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+ This Policy Brief seeks to explore how key partners in the Indo-Pacific have perceived and responded to recent Western efforts in the region.
+ +Much has been written about the enhanced Indo-Pacific strategies of the US, Canada and their European partners, as they have fleshed out their respective approaches in a series of important policy documents. But there has been far less research on how governments in the Indo-Pacific view the rhetorical and real-word implications of intensified Western engagement. As part of an ongoing RUSI–Chatham House project on transatlantic cooperation, this Policy Brief seeks to explore how key partners in the Indo-Pacific have perceived and responded to recent North American and European efforts in the region. To what extent do Indo-Pacific countries view these as part of a concerted transatlantic or Western approach, and how would such an approach accord with their interests?
+ +Rather than offering a comprehensive study of such a large region, this brief focuses on the perspectives of a selection of Indo-Pacific states that transatlantic governments have identified as priority partners in shaping the future regional order. This includes an inner ring of US allies that have most openly embraced the renewed transatlantic interest in the region, and tougher stances toward China: Japan; Australia; and South Korea. It also includes an outer ring of mostly non-aligned partners that have been more circumspect, welcoming enhanced diplomatic engagement, but raising concerns about the long-term commitment of the transatlantic powers, and the risk that more robust China policies could inflame tensions with Beijing, rather than bringing balance to the region. This group includes India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines.
+ +These groups are not, of course, uniform in their attitudes, which tend to differ across different issues, as is to be expected when dealing with broad geographical spaces such as the Indo-Pacific and transatlantic regions.
+ +This Policy Brief draws on interviews with senior government officials and experts, as well as a review of open-source data on national security priorities. Interviews took place in Hanoi, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, London, New York City, Singapore, Washington, DC and other locations between October 2022 and August 2023. The brief does not consider China’s approach to the Indo-Pacific strategies of transatlantic partners in the brief, because these strategies are broadly targeted at China, rather than considering China a partner in the execution of transatlantic policy.
+ +The US’s closest regional allies – Japan, Australia and South Korea – have been the strongest supporters of intensified regional engagement from transatlantic partners, actively seeking to encourage and shape their involvement, across security, economics, technology and other contested domains. While there are differences of tone and emphasis, this crucial trio broadly shares the analytical framework through which the US and Europe see the Indo-Pacific. Further, the transatlantic partners and this trio share some overarching regional objectives, such as: balancing China’s rising power and assertiveness; pursuing economic de-risking vis-à-vis China; and providing developing economies in Asia with diplomatic and economic options that can boost their resilience. Over the past couple of years, officials from these three countries have expanded and deepened their conversations with North American and European counterparts as they explore areas in which they can learn from one another and, ultimately, better coordinate policies where there are substantial areas of overlap.
+ +Japan and Australia are most closely aligned with the US and Europe. Tokyo and Canberra share transatlantic concerns about the rise of China and its increasing assertiveness: from Beijing’s defence modernisation and deployment of military capabilities to its use of economic coercion, disinformation and other tools of interference beneath the threshold of armed conflict, and its ambition to reshape the international order. New South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has brought his country closer to the positions of Australia and Japan, with his government publishing its own Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2022, and distancing itself from the concerns of his predecessor, Moon Jae-in. But the Yoon administration’s National Security Strategy, published in June 2023, frames the challenge as being the “intensification of US–China strategic competition”, in contrast to how Japan, Australia and transatlantic partners frame China itself as the chief challenge. The concluding statement of the Camp David trilateral summit between the leaders of the US, Japan and South Korea in August 2023 was markedly more restrained in its discussion of China than the final communiqué of the May 2023 summit of the G7, which includes Japan and key transatlantic governments, but not South Korea.
+ +While officials and policy experts interviewed from Australia, Japan and South Korea generally did not view their partnerships with the US and Europe through an explicitly transatlantic lens, they universally welcomed increased efforts to discuss shared objectives and work towards better policy coordination in the region. This is happening across a range of overlapping platforms and issues, mirroring the complex arrangements through which the US and Europe are trying to better work together in the region. This reflects US efforts to build a “latticework” of alliances and partnerships that are “more flexible, ad hoc, more political than legal, sometimes more temporary than permanent”.
+ +On economics, the US, Europe and Japan are seeking to build a common approach and manage competitive differences over industrial policy through the G7. Neither Australia nor South Korea is a G7 member but, under the rubric of “G7+”, they were both invited to the Hiroshima summit in May 2023, alongside the leaders of Brazil, Comoros, Cook Islands, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. Outside of summits, European and North American officials are also engaging with their Australian, Japanese and South Korean counterparts in much more frequent discussions and dialogues about the economic and technological challenges presented by China, and how to ensure development assistance and infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific is more effective.
+ +On traditional security, Japan, Australia and South Korea are increasing their engagement with NATO, participating in a NATO summit for the first time in June 2022, and again in 2023. It should be acknowledged, however, that this is in part a response to the war in Ukraine, as well as being a result of transatlantic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. In a show of less-than-perfect transatlantic cooperation, the proposal for a regional liaison office in Tokyo that might have supported a coordinated response to shared security challenges was opposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. Ben Wallace, the then British defence secretary, seemed to support the proposal in comments made in Singapore in June 2023 but, in a subsequent interview, he expressed understanding for the French position and concern about NATO “mission creep” to the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, the bilateral “tailored partnership programmes” that Japan and South Korea signed with NATO in 2023 suggest there is agreement across the Alliance on the rising importance of Asian partnerships.
+ +While there is no intention to build a comprehensive, synthesised approach to the Indo-Pacific, Australia, Japan and South Korea are all looking to push their cooperation with North America and Europe to a new level through a web of overlapping platforms and priorities anchored in the US alliance system. Japan, Australia and the US are seeking to coordinate their security and economic cooperation with one another and India through the “Quad”. Australia, the UK and the US are deepening their military-to-military and military–industrial engagement through AUKUS. And, despite the historical tribulations of Japan–South Korea relations, both governments have pledged to strengthen trilateral cooperation with the US across traditional security, economic security and other regional issues.
+ +Beyond the core trio, five other important states in the Indo-Pacific – India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines – have taken a more selective and transactional approach to enhanced transatlantic engagement in the region. This reflects the fact that, aside from the Philippines, none of these states is a formal military ally of the US, and all have distinctive traditions of foreign policy independence. Aside from Singapore, they are developing economies with leaderships that are under pressure to deliver growth and jobs. According to the sources interviewed for this brief, these five countries want the US and its transatlantic allies to help maintain a stable balance of power in the region, but they also fear that the intensity of Washington’s competition with China could be a destabilising force.
+ +Transatlantic partners’ economic engagement looks particularly disjointed to those in this circle. Unwilling for domestic political reasons to offer market access, the US is pursuing instead a vague Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The five countries discussed here are all participating in early IPEF negotiations, but regional officials say it is too early to tell whether these talks can deliver an economic benefit. The UK is seeking bilateral trade deals, and has acceded to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam, but not the US, which pulled out of a predecessor agreement in 2017, or the EU. Meanwhile, the EU’s Global Gateway and the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment remain nascent initiatives, with regional officials sceptical about their ability to deliver tangible, rapid benefits.
+ +One further key challenge is the Indo-Pacific concept itself. Although many advocates of the Indo-Pacific framing see it as a way to embrace a bigger regional role for India, India’s own view of the Indo-Pacific does not tally neatly with those of the US and Europe. The reinvigorated Quad is often painted as a balancing coalition against China, but Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stipulated that India “does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country”. India’s own initiatives for the region, such as the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and the Indian Ocean vision of “Security and Growth for All in the Region”, are framed in inclusive terms, as is ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, there is growing consensus in India about the need for a tougher approach to Beijing, in the aftermath of the flare-up of tensions along its border with China.
+ +India has also stepped up its engagement with specific transatlantic countries, including the US, the UK and France. However, India’s maintenance of its historical relationship with Russia, despite the invasion of Ukraine, is a reminder that – as is the case within the transatlantic community – not all Indo-Pacific countries will accept Manichean framings of the region as an arena for a battle of democracies versus autocracies.
+ +There is yet more divergence when it comes to Southeast Asia. Officials and policy experts in that region welcome many aspects of Western plans for the Indo-Pacific, but have concerns that the hardening US approach to China, in particular, may antagonise rather than deter Beijing, and that new frameworks and institutions such as the Quad may bypass or undermine the region’s existing ASEAN-anchored architecture. ASEAN member states are concerned with maintaining “ASEAN centrality” in countries’ approaches to the Indo-Pacific, noting that this is the “underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the … region”. In other words, they would prefer that ASEAN institutions and platforms are the vehicles through which partners implement their Indo-Pacific strategies.
+ +New Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, who took office in June 2022, has shed the anti-American approach of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte, and is intensifying security cooperation with Washington as China increases the pressure on the Philippines in disputed parts of the South China Sea. But other governments in this outer ring remain concerned that the US and its transatlantic allies are too heavily focused on competing with, if not containing, China. Key officials and policy experts in Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam fear that the US and European governments could unnecessarily antagonise Beijing, prompting an escalatory spiral that will cost their region much more than it will the Euro-Atlantic. Numerous Southeast Asian officials indicated that Western government narratives that criticised China’s infrastructure investments and framed competition with Beijing as that between democracy and autocracy had fallen flat. However, it should be noted that this has not caused Singapore and Vietnam to hesitate in improving their military ties with the US.
+ +Many officials and policy experts expressed a dual fear that the US might abandon the region if US politics turns further inward, and also that it might become too aggressive toward China, which could trigger a potentially devastating conflict in the Indo-Pacific. These perceptions about likely trajectories in US policy also colour expectations among regional partners about what Europe will do, due to the widely held belief that European policy toward the Indo-Pacific largely tracks that of its premier security guarantor, the US.
