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+---
+layout: post
+title : Intel. Contest In Cyberspace
+author: Louise Marie Hurel
+date : 2023-08-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Q6cUINI.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "On the Promises and Consequences of the Intelligence Contest in Cyberspace"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_There has been growing pushback from experts and scholars to the concept of “cyber war”, with some suggesting that a more sober way of assessing cyber operations is to see them as part of a wider “intelligence contest” – a term proposed by some scholars to describe strategic competition in cyberspace as a duel between actors to gather data, undermine adversary institutions and sabotage capabilities._ _It is worth noting this definition of “intelligence” is contentious in some quarters, with others preferring the more limited description of intelligence as relating to the collection and analysis of information._
+
+
+In terms of cyber war hyperbole, unhelpful headlines such as Newsweek’s “The Rising Risk of a Cyber Pearl Harbour” in 2021 usually grab the everyday reader’s attention but limit our understanding of the far more important dimension of these cyber incidents: how states and non-state actors use cyberspace below the threshold of war to further their strategic objectives.
+
+Even when scrolling down The New York Times’s tag on “cyberwarfare”, most of the reporting concentrates on espionage and activities such as information operations and subversion – which in practice, is a more accurate reflection of what goes on in cyberspace.
+
+However, the jury is still out on alternative concepts to “cyber war” that can appropriately capture the effects of cyber operations below the threshold of armed conflict and how they might transform intelligence activities. The book Deter, Disrupt or Deceive: Assessing Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest offers some options – although it does not seek to be conclusive.
+
+To what extent is it worth considering that states are actually involved in a continuous “intelligence contest” in cyberspace?
+
+
+### It’s a Trap! Reassessing the Vocabulary
+
+As the ongoing war in Ukraine has illustrated, the obsession with the concept of “cyber war” is not just about the latest news headlines; rather, it has resulted in deep miscalculations about the role of cyber operations in conflict and crisis scenarios.
+
+The first miscalculation from the hyperbole around “cyber war” is the heightened expectations of what cyber operations can and should deliver. Having been known for numerous disruptive cyber incidents, Russia’s cyber operations at the outbreak of the war in Ukraine were commonly depicted as contrary to expectations. There was no widespread or particularly significant impact from Russian destructive cyber operations, no cyber takedown of Ukrainian critical national infrastructure.
+
+This exemplifies how “cyber war” can also fail to grasp how effects are shaped by a culture of strategic doctrine – as is particularly the case with Russia’s conceptualisation of cyber operations.
+
+However, the focus on decisive and short-term effects of cyber operations, especially in conflict situations, has also led to a paradoxical dismissal of the cumulative effects that operations have as part of a wider contest between state and non-state actors. Russian cyber activity during the war has still revealed a largely unprecedented deployment of capabilities, with at least nine new wiper malware families, two ransomware attacks and the targeting of 100 organisations in Ukraine. According to companies such as ESET, Microsoft, Mandiant and other large threat intelligence companies, Russia has used a record amount of data-destroying malware on Ukraine, showcasing an accelerated pace of deployment of cyber capabilities in conflict scenarios. This in turn has also contributed to the reuse of many of these capabilities in at least other 25 countries, which showcases the cascading effects of sub-threshold capabilities. Despite these numbers – and within this particular context – cyber operations have not been the decisive or primary tool in the conflict. They have, however, contributed to the broader friction of war – be it in the operation of infrastructure, communication or leveraging the information space to push their narratives about the war.
+
+
+### On Intelligence Contests
+
+American University Professor Joshua Rovner suggests that activities in cyberspace are more about intelligence than the use of force. He argues that strategic behaviour in cyberspace will rarely surpass the threshold of armed conflict, but states will continuously engage in an “intelligence contest” through sabotage and covert action. Rovner defines the intelligence contest as:
+
+- A race among adversaries to collect more and better information.
+
+- A race to exploit information to improve one’s relative position.
+
+- A reciprocal effort to covertly undermine adversary morale, institutions and alliances.
+
+- A contest to disable adversary capabilities through sabotage.
+
+- A campaign to preposition assets for intelligence collection in the event of a conflict.
+
+___`Countries recognise the importance of having an institution to engage in cyber operations – but it does not mean that all do so`___
+
+What the concept seeks to illustrate is that the dynamics of contestation among states in cyberspace extend far beyond the tactics of cyber operations and the battlefield itself, and play into strategic competition among state and non-state actors. As noted by the UK’s National Cyber Force (NCF), while cyber operations are not expected to be strategically decisive, they are effective when “combined and co-ordinated with the activities of partners to achieve a shared goal”.
+
+This applies as much to cyber security as it does to offensive cyber. One example of the former is that in May 2023, Ukraine, Ireland, Iceland and Japan announced that they would officially join NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence. While the deal opens the door for greater exchange between NATO and non-NATO countries, the occasion sends a relevant message of expanding technical and strategic alignment between countries in the face of growing geopolitical contestation in the Indo-Pacific and amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.
+
+Offensive cyber capabilities should be seen as part of a much wider policy toolkit to respond to hostile activities in cyberspace. Likewise, offensive cyber capabilities can be used to respond to other threats such as terrorism, disinformation or child sexual exploitation. In short, a cyber incident does not necessarily merit a cyber response.
+
+As of 2021, approximately 45 countries have launched military cyber organisations (that is, cyber commands) and nearly 35 of those possess an offensive mandate. While capacities and capabilities vary, both Western and non-Western countries recognise the importance of having an institution to engage in this contested environment – but it does not mean that all do so.
