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+layout: post
+title : Is NATO Ready For War?
+author: Sean Monaghan, et al.
+date : 2024-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ZfcsHZ1.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "An Assessment of Allies’ Efforts to Strengthen Defense and Deterrence since the 2022 Madrid Summit"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Two years ago, NATO adopted a “back to the future” strategy of forward defense and deterrence following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To implement it, allies committed to take various measures to strengthen their deterrence and defense at the 2022 Madrid Summit._ _As NATO leaders gather in Washington for the alliance’s 75th anniversary summit, this paper takes stock of allied efforts to strengthen collective defense. It finds they have made substantial progress on defense spending, forward defense, high-readiness forces, command and control, collective defense exercises, and integrating Finland and Sweden — achievements which should be recognized in Washington. However, while NATO might be ready for war, the question remains whether it is ready to fight — and thereby deter — a protracted war. To meet this goal, allies still need to spend more, boost industrial capacity, address critical capability gaps, and bolster national resilience._
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Si vis pacem, para bellum. If you want peace, prepare for war. If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not already have a motto — animus in consulendo liber, “in discussion a free mind” — this Latin adage would fit the alliance’s purpose quite well. The phrase conveys a piece of timeless deterrence logic: preparing for war might be the best way of averting it.
+
+After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO adopted a new “back to the future” strategic concept which returned Russia to its Cold War status of adversary and put deterrence and defense back at the heart of alliance strategy. NATO revealed the concept at the 2022 Madrid Summit alongside a wide range of commitments which NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg described as amounting to a “fundamental shift to our deterrence and defence.”
+
+In less than a month, NATO leaders will gather in Washington for the alliance’s 75th anniversary summit. Ahead of that historic meeting, this paper takes stock of the progress NATO allies have made in implementing the commitments made two years ago in Madrid.
+
+The paper comprises three sections. The first briefly recaps NATO’s efforts to strengthen defense and deterrence since 2014 and considers Russia’s current threat to NATO. The second assesses the progress made by NATO allies in implementing their Madrid commitments to strengthen deterrence and defense across the nine issue areas described in the Madrid Summit Declaration. The final section uses this assessment to gauge whether NATO is ready for war.
+
+
+### The Road to Washington
+
+NATO’s journey toward stronger deterrence and defense began at the 2014 Wales Summit where allies responded to Russia’s annexation of Crimea by making long-term commitments to raise defense spending above 2 percent of GDP. Their near-term focus was on adapting NATO’s force posture. This started with the 2014 Readiness Action Plan, followed by establishing four Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) multinational battlegroups in the east in 2016. In 2018, the NATO Readiness Initiative improved the state of NATO’s high-readiness forces.
+
+While the 2022 Strategic Concept garnered public attention, another NATO concept agreed upon in 2020 was already quietly revolutionizing deterrence and defense: the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) concept. The DDA focuses on “force employment to deter and defend today.” Following Russia’s 2022 invasion, NATO activated its defense plans, making 40,000 troops — plus air, naval, and other assets — available to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Four new EFP missions followed, alongside a strengthened maritime posture, air policing, air defense, and multinational exercises.
+
+NATO planning was further transformed at last year’s Vilnius summit with the unveiling of new defense plans, another product of the DDA. “The DDA family of plans,” as SACEUR, U.S. general Christopher G. Cavoli, describes them, include three regional plans (covering northern, central, and southern Europe) alongside domain-specific plans (for land, air, maritime, cyber, and space forces) as well as plans for logistics and sustainment. As one recent analysis suggests: “None of this would have been possible without the DDA.”
+
+
+### Ready for War?
+
+Russia’s actions in Ukraine confirmed the fears of many that Vladimir Putin would seek to continue the Stalinist subjugation of Russia’s near abroad. The war suggests that the worst-case thinking about Russia’s “maximum intentions” that historically guided NATO’s planning is warranted for the foreseeable future. Putin’s apparent propensity for aggression, risk taking, and strategic miscalculation makes him a dangerous adversary — and a difficult one to deter.
+
+Russia has seen staggering losses in Ukraine but has “almost completely reconstituted militarily” to pre-war levels thanks to national mobilization and a war economy supported by China, Iran, and North Korea. Beyond Ukraine, Russia is making nuclear threats against NATO and stepping up hybrid threats across Europe. Several European leaders have warned that Russia could attack NATO allies within three, four, five, or eight years. Not only is China helping Russia’s military reconstitute, but the prospect of coordinated aggression between Moscow and Beijing has many implications for NATO — the most serious being the implications for U.S. force posture in Europe.
+
+To paraphrase Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, what kind of war should NATO prepare for? Perhaps the most stressing scenario is a rapid territory seizure by Russian forces in the Baltic region. Variations of this scenario have been described, wargamed, and analyzed in recent years, almost becoming cliché, but it should not be dismissed. In military planning jargon, it is the “most likely” and “most dangerous” course of action for Russia to take.
+
+It is the likeliest scenario for any Russian conventional attack on NATO because the local force balance drastically favors Russia. This does not mean it is likely — a lot of things would have to go badly for Russia to consider this a good option — just that it might be the most likely NATO-Russia war scenario. Despite all the warnings from NATO leaders, the jury is still out on whether (and why) Russia would invade.
+
+The consequences mean NATO planners must be prepared, as this kind of invasion risks nuclear escalation and is hard to reverse. Any NATO operation to regain lost ground would require establishing air superiority and control of the Baltic Sea before massing a significant local ground force. Even with NATO assurances, this situation is sufficiently threatening under Russian doctrine for Moscow to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons for coercive or military purposes — forcing NATO to threaten nuclear use to compel withdrawal and reestablish deterrence.
+
+This is why Baltic officials describe the best strategy as “repel, don’t expel.” It is also why NATO’s new strategic concept returned deterrence by denial and forward defense to the core of alliance strategy. As with the Cold War, deterrence by punishment — which relies primarily on the “sword” of U.S., UK, and French strategic nuclear forces — will continue to do most of the heavy lifting to deter the most serious threats to NATO allies. But just like in the Cold War, NATO allies will increasingly rely on forward-based “shield” forces to strengthen conventional deterrence and defense. This paper focuses on the commitments made by NATO allies in Madrid to do just this. The next section analyzes these commitments in detail.
+
+
+### From Madrid to Washington: Assessing Commitments by NATO Allies to Strengthen Deterrence and Defense
+
+#### Defense Spending
+
+> We reaffirm our commitment to the Defence Investment Pledge in its entirety. We will build on that pledge and decide next year on subsequent commitments beyond 2024
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+The 2014 Defense Investment Pledge (DIP) required allies to invest at least 2 percent of GDP on defense — and at least 20 percent of that on modernization — by 2024. Last year in Vilnius, allies agreed that 2 percent would become “a minimum.” While in Wales only three allies met the target, this year 18 are projected to do so. NATO estimates that this year will be the first where European NATO allies invest 2 percent of their combined GDP. As Figure 1 shows, European allies have increased their investment by around a third since 2014, to a total of $380 billion.
+
+
+
+Recent announcements on spending included Norway’s “historic boost” to its spending, which will double over the next 12 years. The UK government recently announced a “fully funded plan” to reach 2.5 percent by 2030 — an extra £75 billion ($96 billion). Meanwhile, despite announcing an additional funded CAD 8.1 billion ($5.9 billion) by 2030, Canada would still fall short at 1.76 percent of GDP.
+
+Despite solid progress on defense spending since Madrid, three important questions remain for NATO allies. The first is whether the “2 percent as a minimum” target agreed to in Vilnius is enough to maintain a positive trajectory and deliver the capabilities required for a strong forward defense. The second is what they are spending money on. European allies need to address their known capability gaps and remove their reliance on the United States to conduct high-end collective defense missions. The final question is how the money is being spent. European allies have been spending more but cooperating less, making defense more expensive and inefficient than it needs to be.
+
+#### Forward Defense Forces
+
+> Allies have committed to deploy additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battle groups to brigade-size units where and when required . . . [including] establishing division-level structures.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+The main component of NATO’s revitalized forward defense is the eight EFP missions, including multinational forces from several allies led by a framework nation. The status of each mission is set out below, based on the latest available data. This analysis highlights progress against the two new Madrid commitments: to scale up each mission to “brigade-size units” (up to 5,000 personnel) and to establish “division-level structures.”
+
+
+
+NATO forward defense forces are also deployed in the air and at sea. Last year, NATO’s strengthened Air Policing mission conducted over 300 intercepts of Russian aircraft in Baltic airspace. Allied air forces also increased contributions to Air Policing and Air Shielding (air and missile defense). At sea, allied Standing Naval Forces came under SACEUR’s command for the first time in 2022, while a French navy carrier strike group operated under NATO command in the Mediterranean — another first.
+
+Significant progress has been made to enhance NATO’s forward defense. Since Madrid, allies have proven the combat readiness of all eight EFP missions with battlegroup-level certification exercises. Four of the eight missions have been exercised at the brigade level to rehearse rapid reinforcement in a crisis. Meanwhile, all eight missions are integrated into NATO’s command structure at the division level. EFP Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have plans to integrate with new national division-level structures. Meanwhile, NATO allies have strengthened existing missions in the air and at sea. However, only two EFP missions are planning to permanently scale up to brigade size. This is because the Madrid agreement leaves the decision to scale up to the host, framework, and contributing nations. The question remains as to whether even brigade-size missions would be sufficient to deter by denial, given the local force imbalance in Russia’s favor.
+
+#### NATO Force Model
+
+> We welcome the initial offers by Allies to NATO’s new force model, which will strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure and will resource our new generation of military plans.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+In Madrid, allies agreed to transition to a new force model by 2023. The aim of the New NATO Force Model (NFM) is to boost deterrence and defense by providing a much larger pool of forces available to deploy quickly in a crisis. The NFM replaced the 40,000 strong NATO Response Force (NRF). As Figure 2 below shows, it contains three tiers of forces held at graduated readiness, from 10 to 180 days (the NRF’s readiness time was 15 days). The NFM presaged the regional plans agreed to a year later in Vilnius, stating forces “will be pre-assigned to specific plans.” The NFM also provides the high-readiness forces required for the new Allied Reaction Force, to which NATO will transitioned in mid-2024.
+
+
+
+Detailed allied contributions to the NFM remain classified, but public announcements suggest progress. Germany agreed to contribute 30,000 troops and a combination of 85 ships and aircraft mobilizable in 30 days (Tier 2). The United Kingdom offered combat aircraft, ships, aircraft carriers, and “brigade-sized land forces.” The United States has also placed much of its 80,000 strong forces in Europe under NATO command, the most connected it has been to NATO structures in decades.
+
+Challenges remain regarding force generation and sustainment. Last year, NATO Military Committee leaders acknowledged the remaining work to meet 300,000 but emphasized the importance of knowing what is missing. Additionally, experts such as John R. Deni of the U.S. Army War College have raised concerns about readiness. Recruitment and retention challenges in Europe and the United States undermine readiness, while demand for enablers and logistics personnel is going up. Deni notes that NATO has established readiness verification processes for Tier 1 and Tier 2 forces, but these have revealed shortfalls.
+
+The authorities for SACEUR to activate and deploy NFM forces pre-crisis will be essential for delivering the DDA. As SACEUR confirmed, these authorities support “NATO’s ability to execute its plans and helps influence Allies to contribute their own forces.” Yet, allies are not always willing to grant NATO commanders the “transfer of authority” required for optimization and efficiency. This also highlights the significance of aligning NFM force composition with the regional plans, potentially different from the forces allies typically provide.
+
+#### Command Structure
+
+> Allies have committed to . . . enhanced command and control.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+NATO has steadily adapted its command structure since Madrid, vital for the implementation and execution of the regional plans. The NFM’s scale also underscores the need for an updated and modernized structure. Figure 3 shows critical command and control (C2) nodes and how they relate to NATO’s regional plans.
+
+
+
+New headquarters include Headquarters Multinational Division North (MND N) in Ādaži, Latvia, which became fully operational in July 2023. In March 2024, Headquarters Multinational Division Northeast (HQ MND-NE) in Elbląg, Poland, followed suit. Both have a key role in coordinating EFP missions. In September 2023, the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA) became the interim headquarters of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF).
+
+The addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO also required new C2 arrangements. JFC Norfolk (JFCNF), NATO’s newest strategic command, which oversees the northwest Europe regional plan (see Figure 3), became fully operational in July 2021 but significantly changed following Finland and Sweden’s accession, when a political consensus formed across the Nordic nations to gather under JFCNF. To meet this reconfiguration, the JFCNF is being upscaled, with full integration planned for 2025. The JFCNF demonstrated its readiness by taking command of Steadfast Defender for one month while the exercise was in its area of responsibility. A new corps-level land component command has been proposed in Mikkeli, Finland (about 140 km from the Russian border), likely vital for the JFCNF’s C2 infrastructure.
+
+If created, Mikkeli would take the number of corps-level commands to the 11 deemed necessary by NATO to deliver on regional plans. Streamlining NATO’s C2 structures is crucial for robust deterrence and defense. Agile commands such as the German DEU MARFOR, capable of rapid scalability in crises or supporting DDA activities, are essential. Prioritizing C2 adaptation and exercising should address this need.
+
+#### Integrate Finland and Sweden
+
+> We reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy. Today, we have decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO and agreed to sign the Accession Protocols.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+The most notable NATO achievement since the Madrid Summit has been Finland and Sweden joining as full NATO members. Following their formal invitation and after nearly two years of political drama, Ankara and Budapest eventually dropped their objections after extracting concessions from various allies, including the United States. This sent a resounding political signal to Moscow and added serious deterrent power to NATO’s ranks, gaining two highly capable members with the ability to severely constrain Russia’s freedom of maneuver in the Baltic Sea.
+
+The process of fully integrating Finland and Sweden into NATO is ongoing, but substantial progress has been made. The integration is helped by the deep military cooperation between the two countries and NATO prior to accession. Both were Enhanced Opportunities Partners (under the Partnership Interoperability Initiative) which assessed Finland and Sweden as more interoperable with NATO than some existing allies. The integration of the “formidable” air power of the Nordic countries has been developing for decades, as the recent integration of Finnish and Swedish air forces into NATO illustrates.
+
+Several challenges remain to fully integrate Finland and Sweden. These include developing adequate command structure arrangements, adjusting the regional plans and DDA, and taking account of both nations’ requirements for defense across domains, including logistics. Analysis suggests the critical role here of the United States and United Kingdom, given that the United States recently signed Nordic defense cooperation agreements and the United Kingdom leads the Joint Expeditionary Force, which has integrated Finnish and Swedish forces on operations for several years.
+
+#### Collective Defense Exercises
+
+> We will enhance our collective defense exercises to be prepared for high intensity and multi-domain operations and ensure reinforcement of any ally on short notice.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+NATO has significantly delivered since Madrid on its promise to refocus its exercise program on collective defense. The recent Steadfast Defender was the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War, featuring 90,000 personnel from all allies across all domains. It included maritime and amphibious drills in the High North and multi-domain exercises across Europe, with a focus on military mobility. Steadfast Defender has been an important tool to test and validate other major lines of effort such as the NFM and regional plans.
+
+NATO’s exercise program has focused on multi-domain operations. In the air, Germany hosted and led its largest edition of Air Defender, while Vigilant Falcon tested Baltic air policing this May. At sea, Neptune Strike 2024 included five carrier strike groups in the Mediterranean, and Dynamic Mongoose focused on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. The 2023 Baltops exercise was the first with Finland participating as an ally.
+
+The newest domains, cyber and space, were also tested. NATO held its dedicated space exercise Vulcan Guard in April. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, hosted the world’s largest cyber defense exercise, Locked Shields, last year. In June, the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise will test interoperability across all domains and NATO C2 systems.
+
+#### Defense Industry
+
+> To have the necessary capabilities, the Alliance requires a strong and capable defence industry, with resilient supply chains.
+> #### — Vilnius Communiqué
+
+Russia’s war in Ukraine revealed the critical state of NATO’s defense industrial base, as allies seek to supply Ukraine with munitions and replenish their stocks. At Vilnius, allies urged the removal of barriers to defense trade and investment among themselves to bolster resiliency. The Defence Production Action Plan (DPAP) was unveiled, “leveraging the Alliance’s role as a convener, standard-setter, requirement setter and aggregator, and delivery enabler.” Highlighted DPAP priority areas include aggregating demand across allies to accelerate joint procurement, increasing production capacity, and enhancing allied interoperability.
+
+Varying progress has been evident in demand aggregation, interoperability, and procurement coordination and collaboration. Since July 2023, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) has awarded contracts for munitions, joint procurement of Patriot missiles, and artillery shells. In addition, allies have improved multinational capability cooperation, evident in NATO’s MRTT-C air fleet achieving initial operational capability. As Figure 4 shows, traditional European producers have increased trade within Europe, but Poland’s all-source importation strategy has significantly boosted arms trade for the continent.
+
+Synchronization efforts between the European Union and NATO could enhance NATO deterrence and defense, should such efforts be pursued. The European Union has allocated over €500 million ($544 million) to ramp up ammunition production and has provided aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility. Additionally, its first ever Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) was released this year, with the aim to boost capacity and intra-European collaboration. While some have seen EDIS as in competition with DPAP on standard setting, officials affirm that they are not in competition with each other. The European Union and NATO share the goal of increasing readiness, making enhanced coordination between them essential to avoid duplication.
+
+
+
+Unsurprisingly, significant defense industrial production challenges remain. Despite clear demand signals, barriers inhibiting production acceleration and NATO-EU tensions persist. Orders form only one input in the production equation, and delivery delays fail to convert into weapons stocks in reliable timeframes. Figure 4 shows incremental progress but demonstrates that longstanding pathologies hobbling European production are not easily overcome. To ensure NATO readiness, the United States should prioritize multilateral munitions production with member states over bilateral efforts. The European Union’s anticipated increased role raises NATO concerns, but it could positively transform the transatlantic defense industrial base, contingent on EU funding capacity. To effectively leverage NATO collective investments and build production capacity, the alliance would benefit from greater defense industrial integration and consolidation.
