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+layout: post
+title : Deal or No Deal?
+author: Simon Rynn and Michael Jones
+date  : 2023-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/r8IsoKy.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "An Appraisal of UK Engagement in Sudan"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_This paper sets out research findings on the UK’s development, defence and diplomacy engagements in Sudan from 2015 to the present. It also tests common assertions around the effects of Brexit, reductions in the UK aid budget, and the merger of two government departments, the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+### Executive Summary
+
+Since 2016, successive British governments have sought to emphasise that a post-Brexit UK would be outward looking, collaborative and influential. A series of speeches and policy statements emphasised that the UK would pursue future prosperity through overseas engagements built upon investments in diplomacy, trade, defence and development aid. In March 2021, the UK government published its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The document reiterated these themes and referenced Eastern Africa as a part of the world where the UK would increase its engagement.
+
+Against this backdrop, a RUSI research team set out to examine how the UK has deployed its development, defence and diplomacy toolkit in four countries in Eastern Africa since 2015. The project, entitled “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa”, seeks to identify the factors that have helped or hindered the UK in pursuing a “Global Britain” agenda in four countries in the region: Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The research tested some common assertions around the effects of Brexit, reductions in the UK aid budget, and the merger of two government departments: the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).
+
+This paper sets out findings on the UK’s relevant engagements in one of the four focus countries, Sudan, from 2015 to the present. It finds that, despite a chequered past, the UK has had significant leverage at key moments, building on a long history of engagement. There have been some successes in recent years. Examples include careful use of diplomacy and development aid in support of conflict resolution and humanitarian relief. The UK has also worked to support inclusion of civilians in government and to help Sudan manage economic and political crises from 2019 to the present. While the Sudanese may be disappointed by the record of Sudan’s hybrid civilian–military government of 2019–20, the UK is still well regarded overall.
+
+Regarding an “integrated approach” to UK foreign policy, Sudan has provided few opportunities to pursue defence engagement or promote trade since 2016. Use of development aid and diplomacy have, however, become more integrated over the period, as envisaged by UK government policy. The unplanned merger of DFID and the FCO, though time-consuming and frustrating, has also offered benefits.
+
+UK relationships in Sudan have weathered Brexit well. The UK enjoys substantial depth and quality of partnerships both in Sudan and with regional actors. Its ability to operate in multiple forums, from New York to Khartoum and the immediate region, via a combination of envoys, ambassadors, political and aid specialists and multilateral bodies, is significant. The UK has been particularly effective in two groupings: the UK–US–Norwegian “Troika” and the “Quad” (the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – also at times referred to as “the Quartet”). Astute UK involvement here has helped to compensate for a post-Brexit loss of influence over EU policy and expenditure. Linked to Brexit, however, the paralysis that characterised British politics during 2019–20 has been detrimental. It drew the attention of ministers and senior decision-makers away from Sudan at a critical moment in Sudan’s history and contributed to perceptions of declining UK influence in Sudan.
+
+Sudan has not been prioritised as the 2021 Integrated Review suggested it would be. The lingering effects of the Covid-19 pandemic response, Brexit, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have all diverted the UK’s attention and resources. After a brief increase linked to a 2019 political transition in Sudan, the UK aid budget has levelled off. Although aid agencies in receipt of UK aid have been alarmed, the real-world impact of this is hard to gauge, given the fragile state of Sudan’s economy. Reductions also coincided with an overall decline in humanitarian aid contributions from other donors. Nevertheless, a solid reputation and substantial influence that the UK has earned within the aid sector in Sudan is now seen as being at risk.
+
+Overall, the research finds that commentators expect UK influence in Sudan to wane in the years ahead. Brexit has played a part in this, but aid cuts and the visible rise of competitors such as China are more salient factors. In the research for this paper, interviews revealed a general sense of frustration that the former colonial power would not commit further resources to Sudan, along with a feeling that the UK appears too willing to back a compromise with military actors amid a contested political “transition”. Interviews also show that many pro-democracy campaigners expect the UK and Western allies to play a conservative hand in future: that, despite clear evidence of the Sudanese military’s role in driving disorder, they will seek stability through a compromise.
+
+Notwithstanding its many problems, Sudan represents what practitioners might call a “medium-sized” challenge. If senior decision-makers were willing, the UK might help shape the country’s trajectory through technical leadership, financial assistance and support to political coalition-building. Alongside humanitarian relief and reform, other areas of traditional UK expertise, from stabilisation to governance and security sector reform to economic development, will be critical to Sudan’s future. The UK could plausibly convene others around these topics. It might also play a useful role facilitating much-needed dialogue among disparate pro-democracy groups. To maximise its effectiveness, the UK should, however, work alongside others to identify the lessons of recent years and to forge coalitions and strategies that might in time lead towards a fully democratised Sudan.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Following the June 2016 Brexit vote, successive UK prime ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson repeatedly made reference to “Global Britain”. The phrase attracted widespread commentary, much of it quizzical or critical. It was, however, an attempt to signal a sense that the UK would remain an outward-looking country.
+
+In March 2021, the UK government published the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The document recognised a more competitive global context than in 2016 but reiterated now-familiar “Global Britain” themes. It signalled a wish to play a proactive role in global affairs; to work in partnership with others, particularly “like-minded bilateral and multilateral partners”; and to better integrate foreign policy, defence, trade and international development efforts. Africa was referenced in terms of forging problem-solving partnerships and pursuing shared goals such as prosperity, democracy and security. The policy referenced overseas aid, while leaning strongly towards promoting trade, economic resilience and the alignment of international development with wider foreign policy. Specific references were made to Eastern Africa, in the case of Sudan to support for “conflict resolution and stabilisation efforts”.
+
+In March 2023, the Integrated Review Refresh was published to provide an update of the government’s policy priorities amid a changing global context since the Integrated Review of 2021. Although no longer using the language of “Global Britain”, the key themes remain unchanged. Africa is again flagged a region where the UK government would deepen relationships. More emphasis than before was placed on pursuing international development alongside “the full range of UK strengths and expertise”. Against this backdrop, a RUSI research team has set out to examine how the UK has deployed its development, defence and diplomacy toolkit in Eastern Africa in support of the UK government’s agenda for a more integrated, proactive foreign policy in the region. The team looked at how the government sought to bring about positive change in the countries in which it is working while also securing secondary, largely geopolitical, benefits in its national interest at a time of domestic and international change.
+
+A two-year research project has sought to test some of the assertions that have been made around Brexit, the reduction in the UK aid budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI), the increases in the defence budget, and the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) from a merger of the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The project, entitled “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa”, asks whether these structural changes have helped or hindered the progress of recent UK governments’ “Global Britain” policy agendas in the region, while seeking to identify factors that may have contributed to or limited the UK’s ability to project influence. It aims to answer the following research questions:
+
+- How effective has the UK been in making a positive difference in relation to “Global Britain” objectives in the region in recent years, particularly through its development aid, diplomacy and defence engagement?
+
+- What impact have recent structural and policy changes such as Brexit, aid cuts and the merger of DFID and the FCO had on “Global Britain” outcomes?
+
+- How does the UK’s approach and impact differ from those of others?
+
+- How do UK aid priorities for Eastern Africa align with those of East African governments, and what are those governments’ expectations of and recommendations for the UK?
+
+The research methodology consisted of a review of selected policy literature and semi-structured expert interviews (see Table 1). Interviews were used to identify factors that recurrently enabled or constrained UK actions, particularly with reference to positive outcomes to which the UK was thought to have contributed. Data on UK aid, defence and diplomatic engagement in the four focal countries from 2015 to 2022 is used as a reference point to identify UK policy objectives and trends over time. The intention is to provide an overview of the realities of UK engagement in each country over this six-year period, and to identify the factors that were most salient in driving outcomes.
+
+This paper provides findings on the UK’s engagement in Sudan. It is based on a review of key secondary sources and 51 interviews carried out between November 2021 and October 2022 with current and former government officials, staff from multilateral organisations, academics, and civil society and business figures, a substantial number of them based in Sudan (see Table 1). Research concluded prior to the outbreak of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023 (see Chapter I below).
+
+![image1](https://i.imgur.com/kaS8L7v.png)
+_▲ __Table 1: Interview Breakdown._ Source: Author.__
+
+Chapter I provides background on Sudan–UK relations and summarises the UK’s major policy interests and its main investments in international development, diplomatic and defence engagement in recent years. From within this broad portfolio of work, Chapter II highlights several examples of UK action that have contributed positively to outcomes in Sudan. Chapter III identifies key factors that have constrained or enabled UK action.
+
+This publication should be read in conjunction with accompanying papers on the UK in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, and an earlier publication that sets out the project methodology and offers more detail on UK investments in the region. A synthesis paper that combines findings from the four focus countries will follow.
+
+
+### I. Background
+
+The UK has longstanding ties with the Republic of Sudan, a former colony. The long period from 1881 to 1899, termed the “Mahdist War”, saw British and allied Egyptian forces pitted against the Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad – an Islamic puritan, reformer and military leader) in a series of bloody confrontations. From 1899 to 1956 Britain had de facto control of the country, although “Anglo-Egyptian Sudan” was legally a joint condominium. Following independence in 1956, relations with the UK were maintained through historical ties, trade and aid. The UK is now home to a significant and longstanding Sudanese diaspora of around 20,000 people, and attracts additional migrants and refugees each year.
+
+Post-independence, from 1956 to 1972, Sudan experienced the first of two civil wars. An imperfect peace ended in 1983 as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) fought the Sudanese government and its various southern Sudanese rivals. The second war ended in 2005 with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brokered via the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The UK, the US and Norway were strong supporters. Although the three governments held somewhat different positions (for example, the UK was seen by Khartoum as more sympathetic to its position; Norway and the US were seen as leaning towards the SPLM/A), all three worked together as a “Troika”. Linked to the Troika, the UK played a notable role in the CPA negotiations, among other things pushing the parties to meet a 31 December 2004 deadline for completing talks. The UK remained active in the follow-on period. The entire process that led to eventual South Sudanese independence in 2011, including peace negotiations, a referendum and elections, was only possible with the active participation of the north. Throughout the period to 2011, the US was the leading international actor in dealings with the government of Sudan. UK aid and diplomatic contributions were prominent, however, and included seconding a senior diplomat, Derek Plumbly, to head the Assessment and Evaluation Commission established to monitor implementation of the CPA. As many in the government of Sudan came to recognise, the UK was able to moderate and influence the US on occasion. According to interviewees, it also took on tasks such as defence cooperation that, due to domestic pressure, the US could not.