+
+Strategies vary as to how countries engage in this contest. The US Cyber Command, which defends the Department of Defense’s information systems, supports joint force commanders with cyberspace operations, and defends the US from significant cyberattacks, has developed complementary concepts of “defend forward” and “persistent engagement”. Meanwhile, the UK’s NCF has published a document outlining operating principles for its own approach to offensive cyber which is in line with a broader vision outlined in the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh to deter, defend and compete across all domains. Central to the NCF’s approach is the doctrine of “cognitive effect”.
+
+So, should we then consider “intelligence contest” as the most accurate means of defining the nature of cyber operations?
+
+Critics of the concept have argued that the scale and scope of operations in cyberspace fundamentally change the nature of intelligence (especially covert action), resulting in a “difference in kind and not merely degree”. As some have argued, the 2016 Russian interference during the US elections shows that smaller activities can result in aggregated strategic effects – eroding trust and confidence in society. So, what are the consequences of framing cyber operations as an intelligence contest?
+
+
+### Responsible Cyber Operations – Long Road Ahead
+
+One risk when intelligence becomes the main qualifier to describe the nature of cyber operations is that it could alter public perceptions on what activities their government is conducting in cyberspace. Public understanding may also differ depending upon the oversight mechanisms in place within a particular national context. The outcome of framing cyber operations around intelligence activities could be for better or worse, depending upon the national context.
+
+___`Cyber might play a significantly different role depending on the respective country’s primary threat concern`___
+
+For example, the UK has a detailed regulatory framework when it comes to intelligence activity. In addition, the NCF’s recent guide outlines the importance of robust oversight and accountability as a core element for responsible operational planning – a key part of our latest project at RUSI.
+
+In some cases, less capable states contract cyber mercenaries for easier access to opportunities in developing and deploying capabilities. While commercial hacking tools have legitimate applications in support of national security and law enforcement objectives, they are also subject to misuse and abuse. As of 2023, 74 countries have reportedly used spyware and between 2015 and 2017, and EU member states have allowed surveillance technology to be exported more than 317 times. It is not always the case that states will contract well-known spyware vendors either – there is a complex market of companies promoting open-source intelligence tools that can be coupled with other sophisticated add-ons and services. In this regard, the intelligence contest concept does not help with addressing these kinds of dynamics. Instead of clarifying what kinds of intelligence activities are permissible, it overemphasises state-to-state spying rather than domestic activities – usually more appealing to less developed economies that can buy off-the-shelf products to meet their internal needs. What is then the applicability of the intelligence contest? To whom does this concept apply?
+
+It is important to understand the motivations of countries beyond the usual cyber powers in developing and deploying cyber capabilities. As illustrated by Saudi Arabia, Mexico, India and many other Western and non-Western countries, it might be more profitable for countries to develop their own cyber capabilities to conduct surveillance of citizens within their own national territory and abroad than to primarily do it among states. As states across the development spectrum enhance their capabilities, cyber might play a significantly different role depending on the respective country’s primary threat concern – which in turn will also affect how they engage in strategic competition.
+
+Countries might also be influenced by the NCF’s guide on cyber operations, as it provides some initial thoughts for establishing processes and guidance relating to cyber operations. However, there is a risk that some countries will see cyber operations as intelligence activity only, to be conducted against a foreign or external threat. A different and more worrying scenario takes place when countries seek to aggressively use capabilities against internal threats, with little oversight, as has been the case with commercial hacking tools.
+
+
+### A Contest for a Few?
+
+A crucial and yet overlooked question within this debate is: “who can engage in this intelligence contest?” While many countries have developed cyber commands and have sought to enhance their capabilities, the intelligence contest still arguably remains a game to be played by a small group of countries.
+
+It might be too much to assume that countries beyond the pool of cyber powers can effectively achieve significant cumulative effects through cyberspace in conjunction with other diplomatic and/or commercial strategies, despite their eagerness to outsource capabilities.
+
+In addition, the 45 countries that have established military cyber organisations (and others) will continue to search for other levers to develop their own capacities, away from cyber. It is also questionable how applicable and operationalisable the intelligence contest in cyberspace is for developing countries.
+
+Overall, how the term “intelligence contest” increases the understanding of cyber operations remains unclear. There are geographical, capability and conceptual challenges as well as consequences of the framing that require further assessment. Regardless, it is better than using the term “cyber war” to define state activity in cyberspace – although whether that is enough is yet to be seen.
+
+---
+
+__Louise Marie Hurel__ is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI. Her research interests include incident response, cyber capacity building, cyber diplomacy and non-governmental actors’ engagement in cyber security.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-safeguard-digital-landscape.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-safeguard-digital-landscape.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-safeguard-digital-landscape.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Safeguard Digital Landscape
+author: Abigail Edwards, et al.
+date : 2023-08-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/4UcKnad.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Online Opportunities & Threats
+for Displaced Ukrainians"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it sparked the largest and quickest mass displacement of people since the Second World War._
+
+
+
+Ukrainians often left their homes with only the clothes on their backs and a small bag — an all-too-common experience in a world experiencing record high levels of forced displacement.
+
+Yet, unlike many other displaced populations, almost all Ukrainians were able to bring their smartphones, a near-unmatched level of tech savviness, and supportive, tightly woven online networks.
+
+This connectivity has presented new opportunities to assist vulnerable people; it has also put those same vulnerable people face-to-face with new online threats that can translate into very real physical danger.
+
+
+### Ukraine’s Digital Connectivity
+
+
+
+_Digitization has always been central to President Zelensky’s vision of Ukraine._
+
+Promises surrounding digitization served a critical role in his almost entirely virtual campaign. At the time, it was seen as a way to both fight corruption and engage the country’s younger generation. However, the long-term impacts of his administration’s efforts in this area can be seen both in the success of the war effort and in the options now open to displaced Ukrainians.
