist as exceptions to the usual system, and need to be made “normal”.</p> -<h3 id="the-future-of-collective-defense">The Future of Collective Defense</h3> +<h4 id="partnering">Partnering</h4> -<p>In the next three to five years, CISA’s challenge will be not only to grow and integrate its capabilities, but also to clearly communicate its capabilities to partners and adversaries alike to enhance deterrence.</p> +<p>A whole force approach to learning and development is paying dividends in some areas of Defence, where, as Haythornthwaite hoped, the complementary skills of Defence and contractor personnel mitigate risks, enhance outputs and help Defence remain at the cutting edge of training. However, best practice needs to be shared more widely, and more sophisticated arrangements are needed in the training system as much as they are in procurement.</p> -<p>One of the more concerning aspects of the SolarWinds software compromise is not just that the malware comprehensively penetrated over 200 U.S. government and allied systems as early as 2019. It is that it was able to do so at a time when CISA, FedRAMP reporting, CDM and EINSTEIN, and a host of other agencies, capabilities, and processes were in place that should have, in theory, more quickly detected the intrusion.</p> +<p>Just as Defence’s skills requirements are not static, neither are the science of learning nor learning technologies. Commercial requirements in contracts spanning over 20 years that specify inputs cannot take account of changing andragogical practice, technologies or even system capacity. More partnership-focused models, such as those at the Defence Academy and Royal Navy, offer significant advantages, especially where they include funded requirements for training innovation and allow the partner to maximise the use of the infrastructure, such as the Holdfast contract at RSME. For example, Project Selborne’s eight output-based key performance indicators drive effective partnership behaviours aligned to the Royal Navy’s strategic goals, where sharing people creates a single workforce (civilian and military) that contributes to the sense of shared endeavour and priorities. More broadly, however, Defence must recognise that external learning expertise is valuable, and be more realistic about its own uniqueness.</p> -<p>One of the key takeaways from the expert tabletop exercises is that while knowledge of CISA services encouraged a few of the attackers to change their attack strategy, most of CISA’s services, while important to have, did not greatly factor into the attackers’ analyses. The experts came to these conclusions from a few different perspectives. Some believed that the benefits of CISA cyber services, such as those that promote system and process resilience, could only be realized in the long term and would not fully be realized in the immediate future, thereby making them ineffective as deterrents. Others were skeptical that CISA’s capabilities would be sufficiently advanced in the near future. And some of the experts did not believe that CISA alone with its defensive posture could undermine an attack strategy without reinforcements from other government entities with investigatory or prosecutorial powers.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>But the truth is that with increased resourcing, CISA is making meaningful steps to not only up its capabilities but also make sure those capabilities are integrated and provide a greater picture of the threats and vulnerabilities that FCEB agencies need to address. CISA’s current capabilities, combined with planned reporting requirements and processes, will ensure that the agency has a more fulsome global cyber activity picture. CISA is well positioned not only to monitor and collect information but also to disseminate the information and help entities plan their responses at different levels. The challenge is to ensure CISA can adapt to the evolving threat landscape while navigating bureaucratic challenges.</p> +<p>The skills challenge in Defence is becoming more acute, with traditional roles becoming more complex and new technologies requiring new skills. Moreover, in looking for recruits that possess these skills, Defence is competing directly with employers who have greater flexibility to pay market rates. The extensive training organisation Defence operates is a vital tool for ensuring sustained delivery of its operational outputs. This organisation is a great strength, and an attractive part of the Defence offer to its people, being more systematic and structured than that of most employers.</p> -<hr /> +<p>However, this training system is expensive, and requires modernisation to help it meet the challenges it faces.</p> -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<p>Foremost among the challenges is one of culture. The traditional conception of training in Defence is an “industrial” one, where people are raw materials fed into a process that homogenises them via the delivery of standardised training, largely regardless of individual needs. This rather mechanistic approach was effective when skills and careers were static, but is less suited to the rapidly-evolving environments that Defence operates in today. The lack of a “system view”, in which an individual’s training is situated within a broader ecosystem, has hindered modernisation attempts and resulted in risk being displaced rather than removed.</p> -<p><strong>Devi Nair</strong> is a former associate director and associate fellow with the CSIS Defending Democratic Institutions Project, where her research focused on cyber and disinformation operation efforts aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions.</p> +<p>The second challenge is that although the DSAT process that shapes the development of training is conceptually sound, the failure to resource it properly in practice means that it struggles to deliver, while the process by which Defence contracts for training partners also creates problems.</p> -<p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is a PhD candidate and a graduate fellow at the Center for Data Science at American University. His research focuses on civil-military relations and international security implications of technology. Methodologically, he is interested in Bayesian analysis, machine learning, and large language models. He is a replication analyst at Political Analysis.</p> +<p>Thirdly, training delivery has failed to keep pace with advances in the understanding of andragogy, often as a result of how the Defence training workforce is itself resourced, trained and employed.</p> -<p><strong>Jose M. Macias</strong> is a research associate in the Futures Lab within the International Security Program at CSIS. He is also a Pearson fellow and teaching assistant at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. With a keen interest in the quantitative study of war, Jose’s research delves into topics like cross-domain conflicts, societal impacts, and the integration of machine learning in international relations research, with prior significant contributions to the Correlates of War Project, including notable work quantifying the effects of U.S. bilateral counterterrorism treaties in the Global South and eastern Europe.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.This report delves into critical cybersecurity issues and offers insightful analysis for policymakers and the public.Paper Tiger or Pacing Threat?2023-10-19T12:00:00+08:002023-10-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/paper-tiger-or-pacing-threats<p><em>China has long couched its engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean in primarily economic terms. However, China is becoming increasingly strident in its efforts to bolster defense and security initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Chinese defense and security engagements manifest along a spectrum, including dual-use civilian and military infrastructure projects, public safety assistance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, arms sales, and joint military-to-military exchanges and trainings. An expanded military and security presence in the hemisphere poses significant concerns for the United States in the event of a potential conflict or crisis, imperils regional stability by empowering criminal regimes in the hemisphere, and risks eroding democratic norms within regional militaries and police forces.</em></p> +<p>The final challenge is that many of the essential enablers underpinning the learning environment are missing, including the data, infrastructure and capacity needed to manage fluctuating demand.</p> -<p>Taken together, these trendlines place the United States at an inflection point — it remains a preferred security partner for most countries in the hemisphere but must act now to preserve this status, lest it slip at a precarious moment. To fortify security partnerships with countries in the region, and counter Chinese influence in the security and defense space, the United States should pursue the following lines of effort:</p> +<p>Responding to these challenges is complex, but must involve sharing existing good practice, as well as incorporating the lessons that can be learned from others. Key elements of any response would include:</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Leverage U.S. partners to fill force modernization and equipment shortfalls.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Bolster the defense cooperation mechanisms of the inter-American system.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Clarify U.S. red lines when it comes to security engagement.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Invest in U.S. core competencies in military education and training.</p> - </li> +<ul> <li> - <p>Enhance interagency and international cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.</p> + <p>Upskilling the Defence training workforce – not just instructors, but staff across the training system, including TRAs, training managers and designers, and those validating the learning.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Improve cooperation on countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the nexus between transnational organized crime and environmental crimes.</p> + <p>Adopting a less mechanistic, more organic approach to delivery – one that facilitates unique individual journeys through the training system, gives more power to learners, and provides the right learning environment, enabled by modern learning technology.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Strengthen awareness and training on cybersecurity.</p> + <p>Building a stronger understanding of the systems within which training sits, including the individual/collective training continuum, and better use of training data and its connection with recruitment and career management, which is how Defence applies the skills people have learned. The shift also needs to normalise the (impressive) response to the Covid-19 pandemic that often stands out as an exception to the standard approach.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Invest in citizen security and delink citizen security from the regional conversation on drugs.</p> + <p>Building stronger partnerships with providers who can complement the strengths Defence instructors bring to the training system (their up-to-date operational knowledge and ability to contextualise the learning) through a stronger understanding of andragogy and best practice outside Defence.</p> </li> -</ol> - -<h3 id="from-creeping-concern-to-strategic-competitor">From Creeping Concern to Strategic Competitor</h3> - -<p>Peering out from the treetops on a hillside near Bejucal, Cuba, massive parabolic antennas mark the location of a suspected signals intelligence base reportedly operated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1999. More recently, images of the facility have sprung up across U.S. media after reports that China and Cuba had reached an agreement to open another such facility on the island. The true extent of China’s military footprint on the island remains hotly debated in open sources but given the proximity of any such facility to key commercial, technological, and military infrastructure along the southeastern coast of the United States, it should inspire planning for the worst. Adding yet more fuel to the fire, on June 20, 2023, the Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese officials had been in high-level talks with their Cuban counterparts to open yet another base on the island, this one dedicated to military training. These combined revelations garnered a raft of comparisons to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, assessments which, while perhaps exaggerations to some, underscore both the strategic import of the Western Hemisphere to the United States and the changing nature of the security and defense challenges in the region. Over 60 years ago, fear of missiles housed less than a hundred miles off the coast of Florida brought the world to the nuclear brink, but today the spectrum of potential threats encompasses a staggering range of issues, from cybersecurity and infrastructure investment to overseas police outposts, security cameras, and telecommunications networks. In such a diffuse threat environment, it may be easy to downplay individual risks as not rising to the level of serious concern. However, failing to see the ways in which they intersect and cumulate would represent a serious lack of foresight.</p> - -<p>The United States, for its part, has demonstrated an admirable degree of strategic clarity when it comes to defense of the hemisphere. The 2022 National Security Strategy states that “no region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere” and that preventing the emergence of a hostile military presence in the region has for decades been a guiding light of U.S. defense posture. Historically, the United States has oriented its approach to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) around the idea of “strategic denial.” As one of the authors has noted previously, strategic denial consists of efforts to “prevent major rivals from developing regional footholds from which they can menace, distract, or otherwise undercut the strategic interests of the United States.” Nevertheless, the defense and security dimensions and considerations of China’s engagement with LAC has been comparatively understudied. Indeed, when faced with the scale of China’s economic and trade relations with the hemisphere, other dimensions of engagement often appear secondary priorities for Beijing at best. To categorize defense and security as afterthoughts, however, is to fundamentally misunderstand China’s approach in LAC, wherein economic ties often serve as a foray into security engagement and sometimes security gains. This can be seen most notably with the proliferation of PRC-financed dual-use infrastructure in the hemisphere, particularly ports, airports, and space facilities — a raft of projects that span the southern tip of Argentina to the ports of the Bahamas.</p> - -<p>More explicitly in the military realm, senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials conducted more than 200 visits to LAC countries between 2002 and 2019. Exchanges such as the defense forum between China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) provide additional opportunities for high-level coordination on security matters. For example, the “China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022-2024)” listed “Political and Security Cooperation” as the top issue area upon which to build. China has also stepped up its sales and gifts of arms to countries throughout the hemisphere and broadened the aperture of security to include citizen security initiatives to create both physical and digital beachheads throughout the region. China’s preference to let security engagement be overshadowed by economic and political engagement in LAC means that the United States may ignore the challenge until it proves too late. Cuba seems to be a case in point, as the United States faces limited options from a security standpoint, beyond diplomatic pressure and condemnation, to mitigate the risks posed by an expanding Chinese military presence. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, the continuous drumbeat of Chinese infrastructure in Argentina, the rising tally of countries accepting China’s “safe cities” technology and surveillance equipment, and Beijing’s unflinching support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela all suggest that the concept of integrated deterrence is at risk of failing in the very region where it should hold most firm.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BaYI6J3.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: PLA Military Diplomacy 2003–2018.</strong> Source: <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1249864/chinese-military-diplomacy-20032016-trends-and-implications/">Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, July 2017)</a>. Elaborated with data from <a href="https://csis-ilab.github.io/cpower-viz/military-diplomacy/military-diplomacy/dist/index.html">“China’s Military Diplomatic Activities,” China Power, CSIS</a>.</em></p> - -<p>Furthermore, there is reason to believe security and defense issues could rise on China’s priorities list due to its growing military power and the confidence of its leadership. As China’s economic dynamo continues to flag, security cooperation, carried out by the PLA, could represent a durable means to prolong the influence it gained originally from investment flows. As competition with the United States sharpens in the Indo-Pacific, China can be expected to escalate in other regions, with LAC being viewed as a strategic blind spot within the United States’ traditional “sphere of influence” — and therefore open for exploitation in times of conflict. In addition, as home to the majority of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies, LAC stands out as a potential catalyst for cross-strait escalation. If China is able to entice some or all of these countries to switch their recognition to Beijing, it may embolden China’s disposition and accelerate its timetable to pursue reunification by force.</p> - -<p>Within the hemisphere itself, Chinese security and defense engagement presents three core challenges to the United States. First, such engagement most explicitly furthers China’s preparations for and options in a potential Taiwan contingency. Access to the Western Hemisphere during wartime opens a number of opportunities for the PLA. This includes both passively ensuring a continued flow of important foodstuffs and raw materials from the region to sustain China’s war effort and enabling more active efforts, such as using intelligence operatives, threatening U.S. deployment and sustainment flows, putting the U.S. homeland at risk, and even opening the door to the potential military use of LAC infrastructure such as ports and airbases for operations by PLA forces. Second, Chinese security support, including both explicitly military systems as well as digital systems for monitoring and controlling populations, may empower and extend the life of dictators within the hemisphere, especially in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Third, Chinese engagement with armed forces throughout the hemisphere shows signs of eroding standards of military subordination to civilian control, respect for human rights, or otherwise leading militaries in the region to behave in undesirable ways. Taken together, these risks paint a troubling picture wherein China is able to compel “neutrality” from the region in times of conflict, foment ungovernability in the region that undermines or distracts the United States in its own hemisphere, and overall erodes the ability of actors in the region to resist China’s will.</p> - -<p>Fortunately, the United States remains in a position of strength as the predominant security partner for the region. However, it must work to realign priorities and capabilities for competition with China, beginning with a clear statement of strategic goals. For the purposes of this report, the following is assumed to encapsulate the guiding policy objective of U.S. defense posture in LAC: to preserve freedom of operation, navigation, and access for U.S. forces in times of crisis, as well as maintain strategic denial of the region to adversaries, by remaining the partner of choice during peacetime.</p> - -<p>Simultaneously, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the U.S. Department of Defense should be clear about their limitations. China’s defense cooperation often comes on the heels of, or is intertwined with, vastly expanded economic cooperation. Without a broader U.S. strategy to meet the economic and development requirements of LAC, no amount of increased security cooperation will be sufficient to curb the growing Chinese presence in the hemisphere. A cohesive, practical, and forward-looking framework for engagement with allies and partners in LAC will nevertheless be essential, lest the United States lose one of its greatest assets for national defense.</p> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For the purposes of this report, the following is assumed to encapsulate the guiding policy objective of U.S. defense posture in LAC: to preserve freedom of operation, navigation, and access for U.S. forces in times of crisis, as well as maintain strategic denial of the region to adversaries, by remaining the partner of choice during peacetime.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The key strength of Defence’s training organisation – its highly structured approach – also makes it relatively rigid, and thus less able to react to rapidly changing needs. Modifying the structure to make it more flexible – rather than abandoning it – offers the best way forward, but success will only be possible if training modernisation is considered within its broader contexts, taking a “whole system” approach that considers the effects of changes in one part of the system on the other parts. Without this broader understanding, training modernisation could merely transfer risk elsewhere rather than remove it.</p> -<p>This report takes a comprehensive look at China’s means, methods, and motivations for engaging LAC countries on security and defense issues. Subsequent sections of this report first analyze China’s objectives for security and defense cooperation with LAC, proposing a typology that observes five overarching categories of engagement along a continuum from dual-use infrastructure investments to direct military-to-military trainings and exercises. Next, it outlines how each of these five categories manifest in the Western Hemisphere, and what role they play in China’s overall strategic framework. Subsequently, the report delves into the three primary threats posed by a more assertive Chinese security and defense posture in the region over the short to medium term. It concludes by outlining a range of policy recommendations to bolster U.S. security partnerships in LAC, limit the risks associated with existing Chinese engagement, and better address the growing security and defense challenges faced by partner countries.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="arrows-in-the-quiver">Arrows in the Quiver</h3> +<p><strong>Paul O’Neill</strong> is Director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His research interests cover national security strategy, NATO, and organisational aspects of Defence and security, including organisational design, human resources, professional military education and decision-making.He is a CBE, Companion of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, and a member of the UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team.</p> -<p><em>China’s Security and Defense Strategy in LAC</em></p> +<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Paul O’Neill and Patrick HintonBetter practices are needed to improve the effectiveness of defence training.Uncrewed Ground Systems2023-10-26T12:00:00+08:002023-10-26T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uncrewed-ground-systems<p><em>Military experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) is happening apace. Bomb disposal robots have been in service with armed forces for decades. Now, systems with greater capabilities and autonomy are being developed and tested.</em></p> -<p>Conventional assessments of LAC’s strategic importance to China relegate the region to the bottom of Beijing’s priorities list. Indeed, compared to regions such as the Indo-Pacific, which has a direct bearing on the revisionist ambitions of China as the theater where any potential war over Taiwan would be waged, or Africa, which possesses important resource wealth and strategic geography China is looking to secure for itself, the Western Hemisphere is less directly critical to China’s national security. However, to write off the region as unimportant or marginal to U.S.-China security competition overlooks important evolutions in China’s strategic calculus in the Western Hemisphere.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>China’s 2015 and 2019 defense white papers emphasize strengthening military partnerships with LAC nations. However, the most telling sign of China’s shifting view of security and defense engagement comes from President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022. Proposing “a holistic approach, maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains,” the GSI broadens the aperture for Chinese international security activities, including on matters of cybersecurity, data governance, and public health. In doing so, it takes explicit aim at the U.S. model of security and defense engagement, described by one international affairs scholar as “increasingly militant and belligerent” in the post-Cold War era. A holistic approach to security that encompasses emerging challenges and non-traditional concepts such as environmental and health security is not unwarranted. However, the most proximate outcome of the GSI is to enable China to engage with countries, even traditional U.S. partners, across a broader range of activities, especially in the police and cyber domains, where the United States may have a weaker presence in regions such as LAC. In general, the GSI is but one of several new initiatives — along with the Global Development Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative — launched by Xi to encourage a more Beijing-centric international order.</p> +<p>Potential uses include carrying cargo, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, chemical-agent detection, communications and fire support. However, the gap between ideal uses and present technical capability is significant. The delivery of systems to where they will be used, the realistic uses once there and the machines’ interactions with soldiers have frequently been underexamined but are crucial to how UGS will form part of land forces and offer genuine operational advantage. The technical limitations of UGS must be reflected in how they are task-organised within land forces. Due consideration must be given to how UGS will move around the battlefield, as it will often not be by their own steam. Maintenance and repair of UGS will require new training courses and a close relationship with industrial partners.</p> -<p>LAC countries are exemplary test beds for the application of the GSI. The region itself is remarkably free from interstate conflict but confronts a plethora of other security threats beyond this fortunate trend. The region makes up just 8 percent of the global population while accounting for one-third of homicides worldwide, driven by deeply entrenched transnational criminal networks. Climate change has exposed many countries to increased extreme weather events, devastating communities and uprooting thousands. The Covid-19 pandemic hit LAC harder than any other region, with 1.74 million deaths reported as of December 2022, over a quarter of the global death toll at that point. For each of these challenges, the GSI promises ready-made solutions — tested, refined, and proven in the crucible of China’s highly efficient (and ruthless) state security apparatus.</p> +<p>The principal conclusion to draw is that UGS will require significant support from their human counterparts. Moreover, cognitive burden on operators must be considered and managed. Systems move slowly, and the difficulty of navigating in complex terrain means they are not suited to some of the tasks for which they have been proposed, such as dismounted close combat in complex terrain. It is important to involve as many soldiers as possible in experimentation, and expose them to UGS early and often. This can be achieved by employing UGS in those areas with the highest throughput of soldiers, such as firing ranges and exercise areas, and making use of simulation. In addition, initial training should include education and demonstrations of UGS for new recruits. This will help build familiarity, favourability and trust in these systems.</p> -<p>In practice, however, the initiatives that China has sought to export and bring together under the GSI umbrella have led to an expanded Chinese presence — to the detriment of the sovereignty of recipient countries. China’s answer to crime and instability, for instance, has been opening new overseas police stations, exporting cameras and digital infrastructure with dubious safeguards, and deploying former PLA and People’s Armed Police personnel as security contractors. Its answer to the pandemic was to use vaccines as a cudgel to suppress criticism from countries such as Brazil and to try and pressure Paraguay into dropping its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Such tendencies are indicative of China’s motivation in recent years to apply its internal quest for order at the international level to “make the world safe” for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in the words of a leading scholar who has carefully studied Xi’s “Comprehensive National Security Concept.”</p> +<p>The potential of human–machine teams is significant, but hype should not disguise the limitations of UGS and the difficulty of integrating new technology into established structures.</p> -<p>The Western Hemisphere also plays a crucial role in China’s strategy of political warfare. As the region with the greatest potential to affect U.S. national security, every advance China makes in the Western Hemisphere is inherently more consequential. Even if these gains appear minor, they are often zero-sum and compounding. A country which elects to buy its armored vehicles from China will most likely not purchase similar platforms from the United States. Similarly, countries that use Huawei as the backbone of their telecommunications infrastructure will have little use for U.S. or European firms offering similar services. On the diplomatic front, China’s military-to-military exchanges and trainings hold the potential to increase familiarity and goodwill between regional militaries and the PLA, as well as undermine the United States’ links to and ability to coordinate with longstanding allies.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XxU9fBq.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Officials from Cuba, Ecuador, Costa Rica, China, and the Bahamas attend the first ministerial meeting of the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC) in Beijing on January 6, 2015.</em></p> +<h4 id="context">Context</h4> -<p>Such advances will undoubtedly be useful for China in the event of a war with the United States, but even below the threshold of armed conflict, they shape the theater in which the United States must operate and live. Activities that may appear minor on the surface, such as denial of port calls or the rejection of U.S. bids to supply military equipment, can subtly reshape the physical and human terrain of the Western Hemisphere, throwing up unexpected wrinkles and pitfalls for the United States while at the same time smoothing over these obstacles for China.</p> +<p>The presence of robots on the battlefield is central in today’s military discourse. A recent British Army recruiting advert showed soldiers operating in close combat alongside humanoid and wheeled robots. A former head of the British armed forces has stated that in the 2030s, the Army could comprise 90,000 soldiers and 30,000 robots. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a recent interview that “you’re going to see significant portions of armies and navies and air forces that will be robotic”. There is a significant jump from where forces are now to this envisioned state. Experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) in military forces is gaining pace. Many forces are running trials with a variety of systems. Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) are far more mature in their journey and lessons can be drawn across to their land-based brethren. Similar to UAS, it is believed that UGS will provide competitive advantage to land forces in several ways. UGS have the potential to support logistics and reconnaissance missions, as well as the ability to be armed with remote weapon systems to provide additional firepower to manoeuvre units. They can remove soldiers from harm’s way and increase mass, which underpins fighting power. However, there are substantial technological hurdles and organisational realities which need to be overcome before UGS are seamlessly integrated into military forces and become a force multiplier. The simple existence of such systems is not enough to transform warfare or generate competitive advantage for a force. It is not clear that any military force has integrated UGS at scale except for bomb disposal robots. These basic UGS have been part of military arsenals for decades, but the current zeitgeist is focused on those systems with a degree of autonomy which can unlock operational effectiveness above that seen on battlefields today.</p> -<p>Finally, China’s strategy for defense and security engagement recognizes that the United States’ conventional preponderance in the Western Hemisphere makes competing one-for-one on traditional defense issues an impossibility. As a result, China has exploited a variety of tools not commonly associated with direct military competition, but which nevertheless offer important security benefits and enable military operations. These include areas such as civilian infrastructure, policing, and even professional military education. U.S. institutions are not prepared to compete in these areas and are allowing China to advance steadily on several fronts. In this context, military engagement is not the spear tip of China’s advance in the Americas. Rather, a diffuse array of security and defense policies comprise a quiver of arrows China can use to turn the strategic environment to its advantage.</p> +<p>This paper answers three research questions focused on the integration of UGS into light land forces at the tactical level. The first concerns how UGS can be usefully employed in tactical land formations with their technical limitations and tactical realities considered. The second relates to how they get to the fight in the first place: organisation, movement and sustainment of UGS around battlefield echelons must be considered, and this is much less examined in the literature than is their use in frontline combat. The third involves how military forces can ensure that UGS are put to good use by their soldiers. Preparing soldiers to form part of human–machine teams must be a deliberate act, using training and education to build trust and understanding. The paper focuses on developments in the British and US militaries, but lessons can be drawn more widely.</p> -<h3 id="the-full-spectrum-of-engagement">The Full Spectrum of Engagement</h3> +<p>Light land forces have been chosen as the focus for discussion, although employment considerations can be extrapolated to other parts of the force. Light infantry operate with minimal vehicular support, although they may be supported by vehicles such as quad bikes. They have the critical task of closing with the enemy at close quarters and seizing ground in complex terrain. These troops are laden with all the equipment required to operate for days at a time, including weapons, ammunition, rations, water, radios, batteries and more. As a result, they may have much to gain from the advent of UGS.</p> -<p>China’s strategy of avoiding overt military action in the Western Hemisphere can make it challenging to disentangle security engagement from other forms of influence. Accordingly, it is useful to conceptualize Chinese engagement in this space along a continuum encompassing five areas: (1) facilities and infrastructure, (2) citizen security assistance, (3) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, (4) arms sales and equipment transfers, and (5) joint training and exercises.</p> +<p>This variety of potential uses means that UGS offer great potential utility to armed forces. However, their development, introduction and scaling across armies requires careful consideration, the totality of which is not immediately obvious. Considerations are set out below to outline how military procurement professionals and concept developers might conceive the introduction of UGS into the force.</p> -<h4 id="1-facilities-and-infrastructure">1. FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE</h4> +<h4 id="structure">Structure</h4> -<p>Strategic infrastructure projects are one of the most successful areas in which China has been able to advance its defense and security interests in the Western Hemisphere. With the exception of the proposed Cuban training facility, China does not maintain any overt military bases in the hemisphere. Indeed, in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation to “hide your strength and bide your time,” China remains exceptionally cautious in its terminology, referring to its first overseas naval base in Djibouti as a “support facility.” As a result, this category does not always fall neatly within the framework of defense and security engagement. However, it is crucial to consider facilities and infrastructure given China’s pattern of “civil-military fusion” — the effort to ensure civilian resources and infrastructure can be seamlessly integrated with military capabilities when needed, which has been documented in projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Civil-military fusion is therefore closely tied to the PLA’s pursuit of overseas basing and access, a capability that will be essential for that force to achieve its aspirations of power projection on a global scale.</p> +<p>After setting out its methodology, the paper outlines the principal characteristics of UGS. These are the basis of their numerous uses and the foundation of their strengths and limitations. The drivers behind UGS development – including reducing risk, increasing mass, and the ability to increase advantage through human–machine teams – are noted. Next, the state of the art of UGS is shown, demonstrating the numerous use cases which are developing in forces around the world. With this foundation set out, the bulk of the paper then offers several areas of investigation and recommendations for military forces. The first concerns how such systems might be employed at the tactical level. The second is how UGS can be moved around the battlefield and where they might be assigned organisationally. Third, means by which to socialise UGS within a force, improve education and foster trust are offered. These areas are often sidelined by discussion of experiments or capabilities, without due thought to the various interdependencies and whole-force considerations.</p> -<p>Key to China’s definition of interoperability is familiarity with and reliable access to infrastructure that its forces can use, and it has worked assiduously to expand its influence through infrastructure investments that cast long shadows due to dual-use military and civilian capabilities. Dual-use facilities present an inherent challenge for U.S. deterrence. First, their military utility can be obfuscated from public view until a project is a near <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">fait accompli</code></em>. This is doubly true given China’s penchant for opaque contracts, which, in the case of port facilities in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, have later been revealed to contain specifications that would allow People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships to dock and conduct resupply. PRC-funded port projects in the United Arab Emirates and Equatorial Guinea have also been revealed to house facilities and capabilities that could be used to provide overseas refueling and resupply capabilities, as well as command and control assistance, for the PLAN. Second, if the United States seeks to block such facilities, it risks the appearance of stymieing a country’s development.</p> +<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> -<p>Although dual-use infrastructure is often associated with more overt displays of military power, such as the appearance of a PLAN warship in port, or the presence of military officers at a satellite research station, the ways in which such projects can further China’s strategic goals are often much more subtle and yet omnipresent. Chinese port projects around the world are illustrative of this fact. In Germany, for instance, a logistics hub in Wilhelmshaven recently drew attention for its location a mere three miles from Germany’s largest naval base. Replete with cameras, cell towers, and PRC-designed data management software, the facility provides China with a permanent base from which to collect human and electronic intelligence on the German navy. Within LAC, Chinese-owned and-operated ports in Veracruz, Mexico, and Paranaguá, Brazil also operate virtually next door to host country military bases.