+
+Through most of this period the Sudanese Republic was a military-influenced autocracy led by President Omar Al-Bashir and the Islamic National Front, the Islamist movement that had formed the National Congress Party (NCP) in the late 1990s. The UK’s relationship with Sudan proved difficult throughout Al-Bashir’s 30-year rule. Large-scale atrocities across the Darfur region in the early 2000s led to a 2007 UN Security Council Resolution authorising a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission – what was to become the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) – against Al-Bashir’s wishes, with strong public statements from then UK prime minister Gordon Brown. The UK acted as the lead P5 Security Council member during subsequent peacekeeping mission mandate negotiations. London also subscribed to a suite of UN and EU sanctions and later supported International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments against key government officials, including Al-Bashir.
+
+The CPA, however, offered a framework for UK re-engagement. From 2008 until the mid-2010s, the UK provided key technical and diplomatic support to the linked African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP) forum. As respondents pointed out, it was the principal donor to AUHIP and, among other things, paid for technical advisers to support the forum. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) organised trainings and exchange visits for Sudanese security officials, and at one point a UK defence attaché was seconded as a military adviser. A few interviewees credited the UK’s support with helping to avert war between north and south during the tense post-independence period, and with strengthening the AU.
+
+By 2014 the UK and Sudan were participants in an EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative – the so-called Khartoum Process. A response to increased outward migration to Europe and the UK, it led to funding and capacity building for Sudanese security bodies. These included the notorious Janjaweed militia. The initiative proved highly controversial. Many questioned the wisdom of engaging with what they saw as a pariah government, and there were allegations of hypocrisy and the compromising of professed Western values. Critics pointed to evidence that the government of Sudan was displacing people through violence in its periphery, while in some cases facilitating the onward transit of Eritrean, Somali and Ethiopian migrants. The programme underscored the fact that, despite public condemnations, the UK and the EU were prepared to work closely with the Sudanese government in response to domestic policy pressures.
+
+In March 2016 a UK–Sudan Strategic Dialogue was established – a contact forum in which senior officials discussed such issues as sanctions, trade and migration. But with sanctions still in place and an ICC arrest warrant out against the head of state, the Dialogue proved difficult and controversial. UK officials were unable to meet with Al-Bashir himself and began talking through intermediaries. Interviewees pointed out that establishing a dialogue framework fuelled allegations that the UK government had accepted Sudan’s price for cooperation on the outward migration that its own human rights abuses had generated. Nevertheless, the forum provided a vehicle for discussing challenging issues, including those associated with the secession of the south. Although activity in the forum was halted due to an outbreak of violence over north– south borders and oil in 2012, early progress was made on the important question of Sudanese debt relief, as discussed below.
+
+By 2018, conditions were changing. Al-Bashir had lost oil revenues following the independence of South Sudan in 2011 and could no longer finance his patronage budget, nor imports of food and fuel. He ramped up the export production of crops, livestock and gold by printing local currency to pay above-market rates. This fed inflation. Import costs rose and urban living standards plummeted. Large-scale protests took off in December 2018, coalescing into nationwide resistance. Al-Bashir’s former political allies eventually launched a coup against him in April 2019, establishing a Transitional Military Council (TMC) that brought the once-peripheral RSF and its leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) to the centre of power.
+
+After further demonstrations, and the massacre on 3 June 2019 of more than 120 civilians outside the headquarters of the military in Khartoum, the TMC bowed to domestic and international pressure, signing a July 2019 Constitutional Charter with the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a coalition of political, professional and civic groups. Interviews found that, alongside the AU and IGAD, the UK and the US were key players influencing the process, doing so via the informal grouping known as the Quad, crucially convincing the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which both have strong connections to the SAF, to pressure Sudan’s security elite to compromise. The Constitutional Charter put in place a civilian–military transitional government with a civilian prime minister and cabinet staffed almost entirely by technocrats. This included diaspora figures such as incoming prime minister Abdalla Hamdok, alongside an executive Sovereign Council comprising five military and five civilian figures and chaired by the head of the military General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, with RSF leader Hemedti as his deputy. There was to be a 39-month transitional period during which, among other things, a new legislature would be appointed, a constitution drafted and transitional justice measures introduced prior to elections. In the interim the Sovereign Council was to be chaired by the military for the first 21 months and by civilians for the final 18 months.
+
+In October 2019, soon after the transitional government took office, peace talks started with the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a composite of rebel groups, to bring these groups into the military and transitional government and to redress a historical power imbalance between Sudan’s centre and its long-neglected peripheries. The resulting October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement provided a wealth-sharing formula, or “payroll peace”. In February 2021 armed group representatives joined Hamdok’s government, many replacing technocrats as part of a larger reshuffle.
+
+The attempted transition away from armed conflict was accompanied by high-stakes economic reforms to address a rapidly deteriorating economy with serious structural flaws. To control inflation and reduce debt, Hamdok cut subsidies on many staples. The inflationary impact was immediate, with a knock-on effect on food security in the months following. A social safety net programme called the Family Support Programme ( Thamarat) was to be implemented simultaneously to soften the economic impact. At the same time, efforts were made to catalogue and regulate parastatal companies owned or run by the military, and to investigate cronyism via a new Elimination, Empowerment, Anti-Corruption and Funds Recovery Committee. The increasingly successful impact of these reforms and investigations sparked a backlash, however: to preserve their power and commercial interests, and fearing moves to hold them accountable for past abuses, the RSF and the SAF launched a coup in October 2021. Hamdok was arrested and civilian institutions were dissolved.
+
+Amid international condemnation, Western and multilateral foreign aid totalling approximately $4.6 billion and planned debt relief worth $56 billion were suspended. Most Western countries, including the UK, condemned the coup, but opted not to reimpose sanctions. The military regime established in October 2021 remains in place to date. Despite repression, activists linked to both the FFC and neighbourhood “resistance committees” have continued to protest and demand a fully civilian-led government.
+
+These events have compounded an ongoing food crisis – in December 2022, around 11.7 million people were assessed as facing crisis-level food insecurity; a marked increase from the period to summer 2019. Against this backdrop, political negotiations have made slow progress. A “Tripartite Mechanism” led by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the AU and IGAD has struggled to broker a compromise. Both military and civilian groupings are riven with internal divisions. On 5 December 2022, the FFC and the military signed a framework agreement providing for eventual elections and a civilian-headed administration. Rather than providing a route out of instability, the agreement proved to be a harbinger of fresh conflict. Unable to resolve differences over command and control, fighting broke out in Khartoum on 15 April 2023 between the SAF and the RSF. At the time of writing hundreds of casualties had been reported. With violence spreading, scenarios could include an all-out war. Foreign governments have raced to evacuate their nationals while calling for calm. With tensions between the SAF and the RSF well-documented, the approach that external actors from the UN to the US and UK have taken towards deal-making and democratisation is being scrutinised. While they hold some basic “red lines” in common, what is referred to as the Sudanese “street” – an amorphous collection of youth and student movements, unions, civic initiatives, ordinary citizens and neighbourhood resistance committees – is also fragmented. Many Sudanese pro-democracy voices have been fiercely critical of the December 2022 framework agreement, the recent violence and external responses to it. It remains to be seen whether this broad set of actors, including politicians, professionals, unions, local resistance committees and students, can coalesce around a common vision.
+
+#### UK Policy Priorities and Engagements
+
+The UK government has publicly stated that a more peaceful, democratic and economically resilient Sudan is in the UK’s interest, as this would reduce the need for UK aid, lessen outward migration and provide opportunities for UK businesses to invest in the country. In 2021 it committed to continue supporting “conflict resolution and stabilisation efforts”.
+
+This chapter offers a summary of the UK’s engagements in recent years in the areas of development, humanitarian aid, diplomacy and defence.
+
+__Development and Humanitarian Engagements__
+
+UK bilateral aid commitments to Sudan averaged around £90 million per annum between 2016 and 2020. Recent programmes funded by UK official development assistance (ODA) have contributed to humanitarian relief and humanitarian system reform; economic reform via the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank; programmes to reduce female genital mutilation and child marriage; schemes to improve access to water and sanitation; civil society support; and targeted support for the Juba Peace Agreement. The highest expenditure items have been humanitarian relief, social safety net support and, briefly, economic reform (see Figure 2). The UK played a leading role in supporting Sudan to obtain Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) status in 2021. This arrangement, now on hold following the coup, would have enabled relief on around 90% of the country’s $50-billion IMF and World Bank debts in 2024.
+
+![image2](https://i.imgur.com/pXjDAGD.png)
+_▲ __Figure 1: Top Five OECD–DAC Contributing Donors to Sudan, 2012–21.__ Source: OECD–DAC (Creditor Reporting System)._
+
+_Recent Trends_
+
+UK bilateral aid spending increased from £93 million in 2019 to £139 million in 2020, an increase linked to the political transition. Most of this increase was due to a one-off contribution to the Sudan Family Support Project, as discussed further below. This briefly made Sudan the 10th-largest recipient of UK aid globally. While humanitarian assistance still accounted for around 37.8% of UK bilateral funding, support for “government and civil society”, and “social infrastructure and services” increased after the appointment of the 2019 transitional government (increases of 9.5% to 23.4%, and 3.1% to 14.5%, respectively). UK bilateral ODA funding for Sudan then dropped back to £93 million by the end of 2021. The reduction – due both to global UK aid cuts and the suspension of development programming following the October 2021 military coup – still left Sudan as the ninth-largest recipient of UK bilateral ODA worldwide. Following the coup, however, the UK, together with the US, the World Bank and other major donors, suspended all non-humanitarian aid.