+
+Just months after Zelensky’s election in 2019, the Ukrainian government established the Ministry of Digital Transformation — a trailblazing effort to transform government through the creation of the “state in a smartphone.”
+
+With the goal of making 100 percent of government services available online by 2024, the Ministry of Digital Transformation quickly mobilized to launch Diia — meaning “action” — a mobile app and web platform centralizing citizen access to public services.
+
+In 2021, Ukraine became the first country in the world to issue digital passports through Diia.
+
+After February 2022, the Ukrainian government worked to ensure that Ukraine’s digital connections were both protected and strengthened.
+
+
+
+Zelensky’s administration has partnered with Starlink, the European Union, and European telecom companies to ensure that Ukrainians maintain internet connection during the war. This has been essential to countering Russian attempts to control information flows about the war.
+
+Maintaining internet access is also critical to ensure that displaced Ukrainians — both within Ukraine and across international borders — are able to access to public services, personal networks, and aid resources.
+
+
+### Stabilizing Connections
+
+
+
+_Ukraine’s level of digital connectedness has spurred new opportunities and innovations to aid displaced Ukrainians across several critical areas._
+
+#### Ukraine’s Diia App
+
+Developed with the motto, “the government in a smartphone,” Diia has brought essential public resources to the fingertips of Ukrainians both within and outside of Ukraine.
+
+- Launched in 2020, Diia was downloaded on the phones of one-third of the adult Ukrainian population by 2021.
+
+- Diia has been at the center of the digital effort to aid Ukrainians. As of May 2023, 70 percent of Ukrainian-owned smartphones have Diia installed.
+
+- Through Diia, Ukrainians can register as displaced and have access to digital forms of the identification document that they need to cross borders. They can also provide digital signatures on official documents using biometrics, pay taxes and fines, collect cash payments, receive compensation for damaged property, donate to the war effort, register a child or a business, report information about Russian troops, and more.
+
+#### Internet and Connectivity
+
+Stable and secure internet connections have been critical to keeping Ukrainians connected with resources, aid, and their digital networks during the war.
+
+- Starlink, a satellite constellation that provides internet coverage to countries across the world, has been critical to ensure that Ukrainians — as well as Ukrainian hospitals, energy sources, educational institutions, and businesses — have access to fast and stable internet. Starlink was also responsible for restoring internet connection in cities such as Irpin, Bucha, Borodyanka, and Chernihiv.
+
+- Nokia, in partnership with the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, started a project to modernize internet networks across Ukraine, ensuring that Ukrainians and Ukrainian institutions retained internet access in the face of physical bombardment.
+
+- The European Commission and the European Parliament coordinated with European telecom providers to reduce costs or freely provide roaming and international calling within the European Union and Ukraine for displaced Ukrainians.
+
+#### Services and Assistance
+
+With many Ukrainians having to quickly flee their homes, a number of different platforms have been created to connect displaced Ukrainians to key information, assistance, and aid.
+
+- The Alarm app by Ajax Systems serves as a digital air raid siren that helps provide safety warnings to all Ukrainians with smart phones even if municipal air raid sirens are destroyed.
+
+- The UN Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) online dashboards outline key information about each refugee-receiving country, so that Ukrainian refugees have information on how to access public services and aid and how to report fraud and abuse.
+
+- Host governments have similarly created online platforms for Ukrainian refugees seeking assistance, including the “Dopomoha,” platform launched by the Romanian and Moldovan governments.
+
+- UNHCR’s system also allows Ukrainians to register with their biometric data to collect cash aid payments at ATMs across Europe.
+
+#### Housing
+
+A variety of online platforms have been created to match Ukrainian refugees with short- and long-term housing opportunities.
+
+- Online projects have been started by many companies and organizations to match Ukrainian refugees with short- and long-term housing opportunities, including betterplace.org, Boston Consulting Group (BCG), Station F (France), Wunderflats (Germany), EU4UA, Prykhystok, Ukraine Now, HomesforUkraine.eu (Austria), Casafari, Shelter UKR, TakecareBnB, Icanhelp.host, and UkraineTakeShelter.com.
+
+#### Data
+
+In order to help aid organizations prioritize where to work, some projects are collecting comprehensive data on displacement patterns.
+
+- The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix has tracked internal displacement data in order to create a more accurate picture of the state of internal displacement in Ukraine to aid the IOM’s and other aid organizations’ efforts.
+
+#### Supplies and Resources
+
+Many organizations are focused on distributing essential supplies such as food, water, shelter materials, and power banks.
+
+- Projects such as the Ukrainian Defense Fund and Gorillas have created apps to collect and distribute supplies on the ground to people within Ukraine and in areas with high numbers of Ukrainian refugees, such as across the Polish border.
+
+- Other projects, such as Lifesaver and Techfugees, have focused on providing more specific supplies — power banks — ensuring that Ukrainians can maintain mobile access even when power is out.
+
+#### Transportation
+
+A number of different platforms have been created to help displaced Ukrainians travel safely to their desired destinations.
+
+- Techfugees, in partnership with Citizens of Our Planet and Chili Piper, has created a detailed virtual guide for Ukrainians on transportation options for traveling within Ukraine or to cross international borders into Europe.
+
+- Companies such as Uber and Flixbus have offered free trips for refugees — especially around the Ukraine-Poland border.
+
+- Ride-sharing apps such as Uklon and BlaBlaCar have worked to organize carpools for Ukrainians fleeing the war.
+
+#### Employment
+
+With many Ukrainians out of work due to the war, online platforms have been created to help connect displaced Ukrainians with job opportunities.