+
+#### Defense Capabilities
+
+> Investing in our defence and key capabilities is essential.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+NATO’s cumulative capabilities far exceed Russia’s — even excluding the United States. This is shown below in Table 2, which uses two examples of critical capabilities to make the comparison. Two years of war in Ukraine have taken their toll on Russia’s armed forces, as its fleet of active main battle tanks has diminished by 41 percent since 2022 and active personnel have fallen by nearly 20 percent despite partial national mobilization. Moreover, non-U.S. NATO can field more modern equipment than Russia. Approximately 71 percent of non-U.S. NATO’s combat aircraft fleet was produced or modernized after 1990, compared to 53 percent of Russia’s inventory.
+
+
+
+However, this advantage does not necessarily translate to the battlefield. NATO faces significant capability gaps and readiness challenges which undermine conventional deterrence. Allies may have more advanced combat aircraft, but they have struggled with magazine depth. During NATO’s 2011 air operations in Libya, non-U.S. NATO members began running out of precision munitions within a month — and this was a comparatively minor operation compared to defending the Baltics.
+
+NATO’s issues go beyond airpower. According to a study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the number of combat battalions, in-service main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored reconnaissance vehicles, and self-propelled artillery in European armies has remained static or fallen between 2014 and 2023. More broadly, European nations are carrying significant gaps in naval forces, air enablers, air defense, and “battle-decisive ammunition” (artillery munitions and missiles). Any major combat operation in Europe would rely on U.S. forces to make up for European shortfalls in the land, maritime, and air forces required to deliver a range of warfighting missions. These issues have not yet been addressed by the significant increases in defense investment by NATO allies since 2014. NATO allies clearly face an important conversion challenge in translating their wealth into combat capabilities.
+
+#### Resilience
+
+> Resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+Resilience — incorporating military capacity, civil preparedness, and emergency planning — was NATO’s first line of defense against the Soviet Union. The same is true again today. Since Madrid, allies have launched several new initiatives to enhance resilience. In October 2022, NATO established a Resilience Committee which met twice prior to Vilnius. In March 2023, the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure was established to examine four key sectors: energy, transport, digital infrastructure, and space. Its final report in June 2023 recommended 14 actions to leverage NATO-EU cooperation on critical infrastructure. This was picked up at the Vilnius Summit in July, when NATO launched a new Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command. The summit communiqué also emphasized societal resilience, health systems, supply chains, and energy security. Allies also agreed to resilience objectives and a new baseline for allied resilience planning — which remains a national responsibility, guided by NATO authorities.
+
+Resilience is a complex issue that demands persistence, investment, and cooperation, requiring a more coordinated and collective approach. Building on progress to date, NATO’s Resilience Committee should consider new ideas such as a NATO resilience fund, a resilience advisory group, and a NATO-wide Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) to identify key resilience risks. The European Union’s renewed focus on resilience and the unique levers it possesses — from financial instruments to regulatory powers — make it well placed to act boldly, in continued close cooperation with NATO. These efforts also boost allies’ responses to generational challenges in NATO’s Strategic Concept, such as green energy and the digital transition.
+
+Enhancing military resilience through NATO is not enough; each ally must confront the societal challenge of war preparedness based on its own strategic culture. New allies Finland and Sweden offer a new wave of expertise based on their advanced approaches to whole-of-society resilience and civil preparedness. Above all, NATO allies must find the “will to fight,” which — as Ukraine has shown — remains the foundation of defense.
+
+
+### Is NATO Ready for War?
+
+The detailed assessments above are summarized in Table 3 and discussed below. A simple rating of “on track” or “off track” is used because the commitments made by NATO allies in Madrid were not scheduled for completion in Washington. As one analysis put it: “the alliance’s journey toward stronger defense and deterrence has only just begun.”
+
+
+
+What does this assessment tell us about NATO’s readiness for war? The answer to this question depends on the kind of war that emerges from any crisis. It seems clear that NATO is ready to “fight tonight.” The transition to the DDA and the regional plans adopted in Vilnius have driven a step change in the scale of NATO’s forces which are combat ready, deployed forward, and under SACEUR’s direct command.
+
+Expanding to eight EFP missions and reinforcing air and maritime presence has empowered NATO to swiftly assemble a significant fighting force along the eastern front in crises, fostering a cultural shift among allies. Meanwhile, NATO’s C2 has evolved quickly and demonstrated readiness through large-scale exercises. The NFM has led to a revolution in apportioning high-readiness national forces to NATO at a scale 10 times greater than before. Above all, NATO has successfully integrated Finland and Sweden, adding significant air, naval, and land combat power and removing any uncertainty over their contribution to an Article 5 scenario.
+
+However, a closer look at the longer-term measures agreed upon in Madrid reveals a slightly different question: NATO might be ready for war, but is it ready for protracted war? Any permutation of a serious Russia-NATO conflict that does not end quickly will become a clash of not just armies, but societies. This becomes a competition in resilience and preparedness, industrial capacity and supply chains, magazine depth, logistics, mass, resources, and especially the “will to fight.” The halting progress and ongoing challenges to increase defense spending, transform defense industrial capacity, address critical capability gaps, and bolster national resilience — all required to strengthen deterrence and defense — must be acknowledged, addressed, and overcome. As SACEUR Cavoli recently clarified, the key question for NATO is not about Russian reconstitution per se, but relative to the alliance’s own deterrence and defense reconstitution. As Clausewitz reminds us in his “two wrestlers” metaphor, all strategy is dynamic and relative.
+
+In reconstituting their forces, NATO allies face the perennial challenge of balancing the “iron triangle” of trade-offs between readiness, modernization, and force structure. For NATO, this might be adjusted as shown in Figure 5. In essence, allies must balance short-term force increases (“fight tonight”) and long-term modernization efforts (“fight tomorrow”), all while preparing for protraction. For example, compare Poland’s efforts to soon field the biggest army in Europe with the United Kingdom’s focus on becoming a “Science and Tech Superpower” by 2030. This trade-off is neither new nor binary, but the nature of the Russian threat makes it critical. The answer will depend on the judgment of NATO allies as to when Russia might be able and willing to attack. The diverse range of assessments and inherent uncertainty of this task make it challenging, but NATO’s war readiness will depend on the type of conflict that arises. It seems clear that NATO is ready to “fight tonight.”
+
+
+
+A final question raised by this analysis is the paradigm within which NATO allies are planning to meet their Madrid commitments. The 2022 Strategic Concept put forward defense back on NATO’s agenda, but for all its qualities, allied forward presence is “still a tripwire.” Even if the Madrid commitments were fulfilled completely, NATO’s forward presence would likely still fall short of the denial standard required to make a Russian fait accompli untenable. The strategy would then be “expel, not repel,” when the reverse is far preferable. The alliance would be placing all of its eggs in the basket of nuclear deterrence, with all the catastrophic associated risks.
+
+As NATO leaders gather in Washington this summer, they should celebrate their significant progress in fulfilling the commitments made in Madrid to bolster allied deterrence and defense. They should also push for improvements in key areas underpinning NATO’s readiness for a protracted war: defense spending, industrial capacity, critical capability gaps, and national resilience. Furthermore, they should reconsider whether the level of ambition they set in Madrid is high enough. In the Cold War, NATO’s strategy rested just as much on a robust forward defense “shield” as it did on its “sword” of nuclear deterrence. Times have changed, but not that much. Si vis pacem, para bellum.
+
+---
+
+__Sean Monaghan__ is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Eskil Jakobsen__ is the Stuart Center visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.
+
+__Sissy Martinez__ is a program manager and research associate for the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.
+
+__Mathieu Droin__ is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.
+
+__Gregory Sanders__ is deputy director and fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.
+
+__Nicholas Velazquez__ is a research assistant with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.
+
+__Cynthia Cook___ is director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.
+
+__Anna Dowd__ is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.
+
+__Maeve Sockwell__ is an intern with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-reimagining-the-g7.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-reimagining-the-g7.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Reimagining The G7
+author: John J. Hamre, et al.
+date : 2024-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aTjPttx.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "“Bending” the Architecture: Reimagining the G7"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The global governance system is in disarray. The UN Security Council is frozen by geopolitical rivalry and two wars. Other institutions such as the G20 and World Trade Organization (WTO) are underperforming._ _Time does not allow for building a new governance institution — but requires the “bending” of existing ones to meet the moment. This CSIS report speaks to the global need to elevate the Group of Seven (G7), a bloc of industrialized democracies — the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union — to foster a more stable and predictable world order. The report offers recommendations on reimagining the future G7 as a critical institution of global governance, focused on agenda setting, institutionalization, and membership of the body._
+
+- Over the last half-decade, G7 leadership summits have identified nine global priorities: (1) the Indo-Pacific; (2) economic resilience and security; (3) food security; (4) digital competitiveness; (5) climate; (6) Ukraine; (7) sustainable development; (8) disarmament and non-proliferation; and (9) labor.
+
+- The G7’s scope has expanded, but its representation of the global economy and population has declined, highlighting the need for reform to enhance capabilities and legitimacy without sacrificing the G7’s trademark informality, trust, and effectiveness.
+
+- The G7 should create an informal “troika” of the previous, current, and next G7 hosts to manage a consensus-based approach to agenda setting. This ensures consistency and follow-through on issues from one host to the next.
+
+- The G7 should expand membership to include Australia and South Korea. They bring significant capabilities to the nine priorities identified by G7 leaders, are like-minded partners, and display the trust and reliability required of G7 members. These two countries perform as well, if not better than, current G7 members in the nine priority issue areas. They also address Europe’s overrepresentation and Asia’s severe underrepresentation in the group.
+
+- The G7 might recognize other high-performing actors (e.g., Spain) as dialogue partners or associate members. The G7 should also consider consolidation of the European Council and European Commission into one seat.
+
+- The G7 should establish a formal leader-level outreach mechanism to the Global South and middle-power economies to demonstrate inclusivity and confer legitimacy on the body as a global governance institution. The outreach partners should include the African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the G20, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
+
+While the current G7, a decade old in its practices and membership, has performed admirably, the pace of change engendered by new disruptive technologies and old geopolitical rivalries now requires innovation beyond comfort for some. Inaction precipitates a vacuum that may be filled with forms of rule that are less desirable and even dangerous. The recommendations contained in this report are necessary pre-requisites for the incarnation of tomorrow’s G7 global governance mission.
+
+
+### A WORLD IN TURMOIL
+
+At a time of global turmoil when traditional institutions of global governance are underperforming, the Group of Seven (G7), a bloc of industrialized democracies which includes the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, is needed now more than ever to foster a more stable and predictable world order.
+
+This CSIS report offers recommendations to empower a future G7 as a critical institution of global governance. The work presented here is a non-partisan and collaborative effort of CSIS expertise on Asia, Europe, sustainable development, and economics. The authors sought advice and critical input from almost three dozen former G7 point persons — so-called sherpas, sous-sherpas, and yaks — and representatives of the G7, European, and Asian diplomatic communities. This report does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of these participants.
+
+The international system is changing at a pace not seen since the end of World War II. In the geostrategic space, wars in Europe and the Middle East, cohesion among a bloc of autocratic powers, and heightened proliferation threaten a new Cold War and pose major challenges to the peaceful status quo. At the same time, emerging and critical global issues such as artificial intelligence (AI), resilient supply chains, advances in synthetic biology, pandemic preparedness, and sustainable development demand new standards and norms, as well as cooperative and sustained action.
+
+The current architecture of global governance is ill-suited to meet these challenges and opportunities. The United Nations, particularly the UN Security Council (UNSC), has failed to address human rights abuses, anti-democratic behavior, and aggression globally. The G20, once a stabilizing force that helped address the 1997 Asian liquidity crisis and the 2007–08 global financial crisis, is now hamstrung by geopolitical rivalry. The WTO, established to uphold rules and norms for the global trading system, has expanded membership to more than 160 countries, making it difficult to make decisions or enact the reforms necessary to regulate the current trade landscape. Changes in the operative space of the international system have led large emerging and middle powers to organize a proliferation of ad hoc groupings, including the Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, AUKUS, U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateralism, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Others, such as the BRICS partnerships, are also growing in membership and seeking to diminish their dependency on the U.S. dollar. Likewise, the G20 has welcomed the African Union to its ranks. Though these minilaterals allow new forums for marginalized voices, they are not yet in a position to set new rules of the road or replace institutions such as the UNSC or WTO.
+
+Dealing with these potentially existential issues will require a level of trust and capability, as well as a track record of working together. It will take real conversations among leaders, not a set of talking points or a lowest-common-denominator joint statement to produce solutions that are lacking in these larger groupings.
+
+Trying to devise a new institution would take decades, with no promise of success. The current pace of change in world affairs requires a “bending” of existing institutions to meet the challenges of global governance. As a grouping of like-minded, advanced industrialized democracies, the G7 is the only institution today that can step into this role. But this requires a reimagination of the G7 not of the past two decades but of the next two, that can find solutions to global problems, capitalize on future opportunities, and engage with critical voices from emerging and middle-power economies. This report offers recommendations focused on agenda setting, institutionalization, and membership of the body.
+
+
+### THE GLOBAL ROLE OF THE G7
+
+G7 leaders have come a long way since their initial gathering in 1975 to address the oil shock and to coordinate monetary policies. In the past few years, the G7 leaders’ statements have taken on a more urgent, expansive, and unified tone as the world has grappled with a range of existential issues, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, multiple financial crises, climate change, supply chain resilience, and wars in Ukraine and Gaza. In the past few years, it has become clear that the significant global challenges today have created demands for the G7 to actively execute across its expansive domain of responsibilities. Table 1 lists the top nine global priority issues of the G7 leaders over the past half-decade, derived from text analysis of G7 leaders’ statements between 2018 and 2023.
+
+There is no denying that G7 leaders are willing to shoulder global responsibilities to meet the demands of a new era. Yet at the same time, the G7 commands a smaller portion of the global constituency. Even as the G7’s agenda has grown global, its representation as a share of the world’s population and global economy has declined over time, raising questions about its legitimacy outside of advanced industrialized democracies. At the same time, global challenges highlight the need for other capable countries to step up and help shoulder the burden of an expanded agenda.
+
+This confluence of necessities — the need for the G7’s expanded scope, the need for effective institutions of global governance on the international stage, and the need for more inclusive representation of actors to manage the global challenges ranging from war to pandemics to the AI race — requires the G7 to “bend” and embrace a set of reforms to meet the moment. Reform and reimagination of the G7 will have to be done in a way to maintain the pieces that make it an effective and special grouping but allow it to effectuate its expanded scope and be an effective leadership organization.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Top Nine Priorities of G7 Leaders, 2018 vs. 2023.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair analysis of G7 communiqués and statements._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: G7 Leaders’ Priorities by Topic, 2018–2023.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair analysis of G7 communiqués and statements._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: The G7’s Declining Share of the World Economy and Global Population, 1975–2022.__ Source: Data aggregated by CSIS Korea Chair from [“GDP (current US$),” World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD); and [“Population,” World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL)._
+
+
+### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REIMAGINING THE G7
+
+#### RECOMMENDATION 1
+#### Create a Consensus-Based Approach for G7 Agenda Setting
+
+Traditionally, the G7 has been an informal grouping. Former sherpas praise the informality as contributing to the grouping’s flexibility, nimbleness, frank consultative process, and ability to act quickly on issues.
+
+The downside, however, is that informality leads to inefficiency around agenda setting and discontinuity from presidency to presidency. For example, the 2023 Hiroshima G7 statement laid out an ambitious global agenda for member countries ranging from AI norms to cyber defenses to economic security, but the agenda for the 2024 Apulia G7 meeting, chaired by Italy, largely ignored these issues and has turned to migration from North Africa. While both sets of issues are important, the discontinuity in the agenda-setting function is suboptimal. It conveys confusing signals to the international community, precipitates a lack of follow-through, and exacerbates a lack of oversight on announced commitments.
+
+- Create an informal “troika” of past, current, and upcoming G7 hosts to complement the work of individual country secretariats.
+
+ While respecting the privilege of the host country to shape the annual agenda, the informal troika’s main focus would be to ensure the continuity of core issues, including economic security, emerging technology, China, and Ukraine. These issues may change over time as they are resolved or as new challenges arise.
+
+- Build a task force structure for key, pressing issues to ensure continuity and follow-through.
+
+ Task force-like structures, in the form of working groups, expert groups, and other such forums, already exist within the G7, but these could be repurposed in a way to ensure (1) completion of commitments from previous G7 presidencies; and (2) the tracking of agenda items for follow-on work in the next G7 presidency. Since approximately 2010, the G7 has had in place a mechanism to track accountability for G7 commitments to global development, but no such mechanism to track accountability for other political and economic commitments exists. This could be accomplished through explicit task forces, which could change focus and composition as needed. For example, G7 governments could explicitly agree to sunset task forces after a set number of years, and G7 members could also introduce new task forces to address emerging challenges.
+
+- Consider a bifurcated agenda process.
+
+ This process would include two to three items that are core interests to the greater G7 and one to two items of critical importance to the host. The agenda could be determined by the G7 “troika” — consisting of the current G7 president alongside the countries holding the most recent and the upcoming G7 presidency — with input from other G7 countries through existing consultation mechanisms.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: A Brief History of G7 Membership.__ Source: [“About the G7,” G7 Italia 2024](https://www.g7italy.it/en/about-g7/); [“The History of the G7,” Federal Government of Germany](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/service/the-history-of-the-g7-397438); and [“G7/Summit of The Eight: History and Purpose,” U.S. Department of State, June 3, 1997](https://1997-2001.state.gov/issues/economic/summit/fs_summit_history.html)._
+
+#### RECOMMENDATION 2
+#### Expand the G7 to Include Australia and South Korea
+
+The current composition of the G7, now a decade old, represents a declining portion of the world’s population and global economy. Moreover, changes in the G7’s membership have been part of the organization’s identity as it has evolved over time to meet different challenges (Figure 3).