+
+![image3](https://i.imgur.com/01PqP3l.png)
+_▲ __Figure 2: Sector Allocation of UK ODA Spend in Sudan, 2012–21.__ Source: OECD–DAC (Creditor Reporting System)._
+
+__Diplomacy__
+
+British diplomatic engagement with Sudan has historically focused on a range of issues, from regional stability to counterterrorism, humanitarian relief, governance, security and migration. The emphasis among these themes has varied according to the changing local and global context. Important diplomatic initiatives have over the years included a leading role in the negotiations that led to the CPA, subsequent support to the AUHIP process, the establishment of the UK–Sudan Dialogue and acting as Penholder for UN missions designed to mitigate conflict. The UK maintains a permanent ambassadorial presence in Sudan, backed by an envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. Since the CPA years, a London-based “Sudans” Unit’ has existed to coordinate and cohere elements of UK policy on north and South Sudan. Ambassadors, particularly Irfan Siddiq (in post 2018–21), have been prominent voices in support of democratic transition and civilian rule since 2018, often working within the Troika. UK diplomacy played an important role in the June–July 2019 “Quad” negotiations that produced the civilian-led transitional government following the ousting of Al-Bashir, as discussed below. The level of attention that UK ministers pay to Sudan fluctuates considerably, however. In a show of support for Hamdok, Dominic Raab visited Sudan as foreign secretary in January 2021. No senior minister has visited since.
+
+_Recent Trends_
+
+The main UK diplomatic objectives at present appear to be to encourage a transition towards civilian rule while helping to maintain stability and mitigate humanitarian crisis. As detailed below, the UK provided strong diplomatic, financial and technical support to the transitional government until October 2021. Since that time, the UK has had ongoing contact with Sudan’s officials, including the chair of the now military government, General Al-Burhan, while stating that it is striving to prevent the normalisation of military rule. UK diplomats have lobbied to block Sudan’s access to international assistance and debt relief until a civilian-led government is restored.
+
+__Defence Engagement__
+
+Given Sudan’s long period of military rule and the existence of UK, UN and EU sanctions regimes, opportunities for defence engagement have been few. Interviewees noted that from 2005 to the mid-2010s the UK MoD did establish a close working relationship with SAF officers through trainings, exchange visits and technical support up the level of Chief of Defence Staff. The AUHIP, active from 2009 to 2013, also provided a framework for UK engagement on defence matters. Respondents point out that it allowed for a UK defence attaché to be seconded to it, and enabled language training to be provided to Sudanese officers as an entry point for diplomacy at what was in other ways a difficult time for UK–Sudan relations. In comparison, however, South Sudan received a larger UK investment in its nascent military, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (as it then was).
+
+_Recent Trends_
+
+UK–Sudan defence engagement was suspended after the October 2021 coup. The MoD withdrew its in-country defence attaché from Khartoum in 2022.
+
+
+### II. Overview of Selected Outcomes
+
+This chapter highlights a number of outcomes that UK action has contributed towards in Sudan, whether through international development cooperation, defence engagement or diplomacy. The chapter draws on interviews to identify examples from among the UK’s wider portfolio of work as set out in Chapter I. While seen as broadly successful by interlocutors, the examples are used to identify and analyse key factors that have enabled or constrained UK attempts to further its “Global Britain” agenda, for example by showing leadership, responding quickly, cultivating partnerships or linking development, defence, diplomacy and trade.
+
+#### Debt Relief and Economic Reform
+
+By early 2019, Sudan’s long-running economic difficulties had precipitated a political crisis. Catapulted to power in August, the civilian-led transitional government faced an enormous debt burden, inflation and a weak currency. Decades of economic mismanagement had created fiscal and current account deficits, sustained by excessive monetisation of the budget. The country was close to hyperinflation and experiencing acute shortages of essential commodities. The new civilian leaders attempted to leverage Western capitals’ hope that they would introduce rapid reforms to access debt relief, loans and grants as they embarked on economic reforms. A programme was agreed with the IMF which, it was assumed, would increase foreign currency income, settle the currency and eventually secure debt relief. In return, donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) required drastic fiscal measures. It was made clear to the transitional government that eliminating fuel and wheat subsidies costing around 12% of GDP would be key to securing debt relief. The programme was also designed to enable a sixfold public sector wage increase and the establishment of a “social safety net” programme. Despite opposition from elements of the “street” and some political parties (for example, the Communist Party), IFIs and Western donors were strongly supportive.
+
+Building on technical work carried out in 2011 under AUHIP auspices with support from British economic advisers, the UK played an important role in building consensus among international partners around proposed economic reforms and debt relief. As interviewees noted, the Friends of Sudan group initially displayed divergent positions – helping Sudan to re-engage with IFIs was not a priority for everyone. The UK helped to get agreement among donors on ensuring fiscal and political space for the reform agenda and encouraged others to engage early with the transitional government. Germany sponsored a Sudan Partnership Conference in Berlin in June 2020, at which around €1.6 billion was pledged. This in turn allowed the IMF to agree a 12-month Staff-Monitored Program, tied to a macroeconomic and structural reform agenda, to release future loans. A multi-country effort was then led by the UK under its G7 presidency to fund clearance of Sudan’s longstanding debt arrears to the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank (ADB), which according to interview sources totalled $2.9 billion.
+
+UK aid was used to simultaneously embed experts within Sudan’s Finance and National Economy Ministry and provide support to the government’s strategic communications (of which more below). The immediate results were in many ways remarkable. As interviews pointed out, the obstacles to progress on debt relief were more political than technical and Sudan met IMF requirements in record time and in 2020, concessional IFI finance of up to $2.5 billion was unlocked for the first time in 30 years. By June 2021, Sudan had qualified for Stage One debt relief under the HIPC debt relief scheme. It had qualified in historically short time. Respondents felt this was due in large part to the UK’s combined diplomatic and technical assistance. It was also noted that as part of this process, UK ministers agreed to provide a bridging loan so that Sudan could begin to clear its debts to the ADB through the debt relief process.
+
+The UK became the largest bilateral donor to a restructured World Bank trust fund (close to £80 million was allocated over two years, second to the EU’s contribution in terms of size), earmarking its support for a “Family Support” (cash transfer) project. The stated purpose of this project was to mitigate the political and economic fallouts from the structural economic adjustments required for debt relief, and address concerns raised by the Sudanese “street” about possible negative effects on public services or the cost of living. But the success seen on debt relief was not mirrored here. Envisaged as a rolling project funded by donors but delivered via Sudan’s finance ministry working in tandem with the World Food Programme, it was designed to provide an initial cash transfer worth $5 per person to 80% of Sudanese households (around 8 million families). By September 2021, however, only around 1 million households were recorded as having received payments. Interviewees pointed to a combination of IFI institutional bureaucracy, the limited bureaucratic capacity of the finance ministry and a slow response by donors as leading to project funding falling below initial expectations, arriving late and under-delivered. The Family Support Project had been conceived as a way of mitigating the negative effects of removing the fuel and wheat subsidies that were draining the country’s budget. It was also seen as helping to rebuild the social contract between government and population that had been so damaged by previous governments. In reality, the finance ministry did not have the societal reach nor capacity to deliver as envisaged. Respondents felt that in spite of donor funding for strategic communications, the civilian-led government performed poorly on communicating the linked issues of budgeting, family support, currency and subsidy reforms to a weary public.
+
+The above problems might have been mitigated by better strategic coordination among donors. But a few respondents argued that more forceful dealings with IFI institutions at points – realistically, this would have required US leadership – could have ensured that multi-donor disbursement mechanisms worked better and quicker. They noted that the project was largely shelved following the October 2021 coup, with $350 million left unspent. 
+
+Although there were disagreements between the office of the prime minister and the finance ministry on the pace of reform, respondents felt that painful fiscal measures had nevertheless been enacted by mid-2021 prior to the coup. As subsidies on key commodities such as fuel were lifted, prices spiked. By December, year-on-year inflation stood at 318%, driven both by subsidy removal and by the changing exchange rate. The price of wheat tripled in the year to September 2021. A few respondents suggested that the Sudanese pound showed some indications that it might stabilise, but it was no easier to borrow on international markets nor to purchase commodities. Hoped-for international loans and grants were also not arriving at scale – in the first three quarters of 2021, Sudan’s central bank reported that grants and loans fell to $80 million, around a quarter of the 2020 total. The reforms did reduce Sudan’s overall balance-of-payments deficit. Consumer prices also began to fall, around seven months after the fuel subsidy removal. But while the subsidy removal had likely reduced the printing of money, the fall may largely be attributable to lower imports of now unaffordable wheat and fuel.
+
+The consensus among Western donors, IFIs and elements in the transitional government that emerged between 2019 and 2021 on key economic reforms, principally currency flotation, subsidy removal and public sector wage adjustments, did not extend to the “street” or to a number of political figures. Support from military elements for what were in practice a set of medium-term austerity measures was probably situation-specific. With civilians fronting the reforms, the military elements within government could stand somewhat aloof and allow the civilian technocrats to take most of the political flak. As the reforms further eroded living standards, ongoing tensions between different governmental factions had increased. In hindsight, interviews suggested that by pushing the reforms through, finance minister Gibril Ibrahim, chair of the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement armed group, which had entered government via the Juba Peace Agreement, helped to craft a narrative around a failing civilian transition prior to the 2021 coup.
+
+This example of UK engagement with Sudan’s debt relief and economic reform raises a number of issues. On the one hand, it shows the UK demonstrating leadership, working with allies and multilaterals, and combining technical expertise with diplomacy. Yet it also raises very difficult questions about close donor alignment with a contentious – if economically orthodox – set of policies that many in Sudan opposed, including the “street”. While planning for reforms was underway, the UK supported the government of Sudan to design and deliver a nationwide awareness campaign to sensitise its citizens to the economic situation and prepare people for the proposed reforms. Respondents noted that, along with others, the UK also funded roundtable discussions, a conference and training for a number of Sudanese journalists to discuss the economic reform agenda. Respondents pointed out, however, that such inputs could not have forged anything like a public consensus in the time available, while the benefits of unlocking international finance were not realised prior to the military takeover.
+
+As interviewees noted, a key assumption of all donor support to Sudan’s transition in those years that now appears questionable was that what was in fact a weak political centre could successfully enact these far-reaching changes. To do so would have meant securing support from stronger institutions (the SAF, the RSF, armed groups, the Native Administration), oligarchs and regional powers, and what respondents pointed out was a notoriously dysfunctional civil service charged with delivering the accompanying social safety net programme. The post-October 2021 military government did not reverse the fuel subsidy cut or currency liberalisation introduced by their civilian predecessors. They also sought to restart talks on IFI loans and debt relief. But the extent to which the immediate societal costs of reforms enacted under the civilian-led government provided military actors with a narrative around civilian incompetence seems to respondents to have been underappreciated. In hindsight, timing was also a crucial factor. Had fiscal and debt relief efforts been initiated earlier, or changes introduced at a different tempo, the politics might have been easier. The US insistence on a quid pro quo for debt relief and loans linked to the Abraham Accords meant, however, that the pace of events was not within the control of most donors, including the UK. (Under the Trump administration, the US required Sudan to normalise relations with Israel in return for removal from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list and to progress debt relief and World Bank loans.) Nevertheless, respondents argued that in this case donors focused too single-mindedly on fiscal issues, to the detriment of a wider set of linked political questions.