+
+- For those looking to work in tech, Employ Ukraine seeks to match Ukrainians with tech positions in EU companies and allows the companies to pay them directly through the platform.
+
+- Google created a $5 million fund to provide cash awards and Google support to Ukrainian start-ups.
+
+#### Education and Culture
+
+In order to maintain a sense of normalcy, some organizations are utilizing online tools to connect displaced Ukrainians with educational and cultural resources.
+
+- “Laptops for Ukraine” is an EU initiative to collect and distribute laptops and smartphones for schools as well as other public institutions to ensure that public service provision can continue.
+
+- Levebee was funded by the European Union to serve as an app to support the continued education of Ukrainian children during the war. Children can learn math, languages, and other subjects remotely on the app.
+
+- In light of the destruction of parts of Ukraine during the war, the European Competence Centre for Cultural Heritage (4CH) created the Supporting Ukrainian Monuments Initiative, which digitizes and preserves Ukrainian culture online.
+
+
+### Missed Connections
+
+
+
+_As comprehensive as the digital platforms helping displaced Ukrainians are, certain demographics are at risk of being left behind as they try to access vital resources._
+
+A number of organizations have found that elderly people have struggled to adjust to the mass proliferation of digital tools. A UNDP report found a significant digital divide across different age groups in Ukraine, with over 46 percent of older Ukrainians reporting in early 2022 that they never use the internet. Another study found that 53 percent of Ukrainians have a “below average” level of digital skills — an issue that has become a central focus for the Diia.Education team.
+
+Moreover, people with irregular status are unable to register for Diia, as the user’s information must be registered with the Ukrainian immigration system to gain access to the app. Moreover, users need a Ukrainian bank account and a taxpayer number in order to go through the identification process.
+
+Consequentially, as discussed in a recent CSIS piece, stateless persons in Ukraine are also unable to use the app because they lack any proof of nationality, birth certificates, passports, or residence permits.
+
+Similarly, according to an interview with a civil society organization conducting programming in Ukraine, Ukrainian citizens who reside in Russian-occupied territories such as the Donetsk and Luhansk regions cannot safely use Diia. Using Diia could put them at risk while under Russian occupation, as doing so would mean that they admit to retaining Ukrainian citizenship.
+
+This gap in availability of services and centralized information puts people already vulnerable to exploitation at additional risk of being left out of assistance efforts.
+
+
+### Opportunities for Exploitation
+
+
+
+_As Ukrainians navigate their journey away from the conflict, the same access to digital information that facilitated their escape can also leave them vulnerable to dangers just as real as those they left back home._
+
+#### I. Trafficking
+
+Actors with malicious intentions have also capitalized on this proliferation of new digital platforms designed to help Ukrainians.
+
+Even prior to Russia’s invasion, Ukraine faced high levels of human trafficking, as both an origin and destination country for victims.
+
+According to the UN migration agency, over 300,000 Ukrainians have been victims of human trafficking since 1991.
+
+Men, women, and children are all at risk of trafficking, including forced labor, forced sex work, and forced begging.
+
+Via kidnapping or coercive recruitment, victims are frequently trafficked to various locations around Europe and Eurasia, such as Russia, Poland, Iraq, Spain, and Turkey.
+
+Just as displaced Ukrainians are using digital tech to help them navigate complex journeys, traffickers are becoming more adept at using these resources to identify, mislead, and capture people.
+
+In September 2022 a Europol-sponsored hackathon identified at least 30 online platforms created to exploit Ukrainian refugees, 10 of which explicitly targeted them for trafficking. In May 2022 an EMPACT action day monitored 125 online platforms, leading to the identification of nine suspected human traffickers.
+
+Similarly, a PBS report showed evidence of online listings for rent-free housing in exchange for sex work and housework, as well as scam online advertising for intermediaries who claim to help with immigration paperwork.
+
+In the United Kingdom, the moderators for Facebook groups established to match Ukrainian refugees with resources — including housing arrangements — have witnessed potential traffickers attempting to contact vulnerable people, particularly women traveling alone.
+
+In this way, the proliferation of online aid networks has opened a new portal for traffickers to target, locate, and capture displaced Ukrainians in search of assistance.
+
+#### II. Misuse of Information
+
+A generalized lack of trust in available information, combined with complex, confusing, or missing language on official government websites has driven people to overly rely on peer-to-peer information seeking through informal channels. Many of these platforms, such as Facebook, Telegram, and WhatsApp are particularly susceptible to mis- and disinformation.
+
+Malign actors — including the Russian state — use these networks to spread false information. During the March 2022 invasion, a variety of popular Telegram channels spread false information claiming that Russia had taken critical Ukrainian cities. Soon after the March 2022 invasion, Russian actors used social media platforms to attempt to discredit reports about their attack on a Mariupol hospital.
+
+Additionally, many small organizations and startups created their own online platforms in the wake of the invasion but failed to keep them updated. While likely unintentional, the proliferation of online information sources resulted in “digital litter” — an abundance of broken links and websites with outdated or false information.
+
+People trying to plan how to flee Ukraine, find resources, or locate employment opportunities must sort through outdated, unclear, or even false information.
+
+#### III. Cybercrime
+
+Bad actors see opportunity in vulnerability.
+
+Cyberspace is filled with scammers, hackers, and websites that seek to take advantage of people in search of jobs, legal assistance, or humanitarian aid.
+
+In 2022, nine people were arrested for operating over 400 phishing sites claiming to offer financial benefits to Ukrainians. They are estimated to have stolen over $3,360,000 from approximately 5,000 victims.