+
+Increasing membership is not without controversy. Some former sherpas see it as a potential slippery slope where the G7’s effectiveness is sacrificed for the desire for greater inclusiveness and representation.
+
+Two factors, however, weigh in favor of expansion. First, the extent to which the G7 members have enlarged the scope of their responsibilities requires new players with critical capabilities to fulfill the mission. Second, the G7’s current membership is disproportionately dominated by Europe (six out of nine seats, including the European Council and European Commission); has only one country to represent the whole of Asia; and excludes any voice representing the developing world. This composition is ill-suited for a reimagined G7 to play the role of the preeminent institution of global governance.
+
+Australia and South Korea fall in the “sweet spot” of expanded G7 membership and enhanced effectiveness. Former sherpas argued that any new members must support the G7’s mission, share its political values, be responsible stewards of the international economy, and have the capabilities, commitment, and, importantly, the trust of the other G7 members. Australia and South Korea, respectively the 12th- and 13th-largest economies in the world, easily meet this bar.
+
+- Trust and Responsibility: Both Australia and South Korea have demonstrated records as trustworthy and responsible public goods providers.
+
+ The two U.S. allies have fought on the side of democracy and a rules-based order in every major war since World War I and the Korean War, respectively. They have been exemplary leaders in contending with challenges that preoccupy the G7 leaders. Today, Australia has stood up like no other to unfair economic coercion by China, and it is instrumental to the critical mineral resiliency of the industrialized democracies. South Korea is a major provider of economic and indirect military assistance to Ukraine, and it is a critical player in protecting emerging technology supply chains. Both have demonstrated a leadership role in a host of global issues prioritized by the G7 (Figure 4). Both have been constructive members of the G20, demonstrating strong cooperation with the United States across administrations.
+
+- Performance: Australia and South Korea are outperforming some current G7 members in areas deemed critical to G7 leaders.
+
+ Former sherpas noted that any new members must enhance, not detract from, the effectiveness of the G7. At the outset of the G4/5, the original members had outsized influence and economic prowess, but that is not the case today. New members should be more representative of the type of advanced and industrialized economies of the future to be fit to deal with those challenges.
+
+ Figures 5 and 6 show how Australia and South Korea are outperforming several current members on the nine priorities identified by the G7 over the last half-decade of leaders’ statements.
+
+- Representation and Values: Australia and South Korea “balance out” the non-European composition of industrialized democracies.
+
+ A reimagined G7 should be more representative of the world as it is and will be, not as it was. The current G7 is Eurocentric and has only one Asian nation representing the entire region. As Figure 2 shows, and as suggested in the performance criteria, the G7’s share of the world economy and population is declining, calling into question how its members could speak for markets larger than them in terms of GDP or population size. Australia and South Korea would bring representation for two advanced countries in the Indo-Pacific region, with the latter demonstrating significant advancements in the economies of the future, including computing, AI, and technology.
+
+- Recognize other high-performing actors.
+
+ The metrics in Figure 6 show that other European countries, such as Spain, perform respectably in the nine priority areas identified by G7 leaders and could be considered as regular dialogue partners. The G7 should consolidate representation from the European Council and European Commission, which now occupy two seats.
+
+#### RECOMMENDATION 3
+#### Establish a Formal G7 Outreach Mechanism
+
+Any expansion of the G7, whether to a G9 or beyond, will be met with staunch criticism by some within and outside of the body. Outreach to the so-called Global South, and emerging and middle-power economies, is necessary if a reimagined G7 were to truly fulfill the role of becoming the preeminent global governance institution. The tradition of consultation with developing countries might be institutionalized as an official consultation by the annual G7 president and foreign or finance ministers, as well as both before and after the convening of the leaders’ meeting. This would ensure linkages with developing economies, demonstrate inclusivity, and confer more credibility and legitimacy on the G7. The issue areas in the near term should focus on pursuing development and climate goals, implementing new norms and standards (e.g., AI and emerging technologies), and strategic signaling and shaping, particularly with respect to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This outreach should be extended to the African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the G20, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
+
+These organizations and countries represent voices from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Islamic world, ensuring better communication but also limiting the size of the G7 to ensure the optimal equilibrium in maintaining the G7’s effectiveness.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Australia’s and South Korea’s Convening Roles in Priority G7 Issues.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: Ranking of Country Performance along Identified Issue Areas.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 6: Comparison of Country Performance across Identified Priority G7 Issue Areas.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair._
+
+
+### CONCLUSION
+
+The scope of disruption brought on by new emerging technologies as well as old geopolitical rivalries and territorial aggression presages that the world of tomorrow will not look like the world of today. Current institutions have proven incapable of carving out a path forward that capitalizes on the opportunities created by disruption and also guards against the erosion or even usurping of the core values, norms, and ethics of the rules-based order established after World War II. A confluence of forces has made it incumbent upon a reimagined G7 to fill the leadership void. While the current G7, now a decade old in its practices and membership, has performed admirably, the pace of change now cresting requires innovation beyond what may seem comfortable to some. Inaction, moreover, precipitates a vacuum that others may seek to fill with less desirable and even dangerous forms of rule. The recommendations contained in this report are by no means comprehensive, but they are necessary prerequisites for the incarnation of tomorrow’s G7 as the preeminent institution of global governance.
+
+---
+
+__John Hamre__ was elected president and CEO of CSIS in January 2000.
+
+__Victor Cha__ is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at CSIS. He is also the distinguished university professor and professor of government at Georgetown University.
+
+__Emily Benson__ is director of Project on Trade and Technology, and senior fellow of Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, where she focuses on trade, investment, and technology issues primarily in the transatlantic context.
+
+__Max Bergmann__ is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at CSIS.
+
+__Erin Murphy__ is a senior fellow for the Asia Program at CSIS. She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.
+
+__Caitlin Welsh__ is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS, where she analyzes the drivers and consequences of food and water insecurity around the world, including for U.S. national security. Her specific areas of focus include the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security and nutrition, food insecurity in the U.S. military, and the coherence between U.S. global water security policy and U.S. global food security policy.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-13-dilemma-of-aid-to-afghanistan.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-13-dilemma-of-aid-to-afghanistan.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Dilemma Of Aid To Afghanistan
+author: Daniel F. Runde, et al.
+date : 2024-06-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/5KWUNeD.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Future of Assistance for Afghanistan: A Dilemma"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Three years after the fall of Kabul, international assistance for Afghanistan is at a crossroads. As donor fatigue sets in and aid dwindles, stakeholders must grapple with how to address the country’s critical humanitarian needs without legitimizing the Taliban’s rule._
+
+
+
+Afghanistan has largely disappeared from the news, but it remains at the center of one of the world’s most persistent, severe, and complex humanitarian crises. Almost three years after the Taliban retook power in August 2021, Afghanistan has achieved a moderate degree of stability but remains in a highly precarious position. Taliban leaders inherited tremendous macroeconomic problems when they assumed control of the country. Before the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, foreign aid was equivalent to 40 percent of the nation’s GDP and financed over half of the government’s $6 billion annual budget and 75 to 80 percent of total public expenditures. The sudden regime change was followed by the abrupt withdrawal of all international aid, plunging the country into economic free fall and precipitating a catastrophic humanitarian crisis.
+
+The shock to Afghanistan’s economy was compounded by immediate diplomatic and financial isolation. Consistent with long-standing U.S. and UN sanctions against Taliban leaders, many of whom were named to key cabinet positions, the United States and Europe froze nearly $9.5 billion of Afghanistan’s external reserves, leaving the Afghan central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), deprived of assets and cut off from the global financial system. This resulted in an acute liquidity crisis, the cessation of normal financial transactions with foreign banks, and the immobilization of the country’s commercial banking sector. In order to protect some of the frozen funds from being claimed as damages by family members of September 11 victims, who had won a $7 billion default judgment against the Taliban in 2011, the Biden administration diverted $3.5 billion of these assets to establish the Swiss-based Fund for the Afghan People, or Afghan Fund, with the intention of using targeted disbursements to support Afghanistan’s macroeconomic and financial stability. As of 2024, however, the fund remains untapped.
+
+The multidimensional crises facing Afghanistan present a dilemma for the international community. An underlying assumption is that the Taliban will remain in power for at least the immediate future, which will require workarounds and tough compromises if the plight of Afghanistan’s people is to be alleviated to any degree. The large-scale influx of humanitarian aid since the end of 2021 has come largely in the form of physical shipments of U.S. dollars, delivered under the coordination of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to various UN agencies and UN-partnered international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating on the ground. The funds are used to pay staff salaries and procure food and supplies, including covering the costs of imports. As of this year, UN cash shipments remain a critical lifeline for an estimated 23.7 million people at risk in a nation of 41 million. The country’s modest degree of economic stabilization since 2021 is in large part owed to the weekly inflow of these donor funds, which have totaled more than $2.9 billion since the Taliban takeover.
+
+Although international assistance has prevented a further deterioration of conditions and helped stave off an even greater humanitarian disaster, the stability of the Afghan economy and the welfare of the Afghan people remain extremely tenuous. Afghanistan is one of the poorest and least developed nations in the world, ranked 182 out of 193 countries and territories on the Human Development Index. The initial economic collapse in 2021 has hardened into a state of chronic economic weakness: after weathering a 27 percent contraction in GDP between 2021 and 2023, the Afghan economy is now hovering in “no-growth territory,” propped up by foreign aid and highly vulnerable to shocks. According to the World Bank’s most recent Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey, the unemployment rate among surveyed households was close to 20 percent as of April–June 2023, and there is “no reason to believe that more recent trends will be any better.” The loss of more than 700,000 jobs has been felt most acutely in Afghanistan’s cities, but Afghans in rural areas have been struggling to cope with floods, droughts, and earthquakes, as well as the devastating toll of the Taliban’s 2022 ban on the cultivation of opium poppy, Afghanistan’s most important agricultural product.
+
+The Afghan population is also facing economy-wide price deflation, currency shortages, weakened purchasing power, outbreaks of disease, damage to critical infrastructure, and the deterioration of basic public services. Afghans have limited access to shelter, education, healthcare, electricity, food, clean water, and sanitation systems, and roughly 6.3 million are internally displaced — the second-highest number in the world after Syria. Reports for 2024 by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimate that 15.8 million Afghans are experiencing acute food insecurity, 22.1 million require protection assistance, and 8.7 million children need education support. Pakistan’s decision to expel an estimated 1.3 million Afghan refugees in late 2023 added to the country’s burden, as approximately 515,000 Afghans have reentered the country between September 2023 and February 2024.
+
+The Taliban’s crackdown on individual freedoms — particularly those of women and girls — has worsened the countrywide crisis and interfered with the humanitarian response. The imposition of restrictions on female education, employment, dress, and freedom of movement and the segregation of men and women in public life have crippled humanitarian operations, obstructing access to essential services while raising the cost of their delivery. According to the 2023 annual U.S. Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Afghanistan, the Taliban regime’s restrictions extend to the exercise of free speech, the right to protest, and aspects of the Shia minority’s right to religious observance. Moreover, some former members of the Islamic Republic’s government and security forces have faced disappearance, imprisonment, and extrajudicial killings. Unmoved by sanctions or international pressure, the Taliban’s flagrant disregard for human rights poses a tremendous operational and moral challenge for donors and humanitarian actors, who struggle between providing lifesaving assistance despite the Taliban’s edicts or withholding funds and services in protest despite the impact on civilians.
+
+Compounding these challenges is the rapid decline in international support for Afghanistan in the context of growing donor fatigue. As other global crises draw the attention of the donor community, the plight of Afghanistan is fading increasingly into the background despite the country’s enormous needs. OCHA’s 2023 Humanitarian Needs Response Plan (HNRP) sought an initial budget of $4.6 billion — its highest-ever humanitarian funding appeal for a single country. This figure was later scaled down to $3.2 billion, a reduction attributable not to improved conditions but to severe shortfalls in funding. The staggering funding gap for the 2023 HNRP — which fell $2.96 billion short of the original budget and $1.59 billion short of the revised budget — does not bode well for the 2024 HNRP’s $3.1 billion funding target. As human rights violations and corruption concerns have become harder to ignore, heavyweight donors including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the Asian Development Bank have begun to sour on aid commitments. In 2023, the United Kingdom cut its Afghan aid budget by 76 percent, while Germany slashed its contributions by 93 percent. Even the United States — which appropriated upward of $2.5 billion for assistance to Afghanistan between October 2021 and September 2023 — has reduced its financial support, which dropped from $1.26 billion in 2022 to $377 million in 2023. As of May 9, 2024, the 2024 HNRP is only 15.9 percent funded.
+
+Relations with Afghanistan are now at an impasse. The international community continues to resist deeper engagement due to mounting concerns about rights protection, adherence to international law, and financial transparency. Meanwhile, the Taliban continue to appeal for political, diplomatic, and economic normalization without showing any intention of addressing the issues of concern to foreign donors, instead “framing calls by Western leaders to uphold international norms as the latest episode in a long history of interference and intervention.”
+
+The central challenge is finding a politically palatable middle ground between two bleak alternatives — engaging with the Taliban to assist the Afghan people or isolating Afghanistan and abandoning its vulnerable population. Given that isolation has been tried in the past to little effect, many have urged the West to avoid falling back on old strategies, which are unlikely to move a “pariah regime” that has proved defiant in the face of international condemnation. As the United States and its allies attempt to find the right balance between support for the population and pressure on the regime, they have to temper their economic punishments for the Taliban’s “increasingly flagrant human rights abuses” to mitigate the suffering of the Afghan people and prevent the country from tipping closer to collapse.
+
+___`The central challenge is finding a politically palatable middle ground between two bleak alternatives — engaging with the Taliban to assist the Afghan people or isolating Afghanistan and abandoning its vulnerable population.`___
+
+In a situation with no good options or easy decisions, the international community is struggling to find a viable path forward. There is a general consensus that ordinary Afghans should not be forgotten but that the current humanitarian-dominated assistance regime is unsustainable. If international aid is to continue and evolve as needed, there are five interrelated and overlapping issues that stakeholders will need to grapple with as they debate what form that aid should take.
+
+
+### Promoting the Rights of Women and Girls
+
+One of the most significant barriers to large-scale international donor assistance for Afghanistan — and to shifting from humanitarian aid to development aid in particular — is the deteriorating circumstances of Afghan women and girls. To the extent that Afghanistan does appear in the news, it is because of the Taliban’s draconian applications of sharia law — which include barbaric punishments for “moral crimes,” such as public stoning for adultery — and the enactment of a harsh set of measures that oppress women and girls to a degree tolerated nowhere else on earth. Since 2021, the Taliban’s repressive policies have included prohibiting female education beyond the sixth grade, barring women from civil service and NGO work, mandating the wearing of burkas, and requiring that women be accompanied by a mahram (a male relative guardian) in public. These edicts are not only egregious human rights violations but also major hindrances to the country’s long-term socioeconomic development. Estimates suggest that the de facto exclusion of women from public life will exacerbate the country’s “brain drain” — the flight of educated Afghans — and cost Afghanistan’s economy up to 5 percent of its GDP.
+
+Although the international community is in unanimous agreement that Afghanistan’s economic development hinges on the reinstatement of women’s rights, donors and stakeholders have been divided over the implications of human rights concerns for the continuation and expansion of international assistance programs in the country. Women and girls have been disproportionately affected by Afghanistan’s economic collapse and Taliban rule in virtually every dimension, making women and girls especially reliant on the continued delivery of direct humanitarian assistance and small-scale, private-sector development projects. Significant numbers of Western donors and humanitarian actors temporarily ceased, paused, or scaled down their operations as a mark of outrage, and some continue to advocate stricter conditionalities for any future or additional aid. Others have argued that the threat of further isolation is not a pragmatic or moral approach to alleviating the humanitarian crisis and reducing the burden on Afghanistan’s women. As the Taliban have doubled down on gender-based discrimination, donor strategies have sought to prioritize women and girls in the provision of essential services and development assistance.
+
+As foreign cash flows decline and assistance programs begin to emphasize the mobilization of the local private sector to meet humanitarian needs, targeted development assistance could be a more crucial lifeline for women, who experience higher rates of unemployment, face greater operational challenges as business owners, and have more difficulty accessing humanitarian relief. Ongoing World Bank and USAID programs have centered women in many project activities, rolling out educational courses, skills development programs, and targeted microfinance plans for women. Donors have also supported efforts to leverage the digital economy to provide women with alternative means of economic empowerment, the scaling up of which will depend on investments in digital public infrastructure and digital literacy programs. All these initiatives risk running afoul of the Taliban authorities, who have reportedly refused to renew business licenses for female entrepreneurs and may yet impose new policy restrictions on women’s participation in economic activities. Humanitarian actors are ultimately forced to walk a fine line between flouting the regime’s policies and attempting to work within them. Although more defiant approaches may be too out of touch with political reality to be effective, more pragmatic proposals, such as incentivizing the employment of women in the private sector by providing funds for segregated office spaces, are controversial for their perceived accommodation of the Taliban’s restrictions.
+
+There are no perfect options for protecting the rights and opportunities of women and girls in a context of humanitarian crisis and oppressive policies that UN officials have equated with “gender apartheid.” The international community must remain committed to supporting Afghan women and girls while recognizing that meaningful assistance will require a delicate balance of engagement, pressure, and humanitarian aid. Without progress on women’s rights and inclusion, the Taliban risk jeopardizing Western donors’ willingness to provide development assistance or eventual diplomatic recognition, both of which will be vital to Afghanistan’s ability to secure large-scale investment.