+
+#### Humanitarian Relief
+
+UK support for humanitarian relief has been a longstanding commitment in Sudan dating back to the second civil war of 1983–2005. Some of the achievements reported by the UK from its humanitarian work in Sudan in recent years include: 1.2 million people with sustainable access to clean water and/or sanitation by 2018; 589,000 children under five, women and adolescent girls reached through food- and nutrition-related interventions; and more than 500,000 vulnerable children provided with free school meals in 2021.
+
+Financial commitments have been substantial. The most recent large-scale UK aid programme, Responding to Protracted Crisis in Sudan: Humanitarian Reform, Assistance and Resilience Programme (HRAR), cost approximately £250 million from 2017 to 2022. It reached more than 2 million people, providing food aid, cash and voucher transfers, education, primary healthcare and water access, while attempting to strengthen the long-term resilience of more than 890,000 people.76 The programme also helped to fund a “conflict sensitivity facility”, intended as a resource for the wider humanitarian community.
+
+HRAR’s overarching objectives on reform of humanitarian relief are based on the UN-led “Grand Bargain” agreement to which the UK is a signatory, and include greater transparency, better needs assessments and localisation of support. The end-of-term FCDO programme review of HRAR reported “good” or “partial” progress on these objectives. Improvements on information management and agency transparency have been marked, and substantial progress recorded towards localisation targets, on increasing cash transfers, and on humanitarian agencies conducting joint needs assessments. More specifically, transparency has improved, with the online publication of data by the UN Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and better-quality reporting by bilateral donors. Progress on more timely and effective humanitarian responses has been slower, partly attributed by interviewees to a restrictive operating context. To the regret of some implementing partners, objectives for linking humanitarian relief to longer-term development work will not be met, since the embassy has deprioritised the issue.
+
+HRAR also funded technical advisers and programme officers within the UN system to work on nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, physical protection (including from gender-based violence) and cash grants, and to play technical or coordination roles within the UN Resident Coordinator’s office. Respondents see this as having added capacity to the wider system and enhanced the UK’s profile.
+
+As respondents noted, the majority of UK humanitarian work is carried out day to day by technical staff who, for example, administer funding or try to support the humanitarian “cluster system” and implementing partners. Meanwhile, higher-level influencing work falls to the UK development director, who seeks to influence other donor and agency leads from the UN Humanitarian Country Team to the office of the UN’s humanitarian and “resident” coordinators, who are in charge of overall system coordination, and international humanitarian non-governmental organisations. Together with the Netherlands, the UK also chairs the humanitarian donor group. UK diplomatic staff, including those in New York and Geneva, have long supported these efforts. Interviewees, however, point to diplomats in-country now feeling increased ownership of humanitarian issues following the creation of the merged FCDO.
+
+An issue that UK diplomats and development staff at different levels report having grappled with continuously is improving humanitarian “access”. Sudanese governments have long frustrated aid delivery through a complex web of permits, bureaucratic delays, security protocols and financial demands via their – security-influenced – Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). At the time of writing, the Dutch and UK co-chairs of the humanitarian donor group were said by respondents to be making representations to the government of Sudan on behalf of donors in an attempt to resolve key issues. The UK, among others, was credited with injecting realism into what can at times be overly theoretical donor discussion on such questions. HAC requirements and other impediments to humanitarian access were somewhat relaxed during the transitional government’s tenure, but interviews point to them having returned in force quickly after the 2021 coup, as figures from the Al-Bashir era were swiftly returned to their former posts and revived previous policies. In the meantime, no major combined effort had been mounted in the interim by donors or the UN to address deeper issues of government and security forces’ interference with humanitarian access.
+
+The example of humanitarian relief shows the UK working effectively and showing leadership on challenging issues with partners and multilaterals in Sudan. Some targets have not been met, and opportunities to adopt a new approach towards access restrictions may have been missed. Yet the embassy has been effective in linking together programme funding, technical assistance and diplomacy. There are no indications that past UK engagement on defence has provided an entry point for access discussions. Interviewees felt that the UK’s prominence on humanitarian issues has, however, given it influence and offered entry points for wider discussions on aid and political and security matters. Whether influence can be maintained at current levels is an open question. Many suspect not – interviewees note that implementing partners are less inclined to approach embassy staff than in the past, due to uncertainties over funding. The UK has traditionally been the largest donor to the UN-run Sudan Humanitarian Fund, at points contributing more than 50% of funds. While the UK remains on the Fund’s advisory board, currently the US, Germany and the Netherlands make larger contributions.
+
+#### Crisis Response: 2019 Coup and 2021 Counter-Coup
+
+Just prior to the coup of October 2021, the Sudanese military hoarded commodities and fomented unrest. A street “protest” calling for a military takeover was organised in Khartoum on 16 October, presumably to test the resolve of international actors. At this point, the UK embassy moved into “crisis watch” mode, in line with its crisis management plan. This was one step below “crisis mode”, indicating that embassy priorities had shifted away from business as usual and were focused on unfolding political events. After two days with no further events to respond to and the transitional government still apparently in charge, the embassy stepped out of crisis watch mode and reverted to business as usual.
+
+The coup of 25 October first unfolded on social media. The embassy was alerted by London 30 minutes prior to a communications blackout in Khartoum. This was enough time, however, to allow the local crisis team to convene, for roles to be assigned and for initial measures ranging from a telephone tree to regular situation reports to be put in place. Over the subsequent days and weeks, the crisis team handled a variety of operational, programmatic and diplomatic questions ranging from staff and family welfare to updating travel advice for UK citizens, amending programme spend and agreeing messaging towards the de facto government. Scenarios under which UK non-essential staff would “draw down” to the UK were considered and prepared for, but not enacted. After a six-week public internet blackout the situation in-country became more routine. The embassy stayed in full crisis mode for around a month, before reducing the response level to “crisis watch” until April 2022. A lessons identification exercise was then carried out which praised the response, noting the value of the “whole-of-mission approach” that had been adopted, and the swift actions taken.
+
+In contrast, the UK’s response to the changes of spring 2019 drew some criticism. Western embassies did not act early in advance of Al-Bashir’s ousting, despite a build-up of tension. Viewed from today, his removal in mid-2019 may have an air of inevitability, coming as it did after years of mounting political and economic pressure. At the time, however, there was anything but a consensus among observers in general or Western embassies in particular, who had seen protests many times before. The then UK ambassador has been credited with warning both London and diplomatic colleagues that the wave of protests could be consequential.
+
+Despite coordination efforts among donors, some observers felt that multilateral and Western donors’ efforts to hurriedly mount programmes of support for the incoming transitional administration in 2019 and 2020 were either ineffective or duplicative. According to interviewees, the EU and the UK gave strategic communications support to the office of the prime minister, while the UN provided equipment. Yet for reasons explored earlier, the civilian government leadership was chaotic, divided and indecisive on some critical and difficult issues. From this perspective it is far from clear that improved donor offerings on communications support would have remedied the situation. Respondents pointed to the limited quantity of UK technical and programmatic assistance, which appeared modest in comparison to the scale of the challenge and Western rhetoric at the time. The extent of economic bailout required by this point was truly daunting, requiring both IFI and bilateral financing, and for the US leadership to lift its sanctions regime and Saudi Arabia and the UAE to provide bridging loans. Unfortunately, in the case of the UK, although it was possible to advance the debt relief agenda, especially work on the Paris Club and IFI engagement, political turmoil at home linked to Brexit, among other things, resulted in little attention for Sudan.
+
+Interview findings point to the UK having played a critical political role in spring and summer 2019, managing to combine public pro-democracy messaging from the ambassador with acting as a bridge to the US, and bringing the Gulf states, the AU and IGAD into broad agreement on a transitional arrangement. This meant marshalling the Quad to ensure that the Sudanese military, having taken over control from the National Congress Party in April 2019, handed over to a fresh (transitional) administration as set out in what became a Constitutional Charter. Although IGAD and the AU took credit for the handover, the UK’s role was said to have been significant in bringing the Quad powers to a shared position.
+
+A few respondents questioned the fundamental approach that Western actors took to economic reform. In practice, this involved aligning with a relatively small number of FFC coalition ministers and advisers and providing technical support to the finance ministry and the prime minister’s office in relation to milestones for macroeconomic reform and institution building. The politics of the economic reforms were apparently discussed among donors, and attempts – such as the Family Support Project – were made to manage the anticipated impact on households. Yet serious questions remain about the effectiveness of these measures, the speed with which the reforms were pursued, and the way that divergent opinions about them were managed. Alternative approaches might, for example, have been to prioritise developing a nuanced understanding of different political constituencies’ calculations, contradictions and weaknesses. A few respondents argued that foregrounding the politics of reform over the (technical) economic questions might have helped donors to navigate a protracted political struggle and gradually develop a long-term democratisation strategy. More fundamentally, many international and Sudanese analysts believe that the diplomatic community made a mistake in urging the FFC to accept a hybrid civilian–military government. In this view, civilian campaigners should have pursued the sidelining of military actors, particularly after the 3 June massacre. How these alternative approaches might have affected attempts to secure debt relief and IFI loan access for Sudan, and whether they would eventually have led to civilian control of military–economic assets or not, are unanswered questions.
+
+
+### III. Enablers and Constraints: Key Findings
+
+This chapter explores the role of six factors that either enabled or constrained UK action in Sudan in recent years: operating context; resourcing; structures; strategy; leadership; and relationships. These have been identified through interviews and by exploring the nature of the UK’s contribution to the above outcomes.
+
+#### Operating Context
+
+Sudan has presented a challenging context for external actors for decades. It has seen intercommunal conflict, displacement and insurgencies, accusations of support for terrorism, genocide and war crimes, and widespread hunger. The UK’s responses have included participation in a framework of economic sanctions against key government figures that made the bilateral relationship more difficult. In turn, the government of Sudan has sought to limit the movement of Western diplomats within the country and curtailed humanitarian aid delivery, which it sees as political.