</p> +<p>This paper is founded on both primary and secondary research. First, the author has conducted consultations with both practitioners and analysts, aimed at discussing their experience with UGS and associated technology. He has also deployed on and visited military exercises, such as Project Convergence 22. The author is a serving military officer and has extensive experience of and a professional background in the employment of robotics and autonomous systems (RAS). He has spent time with industry, looking at both hardware and software. A literature review of academic articles, news media and military press releases has also been conducted.</p> -<p>Even the raw data collected by port operators, which in the case of Chinese firms are required to hand over data to the CCP if deemed relevant for national security, can be a powerful strategic asset. Knowledge of shipping manifests, and vessel locations, as well as the ability to hold cargo, delay departures or prevent vessels from docking could be used, according to one recent study, “to selectively seize critical goods, such as medicines; divert or delay military components; or let essential supplies just sit in storage — no naval deployments needed.” Thus, the appearance of a gray-hulled PLAN destroyer in a LAC port does not encompass the totality of the dual-use challenge. Rather, the risks to U.S. and regional security and defense are a constant from the moment the first ship docks at a PRC-owned or operated terminal.</p> +<p>The author has also attended conferences with military personnel examining UGS. Existing research and expertise on the organisational impact of UGS is limited compared with that on their aerial counterparts. The literature is either very technical with an academic focus, or less analytical, mainly comprising news articles and manufacturer comment. Moreover, the paucity of information in the public domain about military UGS has also imposed a limitation on this research. Attempting to describe a future state is inherently difficult, but the assumptions and considerations laid out in this paper are grounded in reality, and draw on practical knowledge of both RAS and military organisational processes and structure.</p> -<p>The strategic relevance of dual-use infrastructure projects is further underscored by leaked U.S. intelligence documents that show several such projects included as part of “Project 141,” an ambitious effort by China to expand the global reach of its armed forces and power-projection capabilities. According to these documents, the PLA has identified overseas basing and logistics facilities as essential to China’s national security objectives and made it a priority to secure access to these bases by 2030. At the time of the leaks in April 2023, no facilities in the Western Hemisphere were included as Project 141 initiatives, though the Cuban training base would almost certainly qualify. Within the Western Hemisphere, two dual-use infrastructure projects carry implications for U.S. defense and security that are significant enough to describe here in detail.</p> +<h3 id="i-what-are-ugs">I. What are UGS?</h3> -<p>Chinese forays in the Panama Canal Zone have been the subject of growing alarm, most recently voiced at a high level by SOUTHCOM commander General Laura Richardson in her 2023 force posture statement before Congress.36 Since its inauguration, the canal has been a strategic commercial and military node in the hemisphere, further cemented as the site of SOUTHCOM’s original headquarters. As early as 1997, Hong Kong-based Hutchison Ports PPC won contracts to operate the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, located on the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the canal, respectively. While the move aroused controversy at the time, concerns were assuaged by the independence of Hong Kong relative to the rest of China, a status which Beijing has by and large dispensed with since 2019. In 2016, the Shandong-headquartered Landbridge Group acquired Margarita Island to the tune of nearly $1 billion, home to Panama’s strategically and commercially critical Colón Free Trade Zone (FTZ). Shortly thereafter, as Panama first switched diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of China in 2017, and subsequently became the first Latin American country to accede to the BRI, plans moved forward for construction of a deep-water port in the Colón FTZ. Construction was to be helmed by the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), two key state-owned enterprises that also happened to be part of the winning bid on the $1.3 billion contract to construct a fourth bridge over the Panama Canal.</p> +<p>UGS are vehicles or static platforms that operate on land without a human crew inside, although some systems can be optionally uncrewed. UGS can be as small as shoeboxes and even thrown by users. Others are as large as historically crewed vehicles, weighing many tonnes. They may or may not be armoured. UGS may be wheeled, tracked, have legs or a combination of the three. Each type of drivetrain has its advantages and disadvantages. Wheels are good for speed and manoeuvrability on even surfaces, are lightweight and are simple to replace. They are, however, vulnerable to shrapnel damage and punctures. Tracks are useful for offroad manoeuvrability and offer good traction over rough terrain. However, they are generally slower than wheels and are also complex to refit if they become dislodged. UGS with legs, such as the Boston Dynamics Spot, can tackle obstacles such as stairs and climb very steep slopes, and can also move laterally. Wheeled and tracked vehicles are faster over most surfaces, however.</p> -<p>However, China’s progress on these efforts has been uneven. The government of Panama’s current president, Laurentino Cortizo, canceled the port project after a review from the Panama Maritime Authority found the project to be in violation of numerous contractual terms. Another proposal, for the Colón FTZ to be added to China’s “safe cities” initiative, was also rejected amid skepticism from the Cortizo government and pressure from the United States. However, these setbacks have not rolled back Chinese influence entirely. For example, 300 security cameras donated by China to help establish the Colón “safe city” remain in place; in 2021, Hutchison was granted a 25-year renewal of its port concessions; and, after a number of setbacks, CCCC and CHEC have moved forward with construction on the fourth canal bridge.</p> +<p>UGS exist on a spectrum of control. They may be operated by a soldier holding a wired controller or a remote control while within line of sight. Examples include mine clearance systems and bomb disposal robots. Teleoperation adds a level of complexity, in which the operator relies on the UGS’ cameras and sensors to make sense of surroundings and controls them from a distance. UGS with levels of automaticity or automation are more complex still. Within this category, there remains significant variety. It is necessary to stress that a system being uncrewed does not mean it is autonomous. The Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) framework is one toolset with which to understand UGS’ autonomous capability. Autonomy can be understood as a system’s “own ability of integrated sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting/executing, to achieve its goals as assigned”. Systems with high levels of autonomy are rare. More commonly, UGS have a leader–follower function whereby the vehicle will follow another crewed vehicle or a human commander. Increasing levels of autonomy then allow some UGS to follow waypoints given by a human operator and avoid obstacles while following a given route or exploring a designated area. Some systems may have the capability to act with conditional automation, whereby an operator can take control in certain circumstances, such as if the UGS cannot figure out how to manoeuvre around a certain obstacle. UGS that have the capability to act independently of an operator’s instructions and make a series of linked “decisions” in pursuit of an end objective are scarce. And that end objective will have been given by a human operator, which again means that the system is not fully autonomous. The necessity of human input is a golden thread in this research. Supervision of many systems still requires soldiers to be at least monitoring, and perhaps solely focused on, the UGS, rather than free to conduct other tasks.</p> -<p>The Panama Canal is perhaps the most important piece of infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere. For the United States’ blue-water navy, the canal reduces the average time needed to reposition forces between the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters by about five months, and commanders from World War II to the Persian Gulf campaign have cited its criticality to their efforts. For this reason, there are a number of mechanisms intended to prevent the canal from being disrupted in times of conflict, namely the Torrijos–Carter Treaties, which both established that the canal must remain neutral for international transit and enshrined the right of the United States to seize control in the event of a security threat to the canal’s continued operation. These measures mean China cannot easily use political or economic coercion to shut the canal in times of conflict, but U.S. military planners should not overlook the potential for China or others to disrupt access, either through sabotage or kinetic efforts, or by selectively manipulating the infrastructure and data that feeds this critical maritime artery. If China were to deny the canal to U.S. warships during a crisis, even momentarily, it could spell fatal consequences for forward-deployed units in the Indo-Pacific. During peacetime as well, China benefits from access to Hutchison’s shipping data and camera systems, which the company is obliged to share due to China’s stringent “national security” law.</p> +<p>Systems also differ by use, which is examined in detail in later chapters. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that any remote weapons systems associated with UGS will have a human in the loop throughout for decision-making, retaining meaningful control, and providing authorisation for any engagement. This is in line with British defence policy.</p> -<p>Further south, the Espacio Lejano Station in Neuquén Province, Argentina, has drawn consternation for the direct role of Chinese military forces from the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in its quotidian operations. Espacio Lejano represents China’s only deep space ground station in the southern hemisphere, thus filling an important coverage gap in China’s space domain awareness. The internal workings of the station are remarkably opaque, even by the standards of China’s dealings, with the media describing the facility as a “black box.” The facility is officially considered sovereign Chinese territory, and Argentina is barred from conducting inspections. The equipment contained in Espacio Lejano possesses important dual-use telemetry tracking and control (TT&amp;C) capabilities, used for monitoring and providing positional guidance to satellites in orbit. In times of conflict, the TT&amp;C capacity found here would greatly augment China’s anti-satellite warfare operations, a capability the PLA has assiduously cultivated since its first successful anti-satellite test in 2007. Even more concerning is the fact that the United States’ own satellite coverage of the southern hemisphere remains incomplete. Therefore, Espacio Lejano not only offers the PLASSF an important capability to degrade or deny the space domain to the United States but also could enable China to conduct attacks with conventional or hypersonic missiles against the homeland, striking up from Antarctica and, in the process, evading U.S. missile defenses, the majority of which are oriented toward the Arctic.</p> +<h4 id="sensors">Sensors</h4> -<p>The risks are compounded by the fact that China has pursued space cooperation agreements throughout Latin America. These include physical infrastructure in the form of satellite ground stations in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Chile. Elsewhere in Argentina, a proposed ground station in Rio Gallegos, close to the southernmost point of the country, promises to augment China’s coverage of the Southern Hemisphere and enhance the ability of China’s stations in Antarctica to communicate with the rest of China’s space support network. Today, LAC with the greatest quantity of PRC space infrastructure outside of mainland China. China’s efforts also encompass technical and diplomatic cooperation, such as the China–Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program and the recent incorporation of Venezuela into China’s lunar research station project. Thus, as concerning as the Espacio Lejano station is, it ought to be considered as part of a broader effort by China to establish space domain awareness under the nose and in the blind spot of the United States.</p> +<p>The simplest remotely operated UGS may have no sensors, as the human operator is expected to be close by. An example might be an excavator. Systems such as bomb disposal robots have cameras that allow the operator a close-up view from the system, and allow the manipulation of the target object with the operator at a safe distance. As systems gain autonomous functions, a suite of sensors can be expected, including LIDAR, RADAR, GPS and cameras. LIDAR and RADAR help the UGS make a 3D map of their surroundings, which is then used for routing and obstacle avoidance. Ultrasonic sensors may be mounted on the sides of the vehicle to detect objects very close up. In civilian applications, these are used to help autonomous vehicles park. Video cameras are used to detect humans or animals, as well as to make sense of traffic lights and signage. Video cameras are also able to pick up more nuances than LIDAR and RADAR, including hand gestures and traffic cones. GPS helps the system situate itself within the wider geography of the area and aids a system to stay on course when navigating a waypoint route or searching an area for reconnaissance purposes. UGS may also have an inertial measurement unit to give an additional indication of the direction and velocity in which the system is moving. This information can complement that of GPS, and is useful when GPS signals are weak, such as when moving through urban areas or tunnels, or during bad weather. Developments in this area are fast moving, and new sensors and combinations are being experimented with. Given this, commenting categorically is difficult, but suffice to say UGS use sensors to make sense of their surroundings.</p> -<p>The above represent just two of a startling array of projects currently being pursued by China. Other noteworthy infrastructure projects either under development or proposed include a potential expansion of the port at La Unión in El Salvador, to be carried out by China-based Asia Pacific Xuanhao (APX), as well as the nearly completed $1.3 billion deep-water port of Chancay near Lima, Peru, where construction is managed by a laundry list of Chinese state-owned enterprises, including CCCC, CHEC, China Railway, and Cosco Shipping. China has also pursued several leads in its search for a foothold along the Strait of Magellan from which it could strengthen its strategic position in the Antarctic, as well as monitor and disrupt maritime traffic through that global choke point in times of conflict. These efforts have included talks with the Chilean government to grant access to port facilities in Punta Arenas and overtures to Argentina to help construct a “polar logistics facility” in Ushuaia. After Buenos Aires rebuffed these efforts under U.S. pressure, China pivoted again to a commercial strategy, with the state-owned Shaanxi Chemical Industry Group reportedly signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in May 2023 with the provincial government of Tierra del Fuego to build a multipurpose port in Rio Grande.</p> +<h4 id="software">Software</h4> -<p>The security challenges posed by dual-use facilities are inherently difficult to estimate, as they depend not only on their technical specifications but also on how such facilities would factor into Chinese strategies and plans for military confrontation. Nevertheless, Beijing’s close involvement with the construction of so many critical infrastructure projects in the Western Hemisphere undoubtedly gives China more options for how and where it may project power within the United States’ shared neighborhood.</p> +<p>Software must then make sense of all the inputs described above. The UGS’ use, the environment they will operate in and their level of autonomy determine the complexity of the software. The software uses the sensors to make sense of where the UGS are, what is around them and, in some cases, what might happen next in the case of people and vehicles in close proximity, and what to do if a particular circumstance presents itself, such as another vehicle moving into the systems’ path. Software will use this information to plan UGS’ next move before moving. The systems may take their external environment and plan against a library of scenarios on which they have been previously trained. The software must fuse information from the various sensors to form one combined understanding of the environment, using a variety of filter mechanisms. Software architectures differ from system to system and in complexity. UGS may also have target recognition capability that can spot armoured vehicles and movement on the horizon, which can be fed to commanders for subsequent decisions and actions.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uk2Aynh.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Map 1: Known PRC Infrastructure Projects.</strong> Source: Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert, “Pier Competitor: China’s Power Position in Global Ports,” International Security 46, no. 4 (2022): 9–47, doi:10.1162/isec_a_00433; <a href="https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/">Matthew P. Funaiole et al., “Eyes on the Skies: China’s Growing Space Footprint in South America,” CSIS, Hidden Reach no. 1, October 4, 2022</a>; and elaborated with authors’ research based on multiple sources cited throughout this report.</em></p> +<h4 id="power">Power</h4> -<h4 id="2-citizen-security-assistance">2. CITIZEN SECURITY ASSISTANCE</h4> +<p>Smaller UGS are usually battery powered, with larger systems using a combustion engine or hybrid diesel–electric power train. Each has benefits and limitations. Electric systems are near-silent to run and produce a low heat signature. However, battery life is often limited, and requires extensive management, of replacing batteries and charging them. Systems using diesel or petrol are easier to fold into existing military logistic chains as they are already geared to provide fuel to current fleets. However, they have a significant noise and heat signature, which can make them vulnerable in an era of persistent ISR capability.</p> -<p>While the United States remains predominant in military-to-military cooperation, China has identified citizen security as an area ripe for expansion, opening the door to displacing the United States in military-to-military cooperation someday. As LAC countries grapple with resurgent transnational organized crime and under-resourced, sometimes corrupt police forces, such overtures are sure to meet with a receptive audience. Indeed, the “China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022–2024)” positions political and security cooperation first, ahead of even economic cooperation and development. The inauguration of the wide-ranging GSI promises to elevate China’s focus on security engagement with LAC further still.</p> +<h4 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h4> -<p>To understand where such engagement may lead, it is instructive to first look beyond the Western Hemisphere. China’s security cooperation agreement with the Solomon Islands offers a concerning portent — China has shown its ability to leverage cooperation on citizen security issues to gain advantages in the defense and military domains. While the text makes no mention of explicit military cooperation or basing, it intentionally conflates Chinese police and military personnel and includes a provision allowing for Chinese forces to conduct logistical replenishment in the islands. The Solomon Islands’ subsequent denial of port calls to all U.S. Coast Guard vessels further demonstrates the cumulative implications such Chinese engagement can have on freedom of navigation operations. Should this model of security cooperation become ascendant in LAC, it would likely grant Beijing a freer hand to project power within the Western Hemisphere.</p> +<p>Despite the connotations of autonomy, UGS must in practice remain connected to their human operators. This could be to give the UGS instructions on where to go next, or to execute a particular command. Or it might be to relay information back to the operator, such as a potential target. Data processing may take place at the edge, depending on the size of the platform, or packets of data will be sent for processing elsewhere. UGS will place demands on the existing combat radio network, and this must be planned for. There also exists opportunity for adversary action in jamming or spoofing systems. UGS may be able to carry out tasks without being connected to the network, before reconnecting when necessary, which will increase their survivability.</p> -<p>This trend can already be observed in LAC, where police exchanges and training programs are starting to mature. While attention is often focused on the PLA and military exchanges, China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has expanded its overseas reach and sought to compete directly with U.S. police assistance programs offered by agencies such as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) at the Department of State. According to one analysis of MPS capacity-building programs, LAC ranks third in terms of overall allocation of MPS trainings, behind Asia and Africa, receiving 12 percent of all such programming between 2004 and 2021. In 2019 alone, these activities included a 15-member delegation from the Peruvian national police to Zhongshan to study counternarcotics and methods for countering fraud, 14-member delegations from Brazil and Cuba, and an anti-drug seminar at China’s Shandong Police College that hosted two dozen members of the Royal Grenada Police Force. China also sells and donates military-grade equipment to police forces throughout the hemisphere, often with substantial public relations campaigns, such as when it donated 6,000 ballistic vests to the Panamanian police forces shortly after the fatal shooting of one of their officers. Other recipients of Chinese police equipment include Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Trinidad and Tobago, among others.</p> +<h3 id="ii-what-are-the-purported-benefits-of-ugs-to-tactical-land-forces">II. What are the Purported Benefits of UGS to Tactical Land Forces?</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/toFOuql.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: China’s Police Engagement.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-expanding-international-reach-of-chinas-police/">Jordan Link, The Expanding International Reach of China’s Police (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, October 2022)</a>; and elaborated with authors’ research based on multiple sources cited throughout this report.</em></p> +<p>The drivers for the development of military UGS are numerous, and are broken down below.</p> -<p>Digital security assistance represents a growing area of concern and perhaps one of the sectors in which China has shown the greatest savvy in marketing itself to potential LAC partners. China’s “safe cities” initiative represents the culmination of such policies, with an estimated 12 countries across LAC that have deployed Chinese-made surveillance technologies, including in Ecuador, Guyana, and Suriname. Beyond formal “safe cities,” Chinese telecommunications and technology companies such as Huawei, Hikvision, and Dahua have been actively involved in installing interconnected monitoring systems, including cameras and other sensors empowered by biometrics and analytical capabilities throughout the hemisphere. These capabilities are themselves troubling but are made doubly concerning given their tendency to be clustered by embassies, ports, and other sensitive facilities. These approaches to citizen security attempt to replicate China’s own domestic model of policing, which involves conducting mass data collection in the name of tracking and preventing criminal activity. They also carry understandable appeal for policymakers in LAC, especially at the municipal and mayoral level, where crime and violence remain the most proximate threats. To these leaders, China’s promises of efficient, orderly, and comprehensive security are seen as useful to curb the powerful transnational criminal enterprises that have penetrated the highest echelons of power in every country in the hemisphere and curry favor with voters who increasingly report security as a top concern. However, absent significant reforms to public security institutions, and training these police forces on proper storage and cybersecurity measures, there is a serious risk that widespread adoption may simply grant China a back door through which to access the personal data of millions of individuals, companies, and government organizations throughout LAC.</p> +<h4 id="risk">Risk</h4> -<p>Formal collaboration with police also opens the door to more overt forms of Chinese police presence in the hemisphere. While China approaches the question of overseas military basing with caution, it reportedly operates 14 overseas police outposts across 10 LAC countries. The physical presence of representatives from the People’s Armed Police in LAC countries is a major victory for one of the GSI’s core principles: to make the CCP’s state security — and by extension, party security — a matter of foreign policy. In some cases, an expanded overseas police presence may be welcomed by some countries, such as in 2016 when China and Argentina collaborated to bring down the Pixiu mafia, the most active Chinese criminal organization in Argentina. However, looking beyond the hemisphere once again reveals the troubling consequences of such collaboration. In Fiji for instance, Chinese police forces rounded up more than a hundred suspected criminals and sent them back to China in 2017 with only a modicum of cooperation with Fijian police and no extradition agreement in place. China’s globetrotting police operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net have also faced scrutiny after reports of Chinese forces engaging in state-sponsored kidnapping and targeting of political dissidents outside of China. Such incidents suggest that China has few qualms about violating other countries’ sovereignty when confronting a perceived threat to domestic order and tranquility.</p> +<p>Using uncrewed systems in place of crewed vehicles can reduce risk to personnel. Soldiers can be kept further back from the line of contact and can avoid a number of dull and dangerous tasks that up to now have been the responsibility of humans.</p> -<p>The final piece in Beijing’s vision of security engagement involves a burgeoning number of Chinese private security companies (PSCs). Many of these firms are well established in Africa and Southeast Asia, where they play a role in protecting important investments and project sites, especially in fragile country contexts. In LAC, the on-the-ground presence of PRC-based security contractors has been more muted thus far, but they have been carefully preparing the legal terrain to significantly scale up activity in the region. The China Overseas Security Group, for instance, has reported conducting fieldwork in Argentina “to prepare the establishment of branch offices.” Meanwhile, the Zhong Bao Hua An Security Company has also reportedly held strategic cooperation dialogues with the governments of Panama, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. PSCs play a growing role in China’s strategy of political warfare and pursuit of strategic goals well beyond China’s borders. As one CSIS analysis notes: “Even if the activities conducted by a given PSC are not directly related to China’s geopolitical goals, they present an additional threat vector that allows Beijing to build nontraditional security and political relationships through market forces.” Indeed, China’s substantial economic interests in the region provide natural cover for an expansion of PSCs as necessary to protect key investments in an increasingly challenging security context. Shandong Huawei Security Group already contracts with Chinese mining companies in Africa, while the China Security Technology Group signed a $21 million contract in 2018 with Grand Tai Peru S.A.C. to provide security services in the mining sector. An expansion of Chinese PSCs in the hemisphere would augment China’s ability to provide security assistance training and services to host governments, further undercutting the United States’ role as partner of choice in the security space.</p> +<h4 id="mass">Mass</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VSgkpoL.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Map 2: PRC Police Outposts and Extradition Agreements.</strong> Source: <a href="https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/patrol-and-persuade-follow-110-overseas-investigation">Safeguard Defenders, Patrol and Persuade: A follow-up investigation to 110 Overseas (Safeguard Defenders, December 2022)</a>; and <a href="https://fiugis.maps.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/58ace2b67a37433b90ce46fd62318b8e">“China’s Activities in Latin America Dashboard,” FIU, Security Research Hub</a>.</em></p> +<p>Uncrewed systems allow the generation of additional mass above that which can be formed through an army’s physical workforce size. A future scenario might see one soldier controlling a suite of UGS, which could increase the area over which a unit has sight, influence and, potentially, control.</p> -<h4 id="3-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief">3. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF</h4> +<h4 id="situational-awareness">Situational Awareness</h4> -<p>If there is a sector where the United States ought to adopt a permissive approach to PLA activity in the hemisphere, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is the most likely contender. Here the United States is likely to remain the partner of choice, owing to its relationships with and proximity to the region, as well as the strong logistical capabilities of the U.S. armed forces. While Chinese efforts have been comparatively limited, spending just $19 million on HADR in the Western Hemisphere between 2010 and 2022, they remain an important means of enhancing China’s reputation and capabilities. Historically, HADR has opened doors for China in the region, such as when the PLA and Peruvian armed forces conducted a joint training exercise in the use of a mobile military hospital in 2010. The PLAN’s hospital ship, the Peace Ark, also visited the region in 2011 and 2018 and represents an important tool in China’s naval engagement with the hemisphere. China has also worked to establish the China-CELAC Ministerial Forum on Cooperation and Management of Disaster Risk Reduction as a channel for multilateral coordination between Beijing and the region.</p> +<p>UGS equipped with sensors such as cameras and radar can help commanders get a firmer sense of the battlespace. UAS have proven very effective in this area, and UGS can add additional capabilities, such as navigating through those places less accessible to UAS.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, while there may be reasons to welcome an expanded Chinese HADR commitment to the Western Hemisphere, there is cause for skepticism as well. China has evinced a willingness to use disaster response as a political bargaining chip, such as in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan when China delayed the delivery of aid to the Philippines as a result of ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Even within the hemisphere, it is telling that the Peace Ark’s past deployments have focused on providing medical assistance to China’s authoritarian allies in Venezuela and Cuba, an approach which risks treating the symptoms of humanitarian emergency while simultaneously propping up the which drive such crises.</p> +<h4 id="burden-reduction">Burden Reduction</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rNnY80V.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ Soldiers lower a boat from a trailer to help evacuate people in the municipality of La Lima, near San Pedro Sula, 240 km north of Tegucigalpa, an area flooded due to the overflowing of the Chamelecon river after the passage of Hurricane Iota, on November 18, 2020.</em></p> +<p>UGS can carry equipment that currently burdens soldiers. This allows soldiers to move more quickly and with less effort. This is important when soldiers have become loaded with equipment – in the pursuit of protection, reducing their ability to fight.</p> -<p>Furthermore, one report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission found that “Beijing also exploits HA/DR-related exchanges to learn combat skills from and gather intelligence on advanced militaries, particularly the United States and its allies and partners.” Given the close collaboration between LAC armed forces and the United States on HADR responses, expanded Chinese involvement in such operations could open the door to greater awareness of U.S. capabilities and tactics. The China-CELAC disaster forum illustrates how China views cooperation on disaster response as a means to expand its ability to operate militarily in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, many of the topics discussed, such as increased information sharing, exercises, and access to LAC countries’ logistics infrastructure, would also help to grow China’s knowledge and relationships, which it could then exploit in times of conflict or crisis.</p> +<h4 id="humanmachine-teaming-hmt">Human–Machine Teaming (HMT)</h4> -<p>Finally, the participation of 130 Chinese riot police in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti from 2004 to 2012 stands out as a notable case of engagement in humanitarian missions in a country that continues to officially recognize Taiwan. As climate change increases the vulnerability of the region to natural disasters, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations could provide China with inroads for operating within other Taiwanese diplomatic allies such as Guatemala and the Caribbean island states.</p> +<p>In the popular imagination, machines replace people in their roles entirely. However, this is not how military forces are conceiving of the near to medium horizon. Instead, the optimum balance between soldier and robot is key. HMT makes use of the comparative advantages inherent to humans and machines respectively. Humans do the tasks they are best suited to, and robots do those they are best at. The British Army, for example, envisages that humans will remain the core part of HMT for some time to come. The Army framework sees increasing machine involvement over time. In the immediate future, RAS-enhanced teams will see machines used in a transactional manner, as tools. These teams are limited by the current levels of autonomy and human levels of trust. This phase sees machines used to increase performance in human-led tasks. Later, trust and technology develop to enable RAS-integrated teams in which humans cede more control to machines whose autonomous capabilities have improved. Here, humans and machines perform tasks that result in a combined outcome. Finally, RAS-supervised teams are envisaged in which machines can outperform humans and humans retain a supervisory role to keep meaningful control.</p> -<h4 id="4-arms-sales-and-equipment-transfers">4. ARMS SALES AND EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS</h4> +<p>This framework is particular to the British experience, but a similar gradient is noted in other forces. For example, the US Army’s RAS strategy notes three likely epochs of development. The first lasted from 2017 to 2020, when the Army matured concepts and initiated programmes to look at increasing situational awareness, lightening the load on soldiers and improving sustainment. The second epoch, from 2021 to 2030, aims at improvements including achieving automated convoy operations and removing soldiers from lead vehicles. In the far term, from 2031 to 2040, the first era of automated systems will be replaced, and see new organisational designs and fully integrated autonomous systems, which work in concert to achieve the task.</p> -<p>China is the fourth-largest supplier of conventional arms globally, behind only the United States, Russia, and France. In spite of a decline following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, Beijing has made strategic investments to insert itself in key sectors, including combat aviation, missiles, and uncrewed vehicles. Furthermore, Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has opened new opportunities for China to fill the gap when it comes to providing a similar supply of low-cost, no-frills weapons and equipment. Notably, Western sanctions on the Russian defense industry, combined with the steep attrition rates for military equipment in high-intensity modern warfare, has caused Moscow’s arms exports to fall from 22 percent to 16 percent of the global market, and such exports are set to decline even further in 2023. China, which currently captures 5 percent of the arms market, and is home to 6 of the top 25 defense companies, is well positioned to step into this gap.</p> +<p>It is not the case that simply adding systems is the answer to providing mass in armed forces. Depending on levels of autonomy and the requirement of a task, soldiers can only manage so many responsibilities. If an uncrewed ground system is remote controlled without any level of autonomy, the ratio will be one to one, or even worse. It has been noted on some experiments that it takes three soldiers to adequately manage one uncrewed ground system. A one to two ratio would see one soldier jump between systems to operate them. Systems with more autonomy are less burdensome on the operator, and soldiers can then manage more systems at once. Cognitive overload is a crucial consideration when building a force structure that includes UGS. There are only so many screens or notifications a soldier can make sense of. There are also more practical considerations that do not generally make it into discussions of HMT at the policy level. On Project Convergence 22, a US military experimentation exercise, a US Army officer spoke of the difficulty for a junior soldier of sitting in the back of a moving Bradley armoured fighting vehicle while trying to manage uncrewed systems on a tablet computer. They quickly became overwhelmed. This might be because the uncrewed systems required inputs or verification from an operator, or it might be because the information and intelligence being sent from the systems was difficult to digest. Simply sitting in an armoured vehicle on the move is not a comfortable experience. Adding additional cognitive load may be problematic. Ergonomic issues such as motion sickness are an important consideration. Some soldiers may cope better than others. Seemingly minor additional tasks may have significant repercussions for combat effectiveness. This speaks to the importance of allowing soldiers to get used to working with such systems, and being aware of their own abilities and those of the systems.</p> -<p>Arms sales facilitate broad, long-term Chinese military relationships with countries in the region. When one country buys a weapons system from another, they are not just buying the physical gear but often are signing a contract for post-sale parts and servicing, which must be done typically by technicians from or certified by the seller country. Likewise, such purchases often also create a dependency on that country for replacement parts.</p> +<p>Having outlined the foundational concepts of military UGS, the potential individual tasks of such systems can be investigated, the subject of the next chapter.</p> -<p>China already has a substantial presence in the region. Venezuela in particular is notable for being the first LAC country to purchase Chinese military radars, while Chinese VN-4 armored personnel carriers saw action in 2017 during the Maduro regime’s crushing of anti-regime protesters. Meanwhile, Bolivia is one of the largest Chinese clients in the hemisphere, having purchased millions of dollars in weapons from China, including capabilities from small arms and night vision goggles to artillery, helicopters, and planes. China has also made several large donations to the Bolivian armed forces. Peru increasingly merits close attention, having acquired 27 Type-90BM multiple rocket launchers from China, and previously the Peruvian defense ministry contemplated purchasing MBT-2000 tanks. In 2012, the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) successfully convinced Peru to cancel a more than $100 million contract with Northrop Grumman for man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), replacing these with China’s indigenous QW-series MANPADs instead. With Peru’s defense acquisitions budget set to grow by 116 percent in 2023, and surpass $200 million by 2028, the Peruvian armed forces represent a potentially rich market for Chinese military hardware.</p> +<h3 id="iii-what-are-the-potential-uses-of-ugs">III. What are the Potential Uses of UGS?