+ +In communicating their various Indo-Pacific approaches, the US and European governments have tended to stress like-mindedness as a basis for working with a broad array of regional partners, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. Yet those governments have diverse views on the Indo-Pacific, and do not view their engagement in the region through a “transatlantic” lens.
+ +Although the US and Europe have put economic security, shared prosperity and resilient supply chains at the heart of their various Indo-Pacific strategies and documents, regional partners expressed concern about the brewing discord between the US and its allies over landmark economic and technological policies. The UK and the EU have warned that the US Inflation Reduction Act, which offers billions of dollars in green subsidies to US companies, could curb competition. Japan and South Korea share these concerns. While the US and the EU have set up a Trade and Technology Council to promote shared rules and norms in this vital emerging domain, they are also pursuing different approaches to the regulation and promotion of the technology sector. Further, recent trips to Beijing by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, European Council President Charles Michel and French President Macron have stirred US fears that its European allies might be softening their approach to China, in the hope of avoiding costly decoupling, and of maintaining or even expanding economic benefits as the Chinese economy comes back to life after Beijing’s abandonment of its zero-Covid strategy.
+ +Unsurprisingly, countries in the Indo-Pacific do not view the Euro-Atlantic region as an integrated monolithic actor and, according to interviewees, the term “transatlantic” generally holds little meaning across the Indo-Pacific. While the slew of recently published Indo-Pacific strategies and documents has raised awareness of the diplomatic energy that European and North Atlantic countries are directing toward the Indo-Pacific, countries in the region draw different conclusions on how best to work with transatlantic partners.
+ +Australia, Japan and South Korea form a core of partners that are truly like-minded from a transatlantic point of view on many, although not all, issues. Beyond these core partners, degrees of like-mindedness are more limited. Vietnam and India share US and European concerns about China’s growing military might, and want transatlantic partners to help provide a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. However, their divergent views on the war in Ukraine or on Russia’s role are not only a product of dependence on Moscow for military hardware and technology. In the case of India – but perhaps also more widely – this also reflects a welcoming of the opportunities that multipolarity offers for realising greater strategic autonomy.
+ +US and European officials need to get better at accepting and navigating these complexities, rather than wishing them away. Just as they will need to engage with governments in the Indo-Pacific as partners in their own right and not simply as participants in a US–China struggle, they will also need their Indo-Pacific partners to be much more honest with them about their qualms and differences in opinion and national interest. While these conversations might not be easy, transatlantic partners can help by better coordinating their engagement with key Indo-Pacific partners, at diplomatic posts in the region as well as in national capitals. US and European diplomats are already coordinating on an ad hoc basis across the Indo-Pacific, but they can and should be better joined up with discussions at headquarters.
+ +From the perspective of Indo-Pacific partners, relationships with the US and Europe will be shaped to a great extent by the trajectory of China’s relationships with them and with the West. The core group of US allies in the region – Australia, Japan and South Korea – are largely comfortable with tougher US and European policy toward China, although there are concerns about the harder-edged rhetoric coming out of the US Congress. Across the rest of the region, there is much more ambivalence.
+ +There are, ultimately, two overarching challenges. First, the US and Europe will need to find the right balance between enhancing security relationships with allies and their closest partners, and helping other regional countries to tackle the economic and non-traditional security issues that they face. Second, while transatlantic states are not seen as a monolithic actor in the region, they can improve their reputations, and the effectiveness of their engagement, if they better coordinate their efforts in the Indo-Pacific, and avoid duplicating them. This will require more candid conversations between transatlantic countries and Indo-Pacific countries. The US and Europe will need to listen more and encourage Indo-Pacific partners to speak up honestly, to ensure that their various Indo-Pacific strategies and approaches can be refined and adjusted as they are implemented.
+ +Ben Bland is the director of the Asia-Pacific programme at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition.
+ +Veerle Nouwens was previously Senior Research Fellow at the International Security Studies Department, focusing on geopolitical relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Her research interests include China’s foreign policy, cross-strait relations, maritime security and ASEAN.
+ +Philip Shetler-Jones is a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security team at RUSI. His current research is concentrated on Indo-Pacific security. His recent publications have focused on the defence policy of Japan, attitudes of China to NATO, and narratives about the defence of Taiwan.
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+ 
【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（4日）踏入審訊第118天。代表李予信的大律師關文渭進行結案陳詞，就被告被控「以威脅使用武力或其他非法手段」顛覆國家政權，關認為根據普通法下的詮釋原則，「非法手段」應只指涉與「實質脅迫與強迫（physical coercion and compulsion）」相關的手段，否則定義會太闊。法官問如有人用電腦病毒攻擊政府系統，是否不涉顛覆罪下的「非法手段」，辯方同意，但指這或涉恐怖活動罪，而即使《國安法》或出現漏洞，也應由立法機關而非法庭去填補。法官亦關注，《國安法》由中央草擬，為何辯方認為普通法原則適用，關引終院案例指《國安法》須與本港法律並行。
+ +此外，關指李予信無轉發「墨落無悔」聲明、論壇無提否決預算案，而公民黨非本案「共謀者」，控方不能將黨的行為歸咎李。
+ +
+▲ 李予信
案件今踏入結案陳詞第3日，控方上周就控罪中的「非法手段」作法律陳詞，指不限於刑事罪行及武力相關行為，議員濫用職權和違反職責也屬非法。代表李予信的大律師關文渭今代表其中13名被告作出回應。
+ +關文渭表示，就《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權罪下，「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」犯案的條文，應以「同類原則（ejusdem generis）」（即列出具體事物的前句如跟隨一個概括性字眼，後者所指事物應受前述類別所限）詮釋，當中「以武力、威脅使用武力」均涉「實質脅迫與強迫（physical coercion and compulsion）」，因此「其他非法手段」也應受此類別所限，只涉「實質脅迫與強迫」的相關行為，包括刑事恐嚇及刑事損壞。