+
+
+_▲ People wait to receive a food donation in Kandahar on April 27, 2022._
+
+
+### Right-Sizing UN Cash Shipments and Humanitarian Aid
+
+With donor funds drying up, two particularly urgent, related concerns are (1) Afghanistan’s extreme reliance on foreign aid, which long predates the current humanitarian crisis, and (2) the issues associated with UN cash shipments, which were introduced as a temporary expedient but have persisted for well over two years. Worldwide, most humanitarian aid is intended as a temporary stopgap, allowing humanitarian actors to address the immediate needs of the population while buying time for more meaningful, long-term stabilization. Likewise, emergency cash shipments are not a lasting substitute for a functional banking sector and sustainable economic growth, and this form of aid financing is not normally allocated in ways that promote the development of effective governing institutions or the construction of the basic infrastructure needed to deliver healthcare, education, and vital human services.
+
+In the case of Afghanistan, the problems associated with long-term foreign aid dependence are particularly acute — and given the severity of the present humanitarian crisis and the country’s enormous structural problems, the risk of inertia is inordinately high. Humanitarian interventions alone cannot improve the situation for affected Afghans, leaving the population stuck in a cycle of repeated, protracted crises. The constraints related to the sanctions regime and international isolation have only exacerbated the Afghan economy’s weakness and the population’s reliance on international assistance. At the same time, large-scale humanitarian aid has allowed the Taliban to abdicate their responsibility to meet the needs of the Afghan people, effectively outsourcing the country’s social safety net to UN agencies and a handful of other international NGOs. With respect to the use of cash shipments, the weekly inflow of $40 million may have initially relieved pressure on Afghanistan’s moribund banking sector, but the money now stands in the way of the financial system’s revival. Although cash shipments have helped stabilize the local currency, an additional consequence is the Taliban regime’s accumulation of a large supply of U.S. dollars. The ban on the use of U.S. dollars in local transactions has required humanitarian agencies to exchange dollars for afghanis to fund their operations; because the local currency is in short supply, this has resulted in many private banks using UN-supplied dollars to purchase afghanis from the Taliban-controlled DAB.
+
+For donors, the risks, costs, and inefficiencies associated with regular cash shipments have become intolerable as a long-term assistance strategy — not least because the shipments can give the problematic appearance of “paying the Taliban,” undermining international statements of principles. This approach to aid financing incurs “substantial costs at every stage of the process,” including the conversion of European currencies into U.S. dollars, air shipment costs, security costs, bank fees, administrative overheads, and so on. Donors also have limited visibility over the administration and deployment of UN funds; with no reliable government structures in place, UN estimates of humanitarian needs have been issued without sufficient public accounting of the sources of data or the effectiveness, reliability, or presence of third-party monitoring and verification. Most UN assessments “grossly oversimplify” the population’s needs and the allocation of donor funds, providing an aggregate figure for the entire nation that fails to capture the enormous variations in need by area, demographic, and economic sector.
+
+Although UN agencies may be inclined to maintain the status quo for reasons of convenience, stakeholders are beginning to disfavor the use of cash shipments as the primary mode of aid financing. All donors have an interest in mitigating risks, countering waste, and avoiding the negative optics associated with the Taliban regime indirectly benefiting from foreign aid flows. However, while many are beginning to endorse the use of digital cash transfers and monitored private bank transactions, wariness of the sanctions regime and long-standing concerns about the security of the Afghan banking sector, notably the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing, may still obstruct more practical approaches to delivering aid funds. As donors become more opposed to cash shipments and less generous in their aid commitments, the failure to find alternative financing may grind humanitarian operations to a halt at great expense to the population. Despite reasonable concerns about foreign assistance relieving pressure on the state to the Taliban’s benefit, that group’s reliance on aid to avoid its duties does not mean that it would prioritize the welfare of the Afghan people if the money were withdrawn. Meanwhile, UN and NGO officials have emphasized that the population’s needs have reached a scale beyond what aid agencies alone are capable of managing.
+
+___`All donors have an interest in mitigating risks, countering waste, and avoiding the negative optics associated with the Taliban regime indirectly benefiting from foreign aid flows.`___
+
+In response to these issues, some have urged a move away from “humanitarian business as usual,” with the goal of phasing out cash shipments on a gradual and predictable basis, retooling large-scale foreign humanitarian aid, and replacing the current model of foreign support with more traditional development assistance geared to increase the Afghan economy’s self-sufficiency. Humanitarian aid funds are dwindling at an alarming rate, falling from $3.8 billion in 2022 to $1.9 billion in 2023, “with further declines expected in 2024.” Moving forward, international assistance strategies must find a way to both smooth the macroeconomic impact of declining aid and deploy increasingly limited resources in a more targeted and cost-effective way. This could include improving coordination between agencies, reducing the size of UN administrative overheads, making more use of the Afghan private sector for aid delivery, and prioritizing basic healthcare and food assistance.
+
+
+### Promoting Financial Transparency
+
+As Western donors assess how to gradually scale down cash shipments and shift to more basic development aid, a related consideration is the problem of financial transparency, which pertains to both suspected “leakages” of foreign aid funds and the black box of the Taliban budget.
+
+Considering the scope of humanitarian needs and the level of foreign aid being channeled into the country, the misappropriation of aid funds has been a consistent concern among donor governments. Humanitarian operations have not been exempt from Taliban interference, as is the case in any country receiving large amounts of such aid. According to a January 2024 report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Taliban have siphoned or benefited from a considerable amount of humanitarian aid. Reported tactics include infiltrating UN-partnered NGOs to access their aid budgets; imposing taxes and “security” fees on humanitarian workers; directing aid agencies to serve Taliban officials and family members; and taxing Afghan aid recipients at high rates, in some cases amounting to 60 to 100 percent of the aid received.
+
+Although the Taliban regime exaggerates the success of its anticorruption measures, its high-profile campaign claiming to eliminate the corruption that plagued the Islamic Republic government has resulted in some notable improvements. The tightening of border and customs controls has allowed for more aggressive taxation of imports and stricter regulation of the country’s vast informal economy. These measures and the dismantling of many unofficial road checkpoints — notorious sites of extortion in the Islamic Republic, used by both insurgents and state police — are “consistent with reports from Afghan traders” about the decline in corruption. Nonetheless, other reports have highlighted the persistence of illicit economies, including drug and arms trafficking, the regime’s financial linkages with al Qaeda affiliates, and the capture of state resources by Taliban leaders, who have continued previous governments’ practices of relying on patronage networks to maintain their authority. According to a February 2024 study, the Taliban regime can be termed a theocratic authoritarian “kleptocracy” due to its use of public funds, diverted humanitarian assistance, informal and illicit profits, and extensive taxation network to consolidate control over the country’s resources for the use of Taliban leaders and their cadres.
+
+Despite recent efforts to demonstrate fiscal responsibility, the Taliban regime ultimately lacks any meaningful or structural financial transparency — particularly in the area of expenditures. There is no public accounting of what the regime spends on its security forces, intelligence apparatus, and prisons vis-à-vis public services such as food, healthcare, and education. Nor are there criteria for awarding government contracts, property sales, or licenses, and the lack of external accountability mechanisms prevents transparency in procurement. The World Bank reported that the government raised $2.2 billion in revenue in 2022, 60 percent of which is estimated to have been generated through aggressive tax and customs collection, achieved in part through violence, harassment, and the threat of license suspensions and asset seizures. The World Bank’s Afghanistan Development Update reported that the government raised $2.9 billion in revenue in 2023 — a 9 percent increase from the previous year but not necessarily indicative of long-term fiscal sustainability. The primary sources of revenue growth were increases in import volume and associated border tax revenues, which may only exacerbate Afghanistan’s dependence on imports at the expense of domestic economic growth, as well as one-time nontax revenues, such as vehicle registration fees, passport issuances, and royalties, which are not reliable sources of recurring incomes.
+
+Alongside more pressing concerns about Taliban gender policies and human rights violations, reports of state kleptocracy and concerns about fiscal transparency are also threats to both the continued flow of international humanitarian aid and the prospect of future development projects. Major stakeholders need assurances against the duplication of spending and the misappropriation of funds, which depend on oversight mechanisms including audits and impact assessments. The reputational risks associated with documented aid leakages to the Taliban — particularly alongside evidence of Taliban linkages with terrorist organizations — also jeopardize foreign cash inflows. Allegations of aid diversion in various SIGAR reports prompted U.S. senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) to introduce a bill in March to withhold all U.S. funding for UNAMA pending assurances that U.S. taxpayer dollars are not funding the Taliban and — by extension — terrorism.
+
+Short of suspending aid funding for Afghanistan, the international community has few options for resolving either issue. Some current forms of aid embezzlement can be mitigated with more secure financial transfers and more robust third-party monitoring, but Western donors’ ability to pressure Kabul on its fiscal transparency is more limited. The scale of tax revenues and the regime’s evident disregard for the well-being of Afghan citizens have helped insulate the Taliban from the traditional methods by which rogue regimes are subjected to international pressure, namely sanctions and isolation. Given the shortcomings of the current approach, stakeholders must get more creative and pragmatic. A certain level of contact with governing authorities is unavoidable — rather than making aid flows contingent on total insulation from the Taliban, donors have to assess what level of “spillage” can be tolerated in exchange for economic and humanitarian progress while also tightening the delivery, allocation, and management of aid. In terms of exploring economic development strategies, donors must incentivize the Taliban authorities to be more transparent, particularly about the proportion of spending on their security apparatus versus on the social and humanitarian needs of the population. The Taliban administration’s demonstrated interest in pursuing infrastructure projects and attracting foreign investment indicates that the regime is committed to developing the Afghan economy. But ambitious development projects are unlikely to come to fruition through opaque deals that circumvent international standards and bear hidden risks.
+
+
+### Import Substitution and Private-Sector Development
+
+As direct cash transfers and humanitarian aid are scaled down, complementary engagement and investment in Afghanistan’s economy must be scaled up. Reviving Afghanistan’s private sector and enhancing local economic resilience will be critical for the country’s economic stability and long-term recovery in the absence of regular cash flows and humanitarian assistance.
+
+Afghanistan’s current economic state is the result of a lethal combination of long-term dysfunction and acute crisis. Decades of conflict and large international aid inflows have trapped the country in a state of chronic underdevelopment, leaving the economy heavily dependent on a huge basket of imports that are affordable only through external support. The Afghan financial system never fully recovered from the 2010–11 near collapse of the Kabul Bank — “at the time a critically important institution in Afghanistan’s banking system” — following revelations of massive fraud and embezzlement. Endemic corruption and persistent instability have also made for a hostile business climate and a weak private sector, made even weaker by the recent liquidity crunch. According to the World Bank’s 2023 Private Sector Rapid Survey, roughly half of Afghanistan’s businesses are struggling to operate at full capacity, and most cite disruptions in financial services as their main constraint. The country’s financial paralysis stems in part from widespread misconceptions about the scope of the sanctions regime, resulting in overcompliance and other de-risking measures at the expense of business activity, commercial financing, and cross-border trade. Barriers to economic growth have been exacerbated by the Taliban’s regressive policies and economic missteps, which include prohibitive restrictions on women in the workforce, an “unguided and mandatory shift to Islamic banking,” a burdensome taxation regime that stifles entrepreneurial incentives, and the ban on opium poppies, costing rural households over $1 billion in annual income.
+
+Circumstances are unlikely to change significantly in the short term, but there are several things that donors can do to mitigate the severity of the economic crisis while minimizing contact with the Taliban. One recommendation is for donors to promote import substitution, which would entail revving up domestic production to capture key import markets, with the ultimate objective of creating jobs, increasing economic resilience, and improving Afghanistan’s balance of trade in areas where competitive advantages exist. Afghanistan currently relies on foreign aid to import a wide range of goods — worth approximately $6 billion to $8 billion per year — that can instead be produced domestically, including food, textiles, cement, and hydrocarbons. By emphasizing local procurement, the United Nations and donor aid agencies can reduce aid costs and reorient a core aspect of the humanitarian response around the development of Afghanistan’s own resources and private sector. Significantly, the Taliban regime appears to recognize the importance of import substitution, having contracted three sizable cement projects — two with Afghan companies and one with a Qatari investor — to break Afghanistan’s costly reliance on neighboring countries for a product that may ultimately have export potential.
+
+Jump-starting private-sector development will require more concerted efforts to clarify the parameters of the sanctions regime. There are no comprehensive sanctions in place against the country of Afghanistan — instead, the United Nations and the United States have imposed targeted sanctions against a number of individuals and organizations. The UN Security Council Resolution 2615 and the U.S. General License 20, which were issued in order to facilitate normal aid-related and commercial financial transactions, explicitly state that current sanctions exempt humanitarian activities and permit most commercial and financial transactions. These include the payment of taxes and fees to government agencies, which are not sanctioned as institutions even if they are led by sanctioned individuals. Despite this, the attitudes of most U.S. and other Western banks toward financial transactions involving Afghanistan have not changed. Clearer sanctions guidance from the U.S. Treasury Department in areas in which confusion persists can help ensure that the Afghan private sector as well as Western and regional firms and banks are aware of the exemptions and safeguards that allow for continued trade and commercial activities.
+
+Supporting the revival of Afghanistan’s banking sector is equally critical for ensuring smooth payments to facilitate trade, aid, remittances, and financing. Moving away from UN cash shipments will offer an opportunity to further develop and expand alternative payment methods as well as strengthen Afghan banks and their international connections, but this shift will depend on fostering greater trust in Afghanistan’s financial system. The resumption of normal financial transactions will require increases in third-party monitoring to ensure compliance with internationally recognized Anti–Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards and policies. Given that DAB lacks the institutional capacity and political autonomy necessary to credibly monitor financial transactions, either the World Bank or a qualified private accounting firm commissioned by the Afghan Fund could provide AML/CFT oversight in the interim.
+
+With the help of increased engagement from the World Bank, the revival of the banking sector could also enable more direct support to vetted Afghan businesses through microfinancing plans and other innovative financing tools, which can be used to promote import substitution and increase exports. The Afghan Fund might also be mobilized to that end — a portion of its funds could be diverted to some of Afghanistan’s private commercial banks to provide liquidity for private-sector lending and financing.
+
+
+### The World Bank and Development Assistance
+
+In February 2024, the World Bank Board of Executive Directors endorsed a revision of the bank’s approach to assisting the people of Afghanistan, taking the first significant steps toward a development-based international assistance strategy since the 2022 suspension of previous projects. The bank’s “Approach 3.0” will deploy funds from the International Development Association through grants to UN agencies and NGOs to finance private-sector activities, boost employment opportunities, and facilitate private-sector participation in aid delivery. The board also gave the green light for direct engagement with senior officials at Afghan economic institutions, enhancing the bank’s ability to produce technical assessments, provide rigorous third-party monitoring, engage in knowledge sharing, and potentially open dialogues on macroeconomic policy and fiscal management. Most notable is the revival of the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000) after a two-year suspension. The $1.2 billion regional infrastructure project, undertaken in collaboration with the publicly owned Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherikat (DABS), will transport clean energy “between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and from Tajikistan to Pakistan and Afghanistan.” The project’s “ring-fenced” funding will ensure that payments and revenues are managed beyond the control of Taliban authorities. Although there were many reasons why this particular project was the first to be revived, CASA-1000 could be a trial balloon for future Western-backed development projects. Given the enormous gaps in Afghanistan’s critical infrastructure and the total paralysis of its financial system, the direct involvement of a credible, trusted international financial institution such as the World Bank is essential to restoring trust in the banking sector and removing barriers to development financing.
+
+The erosion of foreign aid has underscored the urgency of resuming development assistance, and there has been a growing international consensus on the necessity of increased engagement. Nonetheless, the bank’s decision to engage in development projects without attaching political conditionalities on Taliban authorities — a consequence of barring direct technical assistance or support to sanctioned individuals and entities — may raise political concerns about inadvertently legitimizing or strengthening the Taliban’s rule and reducing the international community’s leverage to push for reforms. A number of international actors and former Afghan officials supported the previous suspension of development projects as a way to hold the regime accountable for its objectionable policies. Some, including politicians in donor countries wary of the optics of “working with the Taliban,” may be similarly apprehensive that the resumption of development assistance in the context of recent Taliban policies against women could convey a message of impunity, making the regime less receptive to concessions on human rights, political reforms, and financial transparency. In light of the Taliban’s current human rights record, which has withstood immense international pressure, those in favor of increasing engagement have argued that the welfare of the population cannot be held hostage to an unlikely moderation in Taliban policies.
+
+Approach 3.0 represents a carefully calibrated strategy that reckons with the challenges of the current political reality and balances the pressing needs of the Afghan people with the long-term goal of promoting inclusive growth and social change in Afghanistan. Circumstances in Afghanistan call for greater nuance than is typically possible at the international level; navigating this difficult landscape requires the international community to leverage the flexibility of the sanctions regime to promote sustainable economic development through a policy of principled, limited engagement. This approach must prioritize initiatives that directly benefit the Afghan population while maintaining pressure on the Taliban to improve their human rights record, embrace political reforms, and enhance financial transparency. By undertaking projects such as CASA-1000, which has the potential to enhance regional connectivity and stimulate economic growth, the international community can demonstrate its commitment to the welfare of the Afghan people while avoiding actions that would signal a normalization of diplomatic and economic relations.