+
+The period since 2019 has, however, been unusually turbulent. The political revolution of spring 2019 and the massacre in June of civilians by security forces was followed by only nine months of relative normality, before the Covid-19 pandemic and later resumption of street protests and government crackdowns culminated in the military coup of October 2021. Since then, violence, hunger and displacement have unfortunately spread to new parts of the country. 
+
+Clearly, this is a highly challenging context in which to pursue objectives around poverty reduction, humanitarian relief, development, stability and migration. The political environment is now one in which constitutional provisions are unclear, government-to-government relations cannot easily be formalised, and popular movements, regional powers and the use of force play a key role. Changes in Sudan occurred while Ethiopia, South Sudan and Somalia were also experiencing instability, alongside the common experience of Covid-19 and, more recently, rising food and fuel prices associated with the Ukraine war. Interviews indicate that these wider events have tested the UK government’s plans and resources. Any assessment of the UK’s overall effectiveness and progress with the “Global Britain” agenda needs to be made against this unusually challenging backdrop.
+
+#### Resourcing
+
+Given the particularities of UK–Sudan relations, with fraught diplomatic relations and a limited trading relationship, ODA has been the main resource at the UK’s disposal. However, interviewees felt that cuts to the UK’s aid budget had not yet been seriously detrimental. One explanation for this could be that Sudan tends to receive smaller aid allocations in absolute terms than neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia or Somalia. Moreover, the leading budget item – humanitarian aid contributions – though reduced, has been better protected than development spending, which was paused following the October 2021 coup. The picture is also complicated by the UK bilateral aid budget having been temporarily increased (by £80 million) to fund the Family Support Project, prior to the October 2021 coup. The UK’s humanitarian implementing partners are of a different view, however, as interviews suggested that they expect UK influence to wane as the country “brings less to the table”, and some feel this is already happening.
+
+The announcement of a move down to 0.5% GNI aid targets in 2019 also ushered in a period of ongoing uncertainty about aid budgets. By mid-March 2022, the FCDO’s budget for the financial year 2022–23 for Sudan was not set, making it difficult to plan and maintain good external relations. As respondents pointed out, predictability means that partners’ expectations cannot easily be managed, and long-term planning is impossible. A few interviewees stated that uncertainty over funding allocations has given the UK a reputation as an unreliable donor in Sudan. A number of humanitarian implementing partners are now said to be deprioritising the UK as a donor and seeking funds elsewhere
+
+Uncertainty around UK aid cuts affected not only bilateral but also discretionary multi-donor programmes. The EU delegation to Sudan reported during interviews that it had to scale back delivery and delay long-awaited additional work in light of announced UK cuts. Since 2019 the military has followed the National Congress Party government’s practice of using cash loans from the Gulf to maintain power, but, as informed respondents pointed out, these do not compare in scale to the large-scale grants, loans and debt relief that Western influence can secure from IFIs.
+
+One positive resourcing issue is that FCDO staffing levels, although low, have been maintained in spite of programme cuts. This has been good not only for delivery but also reputation – externals who were intervieweed still consider UK technical expertise and political analysis a strong asset. An exception is the departure in late 2022 of the permanent UK defence attaché to Sudan. The MoD concluded, after months of waiting, that without any moves to reintroduce civilians into government, it could no longer justify maintaining the position permanently following the October 2021 coup, as that event represented a block to meaningful UK cooperation with the SAF.
+
+The Khartoum embassy was not immune to the “process” fatigue that afflicted FCDO globally as a result of the DFID-FCO merger. A carefully managed local merger process does appear, however, to have taken the edge off this. The UK’s relatively small staff footprint in Sudan probably facilitated the merger, with few pre-existing teams and “silos”.
+
+#### Strategy
+
+Interviews suggested that Sudanese who are familiar with the UK’s day-to-day diplomatic, defence and development engagement tend to see it as broadly coherent, and often give the UK credit for navigating the turbulent waters since 2018 with some success. But interviewees remarked that it is increasingly common to hear complaints about a lack of clear vision for Sudan beyond “transition”. Some reflected that the UK is struggling to play a decisive leadership role as it remains torn between different assumptions and strategies. In this view, the UK’s vocal support for a political transition is positive but not sufficient, and better articulation is needed of the relationship between restoring stability, achieving democratisation and reducing conflict.
+
+At the same time, it can be argued that a desire for stability in Sudan has shaped a UK policy that pursues elite settlements (for example, the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement and the 2005 CPA) that have been in tension with wider democratisation. Core elements of Sudan’s military, security and pro-Islamist establishment are intransigent and pitted in a zero-sum game against democratisation. Respondents noted that Western interests include a desire to be seen as working with and through a region (IGAD members and Gulf states) that includes governments that are not necessarily keen to promote democratisation. If the UK lacks a consistent strategy and vision here, it is, however, in company with arguably all Western states and multilaterals. These criticisms would extend to many others, including the UNITAMS “Trilateral Mechanism”, which is geared towards compromise. Yet given recent events, even a minimalist “pro-stability” agenda must now grapple with accruing evidence that military rule and associated economic predation is in fact the principal source of Sudan’s instability. From this perspective, as critical respondents argued, continuity will not bring stability. Rather, any future compromise settlement between military and civilian reformers will ultimately fail. In turn, this implies that Western actors should therefore develop red lines and strategies to help Sudan navigate potential future transitions or uprisings, at the same time exploring options to influence regional actors and build coherence among bottom-up social forces that might eventually shift power dynamics.
+
+#### Structures
+
+As interviewees pointed out, in Whitehall, legacy DFID and FCO Africa departments were gradually merged into one shared structure in 2021–22. Creating new structures and working relationships has apparently been less difficult than adjusting other business processes. Across the FCDO, existing business processes have had to be revised repeatedly as merger activities have run concurrently with a series of ministerial and leadership changes, restructuring in London, and iterative aid cuts. Respondents cited the successive changes as having slowed down delivery and decision-making and testing staff morale.
+
+Following the 2020 merger announcement, the Khartoum embassy began scoping out issues and options for delivering the merger of separate FCO and DFID teams and processes. According to interviews, by early 2021, a change-management process was underway, led by the deputy head of mission. The merger was felt to be disruptive by many, and a good many former DFID staff are said to have been demotivated by its prospect. Running a self-conscious change-management process in Khartoum may, however, have limited staff frustration and increased buy-in. Embassy staff were eventually structured into two “joint” teams, one focused on intra-Sudan issues, the other on external issues. Interviewees reported that corporate messaging is more unified now, and dealings with government easier to coordinate. Others reported that ambassadorial oversight of the UK’s portfolio of work in the country has improved.
+
+Interviews showed that Sudanese with close ties to the UK – for example, aid workers, sections of academia, business people and journalists – were very aware of DFID’s closure and the creation of the FCDO. Among this constituency, most did not expect the UK’s reputation to suffer as a result of the merger. In contrast to countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, it appears from interviews that people in Sudan have more of a connection with the “UK” brand than with “DFID” specifically, perhaps as a result of the UK’s independent profile on peace mediation linked to its role in the Troika.
+
+Some observers felt that, following the merger, the UK’s development work was increasingly being seen through the lens of Sudan’s politics – an appropriate approach for the country. On the other hand, external partners noted a reduced focus by the FCDO on linking humanitarian relief efforts to development, once a prominent concern for DFID. It was unclear from the interviews, however, whether this is a consequence of the DFID–FCO merger, aid cuts, or other pressures.
+
+#### Leadership
+
+Interviews suggest that political instability in the UK, with high rates of ministerial turnover and questions around integrity, has left many Sudanese doubtful about UK leadership. Periodic clampdowns on African migration to the UK, the recent proposed arrangement to send asylum applicants to be processed and resettled in Rwanda, work permit restrictions and reports of worsening living conditions in the West are also negatively influencing attitudes towards the UK and the West. UK ministerial attention to Sudan has reduced from previous years, with no senior ministers visiting since 2021. This has been noticed in Sudan. Although there is a large constituency in favour of increased UK–Sudan engagement, the sense from interviews was that many expect UK engagement to diminish further as a result of a difficult economic situation in the UK and other concerns, including the war in Ukraine.
+
+#### Relationships
+
+As the examples above illustrate, the UK has built a range of useful relationships in Sudan, with multilateral organisations, like-minded bilaterals, regional powers and some elements in government, the military and civil society.
+
+The UK won both praise and blame for its coordination efforts during the transition period. On the positive side, UK officials played to the strengths of different partners in support of the transitional government, combining the UK’s own technical expertise with EU budgets and US leverage. The UK also influenced and supported the World Bank and the IMF around debt relief and reform. But as the examples above show, there were significant challenges associated with the overall approach taken by Western governments and IFIs during the 2019–21 transition period.
+
+Aside from larger strategic questions, a few respondents recalled the UK’s attempts to establish a common framework for day-to-day donor interaction with the government of Sudan. Having taken ownership of this agenda prior to summer 2019, they felt that the UK failed to make any progress with this agenda, ultimately yielding to Sweden. Apparently limited progress was being made just prior to the October 2021 coup, when the issue was dropped.
+
+Interviewees suggested that a minority of Sudanese observers feel that the UK has lost traction as a result of leaving the EU. Most see the issue as being of marginal importance. Interviewees reported no insurmountable operational changes flowing from Brexit. UK officials no longer attend routine EU cooperation meetings (such as the EU Heads of Mission, Political Council, and Heads of Development Cooperation meetings), but are finding workarounds. Although UK influence over EU activity is now diminished, there are alternative coordination structures with which the UK has long worked successfully, including the Friends of Sudan, Troika and Quad groupings. According to interviewees, the UK has a reputation for collaborative working with all of these, but with the Troika and Quad in particular. Indeed, respondents felt that the UK has been able to move more quickly diplomatically, and to demonstrate sharper messaging, since Brexit. It is also true, however, that Brexit itself – alongside other political difficulties – consumed an unwelcome amount of the UK government’s time, particularly for the FCDO and ministers, at exactly the point when increased attention to Sudan’s political transition was needed.
+
+Sudanese reflections on Western international engagement tend to focus on either the Troika countries or the UNITAMS mission. Views differ between urban elites (professionals, FFC-affiliated political parties) on the one hand and the “street” and resistance committees on the other. A range of interviewees indicated that the former, for example, perceive UNITAMS as confused and ineffective, and although concerned that they may be too willing to countenance compromise with the military, see the Troika and other Western countries as allies. The “street”, however, is cynical about all international involvement in Sudan, and apparently expects the West to restore the military via a hybrid government in pursuit of stability. Interviewees consider Western influence to be in decline relative to that of states in the wider region. Sudan’s ruling elite now seems little concerned about Western governments’ opinions – the October 2021 coup came just days after the chair of the Sovereign Council, General Al-Burhan, assured the British ambassador, the UK special envoy for Sudan, the Africa minister, and the US envoy of his commitment to the hybrid transitional government.