</h3> -<p>More recently, the Argentine air force’s consideration of the JF-17 fighter jet, mostly as a means to evade the United Kingdom’s supply chain chokehold on ejector seats through English company Martin Baker, has been perhaps the highest-profile instance of China’s arms export efforts in the region. The deal has gone through multiple rounds of negotiation, with a U.S. counteroffer proposing Danish F-16s as an alternative initially being rebuffed by Argentine defense minister Jorge Taiana on account of difficulties procuring replacement parts and the fact that the F-16s would come without weapons. While it appears Argentina has circled back to consider the F-16, finalization of such a deal would have represented one of the most sophisticated transfers of Chinese military capabilities to a South American country and would include a multi-year partnership between China and Argentina to train, sustain, and repair the aircraft.</p> +<p>UGS have several proposed uses for military forces, some of which are more obvious than others. These are identified here as potential uses, while subsequent chapters tackle the realities of their employment, whether such uses are realistic, and the implications for the force.</p> -<p>In addition to sales, China has bolstered its position in the region with donations, including of a patrol boat to the Barbados Defense Force in 2018, a Y-12 transport aircraft and military construction equipment to the Guyanese Defense Force in 2012, and vehicles to the Dominican Republic’s military in 2020. Both sales and gifts exploit China’s centralized power structure to outmaneuver the United States and deliver on timelines which may take only a fraction of the time to arrive compared to U.S. equipment. Therefore, while many LAC militaries have expressed their preference for U.S. equipment, the lengthy approval processes associated with U.S. defense exports have pushed many into China’s arms for their defense needs. This is compounded by the fact that much of the equipment included in China’s sales and donations — from ambulances to Peru, to bridge laying equipment to Colombia, to the more than 700 logistics support vehicles recently delivered to Ecuador — do not represent top-line combat capabilities. Rather, they are practical tools in high demand across regional militaries, delivered on a timeline that foments goodwill among recipient countries, especially when U.S. equipment packages remain mired in arms export bureaucracy. China’s operations demonstrate the importance of delivering with speed and meeting partners’ needs, as expressed on their own terms.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="load-carriage">Load Carriage</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ot4Eg2A.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Chinese Arms Sales to LAC.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers">“Trade Registers,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, n.d.</a>.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gmq8bpj.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>Figure 1: UGS with Cargo Basket</em></p> -<p>Finally, China has evinced a greater willingness to take part in joint ventures to co-develop and manufacture new weapons systems. The JF-17s considered by Argentina, for instance, are the product of a joint venture by China and Pakistan, a partnership which also birthed Pakistan’s new MBT-2000 tank. An earlier version of the JF-17 deal even suggested that China might transfer technology and co-produce the planes with Argentina. Such a partnership with LAC defense sectors could establish a durable and long-term military-to-military pipeline between China and the region. One candidate for such a joint venture could be Venezuela, which co-developed its Tiuna jeeps with Iran and has allegedly entered into an agreement to construct Iranian Mohajer-2 loitering munitions. However, given the collapsed state of Venezuela’s industrial and scientific base, a Chinese partnership with a country that is home to a more robust defense sector, such as Brazil, could be cause for even greater concern. More importantly, Chinese defense industrial supply chains tend to avoid many suppliers in the West, making them attractive alternatives to governments worried about being cut off for human rights, corruption, or governance concerns.</p> +<p>Load carriage is the principal identified task for UGS at today’s stage of development. This might be carrying personal equipment such as bergens, rations and ammunition, or platoon and company equipment such as ladders or beaching equipment. UGS might also be equipped with stretchers to enable casualties to be extracted from danger areas. Casualty evacuations are a particularly strenuous activity for soldiers. Being able to use UGS instead has multiple benefits. It allows soldiers to preserve energy in close combat, where fatigue can lead to poor decisions and further casualties. It also keeps soldiers free to complete the task at hand, such as winning a firefight. Another related use for UGS is for broader logistic purposes, especially in the dangerous “last mile” delivering supplies to frontline locations.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VetwB1t.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Chinese, Russian, and U.S. Arms Sales by Share to Selected LAC Countries, 2000–2022 (%).</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Top list TIV tables”</a>.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="communication-node">Communication Node</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="5-joint-training-and-exercises">5. JOINT TRAINING AND EXERCISES</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wU9Neva.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>Figure 2: UGS Fitted with Radio Equipment</em></p> -<p>At the other end on the spectrum of Chinese defense and security engagement in LAC lies participation in joint training and exercises. China has been making comparatively small but compounding inroads in developing partnerships with regional militaries, including key U.S. allies such as Brazil and Colombia. Indeed, Chinese forces have participated in courses at Colombia’s Lancero School for special operations as well as the world-renowned Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Training Center and the Jungle Warfare Training Center. The latter is of note, as a future conflict scenario in the Indo-Pacific, including over Taiwan, would most certainly involve combat in jungle terrain. Training with Brazilian and Colombian armed forces also gives the PLA indirect exposure to U.S. doctrine and, in this respect, could play a direct role in helping develop China’s military capabilities for a U.S.-China conflict scenario.</p> +<p>UGS could carry a unit’s radios, which can be very heavy and slow to move. They may also carry electronic countermeasure and electronic warfare systems, which can be used to prevent explosive devices detonating, or to disable enemy UAS. Equally, there are times when soldiers must be detached to form a rebroadcasting or retransmission service if radio waves are blocked by terrain or another barrier. This allows units and headquarters to communicate with one another. This task might be completed by a UGS with a communications equipment fit.</p> -<p>While PLA forces are travelling to LAC, hundreds of officers from across the region have also received training in China at a variety of institutions, including the Chinese National Defense University. At least 18 LAC countries have sent personnel to China to receive a variety of courses offered to groups ranging from second lieutenants to colonels and higher. China trained more officers from LAC countries than the United States for the first time in 2015 and would continue to do so for at least four more years. However, Chinese PME overall remains focused on field grade officers, who rank between major and colonel, with fewer inroads at the captain rank and below, and more nascent efforts to engage non-commissioned officers. This is changing, however, as China works to overhaul its military education institutions and further position itself as a leading source for PME.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="surveillance-and-reconnaissance">Surveillance and Reconnaissance</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>As with arms sales, these exchanges create durable linkages between the PLA and LAC militaries by sharing doctrine but also, even more importantly, by demystifying and marketing China to military personnel across the region. Indeed, reports from individuals familiar with China’s approach to training suggest that comparatively little effort is devoted to exchanging information on tactics, operations, and military best practices. Instead, China spends lavishly on visiting officers, many of whom will likely be visiting for the first time. Furthermore, one recent assessment of Chinese PME found trainings on human rights, democracy, and military ethics — mainstays of U.S. efforts — were largely absent from PRC training programs. China’s hope is that such efforts cultivate a favorable view of the country among attendees, who will in turn be more likely to advocate for participation in future trainings to their colleagues and carry such positive impressions with them long into their careers. In at least one of its training courses, programming included material seeking to convince LAC militaries that the United States is not a partner of choice for defense cooperation.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JgewS6X.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>Figure 3: UGS Fitted with Cameras and Sensors for Surveillance and Reconnaissance</em></p> -<p>China views military education as an important mechanism for strategic competition and has refined its approach to professional military education with this in mind. For example, in Guyana, China has hosted more than a dozen members of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) each year since at least 2019. Programming for these courses emphasizes cybersecurity and language instruction in Mandarin. For the GDF, whose armed forces number just 3,400 active personnel, with a mere few hundred of those being commissioned officers, the cumulative effect of this training seeks to ensure PLA doctrine guides Guyana’s approach to military cybersecurity. Meanwhile, the United States’ International Military Education and Training (IMET) program faces steep resource constraints, preventing it from supporting this kins of large-scale exchange, especially with smaller LAC forces. Furthermore, foreign participants in IMET are often scattered across numerous service academies and training programs, preventing the development of a critical mass of officers steeped in U.S. doctrine on any given issue as China has done for the GDF.</p> +<p>UGS can be equipped with sensors that can scan the area for potential threats. Software can categorise objects in the UGS’ field of view and identify points of interest, both static and mobile. These can then be passed to commanders for further investigation and potential targeting. Another use of UGS is as a reconnaissance screen moving ahead of dismounted or mounted recce soldiers. Or they might be employed in a static or roving function around unit locations or bases.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/66aD9Kv.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: U.S. Foreign Military Training in LAC, 1999–2019.</strong> Source: <a href="https://securityassistance.org/foreign-military-training/">“Foreign Military Training,” Security Assistance Monitor</a>.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="chemical-biological-radiological-andor-nuclear-cbrn-sensing">Chemical, Biological, Radiological and/or Nuclear (CBRN) Sensing</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>One area in which China has not made substantial inroads is on joint exercises and operations with LAC militaries. The most noteworthy PLA engagement in this regard was the 2022 Sniper Frontier competition hosted in Venezuela as part of Russia’s International Army Games. However, the number of foreign exercises conducted each year by China has grown since 2013, suggesting the potential for overtures from China to LAC countries in the future. Venezuela, with its deep security assistance ties to Beijing, stands out as one candidate. However, an even more concerning development would be PLA exercises with U.S. partner militaries such as Argentina, Brazil, or Colombia, which could offer critical insights into U.S. doctrine and capabilities in the region, as well as provide China an opportunity to test its ability to operate a military force in the hemisphere.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/08amkD9.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>Figure 4: UGS Fitted with CBRN Sensors</em></p> -<p>Joint training, arms transfers, and cooperation on HADR initiatives also contribute to enhancing interoperability between the PLA and regional militaries. Here it is important to note that China’s concept of interoperability differs substantially from that of the United States. While there is little reason to assume that PLA forces would deploy side-by-side with LAC militaries in a potential future conflict, familiarity with one another and positive military-to-military ties will be essential for China to make use of its dual-use facilities with a high-level of reliability. There is little sense in investing in ports capable of resupplying PLAN warships if the country they are based in refuses docking rights. Even upon clearing this threshold, for the PLA to successfully conduct replenishment and sustainment operations oceans away, it must be familiar with the logistics systems of the countries where it operates, from the physical routes and delivery systems used, to the key individuals in related military and civilian entities. This familiarity can be built over time through commercial operations as well as regular military-to-military engagement. In fact, it is one of the pillars of the United States’ own global logistics network. As the PLA seeks to become a force capable of global power projection, it is making a concerted effort to replicate this model for its own logistics and supply chains.</p> +<p>UGS can provide a sensor capability for CBRN threats. UGS with appropriate sensors could be sent to locations of potential attacks. Equally, they could remain with troops and carry sensor equipment that had previously to be carried by soldiers.</p> -<h3 id="layered-risks">Layered Risks</h3> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="armed">Armed</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>While China’s security and defense engagement in LAC may still appear an afterthought in comparison to the behemoth of China’s economic ties, accounting for the full spectrum of engagement reveals a complex and layered set of challenges for the United States and its allies to confront.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1t109C8.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>Figure 5: UGS with Remote Weapon Station</em></p> -<p>At present, China’s security and defense efforts in LAC present three primary risks to U.S. defense and security as well as to the region at large. The first, most obvious, and most calamitous risk is the potential for dual-use infrastructure to be employed by China against the United States in a conflict or crisis scenario. As detailed previously, there is a wide array of forms such engagement could take, ranging from the interruption of commerce and navigation through the Panama Canal and around the Straits of Magellan, to the use of satellite stations to aid in counterspace activities, interception of electronic signals, and even strikes against the continental United States itself.</p> +<p>UGS can be armed with remote weapon stations. Remote weapons are in mainstream use on crewed armoured vehicles today. Their benefit is that they allow the weapon to be fired by operators from inside the vehicle without a soldier having to be exposed in a cupola. Cameras mounted on the system allow the operator to aim the system and maintain control. Such systems, for example the Kongsberg Protector, can be mounted on UGS and operated remotely by offset troops. Such weapons might be used as sentry devices or in a fire-support capacity. Another potential use for UGS is as mobile landmines, a technique that has been adopted by the Ukrainian armed forces fighting Russia.</p> -<p>The penetration of Chinese-made sensors and digital infrastructure throughout LAC also poses risks for U.S. forces, as they may fall under intense surveillance long before they reach the Indo-Pacific. Cybersecurity gaps are another area where China has proven particularly adept at exploiting vulnerabilities, while LAC militaries themselves have been dragging their feet, as evidenced in a series of high-profile hacks and data breaches of sensitive government information in recent years. Much of this is driven by a lack of high-level commitment to cybersecurity among LAC governments, preventing the kind of interagency cooperation needed to shore up defenses in cyberspace. In Mexico, for instance, the lack of a national cybersecurity agency has left this role in the hands of the Secretariat of National Defense, which was itself the victim of a massive cyberattack in the fall of 2022, losing six terabytes of data in the process. In this environment, China can and has offered to supply cybersecurity solutions to governments in the region, and it can be expected that PRC-built digital infrastructure will contain a back door that allows Beijing a high degree of access. Critically, in this scenario LAC would not even need to take sides in such a conflict nor allow their physical infrastructure to be used for explicit military confrontation. China’s presence alone could already provide it with a huge advantage to surveil U.S. movements. China’s cultivation of relationships with regional militaries can facilitate cooperation and interoperability with the PLA and, in doing so, undermine the United States’ own ability to interface with these forces, for fear that information shared may be willingly or unwittingly passed along to Beijing.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="engineering">Engineering</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Beyond utilizing physical and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere for intelligence-gathering purposes, China could also seek to spark concurrent crises to draw U.S. attention and resources away from the Indo-Pacific. China would be aided in this regard by its close relations with the hemisphere’s three dictatorships: Venezuela, Cuba, and, to a growing extent, Nicaragua. These regimes have invested heavily in both their conventional armed forces as well as hybrid and gray zone capabilities such as cyber warfare, disinformation and misinformation, and the use of irregular armed groups. For example, China’s spy base in Bejucal, Cuba, is allegedly operated in partnership with an electronic warfare unit attached to Cuba’s Directorate of Military Intelligence. Accordingly, the capacity for each of these criminal regimes to disrupt regional security should not be understated, especially if they are emboldened by a conflict between China and United States.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5QtdHuJ.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>Figure 6: UGS Fitted with Mine Clearing Capability</em></p> -<p>In addition to actively tapping these three hemispheric dictatorships in the event of a crisis, China’s defense and security engagement plays a passive disruptive role already by empowering, emboldening, and extending the life of authoritarian and other populist-autocratic regimes within the hemisphere. To date, Caracas, Havana, and Managua have been more reliant on Russia to meet their security needs; however, if Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to drain Russian capacity to project power in the hemisphere, China may step up to fill that gap. As China’s red-hot economic growth appears to cool, security assistance has in many ways already eclipsed financing as the most important category of assistance to LAC dictatorships. For instance, Venezuela has not received any loans from Chinese policy or commercial banks since 2015 but has continued to receive support for its armed forces in the form of radars, drones, and a maintenance center for its fleet of Chinese-produced armored vehicles.</p> +<p>Military engineering includes the breaching of obstacles, demining and providing plant for trench digging. This is currently done by hand, or by soldiers using excavators. The civilian mining industry is a world leader in uncrewed technology and uncrewed diggers are in common use. UGS with a digging capability could set up a defensive position with much less human input than is currently required.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yLqI0pZ.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ A demonstrator stands in front of a Chinese-made VN-4 armored vehicle of the riot police during a rally against Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, in Caracas on April 19, 2017.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="deception">Deception</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Venezuela’s unmitigated economic calamity brought on by the Maduro regime’s disastrous management has dissuaded China from extending new lines of credit. Nevertheless, Sino-Venezuelan security cooperation remains firmly in place and on full display, from the prominent role of Chinese riot control vehicles in suppressing protests against the Maduro regime (for which the regime is now under a nascent investigation for “crimes against humanity” by the International Criminal Court), to the more insidious effects of Carnet de la Patria (“Homeland card”), a national ID card co-developed with China and modeled on China’s social credit tool kit. China has also worked closely in both Venezuela and Cuba on refining digital tools of repression through misinformation and disinformation campaigns, as well as controlling access to information and shutting off internet access selectively to disrupt protests.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cWatkzP.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>Figure 7: UGS Fitted with Emitters for Deception</em></p> -<p>These developments suggest that while China has often been depicted as a lender of last resort to countries shunned by much of the international community, it is increasingly taking on the role of the security partner of last resort as well. As far back as 2014, for instance, when the heavy-handed response of Venezuelan riot police to protests caused Spain and Brazil to halt their exports of tear gas and police equipment to the regime, China stepped in to fill that void. Meanwhile, in the wake of the July 2021 mass protests in Cuba, China played an important role in propping up Havana both diplomatically and practically by helping Cuba enforce internet blackouts on its Huawei- and ZTE-provided telecommunications networks. The Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua has also benefitted from China’s focus on policing assistance, receiving donations of riot gear and protective equipment to its police force from China even amid mounting evidence of human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan security services.</p> +<p>UGS might also be employed to provide deception capability. This could be in the form of “fake” vehicles or groupings, or they can be used for deception using the electromagnetic spectrum. Such systems deliberately radiate to mislead the enemy. UGS equipped with a radio system and antennae can be used to draw enemy resource and disguise intentions and dispositions.</p> -<p>For other authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes looking to preserve their hold on power, China appears poised to deliver a full spectrum of repressive tools, giving rise to a third risk: growing Chinese engagement with LAC militaries and police forces may erode standards of civil-military relations. Currently, China has found more success in capturing political, rather than military, elites, and civil-military relations throughout the hemisphere appear stable, if less than ideal. However, military-to-military exchange almost invariably results in opportunities for imparting values, as well as tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine, which may lead to troubling behaviors by militaries in times of crisis. China’s growing efforts to train foreign military officials may include elements of China’s “discursive competition,” and promotion of its party-army model among graduates suggests an effort to undermine traditional notions of military subordination to civilian leadership.</p> +<p>UGS may be multirole and capable of carrying out more than one of these tasks at a time, or of switching between them. Moreover, UGS should not be considered in isolation. There are also UGS built as mobile launch pads for UAS, such as the THeMIS Observe, which is an example of using the two technologies in concert. Military strategy requires conducting the orchestra of military capability in the most suitable way possible. UGS should be used for those tasks where they offer a competitive advantage. They should not be the answer before the question has been asked. There is always a danger of pursuing technological innovation for its own sake, especially in times when commitments outstrip resource – which is a place in which many forces find themselves. This friction has been recognised as problematic in military forces in the past, and has at times resulted in poor decisions.</p> -<p>Militaries in LAC remain some of the most trusted institutions, consistently ranked as the second most trusted institution, according to Latinobarómetro, behind only the church, and viewed as more efficient and professional than politicians. What military leaders say matters in the region, and to the extent that there is political and ideological transfer that accompanies China’s trainings and military diplomacy engagement, this can have profound consequences for the health of LAC democracies, which often suffer from corruption and unconsolidated institutions and checks and balances. Furthermore, in a hemisphere largely marked by small and shrinking military budgets, China’s approach of providing or donating equipment at low cost and with few restrictions might embolden armed forces, which have seen their societal roles swell considerably in recent years. China’s practice of gifting military and police equipment is an especially tantalizing tool for influence in this regard, allowing security forces to increase their stature without needing to spend from their own pocket.</p> +<p>Having introduced UGS and their proposed military uses, this paper moves in the next chapter to answer three questions:</p> -<p>In the citizen security space as well, rising Chinese engagement has already shown its potential to be especially corrosive to democracy. This applies not only to full-fledged authoritarian regimes but to ostensibly democratic governments as well, where leaders have often deployed the rhetoric of public safety as a pretext to restrict civic space and to intimidate and dismantle organized political opposition. Under former president Rafael Correa, Ecuador was an eager adopter of Chinese “safe cities” equipment, which was swiftly used to spy on opposition parties and which had a chilling effect on journalists and civil society watchdogs. Footage from CCTV cameras were fed through the country’s central intelligence agency. In 2019, Bolivia also announced the development of a new Integrated System of Citizen Security, replete with the purchase of hundreds of facial recognition cameras from China, as well as a new center of operations to be built by the China National Electronics Import &amp; Export Corporation (CEIEC). As of July 2023, the rollout of this program has continued apace, with CEIEC recently completing its deployment of more than five dozen cameras to the town of Warnes, the first provincial center to be integrated into Bolivia’s new security system.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>How can UGS realistically be employed today and in the immediate future, with technological limitations and tactical realities taken into consideration?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How are UGS task-organised and how do they move around the battlespace?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What is the best way to ensure that soldiers use UGS as intended?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>More recently, the government of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador has shown deeply concerning autocratic tendencies, exacerbated by his heavy-handed and expansive security policy. Parallel to his challenges to El Salvador’s democracy, Bukele has been exploring closer relations with China. On the citizen security front, China has offered to provide computers and other equipment to El Salvador’s national police. Taken together, these developments mean that El Salvador joining a “safe cities” project should be of grave concern to both the United States and other defenders of democracy.</p> +<p>The soldier must remain central to these efforts. The uses outlined above broadly represent attempts to do away with human input where possible. However, UGS are built to support soldiers in their endeavours, and it is soldiers who will enable them to do this. The relationship is key, and the focus should remain on the human, as demonstrated below.</p> -<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> +<h3 id="iv-considerations-for-ugs-support-to-light-manoeuvre-forces">IV. Considerations for UGS Support to Light Manoeuvre Forces</h3> -<p>China is encroaching along several divergent axes in the security and defense space. The United States should engage the region with confidence that its longstanding partnerships and ties offer a strong foundation. However, the United States’ commitments to Europe and the Indo-Pacific mean that in the coming years policymakers must be realistic about the resource constraints they face. It will require a more agile, multifaceted strategy to insulate LAC militaries and police forces from the most corrosive effects of Chinese influence, curtail Beijing’s advances in infrastructure, citizen security, and arms sales, and compete to preserve strategic denial in the hemisphere.</p> +<h4 id="gently-does-it">Gently Does it</h4> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Leverage U.S. partners to fill force modernization and equipment shortfalls.</strong></p> +<p>UGS lack manoeuvrability in close or complex terrain. This must be a central consideration for their employment in tactical formations. Their ability to troubleshoot when faced with obstacles is currently far below that of humans. When moving autonomously, UGS must make sense of their surroundings to plot a clear path. Navigating obstacles using sensors alone is incredibly difficult. A study using the TAERO optionally crewed wheeled system found that “it is possible to effectively implement autonomous mode up to a speed of 2.8 m/s in an unstructured environment”. Advertised maximum speeds for UGS far exceed that which would be possible in complex terrain. This pattern is seen in numerous trials and reports, in which soldiers outpace their robotic counterparts. This finding is further corroborated by wargames and testing. The civilian transport sector is yet to make autonomous vehicles a viable offering despite billions of dollars and years of research and development. This is also in spite of a relatively robust framework within which they must work. Road networks have defined edges, junctions and rules. The latter are not always followed, of course, and autonomous vehicles on roads must try to account for the actions of other road users, which cannot always be predicted. The problem becomes more difficult when extrapolated to military UGS. Normal road networks are a simpler environment than a battlefield, where smoke, debris, adversarial activity, and disturbed earth make for a much more complex picture, with fewer established norms. Water hazards are illustrative here. Water’s surface is highly refracted, meaning it looks different depending on the view angle, the surrounding area and the weather. In wet weather, determining what is simply a slick surface versus a puddle versus something deeper is difficult for sensors and computers.</p> - <p>Many Latin American militaries currently using legacy Russian weapons systems are liable to find these increasingly obsolete and to have no way of servicing them, particularly as U.S. sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial complex continue to bite. The United States can play a role in reducing dependence on Russian weapons, but only if it is forthcoming in sales of alternatives which are competitive on price, especially in comparison to China.</p> +<p>The vision of autonomous land systems moving around the battlefield with abandon is currently fantasy. Most systems that are advertised as, or considered to be, autonomous or AI-enabled are much more limited in their capacities. As noted above, uncrewed does not mean autonomous. For example, the Milrem Robotics THeMIS is one of the more advanced and developed platforms on the market, with buy-in from several European countries. It can be teleoperated and can complete waypoint navigation as given by an operator. At the time of writing, a “follow the leader” capability is still in development, as is the ability to swarm. Teleoperation is usually conducted using a line-of-sight antenna. As such it is limited by terrain and range. In the case of the THeMIS, the line-of-sight range for control is up to 1,500 metres. This central limitation is clarified when overlaid with the proposed tasks of UGS outlined above.</p> - <p>Additional funding for U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is sorely needed. The Western Hemisphere receives the lowest levels of FMF and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) across all geographic regions. In fact, FMF for the region declined by about 12 percent between fiscal years 2019 and 2023. Absent alternative financing options, LAC militaries must pay up front for equipment purchased from the United States. These sales may in turn be caught up in bureaucratic red tape as they navigate the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, leading to further delays. Panama, for instance, waited for over a year to receive a second Beechcraft King Air turboprop plane for marine patrols on account of delays related to supply chain disruption and Covid-19. Yet, compared to the speed with which the United States has proven itself capable of funneling equipment to its European and East Asian allies, LAC armed forces have found themselves hard pressed not to ascribe a double standard to U.S. military sales.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="combat">Combat</h4> +</blockquote> - <p>Another area where the United States can preempt potential encroachment from China is in joint ventures. While the Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status held by Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia is intended to facilitate co-development of defense technologies, the promise of this designation has been slow to materialize. The United States should seek to identify qualitative advantages in these countries’ sectors, beginning with Brazil, whose aerospace industry has extensive experience with military aviation and is currently partnering with Swedish firm Saab for research and development on the Gripen fighter jet. However, the United States must also look beyond the MNNA box to develop new, more innovative financing mechanisms and partnership opportunities with other key partners, including Ecuador, Uruguay, and Chile. At the same time, the United States must remain cognizant of the possibility that arms sales or technology transfers may find their way from LAC militaries into China’s hands or those of another geostrategic rival. To assuage such concerns, the United States can pursue formal agreements with key security partners that their defense industrial bases will adhere to U.S. standards for handling classified technologies and prioritize training regional militaries and defense firms on U.S. best practices for defense-industrial security.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZLb65dQ.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>Figure 8: UGS as Fire Support</em></p> - <p>At the same time, the top-line systems that would stir up the greatest concerns are only sought after by a handful of LAC militaries. For much of the region, far more practical equipment such as bridge-layers, trucks, small arms, boots, and personal protective equipment are in far greater demand, with China often moving the fastest to supply these bread-and-butter items. The U.S. Congress can address this blind spot by authorizing the secretary of defense to approve requests from geographic combatant commands such as SOUTHCOM to provide small-scale aid to local militaries. More broadly, the Departments of Defense and State should work together to develop a list of less-sensitive defense articles such as logistics trucks or military construction equipment to be subject to an expedited FMS process, allowing the United States to deliver critical support to partners on competitive timelines while ensuring a more thorough review for sensitive technologies and advanced equipment.</p> +<p>Dismounted close combat is an inherently complex business. It involves rapid decisions, movement, adaptation to constantly changing dynamics, and the most intimate of command and control, communication and logistic interactions. As a result, such activity will remain the realm of humans. UGS are far from being able to close with and kill the enemy on an objective. There are simply too many variables for systems to manage coherently, and the systems’ vulnerabilities too many.</p> - <p>Finally, where the United States lacks the resources to sufficiently meet the force modernization and equipment needs of LAC countries, it can look to like-minded countries such as South Korea, Israel, and Sweden, countries with their own established or ascendant arms industries that are also aligned with U.S. geopolitical goals. Bringing a coalition to fill LAC’s defense requirements promises to put more options on the table in order to prevent China from emerging as the primary arms exporter for countries in the hemisphere.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Bolster the defense cooperation mechanisms of the inter-American system.</strong></p> +<p>However, AI-enabled systems can add value by accurately sensing and categorising objects in their field of view, providing important information to the commander. Sensors and their respective algorithms can distinguish between types of vehicles, military and civilian, with great accuracy. One study showed a 97.25% to 99.5% detection rate at 2,000–5,000 metres, both during the day and at night. Another, using different methods, achieved accuracy of above 85%. The fact that these systems are not achieving 100% accuracy is not a reason for alarm. People are fallible and contend with issues of eyesight, optics, climate and fatigue when engaging in combat. For UGS, these figures will only improve with time and access to labelled datasets, which will in turn grow as the proliferation of UGS continues.</p> - <p>The Western Hemisphere is home to an impressive web of security coordination mechanisms, such as the System of Cooperation Among the American Air Forces (SICOFAA), Conference of American Armies (CAA), and Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA). Among these, however, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and its counterpart focused on professional military education, the Inter-American Defense College (IADC), stand out as some of the most storied and expansive players in helping develop and align policy on hemispheric security issues. Both institutions are explicitly tied to the Organization of American States (OAS), which orients their missions around the OAS’s commitment to democracy and human rights. Together with forums such as the SICOFAA, CAA, and CDMA, which include promotion of healthy civil-military relations in their own mission and values statements, the inter-American system has a sound base of institutions to promote principled security cooperation.</p> +<p>In the current state of development, armed UGS are probably better placed to provide supporting fires. This task would traditionally be done with a fire support section set off to a flank while another section carried out the assault. Supporting deliberate offensive action lends itself to the use of UGS, as the terrain can be analysed by commanders ahead of time. In this scenario, armed UGS are likely less suited to ad hoc offensive action and instead must be used deliberately. The idea of robots facing off against other robots while humans sit in a command bunker watching the action unfold is misleading. Placing three armed UGS in a fire support position with a human in the loop for engagement authority, and soldiers adhering to battlespace management boundaries, is a more realistic application, balancing well understood norms with novel technology. Equally, static defence tasks such as an anti-tank screen might be envisaged. This matches UGS’ and soldiers’ relative strengths.</p> - <p>Closer engagement with the IADB can serve as a force multiplier for U.S. defense engagement with LAC countries. Indeed, the board’s areas of focus, from leading the MECODEX 2022 disaster relief exercise to its efforts to promote awareness among OAS member states on cybersecurity, closely align with U.S. priorities in LAC. Meanwhile the IADB’s independent status means that it can serve as a more effective interlocutor with countries that may otherwise hesitate to welcome purely bilateral military engagement with the United States. A practical first step to help raise the profile of these inter-American security cooperation mechanisms would be to expand SOUTHCOM’s J7/9 directorate, responsible for exercises and coalition affairs. As the smallest combatant command, SOUTHCOM suffers from personnel shortfalls across the board, but given the premium placed throughout the hemisphere on multilateral defense cooperation, prioritizing this directorate stands out as an area where a small investment in additional staff can have an outsized effect.