+ +關並指，在22條下，如有意圖顛覆，相關手段便是非法。法官李運騰續問，那如某人有意圖顛覆，但手段不涉武力是否便不違法？關指視乎其行為是否涉「物理脅迫與強迫」。
+ +法官陳慶偉續舉例，若以電腦病毒攻擊政府電腦系統，令行政立法和司法機關無法運作，又或釋放新冠病毒作生化或化學攻擊，也不屬辯方所指的「非法手段」，不會觸犯顛覆國家政權罪？關同意，但指這樣或干犯恐怖活動罪，仍受《國安法》所規限。
+ +李運騰續指，但恐怖活動罪旨在保障市民及財產，顛覆罪則保障政治制度，若辯方所言正確，《國安法》或會出現漏洞。關同意，但指法庭的責任不是要填補漏洞，這是立法機關的責任，若法庭這樣做有濫用司法權力的風險。
+ +關文渭亦不認同控方所指，《國安法》目的是將所有可能危害國安的罪行都刑事化，強調人大常委制訂《國安法》條文的每隻字都有意思，不會以很多字眼表達同一意思；而假如條文針對任何非法手段，則毋須再冗贅地列出「以武力、威脅使用武力」。因此列出相關字眼，是讓人以「同類原則」理解何謂「其他非法手段」，將其意思限制為只涉武力。
+ +關並指，中國《刑法》無就「顛覆」定義，但「顛覆」一般指推翻政府權力及法律所制訂的制度，而這很少能透過非武力手段達致。而人大常委立法時已列出「嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞中央或香港特區政權機關依法履行職能」等，擴闊「顛覆」的意思，故條文應同時會包含限制，即只限與武力相關的非法手段，以免意思過闊（over-breadth）。
+ +陳慶偉續問，「同類原則」乃普通法詮釋原則，但《國安法》是由「北方」（中央）草擬（drafted up in the North），為何辯方認為會適用？關引終審法院就呂世瑜案的判詞，指《國安法》須與本港法律並行（work in tandem）。李運騰指，該判詞亦指詮釋《國安法》時應考慮與維護國安有關的全國性法律，惟關回應相關法例非常簡短，無列明任何手段或是否涉武力，因此《國安法》22條特別提到「以武力、威脅使用武力」的非法手段就很能反映問題（very telling）。
+ +陳慶偉續指，《國安法》第一條提及《國安法》立法目的，或隱含「同類原則」不適用（implied exclusion）。關同意《國安法》是因2019年社會事件而訂立，但引人大常委副委員長王晨2020年5月22日就《國安法》的講話，提到立法背景是「反中亂港勢力」破壞香港社會秩序，毀損公共設施及癱瘓政府和立法會運作等，而當時在議會內有武力阻礙議會運作，不知道人大常委立法時是否欲針對該些行為。關強調，法庭必須肯定該講話排除「同類原則」的應用，才能指隱含「同類原則」不適用。
+ +就「非法手段」的界線，關文渭認為，若民事過失如侵入土地和誹謗也可被視為「非法手段」會十分危險。李運騰問，若該人作出相關行為時有意圖顛覆，「為什麼不可以？」關回應，那便會令條文定義「非常廣闊、太過廣闊（very wide, too wide）」。李運騰則指，《國安法》的嚴苛，某程度上是被控罪須證被告意圖顛覆的條件，而有所減輕。
+ +關續指，重點並非「非法手段」是否只限刑事罪行，而是基於預算案內容以外的原因否決是否合法。而控方的主張是議員若考慮預算案以外的原因而否決，便屬不考慮議案內容和優劣的「無差別」否決，屬「非法」。但關指，本案有無法抗拒的證據顯示，被告否決目的是迫政府回應五大訴求。
+ +法官陳仲衡即問，迫政府回應五大訴求豈不是被告的藉口，因他們知道不可能達到？關指根據各方陳詞，若說被告只是以五大訴求作為掩飾是有悖常理。關續重申，除非法律禁止，否則個人可以做任何事情，而法例沒有列明議員投票時應該或不應該考慮什麼；法例只列明要根據政府提案「審核、通過財政預算」，故如被告審視預算案後發現沒有五大訴求的內容而否決，也不能說他們沒有審視過預算案。
+ +
+▲ 代表李予信的大律師 關文渭
至於就李予信的案情，關文渭指李沒有參與過超級區議會的協調會議，雖有出席3月25日公民黨記者會，但沒有轉發過黨6月簽署「墨落無悔」的帖文。而就李提到否決權的選舉單張，關指是在《國安法》前印發，並於6月30日晚收回，李於《國安法》後短時間已印製沒有提到否決權的新單張。
+ +就李的選舉論壇筆記提到否決預算案，關文渭指在7月4日、即《國安法》生效後數日的超區選舉論壇上，李從沒有提過否決預算案，大部分其他參與者包括鄺俊宇和涂謹申也沒有提過；而黨友鄭達鴻雖在6月19日街站提到否決預算案，但那是《國安法》前的事，至7月12日的街站無公民黨成員再提過。辯方認為就李是否在案發時間（2020年7月1日）前已退出（withdraw）參與有疑點。
+ +
+▲ 鄭達鴻（中）
關續指，除去以上所有證據，控方指控只餘李予信的公民黨黨員身分。惟關引案例強調，單以政治連繫定罪屬危險，公民黨無被指為「共謀者」之一，不能將黨的言行歸咎黨員，而是視乎被告的個別言行。
+ +就李有份拍攝、楊岳橋提到否決預算案的初選宣傳片段，關稱是於《國安法》前拍攝，由黨所剪輯和發布，只是黨的行為而非李的行為；而李初選落敗後報名港島地區直選，但那從不是組織者協議的目標。關最後指，李的供詞沒有動搖，如法庭認為他所言是正確或可能正確，應讓他脫罪。
+ +關文渭陳詞完畢後，續由代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 進行結案陳詞。
+ +
【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（4日）踏入審訊第118天。所有被告的代表律師完成結案陳詞，正式結束118天的審訊，法官料約3至4個月後裁決，但不能作出保證。
+ +本案指控被告以「非法手段」無差別否決預算案，意圖顛覆國家政權，控方指濫用議員職權亦屬「非法手段」。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 今陳詞指，《基本法》無規定議員應如何投票和說明何謂濫權，議員只是向選民問責，議員投票不是法律問題、是政治問題，不應由法庭裁定他們有否恰當履行職責。Beel又指，何桂藍早料會被DQ、亦認為35+不可能，故不可能意圖做出她根本知道不可能的事；而何並非要無差別否決，而是望審核預算案，即使政府回應五大訴求但財案有不公她也會反對。Beel 又指，本案整個串謀公開進行，無人相信當時所做是違法；而控方是將政治問題變成刑事罪行問題，本案案情在任何其他普通法管轄區均不會構成顛覆，而是被視為「尋常政治」。
+ +代表李予信的大律師關文渭今早陳詞完畢，最後由代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 陳詞。Beel 指，根據《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權罪，被告必須「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」作出22條下的4項行為，並同時有顛覆國家政權的意圖才能入罪。惟 Beel 指條文模糊（vague），沒有訂明何謂「顛覆」和「非法手段」，提出應以2003年就《基本法》23條立法的草案去理解立法原意，當中顛覆條文包括「推翻中央人民政府」。惟法官李運騰質疑，該條例從無通過，只是本地立法機關的立法原意，但本案要處理的是人大常委的立法原意，兩者截然不同，不認為與案有關。
+ +Beel 指，《國安法》同樣無列明「國家政權」定義，李運騰提議以內地法律理解，惟 Beel 指內地法律指涉中央政府，但香港不是國家。李運騰續指香港政府也是行使中央所授予的權力，惟 Beel 指無證據顯示被告推翻香港政府。法官陳慶偉續引控方呈交、由清華大學法學院教授王振民等編著的《香港特別行政區維護國家安全法讀本》，指有提到就國家政權的解釋，又指「國家政權的概念是我們所不熟悉（not known to us），是內地法律制度所熟悉」，Beel 無進一步補充。
+ +
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel
就「非法手段」的定義，Beel 同意應以「同類原則」詮釋，而法庭如不接納只限與武力相關，亦應限於刑事罪行，否則便會令法律不清晰，公眾難以分辨何謂合法和非法行為，有違普通法傳統及法治精神。Beel 並指，若說「非法手段」不限於刑事罪行，是「矛盾修辭（oxymoron）」，因控方是指「你可以透過不犯法去犯法（“You can commit a crime by not commiting a crime.”）」；李運騰回應但控方仍須證明被告意圖顛覆國家政權。
+ +Beel 續解釋，被告達成協議時，應知道其行為將會構成刑事罪行才能入罪。李運騰問，即他們犯案前要獲得一個法律學位？Beel 否認，指對法律無知不是辯解理由，但法律應是公眾可理解。法官遂舉串謀打劫銀行的例子，指被告的參與行為可能是合法，如只是負責「睇水」或擔任司機，但若知道串謀的目的並同意參與便可構成罪行，並問此情況下控方還要證明被告知道打劫銀行是刑事罪行嗎？Beel 指不需要，因被告可從法例知道其行為是刑事罪行。
+ +李運騰即說，《國安法》於6月30日通過，每人也可以閱讀條文。但 Beel 強調當中就「非法手段」定義不清晰，被告不能知道就預算案投反對票會否構成罪行，強調若法例無明文規定為犯罪行為，法庭不得加以定罪。
+ +而就控罪指被告旨在濫用當選後根據《基本法》第73條受託的職權（包括「根據政府的提案，審核、通過財政預算」），Beel 指條文只是列明立法會而非議員有的權力，且該權力是可用可不用。李運騰即指，議會獲賦予權力不代表可被濫用，但 Beel 反問「什麼是濫用？」，指《基本法》無規定議員在投票時有什麼職責、也沒有說明何謂濫權，控方亦無相關專家或案例支持，質疑是「空洞的論點」；又指這「不是法律問題，是政治問題」，反問「如何就議員有否恰當審核議案立法？審核是什麼意思？要去到什麼程度才足夠？」
+ +Beel 續引何桂藍證供，指預算案有議員無法審核的部分，如「基本工程基金」和現時已撥款130億的國安開支，議員不是不想審核，而是無法審核。而終審法院就梁國雄案的判詞，指法庭不應干預立法會內部事務，Beel 指議員如何投票沒有法律規定，是立法會內部程序問題，不是法律問題；而議員如何投票最終是向選民問責，不應由法庭裁定議員有否恰當履行職責。
+ +Beel 又指，控方是將純粹政治議題變成刑事罪行問題，但本案案情在任何其他普通法管轄區並不會構成顛覆罪，而是會被視為尋常政治（normal politics）。法庭在本案應考慮普通法原則，而非政治考慮。
+ +Beel 亦質疑控方於本案改變立場，由指控被告濫用73條的職權，移向指控沒有效忠《基本法》及香港特區。惟 Beel 強調，效忠香港特區不是效忠香港政府，立法會由人民選出，議員是對人民有義務（beholden），人民是特區的一部分。Beel 亦指控方在共謀者原則的法律爭議時，才首次提出被告《國安法》前或涉「公職人員行為失當」罪，但不被接納，現時將此論點「起死回生」，法庭也不應接納。
+ +而就本案指控被告否決預算案後導致特首解散立法會及下台，Beel 強調，根據《基本法》，特首有權不解散立法會，即使解散也不會癱瘓政府，因可申請臨時撥款，亦無人可迫特首下台，除非特首提交相同預算案並被否決。而且據基本法起草委員譚耀宗指，《基本法》50至51條機制原意是讓選民決定特首或議會哪方合理，Beel 反問：「如法例容許，又怎會構成阻撓和破壞政府履行職能？」，指否決致特首下台是《基本法》提供的程序，不可能是憲政危機。
+ +就何桂藍的案情，Beel 指沒有足夠證據證明有涉案串謀協議，即使有，何桂藍亦非協議一分子，沒有意圖無差別否決預算案和顛覆國家政權。而何的證供令人耳目一新（refreshing）、誠實、毫無歉意（unapologetic）和直接，沒有提出藉口，其證供可信，望法庭採納。
+ +Beel 並指，無論是控方證人區諾軒和何桂藍均認為民主派取得35+不可能，何於5月《國安法》訂立後已知她本人會被DQ，不可能當選和行使其權力，其後亦確實如此發生，「她如何能意圖做一些她知道做不到的事？」
+ +Beel 同意，串謀的不可能並非辯護理由，但舉例如有人在協議謀殺另一人前，已知道那人已死了，則根本不可能意圖殺他、亦不可能串謀罪成；而本案中何亦知道不可能做到涉案行為，亦因此無意圖這樣做，她參選只是想取得高投票率，其串謀罪不應成立。
+ +而若法庭不接納，Beel 亦提出何桂藍並無參與控方所指控的任何協議，指預算案需經歷兩三個月的審議階段，而何清楚說明若預算案有無法審核的部分，其預設立場便是投反對票，除非政府說服她投贊成；她亦會指出議案問題並提修正案。
+ +Beel 指，何明顯並非「無差別」否決，其目的是要審核預算案，找出其弊端，而她無直接提倡五大訴求或否決預算案，其立場亦與五大訴求無關，因即使政府回應五大訴求，但預算案有不公她也會投反對。Beel 亦指，何簽署「墨落無悔」只是讓選民看到她敢於運用《基本法》賦予的權力，是個人對聲明的回應，但不是簽署協議。
+ +Beel 最後指，本案串謀與其他任何串謀不同，整個協調過程是公開，無人相信他們當時所做的是違法、也沒有任何要隱瞞，何桂藍亦希望公眾知道事情如何發生，以在投票時作出知情的選擇。而否決預算案的議題一開始只是次要問題（side issue），因所有人都知道他們有權對預算案投下反對票；只是在得悉提到否決或會被DQ時才開始關注，但人們當時也非關注會干犯刑事罪行，因如何桂藍所說，她從無想過「撳個反對掣」也會被捕。
+ +Beel 續指，本案純粹關乎被告對政府的挑戰，就如譚耀宗及時任中聯辦主任駱惠寧都提過民主派若立會過半，是中央所不容許，2020年選舉制度「完善」後直選議席亦大幅減少，控方是將政治問題變成成刑事罪行問題。Beel 指，何桂藍議程清晰，就是推動民主化，尋求將功能失常的立法會改革，以向政府問責，但從無協議無差別否決預算案。即使法庭認為有，Beel 亦重申無法律規定如何投票、不認為無差別否決是違法，議員只是向其選民問責，應判何桂藍無罪。
+ +Beel 陳詞完畢後，所有辯方律師均完成陳詞，正式完結由今年2月6日開審、長達118天的審訊。法官陳慶偉表示，與另外兩名法官其後都要審理其他案件，不清楚需時多久作出裁決，但會盡快處理，料需約3至4個月，但強調不能作出保證，一有裁決會盡快通知各方。
+ +大律師關文渭另為保釋被告申請撤銷宵禁令，控方反對，法官最終批准所有被告撤宵禁令。散庭時，各被告與旁聽人士揮手道別。
+ +本案不認罪的16人，包括鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、李予信、余慧明及吳政亨。其中何桂藍、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、余慧明及吳政亨6人不獲准保釋，分別還柙逾26至33個月，其餘10人獲准保釋。
+ +案件編號：HCCC69/2022
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+ Experts examine two aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural recovery that are critical to increasing its food production and exports: demining farmland and restoring farmers’ access to fertilizers.