+
+___`This approach must prioritize initiatives that directly benefit the Afghan population while maintaining pressure on the Taliban to improve their human rights record, embrace political reforms, and enhance financial transparency.`___
+
+Against the backdrop of Approach 3.0, there is ongoing interest by China and other regional nations in investment in the country. Afghanistan possesses a wealth of largely untapped petroleum deposits and mineral reserves that have become the focus of Taliban aspirations for economic self-sufficiency. Taliban leaders have been courting foreign investors for a variety of mining, irrigation, and infrastructure projects, recently announcing their intention to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Deepening ties with China include a $540 million contract with the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company for oil and gas exploration, in addition to interest from other Chinese firms in mineral extraction, power generation, cement production, and digital public infrastructure projects. Although any prospective foreign investments would help address cash flow shortages, the intervention of authoritarian actors raises serious concerns about the country’s development trajectory. Given the Taliban’s pursuit of economic growth through raw mineral exports, the absence of accountability, supervision, community engagement, and independent oversight could result in asymmetric development that primarily advantages Taliban leaders, prevents the broader society from benefiting from the country’s natural resources, and further insulates the regime from human rights–related pressures.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Foreign donors, civil society actors, Afghanistan stakeholders, UN officials, and Afghanistan’s neighbors have found themselves at odds over how to move forward in Afghanistan. Some are urging the international community to hold a firm, consistent line on human rights and refuse to engage with the Taliban on moral grounds. Others are emphasizing the severity of the humanitarian crisis and calling for a pragmatic, phased approach to engagement in order to ensure the continued delivery of essential services and remove some of the obstacles preventing progress on sustainable socioeconomic development.
+
+Afghanistan’s long-term economic development will ultimately require political and policy choices that the Taliban appear unwilling to make. No country can move up the development ladder if 50 percent of the population is categorically excluded from public life — but the Taliban’s track record and ideological zeal suggest that the regime is unlikely to moderate its policies against women in the near term. Enhancing Afghanistan’s economic self-sufficiency, then, will hinge on the question of when and how international actors can better address the needs of the population without providing an impermissible level of support — however indirectly — to the Taliban.
+
+The Afghan people need long-term sustainable solutions that include not only increased humanitarian assistance but also greater economic stability, the resumption of international development assistance, and a viable private sector–led economy. With the welfare of ordinary Afghans on the line, stakeholders will have to reckon with what imperfect options remain if both engagement and disengagement are deemed unacceptable.
+
+---
+
+__Daniel F. Runde__ is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD), and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a leading global think tank.
+
+__Annie Pforzheimer__ is a non-resident senior associate with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.
+
+__Thomas Bryja__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.
+
+__Caroline Smutny__ is a research intern with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : AI For Unified Command Plan
+author: Benjamin Jensen, et al.
+date : 2024-06-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/sI4yatc.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Using Artificial Intelligence to Rethink the Unified Command Plan"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report explores how the U.S. military can benefit from creative artificial intelligence tools to integrate cyber, space, and electronic warfare, better organizing the national security apparatus and ensuring readiness for modern global competition._
+
+
+
+### In the Future . . .
+
+1. __Global competition will force the United States to adopt new combatant command designs optimized for gray zone competition and security cooperation.__ These new commands will better integrate gender dynamics and analyze human terrain and competing influence networks to gain access, deny benefits, impose costs, and reassure partners.
+
+2. __The integrated deterrence doctrine will drive the U.S. military to combine cyber, space, and electronic warfare and other information-related capabilities into a new multidomain strategic command.__ The command will support integrated planning, provide a larger menu of options for conventional and nuclear deterrence, and synchronize multidomain effects.
+
+3. __There will be fewer combatant commands but more combined joint interagency task forces scaled to meet emerging challenges.__ The United States will check authoritarian advances globally by better synchronizing instruments of power and creating new command and control architectures to align authorities and partners against missions globally.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Every two years, a ritual takes over the Pentagon. A mix of service priorities, presidential prerogatives, defense ideas, and congressional intrigue combine in a cauldron called the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The classified document specifies functional and geographic responsibilities and uses this division to assign missions, planning, training, and operational responsibilities.
+
+As the ritual takes place in the “Puzzle Palace” today, the authors have decided to join the ranks of pundits new and old with ideas for revising the UCP — but with a twist. They have refined a large language model (LLM) with over 600 authoritative texts on topics ranging from military history and international relations theory to competitive strategy and deterrence into nine datasets to explore alternative blueprints for the U.S. military. Two insights have emerged.
+
+First, the tendency to create new commands may have reached its limit and potentially undermines calls for integrated deterrence and better synchronization of effects across domains, the U.S. government, and the U.S. network of partners and allies. For example, in this study, the LLM — across multiple iterations — kept generating UCP designs optimized for long-term competition with China that merged cyber, space, and electronic warfare capabilities into a unified command.
+
+Second, the current U.S. blueprint for projecting power and influence struggles in day-to-day competition and integrating development assistance, security cooperation, and economic measures in a holistic manner. The LLM consistently generated alternative UCP designs organized around this central idea.
+
+The net result is a series of options the authors hope will help the civil servants and military professionals who have the Sisyphean task of aligning the structure of the Department of Defense (DOD) with the reality of twenty-first-century great power competition.
+
+
+### What’s Wrong with the UCP?
+
+Critiques of the UCP focus either on specific issues and geographic seams or on larger bureaucratic challenges associated with the design of the national security enterprise. In fact, War on the Rocks has been a hotbed for debates about the right types of commands to address the changing character of war and evolving strategic challenges. Authors have debated U.S. Space Command, building a future warfare command, and geographic designs that are better aligned with the prevailing demand signal.
+
+A risk-averse culture and bureaucracy haunt these debates. Combatant commands appear as bloated proconsuls because they try to compensate for a misaligned national security enterprise. Organizationally, the U.S. government struggles to reconcile maps between the Department of State (DOS) and DOD because the perception of the world is shaped by theater and global campaign plans. Out of desperation, many stakeholders therefore turn to the National Security Council (NSC) to synchronize interagency activities. However, statutorily speaking, the NSC is a coordinating body to untangle the differences across the federal government rather than policymaking to align campaign plans. The net result is strategy as cacophony and an inherent dilemma where unity of effort should reside.
+
+Another issue is proponency, a fancy term that describes the advocacy of people sitting at senior decisionmaking tables and, crucially, their priorities. Proponency is a key aspect of defense politics that plays out in UCP revisions, among other places. The higher the rank of the person in charge of a particular issue set, region, or capability, the easier it will be to argue for budget shares. In 2019, concerns about insufficient advocacy for the space mission within the DOD led to a proponency overcompensation in the form of the near-simultaneous creation of the Space Force and U.S. Space Command. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act ensured that operational commanders and service chiefs had a clear division of roles and responsibilities in order to prevent further U.S. military fiascos. Needless to say, focusing a service chief and a four-star commander on the same mission set runs counter to the organizational design of the Pentagon and could create greater risk of future military fiascos.
+
+The other problem with proponency dominating the command structure is that there are only so many senior decisionmaking tables, but the list of issues the department grapples with is enormous and grows every day. There is an inherent mismatch between what is important and who gets to decide what to do about things that are deemed important — not to mention the fact that every four-star leader is supported by a galaxy of subordinate general and flag officers. The issue has led at least one former secretary of defense to complain of “brass creep,” or an inflated number of officers with stars on their shoulders running the U.S. military without solving enduring strategic challenges.
+
+In addition to these concerns, like most bureaucratic processes, the result tends to create winners and losers while leaving both equally unhappy. With a two-year update cycle prone to parochial infighting over budgets and authorities, change tends to take the form of addition over optimization. It is easier to satisfice and add structure than it is to realign or reduce the number of combatant commands. This puts a premium on growth that may be suboptimal and reinforces a tendency for service-level interests over a unified joint or combined approach to modern operational art and campaigning. Furthermore, competing ideas, parochial interests, veto players, and the enduring quest for turf and money plague open dialogue. The net result is diminishing returns and a span of control issues that inflate the number of four-star generals and staffs running the U.S. military without solving enduring strategic challenges. As staffs become bloated, command structures grow unwieldy, and defense budgets balloon, roles and missions expand without a corresponding increase in either security or strategic advantage.
+
+
+### To Answer a Strategy Question, Tailor a Model
+
+To analyze options for UCP reform, the authors worked with the CSIS Futures Lab and Scale AI to build datasets optimized for retrieval augmented generation — a technique for refining how large models weight documents to generate text. This technique is particularly useful for overcoming the inherent limitations LLMs face when addressing specialized questions and context-dependent domains. Applied to national security, these models can help support campaign planning, wargaming, and studying escalation dynamics (Table 1).
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Training Datasets.__ Source: CSIS Futures Lab._
+
+First, the authors had the model summarize common criticisms of the UCP to provide a baseline leveraging 119 prior studies of UCP reform. Of note, much of the criticism matched the prevailing debate, which is not a surprise since LLMs excel at basic synthesis.
+
+Second, the authors used this baseline to explore alternative UCP reform options weighted against different combinations of datasets to, in essence, force productive hallucinations and novel insights. These datasets included 70 documents on Chinese military doctrine and competitive strategy; 205 documents on deterrence theory, military history, and operational art; and 232 document excerpts on international relations cutting across multiple theoretical schools of thought.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Model Threads.___
+
+Using these datasets, the authors asked the model (1) to create an illustrative scenario depicting global competition between the United States and China and (2) to recommend a new set of combatant and functional commands based on the scenario that ensures the United States is sufficiently aligned to counter the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
+
+The authors ran this sequence four times to explore where the model returns converged and where they diverged (Figure 1). In model one — “The Hunt for Asymmetries” — the authors used concepts from competitive strategy and assessments of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military strategy to analyze UCP rewrite options. In model two — “The Rational Past as Prologue” — the authors used deterrence theory, military history, and concepts from bargaining theory to analyze UCP rewrite options. In model three — “Anarchy Shapes All Decisionmaking” — the authors used texts on realism from international relations theory. Last, in model four — “Stories Guide the Art of the Possible” — the authors used a mix of social constructivism and critical perspectives to analyze UCP rewrite options. Below the authors summarize the results from each iteration.
+
+Last, to help visualize and describe the alternative strategic logics, the research team tailored prompts to produce stylized paintings using the Midjourney AI Pro art generator. To create a common reference point, the team combined international relations theory references with prompts requesting the LLM to produce a “painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.” The use of this famous American artist situates the visual logic in classic portrayals of American nostalgia, a deliberate effort to show alternatives to the Cold War history of the UCP for a new era of great power competition.
+
+#### The Hunt for Asymmetries
+
+The first thread focused on using net assessment and documents on Chinese military strategy to assess the UCP. The thread depicted an outsize role for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) supported by existing regional commands — consistent with current approaches to global integration — and a host of new functional commands. The thread discussed the need to organize roles and missions around an evolving assessment of regional military balances relative to force posture. It also discussed the need to evaluate military balance and force posture in a search for asymmetry. In other words, net assessment should drive competitive strategy and alteration of assigned forces within the existing UCP structure and the current global integration framework, placing USINDOPACOM as the global coordinating authority for competition with China, supported by regional and functional commands.
+
+The thread sought to expand the number and type of functional commands required to support long-term competition with China. First, it expanded U.S. Cyber Command to include a larger role in technology policy and research, development, testing, and engineering. In addition to coordinating cyber offense and defense activities, the thread detailed new responsibilities for protecting U.S. technology from Chinese cyber theft and focusing investments in advanced military technology, currently overseen by the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering as well as service-level entities. Second, the model discussed the need for a new functional command focused on coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities globally, with an eye toward countering Chinese battle networks and developing indicators and warnings on military capabilities and troop deployments.
+
+Interestingly, the tailored LLM suggested the United States should, through the UCP, get its act together when it comes to nonmilitary aspects of national security policy. First, the model discussed the need for a new functional command focused on economic security. The interagency command would counter Chinese economic strategies harmful to U.S. interests, counter economic coercion against partners and allies, and coordinate interagency measures addressing issues such as trade imbalances, intellectual property protection, and other economic security concerns like the labor market. Second, the model proposed new structures dedicated to human assistance and disaster relief to promote stability and enhance the reputation of the United States in regions where China is expanding its influence. These new soft power approaches are intended to appeal to the hearts and minds that China has courted in the past or is actively courting. Examples include countries in the Belt and Road Initiative or regions like Africa and Latin America.
+
+Much of the discussion is consistent with the large body of debates on interagency reform and past tendencies to expand, vice optimize, the UCP to solve evolving strategy challenges. What is interesting, however, is the model’s conclusion that integrating civilian-military effects into an operational and operational-level command structure is necessary to gain a long-term advantage against the CCP.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Reimagining the UCP Using Net Assessment.__ Source: Benjamin Jensen. Midjourney Pro Prompt: “Andrew Marshall net assessment explaining Cold War strategy painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.”_
+
+#### The Rational Past as Prologue
+
+The second model combined documents on deterrence, military history, and operational art. Of note, the scenario the model returned anchored global competition around a potential crisis in the South China Sea, drawing on principles from deterrence theory more than from operational art or military history. Most of the output discussed using diplomacy alongside demonstrations of military capability with only a limited discussion of combined arms and lines of operation. In other words, escalation management loomed larger than gaining a near-term decisive military advantage.
+
+At the same time, the model envisioned competition with China as global and cutting across multiple domains in an effort to support a cost-imposition strategy. The scenario discussed using security cooperation in Africa to counter Chinese access and diplomacy to counter growing Chinese influence in Eastern Europe. The scenario discussed working with partners and the private sector to make it more difficult for China to gain an advantage in space and cyberspace. Last, the scenario focused on diplomacy and economic sanctions as the main effort, seeking to signal to China the risks of continued escalation. According to the model, these combined lines of effort created a more synchronized approach to strategy:
+
+“All these activities have a constant backdrop of political diplomacy, economic negotiations, and information campaigns to create a comprehensive response strategy. These strategies collectively work towards deterring China from aggressive action and work to maintain the balance of power in line with international rules and norms. This kind of strategizing effectively uses the UCP and its multiple combatant commands, integrating operational art and deterrence theory on a global scale.”
+
+Based on this strategy, the model recommended the following changes to the UCP. First, it advocated consolidating existing combatant command structures. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) would be merged to form a new Eurasian Command to better link global competition with Russia and China outside of USINDOPACOM. The same logic applied to U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The model recommended a new Americas command merging the two to better prioritize countering China’s growing influence in South America. The model also recommended merging several of the functional commands, including the U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command, to better synchronize multidomain operations.
+
+Second, the model recommended an operational command structure similar to the net assessment thread (“The Hunt for Asymmetries”) to make economic competition a central pillar of national strategy. Of note, the model saw the primary role of the functional command as coordinating interagency activities to counter the Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing’s economic priorities. The model identified the need to coordinate nonmilitary forms of power with traditional military roles and missions to manage long-term competition with China.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Reimagining the UCP Using Rational Deterrence.__ Source: Benjamin Jensen. Midjourney Pro Prompt: “Thomas Schelling explaining nuclear deterrence using game theory on a chalk board painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.”_
+
+#### Anarchy Shapes All Decisionmaking
+
+When weighted with realist texts, the model focused more on how best to manage escalation regardless of the structure of combatant commands alongside the need to better integrate different agencies and instruments of power. Specifically, the model highlighted war control — a PLA concept for controlling the pace and intensity of escalation — as providing the United States an opportunity to take a measured approach to maximizing its security. Second, the model saw the future of integrated deterrence less in technology and more in how well the United States integrates multiple instruments of power and works alongside partners and allies. Last, the model saw the future as a global struggle and highlighted the need for the United States to focus on maintaining favorable regional balances of power.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Reimagining the UCP Using Realism.__ Source: Benjamin Jensen. Midjourney Pro Prompt: “Machiavelli discussing political realism painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.”_
+
+#### Stories Guide the Art of the Possible
+
+When weighted with constructivist and critical theory texts, the model prioritized norms, power dynamics, and underlying narratives. This focus meant the analysis of UCP options prioritized shaping stories and how people perceive the word over regional balances of power. The model focused on a new global engagement command with elements similar to those discussed in the operational art and deterrence theory iterations, albeit based on different assumptions. Modern competition was seen as a war over ideas. In this logic, the United States needs to address not just China’s current actions but also the wider power dynamics and structural issues at play in foreign policy and how they collide in stories, propaganda, and global influence campaigns. The model assessed that these responses could involve challenging dominant narratives around sovereignty, power, and security but should avoid imposing Western-centric narratives and norms in diplomatic initiatives. Like previous threads, the insights support new, novel structures linked to coordinating nonmilitary instruments of power.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: Reimagining the UCP Using Constructivism.__ Source: Benjamin Jensen. Midjourney Pro Prompt: “a feminist criticizing grand strategy painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.”_
+
+
+### Policy Options to Explore
+
+While all statistical models are incomplete, some are useful, and generative artificial intelligence (AI) is no different. The ideas that emerged from this experiment suggest three options worth further deliberation for rewriting the UCP.
+
+#### Enhance Command Structure for Global Engagement and Competition
+
+Across the threads, the generative model highlighted a need to better organize the DOD — if not the entire national security enterprise — for competition short of war. These campaigns would combine traditional security cooperation activity with new efforts to protect U.S. technology and economic access. Better still, this realignment could help better connect competition and contingency planning, a perennial challenge in the Pentagon.
+
+The challenge in the current UCP design is that the authorities for these activities are divided between multiple government agencies that do not have similar regional planning frameworks (e.g., DOS and DOD). Furthermore, these activities are not strictly military, making them outside the purvey of geographic combatant commands. Getting better synchronization, therefore, would likely require deeper debate about how to design a national security system that currently contrasts DOD efforts to manage regional security challenges with the country-specific orientation of the DOS. That is a tall order and one likely to involve Congress.
+
+In the near term, military planners should consider using the UCP to task each combatant command to stand up interagency joint task forces for competition. This standing task force would enact current theater and global competition plans but serve as a focal point for better coordinating with other agency activities. In the absence of new authorities, a large amount of the task force’s time would be used to establish interagency awareness and develop a common understanding of the range of ongoing programs and activities in the region and how best to align competition planning with them. This interagency awareness over time could evolve to inform national security coordination through the NSC and augment experiments with battle networks currently ongoing through the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE) managed by the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO).