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="supply">Supply</h4> +</blockquote> - <p>Considering China’s forays into multilateral security conversations broadly through the GSI, and regionally with the China-CELAC defense forum, the United States should also seek to highlight the IADB and inter-American system more broadly as a counterpoint for countries in the region to conduct their military diplomacy and security cooperation activities. In doing so, U.S. policymakers should also use public messaging to question China’s fixation on working around these existing institutions and excluding the United States, one of the region’s core security providers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Clarify U.S. red lines when it comes to security engagement.</strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Huo8mjk.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>Figure 9: UGS for Supply</em></p> - <p>The breadth and depth of the China’s engagement in LAC means that an all-or-nothing approach would likely be destined to fail. Especially when it comes to Chinese dual-use infrastructure, the lack of a credible U.S. counteroffer for countries’ transportation, energy, or communications needs means that warnings of the risks of dealing with Beijing often fall on deaf ears. Nevertheless, China’s preferred approach to security and defense cooperation means that it is difficult to discern a clear point at which such engagement crosses into national security concern. In a worst-case scenario, China’s history of opaque dealings and espionage means that militaries which cooperate closely with the PLA could be deemed too risky for the United States to engage with, for fear that information on sensitive capabilities or doctrine would find its way back to Beijing. To avoid this future, especially in the case of MNNAs in the hemisphere, the United States must clearly spell out which elements of engagement it views as “red lines” to prevent unnecessarily isolating partners.</p> +<p>Resupply is one of the more mature tasks for UGS, and this is one where most experimentation has been completed. At the larger scale, platoons of uncrewed heavy goods vehicles might be led by a crewed lead vehicle for logistic missions in rear areas. The logistic and movement constraints outlined mean that the use of UGS in rear areas is the place to focus attention. However, due to risk to personnel, current research focuses on autonomous “last mile” resupply. In fact, rear areas are also now vulnerable, in the face of persistent ISR and precision strike. There is, therefore, value in fielding UGS in these areas, where tasks and wayfinding are often more simple than using main supply routes. Fielding UGS here would also allow data collection, which is crucial for system improvement.</p> - <p>Permanent deployment of PLA combat forces in the hemisphere represents one such red line. To this end, news of a potential new Chinese base in Cuba should be subjected to close inspection by the U.S. intelligence community. While it appears unlikely that any such facility would be designed with the intention of conducting offensive operations against the United States, the Departments of Defense and State should be actively involved in planning for such a contingency and drawing up sets of options for the administration to consider in the event such a project moves forward.</p> +<p>Currently, it is likely that a human would still be involved in these tasks, providing a lead element to be followed, either on foot or in a crewed vehicle. However, UGS would still be useful, as logistic patrols are a significant burden on forces. Reducing crew requirements to free up soldiers to do other tasks is an important contribution of UGS. The urban environment provides an avenue through which UGS could be employed further forward, as moving between buildings leaves soldiers vulnerable.</p> - <p>Other clear red lines include participation of the PLA in exercises with a major U.S. ally in LAC. Such activities would give Chinese military forces the opportunity to observe the performance of U.S.-trained militaries up close, potentially offering critical insights into the United States’ own doctrine and capabilities. Transfers of high-end military equipment, especially if accompanied by offers of technological cooperation or co-production, represent another red line due to China’s ability to establish a long-term and deep presence in the partner country’s defense industrial base. The deal appears to have been a success in the end, but the lengthy and tumultuous process leading up to it portends ill for future U.S. efforts to dissuade countries from purchasing equipment from strategic rivals.</p> +<p>That said, a slow-moving UGS would be an easy target for enemy troops. There is a tension at the heart of the proposed use of UGS for burden carriage in combat scenarios. The dismounted troops who have the most to gain from having a system carry their equipment are also those who need to be able to move rapidly through complex terrain such as forests and urban environments. Smaller vehicles may be more agile, but they cannot carry that much equipment. While UGS could reduce what soldiers are carrying, they would add friction if they were unable to keep up in tactical movement in complex terrain due to technical limitations. There may be scope for these systems to follow units a tactical bound behind, but there is a risk that they could get stuck. This then becomes an additional constraint and planning consideration for commanders. Therefore, it is sensible for UGS to remain with companies or the battlegroup echelons, where movement will be more deliberate.</p> - <p>One final area where the United States should seek to clarify its stance applies to the proliferation of Chinese space research stations in the hemisphere. In particular, the United States should urge the Argentine government to push for inspections and closer monitoring of the Espacio Lejano ground station. In doing so, the United States should reiterate that signing away sovereignty over such facilities is not only a concern for Washington but also undermines Argentina’s own sovereignty and security.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Invest in U.S. core competencies in military education and training.</strong></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="reconnaissance">Reconnaissance</h4> +</blockquote> - <p>The United States remains the security and defense partner of choice for LAC by a large margin and should endeavor to maintain the status quo. One of the greatest assets in this regard lies in U.S. professional military education, regarded as the gold standard by militaries across the region. Foreign graduates of these programs often go on to play leading roles in their home countries’ armed forces, and shared experiences forge long-lasting bonds at all levels of command. However, currently U.S. PME efforts are not purpose-built for competition with a near-peer adversary. The top-down approach, wherein domestic service academies dictate to embassy staff the number of individuals from each country they can accept and the types of courses they will offer, is counterproductive to a more strategic assessment of what kinds of trainings LAC militaries need most. A bottom-up approach, wherein embassies coordinate with regional combatant commands to identify the number of personnel and types of skill sets are most needed, would represent a sea change in the United States’ ability to leverage its core competency in military education for competition with China.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yjaWpdm.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>Figure 10: UGS in “Stay-Behind” Reconnaissance Function</em></p> - <p>Other key limitations to reforming U.S. military education and training programs for competition with China include the Section 312 and 321 requirements that the Department of Defense focus on “developing countries.” The department uses World Bank income classifications to assess which countries fall into this category, meaning that military personnel from Chile, Panama, Uruguay, and most recently Guyana cannot receive funding to attend security cooperation meetings or train with U.S. forces. Such a standard is artificial at best and arbitrary at worst, limiting the ability of the U.S. military to engage some of its most important partners in the hemisphere. Tellingly, the World Bank itself has moved away from using income groups to assign “developing country” status in favor of a more holistic assessment of development indicators. The Department of Defense should follow suit, and the Joint Staff should urgently engage with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to reevaluate its method for determining Section 312 and 321 exemptions. Doing so would rapidly increase the range of tools available to the United States for military-to-military training and partnerships.</p> +<p>Employing UGS in a reconnaissance capacity would see lines of robots moving in front of the traditional human recce screen. At present, soldiers move ahead of the formation’s main body looking to spot the enemy before the enemy spots them. This enables shaping activity and for deliberate targeting by indirect fires to take place, which is preferable to having to react on someone else’s terms. Recce is also risky. Recce units are generally small, detached from the larger mass of their formation and susceptible to interdiction by the enemy, which is in turn looking to achieve the same effect in reverse.</p> - <p>Within the hemisphere as well, a multitude of tools exist for joint exercises and trainings, ranging from Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, which focus on improving linkages between special forces, to larger initiatives involving thousands of personnel from several countries, such as PANAMAX 22, which concluded in August of last year. More exercises seeking to bring together a broad cross-section of the hemisphere may be important for fostering a sense of regional solidarity and alignment that China will find difficult to replicate.</p> +<p>A concept proposed in the US supports deploying a forward line of RAS, thereby reducing risk to personnel. A forward line of sensors can probe positions for enemy activity, and potentially force them to unmask. This could be by moving and giving off a signature, be it heat or electromagnetic, or by engaging the UGS, which also gives away their position. However, the limitations discussed above demonstrate that this vision is a long way off for UGS. The use of UGS in this way would slow manoeuvre units to a crawl, making them susceptible to targeting from enemy fires. In addition, there would be significant burden in trying to manage their movement and make sense of their data. This task is best left to UAS. UGS with this function are best suited to static, and perhaps predesignated, roving sentry tasks, where they can support soldiers to maintain situational awareness over an area. A situation where UGS could be used as a “stay behind” capability as friendly troops withdraw is a more suitable use case, and more palatable than using soldiers in what is a very risky activity. Leaving UGS to identify the movement of enemy troops and vehicles and alert friendly forces plays to their strengths in image recognition. It also has the advantage of freeing up recce troops for additional tasks.</p> - <p>The United States can further leverage the National Guard’s State Partnership Program, which has active relationships with 27 countries in the region, to serve as a force multiplier in training efforts. An integrated approach to professional military education which brings together SOUTHCOM, embassy, and National Guard personnel to train partner militaries would be a major step forward in terms of demonstrating sustained U.S. commitment and building up important skills. Such exercises can be tailored based on the security needs of the country in question while remaining oriented around a single key capability, such as cybersecurity or disaster response, to have the greatest effect.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhance interagency and international cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.</strong></p> +<p>The considerations for deployment in these three areas can be mapped across to the other potential tasks outlined earlier in the paper. Those tasks that require high levels of mobility remain under the purview of UAS. CBRN threat monitoring and radio rebroadcasting can be achieved by UAS, although there may be times when UGS are better suited to the tactical situation. This chapter has considered the technological limitations associated with various types of UGS, and has applied these to tactical formations. The next chapter looks at the enabling activities needed to ensure that UGS are in the right place in working order.</p> - <p>HADR represents one of the most critical mission sets the United States conducts in the hemisphere. The ability of U.S. forces to access disaster areas and distribute lifesaving aid, combined with the presence of pre-positioned supplies in the region through Joint Task Force Bravo, makes the U.S. military an indispensable partner. However, demand for HADR in LAC is liable to grow significantly across the region. SOUTHCOM can strengthen the United States’ role in disaster relief operations by expanding its efforts to convene regional militaries for planning, coordination, and exercises to improve responses in a region that has been heavily impacted as of late by extreme weather, health crises, and natural disasters. The two-week Tradewinds exercise, the 38th iteration of which included more than 1,800 participants from 21 partner countries as well as every branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, is one of the most important tools in this regard for bolstering multilateral disaster response capabilities. SOUTHCOM’s investments in compact “clinic in a can” medical facilities, which can be deployed rapidly to offer care in times of crisis, also represent an important development for making U.S. HADR more reactive and prompt.</p> +<h3 id="v-how-do-ugs-get-to-and-stay-in-the-fight">V. How Do UGS Get to, and Stay in, the Fight?</h3> - <p>However, the United States continues to struggle to harmonize its policies around when and where humanitarian assistance can be deployed. Currently, USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs (USAID/BHA), as the lead agency on HADR, must issue a disaster assistance declaration before actors such as SOUTHCOM can step in. This process risks creating delays when speed is of the essence. It also limits the United States’ ability to engage partner countries on crises which may not rise to the level of a declared disaster, such as wildfires, oil spills, or water shortages. The United States should consider signing MOUs with countries in the region that allow local U.S. first-response elements to be deployed on request from partner governments.</p> +<p>Military logistics have been brought into sharp relief by the war in Ukraine. The true potential of UGS can only be unlocked if they are in the right place at the right time for the right task. Like other military equipment, UGS will need to be transported to the area of operations. The size and ability of the system will determine how this might happen. Factoring UGS into future lift capability, on land, at sea and in the air, is important for planners. Military lift capacity is a limiting factor to the success of deployments. Every system that is transported takes up space that cannot be used by another piece of equipment. The military benefit in theatre must therefore be clear. Units and formations are responsible for devising field equipment tables for the kit they need in theatre to do their job while deployed. UGS will feature in these considerations going forward. There is little capacity for superfluous equipment. Larger armoured systems such as the Milrem Type-X, a 12-tonne uncrewed system equipped with 50-mm cannon to support main battle tanks, or the 10-tonne General Dynamics TRX, will need dedicated logistic support. Larger vehicles are moved by aircraft or low-loader trucks and ferries. In the near term, all these options require human crew, emphasising the reliance of UGS on people. Smaller systems such as the Milrem THeMIS, which is the size of a small car, can be towed behind a parent vehicle until they are required. That parent vehicle will need to meet specific towing requirements, such as height of hitch. In the case of the THeMIS, the speed at which it can be towed is three times as fast as it can move itself – 80 km per hour, rather than 20 km per hour. Moving UGS from an initial railhead, port or airfield to the area in which they will be employed must be planned for in detail.</p> - <p>Another area for increased focus should be developing and offering more courses on HADR operations as part of U.S. professional military education and training programs. Such efforts will be important for regional militaries to develop their own strategies for disaster response and ensuring these synergize with SOUTHCOMs efforts. Information-sharing mechanisms should also be strengthened as the first pillar of disaster risk reduction, and streamlining early-warning and first-responder communications should be a critical area for investment.</p> +<p>The totality of the system must be considered, including power supply. If the UGS are battery powered, how and where are these batteries charged, and who does the charging? Which echelon should be burdened with the charging capability? Battery technology is relatively nascent, and stamina remains low. On battery power, the THeMIS has a runtime of just one and a half hours. In hybrid mode, using its diesel engine, it has a runtime of 15 hours. Low-level battery management for existing equipment such as radios already requires planning and demands electricity, which may be provided by the mains, generators or other vehicles.</p> - <p>Finally, to the extent possible, the United States should more extensively leverage partners from outside the hemisphere to augment its own HADR capabilities. For instance, Taiwan has a strong track record with its seven diplomatic allies, and closer cooperation with SOUTHCOM and USAID/BHA could help continue to elevate Taiwan’s profile in the region, along with that of other key U.S. partners, including South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Improve cooperation on countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the nexus between transnational organized crime and environmental crimes.</strong></p> +<p>Another consideration for UGS is where repair and battery charging take place. In the case of crewed vehicles, the crew can fix small errors and conduct simple repair jobs. For instance, great pride is taken by tank and artillery howitzer crews in their ability to fix a track if one becomes dislodged. UGS will not have the luxury of an on-hand repair crew. This means that resource must be dedicated to recovering systems once broken. Repair functions in military forces have become eroded in recent times, as systems have become more complex and manufacturers retain the right to repair. The ability to repair equipment and keep it on the battlefield has been shown to be crucial in the conflict in Ukraine. For instance, a third of Ukraine’s howitzers are out of service for repair at any one time. Repairing technical equipment is often left to contractors rather than completed in place, even for well-established capabilities that are in service. Sensors and computer systems, no matter the platform on which they sit, are vulnerable, despite ruggedisation by the manufacturers. Holding UGS back several bounds until they are used for a discrete task before being recovered will allow more sustained repair operations than can be offered at lower formations.</p> - <p>Just as climate change and environmental degradation is creating new risks for LAC countries and the United States alike, environmental crime throughout the hemisphere has surged. IUU fishing, in particular, is one of the most pervasive criminal, environmental, and economic challenges facing the region today. It is also a sector in which militaries, especially navies and coast guards, play a vital role. China stands out as one of the largest perpetrators of IUU fishing both globally and in LAC. China’s vast deep-water fishing fleet represents an important tool in Beijing’s gray zone arsenal in the South China Sea, often deployed alongside PLAN vessels as provocations in disputed waters.</p> +<p>Managing demand for UGS by frontline units is another concern for planners. As in the case of UAS earlier in their development, demand for their support far outstrips UGS supply. It is still the case that larger and more capable UAS are held at divisional or corps level and assigned to discrete tasks depending on a commander’s decision. Specific recommendations for UGS are difficult to outline without firm knowledge of the types and numbers of systems to be procured. They will likely be a scarce resource for some time. However, forces should be wary of putting manoeuvre units in permanent possession of larger, more capable UGS. If soldiers are having to consider what their UGS are doing instead of fighting the enemy, then the systems have been misemployed. Tactical units should bid for UGS support as they currently do for aircraft. In this framework, bids for support from aircraft are submitted while formations are planning for future operations. The demand for aircraft for offensive support, moving people or cargo, or providing reconnaissance and surveillance, generally outstrips supply, as platforms are scarce. To that end, units make bids for capability, and a central cell determines who gets what and when. This generally works on a rolling 72-hour time horizon tied to the operational area’s planning cycles.</p> - <p>In the Western Hemisphere as well, China’s complicity in IUU fishing presents layered security and environmental risks, such as in 2019, when more than 300 Chinese vessels conducted thousands of hours of illegal fishing off the coast of the Galápagos Islands, prompting urgent calls for assistance from the Ecuadorean navy. Elsewhere along the Southern Cone of South America, vessels originating from China have decimated marine ecosystems and been found responsible for labor and human rights abuses onboard. Likewise, other forms of environmental crime, such as wildlife trafficking and illegal logging, have grown in the hemisphere. Critically, these operations often form part of a nexus involving China, with the illicit animal trade in Mexico, for instance, becoming an increasingly important channel through which cartels acquire fentanyl precursors from China.</p> +<p>Currently, formations bid for a primary and secondary asset to provide support. The primary would be ideal, but may be tasked elsewhere, so a second, different asset should also be identified. In this case, with UGS in their infancy, the secondary course of action should employ established capabilities. This will mitigate against undue reliance on UGS while the capability is nascent.</p> - <p>The United States should seek to raise awareness of China’s complicity in such activities in both regional and international fora. Indeed, China’s tacit encouragement of IUU fishing by its deep-water fleets undermines Beijing’s efforts to style itself as an exemplar of law and order at home and abroad. The United States should support efforts such as Panama’s recently announced IUU fishing protection center and seek to lead joint trainings and even enforcement exercises against IUU fishing fleets. U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and Air Force assets should all consider host-nation rider programs to allow regional militaries to come aboard for hands-on training and exchange. Indeed, both Panama and Ecuador were highlighted as priority countries for cooperation in the United States’ five-year strategy for countering IUU fishing. Outside of the military realm, the United States, through the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, can pursue capacity-building partnerships with LAC governments on environmental crime and seek to improve intelligence sharing with national police forces on activities such as illegal wildlife and timber trafficking.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Strengthen awareness and training on cybersecurity.</strong></p> +<h4 id="network">Network</h4> - <p>Cyber vulnerabilities not only create practical information security risks that damage the national security of LAC countries, but a lack of general knowledge on cybersecurity also opens the door to Chinese offers to provide quick solutions. China is also not the only extra-hemispheric authoritarian making such inroads; the Brazilian military renewed its contract with the Russian company Kaspersky Lab to provide cybersecurity services in the summer of 2022 as the war in Ukraine was raging and just as the company was deemed a national security risk by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission.</p> +<p>It is not just the physical systems that need to be in place. UGS with a reconnaissance or surveillance function need to be able to relay that information back to commanders, using a robust communications network. That network may also need to permit some UGS to pass information among themselves, either to corroborate a potential target if more than one system can “see” it, or to help them avoid obstacles. Equally, commanders may need to issue instructions to the UGS for a task. The electromagnetic spectrum is not an unlimited resource, and different capabilities must be deconflicted. Radars may interfere with aircraft if their systems operate within the same band. The network needs to remain available and have enough capacity to pass information around. This is the focus of major experiments, such as the Project Convergence series, in which a resilient network is identified as a “backbone” to enable large amounts of data to be passed around. This is easier said than done. Militaries use a host of different communication systems and bearers, from radios through to satellites. The network needs to have low latency, be efficient in its use of bandwidth, and be secure from enemy interference. All additional interactions with these networks provide adversaries with opportunities to interfere. They may look to jam or spoof UGS. Robust countermeasures will need to be in place, or UGS will suffer in the same way UAS have in Ukraine, with 10,000 systems lost a month. What is more, the network needs to be interoperable with those of allies and partner forces. Importantly, it is likely that the network will be provided by a different company, or set of companies, than those who have built the UGS. A variety of bearers, data links and data standards make interoperability very complex. In a contested network space, prioritisation of the information being transmitted is important.</p> - <p>In March 2023, the United States released the National Cybersecurity Strategy, which included among its objectives efforts to “expand U.S. ability to assist allies and partners” as well as avenues for both multilateral and bilateral cooperation on network resilience and countering digital threats. One starting point would be to encourage LAC countries to adopt their own cybersecurity strategies. Indeed, less than half of the countries in the Western Hemisphere currently have a national plan for addressing cyber threats. Alongside the development of national strategies, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) can engage directly with regional armed forces to outline the importance of developing specialized units for national defense of the digital domain.</p> +<h4 id="adversary-activity">Adversary Activity</h4> - <p>SOUTHCOM, in partnership with CYBERCOM and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, can lead training with partner countries to outline key risks and the elements of a better strategy to counter cyber threats. Such efforts should also leverage U.S. allies and partners, with one key player in this regard being Costa Rica, which has invested heavily in shoring up its digital defenses since the 2022 Conti ransomware attacks. Indeed, regional partnerships will be critical to help tailor cybersecurity training to the LAC context and overcome language barriers and other obstacles to effective knowledge transfer. SOUTHCOM’s recent inauguration of a $9.8 million commitment to strengthen Costa Rica’s cyber defenses presents one opportunity to not only build up bilateral cooperation but potentially offer a springboard for regional cybersecurity efforts.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Invest in citizen security and delink citizen security from the regional conversation on drugs.</strong></p> +<p>While providing opportunity for friendly forces, the proliferation of UGS also provides options for the adversary. This might include jamming GPS or seizing control of systems using electronic warfare means. Systems with automated navigation and reconnaissance capabilities are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks on their software. Here, machine learning and AI models can be “attacked” by objects in the physical environment, where an input specifically designed by an adversary can cause a system to act in an unamenable way. An understanding of a system’s software architecture and logics can allow an adversary to confuse a system and reduce its effectiveness, or deduce the information on which it has been trained. Researchers tricked an autonomous vehicle into misidentifying a stop sign as a 45 miles per hour sign, a mistake that could have had catastrophic consequences. Subtly altered images that look normal to humans can fool AI. In one study, a 3D-printed model of a turtle was specifically designed to trick a computer into thinking it was a rifle, which it did at every angle it was presented to the camera. Such activity is worrying in relation to sensors that seek out targets in a given area, as there are rules of engagement in which possession of a rifle might allow targeting. This shows the importance of maintaining meaningful human control in such systems. Adversarial activity is also troublesome in relation to more benign UGS with logistic functions that may be convinced to stop or get trapped maliciously by adversary action.</p> - <p>While the United States is competing from a point of relative strength when it comes to military-to-military engagement, the reverse may be true with respect to policing and citizen security efforts. Insecurity is the single greatest security threat most LAC governments face today, meaning that without a credible plan for citizen security assistance, the United States risks ceding this critical front entirely to China in its efforts to engage regional police forces. Accordingly, U.S. law enforcement agencies, as well as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, have an important role to play in articulating a counternarrative to China’s when it comes to citizen security.</p> +<p>This said, the ability for real-world adversarial attacks to be successful is limited. The complexity of defeating multiple sensors in the physical world outside a research environment is a significant barrier, and may simply make such attacks uneconomical. Some of the ability to counter adversary activity will be built into systems by developers. However, military users who are alive to the threat will be better able to manage it, which raises the importance of awareness and understanding, discussed in the next section.</p> - <p>One key weakness of the United States in the citizen security space is its lack of a comprehensive menu of options. When partner governments request assistance, such as when the Guillermo Lasso administration called out for a “Plan Ecuador” to address rising levels of violence and criminal activity, the United States often struggles to put together an effective package in response. The Department of State can lead an assessment of previous U.S. overseas security assistance programs, including efforts such as Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative. Identifying best practices and areas from improvement should subsequently inform U.S. planning for new citizen security partnerships. Understanding the types of assistance and their relative advantages and weaknesses is essential for the United States to be able to effectively deploy its resources to help partner governments. However, U.S. law enforcement and security assistance budgets have not kept pace with the needs of the region, meaning that ultimately Congress will need to appropriate additional resources to fully correct this mismatch.</p> +<h4 id="force-design">Force Design</h4> - <p>The United States should also seek to bring delegations from its own local police forces, such as from New York and Los Angeles, to the region to share their experience on data protection in police work. These departments employ sophisticated surveillance technologies, including thousands of security cameras, in their police work. Bringing them into contact with their counterparts in LAC represents one way to promote frameworks for responsible use of surveillance technology.</p> +<p>Force structures will look different as UGS become more prevalent. Maintaining the same force structure and simply adding UGS on top will not maximise advantage. One frequent claim is that robots will replace soldiers in some cases. However, it is unlikely that this will be a zero-sum relationship, in which more robots can lead to forces having fewer soldiers. The British Army is experimenting with how force structures might change via its Experimentation and Trials Group, and initiatives such as the Phalanx platoon, which has reimagined the traditional platoon structure for when more uncrewed assets are integrated. In the near to mid-term, a rebalancing of forces into support functions may be required, as the example below demonstrates.</p> - <p>Another particularly impactful development would be the establishment of a new International Law Enforcement Academy in the Caribbean region, where China has made significant inroads in the field of police and citizen security efforts. Given the important role of the armed forces in many LAC countries for countering transnational organized crime, SOUTHCOM has a role to play in ensuring healthy civil-military relations as well as best practices for armed forces which engage in domestic peace and security missions.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="force-design-lessons-from-uas"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Force Design Lessons from UAS</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Even backed by strong political will and resource-backed commitments, countering China’s forays in the security and defense space represents just one facet of the grand strategy the United States needs to address China’s growing influence in LAC. Nevertheless, a revitalized, multifaceted, and forward-looking U.S. approach to defense and security in the Western Hemisphere promises to pay dividends not only in the context of strategic competition but in meeting shared challenges together with allies and partners in the region.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">One must look at the whole uncrewed ecosystem to see the interdependencies and how an army with many uncrewed systems might look. The best real examples today involve UAS, as the more mature capability. The British Army’s Watchkeeper is a fixed-wing surveillance UAS. It measures six by ten metres and weighs 450 kg, requiring a runway to operate. It operates on a line of sight data link with an endurance of around 14 hours and a range of 150 km. While it has no pilot inside the aircraft, the personnel and logistic tail is significant. The aircraft is operated by two pilots in a ground control station, with a third required at times. A nuance here is that military pilots can only have an eight-hour duty period, which includes flight planning. Given this, for Watchkeeper to be used at full capacity, two or even three sets of pilots are required. Watchkeeper does not have the ability to taxi and does not have ground brakes, as a weight saving measure, increasing endurance. To this end, it employs a groundcrew of seven to ten people, depending on experience levels and instructor requirements. The groundcrew tow the aircraft to the take off point and run pre-take off computer scripts alongside the pilots in the ground control station. They also set up the cable system that is used to recover the aircraft on landing. Away from the runway sits an engineering detachment of around 20 people. It conducts routine maintenance on the aircraft and keeps it airworthy. It also constructs and dismantles the aircraft when it is loaded into shipping containers for transport. It is supported by two field service representatives from the aircraft’s manufacturer. These people provide technical support and a link back to industry, which can provide in-depth technical support when needed. In addition, a command and flight operations staff of between five and ten people manages the sorties and liaises with wider airfield stakeholders. It manages the risk profile of the aircraft’s flights and provides the wider support wrap to the soldiers in the detachment.</code></em></p> -<hr /> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In this case, one uncrewed system requires a wider staff of over 40 people for it to operate in a benign environment on an established operational airfield. What is more, the infrastructure required to store, transport and maintain the aircraft is a significant footprint.</code></em></p> -<p><strong>Ryan C. Berg</strong> is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also an adjunct professor at the Catholic University of America and visiting research fellow at the University of Oxford’s Changing Character of War Programme. His research focuses on U.S.-Latin America relations, authoritarian regimes, armed conflict, strategic competition, and trade and development issues. He also studies Latin America’s criminal groups and the region’s governance and security challenges.</p> +<p>While exact roles and ratios may vary, this example is indicative of the challenge of employing uncrewed systems. While such systems technically remove soldiers from a frontline task, the tail of necessary support will likely be extensive, at least in the short to medium term. For example, the key enabler for UGS is the availability of engineers to keep systems running. New technical trades focused on computer-systems engineering will be needed. Software changes rapidly, and it is likely that the burden of keeping engineers up to date with latest developments will be considerable. In turn, this will mean new courses will need to be designed, with an important question being: who would be the right authority to design such courses? These courses will then need to be run from a base, requiring accommodation, classrooms and hangars. The integration of UGS fundamentally changes the size and shape of the force using them.</p> -<p><strong>Henry Ziemer</strong> is a research associate with the Americas Program at CSIS, where he supports the program’s research agenda and coordinates event planning and outreach.</p>Ryan C. Berg and Henry ZiemerChina has long couched its engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean in primarily economic terms. However, China is becoming increasingly strident in its efforts to bolster defense and security initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.UK In N. European Security2023-10-17T12:00:00+08:002023-10-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-in-northern-european-security<p><em>This Policy Brief is to explain why the UK has chosen to explicitly prioritise the security of Northern Europe following Russia’s war in Ukraine.</em></p> +<p>This section has made it clear that humans will be the key enabler for UGS – they will move them around the battlefield, they will fix them and they will manage them, at least in the near to medium term. Thus, while it is seemingly logical to focus on technology, it is the soldier who will unlock that technology’s potential, and indeed use it as they see fit, which will be discussed in the next chapter.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="vi-how-to-make-sure-soldiers-use-them">VI. How to Make Sure Soldiers Use Them</h3> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Integrating new technologies into a force is difficult and should not be considered on a solely technical basis. Scaling the use of UGS across a land force is a deliberate organisational change programme. This chapter examines the role of experimentation, training and trust on the route to successful HMT. Actual future users of UGS, not the abstractions of experimentation, must be front and centre in these endeavours.</p> -<p>Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine was an inflection point for European security. For the UK, it prompted a “refresh” of its defence, security and foreign policy. The March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IR2023) concluded that “the most pressing national security and foreign policy priority in the short-to-medium term is to address the threat posed by Russia to European security … and denying Russia any strategic benefit from its invasion”. Underpinning this ambition, the Refresh committed the UK to “lead and galvanise where we have most value to add, giving particular priority … to the contribution we can make in northern Europe as a security actor” (p. 11).