+ +In the two decades leading up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Ukraine had become a major producer and exporter of numerous agricultural commodities. In the 2020–2021 harvest season — the last season unaffected by Russia’s full-scale invasion — Ukraine was the fifth-largest exporter of wheat, honey, and walnuts worldwide; the third-largest exporter of maize, barley, and rapeseed; and the world’s top exporter of sunflower oil, sunflower meal, and millet.
+ +Due to Russia’s intentional attacks on all aspects of Ukraine’s agriculture sector, and collateral damage from hostilities, Ukraine’s production and exports are diminished today from prewar levels. As of June 2023, the Kyiv School of Economics estimated that Ukraine’s agriculture sector had incurred $8.7 billion in direct damages to agricultural machinery, equipment, and storage facilities, as well as from stolen or damaged agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and seeds, and outputs, such as crops and livestock. The sector’s $40.3 billion losses represent farmers’ diminished incomes due to foregone production, lower selling prices for products, and higher operational costs across all stages of the agri-food value chain.
+ +The Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, published in February 2023 by the World Bank in partnership with Kyiv School of Economics, the Ukrainian government, the European Union, and the United Nations, provides the most thorough evaluation of the war’s consequences for Ukraine and the investments required to ensure its future prosperity. However, the continuous and comprehensive nature of Russia’s assault complicates any estimate of damage and needs. Following the report’s publication, further losses and damages resulted from Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 and its immediate intensification of attacks on agricultural export infrastructure along Ukraine’s Black Sea and Danube River coasts. Between July and October, 17 separate attacks on Ukraine’s ports, grain facilities, and civilian ships destroyed 300,000 metric tons of grain and further reduced the country’s export potential.
+ +This destruction has resulted in a further downward spiral in Ukraine’s agricultural economy. Limited export routes have raised transportation costs and reduced the volume of goods farmers can sell, decreasing farmers’ incomes and eliminating profitability. While incomes have fallen, the costs of agricultural inputs have risen, and damage to farms and equipment imposes additional, heavy costs on farmers. As a result, many farmers are curtailing their activities and reducing the size of their harvests. And despite the Ukrainian government’s efforts to insulate agricultural workers from the draft, active war has drawn farmers to the battlefield, reducing the size of Ukraine’s agricultural labor force.
+ +In aggregate, this has significantly decreased Ukraine’s agricultural production and exports.
+ +
Still, in 2022, Ukraine managed to remain among the world’s top producers and exporters of corn, wheat, sunflower oil and seeds, and soybeans, due to the determination of Ukraine’s agricultural labor force, the commitment of Ukraine’s government, and support from numerous other partners, including governments, multilateral organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and research institutes. According to Kyiv School of Economics president Tymofiy Milovanov, efforts to rebuild Ukraine’s agricultural sector should continue even as conflict continues because it is unlikely there will be a “clear end to the war.” Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky established the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the War just two months after the full-scale invasion began, and the council continues to develop the Ukraine Recovery Plan in partnership with Ukrainian civil society institutions, partner governments, and international organizations and companies. The overarching goal of this work is not just to reconstruct Ukraine, but to build on the country’s reforms in recent years and transform Ukraine’s economy for the future.
+ +The importance of investing in Ukraine’s agricultural sector is threefold: to bolster Ukraine’s economy in wartime, to restore its capacity as a major global food supplier, and to strengthen its position as a bulwark to Russia’s influence through its own agricultural exports. Rebuilding and transforming Ukraine’s agriculture sector will require coordinated investments in its soil, labor force, agricultural institutions, and infrastructure. Adequate and low-cost routes must be secured for Ukraine’s agricultural exports; damaged farm, storage, transportation, and port infrastructure must be rebuilt; destroyed and stolen equipment and goods must be replaced; farmlands must be demined, tested, and restored; farmers’ access to seeds, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs much be secured; and farmers’ needs for additional financing and training to continue agricultural activity must be met. Investments to address immediate needs and obstacles are ongoing, but even more immense challenges will require international attention in the coming decades, including demining waterways, namely the Black and Azov Seas, modernizing the country’s irrigation infrastructure, and addressing the repercussions of the Kakhovka dam collapse on surrounding ecosystems and agricultural livelihoods. This work will take place in the context of Ukraine’s 2024 farmland market reform and the country’s candidacy for membership in the European Union, which will necessitate further reforms to Ukraine’s agriculture sector.
+ +This white paper focuses on two aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural reconstruction that are crucial to supporting transformation throughout the sector: demining Ukraine’s farmland and improving access to fertilizers in Ukraine. The information and insights included herein are the result of CSIS research, with input from numerous experts in Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. Information and policy recommendations regarding rebuilding other aspects of Ukraine’s agriculture sector can be found in other CSIS publications and will be the focus of future scholarship.
+ +Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a significant proportion of combat has been waged across farmland in Ukraine’s rural areas, compromising Ukraine’s agricultural economy. The nature of the war’s impacts on Ukraine’s farmland varies by locale. War-related damage to Ukraine’s farmland includes craters and other physical destruction from munitions attacks; possible chemical contamination from munitions, fuel spills, shell remnants, and human remains; and depressions from armed vehicle tracks. According to the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, Russian troops were firing between 40,000 and 60,000 shells at Ukrainian positions every day as of August 2022. Up to 20 percent of ammunition fired does not detonate, and Russian troops regularly place landmines in fields and forests. Among threats to Ukraine’s farmland, unexploded ordnance and the extensive placement of landmines remain widespread concerns.
+ +A Reuters investigation into landmine use in Ukraine revealed “landmine contamination so vast it is most likely unprecedented in the 21st century,” with emplaced landmines numbering in the hundreds of thousands. By mid-2023, Ukraine had become the most mined country in the world, surpassing Afghanistan, Syria, Cambodia, and other countries in which landmines are a common feature of warfare. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, about 30 percent of Ukraine’s lands, or approximately 174,000 square kilometers (67,000 square miles), has been exposed to conflict and will require surveying and, if necessary, demining. According to Interfax, a further 13,500 square kilometers (over 5,200 square miles) of the Black Sea, Azov Sea, and Ukraine’s rivers and other inland bodies of water are potentially contaminated with landmines. Likewise, according to Human Rights Watch, the scale of landmine use in Ukraine has resulted in a “large, dispersed, and complex level of contamination that will threaten Ukrainian civilians and hinder recovery efforts for years to come.” One deminer (or “sapper”) is able to clear between 15 and 25 square meters per day, and given the current rate of progress, some estimate that complete demining of Ukrainian territory could take decades or even centuries.
+ +Antipersonnel mines and anti-vehicle mines have been used in the ongoing war, with at least 13 types of mines identified in Ukraine to date, according to Human Rights Watch, which are located in at least 11 regions across central and eastern Ukraine (see [map]). The preponderance of landmines in Ukraine have been emplaced by Russia, which is not a signatory to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty). Human Rights Watch has even identified in Ukraine several previously unseen Russian landmines produced as late as 2021, including antipersonnel mines. Though Ukraine is a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine has used antipersonnel mines in at least one location since Russia’s invasion, according to Human Rights Watch.
+ +Landmines used in the war have been hand-emplaced, mechanically laid, scattered by truck-mounted projectors, and delivered by rocket. They include small, plastic-cased PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, which can be easily mistaken for harmless objects and overlooked by metal detectors; POM-3 anti-personnel mines, which can be scattered by air and detonated with mere vibrations, such as nearby footsteps; metal- and plastic-encased anti-vehicle mines, which can be buried in shallow holes and penetrate vehicles’ under-armor upon detonation; and PARM anti-vehicle mines, which can be placed above ground and fire a projectile into their target. Russian forces are also employing “Zemledelie” systems, which can remotely lay mines in areas as large as several football fields in short periods of time, creating minefields of varying complexities across Ukraine. The “Zemledelie” system, Russian for “agriculture,” was developed by the Russian company Rostec and was first observed in use in March 2022.