+
+At the same time, the UK is credited by respondents for its ongoing attempts to engage with regional and emerging powers, countries that past experience shows can decisively shape Sudan’s political direction. Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are seen as the country’s most influential neighbours. Egypt has deep connections with the Sudanese military and Saudi Arabia has relied on substantial RSF troops to fight in Yemen. As interviewees pointed out, Saudi Arabia and the UAE also have close economic ties with Sudan that include investments in land and productive industries, while the UAE is a major exporter to the country. They also note that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are particularly known for chequebook diplomacy, having provided cash loans to past Sudanese governments. All three countries prefer dealing with the Sudanese military to Islamist rule or democratisation – largely a reflection of their domestic politics.
+
+The fact that the UK also enjoys strong ties to the US at a time when the Abraham Accords coloured diplomacy with Gulf and Middle Eastern partners is also significant. The US recently appointed a new ambassador to Sudan, the first in many years. While still regarded as important, a visible donor and a sometimes strident political player, various interviewees saw the US as having declined in influence relative to others, including not only Gulf states but also Russia and China. For example, the Russian paramilitary organisation the Wagner Group has reportedly trained the RSF in exchange for gold. RSF leader General Hemedti has visited Moscow to discuss security cooperation – Russia being keen to secure a naval base in Sudan. A friendly Russia can influence UN mandates and voting on Sudanese affairs; likewise, Sudan abstained in March 2022 on UN votes on the Ukraine war. For its part, China maintains a stake in South Sudanese oil production and supplies cheap consumer goods to Sudan. Its investments overall are limited, however, and it is primarily concerned with regional stability.
+
+The UK’s consistent use of envoys to Sudan since the time of the CPA negotiations in the early 2000s has contributed to successful UK diplomacy. Individuals have come and gone, but the post is seen as important by allies and Sudanese interlocutors. While also working on South Sudan, respondents noted that the role of the current UK Envoy to Sudan maintains a broad set of relationships with government, opposition, armed groups and external partners, and is seen as coordinating well with peers.
+
+But with animosities driven by sanctions and mutual condemnations, interviewees underscored that UK relations with the government of Sudan have often been strained, and contacts difficult to cultivate. At times, including following the October 2021 coup, London would not countenance formal government-to-government contact between UK and Sudanese officials. The level of UK access and influence in Sudan has fluctuated from cooperation on specific initiatives (for example, HIPC and the Khartoum Process) to close alignment with elements of the recent transitional government and periods of outright hostility under the NCP. Western influence in Sudan has varied according to the strength of the military. The Friends of Sudan and Troika groups both condemned the October coup, leaving them with reduced influence with the military. The stridency of the UK ambassador in condemning the 2021 coup – initially alone – was remarked upon by more than one interviewee. While the UK may enjoy decent relations with a hybrid or civilian government, it was suggested by interviewees that the Sudanese military now sees it as antagonistic. Perhaps it is no surprise then that accusations of UK hyprocisy surface periodically, and diplomats have long faced movement restrictions and bureaucratic hurdles.
+
+In spite of all this, a range of interviewees assessed that the UK has, overall, succeeded in maintaining access to Sudanese governments, even while being critical of current and previous regimes. Despite difficulties and criticisms, it seems from this research that a majority of Sudanese still view the UK as a supportive partner with a positive track record. A few respondents, Sudanese and international, who have observed the UK at work over time considered the government-to-government relationship to have been inescapably difficult but managed with some skill. Respondents underscored that, with some exceptions, Sudanese are on the whole affectionate towards the UK, believing there to be a special, albeit neglected, relationship between the two countries that has huge untapped potential. This creates a two-way expectation that the UK can and should “do more”. A key question in the months and years ahead will be whether the UK and like-minded actors are prepared to go beyond established relationships with political parties and the military, to embrace the messy but necessary business of interacting regularly with “the street”. From this perspective, understanding how to engage and, where possible, support pro-democracy campaigners, whether through, for example, small capacity-building initiatives, encouraging dialogue or strategising among campaign groups, should be more of a priority.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+This paper has summarised findings on how the UK has sought to deliver positive change for Sudan as well as progress its “Global Britain” agenda through the use of development aid, defence engagement and diplomacy. It has looked in particular at the years since Brexit, during which the UK has made aid cuts and seen a brief fall in GDP and wider political and institutional changes.
+
+The UK generally enjoys a good reputation in Sudan. This derives partly from diaspora and cultural ties and, for some, positive memories of the colonial era. It also, however, comes from the UK’s fairly consistent championing of civilian rule, conflict resolution and humanitarianism, which has led to it still being regarded in Sudan as a relevant actor, with worthwhile capabilities from skilled personnel to valuable aid contributions, and some measure of influence.
+
+The UK can claim substantial depth and quality of relationships both in Sudan and with regional actors. Its ability to operate in multiple forums, from New York to Khartoum and the region, including through the use of envoys, ambassadors, and political and aid specialists, is significant. Leaving the EU has had a marginal effect on the UK’s standing in Sudan. The merger of DFID and the FCO has absorbed time and energy, but the benefits of joined-up working are identifiable. The end of DFID does not appear to have had a marked effect, unlike cuts to the aid budget. These are most noticeable in relation to humanitarian delivery and partner confidence.
+
+In the face of ongoing budget cuts and the rise of competitors, however, doubts now exist about the durability of UK influence. Interviewees expected UK influence to wane in the years ahead. Some expressed confusion or frustration that the former colonial power will not commit further resources. It is true that in resource terms – barring a brief increase in the 2019–20 UK aid budget linked to economic reform – the country has not been prioritised as suggested in the 2021 Integrated Review. The Ukraine war, the Covid-19 pandemic, budget cuts and turbulent UK politics have drawn time and money away from Sudan. As interviewees noted, the contemporary issue for many pro-democracy actors in Sudan, however, is a suspicion that the UK and Western allies will play a conservative hand in future, opting for political compromise in the hope of achieving stability. This would be despite the UK’s professed values and in the face of increasing evidence that the military grip is a key driver of Sudan’s instability.
+
+Looking ahead, despite its many problems, Sudan presents challenges that the UK could help to address if ministers were prepared to offer a combination of technical leadership, targeted financing and support for political coalition-building. Alongside humanitarian relief and reform, areas of traditional UK expertise, from stabilisation to improving governance, security sector reform and economic development, will all be critical. The UK might, for example, find opportunities to convene like-minded actors interested in these issues, or it might seek to facilitate dialogue among disparate pro-democracy groups in the hope of avoiding the mistakes of the previous transitional government. To maximise its effectiveness, the UK should reflect on the significance of the enabling and constraining factors identified in this paper and identify gaps and lessons to be learned around its recent strategies and vision for a future Sudan.
+
+---
+
+__Simon Rynn__ is Senior Research Fellow for Africa at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers conflict prevention and peacebuilding, stabilisation, security and justice, de-mining, humanitarian, governance and small arms control. His main research focus is on the security of East Africa and the Horn, particularly the security sector, external engagement with stabilisation and peace support operations, as well as economic security and the relationship between security and international development.
+
+__Michael Jones__ is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team examining political violence, governance by non/pseudo-state armed groups, and the convergence of violent extremism and insurgent militancy in East and sub-Saharan Africa. He has led investigative fieldwork across various countries including Sudan, Kenya and Lebanon; managed conflict focused projects looking into Darfur and Somalia; and worked in RUSI’s Nairobi Office on a range of projects related to the EU’s STRIVE Horn of Africa and STRIVE II programming.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-12-talibans-counter-terrorism.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-12-talibans-counter-terrorism.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-12-talibans-counter-terrorism.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Taliban’s Counter-terrorism
+author: Antonio Giustozzi
+date  : 2023-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/OkTbxvb.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Islamic State and the Taliban’s Counter-terrorism"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_As the Taliban develops its state and governance apparatus in Afghanistan, it is also confronted with the unexpected task of developing a counter-terrorism strategy. As Antonio Giustozzi explains, the Islamic State in Khorasan has now turned on the Taliban, drawing attention to the complexity of extreme right-wing terrorism, deeply entrenched as it is in the social fabric of Afghanistan._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+In August 2021, the Taliban suddenly went from being an insurgent organisation, not alien to deploying terrorist tactics, to being a government, even if not recognised by anybody as such as yet. The Taliban themselves were shocked by their faster-than-anticipated rise to power, and were caught unprepared. They had to move quickly, and figure out how to (re)organise the state apparatus.
+
+If capturing the state had always been their aim, more unexpected was the fact that they also had to come up with a counter-terrorism strategy. This was because the competing insurgents of the Islamic State (IS) in Khorasan did not wither away, contrary to what many Taliban had expected, who were seeing it largely as a proxy of the previous government, and hence imagined that it would melt away. Instead, after a lull of a few weeks, the IS was back with a renewed campaign of terrorist attacks in the cities, more intense and widespread than the Taliban’s own in earlier years. After initially targeting religious minorities almost exclusively (as it had done before August 2021), the IS gradually widened its targets to include Taliban state institutions and pro-Taliban clerics; eventually, it would start targeting individual Taliban officials.
+
+Indeed, the IS in Khorasan has embarked on a transformation, from being primarily an insurgent organisation which deployed terrorist tactics in urban environments to one almost entirely focused on terrorist campaign. By 2022, it had given up on a half-hearted attempt to wage a guerrilla war in the east, and went completely underground, forming secret cells and abandoning all fixed bases. Once a very centralised organisation willing to challenge its enemies and especially the Taliban on the open battlefield, the IS had to change its modus operandi and adopt a much more decentralised structure.
+
+In order to run a structure based on hundreds of small cells, the IS became dependent on producing a steady flow of reliable cadres. Its original character of being a coalition of disparate hardline Taliban, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Central Asian splinter groups had already been changing over the years. The in-flow of former Taliban and TTP members had largely dried up by 2017 and casualties wore down the original nuclei (which in 2014–15 had come together in the so-called “Wilayah Khorasan” (Khorasan province)). The IS had to rely more and more on other sources of recruits, and found them in the Salafi community and in various radical Islamist groups such as Hizb ut Tahrir, whose ideologies had some contiguity with that of the IS and were mostly active among university students. With that, the ideological unity and “quality” of the IS in Khorasan’s rank and file improved, but the bulk of the new recruits were still poorly educated villagers, typically brought into the organisation by community elders who felt the community was threatened.