</p> +<p>It is a mistake to assume that soldiers use equipment given to them in the way intended by designers. One trial saw soldiers continually overload a UGS, as its capacity was not enough for their needs. This led to the system overheating. At the other end of the scale, it should not be assumed that soldiers will use UGS at all. A host of factors interact to determine how soldiers use the kit they are issued. These might include previous experience, who trained them and when they were trained. One example here is personal load-carrying equipment. The British Army brought in a new type of body armour and load-carrying equipment – Virtus. However, many soldiers opted to keep using their old equipment, as it better suited their purposes. They could carry all their equipment, they knew where everything went, and it had worked so far in their career.</p> -<p>The purpose of this Policy Brief is to explain why the UK has chosen to explicitly prioritise the security of Northern Europe following Russia’s war against Ukraine. It identifies exactly where the UK is best placed to lead and galvanise to address the current and likely future Russian threat. There is no common definition of “Northern Europe” among Allies, so the Brief defines the region collectively as the sub-regions of the Arctic, the North Atlantic, the High North and the Baltic Sea region, extending to Estonia – the location of the UK-led NATO multinational battlegroup.</p> +<h4 id="experimentation">Experimentation</h4> -<p>The explicit prioritisation of Northern Europe is a natural evolution of UK policy, and the increased investment in the region addresses both immediate security requirements – the acute Russian threat – and future ones, as rapidly melting ice in the Arctic creates viable sea lines of communication directly linking the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific – priority one and two geographic “strategic arenas” (pp. 3, 9) for the UK respectively. Given this, Northern Europe is a “transitional theatre” for the UK, where enhanced engagement now can produce value and strategic advantage for the UK – and its allies – in the future.</p> +<p>Experimentation is important for understanding the utility of new capability. New technologies are generally examined and researched for a broad use case. Then they will be handed over to troops for a pilot programme, before potentially being rolled out more widely. For all the talk of the importance of such technology in future warfighting, there is little evidence that forces have started to integrate UGS on a regular and even basis. Many soldiers are not being exposed to uncrewed technologies, even if forces may think they are. UGS integration is vulnerable to becoming stuck in an experimental purgatory, on a small scale that disenfranchises the rest of the force. An order from the Dutch Army Command to a single officer was to “just get started and explore the possibilities” of RAS. While an admirable aspiration, this is too tentative. Experimentation often takes place with a limited audience for practical reasons of scale. However, this small scale can have a deleterious effect on the success of the experiment. US Major General James Dubik refers to this increase in scale as “expanding the experimental ground”. Simulation may offer one route to democratising the experimentation process. Bohemia Interactive’s “virtual battlespace” simulation software, in use with the British military, has integrated several of the UGS discussed in this paper, for example the THeMIS. Terminals are widely available throughout the British defence estate and accessible to troops, should they be given the time to make use of them. With simulation, there is less reliance on access to physical systems, of which there are not many. Simulations allow soldiers to test approaches and witness the strengths and weaknesses of the UGS outlined above, confirming appropriate use cases. It is, however, difficult to say yet how this will impact the integration of UGS into the force, or actual future use.</p> -<p>The UK offers unique value to Northern Europe as a security actor for three principal reasons. First, the UK, as a regional geopolitical heavyweight, acts as a substantial backstop to the US presence and engagement. Second, the UK provides specialist military capabilities, spanning warfighting and sub-threshold, such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and other sub-sea capabilities that are in short supply in Europe and best match the Russian threat. Third, the geostrategic position of the British homeland – within the North Atlantic – is critical to the successful execution of NATO’s new regional defence plan for “the Atlantic and European Arctic” and “the Baltic and Central Europe”, alongside its transatlantic reinforcement plan. With growing and ambitious security commitments to Northern Europe, the UK is sending a strong message of reassurance to Allies and a strong signal of deterrence to Russia, and to China as a “near-Arctic state”, in the context of a growing partnership between the two powers in the Arctic.</p> +<p>Another difficulty in experimentation and novel procurement is the military’s propensity to replace like with like. As a result of this propensity, force structures look very similar to how they did 50 years ago. There is difficulty in identifying truly disruptive innovations because they do not look like what the organisation is currently doing. This limits organisations’ openness to the truly disruptive potential of UGS. Indeed, the discussion above itself adds UGS to existing structures, techniques and tactics. It may be the case that using entirely novel tactics may be the way to gain competitive advantage. This is where extensive experimentation with many members of the force should be considered. Giving soldiers the freedom to troubleshoot and use the system without preordained norms may lead to unexpected and beneficial findings.</p> -<p>The research for this Brief is drawn from two main sources. First, a review of UK government and NATO policy documents, including the 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper alongside their 2023 updates, and the UK’s Arctic and High North policies. Second, four expert-led roundtable discussions held between April 2022 and June 2023 and attended by Norwegian, UK and US officials and academics, in London, Oslo and Washington, DC. It is augmented with analysis of official government announcements, research papers and media reporting. This Policy Brief is part of a two-year transatlantic security dialogue in collaboration between RUSI, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The project is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and focuses on the Norwegian, UK and US roles in securing Northern Europe.</p> +<p>Timelines for the introduction of UGS into land forces are tentative. The British Army’s RAS strategy uses horizons stretching out to 2035 for the integration of RAS, despite them having been part of force structures for decades already. Making use of corporate knowledge developed in the UAS world can help ease the frictions of integrating UGS. The US military’s timeline is more assured, but progress towards its ambitions is uncertain. The Project Convergence series of experiments led by the US hopes to merge capabilities between partner nations in the pursuit of effective integration and increased lethality.</p> -<h3 id="why-is-the-uk-prioritising-northern-europe">Why is the UK Prioritising Northern Europe?</h3> +<p>Lethargy is common in military decision-making, and it is important that UGS do not fall into the trap that so often ensnares military procurement. The phenomenon whereby innovative technologies receive government funding but fail to make it into the hands of warfighters is known as the “Valley of Death”. Indeed, it appears that with AI being perceived as a potential silver bullet for many military issues, and RAS and UGS being the physical embodiment of that technology, militaries are having to hedge and spread their bets over a wide variety of initiatives. For example, the UK’s Defence and Security Accelerator has awarded more than £180 million to 1,065 different projects, an average of just £169,000 per serial. This is slightly less than the annual capitation rate of a single software engineer with the professional background and resources to develop this technology meaningfully. Increasing focus on those capabilities that show potential for the use cases described above is a potential route to success. Signalling commitment to the cause and allowing industry to plan accordingly is a key output of any RAS and UGS strategy. Indeed, the extended period of experimentation seen so far that has not led to serious expansion may in fact signal to industry to disinvest from research and development of UGS.</p> -<p>The explicit prioritisation of Northern European security is an evolution of UK policy over the past decade. The Arctic, and the High North in particular, have become central to UK strategic thinking, and they are the only regions to receive specific policy documents. UK objectives in the region are a blend of hard and soft security issues, majoring on: the protection of UK and Allied critical national infrastructure (CNI); reinforcing the rules-based international order and enforcing freedom of navigation; and managing climate change (pp. 10, 11). Central to the UK approach has been a similar security policy outlook and working with likeminded Allies and partners, in particular Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) members, on Euro-Atlantic security challenges, the utility of military force and the pervasive Russian threat. Indeed, UK engagement has increased significantly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; multilaterally through NATO, and minilaterally through the JEF and the Northern Group of Defence Ministers. These engagements are underpinned by bilateral and trilateral agreements, including most significantly the strong mutual security guarantees offered to both Finland and Sweden during the NATO membership process. The UK is also heavily reliant on the region for energy, with Norway being the UK’s primary gas supplier.</p> +<p>The buy-in of top-level leadership is also crucial to successfully instigating change in an organisation. In the case of military experimentation, there can be a propensity for general officers to only attend “distinguished visitors’ days”, which are designed specifically for show, providing an element of innovation theatre. These sessions involve orchestrated demonstrations to show best-case scenarios. They also often take place at the end of an exercise period, in which frictions and realities have been found and then solved or worked around. Multiple rehearsals take place and minute details are agreed on by the deliverers. Such opportunities give industry representatives access to senior officers, and will often be identified as a career-enhancing event for the organisers. This can lead to true frictions being masked, and often means that the generals who hold authority for novel equipment programmes do not have an accurate and holistic picture of the state of play. Moreover, the tendency of armed forces personnel to move roles every two to three years means that only a general, rather than deep, level of understanding can be achieved. In a fast-moving technological environment, this is inimical to progress.</p> -<p>The acute Russian threat in Northern Europe binds Allies together. Despite Russia severely weakening and fixing a large portion of its land forces in Ukraine, the country’s naval capabilities remain largely intact, through its Northern Fleet, including strategic nuclear forces, and its Baltic Fleet – notwithstanding heavy losses (p. 6) for two Russian Arctic brigades. Russia also intends to militarily reinforce the region in response to NATO enlargement. This short-term conventional military weakness is likely to push Russia to rely more heavily on hybrid activity and nuclear signalling to achieve its objectives, which may become a potential source of conflict escalation, and which feature heavily in its 2022 Maritime Doctrine. Furthermore, some European intelligence agencies, such as the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, assess that Russia could still exert “credible military pressure” on the Baltic states, and its military capabilities near the Estonian border could be “quantitatively reconstituted in up to four years” (p. 11).</p> +<h4 id="trust">Trust</h4> -<p>As NATO orientates its new defence posture to defend “every inch” (p. 6) of NATO territory, the UK is galvanising its northern flank into the most secure Alliance region, a region that is continually the target of Russian hybrid aggression and exposed to persistent conventional and nuclear threat. The rationale for the UK’s strategic focus in the region and how this is perceived by the regional actors has been summarised thus:</p> +<p>A significant barrier to successful integration of UGS is trust. The desired human–technology relationship is often framed in terms of trust. This suggests there will always be some level of uncertainty about the workings of such systems, including UGS with some degree of autonomous function. Definitions of trust are numerous, and it is not feasible to give a full review of definitions here. One usable and well-cited definition of trust is, “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”. To get their full utility, soldiers must embrace these systems and trust them to complete a task. Another conception is that trust in AI-related technology is a contractual one. A system can be considered trustworthy if it can maintain the contract made with a human operator. That is, the system will carry out the given task.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given that the United Kingdom shares historical, cultural, and geopolitical ties with the Nordic countries, the UK would benefit from having all Nordic countries within NATO. As relatively small countries, the Nordics would certainly benefit from the UK’s support, especially related to logistics, intelligence sharing, and the security provided by the nuclear umbrella. If combined with the UK’s capabilities and focus, this unified North would outrank any other European force structure and would help secure both the Eastern and Northern Flank of NATO.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Computer models that allow some level of autonomous activity are necessarily complex. There is a lack of transparency in many machine learning and AI models. When working with another soldier, it is possible to ask them why they made a decision, and person-to-person interaction is a norm with which all are familiar. This becomes more difficult with a “black box” scenario, where the decision-making process is opaque and not fully understood by the user. Trust is built slowly, but lost rapidly in the face of failure. Unless a system is fully explicable, a sceptical soldier is unable to query UGS as to why they want to act or have acted in a particular way. The military has many examples where lack of trust would cause a breakdown in operational effectiveness. The most obvious is a targeting system where a machine alerts a human operator to the potential presence of the enemy. Scepticism rather than over-trusting here is preferable, where a soldier checks the information before potentially suggesting an engagement through appropriate means. A more nuanced example would be the willingness of soldiers to load injured comrades on to UGS tasked with moving the casualties back to an aid post or hospital. The soldiers may think they could get there faster, and they might well be right. One study showed soldiers opting to manually control a UGV rather than trusting it to follow waypoints or a leader.</p> -<p>The UK is the European power best placed to lead and galvanise NATO’s northern flank and support the full integration of Finland (and Sweden) into the Alliance, both through providing strategic depth and its capabilities (military, non-military and command enablers), and through its significant defence and security engagement in the region.</p> +<p>Many studies of autonomous systems are focused on the ethics and practice of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Moreover, this discussion is often happening between civilian commentators. There has been much less research on the importance of various design features to active-duty service people. One study found a direct friction between maintaining meaningful control and understanding on the one hand, and maintaining the increased operational tempo that uncrewed and autonomous systems are hoped to unlock, on the other. Soldiers need to be able to rapidly verify a system’s suggestions and decisions without having to work through the entire evidence body, which would render the system moot. To that end, Jai Galliott and Austin Wyatt suggest that confidence measures in observations by UGS should be accessible to soldiers. Such measures would not be infallible, because of the technical reasons and potential for adversarial action discussed above. Therefore, a secondary suggestion by respondents to the study cited above was for systems to have a means of both simply describing their planned actions and of confirming that UGS have “understood” their operator’s commands. It would be worthwhile to consult a wide user base on this issue, rather than only people who happen to be in small experimental units, which may be more by luck than judgement.</p> -<h3 id="the-uk-as-a-backstop-for-us-engagement-and-presence-in-northern-europe">The UK as a Backstop for US Engagement and Presence in Northern Europe</h3> +<p>Equally, there is a fear of over-trust. Overestimating the ability of UGS will lead equally to an inefficient allocation of resources. This makes the process of integration and education throughout the force all the more important. Trust in automated systems has led to accidents in both conflict situations and commercial aviation. In Kuwait in 2003, a US Patriot detachment shot down a British Tornado, killing both pilots. The Patriot crew had acted on indicators given by the system’s computer. The best way to build trust is to develop understanding, which is the subject of the next section.</p> -<p>The US is the indispensable security partner for Northern Europe, a region that has a strongly transatlantic outlook. For Nordic states, and to a lesser extent Baltic states, strategic depth is secured primarily through NATO and the Article 5 security guarantee, and augmented by bilateral and trilateral agreements that bind the US to the region. For example, Norway’s defence relies on a denial ambition until Allied (US) reinforcements are in position. Moreover, Norway’s role as a reception, staging and onward integration location for US reinforcements will become more important as Finland, and soon Sweden, joins the Alliance. Indeed, the inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO defensive plans will provide increased strategic depth, especially with the scale of forces that Finland can mobilise at short notice, but Nordic defence will remain heavily reliant on follow-on forces from the US. Therefore, the fundamental risk that security actors in Northern Europe must manage is the possible reduction of attention and corresponding drawdown in US assets to redeploy to the Indo-Pacific as US security concerns there grow, especially if the war in Ukraine ends on terms that benefit NATO, or a US president less sympathetic to European security is elected in 2024. This possibility is a strategic risk for Northern Europe, not only in terms of overall mass in the form of combat-capable brigades, but also in terms of specialist capabilities such as ISR. In the short term, the UK is the only European country realistically able to support Europe’s “ISR gap” in Northern Europe, and it is unlikely to contribute more brigades to NATO’s New Force Model for the remainder of the decade.</p> +<h4 id="socialisation">Socialisation</h4> -<p>As a major regional power, the UK’s engagement and capabilities are best able to mitigate any potential US shortfall and provide enhanced strategic depth. US Arctic priorities are motivated by strategic competition, whereas the Nordic states prioritise defence and deterrence against Russia. The UK is positioned on a scale between the two, and can play an important role in bridging between them. Specifically, the UK is best placed to lead in two areas, both of which already enjoy high levels of cooperation with the US, providing critical continuity.</p> +<p>As UGS proliferate, it is important for as many soldiers as possible to be exposed to them early in a safe manner. This is crucial to building the trust that is a precursor to success in HMT. Familiarity breeds trust, but military forces are poor at introducing soldiers to capabilities that are not their core system. Familiarity can also build favourability, whereby soldiers and commanders are willing to lean on these capabilities when planning operations. Such favourability is not a given. The more that soldiers are exposed to UGS, in whatever guise, the better they will understand them and the more likely they are to become ambassadors. As noted above, building trust is crucial to the full integration of UGS. Importantly, it is recognised that trust will not be developed solely by developers improving software outcomes over time. Instead, most gaps in trust “won’t be solved by code but by conversation”.</p> -<p>First, NATO considers Russia’s ability to disrupt Atlantic reinforcement in the High North a “strategic challenge” (p. 4). The UK has traditionally secured the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap with ASW capabilities and, more recently, through the UK–US–Norway trilateral interoperability (p. 21) of the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), which increases availability of a critical ISR capability and allows it to operate further north. The ability to operate further north is a growing requirement, as Russia has refitted multiple vessels with the 3M-54 Kalibr missile, which gives a longer range to precision strike operations, allowing Russian assets to enjoy better protection of its Arctic and High North defensive bastions, in turn drawing NATO assets further north. To meet this challenge, Norway is hosting NATO submarines (p. 22), mainly from the UK and the US, in new Norwegian facilities to enable operations to push further north to match Russia’s reach. Moreover, the UK has established a land and littoral presence in the High North, now operating from a new facility in Norway called Camp Viking. With a multi-domain presence and specialist capabilities, including logistic and intelligence enablers, the UK is the best placed European nation to secure end-to-end transatlantic reinforcements from the US to NATO’s eastern front, thereby delivering strategic depth.</p> +<p>This conversation might take place in several ways. The crucial step is to safely move UGS from being only in the hands of experimenters into those areas which see a large throughput of troops. These are most likely to be training establishments, both for initial training and for later tactical training. The first way is during military training and education. If military forces are not including modules on UGS in basic training, they should do so immediately. This might be as simple as a classroom discussion or presentation. Better still would be a physical demonstration using UGS. This could be a short session where a UGS’ capability is demonstrated to soldiers under training. The seemingly small act of having a trainee lie on a stretcher mounted to a UGS and travel a short distance would have manifest training benefits. As mentioned above, there is also an opportunity for simulation to play a role in widening the population of troops with exposure to UGS.</p> -<p>Second, the UK can lead on re-establishing and maintaining strategic stability, consistent with “a new long-term goal to manage the risks of miscalculation and escalation between major powers, upholding strategic stability through strategic-level dialogue and an updated approach to arms control and counter-proliferation” (p. 13). The UK, as a European nuclear power, will be a valuable actor in the region, which also hosts Russian strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, the UK is well placed to support Finland and Sweden as they join a nuclear alliance and, for the first time, have a direct role in nuclear policy and planning, by providing a greater understanding of deterrence, risk reduction and arms control.</p> +<p>The second area for consideration would be training areas and firing ranges. Large numbers of troops who have gone through basic training pass through these facilities each year. Forces undergoing range work could integrate a serial using a UGS. This could include UGS with a remote weapon system providing overhead fire, a task currently done by soldiers. This would build trust and understanding and increase the audience exposed to such systems. Equally, many range serials involve a simulated casualty evacuation. A “casualty” will be designated by the training staff, and the soldiers will have to give first aid and use a stretcher to evacuate the soldier to a safe area. An uncrewed ground system with a stretcher could be in place on the range and used to show its utility and allow soldiers to interact with novel systems. Pitting a human team against an uncrewed ground system would begin to show soldiers and commanders where and how UGS can be most usefully employed – they do not necessarily need to learn this from an instructional leaflet produced by a faraway department. Instead, troops would be enfranchised by direct experience. These activities would also create additional data for the manufacturer about usage and failure rates.</p> -<h3 id="galvanising-nato-command-and-control">Galvanising NATO Command and Control</h3> +<h4 id="siloes">Siloes</h4> -<p>Finland, and eventually Sweden, joining NATO fundamentally changes defence and security policy in Northern Europe. Finland’s membership has already doubled the NATO border with Russia, and the inclusion of Sweden will expand the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s land area of operations by more than 866,000 km2. While this obviously presents significant opportunities for NATO, there are also considerable challenges. The UK has an interest in being a security “integrator” in the region by supporting its newest members and building coherence between Nordic and Baltic regional plans and Alliance command and control (C2). Here there is a significant opportunity for the UK to lead and galvanise and make a major contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.</p> +<p>State defence enterprises are large organisations. They consist of tens of thousands or more personnel. There are central departments or ministries and single services, as well as research laboratories such as the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency. Both the US and the UK have directorates dedicated to scanning the future and identifying concepts and capabilities that might be brought into forces. UGS are such a capability. It is not uncommon for people within defence ministries or the single services to not be aware of complementary activity that is taking place elsewhere within the organisation. This is a significant friction, and it prevents progress. In the UK, for example, DSTL, the Ministry of Defence Head Office and the Army Futures Directorate, which owns the HMT programme, all explore UGS. In addition, commercially, Defence Equipment and Support leads the procurement and delivery of UGS into the force. There is also the Experimentation and Trials Group, which leads experimentation with UGS. Moreover, there is a series of defence technology accelerators and innovation hubs. This list does not take into account the bulk of Army personnel who will become the users of UGS. These people should be the focus of UGS implementation. Within this large cohort, there will be a mixture of experience, aptitude and interest in UGS. If this community could be successfully tapped and exploited, there would be significant additional capacity to enhance the integration of UGS into land forces.</p> -<p>The enlargement creates NATO C2 headaches for Northern Europe, as does the timing gap between the two countries joining. Finland has joined under the command of Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum, alongside the Baltic states, Poland and Germany. However, Norway (and likely Sweden when it joins) falls under JFC Norfolk in the US, which is responsible for the North Atlantic, including the Arctic. This arrangement (p. 14) creates C2 incoherence between the “European Arctic and Atlantic” and “Baltic and Central Europe” defence plans, which will make their execution more difficult and create potential friction precisely when the Nordic states are finally united in NATO, and it could set back growing defence integration efforts between them. Integrating NATO’s regional plans and Nordic–Baltic security policy more broadly will be critical to their delivery. Specifically, better integrating Finland and Estonia would best serve this purpose, securing the Baltic Sea and containing Russia and denying it freedom of manoeuvre in wartime between St Petersburg and access to the Baltic Sea and Kaliningrad.</p> +<p>With such a wide breadth of activity, it is difficult to know who, if anyone, fully understands the totality of UGS research and development. Equally, within forces themselves, understanding of other units’ capabilities is often not well understood even when they are well established. Formations regularly organise briefing days so that staff can be informed of what is available to them during planning. Internal communications on this subject should be a central effort, to ensure coherence and a clear path to actual use, rather than a succession of experiments that remain in the trials arena.</p> -<p>UK engagement and interests straddle the Nordic and Baltic states through the JEF, the Northern Group of Defence Ministers, and close bilateral security cooperation with both Finland and Estonia – the latter being the location of the UK-led NATO multinational battlegroup. The July 2023 Defence Command Paper Refresh stated:</p> +<p>Experimentation is important, but it should not be limited to small numbers of soldiers. Instead, exposure should be wide and varied to make use of the diversity of thought and talent available. The building of trust in robotic systems must be deliberate, through exposure early on in careers and regular, good-quality education. There must be a concerted effort to break down siloes in defence establishments so that best practice and knowledge can be better shared. The common theme is giving primacy to the future users of these systems as quickly as possible and at scale.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As the Alliance looks to welcome in two new members, the UK will also lead the collaboration amongst Allies to shape a revised Control and Command structure, with a specific focus on Northern Europe – the regional area of greatest importance to our homeland defence (p. 62).</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="vii-recommendations-for-ugs-integration">VII. Recommendations for UGS Integration</h3> -<p>As an established European framework nation, the UK – known for its C2 ability, structures and maturity – would be well placed to manage Finland and Swedish integration and C2 coherence in Northern Europe. During the Cold War, the UK was a C2 enabler for NATO, emphasising strengths in the naval and air domains, through Allied Forces Northern Europe and UK Command through Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe. Today, the UK hosts both NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) and JEF C2 through Standing Joint Force Headquarters, which, since the Russian invasion, has deployed nodes and liaison officers across Northern Europe.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Role and management:</strong> Due to current technical limitations, UGS should be employed in standoff roles and in rear areas, where there is a dividend for their use. Treating larger UGS like aircraft whose support can be bid for will allow supply and demand to be managed, as well as keeping UGS from burdening low-level formations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Force design:</strong> The extra demand UGS will place on engineers and enablers (the invisible tail) needs to be baked into force planning now. The management of UGS may, in fact, require more soldiers.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Logistic burden:</strong> The transport and storage of UGS, and battery management, must be planned for in detail, accepting that it cannot simply be added on to existing commitments, which would further stretch scarce resource. This will ensure the force-wide implications of new technology are catered for adequately.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Education:</strong> Education and training related to UGS should be implemented now, while experimentation is ongoing, rather than waiting until systems are formally brought into service. Basic training should include education on UGS now, even in a basic form, to begin to build trust and familiarity, easing the integration of UGS at scale.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Experimentation:</strong> UGS trials should be integrated into those areas with a significant throughput of soldiers, such as firing ranges. Moreover, it should be ensured that the totality of UGS experimentation and activity is understood by decision-makers and those conducting the experimentation, and that leaders maintain engagement with projects throughout the life cycle, rather than at the beginning and end. Clear ownership of the whole ecosystem is vital, while encouraging bottom-up engagement will create a user base ready to make best use of UGS.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<h3 id="uk-leadership-of-the-jef">UK Leadership of the JEF</h3> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>The JEF has developed into a key mechanism for the UK to provide leadership in Northern Europe and galvanise the Nordic and Baltic states together to optimise defence and deterrence against Russia. In 2022, the JEF came of age. The first-ever JEF leaders’ meeting was held the day after Russia’s invasion, followed by two more during the year, which included a commitment to developing a 10-year vision ahead of the 2023 leaders’ summit.</p> +<p>This paper has discussed UGS and the considerations for successfully integrating these systems into military forces. It has described the physical and software components of such systems, and how they are anticipated to be used by military forces in the near and further future. Having established the state of the art, the paper discussed three questions.</p> -<p>The September 2022 attacks on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea brought into sharper focus the security requirement to better protect CNI, and highlighted the risk of attacks specifically to undersea assets. This was reinforced by the October 2023 damage to the Balticconnector natural gas pipeline and communications cable between Finland and Estonia likely caused by “external activity”. This is an area where the Russian threat is acute. NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, David Cattler, has warned of an increase in Russian submarine and underwater activity, including “actively mapping allied critical infrastructure both on land and on the seabed”.</p> +<p>First, how will UGS be used once they have been deployed? Systems with high levels of autonomous capability remain rare. Thus, most systems are remotely controlled or teleoperated from a distance. Potential benefits abound, such as enabling soldiers to stay out of harm’s way, and increasing the envelope over which they have sight and potentially control. UGS are not ready to manoeuvre in close combat, their movement is limited by the sheer number of variables, and humans retain the upper hand by some way. Equally, full autonomous navigation is possible, but systems move so slowly as to be potentially deleterious to their main functions, such as load carriage for manoeuvre troops.</p> -<p>To respond, the JEF will focus activity on countering hybrid aggression in its area of operations of the North Atlantic, High North and Baltic, especially in relation to the protection of CNI, including underwater cables and pipelines. Here, the UK provides leadership, through committing to protect Allied CNI, alongside upholding freedom of navigation and international norms in the region. Immediately following the Nord Stream attacks, the UK announced that two Multirole Ocean Surveillance ships would be sped into service. This capability, alongside Astute-class submarines, mine-countermeasure vessels and RAF MPA, will be critical to protecting underwater CNI. Moreover, MARCOM hosts NATO’s new Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, and the UK has signed new bilateral agreements such as the UK–Norway strategic partnership on undersea threats. The UK, as a regional geopolitical heavyweight, is ideally situated to engage with the JEF collectively and individually; to link its agenda to other key regional actors, such as France, Germany and Poland; and to develop greater JEF coherence between the myriad of security institutions in Northern Europe, including NATO, the EU, the Northern Group of Defence Ministers, Nordic Defence Cooperation and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable.</p> +<p>Second, how will UGS get to, and stay in, the fight? Some UGS can be carried by soldiers, while others will need to be towed or transported to where they are needed. They will also then require collecting and moving onward to repair and maintenance before further use. A secondary effect of this is that UGS will have a significant logistic tail, at least in the short to medium term. This will lead to an increase in human enablers supporting UGS.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-the-uk-orients-to-future-challenges-in-northern-europe">Conclusion: The UK Orients to Future Challenges in Northern Europe</h3> +<p>Third, how can soldiers be encouraged to make proper use of UGS? It is not a given that soldiers will adopt systems in the way originally envisaged by their designers, or even by military procurement officers and decision-makers. Familiarisation is key to building trust. If soldiers believe they can do a particular job better, they will follow that route. Given this, it is also important not to force the integration of UGS that do not add value to the HMT. Integrating UGS into basic training and those areas with a high throughput of soldiers will rapidly help socialise the use of UGS.</p> -<p>The explicit prioritisation of Northern Europe addresses both immediate UK security requirements – defence and deterrence against Russia – and future challenges – China’s increasing presence in the Arctic and High North as a “near-Arctic state”, and growing Sino-Russian cooperation. The IR2023 declared that the prosperity and security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific were “inextricably linked”, upgraded China as an “epoch-defining challenge”, and cemented the Indo-Pacific “tilt” as a permanent pillar of UK foreign policy (pp. 9, 3, 22). A rapidly heating Arctic climate will make the Northern Sea Route increasingly navigable during the summer and the Transpolar Sea Route will likely be usable by 2050 (p. 36). This transformational geopolitical change will directly link the UK’s two priority geographic “strategic arenas” – politically, economically and militarily – which will fundamentally impact UK and Euro-Atlantic security. Given this, NATO may have not only to contend with Russia, but also with a more assertive Chinese presence in the Arctic and High North. Therefore, heavily investing in Northern Europe now will enhance UK strategic advantage, reassure Allies and deter future threats.</p> +<p>All these themes are interlinked and there are dependencies between them all. They must be considered by planners who have a firm view of the totality of the enterprise. Moving from experimentation to a capability integrated into field forces is no mean feat, and requires energy and direction from senior leadership. Somewhat ironically, it appears that the most sensible approach when considering the integration of uncrewed systems is to focus on the human.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Ed Arnold</strong> is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on the transformation of European security following Russia’s war on Ukraine. Specifically, he covers the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the security of northern Europe, and the UK contribution to European security through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force, and other fora. Ed has a particular interest in UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Reviews.</p>Ed ArnoldThis Policy Brief is to explain why the UK has chosen to explicitly prioritise the security of Northern Europe following Russia’s war in Ukraine. \ No newline at end of file +<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Patrick HintonMilitary experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) is happening apace. Bomb disposal robots have been in service with armed forces for decades. Now, systems with greater capabilities and autonomy are being developed and tested. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2023-12-21-euro-sifmanet-tbilisi-report.html b/hkers/2023-12-21-euro-sifmanet-tbilisi-report.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e5c1dac1 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2023-12-21-euro-sifmanet-tbilisi-report.html @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ + + + + + + + + + + Euro SIFMANet Tbilisi Report · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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Euro SIFMANet Tbilisi Report