+ +Both the extent of Russia’s mine placements and the use of mining technology innovations within Ukraine have resulted in mine contamination of enormous complexity, scale, and lethality. As of September 2023, 246 civilians (including 13 children) had been killed by explosive devices, and 521 civilians (including 53 children) had been injured across Ukraine.
+ +
While the war continues, the Ukrainian government’s assistance for demining efforts continues to evolve. The Ukrainian government was already supporting demining efforts in Ukraine when Russia invaded in February 2022; previously occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk had been subject to demining efforts since 2015, following Russia’s 2014 invasion. In November 2021, the Ukrainian government announced the creation of the National Mine Action Authority, an interagency group led by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence that is responsible for the development of national policy and plans for demining as well as coordination of all actors involved in demining.
+ +Among Ukraine’s mined territory is a significant proportion of Ukraine’s farmland. The precise proportion of Ukraine’s farmland that has been contaminated by landmines is impossible to determine while hostilities continue. Estimates of Ukraine’s farmland exposed to landmines range from 470,000 hectares (or 1,814 square miles), according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, to 2.5 million hectares (or 9,652 square miles), according to Ukraine’s first deputy minister of agrarian policy and food. GLOBSEC estimates that 5 million hectares (or 19,305 square miles, approximately 15.2 percent) of Ukraine’s farmland are unsuitable for use due to landmines, contamination with explosive ordnance, and exposure to armed hostilities.
+ +In March 2023, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence announced the creation of an Action Plan for Demining Agricultural Land to facilitate spring sowing and fall harvesting of crops in 2023 and after. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for ensuring implementation of the plan and coordination among Ukrainian and international partners. To expedite humanitarian demining nationwide, the Ukrainian government announced the formation of the Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining in June 2023, chaired by the Ministry of Economy, and the working group held its first meeting in September 2023, emphasizing the importance of creating a mine action strategy for Ukraine. Later in September 2023, Ukrainian prime minister Denis Shmyhal convened the first Demine Ukraine Forum among Ukrainian government representatives and international partners.
+ +The ultimate purpose of mine removal dictates the level of investment — of time and funding — in demining efforts. Swiftly clearing an area of mines in the course of combat or immediately thereafter is called military, combat, or operational demining. Operational demining is conducted by special military units or other emergency services and is intended to clear a path for the safe advance or retreat of troops. Though it may quickly return access to roads, residential buildings, or other areas of common use, it does not necessarily guarantee the safety of these areas.
+ +Humanitarian demining, by contrast, aims to “clear land so that civilians can return to their homes and their everyday routines without the threat of explosive hazards,” according to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Humanitarian demining involves numerous, resource-intensive steps, all of which are required to guarantee that an area has been thoroughly searched and cleared of explosives and is safe for use. Steps required for humanitarian demining include a non-technical survey of land, involving interviewing communities and reviewing records of conflicts; a technical survey, involving the use of equipment or animals to determine the boundaries of minefields; mine removal, most commonly through mine detonation; and certification that mine removal is complete and land is safe for use.
+ +According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, humanitarian demining in Ukraine is presently carried out by 18 certified mine action operator organizations, including NGOs (e.g., the Danish Refugee Council, HALO Trust, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, the Norwegian People’s Aid, and DanChurchAid), companies (e.g., Demining Solutions, GK Group, and TetraTech), and Ukrainian entities (e.g., the Ukrainian Sappers Association, Ukrspecexport, and Ukroboronservice). Entities that wish to contribute to Ukraine’s demining efforts must complete a complex certification procedure before working as demining operators in Ukraine. In recognition of the need to expedite and streamline the certification process for demining operators, the State Emergency Service’s Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining launched an online portal for interested organizations to apply for certification and keep apprised of the application’s status. After obtaining certification to demine its own farmland across Ukraine, the Ukrainian company Nibulon has recognized the use of its expertise across Ukraine’s farmland broadly and will offer its services to farmers and to the state. As of September 2023, 30 additional organizations are awaiting certification, including 18 governmental operators from Ukraine’s State Emergency Service, State Transport Special Service, and armed forces.
+ +At present, the Ukrainian government does not fund humanitarian demining services, so most farmers must pay for demining services themselves. At the Demine Ukraine Forum, Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko noted that Ukraine’s 2024 budget would include UAH 2.0 billion ($54.7 million) to partially compensate farmers for demining services. Minister Svyrydenko also announced the establishment of the Prozorro demining market, through which farmers are expected to select certified deminers. The Ukrainian government will compensate farmers for half the cost of demining through the Prozorro system, and the Ukrainian government is considering the best way to compensate farmers for demining costs borne before 2024. Ukraine’s state bank, “Ukragasbank,” has also launched a soft lending program to fund the demining of farmland within the framework of the “Affordable Loans at 5-7-9 percent” program, improving farmers’ access to demining financing and incentivizing farmers’ use of legal, certified demining operators.
+ +Under the Ministry of Defence’s Action Plan for Demining Agricultural Land, the Ukrainian government specified 470,000 hectares of agricultural land in nine regions of Ukraine that would need to be surveyed and, if necessary, demined. These regions are where “the problem of contamination is most urgent and the clearing of agricultural land is most feasible,” according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence. In addition to the National Mine Action Authority, coordinated by the Ministry of Defence, Ukraine’s Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, coordinated by the Ministry of Economy, also supports humanitarian demining across Ukraine. In a press release from the Ministry of Economy in June 2023, the Ukrainian government noted that the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food would update the identification of territories that would need to be demined. According to the Ministry of Economy, 100,000 of the 470,000 hectares specified in the action plan had been cleared by June, and by the end of 2023, up to 165,000 hectares of land could be cleared for agricultural use.
+ +The Ukrainian government has continued to publicize progress under the action plan. By September 2023, the Ukrainian government had surveyed 188,600 hectares of agricultural land under the plan, of which over 124,000 hectares will require clearance, including through humanitarian demining. By October 2023, the Ukrainian government had surveyed more than 225,000 hectares of agricultural land identified in the action plan and had returned 170,000 hectares to economic use. In addition to these periodic updates, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine publishes daily updates regarding its progress demining Ukrainian territories through a portal that is only accessible within Ukraine. Between the beginning of the invasion and November 14, 2023, 454,827 explosive objects and 2,892 kilograms of explosive substance have been defused, including 3,124 aerial bombs. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has also partnered with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining to maintain an interactive map of mine contamination across Ukraine.
+ +Despite recent progress, the demining needs of the Ukrainian government remain staggering. As of February 2023, the cost of clearance of explosive ordnance across Ukraine was estimated at $37.6 billion, according to the Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment produced by the Kyiv School of Economics, the World Bank, the Ukrainian government, the European Union, and the United Nations. This estimate represents the significant investments needed in equipment, training, and salaries, including to expand the strategic planning and operational capacities of Ukraine’s demining forces.
+ +Numerous countries, multilateral organizations, and NGOs have provided financial and other support for demining in Ukraine, including for the demining of agricultural land. In June 2023, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN World Food Programme (WFP) announced a joint plan to clear landmines and other explosive remnants of war from agricultural land, in collaboration with the Fondation Suisse de Déminage and with support from the UN Ukraine Humanitarian Fund and private donors. In July 2023, the Ukrainian government announced that numerous partners — including the United States, the European Union, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, Austria, Switzerland, South Korea, and the Howard Buffett Foundation — together had pledged $244 million for humanitarian demining clearance. In July 2023, South Korea pledged to provide demining equipment to Ukraine, and Japan has similarly offered technical assistance in 2023. In September 2023, the U.S. Department of State announced $90.5 million in humanitarian demining assistance to Ukraine, in addition to the $47.6 million the State Department had announced in September 2022 for a similar purpose. Croatia hosted the first International Donors’ Conference on Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine in October 2023, attracting representatives from more than 40 countries, and Switzerland, which announced over €100 million (approximately $107 million) for humanitarian demining in Ukraine in October 2023, will host the Second International Donors’ Conference on Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine in 2024.
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+▲ A farmer and a member of a demining team of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine carry an unexploded missile near the village of Hryhorivka, Zaporizhzhia region, on May 5, 2022.
Despite the Ukrainian government’s recent progress on its Action Plan for Demining Agricultural Land and considerable support from international partners, many farmers face difficulties accessing humanitarian demining services. One licensed company, for example, is reported to have offered demining services to farmers for $200 per acre of farmland. Because the war has reduced harvests and incomes, and increased the costs of inputs, most farmers are unable to afford such prices. Furthermore, Ukraine’s byzantine bureaucracy can lead to long wait times for demining services. Duplication of services across ministries and the constant evolution of priorities and plans can lead to bottlenecks, which the Ukrainian government admits and is seeking to redress.
+ +In the meantime, some farmers are resorting to conducting demining activities themselves. As one farmer reported to Foreign Policy, “At first we waited for the state to demine our fields. Then we understood it wouldn’t happen, so we decided to do it ourselves.” Three of this farmer’s employees scanned his farmland with handheld metal detectors, marking potential mines with flags. Another farmer operates a remote-controlled tractor, outfitted with panels stripped from Russian tanks, to scan his fields for landmines. One farmer in Kharkhiv explained the situation to local Ukrainian media (authors’ translation):
+ +++ +Out of 3,000 hectares, I have 1,000 hectares mined. I left the application for demining immediately after the de-occupation. The emergency department says that they will not clear the mines in the near future because they do not have time. We are now communicating with the neighboring farms to clear the fields [ourselves]. The situation with the neighbors is still worse, all their lands are “seeded” with explosives. We will look for a way out on our own, because today it is cheaper to buy a field than to demine it. We are considering the possibility of buying a drone that looks for mines or renting a special car. Otherwise, life will not return to our villages. . . . I need to clear the fields and sow crops this year.