+
+#### Merge Space, Cyber, and Information Effects
+
+Across the threads, an approach to military strategy emerged that stands in stark contrast to the last decade of UCP rewrites. Rather than continue to create new functional commands, the model proposed fusing them into a single command somewhat similar to the recently disbanded PLA Strategic Support Force. In some respects, such an entity could even be folded back into U.S. Strategic Command for a one-stop shop for deterrence and setting conditions for modern war fighting. The operative question is what the DOD gains from creating multiple functional commands instead of streamlining and rationalizing them into new entities.
+
+The UCP rewrite team could consider incremental options, such as focusing on global competition. For example, it could experiment with establishing a sub–unified command in each geographic command focused on integrating space, cyber, and information effects into ongoing operations. While interesting, this incremental approach would likely create duplicate structures and would not address the pull to create four-star headquarters for each new domain alongside new services. Clearly, modern competition and war fighting require the ability to integrate multiple domains. Therefore, assigning roles and missions with this unity of effort in mind should drive UCP reform.
+
+#### New Regions, Fewer Components
+
+Last, the model suggested realigning existing geographic combatant command boundaries. The model played with new seams for global competition with China, including an Americas Command merging USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM and a Eurasia Command merging USEUCOM and CENTCOM. This logic is similar to that of earlier experiments during the Cold War that went as far as creating one command for overseas forces and another for those in the United States.
+
+Left unsaid by the model was that merging existing geographic combatant command boundaries could produce cost savings and provide a model for even more radical reductions. For example, are service component commands truly necessary? In both his planning guidance and subsequent comments, General Berger, the 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, expressed concerns about a lack of naval integration that inadvertently emerged as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Maybe it is time to reduce the number of service components at each combatant command, if not eliminate them outright, since service headquarters can coordinate directly to assign forces.
+
+The current team working on the UCP could explore opportunities to reduce the number of headquarters and build structures that better align with the shape of global competition with the CCP.
+
+
+### Conclusion: Back to the Ritual
+
+UCP rewrites are both an opportunity and a bureaucratic conundrum for those who oversee the ritual. Wasting that opportunity, despite the painful debates that need to occur, would abdicate professional responsibility both for those in the fight and for those watching from the outside but still dedicating themselves to national security reform.
+
+The contributions of this report are illustrative, not conclusive. The series of LLMs tailored with key documents highlight big ideas but nothing especially new. For years, national security practitioners have known the current design of the U.S. national security enterprise is broken. The UCP is just one part of that larger Cold War–era bureaucracy in need of a reboot.
+
+The models reiterate the need to rethink functional and geographic command structures alongside their roles and missions. If nothing else, there are significant cost savings to be had from merging commands as well as rethinking the current map. Staffers in the bureaucratic fight over the next UCP must at least answer the question, Why shouldn’t the United States merge the U.S. Space and Cyber Commands? More interesting is the need to imagine new ways of integrating military and nonmilitary power to manage long-term competition with the CCP. Again, ongoing dialogue inside the Pentagon should at least consider an Americas and Eurasia Command and, more importantly, what command structures would best support managing nonmilitary competition with China globally and bridging interagency divides.
+
+Outside of the models, many of these ideas need not take the form of entirely new four-star commands. Rather, new interagency joint task forces — including novel approaches like Joint Task Force Ares, used to combat the Islamic State and subordinate unified commands — offer flexible structures for managing a complex, multidomain, multi-instrument global competition. Even more radical would be using a congressional commission to explore rewriting key authorities and legal code linked to how the United States organizes for national defense and long-term competition. Regardless of what form the next UCP takes, the process of building it should ask hard questions and demand more than answers forged by bureaucratic path dependence, satisficing, and proponency. The world is too dangerous to avoid hard choices; just ask our large-language model.
+
+---
+
+__Benjamin Jensen__ is a professor in the School of Advanced Warfighting at the Marine Corps University and a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Kathleen McInnis__ is a senior fellow in the International Security Program and the director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.
+
+__Jose M. Macias III__ is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Crossing Thresholds
+author: Jade McGlynn
+date : 2024-06-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/7f8ZITS.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Occupation"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia does not have full control over the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories. It is facing an astute insurrectionist campaign. This continued resistance to occupation will play an important role in undermining the sustainability of the Russian war effort._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The most important rule: go unnoticed. You need to blend into the crowd. Dress inconspicuously; don’t swear; walk on the inside of the pavement; prepare an alibi; use public transport during rush hour; be punctual — if someone is two minutes late to meet you, they may have been captured.
+
+This is the basic code of conduct for Ukrainian underground fighters, as set out by the National Resistance Center of Ukraine — the Ukrainian government’s online resource to support the patriotic resistance under Russian occupation. This partisan movement comprises many thousands of Ukrainians and covers all manner of activities, from distributing yellow ribbons to assassinating Russian secret policemen. Their stories are as harrowing as they are heroic. For instance, in occupied Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia Region, Maksym Makhrinov’s final breath was an explosive statement of resistance. Confronted by Russian forces who had uncovered his partisan work for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Makhrinov blew himself up, taking two Russian soldiers with him. But what led Makhrinov to this situation?
+
+The following report is an effort to provide indicative answers to this question. It is based on extensive fieldwork in Ukraine since 2022, largely in the de-occupied territories. It includes 63 interviews, 50 of which are with people who had been under occupation, 17 with individuals involved in violent or nonviolent resistance, and 7 with officials in the security services responsible for handling and helping ongoing resistance. As such, the report makes no claims to be representative; it does, however, also draw from a literature review of relevant sources, such as Ukrainian Telegram channels of resistance networks and offers of support; Ukrainian reports on this topic from organizations such as OPORA, Prometheus, Eastern Variant, Eastern Human Rights Group, and the National Resistance Center; and interviews with experts specializing in this field. For the purposes of safety and anonymization, the names of most interviewees have been changed and locations are kept deliberately vague.
+
+The purpose of this report is to provide insights into the importance of the resistance, its impact on the sustainability of Russia’s war and occupation, the reality of conducting resistance, and the personal stories of some of those involved. Resistance here is defined as any act that deliberately challenges or impedes the Russian war aim as defined by Vladimir Putin: to destroy Ukrainian sovereignty and identity. Amid ongoing discussions of negotiations and dwindling resilience in the West to support Ukraine, the report will also provide information about the reality of Russia’s occupation and Ukrainians’ struggle against it. If Western policymakers intend to abandon Ukraine to its fate, they have a responsibility to acknowledge what that fate entails.
+
+Alternatively, if Western support for Ukraine does prove more resilient, this report provides recommendations and insights into how the resistance can support the Ukrainian war effort, as well as ways to aid the resistance — from boosting morale to providing material assistance. As the involvement of civilian efforts across the West to support Ukraine has been considerable, a number of recommendations are also aimed more generally at interested organizations and individuals who would like to support, morally or otherwise, the Ukrainian resistance against the Russian occupation.
+
+
+### Occupied Territories
+
+_The Situation on the Ground_
+
+To appropriately contextualize the impact, tenor, and ramifications of Ukrainian resistance against Russian occupation, a foundational understanding of the prevailing conditions is essential. Investigations into the situation within these territories highlight egregious human rights abuses perpetrated by the Russian Federation — the abduction of children, torture, extrajudicial killings, indoctrination, pervasive homelessness and poverty, and systematic resource extraction.
+
+Concurrently, the Russian Ministry of Defense has invested in building new military infrastructure in occupied regions. This militarization extends beyond the presence of military installations; it involves a comprehensive reorientation of local industries to support military logistics, the construction of essential supply networks, and educational reforms designed to instill a pro-military ethos among residents. This strategy aims to transform the occupied territories into a militarized zone, acting as a buffer and demarcation line that underscores the Russian government’s intentions toward the remaining unoccupied Ukrainian territories.
+
+The development of civilian infrastructure in the occupied Ukrainian territories is conspicuously absent, as evidenced by the lack of reconstruction efforts in devastated cities such as Popasna, Volnovakha, Bakhmut, and Soledar. Forced mobilization of locals, exploitation of natural resources, and neglect of civil infrastructure development have precipitated a humanitarian crisis. In June 2023, the Russian government’s allocation of 2.9 billion rubles — significantly less than the planned 3.7 billion rubles — for industrial development in these territories reflects Russia’s reduced commitment to reviving local industries, further exacerbating the unsustainable nature of its occupation model.
+
+Socially, interviewees report that the occupation has fractured community bonds, increased substance abuse, and fueled desires for vengeance against collaborators and Russian forces. The emergence of new social hierarchies, such as the privileged status of (some) collaborators and the disintegration of prewar moral and social orders, poses significant threats to the long-term cohesion of these communities. The demographic situation is critical. In the temporarily occupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, the healthcare system has deteriorated significantly due to the departure of medical professionals; occupation administration statistics indicate that 1 in every 81 newborns dies. From 2018 to 2022, the birth rate in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic decreased by 46.8 percent.
+
+The Russian occupiers have exacerbated the current demographic decline through policies that include the shutdown of industrial enterprises and the degradation of healthcare services. In many places, the lack of workers has rendered it impossible to sustain essential services, such as water supply and infrastructure repair; this has prompted directives from the Kremlin to recruit Russian citizens and migrant workers to populate the occupied regions, an approach that is also part of a broader movement of settler colonialism and ethnic cleansing in the occupied territories.
+
+The strategies deployed in the occupied territories demonstrate a profound disregard for the wellbeing of the local population, particularly Ukrainians. This includes the conscription of locals into so-called forward detachments, effectively using them as human shields. Those captured are subsequently abandoned and relegated to second-class status — as demonstrated by a recent video appeal to Putin from POWs from the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics (DNR/LNR) who are upset they are being excluded from prisoner swaps, with only “proper” Russians being exchanged. Aside from a few lucky collaborators, the only individuals leading normal lives in the occupied territories are Russian nationals who have relocated to these “new territories.” Interviewees comprising former and current residents of the occupied territories report that any semblance of normality is largely a facade, masking ongoing human rights abuses such as disappearances and torture.
+
+The selective imposition of normality has led to a system that resembles apartheid between Russian and Ukrainian citizens, heavily enforced by the mandatory acquisition of Russian passports. The enforcement of Russian passport acquisition renders daily life and access to essential services contingent upon compliance with the occupiers’ demands, serving as an indirect punishment for those resisting the imposition of a Russian identity. For instance, emergency services and property transactions are inaccessible without a Russian passport; an interviewed individual recounted an unsuccessful attempt to reclaim her property near Donetsk due to her refusal to accept a Russian passport. Workers’ wages may also be withheld if they refuse to take a passport.
+
+___`The selective imposition of normality has led to a system that resembles apartheid between Russian and Ukrainian citizens, heavily enforced by the mandatory acquisition of Russian passports.`___
+
+Moreover, Russia’s strategy has extended to the systemic restructuring of local governance; as a rule, only Russian citizens who have not previously worked in Ukraine are appointed to senior law enforcement positions within the occupied territories. This policy underscores the Kremlin’s intent to sever any preexisting local ties to Ukrainian governance and assert control, albeit at arms’ length. The Ukrainian Cyber Resistance recently acquired the messages of the deputy director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service, in which it was revealed that he refuses to communicate directly with subordinates in the occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. Instead, he orders the heads of the department in the Rostov region and Crimea to work as intermediaries, underscoring a hierarchical enforcement structure.
+
+Despite these measures, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation permitted residents of the occupied territories to vote in 2023 using any form of identification, including Ukrainian passports. This policy was part of a broader strategy to compile comprehensive voter lists, indirectly serving as a population census, with data subsequently integrated into Russian federal systems. The demographic shifts in these regions are stark; in Melitopol alone, the population halved post-invasion — somewhat offset by the nearly 100,000 Russian nationals relocating to the city, further illustrating a deliberate strategy of ethnic cleansing and demographic manipulation by Russian authorities. Such strategies are coupled with severe restrictions on communication and mobility, particularly in areas near the front line, contributing to a climate of intense surveillance and suppression of dissent. This oppressive environment has eroded community bonds and trust, with residents living under constant fear of betrayal or coercion, reminiscent of Soviet-era tactics.
+
+A rigorous system for monitoring and quelling dissent has been progressively intensified. Measures include eavesdropping on communications, the widespread installation of surveillance cameras, and the establishment of an informant network within communities. Access to external information sources is significantly constrained in the temporarily occupied territories, particularly in areas close to the front line, such as Lysychansk, Sievierodonetsk, Rubizhne, and Kreminna. These cities experience substantial disruptions in internet and mobile communication services, which are restricted by occupation authorities due to concerns that local residents might transmit sensitive information to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
+
+The atmosphere of control extends to acts of intimidation and harassment, which the occupying forces perpetrate with apparent impunity. For instance, social media platforms like Telegram reveal frequent discussions among residents of occupied Mariupol and Luhansk about vehicular accidents caused by inebriated or reckless Russian soldiers. A particularly distressing incident occurred in Luhansk, where a Russian tank ran over a woman at a pedestrian crossing in broad daylight, eliciting no public reaction — a stark indicator of the societal desensitization that has occurred under prolonged Russian occupation. Such everyday harassment is particularly targeted at young and attractive women: as one interviewee noted, “All of the girls stopped taking care of themselves, the women go around in ugly clothes, it didn’t used to be like that, women had their hair, their nails (done).” When asked whether this was due to the economic situation, the interlocutor explained that it was in order to not draw the attention of occupiers, “especially the Chechens.”
+
+There have been numerous reported cases of Russian forces, including but far from limited to Chechens, sexually assaulting and raping women. A veteran soldier, actively involved in the de-occupied territories, recounted harrowing accounts of elderly women in villages who had suffered sexual assault. He told stories of wives being raped before their husbands, who were then killed after being forced to witness the crime, and of young attractive women being kidnapped as sex slaves for senior Russian officers. During interviews with villagers who had lived under occupation in the Kharkiv region, the majority of the worst cases, including the gang rape of an elderly woman in a village not far from the border with Donetsk region, happened during the initial invasion. However, rape and sexual violence — primarily toward women but also toward men in Russian custody — are a systematic part of the occupation and of the general feeling of impunity that the occupying soldiers enjoy or, as this report will show, presume they can enjoy.
+
+#### The Ukrainian Resistance at a Glance
+
+Given the escalating atrocities associated with Russia’s unpredictable and intensifying occupation, it is understandable that a considerable number of individuals might be compelled to resist, despite the profound risks associated with such actions. The context of the occupation — marked by its brutality and the existential threat it poses to Ukrainian identity and autonomy — naturally fosters various forms of resistance. Four distinct types of resistance emerge through research:
+
+__Private Resistance:__ This form involves actions that are personal and confined to a close circle of trusted individuals. Examples include reading Ukrainian literature, speaking Ukrainian within the household, sending children to the neighbors so they are seen to be leaving home for school but do not actually attend school, and refusing to take a Russian passport.
+
+__Public Nonlethal Resistance:__ These activities are overt but nonviolent, aimed at bolstering community morale and asserting Ukrainian presence. They include posting flyers, displaying Ukrainian symbols in public spaces, participating in memorial acts like placing candles in windows to commemorate the Holodomor, and engaging in symbolic resistance such as the Yellow Ribbon and Zla Mavka movements.
+
+__Internal Lethal Resistance:__ This category involves direct contributions to military efforts, such as transmitting coordinates of Russian forces to Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and monitoring the movements of Russian soldiers to facilitate targeted actions.
+
+__Public Lethal Resistance:__ The most overt and dangerous form, this type of resistance includes acts such as assassinating Russian occupation personnel and their collaborators and sabotaging occupation infrastructure, as seen in operations by groups like ATESH and SROK.
+
+The primary focus of this paper will be on the lethal forms of resistance. These actions, though less frequently discussed and more challenging to document, play a critical role in the broader resistance movement. However, the study will also address nonlethal resistance, highlighting its significance in sustaining public spirit, fostering a sense of community, and boosting the morale of those engaged in direct combat, as well as the Ukrainian Armed Forces committed to liberating their territory. This analysis aims to understand the diverse profiles of individuals who participate in both lethal and nonlethal resistance, exploring their motivations, the risks they face, and the impact of their actions on the occupation dynamics.
+
+_DEMOGRAPHICS_
+
+The resistance movement in Ukraine’s occupied territories comprises a diverse demographic, although it predominantly involves younger participants. This younger cohort’s engagement is often attributed to a combination of factors: greater physical capability, a sense of invincibility, and, importantly, a stronger national identity coupled with less nostalgia for the Soviet Union era, as indicated by opinion polls. While men are more commonly engaged in active violent resistance, women play substantial roles in both nonviolent and violent actions. For instance, in the Zla Mavka group based in Melitopol, over a hundred women participate in direct actions, though the network extends far beyond this number. The movement has seen significant growth, particularly during the winter months when new members from Luhansk and Donetsk began to emerge, despite previous isolation.
+
+A notable aspect of the resistance is the participation from Crimea, an area previously thought to be subdued after years of occupation. Reports indicate that a large number of women from Crimea have joined the resistance, demonstrating a readiness to oppose the occupation robustly. Women have also been instrumental in more covert forms of resistance — such as poisoning the food and drink offered to Russian soldiers, exploiting the occupiers’ presumptions of local hospitality. In an interview with the author, one ATESH commander explained the varied makeup of their resistance movement:
+
+> There are a lot of people and everyone is different but I will try to generalize as objectively as possible. We have men and women among our agents. Most of them are under 40. The majority of them are married but far from all of them have children. There are very few people in our movement who originally sympathized with Russia. Those few who did change their minds are not involved in sabotage operations but they do help with all sorts of information. On the other hand, we have a different situation with agents located in the Russian Federation. February 2022 changed the worldview of a lot of people. Such a large-scale war and the Putin regime’s crimes forced Russians to cooperate with the ATESH movement.