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European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Tbilisi Report

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Tom Keatinge and Gonzalo Saiz | 2023.12.21

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Discussions revealed the particular challenges that Georgia faces in implementing sanctions against Russia – and how its partners can help.

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Georgia, as a country which borders Russia and has ambitions to join the EU, is in a difficult geopolitical situation. The raft of sanctions that the EU and allies have imposed on Russia therefore raises serious questions for Tbilisi.

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As an EU candidate country, Georgia is expected to align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes the numerous restrictive measures imposed on Russia. However, with 20% of its territory – Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region or South Ossetia – under Russian occupation, Georgia faces the challenge of striking a balance. On the one hand, it has sympathy and solidarity with Ukraine given the Russian occupation. On the other, it wants to avoid actions that lead to further Russian aggression against Georgia.

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In November 2023, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI, in collaboration with the Regional Institute of Security Studies (RISS), hosted a series of roundtable discussions in Tbilisi with Georgian authorities and representatives from the private sector and civil society. The aim of these discussions was to obtain insights into Georgia’s position on the international sanctions against Russia and the current Georgian efforts, within their national jurisdiction, to prevent circumvention and evasion. This engagement is part of the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.

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Georgia’s Approach to Financial Sanctions Against Russia

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On 25 February 2022, the government of Georgia announced its decision not to implement international sanctions against Russia. However, in reality, Tbilisi’s approach to sanctions is far more complex. Alignment with the EU’s CFSP is important for Georgia’s EU candidacy status and the country’s connections to global markets and correspondent banking relations effectively mandate compliance with these restrictions. Under these conditions, without the introduction of any new laws in Georgia, the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) instructed the country’s financial sector to comply with the sanctions imposed by the US, the EU and the UK. To support compliance in the sector, the NBG has a dedicated anti-money laundering (AML) department that is liaising with banks on sanctions and conducts inspections in relation to sanctions against Russia.

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A representative from the NBG highlighted that businesses in Georgia have boosted their resources dedicated to sanctions and are increasingly adopting programmes to check and identify sanctions issues. The NBG representative noted that they are aware of the complex rules and licences related to the monitoring of goods and services under restrictions, as well the cost of compliance for the private sector. Although businesses seek support from the NBG, Georgia’s central bank faces the challenge of responding to questions about foreign sanctions regimes over which it has no control, and no insight beyond what is on the relevant sanctions coalition websites. For this reason, the NBG intends to guide the private sector in the right direction but informs financial institutions that they must assess their own risks.

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A representative from Georgia’s Banking Association expressed its satisfaction with the performance of the banking sector on sanctions, due to the effectiveness of AML and sanctions procedures that the industry has in place. However, the participant noted that several banks operating in Georgia are part of regional banking groups in countries that are not implementing sanctions, such as Turkey, Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan. This creates risk. The Banking Association representative added that the services of VISA and Mastercard credit cards of Russian banks in Georgia had been suspended to comply with international sanctions.

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A representative from the Bank of Georgia (BOG) also described its limited risk appetite for customers from Russia and transactions related to the country – these are now subject to enhanced due diligence procedures. The BOG, one of the main banks in Georgia with 2.5 million customers, is listed on the London Stock Exchange, so it is under the supervision of the UK Financial Conduct Authority and therefore is required to comply with UK (and wider international) sanctions against Russia. The BOG currently has two co-directors – one for general financial crime issues and another oversees the sanctions programmes – in its compliance department, as well as 80 employees in the “second line of defence”.

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Against this background, the number of suspicious transaction reports in Georgia has increased. Participants explained that the financial sector has expanded its criteria of high-risk activities to include: international transactions; transactions in US dollars; high-net-worth individuals; and jurisdictions under suspicion of facilitating sanctions evasion, among others. Georgia has taken significant steps to mitigate risks of breaching international sanctions, for example, the Tbilisi City Hall terminated the almost $50 million-contract for 44 subway cars for the Tbilisi Metro, that was agreed with the EU-sanctioned Russian company Metrovagonmash. However, private sector representatives noted that while businesses will not trade with a company that raises clear red flags, the emerging challenge is around companies that pose “yellow flags”. To ensure compliance in Georgia, correspondent banks now ask Georgian banks about their transaction monitoring systems, their automated alerts systems, the percentage of false alerts generated, the number of transactions rejected, and the resources allocated to effectively check these procedures.

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When Sanctions Come Home: The Case of Otar Partskhaladze

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As many participants in the workshops noted, the topic of Russia sanctions is highly politicised. Nothing illustrates this more than the case of Georgian citizen, businessman and former prosecutor Otar Partskhaladze, who was sanctioned by the US in September 2023.

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Partskhaladze and two companies of which he owned a majority were sanctioned for allegedly facilitating malign Russian influence in Georgia led by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), and personally profiting from his FSB connection

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In June 2023, in line with a change in the law that had been criticised by the IMF and other experts as damaging the NBG’s independence, a new governor was appointed. Following the designation of Partskhaladze, the newly appointed governor, Natia Turnava, issued an executive order that required a local court order before the assets of a Georgian national could be frozen under international sanctions. This overturned the NBG’s previous position that banks should implement Russia sanctions.

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Among other implications of this decision, the IMF suspended its programme for Georgia over its concerns for the independence of the central bank.

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Although Georgia’s financial sector has, in effect, complied with international sanctions, trade with Russia has continued to increase. This poses numerous challenges to tackling circumvention through Georgia. The following section looks more closely at the state of trade restrictions in Georgia and the related insights provided by participants at the workshops.

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Trade Restrictions Between Georgia and Russia

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Russia is Georgia’s third-largest trade partner, with 11.1% of Georgian exports going to Russia. Georgia has clearly stated that it will not implement trade sanctions against Russia.

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Still, Georgian authorities emphasised that Georgia is one of the main partners of the EU and the US in the region. While the combined EU market is Georgia’s main trade partner, the share is gradually decreasing. Georgian businesses understand the importance of the EU market and are motivated to increase their trade relations, but they require support from the EU to promote investment in the country to support trade decoupling from Russia.

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Participants emphasised that the complexity of monitoring supply chains makes it futile for international partners to tackle circumvention unilaterally. Georgian authorities stressed the resources they are allocating to supporting international partners, prioritising the list of 45 high-priority items, and they find discussions on secondary sanctions frustrating. To facilitate compliance, authorities also highlighted their interest in obtaining consolidated sanctions lists from the international coalition, given the costs of monitoring all the lists independently.

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According to participating authorities, since the beginning, Georgia conveyed to international partners that it would support their aims of preventing circumvention. Authorities noted that half of their capacity is currently focused on sanctions implementation, identifying banned EU goods bound for Russia and the parties involved in their trade. They also noted that the closure of trade borders with the EU via the Baltic states has led to a notable displacement of trade transit through Georgia.

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One side-effect of the introduction of international sanctions on Russia is that Georgia has become a regional re-export hub for used cars from the EU and the US. Both Brussels and Washington have demanded Georgia cease this trade with Russia. In August 2023, Georgia agreed to introduce this ban on the re-export of Western cars to Russia. However, participants at the workshop explained that this action has simply created another layer in the circumvention route. Georgia remains part of the supply chain, but cars are now first transported to Kazakhstan and are likely re-exported again to Russia, despite efforts to identify the real end-user. A further complication is the export of the spare car parts, given their dual-use nature. For their export, Customs requires official letters from manufactures on where these parts are going and how they will be used.

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More broadly, participants highlighted the circumvention challenge Georgia faces as a trading partner with the Eurasian Economic Union, a mechanism that Russia is increasingly using to obfuscate the destination of trade flows.

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Georgian authorities were concerned that the focus of sanctions discussions is dominated by financial integrity, neglecting the key role played by trade integrity, particularly when considering Georgia’s geographic location. Trade integrity requires a combination of export control capacity and trade transparency, which demands good customs communication channels between exporting and importing countries and capacity to monitor the supply chains. This system depends on the reporting information provided by the private sector, but businesses do not have the capacity to identify everything related to sanctions and thus information is incomplete. This is particularly true in the non-financial sector, which participants described as notably less experienced in sanctions implementation. Representatives from the private sector explained that while no meetings have been arranged with authorities to support sanctions implementation, a good cross-sector relationship exists whereby businesses can approach authorities to receive guidance and training when required.

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To improve its domestic controls, Georgia has received technical and capacity-building training from EU member states. The Ministry of Finance reported that as of 8 November 2023, Georgia had stopped 2,970 containers and denied 1,683 applications from companies to conduct operations related to goods and services subject to restrictions. As a small jurisdiction, the Georgian authorities see these numbers as a sign of success. However, they raised frustrations with the time it takes the EU or the US to respond to queries about trucks stopped at the border.

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Georgian authorities at the roundtable also share the concern expressed by international partners regarding the involvement of Russia’s Federal Security Service (the FSB) in establishing front companies in third countries. Investigations into FSB-facilitated circumvention schemes are ongoing.

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The flow of land-based exports from Georgia to Russia – which some participants suggested might be complicated by the development of a north–south trade corridor between Iran and Russia – continues to attract international attention. However, Georgian authorities pointed to an overlooked yet significant challenge that they face: monitoring maritime transport.

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The Challenges of Maritime Trade

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Monitoring land-based trade is a complex and resource-consuming effort for Georgia. Detecting banned goods transported in trucks at the border with Russia and identifying the real end-user of the products is a challenging task. Alongside this task, Georgia also has access to the Black Sea and monitoring maritime trade entering and leaving its ports presents significant challenges.

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Georgia’s Maritime Transport Agency is monitoring vessels and their cargo to prevent the circumvention of international sanctions. Representatives from the agency described the challenge that the small six-hour vessel inspection window poses. Authorities must operate within this period, and delays in obtaining the necessary answers from the beneficial owners of vessels can be problematic.

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A representative of the Maritime Transport Agency explained that, between August and September 2022, several companies wanted to re-flag their vessels with the Georgian flag, but they were identified to be Russian so Georgia denied their requests. Still, a major challenge the Agency faces in this regard is the presence of vessels with flags from non-cooperative jurisdictions. Georgian authorities try to communicate with the reported beneficial owners in these jurisdictions – notably British Overseas Territories in the Caribbean – but often fail to establish contact.

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Georgia also faces a unique challenge on maritime trade through the ports of Russian-occupied Abkhazia. Georgia monitors trade through these ports but has no control over this activity. Georgian authorities track vessels in Abkhazia that involve suspicious beneficial owners and offshore jurisdictions and shares these reports with international partners. Authorities described how the vessels that Georgia tracks from Russia to Abkhazia go to Turkish ports to obfuscate their origin. By visiting Turkish ports, they can obtain the necessary papers to then access EU ports and thus circumvent sanctions. Georgian authorities expressed their dissatisfaction with the scarce support received from the EU and the US on this concern, a view consistent with their wider frustration on support received for implementing trade-related sanctions.

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Impact of Russian Inflows (of People and Money) into Georgia

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A final point emerged from the workshop on the unique challenge of geography and the resulting incoming flows of Russian citizens and investment. Participants noted that Georgia gets economic benefits from the increasing numbers of Russian citizens coming into the country and opening businesses. Tourism from Russian nationals has increased, and new Russian-owned businesses have opened in the country, notably in the IT industry. But participants also agreed that this presents security risks for Georgia. Real estate market prices in Georgia have doubled and participants described the IT industry as posing particular risks in terms of sanctions, given that these services are banned in the EU and US but can now operate from Georgia.

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Furthermore, while these booming economic sectors generate wealth in the country, participants were concerned about the negative impact their sudden departure would have on Georgia’s economy should they leave immediately the war is over. Moreover, participants added that these new businesses are competing with existing Georgian businesses, with resulting impacts on business opportunities and/or recruitment. One interesting observation related to Russian tourism is that Russian nationals are setting up tourist guides that Georgian authorities fear may be spreading pro-Russian propaganda as part of their service.

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Russia is a visibly divisive topic in Georgia, which, participants assert, is fuelled by mis/disinformation. Pro-Russian media pushes a narrative on the ineffectiveness of sanctions on the Russian economy and their negative impact on the sanctioning country’s population, while opposing media focuses on the scandal, noted earlier in this report, around the former prosecutor. Georgian media also focuses on how Georgia is economically dependent on trade with Russia and the aforementioned Russian inflows. These dependencies are made more acute by the lack of EU trade growth. Participants disagreed with these views and added that economic ties with Russia are not critical to Georgia’s economic security, having survived a direct war with Russia, although participants did share their concerns over Russia’s influence on Georgia’s critical infrastructure.

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Recommendations

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The Georgian government chose not to implement sanctions against Russia and the lack of a relevant national law has provided an opportunity for it to make some questionable decisions (such as the case of Partskhaladze and the NBG). However, the insights provided by both public and private sector participants at the recent workshops reflect the solid efforts of the Georgian authorities to prevent circumvention and evasion from happening through its jurisdiction. In doing so, Georgian authorities face similar challenges to those found across EU member states. Participants agreed on the following list of recommendations to improve Georgia’s ability to support relevant elements of the international sanctions regime against Russia by tackling circumvention:

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    Establish a dedicated government sanctions unit. While several departments and agencies consider sanctions, Georgia’s response would benefit from greater coordination that could be achieved by establishing a national sanctions coordination unit that can draw on relevant expertise from across the public and private sectors. This unit could also highlight where new legislation is needed to ensure the integrity of EU sanctions implementation.

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    Promote trade transparency. Integrity and transparency are essential in trade. This must be supported by the quality and accessibility of data regarding beneficial ownership, as well as the availability of information-sharing channels to ensure a robust framework and facilitate investigations to enforce it.

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    Continue providing international support to Georgia. Georgian authorities appear committed to preventing the circumvention of international sanctions but, as in all jurisdictions implementing sanctions, the country requires substantial technical assistance support from international partners. The EU and its allies must ensure they provide sufficient and timely support to Georgia’s anti-circumvention efforts.

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    Simplify bureaucratic impediments for Georgia’s trade with the EU. Georgian economic operators should see the EU as an accessible market. Entering and initiating trade with the EU should not be a complicated process. Facilitating smooth trade between the two jurisdictions will see Georgia’s trade shift from Russia towards the EU. As a share, trade with Russia is currently increasing and trade with the EU is decreasing.

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    Invest in EU/US–Georgia trade relations. If Georgia is expected to further decouple from Russia, the EU and the US should encourage their businesses to invest in Georgia and expand trade links with the country. Participants explained that Georgian businesses understand that Russia is not a reliable partner, but if they are to reduce trade with Russia, they need to identify a sustainable alternative.

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The workshop discussions highlighted the challenges Georgia faces from both a trade and security perspective when considering the implementation of sanctions on Russia. While there is support for sanctions across the public and private sectors, Georgia clearly needs greater support in managing the related trade and security risks. The EU and allies must show that they understand Georgia’s security predicament. Russia’s intention to hold a referendum to annex the occupied territories in Georgia – as it did in Ukraine – can be reactivated any time, creating a sense of vulnerability in Georgia. Georgia is a strategic partner for the West in the region and thus its national interests, particularly related to trade, should be taken into consideration to foster heightened commitment to the implementation of sanctions on Russia.

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Tom Keatinge is the founding Director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI, where his research focuses on matters at the intersection of finance and security. He is also currently a specialist adviser on illicit finance to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ongoing enquiry.

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Gonzalo Saiz is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime & Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-01-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-4.html b/hkers/2024-01-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-4.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..39732a66 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-01-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-4.html @@ -0,0 +1,303 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第四日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第四日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.01.02

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  • 控方開案陳詞:黎智英為「主腦」 國安法生效前已著手聯絡及會面外國官員
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  • 控方指黎智英與李柱銘晤佩洛西 多次受訪稱需要外國向中國施壓制裁
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(2日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第4日審訊。3名《國安法》指定法官上月裁定煽動刊物罪無逾時檢控後,黎今早庭上答辯,否認3項控罪。之後控方讀出開案陳詞,指黎智英是本案「主腦」,對《蘋果日報》的運作有完全的控制權,他曾指示下屬開設英文版,以圖尋求外國制裁中國及香港特區官員。控方又指黎在《國安法》生效之前,已開始與不同的外國官員及非政府組織人士聯絡、會面,尋求實施制裁、封鎖及敵對行動,至今共有42名中國及香港特區官員被制裁。

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76歲的黎智英身穿白色恤衫、藍色西裝褸,由數名懲教人員帶往被告欄應訊,他面帶笑容、神情愉悅地與妻子及兒女打招呼。

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image02 +▲ 黎妻 李韻琴

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黎否認一項發布煽動刊物及兩項串謀勾結外國勢力罪 另一項勾結外力罪則存檔法庭

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在上月開審首天,辯方爭議串謀煽動刊物罪逾時檢控,3名《國安法》指定法官聽畢控辯雙方陳詞後,裁定法庭在檢控期限屆滿10日之前收到控方通知擬加控罪,所以認為不存在逾時檢控的情況,因此駁回辯方申請,換言之控方就煽動刊物罪的檢控仍然有效。今天辯方向法庭申請釐清相關裁決,指稱控罪時段應縮短至10日,即2021年6月14至24日,惟3名法官認為辯方是提出新理據並意圖重啟爭議,最終拒絕申請。

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接著4名被告在庭上答辯。黎智英否認一項「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物罪」及一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司派出一名代表,該人士代表3間公司同樣否認上述兩罪。

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黎亦否認另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。他另面對的一項「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,控方則申請存檔於法庭,獲法庭批准。

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控方形容黎為「激進的政治人物」 是案中主腦

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控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作開案陳詞,指本案關於一名「激進的政治人物」,激起市民對中央及特區政府的憎恨,以及勾結外國勢力以對中國及香港特區實施制裁、封鎖及敵對行動,危害國家安全。

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控方指,黎智英是3項控罪的主腦,並與政治倡議團體「Stand with Hong Kong, Fight for Freedom」一同串謀犯案。在案發時期,《蘋果日報》一共發布了161篇具煽動性文章,其中31篇在2020年7月1日《國安法》實施之後發布。

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控方指稱,早在《國安法》於2020年7月生效之前,黎智英已開始支持或提出請求外國勢力向中央及特區政府實施制裁或封鎖。據《蘋果日報》報導,黎智英於2019年7月與時任美國副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧及美國參議員等人會面,討論《逃犯條例》修訂,當黎被問到美國可以做什麼時,黎曾提出制裁中國及香港官員,讓他們知道有何後果。控方指,上述顯示《蘋果日報》被利用作為平台提倡制裁。

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控方指黎智英與多名外籍人士聯絡 導致42名中港官員受制裁

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控方又指,從2020年7月1日《國安法》實施起,至2021年2月15日陳梓華被拘捕,黎與 Mark Simon 和陳梓華等人一同串謀勾結外國勢力。控方在庭上屏幕展示人物關係圖,其中 Mark Simon 是黎智英的私人助理,二人均在 WhatsApp 群組「DC Dems」及 Signal 群組「Jimmy Mark」。其他涉案人士包括前美國陸軍上將 Jack Keane、前美國國防部副部長 Paul Wolfowitz、前美國駐港澳總領事郭明瀚(James Cunningham)、「香港監察」創辦人 Benedict Rogers 及「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」行政總監 Luke de Pulford 等,控方指部份人加入上述兩個通訊群組,亦會與黎智英「一對一」聯絡及電郵。

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控方指,事實上不同的制裁措施的確有實施,至今共有42名中國及香港特區官員被制裁,審訊期間將會傳召香港城市大學法律學院教授王貴國就此作供。

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控方指擬傳召4名前蘋果高層出庭作供 其中3名為同案被告

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就煽動刊物和涉及蘋果高層的串謀勾結外國勢力罪,控方將會依賴同案被告張劍虹、陳沛敏、楊清奇,以及未被起訴的前營運總監兼行政總裁周達權的證供,以證明串謀犯罪協議的存在,以及相關串謀協議乃源自黎智英的指示。

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控方邀請法庭考慮相關串謀是持續性的,亦邀請法庭考慮黎智英在2020年5月開設了個人 Twitter 帳戶,作為顯示意圖的「外顯行為(Overt act)」。此外,控方依賴22篇黎智英個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」的評論文章、一段訪問影片,以及24段網上直播節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」影片,題為「Live Q&A with Jimmy Lai」。控方亦會依賴黎智英接受外國傳媒訪問及 Twitter 帖文。

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控方:黎智英指示開設英文版 以圖尋求外力制裁

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控方指,《蘋果日報》於1995年1月根據《本地報刊註冊條例》註冊,直至2021年6月24日停運之前,《蘋果日報》一直是香港廣泛流通的報紙,無論實體報紙還是網站均有影響力。《蘋果》亦開設社交媒體包括 Facebook、Twitter 和 YouTube 。

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2020年5月25日,黎智英指示《蘋果》開設英文版,以圖尋求外力向中央及香港政府實施制裁,並發布了一篇文章題為「打國際線 蘋果英文版免費試睇」。

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控方提及社長與總編輯等各人角色 黎智英對《蘋果》運作有「完全控制權」

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就各人在案中角色,控方指黎智英為串謀犯罪的主腦,對《蘋果日報》的運作有完全的控制權,他會向編輯發出指示以執行日常運作。

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張劍虹於案發時為《蘋果日報》社長,負責公司的整體運作,以及報紙的出版及發行。陳沛敏則是副社長,是實體報紙日常運作的決策人,亦撰寫評論文章,刊於專欄「堆填生活」。羅偉光是《蘋果日報》的總編輯,負責編輯工作及擔任《蘋果》網上平台的決策人。而林文宗是執行總編輯。

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image03 +▲ 張劍虹

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馮偉光是英文版網站的編輯,並會以筆名「盧峯」撰寫評論文章。楊清奇是《蘋果日報》的主筆,負責撰寫社論,以及尋找適合的時評作者供稿。楊自己亦以筆名「李平」撰寫評論文章。

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控方指,黎智英作為「飯盒會」的主席,平日會與陳沛敏、張劍虹、羅偉光、林文宗及楊清奇一同討論《蘋果日報》及其網上平台的編採方向。黎亦撰寫評論文章,刊於其專欄「成敗樂一笑」。

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控方指Simon Lee於海外管理黎的Twitter帳戶

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至於利世民(Simon Lee)則負責管理黎智英的Twitter 帳戶,黎的帳戶於2020年5月發布首則帖文,但《國安法》生效後,利已經停止管理黎的帳戶,直至他離港後再次恢復相關工作。

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周達權案發時則為《蘋果日報》的營運總監,亦是壹傳媒管理服務有限公司的財務總裁。

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審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。

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黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師 Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。

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控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。

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同案8名被告:前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華,早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,現正還柙,等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。

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image04 +▲ 林文宗(左)、陳沛敏(右)

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image05

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(2日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第4日審訊。控方早上開始作開案陳詞,指黎智英掌控《蘋果日報》的運作,為案中主腦,並且在《國安法》實施之前便著手聯絡外國官員。下午控方在庭上展示時任美國眾議院議長佩洛西 Twitter 截圖,顯示黎於2019年10月曾聯同民主黨創黨主席李柱銘一同見面。庭上播放多段黎智英接受採訪的片段,他提及香港反修例是「最後一戰」,非常需要「外國勢力」的支持,以改變中國乃至世界,又促請美國向中國實施制裁,「我相信特朗普是一個守信用的人」。控方亦展示黎與蘋果副社長陳沛敏的對話,二人曾討論制裁名單,並提及「賣港賊」字眼。

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控方籲法庭考慮社會騷亂背景 蘋果頭版籲上街

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控方邀請法庭採取司法認知(judicial notice),自2019年6月反修例運動開始,本港處於社會動亂及暴力事件頻繁發生的時期。在這段期間,《蘋果日報》刊登了題為《黎智英:倘修例傳媒冇得做》的文章。

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而在政府宣布暫緩修訂後,報紙頭版題為「惡法擬暫緩但不撤、遊行前夕、林鄭緩兵、明天照上街」。同年7月1日更有示威者闖入立法會大樓。政府其後於2019年9月4日宣布撤回修訂條例草案,報紙頭版則以「Freedom Summer」作為英語標題。

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image06 +▲ 2019年6月15日,林鄭月娥宣布暫緩《逃犯條例》修訂草案。

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控方庭上播片 稱黎智英多次與外國官員會面、接受外媒訪問 談及制裁

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控方指,在《國安法》實施前,黎智英已多次與外國官員會談、接受外國媒體訪問以及在美國報紙撰寫文章。控方展示黎與美國、英國及台灣連繫的時間表,時間由2016年開始至2020年。控方亦在庭上播放8段黎智英與外國官員會談、接受外國或台灣媒體訪問的片段。

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控方接著簡述黎智英與外國官員等人的關係。於2019年7月9日,《蘋果》刊登文章《蓬佩奧晤黎智英》。同月,黎會見美國國家安全顧問博爾頓。黎其後在何俊仁主持的網台節目《細說中南海》擔任嘉賓。《蘋果》網站報導黎在節目中的言論,包括:「黑社會文化就是要讓人恐懼、用暴力打低對方,跟共產黨如出一轍」,又指控中央政府管治下的社會是「恐懼社會」而不是「自由社會」。對於721白衣人襲擊事件,黎亦表示:「今次恐襲必須交由國際機構如聯合國或英美等國家,作公開的獨立調查。」他其後稱:「反送中行動發展至今,越來越需要國際支持」,報導提及「(黎)早前與美國國務卿會面時,對方問他:『美國可以怎樣做?』」,黎認為美國可以實施制裁,令中國官員可以知道後果。

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控方指,當美國在2019年8月開始提出《香港人權及民主法案》時,黎智英與香港民主委員會一同呼籲美國支持,並對香港及中國政府實施制裁。控方庭上展示時任美國眾議院議長佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi)的 Twitter 截圖,顯示2019年10月與黎智英和民主黨創黨主席李柱銘等人會面。影片顯示同年10月25日,黎與李柱銘出席時任美國副總統彭斯的專題演講,黎發言指,以人道方式解決香港問題是貿易戰的重要考慮。

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So pleased to welcome Jimmy Lai, Martin Lee and Janet Pang to the U.S. Capitol. My full support and admiration goes to those who have taken to the streets week after week in non-violent protest to fight for democracy and the rule of law in #HongKong. pic.twitter.com/maeTwTR8eV — Nancy Pelosi (@SpeakerPelosi) October 22, 2019

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庭上展示黎智英與陳沛敏對話截圖 討論「賣港賊」制裁名單

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於2019年10月及2020年3月,黎指示員工取消公司的「飯盒會」,因他需要出席由 Mark Simon 所安排的美國參議員會面。控方亦展示雙方合照。

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2020年5月,《壹傳媒》前副社長陳沛敏告知黎智英,政府或會提出《國安法》。黎及後於 Twitter 發文,附有一張政協委員手持「支持國安立法 護航一國兩制」橫額的圖片,並在帖文寫道:「美國政府是否應該將他們納入制裁名單?」,同時標籤「#MagnitskyAct (馬格尼茨基法)」。

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控方庭上展示黎智英與蘋果副社長陳沛敏之間的 WhatsApp 對話內容,當中顯示二人討論制裁名單,提及「賣港賊」字眼。黎智英又向陳提及,希望警察為他們所犯的罪行付上代價。

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控方另展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的通訊對話內容,顯示楊向黎報告再有多兩名作者可供稿給《蘋果日報》英文版。

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黎形容香港在「新冷戰」前線 籲美國以行動支持 包括派人來港

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控方指2019年7月,黎智英與時任美國副總統彭斯及其他資深參議員會面。控方又展示 WhatsApp 對話截圖,顯示同年3月李柱銘和陳方安生與彭斯見面後,黎向李表示現在似乎是在美國華盛頓游說的好時機,因現時氣氛「反中」和支持抗爭,美國兩黨對中國的敵對行動是顯而易見的。

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另外,黎智英於2019年7月曾與「保衛民主基金會」的資深副主席 Johnathan Schanzer 進行現場對談。黎強調反修例是「最後一戰」,而香港人的反抗是道德力量的戰爭,又指美國政府是道德權威,其支持是有力量的武器,因此香港極需要美國支持,否則香港缺乏持續反抗的能力。黎形容「新冷戰」是關乎價值的鬥爭,而香港正在「前線」,他最後指,美國不能只說不做,同時亦要以行動支持香港人,包括派人員來港。

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黎指有效方法是凍結中國官員戶口

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控方展示黎智英與 Mark Simon 之間的對話截圖,2019年7月 Mark Simon 轉述時任美國國務院高級顧問 Mary Kissel 的要求,指屆時黎與副總統彭斯會面時,可提出建議美國可就香港局勢採取什麼行動,包括制裁的時機及對象。

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The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive & an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy & the rights & autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020

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黎智英另在 Signal 中向 Mark Simon 指,經深思熟慮後認為美國應該取消香港特殊地位,因為若美國與中國脫鉤,當香港這個唯一出路都關上後,便會逼使中國滿足美國的要求。

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黎智英亦於2020年3月至7月與 Mark Simon 以電郵通訊,並提及最有效的方法是凍結中國官員的戶口,他們就會感到害怕。

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黎於台灣節目稱:外國支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去