+
In this context, many farmers opt to use the services of uncertified or “dark deminers,” who charge prices lower than certified deminers but who cannot guarantee that land they survey is clear of mines and safe for use. Among farmers who use dark demining services, accidents are reportedly common.
+ +And among farmers in regions exposed to conflict, not only the presence but the fear of landmines can keep farmers from working their land, according to CSIS interviews. Kyiv School of Economics president Timofiy Milovanov characterized the current situation as two systems of demining at tension within Ukraine: the “legacy” system, whose adherence to international mine action standards renders it slow and expensive but best able to guarantee the safe clearance of lands, and the alternative system made up of Ukrainians that “have to work . . . [and] protect their children,” who “innovate right now, whether it’s certified or not.” Such demining “innovations” are borne from farmers’ need to continue agricultural activity for their livelihoods, but the risks of uncertified demining are severe. A farmer in Kherson who opted against planting in the face of mine contamination told Reuters, “I have no moral right to send workers to fields as it is dangerous for life.” CSIS interviews revealed the same tension between these two systems, with some Ukrainian entities advocating for equipping farmers with demining machines to expediate the process, and others insisting that farmers are not professional deminers and their participation in the process would risk lives and complicate the government’s coordination and planning.
+ +The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that while overall production and export levels have fallen since Russia’s invasion, agricultural yields per acre have risen compared to last season for Ukraine’s major commodities, although the USDA estimates include crop production in Crimea and occupied territories, where Russia reaps the benefits of favorable harvests. For wheat, for example, yields are estimated at a 4.5 tons per hectare, up 17 percent from 2022 and 13 percent from the five-year average. This suggests that production losses are due primarily to reduced planting: the USDA estimates that harvested area has fallen 26 percent from the five-year average. In fact, farmland exposed to hostilities since February 2022 has left an impact visible from space, according to NASA’s Harvest program, which estimates that up to 2.8 million hectares (or over 10,800 square miles) of Ukraine’s agricultural land have been abandoned as a result of the war.
+ +The presence, or even the fear, of landmines on agricultural land has affected farmers’ harvests across Ukraine. At the same time, the process of demining farmland could also depress agricultural yields, as some farmers may experience long-term impacts once their land has been demined. A report from the NGO Mine Action Review, with funding from the Norwegian, Canadian, and Swiss governments, details the numerous destructive effects of demining on soil. The most common machinery employed in demining is equipped with flails, tillers, and rollers, which can disrupt soil structure, accelerate soil erosion, and disrupt water, carbon, and nutrient cycles. While the most expedient and safest method of landmine disposal is through remote detonation, detonation generates a crater that displaces topsoil while compacting subsoil into the crater. Finally, the detonation of landmines can release toxic pollutants into soils and waterways, including from explosive substances as well as the breakdown of other munitions components. In Cambodia, for example, researchers found that the content of heavy metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and copper increased by 30 percent in soil in a 1-meter radius of the detonation point.
+ +Mitigation measures for such effects of landmine detonation are unclear, and data on the environmental impacts of landmine detonation are limited. The extent to which the detonation of landmines could affect soil fertility and water quality in heavily mined territories has not been widely examined or reported. Only one international covenant, the International Mine Actions Standard 07.13, addresses the impacts of demining on agricultural land, stating that national authorities and mine action operators have the responsibility to “ensure that all mine action activities . . . are carried out in accordance with applicable legislation, safely, effectively and efficiently, but also in a way that minimises any adverse impact on people, wildlife, vegetation and other aspects of the environment.” The standard further specifies that mechanical clearance and bulk demolition, or the process of clearing land with machines designed to detonate ordnance, require greater oversight than other clearance methods given that “these processes have the ability to severely impact the environment.”
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+▲ Employees of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine present to media the Ukraines first Armtrac 400 specialized mine clearance vehicle, purchased through the UNITED24 fundraising platform, near Kharkiv, on October 27, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Although detonation carries risks for agricultural land, leaving landmines in the ground can also lead to chemical contamination as the munitions age and corrode. The leaching of hazardous chemicals into soil and groundwater can take anywhere from 10 to 90 years, but Ukraine’s farmland may experience pollution from buried ordnances sooner rather than later. Russia has reportedly used Soviet-era landmines against Ukraine, which would corrode faster than landmines produced more recently. Further, the characteristics of Ukraine’s fertile soils that enable plants to thrive also enable the soil to “cling on to a lot of these toxins following the war,” according to soil geomorphologist Joe Hupy.
+ +Efforts to identify the impacts on agricultural soil and groundwater resulting from exploded ordnance, unexploded ordnance, and landmines have only just begun within Ukraine, and CSIS interviews with in-country experts and operators revealed that more investment, time, and resources are needed before these impacts can be accurately determined. The Ukrainian Researchers Society, FAO, and WFP have partnered to map munition craters, soil pollution, and the presence of “bombturbation,” or incidences of explosives cratering, compacting, displacing, and ejecting hazardous materials into soil. Their preliminary study of contamination in the Kharkiv Oblast using remote sensing and soil sample analysis shows that over 420,000 craters across roughly 655,072 hectares of arable land have resulted in over 1.3 million cubic meters of displaced soil, 4,214 hectares of bombturbated soil, and 28,286 hectares of potentially contaminated soil, with only 1.76 percent of assessed soils found to be contaminated with heavy metals. A CSIS interview with the FAO Ukraine office confirmed this level of contamination is not concerning for the safe consumption of crops, but rather for the potential of reduced agricultural production in the future.
+ +A collection of researchers across Ukraine, Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain have conducted a similar assessment within the Kharkiv Oblast, also finding that explosions on and within soil have damaged soil structure and released heavy metals into surrounding soils. The researchers note these findings are concluded from a minimal sample size that may not reflect the full extent of the war’s impacts on soils, especially given the limited access to areas of intense combat. These preliminary analyses are a significant step toward understanding the war’s effects on Ukrainian farmland, but offer an incomplete picture of what will be required to restore agricultural soil following the war’s conclusion. The scale of soil analysis required to determine the unique impacts of this war on Ukraine’s black soils will necessitate improved access to in-country soil testing facilities and greater investment in Ukraine’s remote sensing capabilities.
+ +In October 2023, Ukraine’s minister of economy acknowledged, “Without demining, we will not be able to fully launch our economy. Mine clearance is therefore the starting point for the recovery of our country and its economy.” Significant progress against the challenge of demining Ukraine’s farmland is clear. At the same time, the scale of landmine contamination across Ukraine’s farmland and the importance of sustained agricultural activity to its economic recovery require unparalleled measures by the Ukrainian government along with support from international partners.
+ +Following is a description of ongoing best practices and additional steps needed to demine Ukraine’s farmland.
+ +The Ukrainian government is prioritizing humanitarian demining at the highest levels, including by the leadership of the Ministries of Economy and Defence, as well as by the prime minister.
+In the course of adapting demining services to the ongoing war, the Ukrainian government recognizes that inefficiencies remain and is attempting to expedite the provision of humanitarian demining services and reduce the cost to Ukraine’s farmers through the recently launched demining market on the Prozorro system and through soft loans to farmers.
+The Ukrainian government is also tracking the resources needed to demine Ukraine’s farmland, including demining equipment and training for deminers.
+The Action Plan for Demining Ukraine’s Agricultural Lands aims to synchronize humanitarian demining of Ukraine’s farmland, and the Ukrainian government is attempting to unify all Ukrainian government demining activities under a forthcoming mine action strategy, which the Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining is presently drafting.
+At the same time, the Ukrainian government should continue to take steps to reduce the prevalence of “dark demining” of Ukraine’s agricultural land and demining by farmers themselves, recognizing risks to the safety of farmers and other civilians.
+Furthermore, the Ukrainian government is coordinating regularly with international partners to fill gaps and prevent overlaps in services, including through the International Donors’ Conference on Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine.
+Finally, the Ukrainian government and its partners appear to be aligning activities with UNMAS’s Five Pillars of Mine Action, including mine education, with Minister of Economy Svyrydenko recently emphasizing the need for a “nationwide awareness campaign to educate children from an early age about the dangers of explosive ordnance.”
+The complete humanitarian demining of Ukraine will require 10,000 sappers, necessitating an additional 7,000 deminers to supplement the 3,000 specialists working across the country today, according to Prime Minister Shmyhal. Funding for deminers’ training and salaries must be increased, with training for one sapper costing up to $6,000.
+Conducting non-technical surveys prior to other humanitarian demining procedures is the most cost-effective way to confirm the presence of landmine contamination and efficiently release non-contaminated land. In its action plan and national mine action strategy, the Ukrainian government should formalize the release of low- and no-risk land through non-technical surveys before conducting technical surveys in order to release more land for economic use as quickly as possible.
+In completing non-technical surveys, technical surveys, and mine removal, sappers should have access to advanced demining technologies, including drones, ground-penetrating radar, and satellite imagery analysis enhanced by artificial intelligence, in order to expedite humanitarian demining and increase the safety of deminers.
+Ukraine should continue to invest in its capacity to manufacture advanced demining equipment locally.
+In the face of the rapid evolution of Ukrainian government demining processes, the Ukrainian government should continue to clearly communicate the steps farmers must take to access certified demining services and receive compensation for them, including through the newly announced demining market under the Prozorro system.
+The Ukrainian government and international partners should also attempt to reduce the cost to farmers of humanitarian demining of their agricultural land, recognizing that any costs borne by farmers will detract from investments in agricultural production, resulting in lower farmer incomes, production, and exports nationwide.
+Given the urgent need for actionable information about the impacts of demining on agricultural land, and the fragility of the ecosystems on which agricultural activity depends, Ukraine’s government and international partners should invest in research on the impacts of demining agricultural land and disseminate best practices for demining Ukraine’s farmland to minimize impacts on soil fertility, water, and agricultural productivity. Such considerations and steps should be codified in plans for demining Ukraine’s farmland today and in the future, for the awareness of Ukrainian and international deminers.