+
+People receiving displaced people in their homes have also become targets online. Fraud schemes, including fake financial assistance for hosts, fake donation websites, and illegitimate fundraising campaigns have led people in host countries to send money directly to scammers.
+
+Similarly, some host countries are worried that malign actors are using unknowing hosts to gather sensitive data about refugees from Ukraine. For example, government officials in Poland, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom have warned of fake letters circulating on social media asking hosts of Ukrainian refugees to share personal information about their guests.
+
+#### IV. Toxic Online Narratives and Hate Speech
+
+Since the beginning of the invasion, there has been an uptick in hate speech acts propagated via social media.
+
+In early 2023 there were reports of anti-Ukrainian narratives circulating through Polish Twitter, with some tweets using xenophobic hashtags. A study by the Centre for Information Resilience concluded that compared to previous years, 2022 saw an increase in the use of nationalistic slurs against Ukrainians on Twitter and Telegram, including from verified blue-check accounts.
+
+Telegram channels dehumanizing the plight of Ukrainians and distributing hateful and disturbing media — sometimes depicting corpses or attacks alongside hateful narrations and captions — were identified as well.
+
+These practices can be both a root cause of forced displacement and a protection threat to the displaced.
+
+In some cases, these narratives can cause potential host communities to reject migrants; in others, they might lead refugees to be more reticent to accept aid from legitimate sources.
+
+__Rogue actors have successfully exploited online platforms to promote trafficking and cybercrimes.__
+
+__However, the use of mis- and disinformation and the proliferation of toxic online narratives and hate speech can be prevented.__
+
+
+### Digital Protection
+
+
+
+_Even as the war wages on, actors making use of digital tools can work to support the safety and integrity of information and services provided to displaced Ukrainians._
+
+#### I. Fight Cybercrime
+
+Aid actors implementing digital programming should work to train refugees and volunteers on how to spot and combat suspicious activity online.
+
+For example, UNHCR, according to interviews, is conducting training on digital issues with its staff in Ukraine. IOM Ukraine has similarly taken an innovative approach to training displaced Ukrainians on how to spot online threats. IOM developed two online games (one targeted at children and one at adults) where users engage in a “quest,” making a series of difficult decisions mirroring the experiences and threats faced by displaced Ukrainians during the war. At the end of the game, the pros and cons of each decision are explained.
+
+In addition to helping users learn to make smarter decisions about whom to trust when on the move, IOM’s platform has also been used to offer current information — including a road map — on best practices for displaced persons. However, while the game itself is digital, it does not address the threats that Ukrainian refugees are likely to encounter in the digital landscape. This gap has at least partially been filled by the Diia.Education team, which developed online guides and simulators walking Ukrainians through combating human trafficking, promoting online safety for children and elderly populations, and implementing best practices for cybersecurity.
+
+#### II. Improve Vetting for Digital Programming
+
+Organizations must implement stringent vetting procedures for aid and programming that is organized or advertised online.
+
+UNHCR has already started upping vetting procedures for volunteers and discouraging beneficiaries from accepting help from unregistered volunteers. Similarly, Airbnb.org — the company’s nonprofit arm — implemented a vetting procedure to review hosts before they were matched with displaced Ukrainians. Still, the vetting procedures of various organizations, including Airbnb, have been criticized as falling short of what is necessary to truly protect the displaced, in part because they did not include substantive background checks.
+
+Implementing a comprehensive vetting process is often laborious for an aid organization and can slow down aid dispersal. However, it is critical to ensure that aid programs do not place the displaced directly in harm’s way. Similarly, although efforts to individually vet volunteers and share locations are smart practice, the onus should not be on vulnerable displaced persons themselves.
+
+#### III. Reduce Digital Litter
+
+Digital litter leads displaced persons to rely on misleading or unavailable information.
+
+Both governments and other actors should work to clear the web of outdated portals and simplify language online.
+
+Several organizations and researchers are now aware that the abundance of unusable links and outdated information online represents an important downside to using the digital space to distribute information. There are many in the tech space who are willing to volunteer to clear digital litter if the right campaigns are run.
+
+Similarly, social media influencers and actors should be urged to carefully date and archive any information they publish and, should efforts cease, be responsible for clearing their digital footprint.
+
+Since many of these independent platforms are born out of a need for clearer information and conciseness, governments should work toward simplifying their website language, date and update content, display information in different languages and dialects, establish Q&A sections in their portals, and enable chatbots or a channel for feedback and questions.
+
+#### IV. Work with Ukrainian Civil Society to Create Trust
+
+If digital programming is going to be effective, displaced Ukrainians must be able to trust the information they find online. Actors should look to campaigns created in other contexts to create a campaign promoting trust in credible online information. Notably, lessons could be taken from the “Confía en el Jaguar” campaign — launched by UNHCR and Facebook in Mexico in 2016 — which used the symbol of the jaguar to mark trustworthy migration information available through social media.
+
+Along similar lines, IOM created a Telegram hotline for Ukrainians looking to quickly verify online information. By scanning a QR code, users are taken to a Telegram chat room, linked with a hotline where users can engage with a real person in real time.
+
+UNHCR has similarly launched a pilot of its messaging service (first piloted in Ecuador in 2020), offering frequently updated automated responses to aid queries. The platform also functions to connect refugees with specialized staff to help them answer questions that cannot be answered by the messaging service.
+
+By working proactively to fight cybercrime, improve vetting procedures, reduce digital litter, and create trust in online information, state and non-state actors alike have the opportunity to develop a virtual world where displaced Ukrainians can thrive, despite the realities of the war.
+
+
+### Ukraine’s Digital Future
+
+
+
+_Much of the world has rallied to support Ukraine._
+
+Digital innovations like Diia have rightly been celebrated as a means to keep Ukrainian refugees connected, despite the devastation caused by the ongoing Russian war of aggression.