+
+After August 2021, Salafi madrasas and university graduates became even more important because of this need for ideologically dependable, even fanatically committed, cadres to staff the small cells that had become the mainstay of the organisation. The Taliban, now the de facto government, cracked down on Salafi madrasas, closing down any that they suspected of supplying recruits to the IS. As a result, the importance of universities as a source of recruits increased further.
+
+The IS in Khorasan managed to establish a strong presence in the universities of Kabul and Nangarhar quite rapidly once it started focusing more on the Salafi community and pious individuals leaning towards Salafism. They were helped by the fact that, in order to stem the influence of the Taliban in the Islamic Law Faculty of Kabul University, the Afghan authorities had encouraged the appointment of Salafi professors, several of whom were later accused of helping the IS recruit among students.
+
+The Taliban did not waste much time in cracking down on IS recruitment in the universities, imposing a strict security regime. Recruitment became harder for the IS, but not impossible, especially as it moved much of its recruitment activity online. My recently published report discusses in detail the adaptation of the IS in Afghanistan’s university campuses, and how it developed a sophisticated system to attract new recruits without taking excessive risks.
+
+In brief, the IS formed specialised cells, each tasked to focus on a particular phase of the recruitment process. A team would identify suitable recruits among Salafi or Salafi-leaning students, known to have poor relations with Taliban security staff, with non-Salafi teachers, or with Hanafi and Shi’a students. These individuals would then be targeted for recruitment, first by a dedicated team inviting them to social media accounts sharing strict Salafist literature and videos. Then, depending on their response, another team would step in, sharing with them more political, pro-IS material via private chats. Finally, assuming the targeted recruit does not bail out, a third team would start face-to-face contact.
+
+The Taliban’s security regime has been limiting the ability of the IS to recruit in university campuses to somewhere between 100-200 students per year, according to IS sources that appear quite credible (given also that it seems a relatively modest claim). This number may indeed appear modest, but these recruits then mostly turn into cadres, whom the IS deems of essential importance for maintaining and reinforcing the ideological strength of the organisation. Few of these recruits turn into regular fighters or even commanders; instead, they staff the terror cells or take up the job of trainer/indoctrinator, an increasingly essential role in an organisation that needs to stiffen the ideological conformity of its members. Whereas in the past it was common to recruit members of the Salafi community, even villagers, and induce them into the organisation without much indoctrination, now the three-month-long ideological/religious training courses are much more important, so more trainers are required.
+
+The Taliban have of course noticed the shift towards online activities and have tried to disrupt them with some success. But social media propaganda and recruitment does not need to be carried out locally, at least not entirely, and indeed a growing number of propagandists of the IS in Khorasan are based in Europe and other locations outside Afghanistan. The Taliban are trying to infiltrate their private chats, in order to identify the cells based inside Afghanistan. So far, the IS has been able to maintain the bulk of its social media operations, despite some losses. Overall, the Taliban have been quicker at taking on the mantle of counter-terrorism than many thought they would, but the IS remains a highly adaptive organisation that will likely defy attempts to destroy it.
+
+---
+
+__Antonio Giustozzi__ is Visiting Fellow at the LSE South Asia Centre and Senior Research Fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London. He is author, most recently, of “Jihadism in Pakistan: Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and the Local Militants” (2023), among others.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-19-russias-theatre-missile-coercion.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-19-russias-theatre-missile-coercion.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-19-russias-theatre-missile-coercion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : RU’s Theatre Missile Coercion
+author: Sidharth Kaushal and Matthew Harries
+date  : 2023-06-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dJWYGbM.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Intercepts of Russian missiles in Ukraine suggest that, although it still has a broad range of nuclear options, Moscow’s ability to carry out theatre-level conventional and nuclear coercion may face complications – particularly if NATO is able to implement a more robust integrated air and missile defence capability._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+Recent claims by Ukrainian authorities that six Russian KH-47M2 Kinzhal missiles were intercepted by a Patriot missile defence system in an attack on Kyiv led to a flurry of excitable commentary about the potential implications for Russia’s nuclear forces. Much of this is overblown. Russia has many options to conduct a limited nuclear strike if it so wishes, and neither Ukraine nor NATO’s missile defence capabilities could be confidently expected to simply prevent a Russian attack.
+
+Nevertheless, the successful intercept of at least one Kinzhal, alongside the larger number of verifiable interceptions of Russian cruise missiles such as the 3M-14 Kalibr, does pose interesting questions for Russia’s approaches to both conventional and nuclear coercion at the theatre level. In particular, it suggests that better integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) could allow NATO to complicate Russia’s ability to use conventional precision strike and non-strategic nuclear weapons to manage escalation and compensate for conventional military weaknesses.
+
+
+### What We Know
+
+To be sure, we should be cautious about overstating the significance of the intercept. Though described as a hypersonic missile, the Kinzhal does not meet the standard of manoeuvrability at hypersonic speeds that has led other systems – such as the Chinese DF-17 – to be seen as qualitatively new capabilities. The missile is of the same family as the 9M723 aero-ballistic missile which is launched from the Iskander system. However, it still represents a challenging target for missile defence systems. In contrast to traditional ballistic missiles which fly on a parabolic trajectory, Kinzhal’s quasi-ballistic trajectory represents a more complex target for air and missile defence systems to track. Early in the conflict, it became apparent that the 9M723 is capable of deploying six decoys, which complicate the task of target discrimination in the missile’s terminal phase, including by mimicking things such as the radar return of the missile’s warhead. Given that the two missiles are nearly identical, this could be true of the KH-47M2, although the air-launched Kinzhal may also exploit its greater velocity to carry a larger conventional warhead, which uses up more space.
+
+The likely intercept of at least one Kinzhal by a Patriot battery is thus noteworthy in certain regards. Though PAC-3 has demonstrated considerable effectiveness against short-range ballistic missiles in recent conflicts, achieving a very high intercept rate against ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia, questions have remained regarding its effectiveness against more complex targets. In particular, doubts remain regarding its ability to achieve effective target discrimination when performing terminal-phase intercepts. Failed intercept attempts against Houthi Burkan 2H missiles during the war in Yemen were presumed to be a consequence of the failure of the system’s radar and the seekers on its interceptors to discriminate the missile’s separating warhead from the debris of its body. If the Kinzhals intercepted deployed decoys, as similar missiles such as the 9M723 have, this would suggest the effectiveness of the millimetric wave seeker on the PAC-3 interceptor at discriminating targets from clutter. Moreover, in its terminal phase, the family of missiles is claimed to have a speed of 2.1 km/s – well over Mach 5. Of course, if not carrying decoys then in certain ways a missile like the 9M723, which does not have a separating warhead, is a simpler target for interception for a system like Patriot.
+
+There are caveats to bear in mind, however. First, the Patriots defending Kyiv were performing point defence over a target which it was known the Russians would prioritise – the city itself. Point defence against a missile like the Kinzhal in its terminal phase, though far from easy, is somewhat simpler than performing an intercept in its midcourse phase, when it is manoeuvring on a quasi-ballistic trajectory. As such, the ability to defend a specific target from the Kinzhal may not be illustrative of the ability of air and missile defence systems to provide wide-area coverage against such systems. In a conflict against Russia, some likely targets for Russian missiles will be well known – for example, major airbases and combined air operation centres. Other targets, however, such as command posts for ground units or components of national energy grids, will be more geographically distributed, and if a strike was not for purely tactical-operational purposes but had broader aims in mind – as could be the case in the event of nuclear use – Russia would have a broad range of targets to choose from. Moreover, we are still working with a small empirical base, and will require more reliable evidence that the Patriot is consistently effective against missiles based on the 9M723.
+
+Nonetheless, the event is particularly notable in conjunction with what we know about Ukraine’s intercept rates against Russian cruise missiles such as the 3M-14 Kalibr. While they struggled initially, by the end of 2022, Ukrainian air defenders were intercepting 70–80% of the cruise missiles fired by Russia. This is despite the fact that cruise missiles were used against a relatively wide range of targets and were manoeuvring in flight to confound assessments of their ultimate destination. If air and missile defences can deliver high intercept rates against Russian cruise and ballistic missiles, many of which are dual-use – and especially if these rates differ significantly from pre-war Russian expectations – this could have significant ramifications for both conventional and nuclear coercive strikes.
+
+
+### Implications for Russia
+
+This could have considerable impacts on both Russia’s planning for strategic conventional strike operations (otherwise known as “strategic operations for the destruction of critically important targets”, or SODCIT) and its low-yield nuclear options – two things that are closely interrelated in Russian thinking. Russian strategists show a preference for the use of conventional precision strike assets such as cruise missiles to deliver calibrated damage against an opponent, with nuclear weapons playing a passive enabling role by constraining an opponent’s retaliatory options. There is a body of Russian literature on the use of limited numbers of nuclear weapons to deliver “dosed” damage against an opponent if this fails. To the extent that this model of use and subcomponent objectives such as demonstration and intimidation are predicated on the assumption that relatively limited numbers of strike assets would be needed to achieve each mission – which is of particular salience with respect to nuclear use – this assumption will now come into question.
+
+It could, of course, be argued that little has changed for Russia. The costs of layered IAMD remain prohibitive; one expert at the 2023 Air and Missile Defence Conference estimated that the costs to the US of protecting Guam alone would be in the range of $5 billion. While it is possible to erect a missile shield over a specific area such as Kyiv, scaling missile defence across a theatre will be much more difficult, and Russia has a variety of targets that it can strike for demonstrative purposes. Furthermore, given the scale of the missile threat faced by the US in the Indo-Pacific, it is unclear that large numbers of US systems – currently the backbone of alliance IAMD – will be available to NATO in the medium term. Ukraine, moreover, operated 250 surface-to-air missile systems at the war’s outset – the largest air and missile defence force in Europe, and one which was augmented by Western systems.