+
+The socioeconomic profile of the resistance is primarily composed of middle and lower-class individuals. Many of the wealthiest Ukrainians fled the country early in the full-scale invasion, having the resources to do so. In contrast, those from less affluent backgrounds — including some of the most marginalized groups, such as prisoners — have contributed significantly to the resistance efforts. For example, detainees in the Kherson pretrial detention center managed to transmit coordinates of enemy missiles and machinery using a covertly held phone, enabling precise Ukrainian Armed Forces strikes on Russian command centers.
+
+___`A notable aspect of the resistance is the participation from Crimea, an area previously thought to be subdued after years of occupation. Reports indicate that a large number of women from Crimea have joined the resistance, demonstrating a readiness to oppose the occupation robustly.`___
+
+This demographic diversity within the resistance highlights a widespread national commitment across different strata of society, challenging the occupation through various forms of resistance that leverage the unique capabilities and circumstances of its members.
+
+_LANGUAGE, LOCATION, AND CULTURAL IDENTITY_
+
+Many resistance movements operate in Russian-speaking areas but conduct their activities in Ukrainian, as there is a lower likelihood of occupiers understanding the language. The use of the Ukrainian language in resistance activities, especially those involving information dissemination and education, also serves as a tool of cultural resistance and identity affirmation.
+
+It is worth noting, however, that despite language differences, there is no significant division between Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking individuals in terms of their opposition to the occupiers. Linguistic preference does not correlate with political allegiance; just as speaking English does not imply that an Irishman supports British reinvasion, speaking Russian does not mean a Ukrainian desires Russian occupation. In Kharkiv, for example, predominantly Russian-speaking defenders initially confronted the Russian “liberators” with significant resistance. Notably, the Azov Assault Brigade and the Kraken Special Division, units particularly reviled by the Kremlin, consist overwhelmingly of Russian speakers.
+
+Furthermore, the assumption that residents in territories that were occupied following the 2014 invasion are less resistant than those in other cities does not always hold. For instance, Alchevsk in the Luhansk region, occupied by Russian forces in 2014, has experienced persistent hardships under occupation — including frequent water shortages, unstable mobile communications, and inadequate postal services — all of which have contributed to profound anger with the occupation. In an interview with the Eastern Variant network, a local Ukrainian partisan from Alchevsk conveyed the communal exhaustion with the ongoing deprivation and highlighted significant local resistance actions, such as the sabotage of enemy locations and ammunition depots:
+
+> Of course, the main problem in Alchevsk is water supply. It often happens that one of the areas does not have water for four to five days. Discussions arise almost weekly: either a water pipe has burst, the sewage smells across the street, or there has been no water for four days. Besides, the city often has very poor connectivity. Mobile internet was only allowed after the new year. . . . Even local Russian patriots realize that the occupiers have taken 10 years of their lives while not doing anything significant or centralized. Has life gotten better? Not at all. People have lost time, and that’s the most important thing. The occupiers closely monitor Alchevsk. Russians do not trust the local authorities entirely and always keep them under control, placing people from Russia. There are still people with a pro-Ukrainian stance in the city, especially noticeable in 2022 when almost all enemy locations and ammunition depots in Alchevsk were blown up, thanks to local partisans. Alchevsk is Ukraine. Alchevsk is waiting to return home.
+
+Occupational challenges have persisted in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions since 2014, with the situation worsening after the full-scale invasion in 2022. From the very start, there has been forced mobilization, and local LNR and DNR forces receive inferior treatment compared to Russian soldiers. Further, the dissatisfaction among the collaborator ruling class with the Kremlin’s personnel policies has led to instances of noncompliance and outright sabotage, as evidenced in Horlivka, where new mobilization rounds were refused.
+
+The author’s interviews with those living or having lived under LNR and DNR occupation often revealed conflicts between local “People’s Militia” units and Russian forces, driven by deep-seated differences. The cancellation of LPR and DPR passports, replaced with Russian passports, restricted residents’ ability to cross into Ukrainian-controlled territory, exacerbating tensions. Furthermore, the continuous arrests and detentions of pro-Ukrainian locals have intensified animosity toward Russian law enforcement representatives among the detainees’ families. To consolidate control, the Kremlin has significantly strengthened its law enforcement presence in the occupied territories, establishing an extensive network of Russian military and security forces, especially the National Guard and FSB (Russia’s domestic intelligence agency) counterintelligence.
+
+_MOTIVATIONS AND BACKGROUND_
+
+From interviews with past and current members of the resistance, as well as potential recruits, it is evident that these individuals are characterized by resourcefulness, courage, and resilience. Often creative and slightly anarchic, they tend not to adhere strictly to directives, even when associated with intelligence agencies. The challenging circumstances of ongoing resistance have further honed their ingenuity, compelling them to become highly adaptive and continuously develop new tactics to persist in their activities under intense surveillance and oppression.
+
+The resistance members who engaged with the author expressed a spectrum of political beliefs, ranging from left-wing to right-wing ideologies. However, a common thread among them was a robust commitment to sovereignty and freedom, which they interpreted in practical rather than abstract terms. Motivated by a sense of basic human dignity, they articulated sentiments such as: “I refuse to live like a serf in my own home[town/land]” and “This is my country; why should I just hand it over to [Russians]?” In this context, concepts like sovereignty and freedom are understood literally — as the right not to be dragged into a basement and tortured, or the right to not have someone take your apartment.
+
+The motivations of resistance members vary, often depending on the nature of their involvement. Those engaged in violent acts of resistance, such as sabotage and assassination, are typically the most patriotic and ideologically driven. These individuals often chose to stay behind in occupied areas to fight. For instance, one Ukrainian serviceman interviewed for this report shared how he was instructed in late 2021 to remain and coordinate resistance activities in the event of occupation. He and his colleagues replicated training schools for resistance under occupation, drawing on both local knowledge and external support — sometimes from Western intelligence agencies, though the applicability of the latter’s methods received mixed reviews from interviewees.
+
+For these “anticipatory” resisters, who are often linked formally or informally with Ukrainian Military Intelligence (HUR), their motivations are deeply entwined with a sense of historical destiny. Common sentiments among these fighters include a determination to end centuries-long struggles against Russian domination, referencing historical atrocities and genocides, such as the Holodomor, as well as Russian efforts to erase Ukrainian identity. These sentiments are prevalent across much of the Ukrainian resistance, with many viewing the conflict as a genocidal attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation. The millennial generation, in particular, expresses frustration with their parents’ generation for not doing more to secure Ukraine’s defense post–Soviet Union. This historical perspective is also prominent in Ukrainian media coverage of the resistance, reinforcing the narrative of finality and self-defense: fighting now so future generations won’t have to. This is exemplified by initiatives like HUR’s Military TV Resistance Movement project launched on June 2, 2022, which featured a series of informational films to educate and motivate citizens to defend their lives and homeland.
+
+The resistance includes many trained professionals, such as the types of operatives who planned to stay behind — the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, military intelligence, and certain special divisions. For example, the Kraken special division has been known to operate in Russian-controlled territories with considerable success, although it also sometimes sees losses. However, there are also many in the resistance who were not initially prepared for such roles but found themselves compelled by circumstances. For instance, the Sumy volunteer group, or “SUD,” was composed largely of local volunteers and yet they played a critical role in defending their city when official military presence was scant. This group, which grew to about 900 people, was pivotal in organizing local defense and maintaining order during the initial stages of the invasion. People continue to join the resistance, largely operating in small cells with minimal connection to other members. As one ATESH fighter explained:
+
+> People get in touch with us by contacting one of the coordinators of our Telegram channel. Or via personal contacts. The coordination of agents is generally carried out over secure messaging apps or some other different channel, depending on the situation.
+
+Among those who are not professionals or trained operatives, the motivations for joining the resistance are complex and varied. For some, it might be a response to direct impacts of the occupation, such as loss of property, restrictions on freedoms, or personal harm. The “sister regions” program implemented by Russia, which sees a Russian region invest in an occupied area and then receive rights to flood markets with local products, is one example that fueled resentment and resistance. By displacing local goods with more expensive Russian products, this program not only altered the economic landscape but also deepened the sense that this was an occupation purely in the interests of the occupiers.
+
+Sexual violence and other forms of abuse by Russian forces also serve as potent motivators for resistance. The horrific acts committed against both men and women have galvanized many to take up arms or support the resistance in any way they can. The fear and indignity experienced by victims and witnesses have in many cases been translated into a fierce determination to resist. This complex amalgam of historical grievances, personal experiences of injustice and abuse, and a profound commitment to national sovereignty and cultural preservation are fueling a resilient and adaptive movement determined to oppose Russian occupation and influence.
+
+___`This complex amalgam of historical grievances, personal experiences of injustice and abuse, and a profound commitment to national sovereignty and cultural preservation are fueling a resilient and adaptive movement determined to oppose Russian occupation and influence.`___
+
+
+### Forms of Resistance
+
+In wars like Ukraine’s fight for sovereignty, the distinctions between soldiers, civilians, and resistance fighters often become indistinct, as a broad segment of the population engages in the struggle for national survival. As previously discussed, the separation between violent and nonviolent resistance is somewhat artificial, given that each type supports and sustains the other, creating a symbiotic relationship of mutual reliance. In the words of one ATESH commander, speaking to the author:
+
+> Non-violent resistance is incredibly important too. We also conduct forms of non-violent resistance, like agitational events in Russian and occupied Ukrainian cities. Our “ATESH civilian strength” activists put up our flyers across cities and this demonstrates our presence among the population. People feel a sense of support, that people who think like them are living next door. We also take revenge on drivers who support Russia’s criminal war. We destroy or paint over cars with ZOV symbols.
+
+However, it is important to note that some members of the resistance consciously choose to avoid involvement in violent or lethal actions, driven either by personal convictions or a strategic desire to preserve their lives. To understand the full scope of the resistance, it is crucial to delineate and examine the specific acts that contribute to the broader resistance movement. Such an analysis not only highlights the varied nature of resistance activities but also helps in understanding the dynamic interplay between different forms of resistance and their collective impact on Ukraine’s struggle for autonomy.
+
+#### Nonviolent Resistance
+
+_PUBLIC ACTS OF DEFIANCE_
+
+These include acts of civil disobedience, such as refusing to comply with the occupiers’ demands or participating in organized protests and demonstrations to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the occupying forces. For example, the Zla Mavka group based in Melitopol has created and distributed fake rubles with Ukrainian symbols and messages to remind the occupiers that they are in Ukraine, not Russia. This initiative represents a creative form of psychological resistance, using humor and art to assert Ukrainian identity and sovereignty. Another prominent example is the Yellow Ribbon movement, which involves Ukrainian citizens discreetly displaying yellow ribbons as a sign of solidarity and covert defiance against Russian forces. The choice of yellow, along with blue, represents the colors of the Ukrainian national flag, signaling a quiet yet powerful affirmation of national identity and opposition to the occupiers.
+
+This form of resistance is significant because it allows for broad participation from the public, including those who may not be able to engage in more direct or violent forms of resistance. By adopting such symbols, individuals communicate their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and their resistance to the occupation in a manner that is relatively safe yet impactful. This method is particularly effective in fostering a sense of unity and shared purpose among the population, reinforcing the resilience of the community in the face of foreign aggression.
+
+_INFORMATION AND CULTURAL INITIATIVES_
+
+To counter the occupiers’ narrative and propaganda, the resistance works hard to disseminate accurate information about the situation in the occupied territories. For instance, online bots like Resistance.Bot enable reporting on repairs to communication lines, allowing the Ukrainian underground to prevent occupiers from restricting internet access. For younger inhabitants of the occupied territories, the use of the internet and social media — especially Telegram — plays a crucial role in organizing, communicating, and raising awareness about the occupation, thus enabling the spread of information, mobilization of support, and coordination of activities without the need for direct confrontation. Telegram and increasingly Signal are also the way that violent resistance groups recruit new members.
+
+Other efforts encompass activities by journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens aimed at documenting abuses, reporting on the actual conditions under occupation, and debunking falsehoods spread by the occupiers. This includes the production and distribution of materials, such as newspapers and leaflets, with pro-Ukrainian content to combat occupier narratives and bolster public morale. The production of physical products is especially important given that the occupation forces primarily target their propaganda at older demographics, for whom the main source of information is television.
+
+_YOUTH INDOCTRINATION_
+
+Engaging in cultural and educational activities that promote Ukrainian identity and resist Russian cultural assimilation represents another facet of nonviolent resistance. This may include organizing Ukrainian language classes, cultural events, and discussions that reinforce the community’s identity and resilience against efforts to suppress it. For this report, the author spoke to several university professors in free Ukraine who provide online classes to students of high school and university age who are located in the occupied territories. These classes are discreet, with students joining anonymously using false names and with their cameras off to ensure their safety. However, the students often join group classes and are reluctant to take up the offer of separate classes, away from their fellow students, as to them maintaining their connection to a broader Ukrainian community is a much-needed “form of psychological sustenance under the oppressive conditions of occupation.”
+
+A recent BBC report highlighted a schoolteacher who left occupied Melitopol but continues to teach her former students who were left behind. In her case, she prioritizes psychological support and cultural education over traditional subjects, recognizing the significant emotional and psychological impact of the occupation on the children. In the occupied territories themselves, the author was told of numerous efforts to create safe spaces for Ukrainian education — from language to literature — for the children. Originally this was possible under the guise of religious or other forms of gatherings, but since the pseudo-referenda in autumn 2022, this has become much more difficult. The risks associated with these educational efforts are substantial, as any sign of dissent can lead to severe repercussions, including potential forced conscription of the students’ parents into the Russian military. However, these initiatives are critical in countering Russian propaganda and Russia’s extensive cultural and educational indoctrination efforts. By keeping children and older students connected to their Ukrainian roots and realities, these teachers and professors maintain a sense of identity and resilience.
+
+_LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESISTANCE_
+
+Other efforts involve resisting through legal and administrative means, such as refusing to recognize the legality of the occupiers’ authorities, not participating in their organized events or elections, and maintaining loyalty to the Ukrainian government. This type of resistance challenges the occupiers’ attempts to legitimize their control and governance over the occupied territories. Despite the efforts at forced passportization, a large number of Ukrainians have resisted, with the National Resistance Centre, using Russian state statistics, claiming that at least 60 percent of Ukrainians have refused passports and 80 percent have refused to put Russian license plates on their cars, as required by law. One interviewee from an area occupied since 2014 who is unable to leave due to caring responsibilities explained to the author: “I won’t take a Russian passport. [My friends in Ukraine] tell me I should, that it is safer but if I do, then who will be here to greet our boys when they liberate us? Where will all the Ukrainians be? I will greet [our boys] as a Ukrainian.”
+
+#### Violent Resistance
+
+Types of violent resistance in the occupied territories include direct attacks and sabotage operations against Russian forces and infrastructure, as well as coordinated efforts with Ukrainian Armed Forces for targeted assaults on enemy positions.
+
+_RECONNAISSANCE_
+
+In addition to educating the public on the situation, countering misinformation, and maintaining morale among the Ukrainian population, various digital platforms have been crucial for coordinating immediate resistance activities. For example, during the occupation of the Kharkiv region, local civilian defense forces, in cooperation with intelligence agencies, established a Signal chat across the region that allowed them to track the movements of the occupiers, often via hastily taken photos from the windows of basements in occupied villages. The chat was set up within the first day of the invasion. This was thanks to the Ukrainian history of self-organization and a certain level of social trust, as well as preparation. The mayor of Derhachi spoke to the author of his own involvement in clandestine networks that enabled the liberation of his home village, Ruska Lozova, strategically placed on the Kharkiv-Belgorod highway. The mayor’s broad network of friends and family provided information on the movements of Russians.
+
+On one occasion, the sharing of encrypted information over social networks and chats led to civilians informing the armed forces that a nearby factory had been taken by the Russians and was being used by them to store military equipment and tanks. Once this information had been verified, the choice was taken by intelligence forces to destroy this site. As the Russians were holding Ukrainian civilians as human shields, this was an especially fraught choice for those involved; however, the risk to the general population of Ukraine’s second-largest city meant that it was a choice the intelligence operative involved felt he had to take.
+
+The longer the occupation continued, however, the less useful such chats became. For example, by August the Kharkiv region chat was largely dead, as the risks became too high with the enhanced occupation regime. Thankfully for the residents of the Kharkiv region, their liberation came soon after. However, the challenges of disseminating information have not halted resistance efforts. Resistance groups such as ATESH continue to provide intelligence on air defenses, depots, military bases, and soldiers’ movements. Journalists have also played a crucial role; for instance, journalists from the online news source Eastern Variant established a hotline for residents of occupied and frontline territories. This provided a secure channel for information sharing, seeking assistance, and accessing a network of specialists. Eastern Variant also launched an online school of civic journalism to teach non-journalists how to safely transmit information, expanding the impact of grassroots information efforts.
+
+Support is not unidirectional; for instance, the “In the Eyes of Partisans” fundraiser, initiated by the Center for National Resistance in 2023, helped purchase drones used to adjust attacks on Russian forces. The resistance’s logistical challenges include acquiring and distributing inexpensive but effective smartphones for communication and coordination, with many such efforts described as grassroots initiatives relying on a network of trusted contacts. There are numerous organizations to support the resistance and general horizontal networking that assists, for example, in getting telephones to the occupied territories. Partisan operations burn through a lot of phones (each phone has to be destroyed after being used to send coordinates). The phones used tend to be inexpensive ($100) but still need to have basic smartphone functions. Two individuals involved in this process described their sourcing as a grassroots effort, asking trusted friends to help; they said the hardest element was the transient nature of support, which poses strategic challenges for resistance operations, highlighting the need for continuous, reliable assistance to the occupied territories.