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黎於2020年4月接受英國《金融時報》(Financial Times)訪問,談及唯一能阻止中國及拯救香港的就是國際力量。另於同年5月,黎接受台灣 YouTube 頻道《Yahoo TV 一起看》的節目「鄉民來衝康」訪問,他表示:「我很想美國影響我們⋯⋯我很想英國影響我們⋯⋯我很想外國影響我們⋯⋯他們的支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去的⋯⋯外國的勢力是現在我們非常需要⋯⋯讓我們撐下去的。」

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黎多次接受英美媒體訪問 表示:相信特朗普守信用、會制裁中國

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於2020年5月,黎智英接受美國媒體《福斯財經》(Fox Business)訪問,他其後在 Twitter 轉載有關片段。他在訪問中提到:「是時候改變中國,這樣才能改變世界⋯⋯除非中國改變,否則我們不會有和平。」他亦指美國可採用很多途徑逼使中國改變,包括凍結中國的戶口及其於美國的金錢,同時停止出口科技及電子產品到中國。

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同月,黎接受美國《彭博》(Bloomberg)訪問,他建議美國總統特朗普向中國實施制裁,並引述特朗普稱若北京確實在香港實行《國安法》並摧毀法律,他會認真採取行動。黎接着指:「我相信特朗普是一個守信用的人,因此希望他會向中國實施制裁。」

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黎亦接受《BBC》訪問,再次促請特朗普對中國實施制裁,並解釋一旦《國安法》實施,將會是香港的「末日」,因未能保護在港商人,而香港亦不再是國際金融中心。

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黎籲撤銷中港官員子女在外地的學生簽證

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於2020年5月,黎撰寫文章表示:「我的 Twitter 帖文是否真的威脅到中國的國家安全?」他在文中呼籲,撤銷中國及香港政府官員子女在外地的學生簽證。

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黎亦接受美國節目《Uncommon Knowledge with Peter Robinson》的訪問,他指需要美國協助制裁中國,而本港的特別貿易待遇不應被撤銷。

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黎表示若實施制裁 有機會即使立《國安法》也不會執行

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至2020年6月,黎智英接受《RFA 自由亞洲粵語》的訪問,他表示:「點都要抗爭,希望我哋有機會係美國、甚至歐洲其他國家支持下,我哋能夠保住法治同自由。」他又指:「而家中國處境唔係我哋覺得咁穩定⋯⋯李克強同習近平已經反晒面,你就知道佢哋下面嘅權鬥去到乜嘢地步」、「好緊要係外國盡量畀中國嘅壓力、制裁⋯⋯將中國專橫嘅做法阻擋住」。他認為外國若實施制裁,「有機會《國安法》就算立咗都唔會執行,或者執行都會將佢 water down(沖淡),唔會做到咁辣。」

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黎撰文指引渡惡法令大陸法律凌駕香港司法 並籲人參與遊行

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至於黎撰寫的文章方面,他在其專欄「成敗樂一笑」發表題為「請站出來保住最後防線」的文章,內容包括:「『引渡惡法』的作用,就像恐怖分子襲擊產生『可用性級聯』的效果,讓香港市民都被籠罩在恐慌的順民意識下,讓大陸無法無天的法律凌駕香港的司法制度。」他有提到:「修訂《逃犯條例》就是要摧毀『一國兩制』這個習帝的眼中釘⋯⋯『引渡惡法』就是讓中央的魔爪撕破《基本法》和一國兩制的最後防線。」他於文末呼籲:「請你們相信群眾的力量,加入今天反惡法的示威遊行吧!」

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另一文章題為《諗移民定諗遊行》,內文指:『「逃犯條例」還可以隨時拉你鎖你,多神奇的權力,多神聖的地圖啊!」、「若我們人多勢眾站出來遊行⋯⋯」及「我們會去到盡,堅決抗爭到底的事實」。

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黎另在文章《為自己和下一代 阻擋香港沉淪》表示:「你要跟中共講法律,你從火星來的嗎?」、「修訂逃犯條例就是奪去香港的法治,拿住大陸那套陽光司法在港任拉任鎖肆虐橫行」、「香港無形中成為了集中營」、「若我們今天還有機會行出來發聲,卻袖手旁觀」。他最後呼籲:「請看前一步,六月九號花三小時,為自己和下一代留下阻擋公義沉淪的足跡。」

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黎要求將陳方安生與美國副總統彭斯會面的消息散播

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另外,黎於2019年3月通知《蘋果日報》的社長張劍虹,要求將陳方安生與副總統彭斯會面的消息散播開去,於是翌日的報紙以《彭斯晤陳太 關注港人權 學者:高規格接待向京施壓》為頭版標題。

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同年4月,黎指示副社長陳沛敏訪問「銅鑼灣書店」前店長林榮基,翌日的報紙題為《送中例殺埋身 林榮基流亡台灣 臨別呼籲 守護香港明日上街》。

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image07 +▲ 佩洛西(左)、林榮基(右)

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控方開案陳詞未完,案件明日續審。

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黎智英否認一項「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物罪」及一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司派出一名代表,該人士代表3間公司同樣否認上述兩罪。

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黎亦否認另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。他另面對的一項「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,控方則申請存檔於法庭,獲法庭批准。

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首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指,黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司,於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日(包括首尾兩日),在香港與其他人一同串謀,請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。

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另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間,與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀,請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員,實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。

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「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指,黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日(包括首尾兩日),在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物,具意圖:

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a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛

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b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項

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c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛

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d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛

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e) 煽惑他人使用暴力

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f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。

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案件編號:HCCC51/2022

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U.S.-India Relations In 2023

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2023 Roundup: Small Steps and Big Shifts in U.S.-India Relations

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Richard M. Rossow | 2024.01.02

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2023 was one of the more consequential years for U.S.-India relations — for both, positive and negative reasons. Poring through the numerous senior-level engagements and outcome documents, the relationship largely remains in the “agenda-setting mode”. However, as indicated by the types of engagements and frequency — one can expect concrete outcomes soon. Notably, China remains a driving imperative behind U.S.-India strategic and commercial relations.

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However, there were several tangible steps marking important shifts in U.S.-India relations. I have outlined five big events from the past year and underscored their larger implications. Additionally, I have also linked the work produced by the CSIS India Chair on the five subjects to provide additional detail. The events are not chronological but rather in the order of significance.

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    GE Engine Deal, June 2023: General Electric and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited announced an agreement to co-produce the F-414 engine for India’s domestic “Tejas” light fighter. The two governments first announced plans to work towards co-production of jet engines in January 2015, but discussions soon died off.

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    The Significance: This agreement underscores growing U.S. trust in India, based on shared security concerns. Helping India improve defense production will also reduce India’s continued reliance on Russian-made defense equipment. This agreement also shows that ideas which may have failed a decade ago can be successfully revisited.

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    Dropping WTO Disputes, June 2023: During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington in June, the two governments agreed to drop six outstanding disputes before the World Trade Organization. The seventh and final dispute was dropped during President Biden’s visit to India in September 2023.

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    The Significance: Trade policy remains one of the weakest areas of bilateral government engagement. While the two sides have made some progress in discussions over areas of strategically significant trade, general trade concerns fester. Utilizing leader-level summits to end disputes might be an “overkill,” but it shows growing recognition from both nations that improving commercial ties is crucial for the long-term sustainability of the relationship. However, as I noted in an earlier piece, despite the significance of the measures, a comprehensive framework akin to the Australian government’s 2018 India Economic Strategy would be momentous for bilateral commercial relationship.

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    Combined Maritime Force Bahrain, November 2023: While the American and Indian militaries regularly conduct exercises, there is a dearth of practical military cooperation. That changed at the India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in November, in Delhi when India announced it would join the 28-member “Combined Maritime Forces” naval partnership based in Bahrain.

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    The Significance: India’s membership of the CMF provides a new, regularized venue for U.S.-India interoperability training. We may soon witness more regular joint security missions in the Gulf to counter piracy, smuggling, and other illicit operations.

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    New York Assassination Attempt Indictment, November 2023: As the year was nearing its close, U.S.-India relations were shook with the unsealing of an indictment in the Southern District of New York. The indictment alleged a plot outlining an Indian intelligence officer’s involvement in the attempted assassination of a Sikh separatist who is an American citizen. As this case moves ahead, there will likely be other closely watched moments that could alter the trajectory of U.S.-India ties

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    The Significance: American policy circles are already replete with critics of India’s recent record in areas like religious tolerance and human rights. While the Biden Administration has chosen — so far — to press ahead on cooperation, the assassination attempt further strengthens these critics and raises fundamental questions about the depth of our “shared values.” As noted by my colleague Katherine Hadda, the United States’ approach to focus on a specific Indian official rather than implicating the entire government is pragmatic. Most likely, reasonable action from India in response to these allegations will suffice to maintain the relationship’s momentum. However, the event adds uncertainty to the relationship. Other steps by the Modi government that shrink the civil society space can further move these currents.

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    Steep Drop in FDI: Media reports of significant investments by foreign technology firms into India engenders the feeling that “Make in India,” paired with increased trade pressure on China, has finally started to build momentum. However, the government of India’s own data proves otherwise. According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Monthly Bulletin data, India saw a 27 percent year-on-year drop in 12-month foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow (new equity) and a 43 percent drop in FDI inflow from the mid-2021 peak. World Bank data shows manufacturing stuck at around 13 percent of India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). One major potential investor, Foxconn, dropped its massive $20 billion chip venture with Vedanta this summer. However, there are some “green shoots” that foreign investment might finally be shifting back towards India — including a healthy $6.5 billion new equity inflow in October 2023.

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    The Significance: There are a multitude of reasons that the FDI into India has declined. First, there has been a significant slowdown in new reforms during the Modi government’s second term, as indicated by our own “India Reforms Scorecard.” Second, too few state governments are aggressively pursuing foreign investment. Third, regulatory shifts occur quite often. Finally, dozens of sectors still have foreign investment restrictions including both sectoral FDI caps as well as stringent operational regulations that only apply to foreign companies. U.S.-India cooperation on boosting Indian manufacturing will be mutually advantageous. For instance, my colleague Raymond Vickery, notes that the signing of the U.S.-India Memorandum of Understanding on Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation will allow the two countries to the identify complementary competencies, and prevent unrequited competition.

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The coming year is replete with promises and pitfalls. National elections in both India and the United States could trigger shifts in foreign policy and economic policymaking. New revelations related to the attempted murder case in New York may provide new fuel to the relationship’s critics. Additionally, the United States’ and India’s differing approaches to the elections in Bangladesh will underscore geostrategic divisions.

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However, we can expect the several workstreams outlined above to bear fruit. Senior-level engagements provide action-forcing events — with great urgency over time as China increases its dangerous activities across the Indo-Pacific.

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In the words of the author Karl Schroeder, “Foresight is not about predicting the future, it’s about minimizing surprise”. We may not know every significant in 2024 that will influence the relationship, but the high level of dialogue between the United States and Indian governments is reason for cautious optimism.

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Richard Rossow is a senior adviser and holds the Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In this role, he helps frame and shape policies to promote greater business and economic engagement between the two countries, with a unique focus on tracking and engaging Indian states. He has been working on U.S.-India relations for over 25 years.

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【黎智英案・審訊第五日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.01.03

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  • 控方:黎智英籲下屬勿針對特朗普 指示Mark Simon邀彭斯和蓬佩奧訂閱英文版
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image01

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(3日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第5日審訊。控方繼續開案陳詞,指黎智英在美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 的建議下,指示下屬設立蘋果英文版,目的是爭取外國人的支持,以尋求外力向中央及香港政府實施制裁。黎又指示國際組同事不要針對特朗普,因蘋果靠特朗普政府的支持「保命」。當黃之鋒表示不認同蘋果發起的「一人一信救香港」行動,黎則向陳沛敏表示不同意黃,現時任何有助於香港的方法都應該採用,因已沒有其他方法對付中共。控方又指黎於2020年5月開設了個人 Twitter 帳戶,以圖增加影響力打「國際線」,列出黎智英所追蹤的外國政治人物及機構,遭法官質疑控方想反映什麼。

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控方:黎智英FCC演講獲蘋果報導 另指示下屬訪問彭定康

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控方昨日開案陳詞提到,黎智英對《蘋果日報》的日常運作有完全的控制權,他會給予指示其他同案被告,是串謀犯罪的「主腦」。控方今天繼續開案陳詞,就發布煽動刊物罪,控方指2019年4月,黎智英指示張劍虹訪問「銅鑼灣書店」前店長林榮基,希望報導能有效地引發市民上街反送中。黎智英亦吩咐張想想如何推動更多人參與遊行,並向張轉發訊息,顯示黎早前請求「香港監察」創辦人 Benedict Rogers 聯絡前港督彭定康,採訪其對反送中的評論,後來相關報導於2019年4月28日刊出。

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2019年5月21日,黎智英在外國記者協會場合發表演講,後來《蘋果日報》報導演講內容,題為〈送中惡法 黎智英:修例後香港玩完 FCC演講斥林鄭非常邪惡〉。

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控方:反送中運動開始後 蘋果報導及黎智英專欄文章煽動對政府仇恨

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控方指,2019年6月9日的反修例大遊行標誌著「社會騷動」的開始。雖然政府其後宣布暫緩以至撤回修例草案,但暴力示威浪潮持續。在這社會背景下,《蘋果日報》發布不同內容,包括針對中央政府及香港特區政府的煽動性陳述、呼籲市民參與示威、宣揚對警察的憎恨、提倡透過非法、暴力及「攬炒」手段來對抗中央及特區政府。

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控方列出31篇從2019年6月15日至2020年1月26日期間發布的文章,指稱它們具煽動性:

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    〈和變勇 「是政權,逼我進化」〉:控方指稱文章意圖激起市民對中央政府及香港特區政府的憎恨

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    〈天下制裁集會 今勢逼爆遮打〉:控方引述內容「2020年才過了不足20天,林鄭月娥政府已經急不及待要『推動』逆權運動另一浪高潮。民政事務專員擅離職守架空區議會、警察喬裝市民濫捕公眾場所拍照少年、監警會借故延遲提交報告……種種事端都有意無意為刻下看似已緩和的民怨重新撥火。民間集會團隊呼籲港人今日再集結,向國際社會展示民意,冀求各國政府向迫害港人的香港官員與警察落實制裁措施。」控方指稱文章意圖激起市民對中央政府及香港特區政府的憎恨

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    〈社會專題:自己手足自己救〉

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    〈屠龍隊邊緣呼喚 全民勇武/三罷〉:文章提到「隊名『層龍,對抗警察是家常便飯,有人試過被警棍打穿頭,亦有人遭橡膠子彈爆頭險死,但他們明白不是每個人都有這種勇氣。」控方指文章意圖引起對警方的仇恨

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    〈港鐵大搜捕 釀元朗恐襲2.0 速龍無差別毆打市民〉

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    廣告〈誰殺死他她他和她……〉

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    廣告〈一次過變黑又得 逐漸變黑又得 黑晒!〉

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    〈攬炒巴×G20 團隊 眾籌1,400萬連登13國賣廣告 推爆警暴〉:控方指稱文章意圖提倡透過非法、暴力及「攬炒」手段來對抗中央及特區政府

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控方又指,從2019年6月15日至2020年1月16日,黎智英透過其個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」發表評論文章,旨在煽動市民對中央、特區政府和警察的仇恨。

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    〈我們堅持下去,才有希望〉

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    〈反極權 台灣更不用怕〉:控方引文「中共可怕的地方是,把人當成是純綷被物質驅使的動物,而不是有靈性和精神面貌的人。」、「在中共金錢萬能的思維世界裡,自由如糞土,人民只是極權機器中的螺絲,最後只會令他們在這資訊開放的時代無地自容。」

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    〈2020 和勇繼續一起撐下去〉:黎在文中稱2020年元旦與李柱銘及何俊仁參與遊行,途中見到有一名年約14至15歲的少女大叫「黑警死全家」、「香港差佬,X你老母」。黎向何說:「有這樣的後生,我哋冇得輸。」黎續指,不知道「裝修」滙豐銀行的,是否「我們的勇武手足」,但打爆中國人壽店舖玻璃的兩名黑衣人便十分可疑,現場有人質疑二人是喬裝警員。

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    〈捍道德抗極權 全球人人有責〉

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2019年7月2日,黎智英指示陳沛敏報導示威者七一佔領立法會事件,以引起市民對年輕示威者的同情和支持。同年7月19日,黎智英向陳沛敏轉述 Benedict Rogers 的要求,轉述美國眾議員 Ted Yoho 有意投稿。同年10月,黎智英與美國眾議院議長佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi)會面後,黎要求陳訪問她。

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image02 +▲ 林文宗(左)、陳沛敏(右)

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控方:疫情爆發後 蘋果持續煽動

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2020年1月底開始,新冠肺炎在香港爆發,令示威活動暫時沉寂,但《蘋果日報》持續發布內容,針對中央政府及香港特區政府的煽動性陳述、宣揚對警察的憎恨,以及提倡透過非法及暴力的手段來對抗中央及特區政府。

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  • 〈擬用反恐例 控爆炸品案 鄧炳強學新疆鐵腕壓抗爭〉:控方指內容有意煽動對警察的仇恨,以及提倡使用不守法及暴力手段。
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控方另指黎智英5篇專欄文章含煽動內容:

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    〈現代人不是西方文明機制外生存的動物〉

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    〈武漢瘟疫 中共喪鐘〉:「肺炎疫情在中共維穩大前提下,謊言泛濫真相模糊,層層官僚架構層層謊言重疊,肺炎災情有多深重,就是中共也不知道。謊言治國不講誠信難服眾,習帝靠的是極權操控,絕對扼殺人民資訊自由,把人民變成盲從的羊群,管治便乾脆脷落。」、「習帝的極權控制了所有資訊,連拍電影現在也找不到題材了。」、「人民噤聲,政府霸道,惡毒病菌肆虐橫行,受苦的最後是人民。」

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    〈我們最光輝的時刻〉

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    〈專橫暴政打壓 我們氣魄不滅〉:「今日我們明知有事,中共打到嚟必然大清算大清洗,清算不聽話的人,清洗英國殖民地遺留下來保護港人自由的法治和機制,把香港人變成任由習帝擺佈的奴才,因此我們會繼續起來抗爭到底,希望趁習帝內外危機四伏,和慘遭武漢肺炎瘟疫人命摧殘和經濟淪陷後,各國尤其美國向中國責難及局部制裁,迫使中共不敢太明目張膽,暫時克制對香港的迫害」

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    〈無賴在摧毀香港法治〉

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控方:在美國國務院前資深顧問建議下 黎智英指示設蘋果英文版

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控方指2020年5月,有傳媒報導人大打算在香港實施《國安法》,其時黎智英已開始從事針對中央的敵對活動,支持或提出請求外國勢力向中央及特區政府實施制裁或封鎖。早於同年4月,美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 電郵向黎智英提議設英文版,黎智英便指示下屬設立《蘋果日報》英文版,以尋求外力向中央及香港政府實施制裁。

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控方展示黎智英與 Christian Whiton 之間的對話,後者在2020年4月17日指設立《蘋果日報》英文版在政治上有好處。4月19日,Mark Simon 向黎指英文版原意是好,但可能不符成本效益。

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群組對話顯示黎稱不需做平衡報導 指示應集中「保衛香港的聲音」

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至2020年5月10日,黎智英創立 WhatsApp 群組「English news」,其他成員包括張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、馮偉光及張志偉。他們其後討論英文版的運作方式,黎提出請求美國政治領袖去訂閱,以得到他們的支持(“By enlisting foreign leaders to subscribe to us is enlisting their support.”)。

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黎強調不需全面地向外國人展示香港的不同政治派別,只需要聚焦在「蘋果日報觀點,即黃營的一般觀點」。(“We only concentrate in our Apple Daily HK view, a general view of the yellow side.”) 黎又指不需要做平衡報導,因保衛香港的聲音需要被世界聽見。(“We are not trying to strike a balance but the point of view of the people on the side of protecting HK. This is the voice the world wants to know.”)直至黎智英被拘捕之前,該群組一直有持續運作。

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黎智英指示Mark Simon邀請彭斯和蓬佩奧等人訂閱蘋果英文版

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黎智英亦與 Mark Simon 討論,黎指引入英文版可吸引美國人及其他外國人支持,遂指示 Mark Simon 協助宣傳,以及邀請時任美國副總統彭斯和時任國務卿蓬佩奧訂閱。黎其後表示聽聞有一些撰稿人不想再替《南華早報》寫文章,提議可邀請他們供稿予蘋果英文版,籲 Mark Simon 聯絡南華早報前總編輯 Mark Clifford 商討。

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黎其後指出,英文版除了讓支持反修例運動的美國人有方法訂閱蘋果之外,若果彭斯(Mike Pence)、蓬佩奧(Mike Pompeo)和共和黨參議員 Marco Rubio 等外國官員都訂閱的話,可在政治上保護到蘋果,因蘋果現時是中聯辦的針對目標,而外國支持是黎的關注點。黎決定英文版每天發布約10至12篇報導、專題和評論文章,另加8至10篇關於中國內地的文章,目標對象是美國讀者,希望打破《南華早報》的壟斷。

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Jimmy Lai is a Champion of Freedom & I was honored to welcome him to the White House in 2019. Today, he sits in prison for his support of Democracy in Hong Kong & @VoCommunism rightly awarded him their Highest Honor for his Courageous Commitment to Freedom. God Bless Jimmy Lai.🇺🇸 pic.twitter.com/oU69TSkex2 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) June 11, 2021

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黎智英亦向張劍虹提議在英文版加入台灣的報導,以吸引美國人的注意。張回覆:「老闆,一定需要的,中美大戰,台灣重要,必須要加的,謝謝」。

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控方列黎智英Twitter追蹤名單 官質疑可反映什麼

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控方指在大約同一時間,黎於2020年5月開設了個人 Twitter 帳戶,以圖增加影響力打「國際線」。帖文不時標示美國、英國、日本及台灣的政治人物,與他們互相交流。而李兆富(Simon Lee)則負責管理黎的 Twitter 帳戶。

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控方列出黎智英 Twitter 帳戶追蹤的多名外國政治人物,包括時任美國副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧、Natan Sharansky、台灣領導人蔡英文、「香港監察」創辦人 Benedict Rogers、「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人兼執行董事 Luke de Pulford、「Fight for Freedom. Stand with Hong Kong. 重光團隊」、對華政策跨國議會聯盟、前香港大專學界國際事務代表團發言人邵嵐、美國國會及行政當局中國委員會、美國眾議院外交委員會、美軍前副參謀長 Jack Keane、美國參議員 Ted Cruz、《華爾街日報》編輯 Bill McGurn。

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法官李運騰問到,控方列出黎追蹤的帳戶是想顯示什麼?控方代表周天行則指名單可顯示到黎的「聯繫」,李官指「聯繫」的意思可以很廣闊。周天行指可反映黎與上述人士在 Twitter 上有交流,以及犯案時的心思意念(state of mind),即黎是知悉自己在做什麼,並且有相關意圖。

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黎智英曾指示蘋果員工不要針對特朗普 因蘋果靠其支「保命」

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同年5月25日,《蘋果》發布一篇文章題為〈打國際線 蘋果英文版免費試睇〉,內容表示香港的人權被中共侵犯,英文版可供國際的朋友認識香港的狀況。

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控方指,黎智英宣傳英文版時提及,多人訂閱不但可提供經濟上的支持,亦可保護《蘋果》免受政治打壓。黎智英又指示國際組同事「不要跟紐約時報及CNN針對川普,我們蘋果卻要靠川普政府支持保命」。

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2020年6月16日,《蘋果》發布彭定康支持訂閱的宣傳短片,題為「彭定康拍片撐新聞自由:每日一蘋果全為你好」。黎智英其後指示張劍虹安排《蘋果》發起「一人一信救香港」,呼籲香港人寫信給時任美國總統特朗普,並提供書信範本及步驟。

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黃之鋒對「一人一信救香港」持不同意見,並在社交媒體稱「冇理由叫人哋國家嘅總統SaveHK」。陳沛敏把相關帖文 WhatsApp 發送給黎,黎則回應他不同意黃的觀點,現時任何有助於香港的方法都應該採用,雖然他知道很多人不同意「一人一信救香港」行動,包括李柱銘,但唯一出路就是要勇敢起來,因已沒有其他方法對付中共。

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控方:國安法生效後 黎智英在網上直播對談節目談制裁

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控方指,當《國安法》於2020年6月30日晚上11時生效,《蘋果》隨即發布一篇題為〈惡法生效 兩制蓋棺 泛民7.1繼續抗爭〉的新聞報導,實體報紙亦夾附一張海報,寫有「Fight For Freedom 為自由抗爭」。

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此時《蘋果》製作了新的網上直播節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」,首次播出時間為7月9日,題為「Live Q&A with Jimmy Lai」,黎在節目中表示以後會每週播放,並對《國安法》作出批評。之後的集數則邀請不同人士與黎智英對談,包括南華早報及英文虎報前總編輯 Mark Clifford、前港督彭定康 Chris Patten、Benedict Rogers、Jack Keane、前美國外交官 Raymond Burghardt、美國前副國防部長 Paul Wolfowitz、Natan Sharansky、美國記者兼時評作家 Nicholas Kristof 等。

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控方列舉黎智英在節目中的言論,並在庭上播放影片。黎以英語形容《國安法》生效後香港會「玩完」,若果美國取消香港特殊地位的話,意味關上中國通向世界的窗口,中國會更易接受美國的要求,因此黎支持美國取消香港特殊地位,因在國安法下特殊地位變得無意義。

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黎又指,歐洲國家應與美國聯合一起對付中國,制裁措施可以拖慢中國的通訊科技和晶片科技發展和研究,影響「華為」手機和中端科技(CTE)等企業。屆時台灣將會成為亞洲的科技樞紐,而中國則會逐漸衰退,最終使習近平讓步及立場軟化。

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控方指黎智英被捕後繼續辦節目 稱有機會被起訴勾結 籲海外人士繼續發聲

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控方指,黎在2020年8月10日首次被拘捕,即使如此,黎在同月13日繼續舉行直播節目,並在 Twitter 稱「the show has to go on」。黎又在其後的節目中稱自己被捕一事顯示香港人正面對一個怎樣的政權,並批評香港政府隨意拘捕及是極權,猶如「俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭」。

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在另一集節目,黎智英與 Benedict Rogers 對談時提到,他自己有機會被控告「勾結外國勢力」,所以海外人士的聲音變得重要,呼籲 Benedict Rogers 繼續堅持他的工作,並感謝他所做的工作,又形容國際社會是香港人的「救星」(savior)。

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2020年11月13日的節目中,前港督彭定康指中共是香港自由民主的威脅,如果想中國改變的話,要持續為香港勇敢走出來。有觀眾問國際社會可以做什麼,黎智英表示,民主派聲音將在立法會消失,意味國際社會可能再也聽不到香港的聲音,「香港可以講係喺窒息之中」,所以新聞很重要,可以令世界繼續留意香港並為香港發聲,「如果世界忘記咗我哋,就會好大鑊。」

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黎智英在另一次節目中強調,不可以向中國認輸,而他現時與不同外國人士交流,面對被起訴「勾結外國勢力」的風險,但他必須堅持及繼續手上的工作。黎又提到,很多人崇拜他,使他肩負很多責任,一方面感到責任重大,另一方面感到振奮,因他有這樣的身位去做如此美妙的工作(wonderful thing),沒有放棄的理由。

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黎智英稱特朗普較難以捉摸 於中國而言比拜登更「危險」

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黎智英在其後的集數中指,制裁不會帶來最大的破壞,最大的破壞是中美對立局面導致開戰,若果中美之間開戰的話,會帶來不確定性,最終沒有人敢來中國投資。不過黎指,若果美國與亞洲國家愈走愈近,最後孤立中國的話,便會削弱中國應對戰爭的力量,所以他認為未來中美不會開戰。另一個黎認為不會開戰的原因,是若果開戰的話,外國將不會運送石油給中國,而中國並未準備好開戰。

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有聽眾問到海外人士在美國大選應怎樣做,黎智英則指對中國來說,特朗普(Donald Trump)比拜登(Joe Biden)更「危險」,因特朗普比較難以捉摸,認為他當選是很重要。黎在一集與彭定康對談時表示,對於拜登採取「多邊主義」外交手法並不抱希望,因各個國家對中國採取不同做法,導致削弱整體立場,籲拜登對中國強硬,又鼓勵海外人士游說外國官員。

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黎亦呼籲美國更多連繫太平洋亞洲,因他們是未來最大的經濟市場。就台灣局勢,黎形容美國是台灣的「國防後盾」(security backbone),無可避免地會提升軍事和經濟支援予台灣。

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案件明日續審,控方將繼續開案陳詞及播放「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」片段。

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案件編號:HCCC51/2022

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-01-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-6.html b/hkers/2024-01-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-6.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f48cd741 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-01-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-6.html @@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第六日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第六日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.01.04

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  • 控方:黎智英受訪稱不會離開 留港直至最後一日 被捕後稱「坐監都揀呢條路」
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  • 控方:黎智英倡「支爆」 經中間人指示李宇軒及「攬炒巴」國際游說促制裁中港
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(4日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第6日審訊。控方繼續開案陳詞,指國安法生效後,黎智英持續在專欄撰文及在 Twitter 發文,稱推行國安法會導致中國被國際圍堵,又表態支持美國推行《香港避風港法案》和《香港人自由和選擇法》。黎接受外媒採訪時稱:「我將會留在這裡直至最後一日⋯⋯直至我不能再留或我們陣營的人全部被捕或離去。」如果他離開會令自己蒙羞,也會令《蘋果日報》名譽受損。黎於2020年8月10日被拘捕,他獲釋後,《蘋果日報》隨即以頭版報導黎智英稱:「坐監都揀呢條路。」