+
+Yet, a proliferation of digital resources and aid has translated to a growth of new, unmoderated platforms. While many of these initiatives were created with good intentions, many also lack the controls to prevent exploitation. Global actors should take care to avoid creating opportunities for malicious actors to exploit digitally connected — yet still vulnerable — displaced Ukrainians.
+
+Many Ukrainian refugees are getting smart about their interactions online and implementing their own vetting procedures. But they shouldn’t have to do this work alone.
+
+Individuals and aid organizations seeking to use digital tools to help Ukrainians have a responsibility to engage in digital protection and to consider all of the uses — and misuses — of the platforms and resources they create.
+
+As Ukraine pushes forward toward the end of the war, the decisions made today about the country’s digital space have the opportunity to shape its reconstruction process. Building a safer digital space now means that Ukraine will be all the more ready to embrace a truly digital future.
+
+---
+
+__Abigail Edwards__, Research Assistant, CSIS Project on Fragility and Mobility
+
+__Ángeles Zúñiga__, Former Research Intern, CSIS Project on Fragility and Mobility
+
+__Erol Yayboke__, Former Director, CSIS Project on Fragility and Mobility
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-115.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-115.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-115.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 115 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-08-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 余慧明完成作供 辯方案情完結 暫押至11.27結案陳詞
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（28日）踏入審訊第115天。本案由2月6日開審至今，歷時近7個月，最後一名不認罪被告余慧明今完成4天作供，辯方案情完結，法官暫定押至11月27日讓雙方進行口頭結案陳詞，料需時約兩至三周。就法官李運騰有份審理的《蘋果日報》案原定12月18日開審，法官陳慶偉指若撞期，該案可再押後，李運騰亦稱相信該案律師不會介意延誤多數天。法官亦指押後期間會處理部分認罪被告就同意案情的爭議，但暫不會處理求情。
+
+余今接受盤問時，表明認為以否決預算案爭取五大訴求為合法、合理的手段，強調並非「淨係想破壞而無建設」，真正目的是爭取雙普選。被問是否有意與其他議員聯手否決預算案，余稱每個議員為獨立個體，「我冇辦法迫人哋去做」，「墨落無悔」聲明亦無表明會聯同其他議員運用權力；而她從決定參選至勝出也沒有相信參選人之間有協議。余作供完畢後，向旁聽親友面露微笑做握拳手勢，散庭時興奮地跳起數下，向親友飛吻。
+
+
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余稱雖以個人身分參選仍諮詢會員、若大部分不支持或不參選
+
+參選衞生服務界的前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明，今繼續接受主控萬德豪盤問。余表示以個人而非工會身分參選，她先諮詢工會是因作為一名工會代表，擔心會員對她參選會有些反感，同意並非一定要諮詢，只是出於禮貌。法官陳仲衡問，那余想過工會不支持她參選會怎樣？余指如會員大部分不太支持，「我可能唔考慮呢條路線，因為始終嗰陣時我都係一個工會嘅代表，我唔可以唔理會我啲會員嘅意見。」
+
+余續指，約於6月初選競選階段時，聘請3至4名全職競選團隊成員，他們的薪金「全部都係我自己畀嘅」，因她以個人名義出選，「我一蚊都冇用過工會錢㗎，況且我係工會代表嗰時，我都冇收過工會嘅人工」；她亦有十多名義工，當中3至5名為核心義工。
+
+
+▲ 2020年2月5日醫護罷工第三日，醫管局員工陣線到特首辦示威。（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余稱從無讀過戴耀廷區諾軒文章
+