+
+_SABOTAGE_
+
+There have been a significant number of sabotage activities in the occupied territories, many of them psychological as well as physical. For instance, in Melitopol, the resistance movement SROK has engaged in marking the residences of Russian occupiers in the city. Specifically, apartments that Russian military and police personnel have commandeered are marked with “200,” a reference to Cargo 200, the Russian military slang term for dead soldiers. This marking tactic is intended to disrupt the occupiers’ sense of security and destabilize their operations.
+
+The resistance also targets key infrastructure to disrupt Russian logistical and administrative control in the occupied territories. Notably, the railway system in these regions has been declared autonomous and named the “Railways of Novorossiya,” ostensibly to evade international sanctions aimed at Russian Railways. This entity is not integrated into the broader Russian railway network and is overseen by the Federal Agency for Railway Transport (Roszheldor). Strategic efforts by Ukrainian partisans have focused on sabotaging these rail lines, which are critical for transporting military supplies and looted goods, such as grain and metal, from Crimea to mainland Ukraine. On October 13, 2023, and again on December 15, Melitopol partisans successfully detonated devices on trains that were transporting ammunition, fuel, and stolen resources between Crimea and Dniprorudne. These acts resulted in substantial damage to the railway infrastructure and severely disrupted Russian logistical operations. Following these incidents, Russian forces and administrative personnel intensified security measures and launched extensive searches for the partisans, who have, in this case, evaded capture and remained active.
+
+_DIRECT ACTION_
+
+During the initial full-scale invasion, in many soon-to-be-occupied cities, territorial defense units swiftly transitioned into partisans operating behind enemy lines. An example of this proactive resistance occurred at the battles for the Antonivskyi Bridge near Kherson, where partisans impeded the occupiers’ movements by barricading roads with concrete blocks and trees. Under intense conditions — lacking ammunition and close mortar fire — the partisan leader orchestrated a strategic retreat, ensuring the safety of his unit. Russian forces possessed comprehensive lists of all members of the territorial defense, including personal details such as names and addresses, meaning they had to flee once they could. In an interview with the author, one soldier who fought in the territorial defense of Melitopol recounted his harrowing experience of escaping surrounded cities, navigating through potentially mined fields, leaving behind injured comrades, and enduring severe frostbite.
+
+In a published story on Kherson, another soldier remembers disguising himself as a homeless person to avoid suspicion. Many of the soldier’s comrades stayed behind until the last minute in order to coordinate with commanders to identify and transmit the locations of enemy equipment and personnel. This intelligence gathering was crucial for directing accurate strikes against Russian military assets, but in many cases cost the soldiers their lives.
+
+As in the cases above, there is often a combination of reconnaissance and direct action. For example, while the ATESH movement mainly appears to provide logistical information, partisan activists also claim to have carried out violent attacks, including killing 30 Russian soldiers in a military hospital and setting off a car-bomb attack in Russian-occupied Kherson. In another blurring of roles, there are also crossovers into occupied territory by Ukrainian special divisions. The Bratstvo Ukrainian special division, for example, has conducted operations in Crimea, while others work in different parts of the occupied territories or provide support. For example, Kraken has provided support to Russian units fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces — like Legion Svobody, the RDK, and Vostok battalion — in raids into Russia, as well as to Ichkerian units; these units fight on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces “for the liberation of their countries from Vladimir Putin’s regime,” in the words of Legion Svobody’s leader.
+
+However, there are also raids into occupied Ukrainian territory, much of which remain secret and classified but a few of which have been made public. One HUR special unit conducted a night raid in the area of Nova Kakhovka on January 23, 2023. The raid was possible thanks to cooperation with local partisans and satellite imagery that identified the exact location of the Russian forward command post, which the reconnaissance forces destroyed with grenade launcher fire. The raid also gave the Ukrainian special forces comprehensive data on the number, composition, and locations of enemy reserves. While the so-called Surovikin line of reinforced defensive lines has made such raids very difficult now, they were very common during the initial months of the invasion; for example, in the village of Shestakove, there was a crossing point where people could come and go between the occupied territories and the gray zone, then pass through into the free territories (e.g., Chuhuiv). This was a space, albeit a very dangerous one, for saboteurs to cross into the occupied territories and collect information from villagers or set traps.
+
+Perhaps the most astonishing of all actions are those direct attacks that involve self-sacrifice — as in the example of Maksym Makhrinov, mentioned at the beginning of this report, who blew himself up and took two Russian soldiers with him. In a similar vein, in December 2023, members of a Ukrainian partisan group called the Crimean Combat Seagulls poisoned and killed 24 Russian soldiers after lacing their vodka with arsenic and strychnine, despite knowing that there was a high risk they would be caught, tortured, and even executed. Similarly, there have been reports from Bakhchysarai, Crimea, of Ukrainian partisans killing Russian soldiers by lacing pies and alcohol with arsenic and rat poison. There have also been reports and claims of mass poisonings of Russian troops elsewhere, from Melitopol to Mariupol. Often, attractive young women are involved in these types of actions, and, in the words of one Ukrainian intelligence operative interviewed by the author: “They are very brave but they don’t live very long afterwards. They disappear into the basements, or if they are lucky some general takes them for a bit [for forced sex].”
+
+As in the cases above, partisans’ direct action is overwhelmingly targeted at Russian military or security forces. The author’s own monitoring of Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels covering the occupied territories identified over 73 reported deaths of Russian soldiers, police officers, and occupation officials at the hands of partisan movements between December 2023 and January 2024 alone. The true number is likely much higher. Moreover, this figure does not include the vastly more numerous deaths of Russian occupying forces from targeted strikes carried out on the basis of intelligence provided by the underground resistance. For example, in February 2024, a Ukrainian strike on a bakery in the occupied eastern Ukrainian city of Lysychansk killed three Russian occupation officials; in April, Ukraine used Storm Shadow cruise missiles supplied by Britain to target the Luhansk military command base for the Russian army — a severe blow to Russia’s efforts to take more of the region, given the micromanagement of the armed operations there, and something that would not have been possible without the involvement of partisans on the ground.
+
+In addition to Russian occupiers, the resistance also targets those collaborators who actively implement and facilitate the occupation. For example, on April 1, 2024, partisans likely assassinated Valeriy Chaika, who went over to the enemy in 2022 and took on the position of deputy head of the “Center for the Maintenance of Educational Organizations,” in which role he implemented Russia’s indoctrination system for Ukrainian children. On February 10, 2024, partisans appear to have assassinated Oleksandr Hallii in Berdyansk. Before the full-scale war, Hallii was involved in waste processing and selling tobacco products, but afterwards he helped the Russians to expropriate the homes and businesses of Ukrainian residents. Hallii fits a rather typical portrait of collaborators in the occupied territories — but Ukrainian partisans have more egregious traitors in their sights, as with the assassination of Ilya Kiva, a former Ukrainian MP and Russian agent, in Moscow.
+
+
+### Implications and Recommendations
+
+#### The Risk of Being Caught
+
+“Everyone knew that the police station had become the torture chamber, they wanted you to know. I would cross the street not to walk too close to it.” The performative terror so characteristic of the Putin regime in Russia has acquired an even grislier turn in the occupied territories, as reflected in the words of this former resident of the occupied territories. Across all Russian-occupied towns and cities in Ukraine, torture chambers run by the FSB function in plain sight, as a demonstrative form of intimidation. There are legion reports of sexualized torture (e.g., electric shocks attached to genitalia), the removal of fingernails, rape, and mutilation. Any Ukrainian caught helping the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces or undertaking violent resistance is unlikely to live for very long — although, given the conditions in the torture chambers, they may not want to live for very long. There are detailed lists of torture chambers across the occupied territories, the happenings in which deserve far greater media attention but are sadly predictable; they were described in detail in Stanislav Aseyev’s recounting of his time in a DNR torture camp.
+
+___`The performative terror so characteristic of the Putin regime in Russia has acquired an even grislier turn in the occupied territories, as reflected in the words of this former resident. Across all Russian-occupied towns and cities in Ukraine, torture chambers function in plain sight, as a demonstrative form of intimidation.`___
+
+In anticipation of resistance activities, the occupying forces frequently deploy disinformation campaigns to distract from their inability to prevent such actions. Often, they attempt to link resistance efforts to Western influences, as seen in fabricated news claiming that the “British Council” was attempting to recruit residents on the western bank of Kherson. According to Russian allegations, British intelligence was using cultural engagements as a cover for espionage activities, collecting data on Russian military deployments and occupier equipment. These accusations escalated following a series of successful strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, leading to propaganda that painted all cultural exchanges as intelligence operations.
+
+Russian efforts to dismantle the resistance also include crudely executed schemes aimed at ensnaring partisans. For instance, a Telegram channel named “Volya” threatened to destroy schools in Mariupol, purporting to represent an anarcho-Ukrainian underground movement. This was a calculated provocation designed to identify active and potential members of the resistance, framing them as criminals and miscreants within the Russian-controlled narrative. Speaking to the author, one ATESH commander explained how the FSB try to infiltrate their network:
+
+> The Russians constantly try to penetrate our network. The FSB are especially interested in us. We maintain our security by verifying potential agents and putting them through a screening process. We give them a number of tasks to complete and then once the potential agent has completed the tasks we give them something a bit trickier. From the results of the tasks we can evaluate their work and their trustworthiness, which trained people help us to do. We can also evaluate how the agent communicates, whether they are suspicious. Normally FSB agents who want to infiltrate us try to find out about our locations, how exactly our network works, and they try to get into physical contact with representatives of the ATESH movement. This system helps us to screen [them] out.
+
+Some areas are experiencing a spate of resistance activity, such as Luhansk, where the resistance is trying to pick up the slack from exhausted forces in the 31st Brigade attempting to resist Russia’s efforts to “fulfill its strategic aims of reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.” In the words of the commander of the 31st Brigade, responsible for this area, his troops “will keep on fighting, they have no other choice but they are tired of course and the lack of support can be felt on the ground and in their heads.” As the resistance try to help as they can, the occupiers have sought to significantly limit their internet access in order to limit communication between partisans and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, such as by installing wired internet which can only be accessed after identification.
+
+#### The Importance of Resistance
+
+On D-Day, the allies knew the location of the Nazi defenses thanks to the French resistance. This is just one of the many factors — from the weather to technological advances — that contributed to Operation Overlord’s success. Ukrainian resistance groups have played pivotal roles in similar, albeit smaller, operations, significantly aiding the Ukrainian Armed Forces in liberating villages near Kharkiv and throughout the region. Should Ukraine acquire sufficient weaponry to launch further counteroffensives, the Ukrainian resistance will undoubtedly have its own D-Day.
+
+To date, partisans have been instrumental in collecting and transmitting intelligence about the locations of enemy equipment and personnel, enabling the Ukrainian Armed Forces to execute precise strikes against Russian military assets. They support military operations by providing essential intelligence, engaging in sabotage to disrupt enemy logistics and command structures, and creating favorable conditions for Ukrainian military initiatives. This not only impacts the operational capabilities of the occupiers but also exposes critical weaknesses, such as the inadequacy of Russian air defenses in occupied territories. The attacks on Crimea, in particular, have carried substantial geopolitical weight and have bolstered Ukrainian morale, countering Putin’s narratives of Russian might.
+
+Moreover, the actions of the Ukrainian resistance debunk Russian propaganda claims of a welcoming occupied populace and pose challenging questions for the liberal Russian opposition in exile. While some Russians are supporting the Crimean resistance movements, the stark contrast between the vigorous resistance within Ukraine and the lack of any large-scale significant opposition within Russia itself raises critical questions about the authenticity and effectiveness of anti-war sentiments in Russia. The repressive regime in the occupied territories far exceeds that within Russia’s borders — and it is only getting worse. On the other hand, the need to constantly increase the numbers of Russian national guard, FSB, and other security personnel points to the challenges occupiers face in policing resistance activities in the occupied territories. This ongoing resistance stretches Russian resources thin, diverts attention from frontline engagements to internal security, and exacerbates the challenges of sustaining the occupation, further demoralizing the Russian mobilization effort as the local population remains overtly hostile.
+
+Despite the suffocating weight of the Russian occupation, Ukrainian men and women continue to identify, intimidate, and assassinate Russian occupiers on a daily basis. As a result, Russia does not have full control over the temporarily occupied territories. It is facing a sustained, well-trained, and astute insurrectionist campaign. This continued resilience and resistance to occupation will play an ever more important role in undermining the sustainability of the Russian war effort. The integration of civilians into the resistance efforts, forming underground networks that provide logistical and intelligence support, underscores the comprehensive nature of the Ukrainian fight. It is imperative that the international community recognizes these regions not as lost causes but as active participants in Ukraine’s ongoing war of liberation. The heroic feats of the Ukrainian resistance deserve to be covered — and Western audiences deserve to read about them. Otherwise, they will develop a flawed understanding of the war and what might be an acceptable, or practical, way to resolve it. It is easier to justify giving up hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and children to the arbitrary rule of torturers and executioners if you can pretend that there is no alternative, nobody there is fighting back, and the residents have come around to Russian rule, perhaps even welcomed it. As this report shows, that justification is not true.
+
+___`The heroic feats of the Ukrainian resistance deserve to be covered — and Western audiences deserve to read about them.`___
+
+#### Civil and Policy Recommendations
+
+Supporting the Ukrainian resistance is crucial for those committed to thwarting Russian ambitions in the region. The resistance has demonstrated remarkable resilience and effectiveness under extremely challenging conditions. However, these groups require continued moral and financial support to sustain their efforts. Recognizing and amplifying their struggle in media, government discussions, and public discourse is vital.
+
+In thinking of ways the West can support the Ukrainian resistance, the author asked resistance fighters past and present to offer their own recommendations. It goes without saying that they all asked first and foremost for more military support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces to help liberate their territories. As such, what follows is selection of their answers that specifically related to the resistance movement. The following recommendations outline realistic actions that can be supported by policymakers and the general public to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of Ukrainian resistance efforts.
+
+__1. Information and Perception__
+
+- Enhancing the visibility of the resistance’s activities is crucial. There needs to be a significant increase in English-language coverage, possibly through translations of comprehensive reports by Ukrainian media and greater sharing of English-language Ukrainian sources such as the National Resistance Centre. Russian opposition publications like Verstka and Important Stories also produce important reports on the resistance.
+
+- One Ukrainian research organization heavily involved in the occupied territories expressed a desire for more support from Russian colleagues in the form of data. For both security and political reasons, such cooperation with Russian anti-war organizations should be mediated through a Western, or neutral, intermediary organization.
+
+- In the words of one ATESH fighter: “We need informational support, so that as many people as possible find out about our struggle. That helps us to recruit new potential agents.”
+
+__2. Technological Support__
+
+- Ensuring the operational continuity of trusted local media outlets in exile is vital. For instance, during its occupation, the local news site Obrii 1909 in Izyum was able, with the help of Western technical support, to unblock its website and then to disseminate crucial information from journalists within and outside the area, bolstering community spirit during critical times.
+
+- Facilitating reconnaissance activities that lighten the load on partisans is essential. Civilian and open-source intelligence (OSINT) communities play a pivotal role in gathering and disseminating actionable intelligence, and the Ukrainian communities involved in this space would be grateful for more assistance from Western colleagues.
+
+- Innovative technological solutions can aid nonviolent resistance. For example, language learning apps could create mirror sites for the Ukrainian language, serving as a tool for cultural preservation and resistance.
+
+__3. General Fundraising__
+
+- Public fundraising initiatives like “In the Eyes of Partisans” deserve broad support. Individuals can contribute financially to organizations that supply the resistance with essential equipment like drones and communication devices. Nongovernmental organizations can form partnerships with entities like the National Resistance Centre and the Ukraine Security and Cooperation Centre’s Free Ukraine Fund, which supports the resistance with nonlethal equipment and delivers funding to Ukrainian domestic arms producers.
+
+- In addition to U.S. support already provided, European countries should provide dedicated funding for special divisions, such as Kraken, and the Special Operations Forces, as well as military intelligence, who form and/or support the resistance. This is especially important given that while special divisions carry out targeted and difficult work, they receive less priority in resource allocation from the Ukrainian Armed Forces, impacting their operational capabilities.
+
+__4. Intelligence Sharing__
+
+- Ukraine’s allies should increase the sharing of satellite imagery to identify coordinates to destroy occupation infrastructure. For example, this could include undermining critical infrastructure used by the occupiers, such as the railway line from Rostov to Dzhankoi, which is crucial for Russian military logistics.
+
+- A number of collaborators are reported to be currently living in the European Union, having escaped the Ukrainian liberation via Russia. Ukraine is currently preparing Interpol requests for their extradition, but European countries should proactively identify these individuals and, if there is legally a case to do so, return them to Ukraine to face justice.
+
+Even small measures, like donating telephones for the resistance or helping to increase public awareness of the resilience of the Ukrainian underground, make a real difference in the desperate conditions of the occupied territories. In the words of one active resistance fighter: “We are grateful to any international and Ukrainian media that bring attention to our activities. It is a great help from their side and an honor for us.” It is important to stress that small acts can have large consequences in these circumstances and that individuals supportive of Ukraine do not feel overwhelmed by the scale of the Russian occupation. After all, Ukrainian partisans continue to believe in their own agency:
+
+> Our faith in liberation is the cornerstone of our struggle. Our actions, every single successful act of sabotage brings victory closer and we understand that perfectly. Every one of us imagines victory day in their own way. For some of us, it will be a massive party, for others a huge demonstration with Ukrainian symbols everywhere, for others still an unbelievable sense of relief. And for the rest, we will just quietly remember all our dead comrades.
+
+---
+
+__Jade McGlynn__ is a research fellow in the War Studies Department at King’s College London.