+
+___`Air and missile defences capable of intercepting single targets across the European theatre create requirements for Russian planners which militate against the logic of limited nuclear use`___
+
+That being said, there are potential lessons regarding the implications of a more robust European IAMD capability. The evidence from Ukraine does not necessarily suggest that point defence is the only achievable option. Missiles such as the Kalibr have been used against a wide variety of targets, and Ukraine’s ability to achieve relatively high intercept rates against them in a fairly large theatre is noteworthy – especially since cruise missiles carry the bulk of Russia’s low-yield throw weight. Defending a large theatre against ballistic missiles like the 9M723 and the Kinzhal would prove much more challenging, of course, but these missiles are fewer in number. Moreover, the relative success of Saudi air defenders against Houthi short-range ballistic missiles illustrates that ballistic missile defence (BMD) over a large theatre is achievable.
+
+To be sure, realism should inform our assessments. There is no plausible and affordable NATO IAMD system which can defend every inch of alliance territory against Russia. Moreover, if Russia intended to use low-yield nuclear weapons to play on fears of subsequent escalation in order to achieve a peace on its terms, then it would not be constrained to attacking targets of military or strategic value; a demonstration almost anywhere would have the desired effect, and striking at some distance from anything of significance might be useful as a means of signalling restraint.
+
+However, there are two important ways in which Russia’s strategic posture – including elements of its approach to nuclear use – would be impacted by more credible NATO IAMD.
+
+First, air and missile defences capable of intercepting single targets across the European theatre create requirements for Russian planners which militate against the logic of limited nuclear use. The question is not one of whether Russia can be prevented from striking targets with low-yield nuclear weapons, but whether it can be prevented from doing so in a way that allows it to credibly signal limited intent. To signal this and thus avoid unintended escalation, Russia can only mate a limited number of warheads to their missiles and, moreover, must launch limited salvos.
+
+Second, Russia also intends to use low-yield nuclear weapons on a much greater scale when a conflict escalates to the level of a large-scale war. For example, one of the performance criteria set for the Russian Navy by the country’s 2017 Naval Doctrine is the ability to do critical damage to an opposing fleet using non-strategic nuclear weapons. Such weapons would also likely be used in a regional war to target critical infrastructure such as airbases, which are difficult to shut down permanently using conventional capabilities. To the extent that Russia believes it needs larger numbers of missiles to achieve its aims at this level of warfare, this imposes constraints on the Russian system when a conflict is in its conventional phase. Every missile used for a conventional mission is one that will not be available for non-strategic nuclear use, and the production rates of ballistic missiles like the Iskander – roughly six a month – suggest this will be a major constraint. To be useful, NATO IAMD does not need to deny Russia the capacity to conduct low-yield strikes, but rather it needs to increase the number of missiles Russia requires in order to conduct these strikes, thus constraining its options for conventional targeting.
+
+While it is highly likely that Russia will remain capable of saturating the air and missile defences of well-defended targets, it can be compelled to do so in ways which will require expending ever-greater numbers of dual-use missiles. This would particularly be the case in a potential conflict with NATO. While it might be noted that systems such as Patriot provide fairly limited coverage, for many longer-range air and missile defence platforms, a major limiting factor is not the range of interceptors but that of radar. Networking maritime IAMD platforms or even systems like Patriot with the F-35 – as the US has in recent experiments – can readily increase their range. Maritime BMD capabilities such as the Aster-30 Block 1NT have a theoretical range of 600 km. If combined with external sensors – be it F-35 or a space-based sensor layer along the lines envisioned under the PESCO Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based TheatER surveillance (TWISTER) project – such interceptors could provide wide-area coverage against manoeuvring ballistic and quasi-ballistic threats. Though unsuited for defence against Russia (something they were not built for), the European Phased Adaptive Approach sites at Deveselu and Redzikowo could theoretically be modified to control a larger number of vertical launching systems and to contain a different mix of interceptors, much in the way an Arleigh Burke destroyer at sea would.
+
+To be sure, this is predicated on a level of capacity and integration that does not currently exist within the alliance, particularly in the case of its European members. Several points are salient here. First, the eventual success of projects such as TWISTER remains to be seen. Second, the level of integration needed to deliver results comparable to those achieved by F-35 and Patriot working in tandem may or may not be viable across an alliance which fields a number of air defence systems. Finally, achieving a level of rationalisation across air forces that would allow some to prioritise missions such as defensive counter air – while a prerequisite to any credible IAMD – may not be politically feasible.
+
+While the process of overcoming these barriers exceeds the remit of this article, the important point here is that strategic effects can be achieved by improvements in IAMD well short of a preclusive defence of Europe against Russian missiles.
+
+
+### The Impact of Better IAMD on Russian Strategy
+
+To be clear, there is no plausibly affordable air and missile defence system that can cover Europe against Russian attack. However, an effective IAMD system capable of raising the number of missiles Russia needs to use to strike any given target could hinder elements of Russia’s strategy for missile use.
+
+___`Improvements in European IAMD could potentially require Russian plans for limited nuclear use to involve greater numbers of weapons, complicating assumptions about escalation management`___
+
+First, if larger numbers of missiles are needed to strike assets that are likely to be on NATO’s critical asset list and defended asset list, then Russia will need to consider whether the operational utility of striking a target with conventional options – its preference – exceeds the cost imposed in terms of running down capabilities needed to maintain Russia’s nuclear credibility at the theatre level.
+
+Second, Russia could lose some confidence in the idea of a nuclear “shot across the bows” as a tool to manipulate escalation in a reasonably controllable way. The premise of such an attack would have been that striking a high-value target with a missile precise enough to be detonated above the fallout threshold would enable nuclear demonstration at relatively low cost to civilians, thus limiting the risk of escalation. If, however, multiple missiles are needed to saturate a given target, then controlling escalation becomes considerably more difficult. For example, if NATO IAMD can draw data from a space-based sensor layer, then in order to use short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Russia first has to neutralise the satellites associated with projects such as TWISTER. In all likelihood, Russia might also believe it has to suppress any maritime BMD capabilities that NATO has at its disposal. Russia has struggled to replace the Soviet-era Tselina and Legenda satellite clusters, which used electronic signals intelligence and radar respectively to track carrier battle groups. Moreover, even China, which maintains a much more robust space-based ISR network, would have a difficult task tracking mobile maritime targets at very long ranges to the degree needed to enable conventional targeting. Finally, very large numbers of missiles would be needed to sink well-defended air defence destroyers. Russia could turn to the old Soviet palliative – the use of nuclear missiles at sea. Anti-ship missiles like the SSN-19 Shipwreck were built to be nuclear-armed, reducing the need for granular targeting and requiring fewer missiles to leak through to destroy high-value targets. The challenge, however, is that if nuclear missiles are needed to destroy or incapacitate targets such as air defence destroyers, this necessitates nuclear use on a larger scale.
+
+Finally, if penetrating credible air and missile defences necessitated larger salvos, this could in turn require larger numbers of warheads to be mated to missiles, something likely to be noted by NATO intelligence. Unless Russia was willing to run the risk of failure, leading not only to embarrassment but also likely to serious consequences, these steps would defeat one of the prerequisites of calibrated nuclear use: the ability to communicate intent clearly to an opponent. Attacks on space-based assets would create some ambiguity regarding whether Russia was intent on destroying or disrupting early warning capabilities and thus preparing for a larger strike. Russia could mitigate this risk by targeting systems like the US’s planned hypersonic and ballistic tracking system or a comparable future European system in low Earth orbit, while avoiding early warning systems in geosynchronous orbit. The effectiveness of this distinction would depend on Western interpretation, however – something the Russians could not count on given how uncertain such assessments can be. We might think of how Western adversaries, real and simulated, responded in unanticipated ways during exercises such as Proud Prophet and Able Archer.
+
+This problem is compounded for Russia by two factors. First, the majority of the delivery systems for low-yield nuclear weapons are cruise missiles, against which interception rates have been especially high. The exceptions to this rule – the 9M723 and the Kinzhal – are available in more limited numbers. For example, it is estimated that Russia’s monthly production rate for the 9M723 is around six per month. Moreover, of the two missiles, only the Kinzhal is capable of striking targets beyond 500 km. Second, many of the launch platforms for low-yield delivery systems like the Kalibr are surface vessels which are vulnerable to early destruction. This is also potentially true of Russia’s strategic bombers, which can be targeted on the ground at the few airbases from which they operate – though this would certainly not be easy, given the dense air defences around these bases.
+
+Russia can use submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the Sineva to conduct low-yield strikes, and it has apparently developed low-yield warheads for the Sineva. The speed of an SLBM on a depressed trajectory means it is all but certain to be effective. However, at this point it becomes all but impossible to signal strategic restraint, or to ensure that an opponent can discriminate a Sineva carrying a low-yield warhead from a loadout of strategic warheads. Moreover, using SLBMs for non-strategic missions means eroding Russia’s strategic deterrent vis-á-vis the US.
+
+
+### Russia’s Options
+
+None of this should be taken to suggest that Russia cannot conduct low-yield strikes in Europe – the country’s arsenal of low-yield capabilities is too large and robust, and the range of potential targets is too broad. But improvements in European IAMD could potentially require Russian plans for limited nuclear use to involve greater numbers of weapons, complicating their assumptions regarding escalation management. The assumption that nuclear weapons can be coordinated artfully with diplomacy is likely to be increasingly problematised.
+
+Additionally, Russia would need to be more judicious in its use of dual-use missiles for conventional strike missions, if a larger number of missiles are needed for many sub-strategic nuclear missions. This, in turn, would constrain Russia’s options for conventional countervalue targeting. Cumulatively, this could have the effect of pushing Russia towards the nuclear doctrine it espoused in 1999, when that year’s Zapad exercises involved the early and large-scale use of low-yield nuclear weapons against a putative opponent (likely NATO). The balance depends, of course, on whether the success rate differs from what Russia, NATO and Ukraine would reasonably have expected, a question which cannot be definitively answered based on open sources. But it should at least give cause to question some of the assumptions about what a Russian conventional missile campaign or “limited” nuclear strike might look like, which have been common in public discourse since the beginning of the war. In particular, a Russian attempt at “limited” nuclear use against NATO might be more complicated than feared, but – were it to occur – it would be more escalatory and even more potentially damaging than is sometimes hoped.
+
+---
+
+__Sidharth Kaushal__ is the Research Fellow of Sea Power in RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy. Sidharth holds a doctorate in International Relations from the London School of Economics, where his research examined the ways in which strategic culture shapes the contours of a nation’s grand strategy.
+
+__Matthew Harries__ is Director of Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at RUSI, where he leads the institute’s programme of research on WMD issues. His own research interests include deterrence, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, and UK nuclear policy.