+The Ukrainian government and partners should also increase the availability of soil testing to ensure the absence of chemical contamination and the safety of crops produced.
+++ +Humanitarian demining is more than just neutralizing mines or other explosive devices. It is about providing people with the opportunity to return to their homes and live safely. It’s about the recovery of the economy and the restoration of the country, and ultimately, about global food security.
+
++ +— Vitalii Dankevych
+
Ukraine is endowed with uniquely fertile farmland. Nearly two-thirds of Ukraine’s total arable land is covered in black soils, a highly fertile soil type containing ideal clay content for plant growth and high quantities of organic matter, such as humus, and nutrients, including calcium, nitrogen, phosphates, and potassium. Ukraine’s wealth of fertile soil facilitated its rise as a major global food supplier, even as it applied less fertilizers per hectare compared to neighboring countries.
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+▲ A farmer rides a floater truck spraying fertilizers on a farm in Kyiv on April 19, 2023.
While harvesting crops removes essential nutrients from soils, mineral fertilizers replace these nutrients for subsequent harvests. Ukraine’s major agricultural harvests require application of nitrogen, in the form of ammonia nitrate, urea, anhydrous ammonia, and other forms; phosphorus, in the form of diammonium phosphate, monoammonium phosphate, and other forms; and potassium or potassic fertilizer, in the form of potash. Worldwide, fertilizers have accounted for a large share of agricultural productivity growth over the past century.
+ +Ukraine’s increased agricultural production and exports over the past two decades are largely due to an increase in the use of fertilizers by Ukrainian farmers. Russia’s invasion has disrupted Ukrainian farmers’ ability to purchase and apply fertilizers since 2022. According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Ukrainian farmers applied 27.7 percent less fertilizer in 2022 than 2021, using roughly 20.8 million metric tons of mineral fertilizers in 2022 compared to 28.8 million metric tons in 2021, representing declines in the use of nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic fertilizers. Reductions continued into the 2022–2023 season: compared to average rates from 2018 to 2022, a March 2023 survey of 119 agricultural enterprises in Ukraine found that nitrogen application decreased by 16 percent for corn and wheat, 19 percent for sunflower, 21 percent for canola oil crops, and 24 percent for soybeans. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food shows that access has not improved as the country heads into its third growing season since Russia’s invasion: most Ukrainian farmers will be able to apply only half the fertilizers necessary for the 2024 harvest season, with only 10 percent of respondents fully equipped to meet their crops’ fertilizer needs.
+ +Insufficient fertilizer use impacts the quality and quantity of current and future harvests. According to the first deputy minister of Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, a decrease in fertilizer application by 30 percent or more can reduce yields by 50 percent. The consequences of reduced fertilizer application can vary from farm to farm, depending on the nutrients applied, the crops cultivated, the season’s soil and climatic conditions, and the practices farmers employ throughout the season. A farm’s history of crop cultivation also determines which nutrients are present in the soil at the time of planting and which nutrients need to be applied for a specific crop’s optimal yield. Excessive application of one or more types of nutrients can likewise impact the quality and quantity of an upcoming harvest. Fertilizer application is not a one-size-fits-all practice, and many agricultural enterprises seeking to reduce any adverse effects of excessive mineral fertilizer application rely on soil testing to tailor the nutrients applied to the specific needs of their soil. As Ukrainian farmers have faced difficulties accessing and affording a range of mineral fertilizers, they have resorted to applying whatever nutrients are available in their own stores or from local suppliers, often not within recommended timeframes, which may have long-term impacts on Ukraine’s soil.
+ +Access to fertilizer is necessary for the livelihoods of Ukraine’s farmers and for Ukraine’s agricultural output, two related but distinct facets of Ukraine’s agricultural economy. Across Ukraine, roughly 2.7 million people were engaged in agricultural activity in 2021, comprising 17.3 percent of Ukraine’s total labor force. Access to fertilizers is important to small-scale farmers (farmers cultivating less than 500 hectares), who operate 82.4 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural enterprises, as it is central to the prosperity of their farms. Access to fertilizers is critical for medium- and large-scale producers, who operate the remaining 17.6 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural enterprises and are responsible for the majority of Ukraine’s agricultural exports and export revenues: agricultural enterprises cultivating over 500 hectares of farmland made up nearly 80 percent of Ukraine’s cereal and legume crop production in 2022. Medium- and large-scale enterprises are better able to access and afford fertilizers than small-scale farmers: the 10 percent of agricultural enterprises surveyed by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food that can meet their crops’ fertilizer needs in 2024 are medium- or large-scale operations, with no surveyed small-scale farmers reporting that their fertilizer needs are met for the upcoming season.
+ +
As fertilizer prices remain high within Ukraine, Ukrainian farmers are adjusting their sowing plans to plant crops whose nutrient requirements they can meet with current fertilizer stores. Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food also observes farmers basing their plans on the needs of domestic markets as export routes remain limited, sowing their fields with more peas, barley, millet, and oats relative to prewar harvests. According to the FAO’s January–February 2023 survey, nearly 20 percent of small-scale farmers in Ukraine, defined by the FAO as cultivating 250 hectares or less, had stopped purchasing fertilizers due to high prices. Of the 1,927 agricultural enterprises interviewed by the FAO, 81 percent expressed a need for more fertilizers to continue agricultural activities. Ukrainian farmers, especially small- and medium-sized producers, have resorted to a barter system with input suppliers in which fertilizers are purchased with grains and agricultural products.
+ +Ukrainian farmers’ reduced access to fertilizer is due to numerous, concurrent shocks, including global fertilizer price spikes following Russia’s invasion, curtailed nitrogenous fertilizer production within Ukraine, and high logistics costs due to Russia’s obstruction of Ukraine’s primary trade routes.
+ +Despite carveouts for food and fertilizer exports, international sanctions on Russian and Belarusian banking, trade, and energy sectors have reduced the two countries’ share of the world’s fertilizer trade, estimated at 18 percent in 2020, triggering global price spikes for all mineral fertilizers. In Ukraine, farmers’ fertilizer stocks helped insulate them from initial fertilizer price spikes, but domestic prices rose by the fall of 2022 after farmers exhausted their fertilizer supplies. The implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2022 expanded agricultural exports, increasing farmers’ working capital — and increasing demand for fertilizers and other agricultural inputs. As farmers prepared for the spring 2023 sowing campaign, fertilizer prices increased. For example, prices for potassium nitrate, or saltpeter, rose from UAH 27,000 (roughly $750) per metric ton to UAH 37,000 (roughly $1,025) per metric ton from July to October 2022. By February 2023, farmers spent UAH 8,000–9,000 (roughly $220–250) for the nitrogenous fertilizers needed to cultivate just one hectare of corn, excluding additional costs for fuel, potassic and phosphatic fertilizers, and other inputs, compared to prewar prices of roughly UAH 6,000 (roughly $165).
+ +In addition to disruptions in global fertilizer markets, energy price spikes affected global fertilizer prices in the months following Russia’s invasion. Global price spikes for natural gas and coal, key ingredients in the manufacturing of fertilizers, reduced fertilizer production capacity and added further upward pressure on fertilizer prices around the world. Europe’s fertilizer industry was hit especially hard as countries slashed imports of Russian natural gas, coal, and oil. High manufacturing costs forced plants to close across the region, reducing Europe’s overall fertilizer production by approximately 70 percent and its nitrogenous fertilizer production capacity by 50 to 60 percent in 2022. China’s ammonia production also contracted in response to high coal prices following Russia’s invasion. China’s October 2021 restrictions on fertilizer exports kept its 25 percent share of the global trade off global markets until December 2022, which pushed fertilizer prices even higher during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion.
+ +Prior to Russia’s invasion, Ukraine produced enough nitrogenous fertilizer to meet over 70 percent of domestic demand. In 2021, domestic production exceeded 5.2 million metric tons, while Ukraine imported 1.4 million metric tons of nitrogenous fertilizers. After Russia’s invasion, only two of Ukraine’s five nitrogenous fertilizer factories remained operational, causing domestic production to fall by 78.3 percent to 1.1 million metric tons in 2022, and imports to triple to 4.3 million metric tons. By February 2023, the Cherkasy Azot and Rivneazot factories increased production capacity by 40 percent and 50 percent, respectively, but Ukrainian farmers still saw a shortage of mineral fertilizers, including nitrogenous fertilizers, ahead of the 2023 spring sowing campaign.
+ +Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports obstructed trade routes that were previously responsible for over 90 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural exports and a majority of its fertilizer imports. This sudden lack of access to its primary, high-volume trade routes forced Ukrainian traders and agricultural enterprises to turn to road, rail, and river routes for fertilizer supplies from new sources. According to Ruslan Voytovych, the director and founder of Arus Trade, a fertilizer importer in Ukraine, his company’s shift to road transport routes significantly limited the volume of supplies he could import and raised delivery costs by 60 percent in the months following Russia’s invasion. Taras Ivashchenko, the head of Belor Ukraine, another Ukrainian fertilizer importer, found that the Danube River ports can only handle 30,000 to 40,000 metric tons of fertilizer imports per month, which is “almost nothing” for the Ukrainian market.
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+▲ A fisherman walks on the banks of the Danube River near the port of Izmail, southwestern Ukraine, on July 27, 2023.
Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food has supported farmers’ applications for fertilizer aid through the State Agrarian Register and coordinated agricultural aid through this system, while Ukraine’s bilateral and multilateral partners have invested to improve Ukrainian farmers’ access to fertilizers. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched the AGRI-Ukraine initiative in July 2022 to help meet the needs of Ukrainian small- and medium-scale farmers for agricultural inputs, financing, improved export logistics and infrastructure, and capacity for drying, storing, and processing harvests. As of July 2023, USAID contributed $350 million, leveraged an additional $250 million from other donors and the private sector, and was seeking to leverage a further $250 million for the initiative. As of the time of publication, AGRI-Ukraine had provided 12,892 small-scale Ukrainian farmers (defined, in this case, as cultivating less than 500 hectares of farmland) with approximately 18,300 tons of complex and nitrogenous fertilizers for the 2023 spring and autumn campaigns. This September, the initiative announced a partnership with South Korea to deliver to Ukrainian farmers $5 million of fertilizers donated by South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
+ +International agricultural aid packages have largely targeted the small- and medium-sized enterprises otherwise unable to sustain operation in wartime, but assistance also funnels through the Ukrainian government’s “Affordable Loans at 5-7-9 percent” program, which offers low-rate subsidized lending for agricultural enterprises of all sizes. Launched in early 2020, the program provides loans up to UAH 90.0 million (roughly $2.5 million), depending on the loan type and the enterprise’s size and activity. The program has received direct financing from the World Bank through USAID’s AGRI-Ukraine initiative and provided UAH 158.0 billion (nearly $4.4 billion) to agricultural enterprises through 40,509 loan agreements since February 2022. Combined with the FAO’s cash transfers, this assistance has enabled farmers to afford the purchase of fertilizers at elevated prices from in-country suppliers. According to CSIS interviews, Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food has encouraged partners to concentrate investments into this soft loan program over procuring and distributing in-kind fertilizer donations, as this financing concurrently empowers farmers to decide which inputs to prioritize purchasing and sustains business for Ukrainian fertilizer suppliers. Farmers in front-line oblasts, however, benefit more from in-kind fertilizer donations, as active conflict disrupts these farmers’ ability to obtain fertilizer on local markets.
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Ukraine fertilizer imports were down significantly in 2022 compared to 2021, ranging from a decline of 65 percent for nitrogenous-based fertilizers to over 85 percent decline for potassic fertilizers. Historically, Russia and Belarus supplied fertilizer and fertilizer ingredients to Ukraine. While Ukraine instituted an embargo of Russian fertilizer imports in 2018 due to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Donbas and the Crimea annexation, it was still heavily dependent on Belarusian supplies when Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Over 2019–2021, Belarus alone accounted for 71 percent of Ukraine’s potash imports, 58 percent of its urea imports, and 41 percent of its complex fertilizers imports, or fertilizers containing all three nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic elements. With Belarusian imports essentially ending with Russia’s full-scale invasion in late February 2022, Ukraine relied on other trade partners such as Poland, Germany, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for its potash imports in 2022. As Ukraine’s trade relationships with two of the world’s largest fertilizers producers are now severed, the government of Ukraine and Ukrainian agricultural enterprises are struggling to identify alternative sources to fill the considerable supply gap left by foregone Russian and Belarusian imports.
+ +Ukraine faces different challenges accessing nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic fertilizers. Even with curtailed domestic production capacity, Ukraine can meet some of its domestic demand for nitrogenous fertilizers, and Ukraine’s trade partners can supply additional nitrogenous fertilizer as well as phosphatic fertilizers. However, securing alternative potash suppliers will remain a challenge for Ukraine’s agricultural enterprises. The global potash market is highly concentrated, with Russia and Belarus accounting for 41 percent of global potash trade in 2020. The world’s top producer of potash is Canada, with 39 percent of global market share, but transporting supplies from Canada to Ukraine would require long and costly freight shipments in addition to overland transport through Europe. This inherently expensive route introduces complex logistical issues and would likely only result in high potash prices on domestic Ukrainian markets if attempted. Kernel, Ukraine’s largest producer and exporter of vegetable oils, procured two vessels of complex fertilizers and potash from Morocco’s OCPGroup and Jordan’s Arab Potash Company in the summer of 2023. However, concerns remain as to whether these potential trade partners could supply enough potash to meet the significant needs of Ukrainian farmers, especially as food producers around the world are anticipating higher demand for potash in the coming decades. To meet domestic needs, Ukraine will likely have to turn to smaller potash producers that are closer to home, such as Germany, Israel, and Jordan.
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As the war continues to suppress agricultural production in Ukraine, the Ukrainian government continues to help improve Ukrainian producers’ access to fertilizer, and access to fertilizer remains a priority within support packages from Ukraine’s partners to its agricultural sector. This aid has been essential to maintaining Ukrainian agricultural production since February 2022. Nonetheless, the amount of assistance has been insufficient to meet farmers’ immediate needs, indicating the importance of additional efforts in this regard.
+ +Following is a description of ongoing best practices and additional steps needed to increase access to fertilizer.
+ +Improved information about the specific fertilizer needs of Ukraine’s farmland, including through investing in both remote sensing and traditional laboratory soil-testing programs could enable farmers to purchase the right quantity of the right nutrients and inform the government’s projections for domestic fertilizer requirements.
+Investment in Ukraine’s national infrastructure for geospatial data would enable high-quality, rapid soil analysis that could predict Ukraine’s fertilizer needs with greater accuracy.
+As international partners such as USAID, the FAO, and others continue to support Ukrainian farmers’ access to fertilizers, improved information sharing regarding the long-term plans for Ukraine’s fertilizer market would help partners align their assistance with the needs of Ukrainian farmers and fertilizer producers.
+At the same time, Ukraine’s partners should support rebuilding Ukraine’s capacity to produce nitrogenous fertilizers domestically, restoring — or even exceeding — Ukraine’s prewar production capacity, which will require an uninterrupted supply of raw materials, particularly natural gas.
+As Ukraine rebuilds its capacity to produce fertilizers domestically, the Ukrainian government and partners should continue to calibrate assistance so as not to reduce demand for Ukrainian-produced fertilizers and fertilizers secured by domestic suppliers.
+Ukraine’s candidacy for membership in the European Union will necessitate further reforms to its agriculture sector and production standards as the European Union aims for climate neutrality by 2050. For instance, aligning with the European Union’s common agricultural policy requires Ukraine certify 3 percent of its total agricultural land as organic by 2030. As Ukraine and its partners work to secure sufficient mineral fertilizer suppliers to fill the gap left by foregone Russian and Belarusian imports, concurrently incentivizing increased use of organic fertilizers would help sustain production and soil fertility, as well as support the country’s path to EU integration.
+Finally, international partners should support Ukraine’s efforts to secure long-term suppliers of fertilizer, especially potash, to replace foregone inputs from Belarus and Russia.
+Ukraine’s agriculture sector has been a major front in Russia’s war since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. The systematic destruction of Ukraine’s farmland, agricultural equipment and infrastructure, and export capacity has contributed to a global food crisis that continues to affect millions around the world. For Ukraine to strengthen its economy to fend off Russia’s continued assault, restore its role as a major global food supplier, and maintain its counterweight to the influence Russia wields through its own agricultural exports, unprecedented support is necessary to restore Ukraine’s natural resources and transform its agricultural institutions, infrastructure, and labor force.
+ +As urgent needs — related to agriculture and all sectors affected by the war — occupy the attention of Ukraine and its international partners, they should not lose focus on a resource central to Ukraine’s rise as a global agricultural powerhouse: its black soils. The focus of this report has been the safe and expeditious demining of Ukraine’s farmland and increasing farmers’ access to fertilizer. Essential to both endeavors is soil testing, which could both ensure the safety of agricultural land once it has been cleared of mines and help farmers determine the appropriate types and levels of fertilizer to apply to their land. Rebuilding Ukraine’s agriculture sector from the ground up must involve identifying the optimal set of soil testing methods for Ukraine’s agricultural soils and scaling up a national infrastructure for such testing within Ukraine in the face of numerous, concurrent challenges imposed by Russia’s war.
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+▲ Farmers use combine harvesters to harvest a wheat field near the city of Bila Tserkva on August 4, 2023, in Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine.
Caitlin Welsh is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she analyzes the drivers and consequences of food and water insecurity around the world, including for U.S. national security. Her specific areas of focus include the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security and nutrition, food insecurity in the U.S. military, and the coherence between U.S. global water security policy and U.S. global food security policy.
+ +Emma Dodd is a research associate for the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS, where she supports the program’s communication strategy and serves as the point of contact for research relating to the Russia-Ukraine War’s impact on global food security.
+ +Vitalii Dankevych is dean of the Faculty of Law, Public Administration and National Security, at Polissia National University in Ukraine and a professor at the Department of International Economic Relations and European Integration.
+ +Joe Glauber is a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and currently serves as interim secretary of the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS). He is also a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a non-resident senior adviser at CSIS.
+ +Antonina Broyaka is an extension associate with the Department of Agricultural Economics at Kansas State University.
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+ Experts examine two aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural recovery that are critical to increasing its food production and exports: demining farmland and restoring farmers’ access to fertilizers.
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+ This Policy Brief seeks to explore how key partners in the Indo-Pacific have perceived and responded to recent Western efforts in the region.
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- China is quietly deepening its influence along the Bay of Bengal, intimately linked to Beijing’s expanding overseas interests. Commercial satellite imagery reveals that China has made significant progress on a naval base it is constructing for Bangladesh’s military. The base houses a pair of submarines that Dhaka received from Beijing two years before ground broke at the facility. China has likewise transferred a submarine to neighboring Myanmar to aid the embattled military regime.
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- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused attention on energy supply chains and contributed to growing unease in the West about the fact that supply chains for the commodities necessary for the global energy transition are highly concentrated in China (or under Chinese control).
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- As demand for minerals increases to achieve an energy transition, companies, regulators, and end users will need to assess the entire mine-to-market value chain to ensure that all firms are incentivized to adhere to best practices.
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