+萬德豪續問，余的團隊成員有否告知她戴耀廷和區諾軒曾寫過關於否決預算案和「攬炒」的文章，余說沒有。萬再指戴作為初選組織者和公眾人物，余知道他於Facebook和《蘋果日報》發表文章嗎？余指不知道，因無追蹤戴Facebook，也無人告訴過她；而她「睇連登多過睇報紙」，看《蘋果日報》亦主要看港聞和娛樂，不知道戴對35+的目標有政治看法。余後在覆問稱，被捕前從無讀過戴耀廷和區諾軒的文章。
+
+#### 余稱否決財案爭五大訴求為合法合理手段
+
+就初選提名表格，余慧明同意簽署和提交時均無留意「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」的條款，指表格由助理填寫，助理無問她何謂共識，亦無告訴她曾否問組織者。萬德豪續指，條款中「目標」的英文是「goals」、是眾數，問余其助理是否護士？教育程度是什麼？余指是大學生。法官陳仲衡指萬是假設該助理閱讀表格的英文版，陳慶偉亦着控方改問助理有否與她討論計劃目標，「不論語言」，余回應沒有。
+
+萬德豪續問，余慧明是否曾提及，願（willing to）以任何合法方式爭取五大訴求，余答「係」。萬再問，余是會（would）以任何合法方式爭取五大訴求？余說：「誒同頭先嗰個問題有乜嘢分別啊，都係『係』囉，或者你會唔會解釋一次第二次嘅問法同埋第一次嘅問法會唔會有乜大分別？」
+
+萬說第一個問題是「You were willing」，第二個問題是「You would」，法官陳慶偉笑說：「有什麼分別？」旁聽席發笑。李運騰說沒關係，總之余兩條問題答案均為「是」，余同意，並在盤問下指，否決預算案爭取五大訴求「係一個合法兼且合理嘅手段」。
+
+#### 被問是否有意聯同他人否決 余：每個議員為獨立個體無法迫人做
+
+就余慧明於2020年3月發布的〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉，提到「爭取35席後為手段，然後全面否決所有政府提出的議案為目的，藉此觸發基本法第五十條，令特首宣佈解散立法會，制造憲政危機，此為制度內的『攬炒』」，萬德豪指若無35席便不能否決所有政府議案，而為了行使否決權，大多數議員應一同行動，余均同意。
+
+萬續問，因此余有意與其他議員聯手（join force）組成大多數否決預算案？余說：「但係每一個議員都係自己一個獨立嘅個體，我冇辦法迫人哋去做囉。」李運騰指，但若要達到余所說的目標，便需要民主派議員合作或有協議，余同意，並於覆問稱從決定參選至勝出初選，沒有相信參選人之間有協議，而她於8月訪問提到「我覺得大家係要簽一份共同認同嘅綱領」，是因「就係冇（協議）我先會咁講」。
+
+#### 余稱否決財案非目的僅手段：我哋唔係淨係想破壞冇建設
+
+余又承認上文錯用「目的」一字，指全面否決所有政府議案「唔係我哋嘅最終目的」，最終目的應是該段最後一句「再共同建構重光後的香港」，即「真正落實到『港人治港，高度自治』」；又解釋指：「因為我哋唔係想爭取否決晒所有議案呀嘛，我哋唔係淨係想破壞而冇建設，我哋嘅真正目的係想爭取雙普選」，同意法官李運騰指否決預算案並非目的，而是達致目的之手段（means to an end）。萬德豪質疑，余稱這是其宣言，會花時間準備，余同意，「但唔代表我嘅選字一定係最正確囉，始終我真係一個政治嘅素人。」
+
+而就余提到：「當初要爭取議會過半，全面反枱，迫使政權解散立法會進行破局。這個目標一日未達成，一日亦要堅持」，余重申否決財案並非最終目標，強調「我係一直都想爭取五大訴求缺一不可」，並認為真普選是最重要。余在法官陳慶偉追問下，同意她望廢除功能組別，因認為「一個議席唔應該淨係代表到一小撮人嘅利益囉」。
+
+#### 余稱簽「墨落」僅表達自己立場、不包括聯同他人運用權力
+
+至於余於6月簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明，萬德豪指余知道其他簽署者均同意當選後會否決預算案，余說「依個我唔肯定喎，佢簽咋嘛」，「佢哋話佢哋會囉。」萬續指出，余簽聲明時，實向公眾表明她會聯同其他未來議員否決預算案，余說：「我只係表達返我自己嘅立場，依度都唔包括話我會聯同其他立法會議員一齊運用基本法賦予嘅權力啦。」
+
+#### 余稱專訪未完全反映其意思 重申若提修改或釀公關災難
+
+控方續引余慧明4月的《獨立媒體》專訪〈從組織工會到走進議會 余慧明：我要真攬炒！〉，提到余慧明「正積極考慮參選立法會『衞生服務界』，為了立法會過半後，全面否決政府提出的議案，製造憲政危機，重組一個真正為人民服務的政府」，余指這是記者選用的詞語，但「唔完全反映到我嘅意思囉」。李運騰指，該段最後也提到「重組一個真正為人民服務的政府」，與余的文章意思一致，余同意「差唔多」。
+
+萬德豪續指，余受訪後無向記者表示要修改。余重申當時已進入競選階段，如向記者指「有啲字眼我想執」、甚至全篇文章下架，有機會被其他潛在候選人攻擊、造成「公關災難」，故無特別處理。萬指，但無任何事情阻止余在 Facebook 就文章發表意見，余同意，但她沒有這樣做。
+
+萬再引訪問提到「她很清楚，立會過半的目標，是透過否決政府的所有議案，令立法會停擺，觸發憲政危機」。余指「目標」是記者選擇的用語，萬追問是錯誤的選擇？余說：「我唔識幫佢答喎。」李運騰追問記者有否扭曲余的意思，余說：「佢唔算扭曲，但解釋得唔夠詳細囉。」
+
+余續主動舉例，訪問提到「她記得，當時醫管局剛轉用電子派藥系統，有次醫生將某藥物的使用方法更改，系統卻沒有標示」，但她受訪時是指派藥的「三核五對（3 Checks 5 Rights）」中第二次核對只標示藥物處方，無顯示使用途徑。李運騰指毋須進入細節，「我們也不會明白」，余說：「可能陳慶偉法官會明」（陳為註冊藥劑師），陳慶偉說「我明白」，但笑言不認為與案相關，多人大笑。
+
+#### 余強調《國安法》後不認為爭取五大訴求的目標及手段違法
+
+而就余慧明5月15日於「大紀元」的訪問，提及如當選後要反對政府任何議案，「去逼使呢個政權，佢一定要回應五大訴求缺一不可」，而非只是回應其中一兩個，又強調「我哋個口號唔淨係一個口號式嘅抗爭，我哋係要用行動去表達，我哋係要求政府真係要回應晒全部五大訴求，先可以叫做解決到呢件事囉」。
+
+控方問余，該想法直至《國安法》落實後是否也沒有改變？余同意，指「爭取五大訴求缺一不可，一直都係我爭取緊嘅嘢」，即使《國安法》通過後「我都唔認為爭取五大訴求缺一不可係違法」。
+