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控方:國安法生效後 黎智英續撰文提制裁

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控方繼續開案陳詞,指《國安法》生效之後,黎智英持續利用《蘋果日報》作為平台發布煽動文章,美化及鼓吹示威者的違法行為,又請求外國勢力向中港官員實施制裁。在2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日期間,《蘋果》發布了合共85篇煽動刊物,其中31篇含有請求外國勢力向中港官員實施制裁、封鎖或其他敵對措施的內容。

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其中黎智英在專欄「成敗樂一笑」所撰寫的文章,涉及請求外國制裁的內容,包括:

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    《有種回力鏢……自插心臟》(2020年7月26日):黎稱國安法生效後,會損害中國經濟及引來國際圍堵。黎又指美國會有強烈反制措施,以及制裁和懲罰。

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    《繼續打壓香港 還是以身報國?》(2020年9月27日):黎形容國安法是中央殘暴和惡毒的手段去打壓香港人追求民主自由

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    《台灣也要感謝黨》(2020年10月11日):黎稱若日本、澳洲和西方國家向中國實施科技禁運及制裁,中國的經濟和科技發展將會停滯,而台灣能獲得好處,又指國家領導人習近平是自大及獨裁

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    《天下圍中 拜登騎虎難下》(2020年11月29日):黎呼籲拜登政府不要採取「多邊主義」外交手段,若果拜登政府不繼續上一任總統特朗普的「對中國不妥協」政策,台灣的形勢將會惡化

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控方:黎被捕獲釋後 蘋果頭版報導「坐監都揀呢條路」

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黎智英於2020年8月10日被警方國安處拘捕,其後獲得警方擔保。8月13日,《蘋果日報》頭版報導黎智英稱:「坐監都揀呢條路」,並引述黎稱:「將來瞓喺監獄,whatever,我都係會揀呢條路。」報章另發布報導引述黎稱「手銬都不能侮辱我」。

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控方提到,黎於2020年12月還柙後,來監獄探訪的人包括張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、馮偉光、張志偉。《蘋果日報》仍繼續運作,而黎則繼續給予指示。

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控方又提到,楊清奇負責聯絡《蘋果》不同專欄作者,包括李怡,亦曾安排區家麟撰稿,而區的文章亦構成部份煽動內容。黎亦曾介紹日本籍的作者替《蘋果》撰文。

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黎受訪稱「不會離開」 否則令自己蒙羞

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控方指,黎智英在2020年7月1日接受《霍士新聞》(Fox News)訪問,提到香港或不再是金融中心(financial hub),當中譴責《國安法》和中共,又指會在香港留到最後一刻。庭上播放片段,黎提到《國安法》內文比最壞的想像更差,港人之間溝通要變得非常小心,又批評《國安法》凌駕立法會、取代法治和《基本法》,令做生意的人無法受到保障,難以維持香港的金融地位。被問到是否害怕被捕,黎指「我不擔心,因為我不能擔心,如果我擔心就不能做或講任何事情」。

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至於會否離港,他則堅決表示不會:「我將會留在這裡直至最後一日(“I’m going to stay until the last day.”)⋯⋯直至我不能再留或我們陣營的人全部被捕或離去。不,我不能離開,如果我離開,我令自己蒙羞,我令《蘋果日報》名譽受損,我也損害民主運動的團結。(“Until I can’t stay or everybody in our camp is either arrested or gone. I can’t go away, if I go away, I disgrace myself, I discredit Apple Daily, I also undermine the solidarity of the democratic movement.”)」被問到他曾被捕數次,所涉罪名或能判終身監禁,黎指他不知道將會發生什麼,「但當政府不尊重法律,你不會知道紅線在哪。」

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播放片段期間,黎智英專注望向前方螢幕,一度輕輕搖頭。

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控方:黎Twitter發文支持美推行法案及制裁 獲特朗普讚勇敢受寵若驚

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控方亦展示多則 Twitter 帖文。2020年7月15日,黎智英轉載美國駐港澳領事館關於民主派初選的聲明,黎標註(Tag)時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧及美國駐港澳領事館的 Twitter,感謝他們對香港人的支持,又稱國際間發聲及採取行動防範中共打壓自由,是前所未有的重要。

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2020年7月17日,黎智英在 Twitter 發文指《香港避風港法案》(Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act)和《香港人自由和選擇法》(Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act)是逆權運動的重要資源,向所有前美國政府及國務院職員致敬。

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“#HongKong #SafeHarborAct and #PeoplesFreedomandChoiceAct are good wherewithals to our resistance movement. Salute all former CGs and State Dept staff for caring about this place we call home.” — 黎智英 Twitter

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2020年7月23日,黎智英 Twitter 發文指年輕人是爭取自由運動的中流砥柱,但他們危在旦夕,而英國推行BNO簽證新政策作為香港人的「救生艇」。

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“This is urgent and necessary. Our young people are the backbone of our freedom movement. They’re in the most danger. U.K. launches lifeboat for Hongkongers with focus on younger generation with new BN(O) visa.” — 黎智英 Twitter

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同日黎智英再發文,指美國應對尋求庇護的香港年輕人寬大,因他們為了爭取自由失去很多(“The US should be lenient for young #HKers seeking asylum. They suffered a lot fighting for #HongKong’s freedom.”),並轉載《蘋果》英文新聞,標題指《國安法》生效後,辦理移民美國的律師稱有關政治庇護的查詢驟增。(“Political asylum inquiries surge after national security law: US immigration lawyer”)

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2020年8月21日,黎智英 Twitter 引述《蘋果》報導指時任美國總統特朗普稱呼黎作勇敢的人,他感到受寵若驚,但他還未夠勇敢去對抗習近平,他只是為香港和台灣站出來。

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“President @realDonaldTrump calls me a brave man. I am flattered. But I am not brave enough to stand against the whole world like #Xi. I only #StandWithHongKong #StandwithTaiwan” — 黎智英 Twitter

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2020年9月17日,黎智英 Twitter 稱,當美國等聯合一起實施制裁,中共同伙便會無處躲避,他們的資產亦無處可藏,並需為迫害香港人而承受後果。

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“When America and the rest of the free world are aligned and put in place the sanctions, CCP’s accomplices have nowhere to turn, and their assets have nowhere to hide. Their evil deeds persecuting of HKers will have consequences.” — 黎智英 Twitter

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2020年12月1日,黎轉載《蘋果》英文新聞指林鄭因被美國制裁而家中堆放大量現金,黎稱拜登政府應令協助中共的人付上責任,制裁措施可挫他們的士氣,即使只為他們帶來少許不便,也是有效用。

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“Biden administration should know that by making those abetting CCP repression personally accountable the measures can frustrate their morale of evil doing, thus will be effective even the measures may seem inconveniences in small ways.” — 黎智英 Twitter

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審訊不設陪審團,由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。

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黎智英的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師 Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。

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image04 +▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻(右)、大律師 Marc Corlett(左)

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控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。

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同案8名被告:前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華,早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,現正還柙,等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。

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首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指,黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司,於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日(包括首尾兩日),在香港與其他人一同串謀,請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。

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另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪,指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間,與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀,請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員,實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。

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「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指,黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日(包括首尾兩日),在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物,具意圖:

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a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛

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b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項

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c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛

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d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛

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e) 煽惑他人使用暴力

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f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(4日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第6日審訊。控方續開案陳詞,就涉及李宇軒、陳梓華和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人的「串謀勾結外國勢力」控罪,控方指黎智英為主腦和金主,透過陳梓華作為「中間人」,向李宇軒和劉祖廸傳達指示,以「重光團隊(SWHK)」作平台,請求外國對中港實施制裁或敵對行動。當中黎智英曾在台灣向陳梓華和劉祖廸等人解釋其「支爆」計劃,並提出進行國際游說,令港府同意其議程、甚至推翻中共,李宇軒等人負責執行。而落實策略包括全球登報和眾籌;以「美國線」、「英國線」和「日本線」與當地政治人物接觸和聯繫,游說制裁中港;及發布制裁名單等。其中黎曾為全球登報墊支約500萬港元,並資助外國政治人物來港監察區選。

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控方:陳梓華經李柱銘認識黎智英助手、指示李宇軒加入「攬炒團隊」

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控方今續讀出就黎智英與李宇軒等人,串謀勾結外國勢力罪行的開案陳詞。控方指稱,黎智英與李宇軒、陳梓華、Mark Simon、劉祖廸,及英國保守黨人權委員會委員裴倫德(Luke de Pulford)、日本眾議院議員菅野志櫻里、及英國金融家比爾布勞德(Bill Browder),串謀請求英、美、日及歐洲等國,對中港政府實施制裁或採取敵對行動,包括停止與香港的司法互助及或引渡協議、向香港停售武器、限制中港貿易,並以「重光團隊(Stand with Hong Kong Fight for Freedom,簡稱 SWHK)」作平台促進串謀。

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控方指,2019年6月反修例運動期間,陳梓華在 Telegram 群組「G20」得悉有示威者欲尋求黎智英資助進行「全球登報」,以尋求外國對中港政府施壓。陳其後嘗試透過李柱銘接觸黎智英,並獲介紹認識黎的助手 Mark Simon,Simon 轉告黎支持計劃,願預留500萬港元作廣告開支,事後需還款。

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陳梓華遂聯絡群組成員之一的李宇軒,表示自己是黎智英的「中間人」,並要求李在G20峰會時組織全球登報,促使外國向港府施壓;陳並於2019年7月指示李加入「攬炒團隊」為核心成員,李和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸其後負責團隊運作,並透過陳接收黎智英和 Mark Simon 的指示。

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2019年7月,陳梓華首次與黎智英會面,同場還有李柱銘,飯局上黎智英指示陳透過 Mark Simon 接觸他,又着陳向激進示威者轉達訊息,指他們應採用較溫和的手段以爭取國際支持。同年8月,李宇軒和劉祖廸等人成立「重光團隊(SWHK)」,目的是請求外國制裁中港政府和介入警暴。

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控方:黎智英為主腦、金主 陳梓華為中間人 李宇軒執行指示

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就各人角色,控方指黎智英為主腦和金主,負責「最高指揮」;Mark Simon 是黎的代理人,直接向黎匯報和負責執行其指示,及審理財政援助的申請,黎本人會批核大額財政,Mark Simon 則負責較低金額。

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至於陳梓華是中間人,直接從黎智英或透過 Mark Simon 接收黎的指示,再傳達予李宇軒和劉祖廸,並與外媒聯絡放置廣告;李和劉則為團隊對外核心成員,按黎智英或 Mark Simon 經陳梓華的指示,指揮其他團隊成員,李並曾在眾籌前預付登報的費用。

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而 SWHK 則自2019年8月起被用作平台實施串謀,透過社交媒體上的政治宣傳、發布文章、與外國政治人物或社運人士聯繫,請求外國對中港實施制裁、封鎖或其他敵對行為。

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控方:黎在台與「攬炒巴」等會面談「支爆」 促制裁甚至推翻中共

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控方續指,2020年1月,黎智英指示 Mark Simon 安排與陳梓華、劉祖廸和一名林姓女示威者在其台灣陽明山寓所會面,會上黎解釋其「支爆」計劃,即透過造成中國行政及經濟動盪令中國政府倒台,並解釋國際游說的4個階段:

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(i)令外國知悉香港發生什麼事;

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(ii)呼籲外國政府關注和譴責港府;

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(iii)會見外國官員並將他們想法帶回香港;

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(iv)會見外國政治顧問,以影響其政府對華政策,促使對香港及中國實施制裁,令港府同意其議程,甚至推翻中共。

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何俊仁和李永達其後亦加入該會面。此外,黎智英亦安排陳梓華、李宇軒和女示威者在台灣會見施明德,讓施分享抗爭的經驗。

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控方指,各人其後討論如何執行黎的「支爆」計劃,當中陳梓華負責聯絡抗爭相關人士,李宇軒繼續國際游說及建立國際網絡,劉祖廸扮演精神領袖宣揚「攬炒」。至2020年5月,Mark Simon 與陳梓華會面重申4階段國際游說;黎智英於同年6月與陳會面,指示他繼續進行國際游說,又邀請陳到壹傳媒大樓會面,強調《蘋果日報》英文版的重要性。

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控方:李宇軒被捕後 Mark Simon曾稱運作不受影響

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控方並指,《國安法》生效後,陳梓華和 Mark Simon 繼續保持聯絡,而李宇軒於2020年8月被捕後,Simon 告知陳梓華 SWHK 的運作不會受影響,因他們有 Plan B,就是讓劉祖廸到美國演講宣揚「攬炒」理念,並繼續要求美國制裁中港政府。同年10月,陳梓華被以「協助罪犯罪」被捕並獲保釋,Simon 仍鼓勵他繼續國際游說,又稱會向他提供協助,包括安排他到美國。

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控方:黎智英指示李宇軒3次全球登報、墊支約510萬

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控方續指,黎智英等人採取不同策略勾結外國勢力,包括全球登報和眾籌、建立國際網絡、及發布文章、新聞稿和制裁報告等。

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就全球登報及眾籌,控方指,李宇軒在黎智英及 Mark Simon 經陳梓華指示下,於2019年6、7、8月分別組織3次全球登報,在美、加、英、日及台等多地報章刊登文章,呼籲譴責中國、香港政府和香港警察,並促請對中港實施制裁。其中加拿大《環球郵報》〈Stand With Hong Kong Until Dawn〉,提到望加政府承認香港警察犯下反人類罪行,實施制裁和禁向香港售武;美國《紐約時報》〈Catch Hong Kong As We Fall〉,則促美方停止賣彈藥予香港警察並通過《香港人權及民主法案》。

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為支付相關費用,李宇軒及陳梓華等人發起3次眾籌,分別籌得約700萬港元、30萬英鎊(約310萬港元)及183萬美元(約1,440萬港元),即共約2,450萬港元。控方並指黎智英透過 Mark Simon 提供財政支持,其中第一次登報開支約600萬港元,黎和 Simon 透過二人持有的公司 LAIS Hotel Properties Limited 及力高顧問,墊支156萬港元給至少5份報章;李宇軒其後在8月初將156萬港元轉帳到台灣的查德威有限公司償還黎,以避免黎的身分曝光。

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Mark Simon 亦協助處理眾籌款項,就第二次全球登報,Mark Simon 將眾籌的約310萬港元,存入《蘋果日報》專欄作者 Jack Henry Hazlewood 的英國戶口,再轉帳給李宇軒。就第三次全球登報,Mark Simon 將眾籌資金存入其美國戶口,再存入他成立的信託基金「The Project Hong Kong Trust」,再透過基金將約320萬港元存入李宇軒戶口;LAIS Hotel 及力高亦向6份報章支付354萬港元,包括向《日本經濟新聞》支付約147萬港元。庭上展示 WhatsApp 訊息,Mark Simon 曾表示已獲歸還所有就國際廣告支付的款項(“all monies that were used for the international ad campaign are now back with us”)。

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法官李運騰一度問及,控方展示 Mark Simon 的 WhatsApp 訊息,是否依賴該些訊息的真實性,周天行回應視乎情況,指部分訊息有銀行紀錄支持。惟李運騰指即使如此,該些訊息仍屬「傳聞證供」,控方不能以此證明 Simon 訊息所說為真,周天行終稱只會用以證黎智英犯案時的心態。

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image06 +▲ 周天行

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控方:黎智英資助辦展覽及組織選舉監察團、轉讓公司予陳梓華作回報

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控方續指,黎智英亦為其他宣傳提供財政支持,包括2019年8月,Mark Simon 轉帳3萬元予陳梓華,由李予信協助籌辦報紙展覽;10月黎智英再轉帳14.41萬元予陳,組織其他報紙展覽和街站;11月 Mark Simon 轉帳50萬元予李宇軒組織「選舉監察團」,邀請外國政治人物來港監察區議會選舉。2020年1月,黎智英亦將一所在英屬維爾京群島註冊的公司「LACOCK」轉讓予陳梓華,包括股權、董事及銀行戶口的簽署人,作為陳提供協助的回報。

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此外,黎智英和 Mark Simon 亦透過陳梓華,批准李宇軒免費使用《蘋果日報》就鄧小平簽署《中英聯合聲明》的版權相片;《蘋果日報》亦在重要版面刊登第三次全球登報的詳情。

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控方續指,眾籌的資金同時用作 SWHK 營運開支及作國際游說工作,及邀請英國國會議員 Bob Seely 於2019年8月來港觀察反修例運動。而由於眾籌資金用畢,劉祖廸於2020年5月提出進行第4次眾籌,團隊於8月籌得170萬美元(約1,320萬港元),並存放在由 Mark Simon 設立和控制的「the Project Hong Kong Trust」,並按其指示將有關款項用於國際游說工作。

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控方:黎指示分美、英、日3線 李宇軒向美議員展警彈藥游說警暴

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除了全球登報,控方亦指 SWHK 被用作平台以建立國際網絡爭取外國支持,及向中港施壓。在2019年10至11月,團隊資助香港大專學生在日內瓦、柏林、巴黎、倫敦及華盛頓會見外國政治人物,游說他們支持反修例示威;同年11月發起「選舉監察團」,邀請19名外國政治人物來港監察區議會選舉,期間李宇軒與 Lord Alton、Luke de Pulford、陳方安生和李柱銘會面,擴展網絡。

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📣 🗳️ Hong Kong Electoral Observation Mission

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We are very pleased to welcome the following independent observers of the 2019 District Council Election! Thank you for being witnesses for Hong Kong!#HongKongEOM #HongKongProtests #StandwithHK pic.twitter.com/v9WIeyShko — Fight For Freedom. Stand With Hong Kong. 重光團隊 (@Stand_with_HK) November 23, 2019

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而為促進串謀,及在黎智英指示下,陳梓華、李宇軒及劉祖廸等人與美國、英國及日本的政治人物接觸和持續聯繫,並稱之為「美國線」、「英國線」與「日本線」。「美國線」方面,黎智英同意 Mark Simon 於2019年9月安排李宇軒與潛在美國總統參選人、參議員斯科特 Rick Scott、其助手 Scott Sciretta 及美國領事職員 Alan Brinker 會面,李透過展示277粒警方使用過的彈藥,就「警暴」進行游說,陳梓華並曾指示李宇軒隱藏「資助人(backers)」黎和 Simon 的身分。

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同年12月,李宇軒到美國與「香港民主委員會」創辦人、朱耀明兒子朱牧民及美國參議員 Rick Scott、Todd Young 和 Ted Cruz 會面,陳梓華提醒李把握機會建立美國網絡並游說制裁中港政府。

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控方:陳方安生邀李宇軒與英領事等會面、李協助IPAC工作

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「英國線」方面,2019年12月,黎智英安排陳梓華於倫敦與「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯 Benedict Rogers 會面;同月在陳方安生邀請下,李宇軒參與時任英國駐港領事 Andrew Heyn 舉辦的飯局,席間除陳方安生外,李柱銘、郭榮鏗和莫乃光均有出席。至2020年1或2月,陳方安生再邀陳梓華和李宇軒在其辦公室會面,就對示威的看法交流意見。

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同年5月,英國保守黨人權委員會委員裴倫德向李宇軒提出,有意成立「對華政策跨國議會聯盟(IPAC)」,成員包括對中國採強硬立場的各國議員,以爭取落實制裁中港政府的政策。Mark Simon 指示 SWHK 應加入 IPAC,SWHK 遂於2020年6月在裴倫德招募下加入 IPAC 秘書處。

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同年7月,李宇軒向裴倫德建議游說英、美、日、德國、西班牙、意大利等多個國家,停止與香港的司法互助或逃犯引渡協議;其後在黎智英和 Mark Simon 指示下,陳梓華建議李宇軒繼續協助 IPAC 的工作,負責網站編輯及發布文章。

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控方:李宇軒向日議員交制裁草案、協助翻譯推立法

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「日本線」方面,李宇軒於2020年1月至4月,向3名日本眾議院議員提交有關「馬格尼茨基式」制裁的草案,並將 IPAC 的會議紀錄翻譯成日文,以協助菅野志櫻里推動《馬格尼茨基人權法案》立法。李又與裴倫德等人討論 SWHK 可如何協助 IPAC 和由日本議員組成的「對中政策相關國會議員聯盟(JPAC)」,其中 Bill Browder 和菅野志櫻里原擬會面討論該法案,但該視像會議終因李宇軒被捕而未成事。

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控方並指,李宇軒在黎智英透過 Mark Simon 和陳梓華的指示下,執行和管理 SWHK 的事務,與外國政治人物建立網絡、進行國際游說,請求外國制裁中國;負責 SWHK 會計紀錄,批出團隊活動開支;亦負責編輯 SWHK 的網頁。

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控方:SWHK發布多篇文章籲制裁、致函外國政府促停引渡協議

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控方另指,在黎智英及 Mark Simon 透過陳梓華指示下,李宇軒本人或透過 SWHK,發布一系列文章、新聞稿和制裁名單,以促請制裁。其中2019年12月,SWHK 發布一份與香港大專學界國際事務代表團制作,針對144名中港官員的制裁名單;2020年7月1日,SWHK 發布題為〈Darkness is descending on freedom and democracy in Hong Kong, a leading global campaigning organisation has warned〉的新聞稿,譴責《國安法》頒布,並呼籲英政府急切考慮對中國及香港實施馬格尼茨基式制裁、及撤銷與香港的引渡協議,並對中國國企如華為施加限制。同年7月17日,SWHK 致函捷克、愛爾蘭及葡萄牙政府,促請她們終止與香港的引渡協議,3封信於李的電腦搜得。

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7月期間,SWHK 亦多次在 Twitter 轉發外國政治人物的帖文,如轉發美國議員帖文,感謝他們投票通過《香港自治法案》;轉發 Bill Browder 帖文呼籲制裁中港官員;轉發美國白宮帖文,感謝美國取消香港「特別待遇」和對中國施加關稅;及轉發羅冠聰帖文,促請國際社會對前特首和選舉主任進行制裁等。

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SWHK亦曾於7至8月發布數篇文章,包括〈The destruction of the democratic process in Hong Kong〉,呼籲美國對中港進行制裁,並於2021年1月發布由數個海外組織聯署的聲明,促請美政府啟動「救生艇」政策及英國政府實施對中港制裁。

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控方稱黎智英2013至2020年期間 向民主派課金逾9千萬元

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就資金流向,控方指在2013年7月至2020年7月期間,黎智英共86次轉帳予 Mark Simon,款項達1億1,860萬元。其中9,326萬元再被分配給不同民主派人士及政黨。此外,黎智英於2019年10月18日指示 Mark Simon,將25,819.15元美金(即港幣約202,163.94元)捐給「香港監察」。

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稅務局的資料顯示在2013至2020年期間,Mark Simon 報稱為壹傳媒動畫公司的職員,年薪為110至120萬元。在2020至2021年期間,Mark Simon 亦報稱為力高顧問有限公司的商業經理。

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李宇軒被捕後獲警方擔保 惟其後被內地水警截獲 終移交回港

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就各被告的被捕情況,控方指,李宇軒於2020年8月10日被警方以「勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」、「無牌管有槍械或彈藥」、「藏有可作非法用途的工具」及「洗黑錢」罪拘捕。8月12日李獲警方擔保,惟須交出護照等旅遊證件及不得離港,並須於同年9月1日到警署報到。

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惟8月23日李乘船非法闖入中國水域時被內地水警拘捕。至2021年3月22日,李從中國被移交至香港警方。

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陳梓華2021年2月還柙至今 劉祖廸和Mark Simon於2020年離港

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至於陳梓華於2020年10月10日被警方以「協助罪犯」罪名拘捕,其後獲警方擔保。同年10至11月,Mark Simon 向陳說自己可能會因國安法罪名而被捕,但鼓勵陳繼續國際游說工作,Mark Simon 並向陳保證黎智英及他會提供一切協助,包括提供逃往美國的路線。

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至2021年2月15日,陳再度被警方以「勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪拘捕,其後一直還柙至今。

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至於劉祖廸和 Mark Simon,則分別於2020年1月5日及4月18日經出境關口離開香港。

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黎智英於2020年8月10日首次被捕。其後於9月1日,黎進行警誡錄影會面,警員向他展示部份專欄文章,他承認作者是自己。黎亦承認 Twitter 帳戶屬於他持有及使用。

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控方:3法案通過立法 42名官員被制裁

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控方最後指,在涉案時段,外國推行不同法案及政策,以制裁中港官員、限制貿易和出入口,以及延長港人外國居留期限等。包括2019年6月13日,《香港人權及民主法案》(The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act)在美國眾議院審議,並於同年11月27日獲時任美國總統特朗普簽署立法。2020年6月30日,美國議員提出《香港避風港法案》(Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act),相關立法程序仍在進行中。

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2020年7月14日特朗普正式簽署《香港自治法》(Hong Kong Autonomy Act)。法案授權美國政府制裁有份損害香港自治的中國及香港官員、機構或企業。同日,特朗普簽署《香港正常化總統行政命令》(President’s Executive Order 13936 on Hong Kong Normalization),暫緩或取消對香港的部份特別待遇,以及授權美政府實施制裁措施。

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2021年6月30日,美國有議員提出《香港人自由和選擇法》(Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act),要求為合資格的港人提供臨時庇護和難民身份,以及其他有關移居美國的措施,相關立法程序仍在進行中。

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2020年8月至2021年7月期間,美國向42名中央及香港特區政府官員實施制裁。

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2020年8月11日,美國政府宣布由同年9月25日起,從香港進口美國的產品須註明原產地是「中國」,而不能標示「香港」。2020年8月19日,美國國務院宣布終止與香港簽署的三項雙邊協議,包括逃犯的移交、被判刑人士的移交、豁免國際船運利得稅。

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此外,約於2020年11月9日,英國、愛爾蘭、澳洲、紐西蘭等9個國家分別暫緩與香港之間的逃犯移交協議。

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控方指,香港城市大學法律學院教授、梁美芬丈夫王貴國會以美國法律和國際經濟法的專家身份出庭作供,講述制裁及封鎖措施的法律效力,包括影響、後果及時效等。

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下周一續審 料將讀出同意事實

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控方讀畢179頁的開案陳詞,表示原預計傳召60名證人,但可減至31人,並望減至30人以下。控方亦將讀出同意事實,但望法庭給予時間與辯方商討,以視乎可否同意更多事實。案件下周一(8日)續審,將讀出同意事實。

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案件編號:HCCC51/2022

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UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.36 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
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Ukraine Can, But...

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【黎智英案・審訊第六日】

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Jack Watling | 2023.12.27
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By finally delivering on their promises, Kyiv’s European allies will find the benefits extend to them, too.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.01.04
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  • 控方:黎智英受訪稱不會離開 留港直至最後一日 被捕後稱「坐監都揀呢條路」
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  • 控方:黎智英倡「支爆」 經中間人指示李宇軒及「攬炒巴」國際游說促制裁中港
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【黎智英案・審訊第二日】

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U.S.-India Relations In 2023

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獨媒報導 | 2023.12.19
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  • 控方指黎智英持續串謀、無逾時檢控 官周五頒判決
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Richard M. Rossow | 2024.01.02
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2023 was one of the more consequential years for U.S.-India relations — for both, positive and negative reasons. Poring through the numerous senior-level engagements and outcome documents, the relationship largely remains in the “agenda-setting mode”. However, as indicated by the types of engagements and frequency — one can expect concrete outcomes soon. Notably, China remains a driving imperative behind U.S.-India strategic and commercial relations.

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NATO To Protect Undersea

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【黎智英案・審訊第四日】

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Sean Monaghan, et al. | 2023.12.19
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NATO is not ready to mitigate increasingly prevalent Russian aggression against European critical undersea infrastructure (CUI).

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獨媒報導 | 2024.01.02
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  • 控方開案陳詞:黎智英為「主腦」 國安法生效前已著手聯絡及會面外國官員
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  • 控方指黎智英與李柱銘晤佩洛西 多次受訪稱需要外國向中國施壓制裁
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Getting On Track

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【黎智英案・審訊第三日】

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Masao Dahlgren | 2023.12.18
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The conflict in Ukraine has made it clear that missiles “are foundational to adversaries’ way of war.” Future missile threats, however, increasingly stress existing missile defenses, flying lower, faster, and on unpredictable trajectories. Most importantly, they are difficult to detect — defeating them will require elevated sensors, on aircraft or satellites, to track them at range.

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獨媒報導 | 2023.12.22
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  • 官裁煽動刊物罪非逾時檢控 去信法庭「提出告發」未等黎智英上庭 已屬啟動程序
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Profiting From Proliferation?

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Euro SIFMANet Tbilisi Report

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Daniel Salisbury and Darya Dolzikova | 2023.12.15
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This paper examines North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, based on a review of Pyongyang’s recent technological advancements and developments in North Korea’s customer base. The authors assess the likelihood of North Korea selling its missile and nuclear technology onwards, and the kinds of technology that may be for sale and to whom.

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Tom Keatinge and Gonzalo Saiz | 2023.12.21
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Discussions revealed the particular challenges that Georgia faces in implementing sanctions against Russia – and how its partners can help.

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In Plain Sight

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【黎智英案・審訊第二日】

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James Byrne, et al. | 2023.12.14
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An exclusive investigation conducted by RUSI, in partnership with Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR, reveals how one of Russia’s leading microelectronic distributors, Compel JSC, has imported massive volumes of Western microelectronics through Germany and Hong Kong since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

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獨媒報導 | 2023.12.19
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  • 控方指黎智英持續串謀、無逾時檢控 官周五頒判決
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Euro SIFMANet Barna Report

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NATO To Protect Undersea

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Tom Keatinge and Gonzalo Saiz | 2023.12.14
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Participants discussed the key role that data plays in the success of sanctions.

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Sean Monaghan, et al. | 2023.12.19
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NATO is not ready to mitigate increasingly prevalent Russian aggression against European critical undersea infrastructure (CUI).

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Organised Cybercrime

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【黎智英案・審訊第一日】

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Jamie MacColl and Gareth Mott | 2023.12.13
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This article traces the journey of the threat and response to cybercrime – specifically, ransomware, which has emerged as the most disruptive cyber threat to the UK’s national security and society today.

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獨媒報導 | 2023.12.18
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  • 黎智英爭議串謀發布煽動刊物罪逾時檢控、涉新聞自由應寬鬆詮釋法例
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