+李運騰指，余或認為目標不違法，但達致此目標的手段，余當時也認為是合法？余說「係」。控方問她曾否於訪問或 Facebook 專頁表明若政府放低身段對話，會與政府「有得傾」，余指記憶中沒有，強調「呢個係我嘅談判策略嚟嘅，我冇可能公開畀大眾知囉」。
+
+#### 被問是否意圖顛覆國家政權 余：絕對不同意
+
+就7月15日抗爭派記者會，梁晃維、岑敖暉、王百羽會上發言提及否決預算案時提到「我哋」，余說這是他們用的詞彙，但不等於事前「有傾過」。而余會後無向他們和公眾表示其言論不代表她，因認為無此需要，且每個議員也是獨立個體。
+
+
+▲ 2020年7月15日 抗爭派記者會（資料圖片）
+
+萬德豪最後指出控方案情，指余與其他被告串謀取得立會過半，無差別否決預算案，以迫使政府回應五大訴求，余不同意。萬再指她意圖顛覆國家政權，余答：「絕對不同意。」
+
+辯方完成覆問後，余完成作供，在座位喝水後，向旁聽親友面露微笑，在腰間做出握拳手勢，並在兩名懲教陪同下步回被告欄。
+
+#### 官下令控辯雙方分別於10.3及11.7前呈交結案陳詞
+
+辯方案情完成，代表梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙其後表示，將呈上梁2015至2017年就預算案的投票紀錄。就結案陳詞，萬德豪指控方需時4星期準備，大律師石書銘稱辯方需要同樣時間。萬問控方會否被給予時間再回應，法官指控方通常無權就證據再回應，除非涉法律議題，控方屆時可再作申請。法官陳慶偉終下令，控方須於10月3日前呈交書面陳詞，辯方則於11月7日前回應，每名被告限30頁。
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 續指本案牽涉頗為新的法例，辯方需更多頁數探討條文字眼。陳慶偉指可增加至35頁，又指辯方可以點列式處理。石書銘指辯方或就法律觀點呈交聯合陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 大律師 Trevor Beel
+
+#### 官暫定11.27結案陳詞 料需時兩至三周
+
+代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑問，法庭能否定下結案陳詞日期。陳慶偉指未能決定，因視乎法律議題的複雜性，但大概是在11至12月期間，望能於聖誕節前後完成，又指向身旁的李運騰，指他有另一宗案件（黎智英《蘋果日報》案）將於12月18日開審，「我不能承諾你任何事情」。
+
+李運騰指，聽取所有口頭陳詞或需兩至三星期，陳世傑再追問暫定日子，陳慶偉指大約是11月27日。潘熙問需多少天、5天是否可以，李運騰指5天有點太樂觀，因控方需涵蓋16名被告的案情及相關法律議題，控方陳詞或需5天，又指寧願預留較多時間（generous）。
+
+陳世傑關注，若11月27日開始陳詞，或與另案（《蘋果》案）重疊，陳慶偉擺動右手說：「那就由它，再延期（“So be it, further defer.”）」，庭上傳來笑聲。李運騰續說如有需要，不認為該案的律師會介意延誤多數天（“I don’t think the counsel in the other case would mind a few days’ delay if necessary.”）。
+
+
+▲ 大律師 陳世傑
+
+陳慶偉又指，案件押後期間，會處理部分認罪被告就同意案情的爭議，但李運騰補充不會在該段時間聽取求情，而是先處理事實的部分，Beel 指何桂藍望出席該些聆訊。陳慶偉下令休庭前，提醒各方執拾物品，指現在要清空此法庭。
+
+散庭時，多名旁聽人士上前揮手，梁國雄、林卓廷等也不住揮手回應，余慧明則在被告欄內興奮地跳起數下，又向旁聽親友飛吻。部分准保釋被告離庭時神情輕鬆，劉偉聰、何啟明，黃碧雲、施德來均一同離開，當中連日審訊均自備坐墊、交律師保管在庭內的施亦攜同座墊離開。漫畫家尊子今亦有來旁聽，「王婆婆」王鳳瑤亦有於庭外聲援。
+
+
+▲ 漫畫家 尊子
+
+
+▲ 王婆婆（資料圖片）
+
+#### 2月初開審 至今近7個月
+
+本案今年2月6日開審，原定審期90天，至今歷時近7個月，惟至審訊第115天才完成辯方案情。47名被告中，原有18人不認罪，惟伍健偉和林景楠開審前改為認罪，最終16人不認罪受審。翻查資料，審訊第1至58日處理被告答辯和控方案情，第59至64日處理共謀者原則爭議及中段陳詞，第65日至115日則處理辯方案情。
+
+16名被告中，鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林及李予信10人獲准保釋，何桂藍、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、余慧明及吳政亨6人則須還柙。而當中楊雪盈、黃碧雲、林卓廷和梁國雄均不作供亦無傳召證人；吳政亨和柯耀林無作供但有傳召證人，其餘10人均有出庭作供。
+
+審訊期間，認罪被告包括黃之鋒、朱凱廸、譚凱邦、馮達浚、梁晃維、岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、尹兆堅、毛孟靜、胡志偉及劉頴匡曾到庭旁聽，他們於開審首周獲准在正庭與不認罪被告同坐，但至區諾軒開始作供後被改安排至延伸庭就坐，其後男女分庭而坐。准保釋的呂智恆亦曾到庭旁聽。
+
+另有多人曾旁聽本案，包括歌手黃耀明，立法會議員謝偉俊（其律師行代表本案被告彭卓棋、區諾軒和鍾錦麟），漫畫家尊子，民主黨劉慧卿、黃偉賢，社民連陳寶瑩、黃浩銘、曾健成、陳皓桓，支聯會徐漢光，「王婆婆」王鳳瑤及多國領事等。
+
+案件現暫定11月27日進行口頭結案陳詞，料法庭將押後裁決，並連同其餘31名認罪被告進行求情和判刑，意味屆時其中32名被告已還柙近2年8個月。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲、施德來
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰、何啟明
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+
+▲ 柯耀林、彭卓棋
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022